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A

HISTORY OF GREECE;

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XXIX.

LYRIC POETRY.—THE SEVEN WISE MEN.

THE interval between 776-560 B.C. presents to us a remarkable expansion of Grecian genius in the creation of their elegiac, iambic, lyric, choric, and gnomic poetry, which was diversified in a great many ways and improved by many separate masters. The creators of all these different styles—from Kallinus and Archilochus down to Stesichorus—fall within the two centuries here included; though Pindar and Simonidês, “the proud and high-crested bards,”¹ who carried lyric and choric poetry to the maximum of elaboration consistent with full poetical effect, lived in the succeeding century, and were contemporary with the tragedian Æschylus. The Grecian drama, comic as well as tragic, of the fifth century B.C., combined the lyric and choric song with the living action of iambic dialogue—thus constituting the last ascending movement in the poetical genius of the race. Reserving this for a future time, and for the history of Athens, to which it more particularly belongs, I now propose to speak only of the poetical movement of the two earlier centuries, wherein Athens had little or no part. So scanty are the remnants, unfortunately, of these earlier

¹ Himerius, Orat. iii. p. 426, Wernsdorf—ἀγέρωχοι καὶ ὕψαυ-
χέτες.

poets, that we can offer little except criticisms borrowed at second-hand, and a few general considerations on their workings and tendency.¹

Archilochus and Kallinus both appear to fall about the middle of the seventh century B.C., and it is with them that the innovations in Grecian poetry commence. Before them, we are told, there existed nothing but the Epos, or Daktylic Hexameter poetry, of which much has been said in my former volume—being legendary stories or adventures narrated, together with addresses or hymns to the gods. We must recollect, too, that this was not only the whole poetry, but the whole literature of the age. Prose composition was altogether unknown. Writing, if beginning to be employed as an aid to a few superior men, was at any rate generally unused, and found no reading public. The voice was the only communicant, and the ear the only recipient, of all those ideas and feelings which productive minds in the community found themselves impelled to pour out; and both voice and ear were accustomed to a musical recitation or chant, apparently something between song and speech, with simple rhythm and a still simpler occasional accompaniment from the primitive four-stringed harp. Such habits and requirements of the voice and ear were, at that time, inseparably associated with the success and popularity of the poet, and contributed doubtless to restrict the range of subjects with which he could deal. The type was to a certain extent consecrated, like the primitive statues of the gods, from which men only ventured to deviate by gradual and almost unconscious innovations. Moreover, in the first half of the seventh century B.C., that genius which had once created an Iliad and an Odyssey was no longer to be found. The work of hexameter narrative had come to be prosecuted by less gifted persons—by those Cyclic poets of whom I have spoken in the preceding volumes.

¹ For the whole subject of this chapter, the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of O. Müller's *History of the Literature of Ancient Greece*, wherein the lyric poets are handled with greater length than consists with the limits of this work, will

be found highly valuable—chapters abounding in erudition and ingenuity, but not always within the limits of the evidence.

The learned work of Ulrich (*Geschichte der Griechischen Poesie—Lyrik*) is still more open to the same remark.

Such, as far as we can make it out amidst very uncertain evidence, was the state of the Greek mind immediately before elegiac and lyric poets appeared; while at the same time its experience was enlarging by the formation of new colonies, and the communion among various states tending to increase by the freer reciprocity of religious games and festivals. There arose a demand for turning the literature of the age (I use this word as synonymous with the poetry) to new feelings and purposes, and for applying the rich, plastic, and musical language of the old epic, to present passion and circumstance, social as well as individual. Such a tendency had become obvious in Hesiod, even within the range of hexameter verse. Now the same causes which led to an enlargement of the subjects of poetry inclined men also to vary the metre. In regard to this latter point, there is reason to believe that the expansion of Greek music was the immediate determining cause. For it has been already stated that the musical scale and instruments of the Greeks, originally very narrow, were materially enlarged by borrowing from Phrygia and Lydia, and these acquisitions seem to have been first realized about the beginning of the seventh century B.C., through the Lesbian harper Terpander—the Phrygian (or Greco-Phrygian) flute-player Olympus—and the Arkadian or Bœotian flute-player Klonas. Terpander made the important advance of exchanging the original four-stringed harp for one of seven strings, embracing the compass of one octave or two Greek tetrachords; while Olympus as well as Klonas taught many new nomes or tunes on the flute, to which the Greeks had before been strangers—probably also the use of a flute of more varied musical compass. Terpander is said to have gained the prize at the first recorded celebration of the Lacedæmonian festival of the Karneia, in 676 B.C. This is one of the best-ascertained points among the obscure chronology of the seventh century; and there seem grounds for assigning Olympus and Klonas to nearly the same period, a little before Archilochus and Kallinus.¹ To Terpander, Olympus,

Wider range of subjects for poetry—
new metres—
enlarged musical scale.

Improvement of the harp by Terpander—of the flute by Olympus and others.

¹ These early innovators in Grecian music, rhythm, metre and poetry, belonging to the seventh century B.C., were very imperfectly known even to those contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle, who

and Klonas, are ascribed the formation of the earliest musical nomes known to the inquiring Greek of later times; to the first, nomes on the harp; to the two latter, on the flute—every nome being the general scheme or basis of which the airs actually performed constituted so many variations, within certain defined limits.¹ Terpander employed his enlarged instrumental power as a new accom-

panied to get together facts for a consecutive history of music. The treatise of Plutarch, *De Musica*, shows what contradictory statements he found. He quotes from four different authors—Herakleides, Glaukus, Alexander, and Aristoxenus, who by no means agreed in their series of names and facts. The first three of them blend together myth and history. The *Anagraphe* or inscription at Sikyon, which professed to give a continuous list of such poets and musicians as had contended at the Sikyonian games, began with a large stock of mythical names—Amphion, Linus, Pierius, &c. (Plutarch, *Music*, p. 1132). Some authors, according to Plutarch (p. 1133), made the great chronological mistake of placing Terpander as contemporary with Hippónax; a proof how little of chronological evidence was then accessible.

That Terpander was victor at the Spartan festival of the *Karneia* in 676 B.C., may have been learnt by Hellanikus from the Spartan registers: the name of the Lesbian harper Perikleitas as having gained the same prize at some subsequent period (Plutarch, *De Mus.* p. 1133) probably rests on the same authority. That Archilochus was rather later than Terpander, and Thalétas rather later than Archilochus, was the statement of Glaukus (Plutarch, *De Mus.* p. 1134). Klonas and Polymnēstus are placed later than Terpander; Archilochus later than

Klonas: Alkman is said to have mentioned Polymnēstus in one of his songs (p. 1133-1135). It can hardly be true that Terpander gained four Pythian prizes, if the festival was octennial prior to its reconstitution by the Amphiktyons (p. 1132). Sakadas gained three Pythian prizes *after* that period, when the festival was quadrennial (p. 1134).

Compare the confused indications in Pollux, iv. 65, 66, 78, 79. The abstract given by Photius of certain parts of the *Chrestomathia* of Proclus (published in Gaisford's edition of Hephæstion, p. 375-389), is extremely valuable, in spite of its brevity and obscurity, about the lyric and choric poetry of Greece.

¹ The difference between *Nómos* and *Mélos* appears in Plutarch, *De Musica*, p. 1132—*Καὶ τὸν Τέρπανδρον, κιθαρωδικῶν ποιητῶν ὄντα νόμων, κατὰ νόμον ἕκαστον τοῖς ἔπει τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῖς Ὀμήρου μέλη περιτιθέντα, ἄδεινέν τοις ἀγῶσι ἀποφῆναι δὲ τοῦτον λέγει ὀνόματα πρῶτον τοῖς κιθαρωδικοῖς νόμοις.*

The nomes were not many in number; they went by special names; and there was disagreement of opinion as to the persons who had composed them (Plutarch, *Music*, p. 1133). They were monodic, not choric—intended to be sung by one person (Aristot. *Problem.* xix. 15). Herodot. i. 23, about Arion and the *Nomus Orthius*.

paniment to the Homeric poems, as well as to certain epic proœmia or hymns to the gods of his own composition. But he does not seem to have departed from the Hexameter verse and the Daktylic rhythm, to which the new accompaniment was probably not quite suitable; and the idea may thus have been suggested of combining the words also according to new rhythmical and metrical laws.

It is certain, at least, that the age (670-600) immediately succeeding Terpander—comprising Archilochus, Kallinus, Tyrtæus and Alkman, whose relations of time one to another we have no certain means of determining,¹ though Alkman seems to have been the latest—presents a remarkable variety both of new metres and of new rhythms, superinduced upon the previous Daktylic Hexameter. The first departure from this latter is found in the elegiac verse, employed seemingly more or less by all the four above-mentioned poets, but chiefly by the first two, and even ascribed by some to the invention of Kallinus. Tyrtæus in his military march-songs employed the Anapæstic metre, while in Archilochus as well as in Alkman we find traces of a much larger range of metrical variety—Iambic, Trochaic, Anapæstic, Ionic, &c.—sometimes even asynartetic or compound metres, Anapæstic or Daktylic blended with Trochaic or Iambic. What we have remaining

Archilochus,
Kallinus,
Tyrtæus,
and Alkman—
670-600 B.C.

¹ Mr. Clinton (*Fasti Hellen.* ad ann. 671, 665, 644) appears to me noway satisfactory in his chronological arrangement of the poets of this century. I agree with O. Müller (*Hist. of Literat. of Ancient Greece*, ch. xii. 9) in thinking that he makes Terpander too recent, and Thalétas too ancient; I also believe both Kallinus and Alkman to have been more recent than the place which Mr. Clinton assigns to them; the epoch of Tyrtæus will depend upon the date which we assign to the second Messenian war.

How very imperfectly the chronology of the poetical names even of the sixth century B.C.—Sappho, Anakreon, Hippônax—was known

to writers of the beginning of the Ptolemaic age (or shortly after 300 B.C.), we may see by the mistakes noted in Athenæus, xiii. p. 599. Hermesianax of Kolophon, the elegiac poet, represented Anakreon as the lover of Sappho; this might perhaps be not absolutely impossible, if we supposed in Sappho an old age like that of Ninon de l'Enclos; but others (even earlier than Hermesianax, since they are quoted by Chamæleon) represented Anakreon, when in old age, as addressing verses to Sappho still young. Again, the comic writer Diphilus introduced both Archilochus and Hippônax as the lovers of Sappho.

from Mimnermus, who comes shortly after the preceding four, is elegiac. His contemporaries Alkæus and Sappho, besides employing most of those metres which they found existing, invented each a peculiar stanza, which is familiarly known under a name derived from each. In Solon, the younger contemporary of Mimnermus, we have the elegiac, iambic, and trochaic: in Theognis, yet later, the elegiac only. Arion and Stesichorus appear to have been innovators in this department, the former by his improvement in the dithyrambic chorus or circular song and dance in honour of Dionysus—the latter by his more elaborate choric compositions, containing not only a strophê and antistrophê, but also a third division or epode succeeding them, pronounced by the chorus standing still. Both Anakreon and Ibykus likewise added to the stock of existing metrical varieties. We thus see that within the century and a half succeeding Terpander, Greek poetry (or Greek literature, which was then the same thing) became greatly enriched in matter as well as diversified in form.

To a certain extent there seems to have been a real connexion between the two. New forms were essential for the expression of new wants and feelings—though the assertion that elegiac metre is especially adapted for one set of feelings,¹ trochaic for a second, and iambic for a third, if true at all, can only be admitted with great latitude of exception, when we find so many of them employed by the poets for very different subjects—gay or melancholy, bitter or complaining, earnest or sprightly—seemingly with little discrimination. But the adoption of some new metre, different from the perpetual series of hexameters, was required when the poet desired to do something more than recount a long story or fragment of heroic legend—when he sought to bring himself, his friends, his enemies,

New metres
superadded
to the
Hexameter
—Elegiac,
Iambic,
Trochaic.

¹ The Latin poets and the Alexandrine critics seem to have both insisted on the natural mournfulness of the elegiac metre (Ovid. *Heroid.* xv. 7; *Horat. Art. Poet.* 75): see also the fanciful explanation given by Didymus in the *Etymologicon Magnum*, v. Ἐλεγεῖον.

We learn from Hephæstion (c.

viii. p. 45, Gaisf.) that the Anapestic march-metre of Tyrtæus was employed by the comic writers also, for a totally different vein of feeling. See the Dissertation of Franck, Callinus, p. 37-48 (Lips-1816).

Of the remarks made by O. Müller respecting the metres of these early poets (*History of the Litera-*

his city, his hopes and fears with regard to matters recent or impending, all before the notice of the hearer, and that too at once with brevity and animation. The Greek hexameter, like our blank verse, has all its limiting conditions bearing upon each separate line, and presents to the hearer no predetermined resting-place or natural pause beyond.¹ In reference to any long composition, either epic and dramatic, such unrestrained licence is found convenient, and the case was similar for Greek epos and drama—the single-lined Iambic Trimeter being generally used for the dialogue of tragedy and comedy, just as the Daktylic Hexameter had been used for the epic. The metrical changes introduced by Archilochus and his contemporaries may be compared to a change from our blank verse to the rhymed couplet and quatrain. The verse was thrown into little systems of two, three, or four lines, with a pause at the end of each; and the halt thus assured to, as well as expected and relished by, the ear, was generally coincident with a close, entire or partial, in the sense which thus came to be distributed with greater point and effect.

The elegiac verse, or common Hexameter and Pentameter (this second line being an hexameter with the third and sixth thesis,² or the last half of the third and sixth foot suppressed, and a pause left in place of it), as well as

ture of Ancient Greece, ch. xi. s. 8-12, &c.; ch. xii. s. 1, 2, &c.), many appear to me uncertified and disputable.

For some good remarks on the fallibility of men's impressions respecting the natural and inherent ἦθος of particular metres, see Adam Smith (Theory of Moral Sentiment, Part v. ch. i. p. 329), in the edition of his works by Dugald Stewart.

¹ See the observations in Aristotle (Rhetor. iii. 9) on the λέξις εἰρομένη as compared with λέξις καταστραμμένη.—λέξις εἰρομένη, ἣ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ λεγόμενον τελειώθῃ.—καταστραμμένη δὲ, ἣ ἐν περιόδοις λέγω δὲ περίοδον, λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον.

² I employ, however unwillingly, the word *thesis* here (arsis and thesis) in the sense in which it is used by G. Hermann ("Illud tempus, in quo ictus est, *arsis*; ea tempora, quæ carent ictu, *thesin* vocamus," Element. Doctr. Metr. sect. 15), and followed by Boeckh, in his Dissertation on the Metres of Pindar (i. 4), though I agree with Dr. Barham (in the valuable Preface to his edition of Hephaestion, Cambridge, 1843, pp. 5-8) that the opposite sense of the words would be the preferable one, just as it was the original sense in which they were used by the best Greek musical writers: Dr. Barham's Preface is very instructive on the difficult subject of ancient rhythm generally.

the Epode (or Iambic Trimeter followed by an Iambic Dimeter) and some other binary combinations of verse Archilochus, which we trace among the fragments of Archilochus, are conceived with a view to such increase of effect both on the ear and the mind, not less than to the direct pleasures of novelty and variety. The Iambic metre, built upon the primitive Iambus or coarse and licentious jesting¹ which formed a part of some Grecian festivals (especially of the festivals of Dêmêtêr as well in Attica as in Paros, the native country of the poet), is only one amongst many new paths struck out by this inventive genius. His exuberance astonishes us, when we consider that he takes his start from little more than the simple Hexameter,² in which too he was a distinguished composer

¹ Homer, Hymn. ad Cererem, 202; Hesychius, v. Γεφυρίε; Herodot. v. 83; Diodor. v. 4. There were various gods at whose festivals scurrility (τῶθαροῦς) was a consecrated practice, seemingly different festivals in different places (Aristot. Politic. vii. 15, 8).

The reader will understand better what this consecrated scurrility means by comparing the description of a modern traveller in the kingdom of Naples (Tour through the Southern Provinces of the kingdom of Naples, by Mr. Keppel Craven, London, 1821, ch. xv. p. 287):—

"I returned to Gerace (the site of the ancient Epizephyrian Lokri) by one of those moonlights which are known only in these latitudes, and which no pen or pencil can portray. My path lay along some corn-fields, in which the natives were employed in the last labours of the harvest, and I was not a little surprised to find myself saluted with a volley of opprobrious epithets and abusive language, uttered in the most threatening voice, and accompanied with the most insulting gestures. This extraordinary custom is of the most remote antiquity, and is observed

towards all strangers during the harvest and vintage seasons; those who are apprised of it will keep their temper as well as their presence of mind, as the loss of either would only serve as a signal for still louder invectives, and prolong a contest in which success would be as hopeless as undesirable."

² The chief evidence for the rhythmical and metrical changes introduced by Archilochus is to be found in the 28th chapter of Plutarch, De Musica, p. 1140—1141, in words very difficult to understand completely. See Ulrici Geschichte der Hellenisch. Poesie, vol. ii. p. 381.

The epigram ascribed to Theokritus (No. 18 in Gaisford's Poetæ Minores) shows that the poet had before him Hexameter compositions of Archilochus, as well as lyric—

ὡς ἐμμελής τ' ἔγεντο χάπιδ' ἔξιος
ἔπα' τε ποιεῖν, πρὸς λῶραν τ' ἀει-
δεῖν.

See the article on Archilochus in Welcker's Kleine Schriften, p. 71-82, which has the merit of showing that iambic bitterness is far from being the only marked feature in his character and genius.

—for even of the elegiac verse he is as likely to have been the inventor as Kallinus, just as he was the earliest popular and successful composer of table-songs or Skolia, though Terpander may have originated some such before him. The entire loss of his poems, excepting some few fragments, enables us to recognise little more than one characteristic—the intense personality which pervaded them, as well as that coarse, direct, and outspoken license, which afterwards lent such terrible effect to the old comedy at Athens. His lampoons are said to have driven Lykambês, the father of Neobulê, to hang himself. Neobulê had been promised to Archilochus in marriage, but that promise was broken, and the poet assailed both father and daughter with every species of calumny.¹ In addition to this disappointment, he was poor, the son of a slave-mother, and an exile from his country Paros to the unpromising colony of Thasos. The desultory notices respecting him betray a state of suffering combined with loose conduct which vented itself sometimes in complaint, sometimes in libellous assault. He was at last slain by some whom his muse had thus exasperated. His extraordinary poetical genius finds but one voice of encomium throughout antiquity. His triumphal song to Hêraklês was still popularly sung by the victors at Olympia, near two centuries after his death, in the days of Pindar; but that majestic and complimentary poet at once denounces the malignity, and attests the retributive suffering, of the great Parian iambist.²

Amidst the multifarious veins in which Archilochus displayed his genius, moralising or gnostic poetry is not wanting; while his contemporary Simonidês of Amorgos devotes the Iambic metre especially to this destination, afterwards followed out by Solon and Theognis. Kallinus, the earliest celebrated elegiac poet, so far as we can judge from his few fragments, employed the elegiac metre for exhortations of warlike patriotism; and the more ample remains which we possess of Tyrtaeus are sermons in the same strain, preaching

¹ See Meleager, Epigram. cxix. 8, Horat. Epist. 1a, 23, and Epod. vi. 13, with the Scholiast; Ælian, V. H. x. 13.

² Pindar, Pyth. ii. 55; Olymp. ix. 1, with the Scholia; Euripid. Hercul. Furens, 683-683. The eighteenth

epigram of Theokritus (above alluded to) conveys a striking tribute of admiration to Archilochus: compare Quintilian, x. 1, and Liebel, ad Archilochi Fragmenta, sect. 5, 6, 7.

Simonidês
of Amorgos,
Kallinus,
Tyrtaeus.

to the Spartans bravery against the foe, and unanimity as well as obedience to the law at home. They are patriotic effusions, called forth by the circumstances of the time, and sung by single voice, with accompaniment of the flute,¹ to those in whose bosoms the flame of courage was to be kindled. For though what we peruse is in verse, we are still in the tide of real and present life, and we must suppose ourselves rather listening to an orator addressing the citizens when danger or dissension is actually impending. It is only in the hands of Mimnermus that elegiac verse comes to be devoted to soft and amatory subjects. His few fragments present a vein of passive and tender sentiment, illustrated by appropriate matter of legend, such as would be cast into poetry in all ages, and quite different from the rhetoric of Kallinus and Tyrtæus.

The poetical career of Alkman is again distinct from that of any of his above-mentioned contemporaries. Their compositions, besides hymns to the gods, were principally expressions of feeling intended to be sung by individuals, though sometimes also suited for the Kômus or band of festive volunteers, assembled on some occasion of common interest: those of Alkman were principally choric, intended for the song and accompanying dance of the chorus. He was a native of Sardis in Lydia, or at least his family were so: and he appears to have come in early life to Sparta, though his genius and mastery of the Greek language discountenance the story that he was brought over to Sparta as a slave. The most ancient arrangement of music at Sparta, generally ascribed to Terpander,² underwent considerable alteration, not only through the elegiac and anapæstic measures of Tyrtæus, but also through the Kretan Thalêtas and the Lydian Alkman. The harp, the instrument of Terpander, was rivalled and in part superseded by the flute or pipe, which had been recently rendered more effective in the hands of Olympus, Klonas, and Polymnêstus, and which gradually became, for compositions intended to raise strong emotion, the favourite instrument of the two—being employed as accompaniment both to the elegies of Tyrtæus, and to the hyporchemata (songs or hymns combined with

¹ Athenæus, xiv. p. 630.

Republica, Fragm. xl. p. 182, ed.

² Plutarch, De Musica, pp. 1184, 1185; Aristotle, De Lacedæmon.

Neumann; Plutarch, De Serâ Numin. Vindict. c. 18. p. 568.

dancing) of Thalêtas; also, as the stimulus and regulator to the Spartan military march.¹ These elegies (as has been just remarked) were sung by one person in the midst of an assembly of listeners, and there were doubtless other compositions intended for the individual voice. But in general such was not the character of music and poetry at Sparta; everything done there, both serious and recreative, was public and collective, so that the chorus and its performance received extraordinary development.

It has been already stated, that the chorus, with song and dance combined, constituted an important part of divine service throughout all Greece. It was originally a public manifestation of the citizens generally—a large proportion of them being actively engaged in it,² and receiving some training for the purpose as an ordinary branch of education. Neither the song nor the dance under such conditions could be otherwise than extremely simple. But in process of time, the performance at the chief festival tended to become more elaborate and to fall into the hands of persons expressly and professionally trained—the mass of the citizens gradually ceasing to take active part, and being present merely as spectators. Such was the practice which grew up in most parts of Greece, and especially at Athens, where the dramatic chorus acquired its highest perfection. But the drama never found admission at Sparta, and the peculiarity of Spartan life tended much to keep up the popular chorus on its ancient footing. It formed in fact

¹ Thucyd. v. 69-70, with the Scholia—μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων . . . Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ ἀλλήτρων πολλῶν νόμον ἔγκραθεστώων, οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ χάριν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ βαίνοισιν, καὶ μὴ διασπασθεῖη αὐτοῖς ἡ τάξις.

Cicero, Tuscul. Qu. ii. 16. "Spartiatarum quorum procedit Mora ad tibiam, neque adhibetur ulla sine anapæstis pedibus hortatio."

The flute was also the instrument appropriated to Kómus, or the excited movement of half-intoxicated revellers (Hesiod, Scut. Hercul. 80; Athenæ. xiv. p. 617-618).

² Plato, Legg. vii. p. 803. θύοντα καὶ εἴδοντα καὶ ὀρχοῦμενον, ὡστε

τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἰλέως αὐτῷ παρασκευάζειν δυνατόν εἶναι, &c.; compare p. 799; Maximus Tyr. Diss. xxxvii. 4; Aristophan. Ran. 950-975; Athenæus, xiv. p. 626; Polyb. iv. 30; Lucian, De Saltatione, c. 10, 11, 16, 31.

Compare Aristotle (Problem. xix. 15) about the primitive character and subsequent change of the chorus; and the last chapter of the eighth book of his Politica: also a striking passage in Plutarch (De Cupidine Divitiarum, c. 8. p. 527) about the transformation of the Dionysiac festival at Chæroneia from simplicity to costliness.

one element in that never-ceasing drill to which the Spartans were subject from their boyhood, and it served a purpose analogous to their military training, in accustoming them to simultaneous and regulated movement—inasmuch that the comparison between the chorus, especially in its Pyrrhic or war-dances, and the military enômoty, seems to have been often dwelt upon.¹ In the singing of the solemn pæan in honour of Apollo, at the festival of the Hyakinthia, king Agesilaus was under the orders of the chorus-master, and sang in the place allotted to him;² while the whole body of Spartans without exception—the old, the middle-aged, and the youth, the matrons and the virgins—were distributed in various choric companies,³ and trained to harmony both of voice and motion, which was publicly exhibited at the solemnities of the Gymnopædia. The word *dancing* must be understood in a larger sense than that in which it is now employed, and as comprising every variety of rhythmical, accentuated, conspiring movements, or gesticulations, or postures of the body, from the slowest to the quickest;⁴ cheironomy, or the decorous and expressive movement of the hands, being especially practised.

We see thus that both at Sparta and in Krête (which approached in respect to publicity of individual life most nearly to Sparta) the choric aptitudes and manifestations

¹ Athenæus, xiv. p. 628; Suidas, vol. iii. p. 715, ed. Kuster; Plutarch, *Instituta Laconica*, c. 32—κωμῳδίας καὶ τραγῳδίας οὐκ ἤχρῶντο, ὅπως μῆτε ἐν σπουδῇ, μῆτε ἐν παιδίᾳ, ἀκούωσι τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων τοῖς νόμοις—which exactly corresponds with the ethical view implied in the alleged conversation between Solon and Thespis (Plutarch, Solon, c. 29: see above, ch. xi. vol. III. p. 147), and with Plato, *Legg.* vii. p. 817.

² Xenophon, *Agesilaus*, ii. 17. οἷα καὶ ἀπελθὼν εἰς τὰ Ἵακινθία, ἔκρου ἐτάχθη ὑπὸ τοῦ χοροποιού, τὸν παῖδᾶν τῷ ἑσὶ συνεπετέλει.

³ Plutarch, *Lycurg.* c. 14, 16, 21; Athenæus, xiv. p. 631-632, xv. p. 678; Xenophon, *Hellen.* vi. 4, 15; *De Republic.* *Lacedæm.* ix. 5;

Pindar, *Hyporchemata*, *Fragm.* 78, ed. Bergk.

Δάχαινα μὲν παρθένων ἀγέλα. Also Alkman, *Fragm.* 13, ed. Bergk; Antigon. *Caryst. Hist.* Mirab. c. 27.

⁴ How extensively pantomimic the ancient orchêsis was, may be seen by the example in Xenophon, *Symposion* vii. 5, ix. 3-6, and Plutarch, *Symposion*, ix. 15, 2: see K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der gottesdienstlichen Alterthümer der Griechen*, ch. 29.

"Sane ut in religionibus saltaretur, hæc ratio est: quod nullam majores nostri partem corporis esse voluerunt, quæ non sentiret religionem: nam cantus ad animum, saltatio ad mobilitatem corporis pertinet." (Servius ad Virgil. *Ecolg.* v. 73.)

occupied a larger space than in any other Grecian city. And as a certain degree of musical and rhythmical variety was essential to meet this want,¹ while music was never taught to Spartan citizens individually, we farther understand how strangers like Terpander, Polymnêstus, Thalêtas, Tyrtæus, Alkman, &c., were not only received, but acquired great influence at Sparta, in spite of the preponderant spirit of jealous seclusion in the Spartan character. All these masters appear to have been effective in their own special vocation—the training of the chorus—to which they imparted new rhythmical action, and for which they composed new music.

Choric
training—
Alkman,
Thalêtas.

But Alkman did this, and something more. He possessed the genius of a poet, and his compositions were read afterwards with pleasure by those who could not hear them sung or see them danced. In the little of his poems which remains we recognise that variety of rhythm and metre for which he was celebrated. In this respect he (together with the Kretan Thalêtas, who is said to have introduced a more vehement style both of music and dance, with the Kretic and Pæonic rhythm, into Sparta²) surpassed Archilochus, preparing the way for the complicated choric movements of Stesichorus and Pindar. Some of his fragments, too, manifest that fresh outpouring of individual sentiment and emotion which constitutes so much of the charm of popular poetry. Besides his touching address in old age to the Spartan virgins, over whose song and dance he had been accustomed to preside, he is not afraid to speak of his hearty appetite, satisfied with simple food and relishing a bowl of warm broth at the winter tropic.³

¹ Aristot. Politic. viii. 4, 6. Οἱ Λάκωνες—οὐ μανθάνοντες ὄρωσιν δύνανται χρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρηστά καὶ τὰ μὴ τῶν μέλων.

² Homer, Hymn. Apoll. 340. Οἱοί τε Κρητῶν παῖθες, &c.: see Boeckh, De Metris Pindari, ii. 7, p. 143; Ephorus ap. Strabo. x. p. 480; Plutarch, De Musica, p. 1132.

Respecting Thalêtas, and the gradual alterations in the character of music at Sparta, Hoeckh has given much instructive matter (Kreta, vol. iii. p. 340-377). Respecting Nymphæus of Kydonia,

whom Ælian (V. H. xii. 50) puts in juxtaposition with Thalêtas and Terpander, nothing is known.

After what is called the second fashion of music (κατάστασις) had thus been introduced by Thalêtas and his contemporaries—the first fashion being that of Terpander—no farther innovations were allowed. The ephors employed violent means to prohibit the intended innovations of Phrynis and Timotheus, after the Persian war: see Plutarch, Agis, c. 10.

³ Alkman, Fragm. 13-17, ed. Bergk,

He has attached to the spring an epithet, which comes home to the real feelings of a poor country more than those captivating pictures which abound in verse, ancient as well as modern. He calls it "the season of short fare"—the crop of the previous year being then nearly consumed, the husbandman is compelled to pinch himself until his new harvest comes in.¹ Those who recollect that in earlier periods of our history, and in all countries where there is little accumulated stock, an exorbitant difference is often experienced in the price of corn before and after the harvest, will feel the justice of Alkman's description.

Judging from these and from a few other fragments of this poet, Alkman appears to have combined the life and exciting vigour of Archilochus in the song properly so called, sung by himself individually—with a larger knowledge of musical and rhythmical effect in regard to the choric performance. He composed in the Laconian dialect—a variety of the Doric with some intermixture of Æolisms. And it was from him, jointly with those other composers who figured at Sparta during the century after Terpander, as well as from the simultaneous development of the choric muse² in Argos, Sikyon, Arcadia, and other parts of Peloponnesus, that the Doric dialect acquired permanent footing in Greece, as the only proper dialect for choric compositions. Continued by Stesichorus and Pindar, this habit passed even to the Attic dramatists, whose choric songs are thus in a great measure Doric, while their dialogue is Attic. At Sparta, as well as in other parts of Peloponnesus,³ the musical and rhythmical style appears to have

Doric
dialect
employed
in the
choric com-
positions.

ὁ πάμφραχος Ἄλκμαν: compare Fr. 63. Aristides calls him ὁ τῶν παρθένων ἐπαινέτης καὶ σύμβουλος (Or. xlv. vol. ii. p. 40, Dindorf).

Of the Partheneia of Alkman (songs, hymns, and dances, composed for a chorus of maidens) there were at least two books (Stephanus Byzant. v. Ἐρυσίγη). He was the earliest poet who acquired renown in this species of composition, afterwards much pursued by Pindar, Bacchylidés, and Simonidés of Keós; see Welcker, Alkman. Fragment. p. 10.

¹ Alkman, Frag. 64, ed. Bergk.

Ἔραρος δ' ἐσθῆκε τρεῖς, θέραρος
καὶ χεῖμα κ' ὠπώωραν τρίταν·
καὶ τέτρατον τὸ ἦρ, ἄκα
Σάλλει μὲν, ἐσθίειν δ' ἄδων
Οὐκ ἐστὶ.

² Plutarch, De Musicá, c. 9. p. 1134. About the dialect of Alkman see Ahrens, De Dialecto Æolicá. sect. 2, 4; about his different metres, Welcker, Alkman. Fragm. p. 10-12.

³ Plutarch, De Musicá, c. 32. p. 1142, c. 37. p. 1144; Athenæus, xiv. p. 682. In Krête also, the popularity of the primitive musical

been fixed by Alkman and his contemporaries, and to have been tenaciously maintained, for two or three centuries, with little or no innovation; the more so, as the flute-players at Sparta formed an hereditary profession, who followed the routine of their fathers.¹

Alkman was the last poet who addressed himself to the popular chorus. Both Arion and Stesichorus composed for a body of trained men, with a degree of variety and involution such as could not be attained by a mere fraction of the people. The primitive Dithyrambus was a round choric dance and song in honour of Dionysus,² common to Naxos, Thebes, and seemingly to many other places, at the Dionysiac festival—a spontaneous effusion of drunken men in the hour of revelry, wherein the poet Archilochus, “with the thunder of wine full upon his mind,” had often taken the chief part.³ Its exciting character approached to the worship of the Great Mother in Asia, and stood in contrast with the solemn and stately pæan addressed to Apollo. Arion introduced into it an alteration such as Archilochus had himself brought about in the scurrilous Iambus. He converted it into an elaborate composition in honour of the god, sung and danced by a chorus of fifty persons, not only sober, but trained with great strictness; though its rhythm and movements, and its equipment in the character of satyrs, presented more or less an imitation of the primitive licence. Born at Methymna in Lesbos, Arion appears as a harper, singer, and composer, much favoured by Periander at Corinth, in which city he first “composed, denominated, and taught the Dithyramb,” earlier than any one known to Herodotus.⁴

Arion and Stesichorus —substitution of the professional in place of the popular chorus.

composers was maintained, though along with the innovator Timotheus: see Inscription No. 3053, ap. Boeckh, Corp. Ins.

¹ Herodot. vi. 60. They were probably a γένος with an heroic progenitor, like the heralds, to whom the historian compares them.

² Pindar, Fragm. 44, ed. Bergk, Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. xiii. 25; Proclus, Chrestomathia, c. 12-14, ad calc. Hephæst. Gaisf. p. 382: compare W. M. Schmidt, In Dithyrambum Poetarumque Dithyrambi-

corum Reliquias, pp. 171-183 (Berlin 1845).

³ Archiloch. Fragm. 72, ed. Bergk.

Ὡς Διονύσου ἀνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξαι μέλος

Οἶδα διθύραμβον, οἶνω ξυχερπυρωθεὶς φρένας.

The old oracle quoted in Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, about the Dionysia at Athens, enjoins—Διονύσῳ δημοστελῆ ἱερά τελεῖν, καὶ κρατῆρα κεράσαι, καὶ χοροὺς ἱστάναι.

⁴ Herodot. i. 23; Suidas, v. Ἀρίων; Pindar, Olymp. xiii. 25.

He did not, however, remain permanently there, but travelled from city to city exhibiting at the festivals for money,—especially to Sicilian and Italian Greece, where he acquired large gains. We may here again remark how the poets as well as the festivals served to promote a sentiment of unity among the dispersed Greeks. Such transfer of the Dithyramb, from the field of spontaneous nature into the garden of art,¹ constitutes the first stage in the refinement of Dionysiac worship; which will hereafter be found still farther exalted in the form of the Attic drama.

The date of Arion seems about 600 B.C., shortly after Alkman: that of Stesichorus is a few years later. To the latter the Greek chorus owed a high degree of improvement, and in particular the final distribution of its performance into the Strophê, the Antistrophê, and the Epôdus: the turn, the return, and the rest. The rhythm and metre of the song during each strophê corresponded with that during

Distribu-
tion of the
chorus by
Stesichorus
—Strophê
—Antistro-
phê,—Epô-
dus.

the antistrophê, but was varied during the epôdus, and again varied during the following strophês. Until this time the song had been monostrophic, consisting of nothing more than one uniform stanza, repeated from the beginning to the end of the composition;² so that we may easily see how vast was the new complication and difficulty

introduced by Stesichorus—not less for the performers than for the composer, himself at that time the teacher and trainer of performers. Both this poet, and his contemporary the flute-player Sakadas of Argos,—who gained the prize at the first three Pythian games founded after the Sacred War,—seem to have surpassed their predecessors in the breadth of subject which they embraced, borrowing from the inexhaustible province of ancient legend, and expanding the choric song into a well-sustained epical narrative.³ Indeed these Pythian games opened a new career to musical composers just at the time when Sparta began to be closed against musical novelties.

¹ Aristot. Poetic. c. 6. ἐγέννησαν τὴν πόησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδισμάτων; again, to the same effect, *ibid.* c. 9.

² Alkman slightly departed from this rule: in one of his compositions of fourteen strophês, the last seven were in a different metre

from the first seven (Hephæstion, c. xv. p. 134 Gaisf.; Hermann, Elementa Doctrin. Metricæ, c. xvii. sect. 595). Ἀλκμανική καινοτομία καὶ Στησίχορος (Plutarch, De Musica, p. 1135).

³ Pausanias, vi. 14, 4; x. 7, 8. Sakadas, as well as Stesichorus,

Alkæus and Sappho, both natives of Lesbos, appear about contemporaries with Arion B. C. 610-580. Of their once celebrated lyric compositions, Alkæus and Sappho. scarcely anything remains. But the criticisms which are preserved on both of them place them in strong contrast with Alkman, who lived and composed under the more restrictive atmosphere of Sparta—and in considerable analogy with the turbulent vehemence of Archilochus,¹ though without his intense private malignity. Both Alkæus and Sappho composed for their own local audience, and in their own Lesbian Æolic dialect; not because there was any peculiar fitness in that dialect to express their vein of sentiment, but because it was more familiar to their hearers. Sappho herself boasts of the preeminence of the Lesbian bards;² and the celebrity of Terpander, Perikleitas, and Arion, permits us to suppose that there may have been before her other popular bards in the island who did not attain to a wide Hellenic celebrity. Alkæus included in his songs the fiercest bursts of political feeling, the stirring alternations of war and exile, and all the ardent relish of a susceptible man for wine and love.³ The love-song seems to have formed the

composed an Ἰλίου περίου (Atheneus, xiii. p. 609).

“Stesichorum (observes Quintilian, x. 1) quam sit ingenio validus, materiæ quoque ostendunt, maxima bella et clarissimos canentem duces, et epici carminis onera lyræ sustinentem. Reddit enim personis in agendo simul loquendoque debitam dignitatem: ac si tenuisset modum, videtur æmulari proximus Homerum potuisse: sed redundat, atque effunditur: quod, ut est reprehendendum, ita copiæ vitium est.”

Simonides of Keos (Frag. 19, ed. Bergk) puts Homer and Stesichorus together: see the epigram of Antipater in the Anthologia, t. i. p. 328, ed. Jacobs, and Dio Chrysostom, Or. 55. vol. ii. p. 284, Reisk. Compare Kleine, Stesichori Fragment, p. 30-34 (Berlin 1828), and O. Müller, History of the Litera-

ture of Ancient Greece, ch. xiv. sect. 5.

The musical composers of Argos are affirmed by Herodotus to have been the most renowned in Greece, half a century after Sakadas (Her. iii. 181).

¹ Horat. Epistol. i. 19, 23.

² Sappho, Fragm. 93, ed. Bergk. See also Plehn, Lesbiaca, pp. 145-165. Respecting the postesses, two or three of whom were noted, contemporary with Sappho, see Ulrich, Gesch. der Hellen. Poesie, vol. ii. p. 270.

³ Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. v. 82; Horat. Od. i. 32; Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 28; the striking passage in Plutarch, Symposion iii. 1, 3, ap. Bergk. Fragm. 42. In the view of Dionysius, the Æolic dialect of Alkæus and Sappho diminished the value of their compositions: the Æolic accent, analogous to

principal theme of Sappho, who, however, also composed odes or songs¹ on a great variety of other subjects, serious as well as satirical, and is said farther to have first employed the Myxolydian mode in music. It displays the tendency of the age to metrical and rhythmical novelty, that Alkæus and Sappho are said to have each invented the peculiar stanza, well-known under their respective names—combinations of the dactyl, trochee and iambus, analogous to the asynartetic verses of Archilochus. They by no means confined themselves however to Alkaic and Sapphic metre. Both the one and the other composed hymns to the gods; indeed this is a theme common to all the lyric and choric poets, whatever may be their peculiarities in other ways. Most of their compositions were songs for the single voice, not for the chorus. The poetry of Alkæus is the more worthy of note, as it is the earliest instance of the employment of the Muse in actual political warfare, and shows the increased hold which that motive was acquiring on the Grecian mind.

The gnomic poets, or moralists in verse, approach by the tone of their sentiments more to the nature of prose. They begin with Simonidés of Amorgos or of Samos, the contemporary of Archilochus. Indeed Archilochus himself devoted some compositions to the illustrative fable, which had not been unknown even to Hesiod. In the remains of

the Latin, and acknowledging scarcely any oxyton words, must have rendered them much less agreeable in recitation or song.

¹ See Plutarch, *De Music.* p. 1130; Dionys. *Hal. de Comp. Verb.* c. 23. p. 173, Reisk., and some striking passages of Himerius, in respect to Sappho (i. 4, 16, 19; Maximus Tyrius, *Dissert.* xxiv. 7-9), and the encomium of the critical Dionysius (*De Compos. Verborum*, c. 23, p. 173).

The author of the Parian marble adopts as one of his chronological epochs (Epoch 37) the flight of Sappho, or exile, from Mityléné to Sicily, somewhere between 604-596 B.C. There probably was

something remarkable which induced him to single out this event; but we do not know what, nor can we trust the hints suggested by Ovid (*Heroid.* xv. 51).

Nine books of Sappho's songs were collected by the later literary Greeks, arranged chiefly according to the metres (B. F. Neue, *Sapphonis Fragment.* p. 11, Berlin 1827). There were ten books of the songs of Alkæus (*Athenæus*, xi. p. 481), and both Aristophanés (*Grammaticus*) and Aristarchus published editions of them (*Hephæstion*, c. xv. p. 134, *Gaisf.*). *Dikæarchus* wrote a commentary upon his songs (*Athenæus*, xi. p. 461).

Simonidês of Amorgos we trace nothing relative to the man personally, though he too, like Archilochus, is said to have had an individual enemy, Orodœkidês, whose character was aspersed by his Muse.¹ His only considerable poem extant is devoted to a survey of the characters of women, in iambic verse, and by way of comparison with various animals—the mare, the ass, the bee, &c. This poem follows out the Hesiodic vein respecting the social and economical mischief usually caused by women, with some few honourable exceptions. But the poet shows a much larger range of observation and illustration, if we compare him with his predecessor Hesiod; moreover his illustrations come fresh from life and reality. We find in this early iambist the same sympathy with industry and its due rewards, which is observable in Hesiod, together with a still more melancholy sense of the uncertainty of human events.

Of Solon and Theognis I have spoken in former chapters. They reproduce in part the moralising vein of Simonidês, though with a strong admixture of personal feeling and a direct application to passing events. The mixture of political with social morality, which we find in both, marks their more advanced age: Solon bears in this respect the same relation to Simonidês, as his contemporary Alkæus bears to Archilochus. His poems, as far as we can judge by the fragments remaining, appear to have been short occasional effusions, with the exception of the epic poem respecting the submerged island of Atlantis; which he began towards the close of his life, but never finished. They are elegiac, trimeter iambic, and trochaic tetrameter: in his hands certainly neither of these metres can be said to have any special or separate character. If the poems of Solon are short, those of Theognis are much shorter, and are indeed so much broken (as they stand in our present collection), as to read like separate epigrams or bursts of feeling, which the poet had not taken the trouble to incorporate in any definite scheme or series. They form a singular mixture of maxim and passion—of general precept with personal affection towards the youth Kyrnus—which surprises us if tried by the standard of literary composition, but which seems a very genuine manifestation of an

¹ Welcker, *Simonidis Amorgini Iambi qui supersunt*, p. 9.

impoverished exile's complaints and restlessness. What remains to us of Phokylidês, another of the gnomic poets nearly contemporary with Solon, is nothing more than a few maxims in verse—couplets with the name of the author in several cases embodied in them.

Amidst all the variety of rhythmical and metrical innovations which have been enumerated, the ancient epic continued to be recited by the rhapsodes as before. Some new epical compositions were added to the existing stock: Eugammon of Kyrênê, about the 50th Olympiad (580 B.C.), appears to be the last of the series. At Athens, especially, both Solon and Peisistratus manifested great solicitude as well for the recitation as for the correct preservation of the Iliad. Perhaps its popularity may have been diminished by the competition of so much lyric and choric poetry, more showy and striking in its accompaniments, as well as

Subordina-
tion of
musical
and or-
chestrical
accompani-
ment to the
words and
meaning.

more changeful in its rhythmical character. Whatever secondary effect, however, this newer species of poetry may have derived from such helps, its primary effect was produced by real intellectual or poetical excellence—by the thoughts, sentiment and expression, not by the accompaniment. For a long time the musical composer and the poet continued generally to be one and the same person; and besides those who have acquired sufficient distinction to reach posterity, we cannot doubt that there were many known only to their own contemporaries. But with all of them the instrument and the melody constituted only the inferior part of that which was known by the name of *music*—altogether subordinate to the “thoughts that breathe and words that burn.”¹ Exactness and variety of rhythmical pronunciation gave to the words their full effect upon a delicate ear; but such pleasure of the ear was ancillary to the emotion of mind arising out of the sense conveyed. Complaints are made by the poets, even so early as 500 B.C., that the accompaniment was becoming too prominent. But it was not until the age of the comic poet Aristophanês, towards the end of the fifth century B.C., that the primitive relation between the instrumental accompaniment and the words was really reversed—and loud were the complaints to which it gave rise.² The per-

¹ Aristophan. Nubes, 586.

'Αλλ' αὐτῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔπεσιν πικ-

τεύουσα' ἐλήλυθεν.

² See Pratinas ap. Athenæum,

formance of the flute or harp then became more elaborate, showy, and overpowering, while the words were so put together as to show off the player's execution. I notice briefly this subsequent revolution for the purpose of setting forth, by contrast, the truly intellectual character of the original lyric and choric poetry of Greece; and of showing how much the vague sentiment arising from mere musical sound was lost in the more definite emotion, and in the more lasting and reproductive combinations, generated by poetical meaning.

The name and poetry of Solon, and the short maxims or sayings of Phokylidês, conduct us to the mention of the Seven Wise men of Greece. Solon was himself one of the seven, and most, if not all, of them were poets or composers in verse.¹ To most of them is ascribed also an abundance of pithy repartees, together with one short saying or maxim peculiar to each, serving as a sort of distinctive motto.² Indeed the test of an accomplished man about this time was his talent for singing

xiv. p. 617, also p. 636, and the striking fragment of the lost comic poet Pherekratês, in Plutarch, *De Musica*, p. 1141, containing the bitter remonstrance of *Musikê* (Μουσική) against the wrong which she had suffered from the dithyrambist Melanippidês: compare also Aristophanês, *Nubes*, 951-972; Athenæus, xiv. p. 617; Horat. *Art. Poetic.* 205; and W. M. Schmidt, *Diatribê in Dithyrambum*, ch. viii. p. 250-265.

Τὸ σοβαρὸν καὶ περικτὸν—the character of the newer music (Plutarch, *Ag's*, c. 10)—as contrasted with τὸ ἁμυρόν καὶ ἀνσπίγγον of the old music (Plutarch, *De Musica*, *ut sup.*): ostentation and affected display, against seriousness and simplicity. It is by no means certain that these reproaches against the more recent music of the Greeks were well-founded; we may well be rendered mistrustful of their accuracy when we hear similar remarks and contrasts advanced with regard to the music

of the last three centuries. The character of Greek poetry certainly tended to degenerate after Euripidês.

¹ Bias of Priênê composed a poem of 2000 verses on the condition of Ionia (Diogen. Laërt. i. 85), from which perhaps Herodotus may have derived (either directly or indirectly) the judicious advice which he ascribes to that philosopher on the occasion of the first Persian conquest of Ionia (Herod. i. 170).

Not merely Xenophanês the philosopher (Diogen. Laërt. viii. 36, ix. 20), but long after him Parmenidês and Empedoklês, composed in verse.

² See the account given by Herodotus (vi. 128-129) of the way in which Kleisthenês of Sikyon tested the comparative education (παίδευσις) of the various suitors who came to woo his daughter—οἱ δὲ μνήστηρες ἔβην εἰχόν ἀμφὶ τε μουσικῇ καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἔς τὸ μέτρον.

or reciting poetry, and for making smart and ready answers. Respecting this constellation of Wise Men—who in the next century of Grecian history, when philosophy came to be a matter of discussion and argumentation, were spoken of with great eulogy—all the statements are confused, in part even contradictory. Neither the number, nor the names, are given by all authors alike. Dikæarchus numbered ten, Hermippus seventeen: the names of Solon the Athenian, Thalés the Milesian, Pittakus the Mitylenean, and Bias the Prienean, were comprised in all the lists—and the remaining names as given by Plato¹ were, Kleobulus of Lindus in Rhodes, Myson of Chênæ, and Cheilon of Sparta. We cannot certainly distribute among them the sayings or mottos, upon which in later days the Amphiktyons conferred the honour of inscription in the Delphian temple—Know thyself—Nothing too much—Know thy opportunity—Suretyship is the precursor of ruin. Bias is praised as an excellent judge: while Myson was declared by the Delphian oracle to be the most discreet man among the Greeks, according to the testimony of the satirical poet Hippônax—this is the oldest testimony (540 B.C.) which can be produced in favour of any of the Seven. But Kleobulus of Lindus, far from being universally extolled, is pronounced by the poet Simonidês to be a fool.²

Dikæarchus, however, justly observed, that these Seven or Ten persons were not Wise Men or Philosophers, in the sense which those words bore in his day, but persons of practical discernment in reference to man and society³—of the same turn of mind as their contemporary the fabulist Æsop, though not employing the same mode of illustration. Their appearance forms an epoch in Grecian history, inas-

¹ Plato, Protagoras, c. 28. p. 348.

² Hippônax, Fragm. 77, 84, ed. Bergk—καὶ δικάσασθαι Βιαντος τοῦ Πριηνέος κρείττων.

.....Καὶ Μύσον, ὃν ὡ πολλῶν Ἄνεϊπεν ἀνδρῶν σωφρονέστατον πάντων.

Simonidês, Fr. 6, ed. Bergk—μωροῦ φωτός ἄδε βουλά. Diogen. Laërt. i. 6. 2.

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³ Dikæarchus ap. Diogen. Laërt. i. 40. συνετοῦς καὶ νομοθετικοῦς δεινότητι πολιτικῆν καὶ δραστήριον σύνεσιν. Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 2.

About the story of the tripod, which is said to have gone the round of these seven wise men, see Menage ad Diogen. Laërt. i. 28, p. 17.

much as they are the first persons who ever acquired an Hellenic reputation grounded on mental competency apart from poetical genius or effect—a proof that political and social prudence was beginning to be appreciated and admired on its own account. Solon, Pittakus, Bias, and Thalês, were all men of influence—the first two even men of ascendancy¹—in their respective cities. Kleobulus was despot of Lindus, and Periander (by some numbered among the seven) of Corinth. Thalês stands distinguished as the earliest name in physical philosophy, with which the other contemporary Wise Men are not said to have meddled. Their celebrity rests upon moral, social, and political wisdom exclusively, which came into greater honour as the ethical feeling of the Greeks improved and as their experience became enlarged.

They were the first men who acquired an Hellenic reputation, without poetical genius.

In these celebrated names we have social philosophy in its early and infantine state—in the shape of homely sayings or admonitions, either supposed to be self-evident, or to rest upon some great authority divine or human, but neither accompanied by reasons nor recognising any appeal to inquiry and discussion as the proper test of their rectitude. From such incurious acquiescence, the sentiment to which these admonitions owe their force, we are partially liberated even in the poet Simonidês of Keôs, who (as before alluded to) severely criticises the song of Kleobulus as well as its author. The half-century which followed the age of Simonidês (the interval between about 480-430 B.C.) broke down that sentiment more and more, by familiarising the public with argumentative controversy in the public assembly, the popular judicature, and even on the dramatic stage. And the increased self-working of the Grecian mind, thus created, manifested itself in Sokratês, who laid open all ethical and social doctrines to the scrutiny of reason, and who first awakened among his countrymen that love of dialectics which never left them—an analytical interest in the mental process of inquiring out, verifying, proving and expounding truth. To this capital item of human progress, secured through the Greeks—and through them only—to

Early manifestation of philosophy—in the form of maxims.

Subsequent growth of dialectics and discussion.

¹ Cicero, De Republ. i. 7; Plutarch, in Delph. p. 385; Bernhardt, Grundriss der Griechischen Litteratur, vol. i. sect. 66. not. 3.

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Early manifestation of philosophy—in the form of maxims.

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¹ Cicero, *De Republ.* i. 7; Plutarch, in *Delph.* p. 385; Bernhardt, *Grundriss der Griechischen Litteratur*, vol. i. sect. 66. not. 3.

mankind generally, our attention will be called at a later period of the history. At present it is only mentioned in contrast with the naked, dogmatical, laconism of the Seven Wise Men, and with the simple enforcement of the early poets—a state in which morality has a certain place in the feelings, but no root, even among the superior minds, in the conscious exercise of reason.

The interval between Archilochus and Solon (660-580 b.c.) seems, as has been remarked in my former volume, to be the period in which writing first came to be applied to Greek poems—to the Homeric poems among the number; and shortly after the end of that period, commences the æra of compositions without metre or prose. The philosopher Pherekydês of Syros, about 550 b.c., is called by some the earliest prose-writer. But no prose-writer for a considerable time afterwards acquired any celebrity—seemingly none earlier than Hekataëus of Milêtus,¹ about 510-490 b.c.—prose being a subordinate and ineffective species of composition, not always even perspicuous, and requiring no small practice before the power was acquired of rendering it interesting.² Down to the generation preceding Sokratês, the poets continued to be the grand leaders of the Greek mind. Until then, nothing was taught to youth except to read, to remember, to recite musically and rhythmically, and to comprehend, poetical composition. The comments of preceptors addressed to their pupils may probably have become fuller and more instructive, but the text still continued to be epic or lyric poetry. These were the best masters for acquiring a full command of the complicated accent and rhythm of the Greek language, so essential to an educated man in ancient times, and so sure to be detected if not properly acquired. Not to mention the Cheliambist Hippônax, who seems to have been possessed with the devil of Archilochus, and in part also with his genius—Anakreon, Ibykus, Pindar, Bacchylidês, Simonidês, and the dramatists of Athens, continue the line of eminent poets without intermission. After the Persian war, the

¹ Pliny, H. N. vii. 57. Suidas v. *Ἐκκράτιος*.

² H. Ritter (*Geschichte der Philosophie*, ch. vi. p. 243) has some good remarks on the difficulty and

obscurity of the early Greek prose-writers, in reference to the darkness of expression and meaning universally charged upon the philosopher Herakleitus.

requirements of public speaking created a class of rhetorical teachers, while the gradual spread of physical philosophy widened the range of instruction; so that prose composition, for speech or for writing, occupied a larger and larger share of the attention of men, and was gradually wrought up to high perfection, such as we see for the first time in Herodotus. But before it became thus improved, and acquired that style which was the condition of wide-spread popularity, we may be sure that it had been silently used as a means of recording information, and that neither the large mass of geographical matter contained in the *Periegêsis* of Hekataëus, nor the map first prepared by his contemporary Anaximander, could have been presented to the world, without the previous labours of unpretending prose writers, who set down the mere results of their own experience. The acquisition of prose-writing, commencing as it does about the age of Peisistratus, is not less remarkable as an evidence of past, than as a means of future, progress.

Of that splendid genius in sculpture and architecture, which shone forth in Greece after the Persian invasion, the first lineaments only are discoverable between 600-560 B.C., in Corinth, Ægina, Samos, Chios, Ephesus, &c.—enough however to give evidence of improvement and progress. Glaukus of Chios is said to have discovered the art of welding iron, and Rhœkus or his son Theodôrus of Samos the art of casting copper or brass in a mould. Both these discoveries, as far as can be made out, appear to date a little before 600 B.C.¹ The primitive memorial erected in honour of

First beginnings of Grecian art.

¹ See O. Müller, *Archäologie der Kunst*, sect. 61; Sillig, *Catalogus Artificum*—under Theodôrus and Teleklês.

Thiersch (*Epochen der Bildenden Kunst*, p. 182-190, 2nd edit.) places Rhœkus near the beginning of the recorded Olympiads; and supposes two artists named Theodôrus, one the grandson of the other; but this seems to me not sustained by any adequate authority (for the loose chronology of Pliny about the Samian school of artists is not more trustworthy than about the Chian

school—compare xxxv. 12. and xxxvi. 3), and moreover intrinsically improbable. Herodotus (i. 51) speaks of “the Samian Theodorus,” and seems to have known only one person so called; Diodôrus (i. 93) and Pausanias (x. 38, 3) give different accounts of Theodôrus, but the positive evidence does not enable us to verify the genealogies either of Thiersch or O. Müller. Herodotus (iv, 152) mentions the Ἡραίων at Samos in connexion with events near Olymp. 37; but this does not prove that

a god did not even pretend to be an image, but was often nothing more than a pillar, a board, a shapeless stone, a post, &c., fixed so as to mark and consecrate the locality, and receiving from the neighbourhood respectful care and decoration as well as worship. Sometimes there was a real statue, though of the rudest character, carved in wood; and the families of carvers—who from father to son, exercised this profession, represented in Attica by the name of Dædalus and in Ægina by the name of Smilis—adhered long with strict exactness to the consecrated type

of each particular god. Gradually the wish grew up to change the material, as well as to correct the rudeness, of such primitive idols. Sometimes the original wood was retained as the material, but covered in part with ivory or gold—in other cases marble or metal was substituted. Dipœnus and Skyllis of Krête acquired renown as workers in marble about the 50th Olympiad (580 B.C.). From them downwards, a series of names may be traced, more or less distinguished; moreover it seems about the same period that the earliest temple-offerings, in works of art properly so called, commence—the golden statue of Zeus, and the large carved chest, dedicated by the Kypselids of Corinth at Olympia.¹ The pious associations, however, connected with the old type were so strong, that the hand of the artist was greatly restrained in dealing with statues of the gods. It was in statues of men, especially in those of the victors at Olympia and other sacred games, that genuine ideas of beauty were first aimed at and in part attained, from whence they passed afterwards to the statues of the

the great temple which he himself saw, a century and a half later, had been begun before Olymp. 37, as Thiersch would infer. The statement of O. Müller, that this temple was begun in Olymp. 35, is not authenticated (Arch. der Kunst, sect. 53).

¹ Pausanias tells us distinctly that this chest was dedicated at Olympia by the Kypselids, descendants of Kypselus; and this seems credible enough. But he also tells us that this was the identical chest

in which the infant Kypselus had been concealed, believing this story as told in Herodotus (v. 92). In this latter belief I cannot go along with him, nor do I think that there is any evidence for believing the chest to have been of more ancient date than the persons who dedicated it—in spite of the opinions of O. Müller and Thiersch to the contrary (O. Müller, Arch. der Kunst, sect. 57; Thiersch, Epochen der Griechischen Kunst, p. 169, 2nd edit.: Pausan. v. 17, 2).

gods. Such statues of the athletes seem to commence somewhere between Olympiad 53-58 (568-548 B.C.).

It is not until the same interval of time (between 600-550 B.C.) that we find any traces of these architectural monuments by which the more important cities in Greece afterwards attracted to themselves so much renown. The two greatest temples in Greece known to Herodotus were the Artemision at Ephesus, and the Heræon at Samos. Of these the former seems to have been commenced, by the Samian Theodorus, about 600 B.C.—the latter, begun by the Samian Rhœkus, can hardly be traced to any higher antiquity. The first attempts to decorate Athens by such additions proceeded from Peisistratus and his sons, near the same time. As far as we can judge, too, in the absence of all direct evidence, the temples of Pæstum in Italy and Selinus in Sicily seem to fall in this same century. Of painting during these early centuries, nothing can be affirmed. It never at any time reached the same perfection as sculpture, and we may presume that its years of infancy were at least equally rude.

Monumental ornaments in the cities—begin in the sixth century B.C.

The immense development of Grecian art subsequently, and the great perfection of Grecian artists, are facts of great importance in the history of the human race; while in regard to the Greeks themselves, these facts not only acted powerfully on the taste of the people, but were also valuable indirectly as the common boast of Hellenism, and as supplying one bond of fraternal sympathy as well as of mutual pride, among its widely-dispersed sections. It is the paucity and weakness of such bonds which renders the history of Greece, prior to 560 B.C., little better than a series of parallel, but isolated threads, each attached to a separate city. The increased range of joint Hellenic feeling and action, upon which we shall presently enter, though arising doubtless in great measure from new and common dangers threatening many cities at once—also springs in part from those other causes which have been enumerated in this chapter, as acting on the Grecian mind. It proceeds from the stimulus applied to all the common feelings in religion, art, and recreation—from the gradual formation of national festivals, appealing in various ways to such tastes and sentiments as animated every Hellenic

Importance of Grecian art as a means of Hellenic union.

bosom—from the inspirations of men of genius, poets, musicians, sculptors, architects, who supplied more or less in every Grecian city, education for the youth, training for the chorus, and ornament for the locality—from the gradual expansion of science, philosophy, and rhetoric, during the coming period of this history, which rendered one city the intellectual capital of Greece, and brought to Isokratés and Plato pupils from the most distant parts of the Grecian world. It was this fund of common tastes, tendencies, and aptitudes, which caused the social atoms of Hellas to gravitate towards each other, and which enabled the Greeks to become something better and greater than an aggregate of petty disunited communities like the Thracians or Phrygians. And the creation of such common, extrapolitical, Hellenism, is the most interesting phænomenon which the historian has to point out in the early period now under our notice. He is called upon to dwell upon it the more forcibly because the modern reader has generally no idea of national union without political union—an association foreign to the Greek mind. Strange as it may seem to find a song-writer put forward as an active instrument of union among his fellow-Hellens, it is not the less true, that those poets, whom we have briefly passed in review, by enriching the common language and by circulating from town to town either in person or in their compositions, contributed to fan the flame of Pan-Hellenic patriotism at a time when there were few circumstances to co-operate with them, and when the causes tending to perpetuate isolation seemed in the ascendant.

CHAPTER XXX.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF PEISISTRATUS AND HIS SONS AT ATHENS.

WE now arrive at what may be called the second period of Grecian history, beginning with the rule of Peisistratus at Athens and of Croesus in Lydia.

It has been already stated that Peisistratus made himself despot of Athens in 560 B.C. He died in 527 B.C., and was succeeded by his son Hippias, who was deposed and expelled in 510 B.C., thus making an entire space of fifty years between the first exaltation of the father and the final expulsion of the son. These chronological points are settled on good evidence. But the thirty-three years covered by the reign of Peisistratus are interrupted by two periods of exile, one of them lasting not less than ten years, the other, five years; and the exact place of the years of exile, being nowhere laid down upon authority, has been differently determined by the conjectures of chronologers.¹ Partly from this half-known chronology, partly from a very scanty collection of facts, the history of the half-century now before us can only be given very imperfectly. Nor can we wonder at our ignorance, when we find that even among the Athenians themselves, only a century afterwards, statements the most incorrect and contradictory respecting the Peisistratids were in circulation, as Thucydides distinctly, and somewhat reproachfully, acquaints us.

More than thirty years had now elapsed since the promulgation of the Solonian constitution, whereby the annual Senate of Four Hundred had been created, and the public assembly (preceded in its action as well as aided and regulated by this senate) invested with a power of exacting

Peisistratus and his sons at Athens—B.C. 560-510—uncertain chronology as to Peisistratus.

State of feeling in Attica at the accession of Peisistratus.

¹ Mr. Fynes Clinton (*East. Hel-len. vol. ii. Appendix, c. 2. p. 201*) has stated and discussed the dif-

ferent opinions on the chronology of Peisistratus and his sons.

responsibility from the magistrates after their year of office. The seeds of the subsequent democracy had thus been sown, and no doubt the administration of the archons had been practically softened by it. Yet nothing in the nature of a democratical sentiment yet had been created. A hundred years hence, we shall find that sentiment unanimous and potent among the enterprising masses of Athens and Peiræus, and shall be called upon to listen to loud complaints of the difficulty of dealing with "that angry, waspish, intractable little old man, Dêmus of Pnyx"—so Aristophanês¹ calls the Athenian people to their faces, with a freedom which shows that he at least counted on their good temper. But between 560-510 B.C. the people are as passive in respect to political rights and securities as the most strenuous enemy of democracy could desire, and the government is transferred from hand to hand by bargains and cross-changes between two or three powerful men,² at the head of partisans who echo their voices, espouse their personal quarrels, and draw the sword at their command. It was this ancient constitution—Athens as it stood before the Athenian democracy—which the Macedonian Antipater professed to restore in 322 B.C., when he caused the majority of the poorer citizens to be excluded altogether from the political franchise.³

By the stratagem recounted in a former chapter,⁴ Peisistratus had obtained from the public assembly a guard which he had employed to acquire forcible possession of the acropolis. He thus became master of the adminis-

¹ 'Ἀγροῖκος ὄργην, κυαμοτρῶξ, ἀκράχολος

Δῆμος Πνυκίτης, δύσκολον γερωντίον.—

Aristoph. Equit. 41.

I need hardly mention that the Pnyx was the place in which the Athenian public assemblies were held.

² Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. c. 15. p. 858) is angry with Herodotus for imparting so petty and personal a character to the dissensions between the Alkmaônids and Peisistratus: his severe remarks in that treatise, however, tend almost always to strengthen rather than

to weaken the credibility of the historian.

³ Plutarch, Phokion, c. 27. ἀπεκρίνατο φίλλαν ἔσσεσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ξυμμαχίαν, ἐκδοῦσι μὲν τοὺς περὶ Δημοσθένη καὶ Ὑπερίδην, πολιτευομένους δὲ τὴν πατριον ἀπὸ τιμήματος πολιτείας, δεξαμένοις δὲ φρουρὰν εἰς τὴν Μουνοχίαν, ἔτι δὲ χρήματα τοῦ πολέμου καὶ ζήμιαν προσεχτίσασιν. Compare Diodor. xviii. 18.

Twelve thousand of the poorer citizens were disfranchised by this change (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 28).

⁴ See the preceding volume, ch. xi. p. 156.

tration; but he employed his power honourably and well, not disturbing the existing forms farther than was necessary to ensure to himself full mastery. Nevertheless we may see by the verses of Solon¹ (the only contemporary evidence which we possess), that the prevalent sentiment was by no means favourable to his recent proceeding, and that there was in many minds a strong feeling both of terror and aversion, which presently manifested itself in the armed coalition of his two rivals—Megaklês at the head of the Parali or inhabitants of the sea-board, and Lykurgus at the head of those in the neighbouring plain. As the conjunction of the two formed a force too powerful for Peisistratus to withstand, he was driven into exile, after no long possession of his despotism. But the time came (how soon we cannot tell) when the two rivals who had expelled him quarrelled. Megaklês made propositions to Peisistratus, inviting him to resume the sovereignty, promising his own aid, and stipulating that Peisistratus should marry his daughter. The conditions being accepted, a plan was laid between the two new allies for carrying them into effect, by a novel stratagem—since the simulated wounds and pretence of personal danger were not likely to be played off a second time with success. The two conspirators clothed a stately woman, six feet high, named Phylê, in the panoply and costume of Athênê—surrounded her with the processional accompaniments belonging to the goddess—and placed her in a chariot with Peisistratus by her side. In this guise the exiled despot and his adherents approached the city and drove up to the acropolis, preceded by heralds, who cried aloud to the people,—“Athenians, receive ye cordially Peisistratus, whom Athênê has honoured above all other men, and is now bringing back into her own acropolis.” The people in the city received the reputed goddess with implicit belief and demonstrations of worship, while among the country cantons the report quickly spread that Athênê had appeared in person to restore Peisistratus; who thus found himself, without even a show of resistance, in possession of the acropolis and of the government. His own party, united with that of Megaklês, were powerful

Retirement of Peisistratus, and stratagem whereby he is reinstated.

¹ Solon, Fragm. 10. ed. Bergk.—

Εἰ δὲ πεπόνθασα λυγρὰ δι' ὑμετέρην
καχότητα,

Μήτι θεοῖς τούτων μοῖραν ἐπαμ-
φύρετε, &c.

enough to maintain him, when he had once acquired possession. And probably all, except the leaders, sincerely believed in the epiphany of the goddess, which came to be divulged as having been a deception, only after Peisistratus and Megaklès had quarrelled.¹

¹ Herodot. i. 60. καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄσπεϊ κειθόμενοι τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι αὐτῆν τὴν θεὸν, προσεύχοντό τε τὴν ἀνθρώπων καὶ εἰδέχοντο τὸν Πεισίστρατον. A statement (Athenæus, xiii. p. 609) represents Phyé to have become afterwards the wife of Hipparchus.

Of this remarkable story, not the least remarkable part is the criticism with which Herodotus himself accompanies it. He treats it as a proceeding infinitely silly (πρῆγμα εὐηθέστατον, ὡς ἐγὼ εὐρίσχω, μακρῶ); he cannot conceive how Greeks, so much superior to barbarians—and even Athenians, the cleverest of all the Greeks—could have fallen into such a trap. To him the story was told as a deception from the beginning, and he did not perhaps take pains to put himself into the state of feeling of those original spectators who saw the chariot approach, without any warning or preconceived suspicion. But even allowing for this, his criticism brings to our view the alteration and enlargement which had taken place in the Greek mind during the century between Peisistratus and Periklès. Doubtless neither the latter nor any of his contemporaries could have succeeded in a similar trick.

The fact, and the criticism upon it, now before us, are remarkably illustrated by an analogous case recounted in a previous chapter (vol. ii. chap. viii.). Nearly at the same period as this stratagem of Peisistratus, the Lacedæmonians and the Argeians agreed to decide,

by a combat of three hundred select champions, the dispute between them as to the territory of Kynuria. The combat actually took place, and the heroism of Othryades, sole Spartan survivor, has been already recounted. In the eleventh year of the Peloponnesian war (shortly after or near upon the period when we may conceive the history of Herodotus to have been finished) the Argeians, concluding a treaty with Lacedæmon, introduced as a clause into it the liberty of reviving their pretensions to Kynuria, and of again deciding the dispute by a combat of select champions. To the Lacedæmonians of that time this appeared extreme folly—the very proceeding which had been actually resorted to a century before. Here is another case, in which the change in the point of view, and the increased positive tendencies in the Greek mind, are brought to our notice not less forcibly than by the criticism of Herodotus upon Phyé-Athênè.

Istrus (one of the Atthidographers of the third century B.C.) and Antiklès published books respecting the personal manifestations or epiphanies of the gods—'Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπιφανεῖαι: see Istri Fragm. 33-37, ed Didot. If Peisistratus and Megaklès had never quarrelled, their joint stratagem might have continued to pass for a genuine epiphany, and might have been included as such in the work of Istrus. I will add, that the real presence of the gods, at the festivals celebrated in their honour,

The daughter of Megaklēs, according to agreement, quickly became the wife of Peisistratus, but she bore him no children. It became known that her husband, having already adult sons by a former marriage, and considering that the Kylonian curse rested upon all the Alkmæonid family, did not intend that she should become a mother.¹ Meglakēs was so incensed at this behaviour, that he not only renounced his alliance with Peisistratus, but even made his peace with the third party, the adherents of Lykurgus—and assumed so menacing an attitude, that the despot was obliged to evacuate Attica. He retired to Eretria in Eubœa, where he remained no less than ten years, employed in making preparations for a forcible return, and exercising, even while in exile, a degree of influence much exceeding that of a private man. He not only lent valuable aid to Lygdamis of Naxos² in constituting himself despot of that island, but possessed, we know not how, the means of rendering important service to different cities, Thebes in particular. They repaid him by large contributions of money to aid in his re-establishment: mercenaries were hired from Argos, and the Naxian Lygdamis came himself both with money and with troops.

was an idea continually brought before the minds of the Greeks.

The Athenians fully believed the epiphany of the god Pan to Pheidippidēs the courier on his march to Sparta a little before the battle of Marathōn (Herodot. vi. 105. καὶ ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι πιστεύσαντες εἶναι ἀληθῆα), and even Herodotus himself does not controvert it, though he relaxes the positive character of history so far as to add—"as Pheidippidēs himself said and recounted publicly to the Athenians." His informants in this case were doubtless sincere believers; whereas in the case of Phylē, the story was told to him at first as a fabrication.

At Gela in Sicily, seemingly not long before this restoration of Peisistratus, Tēlinēs (ancestor of the despot Gelon) had brought

back some exiles to Gela, "without any armed force, but merely through the sacred ceremonies and appurtenances of the subterranean goddesses"—ἔχων οὐδεμίαν ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἰρὰ τουτέων τῶν θεῶν—τούτοις δ' ὦν πισυνος ἐὼν, κατήγαγε (Herodot. vii. 153). Herodotus does not tell us the details which he had heard of the manner in which this restoration at Gela was brought about; but his general language intimates that they were remarkable details, and they might have illustrated the story of Phylē-Athēnē.

¹ Herodot. i. 61. Peisistratus—ἐπιγῆθι οἱ οὐ κατὰ νόμον.

² About Lygdamis, see Athenæus, viii. p. 348, and his citation from the lost work of Aristotle on the Grecian Πολιτεῖαι; also Aristot. Politic. v. 5. 1.

Thus equipped and aided, Peisistratus landed at Marathon in Attica. How the Athenian government had been conducted during his ten years' absence, we do not know; but the leaders of it permitted him to remain undisturbed at Marathon, and to assemble his partisans both from the city and from the country. It was not until he broke up from Marathon and had reached Pallênê on his way to Athens, that they took the field against him. Moreover, their conduct, even when the two armies were near together, must have been either extremely negligent or corrupt; for Peisistratus found means to attack them unprepared, routing their forces almost without resistance. In fact, the proceedings have altogether the air of a concerted betrayal. For the defeated troops, though unpursued, are said to have dispersed and returned to their homes forthwith, in obedience to the proclamation of Peisistratus, who marched on to Athens, and found himself a third time ruler.¹

On this third successful entry, he took vigorous precautions for rendering his seat permanent. The Alkmæonidæ and their immediate partisans retired into exile: but he seized the children of those who remained and whose sentiments he suspected, as hostages for the behaviour of their parents, and placed them in Naxos under the care of Lygdamis. Moreover he provided himself with a powerful body of Thracian mercenaries, paid by taxes levied upon the people:² and he was careful to conciliate the favour of the gods by a purification of the sacred island of Delos. All the dead bodies which had been buried within sight of the temple of Apollo, were exhumed and reinterred farther off. At this time the Delian festival—attended by the Asiatic Ionians and the islanders, and with which Athens was of course peculiarly connected—must have been beginning to decline from its pristine magnificence; for the subjugation of the continental Ionic cities by Cyrus had been already achieved, and the power of Samos, though increased under the despot Polykratês, seems to have increased at the expense and to the ruin of the smaller Ionic islands. Partly from the same feelings

¹ Herodot. i. 68.

τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρέ-

² Herodot. i. 64. ἐπικούροισι τε πολλοῖσι, καὶ χρημάτων συνόδοισι,

μονος ποταμοῦ προσιόντων.

which led to the purification of Delos—partly as an act of party revenge—Peisistratus caused the houses of the Alkmæônids to be levelled with the ground, and the bodies of the deceased members of that family to be disinterred and cast out of the country.¹

This third and last period of the rule of Peisistratus lasted several years, until his death in 527 B.C. It is said to have been so mild in its character, that he once even suffered himself to be cited for trial before the senate of Areopagus; yet as we know that he had to maintain a large body of Thracian mercenaries out of the funds of the people, we shall be inclined to construe this eulogium comparatively rather than positively. Thucydides affirms that both he and his sons governed in a wise and virtuous spirit, levying from the people only an income-tax of five per cent.² This is high praise coming from such an authority, though it seems that we ought to make some allowance for the

Mild despotism of Peisistratus.

¹ Isokratēs, Or. xiv. De Bigis, c. 351.

² For the statement of Boeckh, Dr. Arnold, and Dr. Thirlwall, that Peisistratus had levied a tythe or tax of ten per cent., and that his sons reduced it to the half, I find no sufficient warrant: certainly the spurious letter of Peisistratus to Solon in Diogenes Laërtius (i. 53) ought not to be considered as proving anything. Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, B. iii. c. 6 (i. 351 German); Dr. Arnold ad Thucyd. vi. 34; Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. of Gr. ch. xi. p. 72-74. Idomeneus (ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 533) considers the sons of Peisistratus to have indulged in pleasures to an extent more costly and oppressive to the people than their father.

Herodotus (i. 64) tells us that Peisistratus brought mercenary soldiers from the Strymon, but that he levied the money to pay them in Attica—ἐβρίζωσα τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπιχοῦροισι τε πολλοῖσι, καὶ χρημάτων συνόδοισι, τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν,

τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρώμονος ποταμοῦ συνόδων. On this passage, apparently, Dr. Thirlwall has founded a statement (p. 68), for which in my first edition I did not perceive his authority—"He (Peisistratus) possessed lands on the Strymon in Thrace, which yielded a large revenue." The words of Herodotus undoubtedly justify Dr. Thirlwall's construction: but they are also consistent with a different construction, which appears to me in this case the truer one; referring τῶν μὲν τὸ χρημάτων, and τῶν δὲ τὸ ἐπιχοῦροισι. "Peisistratus collected the mercenary soldiers from the Strymon, and the money at home." If he wanted mercenaries, the bank of the Strymon, with the Thracian population adjoining, was the natural place to seek them. But I think it highly improbable that "he possessed lands on the Strymon which yielded him a large revenue." If this is to be admitted, we must suppose him to have founded, or to have taken a leading part in founding, a city at

circumstance of Thucydides being connected by descent with the Peisistratid family.¹ The judgement of Herodotus is also very favourable respecting Peisistratus; that of Aristotle favourable, yet qualified, since he includes these despots among the list of those who undertook public and sacred works with the deliberate view of impoverishing as well as of occupying their subjects. This supposition is countenanced by the prodigious scale upon which the temple of Zeus Olympius at Athens was begun by Peisistratus—a scale much exceeding either the Parthenon or the temple of Athene Polias; both of which, nevertheless, were erected in later times, when the means of Athens were decidedly larger² and her disposition to demonstrative piety certainly no way diminished. It was left by him unfinished, nor was it ever completed until the Roman emperor Hadrian undertook the task. Moreover, Peis-

the mouth of the Strymon: for large private landed property, possessed by a man in the territory of a foreign city, was at that time a thing rare indeed, if not altogether unknown. But if Peisistratus had established any settlement at the mouth of the Strymon, we must surely have heard more of it afterwards. It would have been retained by Hippias when expelled from Athens; and Herodotus (v. 65-94) would surely have told us something about it on that occasion. Moreover, the mouth of the Strymon was a capital position, more coveted than almost any other by enterprising Greeks, and stoutly maintained by the Edonian Thracians. Had there been any settlement established there by Peisistratus, we must have found some mention of it either from Herodotus or Thucydides, when they advert to the proceedings of Histæus, Aristagoras, and the Athenians, connected with the subsequent settlement of the locality, and ending at last in the foundation of Amphipolis (Herodot. v. 11, 23, 94; Thucyd. iv. 102).

¹ Hermippus (ap. Marcellin. Vit. Thucyd. p. ix.), and the Scholiast on Thucyd. i. 20, affirm that Thucydides was connected by relationship with the Peisistratidæ. His manner of speaking of them certainly lends countenance to the assertion; not merely as he twice notices their history, once briefly (i. 20) and again at considerable length (vi. 54-59), though it does not lie within the direct compass of his period—but also as he so emphatically announces his own personal knowledge of their family relations—'Ὅτι δὲ πρεσβύτατος ὢν Ἰππίας ἤρξεν, εἰδῶς μὲν καὶ ἀκοῇ ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλων ἰσχυρίζομαι (vi. 55).

Aristotle (Politic. v. 9, 21) mentions it as a report (φασί) that Peisistratus obeyed the summons to appear before the Areopagus; Plutarch adds that the person who had summoned him did not appear to bring the cause to trial (Vit. Solon. 31), which is not at all surprising; compare Thucyd. vi. 56, 57.

² Aristot. Politic. v. 9, 4; Dikæarchus, Vita Græciæ, pp. 140-166, ed. Fuhr; Pausan. i. 18, 8.

tratus introduced the greater Panathenaic festival, solemnized every four years, in the third Olympic year: the annual Panathenaic festival, henceforward called the Lesser, was still continued.

I have already noticed, at considerable length, the care which he bestowed in procuring full and correct copies of the Homeric poems, as well as in improving the recitation of them at the Panathenaic festival,—a proceeding, for which we owe him much gratitude, but which has been shown to be erroneously interpreted by various critics. He probably also collected the works of other poets—called by Aulus Gellius,¹ in language not well-suited to the sixth century B. C., a library thrown open to the public. The service which he thus rendered must have been highly valuable at a time when writing and reading were not widely extended. His son Hipparchus followed up the same taste, taking pleasure in the society of the most eminent poets of the day,²—Simonidês, Anakreon, and Lasus; not to mention the Athenian mystic Onomakritus, who though not pretending to the gift of prophecy himself, passed for the proprietor and editor of the various prophecies ascribed to the ancient name of Musæus. The Peisistratids, well-versed in these prophecies, set great value upon them, and guarded their integrity so carefully, that Onomakritus, being detected on one occasion in the act of interpolating them, was banished by Hipparchus in consequence.³ The statues of Hermês, erected by this prince or by his personal friends in various parts of Attica,⁴ and inscribed with short moral sentences, are extolled by the author of the Platonic dialogue called Hipparchus, with an exaggeration which approaches to irony. It is certain, however, that both the sons of Peisistratus, as well as himself, were exact in fulfilling the religious obligations of the state, and ornamented the city in several ways, especially the public fountain Kallirrhôê. They are said to have maintained the pre-existing forms of law and justice, merely taking care always to keep themselves and

¹ Aul. Gell. N. A. vi. 17.

² Herodot. vii. 6; Pseudo-Plato, Hipparchus, p. 229.

³ Herodot. v. 93; vii. 6. Ὀνομάκριτον, χρησμολόγον καὶ διαθέτην τῶν χρησμῶν τῶν Μουσᾶίου. See Pausan.

i. 22, 7. Compare, about the literary tendencies of the Peisistratids, Nitzsch, De Historiâ Homeri, ch. 30. p. 168.

⁴ Philochor. Frag. 69, ed. Didot; Plato, Hipparch. p. 230.

their adherents in the effective offices of state, and in the full reality of power. They were moreover modest and popular in their personal demeanour, and charitable to the poor; yet one striking example occurs of unscrupulous enmity, in their murder of Kimôn by night through the agency of hired assassins.¹ There is good reason, however, for believing that the government both of Peisistratus and of his sons was in practice generally mild until after the death of Hipparchus by the hands of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn, after which event the surviving Hippias became alarmed, cruel, and oppressive during his last four years. Hence the harshness of this concluding period left upon the Athenian mind² that profound and imperishable hatred, against the dynasty generally, which Thucydidês reluctantly admits: labouring to show that it was not deserved by Peisistratus, nor at first by Hippias.

Peisistratus left three legitimate sons—Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thessalus. The general belief at Athens among the contemporaries of Thucydidês was, that Hipparchus was the eldest of the three and had succeeded him. Yet the historian emphatically pronounces this to be a mistake, and certifies upon his own responsibility that Hippias was both eldest son and successor. Such an assurance from him, fortified by certain reasons in themselves not very conclusive, is sufficient ground for our belief—the more so as Herodotus countenances the same version; but we are surprised at such a degree of historical carelessness in the Athenian public, and seemingly even in Plato,³ about a matter both interesting and comparatively recent. In order to abate this surprise, and to explain how the name of Hipparchus came to supplant that of Hippias in the popular talk, Thucydidês recounts the memorable story of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn.

¹ Herodot. vi. 88-103; Theopomp. ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 533.

² Thucyd. vi. 53; Pseudo-Plato, Hipparch. p. 230; Pausan. i. 23, 1.

³ Thucyd. i. 20, about the general belief of the Athenian public in his time—'Αθηναίων γούν τὸ πλῆθος οἰόνται ὅψ' Ἀρμόδιου καὶ Ἀριστογεῖτονος Ἰππάρχου τύραννον ὄντα ἀπο-

θανεῖν, καὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν ὅτι Ἰππίας πρεσβύτατος ὢν ἤρχε τῶν Πεισιστράτου παιδῶν, &c.

The Pseudo-Plato in the dialogue called Hipparchus adopts this belief, and the real Plato in his Symposium (c. 9. p. 182) seems to countenance it.

Of these two Athenian citizens,¹ both belonging to the ancient gens called Gephyræi, the former was a beautiful youth, attached to the latter by a mutual friendship and devoted intimacy which Grecian manners did not condemn. Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Hipparchus made repeated propositions to Harmodius, which were repelled, but which, on becoming known to Aristogeiton, excited both his jealousy and his fears lest the disappointed suitor should employ force—fears justified by the proceedings not unusual with Grecian despots,² and by the absence of all legal protection against outrage from such a quarter. Under these feelings, he began to look about, in the best way that he could, for some means of putting down the despotism. Meanwhile Hipparchus, though not entertaining any designs of violence, was so incensed at the refusal of Harmodius, that he could not be satisfied without doing something to insult or humiliate him. In order to conceal the motive from which the insult really proceeded, he offered it, not directly to Harmodius, but to his sister. He caused this young maiden to be one day summoned to take her station in a religious procession as one of the Kanêphoræ or basket-carriers, according to the practice usual at Athens. But when she arrived at the place where her fellow-maidens were assembled, she was dismissed with scorn as unworthy of so respectable a function, and the summons addressed to her was disavowed.³

¹ Herodot. v. 55-58. Harmodius is affirmed by Plutarch to have been of the deme Aphidnæ (Plutarch, Symposiæcon, i. 10. p. 628).

It is to be recollected that he died before the introduction of the Ten Tribes, and before the recognition of the demes as political elements in the commonwealth.

² For the terrible effects produced by this fear of ὄβρις εις τὴν ἡλικίαν, see Plutarch, Kimon, 1; Aristot. Polit. v. 9, 17.

³ Thucyd. vi. 56. Τὸν δ' οὖν Ἀρμόδιον ἀπαρνηθέντα τὴν πείρασιν, ὡς περ διανοεῖτο, προσηλάκισεν· ἀδελφῆν γὰρ αὐτοῦ, κόρην, ἐπαγγεῖλαντες ἤκειν κανοῦν οἴσουσαν ἐν πομπῇ τινι, ἀήλασαν, λέγοντες οὐδὲ ἐπαγγεῖλαι ἀρχῆν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄξίαν εἶναι.

Dr. Arnold, in his note, supposes that this exclusion of the sister of Harmodius by the Peisistratids may have been founded on the circumstance that she belonged to the gens Gephyræi (Herodot. v. 57); her foreign blood, and her being in certain respects ἀτιμος, disqualified her (he thinks) from ministering to the worship of the gods of Athens.

There is no positive reason to support the conjecture of Dr. Arnold, which seems moreover virtually discountenanced by the narrative of Thucydides, who plainly describes the treatment of this young woman as a deliberate, preconcerted insult. Had there existed any assignable ground of

An insult thus publicly offered filled Harmodius with indignation, and still farther exasperated the feelings of Aristogeitôn. Both of them resolving at all hazards to put an end to the despotism, concerted means for aggression with a few select associates. They awaited the festival of the Great Panathenæa, wherein the body of the citizens were accustomed to march up in armed procession, with spear and shield, to the acropolis; this being the only day on which an armed body could come together without suspicion. The conspirators appeared armed like the rest of the citizens, but carrying concealed daggers besides.

They con-
spire and
kill Hip-
parchus,
B.C. 514.

Harmodius and Aristogeitôn undertook with their own hands to kill the two Peisistratids, while the rest promised to stand forward immediately for their protection against the foreign mercenaries; and though the whole number of persons engaged was small, they counted upon the spontaneous sympathies of the armed bystanders in an effort to regain their liberties, so soon as the blow should once be struck. The day of the festival having arrived, Hippias, with his foreign body-guard around him, was marshalling the armed citizens for procession, in the Kerameikus without the gates, when Harmodius and Aristogeitôn approached with concealed daggers to execute their purpose. On coming near, they were thunderstruck to behold one of their own fellow-conspirators talking familiarly with Hippias, who was of easy access to every man. They immediately concluded that the plot was betrayed. Expecting to be seized, and wrought up to a state of desperation, they resolved at least not to die without having revenged themselves on Hipparchus; whom they found within the city gates near the chapel called the Leôkorion, and immediately slew him. His attendant guards killed Harmodius on the spot; while Aristogeitôn, rescued for the moment by the surrounding

exclusion, such as that which Dr. Arnold supposes, leading to the inference that the Peisistratids could not admit her without violating religious custom, Thucydides would hardly have neglected to allude to it, for it would have lightened the insult; and indeed on that supposition, the sending

of the original summons might have been made to appear as an accidental mistake. I will add, that Thucydides, though no way forfeiting his obligations to historical truth, is evidently not disposed to omit any thing which can be truly said in favour of the Peisistratids.

crowd, was afterwards taken, and perished in the tortures applied to make him disclose his accomplices.¹

The news flew quickly to Hippias in the Kerameikus, who heard it earlier than the armed citizens near him awaiting his order for the commencement of the procession. With extraordinary self-command, he took advantage of this precious instant of foreknowledge, and advanced towards them,—directing them to drop their arms for a short time, and assemble on an adjoining ground. They unsuspectingly obeyed; upon which he ordered his guards to take possession of the vacant arms. Being now undisputed master, he seized the persons of all those citizens whom he mistrusted—especially all those who had daggers about them, which it was not the practice to carry in the Panathenaic procession.

Such is the memorable narrative of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, peculiarly valuable inasmuch as it all comes from Thucydides.² To possess great power—to be above legal restraint—to inspire extraordinary fear—is a privilege so much coveted by the giants among mankind, that we may well take notice of those cases in which it brings misfortune even upon themselves. The fear inspired by Hipparchus—of designs which he did not really entertain, but was likely to entertain, and competent to execute without hindrance—was here the grand cause of his destruction.

The conspiracy here detailed happened in 514 B.C., during the thirteenth year of the reign of Hippias, which lasted four years longer, until 510 B.C. These last four years, in the belief of the Athenian public, counted for his whole reign; nay, many persons made the still greater historical mistake of eliding these last four years altogether, and of supposing that the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeiton had deposed the Peisistratid government and liberated Athens. Both poets and philosophers shared this faith, which is distinctly put

Strong and lasting sentiment, coupled with great historical mistake, in the Athenian public.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 58. οὐ βραδύως δεικνύται; compare Polyæn. i. 22; Diodorus, *Fragm. lib. x. p. 62*, vol. iv. ed. Wess.; Justin, ii. 9. See also a good note of Dr. Thirlwall on the passage, *Hist. of Gr. vol. ii. ch. xi. p. 77*. 2nd ed. I agree with him, that we may fairly con-

strue the indistinct phrase of Thucydides by the more precise statement of later authors, who mention the torture.

² Thucyd. i. 20; vi. 54-59; Herodot. v. 55, 56; vi. 123; Aristot. *Polit. v. 8, 9*.

forth in the beautiful and popular Skolion or song on the subject: the two friends are there celebrated as the authors of liberty at Athens—"they slew the despot and gave to Athens equal laws."¹ So inestimable a present was alone sufficient to enshrine in the minds of the subsequent democracy those who had sold their lives to purchase it. Moreover we must recollect that the intimate connexion between the two, though repugnant to the modern reader, was regarded at Athens with sympathy,—so that the story took hold of the Athenian mind by the vein of romance conjointly with that of patriotism. Harmodius and Aristogeiton were afterwards commemorated both as the winners and as the protomartyrs of Athenian liberty. Statues were erected in their honour shortly after the final expulsion of the Peisistratids; immunity from taxes and public burdens was granted to the descendants of their families; and the speaker who proposed the abolition of such immunities, at a time when the number had been abusively multiplied, made his only special exception in favour of this respected lineage.² And since the name of Hipparchus was universally notorious as the person slain, we discover how it was that he came to be considered by an uncritical public as the predominant member of the Peisistratid family—the eldest son and successor of Peisistratus—the reigning despot—to the comparative neglect of Hippias. The same public probably cherished many other anecdotes,³ not the less eagerly believed because they could not be authenticated, respecting this eventful period.

¹ See the words of the Song—

Ὅτι τὸν τύραννον χτανέτην
Ἰσονόμους τ' Ἀθήνας ἐποίησά-
την—

ap. Athenæum, xv. p. 691.

The epigram of the Keian Simonidēs (Fragm. 132, ed. Bergk—ap. Hephæstion. c. 14. p. 26, ed. Gaisf.) implies a similar belief: also the passages in Plato, Symposium, p. 182, in Aristot. Polit. v. 8, 21, and Arrian, Exped. Alex. iv. 10, 3.

² Herodot. iv. 109; Demosthen. adv. Leptin. c. 27. p. 495; cont. Meidiam, c. 47. p. 569; and the oath prescribed in the Psephism

of Demophantus—Andokidēs, De Mysteriis, p. 13; Pliny. HN. xxxiv. 4-8; Pausan. i. 8, 5; Plutarch, Aristeidēs, 27.

The statues were carried away from Athens by Xerxēs, and restored to the Athenians by Alexander after his conquest of Persia (Arrian, Ex. Al. iii. 16, 14; Pliny, H. N. xxxiv. 4-8).

³ One of these stories may be seen in Justin, ii. 9—who gives the name of Dioklēs to Hipparchus—"Diocles, alter ex filiis, per vim stupratâ virgine, a fratre puellâ interficitur."

Whatever may have been the previous moderation of Hippias, indignation at the death of his brother, and fear for his own safety,¹ now induced him to drop it altogether. It is attested both by Thucydidês and Herodotus, and admits of no doubt, that his power was now employed harshly and cruelly—that he put to death a considerable number of citizens. We find also a statement noway improbable in itself and affirmed both in Pausanias and in Plutarch—inferior authorities, yet still in this case sufficiently credible—that he caused Leæna, the mistress of Aristogeitôn, to be tortured to death, in order to extort from her a knowledge of the secrets and accomplices of the latter.² But as he could not but be sensible that this system of terrorism was full of peril to himself, so he looked out for shelter and support in case of being expelled from Athens. With this view he sought to connect himself with Darius king of Persia—a connexion full of consequences to be hereafter developed. Æantidês, son of Hippoklus the despot of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, stood high at this time in the favour of the Persian monarch, which induced Hippias to give him his daughter Archedikê in marriage; no small honour to the Lampsakene, in the estimation of Thucydidês.³ To explain how Hippias came to fix upon this town, however, it is necessary to say a few words on the foreign policy of the Peisistratids.

Hippias
despot al-
one—514-
510 B.C.—his
cruelty and
conscious
insecurity.

It has already been mentioned that the Athenians, even so far back as the days of the poet Alkæus, had occupied Sigeium in the Troad, and had there carried on war with the Mityleneans; so that their acquisitions in these regions date much before the time of Peisistratus. Owing probably to this circumstance, an application was made to them in the early part of his reign from the Dolonkian Thracians inhabitants of

Connexion
of Athens
with the
Thracian
Chersonese
and the
Asiatic
coast of
the Helles-
pont.

¹ Ἡ γὰρ δειλία φονικώτατον ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν—observes Plutarch (*Artaxerxês*, c. 25).

² Pausan. i. 23. 2; Plutarch, *De Garrulitate*, p. 897; Polyæn. viii. 45; Athenæus, xiii. p. 596.

³ We can hardly be mistaken in putting this interpretation on the words of Thucydidês—Ἀθηναῖος ὦν,

Δαμψακηνῶ ἔδωκε (vi. 59).

Some financial tricks and frauds are ascribed to Hippias by the author of the Pseudo-Aristotelian second book of the (*Œconomica* (ii. 4). I place little reliance on the statements in this treatise respecting persons of early date, such as Kypselus or Hippias: in

the Chersonese on the opposite side of the Hellespont, for aid against their powerful neighbours the Absinthian tribe of Thracians. Opportunity was thus offered for sending out a colony to acquire this valuable peninsula for Athens. Peisistratus willingly entered into the scheme, while Miltiadês son of Kypselus, a noble Athenian living impatiently under his despotism, was no less pleased to take the lead in executing it: his departure and that of other malcontents as founders of a colony suited the purpose of all parties. According to the narrative of Herodotus—alike pious and picturesque, and doubtless circulating as authentic at the annual games which the Chersonesites, even in his time, celebrated to the honour of their œkist—it is the Delphian god who directs the scheme and singles out the individual. The chiefs of the distressed Dolonkians going to Delphi to crave assistance towards procuring Grecian colonists, were directed to choose for their œkist the individual who should first show them hospitality on their quitting the temple. They departed and marched all along what was called the Sacred Road, through Phokis and Bœotia to Athens, without receiving a single hospitable invitation. At length they entered Athens, and passed by the house of Miltiadês while he himself was sitting in front of it. Seeing men whose costume and arms marked them out as strangers, he invited them into his house and treated them kindly: upon which they apprised him that he was the man fixed upon by the oracle and adjured him not to refuse his concurrence. After asking for himself personally the opinion of the oracle, and receiving an affirmative answer, he consented; sailing as œkist at the head of a body of Athenian emigrants to the Chersonese.¹

Having reached this peninsula, and having been constituted despot of the mixed Thracian and Athenian population, he lost no time in fortifying the narrow isthmus by a wall reaching all across from Kardia to Paktya, a distance of about four miles and a half; so that the Absinthian invaders were for the time effectually shut out,² though the pro-

respect to facts of the subsequent period of Greece, between 450-300 B.C., the author's means of information will doubtless render him

a better witness.

¹ Herodot. vi. 36, 37.

² Thus the Scythians broke into the Chersonese even during the

tection was not permanently kept up. He also entered into a war with Lampsakus on the Asiatic side of the strait, but was unfortunate enough to fall into an ambush and become a prisoner. Nothing preserved his life except the immediate interference of Crœsus king of Lydia, coupled with strenuous menaces addressed to the Lampsakenes, who found themselves compelled to release their prisoner. Miltiadês had acquired much favour with Crœsus, in what manner we are not told. He died childless some time afterwards, while his nephew Stesagoras, who succeeded him, perished by assassination some time subsequent to the death of Peisistratus at Athens.¹

The expedition of Miltiadês to the Chersonese must have occurred early after the first usurpation of Peisistratus, since even his imprisonment by the Lampsakenes happened before the ruin of Crœsus (546 B.C.). But it was not till much later—probably during the third and most powerful period of Peisistratus—that the latter undertook his expedition against Sigeium in the Troad. This place appears to have fallen into the hands of the Mityleneans: Peisistratus retook it,² and placed there his illegitimate son Hegesistratus as despot. The Mityleneans may have been enfeebled at this time (somewhere between 537-527 B.C.) not only by the strides of Persian conquest on the mainland, but also by the ruinous defeat which they suffered from Polykratês and the Samians.³ Hegesistratus maintained the place against various hostile attempts, throughout all the reign of Hippias, so that the Athenian possessions in those regions comprehended at this period both

government of Miltiadês son of Kimôn, nephew of Miltiadês the ekist, about forty years after the wall had been erected (Herodot. vi. 40). Again Periklês re-established the cross-wall, on sending to the Chersonese a fresh band of 1000 Athenian settlers (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 19): lastly, Derkyllidas the Lacedæmonian built it anew, in consequence of loud complaints raised by the inhabitants of their defenceless condition—about 397 B.C. (Xenophon, Hellen. iii. 2, 8-10). So imperfect however did the protection prove, that about half

a century afterwards, during the first years of the conquest of Philip of Macedon, an idea was entertained of digging through the isthmus, and converting the peninsula into an island (Demosthenês, Philippic ii. 6. p. 92, and De Haloneso, c. 10. p. 86); an idea however never carried into effect.

¹ Herodot. vi. 38, 39.

² Herodot. v. 94. I have already said that I conceive this as a different war from that in which the poet Alkæus was engaged.

³ Herodot. iii. 39.

the Chersonese and Sigeium.¹ To the former of the two, Hippias sent out Miltiadês, nephew of the first œkist, as governor after the death of his brother Stesagoras. The new governor found much discontent in the peninsula, but succeeded in subduing it by entrapping and imprisoning the principal men in each town. He farther took into his pay a regiment of five hundred mercenaries, and married Hegesipylê daughter of the Thracian king Olorus.² It must have been about 518 B. C. that this second Miltiadês went out to the Chersonese.³ He seems to have been obliged to quit it for a time, after the Scythian expedition of Darius, in consequence of having incurred the hostility of the Persians; but he was there from the beginning of the Ionic revolt until about 493 B. C., or two or three years before the battle of Marathon, on which occasion we shall find him acting commander of the Athenian army.

Both the Chersonese and Sigeium, however, though Athenian possessions, were now tributary and dependant on Persia. It was to Persia that Hippias, during his last years of alarm, looked for support in the event of being expelled from Athens: he calculated upon Sigeium as a shelter, and upon Æantidês as well as Darius as an ally. Neither the one nor the other failed him.

The same circumstances which alarmed Hippias and rendered his dominion in Attica at once more oppressive and more odious, tended of course to raise the hopes of his enemies, the Athenian exiles, with the powerful Alkmæônids at their head. Believing the favourable moment to be come, they even ventured upon an invasion of Attica, and occupied a post called Leipsydriou in the mountain range

¹ Herodot. vi. 104, 139, 140.

² Herodot. vi. 39-103. Cornelius Nepos in his life of Miltiadês confounds in one biography the adventures of two persons—Miltiadês son of Kypselus, the œkist—and Miltiadês son of Kimôn, the victor of Marathon—the uncle and the nephew.

³ There is nothing that I know to mark the date except that it was earlier than the death of Hip-

parchus in 514 B.C., and also earlier than the expedition of Darius against the Scythians, about 516 B.C., in which expedition Miltiadês was engaged: see Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, and J. M. Schultz, *Beitrag zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen der Hellen. Geschichten von der 63sten bis zur 72sten Olympiade*, p. 165, in the *Kieler Philologische Studien*, 1841.

of Parnês, which separates Attica from Bœotia.¹ But their schemes altogether failed: Hippias defeated and drove them out of the country. His dominion now seemed confirmed, for the Lacedæmonians were on terms of intimate friendship with him; and Amyntas king of Macedon, as well as the Thessalians, were his allies. Yet the exiles whom he had beaten in the open field succeeded in an unexpected manœuvre, which, favoured by circumstances, proved his ruin.

By an accident which had occurred in the year 548 B.C.,² the Delphian temple was set on fire and burnt. To repair this grave loss was an object of solicitude to all Greece; but the outlay required was exceedingly heavy, and it appears to have been long before the money could be collected. The Amphiktyons decreed that one-fourth of the cost should be borne by the Delphians themselves, who found themselves so heavily taxed by such assessment, that they sent envoys throughout all Greece to collect subscriptions in aid, and received, among other donations, from the Greek settlers in Egypt twenty minæ, besides a large present of alum from the Egyptian king Amasis: their munificent benefactor Cræsus fell a victim to the Persians in 546 B. C., so that his treasure was no longer open to them. The total sum required was three hundred talents (equal probably to about 115,000*l.* sterling)³—a prodigious amount to be collected from the dispersed Grecian cities, who acknowledged no common sovereign authority, and among whom the proportion reasonable to ask from each was difficult to determine with satisfaction to all parties. At length however the money was collected, and the Amphiktyons were in a situation to make a contract

Conflagration and rebuilding of the Delphian temple.

¹ Herodot. v. 62. The unfortunate struggle at Leipsydriion became afterwards the theme of a popular song (Athenæus, xv. p. 695): see Hesychius, v. Λειψύδριον, and Aristotle, Fragm. 'Αθηναίων Πολιτείας, 37, ed. Neumann.

If it be true that Alkibiadês, grandfather of the celebrated Alkibiadês, took part with Kleisthenês and the Alkmæonid exiles in this struggle (see Isokratês, De

Bigis, Or. xvi. p. 351) he must have been a mere youth.

² Pausan. x. 5, 5.

³ Herodot. i. 50, ii. 180. I have taken the 300 talents of Herodotus as being Ægeian talents, which are to Attic talents in the ratio of 5:3. The Inscriptions prove that the accounts of the temple were kept by the Amphiktyons on the Ægeian scale of money: see Corpus Inscip. Boeckh, No. 1683, and Boeckh, Metrologie, vii. 4.

for the building of the temple. The Alkmæônids, who had been in exile ever since the third and final acquisition of power by Peisistratus, took the contract. In executing it, they not only performed the work in the best manner, but even went much beyond the terms stipulated; employing Parian marble for the frontage where the material prescribed to them was coarse stone.¹ As was before remarked in the case of Peisistratus when he was in banishment, we are surprised to find exiles (whose property had been confiscated) so amply furnished with money, unless we are to suppose that Kleisthenês,² inherited through his mother wealth independent of Attica, and deposited it in the temple of the Samian Hêrê. But the fact is unquestionable, and they gained signal reputation throughout the Hellenic world for their liberal performance of so important an enterprise. That the erection took considerable time, we cannot doubt. It seems to have been finished, as far as we can conjecture, about a year or two after the death of Hipparchus—512 B.C.—more than thirty years after the conflagration.

To the Delphians, especially, the rebuilding of their temple on so superior a scale was the most essential of all services, and their gratitude towards the Alkmæônids was proportionally great. Partly through such a feeling, partly through pecuniary presents, Kleisthenês was thus enabled to work the oracle for political purposes, and to call forth the powerful arm of Sparta against Hippias. Whenever any Spartan presented himself to consult the oracle, either on private or public business, the answer of the priestess was always in one strain—"Athens must be liberated." The

Gratitude of the Delphians towards them—they procure from the oracle directions to Sparta, enjoining the expulsion of Hippias.

¹ Herodot. v. 62. The words of the historian would seem to imply that they only began to think of this scheme of building the temple after the defeat of Leipsydriôn, and a year or two before the expulsion of Hippias; a supposition quite inadmissible, since the temple must have taken some years in building.

The loose and prejudiced state-

ment in Philochorus, affirming that the Peisistratids caused the Delphian temple to be burnt, and also that they were at last deposed by the victorious arm of the Alkmæônids (Philochori Fragment. 70, ed. Didot) makes us feel the value of Herodotus and Thucydids as authorities.

² Herodot. vi. 128; Cicero, De Legg. ii. 18. The deposit here

constant repetition of that mandate at length extorted from the piety of the Lacedæmonians a reluctant compliance. Reverence for the god overcame their strong feeling of friendship towards the Peisistratids, and Anchimolius son of Aster was despatched by sea to Athens at the head of a Spartan force to expel them. On landing at Phalêrum, however, he found them already forewarned and prepared, as well as farther strengthened by one thousand horse specially demanded from their allies in Thessaly. Upon the plain of Phalêrum this latter force was found peculiarly effective, so that the division of Anchimolius were driven back to their ships with great loss, and he himself slain.¹ The defeated armament had probably been small, and its repulse only provoked the Lacedæmonians to send a larger, under the command of their king Kleomenês in person, who on this occasion marched into Attica by land. On reaching the plain of Athens, he was assailed by the Thessalian horse, but repelled them in so gallant a style, that they at once rode off and returned to their native country; abandoning their allies with a faithlessness not unfrequent in the Thessalian character. Kleomenês marched on without farther resistance to Athens, where he found himself, together with the Alkmæônids and the malcontent Athenians generally, in possession of the town. At that time there was no fortification except round the acropolis, into which Hippias retired, with his mercenaries and the citizens most faithful to him; having taken care to provision it well before-hand, so that it was not less secure against famine than against assault. He might have defied the besieging force, which was noway prepared for a long blockade. Yet, not altogether confiding in his position, he tried to send his children by stealth out of the country; in which proceeding the children were taken prisoners. To procure their restoration, Hippias consented to all that was demanded of him, and withdrew from Attica to Sigeium in the Troad within the space of five days.

Spartan
expedi-
tions into
Attica.

mentioned by Cicero, which may very probably have been recorded in an inscription in the temple, must have been made before the time of the Persian conquest of Samos—indeed before the death

of Polykratês in 522 B.C., after which period the island fell at once into a precarious situation, and very soon afterwards into the greatest calamities.

¹ Herodot. v. 62, 63.

Thus fell the Peisistratid dynasty in 510 B.C., fifty years after the first usurpation of its founder.¹ It was put down through the aid of foreigners,² and those foreigners, too, wishing well to it in their hearts, though hostile from a mistaken feeling of divine injunction. Yet both the circumstances of its fall, and the course of events which followed, conspire to show that it possessed few attached friends in the country, and that the expulsion of Hippias was welcomed unanimously by the vast majority of Athenians. His family and chief partisans would accompany him into exile—probably as a matter of course, without requiring any formal sentence of condemnation. An altar was erected in the acropolis, with a column hard by, commemorating both the past iniquity of the dethroned dynasty, and the names of all its members.³

¹ Herodot. v. 64, 65.

² Thucyd. vi. 56, 57.

³ Thucyd. vi. 55. ὡς δὲ τὰ βωμὸς σημαίνει, καὶ ἡ στήλη περὶ τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἀδικίας, ἣ ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλει σταθεῖσα.

Dr. Thirlwall, after mentioning the departure of Hippias, proceeds as follows: "After his departure many severe measures were taken against his adherents, who appear to have been for a long time afterwards a formidable party. They were punished or repressed, some by death, others by exile or by the loss of their political privileges. The family of the tyrants was condemned to perpetual banishment, and appears to have been excepted from the most comprehensive decrees of amnesty passed in later times." (*Hist. of Gr. ch. xi. vol. ii. p. 81.*)

I cannot but think that Dr. Thirlwall has here been misled by insufficient authority. He refers to the oration of Andokidēs de Mysteriis, sect. 106 and 78 (sect. 106 coincides in part with ch. 18 in the ed. of Dobree). An attentive reading of it will show that it is utterly unworthy of credit in regard to

matters anterior to the speaker by one generation or more. The orators often permit themselves great licence in speaking of past facts, but Andokidēs in this chapter passes the bounds even of rhetorical licence. First, he states something not bearing the least analogy to the narrative of Herodotus as to the circumstances preceding the expulsion of the Peisistratids, and indeed tacitly setting aside that narrative; next, he actually jumbles together the two capital and distinct exploits of Athens—the battle of Marathon and the repulse of Xerxēs ten years after it. I state this latter charge in the words of Sluiter and Valckenaer, before I consider the former charge: "Verissime ad hæc verba notat Valckenaerius—Confunderet videtur Andocidēs diversissima; Persica sub Miltiade et Dario et victoriam Marathoniam (v. 14)—quæque evenere sub Themistocle, Xerxis gesta. Hic urbem incendio delevit, non ille. (v. 20.) Nihil magis manifestum est, quam diversa ab oratore confundi." (Sluiter, *Lectio. Andocidæ*, p. 147.)

The criticism of these commen-

tators is perfectly borne out by the words of the orator, which are too long to find a place here. But immediately prior to those words he expresses himself as follows, and this is the passage which serves as Dr. Thirlwall's authority: Οἱ γὰρ πατέρες οἱ ἡμέτεροι, γενομένων τῇ πόλει κακῶν μεγάλων, ὅτε οἱ τύραννοι εἶχον τὴν πόλιν, ὁ δὲ ἄστυς ἔφυγε, νικῆσαντες μαχόμενοι τοὺς τυράννους ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ, στρατηγούντος Δαωγόρου τοῦ προπάππου τοῦ ἔμοι, καὶ Χαρίου οὐ ἐκείνου τὴν θυγατέρα εἶχεν ἐξ ἧς ὁ ἡμέτερος ἦν πάππος, καταλθόντες εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τῶν δὲ φυγὴν κατέγνωσαν, τοὺς δὲ μένειν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐάσαντες ἡτίμωσαν.

Both Sluiter (Lect. And. p. 8) and Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. p. 80) refer this alleged victory of Leogoras and the Athenian demus to the action described by Herodotus (v. 64) as having been fought by Kleomenés of Sparta against the Thessalian cavalry. But the two events have not a single circumstance in common, except that each is a victory over the Peisistratidæ or their allies; nor could they well be the same event described in different terms, seeing that Kleomenés, marching from Sparta to Athens, could not have fought the Thessalians at Pallênê, which lay on the road from Marathon to Athens. Pallênê was the place where Peisistratus, advancing from Marathon to Athens on occasion of his second restoration, gained his complete victory over the opposing party, and marched on afterwards to Athens without farther resistance (Herodot. i. 63).

If then we compare the statement given by Andokidês of the preceding circumstances whereby the dynasty of the Peisistratids was put down, with that given by Herodotus, we shall see that the two

are radically different; we cannot blend them together, but must make our election between them. Not less different are the representations of the two as the circumstances which immediately ensued on the fall of Hippias: they would scarcely appear to relate to the same event. That "the adherents of the Peisistratidæ were punished or repressed, some by death, others by exile or by the loss of their political privileges," which is the assertion of Andokidês and Dr. Thirlwall, is not only not stated by Herodotus, but is highly improbable if we accept the facts which he does state; for he tells us that Hippias capitulated and agreed to retire while possessing ample means of resistance—simply from regard to the safety of his children. It is not to be supposed that he would leave his intimate partisans exposed to danger; such of them as felt themselves obnoxious would naturally retire along with him; and if this be what is meant by "many persons condemned to exile," there is no reason to call it in question. But there is little probability that any one was put to death, and still less probability that any were punished by the loss of their political privileges. Within a year afterwards came the comprehensive constitution of Kleisthenês, to be described in the following chapter. Now I consider it eminently unlikely that there were a considerable class of residents in Attica left out of this constitution, under the category of partisans of Peisistratus; indeed the fact cannot be so, if it be true that the very first person banished under the Kleisthenean ostracism was a person named Hipparchus, a kinsman of Peisistratus (Androtion, Fr. 5, ed. Didot; Harpokration, v. Ἰππαρχος); and this latter

circumstance depends upon evidence better than that of Andokidês. That there were a party in Attica attached to the Peisistratids I do not doubt. But that they were "a powerful party" (as Dr. Thirlwall imagines), I see nothing to show; and the extraordinary vigour and unanimity of the Athenian people under the Kleisthenean constitution will go far to prove that such could not have been the case.

I will add another reason to evince how completely Andokidês misconceives the history of Athens between 510—480 B.C. He says that when the Peisistratids were put down, many of their partisans were banished, many others allowed to stay at home with the loss of their political privileges; but that afterwards when the overwhelming dangers of the Persian invasion supervened, the people passed a vote to restore the exiles and to remove the existing disfranchisements at home. He would thus have us believe that the exiled partisans of the Peisistratids were all restored, and the disfranchised partisans of the Peisistratids all enfranchised, just at the moment of the Persian invasion, and with the view of enabling Athens better to repel that grave danger. This is nothing less than a glaring mistake; for the first Persian invasion was undertaken with the express view of restoring Hippias, and with the presence of Hippias himself at Marathon; while the second Persian invasion was also brought on in part by the instigation of his family. Persons who had remained in exile or in a state of disfranchisement down to that time, in consequence of their attachment to the Peisistratids, could not in common prudence be called into action at the moment of peril to

help in repelling Hippias himself. It is very true that the exiles and the disfranchised were re-admitted, shortly before the invasion of Xerxês, and under the then pressing calamities of the state. But these persons were not philo-Peisistratids; they were a number gradually accumulated from the sentences of exile and (atimy or) disfranchisement every year passed at Athens. These were punishments applied by the Athenian law to various crimes and public omissions—the persons so sentenced were not politically disaffected, and their aid would then be of use in defending the state against a foreign enemy.

In regard to "the exception of the family of Peisistratus from the most comprehensive decrees of amnesty passed in later times," I will also remark, that in the decree of amnesty there is no mention of them by name, nor any special exception made against them: among a list of various categories excepted, those are named "who have been condemned to death or exile either as murderers or as despots" (*ἢ σφαγῆσθαι ἢ τυραννοῦς*, Andokid. c. 13). It is by no means certain that the *descendants* of Peisistratus would be comprised in this exception, which mentions only the person himself condemned; but even if this were otherwise, the exception is a mere continuance of similar words of exception in the old Solonian law, anterior to Peisistratus; and therefore affords no indication of particular feeling against the Peisistratids.

Andokidês is a useful authority for the politics of Athens in his own time (between 420—390 B.C.), but in regard to the previous history of Athens between 510—480 B.C., his assertions are so loose, confused, and unscrupulous, that he is a witness of no value. The

mere circumstance noted by Valckenaer, that he has confounded together Marathon and Salamis, would be sufficient to show this. But when we add to such genuine ignorance his mention of his two great-grandfathers in prominent and victorious leadership, which it is hardly credible that they could ever have occupied—when we recollect that the facts which he

alleges to have preceded and accompanied the expulsion of the Peisistratids are not only at variance with those stated by Herodotus, but so contrived as to found a factitious analogy for the cause which he is himself pleading—we shall hardly be able to acquit him of something worse than ignorance in his deposition.

CHAPTER XXXI.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE PEISISTRATIDS.—REVOLUTION OF KLEISTHENES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS.

WITH Hippias disappeared the mercenary Thracian gar-
 rison, upon which he and his father before him
 State of Athens after the expulsion of Hippias. had leaned for defence as well as for enforce-
 ment of authority. Kleomenês with his Lace-
 dæmonian forces retired also, after staying only
 long enough to establish a personal friendship, productive
 subsequently of important consequences, between the Spar-
 tan king and the Athenian Isagoras. The Athenians were
 thus left to themselves, without any foreign interference
 to constrain them in their political arrangements.

It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, that
 the Peisistratids had for the most part respected the forms
 of the Solonian constitution. The nine archons, and the
 probouleutic or preconsidering Senate of Four Hundred
 (both annually changed), still continued to subsist, together
 with occasional meetings of the people—or rather of such
 portion of the people as was comprised in the gentes, phra-
 tries, and four Ionic tribes. The timocratic classification
 of Solon (or quadruple scale of income and admeasurement
 of political franchises according to it) also continued to
 subsist—but all within the tether and subservient to the
 purposes of the ruling family, who always kept one of their
 number as real master, among the chief administrators,
 and always retained possession of the acropolis as well as
 of the mercenary force.

That overawing pressure being now removed by the
 expulsion of Hippias, the enslaved forms be-
 came at once endued with freedom and reality.
 Opposing party-leaders—Kleisthenês—Isagoras. There appeared again, what Attica had not
 known for thirty years, declared political
 parties, and pronounced opposition between two men as
 leaders—on one side, Isagoras son of Tisander, a person

of illustrious descent—on the other Kleisthenês the Alkmæonid, not less illustrious, and possessing at this moment a claim on the gratitude of his countrymen as the most persevering as well as the most effective foe of the dethroned despots. In what manner such opposition was carried on we are not told. It would seem to have been not altogether pacific; but at any rate, Kleisthenês had the worst of it, and in consequence of his defeat (says the historian), “he took into partnership the people, who had been before excluded from everything.”¹ His partnership with the people gave birth to the Athenian democracy: it was a real and important revolution.

The political franchise, or the character of an Athenian citizen, both before and since Solon, had been confined to the primitive four Ionic tribes, each of which was an aggregate of so many close corporations or quasi-families—the gentes and the phratries. None of the residents in Attica, therefore, except those included in some gens or phratry, had any part in the political franchise. Such non-privileged residents were probably at all times numerous, and became more and more so by means of fresh settlers. Moreover they tended most to multiply in Athens and Peiræus, where immigrants would commonly establish themselves. Kleisthenês, breaking down the existing wall of privilege, imparted the political franchise to the excluded masses. But this could not be done by enrolling them in new gentes or phratries, created in addition to the old. For the gentile tie was founded upon old faith and feeling which in the existing state of the Greek mind could not be suddenly conjured up as a bond of union for comparative strangers. It could only be done by disconnecting the franchise altogether from the Ionic tribes as well as from the gentes which constituted them, and by redistributing the population into new tribes with a character and purpose exclusively political. Accordingly Kleisthenês abolished the four Ionic tribes, and created in their place ten new tribes founded upon a different principle, independent of the gentes and phratries. Each of his new tribes comprised a certain number of demes or cantons, with the

Democrati-
cal revo-
lution
headed by
Kleisthe-
nês.

¹ Herodot. v. 66-69. ἐσσοῦμενος δῆμον, πρότερον ἀπωσμένον πάντων, δὲ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον προσταίριζεται—ὡς γὰρ δὴ τὸ Ἀθηναίων θήκατο, &c.

Re-arrangement and extension of the political franchise. Formation of ten new tribes, including an increased number of the population.

enrolled proprietors and residents in each of them. The demes taken altogether included the entire surface of Attica, so that the Kleisthenean constitution admitted to the political franchise all the free native Athenians; and not merely these, but also many metics, and even some of the superior order of slaves.¹ Putting out of sight the general body of slaves, and regarding only the free inhabitants it was in point of fact a scheme approaching to universal suffrage, both political and judicial.

Imperfect description of this event of Herodotus—its real bearing.

The slight and cursory manner in which Herodotus announces this memorable revolution tends to make us overlook its real importance. He dwells chiefly on the alteration in the number and names of the tribes; Kleisthenês, he says, despised the Ionians so much, that he would not tolerate the continuance in Attica of the four tribes which prevailed in the Ionic cities,² deriving their names from the four sons of Ion—just as his grandfather the Sikyonian Kleisthenês, hating the Dorians, had degraded and nicknamed the three Dorian tribes at Sikyôn.

¹ Aristot. Polit. iii. 1, 10; vi. 2, 11. Κλεισθένης—πολλούς ἐφυλέτους ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους.

Several able critics, and Dr. Thirlwall among the number, consider this passage as affording no sense, and assume some conjectural emendation to be indispensable; though there is no particular emendation which suggests itself as pre-eminently plausible. Under these circumstances, I rather prefer to make the best of the words as they stand; which, though unusual, seem to me not absolutely inadmissible. The expression ξένος μετοίκος (which is a perfectly good one, as we find in Aristoph. Equit. 847—εἶπὸν δικιδίον εἶπας εὐ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου) may be considered as the correlative to δούλους μετοίκους—the last word being construed both with δούλους and with ξένους. I apprehend that there

always must have been in Attica a certain number of intelligent slaves living apart from their masters (χωρὶς οἰκοῦντες), in a state between slavery and freedom, working partly on condition of a fixed payment to him, partly for themselves, and perhaps continuing to pass nominally as slaves after they had bought their liberty by instalments. Such men would be δοῦλοι μέτοικοι: indeed there are cases in which δοῦλοι signifies *freedmen* (Meier, De Gentilitate Atticâ, p. 6): they must have been industrious and pushing men, valuable partisans to a political revolution. See K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech. Staatsalterth. ch. 111. not. 15.

² Herodot. v. 69. Κλεισθένης—ὕπεριδῶν Ἴωνας, ἵνα μὴ σφισι αἰ αὐταὶ ἔωσι φυλαὶ καὶ Ἴωσι.

Such is the representation of Herodotus, who seems himself to have entertained some contempt for the Ionians,¹ and therefore to have suspected a similar feeling where it had no real existence.

But the scope of Kleisthenês was something far more extensive. He abolished the four ancient tribes, not because they were Ionic, but because they had become incommensurate with the existing condition of the Attic people, and because such abolition procured both for himself and for his political scheme new as well as hearty allies. And, indeed, if we study the circumstances of the case, we shall see very obvious reasons to suggest the proceeding. For more than thirty years—an entire generation—the old constitution had been a mere empty formality, working only in subservience to the reigning dynasty, and stripped of all real controlling power. We may be very sure, therefore, that both the Senate of Four Hundred and the popular assembly, divested of that free speech which imparted to them not only all their value but all their charm, had come to be of little public estimation, and were probably attended only by a few partisans. Under such circumstances, the difference between qualified citizens and men not so qualified—between members of the four old tribes and men not members—became during this period practically effaced. This in fact was the only species of good which a Grecian despotism ever seems to have done. It confounded the privileged and the non-privileged under one coercive authority common to both, so that the distinction between the two was not easy to revive when the despotism passed away. As soon as Hippias was expelled, the senate and the public assembly regained their efficiency; but had they been continued on the old footing, including none but members of the four tribes, these tribes would have been re-invested with a privilege which in reality they had so long lost, that its revival would have seemed an odious novelty, and the remaining population would probably not have submitted to it. If in addition we consider the political excitement of the moment—the restoration of one body of men from exile, and the departure of another body into exile—the outpouring of long-suppressed hatred, partly against these very forms by the corruption of which the despot had reigned—we shall see that prudence

¹ Such a disposition seems evident in Herodot. i. 143.

as well as patriotism dictated the adoption of an enlarged scheme of government. Kleisthenês had learnt some wisdom during his long exile; and as he probably continued for some time after the introduction of his new constitution, to be the chief adviser of his countrymen, we may consider their extraordinary success as a testimony to his prudence and skill not less than to their courage and unanimity.

Nor does it seem unreasonable to give him credit for a more generous forward movement than what is implied in the literal account of Herodotus. Instead of being forced against his will to purchase popular support by proposing this new constitution, Kleisthenês may have proposed it before, during the discussions which immediately followed the retirement of Hippias; so that the rejection of it formed the ground of quarrel (and no other ground is mentioned) between him and Isagoras. The latter doubtless found sufficient support, in the existing senate and public assembly, to prevent it from being carried without an actual appeal to the people. His opposition to it, moreover, is not difficult to understand; for necessary as the change had become, it was not the less a shock to ancient Attic ideas. It radically altered the very idea of a tribe, which now became an aggregation of demes, of gentes—of fellow-demots, not of fellow-gentiles. It thus broke up those associations, religious, social and political, between the whole and the parts of the old system, which operated powerfully on the mind of every old-fashioned Athenian. The patricians at Rome who composed the gentes and curiæ—and the plebs, who had no part in these corporations—formed for a long time two separate and opposing fractions in the same city, each with its own separate organisation. Only by slow degrees did the plebs gain ground, while the political value of the patrician gens was long maintained alongside of and apart from the plebeian tribe. So too, in the Italian and German cities of the middle ages, the patrician families refused to part with their own separate political identity when the guilds grew up by the side of them; even though forced to renounce a portion of their power, they continued to be a separate fraternity, and would not submit to be regimented anew, under an altered category and denomination, along with the traders who had grown into

Grounds of
opposition
to it in an-
cient Athe-
nian feel-
ing.

wealth and importance.¹ But the reform of Kleisthenês effected this change all at once, both as to the name and as to the reality. In some cases, indeed, that which had been the name of a gens was retained as the name of a deme, but even then the old gentiles were ranked indiscriminately among the remaining demots. The Athenian people, politically considered, thus became one homogeneous whole distributed for convenience into parts, numerical, local, and politically equal. It is however to be remembered, that while the four Ionic tribes were abolished, the gentes and phratries which composed them were left untouched, continuing to subsist as family and religious associations, though carrying with them no political privilege.

The ten newly-created tribes, arranged in an established order of precedence, were called—Erechthêis, Ægêis, Pandiônis, Leontis, Akamantis, CEnêis, Kekrôpis, Hippothoontis, Æantis, Antiochis; names borrowed chiefly from the respected heroes of Attic legend. This number remained unaltered until the year 305 B.C., when it was increased to twelve by the addition of two new tribes, Antigonias and Demetrias, afterwards designated anew by the names of Ptolemais and Attalis: the mere names of these last two, borrowed from living kings, and not from legendary heroes, betray the change from freedom to subservience at Athens. Each tribe comprised a certain number of demes—cantons, parishes, or townships—in Attica. But the total number of these demes is not distinctly ascertained; for though we know that in the time of Pôlemô (the third century B.C.) it was one hundred and seventy-four, we cannot be sure that it had always remained the same; and several critics construe the words of Herodotus to imply that Kleisthenês at first recognised exactly one hundred demes, distributed in equal proportion among his ten tribes.²

¹ In illustration of what is here stated, see the account of the mo-

δῆμος κατένευε εἰς τὰς φυλάς.

Schömann contends that Kleis-

book iii. ch. 2. p. 322; also, Kortüm, Entstehungs-Geschichte der Freistädtischen Bünde im Mittelalter, ch. 5. p. 74-75.

p. xv. and page 363, and Antiquitat. Jur. Pub. Græc. ch. xxii. p. 260), and K. F. Hermann (Lehrbuch der Griech. Staatsalt. ch. 111) thinks that this is what

² Herodot. v. 69. δέξα δὲ καὶ τοὺς

Such construction of the words however is more than doubtful, while the fact itself is improbable; partly because if the change of number had been so considerable as the difference between one hundred and one hundred and seventy-four, some positive evidence of it would probably be found—partly because Kleisthenês would indeed have a motive to render the amount of citizen population nearly equal, but no motive to render the number of demes equal, in each of the ten tribes. It is well known how great is the force of local habits, and how unalterable are parochial or cantonal boundaries. In the absence of proof to the contrary, therefore, we may reasonably suppose the number and circumscription of the demes, as found or modified by Kleisthenês, to have subsisted afterwards with little alteration, at least until the increase in the number of the tribes.

There is another point, however, which is at once more certain, and more important to notice. The demes which

Demes belonging to each tribe usually not adjacent to each other.

Kleisthenês assigned to each tribe were in no case all adjacent to each other: and therefore the tribe, as a whole, did not correspond with any continuous portion of the territory, nor could it have any peculiar local interest, separate from the entire community. Such systematic avoidance of the factious arising out of neighbourhood will appear to have been more especially necessary, when we recollect that the quarrels of the Parali, the Diakrii, the Pediaki, during the preceding century, had all been generated from local feud, though doubtless artfully fomented by individual ambition. Moreover it was only by this same precaution that the local predominance of the city, and the

Herodotus meant to affirm, though he does not believe the fact to have really stood so.

There is a difficulty in the construction of these words—δέξα δὲ καὶ τοὺς δήμους κατένευε ἐς τὰς φυλάς. In my former edition, I followed many commentators, in joining δέξα with φυλάς; which, though it brings out the sense required, is embarrassing from the position of the words. Mr. Scott (of Trinity College, Cambridge)

has pointed out what seems a better construction, bringing out the same sense. He joins δέξα, not with φυλάς, but with κατένευε, upon the analogy of various passages—Xenophon. Cyropæd. vii. 5, 8. τὸ στρατευμα κατένευε δώδεκα μέρη—Plato, Politicus. p. 283 D. διέλωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὴν δύο μέρη—Herodotus, vii. 121. τρεῖς μοῖρας ὁ Σέρξης δασάμενος πάντα τὸν πέζον στρατὸν—and various other passages.

formation of a city-interest distinct from that of the country, was obviated; which could hardly have failed to arise had the city by itself constituted either one deme or one tribe. Kleisthenês distributed the city (or found it already distributed) into several demes, and those demes among several tribes; while Peiræus and Phalêrum, each constituting a separate deme, were also assigned to different tribes; so that there were no local advantages either to bestow predominance, or to create a struggle for predominance, of one tribe over the rest.¹ Each deme had its own local interests to watch over; but the tribe was a mere aggregate of demes for political, military, and religious purposes, with no separate hopes or fears apart from the whole state. Each tribe had a chapel, sacred rites and festivals, and a common fund for such meetings, in honour of its eponymous hero, administered by members of its own choice:² and the statues of all the ten eponymous heroes, fraternal patrons of the democracy, were planted in the most conspicuous part of the agora of Athens. In the future working of the Athenian government, we shall trace no symptom of disquieting local factions—a capital amendment, compared with the disputes

¹ The deme *Melîtê* belonged to the tribe *Kekropis*; *Kollytus*, to the tribe *Ægëis*; *Kydathenæon*, to the tribe *Pandionis*; *Kerameis*, or *Kerameikus*, to the *Akamantis*; *Skambônida*, to the *Leontis*.

All these five were demes within the city of Athens, and all belonged to different tribes.

Peiræus belonged to the *Hippochoontis*; *Phalêrum*, to the *Æantis*; *Xypetê*, to the *Kekropis*; *Thymætadæ*, to the *Hippochoontis*. These four demes, adjoining to each other, formed a sort of quadruple local union, for festivals and other purposes, among themselves; though three of them belonged to different tribes.

See the list of the Attic demes, with a careful statement of their localities in so far as ascertained, in Professor Ross, *Die Deme von Attika*, Halle 1846. The distribu-

tion of the city-demes, and of *Peiræus* and *Phalêrum*, among different tribes, appears to me a clear proof of the intention of the original distributors. It shows that they wished from the beginning to make the demes constituting each tribe discontinuous, and that they desired to prevent both the growth of separate tribe-interests and ascendancy of one tribe over the rest: it contradicts the belief of those who suppose that the tribe was at first composed of continuous demes, and that the breach of continuity arose from subsequent changes.

Of course there were many cases in which adjoining demes belonged to the same tribe; but not one of the ten tribes was made up altogether of adjoining demes.

² See Boeckh, *Corp. Inscriptt.* No. 85, 128, 213, &c.

of the preceding century, and traceable in part to the absence of border-relations between demes of the same tribe.

The deme now became the primitive constituent element of the commonwealth, both as to persons and as to property. It had its own demarch, its register of enrolled citizens, its collective property, its public meetings and religious ceremonies, its taxes levied and administered by itself. The register of qualified citizens¹ was kept by the demarch, and the inscription of new citizens took place at the assembly of the demots, whose legitimate sons were enrolled on attaining the age of eighteen, and their adopted sons at any time when presented and sworn to by the adopting citizen. The citizenship could only be granted by a public vote of the people, but wealthy non-freemen were enabled sometimes to evade this law and purchase admission upon the register of some poor deme, probably by means of a fictitious adoption. At the meetings of the demots, the register was called over, and it sometimes happened that some names were expunged, in which case the party thus disfranchised had an appeal to the popular judicature.² So great was the local administrative power, however, of these demes, that they are described as the substitute,³ under the Kleisthenean system, for the Naukraries under the Solonian and ante-Solonian. The Trittyes and Naukraries, though nominally preserved, and the latter augmented in number from forty-eight to fifty, appear henceforward as of little public importance.

Kleisthenês preserved, but at the same time modified and expanded, all the main features of Solon's political constitution; the public assembly or Ekklesia—the pre-considering senate composed of members from all the tribes—and the habit of annual election, as well as annual responsibility.

Solonian constitution preserved with modifications.

¹ We may remark that this register was called by a special name, the Lexiarchic register; while the primitive register of phrators and gentiles always retained, even in the time of the orators, its original name of the common register.—Harpokraton, v. Κοινὸν γράμματειον καὶ ληξιαρχικόν.

² See Schömann, *Antiq. Jur. P. Græc.* ch. xxiv. The oration of Demosthenês against Ebulidês is instructive about these proceedings of the assembled demots: compare Harpokration, v. Διαψήφισις, and Meier, *De Bonis Damnatorum*, ch. xii. p. 78, &c.

³ Aristot. *Fragment. de Republ.*, ed. Neumann—*Ἀθην. πολιτ.* Fr. 40.

of magistrates, by and to the Ekklesia. The full value must now have been felt of possessing such pre-existing institutions to build upon, at a moment of perplexity and dissension. But the Kleisthenean Ekklesia acquired new strength, and almost a new character, from the great increase of the number of citizens qualified to attend it; while the annually-changed senate, instead of being composed of four hundred members taken in equal proportion from each of the old four tribes, was enlarged to five hundred, taken equally from each of the new ten tribes. It now comes before us, under the name of Senate of Five Hundred, as an active and indispensable body throughout the whole Athenian democracy: moreover the practice now seems to have begun (though the period of commencement cannot be decisively proved) of determining the names of the senators by lot. Both the senate thus constituted, and the public assembly, were far more popular and vigorous than they had been under the original arrangement of Solon.

The new constitution of the tribes, as it led to a change in the annual senate, so it transformed no less directly the military arrangements of the state, both as to soldiers and as to officers. The citizens called upon to serve in arms were now marshalled according to tribes—each tribe having its own taxiarchs as officers for the hoplites, and its own phylarch at the head of the horsemen. Moreover there were now created, for the first time, ten stratêgi or generals, one from each tribe; and two hipparchs, for the supreme command of the horsemen. Under the prior Athenian constitution it appears that the command of the military force had been vested in the third archon or polemarch, no stratêgi then existing. Even after the stratêgi had been created, under the Kleisthenean constitution, the polemarch still retained a joint right of command along with them—as we are told at the battle of Marathon, where Kallimachus the polemarch not only enjoyed an equal vote in the council of war along with the ten stratêgi, but even occupied the post of honour on the right wing.¹ The ten generals, annually changed, are thus (like the ten tribes) a fruit of the Kleisthenean constitution, which was at the same time powerfully strengthened and protected by this

Change of military arrangement in the state. The ten stratêgi or generals.

p. 88: Schol. ad Aristophan. Ran. Ναυκρατικά; Photius, v. Ναυκρατία.
 87; Harpokration, v. Δημάρχος—¹ Herodot. vi. 109-111.

remodelling of the military force. The functions of the generals became more extensive as the democracy advanced, so that they seem to have acquired gradually not merely the direction of military and naval affairs, but also that of the foreign relations of the city generally—while the nine archons, including the polemarch, were by degrees lowered down from that full executive and judicial competence which they had once enjoyed, to the simple ministry of police and preparatory justice. Encroached upon by the *stratēgi* on one side, they were also restricted in efficiency, on the other side, by the rise of the popular *dikasteries* or numerous jury-courts. We may be sure that these popular *dikasteries* had not been permitted to meet or to act under the despotism of the *Peisistratids*, and that the judicial business of the city must then have been conducted partly by the senate of *Areopagus*, partly by the archons; perhaps with a nominal responsibility of the latter, at the end of their year of office, to an acquiescent *Ekklesia*. And if we even assume it to be true, as some writers contend, that the habit of direct popular judicature (over and above this annual trial of responsibility) had been partially introduced by *Solon*, it must have been discontinued during the long coercion exercised by the supervening dynasty. But the

The judicial assembly of citizens—or *Heliaea*—subsequently divided into bodies judging apart. The political assembly, or *Ekklesia*.

outburst of popular spirit, which lent force to *Kleisthenēs*, doubtless carried the people into direct action as jurors in the aggregate *Heliaea*, not less than as voters in the *Ekklesia*—and the change was thus begun which contributed to degrade the archons from their primitive character as judges, into the lower function of preliminary examiners and presidents of a jury. Such convocation of numerous juries, beginning first with the aggregate body of sworn citizens above thirty years of age, and subsequently dividing them into separate bodies or pannels for trying particular causes, became gradually more frequent and more systematised; until at length, in the time of *Periklēs*, it was made to carry a small pay, and stood out as one of the most prominent features of Athenian life. We cannot particularise the different steps whereby such final development was attained, and whereby the judicial competence of the archon was cut down to the mere power of inflicting a small fine. But the first steps of it are found in the revolution

of Kleisthenês, and it seems to have been consummated after the battle of Platæa. Of the function exercised by the nine archons, as well as by many other magistrates and official persons at Athens, in convoking a dikastery or jury-court, bringing on causes for trial, and presiding over the trial—a function constituting one of the marks of superior magistracy, and called the Hegemony or presidency of a dikastery—I shall speak more at length hereafter. At present I wish merely to bring to view the increased and increasing sphere of action on which the people entered at the memorable turn of affairs now before us.

The financial affairs of the city underwent at this epoch as complete a change as the military. The appointment of magistrates and officers by Financial arrangements. tents, one from each tribe, seems to have become the ordinary practice. A board of ten, called Apodektæ, were invested with the supreme management of the exchequer, dealing with the contractors as to those portions of the revenue which were farmed, receiving all the taxes from the collectors, and disbursing them under competent authority. Of this board the first nomination is expressly ascribed to Kleisthenês,¹ as a substitute for certain persons called Kôlakretæ, who had performed the same function before and who were now retained only for subordinate services. The duties of the Apodektæ were afterwards limited to receiving the public income, and paying it over to the ten treasurers of the goddess Athênê, by whom it was kept in the inner chamber of the Parthenon, and disbursed as needed; but this more complicated arrangement cannot be referred to Kleisthenês. From his Senate of Five Hundred. time forward too, the Senate of Five Hundred steps far beyond its original duty of preparing matters for the discussion of the Ekklesia. It embraces, besides, a large circle of administrative and general superintendence, which hardly admits of any definition. Its sittings become constant, with the exception of special holidays. The year is distributed into ten portions called Prytanies—the fifty senators of each tribe taking by turns the duty of constant attendance during one prytany, and receiving during that time the title of The Prytanes: the order of precedence among the tribes in these duties was annually determined by lot. In the ordinary Attic year

¹ Harpokration, v. Ἀποδέκται.

of twelve lunar months, or 354 days, six of the prytanies contained thirty-five days, four of them contained thirty-six: in the intercalated years of thirteen months, the number of days was thirty-eight and thirty-nine respectively. Moreover a farther subdivision of the prytany into five periods of seven days each, and of the fifty tribe-senators into five bodies of ten each, was recognised. Each body of ten presided in the senate for one period of seven days, drawing lots every day among their number for a new chairman called Epistatês, to whom during his day of office were confided the keys of the acropolis and the treasury, together with the city seal. The remaining senators, not belonging to the prytanising tribe, might of course attend if they chose. But the attendance of nine among them, one from each of the remaining nine tribes, was imperatively necessary to constitute a valid meeting, and to ensure a constant representation of the collective people.

During those later times known to us through the great orators, the Ekklesia, or formal assembly of the citizens, was convoked four times regularly during each prytany, or oftener if necessity required—usually by the senate, though the stratêgi had also the power of convoking it by their own authority. It was presided over by the prytanes, and questions were put to the vote by their Epistatês or chairman. But the nine representatives of the non-prytanising tribes were always present as a matter of course, and seem indeed in the days of the orators to have acquired to themselves the direction of it, together with the right of putting questions for the vote¹—setting aside wholly or partially the fifty prytanes. When we carry our attention back, however, to the state of the Ekklesia, as first organised by Kleisthenês (I have already remarked that expositors of the Athenian constitution are too apt to neglect the distinction of times, and to suppose that what was the practice between 400-330 B.C. had been always the practice), it will appear probable that he provided one regular meeting in each prytany, and no more; giving to the senate and the stratêgi power of convening special meetings if needful, but establishing one Ekklesia during each prytany, or ten in the

¹ See the valuable treatise of xxxi.; Harpokration, v. Κοπία 'Ex-Schömann, De Comititiis, *passim*; xλγσιζ; Pollux, viii. 95. also his *Antiq. Jur. Publ. Gr. ch.*

year, as a regular necessity of state. How often the ancient Ekklesia had been convoked during the interval between Solon and Peisistratus, we cannot exactly say—probably but seldom during the year. Under the Peisistratids, its convocation had dwindled down into an inoperative formality. Hence the re-establishment of it by Kleisthenês, not merely with plenary determining powers, but also under full notice and preparation of matters beforehand, together with the best securities for orderly procedure, was in itself a revolution impressive to the mind of every Athenian citizen. To render the Ekklesia efficient, it was indispensable that its meetings should be both frequent and free. Men were thus trained to the duty both of speakers and hearers, and each man, while he felt that he exercised his share of influence on the decision, identified his own safety and happiness with the vote of the majority, and became familiarised with the notion of a sovereign authority which he neither could nor ought to resist. This was an idea new to the Athenian bosom. With it came the feelings sanctifying free speech and equal law—words which no Athenian citizen ever afterwards heard unmoved: together with that sentiment of the entire commonwealth as one indivisible, which always overruled, though it did not supplant, the local and cantonal specialties. It is not too much to say that these patriotic and ennobling impulses were a new product in the Athenian mind, to which nothing analogous occurs even in the time of Solon. They were kindled in part doubtless by the strong reaction against the Peisistratids, but still more by the fact that the opposing leader, Kleisthenês, turned that transitory feeling to the best possible account, and gave to it a vigorous perpetuity, as well as a well-defined positive object, by the popular elements conspicuous in his constitution. His name makes less figure in history than we should expect, because he passed for the mere renovator of Solon's scheme of government after it had been overthrown by Peisistratus. Probably he himself professed this object, since it would facilitate the success of his propositions: and if we confine ourselves to the letter of the case, the fact is in a great measure true, since the annual senate and the Ekklesia are both Solonian—but both of them under his reform were clothed in totally

Kleisthenês
the real
author of
the Athe-
nian de-
mocracy.

But it could only have been matured by degrees into that constant and systematic service which the pay of Periklès called forth at last in completeness. Under the last mentioned system the judicial competence of the archons was annulled, and the third archon or polemarch withdrawn from all military functions. But this had not been yet done at the time of the battle of Marathon, where Kallimachus the polemarch not only commanded along with the stratêgi, but enjoyed a sort of pre-eminence over them: nor had it been done during the year after the battle of Marathon, in which Aristeidès was archon—for the magisterial decisions of Aristeidès formed one of the principal foundations of his honourable surname, the Just.¹

With this question as to the comparative extent of judicial power vested by Kleisthenês in the popular dikastery and the archons, are in reality connected two others in Athenian constitutional law; relating first, to the admissibility of all citizens for the post of archon—next, to the choosing of archons by lot. It is well known that in the time of Periklès, the archons, and various other individual functionaries, had come to be chosen by lot—moreover all citizens were legally admissible, and might give in their names to be drawn for by lot, subject to what was called the Dokimasy, or legal examination into their status of citizen and into various moral and religious qualifications, before they took office; while at the same time the function of the archon had become nothing higher than preliminary examination of parties and witnesses for the dikastery, and presidency over it when afterwards assembled, together with the power of imposing by authority a fine of small amount upon inferior offenders. Now all these three political arrangements hang essentially together. The great value of the lot, according to Grecian democratical ideas, was that it equalised the chance of office between rich and poor: but so long as the poor citizens were legally inadmissible, choice by lot could have no recommendation either to the rich or to the poor. In fact, it would be less democratical than election by the general mass of citizens, because the poor citizen would under the latter system

Three points in Athenian constitutional law, hanging together:—Universal admissibility of citizens—Choice by lot—Reduced functions of the magistrates chosen by lot.

¹ Plutarch, Arist. 7; Herodot. vi. 109-111.

enjoy an important right of interference by means of his suffrage, though he could not be elected himself.¹ Again, choice by lot could never under any circumstances be applied to those posts where special competence, and a certain measure of attributes possessed only by a few, were indispensable—nor was it ever applied throughout the whole history of democratical Athens, to the stratêgi or generals, who were always elected by show of hands of the assembled citizens. Accordingly, we may regard it as certain, that at the time when the archons first came to be chosen by lot, the superior and responsible duties

¹ Aristotle puts these two together; election of magistrates by the mass of the citizens, but only out of persons possessing a high pecuniary qualification: this he ranks as the least democratical democracy, if one may use the phrase (*Politic.* iii. 6-11), or a mean between democracy and oligarchy—an ἀριστοκρατία or πολιτεία in his sense of the word (*iv.* 7, 3). He puts the employment of the lot as a symptom of decisive and extreme democracy, such as would never tolerate a pecuniary qualification of eligibility.

So again Plato (*Legg.* iii. p. 692), after remarking that the legislator of Sparta first provided the senate, next the ephors, as a bridle upon the kings, says of the ephors that they were "something nearly approaching to an authority emanating from the lot"—οἷον ψάλλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ τῆν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγύς τῆς κληρωτῆς ἀγαθῶν δυνάμεως.

Upon which passage there are some good remarks in Schömann's edition of Plutarch's *Lives of Agis and Kleomenès* (*Comment. ad Ag.* c. 8. p. 119). It is to be recollected that the actual mode in which the Spartan ephors were chosen, as I have already stated in my first volume, cannot be clearly made out, and has been much debated by critics:—

"Mihi hæc verba, quum illud quidem manifestum faciant, quod etiam aliunde constat, sorte captos ephoros non esse, tum hoc alterum quod Hermannus statuit, creationem sortitioni non absimilem fuisse, nequaquam demonstrare videntur. Nimirum nihil aliud nisi prope accedere ephorum magistratus ad eos dicitur, qui sortito capiantur. *Sortitis autem magistratibus hoc maxime proprium est, ut promiscue—non ex genere, censu, dignitate—a quolibet capi possint: quamobrem quum ephori quoque fere promiscue fierent ex omni multitudine civium, poterat haud dubie magistratus eorum ἐγγύς τῆς κληρωτῆς δυνάμεως esse dici, etiamsi ἀρετοὶ essent—h. e. suffragiis creati. Et video Lachmannum quoque p. 165. not. 1. de Platonis loco similiter judicare."*

The employment of the lot, as Schömann remarks, implies universal admissibility of all citizens to office: though the converse does not hold good—the latter does not of necessity imply the former. Now as we know that universal admissibility did not become the law of Athens until after the battle of Plataea, so we may conclude that the employment of the lot had no place before that epoch—i. e. had no place under the constitution of Kleisthenès.

once attached to that office had been, or were in course of being, detached from it, and transferred either to the popular dikasts or to the ten elected stratêgi: so that there remained to these archons only a routine of police and administration, important indeed to the state, yet such as could be executed by any citizen of average probity, diligence, and capacity—at least there was no obvious absurdity in thinking so; while the Dokimasy excluded from the office men of notoriously discreditable life, even after they might have drawn the successful lot. Periklês,¹ though chosen stratêgus year after year successively, was never archon; and it may be doubted whether men of first-rate talents and ambition often gave in their names for the office. To those of smaller aspirations² it was doubtless a source of importance, but it imposed troublesome labour, gave no pay, and entailed a certain degree of peril upon any archon who might have given offence to powerful men, when he came to pass through the trial of accountability which followed immediately upon his year of office. There was little to make the office acceptable, either to very poor men, or to very rich and ambitious men; and between the middling persons who gave in their names, any one might be taken without great practical mischief, always assuming the two guarantees of the Dokimasy before, and accountability after office. This was the conclusion—in my opinion a mistaken conclusion, and such as would find no favour at present—to which the democrats of Athens were conducted by their strenuous desire to equalise the chances of office for rich and poor. But their sentiment seems to have been satisfied by a partial enforcement of the lot to the choice of some offices—especially the archons, as the primitive chief magistrates of the state—without applying it to all or to the most responsible and difficult. Hardly would they have applied it to the archons, if it had been indispensably necessary that these magistrates should retain their original very serious duty of judging disputes and condemning offenders.

I think therefore that these three points—1. The opening of the post of archon to all citizens indiscriminately; 2. The choice of archons by lot; 3. The diminished range

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 9-16.

acters in Plato, Republic, v. p.

² See a passage about such char- 475 B.

of the archon's duties and responsibilities, through the extension of those belonging to the popular courts of justice on the one hand and to the stratêgi on the other—are all connected together, and must have been simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, in the time of introduction: the enactment of universal admissibility to office certainly not coming after the other two, and probably coming a little before them.

Now in regard to the eligibility of all Athenians indiscriminately to the office of archon, we find a clear and positive testimony as to the time when it was first introduced. Plutarch tells us¹ that the oligarchical,² but high-principled, Aristeidês was himself the proposer of this constitutional change, shortly after the battle of Plataea, with the consequent expulsion of the Persians from Greece, and the return of the refugee Athenians to their ruined city. Seldom has it happened in the history of mankind that rich and poor have been so completely equalised as among the population of Athens in that memorable expatriation and heroic struggle; nor are we at all surprised to hear that the mass of the citizens, coming back with freshly-kindled patriotism as well as with the consciousness that their country had only been recovered by the equal efforts of all, would no longer submit to be legally disqualified from any office of state. It was on this occasion that the constitution was first made really "common" to all, and that the archons, stratêgi, and all functionaries, first began to be chosen from all Athenians without any difference of legal eligibility.³ No mention is made of the lot, in this important statement of Plutarch, which appears to me every way worthy of credit, and which teaches us, that down to the invasion of Xerxês, not only had the exclusive principle of the Solonian law of qualification continued in force (whereby the first three classes on the census were alone admitted to all individual offices, and the fourth or Thêtic class excluded), but also the archons had hitherto been elected by the citizens—not taken by lot. Now for

Universal admissibility of citizens to the archonship—not introduced until after the battle of Plataea.

¹ Plutarch, Arist. 22.

² So at least the supporters of the constitution of Kleisthenês were called by the contemporaries of Periklês.

³ Plutarch, Arist. *ut sup.* γράφει ψήφισμα, καινήν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἰρεσθῆναι.

financial purposes, the quadruple census of Solon was retained long after this period, even beyond the Peloponnesian war and the oligarchy of Thirty; but we thus learn that Kleisthenès in his constitution retained it for political purposes also, in part at least. He recognised the exclusion of the great mass of the citizens from all individual offices—such as the archon, the stratêgus, &c. In his time, probably, no complaints were raised on the subject. For his constitution gave to the collective bodies—senate, ekklesia, and heliæa or dikastery—a degree of power and importance such as they had never before known or imagined. And we may well suppose that the Athenian people of that day had no objection even to the proclaimed system and theory of being exclusively governed by men of wealth and station as individual magistrates—especially since many of the newly-enfranchised citizens had been before metics and slaves. Indeed it is to be added, that even under the full democracy of later Athens, though the people had then become passionately attached to the theory of equal admissibility of all citizens to office, yet in practice, poor men seldom obtained offices which were elected by the general vote, as will appear more fully in the course of this history.¹

The choice of the stratêgi remained ever afterwards upon the footing on which Aristeidês thus placed it; but the lot for the choice of archon must have been introduced

¹ So in the Italian republics of the twelfth and thirteenth century, the nobles long continued to possess the exclusive right of being elected to the consulate and the great offices of state, even after those offices had come to be elected by the people. The habitual misrule and oppression of the nobles gradually put an end to this right, and even created in many towns a resolution positively to exclude them. At Milan, towards the end of the twelfth century, the twelve consuls with the Podestat possessed all the powers of government: these consuls were nominated by one hundred electors

chosen by and among the people. Sismondi observes—“Cependant le peuple imposa lui-même à ces électeurs, la règle fondamentale de choisir tous les magistrats dans le corps de la noblesse. Ce n'étoit point encore la possession des magistratures que l'on contestoit aux gentils-hommes: on demandoit seulement qu'ils fussent les mandataires immédiats de la nation. Mais plus d'une fois, en dépit du droit incontestable des citoyens, les consuls regnant s'attribuèrent l'élection de leurs successeurs.” (Sismondi, Histoire des Républiques Italiennes, chap. xii. vol. ii. p. 240.)

shortly after his proposition of universal eligibility, and in consequence too of the same tide of democratical feeling—introduced as a farther corrective, because the poor citizen, though he had become eligible, was nevertheless not elected. And at the same time, I imagine, that elaborate distribution of the *Heliæa*, or aggregate body of dikasts or jurors, into separate pannels or dikasteries for the decision of judicial matters, was first regularised. It was this change that stole away from the archons so important a part of their previous jurisdiction: it was this change that Periklès more fully consummated by ensuring pay to the dikasts.

But the present is not the time to enter into the modifications which Athens underwent during the generation after the battle of Platæa. They have been here briefly noticed for the purpose of reasoning back, in the absence of direct evidence, to Athens as it stood in the generation before that memorable battle, after the reform of Kleisthenês. His reform, though highly democratical, stopped short of the mature democracy which prevailed from Periklès to Demosthenês, in three ways especially, among various others; and it is therefore sometimes considered by the later writers as an aristocratical constitution:—1. It still recognised the archons as judges to a considerable extent, and the third archon or polemarch as joint military commander along with the stratêgi. 2. It retained them as elected annually by the body of citizens, not as chosen by lot.² 3. It still excluded

Difference between that constitution and the political state of Athens after Periklès.

¹ Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 15. τὴν ἐπὶ Κλεισθένοισι ἀγείρειν ἀριστοκρατίαν περὶωμένον: compare, Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 2, and *Isokratês*, *Areopagiticus*, Or. xii. p. 143, p. 192 ed. Bek.

² Herodotus speaks of Kallimachus the Polemarch at Marathon as ὁ τῶν κατὰ μὲν λαχῶν Πολέμαρχος (vi. 110).

I cannot but think that in this case he transfers to the year 490 B.C. the practice of his own time. The polemarch at the time of the battle of Marathon was in a certain sense the first stratêgi; and the stratêgi were never taken by lot,

but always chosen by show of hands, even to the end of the democracy. It seems impossible to believe that the stratêgi were elected, and that the polemarch, at the time when his functions were the same as theirs, was chosen by lot.

Herodotus seems to have conceived the choice of magistrates by lot as being of the essence of a democracy (Herodot. iii. 80).

Plutarch also (*Periklès*, c. 9) seems to have conceived the choice of archons by lot as a very ancient institution of Athens: nevertheless it results from the first chapter of

the fourth class of the Solonian census from all individual office, the archonship among the rest. The Solonian law of exclusion, however, though retained in principle, was mitigated in practice thus far—that whereas Solon had rendered none but members of the highest class on the census (the Pentakosiomedimni) eligible to the archonship, Kleisthenês opened that dignity to all the first three classes, shutting out only the fourth. That he did this may be inferred from the fact that Aristeidês, assuredly not a rich man, became archon. I am also inclined to believe that the senate of Five Hundred as constituted by Kleisthenês was taken, not by election, but by lot, from the ten tribes—and that every citizen became eligible to it. Election for this purpose—that is, the privilege of annually electing a batch of fifty senators all at once by each tribe—would probably be thought more troublesome than valuable; nor do we hear of separate meetings of each tribe for purposes of election. Moreover the office of senator was a collective, not an individual office; the shock therefore to the feelings of semi-democratised Athens, from the unpleasant idea of a poor man sitting among the fifty prytanes, would be less than if

his life of Aristeidês—an obscure chapter, in which conflicting authorities are mentioned without being well discriminated—that Aristeidês was *chosen* archon by the people—not drawn by lot: an additional reason for believing this is, that he was archon in the year following the battle of Marathon, at which he had been one of the ten generals. Idomeneus distinctly affirmed this to be the fact—οὐ κωμωδῶν, ἀλλ' ἐλομένων Ἀθηναίων (Plutarch, Arist. c. 1).

Isokratês also (Areopagit. Or. vii. p. 144, p. 195 ed. Bekker) conceived the constitution of Kleisthenês as including all the three points noticed in the text:—1. A high pecuniary qualification of eligibility for individual offices. 2. Election to these offices by all the citizens, and accountability to the same after office. 3. No employment of the lot.—He even

contends that this election is more truly democratical than sortition; since the latter process might admit men attached to oligarchy, which would not happen under the former—ἐπειτα καὶ δημοτικωτέραν ἐνόμιζον ταύτην τὴν κατάστασιν ἢ τὴν διὰ τοῦ λαγχάνειν γιγνομένην· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ κληρώσει τὴν τύχην βραβεύσειν, καὶ πολλάκις λήψεσθαι τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, &c. This would be a good argument if there were no pecuniary qualification for eligibility—such pecuniary qualification is a provision which he lays down, but which he does not find it convenient to insist upon emphatically.

I do not here advert to the γραφὴ παρανόμων, the νομοφύλακας, and the sworn νομοθέται—all of them institutions belonging to the time of Periklês at the earliest; not to that of Kleisthenês.

they conceived him as polemarch at the head of the right wing of the army, or as an archon administering justice.

A farther difference between the constitution of Solon and that of Kleisthenês is to be found in the ^{Senate of} position of the senate of Areopagus. Under the ^{Areopagus.} former, that senate had been the principal body in the state, and Solon had even enlarged its powers; under the latter, it must have been treated at first as an enemy and kept down. For as it was composed only of all the past archons, and as during the preceding thirty years every archon had been a creature of the Peisistratids, the Areopagites collectively must have been both hostile and odious to Kleisthenês and his partisans—perhaps a fraction of its members might even retire into exile with Hippias. Its influence must have been sensibly lessened by the change of party, until it came to be gradually filled by fresh archons springing from the bosom of the Kleisthenean constitution. Now during this important interval, the new-modelled senate of Five Hundred and the popular assembly stepped into that ascendancy which they never afterwards lost. From the time of Kleisthenês forward, the Areopagites cease to be the chief and prominent power in the state. Yet they are still considerable; and when the second fill of the democratical tide took place, after the battle of Platæa, they became the focus of that which was then considered as the party of oligarchical resistance. I have already remarked that the archons during the intermediate time (about 509-477 B.C.) were all elected by the ekklesia, not chosen by lot—and that the fourth or poorest and most numerous class on the census were by law then ineligible; while election at Athens, even when every citizen without exception was an elector and eligible, had a natural tendency to fall upon men of wealth and station. We thus see how it happened that the past archons, when united in the senate of Areopagus, infused into that body the sympathies, prejudices, and interests, of the richer classes. It was this which brought them into conflict with the more democratical party headed by Periklês and Ephialtês, in times when portions of the Kleisthenean constitution had come to be discredited as too much imbued with oligarchy.

One other remarkable institution, distinctly ascribed to Kleisthenês, yet remains to be noticed—the ^{The ostrac-} ostracism; upon which I have already made

some remarks¹ in touching upon the memorable Solonian proclamation against neutrality in asedition. It is hardly too much to say, that without this protective process none of the other institutions would have reached maturity.

By the ostracism a citizen was banished without special accusation, trial, or defence, for a term of ten years—subsequently diminished to five. His property was not taken away, nor his reputation tainted; so that the penalty consisted solely in the banishment from his native city to some other Greek city. As to reputation, the ostracism was a compliment rather than otherwise;² and so it was vividly felt to be, when, about ninety years after Kleisthenês, the conspiracy between Nicias and Alkibiadês fixed it upon Hyperbolus: the two former had both recommended the taking of an ostracising vote, each hoping to cause the banishment of the other; but before the day arrived, they accommodated their own quarrel. To fire off the safety-gun of the republic against a person so little dangerous as Hyperbolus, was denounced as the prostitution of a great political ceremony: “it was not against such men as him (said the comic writer Plato³) that the shell

¹ See above, chap. xi.

² Aristeidês Rhetor, Orat. xlvi. vol. ii. p. 317, ed. Dindorf.

³ Plutarch (Nicias, c. 11; Alkibiad. c. 13; Aristeid. c. 7): Thucyd. viii. 73. Plato Comicus said respecting Hyperbolus—

Οὐ γὰρ τοιοῦτων οὐνεκ' ὄστραχ' ἠύρεθη.

Theophrastus had stated that Phæax, and not Nicias, was the rival of Alkibiadês on this occasion when Hyperbolus was ostracised; but most authors (says Plutarch) represent Nicias as the person. It is curious that there should be any difference of statement about a fact so notorious, and in the best-known time of Athenian history.

Taylor thinks that the oration which now passes as that of Andokidês against Alkibiadês, is really by Phæax, and was read by Plutarch, as the oration of Phæax in an actual contest of ostracism between Phæax, Nicias, and Al-

kibiadês. He is opposed by Ruhnken and Valckenaer (see Sluiter's preface to that oration, c. 1, and Ruhnken, Hist. Critic. Oratt. Græcor. p. 135). I cannot agree with either: I cannot think with him, that it is a real oration of Phæax; nor with them, that it is a real oration in any genuine cause of ostracism whatever. It appears to me to have been composed after the ostracism had fallen into desuetude, and when the Athenians had not only become somewhat ashamed of it, but had lost the familiar conception of what it really was. For how otherwise can we explain the fact, that the author of that oration complains that he is about to be ostracised without any secret voting, in which the very essence of the ostracism consisted, and from which its name was borrowed (οὐτε διαψηφισαμένων χρυβδῆν, c. 2)? His oration is framed as if the

was intended to be used." The process of ostracism was carried into effect by writing upon a shell or potsherd the name of the person whom a citizen thought it prudent for a time to banish; which shell, when deposited in the proper vessel, counted for a vote towards the sentence.

I have already observed that all the governments of the Grecian cities, when we compare them with that idea which a modern reader is apt to conceive of the measure of force belonging to a government, were essentially weak—the good as well as the bad—the democratical, the oligarchical, and the despotic. The force in the hands of any government, to cope with conspirators or mutineers, was extremely small, with the single exception of a despot surrounded with his mercenary troop. Accordingly, no tolerably sustained conspiracy or usurper could be put down except by direct aid of the people in support of the government; which amounted to a dissolution, for the time, of constitutional authority, and was pregnant with reactionary consequences such as no man could foresee. To prevent powerful men from attempting usurpation was therefore of the greatest possible moment. Now a despot or an oligarchy might exercise at pleasure preventive

Weakness
of the
public
force in the
Grecian go-
vernments.

audience whom he was addressing were about to ostracise one out of the three by show of hands. But the process of ostracising included no meeting and haranguing—nothing but simple deposit of the shells or sherds in a cask; as may be seen by the description of the special railing-in of the agora, and by the story (true or false) of the unlettered country-citizen coming in to the city to give his vote, and asking Aristeidês, without even knowing his person, to write the name for him on the shell (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 7). There was indeed previous discussion in the senate as well as in the ekklesia, whether a vote of ostracism should be entered upon at all; but the author of the oration to which I allude does not

address himself to *that* question; he assumes that the vote is actually about to be taken, and that one of the three—himself, Nikias, or Alkibiadês—must be ostracised (c. 1). Now, doubtless, in practice the decision commonly lay between two formidable rivals; but it was not publicly or formally put so before the people: every citizen might write upon the shell such name as he chose. Farther, the open denunciation of the injustice of ostracism as a system (c. 2), proves an age later than the banishment of Hyperbolus. Moreover the author having begun by remarking that he stands in contest with Nikias as well as with Alkibiadês, says nothing more about Nikias to the end of the speech.

means,¹ much sharper than the ostracism, such as the assassination of Kimon, mentioned in my last chapter as directed by the Peisistratids. At the very least, they might send away any one, from whom they apprehended attack or danger, without incurring even so much as the imputation of severity. But in a democracy, where arbitrary action of the magistrate was the thing of all others most dreaded, and where fixed laws, with trial and defence as preliminaries to punishment, were conceived by the ordinary citizen as the guarantees of his personal security and as the pride of his social condition—the creation of such an exceptional power presented serious difficulty. If we transport ourselves to the times of Kleisthenês, immediately after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, when the working of the democratical machinery was as yet untried, we shall find this difficulty at its maximum. But we shall also find the necessity of vesting such a power somewhere, absolutely imperative. For the great Athenian nobles had yet to learn the lesson of respect for any constitution. Their past history had exhibited continual struggles between the armed factions of Megaklês, Lykurgus, and Peisistratus, put down after a time by the superior force and alliances of the latter; and though Kleisthenês, the son of Megaklês, might be firmly disposed to renounce the example of his father and to act as the faithful citizen of a fixed constitution, he would know but too well that the sons of his father's companions and rivals would follow out ambitious purposes without any regard to the limits imposed by law, if ever they acquired sufficient partisans to present a fair prospect of success. Moreover, when any two candidates for power, with such reckless dispositions, came into a bitter personal rivalry, the motives to each of them, arising as well out of fear as out of ambition, to put down his opponent at any cost to the constitution, might well become irresistible, unless some impartial and discerning interference could arrest the strife in time. "If the Athenians

¹ See the discussion of the ostracism in Aristot. Politic. iii. 8, where he recognises the problem as one common to all governments.

Compare also a good Dissertation

— J. A. Paradys, *De Ostracismo Atheniensium*, Lugduni Batavor, 1792; K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer*, ch. 130; and Schömann, *Antiq. Jur. Pub. Græc.* ch. xxxv. p. 233.

were wise (Aristeidês is reported to have said,¹ in the height and peril of his parliamentary struggle with Themistoklês), they would cast both Themistoklês and me into the barathrum."² And whoever reads the sad narrative of the Korkyræan sedition, in the third book of Thucydidês, together with the reflections of the historian upon it,³ will trace the gradual exasperation of these party feuds, beginning even under democratical forms, until at length they breakdown the barriers of public as well as of private morality.

Against this chance of internal assailants Kleisthenês had to protect the democratical constitution—first, by throwing impediments in their way and rendering it difficult for them to procure the requisite support; next, by eliminating them before any violent projects were ripe for execution. To do either the one or the other, it was necessary to provide such a constitution as would not only conciliate the good will, but kindle the passionate attachment, of the mass of citizens, insomuch that not even any considerable minority should be deliberately inclined to alter it by force. It was necessary to create in the multitude, and through them to force upon the leading ambitious men, that rare and difficult sentiment which we may term a constitutional morality—a paramount reverence for the forms of the constitution, enforcing obedience to the authorities acting under and within those forms, yet combined with the habit of open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts—combined too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen, amidst the bitterness of party contest, that the forms of the constitution will be not less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own. This co-existence of freedom and self-imposed restraint—of obedience to authority with unmeasured

Necessity
of creating
a constitutional
morality.

¹ Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 3.

² The barathrum was a deep pit, said to have had iron spikes at the bottom, into which criminals condemned to death were sometimes cast. Though probably an ancient Athenian punishment, it seems to have become at the very least extremely rare, if not entirely disused, during the times of Athens his-

torically known to us; but the phrase continued in speech after the practice had become obsolete. The iron spikes depend on the evidence of the Schol. Aristophan. Plutus, 431—a very doubtful authority, when we read the legend which he blends with his statement.

³ Thucyd. iii. 70, 81, 82.

censure of the persons exercising it—may be found in the aristocracy of England (since about 1688) as well as in the democracy of the American United States: and because we are familiar with it, we are apt to suppose it a natural sentiment; though there seem to be few sentiments more difficult to establish and diffuse among a community, judging by the experience of history. We may see how imperfectly it exists at this day in the Swiss Cantons; while the many violences of the first French revolution illustrate, among various other lessons, the fatal effects arising from its absence, even among a people high in the scale of intelligence. Yet the diffusion of such constitutional morality, not merely among the majority of any community, but throughout the whole, is the indispensable condition of a government at once free and peaceable; since even any powerful and obstinate minority may render the working of free institutions impracticable, without being strong enough to conquer ascendancy for themselves. Nothing less than unanimity, or so overwhelming a majority as to be tantamount to unanimity, on the cardinal point of respecting constitutional forms, even by those who do not wholly approve of them, can render the excitement of political passion bloodless, and yet expose all the authorities in the state to the full licence of pacific criticism.

At the epoch of Kleisthenês, which by a remarkable coincidence is the same as that of the regifuge at Rome, such constitutional morality, if it existed anywhere else, had certainly no place at Athens; and the first creation of it in any particular society must be esteemed an interesting historical fact. By the spirit of his reforms,—equal, popular, and comprehensive, far beyond the previous experience of Athenians—he secured the hearty attachment of the body of citizens. But from the first generation of leading men, under the nascent democracy, and with such precedents as they had to look back upon, no self-imposed limits to ambition could be expected. Accordingly, Kleisthenês had to find the means of eliminating beforehand any one about to transgress these limits, so as to escape the necessity of putting him down afterwards, with all that bloodshed and reaction, in the midst of which the free working of the constitution would be suspended at least, if not irrevocably extinguished. To acquire such influence as would render him dangerous

Purpose
and work-
ing of the
ostracism.

under democratical forms, a man must stand in evidence before the public, so as to afford some reasonable means of judging of his character and purposes. Now the security which Kleisthenês provided, was, to call in the positive judgement of the citizens respecting his future promise purely and simply, so that they might not remain too long neutral between two formidable political rivals—pursuant in a certain way to the Solonian proclamation against neutrality in a sedition, as I have already remarked in a former chapter. He incorporated in the constitution itself the principle of *privilegium* (to employ the Roman phrase, which signifies, not a peculiar favour granted to any one, but a peculiar inconvenience imposed), yet only under circumstances solemn and well-defined, with full notice and discussion beforehand, and by the positive secret vote of a large proportion of the citizens. "No law shall be made against any single citizen, without the same being made against *all* Athenian citizens; unless it shall so seem good to 6000 citizens voting secretly."¹ Such was that general principle of the constitution, under which the ostracism was a particular case. Before the vote of ostracism could be taken, a case was to be made out in the senate and the public assembly to justify it. In the sixth prytany of the year, these two bodies debated and determined whether the state of the republic was menacing enough to call for such an exceptional measure.² If they decided in the affirmative, a day was named, the agora was railed round, with ten entrances left for the citizens of each tribe, and ten separate casks or vessels for depositing the suffrages, which consisted of a shell or a potsherd with the name of the person

¹ Andokidês, De Mysteriis, p. 12. c. 13. Μηδὲ νόμον ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ ἐξεῖναι θεῖναι, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις· εἰ μὴ ἑξακισχίλιος δόξη, κρυβδὴν ψηφίζομένοις. According to the usual looseness in dealing with the name of Solon, this has been called a law of Solon (see Petit. Leg. Att. p. 188), though it certainly cannot be older than Kleisthenês.

"Privilegia ne irroganto," said the law of the Twelve Tables at Rome (Cicero, Legg. iii. 4-19).

² Aristotle and Philochorus, ap. Photium, App. p. 672 and 675, ed. Porson.

It would rather appear by that passage that the ostracism was never formally abrogated; and that even in the later times, to which the description of Aristotle refers, the form was still preserved of putting the question whether the public safety called for an ostracising vote, long after it had passed both out of use and out of mind.

written on it whom each citizen designed to banish. At the end of the day the number of votes were summed up, and if 6000 votes were found to have been given against any one person, that person was ostracised; if not, the ceremony ended in nothing.¹ Ten days were allowed to him for settling his affairs, after which he was required to depart from Attica for ten years, but retained his property, and suffered no other penalty.

It was not the maxim at Athens to escape the errors of the people, by calling in the different errors, and the sinister interest besides, of an extrapopular or privileged few. Nor was any third course open, since the principles of representative government were not understood, nor indeed conveniently applicable to very small communities. Beyond the judgement of the people (so the Athenians felt), there was no appeal. Their grand study was to surround the delivery of that judgement with the best securities for rectitude, and the best preservatives against haste, passion, or private corruption. Whatever measure of good government could not be obtained in that way, could not, in their opinion, be obtained at all. I shall illustrate the Athenian proceedings on this head more fully when I come to speak of the working of their mature democracy. Meanwhile in respect to this grand protection of the nascent democracy—the vote of

¹ Philochorus, *ut supra*; Plutarch, *Aristeid.* c. 7; Schol. ad *Aristophan. Equit.* 851; Pollux, viii. 19.

There is a difference of opinion among the authorities, as well as among the expositors, whether the minimum of 6000 applies to the votes given in all, or to the votes given against any one name. I embrace the latter opinion, which is supported by Philochorus, Pollux, and the Schol. on *Aristophanès*, though Plutarch countenances the former. Boeckh, in his *Public Economy of Athens*, and Wachsmuth (i. 1. p. 272) are in favour of Plutarch and the former opinion; Paradys (*Dissertat. De Ostr.* p. 25), Platner, and Heumann (see K. F. Hermann, *Lehrbuch der Gr. Staats-*

alt. ch. 130, not. 6) support the other, which appears to me the right one.

For the purpose, so unequivocally pronounced, of the general law determining the absolute minimum necessary for a *privilegium*, would by no means be obtained, if the simple majority of votes, among 6000 voters in all, had been allowed to take effect. A person might then be ostracised with a very small number of votes against him, and without creating any reasonable presumption that he was dangerous to the constitution; which was by no means either the purpose of Kleisthenès, or the well-understood operation of the ostracism, so long as it continued to be a reality.

ostracism—it will be found that the securities devised by Kleisthenês, for making the sentence effectual against the really dangerous man and against no one else, display not less foresight than patriotism. The main object was, to render the voting an expression of deliberate public feeling, as distinguished from mere factious antipathy. Now the large minimum of votes required (one-fourth of the entire citizen population) went far to ensure this effect—the more so, since each vote, taken as it was in a secret manner, counted unequivocally for the expression of a genuine and independent sentiment, and could neither be coerced nor bought. Then again, Kleisthenês did not permit the process of ostracising to be opened against any one citizen exclusively. If opened at all, every one without exception was exposed to the sentence; so that the friends of Themistoklês could not invoke it against Aristeidês,¹ nor those of the latter against the former, without exposing their own leader to the same chance of exile. It was not likely to be invoked at all, therefore, until exasperation had proceeded so far as to render both parties insensible to this chance—the precise index of that growing internecive hostility, which the ostracism prevented from coming to a head. Nor could it even then be ratified, unless a case was shown to convince the more neutral portion of the senate and the ekklesia: moreover, after all, the ekklesia did not itself ostracise, but a future day was named, and the whole body of the citizens were solemnly invited to vote. It was in this way that security was taken not only for making the ostracism effectual in protecting the constitution, but to hinder it from being employed for any other purpose. We must recollect that it exercised its tutelary influence not merely on those occasions when it was actually employed, but by the mere knowledge that it might be employed, and by the restraining effect which that knowledge produced on the conduct of the great men. Again, the ostracism, though essentially of an exceptional nature, was yet an exception sanctified and limited by the constitution itself; so that the citizen,

¹ The practical working of the ostracism presents it as a struggle between two contending leaders, accompanied with chance of banishment to both—Periklês πρὸς τὸν Θουκυδίδην εἰς ἀγῶνα περὶ τοῦ

ὀστράκου καταστάς, καὶ διακινδυνεύσας, ἐκαίνον μὲν ἐξέβαλε, κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν ἀντιτεταγμένην ἑταιρείαν (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 14: compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11).

in giving his ostracising vote, did not in any way depart from the constitution or lose his reverence for it. The issue placed before him,—“Is there any man whom you think vitally dangerous to the state? if so, whom?”—though vague, was yet raised directly and legally. Had there been no ostracism, it might probably have been raised both indirectly and illegally, on the occasion of some special imputed crime of a suspected, political leader, when accused before a court of justice—a perversion, involving all the mischief of the ostracism, without its protective benefits.

Care was taken to divest the ostracism of all painful consequence except what was inseparable from exile. This is not one of the least proofs of the wisdom with which it was devised. Most certainly it never deprived the public of candidates for political influence: and when we consider

Ostracism necessary as a protection to the early democracy—afterwards dispensed with.

the small amount of individual evil which it inflicted—evil too diminished, in the cases of Kimon and Aristeidês, by a reactionary sentiment which augmented their subsequent popularity after return—two remarks will be quite sufficient to offer in the way of justification. First, it completely produced its intended effect;

for the democracy grew up from infancy to manhood without a single attempt to overthrow it by force¹—a result, upon which no reflecting contemporary of Kleisthenês could have ventured to calculate. Next, through such tranquil working of the democratical forms, a constitutional morality quite sufficiently complete was produced among the leading Athenians, to enable the people after a certain time to dispense with that exceptional security which the ostracism offered.² To the nascent democracy,

¹ It is not necessary in this remark to take notice, either of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, or of that of Thirty, called the Thirty Tyrants, established during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, and after the ostracism had been discontinued. Neither of these changes were brought about by the excessive ascendancy of any one or few men: both of them grew out of the embarrassments and dangers of Athens in the latter period of her great foreign war.

² Aristotle (Polit. iii. 8, 6) seems to recognise the political necessity of the ostracism, as applied even to obvious superiority of wealth, connexion, &c. (which he distinguishes pointedly from superiority of merit and character), and upon principles of symmetry only, even apart from dangerous designs on the part of the superior mind. No painter (he observes) will permit a foot, in his picture of a man, to be of disproportionate size with the entire body, though separately

it was absolutely indispensable: to the growing, yet militant, democracy, it was salutary; but the full-grown democracy both could and did stand without it. The ostracism passed upon Hyperbolus, about ninety years after Kleisthenês, was the last occasion of its employment. And even this can hardly be considered as a serious instance: it was a trick concerted between two distinguished Athenians (Nikias and Alkibiadês) to turn to their own political account a process already coming to be antiquated. Nor would such a manœuvre have been possible, if the contemporary Athenian citizens had been penetrated with the same serious feeling of the value of ostracism as a safeguard of democracy, as had been once entertained by their fathers and grandfathers. Between Kleisthenês and Hyperbolus, we hear of about ten different persons as having been banished by ostracism: first of all, Hipparchus of the deme Cholargus, the son of Charmus, a relative of the recently-expelled Peisistratid despots;¹ then Aristeidês, Themistoklês, Kimon, and Thucydidês son of Melêsias, all of them renowned political leaders: also Alkibiadês and Megaklês (the paternal and maternal grandfathers of the distinguished Alkibiadês), and Kallias, belonging to another eminent family at Athens;² lastly, Damôn, the preceptor of Periklês in poetry and music, and eminent for his acquisitions in philosophy.³ In this last case comes out the vulgar side of humanity, aristocratical as well as democratical; for with both, the process of philosophy and the persons of philosophers are wont to be alike unpopular. Even Kleisthenês himself is said to have been ostracised under his own law, and Xanthippus; but both upon authority too weak to

taken it may be finely painted; nor will the chorus-master allow any one voice, however beautiful, to predominate beyond a certain proportion over the rest.

His final conclusion is, however, that the legislator ought, if possible, so to construct his constitution, as to have no need of such exceptional remedy; but if this cannot be done, then the second-best step is to apply the ostracism. Compare also v. 2, 5.

The last century of the free Athenian democracy realised the

first of these alternatives.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias c. 11; Harpokration, v. Ἰππάρχος.

² Lysias cont. Alkibiad. A. c. 11. p. 143; Harpokration, v. Ἀλκιβιάδης: Andokidês cont. Alkibiad. c. 11, 12. p. 129, 130: this last oration may afford evidence as to the facts mentioned in it, though I cannot imagine it to be either genuine or belonging to the time to which it professes to refer, as has been observed in a previous note.

³ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4; Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 1.

trust.¹ Miltiadês was not ostracised at all, but tried and punished for misconduct in his command.

I should hardly have said so much about this memorable and peculiar institution of Kleisthenês, if the erroneous accusations, against the Athenian democracy, of envy, injustice, and ill-treatment of their superior men, had not been greatly founded upon it, and if such criticisms had not passed from ancient times to modern with little examination. In monarchical governments, a pretender to the throne, numbering a

certain amount of supporters, is as a matter of course excluded from the country. The duke of Bordeaux cannot now reside in France—nor could Napoleon after 1815—nor Charles Edward in England during the last century. No man treats this as any extravagant injustice, yet it is the parallel of the ostracism—with a stronger case in favour of the latter, inasmuch as the change from one regal dynasty to another does not of necessity overthrow all the collateral institutions and securities of the country. Plutarch has affirmed that the ostracism arose from the envy and jealousy inherent in a democracy², and not from justifiable fears—an observation often repeated, yet not the less demonstrably untrue. Not merely because ostracism so worked as often to increase the influence of that political leader whose rival it removed—but still more, because, if the fact had been as Plutarch says, this institution would have continued as long as the democracy; whereas it finished with the banishment of Hyperbolus, at a period when the government was more decisively democratical than it had

been in the time of Kleisthenês. It was, in truth, a product altogether of fear and insecurity,³ on the part both of the democracy and its best friends—fear perfectly well-grounded, and only appearing needless because the precautions taken prevented attack. So soon as the diffusion of a constitutional morality had

¹ Ælian, V. H. xiii. 24; Herakleidês, *περὶ Πολιτικῶν*, c. 1, ed. Köhler.

² Plutarch, Themistoklês, 22; Plutarch, Aristeidês, 7, *παρὰ μὲν φθόνου καὶ κουφισμῶς*. See the same opinions repeated by Wachsmuth,

Hellenische Alterthumskunde, ch. 48, vol. i. p. 272, and by Platner, *Prozess und Klagen bey den Attikern*, vol. i. p. 326.

³ Thucyd. viii. 73. *διὰ δυνάμει καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβου*.

placed the mass of the citizens above all serious fear of an aggressive usurper, the ostracism was discontinued. And doubtless the feeling, that it might safely be dispensed with, must have been strengthened by the long ascendancy of Periklès—by the spectacle of the greatest statesman whom Athens ever produced, acting steadily within the limits of the constitution; and by the ill-success of his two opponents, Kimon and Thucydidès—aided by numerous partisans and by the great comic writers, at a period when comedy was a power in the state such as it has never been before or since—in their attempts to get him ostracised. They succeeded in fanning up the ordinary antipathy of the citizens towards philosophers so far as to procure the ostracism of his friend and teacher Damon; but Periklès himself (to repeat the complaint of his bitter enemy the comic poet Kratinus¹) “holds his head as high as if he carried the Odeion upon it, now that the shell has gone by”—*i. e.* now that he has escaped the ostracism. If Periklès was not conceived to be dangerous to the constitution, none of his successors were at all likely to be so regarded. Damon and Hyperbolus were the two last persons ostracised. Both of them were cases, and the only cases, of an unequivocal abuse of the institution, because, whatever the grounds of displeasure against them may have been, it is impossible to conceive either of them as menacing to the state—whereas all the other known sufferers were men of such position and power, that the 7000 citizens who inscribed each name on the shell, or at least a large proportion of them, may well have done so under the most conscientious belief that they were guarding the constitution against real danger. Such a change in the character of the persons ostracised plainly evinces that the ostracism had become dissevered from that genuine patriotic prudence which originally rendered it both legitimate and popular. It had served for two generations an inestimable tutelary purpose—it lived to be twice dishonoured—and then passed, by universal acquiescence, into matter of history.

¹ Kratinus ap. Plutarch. Periklès, c. 18.

Ὁ σχινοκέφαλος Ζεὺς ὀδὶ προσέρχεται
Περικλέης, τῷθεῖον ἐπὶ τοῦ κρανίου

Ἐχων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦστραχον παροίχεται.

For the attacks of the comic writers upon Damon, see Plutarch, Periklès, c. 4.

A process analogous to the ostracism subsisted at Argos,¹ at Syracuse, and in some other Grecian democracies. Aristotle states that it was abused for factious purposes: and at Syracuse, where it was introduced after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty, Diodorus affirms that it was so unjustly and profusely applied, as to deter persons of wealth and station from taking any part in public affairs; for which reason it was speedily discontinued. We have no particulars to enable us to appreciate this general statement. But we cannot safely infer that because the ostracism worked on the whole well at Athens, it must necessarily have worked well in other states—the more so as we do not know whether it was surrounded with the same precautionary formalities, nor whether it even required the same large minimum of votes to make it effective. This latter guarantee, so valuable in regard to an institution essentially easy to abuse, is not noticed by Diodorus in his brief account of the Petalism—so the process was denominated at Syracuse.²

Such was the first Athenian democracy, engendered as well by the reaction against Hippias and his dynasty, as by the memorable partnership, whether spontaneous or compulsory, between Kleisthenés and the un-franchised multitude. It is to be distinguished both from the mitigated oligarchy established by Solon before, and from the fullgrown and symmetrical democracy which prevailed afterwards from the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, towards the close of the career of Periklés. It was indeed a striking revolution, impressed upon the citizen not less by the sentiments to which it appealed than by the visible change which it made in political and social life. He saw himself marshalled in the ranks of hoplites alongside of new companions in arms—he was enrolled in a new register, and his property in a new schedule, in his deme and by his demarch, an officer before unknown—he found the year distributed afresh, for all legal purposes, into ten parts bearing the name of prytanies, each marked by a solemn and free-spoken ekklesia at which he had a right

¹ Aristot. Polit. iii. 8, 4; v. 2, 5. Athenian ostracism, transferring to it apparently the circumstances

² Diodor. xi. 55-57. This author describes very imperfectly the of the Syracusan Petalism.

Ostracism
in other
Grecian
cities.

Striking
effect of
the revolu-
tion of
Kleisthenés
on the
minds of
the citi-
zens.

to be present—his ekklesia was convoked and presided by senators called prytanes, members of a senate novel both as to number and distribution—his political duties were now performed as member of a tribe, designated by a name not before pronounced in common Attic life, connected with one of ten heroes whose statues he now for the first time saw in the agora, and associating him with fellow-tribemen from all parts of Attica. All these and many others were sensible novelties felt in the daily proceedings of the citizen. But the great novelty of all was, the authentic recognition of the ten new tribes as a sovereign *Dêmos* or people, apart from all specialties of phratric or gentile origin, with free speech and equal law; retaining no distinction except the four classes of the Solonian property-schedule with their gradations of eligibility. To a considerable proportion of citizens this great novelty was still farther endeared by the fact that it had raised them out of the degraded position of metics and slaves; while to the large majority of all the citizens, it furnished a splendid political idea, profoundly impressive to the Greek mind—capable of calling forth the most ardent attachment as well as the most devoted sense of active obligation and obedience. We have now to see how their newly-created patriotism manifested itself.

Kleisthenês and his new constitution carried with them so completely the popular favour, that Isagoras had no other way of opposing it except by calling in the interference of Kleomenês and the Lacedæmonians. Kleomenês listened the more readily to this call, as he was reported to have been on an intimate footing with the wife of Isagoras.

Isagoras calls in Kleomenês and the Lacedæmonians against it.

He prepared to come to Athens; but his first aim was to deprive the democracy of its great leader Kleisthenês, who, as belonging to the Alkmæônid family, was supposed to be tainted with the inherited sin of his great-grandfather Megaklês, the destroyer of the usurper Kylon. Kleomenês sent a herald to Athens, demanding the expulsion "of the accursed"—so this family were called by their enemies, and so they continued to be called eighty years afterwards, when the same manœuvre was practised by the Lacedæmonians of that day against Periklês. This requisition, recommended by Isagoras, was so well-timed, that Kleisthenês, not venturing to disobey it, retired voluntarily; so that Kleomenês, though arriving at Athens only with a

small force, found himself master of the city. At the instigation of Isagoras, he sent into exile seven hundred families, selected from the chief partisans of Kleisthenês. His next attempt was to dissolve the new senate of Five Hundred, and to place the whole government in the hands of three hundred adherents of the chief whose cause he espoused. But now was seen the spirit infused into the people by their new constitution. At the time of the first usurpation of Peisistratus, the senate of that day had not only not resisted, but even lent themselves to the scheme. Now, the new senate of Kleisthenês resolutely refused to submit to dissolution, while the citizens generally, even after the banishment of the chief Kleisthenean partisans, manifested their feelings in a way at once so hostile and Kleomenês so determined, that Kleomenês and Isagoras were and Isa- altogether baffled. They were compelled to goras ex- retire into the acropolis and stand upon the pelled from Athens. defensive. This symptom of weakness was the signal for a general rising of the Athenians, who besieged the Spartan king on the holy rock. He had evidently come without any expectation of finding, or any means of overpowering, resistance; for at the end of two days his provisions were exhausted, and he was forced to capitulate. He and his Lacedæmonians, as well as Isagoras, were allowed to retire to Sparta; but the Athenians of the party captured along with him were imprisoned, condemned,¹ and executed by the people.

Kleisthenês, with the seven hundred exiled families, was immediately recalled, and his new constitution materially strengthened by this first success. Yet the prospect of renewed Spartan attack was sufficiently serious to induce him to send envoys to Artaphernês, the Persian Satrap at Sardis, soliciting the admission of Athens into the Persian alliance. He probably feared the intrigues of the expelled Hippias in the same quarter. Artaphernês, having first informed himself who the Athenians were, and where they dwelt, replied that if they chose to send earth and water to the king of Persia, they might be received as allies, but upon no other condition. Such were the feelings of alarm under which the envoys had quitted Athens, that they went the length of promising this unqualified

Recall of Kleisthenês
 — Athens
 solicits the alliance of the Persians.

¹ Herodot. v. 70-72: compare Schol. ad Aristophan. Lysistr. 274.

token of submission. But their countrymen on their return disavowed them with scorn and indignation.¹

It was at this time that the first connexion began between Athens and the little Bœotian town of Plataea, situated on the northern slope of the range of Kithæron, between that mountain and the river Asôpus—
First connexion between Athens and Plataea.
 on the road from Athens to Thebes; and it is upon this occasion that we first become acquainted with the Bœotians and their politics.

In one of my preceding volumes,² the Bœotian federation has already been briefly described, as composed of some twelve or thirteen autonomous towns under the headship of Thebes, which was, or professed to have been, their mother-city. Plataea had been (so the Thebans affirmed) their latest foundation;³ it was ill-used by them, and discontented with the alliance. Accordingly, as Kleomenês was on his way back from Athens, the Plataeans took the opportunity of addressing themselves to him, craving the protection of Sparta against Thebes, and surrendering their town and territory without reserve. The Spartan king, having no motive to undertake a trust which promised nothing but trouble, advised them to solicit the protection of Athens, as nearer and more accessible for them in case of need. He foresaw that this would embroil the Athenians with Bœotia, and such anticipation was in fact his chief motive for giving the advice, which the Plataeans followed. Selecting an occasion of public sacrifice at Athens, they despatched thither envoys, who sat down as suppliants at the altar, surrendered their town to Athens, and implored protection against Thebes. Such an appeal
Disputes between Plataea and Thebes—decision of Corinth.

was not to be resisted, and protection was promised. It was soon needed, for the Thebans invaded the Platæan territory, and an Athenian force marched to defend it. Battle was about to be joined, when the Corinthians interposed with their mediation, which was accepted by both parties. They decided altogether in favour of Plataea, pronouncing that the Thebans had no right to employ force against any seceding member of the Bœotian federation.⁴ The Thebans,

¹ Herodot. v. 73.

² See part ii. ch. 3.

³ Thucyd. iii. 61.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 108. ἐὰν Θηβαίους Βοιωτῶν τοὺς μὴ βουλευμένους ἐς Βοιω-

τοὺς τελέειν. This is an important circumstance, in regard to Grecian political feeling: I shall advert to it hereafter.

finding the decision against them, refused to abide by it, and attacked the Athenians on their return, but sustained a complete defeat: a breach of faith which the Athenians avenged by joining to Plataea the portion of Theban territory south of the Asôpus, and making that river the limit between the two. By such success, however, the Athenians gained nothing, except the enmity of Bœotia—as Kleomenês had foreseen. Their alliance with Plataea, long-continued, and presenting in the course of this history several incidents touching to our sympathies, will be found, if we except one splendid occasion,¹ productive only of burden to the one party, yet insufficient as a protection to the other.

¹ Herodot. vi. 108. Thucydidês (iii. 68), when recounting the capture of Plataea by the Lacedæmonians in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, states that the alliance between Plataea and Athens was then in its 93rd year of date; according to which reckoning it would begin in the year 519 B.C., where Mr. Clinton and other chronologers place it.

I venture to think that the immediate circumstances, as recounted in the text from Herodotus (whether Thucydidês conceived them in the same way, cannot be determined), which brought about the junction of Plataea with Athens, cannot have taken place in 519 B.C., but must have happened *after* the expulsion of Hippias from Athens in 510 B.C.—for the following reasons:—

1. No mention is made of Hippias, who yet, if the event had happened in 519 B.C., must have been the person to determine whether the Athenians should assist Plataea or not. The Platæan envoys present themselves at a public sacrifice in the attitude of suppliants, so as to touch the feelings of the Athenian citizens generally: had Hippias been then despot, he would have been the person to be propitiated and to determine for or

against assistance.

2. We know no cause which should have brought Kleomenês with a Lacedæmonian force near to Plataea in the year 519 B.C.: we know from the statement of Herodotus (v. 76) that no Lacedæmonian expedition against Attica took place at that time. But in the year to which I have referred the event, Kleomenês is on his march near the spot upon a known and assignable object. From the very tenor of the narrative, it is plain that Kleomenês and his army were not designedly in Bœotia, nor meddling with Bœotian affairs, at the time when the Platæans solicited his aid; for he declines to interpose in the matter, pleading the great distance between Sparta and Plataea as a reason.

3. Again, Kleomenês, in advising the Platæans to solicit Athens, does not give the advice through good will towards them, but through a desire to harass and perplex the Athenians, by entangling them in a quarrel with the Bœotians. At the point of time to which I have referred the incident, this was a very natural desire: he was angry, and perhaps alarmed, at the recent events which had brought about his expulsion from

Meanwhile Kleomenês had returned to Sparta full of resentment against the Athenians, and resolved on punishing them as well as on establishing his friend Isagoras as despot over them. Having been taught however, by humiliating experience, that this was no easy achievement, he would not make the attempt, without having assembled a considerable force. He summoned allies from all the various states of Peloponnesus, yet without venturing to inform them what he was about to undertake. He at the same time concerted measures with the Bœotians, and with the Chalkidians of Eubœa, for a simultaneous invasion of Attica on all sides. It appears that he had greater

Second march of Kleomenês against Athens—desertion of his allies.

Athens. But what was there to make him conceive such a feeling against Athens during the reign of Hippias? That despot was on terms of the closest intimacy with Sparta: the Peisistratids were (ξείνους—ξενίους ταμάλιστα—Herod. v. 63, 90, 91) "the particular guests" of the Spartans, who were only induced to take part against Hippias from a reluctant obedience to the oracles procured one after another by Kleisthenês. The motive therefore assigned by Herodotus, for the advice given by Kleomenês to the Platæans, can have no application to the time when Hippias was still despot.

4. That Herodotus did not conceive the victory gained by the Athenians over Thebes as having taken place *before* the expulsion of Hippias, is evident from his emphatic contrast between their warlike spirit and success when liberated from the despots, and their timidity or backwardness while under Hippias (Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφείας περιοικόντων ἔσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμεινους, ἀπαλλαγθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο· δηλοῖ ὧν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν, ἐθελοκράτειον, &c. v. 78). The man who wrote thus cannot have believed

that in the year 519 B.C., while Hippias was in full sway, the Athenians gained an important victory over the Thebans, cut off a considerable portion of the Theban territory for the purpose of joining it to that of the Platæans, and showed from that time forward their constant superiority over Thebes by protecting her inferior neighbour against her.

These different reasons, taking them altogether, appear to me to show that the first alliance between Athens and Platæa, as Herodotus conceives and describes it, cannot have taken place before the expulsion of Hippias, in 510 B.C.; and induce me to believe either that Thucydides was mistaken in the date of that event, or that Herodotus has not correctly described the facts. Not seeing any reason to suspect the description given by the latter, I have departed, though unwillingly, from the date of Thucydides.

The application of the Platæans to Kleomenês, and his advice grounded thereupon, may be connected more suitably with his first expedition to Athens after the expulsion of Hippias, than with his second.

confidence in their hostile dispositions towards Athens than in those of the Peloponnesians, for he was not afraid to acquaint them with his design—and probably the Bœotians were incensed with the recent interference of Athens in the affair of Platæa. As soon as these preparations were completed, the two kings of Sparta, Kleomenês and Demaratus, put themselves at the head of the united Peloponnesian force, marched into Attica, and advanced as far as Eleusis on the way to Athens. But when the allies came to know the purpose for which they were to be employed, a spirit of dissatisfaction manifested itself among them. They had no unfriendly sentiment towards Athens; and the Corinthians especially, favourably disposed rather than otherwise towards that city, resolved to proceed no farther, withdrew their contingent from the camp, and returned home. At the same time, king Demaratus, either sharing in the general dissatisfaction or moved by some grudge against his colleague which had not before manifested itself, renounced the undertaking also. Two such examples, operating upon the preexisting sentiment of the allies generally, caused the whole camp to break up and return home without striking a blow.¹

We may here remark that this is the first instance known in which Sparta appears in act as recognised head of an obligatory Peloponnesian alliance,² summoning contingents from the cities to be placed under the command of her king. Her headship, previously recognised in theory, passes now into act, but in an unsatisfactory manner, so as to prove the necessity of precaution and concert beforehand—which will be found not long wanting.

Pursuant to the scheme concerted, the Bœotians and Chalkidians attacked Attica at the same time that Kleomenês entered it. The former seized Cenoê and Hysiaë, the frontier demes of Attica on the side towards Platæa; while the latter assailed the north-eastern frontier which faces Eubœa. Invaded on three sides, the Athenians were in serious danger, and were compelled to concentrate

First appearance of Sparta as acting head of Peloponnesian allies.

Signal successes of Athens against Bœotians and Chalkidians.

¹ Herodot. v. 75.

² Compare Kortüm, *Zur Geschichte Hellenischer Staatsverfassungen*, p. 35 (Heidelberg, 1821).

I doubt however his interpretation of the words in Herodotus (v. 63)—αἶτε ἰδίῳ στόλῳ, αἶτε δημοσίῳ χρησόμενοι.

all their forces at Eleusis against Kleomenès, leaving the Bœotians and Chalkidians unopposed. But the unexpected breaking-up of the invading army from Peloponnesus proved their rescue, and enabled them to turn the whole of their attention to the other frontier. They marched into Bœotia to the strait called Euripus which separates it from Eubœa, intending to prevent the junction of the Bœotians and Chalkidians, and to attack the latter first apart. But the arrival of the Bœotians caused an alteration in their scheme; they attacked the Bœotians first, and gained a victory of the most complete character—killing a large number, and capturing 700 prisoners. On the very same day they crossed over to Eubœa, attacked the Chalkidians, and gained another victory so decisive that it at once terminated the war. Many Chalkidians were taken, as well as Bœotians, and conveyed in chains to Athens, where after a certain detention they were at last ransomed for two minæ per man. Of the sum thus raised, a tenth was employed in the fabrication of a chariot and four horses in bronze, which was placed in the acropolis to commemorate the victory. Herodotus saw this trophy when he was at Athens. He saw too, what was a still more speaking trophy, the actual chains in which the prisoners had been fettered, exhibiting in their appearance the damage undergone when the acropolis was burnt by Xerxès: an inscription of four lines described the offerings and recorded the victory out of which they had sprung.¹

Another consequence of some moment arose out of this victory. The Athenians planted a body of 4000 of their citizens as Klêruchs (lot-holders) or settlers upon the lands of the wealthy Chalkidian oligarchy called the Hippobotæ—proprietors probably in the fertile plain of Lélantum between Chalkis and Eretria. This is a system which we shall find hereafter extensively followed out by the Athenians in the days of their power; partly with the view of providing for their poorer citizens—partly to serve as garrison among a population either hostile or of doubtful fidelity. These Attic Klêruchs (I can find no other name by which to speak of them) did not lose their birth-right as Athenian citizens. They were not colonists in the Grecian sense, and they are known by a totally different

Plantation
of Athenian
settlers or
Klêruchs
in the
territory
of Chalkis.

¹ Herodot. v. 77; Ælian, V. H. vi. 1; Pausan. i. 28, 2.

name—but they corresponded very nearly to the colonies formerly planted out on the conquered lands by Rome. The increase of the poorer population was always more or less painfully felt in every Grecian city; for though the aggregate population never seems to have increased very fast, yet the multiplication of children in poor families caused the subdivision of the smaller lots of land, until at last they became insufficient for a maintenance; and the persons thus impoverished found it difficult to obtain subsistence in other ways, more especially as the labour for the richer classes was so much performed by imported slaves. Doubtless some families possessed of landed property became extinct. Yet this did not at all benefit the smaller and poorer proprietors, for the lands rendered vacant passed, not to them, but by inheritance or bequest or intermarriage to other proprietors for the most part in easy circumstances—since one opulent family usually intermarried with another. I shall enter more fully at a future opportunity into this question—the great and serious problem of population, as it affected the Greek communities generally, and as it was dealt with in theory by the powerful minds of Plato and Aristotle—at present it is sufficient to notice that the numerous Klêruchies sent out by Athens, of which this to Eubœa was the first, arose in a great measure out of the multiplication of the poorer population, which her extended power was employed in providing for. Her subsequent proceedings with a view to the same object will not be always found so justifiable as this now before us, which grew naturally, according to the ideas of the time, out of her success against the Chalkidians.

The war between Athens, however, and Thebes with her Bœotian allies, still continued, to the great and repeated disadvantage of the latter, until at length the Thebans in despair sent to ask advice of the Delphian oracle, and were directed to “solicit aid from those nearest to them.”¹ “How (they replied) are we to obey? Our nearest neighbours, of Tanagra, Korôneia, and Thespiæ, are now, and have been from the beginning, lending us all the aid in their power.” An ingenious Theban, however, coming to the relief of his perplexed fellow-citizens, dived into the depths of legend and brought up a happy meaning. “Those

Distress of
the The-
bans—
they ask
assistance
from
Ægina.

¹ Herodot. v. 80.

nearest to us (he said) are the inhabitants of Ægina: for Thêbê (the eponym of Thebes) and Ægina (the eponym of that island) were both sisters, daughters of Asôpus. Let us send to crave assistance from the Æginetans." If his subtle interpretation (founded upon their descent from the same legendary progenitors) did not at once convince all who heard it, at least no one had any better to suggest. Envoys were at once sent to the Æginetans; who, in reply to a petition founded on legendary claims, sent to the help of the Thebans a reinforcement of legendary, but venerated, auxiliaries—the Æakid heroes. We are left to suppose that their effigies are here meant. It was in vain however that the glory and the supposed presence of the Æakids Telamôn and Pêleus were introduced into the Theban camp. Victory still continued on the side of Athens; so that the discouraged Thebans again sent to Ægina, restoring the heroes,¹ and praying for aid of a character more human and positive. Their request was granted, and the Æginetans commenced war against Athens, without even the decent preliminary of a herald and declaration.²

This remarkable embassy first brings us into acquaintance with the Dorians of Ægina—oligarchical, wealthy, commercial, and powerful at sea, even in the earliest days;

¹ In the expression of Herodotus, the Æakid heroes are really sent from Ægina, and really sent back by the Thebans (v. 80, 81)—Οἱ δὲ σφι αἰτέουσι ἐπικουρίην τοὺς Ἀλακίδας συμπέμπειν ἔφασαν—αὐτίς οἱ Θηβαῖοι πέμψαντες, τοὺς μὲν Ἀλακίδας σφι ἀπέδιδουσαν, τῶν δὲ ἀνδρῶν ἐδέοντο. Compare again v. 75; viii. 64; and Polyb. vii. 9, 2. θεῶν τῶν συστρατονομίων.

Justin gives a narrative of an analogous application from the Epizephyrian Lokrians to Sparta (xx. 3): "Territi Locrenses ad Spartanos decurrunt: auxilium supplices deprecantur: illi longinqua militiâ gravati, auxilium a Castore et Polluce petere eos jubent. Neque legati responsum sociæ urbis spreverunt; profectique in proximum templum, facto sacri-

ficio, auxilium deorum implorant. Litatis hostiis, obtentoque, ut rebantur, quod petebant—haud secus læti quam si deos ipsos secum avecturi essent—pulvinaria iis in navi componunt, faustisque profecti omnibus, solatia suis pro auxiliis deportant." In comparing the expressions of Herodotus with those of Justin, we see that the former believes the direct literal presence and action of the Æakid heroes ("the Thebans sent back the heroes, and asked for men"), while the latter explains away the divine intervention into a mere fancy and feeling on the part of those to whom it is supposed to be accorded. This was the tone of those later authors whom Justin followed: compare also Pausan. iii. 19, 2.

² Herodot. v. 81, 82.

more analogous to Corinth than to any of the other cities called Dorian. The hostility which they now began without provocation against Athens—repressed by Sparta at the critical moment of the battle of Marathon—then again breaking out—and hushed for a while by the common dangers of the Persian invasion under Xerxês, was appeased only with the conquest of the island about twenty years after that event, and with the expulsion and destruction of its inhabitants. There had been indeed, according to Herodotus,¹ a feud of great antiquity between Athens and Ægina—of which he gives the account in a singular narrative blending together religion, politics, exposition of ancient customs, &c. But at the time when the Thebans solicited aid from Ægina, the latter was at peace with Athens. The Æginetans employed their fleet, powerful for that day, in ravaging Phalêrum and the maritime demes of Attica; nor had the Athenians as yet any fleet to resist them.² It is probable that the desired effect was produced, of diverting a portion of the Athenian force from the war against Bœotia, and thus partially relieving Thebes; but the war of Athens against both of them continued for a considerable time, though we have no information respecting its details.

Meanwhile the attention of Athens was called off from these combined enemies by a more menacing cloud which threatened to burst upon her from the side of Sparta. Kleomenês and his countrymen, full of resentment at the late inglorious desertion of Eleusis, were yet more incensed by the discovery, which appears to have been then recently made, that the injunctions of the Delphian priestess for the expulsion of Hippias from Athens had been fraudulently procured.³

Moreover Kleomenês, when shut up in the acropolis of Athens with Isagoras, had found there various prophecies previously treasured up by the Peisistratids, many of which foreshadowed events highly disastrous to Sparta. And while the recent brilliant manifestations of courage and repeated victories, on the part of Athens, seemed to indicate that such prophecies might perhaps be realised—Sparta had to reproach herself, that, from the foolish and

Preparations at Sparta to attack Athens anew—the Spartan allies summoned, together with Hippias.

¹ Herodot. v. 83-88.

ναίους ἐσίνεοντο.

² Herodot. v. 81-89. μεγάλης Ἀθη-

³ Herodot. v. 90.

mischievous conduct of Kleomenês, she had undone the effect of her previous aid against the Peisistratids, and thus lost that return of gratitude which the Athenians would otherwise have testified. Under such impressions, the Spartan authorities took the remarkable step of sending for Hippias from his residence at Sigeium to Peloponnesus, and of summoning deputies from all their allies to meet him at Sparta.

The convocation thus summoned deserves notice as the commencement of a new æra in Grecian politics. The previous expedition of Kleomenês against Attica presents to us the first known example of Spartan headship passing from theory into act: that expedition miscarried because the allies, though willing to follow, would not follow blindly, nor be made the instruments of executing purposes repugnant to their feelings. Sparta had now learnt the necessity, in order to ensure their hearty concurrence, of letting them know what she contemplated, so as to ascertain at least that she had no decided opposition to apprehend. Here then is the third stage in the spontaneous movement of Greece towards a systematic conjunction, however imperfect, of its many autonomous units: first we have Spartan headship suggested in theory, from a concurrence of circumstances which attract to her the admiration of all Greece—power, unrivalled training, undisturbed antiquity, &c.: next, the theory passes into act, yet rude and shapeless: lastly, the act becomes clothed with formalities and preceded by discussion and determination. The first convocation of the allies at Sparta, for the purpose of having a common object submitted to their consideration, may well be regarded as an important event in Grecian political history: the proceedings at the convocation are no less important, as an indication of the way in which the Greeks of that day felt and acted, and must be borne in mind as a contrast with times hereafter to be described.

First formal convocation at Sparta—march of Greece towards a political system.

Hippias having been presented to the assembled allies, the Spartans expressed their sorrow for having dethroned him—their resentment and alarm at the newborn insolence of Athens,¹ already tasted by her immediate neighbours, and menacing to every state represented in the convo-

¹ Herodot. v. 90, 91.

Proceedings of the convocation—animated protest of Corinth against any interference in favour of Hippias—the Spartan allies refuse to interfere.

cation—and their anxiety to restore Hippias, not less as a preparation of past wrong, than as a means, through his rule, of keeping Athens low and dependent. But the proposition, though emanating from Sparta, was listened to by the allies with one common sentiment of repugnance. They had no sympathy for Hippias—no dislike, still less any fear, of Athens—and a profound detestation of the character of a despot. The spirit which had animated the armed contingents at Eleusis now re-appeared among the deputies at Sparta, and the Corinthians again took the initiative. Their deputy Sosiklēs protested against the project in the fiercest and most indignant strain. No language can be stronger than that of the long harangue which Herodotus puts into his mouth, wherein the bitter recollections prevalent at Corinth respecting Kypselus and Periander are poured forth. “Surely heaven and earth are about to change places—the fish are coming to dwell on dry land, and mankind going to inhabit the sea—when you, Spartans, propose to subvert the popular governments, and to set up in the cities that wicked and bloody thing called a Despot.¹ First try what it is, for yourselves at Sparta, and then force it upon others if you can: you have not tasted its calamities as we have, and you take very good care to keep it away from yourselves. We adjure you by the common gods of Hellas—plant not despots in her cities: if you persist in a scheme so wicked, know that the Corinthians will not second you.”

This animated appeal was received with a shout of approbation and sympathy on the part of the allies. All with one accord united with Sosiklēs in adjuring the Lacedæmonians² “not to revolutionise any Hellenic city.” No one listened to Hippias when he replied, and warned the Corinthians that the time would come, when they, more than any one else, would dread and abhor the Athenian democracy, and wish the Peisistratidæ back again. “He knew well (says Herodotus) that this would be, for he was better acquainted with the prophecies than any man; but no one then believed him, and he was forced to take his departure back to Sigeium; the Spartans not venturing to

¹ Herodot. v. 92. . . τυραννίδας ἀνθρώπους οὐτε μικροβύτηρον. ἐς τὰς πόλεις κατὰ γαίην παρασκευάζεσθε, ² Herodot. v. 93. μὴ ποιεῖν μηδὲν τοῦ οὐτε ἀδικώτερον οὐδὲν ἔστι κατ’ ἐνώτερον περὶ πόλιν Ἑλλάδα.

espouse his cause against the determined sentiment of the allies."¹

That determined sentiment deserves notice, because it marks the present period of the Hellenic mind: fifty years later it will be found materially altered. Aversion to single-headed rule, and bitter recollection of men like Kypselus and Periander, are now the chords which thrill in an assembly of Grecian deputies. The idea of a revolution (implying thereby an organic and comprehensive change of which the party using the word disapproves) consists in substituting a permanent One in place of those periodical magistrates and assemblies which were the common attribute of oligarchy and democracy; the antithesis between these last two is as yet in the background, and there prevails neither fear of Athens nor hatred of the Athenian democracy. But when we turn to the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war, we find the order of precedence between these two sentiments reversed. The antimonarchical feeling has not perished, but has been overlaid by other and more recent antipathies—the antithesis between democracy and oligarchy having become, not indeed the only sentiment, but the uppermost sentiment, in the minds of Grecian politicians generally, and the soul of active party movement. Moreover a hatred of the most deadly character has grown up against Athens and her democracy, especially in the grandsons of those very Corinthians who now stand forward as her sympathising friends. The remarkable change of feeling here mentioned is nowhere so strikingly exhibited as when we contrast the address of the Corinthian Sosiklês just narrated, with the speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta immediately antecedent to the Peloponnesian war, as given to us in Thucydidês.² It will hereafter be fully explained by the intermediate events, by the growth of Athenian power, and by the still more miraculous development of Athenian energy.

Such development, the fruit of the fresh-planted democracy as well as the seed for its sustentation and aggrandisement, continued progressive during the whole period just adverted to; but the first unexpected burst of it, under the Kleisthenean constitution and after the expulsion

¹ Herodot. v. 93, 94.

² Thucydid. i. 68-71, 120-124.

of Hippias, is described by Herodotus in terms too emphatic to be omitted. After narrating the successive victories of the Athenians over both Bœotians and Chalkidians, that historian proceeds—"Thus did the Athenians grow in strength. And we may find proof not merely in this instance but everywhere else, how valuable a thing freedom is: since even the Athenians, while under a despot, were not superior in war to any of their surrounding neighbours, but so soon as they got rid of their despots, became by far the first of all. These things show that while kept down by one man, they were slack and timid, like men working for a master; but when they were liberated, every single man became eager in exertions for his own benefit." The same comparison reappears a short time afterwards, where he tells us that "the Athenians, when free, felt themselves a match for Sparta; but while kept down by any man under a despotism, were feeble and apt for submission."¹

Stronger expressions cannot be found to depict the rapid improvement wrought in the Athenian people by their new democracy. Of course this did not arise merely from suspension of previous cruelties, or from better laws, or better administration. These indeed were essential conditions, but the active transforming cause here was, the principle and system of which such amendments formed the detail: the grand and new idea of the sovereign People, composed of free and equal citizens—of liberty and equality, to use words which so profoundly moved the French nation half a century ago. It was this comprehensive political idea which acted with electric effect upon the Athenians, creating within them a host of sentiments, motives, sympathies, and capacities, to which they had before been strangers. Democracy in Grecian antiquity possessed the privilege,

Striking development of Athenian energy after the revolution of Kleisthenes—language of Herodotus.

Effect upon their minds of the idea or theory of democracy.

¹ Herodot. v. 78-91. Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν νυν ἠδὲ γεντο· δηλοὶ δὲ οὐ κατ' ἑν μόνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ, ἢ ἰσηγορίῃ ὡς ἐστὶ χρῆμα σκουδαῖον, εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννεύομενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφίας περιοικούντων ἕσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαγθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῶ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο· δηλοὶ ὧν ταῦτα, οἱ καταχόμενοι μὲν,

ἐβελοχάκειον, ὡς δεσπότη ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἐωυτῷ προθυμέετο καταργάζεσθαι.

(c. 91.) Οἱ Δακεδαίμονιοι—νόψ λαβόντες, ὡς ἐλεύθερον μὲν ἔον τὸ γένος τὸ Ἀττικόν, ἰσόβροπον τῷ ἐωυτῶν ἔν γενόιτο, καταχόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ τυραννίδι, ἀσθενὲς καὶ πειθαρχεῖσθαι εἶοιμαν.

not only of kindling an earnest and unanimous attachment to the constitution in the bosoms of the citizens, but also of creating an energy of public and private action, such as could never be obtained under an oligarchy, where the utmost that could be hoped for was a passive acquiescence and obedience. Mr. Burke has remarked that the mass of the people are generally very indifferent about theories of government; but such indifference (although improvements in the practical working of all governments tend to foster it) is hardly to be expected among any people who exhibit decided mental activity and spirit on other matters; and the reverse was unquestionably true, in the year 500 B.C., among the communities of ancient Greece. Theories of government were there anything but a dead letter: they were connected with emotions of the strongest as well as of the most opposite character. The theory of a permanent ruling One, for example, was universally odious: that of a ruling Few, though acquiesced in, was never positively attractive, unless either where it was associated with the maintenance of peculiar education and habits, as at Sparta, or where it presented itself as the only antithesis to democracy, the latter having by peculiar circumstances become an object of terror. But the theory of democracy was pre-eminently seductive; creating in the mass of the citizens an intense positive attachment, and disposing them to voluntary action and suffering on its behalf, such as no coercion on the part of other governments could extort. Herodotus,¹ in his comparison of the three sorts of government, puts in the front rank of the advantages of democracy "its most splendid name and promise"—its power of enlisting the hearts of the citizens in support of their constitution, and of providing for all a common bond of union and fraternity. This is what even democracy did not always do: but it was what no other government in Greece *could* do: a reason alone sufficient

¹ Herodot. iii. 80. Πλήθος δὲ ἔργον, πρῶτα μὲν, οὐνομα πάντων κάλλιστον ἔχει, ἰσονομίην δεύτερα δὲ, τούτων τῶν ὁμόναρχος, ποιεῖ οὐδὲν· πάλῃ μὲν ἀρχὰς ἔργει, ὑπεύθυνον δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βουλευόμενα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει.

The democratical speaker at Syracuse, Athenagoras, also puts this name and promise in the first rank of advantages—(Thucyd. vi. 39)—ἐγὼ δὲ φημι, πρῶτα μὲν, δῆμον ξύμπαν ὀνόμασθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ, μέρος, &c.

to stamp it as the best government, and presenting the greatest chance of beneficent results, for a Grecian community. Among the Athenian citizens, certainly, it produced a strength and unanimity of positive political sentiment, such as has rarely been seen in the history of mankind, which excites our surprise and admiration the more when we compare it with the apathy which had preceded, and which is even implied as the natural state of the public mind in Solon's famous proclamation against neutrality in a sedition.¹ Because democracy happens to be unpalatable to most modern readers, they have been accustomed to look upon the sentiment here described only in its least honourable manifestations—in the caricatures of Aristophanês, or in the empty common-places of rhetorical declaimers. But it is not in this way that the force, the earnestness, or the binding value, of democratical sentiment at Athens is to be measured. We must listen to it as it comes from the lips of Periklês,² while he is strenuously enforcing upon the people those active duties for which it both implanted the stimulus and supplied the courage; or from the oligarchical Nikias in the harbour of Syracuse, when he is endeavouring to revive the courage of his despairing troops for one last death-struggle, and when he appeals to their democratical patriotism as to the only flame yet alive and burning even in that moment of agony.³ From the time of Kleisthenês downward, the creation of this new mighty impulse makes an entire revolution in the Athenian character; and if the change still stood out in so prominent a manner before the eyes of Herodotus, much more must it have been felt by the contemporaries among whom it occurred.

The attachment of an Athenian citizen to his democratical constitution comprised two distinct veins of sentiment: first, his rights, protection, and advantages derived from it—next, his obligations of exertion and sacrifice

¹ See the preceding chapter xi. of this History, vol. iii. p. 144, respecting the Solonian declaration here adverted to.

² See the two speeches of Periklês in Thucyd. ii. 35-46, and ii. 60-64. Compare the reflections of

Thucydides upon the two democracies of Athens and Syracuse—vi. 69 and vii. 21-55.

³ Thucyd. vii. 69. Πατρίδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομιμνήσκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτακτοῦ πᾶσιν ἐς τῆν διακταν εἰςουσίας, &c.

towards it and with reference to it. Neither of these two veins of sentiment was ever wholly absent; but according as the one or the other was present at different times in varying proportions, the patriotism of the citizen was a very different feeling. That which Herodotus remarks is, the extraordinary efforts of heart and hand which the Athenians suddenly displayed—the efficacy of the active sentiment throughout the bulk of the citizens. We shall observe even more memorable evidences of the same phænomenon in tracing down the history from Kleisthenês to the end of the Peloponnesian war: we shall trace a series of events and motives eminently calculated to stimulate that self-imposed labour and discipline which the early democracy had first called forth. But when we advance farther down, from the restoration of the democracy after the Thirty Tyrants, to the time of Demosthenês—(I venture upon this brief anticipation, in the conviction that one period of Grecian history can only be thoroughly understood by contrasting it with another)—we shall find a sensible change in Athenian patriotism. The active sentiment of obligation is comparatively inoperative—the citizen, it is true, has a keen sense of the value of the democracy as protecting him and ensuring to him valuable rights, and he is moreover willing to perform his ordinary sphere of legal duties towards it; but he looks upon it as a thing established, and capable of maintaining itself in a due measure of foreign ascendancy, without any such personal efforts as those which his forefathers cheerfully imposed upon themselves. The orations of Demosthenês contain melancholy proofs of such altered tone of patriotism—of that languor, paralysis, and waiting for others to act, which preceded the catastrophe of Chæroneia, notwithstanding an unabated attachment to the democracy as a source of protection and good government.¹ That same preternatural activity which the allies of Sparta, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, both denounced and admired in the Athenians, is noted by the

Patriotism of an Athenian between 500-400 B.C. — combined with an eager spirit of personal military exertion and sacrifice.

Diminution of this active sentiment in the restored democracy after the Thirty Tyrants.

¹ Compare the remarkable speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta (Thucyd. i. 68-71), with the φιλοπραγμοσύνη which Demosthenês so

emphatically notices in Philip (Olynthiac. i. 6. p. 13): also Philippic. i. 2, and the Philippics and Olynthiacs generally.

orator as now belonging to their enemy Philip. Such variations in the scale of national energy pervade history, modern as well as ancient, but in regard to Grecian history, especially, they can never be overlooked. For a certain measure, not only of positive political attachment, but also of active self-devotion, military readiness, and personal effort, was the indispensable condition of maintaining Hellenic autonomy, either in Athens or elsewhere; and became so more than ever, when the Macedonians were once organised under an enterprising and semi-hellenised prince. The democracy was the first creative cause of that astonishing personal and many-sided energy which marked the Athenian character, for a century downward from Kleisthenês; that the same ultra-Hellenic activity did not longer continue, is referable to other causes which will be hereafter in part explained. No system of government, even supposing it to be very much better and more faultless than the Athenian democracy, can ever pretend to accomplish its legitimate end apart from the personal character of the people, or to supersede the necessity of individual virtue and vigour. During the half-century immediately preceding the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians had lost that remarkable energy which distinguished them during the first century of their democracy, and had fallen much more nearly to a level with the other Greeks, in common with whom they were obliged to yield to the pressure of a foreign enemy. I here briefly notice their last period of languor, in contrast with the first burst of democratical fervour under Kleisthenês now opening—a feeling, which will be found, as we proceed, to continue for a longer period than could have been reasonably anticipated, but which was too high-strung to become a perpetual and inherent attribute of any community.

CHAPTER XXXII.

RISE OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.—CYRUS.

IN the preceding chapter I have followed the history of Central Greece very nearly down to the point at which the history of the Asiatic Greeks becomes blended with it, and after which the two streams begin to flow to a great degree in the same channel. I now revert to the affairs of the Asiatic Greeks, and of the Asiatic kings as connected with them, at the point in which they were left in my seventeenth chapter.

The concluding facts recounted in that chapter were of sad and serious moment to the Hellenic world. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks on the Asiatic coast had been conquered and made tributary by the Lydian king Cræsus: "down to that time (says Herodotus) all Greeks had been free." Their conqueror Cræsus, who ascended the throne in 560 B.C., appeared to be at the summit of human prosperity and power in his unassailable capital, and with his countless treasures at Sardis. His dominions comprised nearly the whole of Asia Minor, as far as the river Halys to the east; on the other side of that river began the Median monarchy under his brother-in-law Astyagès, extending eastward to some boundary which we cannot define, but comprising in a south-eastern direction Persis proper or Farsistan, and separated from the Kissians and Assyrians on the east by the line of Mount Zagros (the present boundary-line between Persia and Turkey). Babylonia, with its wondrous city, between the Euphrates and the Tigris, was occupied by the Assyrians or Chaldæans, under their king Labynétus: a territory populous and fertile, partly by nature, partly by prodigies of labour, to a degree which makes us mistrust even an honest eye-witness who describes it afterwards in its decline—but which was then in its most flourishing condition. The Chaldæan dominion under Labynétus reached to the borders of Egypt, including as dependent territories both

State of the Asiatic Greeks after the conquest of Lydia by Cyrus.

Judæa and Phenicia. In Egypt reigned the native king Amasis, powerful and affluent, sustained in his throne by a large body of Grecian mercenaries, and himself favourably disposed to Grecian commerce and settlement. Both with Labynêtus and with Amasis, Crœsus was on terms of alliance; and as Astyagês was his brother-in-law, the four kings might well be deemed out of the reach of calamity. Yet within the space of thirty years or a little more, the whole of their territories had become embodied in one vast empire, under the son of an adventurer as yet not known even by name.

The rise and fall of Oriental dynasties has been in all times distinguished by the same general features. A brave and adventurous prince, at the head of a population at once poor, warlike, and greedy, acquires dominion; while his successors, abandoning themselves to sensuality and sloth, probably also to oppressive and irascible dispositions, become in process of time victims to those same qualities in a stranger which had enabled their own father to seize the throne. Cyrus, the great founder of the Persian empire, first the subject and afterwards the dethroner of the Median Astyagês, corresponds to this general description, as far at least as we can pretend to know his history. For in truth, even the conquests of Cyrus, after he became ruler of Media, are very imperfectly known, whilst the facts which preceded his rise up to that sovereignty cannot be said to be known at all: we have to choose between different accounts at variance with each other, and of which the most complete and detailed is stamped with all the character of romance. The *Cyropædia* of Xenophon is memorable and interesting, considered with reference to the Greek mind, and as a philosophical novel.¹ That it should have been quoted so largely as authority on matters of history, is only one proof among many how easily authors have been satisfied as to the essentials of historical evidence. The narrative given by Herodotus of the relations between Cyrus and Astyagês, agreeing with Xenophon in little more than the fact that it makes Cyrus son of Kam-

¹ Among the lost productions of Antisthenês, the contemporary of Xenophon and Plato, and emanating like them from the tuition of Sokratês, was one, *Kÿpoc, ἡ περὶ Βασιλείας* (Diogenes Laërt. vi. 15).

bysés and Mandanê and grandson of Astyagês, goes even beyond the story of Romulus and Remus in respect to tragical incident and contrast. Astyagês, alarmed by a dream, condemns the new-born infant of his daughter Mandanê to be exposed: Harpagus, to whom the order is given, delivers the child to one of the royal herdsmen, who exposes it in the mountains, where it is miraculously suckled by a bitch.¹ Thus preserved, and afterwards brought up as the herdsman's child, Cyrus manifests great superiority both physical and mental, is chosen king in play by the boys of the village, and in this capacity severely chastises the son of one of the courtiers; for which offence he is carried before Astyagês, who recognises him for his grandson, but is assured by the Magi that the dream is out, and that he has no farther danger to apprehend from the boy—and therefore permits him to live. With Harpagus, however, Astyagês is extremely incensed, for not having executed his orders: he causes the son of Harpagus to be slain, and served up to be eaten by his unconscious father at a regal banquet. The father, apprised afterwards of the fact, dissembles his feelings, but meditates a deadly vengeance against Astyagês for this Thyestean meal. He persuades Cyrus, who has been sent back to his father and mother in Persia, to head a revolt of the

¹ That this was the real story—a close parallel of Romulus and Remus—we may see by Herodotus, i. 122. Some rationalising Greeks or Persians transformed it into a more plausible tale—that the herdsman's wife who suckled the boy Cyrus was named Κυών (Κυών is a dog, male or female); contending that this latter was the real basis of fact, and that the intervention of the bitch was an exaggeration built upon the name of the woman, in order that the divine protection shown to Cyrus might be still more manifest—οἱ δὲ τοκέες παραλαβόντες τὸ οὐνομα τοῦτο (ἵνα θειοτέρως δοκῆ τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι περιεϊναί σφι ὁ παῖς), κατέβαλον φάτιν ὡς ἐκχειμενον Κύρον κύων ἐξέθρεψε· ἐνθεῦτεν μὲν ἢ φάτις αὐτῆ κεχωρήσας.

In the first volume of this History

I have noticed various transformations operated by Palæphatus and others upon the Greek mythes—the ram which carried Phryxus and Hellê across the Hellespont is represented to us as having been in reality a man named Krius, who aided their flight—the winged horse which carried Bellerophon was a ship named Pegasus, &c.

This same operation has here been performed upon the story of the suckling of Cyrus; for we shall run little risk in affirming that the miraculous story is the older of the two. The feelings which welcome a miraculous story are early and primitive; those which break down the miracle into a commonplace fact are of subsequent growth.

Persians against the Medes; whilst Astyagês—to fill up the Grecian conception of madness as a precursor to ruin—sends an army against the revolters, commanded by Harpagus himself. Of course the army is defeated—Astyagês, after a vain resistance, is dethroned—Cyrus becomes king in his place—and Harpagus repays the outrage which he has undergone by the bitterest insults.

Such are the heads of a beautiful narrative which is given at some length in Herodotus. It will probably appear to the reader sufficiently romantic; though the historian intimates that he had heard three other narratives different from it, and that all were more full of marvels, as well as in wider circulation, than his own, which he had borrowed from some unusually sober-minded Persian informants.¹ In what points the other three stories departed from it we do not hear.

To the historian of Halikarnassus we have to oppose the physician of the neighbouring town Knidus and Ktêsias, who contradicted Herodotus, not without strong terms of censure, on many points, and especially upon that which is the very foundation of the early narrative respecting Cyrus; for he affirmed that Cyrus was noway related to Astyagês.² However indignant we may be with Ktêsias for the disparaging epithets which he presumed to apply to an historian, whose work is to us inestimable—we must nevertheless admit, that as surgeon in actual attendance on king Artaxerxês Mnêmon, and healer of the wound inflicted on that prince at Kunaxa by his brother Cyrus the younger,³ he had better opportunities

¹ Herodot. i. 95. 'Ὅς ὧν Περσῶν μετεξέτεροι λέγουσιν, οἱ μὴ βουλόμενοι σεμνοῦν τὰ περὶ Κύρου, ἀλλὰ τὸν εὐὸντα λέγειν λόγον, κατὰ ταῦτα γράψω ἐπιστάμενος περὶ Κύρου καὶ τριφασίας ἄλλας λόγων ὁδοὺς φῆναι. His informants were thus select persons, who differed from the Persians generally.

The long narrative respecting the infancy and growth of Cyrus is contained in Herodot. i. 107-129.

² See the Extracts from the lost Persian History of Ktêsias, in Photius God. lxxii., also appended to Schweighäuser's edition of Herodo-

tus, vol. iv. p. 345. Φησι δὲ (Κτῆσιος) αὐτὸν τῶν πλείωνων ἢ ἱστορεῖ αὐτόπτην γεόμενον, ἢ παρ' αὐτῶν Περσῶν (ἐνθα τὸ ὄραν μὴ ἐνεχώρει) αὐτήκοον καταστάντα, οὕτως τὴν ἱστορίαν συγγραψαί.

To the discrepancies between Xenophon, Herodotus, and Ktêsias, on the subject of Cyrus, is to be added the statement of Æschylus (Persæ, 747), the oldest authority of them all, and that of the Armenian historians: see Bähr ad Ktesiam, p. 85; compare Bähr's comments on the discrepancies, p. 87.

³ Xenophon, Anab. i. 6, 26.

even than Herodotus of conversing with soberminded Persians; and that the discrepancies between the two statements are to be taken as a proof of the prevalence of discordant, yet equally accredited, stories. Herodotus himself was in fact compelled to choose one out of four. So rare and late a plant is historical authenticity.

That Cyrus was the first Persian conqueror, and that the space which he overran covered no less than fifty degrees of longitude, from the coast of Asia Minor to the Oxus and the Indus, are facts quite indisputable; but of the steps by which this was achieved, we know very little. The native Persians, whom he conducted to an empire so immense, were an aggregate of seven agricultural, and four nomadic tribes—all of them rude, hardy, and brave¹—dwelling in a mountainous region, clothed in skins, ignorant of wine, or fruit, or any of the commonest luxuries of life, and despising the very idea of purchase or sale. Their tribes were very unequal in point of dignity, probably also in respect to numbers and powers, among one another. First in estimation among them stood the Pasargadæ; and the first phratry or clan among the Pasargadæ were, the Achæmenidæ, to whom Cyrus himself belonged. Whether his relationship to the Median king whom he dethroned was a matter of fact, or a politic fiction, we cannot well determine. But Xenophon, in noticing the spacious deserted cities, Larissa and Mespila,² which he saw in his march with the Ten Thousand Greeks on the eastern side of the Tigris, gives us to understand that the conquest of Media by the Persians was reported to him as having been an obstinate and protracted struggle. However this may be, the preponderance of the Persians was at last complete: though the Medes always continued to be the second nation in the empire, after the Persians, properly so called; and by early Greek writers the great enemy in the East is often called “the Mede”³ as well as “the Persian.” The Median

Condition of the native Persians at the first rise of Cyrus.

¹ Herodot. i. 71-163; Arrian, v. 4; Strabo, xv. p. 727; Plato, Legg. iii. p. 695.

² Xenophon, Anabas. iii. 3, 6; iii. 4, 7-12. Strabo had read accounts which represented the last battle between Astyagès and Cyrus

to have been fought near Pasargadæ (xv. p. 730).

³ Xenophanès, Fragm. p. 39, ap. Schneidewin, Delectus Poett. Elægiac. Græc.—

Πήλικος ἤσθ' ἔθ' ὁ Μῆδος ἀφικετο; compare Theognis, v. 775, and Herodot. i. 163.

Ekbatana too remained as one of the capital cities, and the usual summer residence, of the kings of Persia; Susa on the Choaspès, on the Kissian plain farther southward, and east of the Tigris, being their winter abode.

The vast space of country comprised between the Indus on the east, the Oxus and Caspian Sea to the north, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to the south, and the line of Mount Zagros to the west, appears to have been occupied in these times by a great variety of different tribes and people, yet all or most of them belonging to the religion of Zoroaster, and speaking dialects of the Zend language.¹ It was known amongst its inhabitants by the common name of Iran or Aria: it is, in its central parts at least, a high, cold plateau, totally destitute of wood and scantily supplied with water; much of it indeed is a salt and sandy desert, unsusceptible of culture. Parts of it are eminently fertile, where water can be procured and irrigation applied. Scattered masses of tolerably dense population thus grew up; but continuity of cultivation is not practicable, and in ancient times, as at present, a large proportion of the population of Iran seems to have consisted of wandering or nomadic tribes with their tents and cattle. The rich pastures, and the freshness of the summer climate, in the region of mountain and valley near Ekbatana, are extolled by modern travellers, just as they attracted the Great King in ancient times during the hot months. The more southerly province called Persis proper (Farsistan) consists also in part of mountain land interspersed with valley and plain, abundantly watered, and ample in pasture, sloping gradually down to low grounds on the sea-coast which are hot and dry: the care bestowed, both by Medes and Persians, on the breeding of their horses, was remarkable.² There were doubtless material differences between different parts of the population of this vast plateau of Iran. Yet it seems that along with their common

¹ Strabo, xv. p. 724. ὁμόγλωττοι παρά μικρόν. See Heeren, Ueber den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part i. book i. p. 320-340, and Ritter, Erdkunde, West-Asien, b. iii. Abtheil. ii. sect. 1 and 2. p. 17-84.

² About the province of Persis, see Strabo, xv. p. 727; Diodor. xix.

21; Quintus Curtius, v. 13, 14. p. 432-434, with the valuable explanatory notes of Müttzell (Berlin, 1841). Compare also Morier's Second Journey in Persia, p. 49-120, and Ritter, Erdkunde, West Asien, p. 712-733.

language and religion, they had also something of a common character, which contrasted with the Indian population east of the Indus, the Assyrians west of Mount Zagros, and the Massagetæ and other Nomads of the Caspian and the Sea of Aral—less brutish, restless, and bloodthirsty, than the latter—more fierce, contemptuous and extortionate, and less capable of sustained industry, than the two former. There can be little doubt, at the time of which we are now speaking, when the wealth and cultivation of Assyria were at their maximum, that Iran also was far better peopled than ever it has been since European observers have been able to survey it; especially the north-eastern portion, Baktria and Sogdiana; so that the invasions of the Nomads from Turkestan and Tartary, which have been so destructive at various intervals since the Mahomedan conquest, were before that period successfully kept back.

The general analogy among the population of Iran probably enabled the Persian conqueror with comparative ease to extend his empire to the east, after the conquest of Ekbatana, and to become the full heir of the Median kings. If we may believe Ktésias, even the distant province of Baktria had been before subject to those kings. At first it resisted Cyrus, but finding that he had become son-in-law of Astyagês, as well as master of his person, it speedily acknowledged his authority.¹

According to the representation of Herodotus, the war between Cyrus and Crœsus of Lydia began shortly after the capture of Astyagês, and before the conquest of Baktria.² Crœsus was the assailant, wishing to avenge his brother-in-law, to arrest the growth of the Persian conqueror, and to increase his own dominions. His more prudent counsellors in vain represented to him that he had little to gain, and much to lose, by war with a nation alike hardy and poor. He is represented as just at that time recovering from the affliction arising out of the death of his son.

To ask advice of the oracle, before he took any final decision, was a step which no pious king would omit. But in the present perilous question, Crœsus did more—he took a precaution so extreme, that if his piety had not been placed beyond all doubt by his extraordinary muni-

¹ Ktésias, Persica, c. 2.

² Herodot. i. 153.

ficence to the temples, he might have drawn upon himself the suspicion of a guilty scepticism.¹ Before he would send to ask advice respecting the project itself, he resolved to test the credit of some of the chief surrounding oracles—Delphi, Dôdôna, Branchidæ near Milêtus, Amphiaraus at Thebes, Trophônus at Lebadeia, and Ammôn in Libya. His envoys started from Sardis on the same day, and were all directed on the hundredth day afterwards, to ask at the respective oracles how Crœsus was at that precise moment employed. This was a severe trial: of the manner in which it was met by four out of the six oracles consulted, we have no information, and it rather appears that their answers were unsatisfactory. But Amphiaraus maintained his credit undiminished, while Apollo at Delphi, more omniscient than Apollo at Branchidæ, solved the question with such unerring precision, as to afford a strong additional argument against persons who might be disposed to scoff at divination. No sooner had the envoys put the question to the Delphian priestess, on the day named, "What is Crœsus now doing?" than she exclaimed, in the accustomed hexameter verse,² "I know the number of grains of sand, and the measures of the sea: I understand the dumb, and I hear the man who speaks not. The smell reaches me of a hardskinned tortoise boiled in a copper with lamb's flesh—copper above and copper below." Crœsus was awestruck on receiving this reply. It described with the utmost detail that which he had been really doing, so that he accounted the Delphian oracle and that of Amphiaraus the only trustworthy oracles on earth—following up these feelings with a holocaust of the most munificent character, in order to win the favour of the Delphian god. Three thousand cattle were offered up, and upon a vast sacrificial pile were placed the most splendid purple robes and tunics, together with couches and censers of gold and silver; besides which he sent to Delphi itself the richest presents in

¹ That this point of view should not be noticed in Herodotus, may appear singular, when we read his story (vi. 86) about the Milesian Glaukus, and the judgement that overtook him for having tested the

oracle; but it is put forward by Xenophon as constituting part of the guilt of Crœsus (Cyropæd. vii. 2, 17).

² Herodot. i. 47, 48, 49, 50.

gold and silver—ingots, statues, bowls, jugs, &c., the size and weight of which we read with astonishment; the more so as Herodotus himself saw them a century afterwards at Delphi.¹ Nor was Crœsus altogether unmindful of Amphiaraus, whose answer had been creditable, though less triumphant than that of the Pythian priestess. He sent to Amphiaraus a spear and shield of pure gold, which were afterwards seen at Thebes by Herodotus: this large donative may help the reader to conceive the immensity of those which he sent to Delphi.

The envoys who conveyed these gifts were instructed to ask at the same time, whether Crœsus should undertake an expedition against the Persians —and if so, whether he should solicit any allies to assist him. In regard to the second question, the answer both of Apollo and of Amphiaraus was decisive, recommending him to invite the alliance of the most powerful Greeks. In regard to the first and most momentous question, their answer was as remarkable for circumspection as it had been before for detective sagacity: they told Crœsus, that if he invaded the Persians, he would subvert a mighty monarchy. The blindness of Crœsus interpreted this declaration into an unqualified promise of success: he sent farther presents to the oracle, and again inquired whether his kingdom would be durable. “When a mule shall become king of the Medes (replied the priestess) then must thou run away—be not ashamed.”²

Advice given to him by the oracle.

More assured than ever by such an answer, Crœsus sent to Sparta, under the kings Anaxandridês and Aristo, to tender presents and solicit their alliance.³ His propositions were favourably entertained—the more so, as he had before gratuitously furnished some gold to the Lacedæmonians, for a statue to Apollo. The alliance now formed was altogether general—no express effort being as yet demanded from them, though it soon came to be. But the incident is to be noted, as marking the first plunge of the leading Grecian state into Asiatic politics; and that too without any of the generous Hellenic sympathy which afterwards induced Athens to send her citizens across the Ægean. At this time Crœsus was the master and tribute-exactor of the Asiatic Greeks, whose contingents seem to have formed part of his army

He solicits the alliance of Sparta.

¹ Herodot. i. 52, 53, 54.

² Herodot. i. 55.

³ Herodot. i. 67-70.

for the expedition now contemplated; an army consisting principally, not of native Lydians, but of foreigners.

The river Halys formed the boundary at this time between the Median and Lydian empires: and Crœsus, marching across that river into the territory of the Syrians or Assyrians of Kappadokia, took the city of Pteria, with many of its surrounding dependencies, inflicting damage and destruction upon these distant subjects of Ekbatana. Cyrus lost no time in bringing an army to their defence considerably larger than that of Crœsus; trying at the same time, though unsuccessfully, to prevail on the Ionians to revolt from him. A bloody battle took place between the two armies, but with indecisive result: after which Crœsus, seeing that he could not hope to accomplish more with his forces as they stood, thought it wise to return to his capital, and collect a larger army for the next campaign. Immediately on reaching Sardis he despatched envoys to Labynêtus king of Babylon; to Amasis king of Egypt; to the Lacedæmonians, and to other allies; calling upon all of them to send auxiliaries to Sardis during the course of the fifth month. In the meantime, he dismissed all the foreign troops who had followed him into Kappadokia.¹

Had these allies appeared, the war might perhaps have been prosecuted with success. And on the part of the Lacedæmonians at least, there was no tardiness; for their ships were ready and their troops almost on board, when the unexpected news reached them that Crœsus was already ruined.² Cyrus had foreseen and forestalled the defensive plan of his enemy. Pushing on with his army to Sardis without delay, he obliged the Lydian prince to give battle with his own unassisted subjects. The open and spacious plain before that town was highly favourable to Lydian cavalry, which at that time (Herodotus tells us) was superior to the Persian. But Cyrus, employing a stratagem whereby this cavalry was rendered unavailable, placed in front of his line the baggage camels, which the Lydian horses could not endure either to smell or to behold.³ The horsemen of Crœsus were thus obliged to dismount;

¹ Herodot. i. 77.

² Herodot. i. 83.

³ The story about this successful

employment of the camels appears also in Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* vii. 1, 47.

nevertheless they fought bravely on foot, and were not driven into the town till after a sanguinary combat.

Though confined within the walls of his capital, Crœsus had still good reason for hoping to hold out until the arrival of his allies, to whom he sent pressing envoys of acceleration. For Sardis was considered impregnable—one assault had already been repulsed, and the Persians would have been reduced to the slow process of blockade. But on the fourteenth day of the siege, accident did for the besiegers that which they could not have accomplished either by skill or force. Sardis was situated on an outlying peak of the northern side of Tmôlus; it was well fortified everywhere except towards the mountain; and on that side, the rock was so precipitous and inaccessible, that fortifications were thought unnecessary, nor did the inhabitants believe assault to be possible in that quarter. But Hyrcœades, a Persian soldier, having accidentally seen one of the garrison descending this precipitous rock to pick up his helmet which had rolled down, watched his opportunity, tried to climb up, and found it not impracticable; others followed his example, the strong hold was thus seized first, and the whole city speedily taken by storm.¹

Cyrus had given especial orders to spare the life of Crœsus, who was accordingly made prisoner. But preparations were made for a solemn and terrible spectacle; the captive king was destined to be burnt in chains, together with fourteen Lydian youths, on a vast pile of wood. We are even told that the pile was already kindled and the victim beyond the reach of human aid, when Apollo sent a miraculous rain to preserve him. As to the general fact of supernatural interposition, in one way or another, Herodotus and Ktêsias both agree, though they describe differently the particular miracles wrought.² It is certain that

Siege and capture of Sardis.

Crœsus becomes prisoner of Cyrus—how treated.

¹ Herodot. i. 84.

² Compare Herodot. i. 84-87, and Ktêsias, Persica, c. 4; which latter seems to have been copied by Polyænus, vii. 6, 10.

It is remarkable that among the miracles enumerated by Ktêsias, no mention is made of fire or of the pile of wood kindled: we have

the chains of Crœsus miraculously struck off, in the midst of thunder and lightning, but no fire mentioned. This is deserving of notice, as illustrating the fact that Ktêsias derived his information from Persian narrators, who would not be likely to impute to Cyrus the use of fire for such a purpose.

Crœsus, after some time, was released and well treated by his conqueror, and lived to become the confidential adviser of the latter as well as of his son Kambysês:¹ Ktêsias also acquaints us that a considerable town and territory near Ekbatana, called Barênê, was assigned to him, according to a practice which we shall find not unfrequent with the Persian kings.

The prudent counsel and remarks as to the relations between Persians and Lydians, whereby Crœsus is said by Herodotus to have first earned this favourable treatment, are hardly worth repeating; but the indignant remonstrance sent by Crœsus to the Delphian god is too characteristic to be passed over. He obtained permission from Cyrus to lay upon the holy pavement of the Delphian temple the chains with which he had at first been bound. The Lydian envoys were instructed, after exhibiting to the god these humiliating memorials, to ask whether it was his custom to deceive his benefactors, and whether he was not ashamed to have encouraged the king of Lydia in an enterprise so disastrous? The god, condescending to justify himself by the lips of the priestess, replied—"Not even a god can escape his destiny. Crœsus has suffered for the sin of his fifth ancestor (Gygês), who, conspiring with a woman, slew his master and wrongfully seized the sceptre. Apollo employed all his influence with the Moeræ (Fates) to obtain that this sin might be expiated by the children

The Persians worshipped fire as a god, and considered it impious to burn a dead body (Herodot. iii. 16). Now Herodotus seems to have heard the story about the burning from Lydian informants (λέγεται ὑπὸ Λυδῶν, Herodot. i. 87). Whether the Lydians regarded fire in the same point of view as the Persians, we do not know; but even if they did, they would not be indisposed to impute to Cyrus an act of gross impiety, just as the Egyptians imputed another act equally gross to Kambysês, which Herodotus himself treats as a falsehood (iii. 16).

The long narrative given by

Nikolaus Damaskênus of the treatment of Crœsus by Cyrus, has been supposed by some to have been borrowed from the Lydian historian Xanthus, elder contemporary of Herodotus. But it seems to me a mere compilation, not well put together, from Xenophon's *Cyropædia* and from the narrative of Herodotus, perhaps including some particular incidents out of Xanthus (see Nikol. Damas. *Fragm.* ed. Orell. p. 57-70, and the *Fragments of Xanthus* in Didot's *Historic. Græcor. Fragm.* p. 40).

¹ Justin (i. 7) seems to copy Ktêsias, about the treatment of Crœsus.

of Crœsus, and not by Crœsus himself; but the Mœræ would grant nothing more than a postponement of the judgement for three years. Let Crœsus know that Apollo has thus procured for him a reign three years longer than his original destiny,¹ after having tried in vain to rescue him altogether. Moreover he sent that rain which at the critical moment extinguished the burning pile. Nor has Crœsus any right to complain of the prophecy by which he was encouraged to enter on the war; for when the god told him, that he would subvert *a great empire*, it was his duty to have again inquired which empire the god meant; and if he neither understood the meaning, nor chose to ask for information, he has himself to blame for the result. Besides, Crœsus neglected the warning given to him, about the acquisition of the Median kingdom by a mule: Cyrus was that mule—son of a Median mother of royal breed, by a Persian father at once of different race and of lower position.”

This triumphant justification extorted even from Crœsus himself a full confession, that the sin lay with him, and not with the god.² It certainly illustrates in a remarkable manner the theological ideas of the time. It shows us how much, in the mind of Herodotus, the facts of the centuries preceding his own, unrecorded as they were by any contemporary authority, tended to cast themselves into a sort of religious drama; the threads of the historical web being in part put together, in part originally spun, for the purpose of setting forth the religious sentiment and doctrine woven in as a pattern. The Pythian priestess predicts to Gygês that the crime which he had committed in assassinating his master would be expiated by his fifth descendant, though, as Herodotus tells us, no one took any notice of this prophecy until it was at last fulfilled:³ we see thus the history of the

Successful
justifica-
tion of
the oracle.

¹ Herodot. i. 91. Προθυμομένου δὲ Ἀρξίω ἕως ἂν κατὰ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς Κροίσου γένοιτο τὸ Σαρδίων πάθος, καὶ μὴ κατ' αὐτὸν Κροίσου, οὐκ οἶόν τε ἐγένετο παραγαγεῖν Μοίρας· ὅσον δὲ ἐνέδωκαν αὐταί, ἠγύσατο, καὶ ἐχαρίσατό οἱ τρία γὰρ ἔτι ἀπερῆβᾶλετο τὴν Σαρδίων ἄλωσιν. Καὶ τοῦτο ἐπιστάθω Κροίσου, ὡς ὕστερον τοῖσι ἔτι τοῖσι ἄλλοις τῆς πε-

ρωμένης.

² Herodot. i. 91. Ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας συνέγ.ω ἐωυτοῦ εἶναι τὴν ἀμαρτάδα, καὶ οὐ τοῦ θεοῦ.

Xenophon also in the *Cyropædia* (vii. 2, 16-25) brings Crœsus to the same result of confession and humiliation, though by steps somewhat different.

³ Herodot. i. 13.

first Mermnad king is made up after the catastrophe of the Fate of last. There was something in the main facts of Cræsus im- the history of Cræsus profoundly striking to the pressive to the Greek mind: a king at the summit of wealth and power—pious in the extreme and munificent towards the gods—the first destroyer of Hellenic liberty in Asia—then precipitated, at once and on a sudden, into the abyss of ruin. The sin of the first parent helped much towards the solution of this perplexing problem, as well as to exalt the credit of the oracle, when made to assume the shape of an unnoticed prophecy. In the affecting story (discussed in a former chapter¹) of Solon and Cræsus, the Lydian king is punished with an acute domestic affliction because he thought himself the happiest of mankind—the gods not suffering any one to be arrogant except themselves;² and the warning of Solonis made to recur to Cræsus after he has become the prisoner of Cyrus, in the narrative of Herodotus. To the same vein of thought belongs the story, just recounted, of the relations of Cræsus with the Delphian oracle. An account is provided, satisfactory to the religious feelings of the Greeks, how and why he was ruined—but nothing less than the overruling and omnipotent Mœræ could be invoked to explain so stupendous a result. It is rarely that these supreme goddesses—or hyper-goddesses, since the gods themselves must submit to them—are brought into such distinct light and action. Usually they are kept in the dark, or are left to be understood as the unseen stumbling-block in cases of extreme incomprehensibility; and it is difficult clearly to determine (as in the case of some complicated political constitutions) where the Greeks conceived sovereign power to reside, in The Mœræ respect to the government of the world. But or Fates. here the sovereignty of the Mœræ, and the subordinate agency of the gods, are unequivocally set forth.³

¹ See above, chap. xi. vol. iii. p. 149.

² Herodot. vii. 10. οὐ γὰρ εἶναι φρονέειν ἄλλον μέγα ὁ θεός ἢ ἑαυτόν.

³ In the oracle reported in Herodot. vii. 141. as delivered by the Pythian priestess to Athens on occasion of the approach of Xerxes, Zeus is represented in the

same supreme position as the present oracle assigns to the Mœræ or Fates: Pallas in vain attempts to propitiate him in favour of Athens, just as in this case Apollo tries to mitigate the Mœræ in respect to Cræsus—

Οὐ δύνανται Παλλάς Δι' Ὀλύμπου
ἐξίλασθαι,

The gods are still extremely powerful, because the Mœræ comply with their requests up to a certain point, not thinking

Δισσομένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ μή-
τιδι πυκνῇ, &c.

Compare also viii. 109 and ix. 16.

O. Müller (Dissertation on the Eumenides of Æschylus, p. 222, Eng. Transl.) says—"On no occasion does Zeus Sotër exert his influence directly, like Apollo, Minerva, and the Erinnyes; but whereas Apollo is prophet and exegetes by virtue of wisdom derived from him, and Minerva is indebted to him for her sway over states and assemblies—nay, the very Erinnyes exercise their functions in his name—this Zeus stands always in the background, and has in reality only to settle a conflict existing within himself. For with Æschylus, as with all men of profound feeling among the Greeks from the earliest times, Jupiter is the only real god in the higher sense of the word. Although he is in the spirit of ancient theology a generated god arisen out of an imperfect state of things, and not produced till the third stage of a development of nature—still he is, at the time we are speaking of, the spirit that pervades and governs the universe."

To the same purpose Klausen expresses himself (Theologumena Æschyli, p. 6-69).

It is perfectly true that many passages may be produced from Greek authors which ascribe to Zeus the supreme power here noted. But it is equally true that this conception is not uniformly adhered to, and that sometimes the Fates or Mœræ are represented as supreme; occasionally represented as the stronger and Zeus as the weaker (Promætheus, 515). The whole tenor of the Prometheus of Æschylus, in fact, brings out

the conception of a Zeus τύραννος—whose power is not supreme, even for the time; and is not destined to continue permanently even at its existing height. The explanations given by Klausen of this drama appear to me incorrect; nor do I understand how it is to be reconciled with the above passage quoted from O. Müller.

The two oracles here cited from Herodotus exhibit plainly the fluctuation of Greek opinion on this subject: in the one, the supreme determination, and the inexorability which accompanies it, are ascribed to Zeus—in the other, to the Mœræ. This double point of view adapted itself to different occasions, and served as a help for the interpretation of different events. Zeus was supposed to have certain sympathies for human beings; misfortunes happened to various men which he not only did not wish to bring on, but would have been disposed to avert; here the Mœræ, who had no sympathies, were introduced as an explanatory cause, tacitly implied as overruling Zeus. "Cum Furiis Æschylus Parcas tantum non ubique conjungit," says Klausen (Theol. Æsch. p. 39); and this entire absence of human sympathies constitutes the common point of both—that in which the Mœræ and the Erinnyes differ from all the other gods—πέφριχα τῶν ὠλεσίοικον θεῶν, οὐ θεοῖς ὁμοίαν (Æschyl. Sept. ad Theb. 720): compare Eumenid. 961, 172, and indeed the general strain of that fearful tragedy.

In Æschylus, as in Herodotus, Apollo is represented as exercising persuasive powers over the Mœræ (Eumenid. 724)—Μοῖρας ἐπι-
σας ἀφίητους θείναι βροτοῦς.

it proper to be wholly inexorable; but their compliance is carried no farther than they themselves choose; nor would they, even in deference to Apollo¹, alter the original sentence of punishment for the sin of Gygês in the person of his fifth descendant—a sentence moreover which Apollo himself had formally prophesied shortly after the sin was committed; so that, if the Mœræ had listened to his intercession on behalf of Crœsus, his own prophetic credit would have been endangered. Their unalterable resolution has predetermined the ruin of Crœsus, and the grandeur of the event is manifested by the circumstance, that even Apollo himself cannot prevail upon them to alter it, or to grant more than a three years' respite. The religious element must here be viewed as giving the form—the historical element as giving the matter only, and not the whole matter—of the story. These two elements will be found conjoined more or less throughout most of the history of Herodotus, though as we descend to later times, we shall find the latter element in constantly increasing proportion. His conception of history is extremely different from that of Thucydidês, who lays down to himself the true scheme and purpose of the historian, common to him with the philosopher—to recount and interpret the past, as a rational aid towards prevision of the future.²

The destruction of the Lydian monarchy, and the establishment of the Persians at Sardis—an event pregnant with consequences to Hellas generally—took place in 546 B.C.³ Sorely did the Ionic

¹ The language of Herodotus deserves attention: Apollo tells Crœsus—"I applied to the Mœræ to get the execution of the judgement postponed from your time to that of your children—but I could not prevail upon them; but as much as they would yield of *their own accord*, I procured for you (ὅσον δὲ ἐνέδωξαν αὐτοί, ἑχαρίσται) οί—i. 91).

² Thucyd. i. 22.

³ This important date depends upon the evidence of Solinus (Polyhistor. i. 112) and Sosikratês (ap. Diog. Laërt. i. 95): see Mr. Clinton's *Fæsti Hellen. ad ann. 546*, and his

Appendix, ch. 17, upon the Lydian kings.

Mr. Clinton and most of the chronologists accept the date without hesitation, but Volney (*Recherches sur l'Histoire Ancienne*, vol. i. p. 306-308; *Chronologie des Rois Lydiens*) rejects it altogether; considering the capture of Sardis to have occurred in 557 B.C., and the reign of Crœsus to have begun in 571 B.C. He treats very contemptuously the authority of Solinus and Sosikratês, and has an elaborate argumentation to prove that the date which he adopts is borne out by Herodotus. This latter does

Greeks now repent that they had rejected the propositions made to them by Cyrus for revolting from Crœsus—though at the time when these propositions were made, it would have been highly imprudent to listen to them, since the Lydian power might reasonably be looked upon as the stronger. As soon as Sardis had fallen, they sent envoys to the conqueror entreating that they might be enrolled as his tributaries, on the footing which they had occupied under Crœsus. The reply was a stern and angry refusal, with the exception of the Milesians, to whom the terms which they asked were granted:¹ why this favourable exception was extended to them, we do not know.

State of the Asiatic Greeks after the conquest of Lydia by Cyrus.

The other continental Ionians and Æolians (exclusive of Milêtus, and exclusive also of the insular cities which the Persians had no means of attacking), seized with alarm, began to put themselves in a condition of defence. It seems that the Lydian king had caused their fortifications to be wholly or partially dismantled, for we are told that they now began to erect walls; and the Phokœans especially devoted to that purpose a present which they had received from the Iberian Arganthônus, king of Tartessus. Besides thus strengthening their own cities, they thought it advisable to send a joint embassy entreating aid from Sparta. They doubtless were not unapprised that the Spartans had actually equipped an army for the support of Crœsus. Their deputies went to Sparta, where the Phokœan Pythermus, appointed by the rest to be spokesman, clothing himself in a purple robe² in order to attract the largest audience possible, set forth their pressing need of succour against the impending danger. The Lacedæmonians refused the prayer; never-

They apply in vain to Sparta for aid.

not appear to me at all satisfactory; I adopt the date of Solinus and Sosikrateés (though agreeing with Volney that such positive authority is not very considerable), because there is nothing to contradict them, and because the date which they give seems in consonance with the stream of the history.

Volney's arguments suppose in the mind of Herodotus a degree of chronological precision altogether unreasonable, in reference to events

anterior to contemporary records. He (like other chronologists) exhausts his ingenuity to find a proper point of historical time for the supposed conversation between Solon and Crœsus (p. 320).

¹ Herodot. i. 141.

² Herodot. i. 152. The purple garment, so attractive a spectacle amid the plain clothing universal at Sparta, marks the contrast between Asiatic and European Greece.

theless they despatched to Phôkæa some commissioners to investigate the state of affairs—who, perhaps persuaded by the Phôkæans, sent Lakrinês, one of their number, to the conqueror at Sardis, to warn him that he should not lay hands on any city of Hellas—for the Lacedæmonians would not permit it. “Who are these Lacedæmonians? (inquired Cyrus from some Greeks who stood near him)—how many are there of them, that they venture to send me such a notice?” Having received the answer, wherein it was stated that the Lacedæmonians had a city and a regular market at Sparta, he exclaimed—“I have never yet been afraid of men like these, who have a set place in the middle of their city, where they meet to cheat one another and forswear themselves. If I live they shall have troubles of their own to talk about, apart from the Ionians.” To buy or sell appeared to the Persians a contemptible practice: for they carried out consistently one step farther, the principle upon which even many able Greeks condemned the lending of money on interest; and the speech of Cyrus was intended as a covert reproach of Grecian habits generally.¹

This blank menace of Lakrinês, an insulting provocation to the enemy rather than a real support to the distressed, was the only benefit which the Ionic Greeks derived from Sparta. They were left to defend themselves as best they could against the conqueror; who presently however quitted Sardis to prosecute in person his conquests in the East, leaving the Persian Tabalus with a garrison in the citadel, but consigning the large treasure captured, with authority over the Lydian population, to the Lydian Paktyas. As he carried away Crœsus along with him, he probably considered himself sure of the fidelity of those Lydians whom the deposed monarch recommended. But he had not yet arrived at his own capital, when he received the intelligence that Paktyas had revolted, arming the Lydian population, and employing the treasure in his charge to hire fresh troops. On hearing this news, Cyrus addressed himself to Crœsus (according to Herodotus) in terms of much wrath against the Lydians, and even intimated that he should be compelled to sell them all as slaves. Upon which

¹ Herodot. l. 153. ταῦτα ἐς τοὺς πάντας Ἑλληνας ἀπέβριψε ὁ Κύρος τὰ ἔπεια, &c.

Croesus, full of alarm for his people, contended strenuously that Paktyas alone was in fault and deserving of punishment; but he at the same time advised Cyrus to disarm the Lydian population, and to enforce upon them both effeminate attire and habits of playing on the harp and shopkeeping. "By this process (he said) you will soon see them become women instead of men."¹ This suggestion is said to have been accepted by Cyrus, and executed by his general Mazarês. The conversation here reported, and the deliberate plan for enervating the Lydian character supposed to be pursued by Cyrus, is evidently an hypothesis imagined by some of the contemporaries or predecessors of Herodotus, to explain the contrast between the Lydian whom they saw before them, after two or three generations of slavery, and the old irresistible horsemen of whom they heard in fame, at the time when Croesus was lord from the Halys to the Ægean Sea.

To return to Paktyas—he had commenced his revolt, come down to the sea-coast, and employed the treasures of Sardis in levying a Grecian mercenary force, with which he invested the place and blocked up the governor Tabalus. But he manifested no courage worthy of so dangerous an enterprise; for no sooner had he heard that the Median general Mazarês was approaching at the head of an army despatched by Cyrus against him, than he disbanded his force and fled to Kymê for protection as a suppliant. Presently arrived a menacing summons from Mazarês, demanding that he should be given up forthwith, which plunged the Kymæans into profound dismay. The idea of giving up a suppliant to destruction was shocking to Grecian sentiment. They sent to solicit advice from the holy temple of Apollo at Branchidæ near Milêtus; and the reply directed, that Paktyas should be surrendered. Nevertheless so ignominious did such a surrender appear, that Aristodikus and some other Kymæan citizens denounced the messengers as liars, and required that a more trustworthy deputation should be sent to consult the god. Aristodikus himself, forming one of the second body, stated the perplexity to the oracle, and received a repetition of the same answer; whereupon he proceeded to rob the birds'-nests which existed in abundance in and about the

The Persian general Mazarês attacks Ionia—the Lydian Paktyas.

¹ Herodot. i. 155.

temple. A voice from the inner oracular chamber speedily arrested him, exclaiming—"Most impious of men, how darest thou to do such things? Wilt thou snatch my suppliants from the temple itself?" Unabashed by the rebuke, Aristodikus replied—"Master, thus dost *thou* help suppliants thyself: and dost thou command the Kymæans to give up a suppliant?" "Yes, I do command it¹ (rejoined the god forthwith), in order that the crime may bring destruction upon you the sooner, and that you may not in future come to consult the oracle upon the surrender of suppliants."

The ingenuity of Aristodikus thus completely nullified the oracular response, and left the Kymæans in their original perplexity. Not choosing to surrender Paktyas, nor daring to protect him against a besieging army, they sent him away to Mitylênê, whither the envoys of Mazarês followed and demanded him; offering a reward so considerable, that the Kymæans became fearful of trusting them, and again conveyed away the suppliant to Chios, where he took refuge in the temple of Athênê Poliuchus. But here again the pursuers followed. The Chians were persuaded to drag him from the temple and surrender him, on consideration of receiving the territory of Atarneus (a district on the continent over against the island of Lesbos) as purchase-money. Paktyas was thus seized and sent prisoner to Cyrus, who had given the most express orders for this capture: hence the unusual intensity of the pursuit. But it appears that the territory of Atarneus was considered as having been ignominiously acquired by the Chians: none even of their own citizens would employ any article of its produce for holy or sacrificial purposes.²

¹ Herodot. i. 159.

² Herodot. i. 180. The short fragment from Charôn of Lampsakus, which Plutarch (*De Malignitat.* Herod. p. 859) cites here, in support of one among his many unjust censures on Herodotus, is noway inconsistent with the statement of the latter, but rather tends to confirm it.

In writing this treatise on the alleged ill-temper of Herodotus, we see that Plutarch had before him the history of Charôn of Lam-

psakus, more ancient by one generation than the historian whom he was assailing, and also belonging to Asiatic Greece. Of course it suited the purpose of his work to produce all the contradictions to Herodotus which he could find in Charôn: the fact that he has produced none of any moment, tends to strengthen our faith in the historian of Halikarnassus, and to show that in the main his narrative was in accordance with that of Charôn.

Mazarês next proceeded to the attack and conquest of the Greeks on the coast; an enterprise which, since he soon died of illness, was completed by his successor Harpagus. The towns assailed successively made a gallant but ineffectual resistance. The Persian general by his numbers drove the defenders within their walls, against which he piled up mounds of earth, so as either to carry the place by storm or to compel surrender. All of them were reduced one after the other. With all, the terms of subjection were doubtless harder than those which had been imposed upon them by Croesus, because Cyrus had already refused to grant these terms to them, with the single exception of Milêtus, and because they had since given additional offence by aiding the revolt of Paktyas. The inhabitants of Priênê were sold into slavery: they were the first assailed by Mazarês, and had perhaps been especially forward in the attack made by Paktyas on Sardis.¹

Harpagus succeeds Mazarês—conquest of Ionia by the Persians.

Among these unfortunate towns thus changing their master and passing into a harsher subjection, two deserve especial notice—Teôs and Phôkæa. The citizens of the former, so soon as the mound around their walls had rendered farther resistance impossible, embarked and emigrated, some to Thrace, where they founded Abdêra—others to the Cimmerian Bosphorus, where they planted Phanagoria: a portion of them however must have remained to take the chances of subjection, since the town appears in after-times still peopled and still Hellenic.²

Fate of Phôkæa.

The fate of Phôkæa, similar in the main, is given to us with more striking circumstances of detail, and becomes the more interesting, since the enterprising mariners who inhabited it had been the torch-bearers of Grecian geographical discovery in the west. I have already described their adventurous exploring voyages of former days into the interior of the Adriatic, and along the whole northern and western coasts of the Mediterranean as far as Tartessus (the region around and adjoining to Cadiz)—together with the favourable reception given to them by old Arganthônus, king of the country, who invited them to immigrate in a body to his kingdom, offering them the choice of any

¹ Herodot. i. 161-169.

Fragm. v. 153; Dionys. Perieg. v.

² Herodot. i. 168; Skymnus Chius, 553.

site which they might desire. His invitation was declined, though probably the Phôkæans may have subsequently regretted the refusal; and he then manifested his goodwill towards them by a large present to defray the expense of constructing fortifications round their town.¹ The walls, erected in part by this aid, were both extensive and well built. Yet they could not hinder Harpagus from raising his mounds of earth up against them, while he was politic enough at the same time to tempt them with offers of a

¹ Herodot. i. 163. Ὁ δὲ πυθόμενος παρ' αὐτῶν τὸν Μῆδον ὡς ἀξιοῖτο, εἰδοῦσιν σφι χρήματα τείχος περιβαλέσθαι τὴν πόλιν.

I do not understand why the commentators debate what or who is meant by τὸν Μῆδον: it plainly means the Median or Persian power generally; but the chronological difficulty is a real one, if we are to suppose that there was time between the first alarm conceived of the Median power by the Ionians, and the siege of Phôkæa by Harpagus, to inform Arganthônus of the circumstances, and to procure from him this large aid as well as to build the fortifications. The Ionic Greeks neither actually did conceive, nor had reason to conceive, any alarm respecting Persian power, until the arrival of Cyrus before Sardis; and within a month from that time Sardis was in his possession. If we are to suppose communication with Arganthônus grounded upon this circumstance, at the distance of Tartessus and under the circumstances of ancient navigation, we must necessarily imagine also that the attack made by Harpagus upon Phôkæa (which city he assailed before any of the rest) was postponed for at least two or three years. Such postponement is not wholly impossible, yet it is not in the spirit of the Herodotean narrative, nor do I think it likely. It is much more probable that the informants of Herodotus

made a slip in chronology, and ascribed the donations of Arganthônus to a motive which did not really dictate them.

As to the fortifications (which Phôkæa and the other Ionic cities are reported to have erected after the conquest of Sardis by the Persians), the case may stand thus. While these cities were all independent, before they were first conquered by Croesus, they must undoubtedly have had fortifications. When Croesus conquered them, he directed the demolition of the fortifications; but demolition does not necessarily mean pulling down the entire walls: when one or a few breaches are made, the city is laid open, and the purpose of Croesus would thus be answered. Such may well have been the state of the Ionian cities at the time when they first thought it necessary to provide defences against the Persians at Sardis: they repaired and perfected the breached fortifications.

The conjecture of Larcher (see the Notes both of Larcher and Wesseling)—τὸν Αὐδὸν instead of τὸν Μῆδον—is not an unreasonable one, if it had any authority: the donation of Arganthônus would then be transferred to the period anterior to the Lydian conquest: it would get rid of the chronological difficulty above adverted to, but it would introduce some new awkwardness into the narrative.

moderate capitulation; requiring only that they should breach their walls in one place by pulling down one of the towers, and consecrate one building in the interior of the town as a token of subjection. To accept these terms was to submit themselves to the discretion of the besieger, for there could be no security that they would be observed. The Phôkæans, while they asked for one day to deliberate upon their reply, entreated that during that day Harpagus should withdraw his troops altogether from the walls. With this demand the latter complied, intimating at the same time that he saw clearly through the meaning of it. The Phôkæans, having determined that the inevitable servitude impending over their town should not be shared by its inhabitants, employed their day of grace in preparation for collective exile, putting on shipboard their wives and children as well as their furniture and the moveable decorations of their temples. They then set sail for Chios, leaving to the conqueror a deserted town for the occupation of a Persian garrison.¹

It appears that the fugitives were not very kindly received at Chios. At least when they made a proposition for purchasing from the Chians the neighbouring islands of Cœnussæ as a permanent abode, the latter were induced to refuse by apprehensions of commercial rivalry. It was necessary to look farther for a settlement; while Arganthônus, their protector, being now dead, Tartêssus was no longer inviting. Twenty years before, however, the colony of Alalia in the island of Corsica had been founded from Phôkæa by the direction of the oracle, and thither the general body of Phôkæans now resolved to repair. Having prepared their ships for this distant voyage, they first sailed back to Phôkæa, surprised the Persian garrison whom Harpagus had left in the town, and slew them. They then sunk in the harbour a great lump of iron, binding themselves by a solemn and unanimous oath never again to see Phôkæa until that iron should come up to the surface. Nevertheless, in spite of the oath, the voyage of exile had been scarcely begun when more than half of them repented of having so bound themselves—and became home-sick.² They broke their

Emigration of the Phôkæans vowed by all, executed only by one half.

¹ Herodot. i. 184.

ἀστών εἰλαβε πόθος τε καὶ οἶκτος τῆς

² Herodot. i. 185. ὑπερημίσεας τῶν

πόλιος καὶ τῶν ἡθίων τῆς χωρῆς.

vow and returned to Phôkæa. Yet since Herodotus does not mention any divine judgement as having been consequent on the perjury, we may perhaps suspect that some grey-headed citizen, to whom transportation to Corsica might be little less than a sentence of death, both persuaded himself, and certified to his companions, that he had seen the sunken lump of iron raised up and floating for a while buoyant upon the waves. Harpagus must have been induced to pardon the previous slaughter of his Persian garrison, or at least to believe that it had been done by those Phôkæans who still persisted in exile. He wanted tribute-paying subjects, not an empty military post, and the repentant home-seekers were allowed to number themselves among the slaves of the Great King.

Meanwhile the smaller but more resolute half of the

Phôkæan
colony
first at
Alalia,
then at
Elea.

Phôkæans executed their voyage to Alalia in Corsica, with their wives and children, in sixty pentekontêrs or armed ships, and established themselves along with the previous settlers.

They remained there for five years,¹ during which time their indiscriminate piracies had become so intolerable (even down to this time, piracy committed against a foreign vessel seems to have been practised frequently and without much disrepute), that both the Tyrrhenian sea-ports along the Mediterranean coast of Italy, and the Carthaginians, united to put them down. There subsisted particular treaties between these two, for the regulation of the commercial intercourse between Africa and Italy, of which the ancient treaty preserved by Polybius between Rome and Carthage (made in 509 B.C.) may be considered as a specimen.² Sixty Carthaginian and as many Tuscan ships, attacking the sixty Phôkæan ships near Alalia, destroyed forty of them, yet not without such severe loss to themselves that the victory was said to be on the side of the latter; who however, in spite of this Kadmeian victory (so a battle was denominated in which the victors lost more than the vanquished), were

ψευδορχιστοί τε γινόμενοι, &c. The colloquial term which I have ventured to place in the text expresses exactly, as well as briefly, the meaning of the historian. A public oath, taken by most of the Greek cities with similar ceremony

of lumps of iron thrown into the sea, is mentioned in Plutarch, Aristid. c. 25.

¹ Herodot. i. 166.

² Aristot. Polit. iii. 5, 11; Polyb. iii. 22.

compelled to carry back their remaining twenty vessels to Alalia, and to retire with their wives and families, in so far as room could be found for them, to Rhegium. At last these unhappy exiles found a permanent home by establishing the new settlement of Elea or Velia in the Gulf of Policastro, on the Italian coast (then called Cœnôtrian) southward from Poseidônia or Pæstum. It is probable that they were here joined by other exiles from Æonia, in particular by the Kolophonian philosopher and poet Xenophanês, from whom what was afterwards called the Eleatic school of philosophy, distinguished both for bold consistency and dialectic acuteness, took its rise. The Phôkæan captives, taken prisoners in the naval combat by Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, were stoned to death. But a divine judgement overtook the Tyrrhenian town of Agylla in consequence of this cruelty; and even in the time of Herodotus, a century afterwards, the Agyllæans were still expiating the sin by a periodical solemnity and agon, pursuant to the penalty which the Delphian oracle had imposed upon them.¹

Such was the fate of the Phôkæan exiles, while their brethren at home remained as subjects of Harpagus, in common with all the other Ionic and Æolic Greeks, except Samos and Milêtus. For even the insular inhabitants of Lesbos and Chios, though not assailable by sea, since the Persians had no fleet, thought it better to renounce their independence and enrol themselves as Persian subjects—both of them possessing strips of the mainland which they were unable to protect otherwise. Samos, on the other hand, maintained its independence, and even reached, shortly after this period, under the despotism of Polykratês, a higher degree of power than ever: perhaps the humiliation of the other maritime Greeks around may have rather favoured the ambition of this unscrupulous prince, to whom I shall revert presently. But we may readily conceive that the public solemnities in which the Ionic Greeks intermingled, in place of those gay and richly-decked crowds which the Homeric hymn describes in the preceding century as assembled at Delos, presented scenes of marked despondency. One of their wisest men, indeed, Bias of Priênê, went so far as to propose, at the Pan-Ionic festival, a collective emigration of the entire population of

¹ Herodot. i. 167.

the Ionic towns to the island of Sardinia. Nothing like freedom (he urged) was now open to them in Asia; but in Sardinia, one great Pan-Ionic city might be formed, which would not only be free herself, but mistress of her neighbours. The proposition found no favour; the reason of which is sufficiently evident from the narrative just given respecting the unconquerable local attachment on the part of the Phôkæan majority. But Herodotus bestows upon it the most unqualified commendation and regrets that it was not acted upon.¹ Had such been the case, the subsequent history of Carthage, Sicily, and even Rome, might have been sensibly altered.

Thus subdued by Harpagus, the Ionic and Æolic Greeks were employed as auxiliaries to him in the conquest of the south-western inhabitants of Asia Minor—Karians, Kaunians, Lykians, and Doric Greeks of Knidus and Halikarnassus. Of the fate of the latter town, Herodotus tells us nothing, though it was his native place. The inhabitants of Knidus, a place situated on a long outlying tongue of land, at first tried to cut through the narrow isthmus which joined them to the continent, but abandoned the attempt with a facility which Herodotus explains by referring it to a prohibition of the oracle.² Neither Karians nor Kaunians offered any serious resistance. The Lykians only, in their chief town Xanthus, made a desperate defence. Having in vain tried to repel the assailants in the open field, and finding themselves blocked up in their city, they set fire to it with their own hands; consuming in the flames their women, children and servants, while the armed citizens marched out and perished to a man in combat with the enemy.³ Such an act of brave and even ferocious despair is not in the Grecian character. In recounting, however, the languid defence and easy submission of the Greeks of

¹ Herodot. i. 170. Πυνθάνομαι γνῶμην βίαντα ἄνδρα Πριηνέα ἀποδέξασθαι ἴωσι χρησιμωτάτην, τῇ εἰ ἐπιθόντο, παρείχε ἄν σφι εὐδαιμονέειν Ἑλλήνων μάλιστα.

² Herodot. i. 174.

³ Herodot. i. 176. The whole population of Xanthus perished, except eighty families accidentally

absent: the subsequent occupants of the town were recruited from strangers. Nearly five centuries afterwards, their descendants in the same city slew themselves in the like desperate and tragical manner, to avoid surrendering to the Roman army under Marcus Brutus (Plutarch, Brutus, c. 31).

Knidus, it may surprise us to call to mind that they were Dorians and colonists from Sparta. The want of stedfast courage, often imputed to Ionic Greeks as compared to Dorian, ought properly to be charged on Asiatic Greeks as compared with European; or rather upon that mixture of indigenous with Hellenic population, which all the Asiatic colonies, in common with most of the other colonies, presented, and which in Halikarnassus was particularly remarkable; for it seems to have been half Karian, half Dorian, and was even governed by a line of Karian despots.

Harpagus and the Persians thus mastered, without any considerable resistance, the western and southern portions of Asia Minor; probably also, though we have no direct account of it, the entire territory within the Halys which had before been ruled by Crœsus. The tributes of the conquered Greeks were transmitted to Ekbatana instead of to Sardis. While Harpagus was thus employed, Cyrus himself had been making still more extensive conquests in Upper Asia and Assyria, of which I shall speak in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

GROWTH OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.

IN the preceding chapter an account has been given, the best which we can pick out from Herodotus, of the steps by which the Asiatic Greeks became subject to Persia. If his narrative is meagre, on a matter which vitally concerned not only so many of his brother Greeks, but even his own native city, we can hardly expect that he should tell us much respecting the other conquests of Cyrus. He seems to withhold intentionally various details which had come to his knowledge, and merely intimates in general terms that while Harpagus was engaged on the coast of the Ægean, Cyrus himself assailed and subdued all the nations of Upper Asia "not omitting any one of them."¹ He alludes to the Bactrians and the Sakæ,² who are also named by Ktésias as having become subject partly by force, partly by capitulation. But he deems only two of the exploits of Cyrus worthy of special notice—the conquest of Babylon, and the final expedition against the Massagetæ. In the short abstract which we now possess of the lost work of Ktésias, no mention appears of the important conquest of Babylon. His narrative, indeed, as far as the abstract enables us to follow it, diverges materially from that of Herodotus, and must have been founded on data altogether different.

"I shall mention (says Herodotus)³ those conquests which gave Cyrus most trouble, and are most memorable: after he had subdued all the rest of the continent, he attacked the Assyrians." Those who recollect the description of Babylon and its surrounding territory, as given in a former chapter, will not be surprised to learn that the capture of it gave the Persian aggressor

¹ Herodot. i. 177.

² Herodot. i. 153.

³ Herodot. i. 177. τὰ βίαια καὶ ἐπιβλητά.

περὶ πόνον τε πλείστον, καὶ ἀξιοπήγητότατά ἐστι, τούτων ἐπιμνήσομαι.

much trouble. Their only surprise will be, how it could ever have been taken at all—or indeed how a hostile army could have even reached it. Herodotus informs us that the Babylonian queen Nitôkris (mother of that very Laby-nêtus who was king when Cyrus attacked the place) apprehensive of invasion from the Medes after their capture of Nineveh, had executed many laborious works near the Euphratês for the purpose of obstructing their approach. Moreover there existed what was called the wall of Media (probably built by her, but certainly built prior to the Persian conquest), one hundred feet high and twenty feet thick,¹ across the entire space of seventy-five miles which joined the Tigris with one of the canals of the Euphratês: while the canals themselves, as we may see by the march of the Ten Thousand Greeks after the battle of Kunaxa, presented means of defence altogether insuperable by a rude army such as that of the Persians. On the east, the territory of Babylonia was defended by the Tigris, which cannot be forded lower than the ancient Nineveh or the modern Mosul.² In addition to these ramparts, natural as

¹ See Xenophon, *Anab.* i. 7, 15; ii. 4, 12. For the inextricable difficulties in which the Ten Thousand Greeks were involved, after the battle of Kunaxa, and the insurmountable obstacles which impeded their march, assuming any resisting force whatever, see Xenophon. *Anab.* ii. 1, 11; ii. 2, 3; ii. 8, 10; ii. 4, 12, 13. These obstacles doubtless served as a protection to them against attack, not less than as an impediment to their advance; and the well-supplied villages enabled them to obtain plenty of provisions: hence the anxiety of the Great King to help them across the Tigris out of Babylonia. But it is not easy to see how, in the face of such difficulties, any invading army could reach Babylon.

Ritter represents the wall of Media as having reached across from the Euphratês to the Tigris at the point where they come nearest together, about 200 stadia or

twenty-five miles across. But it is nowhere stated, so far as I can find, that this wall reached to the Euphratês—still less that its length was 200 stadia, for the passages of Strabo cited by Ritter do not prove either point (ii. 80; xi. 529). And Xenophon (ii. 4, 12) gives the length of the wall as I have stated it in the text, = 20 parasangs = 600 stadia = 75 miles.

The passage of the *Anabasis* (i. 7, 15) seems to connect the Median wall with the canals, and not with the river Euphratês. The narrative of Herodotus (as I have remarked in a former chapter) leads us to suppose that he descended that river to Babylon; and if we suppose that the wall did not reach the Euphratês, this would afford some reason why he makes no mention of it. See Ritter, *West-Asien*, b. iii. *Abtheilung* iii. *Abschn.* i: sect. 29. p. 19-22.

² Ὁ Τίγρης μέγας τε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ διαβατός ἐς τε ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν (Ar-

well as artificial, to protect the territory—populous, cultivated, productive, and offering every motive to its inhabitants to resist even the entrance of an enemy—we are told that the Babylonians were so thoroughly prepared for the inroad of Cyrus that they had accumulated within their walls a store of provisions for many years. Strange

Difficult approach to Babylon—no resistance made to the invaders.

as it may seem, we must suppose that the king of Babylon, after all the cost and labour spent in providing defences for the territory, voluntarily neglected to avail himself of them, suffered the invader to tread down the fertile Babylonia without resistance, and merely drew out

the citizens to oppose him when he arrived under the walls of the city—if the statement of Herodotus is correct.¹ And we may illustrate this unaccountable omission by that which we know to have happened in the march of the younger Cyrus to Kunaxa against his brother Artaxerxês Mnêmon. The latter had caused to be dug, expressly in preparation for this invasion, a broad and deep ditch (thirty feet wide and eight feet deep) from the wall of Media to the river Euphratês, a distance of twelve parasangs or forty-five English miles, leaving only a passage of twenty feet broad close alongside of the river. Yet when the invading army arrived at this important pass, they found not a man there to defend it, and all of them marched without resistance through the narrow inlet. Cyrus the younger, who had up to that moment felt assured that his brother would fight, now supposed that he had given up the idea of defending Babylon:² instead of which, two days afterwards, Artaxerxês attacked him on an open plain of ground where there was no advantage of position

rian, vii. 7, 7). By which he means, that it is not fordable below the ancient Nineveh or Mosul; for a little above that spot, Alexander himself forded it with his army, a few days before the battle of Arbêla—not without very great difficulty (Arrian, iii. 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 55).

¹ Herodot. i. 190. ἐπει δὲ ἐγένετο ἐλαύνων ἀγγοῦ τῆς πόλιος, συνέβαλόν τε οἱ Βαβυλωνιοὶ, καὶ ἐσωθέντες τῆ μάχῃ, καταλίθησαν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ.

Just as if Babylon was as easy to be approached as Sardis.—About the provisions, οἳα τε ἐπιστάμενοι εἶτι πρότερον τὸν Κύρον οὐκ ἀτρεμίζοντα, ἀλλ' ὄροντες αὐτὸν παντὶ ὁμοίως ἔθναϊ ἐπιχειρόντα, προσέειπεν οἷα ἐπίων χάριτα πολλῶν.

² Xenophon, Anab. i. 7, 14-20; Diodor. xiv. 22; Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 7. I follow Xenophon without hesitation, where he differs from these two latter.

on either side; though the invaders were taken rather unawares in consequence of their extreme confidence arising from recent unopposed entrance within the artificial ditch. This anecdote is the more valuable as an illustration, because all its circumstances are transmitted to us by a discerning eye-witness. And both the two incidents here brought into comparison demonstrate the recklessness, changefulness, and incapacity of calculation, belonging to the Asiatic mind of that day—as well as the great command of hands possessed by these kings, and their prodigal waste of human labour.¹ We shall see, as we advance in this history, farther evidences of the same attributes, which it is essential to bear in mind, for the purpose of appreciating both Grecian dealing with Asiatics, and the comparative absence of such defects in the Grecian character. Vast walls and deep ditches are an inestimable aid to a brave and well-commanded garrison; but they cannot be made entirely to supply the want of bravery and intelligence.

In whatever manner the difficulties of approaching Babylon may have been overcome, the fact that they were overcome by Cyrus is certain. On first setting out for this conquest, he was about to cross the river Gyndês (one of the affluents from the East which joins the Tigris near the modern Bagdad, and along which lay the high road crossing the pass of Mount Zagros from Babylon to Ekbatana), when one of the sacred white horses, which accompanied him, entered the river in pure wantonness and tried to cross it by himself.² The Gyndes resented this insult and the horse was drowned: upon which Cyrus swore in his wrath that he would so break the strength of the river as that women in future should pass it without wetting their knees. Accordingly he employed his entire army, during the whole summer season, in digging three hundred and sixty artificial channels to disseminate the unity of the stream. Such, according to Herodotus, was the incident which postponed for one year the fall of the great Babylon. But in the next spring Cyrus and his army were before the walls, after

Cyrus distributes the river Gyndês into many channels.

¹ Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* iii. 8, 26, about the πολυχειρία of the barbaric kings.

² Herodot. i. 189-202. ἐνθαυτὰ οἱ τῶν τις ἱρῶν ἰππων τῶν λευκῶν ὑπὸ

ὑβρίου ἐσβάς ἐς τὸν ποταμόν, διαβαίνειν ἐπειράτο. . . . Κάριτα τε ἐγγλέπαινε τῷ ποταμῷ ὁ Κύρος τοῦτο ὑβρίζαντι, &c.

having defeated and driven in the population who came out to fight. These walls were artificial mountains (three hundred feet high, seventy-five feet thick, and forming a square of fifteen miles to each side), within which the besieged defied attack, and even blockade, having previously stored up several years' provision. Through the midst of the town, however, flowed the Euphratês. That river, which had been so laboriously trained to serve for protection, trade, and sustenance to the Babylonians, was now made the avenue of their ruin. Having left a detachment of his army at the two points where the Euphratês enters and quits the city, Cyrus retired with the remainder to the higher part of its course, where an ancient Babylonian queen had prepared one of the great lateral reservoirs for carrying

He takes
Babylon,
by drawing
off for a
time the
waters
of the Eu-
phrates.

off in case of need the superfluity of its water. Near this point Cyrus caused another reservoir and another canal of communication to be dug, by means of which he drew off the water of the Euphratês to such a degree that it became not above the height of a man's thigh. The period chosen was that of a great Babylonian festival, when the whole population were engaged in amusement and revelry. The Persian troops left near the town, watching their opportunity, entered from both sides along the bed of the river, and took it by surprise with scarcely any resistance. At no other time, except during a festival, could they have done this (says Herodotus) had the river been ever so low; for both banks throughout the whole length of the town were provided with quays, with continuous walls, and with gates at the end of every street which led down to the river at right angles; so that if the population had not been disqualified by the influences of the moment, they would have caught the assailants in the bed of the river "as in a trap," and overwhelmed them from the walls alongside. Within a square of fifteen miles to each side, we are not surprised to hear that both the extremities were already in the power of the besiegers before the central population heard of it, and while they were yet absorbed in unconscious festivity.¹

¹ Herodot. 1. 191. This latter portion of the story, if we may judge from the expression of Herodotus, seems to excite more doubt in his mind than all the rest, for

he thinks it necessary to add, "as the residents at Babylon say," ὡς λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν ταύτη οικημένων. Yet if we assume the size of the place to be what he has affirmed,

Such is the account given by Herodotus of the circumstances which placed Babylon—the greatest city of Western Asia—in the power of the Persians. To what extent the information communicated to him was incorrect or exaggerated, we cannot now decide. The way in which the city was treated would lead us to suppose that its acquisition cannot have cost the conqueror either much time or much loss. Cyrus comes into the list as king of Babylon, and the inhabitants with their whole territory become tributary to the Persians, forming the richest satrapy in the empire; but we do not hear that the people were otherwise ill-used, and it is certain that the vast walls and gates were left untouched. This was very different from the way in which the Medes had treated Nineveh, which seems to have been ruined and for a long time absolutely uninhabited, though re-occupied on a reduced scale under the Parthian empire; and very different also from the way in which Babylon itself was treated twenty years afterwards by Darius, when reconquered after a revolt.

Babylon left in undiminished strength and population.

The importance of Babylon, marking as it does one of the peculiar forms of civilization belonging to the ancient world in a state of full development, gives an interest even to the half-authenticated stories respecting its capture. The other exploits ascribed to Cyrus—his invasion of

there seems nothing remarkable in the fact that the people in the centre did not at once hear of the capture; for the first business of the assailants would be to possess themselves of the walls and gates. It is a lively illustration of prodigious magnitude, and as such it is given by Aristotle (*Polit.* iii. 1, 12); who however exaggerates it by giving as a report that the inhabitants in the centre did not hear of the capture until the third day. No such exaggeration as this appears in Herodotus.

Xenophon, in the *Cyropædia* (vii. 5, 7-18), following the story that Cyrus drained off the Euphratês, represents it as effected in a manner differing from Herodotus. According to him, Cyrus dug two vast

and deep ditches, one on each side round the town, from the river above the town to the river below it: watching the opportunity of a festival day in Babylon, he let the water into both of these side ditches, which fell into the main stream again below the town: hence the main stream in its passage through the town became nearly dry. The narrative of Xenophon, however, betrays itself as not having been written from information received on the spot, like that of Herodotus; for he talks of *ai äxpai* of Babylon, just as he speaks of the *äxpai* of the hill-towns of Karia (compare *Cyropædia*, vii. 4, 1, 7, with vii. 5, 34). There were no *äxpai* on the dead flat of Babylon.

India, across the desert of Arachosia¹—and his attack upon the Massagetæ, Nomads ruled by queen Tomyris and greatly resembling the Scythians, across the mysterious river which Herodotus calls Araxês—are too little known to be at all dwelt upon. In the latter he is said to have perished, his army being defeated in a bloody battle.² He was buried at Pasargadæ, in his native province of Persis proper, where his tomb was honoured and watched until the breaking up of the empire,³ while his memory was held in profound veneration among the Persians. Of his real exploits we know little or nothing, but in what we read respecting him there seems, though amidst constant fighting, very little cruelty. Xenophon has selected his life as the subject of a moral romance, which for a long time was cited as authentic history, and which even now serves as an authority, express or implied, for disputable and even incorrect conclusions. His extraordinary activity and conquests admit of no doubt. He left the Persian empire⁴ extending from Sogdiana and the rivers Jaxartês and Indus eastward, to the Hellespont and the Syrian coast westward, and his successors made no permanent addition to it except that of Egypt. Phenicia and Judæa were dependencies of Babylon, at the time when he conquered it, with their princes and grandees in Babylonian captivity. As they seem to have yielded to him, and become his tributaries,⁵ without difficulty; so the restoration of their captives was conceded to them. It was from Cyrus that the habits of the Persian kings took commencement, to dwell at Susa in the winter, and Ekbatana during the summer; the primitive territory of Persis, with its two towns of Persepolis and Pasargadæ, being reserved for the burial-place of the kings and the religious sanctuary of the empire. How or when

¹ Arrian, vi. 24, 4.

² Herodot. i. 205-214; Arrian, v. 4, 14; Justin, i. 8; Strabo, xi. p. 512.

According to Ktésias, Cyrus was slain in an expedition against the Derbikes, a people in the Caucasian regions—though his army afterwards prove victorious and conquer the country (Ktésias Persica, c. 8-9)—see the comment of Bähr on the

passage in his edition of Ktésias.

³ Strabo, xv. p. 730, 731; Arrian, vi. 29.

⁴ The town Kyra, or Kyropolis, on the river Sihon or Jaxartês, was said to have been founded by Cyrus—it was destroyed by Alexander (Strabo, xi. p. 517, 518; Arrian, iv. 2, 2; Curtius, vii. 6, 16).

⁵ Herodot. iii. 10.

the conquest of Susiana was made, we are not informed. It lay eastward of the Tigris, between Babylonia and Persis proper, and its people, the Kissians, as far as we can discern, were of Assyrian and not of Arian race. The river Choaspês near Susa was supposed to furnish the only water fit for the palate of the Great King, and is said to have been carried about with him wherever he went.¹

While the conquests of Cyrus contributed to assimilate the distinct types of civilization in Western Asia—not by elevating the worse, but by degrading the better—upon the native Persians themselves they operated as an extraordinary stimulus, provoking alike their pride, ambition, cupidity, and warlike propensities. Not only did the territory of Persis proper pay no tribute to Susa or Ekbatana—being the only district so exempted between the Jaxartês and the Mediterranean—but the vast tributes received from the remaining empire were distributed to a great degree among its inhabitants. Empire to them meant—for the great men, lucrative satrapies or pachalics, with powers altogether unlimited, pomp inferior only to that of the Great King, and standing armies which they employed at their own discretion sometimes against each other²—for the common soldiers, drawn from their fields or flocks, constant plunder, abundant maintenance, and an unrestrained licence, either in the suite of one of the satraps, or in the large permanent troop which moved from Susa to Ekbatana with the Great King. And if the entire population of Persis proper did not migrate from their abodes to occupy some of those more inviting spots which the immensity of the imperial dominion furnished—a dominion extending (to use the language of Cyrus the younger before the battle of Kunaxa)³ from the region of insupportable heat to that of insupportable cold—this was only because the early kings discouraged such a movement, in order that the nation might maintain its military hardihood⁴ and be in a situation to furnish undiminished supplies of soldiers. The self-esteem and arrogance of the Persians were no less remarkable than their avidity for sensual enjoyment. They were

Extraordinary stimulus to the Persians, from the conquests of Cyrus.

Character of the Persians.

¹ Herodot. i. 188; Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 8; Diodor. xvii. 71.

² Xenophon, Anab. i. 1, 8.

³ Xenophon, Anab. i. 7, 6; Cyropæd. viii. 6, 19.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 122.

fond of wine to excess: their wives and their concubines were both numerous; and they adopted eagerly from foreign nations new fashions of luxury as well as of ornament. Even to novelties in religion, they were not strongly averse. For though disciples of Zoroaster, with Magi as their priests and as indispensable companions of their sacrifices, worshipping Sun, Moon, Earth, Fire, &c., and recognising neither image, temple, nor altar—yet they had adopted the voluptuous worship of the goddess Mylitta from the Assyrians and Arabians. A numerous male offspring was the Persian's boast. His warlike character and consciousness of force were displayed in the education of these youths, who were taught, from five years old to twenty, only three things—to ride, to shoot with the bow, and to speak the truth.¹ To owe money, or even to buy and sell, was accounted among the Persians disgraceful—a sentiment which they defended by saying that both the one and the other imposed the necessity of telling falsehood. To exact tribute from subjects, to receive pay or presents from the king, and to give away without forethought whatever was not immediately wanted, was their mode of dealing with money. Industrious pursuits were left to the conquered, who were fortunate if by paying a fixed contribution and sending a military contingent when required, they could purchase undisturbed immunity for their remaining concerns.² They could not thus purchase safety for the family hearth, since we find instances of noble Grecian maidens torn from their parents for the harem of the satrap.³

To a people of this character, whose conceptions of

¹ The modern Persians at this day exhibit almost matchless skill in shooting with the firelock, as well as with the bow, on horseback—see Sir John Malcolm, *Sketches of Persia*, ch. xvii. p. 201; see also Kinneir, *Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire*, p. 32.

² About the attributes of the Persian character, see Herodot. i. 131-140: compare i. 153.

He expresses himself very strongly as to the facility with which the Persians imbibed foreign

customs, and especially foreign luxuries (i. 135)—*Ξεινικά δὲ νόματα Πέρσαι προσίενται ἀνδρῶν μάλιστα—καὶ εὐπαθείας τε παντοδαπᾶς πυνθανόμενοι ἐπιτηδεύουσι.*

That rigid tenacity of customs and exclusiveness of tastes, which mark the modern Orientals, appear to be of the growth of Mahometanism, and to distinguish them greatly from the old Zoroastrian Persians.

³ Herodot. ix. 70; Plutarch, *Artaxerx.* c. 26.

political society went no farther than personal obedience to a chief, a conqueror like Cyrus would communicate the strongest excitement and enthusiasm of which they were capable. He had found them slaves, and made them masters: he was the first and greatest of national benefactors,¹ as well as the most forward of leaders in the field: they followed him from one conquest to another, during the thirty years of his reign, their love of empire growing with the empire itself. And this impulse of aggrandisement continued unabated during the reigns of his three next successors—Kambysês, Darius, and Xerxês—until it was at length violently stifled by the humiliating defeats of Plataea and Salamis; after which the Persians became content with defending themselves at home and playing a secondary game. But at the time when Kambysês son of Cyrus succeeded to his father's sceptre, Persian spirit was at its highest point. He was not long in fixing upon a prey both richer and less hazardous than the Massagetæ, at the opposite extremity of the empire. Phenicia and Judæa being already subject to him, he resolved to invade Egypt, then highly flourishing under the long and prosperous reign of Amasis. Not much pretence was needed to colour the aggression; so that the various stories which Herodotus mentions as causes of the war, are only interesting inasmuch as they imply a vein of Egyptian party-feeling—affirming that the invasion was brought upon Amasis by a daughter of Apriês, and was thus a judgement upon Amasis for having deposed Apriês. As to the manner in which the daughter had produced this effect, indeed, the most contradictory stories were circulated.²

Kambysês summoned the forces of his empire for this new enterprise, and among them both the Phenicians and the Asiatic Greeks, Æolic as well as Ionic,³ insular as well as continental—nearly all the maritime force and skill of the Ægean Sea. He was apprised by a Greek deserter from the mercenaries in Egypt, named Phanês, of the difficulties of the march, and the best method of surmounting them; especially the three days of sandy desert, altogether without water, which lay between Egypt and Judæa. By the aid of the neighbouring

Thirst for foreign conquest among the Persians, for three reigns after Cyrus.

B. C. 525.

Kambysês succeeds his father Cyrus—his invasion of Egypt.

¹ Herodot. i. 210; iii. 159.

² Herodot. iii. 1-4.

³ Herodot. iii. 1, 19, 44.

Arabians—with whom he concluded a treaty, and who were required for this service with the title of equal allies, free from all tribute—he was enabled to surmount this serious difficulty, and to reach Pelusium at the eastern mouth of the Nile, where the Ionian and Karian troops in the Egyptian service, as well as the Egyptian military, were assembled to oppose him.¹

Fortunately for himself, the Egyptian king Amasis had died during the interval of the Persian preparations, a few months before the expedition took place—after forty-four years of unabated prosperity. His death, at this critical moment, was probably the main cause of the easy conquest which followed; his son Psammenitus succeeding to his crown, but neither to his abilities nor his influence. The result of the invasion was foreshadowed, as usual, by a menacing prodigy—rain falling at Thebes in upper Egypt. It was brought about by a single victory, though bravely disputed, at Pelusium,—followed by the capture of Memphis with the person of king Psammenitus, after a siege of some duration. Kambysés had sent forward a Mitylenæan ship to Memphis, with heralds to summon the city. The Egyptians, in a paroxysm of fury, rushed out of the walls, destroyed the vessel, and tore the crew into pieces—a savage proceeding which drew upon them severe retribution after the capture. Psammenitus, after being at first treated with harshness and insult, was at length released and even allowed to retain his regal dignity as a dependent of Persia. But being soon detected, or at least believed to be concerned, in raising revolt against the conquerors, he was put to death, and Egypt was placed under a satrap.²

There yet lay beyond Egypt territories for the Per-

¹ The narrative of Ktésias is, in respect both to the Egyptian expedition and to the other incidents of Persian history, quite different in its details from that of Herodotus, agreeing only in the main events (Ktésias, Persica, c. 7). To blend the two together is impossible.

Tacitus (Histor. i. 11) notes the difficulty of approach for an invading army to Egypt—"Ægyptum, provinciam aditu difficilem, annonæ fecundam, superstitione ac lasciviâ discordem et mobilem," &c.

² Herodot. iii. 10-16. About the Arabians, between Judæa and Egypt, see iii. c. 5, 88-91.

sians to conquer, though Kyrênê and Barka, the Greek colonies near the coast of Libya, placed themselves at once out of the reach of danger by sending to Kambysês tribute and submission at Memphis. He projected three new enterprises: one against Carthage, by sea; the other two, by land—against the Ethiopians, far to the southward up the course of the Nile—and against the oracle and Oasis of Zeus Ammon, amidst the deserts of Libya. Towards Ethiopia he himself conducted his troops, but was compelled to bring them back without reaching it, since they were on the point of perishing with famine; while the division which he sent against the temple of Ammon is said to have been overwhelmed by a sand-storm in the desert. The expedition against Carthage was given up, for a reason which well deserves to be commemorated. The Phenicians, who formed the most efficient part of his navy, refused to serve against their kinsmen and colonists, pleading the sanctity of mutual oaths as well as the ties both of relationship and traffic.¹ Even the frantic Kambysês was compelled to accept, and perhaps to respect, this honourable refusal; which was not imitated by the Ionic Greeks when Darius and Xerxês demanded the aid of their ships against Athens—we must add, however, that they were then in a situation much more exposed and helpless than that in which the Phenicians stood before Kambysês.

Submission of Kyrênê and Barka to Kambysês—his projects for conquering Libya and Ethiopia disappointed.

Among the sacred animals so numerous and so different throughout the various nomes of Egypt, the most venerated of all was the bull Apis. Such peculiar conditions were required by the Egyptian religion as to the birth, the age, and the marks of this animal, that when he died, it was difficult to find a new calf properly qualified to succeed him. Much time was sometimes spent in the search, and when an unexceptionable successor was at last found, the demonstrations of joy in Memphis were extravagant and universal. At the moment when Kambysês returned to Memphis from his Ethiopian expedition, full of humiliation for the result, it so happened that a new Apis was just discovered; and as the population of the city gave vent to their usual festive pomp and delight,

Insults of Kambysês to the Egyptian religion.

¹ Herodot. iii. 19.

he construed it into an intentional insult towards his own recent misfortunes. In vain did the priests and magistrates explain to him the real cause of these popular manifestations. He persisted in his belief, punished some of them with death and others with stripes, and commanded every man seen in holiday attire to be slain. Farthermore—to carry his outrage against Egyptian feeling to the uttermost pitch—he sent for the newly-discovered Apis, and plunged his dagger into the side of the animal, who shortly afterwards died of the wound.¹

After this brutal deed—calculated to efface in the minds of the Egyptian priests the enormities of Cheops and Chephrên, and doubtless unparalleled in all the 24,000 years of their anterior history—Kambysês lost every spark of reason which yet remained to him. The Egyptians found in this visitation a new proof of the avenging interference of their gods. Not only did he commit every variety of studied outrage against the conquered people among whom he was tarrying, as well as their temples and their sepulchres—but he also dealt his blows against his Persian friends and even his nearest blood-relations. Among these revolting atrocities, one of the greatest deserves peculiar notice, because the fate of the empire was afterwards materially affected by it. His younger brother Smerdis had accompanied him into Egypt, but had been sent back to Susa, because the king became jealous of the admiration which his personal strength and qualities called forth.² That jealousy was aggravated into alarm and hatred by a dream portending dominion and conquest to Smerdis, and the frantic Kambysês sent to Susa secretly a confidential Persian, Prexaspês, with express orders to get rid of his brother. Prexaspês fulfilled his commission effectively, burying the slain prince with his own hands,³ and keeping the deed concealed from all except a few of the chiefs at the regal residence.

¹ Herodot. iii. 19.

² Ktésias calls the brother Tanyoxarkês, and says that Cyrus had left him satrap, without tribute, of Bactria and the neighbouring regions (Persica, c. 8). Xenophon

in the Cyropædia also calls him Tanyoxarkês, but gives him a different satrapy (Cyropæd. viii. 7, 11).

³ Herodot. iii. 80-82.

Among these few chiefs, however, there was one, the Median Patizeithês, belonging to the order of the Magi, who saw in it a convenient stepping-stone for his own personal ambition, and made use of it as a means of covertly supplanting the dynasty of the great Cyrus. Enjoying the full confidence of Kambysês, he had been left by that prince on departing for Egypt in the entire management of the palace and treasures, with extensive authority.¹ Moreover he happened to have a brother extremely resembling in person the deceased Smerdis. As the open and dangerous madness of Kambysês contributed to alienate from him the minds of the Persians, Patizeithês resolved to proclaim this brother as king in his room, as if it were the younger son of Cyrus succeeding to the disqualified elder. On one important point, the false Smerdis differed from the true. He had lost his ears, which Cyrus himself had caused to be cut off for an offence; but the personal resemblance, after all, was of little importance, since he was seldom or never allowed to show himself to the people.² Kambysês heard of this revolt in Syria on his return from Egypt. He was mounting his horse in haste for the purpose of going to suppress it, when an accident from his sword put an end to his life. Herodotus tells us that before his death he summoned the Persians around him, confessed that he had been guilty of putting his brother to death, and apprised them that the reigning Smerdis was only a Median pretender—conjuring them at the same time not to submit to the disgrace of being ruled by any other than a Persian and an Achæmenid. But if it be true that he ever made known the facts, no one believed him. For Prexaspês on his part was compelled by regard to his own safety, to deny that he had imbrued his hands in the blood of a son of Cyrus;³ and thus the opportune death of Kambysês placed the false Smerdis without opposition at the head of the Persians, who all, or for the most part, believed themselves to be ruled by a genuine son of Cyrus. Kambysês had reigned for seven years and five months.

Conspiracy of the Median Patizeithês, who sets up his brother as king under the name of Smerdis.

Death of Kambysês.

¹ Herodot. iii. 61-63.

² Herodot. iii. 68-69.—“Auribus decisiv vivere jubet,” says Tacitus about a case under the Parthian government (Annal. xii. 14)—and

the Turkish authorities have not given up the infliction of it at the present moment, or at least down to a very recent period.

³ Herodot. iii. 64-66.

For seven months did Smerdis reign without opposition, seconded by his brother Patizeithês. If he manifested his distrust of the haughty Persians around him by neither inviting them into his palace nor showing himself out of it, he at the same time studiously conciliated the favour of the subject-provinces, by remission of tribute and of military service for three years.¹ Such a departure from the Persian principle of government was in itself sufficient to disgust the warlike and rapacious Achæmenids at Susa; but it seems that their suspicions as to his genuine character had never been entirely set at rest, and in the eighth month those suspicions were converted into certainty. According to what seems to have been the Persian usage, he had taken to himself the entire harem of his predecessor, among whose wives was numbered Phædymê, daughter of a distinguished Persian named Otanês. At the instance of her father, Phædymê undertook the dangerous task of feeling the head of Smerdis while he slept, and thus detected the absence of ears.² Otanês, possessed of the decisive information, lost no time in concerting, with five other noble Achæmenids, means for ridding themselves of a king who was at once a Mede, a Magian, and a man without ears;³ Darius, son of Hystaspês the satrap of Persis proper, arriving just in time to join the conspiracy as the seventh. How these seven noblemen slew Smerdis in his palace at Susa—how they subsequently debated among themselves whether they should establish in Persia a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy—how, after the first of the three had been resolved upon, it was determined that the future king, whichever he might be, should be bound to take his wives only from the families of the seven conspirators—how Darius became king from the circumstance of his horse being the first to neigh among those of the conspirators at a given spot, by the stratagem of the groom Œbarês—how Otanês, standing

¹ Herodot. iii. 67.

² Herodot. iii. 68-69.

³ Herodot. iii. 69-73. ἀργόμεθα μὲν ἄνθρωποι Πέρσαι, ὑπὸ Μήδου ἀνδρὸς μάγου, καὶ τούτου ὡτα οὐκ ἔχοντες.

Compare the description of the insupportable repugnance of the Greeks of Kyrênê to be governed by the lame Battus (Herodot. iv. 161).

aside beforehand from this lottery for the throne, reserved for himself as well as for his descendants perfect freedom and exemption from the rule of the future king, whichever might draw the prize—all these incidents may be found recounted by Herodotus with his usual vivacity, but with no small addition of Hellenic ideas as well as of dramatic ornament.

It was thus that the upright tiara, the privileged head-dress of the Persian kings,¹ passed away from the lineage of Cyrus, yet without departing from the great phratry of the Achæmenidæ—to which Darius and his father Hystaspês, as well as Cyrus, belonged. That important fact is unquestionable, and probably the acts ascribed to the seven conspirators are in the main true, apart from their discussions and intentions. But, on this as well as on other occasions, we must guard ourselves against an illusion which the historical manner of Herodotus is apt to create. He presents to us with so much descriptive force the personal narrative—individual action and speech, with all its accompanying hopes, fears, doubts and passions—that our attention is distracted from the political bearing of what is going on; which we are compelled often to gather up from hints in the speeches of performers, or from consequences afterwards indirectly noticed. When we put together all the incidental notices which he lets drop, it will be found that the change of sceptre from Smerdis to Darius was a far larger political event than his direct narrative would seem to announce. Smerdis represents preponderance to the Medes over the Persians, and comparative degradation to the latter; who, by the installation of Darius, are again placed in the ascendent. The Medes and the Magians are in this case identical; for the Magians, though indispensable in the capacity of priests to the Persians, were essentially one of the seven Median tribes.² It thus appears that though Smerdis ruled as a son of

Political bearing of this conspiracy—Smerdis represents Median preponderance, which is again put down by Darius.

¹ Compare Aristophan. *Aves*, 487, with the Scholia, and Herodot. vii. 61; Arrian, *iv.* 6, 29. The cap of the Persians generally was loose, low, clinging about the head in folds; that of the king was

high and erect above the head. See the notes of Wesseling and Schweighäuser upon *πῆλοι ἀπαγέας* in Herodot. *l. c.*

² Herodot. *i.* 101-120.

the great Cyrus, yet he ruled by means of Medes and Magians, depriving the Persians of that supreme privilege and predominance to which they had become accustomed.¹ We see this by what followed immediately after the assassination of Smerdis and his brother in the palace. The seven conspirators, exhibiting the bloody heads of both these victims as an evidence of their deed, instigated the Persians in Susa to a general massacre of the Magians, many of whom were actually slain, and the rest only escaped by flight, concealment, or the hour of night. And the anniversary of this day was celebrated afterwards among the Persians by a solemnity and festival, called the Magophonia; no Magian being ever allowed on that day to appear in public.² The descendants of the Seven maintained a privileged name and rank,³ even down to the extinction of the monarchy by Alexander the Great.

Furthermore, it appears that the authority of Darius was not readily acknowledged throughout the empire, and

¹ In the speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Kambysés on his death-bed, addressed to the Persians around him in a strain of prophetic adjuration (iii. 65), he says—Καὶ δὴ ὑμῖν τάδε ἐπισκήπτω, θεοὺς τοὺς βασιλεῖους ἐπικαλέων, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν καὶ μάλιστα Ἀχαιμενιδῶν τοῖσι παρροῦσι, μὴ περιῖδειν τὴν ἡγεμονίην αὐτίς ἐς Μῆδους περιελθούσαν· ἀλλ' εἴτε δόλῳ ἔχουσι αὐτὴν κτησάμενοι (the personification of the deceased son of Cyrus), δόλῳ ἀπαιρηθῆναι ὑπὸ ὑμῶν· εἴτε καὶ σθένει τῶν κατεργασάμενοι, σθένει κατὰ τὸ κάρτερον ἀνασώσασθαι (the forcible opposition of the Medes to Darius, which he put down by superior force on the Persian side): compare the speech of Gobryas, one of the seven Persian conspirators (iii. 73), and that of Prexaspés (iii. 75); also Plato, *Legg.* iii. 12. p. 695.

Heeren has taken a correct view of the reign of Smerdis the Magian and its political character (*Ideen über den Verkehr, &c. der Alten*

Welt, part i. Abth. i. p. 431).

² Herodot. iii. 79. Σπασάμενοι δὲ τὰ ἐγχειρίδια, ἔκτεινον ἑκου τινὰ μάγον εὐρισκόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ νύξ ἐπελθοῦσα ἔσχε, ἔλιπον ἂν οὐδένα μάγον. Ταύτην τὴν ἡμέρην θεραπεύουσι Πέρσαι κοινῇ μάλιστα τῶν ἡμερῶν· καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ὄρτην μεγάλην ἀνάγουσι, ἣ κέλῃται ὑπὸ Περσέων Μαγοφόνια.

The periodical celebration of the Magophonia is attested by Ktésias—one of the few points of complete agreement with Herodotus. He farther agrees in saying that a Magian usurped the throne, through likeness of person to the deceased son of Cyrus, whom Kambysés had slain—but all his other statements differ from Herodotus (Ktésias, 10-14).

³ Even at the battle of Arbela—“*Summæ Orsines præerat, a septem Persis oriundus, ad Cyrum quoque, nobilissimum regem, originem sui referens.*” (Quintus Curtius, iv. 12, 7, or iv. 45, 7, Zumpt.): compare Strabo, xi. p. 531; Florus, iii. 5, 1.

that an interval of confusion ensued before it became so.¹ The Medes actually revolted, and tried to maintain themselves by force against Darius, who however found means to subdue them: though when he convoked his troops from the various provinces, he did not receive from the satraps universal obedience. The powerful Orontês especially, who had been appointed by Cyrus satrap of Lydia and Ionia, not only sent no troops to the aid of Darius against the Medes,² but even took advantage of the disturbed state of the government to put to death his private enemy Mitrobatês satrap of Phrygia, and appropriate that satrapy in addition to his own. Aryandês also, the satrap nominated by Kambysês in Egypt, comported himself as the equal of Darius rather than as his subject.³ The subject provinces generally, to whom Smerdis had granted remission of tribute and military service for the space of three years, were grateful and attached to his memory, and noway pleased with the new dynasty. Moreover the revolt of the Babylonians, conceived a year or two before it was executed, took its rise from the feelings of this time.⁴ But the renewal of the old conflict between the two principal sections of the empire, Medes and Persians, is doubtless the most important feature in this political revolution. The false Smerdis with his brother, both of them Medes and Magians, had revived the Median nationality to a state of supremacy over the Persian, recalling the memory of what it had been under Astyagês; while Darius—a pure Persian, and not (like the mule Cyrus) half Mede and half Persian—replaced the Persian nationality in its ascendent condition, though not without the necessity of suppressing by force a rebellion of the Medes.⁵

Revolt of the Medes—suppressed. Discontents of the satraps.

¹ Herodot. iii. 127. Δαρειός—ἄτε οἰδεόντων οἱ ἔτι τῶν πρηγμάτων, &c.—mention of the ταραχή (iii. 126, 150).

² Herodot. iii. 126. Μετὰ γὰρ τὸν Καμβύσου θάνατον, καὶ τῶν Μάγων τὴν βασιλείην, μένων ἐν τῆσι Σάρδισι Ὀροίτης, ὠφέλει μὲν οὐδὲν Πέρσας, ὑπὸ Μήδων ἀπαραιτημένους τὴν ἀρχήν· ὁ δὲ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ταραχῇ κατὰ μὲν ἔκτεινε Μιτροβάτεια. . . ἄλλα τε ἐξύβρισε παντοία, &c.

³ Herodot. iv. 166. Ὁ δὲ Ἀρυάνδης ἦν οὗτος τῆς Αἰγύπτου ὑπαρχος ὑπὸ Καμβύσου κατεστεινός· ὡς ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ περισεύμενος Δαρείῳ διεφθάρη.

⁴ Herodot. iii. 67-150.

⁵ Herodot. i. 180. Ἀστυάγης μὲν νυν βασιλεύσας ἐπ' ἔτεα πέντε καὶ τριήκοντα, οὕτω τῆς ἀρχῆς κατεπαύθη. Μῆδοι δὲ ὑπέκυψαν Πέρσῃσι διὰ τὴν τοῦτου πικρότητα. . . Ὑστέρῳ μὲν τοι χρόνῳ μετεμέλησέ τέ σφι ταῦτα

It has already been observed that the subjugation of the recusant Medes was not the only embarrassment of the

ποῦήσασαι, καὶ ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Δαρείου· ἀποστάνας δὲ, ὅπως καταστράφησαν, μάχῃ νικηθέντες· τότε δὲ, ἐπὶ Ἀστυάγου, οἱ Πέρσαι τε καὶ ὁ Κύρος ἐπαναστάνας τοῖσι Μήδοισι, ἤρχον τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου τῆς Ἀσίας.

This passage—asserting that the Medes, some time after the deposition of Astyagès and the acquisition of Persian supremacy by Cyrus, repented of having suffered their discontent against Astyagès to place this supremacy in the hands of the Persians, revolted from Darius, and were reconquered after a contest—appears to me to have been misunderstood by chronologists. Dodwell, Larcher, and Mr. Fynes Clinton (indeed most, if not all, of the chronologists) explain it as alluding to a revolt of the Medes against the Persian king Darius Nothus, mentioned in the *Hellenica* of Xenophon (i. 2, 12), and belonging to the year 408 B.C. See Larcher ad Herodot. i. 130, and his *Vie d'Hérodote*, prefixed to his translation (p. lxxxix); also Mr. Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, ad ann. 408 and 455, and his *Appendix*, c. 18, p. 316.

The revolt of the Medes alluded to by Herodotus is, in my judgement, completely distinct from the revolt mentioned by Xenophon: to identify the two, as these eminent chronologists do, is an hypothesis not only having nothing to recommend it, but open to grave objection. The revolt mentioned by Herodotus was against Darius son of Hystaspès, not against Darius Nothus; and I have set forth with peculiar care the circumstances connected with the conspiracy and accession of the former, for the purpose of showing that they all decidedly imply that conflict between

Median and Persian supremacy, which Herodotus directly announces in the passage now before us.

1. When Herodotus speaks of Darius, without any adjective designation, why should we imagine that he means any other than Darius the son of Hystaspès, on whom he dwells so copiously in his narrative? Once only in the course of his history (ix. 108) another Darius (the young prince, son of Xerxès the first) is mentioned; but with this exception, Darius son of Hystaspès is uniformly throughout the work spoken of under his simple name: Darius Nothus is never alluded to at all.

2. The deposition of Astyagès took place in 559 B.C.; the beginning of the reign of Darius occurred in 520 B.C. Now repentance on the part of the Medes, for what they had done at the former of those two epochs, might naturally prompt them to try to repair it in the latter. But between the deposition of Astyagès in 559 B.C., and the revolt mentioned by Xenophon against Darius Nothus in 408 B.C., the interval is more than 150 years. To ascribe a revolt which took place in 408 B.C. to repentance for something which had occurred 150 years before, is unnatural and far-fetched, if not positively inadmissible.

The preceding arguments go to show that the natural construction of the passage in Herodotus points to Darius son of Hystaspès, and not to Darius Nothus; but this is not all. There are yet stronger reasons why the reference to Darius Nothus should be discarded.

The supposed mention in Herodotus of a fact so late as 408 B.C. perplexes the whole chronology of his life and authorship. Accord-

first years of Darius. Oroëtês, satrap of Phrygia, Lydia, and Ìonia, ruling seemingly the entire western coast of

ing to the usual statement of his biography, which there is no reason to call in question, he was born in 484 B.C. Here then is an event alluded to in his history, which occurred when the historian was seventy-six years old, and the allusion to which he must be presumed to have written when about eighty years old, if not more; for his mention of the fact by no means implies that it was particularly recent. Those who adopt this view do not imagine that he wrote his whole history at that age; but they maintain that he made later additions, of which they contend that this is one. I do not say that this is impossible: we know that Isokratês composed his Panathenaic oration at the age of ninety-four; but it must be admitted to be highly improbable—a supposition which ought not to be advanced without some cogent proof to support it. But here no proof whatever is produced. Herodotus mentions a revolt of the Medes against Darius—Xenophon also mentions a revolt of the Medes against Darius; hence chronologists have taken it as a matter of course, that both authors must allude to the same event; though the supposition is unnatural as regards the text, and still more unnatural as regards the biography of Herodotus.

In respect to that biography, Mr. Clinton appears to me to have adopted another erroneous opinion; in which, however, both Larcher and Wesseling are against him, though Dahlmann and Heyse agree with him. He maintains that the passage in Herodotus (iii. 15), wherein it is stated that Pausiris succeeded his father Amyrtæus by

consent of the Persians in the government of Egypt, is to be referred to a fact which happened subsequent to the year 414 B.C., or the tenth year of Darius Nothus; since it was in that year that Amyrtæus acquired the government of Egypt. But this opinion rests altogether upon the assumption, that a certain Amyrtæus, whose name and date occur in Manetho (see Eusebius, *Chronicon*), is the same person as the Amyrtæus mentioned in Herodotus; which identity is not only not proved, but is extremely improbable, since Mr. Clinton himself admits (*F. H. Appendix*, p. 317), while maintaining the identity—"He (Amyrtæus) had conducted a war against the Persian government *more than fifty years before*." This though not impossible, is surely very improbable; it is at least equally probable that the Amyrtæus of Manetho was a different person from (perhaps even the *grandson* of) that Amyrtæus in Herodotus who had carried on war against the Persian more than fifty years before; it appears to me, indeed, that this is the more reasonable hypothesis of the two.

I have permitted myself to prolong this note to an unusual length, because the supposed mention of such recent events in the history of Herodotus, as those in the reign of Darius Nothus, has introduced very gratuitous assumptions as to the time and manner in which that history was composed. It cannot be shown that there is a single event of precise and ascertained date, alluded to in his history, later than the capture of the Lacedæmonian heralds in the year 430 B.C. (*Herodot. vii. 137*: see Larcher,

Asia Minor—possessing a large military force and revenue, and surrounded by a body-guard of 1000 native Persians—maintained a haughty independence. He secretly made away with couriers sent to summon him to Susa, and even wreaked his vengeance upon some of the principal Persians who had privately offended him. Darius, not thinking it prudent to attack him by open force, proposed to the chief Persians at Susa the dangerous problem of destroying him by stratagem. Thirty among them volunteered to undertake it, and Bagæus son of Artontês, to whom on drawing lots the task devolved, accomplished it by a manœuvre which might serve as a lesson to the Ottoman government in its embarrassments with contumacious Pachas. Having proceeded to Sardis, furnished with many different royal ordinances, formally set forth and bearing the seal of Darius, he was presented to Orêtês in audience, with the public secretary of the satrapy close at hand, and the Persian guards standing around. He presented his ordinances

Vie d'Hérodote, p. lxxxix.); and this renders the composition of his history as an entire work much more smooth and intelligible.

It may be worth while to add, that if we read attentively Herodotus vi. 98—and reflect at the same time that the destruction of the Athenian armament at Syracuse (the greatest of all Hellenic disasters, hardly inferior for its time to the Russian campaign of Napoleon, and especially impressive to one living at Thuri, as may be seen by the life of Lysias, Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 835) happened during the reign of Darius Nothus in 415 B.C.—we shall not readily admit the hypothesis of additions made to the history during the reign of the latter, or so late as 408 B.C. Herodotus would hardly have dwelt so expressly and emphatically upon mischief done by Greeks to each other in the reigns of Darius son of Hystaspês, Xerxês and Artaxerxês, if he had lived to witness the greater mischiefs so inflicted during the reign of Darius

Nothus, and had kept his history before him for the purpose of inserting new events. The destruction of the Athenians before Syracuse would have been a thousand times more striking to his imagination than the revolt of the Medes against Darius Nothus, and would have impelled him with much greater force to alter or enlarge the chapter vi. 98.

The sentiment too which Herodotus places in the mouth of Demaratus respecting the Spartans (vii. 104) appears to have been written *before* the capture of the Spartans in Sphakteria, in 425 B.C., rather than *after* it: compare Thucyd. iv. 40.

Dahlmann (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, vol. ii. p. 41-47) and Heyse (Quæstiones Herodotæ, p. 74-77, Berlin 1827) both profess to point out six passages in Herodotus which mark events of later date than 430 B.C. But none of the chronological indications which they adduce appear to me trustworthy.

to be read aloud by the secretary, choosing first those which related to matters of no great importance; but when he saw that the guards listened with profound reverence, and that the king's name and seal imposed upon them irresistibly, he ventured upon the real purport of his perilous mission. An ordinance was handed to the secretary, and read by him aloud, as follows: "Persians, king Darius forbids you to serve any longer as guards to Orôtês." The obedient guards at once delivered up their spears, when Bagæus caused the final warrant to be read to them: "King Darius commands the Persians in Sardis to kill Orôtês." The guards drew their swords and killed him on the spot: his large treasure was conveyed to Susa: Darius became undisputed master, and probably Bagæus satrap.¹

Another devoted adherent, and another yet more memorable piece of cunning, laid prostrate before Darius the mighty walls and gates of the revolted Babylon. Revolt of Babylon. The inhabitants of that city had employed themselves assiduously—both during the lax provincial superintendence of the false Smerdis and during the period of confusion and conflict which elapsed before Darius became firmly established and obeyed—in making every preparation both for declaring and sustaining their independence. Having accumulated a large store of provisions and other requisites for a long siege, without previous detection, they at length proclaimed their independence openly. Such was the intensity of their resolution to shake off the yoke, that they had recourse to a proceeding, which, if correctly reported by Herodotus, forms one of the most frightful enormities recorded in his history. To make their provisions last out longer, they strangled all the women in the city, reserving only their mothers, and one woman to each family for the purpose of baking.² We cannot but suppose that this has been magnified from a partial into a universal destruction; but taking it even with such allowance, it illustrates that ferocious force of will—and that predominance of strong nationality, combined with antipathy to foreigners, over all the gentler sympathies—which seems to mark the Semitic nations, and which may be traced so conspicuously in the Jewish history of Josephus.

Darius, assembling all the forces in his power, laid siege to the revolted city, but could make no impression

¹ Herodot. iii. 127, 128.

² Herodot. iii. 150.

upon it either by force or by stratagem. He tried to repeat the proceeding by which Cyrus had taken it at first; but the besieged were found this time on their guard. The siege had lasted twenty months without the smallest progress, and the Babylonians derided the besiegers from the height of their impregnable walls, when a distinguished Persian nobleman Zopyrus—son of Megabyzus who had been one of the seven conspirators against Smerdis—presented himself one day before Darius in a state of frightful mutilation. His nose and ears were cut off, and his body misused in every way. He had designedly thus maimed himself, “thinking it intolerable that Assyrians should thus laugh the Persians to scorn,”¹ in the intention, which he presently intimated to Darius, of passing into the town as a deserter, with the view of betraying it—for which purpose measures were concerted. The Babylonians, seeing a Persian of the highest rank in so calamitous a condition, readily believed his assurance that he had been thus punished by the king’s order, and that he came over to them as the only means of procuring for himself signal vengeance. Entrusted by them with the command of a detachment, he gained several advantages in different sallies, according to previous concert with Darius, until at length the Babylonians, grateful and confident, placed under his charge the principal gates. At the critical moment these gates were thrown open, and the Persians became masters of the city.²

Thus was the impregnable Babylon a second time reduced.³ Darius took precautions on this occasion to put it out of condition for resisting a third time. He caused the walls and gates to be demolished, and three thousand of the principal citizens to be crucified. The remaining in-

¹ Herodot. iii. 155. δεινόν τι ποιούμενος, Ἀσσυρίους Πέρσῃσι καταγελάειν. Compare the speech of Mardonius, vii. 9.

The horror of Darius, at the first sight of Zopyrus in this condition, is strongly dramatised by Herodotus.

² Herodot. iii. 154-158.

³ Ktésias represents the revolt and recapture of Babylon to have

taken place, not under Darius, but under his son and successor Xerxes. He says that the Babylonians, revolting, slew their satrap Zopyrus; that they were besieged by Xerxes, and that Megabyzus son of Zopyrus caused the city to be taken by practising that very stratagem which Herodotus ascribes to Zopyrus himself (Persica, c. 20-22).

habitants were left in the dismantled city, fifty thousand women being levied by assessment upon the neighbouring provinces, to supply the place of the women strangled when it first revolted.¹ Zopyrus was appointed satrap of the territory for life, with enjoyment of its entire revenues, receiving besides every additional reward which it was in the power of Darius to bestow, and generous assurances from the latter that he would rather have Zopyrus without wounds than the possession of Babylon. I have already intimated in a former chapter that the demolition of the walls here mentioned is not to be regarded as complete and continuous, nor was there any necessity that it should be so. Partial demolition would be quite sufficient to

This seems inconsistent with the fact, that Megabyzus was general of the Persian army in Egypt in the war with the Athenians, about 460 B.C. (Diodor. Sic. xi. 75-77). He would hardly have been sent on active service had he been so fearfully mutilated: moreover, the whole story of Ktésias appears to me far less probable than that of Herodotus; for on this, as on other occasions, to blend the two together is impossible.

¹ Herodot. iii. 159, 160. "From the women thus introduced (says Herodotus) the present Babylonians are sprung."

To crucify subdued revolters by thousands is, fortunately, so little in harmony with modern European manners, that it may not be amiss to strengthen the confidence of the reader in the accuracy of Herodotus, by producing an analogous narrative of incidents far more recent. Voltaire gives, from the MS. of General Lefort, one of the principal and confidential officers of Peter the Great, the following account of the suppression of the revolted Strelitzes at Moscow in 1698: these Strelitzes were the old native militia or Janissaries of the Russian Czars, opposed to all the reforms of Peter.

"Pour étouffer ces troubles, le czar part secrètement de Vienne, arrive enfin à Moscou, et surprend tout le monde par sa présence: il récompense les troupes qui ont vaincu les Strélitz: les prisons étaient pleines de ces malheureux. Si leur crime était grand, le châtiment le fut aussi. Leurs chefs, plusieurs officiers, et quelques prêtres, furent condamnés à la mort: quelques-uns furent roués, deux femmes enterrées vives. On pendit autour des murailles de la ville et on fit périr dans d'autres supplices deux mille Strélitz: leurs corps restèrent deux jours exposés sur les grands chemins, et surtout autour du monastère où résidaient les princesses Sophie et Eudoxe. On érigea des colonnes de pierre où le crime et le châtement furent gravés. Un très-grand nombre qui avaient leurs femmes et leurs enfans furent dispersés avec leurs familles dans la Sibérie, dans le royaume d'Astrakhan, dans le pays d'Azof: par là du moins leur punition fut utile à l'état: ils servirent à défricher des terres qui manquaient d'habitans et de culture." (Voltaire, Histoire de Russie, part i. ch. x. tom. 31. of the Œuvres Complètes de Voltaire, p. 148, ed. Paris, 1825.)

leave the city without defence; and the description given by Herodotus of the state of things as they stood at the time of his visit, proves that portions of the walls yet subsisted. One circumstance is yet to be added in reference to the subsequent condition of Babylon under the Persian empire. The city with the territory belonging to it constituted a satrapy, which not only paid a larger tribute (one thousand Euboic talents of silver) and contributed a much larger amount of provisions in kind for the maintenance of the Persian court, than any other among the twenty satrapies of the empire, but furnished besides an annual supply of five hundred eunuch youths.¹ We may presume that this was intended in part as a punishment for the past revolt, since the like obligation was not imposed upon any other satrapy.

Thus firmly established on the throne, Darius occupied it for thirty-six years. His reign was one of organization, different from that of his two predecessors; a difference which the Persians well understood and noted, calling Cyrus the father, Kambysès the master, and Darius the retailer or huckster.² In the mouth of the Persians this latter epithet must be construed as no insignificant compliment, since it intimates that he was the first to introduce some methodical order into the imperial administration and finances. Under the two former kings there was no definite amount of tribute levied upon the subject provinces. They furnished what were called presents, subject to no fixed limit except such as might be satisfactory to the satrap in each district. But Darius—succeeding as he did to Smerdis, who had rendered himself popular with the provinces by large financial exemptions, and having farther to encounter jealousy and dissatisfaction from Persians, his former equals in rank—probably felt it expedient to relieve the provinces from the burden of undefined exactions. He distributed the whole empire into

¹ Herodot. iii. 92.

² Herodot. iii. 89. What the Persian denomination was, which Herodotus or his informants translated κάπηλος, we do not know; but this latter word was used often by Greeks to signify a cheat or

deceiver generally: see Etymologic. Magn. p. 490, 11, and Suidas, v. Κάπηλος. 'Ο δ' Αἰσχυλος τὰ δόλια πάντα καλεῖ κάπηλα—“Κάπηλα προσφέρων τεχνήματα.” (Æschylus, Fragment. 328, ed. Dindorf: compare Euripid. Hippolyt. 953.)

twenty departments, imposing upon each a fixed annual tax, and a fixed contribution for the maintenance of the court. This must doubtless have been a great improvement, though the limitation of the sum which the Great King at Susa would require, did not at all prevent the satrap in his own province from indefinite requisitions beyond it. The satrap was a little king, who acted nearly as he pleased in the internal administration of his province, subject only to the necessity of sending up the imperial tribute, of keeping off foreign enemies, and of furnishing an adequate military contingent for the foreign enterprises of the Great King. To every satrap was attached a royal secretary or comptroller of the revenue,¹ who probably managed the imperial finances in the province, and to whom the court of Susa might perhaps look as a watch upon the satrap himself. It is not to be supposed that the Persian authorities in any province meddled with the details of taxation or contribution, as they bore upon individuals. The court having fixed the entire sum payable by the satrapy in the aggregate, the satrap or the secretary apportioned it among the various component districts, towns, or provinces, leaving to the local authorities in each of these latter the task of assessing it upon individual inhabitants. From necessity, therefore, as well as from indolence of temper and political incompetence, the Persians were compelled to respect the authorities which they found standing both in town and country, and to leave in their hands a large measure of genuine influence; frequently overruled indeed by oppressive interference on the part of the satrap, whenever any of his passions prompted—but never entirely superseded. In the important towns and stations, Persian garrisons were usually kept, and against the excesses of the military there was probably little or no protection to the subject people. Yet still the provincial governments were allowed to continue, and often even the petty kings who had governed separate districts during their state of independence prior to the

¹ Herodot. iii. 128. This division of power, and double appointment by the Great King, appears to have been retained until the close of the Persian empire: see Quintus Curtius, v. 1, 17-20 (v. 3, 19-21,

Zumpt). The present Turkish government nominates a Defterdar as finance administrator in each province, with authority derived directly from itself, and professionally independent of the Pacha.

Persian conquest, retained their title and dignity as tributaries to the court of Susa.¹ The empire of the Great King was thus an aggregate of heterogeneous elements, connected together by no tie except that of common fear and subjection—noway coherent nor self-supporting, nor pervaded by any common system or spirit of nationality. It resembled in its main political features, the Turkish and Persian empires of the present day,² though distinguished materially by the many differences arising out of Mahometanism and Christianity, and perhaps hardly reaching the same extreme of rapacity, corruption, and cruelty in detail.

Darius distributed the Persian empire into twenty satrapies, each including a certain continuous territory, and one or more nations inhabiting it, the names of which Herodotus sets forth. The amount of tribute payable by each satrapy was determined: payable in gold, according to the Euboic talent, by the Indians in the easternmost satrapy—in silver, according to the Babylonian or larger talent, by the remaining nineteen. Herodotus computes the ratio of gold to silver as 13:1. From the nineteen satrapies which paid in silver, there was levied annually the sum of 7740 Babylonian talents, equal to something about 2,964,000*l.* sterling: from the Indians, who alone paid in gold, there was received a sum equal (at the rate of 1:13) to 4680 Euboic talents of silver, or to about 1,290,000*l.* sterling.³ To explain how it happened that

Twenty satrapies with a fixed tribute apportioned to each.

¹ Herodot. iii. 15.

² Respecting the administration of the modern Persian empire, see Kinneir, *Geograph. Memoir of Persia*, pp. 29, 43, 47.

³ Herodot. iii. 95. The text of Herodotus contains an erroneous summing up of items, which critics have no means of correcting with certainty. Nor is it possible to trust the large sum which he alleges to have been levied from the Indians, though all the other items, included in the nineteen silver-paying divisions, seem within the probable truth. Indeed both Rennell and Robertson think the

total too small: the charges on some of the satrapies are decidedly smaller than the reality.

The vast sum of 50,000 talents is said to have been found by Alexander the Great laid up by successive kings at Susa alone, besides the treasures at Persepolis, Pasargadæ, and elsewhere (*Arrian*. iii. 16, 22; *Plutarch*, *Alexand.* 87). Presuming these talents to be Babylonian or Ægeinean talents (in the proportion 5:3 to Attic talents), 50,000 talents would be equal to £19,000,000 sterling: if they were Attic talents, it would be equal to £11,600,000 sterling.

this one satrapy was charged with a sum equal to two-fifths of the aggregate charge on the other nineteen, Herodotus dwells upon the vast population, the extensive territory, and the abundant produce in gold, among those whom he calls Indians—the easternmost inhabitants of the earth, since beyond them there was nothing but uninhabitable sand—reaching, as far as we can make it out, from Baktria southward along the Indus to its mouth, but how far eastward we cannot determine. Darius is said to have undertaken an expedition against them and subdued them. Moreover, he is affirmed to have constructed and despatched vessels down the Indus, from the city of Kaspatyri and the territory of the Paktyes, in its upper regions, all the way down to its mouth: then into the Indian Ocean, round the peninsula of Arabia, and up the Red Sea to Egypt. The ships were commanded by a Greek—Skylax, of Karyanda on the south-western coast of Asia Minor;¹

The statements of Diodorus give even much larger sums (xvii. 66-71: compare Curtius, v. 2, 8; v. 6, 9; Strabo, xv. p. 730). It is plain that the numerical affirmations were different in different authors, and one cannot pretend to pronounce on the trustworthiness of such large figures without knowing more of the original returns on which they were founded. That there were prodigious sums of gold and silver, is quite unquestionable. Respecting the statement of the Persian revenue given by Herodotus, see Boeckh, *Metrologie*, ch. v. 1, 2.

Amedée Jaubert, in 1806, estimated the population of the modern Persian empire at about 7,000,000 souls; of which about 6,000,000 settled population, the rest nomadic: he also estimated the Schah's revenue at about 2,000,000 tomans, or £1,500,000 sterling. Others calculated the population higher, at nearer 12,000,000 souls. Kinneir gives the revenue at something more than £3,000,000 sterling: he thinks that

the whole territory between the Euphratès and the Indus does not contain above 18,000,000 of souls (*Geogr. Memoir of Persia*, p. 44-47: compare Ritter, *West-Asien*, Abtheil. ii. Abschn. iv. p. 879-889).

The modern Persian empire contains not so much as the eastern half of the ancient, which covered all Asiatic Turkey and Egypt besides.

¹ Herodot. ii. 102, iv. 44. See the two *Excursus* of Bähr on these two chapters, vol. ii. p. 648-671 of his edit. of Herodotus.

It certainly is singular that neither Nearchus, nor Ptolemy, nor Aristobulus, nor Arrian, take any notice of this remarkable voyage distinctly asserted by Herodotus to have been accomplished. Such silence however affords no sufficient reason for calling the narrative in question. The attention of the Persian kings, successors to Darius, came to be far more occupied with the western than with the eastern portions of their empire.

who, if this statement be correct, executed a scheme of nautical enterprise not only one hundred and seventy years earlier, but also far more extensive, than the famous voyage of Nearchus, admiral of Alexander the Great, who only went from the Indus to the Persian Gulf. The eastern portions of the Persian empire remained so unknown and unvisited until the Macedonian invasion, that we are unable to criticise the isolated statements of Herodotus. None of the Persian kings subsequent to Darius appear to have visited them, and whether the prodigious sum demandable from them according to the Persian rent-roll was ever regularly levied, may reasonably be doubted. At the same time, we may readily believe that the mountains in the northern parts of Persian India (Cabul and Little Thibet) were at that time extremely productive in gold, and that quantities of that metal, such as now appear almost fabulous, may have been often obtained. It seems that the produce of gold in all parts of the earth, as far as hitherto known, is obtained exclusively near the surface; so that a country once rich in that metal may well have been exhausted of its whole supply, and left at a later period without any gold at all.

Of the nineteen silver-paying satrapies, the most heavily imposed was Babylonia, which paid 1000 talents. The next in amount of charge was Egypt, paying 700 talents, besides the produce of the fish from the lake of Mœris: the remaining satrapies varied in amount, down as low as 170 talents, which was the sum charged on the seventh satrapy (in the enumeration of Herodotus) comprising the Sattagydæ, the Gandarii, the Dodikæ, and the Aparytæ. The Ionians, Æolians, Magnesians on the Mæander and on Mount Sipylus, Karians, Lykians, Milyans, and Pamphylians—including the coast of Asia Minor southward of Kanê, and from thence round the southern promontory to Phasêlis—were rated as one division, paying 400 talents. Yet we may be sure that much more than this was really taken from the people, when we read that Magnesia alone afterwards paid to Themistoklês a revenue of 50 talents annually.¹ The Mysians and Lydians were included, with some others, in another division; and the Hellespontine Greeks in a third, with Phrygians, Bithynians, Paphlagonians, Marian-

Imposts
upon the
different
satrapies.

¹ Thucyd. i. 138.

dynians, and Syrians, paying 360 talents—nearly the same as was paid by Syria proper, Phenicia and Judæa, with the island of Cyprus. Independent of this regular tribute, with the undefined sums extorted over and above it,¹ there were some dependent nations, which, though exempt from tribute, furnished occasional sums called presents. Farther contributions were exacted for the maintenance of the vast suite who always personally attended the king. One entire third of this last burden was borne by Babylonia alone in consequence of its exuberant fertility:² it was paid in produce, as indeed the peculiar productions of every part of the empire seem to have been sent up for the regal consumption.

However imperfectly we are now able to follow the geographical distribution of the subject nations as given by Herodotus, it is extremely valuable as the only professed statistics remaining, of the entire Persian empire. The arrangement of satrapies, which he describes, underwent modification in subsequent times; at least it does not harmonise with various statements in the *Anabasis* of Xenophon, and in other authors who recount Persian affairs belonging to the fourth century B.C. But we find in no other author except Herodotus any entire survey and distribution of the empire. It is indeed a new tendency which now manifests itself in the Persian Darius, compared with his predecessors: not simply to conquer, to extort, and to give away—but to do all this with something like method and system,³ and to define the obligations of the satraps towards Susa. Another remarkable example of the same tendency is to be found in the fact, that Darius was the first Persian king who coined money. His coin both in gold and silver, the Daric, was the earliest produce of a Persian mint.⁴ The revenue, as brought to Susa in

Organizing tendency of Darius—first imperial coinage—imperial roads and posts.

¹ Herodot. iii. 117.

² Herodot. i. 192. Compare the description of the dinner and supper of the Great King, in Polyænus, iv. 3, 32; also Ktésias and Deinôn ap. Athenæum, ii. p. 67.

³ Plato, *Legg.* iii. 12. p. 695.

⁴ Herodot. iv. 166; Plutarch, *Kimon*, 10.

The gold Daric, of the weight of

two Attic drachmæ (Stater Darius), equivalent to 20 Attic silver drachmæ (Xenoph. *Anab.* i, 7, 18), would be about 16s. 3d. English. But it seems doubtful whether that ratio between gold and silver (10:1) can be reckoned upon as the ordinary ratio in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Mr. Hussey calculates the golden Daric as equal to

metallic money of various descriptions, was melted down separately, and poured in a fluid state into jars or earthenware vessels. When the metal had cooled and hardened, the jar was broken, leaving a standing solid mass from which portions were cut off as the occasion required.¹ And in addition to these administrative, financial, and monetary arrangements, of which Darius was the first originator, we may probably ascribe to him the first introduction of that system of roads, resting-places, and permanent relays of couriers, which connected both Susa and Ekbatana with the distant portions of the empire. Herodotus describes in considerable detail the imperial road from Sardis to Susa, a journey of ninety days, crossing the Halys, the Euphratês, the Tigris, the Greater and Lesser Zab, the Gyndês, and the Choaspês. In his time it was kept in excellent order, with convenience for travellers.²

It was Darius also who first completed the conquest of the Ionic Greeks by the acquisition of the important island of Samos. That island had maintained its independence, at the time when the Persian general Harpagus effected the conquest of Ionia, and even when Chios and Lesbos submitted. The Persians had no fleet to attack it; nor had the Phenicians yet been taught to round the Triopian cape. Indeed the depression which overtook the

Island of Samos—its condition at the accession of Darius. Polykratês.

‡ 1 *ls. 3d.* English (Hussey, *Essay on the Ancient Weights and Money*, Oxford 1836, ch. iv. s. 8. p. 68; ch. vii. s. 3. p. 103).

I cannot think, with Mr. Hussey, that there is any reason for believing either the name or the coin *Daric* to be older than Darius son of Hystaspês. Compare Boeckh, *Metrologie*, ix. 5. p. 129.

Particular statements respecting the value of gold and silver, as exchanged one against the other, are to be received with some reserve as the basis of any general estimate, since we have not the means of comparing a great many such statements together. For the process of coinage was imperfectly performed, and the different pieces,

both of gold and silver, in circulation, differed materially in weight one with the other. Herodotus gives the ratio of gold to silver as 13 : 1.

¹ Herodot. iii. 96.

² Herodot. v. 52-53; viii. 98. "It appears to be a favourite idea with all barbarous princes, that the badness of the roads adds considerably to the natural strength of their dominions. The Turks and Persians are undoubtedly of this opinion: the public highways are therefore neglected, and particularly so towards the frontiers." (Kinneir, *Geog. Mem. of Pers.* p. 43.)

The description of Herodotus contrasts favourably with the picture here given by Mr. Kinneir.

other cities of Ionia tended rather to the aggrandisement of Samos, under the energetic and unscrupulous despotism of Polykratês. That ambitious Samian, about ten years after the conquest of Sardis by Cyrus (seemingly between 536-532 B.C.), contrived to seize by force or fraud the government of his native island, with the aid of his brothers Pantagnôtus and Sylosôn, and a small band of conspirators.¹ At first the three brothers shared the supreme power; but presently Polykratês put to death Pantagnôtus, banished Sylosôn, and made himself despot alone. In this station his ambition, his perfidy, and his good fortune were alike remarkable. He conquered several of the neighbouring islands, and even some towns on the mainland: he carried on successful war against Milêtus, and signally defeated the Lesbian ships which came to assist Milêtus: he got together a force of one hundred armed ships called pentekonters, and one thousand mercenary bowmen—aspiring to nothing less than the dominion of Ionia, with the islands in the Ægean. Alike terrible to friend and foe by his indiscriminate spirit of aggression, he acquired a naval power which seems at that time to have been the greatest in the Grecian world.² He had been in intimate alliance with Amasis king of Egypt, who however ultimately broke with him. Considering his behaviour towards allies, this rupture is not at all surprising; but Herodotus ascribes it to the alarm which Amasis conceived at the uninterrupted and superhuman good fortune of Polykratês—a degree of good fortune sure to draw down ultimately corresponding intensity of suffering from the hands of the envious gods. Indeed Herodotus—deeply penetrated with this belief in an ever-present Nemesis, which allows no man to be very happy, or long happy, with impunity—throws it into the form of an epistolary warning from Amasis to Polykratês, advising him to inflict upon himself some seasonable mischief or suffering; in order, if possible, to avert the ultimate judgement—to let blood in time, so that the plethora of happiness might not end in apoplexy.³ Pursuant to such counsel, Polykratês threw into the sea a favourite ring of matchless price and beauty; but unfortunately, in a few

¹ Herodot. iii. 120.

² Herodot. iii. 39; Thucyd. i. 18.

³ Herodot. iii. 40-42. . . . ἦν δὲ μὴ ἐναλλάξ ἡδῆ τῶπὸ τούτου αἰετού-

χίαι τοι τοιαύταισι πάθαισι προσπιπῶσι, τρόπῳ τῷ ἐξ ἐμαυτοῦ ὀκοιμῆναι ἀχέο: compare vii. 208, and i. 32.

days, the ring re-appeared in the belly of a fine fish, which a fisherman had sent to him as a present. Amasis, now forewarned that the final apoplexy was inevitable, broke off the alliance with Polykratês without delay. This well-known story, interesting as evidence of ancient belief, is not less to be noted as showing the power of that belief to beget fictitious details out of real characters, such as I have already touched upon in the history of Solon and Crœsus, and elsewhere.

The facts mentioned by Herodotus rather lead us to believe that it was Polykratês, who, with characteristic faithlessness, broke off his friendship with Amasis;¹ finding it suitable to his policy to cultivate the alliance of Kambysês, when that prince was preparing for his invasion of Egypt. In that invasion the Ionic subjects of Persia were called upon to serve, and Polykratês deeming it a good opportunity to rid himself of some Samian malcontents, sent to the Persian king to tender auxiliaries from himself. Kambysês eagerly caught at the prospect of aid from the first naval potentate in the Ægean; upon which forty Samian triremes were sent to the Nile, having on board the suspected persons, as well as conveying a secret request to the Persian king that they might never be suffered to return. Either they never went to Egypt, however, or they found means to escape: very contradictory stories had reached Herodotus. But they certainly returned to Samos, attacked Polykratês at home, and were driven off by his superior force without making any impression. Whereupon they repaired to Sparta to entreat assistance.²

We may here notice the gradually increasing tendency in the Grecian world to recognise Sparta as something like a head, protector, or referee, in cases either of foreign danger or internal dispute. The earliest authentic instance known to us, of application to Sparta in this character, is that of Crœsus against Cyrus; next, that of the Ionic Greeks against the latter: the instance of the Samians now before us, is the third. The important events connected with, and consequent upon, the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ from Athens, manifesting yet more formally the headship of Sparta, occur fifteen years after the present event; they have been already re-

Polykratês
breaks with
Amasis
king of
Egypt, and
allies him-
self with
Kambysês.

B.C. 524.

¹ Herodot. iii. 44.

² Herodot. iii. 44.

counted in a previous chapter, and serve as a farther proof of progress in the same direction. To watch the growth of these new political habits is essential to a right understanding of Grecian history.

On reaching Sparta, the Samian exiles, borne down with despondency and suffering, entered at large into the particulars of their case. Their long speaking annoyed instead of moving the Spartans, who said, or are made to say—"We have forgotten the first part of the speech, and the last part is unintelligible to us." Upon which the Samians appeared the next day simply with an empty wallet, saying—"Our wallet has no meal in it." "Your wallet is superfluous" (said the Spartans); *i. e.* the words would have been sufficient without it.¹ The aid which they implored was granted.

The Samian exiles, expelled by Polykratês, apply to Sparta for aid.

We are told that both the Lacedæmonians and the Corinthians—who joined them in the expedition now contemplated—had separate grounds of quarrel with the Samians,² which operated as a more powerful motive than the simple desire to aid the suffering exiles. But it rather seems that the subsequent Greeks generally construed the Lacedæmonian interference against Polykratês as an example of standing Spartan hatred against despots. Indeed the only facts which we know, to sustain this anti-despotic sentiment for which the Lacedæmonians had credit, are, their proceedings against Polykratês and Hippias; there may have been other cases, but we cannot specify them with certainty. However this may be, a joint Lacedæmonian and Corinthian force accompanied the exiles back to Samos, and assailed Polykratês in the city: they did their best to capture it, for forty days, and were at one time on the point of succeeding, but were finally obliged to retire without any success. "The city would have been taken," says Herodotus, "if all the Lacedæmonians had acted like Archias and Lykôpas"—who, pressing closely upon the retreating Samians, were shut within the town-gates, and perished. The historian had heard this exploit in personal conversation with Archias, grandson of the person above-mentioned, in the deme Pitana at Sparta—whose father had been named Samius, and who respected the Samians above any

The Lacedæmonians attack Samos, but are repulsed.

¹ Herodot. iii. 46. τῶν θυλάκων περιεργασθαι. ² Herodot. iii. 47, 48, 52.

other Greeks, because they had bestowed upon the two brave warriors, slain within their town, an honourable and public funeral.¹ It is rarely that Herodotus thus specifies his informants: had he done so more frequently, the value as well as the interest of his history would have been materially increased.

On the retirement of the Lacedæmonian force, the Samian exiles were left destitute; and looking out for some community to plunder, weak as well as rich, they pitched upon the island of Siphnos. The Siphnians of that day were the wealthiest islanders in the Ægean, from the productiveness of their gold and silver mines,—the produce of which was annually distributed among the citizens, reserving a tithe for the Delphian temple.² Their treasure-chamber was among the most richly-furnished of which that holy place could boast, and they themselves probably, in these times of early prosperity, were numbered among the most brilliant of the Ionic visitors at the Delian festival. The Samians, landing at Siphnos, demanded a contribution, under the name of a loan, of ten talents. Upon refusal, they proceeded to ravage the island, inflicting upon the inhabitants a severe defeat, and ultimately extorting from them 100 talents. They next purchased from the inhabitants of Hermionê, in the Argolic peninsula, the neighbouring island of Hydreia, famous in modern Greek warfare. Yet it appears that their plans must have been subsequently changed, for instead of occupying it, they placed it under the care of the Trœzenians, and repaired themselves to Krete, for the purpose of expelling the Zakynthian settlers at Kydônia. In this they succeeded, and were induced to establish themselves in that place; but after they had remained there five years, the Kretans obtained naval aid from Ægina, whereby the place was recovered, and the Samian intruders finally sold into slavery.³

Such was the melancholy end of the enemies of Polykratês. Meanwhile that despot himself was more powerful and prosperous than ever. Samos under him was “the first of all cities, Hellenic or barbaric.”⁴ The great works admired by Herodotus in

Prosperity
of Poly-
kratês.

¹ Herodot. iii. 54-56.
² Herodot. iii. 57. νησιωτέων μά-
λιτα ἀπλοῦτεον.

³ Herodot. iii. 58, 59.

⁴ Herodot. iii. 189. πολλῶν κτιστων
πρώτην Ἑλληνίδων καὶ βαρβάρων.

the island¹—an aqueduct for the city, tunnelled through a mountain for the length of seven furlongs—a mole to protect the harbour, two furlongs long and twenty fathoms deep—and the vast temple of Hêrê—may probably have been enlarged and completed, if not begun, by him. Aristotle quotes the public works of Polykratês as instances of the profound policy of despots, to occupy as well as to impoverish their subjects.² The earliest of all Grecian thalassocrats, or sea-kings—master of the greatest naval force in the Ægean, as well as of many among its islands—he displayed his love of letters by friendship to Anakreon, and his piety by consecrating to the Delian Apollo³ the neighbouring island of Rhêneia. But while thus outshining all his contemporaries, victorious over Sparta and Corinth, and projecting farther aggrandisement, he was precipitated on a sudden into the abyss of ruin;⁴ and that too, as if to demonstrate unequivocally the agency of the envious gods, not from the revenge of any of his numerous victims, but from the gratuitous malice of a stranger whom he had never wronged and never even seen. The Persian satrap Orôetês, on the neighbouring mainland, conceived an implacable hatred against him: no one could tell why—for he had no design of attacking the island; and the trifling reasons conjecturally assigned, only prove that the real reason, whatever it might be, was unknown. Availing himself of the notorious ambition and cupidity of Polykratês, Orôetês sent to Samos a messenger, pretending that his life was menaced by Kambysês, and that he was anxious to make his escape with his abundant treasures. He proposed to Polykratês a share in this treasure, sufficient to make him master of all Greece, as far as that object could be achieved by money, provided the Samian prince would come over to convey him away. Mæandrius, secretary of Polykratês, was sent over to Magnêsia on the Mæander to make inquiries. He there saw the satrap with eight large coffers full of gold—or rather apparently so, being in reality full of stones, with a layer of gold at the top⁵—tied up ready for departure. The

He is slain
by the Per-
sian satrap
Orôetês.

¹ Herodot. iii. 60.

² Aristot. Polit. v. 9, 4. τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτειά· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα δύνανται ταῦτόν, ἀσχολίαν καὶ κενίαν τῶν ἀρχομένων.

³ Thucyd. i. 14. iii. 104.

⁴ Herodot. iii. 120.

⁵ Compare the trick of Hannibal at Gortyn in Krete—Cornelius Nepos (Hannibal, c. 9).

cupidity of Polykratês was not proof against so rich a bait. He crossed over to Magnêsia with a considerable suite, and thus came into the power of Orœtês, in spite of the warnings of his prophets and the agony of his terrified daughter, to whom his approaching fate had been revealed in a dream. The satrap slew him and crucified his body; releasing all the Samians who accompanied him, with an intimation that they ought to thank him for procuring them a free government—but retaining both the foreigners and the slaves as prisoners.¹ The death of Orœtês himself, which ensued shortly afterwards, has already been described: it is considered by Herodotus as a judgement for his flagitious deed in the case of Polykratês.²

At the departure of the latter from Samos, in anticipation of a speedy return, Mæandrius had been left as his lieutenant at Samos; and the unexpected catastrophe of Polykratês filled him with surprise and consternation. Though possessed of the fortresses, the soldiers, and the treasures, which had constituted the machinery of his powerful master, he knew the risk of trying to employ them on his own account. Partly from this apprehension, partly from the genuine political morality which prevailed with more or less force in every Grecian bosom, he resolved to lay down his authority and enfranchise the island. “He wished (says the historian in a remarkable phrase³) to act like the justest of men; but he was not allowed to do so.” His first proceeding was to erect in the suburbs an altar, in honour of Zeus Eleutherius, and to enclose a piece of ground as precinct, which still existed in the time of Herodotus; he next convened an assembly of the Samians. “You know (said he) that the whole power of Polykratês is now in my hands, and that there is nothing to hinder me from continuing to rule over you. Nevertheless what I condemn in another I will not do myself, and I have always disapproved of Polykratês, and others like him, for seeking to rule over men as good as themselves. Now that Polykratês has come to the end of his destiny, I at once lay down the command, and proclaim

¹ Herodot. iii. 124, 125.

² Herodot. iii. 126. Ὁροίτεα Πολυκράτεος τινας μετέλλθον.

³ Herodot. iii. 142. τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ

ἀνδρῶν βουλομένῳ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐξεγένετο. Compare his remark on Kadmus, who voluntarily resigned the despotism at Kôs (vii. 164).

among you equal law; reserving to myself as privileges, first, six talents out of the treasures of Polykratês—next, the hereditary priesthood of Zeus Eleutherius for myself and my descendants for ever. To him I have just set apart a sacred precinct, as the God of that freedom which I now hand over to you.”

This reasonable and generous proposition fully justifies the epithet of Herodotus. But very differently was it received by the Samian hearers. One of the chief men among them, Telesarchus, exclaimed with the applause of the rest, “*You* rule us, low-born and scoundrel as you are! you are not worthy to rule: don’t think of that, but give us some account of the money which you have been handling.”¹

Such an unexpected reply caused a total revolution in the mind of Mæandrius. It left him no choice but to maintain dominion at all hazards, which he resolved to do. Retiring into the acropolis under pretence of preparing his money accounts for examination, he sent for Telesarchus and his chief political enemies, one by one—intimating that the accounts were open to inspection. As fast as they arrived they were put in chains, while Mæandrius remained in the acropolis, with his soldiers and his treasures, as the avowed successor of Polykratês. After a short hour of insane boastfulness, the Samians found themselves again enslaved. “It seemed (says Herodotus) that they were not willing to be free.”²

We cannot but contrast their conduct on this occasion with that of the Athenians about twelve years afterwards, on the expulsion of Hippias, which has been recounted in a previous chapter. The position of the Samians was far the more favourable of the two, for the quiet and successful working of a free government; since they had the advantage of a voluntary as well as a sincere resignation from the actual despot. Yet the thirst for reactionary investigation prevented them even from taking a reasonable estimate of their own power of enforcing it. They passed at once from extreme subjection to overbearing and ruinous rashness. Whereas the Athenians, under

Mæandrius becomes despot. Contrast between the Athenians and the Samians.

¹ Herodot. iii. 142. 'Ἄλλ' οὐδ' ἄξιός ἐστι σὺ γ' ἡμέων ἄρχειν, γεγονώς τε κακός, καὶ ἐὼν ἐλευθρός· ἀλλὰ μάλλον ὅπως λόγον δώσεις τῶν ἐνεχειρίσας χρημάτων.

² Herodot. iii. 143. οὐ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς οἴκασι, ἐβουλόετο εἶναι ἐλεύθεροι.

circumstances far less promising, avoided the fatal mistake of sacrificing the prospects of the future to recollections of the past; showed themselves both anxious to acquire the rights, and willing to perform the obligations, of a free community; listened to wise counsels, maintained unanimous action, and overcame by heroic effort forces very greatly superior. If we compare the reflections of Herodotus on the one case and on the other,¹ we shall be struck with the difference which those reflections imply between the Athenians and the Samians—a difference partly referable, doubtless, to the pure Hellenism of the former, contrasted with the half-Asiatized Hellenism of the latter—but also traceable in a great degree to the preliminary lessons of the Solonian constitution, overlaid, but not extinguished, during the despotism of the Peisistratids which followed.

The events which succeeded in Samos are little better than a series of crimes and calamities. The prisoners, whom Mæandrius had detained in the acropolis, were slain during his dangerous illness, by his brother Lykarêtus, under the idea that this would enable him more easily to seize the sceptre. But Mæandrius recovered, and must have continued as despot for a year or two. It was however a weak despotism, contested more or less in the island, and very different from the iron hand of Polykratês. In this untoward condition the Samians were surprised by the arrival of a new claimant for their sceptre and acropolis—and what was much more formidable, a Persian army to back him.

Sylosôn the brother of Polykratês, having taken part originally in his brother's conspiracy and usurpation, had been at first allowed to share the fruits of it, but quickly found himself banished. In this exile he remained during the whole life of Polykratês, and until the accession of Darius to the Persian throne, which followed about a year after the death of Polykratês. He happened to be at Memphis in Egypt during the time when Kambyshês was there with his conquering army, and when Darius, then a Persian of little note, was serving among his guards. Sylosôn was walking in the agora of Memphis, wearing a scarlet cloak, to which Darius took a great fancy,

Sylosôn,
brother of
Polykratês,
lands with
a Persian
army in
Samos—his
history.

¹ Herodot. v. 78. and iii. 142. 143.

and proposed to buy it. A divine inspiration prompted Sylosôn to reply,¹ "I cannot for any price sell it; but I give it you for nothing, if it must be yours." Darius thanked him and accepted the cloak; and for some years the donor accused himself of a silly piece of good nature.² But as events came round, Sylosôn at length heard with surprise that the unknown Persian, whom he had presented with the cloak at Memphis, was installed as king in the palace at Susa. He went thither, proclaimed himself as a Greek, the benefactor of the new king, and was admitted to the regal presence. Darius had forgotten his person, but perfectly remembered the adventure of the cloak, when it was brought to his mind—and showed himself forward to requite, on the scale becoming the Great King, former favours, though small, rendered to the simple soldier at Memphis. Gold and silver were tendered to Sylosôn in profusion, but he rejected them—requesting that the island of Samos might be conquered and handed over to him, without slaughter or enslavement of inhabitants. His request was complied with. Otanês, the originator of the conspiracy against Smerdis, was sent down to the coast of Ionia with an army, carried Sylosôn over to Samos, and landed him unexpectedly on the island.³

Mæandrius was in no condition to resist the invasion, nor were the Samians generally disposed to sustain him. He accordingly concluded a convention with Otanês, whereby he agreed to make way for Sylosôn, to evacuate the island, and to admit the Persians at once into the city; retaining possession, however, for such time as might be necessary to embark his property and treasures, of the acropolis, which had a separate landing-place, and even a subterranean passage and secret portal for embarkation—probably one of the precautionary provisions of Polykratês. Otanês willingly granted these conditions, and himself with his principal officers entered the town, the army being quartered around; while Sylosôn seemed on the point of ascending the seat of his deceased brother without violence or bloodshed. But the Samians were destined to a fate

Mæandrius agrees to evacuate the island.

¹ Herodot. iii. 139. 'Ο δὲ Συλοσῶν, ὄρεων τὸν Δαρείον μὲγάλως ἐπιθυμῶντα τῆς χλαίνιδος, θεῖη τύχῃ χρεώμενος, λέγει.

² Herodot. iii. 140. ἡπίστατό οἱ τοῦτο ἀπολωλέναι δι' εὐθιῆν.

³ Herodot. iii. 141-144.

more calamitous. Mæandrius had a brother named Charilaus, violent in his temper and half a madman, whom he was obliged to keep in confinement. This man, looking out of his chamber-window, saw the Persian officers seated peaceably throughout the town and even under the gates of the acropolis, unguarded, and relying upon the convention: it seems that these were the chief officers whose rank gave them the privilege of being carried about on their seats.¹ The sight inflamed both his wrath and his insane ambition. He clamoured for liberty and admission to his brother, whom he reviled as a coward no less than a tyrant. "Here are you, worthless man, keeping me, your own brother, in a dungeon, though I have done no wrong worthy of bonds; while you do not dare to take your revenge on the Persians, who are casting you out as a houseless exile, and whom it would be so easy to put down. If you are afraid of them, give me your guards; I will make the Persians repent of their coming here, and I will send you safely out of the island forthwith."²

Mæandrius, on the point of quitting Samos for ever had little personal motive to care what became of the population. He had probably never forgiven them for disappointing his honourable intentions after the death of Polykratês, nor was he displeased to hand over to Sylosôn an odious and blood-stained sceptre, which he foresaw would be the only consequence of his brother's mad project. He therefore sailed away with his treasures, leaving the acropolis to his brother Charilaus; who immediately armed the guards, sallied forth from his fortress, and attacked the unsuspecting Persians. Many of the great officers were slain without resistance before the army could be got together; but at length Otanês collected his troops and drove the assailants back into the acropolis. While he immediately began the siege of that fortress, he also resolved, as Mæandrius had foreseen, to take

¹ Herodot. iii. 146. τῶν Περσέων τοὺς διπροφορευμένους καὶ λόγου πλείστου ἀξίους.

² Herodot. iii. 145. Ἐμὲ μὲν, ὦ κάκιστα ἀνδρῶν, ἐόντα σεωῦ τοῦ ἀδελφεῶν, καὶ ἀδικήσαντα οὐδὲν ἄξιον δεσμοῦ, ἐήσαε γυργύρης ἤξιωσας·

ὄρεων δὲ τοὺς Πέρσας ἐκβάλλοντάς τε σε καὶ ἀνοιχόν ποιεῦντας, οὐ τολμᾶς τίσασθαι, οὕτω δὴ τι ἐόντας εὐπετέας χειρωθῆναι.

The highly dramatic manner of Herodotus cannot be melted down into smooth historical recital.

a signal revenge for the treacherous slaughter of so many of his friends and companions. His army, no less incensed than himself, were directed to fall upon the Samian people and massacre them without discrimination—man and boy, on ground sacred as well as profane. The bloody order was too faithfully executed, and Samos was handed over to Sylosôn, stripped of its male inhabitants.¹ Of Charilaus and the acropolis we hear no farther: perhaps he and his guards may have escaped by sea. Lykarêtus,² the other brother of Mæandrius, must have remained either in the service of Sylosôn or in that of the Persians; for we find him some years afterwards entrusted by the latter with an important command.

Sylosôn was thus finally installed as despot of an island peopled chiefly, if not wholly, with women and children: we may however presume, that the deed of blood has been described by the historian as more sweeping than it really was. It seems nevertheless to have set heavily on the conscience of Otanês, who was induced some time afterwards, by a dream and by a painful disease, to take measures for re-peopling the island.³ From whence the new population came, we are not told; but wholesale translations of inhabitants from one place to another were familiar to the mind of a Persian king or satrap.

Mæandrius, following the example of the previous Samian exiles under Polykratês, went to Sparta and sought aid for the purpose of re-establishing himself at Samos. But the Lacedæmonians had no disposition to repeat an attempt which had before turned out so unsuccessfully, nor could he seduce king Kleomenês by the display of his treasures and finely-wrought gold plate. The king however, not without fear that such seductions might win over some of the Spartan leading men, prevailed with the ephors to send Mæandrius away.⁴

Sylosôn seems to have remained undisturbed at Samos, as a tributary of Persia, like the Ionic cities on the continent: some years afterwards we find his son Æakês reigning in the island.⁵ Strabo states that it was the harsh

¹ Herodot. iii. 139. ἐρημον ἐούσαν ἀνδρῶν.

² Herodot. v. 27.

³ Herodot. iii. 149.

⁴ Herodot. iii. 148.

⁵ Herodot. vi. 13.

rule of Sylosôn which caused the depopulation of the island. But the cause just recounted out of Herodotus is both very different, and sufficiently plausible in itself; and as Strabo seems in the main to have derived his account from Herodotus, we may suppose that on this point he has incorrectly remembered his authority.¹

¹ Strabo, xiv. p. 638. He gives a proverbial phrase about the depopulation of the island—

Ἐχρητὶ Συλοσῶντος εὐρυχωρίη, which is perfectly consistent with the narrative of Herodotus.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

DEMOKEDES.—DARIUS INVADES SCYTHIA.

DARIUS had now acquired full authority throughout the Persian empire, having put down the refractory satrap Oroëtes, as well as the revolted Medes and Babylonians. He had moreover completed the conquest of Ionia, by the important addition of Samos; and his dominion thus comprised all Asia Minor with its neighbouring islands. But this was not sufficient for the ambition of a Persian king, next but one in succession to the great Cyrus. The conquering impulse was yet unabated among the Persians, who thought it incumbent upon their king, and whose king thought it incumbent upon himself, to extend the limits of the empire. Though not of the lineage of Cyrus, Darius had taken pains to connect himself with it by marriage: he had married Atossa and Artystonê, daughters of Cyrus—and Parmys, daughter of Smerdis the younger son of Cyrus. Atossa had been first the wife of her brother Kambysês; next, of the Magian Smerdis his successor; and thirdly of Darius, to whom she bore four children.¹ Of those children the eldest was Xerxês, respecting whom more will be said hereafter.

Atossa, mother of the only Persian king who ever set foot in Greece—the Sultana Validi of Persia during the reign of Xerxês—was a person of commanding influence in the reign of her last husband,² as well as in that of her son, and filled no inconsiderable space even in Grecian imagination, as we may see both by Æschylus and Herodotus. Had her influence prevailed, the first conquering appetites of Darius would have been directed not against the steppes of Scythia, but against Attica and Peloponnesus; at least so Herodotus

¹ Herodot. iii. 88. vii. 2.

² Herodot. vii. 3. ἡ γὰρ Ἀτossa εἶχε τὸ πᾶν κράτος. Compare the description given of the ascendancy

of the savage Sultana Parysatis over her son Artaxerxês Mnêmon (Plutarch, Artaxerxês, c. 16, 19, 23).

assures us. The grand object of that historian is to set forth the contentions of Hellas with the barbarians or non-Hellenic world. Accordingly with an art truly epical, which manifests itself everywhere to the careful reader of his nine books, he preludes to the real dangers which were averted at Marathon and Platæa by recounting the first conception of an invasion of Greece by the Persians—how it originated and how it was abandoned. For this purpose—according to his historical style, wherein general facts are set forth as subordinate and explanatory accompaniments to the adventures of particular persons—he gives us the interesting, but romantic history, of the Krotoniate surgeon Dêmokêdês.

Dêmokêdês —the Krotoniate surgeon—his adventures—he is carried as a slave to Susa.

Dêmokêdês, son of a citizen of Krotôn named Kalliphôn, had turned his attention in early youth to the study and practice of medicine and surgery (for that age, we can make no difference between the two) and had made considerable progress in it. His youth coincides nearly with the arrival of Pythagoras at Krotôn (550-520); a time when the science of the surgeon as well as the art of the gymnastic trainer were prosecuted in that city more actively than in any part of Greece. Kalliphôn, the father of Dêmokêdês, was a man of such severe temper, that the son ran away from him and resolved to maintain himself by his talents elsewhere. Retiring to Ægina, he there began to practise in his profession. So rapid was his success even in the first year—though very imperfectly equipped with instruments and apparatus¹—that the citizens

¹ Herodot. iii. 181. ἀσχευῆς παρ ἑῶν, καὶ ἔχων οὐδέν τῶν ἔσα περὶ τὴν τέχνην ἔστιν ἐργαλῆια—the description refers to surgical rather than to medical practice.

That curious assemblage of the cases of particular patients with remarks, known in the works of Hippokratês under the title Ἐπιδήμια (Notes of visits to different cities), is very illustrative of what Herodotus here mentions about Dêmokêdês. Consult also the valuable Prolegomena of M. Littré, in his edition of Hippokratês, as to the character, means of action, and

itinerant habits of the Grecian ιατροί; see particularly the preface to vol. v. p. 12, where he enumerates the various places visited and noted by Hippokratês. The greater number of the Hippocratic observations refer to various parts of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; but there are some also which refer to patients in the islands of Syros and Delos, at Athens, Salamis, Elis, Corinth, and Æniadæ in Akarnania. "On voit par là combien étoit juste le nom de Periodeutes ou voyageurs donnés à ces anciens médecins."

of the island made a contract with him to remain there for one year, at a salary of one talent (about 383 l. sterling, an Æginæan talent). The year afterwards he was invited to come to Athens, then under the Peisistratids, at a salary of 100 minæ or $1\frac{2}{3}$ talent; and in the following year, Polykratês of Samos tempted him by the offer of two talents. With that despot he remained, and accompanied him in his last calamitous visit to the satrap Oroetês; on the murder of Polykratês, being seized among the slaves and foreign attendants, he was left to languish with the rest in imprisonment and neglect. When again, soon after, Oroetês himself was slain, Dêmokêdês was numbered among his slaves and chattels, and sent up to Susa.

He had not been long at that capital, when Darius, leaping from his horse in the chase, sprained his foot badly, and was carried home in violent pain. The Egyptian surgeons, supposed to be the first men in their

Again, M. Littré, in the same preface, p. 25, illustrates the proceedings and residence of the ancient *ιατρός*—"On se tromperoit si on se représentoit la demeure d'un médecin d'alors comme celle d'un médecin d'aujourd'hui. La maison du médecin de l'antiquité, du moins au temps d'Hippocrate et aux époques voisines, renfermoit un local destiné à la pratique d'un grand nombre d'opérations, contenant les machines et les instrumens nécessaires, et de plus étant aussi une boutique de pharmacie. Ce local se nommait *ιατρείον*." See Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 648, iv. p. 720. Timæus accused Aristotle of having begun as a surgeon, practising to great profit in surgery or *ιατρείον*, and having quitted this occupation late in life to devote himself to the study of science—*σοφιστήν ὀψιμαθῆ καὶ μισητόν ὑπάρχοντα, καὶ τὸ πολυτίμητον ἱατρείον ἀργίως ἀποκλαλεῖκότα* (Polyb. xii. 9).

See also the *Remarques Rétrospectives* attached by M. Littré to volume iv. of the same work (p.

654-658), where he dwells upon the intimate union of surgical and medical practice in antiquity. At the same time, it must be remarked that a passage in the remarkable medical oath, published in the collection of Hippocratic treatises, recognises in the plainest manner the distinction between the physician and the operator—the former binds himself by this oath not to perform the operation "even of lithotomy, but to leave it to the operators or workmen:" *Ὁὐ τερμῶ δὲ οὐδὲ μὴ λιθιῶντας ἐκχωρήσω δὲ ἐργάτησι, ἀνδράσι πρόξιος τῆσδε* (*Œuvres d'Hippocrate*, vol. iv. p. 630, ed. Littré). M. Littré (p. 617) contests this explanation, remarking that the various Hippocratic treatises represent the *ιατρός* as performing all sorts of operations, even such as require violent and mechanical dealing. But the words of the oath are so explicit, that it seems more reasonable to assign to the oath itself a later date than the treatises, when the habits of practitioners may have changed.

profession¹ whom he habitually employed, did him no good, but only aggravated his torture. For seven days and nights he had no sleep, and he as well as those around him began to despair. At length, some one who had been at Sardis accidentally recollected that he had heard of a Greek surgeon among the slaves of Oroëtês. Search was immediately made, and the miserable slave was brought, in chains as well as in rags,² into the presence of the royal sufferer. Being asked whether he understood surgery, he affected ignorance; but Darius, suspecting this to be a mere artifice, ordered out the scourge and the pricking instrument to overcome it. Dêmokêdês now saw that there was no resource, admitted that he had acquired some little skill, and was called upon to do his utmost in the case before him. He was fortunate enough to succeed perfectly, in alleviating the pain, in procuring sleep for the exhausted patient, and ultimately in restoring the foot to a sound state. Darius, who had abandoned all hopes of such a cure, knew no bounds to his gratitude. As a first reward, he presented him with two sets of chains in solid gold—a commemoration of the state in which Dêmokêdês had first come before him. He next sent him into the harem to visit his wives. The conducting eunuchs introduced him as the man who had restored the king to life, upon which the grateful sultanas each gave to him a saucer full of golden coins called staters;³ in all so numerous, that the slave Skitôn who followed him was enriched by merely picking up the pieces which dropped on the floor. This was not all. Darius gave him a splendid house and furniture, made him the companion of his table, and showed him every description of favour. He was about to crucify the Egyptian surgeons who had been so unsuccessful in their attempts to cure him. But Dêmokêdês had the happiness of preserving their lives, as well as of rescuing an unfor-

He cures
Darius,
who re-
wards him
munifi-
cently.

¹ About the Persian habit of sending to Egypt for surgeons, compare Herodot. iii. 1.

² Herodot. iii. 129. τὸν δὲ ὡς ἐξευρονὲν τοῖσι Ὀροῖται ἀνδραπόδοιαι ἔκου δὴ ἀπημαλγμένον, παρήγον ἐς μέσον, πίδαας τε ἔλκοντα καὶ βράχειον ἐσθμμένον.

³ Herodot. iii. 130. The golden

stater was equal to about 11. 1s. 3d. English money (Hussey, Ancient Weights, vii. 3. p. 103).

The ladies in a Persian harem appear to have been less unapproachable and invisible than those in modern Turkey; in spite of the observation of Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 27.

tunate companion of his imprisonment—an Eleian prophet, who had followed the fortunes of Polykratês.

But there was one favour which Darius would on no account grant; yet upon this one Dêmokêdês had set his heart—the liberty of returning to Greece. At length accident, combined with his own surgical skill, enabled him to escape from the splendour of his second detention, as it had before extricated him from the misery of the first. A tumour formed upon the breast of Atossa: at first she said nothing to any one, but it became too bad for concealment, and she was forced to consult Dêmokêdês. He promised to cure her, but required from her a solemn oath that she would afterwards do for him anything which he should ask—pledging himself at the same time to ask nothing indecent.¹ The cure was successful, and Atossa was required to repay it by procuring his liberty. Knowing that the favour would be refused, even to her, if directly solicited, he taught her a stratagem for obtaining under false pretences the consent of Darius. She took an early opportunity (Herodotus tells us,² in bed) of reminding Darius that the Persians expected from him some positive addition to the power and splendour of the empire; and when Darius, in answer, acquainted her that he contemplated a speedy expedition against the Scythians, she entreated him to postpone it and to turn his forces first against Greece—"I have heard (she said) about the maidens of Sparta, Athens, Argos and Corinth, and I want to have some of them as slaves to serve me—(we may conceive the smile of triumph with which the sons of those who had conquered at Platæa and Salamis would hear this part of the history read by Herodotus)—you have near you the best person possible to give information about Greece—that Greek who cured your foot." Darius was induced by this request to send some confidential Persians into Greece to procure information, along with Dêmokêdês. Selecting fifteen of them, he ordered them to survey the

He procures permission, by artifice and through the influence of Atossa, to return to Greece.

¹ Herodot. iii. 133. δεῖσασθαι δὲ οὐδένος τῶν βασιλευμένων ἔστι φέροντα. Another Greek physician at the court of Susa, about seventy years afterwards—Apollonidês of Kôs—in attendance on a Persian

princess, did not impose upon himself the same restraint: his intrigue was divulged, and he was put to death miserably (Ktésias, Persica, c. 42).

² Herodot. iii. 134.

coasts and cities of Greece, under guidance of Dêmokêdês, but with peremptory orders upon no account to let him escape or to return without him. He next sent for Dêmokêdês himself, explained to him what he wanted, and enjoined him imperatively to return as soon as the business had been completed. He farther desired him to carry away all the ample donations which he had already received, as presents to his father and brothers, promising that on his return fresh donations of equal value should make up the loss. Lastly, he directed that a store-ship, "filled with all manner of good things," should accompany the voyage. Dêmokêdês undertook the mission with every appearance of sincerity. The better to play his part, he declined to take away what he already possessed at Susa—saying, that he should like to find his property and furniture again on coming back, and that the store-ship alone, with its contents, would be sufficient both for the voyage, and for all necessary presents.

Accordingly he and the fifteen Persian envoys went down to Sidon in Phenicia, where two armed triremes were equipped, with a large store-ship in company. The voyage of survey into Greece was commenced. They visited and examined all the principal places in Greece—probably beginning with the Asiatic and insular Greeks, crossing to Eubœa, circumnavigating Attica and Peloponnesus, then passing to Korkyra and Italy. They surveyed the coasts and cities, taking memoranda¹ of everything worthy of note which they saw. Such

a Periplus, if it had been preserved, would have been inestimable, as an account of the actual state of the Grecian world about 518 B.C. As soon as they arrived at Tarentum, Dêmokêdês—now within a short distance of his own home, Krotôn—found an opportunity of executing what he had meditated from the beginning. At his request, Aristophilidês the king of Tarentum seized the fifteen Persians and detained them as spies, at the same time taking the rudders from off their ships—while Dêmokêdês himself made his escape to Krotôn. As soon as he had arrived there, Aristophilidês released the

Atossa suggests to Darius an expedition against Greece—Dêmokêdês with some Persians is sent to procure information for him.

¹ Herodot. iii. 136. προσίσχοντες δὲ αὐτῆς τὰ παραθαλάσσια ἐθήσαντο καὶ ἀπεγράφωντο.

Persians; who, pursuing their voyage, went on to Krotôn, found Dêmokêdês in the market-place, and laid hands upon him. But his fellow-citizens rescued him, not without opposition from some who were afraid of provoking the Great King—and in spite of remonstrances, energetic and menacing, from the Persians themselves. Indeed the Krotoniates not only protected the restored exile, but even robbed the Persians of their store-ship. The latter, disabled from proceeding farther as well by this loss as by the secession of Dêmokêdês, commenced their voyage homeward, but unfortunately suffered shipwreck near the Iapygian cape, and became slaves in that neighbourhood. A Tarentine exile, named Gillus, ransomed them and carried them up to Susa—a service for which Darius promised him any recompense that he chose. Restoration to his native city was all that Gillus asked; and that too, not by force, but by the mediation of the Asiatic Greeks of Knidus, who were on terms of intimate alliance with the Tarentines. This generous citizen—an honourable contrast to Dêmokêdês, who had not scrupled to impel the stream of Persian conquest against his country, in order to procure his own release—was unfortunately disappointed of his anticipated recompense. For though the Knidians, at the injunction of Darius, employed all their influence at Tarentum to procure a revocation of the sentence of exile, they were unable to succeed, and force was out of the question.¹ The last words addressed by Dêmokêdês at parting to his Persian companions, exhorted them to acquaint Darius that he (Dêmokêdês) was about to marry the daughter of the Krotoniate Milo—one of the first men in Krotôn as well as the greatest wrestler of his time. The reputation of Milo was very great with Darius—probably from the talk of Dêmokêdês himself: moreover gigantic muscular force could be appreciated by men who had no relish either for Homer or Solon. And thus did this clever and vain-glorious Greek, sending back his fifteen Persian companions to disgrace and perhaps to death, deposit in their parting ears a braggart message calculated to create for himself a factitious name at Susa. He paid a large sum to Milo as the price of his daughter, for this very purpose.¹

Voyage of Dêmokêdês along the coast of Greece—he stays at Krotôn—fate of his Persian companions.

¹ Herodot. iii. 137, 138.

¹ Herodot. iii. 137. κατὰ δὴ τοῦ-

Thus finishes the history of Dêmokêdês, and of the "first Persians (to use the phrase of Herodotus) who ever came over from Asia into Greece."¹ It is a history well-deserving of attention, even looking only to the liveliness of the incidents, introducing us as they do into the full movement of the ancient world—incidents which I see no reason for doubting, with a reasonable allowance for the dramatic amplification of the historian. Even at that early date, Greek medical intelligence stands out in a surpassing manner, and Dêmokêdês is the first of those many able Greek surgeons who were seized, carried up to Susa,² and there detained for the Great King, his court, and harem.

But his history suggests in another point of view far more serious reflections. Like the Milesian Histiaëus (of whom I shall speak hereafter), he cared not what amount of risk he brought upon his country in order to procure his own escape from a splendid detention at Susa. Now the influence which he originated was on the point of precipitating upon Greece the whole force of the Persian empire, at a time when Greece was in no condition to resist it. Had the first aggressive expedition of Darius, with his own personal command and fresh appetite for conquest, been directed against Greece instead of against Scythia (between 516-514 B.C.), Grecian independence would have perished almost infallibly. For Athens was then still governed by the Peisistratids. What she was under them, we have had occasion to notice in a former chapter. She had then no courage for energetic self-defence, and probably Hippias himself, far from offering resistance, would

τό μοι σπεύσαι δοκέει τὸν γάμον τοῦ-
τον τελέσας γρήματα μεγάλα Δημο-
κίδης, ἵνα φανῆ πρὸς Δαρείου εὖν
καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐιοῦτου δόκιμος.

¹ Herodot. iii. 138.

² Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 2, 33.
Ἄλλους δὲ πόσους οἶει (says Sokra-
tês) διὰ σοφίαν ἀναρπάστους πρὸς
βασιλέα γεγονέναι, καὶ ἐκεῖ δουλεύ-
ειν;

We shall run little risk in con-
jecturing that among the intelli-
gent and able men thus carried

off, surgeons and physicians would
be selected as the first and most
essential.

Apollônîdês of Kôs (whose ca-
lamitous end has been alluded to
in a previous note) was resident
as surgeon or physician with Ar-
taxerxês Longimanus (Ktesias,
Persica, c. 30), and Polykritus of
Mendê, as well as Ktêsias himself,
with Artaxerxês Mnêmon (Plutarch,
Artaxerxês, c. 31).

have found it advantageous to accept Persian dominion as a means of strengthening his own rule, like the Ionian despots. Moreover Grecian habit of co-operation was then only just commencing. But fortunately the Persian invader did not touch the shore of Greece until more than twenty years afterwards, in 490 B.C.; and during that precious interval, the Athenian character had undergone the memorable revolution which has been before described. Their energy and their organization had been alike improved, and their force of resistance had become decupled; besides which, their conduct had so provoked the Persian that resistance was then a matter of necessity with them, and submission on tolerable terms an impossibility. When we come to the grand Persian invasion of Greece, we shall see that Athens was the life and soul of all the opposition offered. We shall see farther, that with all the efforts of Athens, the success of the defence was more than once doubtful; and would have been converted into a very different result, if Xerxès had listened to the best of his own counsellors. But had Darius—at the head of the very same force which he conducted into Scythia, or even an inferior force—landed at Marathon in 514 B.C., instead of sending Datis in 490 B.C., he would have found no men like the victors of Marathon to meet him. As far as we can appreciate the probabilities, he would have met with little resistance except from the Spartans singly, who would have maintained their own very defensible territory against all his efforts, like the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor, or like the Mainots of Laconia in later days; but Hellas generally would have become a Persian satrapy. Fortunately, Darius, while bent on invading some country, had set his mind on the attack of Scythia, alike perilous and unprofitable. His personal ardour was wasted on those unconquerable regions, where he narrowly escaped the disastrous fate of Cyrus—nor did he ever pay a second visit to the coasts of the Ægean. Yet the amorous influences of Atossa, set at work by Dêmokédês, might well have been sufficiently powerful to induce Darius to assail Greece instead of Scythia—a choice in favour of which all other recommendations concurred; and the history of free Greece would then probably have stopped at this point, without unrolling any of the glories which followed. So incalculably great has been the influence of Grecian development,

during the two centuries between 500-300 B.C., on the destinies of mankind, that we cannot pass without notice a contingency which threatened to arrest that development in the bud. Indeed it may be remarked that the history of any nation, considered as a sequence of causes and effects affording applicable knowledge, requires us to study not merely real events, but also imminent contingencies—events which were on the point of occurring, but yet did not occur. When we read the wailings of Atossa in the *Persæ* of Æschylus, for the humiliation which her son Xerxês had just undergone in his flight from Greece,¹ we do not easily persuade ourselves to reverse the picture, and to conceive the same Atossa twenty years earlier, numbering as her slaves at Susa the noblest Hêracleid and Alkmæônid maidens from Greece. Yet the picture would really have been thus reversed—the wish of Atossa would have been fulfilled and the wailings would have been heard from enslaved Greek maidens in Persia—if the mind of Darius had not happened to be pre-occupied with a project not less insane even than those of Kambysês against Ethiopia and the Lybian desert. Such at least is the moral of the story of Dêmokêdês.

That insane expedition across the Danube into Scythia comes now to be recounted. It was undertaken about 516-515 B.C. by Darius for the purpose of avenging the inroad and devastation of the Scythians in Media and Upper Asia, about a century before. The lust of conquest imparted unusual force to this sentiment of wounded dignity, which in the case of the Scythians could hardly be connected with any expectation of plunder or profit. In spite of the dissuading admonition of his brother Artabanus,² Darius summoned

Darius
marches
against
Scythia.

¹ Æschyl. *Pers.* 435-845, &c.

² Herodot. iv. 1, 83. There is nothing to mark the precise year of the Scythian expedition; but as the accession of Darius is fixed to 521 B.C., and as the expedition is connected with the early part of his reign, we may conceive him to have entered upon it as soon as his hands were free; that is, as soon as he had put down the revolted satraps and provinces, Orêtês, the Medes, Babylonians, &c.

Five years seems a reasonable time to allow for these necessities of the empire, which would bring the Scythian expedition to 516-515 B.C. There is reason for supposing it to have been before 514 B.C., for in that year Hipparchus was slain at Athens, and Hippias the surviving brother, looking out for securities and alliances abroad, gave his daughter in marriage to Æantidês son of Hippoklus despot of Lampsakus, "perceiving that Hip-

the whole force of his empire, army and navy, to the Thracian Bosphorus—a force not less than 700,000 horse and foot, and 600 ships, according to Herodotus. On these prodigious numbers we can lay no stress. But it appears that the names of all the various nations composing the host were inscribed on two pillars, erected by order of Darius on the European side of the Bosphorus, and afterwards seen by Herodotus himself in the city of Byzantium—the inscriptions were bilingual, in Assyrian characters as well as Greek. The Samian architect Mandroklês had been directed to throw a bridge of boats across the Bosphorus, about half-way between Byzantium and the mouth of the Euxine. So peremptory were the Persian kings that their orders for military service should be punctually obeyed, and so impatient were they of the idea of exemptions, that when a Persian father named *Æobazus* entreated that one of his three sons, all included in the conscription, might be left at home, Darius replied that all three of them should be left at home—an answer which the unsuspecting father heard with delight. They were indeed all left at home—for they were all put to death.¹ A proceeding similar to this is ascribed afterwards to *Xerxês*;² whether true or not as matters of fact, they illustrate the wrathful displeasure with which the Persian kings were known to receive such petitions for exemption.

The naval force of Darius seems to have consisted entirely of subject Greeks, Asiatic and insular; for the Phœnician fleet was not brought into the *Ægean* until the subsequent Ionic revolt. At this time all or most of the

poklus and his son had great influence with Darius" (Thucyd. vi. 59). Now Hippoklus could not well have acquired this influence before the Scythian expedition; for Darius came down then for the first time to the western sea: Hippoklus served upon that expedition (Herodot. iv. 138), and it was probably then that his favour was acquired, and farther confirmed during the time that Darius stayed at Sardis after his return from Scythia.

Professor Schultz (Beiträge zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen der Hellen. Geschichte von der 63. bis

zur 72. Olympiade, p. 168, in the Kieler Philolog. Studien) places the expedition in 513 B.C.; but I think a year or two earlier is more probable. Larcher, Wesseling, and Bähr (ad Herodot. iv. 145) place it in 508 B.C., which is later than the truth; indeed Larcher himself places the reduction of Lemnos and Imbros by Otanês in 511 B.C., though that event decidedly came after the Scythian expedition (Herodot. v. 27; Larcher, Table Chronologique, Trad. d'Hérodote, t. vii. p. 633-635).

¹ Herodot. iv. 84.

² Herodot. vii. 89.

Asiatic Greek cities were under despots, who leaned on the Persian government for support, and who appeared with their respective contingents to take part in the Scythian expedition.¹ Of Ionic Greeks were seen—Strattis, despot of Chios; *Æakês* son of *Sylosôn*, despot of *Samos*; *Laodamas*, of *Phôkæa*; and *Histiæus*, of *Milêtus*. From the *Æolic* towns, *Aristagoras* of *Kymê*; from the *Hellespontine* Greeks, *Daphnis* of *Abydus*, *Hippoklus* of *Lampsakus*, *Hêrophantus* of *Parium*, *Metrodôrus* of *Prokonnêsus*, *Aristagoras* of *Kyzikus*, and *Miltiadês* of the *Thracian Chersonese*—all these are mentioned, and there were probably more. This large fleet, assembled at the *Bosphorus*, was sent forward into the *Euxine* to the mouth of the *Danube*—with orders to sail up the river two days' journey, above the point where its channel begins to divide, and to throw a bridge of boats over it. *Darius*, having liberally recompensed the architect *Mandroklês*, crossed the bridge over the *Bosphorus*, and began his march through *Thrace*, receiving the submission of various *Thracian* tribes in his way, and subduing others—especially the *Getæ* north of *Mount Hæmus*, who were compelled to increase still farther the numbers of his vast army.² On arriving at the *Danube*, he found the bridge finished and prepared for his passage by the *Ionians*. We may remark, here as on so many other occasions, that all operations requiring intelligence are performed by the *Persians* either by *Greeks* or by *Phenicians*—more usually by the former. He crossed this greatest of all earthly rivers³—for so the *Danube* was imagined to be in the fifth century *B.C.*—and directed his march into *Scythia*.

As far as the point now attained, our narrative runs smoothly and intelligibly: we know that *Darius* marched his army into *Scythia*, and that he came back with ignominy and severe loss. But as to all which happened between his crossing and recrossing the *Danube*, we find nothing approaching to authentic statement, nor even what we can set forth as the probable basis of truth on which exaggerating fancy has been at work—all is inexplicable

¹ Herodot. iv. 97, 137, 138.

² Herodot. iv. 89-93.

³ Herodot. iv. 48-50. Ἴστρος—μέ-

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mystery. Ktésias indeed says that Darius marched for fifteen days into the Scythian territory—that he then exchanged bows with the king of Scythia and discovered the Scythian bow to be the largest—and that being intimidated by such discovery, he fled back to the bridge by which he had crossed the Danube, and recrossed the river with the loss of one-tenth part of his army,¹ being compelled to break down the bridge before all had passed. The length of march is here the only thing distinctly stated; about the direction nothing is said; but the narrative of Ktésias, defective as it is, is much less perplexing than that of Herodotus, who conducts the immense host of Darius as it were through fairyland—heedless of distance, large intervening rivers, want of all cultivation or supplies, destruction of the country (in so far as it could be destroyed) by the retreating Scythians, &c. He tells us that the Persian army consisted chiefly of foot—that there were no roads nor agriculture; yet his narrative carries it over about twelve degrees of longitude from the Danube to the country east of the Tanais, across the rivers Tyras (Dniester), Hypanis (Bog), Borysthenês (Dnieper), Hypakyris, Gerrhos, and Tanais.² How these rivers could have been passed in the face of enemies by so vast a host, we are left to conjecture, since it was not winter-

¹ Ktésias, Persica, c. 17. Justin (ii. 5—compare also xxxviii. 7) seems to follow the narrative of Ktésias.

Æschylus (Persæ, 864), who presents the deceased Darius as a glorious contrast with the living Xerxes, talks of the splendid conquests which he made by means of others—"without crossing the Halys himself, nor leaving his home." We are led to suppose, by the language which Æschylus puts into the mouth of the Eïdolon of Darius (v. 720-745), that he had forgotten the bridge thrown across the Bosphorus by order of Darius; for the latter is made to condemn severely the impious insolence of Xerxes in bridging over the Hellespont.

² Herodot. iv. 136. ἄτε δὲ τοῦ Περσικοῦ πολλοῦ ἐόντος περὶ στρατοῦ, καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς οὐκ ἐπισταμένω, ὥστε οὐ τετραμμένω τῶν ὁδῶν, τοῦ δὲ Σκυθικοῦ, ἰκπότεω, καὶ τὰ σύντομα τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐπισταμένω, &c. Compare c. 128.

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He marches into Scythia—narrative of his march impossible and unintelligible, considered as history.

time to convert them into ice: nor does the historian even allude to them as having been crossed either in the advance or in the retreat. What is not less remarkable, is, that in respect to the Greek settlement of Olbia or Borysthenês, and the agricultural Scythians and Mix-hellenes between the Hypanis and the Borysthenês, across whose country it would seem that this march of

Darius must have carried him—Herodotus does not say anything; though we should have expected that he would have had better means of informing himself about this part of the march than about any other, and though the Persians could hardly have failed to plunder or put in requisition this, the only productive portion of Scythia.

The narrative of Herodotus in regard to the Persian march north of the Ister seems indeed destitute of all the conditions of reality. It is rather an imaginative description, illustrating the desperate and impracticable character of Scythian warfare, and grouping in the same picture, according to that large sweep of the imagination which is admissible in epical treatment, the Scythians with all their barbarous neighbours from the Carpathian mountains to the river

Wolga. The Agathyrsi, the Neuri, the Androphagi, the Melanchlæni, the Budini, the Gelôni, the Sarmatians, and the Tauri—all of them bordering on that vast quadrangular area of 4000 stadia for each side, called Scythia, as Herodotus conceives it¹—are brought into deliberation and action in consequence of the Persian approach. And Herodotus takes that opportunity of communicating valuable particulars respecting the habits and manners of each. The kings of these nations discuss whether Darius is justified in his invasion, and whether it be prudent in them to aid the Scythians. The latter question is decided in the affirmative by the Sarmatians, the Budini, and the Gelôni, all eastward of the Tanais²—in the negative by the rest. The Scythians, removing their waggons with their wives and children out of the way northward, retreat and draw Darius after them from the Danube all across Scythia and Sarmatia to the north-eastern extremity of the territory

¹ Herodot. iv. 101.

² Herodot. iv. 118, 119.

of the Budini,¹ several days' journey eastward of the Tanais. Moreover they destroy the wells and ruin the herbage as much as they can, so that during all this long march (says Herodotus) the Persians "found nothing to damage, inasmuch as the country was barren." We can hardly understand therefore what they found to live upon. It is in the territory of the Budini, at this easternmost terminus on the borders of the desert, that the Persians perform the only positive acts which are ascribed to them throughout the whole expedition. They burn the wooden wall before occupied, but now deserted, by the Gelôni; and they build, or begin to build, eight large fortresses near the river Oarus. For what purposes these fortresses could have been intended Herodotus gives no intimation; but he says that the unfinished work was yet to be seen even in his day.²

Having thus been carried all across Scythia and the other territories above-mentioned in a north-easterly direction, Darius and his army are next marched back a prodigious distance in a north-westerly direction, through the territories of the Melanchlæni, the Androphagi, and the Neuri, all of whom flee affrighted into the northern desert, having been thus compelled against their will to share in the consequences of the war. The Agathyrsi peremptorily require the Scythians to abstain from drawing the Persians into *their* territory on pain of being themselves treated as enemies.³ Accordingly the Scythians, avoiding the boundaries of the Agathyrsi, direct their retreat in such a manner as to draw the Persians again southward into Scythia. During all this long march backwards and

Poetical grouping of the Scythians and their neighbours by Herodotus.

¹ Herodot. iv. 120-122.

² Herodot. iv. 123. "Ὅσον μὲν δὴ χρόνον οἱ Πέρσαι ἦσαν διὰ τῆς Σκυθικῆς καὶ τῆς Σχυρομάτιδος γῶρης, οἱ δὲ εἶχον οὐδὲν σίνεσθαι, ἅτε τῆς γῶρης εὐόχης χέρσου· ἐπεὶ δὲ τε ἐς τὴν τῶν Βουδίνων γῶρην ἐσεβήλον, &c. See Rennell, Geograph. System of Herodotus, p. 114, about the Oarus.

The erections, whatever they were, which were supposed to mark the extreme point of the march of Darius, may be compared to those

evidences of the extreme advance of Dionysus, which the Macedonian army saw on the north of the Jaxartes—"Liberi patris terminos." Quintus Curtius, vii. 9, 15 (vii. 37, 16, Zumpt.)

³ Herodot. iv. 125. Hekateus ranks the Melanchlæni as a Scythian ἔθνος (Hekat. Fragment. 154, ed. Klausen): he also mentions several other subdivisions of Scythians, who cannot be farther authenticated (Fragm. 155-160).

forwards, there are partial skirmishes and combats of horse, but the Scythians steadily refuse any general engagement. And though Darius challenges them formally by means of a herald, with taunts of cowardice, the Scythian king Idanthyrsus not only refuses battle, but explains and defends his policy, and defies the Persian to come and destroy the tombs of their fathers—it will then (he adds) be seen whether the Scythians are cowards or not.¹ The difficulties of Darius have by this time become serious, when Idanthyrsus sends to him the menacing presents of a bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows: the Persians are obliged to commence a rapid retreat towards the Danube, leaving, in order to check and slacken the Scythian pursuit, the least effective and the sick part of their army encamped, together with the asses which had been brought with them—animals unknown to the Scythians, and causing great alarm by their braying.² However, notwithstanding some delay thus caused, as well as the anxious haste of Darius to reach the Danube, the Scythians, far more rapid in their movements, arrive at the river before him, and open a negotiation with the Ionians left in guard of the bridge, urging them to break it down and leave the Persian king to his fate—inevitable destruction with his whole army.³

Here we re-enter the world of reality, at the north bank of the Danube, the place where we before quitted it. All that is reported to have passed in the interval, if tried by the tests of historical matter of fact, can be received as nothing better than a perplexing dream. It only acquires value when we consider it as an illustrative fiction, including, doubtless, some unknown matter of fact, but framed chiefly to exhibit in action those unattackable Nomads who formed the north-eastern barbarous world of a Greek, and with whose manners Herodotus was profoundly struck. "The Scythians⁴ (says he), in regard to one of the

Strong impression produced upon the imagination of Herodotus by the Scythians.

¹ Herodot. iv. 126, 127.

² Herodot. iv. 128-132. The bird, the mouse, the frog, and the arrows, are explained to mean: Unless you take to the air like a bird, to the earth like a mouse, or to the water like a frog, you will become the victim of the Scythian arrows.

³ Herodot. iv. 133.

⁴ Herodot. iv. 46. Τῷ δὲ Σκυθικῷ γένει μετὰ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀθροωπηίων πρηγματῶν σοφώτατα πάντων ἐξεύρηται, τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν τὰ μέντοι ἄλλα οὐκ ἄγαμαί. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον οὕτω σφι ἀνεύρηται, ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τε μηδένα ἐπελθόντα ἐκί σφέας, μὴ βουλομένους τε ἐξευρεθῆναι,

greatest of human matters, have struck out a plan cleverer than any that I know. In other respects I do not admire them; but they have contrived this great object, that no invader of their country shall ever escape out of it, or shall ever be able to find out and overtake them, unless they themselves choose. For when men have neither walls nor established cities, but are all house-carriers and horse-bowmen—living, not from the plough, but from cattle, and having their dwellings on waggons—how can they be otherwise than unattackable and impracticable to meddle with?" The protracted and unavailing chase ascribed to Darius—who can neither overtake his game nor use his arms, and who hardly even escapes in safety—embodies in detail this formidable attribute of the Scythian Nomads. That Darius actually marched into the country, there can be no doubt. Nothing else is certain, except his ignominious retreat out of it to the Danube; for of the many different guesses,¹ by

καταλαβείν μὴ οἶόν τε εἶναι. Τοῖσι γὰρ μήτε τείχεα ἢ ἐκτισμένα, ἀλλὰ φερέοικοι εὐόντες πάντες, ἔωσι ἰκποτοζῶνται, ζῶντες μὴ ἀπ' ἀρότου, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ κτηνῶν, οἰκίσματα δὲ σφι ἢ ἐπὶ ζευγέων, κῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν οὗτοι ἄμαχοι τε καὶ ἄποροι προσμίσγειν;

Ἐξεύρηται δὲ σφι ταῦτα, τῆς τε γῆς εὐόσης ἐπιτηδέης, καὶ τῶν ποταμῶν εὐόντων σφι συμμάχων, &c.

Compare this with the oration of the Scythian envoys to Alexander the Great, as it stands in Quintus Curtius, vii. 8, 22 (vii. 35, 22, Zumpt).

¹ The statement of Strabo (vii. p. 305), which restricts the march of Darius to the country between the Danube and the Tyras (Dniester), is justly pronounced by Niebuhr (Kleine Schriften, p. 372) to be a mere supposition suggested by the probabilities of the case, because it could not be understood how his large army should cross even the Dniester: it is not to be treated as an affirmation resting upon any authority. "As Herodotus tells us what is impossible (adds Niebuhr), we know nothing

at all historically respecting the expedition."

So again the conjecture of Palmerius (*Exercitationes ad Auctores Græcos*, p. 21) carries on the march somewhat farther than the Dniester—to the Hypanis, or *perhaps* to the Borysthenes. Rennell, Klaproth, and Reichard, are not afraid to extend the march on to the Wolga. Dr. Thirlwall stops within the Tanais, admitting however that no correct historical account can be given of it. Eichwald supposes a long march up the Dniester into Volhynia and Lithuania.

Compare Ukert, *Skythien*, p. 26; Dahlmann, *Historische Forschungen*, ii. p. 159-164; Schaffarik, *Slavische Alterthümer*, i. 10, 3. i. 13, 4-5; and Mr. Kenrick, *Remarks on the Life and Writings of Herodotus*, prefixed to his Notes on the Second Book of Herodotus, p. xxi. The latter is among those who cannot swim the Dniester: he says—"Probably the Dniester (Tyras) was the real limit of the expedition, and Bessarabia, Moldavia, and the Bukovina, the scene of it."

which critics have attempted to cut down the gigantic sketch of Herodotus into a march with definite limits and direction, not one rests upon any positive grounds. We can trace the pervading idea in the mind of the historian, but cannot find out what were his substantive data.

The adventures which took place at the passage of that river, both on the out-march and the home-march, wherein the Ionians are concerned, are far more within the limits of history. Here Herodotus possessed better means of information, and had less of a dominant idea to illustrate. That which passed between Darius and the Ionians on his first crossing is very curious: I have reserved it until the present moment, because it is particularly connected with the incidents which happened on his return.

On reaching the Danube from Thrace, he found the bridge of boats ready; and when the whole army had passed

Order
given by
Darius to
the Ionians
at the
bridge
over the
Danube.

over, he ordered the Ionians to break it down, as well as to follow him in his land-march into Scythia,¹ the ships being left with nothing but the rowers and seamen essential to navigate them homeward. His order was on the point of being executed, when, fortunately for him, the Mitylænæan general Kôês ventured to call in question the prudence of it, having first asked whether it was the pleasure of the Persian king to listen to advice. Kôês urged that the march on which they were proceeding might prove perilous, and retreat possibly unavoidable; because the Scythians, though certain to be defeated if brought to action, might perhaps not suffer themselves to be approached or even discovered. As a precaution against all contingencies, it was prudent to leave the bridge standing and watched by those who had constructed it. Far from being offended at the advice, Darius felt grateful for it, and desired that Kôês would ask him after his return for a suitable reward—which we shall hereafter find granted. He then altered his resolution, took a cord, and tied sixty knots in it. "Take this cord (said he to the Ionians): untie one of the knots in it each day after my advance from the Danube into Scythia. Remain here and guard the bridge until you shall have untied all the knots; but if by that time I shall

¹ Herodot. iv. 97. Δαρείος ἐκέ- τας ἔπεισθαι κατ' ἡπειρον ἐωυτῷ και
λευσε τοὺς Ἴωνας τὴν σχεδὴν λύσαν- τὸν ἐκ τῶν νέων στρατόν.

not have returned, then depart and sail home.”¹ With such orders he began his march into the interior. This anecdote is interesting, not only as it discloses the simple expedients for numeration and counting of time then practised, but also as it illustrates the geographical ideas prevalent. Darius did not intend to come back over the Danube, but to march round the Mæotis, and to return into Persia on the eastern side of the Euxine. No other explanation can be given of his orders. At first, confident of success, he orders the bridge to be destroyed forthwith: he will beat the Scythians, march through their country, and re-enter Media from the eastern side of the Euxine: when he is reminded that possibly he may not be able to find the Scythians, and may be obliged to retreat, he still continues persuaded that this must happen within sixty days, if it happens at all; and that should he remain absent more than sixty days, such delay will be a convincing proof that he will take the other road of return instead of repassing the Danube. The reader who looks at a map of the Euxine and its surrounding territories may be startled at so extravagant a conception; but he should recollect that there was no map of the same or nearly the same accuracy before Herodotus, much less before the contemporaries of Darius. The idea of entering Media by the north from Scythia and Sarmatia over the Caucasus, is familiar to Herodotus in his sketch of the early marches of the Scythians and Cimmerians: moreover, he tells us that after the expedition of Darius, there came some Scythian envoys to Sparta, proposing an offensive alliance against Persia, and offering on their part to march across the Phasis into Media from the north,² while the Spartans were invited to land on the shores of Asia Minor, and advance across the country to meet them from the west. When we recollect that the Macedonians and their leader, Alexander the Great, having arrived at the river Jaxartès, on the north of Sogdiana and on the east of the Sea of Aral, supposed that they had reached the Tanais and called the river by that name³—we shall not be astonished at the

¹ Herodot. iv. 98. ἦν δὲ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ μὴ παρέω, ἀλλὰ διέλωσι ὕμιν αἱ ἡμέραι τῶν ἀμμάτων, ἀποπλέετε ἐς τὴν ὑμετέραν αὐτῶν μέγρι δὲ τούτου, ἐπεὶ τε οὗτω μετέδοξε, φυλάσσετε τὴν σχεδὴν.

² Herodot. vi. 84. Compare his account of the marches of the Cim-

merians and of the Scythians into Asia Minor and Media respectively (Herodot. i. 103, 104, iv. 12).

³ Arrian, Exp. Al. iii. 6, 15; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 45; Quint. Curt. vii. 7, 4. vii. 8, 30 (vii. 29, 5. vii. 36, 7, Zumpt).

erroneous estimation of distance implied in the plan conceived by Darius.

The Ionians had already remained in guard of the bridge beyond the sixty days commanded, without hearing anything of the Persian army, when they were surprised by the appearance, not of that army, but of a body of Scythians; who acquainted them that Darius was in full retreat and in the greatest distress, and that his safety with the whole army depended upon that bridge.

They endeavoured to prevail upon the Ionians, since the sixty days included in their order to remain had now elapsed, to break the bridge and retire; assuring them that if this were done, the destruction of the Persians was inevitable—of course the Ionians themselves would then be free. At first the latter were favourably disposed towards the proposition, which was warmly espoused by the Athenian Miltiadês, despot or governor of the Thracian Chersonese.¹ Had he prevailed, the victor of Marathon (for such we shall hereafter find him) would have thus inflicted a much more vital blow on Persia than even that celebrated action, and would have brought upon Darius the disastrous fate of his predecessor Cyrus. But the Ionian princes, though leaning at first towards his suggestion, were speedily converted by the representations of Histiaeus of Milêtus, who reminded them that the maintenance of his own ascendancy over the Milesians, and that of each despot in his respective city, was assured by means of Persian support alone—the feeling of the population being everywhere

The Ionian despots preserve the bridge and enable Darius to recross the river, as a means of support to their own dominion at home.

against them: consequently, the ruin of Darius would be their ruin also. This argument proved conclusive. It was resolved to stay and maintain the bridge, but to pretend compliance with the Scythians, and prevail upon them to depart, by affecting to destroy it. The northern portion of the bridge was accordingly destroyed, for the length of a bow-shot; while the Scythians departed, under the persuasion that they had succeeded in depriving their enemies of the means

of crossing the river.² It appears that they missed the track of the retreating host, which was thus enabled, after the severest privation and suffering, to reach the Danube

¹ Herodot. iv. 133, 136, 137.

² Herodot. iv. 137-139.

in safety. Arriving during the darkness of the night, Darius was at first terrified to find the bridge no longer joining the northern bank. An Egyptian herald, of stentorian powers of voice, was ordered to call as loudly as possible the name of Histæus the Milesian. Answer being speedily made, the bridge was re-established, and the Persian army passed over before the Scythians returned to the spot.¹

There can be no doubt that the Ionians here lost an opportunity eminently favourable, such as never again returned, for emancipating themselves from the Persian dominion. Their despots, by whom the determination was made, especially the Milesian Histæus, were not induced to preserve the bridge by any honourable reluctance to betray the trust reposed in them, but simply by selfish regard to the maintenance of their own unpopular dominion. And we may remark that the real character of this impelling motive, as well as the deliberation accompanying it, may be assumed as resting upon very good evidence, since we are now arrived within the personal knowledge of the Milesian historian Hekataeus, who took an active part in the Ionic revolt a few years afterwards, and who may perhaps have been personally engaged in this expedition. He will be found reviewing with prudence and sobriety the chances of that unfortunate revolt, and distrusting its success from the beginning; while Histæus of Milétus will appear on the same occasion as the fomentor of it, in order to procure his release from an honourable detention at Susa near the person of Darius. The selfishness of this despot, having deprived his countrymen of that real and favourable chance of emancipation which the destruction of the bridge would have opened to them, threw them into revolt a few years afterwards against the entire and unembarrassed force of the Persian king and empire.

Extricated from the perils of the Scythian warfare, Darius marched southward from the Danube through Thrace to the Hellespont, where he crossed from Sestus into Asia. He left however a considerable army in Europe, under the command of Megabazus, to accomplish the conquest of Thrace. Perinthus on the Propontis made a brave resistance,² but was at length subdued; after which all

¹ Herodot. iv. 140-141.

² Herodot. iv. 143, 144, v. 1, 2.

the Thracian tribes, and all the Grecian colonies between the Hellespont and the Strymon, were forced to submit, giving earth and water, and becoming subject to tribute.¹ Near the lower Strymon was the Edonian town of Myrkinus, which Darius ordered to be made over to Histiaëus of Milêtus; for both this Milesian, and Kôês of Mitylênê, had been desired by the Persian king to name their own reward for their fidelity to him on the passage over the Danube.² Kôês requested that he might be constituted despot of Mitylênê, which was accomplished by Persian authority; but Histiaëus solicited that the territory near Myrkinus might be given to him for the foundation of a colony. As soon as the Persian conquests extended thus far, the site in question was presented to Histiaëus, who entered actively upon his new scheme. We shall find the territory near Myrkinus eminent hereafter as the site of Amphipolis; it offered great temptation to settlers, as fertile, well-wooded, convenient for maritime commerce, and near to auriferous and argentiferous mountains.³

It seems however that the Persian dominion in Thrace was disturbed by an invasion of the Scythians, who, in revenge for the aggression of Darius, overran the country as far as the Thracian Chersonese, and are even said to have sent envoys to Sparta, proposing a simultaneous invasion of Persia, from different sides, by Spartans and Scythians. The Athenian Miltiadês, who was despot or governor of the Chersonese, was forced to quit it for some time, and Herodotus ascribes his retirement to the incursion of these Nomads. But we may be permitted to suspect that the historian has misconceived the real cause of such retirement. Miltiadês could not remain in the Chersonese after he had incurred the deadly enmity of Darius by exhorting the Ionians to destroy the bridge over the Danube.⁴

¹ Herodot. v. 2.

² Herodot. v. 11.

³ Herodot. v. 23.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 40-84. That Miltiadês could have remained in the Chersonese undisturbed, during the interval between the Scythian ex-

pedition of Darius and the Ionic revolt (when the Persians were complete masters of those regions, and when Otanês was punishing other towns in the neighbourhood for evasion of service under Darius), after he had declared so pointedly

The conquests of Megabazus did not stop at the western bank of the Strymon. He carried his arms across that river, conquering the Pæonians, and reducing the Macedonians under Amyntas to tribute. A considerable number of the Pæonians were transported across into Asia, by express order of Darius; whose fancy had been struck by seeing at Sardis a beautiful Pæonian woman

Macedonians and Pæonians conquered by Megabazus.

against the Persians on a matter of life and death to the king and army—appears to me, as it does to Dr. Thirlwall (History of Gr. vol. ii. App. ii. p. 486, ch. xiv. p. 226-249), eminently improbable. So forcibly does Dr. Thirlwall feel the difficulty, that he suspects the reported conduct and exhortations of Miltiadès at the bridge over the Danube to have been a falsehood, fabricated by Miltiadès himself twenty years afterwards, for the purpose of acquiring popularity at Athens during the time immediately preceding the battle of Marathon.

I cannot think this hypothesis admissible. It directly contradicts Herodotus on a matter of fact very conspicuous, and upon which good means of information seem to have been within his reach. I have already observed that the historian Hekataüs must have possessed personal knowledge of all the relations between the Ionians and Darius, and that he very probably may have been even present at the bridge: all the information given by Hekataüs upon these points would be open to the inquiries of Herodotus. The unbounded gratitude of Darius towards Histiaüs shows that some one or more of the Ionic despots present at the bridge must have powerfully enforced the expediency of breaking it down. That the name of the despot who stood forward as chief mover of this resolution should have been forgotten and

not mentioned at the time, is highly improbable; yet such must have been the case, if a fabrication by Miltiadès twenty years afterwards could successfully fill up the blank with his own name. The two most prominent matters talked of, after the retreat of Darius, in reference to the bridge, would probably be the name of the leader who urged its destruction, and the name of Histiaüs who preserved it; indeed the mere fact of the mischievous influence exercised by the latter afterwards, would be pretty sure to keep these points of the case in full view.

There are means of escaping from the difficulty of the case, I think without contradicting Herodotus on any matter of fact important and conspicuous, or indeed on any matter of fact whatever. We see by vi. 40, that Miltiadès *did quit the Chersonese* between the close of the Scythian expedition of Darius and the Ionic revolt; Herodotus indeed tells us that he quitted it in consequence of an incursion of the Scythians. Now without denying the fact of such an incursion, we may well suppose the historian to have been mistaken in assigning it as the cause of the flight of Miltiadès. The latter was prevented from living in the Chersonese continuously, during the interval between the Persian invasion of Scythia and the Ionic revolt, by fear of Persian enmity: it is not necessary for us to believe that he was never

carrying a vessel on her head, leading a horse to water, and spinning flax, all at the same time. This woman had been brought over (we are told) by her two brothers Pigês and Mantyês for the express purpose of arresting the attention of the Great King. They hoped by this means to be constituted despots of their countrymen; and we may presume that their scheme succeeded, for such part of the Pæonians as Megabazus could subdue were conveyed across to Asia and planted in some villages in Phrygia. Such violent transportations of inhabitants were in the genius of the Persian government.¹

From the Pæonian lake Prasias, seven eminent Persians were sent as envoys into Macedonia, to whom Amyntas readily gave the required token of submission, inviting them to a splendid banquet. When exhilarated with wine, they demanded to see the women of the regal family, who, being accordingly introduced, were rudely

Insolence
and murder
of the
Persian
envoys
in Mace-
donia.

there at all, but his residence there must have been interrupted and insecure. The chronological data in Herodot. vi. 40 are exceedingly obscure and perplexing; but it seems to me that the supposition which I suggest introduces a plausible coherence into the series of historical facts, with the slightest possible contradiction to our capital witness.

The only achievement of Miltiadês, between the affair on the Danube and his return to Athens shortly before the battle of Marathon, is the conquest of Lemnos; and that must have taken place evidently while the Persians were occupied by the Ionic revolt (between 502-494 B.C.). There is nothing in his recorded deeds inconsistent with the belief, therefore, that between 515-502 B.C. he may not have resided in the Chersonese at all, or at least not for very long together: and the statement of Cornelius Nepos, that he quitted it immediately after the return from Scythia, from fear of the Persians, may be substantially true.

Dr. Thirlwall observes (p. 487)—“As little would it appear that when the Scythians invaded the Chersonese, Miltiadês was conscious of having endeavoured to render them an important service. He flies before them, though he had been so secure while the Persian arms were in his neighbourhood.” He has here put his finger on what I believe to be the error of Herodotus—the supposition that Miltiadês fled from the Chersonese to avoid the Scythians, whereas he really left it to avoid the Persians.

The story of Strabo (xiii. p. 591), that Darius caused the Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont to be burnt down, in order to hinder them from affording means of transport to the Scythians into Asia, seems to me highly improbable. These towns appear in their ordinary condition, Abydos among them, at the time of the Ionic revolt a few years afterwards (Herodot. v. 117).

¹ Herodot. v. 13-16. Nikolaus Damaskênus (Fragm. p. 36, ed.

dealt with by the strangers: at length the son of Amyntas, Alexander, resented the insult, and exacted for it a signal vengeance. Dismissing the women under pretence that they should return after a bath, he brought back in their place youths in female attire, armed with daggers. Presently the Persians proceeding to repeat their caresses, were all put to death. Their retinue, and the splendid carriages and equipment which they had brought, disappeared at the same time, without any tidings reaching the Persian army. And when Bubarês, another eminent Persian, was sent into Macedonia to institute researches, Alexander contrived to hush up the proceeding by large bribes, and by giving him his sister Gigæa in marriage.¹

Meanwhile Megabazus crossed over into Asia, carrying with him the Pæonians from the Strymon. Having become alarmed at the progress of Histiaëus with his new city of Myrkinus, he communicated his apprehensions to Darius; who was prevailed upon to send for Histiaëus, retaining him about his person, and carrying him to Susa as counsellor and friend, with every mark of honour, but with the secret intention of never letting him revisit Asia Minor. The fears of the Persian general were probably not unreasonable; but this detention of Histiaëus at Susa became in the sequel an important event.²

Histiaëus
founds a
prosperous
colony at
Myrkinus
—Darius
sends for
him into
Asia.

On departing for his capital, Darius nominated his brother Artaphernês satrap of Sardis, and Otanês general of the forces on the coast in place of Megabazus. The new general dealt very severely with various towns near the Propontis, on the ground that they had evaded their duty in the late Scythian expedition, and had even harassed the army of Darius in its retreat. He took Byzantium and Chalkêdon, as well as Antandrus in the Troad, and Lampônium. With the aid of a fleet from Lesbos, he achieved a new conquest—the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, at that time occupied by a Pelasgic population, seemingly without any Greek inhabitants

Otanês
Persian
general on
the Hel-
tespont—
he conquers
the Pelas-
gic popula-
tion of
Lemnos,
Imbros, &c.

Orell.) tells a similar story about the means by which a Mysian woman attracted the notice of the Lydian king Alyattês. Such repetition of a striking story, in refer-

ence to different people and times, has many parallels in ancient history.

¹ Herodot. v. 20, 21.

² Herodot. v. 23, 24.

at all. These Pelasgi were of cruel and piratical character, if we may judge by the tenor of the legends respecting them; Lemnian misdeeds being cited as a proverbial expression for atrocities.¹ They were distinguished also for ancient worship of Hêphæstus, together with mystic rites in honour of the Kabeiri, and even human sacrifices to their Great Goddess. In their two cities—Hephæstias on the east of the island and Myrina on the west—they held out bravely against Otanês, and did not submit until they had undergone long and severe hardship. Lykarêtus, brother of that Mæandrius whom we have already noticed as despot of Samos, was named governor of Lemnos; but he soon after died.² It is probable that the Pelasgic population of the islands was greatly enfeebled during this struggle, and we even hear that their king Hermon voluntarily emigrated from fear of Darius.³

Lemnos and Imbros thus became Persian possessions, held by a subordinate prince as tributary. A few years afterwards their lot was again changed—they passed into the hands of Athens, the Pelasgic inhabitants were expelled, and fresh Athenian settlers introduced. They were conquered by Miltiadês from the Thracian Chersonese; from Elæus at the south of that peninsula to Lemnos being within one day's sail with a north wind. The Hephæstians abandoned their city and evacuated the island with little resistance; but the inhabitants of Myrina stood a

Lemnos
and Imbros
captured
by the
Athenians
and Mil-
tiadês.

¹ Herodot. vi. 138. Æschyl. Choëphor. 632; Stephan. Byz. v. Ἀῆμιος.

The mystic rites in honour of the Kabeiri at Lemnos and Imbros are particularly noticed by Pherekydês (ap. Strabo, x. p. 472): compare Photius, v. Κάβειροι, and the remarkable description of the periodical Lemnian solemnity in Philostratus (Heroi. p. 740).

The volcanic mountain Mosychlus, in the north-eastern portion of the island, was still burning in the fourth century B.C. (Antimach. Fragment. xviii. p. 103, Düntzer Epicc. Græc. Fragm.)

Welcker's Dissertation (Die Æ-

schylische Trilogie, p. 248 seqq.) enlarges much upon the Lemnian and Samothracian worship.

² Herodot. v. 26, 27. The twenty-seventh chapter is extremely perplexing. As the text reads at present, we ought to make Lykarêtus the subject of certain predications which yet seem properly referable to Otanês. We must consider the words from Οἱ μὲν δὲ Ἀῆμιος—down to τελευτᾶ—as parenthetical. This is awkward; but it seems the least difficulty in the case, and the commentators are driven to adopt it.

³ Zenob. Proverb. iii. 85.

siege,¹ and were not expelled without difficulty: both of them found abodes in Thrace, on and near the peninsula of Mount Athos. Both these islands, together with that of Skyros (which was not taken until after the invasion of Xerxês), remained connected with Athens in a manner peculiarly intimate. At the peace of Antalkidas (387 B.C.)—which guaranteed universal autonomy to every Grecian city, great and small—they were specially reserved, and considered as united with Athens.² The property in their soil was held by men who, without losing their Athenian citizenship, became Lemnian Kleruchs, and as such were classified apart among the military force of the state; while absence in Lemnos or Imbros seems to have been accepted as an excuse for delay before the courts of justice, so as to escape the penalties of contumacy or departure from the country.³ It is probable that a considerable number of poor Athenian citizens were provided with lots of land in these islands, though we have no direct information of the fact, and are even obliged to guess the precise time at which Miltiadês made the conquest. Herodotus, according to his usual manner, connects the conquest with an ancient oracle, and represents it as the retribution for ancient legendary crime committed by certain Pelasgi, who, many centuries before, had been expelled by the Athenians from Attica, and had retired to Lemnos. Full of this legend,

¹ Herodot. vi. 140. Charax ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Ἡφαίστια.

² Xenophon. Hellen. v. 1, 31. Compare Plato, Menexenus, c. 17, p. 245, where the words ἡμετέρας ἀποικίας doubtless mean Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros.

³ Thucyd. iv. 28, v. 8, vii. 57; Phylarchus ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 255; Dêmosthen. Philippic. 1. c. 12, p. 17, B.: compare the Inscription No. 1686 in the collection of Boeckh; with his remarks, p. 297.

About the stratagems resorted to before the Athenian Dikastery to procure delay by pretended absence in Lemnos or Skyros, see Isæus, Or. vi. p. 58 (p. 80 Bek.); Pollux, viii. 7, 81; Hesych. v. Ἰμβριος; Suidas, v. Δημνία δίκη; compare

also Carl Rhode, Res Lemnicæ. p. 50 (Wratisslaw 1829).

It seems as if εἰς Ἀἴμνον πλεῖν had come to be a proverbial expression at Athens for getting out of the way—evading the performance of duty; this seems to be the sense of Dêmosthenês, Philipp. 1. c. 9. p. 14. ἀλλ' εἰς μὲν Ἀἴμνον τὸν παρ' ἡμῶν ἵππαρχον δεῖ πλεῖν, τῶν δ' ὅπερ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κτημάτων ἀγωνιζομένων Μεγάλαον ἵππαρχεῖν.

From the passage of Isæus above alluded to, which Rhode seems to me to construe incorrectly, it appears that there was a legal *connubium* between Athenian citizens and Lemnian women.

he tells us nothing about the proximate causes or circumstances of the conquest, which must probably have been accomplished by the efforts of Athens jointly with Miltiadês from the Chersonese, during the period that the Persians were occupied in quelling the Ionic revolt, between 502-494 B.C.—since it is hardly to be supposed that Miltiadês would have ventured thus to attack a Persian possession during the time that the satraps had their hands free. The acquisition was probably facilitated by the fact, that the Pelasgic population of the islands had been weakened, as well by their former resistance to the Persian Otanês, as by some years passed under the deputy of a Persian satrap.

In mentioning the conquest of Lemnos by the Athenians and Miltiadês, I have anticipated a little on the course of events, because that conquest—though coinciding in point of time with the Ionic revolt (which will be recounted in the following chapter), and indirectly caused by it in so far as it occupied the attention of the Persians—lies entirely apart from the operations of the revolted Ionians. When Miltiadês was driven out of the Chersonese by the Persians, on the suppression of the Ionic revolt, his fame, derived from having subdued Lemnos,¹ contributed both to neutralize the enmity which he had incurred as governor of the Chersonese, and to procure his election as one of the ten generals for the year of the Marathonian combat.

¹ Herodot. vi. 136.

CHAPTER XXXV.

IONIC REVOLT.

HITHERTO the history of the Asiatic Greeks has flowed in a stream distinct from that of the European Greeks. The present chapter will mark the period of confluence between the two.

At the time when Darius quitted Sardis on his return to Susa, carrying with him the Milesian Histiaëus, he left Artaphernês his brother as satrap of Sardis, invested with the supreme command of Western Asia Minor. The Grecian cities on the coast, comprehended under his satrapy, appear to have been chiefly governed by native despots in each; and Milêtus especially, in the absence of Histiaëus, was ruled by his son-in-law Aristagoras. That city was now in the height of power and prosperity—in every respect the leading city of Ionia. The return of Darius to Susa may be placed seemingly about 512 B.C., from which time forward the state of things above described continued, without disturbance, for eight or ten years—"a respite from suffering," to use the significant phrase of the historian.¹

Darius carries Histiaëus to Susa.

¹ Herodot. v. 27. Μετά δὲ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον, ἄνεως κακῶν ἦν—οἱ ἄνεως κακῶν—if the conjecture of some critics be adopted. Mr. Clinton, with Larcher and others (see *Fasti Hellen.* App. 18. p. 314), construe this passage as if the comma were to be placed after μετὰ δὲ, so that the historian would be made to affirm that the period of repose lasted only a short time. It appears to me that the comma ought rather to be placed after χρόνον, and that the "short time" refers to those evils which the historian had been describing before. There must have been an interval of eight years at least, if not of ten years, between

the events which the historian had been describing (the evils inflicted by the attacks of Otanês) and the breaking out of the Ionic revolt; which latter event no one places earlier than 504 B.C., though some prefer 502 B.C., others even 500 B.C.

If indeed we admitted with Wesseling (ad Herodot. vi. 40; and Mr. Clinton seems inclined towards the same opinion, see p. 314 *ut sup.*) that the Scythian expedition is to be placed in 508-507 B.C., then indeed the interval between the campaign of Otanês and the Ionic revolt would be contracted into one or two years. But I have already observed that I cannot think 508

It was about the year 506 B.C. that the exiled Athenian despot Hippias, after having been repelled from Sparta by the unanimous refusal of the Lacedæmonian allies to take part in his cause, presented himself from Sigeium as a petitioner to Artaphernês at Sardis. He now doubtless found the benefit of the alliance which he had formed for his daughter with the despot Æantidês of Lampsakus, whose favour with Darius would stand him in good stead. He made pressing representations to the satrap, with a view of procuring restoration to Athens, on condition of holding it under Persian dominion; and Artaphernês was prepared, if an opportunity offered, to aid him in this design. So thoroughly had he resolved on espousing actively the cause of Hippias, that when the Athenians despatched envoys to Sardis, to set forth the case of the city against its exiled pretender, he returned to them an answer not merely of denial, but of menace—bidding them receive Hippias back again, if they looked for safety.¹ Such a reply was equivalent to a declaration of war, and so it was construed at Athens. It leads us to infer that the satrap was even then revolving in his mind an expedition against Attica, in conjunction with Hippias; but fortunately for the Athenians, other projects and necessities intervened to postpone for several years the execution of the scheme.

Of these new projects, the first was that of conquering the island of Naxos. Here too, as in the case of Hippias, the instigation arose from Naxian exiles—a rich oligarchy which had been expelled by a rising of the people. This island, like all the rest of the Cyclades, was as yet independent of the Persians.² It was wealthy, prosperous, possessing a large population both of freemen and slaves, and defended as well by armed ships as by a force of 8000 heavy-armed infantry. The exiles applied for aid to Aristagoras, who saw

about 502 B.C. State of the island of Naxos—Naxian exiles solicit aid from Aristagoras of Milêtus.

B.C. a correct date for the Scythian expedition: it seems to me to belong to about 515 B.C. Nor do I know what reason there is for determining the date as Wesseling does, except this very phrase οὐ πολλόν χρόνον, which is, on every supposition, exceedingly vague, and

which he appears to me not to have construed in the best way.

¹ Herodot. v. 96. Ὁ δὲ Ἀρταφέρνης ἐκέλευε σφραγίσσειν τὰς βουλομένας πόλεις καταδέχεσθαι ὀπίσω τὸν Ἰππίην.

² Herodot. v. 31. Plutarch says that Lygdamis, established as despot at Naxos by Peisistratus (He-

that he could turn them into instruments of dominion for himself in the island, provided he could induce Artaphernês to embark in the project along with him—his own force not being adequate by itself. Accordingly he went to Sardis, and laid his project before the satrap, intimating that as soon as the exiles should land with a powerful support, Naxos would be reduced with little trouble: that the neighbouring islands of Paros, Andros, Tênos, and the other Cyclades, could not long hold out after the conquest of Naxos, nor even the large and valuable island of Eubœa. He himself engaged, if a fleet of 100 ships were granted to him, to accomplish all these conquests for the Great King, and to bear the expenses of the armament besides. Artaphernês entertained the proposition with eagerness, loaded him with praise, and promised him in the ensuing spring 200 ships instead of 100. Messengers despatched to Susa having brought back the ready consent of Darius, a large armament was forthwith equipped under the command of the Persian Megabatês, to be placed at the disposal of Aristagoras—composed both of Persians and of all the tributaries near the coast.¹

With this force Aristagoras and the Naxian exiles set sail from Milêtus, giving out that they were going to the Hellespont: on reaching Chios, they waited in its western harbour of Kaukasa for a fair wind to carry them straight across to Naxos. No suspicion was entertained in that island of its real purpose, nor was any preparation made for resistance; so that the success of Aristagoras would have been complete, had it not been defeated by an untoward incident ending in dispute. Megabatês, with a solicitude which we are surprised to discern in a Persian general, personally made the tour of his fleet, to see that every ship was under proper watch. He discovered a ship from Myndus (an Asiatic Dorian city near Halikarnassus) left without a single man on board. Incensed at such neglect, he called before him Skylax, the

Expedition against Naxos undertaken by Aristagoras with the assistance of Artaphernês the satrap.

redot. i. 64), was expelled from this post by the Lacedæmonians (De Herodot. Malignitat. c. 21. p. 859). I confess that I do not place much confidence in the statements of that treatise as to the many des-

pots expelled by Sparta: we neither know the source from whence Plutarch borrowed them, nor any of the circumstances connected with them.

¹ Herodot. v. 30, 31.

commander of the ship, and ordered him to be put in chains, with his head projecting outwards through one of the apertures for oars in the ship's side. Skylax was a guest and friend of Aristagoras, who on hearing of this punishment, interceded with Megabatês for his release; but finding the request refused, took upon him to release the prisoner himself. He even went so far as to treat the remonstrance of Megabatês with disdain, reminding him that according to the instructions of Artaphernês, he was only second—himself (Aristagoras) being first. The pride of Megabatês could not endure such treatment: as soon as night arrived, he sent a private intimation to Naxos of the coming of the fleet, warning the islanders to be on their guard. The warning thus fortunately received was turned by the Naxians to the best account. They carried in their property, laid up stores, and made every preparation for a siege, so that when the fleet, probably delayed by the dispute between its leaders, at length arrived, it was met by a stout resistance, remained on the island for four months in prosecution of an unavailing siege, and was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything beyond the erection of a fort, as lodgment for the Naxian exiles. After a large cost incurred, not only by the Persians, but also by Aristagoras himself, the unsuccessful armament was brought back to the coast of Ionia.¹

The failure of this expedition threatened Aristagoras with entire ruin. He had incensed Megabatês, deceived Artaphernês, and incurred an obligation, which he knew not how to discharge, of indemnifying the latter for the costs of the fleet. He began to revolve in his mind the scheme of revolting from Persia, and it so happened that there arrived nearly at the same moment a messenger from his father-in-law Histiaeus, who was detained at the court of Susa, secretly instigating him to this very resolution. Not knowing whom to trust with this dangerous message, Histiaeus had caused the head of a faithful slave to be shaved—branded upon it the words necessary—and then despatched him, so soon as his hair had grown, to Milêtus, with a verbal intimation to Aris-

Its failure, through dispute between Aristagoras and the Persian general Megabatês.

Alarm of Aristagoras—he determines to revolt against Persia—instigation to the same effect from Histiaeus.

¹ Herodot. v. 84, 85.

tagoras that his head was to be again shaved and examined.¹ Histiaeus sought to provoke this perilous rising, simply as a means of procuring his own release from Susa, and in the calculation that Darius would send him down to the coast to re-establish order. His message, arriving at so critical a moment, determined the faltering resolution of Aristagoras, who convened his principal partisans at Milêtus, and laid before them the formidable project of revolt. All of them approved it, with one remarkable exception—the historian Hekataeus of Milêtus; who opposed it as altogether ruinous, and contended that the power of Darius was too vast to leave them any prospect of success. When he found direct opposition fruitless, he next insisted upon the necessity of at once seizing the large treasures in the neighbouring temple of Apollo at Branchidæ for the purpose of carrying on the revolt. By this means alone (he said) could the Milesians, too feeble to carry on the contest with their own force alone, hope to become masters at sea—while, if *they* did not take these treasures, the victorious enemy assuredly would. Neither of these recommendations, both of them indicating sagacity and foresight in the proposer, was listened to. Probably the seizure of the treasures—though highly useful for the impending struggle, and though in the end they fell into the hands of the enemy, as Hekataeus anticipated—would have been insupportable to the pious feelings of the people, and would thus have proved more injurious than beneficial:² perhaps indeed Hekataeus himself may have urged it with the indirect view of stifling the whole project. We may remark that he seems to have argued the question as if Milêtus were to stand alone in the revolt; not anticipating, as indeed no prudent man could then anticipate, that the Ionic cities generally would follow the example.

Aristagoras and his friends resolved forthwith to revolt. Their first step was to conciliate popular favour throughout Asiatic Greece by putting down the despots in all the various cities—the instruments not less than the supports of Persian ascendancy, as Histiaeus had well argued at the bridge of the Danube. The opportunity was favourable for striking this blow at once

Revolt of Aristagoras and the Milesians—the despots in the various cities deposed and seized.

¹ Herodot. v. 35: compare Polyæn. i. 24, and Aulus Gellius, N. A. xvii. 9.

² Herodot. v. 36.

on a considerable scale. For the fleet, recently employed at Naxos, had not yet dispersed, but was still assembled at Myus, with many of the despots present at the head of their ships. Accordingly Iatragoras was despatched from Milêtus, at once to seize as many of them as he could, and to stir up the soldiers to revolt. This decisive proceeding was the first manifesto against Darius. Iatragoras was successful: the fleet went along with him, and many of the despots fell into his hands—among them Histiaëus (a second person so named) of Termera, Oliatus of Mylasa (both Karians),¹ Kôês of Mitylênê, and Aristagoras (also a second person so named) of Kymê. At the same time the Milesian Aristagoras himself, while he formally proclaimed revolt against Darius, and invited the Milesians to follow him, laid down his own authority, and affected to place the government in the hands of the people. Throughout most of the towns of Asiatic Greece, insular and continental, a similar revolution was brought about; the despots were expelled, and the feelings of the citizens were thus warmly interested in the revolt. Such of these despots as fell into the hands of Aristagoras were surrendered into the hands of their former subjects, by whom they were for the most part quietly dismissed, and we shall find them hereafter active auxiliaries to the Persians. To this treatment the only exception mentioned is Kôês, who was stoned to death by the Mitylenæans.²

Extension
of the
revolt
throughout
Asiatic
Greece—
Aristagoras
goes to
solicit
aid from
Sparta.

By these first successful steps the Ionic revolt was made to assume an extensive and formidable character; much more so, probably, than the prudent Hekataëus had anticipated as practicable. The naval force of the Persians in the Ægean was at once taken away from them, and passed to their opponents, who were thus completely masters of the sea; and would in fact have remained so, if a second naval force had not been brought up against them from Phenicia—a proceeding never before resorted to, and perhaps at that time not looked for.

Having exhorted all the revolted towns to name their generals and to put themselves in a state of defence,

¹ Compare Herodotus, v. 121 and vii. 98. Oliatus was son of Ibanôlis, as was also the Mylasi Herakleidês mentioned in v. 121.

² odot. v. 36, 37. vi. 9.

Aristagoras crossed the Ægean to obtain assistance from Sparta, then under the government of king Kleomenès; to whom he addressed himself, "holding in his hand a brazen tablet, wherein was engraved the circuit of the entire earth, with the whole sea and all the rivers." Probably this was the first map or plan which had ever been seen at Sparta, and so profound was the impression which it made, that it was remembered there even in the time of Herodotus.¹ Having emphatically entreated the Spartans to step forth in aid of their Ionic brethren, now engaged in a desperate struggle for freedom, he proceeded to describe the wealth and abundance (gold, silver, brass, vestments, cattle and slaves), together with the ineffective weapons and warfare, of the Asiatics. Such enemies as the latter (he said) could be at once put down, and their wealth appropriated, by military training such as that of the Spartans—whose long spear, brazen helmet and breastplate, and ample shield, enabled them to despise the bow, the short javelin, the light wicker target, the turban and trowsers, of a Persian.² He then traced out on his brazen plan the road from Ephesus to Susa, indicating the intervening nations, all of them affording a booty more or less rich. He concluded by magnifying especially the vast treasures at Susa—"Instead of fighting your neighbours (he concluded),

¹ Herodot. v. 49. Τῷ δὲ (Κλεομένει) ἐς λόγους ἦτο, ὡς Δακεδαίμονιοι λέγουσι, ἔχων χάλκον πίνακα, ἐν τῷ γῆς ἀπάσης περιόδου ἐνετίμητο, καὶ θάλασσα τε πᾶσα καὶ ποταμοὶ πάντες.

The earliest map of which mention is made was prepared by Anaximander in Ionia, apparently not long before this period: see Strabo, i. p. 7; Agathemerus, l. c. 1; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 1.

Grosskurd, in his note on the above passage of Strabo, as well as Larcher and other critics, appear to think, that though this tablet or chart of Anaximander was the earliest which embraced the whole known earth, there were among the Greeks others still earlier, which described particular countries. There is no proof of

this, nor can I think it probable: the passage of Apollonius Rhodius (iv. 279) with the Scholia to it, which is cited as evidence, appears to me unworthy of attention.

Among the Roman Agrimensores, it was the ancient practice to engrave their plans, of land surveyed, upon tablets of brass, which were deposited in the public archives, and of which copies were made for private use, though the original was referred to in case of legal dispute (Siculus Flaccus ap. Rei Agrariæ Scriptores, p. 16, ed. Goes: compare Giraud, Recherches sur le Droit de Propriété, p. 116, Aix 1838).

² Herodot. v. 49. δεικνὸς δὲ ταῦτα ἔλεγε ἐς τὴν τῆς γῆς περίοδον, τὴν ἐπέριετο ἐν τῷ πίνακι ἐνετεμημένην.

Argeians, Arcadians, and Messenians, from whom you get hard blows and small reward, why do you not make yourself rulers of all Asia,¹ a prize not less easy than lucrative?" Kleomenês replied to these seductive instigations by desiring him to come for an answer on the third day. When that day arrived, he put to him the simple question, how far it was from Susa to the sea? To which Aristagoras answered with more frankness than dexterity, that it was a three months' journey; and he was proceeding to enlarge upon the facilities of the road when Kleomenês interrupted him—"Quit Sparta before sunset, Milesian stranger: you are no friend to the Lacedæmonians, if you want to carry

Refusal
of the
Spartans to
assist him.

them a three months' journey from the sea." In spite of this peremptory mandate, Aristagoras tried a last resource. Taking in his hand the bough of supplication, he again went to the house of Kleomenês, who was sitting with his daughter Gorgô, a girl of eight years old. He requested Kleomenês to send away the child, but this was refused, and he was desired to proceed; upon which he began to offer to the Spartan king a bribe for compliance, bidding continually higher and higher from ten talents up to fifty. At length the little girl suddenly exclaimed, "Father, the stranger will corrupt you, if you do not at once go away." The exclamation so struck Kleomenês, that he broke up the interview, and Aristagoras forthwith quitted Sparta.²

Doubtless Herodotus heard the account of this interview from Lacedæmonian informants. Yet we may be permitted to doubt whether any such suggestions were really made, or any such hopes held out, as those which he places in the mouth of Aristagoras—suggestions and hopes which might well be conceived in 450—440 B. C., after a generation of victories over the Persians, but which have no pertinence in the year 502 B. C. Down even to the battle of Marathon, the name of the Medes

¹ Herodot. v. 49. πάραγον δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας πάσης ἄρχειν εὐπετέως, ἄλλο τι αἰρήσεσθε;

² Herodot. v. 49, 50, 51. Compare Plutarch. Apophthegm. Laconic. p. 240.

We may remark, both in this instance and throughout all the life and time of Kleomenês, that

the Spartan king has the active management and direction of foreign affairs—subject however to trial and punishment by the ephors in case of misbehaviour (Herodot. vi. 82). We shall hereafter find the ephors gradually taking into their own hands, more and more, the actual management.

was a terror to the Greeks, and the Athenians are highly and justly extolled as the first who dared to look them in the face.¹ To talk about an easy march up to the treasures of Susa and the empire of all Asia, at the time of the Ionic revolt, would have been considered as a proof of insanity. Aristagoras may very probably have represented that the Spartans were more than a match for Persians in the field; but even thus much would have been considered, in 502 B. C., rather as the sanguine hope of a petitioner than as the estimate of a sober looker-on.

The Milesian chief had made application to Sparta, as the presiding power of Hellas—a character which we thus find more and more recognised and passing into the habitual feelings of the Greeks. Fifty years previously to this, the Spartans had been flattered by the circumstance that Cræsus singled them out from all other Greeks to invite as allies: now, they accepted such priority as a matter of course.²

Aristagoras applies to Athens— obtains aid both from Athens and Eretria.

Rejected at Sparta, Aristagoras proceeded to Athens, now decidedly the second power in Greece. Here he found an easier task, not only as it was the metropolis (or mother-city) of Asiatic Ionia, but also as it had already incurred the pronounced hostility of the Persian satrap, and might look to be attacked as soon as the project came to suit his convenience, under the instigation of Hippias: whereas the Spartans had not only no kindred with Ionia, beyond that of common Hellenism, but were in no hostile relations with Persia, and would have been provoking a new enemy by meddling in the Asiatic war. The promises and representations of Aristagoras were accordingly received

¹ Herodot. vi. 112. πρῶτοι τε ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν ὀρέοντες, καὶ ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους· τῶς δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι καὶ τὸ οὐνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκοῦσαι.

² Aristagoras says to the Spartans (v. 49)—τά κατήχοντα γὰρ ἐστὶ ταῦτα· Ἴωνων παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ' ἐλευθέρων, θναῖδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Herodot. v. 49). In re-

ference to the earlier incident (Herodot. i. 70)—Τουτέων τε ὧν ἐνεκεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῆν συμμαχίην ἐδέξατο, καὶ ἔτι ἐκ πάντων σφέας προκρίνας Ἕλλήνων, αἰρέστω φίλους (Cræsus).

An interval of rather more than forty years separates the two events, during which both the feelings of the Spartans, and the feelings of others towards them, had undergone a material change.

with great favour by the Athenians; who, over and above the claims of sympathy, had a powerful interest in sustaining the Ionic revolt as an indirect protection to themselves—and to whom the abstraction of the Ionic fleet from the Persians afforded a conspicuous and important relief. The Athenians at once resolved to send a fleet of twenty ships, under Melanthius, as an aid to the revolted Ionians—ships which are designated by Herodotus, “the beginning of the mischiefs between Greeks and barbarians”—as the ships in which Paris crossed the Ægean had before been called in the Iliad of Homer. Herodotus further remarks that it seems easier to deceive many men together than one—since Aristagoras, after having failed with Kleomenês, thus imposed upon the 30,000 citizens of Athens.¹ But on this remark two comments suggest themselves. First, the circumstances of Athens and Sparta were not the same in regard to the Ionic quarrel,—an observation which Herodotus himself had made a little while before: the Athenians had a material interest in the quarrel, political as well as sympathetic, while the Spartans had none. Secondly, the ultimate result of their interference, as it stood in the time of Herodotus, though purchased by severe intermediate hardship, was one eminently gainful and glorifying, not less to Athens than to Greece.²

When Aristagoras returned, he seems to have found the Persians engaged in the siege of Milêtus. The twenty Athenian ships soon crossed the Ægean, and found there five Eretrian ships which had also come to the succour of the Ionians; the Eretrians generously taking this opportunity to repay the assistance formerly rendered to them by the Milesians in their ancient war with Chalkis. On the arrival of these allies, Aristagoras organized an expedition from Ephesus up to Sardis, under the command of his brother Charopinus with others. The ships were left at Korêssus,³ a mountain and seaport five miles

March of Aristagoras up to Sardis with the Athenian and Eretrian allies—burning of the town—retreat and defeat of these Greeks by the Persians.

¹ Herodot. v. 97. πολλοὺς γὰρ οἶκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἢ ἓνα, εἰ Κλεομένηα μὲν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον μόνον οὐκ οἶός τε ἐγένετο διαβαλεῖν, τρεῖς δὲ μυριάδας Ἀθηναίων ἐποίησε τοῦτο.

² Herodot. v. 98; Homer, Iliad, v. 62. The criticism of Plutarch

(De Malignitat. Herodot. p. 861) on this passage, is rather more pertinent than the criticisms in that ill-tempered composition generally are.

³ About Korêssus, see Diodor. xiv. 99 and Xenophon. Hellen. I. 2, 7.

from Ephesus, while the troops marched up under Ephesian guides, first along the river Kayster, next across the mountain range of Tmólus to Sardis. Artaphernês had not troops enough to do more than hold the strong citadel, so that the assailants possessed themselves of the town without opposition. But he immediately recalled his force near Milêtus,¹ and summoned Persians and Lydians from all the neighbouring districts, thus becoming more than a match for Charopinus: who found himself moreover obliged to evacuate Sardis owing to an accidental conflagration. Most of the houses in that city were built in great part with reeds or straw, and all of them had thatched roofs. Hence it happened that a spark touching one of them set the whole city in flame. Obligated to abandon their dwellings by this accident, the population of the town congregated in the market-place,—and as reinforcements were hourly crowding in, the position of the Ionians and Athenians became precarious. They evacuated the town, took up a position on Mount Tmólus, and when night came, made the best of their way to the seacoast. The troops of Artaphernês pursued, overtook them near Ephesus, and defeated them completely. Eualkidês the Eretrian general, a man of eminence and a celebrated victor at the solemn games, perished in the action, together with a considerable number of troops. After this unsuccessful commencement, the Athenians betook themselves to their vessels and sailed home, in spite of pressing instances on the part of Aristagoras to induce them to stay. They took no farther part in the struggle;² a retirement at once so sudden and so complete, that they must probably have experienced some glaring desertion on the part of their Asiatic allies, similar to that which brought so much danger upon the Spartan general Derkyllidas, in 396 B.C. Unless such was the case, they seem open to censure rather for having too soon withdrawn their aid, than for having originally lent it.³

The Athenians abandon the alliance.

¹ Charôn of Lampsakus, and Lysanias in his history of Eretria, seem to have mentioned this first siege of Milêtus, and the fact of its being raised in consequence of the expedition to Sardis: see Plutarch. de Herodot. Malignit. p. 861—though the citation is given there confusedly, so that we cannot make

much out of it.

² Herodot. v. 102, 103. It is a curious fact that Charôn of Lampsakus made no mention of this defeat of the united Athenian and Ionian force: see Plutarch. de Herodot. Malign. *ut sup.*

³ About Derkyllidas, see Xenophon, Hellen. iii. 2, 17-19.

The burning of a place so important as Sardis, however, including the temples of the local goddess Kybêbê, which perished with the remaining buildings, produced a powerful effect on both sides —encouraging the revolters, as well as incensing the Persians. Aristagoras despatched ships along the coast, northward as far as Byzantium, and southward as far as Cyprus. The Greek cities near the Hellespont and the Propontis were induced, either by force or by inclination, to take part with him; the Karians embraced his cause warmly; even the Kaunians who had not declared themselves before, joined him as soon as they heard of the capture of Sardis; while the Greeks in Cyprus, with the single exception of the town of Amathûs, at once renounced the authority of Darius, and prepared for a strenuous contest. Onesilus of Salamis, the most considerable city in the island, finding the population willing, but his brother, the despot Gorgus, reluctant, shut the latter out of the gates, took the command of the united forces of Salamis and the other revolting cities, and laid siege to Amathûs. These towns of Cyprus were then, and seem always afterwards to have continued, under the government of despots; who however, unlike the despots in Ionia generally, took part along with their subjects in the revolt against Persia.¹

The rebellion had now assumed a character so serious, that the Persians were compelled to put forth their strongest efforts to subdue it. From the number of different nations comprised in their empire, they were enabled to make use of the antipathies of one against the other; and the old adverse feeling of Phenicians against Greeks was now found extremely serviceable. After a year

spent in getting together forces,² the Phenician fleet was employed to transport into Cyprus the Persian general Artybius with a Kilikian and Egyptian army;³ while the force under Artaphernês at

¹ Herodot. v. 103, 104, 108. Compare the proceedings in Cyprus against Artaxerxês Mnêmon, under the energetic Evagoras of Salamis (Diodor. xiv. 98, xv. 2), about 386 B.C.; most of the petty princes of the island became for the time his subjects, but in 351 B.C. there were nine of them independent (Diodor.

xvi. 42), and seemingly quite as many at the time when Alexander besieged Tyre (Arrian, ii. 20, 8).

² Herodot. v. 116. Κύπριοι μὴ δὴ, ἑν αὐτὸν ἐλεύθεροι γινόμενοι, αὐτίς ἐκ νέης καταδεδοῦλωσαντο.

³ Herodot. vi. 6. Κιλίκας καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι.

Sardis was so strengthened as to enable him to act at once against all the coast of Asia Minor, from the Propontis to the Triopian promontory. On the other side, the common danger had for the moment brought the Ionians into a state of union foreign to their usual habit; so that we hear now, for the first and the last time, of a tolerably efficient Pan-Ionic authority.¹

Apprised of the coming of Artybius with the Phœnician fleet, Onesilus and his Cyprian supporters solicited the aid of the Ionic fleet, which arrived shortly after the disembarkation of the Persian force in the island. Onesilus offered to the Ionians their choice, whether they would fight the Phœnicians at sea or the Persians on land. Their natural determination was in favour of the seafight, and they engaged with a degree of courage and unanimity which procured for them a brilliant victory; the Samians being especially distinguished.² But the combat on land, carried on at the same time, took a different turn. Onesilus and the Salaminians brought into the field, after the fashion of Orientals rather than of Greeks, a number of scythed chariots, destined to break the enemy's ranks; while on the other hand the Persian general Artybius was mounted on a horse, trained to rise on his hind-legs and strike out with his fore-legs against an opponent on foot. In the thick of the fight, Onesilus and his Karian shield-bearer came into personal conflict with this general and his horse. By previous concert, when the horse so reared as to get his fore-legs over the shield of Onesilus, the Karian with a scythe severed the legs from his body, while Onesilus with his own hand slew Artybius. But the personal bravery of the Cypriots was rendered useless by treachery in their own ranks. Stêsênor, despot of Kurium, deserted in the midst of the battle, and even the scythed chariots of Salamis followed his example; while the brave Onesilus, thus weakened, perished in the total rout of his army, along with Aristokyprus despot of Soli on the north coast of the island: this latter was son of that Philokyprus who had been immortalized more than sixty years before in the poems of Solon. No farther hopes now remaining for the revolt-

Persian and Phœnician armament sent against Cyprus—the Ionians send aid thither—victory of the Persians—they reconquer the island.

¹ Herodot. v. 109. Ἡμέας ἀπέφυλάζοντες τὴν θάλασσαν, etc.: compare vi. 7.

² Herodot. v. 112.

the victorious Ionian fleet returned home. Salamis relapsed under the sway of its former despot Gorgus, while the remaining cities in Cyprus were successively besieged and taken; not without a resolute defence, however, since Soli alone held out five months.¹

Meanwhile the principal force of Darius having been assembled at Sardis, Daurisès, Hymeas, and other generals who had married daughters of the Great King, distributed their efforts against different parts of the western coast. Daurisès attacked the towns near the Hellespont²—Abydus, Perkôtê, Lampsakus, and Pæsus—which

Successes
of the
Persian
against the
revolted
coast of
Asia Minor.

¹ Herodot. v. 112-115. It is not uninteresting to compare, with this reconquest of Cyprus by the Persians, the conquest of the same island by the Turks in 1570, when they expelled from it the Venetians. See the narrative of that conquest (effected in the reign of Selim II. by the Seraskier Mustapha-Pasha), in Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, book xxxvi. vol. iii. p. 578-589. Of the two principal towns, Nikosia in the centre of the island, and Famagusta on the north-eastern coast, the first, after a long siege, was taken by storm, and the inhabitants of every sex and age either put to death or carried into slavery; while the second, after a most gallant defence, was allowed to capitulate. But the terms of the capitulation were violated in the most flagitious manner by the Seraskier, who treated the brave Venetian governor, Bragadino, with frightful cruelty, cutting off his nose and ears, exposing him to all sorts of insults, and ultimately causing him to be flayed alive. The skin of this unfortunate general was conveyed to Constantinople as a trophy, but in after times found its way to Venice.

We read of nothing like this treatment of Bragadino in the Persian reconquest of Cyprus, though

it was a subjugation after revolt; indeed nothing like it in all Persian warfare.

Von Hammer gives a short sketch (not always very accurate as to ancient times) of the condition of Cyprus under its successive masters—Persians, Græco-Egyptians, Romans, Arabians, the dynasty of Lusignan, Venetians, and Turks—the last seems decidedly the worst of all.

In reference to the above-mentioned piece of cruelty, I may mention that the Persian king Kambysès caused one of the royal judges (according to Herodotus, v. 25), who had taken a bribe to render an iniquitous judgement, to be flayed alive, and his skin to be stretched upon the seat on which his son was placed to succeed him; as a lesson of justice to the latter. A similar story is told respecting the Persian king Artaxerxès Mnémon; and what is still more remarkable, the same story is also recounted in the Turkish history, as an act of Mahomet II. (Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanisch. Reichs*, book xvii; vol. ii. p. 209; Diodorus, xv. 10). Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiii. 6) had good reason to treat the reality of the fact as problematical.

² Herodot. v. 117.

made little resistance. He was then ordered southward into Karia, while Hymeas, who with another division had taken Kios on the Propontis, marched down to the Hellespont and completed the conquest of the Troad as well as of the Æolic Greeks in the region of Ida. Artaphernês and Otanês attacked the Ionic and Æolic towns on the coast—the former taking Klazomenæ,¹ the latter Kymê.

There remained Karia, which, with Milêtus in its neighbourhood, offered a determined resistance to Daurisês. Forewarned of his approach, the Karians assembled at a spot called the White Pillars, near the confluence of the rivers Mæander and Marsyas. Pixodarus, one of their chiefs, recommended the desperate expedient of fighting with the river at their back, so that all chance of flight might be cut off; but most of the chiefs decided in favour of a contrary policy²—to let the Persians pass the river, in hopes of driving them back into it and thus rendering their defeat total. Victory however, after a sharp contest, declared in favour of Daurisês, chiefly in consequence of his superior numbers. Two thousand Persians, and not less than ten thousand Karians, are said to have perished in the battle. The Karian fugitives, re-united after the flight in the grove of noble plane-trees consecrated to Zeus Stratius near Labranda,³ were deliberating whether they should now submit to the Persians or emigrate for ever, when the appearance of a Milesian reinforcement restored their courage. A second battle was fought, and a second time they were defeated, the loss on this occasion falling

¹ Herodot. v. 122-124.

² Herodot. v. 118. On the topography of this spot, as described in Herodotus, see a good note in Weissenborn, *Beiträge zur genaueren Erforschung der alt. Griech. Geschichte*, p. 116, Jena 1844.

He thinks, with much reason, that the river Marsyas here mentioned cannot be that which flows through Kelænæ, but another of the same name which flows into the Mæander from the southwest.

³ About the village of Labranda and the temple of Zeus Stratius, see Strabo, xiv. p. 659. Labranda was a village in the territory of,

and seven miles distant from, the inland town of Mylasa. It was Karian at the time of the Ionic revolt, but partially hellenized before the year 350 B.C. About this latter epoch, the three rural tribes of Mylasa—constituting, along with the citizens of the town, the Mylasene community—were, Ταρχόνδαρα, Ὀτῶρχονδα, Λάβρανδα—see the Inscription in Boeckh's Collection, No. 2695, and in Franz, *Epigraphicô Græca*, No. 73. p. 191. In the Lydian language, λάβρος is said to have signified a hatche (Plutarch, *Quæst. Gr. c. 45. p. 314*).

chiefly on the Milesians.¹ The victorious Persians now proceeded to assault the Karian cities, but Herakleidès of Mylasa laid an ambushade for them with so much skill and good fortune, that their army was nearly destroyed, and Daurisès with other Persian generals perished. This successful effort, following upon two severe defeats, does honour to the constancy of the Karians, upon whom Greek proverbs generally fasten a mean reputation. It saved for the time the Karian towns, which the Persians did not succeed in reducing until after the capture of Milétus.²

On land, the revolters were thus everywhere worsted, though at sea the Ionians still remained masters. Aristagoras loses courage and abandons the country. But the unwarlike Aristagoras began to despair of success, and to meditate a mean desertion of the companions and countrymen whom he had himself betrayed into danger. Assembling his chief advisers, he represented to them the unpromising state of affairs, and the necessity of securing some place of refuge, in case they were expelled from Milétus. He then put the question to them, whether the island of Sardinia, or Myrkinus in Thrace near the Strymon (which Histiaëus had begun some time before to fortify, as I have mentioned in the preceding chapter), appeared to them best adapted to the purpose. Among the persons consulted was Hekataëus the historian, who approved neither the one nor the other scheme, but suggested the erection of a fortified post in the neighbouring island of Leros; a Milesian colony, wherein a temporary retirement might be sought, should it prove impossible to hold Milétus, but which permitted an easy return to that city, so soon as opportunity offered.³ Such an opinion must doubtless have been founded on the assumption, that they would be able to maintain superiority at sea. It is important to note such confident reliance upon this superiority in the mind of a sagacious man, not given to sanguine hopes, like Hekataëus—even under circumstances very unprosperous on land. Emigration to Myrkinus, as proposed by Aristagoras, presented no hope of refuge at all; since the Persians, if they regained their authority in Asia Minor, would not fail again to extend it to the Strymon. Nevertheless the consultation ended by adopting this scheme,

¹ Herodot. v. 118, 119.

² Herodot. v. 120, 121; vi. 25.

³ Herodot. v. 125; Strabo, xiv. p. 635.

since probably no Ionians could endure the immeasurable distance of Sardinia as a new home. Aristagoras set sail for Myrkinus, taking with him all who chose to bear him company. But he perished not long after landing, together with nearly all his company, in the siege of a neighbouring Thracian town.¹ Though making profession to lay down his supreme authority at the commencement of the revolt, he had still contrived to retain it in great measure; and on departing for Myrkinus, he devolved it on Pythagoras, a citizen in high esteem. It appears however that the Milesians, glad to get rid of a leader who had brought them nothing but mischief,² paid little obedience to his successor, and made their government from this period popular in reality as well as in profession. The desertion of Aristagoras with the citizens whom he carried away, must have seriously damped the spirits of those who remained. Nevertheless it seems that the cause of the Ionic revolters was quite as well conducted without him.

Not long after his departure, another despot—Histæus of Milêtus, his father-in-law and jointly with him the fomentor of the revolt—presented himself at the gates of Milêtus for admission. The outbreak of the revolt had enabled him, as he had calculated, to procure leave of departure from Darius. That prince had been thrown into violent indignation by the attack and burning of Sardis, and by the general revolt of Ionia, headed (so the news reached him) by the Milesian Aristagoras, but carried into effect by the active co-operation of the Athenians. “The Athenians (exclaimed Darius)—who are *they?*” On receiving the answer, he asked for his bow, placed an arrow on the string, and shot as high as he could towards the heavens, saying—“Grant me, Zeus, to revenge myself on the Athenians.” He at the same time desired an attendant to remind him thrice every day at dinner—“Master, remember the Athenians:” for as to the Ionians, he felt assured that their hour of retribution would come speedily and easily enough.³

¹ Herodot. v. 126.

² Herodot. vi. 5. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι, ἄπαλλαχθέντες καὶ Ἀρισταγόρου, οὐδαμῶς ἔτοιμοι ἔσαν ἄλλον τύραννον δεχέσθαι ἐς τὴν χώραν, οἷά τε ἐλευθερίας γευσάμενοι.

³ Herodot. v. 105. Ὡ Ζεῦ, ἐχγέσθαι μοι Ἀθηναίους τιτῆσθαι. Compare the Thracian practice of communicating with the gods by shooting arrows high up into the air (Herodot. iv. 94).

This Homeric incident deserves notice as illustrating the epical handling of Herodotus. His theme is, the invasions of Greece by Persia: he has now arrived at the first eruption, in the bosom of Darius, of that passion which impelled the Persian forces towards Marathon and Salamis—and he marks the beginning of the new phase by act and word both alike significant. It may be compared to the libation and prayer addressed by Achilles in the Iliad to Zeus, at the moment when he is sending forth Patroklos and the Myrmidons to the rescue of the despairing Greeks.

At first Darius had been inclined to ascribe the movement in Ionia to the secret instigation of Histiaëus, whom he called into his presence and questioned. But the latter found means to satisfy him, and even to make out that no such mischief would have occurred, if he (Histiaëus) had been at Milêtus instead of being detained at Susa. "Send me down to the spot (he asseverated), and I engage not merely to quell the revolt and put into your hands the traitor who heads it—but also not to take off this tunic from my body, before I shall have added to your empire the great island of Sardinia." An expedition to Sardinia, though never realized, appears to have been among the favourite fancies of the Ionic Greeks of that day.¹ By such boasts and assurances he obtained his liberty, and went down to Sardis, promising to return as soon as he should have accomplished them.² But on reaching Sardis he found the satrap Artaphernês better informed than the Great King at Susa. Though Histiaëus, when questioned as to the causes which had brought on the outbreak, affected nothing but ignorance and astonishment, Artaphernês detected his evasions, and said—"I will tell you how the facts stand, Histiaëus: it is you that have stitched this shoe, and Aristagoras has put it on."³ Such

Histiaëus
suspected
by Ar-
taphernês
—flees to
Chios.

¹ Herodot. v. 107, vi. 2. Compare the advice of Bias of Priênê to the Ionians, when the Persian conqueror Cyrus was approaching, to found a Pan-Ionic colony in Sardinia (Herodot. i. 170): the idea started by Aristagoras has been alluded to just above (Herodot. v. 124).

Pausanias (iv. 23, 2) puts into the mouth of Mantiklus, son of Aristomenês, a recommendation to the Messenians, when conquered a second time by the Spartans, to migrate to Sardinia.

² Herodot. v. 106, 107.

³ Herodot. vi. 1. Οὐτω τοι, 'Ισ-
τιαιε, ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ πρήγματα

a declaration promised little security to the suspected Milesian who heard it: and accordingly, as soon as night arrived, he took to flight, went down to the coast, and from thence passed over to Chios. Here he found himself seized on the opposite count, as the confidant of Darius and the enemy of Ionia. He was released however on proclaiming himself not merely a fugitive escaping from Persian custody, but also as the prime author of the Ionic revolt: and he farther added, in order to increase his popularity, that Darius had contemplated the translation of the Ionian population to Phenicia, as well as that of the Phenician population to Ionia—to prevent which translation he (Histiaëus) had instigated the revolt. This allegation, though nothing better than a pure fabrication, obtained for him the goodwill of the Chians, who carried him back to Milêtus: but before he departed, he despatched to Sardis some letters, addressed to distinguished Persians, framed as if he were already in established intrigue with them for revolting against Darius, and intended to invite them to actual revolt. His messenger, Hermippus of Atarneus, betrayed him, and carried his letters straight to Artaphernês. The satrap desired that these letters might be delivered to the persons to whom they were addressed, but that the answers sent to Histiaëus might be handed to himself. Such was the tenor of the answers, that Artaphernês was induced to seize and put to death several of the Persians around him: but Histiaëus was disappointed in his purpose of bringing about a revolt in the place.¹

On arriving at Milêtus, Histiaëus found Aristagoras no longer present, and the citizens altogether adverse to the return of their old despot: nevertheless he tried to force his way by night into the town, but was repulsed and even wounded in the thigh. He returned to Chios, but the Chians refused him the aid of any of their ships: he next passed to Lesbos, from the inhabitants of which island he obtained eight triremes, and employed them to occupy Byzantium, pillaging and detaining the Ionian merchant-ships as they passed into or out of the Euxine.² The few remaining piracies of this

He attempts in vain to procure admission into Milêtus—puts himself at the head of a small piratical squadron.

τοῦτο τὸ ἐπόδημα ἔργασι μὲν σὺ,
ἐπέδησατο δὲ Ἀρισταγόρη.

¹ Herodot. vi. 2-5.

² Herodot. vi. 5-26.

worthless traitor, mischievous to his countrymen even down to the day of his death, hardly deserve our notice amidst the last struggles and sufferings of the subjugated Ionians, to which we are now hastening.

A vast Persian force, both military and naval, was gradually concentrating itself near Milétus, against which city Artaphernês had determined to direct his principal efforts. Not only the whole army of Asia Minor, but also the Kilikian and Egyptian troops fresh from the conquest of Cyprus, and even the conquered Cypriots themselves, were brought up as reinforcements; while the entire Phenician fleet, no less than 600 ships strong, co-

operated on the coast.¹ To meet such a land-force in the field was far beyond the strength of the Ionians, and the joint Pan-Ionic council resolved that the Milesians should be left to defend their own fortifications, while the entire force of the confederate cities should be mustered on board the ships. At sea they had as yet no reason to despair, having been victorious over the Phenicians near Cyprus, and having sustained no defeat. The combined Ionic fleet, including the Æolic Lesbians,

amounting in all to the number of 353 ships, was accordingly mustered at Ladê—then a little island near Milétus, but now joined on to the coast, by the gradual accumulation of land in the bay at the mouth of the Mæander. Eighty

Milesian ships formed the right wing, one hundred Chian ships the centre, and sixty Samian ships the left wing, while the space between the Milesians and the Chians was occupied by twelve ships from Priênê, three from Myus, and seventeen from Teôs—the space between the Chians and Samians was filled by eight ships from Erythræ, three from Phôkæa, and seventy from Lesbos.²

The total armament thus made up was hardly inferior in number to that which, fifteen years afterwards, gained the battle of Salamis against a far larger Persian fleet than the present. Moreover the courage of the Ionians, on ship-board, was equal to that of their contemporaries on the other side of the Ægean; while in respect of disagreement among the allies, we shall hereafter find the circumstances preceding the battle of Salamis still more

Large Persian force assembled, aided by the Phenician fleet, for the siege of Milétus.

The allied Grecian fleet mustered at Ladê.

¹ Herodot. vi. 6-9.

² Herodot. vi. 8.

menacing than those before the coming battle of Ladê. The chances of success therefore were at least equal between the two, and indeed the anticipations of the Persians and Phenicians on the present occasion were full of doubt, so that they thought it necessary to set on foot express means for disuniting the Ionians—it was fortunate for the Greeks that Xerxês at Salamis could not be made to conceive the prudence of aiming at the same object. There were now in the Persian camp all those various despots whom Aristagoras, at the beginning of the revolt, had driven out of their respective cities. At the instigation of Artaphernês, each of these men despatched secret communications to their citizens in the allied fleet, endeavouring to detach them severally from the general body, by promises of gentle treatment in the event of compliance, and by threats of extreme infliction from the Persians if they persisted in armed efforts. Though these communications were sent to each without the knowledge of the rest, yet the answer from all was one unanimous negative.¹ The confederates at Ladê seemed more one, in heart and spirit, than the Athenians, Spartans and Corinthians will hereafter prove to be at Salamis.

Attempts of the Persians to disunite the allies, by means of the exiled despots.

But there was one grand difference which turned the scale—the superior energy and ability of the Athenian leaders at Salamis, coupled with the fact that they were Athenians—that is, in command of the largest and most important contingent throughout the fleet.

At Ladê, unfortunately, this was quite otherwise. Each separate contingent had its own commander, but we hear of no joint commander at all. Nor were the chiefs who came from the larger cities—Milesian, Chian, Samian, or Lesbian—men like Themistoklês, competent and willing to stand forward as self-created leaders, and usurp for the moment, with the general consent and for the general benefit, a privilege not intended for them. The only man of sufficient energy and forwardness to do this, was the Phôkæan Dionysius—unfortunately the captain of the smallest contingent of the fleet, and therefore enjoying the least respect. For Phôkæa, once the daring explorer of the western waters, had so dwindled down since the Persian conquest

Want of command and discipline in the Grecian fleet.

¹ Herodot. vi. 9, 10.

of Ionia, that she could now furnish no more than three ships, and her ancient maritime spirit survived only in the bosom of her captain. When Dionysius saw the Ionians assembled at Ladê, willing, eager, full of talk and mutual encouragement, but untrained and taking no thought of discipline, or nautical practice, or co-operation in the hour of battle—he saw the risk which they ran for want of these precautions, and strenuously remonstrated with them: “Our fate hangs on the razor’s edge, men of Ionia: either to be freemen or slaves,—and slaves too, caught after running away. Set yourself at once to work and duty. You will then have trouble indeed at first, with certain victory and freedom afterwards; but if you persist in this carelessness and disorder, there is no hope for you to escape the king’s revenge for your revolt. Be persuaded and commit yourself to me. I pledge myself, if the gods only hold an equal balance, that your enemies either will not fight, or will be severely beaten.”¹

The wisdom of this advice was so apparent, that the Ionians, quitting their comfortable tents on the shore of Ladê, and going on board their ships, submitted themselves to the continuous nautical labours and manœuvres imposed upon them by Dionysius. The rowers, and the hoplites on the deck, were exercised in their separate functions, and even when they were not so employed, the ships were kept at anchor, and the crews on board, instead of on shore; so that the work lasted all day long, under a hot summer’s sun. Such labour was new to the Ionian crews. They endured it for seven successive days, after which they broke out with one accord into resolute mutiny and refusal: “Which of the Gods have we offended, to bring upon ourselves such a retribution as this? madmen as we are, to put ourselves into the hands of this Phôkæan braggart, who has furnished only three ships!² He has now got us and is ruining us without remedy; many of us are

¹ Herodot. vi. 11. Ἐπὶ ξυροῦ γὰρ ἀμῆς ἔχεται ἡμῖν τὰ πρήγματα, ἄνδρες Ἴωνες, ἢ εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι, ἢ δούλοισι, καὶ ταῦτοισι ὡς ὀρηπέτῃσι· νῦν ὦν ἡμέεσσι, ἣν μὲν βούλησθε ταλαιπωρίας ἐνδέχεσθαι, τὸ παραχρῆμα μὲν πόνος ἡμῖν ἔσται, οἷοί τε δὲ ἔσεσθε, ὑπερ-

βλλόμενοι τοὺς ἐναντίους, εἶναι ἐλεύθεροι, &c.

² Herodot. vi. 12. Οἱ Ἴωνες, οἷα ἀπαθέες ἔοντες πόνων τοιοῦτων, τετραμμένοι τε ταλαιπωρήσῃσι τε καὶ ἡλίῳ, ἔλεξαν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς τάδε—Τίνα δοσιμόνων παραβάντες, τάδε ἀνα-

already sick, many others are sickening. We had better make up our minds to Persian slavery, or any other mischiefs, rather than go on with these present sufferings. Come, we will not obey this man any longer." And they forthwith refused to execute his orders, resuming their tents on shore, with the enjoyments of shade, rest, and inactive talk, as before.

I have not chosen to divest this instructive scene of the dramatic liveliness with which it is given in Herodotus—the more so as it has all the air of reality, and as Hekataeus the historian was probably present in the island of Ladê, and may have described what he actually saw and heard. When we see the intolerable hardship which these nautical manœuvres and labours imposed upon the Ionians, though men not unaccustomed to ordinary ship-work,—and when we witness their perfect incapacity to submit themselves to such a discipline, even with extreme danger staring them in the face—we shall be able to appreciate the severe and unremitting toil whereby the Athenian seaman afterwards purchased that perfection of nautical discipline which characterised him at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It will appear, as we proceed with this history, that the full development of the Athenian democracy worked a revolution in Grecian military marine, chiefly by enforcing upon the citizen seaman a strict continuous training, such as was only surpassed by the Lacedæmonian drill on land—and by thus rendering practicable a species of nautical manœuvring, which was unknown even at the time of the battle of Salamis. I shall show this more fully hereafter: at present I contrast it briefly with the incapacity of the Ionians at Ladê, in order that it may be understood how painful such training really was. The reader of Grecian history is usually taught to associate only ideas of turbulence and anarchy with the Athenian democracy. But the Athenian navy, the child and champion of that democracy, will be found to display an indefatigable labour and obedience nowhere else witnessed in Greece—of which even the first lessons, as in the case now before us, prove to others so irksome as to

Contrast of this incapacity of the Ionic crews with the subsequent severe discipline of the Athenian seaman.

πίμπλαμεν, οτινες παραφρονήσαντες, τρεῖς, ἐπιτρέψαντες ἡμέας αὐτοὺς
καὶ ἐκπλώσαντες ἐκ τοῦ νόου, ἀνδρὶ ἔχομεν, &c.
Φωκαεῖ ἀλαζόνι, παρεχομένῳ νέας

outweigh the prospect of extreme and imminent peril. The same impatience of steady toil and discipline, which the Ionians displayed to their own ruin before the battle of Lādê, will be found to characterize them fifty years afterwards as allies of Athens, as I shall have occasion to show when I come to describe the Athenian empire.

Ending in this abrupt and mutinous manner, the judicious suggestions of the Phôkæan leader did more harm than good. Perhaps his manner of dealing may have been unadvisedly rude; but we are surprised to see that no one among the leaders of the larger contingents had the good sense to avail himself of the first readiness of the Ionians, and to employ his superior influence in securing the continuance of a good practice once begun. Not one such superior man did this Ionic revolt throw up. From the day on which the Ionians discarded Dionysius, their camp became a scene of disunion and mistrust. Some of them grew so reckless and unmanageable, that the better portion despaired of maintaining any orderly battle; and the Samians in particular now repented that they had declined the secret offers made to them by their expelled despot!—Æakês son of Sylosôn. They sent privately to renew the negotiation, received a fresh promise of the same indulgence, and agreed to desert when the occasion arrived. On the day of battle, when the two fleets were on the point of coming to action, the sixty Samian ships all sailed off, except eleven whose captains disdained such treachery. Other Ionians followed their example; yet amidst the reciprocal crimination which Herodotus had heard, he finds it difficult to determine who was most to blame, though he names the Lesbians as among the earliest deserters.² The hundred ships from Chios, constituting the centre of the fleet—each ship carrying forty chosen soldiers fully armed—formed a brilliant exception to the rest. They fought with the greatest fidelity and resolution, inflicting upon the enemy, and themselves sustaining, heavy loss. Dionysius the Phôkæan also behaved in a manner worthy of his previous language, and captured with his three ships the like number of Phœnicians. But such examples of bravery did not compensate the treachery or cowardice of the rest.

Disorder
and mis-
trust grow
up in
the fleet—
treachery
of the
Samian
captains.

¹ Herodot. vi. 13.

² Herodot. vi. 14, 15.

The defeat of the Ionians at Ladê was complete as well as irrecoverable. To the faithful Chians, the loss was terrible both in the battle and after it; for though some of their vessels escaped from the defeat safely to Chios, others were so damaged as to be obliged to run ashore close at hand on the promontory of Mykalê, where the crews quitted them, with the intention of marching northward through the Ephesian territory to the continent opposite their own island. We hear with astonishment, that at that critical moment, the Ephesian women were engaged in solemnizing the Thesmophoria,—a festival celebrated at night, in the open air, in some uninhabited portion of the territory, and without the presence of any male person. As the Chian fugitives entered the Ephesian territory by night, their coming being neither known nor anticipated—it was believed that they were thieves or pirates coming to seize the women, and under this error they were attacked by the Ephesians and slain.¹ It would seem from this incident that the Ephesians had taken no part in the Ionic revolt, nor are they mentioned amidst the various contingents; nor is anything said either of Kolophon, or Lebedus, or Eræ.²

The Phôkæan Dionysius, perceiving that the defeat of Ladê was the ruin of the Ionic cause, and that his native city was again doomed to Persian subjection, did not think it prudent even to return home. Immediately after the battle he set sail, not for Phôkæa, but for the Phœnician coast, at this moment stripped of its protecting cruisers. He seized several Phœnician merchantmen, out of which considerable profit was obtained: then setting sail for Sicily, he undertook the occupation of a privateer against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, abstaining from injury towards Greeks.³ Such an employment seems then to have been considered perfectly admissible. A considerable body of Samians also migrated to Sicily, indignant at the treachery of their admirals in the battle, and yet more indignant at the approaching restoration of their despot Æakês. How these Samian emigrants became established in the Sicilian town

Complete
victory
of the
Persian
fleet at
Ladê—ruin
of the
Ionic fleet
—severe
loss of the
Chians.

Voluntary
exile and
adventures
of Diony-
sius.

¹ Herodot. vi. 16.

² Thucyd. viii. 14.

³ Herodot. vi. 17. ληϊστής κατα-

στήσας Ἑλλήνων μὲν οὐδένος, Καρ-
χθηονίων δὲ καὶ Τυρσηνῶν.

of Zankle,¹ I shall mention as a part of the course of Sicilian events, which will come hereafter.

The victory of Ladê enabled the Persians to attack Milêtus by sea as well as by land; they prosecuted the siege with the utmost vigour, by undermining the walls, and by various engines of attack. Their resources in this respect seem to have been enlarged since the days of Harpagus. In no long time the city was taken by storm, and miserable was the fate reserved to it. The adult male population was chiefly slain; while such of them as were preserved, together with the women and children, were sent in a body to Susa to await the orders of Darius, who assigned to them a residence at Ampê, not far from the mouth of the Tigris. The temple at Branchidæ was burnt and pillaged, as Hekataëus had predicted at the beginning of the revolt. The large treasures therein contained must have gone far to defray the costs of the Persian army. The Milesian territory is said to have been altogether denuded of its former inhabitants—the Persians retaining for themselves the city with the plain adjoining to it, and making over the mountainous portions to the Karians of Pedasa. Some few of the Milesians found a place among the Samian emigrants to Sicily.² It is certain however that the new Grecian inhabitants must have been subsequently admitted into Milêtus; for it appears ever afterwards as a Grecian town though with diminished power and importance.

The capture of Milêtus, in the sixth year from the commencement of the revolt,³ carried with it the rapid

¹ Herodot. vi. 22-25.

² Herodot. vi. 18, 19, 20, 22.

Μιλῆτος μὲν νῦν Μιλησίων ἡρήμωτο.

³ Herodot. vi. 18. αἰρίουσι κατ' ἄρχης, ἐν τῷ ἔκτῳ ἔτει ἀπὸ τῆς ἀποστάσεως τῆς Ἀρισταγόρου. This is almost the only distinct chronological statement which we find in Herodotus respecting the Ionic revolt. The other evidences of time in his chapters are more or less equivocal: nor is there sufficient testimony before us to enable us to arrange the events, between the commencement of the Ionic

revolt and the battle of Marathon, into the precise years to which they belong. The battle of Marathon stands fixed for September 490 B.C.: the siege of Milêtus may probably have been finished in 496-495 B.C., and the Ionic revolt may have begun in 502-501 B.C. Such are the dates which, on the whole, appear to me most probable, though I am far from considering them as certain.

Chronological critics differ considerably in their arrangement of the events here alluded to among

submission of the neighbouring towns in Karia; and during the next summer—the Phœnician fleet having wintered at Milētus—the Persian forces by sea and land reconquered all the Asiatic Greeks, insular as well as continental.¹

particular years. See Appendix No. 5, p. 244, in Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*; Professor Schultz, *Beiträge zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen von der 63. zur 72. Olympiade*, p. 177-183, in the *Kieler Philologische Studien*; and Weissenborn, *Beiträge zur genaueren Erforschung der alten Griechischen Geschichte*, Jena 1844, p. 87 *seqq.*: not to mention Reiz and Larcher. Mr. Clinton reckons only ten years from the beginning of the Ionic revolt to the battle of Marathon; which appears to me too short, though, on the other hand, the fourteen years reckoned by Larcher—much more the sixteen years reckoned by Reiz—are too long. Mr. Clinton compresses inconveniently the latter portion of the interval—that portion which elapsed between the siege of Milētus and the battle of Marathon: and the very improbable supposition to which he is obliged to resort—of a confusion in the language of Herodotus between Attic and Olympic years—indicates that he is pressing the text of the historian too closely, when he states "that Herodotus specifies a term of three years between the capture of Milētus and the expedition of Datis:" see F. H. ad ann. 499. He places the capture of Milētus in 494 B.C.; which I am inclined to believe a year later—if not two years later—than the reality. Indeed as Mr. Clinton places the expedition of Aristagoras against Naxos (which was immediately before the breaking out of the revolt, since Aristagoras seized the Ionic despots while that fleet yet remained congregated immediately at the close

of the expedition) in 501 B.C. and as Herodotus expressly says that Milētus was taken in the sixth year after the revolt, it would follow that this capture ought to belong to 495, and not to 494 B.C. I incline to place it either in 496 or in 495; and the Naxian expedition in 502 or 501, leaning towards the earlier of the two dates: Schultz agrees with Larcher in placing the Naxian expedition in 504 B.C., yet he assigns the capture of Milētus to 496 B.C.—whereas Herodotus states that the last of these two events was in the sixth year after the revolt, which revolt immediately succeeded on the first of the two, within the same summer. Weissenborn places the capture of Milētus in 496 B.C., and the expedition to Naxos in 499—suspecting that the text in Herodotus—ἔτη ἕταί—is incorrect, and that it ought to be τετάρτη ἔταί, the fourth year (p. 125: compare the chronological table in his work, p. 222). He attempts to show that the particular incidents composing the Ionic revolt, as Herodotus recounts it, cannot be made to occupy more than four years; but his reasoning is in my judgement unsatisfactory, and the conjecture inadmissible. The distinct affirmation of the historian, as to the entire interval between the two events, is of much more evidentiary value than our conjectural summing up of the details.

It is vain, I think, to try to arrange these details according to precise years: this can only be done very loosely.

¹ Herodot. vi. 25.

The Phœnician fleet reconquers all the coast-towns and islands. Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—the towns in the Chersonese—Selymbria and Perinthus in Thrace—Prokonnêsus and Artake in the Propontis—all these towns were taken or sacked by the Persian and Phœnician fleet.¹ The inhabitants of Byzantium and Chalkêdôn fled for the most part, without even awaiting its arrival, to Mesembria; while the Athenian Miltiadês only escaped Persian captivity by a rapid flight from his abode in the Chersonese to Athens. His pursuers were indeed so close upon him, that one of his ships, with his son Metiochus on board, fell into their hands. As Miltiadês had been strenuous in urging the destruction of the bridge over the Danube, on the occasion of the Scythian expedition, the Phœnicians were particularly anxious to get possession of his person, as the most acceptable of all Greek prisoners to the Persian king; who however, when Metiochus the son of Miltiadês was brought to Susa, not only did him no harm, but treated him with great kindness, and gave him a Persian wife with a comfortable maintenance.²

Far otherwise did the Persian generals deal with the reconquered cities on and near the coast. The threats which had been held out before the battle of Ladê were realized to the full. The most beautiful Greek youths and virgins were picked out, to be distributed among the Persian grandees as eunuchs or inmates of the harems. The cities, with their edifices sacred as well as profane, were made a prey to the flames; and in the case of the islands, Herodotus even tells us that a line of Persians was formed from shore to shore, which swept each territory from north to south, and drove the inhabitants out of it.³ That much of this hard treatment is well founded, there

¹ Herodot. vi. 31-33. It may perhaps be to this burning and sacking of the cities in the Propontis and on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont that Strabo (xiii. p. 591) makes allusion; though he ascribes the proceeding to a different cause—to the fear of Darius that the Scythians would cross into Asia

to avenge themselves upon him for attacking them, and that the towns on the coast would furnish them with vessels for the passage.

² Herodot. vi. 41.

³ Herodot. vi. 31, 32, 33.

can be no doubt. But it must be exaggerated as to extent of depopulation and destruction, for these islands and cities appear ever afterwards as occupied by a Grecian population, and even as in a tolerable, though reduced, condition. Samos was made an exception to the rest, and completely spared by the Persians, as a reward to its captains for setting the example of desertion at the battle of Ladê; while Æakês the despot of that island was reinstated in his government.¹ It appears that several other despots were reinstated at the same time in their respective cities, though we are not told which.

Admidst the sufferings endured by so many innocent persons, of every age and of both sexes, the fate of Histiaëus excites but little sympathy. He was carrying on his piracies at Byzantium when he learnt the surrender of Milêtus; he then thought it expedient to sail with his Lesbian vessels for Chios, where admittance was refused to him. But the Chians, weakened as they had been by the late battle, were in little condition to resist, so that he defeated their troops and despoiled the island. During the present break-up of the Asiatic Greeks, there were doubtless many who (like the Phôkæan Dionysius) did not choose to return home to an enslaved city, yet had no fixed plan for a new abode. Of these exiles, a considerable number put themselves under the temporary command of Histiaëus, and accompanied him to the plunder of Thasos.² While besieging that town, he learnt the news that the Phenician fleet had quitted Milêtus to attack the remaining Ionic towns. He therefore left his designs on Thasos unfinished, in order to go and defend Lesbos. But in this latter island the dearth of provisions was such, that he was forced to cross over to the continent to reap the standing corn, around Atarneus and in the fertile plain of Mysia near the river Kaïkus. Here he fell in with a considerable Persian force under Harpagus—was beaten, compelled to flee, and taken prisoner. On his being carried to Sardis, Artaphernês the satrap caused him to be at once crucified: partly no doubt from genuine hatred, but partly also under the persuasion that if he were sent up as a prisoner to Susa, he might again become dangerous, since Darius would

Movements
and death
of His-
tiaëus.

¹ Herodot. vi. 25.

² Herodot. vi. 26-28. ἀγῶν Ἰώνων καὶ Αἰολέων συγροῦς.

even now spare his life, under an indelible sentiment of gratitude for the maintenance of the bridge over the Danube. The head of Histæus was embalmed and sent up to Susa, where Darius caused it to be honourably buried, condemning this precipitate execution of a man who had once been his preserver.¹

We need not wonder that the capture of Milêtus excited the strongest feeling, of mixed sympathy and consternation among the Athenians. In the succeeding year (so at least we are led to think, though the date cannot be positively determined) it was selected as the subject of a tragedy—The Capture of Milêtus—by the dramatic poet Phrynichus; which, when performed, so painfully wrung the feelings of the Athenian audience, that they burst into tears in the theatre, and the poet was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand drachmæ, as “having recalled to them their own misfortunes.”² The piece was forbidden to be afterwards acted, and has not come down to us. Some critics have supposed that Herodotus has not correctly assigned the real motive which determined the Athenians to impose this fine;³ for it is certain that the subjects usually selected for tragedy were portions of Heroic legend, and not matters of recent history; so that the Athenians might complain of Phrynichus on the double ground—for having violated an established canon of propriety, as well as for touching their sensibilities too deeply. Still I see no reason for doubting that the cause assigned by Herodotus is substantially the true one. Yet it is very possible that Phrynichus, at an age when tragic poetry had not yet reached its full development, might touch this very tender subject with a rough and offensive hand, before a people who had fair reason to dread the like cruel fate for themselves. Æschylus, in his *Persæ*, would naturally carry with him the full tide of Athenian sympathy, while dwelling on the victories of Salamis and Platæa. But to interest the audience in Persian success and Grecian suffering, was a task in which much greater poets than Phry-

¹ Herodot. vi. 28, 29, 30.

and Plutarch, *Præcept. Reipubl.* Gerend. p. 814.

² Herodot. v. 21. ὡς ἀναμνήσαντα οἱ χυγὰ κακά: compare vii. 152; also Kalliathenês ap. Strabo. xiv. p. 635,

³ See Welcker, *Griechische Tragödien*, vol. i. p. 25.

nichus would have failed—and which no judicious poet would have undertaken. The sack of Magdeburg by Count Tilly, in the Thirty Years' war, was not likely to be endured as the subject of dramatic representation in any Protestant town of Germany.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

FROM IONIC REVOLT TO BATTLE OF MARATHON.

IN the preceding chapter, I indicated the point of confluence between the European and Asiatic streams of Grecian history—the commencement of a decided Persian intention to conquer Attica; manifested first in the form of a threat by Artaphernês the satrap, when he enjoined the Athenians to take back Hippias as the only condition of safety, and afterwards converted into a passion in the bosom of Darius in consequence of the burning of Sardis. From this time forward, therefore, the affairs of Greece and Persia come to be in direct relation one with the other, and capable of being embodied, much more than before, into one continuous narrative.

The reconquest of Ionia being thoroughly completed, Artaphernês proceeded to organise the future government of it, with a degree of prudence and forethought not often visible in Persian proceedings. Convoaking deputies from all the different cities, he compelled them to enter into a permanent convention for the amicable settlement of disputes, so as to prevent all employment of force by any one against the others. Moreover he caused the territory of each city to be measured by parasangs (each parasang was equal to thirty stadia, or about three miles and a half), and arranged the assessments of tribute according to this measurement; without any material departure, however, from the sums which had been paid before the revolt.¹ Unfortunately, Herodotus is unusually brief in his allusion to this proceeding, which it would have been highly interesting to be able to comprehend perfectly. We may however assume it as certain, that both the population and the territory of many among the Ionic cities, if not of all, were materially altered in consequence of the preceding

Proceed-
ings of
the satrap
Artapher-
nês after
the recon-
quest of
Ionia.

¹ Herodot. vi. 42.

revolt, and still more in consequence of the cruelties with which the suppression of the revolt had been accompanied. In regard to Milêtus, Herodotus tells us that the Persians retained for themselves the city with its circumjacent plain, but gave the mountain-portion of the Milesian territory to the Karians of Pêdasa.¹ Such a proceeding would naturally call for fresh measurement and assessment of tribute; and there may have been similar transfers of land elsewhere. I have already observed that the statements which we find in Herodotus, of utter depopulation and destruction falling upon the cities, cannot be credited in their full extent; for these cities are all peopled, and all Hellenic, afterwards. Yet there can be no doubt that they are partially true, and that the miseries of those days, as stated in the work of Hekataëus as well as by contemporary informants with whom Herodotus had probably conversed, must have been extreme. New inhabitants would probably be admitted in many of them, to supply the loss sustained; and such infusion of fresh blood would strengthen the necessity for the organization introduced by Artaphernês, in order to determine clearly the obligations due from the cities both to the Persian government and towards each other. Herodotus considers that the arrangement was extremely beneficial to the Ionians, and so it must unquestionably have appeared, coming as it did immediately after so much previous suffering. He farther adds that the tribute then fixed remained unaltered until his own day—a statement requiring some comment, which I reserve until the time arrives for describing the condition of the Asiatic Greeks after the repulse of Xerxês from Greece Proper.

Meanwhile the intentions of Darius for the conquest of Greece were now effectively manifested. Mardonius, invested with the supreme command, at the head of a large force, was sent down in the ensuing spring for the purpose. Having reached Kili-
Mardonius comes with an army into Ionia —he puts down the despots in the Greek cities.
 kia in the course of the march, he himself got on ship-board and went by sea to Ionia, while his army marched across Asia Minor to the Hellespont. His proceeding in Ionia surprises us, and seems to have appeared surprising as well to Herodotus himself as to his readers. Mardonius deposed the

¹ Herodot. vi. 20.

despots throughout the various Greek cities;¹ leaving the people of each to govern themselves, subject to Persian dominion and tribute. This was a complete reversal of the former policy of Persia, and must be ascribed to a new conviction, doubtless wise and well-founded, which had recently grown up among the Persian leaders, that on the whole their unpopularity was aggravated more than their strength was increased, by employing these despots as instruments. The phenomena of the late Ionic revolt were well calculated to teach such a lesson; but we shall not often find the Persians profiting by experience, throughout the course of this history.

Mardonius did not remain long in Ionia, but passed on with his fleet to the Hellespont, where the land-force had already arrived. He transported it across into Europe, and began his march through Thrace; all of which had already been reduced by Megabazus, and does not seem to have participated in the Ionic revolt. The island of Thasus surrendered to the fleet without resistance, and the land-force was conveyed across the Strymon to the Greek city of Akanthus, on the western coast of the Strymonic Gulf. From hence Mardonius marched into Macedonia, and subdued a considerable portion of its inhabitants—perhaps some of those not comprised in the dominion of Amyntas, since that prince had before submitted to Megabazus. Meanwhile he sent his fleet to double the promontory of Mount Athos, and to join the land-force again at the Gulf of Therma, with a view of conquering as much of Greece as he could, and even of prosecuting the march as far as

¹ Herodot. vi. 43. In recounting this deposition of the despots by Mardonius, Herodotus reasons from it as an analogy for the purpose of vindicating the correctness of another of his statements, which (he acquaints us) many persons disputed; namely, the discussion which he reports to have taken place among the seven conspirators, after the death of the Magian Smerdis, whether they should establish a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy—ἐμβαῦτα μέγιστον

θῶμα ἐρέω τοῖσι μὴ ἀποδεχομένοιαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Περσέων τοῖσι ἔπτα Ὀτάνεα γνῶμην ἀποδέξασθαι, ὡς χρέων εἶη δημοκρατέεσθαι Πέρσας· τοὺς γὰρ τυράννους τῶν Ἰώνων καταπάσας πάντας ὁ Μαρδόνιος, δημοκρατίας κατίστα ἐς τὰς πόλεις. Such passages as this let us into the controversies of the time and prove that Herodotus found many objectors to his story about the discussion on theories of government among the seven Persian conspirators (iii. 80-82).

Athens and Eretria;¹ so that the expedition afterwards accomplished by Xerxês would have been tried at least by Mardonius, twelve or thirteen years earlier, had not a terrible storm completely disabled the fleet. The sea near Athos was then, and is now, full of peril to navigators. One of the hurricanes so frequent in its neighbourhood overtook the Persian fleet, destroyed three hundred ships, and drowned or cast ashore not less than twenty thousand men. Of those who reached the shore, many died of cold, or were devoured by the wild beasts on that inhospitable tongue of land. This disaster checked altogether the farther progress of Mardonius, who also sustained considerable loss with his land-army, and was himself wounded in a night attack made upon him by the tribe of Thracians called Brygi. Though strong enough to repel and avenge this attack, and to subdue the Brygi, he was yet in no condition to advance farther. Both the land-force and the fleet were conveyed back to the Hellespont, and from thence across to Asia, with so much shame of failure, that Mardonius was never again employed by Darius; though we cannot make out that the fault was imputable to him.² We shall hear of him again under Xerxês.

The ill-success of Mardonius seems to have inspired the Thasians, so recently subdued, with the idea of revolting. At least their conduct provoked the suspicion of Darius; for they made active preparations for defence, both by building war-ships, and by strengthening their fortifications. The Thasians were at this time in great opulence, chiefly from gold and silver mines, both in their island and in their mainland territory opposite. The mines at Skaptê Hylê in Thrace yielded to them an annual income of eighty talents; their total surplus revenue—after defraying all the expenses of government so that the inhabitants were entirely untaxed—was two hundred talents (46,000*l.*, if Attic talents; more, if either Euboic or Æginæan). With such large means, they were enabled soon to make preparations which excited notice among their neighbours; many of whom were doubtless jealous of their

Island of Thasos—prepares to revolt from the Persians—forced to submit.

¹ Herodot. vi. 43, 44. ἐπορεύοντο δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ Ἐρετρῆϊ καὶ Ἀθήναις.

² Herodot. vi. 44-94. Charon of Lampakus had noticed the storm

near Mount Athos, and the destruction of the fleet of Mardonius (Charonis Fragment. 8, ed. Didot., Athenæ. ix. p. 394).

prosperity, and perhaps inclined to dispute with them possession of the profitable mines of Skaptê Hylê. As in other cases, so in this: the jealousies among subject neighbours often procured revelations to the superior power. The proceedings of the Thasians were made known, and they were forced to raze their fortifications as well as to surrender all their ships to the Persians at Abdêra.¹

Though dissatisfied with Mardonius, Darius was only the more eagerly bent on his project of conquering Greece.

Preparations of Darius for invading Greece—he sends heralds round the Grecian towns to demand earth and water—many of them submit.

Hippias was at his side to keep alive his wrath against the Athenians.² Orders were despatched to the maritime cities of his empire to equip both ships of war and horse-transporters for a renewed attempt. His intentions were probably known in Greece itself by this time, from the recent march of his army to Macedonia. Nevertheless he now thought it advisable to send heralds round to most of the Grecian cities, in order to require from each the formal token of submission—earth and water; and thus to ascertain what extent of resistance his projected

expedition was likely to experience. The answers received were to a high degree favourable. Many of the continental Greeks sent their submission, as well as all those islanders to whom application was made. Among the former we are probably to reckon the Thebans and Thessalians, though Herodotus does not particularize them. Among the latter Naxos, Eubœa, and some of the smaller islands, are not included; but Ægina, at that time the first maritime power of Greece, is expressly included.³

Nothing marks so clearly the imminent peril in which the liberties of Greece were now placed, and the terror inspired by the Persians after their reconquest of Ionia, as this abasement on the part of the Æginetans, whose commerce with the Asiatic islands and continent doubtless impressed them strongly with the melancholy consequences of unsuccessful resistance to the Great King. But on the present occasion their conduct was dictated as much by antipathy to Athens as by fear,

Ægina among those towns which submitted—state and relations of this island.

the liberties of Greece were now placed, and the terror inspired by the Persians after their reconquest of Ionia, as this abasement on the part of the Æginetans, whose commerce with the Asiatic islands and continent doubtless impressed them strongly with the melancholy consequences of unsuccessful resistance to the

¹ Herodot. vi. 46-48. See a similar case of disclosure arising from jealousy between Tenedos and Les-

bos (Thucyd. iii. 2).

² Herodot. vi. 94.

³ Herodot. vi. 48, 49. viii. 46.

so that Greece was thus threatened with the intrusion of the Persian arm as ally and arbiter in her internal contests—a contingency which, if it had occurred now in the dispute between Ægina and Athens, would have led to the certain enslavement of Greece, though when it did occur nearly a century afterwards, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war and in consequence of the prolonged struggle between Lacedæmon and Athens, Greece had become strong enough in her own force to endure it without the loss of substantial independence.

The war between Thebes and Ægina on one side, and Athens on the other—begun several years before, and growing out of the connexion between Athens and Plataea—had never yet been terminated. The Æginetans had taken part in that war from gratuitous feeling, either of friendship for Thebes or of enmity to Athens, without any direct ground of quarrel,¹ and they had begun the war even without the formality of notice. Though a period apparently not less than fourteen years (from about 506-492 B.C.) had elapsed, the state of hostility still continued; and we may readily conceive that Hippias, the great instigator of Persian attack upon Greece, would not fail to enforce upon all the enemies of Athens the prudence of seconding, or at least of not opposing, the efforts of the Persian to reinstate him in that city. It was partly under this feeling, combined with genuine alarm, that both Thebes and Ægina manifested submissive dispositions towards the heralds of Darius.

Among these heralds, some had gone both to Athens and to Sparta, for the same purpose of demanding earth and water. The reception given to them at both places was angry in the extreme. The Athenians cast the herald into the pit called the Barathrum,² into which they sometimes precipitated public criminals: the Spartans threw the herald who came to them into a well, desiring the

Heralds from Darius are put to death both at Athens and Sparta.

¹ Herodot. v. 81-83. See above, chapter xxxi. The legendary story there given as the provocation of Ægina to the war is evidently not to be treated as a real and historical cause of war: a state of quarrel causes all such stories to be raked up, and some probably to be in-

vented. It is like the old alleged quarrel between the Athenians and the Pelasgi of Lemnos (vi. 137-140).

² It is to this treatment of the herald that the story in Plutarch's Life of Themistoklès must allude, if that story indeed be true; for the Persian king was not likely to

unfortunate messenger to take earth and water from thence to the king. The inviolability of Heralds was so ancient and undisputed in Greece, from the Homeric times downward, that nothing short of the fiercest excitement could have instigated any Grecian community to such an outrage. But to the Lacedæmonians, now accustomed to regard themselves as the first of all Grecian states, and to be addressed always in the character of superiors, the demand appeared so gross an insult as to banish from their minds for the time all recollection of established obligations. They came subsequently, however, to repent of the act as highly criminal, and to look upon it as the cause of misfortunes which overtook them thirty or forty years afterwards. How they tried at that time to expiate it, I shall hereafter recount.¹

But if, on the one hand, the wounded dignity of the Spartans hurried them into the commission of this wrong, it was on the other hand of signal use to the general liberties of Greece, by rousing them out of their apathy as to the coming invader, and placing them with regard to him in the same state of inexpiable hostility as Athens and Ere-

Effects of this act in throwing Sparta into a state of hostility against Persia.

send a second herald, after such treatment of the first. An interpreter accompanied the herald, speaking Greek as well as his own native language. Themistoklès proposed and carried a vote that he should be put to death for having employed the Greek language as medium for barbaric dictation. (Plutarch, Themist. c. 6.) We should be glad to know from whom Plutarch copied this story.

Pausanias states that it was Miltiadès who proposed the putting to death of the heralds at Athens (iii. 12, 6); and that the divine judgement fell upon his family in consequence of it. From whom Pausanias copied this statement I do not know: certainly not from Herodotus, who does not mention Miltiadès in the case, and expressly says that he does not know in what manner the divine judgement over-

took the Athenians for the crime —“except (says he) that their city and country was afterwards laid waste by Xerxès; but I do not think that this happened on account of the outrage on the herald” (Herodot. vii. 138).

The belief that there must have been a divine judgement of some sort or other, presented a strong stimulus to invent or twist some historical fact to correspond with it. Herodotus has sufficient regard for truth to resist this stimulus and to confess his ignorance; a circumstance which goes, along with others, to strengthen our confidence in his general authority, His silence weakens the credibility, but does not refute the allegation, of Pausanias with regard to Miltiadès—which is certainly not intrinsically improbable.

¹ Herodot. vii. 138.

tria. We see at once the bonds drawn closer between Athens and Sparta. The Athenians, for the first time, prefer a complaint at Sparta against the Æginetans for having given earth and water to Darius—accusing them of having done this with views of enmity to Athens, and in order to invade Attica conjointly with the Persian. This they represented “as treason to Hellas,” calling upon Sparta, as head of Greece, to interfere. In consequence of their appeal, Kleomenês king of Sparta went over to Ægina, to take measures against the authors of the late proceeding, “for the general benefit of Hellas.”¹

The Athenians appeal to Sparta, in consequence of the *mediism* of Ægina.

The proceeding now before us is of very great importance in the progress of Grecian history. It is the first direct and positive historical manifestation of Hellas as an aggregate body, with Sparta as its chief, and obligations of a certain sort on the part of its members, the neglect or violation of which constitutes a species of treason. I have already pointed out several earlier incidents, showing how the Greek political mind, beginning from entire severance of states, became gradually prepared for this idea of a permanent league with mutual obligations and power of enforcement vested in a permanent chief—an idea never fully carried into practice, but now distinctly manifest and partially operative. First, the great acquired power and territory of Sparta, her military training, her undisturbed political traditions, create an unconscious deference towards her such as was not felt towards any other state. Next, she is seen (in the proceedings against Athens after the expulsion of Hippias) as summoning and conducting to war a cluster of self-obliged Peloponnesian allies, with certain formalities which give to the alliance an imposing permanence and solemnity. Thirdly, her position becomes recognised as first power or president of Greece, both by foreigners who invite alliance (Crœsus) or

Interference of Sparta—her distinct acquisition and acceptance of the leadership of Greece.

¹ Herodot. vi. 49. Ποιήσασι δὲ σφι (Αἰγινήταις) ταῦτα, ἰθέως Ἄθηναῖοι ἐπεκέατο, δοκέοντες ἐπὶ σφίσι ἔχοντας τοὺς Αἰγινήτας δεδωκέναι (γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ), ὡς ἅμα τῷ Πέρσῃ ἐπὶ σφίσι στρατεύονται. Καὶ ἄσμενοι προφάσιος ἐπέλαβοντο φοιτούντες τε ἐς τὴν Σπάρτην, κατηγύρευον τῶν Αἰγινήτεων

τὰ πεποιήκοιεν, προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Compare viii. 144, ix. 7. τὴν Ἑλλάδα δεινὸν ποιούμενοι προδοῦναι—a new and very important phrase.

vii. 61. Τότε δὲ τὸν Κλεομένηα, ἐότα ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προσεργαζόμενον, &c.

by Greeks who seek help, such as the Platæans against Thebes or the Ionians against Persia. But Sparta has not been hitherto found willing to take on herself the performance of this duty of Protector general. She refused the Ionians and the Samian Mæandrius, as well as the Platæans, in spite of their entreaties founded on common Hellenic lineage: the expedition which she undertook against Polykratês of Samos was founded upon private motives for displeasure, even in the estimation of the Lacedæmonians themselves: moreover, even if all these requests had been granted, she might have seemed to be rather obeying a generous sympathy than performing a duty incumbent upon her as superior. But in the case now before us, of Athens against Ægina, the latter consideration stands distinctly prominent. Athens is not a member of the cluster of Spartan allies, nor does she claim the compassion of Sparta, as defenceless against an overpowering Grecian neighbour. She complains of a Pan-Hellenic obligation as having been contravened by the Æginetans to her detriment and danger, and calls upon Sparta to enforce upon the delinquents respect to these obligations. For the first time in Grecian history, such a call is made; for the first time in Grecian history, it is effectively answered. We may well doubt whether it would have been thus answered—considering the tardy, unimpressible, and home-keeping, character of the Spartans, with their general insensibility to distant dangers¹—if the adventure of the Persian herald had not occurred to gall their pride beyond endurance—to drive them into unpardonable hostility with the Great King—and to cast them into the same boat with Athens for keeping off an enemy who threatened the common liberties of Hellas.

From this time, then, we may consider that there exists a recognised political union of Greece against the Persian²—or at least something as near to a political union as Grecian temper will permit—with Sparta as its head for the present. To such a pre-eminence of Sparta, Grecian history had been gradually tending. But the final event which placed it beyond dispute, and which humbled for the time her ancient and only rival—Argos—is now to be noticed.

¹ Thucyd. i. 70-118. ἄσπαστοι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς (i. e. the Spartans) μελλήτας καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους.

² Herodot. vii. 145-148. Οἱ συνωμοταὶ Ἑλλήνων ἐπὶ τῷ Πέρσῃ.

It was about three or four years before the arrival of these Persian heralds in Greece, and nearly at the time when Milētus was besieged by the Persian generals, that a war broke out between Sparta and Argos¹—on what grounds Herodotus does not inform us. Kleomenēs, encouraged by a promise of the oracle that he should take Argos, led the Lacedæmonian troops to the banks of the Erasinus, the border river of the Argeian territory. But the sacrifices, without which no river could be crossed, were so unfavourable, that he altered his course, extorted some vessels from Ægina and Sikyon,² and carried his troops by sea to Nauplia, the seaport belonging to Argos, and to the territory of Tiryns. The Argeians having marched their forces down to resist him, the two armies joined battle at Sêpeia near Tiryns. Kleomenēs, by a piece of simplicity on the part of his enemies which we find it difficult to credit in Herodotus, was enabled to attack them unprepared, and obtained a decisive victory. For the Argeians (the historian states) were so afraid of being over-reached by stratagem, in the post which their army occupied over against the enemy, that they listened for the commands proclaimed aloud by the Lacedæmonian herald, and performed with their own army the same order which they thus heard given. This came to the knowledge of Kleomenēs, who communicated private notice to his soldiers, that when the herald proclaimed orders to go to dinner, they should not obey, but immediately stand to their arms. We are to presume that the Argeian camp

B.C. 496-495.

Victorious war of Sparta against Argos.

¹ That which marks the siege of Milētus, and the defeat of the Argeians by Kleomenēs, as contemporaneous, or nearly so, is—the common oracular dictum delivered in reference to both: in the same prophecy of the Pythia, one half alludes to the sufferings of Milētus, the other half to those of Argos (Herodot. vi. 19-77).

Χρῆσωμένοισι γὰρ Ἀργείοισι ἐν Δελφοῖσι περὶ σωτηρίας τῆς πόλιος τῆς σφετέρης, τὸ μὲν ἐς αὐτοῦς τοῦ Ἀργείους φέρον, τὴν δὲ παρενθήκην ἔχρησε ἐς Μιλησίους.

I consider this evidence of date

to be better than the statement of Pausanias. That author places the enterprise against Argos immediately (αὐτίκα—Paus. iii. 4, 1) after the accession of Kleomenēs, who, as he was king when Meandrius came from Samos (Herodot. iii. 148), must have come to the throne not later than 518 or 517 B.C. This would be thirty-seven years prior to 480 B.C.; a date much too early for the war between Kleomenēs and the Argeians, as we may see by Herodotus (vii. 149).

² Herodot. vi. 92.

was sufficiently near to that of the Lacedæmonians to enable them to hear the voice of the herald—yet not within sight, from the nature of the ground. Accordingly, so soon as the Argeians heard the herald in the enemy's camp proclaim the word to go to dinner,¹ they went to dinner themselves. In this disorderly condition they were attacked and overthrown by the Spartans. Many of them perished in the field, while the fugitives took refuge in a thick grove consecrated to their eponymous hero Argus. Kleomenès, having enclosed them therein, yet thinking it safer to employ deceit rather than force, ascertained from deserters the names of the chief Argeians thus shut up, and then invited them out successively by means of a herald—pretending that he had received their ransom, and that they were released. As fast as each man came out, he was put to death; the fate of these unhappy sufferers being concealed from their comrades within the grove by the thickness of the foliage, until some one climbing to the top of a tree detected and proclaimed the destruction going on—after about fifty of the victims had perished. Unable to entice any more of the Argeians from their consecrated refuge, which they still vainly hoped would protect them—Kleomenès set fire to the grove and burnt it to the ground. The persons within it appear to have been destroyed either by fire or by sword.² After the conflagration had begun, he inquired for the first time to whom the grove belonged, and learnt that it belonged to the hero Argus. Not less than six thousand citizens, the flower and strength of Argos, perished in this disastrous battle and retreat. So completely was the city prostrated, that Kleomènes might easily have taken it, had he chosen to march thither forthwith and attack it with vigour. If we are to believe later historians whom Pausanias, Polyænus, and Plutarch have copied, he did march thither and attack it, but was repulsed by the valour of the Argeian women; who, in the dearth of warriors occasioned by the recent defeat, took arms along with the slaves, headed by

¹ Herodot. vi. 78; compare Xenophon, Rep. Laced. xii. 6. Orders for evolutions in the field, in the Lacedæmonian military service, were not proclaimed by the herald,

but transmitted through the various gradations of officers (Thucyd. v. 86).

² Herodot. vi. 79, 80.

the poetess Telesilla, and gallantly defended the walls.¹ This is probably a mythe, generated by a desire to embody in detail the dictum of the oracle a little before, about "the female conquering the male."² Without meaning to deny that the Argeian women might have been capable of achieving so patriotic a deed, if Kleomenês had actually marched to the attack of their city—we are compelled by the distinct statement of Herodotus to affirm that he never did attack it. Immediately after the burning of the sacred grove of Argos, he dismissed the bulk of his army to Sparta, retaining only one thousand choice troops—with whom he marched up to the Hêræum, or great temple of Hêrê, between Argos and Mykênæ, to offer sacrifice. The priest in attendance forbade him to enter, saying that no stranger was allowed to offer sacrifice in the temple. But Kleomenês had once already forced his way into the sanctuary of Athênê on the Athenian acropolis, in spite of the priestess and her interdict—and he now acted still more brutally towards the Argeian priest, for he directed his helots to drag him from the altar and scourge him. Having offered sacrifice, Kleomenês returned with his remaining force to Sparta.³

Kleomenês returns without having attacked Argos.

But the army whom he had sent home returned with a full persuasion that Argos might easily have been

¹ Pausan. ii. 20, 7; Polyxen. viii. 33; Plutarch, De Virtut. Mulier. p. 245; Suidas, v. Τηλέσιλλα.

Plutarch cites the historian Sokratês of Argos for this story about Telesilla; an historian, or perhaps composer of a περιήγησις Ἀργους, of unknown date: compare Diogen. Laërt. ii. 5, 47, and Plutarch, Question. Romæic. p. 270-277. According to his representation, Kleomenês and Demaratus jointly assaulted the town of Argos, and Demaratus, after having penetrated into the town and become master of the Pamphyliakon, was driven out again by the women. Now Herodotus informs us that Kleomenês and Demaratus were never employed upon the same ex-

pedition, after the disagreement in their march to Attica (v. 75, vi. 64).

² Herodot. vi. 77.

Ἄλλ' ἔταν ἡ θελήσια τὸν ἄρσενά νικήσασα
'Ἐξέλασθη, καὶ κύδος ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἄρηται, &c.

If this prophecy can be said to have any distinct meaning, it probably refers to Hêrê, as protectress of Argos, repulsing the Spartans.

Pausanias (ii. 20, 7) might reasonably doubt whether Herodotus understood this oracle in the same sense as he did: it is plain that Herodotus could not have so understood it.

³ Herodot. vi. 80, 81: compare v. 72.

taken—that the king alone was to blame for having missed the opportunity. As soon as he himself returned, his enemies (perhaps his colleague Demaratus) brought him to trial before the ephors on a charge of having been bribed, against which he defended himself as follows. He had invaded the hostile territory on the faith of an assurance from the oracle that he should take Argos; but so soon as he had burnt down the sacred grove of the hero Argus (without knowing to whom it belonged), he became at once sensible that this was all that the god meant by *taking Argos*, and therefore that the divine promise had been fully realized. Accordingly, he did not think himself at liberty to commence any fresh attack, until he had ascertained whether the gods would approve it and would grant him success. It was with this view that he sacrificed in the Hêræum. There, though his sacrifice was favourable, he observed that the flame kindled on the altar flashed back from the bosom of the statue of Hêrê, and not from her head. If the flame had flashed from her head, he would have known at once that the gods intended him to take the city by storm;¹ but the flash from her

¹ Herodot. vi. 82. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς κερφαλῆς τοῦ ἀγάλματος ἐξέλαμψε, αἰρέειν ἂν κατ' ἀκρῆς τὴν πόλιν· ἐκ τῶν στηθέων δὲ λάμπαντος, πᾶν οἱ πεποιθῆσθαι ὄσον ὁ θεός ᾗ ἦελε.

For the expression αἰρέειν κατ' ἀκρῆς, compare Herodot. vi. 21 and Damm. Lex. Homer. v. ἀκρός. In this expression as generally used, the last words κατ' ἀκρῆς have lost their primitive and special sense, and do little more than intensify the simple αἰρέειν — equivalent to something like “de fond en comble:” for Kleomenês is accused by his enemies—φάμενοι μιν δωροδοκῆσαντα, οὐκ ἔλεειν τὸ Ἄργος, παρῶν εὐπετέως μιν ἔλεειν. But in the story recounted by Kleomenês, the words κατ' ἀκρῆς come back to their primitive meaning, and serve as the foundation for his religious

inference, from type to thing typified: if the light had shone from the head or *top* of the statue, this would have intimated that the gods meant him to take the city “*from top to bottom.*”

In regard to this very illustrative story—which there seems no reason for mistrusting—the contrast between the point of view of Herodotus and that of the Spartan ephors deserves notice. Herodotus, while he affirms distinctly that it was the real story told by Kleomenês, suspects its truth, and utters as much of scepticism as his pious fear will permit him: the ephors find it in complete harmony both with their canon of belief and with their religious feeling—Κλειομένης δὲ σφι ἔλεξε, οὔτε εἰ ψευδόμενος οὔτε εἰ ἀληθῆα λέγων, ἔχω σαφηνίως εἶπαι· ἔλεξε δ' ὧν. . .

bosom plainly indicated that the topmost success was out of his reach, and that he had already reaped all the glories which they intended for him. We may see that Herodotus, though he refrains from criticising this story, suspects it to be a fabrication. Not so the Spartan ephors. To them it appeared not less true as a story than triumphant as a defence, ensuring to Kleomenês an honourable acquittal.¹

Though this Spartan king lost the opportunity of taking Argos, his victories already gained had inflicted upon her a blow such as she did not recover for a generation, putting her for a time out of all condition to dispute the primacy of Greece with Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that both in legend and in earliest history, Argos stands forth as the first power in Greece, with legendary claims to headship, and decidedly above Lacedæmon; who gradually usurps from her, first the reality of superior power, next the recognition of pre-eminence—and is now, at the period which we have reached, taking upon herself both the rights and the duties of a presiding state over a body of allies who are bound both to her and to each other. Her title to this honour, however, was never admitted at Argos, and it is very probable that the war just described grew in some way or other out of the increasing presidential power which circumstances were tending to throw into her hands.

Argos
unable to
interfere
with Sparta
in the affair
of Ægina
and in her
presidential
power.

Now the complete temporary prostration of Argos was one essential condition to the quiet acquisition of this power by Sparta. Occurring as it did two or three years before the above-recounted adventure of the heralds, it removed the only rival at that time both willing and able to compete with Sparta—a rival who might well have prevented any effective union under another chief, though she could no longer have secured any Pan-Hellenic ascendancy for herself—a rival who would have seconded Ægina in her submission to the Persians, and would thus have lamed incurably the defensive force of Greece. The ships which Kleomenês had obtained from the Æginetans as well as from the Sikyonians, against their own will, for landing his

Ταῦτα δὲ λέγων, πιστὰ τε καὶ οἴκιστα
ἔδοξε Σπαρτιήγεσι λέγειν, καὶ ἀπέ-

φυσε πολλὸν τοὺς διώκοντας.

Compare Pausanias, ii. 20, 8.

troops at Nauplia, brought upon both these cities the enmity of Argos, which the Sikyonians compromised by paying a sum of money, while the Æginetans refused to do so.¹ The circumstances of the Kleomenic war had thus the effect not only of enfeebling Argos, but of alienating her from her natural allies and supporters, and clearing the ground for undisputed Spartan primacy.

Returning now to the complaint preferred by Athens to the Spartans against the traitorous submission of Ægina to Darius, we find that king Kleomenês passed immediately over to that island for the purpose of inquiry and punishment. He was proceeding to seize and carry away as prisoners several of the leading Æginetans, when Krius and some others among them opposed to him a menacing resistance, telling him that he came without any regular warrant from Sparta and under the influence of Athenian bribes—that in order to carry authority, both the Spartan kings ought to come together. It was not of their own accord that the Æginetans ventured to adopt so dangerous a course. Demaratus, the colleague of Kleomenês in the junior or Prokleid line of kings, had suggested to them the step and promised to carry them through it safely.² Dissension between the two co-ordinate kings was no new phenomenon at Sparta. But in the case of Demaratus and Kleomenês, it had broken out some years previously on the occasion of the march against Attica. Hence Demaratus, hating his colleague more than ever, entered into the present intrigue with the Æginetans with the deliberate purpose of frustrating his intervention. He succeeded, so that Kleomenês was compelled to return to Sparta; not without unequivocal menace against Krius and the other Æginetans who had repelled him,³ and not without a thorough determination to depose Demaratus.

It appears that suspicions had always attached to the legitimacy of Demaratus's birth. His reputed father Aristo, having had no offspring by two successive wives, at last became enamoured of the wife of his friend Agêtus—a woman of surpassing beauty—and entrapped him into an

¹ Herodot. vi. 92.

του. Compare Pausan. iii. 4, 3.

² Herodot. vi. 50. Κρίος—ἔλεγε δὲ ταῦτα εἰς ἀπιστολήν τῆς Δημάρχου.

³ Herodot. vi. 50-61, 64. Δημάρχου τος—φθόνου καὶ ἄγῃ χρωόμενος.

agreement, whereby each solemnly bound himself to surrender anything belonging to him which the other might ask for. That which Agêtus asked from Aristo was at once given. In return, the latter demanded to have the wife of Agêtus, who was thunderstruck at the request and indignantly complained of having been cheated into a sacrifice of all others the most painful: nevertheless the oath was peremptory, and he was forced to comply. The birth of Demaratus took place so soon after this change of husbands, that when it was first made known to Aristo, as he sat upon a bench along with the ephors, he counted on his fingers the number of months since his marriage, and exclaimed with an oath—"The child cannot be mine." He soon however retracted his opinion, and acknowledged the child, who grew up without any question being publicly raised as to his birth, and succeeded his father on the throne. But the original words of Aristo had never been forgotten, and private suspicions were still cherished that Demaratus was really the son of his mother's first husband.¹

Of these suspicions Kleomenês now resolved to avail himself, exciting Leotychidês, the next heir in the Prokleid line of kings, to impugn publicly the legitimacy of Demaratus—engaging to second him with all his influence as next in order for the crown—and exacting in return a promise that he would support the intervention against Ægina. Leotychidês was animated not merely by ambition, but also by private enmity against Demaratus, who had disappointed him of his intended bride. He warmly entered into the scheme, arraigned Demaratus as no true Herakleid, and produced evidence to prove the original doubts expressed by Aristo. A serious dispute was thus raised at Sparta, wherein Kleomenês, espousing the pretensions of Leotychidês, recommended that the question as to the legitimacy of Demaratus should be decided by reference to the Delphian oracle. Through the influence of Kôbon, a powerful native of Delphi, he procured from the Pythian priestess an answer pronouncing that Demaratus was not the son of Aristo.² Leotychidês

Demaratus
deposed,
and Leotychidês
chosen
king by
the intrigues of
Kleomenês.

¹ Herodot. vi. 61, 62, 63.

² Herodot. vi. 65, 66. In an analogous case afterwards, where the

succession was disputed between Agesilaus the brother, and Leotychidês the reputed son, of the de-

thus became king of the Prokleid line, while Demaratus descended into a private station, and was elected at the ensuing solemnity of the *Gymnopædia* to an official function. The new king, unable to repress a burst of triumphant spite, sent an attendant to ask him in the public theatre, how he felt as an officer after having once been a king. Stung with this insult, Demaratus replied that he himself had tried them both, and that *Leotychidês* might in time come to try them both also: the question (he added) shall bear its fruit—great evil, or great good, to Sparta. So saying he covered his face and retired home from the theatre—offered a solemn farewell sacrifice at the altar of *Zeus Herkeios*, and solemnly adjured his mother to declare to him who his real father was—then at once quitted Sparta for *Elis*, under pretence of going to consult the *Delphian oracle*.¹

Demaratus was well known to be a high-spirited and ambitious man—noted, among other things, as the only *Lacedæmonian* king down to the time of *Herodotus* who had ever gained a chariot victory at *Olympia*. Hence *Kleomenês* and *Leotychidês* became alarmed at the mischief which he might do them in exile. By the law of Sparta, no *Herakleid* was allowed to establish his residence out of the country, on pain of death. This marks the sentiment of the *Lacedæmonians*, and Demaratus was not the less likely to give trouble because they had pronounced him illegitimate.² Accordingly they sent in pursuit of him, and seized him in the island of *Zakynthus*. But the *Zakynthians* would not consent to surrender him, so that he passed unobstructed into *Asia*, where he presented himself to *Darius*, and was

ceased king *Agis*, the *Lacedæmonians* appear to have taken upon themselves to pronounce *Leotychidês* illegitimate; or rather to assume tacitly such illegitimacy by choosing *Agésilas* in preference, without the aid of the oracle (*Xenophon*, *Hellen.* iii. 3, 1-4; *Plutarch*, *Agésilas*, c. 3). The previous oracle from *Delphi*, however, φυλάττωσθαι τὴν γαλῆν βασιλείαν, was cited on the occasion, and the question was, in what manner it should be interpreted.

¹ *Herodot.* vi. 68, 69. The answer made by the mother to this appeal—informing Demaratus that he is the son either of King *Aristo*, or of the hero *Astrobakus*—is extremely interesting as an evidence of Grecian manners and feeling.

² *Plutarch*, *Agis*, c. 11. κατὰ δὲ τινὰ νόμον παλαιόν, ὃς οὐκ ἔστ' τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀλλοδαπῆς τεκνοῦσθαι, τὸν δ' ἀπελθόντα τῆς Σάρτης ἐπὶ μετακισμῷ πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀποθνήσκειν κελεύει.

received with abundant favours and presents.¹ We shall hereafter find him the companion of Xerxès, giving to that monarch advice such as, if it had been acted upon, would have proved the ruin of Grecian independence; to which however he would have been even more dangerous, if he had remained at home as king of Sparta.

Meanwhile Kleomenès, having obtained a consentient colleague in Leotychidès, went with him over to Ægina, eager to revenge himself for the affront which had been put upon him. To the requisition and presence of the two kings jointly, the Æginetans did not dare to oppose any resistance. Kleomenès made choice of ten citizens eminent for wealth, station, and influence, among whom were Krius and another person named Kasambus, the two most powerful men in the island. Conveying them away to Athens, he deposited them as hostages in the hands of the Athenians.²

Kleomenès and Leotychidès go to Ægina, seize ten hostages, and convey them as prisoners to Athens.

It was in this state that the affairs of Athens and of Greece generally were found by the Persian armament which landed at Marathon, the progress of which we are now about to follow. And the events just recounted were of material importance, considered in their indirect bearing upon the success of that armament. Sparta had now, on the invitation of Athens, assumed to herself for the first time a formal Pan-hellenic primacy, her ancient rival Argos being too much broken to contest it — her two kings, at this juncture unanimous, employ their presiding interference in coercing Ægina, and placing Æginetan hostages in the hands of Athens. The Æginetans would not have been unwilling to purchase victory over a neighbour and rival at the cost of submission to Persia, and it was the Spartan interference only which restrained them from assailing Athens conjointly with the Persian invaders; thus leaving the hands of the Athenians free, and their courage undiminished for the coming trial.

Important effect of this proceeding upon the result of the first Persian invasion of Greece.

Meanwhile a vast Persian force, brought together in consequence of the preparation made during the last two years in every part of the empire, had assembled in the Aleïan plain of Kilikia near the sea. A fleet of six hundred armed triremes, together with many transports both

¹ Herodot. vi. 70.

² Herodot. vi. 73.

for men and horses, was brought hither for their embarkation: the troops were put on board and sailed along the coast to Samos in Ionia. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks constituted an important part of this armament, while the Athenian exile Hippias was on board as guide and auxiliary in the attack of Attica. The generals were Datis, a Median¹—and Artaphernês, son of the satrap of Sardis so named, and nephew of Darius. We may remark that Datis is the first person of Median lineage who is mentioned as appointed to high command after the accession of Darius, which had been preceded and marked, as I have noticed in a former chapter, by an outbreak of hostile nationality between the Medes and Persians. Their instructions were, generally, to reduce to subjection and tribute all such Greeks as had not already given earth and water. But Darius directed them most particularly to conquer Eretria and Athens, and to bring the inhabitants as slaves into his presence.² These orders were literally meant, and probably neither the generals nor the soldiers of this vast armament doubted that they would be literally executed; and that before the end of the year, the wives, or rather the widows, of men like Themistoklês and Aristeidês would be seen among a mournful train of Athenian prisoners on the road from Sardis to Susa, thus accomplishing the wish expressed by queen Atossa at the instance of Dêmokêdês.

The recent terrific storm near Mount Athos deterred the Persians from following the example of Mardonius, and taking their course by the Hellespont and Thrace. It was resolved to strike straight across the Ægean³ (the mode of attack which intelligent Greeks like Themistoklês most feared, even after the repulse of Xerxês) from Samos to Eubœa, attacking the

He crosses the Ægean — carries the island of Naxos without resistance — respects Delos.

¹ Herodot. vi. 94. Δάτιν τε, τόνα Μῆδον γένος, &c.

Cornelius Nepos (*Life of Pausanias*, c. 1) calls Mardonius a Mede; which cannot be true, since he was the son of Gobryas, one of the seven Persian conspirators (Herodot. vi. 43).

² Herodot. vi. 94. ἐνταλάμενος δὲ

ἀπέπεμπε, ἐξανδρακοδίσαντας Ἐρετριαν καὶ Ἀθήνας, ἄγαινέω ὑπὲρ ἑσέων τὰ ἀνδράποδα.

According to the Menæxenus of Plato (c. 17. p. 265), Darius ordered Datis to fulfil this order on peril of his own head: no such harshness appears in Herodotus.

³ Thucyd. i. 93.

intermediate islands in the way. Among those islands was Naxos, which ten years before had stood a long siege, and gallantly repelled the Persian Megabatês with the Milesian Aristagoras. It was one of the main objects of Datis to efface this stain on the Persian arms and to take a signal revenge on the Naxians.¹ Crossing from Samos to Naxos, he landed his army on the island, which he found an easier prize than he had expected. The terrified citizens, abandoning their town, fled with their families to the highest summits of their mountains; while the Persians, seizing as slaves a few who had been dilatory in flight, burnt the undefended town with its edifices sacred and profane.

Immense indeed was the difference in Grecian sentiment towards the Persians created by the terror-striking reconquest of Ionia, and by the exhibition of a large Phœnician fleet in the Ægean. The strength of Naxos was the same now as it had been before the Ionic revolt, and the successful resistance then made might have been supposed likely to nerve the courage of its inhabitants. Yet such is the fear now inspired by a Persian armament, that the eight thousand Naxian hoplites abandon their towns and their gods without striking a blow,² and think of nothing but personal safety for themselves and their families. A sad augury for Athens and Eretria!

From Naxos Datis despatched his fleet round the other Cyclades islands, requiring from each, hostages for fidelity and a contingent to increase his army. With the sacred island of Delos, however, he dealt tenderly and respectfully. The Delians had fled before his approach to Tênos, but Datis sent a herald to invite them back again, promised to preserve their persons and property inviolate, and proclaimed that he had received express orders from the Great King to reverence the island in which Apollo and Artemis were born. His acts corresponded with this language; for the fleet was not allowed to touch the island, and he himself, landing with only

¹ Herodot. vi. 95, 96. ἐπὶ ταύτῃ (Naxos) γὰρ δὴ πρώτην ἐπέτυχον στρατεύεσθαι οἱ Πέρσαι, μемуνημένοι τῶν πρότερον.

² The historians of Naxos affirmed that Datis had been repulsed

from the island. We find this statement in Plutarch, De Malign. Herodot. c. 36, p. 869, among his violent and unfounded contradictions of Herodotus.

a few attendants, offered a magnificent sacrifice at the altar. As a large portion of his armament consisted of Ionic Greeks, such pronounced respect to the island of Delos may probably be ascribed to the desire of satisfying their religious feelings; for in their days of early freedom, this island had been the scene of their solemn periodical festivals, as I have already more than once remarked.

Pursuing his course without resistance along the islands, and demanding reinforcements as well as hostages from each, Datis at length touched the southernmost portion of Eubœa—the town of Karystus and its territory.¹ The Karystians at first refused either to give hostages or to furnish reinforcements against their friends and neighbours. But they were speedily compelled to submission by the aggressive devastation of the invaders. This was the first taste of resistance which Datis had yet experienced; and the facility with which it was overcome gave him a promising omen as to his success against Eretria, whither he soon arrived.

The destination of the armament was no secret to the inhabitants of this fated city, among whom consternation, aggravated by intestine differences, was the reigning sentiment. They made application to Athens for aid, which was readily and conveniently afforded to them by means of those four thousand kleruchs or out-citizens whom the Athenians had planted sixteen years before in the neighbouring territory of Chalkis. Notwithstanding such reinforcement, however, many of them despaired of defending the city, and thought only of seeking shelter on the unassailable summits of the island, as the more numerous and powerful Naxians had already done before them; while another party, treacherously seeking their own profit out of the public calamity, lay in wait for an opportunity of betraying the city to the Persians.² Though a public resolution was taken to defend

¹ Herodot. vi. 99.

² Herodot. vi. 100. Τῶν δὲ Ἐρετριῶν ἦν ἄρα οὐδὲν ὑγιές βούλευμα, οἱ μεταπέμποντο μὲν Ἀθηναίους, ἐφρόνων δὲ ζήρασις ἰδέας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἐς τὰ ἄκρα τῆς Εὐβοίης, ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτῶν ἰδία κέρδεα προσδεχόμενοι

παρὰ τοῦ Πέρσῳ οἰσασθαι προδοσίην ἐσκευάζοντο.

Allusion to this treason among the Eretrians is to be found in a saying of Themistoklēs (Plutarch, Themist. c. 11).

The story told by Hērakleidēs Ponticus (ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 686),

the city, yet so manifest was the absence of that stoutness of heart which could alone avail to save it, that a leading Eretrian named *Æschinês* was not ashamed to forewarn the four thousand Athenian allies of the coming treason, and urge them to save themselves before it was too late. They followed his advice and passed over to Attica by way of *Orôpus*; while the Persians disembarked their troops, and even their horses, in expectation that the Eretrians would come out and fight, at *Tamynæ* and other places in the territory. As the Eretrians did not come out, they proceeded to lay siege to the city, and for some days met with a brave resistance, so that the loss on both sides was considerable. At length two of the leading citizens, *Euphorbus* and *Philagrus*, with others, betrayed Eretria to the besiegers; its temples were burnt, and its inhabitants dragged into slavery.¹ It is impossible to credit the exaggerated statement of *Plato*, which is applied by him to the Persians at Eretria as it had been before applied by *Herodotus* to the Persians at *Chios* and *Samos*—that they swept the territory clean of inhabitants by joining hands and forming a line across its whole breadth.² Evidently this is an idea, illustrating the possible effects of numbers and ruinous conquest, which has been woven into the tissue of historical statements, like so many other illustrative ideas in the writings of Greek authors. That a large proportion of the inhabitants were carried away as prisoners, there can be no doubt. But the traitors who betrayed the town were spared and rewarded by the Persians,³ and we see plainly that either

of an earlier Persian armament which had assailed Eretria and failed, cannot be at all understood; it rather looks like a mythe to explain the origin of the great wealth possessed by the family of *Kallias* at Athens—the *Καλλιάδουρος*. There is another story, having the same explanatory object, in *Plutarch*, *Aristeidês*, c. 5.

¹ *Herodot.* vi. 101, 102.

² *Plato*, *Legg.* iii. p. 698, and *Menexen.* c. 10. p. 240; *Diogen. Laërt.* iii. 33; *Herodot.* vi. 31: compare *Strabo*, x. p. 446, who ascribes to *Herodotus* the statement of *Plato* about the *παγήνησις* of Ere-

tria. *Plato* says nothing about the betrayal of the city.

It is to be remarked, that in the passage of the *Treatise de Legibus*, *Plato* mentions this story (about the Persians having swept the territory of Eretria clean of its inhabitants) with some doubt as to its truth, and as if it were a rumour intentionally circulated by *Datis* with a view to frighten the Athenians. But in the *Menexenus*, the story is given as if it were an authentic historical fact.

³ *Plutarch*, *De Gurrulitate*, c. 15. p. 510. The descendants of *Gon-*

some of the inhabitants must have been left, or new settlers introduced, when we find the Eretrians reckoned ten years afterwards among the opponents of Xerxés.

Datis had thus accomplished with little or no resistance one of the two express objects commanded by Darius, and his army were elated with the confident hope of soon completing the other. After halting a few days at Eretria, and depositing in the neighbouring islet of *Ægilia* the prisoners recently captured, he re-embarked his army to cross over to Attica, and landed in the memorable bay of Marathon on the eastern coast—the spot indicated by the despot Hippias, who now landed along with the Persians, twenty years after his expulsion from the government. Forty-seven years had elapsed since he had made as a young man this same passage, from Eretria to Marathon, in conjunction with his father Peisistratus, on the occasion of the second restoration of the latter. On that previous occasion, the force accompanying the father had been immeasurably inferior to that which now seconded the son. Yet it had been found amply sufficient to carry him in triumph to Athens, with feeble opposition from citizens alike irresolute and disunited. And the march of Hippias from Marathon to Athens would now have been equally easy, as it was doubtless conceived to be by himself, both in his waking hopes and in the dream which Herodotus mentions—had not the Athenians whom he found been men radically different from those whom he had left.

To that great renewal of the Athenian character, under the democratical institutions which had subsisted since the dispossession of Hippias, I have already pointed attention in a former chapter. The modifications introduced by Kleisthenés in the constitution had now existed eighteen or nineteen years, without any attempt to overthrow them by violence. The Ten Tribes, each with its constituent demes, had become a part of the established habits of the country; the citizens had become accustomed to exercise a genuine and

Existing condition and character of the Athenians.

gylus the Eretrian, who passed over to the Persians on this occasion, are found nearly a century afterwards in possession of a town and district in Mysia, which the Persian king had bestowed upon their ancestor. Herodotus does

not mention Gongylus (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 6).

This surrender to the Persians drew upon the Eretrians bitter remarks at the time of the battle of Salamis (Plutarch, Themistoklés, c. 11).

self-determined decision, in their assemblies political as well as judicial; while even the senate of Areopagus, renovated by the nine annual archons successively chosen who passed into it after their year of office, had also become identified in feeling with the constitution of Kleisthenês. Individual citizens doubtless remained, partisans in secret, and perhaps correspondents, of Hippias. But the mass of citizens, in every scale of life, could look upon his return with nothing but terror and aversion. With what degree of newly-acquired energy the democratical Athenians could act in defence of their country and institutions, has already been related in a former chapter. But unfortunately we possess few particulars of Athenian history, during the decade preceding 490 B.C., nor can we follow in detail the working of the government. The new form however which Athenian politics had assumed becomes partially manifest when we observe the three leaders who stand prominent at this important epoch—Miltiadês, Themistoklês, and Aristeidês.

The first of the three had returned to Athens three or four years before the approach of Datis, after six or seven years' absence in the Chersonesus of Thrace, whither he had been originally sent by Hippias about the year 517-516 B.C., to inherit the property as well as the supremacy of his uncle the œkist Miltiadês. As despot of the Chersonese, and as one of the subjects of Persia, he had been among the Ionians who accompanied Darius to the Danube in his Scythian expedition. He had been the author of that memorable recommendation which Histiaëus and the other despots did not think it their interest to follow—of destroying the bridge and leaving the Persian king to perish. Subsequently he had been unable to remain permanently in the Chersonese, for reasons which have before been noticed; but he seems to have occupied it during the period of the Ionic revolt.¹ What part he took in that revolt, we do not know. He availed

Miltiadês
—his ad-
ventures
—chosen
one of the
ten gene-
rals in the
year in
which the
Persians
landed at
Marathon.

¹ The chapter of Herodotus (iv. 40) relating to the adventures of Miltiadês is extremely perplexing, as I have already remarked in a former note: and Wesseling considers that it involves chronologi-

cal difficulties which our present MSS. do not enable us to clear up. Neither Schweighäuser, nor the explanation cited in Bähr's note, is satisfactory.

himself, however, of the period while the Persian satraps were employed in suppressing it, and deprived of the mastery of the sea, to expel, in conjunction with forces from Athens, both the Persian garrison and the Pelasgic inhabitants from the islands of Lemnos and Imbros. But the extinction of the Ionic revolt threatened him with ruin. When the Phœnician fleet, in the summer following the capture of Milêtus, made its conquering appearance in the Hellespont, he was forced to escape rapidly to Athens with his immediate friends and property, and with a small squadron of five ships. One of these ships, commanded by his son Metiochus, was actually captured between the Chersonese and Imbros; and the Phœnicians were most eager to capture Miltiadês himself,¹ inasmuch as he was personally odious to Darius from his strenuous recommendation to destroy the bridge over the Danube. On arriving at Athens, after his escape from the Phœnician fleet, he was brought to trial before the judicial popular assembly for alleged misgovernment in the Chersonese, or for what Herodotus calls "his despotism" there exercised.² Probably the Athenian citizens settled in that peninsula may have had good reason to complain of him,—the more so as he had carried out with him the maxims of government prevalent at Athens under the Peisistratids, and had in his pay a body of Thracian mercenaries. However the people at Athens honourably acquitted him, probably in part from the reputation which he had obtained as conqueror of Lemnos;³ and he was one of the ten annually elected generals of the republic, during the year of this Persian expedition—chosen at the beginning of the Attic year, shortly after the summer solstice, at a time when Datis and Hippias had actually sailed, and were known to be approaching.

The character of Miltiadês is one of great bravery and decision—qualities pre-eminently useful to his country on the present crisis, and the more useful as he was under the strongest motive to put them forth, from the personal hostility of Darius towards him. Yet he does not peculiarly belong to the democracy of Kleisthenês, like his younger contemporaries Themistoklês and Aristeidês. The two

¹ Herodot. vi. 43-104.

² Herodot. vi. 39-104.

³ Herodot. vi. 132. Μιλτιάδης, και πρότερον εὐδοκίμων—i. e. before

the battle of Marathon. How much his reputation had been heightened by the conquest of Lemnos, see Herodot. vi. 136.

latter are specimens of a class of men new at Athens since the expulsion of Hippias, and contrasting forcibly with Peisistratus, Lykurgus, and Megaklês, the political leaders of the preceding generation. Themistoklês and Aristeidês, different as they were in disposition, agree in being politicians of the democratical stamp, exercising ascendancy by and through the people—devoting their time to the discharge of public duties, and to the frequent discussions in the political and judicial meetings of the people—manifesting those combined powers of action, comprehension, and persuasive speech, which gradually accustomed the citizens to look to them as advisers as well as leaders—but always subject to criticism and accusation from unfriendly rivals, and exercising such rivalry towards each other with an asperity constantly increasing. Instead of Attica disunited and torn into armed factions, as it had been forty years before—the Diakrii under one man, and the Parali and Pedieis under others—we have now Attica one and indivisible; regimented into a body of orderly hearers in the Pnyx, appointing and holding to accountability the magistrates, and open to be addressed by Themistoklês, Aristeidês, or any other citizen who can engage their attention.

Neither Themistoklês nor Aristeidês could boast a lineage of gods and heroes, like the Æakid Miltiadês.¹ Both were of middling station and circumstances. Aristeidês, son of Lysimachus, was on both sides of pure Athenian blood; but the wife of Neoklês, father of Themistoklês, was a foreign woman of Thrace or of Karia: and such an alliance is the less surprising, since Themistoklês must have been born during the dynasty of the Peisistratids, when the status of an Athenian citizen had not yet acquired its political value. There was a marked contrast between these two eminent men—those points which stood most conspicuous in the one being comparatively Themistoklês deficient in the other. In the description of Themistoklês, which we have the advantage of finding briefly sketched by Thucydidês, the circumstance most emphatically brought out is, his immense force of spontaneous invention and apprehension, without any previous aid either from teaching or gradual practice. The might of unassisted nature² was never so strikingly exhibited

¹ Herodot. vi. 35.

² Thucyd. i. 138. ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαιοτάτα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχυρὸν δηλώσας καὶ διαφερόντως τα

as in him. He conceived the complications of a present embarrassment, and divined the chances of a mysterious future, with equal sagacity and equal quickness. The right expedient seemed to flash upon his mind extempore, even in the most perplexing contingencies, without the least necessity for premeditation. He was not less distinguished for daring and resource in action: when engaged on any joint affairs, his superior competence marked him out as the leader for others to follow, and no business, however foreign to his experience, ever took him by surprise, or came wholly amiss to him. Such is the remarkable picture which Thucydidês draws of a countryman whose death nearly coincided in time with his own birth. The untutored readiness and universality of Themistoklês probably formed in his mind a contrast to the more elaborate discipline, and careful preliminary study, with which the statesmen of his own day—and Periklês especially, the greatest of them—approached the consideration and discussion of public affairs. Themistoklês had received no teaching from philosophers, sophists and rhetors, who were the instructors of well-born youth in the days of Thucydidês, and whom Aristophanês, the contemporary of the latter, so unmercifully derides—treating such instruction as worse than nothing, and extolling, in comparison with it, the unlettered courage, with mere gymnastic accomplishments, of the victors at Marathon.¹ There is no evidence in the mind of Thucydidês of any such undue contempt towards his own age. The same terms of contrast are tacitly present to his mind, but he seems to treat the great capacity of Themistoklês as the more a matter of wonder, since it sprung up without that preliminary cultivation which had gone to the making of Periklês.

ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρων ἄξιος θαυμάσαι· οἰκείῃ γὰρ συνέσει καὶ οὐτε προμαθῶν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἐπιμαθῶν, τῶν τε παραρχήμα δι' ἐλαχίστης βουλής κράτιστος γνῶμων, καὶ τῶν μαιλλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής. Καὶ δὲ μὲν μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἷός τε· ὧν δὲ ἄπειρος εἴη, κρίναι ἱκανῶς οὐκ ἀπῆλλακτο. Τὸ τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῇ ἀφανεί ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα· καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν εἰκεῖν, φύ-

σεως μὲν δυνάμει μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι, κράτιστος δὲ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο.

¹ See the contrast of the old and new education, as set forth in Aristophanês, *Nubes*, 957-1003; also *Ranæ*, 1067.

About the training of Themistoklês, compared with that of the contemporaries of Periklês, see also Plutarch, *Themistokl.* c. 2.

The general character given by Plutarch,¹ though many of his anecdotes are both trifling and apocryphal, is quite consistent with the brief sketch just cited from Thucydidês. Themistoklês had an unbounded passion—not merely for glory, insomuch that the laurels of Miltiadês acquired at Marathon deprived him of rest—but also for display of every kind. He was eager to vie with men richer than himself in showy exhibition—one great source, though not the only source, of popularity at Athens—nor was he at all scrupulous in procuring the means of doing so. Besides being assiduous in attendance at the Ekklesia and the Dikastery, he knew most of the citizens by name, and was always ready with advice to them in their private affairs. Moreover he possessed all the tactics of an expert party-man in conciliating political friends and in defeating political enemies. And though he was in the early part of his life sincerely bent upon the upholding and aggrandisement of his country, and was on some most critical occasions of unspeakable value to it, yet on the whole his morality was as reckless as his intelligence was eminent. He will be found grossly corrupt in the exercise of power, and employing tortuous means, sometimes indeed for ends in themselves honourable and patriotic, but sometimes also merely for enriching himself. He ended a glorious life by years of deep disgrace, with the forfeiture of all Hellenic esteem and brotherhood—a rich man, an exile, a traitor, and a pensioner of the Great King, pledged to undo his own previous work of liberation accomplished at the victory of Salamis.

Of Aristeidês we possess unfortunately no description from the hand of Thucydidês. Yet his character is so simple and consistent, that we may safely Aristeidês. accept the brief but unqualified encomium of Herodotus and Plato, expanded as it is in the biography of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos,² however little the details of the latter can be trusted. Aristeidês was inferior to Themistoklês in resource, quickness, flexibility, and power of coping with difficulties; but incomparably superior to him, as well as to other rivals and contemporaries, in integrity public as well as private; inaccessible to pecuniary temptations

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 3, 4, 5; Cornelius Nepos, Themist. c. 1.

² Herodot. viii. 79; Plato, Gorgias, c. 172. ἀριστον ἄνδρα ἐν Ἀθῆναις καὶ δίκαιοτατον.

as well as to other seductive influences, and deserving as well as enjoying the highest measure of personal confidence. He is described as the peculiar friend of Kleisthenês, the first founder of the democracy¹—as pursuing a straight and a single-handed course in political life, with no solicitude for party-ties, and with little care either to conciliate friends or to offend enemies—as unflinching in the exposure of corrupt practices, by whomsoever committed or upheld—as earning for himself the lofty surname of the Just, not less by his judicial decisions in the capacity of archon, than by his equity in private arbitrations and even his candour in political dispute—and as manifesting, throughout a long public life full of tempting opportunities, an uprightness without flaw and beyond all suspicion, recognised equally by his bitter contemporary the poet Timokreon² and by the allies of Athens upon whom he first assessed the tribute. Few of the leading men in any part of Greece were without some taint on their reputation, deserved or undeserved, in regard to pecuniary probity. But whoever became notoriously recognised as possessing this vital quality, acquired by means of it a firmer hold on the public esteem than even eminent talents could confer. Thucydidês ranks conspicuous probity among the first of the many ascendent qualities possessed by Periklês;³ while Nikias, equal to him in this respect, though immeasurably inferior in every other, owed to it a still larger proportion of that exaggerated confidence which the Athenian people continued so long to repose in him. The abilities of Aristeidês—though apparently adequate to every occasion on which he was engaged, and only inferior when we compare him with so remarkable a man as Themistoklês—were put in the shade by this incorruptible probity; which procured for him, however, along with the general esteem, no inconsiderable amount of private enmity from jobbers whom he exposed, and even some jealousy from persons who heard it proclaimed with offensive ostentation. We are told that a rustic and unlettered citizen gave his ostracising vote and expressed his dislike against Aristeidês,⁴ on the simple ground that he was tired of hearing him always called the Just. Now the purity of the

¹ Plutarch (Aristeidês, c. 1—4; Themistoklês, c. 3; An Seni sit gerenda respublica, c. 12. p. 790; Præcepta Reip. Gerend. c. ii. p. 805).

² Timokreon ap. Plutarch. Themistoklês, c. 21.

³ Thucyd. ii. 65.

⁴ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 7.

most honourable man will not bear to be so boastfully talked of as if he were the only honourable man in the country. The less it is obtruded, the more deeply and cordially will it be felt: and the story just alluded to, whether true or false, illustrates that natural reaction of feeling produced by absurd encomiasts, or perhaps by insidious enemies under the mask of encomiasts, who trumpeted forth Aristeidês as *The Just man of Attica*, so as to wound the legitimate dignity of every one else. Neither indiscreet friends nor artful enemies, however, could rob him of the lasting esteem of his countrymen; which he enjoyed, though with intervals of their displeasure, to the end of his life. He was ostracised during a part of the period between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, at a time when the rivalry between him and Themistoklês was so violent that both could not remain at Athens without peril; but the dangers of Athens during the invasion of Xerxês brought him back before the ten years of exile were expired. His fortune, originally very moderate, was still farther diminished during the course of his life, so that he died very poor, and the state was obliged to lend aid to his children.

Such were the characters of Themistoklês and Aristeidês, the two earliest leaders thrown up by the Athenian democracy. Half a century before, Themistoklês would have been an active partisan in the faction of the Parali or the Pedieis, while Aristeidês would probably have remained an unnoticed citizen. At the present period of Athenian history, the characters of soldier, magistrate, and orator, were intimately blended together in a citizen who stood forward for eminence, though they tended more and more to divide themselves during the ensuing century and a half. Aristeidês and Miltiadês were both elected among the ten generals, each for his respective tribe, in the year of the expedition of Datis across the Ægean, and probably even after that expedition was known to be on its voyage. Moreover we are led to suspect from a passage in Plutarch, that Themistoklês also was general of his tribe on the same occasion,¹ though this is doubtful; but it is certain that he fought at Marathon. The ten generals had jointly the command of the army, each of them taking his turn to exercise it for a day. In

Miltiadês, Aristeidês, and perhaps Themistoklês were among the ten Stratêgi in 490 B.C.

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 5.

addition to the ten, the third archon or polemarch was considered as eleventh in the military council. The polemarch of this year was Kallimachus of Aphidnæ.¹

Such were the chiefs of the military force, and to a great degree the administrators of foreign affairs, at the time when the four thousand Athenian kleruchs or settlers planted in Eubœa—escaping from Eretria, now invested by the Persians—brought word to their countrymen at home that the fall of that city was impending. It was obvious that the Persian host would proceed from Eretria forthwith against Athens. A few days afterwards Hippias disembarked them at Marathon.

Of the feeling which now prevailed at Athens we have no details. But doubtless the alarm was hardly inferior to that which had been felt at Eretria. Opinions were not unanimous as to the proper steps to be taken, nor were suspicions of treason wanting. Pheidippidês the courier was sent to Sparta immediately to solicit assistance; and such was his prodigious activity, that he performed this journey of 150 miles, on foot, in 48 hours.² Revealing to the ephors that Eretria was already enslaved, he entreated their assistance to avert the same fate from Athens, the most ancient city in Greece. The Spartan authorities readily promised their aid, but unfortunately it was now the ninth day of the moon. Ancient law or custom forbade them to march, in this month at least, during the last quarter before the full moon; but after the full, they engaged to march without delay. Five days' delay at this critical moment might prove the utter ruin of the endangered city; yet the reason assigned seems to have been no pretence on the part of the Spartans. It was mere blind tenacity of ancient habit, which we shall find to abate, though never to disappear, as we advance in their history.³ Indeed their delay in marching to rescue Attica from Mardonius, eleven years afterwards, at the imminent hazard of alienating Athens and ruining the Hellenic cause, marks the same selfish dulness. But the reason now given certainly looked very like a pretence, so that the Athenians could indulge no certain assurance

¹ Herodot. vi. 109, 110.

² Mr. Kinneir remarks that the Persian Cassids, or foot-messengers, will travel for several days suc-

cessively at the rate of sixty or seventy miles a day (Geographical Memoir of Persia, p. 44).

³ Herodot. ix. 7-10.

that the Spartan troops would start even when the full moon arrived.

In this respect the answer brought by Pheidippidês was mischievous, as it tended to increase that uncertainty and indecision which already prevailed among the ten generals, as to the proper steps for meeting the invaders. Partly, perhaps, in reliance on this expected Spartan help, five out of the ten generals were decidedly averse to an immediate engagement with the Persians; while Miltiadês with the remaining four strenuously urged that not a moment should be lost in bringing the enemy to action, without leaving time to the timid and the treacherous to establish correspondence with Hippias and to take some active step for paralysing all united action on the part of the citizens. This most momentous debate, upon which the fate of Athens hung, is represented by Herodotus to have occurred at Marathon, after the army had marched out and taken post there within sight of the Persians; while Cornelius Nepos describes it as having been raised before the army quitted the city—upon the question, whether it was prudent to meet the enemy at all in the field, or to confine the defence to the city and the sacred rock. Inaccurate as this latter author generally is, his statement seems more probable here than that of Herodotus. For the ten generals would scarcely march out of Athens to Marathon without having previously resolved to fight: moreover, the question between fighting in the field or resisting behind the walls, which had already been raised at Eretria, seems the natural point on which the five mistrustful generals would take their stand. And probably indeed Miltiadês himself, if debarred from immediate action, would have preferred to hold possession of Athens, and prevent any treacherous movement from breaking out there, rather than to remain inactive on the hills, watching the Persians at Marathon, with the chance of a detachment from their numerous fleet sailing round to Phalêrum, and thus distracting by a double attack both the city and the camp.

Difference of opinion among the ten generals—five of them recommend an immediate battle, the other five are averse to it.

However this may be, the equal division of opinion among the ten generals, whether manifested at Marathon or at Athens, is certain. Miltiadês had to await the casting vote of the polemarch Kallimachus. To him he represented

emphatically the danger of delay, with the chance of some traitorous intrigue occurring to excite disunion and aggravate the alarms of the citizens. Nothing could prevent such treason from breaking out, with all its terrific consequences of enslavement to the Persians and to Hippias, except a bold, decisive, and immediate attack—the success of which he (Miltiadès) was prepared to guarantee. Fortunately for Athens, the polemarch embraced the opinion of Miltiadès; while the seditious movements which were preparing did not show themselves until after the battle had been gained. Aristeidès and Themistoklès are both recorded to have seconded Miltiadès warmly in this proposal, while all the other generals agreed in surrendering to Miltiadès their days of command, so as to make him as much as they could the sole leader of the army. It is said that the latter awaited the day of his own regular turn before he fought the battle.¹ Yet considering the eagerness which he displayed to bring on an immediate and decisive action, we cannot suppose that he would have admitted any serious postponement upon such a punctilio.

While the army were mustered on the ground sacred to Hêraklès near Marathon, with the Persians and their fleet occupying the plain and shore beneath, and in preparation for immediate action—they were joined by the whole force of the little town of Plataea, consisting of about 1000 hoplites, who had marched directly from their own city to the spot, along the southern range of Kithærôn, and passing through Dekeleia. We are not told that they had ever been invited. Very probably the Athenians had never thought of summoning aid from this unimportant neighbour, in whose behalf they had taken upon themselves a lasting feud with Thebes and the Bœotian league.² Their coming on this important occasion seems to have been a spontaneous effort of gratitude, which ought not to be the less commended because their interests were really wrapped up in those of Athens—since if the latter had been conquered, nothing could have saved Plataea from being subdued by the Thebans. Yet many a Grecian town would have disregarded both generous impulse and

Urgent instances of Miltiadès in favour of an immediate battle—casting-vote of the polemarch determines it.

March of the Athenians to Marathon—the Plataeans spontaneously join them there.

¹ Herodot. vi. 110.

² Herodot. vi. 108-112.

rational calculation, in the fear of provoking a new and terrific enemy. If we summon up to our imaginations all the circumstances of the case—which it requires some effort to do, because our authorities come from the subsequent generations, after Greece had ceased to fear the Persians—we shall be sensible that this volunteer march of the whole Platæan force to Marathon is one of the most affecting incidents of all Grecian history. Upon Athens generally it produced an indelible impression, commemorated ever afterwards in the public prayers of the Athenian herald,¹ and repaid by a grant to the Platæans of the full civil rights (seemingly without the political rights) of Athenian citizens. Upon the Athenians then marshalled at Marathon its effect must have been unspeakably powerful and encouraging, as a proof that they were not altogether isolated from Greece, and as an unexpected counter-vailing stimulus under circumstances so full of hazard.

Of the two opposing armies at Marathon, we are told that the Athenians were 10,000 hoplites, either including, or besides, the 1000 who came from Platæa.² Numbers of This statement is no way improbable, though the armies. it does not come from Herodotus, who is our only really valuable authority on the case, and who mentions no numerical total. Indeed the number named may seem smaller than we should have expected, considering that no less than 4000 kleruchs or out-settled citizens had just come over from Eubœa. A sufficient force of citizens must of course have been left behind to defend the city. The numbers of the Persians we cannot be said to know at all, nor is there anything certain except that they were greatly superior to the Greeks. We hear from Herodotus that their armament originally consisted of six hundred ships of war, but we are not told how many separate transports there were; moreover, reinforcements had been

¹ Thucyd. iii. 55.

² Justin states 10,000 Athenians, besides 1000 Platæans. Cornelius Nepos, Pausanias and Plutarch give 10,000 as the sum total of both. Justin, ii. 9; Corn. Nep. Miltiad. c. 4; Pausan. iv. 25, 5; x. 20, 2: compare also Suidas, v. Ιαπίτζ.

Heeren (De Fontibus Trogi Pom-

pei, Dissertat. ii. 7) affirms that Trogius or Justin follows Herodotus in matters concerning the Persian invasions of Greece. He cannot have compared the two very attentively; for Justin not only states several matters which are not to be found in Herodotus, but is at variance with the latter on some particulars not unimportant.

procured as they came across the *Ægean* from the islands successively conquered. The aggregate crews on board of all their ships must have been between 150,000 and 200,000 men. Yet what proportion of these were fighting-men, or how many actually did fight at *Marathon*, we have no means of determining.¹ There were a certain proportion of cavalry, and some transports expressly prepared for the conveyance of horses. Moreover, *Herodotus* tells us that *Hippias* selected the plain of *Marathon* for a landing-place, because it was the most convenient spot in *Attica* for cavalry movements—though it is singular, that in the battle the cavalry are not mentioned.

Marathon, situated near to a bay on the eastern coast of *Attica*, and in a direction E. N. E. from *Athens*, Locality of *Marathon*. is divided by the high ridge of *Mount Pentelikus* from the city, with which it communicated by two roads, one to the north, another to the south of that mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the shortest and the most difficult, is twenty-two miles in length: the southern—longer but more easy, and the only

¹ *Justin* (ii. 9) says that the total of the Persian army was 600,000, and that 200,000 perished. *Plato* (*Menexen.* p. 240) and *Lysias* (*Orat. Funer.* c. 7) speak of the Persian total as 500,000 men. *Valerius Maximus* (v. 3), *Pausanias* (iv. 25), and *Plutarch* (*Parallel. Græc. ad init.*), give 300,000 men. *Cornelius Nepos* (*Miltiadès*, c. 5) gives the more moderate total of 110,000 men.

See the observations on the battle of *Marathon* made both by *Colonel Leake* and by *Mr. Finlay*, who have examined and described the locality: *Leake* on the *Demi of Attica*, in *Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature*, vol. ii. p. 160 *seq.*; and *Finlay* on the *Battle of Marathon*, in the same *Transactions*, vol. iii. p. 360—380, &c.

Both have given remarks on the probable numbers of the armies assembled; but there are really no

materials, even for a probable guess, in respect to the Persians. The silence of *Herodotus* (whom we shall find hereafter very circumstantial as to the numbers of the army under *Xerxès*) seems to show that he had no information which he could trust. His account of the battle of *Marathon* presents him in honourable contrast with the loose and boastful assertors who followed him. For though he does not tell us much, and falls lamentably short of what we should like to know, yet all that he does say is reasonable and probable as to the proceedings of both armies; and the little which he states becomes more trustworthy on that very account—because it is so little—showing that he keeps strictly within his authorities.

There is nothing in the account of *Herodotus* to make us believe that he had ever visited the ground of *Marathon*.

one practicable for chariots—is twenty-six miles in length, or about six and a half hours of computed march. It passed between Mounts Pentelikus and Hymettus, through the ancient demes of Gargêttus and Pallênê, and was the road by which Peisistratus and Hippias, when they landed at Marathon, forty-seven years before, had marched to Athens. The bay of Marathon, sheltered by a projecting cape from the northward, affords both deep water and a shore convenient for landing; while “its plain (says a careful modern observer¹) extends in a perfect level along this fine bay and is in length about six miles, in breadth never less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the extremities of the plain: the southern is not very large, and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons impassable. Both however leave a broad, firm,

¹ See Mr. Finlay on the Battle of Marathon, Transactions, &c., vol. iii. pp. 364, 368, 383, *ut supra*: compare Hobhouse (Lord Broughton), Journey in Albania, i. p. 432.

Colonel Leake thinks that the ancient town of Marathon was not on the exact site of the modern Marathon, but at a place called Vraná, a little to the south of Marathon (Leake on the Demi of Attica, in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, 1829, vol. ii. p. 166).

“Below these two points,” he observes, “(the tumuli of Vraná and the hill of Kotróni) the plain of Marathon expands to the shore of the bay, which is near two miles distant from the opening of the valley of Vraná. It is moderately well cultivated with corn, and is one of the most fertile spots in Attica, though rather inconveniently subject to inundations from the two torrents which cross it, particularly that of Marathóna. From Lucian (in Icaro-Menippo) it appears that the parts about Énoé were noted for their ferti-

lity, and an Egyptian poet of the fifth century has celebrated the vines and olives of Marathon. It is natural to suppose that the vineyards occupied the rising grounds; and it is probable that the olive-trees were chiefly situated in the two valleys, where some are still growing: for as to the plain itself, the circumstances of the battle incline one to believe that it was anciently as destitute of trees as it is at the present day.” (Leake, on the Demi of Attica, Trans. of Roy. Soc. of Literature, vol. ii. p. 162).

Colonel Leake farther says, respecting the fitness of the Marathonian ground for cavalry movements: “As I rode across the plain of Marathon with a peasant of Vraná, he remarked to me that it was a fine place for cavalry to fight in. None of the modern Marathonii were above the rank of labourers: they have heard that a great battle was once fought there, but that is all they know.” (Leake, *ut sup.*, ii. p. 175.).

sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree; and an amphitheatre of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Attica, over the lower ridges of which some steep and difficult paths communicate with the districts of the interior."

The position occupied by Miltiadês before the battle, identified as it was to all subsequent Athenians by the sacred grove of Hêraklês near Marathon, was probably on some portion of the high ground above this plain. Cornelius Nepos tells us that he protected it from the attacks of the Persian cavalry by felled trees obstructing the approach. The Persians occupied a position on the plain; their fleet was ranged along the beach, and Hippias himself marshalled them for the battle.¹ The native Persians and Sakæ, the best troops in the whole army, were placed in the centre, which they considered as the post of honour,² and which was occupied by the Persian king himself, when present at a battle. The right wing was so regarded by the Greeks, and the polemarch Kallimachus had the command of it. The hoplites were arranged in the order of their respective tribes from right to left, and at the extreme left stood the Platæans. It was necessary for Miltiadês to present a front equal or nearly equal to that of the more numerous Persian host, in order to guard himself from being taken in flank. With this view he drew up the central tribes, including the Leontis and Antiochis, in shallow files and occupying a large breadth of ground; while each of the wings was in stronger and

¹ Herodot. vi. 107.

² Plutarch, *Symposiac.* i. 8. p. 618; Xenophon, *Anab.* i. 8, 21; Arrian, ii. 8, 18; iii. 11, 16.

We may compare, with this established battle-array of the Persian armies, that of the Turkish armies, adopted and constantly followed ever since the victorious battle of Ikonium in 1386, gained by Amurath I. over the Karamanians. The European troops (or those of Rum) occupy the left wing: the Asiatic troops (or those of Anatoli) the right wing: the Janissaries are in the centre. The

Sultan, or the Grand Visir, surrounded by the national cavalry or Spahis, is in the central point of all (Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, book v. vol. i. p. 199).

About the honour of occupying the right wing in a Grecian army, see in particular the animated dispute between the Athenians and the Tegeates before the battle of Platæa (Herodot. ix. 27). It is the post assigned to the heroic kings of legendary warfare (*Hurt.* *Supplices*, 657).

deeper order, so as to make his attack efficient on both sides. His whole army consisted of hoplites, with some slaves as unarmed or light-armed attendants, but without either bowmen or cavalry. Nor could the Persians have been very strong in this latter force, seeing that their horses had to be transported across the *Ægean*: but the elevated position of Miltiadês enabled them to take some measure of the numbers under his command, and the entire absence of cavalry in his army could not but confirm the confidence with which a long career of uninterrupted victory had impressed their generals.

At length the sacrifices in the Greek camp were favourable for battle. Miltiadês, who had everything to gain by coming immediately to close quarters, ordered his army to advance at a running step over the interval of one mile which separated the two armies. This rapid forward movement, accompanied by the war-cry or *pæan* which always animated the charge of the Greek soldier, astounded the Persian army. They construed it as an act of desperate courage little short of insanity, in a body not only small but destitute of cavalry or archers—but they at the same time felt their conscious superiority sink within them. It seems to have been long remembered also among the Greeks as the peculiar characteristic of the battle of Marathon, and Herodotus tells us that the Athenians were the first Greeks who ever charged at a run.¹ It doubtless operated beneficially in rendering the

Battle of
Marathon
—rapid
charge of
Miltiadês
—defeat of
the Per-
sians.

¹ Herodot. vi. 112. Πρώτοι μὲν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, δρόμον ἐς πολεμίους ἐχρήσαντο.

The running pace of the charge was obviously one of the most remarkable events connected with the battle. Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay seem disposed to reduce the run to a quick march; partly on the ground that the troops must have been disordered and out of breath by running a mile. The probability is, that they really were so, and that such was the great reason of the defeat of the centre. It is very probable that

a part of the mile run over consisted of declivity. I accept the account of Herodotus literally, though whether the distance be exactly stated, we cannot certainly say: indeed the fact is, that it required some steadiness of discipline to prevent the step of hoplites, when charging, from becoming accelerated into a run. See the narrative of the battle of Kunaxa in Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 18; Diodor. xiv. 23: compare Polyæn. ii. 2, 3. The passage of Diodorus here referred to contrasts the advantages with the disadvantages of the running charge.

Persian cavalry and archers comparatively innocuous, but we may reasonably suppose that it also disordered the Athenian ranks, and that when they reached the Persian front, they were both out of breath and unsteady in that line of presented spears and shields which constituted their force. On the two wings, where the files were deep, such disorder produced no mischievous effect: the Persians, after a certain resistance, were overborne and driven back. But in the centre, where the files were shallow, and where moreover the native Persians and other choice troops of the army were posted, the breathless and disordered Athenian hoplites found themselves in far greater difficulties. The tribes Leontis and Antiochis, with Themistoklês and Aristeidês among them, were actually defeated, broken, driven back, and pursued by the Persians and Sakæ.¹ Miltiadês seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a check when he found himself compelled to diminish so materially the depth of his centre. For his wings, having routed the enemies opposed to them, were stayed from pursuit until the centre was extricated, and the Persians and Sakæ put to flight along with the rest. The pursuit then became general, and the Persians were chased to their ships ranged in line along the shore. Some of them became involved in the impassable marsh and there perished.² The Athenians tried to set the ships on fire, but the defence here was both vigorous and successful—several of the forward warriors of Athens were slain, and only seven ships out of the numerous fleet destroyed.³ This part of the battle terminated to the advantage of the Persians. They repulsed the Athenians from the sea-shore, so as to secure a safe re-embarkation;

Both Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay try to point out the exact ground occupied by the two armies: they differ in the spot chosen, and I cannot think that there is sufficient evidence to be had in favour of any spot. Leake thinks that the Persian commanders were encamped in the plain of Tricorythos, separated from that of Marathon by the great marsh, and communicating with it only by means of a causeway (Leake, Trans-

act. ii. p. 170).

¹ Herodot. vi. 113. Κατὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἶη, ἐνίκων οἱ Βάρβαροι, καὶ ἤζησαντες, ἐδίωκον ἐς τὴν μισθίσταν.

Herodotus here tells us the whole truth without disguise; Plutarch (Aristeidês, c. 8) only says that the Persian centre made a longer resistance, and gave the tribes in the Grecian centre more trouble to overthrow.

² Pausan. i. 82, 6.

³ Herodot. vi. 118-115.

leaving few or no prisoners, but a rich spoil of tents and equipments which had been disembarked and could not be carried away.

Herodotus estimates the number of those who fell on the Persian side in this memorable action at 6400 men. The number of Athenian dead is accurately known, since all were collected for the last solemn obsequies—they were 192. How many were wounded we do not hear. The brave Kallimachus the polemarch, and Stesilaus one of the ten generals, were among the slain; together with Kynegeirus son of Euphorion, who, in laying hold on the poop-staff of one of the vessels, had his hand cut off by an axe,¹ and died of the wound. He was brother of the poet Æschylus, himself present at the fight; to whose imagination this battle at the ships must have emphatically recalled the fifteenth book of the Iliad. Both the slain Athenian generals are said to have perished in the assault of the ships, apparently the hottest part of the combat. The statement of the Persian loss as given by Herodotus appears moderate and reasonable,² but he does not specify any distinguished individuals as having fallen.

But the Persians, though thus defeated and compelled to abandon the position of Marathon, were not yet disposed to relinquish altogether their chances against Attica. Their fleet was observed to take the direction of Cape Sunium—a portion being sent to take up the Eretrian prisoners and the stores which had been left in the island of Ægilia. At the same time a shield, discernible

Ulterior plans of the Persians against Athens—party in Attica favourable to them.

¹ Herodot. vi. 114. This is the statement of Herodotus respecting Kynegeirus. How creditably does his character as an historian contrast with that of the subsequent romancers! Justin tells us that Kynegeirus first seized the vessel with his right hand: that was cut off, and he held the vessel with his left: when he had lost that also, he seized the ship with his teeth "like a wild beast" (Justin, vi. 9)—Justin seems to have found this statement in many different authors: "Cynegiri militis virtus,

multis scriptorum laudibus celebrata."

² For the exaggerated stories of the numbers of Persians slain, see Xenophon. Anab. iii. 2, 12; Plutarch, De Malign. Herodot. c. 26. p. 82; Justin, ii. 9; and Suidas, v. Περσίων.

In the account of Ktésias, Datis was represented as having been killed in the battle, and it was further said that the Athenians refused to give up his body for interment; which was one of the grounds whereupon Xerxes after-

from its polished surface afar off, was seen held aloft upon some high point of Attica¹—perhaps on the summit of Mount Pentelikus, as Colonel Leake supposes with much plausibility. The Athenians doubtless saw it as well as the Persians; and Miltiadês did not fail to put the right interpretation upon it, taken in conjunction with the course of the departing fleet. The shield was a signal put up by partisans in the country, to invite the Persians round to Athens by sea, while the Marathonian army was absent. Miltiadês saw through the plot, and lost not a moment in

Rapid march of Miltiadês back to Athens on the day of the battle.

The Persians abandon the enterprise, and return home.

returning to Athens. On the very day of battle, the Athenian army marched back with the utmost speed from the precinct of Hêraklês at Marathon to the precinct of the same god at Kynosarges close to Athens, which they reached before the arrival of the Persian fleet.² Datis soon came off the port of Phalêrum; but the partisans of Hippias had been so dismayed by the rapid return of the Marathonian army, that he did not find those aids and facilities which he had anticipated for a fresh disembarkation in the immediate neighbourhood of Athens. Though too late however, it seems that he was not much too late. The Marathonian army had only just completed their forced return-march. A little less quickness on the part of Miltiadês in deciphering the treasonable signal, and giving the instant order of march—a little less energy on the part of the Athenian citizens in superadding a fatiguing march to a no less fatiguing combat—and the Persians with the partisans of Hippias might have been found in possession

wards invaded Greece. It is evident that in the authorities which Ktésias followed, the alleged death of Datis at Marathon was rather emphatically dwelt upon. See Ktésias, Persica, c. 18-21, with the note of Bähr, who is inclined to defend the statement against Herodotus.

¹ Herodot. vi. 124. Ἀνεδέχθη μὲν γὰρ ἄσπις, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι ἄλλως εἰπεῖν ἰγνέτω γὰρ ὅς μέντοι ἦν ὁ ἀναδείξας οὐκ ἔχω τὸ προσωτέρω εἰπεῖν τούτῳ.

² Herodot. vi. 116. Οὔτοι μὲν ὄν

περιέπλων Σούνιον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ, ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον, τάχιστα ἐβόηθηον ἐς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ ἐβήσαν τε ἀκινόμενοι, πρὶν ἢ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἤκειν, καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἀγήμενοι ἐξ Ἡρακλῆϊου τοῦ ἐν Μαραθῶνι ἐς ἄλλο Ἡρακλῆϊον τὸ ἐν Κυνοσάργει.

Plutarch (Bellone an Pace clariores fuerint Athenienses, c. 8. p. 350) represents Miltiadês as returning to Athens on the day after the battle: it must have been on the same afternoon, according to the account of Herodotus.

of Athens. As the facts turned out, Datis, finding at Phalêrum no friendly movement to encourage him, but, on the contrary, the unexpected presence of the soldiers who had already vanquished him at Marathon—made no attempt again to disembark in Attica, but sailed away, after a short delay, to the Cyclades.

Thus was Athens rescued, for this time at least, from a danger not less terrible than imminent. Nothing could have rescued her except that decisive and instantaneous attack which Miltiadês so emphatically urged. The running step on the field of Marathon might cause some disorder in the ranks of the hoplites; but extreme haste in bringing on the combat was the only means of preventing disunion and distraction in the minds of the citizens. Imperfect as the account is which Herodotus gives of this most interesting crisis, we see plainly that the partisans of Hippias had actually organized a conspiracy, and that it only failed by coming a little too late. The bright shield uplifted on Mount Pentelikus, apprising the Persians that matters were prepared for them at Athens, was intended to have come to their view before any action had taken place at Marathon, and while the Athenian army were yet detained there; so that Datis might have sent a portion of his fleet round to Phalêrum, retaining the rest for combat with the enemy before him. If it had once become known to the Marathonian army that a Persian detachment had landed at Phalêrum¹—where there was a good plain for cavalry to act in, prior to the building of the Phalêric wall, as had been seen in the defeat of the Spartan Anchimolius by the Thessalian cavalry, in 510 B.C.—that it had been joined by timid or treacherous Athenians, and had perhaps even got possession of the city—their minds would have been so distracted by the double danger, and by fears for their absent wives and children, that they would have been disqualified for any unanimous execution of military orders. Generals as well as soldiers would have become incurably divided in opinion—perhaps even mistrustful of each other. The citizen-soldier of Greece generally, and especially of Athens, possessed in a high degree both personal bravery and attachment to order and discipline. But his bravery was not of that equal, imperturbable, uninquiring character,

Athens rescued by the speedy battle brought on by Miltiadês.

¹ Herodot. v. 62, 63.

which belonged to the battalions of Wellington or Napoleon. It was fitful, exalted or depressed by casual occurrences, and often more sensitive to dangers absent and unseen, than to enemies immediately in his front. Hence the advantage, so unspeakable in the case before us, and so well appreciated by Miltiadês, of having one undivided Athenian army—with one hostile army, and only one, to meet in the field. When we come to the battle of Salamis, ten years later, it will be seen that the Greeks of that day enjoyed the same advantage. But the wisest advisers of Xerxês impressed upon him the prudence of dividing his large force, and of sending detachments to assail separate Greek states—which would infallibly produce the effect of breaking up the combined Grecian host, and leaving no central or co-operating force for the defence of Greece generally. Fortunately for the Greeks, the childish insolence of Xerxês led him to despise all such advice, as implying conscious weakness. Not so Datis and Hippias. Sensible of the prudence of distracting the attention of the Athenians by a double attack, they laid a scheme, while the main army was at Marathon, for rallying the partisans of Hippias, with a force to assist them in the neighbourhood of Athens, and the signal was upheld by these partisans as soon as their measures were taken. But the rapidity of Miltiadês so precipitated the battle, that this signal came too late, and was only given “when the Persians were already in their ships,”¹ after the Marathonian defeat. Even then it might have proved dangerous, had not the movements of Miltiadês been as rapid after the victory as before it. If time had been allowed for the Persian movement on Athens before the battle of Marathon had been fought, the triumph of the Athenians might well have been exchanged for a calamitous servitude. To Miltiadês belongs the credit of having comprehended the emergency from the beginning, and overruled the irresolution of his colleagues by his own single-hearted energy. The chances all turned out in his favour—for the unexpected junction of the Platæans in the very encampment of Marathon must have wrought up the courage of his army to the highest pitch. Not only did he thus escape all the depressing and distracting accidents, but he was fortunate enough to find this extraneous encou-

¹ Herodot. vi. 115. Τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι ἀναδίζαι ἄσπιδα, ἐοῦσι ἡδὲ ἐν τῆσι νηυσὶ.

agement immediately preceding the battle, from a source on which he could not have calculated.

I have already observed that the phase of Grecian history best known to us, and amidst which the great authors from whom we draw our information lived, was one of contempt for the Persians in the field. It requires some effort of imagination to call back previous feelings after the circumstances have been altogether reversed. Perhaps even Æschylus the poet, at the time when he composed his tragedy of the Persæ to celebrate the disgraceful flight of the invader Xerxês, may have forgotten the emotions with which he and his brother Kynegirus must have marched out from Athens fifteen years before, on the eve of the battle of Marathon. Again, therefore, the fact must be brought to view, that down to the time when Datis landed in the bay of Marathon, the tide of Persian success had never yet been interrupted, and that especially during the ten years immediately preceding, the high-handed and cruel extinction of the Ionic revolt had aggravated to the highest pitch the alarm of the Greeks. To this must be added the successes of Datis himself, and the calamities of Eretria, coming with all the freshness of novelty as an apparent sentence of death to Athens. The extreme effort of courage required in the Athenians, to encounter such invaders, is attested by the division of opinion among the ten generals. Putting all the circumstances together, it is without a parallel in Grecian history. It surpasses even the combat of Thermopylæ, as will appear when I come to describe that memorable event. And the admirable conduct of the five dissentient generals, when outvoted by the decision of the polemarch against them, in co-operating heartily for the success of a policy which they deprecated—proves how much the feelings of a constitutional democracy, and that entire acceptance of the pronounced decision of the majority on which it rests, had worked themselves into the Athenian mind. The combat of Marathon was by no means a very decisive defeat, but it was a defeat—the first which the Persian had ever received from Greeks in the field. If the battle of Salamis, ten years afterwards, could be treated by Themistoklês as a hair-breadth escape for Greece, much more is this true

Change of Grecian feeling as to the Persians—terror which the latter inspired at the time of the battle of Marathon

of the battle of Marathon;¹ which first afforded reasonable proof, even to discerning and resolute Greeks, that the Persians might be effectually repelled, and the independence of European Greece maintained against them—a conviction of incalculable value in reference to the formidable trials destined to follow.

Upon the Athenians themselves, the first to face in the field successfully the terrific look of a Persian army, the effect of the victory was yet more stirring and profound.² It supplied them with resolution for the far greater actual sacrifices which they cheerfully underwent ten years afterwards, at the invasion of Xerxês, without altering in their Pan-hellenic fidelity. It strengthened them at home by swelling the tide of common sentiment and patriotic fraternity in the bosom of every individual citizen. It was the exploit of Athenians alone, but of all Athenians without dissent or exception—the boast of orators, repeated until it almost degenerated into common-place, though the people seem never to have become weary of allusions to their single-handed victory over a host of forty-six nations.³ It had been purchased without a drop of intestine bloodshed—for even the unknown traitors who raised the signal shield on Mount Pentelikus, took care not to betray themselves by want of apparent sympathy with the triumph. Lastly, it was the final guarantee of their democracy, barring all chance of restoration of Hippias for the future. Themistoklês⁴ is

¹ Herodot. viii. 108. ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὐρηματὶ γὰρ εὐρήκαμεν ἡμᾶς τε καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, νέφος ποσοῦτον ἀνθρώπων ἀνωσάμενοι.

² Pausanias, i. 14, 4; Thucyd. i. 73. φαμέν γὰρ Μαραθῶνι τι μόνον προκινδυνεύσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ, &c. Herodot. vi. 112. πρῶτον τε ἀνεσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν ὄροντες, καὶ ἀνέσχεον ταύτην ἐσθῆμίνους· τίως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἑλλήσι καὶ τὸ οὐνοματὶ Μήλων· εὐχος ἀκούσει.

It is not unworthy of remark, that the memorable oath in the oration of Demosthenês, de Coronâ, wherein he adjures the warriors of Marathon, copies the phrase of

Thucydides—οὐ μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων, &c. (Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 60).

³ So the computation stands in the language of Athenian orators (Herodot. ix. 27). It would be unfair to examine it critically.

⁴ Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 3. According to Cicero (Epist. ad Attic. ix. 10) and Justin (ii. 9), Hippias was killed at Marathon. Suidas (v. Ἰππίας) says that he died afterwards at Lemnos. Neither of these statements seems probable. Hippias would hardly go to Lemnos, which was an Athenian

said to have been robbed of his sleep by the trophies of Miltiadês, and this is cited in proof of his ambitious temperament. Yet without supposing either jealousy or personal love of glory, the rapid transit from extreme danger to unparalleled triumph might well deprive of rest even the most sober-minded Athenian.

Who it was that raised the treacherous signal shield, to attract the Persians to Athens, was never ascertained. Very probably, in the full exultation of success, no investigation was made. Of course, however, the public belief would not be satisfied without singling out some persons as the authors of such a treason. The information received by Herodotus (probably about 450-440 B.C., forty or fifty years after the Marathonian victory) ascribed the deed to the Alkmæônids. He does not notice any other reported authors, though he rejects the allegation against the Alkmæônids upon very sufficient grounds. They were a race religiously tainted ever since the Kylonian sacrilege, and were therefore convenient persons to brand with the odium of an anonymus crime; while party feud, if it did not originally invent, would at least be active in spreading and certifying such rumours. At the time when Herodotus knew Athens, the political enmity between Periklês son of Xanthippus, and Kimon son of Miltiadês, was at its height. Periklês belonged by his mother's side to the Alkmæônid race, and we know that such lineage was made subservient to political manœuvres against him by his enemies.¹ Moreover the enmity between Kimon and Periklês had been inherited by both from their fathers; for we shall find Xanthippus, not long after the battle of Marathon, the prominent accuser of Miltiadês. Though Xanthippus was not an Alkmæônid, his marriage with Agaristê connected himself indirectly, and his son Periklês directly, with that race. And we may trace in this standing political feud a probable origin for the false reports as to the treason of the Alkmæônids, on that great occasion which founded the glory of Miltiadês; for that the reports were false, the intrinsic probabilities of the case, supported by the judgement of Herodotus, afford ample ground for believing.

Who were the traitors that invited the Persians after the battle—false imputation on the Alkmæônids.

possession; and had he been slain in the battle, Herodotus would have been likely to mention it
¹ Thucyd. i. 126.

When the Athenian army made its sudden return-march from Marathon to Athens, Aristeidês with his tribe was left to guard the field and the spoil; but the speedy retirement of Datis from Attica left the Athenians at full liberty to revisit the scene, and discharge the last duties to the dead. A tumulus was erected on the field¹ (such distinction was never conferred by Athens except in this case only) to the one hundred and ninety-two Athenian citizens who had been slain. Their names were inscribed on ten pillars erected at the spot, one for each tribe: there was also a second tumulus for the slain Plateæans, a third for the slaves, and a separate funeral monument to Miltiadês himself. Six hundred years after the battle, Pausanias saw the tumulus, and could still read on the pillars the names of the immortalised warriors.² Even now a conspicuous tumulus exists about half a mile from the seashore, which Colonel Leake believes to be the same.³ The inhabitants of the deme of Marathon worshipped these slain warriors as heroes, along with their own eponymus, and with Hêraklês.

So splendid a victory had not been achieved, in the belief of the Athenians without marked supernatural aid. The god Pan had met the courier Pheidippidês on his hasty route from Athens to Sparta, and had told him that he was much hurt that the Athenians had as yet neglected to worship him;⁴ in spite of which neglect, however, he promised them effective aid at Marathon. The promise of Pan having been faithfully executed, the Athenians repaid it by a temple with annual worship and sacrifice. Moreover, the hero Theseus was seen strenuously assisting in the battle; while an unknown warrior, in rustic garb and armed only with a ploughshare, dealt destruction among the Persian ranks: after the battle he could not be found, and the Athenians, on asking at Delphi who he was, were directed to worship the hero Echetlus.⁵ Even in the time

¹ Thucyd. ii. 34.

² Pausan. i. 32, 3. Compare the elegy of Kritias ap. Athenæ. i. p. 28.

³ The tumulus now existing is about thirty feet high, and two hundred yards in circumference.

(Leake on the Demi of Attica; Transactions of Royal Soc. of Literat. ii. p. 171.)

⁴ Herodot. vi. 105; Pausan. i. 28, 4.

⁵ Plutarch, Theseus, c. 24; Pausan. i. 32, 4.

of Pausanias, this memorable battle-field was heard to resound every night with the noise of combatants and the snorting of horses. "It is dangerous (observes that pious author) to go to the spot with the express purpose of seeing what is passing; but if a man finds himself there by accident, without having heard anything about the matter, the gods will not be angry with him." The gods (it seems) could not pardon the inquisitive mortal who deliberately pryed into their secrets. Amidst the ornaments with which Athens was decorated during the free working of her democracy, the glories of Marathon of course occupied a conspicuous place. The battle was painted on one of the compartments of the portico called Pœkilê, wherein, amidst several figures of gods and heroes—Athênê, Hêraklês, Theseus, Êchetlus, and the local patron Marathon—were seen honoured and prominent the polemarch Kallimachus and the general Miltiadês, while the Plataeans were distinguished by their Bœotian leather casques.¹ The sixth of the month Boëdromion, the anniversary of the battle, was commemorated by an annual ceremony even down to the time of Plutarch.²

¹ Pausan. i. 15, 4; Dêmosthen. cont. Near. c. 25.

² Herodot. vi. 120; Plutarch, Camill. c. 19; De Malignit. Herodoti, c. 26. p. 8c2; and De Gloria Atheniensium, c. 7.

Boëdromion was the third month of the Attic year, which year began shortly after the summer solstice. The first three Attic months, Hekatombæon, Metageitnion, Boëdromion, correspond (speaking in a loose manner) nearly to our July, August, September.

From the fact that the courier Pheidippidês reached Sparta on the ninth day of the moon, and that the 2000 Spartans arrived in Attica on the third day after the full moon, during which interval the battle took place—we see that the sixth day of Boëdromion could not be the sixth day of the moon. The Attic months, though professing lunar months, did not at

this time therefore accurately correspond with the course of the moon. See Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen. ad an. 490 B.C. Plutarch (in the Treatise De Malign. Herodoti, above referred to) appears to have no conception of this discrepancy between the Attic month and the course of the moon. A portion of the censure which he casts on Herodotus is grounded on the assumption that the two must coincide.

Mr. Boeckh, following Fréret and Larcher, contests the statement of Plutarch, that the battle was fought on the sixth of the month Boëdromion, but upon reasons which appear to me insufficient. His chief argument rests upon another statement of Plutarch (derived from some lost verses of Æschylus), that the tribe Æantis had the right wing or post of honour at the battle; and that the

Two thousand Spartans started from their city immediately after the full moon, and reached the frontier of

public vote, pursuant to which the army was led out of Athens, was passed during the prytany of the tribe *Æantis*. He assumes, that the reason why this tribe was posted on the right wing, must have been, that it had drawn by lot the first prytany in that particular year: if this be granted, then the vote for drawing out the army must have been passed in the first prytany, or within the first thirty-five or thirty-six days of the Attic year, during the space between the first of Hekatombæon and the fifth or sixth of Metageitnion. But it is certain that the interval, which took place between the army leaving the city and the battle, was much less than one month—we may even say less than one week. The battle therefore (Boeckh contends) must have been fought between the sixth and tenth of Metageitnion. (Plutarch, *Symposiac.* i. 10, 3, and Ideler, *Handbuch der Chronologie*, vol. i. p. 291.) Herodotus (vi. 111) says that the tribes were arranged in line $\omega\zeta$ ἡριθμίσοντο—"as they were numbered"—which is contended to mean necessarily the arrangement between them, determined by lot for the prytanies of that particular year. "In acie instruendâ (says Boeckh, *Comment. ad Corp. Inscriptt.* p. 299) Athenienses non constantem, sed variabilem secundum prytanias, ordinem secutos esse, ita ut tribus ex hoc ordine inde a dextro cornu disponentur, docui in Commentatione de pugna Marathonîâ." *Proœmia Lect. Univ. Berolin. æstiv. a. 1816.*

The *Proœmia* here referred to I have not been able to consult, and they may therefore contain additional reasons to prove the point

advanced, viz. that the order of the ten tribes in line of battle, beginning from the right wing, was conformable to their order in prytanising, as drawn by lot for the year; but I think the passages of Herodotus and Plutarch now before us insufficient to establish this point. From the fact that the tribe *Æantis* had the right wing at the battle of Marathon, we are by no means warranted in inferring that that tribe had drawn by lot the earliest prytany in the year. Other reasons, in my judgement equally probable, may be assigned in explanation of the circumstance: one reason, I think, decidedly more probable. This reason is, that the battle was fought during the prytany of the tribe *Æantis*, which may be concluded from the statement of Plutarch, that the vote for marching out the army from Athens was passed during the prytany of that tribe; for the interval, between the march of the army out of the city and the battle, must have been only very few days. Moreover, the deme Marathon belonged to the tribe *Æantis* (see Boeckh, *ad Inscriptt. No. 172.* p. 309): the battle being fought in their deme, the Marathonians may perhaps have claimed on this express ground the post of honour for their tribe: just as we see that at the first battle of Mantinea against the Lacedæmonians, the Mantineians were allowed to occupy the right wing or post of honour, "because the battle was fought in their territory" (Thucyd. v. 67). Lastly, the deme Aphidnæ also belonged to the tribe *Æantis* (see Boeckh, l. c.): now the polemarch Kallimachus was an Aphidnæan (Herodot. vi. 109), and Hero-

Attica on the third day of their march—a surprising effort when we consider that the total distance from Sparta to

dotus expressly tells us, “the law or custom *then* stood among the Athenians, that the polemarch should have the right wing”—ὁ γὰρ νόμος τότε εἶχε οὕτω τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι, τὸν πολέμαρχον ἔχειν κίραρ τὸ δεξιόν (vi. 111). Where the polemarch stood, there his tribe would be likely to stand; and the language of Herodotus indeed seems directly to imply that he identifies the tribe of the polemarch with the polemarch himself—ἡγεομένου δὲ τούτου, εἰ δέχοιτο ὡς ἀριθμῆντο αἱ φυλαί, ἔχονταί τε ἀλλήλων—meaning that the order of tribes began by that of the polemarch being in the leading position, and was then “taken up” by the rest “in numerical sequence”—i. e. in the order of their prytanising sequence for the year.

Here are a concurrence of reasons to explain why the tribe Æantis had the right wing at the battle of Marathon, even though it may not have been first in the order of prytanising tribes for the year. Boeckh therefore is not warranted in inferring the second of these two facts from the first.

The concurrence of these three reasons, all in favour of the same conclusion, and all independent of the reason supposed by Boeckh, appears to me to have great weight; but I regard the first of the three, even singly taken, as more probable than his reason. If my view of the case be correct, the sixth day of Boëdromion, the day of battle as given by Plutarch, is not to be called in question. That day comes in the second prytany of the year, which begins about the sixth of Metageitnion, and ends about the twelfth of Boëdromion, and which must in this year have fallen to the lot of the tribe Æantis. On

the first or second day of Boëdromion, the vote for marching out the army may have passed; on the sixth the battle was fought; both during the prytany of this tribe.

I am not prepared to carry these reasons farther than the particular case of the battle of Marathon, and the vindication of the day of that battle as stated by Plutarch; nor would I apply them to later periods, such as the Peloponnesian war. It is certain that the army regulations of Athens were considerably modified between the battle of Marathon and the Peloponnesian war, as well in other matters as in what regards the polemarch; and we have not sufficient information to enable us to determine whether in that later period the Athenians followed any known or perpetual rule in the battle order of the tribes. Military considerations, connected with the state of the particular army serving, must have prevented the constant observance of any rule. Thus we can hardly imagine that Nikias, commanding the army before Syracuse, could have been tied down to any invariable order of battle among the tribes to which his hoplites belonged. Moreover, the expedition against Syracuse lasted more than one Attic year: can it be believed that Nikias, on receiving information from Athens of the sequence in which the prytanies of the tribes had been drawn by lot during the second year of his expedition, would be compelled to marshal his army in a new battle order conformably to it? As the military operations of the Athenians became more extensive, they would find it necessary to leave such dispositions more and more to the general

Athens was about one hundred and fifty miles. They did not arrive, however, until the battle had been fought and the Persians departed. Curiosity led them to the field of Marathon to behold the dead bodies of the Persians; after which they returned home, bestowing well-merited praise on the victors.

Datis and Artaphernês returned across the Ægean with their Eretrian prisoners to Asia; stopping for a short time at the island of Mykonos, where discovery was made of a gilt image of Apollo carried off as booty in a Phenician ship. Datis went himself to restore it to Dêlos, requesting the Delians to carry it back to the Delium or temple of

Return of
Datis to
Asia—fate
of the
Eretrian
captives.

servicing in every particular campaign. It may well be doubted whether during the Peloponnesian war any established rule was observed in marshalling the tribes for battle.

One great motive which induces critics to maintain that the battle was fought in the Athenian month *Metageitnion*, is, that that month coincides with the Spartan month *Karneius*, so that the refusal of the Spartans to march before the full moon is construed to apply only to the peculiar sanctity of this last-mentioned month, instead of being a constant rule for the whole year. I perfectly agree with these critics, that the answer given by the Spartans to the courier *Pheidippidês* cannot be held to prove a regular, invariable Spartan maxim, applicable throughout the whole year, not to begin a march in the second quarter of the moon: very possibly, as *Boeckh* remarks, there may have been some festival impending during the particular month in question, upon which the Spartan refusal to march was founded. But no inference can be deduced from hence to disprove the sixth of *Boëdromion* as the day of the battle of *Marathon*: for though the months of every Grecian city were professedly lunar,

yet they never coincided with each other exactly or long together, because the systems of intercalation adopted in different cities were different: there was great irregularity and confusion (*Plutarch*, *Aristeidês*, c. 19; *Aristoxenus*, *Harmon.* ii. p. 30: compare also *K. F. Hermann*, *Ueber die Griechische Monatskunde*, p. 26, 27. *Göttingen*, 1844: and *Boeckh*, *ad Corp. Inscript.* T. i. p. 734).

Granting therefore that the answer given by the Spartans to *Pheidippidês* is to be construed, not as a general rule applicable to the whole year, but as referring to the particular month in which it was given—no inference can be drawn from hence as to the day of the battle of *Marathon*, because either of the two following suppositions is possible:—1. The Spartans may have had solemnities on the day of the full moon, or on the day before it, in *other months* besides *Karneius*; 2. or the full moon of the Spartan *Karneius* may actually have fallen, in the year 490 B.C., on the fifth or sixth of the Attic month *Boëdromion*.

Dr. Thirlwall appears to adopt the view of *Boeckh*, but does not add anything material to the reasons in its favour (*Hist. of Gr.* vol. ii. *Append.* III. p. 488).

Apollo on the eastern coast of Bœotia: the Delians however chose to keep the statue until it was reclaimed from them twenty years afterwards by the Thebans. On reaching Asia, the Persian generals conducted their prisoners up to the court of Susa and into the presence of Darius. Though he had been vehemently incensed against them yet when he saw them in his power, his wrath abated, and he manifested no desire to kill or harm them. They were planted at a spot called Arderikka, in the Kissian territory, one of the resting-places on the road from Sardis to Susa, and about twenty-six miles distant from the latter place. Herodotus seems himself to have seen their descendants there on his journey between the two capitals, and to have had the satisfaction of talking to them in Greek—which we may easily conceive to have made some impression upon him, at a spot distant by nearly three months' journey from the coast of Ionia.¹

Happy would it have been for Miltiadês if he had shared the honourable death of the polemarch Kallimachus —“animam exhalasset opimam”—in seeking to fire the ships of the defeated Persians at Marathon. The short sequel of his history will be found in melancholy contrast with the Marathonian heroism.

His reputation had been great before the battle, and after it the admiration and confidence of his countrymen knew no bounds. These feelings reached such a pitch, that his

Glory of Miltiadês —his subsequent conduct—unsuccessful expedition against Paros—bad hurt of Miltiadês.

¹ Herodot. vi. 119. Darius—σφίας τῆς Κισσίους χώρας κατοικίαις ἐν σταθμῷ ἑωυτοῦ τῷ ὀνόματι Ἀρδέρικκα—ἐνθαῦτα τοὺς Ἐρετριέας κατοικίαις Δαρείου, οἱ καὶ μέχρι ἐμὸς εἶχον τὴν χώραν ταύτην, φυλάσσοντες τὴν ἀρχαίην γλῶσσαν. The meaning of the word σταθμός is explained by Herodot. v. 52. σταθμός ἑωυτοῦ is the same as σταθμός βασιλῆος: the particulars which Herodotus recounts about Arderikka, and its remarkable well or pit of bitumen, salt, and oil, give every reason to believe that he had himself stopped there.

Strabo places the captive Ere-

trians in Gordyênê, which would be considerably higher up the Tigris; upon whose authority we do not know (Strabo, xv. 747).

The many particulars which are given respecting the descendants of these Eretrians in Kissia, by Philostratus in his *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, as they are alleged to have stood even in the first century of the Christian æra, cannot be safely quoted. With all the fiction there contained, some truth may perhaps be mingled; but we cannot discriminate it (Philostratus, *Vit. Apollon. i. c. 24-30*).

head was turned, and he lost both his patriotism and his prudence. He proposed to his countrymen to incur the cost of equipping an armament of seventy ships with an adequate armed force, and to place it altogether at his discretion; giving them no intimation whither he intended to go, but merely assuring them that if they would follow him, he would conduct them to a land where gold was abundant, and thus enrich them. Such a promise, from the lips of the recent victor of Marathon, was sufficient. The armament was granted, no man except Miltiadés knowing what was its destination. He sailed immediately to the island of Paros, laid siege to the town, and sent in a herald to require from the inhabitants a contribution of one hundred talents, on pain of entire destruction. His pretence for this attack was, that the Parians had furnished a trireme to Datis for the Persian fleet at Marathon; but his real motive (so Herodotus assures us¹) was vindictive animosity against a Parian citizen named Lysagoras, who had exasperated the Persian general Hydarnés against him. The Parians amused him at first with evasions, until they had procured a little delay to repair the defective portions of their wall, after which they set him at defiance. In vain did Miltiadés prosecute hostilities against them for the space of twenty-six days: he ravaged the island, but his attacks made no impression upon the town.² Beginning to despair of success in his military operations, he entered into some negotiation (such at least was the tale of the Parians themselves) with a Parian woman named Timô, priestess or attendant in the temple of Dêmêtêr near the town-gates. This woman, promising to reveal to him a secret which would place Paros in his power, induced him to visit by night a temple to which no male person was admissible. Having leaped the exterior

¹ Herodot. vi. 132. ἐπλεε ἐπὶ Πάρον, πρόφασιν ἔχων ὡς οἱ Πάριοι ὑπερῆσαν πρότεροι στρατευόμενοι τριήρει ἐς Μαραθῶνα ἅμα τῷ Πέρσῃ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ πρόσχημα τοῦ λόγου ἦν· ἀτὰρ τίνα καὶ ἔγκοτον εἶχε τοῖσι Πάριοισι διὰ Λυσαγόρα τὸν Τισίω, εὐόντα γένος Πάριον, διαβαλόντα μιν πρὸς Ἰθάρνα τὸν Πέρσῃ.

² Ephorus (Fragm. 107, ed. Didot; ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Πάρος)

gave an account of this expedition in several points different from Herodotus which latter I here follow. The authority of Herodotus is preferable in every respect; the more so, since Ephorus gives his narrative as a sort of explanation of the peculiar phrase ἀνακρίσειν. Explanatory narratives of that sort are usually little worthy of attention.

fence, he approached the sanctuary; but on coming near, he was seized with a panic terror and ran away, almost out of his senses. On leaping the same fence to get back, he strained or bruised his thigh badly, and became utterly disabled. In this melancholy state he was placed on ship-board; the siege being raised, and the whole armament returning to Athens.

Vehement was the indignation both of the armament and of the remaining Athenians against Miltiadês on his return.¹ Of this feeling Xanthippus, father of the great Periklês, became the spokesman. He impeached Miltiadês before the popular judicature, as having been guilty of deceiving the people and as having deserved the penalty of death. The accused himself, disabled by his injured thigh, which even began to show symptoms of gangrene, was unable to stand or to say a word in his own defence. He lay on his couch before the assembled judges, while his friends made the best case they could in his behalf. Defence, it appears, there was none: all they could do was to appeal to his previous services: they reminded the people largely and emphatically of the inestimable exploit of Marathon,

Disgrace of Miltiadês on his return.

¹ Herodot. vi. 136. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐκ Πάρου Μιλτιάδεα ἀποουστήσαντα ἔσχον ἐν στόμασι, οἱ τε ἄλλοι, καὶ μάλα τὸν Ξάνθιππος ὁ Ἀρίφρωνος· ὁ θανάτου ὑπαγαγὼν ὑπὸ τὸν δῆμον Μιλτιάδεα, εἰδίωκε τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀπάτης εἶνεκεν. Μιλτιάδης δὲ, αὐτὸς μὲν περῶν, οὐκ ἀπελογίετο· ἦν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὥστε σηπομένου τοῦ μηροῦ. Προκειμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐν κλίνῃ, ὑπεραπολογέοντο οἱ φίλοι, τῆς μάχης τε τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι γενομένης πολλὰ ἐπιμνησκόμενοι, καὶ τὴν Δῆμον αἰρεσιν ὡς ἐλὼν Δῆμόν τε καὶ τισάμενος τοὺς Πελασγούς, παρέδωκε Ἀθηναίοισι. Προσγενομένου δὲ τοῦ δήμου αὐτῶς κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τοῦ θανάτου, ζημιώσαντος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀδικίην πεντήκοντα τάλαντοισι, Μιλτιάδης μὲν μετὰ ταῦτα, σφακελισαντός τε τοῦ μηροῦ καὶ σαπέντος, τελευτᾷ· τὰ δὲ πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἐξέτισεν ὁ παῖς αὐτοῦ Κίμων.

Plato (Gorgias, c. 153. p. 516)

says that the Athenians passed a vote to cast Miltiadês into the barathrum (ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο), and that the would have been actually thrown in, if it had not been for the Prytanis, i. e. the president, by turn for that day, of the prytanising senators and of the Ekklesia. The Prytanis may perhaps have been among those who spoke to the dikastery on behalf of Miltiadês, deprecating the proposition made by Xanthippus; but that he should have caused a vote once passed to be actually rescinded, is incredible. The Scholiast on Aristeidês (cited by Valckenaer ad Herodot. vi. 136) reduces the exaggeration of Plato to something more reasonable—Ὅτι γὰρ ἐπρίνετο Μιλτιάδης ἐπὶ τῷ Πάρῳ, ἤβηλθην αὐτὸν κατακρημνίσαι· ὁ δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν εἰρητήσατο αὐτόν.

coming in addition to his previous conquest of Lemnos. The assembled dikasts or jurors showed their sense of such powerful appeals by rejecting the proposition of his accuser to condemn him to death; but they imposed on him the penalty of fifty talents "for his iniquity." Cornelius Nepos affirms that these fifty talents represented the expenses incurred by the state in fitting out the armament. But we may more probably believe, looking to the practice of the Athenian dikastery in criminal cases, that fifty talents was the minor penalty actually proposed by the defenders of Miltiadês themselves, as a substitute for the punishment of death.

In those penal cases at Athens, where the punishment was not fixed beforehand by the terms of the law, if the person accused was found guilty, it was customary to submit to the jurors, subsequently and separately, the question as to amount of punishment: first, the accuser named the penalty which he thought suitable; next, the accused person was called upon to name an amount of penalty for himself, and the jurors were constrained to take their choice between these two—no third gradation of penalty being admissible for consideration.¹ Of course, under such circumstances, it was the interest of the accused

¹ That this was the habitual course of Attic procedure in respect to public indictments, wherever a positive amount of penalty was not previously determined, appears certain. See Platner, *Prozess und Klagen beiden Attikern*, Abschn. vi. vol. i. p. 201; Heffter, *Die Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung*, p. 384. Meier and Schömann (*Der Attische Prozess*, b. iv. p. 726) maintain that any one of the dikasts might propose a third measure of penalty, distinct from that proposed by the accuser as well as the accused. In respect to public indictments, this opinion appears decidedly incorrect; but where the sentence to be pronounced involved a compensation for private wrong and an estimate of damages, we cannot so clearly determine whether there was not

sometimes a greater latitude in originating propositions for the dikasts to vote upon. It is to be recollected that these dikasts were several hundred, sometimes even more, in number—that there was no discussion or deliberation among them—and that it was absolutely necessary for some distinct proposition to be laid before them to take a vote upon. In regard to some offences, the law expressly permitted what was called a *προστίμην*; that is, after the dikasts had pronounced the full penalty demanded by the accuser, any other citizen, who thought the penalty so imposed insufficient, might call for a certain limited amount of additional penalty, and require the dikasts to vote upon it—*ay* or *no*. The votes of the dikasts were given

party to name, even in his own case, some real and serious penalty—something which the jurors might be likely to deem not wholly inadequate to his crime just proved; for if he proposed some penalty only trifling, he drove them to prefer the heavier sentence recommended by his opponent. Accordingly, in the case of Miltiadēs, his friends, desirous of inducing the jurors to refuse their assent to the punishment of death, proposed a fine of fifty talents as the self-assessed penalty of the defendant;

He is fined —dies of his wound —the fine is paid by his son Kimon.

by depositing pebbles in two casks, under certain arrangements of detail.

The ἀγών τιμητός, δίκη τιμητός, or trial including this separate admeasurement of penalty—as distinguished from the δίκη ἀτιμητός, or trial where the penalty was predetermined, and where there was no τιμησις, or vote of admeasurement of penalty—is an important line of distinction in the subject-matter of Attic procedure; and the practice of calling on the accused party, after having been pronounced guilty, to impose upon himself a counter-penalty or under-penalty (ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι or ὑποτιμᾶσθαι) in contrast with that named by the accuser, was a convenient expedient for bringing the question to a substantive vote of the dikasts. Sometimes accused persons found it convenient to name very large penalties on themselves, in order to escape a capital sentence invoked by the accuser (see Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 34. p. 743 R.). Nor was there any fear (as Platner imagines) that in the generality of cases the dikasts would be left under the necessity of choosing between an extravagant penalty and something merely nominal; for the interest of the accused party himself would prevent this from happening. Sometimes we see him endeavouring by entreaties to prevail

upon the accuser voluntarily to abate something of the penalty which he had at first named. The accuser might probably do this, if he saw that the dikasts were not likely to go along with that first proposition.

In one particular case, of immortal memory, that which Platner contemplates actually did happen; and the death of Sokratēs was the effect of it. Sokratēs, having been found guilty, only by a small majority of votes among the dikasts, was called upon to name a penalty upon himself, in opposition to that of death urged by Melētus. He was in vain entreated by his friends to name a fine of some tolerable amount, which they would at once have paid in his behalf; but he would hardly be prevailed upon to name any penalty at all, affirming that he had deserved honour rather than punishment; at last he named a fine so small in amount, as to be really tantamount to an acquittal. Indeed, Xenophon states that he would not name any counterpenalty at all; and in the speech ascribed to him, he contended that he had even merited the signal honour of a public maintenance in the Prytaneium (Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 27; Xenoph. Apol. Sok. 23; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 41). Plato and Xenophon do not agree; but taking the two together, it would

and perhaps they may have stated, as an argument in the case, that such a sum would suffice to defray the costs of the expedition. The fine was imposed, but Miltiadês did not live to pay it: his injured limb mortified, and he died, leaving the fine to be paid by his son Kimon.

According to Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus, and Plutarch, he was put in prison, after having been fined, and there died.¹ But Herodotus does not mention this imprisonment, nor does the fact appear to me probable: he would hardly have omitted to notice it, had it come to his knowledge. Immediate imprisonment of a person fined by the dikastery, until his fine was paid, was not the natural and ordinary course of Athenian procedure, though there were particular cases in which such aggravation was added. Usually a certain time was allowed for payment,² before absolute

seem that he must have named a very small fine. There can be little doubt that this circumstance, together with the tenor of his defence, caused the dikasts to vote for the proposition of Melêtus.

¹ Cornelius Nepos, Miltiadês, c. 7; and Kimon, c. 1; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 4; Diodorus, Fragment. lib. x. All these authors probably drew from the same original fountain; perhaps Ephorus (see Marx ad Ephori Fragmenta, p. 212); but we have no means of determining. Respecting the alleged imprisonment of Kimon, however, they must have copied from different authorities, for their statements are all different. Diodorus states, that Kimon put himself voluntarily into prison after his father had died there, because he was not permitted on any other condition to obtain the body of his deceased father for burial. Cornelius Nepos affirms that he was imprisoned, as being legally liable to the state for the unpaid fine of his father. Lastly, Plutarch does not represent him as having been put into prison at all. Many of the Latin writers follow the statement of Diodorus: see the citations in Bos's

note on the above passage of Cornelius Nepos.

There can be no hesitation in adopting the account of Plutarch as the true one. Kimon neither was, nor could be, in prison, by the Attic law, for an unpaid fine of his father; but after his father's death, he became liable for the fine, in the sense—that he remained disfranchised (*ἀτιμος*) and excluded from his rights as a citizen, until the fine was paid: see Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 46. p. 762 R.

² See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, b. iii. ch. 13. p. 390 Engl. Transl. (vol. i. p. 420 Germ.); Meier und Schömann, Attisch. Prozess, p. 744. Dr. Thirlwall takes a different view of this point, with which I cannot concur (*Hist. Gr.* vol. iii. Append. II. p. 488); though his general remarks on the trial of Miltiadês are just and appropriate (ch. xiv. p. 273).

Cornelius Nepos (Miltiadês, c. 8; Kimon, c. 3) says that the misconduct connected with Paros was only a pretence with the Athenians for punishing Miltiadês; their real motive (he affirms) was envy and fear, the same feelings which dic-

execution was resorted to; though the person under sentence became disfranchised and excluded from all political rights, from the very instant of his condemnation as a public debtor, until the fine was paid. Now in the instance of Miltiadês, the lamentable condition of his wounded thigh rendered escape impossible—so that there would be no special motive for departing from the usual practice, and imprisoning him forthwith: moreover if he was not imprisoned forthwith, he would not be imprisoned at all, since he cannot have lived many days after his trial.¹ To carry away the suffering general in his couch, incapable of raising himself even to plead for his own life, from the presence of the dikasts to a prison—would not only have been a needless severity, but could hardly have failed to imprint itself on the sympathies and the memory of all the beholders; so that Herodotus would have been likely to hear and mention it, if it had really occurred. I incline to believe therefore that Miltiadês died at home. All accounts concur in stating that he died of the mortal bodily hurt which already disabled him even at the moment of his trial, and that his son Kimon paid the fifty talents after his death. If *he* could pay them, probably his father could have paid them also. This is an additional reason for believing that there was no imprisonment—for nothing but non-payment could have sent him to prison; and to rescue the suffering Miltiadês from being sent thither, would have been the first and strongest desire of all sympathizing friends.

Thus closed the life of the conqueror of Marathon. The last act of it produces an impression so mournful, and even shocking—his descent, from the pinnacle of glory, to defeat, mean tampering with a temple-servant, mortal bodily hurt, undefended ignominy, and death under a sentence of heavy fine, is so abrupt and unprepared—that readers, ancient and modern, have not been satisfied without finding some one to blame for it: we must except Herodotus, our original authority, who recounts the transaction

Reflections on the closing adventures of the life of Miltiadês.

tated the ostracism of Kimon. How little there is to justify this fancy, may be seen even from the nature of the punishment inflicted. Fear would have prompted them to send away or put to death Miltiadês, not to fine him. The ostracism,

which was dictated by fear, was a temporary banishment.

¹ The interval between his trial and his decease is expressed in Herodotus (vi. 136) by the difference between the present participle *εἰρημένου* and the past participle *σπέντος τοῦ μηροῦ*.

without dropping a hint of blame against any one. To speak ill of the people, as Machiavel has long ago observed,¹ is a strain in which every one at all times, even under a democratical government, indulges with impunity and without provoking any opponent to reply. In this instance, the hard fate of Miltiadês has been imputed to the vices of the Athenians and their democracy—it has been cited in proof, partly of their fickleness, partly of their ingratitude. But however such blame may serve to lighten the mental sadness arising from a series of painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to those facts a reasonable criticism.

What is called the fickleness of the Athenians on this occasion is nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estimation of Miltiadês; unbounded admiration passing at once into extreme wrath. To censure them for fickleness is here an abuse of terms; such a change in their opinion was the unavoidable result of his conduct. His behaviour in the expedition of Paros was as reprehensible as at Marathon it had been meritorious, and the one succeeded immediately after the other; what else could ensue except an entire revolution in the Athenian feelings? He had employed his prodigious ascendancy over their minds to induce them to follow him without knowing whither, in the confidence of an unknown booty: he had exposed their lives and wasted their substance in wreaking a private grudge: in addition to the shame of an unprincipled project, comes the constructive shame of not having succeeded in it. Without doubt, such behaviour, coming from a man whom they admired to excess, must have produced a violent and painful revulsion in the feelings of his countrymen. The idea of having lavished praise and confidence upon a person who forthwith turns it to an unworthy purpose, is one of the greatest torments of the human bosom; and we may easily understand that the intensity of the subsequent displeasure would be aggravated by this reactionary sentiment without accusing the Athenians of fickleness. If an officer, whose

¹ Machiavel, Discorsi sopra Tito Livio, cap. 85. "L' opinione contro ai popoli nasce, perchè dei popoli ciascun dice male senza

paura, e liberamente ancora mentie che regnano: del principi si parla sempre con mille timori e mille rispetti."

conduct had been such as to merit the highest encomiums, comes on a sudden to betray his trust, and manifests cowardice or treachery in a new and important undertaking confided to him, are we to treat the general in command as fickle, because his opinion as well as his conduct undergoes an instantaneous revolution—which will be all the more vehement in proportion to his previous esteem? The question to be determined is, whether there be sufficient ground for such a change; and in the case of Miltiadês, that question must be answered in the affirmative.

In regard to the charge of ingratitude against the Athenians, this last-mentioned point—sufficiency of reason—stands tacitly admitted. It is conceded that Miltiadês deserved punishment for his conduct in reference to the Parian expedition, but it is nevertheless maintained that gratitude for his previous services at Marathon ought to have exempted him from punishment. But the sentiment, upon which, after all, this exculpation rests, will not bear to be drawn out and stated in the form of a cogent or justifying reason. For will any one really contend, that a man who has rendered great services to the public, is to receive in return a licence of unpunished misconduct for the future? Is the general, who has earned applause by eminent skill and important victories, to be recompensed by being allowed the liberty of betraying his trust afterwards, and exposing his country to peril, without censure or penalty? This is what no one intends to vindicate deliberately; yet a man must be prepared to vindicate it, when he blames the Athenians for ingratitude towards Miltiadês. For if all that be meant is, that gratitude for previous services ought to pass, not as a receipt in full for subsequent crime, but as an extenuating circumstance in the measurement of the penalty, the answer is, that it was so reckoned in the Athenian treatment of Miltiadês.¹ His friends had nothing

¹ Machiavel will not even admit so much as *this*, in the clear and forcible statement which he gives of the question here alluded to: he contends that the man who has rendered services ought to be recompensed for them, but that he ought to be punished for subsequent crime just as if the previous services had not been rendered.

He lays down this position in discussing the conduct of the Romans towards the victorious survivor of the three Horatii, after the battle with the Curiatii—"Erano stati i meriti di Orazio grandissimi, avendo con la sua virtù vinti i Curiazi. Era stato il fallo suo atroce, avendo merto la sorella. Nondimeno dispiacque tanto tale

whatever to urge, against the extreme penalty proposed by his accuser, except these previous services—which influenced the dikasts sufficiently to induce them to inflict the lighter punishment instead of the heavier. Now the whole amount of punishment inflicted consisted in a fine which certainly was not beyond his reasonable means of paying, or of prevailing upon friends to pay for him—since his son Kimon actually did pay it. Those who blame the Athenians for ingratitude, unless they are prepared to maintain the doctrine, that previous services are to pass as full acquittal for future crime, have no other ground left except to say that the fine was too high; that instead of being fifty talents, it ought to have been no more than forty, thirty, twenty, or ten talents. Whether they are right in this, I will not take upon me to pronounce: if the amount was named on behalf of the accused party, the dikastery had no legal power of diminishing it; but it is within such narrow limits that the question actually lies, when transferred from the province of sentiment to that of reason. It will be recollected that the death of Miltiades arose neither from his trial nor his fine, but from the hurt in his thigh.

The charge of ingratitude against the Athenian popular juries really amounts to this—that in trying a person accused of present crime or fault, they were apt to confine themselves too strictly and exclusively to the particular matter of charge, either forgetting, or making too little account of, past services which he might have rendered.

Usual temper of the Athenian dikasts in estimating previous services.

omicidio ai Romani, che lo condussero a disputare della vita, non ostante che gli meriti suoi fossero tanto grandi e si freschi. La qual cosa, a chi superficialmente la considerasse, parrebbe uno esempio d'ingratitude popolare. Nondimeno chi lo esaminerà meglio, e con migliore considerazione ricercherà quali debbono essere gli ordini delle repubbliche, biasimerà quel popolo piuttosto per averlo assoluto, che per averlo voluto condannare: e la ragione è questa, che nessuna repubblica bene ordinata, non mai

cancellò i demeriti con gli meriti dei suoi cittadini: ma avendo ordinati i premi ad una buona opera, e le pene ad una cattiva, ed avendo premiato uno per aver bene operato, se quel medesimo opera dipoi male, lo gastiga senza avere riguardo alcuno alle sue buone opere. E quando questi ordini sono bene osservati, una città vive libera molto tempo: altrimenti sempre rovinerà presto. *Perchè se, ad un cittadino che abbia fatto qualche egregia opera per la città, si aggiunge oltre alla riputazione, che quella cosa gli arreca,*

Whoever imagines that such was the habit of Athenian dikasts, must have studied the orators to very little purpose. Their real defect was the very opposite: they were too much disposed to wander from the special issue before them, and to be affected by appeals to previous services and conduct.¹ That which an accused person at Athens usually strives to produce is, an impression in the minds of the dikasts favourable to his general character and behaviour: of course he meets the particular allegation of his accuser as well as he can, but he never fails also to remind them emphatically, how well he has performed his general duties of a citizen—how many times he has served in military expeditions—how many trierarchies and liturgies he has performed, and performed with splendid efficiency. In fact, the claim of an accused person to acquittal is made to rest too much on his prior services, and too little upon innocence or justifying matter as to the particular indictment. When we come down to the time of the orators, I shall be prepared to show that such indisposition to confine themselves to a special issue was one of the most serious defects of the assembled dikasts at Athens. It is one which we should naturally expect from a body of private, non-professional citizens assembled for the occasion—and which belongs more or less to the system of jury-trial everywhere; but it is the direct reverse of that ingratitude, or habitual insensibility to prior services, for which they have been so often denounced.

The fate of Miltiadês, then, so far from illustrating either the fickleness or the ingratitude of his countrymen, attests their just appreciation of deserts. It also illustrates another moral, of no small importance to the right comprehension of Grecian affairs;—it teaches us the painful lesson,

Tendency of eminent Greeks to be corrupted by success.

una audacia e confidenza di potere senza temer pena, far qualche opera non buona, diventerà in breve tempo tanto insolente, che si risolverà ogni civiltà.—Machiavel, Discorsi sop. Tit. Livio, c. 24.

¹ Machiavel, in the twenty-ninth chapter of his *Discorsi sopra T. Livio*, examines the question, "Which of the two is more open to the charge of being ungrateful

—a popular government or a king?" he thinks that the latter is more open to it. Compare chap. 59 of the same work, where he again supports a similar opinion.

M. Sismondi also observes, in speaking of the long attachment of the city of Pisa to the cause of the Emperors and to the Ghibelin party—"Pise montra dans plus d'une occasion, par sa constance

how perfectly maddening were the effects of a copious draught of glory on the temperament of an enterprising and ambitious Greek. There can be no doubt, that the rapid transition, in the course of about one week, from Athenian terror before the battle to Athenian exultation after it, must have produced demonstrations towards Miltiadês such as were never paid towards any other man in the whole history of the commonwealth. Such unmeasured admiration unseated his rational judgement. His mind became abandoned to the reckless impulses of insolence, and antipathy, and rapacity;—that distempered state, for which (according to Grecian morality) the retributive Nemesis was ever on the watch, and which in his case she visited with a judgement startling in its rapidity as well as terrible in its amount. Had Miltiadês been the same man before the battle of Marathon as he became after it, the battle might probably have turned out a defeat instead of a victory. Dêmôsthenês indeed,¹ in speaking of the wealth and luxury of political leaders in his own time, and the profuse rewards bestowed upon them by the people, pointed in contrast to the house of Miltiadês as being noway more splendid than that of a private man. But though Miltiadês might continue to live in a modest establishment, he received from his countrymen marks of admiration and deference such as were never paid to any citizen before or after him; and, after all, admiration and deference constitute the precious essence of popular reward. No man except Miltiadês ever dared to raise his voice in the Athenian assembly, and say—"Give me a fleet of ships: do not ask what I am going to do with them, but only follow me, and I will enrich you." Herein we may read the unmeasured confidence which the Athenians placed in their victorious general, and the utter incapacity of a leading Greek to bear it without mental depravation; while we learn from it to draw the melancholy inference, that one result of success was to make the successful leader one of the most dangerous men in the community. We shall

à supporter la cause des empereurs au milieu des revers, combien la reconnaissance lie un peuple libre d'une manière plus puissante et plus durable qu'elle ne sauroit lier le peuple gouverné par un

seul homme."—(Histoire des Républ. Italiennes, ch. xiii. tom. ii. p. 302).

¹ Dêmôsthenês, Olynth. III. c. 9. p. 35 R.

presently be called upon to observe the same tendency in the case of the Spartan Pausanias, and even in that of the Athenian Themistoklès.

It is indeed fortunate that the reckless aspirations of Miltiadès did not take a turn more noxious to Athens than the comparatively unimportant enterprise against Paros. For had he sought to acquire dominion and gratify antipathies against enemies at home, instead of directing his blow against a Parian enemy, the peace and security of his country might have been seriously endangered. Of the despots who gained power in Greece, a considerable proportion began by popular conduct and by rendering good service to their fellow-citizens: having first earned public gratitude, they abused it for purposes of their own ambition. There was far greater danger, in a Grecian community, of dangerous excess of gratitude towards a victorious soldier, than of deficiency in that sentiment. The person thus exalted acquired a position such that the community found it difficult afterwards to shake him off. Now there is a disposition almost universal among writers and readers to side with an individual, especially an eminent individual, against the multitude. Accordingly those who under such circumstances suspect the probable abuse of an exalted position, are denounced as if they harboured an unworthy jealousy of superior abilities; but the truth is, that the largest analogies of the Grecian character justified that suspicion, and required the community to take precautions against the corrupting effects of their own enthusiasm. There is no feature which more largely pervades the impressive Grecian character, than a liability to be intoxicated and demoralised by success: there was no fault from which so few eminent Greeks were free: there was hardly any danger, against which it was at once so necessary and so difficult for the Grecian governments to take security—especially the democracies, where the manifestations of enthusiasm were always the loudest. Such is the real explanation of those charges which have been urged against the Grecian democracies, that they came to hate and ill-treat previous benefactors. The history of Miltiadès illustrates it in a manner no less pointed than painful.

I have already remarked that the fickleness, which has been so largely imputed to the Athenian democracy in their dealings with him, is nothing more than a reasonable

change of opinion on the best grounds: nor can it be said that fickleness was in any case an attribute of the Athenian democracy. It is a well-known fact, that feelings, or opinions, or modes of judging, which have once obtained footing among a large number of people, are more lasting and unchangeable than those which belong only to one or a few; insomuch that the judgments and actions of the many admit of being more clearly understood as to the past, and more certainly predicted as to the future. If we are to predicate any attribute of the multitude, it will rather be that of undue tenacity than undue fickleness. There will occur nothing in the course of this history to prove that the Athenian people changed their opinions, on insufficient grounds, more frequently than an irresponsible one or few would have changed.

But there were two circumstances in the working of the Athenian democracy which imparted to it an appearance of greater fickleness, without the reality:—First, that the manifestations and changes of opinion were all open, undisguised, and noisy: the people gave utterance to their present impression, whatever it was, with perfect frankness; if their opinions were really changed, they had no shame or scruple in avowing it: Secondly—and this is a point of capital importance in the working of democracy generally—the *present* impression, whatever it might be, was not merely undisguised in its manifestations, but also had a tendency to be exaggerated in its intensity. This arose from their habit of treating public affairs in multitudinous assemblages, the well-known effect of which is, to inflame sentiment in every man's bosom by mere contact with a sympathising circle of neighbours. Whatever the sentiment might be, fear, ambition, cupidity, wrath, compassion, piety, patriotic devotion, &c.;¹ and whether well-founded or ill-

¹ This is the general truth, which ancient authors often state, both partially, and in exaggerated terms as to degree:—"Hæc est natura multitudinis (says Livy); aut humiliter servit aut superbe dominatur." Again, Tacitus—"Nihil in vulgo modicum; terrere, ni paveant; ubi perimuerint, impune contemni." (Annal. i. 29.) Hero-

dotus, iii. 81. ὁ θέλει δὲ (ὁ δῆμος) ἀπερῶν τὰ πρήγματα ἔνευ νοῦ, χειμάρρῳ ποταμῶ ἔχειλος.

It is remarkable that Aristotle, in his *Politica*, takes little or no notice of this attribute belonging to every numerous assembly. He seems rather to reason as if the aggregate intelligence of the multitude was represented by the sum

founded—it was constantly influenced more or less by such intensifying cause. This is a defect which of course belongs in a certain degree to all exercise of power by numerous bodies, even though they be representative bodies—especially when the character of the people, instead of being comparatively sedate and slow to move, like the English, is quick, impressible, and fiery, like Greeks or Italians; but it operated far more powerfully on the self-acting *Dêmos* assembled in the *Pnyx*. It was in fact the constitutional malady of the democracy, of which the people were themselves perfectly sensible—as I shall show hereafter from the securities which they tried to provide against it—but which no securities could ever wholly eradicate. Frequency of public assemblies, far from aggravating the evil, had a tendency to lighten it. The people thus became accustomed to hear and balance many different views as a preliminary to ultimate judgement; they contracted personal interest and esteem for a numerous class of dissentient speakers; and they even acquired a certain practical consciousness of their own liability to error. Moreover the diffusion of habits of public speaking, by means of the sophists and the rhetors, whom it has been so much the custom to disparage, tended in the same direction—to break the unity of sentiment among the listening crowd, to multiply separate judgements, and to neutralise the contagion of mere sympathising impulse. There were important deductions, still farther assisted by the superior taste and intelligence of the Athenian people: but still the inherent malady remained—excessive and misleading intensity of present sentiment. It was this which gave such inestimable value to the ascendancy of *Periklês*, as depicted by *Thucydîdês*: his hold on the people was so firm, that he could always speak with effect against excess of the reigning tone of feeling. “When *Periklês* (says the historian) saw the people in a state of unreasonable and insolent confidence, he spoke so as to cow them into alarm; when

total of each man's separate intelligence in all the individuals composing it (*Polit.* iii. 6. 4. 10. 12), just as the property of the multitude, taken collectively, would be greater than that of the few rich. He takes no notice of the difference between a number of individuals

judging jointly and judging separately: I do not indeed observe that such omission leads him into any positive mistake, but it occurs in some cases calculated to surprise us, and where the difference here adverted to is important to notice; see *Polit.* iii. 10. 5, 6.

again they were in groundless terror, he combated it, and brought them back to confidence."¹ We shall find D m sthen s, with far inferior ascendancy, employed in the same honourable task. The Athenian people often stood in need of such correction, but unfortunately did not always find statesmen, at once friendly and commanding, to administer it.

These two attributes, then, belonged to the Athenian democracy; first, their sentiments of every kind were manifested loudly and openly; next, their sentiments tended to a pitch of great present intensity. Of course, therefore, when they changed, the change of sentiment stood prominent and forced itself upon every one's notice—being a transition from one strong sentiment past to another strong sentiment present.² And it was because such alterations, when they did take place, stood out so palpably to remark, that the Athenian people have drawn upon themselves the imputation of fickleness: for it is not at all true (I repeat) that changes of sentiment were more frequently produced in them by frivolous or insufficient causes, than changes of sentiment in other governments.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65. "Οποτε γοϋν αΐσθαιτό τι αϋτοϋς παρά καιρόν ὕβρει θρασϋντας, λέγων κατέπλησεν πάλιν ἐπί τό φοβείσθαι καί δεδιότας αϋ αλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπί το θρασιν.

² Such swing of the mind, from one intense feeling to another, is always deprecated by the Greek

moralists, from the earliest to the latest; even Demokritus, in the fifth century B.C., admonishes against it—Αί ἐκ μεγάλων διαστημάτων κινεόμεναι τῶν ψυχῶν οϋτε εϋσταθεές εἰσιν, οϋτε εϋθυμοί. (Democriti Fragmenta, lib. iii. p. 168. ed. Mullach ap. Stobaeum, Florileg. i. 40.)

CHAPTER XXXVII.

IONIC PHILOSOPHERS.—PYTHAGORAS.—KROTON AND SYBARIS.

THE history of the powerful Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily, between the accession of Peisistratus and the battle of Marathon, is for the most part unknown to us. Phalaris, despot of Agrigentum in Sicily, made for himself an unenviable name during this obscure interval. His reign seems to coincide in time with the earlier part of the rule of Peisistratus (about 560-540 B.C.), and the few and vague statements, which we find respecting it,¹ merely show us that it was a period of extortion and cruelty, even beyond the ordinary licence of Grecian despots. The reality of the hollow bull of brass, which Phalaris was accustomed to heat in order to shut up his victims in it and burn them, appears to be better authenticated than the nature of the story would lead us to presume. For it is not only noticed by Pindar, but even the actual instrument of this torture—the brazen bull itself²—which had been taken away from Agrigentum

Phalaris
despot of
Agrigentum.

¹ The letters of Bentley against Boyle, discussing the pretended Epistles of Phalaris—full of acuteness and learning though beyond measure excursive—are quite sufficient to teach us that little can be safely asserted about Phalaris. His date is very imperfectly ascertained. Compare Bentley, p. 82, 83, and Seyfert, *Akragas und sein Gebiet*, p. 60: the latter assigns the reign of Phalaris to the years 570-554 B.C. It is surprising to see Seyfert citing the letters of the pseudo-Phalaris as an authority, after the exposure of Bentley.

² Pindar. *Pyth.* 1 *ad fin.* with the Scholia, p. 310, ed. Boeckh; Polyb.

xii. 25; Diodor. xiii. 99; Cicero cont. Verr. iv. 33. The contradiction of Timæus is noway sufficient to make us doubt the authenticity of the story. Ebert (*Συζήσιον*, part ii. p. 41-84, Königsberg, 1829) collects all the authorities about the bull of Phalaris. He believes the matter of fact substantially. Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, ii. 20) tells a story of the fable whereby Stésichorus the poet dissuaded the inhabitants of Himera from granting a guard to Phalaris: Conon (*Narrat.* 42 ap. Photium) recounts the same story with the name of Hiero substituted for that of Phalaris. But it is not likely that either the one or the

as a trophy by the Carthaginians when they captured the town, was restored by the Romans, on the subjugation of Carthage, to its original domicile. Phalaris is said to have acquired the supreme command by undertaking the task of building a great temple¹ to Zeus Polieus on the citadel rock; a pretence, whereby he was enabled to assemble and arm a number of workmen and devoted partisans, whom he employed, at the festival of the Thesmophoria, to put down the authorities. He afterwards disarmed the citizens by a stratagem, and committed cruelties which rendered him so abhorred, that a sudden rising of the people, headed by Télémachus (ancestor of the subsequent despot Théron), overthrew and slew him. A severe revenge was taken on his partisans after his fall.²

During the interval between 540-500 B.C., events of much importance occurred among the Italian Greeks—especially at Kroton and Sybaris—events, unhappily, very imperfectly handed down. Between these two periods fall both the war between Sybaris and Kroton, and the career and ascendancy of Pythagoras. In connexion with this latter name, it will be requisite to say a few words respecting the other Grecian philosophers of the sixth century B.C.

I have, in a former chapter, noticed and characterized those distinguished persons called the Seven Wise Thalés. Men of Greece, whose celebrity falls in the first half of this century—men not so much marked by scientific genius as by practical sagacity and foresight in the appreciation of worldly affairs, and enjoying a high degree of political respect from their fellow-citizens. One of them, however, the Milesian Thalés, claims our notice, not only on this ground, but also as the earliest known name in the long line of Greek scientific investigators. His life, nearly contemporary with that of Solon, belongs seemingly to the interval about 640-550 B.C.: the stories mentioned in Herodotus (perhaps borrowed in part from the Milesian Hekataeus) are sufficient to show that his reputation, for wisdom as well as for science, continued to be very great, even a century after his death, among his fellow-citizens. And he marks an important epoch in the progress of the Greek

other could ever have been in such relations with the citizens of Himera. Compare Polybius, vii. 7. 2.

¹ Polyan. v. 1, 1; Cicero de Officiis, ii. 7.

² Plutarch, Philosophand. cum Principibus, c. 3. p. 778.

mind, as having been the first man to depart both in letter and spirit from the Hesiodic Theogony, introducing the conception of substances with their transformations and sequences, in place of that string of persons and quasi-human attributes which had animated the old legendary world. He is the father of what is called the Ionic philosophy, which is considered as lasting from his time down to that of Sokratês. Writers ancient as well as modern have professed to trace a succession of philosophers, each one the pupil of the preceding, between these two extreme epochs. But the appellation is in truth undefined and even incorrect, since nothing entitled to the name of a school, or sect, or succession (like that of the Pythagoreans, to be noticed presently) can be made out. There is indeed a certain general analogy in the philosophical vein of Thalês, Hippo, Anaximenês, and Diogenês of Apollonia, whereby they all stand distinguished from Xenophanês of Elea, and his successors the Eleatic dialecticians Parmenidês and Zêno; but there are also material differences between their respective doctrines—no two of them holding the same. And if we look to Anaximander (the person next in order of time to Thalês), as well as to Herakleitus, we find them departing in a great degree even from that character which all the rest have in common, though both the one and the other are usually enrolled in the list of Ionic philosophers.

Of the old legendary and polytheistic conception of nature, which Thalês partially discarded, we may remark that it is a state of the human mind in which the problems suggesting themselves to be solved, and the machinery for solving them, bear a fair proportion one to the other. If the problems be vast, indeterminate, confused, and derived rather from the hopes, fears, love, hatred, astonishment, &c., of men, than from any genuine desire of knowledge—so also does the received belief supply invisible agents in unlimited number and with every variety of power and inclination. The means of explanation are thus multiplied and diversified as readily as the phænomena to be explained. Though no event or state which has not yet occurred can be predicted, there is little difficulty in rendering a plausible account of every thing which has occurred in the past—of any and all things alike. Cosmogony, and the

Ionic philosophers
—not a school or succession.

Step in philosophy
commenced by Thalês.

prior ages of the world, were conceived as a sort of personal history with intermarriages, filiation, quarrels, and other adventures, of these invisible agents; among whom some one or more were assumed as unbegotten and self-existent—the latter assumption being a difficulty common to all systems of cosmogony, and from which even this flexible and expansive hypothesis is not exempt. Now when Thalès disengaged Grecian philosophy from the old mode of explanation, he did not at the same time disengage it from the old problems and matters propounded for inquiry. These he retained, and transmitted to his successors, as vague and vast as they were at first conceived; and so they remained, though with some transformations and modifications, together with many new questions equally insoluble, substantially present to the Greeks throughout their whole history, as the legitimate problems for philosophical investigation. But these problems, adapted only to the old elastic system of polytheistic explanation and omnipresent personal agency, became utterly disproportioned to any impersonal hypotheses such as those of Thalès and the philosophers after him—whether assumed physical laws, or plausible moral and metaphysical dogmas, open to argumentative attack, and of course requiring the like defence. To treat the visible world as a whole, and inquire when and how it began, as well as into all its past changes—to discuss the first origin of men, animals, plants, the sun, the stars, &c.—to assign some comprehensive reason, why motion or change in general took place in the universe—to investigate the destinies of the human race, and to lay down some systematic relation between them and the gods—all these were topics admitting of being conceived in many different ways, and set forth with eloquent plausibility; but not reducible to any solution resting on scientific evidence or commanding steady adherence under a free scrutiny.¹

¹ The less these problems are adapted for rational solution, the more nobly do they present themselves in the language of a great poet: see as a specimen, Euripides, Fragment 101, ed. Dindorf.

Ὀλβίος δασίς τῆς ἱστορίας
Ἔσχε μάθησιν, μήτε πολιτῶν

Ἐπὶ πηροσύνη, μήτ' εἰς ἀδίκοις
Ἡράεις ὄρμων·

Ἄλλ' ἀθανάτου κτητορῶν φύσεως
Κόσμον ἀγγῆρω, πῆ τε συνέστη
καὶ θεῶν καὶ θεῶν.

Τοῖς δὲ τοιοῦτοις οὐδέποτε' αἰσχρῶν
Ἔργων μελέτημα προσίξαι.

At the time when the power of scientific investigation was scanty and helpless, the problems proposed were thus such as to lie out of the reach of science in its largest compass. Gradually indeed subjects more special and limited, and upon which experience or deductions from experience could be brought to bear, were added to the list of *quæsitæ*, and examined with profit and instruction. But the old problems, with new ones alike unfathomable, were never eliminated, and always occupied a prominent place in the philosophical world. Now it was this disproportion, between questions to be solved and means of solution, which gave rise to that conspicuous characteristic of Grecian philosophy—the antagonist force of suspensive scepticism, passing in some minds into a broad negation of the attainability of general truth—which it nourished from its beginning to its end; commencing as early as Xenophanês, continuing to manifest itself seven centuries afterwards in Ænesidêmus and Sextus Empiricus, and including in the interval between these two extremes some of the most powerful intellects in Greece. The present is not the time for considering these Sceptics, who bear an unpopular name, and have not often been fairly appreciated; the more so, as it often suited the purpose of men themselves more than half sceptical, like Sokratês and Plato, to denounce professed scepticism with indignation. But it is essential to bring them into notice at the first spring of Grecian philosophy under Thalês, because the circumstances were then laid which so soon afterwards developed them.

One cause
of the
vein of
scepticism
which runs
through
Grecian
philosophy.

Though the celebrity of Thalês in antiquity was great and universal, scarcely any distinct facts were known respecting him: it is certain that he left nothing in writing. Extensive travels in Egypt and Asia are ascribed to him, and as a general fact these travels are doubtless true, since no other means of acquiring knowledge were then open. At a time when the brother of the Lesbian Alkæus was serving in the Babylonian army, we may well conceive that an inquisitive Milesian would make his way to that wonderful city wherein stood the temple-observatory of the Chaldæan priesthood. How great his reputation was in his lifetime, the admiration expressed by his younger contemporary Xenophanês assures us; and Herakleitus, in the next generation, a severe judge of all other philo-

sophers, spoke of him with similar esteem. To him were traced by the Grecian inquirers of the fourth century B.C., the first beginnings of geometry, astronomy, and physiology in its large and really appropriate sense, the scientific study of nature: for the Greek word denoting nature ($\varphiύσις$) first comes into comprehensive use about this time (as I have remarked in an earlier chapter¹) with its derivatives *physics* and *physiology*, as distinguished from the *theology* of the old poets. Little stress can be laid on those elementary propositions in geometry which are specified as discovered, or as first demonstrated, by Thalês—still less upon the solar eclipse respecting which (according to Herodotus) he determined beforehand the year of occurrence.² But the main doctrine of his physiology (using that word in its larger Greek sense) is distinctly attested. He stripped Oceanus and Tethys, primæval parents of the gods in the Homeric theogony, of their personality and laid down water, or fluid substance, as the single original element from which every thing came and into which every thing returned.³ The doctrine of one eternal element, remaining always the same in its essence, but indefinitely variable in its manifestations to sense, was thus first introduced to the discussion of the Grecian public. We have no means of knowing the reasons by which Thalês supported this opinion, nor could even Aristotle do more than conjecture what they might have been; but one of the statements urged on behalf of it—that the earth itself rested on water⁴—we may safely refer to the Milesian himself, for it would hardly have been advanced at a later age. Moreover Thalês is reported to have held, that everything was living and full of gods; and that the magnet, especially, was a living thing. Thus the gods, as far as we can pretend to follow opinions so very faintly transmitted, are conceived as active powers, and causes of changeful manifestation, attached to the

¹ Vol. I. ch. xvi.

² Diogen. Laërt. i. 23; Herodot. l. 75; Apuleius, Florid. iv. p. 144, Bip.

Proclus, in his Commentary on Euclid, specifies several propositions said to have been discovered by Thalês (Brandis, Handbuch der

Gr. Philos. ch. xxviii. p. 11).

³ Aristotel. Metaphys. i. 3; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i. 3. p. 875. $\delta\varsigma \epsilon\tilde{\iota}\tilde{\nu} \delta\delta\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma \varphi\eta\sigma\iota \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha \epsilon\iota\tilde{\nu}\alpha\iota, \kappa\alpha\iota \epsilon\iota\varsigma \delta\delta\omega\pi \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha \acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\lambda\upsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota.$

⁴ Aristotel. *ut supra*, and De Cælo, ii. 13.

primæval substance;¹ the universe being assimilated to an organised body or system.

Respecting Hippo—who reproduced the theory of Thalês with some degree of generalization, substituting, in place of water, moisture, or something common to air and water²—we do not know whether he belonged to the sixth or the fifth century B.C.: but both Anaximander, Anaximander, Xenophanês, and Pherekydês belong to the latter half of the sixth century. Anaximander the son of Praxiadês was a native of Milêtus—Xenophanês, a native of Kolophôn; the former among the earliest expositors of doctrine in prose,³ while the latter committed his opinions to the old medium of verse. Anaximander seems to have taken up the philosophical problem, while he materially altered the hypothesis, of his predecessor Thalês. Instead of the primæval fluid of the latter, he supposed a primæval principle, without any actual determining qualities whatever, but including all qualities potentially, and manifesting them in an infinite variety from its continually self-changing nature—a principle, which was nothing in itself, yet had the capacity of producing any and all manifestations, however contrary to each other⁴—a primæval something,

¹ Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2—5; Cicero, De Legg. ii. 11; Diogen. Laërt. i. 24.

² Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Anaximander Aphrodis. in Aristotel. Metaphys. i. 8.

³ Apollodorus, in the second century B.C., had before him some brief expository treatises of Anaximander (Diogen. Laërt. ii. 2): Περὶ Φύσεως, ἢ τῆς Περιόδου, Περὶ τῶν Ἀπλανῶν καὶ Σφαίρων καὶ ἄλλα τινά. Suidas, v. Ἀναξίμανδρος. Themistius, Orat. xxv. p. 317: ἐθάβρησε πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν Ἑλλάνων λόγον ἐξευεργεῖν περὶ Φύσεως συγγραμμένον.

⁴ Irenæus, ii. 19 (14), ap. Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Griech. Röm. Philos. ch. xxxv. p. 133: "Anaximander hoc quod immensum est, omnium initium subiecit, seminaliter habens in semetipso omnium genesin, ex quo immensos mundos constare ait."

Aristotel. Physic. Auscult. iii. 4. p. 203 Bek. οὐτε γὰρ μάτην αὐτὸ οἶόν τε εἶναι (τὸ ἄπειρον), οὐτε ἄλλην ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν, πλήνως ἀρχήν. Aristotle subjects this ἄπειρον to an elaborate discussion, in which he says very little more about Anaximander, who appears to have assumed it without anticipating discussion or objections. Whether Anaximander called his ἄπειρον divine, or god, as Tennemann (Gesch. d. Philos. i. 2. p. 67) and Panzerbieter affirm (ad Diogenis Apolloniat. Fragment. c. 13. p. 16), I think doubtful: this is rather an inference which Aristotle elicits from his language. Yet in another passage, which is difficult to reconcile, Aristotle ascribes to Anaximander the water doctrine of Thalês (Aristotel. de Xenophane, p. 975, Bek.).

Anaximander seems to have

whose essence it was to be eternally productive of different phænomena—a sort of mathematical point, which counts for nothing in itself, but is vigorous in generating lines to any extent that may be desired. In this manner Anaximander professed to give a comprehensive explanation of change in general, or Generation or Destruction—how it happened that one sensible thing began and another ceased to exist—according to the vague problems which these early inquirers were in the habit of setting to themselves.¹ He avoided that which the first philosophers especially dreaded, the affirmation that generation could take place out of Nothing; yet the primæval Something which he supposed was only distinguished from Nothing by possessing this power of generation. In his theory he passed from the province of physics into that of metaphysics. He first introduced into Grecian philosophy that important word which signifies a Beginning or a Principle,² and first opened that metaphysical discussion, which was carried on in various ways throughout the whole period of Grecian philosophy, as to the One and the

Problem of the One and the Many—the Permanent and the Variable.

Many—the Continuous and the Variable—that which exists eternally, as distinguished from that which comes and passes away in ever-changing manifestations. His physiology or explanation of nature thus conducted the mind into a different route from that suggested by the

hypothesis of Thalès, which was built upon physical considerations, and was therefore calculated to suggest and stimulate observations of physical phænomena for the purpose of verifying or confuting it—while the hypothesis of Anaximander admitted only of being discussed dialectically, or by reasonings expressed in general language; reasonings, sometimes indeed referring to experience for the purpose of illustration, but seldom resting on it—and never looking out for it as a necessary support. The physical explanation of nature, however, once introduced by Thalès,

followed speculations analogous to that of Thalès in explaining the first production of the human race (Plutarch. Placit. Philos. v. 19. p. 908), and in other matters (ibid. iii. 16. p. 896).

¹ Aristotel. De Generat. et Construct. c. 8. p. 317, Bek. ὁ μάλιστα

φοβούμενοι διετέλεσαν οἱ πρώτοι φιλοσοφῆσαντες, τὸ ἐκ μηδενός γίνεσθαι προὔπαρχοντος: compare Physic. Auscultat. 1. 4. p. 187, Bek.

² Simplicius in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 6, 32. πρώτος αὐτὸς Ἀρχὴν ὀνομάσας τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

although deserted by Anaximander, was taken up by Anaximenês and others afterwards, and reproduced with many divergences of doctrine—yet always more or less entangled and perplexed with metaphysical additions, since the two departments were never clearly parted throughout all Grecian philosophy.

Of these subsequent physical philosophers I shall speak hereafter: at present I confine myself to the thinkers of the sixth century B.C., among whom Anaximander stands prominent, not as the follower of Thalês, but as the author of an hypothesis both new and tending in a different direction. It was not merely as the author of this hypothesis, however, that Anaximander enlarged the Greek mind and roused the powers of thought: we find him also mentioned as distinguished in astronomy and geometry. He is said to have been the first to establish a sun-dial in Greece, to construct a sphere, and to explain the obliquity of the ecliptic;¹ how far such alleged authorship really belongs to him, we cannot be certain—but there is one step of immense importance which he is clearly affirmed to have made. He was the first to compose a treatise on the geography of the land and sea within his cognizance, and to construct a chart or map founded thereupon—seemingly a tablet of brass. Such a novelty, wondrous even to the rude and ignorant, was calculated to stimulate powerfully inquisitive minds, and from it may be dated the commencement of Grecian rational geography—not the least valuable among the contributions of this people to the stock of human knowledge.

Xenophanês of Kolophon, somewhat younger than Anaximander and nearly contemporary with Pythagoras (seemingly from about 570-480 B.C.), migrated from Kolophon² to Zanklê and Katana in Sicily and Elea in Italy, soon after the time when Ionia became subject to the Persians (540-530 B.C.). He was the founder of what is called the Eleatic school of philosophers—a real school, since it appears that Parmenidês, Zeno, and Melissus, pursued and developed, in a great degree, the train of speculation which had been begun by Xenophanês—doubt-

Xenophanês—his doctrine the opposite of that of Anaximander.

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ii. 81, 2. He (Aristotel. de Cœlo, ii. 13, p. 295, agreed with Thalês in maintaining ed. Bekk.).
that the earth was stationary ² Diogen. Laërt. ix. 18.

less with additions and variations of their own, but especially with a dialectic power which belongs to the age of Periklēs, and is unknown in the sixth century B.C. He was the author of more than one poem of considerable length, one on the foundation of Kolophon and another on that of Elea; besides his poem on Nature, wherein his philosophical doctrines were set forth.¹ His manner appears to have been controversial and full of asperity towards antagonists. But what is most remarkable is the plain-spoken manner in which he declared himself against the popular religion, and in which he denounced as abominable the descriptions of the gods given by Homer and Hesiod.² He is said to have controverted the doctrines both of Thalēs and Pythagoras: this is probable enough; but he seems to have taken his start from the philosophy of Anaximander—not however to adopt it, but to reverse it—and to set forth an opinion which we may call its contrary. Nature, in the conception of Anaximander, consisted of a Something having no other attribute except the unlimited power of generating and cancelling phænomenal changes: in this doctrine the Something or Substratum existed only in and for those changes, and could not be said to exist at all in any other sense: the Permanent was thus merged and lost in the Variable—the One in the Many. Xenophanēs laid down the exact opposite: he conceived nature as one unchangeable and indivisible Whole, spherical, animated, endowed with reason, and penetrated by or indeed identical with God. He denied the objective reality of all change, or generation, or destruction, which he seems to have considered as only changes or modifications in the percipient, and perhaps different in one percipient and another. That which exists (he maintained) could not have been generated, nor could it ever be destroyed: there was neither real generation nor real destruction of anything; but that which men took for such was the change in their own feelings and ideas. He thus recognised the Permanent without the Variable³—the

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ix. 22; Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. p. 294.

² Sextus Empiricus, adv. Mathem. ix. 193.

³ Aristot. Metaphys. i. 5. p. 986, Bek. Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων ἐνίστασας, οὐδὲν διασφάττεισεν, οὐδὲ τῆς φύσεως τούτων (τοῦ κατὰ τὸν

λόγον ἑνός καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην) οὐδετέρας εἶκοι θεγεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ἕλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν εἶναι φησι τὸν θεόν.

Plutarch. ap. Eusebium Præparat. Evangel. i. 8. Ξενοφάνης γὰρ ὁ Κολοφώνιος εἶπεν μὲν τινα ὁδὸν πεπορευμένους καὶ παρηλλαχυσίαν πάντας τοὺς

One without the Many. And his treatment of the received religious creed was in harmony with such physical or metaphysical hypothesis; for while he held the whole of nature to be God, without parts or change, he at the same time pronounced the popular gods to be entities of subjective fancy, imagined by men after their own model: if oxen or lions were to become religious (he added), they would in like manner provide for themselves gods after their respective shapes and characters.¹ This hypothesis, which seemed to set aside altogether the study of the sensible world as a source of knowledge, was expounded briefly, and, as it should seem, obscurely and rudely, by Xenophanês; at least we may infer thus much from the slighting epithet applied to him by Aristotle.² But his successors, Parmenidês and Zeno, in the succeeding century, expanded it considerably, supported it with extraordinary acuteness of dialectics, and even superadded a second part, in which the phænomena of sense—though considered only as appearances, not partaking in the reality of the One Ens—were yet explained by a new physical hypothesis; so that they will be found to exercise great influence over the speculations both of Plato and Aristotle. We discover in Xenophanês, moreover, a vein of scepticism, and a mournful despair as to the attainability of certain knowledge,³ which the nature of his philosophy was well-calculated to suggest, and in which the sillograph Timon of the third century B.C., who seems to have spoken of Xenophanês better than of most of the other philosophers, powerfully sympathised.

The Eleatic school, Parmenidês and Zeno, springing from Xenophanês—their dialectics—their great influence on Grecian speculation.

προσηρημένους, οὐτε γένεσιν οὐτε φθορὰν ἀπολείπει, ἀλλ' εἶναι λέγει τὸ πᾶν ἄσι ὅμοιον. Compare Timon ap. Sext. Empiric. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. i. 224, 226. εἰδογμάτιζε δὲ ὁ Ξενοφάνης παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων προλήψεις, ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν συμφυῆ τοῖς πᾶσιν· εἶναι δὲ σφαιροειδῆ καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ λογικόν (Aristot. de Xenoph. c. 3. p. 977, Bek.). 'Ἀδύνατον φησιν (ὁ Ξενοφάνης) εἶναι, εἰ τι ἐστίν, γενέσθαι, &c.

One may reasonably doubt whe-

ther all the arguments ascribed to Xenophanês in the short but obscure treatise last quoted really belong to him.

¹ Clemens Alexand. Stromat. v. p. 601, vii. p. 711.

² Aristot. Metaphysic. i. 5. p. 986, Bek. μικρὸν ἀγροικότερος.

³ Xenophanês, Fr. xiv. ed. Mullach; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, vii. 49-110; and Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 224; Plutarch adv. Colótên. p. 1114; compare Karsten ad Parmenidis Fragmenta, p. 146.

The cosmogony of Pherekydês of Syrus, contemporary of Anaximander and among the teachers of Pherekydês. Pythagoras, seems, according to the fragments preserved, a combination of the old legendary fancies with Orphic mysticism,¹ and probably exercised little influence over the subsequent course of Grecian philosophy. By what has been said of Thalês, Anaximander, and Xenophanês, it will be seen that the sixth century B.C. witnessed the opening of several of those roads of intellectual speculation which the later philosophers pursued farther, or at least from which they branched off. Before the year 500 B.C. many interesting questions were thus brought into discussion, which Solon, who died about 558 B.C., had never heard of—just as he may probably never have seen the map of Anaximander. But neither of these two distinguished men—Anaximander or Xenophanês—was anything more than a speculative inquirer. The third eminent name of this century, of whom I am now about to speak—Pythagoras, combined in his character disparate elements which require rather a longer development.

Pythagoras was founder of a brotherhood, originally brought together by a religious influence, and with observances approaching to monastic peculiarity—working in a direction at once religious, political, and scientific, and exercising for some time a real political ascendancy,—but afterwards banished from government and state affairs into a sectarian privacy with scientific pursuits, not without however still producing some statesmen individually distinguished. Amidst the multitude of false and apocryphal statements which circulated in antiquity respecting this celebrated man, we find a few important facts reasonably attested and deserving credence. He was a native of Samos,² son of an opulent merchant named Mnêsarchus,—or, according to some of his later and more fervent admirers, of Apollo: born, as far as we can make out, about the fiftieth Olympiad, or 580

¹ See Brandis, *Handbuch der Griech. Röm. Philosophie*, ch. xxii.

² Herodot. iv. 95. The place of his nativity is certain from Herodotus, but even this fact was differently stated by other authors, who called him a Tyrrhenian of Lemnos or Imbros (Porphyry, Vit.

Pythag. c. 1-10), a Syrian, a Phlisanian, &c.

Cicero (*De Repub.* ii. 15: compare Livy, i. 18) censures the chronological blunder of those who made Pythagoras the preceptor of Numa; which certainly is a remarkable illustration how much con-

B.C. On the many marvels recounted respecting his youth it is unnecessary to dwell. Among them may be numbered his wide-reaching travels, said to have been prolonged for nearly thirty years, to visit the Arabians, the Syrians, the Phenicians, the Chaldæans, the Indians, and the Gallic Druids. But there is reason to believe that he really visited Egypt¹—perhaps also Phenicia and Babylon, then Chaldæan and independent. At the time when he saw Egypt, between 560-540 B.C., about one century earlier than Herodotus, it was under Amasis, the last of its own kings, with its peculiar native character yet unimpaired by foreign conquest, and only slightly modified by the admission during the preceding century of Grecian mercenary troops and traders. The spectacle of Egyptian habits, the conversation of the priests, and the initiation into various mysteries or secret rites and stories not accessible to the general public, may very naturally have impressed the mind of Pythagoras, and given him that turn for mystic observance, asceticism, and peculiarity of diet and clothing, which manifested itself from the same cause among several of his contemporaries, but which was not a common phenomenon in the primitive Greek religion. Besides visiting Egypt, Pythagoras is also said to have profited by the teaching of Thalês, of Anaximander, and of Pherekydês of Syros:² amidst the towns of Ionia he would moreover have an opportunity of conversing with many Greek navigators who had visited foreign countries, especially Italy and Sicily. His mind seems to have been acted upon and impelled by this combined stimulus,—partly towards an imaginative and religious vein of speculation, with a life of mystic observance,—partly towards that active exercise, both of mind and body, which the genius of an Hellenic community so naturally tended to suggest.

fusion prevailed among literary men of antiquity about the dates of events even of the sixth century B.C. Ovid follows this story without hesitation: see *Metamorph.* xv. 60, with Burmann's note.

¹ Cicero de Fin. v. 29; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 8; Strabo, xiv. p. 688; Alexander Polyhistor ap. Cyrill. cont. Julian. iv. p. 128, ed. Spanh. For the vast reach of his supposed

travels, see Porphyry, *Vit. Pythag.* 11; Jamblic. 14, *segg.*

The same extensive journeys are ascribed to Dêmokritus, Diogen. Laërt. ix. 35.

² The connexion of Pythagoras with Pherekydês is noticed by Aristoxenus, ap. Diogen. Laërt. i. 118, viii. 2; Cicero de Divinat. i. 13.

Of the personal doctrines or opinions of Pythagoras, whom we must distinguish from Philolaus and the subsequent Pythagoreans, we have little certain knowledge, though doubtless the first germ of their geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, &c. must have proceeded from him. But that he believed in the metempsychosis or transmigration of the souls of deceased men into other men as well as into animals, we know, not only by other evidence, but also by the testimony of his contemporary, the philosopher Xenophanês of Elea. Pythagoras, seeing a dog beaten and hearing him howl, desired the striker to desist, saying—"It is the soul of a friend of mine, whom I recognised by his voice." This—together with the general testimony of Hêrakleitus, that Pythagoras was a man of extensive research and acquired instruction, but artful for mischief and destitute of sound judgement—is all that we know about him from contemporaries. Herodotus, two generations afterwards, while he conceives the Pythagoreans as a peculiar religious order, intimates that both Orpheus and Pythagoras had derived the doctrine of the metempsychosis from Egypt, but had pretended to it as their own without acknowledgement.¹ Pythagoras com-

¹ Xenophanês, Fragm. 7, ed. Schneidewin; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 36: compare Aulus Gellius, iv. 11 (we must remark that this or a like doctrine is not peculiar to Pythagoreans, but believed by the poet Pindar, Olymp. ii. 68, and Fragment, Thren. x., as well as by the philosopher Pherekydês, Porphyrius de Antro Nympharum, c. 31).

Καὶ ποτὲ μιν στυγελιζομένου ἀκύλακος παριόντα

Φασὶν ἐποικταίραι, καὶ τότε φάσθαι ἔπος—

Παῦσαι, μὴ δὲ βράπτει· ἐπέτη φίλον ἀνερός ἐστὶ

Ψυχῆ, τὴν ἔγνω φεγεζαμένης αἴων.

Consult also Sextus Empiricus, viii. 286, as to the *κοινωνία* between gods, men, and animals, believed both by Pythagoras and Empedoklês. That Herodotus (ii. 123) alludes to Orpheus and Py-

thagoras, though refraining designedly from mentioning names, there can hardly be any doubt: compare ii. 81; also Aristotle, de Anima, i. 3, 23.

The testimony of Hêrakleitus is contained in Diogenes Laërtius, viii. 6, ix. 1. Ἡρακλείτους γοῦν ὁ φυσικός μονουσιγὶ κέκραγε καὶ φησὶ Πυθαγόρης Μνηστάρχου ιστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων, καὶ ἐκλεζόμενος ταῦτας τὰς συγγραφάς, ἐποιήσατο ἐκτουτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην. Again, Πολυμαθὴν νόον οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, αὐθὺς δὲ Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἐκασταίων.

Dr. Thirlwall conceives Xenophanês as having intended in the passage above-cited to treat the doctrine of the metempsychosis "with deserved ridicule" (Hist. of Greece, ch. xii. vol. ii. p. 162). Religious opinions are so apt to

bines the character of a sophist (a man of large observation, and clever, ascendent, inventive mind—the original sense of the word Sophist, prior to the polemics of the Platonic school, and the only sense known to Herodotus),¹ with that of an inspired teacher, prophet, and worker of miracles, —approaching to and sometimes even confounded with the gods,—and employing all these gifts to found a new special order of brethren bound together by religious rites and observances peculiar to themselves. In his prominent vocation, analogous to that of Epimenidês, Orpheus, or Melampus, he appears as the revealer of a mode of life calculated to raise his disciples above the level of mankind, and to recommend them to the favour of the gods; the Pythagorean life, like the Orphic life,² being intended as the exclusive prerogative of the brotherhood—approached only by probation and initiatory ceremonies, which were adapted to select enthusiasts rather than to an indiscriminate crowd —and exacting entire mental devotion to the master.³ In

appear ridiculous to those who do not believe them, that such a suspicion is not unnatural; yet I think, if Xenophanês had been so disposed, he would have found more ridiculous examples among the many which this doctrine might suggest. Indeed it seems hardly possible to present the metempsychosis in a more touching or respectable point of view than that which the lines of his poem set forth. The particular animal selected is that one between whom and man the sympathy is most marked and reciprocal, while the doctrine is made to enforce a practical lesson against cruelty.

¹ Herodot. i. 29, ii. 49, iv. 95. Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθεναστάτῳ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ. Hippokratês distinguishes the σοφιστής from the ἰητρὸς, though both of them had handled the subject of medicine—the special from the general habits of investigation. (Hippokratês, Περὶ ἀρχαίας ἰητρικῆς, c. 20. vol. i. p. 620, Littré.)

² See Lobeck's learned and valu-

able treatise, *Aglaophamus, Orphica*, lib. ii. pp. 247, 698, 900; also Plato, *Legg.* vi. 782, and Euripid. *Hippol.* 946.

³ Plato's conception of Pythagoras (*Republ.* x. p. 600) depicts him as something not unlike St. Benedict or, St. Francis, (or St. Elias, as some Carmelites have tried to make out: see Kuster ad Jamblich. c. 3)—Ἄλλὰ δὴ, εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ τισὶν ἡγεμῶν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται Ὀμηρος γενέσθαι, οἱ ἐκείνον ἡγάπων ἐπὶ συνουσίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὑστέροις ὁδὸν τινα βίου παρέδωσαν Ὀμηρικὴν ὥσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτὸς τε διαπερόντως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἡγαπήθη, καὶ οἱ ὑστέρον ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πυθαγοραῖον τροπὸν ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου διαφανεῖς καὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

The description of Melampus given in Herodot. ii. 49, very much fills up the idea of Pythagoras, as derived from ii. 81-123, and iv. 95. Pythagoras, as well as Melampus, was said to have pretended to divination and prophecy (Cicero, *Divinat.* l. 2, 46; Porphyr. *Vit*

these lofty pretensions the Agrigentine Empedoklēs seems to have greatly copied him, though with some varieties, about half a century afterwards.¹ While Aristotle tells us that the Krotoniates identified Pythagoras with the Hyperborean Apollo, the satirical Timon pronounced him to have been "a juggler of solemn speech, engaged in fishing for men."² This is the same character, looked at from the different points of view of the believer and the unbeliever. There is however no reason for regarding Pythagoras as an impostor, because experience seems to show, that while in certain ages it is not difficult for a man to persuade others that he is inspired, it is still less difficult for him to contract the same belief himself.

Looking at the general type of Pythagoras, as conceived by witnesses in and nearest to his own age—Xenophanēs, Herakleitus, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Isokratēs³—we find in him chiefly the religious missionary and schoolmaster, with little of the politician. His efficiency in the latter character, originally subordinate, first becomes prominent in those glowing fancies which the later Pythagoreans communicated to Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus. The primitive Pythagoras is inspired by the gods to reveal a new mode of life⁴—the Pythagorean life—and to promise divine favour

Pythagoras more a missionary and schoolmaster than a politician—his political efficiency exaggerated by later witnesses.

Pyth. c. 29: compare Krische, *De Societate a Pythagorā in urbe Crotoniatarum conditā* Commentatio, ch. v. p. 72. Göttingen, 1831).

¹ Brandis, *Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch. Röm. Philosophie*, part i. sect. xlvii. p. 191.

² Ælian, *V. H.* ii. 26; Jamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* c. 31, 140; Porphyry, *Vit. Pyth.* c. 20; Diodorus, *Fragm.* lib. x. vol. iv. p. 56, Weas.:—Timon *ap. Diogen. Laërt.* viii. 36; and Plutarch, *Numa*, c. 8.

Πυθαγόρην τε γόητος ἀποκλίναντ' ἐπὶ δόξαν

Θῆρην ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων, σμηνηγορίης ὀριστήν.

³ Isokratēs, *Busiris*, p. 402. ed. Auger. Πυθαγόρας ὁ Σάμιος, ἀφιχόμενος εἰς Αἴγυπτον, καὶ μαθητῆς

τῶν ἱερῶν γινόμενος, τὴν τε ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτος εἰς Ἑλλήνας ἐκόμισε, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἀγιστείας ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐσπούδασε.

Compare Aristotel. *Magn. Moralia*, i. 1, about Pythagoras as an ethical teacher. Dēmokritus, born about 460 B.C., wrote a treatise (now lost) respecting Pythagoras, whom he greatly admired: as far as we can judge, it would seem that he too must have considered Pythagoras as an ethical teacher (*Diogen. Laërt.* ix. 38; Mullaoh, *Democriti Fragmenta*, lib. ii. p. 113; Cicero de *Orator.* iii. 15).

⁴ Jamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* c. 64, 115, 151, 199: see also the idea ascribed to Pythagoras, of divine inspirations coming on men (ἐπι-

to a select and docile few as the recompense of strict ritual obedience, of austere self-control, and of laborious training, bodily as well as mental. To speak with confidence of the details of his training, ethical or scientific, and of the doctrines which he promulgated, is impossible; for neither he himself nor any of his disciples anterior to Philolaus (who was separated from him by about one intervening generation) left any memorials in writing.¹ Numbers and lines, studied partly in their own mutual relations, partly under various symbolising fancies, presented themselves to him as the primary constituent elements of the universe, and as a sort of magical key to phænomena, physical as well as moral. Such mathematical tendencies in his teaching, expanded by Pythagoreans his successors, and coinciding partly also (as has been before stated) with the studies of Anaximander and Thalès, acquired more and more development, so as to become one of the most glorious and profitable manifestations of Grecian intellect. Living as Pythagoras did at a time when the stock of experience was scanty, the licence of hypothesis unbounded, and the process of deduction without rule or verifying test—he was thus fortunate enough to strike into that track of geometry and arithmetic, in which, from data of experience few, simple, and obvious, an immense field of deductive and verifiable investigation may be travelled over. We must at the same time remark, however, that in his mind this track, which now seems so straightforward and well-defined, was clouded

πνοια παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου). Aristoxenus apud Stobæum, Eclog. Physic. p. 206; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 82.

Meiners renders it probable that the stories respecting the miraculous powers and properties of Pythagoras got into circulation either during his lifetime, or at least not long after his death (Geschichte der Wissenschaften, B. iii. vol. i. p. 504, 505).

¹ Respecting Philolaus, see the valuable collection of his fragments, and commentary on them, by Boeckh (Philolaus des Pythagoreers Leben, Berlin, 1819). That Philolaus was the first who com-

posed a work on Pythagorean science, and thus made it known beyond the limits of the brotherhood—among others to Plato—appears well-established (Boeckh, Philolaus, p. 22; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 15-55; Jamblichus, c. 119). Simmias and Kebés, fellow-disciples of Plato under Sokratés, had held intercourse with Philolaus at Thebes (Plato, Phædon, p. 61), perhaps about 420 B.C. The Pythagorean brotherhood had then been dispersed in various parts of Greece, though the attachment of its members to each other seems to have continued long afterwards.

by strange fancies which it is not easy to understand, and from which it was but partially cleared by his successors.

Of his spiritual training much is said, though not upon very good authority: we hear of his memorial discipline, his monastic self-scrutiny, his employment of music to soothe disorderly passions,¹ his long novitiate of silence, his knowledge of physiognomy which enabled him to detect even without trial unworthy subjects, his peculiar diet, and his rigid care for sobriety as well as for bodily vigour. He is also said to have inculcated abstinence from animal food; a feeling so naturally connected with the doctrine of the metempsychosis, that we may well believe him to have entertained it, as Empedoklēs also did after him.² It is certain that there were peculiar observances, and probably a certain measure of self-denial, embodied in the Pythagorean life. Yet on the other hand, it seems equally certain that the members of the order cannot have been all subjected to the same diet, or training, or studies; for Milo the Krotoniate was among them,³ the strongest man and the unparalleled wrestler of his age—who cannot possibly have dispensed with animal food and ample diet (even setting aside the tales about his voracious appetite), and is not likely to have bent his attention on speculative study. Probably Pythagoras did not enforce the same bodily or mental discipline on all, or at least knew when

¹ Plutarch, *De Isid. et Osirid.* p. 384, ad fin. Quintilian. *Instit. Oratt.* ix. 4.

² Empedoklēs, ap. Aristot. *Rhetoric.* i. 14, 2; Sextus *Empiric.* ix. 137; Plutarch, *De Esu Carnium*, p. 993, 996, 997; where he puts Pythagoras and Empedokles together, as having both held the doctrine of the metempsychosis, and both prohibited the eating of animal food. Empedokles supposed that plants had souls, and that the souls of human beings passed after death into plants as well as into animals. „I have been myself heretofore (said he) a boy, a girl, a shrub, a bird, and a fish of the sea.”

ἤδη γὰρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμενν κοῦρός τε κόρη τε, θάμνος τ', οἰωνός τε καὶ ἐξ ἄλλοις ἔμπερος ἰχθύς.

(Diogen. *L.* viii. 77; Sturz. ad Empedokl. *Frag.* p. 466.) Pythagoras is said to have affirmed that he had been not only Euphorbus in the Grecian army before Troy, but also a tradesman, a courtesan, &c., and various other human characters, before his actual existence; he did not however extend the same intercommunion to plants, in any case.

The abstinence from animal food was an Orphic precept as well as a Pythagorean (Aristophan. *Ran.* 1082).

³ Strabo, vi. p. 263; Diog. *L.* xiii. 40.

to grant dispensations. The order, as it first stood under him, consisted of men different both in temperament and aptitude, but bound together by common religious observances and hopes, common reverence for the master, and mutual attachment as well as pride in each other's success. It must thus be distinguished from the Pythagoreans of the fourth century b.c., who had no communion with wrestlers, and comprised only ascetic, studious men, generally recluse, though in some cases rising to political distinction. The succession of these Pythagoreans, never very numerous, seems to have continued until about 300 b.c., and then nearly died out; being superseded by other schemes of philosophy more suited to cultivated Greeks of the age after Sokratês. But during the time of Cicero, two centuries afterwards, the orientalising tendency—then beginning to spread over the Grecian and Roman world, and becoming gradually stronger and stronger—caused the Pythagorean philosophy to be again revived. It was revived, too, with little or none of its scientific tendencies, but with more than its primitive religious and imaginative fanaticism—Apollonius of Tyana constituting himself a living copy of Pythagoras. And thus, while the scientific elements developed by the disciples of Pythagoras had become disjoined from all peculiarity of sect, and passed into the general studious world—the original vein of mystic and ascetic fancy belonging to the master, without any of that practical efficiency of body and mind which had marked his first followers, was taken up anew into the Pagan world, along with the disfigured doctrines of Plato. Neo-Pythagorism, passing gradually into Neo-Platonism, outlasted the other more positive and masculine systems of Pagan philosophy, as the contemporary and rival of Christianity. A large proportion of the false statements concerning Pythagoras come from these Neo-Pythagoreans, who were not deterred by the want of memorials from illustrating, with ample latitude of fancy, the ideal character of the master.

Decline and subsequent renovation of the Pythagorean order.

That an inquisitive man like Pythagoras, at a time when there were hardly any books to study, would visit foreign countries, and converse with all the Grecian philosophical inquirers within his reach, is a matter which we should presume even if no one attested it; and our

Pythagoras not merely a borrower, but an original and ascendent mind.—He passes from Samos to Kroton.

witnessess carry us very little beyond this general presumption. What doctrines he borrowed, or from whom, we are unable to discover. But in fact his whole life and proceedings bear the stamp of an original mind and not of a borrower—a mind impressed both with Hellenic and with non-Hellenic habits and religion, yet capable of combining the two in a manner peculiar to himself; and above all, endued with those talents for religious and personal ascendancy over others, which told for much more than the intrinsic merit of his ideas. We are informed that after extensive travels and inquiries he returned to Samos, at the age of about forty. He then found his native island under the despotism of Polykratês, which rendered it an unsuitable place either for free sentiments or for marked individuals. Unable to attract hearers, or found any school or brotherhood, in his native island, he determined to expatriate; and we may presume that at this period (about 535-530 B.C.) the recent subjugation of Ionia by the Persians was not without influence on his determination. The trade between the Asiatic and the Italian Greeks—and even the intimacy between Milêtus and Knidus on the one side, and Sybaris and Tarentum on the other—had been great and of long standing, so that there was more than one motive to determine him to the coast of Italy; in which direction also his contemporary Xenophanês, the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, emigrated seemingly about the same time—from Kolophon to Zanklê, Katana and Elea.¹

Kroton and Sybaris were at this time in their fullest prosperity—among the first and most prosperous cities of the Hellenic name. To the former of the two Pythagoras directed his course. A Council of One Thousand persons, taken from among the heirs and representatives of the principal proprietors at its first foundation, was here invested with the supreme authority: in what manner the executive offices were filled, we have no information. Besides a great extent of power, and a numerous population, the large mass of whom had

State of Kroton—oligarchical government—excellent gymnastic training and medical skill.

¹ Diogen. Laërt. ix. 18.

no share in the political franchise, Kroton stood at this time distinguished for two things—the general excellence of the bodily habit of the citizens, attested in part by the number of conquerors furnished to the Olympic games—and the superiority of its physicians or surgeons.¹ These two points were in fact greatly connected with each other; for the therapeutics of the day consisted not so much of active remedies as of careful diet and regimen; while the trainer, who dictated the life of an athlete during his long and fatiguing preparation for an Olympic contest—and the professional superintendent of the youths who frequented the public gymnasia—followed out the same general views and acted upon the same basis of knowledge, as the physician who prescribed for a state of positive bad health.²

¹ Herodot. iii. 131; Strabo, vi. p. 261; Menander de Encomiis, p. 96, ed. Heeren. 'Αθηναίους ἐπὶ ἀγχιματοποιίᾳ τε καὶ ζωγραφικῇ, καὶ Κροτωνιάτας ἐπὶ ἰατρικῇ, μέγα φρονῆσαι, &c.

The Krotoniate Alkmæon, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras (Aristotel. Metaph. i. 5), is among the earliest names mentioned as philosophizing upon physical and medical subjects. See Brandis, Handbuch der Geschichte der Philos. sect. lxxxiii. p. 508, and Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii. 2. p. 752, Bekker.

The medical art in Egypt, at the time when Pythagoras visited that country, was sufficiently far advanced to excite the attention of an inquisitive traveller—the branches of it minutely subdivided and strict rules laid down for practice (Herodot. ii. 84; Aristotel. Politic. iii. 10, 4).

² See the analogy of the two strikingly brought out in the treatise of Hippocrates Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰατρικῆς, c. 3, 4, 7. vol. i. p. 580-584, ed. Littré.

Ἔτι γοῦν καὶ νῦν οἱ τῶν γυμνασίων καὶ ἀσκησίων ἐπιμελόμενοι αἰεὶ τι πρᾶξιευρίσκουσι, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ζητούντες, ὅ,τι ἔδων καὶ πίνων ἐπι-

κρατήσαι τε αὐτῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἰσχυρότερος αὐτὸς ἐωυτότου ἔσται (p. 580); again, p. 584: Τί οὖν φαίνεται ἀτεροῖον διανοηθεὶς ὁ καλεῦμαι ἰατρὸς καὶ ὁμολογημένως χειροτέχνης, ὅς ἐξεῦρε τὴν ἀμφὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας διαίταν καὶ τροφήν, ἣ κείνοις ὁ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοῖσι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισι τροφήν, ἣ νῦν χρζόμεθα, ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ θηριώδους εὐρών τε καὶ παρασκευάσας διαίτην: compare another passage not less illustrative in the treatise of Hippokratēs Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων, c. 3, vol. ii. p. 245, ed. Littré.

Following the same general idea, that the theory and practice of the physician is a farther development and variety of that of the gymnastic trainer, I transcribe some observations from the excellent Remarques Rétrospectives of M. Littré, at the end of the fourth volume of his édition of Hippokratēs (p. 662).

After having observed (p. 659) that physiology may be considered as divided into two parts—one relating to the mechanism of the functions; the other, to the effects produced upon the human body by the different influences which act upon it and the media by which it is surrounded; and after having observed that on the first

Of medical education properly so called, especially of anatomy, there was then little or nothing. The physician acquired his knowledge from observation of men sick as well as healthy, and from a careful notice of the way in which the human body was acted upon by surrounding agents and circumstances: and this same knowledge was not less necessary for the trainer; so that the same place which contained the best men in the latter class was also likely to be distinguished in the former. It is not improbable that such celebrity of Kroton may have been one of

of these two branches, the ancients could never make progress, from their ignorance of anatomy—he goes on to state, that respecting the second branch they acquired a large amount of knowledge:—

“Sur la physiologie des influences extérieures, la Grèce du temps d’Hippocrate et après lui fut le théâtre d’expériences en grand les plus importantes et les plus instructives. Toute la population (la population libre, s’entend) étoit soumise à un système régulier d’éducation physique (N.B. this is a little too strongly stated): dans quelques cités, à Lacédémone par exemple, les femmes n’en étoient pas exemptées. Ce système se composoit d’exercices et d’une alimentation que combinèrent l’empirisme d’abord, puis une théorie plus savante: il concernoit (comme dit Hippocrate lui-même, en ne parlant, il est vrai, que de la partie alimentaire), il concernoit et les malades pour leur rétablissement, et les gens bien portans pour la conservation de leur santé, et les personnes livrées aux exercices gymnastiques pour l’accroissement de leurs forces. On savoit au juste ce qu’il falloit pour conserver seulement le corps en bon état ou pour traiter un malade—pour former un militaire ou pour faire un athlète—et en particulier, un lutteur, un coureur, un sauteur, un pugiliste. Une classe d’hommes, les

maitres des gymnases, étoient exclusivement adonnés à la culture de cet art, auquel les médecins participoient dans les limites de leur profession; et Hippocrate, qui dans les Aphorismes, invoque l’exemple des athlètes, nous parle dans le Traité des Articulations des personnes maigres, qui n’ayant pas été amaigris par un procédé régulier de l’art, ont les chairs muqueuses. Les anciens médecins savoient, comme on le voit, procurer l’amaigrissement conformément à l’art, et reconnoître à ses effets un amaigrissement irrégulier: toutes choses auxquelles nos médecins sont étrangers, et dont on ne retrouve l’analogie que parmi les entraîneurs Anglois. Au reste cet ensemble de connoissances empiriques et théoriques doit être mis au rang des pertes fâcheuses qui ont accompagné la longue et turbulente transition du monde ancien au monde moderne. Les admirables institutions destinées dans l’antiquité à développer et affermir le corps, ont disparu: l’hygiène publique est destituée à cet égard de toute direction scientifique et générale, et demeure abandonnée complètement au hasard.”

See also the remarks of Plato respecting Herodikus, De Republicâ, iii. p. 476; Aristotel. Politic. iii. 11, 6. iv. 1, 1. viii. 4, 1.

the reasons which determined Pythagoras to go thither. For among the precepts ascribed to him, precise rules as to diet and bodily regulation occupy a prominent place. The medical or surgical celebrity of Dêmokêdês (son-in-law of the Pythagorean Milo), to whom allusion has been made in a former chapter, is contemporaneous with the presence of Pythagoras at Kroton; and the medical men of Magna Græcia maintained themselves in credit, as rivals of the schools of the Asklepiads at Kôs and Knidus, throughout all the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

The biographers of Pythagoras tell us that his arrival there, his preaching, and his conduct, produced an effect almost electric upon the minds of the people, with an extensive reform public as well as private. Political discontent was repressed, incontinence disappeared, luxury became discredited, and the women hastened to exchange their golden ornaments for the simplest attire.

Rapid and wonderful effects said to have been produced by the exhortations of Pythagoras.

No less than two thousand persons were converted at his first preaching. So effective were his discourses to the youth, that the Supreme Council of One Thousand invited him into their assembly, solicited his advice, and even offered to constitute him their Prytanis or president, while his wife and daughter were placed at the head of the religious processions of females.¹ His influence was not confined to Kroton. Other towns in Italy and Sicily—Sybaris, Metapontum, Rhêgium, Katana, Himera, &c., all felt the benefit of his exhortations, which extricated some of them even from slavery. Such are the tales of which the biographers of Pythagoras are full:² and we see that even the disciples of Aristotle, about the year 300 B.C.—Aristoxenus, Dikæarchus, Herakleidês of Pontus, &c.—are hardly less charged with them than the Neo-Pythagoreans of three or four centuries later. They doubtless heard these tales from their contemporary Pythagoreans,³ the

¹ Valerius Maxim. iii. 15, xv. 1; Jamblichus, Vit. Pyth. c. 45; Timæus, Fragm. 78, ed. Didot.

² Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. c. 21-54; Jamblich. 33-35, 166.

³ The compilations of Porphyry and Jamblichus on the life of Pythagoras, copied from a great variety of authors, will doubtless

contain some truth amidst their confused heap of statements, many incredible, and nearly all unauthenticated. But it is very difficult to single out what these portions of truth really are. Even Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus, the best authors from whom these biographers quote, lived near two

last members of a declining sect, among whom the attributes of the primitive founder passed for godlike, but who had no memorials, no historical judgement, and no means of forming a true conception of Kroton as it stood in 530 B.C.¹ To trace these tales to a true foundation is impossible. But we may reasonably believe that the success of Pythagoras, as a person favoured by the gods and patentee of

centuries after the death of Pythagoras, and do not appear to have had any early memorials to consult, nor any better informants than the contemporary Pythagoreans—the last of an expiring sect, and probably among the least eminent for intellect, since the philosophers of the Sokratic vein in its various branches carried off the acute and aspiring young men of that time.

Meiners, in his *Geschichte der Wissenschaften* (vol. i. b. iii. p. 191 *seq.*), has given a careful analysis of the various authors from whom the two biographers have borrowed, and a comparative estimate of their trustworthiness. It is an excellent piece of historical criticism, though the author exaggerates both the merits and the influence of the first Pythagoreans: Kiessling in the notes to his edition of Jamblichus has given some extracts from it, but by no means enough to dispense with the perusal of the original. I think Meiners allows too much credit, on the whole, to Aristoxenus (see p. 214) and makes too little deduction for the various stories difficult to be believed, of which Aristoxenus is given as the source: of course the latter could not furnish better matter than he heard from his own witnesses. Where the judgement of Meiners is more severe, it is also better borne out, especially respecting Porphyry himself, and his scholar Jamblichus. These later Pythagorean philosophers seem to have set up as a formal canon of cre-

dibility, that which many religious men of antiquity acted upon from a mere unconscious sentiment and fear of giving offence to the gods—That it was *not right to disbelieve any story* recounted respecting the gods, and wherein the divine agency was introduced: no one could tell but what it *might be true*: to deny its truth was to set bounds to the divine omnipotence. Accordingly they made no difficulty in believing what was recounted about Aristæus, Abaris, and other eminent subjects of mythes (Jamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* c. 138-148)—καὶ τοῦτο γε πάντες οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔμαθον ἔχουσι πιστευτικῶς, ὅσον περὶ Ἀρισταίου καὶ Ἀβάριδος τὰ μυθολογούμενα καὶ ἕσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα λέγεται . . . τῶν τοιούτων δὲ τῶν δοκούντων μυθικῶν ἀπορρημονεύουσιν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἀπιστοῦντες ἔτι ἂν εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀνάγηται. Also not less formally laid down in Jamblichus, *Adhortatio ad Philosophiam*, as the fourth Symbolum, p. 324, ed. Kiessling. *Περὶ θεῶν μηδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀπιστεῖ, μηδὲ περὶ θεῶν δογμάτων*. Reasoning from their principles, this was a consistent corollary to lay down; but it helps us to estimate their value as selectors and discriminators of accounts respecting Pythagoras. The extravagant compliments paid by the Emperor Julian in his letters to Jamblichus will not suffice to establish the authority of the latter as a critic and witness: see the *Epistolæ* 34, 40, 41, in Heyler's edit. of Julian's letters.

¹ Aulus Gell. N.A. iv. 11. Apol-

divine secrets, was very great—that he procured to himself both the reverence of the multitude, and the peculiar attachment and obedience of many devoted adherents, chiefly belonging to the wealthy and powerful classes—that a select body of these adherents, three hundred in number, bound themselves by a sort of vow both to Pythagoras and to each other, adopting a peculiar diet, ritual, and observances, as a token of union—though without anything like community of property, which some have ascribed to them. Such a band of men, standing high in the city for wealth and station, and bound together by this intimate tie, came by almost unconscious tendency to mingle political ambition with religious and scientific pursuits. Political clubs with sworn members, under one form or another, were a constant phenomenon in the Grecian cities.¹ Now the Pythagorean order at its first formation was the most efficient of all clubs; since it presented an intimacy of attachment among its members, as well as a feeling of haughty exclusiveness against the public without, such as no other fraternity could parallel.² The devoted attachment of Pythagoreans towards each other is not less emphatically set forth than their contempt for every one else: in fact these two attributes of the order seem the best ascertained as well as the most permanent of all. Moreover, we may be sure

He forms a powerful club or society, consisting of three hundred men taken from the wealthy classes at Kroton.

Ion. (ap. Jamblich. c. 262) alludes to τὰ ὑπομύματα τῶν Κροτωνιτῶν: what the date of these may be, we do not know, but there is no reason to believe them anterior to Aristoxenus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 54. τὰς ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγγανον πρότερον οὐσαὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀργαῖς, ἀπάσας ἐκλήθων, &c.

On this important passage in which Thucydides notes the political clubs of Athens as sworn societies, numerous, notorious, and efficient—I shall speak farther in a future stage of the history. Dr. Arnold has a good note on the passage.

² Justin, xx. 4. "Sed trecenti ex juvenibus cum sodalitiis juris

sacramento quodam nexi, separatam a ceteris civibus vitam exercent, quasi cœtum clandestinæ conjurationis haberent, civitatem in se converterunt."

Compare Diogen. Laërt. viii. 3; Apollonius ap. Jamblich. c. 254; Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 33.

The story of the devoted attachments of the two Pythagoreans Damon and Phintias appears to be very well attested: Aristoxenus heard it from the lips of the younger Dionysius the despot, whose sentence had elicited such manifestation of friendship (Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. c. 59-62; Cicero, De Officiis, iii. 10; and Davis ad Cicero. Tusc. Disp. v. 22).

that the peculiar observances of the order passed for exemplary virtues in the eyes of its members, and exalted ambition into a duty, by making them sincerely believe that they were the only persons fit to govern. It is no matter of surprise, then, to learn that the Pythagoreans gradually drew to themselves great ascendancy in the government of Kroton. And as similar clubs, not less influential, were formed at Metapontum and other places, so the Pythagorean order spread its net and dictated the course of affairs over a large portion of Magna Græcia. Such ascendancy of the Pythagoreans must have procured for the master himself some real, and still more supposed, influence over the march of government at Kroton and elsewhere, of a nature not then possessed by any of his contemporaries throughout Greece.¹ Yet his influence was probably exercised in the background, through the medium of the brotherhood who revered him: for it is hardly conformable to Greek manners that a stranger of his character should guide personally and avowedly the political affairs of any Grecian city.

Nor are we to believe that Pythagoras came originally to Kroton with the express design of creating for himself an ascendent political position—still less that he came for the purpose of realizing a great preconceived political idea, and transforming Kroton into a model-city of pure Dorism, as has been supposed by some eminent modern authors. Such schemes might indeed be ascribed to him by Pythagoreans of the Platonic age, when large ideas of political amelioration were rife in the minds of speculative men—by men disposed to forego the authorship of their own opinions, and preferring to accredit them as traditions handed down from a founder who had left no memorials. But it requires better evidence than theirs to make us believe that any real Greek born in 580 B. C. actually conceived such plans. We cannot construe the scheme of Pythagoras as going farther than the formation of a private, select, order of brethren, embracing his religious fancies, ethical tone, and germs of scientific idea—

¹ Plutarch, *Philosophand.* cum Principib. c. l. p. 777. ἂν δ' ἔργον-
τος ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πρα-
τικοῦ καθάρηται (ὁ φιλόσοφος) καὶ

τοῦτον ἀνακλήσῃ καλοκαγαθίας, πολ-
λοὺς δὲ ἑνὸς ὠφέλησεν, ὡς Πυθαγό-
ρας τοῖς πρωτεύουσι τῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν
συγγεγόμενος.

and manifesting adhesion by those observances which Herodotus and Plato call the Pythagorean orgies and mode of life. And his private order became politically powerful, because he was skilful or fortunate enough to enlist a sufficient number of wealthy Krotoniates, possessing individual influence which they strengthened immensely by thus regimenting themselves in intimate union. The Pythagorean orgies or religious ceremonies were not inconsistent with public activity, bodily as well as mental. Probably the rich men of the order may have been rendered even more active, by being fortified against the temptations of a life of indulgence. The character of the order as it first stood, different from that to which it was afterwards reduced, was indeed religious and exclusive, but also active and domineering; not despising any of those bodily accomplishments which increased the efficiency of the Grecian citizen, and which so particularly harmonised with the pre-existing tendencies of Kroton.¹ Niebuhr and O. Müller have even

¹ I transcribe here the summary given by Krische, at the close of his Dissertation on the Pythagorean order, p. 101. "Societatis scopus fuit mere politicus, ut lapsam optimatium potestatem non modo in pristinum restitueret, sed firmaret amplificaretque: cum summo hoc scopo duo conjuncti fuerunt; moralis alter, alter ad literas spectans. Discipulos suos bonos probosque homines reddere vult Pythagoras, et ut civitatem moderantes potestate sua non abuterentur ad plebem opprimendam; et ut plebs, intelligens suis commodis consuli, conditione sua contenta esset. Quoniam vero bonum sapientisque moderamen nisi a prudente literisque exulto viro expectari (non) licet, philosophiæ studium necessarium duxit Samius is, qui ad civitatis clavum tenendum se accingerent."

This is the general view (coinciding substantially with that of O. Müller—Dorians, iii. 9, 16) given by an author who has gone through

the evidences with care and learning. It differs on some important points from the idea which I conceive of the primitive master and his contemporary brethren. It leaves out the religious ascendancy, which I imagine to have stood first among the means as well as among the premeditated purposes of Pythagoras, while it sets forth a reformatory political scheme as directly contemplated by him, of which there is no proof. Though the political ascendancy of the early Pythagoreans is the most prominent feature in their early history, it is not to be considered as the manifestation of any peculiar or settled political idea—it is rather a result of their position and means of union. Ritter observes (in my opinion more justly), "We must not believe that the mysteries of the Pythagorean order were of a simply political character: the most probable accounts warrant us in considering that its central point was a mystic religious

supposed that the select Three Hundred Pythagoreans constituted a sort of smaller senate at that city¹—an hypothesis no way probable; we may rather conceive them as a powerful private club, exercising ascendancy in the interior of the senate, and governing through the medium of the constituted authorities. Nor can we receive without great allowance the assertion of Varro,² who, assimilating Pythagoras to Plato, tells us that he confined his instructions on matters of government to chosen disciples, who had gone through a complete training, and had reached the perfection of wisdom and virtue. It seems more probable that the political Pythagoreans were those who were most qualified for action, and least for speculation; and that the general of the order possessed that skill in turning to account the aptitudes of individuals, which two centuries ago was so conspicuous in the Jesuits; to whom, in various ways, the Pythagoreans bear considerable resemblance. All that we can be said to know about their political principles is, that they were exclusive and aristocratical, adverse to the control and interference of the people; a circumstance no way disadvantageous to them, since they coincided in this respect with the existing

teaching" (*Geschicht. der Philosophie*, b. iv. ch. i. vol. i. p. 365-368): compare Hoeck. *Kreta*, vol. iii. p. 223.

Krische (p. 32) as well as Boeckh (*Philolaus*, p. 39-42) and O. Müller assimilate the Pythagorean life to the Dorian or Spartan habits, and call the Pythagorean philosophy the expression of Grecian Dorism, as opposed to the Ionians and the Ionic philosophy. I confess that I perceive no analogy between the two, either in action or speculation. The Spartans stand completely distinct from other Dorians; and even the Spartan habits of life, though they present some points of resemblance with the bodily training of the Pythagoreans, exhibit still more important points of difference, in respect to religious peculiarity and mysticism, as well as to the scientific element embod-

died with it. The Pythagorean philosophy, and the Eleatic philosophy, were both equally opposed to the Ionic; yet neither of them is in any way connected with Dorian tendencies. Neither Elea nor Kroton were Doric cities; moreover Xenophanes as well as Pythagoras were both Ionians.

The general assertions respecting Ionic mobility and inconstancy, contrasted with Doric constancy and steadiness, will not be found borne out by a study of facts. The Dorism of Pythagoras appears to me a complete fancy. O. Müller even turns Kroton into a Dorian city, contrary to all evidence.

¹ Niebuhr, *Römisch. Gesch.* i. p. 165, 2nd edit.; O. Müller, *Hist. of Dorians*, iii. 9, 16: Krische is opposed to this idea, sect. v. p. 84.

² Varro ap. *Augustin. de Ordine*, ii. 30; Krische, p. 77.

government of the city—had not their own conduct brought additional odium on the old aristocracy, and raised up an aggravated democratical opposition carried to the most deplorable lengths of violence.

All the information which we possess, apocryphal as it is, respecting this memorable club is derived from its warm admirers. Yet even their statements are enough to explain how it came to provoke deadly and extensive enmity. A stranger coming to teach new religious dogmas and observances, with a tincture of science and some new ethical ideas and phrases, though he would obtain some zealous votaries, would also bring upon himself a certain measure of antipathy. Extreme strictness of observances, combined with the art of touching skilfully the springs of religious terror in others, would indeed do much both to fortify and to exalt him. But when it was discovered that science, philosophy, and even the mystic revelations of religion, whatever they were, remained confined to the private talk and practice of the disciples, and were thus thrown into the background, while all that was seen and felt without was the political predominance of an ambitious fraternity—we need not wonder that Pythagorism in all its parts became odious to a large portion of the community. Moreover we find the order represented not merely as constituting a devoted and exclusive political party, but also as manifesting an ostentatious self-conceit throughout their personal demeanour¹—refusing the hand of fellowship to all except the brethren, and disgusting especially their own familiar friends and kinsmen. So far as we know

Causes which led to the subversion of the Pythagorean order.

¹ Apollonius ap. Jamblichum, V. P. c. 254, 255, 256, 257. ἡγεμόνες δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς διαφορᾶς οἱ ταῖς συγγενεῖαις καὶ ταῖς οἰκειότησιν ἐγγύτατα καθεστῆχότες τῶν Πυθαγορείων. Αἴτιον δ' ἦν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πολλὰ αὐτοῦς ἐλύπει τῶν πραττομένων, &c.: compare also the lines descriptive of Pythagoras, c. 259. Τοὺς μὲν εἰταίρους ἦεν ἴσους μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι. Τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἡγεῖτ' οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ, οὐτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

That this Apollonius, cited both by Jamblichus and by Porphyry, is Apollonius of Tyana, has been

rendered probable by Meiners (Geschich. der Wissenschaft. v. i. p. 239-245): compare Welcker, Prolegomena ad Theognid. p. xlv. xlvii.

When we read the life of Apollonius by Philostratus, we see that the former was himself extremely communicative: he might be the rather disposed therefore of think that the seclusion and reserve of Pythagoras was a defect, and to ascribe to it much of the mischief which afterwards overtook the order.

Grecian philosophy, this is the only instance in which it was distinctly abused for political and party objects. The early days of the Pythagorean order stand distinguished for such perversion, which fortunately for the progress of philosophy, never presented itself afterwards in Greece.¹ Even at Athens, however, we shall hereafter see that Sokratês, though standing really aloof from all party intrigue, incurred much of his unpopularity from supposed political conjunction with Kritias and Alkibiadês,² to which indeed the orator Æschinês distinctly ascribes his condemnation, speaking about sixty years after the event. Had Sokratês been known as the founder of a band holding together intimately for ambitious purposes, the result would have been eminently pernicious to philosophy, and probably much sooner pernicious to himself.

It was this cause which brought about the complete and violent destruction of the Pythagorean order. Their ascendancy had provoked such wide-spread discontent, that their enemies became emboldened to employ extreme force against them. Kylon and Ninon—the former of whom is said to have sought admittance into the order, but to have been rejected on account of his bad character—took the lead in pronounced opposition to the Pythagoreans; whose unpopularity extended itself farther to the Senate of One Thousand, through the medium of which their ascendancy had been exercised. Propositions were made for rendering the government more democratical, and for constituting a new senate, taken by lot from all the people, before which the magistrates should go through their trial of accountability after office: an opportunity being chosen in which the Senate of One Thousand had given signal offence by refusing to divide among the people the recently conquered territory of Sybaris.³ In spite of the opposition of the Pythagoreans, this change of government was carried through. Ninon and Kylon, their principal enemies, made

Violences which accompanied its subversion.

¹ Schleiermacher observes that "Philosophy among the Pythagoreans was connected with political objects, and their school with a practical brotherly partnership, such as was never on any other occasion seen in Greece" (Introduction to his Translation of Plato, p. 12). See also Theopompus, Fr.

68, ed. Didot, apud Athenæum, v. p. 213, and Euripidês, *Medæa*, 294.

² Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2, 12; Æschines, cont. Timarch. c. 34. ὅμοις, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτη τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπέκτειναν, ἕτι Κριτίαν ἐπάνη παπαθευκῶς, ἕνα τῶν τριάκοντα.

³ This is stated in Jamblichus, c. 255; yet it is difficult to believe;

use of it to exasperate the people still farther against the order, until they provoked actual popular violence against it. The Pythagoreans were attacked when assembled in their meeting-house near the temple of Apollo, or, as some said, in the house of Milo. The building was set on fire, and many of the members perished;¹ none but the younger and more vigorous escaping. Similar disturbances, and the like violent suppression of the order, with destruction of several among the leading citizens, are said to have taken place in other cities of Magna Græcia—Tarentum, Metapontum, Kaulonia. And we are told that these cities remained for some time in a state of great disquietude and commotion, from which they were only rescued by the friendly mediation of the Peloponnesian Achæans, the original founders of Sybaris and Kroton—assisted indeed by mediators from other parts of Greece. The cities were at length pacified, and induced to adopt an amicable congress, with common religious festivals, at a temple founded expressly for the purpose and dedicated to Zeus Homarius.² Thus perished the original Pythagorean order. Respecting Pythagoras himself, there were conflicting accounts; some representing that he was burnt in the temple with his disciples;³ others, that he had died a short time previously; others again affirmed, that he was alive at the time, but absent, and that he died not long afterwards in exile,

for if the fact had been so, the destruction of the Pythagoreans would naturally have produced an allotment and permanent occupation of the Sybaritan territory—which certainly did not take place, since Sybaris remained without resident possessors until the foundation of Thurii.

¹ Jamblichus, c. 255-259; Porphyry, c. 54-57; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 39; Diodor. x. Fragm. vol. iv. p. 56, Wess.

² Polyb. ii. 39; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, c. 13. p. 583; Aristoxenus, ap. Jamblich. c. 250. That the enemies of the order attacked it by setting fire to the house in which the members were assembled, is the circumstance in which all accounts agree. On all other

points there is great discrepancy, especially respecting the names and date of the Pythagoreans who escaped: Boeckh (Philolaus, p. 9 seq.) and Brandis (Handbuch der Gesch. d. Philos. ch. lxxiii. p. 432) try to reconcile these discrepancies.

Aristophanês introduces Strep-siadês, at the close of the Nubes, as setting fire to the meeting-house (ἔρποντιστήριον) of Sokratês and his disciple: possibly the Pythagorean conflagration may have suggested this.

³ "Pythagoras Samius suspicione dominatûs injustâ vivus in fano concrematus est" (Arnobius adv. Gentes, lib. i. p. 23, ed. Elmenhorst).

after forty days of voluntary abstinence from food. His tomb was still shown at Metapontum in the days of Cicero.¹

The Pythagorean order is reduced to a religious and philosophical sect, in which character it continues. As an active brotherhood, the Pythagoreans never revived; but the dispersed members came together as a sect, for common religious observances and common pursuit of science. They were re-admitted, after some interval, into the cities of Magna Græcia,² from which they had been originally expelled, but to which the sect is always considered as particularly belonging—though individual members of it are found besides at Thebes and in other cities of Greece. Indeed some of these later Pythagoreans sometimes even acquired great political influence, as we see in the case of the Tarentine Archytas, the contemporary of Plato.

It has already been stated that the period when Pythagoras arrived at Kroton may be fixed somewhere between B. C. 540-530. His arrival is said to have occurred at a time of great depression in the minds of the Krotoniates. They had recently been defeated by the united Lokrians and Rhegians, vastly inferior to themselves in number, at the river Sagra; which humiliation is said to have rendered them docile to the training of the Samian

¹ Cicero, *De Finib.* v. 2 (who seems to have copied from Dikæarchus; see Fuhr. ad Dikæarchi Fragment. p. 55); Justin, xx. 4; Diogen. Laërt. viii. 40; Jamblichus, V. P. c. 249.

O. Müller says (*Dorians*, iii. 9, 16), that "the influence of the Pythagorean league upon the administration of the Italian states was of the most beneficial kind, which continued for many generations after the dissolution of the league itself."

The first of these two assertions cannot be made out, and depends only on the statements of later encomiasts, who even supply materials to contradict their own general view. The judgement of Welcker respecting the influence of the Pythagoreans, much less avourable, is at the same time

more probable (*Præfat. ad Theognid.* p. xlv.).

The second of the two assertions appears to me quite incorrect; the influence of the Pythagorean order on the government of Magna Græcia ceased altogether, as far as we are able to judge. An individual Pythagorean like Archytas might obtain influence, but this is not the influence of the order. Nor ought O. Müller to talk about the Italian Greeks giving up the Doric customs and adopting an Achæan government. There is nothing to prove that Kroton ever had Doric customs.

² Aristotel., *de Calo*, ii. 18. of περί τῆν Ἰταλίαν, καλούμενοι δὲ Πυθαγορεῖα. "Italici philosophiquondam nominati" (Cicero, *De Senectute*, c. 21).

missionary.¹ As the birth of the Pythagorean order is thus connected with the defeat of the Krotoniates at the Sagra, so its extinction is also connected with their victory over the Sybarites at the river Traeis or Trionto, about twenty years afterwards.

Of the history of these two great Achæan cities we unfortunately know very little. Though both were powerful, yet down to the period of 510 B. C., Sybaris seems to have been decidedly the greatest. Of its dominion as well as of its much-denounced luxury I have spoken in a former chapter.² It was at that time that the war broke out between them, which ended in the destruction of Sybaris. It is certain that the Sybaritans were aggressors in the war; but by what causes it had been preceded in their own town, or what provocation they had received, we make out very indistinctly. There had been a political revolution at Sybaris (we are told) not long before, in which a popular leader named Têlys had headed a rising against the oligarchical government, and induced the people to banish five hundred of the leading rich men, as well as to confiscate their properties. He had acquired the sovereignty and become despot of Sybaris.³ It appears too, that he, or his rule at Sybaris, was much abhorred at Kroton; since the Krotoniate Philippus, a man of splendid muscular form and an Olympic victor, was exiled for having engaged himself to

War between Sybaris and Kroton.

¹ Heyne places the date of the battle of Sagra about 560 B. C.; but this is very uncertain. See his *Opuscula*, vol. ii. *Prolus.* ii. p. 53, and *Prolus.* x. p. 184. See also Justin. xx. 3, and Strabo, vi. p. 261-263. I will be seen that the latter conceives the battle of the Sagra as having happened after the destruction of Sybaris by the Krotoniates; for he states twice, that the Krotoniates lost so many citizens at the Sagra, that the city did not long survive so terrible a blow: he cannot therefore have supposed that the complete triumph of the Krotoniates over the great Sybaris was gained afterwards.

² See above chap. xxii.

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³ Diodor. xii. 8. Herodotus calls Têlys in one place βασιλῆα, in another τύραννον of Sybaris (v. 44): this is not at variance with the story of Diodorus.

The story given by Athenæus, out of Herakleïdês Ponticus, respecting the subversion of the dominion of Têlys, cannot be reconciled either with Herodotus or Diodorus (Athenæus, xii. p. 523). Dr. Thirlwall supposes the deposition of Têlys to have occurred between the defeat at the Traeis and the capture of Sybaris; but this is inconsistent with the statement of Herakleïdês, and not countenanced by any other evidence.

marry the daughter of Têlys.¹ According to the narrative given by the later Pythagoreans, those exiles, whom Têlys had driven from Sybaris, took refuge at Kroton, casting themselves as suppliants on the altars for protection: it may well be, indeed, that they were in part Pythagoreans of Sybaris. A body of powerful exiles, harboured in a town so close at hand, inspired alarm, and Têlys demanded that they should be delivered up, threatening war in case of refusal. This demand excited consternation at Kroton, since the military strength of Sybaris was decidedly superior. The surrender of the exiles was much debated, and almost decreed, by the Krotoniates, until at length the persuasion of Pythagoras himself is said to have determined them to risk any hazard sooner than incur the dishonour of betraying suppliants.

On the demand of the Sybarites being refused, Têlys marched against Kroton at the head of a force which is reckoned at 300,000 men.² He marched, too, in defiance of the strongest religious warnings against the enterprise; for the sacrifices, offered on his behalf by the Æamid prophet Kallias of Elis, were so decisively unfavourable, that the prophet himself fled in terror to Kroton.³ Near the river Traeis or Trionto, Têlys was met by the forces of Kroton, consisting (we are informed) of 100,000 men, and commanded by the great athlete and Pythagorean Milo; who was clothed (we are told) in the costume and armed with the club of Heraklês. They were farther reinforced by a valuable ally, the Spartan Dorieus (younger brother of king Kleomenês), then coasting along the Gulf of Tarentum with a body of colonists, intending to found

Defeat of the Sybarites, and destruction of their city, partly through the aid of the Spartan Dorians.

a settlement in Sicily. A bloody battle was fought, in which the Sybarites were totally worsted, with prodigious slaughter; while the victors, fiercely provoked and giving no quarter, followed up the pursuit so warmly that they took the city, dispersed its inhabitants, and crushed its whole power⁴ in the short space of seventy days. The Sybarites fled in great part to Laos and Skidros,⁵ their settlements planted on the

¹ Herodot. v. 47.

⁴ Diodor. xii. 9, 10; Strabo, vi.

² Diodor. xii. 9; Strabo, vi. p. 263; Jamblichus, Vit. Pythag. c.

p. 263.

260; Skymn. Chl. v. 340.

⁵ Herodot. vi. 31; Strabo, vi. p.

253.

³ Herodot. v. 44.

Mediterranean coast, across the Calabrian peninsula. So eager were the Krotoniates to render the site of Sybaris untenable, that they turned the course of the river Krathis so as to overwhelm and destroy it: the dry bed in which the river had originally flowed was still visible in the time of Herodotus,¹ who was among the settlers in the town of Thurii afterwards founded nearly adjoining. It appears however that the Krotoniates for a long time kept the site of Sybaris deserted, refusing even to allot the territory among the body of their own citizens: from which circumstances (as has been before noticed) the commotion against the Pythagorean order is said to have arisen. They may perhaps have been afraid of the name and recollections of the city. No large or permanent establishment was ever formed there until Thurii was established by Athens about sixty-five years afterwards. Nevertheless the name of the Sybarites did not perish: they maintained themselves at Laos, Skidros, and elsewhere—and afterwards formed the privileged Old-citizens among the colonists of Thurii; but misbehaved themselves in that capacity, and were mostly either slain or expelled. Even after that, however, the name of Sybaris still remained on a reduced scale in some portion of the territory: Herodotus recounts what he was told by the Sybarites, and we find subsequent indications of them even as late as Theokritus.

¹ Herodot. v. 45; Diodor. xii. 9, 10; Strabo, vi. p. 263. Strabo mentions expressly the turning of the river for the purpose of overwhelming the city—ἐκόντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ἐπήγαγον τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ κατέκλυσαν. It is to this change in the channel of the river that I refer the expression in Herodotus—τέμνός τε καὶ νηὸν ἴοντα παρὰ τὸν ξηρὸν Κραθίην. It was natural that the old deserted bed of the river should be called "*the dry Krathis*": whereas, if we suppose that there was only one channel, the expression has no appropriate meaning. For I do not think that any one can be well satisfied with the explanation of Bähr—**Vocatur Crathis hoc loco ξηρὸς siccus, ut qui hieme fluit, æstatis*

vero tempore exsiccatus est: quod adhuc in multis Italiæ inferioris fluviis observant." I doubt whether this be true, as a matter of fact, respecting the river Krathis (see my preceding volume, ch. xxii.); but even if the fact were true, the epithet in Bähr's sense has no especial significance for the purpose contemplated by Herodotus, who merely wishes to describe the site of the temple erected by Dorieus. "Near the Krathis," or "near the dry Krathis," would be equivalent expressions, if we adopted Bähr's construction; whereas to say "near the deserted channel of the Krathis," would be a good local designation.

The conquest and destruction of the original Sybaris—perhaps in 510 B.C. the greatest of all Grecian cities—appears to have excited a strong sympathy in the Hellenic world. In Milétus especially, with which it had maintained intimate union, the grief was so vehement, that all the Milesians shaved their heads in token of mourning.¹ The event, happening just at the time of the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, must have made a sensible revolution in the relations of the Greek cities on the Italian coast with the rustic population of the interior. The Krotoniates might destroy Sybaris and disperse its inhabitants, but they could not succeed to its wide dominion over dependent territory: and the extinction of this great aggregate power, stretching across the peninsula from sea to sea, lessened the means of resistance against the Oscan movements from the inland. From this time forward, the cities of Magna Græcia, as well as those of Ionia, tend to decline in consequence; while Athens, on the other hand, becomes both more conspicuous and more powerful. At the invasion of Greece by Xerxês thirty years after this conquest of Sybaris, Sparta and Athens send to ask for aid both from Sicily and Korkyra, but not from Magna Græcia.

It is much to be regretted that we do not possess fuller information respecting such important changes among the Greco-Italian cities. Yet we may remark that even Herodotus—himself a citizen of Thurii and dwelling on the spot not more than eighty years after the capture of Sybaris—evidently found no written memorials to consult; and could obtain from verbal conversation nothing better than statements both meagre and contradictory. The material circumstance, for example, of the aid rendered by the Spartan Dorieus and his colonists, though positively asserted by the Sybarites, was as positively denied by the Krotoniates, who alleged that they had accomplished the conquest by themselves and with their own unaided forces. There can be little hesitation in crediting the affirmative assertion of the Sybarites, who showed to Herodotus a temple and precinct erected by the Spartan prince in testimony of his share in the victory, on the banks

Sensation excited in the Hellenic world by the destruction of Sybaris. Gradual decline of the Greek power in Italy.

Contradictory statements and arguments respecting the presence of Dorieus.

¹ Herodot. vi. 21.

of the dry deserted channel out of which the Krathis had been turned, and in honour of the Krathian Athênê.¹ This of itself forms a proof, coupled with the positive assertion of the Sybarites, sufficient for the case; but they produced another indirect argument to confirm it, which deserves notice. Dorieus had attacked Sybaris while he was passing along the coast of Italy to go and found a colony in Sicily, under the express mandate and encouragement of the oracle. After tarrying awhile at Sybaris, he pursued his journey to the south-western portion of Sicily, where he and nearly all his companions perished in a battle with the Carthaginians and Eggestæans—though the oracle had promised him that he should acquire and occupy permanently the neighbouring territory near Mount Eryx. Now the Sybarites deduced from this fatal disaster of Dorieus and his expedition, combined with the favourable promise of the oracle beforehand, a confident proof of the correctness of their own statement that he had fought at Sybaris. For if he had gone straight to the territory marked out by the oracle (they argued), without turning aside for any other object, the prophecy on which his hopes were founded would have been unquestionably realised, and he would have succeeded. But the ruinous disappointment which actually overtook him was at once explained, and the truth of prophecy vindicated, when it was recollected that he had turned aside to help the Krotoniates against Sybaris, and thus set at nought the conditions prescribed to him. Upon this argument (Herodotus tells us) the Sybarites of his day especially insisted.² And while we note their pious and literal faith in the communications of an inspired prophet, we must at the same time observe how perfectly that faith supplied the place of historical premises—how scanty their stock was of such legitimate evidence—and how little they had yet learnt to appreciate its value.

It is to be remarked that Herodotus, in his brief mention of the fatal war between Sybaris and Kroton, does not make the least allusion to Pythagoras or his

¹ Herodot. v. 45.

² Herodot. v. 45. Τοῦτο δὲ, αὐτοῦ Δωριέως τὸν θάνατον μαρτύριον μέγιστον ποιῶνται (Συβαριταί), ὅτι παρὰ τὰ μεμνητευμένα ποιῶν δια-

φθάρη. Εἰ γὰρ δὴ μὴ παρέφηζε μηδὲν, ἀπ' ᾧ δὲ ἰστέλλη ἐποίησε, εἴθε ἂν τὴν Ἐρυκίνην χώραν καὶ ἑλῶν κάτασε, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἡ στρατὴ διαφθάρη.

brotherhood. The least which we can infer from such silence is, that the part which they played in reference to the war, and their general ascendancy in Magna Græcia, was in reality less conspicuous and overruling than the Pythagorean historians set forth. Even making such allowance, however, the absence of all allusion in Herodotus, to the commotions which accompanied the subversion of the Pythagoreans, is a circumstance not easily explicable. Nor can I pass over a perplexing statement in Polybius, which seems to show that he too must have conceived the history of Sybaris in a way different from that in which it is commonly represented. He tells us, that after much suffering in Magna Græcia from the troubles which followed the expulsion of the Pythagoreans, the cities were induced by Achæan mediation to come to an accommodation and even to establish something like a permanent league with a common temple and sacrifices. Now the three cities which he specifies as having been the first to do this, are, Kroton, Sybaris, and Kaulonia.¹ But according to the sequence of events and the fatal war (just described) between Kroton and Sybaris, the latter city must have been at that time in ruins; little, if at all, inhabited. I cannot but infer from this statement of Polybius, that he followed different authorities respecting the early history of Magna Græcia in the beginning of the fifth century B.C.

Indeed the early history of these cities gives us little more than a few isolated facts and names. With regard to their legislators, Zaleukus and Charondas, nothing is made out except their existence—and even that fact some ancient critics contested. Of Zaleukus, whom chronologists place in 664 B.C., I have already spoken; the date of Charondas cannot be assigned, but we may perhaps presume

Charondas,
lawgiver
of Katana,
Naxos,
Zanklé,
Rhégium,
&c.

¹ Polyb. ii. 39. Heyne thinks that the agreement here mentioned by Polybius took place Olymp. 80. 3; or indeed after the repopulation of the Sybaritan territory by the foundation of Thurii (Opuscula, vol. ii.; Prolus. x. p. 189). But there seems great difficulty in

imagining that the state of violent commotion—which (according to Polybius) was only appeased by this agreement—can possibly have lasted so long as half a century; the received date of the overthrow of the Pythagoreans being about 504 B.C.

that it was at some time between 600-500 B.C. He was a citizen of middling station, born in the Chalkidic colony of Katana in Sicily,¹ and he framed laws not only for his own city, but for the other Chalkidic cities in Sicily and Italy—Leontini, Naxos, Zanklê, and Rhêgium. The laws and the solemn preamble ascribed to him by Diodorus and Stobæus, belong to a later day,² and we are obliged to content ourselves with collecting the brief hints of Aristotle, who tells us that the laws of Charondas descended to great minuteness of distinction and specification, especially in graduating the fine for offences according to the property of the guilty person fined³—but that there was nothing in his laws strictly original and peculiar, except that he was the first to introduce the solemn indictment against perjured witnesses before justice. The perjured witness in Grecian ideas, was looked upon as having committed a crime half religious, half civil. The indictment raised

¹ Aristot. Politic. ii. 9. 6, iv. 9. 10. Heyne puts Charondas much earlier than the foundation of Thurii, in which I think he is undoubtedly right: but without determining the date more exactly (Opuscul. vol. ii.; Prolus. ix. p. 160), Charondas must certainly have been earlier than Anaxilas of Rhêgium and the great Sicilian despots; which will place him higher than 500 B.C.: but I do not know that any more precise mark of time can be found.

² Diodorus, xii. 35; Stobæus, Serm. xlv. 20-40; Cicero de Legg. ii. 6. See K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griech. Staatsalterthümer, ch. 89; Heyne, Opuscul. vol. ii. p. 72-164. Brandis (Geschichte der Röm. Philosophie, ch. xxvi. p. 102) seems to conceive these prologues as genuine.

The mistakes and confusion made by ancient writers respecting these lawgivers—even by writers earlier than Aristotle (Politic. ii. 9. 5)—are such as we have no means of clearing up.

Seneca (Epist. 90) calls both Za-

leukus and Charondas disciples of Pythagoras; that the former was so, is not to be believed; but it is not wholly impossible that the latter may have been so, or at least a contemporary of the earliest Pythagoreans.

³ Aristot. Politic. ii. 9. 8. Χαρωνδου δ' ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶν ψευδομαρτύρων πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσηψιν τῇ δ' ἀριβίαι τῶν νομῶν ἐπὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν. To the fulness and precision predicated respecting Charondas in the latter part of this passage, I refer the other passage in Politic. iv. 10. 6, which is not to be construed as if it meant that Charondas had graduated fines on the rich and poor with a distinct view to that political trick (of indirectly eliminating the poor from public duties) which Aristotle had been just adverting to—but merely means that Charondas had been nice and minute in graduating pecuniary penalties generally, having reference to the wealth or poverty of the person sentenced.

against him, known by a peculiar name, partook of both characters, approaching in some respects to the procedure against a murderer. Such distinct form of indictment against perjured testimony—with its appropriate name,¹ which we shall find maintained at Athens throughout the best known days of Attic law—was first enacted by Charondas.

¹ Πρώτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπισκηψίαν (Aristot. Politic. ii. 9. 8). See Harpokration, v. Ἐπισκήψατο, and Pollux, viii. 33; Dēmothenēs cont. Stephanum, ii. c. 5; cont. Euerg. et Mnēsibal. c. 1. The word ἐπισκηψίαι carries with it the solemnity of meaning adverted to in the text, and seems to have

been used especially with reference to an action or indictment against perjured witnesses: which indictment was permitted to be brought with a less degree of risk or cost to the accuser than most others in the Attic dikasteries (Dēmosth. cont. Euerg. et Mn. l. c.).

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH
OF XERXES AGAINST GREECE.

I HAVE recounted, in a preceding chapter, the Athenian victory at Marathon, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the *Ægean* to the Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both Eretria and Athens; an order which he had indeed executed in part with success, as the string of Eretrian prisoners brought to Susa attested—but which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally obnoxious to Darius. Far from satiating his revenge upon Athens, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious defeat. His wrath against the Athenians rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them as well as upon Greece generally. Resolved upon assembling the entire force of his empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops, horses, and ships both of war and burthen. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Darius determined to conduct in person against Greece.¹ Nor was his determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises—the conquest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt—when he was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxes, his son by Atossa; for the ascendancy of that queen ensured to Xerxes the preference over his elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by a former wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded without opposition.² It

Resolutions of Darius to invade Greece a second time. His death.

¹ Herodot. vii. 3, 4.

—simply as a report, and seemingly

² Herodot. vii. 1-4. He mentions without believing it himself—that

deserves to be remarked, that though we shall meet with several acts of cruelty and atrocity perpetrated in the Persian regal family, there is nothing like that systematic fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires.

The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet unappeased at the time of his death, and it was fortunate for the Athenians that his crown now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxes, personally the handsomest¹ and most stately man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was in character timid and faint-hearted, over and above those defects of vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which he shared more or less with all the Persian kings. Yet we shall see that even under his conduct, the invasion of Greece was very near proving successful: and it might well have succeeded altogether, had he been either endued with the courageous temperament, or inflamed with the fierce animosity, of his father.

On succeeding to the throne, Xerxes found the forces of the empire in active preparation, pursuant to the orders of Darius; except Egypt, which was in a state of revolt.

Demaratus the exiled king of Sparta was at Susa at the moment when Darius was about to choose a successor among his sons (this cannot consist with Ktesias, *Persic.* c. 23); and that he suggested to Xerxes a convincing argument by which to determine the mind of his father, urging the analogy of the law of regal succession at Sparta, whereby the son of a king, born after his father became king, was preferred to an elder son born before that event. The existence of such a custom at Sparta may well be doubted.

Some other anecdotes, not less difficult of belief than this, and alike calculated to bestow a factitious importance on Demaratus, will be noticed in the subsequent pages. The latter received from

the Persian king the grant of Pergamus and Teuthrania, with their land-revenues, which his descendants long afterwards continued to occupy (*Xenoph. Hellen.* iii. 1-6); and perhaps these descendants may have been among the persons from whom Herodotus derived his information respecting the expedition of Xerxes. See vii. 239.

Plutarch (*De Fraternali Amore*, p. 488) gives an account in many respects different concerning the circumstances which determined the succession of Xerxes to the throne, in preference to his elder brother.

¹ Herod. vii. 187. The like personal beauty is ascribed to Darius Codomannus, the last of the Persian kings (*Plutarch, Alexand.* c. 21).

His first necessity was to reconquer this country; a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before: we may presume that not only the tribute was increased, but also the numbers of the Persian occupying force, maintained by contributions levied on the natives. Achæmenes, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap.

B.C. 485.
Revolt and reconquest of Egypt by the Persians.

But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus; who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a satrapy for himself. There were not wanting Grecian counsellors to enforce his recommendation both by the promise of help and by the colour of religion. The great family of the Aleuadæ, belonging to Larissa and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Susa to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas; while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them to Susa a new instrument, the holy mystic Onomakritus—a man who had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, interpreting, and delivering out, prophetic verses passing under the name of the ancient seer or poet Musæus. Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Peisistratids, he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and consulted by him as the expositor of these venerated documents. But having been detected by the poet Lasus of Hermione, in the very act of interpolating them with new matter of his own, he was indignantly banished by Hipparchus. The Peisistratids however, now in banishment themselves, forgot or forgave this offence, and carried Onomakritus with his prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a person of oracular authority, to assist in working on the mind of Xerxes. To this purpose his interpolations, or his omissions, were now directed.

Indifference of Xerxes to the invasion of Greece—persons who advised and instigated him—persuasions which they employed—prophecies produced by Onomakritus.

When introduced to the Persian monarch, he recited emphatically various encouraging predictions, wherein the bridging of the Hellespont, and the triumphant march of a barbaric host into Greece, appeared as predestined; while he carefully kept back all those of a contrary tenor, which portended calamity and disgrace. So at least Herodotus,¹ strenuous in upholding the credit of Bakis, Musæus, and other Grecian prophets whose verses were in circulation, expressly assures us. The religious encouragements of Onomakritus, and the political cooperation proffered by the Aleuadæ, enabled Mardonius effectually to overcome the reluctance of his master. Indeed it was not difficult to show, according to the feelings then prevalent, that a new king of Persia was in honour obliged to enlarge the boundaries of the empire.² The conquering impulse springing from the first founder was as yet unexhausted; the insults offered by the Athenians remained still unavenged; and in addition to this double stimulus to action, Mardonius drew a captivating picture of Europe as an acquisition—"it was the finest land in the world, produced every variety of fruit-bearing trees, and was too good a possession for any mortal man except the Persian kings."³ Fifteen years before, the Milesian Aristagoras,⁴ when entreating the Spartans to assist the Ionic revolt, had exaggerated the wealth and productiveness of Asia in contrast with the poverty of Greece—a contrast less widely removed from the truth, at that time, than the picture presented by Mardonius.

Having thus been persuaded to alter his original views, Xerxes convoked a meeting of the principal Persian counsellors, and announced to them his resolution to invade Greece; setting forth the mingled motives of revenge and aggrandisement which impelled him, and representing the conquest of

Xerxes resolves to invade Greece.

¹ Herodot. vii. 6; viii. 20, 96, 77. Ὀνομάκριτος—κατέλεγε τῶν χρησμῶν—αἰ μὲ, τι ἐπέοι σφάλμα φέρον τῆ Πέρσῃ, τῶν μὲν ἔλεγε οὐδέν· ὁ δὲ τὰ εὐτυχέστατα ἐκλεγόμενος, ἔλεγε τόν τε Ἑλλησποντον ὡς λευγθῆναι χρέον εἶη ὑπ' ἀνδρός Πέρσῃ, τῆς τε ἔλασιν εἰρηγόμενος, &c.

An intimation somewhat curious respecting this collection of prophecies; it was of an extremely

varied character, and contained promises or threats to meet any emergency which might arise.

² Æschylus, Pers. 761.

³ Herodot. vii. 6. ὡς ἡ Εὐρώπη περικαλλῆς χώρη, καὶ δένδρεα παντοῖα φέροι τὰ ἡμέρα, βασιλεῖ τε μόνῃ ἄνητῶν ἀξίη ἐκτῆσθαι—χώρην καμφορωτέραν (vii. 8).

⁴ Herodot. v. 49.

Greece as carrying with it that of all Europe; so that the Persian empire would become coextensive with the æther of Zeus and the limits of the sun's course.

On the occasion of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital informant—Herodotus. The invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the final repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three last books, and the principal object of his whole history, towards which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amidst those prior circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a substantive importance and interest of their own, recounted at so much length that they appear coordinate and principal, so that the thread of the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together the larger divisions of his history, omitting the occasional prolixities of detail, that such thread is never lost in the historian's own mind: it may be traced by an attentive reader, from his preface and the statement immediately following it—of Cræsus as the first barbaric conqueror of the Ionian Greeks—down to the full expansion of his theme, "*Græcia Barbariæ lento collisa duello,*" in the expedition of Xerxes. That expedition, as forming the consummation of his historical scheme, is not only related more copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is also ushered in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment, so that the seventh Book of Herodotus reminds us in many points of the second Book of the Iliad: probably too, if the lost Grecian epics had reached us, we should trace many other cases in which the imagination of the historian has unconsciously assimilated itself to them. The Dream sent by the Gods to frighten Xerxes, when about to recede from his project—as well as the ample catalogue of nations and eminent individuals embodied in the Persian host—have both of them marked parallels in the Iliad: and Herodotus seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against Greece as an antithesis to that of the Atreidæ against Troy. He enters into the internal feeling of Xerxes with as much familiarity as Homer into those of Agamemnon, and introduces "the counsel of Zeus" as not less direct, special, and overruling, than it appears in the Iliad and

Odyssey:¹ though the Godhead in Herodotus, compared with Homer, tends to become neuter instead of masculine or feminine, and retains only the jealous instincts of a ruler, apart from the appetites, lusts, and caprices of a man: acting moreover chiefly as a centralized, or at least as a homogeneous, force, in place of the discordant severalty of agents conspicuous in the Homeric theology. The religious idea, so often presented elsewhere in Herodotus—that the Godhead was jealous and hostile to excessive good fortune or immoderate desires in man,—is worked into his history of Xerxes as the ever-present moral and as the main cause of its disgraceful termination. For we shall discover as we proceed, that the historian, with that honourable frankness which Plutarch calls his “malignity,” neither ascribes to his countrymen credit greater than they deserve for personal valour, nor seeks to veil the many chances of defeat which their mismanagement laid open.²

¹ Homer, *Iliad*, i. 8. Διὸς δ' ἐταλίστο βουλῆ. Herodotus is characterized as Ὀμήρου ζηλωτής—Ὀμηρικώτατος—(Dionys. Halic. ad Cn. Pompeium, p. 772, Reiske; Longinus De Sublim. p. 86, ed. Pearce).

² While Plutarch (if indeed the treatise de Herodoti Malignitate be the work of Plutarch) treats Herodotus as uncandid, malicious, corrupt, the calumniator of great men and glorious deeds—Dionysius of Halikarnassus on the contrary, with more reason, treats him as a pattern of excellent dispositions in an historian, contrasting him in this respect with Thucydides, to whom he imputes an unfriendly spirit in criticising Athens, arising from his long banishment: Ἡ μὲν Ἡροδότου διάθεσις ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιεικής, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς συνηδομένη, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς συναλγοῦσα· ἡ δὲ Θουκυδίδου διάθεσις αὐθελαστός τις καὶ κικρά, καὶ τῇ πατρίδι τῆς φυγῆς μνησικαχοῦσα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμαρτήματα ἐπιέρχεται καὶ μάλα ἀκριβῶς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νοῦν κεραιωμένων κα-

θάπαξ οὐ μέμνηται ἢ ὡσπερ ἡννεκασμένος. (Dionys. Hal. ad Cn. Pompeium de Præcip. Historicis Judic. p. 774, Reiske.)

Precisely the same fault which Dionysius here imputes to Thucydides (though in other places he acquits him, ἀπὸ παντός φόβου καὶ πάσης κολακείας, p. 824), Plutarch and Dio cast far more harshly upon Herodotus. In neither case is the reproach deserved.

Both the moralists and the rhetoricians of ancient times were very apt to treat history, not as a series of true matters of fact, exemplifying the laws of human nature and society, and enlarging our knowledge of them for purposes of future inference—but as if it were a branch of fiction, so to be handled as to please our taste or improve our morality. Dionysius, blaming Thucydides for the choice of his subject, goes so far as to say that the Peloponnesian war, a period of ruinous discord in Greece, ought to have been left in oblivion and never

I have already mentioned that Xerxes is described as having originally been averse to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereto by the persuasions of Mardonius. This was probably the genuine Persian belief, for the blame of so great a disaster would naturally be transferred from the monarch to some evil counsellor.¹ As soon as Xerxes, yielding to persuasion, has announced, to the Persian chief men whom he had convoked, his resolution to bridge over the Hellespont and march to the conquest of Greece and Europe, Mardonius is represented as expressing his warm concurrence in the project, extolling the immense force² of Persia, and depreciating the Ionians in Europe (so he denominated them) as so poor and disunited that success was not only certain but easy. Against the rashness of this general—the evil genius of Xerxes—we find opposed the prudence and long experience of Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius, and therefore uncle to the monarch. The age and relationship of this Persian Nestor embolden him to undertake the dangerous task of questioning the determination which Xerxes, though professing to invite the opinions of others, had proclaimed as already settled in his own mind. The speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Artabanus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek. It opens with the Grecian conception of the necessity of hearing and comparing opposite views, prior to any final decision—reproves Mardonius for falsely depreciating the Greeks and seducing his master into personal danger—sets forth the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at sea, would come and destroy the bridge by which Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont—reminds the latter of the imminent hazard which Darius and his army

Xerxes announces his project to an assembly of Persian counsellors—Mardonius and Artabanus—the evil and good genius.

to have passed into history (σιωπῆ καὶ λήθη παραδοθεῖς, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιγεγομένων ἠγνοήθησι, *ibid.* p. 768)—and that especially Thucydides ought never to have thrown the blame of it upon his own city, since there were many other causes to which it might have been imputed (ἐτέραις ἔχοντα πολλαῖς ἀφορμαῖς περιάψαι τὰς αἰτίας, p. 770). It will be found, however,

if we read Thucydides with attention, that he does not throw the blame of the Peloponnesian war upon Athens, whatever may be thought of his strictures on her conduct in various particular cases.

¹ Herodot. viii. 99. Μαρδόνιον ἐν αἰτίῃ τῶν ἑνῶν: compare c. 100.

² Herodot. vii. 9.

had undergone in Scythia, from the destruction (averted only by Histieus and his influence) of the bridge over the Danube: such prudential suggestions being further strengthened by adverting to the jealous aversion of the Godhead towards overgrown human power.¹

The impatient monarch silences his uncle in a tone of insult and menace: nevertheless, in spite of himself, the dissuasions work upon him so powerfully, that before night they gradually alter his resolution, and decide him to renounce the scheme. In this latter disposition he falls asleep, when a dream appears: a tall stately man stands over him, denounces his change of opinion, and peremptorily commands him to persist in the enterprise as announced. In spite of this dream, Xerxes still adheres to his altered purpose, assembles his council the next morning, and after apologising for his angry language towards Artabanus, acquaints them to their great joy that he adopts the recommendations of the latter, and abandons his project against Greece. But in the following night, no sooner has Xerxes fallen asleep, than the same dream and the same figure again appear to him, repeating the previous command in language of terrific menace. The monarch, in a state of great alarm, springs from his bed and sends for Artabanus, whom he informs of the twice-repeated vision and divine mandate interdicting his change of resolution. "If (says he) it be the absolute will of God that this expedition against Greece should be executed, the same vision will appear to thee also, provided thou puttest on my attire, sittest in my throne, and sleepest in my bed."² Not without reluctance, Artabanus obeys this order (for it was high treason in any Persian to sit upon the regal throne³), but he at length complies, expecting to be able to prove to Xerxes that the dream deserved no attention. "Many dreams (he says) are not of divine origin, nor anything better than mere wandering ob-

¹ Herodot. vii. 10.

² Herodot. vii. 15. Εἰ ὦν θεός ἐστί ὁ ἐπιπέμπων καὶ εἰ πάντως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστί γενέσθαι στρατηλασίην ἐπὶ τῇ Ἑλλάδι, ἐπιτήσεται καὶ σοὶ ταῦτό τοῦτο δειρὸν, ὁμοίως καὶ ἴσολ ἐντελλόμενον. Ἐβρίσκω δὲ ᾧδε ἐν γινόμενα ταῦτα, εἰ λάβοις τὴν ἐμήν

σκευὴν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἐνδύς, μετὰ ταῦτα ἴσαιο ἐς τὸν ἐμὸν θρόνον, καὶ ἕκαστα ἐν κοίτῃ τῇ ἐμῇ κατοκνήσωσαι. Compare vii. 8. θεός τε οὕτω ἄγει, &c.

³ See Brissonius, De Regno Persarum, lib. i. p. 27.

jects such as we have been thinking upon during the day: this dream, of whatever nature it may be, will not be foolish enough to mistake me for the king, even if I be in the royal attire and bed; but if it shall still continue to appear to thee, I shall myself confess it to be divine.”¹ Accordingly Artabanus is placed in the regal throne and bed, and as soon as he falls asleep, the very same figure shows itself to him also, saying, “Art thou he who dissuadest Xerxes, on the plea of solicitude for his safety, from marching against Greece? Xerxes has already been forewarned of that which he will suffer if he disobeys, and thou too shalt not escape either now or in future, for seeking to avert that which must and shall be.” With these words the vision assumes a threatening attitude, as though preparing to burn out the eyes of Artabanus with hot irons, when the sleeper awakens in terror, and runs to communicate with Xerxes. “I have hitherto, O king, recommended to thee to rest contented with that vast actual empire on account of which all mankind think thee happy; but since the divine impulsion is now apparent, and since destruction from on high is prepared for the Greeks, I too alter my opinion, and advise thee to command the Persians as God directs; so that nothing may be found wanting on thy part for that which God puts into thy hands.”²

It is thus that Herodotus represents the great expedition of Xerxes to have originated; partly in the rashness of Mardonius, who reaps his bitter reward on the field of battle at Plataea—but still more in the influence of “mischievous On-eiros,” who is sent by the gods (as in the second book of the Iliad) to put a cheat upon Xerxes, and even to overrule by terror both his

Religious conception of the sequences of history—common both to Persians and Greeks.

¹ Herodot. vii. 16. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐς τοσοῦτό γε εὐηθείης ἀνέχεται τοῦτο, ὅτι δὴ κατέ ἐστι τὸ ἐπιφανιζόμενον τοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ, ὥστε δόξει ἐμέ ὄρων σε ὄραν, τῆ σὴ ἐσθῆτι τεκμαιρόμενον. . . . εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐπιφοιτήσαιε γε συσχεῖως, φαίην ἄν καὶ αὐτός θεῖον εἶναι.

² Herodot. vii. 18. Ἐπει δὲ δαιμονίη τις γίγνεται ὄρημι, καὶ Ἕλληνας, ὡς εἶοικε, φθορὴ τις καταλαμβάνει θεήλατος, ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς τράπομαι, καὶ τὴν γνῶμην μετατιθε-

μαι. . . . Ποῖσε δὲ οὕτω δεῦρος, τοῦ θεοῦ παραδιδόντος, τῶν σῶν ἐνδεήσεται μηδὲν.

The expression τοῦ θεοῦ παραδιδόντος in this place denotes what is expressed by τὸ χρεῖον γίνεσθαι, c. 17. The dream threatens Artabanus and Xerxes for trying to turn aside the current of destiny—or in other words, to contravene the predetermined will of the gods.

scruples and those of Artabanus. The gods having determined (as in the instances of Astyagès, Polykratès, and others) that the Persian empire shall undergo signal humiliation and repulse at the hands of the Greeks, constrain the Persian monarch into a ruinous enterprise against his own better judgement. Such religious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiar to Herodotus, but as common to him with his contemporaries generally, Greeks as well as Persians, though peculiarly stimulated among the Greeks by the abundance of their epic or quasi-historical poetry. Modified more or less in each individual narrator, it is made to supply connecting links as well as initiating causes for the great events of history. As a cause for this expedition, incomparably the greatest fact and the most fertile in consequences, throughout the political career both of Greeks and Persians, nothing less than a special interposition of the gods would have satisfied the feelings either of one nation or the other. The story of the dream has its rise (as Herodotus tells us¹) in Persian fancy, and is in some sort a consolation for the national vanity; but it is turned and coloured by the Grecian historian, who mentions also a third dream, which appears to Xerxes after his resolution to march was finally taken, and which the mistake of the Magian interpreters falsely construed² into an encouragement, though it really threatened ruin. How much this religious conception of the sequence of events belongs to the age, appears by the fact, that it not only appears in Pindar and the Attic tragedians generally, but pervades especially the Persæ of Æschylus, exhibited

¹ Herodot. vii. 12. Καὶ δὴ τοῦ ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ εἶδε ὄψιν τοιγυδε, ὡς λέγεται ὑπὸ Περσέων.

Herodotus seems to use *ὄψιν* in the neuter gender, not *ὄψιν* in the masculine: for the alteration of Bähr (ad vii. 16) of *ὄψιν* in place of *ὄψιν*, is not at all called for. The masculine gender *ὄψιν* is commonly used in Homer; but there are cases of the neuter *ὄψιν*.

Respecting the influence of dreams in determining the enterprises of the early Turkish sultans, see von Hammer, *Geschichte des*

Osmanischen Reichs, book ii. vol. i. p. 49.

² Compare the dream of Darius Codomannus. Plutarch, Alexander, c. 18. Concerning the punishment inflicted by Astyagès on the Magians for misinterpreting his dreams, see Herodot. i. 128.

Philochorus, skilled in divination, affirmed that Nikias put a totally wrong interpretation upon that fatal eclipse of the moon which induced him to delay his retreat, and proved his ruin (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23).

seven years after the battle of Salamis—in which we find the premonitory dreams as well as the jealous enmity of the gods towards vast power and overweening aspirations in man;¹ though without any of that inclination, which Herodotus seems to have derived from Persian informants, to exculpate Xerxes by representing him as disposed himself to sober counsels, but driven in a contrary direction by the irresistible fiat of the gods.²

¹ Æschylus, *Pers.* 96, 104, 181, 220, 368, 745, 825: compare Sophocl. *Ajax*, 129, 744, 775, and the end of the *Œdipus Tyrannus*; Euripid *Hecub.* 58; Pindar, *Olymp.* viii. 86; *Isthm.* vi. 39; Pausanias, ii. 33, 3. Compare the sense of the word *δαιδαίμων* in Xenophon, *Agessilaus*, c. 11. sect. 8.—“the man who in the midst of success fears the envious gods”—opposed to the person who confides in continuance of success: and Klausen, *Theologumena Æschyli*, p. 18.

² The manner in which Herodotus groups together the facts of his history in obedience to certain religious and moral sentiments in his own mind, is well set forth in Hoffmeister, *Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotos*, Essen, 1832, especially sects. 21, 22, pp. 112 *seq.* Hoffmeister traces the veins of sentiment, running through, and often overlaying or transforming, the matters of fact through a considerable portion of the nine books. He does not, perhaps, sufficiently advert to the circumstance, that the informants from whom Herodotus collected his facts were for the most part imbued with sentiments similar to himself; so that the religious and moral vein pervaded more or less his original materials, and did not need to be added by himself. There can be little doubt that the priests, the ministers of temples and oracles, the exegetæ or interpreting guides around these holy

places—were among his chief sources for instructing himself: a stranger, visiting so many different cities, must have been constantly in a situation to have no other person whom he could consult. The temples were interesting both in themselves and in the trophies and offerings which they exhibited, while the persons belonging to them were (as a general rule) accessible and communicative to strangers, as we may see both from Pausanias and Plutarch—both of whom, however, had books before them also to consult, which Herodotus hardly had at all. It was not only the priests and ministers of temples in Egypt, of Héraklès at Tyre, and of Bélus at Babylon, that Herodotus questioned (i. 181; ii. 3, 44, 143), but also those of Delphi (*Δελφῶν οἶδ' ἐγὼ οὕτω: ἀκούσας γενέσθαι*, i. 20: compare i. 91, 92, 51): *Dôdôna* (ii. 52): of the *Ismenian Apollo* at Thebes (v. 59); of *Athênè Alea* at Tegea (i. 66); of *Dêmêtêr* at Paros (vi. 134—if not the priests, at least persons full of temple inspirations); of *Halus* in *Achaia Phthiôtis* (vii. 197); of the *Kabeiri* in *Thrace* (ii. 51); of persons connected with the *Herôon* of *Protesilaus* in the *Chersonese* (ix. 116, 120). The facts which these persons communicated to him were always presented along with associations referring to their own functions or religious sentiments, so that Herodotus did not introduce anything new when

While we take due notice of those religious conceptions with which both the poet and the historian surround this vast conflict of Greeks and barbarians, we need look no farther than ambition and revenge for the real motives of the invasion. Considering that it had been a proclaimed project in the mind of Darius for three years previous to his death, there was no

he incorporated them as such in his history. The treatise of Plutarch—"Cur Pythia nunc non reddat Oracula Carmine"—affords an instructive description of the ample and multifarious narratives given by the expositors at Delphi, respecting the eminent persons and events of Grecian history, to satisfy visitors who came full of curiosity—φιλοθεάμονες, φιλόλογοι and φιλομαθείς (Plutarch, *ib.* p. 394)—such as Herodotus was in a high degree. Compare pp. 396, 397, 400, 407, of the same treatise; also Plutarch *De Defectu Oraculorum*, p. 417—οἱ Δελφῶν θεολόγοι &c. Plutarch remarks that in his time political life was extinguished in Greece, and that the questions put to the Pythian priestess related altogether to private and individual affairs; whereas, in earlier times, almost all political events came somehow or other under her cognizance, either by questions to be answered, or by commemorative public offerings (p. 407). In the time of Herodotus, the great temples, especially those of Delphi and Olympia, were interwoven with the whole web of Grecian political history. See the Dissertation of Preller, annexed to his edition of Ptolemy's *Fragmenta*, c. 3. p. 157-162; *De Historia atque Arte Periegetarum*; also K. F. Hermann, *Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen*, part I. ch. 12, p. 52.

The religious interpretation of historical phenomena is thus not

peculiar to Herodotus, but belongs to him in common with his informants and his age generally, as indeed Hoffmeister observes (p. 81-136): though it is remarkable to notice the frankness with which he (as well as the contemporary poets: see the references in Monk, *Eurip. Alcestis*, 1154) predicates envy and jealousy of the gods, in cases where the conduct which he supposes them to pursue, is really such as would deserve that name in a man,—and such as he himself ascribes to the despot (iii. 80). He does not think himself obliged to call the gods just and merciful while he is attributing to them acts of envy and jealousy in their dealing with mankind. But the religious interpretation does not reign alone throughout the narrative of Herodotus: it is found side by side with careful sifting of fact and specification of positive, definite, appreciable causes: and this latter vein is what really distinguished the historian from his age,—forming the preparation for Thucydides, in whom it appears predominant and almost exclusive. See this point illustrated in *Cruzer, Historische Kunst der Griechen*, Abschnitt iii. pp. 150-159.

Jäger (*Disputationes Herodotæ*, p. 16. Göttingen, 1828) professes to detect evidences of old age (*senile ingenium*) in the moralising colour which overspreads the history of Herodotus, but which I believe to have belonged to his middle and mature age not less than to his

probability that his son and successor would gratuitously renounce it. Shortly after the reconquest of Egypt, Xerxes began to make his preparations, the magnitude of which attested the strength of his resolve as well as the extent of his designs. The satraps and subordinate officers, throughout the whole range of his empire, received orders to furnish the amplest quota of troops and munitions of war—horse and foot, ships of war, horse-transport, provisions, or supplies of various kinds, according to the circumstances of the territory; while rewards were held out to those who should execute the orders most efficiently. For four entire years these preparations were carried on, and as we are told that similar preparations had been going forward during the three years preceding the death of Darius, though not brought to any ultimate result, we cannot doubt that the maximum of force, which the empire could possibly be made to furnish,¹ was now brought to execute the schemes of Xerxes.

The Persian empire was at this moment more extensive than ever it will appear at any subsequent period; for it comprised maritime Thrace and Macedonia as far as the borders of Thessaly, and nearly all the islands of the Ægean north of Krete and east of Eubœa—including even the Cyclades. There existed Persian forts and garrisons at Doriskus, Eion, and other places on the coast of Thrace, while Abdêra with the other Grecian settlements on that coast were numbered among the tributaries of Susa.² It is necessary to bear in mind these boundaries of the empire, at the time when Xerxes mounted the throne, as compared with its reduced limits at the later time of the Peloponnesian war—partly that we may understand the apparent

latter years—if indeed he lived to be very old, which is noway proved, except upon reasons which I have already disputed. See Bähr, *Commentatio de Vita et Scriptis Herodoti*, in the fourth volume of this edition, c. 6. p. 388.

¹ Herodot. vii. 19. χώρον πάντα ἄριυνών τῆς ἡπείρου.

² Herodot. vii. 106. Κατίστασαν γὰρ ἔτι πρότερον ταύτης τῆς ἐξέλασις (i. e. the invasion by Xerxes) ἄπαρχαι ἐν τῇ Θρηλικῇ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλ-

λησπόντου πανταχῆ. vii. 108. εἰδοῦλωτο γὰρ, ὡς καὶ πρότερον μοι διδύλωται, ἢ μέχρι Θεσσαλίας πάσα, καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ βασιλῆα δασμορορος, Μεγαβάρτου τε καταστρεψαμένου καὶ ὑστερον Μαρδονίου; also vii. 59, and Xenophon, *Memorab.* iii. 5, 11. Compare Æschylus, *Pers.* 871-896, and the vision ascribed to Cyrus in reference to his successor Darius, covering with his wings both Europe and Asia (*Herodot.* i. 209).

chances of success to his expedition, as they presented themselves both to the Persians and to the *medising* Greeks—partly that we may appreciate the after-circumstances connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

In the autumn of the year 481 B.C., the vast army thus raised by Xerxes arrived, from all quarters of the empire, at or near to Sardis; a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at Kritala in Kappadokia, on the eastern side of the Halys, where it was joined by Xerxes himself on the road from Susa.¹ From thence he crossed the Halys, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia, passing through the Phrygian towns of Kelænæ, Anaua and Kolossæ, and the Lydian town of Kallatêbus, until he reached Sardis, where winter-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as it was (respecting its numbers, I shall speak farther presently), was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxes had determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the Ægean, as Datis had passed to Eretria and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet at once; the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly; while the latter was intended to accompany and cooperate. A fleet of 1207 ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and burthen, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of Thrace and Ionia; moreover Xerxes, with a degree of forethought much exceeding that of his father Darius in the Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march, from the Hellespont to the Strymonic Gulf. During the four years of military preparation there had been time to bring together great quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and Egypt.²

If the whole contemporary world were overawed by the vast assemblage of men and muniments of war, which Xerxes thus brought together, so much transcending all past, we might even say all subsequent, experience—they were no less astounded by two enterprises which entered into

March of Xerxes from the interior of Asia—collection of the invading army at Sardis—his numerous fleet and large magazines of provision beforehand.

He throws a bridge of boats across the Hellespont.

¹ Herodot. vii. 20-31.

² Herodot. vii. 23-25.

his scheme—the bridging of the Hellespont, and the cutting of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos. For the first of the two there had indeed been a precedent, since Darius about thirty-five years before had caused a bridge to be thrown over the Thracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march to Scythia. Yet this bridge of Darius, though constructed by the Ionians and by a Samian Greek, having had reference only to distant regions, seems to have been little known or little thought of among the Greeks generally, as we may infer from the fact that the poet *Æschylus*¹ speaks as if he had never heard of it; while the bridge of *Xerxes* was ever remembered both by Persians and by Greeks as a most imposing display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridge of boats—or rather the two separate bridges not far removed from each other,—which *Xerxes* caused to be thrown across the Hellespont, stretched from the neighbourhood of Abydos on the Asiatic side to the coast between Sestos and Madytus on the European, where the strait is about an English mile in breadth. The execution of the work was at first entrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phœnicians and Egyptians, who had received orders long beforehand to prepare cables of extraordinary strength and size expressly for the purpose; the material used by the Phœnicians was flax, that employed by the Egyptians was the fibre of the papyrus. Already had the work been completed and announced to *Xerxes* as available for transit, when a storm arose, so violent as altogether to ruin it. The wrath of the monarch, when apprised of this catastrophe, burst all bounds. It was directed partly against the chief engineers, whose heads he caused to be struck off,² but partly also against the Hellespont itself. He commanded that the strait should be scourged with 300 lashes, and that a set of fetters should be let down into it as a farther punishment. Moreover Herodotus had heard, but does not believe, that he even sent irons for the purpose of branding it. “Thou bitter water (exclaimed the scourgers while inflicting this punishment), this is the penalty which our master inflicts upon thee, because thou hast wronged him though he hath never wronged thee. King *Xerxes* will cross

The bridge is destroyed by a storm—wrath of *Xerxes*—he puts to death the engineers and punishes the Hellespont.

¹ *Æschylus*, *Pers.* 731, 754, 873.

² *Plutarch* (*De Tranquillitate Animi*, p. 470) speaks of them as

having had their noses and ears cut off.

thee, whether thou wilt or not; but thou deservest not sacrifice from any man, because thou art a treacherous river of (useless) salt water."¹

Such were the insulting terms heaped by order of Xerxes on the rebellious Hellespont. Herodotus calls them "non-Hellenic and blasphemous terms," which, together with their brevity, leads us to believe that he gives them as he heard them, and that they are not of his own invention, like so many other speeches in his work, where he dramatises, as it were, a given position. It has been common however to set aside in this case not merely

Remarks on this story of the punishment inflicted on the Hellespont: there is no sufficient reason for disbelieving its reality.

the words, but even the main incident of punishment inflicted on the Hellespont,² as a mere Greek fable rather than a real fact; the extreme childishness and absurdity of the proceeding giving to it the air of an enemy's calumny. But this reason will not appear sufficient, if we transport ourselves back to the time and to the party concerned. To transfer to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings, is among

the early and wide-spread instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion. And although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually displaces this elementary Fetichism, banishing it from the regions of reality into those of conventional fiction—yet the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede the acquired habit: and even an intelligent man³ may be impelled in a moment of agonizing pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he has suffered. By the

¹ Herodot. vii. 34, 35. ἐνερτά)λετο δὴ ὦν ῥαπίζοντας, λέγειν βάρβαρα τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλα, ὧ πικρὸν ὕδωρ, δεσπότης τοι δίχην ἐπιτίθει τήνδε, ἔτι μιν ἤδικησας, οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνου ἄδικον παθόν. Καὶ βασιλεὺς μὲν Ἑέρξης διαβήσεται σε, ἦν τε σὺ γε βούλη, ἦν τε καὶ μή: σοὶ δὲ κατὰ δίχην ἄρα οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων θύει, ὡς δόντι δολερῶ τε καὶ ἀ)μυρῶ ποταμῶ.

The assertion—that no one was in the habit of sacrificing to the Hellespont—appears strange, when we look to the subsequent conduct

of Xerxes himself (vii. 53): compare vii. 118, and vi. 76. The epithet *salt*, employed as a reproach, seems to allude to the undrinkable character of the water.

² See Stanley and Blomfield ad *Æschyl. Pers.* 731, and K. O. Müller (in his *Review of Benjamin Constant's work Sur la Religion*), *Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii. p. 59.

³ See Auguste Comte, *Traité de Philosophie Positive*, vol. v. leçon 52, pp. 40, 46.

old procedure, never formally abolished, though gradually disused, at Athens—an inanimate object which had caused the death of a man was solemnly tried and cast out of the border. And the Arcadian youths, when they returned hungry from an unsuccessful day's hunting,¹ scourged and pricked the god Pan or his statue by way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch, corrupted by universal subservience around him, to be capable of thus venting an insane wrath. The vengeance exercised by Cyrus on the river Gyndês (which he caused to be divided into three hundred and sixty streamlets, because one of his sacred horses had been drowned in it), affords a fair parallel to the scourging of the Hellespont by Xerxes. To offer sacrifice to rivers, and to testify in this manner gratitude for service rendered by rivers, was a familiar rite in the ancient religion. While the grounds for distrusting the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive evidence will be found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxes took place when Herodotus was about four years old, so that he afterwards enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who had witnessed

¹ See Wachsmuth, *Hellenische Alterthümer*, 2. i. p. 320, and K. F. Hermann, *Griech. Staatsalterthümer*, sect. 104.

For the manner in which Cyrus dealt with the river Gyndês, see Herodot. i. 202. The Persian satrap Pharnuchês was thrown from his horse at Sardis, and received an injury of which he afterwards died: he directed his attendants to lead the horse to the place where the accident had happened, to cut off all his legs, and leave him to perish there (Herodot. vii. 88). The kings of Macedonia offered sacrifice even during the time of Herodotus, to the river which had been the means of preserving the life of their ancestor Perdikkas; after he had crossed it, the stream swelled and arrested his pursuers (Herodot. viii. 138): see an analogous story about the inhabitants of Apollonia and the

river Aôus, Valerius, *Maxim. i. 5. 2.*

After the death of the great boxer, wrestler, &c., Theagenês of Thasus, a statue was erected to his honour. A personal enemy, perhaps one of the 1400 defeated competitors, came every night to gratify his wrath and revenge by flogging the statue. One night the statue fell down upon this scourger and killed him; upon which his relatives indicted the statue for murder: it was found guilty by the Thasians, and thrown into the sea. The gods however were much displeased with the proceeding, and visited the Thasians with continued famine, until at length a fisherman by accident fished up the statue, and it was restored to its place (Pausan. vi. 11. 2). Compare the story of the statue of Hermês in Babrius, *Fabul. 119*, edition of Mr. Lewis.

and taken part in it: and the whole of his narrative shows that he availed himself largely of such access to information. Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hellespont, and all the incidents connected with it, were acts necessarily known to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily verified. The decapitation of the unfortunate engineers was an act fearfully impressive, and even the scourging of the Hellespont, while essentially public, appears to Herodotus¹ (as well as to Arrian afterwards), not childish, but impious. The more attentively we balance, in the case before us, the positive testimony against the intrinsic negative probabilities, the more shall we be disposed to admit without diffidence the statement of our original historian.

New engineers—perhaps Greek along with, or in place of, Phœnicians and Egyptians—were immediately directed to recommence the work, which Herodotus now describes in detail, and which was executed with increased care and solidity. To form the two bridges, two lines of ships—triremes and pentekonters blended together—were moored across the strait breastwise, with their sterns towards the Euxine and their heads towards the Ægean, the stream flowing always rapidly from the former towards the latter.² They were moored by anchors

¹ Herodot. vii. 35-54: compare viii. 109. Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii. 14. 9.

² Herodot. vii. 36. The language in which Herodotus describes the position of these ships which formed the two bridges, seems to me to have been erroneously or imperfectly apprehended by most of the commentators: see the notes of Bähr, Kruse, Wesseling, Rennell, and especially Larcher: Schweighæuser the most satisfactory. — τοῦ μὲν Πόντου ἐπιχωρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλληνιστοῦ κατὰ ῥέον. The explanation given by Tzetzes of ἐπιχωρσίας by the word πλωγίς seems to me hardly exact: it means, not *oblique*, but *at right angles with*. The course of the Bosphorus and Hellespont, flowing out of the

Euxine sea, is conceived by the historian as meeting that sea at right angles; and the ships, which were moored near together along the current of the strait, taking the line of each from head to stern, were therefore also at right angles with the Euxine sea. Moreover Herodotus does not mean to distinguish the two bridges hereby, and to say that the ships of the one bridge were τοῦ Πόντου ἐπιχωρσίας, and those of the other bridge τοῦ Ἑλληνιστοῦ κατὰ ῥέον, as Bähr and other commentators suppose: both the predicates apply alike to both the bridges;—as indeed it stands to reason that the arrangement of ships best for one bridge must also have been best for the other. Respecting the meaning of

head and stern, and by very long cables. The number of ships placed to carry the bridge nearest to the Euxine

ἐπιχάρσιος in Herodotus, see iv. 101; i. 180. In the *Odyssey* (ix. 70: compare Eustath. ad loc.) ἐπιχάρσιος does not mean oblique, but headlong before the wind: compare ἔπιχαρ, *Iliad*, xviii. 392. So in the position of the ships as described by Herodotus, if the wind blew from the Euxine, it would be right abaft of them.

The circumstance stated by Herodotus,—that in the bridge higher up the stream or nearest to the Euxine, there were in all 360 vessels, while in the other bridge there were no more than 314,—has perplexed the commentators and induced them to resort to inconvenient explanations—as that of saying, that in the higher bridge the vessels were moored not in a direct line across, but in a line slanting, so that the extreme vessel on the European side was lower down the stream than the extreme vessel on the Asiatic side. This is one of the false explanations given of ἐπιχάρσιος (*slanting, schräg*): while the idea of Gronovius and Larcher, that the vessels in the higher bridge presented *their broadside* to the current, is still more inadmissible. But the difference in the number of ships employed in the one bridge compared with the other, seems to admit of an easier explanation. We need not suppose, nor does Herodotus say, that the two bridges were quite close together: considering the multitude which had to cross them, it would be convenient that they should be placed at a certain distance from each other. If they were a mile or two apart, we may well suppose that the breadth of the strait was not exactly the same in the two places

chosen, and that it may have been broader at the point of the upper bridge—which moreover might require to be made more secure, as having to meet the first force of the current. The greater number of vessels in the upper bridge will thus be accounted for in a simple and satisfactory manner.

In some of the words used by Herodotus there appears an obscurity: they run thus—ἐξέφυγσαν δὲ ὡδὲ Πεντηκοντέρους καὶ τριήρεις συνθέντας, ὑπὸ μὲν τῆν (these words are misprinted in Bähr's edition) πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου ἐξήκοιτά τε καὶ τριηκοσίας, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆν ἐπέτρην τέσσαρες καὶ δέκα καὶ τριηκοσίας (τοῦ μὲν Πόντου, ἐπιχαρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλληνικοῦ πόντου κατὰ ῥόον), ἵνα ἀναχωρήσῃ τὸν τόνον τῶν ῥηλων συνθέντας δὲ, ἀγκύρας κατῆκαν περιμήκειας, &c.

There is a difficulty respecting the words ἵνα ἀναχωρήσῃ τὸν τόνον τῶν ῥηλων—what is the nominative case to this verb? Bähr says in his note, *sc. ὁ ῥόος*, and he construes τῶν ῥηλων to mean the cables whereby the anchors were held fast. But if we read farther on, we shall see that τὰ ῥηλα mean, not the anchor-cables, but the cables which were stretched across from shore to shore to form the bridge: the very same words τῶν ῥηλων τοῦ τόνου, applied to these latter cables, occur a few lines afterwards. I think that the nominative case belonging to ἀναχωρήσῃ is ἡ γερῶρα (not ὁ ῥόος), and that the words from τοῦ μὲν Πόντου down to ῥόον are to be read parenthetically, as I have printed them above: the express object for which the ships were moored was, “that the bridge might hold up, or sustain, the tension of its cables stretched across from shore to shore.” I admit that we should

was three hundred and sixty; the number in the other, three hundred and fourteen. Over each of the two lines

naturally expect ἀναχωρεύσει, and not ἀναχωρήσῃ, since the proposition would be true of *both* bridges; but though this makes an awkward construction, it is not inadmissible, since each bridge had been previously described in the singular number.

Bredow and others accuse Herodotus of ignorance and incorrectness in this description of the bridges, but there seems nothing to bear out this charge.

Herodotus (iv. 85), Strabo, (xiii. p. 591), and Pliny (H. N. iv. 12; vi. 1) give seven stadia as the breadth of the Hellespont in its narrowest part. Dr. Pococke also assigns the same breadth: Tournefort allows about a mile (vol. ii. lett. 4). Some modern French measurements give the distance as something considerably greater — 1130 or 1150 toises (see Miot's note on his translation of Herodotus). The Duke of Ragusa states it at 790 toises (Voyage en Turquie, vol. ii. p. 164). If we suppose the breadth to be one mile or 5280 feet, 360 vessels at an average breadth of 14², feet would exactly fill the space. Rennell says, "Eleven feet is the breadth of a barge: vessels of the size of the smallest coasting craft were adequate to the purpose of the bridge." (On the Geography of Herodotus, p. 127.)

The recent measurements or estimates stated by Miot go much beyond Herodotus: that of the Duke of Ragusa nearly coincides with him. But we need not suppose that the vessels filled up entirely the whole breadth, without leaving any gaps between: we only know, that there were no gaps left large enough for a vessel in voyage to sail through, except in three

specified places.

I avail myself of a second edition to notice some comments of Professor Dunbar upon this note, inserted in the critical remarks appended to the third edition of his Greek and English Lexicon, voc. Ἐπιχώριος, Herodotus.

Mr. Dunbar differs from me, as well as from Liddell and Scott, in the meaning of the word ἐπιχώριος, but I do not perceive that he brings any convincing arguments. He says, that this adjective signifies "in a cross direction, and is opposed by Herodotus to ἑρθίος, in a straight direction, and to ἰθείας (Herodot. iv. 101; i. 180)."

I have made reference in my note to both these passages, and they seem to me to bear out my meaning. In the latter of the two, it is not exact to say that ἐπιχώριος is opposed to ἰθείας: on the contrary, the two epithets are applied to the very same streets: "All the streets of Babylon (says Herodotus) are cut straight; those streets which run directly down to the river, as well as the rest."

It is true that in iv. 101, Herodotus contrasts, in a certain sense, ἐπιχώριος with ἑρθίος. Speaking of the figure of Scythia, he says that it is a parallelogram, of which two sides forming an angle with each other, are lines of coast; while the other two sides run straight up into the interior (ἑρθίως αἱ τῆς μεσότητος) to a certain point of junction. To go from the coast into the interior is always conceived by a Greek as going upward — ἄνω; to come from inland to the coast, as coming downward, κάτω. Hence Herodotus says that these two sides go straight up into the interior. The other two sides

of ships, across from shore to shore, were stretched six vast cables, which discharged the double function of

of the parallelogram, which run along the coast, Herodotus calls *ἐπιχαρσίς*, falling in a straight line, or directly, upon the other two which run *ὄρθιαι ἐς τὴν μισόγαιαν*. It is plain that if the two sides, which ran up into the interior and there joined each other, were straight, the other two sides of the parallelogram would be straight also: so that *ἐπιχαρσία* in this passage does not bear any sense inconsistent with straightness.

In construing the passage — *Ἐξεύγυσαν δὲ ὧδε Πεντηκοντέρους καὶ τριηρέας συνθέντες, ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου ἐξήκοντά τε καὶ τριηκοσίας, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἐτέρην τσσαρσεκαίδεκα καὶ τριηκοσίας, (τοῦ μὲν Πόντου, ἐπιχαρσίας, τοῦ δὲ Ἑλληνισπότου, κατὰ ῥοὴν) ἵνα ἀναχωρήσῃ τὸν τόπον τῶν δπλων, Mr. Dunbar says, "Mr. Grote and the editors of Herodotus supply γεφύραν with ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν, and ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἐτέρην. But I cannot conceive what rational meaning can be exacted from *ἐξεύγυσαν*—*ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν* (*γεφύραν*), when the pentekonters and the triremes formed the *γεφύραν*. There can (I imagine) be no doubt that *γῆν* or *χωρὰν* must be understood (which they very often are with the Greek writers); the land, namely, on each side of the strait: *ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν* (*γῆν*), on the Asian side; *ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἐτέρην*, on the European side."*

To deal first with Mr. Dunbar's objection to my meaning, which is the same as that of Bähr and others, I cannot admit his assertion, that "the pentekonters and the triremes *formed* the *γεφύραν*." They formed the *support* of the bridge; standing in the same relation to it, as the piles of Wa-

terloo Bridge stand to the bridge itself. Speaking largely, or for common purposes, indeed the bridge is understood to mean the whole construction, support and all: but the essential portion of the bridge is, the continuous way across from bank to bank, which, in the case of a narrow stream, may exist without any supports at all. Now the pentekonters and triremes did not of themselves form any continuous way across: this was formed by the row of tight parallel cables laid over them, resting upon them, and stretching across from bank to bank. And Herodotus uses the preposition *ὑπὸ* which expresses this relation: the pentekonters and triremes were put together side by side *under the bridge*; or rather, they were first put, and then the bridge of tightened cables was laid over or upon them.

Mr. Dunbar's supposition that the substantive belonging to *ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν*, &c. is *γῆν*—meaning the two opposite coasts, Asiatic and European—seems to me inadmissible. The words *τὴν πρὸς τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου*, if you apply them to one of the two bridges, designate naturally enough the one which is highest up in the stream: but they cannot be employed to signify the Asiatic coast as distinguished from the European, for they have just as much reference to one as to the other. Nor can I think that the preposition *ὑπὸ* can be used to signify what Mr. Dunbar means. Assuming even that it could properly be used to mean those ships which were moored near or close to the land, we must recollect that what Herodotus is here describing, is a series of ships lying near each

holding the ships together, and of supporting the bridge-way to be laid upon them. They were tightened by means

other across the whole breadth of the stream. Of the larger portion of these ships it could never be said with any propriety, that they lay ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν—either *under* the Asiatic or European coast. Besides, on Mr. Dunbar's construction, Herodotus would be only describing *one* bridge, whereas there were undeniably *two*.

Mr. Dunbar's conception of the structure of the bridge differs essentially from mine, but I should lengthen this note too much by commenting upon it.

He contests my supposition that the two bridges may have been at some distance from each other, on the ground that both of them terminated in an ἀκτὴ τριγῆζ ἐς θάλασσαν κατῆκουσα, on the European side; and he translates ἀκτὴ *promontory* or *headland*. But ἀκτὴ, just as often, if not oftener—means a line of coast, stretching along for a considerable distance (see Herodot. iv. 38).

Again, he differs from me, and agrees with Bähr, in regard to the nominative case which is to be understood to the verb ἀναχωχέυῃ. He thinks that ὁ ῥόος is understood, not ἡ γεφύρα—observing:—

"How the bridge should keep the cables in a state of tension, I cannot comprehend. Ἰνα must be referred to a cause immediately preceding and well-ascertained; and this can only be the term ῥόος. From the statement which the historian gives of the different modes of anchoring the two divisions, it would appear that it was necessary for the triremes to be moored in the direction of the current, in order that it might by its force *keep the cables taut*, and not allow them to swing." I con-

less that I do not feel the difficulty which strikes Mr. Dunbar, in translating the words Ἰνα ἀναχωχέυῃ τὸν τόνον τῶν ἑπλων, in the way that I have proposed in an earlier part of this note. And I have already remarked that by the words τὸν τόνον τῶν ἑπλων, Herodotus does not mean the anchor-cables, but the vast cables stretched across: as he himself again uses the phrase a few lines farther on—κόσμοι ἐπατίεσαν κατὸπερθε τῶν ἑπλων τοῦ τόνου, where Bähr and Schweighaeuser justly remark that it is equivalent to κατὸπερθε τῶν ἑπλων ἐντεταμένω. It might be possible to suppose ἡ σύνθεσις or τὰ συντιθέμενα (extracted out of the preceding participle συνθέντες) the understood nominative case to ἀναχωχέυῃ, which would get rid of the awkward construction of γεφύρα in the singular number—Πεντηκοντέρους καὶ τριηρέας συνθέντες Ἰνα ἀναχωχέυῃ (ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν τριηρέων) τὸν τόνον τῶν ἑπλων, ἀγκύρας κατῆκαν περιμήχειας, &c. For cases in which an unexpressed nominative case is extracted out of the verb preceding, compare *Matthiæ*, Gr. Gr. s. 295; and *Kühner*, Gr. Gr. s. 414.

Mr. Dunbar speaks "of the different modes of anchoring the two divisions:" and Bähr holds the same opinion. But as I understand Herodotus, he speaks of no such difference: all the ships, in both bridges, were anchored both ahead and astern, with their heads down the stream. Συνθέντες δὲ ἀγκύρας κατῆκαν περιμήχειας, τὰς μὲν πρὸς τοῦ Πόντου τῆς ἐτέρας, τῶν ἀνέμων εἴνεκεν τῶν ἐσωθεν ἐπνεύοντων, τῆς δὲ ἐτέρας, τῆς πρὸς ἐπέρας τε καὶ τοῦ Αἰγαίου, εὐρου τε καὶ νότου εἴνεκεν. Bähr construes τῆς ἐτέρας—τῆς δὲ

of capstans on each shore: in three different places along the line, a gap was left between the ships for the purpose of enabling small trading vessels without masts, in voyage to or from the Euxine, to pass and repass beneath the cables.

Out of the six cables assigned to each bridge, two were of flax and four of papyrus, combined for the sake of increased strength; for it seems that in the bridges first made, which proved too weak to resist the winds, the Phœnicians had employed cables of flax for one bridge, the Egyptians those of papyrus for the other.¹ Over

ἐπέρης—as if they agreed with γαφύρα, and as if the anchors of the ships belonging to one bridge had been let down at the extremity towards the Euxine—the anchors of those belonging to the other bridge at the extremity towards the Ægean. Surely this explanation cannot be received. If a ship held by only one anchor, that anchor always must be at the extremity towards the Euxine; for the current of the Hellespont, which runs *from* the Euxine, would not permit it to be otherwise. Even if the anchor were originally let down at the head, when pointing to the Ægean, the force of the current would alter the position of the ship until the anchor came to be between the ship and the Euxine. Besides, it surely cannot be doubted, that the same mode of anchorage which was suitable for the ships of one bridge would also be suitable for those of the other. Moreover, the historian tells us that some anchors were intended to guard against the winds blowing out of the Euxine—others, to guard against those blowing out of the Ægean. Surely, each ship of each bridge would need to be made fast against *both*. Compare Pindar, Olymp. vi. 101, δὴ ἀγκύραι.

I construe the words τῆς ἐπέρης—τῆς δὲ ἐπέρης—differently from Bähr. It seems to me that they do not agree with γαφύρας, but with

μέριδος, τελευτῆς, or some word indicating direction, or relative bearing; on the one side, on the other side, equivalent to ἐνθεν μὲν, ἐνθεν δέ. Sufficient vindication may be found of the use of the genitive case ἐπέρης in Matthiæ, Gr. Gr. §. 377; Kühner, Gr. Gr. §. 523. And in this case it coincides with the fundamental conception which these authors give us of a Greek Genitive—as designing the *whence*, or source *from* which an action arises. The anchors are conceived as *pulling* from one side and from the other side, against the dangerous winds when they blow.

¹ For the long celebrity of these cables, see the epigram of Archimælus, composed two centuries and a half afterwards, in the time of Hiero II. of Syracuse, ap. Athenæum, v. 209.

Herodotus states that in thickness and compact make (παχυτῆς καὶ καλλονῆ) the cables of flax were equal to those of papyrus; but that in weight the former were superior; for each cubit in length of the flaxen cable weighed a talent: we can hardly reason upon this, because we do not know whether he means an Attic, an Euboic, or an Æginæan talent; nor, if he means an Attic talent, whether it be an Attic talent of commerce, or of the monetary standard.

The cables contained in the

these again were laid planks of wood, sawn to the appropriate width, secured above by a second line of cables stretched across to keep them in their places. Lastly, upon this foundation the causeway itself was formed, out of earth and wood, with a palisade on each side high enough to prevent the cattle which passed over from seeing the water.

The other great work which Xerxes caused to be performed, for facilitating his march, was, the cutting through of the isthmus which connects the stormy promontory of Mount Athos with the mainland.¹ That isthmus near the point where it joins the mainland was about twelve stadia (not quite so many furlongs) across, from the Strymonic to the Toronaic Gulf; and the canal dug by order of Xerxes was broad and deep enough for two triremes to sail abreast. In this work too, as well as in the bridge across the Hellespont, the Phœnicians were found the ablest and most efficient among all the subjects of the Persian monarch; but the other tributaries, especially the Greeks from the neighbouring town of Akanthus, and indeed the entire maritime forces of the empire,² were brought together to assist. The head-quarters of the fleet were first at Kymê and Phokæa, next at Elæus in the southern extremity of the Thracian Chersonese, from which point it could protect and second at once the two enterprises going forward at the Hellespont and at Mount Athos. The canal-cutting at the latter was placed under the general directions of two noble Persians—Bubarês and Artachæus, and distributed under their measurement as task-work among the contingents of the various nations; an ample supply of flour and other provisions being brought for sale in the neighbouring plain from various parts of Asia and Egypt.

Three circumstances in the narrative of Herodotus respecting this work deserve special notice. First, the

Athenian dockyard are distinguished as *σχοῖνα διαπλάτυλα, ἐξάδα-
τυλα*—in which expressions, however, M. Boeckh cannot certainly determine whether circumference or diameter he meant: he thinks probably the former. See his learned book *Das Seewesen der Athe-*

ner, ch. x. p. 165.

¹ For a specimen of the destructive storms near the promontory of Athos, see Ephorus, Fragment. 121, ed. Didot; Diodor. xiii. 41.

² Herodot. vii. 22, 23, 116; Diodor. xi. 2.

superior intelligence of the Phœnicians, who, within sight of that lofty island of Thasos which had been occupied three centuries before by their free ancestors, were now labouring as instruments to the ambition of a foreign conqueror. Amidst all the people engaged, they alone took the precaution of beginning the excavation at a breadth far greater than the canal was finally destined to occupy, so as gradually to narrow it, and leave a convenient slope for the sides. The others dug their straight down, so that the time as well as the toil of their work was doubled by the continual falling in of the sides—a remarkable illustration of the degree of practical intelligence then prevalent, since the nations assembled were many and diverse. Secondly, Herodotus remarks that Xerxes must have performed this laborious work from motives of mere ostentation: “for it would have cost no trouble at all” (he observes¹) to drag all the ships

Superior intelligence of the Phœnicians.

¹ Herodot. vii. 24: ὡς μὲν ἐμὲ συμβαλλεόμενον εὐρίσκειν, μεγαλοφροσύνης εἶνεκα αὐτὸ Ξέρξης ὀρύσσειν ἐκέλευε, εἰθέλων τε δύναμιν ἀποδεικνύσθαι, καὶ μνημόσυνα λιπέσθαι· παρὸν γάρ, μηδένα κόνον λαβόντας, τὸν ἰσθμὸν τὰς νέας διειρῶσαι, ὀρύσσειν ἐκέλευε διωρυχὰ τῆς θαλάσσης, εὖρος ὡς δύο τριήρας πλείον ὁμοῦ ἐλαστρομένας.

According to the manner in which Herodotus represents this excavation to have been performed, the earth dug out was handed up by man to man from the bottom of the canal to the top—the whole performed by hand, without any aid of cranes or barrows.

The pretended work of turning the course of the river Halys, which Grecian report ascribed to Croesus on the advice of Thalôs, was a far greater work than the cutting at Athos (Herodot. i. 75).

As this ship-canal across the isthmus of Athos has been treated often as a fable both by ancients (Juvenal, Sat. x.) and by moderns (Cousinéry, Voyage en Macédoine),

I transcribe the observations of Colonel Leake. That excellent observer points out evident traces of its past existence: but in my judgement, even if no such traces now remained, the testimony of Herodotus and Thucydidês (iv. 109) would alone be sufficient to prove that it had existed really. The observations of Colonel Leake illustrate at the same time the motives in which the canal originated: “The canal (he says) seems to have been not more than sixty feet wide. As history does not mention that it was ever kept in repair after the time of Xerxes, the waters from the heights around have naturally filled it in part with soil in the course of ages. It might, however, without much labour, be renewed, and there can be no doubt that it would be useful to the navigation of the Ægean: for such is the fear-entertained by the Greek boatmen of the strength and uncertain direction of the currents around Mount Athos, and of the gales and high seas to which the vicinity of the

in the fleet across the isthmus; so that the canal was nowise needed. So familiar a process was it, in the mind of a Greek of the fifth century B.C., to transport ships by mechanical force across an isthmus; a special groove or slip being seemingly prepared for them: such was the case at the Diolkus across the isthmus of Corinth. Thirdly, it is to be noted, that the men who excavated the canal at Mount Athos worked under the lash; and these, be it borne in

Employment of the lash over the workmen engaged on the canal—impression made thereby on the Greeks.

mind, were not bought slaves, but freemen, except in so far as they were tributaries of the Persian monarch; perhaps the father of Herodotus, a native of Halikarnassus and a subject of the brave Queen Artemisia, may have been among them. We shall find other examples as we proceed, of this indiscriminate use of the whip, and full conviction of its indispensable necessity, on the part of the Persians¹—even to drive the troops of their subject-contingents on

mountain is subject during half the year, and which are rendered more formidable by the deficiency of harbours in the Gulf of Orfaná, that I could not, as long as I was on the peninsula, and though offering a high price, prevail upon any boat to carry me from the eastern side of the peninsula to the western. Xerxes, therefore, was perfectly justified in cutting this canal, as well from the security which it afforded to his fleet, as from the facility of the work and the advantages of the ground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an undertaking. The experience of the losses which the former expedition under Mardonius had suffered suggested the idea. The circumnavigation of the capes Ampelus and Canastrum was much less dangerous, as the gulfs afford some good harbours, and it was the object of Xerxes to collect forces from the Greek cities in those gulfs as he passed. If there be any difficulty arising from the narrative of Herodotus,

it is in comprehending how the operation should have required so long a time as three years, when the king of Persia had such multitudes at his disposal, and among them Egyptians and Babylonians, accustomed to the making of canals." (Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii. ch. 24. p. 145.)

These remarks upon the enterprise are more judicious than those of Major Rennell (Geogr. of Herodot. p. 116). I may remark that Herodotus does not affirm that the actual cutting of the canal occupied three years,—he assigns that time to the cutting with all its preliminary arrangements included—*κροταμίζετο ἐκ τριῶν ἐτίων καὶ μάλιστα ἐς τὸν Ἄθων* (vii. 22).

¹ Herodot. vii. 22: ὤρυσσον ὑπὸ μαστιγῶν παντοδαποὶ τῆς στρατιῆς διάδοχοι δ' ἐφοίτων.—vii. 56: Σέρξης δὲ, ἐπεί τε διέβη ἐς τὴν Εὐρώπην, εἰθελίτο τὸν στρατὸν ὑπὸ μαστιγῶν διαβαίνοντα:—compare vii. 108, and Xenophon, Anabasis, iii. 4-26.

The essential necessity, and

to the charge in battle. To employ the scourge in this way towards freemen, and especially towards freemen engaged in military service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic practice and to Hellenic feeling. The Asiatic and insular Greeks were relieved from it, as from various other hardships, when they passed out of Persian dominion to become, first allies, afterwards subjects, of Athens: and we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact when we appreciate the complaints preferred against the hegemony of Athens.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Xerxes excavated this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two extremities by compact earthen walls or embankments, they also threw bridges of boats over the river Strymon. These two works, together with the renovated double bridge across the Hellespont, were both announced to Xerxes as completed and ready for passage, on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter 481-480 B.C. Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted; but the whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the beginning of spring 480 B.C.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch despatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the received tokens of submission, earth and water. The news of his prodigious armament was well calculated to spread terror even among the most resolute of them. And he at the same time sent orders to the maritime cities in Thrace and Macedonia to prepare "dinner" for himself and his vast suite as he passed on his march. That march was commenced at the first beginning of spring, and continued in spite of several threatening portents during the course of it—one of which Xerxes was blind enough not to comprehend, though, according to Herodotus, nothing could be more obvious than its signification¹—while another was misinterpreted into a favourable omen by the compliant answer of the Magian priests.

plentiful use, of the whip, towards subject-tributaries, as conceived by the ancient Persians, finds its parallel in the modern Turks. See the *Mémoires du Baron de Tott*,

vol. i. p. 256 *seqq.*, and his dialogue on this subject with his Turkish conductor Ali-Aga.

¹ Herodot. vii. 67. Τέρας σφι ἰπάνη μέγα, τὸ Ξέρξης ἐν οὐδάνι λόγῳ

On quitting Sardis, the vast host was divided into two nearly equal columns; a spacious interval being left between the two for the king himself with his guards and select Persians. First of all¹ came the baggage, carried by beasts of burden, immediately followed by one-half of the entire body of infantry, without any distinction of nations. Next, the select troops, 1000 Persian cavalry with 1000 Persian spearmen, the latter being distinguished by carrying their spears with the point downwards, as well as by the spear itself, which had a golden pomegranate at its other extremity, in place of the ordinary spike or point whereby the weapon was planted in the ground when the soldier was not on duty. Behind these troops walked ten sacred horses, of vast power and splendidly caparisoned, bred on the Nisæan plains in Media: next, the sacred chariot of Zeus, drawn by eight white horses—wherein no man was ever allowed to mount, not even the charioteer, who walked on foot behind with the reins in his hand. Next after the sacred chariot came that of Xerxes himself, drawn by Nisæan horses; the charioteer, a noble Persian named Patiramphés, being seated in it by the side of the monarch—who was often accustomed to alight from the chariot and to enter

ἐπονήσθητο, καίπερ εὐσύμβλητον εὐν-
 ἵππος γὰρ ἔταξε λαγόν. Εὐσύμβλητον
 ὦν τῆδε ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἐμίλλε μὲν εὐάν
 στρατιῆν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ξέρξης
 ἀγαυρότατα καὶ μαγαλοπρεπέστατα,
 ὅπισθω δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τρέγων ἦξεν
 εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χώρον.

The prodigy was, that a mare brought forth a hare, which signified that Xerxes would set forth on his expedition to Greece with strength and splendour, but that he would come back in timid and disgraceful flight.

The implicit faith of Herodotus, first in the reality of the fact—next, in the certainty of his interpretation—deserves notice, as illustrating his canon of belief and that of his age. The interpretation is doubtless here the generating cause of the story interpreted: an ingenious man, after the expedition

has terminated, imagines an appropriate simile for its proud commencement and inglorious termination (*Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus*), and the simile is recounted, either by himself or by some hearer who is struck with it, as if it had been a real antecedent fact. The aptness of this supposed antecedent fact to foreshadow the great Persian invasion (τὸ εὐσύμβλητον of Herodotus) serves as presumptive evidence to bear out the witness asserting it; while departure from the established analogies of nature affords no motive for disbelief to a man who admits that the gods occasionally send special signs and warnings.

¹ Compare the description of the processional march of Cyrus, as given in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, viii. 2, 1-80.

a litter. Immediately about his person were a chosen body of 1000 horse-guards, the best troops and of the highest breed among the Persians, having golden apples at the reverse extremity of their spears, and followed by other detachments of 1000 horse, 10,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, all native Persians. Of these 10,000 Persian infantry, called the Immortals because their number was always exactly maintained, 9000 carried spears with pomegranates of silver at the reverse extremity, while the remaining 1000, distributed in front, rear, and on each side of this detachment, were marked by pomegranates of gold on their spears. With them ended what we may call the household troops: after whom, with an interval of two furlongs, the remaining host followed pell-mell.¹ Respecting its numbers and constituent portions I shall speak presently, on occasion of the great review at Doriskus.

On each side of the army, as it marched out of Sardis, was seen suspended one-half of the body of a slaughtered man, placed there expressly for the purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects of Persia. It was the body of the eldest son of the wealthy Pythius, a Phrygian old man resident at Kelænæ, who had entertained Xerxes in the course of his march from Kappadokia to Sardis, and who had previously recommended himself by rich gifts to the preceding king Darius. So abundant was his hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing his offers of pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedition, that the monarch asked him what was the amount of his wealth. "I possess (replied Pythius), besides lands and slaves, 2000 talents of silver and 3,993,000 of golden darics, wanting only 7000 of being 4,000,000. All this gold and silver do I present to thee, retaining only my lands and slaves, which will be quite enough." Xerxes replied by the strongest expressions of praise and gratitude for his liberality; at the same time refusing his offer, and even giving to Pythius out of his own treasure the sum of 7000 darics, which was wanting to make up the exact sum of 4,000,000. The latter was so elated with this mark of favour, that when the army was about to depart from Sardis, he ventured, under the influence of terror from the various menacing portents, to

Story of the rich Kappadokian Pythius—son put to death by order of Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. vii. 41. Μιτὰ δὲ τὴν ἵππων διαλέλειπτο καὶ δύο σταδίου, καὶ ἔπειτα ὁ λοιπὸς ὄμιλος ἦν ἀναμιξ.

prefer a prayer to the Persian monarch. His five sons were all about to serve in the invading army against Greece: his prayer to Xerxes was, that the eldest of them might be left behind, as a stay to his own declining years, and that the service of the remaining four with the army might be considered as sufficient. But the unhappy father knew not what he asked. "Wretch! (replied Xerxes) dost thou dare to talk to me about *thy* son, when I am myself on the march against Greece, with my sons, brothers, relatives, and friends? thou who art my slave, and whose duty it is to follow me with thy wife and thy entire family? Know that the sensitive soul of man dwells in his ears: on hearing good things, it fills the body with delight, but boils with wrath when it hears the contrary. As, when thou didst good deeds and madest good offers to me, thou canst not boast of having surpassed the king in generosity—so now, when thou hast turned round and become impudent, the punishment inflicted on thee shall not be the full measure of thy deserts, but something less. For thyself and for thy four sons, the hospitality which I received from thee shall serve as protection. But for that one son whom thou especially wishest to keep in safety, the forfeit of his life shall be thy penalty." He forthwith directed that the son of Pythius should be put to death, and his body severed in twain; of which one-half was to be fixed on the right-hand, the other on the left-hand, of the road along which the army was to pass.¹

A tale essentially similar, yet rather less revolting, has been already recounted respecting Darius, when undertaking his expedition against Scythia. Both tales illustrate the intense force of sentiment with which the Persian kings regarded the obligation of universal personal service, when they were themselves in the field. They seem to have measured their strength by the number of men whom they collected around them, with little or no reference to quality: and the very mention of exemption—the idea that a subject and a slave should seek to withdraw himself from a risk which the monarch was about to encounter—was an offence not to be pardoned. In this as in the other acts of Oriental kings, whether grateful, muni-

¹ The incident respecting Pythius is in Herodot. vii. 27, 28, 36, 39. I place no confidence in the estimate of the wealth of Pythius; but in other respects, the story seems well entitled to credit.

ficient or ferocious, we trace nothing but the despotic force of personal will, translating itself into act without any thought of consequences, and treating subjects with less consideration than an ordinary Greek master would have shown towards his slaves.

From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed its march to Abydos, first across Mysia and the river Kaïkus—then through Atarneus, Karinê, and the plain of Thêbê. They passed Adramyttium and Antandrus, and crossed the range of Ida, most part of which was on their left-hand, not without some loss from stormy weather and thunder.¹ From hence they reached Ilium and the river Skamander, the stream of which was drunk up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by the vast host of men and animals. In spite of the immortal interest which the Skamander derives from the Homeric poems, its magnitude is not such as to make this fact surprising. To the poems themselves even Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute. He ascended the holy hill of Ilium,—reviewed the Pergamus where Priam was said to have lived and reigned,—sacrificed 1000 oxen to the patron goddess Athênê,—and caused the Magian priests to make libations in honour of the heroes who had fallen on that venerated spot. He even condescended to inquire into the local details,² abundantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Ilium, of that great real or mythical war to which Grecian chroniclers had hardly yet learned to assign a precise date. And doubtless when he contemplated the narrow area of that Troy which all the Greeks confederated under Agamemnon had been unable for ten years to overcome, he could not but fancy that these same Greeks would fall an easy prey before his innumerable host. Another day's march between Rhœteium, Ophryneium and Dardanus on the left-hand, and the Teukrians of Gergis on the right-hand, brought him to Abydos, where his two newly-constructed bridges over the Hellespont awaited him.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar emphasis—and well he might do so, since when we consider the bridges, the invading number, the unmeasured hopes succeeded by no less unmeasured

¹ Herodot. vii. 42.

² Herodot. vii. 43. θεηράμενος δὲ, καὶ πυθόμενος κείνων ἕκαστα, &c.

March to
Abydos—
respect
shown to
Ilium by
Xerxes.

calamity—it will appear not only to have been the most imposing event of his century, but to rank among the most imposing events of all history. He surrounds it with much dramatic circumstance, not only mentioning the marble throne erected for Xerxes on a hill near Abydos, from whence he surveyed both his masses of land-force covering the shore and his ships sailing and racing in the strait (a race in which the Phœnicians of Sidon surpassed the Greeks and all the other contingents)—but also superadding to this real fact a dialogue with Artabanus, intended to set forth the internal mind of Xerxes. He farther quotes certain supposed exclamations of the Abydenes at the sight of his superhuman power. “Why (said one of these terror-stricken spectators¹), why dost thou, oh Zeus, under the shape of a Persian man and the name of Xerxes, thus bring together the whole human race for the ruin of Greece? It would have been easy for thee to accomplish *that* without so much ado.” Such emphatic ejaculations exhibit the strong feeling which Herodotus or his informants throw into the scene, though we cannot venture to apply to them the scrutiny of historical criticism.

At the first moment of sunrise, so sacred in the mind of Orientals,² the passage was ordered to begin. The bridges were perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs, while Xerxes himself made libations into the sea with a golden censer, and offered up prayers to Helios, that he might effect without hindrance his design of conquering Europe even to its farthest extremity. Along with his libation he cast into the Hellespont the censer itself, with a golden bowl and a Persian scimitar—“I do not exactly know³ (adds the historian) whether he

¹ Herodot. vii. 45, 53, 56. Ὁ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ ἀνδρὶ εἰδόμενος Πέρσῃ, καὶ οὐνομα ἀντὶ Διὸς Σέρξῃ θεμενος, ἀνάστατον τῆς Ἑλλάδα εἶθέλις ποιῆσαι, ἄγων πάντας ἀθρώπους; καὶ γὰρ ἀνευ τούτων ἐξῆν τοι ποιέειν ταῦτα.

² Tacitus, Histor. iii. 24. “Undique clamor, et orientem solem, ita in Syria mos est, consalutavére” —in his striking description of the night battle near Cremona between

the Roman troops of Vitellius and Vespasian, and the rise of the sun while the combat was yet unfinished: compare also Quintus Curtius (iii. 3, 8. p. 41. ed. Müttel).

³ Herodot. vii. 54. ταῦτα οὐκ ἔγω ἀτρεχίως διακρίναι, οὔτε εἰ τῷ Ἥλιῳ ἀσπιθεὶς κατῆκε ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, οὔτε εἰ ματεμῆλῃσέ οἱ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον μαστιγώσαντι, καὶ ἀντὶ τούτων τῆς θάλασσαν ἐδαρίπτο.

threw them in as a gift to Helios, or as a mark of repentance and atonement to the Hellespont for the stripes which he had inflicted upon it." Of the two bridges, that nearest to the Euxine was devoted to the military force—the other to the attendants, the baggage, and the beasts of burthen. The 10,000 Persians, called Immortals, all wearing garlands on their heads, were the first, to pass over. Xerxes himself, with the remaining army, followed next, though in an order somewhat different from that which had been observed in quitting Sardis: the monarch having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing the bridges after him "under the lash." But in spite of the use of this sharp stimulus to accelerate progress, so vast were the numbers of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing over—a fact to be borne in mind presently, when we come to discuss the totals computed by Herodotus.¹

Xerxes and his army cross over the Hellespontine bridges.

Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxes directed his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, between the town of Kardia on his left-hand and the tomb of Hellê on his right—the eponymous heroine of the strait. After passing this isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the Gulf of Melas and the Ægean Sea—crossing the river from which that Gulf derived its name, and even drinking its waters up (according to Herodotus) with the men and animals of his army. Having passed by the Æolic city of Ænus and the harbour called Stentoris, he reached the sea-coast and plain called Doriskus covering the rich delta near the mouth of the Hebrus. A fort had been built there and garrisoned by Darius. The spacious plain called by this same name reached far along the shore to Cape Serreium, and comprised in it the towns of Salê and Zonê, possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted on the territory once possessed by the Thracian Kikones on the mainland. Having been here joined by his fleet, which had doubled² the southernmost promontory of the

March to Doriskus in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus—his fleet joins him here.

¹ Herodot. vii. 55, 56. Διέβη δὲ ὁ στρατὸς αὐτοῦ ἐν ἑπτὰ ἡμέραισι καὶ ἐν ἑπτὰ σφύρονσι, ἐλευσάσας οὐδένα χρόνον.

² Herodot. vii. 58-59; Pliny, H. N. iv. 11. See some valuable remarks on the topography of Doriskus and the neighbourhood of the

Thracian Chersonese, he thought the situation convenient for a general review and enumeration both of his land and his naval force.

Never probably in the history of mankind has there been brought together a body of men from regions so remote and so widely diverse, for one purpose and under one command, as those which were now assembled in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus. About the numerical total we cannot pretend to form any definite idea; about the variety of contingents there is no room for doubt. "What Asiatic nation was there (asks Herodotus,¹ whose conceptions of this expedition seem to outstrip his powers of language) that Xerxes did not bring against Greece?" Nor was it Asiatic nations alone, comprised within the Oxus, the Indus, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the Ægean and the Euxine: we must add to these also the Egyptians, the Ethiopians on the Nile south of Egypt, and the Libyans from the desert near Kyrênê. Not all the expeditions, fabulous or historical, of which Herodotus had ever heard, appeared to him comparable to this of Xerxes, even for total number; much more in respect of variety of component elements. Forty-six different nations,² each with

town still called Enos, in Grisebach, *Reise durch Rumelien und nach Brussa*, ch. vi. vol. i. p. 157-159 (Göttingen, 1841). He shows reason for believing that the indentation of the coast, marked on the map as the Gulf of Ænos, did not exist in ancient times, any more than it exists now.

¹ Herodot. vii. 20-21.

² See the enumeration in Herodotus, vii. 61-96. In chapter 76, one name has dropped out of the text (see the note of Wesseling and Schweighæuser), which, in addition to those specified under the head of the land force, makes up exactly forty-six. It is from this source that Herodotus derives the boast which he puts into the mouth of the Athenians (ix. 27) respecting the battle of Marathon, in which

they pretend to have vanquished forty-six nations—*εἰκοξήσπευ ἐθνεσσὶ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα*: though there is no reason for believing that so great a number of contingents were engaged with Datis at Marathon.

Compare the boasts of Antiochus king of Syria (B.C. 192) about his immense Asiatic host brought across into Greece, as well as the contemptuous comments of the Roman consul Quinctius (Livy, xxxv. 48-49). "Varia enim genera armorum, et multa nomina gentium inauditarum, Dahas, et Medos, et Cadusios, et Elymaeos—Syros omnes esse: haud paulo mancipiorum melius, propter servilia ingenia, quam militum genus:" and the sharp remark of the Arcadian envoy Antiochus (Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 1, 33). Quintus Curtius also

its distinct national costume, mode of arming, and local leaders, formed the vast land-force. Eight other nations furnished the fleet, on board of which Persians, Medes and Sakæ served as armed soldiers or marines. The real leaders, both of the entire army and of all its various divisions, were native Persians of noble blood, who distributed the various native contingents into companies of thousands, hundreds, and tens. The forty-six nations composing the land-force were as follows:—Persians, Medes, Kissians, Hyrkanians, Assyrians, Baktrians, Sakæ, Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikæ, Kaspian, Sarangæ, Paktyes, Utii, Myki, Parikanii, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asia and Ethiopians south of Egypt, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligyes, Matieni, Maryandyni, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians, Kabélians, Mares, Kolchians, Alarodians, Saspeires, Sagartii. The eight nations who furnished the fleet were—Phœnicians (300 ships of war), Egyptians (200), Cypriots (150), Kilikians (100), Pamphylians (30), Lykians (50), Karians (70), Ionic Greeks (100), Doric Greeks (30), Æolic Greeks (60), Hellespontic Greeks (100), Greeks from the islands in the Ægean (17): in all 1207 triremes or ships of war with three banks of oars. The descriptions of costumes and arms which we find in Herodotus are curious and varied. But it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians, Pamphylians, Cypriots and Karians (partially also the Egyptian marines on shipboard) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (*i. e.* arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge, — for hand combat in line as well as for defence of the person, — but inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight). The other nations were armed with missile weapons, — light shields of wicker or leather, or no shields at all, — turbans or leather caps instead of helmets, — swords and scythes. They were not properly equipped either for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them. Their persons too were much less protected against wounds than those of the latter; some

has some rhetorical turns about (iii. 4, 29; iv. 45, 9) "*ignota etiam the number of nations, whose ipsi Dario gentium nomina,*" &c. names even were hardly known, ¹ Herodot. vii. 89-93.

tributary to the Persian empire

of them indeed, as the Mysians and Libyans, did not even carry spears, but only staves with the end hardened in the fire.¹ A nomadic tribe of Persians, called Sagartii, to the number of 8000 horsemen, came armed only with a dagger and with the rope known in South America as the lasso, which they cast in the fight to entangle an antagonist. The Æthiopians from the Upper Nile had their bodies painted half red and half white, wore the skins of lions and panthers, and carried, besides the javelin, a long bow with arrows of reed, tipped with a point of sharp stone.

It was at Doriskus that the fighting-men of the entire land-army were first numbered; for Herodotus expressly informs us that the various contingents had never been numbered separately, and avows his own ignorance of the amount of each. The means employed for numeration were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted,² and packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a wall of enclosure built, around the space which they had occupied, into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that the aggregate number of divisions, comprising 10,000 each, was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered, constituting a total of 1,700,000 foot, besides 80,000 horse, many war-chariots from Libya and camels from Arabia, with a presumed total of 20,000 additional men.³ Such was the vast land-force of the Persian monarch: his naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude, comprising not only the 1207 triremes⁴ or war-ships of three banks of oars, but also 3000 smaller vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised 200 rowers, and thirty fighting-men, Persians or Sakæ; that of each of the accompanying vessels included eighty men, according to an

¹ Herodot. vii. 61-81.

² The army which Darius had conducted against Scythia is said to have been counted by divisions of 10,000 each, but the process is not described in detail (Herodot. iv. 77).

³ Herodot. vii. 60, 87, 184. This

same rude mode of enumeration was employed by Darius Codomanus a century and a half afterwards, before he marched his army to the field of Issus. (Quintus Curtius, iii. 2, 3, p. 24, Müttel.)

⁴ Herodot. vii. 89-97.

average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum up these items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the plain and to the coast of Doriskus would reach the astounding figure of 2,317,000 and incredible totals brought out by Herodotus. Nor is this all. In the farther march from Doriskus to Thermopylæ, Xerxes pressed into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory he traversed; deriving from hence a reinforcement of 120 triremes with aggregate crews of 24,000 men, and of 300,000 new land troops, so that the aggregate of his force when he appeared at Thermopylæ was 2,640,000 men. To this we are to add, according to the conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, as attendants, slaves, sutlers, crews of the provision-craft and ships of burthen, &c., so that the male persons accompanying the Persian king when he reached his first point of Grecian resistance amounted to 5,283,220! So stands the prodigious estimate of this army, the whole strength of the eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus,¹ who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater; for he conceives the number of "camp-followers" as not only equal to, but considerably larger than, that of fighting-men. We are to reckon, besides, the eunuchs, concubines, and female cooks, at whose number Herodotus does not pretend to guess; together with cattle, beasts of burthen, and Indian dogs, in indefinite multitude, increasing the consumption of the regular army.

To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible: yet the disparaging remarks which it has drawn down upon Herodotus are noway merited.² He takes pains to distinguish that which informants told him, from that which he merely guessed. His description of the review at Doriskus is so detailed, that he had evidently conversed with persons who were present at it, and had learnt the separate totals promulgated by

Comments upon the evidence of Herodotus and upon himself as witness and judge.

¹ Herodot. vii. 185-186. ἐπὶ γὰρ πάντα τὸν ἥψον στρατὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης. (vii. 167.) "Vires Orientis et ultima secum Bactra ferens," to use the language of Virgil about Antony at Actium.

² Even Dahlmann, who has many good remarks in defence of Herodotus, hardly does him justice (Herodot, Aus seinem Buche sein Leben, ch. xxxiv. p. 176).

the enumerators—infantry, cavalry, and ships of war great and small. As to the number of triremes, his statement seems beneath the truth, as we may judge from the contemporary authority of Æschylus, who in the 'Persæ' gives the exact number of 1207 Persian ships as having fought at Salamis: but between Doriskus and Salamis, Herodotus¹ has himself enumerated 647 ships as lost or destroyed, and only 120 as added. No exaggeration therefore can well be suspected in this statement, which would imply about 276,000 as the number of the crews, though there is here a confusion or omission in the narrative which we cannot clear up. But the aggregate of 3000 smaller ships, and still more that of 1,700,000 infantry, are far less trustworthy. There would be little or no motive for the enumerators to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate—an immense nominal total would be no less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself—so that the military total of land-force and ships' crews, which Herodotus gives as 2,641,000 on the arrival at Thermopylæ, may be dismissed as unwarranted and incredible. And the computation whereby he determines the amount of non-military persons present, as equal or more than equal to the military, is founded upon suppositions no way admissible. For though in a Grecian well-appointed army it was customary to reckon one light-armed soldier or attendant for every hoplite, no such estimate can be applied to the Persian host. A few grandees and leaders might be richly provided with attendants of various kinds, but the great mass of the army would have none at all. Indeed, it appears that the only way in which we can render the military total, which must at all events have been very great, consistent with the conditions of possible

¹ Only 120 ships of war are mentioned by Herodotus (vii. 185) as having joined afterwards from the seaports in Thrace. But 400 were destroyed, if not more, in the terrible storm on the coast of Magnesia (vii. 190): and the squadron of 200 sail, detached by the Persians round Eubœa, were also all lost (viii. 7); besides forty-five taken or destroyed in the various sea-fights near Artemisium (vii. 194; viii. 11). Other losses are

also indicated (viii. 14-16).

As the statement of Æschylus for the number of the Persian triremes at Salamis appears well entitled to credit, we must suppose either that the number of Doriskus was greater than Herodotus has mentioned, or that a number greater than that which he has stated joined afterwards.

See a good note of Amersfoordt, ad Demosthen. Orat. de Symmoris, p. 88 (Leyden, 1821).

subsistence, is by supposing a comparative absence of attendants, and by adverting to the fact of the small consumption, and habitual patience as to hardship, of Orientals in all ages. An Asiatic soldier will at this day make his campaign upon scanty fare, and under privations which would be intolerable to an European.¹ And while we thus diminish the probable consumption, we have to consider that never in any case of ancient history had so much previous pains been taken to accumulate supplies on the line of march: in addition to which, the cities in Thrace were required to furnish such an amount of provisions when the army passed by, as almost brought them to ruin. Herodotus himself expresses his surprise how provisions could have been provided for so vast a multitude, and were we to admit his estimate literally, the difficulty would be magnified into an impossibility. Weighing the circumstances of the case well, and considering that this army was the result of a maximum of effort throughout the vast empire,—that a great numerical total was the thing chiefly demanded,—and that prayers for exemption were regarded by the Great King as a capital offence—and that provisions had been collected for three years before along the line of march—we may well believe that the numbers of Xerxes were greater than were ever assembled in ancient times, or perhaps at any known epoch of history. But it would be rash to pretend to guess at any positive number, in the entire absence of ascertained data. When we learn from Thucydidês that he found it impossible to find out the exact numbers of the small

¹ See on this point Volney, *Travels in Egypt and Syria*, ch. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 70, 71; ch. xxxii. p. 367; and ch. xxxix. p. 435 (Engl. transl.)

Kinneir, *Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire*, p. 22-23. Bernier, who followed the march of Aurungzebe from Delhi, in 1665, says that some estimated the number of persons in the camp at 300,000, others at different totals, but that no one knew, nor had they ever been counted. He says, "You are no doubt at a loss to conceive how so vast a number both of men and animals can be

maintained in the field. The best solution of the difficulty will be found in the temperance and simple diet of the Indians." (Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, translated by Brock, vol. ii. App. p. 118.)

So also Petit de la Croix says, about the enormous host of Genghis-Khan, "Les hommes sont si sobres, qu'ils s'accoutument de toutes sortes d'alimens."

That author seems to estimate the largest army of Genghis at 700,000 men. (*Histoire de Genghis*, liv. ii. ch. vi. p. 193.)

armies of Greeks who fought at Mantinea,¹ we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability to count the Asiatic multitudes at Doriskus. We may remark, however, that, in spite of the reinforcements received afterwards in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, it may be doubted whether the aggregate total ever afterwards increased. For Herodotus takes no account of desertions, which yet must have been very numerous, in a host disorderly, heterogeneous, without any interest in the enterprise; and wherein the numbers of each separate contingent were unknown.

Ktesias gives the total of the host at 800,000 men, and 1000 triremes, independent of the war-chariots: if he counts the crews of the triremes apart from the 800,000 men (as seems probable), the total will then be considerably above a million. Ælian assigns an aggregate of 700,000 men: Diodorus²

¹ Thucyd. v. 68. Xenophon calls the host of Xerxes *innumerable*—ἀναριθμητόν στρατιάν (Anab. iii. 2, 13).

It seems not to be considered necessary for a Turkish minister to know the number of an assembled Turkish army. In the war between the Russians and Turks in 1770, when the Turkish army was encamped at Babadag near the Balkan, Baron de Tott tells us, "Le Visir me demanda un jour fort sérieusement si l'armée Ottomane étoit nombreuse. C'est à vous que je m'adresserois, lui dis-je, si j'étais curieux de le savoir. Je l'ignore, me répondit-il. Si vous l'ignorez, comment pourrois-je en être instruit? En lisant la Gazette de Vienne, me répliqua-t-il. Je restai confondu."

The Duke of Ragusa (in his Voyage en Hongrie, Turquie, &c.), after mentioning the prodigiously exaggerated statements current about the numbers slain in the suppressed insurrection of the Janissaries at Constantinople in 1826, observes, "On a dit et répété, que

leur nombre s'étoit élevé à huit ou dix mille, et cette opinion s'est accréditée (it was really about 500). Mais les Orientaux en général, et les Turcs en particulier, n'ont aucune idée des nombres: ils les emploient sans exactitude, et ils sont par caractère portés à l'exagération. D'un autre côté, le gouvernement a dû favoriser cette opinion populaire, pour frapper l'imagination et inspirer une plus grande terreur." (vol. ii. p. 37.)

² Ktesias, Persica, c. 22, 23; Ælian, V. H. xiii. 3; Diodorus, xi. 2-11.

Respecting the various numerical statements in this case, see the note of Bos ad Cornel. Nepot. Themistocl. c. 2, p. 75, 76.

The Samian poet Chœrilus, a few years younger than Herodotus, and contemporary with Thucydides, composed an epic poem on the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. Two or three short fragments of it are all that is preserved: he enumerated all the separate nations who furnished contingents to Xer-

appears to follow partly Herodotus, partly other authorities. None of these witnesses enable us to correct Herodotus, in a case where we are obliged to disbelieve him. He is in some sort an original witness, having evidently conversed with persons actually present at the muster of Doriskus, giving us their belief as to the numbers, together with the computation, true or false, circulated among them by authority. Moreover, the contemporary Æschylus, while agreeing with him exactly as to the number of triremes, gives no specific figure as to the land-force, but conveys to us in his 'Persæ' a general sentiment of vast number, which may seem in keeping with the largest statement of Herodotus: the Persian empire is drained of men—the women of Susa are left without husbands and brothers—the Baktrian territory has not been allowed to retain even its old men.¹ The terror-striking effect of this crowd was probably quite as great as if its numbers had really corresponded to the ideas of Herodotus.

After the numeration had taken place, Xerxes passed in his chariot by each of the several contingents, observed their equipment, and put questions to which the royal scribes noted down the answers. He then embarked on board a Sidonian trireme (which had been already fitted up with a gilt tent), and sailed along the prows of his immense fleet, moored in line about 400 feet from the shore, and every vessel completely manned for action. Such a spectacle was well calculated to rouse emotions of arrogant confidence. It was

Xerxes passes in review the land-force and the fleet at Doriskus—his conversation with the Spartan king Demaratus.

see, and we find not only the Saksæ, but also the Solymi (apparently the Jews, and so construed by Josephus) among them. See Fragments, iii. and iv. in Næke's edition of Chæcilus, p. 121-124. Josephus cont. Apion. p. 454, ed. Havercamp.

¹ Æschylus, Pers. 14-124, 722-737. Heeren (in his learned work on the commerce of the ancient world, Ueber den Verkehr der alten Welt, part 1. sect. 1. pp. 122, 566, 3rd edition) conceives that Herodotus had seen the actual muster-roll, made by Persian authority, of the army

at Doriskus. I cannot think this at all probable: it is much more reasonable to believe that all his information was derived from Greeks who had accompanied the expedition. He must have seen and conversed with many such. The Persian royal scribes or eponetias accompanied the king, and took note of any particular fact or person who might happen to strike his attention (Herodot. vii. 109; viii. 90), or to exhibit remarkable courage. They seem to have been specially attached to the person of the king as ministers

in this spirit that he sent forthwith for Demaratus the exiled king of Sparta, who was among his auxiliaries—to ask whether resistance on the part of the Greeks, to such a force, was even conceivable. The conversation between them, dramatically given by Herodotus, is one of the most impressive manifestations of sentiment in the Greek language.¹ Demaratus assures him that the Spartans most certainly, and the Dorians of Peloponnesus probably, will

to his curiosity and amusement, rather than keepers of authentic and continuous records.

Heeren is disposed to accept the numerical totals, given by Herodotus as to the army of Xerxes, much too easily, in my judgement; nor is he correct in supposing that the contingents of the Persian army marched with their wives and families (p. 557-559).

¹ When Herodotus specifies his informants (it is much to be regretted that he does not specify them oftener) they seem to be frequently Greeks, such as Dikæus the Athenian exile, Thersander of Orchomenus in Bœotia, Archias of Sparta, &c. (iii. 55; viii. 65; ix. 16). He mentions the Spartan king Demaratus often, and usually under circumstances both of dignity and dramatic interest: it is highly probable that he may have conversed with that prince himself, or with his descendants, who remained settled for a long time in Teuthrania, near the Æolic coast of Asia Minor (Xenoph. Hellenica, iii. 1, 6), and he may thus have heard of representations offered by the exiled Spartan king to Xerxes. Nevertheless the remarks made by Hoffmeister, on the speeches ascribed to Demaratus, by Herodotus, are well-deserving of attention (*Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotus*, p. 118).

"Herodotus always brings into connection with insolent kings some man or other through whom

he gives utterance to his own lessons of wisdom. To Cræsus, at the summit of his glory, comes the wise Solon: Cræsus himself, reformed by his captivity, performs the same part towards Cyrus and Cambyses: Darius, as a prudent and honest man, does not require any such counsellor; but Xerxes in his pride has the sententious Artabanus and the sagacious Demaratus attached to him; while Amasis king of Egypt is employed to transmit judicious counsel to Polykrates, the despot of Samos. Since all these men speak one and the same language, it appears certain that they are introduced by Herodotus merely as spokesmen for his own criticisms on the behaviour and character of the various monarchs—criticisms which are nothing more than general maxims, moral and religious, brought out by Solon, Cræsus, or Artabanus, on occasion of particular events. The speeches interwoven by Herodotus have, in the main, not the same purpose as those of Tacitus—to make the reader more intimately acquainted with the existing posture of affairs or with the character of the agents—but a different purpose quite foreign to history: they embody in the narrative his own personal convictions respecting human life and the divine government."

This last opinion of Hoffmeister is to a great degree true, but is rather too absolutely delivered.

resist him to the death, be the difference of numbers what it may. Xerxes receives the statement with derision, but exhibits no feeling of displeasure: an honourable contrast to the treatment of Charidemus a century and a half afterwards, by the last monarch of Persia.¹

After the completion of the review, Xerxes with the army pursued his march westward, in three divisions and along three different lines of road, through the territories of seven distinct tribes of Thracians, interspersed with Grecian maritime colonies. All was still within his own empire, and he took reinforcements from each as he passed: the Thracian Satræ were preserved from this levy by their unassailable seats amidst the woods and snows of Rhodopê. The islands of Samothrace and Thasus, with their subject towns on the mainland—and the Grecian colonies Dikæa,² Maroneia, and Abdëra—were successively laid under contribution for contingents of ships or men. What was still more ruinous—they were constrained to provide a day's meal for the immense host as it passed: on the day of his passage the Great King was their guest. Orders had been transmitted for this purpose long beforehand, and for many months the citizens had been assiduously employed in collecting food for the army, as well as delicacies for the monarch—in grinding flour of wheat and barley, fattening cattle, keeping up birds and fowls; together with a decent display of gold and silver

March of Xerxes from Doriskus westward along Thrace.—Contributions levied on the Grecian towns on the coast of Thrace—particularly Thasus and Abdëra.

¹ Herodot. vii. 101-104. How inferior is the scene between Darius and Charidemus, in Quintus Curtius! (iii. 2, 9-19, p. 20, ed. Mützel). Herodotus takes up substantially the same vein of sentiment and the same antithesis as that which runs through the *Perse* of Æschylus; but he handles it like a social philosopher, with a strong perception of the real causes of Grecian superiority.

It is not improbable that the skeleton of the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus was a reality, heard by Herodotus from Demaratus himself or from his

sons; for the extreme speciality with which the Lacedæmonian exile confines his praise to the Spartans and Dorians, not including the other Greeks, hardly represents the feeling of Herodotus himself.

The minuteness of the narrative which Herodotus gives respecting the deposition and family circumstances of Demaratus (vi. 63 seq.), and his view of the death of Kleomenés as an atonement to that prince for injury done, may seem derived from family information (vi. 48).

² Herodot. vii. 109, 111, 118.

plate for the regal dinner. A superb tent was erected for Xerxes and his immediate companions, while the army received their rations in the open region around: on commencing the march next morning, the tent with all its rich contents was plundered, and nothing restored to those who had furnished it. Of course so prodigious a host, which had occupied seven days and seven nights in crossing the double Hellespontine bridge, must also have been for many days on its march through the territory, and therefore at the charge, of each one among the cities, so that the cost brought them to the brink of ruin, and even in some cases drove them to abandon house and home. The cost incurred by the city of Thasus, on account of their possessions of the mainland, for this purpose was no less than 400 talents¹ (=92,800*l.*): while at Abdéra, the witty Megakreon recommended to his countrymen to go in a body to the temples and thank the gods, because Xerxes was pleased to be satisfied with one meal in the day. Had the monarch required breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderites must have been reduced to the alternative either of exile or of utter destitution.² A stream called Lissus, which seems to have been of no great importance, is said to have been drunk up by the army, together with a lake of some magnitude near Pistyrus.³

Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians and the Pierians, between Pangæus and the sea, Xerxes and his army reached the river Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi or Nine-Roads, afterwards memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown over the river, to which the Magian priests rendered solemn honours by sacrificing white horses and throwing them into the stream.

Xerxes crosses the Strymon—marches to Akanthus—zeal of the Akanthians in regard to the canal of Athos.

¹ This sum of 400 talents was equivalent to the entire annual tribute charged in the Persian king's rent-roll, upon the satrapy comprising the western and southern coast of Asia Minor, wherein were included all the Ionic and Æolic Græeks, besides Lykians, Pamphylians, &c. (Herodot. iii. 90.)

² Herodot. vii. 118-120. He gives (vii. 187) the computation of the

quantity of corn which would have been required for daily consumption, assuming the immenso numbers as he conjectures them, and reckoning one chœnix of wheat for each man's daily consumption (=1/4th of a medimnus). It is unnecessary to examine a computation founded on such inadmissible data.

³ Herodot. vii. 106, 108.

Moreover, the religious feelings of Xerxes were not satisfied without the more precious sacrifices often resorted to by the Persians. He here buried alive nine native youths and nine maidens, in compliment to Nine-Roads, the name of the spot:¹ he also left, under the care of the Pæonians of Siris, the sacred chariot of Zeus, which had been brought from the seat of empire, but which doubtless was found inconvenient on the line of march. From the Strymon he marched forward along the Strymonic Gulf, passing through the territory of the Bisaltæ near the Greek colonies of Argilus and Stageirus, until he came to the Greek town of Akanthus, hard by the isthmus of Athos which had been recently cut through. The fierce king of the Bisaltæ² refused submission to Xerxes, fled to Rhodopê for safety, and forbade his six sons to join the Persian host. Unhappily for themselves, they nevertheless did so, and when they came back he caused all of them to be blinded.

All the Greek cities which Xerxes had passed by, obeyed his orders with sufficient readiness, and probably few doubted the ultimate success of so prodigious an armament. But the inhabitants of Akanthus had been eminent for their zeal and exertions in the cutting of the canal, and had probably made considerable profits during the operation: Xerxes now repaid their zeal by contracting with them the tie of hospitality, accompanied with praise and presents; though he does not seem to have exempted them from the charge of maintaining the army while in their territory. He here separated himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal of Athos, to double the two south-western capes of the Chalkidic peninsula, to enter the Thermaic Gulf, and to await his arrival at Therma. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from the Greek towns in the two peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallênê, as well as on the eastern side of the Thermaic Gulf, in the region called Krusis or Krossæa, on the continental side of the isthmus of Pallênê. These Greek towns were numerous, but of little individual importance. Near Therma (Salonichi) in Myg-

March of Xerxes to Therma—his fleet join him in the Thermaic Gulf.

¹ Herodot. vii. 114. He pronounces this savage practice to be specially Persian. The old and cruel Persian queen Amestris, wife of Xerxes, sought to prolong her

own life by burying alive fourteen victims, children of illustrious men, as offerings to the subterranean god.

² Herodot. viii. 116.

donia, in the interior of the Gulf and eastward of the mouth of the Axios, the fleet awaited the arrival of Xerxes by land from Akanthus. He seems to have had a difficult march, and to have taken a route considerably inland, through Pæonia and Krestônia—a wild, woody, and untrodden country, where his baggage-camels were set upon by lions, and where there were also wild bulls of prodigious size and fierceness. At length he rejoined his fleet at Therma, and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, the ancient Pieria, and Bottiæis, as far as the mouth of the Haliakmôn.¹

Xerxes had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the northern boundary of what was properly called Hellas; after a march through nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand for the subsistence of his army—with additional contingents levied in his course—and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in the hopes of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still shown with solemn reverence by the Thracians, and protected both from intruders and from tillage, even in the days of Herodotus.² The Macedonian princes, the last of his western tributaries, in whose territory he now found himself—together with the Thessalian Aleuadæ—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet appear difficult: what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him, shall be related in the coming chapter.

Favourable prospects of the invasion—zeal of the Macedonian prince to assist Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. vii. 122-127.

² Herodot. vii. 116.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF
MARATHON TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF
THERMOPYLÆ.

OUR information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathon, is very scanty.

Kleomenês and Leotychidês, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging to the elder or Eurystheneïd, the latter to the younger or the Prokleïd, race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Prokleïd king Demaratus: and Kleomenês had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priestess for this purpose. His manœuvre being betrayed shortly afterwards, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his renewed lease did not last long. His habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, insomuch that he struck with his stick whomsoever he met; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a Helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished. So shocking a death was certain to receive a religious interpretation: yet which, among the misdeeds of his life, had drawn down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine. Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of his having corrupted the Pythian priestess.¹ But the Athenians and Argeians were each disposed to an hypothesis of

Violent
proceed-
ings and
death of
Kleomenês,
king of
Sparta.

¹ Herodot. vi. 74, 75.

their own—the former believed that the gods had thus punished the Spartan king for having cut timber in the sacred grove of Eleusis—the latter recognised the avenging hand of the hero Argus, whose grove Kleomenês had burnt, along with so many suppliant warriors who had taken sanctuary in it. Without pronouncing between these different suppositions, Herodotus contents himself with expressing his opinion that the miserable death of Kleomenês was an atonement for his conduct to Demaratus. But what surprises us most is, to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phenomenon to divine agency, recognised on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause: Kleomenês had gone mad (they affirmed) through habits of intoxication, learnt from some Scythian envoys who had come to Sparta.¹

The death of Kleomenês, and the discredit thrown on his character, emboldened the Æginetans to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting their ten hostages, whom Kleomenês and Leotychildês had taken away from the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantee to the Athenians against aggression from Ægina at that critical moment. Leotychildês was the surviving auxiliary of Kleomenês in the requisition of these hostages, and against him the Æginetans complained. Though the proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece,² yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the deceased king and his acts, that the survivor Leotychildês was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisoner in atonement to the Æginetans. The latter were about to carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Theasidês, pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such an indignity against the regal person. The Spartans (he observed) had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence executed.

¹ Herodot. vi. 84.

Ἑλλᾶδι ἀγαθὰ προσεργάμενοι,

² Herodot. vi. 81. Κλεομένης, &c.
δόντα ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ κοινὰ τῷ

Accordingly the Æginetans contented themselves with stipulating that Leotychidès should accompany them to Athens and redemand their hostages detained there. The Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite of the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king set forth the sacred obligation of restoring a deposit.¹ They justified the refusal in part by saying that the deposit had been lodged by the two kings jointly, and could not be surrendered to one of them alone. But they probably recollected that the hostages were placed with them less as a deposit than as a security against Æginetan hostility—which security they were not disposed to forego.

The Spartans deliver Leotychidès to the Æginetans, who require him to go with them to Athens, to get back the hostages.

Leotychidès having been obliged to retire without success, the Æginetans resolved to adopt measures of retaliation for themselves. They waited for the period of a solemn festival celebrated every fifth year at Sunium; on which occasion a ship, peculiarly equipped and carrying some of the leading Athenians as Theòrs or sacred envoys, sailed thither from Athens. This ship they found means to capture, and carried all on board prisoners to Ægina. Whether an exchange took place, or whether the prisoners and hostages on both sides were put to death, we do not know. But the consequence of their proceeding was an active and decided war between Athens and Ægina,² beginning seemingly about 488 or 487 B.C., and lasting until 481 B.C., the year preceding the invasion of Xerxes.

Refusal of the Athenians to give up the hostages—reprisals of the Æginetans.

¹ Herodot. vi. 85; compare vi. 49-73, and chap. xxxvi. of this History.

² Herodot. vi. 87, 88.

Instead of ἦν γὰρ δὴ τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι πεντήρης ἐπὶ Σουνίῳ (vi. 87), I follow the reading proposed by Schömann and sanctioned by Boeckh—πενταηρικίς. It is hardly conceivable that the Athenians at that time should have had any ships with five banks of oars (πεντήρης); moreover, apart from this objection, the word πεντήρης makes considerable embarrassment

in the sentence: see Boeckh, Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen, chap. vii. p. 75, 76.

The elder Dionysius of Syracuse is said to have been the first Greek who constructed πεντήρικες or quinquereme ships (Diodor. xiv. 40, 41).

There were many distinct pentæterides, or solemnities celebrated every fifth year, included among the religious customs of Athens; see Aristoteles—Πολύτ. Fragm. xxvii. ed. Neumann; Pollux, viii. 187.

An Æginetan citizen named Nikodromus took advantage of this war to further a plot against the government of the island. Having been before banished (as he thought unjustly), he now organized a revolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy, concerting with the Athenians a simultaneous invasion in support of his plan. Accordingly on the appointed day he rose with his partisans in arms and took possession of the Old Town—a strong post which had been superseded in course of time by the more modern city on the sea-shore, less protected

The Æginetan Nikodromus lays a scheme for a democratical revolution in Ægina, in concert with Athens—the movement fails.

though more convenient.¹ But no Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his footing. He was obliged to make his escape from the island, after witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans; a large body of whom, seven hundred in number, fell into the hands of the government, and were led out for execution. One man alone among these prisoners burst his chains, fled to the sanctuary of Dêmêtêr Thesmophorus, and was fortunate enough to seize the handle of the door before he was overtaken. In spite of every effort to drag him away by force, he clung to it with convulsive grasp. His pursuers did not venture to put him to death in such a position, but they severed the hands from the body and then executed him, leaving the hands still hanging to and grasping² the door-handle, where they seem to have long remained without being taken off. Destruction of the seven hundred

prisoners does not seem to have drawn down upon the Æginetan oligarchy either vengeance from the gods or censure from their contemporaries. But the violation of sanctuary, in the

Treatment of the defeated conspirators—sacrilege.

¹ See Thucyd. i. 8.

The acropolis at Athens, having been the primitive city inhabited, bore the name of *The City* even in the time of Thucydides (ii. 16), at a time when Athens and Peiræus covered so large a region around and near it.

² Herodot. vi. 91. γαίρας δὲ χεῖρας ἐμπεφυκεισὶ ἔσαν τοῖσι ἀτιμωτοῦσι. The word χεῖρας for ἐξίνας, "those hands," appears so little suitable in this phrase, that I rather imagine

the real reading to have been χεῖρι (the Ionic dialect for χεῖρι), "the hands with nothing attached to them:" compare a phrase not very unlike, Homer, *Iliad*, iii. 376, χεῖρὴ δὲ τρυφάεια ἔμ' ἔσπετο, &c.

Compare the narrative of the arrest of the Spartan king Pausanias, and of the manner in which he was treated when in sanctuary at the temple of Athênê Chalkiokos (*Thucyd.* i. 134).

case of that one unfortunate man whose hands were cut off, was a crime which the goddess *Dêmêtêr* never forgave. More than fifty years afterwards, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the Æginetans, having been previously conquered by Athens, were finally expelled from their island: such expulsion was the divine judgement upon them for this ancient impiety, which half a century of continued expiatory sacrifice had not been sufficient to wipe out.¹

The Athenians who were to have assisted *Nikodromus* arrived at Ægina one day too late. Their proceedings had been delayed by the necessity of borrowing twenty triremes from the Corinthians, in addition to fifty of their own: with these seventy sail they defeated the Æginetans, who met them with a fleet of equal number—and then landed on the island. The Æginetans solicited aid from Argos, but that city was either too much displeased with them, or too much exhausted by the defeat sustained from the Spartan *Kleomenês*, to grant it. Nevertheless, one thousand Argeian volunteers, under a distinguished champion of the pentathlon named *Eurybatês*, came to their assistance, and a vigorous war was carried on, with varying success, against the Athenian armament.

The Athenians land a force in Ægina—war which ensues.

At sea, the Athenians sustained a defeat, being attacked at a moment when their fleet was in disorder, so that they lost four ships with their crews: on land they were more successful, and few of the Argeian volunteers survived to return home. The general of the latter, *Eurybatês*, confiding in his great personal strength and skill, challenged the best of the Athenian warriors to single

¹ Herodot. vi. 91. Ἀπὸ τούτου δὲ καὶ ἄγος οὐκ ἐγένετο, τὸ ἐκθύσασθαι οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἐπιμαρτυρούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐβήσαν ἐκπεσόντες πρότερον ἐκ τῆς νῆσου ἢ οὐκ ἴστων γενέσθαι τῆν θείαν.

Compare Thucyd. ii. 27 about the final expulsion from Ægina. The Lacedæmonians assigned to these expelled Æginetans a new abode in the territory of Thyrea, on the eastern coast of Peloponnesus, where they were attacked, taken prisoners, and put to death by the Athenians, in the eighth year of

the war (Thucyd. iv. 57). Now Herodotus, while he mentions the expulsion, does not allude to their subsequent and still more calamitous fate. Had he known the fact, he could hardly have failed to notice it, as a farther consummation of the divine judgement. We may reasonably presume ignorance in this case, which would tend to support the opinion thrown out in a preceding chapter (c. xxxiii.) respecting the date of composition of his history—in the earliest years of the Peloponnesian war.

combat. He slew three of them in succession, but the arm of the fourth, Sôphanês of Dekeleia, was victorious, and proved fatal to him.¹ At length the invaders were obliged to leave the island without any decisive result, and the war seems to have been prosecuted by frequent descents and privateering on both sides—in which Nikodromus and the Æginetan exiles, planted by Athens on the coast of Attica near Sunium, took an active part;² the advantage on the whole being on the side of Athens.

The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerted with Nikodromus in consequence of delay in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency towards maritime activity, which coincided so happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.

The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dwelt upon in a preceding chapter. Miltiadês, the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristeidês and Themistoklês became the chief men at Athens: and the former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions ensured to him lofty esteem from the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them sufferers by his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival Themistoklês, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into cooperation. The rivalry between the two chiefs became so bitter and menacing, that even Aristeidês himself is reported to have said, "If the Athenians were wise they

Effect of this war in inducing the Athenians to enlarge their military force.

Themistoklês and Aristeidês, the chief men at Athens—intense rivalry between them.—Banishment of the latter by ostracism.

¹ Herodot. ix. 75.

² Herodot. vi. 90, 91, 92, 93. Thucyd. i. 41. About Sôphanês, compare ix. 75.

How much damage was done by such a privateering war, between

countries so near as Ægina and Attica, may be seen by the more detailed description of a later war of the same kind in 388 B.C. (Ænonophon, Hellenic. v. 1).

would cast both of us into the barathrum." Under such circumstances it is not too much to say that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution called Ostracism, the true character of which I have already explained. After three or four years of continued political rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a vote of ostracism, and Aristeidês was banished.

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them was, the important change of policy above alluded to—the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power,—the development of this new and stirring element in the minds of the people. By all authorities, this change of policy is ascribed principally and specially to Themistoklês.¹ On that account, if for no other reason, Aristeidês would probably be found opposed to it: but it was moreover a change not in harmony with that old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life, and narrow range of active duty and experience—which Aristeidês seems to have approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas, and the quickness of his intelligence.² The land-service was a

Conversion of Athens from a land power into a naval power proposed and urged by Themistoklês.

¹ Plutarch, Themist. c. 19.

² See Mr. Galt's interesting account of the Hydriot sailors, *Voyages and Travels in the Mediterranean*, p. 376-378 (London, 1802).

"The city of Hydra originated in a small colony of boatmen belonging to the Morea, who took refuge in the island from the tyranny of the Turks. About forty years ago they had multiplied to a considerable number, their little village began to assume the appearance of a town, and they had cargoes that went as far as Constantinople. In their mercantile transactions, the Hydriote acquired the reputation of greater in-

tegrity than the other Greeks, as well as of being the most intrepid navigators in the Archipelago; and they were of course regularly preferred. Their industry and honesty obtained its reward. The islands of Spezzia, Paros, Myconi, and Ipsara, resemble Hydra in their institutions, and possess the same character for commercial activity. In paying their sailors, Hydra and its sister islands have a peculiar custom. The whole amount of the freight is considered as a common stock, from which the charges of victualling the ship are deducted. The remainder is then divided into two equal parts:

type of steadiness and inflexible ranks, the sea-service that of mutability and adventure. Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and other philosophers:¹ though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian seaman. His training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of obedience far more complete,² than that of the Athenian hoplite or horseman: a training beginning with Themistoklès, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistoklès displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time, for which Thucydidès gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristeidès, though the honester politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with Ægina, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbour —but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had

one is allotted to the crew and equally shared among them without reference to age or rank; the other part is appropriated to the ship and captain. The capital of the cargo is a trust given to the captain and crew on certain fixed conditions. The character and manners of the Hydriot sailors, from the moral effect of these customs, are much superior in regularity to the ideas that we are apt to entertain of sailors. They are sedate, well-dressed, well-bred, shrewd, informed, and speculative. They seem to form a class, in the orders of mankind, which has no existence among us. By their voyages, they acquire a liberality of notion which we expect only among gentlemen, while in their domestic circumstances their conduct is suitable to their condition. The Greeks are all traditional historians, and possess much

of that kind of knowledge to which the term *learning* is usually applied. This, mingled with the other information of the Hydriots, gives them that advantageous character of mind which I think they possess."

¹ Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 705, 706. Plutarch, Themistoklès, c. 19. Isokratès, Panathenaic. c. 43.

Plutarch, Philopomenen, c. 14. Πῶς Ἐπαμεινώνδην μὲν ἐπιτοὶ λίγουσιν ὀκνεύοντα γεῦσαι τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ὠφελειῶν τοῦς πολίτας, ὅπως αὐτῶ μὴ λάθωσιν ἀντὶ μονίμων ὀπλιτῶν, κατὰ Πλάτωνα, ναῦται γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθάρτες, ἀπρακτοὶ ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ τῶν νήσων ἀπελθεῖν ἐκουσίως: compare vii. p. 301.

² See the remarkable passage in Xenophon (Memorab. iii. 5, 18), attesting that the Hoplites and the Hippias, the persons first in rank in the city, were also the most disobedient on military service.

been driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished means of aggression as well as increased thirst for revenge; and Themistoklès knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of Datis to Marathon;¹ against which the best defence would be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistoklès, who now prevailed upon his countrymen to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well against Ægina as against Persia.² Not only were two hundred new ships built, and citizens trained as seamen—but the important work was commenced, during the year when Themistoklès was either archon or general, of forming and fortifying a new harbour for Athens at Peiræus, instead of the ancient open bay of Phalêrum. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peiræus with its three separate natural ports,³ admitting of being closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It is not too much to say, with Herodotus—that the Æginetan “war was the salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power.”⁴ The whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement in the organisation of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years, between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged, was in truth the result of accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes

Fleet of Athens—the salvation of Greece as well as of herself.

¹ Thucyd. i. 93. ἰδῶν (Themistoklès) τῆς βασιλείας στρατιᾶς τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἔφοδον εὐκρωτότεραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν οὖσαν.

² Thucyd. i. 14. Herodot. vii. 144.

³ Thucyd. i. 93.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 144. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συστάς ἔσωσε τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους.

Thucyd. i. 18. ναυτικοὶ ἀγίνοντο.

at his first accession towards Hellenic matters—postponed until 480 B.C., an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B.C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls—the great engine of her subsequent salvation.

Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been built—a considerable amount of public money—was also by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is first in an emphatic passage of the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium¹ in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the state. They were situated in the southern portion of the territory, not very far from the promontory of Sunium,² amidst a district of low hills which extended across much of the space between the eastern sea at Thorikus, and the western at Anaphlystus. At what time they first began to be worked, we have no information; but it seems hardly possible that they could have been worked with any spirit or profitable result, until after the expulsion of Hippias and the establishment of the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês. Neither the strong local factions, by which different portions of Attica were set against each other before the time of Peisistratus—nor the rule of that despot succeeded by his two sons—were likely to afford confidence and encouragement. But when the democracy of Kleisthenês first brought Attica into one systematic and comprehensive whole, with equal rights assigned to each part, and with a common centre at Athens—the power of that central government over the mineral wealth of the country, and its means of binding the whole people to respect agreements concluded with in-

¹ Æschylus, *Persæ*, 235.

² The mountain region of Laurium has been occasionally visited by modern travellers, but never carefully surveyed until 1836, when Dr. Fiedler examined it mineralogically by order of the present Greek government. See his *Reisen durch Griechenland*, vol. I, pp. 39, 78. The region is now little better than a desert, but Fiedler especially

notices the great natural fertility of the plain near Thorikus, together with the good harbour at that place—both circumstances of great value at the time when the mines were in work. Many remains are seen of shafts sunk in ancient times—and sunk in so workmanlike a manner as to satisfy the eye of a miner of the present day.—p. 78.

dividual undertakers, would give a new stimulus to private speculation in the district of Laurium. It was the practice of the Athenian government either to sell, or to let for a long term of years, particular districts of this productive region to individuals or companies; on consideration partly of a sum or fine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal to one twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.

We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian treasury, at the time when Themistoklès made his proposition to enlarge the naval force, a great sum¹ arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a distribution was on the point of being made among the citizens—ten drachms to each man. This great amount in hand must probably have been the produce of the purchase-money or fines received from recent sales, since the small annual reserved rent can hardly have been accumulated during many successive years. New and enlarged enterprises in mines must be supposed to have been recently begun by individuals under contract with the government: otherwise there could hardly have been at the moment so overflowing an exchequer, or adequate means for the special distribution contemplated. Themistoklès availed himself of this precious opportunity—set forth the necessities of the war with Ægina, and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia—and prevailed upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy.² One cannot doubt that

Themistoklès prevails upon the Athenian people to forego the distribution of this fund, and employ it in building and increased number of ships.

¹ Herodot. vii. 144. "Ὅτε Ἀθηναῖοισι γενομένων χρημάτων μεγάλων ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τὰ ἐκ τῶν μετάλλων σρι προσήλθε τῶν ἀπὸ Λαυραίου, ἔμιλλον λάξεσθαι ὀρχηδὸν ἕκαστος δέκα δραχμάς.

² All the information—unfortunately it is very scanty—which we possess respecting the ancient mines of Laurium, is brought together in the valuable Dissertation of M. Boeckh, translated and appended to the English translation of his Public Economy of Athens. He discusses the fact stated in this

chapter of Herodotus, in sect. 8 of that Dissertation: but there are many of his remarks in which I cannot concur.

After multiplying ten drachmæ by the assumed number of 20,000 Athenian citizens, making a sum total distributed of 33¹/₂ talents, he goes on—"That the distribution was made annually might have been presumed from the principles of the Athenian administration, without the testimony of Cornelius Nepos. We are not therefore to suppose that the savings of several

there must have been many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and supporting the distribution; insomuch that the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over a present gain, deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.

Immense indeed was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by

Preparations of Xerxes—known beforehand in Greece.

years are meant. nor merely a surplus; but that all the public money arising from the mines, as it was not required for any other object, was divided among the members of the community" (p. 632).

We are hardly authorized to conclude from the passage of Herodotus that all the sum received from the mines was about to be distributed. The treasury was very rich, and a distribution was about to be made—but it does not follow that nothing was to be left in the treasury after the distribution. Accordingly, all calculations of the total produce of the mines, based upon this passage of Herodotus, are uncertain. Nor is it clear that there was any regular annual distribution, unless we are to take the passage of Cornelius Nepos as proving it; but he talks rather about the magistrates employing this money for jobbing purposes—not about a regular distribution ("Nam cum pecunia publica quæ ex metallis redibat, largitione magistratum quotannis periret." *Corn. Nep. Themist. c. 2*). A story is told by Polyænus, from whomsoever he copied it—of a sum of 100 talents in the treasury, which Themistoklés persuaded the people to hand over to 100 rich men, for the purpose of being expended as

the latter might direct, with an obligation to reimburse the money in case the people were not satisfied with the expenditure: these rich men employed each the sum awarded to him in building a new ship, much to the satisfaction of the people (*Polyæn. i. 30*). This story differs materially from that of Herodotus, and we cannot venture either to blend the two together or to rely upon Polyænus separately.

I imagine that the sum of 23 talents, or 50 talents, necessary for the distribution, formed part of a larger sum lying in the treasury, arising from the mines. Themistoklés persuaded the people to employ the whole sum in shipbuilding, which of course implied that the distribution was to be renounced. Whether there had been distributions of a similar kind in former years, as M. Boeckh affirms, is a matter on which we have no evidence. M. Boeckh seems to me not to have kept in view the fact (which he himself states just before) that there were two sources of receipt into the treasury—original purchase-money paid down, and reserved annual rent. It is from the former source that I imagine the large sum lying in the treasury to have been derived: the

the Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia, the Ægean, and Thrace, would of course become known throughout Greece Proper; especially the vast labour bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thasian or Akanthian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus. All these premonitory evidences were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Demaratus is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from Susa to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition.¹ The formal announcements of Xerxes all designated Athens as the special object of his wrath and vengeance.² Other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape without mischief: so that the prospect of the great invasion did not at first provoke among them any unanimous dispositions to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn of 481 B.C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defence. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle; while both at the same time joined to convene a Pan-hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of organising resistance against the expected invader.

I have in the preceding chapters pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approaching more nearly to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-hellenic character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Peloponnesian states who constitute the immediate

Heralds from Persia to demand earth and water from the Grecian cities—many of them comply and submit.

Pan-hellenic congress convened jointly by Athens and Sparta at the Isthmus of Corinth.— Important effect on Grecian mind.

small reserved rent probably went among the annual item of the state-budget.

¹ Herodot. vii. 239.

² Herodot. vii. 8-138.

allies of Sparta: it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation: moreover it seeks to combine every city of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it—even the Kretans, Korkyræans, and Sicilians. It is true that all these states do not actually come,—but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come. The dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are entreated to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose¹—the defence of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas unlike to anything which has gone before—enlarging prodigiously the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage—and thus introducing increased habits of cooperation among the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandizement among the leaders. The congress at the Isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralising tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march in the same direction: but the promise will not be found realized.

Its first step was indeed one of inestimable value. While most of the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of *medising*² (*i. e.* embracing the cause of the Persians), which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius. But her present conduct afforded no countenance to such suspicions: she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defence and willingly consented to accommodate her difference with Athens.³ In this work of reconciling

Effects of the congress in healing feuds among the different Greeks—especially between Athens and Ægina.

¹ Herodot. vii. 145. Φρονίσαντες πάσι Ἕλλησι.

εἰ πως ἐν τε γένοιτο τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, καὶ εἰ συγκύφαντες τωὐτὸ πρήσσοιεν πάντες, ὡς δεινῶν ἐπιόντων ὁμοίως

² Herodot. viii. 92.

³ Herodot. vii. 145.

feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistoklès took a prominent part, as well as Cheileos of Tegea in Arcadia.¹ The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit cooperation from such cities as were yet either equivocal or indifferent, especially Argos, Korkyra, and the Kretan and Sicilian Greeks; and at the same time to despatch spies across to Sardis, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies presently returned, having been detected and condemned to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the timid, or the treacherous—Xerxes with his countless host appeared irresistible, and indeed something more than human.² Of course such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries: and we may even trace the manifestation of a wish to get rid of the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil submission. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian temple; when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristonikê, when she at once exclaimed—“Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head, body, feet, and hands are alike rotten: fire and sword, in the train of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only *your* city, but other cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods—which are now sweating and trembling with fear, and foreshadow, by drops of blood on their roofs, the hard calamities

Alarm and
mistrust
prevalent
throughout
Greece.

¹ Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 10. εἶναι τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, about Cheileos, Herodot. ix. 9. ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπων, &c.: compare also

² Herodot. vii. 203. οὐ γὰρ θεῶν vii. 56.

impending. Get ye away from the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow."¹

So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the priestess. The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and durst not carry it back to Athens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yet to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace here as elsewhere the underhand working of these leading Delphians on the priestess), who advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time in that imploring guise: "O lord, we pray thee (they said), have compassion on these boughs of supplication, and deliver to us something more comfortable concerning our country; else we quit not thy sanctuary, but remain here, until death." Upon which the priestess replied—"Athênê with all her prayers and all her sagacity cannot propitiate Olympian Zeus.² But this assurance I will give you, firm as adamant. When everything else in the land of Kekrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athênê that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent, but turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest."³

¹ Herodot. vii. 140.

Ἄλλ' ἴσον ἐξ ἀθύρτου, κακοῖς δ' ἐπιχθίστα θυμῶν.

The general sense and scope of the oracle appears to me clear, in this case. It is a sentence of nothing but desolation and sadness; though Bähr and Schweighäuser with other commentators try to infuse into it something of encouragement by construing *θυμῶν*, *fortitude*. The translation of Valla and Schultz is nearer to the truth. But even when the general sense of an oracle is plain (which it hardly ever is), the particular phrases are always wild and vague.

² Herodot. vii. 141.

Ὁς δύνανται Παλλὰς Δι' Ὀλύμπου, ἐξυλάσασθαι Δισσαμένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ μήτιδι πυκνῇ.

Compare with this the declaration of Apollo to Cræsus of Lydia (i. 91).

Ἄ... Τεῖχος Τριτογενεῖ ἐξυλωνοῦσιδοι εὐρύσπα Ζεὺς Μούσοι ἀπόρητον τελέθειν, τὸ σέ τινα τ' ὀλέσει.

Ἢ θεῖη Σαλαμίς, ἀπολεῖς δὲ σὺ τινα γυναικῶν, &c.—(Herodot. vii. 141.)

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first. It left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark and unintelligible: and the envoys wrote it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing probably the terrific sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people, the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations. What was meant by "the wooden wall"? Some supposed that the acropolis itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out; but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica for ever. The last lines of the oracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would destroy the children of women, appeared to them to portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval combat.

Sentence of the oracle frightful, yet obscure: efforts of the Athenians to interpret it: ingenuity and success of Themistoklès.

Such was the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will. It harmonized completely with the despairing temper then prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle. Emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens,—and of Greece generally, which would have been helpless without Athens,—now hung upon a thread, when Themistoklès, the great originator of the fleet, interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to ensure the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate Salamis as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet as "wretched Salamis:" but the fact that it was termed "divine Salamis," indicated that the parties, destined to perish there, were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his countrymen therefore to abandon their city and country, and to trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god, but with full determination to fight and conquer on board.¹ Great indeed were the

¹ Herodot. vii. 143. Ταύτη Θεμιστοκλέους ἀποφαινομένου, Ἀθηναίων

consequences which turned upon this bold stretch of exegetical conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been persuaded, by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense of the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval combat, they would in their existing depression have abandoned all thought of resistance.

Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing less than the most unquerable resolution and patriotism could have enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations from the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers:¹ nay, he even steps out of his way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the real saviour of Greece.

Writing as he did about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war—at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired, by most of the Grecian states—he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and he apologizes for it as something wrung from him against his will by the force of the evidence.² Not only did the Athenians

ταῦτά σφι ἔγνωσαν αἰρετώτερα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῶν χρηρημολόγων, οἱ οὐκ εἶων νουμαχίην ἀρτίεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐκλιπόντας χώραν τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ἄλλην τιὰ οἰκίσειν.

There is every reason to accept the statement of Herodotus as true, respecting these oracles delivered to the Athenians, and the debated interpretation of them. They must have been discussed publicly in the Athenian assembly, and Herodotus may have conversed with persons who had heard the discussion. Respecting the other oracle which he states to have been delivered to the Spartans—intimating that either Sparta must be conquered or a king of Sparta must perish—we may reasonably doubt whether it was in existence before the battle of Thermopylae (Herodot.

vii. 220).

The later writers, Justin (ii. 12), Cornelius Nepos (c. 2), and Polyænus (i. 30), give an account of the proceeding of Themistoklès, inferior to Herodotus in vivacity as well as in accuracy.

¹ Herodot. vii. 139. οὐδὲ σφίσις χρηστήρια φοβερὰ, εἰθόντα ἐκ Δελφῶν, καὶ ἐς δεῖμα βιάοντα, ἔπεισε ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, &c.

For the abundance of oracles and prophecies, from many different sources, which would be current at such a moment of anxiety, we may compare the analogy of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, described by the contemporary historian (Thucyd. ii. 8).

² Herodot. vii. 139. Ἐνθαῦτα ἀναγκασίη ἐξέρχεται γνώμη ἀποδέξασθαι, ἐπιψέθονον μὲν πρότε

dare to stay and fight against immense odds: they, and they alone, threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby it was enabled to succeed,¹ as will appear farther in the sequel.

But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the Isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognize some one commanding city. With regard to the land-force, no one dreamt of contesting the pre-eminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should command at sea and Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honour of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force at this moment of peril would be compromised.² To appreciate this generous abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of pre-eminence was among the most prominent attributes of the

τῶν πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων ἑμῶς
 δεῖ, τῇ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθές,
 οὐκ ἐπισχῆσω. Εἰ Ἀθηναῖοι, κα-
 ταρρωδῆσαντες τὸν ἐπίστυα κίνδυνον,
 εἰλίπκον τὴν σφετέρην, &c. . . . Νῦν
 δὲ, Ἀθηναίους ἂν τις λέγων σωτήρας
 γένοιτο τῆς Ἑλλάδος, οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρ-
 τάνοι τὸ ἀληθές, &c.

The whole chapter deserves peculiar attention, as it brings before us the feelings of those contemporaries to whom his history is addressed, and the mode of judging with which they looked back on the Persian war. One is apt unconsciously to fancy that an ancient historian writes for men in the abstract, and not for men of given sentiments, prejudices, and belief. The persons whom Herodotus addressed are those who were so full of admiration

for Sparta, as to ascribe to her chiefly the honour of having beaten back the Persians; and to maintain, that even without the aid of Athens, the Spartans and Peloponnesians both could have defended, and would have defended, the Isthmus of Corinth, fortified as it was by a wall built expressly. The Peloponnesian allies of that day forgot that they were open to attack by sea as well as by land.

¹ Herodot. vii. 139. ἐλόμνοι δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιεῖναι ἐλευθέρην, τοῦτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν πᾶν τὸ λοιπὸν, ἕσον μὴ ἐμῆδισα, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἦσαν οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες, καὶ βασιλέα μετὰ γέ θεοῦ ἀνωσάμενοι.

² Herodot. viii. 2, 3: compare vii. 161.

Hellenic character; a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honour and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.

We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of resistance—prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity should arrive—furnishing two-thirds of the whole fleet, and yet prosecuting the building of fresh ships until the last moment¹—sending forth the ablest and most forward leader in the common cause, while content themselves to serve like other states under the leadership of Sparta. During the winter preceding the march of Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmus was trying, with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into united action. Among the cities north of Attica and Peloponnesus, the greater number were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Bœotia, or were at least lukewarm in the cause of independence: so rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Platæans fifty-three years afterwards) was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader.²

Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, setting forth the common danger and soliciting cooperation. The result is certain, that no cooperation was obtained—the Argeians did nothing throughout the struggle; but as to their real position, or the grounds of their refusal, contradictory statements had reached the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissuasion from the Delphian oracle—exactng only as conditions that the Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and

¹ Herodot. vii. 144.

² Thucyd. iii. 56. ἐν κρισίαις οἰς σπάνιον ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰ ἀπειρήν τῆ Ἐσχέου δουράμεν ἀντιτάσσασθαι.

This view of the case is much

more conformable to history than the boasts of later orators respecting wide-spread patriotism in those times. See Demosthen. Philipp. iii. 37, p. 126.

should equally divide the honours of headship with Argos. To the proposed truce there would probably have been no objection, nor was there any as to the principle of dividing the headship. But the Spartans added, that they had two kings, while the Argeians had only one; and inasmuch as neither of the two Spartan kings could be deprived of his vote, the Argeian king could only be admitted to a third vote conjointly with them. This proposition appeared to the Argeians (who considered that even the undivided headship was no more than their ancient right) as nothing better than insolent encroachment, and incensed them so much that they desired the envoys to quit their territory before sunset; preferring even a tributary existence under Persia to a formal degradation as compared with Sparta.¹

Such was the story told by the Argeians themselves, but seemingly not credited either by any other Greeks, or by Herodotus himself. The prevalent opinion was, that the Argeians had a secret understanding with Xerxes. It was even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection to themselves and of vengeance against Sparta after their defeat by Kleomenês. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they *medised*, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards.² It is certain that in

Different stories current in Greece about Argos—opinion of Herodotus.

¹ Herodot. vii. 147-160.

² The opinion of Herodotus is delivered in a remarkable way, without mentioning the name of the Argeians, and with evident reluctance. After enumerating all the Grecian contingents assembled for the defence of the isthmus, and the different inhabitants of Peloponnesus, ethnically classified, he proceeds to say: Τούτων ὦν τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡπείρου αἰδοῦνται πολλοὶ κἀρετῆ τῶν νατιλέων, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου σκλαπτοῦ εἰδὲ ἐλευθέρως ἕξεισιν εἰπεῖν, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατῆμενοι ἐμυθίζον (viii. 73.) This assertion includes the Argeians without naming them.

When he speaks respecting the Argeians by name, he is by no means so free and categorical: compare vii. 152—he will give no opinion of his own, differing from the allegation of the Argeians themselves—he mentions other stories, incompatible with that allegation; but without guaranteeing their accuracy—he delivers a general admonition that those who think they have great reason to complain of the conduct of others would generally find, on an impartial scrutiny, that others have as much reason to complain of them—"And thus the conduct of Argos has not been so much worse

act the Argeians were neutral, and one of their reasons for neutrality was, that they did not choose to join any Pan-hellenic levy except in the capacity of chiefs. But probably the more powerful reason was, that they shared the impression, then so widely diffused throughout Greece, as to the irresistible force of the approaching host, and chose to hold themselves prepared for the event. They kept up secret negotiations even with Persian agents, yet not compromising themselves while matters were still pending. Nor is it improbable, in their vexation against Sparta, that they would have been better pleased if the Persians had succeeded,—all which may reasonably be termed, *medising*.

The absence of Hellenic fidelity in Argos was borne out by the parallel examples of Krete and Korkyra, to which places envoys from the Isthmus proceeded at the same time. The Kretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle;¹ the Korkyræans promised without performing, and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from Korkyra; but they took care not to sail round Cape Malea, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on the southern or western coast of Peloponnesus, under pretence of being weather-bound, until the decisive result of the battle of Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch

than that of others"—ὁὕτω δὴ οὐκ Ἀργείοισι ἀσεχέστα παροίηται.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when the history of Herodotus was probably composed, the Argeians were in a peculiarly favourable position. They took part neither with Athens nor Lacedæmon, each of whom was afraid of offending them. An historian who openly countenanced a grave charge of treason against them in the memorable foregone

combat against Xerxes, was thus likely to incur odium from both parties in Greece.

The comments of Plutarch on Herodotus in respect to this matter are of little value (De Herodoti Malignit. c. 28, p. 863), and are indeed unfair, since he represents the Argeian version of the facts as being universally believed (ἄνευ τῆς ἰσχυρίας), which it evidently was not.

¹ Herodot. vii. 169.

would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit of not having arrived in time; but they were also prepared with the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks for their absence.¹ Such duplicity is not very astonishing, when we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Korkyia to isolate herself from Hellenic confederacies.²

The envoys who visited Korkyra proceeded onward on their mission to Gelon the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak more fully in a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention now, that he rendered no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclinations; for the same year which brought the Persian monarch against Greece, was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks to the defence of their own island. It seems even probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians.³

The endeavours of the deputies of Greeks at the Isthmus had thus produced no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Korkyræans. It was about the time when Xerxes was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B.C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians. Though the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadæ were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission from their countrymen—yet it seems that these promises were in reality unwarranted. The Aleuadæ were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the

Mission to Gelon at Syracuse—his reply.

Grecian army sent into Thessaly, to defend the defile of Tempe against Xerxes. B.C. 480.

¹ Herodot. vii. 168.

² Thucyd. i. 32-37. It is perhaps singular that the Corinthian envoys in Thucydidés do not make any allusion to the duplicity of the Korkyræans in regard to the Persian invasion, in the strong invective which they deliver against

Korkyra before the Athenian assembly. (Thucydid. i. 37-42). The conduct of Corinth herself, however, on the same occasion, was not altogether without reproach.

³ Herodot. vii. 158-167. Diodor. xi. 22.

Peisistratidæ:¹ while most of the Thessalians were disposed, to resist Xerxes—for which purpose they now sent envoys to the Isthmus,² intimating the necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defence, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly a body of 10,000 Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of the Spartan Euænetus and the Athenian Themistoklès, were despatched by sea to Alus in Achæa Phthiôtis, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly.³ Being joined by the Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempê, through which the river Peneius makes its way to the sea, by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempê formed then, and forms still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from Lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly. The lofty mountain precipices approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road: it is thus eminently defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous host.⁴ But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they could

On arriving, they find that it cannot be successfully against him,—and retire.

¹ See Schol. ad Aristeid., Panathenaic. p. 138.

² Herodot. vii. 172: compare c. 130.

³ Herodot. vii. 173.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 172. τὴν ἐσθλοτάτην Ὀλυμπικὴν. See the description and plan of Tempê in Dr. Clarke's Travels, vol. iv. ch. ix. p. 280; and the Dissertation of Kriegk, in which all the facts about this interesting defile are collected and compared (Das Thessalische Tempe. Frankfurt, 1834).

The description of Tempê in Livy (xliv. 18; xlv. 6) seems more accurate than that of Pliny (H. N. iv. 8). We may remark that both the one and the other belong to times subsequent to the formation

and organisation of the Macedonian empire, when it came to hold Greece in a species of dependence. The Macedonian princes after Alexander the Great, while they added to the natural difficulties of Tempê by fortifications, at the same time made the road more convenient as a military communication. In the time of Xerxes these natural difficulties had never been approached by the hand of art, and were doubtless much greater.

The present road through the pass is about thirteen feet broad in its narrowest part, and between fifteen and twenty feet broad elsewhere—the pass is about five English miles in length (Kriegk, p. 31-33).

not hold,—first, because the powerful fleet of Xerxes would be able to land troops in their rear; secondly, because there was also a second entrance passable in summer, from Upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain passes over the range of Olympus; an entrance which traversed the country of the Perrhæbians and came into Thessaly near Gonnus, about the spot where the defile of Tempê begins to narrow. It was in fact by this second pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempê, that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the auspices of Alexander king of Macedon, tributary to them and active in their service. That prince sent a communication of the fact to the Greeks at Tempê, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by the countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their hopeless position.¹ He passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be acting as such, in dissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistance to Persia: but he was in reality a very dangerous mediator; and as such the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more hereafter.² On the present occasion, the Grecian commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thessaly, besides Tempê, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk. So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery, justifying or seeming to justify the friendly advice of Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Tempê, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the Isthmus of Corinth—about the time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.³

This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of Mount Kithæron and of the Megarid territory without defence, and it served either as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states, north of that boundary, to make their submission to Xerxes,

¹ Herodot. vii. 173.

² Herodot. viii. 140-143.

³ Herodot. vii. 173, 174.

which some of them had already begun to do before.¹

When Xerxes in the course of his march reached the Thermaic Gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokens of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name—the Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Lokrians, Dorians, Melians, Phthiôtid Achæans, and Bœotians. Among the latter is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or Plataea. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus of the Aleuadæ, whose party now became predominant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.²

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern fraction might probably have been induced to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Tempê and the arrival of Xerxes at Therma, no new plan of defence was yet thoroughly organised: for it was not until that arrival became known at the Isthmus, that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.³

¹ Diodor xi. 4. ἐπιπαροῦσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς Τέμπεισι φυλακῆς, &c.

² Herodot. vii. 131, 132, 174.

³ Herodot. vii. 177.



CHAPTER XL.

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

IT was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the event of success, to inflict upon these reculant brethren condign punishment; to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Exception was to be made in favour of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity.¹ Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed. It was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

Engagement taken by the confederate Greeks against such Greeks as joined the Persians.

To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies. The pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of Tempê—leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Phthiôtid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænians, Malians, &c., who would all have been included if the latter line had been adhered to; but comprising the largest range consistent with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempê; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between Mount Knêmis and Cape Kênæum. On the northern portion of Eubœa, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa Phthiôtis, was situated the line of coast called Artemisium; a name derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its

Resolution taken to defend Thermopylæ as well as the adjoining strait of Eubœa.

¹ Herodot. vii. 132; Diodor. xi. 3.

most conspicuous feature, belonging to the town of Histiaea. It was arranged that the Grecian fleet should be mustered there, in order to cooperate with the land-force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on both elements at once. To fight in a narrow space¹ was supposed favourable to the Greeks on sea not less than on land, inasmuch as their ships were both fewer in number, and heavier in sailing than those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemisium, it was calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into the narrow strait which severs Eubœa to the north and west from the mainland, and which between Chalkis and Bœotia becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point that the Greek seamen would have preferred to place their defence: but the occupation of the northern part of the Eubœan strait was indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ.

Of this Eubœan strait, the western limit is formed by what was then called the Maliac Gulf, into which the river Spercheius poured itself—after a course from west to east between the line of Mount Othrys to the north and Mount Ceta to the south—near the town of Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of the Spercheius was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians, bordering to the north and east on Achæa Phthiôtis: the southernmost Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places considerable, in others very narrow—enclosed between Mount Ceta and the sea. From Trachis the range of Ceta stretched eastward, bordering close on the southern shore of the Maliac Gulf: between the two lay the memorable pass of Thermopylæ.² On the road from Trachis to Thermopylæ, immediately outside of the latter and at the mouth of the little streams called the Phœnix and the Asôpus,

¹ Herodot. viii. 15-60. Compare Isokratès, Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 59.

I shall have occasion presently to remark the revolution which took place in Athenian feeling on this point between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.

² The word *Pass* commonly conveys the idea of a path enclosed between mountains. In this instance it is employed to designate a narrow passage, having mountains on one side only, and water (or marsh ground) on the other.

was placed the town of Anthêla, celebrated for its temples of Amphiktyon and of the Amphiktyonic Dêmêtêr, as well as for the autumnal assemblies of the Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats were provided in the temple.

Immediately near to Anthêla, the northern slope of the mighty and prolonged ridge of Ceta approached so close to the gulf, or at least to an inaccessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf, as to leave no more than one single wheel track between. This narrow entrance formed the western gate of Thermoplæ. At some little distance, seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the same close conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated—thus forming the eastern gate of Thermopylæ, not far from the first town of the Lokrians, called Alpêni. The space between these two gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt and sulphureous. Some cells were here prepared for bathers, which procured for the place the appellation of Chytri or the Pans: but the copious supply of mineral water spread its mud, and deposited its crust over all the adjacent ground; and the Phokians, some time before, had designedly endeavoured so to conduct the water as to render the pass utterly impracticable, at the same time building a wall across it near to the western gate. They had done this in order to keep off the attacks of the Thessalians, who had been trying to extend their conquests southward and eastward. The warm springs, here as in other parts of Greece, were consecrated to Hêraklês,¹ whose legendary exploits and sufferings ennobled all the surrounding region—Mount Ceta, Trachis, Cape Kenæum, the Lichades islands, the river Dyras. Some fragments of these legends have been transmitted and adorned by the genius of Sophoklês, in his drama of the Trachinian Maidens.

Such was the general scene—two narrow openings with an intermediate mile of enlarged road and hot springs between them—which passed in ancient times by the significant name of Thermopylæ, the Hot Gates; or sometimes, more

The Greeks take post at Thermopylæ.

¹ According to one of the numerous hypotheses for refining religious legend into matter of historical and physical fact, Hêraklês

was supposed to have been an engineer or water-finder in very early times—δεινός κατὰ ζήτησιν ὕδατων καὶ συναγωγῆν. See Plu-

briefly, Pylæ—The Gates. At a point also near Trachis, between the mountains and the sea, about two miles outside or westward of Thermopylæ, the road was hardly less narrow, but it might be turned by marching to the westward, since the adjacent mountains were lower, and presented less difficulty of transit: while at Thermopylæ itself, the overhanging projection of Mount Ceta was steep, woody, and impracticable, leaving access, from Thessaly into Locris and the territories south-east of Ceta, only through the straight gate; save and except an unfrequented as well as

tarch, Cum principibus viris philosopho esse disserendum, c. i. p. 776.

¹ About Thermopylæ, see Herodot. vii. 175, 176, 199, 200.

Ἡ δ' αὐτὴ διὰ Τρηχίνος ἑσοδος ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστὶ, τῆ στενωπότητος, ἡμικληθῆρον οὐ μέντοι κατὰ τοῦτο γ' ἐστὶ τὸ στενωπότητος τῆς χώρας τῆς ἄλλης, ἀλλ' ἐμπροσθε τε Θερμοπυλῶν καὶ ὄπισθε κατὰ τε Ἀλκηνόους, ὄπισθε ἐόντας, ἐσοῦσα ἀμαξίτος μόνη, καὶ ἐμπροσθε κατὰ Φοίνικα καταμὸν, ἀμαξίτος ἄλλη μόνη.

Compare Pausanias, vii. 15, 2. τὸ στενὸν τὸ Ἡρακλείας τε μεταξὺ καὶ Θερμοπυλῶν: also Strabo ix. p. 429; and Livy, xxxvi. 12.

Herodotus says about Thermopylæ—στενωπότη, γὰρ ἐφαίνετο εὐδοῦσα τῆς εἰς Θερμοπυλῶν, i. e. than the defile of Tempé.

If we did not possess the clear topographical indications given by Herodotus, it would be almost impossible to comprehend the memorable event here before us; for the configuration of the coast, the course of the rivers, and the general local phenomena, have now so entirely changed, that modern travellers rather mislead than assist. In the interior of the Malia Gulf, three or four miles of new land have been formed by the gradual accumulation of river deposit, so that the Gulf itself is of much less extent, and the mountain bordering the gate of Ther-

mopylæ is not now near to the sea. The river Spercheus has materially altered its course: instead of flowing into the sea in an easterly direction considerably north of Thermopylæ, as it did in the time of Herodotus, it has been diverted southward in the lower part of its course, with many windings, so as to reach the sea much south of the pass, while the rivers Dyras, Melas, and Asopus, which in the time of Herodotus all reached the sea separately between the mouth of Spercheus and Thermopylæ, now do not reach the sea at all, but fall into the Spercheus. Moreover the perpetual flow of the thermal springs has tended to accumulate deposit and to raise the level of the soil generally throughout the pass. Herodotus seems to consider the road between the two gates of Thermopylæ as bearing north and south, whereas it would bear more nearly east and west. He knows nothing of the appellation Callidromus, applied by Livy and Strabo to an undefined portion of the eastern ridge of Ceta.

Respecting the past and present features of Thermopylæ, see the valuable observations of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii. ch. x. p. 7-40; Gell, Itinerary of Greece, p. 239; Kruse, Hellas, vol. iii. ch. x. p. 129. Dr.

circuitous mountain path which will be presently noticed. The wall originally built across the pass by the Phokians was now half-ruined by age and neglect; but the Greeks easily re-established it, determining to await in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of Tempê, the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea-line appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor for sailing; but there were points at which boats could land, so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet at Artemisium, while Alpêni was immediately in their rear to supply provisions.

Though a general resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan strait, had been taken seemingly not long after the retreat from Tempê, their troops and their fleet did not actually occupy these positions until Xerxes was known to have reached the Thermaic Gulf. Both were then put in motion: the land force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartan commander Eurybiadês, apparently about the latter part of the month of June. Leonidas was the younger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law, of the former Eurystheneid king Kleomenês, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother of the same family—Dorieus, older than Leonidas—had perished, even before the death of Kleomenês, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony in Sicily; and room had been thus made for the unexpected succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of 300 Spartans—all being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons to supply their places.¹

Leonidas,
king of
Sparta,
conducts
the force
thither
—the com-
bined fleet
under Eu-
rybiadês
occupy the
Eubœan
strait.

Clarke observes, "The hot springs is us principally from two mouths at the foot of the limestone precipices of Œta, upon the left of the causeway, which here passes close under the mountain, and on this part of it scarcely admits two horsemen abreast of each other, the morass on the right, between the causeway and the sea, being so dangerous, that we were very

near being buried with our horses, by our imprudence in venturing a few paces into it from the paved road." (Clarke's Travels, vol. iv. ch. viii. p. 247.)

¹ Herodot. vii. 177, 205. ἐπιλεξάμενος ἀνδρας τε τοὺς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν τριηκοσίου, καὶ τοῖσι ἐπὶ ὕχαρον παῖδες ἴόντες.

In selecting men for a dangerous service, the Spartans took by

Numbers and composition of the force of Leonidas.

Along with them were 200 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Mantinea, 120 from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 1000 from the rest of Arcadia, 400 from Corinth, 200 from Phlius, and 80 from Mykenæ. There were also doubtless Helots and other light troops, in undefined number, and probably a certain number of Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans. In their march through Bœotia they were joined by 700 hoplites of Thespiæ, hearty in the cause, and by 400 Thebans of more equivocal fidelity under Leontiadês. It appears indeed that the leading men of Thebes, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly *medised*, or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the Persians were actually in the country: and Leonidas, when he made the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist in the defence of Thermopylæ, was doubtful whether they would not refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The Theban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, though against their real inclinations, and furnished a contingent of 400 men,¹ chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed the Theban people and the Bœotians generally, with the exception of Thespiæ and Plataea, seem to have had little sentiment on either side, and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

preference those who already had families: if such a man was slain, he left behind him a son to discharge his duties to the state, and to maintain the continuity of the family sacred rites, the extinction of which was considered as a great misfortune. In our ideas, the life of the father of a family in mature age would be considered as of more value, and his death a greater loss, than that of a younger and unmarried man.

¹ Herodot. vii. 205; Thucyd. iii. 62; Diodor. xi. 4; Plutarch, Aristidês, c. 18.

The passage of Thucydides is very important here, as confirming to a great degree the statement of

Herodotus, and enabling us to appreciate the criticisms of Plutarch, on this particular point very plausible (De Herodoti Malign. pp. 865, 866). The latter seems to have copied from a lost Bœotian author named Aristophanês, who tried to make out a more honourable case for his countrymen in respect to their conduct in the Persian war.

The statement of Diodorus—*θηβαίων ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπίρας μέρους ὡς τετραχόσιοι*—is illustrated by a proceeding of the Korkyræan government (Thucyd. iii. 75) when they enlisted their enemies in order to send them away: also that of the Italian Cumæ (Dionys. Hal. vii. 5).

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylæ, whence he sent envoys to invite the junction of the Phokians and the Lokrians of Opus. The latter had been among those who had sent earth and water to Xerxes, of which they are said to have repented: the step was taken probably only from fear, which at this particular moment prescribed acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately victorious: while the Phokians, if originally disposed to medise, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their bitter enemies the Thessalians were active in the cause of Xerxes and influential in guiding his movements.² The Greek envoys added strength to their summons by all the encouragements in their power. "The troops now at Thermopylæ (they said) were a mere advanced body, preceding the main strength of Greece, which was expected to arrive every day: on the side of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already on guard. Moreover there was no cause for fear, since the invader was after all not a god, but a man, exposed to those reverses of fortune which came inevitably on all men, and most of all, upon those in pre-eminent condition."³ Such arguments prove but too evidently the melancholy state of terror which then pervaded the Greek mind. Whether reassured by them or not, the great body of the Opuntian Lokrians, and 1000 Phokians, joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ.

That this terror was both genuine and serious, there cannot be any doubt: and the question naturally suggests itself, why the Greeks did not at once send their full force instead of a mere advanced guard? The answer is to be found in another attribute of the Greek character—it was the time of celebrating the Olympic festival-games on the banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian festival at Sparta and most of the other Dorian states.⁴ Even

¹ Diodor. xi. 4.

² Herodot. viii. 30.

³ Herodot. vii. 203. λέγοντες δ' ἀγγέλων, ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν ἤκουον πρόδρομοι τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν συμμαχῶν προσδόκιμοι πᾶσάν εἰσι ἡμέρην. . . . καὶ σφι εἶη δεῖνόν οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐπὶ τῇν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπων· εἶναι δὲ

θητὸν οὐδένα, οὐδὲ ἔσεσθαι, τῷ κακὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γινομένῳ οὐ συνμίχθη, τοῖσι δὲ μεγίστοισι αὐτέων, μέγιστα ὀφείλειν ὦν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ σπᾶύοντα, ὡς εἶοντα θητὸν, ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης πσεῖσιν ἂν.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 206. It was only the Dorian states (Lacedæmon, Argos, Sikyon, &c.) which were

at a moment when their whole freedom and existence were at stake, the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these venerated solemnities: especially the Peloponnesian Greeks among whom this force of religious routine appears to have been the strongest. At a period more than a century later, in the time of Demosthenês, when the energy of the Athenians had materially declined, we shall find them too postponing the military necessities of the state to the complete and splendid fulfilment of their religious festival obligations—starving all their measures of foreign policy in order that the Theôric exhibitions might be imposing to the people and satisfactory to the gods. At present, we find little disposition in the Athenians to make this sacrifice—certainly much less than in the Peloponnesians. The latter, remaining at home to celebrate their festivals while an invader of superhuman might was at their gates, remind us of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army round their city to be carried on without interruption during the Sabbath.¹ The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas with his detachment would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylæ until the Olympic and Karneian festivals should be past, after which period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole military force.² They engaged to assemble in Bœotia for the purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land-side, while the great mass of the Athenian force was serving on shipboard.

under obligations of abstinence from aggressive military operations during the month of the Karneian festival: other states (even in Peloponnesus), Elis, Mantinea, &c., and of course Athens, were not under similar restraint (Thucyd. v. 54, 75).

I do not here mean to assert that these two festivals (the Karneia and the Olympia) took place so exactly at the same time, that persons could not attend both. It would seem that the Karneia came latest of the two. But the Grecian festivals depended on the lunar

months, and varied more or less in reference to the solar year. The Karneia were annual; the Olympia quadrennial.

¹ Josephus, *Bell. Judaic.* i. 7, 3; ii. 16, 4; *ibid.* *Antiqq. Judaic.* xiv. 4, 2. If their bodies were attacked on the Sabbath, the Jews defended themselves; but they would not break through the religious obligations of the day in order to impede any military operations of the besiegers. See Reimar. ad *Dion. Cass.* lxxvi. 7.

² Herodot. vii. 206; viii. 49.

At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for the first time that there was also a mountain path starting from the neighbourhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asôpus and the hill called Anopæa, then crossing the crest of Ceta and descending in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrian town of Alpêni. This path—then hardly used, though its ascending half now serves as the regular track from Zeitun, the ancient Lamia, to Salona on the Corinthian Gulf, the ancient Amphissa—was revealed to him by its first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who in former days had conducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phokis, after the Phokians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore not unknown to the Phokians: it conducted from Trachis into their country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would occupy and defend it.¹ But the Greeks thus found themselves at Thermopylæ under the same necessity of providing a double line of defence, for the mountain path as well as for the defile, as that which had induced their former army to abandon Tempê; and so insufficient did their numbers seem, when the vast host of Xerxes was at length understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them. The Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own separate line of defence at the Isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Phokians and Lokrians, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the invader, induced Leonidas to forbid this retrograde movement: but he thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate reinforcements.² So painfully were the consequences now felt, of having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals in Peloponnesus.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their naval armament, though it had mustered in far superior numbers at Artemisium on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan Eurybiadês. It was

Path over Mount Ceta by which Thermopylæ might be evaded—Leonidas first informed of it on reaching the spot—the Phokians engaged to defend it.

¹ Herodot. vii. 216, 218.

² Herodot. vii. 207.

composed as follows:—100 Athenian triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Plateæa, in spite of their total want of practice on shipboard, 40 Corinthian, 20 Megarian, 20 Athenian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis and lent to them by Athens, 18 Æginetan, 12 Sikyonian, 10 Lacedæmonian, 8 Epidaurian, 7 Eretrian, 5 Trœzenian, 2 from Styrys in Eubœa, and 2 from the island of Keos. There were thus in all 271 triremes; together with 9 pentekonters, furnished partly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of Opus. Themistoklês was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and Adeimanthus of the Corinthian; of other officers we hear nothing.¹ Three cruising vessels, an Athenian, an Æginetan, and a Trœzenian, were pushed forward along the coast of Thessaly, beyond the island of Skiathos, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from Therma.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest. Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes, who probably supposing them to be the precursors of the entire fleet sought safety in flight. The Athenian trireme escaped to the mouth of the Peneius, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired by land to Athens, leaving the vessels to the enemy: the other two ships were overtaken and captured afloat—not without a vigorous resistance on the part of the Æginetan, one of whose hoplites, Pythês, fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with wounds. So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most signal manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with his comrades as slaves.

On board the Trœzenian vessel, which was the first to be captured, they found a soldier named Leon, of imposing stature: this man was immediately taken to the ship's head and slain, as a presaging omen in the approaching contest: perhaps (observes the historian) his name may have contributed to determine his fate.² The ten Persian ships

¹ Herodot. viii. 1, 2, 3. Diodorus (xi. 12) makes the Athenian number stronger by twenty triremes.

² Herodot. vii. 160. τάχα ἔ' ἄ τι καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπαύροιο.

advanced no farther than the dangerous rock Myrmêx, between Skiathos and the mainland, which had been made known to them by a Greek navigator of Skyros, and on which they erected a pillar to serve as warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the alarm which their presence, communicated by firesignals¹ from Skiathos, and strengthened by the capture of the three look-out ships, inspired to the fleet at Artemisium, that they actually abandoned their station, believing that the entire fleet of the enemy was at hand.² They sailed up the Eubœan strait to Chalkis, as the narrowest and most defensible passage; leaving scouts on the high lands to watch the enemy's advance.

Capture of these three triremes—panic of the general Grecian fleet, who abandon Artemisium and retire to Chalkis.

Probably this sudden retreat was forced upon the generals by the panic of their troops, similar to that which King Leonidas, more powerful than Eurybiadês and Themistoklês, had found means to arrest at Thermopylæ. It ruined for the time the whole scheme of defence, by laying open the rear of the army at Thermopylæ to the operations of the Persian fleet. But that which the Greeks did not do for themselves was more than compensated by the beneficent intervention of their gods, who opposed to the invader the more terrible arms of storm and hurricane. He was allowed to bring his overwhelming host, land force as well as naval, to the brink of Thermopylæ and to the coast of Thessaly, without hindrance or damage; but the time had now arrived when the gods appeared determined to humble him, and especially to strike a series of blows at his fleet which should reduce it to a number not beyond what the Greeks could contend with.³ Amidst the general terror which pervaded Greece,

Imminent danger of the Greek scheme of defence—they are rescued by a terrific storm.

Respecting the influence of a name and its etymology, in this case unhappy for the possessor, compare Herodot. ix. 91; and Tacit. Hist. iv. 53.

¹ For the employment of firesignals, compare Livy, xxviii. 5; and the opening of the Agamemnon of Æschylus and the same play, v. 270, 300; also Thucyd., iii. 22-80.

² Herodot. vii. 181, 182, 183.

³ Herodot. vii. 184. μέχρι μὲν δὲ τούτου τοῦ χώρου καὶ τῶν θερμοπυλῶν, ἀπαθῆς τε καὶ κῶν ἦν ὁ στρατός, καὶ πλῆθος ἦν τηλικαῦτα ἔτι τόσον, &c.—viii. 13. ἐποιέετο δὲ πᾶν ὄπι τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅπως ἂν ἐξίσωθει τῷ Ἑλλησικῷ τὸ Περσικόν, μηδὲ πολλὰ πλέον εἶη. Compare viii. 109; and Diodor. xi. 13.

the Delphians were the first to earn the gratitude of their countrymen by announcing that divine succour was at hand.¹ On entreating advice from their own oracle, they were directed to pray to the Winds, who would render powerful aid to Greece. Moreover the Athenian seamen, in their retreat at Chalkis, recollecting that Boreas was the husband of the Attic princess or heroine Oreithyia, daughter of their ancient king Erechtheus, addressed fervent prayers to their son-in-law for his help in need. Never was help more effective, or more opportune, than the destructive storm, presently to be recounted, on the coast of Magnesia, for which grateful thanks and annual solemnities were still rendered even in the time of Herodotus, at Athens as well as at Delphi.²

Xerxes had halted on the Thermaic Gulf for several days, employing a large portion of his numerous army in cutting down the woods, and clearing the roads, on the pass over Olympus from Upper Macedonia into Perrhæbia, which was recommended by his Macedonian allies as preferable to the defile of Tempê.³ Not intending to march through the latter, he is said to have gone by sea to view it; and remarks are ascribed to him on the facility of blocking it up so as to convert all Thessaly into one vast lake.⁴ His march from

¹ Herodot. vii. 178. Δέφοι δὲ δεξιόμενοι τὸ μαντήσιον, πρῶτα μὲν, Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βουλευμένοισι εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἐξήγγειλαν τὰ χρησθέντα αὐτοῖσι· καὶ σφι δεινῶς καταβρωδέουσι τὸν βάρβαρον ἐξαγγελίαντες, χάριν ἀθάνατον κατέθεντο.

² Herodot. vii. 189. The language of the historian in this chapter is remarkable: his incredulous reason rather gets the better of religious acquiescence.

Clemens Alexandrinus, reciting this incident together with some other miracles of Æakus, Aristæus, Empedoklēs, &c., reproves his Pagan opponents for their inconsistency, while believing these, in rejecting the Miracles of Moses and the prophets (Stromat. vi. pp. 629, 630).

³ The pass over which Xerxes

passed was that by Petra, Pythium, and Oloosson—"saltum ad Petram"—"Perrhæbiæ saltum" (Livy, xlv. 21; xlv. 27). Petra was near the point where the road passed from Pieria, or Lower Macedonia (see Livy, xxxix. 26).

Compare respecting this pass, and the general features of the neighbouring country, Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. iii. ch. xviii p. 337-343, and ch. xxx. p. 430; also Boué, La Turquie en Europe, vol. i. p. 198-202.

The Thracian king Sitalkês, like Xerxes on this occasion, was obliged to cause the forests to be cut, to make a road for his army, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 98).

⁴ Herodot. vii. 130, 131. That Xerxes' struck by the view of

Therma through Macedonia, Perrhæbia, Thessaly, and Achæa Phthiôtis, into the territory of the Malians and the neighbourhood of Thermopylæ, occupied eleven or twelve days:¹ the people through whose towns he passed had already made their submission, and the Thessalians especially were zealous in seconding his efforts. His numerous host was still farther swelled by the presence of these newly-submitted people, and by the Macedonian troops under Alexander; so that the river Onochônus in Thessaly, and even the Apidanus in Achæa Phthiôtis, would hardly suffice to supply it, but were drunk up, according to the information given to Herodotus. At Alus in Achæa, he condescended to listen to the gloomy legend connected with the temple of Zeus Laphysteus and the sacred grove of the Athamantid family. He respected and protected these sacred places: an incident which shows that the sacrilege and destruction of temples imputed to him by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Abæ, Milêtus, &c., was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified by occasional instances of great respect for Grecian religious feeling.² Along the shore of the Malian Gulf he at length came into the Trachinian territory near Thermopylæ, where he encamped, seemingly awaiting the arrival of the

He arrives with his army in the Malian territory, close upon the pass of Thermopylæ.

Olympus and Ossa, went to see the narrow defile between them, is probable enough; but the remarks put into his mouth are probably the fancy of some ingenious contemporary Greeks, suggested by the juxtaposition of such a landscape and such a monarch. To suppose this narrow defile walled up, was easy for the imagination of any spectator: to suppose that he could order it to be done, was in character with a monarch who disposed of an indefinite amount of manual labour, and who had just finished the cutting of Athos. Such dramatic fitness was quite sufficient to convert that which *might have been* said into that which *was* said, and to procure for it a place

among the historical anecdotes communicated to Herodotus.

¹ The Persian fleet did not leave Therma until eleven days after Xerxes and his land force (Herodot. vii. 183): it arrived in one day on the Sêpias Aktê or south-eastern coast of Magnesia (ibid.), was then assailed and distressed for three days by the hurricane (vii. 191), and proceeded immediately afterwards to Aphetæ (vii. 193). When it arrived at the latter places, Xerxes himself had been *three days* in the Malian territory (vii. 196).

² This point is set forth by Hoffmeister, *Sittlich-religiöse Lebensansicht des Herodotus*. Essen, 1832, sect. 19, p. 93.

fleet, so as to combine his farther movements in advance,¹ now that the enemy were immediately in his front.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of communication with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermopylæ. After having ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned (which captured the three Grecian guardships) that the channel between Skiathos and the mainland was safe, the Persian admiral Magabates sailed with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna², his station in the Thermaic Gulf, eleven days after the monarch had begun his land-march; and reached in one long day's sail the eastern coast of Magnesia, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable; but south of the town called Kasthanæa there was a short extent of open beach where the fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called the Sêpias Aktê.³ The first line of ships were moored to the land, but the larger number of this immense fleet swung at anchor in a depth of eight lines. In this condition they were overtaken the next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane—a wind called by the people of the country Hellespontias, which blew right upon the shore. The most active among the mariners found means to forestall the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large number, unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the wind and dashed to pieces near Melibœa, Kasthanæa, and other points of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports and provision craft, were destroyed: and the loss of life as well as of property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost

¹ Herodot. vii. 196, 197, 201.

² Diodor. xi. 12.

³ Diodorus (xi. 12), Plutarch (Themistoklēs, 8) and Mannert (Geogr. der Gr. und Römer, vol. vii. p. 5th6), seem to treat Sêpias as a cape, the south-eastern corner

Magnesia: this is different from

Herodotus, who mentions it as a line of some extent (ἀκασα ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰσηρίας, vii. 191), and notices separately τῆς ἀπὸ τῆς Μαγνησίας, vii. 193.

The geography of Apollonius Rhodius (i. 560—580) seems sadly inaccurate.

without defence, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the country might assail or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers.¹ Though the Magian priests who accompanied the armament were fervent in prayer and sacrifice—not merely to the Winds but also to Thetis and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities of Sêpias Aktê—they could obtain no mitigation until the fourth day:² thus long did the prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against superhuman arrogance, protract the terrible visitation. At length on the fourth day calm weather returned, when all those ships which were in condition to proceed put to sea and sailed along the land, round the southern promontory of Magnesia to Aphetæ at the entrance of the Gulf of Pagasæ. Little indeed had Xerxes gained by the laborious cutting through Mount Athos, in hopes to escape the unseen atmospheric enemies which howl around that formidable promontory: the work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite side of the intervening Thracian sea.

Immense damage inflicted upon it by the storm.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphetæ without misfortune, they would have found the Eubœan strait evacuated by the Greek fleet and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into communication with the land-army, and would have acted upon the rear of Leonidas and his division. But the storm completely altered this prospect, and revived the spirits of the Greek fleet at Chalkis. It was communicated to them by their scouts on the high lands of Eubœa, who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed: upon which, having returned thanks and offered libations to Poseidon the Saviour, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to

Encouragement occasioned to the Greek fleet—they return from Chalkis to Artemisium.

¹ Herodot. vii. 189-191.

² Herodot. vii. 191. On this occasion, as in regard to the prayers addressed by the Athenians to Boreas, Herodotus suffers a faint indication of scepticism to escape him: ἡμέρας γὰρ δὴ ἑξαίμαζε τρεῖς·

τέλος δὲ, ἔντομά τε ποιεῦντες καὶ κατακίδοντες γόοισι τῶ ἀνέμων οἰμάχοι, πρὸς τε τούτοις καὶ θεῖτι καὶ τῆσι Νηρηΐσι θύοιτες, ἐπαύσαν τετάρτῃ ἡμέρῃ· ἢ ἄλλως κως αὐτὸς ἐθέλων ἐκόπασα.

Artemisium. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and appearance at the opposite station of Aphetæ. The last fifteen ships of that fleet having been so greatly crippled by the storm as to linger behind the rest, mistook the Greek ships for their own comrades, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured. Sandôkês, sub-satrap of the Æolic Kymê—Aridôlis, despot of Alabanda in Karia—and Penthylus, despot of Paphos in Cyprus—the leaders of this squadroñ, were sent prisoners to the Isthmus of Corinth, after having been questioned respecting the enemy: the latter of these three had brought to Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of which eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken with himself aboard.¹

Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylæ, suffered four days to pass without making any attack. A probable reason may be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been utterly destroyed by the storm: but Herodotus assigns a different cause.

Xerxes could not believe (according to him) that the Greeks at Thermopylæ, few as they were in number, had any serious intention to resist. He had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and other Greeks, under a Herakleid leader, had taken post there, but he treated the news with scorn: and when a horseman—whom he sent to reconnoitre them, and who approached near enough to survey their position, without exciting any attention among them by his presence—brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of defence, and the apparent number of the division, he was yet more astonished and puzzled. It happened too, that at the moment when this horseman rode up, the Spartans were in the advanced guard, outside of the wall: some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing their long hair, and none of them heeded the approach of the hostile spy. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king Demaratus, to ask what he was to think of such madness: upon which the latter reminded him of their former conversation at Doriskus, again assuring him that the Spartans in the pass

¹ Herodot. vii. 194.

would resist to the death, in spite of the smallness of their number, and adding, that it was their custom, in moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care. In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only occupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes—Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend to resist, and that they would disperse of their own accord. He delayed the attack for four days: on the fifth he became wroth at the impudence and recklessness of the petty garrison before him, and sent against them the Median and Kissian divisions, with orders to seize them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.¹

Impressions of Xerxes about the defenders at Thermopylæ—conversation with Demaratus, whom he will not believe.

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe that we are reading historical reality. We rather find laid out before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the interview between Cræsus and Solon, to point and enforce that moral which was ever present to the mind of the historian; whose religious and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed unsuitable. The whole proceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance; and though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the position which they then occupied—an entrance little wider than a single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat widened, and then another equally narrow exit, behind it. We are informed by Diodorus² that the Lokrians, when they first sent earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to seize the pass of Thermopylæ on his behalf, and were only prevented from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it unlikely that the Thessalians, now the chief guides

Doubts about the motives ascribed by Herodotus to Xerxes.

¹ Herodot. vii. 208, 210. πέμπει ἄγειν ἐς ὄψιν τὴν ἐαυτοῦ. ἐς αὐτοὺς Μήδους καὶ Κισσίους θυμωθεῖς, ἐνταυθαμένους σφραξ ζωγράφοντας

² Diodor. xi. 4.

of Xerxes,¹ together with Alexander of Macedon, would try the same means of frightening away the garrison of Thermopylæ, as had already been so successful in causing the evacuation of Tempê. An interval of two or three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leaving to such intrigues a fair chance of success: the fleet meanwhile would be arrived at Aphetæ after the dangers of the storm. We may thus venture to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than it is depicted by Herodotus.

The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon,² manifested great personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable, and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well as armour. Short spears, light wicker shields, and tunics, in the assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and spreading shields, steady ranks,³ and practised fighting of the defenders. Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favour, maintained long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves, and little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was as constantly renewed, for two successive days: the Greek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since the space was so narrow that few could contend at once; and even the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persian guards, and the other choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day, were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the rest. Xerxes surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne expressly provided for him: "thrice (says the historian, with Homeric vivacity) did he spring from his throne, in agony for his army."⁴

First attack upon Thermopylæ—made by the Median troops—repulsed.

Repeated attacks, by the best troops in the Persian army, all repulsed with slaughter.

¹ Herodot. vii. 174; viii. 29-32.

Pers. 244.

² Diodor. xi. 6.

³ Herodot. vii. 212. 'Ἐν ταύτῃσιν

Herodot. vii. 211; ix. 62, 63; Diodor. xi. 7: compare Æschyl.

βασιλείᾳ, θηρόμενον, τρίς ἀναδραμαίει

At the end of two days' fighting no impression had been made. The pass appeared impracticable, and the defence not less triumphant than courageous—when a Malian named Ephialtēs revealed to Xerxes the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was the man singled out by the general voice of Greece as the betrayer of the fatal secret. After the final repulse of the Persians, he fled his country for a time, and a reward was proclaimed by the Amphiktyonic assembly for his head; having returned to his country too soon, he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lacedæmonians honoured as a patriot.¹ There were however other Greeks who were also affirmed to have earned the favour of Xerxes by the same valuable information; and very probably there may have been more than one informant—indeed the Thessulians, at that time his guides, can hardly have been ignorant of it. So little had the path been thought of, however, that no one in the Persian army knew it to be already occupied by the Phokians. At nightfall Hydarnēs with a detachment of Persians proceeded along the gorge of the river Asōpus, ascended the path of Anopæa, through the woody region between the mountains occupied by the Ceteans and those possessed by the Trachinians, and found himself at daybreak near the summit, within sight of the Phokian guard of 1000 men. In the stillness of day-break, the noise of his army trampling through the wood² aroused the defenders; but the surprise was mutual, and Hydarnēs in alarm asked his guides whether these men also were Lacedæmonians. Having ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the Phokians with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the path and seek their own safety on a higher point of the mountain. Anxious only for their own safety,

Embarrassment of Xerxes—he is relieved from it by hearing of the path over the mountain.

A Persian detachment under Hydarnēs march over the mountain-path, driving away the Phokian guard.

ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου, δείσαντες περὶ τῆ στρατιῆ. See Homer, *Iliad*, xx. 62; Æschyl. *Pers.* 472.

¹ Herodot. vii. 213, 214; Diodor. xi. 8.

² Xtesias states that it was two powerful men of Trachis, Kalliadēs and Timaphernēs, who dis-

closed to Xerxes the mountain path (*Persica*, c. 24).

² Herodot. vii. 217, 218. ἤως τε δὴ διέφρανε—ἦν μὲν δὴ νηγεμίη, ψόφου δὲ γενομένου πολλοῦ, &c.

I cannot refrain from transcribing a remark of Colonel Leake: "The stillness of the dawn, which

they became unmindful of the inestimable opening which they were placed to guard. Had the full numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylæ, instead of staying behind for the festivals, they might have planted such a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less impregnable than the pass beneath.

Hydarnês, not troubling himself to pursue the Phokians, followed the descending portion of the mountain-path, shorter than the ascending, and arrived in the rear of Thermopylæ not long after midday.¹ But before he had yet completed his descent, the fatal truth had already been made known to Leonidas, that the enemy were closing in upon him behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp, especially a Kymæan² named Tyrastiadas, had both come in with the news. And even if such informants had been wanting, the prophet Megistias, descended from the legendary seer Melampus, read the approach of death in the gloomy aspect of the morning sacrifices. It was evident that Thermopylæ could be no longer defended. There was however ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment of Leonidas were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable, and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted that such was the natural impulse, both of brave soldiers and of prudent officers, under the circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea of retreat was intolerable. His own personal honour, together with that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself,³ forbade him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been sent to defend. The laws of his country required him to conquer or die in the post assigned to

They arrive in the rear of Leonidas.

Debate among the defenders of Thermopylæ when it became known that the Persians were approaching their rear.

saved the Phokians from being surprised, is very characteristic of the climate of Greece in the season when the occurrence took place, and like many other trifling circumstances occurring in the history of the Persian invasion, is an interesting proof of the ac-

curacy and veracity of the historian." (*Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. ii. c. x. p. 55.)

¹ Herodot. vii. 216, 217.

² Diodor. xi. 9.

³ Herodot. vii. 219. ἐνθάδε ἴβου-
λαῶντο οἱ Ἕλλητες, καὶ σπῆων ἑ-
σχιζόντο αἰ γυνῆμα.

him, whatever might be the superiority of number on the part of the enemy:¹ moreover we are told that the Delphian oracle had declared that either Sparta itself, or a king of Sparta, must fall victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece especially, always burst upon the general who failed; while his voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of calumny, but exalt him to the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as a king, and set an example of chivalrous patriotism at the moment when the Greek world most needed the lesson.

Resolution of Leonidas to stay and die in the pass.

The three hundred Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to this act of generous and devoted self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would have wished to inspire the same sentiment to the whole detachment: but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire, thus avoiding all unseemly reluctance and dissension.² The same order was also given to the prophet Megistias, who however refused to obey it and staid, though he sent away his only son.³ None of the contingents remained with Leonidas except the Thespian and the Theban. The former, under their general Demophilus, volunteered to share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint

The three hundred Spartans, together with the Thespians, remain with Leonidas: the rest of the detachment retire.

¹ Herodot. vii. 104.

² Herodot. vii. 220. Τούτῃ καὶ μᾶλλον τῇ γνώμῃ πλείστος εἰμι, Λιωνίδῃν, ἐπεὶ τε ἤθετο τοὺς συμμάχους ὄντας ἀπροθύμους, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας συνδιακινδυνεύειν, καλεῖσθαι σφας ἀπαλλάσσεισθαι αὐτῷ δεῖσθαι οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν μένοντι δὲ αὐτῷ κλέος μέγα ἐλείπετο, καὶ ἡ Σπάρτης εὐδαίμονι οὐκ ἐξηλείφιστο.

Compare a similar act of honourable self-devotion, under less conspicuous circumstances, of the Lacedæmonian commander Anaxibius, when surprised by the Athenians under Iphikratès in the territory of Abydos (Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 8, 38). He and twelve Lacedæ-

dæmonian harmosts all refused to think of safety by flight. He said to his men, when resistance was hopeless, Ἄνδρες, ἐμοὶ μὲν καλὸν ἐνθάδε ἀποθανεῖν ὑμᾶσι δὲ, πρὶν ζυμίζειν τοὺς πολέμιας, σπεύδετε εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν.

³ Herodot. vii. 221. According to Plutarch, there were also two persons belonging to the Herakleid lineage, whom Leonidas desired to place in safety, and for that reason gave them a despatch to carry home. They indignantly refused, and staid to perish in the fight (Plutarch. Herodot. Malign. p. 863).

which arises from the necessity of acting up to a pre-established fame and superiority. But retreat with them presented no prospect better than the mere preservation of life, either in slavery or in exile and misery; since Thespiæ was in Bœotia, sure to be overrun by the invaders;¹ while the Peloponnesian contingents had behind them the Isthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent, we are much perplexed; for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves prisoners to Xerxes as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the Thespians alone remained with the Spartans; and Pausanias, though he mentions the eighty Mykenæans as having staid along with the Thespians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the Thebans.² All things considered, it seems probable that the Thebans remained, but remained by their own offer—being citizens of the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to retire with the Pello-

Doubts
about the
Theban
contingent.

¹ The subsequent distress of the surviving Thespians is painfully illustrated by the fact, that in the battle of Plataeæ in the following year, they had no heavy armour (Herodot. ix. 30). After the final repulse of Xerxes, they were forced to recruit their city by the admission of new citizens (Herodot. viii. 75).

² Herodot. vii. 222. Θηβαῖοι μὲν ἀέροντες ἔμμενοι, καὶ οὐ βουλόμενοι, τασιγὲ γὰρ σπίας Λεωνιδῆς, ἐν ὁμίλῳ λόγῳ ποιούμενοι. How could these Thebans serve as hostages? Against what evil were they intended to guard Leonidas, or what advantages could they confer upon him? Unwilling comrades on such an occasion would be noway desirable. Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 365) severely criticises this statement of Herodotus, and on very plausible grounds: among

the many unjust criticisms in his treatise, this is one of the few exceptions.

Compare Diodorus, xi. 9; and Pausan. x. 20, 1.

Of course the Thebans, taking part as they afterwards did heartily with Xerxes, would have an interest in representing that their contingent had done as little as possible against him, and may have circulated the story that Leonidas detained them as hostages. The politics of Thebes before the battle of Thermopylæ were essentially double-faced and equivocal; not daring to take any open part against the Greeks before the arrival of Xerxes.

The eighty Mykenæans, like the other Peloponnesians, had the Isthmus of Corinth behind them as a post which presented good chances of defence.

ponnesians, than to remain, suspected as they were of *medism*. But when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their courage not standing so firm as that of the Spartans and Thespians, they endeavoured to save their lives by taking credit for *medism*, and pretending to have been forcibly detained by Leonidas.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylæ consisted of the 300 Spartans, with a certain number of Helots attending them, together with 700 Thespians and apparently 400 Thebans. If there had been before any Lacedæmonians (not Spartans) present, they must have retired with the other Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the guide Ephialtês, Xerxes delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops under Hydarnês might soon be expected in the rear. On this last day, however, Leonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the defensive,¹ but advanced into the wider space outside of the pass; becoming the aggressor and driving before him the foremost of the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the Greeks as in the neighbouring sea and morass, and even trodden down by their own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the

Last exploits and death of Leonidas and his band.

¹ The story of Diodorus (xi. 10) that Leonidas made an attack upon the Persian camp during the night, and very nearly penetrated to the regal tent, from which Xerxes was obliged to flee suddenly, in order to save his life, while the Greeks, after having caused immense slaughter in the camp, were at length overpowered and slain—is irreconcilable with Herodotus and

decidedly to be rejected. Justin however (ii. 11), and Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 866) follow it. The rhetoric of Diodorus is not calculated to strengthen the evidence in its favour. Plutarch had written, or intended to write, a biography of Leonidas (De Herodot. Mal. *ibid.*): but it is not preserved.

loss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons, the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief, into the narrow strait behind the cross wall, where they sat altogether on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnês, which had now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining daggers, with their unarmed hands, and even with their mouths.¹

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades—300 Spartans and 700 Thespians. Amidst such equal heroism, it seemed difficult to single out any individual as distinguished: nevertheless Herodotus mentions the Spartan Diênêkês, Alpheus and Maron—and the Thespian Dithyrambus—as standing pre-eminent. The reply ascribed to the first became renowned.² “The Persian host (he was informed) is so prodigious that their arrows conceal the sun.” “So much the better (he answered), we shall then fight them in the shade.” Herodotus had asked and learnt the name of every individual among this memorable three hundred. And even six hundred years afterwards, Pausanias could still read the names engraved on a column at Sparta.³ One alone among them—Aristodêmus—returned home, having taken no part in the combat. He, together with Eurytus, another soldier, had been absent from the detachment on leave, and both were lying at Alpêni suffering from a severe complaint in the eyes. Eurytus, apprised that the fatal hour of the detachment was come, determined not to survive it, asked for his armour, and desired his attendant Helot to lead him to his place in the ranks; where he fell gallantly fighting, while the Helot departed

¹ Herodot. vii. 225.

² Herodot. vii. 226.

³ Herodot. vii. 224. ἐπιθόμην δὲ καὶ ἀνάγνων τῶν τριακοσίων. Pausanias, iii. 14, 1. Annual festivals, with a panegyric oration and gymnastic matches, were still celebrated even in his time in honour

of Leonidas, jointly with the regent Pausanias, whose subsequent treason tarnished his laurels acquired at Plataea. It is remarkable, and not altogether creditable to Spartan sentiment, that the two kings should have been made partners in the same public honours.

and survived: Aristodémus did not imitate this devotion of his sick comrade: overpowered with physical suffering, he was carried to Sparta—but he returned only to scorn and infamy among his fellow-citizens.¹ He was denounced as “the coward Aristodémus;” no one would speak or communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire.² After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to retrieve his honour at the battle of Platæa, where he was slain, after surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valour.

Amidst the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and

¹ Herodot. vii. 229. Ἀριστόδημον — λειποψυχέοντα λειψθῆναι — ἀλλήσαντα ἀπονοστήσαι ἐς Σπάρτην. The commentators are hard upon Aristodémus when they translate these epithets “animo deficientem, timidum, pusillanimum,” considering that ἐλειποψύχης is predicated by Thucydidês (iv. 12) even respecting the gallant Brasidas. Herodotus scarcely intends to imply anything like pusillanimity, but rather the effect of extreme physical suffering. It seems, however, that there were different stories about the cause which had kept Aristodémus out of the battle.

The story of another soldier named Pantitês, who having been sent on a message by Leonidas into Thessaly, did not return in time for the battle, and was so disgraced when he went back to Sparta that he hanged himself—given by Herodotus as a report, is very little entitled to credit. It is not likely that Leonidas would send an envoy into Thessaly, then occupied by the Persians: moreover the disgrace of Aristodémus is particularly explained by Herodotus by the difference between

his conduct and that of his comrade Eurytus: whereas Pantitês stood alone.

² See the story of the single Athenian citizen, who returned home alone, after all his comrades had perished in an unfortunate expedition to the island of Ægina. The widows of the slain warriors crowded round him, each asking him what had become of her husband, and finally put him to death by pricking with their bodkins (Herodot. v. 87).

In the terrible battle of St. Jacob on the Birs, near Basle (August 1444), where 1500 Swiss crossed the river and attacked 40,000 French and Germans under the Dauphin of France, against strong remonstrances from their commanders—all of them were slain, after deeds of unrivalled valour and great loss to the enemy, except sixteen men who receded from their countrymen in crossing the river, thinking the enterprise desperate. These sixteen men on their return were treated with intolerable scorn and hardly escaped execution (Vogelin, Geschichte der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft, vol. i. ch. 5, p. 393).

Thespians, exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached the enemy with out-stretched hands and entreated quarter. They now loudly proclaimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great King, and had come to Thermopylæ against their own consent; all which was confirmed by the Thessalians in the Persian army. Though some few were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians, the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace, however, of being branded with the regal mark as untrustworthy slaves—an indignity to which their commander Leontiadês was compelled to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even of doubt: Plutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a Bœotian author,¹ who affirms that Anaxarchus, not Leontiadês, was commander of the Thebans at Thermopylæ. Without calling in question the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we may reasonably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding, as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in Greece after the repulse of Xerxes.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cutt off and fixed on a cross. But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind. He was farther impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invincible. He now learnt to be anxious respecting the farther resistance which remained behind. "Demaratus (said he to the exiled Spartan king at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions have turned out true: now tell me how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining, and are they all such

Impres-
sions of
Xerxes
after the
combat—
advice
given to
him by
Demaratus
—he re-
jects it.

¹ Herodot. vii. 233; Plutarch, Herodot. Malign. p. 867. The Bœotian history of Aristophanês, cited by the latter, professed to be founded in part upon memorials

arranged according to the sequence of magistrates and generals—*ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ἀρχόντας ὑπομνημάτων ἱστορησε.*

warriors as these fallen men?" "O king (replied Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their towns is great; in Sparta alone there are 8000 adult warriors, all equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers." "Tell me (rejoined Xerxes) what will be the least difficult way of conquering such men?" Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of his fleet to occupy the island of Kythêra, and from thence to make war on the southern coast of Laconia, which would distract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her from cooperating in any combined scheme of defence against his land-force. Unless this were done, the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet witnessed.¹

Happily for the safety of Greece, Achæmenes the brother of Xerxes interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action; not without aspersions on the temper and motives of Demaratus, who (he affirmed) like other Greeks, hated all power, and envied all good fortune above his own. The fleet (added he), after the damage sustained by the recent storm, would bear no farther diminution of number: and it was essential to keep the entire Persian force, on land as well as on sea, in one undivided and cooperating mass.²

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering number. Yet while rejecting the advice of Demaratus, he emphatically repelled the imputations against the good faith and sincere attachment of that exiled prince.³

Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium. It has already been mentioned that the

¹ Herodot. vii. 235.

² Herodot. vii. 236.

³ Herodot. vii. 237. "The citizen (Xerxes is made to observe) does indeed naturally envy another citizen more fortunate than himself, and if asked for counsel will keep back what he has best in his mind,

unless he be a man of very rare virtue. But a foreign friend usually sympathises heartily with the good fortune of another foreigner, and will give him the best advice in his power whenever he is asked."

Greek ships, having abandoned their station at the latter place and retired to Chalkis, were induced to return by the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined

Proceedings of the two fleets, at Artemisium and Aphetæ—alarm among the Grecian fleet—Themistoklès determines them to stay and fight, at the urgent instance of the Eubœans.

by the recent storm; and that on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy's fleet, in spite of the damage just sustained, still mustering an overwhelming number at the opposite station of Aphetæ. Such was the effect of this spectacle, and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved to retire without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended. Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination among the inhabitants of Eubœa, who entreated Eurybiadès to maintain his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove their families and their property. But even such postponement was thought unsafe and was refused. He was on the point of giving orders for retreat, when the Eubœans sent their envoy P'elagon to Themistoklès with the offer of thirty talents, on condition that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in defence of the island. Themistoklès employed the money adroitly and successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiadès, with large presents besides to the other leading chiefs. The most unmanageable among them was the Corinthian Adeimantus,—who at first threatened to depart with his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to remain. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquillized, by a present of three talents.¹

However Plutarch may be scandalized at such inglorious revelations preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the underhand agencies of this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question the bribery, here described. But Themistoklès doubtless was only tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the Eubœan money, that which he would have wished, and had probably tried, to accomplish, without the money—to bring on a naval engagement at Artemisium. It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and to the general

¹ Plutarch, Themistoklès, c. 7; Herodot. viii. 5, 6.

plan of defence, that the Eubœan strait should be defended against the Persian fleet; and the Greeks could not expect any more favourable position to fight in. We may reasonably presume that Themistoklès, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and the great originator of maritime energies in his country, concurred unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemisium. But his high mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary corruption which rendered the presents of the Eubœans both admissible and welcome —yet still more welcome to him perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing over the other opposing chiefs and the Spartan admiral.¹ It was finally determined therefore to remain, and if necessary, to hazard an engagement in the Eubœan strait; but at any rate to procure for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their families. Had these Eubœans heeded the oracles (says Herodotus²) they would have packed up and removed long before; for a text of Bakis gave them express warning: but having neglected the sacred writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for such presumption.

Important service thus rendered by Themistoklès.

Among the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, on the other hand, the feeling prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they would have gained an easy victory, for the Greek fleet would have fled, as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack. But this was not sufficient for the Persians,

Confident hopes of the Persian fleet —they detach a squadron to sail round Eubœa, and take the Greeks in the rear.

¹ The expression of Herodotus is somewhat remarkable: Οὗτοι τε δὴ πληγέντες δῦροισι (Eurybiadès, Adelmantus &c.) ἀναπειρασμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ τοῖσι Εὐβοέσσι ἐκεχάριστο· αὐτὸς τε ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐκέρδηνε, ἐλάσθαι δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔχω.

² Herodot. viii. 20. Οἱ γὰρ Εὐβοέες παραγρησάμενοι τὸν Βάκιδος χρησμὸν ὡς οὐδὲν λέγοντα, οὔτε τι ἐξεκομίσαντο οὐδὲν, οὔτε προσέσσαντο, ὡς κεραιζομένου σφι πολέμου· περι-

πέτεια δὲ ἐποίησαντο σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τὰ πρήγματα. Βάκιδι γὰρ ὧδε ἔχει περὶ τούτων ὁ χρησμὸς·

Φράξο βαρβαρόφωνον ἔταν ζυγὸν εἰς ἄλλα βάλλην Βύβλινον, Εὐβοίης ἀπέχειν πολυμηκάδας αἴγας.

Τούτοις δὲ οὐδὲν τοῖσι ἔπεισιν χρησάμενοι ἐν τοῖσι τότε παρούσι τε καὶ προσδοκίμοις κακοῖσι, παρῆν σφι συμφορῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα.

who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape.¹ Accordingly they detached 200 ships to circumnavigate the island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south, in the rear of the Greeks; postponing their own attack in front until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the manœuvre was concealed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Skiathos, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter—Skyllias of Skionê. This man, the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium, and communicated to the Greek commanders both particulars of the late destructive storm, and the despatch of the intercepting squadron.²

It appears that his communications, respecting the effects of the storm and the condition of the Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of 200 ships, and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistoklès, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Aphetæ.³ Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phœnicians and others in the Persian fleet handled and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained.⁴ Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries. To both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first

¹ Herodot. viii. 6. και ἐμελλον εἶηαι ἐκπιόξισθαι (οἱ Ἕλληνας) ἴδει δὲ μὲν πορφόροι, τῷ ἐκείνων (Περσῶν) λόγῳ, περιγίεσθαι.

² Herodot. viii. 7, 8. Wonderful stories were recounted respecting the prowess of Skyllias, as a diver.

³ Diodorus, xi. 12.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 9. δειλὴν ὄψιν γινόμενης, τῆς ἡμέρας φυλάξαντες, αὐτοὶ ἕκα ἑπλῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς βαρβάρους, ἀπόπειραν αὐτῶν ποιῆσασθαι βουλόμενοι τῆς τε μάχης καὶ τοῦ διεξιπλοῦ.

marshalled in a circle, with their sterns in the interior, and presenting their prows in front, at all points of the circumference.¹ In this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them: but on a second signal given, their ships assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less than thirty of them: in one of which Philaon, brother of Gorgus despot of Salamis in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who however rallied and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks. But the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station; the Persians to Aphetæ, the Greeks to Artemisium.²

The result of this first day's combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties, and did much to exalt the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more. Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the middle of summer—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece—the most violent wind, rain, and thunder prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at Aphetæ, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet, scarcely recovered from the former storm at Sêpias Aktê, were almost driven to despair by this repetition of the same peril; the more so when they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this storm was injurious to the main fleet at Aphetæ, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island (called the Hollows of Eubœa), were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news of this second

Second storm—increased damage to the Persian fleet, and ruin to the detachment sent round Eubœa.

¹ Compare the description in Thucyd. ii. 84, of the naval battle between the Athenian fleet under Phormio and the Lacedæmonian fleet, where the ships of the latter

are marshalled in this same array.

² Herodot. viii. 11. πολλὸν παρὰ δόξαν ἀγωνισάμενοι—ἐτετρακτέως ἀγωνιζόμενοι, &c.

conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who reinforced them the next day, raised them to a still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, and attacked and destroyed some Kilikian ships even at their moorings; the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight.¹

But the Persian admirals were not of a temper to endure such insults—still less to let their master hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half-moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet into action; the ships running foul of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides: the Egyptians bore off the palm of valour among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though the Greeks being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments—still they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion with reference to their inferior total: and the Athenian vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one half of their number out of condition to renew it.² The Egyptians alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders—and Themistoklès, as it seems, among them—determined that they could no longer venture to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval force farther into Greece:³ though this was in fact a surrender of the pass of Thermopylæ, and though the removal which the Eubœans were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were forced to be satisfied with the promise of

¹ Herodot. viii. 12, 13, 14; Diodor. xi. 12.

² Herodot. viii. 17, 18.

³ Herodot. viii. 18. ἔρησμένον δὴ ἐβουλεύοντο ἔσω εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

Themistoklēs to give them convoy for their boats and their persons; abandoning their sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks were thus employed in organising their retreat, they received news which rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Abrōnychus, stationed with his ship near Thermopylæ, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight.

They retreat immediately on hearing of the disaster at Thermopylæ—they go to Salamis.

Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait; the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistokles, conducting the latter, staid long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe, on some neighbouring stones, invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Xerxes; whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against their fathers, but to desert, if possible—or at least, to fight as little and as backwardly as they could. Themistoklēs hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side, or at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust, and thus to diminish their efficiency.¹ With no longer delay than was requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily conveyed by a citizen of Histiaæ to the Persians at Aphetæ, who at first disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiaæ and the neighbouring territory; from whence many of them, by permission and even invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylæ to survey the field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead, Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators: he buried all his own dead, except 1000 whose

Advance of the Persian fleet to Eubœa—Manœuvres ascribed to Xerxes in respect to the dead bodies at Thermopylæ.

¹ Herodot. viii. 19, 21, 22; Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 9.

bodies were left out—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at Thermopylæ, 4000 in number, were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had been much more severe than their own. Moreover the bodies of the slain Helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for Spartans or Thespians in the estimation of the spectators. We are not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public as it must have been, really deceived very few.¹ According to the statement of Herodotus, 20,000 men were slain on the side of the Persians—no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that they wore little defensive armour, and that they were

Numbers of dead on both sides. Subsequent commemorating inscriptions.

three days fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same historian as 4000: if this be correct, it must include a considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites present on the last day except the 300 Spartans, the 700 Thespians, and the 400 Thebans. Some hoplites were of course slain in the first two days' battles, though apparently not many. The number who originally came to the defence of the pass seems to have been about 7000:² but the epigram composed shortly afterwards and inscribed on the spot by order of the Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to posterity the formal boast that 4000 warriors "from Peloponnesus had here fought with 300 myriads or 3,000,000 of enemies."³ Respecting this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the statement of 4000 warriors from Peloponnesus, must indicate all those who originally marched out of that peninsula under Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalized the Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of merit fully equal; especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and

¹ Herodot. viii. 24, 25. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐλάτθανε τοὺς διαβεβηκότας Ἐσπέρης; ταῦτα πρήξας κατὰ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦν, &c.

² About the numbers of the Greeks at Thermopylæ, compare Herodot. vii. 202; Diodorus, xi. 4; Pausanias, x. 20, 1; and Manso's Sparta,

vol. ii. p. 308; Beylage 24th.

Isokratēs talks about 1000 Spartans, with a few allies, Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 59. He mentions also only sixty Athenian ships of war at Artemisium; in fact his numerical statements deserve little attention.

³ Herodot. vii. 228.

his Spartans, without having been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline. While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of the exploit, there was another near it, alike simple and impressive, destined for the Spartan dead separately: "Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians that we lie here, in obedience to their orders." On the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honour of Leonidas; decorated apparently with an epigram by the poet Simonidês. That distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the glories of Thermopylæ: besides several epigrams, one of which was consecrated to the prophet Megistias, "who, though well aware of the fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs."

Impressive
epigram of
Simonidês.

CHAPTER XLI.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES.

THE sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant.

Surprise and terror of the Greeks immediately after the battle of Thermopylæ.

It was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion; the season of the festival-games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken.¹ Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations—and what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Platæa, now joined him.² Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader Attaginus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander

¹ Herodot. viii. 40, 71, 73.

² Herodot. viii. 66. Diodorus calls the battle of Thermopylæ a *Kadmeian victory* for Xerxes, which is true only in the letter, but not in the spirit; he doubtless lost a

greater number of men in the pass than the Greeks, but the advantage which he gained was prodigious (Diodor. xi. 12); and Diodorus himself sets forth the terror of the Greeks after the event (xi. 13-15).

of Macedon to most of the Bœotian towns,¹ as well to protect them from plunder as to ensure their fidelity. The Thespians on the other hand abandoned their city and fled into Peloponnesus; while the Platæans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemisium,² were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city and removing their families. It was not only the land force of Xerxes which had been thus strengthened. His fleet also had received some accessions from Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades—so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sêpias and the fights at Artemisium, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the Greeks.³

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him: a reproach true almost to the letter.⁴ It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas, that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens of taking up a position in Bœotia so as to protect Attica. To defend the Isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them. Thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Kleombrotus king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians and Hermionians, were all present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of 10,000 each) working and bringing materials

No ulterior plan of defence formed—no new position to be found capable of defending Attica—the Peloponnesians crowd to fortify the Isthmus of Corinth.

¹ Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignit. p. 864; Herodot. viii. 34.

² Herodot. viii. 44, 50.

³ Herodot. viii. 66.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 69. τὸν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν ἀπὸ περάτων γῆς πρότερον ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα, πρὶν τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀξίως προσηπαντήσαι.

night and day.¹ As a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position: they considered it as their last chance,² abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes,³ while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Ægina. And thus arose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylæ: no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the separate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a hair's breadth of ruin.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, that there would be a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to cooperate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property. But they saw with indignant disappointment as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of their own isthmus and their own separate existence.⁴ The fleet from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbour of Trœzen, there

¹ Herodot. viii. 71. συνδραμόντες
ἐκ τῶν πολιῶν.

² Herodot. viii. 74.

³ Herodot. vii. 139.

⁴ Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 9.
ἄμα μὲν ὀργή τῆς προδοσίας εἶχε τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους, ἄμα δὲ δυσθυμία καὶ κατή-
βαια μεμονωμένους.

Herodot. viii. 40. δοκέοντες γὰρ
εὐρήσειν Πελοποννησίους πανδημίῃ ἐν
τῇ Βοιωτικῇ ὑποκατημένους τὸν βάρ-
βαρον, τῶν μὲν εὐρον οὐδὲν εἶναι, οἱ
δὲ ἐκυνθάνοντο τὸν Ἴσθμόν αὐτοῦς
ταίχοντας ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον, περὶ
πλείστον δὲ ποιουμένους περιεῖναι,
καὶ ταύτην ἔχοντας ἐν φυλακῇ, τὰ
τὲ ἄλλα ἀπιέναι.

Thucyd. i. 74. ὅτε γούν ἡμεν (we
Athenians) ἐκ σώει, οὐ παρεγένεθε

(Spartans).

Both Lysias (Oratio Funebr. c. 8)
and Isokratēs take pride in the
fact that the Athenians, in spite
of being thus betrayed, never
thought of making separate terms
for themselves with Xerxes (Pana-
gyric, Or. iv. p. 60). But there is
no reason to believe that Xerxes
would have granted them separate
terms: his particular vengeance
was directed against them. Iso-
kratēs has confounded in his mind
the conduct of the Athenians when
they refused the offers of Mardo-
nius in the year following the
battle of Salamis, with their con-
duct before the battle of Salamis
against Xerxes.

to await such reinforcements as could be got together: but the Athenians entreated Eurybiadês to halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybiadês was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Trœzen came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.¹

Meanwhile Themistoklês and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalêrum, and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion,² and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Orôpus, within the narrow space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived even sooner.³ The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in carrying out the helpless exiles; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trœzenian population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens)—but in part also to Ægina: there were however many who could not or would not go farther than Salamis. Themistoklês impressed upon the sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls: and either his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athênê Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed

The Athenians abandon Attica, removing their families and property to Salamis, Ægina, Trœzen, &c.

¹ Herodot. viii. 40-42.

² Plato, Legg. iii. p. 699.

³ Herodot. viii. 66, 67. There was therefore but little time for the

breaking up and carrying away of furniture, alluded to by Thucydîdês, l. 18—*διανοηθέντες ἐκλείπειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι*, &c.

to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was placed once in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed; but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained untouched: the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting the acropolis, and it behoved the citizens to follow the example, confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution.

The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have ensued on the actual capture of the city.¹ Some few individuals, too poor to hope for maintenance, or too old to care for life, elsewhere—confiding

Unavoidable hurry and sufferings of the emigrants.

¹ Herodot. viii. 41: Plutarch, Themistoklès, c. x.

In the years 1821 and 1822, during the struggle which preceded the liberation of Greece, the Athenians were forced to leave their country and seek refuge in Salamis three several times. These incidents are sketched in a manner alike interesting and instructive by Dr. Waddington, in his visit to Greece (London, 1825), Letters vi. viii. x. He states, p. 92, "Three times have the Athenians emigrated in a body, and sought refuge from the sabre among the houseless rocks of Salamis. Upon these occasions, I am assured, that many have dwelt in caverns, and many in miserable huts, constructed on the mountain side by their own feeble hands. Many have perished too from exposure to an intemperate climate; many from diseases contracted through the loathsomeness of their habitations; many from hunger and misery. On the retreat of the Turks, the survivors returned to their country. But to what a country did they return? To a land of desolation and famine; and in fact, on the first re-occupation of Athens,

after the departure of Omer Brioni, several persons are known to have subsisted for some time on grass, till a supply of corn reached the Piræus from Syra and Hydra."

A century and a half ago, also, in the war between the Turks and Venetians, the population of Attica was forced to emigrate to Salamis, Ægina, and Corinth. M. Buchon observes, "Les troupes Albanaises, envoyées en 1688 par les Turcs (in the war against the Venetians) se jetèrent sur l'Attique, mettant tout à feu et à sang. En 1688, les chroniques d'Athènes racontent que ses malheureux habitants furent obligés de se réfugier à Salamine, à Egine, et à Corinthe, et que ce ne fut qu'après trois ans qu'ils purent rentrer en partie dans leur ville et dans leurs champs. Beaucoup de villages de l'Attique sont encore habités par les descendans de ces derniers envahisseurs, et avant la dernière révolution, on n'y parloit que la langue albanaise; mais leur physionomie diffère autant que leur langue de la physionomie de la race Grecque." (Buchon, la Grèce Continentale et la Morée. Paris, 1843, ch. ii. p. 82.)

moreover in their own interpretation¹ of the wooden-wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be inexpugnable—shut themselves up in the acropolis along with the administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western front with wooden doors and palisades.² When we read how great were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century afterwards, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,³ we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that they would every revisit their homes except as his slaves.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy: arm as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended; Themistoklēs proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover he not only included, but even specially designated among them, his own great opponent Aristeidēs, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiadēs, were partners in the same emigration. The latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridles in the acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on shipboard, instead of on horseback.⁴ It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles, but still more for the equipment of the fleet: yet there were no funds in the public treasury. But the senate of Areiopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the

Energy of the Athenians, and unanimity of the leaders.—Themistoklēs proposes the restoration of Aristeidēs from exile.

¹ Pausanias seems to consider these poor men somewhat presumptuous for pretending to understand the oracle better than Themistoklēs—Ἀθηναίων τοὺς πλεόν τι ἐς τὸν χρησμὸν ἢ Θμιστοκλήε

αἰδέναι νομίζοντας (i. 18, 2).

² Herodot. viii. 50.

³ Thucyd. ii. 16, 17.

⁴ Plutarch, Themistoklēs, c. 10, 11; and Kimon, c. 5.

wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others,¹ and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms for every soldier serving.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible resource of Themistoklès, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the Gorgon's head from the statue of Athênè was lost, and directing upon this ground every man's baggage to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might be carrying away, available to the public service.² By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Attica—those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country that the host of Xerxes, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners.³ Moreover the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in something like fighting condition.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of 366 ships—a force greater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than 200 were Athenian; twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian, sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Ambrakia and as many from Eretria, five from Træzen, three from Hermionè, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, despatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their captains and seamen to Salamis;—all these triremes, together with a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonteres, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the

¹ Whether this be the incident which Aristotle (*Polit. v. 3, 5*) had in his mind, we cannot de-

termine.

² Plutarch, *Themistoklès, c. 2.*

³ Herodot. *ix. 99.*

Pythian games.¹ The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force (358 ships) collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Ladê, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt however whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of 300 sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on the point even than Herodotus.²

¹ Herodot. viii. 43-48.

² Æschylus, *Persæ*, 347; Herodot. viii. 48; vi. 9; Pausanias, i. 14, 4. The total which Herodotus announces is 378; but the items which he gives amount, when summed up, only to 366. There seems no way of reconciling this discrepancy except by some violent change which we are not warranted in making.

Ktesias represents that the numbers of the Persian war-ships at Salamis were above 1000, those of the Greeks 700 (*Persica*, c. 26).

The Athenian orator in Thucydides (i. 74) calls the total of the Grecian fleet at Salamis "nearly 400 ships, and the Athenian contingent somewhat less than *two parts* of this total (ναῦς μὲν γὰρ ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγη, ἐλάττωσιν τῶν δύο μοιρῶν)."

The Scholiast, with Poppo and most of the commentators on this passage, treat τῶν δύο μοιρῶν as meaning unquestionably *two parts out of three*: and if this be the sense, I should agree with Dr. Arnold in considering the assertion as a mere exaggeration of the orator, not at all carrying the authority of Thucydides himself. But I cannot think that we are here driven to such a necessity; for the construction of Didot and Gœller (though Dr. Arnold pro-

nounces it "a most undoubted error") appears to me perfectly admissible. They maintain that αἱ δύο μοῖραι does not of necessity mean *two parts out of three*: in Thucyd. i. 10, we find καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πάντε τὰς δύο μοῖρας νέμονται, where the words mean *two parts out of five*. Now in the passage before us, we have ναῦς μὲν γὰρ ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγη ἐλάττωσιν τῶν δύο μοιρῶν: and Didot and Gœller contend, that in the word τετρακοσίας is implied a quaternary division of the whole number—*four hundreds* or *hundredth parts*: so that the whole meaning would be—"To the aggregate *four hundreds* of ships we contributed something less than *two*." The word τετρακοσίας, equivalent to τέσσαρες ἑκατοντάδες, naturally includes the general idea of τέσσαρες μοῖραι: and this would bring the passage into exact analogy with the one cited above—τῶν πάντε τὰς δύο μοῖρας. With every respect to the judgement of Dr. Arnold on an author whom he had so long studied, I cannot enter into the grounds on which he has pronounced this interpretation of Didot and Gœller to be "an undoubted error." It has the advantage of bringing the assertion of the orator in Thucydides into harmony with Herodotus, who states

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the deserted country; his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalêrum with the coast adjoining. His land force had been put in motion under the guidance of the Thesalians, two or three days after the battle of Thermopylæ; and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. "What prize does the victor receive?" he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was nothing more than a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantæhmês son of the monarch's uncle Artabanus is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders—"Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honour!"¹ Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ

the Athenians to have furnished 180 ships at Salamis.

Wherever such harmony can be secured by an admissible construction of existing words, it is an unquestionable advantage, and ought to count as a reason in the case, if there be a doubt between two different constructions. But on the other hand, I protest against altering numerical statements in one author, simply in order to bring him into accordance with another, and without some substantive ground in the text itself. Thus, for example, in this very passage of Thucydides, Bloomfield and Poppo propose to alter *τετρακοσίας* into *τριπλοσίας*, in order that

Thucydides may be in harmony with Æschylus and other authors, though not with Herodotus; while Didot and Gôller would alter *τριπλοσίων* into *τετρακοσίων* in Demosthenes de Coronâ (c. 70), in order that Demosthenes may be in harmony with Thucydides. Such emendations appear to me inadmissible in principle; we are not to force different witnesses into harmony by retouching their statements.

¹ Herodot. viii. 26. Περαι, Μαρδόνιος, κοίτους ἐπ' ἀνδρας ἤγαγες μάχης σφέτους ἡμῶς, εἰ οὐ περὶ χρημάτων τοῖ σπῶμα κούδονται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς.

and the borders of Attica, there were none except the Phokians disposed to refuse submission; and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining favourable terms.¹ Nor would they even listen to a proposition of the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to ensure lenient treatment to the territory of Phokis, provided a sum of fifty talents were paid to them.² The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris, which *medised* and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Kephisis, among the towns of the inflexible Phokians. All of them were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus called Tithorea, or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phokian towns, the most considerable of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by the invaders. Even Abæ, with its temple and oracle of Apollo, was no better treated than the rest: all the sacred treasures were pillaged, and it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ and Platæa; both of them had been deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at Athens.³

The Persian army ravage the Phokian townships in their march from Thermopylæ to Attica—pillage of the temple at Abæ.

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi. Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Cræsus. The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus and for their families by trans-

Persian division detached against the temple of Delphi.

¹ Herodot. viii. 30.

² Herodot. viii. 28, 29.

³ Herodot. viii. 32-34.

port across the Gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Akêratus, the religious superior: but evidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schistê up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athênê Pronæa,—on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard—two vast mountain crags detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing many to death—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Athênê. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also (as they themselves affirmed) by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the Heroes Phylakus and Autonôus, whose sacred precincts were close adjoining; and Herodotus himself, when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athênê the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians.¹ Thus did the god repel these invaders from his

¹ Herodot. viii. 38, 39; Diodor. xi. 14; Pausan. x. 8, 4.

Compare the account given in Pausanias (x. 23) of the subsequent repulse of Brennus and the Gauls from Delphi: in his account, the repulse is not so exclusively the work of the gods as in that of Herodotus; there is a larger force of human combatants in defence of the temple, though greatly assisted by divine intervention: there is also loss on both sides. A similar descent of crags from the summit is mentioned.

See for the description of the road by which the Persians

marched, and the extreme term of their progress, Ulrichs, *Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland*, ch. iv. p. 46; ch. x. p. 146.

Many great blocks of stone and cliff are still to be seen near the spot, which have rolled down from the top, and which remind the traveller of these passages.

The attack here described to have been made by order of Xerxes upon the Delphian temple, seems not easy to reconcile with the words of Mardonius, Herodot. ix. 42; still less can it be reconciled with the statement of Plutarch (Numa, c. 9), who says that the

Delphian sanctuary and treasures, which remained inviolate until 130 years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrilegious hands of the Phokian Philomélus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently, the real protectors of the treasures were the conquerors at Salamis and Plataea.

Four months had elapsed, since the departure from Asia, when Xerxes reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their restoration already certain—and a few Athenian exiles attached to their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the handful of men collected in the acropolis ventured to defy him; nor could all the persuasions of the Peisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender.¹ The Athenian acropolis—a craggy rock rising abruptly about 150 feet with a flat summit of about 1000 feet long from east to west, by 500 feet broad from north to south—had no practicable access except on the western side;² moreover in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic wall. Obligated to take the place by force, the Persian army were posted around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations from the eminence immediately adjoining on the north-west, called Areopagus;³ from whence they bombarded (if we may venture upon the expression) with hot missiles the wood-work before

Xerxes with the Peisistratids in Athens—the acropolis holds out—is taken and sacked.

Delphian temple was burnt by the Medes.

¹ Herodot. viii. 52.

² Pausanias, i. 22. 4: Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 76. Ernst Curtius (*Die Akropolis von Athen*, p. 5. Berlin, 1844) says that the plateau of the acropolis is rather less than 400 feet higher than the town: Fiedler states it to be 178 fathoms or 1068 feet above the level of the sea (*Reise durch das Königreich Griechenland*, i. p. 2); he gives the length and breadth of the plateau in the same figures as Kruse, whose statement I have

copied in the text. In Colonel Leake's valuable *Topography of Athens*, I do not find any distinct statement about the height of the acropolis. We must understand Kruse's statement (if he and Curtius are both correct) to refer only to the precipitous impracticable portion of the whole rock.

³ Athenian legend represented the Amazons as having taken post on the Areopagus and fortified it as a means of attacking the acropolis—ἀντιπύργωσαν (*Æschyl. Eumenid.* 638).

the gates; that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the assault by the western road leading up to the gate, the undaunted little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones, which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time, the Great King seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade; but at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded, and seemingly even unfortified:¹ moreover the attention of the little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the gates. Hence the separate escalading party were enabled to accomplish their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the garrison; who, deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple. The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the

¹ Herodot. viii. 52, 53 . . . ἔμπροσθε ὧν πρό τῆς ἀκροπόλεως, ὁκιοῦσε δε τῶν πύλων καὶ τῆς ἀνάβου, τῆ δὲ οὐτε τις ἐπόλεσσε, οὐτ' ἐν ἤλικαιε μὴ κατὰ τις κατὰ ταῦτα ἀναβραζὴ ἀνθρώπων, ταύτῃ ἀνέβησαν τινες κατὰ τὸ ἶσὺν τῆς Κέκροπος θυγατρὸς, Ἀγλαύρου, καίτοι κερ ἀπεκρήμαντο εὐντος τοῦ χώρου.

That the Aglaurion was on the north side of the acropolis, appears clearly made out; see Leake, *Topography of Athens*, ch. v. p. 261; Kruse, *Hellas*, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 119; Forchhammer, *Topographie Athens*, p. 365, 366; in *Kjöler Philologische Studien*, 1841. Siebelis (in the plan of Athens pre-

fixed to his edition of Pausanias, and in his note on Pausanias, i. 18, 2) places the Aglaurion erroneously on the eastern side of the acropolis.

The expressions ἔμπροσθε πρό τῆς ἀκροπόλεως appear to refer to the position of the Persian army, who would naturally occupy the northern and western fronts of the acropolis; since they reached Athens from the north—and the western side furnished the only regular access. The hill called Areopagus would thus be nearly in the centre of their position. Forchhammer explains these expressions unsatisfactorily.

flames.¹ The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.²

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately despatched to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting seemingly the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus.³ On the next day but one, the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground. They discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel of Erechtheus, the especial gift of the goddess Athênê, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long: at least the piety of restored Athens afterwards believed this encouraging portent,⁴ as well as that which was said to have been seen by Dikæus (an Athenian companion of the Peisistratids) in the Thriasian plain. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred him from doing so: but he construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. Yet whatever may have been received in after times, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city; not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive-tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigour. So

Atoning visit of the Peisistratids to the ruined acropolis.

¹ Herodot. viii. 52, 53.

² Herodot. i. 84.

³ Herodot. v. 102; viii. 53-99; ix.

65. Ἰδου γάρ κατὰ τὸ θεοπρόκιον

πᾶσαν τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἡλείρῳ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Πέρσῃσι.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 55-65.

hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis, the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Phalérum, reinforced by ships from Karystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sêpias Aktê; an estimate certainly not admissible.¹

Soon after their arrival Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favour of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity—Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus in Karia; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis—predicting that if the land force were moved forward to attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return for the protection of their own homes, and that thus the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island—and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet

¹ Herodot. viii. 66. Colonel Leake observes upon this statement (Athens and the Demi of Attica, App. vol. ii. p. 250), "About 1000 ships is the greatest accuracy we can pretend to, in stating the strength of the Persian fleet at Salamis: and from these are to be deducted, in estimating the number of ships engaged in the battle,

those which were sent to occupy the Megaric strait of Salamis, 200 in number."

The estimate of Colonel Leake appears somewhat lower than the probable reality. Nor do I believe the statement of Diodorus, that ships were detached to occupy the Megaric strait: see a note shortly following.

and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That Queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question; and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested. But I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia; an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just—though it had come to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote,¹ and though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper, and even esteemed the Karian queen the more highly; though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon. Orders were accordingly issued for the fleet to attack the next day,² and for the land force to move forward towards Peloponnesus.

Resolution taken by Xerxes to fight at Salamis.

Whilst, on the shore of Phalêrum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity and precluded all real deliberation—great indeed was the contrast presented by the neighbouring Greek armament at Salamis; among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of the Athenians, This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Attica, Eurybiadês convoked the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the Isthmus of Corinth, where it would

Dissensions among the Greeks in the fleet at Salamis. Resolution taken to remove the fleet to the Isthmus.

¹ The picture drawn in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon represents the subjects of Persia as spiritless and untrained to war (ἀνάγκιδες καὶ ἀσθύνετακτοι), and even designed-

ly kept so, forming a contrast to the native Persians (Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* viii. 1, 45).

² Herodot. viii. 68, 69, 70.

be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the ships would find protection on shore and the men would join in the land service—while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be enclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape.¹ In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her acropolis by the Persians. Such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers, for departure. The majority came to a formal vote for removing to the Isthmus; but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.²

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Peloponne-

Ruinous
consequen-
ces if
that resolu-
tion had
been exe-
cuted.

sian chiefs—the Corinthians in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position

where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favourable position, in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defence of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, &c., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the

¹ Herodot. viii. 70.

² Herodot. viii. 49, 50, 56.

efforts of Eurybiadês to keep them together. Hence the order for quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence: and it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistoklês, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

When Themistoklês returned to his ship, with the gloom of this melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the island as well as for that of the squadron—he found an Athenian friend named Mnêsiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs had determined. Concerning this Mnêsiphilus, who is mentioned generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistoklês. On learning what had been resolved, Mnêsiphilus burst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail: there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for.¹ He vehemently urged Themistoklês again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a recall of the vote in favour of retreat, as well as for a positive resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistoklês had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but though he was disheartened by ill-succes, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to the ship of Eurybiadês, asked permission to speak with him, and being invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unsparingly

Themistoklês opposes the resolution, persuades Eurybiadês, and prevails upon him to reopen the debate.

¹ Herodot. viii. 67. Οὗτοι ἄρα ἦν ἀπαρῶσι τὰς νῆας ἀπὸ Ἐλαμίνας, καὶ οὐδαμῆς ἐστὶ πατριῶος ναυμαχίας· οἱ δὲ κατὰ γὰρ πόλις ἕκαστοι τρέφονται, &c. Compare vii. 139, and Thucyd. i. 73.

laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Eurybiadês alone, Themistoklês was enabled to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiadês had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Themistoklês addressed himself to each of the chiefs separately, pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that the Corinthian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying—"Themistoklês, those who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal, are scourged." "True (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag behind the signal win no crowns."¹

¹ Herodot. viii. 58, 59. The account given by Herodotus, of these memorable debates which preceded the battle of Salamis, is in the main distinct, instructive and consistent. It is more probable than the narrative of Diodorus (xi. 15, 16), who states that Themistoklês succeeded in fully convincing both Eurybiadês and the Peloponnesian chiefs of the propriety of fighting at Salamis, but that, in spite of all their efforts, the armament would not obey them, and insisted on going to the Isthmus. And it deserves our esteem still more, if we contrast it with the loose and careless accounts of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos. As Plutarch (Themist. c. 11) describes the scene, Eurybiadês was the person who desired to restrain the forwardness and oratory of Themistoklês, and with that view, first made to him the observation given in my text out of Herodotus, which Themistoklês followed up by the same answer—next, lifted up his stick to strike Themistoklês, upon which the latter addressed to him the well-known observation—"Strike,

but hear me" (Πάταξον μὲν, ἀκούσον δέ). Larcher expresses his surprise that Herodotus should have *suppressed* so impressive an anecdote as this latter: but we may see plainly from the tenor of his narrative that he cannot have heard it. In the narrative of Herodotus, Themistoklês gives no offence to Eurybiadês, nor is the latter at all displeased with him: nay, Eurybiadês is even brought over by the persuasion of Themistoklês, and disposed to fall in with his views. The persons whom Herodotus represents as angry with Themistoklês are, the Peloponnesian chiefs, especially Adeimantus the Corinthian. They are angry too (let it be added), not without plausible reason: a formal vote has just been taken by the majority, after full discussion; and here is the chief of the minority who persuades Eurybiadês to reopen the whole debate: not an unreasonable cause for displeasure. Moreover it is Adeimantus, not Eurybiadês, who addresses to Themistoklês the remark that "persons who rise before the proper signal are scourged."

Eurybiadès then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve: upon which Themistoklès began the debate. He vehemently enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the Isthmus—as well as of preserving Megara and Ægina; contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defence of Peloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus; whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Moreover, he did not omit to add, that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs; who were even exasperated at being again summoned, to reopen a debate already concluded,—and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the bosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially, this feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Themistoklès, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent—Athens being in the power of the enemy. Nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiadès had no right to count the vote of Themistoklès until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of

Synod of Grecian chiefs again convened—Themistoklès tries to get the former resolution rescinded—the Peloponnesians adhere to it—angry words.

and he makes the remark because Themistoklès goes on speaking to, and trying to persuade, the various chiefs, before the business of the assembly has been formally opened. Themistoklès draws upon himself the censure by sinning against the forms of business, and talking before the proper time. But Plutarch puts the remark into the mouth of Eurybiadès, without any previous circumstance to justify it, and without any fitness. His narrative represents Eurybiadès as the person who was anxious both to transfer the ships to the Isthmus, and to prevent Themistoklès from

offering any opposition to it; though such an attempt to check argumentative opposition from the commander of the Athenian squadron is noway credible.

Dr. Blomfield (ad Æschyl. Pers. 728) imagines that the story about Eurybiadès threatening Themistoklès with his stick grew out of the story as related in Herodotus, though to Herodotus himself it was unknown. I cannot think that this is correct, since the story will not fit on to the narrative of that historian: it does not consist with his conception of the relations between Eurybiadès and Themistoklès.

more than half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the un-governable impatience of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus. It provoked a bitter retort against them from Themistoklès, who reminded them that while he had around him 200 well-manned ships, he could procure for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiadès, and addressing him personally, he said—"If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well; but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin.¹ For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophecies announce that we are one day to colonize. You chiefs then, when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying."

Eurybiadès had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistoklès. But this last down-right menace clenched his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution, and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling.² The succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes of Salamis—Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids. It seems to have been on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.

¹ Herodot. viii. 61, 62. Ἐὼς εἰ μὴ
ἦεν αὐτοῦ, καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἔτι ἀσπ
αυροῦ εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀναστρέψαι τὴν

ἑλπίδα.

² Herodot. viii. 64. Οὐδὲν μὲν εἰ
καὶ Σαλαμίνας, ἔπειτα ἀποβήσασθαι

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistoklès, and were further strengthened by the advices from the Isthmus. The messenger from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren while constructing their cross wall at that point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why were *they* not there also, to join hands and to help in the defence,—even if worsted at sea,—at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the insanity of Eurybiadès: at length the common feeling broke out in public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was demanded and convoked.¹ Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamouring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, Æginetans,² and Megarians, were equally urgent in favour of staying to fight. It was evident to Themistoklès that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Eurybiadès; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive Greece of all united maritime defence, appeared imminent—when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the synod, he

The Peloponnesian chiefs, silenced for the moment, afterwards refuse obedience. Third synod convened—renewed disputes; the majority opposed to Themistoklès and determined on retreating to the Isthmus.

νοι, ἐπει τὴ Εὐρυβιάδῃ ἔδοξε, αὐτοῦ παροικιῶσαντο, ὡς ναυμαχῆσοντες.

¹ Herodot. viii. 74. ἕως μὲν δὴ αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ παριστάτο, θωομα ποιεῖσθαι τὴν Εὐρυβιάδῃ ἀβουλίην· τέλος δὲ, ἐξερράγη εἰς τὸ μέσον, σύλλογός τε δὴ ἐγένετο, καὶ πολλὰ ἐλέγχετο περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, &c. Compare Plutarch, Themist. c. 12.

² Lykurgus (cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 185) numbers the Æginetans among those who were anxious to

escape from Salamis during the night, and were only prevented from doing so by the stratagem of Themistoklès. This is a great mistake, as indeed these orators are perpetually misconceiving the facts of their past history. The Æginetans had an interest not less strong than the Athenians in keeping the fleet together and fighting at Salamis.

despatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Sikinnus

Desperate stratagem of Themistoklès—he sends a private message across to Xerxes, persuading him to surround the Greek fleet in the night, and thus, render retirement impossible.

his slave—seemingly an Asiatic Greek¹ who understood Persian and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and teaching of the children of his master—was instructed to acquaint them privately in the name of Themistoklès, who was represented as wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any common enemy. A splendid opportunity (it was added) was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without delay, first to enclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.²

Such was the important communication despatched by Themistoklès across the narrow strait (only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part) which divides Salamis from the neighbouring continent on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honour from it in the eyes of the Greeks as a stratagem, Themistoklès lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days,³ as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch. It is not improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of


¹ Plutarch (Themistoklès, c. 12) calls Sikinnus a *Persian by birth*, which cannot be true.

² Herodot. viii. 76.

³ Thucyd. i. 137. It is curious to contrast this with Æschylus, *Persæ*, 361 *seq.* See also Herodot. viii. 109, 110.

Isokratès might well remark about the ultimate rewards given

by the Persians to Themistoklès—*Θεμιστοκλῆς δ', ὅς ἕκαστ' τῆς Ἑλλάδος σφόδρ' κατανομήσῃσι, τῶν μεγίστων ζωρίων ἤξιωσεν* (*Panegyric*, Or. iv. p. 74)—though that orator speaks as if he knew nothing about the stratagem by which Themistoklès compelled the Greeks to fight at Salamis against their will. See the same Oration, c. 27, p. 61.



Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides during the night, to the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape.¹ The station of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica—its head quarters were in the bay of Phalêrum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy those three natural harbours, as yet unimproved by art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus—and would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalêrum; while the Greek fleet was in the harbour of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing Mount Ægaleos in Attica. During the night,² a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbour of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis; while another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the south-eastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia near to that

Impatient haste of Xerxes to prevent any of the Greeks from escaping—his fleet encloses the Greeks during the night.

¹ Æschylus, *Persæ*, 370.

Herodotus does not mention this threat to the generals, nor does he even notice the personal interference of Xerxes in any way, so far as regards the night-movement of the Persian fleet. He treats the communication of Sikinnus as having been made to the Persian generals, and the night-movement as undertaken by them. The statement of the contemporary poet seems the more probable of the two: but he omits, as might be expected, all notice of the perilous dissensions in the Greek camp.

² Diodorus (xi. 17) states that

the Egyptian squadron in the fleet of Xerxes was detached to block up the outlet between Salamis and the Megarid; that is, to sail round the south-western corner of the island to the north-western strait, where the north-western corner of the island is separated by a narrow strait from Megara, near the spot where the fort of Budorum was afterwards situated, during the Peloponnesian war.

Herodotus mentions nothing of this movement, and his account evidently implies that the Greek fleet was enclosed to the north of the town of Salamis, the Persian

corner.¹ These measures were all taken during the night, to prevent the anticipated flight of the Greeks, and then to

right wing having got between that town and Eleusis. The movement announced by Diodorus appears to me unnecessary and improbable. If the Egyptian squadron had been placed there, they would have been far indeed removed from the scene of the action, but we may see that Herodotus believed them to have taken actual part in the battle along with the rest (viii. 100).

¹ Herodot. viii. 76. Τοῖσι δὲ ὡς κειτὰ ἐγένετο τὰ ἀγγελθέντα, τοῦτο μὲν, ἐς τὴν νηϊίδα τῆν Ψυττάλειαν, μεταξὺ Σαλαμίνος τε καὶ μίνην καὶ τῆς ἡπείρου, πολλοὺς τῶν Περσῶν ἀπεβίβασαν· τοῦτο δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο μίσει νύκτας, ἀνῆγον μὲν τὸ ἀπ' ἐσπέρας κέρως κυκλοῦμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμίνα· ἀνήγον δὲ οἱ ἄμφι τὴν Κίον τε καὶ τὴν Κυνόσουραν τιταγμένοι, κτειρόν τε μέχρι Μουουχίης πάντα τοὺς παρόντων τῶν νηῶν.

He had previously stated Phalerum as the main station of the Persian fleet; not necessarily meaning that the whole of it was there. The passage which I have just transcribed intimates what the Persians did to accomplish their purpose of surrounding the Greeks in the harbour of Salamis; and the first part of it, wherein he speaks of the western (more properly north-western) wing, presents no extraordinary difficulty, though we do not know how far the western wing extended before the movement was commenced. Probably it extended to the harbour of Peiræus, and began from thence its night-movement along the Attic coast to get beyond the town of Salamis. But the second part of the passage is not easy to comprehend, where he states that "those who were stationed about Keos and Kynosura

also moved, and beset with their ships the whole strait as far as Munychia." What places are Keos and Kynosura, and where were they situated? The only known places of those names, are, the island of Keos, not far south of Cape Sunium in Attica—and the promontory Kynosura, on the north-eastern coast of Attica, immediately north of the bay of Marathon. It seems hardly possible to suppose that Herodotus meant this latter promontory, too distant to render the movement which he describes at all practicable: even the island of Keos is somewhat open to the same objection, though not in so great a degree, of being too distant. Hence Barthélemy, Kruse, Bähr, and Dr. Thirlwall, apply the names Keos and Kynosura to two promontories (the southernmost and the south-easternmost) of the island of Salamis; and Kiepert has realised their idea in his newly published maps. But in the first place, no authority is produced for giving these names to two promontories in the island, and the critics only do it because they say it is necessary to secure a reasonable meaning to this passage of Herodotus. In the next place, if we admit their supposition, we must suppose that *before this night-movement commenced*, the Persian fleet was already stationed in part off the island of Salamis; which appears to me highly improbable. Whatever station that fleet occupied before the night-movement, we may be very sure that it was not upon an island then possessed by the enemy: it was somewhere on the coast of Attica: and the names Keos and Kynosura must belong to some unknown points in

attack them in the narrow strait close on their own harbour, the next morning.

Meanwhile that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistoklès had sent over his secret envoy, continued without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding vote, until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat impossible. Such prolongation was nowise difficult in a case so critical, where the majority of chiefs was on one side, and that of naval force on the other—especially as Eurybiadès himself was favourable to the view of Themistoklès. Accordingly the debate was still unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning—when an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new turn. The ostracised Aristeidès arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since the revocation of his sentence—a revocation proposed by Themistoklès himself—he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel in coming from Ægina had only eluded under favour of night. He caused Themistoklès to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs; and after a generous exordium wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprised him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus, and rendered farther

Aristeidès comes in the night to the Greek fleet from Ægina — informs the chiefs that they are enclosed by the Persians, and that escape has become impossible.

Attica, not in Salamis. I cannot therefore adopt the supposition of these critics, though on the other hand Larcher is not satisfactory in his attempt to remove the objections which apply to the supposition of Keos and Kynosura as commonly understood. It is difficult in this case to reconcile the

statement of Herodotus with geographical considerations, and I rather suspect that on this occasion the historian has been himself misled by too great a desire to find the oracle of Bakis truly fulfilled. It is from Bakis that he copies the name Kynosura (viii. 77).

debate useless. Themistoklès expressed his joy at the intelligence; communicating his own secret message whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs might be forced to fight at Salamis even against their own consent. He moreover desired Aristeidès to go himself into the synod, and communicate the news; for if it came from the lips of Themistoklès, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate indeed was their incredulity that they would not accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristeidès: nor was it until the arrival of a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.¹

Having caused his land-force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of Mount Ægaleos—near the Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea²—from whence he could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct of his subject troops. He was persuaded that they had not done

Position of Xerxes—
order of the
fleets, and
plan of
attack.

¹ Herodot. viii. 79, 80.

Herodotus states, doubtless correctly, that Aristeidès, immediately after he had made the communication to the synod, went away, not pretending to take part in the debate: Plutarch represents him as present and as taking part in it (Aristeidès, c. 9). According to Plutarch, Themistoklès desires Aristeidès to assist him in persuading Eurybiadès: according to Herodotus, Eurybiadès was already persuaded: it was the Peloponnesian chiefs who stood out.

The details of Herodotus will be found throughout both more credible and more consistent than those of Plutarch and the later writers.

² Æschylus, Pers. 478: Herodot. viii. 90. The throne with silver feet, upon which Xerxes had sat,

was long preserved in the acropolis of Athens—having been left at his retreat. Harpokration, Ἀρτυρόνοος ὄψρος.

A writer, to whom Plutarch refers, Akestodórus—affirmed that the seat of Xerxes was erected, not under Mount Ægaleos, but much farther to the northwest, on the borders of Attica and the Megarid, under the mountains called Kerata (Plutarch, Themistoklès, 13). If this writer was acquainted with the topography of Attica, we must suppose him to have ascribed an astonishingly long sight to Xerxes: but we may probably take the assertion as a sample of that carelessness in geography which marks so many ancient writers. Etosias recognises the Ἡρακλείον (Persica. c. 26).

their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and that his presence would inspire them with fresh valour: moreover his royal scribes stood ready by his side to record the names both of the brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet, which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to the Athenians on the Grecian left,—were placed the Phœnicians and Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians¹—approaching from the side of Peiræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and Megarians. The seamen of the Persian fleet, however, had been on ship-board all night, in making that movement which had brought them into their actual position; while the Greek seamen now began without previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistoklès and the other leaders. Just as they were getting on board, they were joined by the trireme which had been sent to Ægina to bring to their aid Æakus with the other Æakid heroes. Honoured with this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening enemy.²

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack, with the usual pæan or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians. Indeed the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight. The Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate—and even backed water for a space,

Battle of Salamis—
confusion
and complete
defeat of the
Persians.

¹ Herodot. viii. 85; Diodor. xi. 16.

² Herodot. viii. 83; Plutarch (Themistoklès, c. 13; Aristeidès, c. 9; Pelopidas, c. 21). Plutarch tells a story out of Phaniás, respecting an incident in the moment before the action, which it is pleasing to find sufficient ground for rejecting. Themistoklès, with the prophet Euphrantidès, was offering sacrifice by the side of the admiral's galley, when three beautiful youths, nephews of Xerxes, were brought in prisoners. As the fire was just then blazing brilliantly,

and sneezing was heard from the right, the prophet enjoined Themistoklès to offer these three prisoners as a propitiatory offering to Dionysus Omèstès; which the clamour of the bystanders compelled him to do against his will. This is what Plutarch states in his life of Themistoklès; in his life of Aristeidès, he affirms that these youths were brought prisoners from Psyttaleia, when Aristeidès attacked it at the beginning of the action. Now Aristeidès did not attack Psyttaleia until the naval combat was nearly over, so that

so that some of them touched ground on their own shore; until the retrograde movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole fleet—"Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?" The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the Greeks at the commencement of the battle.¹ The brave Athenian captains Ameinias and Lykomêdês (the former, brother of the poet Æschylus) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the inspirations of their own ardour; though, according to the version current at Ægina, it was the Æginetan ship, the carrier of the Æakid heroes, which first set this honourable example.² The Naxian Demokritus was celebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action. Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his ship full against a Phœnician, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general.

Herodotus, with his usual candour, tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom (apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge) were lukewarm, and some even averse³

no prisoners can have been brought from thence at the commencement of the action: there could therefore have been no Persian prisoners to sacrifice, and the story may be dismissed as a fiction.

¹ Herodot. viii. 84. φημῖσαν δὲ διακαλεῖσασθαι, ὥστε καὶ ἅπαν ἀκούσαι τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατόπεδον, ὑπειπίπταν πρότερον τὰδε· Ὡ δειμόνιοι, μέχρι κέρου ἔτι πρόμνην ἀναχρῶσθε;

Æschylus (Pers. 396-415) describes finely the war-shout of the Greeks and the response of the Persians: for very good reasons, he does not notice the incipient backwardness of the Greeks, which Herodotus brings before us.

The war-shout here described by

Æschylus, a warrior actually engaged, shows us the difference between a naval combat of that day and the improper tactics of the Athenians fifty years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Phormion especially enjoins on his men the necessity of silence (Thucyd. ii. 89).

² Simonides, Epigram 138, Bergk; Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignitate, c. 36.

According to Plutarch (Themist. 12) and Diodorus (xi. 17), it was the Persian admiral's ship which was first charged and captured: if the fact had been so, Æschylus would probably have specified it.

³ Herodot. viii. 85; Diodor. xi. 16. Æschylus in the Persæ, though ho

—the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves generally with great bravery: Phœnicians, Cyprians, Kilikians, Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behaviour. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage—but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks: thirdly, to the fact that when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion and caused them to run foul of each other. Those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear advance:¹ the oar-blades were broken by collision—the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship's course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Phalêrum:² Demokritus the Naxian captain was said to have captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral Ariabignês, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell gallantly trying to board one of them, and the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate was very great;³ the more so,

gives a long list of the names of those who fought against Athens, does not make any allusion to the Ionic or to any other Greeks as having formed part of the catalogue. See Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 49. Such silence easily admits of explanation.

¹ Herodot. viii. 86; Diodor. xi. 17. The testimony of the former,

both to the courage manifested by the Persian fleet, and to their entire want of order and system, is decisive, as well as to the effect of the personal overlooking of Xerxes.

² Simonides, Epigr. 138, Bergk.

³ The many names of Persian chiefs whom Æschylus reports as having been slain, are probably

as few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand.

It appears that the Phœnician seamen of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by an Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phœnicians as dastardly calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off. His wrath and vexation (Herodotus tells us) were boundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to vent the feelings.¹

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable. She then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch Ameinias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma she preserved herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades; she charged the trireme of the Karian prince Damasithymus of Kalyndus, ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to relax in the pursuit—for the Athenian captains were all indignant at the idea of a

for the most part inventions of his own, to please the ears of his audience. See Blomfield, Prefat.

ad Æschyl. Pers. p. xli.

¹ Herodot. viii. 90.

female invader assailing their city.¹ But knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy's ship, he concluded her to be a deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognised the ship of Artemisia, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him, "Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk an enemy's ship?" Assured that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, "My men have become women; my women, men." Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships; among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.²

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of those which were made prisoners

¹ Compare the indignant language of Demosthenés a century and a quarter afterwards, respecting the second Artemisia queen of Karia, as the enemy of Athens—*ὤμαις δ' ὄντας Ἀθηναῖοι βάρβαρον ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα γυναῖκα, φοβηθήσεσθε* (Demostenés, *De Rhodior. Libertat. c. x. p. 197*).

² Herodot. viii. 87, 88, 93. The story here given by Herodotus respecting the stratagem whereby Artemisia escaped, seems sufficiently probable; and he may have heard it from fellow-citizens of his own who were aboard her vessel. Though Plutarch accuses him of extravagant disposition to compliment this queen, it is evident that he does not himself like the story, nor consider it to be complimentary; for he himself insinuates a doubt, "I do not know whether she ran down the Kalyndian ship intentionally, or came accidentally into collision with

it." Since the shock was so destructive that the Kalyndian ship was completely run down and sunk, so that every man of her crew perished, we may be pretty sure that it was intentional; and the historian merely suggests a possible hypothesis to palliate an act of great treachery. Though the story of the sinking of the Kalyndian ship has the air of truth, however, we cannot say the same about the observation of Xerxes, and the notice which he is reported to have taken of the act: all this reads like nothing but romance.

We have to regret (as Plutarch observes, *De Malig. Herodot. p. 878*) that Herodotus tells us so much less about others than about Artemisia; but he doubtless heard more about her than about the rest, and perhaps his own relatives may have been among her contingent.

with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia. As soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeidēs carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.¹

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves—immediately after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies—made ready for a second engagement.² But they were relieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity³ of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and distrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations—Phœnicians, Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphilians, Ionic Greeks, &c., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well-suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service except fear; while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval subjects.⁴ He fancied that they could make no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail

¹ Herodot. viii. 85; Plutarch, Aristid. c. 9; Æschyl. Pers. 454-470; Diodor. xi. 19.

² Herodot. viii. 86.

³ The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were materially aided by the personal timidity of Xerxes, and of Darius Codomannus at Issus and Arbela (Arrian, ii. 11, 6; iii. 14, 5).

⁴ See this feeling especially in the language of Mardonius to Xerxes (Herodot. viii. 100), as well as in that put into the mouth of Artemisia by the historian (viii. 65), which indicates the general conception of the historian himself, derived from the various information which reached him.

forthwith to the Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal retreat; for upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the Danube.¹ Against the Phœnicians, from whom he had expected most, his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from the fleet in the night, and departed homeward.² Such a capitals desertion made future naval struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalærum in the night—not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board.³ They were directed to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.⁴

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. When Xerxes

¹ Herodot. vii. 10.

² This important fact is not stated by Herodotus, but it is distinctly given in Diodorus, xi. 19. It seems probable enough.

If the tragedy of Phrynichus, entitled *Phœnissæ*, had been preserved, we should have known more about the position and behaviour of the Phœnician contingent in this invasion. It was represented at Athens only three years after the battle of Salamis, in B.C. 477 or 476, with Themistoklès as choregus, four years earlier than the *Persæ* of Æschylus, which was affirmed by Glaucois to have been (*ναπαρκουήθηαι*) altered from it. The Chorus in the *Phœnissæ* consisted of Phœnician women, possibly the widows of those Phœnicians whom Xerxes had caused to be beheaded after the battle (Herodot. viii. 90, as Dr. Blomfield supposes, *Præf. ad Æsch. Pers.* p. ix.), or only of Phœnicians absent on the expedition. The fragments

remaining of this tragedy, which gained the prize, are too scanty to sustain any conjectures as to its scheme or details (see Welcker, *Griechische Tragœd.* vol. i. p. 26; and Droysen, *Phrynichos, Æschylos, und die Trilogie*, p. 4-6).

³ Herodot. ix. 32.

⁴ Herodot. viii. 97-107. Such was the terror of these retreating seamen, that they are said to have mistaken the projecting cliffs of Cape Zôstêr (about half-way between Peiræus and Sunium) for ships; and redoubled the haste of their flight as if an enemy were after them—a story which we can treat as nothing better than silly exaggeration in the Athenian informants of Herodotus.

Ktesias, *Pers.* c. xxvi.; Strabo, ix. p. 395, the two latter talk about the intention to carry a mole across from Attica to Salamis, as if it had been conceived *before* the battle.

despatched to Susa intelligence of his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of violent grief

Xerxes resolves to go back himself to Asia—advice and recommendation of Mardonius, who is left behind as general to finish the conquest of Greece.

for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of the monarch: it was farther embittered by anger against Mardonius, as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general knew full well that there was no safety for him¹ in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head. It was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do—and to advise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently palatable to the present alarm of the

monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly he began to re-assure his master by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, like Phœnicians, Egyptians, &c., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch's revenge upon Hellas—that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army, if he were disposed, and that he (Mardonius) would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of 300,00 chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch's wounded vanity, and safety for his person. His confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself from the obligation of farther service. "If Mardonius desires to remain (she remarked contemptuously²) by all means let him have the troops: should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer; should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens." Xerxes, while adopting this counsel and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halikarnassian queen

¹ Compare Herodot. vii. 10.

² Herodot. viii. 101, 102

by entrusting to her some of his children, with directions to transport them to Ephesus.

The Greeks at Salamis learnt with surprise and joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalêrum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros without success. Themistoklês and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes—had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiadês and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was

The Greeks pursue the Persian fleet as far as Andros—second stratagem of Themistoklês by secret message to Xerxes.

dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistoklês readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful Sikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he (Themistoklês) had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed without delay and burn the Hellespontic bridge—and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat.¹ Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that with the great Persian land-force in the heart of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistoklês fabricated the intention, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingencies.

Such crafty manœuvres, and long-sighted calculations of possibility, seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested—since Themistoklês lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the obligation thus conferred. Though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate,

¹ Herodot. viii. 109, 110; Thucyd. 1. 187. The words ἢ ψευδῶς προσποιήσατο may probably be understood in a sense somewhat larger than that which they naturally bear in Thucydides. In point of fact—not only was it false, that

Themistoklês was the person who dissuaded the Greeks from going to the Hellespont—but it was also false, that the Greeks had ever any serious intention of going there. Compare Cornelius Nepos, Themistokl. c. 5.

but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this eminent man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistoklès knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle: moreover, a clever man tainted with such constant guilt might naturally calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cycladès, for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persians. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great gods—Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that “Athens was a great city and blest with excellent gods: but that *they* were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island—Poverty and Helplessness.¹ In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability.” While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities, Themistoklès sent round to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Karystus, Paros, and other places, he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals,² but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence the fleet was brought back to Salamis.³

The intimation sent by Themistoklès perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Bœotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to be retained

¹ Herodot. viii. 111. ἐπεὶ Ἀνδρίους γε εἶναι γεωπατίνας ἐς τὰ μέγιστα ἀνηκοντας, καὶ θεοὺς δύο ἀχρήστους οὐκ ἐκλείπειν σφέων τὴν νῆσον, ἀλλ' εἰ φιλοχωρεῖν . . . Περσὶν τε καὶ Ἀμυγζυῖν.

Compare Alkæus, Fragm. 90, ed.

Bergk, and Herodot. vii. 173.

² Herodot. viii. 112; Plutarch, Themistoklès, c. 21—who cites a few bitter lines from the contemporary poet Timokreon.

³ Herodot. viii. 112-121.

for his future operations. He retained the Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents; making in all, according to Herodotus, 300,000 men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as 60,000 out of his forces, under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to winter in Thessaly, and to postpone farther military operations until the ensuing spring.¹

Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont, by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months before. Respecting his retreat a plentiful stock of stories were circulated²—

¹ Herodot. viii. 114-126.

² The account given by Æschylus of this retiring march appears to me exaggerated, and in several points incredible (Persæ, 482-513). That they suffered greatly during the march from want of provisions, is doubtless true, and that many of them died of hunger. But we must consider in deduction—1. That this march took place in the months of October and November, therefore not very long after the harvest. 2. That Mardonius maintained a large army in Thessaly all the winter and brought them out in fighting condition in the spring. 3. That Artabazus also with another large division was in military operation in Thrace all the winter, after having escorted Xerxes into safety.

When we consider these facts, it will seem that the statements of Æschylus even as to the sufferings by famine must be taken with great allowance. But his statement about the passage of the Strymon appears to me incredible, and I regret to find myself on this point differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who considers it an

undoubted fact (Hist. of Greece, ch. xv. p. 351, 2nd ed.). "The river had been frozen in the night hard enough to bear those who arrived first. But the ice suddenly gave way under the morning sun, and numbers perished in the waters"—so Dr. Thirlwall states, after Æschylus—adding in a note, "It is a little surprising that Herodotus, when he is describing the miseries of the retreat, does not notice this disaster, which is so prominent in the narrative of the Persian messenger in Æschylus. There can however be no doubt as to the fact: and perhaps it may furnish a useful warning, not to lay too much stress on the silence of Herodotus, as a ground for rejecting even important and interesting facts which are only mentioned by later writers," &c.

That a larger river such as the Strymon near its mouth (180 yards broad, and in latitude about N. 40° 50'), at a period which could not have been later than the beginning of November, should have been frozen over in one night so hardly and firmly as to admit of a portion of the army marching over

Persians,
Xerxes
evacuates
Attica and
returns
home
by land,
with the
larger por-
tion of his
army.

inconsistent with each other, fanciful, and even incredible. Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralizers Seneca or Juvenal,¹ delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and shadow; magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the super-human pride of the advance, and illustrating that antithesis with unbounded licence of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing. The magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted, so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of the country through which they passed—an insufficient maintenance, eked out by leaves, grass, the bark

Retreating march of Xerxes to the Hellespont—sufferings of his troops. He finds the bridge broken, and crosses the strait on shipboard into Asia.

It at daybreak—before the sun became warm—is a statement which surely requires a more responsible witness than Æschylus to avouch it. In fact, he himself describes it as a "frost out of season" (γυμῶν ἄωρον) brought about by a special interposition of the gods. If he is to be believed, none of the fugitives were saved, except such as were fortunate enough to cross the Strymon on the ice during the interval between break of day and the sun's heat. One would imagine that there was a pursuing enemy on their track, leaving them only a short time for escape; whereas in fact, they had no enemy to contend with—nothing but the difficulty of finding subsistence. During the advancing march of Xerxes, a bridge of boats had been thrown over the Strymon: nor can any reason be given why that bridge should not still have been subsisting; Artabazus must have recrossed it after he had accompanied the monarch to the Hellespont. I will add, that the town and fortress of Eion, which commanded the mouth of the Strymon,

remained as an important stronghold of the Persians some years after this event, and was only captured, after a desperate resistance, by the Athenians and their confederates under Kimon.

The Athenian auditors of the Persæ, would not criticise nicely the historical credibility of that which Æschylus told them about the sufferings of their retreating foe, nor his geographical credibility when he placed Mount Pangæus on the hither side of the Strymon, to persons marching out of Greece (Persæ, 494). But I must confess that, to my mind, his whole narrative of the retreat bears the stamp of the poet and the religious man, not of the historical witness. And my confidence in Herodotus is increased when I compare him on this matter with Æschylus—as well in what he says as in what he does not say.

¹ Juvenal, Satir. x. 178.

Ille tamen qualis rediit, Salamine relicta,
In Caurum atque Eurum solitus
sevire flagellis, &c.

of trees, and other wretched substitutes for food. Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery, and occasioned many to be left behind among the cities through whose territory the retreat was carried; strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should maintain and tend them. After forty-five days' march from Attica, he at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him.¹ But the short-lived bridge had already been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdêra still showed the gilt scimitar and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction. They even went the length of affirming that never since his departure from Attica had he loosened his girdle until he reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the terror of the repulsed invader! who re-entered Sardis with a broken army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it as the presumed conqueror of the western world.²

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific cloud impending over her was dispersed.³ At the division

Joy of the
Greeks—
distribu-
tion of
honours
and prizes.

¹ Herodot. viii. 130.

² See the account of the retreat of Xerxes in Herodotus, viii. 115-120, with many stories which he mentions only to reject. The description given in the *Perseæ* of Æschylus (v. 486, 615, 670) is conceived in the same spirit. The strain reaches its loudest pitch in Justin (ii. 13), who tells us that Xerxes was obliged to cross the strait in a fishing-boat. "Ipse cum pannels Abydon contendit. Ubi cum

solutum pontem hibernis tempestatibus offendisset, piscatoriâ scaphâ trepidus trajecit. Erat res spectaculo digna, et, æstimatione sortis humanæ, rerum varietate miranda—in exiguo latentem videre navigio, quem paulo ante vix æquor omne capiebat: carentem etiam omni servorum ministerio, cujus exercitus propter multitudinem terris graves erant."

³ Herodot. viii. 109. ἡμαίς δὲ, εὐρημα γὰρ εὐρήκαμεν ἡμεῖς: αὐτοῦς

of the booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among them were three Phœnician triremes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athênê at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the Isthmus of Corinth. Farther presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied that all had done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the Æginetans, the second place of honour was awarded to the Athenians; the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians Eumenes and Ameinias, being ranked first among the individual combatants.¹ Respecting the behaviour of Adeimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavourable picture, representing them to have fled at the commencement and to have been only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining the victory. Considering the character of the debates which had preceded, and the impatient eagerness manifested by the Corinthians to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardness on their part, when forced into a battle at the latter place, would not be in itself improbable. Yet in this case it seems that not only the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that at the time when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristeus son of Adeimantus was among the most efficient enemies of the former.²

καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, μὴ διώκωμεν ἄνδρας
φιλόγοντας.

¹ Herodot. viii. 93-122; Diodor.
xi. 27.

² Herodot. viii. 94; Thucyd. i. 42,
103. τὸ σφοδρὸν μίσος from Corinth
towards Athens. About Aristeus,
Thucyd. ii. 67.

Plutarch (De Herodot. Malignit.
p. 870) employs many angry words
in refuting this Athenian scandal,
which the historian himself does
not uphold as truth. The story
advanced by Dio Chrysostom (Or.
xxxvii. p. 456), that Herodotus
asked for a reward from the Co-

Besides the first and second prizes of valour, the chiefs at the Isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Poseidôn: and when these votes came to be looked at, it was found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistoklês had a large majority of votes for the second.¹ The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it; so that Themistoklês was disappointed of his reward, though exalted so much the higher, perhaps through that very disappointment, in general renown. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honours such as were never paid, before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurybiadês as the first prize, but a like crown was at the same time conferred on Themistoklês as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, the finest which the city afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the 300 select youths called Hippeis, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honour to the frontiers of Tegea.² Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and immoveable Spartans, that they were ascribed by some authors to their fear lest Themistoklês should be offended by being deprived of the

Honours rendered to Themistoklês.

rinthians, and on being refused, inserted this story into his history for the purpose of being revenged upon them, deserves no attention without some reasonable evidence: the statement of Diyllus, that he received ten talents from the Athenians as a reward for his history, would be much less improbable, so far as the fact of pecuniary reward, apart from the magnitude of the sum: but this also requires proof. Dio Chrysostom is not satisfied with rejecting this tale of the Athenians, but goes the length of affirming that the Corinthians carried off the palm of bravery and were the cause of the victory. The

epigrams of Simonides, which he cites, prove nothing of the kind (p. 459). Marcellinus (Vit. Thucyd. p. xvi.) insinuates a charge against Herodotus, something like that of Plutarch and Dio.

¹ Herodot. viii. 123. Plutarch Themist. c. 17): compare De Herodot. Malign. p. 371) states that each individual chief gave his second vote to Themistoklês. The more we test Herodotus by comparison with others, the more we shall find him free from the exaggerating spirit.

² Herodot. viii. 124; Plutarch, Themist. c. 17.

general prize: and they are even said to have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much, that he was displaced from his place of general, to which Xanthippus was nominated.¹ Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Herodotus. The fact that Xanthippus became general of the fleet during the ensuing year, is in the regular course of Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of Themistoklès.

¹ Diodor. xi. 27: compare Herodot. viii. 126, and Thucyd. i. 74.

END OF VOL. IV.

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