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# HISTORY OF GREECE;

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

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# HISTORY OF GREECE.

## PART II.

## CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

### CHAPTER XCIV.

### MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS WINTER-QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.

From this time forward to the close of Alexander's life—a period of about seven years—his time was spent in conquering the eastern half of the Persian empire, together with various independent tribes lying beyond its extreme boundary. But neither Greece, nor Asia Minor, nor any of his previous western acquisitions, was he ever destined to see again. B.C. 330. (Spring).

Now, in regard to the history of Greece—the subject of these volumes—the first portion of Alexander's Asiatic campaigns (from his crossing the Hellespont to the conquest of Persis, a period of four years, March 334 B.C. to March 330 B.C.), though not of direct bearing, is yet of material importance. Having in his first year completed the subjugation of the Hellenic world, he had by these subsequent campaigns absorbed it as a small fraction into the vast Persian empire, renovated under his imperial sceptre. He had accomplished a result substantially the same as would have

The first four Asiatic campaigns of Alexander—their direct bearing and importance in reference to Grecian history.

been brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, destined, a century and a half before, to incorporate Greece with the Persian monarchy, had succeeded instead of failing.[1] Towards the kings of Macedonia alone, the subjugation of Greece would never have become complete, so long as she could receive help from the native Persian kings—who were perfectly adequate as a countervailing and tutelary force, had they known how to play their game. But all hope for Greece from without was extinguished, when Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis became subject to the same ruler as Pella and Amphipolis—and that ruler too, the ablest general, and most insatiate aggressor, of his age; to whose name was attached the prestige of success almost superhuman. Still, against even this overwhelming power, some of the bravest of the Greeks at home tried to achieve their liberation with the sword: we shall see presently how sadly the attempt miscarried.

His last seven years, farther eastward, had no similar bearing upon Greece.

But though the first four years of Alexander's Asiatic expedition, in which he conquered the Western half of the Persian empire, had thus an important effect on the condition and destinies of the Grecian cities—his last seven years, on which we are now about to enter, employed chiefly in conquering the Eastern half, scarcely touched these cities in any way. The stupendous marches to the rivers Jaxartes, Indus, and Hyphasis, which carried his victorious armies over so wide a space of Central Asia, not only added nothing to his power over the Greeks, but even withdrew him from all dealings with them, and placed him almost beyond their cognizance. To the historian of Greece, therefore, these latter campaigns can hardly be regarded as included within the range of his subject. They deserve to be told as examples of military skill and energy, and as illustrating the character of the most illustrious general of antiquity—one who, though not a Greek, had become the master of all Greeks. But I shall not think it necessary to recount them in any detail, like the battles of Issus and Arbêla.

[1] Compare the language addressed by Alexander to his weary soldiers, on the banks of the Hyphasis (Arrian, v. 26), with that which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Xerxês, when announcing his intended expedition against Greece (Herodot. vii. 8).

About six or seven months had elapsed from the battle of Arbêla to the time when Alexander prepared to quit his most recent conquest—Persis proper. During all this time, Darius had remained at Ekbatana,[1] the chief city of Media, clinging to the hope, that Alexander, when possessed of the three southern capitals and the best part of the Persian empire, might have reached the point of satiation, and might leave him unmolested in the more barren East. As soon as he learnt that Alexander was in movement towards him, he sent forward his harem and his baggage to Hyrkania, on the south-eastern border of the Caspian sea. Himself, with the small force around him, followed in the same direction, carrying off the treasure in the city (7000 talents = 1,610,000*l.* in amount), and passed through the Caspian Gates into the territory of Parthyênê. His only chance was to escape to Bactria at the eastern extremity of the empire, ruining the country in his way for the purpose of retarding pursuers. But this chance diminished every day, from desertion among his few followers, and angry disgust among many who remained.[2]

B.C. 330. (May-June).

Darius at Ekbatana—seeks escape towards Baktria, when he hears of Alexander approaching.

Eight days after Darius had quitted Ekbatana, Alexander entered it. How many days had been occupied in his march from Persepolis, we cannot say: in itself a long march, it had been farther prolonged, partly by necessity of subduing the intervening mountaineers called Parætakeni,[3] partly by rumours exaggerating the Persian force at Ekbatana, and inducing him to advance with precaution and regular array. Possessed of Ekbatana—the

Alexander enters Ekbatana—establishes there his depôt and base of operation.

[1] I see no reason for doubting that the Ekbatana here meant is the modern Hamadan. See a valuable Appendix added by Dr. Thirlwall to the sixth volume of his History of Greece, in which this question is argued against Mr. Williams.

Sir John Malcolm observes—"There can hardly be said to be any roads in Persia; nor are they much required, for the use of wheel carriages has not yet been introduced into that kingdom. Nothing can be more rugged and difficult than the paths which have been cut over the mountains by which it is bounded and intersected" (ch. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 525).

In this respect, indeed, as in others, the modern state of Persia must be inferior to the ancient; witness the description given by Herodotus of the road between Sardis and Susa.

[2] Arrian, iii. 19, 2—9; iii. 20, 3.

[3] Arrian, iii. 19, 5.

last capital stronghold of the Persian kings, and their ordinary residence during the summer months—he halted to rest his troops, and establish a new base of operations for his future proceedings eastward. He made Ekbatana his principal depôt; depositing in the citadel, under the care of Harpalus as treasurer, with a garrison of 6000 or 7000 Macedonians, the accumulated treasures of his past conquests out of Susa and Persepolis; amounting, we are told, to the enormous sum of 180,000 talents= 41,400,000*l.* sterling.[1] Parmenio was invested with the chief command of this important post, and of the military force left in Media; of which territory Oxodatês, a Persian who had been imprisoned at Susa by Darius, was named satrap[2].

B.C. 330. (June-July.) Alexander sends home the Thessalian cavalry—necessity for him now to pursue a more desultory warfare.

At Ekbatana Alexander was joined by a fresh force of 6000 Grecian mercenaries,[3] who had marched from Kilikia into the interior, probably crossing the Euphrates and Tigris at the same points as Alexander himself had crossed. Hence he was enabled the better to dismiss his Thessalian cavalry, with other Greeks who had been serving during his four years of Asiatic war, and who now wished to go home.[4] He distributed among them the sum of 2000 talents in addition to their full pay, and gave them the price of their horses, which they sold before departure. The operations which he was now about to commence against the eastern territories of Persia were not against regular armies, but against flying corps and distinct native tribes, relying for defence chiefly on the difficulties which mountains, deserts, privation, or mere distance, would throw in the way of an assailant. For these purposes he required an increased number of light troops, and was obliged to impose even upon his heavy-armed cavalry the most rapid and fatiguing marches, such as none but his Macedonian Companions would have been contented to execute; moreover he was called upon to act less with

[1] Arrian, iii. 19, 14; Diodor. xvii. 80. Diodorus had before stated (xvii. 66, 71) the treasure in Susa as being 49,000 talents, and that in Persepolis as 120,000. Arrian announces the treasure in Susa as 50,000 talents—Curtius gives the uncoined gold and silver alone as 50,000 talents (v. 8, 11). The treasure of both places was transported to Ekbatana.

[2] Arrian, iii. 20, 4.

[3] Curtius, v. 23, 12.

[4] Arrian, iii. 19, 10: compare v. 27, 7.

large masses, and more with small and broken divisions. He now therefore for the first time established a regular Taxis, or division of horse-bowmen.[1]

Alexander pursues Darius to the Caspian Gates, but fails in overtaking him.

Remaining at Ekbatana no longer than was sufficient for these new arrangements, Alexander recommenced his pursuit of Darius. He hoped to get before Darius to the Caspian Gates, at the north-eastern extremity of Media; by which Gates[2] was understood a mountain-pass, or rather a road of many hours' march, including several difficult passes stretching eastward along the southern side of the great range of Taurus towards Parthia. He marched with his Companion-cavalry, the light-horse, the Agrianians, and the bowmen—the greater part of the phalanx keeping up as well as it could—to Rhagæ, about fifty miles north of the Caspian Gates; which town he reached in eleven days, by exertions so severe that many

[1] Arrian, iii. 24, 1. ἤδη γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ἱππακοντίσται ἦσαν τάξις.

See the remarks of Rüstow and Köchly upon the change made by Alexander in his military organization about this period, as soon as he found that there was no farther chance of a large collected Persian force, able to meet him in the field (Geschichte des Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 252 *seq.*). The change which they point out was real— but I think they exaggerate it in degree.

[2] The passes called the Caspian Gates appear to be those described by Morier, Fraser, and other modern travellers, as the series of narrow valleys and defiles called Ser-Desch, Sirdari, or Serdara Khan,—on the southernmost of the two roads which lead eastward from Teheran towards Damaghan, and thence farther eastward towards Mesched and Herat. See the note of Mützell in his edition of Curtius, v. 35, 2, p. 489; also Morier, Second Journey through Persia, p. 363; Fraser's Narrative of a Journey into Khorasan, p. 291.

The long range of mountains, called by the ancients Taurus, extends from Lesser Media and Armenia in an easterly direction along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Its northern declivity, covered by prodigious forests with valleys and plains of no great breadth reaching to the Caspian, comprehends the moist and fertile territories now denominated Ghilan and Mazanderan. The eastern portion of Mazanderan was known in ancient times as Hyrkania, then productive and populous; while the mountain range itself was occupied by various rude and warlike tribes—Kadusii, Mardi, Tapyri, &c. The mountain range, now called Elburz, includes among other lofty eminences the very high peak of Demavend.

The road from Ekbatana to Baktria, along which both the flight of Darius and the pursuit of Alexander lay, passed along the broken ground skirting the southern flank of the mountain range Elburz. Of this broken ground the Caspian Gates formed the worst and most difficult portion.

men as well as horses were disabled on the road. But in spite of all speed, he learnt that Darius had already passed through the Caspian Gates. After five days of halt at Rhagæ, indispensable for his army, Alexander passed them also. A day's march on the other side of them, he was joined by two eminent Persians, Bagistanês and Antibêlus, who informed him that Darius was already dethroned and in imminent danger of losing his life.[1]

B.C. 330, (July.)

Conspiracy formed against Darius by Bessus and others, who seize his person.

The conspirators by whom this had been done, were Bessus, satrap of Baktria—Barsaentês, satrap of Drangiana and Arachosia—and Nabarzanês, general of the regal guards. The small force of Darius having been thinned by daily desertion, most of those who remained were the contingents of the still unconquered territories, Baktria, Arachosia, and Drangiana, under the orders of their respective satraps. The Grecian mercenaries, 1500 in number, and Artabazus, with a band under his special command, adhered inflexibly to Darius, but the soldiers of Eastern Asia followed their own satraps. Bessus and his colleagues intended to make their peace with Alexander by surrendering Darius, should Alexander pursue so vigorously as to leave them no hope of escape; but if they could obtain time to reach Baktria and Sogdiana, they resolved to organise an energetic resistance, under their own joint command, for the defence of those eastern provinces — the most warlike population of the empire.[2] Under the desperate circumstances of the case, this plan was perhaps the least unpromising that could be proposed. The chance of resisting Alexander, small as it was at the best, became absolutely nothing under the command of Darius, who had twice set the example of flight from the field of battle, betraying both his friends and his empire, even when surrounded by the full force of Persia. For brave and energetic Persians, unless they were prepared at once to submit to the invader, there was no choice but to set aside Darius; nor does it appear that the conspirators intended at first anything worse. At a village called Thara in Parthia, they bound him in chains of gold—placed him

[1] Arrian, iii. 20, 21.

[2] Masistês, after the shocking outrage upon his wife by Queen Amestris, was going to Baktria to organise a revolt: see Herodot. ix. 113—about the importance of that satrapy.

in a covered chariot surrounded by the Baktrian troops,—and thus carried him onward, retreating as fast as they could; Bessus assuming the command. Artabazus, with the Grecian mercenaries, too feeble to prevent the proceeding, quitted the army in disgust, and sought refuge among the mountains of the Tapyri bordering on Hyrkania towards the Caspian Sea.[1]

Prodigious efforts of Alexander to overtake and get possession of Darius. He surprises the Persian corps, but Bessus puts Darius to death.

On hearing this intelligence, Alexander strained every nerve to overtake the fugitives and get possession of the person of Darius. At the head of his Companion-cavalry, his light horse, and a body of infantry picked out for their strength and activity, he put himself in instant march, with nothing but arms and two days' provisions for each man; leaving Kraterus to bring on the main body by easier journeys. A forced march of two nights and one day, interrupted only by a short midday repose (it was now the month of July), brought him at daybreak to the Persian camp which his informant Bagistanês had quitted. But Bessus and his troops were already beyond it, having made considerable advance in their flight; upon which Alexander, notwithstanding the exhaustion both of men and horses, pushed on with increased speed through all the night to the ensuing day at noon. He there found himself in the village where Bessus had encamped on the preceding day. Yet learning from deserters that his enemies had resolved to hasten their retreat by night marches, he despaired of overtaking them, unless he could find some shorter road. He was informed that there was another shorter, but leading through a waterless desert. Setting out by this road late in the day with his cavalry, he got over no less than forty-five miles during the night, so as to come on Bessus by complete surprise on the following morning. The Persians, marching in disorder without arms, and having no

[1] Arrian, iii. 21-23. Justin (xi. 15) specifies the name of the place—Thara. Both he and Curtius mention the *golden chain* (Curtius, v. 34, 20). Probably the conspirators made use of some chains which had formed a part of the ornaments of the royal wardrobe. Among the presents given by Darius son of Hystaspes to the surgeon Demokêdês, there were two pairs of golden chains—Δωρέσται δή μιν Δαρεῖος πεδέων χρυσέων δύο ζεύγεσιν—Herodot. iii. 130: compare iii. 15. The Persian king and grandees habitually wore golden chains round neck and arms.

capitals, and for whom he had lightened in every way the difficulties of a conquest, in itself hardly less than impracticable.[1]

B. C. 330. (July).

The recent forced march, undertaken by Alexander for the purpose of securing Darius as a captive, had been distressing in the extreme to his soldiers, who required a certain period of repose and compensation. This was granted to them at the town of Hekatompylus in Parthia, where the whole army was again united. Besides abundant supplies from the neighbouring region, the soldiers here received a donative derived from the large booty taken in the camp of Darius.[2] In the enjoyment and revelry universal throughout the army, Alexander himself partook. His indulgences in the banquet and in wine-drinking, to which he was always addicted when leisure allowed, were now unusually multiplied and prolonged. Public solemnities were celebrated, together with theatrical exhibitions, by artists who joined the army from Greece. But the change of most importance in Alexander's conduct was, that he now began to feel and act manifestly as successor of Darius on the Persian throne; to disdain the comparative simplicity of Macedonian habits, and to assume the pomp, the ostentatious apparatus of luxuries, and even the dress, of a Persian king.

Repose of Alexander and his army at Hekatompylus, in Parthia.

Commencing alteration in his demeanour. He becomes Asiatized and despotic.

Gradual aggravation of these new habits, from the present moment.

To many of Alexander's soldiers, the conquest of Persia appeared to be consummated and the war finished, by the death of Darius. They were reluctant to exchange the repose and enjoyments of Hekatompylus for fresh fatigues; but Alexander,

B.C. 330. (September.)

Alexander conquers

[1] Arrian (iii. 22) gives an indulgent criticism on Darius, dwelling chiefly upon his misfortunes, but calling him ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πολέμια, εἴπερ τινὶ ἄλλῳ, μαλθακῷ καὶ οὐ φρονήματι, &c.

[2] Curtius, vi. 5, 10; vi. 6, 15. Diodor. xvii. 74. Hekatompylus was an important position, where several roads joined (Polyb. x. 28). It was situated on one of the roads running eastward from the Caspian Gates, on the southern flank of Mount Taurus (Elburz). Its locality cannot be fixed with certainty: Ritter (Erdkunde, part viii. 465, 467) with others conceives it to have been near Damaghan; Forbiger (Handbuch der Alten Geographie, vol. ii. p. 549) places it farther eastward, near Jai-Jerm. Mr. Long notes it on his map, as *site unknown*.

assembling the select regiments, addressed to them an emphatic appeal which revived the ardour of all.[1] His first march was across one of the passes from the south to the north of Mount Elburz, into Hyrkania, the region bordering the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea. Here he found no resistance; the Hyrkanian satrap Phrataphernês, together with Nabarzanês, Artabazus, and other eminent Persians, surrendered themselves to him, and were favourably received. The Greek mercenaries, 1500 in number, who had served with Darius, but had retired when that monarch was placed under arrest by Bessus, sent envoys requesting to be allowed to surrender on capitulation. But Alexander—reproaching them with guilt for having taken service with the Persians, in contravention of the vote passed by the Hellenic synod—required them to surrender at discretion; which they expressed their readiness to do, praying that an officer might be despatched to conduct them to him in safety.[2] The Macedonian Andronikus was sent for this purpose, while Alexander undertook an expedition into the mountains of the Mardi; a name seemingly borne by several distinct tribes in parts remote from each other, but all poor and brave mountaineers. These Mardi occupied parts of the northern slope of the range of Mount Elburz, a few miles from the Caspian Sea (Mazanderan and Ghilan). Alexander pursued them into all their retreats—overcame them, when they stood on their defence, with great slaughter,—and reduced the remnant of the half-destroyed tribes to sue for peace.[3]

the mountains immediately south of the Caspian. He requires the Greek mercenaries to surrender at discretion.

From this march, which had carried him in a westerly direction, he returned to Hyrkania. At the first halt he was met by the Grecian mercenaries who

Envoys from Sparta and other

[1] This was attested by his own letters to Antipater, which Plutarch had seen (Plutarch, Alexand. 47). Curtius composes a long speech for Alexander (vi. 7, 9).

[2] Arrian, iii. 23, 15.

[3] Arrian, iii. 22, 4. In reference to the mountain tribes called Mardi, who are mentioned in several different localities—on the parts of Mount Taurus south of the Caspian, in Armenia, on Mount Zagros, and in Persis proper (see Strabo, xi. p. 508–523; Herodot. i. 125), we may note, that the Nomadic tribes, who constitute a considerable fraction of the population of the modern Persian Empire, are at this day found under the same name in spots widely distant: see Jaubert, Voyage en Arménie et en Perse, p. 254.

Greek cities brought to him—how treated.

came to surrender themselves, as well as by various Grecian envoys from Sparta, Chalkedon, and Sinopê, who had accompanied Darius in his flight. Alexander put the Lacedæmonians under arrest, but liberated the other envoys, considering Chalkedon and Sinopê to have been subjects of Darius, not members of the Hellenic synod. As to the mercenaries, he made a distinction between those who had enlisted in the Persian service before the recognition of Philip as leader of Greece, and those whose enlistment had been of later date. The former he liberated at once; the latter he required to remain in his service under the command of Andronikus, on the same pay as they had hitherto received.[1] Such was the untoward conclusion of Grecian mercenary service with Persia; a system whereby the Persian monarchs, had they known how to employ it with tolerable ability, might well have maintained their empire even against such an enemy as Alexander.[2]

B.C. 330. (September.)

March of Alexander farther eastward—his successes in Aria and Drangiana.

After fifteen days of repose and festivity at Zeudracarta, the chief town of Hyrkania, Alexander marched eastward his united army through Parthia into Aria—the region adjoining the modern Herat with its river now known as Herirood. Satibarzanês, the satrap of Aria, came to him near the border, to a town named Susia,[3] submitted, and was allowed to retain his satrapy; while Alexander, merely skirting the northern border of Aria, marched in a direction nearly east towards Baktria against the satrap Bessus, who

[1] Arrian, iii. 24, 8; Curtius, vi. 5, 9. An Athenian officer named Demokratês slew himself in despair, disdaining to surrender.

[2] See a curious passage on this subject, at the end of the Cyropædia of Xenophon.

[3] Arrian iii. 25, 3—8. Droysen and Dr. Thirlwall identify Susia with the town now called Tûs or Toos, a few miles north-west of Mesched. Professor Wilson (Ariana Antiqua, p. 177) thinks that this is too much to the west, and too far from Herat: he conceives Susia to be Zuzan, on the desert side of the mountains west of Herat. Mr. Prinsep (Notes on the historical results deducible from discoveries in Afghanistan, p. 14) places it at Subzawar, south of Herat, and within the region of fertility.

Tûs seems to lie in the line of Alexander's march, more than the other two places indicated; Subzawar is too far to the south. Alexander appears to have first directed his march from Parthia to Baktria (in the line from Asterabad to Balkh through Margiana), merely touching the borders of Aria in his route.

was reported as having proclaimed himself King of Persia. But it was discovered, after three or four days, that Satibarzanês was in league with Bessus; upon which Alexander suspended for the present his plans against Baktria, and turned by forced marches to Artakoana, the chief city of Aria.[1] His return was so unexpectedly rapid, that the Arians were overawed, and Satibarzanês was obliged to escape. A few days enabled him to crush the disaffected Arians and to await the arrival of his rear division under Kraterus. He then marched southward into the territory of the Drangi, or Drangiana (the modern Seiestan), where he found no resistance—the satrap Barsaentês having sought safety among some of the Indians.[2]

B.C. 330. (October.)

Proceedings against Philotas, son of Parmenio, in Drangiana.

Military greatness and consideration of the family.

In the chief town of Drangiana occurred the revolting tragedy, of which Philotas was the first victim, and his father Parmenio the second. Parmenio, now seventy years of age, and therefore little qualified for the fatigue inseparable from the invasion of the eastern satrapies, had been left in the important post of commanding the great depôt and treasure at Ekbatana. His long military experience, and confidential position even under Philip, rendered him the second person in the Macedonian army, next to Alexander himself. His three sons were all soldiers. The youngest of them, Hektor, had been accidentally drowned in the Nile, while in the suite of Alexander in Egypt; the second, Nikanor, had commanded the hypaspists or light infantry, but had died of illness, fortunately for himself, a short time before;[3] the eldest, Philotas, occupied the high rank of general of the Companion-cavalry, in daily communication with Alexander, from whom he received personal orders.

[1] Artakoana, as well as the subsequent city of Alexandria in Ariis, are both supposed by Wilson to coincide with the locality of Herat (Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 152-177).

There are two routes from Herat to Asterabad, at the south-east corner of the Caspian; one by Schahrood, which is 533 English miles; the other by Mesched, which is 688 English miles (Wilson, p. 149).

[2] Arrian. iii. 25; Curtius, vi. 24, 36. The territory of the Drangi, or Zarangi, southward from Aria, coincides generally with the modern Seiestan, adjoining the lake now called Zareh, which receives the waters of the river Hilmend.

[3] Arrian. iii. 25, 6; Curtius, iv. 8, 7; vi. 6, 19.

Revelation of an intended conspiracy made by Kebalinus to Philotas, for the purpose of being communicated to Alexander. Philotas does not mention it to Alexander. It is communicated to the latter through another channel.

A revelation came to Philotas, from Kebalinus, brother of a youth named Nikomachus, that a soldier, named Dimnus of Chalastra, had made boast to Nikomachus, his intimate friend or beloved person, under vows of secrecy, of an intended conspiracy against Alexander, inviting him to become an accomplice.[1] Nikomachus, at first struck with abhorrence, at length simulated compliance, asked who were the accomplices of Dimnus, and received intimation of a few names; all of which he presently communicated to his brother Kebalinus, for the purpose of being divulged. Kebalinus told the facts to Philotas, entreating him to mention them to Alexander. But Philotas, though every day in communication with the king, neglected to do this for two days; upon which Kebalinus began to suspect him of connivance, and caused the revelation to be made to Alexander through one of the pages named Metron. Dimnus was immediately arrested, but ran himself through with his sword, and expired without making any declaration.[2]

Alexander is at first angry with Philotas, but accepts his explanation, and professes to pass over the fact.

Of this conspiracy, real or pretended, every thing rested on the testimony of Nikomachus. Alexander indignantly sent for Philotas, demanding why he had omitted for two days to communicate what he had heard. Philotas replied that the source from which it came was too contemptible to deserve notice—that it would have been ridiculous to attach importance to the simple declarations of such a youth as Nikomachus, recounting the foolish boasts addressed to him by a lover. Alexander received, or affected to receive, the explanation, gave his hand to Philotas, invited him to supper, and talked to him with his usual familiarity.[3]

[1] Curtius, vi. 7, 2. "Dimnus, modicæ apud regem auctoritatis et gratiæ, exoleti, cui Nicomacho erat nomen, amore flagrabat, obsequio uni sibi dediti corporis vinctus." Plutarch, Alex. 49; Diodor. xvii. 79.

[2] Curt. vi. 7, 29; Plutarch, Alex. 49. The latter says that Dimnus resisted the officer sent to arrest him, and was killed by him in the combat.

[3] Curtius, vi. 7, 33.. "Philotas respondit, Cebalinum quidem scorti sermonem ad se detulisse, sed ipsum tam levi auctori nihil credidisse—veritum, ne jurgium inter amatorem et exoletum non sine risu aliorum detulisset."

But it soon appeared that advantage was to be taken of this incident for the disgrace and ruin of Philotas, whose free-spoken criticisms on the pretended divine paternity, — coupled with boasts, that he and his father Parmenio had been chief agents in the conquest of Asia,—had neither been forgotten nor forgiven. These and other self-praises, disparaging to the glory of Alexander, had been divulged by a mistress to whom Philotas was attached; a beautiful Macedonian woman of Pydna, named Antigonê, who, having first been made a prize in visiting Samothrace by the Persian admiral Autophradatês, was afterwards taken amidst the spoils of Damascus by the Macedonians victorious at Issus. The reports of Antigonê, respecting some unguarded language held by Philotas to her, had come to the knowledge of Kraterus, who brought her to Alexander, and caused her to repeat them to him. Alexander desired her to take secret note of the confidential expressions of Philotas, and report them from time to time to himself.[1]

Ancient grudge against Philotas—advantage taken of the incident to ruin him.

It thus turned out that Alexander, though continuing to Philotas his high military rank, and talking to him constantly with seeming confidence, had for at least eighteen months, ever since his conquest of Egypt and perhaps even earlier, disliked and suspected him, keeping him under perpetual watch through the suborned and secret communication of a treacherous mistress.[2] Some of the generals around Alexander—especially Kraterus, the first suborner of Antigonê—fomented these suspicions, from jealousy of the great ascendency of Parmenio and his family. Moreover, Philotas himself was ostentatious and overbearing in his demeanour, so as to have made many enemies among the soldiers.[3] But whatever may

Kraterus and others are jealous of Parmenio and Philotas. Alexander is persuaded to put them both to death.

[1] Plutarch, Alexand. 48.

[2] Plutarch, Alexand. 48, 49. Πρὸς δὲ αὐτὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκ πάνυ πολλῶν χρόνων ἐτύγχανε διαβεβλημένος (Philotas). . . . . Ὁ μὲν οὖν Φιλώτας ἐπιβουλευόμενος ἠγνόει, καὶ συνῆν τῇ Ἀντιγόνῃ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ μεγαλαυχίαν ῥήματα καὶ λόγους τοῦ βασιλέως ἀνεπιτηδείους προϊέμενος.

Both Ptolemy and Aristobulus recognised these previous communications made to Alexander against Philotas in Egypt, but stated that he did not believe them (Arrian, iii. 26, 1).

[3] Plutarch, Alexand. 40-48; Curtius, vi. 11, 3.

have been his defects on this head—defects which he shared with the other Macedonian generals, all gorged with plunder and presents[1]—his fidelity as well as his military merits stand attested by the fact that Alexander had continued to employ him in the highest and most confidential command throughout all the long subsequent interval; and that Parmenio was now general at Ekbatana, the most important military appointment which the king had to confer. Even granting the deposition of Nikomachus to be trustworthy, there was nothing to implicate Philotas, whose name had not been included among the accomplices said to have been enumerated by Dimnus. There was not a tittle of evidence against him, except the fact that the deposition had been made known to him, and that he had seen Alexander twice without communicating it. Upon this single fact, however, Kraterus and the other enemies of Philotas worked so effectually as to inflame the suspicions and the pre-existing ill-will of Alexander into fierce rancour. He resolved on the disgrace, torture, and death, of Philotas,—and on the death of Parmenio besides.[2]

To accomplish this, however, against the two highest officers in the Macedonian service, one of them enjoying a separate and distant command—required management. Alexander was obliged to carry the feelings of the soldiers along with him, and to obtain a condemnation from the army; according to an ancient Macedonian custom, in regard to capital crimes, though (as it seems) not uniformly practised. He not only kept the resolution secret, but is even said to have invited Philotas to supper with the other officers, conversing with him just as usual.[3] In the middle of the night, Philotas was arrested while asleep in his bed,—put in chains,—and clothed in an ignoble garb. A military assembly was convened at

Arrest of Philotas. Alexander accuses him before the assembled soldiers. He is condemned.

[1] Phylarchus, Fragment. 41. ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 539; Plutarch, Alexand. 39, 40. Even Eumenês enriched himself much; though being only secretary, and a Greek, he could not take the same liberties as the great native Macedonian generals (Plutarch, Eumenês, 2).

[2] Plutarch, Alexand. 49; Curtius, vi. 8.

[3] Curtius, vi. 8, 16. "Invitatus est etiam Philotas ad ultimas sibi epulas; et rex non cœnare modo, sed etiam familiariter colloqui, cum eo quem damnaverat, sustinuit."

daybreak, before which Alexander appeared with the chief officers in his confidence. Addressing the soldiers in a vehement tone of mingled sorrow and anger, he proclaimed to them that his life had just been providentially rescued from a dangerous conspiracy organized by two men hitherto trusted as his best friends—Philotas and Parmenio—through the intended agency of a soldier named Dimnus, who had slain himself when arrested. The dead body of Dimnus was then exhibited to the meeting, while Nikomachus and Kebalinus were brought forward to tell their story. A letter from Parmenio to his sons Philotas and Nikanor, found among the papers seized on the arrest, was read to the meeting. Its terms were altogether vague and unmeaning; but Alexander chose to construe them as it suited his purpose.[1]

We may easily conceive the impression produced upon these assembled soldiers by such denunciations from Alexander himself—revelations of his own personal danger, and reproaches against treacherous friends. Amyntas, and even Kœnus, the brother-in-law of Philotas, were yet more unmeasured in their invectives against the accused.[2] They, as well as the other officers with whom the arrest had been concerted, set the example of violent manifestation against him, and ardent sympathy with the king's danger. Philotas was heard in his defence, which, though strenuously denying the charge, is said to have been feeble. It was indeed sure to be so, coming from one seized thus suddenly, and overwhelmed with disadvantages; while a degree of courage, absolutely heroic, would have been required for any one else to rise and presume to criticise the proofs. A soldier named Bolon harangued his comrades on the insupportable insolence of Philotas, who always (he said) treated the soldiers with contempt, turning them out of their quarters to make room for his countless retinue of slaves. Though this allegation (probably enough well-founded) was noway connected with the charge of treason against the king, it harmonized fully with the temper of the assembly, and wound them up to the last pitch of fury. The royal pages began the cry,

[1] Arrian, iii. 26, 2. Λέγει δὲ Πτολεμαῖος εἰσαχθῆναι ἐς Μακεδόνας Φιλώταν, καὶ κατηγορῆσαι αὐτοῦ ἰσχυρῶς Ἀλέξανδρον, &c. Curtius, vi. 9, 13; Diodor. xvii. 80.

[2] Curtius, vi. 9, 30.

echoed by all around, that they would with their own hands tear the parricide in pieces.[1]

Philotas is put to the torture, and forced to confess, both against himself and Parmenio.

It would have been fortunate for Philotas if their wrath had been sufficiently ungovernable to instigate the execution of such a sentence on the spot. But this did not suit the purpose of his enemies. Aware that he had been condemned upon the regal word, with nothing better than the faintest negative ground of suspicion, they determined to extort from him a confession such as would justify their own purposes, not only against him, but against his father Parmenio—whom there was as yet nothing to implicate. Accordingly, during the ensuing night, Philotas was put to the torture. Hephæstion, Kraterus, and Kœnus—the last of the three being brother-in-law of Philotas[2]—themselves superintended the ministers of physical suffering. Alexander himself too was at hand, but concealed by a curtain. It is said that Philotas manifested little firmness under torture, and that Alexander, an unseen witness, indulged in sneers against the cowardice of one who had fought by his side in so many battles.[3] All who stood by were enemies, and likely to describe the conduct of Philotas in such manner as to justify their own hatred. The tortures inflicted,[4] cruel in the extreme and long continued, wrung from him at last a confession, implicating his father along with himself. He was put to death; and at the same time, all those whose names had been indicated by Nikomachus, were slain also—apparently by being stoned, without preliminary torture. Philotas had serving in the army a numerous kindred, all of whom were struck with consternation at the news of his being tortured. It was the Macedonian law that all kinsmen of a man guilty of

[1] Curtius. vi. 11, 8. "Tum vero universa concio accensa est, et à corporis custodibus initium factum, clamantibus, discerpendum esse parricidam manibus eorum. Id quidem Philotas, qui graviora supplicia metueret, haud sane iniquo animo audiebat."

[2] Curtius, vi. 9, 30; vi. 11, 11.

[3] Plutarch, Alexand. 49.

[4] Curtius, vi. 11, 15. "Per ultimos deinde cruciatus, utpote et damnatus et inimicis in gratiam regis torquentibus, laceratur. Ac primo quidem, quanquam hinc ignis, illinc verbera, jam non ad quæstionem, sed ad pœnam, ingerebantur, non vocem modo, sed etiam gemitus habuit in potestate; sed postquam intumescens corpus ulceribus flagellorum ictus nudis ossibus incussos ferre non poterat," &c.

treason were doomed to death along with him. Accordingly, some of these men slew themselves, others fled from the camp, seeking refuge wherever they could. Such was the terror and tumult in the camp, that Alexander was obliged to proclaim a suspension of this sanguinary law for the occasion.[1]

Parmenio is slain at Ekbatana, by order and contrivance of Alexander.

It now remained to kill Parmenio, who could not be safely left alive after the atrocities used towards Philotas; and to kill him, moreover, before he could have time to hear of them, since he was not only the oldest, most respected, and most influential of all Macedonian officers, but also in separate command of the great depôt at Ekbatana. Alexander summoned to his presence one of the Companions named Polydamas; a particular friend, comrade, or *aide de camp,* of Parmenio. Every friend of Philotas felt at this moment that his life hung by a thread; so that Polydamas entered the king's presence in extreme terror, the rather as he was ordered to bring with him his two younger brothers. Alexander addressed him, denouncing Parmenio as a traitor, and intimating that Polydamas would be required to carry a swift and confidential message to Ekbatana, ordering his execution. Polydamas was selected as the attached friend of Parmenio, and therefore as best calculated to deceive him. Two letters were placed in his hands, addressed to Parmenio; one from Alexander himself, conveying ostensibly military communications and orders; the other, signed with the seal-ring of the deceased Philotas, and purporting to be addressed by the son to the father. Together with these, Polydamas received the real and important despatch, addressed by Alexander to Kleander and Menidas, the officers immediately subordinate to Parmenio at Ekbatana; proclaiming Parmenio guilty of high treason, and directing them to kill him at once. Large rewards were offered to Polydamas if he performed this commission with success, while his two brothers were retained as hostages against scruples or compunction. He promised even more than was demanded—too happy to purchase this reprieve from what had seemed impending death. Furnished with native guides and with swift dromedaries, he struck by the straightest road across the desert of

[1] Curtius, vi. 11, 20.

Khorasan, and arrived at Ekbatana on the eleventh day—a distance usually requiring more than thirty days to traverse.[1] Entering the camp by night, without the knowledge of Parmenio, he delivered his despatch to Kleander, with whom he concerted measures. On the morrow he was admitted to Parmenio, while walking in his garden with Kleander and the other officers marked out by Alexander's order as his executioners. Polydamas ran to embrace his old friend, and was heartily welcomed by the unsuspecting veteran, to whom he presented the letters professedly coming from Alexander and Philotas. While Parmenio was absorbed in perusal, he was suddenly assailed by a mortal stab from the hand and sword of Kleander. Other wounds were heaped upon him as he fell, by the remaining officers,—the last even after life had departed.[2]

[1] Strabo, xv. p. 724; Diodor. xvii. 80; Curtius. vii, 2, 11-18.

[2] Curtius, vii. 2, 27. The proceedings respecting Philotas and Parmenio are recounted in the greatest detail by Curtius; but his details are in general harmony with the brief heads given by Arrian from Ptolemy and Aristobulus—except as to one material point. Plutarch (Alex. 49), Diodorus (xvii. 79, 80), and Justin (xii. 5), also state the facts in the same manner.

Ptolemy and Aristobulus, according to the narrative of Arrian, appear to have considered that Philotas was really implicated in a conspiracy against Alexander's life. But when we analyse what they are reported to have said, their opinion will not be found entitled to much weight. In the first place, they state (Arr. iii. 26, 1) that the *conspiracy of Philotas had been before made known to Alexander while he was in Egypt*, but that he did not then believe it. Now eighteen months had elapsed since the stay in Egypt; and the idea of a conspiracy going on for eighteen months is preposterous. That Philotas was in a mood in which he might be supposed likely to conspire, is one proposition; that he actually did conspire, is another; Arrian and his authorities run the two together as if they were one. As to the evidence purporting to prove that Philotas did conspire, Arrian tells us that "the informers came forward before the assembled soldiers and convicted Philotas with the rest by other *indicia* not obscure, *but chiefly by this*—that Philotas confessed to have heard of a conspiracy going on, without mentioning it to Alexander, though twice a day in his presence"—καὶ τοὺς μηνυτὰς τοῦ ἔργου παρελθόντας ἐξελέγξαι Φιλώταν τε καὶ τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἄλλοις τε ἐλέγχοις οὐκ ἀφανέσι, καὶ μάλιστα δὴ ὅτι αὐτὸς Φιλώτας πεπύσθαι μὲν—συνέφη, &c. What these other *indicia* were, we are not told; but we may see how slender was their value, when we learn that the non-revelation admitted by Philotas was stronger than any of them. The non-revelation, when we recollect that Nikomachus was the *only* informant (Arrian loosely talks of μηνυτάς, as if there were more), proves absolutely nothing as to the complicity of Philotas, though it may prove something as to his indis-

The soldiers in Ekbatana, on hearing of this bloody deed, burst into furious mutiny, surrounded the garden wall, and threatened to break in for the purpose of avenging their general, unless Polydamas and the other murderers should be delivered to them. But Kleander, admitting a few of the ringleaders, exhibited to them Alexander's written orders, to which the soldiers yielded, not without murmurs of reluctance and indignation. Most of them dispersed, yet a few remained, entreating permission to bury Parmenio's body.

Mutiny of the soldiers when they learn the assassination of Parmenio—appeased by the production of Alexander's order.

cretion. Even on this minor charge, Curtius puts into his mouth a very sufficient exculpation. But if Alexander had taken a different view, and dismissed or even confined him for it, there would have been little room for remark.

The point upon which Arrian is at variance with Curtius, is that he states "Philotas with the rest to have been shot to death by the Macedonians" — thus, seemingly contradicting, at least by implication, the fact of his having been tortured. Now Plutarch, Diodorus, and Justin, all concur with Curtius in affirming that he was tortured. On such a matter, I prefer their united authority to that of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. These two last-mentioned authors were probably quite content to believe in the complicity of Philotas upon the authority of Alexander himself; without troubling themselves to criticise the proofs. They tell us that Alexander vehemently denounced (κατηγορῆσαι ἰσχυρῶς) Philotas before the assembled soldiers. After this, any mere shadow or pretence of proof would be sufficient. Moreover, let us recollect that Ptolemy obtained his promotion, to be one of the confidential *body guards* (σωματοφύλακες), out of this very conspiracy, real or fictitious; he was promoted to the post of the condemned Demetrius (Arrian, iii. 27, 11).

How little Ptolemy and Aristobulus cared to do justice to any one whom Alexander hated, may be seen by what they say afterwards about the philosopher Kallisthenês. Both of them affirmed that the pages, condemned for conspiracy against Alexander, deposed against Kallisthenês as having instigated them to the deed (Arrian, iv. 14, 1). Now we know, from the authority of Alexander himself, whose letters Plutarch quotes (Alexand. 55), that the pages denied the privity of any one else—maintaining the project to have been altogether their own. To their great honour, the pages persisted in this deposition, even under extreme tortures—though they knew that a deposition against Kallisthenês was desired from them.

My belief is, that Diodorus, Plutarch, Curtius, and Justin, are correct in stating that Philotas was tortured. Ptolemy and Aristobulus have thought themselves warranted in omitting this fact, which they probably had little satisfaction in reflecting upon. If Philotas was not tortured, there could have been no evidence at all against Parmenio—for the only evidence against the latter was the extorted confession of Philotas.

Even this was long refused by Kleander, from dread of the king's displeasure. At last, however, thinking it prudent to comply in part, he cut off the head, delivering to them the trunk alone for burial. The head was sent to Alexander.[1]

Fear and disgust produced by the killing of Parmenio and Philotas.

Among the many tragical deeds recounted throughout the course of this history, there is none more revolting than the fate of these two generals. Alexander, violent in all his impulses, displayed on this occasion a personal rancour worthy of his ferocious mother Olympias, exasperated rather than softened by the magnitude of past services.[2] When we see the greatest officers of the Macedonian army directing in person, and under the eye of Alexander, the laceration and burning of the naked body of their colleague Philotas, and assassinating with their own hands the veteran Parmenio,—we feel how much we have passed out of the region of Greek civic feeling into that of the more savage Illyrian warrior, partially orientalised. It is not surprising to read, that Antipater, viceroy of Macedonia, who had shared with Parmenio the favour and confidence of Philip as well as of Alexander, should tremble when informed of such proceedings, and cast about for a refuge against the like possibilities to himself. Many other officers were alike alarmed and disgusted with the transactions.[3] Hence Alexander, opening and examining the letters sent home from his army to Macedonia, detected such strong expressions of indignation, that he thought it prudent to transfer many pronounced malcontents into a division by themselves, parting them off from the remaining army.[4] Instead of appointing any substitute for Philotas in the command of the Companion-cavalry, he cast that body into two divisions, nominating Hephæstion to the command of one, and Kleitus to that of the other.[5]

B.C. 330-329. Conquest of the

The autumn and winter were spent by Alexander in reducing Drangiana, Gedrosia, Arachosia, and the Paropamisadæ; the modern Seiestan, Afghanistan, and the western part of Kabul, lying

[1] Curtius, vii. 2, 32, 33.

[2] Contrast the conduct of Alexander towards Philotas and Parmenio, with that of Cyrus the younger towards the conspirator Orontês, as described in Xenophon, Anabas. i. 6.

[3] Plutarch, Alexand. 49.

[4] Curtius, vii. 2, 36; Diodor. xvii. 80; Justin, xii. 5.

[5] Arrian iii. 27, 8.

between Ghazna on the north, Kandahar or Kelar on the south, and Furrah in the west. He experienced no combined resistance, but his troops suffered severely from cold and privation.[1] Near the southern termination of one of the passes of the Hindoo-Koosh (apparently north-east of the town of Kabul) he founded a new city, called Alexandria ad Caucasum, where he planted 7000 old soldiers, Macedonians, and others as colonists.[2] Towards the close of winter he crossed over the mighty range of the Hindoo-Koosh; a march of fifteen days through regions of snow, and fraught with hardship to his army. On reaching the north side of these mountains, he found himself in Baktria.

Paropamisadæ, &c. Foundation of Alexandria *ad Caucasum*.

The Baktrian leader Bessus, who had assumed the title of king, could muster no more than a small force, with which he laid waste the country, and then retired across the river Oxus into Sogdiana, destroying all the boats. Alexander overran Baktria with scarcely any resistance; the chief places, Baktra (Balkh) and Aornos surrendering to him on the first demonstration of attack. Having named Artabazus satrap of Baktria,

Alexander crosses the Hindoo-Koosh, and conquers Baktria. Bessus is made prisoner.

[1] Arrian, iii. 28, 2. About the geography, compare Wilson's Ariana Antiqua, p. 173-178. "By perambulator, the distance from Herat to Kandahar is 371 miles; from Kandahar to Kabul, 309 miles: total 680 miles (English)." The principal city in Drangiana (Seiestan) mentioned by the subsequent Greek geographers, is Prophthasia; existing seemingly before Alexander's arrival. See the fragments of his *mensores*, ap. Didot, Fragm. Hist. Alex. Magn. p. 135; Pliny, H. N. vi. 21. The quantity of remains of ancient cities, still to be found in this territory, is remarkable. Wilson observes this (p. 154).

[2] Arrian, iii. 28, 6; Curtius, vii. 3, 23; Diodor. xvii. 83. Alexandria in Ariis is probably Herat; Alexandria in Arachosia is probably Kandahar. But neither the one nor the other is mentioned as having been founded by *Alexander*, either in Arrian or Curtius, or Diodorus. The name Alexandria does not prove that they were founded by him; for several of the Diadochi called their own foundations by his name (Strabo, xiii. p. 593). Considering how very short a time Alexander spent in these regions, the wonder is that he could have found time to establish those foundations which are expressly ascribed to him by Arrian and his other historians. The authority of Pliny and Steph. Byzant. is hardly sufficient to warrant us in ascribing to him more. The exact site of Alexandria ad Caucasum cannot be determined, for want of sufficient topographical data. There seems much probability that it was at the place called Beghram, twenty-five miles north-east of Kabul—in the way between Kabul on the south side of the Hindoo-Koosh, and Anderab on the north side. The prodigious

and placed Archelaus with a garrison in Aornos,[1] he marched northward towards the river Oxus, the boundary between Baktria and Sogdiana. It was a march of extreme hardship; reaching for two or three days across a sandy desert destitute of water, and under very hot weather. The Oxus, six furlongs in breadth, deep, and rapid, was the most formidable river that the Macedonians had yet seen.[2] Alexander transported his army across it on the tent-skins inflated and stuffed with straw. It seems surprising that Bessus did not avail himself of this favourable opportunity for resisting a passage in itself so difficult; he had however been abandoned by his Baktrian cavalry at the moment when he quitted their territory. Some of his companions, Spitamenês and others, terrified at the news that Alexander had crossed the Oxus, were anxious to make their own peace by betraying their leader.[3] They sent a proposition to this effect; upon which Ptolemy with

number of coins and relics, Greek as well as Mahometan, discovered by Mr. Masson at Beghram, supply better evidence for identifying the site with that of Alexandria ad Caucasum, than can be pleaded on behalf of any other locality. See Masson's Narrative of Journeys in Afghanistan, &c., vol. iii. ch. 7. p. 148 *seqq.*

In crossing the Hindoo-Koosh from south to north, Alexander probably marched by the pass of Bamian, which seems the only one among the four passes open to an army in the winter. See Wood's Journey to the Oxus, p. 195.

[1] Arrian, iii. 29, 3; Curtius, vii. 5, 1.

[2] Arrian, iii. 29, 4; Strabo, xi. p. 509. Evidently Ptolemy and Aristobulus were much more awe-struck with the Oxus, than with either the Tigris or the Euphrates. Arrian (iv. 6, 13) takes his standard of comparison, in regard to rivers, from the river Peneius in Thessaly.

[3] Curtius, vii. 5, 19. The exactness of Quintus Curtius, in describing the general features of Baktria and Sogdiana, is attested in the strongest language by modern travellers. See Burnes's Travels into Bokhara, vol. ii. ch. 8, p. 211. 2nd edit.; also Morier, Second Journey in Persia, p. 282.

But in the geographical details of the country, we are at fault. We have not sufficient data to identify more than one or two of the localities mentioned, in the narrative of Alexander's proceedings, either by Curtius or Arrian. That Marakanda is the modern Samarkand—the river Polytimetus, the modern Kohik—and Baktra or Zariaspa the modern Balkh—appears certain; but the attempts made by commentators to assign the site of other places are not such as to carry conviction.

In fact, these countries, at the present moment, are known only superficially as to their general scenery; for purposes of measurement and geography, they are almost unknown; as may be seen by any one who reads the Introduction to Erskine's translation of the Memoirs of Sultan Baber.

a light division was sent forward by Alexander, and was enabled, by extreme celerity of movements, to surprise and seize Bessus in a village. Alexander ordered that he should be held in chains, naked and with a collar round his neck, at the side of the road along which the army were marching. On reaching the spot, Alexander stopped his chariot, and sternly demanded from Bessus, on what pretence he had first arrested, and afterwards slain, his king and benefactor Darius. Bessus replied, that he had not done this single-handed; others were concerned in it along with him, to procure for themselves lenient treatment from Alexander. The king said no more, but ordered Bessus to be scourged, and then sent back as prisoner to Baktra[1]—where we shall again hear of him.

Massacre of the Branchidæ and their families, perpetrated by Alexander in Sogdiana.

In his onward march, Alexander approached a small town, inhabited by the Branchidæ; descendants of those Branchidæ near Miletus on the coast of Ionia, who had administered the great temple and oracle of Apollo on Cape Poseidion, and who had yielded up the treasures of that temple to the Persian king Xerxês, 150 years before. This surrender had brought upon them so much odium, that when the dominion of Xerxês was overthrown on the coast, they retired with him into the interior of Asia. He assigned to them lands in the distant region of Sogdiana, where their descendants had ever since remained; bilingual and partially dishellenised, yet still attached to their traditions and origin. Delighted to find themselves once more in commerce with Greeks, they poured forth to meet and welcome the army, tendering all that they possessed. Alexander, when he heard who they were and what was their parentage, desired the Milesians in his army to determine how they should be treated. But as these Milesians were neither decided nor unanimous, Alexander announced that he would determine for himself. Having first occupied the city in person with a select detachment, he posted his army all round

[1] Arrian, iii. 30, 5-10. These details are peculiarly authentic, as coming from Ptolemy, the person chiefly concerned.

Aristobulus agreed in the description of the guise in which Bessus was exhibited, but stated that he was brought up in this way by Spitamenês and Dataphernês. Curtius (vii. 24, 36) follows this version. Diodorus also gives an account very like it, mentioning nothing about Ptolemy (xvii. 83).

the walls, and then gave orders not only to plunder it, but to massacre the entire population—men, women, and children. They were slain without arms or attempt at resistance, resorting to nothing but prayers and suppliant manifestations. Alexander next commanded the walls to be levelled, and the sacred groves cut down, so that no habitable site might remain, nor any thing except solitude and sterility.[1] Such was the revenge taken upon these unhappy victims for the deeds of their ancestors in the fourth or fifth generation before. Alexander doubtless considered himself to be executing the wrath of Apollo against an accursed race who had robbed the temple of the God.[2] The Macedonian expedition had been proclaimed to be undertaken originally for the purpose of revenging upon the contemporary Persians the ancient wrongs

[1] Curtius, vii. 23; Plutarch de Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, p. 557 B; Strabo, xi. p. 518: compare also xiv. p. 634, and xvii. p. 814. This last-mentioned passage of Strabo helps us to understand the peculiarly strong pious fervour with which Alexander regarded the temple and oracle of Branchidæ. At the time when Alexander went up to the oracle of Ammon in Egypt, for the purpose of affiliating himself to Zeus Ammon, there came to him envoys from Miletus announcing that the oracle at Branchidæ, which had been silent ever since the time of Xerxès, had just begun again to give prophecy, and had certified the fact that Alexander was the son of Zeus, besides many other encouraging predictions.

The massacre of the Branchidæ by Alexander was described by Diodorus, but was contained in that portion of the seventeenth book which is lost; there is a great lacuna in the MSS. after cap. 83. The fact is distinctly indicated in the table of contents prefixed to book xvii.

Arrian makes no mention of these descendants of the Branchidæ in Sogdiana, nor of the destruction of the town and its inhabitants by Alexander. Perhaps neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus said anything about it. Their silence is not at all difficult to explain, nor does it, in my judgement, impeach the credibility of the narrative. They do not feel under obligation to give publicity to the worst acts of their hero.

[2] The Delphian oracle pronounced, in explaining the subjugation and ruin of Krœsus king of Lydia, that he had thereby expiated the sin of his ancestor in the fifth generation before (Herodot. i. 91: compare vi. 86). Immediately before the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedæmonians called upon the Athenians to expel the descendants of those who had taken part in the Kilonian sacrilege, 180 years before; they addressed this injunction with a view to procure the banishment of Periklês, yet still τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες (Thucyd. i. 125-127).

The idea that the sins of fathers were visited upon their descendants, even to the third and fourth generation, had great currency in the ancient world.

done to Greece by Xerxês; so that Alexander would follow out the same sentiment in revenging upon the contemporary Branchidæ the acts of their ancestors—yet more guilty than Xerxês, in his belief. The massacre of this unfortunate population was in fact an example of human sacrifice on the largest scale, offered to the Gods by the religious impulses of Alexander, and worthy to be compared to that of the Carthaginian general Hannibal, when he sacrificed 3000 Grecian prisoners on the field of Himera, where his grandfather Hamilkar had been slain seventy years before.[1]

Alexander then continued his onward progress, first to Marakanda (Samarcand), the chief town of Sogdiana—next to the river Jaxartes, which he and his companions, in their imperfect geographical notions, believed to be the Tanais, the boundary between Asia and Europe.[2] In his march, he left garrisons in various towns,[3] but experienced no resistance, though detached bodies of the natives hovered on his flanks. Some of these bodies, having cut off a few of his foragers, took refuge afterwards on a steep and rugged mountain, conceived to be unassailable. Thither however Alexander pursued them, at the head of his lightest and most active troops. Though at first repulsed, he succeeded in scaling and capturing the place. Of its defenders, thirty thousand in number, three-fourths were either put to the sword, or perished in jumping down the precipices. Several of his soldiers were wounded with arrows, and he himself received a shot from one of them through his leg.[4] But here, as elsewhere, we perceive that nearly all the Orientals whom Alexander

Alexander at Marakanda and on the Jaxartes. Foundation of Alexandria on the Jaxartes. Limit of Alexander's progress northward.

[1] Diodor. xiii. 62. See Ch. LXXXI. of this History.

[2] Pliny, H. N. vi. 16. In the Meteorologica of Aristotle (i. 13, 15-18) we read that the rivers Baktrus, Choaspes, and Araxes flowed from the lofty mountain Parnasus (Paropamisus?) in Asia; and that the Araxes bifurcated, one branch forming the Tanais, which fell into the Palus Mœotis. For this fact he refers to the γῆς περιόδοι current in his time. It seems plain that by the Araxes Aristotle must mean the Jaxartes. We see therefore that Alexander and his companions, in identifying the Jaxartes with the Tanais, only followed the geographical descriptions and ideas current in their time. Humboldt remarks several cases in which the Greek geographers were fond of supposing bifurcation of rivers (Asie Centrale, vol. ii. p. 291).

[3] Arrian, iv. 1, 5.

[4] Arrian, iii. 30, 17.

subdued were men little suited for close combat hand to hand,—fighting only with missiles.

Here, on the river Jaxartes, Alexander projected the foundation of a new city to bear his name; intended partly as a protection against incursions from the Scythian Nomads on the other side of the river, partly as a facility for himself to cross over and subdue them, which he intended to do as soon as he could find opportunity.[1] He was however called off for the time by the news of a wide-spread revolt among the newly-conquered inhabitants both of Sogdiana and Baktria. He suppressed the revolt with his habitual vigour and celerity, distributing his troops so as to capture five townships in two days, and Kyropolis or Kyra, the largest of the neighbouring Sogdian towns (founded by the Persian Cyrus), immediately afterwards. He put all the defenders and inhabitants to the sword. Returning then to the Jaxartes, he completed in twenty days the fortifications of his new town of Alexandria (perhaps at or near Khodjend), with suitable sacrifices and festivities to the Gods. He planted in it some Macedonian veterans and Grecian mercenaries, together with volunteer settlers from the natives around.[2] An army of Scythian Nomads, showing themselves on the other side of the river, piqued his vanity to cross over and attack them. Carrying over a division of his army on inflated skins, he defeated them with little difficulty, pursuing them briskly into the desert. But the weather was intensely hot, and the army suffered much from thirst; while the little water to be found was so bad, that it brought upon Alexander a diarrhœa which endangered his life.[3] This chase, of a few miles on the right bank of the Jaxartes (seemingly in the present Khanat of Kokand), marked the utmost limit of Alexander's progress northward.

B.C. 329. (Summer.) Foundation of Alexandria *ad Jaxartem*. Limit of march northward.

Shortly afterwards, a Macedonian detachment, unskilfully conducted, was destroyed in Sogdiana by Spitamenês and the Scythians: a rare misfortune, which Alexander avenged by overrunning the region[4] near the river Polytimêtus

B.C. 329-328. (Winter.) Alexander at Zariaspa in Baktria

[1] Arrian, iv. 1, 3.

[2] Arrian, iv. 3, 17; Curtius, vii. 6, 25.

[3] Arrian, iv. 5, 6; Curtius, vii. 9.

[4] Arrian, iv. 6, 11; Curtius, vii. 9, 22. The river, called by the Macedonians Polytimêtus (Strabo, xi. p. 518), now bears the name of

(the Kohik), and putting to the sword the inhabitants of all the towns which he took. He then recrossed the Oxus, to rest during the extreme season of winter at Zariaspa in Baktria, from whence his communications with the West and with Macedonia were more easy, and where he received various reinforcements of Greek troops.[1] Bessus, who had been here retained as a prisoner, was now brought forward amidst a public assembly; wherein Alexander, having first reproached him for his treason to Darius, caused his nose and ears to be cut off—and sent him in this condition to Ekbatana, to be finally slain by the Medes and Persians.[2] Mutilation was a practice altogether Oriental and non-Hellenic: even Arrian, admiring and indulgent as he is towards his hero, censures this savage order, as one among many proofs how much Alexander had taken on Oriental dispositions. We may remark that his extreme wrath on this occasion was founded partly on disappointment that Bessus had frustrated his toilsome efforts for taking Darius alive—partly on the fact that the satrap had committed treason against the king's person, which it was the policy as well as the feeling of Alexander to surround with a circle of Deity.[3] For as to traitors against Persia, as a cause and country, Alexander had never discouraged, and had sometimes signally recompensed them. Mithrinês, the governor of Sardis, who opened to him the gates of that almost impregnable fortress immediately after the battle of the Granikus—the traitor who perhaps, next to Darius himself, had done most harm to the Persian cause—obtained from him high favour and promotion.[4]

—he causes Bessus to be mutilated and slain.

Kohik or Zurufshan. It rises in the mountains east of Samarkand, flowing westward on the north of that city and of Bokhara. It does not reach so far as the Oxus; during the full time of the year, it falls into a lake called Karakul; during the dry months, it is lost in the sands, as Arrian states (Burnes's Travels, vol. ii. ch. xi. p. 299, 2nd ed.).

[1] Arrian, iv. 7, 1; Curtius, vii. 10, 12.

[2] Arrian, iv. 7, 5.

[3] After describing the scene at Rome, when the Emperor Galba was deposed and assassinated in the forum, Tacitus observes—"Plures quam centum et viginti libellos præmia exposcentium, ob aliquam notabilem illâ die operam, Vitellius posteà invenit, omnesque conquiri et interfici jussit: *non honore Galbæ, sed tradito principibus more, munimentum ad præsens, in posterum ultionem*" (Tacitus, Hist. i. 44).

[4] Arrian, i. 17, 3; iii. 16, 8. Curtius, iii. 12, 6; v. 1, 44.

B.C. 328. (Summer.) Farther subjugation of Baktria and Sogdiana. Halt at Marakanda.

The rude, but spirited tribes of Baktria and Sogdiana were as yet but imperfectly subdued, seconded as their resistance was by wide spaces of sandy desert, by the neighbourhood of the Scythian Nomads, and by the presence of Spitamenês as a leader. Alexander, distributing his army into five divisions, traversed the country and put down all resistance, while he also took measures for establishing several military posts, or new towns, in convenient places.[1] After some time the whole army was reunited at the chief place of Sogdiana—Marakanda—where some halt and repose was given.[2]

B.C. 328. Banquet at Marakanda. Character and position of Kleitus.

During this halt at Marakanda (Samarcand) the memorable banquet occurred wherein Alexander murdered Kleitus. It has been already related that Kleitus had saved his life at the battle of the Granikus, by cutting off the sword arm of the Persian Spithridatês when already uplifted to strike him from behind. Since the death of Philotas, the important function of general of the Companion-cavalry had been divided between Hephæstion and Kleitus. Moreover the family of Kleitus had been attached to Philip, by ties so ancient, that his sister,

[1] Curtius (vii. 10, 15) mentions six cities (oppida) founded by Alexander in these regions; apparently somewhere north of the Oxus, but the sites cannot be made out. Justin (xii. 5) alludes to twelve foundations in Baktria and Sogdiana.

[2] Arrian, iv. 16, 4; Curtius, vii. 10, 1. "Sogdiana regio magnâ ex parte deserta est; octingenta ferè stadia in latitudinem vastæ solitudines tenent."

Respecting the same country (Sogdiana and Baktria), Mr. Erskine observes (Introduction to the Memoirs of Sultan Baber, p. xliii.):—

"The face of the country is extremely broken, and divided by lofty hills; even the plains are diversified by great varieties of soil, — some extensive districts along the Kohik river, nearly the whole of Ferghana (along the Jaxartes), the greater part of Kwarizm along the branches of the Oxus, with large portions of Balkh, Badakshan, Kesh, and Hissar, being of uncommon fertility; while the greater part of the rest is a barren waste, and in some places a sandy desert. Indeed the whole country north of the Oxus has a decided tendency to degenerate into desert, and many of its most fruitful spaces are nearly surrounded by barren sands; so that the population of all these districts still, as in the time of Baber, consists of the fixed inhabitants of the cities and fertile lands, and of the unsettled and roving wanderers of the desert, who dwell in tents of felt, and live on the produce of their flocks."

Lanikê, had been selected as the nurse of Alexander himself when a child. Two of her sons had already perished in the Asiatic battles. If therefore there were any man who stood high in the service, or was privileged to speak his mind freely to Alexander, it was Kleitus.

In this banquet at Marakanda, when wine, according to the Macedonian habit, had been abundantly drunk, and when Alexander, Kleitus, and most of the other guests were already nearly intoxicated, enthusiasts or flatterers heaped immoderate eulogies upon the king's past achievements.[1] They exalted him above all the most venerated legendary heroes; they proclaimed that his superhuman deeds proved his divine paternity, and that he had earned an apotheosis like Hêraklês, which nothing but envy could withhold from him even during his life. Alexander himself joined in these boasts, and even took credit for the later victories of the reign of his father, whose abilities and glory he depreciated. To the old Macedonian officers, such an insult cast on the memory of Philip was deeply offensive. But among them all, none had been more indignant than Kleitus, with the growing insolence of Alexander—his assumed filiation from Zeus Ammon, which put aside Philip as unworthy—his preference for Persian attendants, who granted or refused admittance to his person—his extending to Macedonian soldiers the contemptuous treatment habitually endured by Asiatics, and even allowing them to be scourged by Persian hands and Persian rods.[2] The pride of a Macedonian general in the stupendous successes of the last five years, was effaced by his mortification, when he saw that they tended only to merge his countrymen amidst a crowd of servile Asiatics, and to inflame the prince with high-flown aspirations transmitted from Xerxês or Ochus. But whatever might be the internal thoughts of Macedonian officers, they held their peace before Alexander, whose formidable character and exorbitant self-estimation would tolerate no criticism.

Boasts of Alexander and his flatterers—repugnance of Macedonian officers felt, but not expressed.

[1] Arrian, iv. 8, 7.

[2] Plutarch, Alexand. 51. Nothing can be more touching than the words put by Plutarch into the mouth of Kleitus—Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ νῦν χαίρομεν, Ἀλέξανδρε, τοιαῦτα τέλη τῶν πόνων κομιζόμενοι, μακαρίζομεν δὲ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας πρὶν ἐπιδεῖν Μηδικαῖς ῥάβδοις ξαινομένους Μακεδόνας, καὶ Πέρσῶν δεομένους ἵνα τῷ βασιλεῖ προσέλθωμεν.

At the banquet of Marakanda, this long-suppressed repugnance found an issue, accidental indeed and unpremeditated, but for that very reason all the more violent and unmeasured. The wine, which made Alexander more boastful, and his flatterers fulsome to excess, overpowered altogether the reserve of Kleitus. He rebuked the impiety of those who degraded the ancient heroes in order to make a pedestal for Alexander. He protested against the injustice of disparaging the exalted and legitimate fame of Philip; whose achievements he loudly extolled, pronouncing them to be equal, and even superior, to those of his son. For the exploits of Alexander, splendid as they were, had been accomplished, not by himself alone, but by that unconquerable Macedonian force which he had found ready made to his hands;[1] whereas those of Philip had been his own—since he had found Macedonia prostrate and disorganised, and had to create for himself both soldiers and a military system. The great instruments of Alexander's victories had been Philip's old soldiers, whom he now despised—and among them Parmenio, whom he had put to death.

Scene at the banquet —vehement remonstrance of Kleitus.

Remarks such as these, poured forth in the coarse language of a half-intoxicated Macedonian veteran, provoked loud contradiction from many, and gave poignant offence to Alexander; who now for the first time heard the open outburst of disapprobation, before concealed and known to him only by surmise. But wrath and contradiction, both from him and from others, only made Kleitus more reckless in the outpouring of his own feelings, now discharged with delight after having been so long pent up. He passed from the old Macedonian soldiers to himself individually. Stretching forth his right hand towards Alexander, he exclaimed:—"Recollect that you owe your life to me; this hand preserved you at the Granikus. Listen to the outspoken language of truth, or else abstain from asking freemen to supper, and confine yourself to the society of barbaric slaves." All these reproaches stung Alexander to the quick. But nothing was so intolerable to him as the respectful sympathy for Parmenio, which brought to his memory one of the blackest deeds of his life—and the

Furious wrath of Alexander —he murders Kleitus.

[1] Arrian, iv. 8. 8, οὔκουν μόνον ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ μέρος Μακεδόνων εἶναι γε (Ἀλέξανδρον) καταπράξαι αὐτά, τὰ ἔργα, &c.

reminiscence of his preservation at the Granikus, which lowered him into the position of a debtor towards the very censor under whose reproof he was now smarting. At length wrath and intoxication together drove him into uncontrollable fury. He started from his couch, and felt for his dagger to spring at Kleitus; but the dagger had been put out of reach by one of his attendants. In a loud voice and with the Macedonian word of command, he summoned the body guards and ordered the trumpeter to sound an alarm. But no one obeyed so grave an order, given in his condition of drunkenness. His principal officers, Ptolemy, Perdikkas and others, clung round him, held his arms and body, and besought him to abstain from violence; others at the same time tried to silence Kleitus and hurry him out of the hall, which had now become a scene of tumult and consternation. But Kleitus was not in a humour to confess himself in the wrong by retiring; while Alexander, furious at the opposition now, for the first time, offered to his will, exclaimed, that his officers held him in chains as Bessus had held Darius, and left him nothing but the name of a king. Though anxious to restrain his movements, they doubtless did not dare to employ much physical force; so that his great personal strength, and continued efforts, presently set him free. He then snatched a pike from one of the soldiers, rushed upon Kleitus, and thrust him through on the spot, exclaiming, "Go now to Philip and Parmenio."[1]

[1] Arrian, iv. 8; Curtius, viii. 1; Plutarch, Alexand. 50, 51; Justin xii. 6. The description given by Diodorus was contained in the lost part of his seventeenth book; the table of contents, prefixed thereunto, notes the incident briefly.

All the authors describe in the same general way the commencement, progress, and result, of this impressive scene in the banqueting hall of Marakanda; but they differ materially in the details. In giving what seems to me the most probable account, I have borrowed partly from all, yet following mostly the account given by Arrian from Ptolemy, himself present. For Arrian's narrative down to sect. 14 of c. 8 (before the words Ἀριστόβουλος δέ) may fairly be presumed to be derived from Ptolemy.

Both Plutarch and Curtius describe the scene in a manner more dishonourable to Alexander than Arrian; and at the same time (in my judgement) less probable. Plutarch says that the brawl took its rise from a poet named Pierion singing a song which turned into derision those Macedonians who had been recently defeated in Sogdiana; that Alexander and those around him greatly applauded this satire; that Kleitus protested against such an insult to soldiers,

Intense remorse of Alexander, immediately after the deed.

No sooner was the deed perpetrated, than the feelings of Alexander underwent an entire revolution. The spectacle of Kleitus, a bleeding corpse on the floor,—the marks of stupefaction and horror evident in all the spectators, and the reaction from a furious impulse instantaneously satiated —plunged him at once into the opposite extreme of remorse and self-condemnation. Hastening out of the hall, and retiring to bed, he passed three days in an agony of distress, without food or drink. He burst into tears and multiplied

who, though unfortunate, had behaved with unimpeachable bravery; that Alexander then turned upon Kleitus, saying that he was seeking an excuse for himself by extenuating cowardice in others; that Kleitus retorted by reminding him of the preservation of his life at the Granikus. Alexander is thus made to provoke the quarrel by aspersing the courage of Kleitus, which I think no way probable; nor would he be likely to encourage a song of that tenor.

Curtius agrees with Arrian in ascribing the origin of the mischief to the extravagant boasts of Alexander and his flatterers, and to their depreciation of Philip. He then tells us that Kleitus, on hearing their unseemly talk, turned round and whispered to his neighbour some lines out of the Andromachê of Euripidês (which lines Plutarch also ascribes to him, though at a later moment); that Alexander, not hearing the words asked what had been said, but no one would tell him; at length Kleitus himself repeated the sentiment in language of his own. This would suit a literary Greek; but an old Macedonian officer half-intoxicated, when animated by a vehement sentiment, would hardly express it by whispering a Greek poetical quotation to his neighbour. He would either hold his tongue, or speak what he felt broadly and directly. Nevertheless Curtius has stated two points very material to the case, which do not appear in Arrian. 1. It was Alexander himself, not his flatterers who vilipended Philip; at least the flatterers only did so, after him, and following his example. The topic would be dangerous for them to originate, and might easily be carried too far. 2. Among all the topics touched upon by Kleitus, none was so intolerable as the open expression of sympathy, friendship, and regret, for Parmenio. This stung Alexander in the sorest point of his conscience; he must have known that there were many present who sympathised with it; and it was probably the main cause which worked him up to phrenzy. Moreover we may be pretty sure that Kleitus, while expatiating upon Philip, would not forget Philip's general in chief and his own old friend, Parmenio.

I cannot believe the statement of Aristobulus, that Kleitus was forced by his friends out of the hall, and afterwards returned to it of his own accord, to defy Alexander once more. It seems plain from Arrian, that Ptolemy said no such thing. The murderous impulse of Alexander was gratified on the spot, and without delay, as soon as he got clear from the gentle restraint of his surrounding friends.

exclamations on his own mad act; he dwelt upon the names of Kleitus and Lanikê with the debt of gratitude which he owed to each, and denounced himself as unworthy to live after having requited such services with a foul murder.[1] His friends at length prevailed on him to take food, and return to activity. All joined in trying to restore his self-satisfaction. The Macedonian army passed a public vote that Kleitus had been justly slain, and that his body should remain unburied; which afforded opportunity to Alexander to reverse the vote, and to direct that it should be buried by his own order.[2] The prophets comforted him by the assurance that his murderous impulse had arisen, not from his own natural mind, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but withheld.[3] Lastly, the Greek sophist or philosopher, Anaxarchus of Abdera, revived Alexander's spirits by well-timed flattery, treating his sensibility as nothing better than generous weakness; reminding him that in his exalted position of conqueror and Great King, he was entitled to prescribe what was right and just, instead of submitting himself to laws dictated from without.[4] Kallisthenês the philosopher was also summoned, along with Anaxarchus, to the king's presence, for the same purpose of offering consolatory reflections. But he is said to have adopted a tone of discourse altogether different, and to have given offence rather than satisfaction to Alexander.

[1] Arrian, iv. 9, 4; Curtius, viii. 2, 2.

[2] Curtius, viii. 2, 12. "Quoque minus cædis puderet, jure interfectum Clitum Macedones decernunt; sepulturâ quoque prohibituri, ni rex humari jussisset."

In explanation of this monstrous verdict of the soldiers, we must recollect that the safety of the whole army (now at Samarkand, almost beyond the boundary of inhabited regions, ἔξω τῆς οἰκουμένης) was felt to depend on the life of Alexander. Compare Justin, xii. 6, 15.

[3] Arrian, iv. 9, 6. Alexander imagined himself to have incurred the displeasure of Dionysus by having sacked and destroyed the city of Thebes, the supposed birthplace and favourite locality of that god (Plutarch, Alex. 13).

The maddening delusion brought upon men by the wrath of Dionysus is awfully depicted in the Bacchæ of Euripidês. Under the influence of that delusion, Agavê, mother of Pentheus, tears her son in pieces and bears away his head in triumph, not knowing what is in her hands. Compare also Euripid. Hippolyt. 440—1412.

[4] Arrian, iv. 9, 10; Plutarch, Alex. 52.

To such remedial influences, and probably still more to the absolute necessity for action, Alexander's remorse at length yielded. Like the other emotions of his fiery soul, it was violent and overpowering while it lasted. But it cannot be shown to have left any durable trace on his character, nor any effects, justifying the unbounded admiration of Arrian; who has little but blame to bestow on the murdered Kleitus, while he expresses the strongest sympathy for the mental suffering of the murderer.

B.C. 328. Active and successful operations of Alexander in Sogdiana.

After ten days,[1] Alexander again put his army in motion, to complete the subjugation of Sogdiana. He found no enemy capable of meeting him in pitched battle; yet Spitamenês, with the Sogdians and some Scythian allies, raised much hostility of detail, which it cost another year to put down. Alexander underwent the greatest fatigue and hardships in his marches through the mountainous parts of this wide, rugged, and poorly supplied country, with rocky positions, strong by nature, which his enemies sought to defend. One of these fastnesses, held by a native chief named Sisymithrês, seemed almost unattackable, and was indeed taken rather by intimidation than by actual force.[2] The Scythians, after a partial success over a small Macedonian detachment, were at length so thoroughly beaten and overawed, that they slew Spitamenês, and sent his head to the conqueror as a propitiatory offering.[3]

After a short rest at Nautaka during the extreme winter, Alexander resumed operations, by attacking a strong post called the Sogdian Rock, whither a large number of fugitives had assembled, with an ample supply of provision. It was a precipice supposed to be inexpugnable; and would seemingly have proved so, in spite of the energy and abilities of Alexander, had not the occupants altogether neglected their guard, and yielded at the mere sight of a handful of Macedonians who had scrambled up the precipice. Among the captives taken by Alexander on this rock, were the wife and

B.C. 328-327. (Winter, Spring). Capture of two inexpugnable positions—the Sogdian rock—the

[1] Curtius, viii. 2, 13—"decem diebus ad confirmandum pudorem apud Maracanda consumptis," &c.

[2] Curtius, viii. 2, 20—30.

[3] Arrian, iv. 17, 11. Curtius (viii. 8) gives a different narrative of the death of Spitamenês.

family of the Baktrian chief Oxyartês; one of whose daughters, named Roxana, so captivated Alexander by her beauty that he resolved to make her his wife.[1] He then passed out of Sogdiana into the neighbouring territory Parætakênê, where there was another inexpugnable site called the Rock of Choriênes, which he was also fortunate enough to reduce.[2]

Rock of Choriênes. Passion of Alexander for Roxana.

From hence Alexander went to Baktra. Sending Krateros with a division to put the last hand to the reduction of Parætakênê, he himself remained at Baktra, preparing for his expedition across the Hindoo-Koosh to the conquest of India. As a security for the tranquillity of Baktria and Sogdiana during his absence, he levied 30,000 young soldiers from those countries to accompany him.[3]

B.C. 327.

It was at Baktra that Alexander celebrated his marriage with the captive Roxana. Amidst the repose and festivities connected with that event, the Oriental temper which he was now acquiring displayed itself more forcibly than ever. He could no longer be satisfied without obtaining prostration, or worship, from Greeks and Macedonians as well as from Persians; a public and unanimous recognition of his divine origin and superhuman dignity. Some Greeks and Macedonians had already rendered to him this homage. Nevertheless to the greater number, in spite of their extreme deference and admiration for him, it was repugnant and degrading. Even the imperious Alexander shrank from issuing public and formal orders on such a subject; but a manœuvre was concerted, with his privity, by the Persians and certain compliant Greek sophists or philosophers, for the purpose of carrying the point by surprise.

B.C. 327. (Spring). Alexander at Baktra—marriage with Roxana. His demand for prostration or worship from all.

During a banquet at Baktra, the philosopher Anaxarchus, addressing the assembly in a prepared harangue, extolled Alexander's exploits as greatly surpassing those of Dionysus and Hêraklês. He proclaimed that Alexander had already done more than enough to establish a title to divine

Public harangue of Anaxarchus during a banquet,

[1] Arrian, iv. 18, 19.

[2] Arrian, iv. 21. Our geographical knowledge does not enable us to verify these localities, or to follow Alexander in his marches of detail.

[3] Curtius, viii. 5, 1; Arrian, iv. 22, 2.

exhorting everyone to render this worship.

honours from the Macedonians; who (he said) would assuredly worship Alexander after his death, and ought in justice to worship him during his life, forthwith.[1]

This harangue was applauded, and similar sentiments were enforced, by others favourable to the plan; who proceeded to set the example of immediate compliance, and were themselves the first to tender worship. Most of the Macedonian officers sat unmoved, disgusted at the speech. But though disgusted, they said nothing. To reply to a speech doubtless well-turned and flowing, required some powers of oratory; moreover, it was well known that whoever dared to reply stood marked out for the antipathy of Alexander. The fate of Kleitus, who had arraigned the same sentiments in the banqueting hall of Marakanda, was fresh in the recollection of every one. The repugnance which many felt, but none ventured to express, at length found an organ in Kallisthenês of Olynthus.

Public reply of Kallisthenês, opposing it. Character and history of Kallisthenês.

This philosopher, whose melancholy fate imparts a peculiar interest to his name, was nephew of Aristotle, and had enjoyed through his uncle an early acquaintance with Alexander during the boyhood of the latter. At the recommendation of Aristotle, Kallisthenês had accompanied Alexander in his Asiatic expedition. He was a man of much literary and rhetorical talent, which he turned towards the composition of history—and to the history of recent times.[2] Alexander, full of ardour for conquest, was at the same time anxious that his achievements should be commemorated by poets and men of letters;[3] there were seasons also when he enjoyed their conversation. On both these grounds he invited several of them to

[1] Arrian, iv. 10, 7–9. Curtius viii. 5, 9–13) represents the speech proposing divine honours to have been delivered, not by Anaxarchus, but by another lettered Greek, a Sicilian named Kleon. The tenor of the speech is substantially the same, as given by both authors.

[2] Kallisthenês had composed three historical works — 1. Hellenica—from the year 387 – 337 B.C. 2. History of the Sacred War—from 357 – 346 B.C. 3. Τὰ κατ' Ἀλέξανδρον. His style is said by Cicero to have been rhetorical; but the Alexandrine critics included him in their Canon of Historians. See Didot, Fragm. Hist. Alex. Magn. p. 6–9.

[3] See the observation ascribed to him, expressing envy towards Achilles for having been immortalised by Homer (Arrian, i. 12, 2).

accompany the army. The more prudent among them declined, but Kallisthenês obeyed, partly in hopes of procuring the reconstitution of his native city Olynthus, as Aristotle had obtained the like favour for Stageira.[1] Kallisthenês had composed a narrative (not preserved) of Alexander's exploits, which certainly reached to the battle of Arbêla, and may perhaps have gone down farther. The few fragments of this narrative remaining seem to betoken extreme admiration, not merely of the bravery and ability, but also of the transcendent and unbroken good fortune, of Alexander—marking him out as the chosen favourite of the Gods. This feeling was perfectly natural under the grandeur of the events. Insofar as we can judge from one or two specimens, Kallisthenês was full of complimentary tribute to the hero of his history. But the character of Alexander himself had undergone a material change during the six years between his first landing in Asia and his campaign in Sogdiana. All his worst qualities had been developed by unparalleled success and by Asiatic example. He required larger doses of flattery, and had now come to thirst, not merely for the reputation of divine paternity, but for the actual manifestations of worship as towards a God.

To the literary Greeks who accompanied Alexander, this change in his temper must have been especially palpable and full of serious consequence; since it was chiefly manifested, not at periods of active military duty, but at his hours of leisure, when he recreated himself by their conversation and discourses. Several of these Greeks—Anaxarchus, Kleon, the poet Agis of Argos—accommodated themselves to the change, and wound up their flatteries to the pitch required. Kallisthenês could not do so. He was a man of sedate character, of simple, severe, and almost unsocial habits—to whose sobriety the long Macedonian potations were distasteful. Aristotle said of him, that he was a great and powerful speaker, but that he had no judgement; according to other reports, he was a vain and arrogant man, who boasted that Alexander's reputation and immortality were dependent on the composition and tone

[1] It is said that Ephorus, Xenokratês, and Menedemus, all declined the invitation of Alexander (Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, p. 1043). Respecting Menedemus, the fact can hardly be so: he must have been then too young to be invited.

of *his* history.[1] Of personal vanity,—a common quality among literary Greeks,—Kallisthenês probably had his full share. But there is no ground for believing that *his* character had altered. Whatever his vanity may have been, it had given no offence to Alexander during the earlier years; nor would it have given offence now, had not Alexander himself become a different man.

The reply of Kallisthenês is favourably heard by the guests—the proposition for worship is dropped.

On occasion of the demonstration led up by Anaxarchus at the banquet, Kallisthenês had been invited by Hephæstion to join in the worship intended to be proposed towards Alexander; and Hephæstion afterwards alleged, that he had promised to comply.[2] But his actual conduct affords reasonable ground for believing that he made no such promise; for he not only thought it his duty to refuse the act of worship, but also to state publicly his reasons for disapproving it; the more so, as he perceived that most of the Macedonians present felt like himself. He contended that the distinction between Gods and men was one which could not be confounded without impiety and wrong. Alexander had amply earned,—as a man, a general, and a king,—the highest honours compatible

[1] Arrian, iv. 10, 2; Plutarch, Alex. 53, 54. It is remarkable that Timæus denounced Kallisthenês as having in his historical work flattered Alexander to excess (Polybius, xii. 12). Kallisthenês seems to have recognised various special interpositions of the Gods, to aid Alexander's successes—see Fragments 25 and 36 of the Fragmenta Callisthenis in the edition of Didot.

In reading the censure which Arrian passes on the arrogant pretensions of Kallisthenês, we ought at the same time to read the pretensions raised by Arrian on his own behalf as an historian (i. 12, 7—9)—καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε οὐχ ἁπαξιῶ ἐμαυτὸν τῶν πρώτων ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῇ Ἑλλάδι, εἴπερ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, &c. I doubt much whether Kallisthenês pitched his self-estimation so high. In this chapter, Arrian recounts, that Alexander envied Achilles for having been fortunate enough to obtain such a poet as Homer for panegyrist; and Arrian laments that Alexander had not, as yet, found an historian equal to his deserts. This, in point of fact, is a re-assertion of the same truth whichKallisthenês stands condemned for asserting — that the fame even of the greatest warrior depends upon his commemorators. The boastfulness of a poet is at least pardonable, when he exclaims, like Theokritus, Idyll. xvi. 78—

Ἔσσεται οὗτος ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐμεῦ κεχρήσετ' ἀοιδῶ,
Ῥέξας ἢ Ἀχιλεὺς ὅσσον μέγας, ἢ βαρὺς Αἴας
Ἐν πεδίῳ Σιμόεντος, ὅθι Φρυγὸς ἠρίον Ἴλου.

[2] Plutarch, Alex. 55.

with humanity; but to exalt him into a God would be both an injury to him and an offence to the Gods. Anaxarchus (he said) was the last person from whom such a proposition ought to come, because he was one of those whose only title to Alexander's society was founded upon his capacity to give instructive and wholesome counsel.[1]

Kallisthenês here spoke out, what numbers of his hearers felt. The speech was not only approved, but so warmly applauded by the Macedonians present, especially the older officers,—that Alexander thought it prudent to forbid all farther discussion upon this delicate subject. Presently the Persians present, according to Asiatic custom, approached him and performed their prostration; after which Alexander pledged, in successive goblets of wine, those Greeks and Macedonians with whom he had held previous concert. To each of them the goblet was handed, and each, after drinking to answer the pledge, approached the King, made his prostration, and then received a salute. Lastly, Alexander sent the pledge to Kallisthenês, who, after drinking like the rest, approached him, for the purgose of receiving the salute, but without any prostration. Of this omission Alexander was expressly informed by one of the Companions; upon which he declined to admit Kallisthenês to a salute. The latter retired, observing, "Then I shall go away, worse off than others as far as the salute goes."[2]

Honorable frankness and courage of Kallisthenês.

Kallisthenês was imprudent, and even blameable, in making this last observation, which, without any necessity or advantage, aggravated the offence already given to Alexander. He was more imprudent still, if we look simply to his own personal safety, in standing forward publicly to protest against the suggestion for rendering divine honours to that prince and in thus creating the main offence which even in itself was inexpiable. But here the occasion was one serious and important, so as to convert the imprudence into an act of genuine moral courage. The question was, not about obeying an order given by Alexander, for no order had been given—but about accepting or rejecting a motion made by Anaxarchus; which Alexander, by a shabby preconcerted manœuvre, affected to leave to the free decision of the

[1] Arrian, iv. 11. ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ τε καὶ παιδεύσει Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συνόντα.

[2] Arrian, iv. 12, 7. φιλήματι ἔλαττον ἔχων ἄπειμι.

assembly, in full confidence that no one would be found intrepid enough to oppose it. If one Greek sophist made a proposition, in itself servile and disgraceful, another sophist could do himself nothing but honour by entering public protest against it; more especially since this was done (as we may see by the report in Arrian) in terms noway insulting, but full of respectful admiration towards Alexander personally. The perfect success of the speech is in itself a proof of the propriety of its tone;[1] for the Macedonian officers would feel indifference if not contempt, towards a rhetor like Kallisthenês, while towards Alexander they had the greatest deference short of actual worship. There are few occasions on which the free spirit of Greek letters and Greek citizenship, in their protest against exorbitant individual insolence, appears more conspicuous and estimable than in the speech of Kallisthenês.[2] Arrian disapproves the purpose of Alexander, and strongly blames the motion of Anaxarchus; nevertheless such is his anxiety to find some excuse for Alexander, that he also blames Kallisthenês for unseasonable frankness, folly, and insolence, in offering opposition. He might have said with some truth, that Kallisthenês would have done well to withdraw earlier (if indeed he could have withdrawn without offence) from the camp of Alexander, in which no lettered Greek could now associate without abnegating his freedom of speech and sentiment, and emulating the servility of Anaxarchus. But being present, as Kallisthenês was, in

[1] Arrian, iv. 12, 1. ἀντᾶσαι μὲν μεγαλωστὶ Ἀλέξανδρον, Μακεδόσι δὲ πρὸς θυμοῦ εἰπεῖν . . . .

Curtius, viii. 5, 20. "Æquis auribus Callisthenes velut vindex publicæ libertatis audiebatur. Expresserat non assensionem modo, sed etiam vocem, seniorum præcipuè, quibus gravis erat inveterati moris externa mutatio."

[2] There was no sentiment more deeply rooted in the free Grecian mind, prior to Alexander's conquests, than the repugnance to arrogant aspirations on the part of the fortunate man, swelling himself above the limits of humanity—and the belief that such aspirations were followed by the Nemesis of the Gods. In the dying speech which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Cyrus the Great, we find—"Ye Gods, I thank you much, that I have been sensible of your care for me, and that I have never in my successes raised my thoughts above the measure of man" (Cyropæd. viii. 7, 3). Among the most striking illustrations of this sentiment is the story of Solon and Crœsus (Herodot. i. 32—34).

I shall recount in the next chapter examples of monstrous flattery on the part of the Athenians, proving how this sentiment expired with their freedom.

the hall at Baktra when the proposition of Anaxarchus was made, and when silence would have been assent—his protest against it was both seasonable and dignified for being fraught with danger to himself.

Kallisthenês knew that danger well, and was quickly enabled to recognize it in the altered demeanour of Alexander towards him. He was, from that day, a marked man in two senses: first, to Alexander himself, as well as to the rival sophists and all promoters of the intended deification,—for hatred, and for getting up some accusatory pretence such as might serve to ruin him; next, to the more free-spirited Macedonians, indignant witnesses of Alexander's increased insolence, and admirers of the courageous Greek who had protested against the motion of Anaxarchus. By such men he was doubtless much extolled; which praises aggravated his danger, as they were sure to be reported to Alexander. The pretext for his ruin was not long wanting.

Kallisthenês becomes odious to Alexander.

Among those who admired and sought the conversation of Kallisthenês, was Hermolaus, one of the royal pages,—the band, selected from noble Macedonian families, who did duty about the person of the king. It had happened that this young man, one of Alexander's companions in the chase, on seeing a wild boar rushing up to attack the king, darted his javelin, and slew the animal. Alexander, angry to be anticipated in killing the boar, ordered Hermolaus to be scourged before all the other pages and deprived him of his horse.[1] Thus humiliated and outraged—for an act not merely innocent, but the omission of which, if Alexander had sustained any injury from the boar, might have been held punishable—Hermolaus became resolutely bent on revenge.[2] He enlisted in the project his intimate friend Sostratus, with several others among the pages; and it was agreed among them to kill Alexander in his chamber, on the first night when they were all on guard together. The appointed night arrived, without any divulgation of their secret; yet the scheme was frustrated by the accident,

Conspiracy of the royal pages against Alexander's life—it is divulged—they are put to torture, but implicate no one else: they are put to death.

[1] Plutarch, Alexand. 54. He refers to Hermippus, who mentions what was told to Aristotle by Strœbus, the reader attendant on Kallisthenês.

[2] Arrian, iv. 13; Curtius, viii. 6, 7.

that Alexander continued till daybreak drinking with his officers, and never retired to bed. On the morrow, one of the conspirators, becoming alarmed or repentant, divulged the scheme to his friend Chariklês, with the names of those concerned. Eurylochus, brother to Chariklês, apprised by him of what he had heard, immediately informed Ptolemy, through whom it was conveyed to Alexander. By Alexander's order, the persons indicated were arrested and put to the torture;[1] under which they confessed that they had themselves conspired to kill him, but named no other accomplices, and even denied that any one else was privy to the scheme. In this denial they persisted, though extreme suffering was applied to extort the revelation of new names. They were then brought up and arraigned as conspirators before the assembled Macedonian soldiers. There their confession was repeated. It is even said that Hermolaus, in repeating it, boasted of the enterprise as legitimate and glorious; denouncing the tyranny and cruelty of Alexander as having become insupportable to a freeman. Whether such boast was actually made or not, the persons brought up were pronounced guilty, and stoned to death forthwith by the soldiers.[2]

Kallisthenês is arrested as an accomplice—antipathy manifested by Alexander against him, and against Aristotle also.

The pages thus executed were young men of good Macedonian families, for whose condemnation accordingly Alexander had thought it necessary to invoke—what he was sure of obtaining against any one—the sentence of the soldiers. To satisfy his hatred against Kallisthenês—not a Macedonian, but only a Greek citizen, one of the surviving remnants of the subverted city of Olynthus—no such formality was required.[3] As yet, there was not a shadow of proof to implicate this philosopher; for obnoxious as his name was known to be, Hermolaus and his companions had, with exemplary fortitude, declined to purchase the chance of respite from extreme torture by pronouncing it. Their

[1] Arrian, iv. 13, 13.

[2] Arrian, iv. 14, 4. Curtius expands this scene into great detail; composing a long speech for Hermolaus, and another for Alexander (viii. 6, 7, 8).

He says that the soldiers who executed these pages, tortured them first, in order to manifest zeal for Alexander (viii. 8, 20).

[3] "Quem, si Macedo esset, (Callisthenem) tecum introduxissem, dignissimum te discipulo magistrum: nunc Olynthio non idem juris est" (Curtius, viii. 8, 19—speech of Alexander before the soldiers, addressing Hermolaus especially).

confessions,—all extorted by suffering, unless confirmed by other evidence, of which we do not know whether any was taken—were hardly of the least value, even against themselves; but against Kallisthenês they had no bearing whatever; nay, they tended indirectly, not to convict, but to absolve him. In his case, therefore, as in that of Philotas before, it was necessary to pick up matter of suspicious tendency from his reported remarks and conversations. He was alleged[1] to have addressed dangerous and inflammatory language to the pages, holding up Alexander to odium, instigating them to conspiracy, and pointing out Athens as a place of refuge; he was moreover well known to have been often in conversation with Hermolaus. For a man of the violent temper and omnipotent authority of Alexander, such indications were quite sufficient as grounds of action against one whom he hated.

On this occasion, we have the state of Alexander's mind disclosed by himself, in one of the references to his letters given by Plutarch. Writing to Kraterus and to others immediately afterwards, Alexander distinctly stated that the pages throughout all their torture had deposed against no one but themselves. Nevertheless, in another letter addressed to Antipater in Macedonia, he used these expressions — "The pages were stoned to death by the Macedonians; but I myself shall punish the sophist, as well as those who sent him out here, and those who harbour in their cities conspirators against me."[2] The sophist Kalli-

[1] Plutarch, Alex. 55; Arrian, iv. 10, 4.

[2] Plutarch, Alex. 55. Καίτοι τῶν περὶ Ἑρμόλαον οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ ἐσχάτης ἀνάγκης Καλλισθένους κατεῖπεν. Ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος αὐτὸς εὐθὺς γράφων Κρατέρῳ καὶ Ἀττάλῳ καὶ Ἀλκέτᾳ φησὶ τοὺς παῖδας βασανιζομένους ὁμολογεῖν, ὡς αὐτοὶ ταῦτα πράξειαν, ἄλλος δὲ οὐδεὶς συνειδείη. Ὕστερον δὲ γράφων πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον, καὶ τὸν Καλλισθένην συνεπαιτιασάμενος, Οἱ μὲν παῖδές, φησιν, ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων κατελεύσθησαν, τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ἐγὼ κολάσω, καὶ τοὺς ἐκπέμψαντας αὐτὸν, καὶ τοὺς ὑποδεχομένους ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς ἐμοὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας . . . . ἄντικρυς ἔν γε τούτοις ἀποκαλυπτόμενος πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην, &c.

About the hostile dispositions of Alexander towards Aristotle, see Dio Chrysostom, Orat. 64. de Fortunâ, p. 598.

Kraterus was at this time absent in Sogdiana, engaged in finishing the suppression of the resistance (Arrian, iv. 22, 1). To him, therefore, Alexander would naturally write.

This statement, from the pen of Alexander himself, distinctly contradicts and refutes (as I have before observed) the affirmation of Ptolemy and Aristobulus as given by Arrian (iv. 14, 1) — that the pages deposed against Kallisthenês.

sthenês had been sent out by Aristotle, who is here designated; and probably the Athenians after him. Fortunately for Aristotle, he was not at Baktra, but at Athens. That he could have had any concern in the conspiracy of the pages, was impossible. In this savage outburst of menace against his absent preceptor, Alexander discloses the real state of feeling which prompted him to the destruction of Kallisthenês; hatred towards that spirit of citizenship and free speech, which Kallisthenês not only cherished, in common with Aristotle and most other literary Greeks, but had courageously manifested in his protest against the motion for worshipping a mortal.

Kallisthenês is tortured and hanged.

Kallisthenês was first put to the torture and then hanged.[1] His tragical fate excited a profound sentiment of sympathy and indignation among the philosophers of antiquity.[2]

B.C. 327. (Summer).

Alexander reduces the country between the Hindoo-Koosh and the Indus.

The halts of Alexander were formidable to friends and companions; his marches, to the unconquered natives whom he chose to treat as enemies. On the return of Kraterus from Sogdiana, Alexander began his march from Baktra (Balkh) southward to the mountain range Paropamisus or Caucasus (Hindoo-Koosh); leaving however at Baktra Amyntas with a large force of 10,000 foot and 3500 horse, to keep these intractable territories in subjugation.[3] His march over the mountains occupied ten days;

[1] Arrian, iv. 15, 5. Curtius also says —"Callisthenes quoque tortus interiit, initi consilii in caput regis innoxius, sed haudquaquam aulæ et assentantium accommodatus ingenio" (viii. 8, 21). Compare Plutarch, Alex. 55.

This is the statement of Ptolemy; who was himself concerned in the transactions, and was the officer through whom the conspiracy of the pages had been revealed. His partiality might permit him to omit or soften what was discreditable to Alexander, but he may be fully trusted when he records an act of cruelty. Aristobulus and others affirmed that Kallisthenês was put in chains and carried about in this condition for some time; after which he died of disease and a wretched state of body. But the witnesses here are persons whose means of information we do not know to be so good as those of Ptolemy; besides that the statement is intrinsically less probable.

[2] See the language of Seneca, Nat. Quest. vi. 23; Plutarch, De Adulator. et Amici Discrimine, p. 65; Theophrast. ap. Ciceron. Tusc. Disp. iii. 10.

Curtius says that this treatment of Kallisthenês was followed by a late repentance on the part of Alexander (viii. 8, 23). On this point there is no other evidence—nor can I think the statement probable.

[3] Arrian, iv. 22, 4.

he then visited his newly-founded city Alexandria in the Paropamisadæ. At or near the river Kophen (Kabool river), he was joined by Taxilês, a powerful Indian prince, who brought as a present twenty-five elephants, and whose alliance was very valuable to him. He then divided his army, sending one division under Hephæstion and Perdikkas, towards the territory called Peukelaôtis (apparently that immediately north of the confluence of the Kabool river with the Indus); and conducting the remainder himself in an easterly direction, over the mountainous regions between the Hindoo-Koosh and the right bank of the Indus. Hephæstion was ordered, after subduing all enemies in his way, to prepare a bridge ready for passing the Indus by the time when Alexander should arrive. Astes, prince of Peukelaôtis, was taken and slain in the city where he had shut himself up; but the reduction of it cost Hephæstion a siege of thirty days.[1]

B.C. 327-326. Conquest of tribes on the right bank of the Indus—the rock of Aornos.

Alexander, with his own half of the army, undertook the reduction of the Aspasii, the Guræi, and the Assakeni, tribes occupying montainous and difficult localities along the southern slopes of the Hindoo-Koosh; but neither they nor their various towns mentioned—Arigæon, Massaga, Bazira, Ora, Dyrta, &c., except perhaps the remarkable rock of Aornos,[2] near the Indus—can be more exactly identified. These tribes were generally brave, and

[1] Arrian, iv. 22, 8—12.

[2] Respecting the rock called Aornos, a valuable and elaborate article, entitled "Gradus ad Aornon," has been published by Major Abbot in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, No iv. 1854. This article gives much information, collected mainly by inquiries on the spot, and accompanied by a map, about the very little known country west of the Indus, between the Kabool river on the south, and the Hindoo-Koosh on the north.

Major Abbot attempts to follow the march and operations of Alexander, from Alexandria ad Caucasum to the rock of Aornos (p. 311 *seq.*). He shows highly probable reason for believing that the Aornos described by Arrian is the Mount Mahabunn, near the right bank of the Indus (lat. 34° 20′), about sixty miles above its confluence with the Kabool river. "The whole account of Arrian of the rock Aornos is a faithful picture of the Mahabunn. It was the most remarkable feature of the country. It was the refuge of all the neighbouring tribes. It was covered with forest. It had good soil sufficient for a thousand ploughs, and pure springs of water everywhere abounded. It was 4125 feet above the plain, and fourteen miles in circuit. The summit was a plain where cavalry could act. It would be difficult to offer

seconded by towns of strong position as well as by a rugged country, in many parts utterly without roads.[1] But their defence was conducted with little union, no military skill, and miserable weapons; so that they were noway qualified to oppose the excellent combination and rapid movements

a more faithful description of the Mahabunn. The side on which Alexander scaled the main summit had certainly the character of a rock. But the whole description of Arrian indicates a table mountain" (p. 341). The Mahabunn "is a mountain table, scarped on the east by tremendous precipices, from which descends one large spur down upon the Indus between Sitana and Umb" (p. 340).

To this similarity in so many local features, is to be added the remarkable coincidence of name, between the town Embolina, where Arrian states that Alexander established his camp for the purpose of attacking Aornos—and the modern names Umb and Balimah (between the Mahabunn and the Indus)— "the one in the river valley, the other on the mountain immediately above it" (p. 344). Mount Mahabunn is the natural refuge for the people of the neighbourhood from a conqueror, and was among the places taken by Nadir Shah (p. 338).

A strong case of identity is thus made out between this mountain and the Aornos *described by Arrian*. But undoubtedly it does not coincide with the Aornos *described by Curtius*, who compares Aornos to a Meta (the conical goal of the stadium), and says that the Indus washed its base,— that at the first assault several Macedonian soldiers were hurled down into the river. This close juxtaposition of the Indus has been the principal feature looked for by travellers who have sought for Aornos; but no place has yet been found answering the conditions required. We have here to make our election between Arrian and Curtius. Now there is a general presumption in Arrian's favour, in the description of military operations, where he makes a positive statement; but in this case, the presumption is peculiarly strong, because Ptolemy was in the most conspicuous and difficult command for the capture of Aornos, and was therefore likely to be particular in the description of a scene where he had reaped much glory.

[1] Arrian, iv. 30, 13. ἡ στρατιὰ αὐτῷ ὡδοποιεῖτο πρόσω ἰοῦσα, ἄπορα ἄλλως ὄντα τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία &c.

The countries here traversed by Alexander include parts of Kafiristan, Swart, Bajore, Chitral, the neighbourhood of the Kameh and other affluents of the river Kabool before it falls into the Indus near Attock. Most of this is Terra Incognita even at present; especially Kafiristan, a territory inhabited by a population said to be rude and barbarous, but which has never been conquered—nor indeed ever visited by strangers. It is remarkable, that among the inhabitants of Kafiristan—as well as among those of Badakshan, on the other or northern side of the Hindoo-Koosh—there exist traditions respecting Alexander, together with a sort of belief that they themselves are descended from his soldiers. See Ritter's Erdkunde part vii. book iii. p. 200 *seq.*; Burnes's Travels, vol. iii. ch. 4. p. 186, 2nd ed.; Wilson Ariana Antiqua, p. 194 *seq.*

of Alexander, together with the confident attack and very superior arms, offensive as well as defensive, of his soldiers. All those who attempted resistance were successively attacked, overpowered and slain. Even those who did not resist, but fled to the mountains, were pursued and either slaughtered or sold for slaves. The only way of escaping the sword was to remain, submit, and await the fiat of the invader. Such a series of uninterrupted successes, all achieved with little loss, it is rare in military history to read. The capture of the rock of Aornos was peculiarly gratifying to Alexander, because it enjoyed the legendary reputation of having been assailed in vain by Hêraklês—and indeed he himself had deemed it, at first sight, unassailable. After having thus subdued the upper regions (above Attock or the confluence of the Kabul river) on the right bank of the Indus, he availed himself of some forests alongside to fell timber and build boats. These boats were sent down the stream, to the point where Hephæstion and Perdikkas were preparing the bridge.[1]

Such fatiguing operations of Alexander, accomplished amidst all the hardships of winter, were followed by a halt of thirty days, to refresh the soldiers, before he crossed the Indus, in the early spring of 326 B. C.[2] It is presumed, probably enough, that he crossed at or near Attock, the passage now frequented. He first marched to Taxila, where the prince Taxilus at once submitted, and reinforced the army with a strong contingent of Indian soldiers. His alliance and information was found extremely valuable. The whole neighbouring territory submitted, and was placed under Philippus as satrap, with a garrison and depôt at Taxila. He experienced no resistance until he reached the river Hydaspes (Jelum), on the other side of which the Indian prince Porus stood prepared to dispute the passage; a brave man, with a formidable force, better armed than Indians generally were, and with many trained elephants; which animals the Macedonians had never yet encountered in battle. By a series of admirable military combinations,

B.C. 326. (Spring).

Alexander crosses the Indus—forces the passage of the Hydaspes, defeating Porus—generous treatment of Porus.

[1] Arrian, iv. 30, 16; v. 7, 2.

[2] The halt of thirty days is mentioned by Diodorus, xvii. 86. For the proof that these operations took place in winter, see the valuable citation from Aristobulus given in Strabo (xv. p. 691).

Alexander eluded the vigilance of Porus, stole the passage of the river at a point a few miles above, and completely defeated the Indian army. In spite of their elephants, which were skilfully managed, the Indians could not long withstand the shock of close combat, against such cavalry and infantry as the Macedonian. Porus, a prince of gigantic stature, mounted on an elephant, fought with the utmost gallantry, rallying his broken troops and keeping them together until the last. Having seen two of his sons slain, himself wounded and perishing with thirst, he was only preserved by the special directions of Alexander. When Porus was brought before him, Alexander was struck with admiration at his stature, beauty, and undaunted bearing.[1] Addressing him first, he asked, what Porus wished to be done for him. "That you should treat me as a king," was the reply of Porus. Alexander, delighted with these words, behaved towards Porus with the utmost courtesy and generosity; not only ensuring to him his actual kingdom, but enlarging it by new additions. He found in Porus a faithful and efficient ally. This was the greatest day of Alexander's life; if we take together the splendour and difficulty of the military achievement, and the generous treatment of his conquered opponent.[2]

[1] Arrian, v. 19, 1. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὡς προσάγοντα ἐπύθετο, προσιππεύσας πρὸ τῆς τάξεως σὺν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἑταίρων ἀπαντᾷ τῷ Πώρῳ, καὶ ἐπιστήσας τὸν ἵππον, τό τε μέγεθος ἐθαύμαζεν ὑπὲρ πέντε πήχεις μάλιστα ξυμβαῖνον, καὶ τὸ κάλλος τοῦ Πώρου, καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεδουλωμένος τῇ γνώμῃ ἐφαίνετο, &c.

We see here how Alexander was struck with the stature and personal beauty of Porus, and how much these visual impressions contributed to determine, or at least to strengthen, his favourable sympathies towards the captive prince. This illustrates what I have observed in the last chapter, in recounting his treatment of the eunuch Batis after the capture of Gaza; that the repulsive appearance of Batis greatly heightened Alexander's indignation. With a man of such violent impulses as Alexander, these external impressions were of no inconsiderable moment.

[2] These operations are described in Arrian, v. 9; v. 19 (we may remark, that Ptolemy and Aristobulus, though both present, differed on many points, v. 14); Curtius viii. 13, 14; Diodor, xvii. 87, 88. According to Plutarch (Alex. 60), Alexander dwelt much upon the battle in his own letters.

There are two principal points—Jelum and Julalpoor—where high roads from the Indus now cross the Hydaspes. Each of these points has been assigned by different writers, as the probable scene of the crossing the river by Alexander. Of the two, Jelum (rather higher up the river than Julalpoor) seems the more probable. Burnes points out,

Alexander celebrated his victory by sacrifices to the Gods, and festivities on the banks of the Hydaspes; where he also gave directions for the foundation of two cities—Nikæa, on the eastern bank; and Bukephalia, on the western, so named in commemoration of his favourite horse, who died here of age and fatigue.[1] Leaving Krateros to lay out and erect these new establishments, as well as to keep up communication, he conducted his army onward in an easterly direction towards

B.C. 326. (April-May).

His farther conquests in the Punjab. Sangala, the last of them.

that near Jelum the river is divided into five or six channels with islands (Travels, vol. ii. ch. 2, p. 50. 2nd ed.). Captain Abbott (in the Journal of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, Dec. 1848) has given an interesting memoir on the features and course of the Hydaspes a little above Jelum, comparing them with the particulars stated by Arrian, and showing highly plausible reasons in support of this hypothesis —that the crossing took place near Jelum.

Diodorus mentions a halt of thirty days, after the victory (xvii. 89), which seems not probable. Both he and Curtius allude to numerous serpents, by which the army was annoyed between the Akesinês and the Hydraotês (Curtius, ix. 1, 11).

[1] Arrian states (v. 19, 5) that the victory over Porus was gained in the month Munychion of the archon Hegemon at Athens—that is, about the end of April, 326 B.C. This date is not to be reconciled with another passage, v. 9, 6—where he says that the summer solstice had already passed, and that all the rivers of the Punjab were full of water, turbid and violent. This swelling of the rivers begins about June; they do not attain their full height until August. Moreover, the description of the battle, as given both by Arrian and by Curtius, implies that it took place after the rainy season had begun (Arrian, v. 9, 7; v. 12, 5. Curtius, viii. 14, 4).

Some critics have proposed to read *Metageitnion* (July-August) as the month, instead of *Munychion;* an alteration approved by Mr. Clinton and received into the text by Schmieder. But if this alteration be admitted, the name of the Athenian archon must be altered also; for Metageitnion of the archon Hegemon would be eight months earlier (July-August, 327 B.C.); and at this date, Alexander had not as yet crossed the Indus, as the passage of Aristobulus (ap. Strab. xv. p. 691) plainly shows—and as Droysen and Mützell remark. Alexander did not cross the Indus before the spring of 326 B.C. If, in place of the archon Hegemon, we substitute the next following archon Chrêmes (and it is remarkable that Diodorus assigns the battle to this later archonship, xvii. 87), this would be July-August 326 B.C.; which would be a more admissible date for the battle than the preceding month of Munychion. At the same time, the substitution of Metageitnion is mere conjecture; and seems to leave hardly time enough for the subsequent events. As far as an opinion can be formed, it would seem that the battle was fought about the end of June or beginning of July 326 B.C., after the

the river Akesinês (Chenab).[1] His recent victory had spread terror around; the Glaukæ, a powerful Indian tribe, with thirty-seven towns and many populous villages, submitted, and were placed under the dominion of Porus; while embassies of submission were also received from two considerable princes—Abisarês, and a second Porus, hitherto at enmity with his namesake. The passage of the great river Akesinês, now full and impetuous in its current, was accomplished by boats and by inflated hides, yet not without difficulty and danger. From thence he proceeded onward in the same direction, across the Punjab—finding no enemies, but leaving detachments at suitable posts to keep up his communications and ensure his supplies—to the river Hydraotês or Ravee; which, though not less broad and full than the Akesinês, was comparatively tranquil, so as to be crossed with facility.[2] Here some free Indian tribes, Kathæans and others, had the courage to resist. They first attempted to maintain themselves in Sangala by surrounding their town with a triple entrenchment of waggons. These being attacked and carried, they were driven within the walls, which they now began to despair of defending, and resolved to evacuate by night; but the project was divulged to Alexander by deserters, and frustrated by his vigilance. On the next day he took the town by storm, putting to the sword 17,000 Indians, and taking (according to Arrian) 70,000 captives. His own loss before the town was less than 100 killed, and 1200 wounded. Two neighbouring towns, in alliance with Sangala, were evacuated by their terrified inhabitants. Alexander pursued, but could not overtake them, except 500 sick or weakly persons, whom his soldiers put to death. Demolishing the town of Sangala, he added the territory to the dominion of Porus, then present, with a contingent of 5000 Indians.[3]

rainy season had commenced; towards the close of the archonship of Hegemon, and the beginning of that of Chrêmes.

[1] Arrian, v. 20; Diodor. xvii. 95. Lieut. Wood (Journey to the Source of the Oxus, p. 11—39) remarks that the large rivers of the Punjab change their course so often and so considerably, that monuments and indications of Alexander's march in that territory cannot be expected to remain, especially in ground near rivers.

[2] Arrian, v. 20.

[3] Arrian, v. 23, 24; Curtius, ix. 1, 15.

Sangala was the easternmost of all Alexander's conquests. Presently his march brought him to the river Hyphasis (Sutledge), the last of the rivers in the Punjab—seemingly at a point below its confluence with the Beas. Beyond this river, broad and rapid, Alexander was informed that there lay a desert of eleven days' march, extending to a still greater river called the Ganges; beyond which dwelt the Gandaridæ, the most powerful, warlike, and populous, of all the Indian tribes, distinguished for the number and training of their elephants.[1] The prospect of a difficult march, and of an enemy esteemed invincible, only instigated his ardour. He gave orders for the crossing. But here for the first time his army, officers as well as soldiers, manifested symptoms of uncontrollable weariness; murmuring aloud at these endless toils, and marches they knew not whither. They had already overpassed the limits where Dionysus and Hêraklês were said to have stopped: they were travelling into regions hitherto unvisited either by Greeks or by Persians, merely for the purpose of provoking and conquering new enemies. Of victories they were sated; of their plunder, abundant as it was, they had no enjoyment;[2] the hardships of a perpetual onward march, often excessively accelerated, had exhausted both men and horses; moreover, their advance from the Hydaspes had been accomplished in the wet season, under rains more violent and continued than they had ever before experienced.[3] Informed of the reigning discontent, Alexander assembled his officers and harangued them, endeavouring to revive in them that forward spirit and promptitude which he had hitherto found not inadequate to his own.[4] But he

B.C. 326. (Summer.)

He reaches the Hyphasis (Sutledge), the farthest of the rivers of the Punjab. His army refuses to march farther.

[1] Curtius, ix. 2, 3; Diodor. xvii. 93; Plutarch, Alex. 62.

[2] Curtius, ix. 3, 11 (speech of Kœnus). "Quoto cuique lorica est? Quis equum habet? Jube quæri, quam multos servi ipsorum persecuti sint, quid cuique supersit ex præda. Omnium victores, omnium inopes sumus."

[3] Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 691-697. ὄεσθαι συνεχῶς. Arrian, v. 29, 8; Diodor. xvii. 93. χειμῶνες ἄγριοι κατερράγησαν ἐφ' ἡμέρας ἑβδομήκοντα, καὶ βρονταὶ συνεχεῖς καὶ κεραυνοὶ κατέσκηπτον, &c.

[4] In the speech which Arrian (v. 25, 26) puts into the mouth of Alexander, the most curious point is, the geographical views which he promulgates. "We have not much farther now to march (he was standing on the western bank of the Sutledge) to the river Ganges, and the great Eastern Sea

entirely failed. No one indeed dared openly to contradict him. Kœnus alone hazarded some words of timid dissuasion; the rest manifested a passive and sullen repugnance, even when he proclaimed that those who desired might return, with the shame of having deserted their king, while he would march forward with the volunteers only. After a suspense of two days, passed in solitary and silent mortification—he still apparently persisted in his determination, and offered the sacrifice usual previous to the passage of a river. The victims were inauspicious; he bowed to the will of the Gods; and gave orders for return, to the unanimous and unbounded delight of his army.[1]

Alexander returns to the Hydaspes.

To mark the last extremity of his eastward progress, he erected twelve altars of extraordinary height and dimension on the western bank of the Hyphasis, offering sacrifices of thanks to the Gods, with the usual festivities, and matches of agility and force. Then, having committed all the territory west of the Hyphasis to the government of Porus, he marched back, repassed the Hydraotês and Akesinês, and returned to the Hydaspes near the point where he had first crossed it. The two new cities—Bukephalia and Nikæa—which he had left orders for commencing on that river, had suffered much from the rains and inundations during his forward march to the Hyphasis, and now required the aid of the army to repair the damage.[2] The heavy rains con-

which surrounds the whole earth. The Hyrkanian (Caspian) Sea joins on to this great sea on one side, the Persian Gulf on the other; after we have subdued all those nations which lie before us eastward towards the Great Sea, and northward towards the Hyrkanian Sea, we shall then sail by water first to the Persian Gulf, next round Libya to the pillars of Hêraklês; from thence we shall march back all through Libya, and add it to all Asia as parts of our empire." (I here abridge rather than translate.)

It is remarkable, that while Alexander made so prodigious an error in narrowing the eastern limits of Asia, the Ptolemaic geography, recognised in the time of Columbus, made an error not less in the opposite direction, stretching it too far to the East. It was upon the faith of this last mistake, that Columbus projected his voyage of circumnavigation from Western Europe, expecting to come to the eastern coast of Asia from the West after no great length of voyage.

[1] Arrian, v. 28, 7. The fact that Alexander, under all this insuperable repugnance of his soldiers, still offered the sacrifice preliminary to crossing—is curious as an illustration of his character, and was specially attested by Ptolemy.

[2] Arrian, v. 29, 8; Diodor. xvii. 95.

tinued throughout most of his return march to the Hydaspes.[1]

B.C. 326. (Autumn). He constructs a fleet, and sails down the Hydaspes and the Indus. Dangerous wound of Alexander in attacking the Malli.

On coming back to this river, Alexander received a large reinforcement both of cavalry and infantry, sent to him from Europe, together with 25,000 new panoplies, and a considerable stock of medicines.[2] Had these reinforcements reached him on the Hyphasis, it seems not impossible that he might have prevailed on his army to accompany him in his further advance to the Ganges and the regions beyond. He now employed himself, assisted by Porus and Taxilus, in collecting and constructing a fleet for sailing down the Hydaspes, and thence down to the mouth of the Indus. By the early part of November, a fleet of nearly 2000 boats or vessels of various sizes having been prepared, he began his voyage.[3] Kraterus marched with one division of the army, along the right bank of the Hydaspes—Hephæstion on the left bank with the remainder, including 200 elephants; Nearchus had the command of the fleet in the river, on board of which was Alexander himself. He pursued his voyage slowly down the river, to the confluence of the Hydaspes with the Akesinês—with the Hydraotês—and with the Hyphasis—all pouring, in one united stream, into the Indus. He sailed down the Indus to its junction with the Indian Ocean. Altogether this voyage occupied nine months,[4] from November 326 B.C. to August 325 B.C. But it was a voyage full of active military operations on both sides of the river. Alexander perpetually disembarked, to attack, subdue, and slaughter all such

[1] Aristobulus, ap. Strab. xv. p. 691—until the rising of Arkturus. Diodorus says 70 days (xvii. 93), which seems more probable.

[2] Diodor. xvii. 95; Curtius, ix. 3, 21.

[3] The voyage was commenced a few days before the setting of the Pleiades (Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 692).

For the number of the ships, see Ptolemy ap. Arrian. vi. 2, 8.

On seeing crocodiles in the Indus, Alexander was at first led to suppose that it was the same river as the Nile, and that he had discovered the higher course of the Nile, from whence it flowed into Egypt. This is curious, as an illustration of the geographical knowledge of the time (Arrian, vi. 1, 3).

[4] Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 692. Aristobulus said that the downward voyage occupied ten months; this seems longer than the exact reality. Moreover Aristobulus said that they had no rain during all the voyage down, through all the summer months: Nearchus stated the contrary (Strabo *l. c.*).

nations near the banks as did not voluntarily submit. Among them were the Malli and Oxydrakæ, free and brave tribes, who resolved to defend their liberty, but, unfortunately for themselves, were habitually at variance, and could not now accomplish any hearty cooperation against the common invader.[1] Alexander first assailed the Malli with his usual celerity and vigour, beat them with slaughter in the field, and took several of their towns.[2] There remained only their last and strongest town, from which the defenders were already driven out and forced to retire to the citadel.[3] Thither they were pursued by the Macedonians, Alexander himself being among the foremost, with only a few guards near him. Impatient because the troops with their scaling-ladders did not come up more rapidly, he mounted upon a ladder that happened to be at hand, attended only by Peukestês and one or two others, with an adventurous courage even transcending what he was wont to display. Having cleared the wall by killing several of its defenders, he jumped down into the interior of the citadel, and made head for some time, nearly alone, against all within. He received however a bad wound from an arrow in the breast, and was on the point of fainting, when his soldiers burst in, rescued him, and took the place. Every person within—man, woman, and child—was slain.[4]

The wound of Alexander was so severe, that he was at first reported to be dead, to the great consternation and distress of the army. However, he became soon sufficiently recovered to show himself, and to receive their ardent congratulations, in the camp established at the point of junction between the Hydraotês (Ravee) and Akesinês (Chenab).[5]

B.C. 325. New cities and posts to be estab- His voyage down the river, though delayed by the care of his wound, was soon resumed and prosecuted, with the same active operations by his land-force on both sides to subjugate all the

[1] Curtius, ix. 4, 15; Diodor. xvii. 98.

[2] Arrian, vi. 7, 8.

[3] This last stronghold of the Malli is supposed, by Mr. Cunningham and others, to have been the modern city of Multan. The river Ravee or Hydraotês is said to have formerly run past the city of Multan into the Chenab or Akesinês.

[4] Arrian, vi. 9, 10, 11. He notices the great discrepancy in the various accounts given of this achievement and dangerous wound of Alexander. Compare Diodor. xvii. 98, 99; Curtius, ix. 4, 5; Plutarch, Alex. 63.

[5] Arrian, xi. 13.

Indian tribes and cities within accessible distance. At the junction of the river Akesinês (Punjnud) with the Indus, Alexander directed the foundation of a new city, with adequate docks and conveniences for ship-building, whereby he expected to command the internal navigation.[1] Having no farther occasion now for so large a land-force, he sent a large portion of it under Kraterus westward (seemingly through the pass now called Bolan) into Karmania.[2] He established another military and naval post at Pattala, where the Delta of the Indus divided; and he then sailed with a portion of his fleet down the right arm of the river to have the first sight of the Indian Ocean. The view of ebbing and flowing tide, of which none had had experience on the scale there exhibited, occasioned to all much astonishment and alarm.[3]

lished on the Indus—Alexander reaches the ocean—effect of the first sight of tides.

The fleet was now left to be conducted by the admiral Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus round by the Persian Gulf to that of the Tigris; a memorable nautical enterprise in Grecian antiquity. Alexander himself (about the month of August) began his march by land westward through the territories of the Arabitæ and the Oritæ, and afterwards through the deserts of Gedrôsia. Pura, the principal town of the Gedrosians, was sixty days' march from the boundary of the Oritæ.[4]

B.C. 325.

March of Alexander by land westward through the desert of Gedrosia—sufferings and losses in the army.

Here his army, though without any formidable opposing enemy, underwent the most severe and

[1] Arrian, xi. 15, 5.

[2] Arrian, xi. 17, 6; Strabo, xv. p. 721.

[3] Arrian, xi. 18, 19; Curtius, ix. 9. He reached Pattala towards the middle or end of July, περὶ κυνὸς ἐπιτολήν (Strabo, xv. p. 692).

The site of Pattala has been usually looked for near the modern Tatta. But Dr. Kennedy, in his recent Narrative of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus in Scinde and Kabool (ch. v. p. 104), shows some reasons for thinking that it must have been considerably higher up the river than Tatta; somewhere near Sehwan. "The Delta commencing about 130 miles above the sea, its northern apex would be somewhere midway between Hyderabad and Sehwan; where local traditions still speak of ancient cities destroyed, and of greater changes having occurred than in any other part of the course of the Indus."

The constant changes in the course of the Indus, however (compare p. 73 of his work), noticed by all observers, render every attempt at such identification conjectural—see Wood's Journey to the Oxus, p. 12.

[4] Arrian, vi. 24, 2; Strabo, xv. p. 723.

deplorable sufferings; their march being through a sandy and trackless desert, with short supplies of food, and still shorter supplies of water, under a burning sun. The loss in men, horses, and baggage-cattle, from thirst, fatigue, and disease, was prodigious; and it required all the unconquerable energy of Alexander to bring through even the diminished number.[1] At Pura the army obtained repose and refreshment, and was enabled to march forward into Karmania, where Kraterus joined them with his division from the Indus, and Kleander with the division which had been left at Ekbatana. Kleander, accused of heinous crimes in his late command, was put to death or imprisoned; several of his comrades were executed. To recompense the soldiers for their recent distress in Gedrôsia, the king conducted them for seven days in drunken bacchanalian procession through Karmania, himself and all his friends taking part in the revelry; an imitation of the jovial festivity and triumph with which the god Dionysus had marched back from the conquest of India.[2]

During the halt in Karmania Alexander had the satisfaction of seeing his admiral Nearchus,[3] who had brought
B.C. 325-324. (Winter). the fleet round from the mouth of the Indus to the harbour called Harmozeia (Ormuz), not far

[1] Arrian, vi. 25, 26; Curtius, ix. 10; Plutarch, Alex. 66.

[2] Curtius, ix. 10; Diodor. xvii. 106; Plutarch, Alex. 67. Arrian (vi. 28) found this festal progress mentioned in some authorities, but not in others. Neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus mentioned it. Accordingly Arrian refuses to believe it. There may have been exaggeration or falsities as to the details of the march; but as a general fact, I see no sufficient ground for disbelieving it. A season of excessive licence to the soldiers, after their extreme suffering in Gedrosia, was by no means unnatural to grant. Moreover, it corresponds to the general conception of the returning march of Dionysus in antiquity, while the imitation of that god was quite in conformity with Alexander's turn of sentiment. I have already remarked, that the silence of Ptolemy and Aristobulus is too strongly insisted on, both by Arrian and by others, as a reason for disbelieving affirmations respecting Alexander.

Arrian and Curtius (x. 1) differ in their statements about the treatment of Kleander. According to Arrian, he was put to death; according to Curtius, he was spared from death, and simply put in prison, in consequence of the important service which he had rendered by killing Parmenio with his own hand; while 600 of his accomplices and agents were put to death.

[3] Nearchus had begun his voyage about the end of September, or beginning of October (Arrian, Indic. 21; Strabo, xv. p. 721).

from the entrance of the Persian Gulf; a voyage of much hardship and distress, along the barren coasts of the Oritæ, the Gedrosians, and the Ichthyophagi.[1] Nearchus, highly commended and honoured, was presently sent back to complete his voyage as far as the mouth of the Euphrates; while Hephæstion also was directed to conduct the larger portion of the army, with the elephants and heavy baggage, by the road near the coast from Karmania into Persis. This road, though circuitous, was the most convenient, as it was now the winter season;[2] but Alexander himself, with the lighter divisions of his army, took the more direct mountain road from Karmania to Pasargadæ and Persepolis. Visiting the tomb of Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian empire, he was incensed to find it violated and pillaged. He caused it to be carefully restored, put to death a Macedonian named Polymachus as the offender, and tortured the Magian guardians of it for the purpose of discovering accomplices, but in vain.[3] Orsinês, satrap of Persis, was however accused of connivance in the deed, as well as of various acts of murder and spoliation: according to Curtius, he was not only innocent, but had manifested both good faith and devotion to Alexander;[4] in spite of which he became a victim of the hostility of the favourite eunuch Bagoas, who both poisoned the king's mind with calumnies of his own, and suborned other accusers with false testimony. Whatever may be the truth of the story, Alexander caused Orsinês to be hanged;[5] naming as satrap Peukestês, whose favour was now high, partly as comrade and preserver of the king in his imminent danger at the citadel of the Malli—partly from his

Alexander and the army come back to Persis.

Conduct of Alexander at Persepolis.

Punishment of the satrap Orsinês.

[1] Arrian, vi. 28, 7; Arrian, Indica c. 33-37.

[2] Arrian, vi. 28, 12-29, 1.

[3] Plutarch, Alex. 69; Arrian, vi. 29, 17; Strabo, xv. p. 730.

[4] Arrian, v. 30, 2; Curtius, x. 1, 23-38. "Hic fuit exitus nobilissimi Persarum, nec insontis modo, sed eximiæ quoque benignitatis in regem." The great favour which the beautiful eunuch Bagoas (though Arrian does not mention him) enjoyed with Alexander, and the exalted position which he occupied, are attested by good contemporary evidence, especially the philosopher Dikæarchus —see Athenæ. xiii. p. 603; Dikæarch. Fragm. 19. ap. Hist. Græc. Fragm. Didot, vol. ii. p. 241. Compare the Fragments of Eumenês and Diodotus (Ælian. V. H. iii. 23) in Didot, Fragm. Scriptor. Hist. Alex. Magni, p. 121; Plutarch De Adul. et Amic. Discrim. p. 65.

[5] Arrian, vi. 30; Curtius, x. 1. 22-30.

having adopted the Persian dress, manners, and language, more completely than any other Macedonian.

B.C. 324. (early Spring). He marches to Susa—junction with the fleet under Nearchus, after it had sailed round from the mouth of the Indus.

It was about February, in 324 B.C.,[1] that Alexander marched out of Persis to Susa. During this progress, at the point where he crossed the Pasitigris, he was again joined by Nearchus, who having completed his circumnavigation from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, had sailed back with the fleet from the latter river and come up the Pasitigris.[2] It is probable that the division of Hephæstion also rejoined him at Susa, and that the whole army was there for the first time brought together, after the separation in Karmania.

B.C. 324. (Spring and Summer.) Alexander at Susa as Great King. Subjects of uneasiness to him—the satraps—the Macedonian soldiers.

In Susa and Susiana Alexander spent some months. For the first time since his accession to the throne, he had now no military operations in hand or in immediate prospect. No enemy was before him, until it pleased him to go in quest of a new one; nor indeed could any new one be found, except at a prodigious distance. He had emerged from the perils of the untrodden East, and had returned into the ordinary localities and conditions of Persian rule, occupying that capital city from whence the great Achæmenid kings had been accustomed to govern the Western as well

[1] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. B.C. 325, also Append. p. 232) places the arrival of Alexander in Susiana, on his return march, in the month of February B.C. 325; a year too early, in my opinion. I have before remarked on the views of Mr. Clinton respecting the date of Alexander's victory over Porus on the Hydaspes, where (following Schmieder's conjecture) he alters the name of the month as it stands in the text of Arrian, and supposes that battle to have occurred in August B.C. 327 instead of April B.C. 326. Mr. Clinton antedates by one year all the proceedings of Alexander subsequent to his quitting Baktria for the last time in the summer of B.C. 327. Dr. Vincent's remark—that "the supposition of *two winters* occurring after Alexander's return to Susa is not borne out by the historians" (see Clinton, p. 232), is a perfectly just one; and Mitford has not replied to it in a satisfactory manner. In my judgement, there was only an interval of sixteen months (not an interval of twenty-eight months, as Mr. Clinton supposes) between the return of Alexander to Susa and his death at Babylon (Feb. 324 B.C. to June 323 B.C).

[2] Arrian, vii. 5, 9; Arrian, Indica, c. 42. The voluntary death of Kalanus the Indian Gymnosophist must have taken place at Susa (where Diodorus places it—

as the Eastern portions of their vast empire. To their post, and to their irritable love of servility, Alexander had succeeded; but bringing with him a restless energy such as none of them except the first founder Cyrus had manifested—and a splendid military genius, such as was unknown alike to Cyrus and to his successors.

In the new position of Alexander, his principal subjects of uneasiness were, the satraps and the Macedonian soldiers. During the long interval (more than five years) which had elapsed since he marched eastward from Hyrkania in pursuit of Bessus, the satraps had necessarily been left much to themselves. Some had imagined that he would never return; an anticipation noway unreasonable, since his own impulse towards forward march was so insatiate, that he was only constrained to return by the resolute opposition of his own soldiers; moreover his dangerous wound among the Malli, and his calamitous march through Gedrôsia, had given rise to reports of his death, credited for some time even by Olympias and Kleopatra in Macedonia.[1] Under these uncertainties, some satraps stood accused of having pillaged rich temples, and committed acts of violence towards individuals. Apart from all criminality, real or alleged, several of them, also, had taken into pay bodies of mercenary troops, partly as a necessary means of authority in their respective districts, partly as a protection to themselves in the event of Alexander's decease. Respecting the conduct of the satraps and their officers, many denunciations and complaints were sent in, to which Alexander listened readily and even eagerly, punishing the accused with indiscriminate rigour, and resenting especially the suspicion that they had calculated upon his death.[2] Among those executed, were Abulitês, satrap of Susiana, with his son Oxathrês; the latter was even slain by the hands of Alexander himself, with a sarissa[3]—the dispensation of punishment becoming in his hands an outburst

Past conduct of the satraps—several of them are punished by Alexander—alarm among them all—flight of Harpalus.

xvii. 107), and not in Persis; for Nearchus was seemingly present at the memorable scene of the funeral pile (Arrian, vii. 3, 9)—and he was not with Alexander in Persis.

[1] Plutarch, Alex. 68.

[2] Arrian, vii. 4, 2-5; Diodor. xvii. 108; Curtius, x. 1, 7. "Cœperat esse præceps ad repræsentanda supplicia, item ad deteriora credenda" (Curtius, x. 1, 39).

[3] Plutarch, Alex. 68.

of exasperated temper. He also despatched peremptory orders to all the satraps, enjoining them to dismiss their mercenary troops without delay.[1] This measure produced considerable effect on the condition of Greece—about which I shall speak in a subsequent chapter. Harpalus, satrap of Babylon (about whom also more, presently), having squandered large sums out of the revenues of the post upon ostentatious luxury, became terrified when Alexander was approaching Susiana, and fled to Greece with a large treasure and a small body of soldiers.[2] Serious alarm was felt among all the satraps and officers, innocent as well as guilty. That the most guilty were not those who fared worst, we may see by the case of Kleomenês in Egypt, who remained unmolested in his government, though his iniquities were no secret.[3]

[1] Diodor. xvii. 106-111.

[2] Among the accusations which reached Alexander against this satrap, we are surprised to find a letter addressed to him (ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπιστολῇ) by the Greek historian Theopompus; who set forth with indignation the extravagant gifts and honours heaped by Harpalus upon his two successive mistresses—Pythionikê and Glykera; celebrated Hetæræ from Athens. These proceedings Theopompus describes as insults to Alexander (Theopompus ap. Athenæ. xiii. p. 586-595; Fragment. 277, 278, ed. Didot.).

The satyric drama called Ἀγήν, represented before Alexander at a period subsequent to the flight of Harpalus, cannot have been represented (as Athenæus states it to have been) on the banks of *the Hydaspes*, because Harpalus did not make his escape until he was frightened by the approach of Alexander *returning* from India. At the Hydaspes, Alexander was still on his outward progress; very far off, and without any idea of returning. It appears to me that the words of Athenæus respecting this drama—ἐδιδάχθη Διονυσίων ὄντων ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὑδάσπου τοῦ ποταμοῦ (xiii. p. 595)—involve a mistake or misreading; and that it ought to stand ἐπὶ τοῦ Χοάσπου τοῦ ποταμοῦ. I may remark that the words *Medus Hydaspes* in Virgil, Georg. iv. 211, probably involve the same confusion. The Choaspes was the river near Susa; and this drama was performed before Alexander at Susa during the Dionysia of the year 324 B.C., after Harpalus had fled. The Dionysia were in the month Elaphebolion; now Alexander did not fight Porus on the Hydaspes until the succeeding month Munychion at the earliest—and probably later. And even if we suppose (which is not probable) that he reached the Hydaspes in Elaphebolion, he would have no leisure to celebrate dramas and a Dionysiac festival, while the army of Porus was waiting for him on the opposite bank. Moreover it is in no way probable that, on the remote Hydaspes, he had any actors or chorus, or means of celebrating dramas at all.

[3] Arrian, vii. 18, 2; vii. 23, 9-13.

Among the Macedonian soldiers, discontent had been perpetually growing, from the numerous proofs which they witnessed that Alexander had made his election for an Asiatic character, and abnegated his own country. Besides his habitual adoption of the Persian costume and ceremonial, he now celebrated a sort of national Asiatic marriage at Susa. He had already married the captive Roxana in Baktria; he next took two additional wives—Statira, daughter of Darius—and Parysatis, daughter of the preceding king Ochus. He at the same time caused eighty of his principal friends and officers, some very reluctantly, to marry (according to Persian rites) wives selected from the noblest Persian families, providing dowries for all of them.[1] He made presents besides, to all those Macedonians who gave in their names as having married Persian women. Splendid festivities[2] accompanied these nuptials, with honorary rewards distributed to favourites and meritorious officers. Macedonians and Persians, the two imperial races, one in Europe, the other in Asia, were thus intended to be amalgamated. To soften the aversion of the soldiers generally towards these Asiatising marriages,[3] Alexander issued proclamation that he would himself discharge their debts, inviting all who owed money to give in their names with an intimation of the sums due. It was known that the debtors were numerous; yet few came to enter their names. The soldiers suspected the proclamation as a stratagem, intended for the purpose of detecting such as were spendthrifts, and obtaining a pretext for punishment: a remarkable evidence how little confidence or affection Alexander now inspired, and how completely the sentiment entertained towards him was that of fear mingled with admiration. He himself was much hurt at their mistrust, and openly complained of it; at the same time proclaiming that paymasters and tables

Discontents of the Macedonian soldiers with the Asiatising intermarriages promoted by Alexander.

[1] Arrian, vii. 4, 6-9. By these two marriages, Alexander thus engrafted himself upon the two lines of antecedent Persian kings. Ochus was of the Achæmenid family, but Darius Codomannus, father of Statira, was not of that family; he began a new lineage. About the overweening regal state of Alexander, outdoing even the previous Persian kings, see Pylarchus ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 539.

[2] Charês ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 538.

[3] Arrian, vii. 6, 3. καὶ τοὺς γάμους ἐν τῷ νόμῳ Περσικῷ ποιηθέντας οὐ πρὸς θυμοῦ γενέσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ τῶν γημάντων ἐστὶν οἷς, &c.

should be planted openly in the camp, and that any soldier might come and ask for money enough to pay his debts, without being bound to give in his name. Assured of secrecy, they now made application in such numbers that the total distributed was prodigiously great; reaching, according to some, to 10,000 talents—according to Arrian, to not less than 20,000 talents or 4,600,000*l.* sterling.[1]

B.C 323. (Spring). Their discontent with the new Asiatic soldiers levied and disciplined by Alexander.

Large as this donative was, it probably gave but partial satisfaction, since the most steady and well-conducted soldiers could have received no benefit, except in so far as they might choose to come forward with fictitious debts. A new mortification moreover was in store for the soldiers generally. There arrived from the various satrapies—even from those most distant, Sogdiana, Baktria, Aria, Drangiana, Arachosia, &c.—contingents of young and fresh native troops, amounting in total to 30,000 men; all armed and drilled in the Macedonian manner. From the time when the Macedonians had refused to cross the river Hyphasis and march forward into India, Alexander saw, that for his large aggressive schemes it was necessary to disband the old soldiers, and to organise an army at once more fresh and more submissive. He accordingly despatched orders to the satraps to raise and discipline new Asiatic levies, of vigorous native youths; and the fruit of these orders was now seen.[2] Alexander reviewed the new levies, whom he called the Epigoni, with great satisfaction. He moreover incorporated many native Persians, both officers and soldiers, into the companion-cavalry, the most honourable service in the army; making the important change of arming them with the short Macedonian thrusting-pike in place of the missile Persian javelin. They were found such apt soldiers, and the genius of Alexander for military organisation was so consummate, that he saw himself soon released from his dependence on the Macedonian veterans; a change evident enough to them as well as to him.[3]

Interest of Alexander in the fleet,

The novelty and success of Nearchus in his exploring voyage had excited in Alexander an eager appetite for naval operations. Going on board his fleet in the Pasitigris (the Karun, the river on

[1] Arrian, vii. 5; Plutarch, Alex. 70; Curtius, x. 2, 9; Diodor. xvii. 109.

[2] Diodor. xvii. 108. It must have taken some time to get together and discipline these young troops; Alexander must therefore have sent the orders from India.

[3] Arrian, vii. 6.

the east side of Susa), he sailed in person down to the Persian Gulf, surveyed the coast as far as the mouth of the Tigris, and then sailed up the latter river as far as Opis. Hephæstion meanwhile, commanding the army, marched by land in concert with his voyage and came back to Opis, where Alexander disembarked.[1]

which sails up the Tigris to Opis.

Sufficient experiment had now been made with the Asiatic levies to enable Alexander to dispense with many of his Macedonian veterans. Calling together the army, he intimated his intention of sending home those who were unfit for service, either from age or wounds, but of allotting to them presents at departure sufficient to place them in an enviable condition, and attract fresh Macedonian substitutes. On hearing this intimation, all the long-standing discontent of the soldiers at once broke out. They felt themselves set aside, as worn out and useless,—and set aside, not to make room for younger men of their own country, but in favour of those Asiatics into whose arms their king had now passed. They demanded with a loud voice that he should dismiss them all—advising him by way of taunt to make his future conquests along with his father Ammon. These manifestations so incensed Alexander, that he leaped down from the elevated platform on which he had stood to speak, rushed with a few of his guards among the crowd of soldiers, and seized or caused to be seized thirteen of those apparently most forward, ordering them immediately to be put to death. The multitude were thoroughly overawed and reduced to silence, upon which Alexander remounted the platform and addressed them in a speech of considerable length. He boasted of the great exploits of Philip, and of his own still greater: he affirmed that all the benefit of his conquests had gone to the Macedonians, and that he himself had derived from them nothing but a double share of the common labours, hardships, wounds, and perils. Reproaching them as base deserters from a king who had gained for them all these unparalleled acquisitions, he concluded by giving discharge to all—commanding them forthwith to depart.[2]

Notice of partial discharge to the Macedonian soldiers—they mutiny—wrath of Alexander—he disbands them all.

After this speech—teeming (as we read it in Arrian) with that exorbitant self-exaltation which formed the leading feature in his character—Alexander

Remorse and

[1] Arrian, vii. 7.

[2] Arrian, vii. 9, 10; Plutarch, Alex. 71; Curtius, x. 2; Justin, xii. 11.

humiliation of the soldiers—Alexander is appeased—reconciliation.

hurried away into the palace, where he remained shut up for two days without admitting any one except his immediate attendants. His guards departed along with him, leaving the discontented soldiers stupefied and motionless. Receiving no farther orders, nor any of the accustomed military indications,[1] they were left in the helpless condition of soldiers constrained to resolve for themselves, and at the same time altogether dependent upon Alexander whom they had offended. On the third day, they learnt that he had convened the Persian officers, and had invested them with the chief military commands, distributing the newly-arrived Epigoni into divisions of infantry and cavalry, all with Macedonian military titles, and passing over the Macedonians themselves as if they did not exist. At this news the soldiers were overwhelmed with shame and remorse. They rushed to the gates of the palace, threw down their arms, and supplicated with tears and groans for Alexander's pardon. Presently he came out, and was himself moved to tears by seeing their prostrate deportment. After testifying his full reconciliation, he caused a solemn sacrifice to be celebrated, coupled with a multudinous banquet of mixed Macedonians and Persians. The Grecian prophets, the Persian magi, and all the guests present, united in prayer and libation for fusion, harmony, and community of empire, between the two nations.[2]

Partial disbanding—body of veterans

This complete victory over his own soldiers was probably as gratifying to Alexander as any one gained during his past life; carrying as it did a consoling retribution for the memorable stoppage

[1] See the description given by Tacitus (Hist. ii. 29) of the bringing round of the Vitellian army,—which had mutinied against the general Fabius Valens: —"Tum Alphenus Varus, præfectus castrorum, deflagrante paulatim seditione, addit consilium— vetitis obire vigilias centurionibus, omisso tubæ sono, quo miles ad belli munia cietur. Igitur torpore cuncti, circumspectare inter se attoniti, *et id ipsum, quod nemo regeret, paventes;* silentio, patientiâ, postremo precibus et lacrymis veniam quærebant. Ut vero deformis et flens, et præter spem incolumis, Valens processit, gaudium, miseratio, favor; versi in lætitiam (ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes gratantesque, circumdatum aquilis signisque, in tribunal ferunt."

Compare also the narrative in Xenophon (Anab. i. 3) of the embarrassment of the Ten Thousand Greeks at Tarsus, when they at first refused to obey Klearchus and march against the Great King.

[2] Arrian, vii. 11.

on the banks of the Hyphasis, which he had neither forgotten nor forgiven. He selected 10,000 of the oldest and most exhausted among the soldiers to be sent home under Kraterus, giving to each full pay until the time of arrival in Macedonia, with a donation of one talent besides. He intended that Kraterus, who was in bad health, should remain in Europe as viceroy of Macedonia, and that Antipater should come out to Asia with a reinforcement of troops.[1] Pursuant to this resolution, the 10,000 soldiers were now singled out for return, and separated from the main army. Yet it does not appear that they actually did return, during the ten months of Alexander's remaining life.

placed under command of Kraterus to return.

Of the important edict issued this summer by Alexander to the Grecian cities, and read at the Olympic festival in July—directing each city to recall its exiled citizens—I shall speak in a future chapter. He had now accomplished his object of organising a land force half Macedonian, half Asiatic. But since the expedition of Nearchus, he had become bent upon a large extension of his naval force also; which was indeed an indispensable condition towards his immediate projects of conquering Arabia, and of pushing both nautical exploration and aggrandisement from the Persian Gulf round the Arabian coast. He despatched orders to the Phenician ports, directing that a numerous fleet should be built; and that the ships should then be taken to pieces, and conveyed across to Thapsakus on the Euphrates, whence they would sail down to Babylon. At that place, he directed the construction of other ships from the numerous cypress trees around—as well as the formation of an enormous harbour in the river at Babylon, adequate to the accommodation of 1000 ships of war. Mikkalus, a Greek of Klazomenæ, was sent to Phenicia with 500 talents, to enlist, or to purchase, seamen for the crews. It was calculated that these preparations (probably under the superintendence of Nearchus) would be completed by the spring,

B.C 324. (Summer.) New projects of conquests contemplated by Alexander—measures for enlarging his fleet.

[1] Arrian, vii. 12, 1-7; Justin, xii. 12. Kraterus was especially popular with the Macedonian soldiers, because he had always opposed, as much as he dared, the Oriental transformation of Alexander (Plutarch, Eumenês, 6).

for which period contingents were summoned to Babylon for the expedition against Arabia.[1]

B.C. 324. Visit to Ekbatana—death of Hephæstion—violent sorrow of Alexander.

In the mean time, Alexander himself paid a visit to Ekbatana, the ordinary summer residence of the Persian kings. He conducted his army by leisurely marches, reviewing by the way the ancient regal parks of the celebrated breed called Nisæan horses—now greatly reduced in number.[2] On the march, a violent altercation occurred between his personal favourite, Hephæstion,—and his secretary, Eumenês, the most able, dexterous, and long-sighted man in his service. Eumenês, as a Greek of Kardia, had been always regarded with slight and jealousy by the Macedonian officers, especially by Hephæstion: Alexander now took pains to reconcile the two, experiencing no difficulty with Eumenês, but much with Hephæstion.[3] During his stay at Ekbatana, he celebrated magnificent sacrifices and festivities, with gymnastic and musical exhibitions, which were farther enlivened, according to the Macedonian habits, by banquets and excessive wine-drinking. Amidst these proceedings, Hephæstion was seized with a fever. The vigour of his constitution emboldened him to neglect all care or regimen, so that in a few days the disease carried him off. The final crisis came on suddenly, and Alexander was warned of it while sitting in the theatre; but though he instantly hurried to the bedside, he found Hephæstion already dead. His sorrow for this loss was unbounded, manifesting itself in excesses suitable to the general violence of his impulses, whether of affection or of antipathy. Like Achilles mourning for Patroklus, he cast himself on the ground near the dead body, and remained there wailing for several hours; he refused all care, and even food, for

[1] Arrian, vii. 19. He also sent an officer named Herakleidês to the shores of the Caspian Sea, with orders to construct ships and make a survey of that sea (vii. 16).

[2] Arrian, vii. 13, 2; Diodor xvii. 110. How leisurely the march was, may be seen in Diodorus.

The direction of Alexander's march from Susa to Ekbatana, along a frequented and good road which Diodorus in another place calls a royal road (xix. 19), is traced by Ritter, deriving his information chiefly from the recent researches of Sir Henry Rawlinson. The larger portion of the way lay along the western side of the chain of Mount Zagros, and on the right bank of the river Kerkha (Ritter, Erdkunde, part ix. b. 3. p. 329, West-Asia).

[3] Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eumenês, 2.

two days; he cut his hair close, and commanded that all the horses and mules in the camp should have their manes cut close also; he not only suspended the festivities, but interdicted all music and every sign of joy in the camp; he directed that the battlements of the walls belonging to the neighbouring cities should be struck off; he hung, or crucified, the physician Glaukias, who had prescribed for Hephæstion; he ordered that a vast funeral pile should be erected at Babylon, at a cost given to us as 10,000 talents (2,300,000*l.*), to celebrate the obsequies; he sent messengers to the oracle of Ammon, to inquire whether it was permitted to worship Hephæstion as a god. Many of those around him, accommodating themselves to this passionate impulse of the ruler, began at once to show a sort of worship towards the deceased, by devoting to him themselves and their arms; of which Eumenês set the example, conscious of his own personal danger, if Alexander should suspect him of being pleased at the death of his recent rival. Perdikkas was instructed to convey the body in solemn procession to Babylon, there to be burnt in state when preparations should be completed.[1]

B.C. 324-323. (Winter.)

Alexander exterminates the Kossæi.

Alexander stayed at Ekbatana until winter was at hand, seeking distraction from his grief in exaggerated splendour of festivals and ostentation of life. His temper became so much more irascible and furious, that no one approached him without fear, and he was propitiated by the most extravagant flatteries.[2] At length he roused himself and found his true consolation, in gratifying the primary passions of his nature—fighting and man-hunting.[3]

[1] Arrian. vii. 14; Plutarch, Alex. 72; Diodor. xvii. 110. It will not do to follow the canon of evidence tacitly assumed by Arrian, who thinks himself authorised to discredit all the details of Alexander's conduct on this occasion, which transgress the limits of a dignified, though vehement sorrow.

When Masistius was slain, in the Persian army commanded by Mardonius in Bœotia, the manes of the horses were cut, as token of mourning (Herodot. ix. 24): compare also Plutarch, Pelopidas, 33; and Euripid. Alkestis, 442.

[2] See the curious extracts from Ephippus the Chalkidian,—seemingly a contemporary, if not an eye-witness (ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 537, 538)—εὐφημία δὲ καὶ σιγὴ κατεῖχε πάντας ὑπὸ δέους τοὺς παρόντας· ἀφόρητος γὰρ ἦν (Alexander) καὶ φονικός· ἐδόκει γὰρ εἶναι μελαγχολικός, &c.

[3] I translate here, literally, Plutarch's expression—Τοῦ δὲ πένθους παρηγορίᾳ τῷ πολέμῳ χρώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ κυνηγέσιον

Between Media and Persis, dwelt the tribes called Kossæi, amidst a region of lofty, trackless, inaccessible mountains. Brave and predatory, they had defied the attacks of the Persian kings. Alexander now conducted against them a powerful force, and in spite of increased difficulties arising from the wintry season, pushed them from point to point, following them into the loftiest and most impenetrable recesses of their mountains. These efforts were continued for forty days, under himself and Ptolemy, until the entire male population was slain; which passed for an acceptable offering to the manes of Hephæstion.[1]

B.C. 323. (Winter—Spring.) March of Alexander to Babylon. Numerous embassies which met him on the way.

Not long afterwards, Alexander commenced his progress to Babylon; but in slow marches, farther retarded by various foreign embassies which met him on the road. So widely had the terror of his name and achievements been spread, that several of these envoys came from the most distant regions. There were some from the various tribes of Libya—from Carthage—from Sicily and Sardinia—from the Illyrians and Thracians—from the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Tuscans, in Italy—nay, even (some affirmed) from the Romans, as yet a people of moderate power.[2] But there were other names yet more surprising—Æthiopians, from the extreme south, beyond Egypt—Scythians from the north, beyond the Danube—Iberians and Gauls, from the far west, beyond the Mediterranean Sea. Legates also arrived from various Grecian cities, partly to tender congratulations and compli-

ἀνθρώπων ἐξῆλθε, καὶ τὸ Κοσσαίων ἔθνος κατεστρέψατο, πάντας ἡβηδὸν ἀποσφάττων. Τοῦτο δὲ Ἡφαιστίωνος ἐναγισμὸς ἐκαλεῖτο (Plutarch, Alexand. 72: compare Polyænus, iv. 3, 31).

[1] Arrian, vii. 15; Plutarch, Alex. 72; Diodor. xvii. 111. This general slaughter, however, can only be true of portions of the Kossæan name; for Kossæans occur in after years (Diodor. xix. 19).

[2] Pliny, H. N. iii. 9. The story in Strabo, v. p. 232: can hardly apply to Alexander the Great. Livy (ix. 18) conceives that the Romans knew nothing of Alexander even by report, but this appears to me not credible.

On the whole, though the point is doubtful, I incline to believe the assertion of a Roman embassy to Alexander. Nevertheless, there were various false statements which afterwards became current about it—one of which may be seen in Memnon's history of the Pontic Herakleia ap. Photium, Cod. 224; Orelli Fragment. Memnon, p. 36. Kleitarchus (contemporary of Alexander), whom Pliny quotes, can have had no motive to insert falsely the name of Romans which in his time was nowise important.

ments upon his matchless successes, partly to remonstrate against his sweeping mandate for the general restoration of the Grecian exiles.[1] It was remarked that these Grecian legates approached him with wreaths on their heads, tendering golden wreaths to him,—as if they were coming into the presence of a god.[2] The proofs which Alexander received, even from distant tribes with names and costumes unknown to him, of fear for his enmity and anxiety for his favour, were such as had never been shown to any historical person, and such as entirely to explain his superhuman arrogance.

B.C. 328. (Spring.) Alexander at Babylon —his great preparations for the circumnavigation and conquest of Arabia.

In the midst of this exuberant pride and good fortune, however, dark omens and prophecies crowded upon him as he approached Babylon. Of these the most remarkable was, the warning of the Chaldean priests, who apprised him soon after he crossed the Tigris, that it would be dangerous for him to enter that city, and exhorted him to remain outside of the gates. At first he was inclined to obey; but his scruples were overruled, either by arguments from the Greek sophist Anaxarchus, or by the shame of shutting himself out from the most memorable city of the empire, where his great naval preparations were now going on. He found Nearchus with his fleet, who had come up from the mouth of the river,—and also the ships directed to be built in Phenicia, which had come down the river from Thapsakus, together with large numbers of seafaring men to serve aboard.[3] The ships of cypress-wood, and the large docks, which he had ordered to be constructed at Babylon, were likewise in full progress. He lost no time in concerting with Nearchus the details of an expedition into Arabia and the Persian Gulf, by his land force and naval force cooperating. From various

[1] Arrian, vii. 15; Justin, xii. 13; Diodor. xvii. 113. The story mentioned by Justin in another place (xxi. 6) is probably referable to this last season of Alexander's career. A Carthaginian named Hamilkar Rhodanus was sent by his city to Alexander; really as an emissary to acquaint himself with the king's real designs, which occasioned to the Carthaginians serious alarm—but under colour of being an exile tendering his services. Justin says that Parmenio introduced Hamilkar — which must, I think, be an error.

[2] Arrian, vii. 19, 1; vii. 23, 3.

[3] Arrian, vii. 19, 5-12; Diodor. xvii. 112.

naval officers, who had been sent to survey the Persian Gulf, and now made their reports, he learnt, that though there were no serious difficulties within it or along its southern coast, yet to double the eastern cape which terminated that coast—to circumnavigate the unknown peninsula of Arabia,—and thus to reach the Red Sea—was an enterprise perilous at least, if not impracticable.[1] But to achieve that which other men thought impracticable, was the leading passion of Alexander. He resolved to circumnavigate Arabia as well as to conquer the Arabians, from whom it was sufficient offence that they had sent no envoys to him. He also contemplated the foundation of a great maritime city in the interior of the Persian Gulf, to rival in wealth and commerce the cities of Phenicia.[2]

B.C. 323. (April, May.)

Alexander on shipboard, on the Euphrates and in the marshes adjoining. His plans for improving the navigation and flow of the river.

Amidst preparations for this expedition—and while the immense funeral pile destined for Hephæstion was being built—Alexander sailed down the Euphrates to the great dyke called Pallakopas, about ninety miles below Babylon; a sluice constructed by the ancient Assyrian kings, for the purpose of being opened when the river was too full, so as to let off the water into the interminable marshes stretching out near the western bank. The sluice being reported not to work well, he projected the construction of a new one somewhat farther down. He then sailed through the Pallakopas in order to survey the marshes, together with the tombs of the ancient Assyrian kings which had been erected among them. Himself steering his vessel, with the kausia on his head, and the regal diadem above it,[3] he passed some time among these lakes and swamps, which were so extensive that his fleet lost the way among them. He stayed long enough also to direct,

[1] Arrian, vii. 20, 15; Arrian, Indica, 43. To undertake this circumnavigation, Alexander had despatched a shipmaster of Soli in Cyprus, named Hiero; who, becoming alarmed at the distance to which he was advancing, and at the apparently interminable stretch of Arabia towards the south, returned without accomplishing the object. Even in the time of Arrian, in the second century after the Christian æra, Arabia had never been circumnavigated, from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea—at least so far as his knowledge extended.

[2] Arrian, vii. 19, 11.

[3] Arrian, vii. 22, 2, 3; Strabo, xvi. p. 741.

and even commence, the foundation of a new city, in what seemed to him a convenient spot.[1]

On returning to Babylon, Alexander found large reinforcements arrived there—partly under Philoxenus, Menander, and Menidas, from Lydia and Karia—partly 20,000 Persians, under Peukestês the satrap. He caused these Persians to be incorporated in the files of the Macedonian phalanx. According to the standing custom, each of these files was sixteen deep, and each soldier was armed with the long pike or sarissa wielded by two hands; the lochage, or front-rank man, being always an officer receiving double pay, of great strength and attested valour —and those second and third in the file, as well as the rearmost man of all, being likewise strong and good men, receiving larger pay than the rest. Alexander, in his new arrangement, retained the first three ranks and the rear rank unchanged, as well as the same depth of file; but he substituted twelve Persians in place of the twelve Macedonians who followed after the third-rank man; so that the file was composed first of the lochage and two other chosen Macedonians, each armed with the sarissa—then of twelve Persians armed in their own manner with bow or javelin—lastly, of a Macedonian with his sarissa bringing up the rear.[2] In this Macedonico-Persian file, the front would have only three projecting pikes, instead of five, which the ordinary Macedonian phalanx presented; but then, in compensation, the Persian soldiers would be able to hurl their javelins at an advancing enemy, over the heads of their three front-rank men. The supervening death of Alexander prevented the actual execution of this reform, interesting as being his last project for amalgamating Persians and Macedonians into one military force.

B.C. 323. (June).

Large reinforcements arrive, Grecian and Asiatic.

New array ordered by Alexander, for Macedonians and Persians in the same files and companies.

Besides thus modifying the phalanx, Alexander also passed in review his fleet, which was now fully equipped.

[1] Arrian, vii. 21, 11. πόλιν ἐξῳκοδόμησέ τε καὶ ἐτείχισε.

[2] Arrian, vii. 23, 5. Even when performing the purely military operations of passing these soldiers in review, inspecting their exercise, and determining their array, — Alexander sat upon the regal throne surrounded by Asiatic eunuchs; his principal officers sat upon couches with silver feet, near to him (Arrian, vii. 24, 4). This is among the evidences of his altered manners.

Splendid funeral obsequies of Hephæstion.

The order was actually given for departing, so soon as the obsequies of Hephæstion should be celebrated. This was the last act which remained for him to fulfil. The splendid funeral pile stood ready—two hundred feet high, occupying a square area, of which the side was nearly one furlong, loaded with costly decorations from the zeal, real and simulated, of the Macedonian officers. The invention of artists was exhausted, in long discussions with the king himself, to produce at all cost an exhibition of magnificence singular and stupendous. The outlay (probably with addition of the festivals immediately following) is stated at 12,000 talents, or 2,760,000*l.* sterling.[1] Alexander awaited the order from the oracle of Ammon, having sent thither messengers to inquire what measure of reverential honour he might properly and piously show to his departed friend.[2] The answer was now brought back, intimating that Hephæstion was to be worshipped as a Hero—the secondary form of worship, not on a level with that paid to the Gods. Delighted with this divine testimony to Hephæstion, Alexander caused the pile to be lighted, and the obsequies celebrated, in a manner suitable to the injunctions of the oracle.[3] He farther directed that magnificent chapels or sacred edifices should be erected for the worship and honour of Hephæstion, at Alexandria in Egypt,—at Pella in Macedonia, and probably in other cities also.[4]

[1] Diodorus, xvii. 115; Plutarch, Alex. 72.

[2] Arrian, vii. 23, 8.

[3] Diodor, xvii. 114, 115: compare Arrian, vii. 14, 16; Plutarch, Alex. 75.

[4] Arrian. vii. 23, 10—13; Diod. xviii. 4. Diodorus speaks indeed, in this passage, of the πυρὰ or funeral pile in honour of Hephæstion as if it were among the vast expenses included in the memoranda left by Alexander (after his decease) of prospective schemes. But the funeral pile had already been erected at Babylon, as Diodorus himself had informed us. What Alexander left unexecuted at his decease, but intended to execute if he had lived, was the splendid edifices and chapels in Hephæstion's honour—as we see by Arrian, vii. 23, 10. And Diodorus must be supposed to allude to these intended sacred buildings, though he has inadvertently spoken of the funeral pile. Kraterus, who was under orders to return to Macedonia, was to have built one at Pella.

The Olynthian Ephippus had composed a book περὶ τῆς Ἡφαιστίωνος καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ταφῆς, of which there appear four or five citations in Athenæus. He dwelt especially on the luxurious habits of Alexander, and on his unmeasured potations — common to him with other Macedonians.

Respecting the honours intended for Hephæstion at Alexandria, he addressed to Kleomenês the satrap of Egypt a despatch which becomes in part known to us. I have already stated that Kleomenês was among the worst of the satraps; having committed multiplied public crimes, of which Alexander was not uninformed. The regal despatch enjoined him to erect in commemoration of Hephæstion a chapel on the terra firma of Alexandria, with a splendid turret in the islet of Pharos; and to provide besides that all mercantile written contracts, as a condition of validity, should be inscribed with the name of Hephæstion. Alexander concluded thus: —" If coming I find the Egyptian temples and the chapels of Hephæstion completed in the best manner, I will forgive you for all your past crimes; and in future, whatever magnitude of crime you may commit, you shall suffer no bad treatment from me."[1] This despatch strikingly illustrates how much the wrongdoings of satraps were secondary considerations in his view, compared with splendid manifestations towards the Gods, and personal attachment towards friends.

The intense sorrow felt by Alexander for the death of Hephæstion—not merely an attached friend, but of the same age and exuberant vigour as himself—laid his mind open to gloomy forebodings from numerous omens, as well as to jealous mistrust even of his oldest officers. Antipater especially, no longer protected against the calumnies of Olympias by the support of Hephæstion,[2] fell more and more into discredit; whilst his son Kassander, who had recently come into Asia with a Macedonian reinforcement, underwent from Alexander during irascible moments much insulting violence. In spite of the dissuasive warning of the Chaldean priests,[3] Alexander had been persuaded to

[1] Arrian, vii. 23, 9—14. Καὶ Κλεομένει ἀνδρὶ κακῷ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικήσαντι ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, ἐπιστέλλει ἐπιστολήν. . . . . Ἢν γὰρ καταλάβω ἐγὼ (ἔλεγε τὰ γράμματα) τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καλῶς κατεσκευασμένα καὶ τὰ ἡρῷα τὰ Ἡφαιστίωνος, εἴτε τι πρότερον ἡμάρτηκας ἀφήσω σε τούτων, καὶ τοὐντεῦθεν, ὁπηλίκον ἂν ἁμάρτῃς, οὐδὲν πείσῃ ἐξ ἐμοῦ ἄχαρι. — In the oration of Demosthenês against Dionysodorus (p. 1285), Kleomenês appears as enriching himself by the monopoly of corn exported from Egypt: compare Pseudo-Aristot. Œconom. c. 33. Kleomenês was afterwards put to death by the first Ptolemy, who became king of Egypt (Pausanias, i. 6, 3).

[2] Plutarch, Alex. 74; Diodor, xvii. 114.

[3] Arrian, vii. 16, 9; vii. 17, 6. Plutarch, Alex. 73. Diodor. xvii.112.

distrust their sincerity, and had entered Babylon, though not without hesitation and uneasiness. However, when, after having entered the town, he went out of it again safely on his expedition for the survey of the lower Euphrates, he conceived himself to have exposed them as deceitful alarmists, and returned to the city with increased confidence, for the obsequies of his deceased friend.[1]

The sacrifices connected with these obsequies were on the most prodigious scale. Victims enough were offered to furnish a feast for the army, who also received ample distributions of wine. Alexander presided in person at the feast, and abandoned himself to conviviality like the rest. Already full of wine, he was persuaded by his friend Medius to sup with him, and to pass the whole night in yet farther drinking, with the boisterous indulgence called by the Greeks Kômus or Revelry. Having slept off his intoxication during the next day, he in the evening again supped with Medius, and spent a second night in the like unmeasured indulgence.[2] It appears that he already had the seeds of a fever upon him, which was so fatally aggravated by this intemperance that he was too ill to return to his palace. He took the bath, and slept in the house of Medius; on the next morning, he was unable to rise. After having been carried out on a couch to celebrate sacrifice (which

B.C. 323. (June.)

General feasting and intemperance in the army. Alexander is seized with a dangerous fever. Details of his illness.

[1] Arrian, vii. 22. 1. Αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς ἐξελέγξας δὴ τῶν Χαλδαίων μαντείαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πεπονθὼς εἴη ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἄχαρι (ἀλλ' ἔφθη γὰρ ἐλάσας ἔξω Βαβυλῶνος πρίν τι παθεῖν) ἀνέπλει αὖθις κατὰ ἕλη θαῤῥῶν. &c.

The uneasiness here caused by these prophecies and omens, in the mind of the most fearless man of his age, is worthy of notice as a psychological fact, and is perfectly attested by the authority of Aristobulus and Nearchus. It appears that Anaxarchus and other Grecian philosophers encouraged him by their reasonings to despise all prophecy, but especially that of the Chaldæan priests; who (they alleged) wished to keep Alexander out of Babylon in order that they might continue to possess the large revenues of the temple of Belus, which they had wrongfully appropriated; Alexander being disposed to rebuild that ruined temple, and to re-establish the suspended sacrifices to which its revenues had been originally devoted (Arrian vii. 17; Diodor. xvii. 112). Not many days afterwards, Alexander greatly repented of having given way to these dangerous reasoners, who by their sophistical cavils set aside the power and the warnings of destiny (Diodor. xvii. 116).

[2] Arrian, vii. 24, 25. Diodorus states (xvii. 117) that Alexander, on this convivial night, swallowed the contents of a large goblet called the cup of Hêraklês, and

was his daily habit), he was obliged to lie in bed all day. Nevertheless he summoned the generals to his presence, prescribing all the details of the impending expedition, and ordering that the land-force should begin its march on the fourth day following, while the fleet, with himself aboard, would sail on the fifth day. In the evening, he was carried on a couch across the Euphrates into a garden on the other side, where he bathed and rested for the night. The fever still continued, so that in the morning, after bathing and being carried out to perform the sacrifices, he remained on his couch all day, talking and playing at dice with Medius; in the evening, he bathed, sacrificed again, and ate a light supper, but endured a bad night with increased fever. The next two days passed in the same manner, the fever becoming worse and worse; nevertheless Alexander still summoned Nearchus to his bedside, discussed with him many points about his maritime projects, and repeated his order that the fleet should be ready by the third day. On the ensuing morning the fever was violent; Alexander reposed all day in a bathing-house in the garden, yet still calling in the generals to direct the filling up of vacancies among the officers, and ordering that the armament should be ready to move. Throughout the two next days, his malady became hourly more aggravated. On the second of the two, Alexander could with difficulty support the being lifted out of bed to perform the sacrifice; even then, however, he continued to give orders to the generals about the expedition. On the morrow, though desperately ill, he still made the effort requisite for performing the sacrifice; he was then carried across from the garden-house to the palace, giving orders that the generals and officers should remain in permanent attendance in and near the hall. He caused some of them to be called to his bedside; but though he knew them perfectly, he had by this time become incapable of utterance. One of his last words

felt very ill after it; a statement repeated by various other writers of antiquity, and which I see no reason for discrediting, though some modern critics treat it with contempt. The Royal Ephemerides, or Court Journal, attested only the general fact of his large potations and the long sleep which followed them: see Athenæus, x. p. 434.

To drink to intoxication at a funeral, was required as a token of respectful sympathy towards the deceased —see the last words of the Indian Kalanus before he ascended the funeral pile—Plutarch, Alexander, 69.

spoken is said to have been, on being asked to whom he bequeathed his kingdom, "*To the strongest*;" one of his last acts was, to take the signet ring from his finger, and hand it to Perdikkas.[1]

No hope of his life. Consternation and grief in the army. Last interview with the soldiers. His death.

For two nights and a day he continued in this state, without either amendment or repose. Meanwhile the news of his malady had spread through the army, filling them with grief and consternation. Many of the soldiers, eager to see him once more, forced their way into the palace, and were admitted unarmed. They passed along by the bedside, with all the demonstrations of affliction and sympathy: Alexander knew them, and made show of friendly recognition as well as he could; but was unable to say a word. Several of the generals slept in the temple of Serapis, hoping to be informed by the God in a dream whether they ought to bring Alexander into it as a suppliant to experience the divine healing power. The God informed them in their dream, that Alexander ought not to be brought into the temple—that it would be better for him to be left where he was. In the afternoon he expired—June 323 B.C.—after a life of thirty-two years and eight months—and a reign of twelve years and eight months.[2]

[1] These last two facts are mentioned by Arrian (vii. 26, 5), and Diodorus (xvii. 117), and Justin (xii. 15): but they found no place in the Court Journal. Curtius (x. v. 4) gives them with some enlargement.

[2] The details, respecting the last illness of Alexander, are peculiarly authentic, being extracted both by Arrian and by Plutarch, from the Ephemerides Regiæ, or short Court Journal; which was habitually kept by his secretary Eumenês, and another Greek named Diodorus (Athenæ. x. p. 434); see Arrian, vii. 25, 26; Plutarch, Alex. 76.

It is surprising that throughout all the course of this malady, no mention is made of any physician as having been consulted. No advice was asked; if we except the application to the temple of Serapis, during the last day of Alexander's life. A few months before, Alexander had hanged or crucified the physician who attended Hephæstion in his last illness. Hence it seems probable that he either despised or mistrusted medical advice, and would not permit any to be invoked. His views must have been much altered since his dangerous fever at Tarsus, and the successful treatment of it by the Akarnanian physician Philippus.

Though the fever (see some remarks from Littré attached to Didot's Fragm. Script. Alex. Magn. p. 124) which caused Alexander's death is here a plain fact satisfactorily made out, yet a different story was circulated some time

The death of Alexander, thus suddenly cut off by a fever in the plenitude of health, vigour, and aspirations, was an event impressive as well as important in the highest possible degree, to his contemporaries far and near. When the first report of it was brought to Athens, the orator Demadês exclaimed — "It cannot be true: if Alexander were dead, the whole habitable world would have smelt of his carcass."[1] This coarse, but emphatic comparison, illustrates the immediate, powerful, and wide-reaching impression produced by the sudden extinction of the great conqueror. It was felt by each of the many remote envoys who had so recently come to propitiate this far-shooting Apollo—by every man among the nations who had sent these envoys—throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa, as then known,—to affect either his actual condition or his probable future.[2] The first growth and development of Macedonia, during the twenty-two years preceding the battle of Chæroneia, from an embarrassed secondary state into the first of all known powers,

B.C. 323.

Effect produced on the imagination of contemporaries by the career and death of Alexander.

afterwards, and gained partial credit (Plutarch, De Invidiâ, p. 538), that he had been poisoned. The poison was said to have been provided by Aristotle,—sent over to Asia by Antipater through his son Kassander,—and administered by Iollas (another son of Antipater), Alexander's cupbearer (Arrian, vii. 27, 2; Curtius, x. 10, 17; Diodor. xvii. 118; Justin, xii. 13). It is quite natural that fever and intemperance (which latter moreover was frequent with Alexander) should not be regarded as causes sufficiently marked and impressive to explain a decease at once so unexpected and so momentous. There seems ground for supposing, however, that the report was intentionally fomented, if not originally broached, by the party-enemies of Antipater and Kassander—especially by the rancorous Olympias. The violent enmity afterwards displayed by Kassander against Olympias, and all the family of Alexander, helped to encourage the report. In the life of Hyperidês in Plutarch (Vit. X Oratt. p. 849), it is stated, that he proposed at Athens public honours to Iollas for having given the poison to Alexander. If there is any truth in this, it might be a stratagem for casting discredit on Antipater (father of Iollas), against whom the Athenians entered into the Lamian war, immediately after the death of Alexander.

[1] Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Demetrius Phaler. De Elocution. s. 300. Οὐ τέθνηκεν Ἀλέξανδρος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—ὦζε γὰρ ἂν ἡ οἰκουμένη τοῦ νεκροῦ.

[2] Dionysius, despot of the Pontic Herakleia, fainted away with joy when he heard of Alexander's death, and erected a statue of Εὐθυμία or Comfort (Memn. Heracl. Fragm. ap. Photium, Cod. 224, c. 4).

had excited the astonishment of contemporaries, and admiration for Philip's organizing genius. But the achievements of Alexander, during his twelve years of reign, throwing Philip into the shade, had been on a scale so much grander and vaster, and so completely without serious reverse or even interruption, as to transcend the measure, not only of human expectation, but almost of human belief. The Great King (as the King of Persia was called by excellence) was, and had long been, the type of worldly power and felicity, even down to the time when Alexander crossed the Hellespont. Within four years and three months from this event, by one stupendous defeat after another, Darius had lost all his Western Empire, and had become a fugitive eastward of the Caspian Gates, escaping captivity at the hands of Alexander only to perish by those of the satrap Bessus. All antecedent historical parallels —the ruin and captivity of the Lydian Crœsus, the expulsion and mean life of the Syracusan Dionysius, both of them impressive examples of the mutability of human condition,—sank into trifles compared with the overthrow of this towering Persian colossus. The orator Æschinês expressed the genuine sentiment of a Grecian spectator, when he exclaimed (in a speech delivered at Athens shortly before the death of Darius)— "What is there among the list of strange and unexpected events, that has not occurred in our time? Our lives have transcended the limits of humanity; we are born to serve as a theme for incredible tales to posterity. Is not the Persian king—who dug through Athos and bridged the Hellespont,—who demanded earth and water from the Greeks,—who dared to proclaim himself in public epistles master of all mankind from the rising to the setting sun—is not *he* now struggling to the last, not for dominion over others, but for the safety of his own person?"[1]

[1] Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 524. c. 43. Τοιγάρτοι τί τῶν ἀνελπίστων καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτων ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὐ γέγονεν! οὐ γὰρ βίον γ' ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπινον βεβιώκαμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς παραδοξολογίαν τοῖς ἐσομένοις μεθ' ἡμᾶς ἔφυμεν. Οὐχ ὁ μὲν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεὺς, ὁ τὸν Ἄθων διορύξας καὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, ὁ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ τοὺς Ἕλληνας αἰτῶν, ὁ τολμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς γράφειν ὅτι δεσπότης ἐστὶν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀφ' ἡλίου ἀνιόντος μέχρι δυομένου, νῦν οὐ περὶ τοῦ κύριος ἑτέρων εἶναι διαγωνίζεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος σωτηρίας;

Compare the striking fragment, of a like tenor, out of the lost work of the Phalerean Demetrius—Περὶ τῆς τύχης—Fragment. Histor. Græcor. vol. ii. p. 368.

Such were the sentiments excited by Alexander's career even in the middle of 330 B.C., more than seven years before his death. During the following seven years, his additional achievements had carried astonishment yet farther. He had mastered, in defiance of fatigue, hardship, and combat, not merely all the eastern half of the Persian empire, but unknown Indian regions beyond its easternmost limits. Besides Macedonia, Greece, and Thrace, he possessed all that immense treasure and military force which had once rendered the Great King so formidable. By no contemporary man had any such power ever been known or conceived. With the turn of imagination then prevalent, many were doubtless disposed to take him for a God on earth, as Grecian spectators had once supposed with regard to Xerxês, when they beheld the innumerable Persian host crossing the Hellespont.[1]

Had Alexander lived, he must have achieved things greater still.

Exalted to this prodigious grandeur, Alexander was at the time of his death little more than thirty-two years old—the age at which a citizen of Athens was growing into important commands; ten years less than the age for a consul at Rome;[2] two years younger than the age at which Timour first acquired the crown, and began his foreign conquests.[3] His extraordinary bodily powers were unabated; he had acquired a large stock of military experience; and, what was still more important, his appetite for farther conquest was as voracious, and his readiness to purchase it at the largest cost of toil or danger, as complete, as it had been when he first crossed the Hellespont. Great as his past career had been, his future achievements, with such increased means and experience, were likely to be yet greater. His ambition would have been satisfied with nothing less than the conquest of the whole habitable world as then known;[4] and if his life had been prolonged, he would probably have accomplished it. Nowhere (so far as our knowledge reaches) did there reside any military power capable of making head against him; nor were his soldiers, when he commanded them, daunted or baffled by any extremity of cold, heat, or fatigue. The patriotic

[1] Herod. vii. 56.

[2] Cicero, Philippic. v. 17, 48

[3] See Histoire de Timour-Bec, par Cherefeddin Ali, translated by Petit de la Croix, vol. i. p. 203.

[4] This is the remark of his great admirer Arrian, vii. 1, 6.

feelings of Livy dispose him to maintain[1] that Alexander, had he invaded Italy and assailed Romans or Samnites, would have failed and perished like his relative Alexander of Epirus. But this conclusion cannot be accepted. If we grant the courage and discipline of the Roman infantry to have been equal to the best infantry of Alexander's army, the same cannot be said of the Roman cavalry as compared with the Macedonian Companions. Still less is it likely that a Roman consul, annually changed, would have been found a match for Alexander in military genius and combinations; nor, even if personally equal, would he have possessed the same variety of troops and arms, each effective in its separate way, and all conspiring to one common purpose—nor the same unbounded influence over their minds in stimulating them to full effort. I do not think that even the Romans could have successfully resisted Alexander the Great; though it is certain that he never throughout all his long marches encountered such enemies as they, nor even such as Samnites and Lucanians—combining courage, patriotism, discipline, with effective arms both for defence and for close combat.[2]

Question raised by Livy, about the chances of Alexander, if he had attacked the Romans.

Among all the qualities which go to constitute the highest military excellence, either as a general or as a soldier, none was wanting in the character of Alexander. Together with his own chivalrous courage—sometimes indeed both excessive and unseasonable, so as to form the only military

Unrivalled excellence of Alexander, as a military man.

[1] Livy, ix. 17-19. A discussion of Alexander's chances against the Romans — extremely interesting and beautiful, though the case appears to me very partially set forth. I agree with Niebuhr in dissenting from Livy's result; and with Plutarch in considering it as one of the boons of Fortune to the Romans, that Alexander did not live long enough to attack them (Plutarch De Fortunâ Romanor. p. 326).

Livy however had great reason for complaining of those Greek authors (he calls them "levissimi ex Græcis"), who said the Romans would have quailed before the terrible reputation of Alexander, and submitted without resistance. Assuredly his victory over them would have been dearly bought.

[2] Alexander of Epirus is said to have remarked, that he, in his expeditions into Italy, had fallen upon the ἀνδρωνῖτις or chamber of the men; while his nephew (Alexander the Great), in invading Asia, had fallen upon the γυναικωνῖτις or chamber of the women (Aulus Gellius, xvii. 21; Curtius, viii. 1, 37).

defect which can be fairly imputed to him—we trace in all his operations the most careful dispositions taken beforehand, vigilant precaution in guarding against possible reverse, and abundant resource in adapting himself to new contingencies. Amidst constant success, these precautionary combinations were never discontinued. His achievements are the earliest recorded evidence of scientific military organization on a large scale, and of its overwhelming effects. Alexander overawes the imagination more than any other personage of antiquity, by the matchless development of all that constitutes effective force—as an individual warrior, and as organizer and leader of armed masses; not merely the blind impetuosity ascribed by Homer to Arês, but also the intelligent, methodized, and all-subduing compression which he personifies in Athênê. But all his great qualities were fit for use only against enemies; in which category indeed were numbered all mankind, known and unknown, except those who chose to submit to him. In his Indian campaigns, amidst tribes of utter strangers, we perceive that not only those who stand on their defence, but also those who abandon their property and flee to the mountains, are alike pursued and slaughtered.

Alexander as a ruler, apart from military affairs—not deserving of esteem.

Apart from the transcendent merits of Alexander as a soldier and a general, some authors give him credit for grand and beneficent views on the subject of imperial government, and for intentions highly favourable to the improvement of mankind. I see no ground for adopting this opinion. As far as we can venture to anticipate what would have been Alexander's future, we see nothing in prospect except years of ever-repeated aggression and conquest, not to be concluded until he had traversed and subjugated all the inhabited globe. The acquisition of universal dominion—conceived not metaphorically, but literally, and conceived with greater facility in consequence of the imperfect geographical knowledge of the time—was the master-passion of his soul. At the moment of his death, he was commencing fresh aggression in the south against the Arabians, to an indefinite extent;[1] while his vast projects against the western tribes in Africa and Europe, as far as the Pillars of Hêraklês, were consigned in the orders and

[1] Arrian, vii. 28, 5.

memoranda confidentially communicated to Kraterus.[1] Italy, Gaul, and Spain, would have been successively attacked and conquered; the enterprises proposed to him when in Baktria by the Chorasmian prince Pharasmanês, but postponed then until a more convenient season, would have been next taken up, and he would have marched from the Danube northward round the Euxine and Palus Mæotis against the Scythians and the tribes of Caucasus.[2] There remained moreover the Asiatic regions east of the Hyphasis, which his soldiers had refused to enter upon, but which he certainly would have invaded at a future opportunity, were it only to efface the poignant humiliation of having been compelled to relinquish his proclaimed purpose. Though this sounds like romance and hyperbole, it was nothing more than the real insatiate aspiration of Alexander, who looked upon every new acquisition mainly as a capital for acquiring more:[3] "You are a man like all of us, Alexander (said the naked Indian to him)—except that you abandon your home like a meddlesome destroyer, to invade the most distant regions; enduring hardship yourself, and inflicting hardship upon others."[4] Now, how an empire thus boundless and heterogeneous, such as no prince has ever yet realized, could have been administered with any superior advantages to subjects, it would be difficult to show. The mere task of acquiring and maintaining —of keeping satraps and tribute-gatherers in authority as well as in subordination—of suppressing resistances ever liable to recur in regions distant by months of march[5]—would occupy the whole life of a world-conqueror, without leaving any leisure for the improvements suited to peace and stability, if we give him credit for such purposes in theory.

[1] Diodor. xviii. 4.

[2] Arrian, iv. 15, 11.

[3] Arrian, vii. 19, 12. Τῷ δὲ ἀληθὲς, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ἄπληστος ἦν τοῦ κτᾶσθαί τι ἀεὶ Ἀλέξανδρος. Compare vii. 1, 3-7; vii. 15, 6, and the speech made by Alexander to his soldiers on the banks of the Hyphasis when he was trying to persuade them to march forward, v. 26 *seq.* We must remember that Arrian had before him the work of Ptolemy, who would give, in all probability, the substance of this memorable speech from his own hearing.

[4] Arrian, vii. 1, 8. σὺ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὢν, παραπλήσιος τοῖς ἄλλοις, πλήν γε δή, ὅτι πολυπράγμων καὶ ἀτάσθαλος, ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας τοσαύτην γῆν ἐπεξέρχῃ, πράγματα ἔχων τε καὶ παρέχων ἄλλοις.

[5] Arrian, vii. 4, 4, 5.

But even this last is more than can be granted. Alexander's acts indicate that he desired nothing better than to take up the traditions of the Persian empire; a tribute-levying and army-levying system, under Macedonians in large proportion, as his instruments; yet partly also under the very same Persians who had administered before, provided they submitted to him. It has indeed been extolled among his merits that he was thus willing to reappoint Persian grandees (putting their armed force however under the command of a Macedonian officer)—and to continue native princes in their dominions, if they did willing homage to him, as tributary subordinates. But all this had been done before him by the Persian kings, whose system it was to leave the conquered princes undisturbed, subject only to the payment of tribute, and to the obligation of furnishing a military contingent when required.[1] In like manner Alexander's Asiatic empire would thus have been composed of an aggregate of satrapies and dependent principalities, furnishing money and soldiers; in other respects, left to the discretion of local rule, with occasional extreme inflictions of punishment, but no systematic examination or control.[2] Upon this, the condition of Asiatic empire in all ages, Alexander would have grafted one special improvement: the military organization of the empire, feeble under the Achæmenid princes, would have been greatly strengthened by his genius, and by the able officers formed in his school, both for foreign aggression and for home control.[3]

Alexander would have continued the system of the Persian empire, with no other improvement except that of a strong organization.

The Persian empire was a miscellaneous aggregate, with no strong feeling of nationality. The Macedonian conqueror who seized its throne was still more indifferent to national sentiment. He was neither Macedonian nor Greek. Though the absence of this

Absence of nationality

[1] Herodot. iii. 15. Alexander offered to Phokion (Plutarch, Phok. 18) his choice between four Asiatic cities, of which (that is, of any one of them) he was to enjoy the revenues; just as Artaxerxês Longimanus had acted towards Themistoklês in recompense for his treason. Phokion refused the offer.

[2] See the punishment of Sisamnês by Kambysês (Herodot. v. 25).

[3] The rhetor Aristeidês, in his Encomium on Rome, has some good remarks on the character and ascendency of Alexander, exercised by will and personal authority, as contrasted with the systematic and legal working of the Roman empire (Orat. xvi. p. 332-360, vol. i. ed. Dindorf).

in Alexander—purpose of fusing the different varieties of mankind into one common type of subjection.

prejudice has sometimes been counted to him as a virtue, it only made room, in my opinion, for prejudices still worse. The substitute for it was an exorbitant personality and self-estimation, manifested even in his earliest years, and inflamed by extraordinary success into the belief in divine parentage; which, while setting him above the idea of communion with any special nationality, made him conceive all mankind as subjects under one common sceptre to be wielded by himself. To this universal empire the Persian king made the nearest approach,[1] according to the opinions then prevalent. Accordingly Alexander, when victorious, accepted the position and pretensions of the overthrown Persian court as approaching most nearly to his full due. He became more Persian than either Macedonian or Greek. While himself adopting, as far as he could safely venture, the personal habits of the Persian court, he took studied pains to transform his Macedonian officers into Persian grandees, encouraging and even forcing intermarriages with Persian women according to Persian rites. At the time of Alexander's death, there was comprised, in his written orders given to Kraterus, a plan for the wholesale transportation of inhabitants both out of Europe into Asia, and out of Asia into Europe, in order to fuse these populations into one by multiplying intermarriages and intercourse.[2] Such reciprocal translation of peoples would have been felt as eminently odious, and could not have been accomplished without coercive authority.[3] It is rash to speculate upon unexecuted purposes; but, as far as we can judge, such compulsory mingling of the different races promises nothing

[1] Xenoph. Cyropæd. vii. 6, 21; Anabas. i. 7, 6; Herodot. vii. 8, 13; compare Arrian, v. 26, 4-10.

[2] Diodor. xviii. 4. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πόλεων συνοικισμοὺς καὶ σωμάτων μεταγωγὰς ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην, καὶ κατὰ τοὐναντίον ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὅπως τὰς μεγίστας ἠπείρους ταῖς ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ταῖς οἰκειώσεσιν εἰς κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ συγγενικὴν φιλίαν καταστήσῃ.

[3] See the effect produced upon the Ionians by the false statement of Histiæus (Herodot. vi. 3) with Wesseling's note—and the eagerness of the Pæonians to return (Herod. v. 98; also Justin, viii. 5).

Antipater afterwards intended to transport the Ætolians in mass from their own country into Asia, if he had succeeded in conquering them (Diodor. xviii. 25). Compare Pausanias (i. 9, 8-10) about the forcible measures used by Lysimachus, in transporting new inhabitants, at Ephesus and Lysimacheia.

favourable to the happiness of any of them, though it might serve as an imposing novelty and memento of imperial omnipotence.

In respect of intelligence and combining genius, Alexander was Hellenic to the full; in respect of disposition and purpose, no one could be less Hellenic. The acts attesting his Oriental violence of impulse, unmeasured self-will,[1] and exaction of reverence above the limits of humanity—have been already recounted. To describe him as a son of Hellas, imbued with the political maxims of Aristotle, and bent on the systematic diffusion of Hellenic culture for the improvement of mankind[2]—is, in my judgement, an estimate of his character contrary to the evidence. Alexander is indeed said to have invited suggestions from Aristotle as to the best mode of colonizing; but his temper altered so much, after a few years of Asiatic conquest, that he came not only to lose all deference for Aristotle's advice, but even to hate him bitterly.[3] Moreover, though the philosopher's full suggestions have not been preserved, yet we are told generally that he recommended Alexander to behave to the Greeks as a leader or president, or limited chief—and to the Barbarians (non-Hellenes) as a master;[4] a distinction substantially coinciding with that

Mistake of supposing Alexander to be the intentional diffuser of Greek civilization. His ideas compared with those of Aristotle.

[1] Livy, ix. 18. "Referre in tanto rege pigeat superbam mutationem vestis, et desideratas humi jacentium adulationes, etiam victis Macedonibus graves, nedum victoribus: et fœda supplicia, et inter vinum et epulas cædes amicorum, et vanitatem ementiendæ stirpis. Quid si vini amor in dies fieret acrior? quid si trux et prævervida ira? (*nec quidquam dubium inter scriptores refero)* nullane hæc damna imperatoriis virtutibus ducimus?"

The appeal here made by Livy to the full attestation of these points in Alexander's character deserves notice. He had doubtless more authorities before him than we possess.

[2] Among other eulogists of Alexander, it is sufficient to name Droysen—in his two works, both of great historical research—Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen—and Geschichte des Hellenismus oder der Bildung des Hellenistischen Staaten-Systemes (Hamburg, 1843). See especially the last and most recent work, p. 27 *segq.* p. 651 *segq.*—and elsewhere *passim.*

[3] Plutarch, Alex. 55—74.

[4] Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. M. p. 329. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἔργον παρέσχεν· οὐ γὰρ, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ, τοῖς μὲν Ἕλλησιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρώμενον .... ἀλλὰ κοινὸς ἦκεν θεοῦθεν ἁρμοστὴς καὶ διαλλακτὴς τῶν ὅλων νομίζων, οὓς

pointed out by Burke in his speeches at the beginning of the American war, between the principles of government proper to be followed by England in the American colonies, and in British India. No Greek thinker believed the Asiatics to be capable of that free civil polity[1] upon which the march of every Grecian community was based. Aristotle did not wish to degrade the Asiatics below the level to which they had been accustomed, but rather to preserve the Greeks from being degraded to the same level. Now Alexander recognised no such distinction as that drawn by his preceptor. He treated Greeks and Asiatics alike, not by elevating the latter, but by degrading the former. Though he employed all indiscriminately as instruments, yet he presently found the free speech of Greeks, and even of Macedonians, so distasteful and offensive, that his preferences turned more and more in favour of the servile Asiatic sentiment and customs. Instead of hellenizing Asia, he was tending to asiatize Macedonia and Hellas. His temper and character, as modified by a few years of conquest, rendered him quite unfit to follow the course recommended by Aristotle towards the Greeks —quite as unfit as any of the Persian kings, or as the French Emperor Napoleon, to endure that partial frus-

τῷ λόγῳ μὴ συνῆγε, τοῖς ὅπλοις βιαζόμενος, εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συνελεγχών τὰ πανταχόθεν, &c.

Strabo (or Eratosthenês, see Strabo, i. p. 66) and Plutarch understand the expression of Aristotle erroneously—as if that philosopher had meant to recommend harsh and cruel treatment of the non-Hellenes, and kind treatment only towards Greeks. That Aristotle could have meant no such thing, is evident from the whole tenor of his treatise on Politics. The distinction really intended is between a greater and a less measure of extra-popular authority—not between kind and unkind purposes in the exercise of authority. Compare Tacitus, Annal. xii. 11—the advice of the Emperor Claudius to the Parthian prince Meherdatês.

[1] Aristot. Politic. i. 1, 5; vii. 6, 1. See the memorable comparison drawn by Aristotle (Polit. vii. 6) between the Europeans and Asiatics generally. He pronounces the former to be courageous and energetic, but wanting in intelligence or powers of political combination; the latter to be intelligent, and clever in contrivance, but destitute of courage. Neither of them have more than a "one-legged aptitude" (φύσιν μονόκωλον); the Greek alone possesses both the courage and the intelligence united. The Asiatics are condemned to perpetual subjection; the Greeks might govern the world, could they but combine in one political society.

Isokratês ad Philippum, Or. v. p. 85. s. 18. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν πείθειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σύμφερον, τὸ δὲ βιάζεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους χρήσιμον.

tration, compromise, and smart from free criticism, which is inseparable from the position of a limited chief. Among a multitude of subjects more diverse-coloured than even the army of Xerxês, it is quite possible that he might have turned his power towards the improvement of the rudest portions. We are told (though the fact is difficult to credit, from his want of time) that he abolished various barbarisms of the Hyrkanians, Arachosians, and Sogdians.[1] But Macedonians as well as Greeks would have been pure losers by being absorbed into an immense Asiatic aggregate.

Plutarch states that Alexander founded more than seventy new cities in Asia.[2] So large a number of them is neither verifiable nor probable, unless we either reckon up simple military posts, or borrow from the list of foundations really established by his successors. Except Alexandria in Egypt,

Number of new cities founded in Asia by Alexander.

[1] Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. M. p. 328. The stay of Alexander in these countries was however so short, that even with the best will he could not have enforced the suppression of any inveterate customs.

[2] Plutarch, Fortun. Al. M. p. 328. Plutarch mentions, a few lines afterwards, Seleukia in Mesopotamia, as if he thought that it was among the cities established by Alexander himself. This shows that he has not been exact in distinguishing foundations made by Alexander, from those originated by Seleukus and other Diadochi.

The elaborate article of Droysen (in the Appendix to his Geschichte des Hellenismus, p. 588-651) ascribes to Alexander the largest plans of colonization in Asia, and enumerates a great number of cities alleged to have been founded by him. But in regard to the majority of these foundations, the evidence upon which Droysen grounds his belief that Alexander was the founder, appears to me altogether slender and unsatisfactory. If Alexander founded so many cities as Droysen imagines, how does it happen that Arrian mentions only so comparatively small a number? The argument derived from Arrian's silence, for rejecting what is affirmed by other ancients respecting Alexander, is indeed employed by modern authors (and by Droysen himself among them), far oftener than I think warrantable. But if there be any one proceeding of Alexander more than another, in respect of which the silence of Arrian ought to make us suspicious —it is the foundation of a new colony; a solemn act, requiring delay and multiplied regulations, intended for perpetuity, and redounding to the honour of the founder. I do not believe in any colonies founded by Alexander, beyond those comparatively few which Arrian mentions, except such as rest upon some other express and good testimony. Whoever will read through Droysen's list, will see that most of the names in it will not stand this test. The short life, and rapid movements, of Alexander, are of themselves the strongest presumption against his having founded so large a number of colonies.

none of the cities founded by Alexander himself can be shown to have attained any great development. Nearly all were planted among the remote, warlike, and turbulent peoples eastward of the Caspian Gates. Such establishments were really fortified posts to hold the country in subjection: Alexander lodged in them detachments from his army, but none of these detachments can well have been large, since he could not afford materially to weaken his army, while active military operations were still going on, and while farther advance was in contemplation. More of these settlements were founded in Sogdiana than elsewhere; but respecting the Sogdian foundations, we know that the Greeks, whom he established there, chained to the spot only by fear of his power, broke away in mutiny immediately on the news of his death.[1] Some Greek soldiers in Alexander's army on the Jaxartes or the Hydaspes, sick and weary of his interminable marches, might prefer being enrolled among the colonists of a new city on one of these unknown rivers, to the ever-repeated routine of exhausting duty.[2] But it is certain that no volunteer emigrants would go forth to settle at distances such as their imaginations could hardly conceive. The absorbing appetite of Alexander was conquest, to the East, West, South, and North; the cities which he planted were established, for the most part, as garrisons to maintain his most distant and most precarious acquisitions. The purpose of colonization was altogether subordinate; and that of hellenizing Asia, so far as we can see, was not even contemplated, much less realized.

It was not Alexander, but the Diadochi after him, who chiefly hellenized Asia.

This process of hellenizing Asia—in so far as Asia was ever hellenized — which has often been ascribed to Alexander, was in reality the work of the Diadochi who came after him; though his conquests doubtless opened the door and established the military ascendency which rendered such a work practicable. The position, the aspir-

[1] Diodor. xvii. 99; xviii. 7. Curtius, ix. 7, 1. Curtius observes (vii. 10, 15) respecting Alexander's colonies in Sogdiana—that they were founded "velut freni domitarum gentium; nunc originis suæ oblita serviunt, quibus imperaverunt."

[2] See the plain-spoken outburst of the Thurian Antileon, one of the soldiers in Xenophon's Ten Thousand Greeks, when the army reached Trapezus (Xenoph. Anabas. v. 1, 2).

ations, and the interests of these Diadochi—Antigonus, Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, &c.—were materially different from those of Alexander. They had neither appetite nor means for new and remote conquest; their great rivalry was with each other; each sought to strengthen himself near home against the rest. It became a matter of fashion and pride with them, not less than of interest, to found new cities immortalising their family names. These foundations were chiefly made in the regions of Asia near and known to Greeks, where Alexander had planted none. Thus the great and numerous foundations of Seleukus Nikator and his successors covered Syria, Mesopotamia, and parts of Asia Minor. All these regions were known to Greeks, and more or less tempting to new Grecian immigrants—not out of reach or hearing of the Olympic and other festivals, as the Jaxartês and the Indus were. In this way a considerable influx of new Hellenic blood was poured into Asia during the century succeeding Alexander—probably in great measure from Italy and Sicily, where the condition of the Greek cities became more and more calamitous—besides the numerous Greeks who took service as individuals under these Asiatic kings. Greeks, and Macedonians speaking Greek, became predominant, if not in numbers, at least in importance, throughout most of the cities in Western Asia. In particular, the Macedonian military organization, discipline, and administration, were maintained systematically among these Asiatic kings. In the account of the battle of Magnesia, fought by the Seleukid king Antiochus the Great against the Romans in 190 B.C., the Macedonian phalanx, constituting the main force of his Asiatic army, appears in all its completeness, just as it stood under Philip and Perseus in Macedonia itself. [1]

When it is said however that Asia became hellenized under Alexander's successors, the phrase requires explanation. Hellenism, properly so called—the aggregate of habits, sentiments, energies, and intelligence, manifested by the Greeks during their epoch of autonomy [2]—never

[1] Appian, Syriac. 32.

[2] This is the sense in which I have always used the word *Hellenism*, throughout the present Work.

With Droysen, the word *Hellenismus—Das Hellenistische Staatensystem*— is applied to the state of things which followed upon Alexander's death; to the aggregate of kingdoms into which Alexander's conquests became distributed, having for their point of

passed over into Asia; neither the highest qualities of the Greek mind, nor even the entire character of ordinary Greeks. This genuine Hellenism could not subsist under the over-ruling compression of Alexander, nor even under the less irresistible pressure of his successors. Its living force, productive genius, self-organizing power, and active spirit of political communion, were stifled, and gradually died out. All that passed into Asia was a faint and partial resemblance of it, carrying the superficial marks of the original. The administration of the Greco-Asiatic kings was not Hellenic (as it has been sometimes called), but completely despotic, as that of the Persians had been before. Whoever follows their history, until the period of Roman dominion, will see that it turned upon the tastes, temper, and ability of the prince, and on the circumstances of the regal family. Viewing their government as a system, its prominent difference, as compared with their Persian prodecessors, consisted in their retaining the military traditions and organization of Philip and Alexander; an elaborate scheme of discipline and manœuvring, which could not be kept up without permanent official grades and a higher measure of intelligence than had ever been displayed under the Achæmenid kings, who had no military school or training whatever. Hence a great number of individual Greeks found employment in the military as well as in the civil service of these Greco-Asiatic kings. The intelligent Greek, instead of a citizen of Hellas, became the instrument of a foreign prince; the details of government were managed to a great degree by Greek officials, and always in the Greek language.

How far Asia was ever really hellenized—the great fact was, that the Greek language became universally diffused.

Moreover, besides this, there was the still more important fact of the many new cities founded in Asia by the Seleukidæ and the other contemporary kings. Each of these cities had a considerable infusion of Greek and Macedonian citizens, among the native Orientals located here, often brought by compulsion from neigh-

Greco-Asiatic cities.

similarity the common use of Greek speech, a certain proportion of Greeks both as inhabitants and as officers, and a partial streak of Hellenic culture.

This sense of the word (if admissible at all) must at any rate be constantly kept in mind, in order that it may not be confounded with *hellenism* in the stricter meaning.

bouring villages. In what numerical ratio these two elements of the civic population stood to each other, we cannot say. But the Greeks and Macedonians were the leading and active portion, who excercised the greatest assimilating force, gave imposing effect to the public manifestations of religion, had wider views and sympathies, dealt with the central government, and carried on that contracted measure of municipal autonomy which the city was permitted to retain. In these cities the Greek inhabitants, though debarred from political freedom, enjoyed a range of social activity suited to their tastes. In each, Greek was the language of public business and dealing; each formed a centre of attraction and commerce for an extensive neighbourhood; all together, they were the main Hellenic, or quasi-Hellenic, element in Asia under the Greco-Asiatic kings, as contrasted with the rustic villages, where native manners, and probably native speech, still continued with little modification. But the Greeks of Antioch, or Alexandria, or Seleukeia, were not like citizens of Athens or Thebes, nor even like men of Tarentum or Ephesus. While they communicated their language to Orientals, they became themselves substantially orientalized. Their feelings, judgements, and habits of action, ceased to be Hellenic. Polybius, when he visited Alexandria, looked with surprise and aversion on the Greeks there resident, though they were superior to the non-Hellenic population, whom he considered worthless.[1] Greek social habits, festivals, and legends, passed with the Hellenic settlers into Asia; all becoming amalgamated and transformed so as to suit a new Asiatic abode. Important social and political

[1] Strabo, xii. p. 797. ὁ γοῦν Πολύβιος, γεγονὼς ἐν τῇ πόλει (Alexandria), βδελύττεται τὴν ταύτῃ κατάστασιν, &c.

The Museum of Alexandria (with its library) must be carefully distinguished from the city and the people. It was an artificial institution, which took its rise altogether from the personal taste and munificence of the earlier Ptolemies, especially the second. It was one of the noblest and most useful institutions recorded in history, and forms the most honourable monument of what Droysen calls the *hellenistic* period, between the death of Alexander and the extension of the Roman empire into Asia. But this Museum, though situated at Alexandria, had no peculiar connexion with the city or its population; it was a College of literary Fellows (if we may employ a modern word) congregated out of various Grecian towns. Eratosthenès, Kallimachus, Aristophanès, Aristarchus, were not natives of Alexandria.

consequences turned upon the diffusion of the language, and upon the establishment of such a common medium of communication throughout Western Asia. But after all, the hellenized Asiatic was not so much a Greek as a foreigner with Grecian speech, exterior varnish, and superficial manifestations; distinguished fundamentally from those Greek citizens with whom the present history has been concerned. So he would have been considered by Sophoklês, by Thucydidês, by Sokratês.

Increase of the means of communication between various parts of the world.

Thus much is necessary, in order to understand the bearing of Alexander's conquests, not only upon the Hellenic population, but upon Hellenic attributes and peculiarities. While crushing the Greeks as communities at home, these conquests opened a wider range to the Greeks as individuals abroad; and produced—perhaps the best of all their effects—a great increase of intercommunication, multiplication of roads, extension of commercial dealing, and enlarged facilities for the acquisition of geographical knowledge. There already existed in the Persian empire an easy and convenient royal road (established by Darius son of Hystaspes, and described as well as admired by Herodotus) for the three months' journey between Sardis and Susa; and there must have been another regular road from Susa and Ekbatana to Baktria, Sogdiana, and India. Alexander, had he lived, would doubtless have multiplied on a still larger scale the communications both by sea and land between the various parts of his world-empire. We read that among the gigantic projects which he was contemplating when surprised by death, one was, the construction of a road all along the northern coast of Africa, as far as the Pillars of Hêraklês.[1] He had intended to found a new maritime city on the Persian Gulf, at the mouth of the Euphrates, and to incur much outlay for regulating the

[1] Diodor. xviii. 4. Pausanias (ii. 1, 5) observes that Alexander wished to cut through Mount Mimas (in Asia Minor), but that this was the only one, among all his undertakings, which did not succeed. "So difficult is it (he goes on) to put force upon the divine arrangements", τὰ θεῖα βιάσασθαι. He wished to cut through the isthmus between Teos and Klazomenæ, so as to avoid the navigation round the cliffs of Mimas (σκόπελον ὑψόεντα Μιμαντος—Aristophan. Nub. 274) between Chios and Erythræ. Probably this was among the projects suggested to Alexander, in the last year of his life. We have no other information about it.

flow of water in its lower course. The river would probably have been thus made again to afford the same conveniences, both for navigation and irrigation, as it appears to have furnished in earlier times under the ancient Babylonian kings. Orders had been also given for constructing a fleet to explore the Caspian Sea. Alexander believed that sea to be connected with the Eastern Ocean,[1] and intended to make it his point of departure for circumnavigating the eastern limits of Asia, which country yet remained for him to conquer. The voyage already performed by Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, was in those days a splendid maritime achievement; to which another still greater was on the point of being added—the circumnavigation of Arabia from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea; though here we must remark, that this same voyage (from the mouth of the Indus round Arabia into the Red Sea) had been performed in thirty months, a century and a half before, by Skylax of Karyanda, under the orders of Darius son of Hystaspes;[2] yet, though recorded by Herodotus, forgotten (as it would appear) by Alexander and his contemporaries. This enlarged and systematic exploration of the earth, combined with increased means of communication among its inhabitants, is the main feature in Alexander's career which presents itself as promising real consequences beneficial to humanity.

Interest of Alexander in science and literature.

We read that Alexander felt so much interest in the extension of science, that he gave to Aristotle the immense sum of 800 talents in money, placing under his directions several thousand men, for the purpose of prosecuting zoological researches.[3] These exaggerations are probably the work of

[1] Arrian, v. 26, 2.

[2] Herodot. iv. 44: compare iii. 102. That Arrian had not present to his memory this narrative of Herodotus, is plain from the last chapter of his Indica; though in his history of Alexander he alludes several times to Herodotus. Some authors have concluded from Arrian's silence that he disbelieved it, I think that he would have mentioned the statement of Herodotus nevertheless, with an intimation that he did not think it worthy of credit. Moreover, Arrian's disbelief (even granting that such was the state of his mind) is not to be held as a conclusive disproof of the story. I confess that I see no sufficient reason for discrediting the narrative of Herodotus—though some eminent modern writers are of an opposite opinion.

[3] Pliny, H. N. viii. 17; Athenæus, ix. p. 398. See Schneider's Preface to his edition of Aristotle's Historiæ De Animalibus, p. xxxix *seq.*

those enemies of the philosopher who decried him as a pensioner of the Macedonian court; but it is probable enough that Philip, and Alexander in the early part of his reign, may have helped Aristotle in the difficult process of getting together facts and specimens for observation—from esteem towards him personally, rather than from interest in his discoveries. The intellectual turn of Alexander was towards literature, poetry, and history. He was fond of the Iliad especially, as well as of the Attic tragedians; so that Harpalus, being directed to send some books to him in Upper Asia, selected as the most acceptable packet various tragedies of Æschylus, Sophoklês, and Euripidês, with the dithyrambic poems of Telestês and the histories of Philistus.[1]

[1] Plutarch, Alexand. 8.

# CHAPTER XCV.

## GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA TO THE CLOSE OF THE LAMIAN WAR.

State of the Grecian world when Alexander crossed the Hellespont.

EVEN in 334 B.C., when Alexander first entered upon his Asiatic campaigns, the Grecian cities, great as well as small, had been robbed of all their free agency, and existed only as appendages of the kingdom of Macedonia. Several of them were occupied by Macedonian garrisons, or governed by local despots who leaned upon such armed force for support. There existed among them no common idea or public sentiment, formally proclaimed and acted on, except such as it suited Alexander's purpose to encourage. The miso-Persian sentiment—once a genuine expression of Hellenic patriotism, to the recollection of which Demosthenês was wont to appeal, in animating the Athenians to action against Macedonia, but now extinct and supplanted by nearer apprehensions—had been converted by Alexander to his own purposes, as a pretext for headship, and a help for ensuring submission during his absence in Asia. Greece had become a province of Macedonia; the affairs of the Greeks (observes Aristotle in illustrating a philosophical discussion) are "in the hands of the king."[1] A public synod of the Greeks sat from time to time at Corinth; but it represented only philo-Macedonian sentiment; all that we know of its proceedings consisted in congratulations to Alexander on his victories. There is no Grecian history of public or political import; there are no facts except the local and municipal details of each city—"the streets and fountains which we are whitening," to use a phrase of Demosthenês[2]—the good management of the

[1] Aristot. Physic. iv. 3. p. 210 λήνων, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ a. 21. ἔτι ὡς ἐν βασιλεῖ τὰ Ἑλ- κινητικῷ.

[2] Demosthen. Olynthiac. iii. p. 36.

Athenian finances by the orator Lykurgus, and the contentions of orators respecting private disputes or politics of the past.

But though Grecian history is thus stagnant and suspended during the first years of Alexander's Asiatic campaigns, it might at any moment have become animated with an active spirit of self-emancipation, if he had experienced reverses, or if the Persians had administered their own affairs with skill and vigour. I have already stated, that during the first two years of the war, the Persian fleet (we ought rather to say, the Phenician fleet in the Persian service) had a decided superiority at sea. Darius possessed untold treasures which might have indefinitely increased that superiority and multiplied his means of transmarine action, had he chosen to follow the advice of Memnon, by acting vigorously from the sea and strictly on the defensive by land. The movement or quiescence of the Greeks therefore depended on the turn of affairs in Asia; as Alexander himself was well aware.

Grecian spirit might have been called into action, if the Persians had played their game well.

During the winter of 334—333 B.C., Memnon with the Persian fleet appeared to be making progress among the islands in the Ægean,[1] and the anti-Macedonian Greeks were expecting him farther westward in Eubœa and Peloponnesus. Their hopes being dashed by his unexpected death, and still more by Darius's abandonment of the Memnonian plans, they had next to wait for the chance of what might be achieved by the immense Persian land force. Even down to the eve of the battle of Issus, Demosthenês[2] and others (as has already been mentioned) were encouraged by their correspondents in Asia to anticipate success for Darius even in pitched battle. But after the great disaster at Issus, during a year and a half (from November 333 B.C. to March or April 331 B.C.), no hope was possible. The Persian force seemed extinct, and Darius was so paralysed by the captivity of his family, that he suffered even the citizens of Tyre and Gaza to perish in their gallant efforts of defence, without the least attempt to save them. At length, in the spring of 331 B.C., the prospects again appeared to improve. A second Persian army, countless like the first, was assembling

Hopes raised in Greece, first by the Persian fleet in the Ægean, next by the two great Persian armies on land.

[1] Arrian, ii. 1. [2] Æschinês cont. Ktesiph. 552.

eastward of the Tigris; Alexander advanced into the interior, many weeks' march from the shores of the Mediterranean, to attack them; and the Persians doubtless transmitted encouragements with money to enterprising men in Greece, in hopes of provoking auxiliary movements. Presently (October 331 B.C.) came the catastrophe at Arbela; after which no demonstration against Alexander could have been attempted with any reasonable hope of success.

Such was the varying point of view under which the contest in Asia presented itself to Grecian spectators, during the three years and a half between the landing of Alexander in Asia and the battle of Arbela. As to the leading states in Greece, we have to look at Athens and Sparta only; for Thebes had been destroyed and demolished as a city; and what had been once the citadel of the Kadmeia was now a Macedonian garrison.[1] Moreover, besides that garrison, the Bœotian cities, Orchomenus, Platæa, &c., were themselves strongholds of Macedonian dependence; being hostile to Thebes of old, and having received among themselves assignments of all the Theban lands.[2] In case of any movement in Greece, therefore, Antipater, the viceroy of Macedonia, might fairly count on finding in Greece interested allies, serving as no mean check upon Attica.

Public acts and policy at Athens—decidedly pacific.

At Athens, the reigning sentiment was decidedly pacific. Few were disposed to brave the prince who had just given so fearful an evidence of his force by the destruction of Thebes and the enslavement of the Thebans. Ephialtês and Charidêmus, the military citizens at Athens most anti-Macedonian in sentiment, had been demanded as prisoners by Alexander, and had withdrawn to Asia, there to take service with Darius. Other Athenians, men of energy and action, had followed their example, and had fought against Alexander at the Granikus, where they became his prisoners, and were sent to Macedonia to work in fetters at the mines. Ephialtês perished at the siege of Halikarnassus, while defending the place with the utmost gallantry; Charidêmus suffered a more unworthy death from the shameful sentence of Darius. The anti-Macedonian leaders

[1] Vita Demosthenis ap. Westermann, Scripti. Biograph. p. 301. Φρουράν καταστήσαντος Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις μετὰ τὸ κατασκάψαι τοὺς Θηβαίους &c.

[2] Pausanias, i. 25, 4.

who remained at Athens, such as Demosthenês and Lykurgus, were not generals or men of action, but statesmen and orators. They were fully aware that submission to Alexander was a painful necessity, though they watched not the less anxiously for any reverse which might happen to him, such as to make it possible for Athens to head a new struggle on behalf of Grecian freedom.

But it was not Demosthenês or Lykurgus who now guided the general policy of Athens.[1] For the twelve years between the destruction of Thebes and the death of Alexander, Phokion and Demadês were her ministers for foreign affairs; two men of totally opposite characters, but coinciding in pacific views, and in looking to the favour of Alexander and Antipater as the principal end to be attained. Twenty Athenian triremes were sent to act with the Macedonian fleet during Alexander's first campaign in Asia; these, together with the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, served to him farther as a guarantee for the continued submission of the Athenians generally.[2] There can be no doubt that the pacific policy of Phokion was now prudent and essential to Athens, though the same cannot be said (as I have remarked in the proper place) for his advocacy of the like policy twenty years before, when Philip's power was growing and might have been arrested by vigorous opposition. It suited the purpose of Antipater to ensure his hold upon Athens by frequent presents to Demadês, a man of luxurious and extravagant habits. But Phokion, incorruptible as well as poor to the end, declined all similar offers, though often made to him, not only by Antipater, but even by Alexander.[3]

Phokion and Demadês were leading ministers at Athens—they were of Macedonising politics.

It deserves particular notice, that though the macedonising policy was now decidedly in the ascendant—accepted, even by dissentients, as the only course admissible under the circumstances, and confirmed the more by each successive victory of Alexander—yet statesmen, like Lykurgus and

Demosthenês and Lykurgus, though not in the ascendant politically,

[1] "Since Macedonian dominion became paramount (observes Demosthenês, De Coronâ, p. 331), Æschinês and men of his stamp are in full ascendency and affluence—I am impotent: there is no place at Athens for free citizens and counsellors, but only for men who do what they are ordered, and flatter the ruling potentate."

[2] Arrian, i. 29, 8.

[3] Plutarch, Phokion, 30.

Demosthenês, of notorious anti-Macedonian sentiment, still held a conspicuous and influential position, though of course restricted to matters of internal administration. Thus Lykurgus continued to be the real acting minister of finance, for three successive Panathenaic intervals of four years each, or for an uninterrupted period of twelve years. He superintended not merely the entire collection, but also the entire disbursement of the public revenue; rendering strict periodical account, yet with a financial authority greater than had belonged to any statesman since Periklês. He improved the gymnasia and stadia of the city — multiplied the donatives and sacred furniture in the temples, — enlarged, or constructed anew, docks and arsenals,—provided a considerable stock of arms and equipments, military as well as naval—and maintained four hundred triremes in a seaworthy condition, for the protection of Athenian commerce. In these extensive functions he was never superseded, though Alexander at one time sent to require the surrender of his person, which was refused by the Athenian people.[1] The main cause of his first hold upon the public mind, was, his known and indisputable pecuniary probity, wherein he was the parallel of Phokion.

are nevertheless still public men of importance. Financial activity of Lykurgus.

As to Demosthenês, he did not hold any such commanding public appointments as Lykurgus; but he enjoyed great esteem and sympathy from the people generally, for his marked line of public counsel during the past. The proof of this is to

Position of Demosthenês—his prudent conduct.

[1] See the remarkable decree in honour of Lykurgus, passed by the Athenian people seventeen or eighteen years after his death, in the archonship of Anaxikratês, B.C. 307 (Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p. 852). The reciting portion of this decree, constituting four fifths of the whole, goes over the public conduct of Lykurgus, and is very valuable.

It seems that the twelve years of financial administration exercised by Lykurgus are to be taken probably, either from 342-330 B.C.—or four years later, from 338-326 B.C. Boeckh leaves the point undetermined between the two. Droysen and Meier prefer the earlier period—O. Müller the later. (Boeckh, Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen, also the second edition of his Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii. p. 114-118.)

The total of public money, recorded by the Inscription as having passed through the hands of Lykurgus in the twelve years, was 18,900 talents=4,340,000 *l.*, or thereabouts. He is said to have held, besides, in deposit, a great deal of money entrusted to him by private individuals. His official duties as treasurer were discharged, for the first four years, in his own

be found in one very significant fact. The indictment, against Ktesiphon's motion for crowning Demosthenês, was instituted by Æschinês, and official entry made of it before the death of Philip— which event occurred in August 336 B.C. Yet Æschinês did not venture to bring it on for trial until August 330 B.C., after Antipater had subdued the ill-fated rising of the Lacedæmonian king Agis; and even at that advantageous moment, when the macedonisers seemed in full triumph, he signally failed. We thus perceive, that though Phokion and Demadês were now the leaders of Athenian affairs, as representing a policy which every one felt to be unavoidable—yet the preponderant sentiment of the people went with Demosthenês and Lykurgus. In fact, we shall see that after the Lamian war, Antipater thought it requisite to subdue or punish this sentiment by disfranchising or deporting two-thirds of the citizens.[1] It seems however that the anti-Macedonian statesmen were very cautious of giving offence to Alexander, between 334 and 330 B.C. Ktesiphon accepted a mission of condolence to Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, on the death of her husband Alexander of Epirus; and Demosthenês stands accused of having sent humble and crouching letters to Alexander (the Great) in Phenicia, during the spring of 331 B.C. This assertion of Æschinês, though not to be trusted as correct, indicates the general prudence of Demosthenês as to his known and formidable enemy.[2]

Anti-Macedonian movement from Sparta—King Agis visits the Persian admirals in the Ægean. His attempts both in Krete and in Peloponnesus.

It was not from Athens, but from Sparta, that anti-Macedonian movements now took rise. In the decisive battle unsuccessfully fought by Athens and Thebes at Chæroneia against Philip, the Spartans had not been concerned. Their king Archidamus,—who had been active conjointly with Athens in the Sacred War, trying to uphold the Phokians against Philip and the Thebans,—had afterwards withdrawn himself from Central Greece to assist the Tarentines in Italy, and had been slain in a battle against the Mes-

name; during the last eight years, in the names of two different friends.

[1] Plutarch, Phokion, 28.

[2] Æschinês (adv. Ktesiph. p. 635) mentions this mission of Ktesiphon to Kleopatra. He also (in the same oration p. 550) charges Demosthenês with having sent letters to Alexander, soliciting pardon and favour. He states that a young man named Ariston, a friend of Demosthenês, was much about the person of Alexander, and that through him the letters were sent.

sapians.[1] He was succeeded by his son Agis, a brave and enterprising man, under whom the Spartans, though abstaining from hostilities against Philip, resolutely declined to take part in the synod at Corinth, whereby the Macedonian prince was nominated Leader of the Greeks; and even persisted in the same denial on Alexander's nomination also. When Alexander sent to Athens three hundred panoplies after his victory at the Granikus, to be dedicated in the temple of Athênê, he expressly proclaimed in the inscription, that they were dedicated "by Alexander and the Greeks, *excepting the Lacedæmonians*."[2] Agis took the lead in trying to procure Persian aid for anti-Macedonian operations in Greece. Towards the close of summer 333 B.C., a little before the battle of Issus, he visited the Persian admirals at Chios, to solicit men and money for intended action in Peloponnesus.[3] At that moment, they were not zealous in the direction of Greece, anticipating (as most Asiatics then did) the complete destruction of Alexander in Kilikia. As soon, however, as the disaster of Issus became known, they placed at the disposal of Agis thirty talents and ten triremes; which he employed, under his brother Agesilaus, in making himself master of Krete—feeling that no movement in Greece could be expected at such a discouraging crisis. Agis himself soon afterwards went to that island, having strengthened himself by a division of the Greek mercenaries who had fought under Darius at Issus. In Krete, he appears to have had considerable temporary success; and even in Peloponnesus, he

He cites as his authority the seamen of the public Athenian vessel called *Paralus*, and the Athenian envoys who went to Alexander in Phenicia in the spring or summer of 331 B.C. (compare Arrian, iii. 6, 3). Hyperidês also seems to have advanced the like allegation against Demosthenês—see Harprokation, v. Ἀριστίων.

The oration of Hyperidês in defence of Euxenippus (recently published by Mr. Churchill Babington), delivered at some period during the reign of Alexander, gives general evidence of the wide-spread feeling of jealous aversion to the existing Macedonian ascendency. Euxenippus had been accused of devotion to Macedonia; Hyperidês strenuously denies it, saying that Euxenippus had never been in Macedonia, nor ever conversed with any Macedonian who came to Athens. Even boys at school (says Hyperidês) know the names of the corrupt orators, or flatterers who serve Macedonia—Euxenippus is not among them (p. 11, 12).

[1] Plutarch, Camill. 19; Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Agis, 3.

[2] Arrian, i. 16, 11: compare Pausan. vii. 10, 1.

[3] Arrian, ii. 13, 4.

organized some demonstrations which Alexander sent Amphoterus with a large naval force to repress, in the spring of 331 B.C.[1] At that time, Phenicia, Egypt, and all the naval mastery of the Ægean, had passed into the hands of the conqueror, so that the Persians had no direct means of acting upon Greece. Probably Amphoterus recovered Krete, but he had no land-force to attack Agis in Peloponnesus.

B.C. 330. (Spring.) Agis levies an army in Peloponnesus, and makes open declaration against Antipater.

In October 331 B.C., Darius was beaten at Arbela and became a fugitive in Media, leaving Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, with the bulk of his immense treasures, as a prey to the conqueror during the coming winter. After such prodigious accessions to Alexander's force, it would seem that any anti-Macedonian movement, during the spring of 330 B.C., must have been obviously hopeless and even insane. Yet it was just then that King Agis found means to enlarge his scale of operations in Peloponnesus, and prevailed on a considerable body of new allies to join him. As to himself personally, he and the Lacedæmonians had been previously in a state of proclaimed war with Macedonia,[2] and therefore incurred

[1] Arrian, iii. 6, 4; Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 1, 39. It is to this war in Krete, between Agis and the Macedonian party and troops, that Aristotle probably alludes (in the few words contained, Politica, ii. 7, 8), as having exposed the weakness of the Kretan institutions—see Schneider's note on the passage. At least we do not know of any other events suitable to the words.

[2] Alexander, as soon as he got possession of the Persian treasures at Susa (about December 331 B.C.), sent a large remittance of 3000 talents to Antipater, as means for carrying on the war against the Lacedæmonians (Arrian, iii. 16, 17). The manifestations of Agis in Peloponnesus had begun in the spring of 331 B.C. (Arrian, iii. 6, 4); but his aggressive movements in Peloponnesus did not assume formidable proportions until the spring of 330 B.C. At the date of the speech of Æschinês against Ktesiphon (August 330 B.C.), the decisive battle by which Antipater crushed the forces of Agis had only recently occurred; for the Lacedæmonian prisoners were only *about to be sent* to Alexander to learn their fate (Æsch. adv. Kt. p. 524). Curtius (vii. 1, 21) is certainly mistaken in saying that the contest was terminated before the battle of Arbela. Moreover, there were Lacedæmonian envoys, present with Darius until a few days before his death (July 330 B.C.), who afterwards fell into the hands of Alexander (Arrian, iii. 24, 7); these men could hardly have known of the prostration of their country at home. I suppose the victory of Antipater to have taken place about June 330 B.C.—and the Pelo-

little additional risk; moreover, it was one of the effects of the Asiatic disasters to cast back upon Greece small bands of soldiers who had hitherto found service in the Persian armies. These men willingly came to Cape Tænarus to enlist under a warlike king of Sparta; so that Agis found himself at the head of a force which appeared considerable to Peloponnesians, familiar only with the narrow scale of Grecian war-muster, though insignificant as against Alexander or his viceroy in Macedonia.[1] An unexpected ray of hope broke out from the revolt of Memnon, the Macedonian governor of Thrace. Antipater was thus compelled to withdraw some of his forces to a considerable distance from Greece; while Alexander, victorious as he was, being in Persis or Media, east of Mount Zagros, appeared in the eyes of a Greek to have reached the utmost limits of the habitable world.[2] Of this partial encouragement Agis took advantage, to march out of Lakonia with all the troops, mercenary and native, that he could muster. He called on the Peloponnesians for a last effort against Macedonian dominion, while Darius still retained all the eastern half of his empire, and while support from him in men and money might yet be anticipated.[3]

Respecting this war, we know very few details. At first, a flush of success appeared to attend Agis. The Eleians, the Achæans (except Pellênê), the Arcadians (except Megalopolis) and some other Peloponnesians, joined his standard; so that he was enabled to collect an army stated at 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. Defeating the first Macedonian forces sent against him, he proceeded to lay siege to Megalopolis; which city, now as previously,

B.C. 330. Agis, at first partially successful, is completely defeated by Antipater, and slain.

ponnesian armament of Agis to have been got together about three months before (March 330 B.C.).

Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. App. c. 4. p. 234) discusses the chronology of this event, but in a manner which I cannot think satisfactory. He seems inclined to put it some months earlier. I see no necessity for construing the dictum ascribed to Alexander (Plutarch, Agesilaus, 15) as proving close coincidence of time between the battle of Arbela and the final defeat of Agis.

[1] Alexander in Media, when informed of the whole affair after the death of Agis, spoke of it with contempt as a battle of frogs and mice, if we are to believe the dictum of Plutarch, Agesilaus, 15.

[2] Æschinês adv. Ktesiphont. p. 553. ὁ δ' Ἀλέξανδρος ἕξω τῆς ἄρκτου καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀλίγου δεῖν πάσης μεθεστήκει, &c.

[3] Diodor. xvii. 62; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 35.

was the stronghold of Macedonian influence in the peninsula, and was probably occupied by a Macedonian garrison. An impulse manifested itself at Athens in favour of active sympathy, and equipment of a fleet to aid this anti-Macedonian effort. It was resisted by Phokion and Demadês, doubtless upon all views of prudence, but especially upon one financial ground, taken by the latter, that the people would be compelled to forego the Theoric distribution.[1] Even Demosthenês himself, under circumstances so obviously discouraging, could not recommend the formidable step of declaring against Alexander — though he seems to have indulged in the expression of general anti-Macedonian sympathies, and to have complained of the helplessness into which Athens had been brought by past bad policy.[2] Antipater, closing the war in Thrace on the best terms that he could, hastened into Greece with his full forces, and reached Peloponnesus in time to relieve Megalopolis, which had begun to be in danger. One decisive battle, which took place in Arcadia, sufficed to terminate the war. Agis and his army, the Lacedæmonians especially, fought with gallantry and desperation, but were completely defeated. Five thousand of their men were slain, including Agis himself; who, though covered with wounds, disdained to leave the field, and fell resisting to the last. The victors, according to one account, lost 3500 men; according to another, 1000 slain, together with a great many wounded. This was a greater loss than Alexander had sustained either at Issus or at Arbela; a plain proof, that Agis and his companions, however unfortunate in the result, had manifested courage worthy of the best days of Sparta.

The allied forces were now so completely crushed, that

[1] Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 818.

[2] This is what we make out, as to the conduct of Demosthenês, from Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 553.

It his however difficult to believe, what Æschinês insinuates, that Demosthenês boasted of having himself got up the Lacedæmonian movement—and yet that he made no proposition or suggestion for countenancing it. Demosthenês can hardly have lent any positive aid to the proceeding, though of course his anti-Macedonian feelings would be counted upon, in case things took a favourable turn.

Deinarchus (*ut suprà*) also accuses Demosthenês of having remained inactive at this critical moment.

all submitted to Antipater. After consulting the philo-Macedonian synod at Corinth, he condemned the Achæans and Eleians to pay 120 talents to Megalopolis, and exacted from the Tegeans the punishment of those among their leading men who had advised the war.[1] But he would not take upon him to determine the treatment of the Lacedæmonians without special reference to Alexander. Requiring from them fifty hostages, he sent up to Alexander in Asia some Lacedæmonian envoys or prisoners, to throw themselves on his mercy.[2] We are told that they did not reach the king until a long time afterwards, at Baktra;[3] what he decided about Sparta generally, we do not know.

Complete submission of all Greece to Antipater —Spartan envoys sent up to Alexander in Asia.

The rising of the Thebans, not many months after Alexander's accession, had been the first attempt of the Greeks to emancipate themselves from Macedonian dominion; this enterprise of Agis was the second. Both unfortunately had been partial, without the possibility of any extensive or organized combination beforehand; both ended miserably, riveting the chains of Greece more powerfully than ever. Thus was the self-defensive force of Greece extinguished piecemeal. The scheme of Agis was in fact desperate from the very outset, as against the gigantic power of Alexander; and would perhaps never have been undertaken, had not Agis himself been already compromised in hostility against Macedonia, before the destruction of the Persian force at Issus. This unfortunate prince, without any superior ability (so far as we know), manifested a devoted courage and patriotism worthy of his predecessor Leonidas at Thermopylæ; whose renown stands higher, only because the banner which he upheld ultimately triumphed. The Athenians and Ætolians, neither of whom took part with Agis, were now left, without Thebes and Sparta, as the two great military powers of Greece; which will appear presently, when we come to the last struggle for Grecian independence—the Lamian war; better combined and more promising, yet not less disastrous in its result.

Untoward result of the defensive efforts of Greece—want of combination.

[1] Curtius, vi. 1, 15-20; Diodor. xvii. 63-73. After the defeat, a suspensive decree was passed by the Spartans, releasing from ἀτιμία those who had escaped from the battle—as had been done after Leuktra (Diodor. xix. 70).

[2] Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 524.

[3] Curtius, vii. 4, 32.

B.C. 330.

Position of parties at Athens during the struggle of Agis—reaction of the Macedonising party after his defeat.

Though the strongest considerations of prudence kept Athens quiet during this anti-Macedonian movement in Peloponnesus, a powerful sympathy must have been raised among her citizens while the struggle was going on. Had Agis gained the victory over Antipater, the Athenians might probably have declared in his favour; and although no independent position could have been permanently maintained against so overwhelming an enemy as Alexander, yet considering that he was thoroughly occupied and far in the interior of Asia, Greece might have held out against Antipater for an interval not inconsiderable. In the face of such eventualities, the fears of the Macedonising statesmen now in power at Athens, the hopes of their opponents, and the reciprocal antipathies of both, must have become unusually manifest; so that the reaction afterwards, when the Macedonian power became more irresistible than ever, was considered by the enemies of Demosthenês to offer a favourable opportunity for ruining and dishonouring him.

Judicial contest between Æschinês and Demosthenês. Preliminary circumstances as to the proposition of Ktesiphon, and the indictment by Æschinês.

To the political peculiarity of this juncture we owe the judicial contest between the two great Athenian orators; the memorable accusation of Æschinês against Ktesiphon, for having proposed a crown to Demosthenês—and the still more memorable defence of Demosthenês, on behalf of his friend as well as of himself. It was in the autumn or winter of 337—336 B.C., that Ktesiphon had proposed this vote of public honour in favour of Demosthenês, and had obtained the (probouleuma) preliminary acquiescence of the senate; it was in the same Attic year, and not long afterwards, that Æschinês attacked the proposition under the Graphê Paranomôn, as illegal, unconstitutional, mischievous, and founded on false allegations.[1] More than six years had thus elapsed since the

[1] Among the various documents real or pretended, inserted in the oration of Demosthenês De Coronâ, there appears one (p. 266) purporting to be the very decree moved by Ktesiphon; and another (p. 243) purporting to be the accusation preferred by Æschinês. I have already stated that I agree with Droysen in mistrusting all the documents annexed to this oration; all of them bear the name of wrong archons, most of them names of unknown archons; some of them do not fit the place in

formal entry of the accusation; yet Æschinês had not chosen to bring it to actual trial; which indeed could not be done without some risk to himself, before the numerous and popular judicature of Athens. Twice or thrice before his accusation was entered, other persons had moved to confer the same honour upon Demosthenês,[1] and had been indicted under the Graphê Paranomôn; but with such signal ill success, that their accusers did not obtain so much as one-fifth of the suffrages of the Dikasts, and therefore incurred (under the standing regulation of Attic law) a penalty of 1000 drachmæ. The like danger awaited Æschinês; and although, in reference to the illegality of Ktesiphon's motion (which was the direct and ostensible purpose aimed at under the Graphê Paranomôn), his indictment was grounded on special circumstances such as the previous accusers may not have been able to show, still it was not his real object to confine himself within this narrow and technical argument. He intended to enlarge the range of accusation, so as to include the whole character and policy of Demosthenês; who would thus, if the verdict went against him, stand publicly dishonoured both as citizen

which they appear. See my preceding Chaps. LXXXIX, XC

We know from the statement of Æschinês himself that the motion of Ktesiphon was made after the appointment of Demosthenês to be one of the inspectors of the fortifications of the city; and that this appointment took place in the last month of the archon Chærondas (June 337 B.C. — see Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 421—426). We also know that the accusation of Æschinês against Ktesiphon was preferred before the assassination of Philip, which took place in August 336 B.C. (Æschin. ib. p. 612, 613). It thus appears that the motion of Ktesiphon (with the probouleuma which preceded it) must have occurred some time during the autumn or winter of 337-336 B.C.—that the accusation of Æschinês must have been handed in shortly after it—and that this accusation cannot have been handed in at the date borne by the pseudo-document, p. 243—the month Elaphebolion of the archon Chærondas, which would be anterior to the appointment of Demosthenês. Moreover, whoever compares the so-called motion of Ktesiphon, as it stands inserted in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 266, with the words in which Æschinês himself (adv. Ktesiph. p. 631. ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἐποιήσω, see also p. 439) describes the exordium of that motion, will see that it cannot be genuine.

[1] Demosthenês De Coronâ, p. 253, 302, 303, 310. He says (p. 267-313) that he had been crowned *often* (πολλάκις) by the Athenians and other Greek citizens. The crown which he received on the motion of Aristonikus (after the successes against Philip at Byzantium and the Chersonesus, &c. in 340 B.C.) was the *second* crown (p. 253)—Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p. 848.

and as politician. Unless this latter purpose were accomplished, indeed, Æschinês gained nothing by bringing the indictment into court; for the mere entry of the indictment would have already produced the effect of preventing the probouleuma from passing into a decree, and the crown from being actually conferred. Doubtless Ktesiphon and Demosthenês might have forced Æschinês to the alternative of either dropping his indictment or bringing it into the Dikastery. But this was a forward challenge, which, in reference to a purely honorary vote, they had not felt bold enough to send; especially after the capture of Thebes in 335 B.C., when the victorious Alexander demanded the surrender of Demosthenês with several other citizens.

Accusatory harangue of Æschinês, nominally against the proposition of Ktesiphon, really against the political life of Demosthenês.

In this state of abeyance and compromise—Demosthenês enjoying the inchoate honour of a complimentary vote from the Senate, Æschinês intercepting it from being matured into a vote of the people—both the vote and the indictment had remained for rather more than six years. But the accuser now felt encouraged to push his indictment to trial under the reactionary party feeling, following on abortive anti-Macedonian hopes, which succeeded to the complete victory of Antipater over Agis, and which brought about the accusation of anti-Macedonian citizens in Naxos, Thasos, and other Grecian cities also.[1] Amidst the fears prevalent that the victor would carry his resentment still farther, Æschinês could now urge that Athens was disgraced by having adopted or even approved the policy of Demosthenês,[2] and that an emphatic condemnation of him was the only way of clearing her from the charge of privity with those who had raised the standard against Macedonian supremacy. In an able and bitter harangue, Æschinês first shows that the motion of Ktesiphon was illegal,

[1] Demosthenês De Coronâ, p. 294.

[2] Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 645. διαβέβληται δ' ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ τῶν Δημοσθένους πολιτευμάτων περὶ τοὺς νῦν καιρούς· δόξετε δ' ἐὰν μὲν τοῦτον στεφανώσητε, ὁμολογῶμονες εἶναι τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην· ἐὰν δὲ τοὐναντίον τούτου πράξητε, ἀπολύσετε τὸν δῆμον τῶν αἰτιῶν.—Compare with this, the last sentence of the oration of Demosthenês in reply, where he puts up a prayer to the Gods—ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς τὴν ταχίστην ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν ἐπηρτημένων φόβων δότε καὶ σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ.

The mention by Æschinês (immediately before) of the Pythian games, as about to be celebrated in a few days, marks the date of this judicial trial—August 330 B.C.

in consequence of the public official appointments held by Demosthenês at the moment when it was proposed—next he enters at large into the whole life and character of Demosthenês, to prove him unworthy of such an honour, even if there had been no formal grounds of objection. He distributes the entire life of Demosthenês into four periods, the first ending at the peace of 346 B.C. between Philip and the Athenians—the second, ending with the breaking out of the next ensuing war in 341—340 B.C.—the third, ending with the disaster at Chæroneia—the fourth, comprising all the time following.[1] Throughout all the four periods, he denounces the conduct of Demosthenês as having been corrupt, treacherous, cowardly, and ruinous to the city. What is more surprising still—he expressly charges him with gross subservience both to Philip and to Alexander, at the very time when he was taking credit for a patriotic and intrepid opposition to them.[2]

That Athens had undergone sad defeat and humiliation, having been driven from her independent and even presidential position into the degraded character of a subject Macedonian city, since the time when Demosthenês first began political life—was a fact but too indisputable. Æschinês even makes this a part of his case; arraigning the traitorous mismanagement of Demosthenês as the cause of so melancholy a revolution, and denouncing him as candidate for public compliment on no better plea than a series of public calamities.[3] Having thus animadverted on the conduct of Demosthenês prior to the battle of Chæroneia, Æschinês proceeds to the more recent past, and contends that Demosthenês cannot be sincere in his pretended enmity to Alexander, because he has let slip three successive occasions, all highly favourable, for instigating Athens to hostility against the Macedonians. Of these three occasions, the earliest was, when Alexander first crossed into Asia; the second, immediately before the battle of Issus; the third, during the flush of success obtained by Agis in Peloponnesus.[4] On none of these occasions did Demosthenês call for any public action against Macedonia; a proof (according to Æschinês) that his anti-Macedonian professions were insincere.

[1] Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 443.
[2] Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. pp. 449, 456, 467, 551.
[3] Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. pp. 526, 538, 541.
[4] Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 551-553.

Appreciation of Æschinês, on independent evidence, as an accuser of Demosthenês.

I have more than once remarked, that considering the bitter enmity between the two orators, it is rarely safe to trust the unsupported allegation of either against the other. But in regard to the last mentioned charges advanced by Æschinês, there is enough of known fact, and we have independent evidence, such as is not often before us, to appreciate him as an accuser of Demosthenês. The victorious career of Alexander, set forth in the preceding chapters, proves amply that not one of the three periods, here indicated by Æschinês, presented even decent encouragement for a reasonable Athenian patriot to involve his country in warfare against so formidable an enemy. Nothing can be more frivolous than these charges against Demosthenês, of having omitted promising seasons for anti-Macedonian operations. Partly for this reason, probably, Demosthenês does not notice them in his reply; still more, perhaps, on another ground, that it was not safe to speak out what he thought and felt about Alexander. His reply dwells altogether upon the period before the death of Philip. Of the boundless empire subsequently acquired, by the son of Philip, he speaks only to mourn it as a wretched visitation of fortune, which has desolated alike the Hellenic and the barbaric world — in which Athens has been engulphed along with others—and from which even those faithless and trimming Greeks, who helped to aggrandise Philip, have not escaped better than Athens, nor indeed so well.[1]

Reply of Demosthenês—oration De Coronâ.

I shall not here touch upon the Demosthenic speech De Coronâ in a rhetorical point of view, nor add anything to those encomiums which have been pronounced upon it with one voice, both in ancient and in modern times, as the unapproachable masterpiece of Grecian oratory. To this work it belongs as a portion of Grecian history; a retrospect of the efforts made by a patriot and a statesman to uphold the dignity of Athens and the autonomy of the Grecian world, against a dangerous aggressor from without. How these efforts were directed, and how they lamentably failed, has been recounted in my preceding chapters. Demosthenês here passes them in review, replying to the criminations against his public conduct during the interval of ten years, between

[1] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 311—316.

the peace of 346 B.C. (or the period immediately preceding it) and the death of Philip. It is remarkable, that though professing to enter upon a defence of his whole public life,[1] he nevertheless can afford to leave unnoticed that portion of it which is perhaps the most honourable to him—the early period of his first Philippics and Olynthiacs—when, though a politician as yet immature and of no established footing, he was the first to descry in the distance the perils threatened by Philip's aggrandisement, and the loudest in calling for timely and energetic precautions against it, in spite of apathy and murmurs from older politicians as well as from the general public. Beginning with the peace of 346 B.C., Demosthenês vindicates his own share in that event against the charges of Æschinês, whom he denounces as the cause of all the mischief; a controversy which I have already tried to elucidate in a former chapter. Passing next to the period after that peace—to the four years first of hostile diplomacy, then of hostile action, against Philip, which ended with the disaster of Chæroneia—Demosthenês is not satisfied with simple vindication. He reasserts this policy as matter of pride and honour, in spite of its results. He congratulates his countrymen on having manifested a Pan-hellenic patriotism worthy of their forefathers, and takes to himself only the credit of having been forward to proclaim and carry out this glorious sentiment common to all. Fortune has been adverse; yet the vigorous anti-Macedonian policy was no mistake; Demosthenês swears it by the combatants of Marathon, Platæa and Salamis.[2] To have had a foreign dominion obtruded upon Greece, is an overwhelming calamity; but to have had this accomplished without strenuous resistance on the part of Athens, would have been calamity aggravated by dishonour.

Conceived in this sublime strain, the reply of Demosthenês to his rival has an historical value, as a funeral oration of extinct Athenian and Grecian freedom. Six years before, the orator had been appointed by his countrymen to deliver the

**Funeral oration of extinct Grecian freedom.**

[1] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 227. μέλλων τοῦ τε ἰδίου βίου παντός, ὡς ἔοικε, λόγον διδόναι τήμερον καὶ τῶν κοινῇ πεπολιτευμένων, &c.

[2] Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 297. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁπάντων ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι—οὐ μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραταξαμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσαντας, &c., the oath so often cited and admired.

usual public oration over the warriors slain at Chæroneia. That speech is now lost, but it probably touched upon the same topics. Though the sphere of action, of every Greek city as well as of every Greek citizen, was now cramped and confined by irresistible Macedonian force, there still remained the sentiment of full political freedom and dignity enjoyed during the past—the admiration of ancestors who had once defended it successfully—and the sympathy with leaders who had recently stood forward to uphold it, however unsuccessfully. It is among the most memorable facts in Grecian history, that in spite of the victory of Philip at Chæroneia—in spite of the subsequent conquest of Thebes by Alexander, and the danger of Athens after it—in spite of the Asiatic conquests which had since thrown all Persian force into the hands of the Macedonian king—the Athenian people could never be persuaded either to repudiate Demosthenês, or to disclaim sympathy with his political policy. How much art and ability was employed, to induce them to do so, by his numerous enemies, the speech of Æschinês is enough to teach us. And when we consider how easily the public sicken of schemes which end in misfortune—how great a mental relief is usually obtained by throwing blame on unsuccessful leaders—it would have been no matter of surprise, if, in one of the many prosecutions wherein the fame of Demosthenês was involved, the Dikasts had given a verdict unfavourable to him. That he always came off acquitted, and even honourably acquitted, is a proof of rare fidelity and steadiness of temper in the Athenians. It is a proof that those noble, patriotic, and Pan-hellenic sentiments, which we constantly find inculcated in his orations, throughout a period of twenty years, had sunk into the minds of his hearers; and that amidst the many general allegations of corruption against him, loudly proclaimed by his enemies, there was no one well-ascertained fact which they could substantiate before the Dikastery.

**Verdict of the Dikasts—triumph of Demosthenês—exile of Æschinês.**

The indictment now preferred by Æschinês against Ktesiphon only procured for Demosthenês a new triumph. When the suffrages of the Dikasts were counted, Æschinês did not obtain so much as one-fifth. He became therefore liable to the customary fine of 1000 drachmæ. It appears that he quitted Athens immediately, without paying the fine, and retired into Asia, from whence he never

returned. He is said to have opened a rhetorical school at Rhodes, and to have gone into the interior of Asia during the last year of Alexander's life (at the time when that monarch was ordaining on the Grecian cities compulsory restoration of all their exiles), in order to procure assistance for returning to Athens. This project was disappointed by Alexander's death.[1]

Causes of the exile of Æschinês—he was the means of procuring coronation for Demosthenês.

We cannot suppose that Æschinês was unable to pay the fine of 1000 drachmæ, or to find friends who would pay it for him. It was not therefore legal compulsion, but the extreme disappointment and humiliation of so signal a defeat, which made him leave Athens. We must remember that this was a gratuitous challenge sent by himself; that the celebrity of the two rivals had brought together auditors, not merely from Athens, but from various other Grecian cities; and that the effect of the speech of Demosthenês in his own defence—delivered with all his perfection of voice and action, and not only electrifying hearers by the sublimity of its public sentiment, but also full of admirably managed self-praise, and contemptuous bitterness towards his rival—must have been inexpressibly powerful and commanding. Probably the friends of Æschinês became themselves angry with him for having brought the indictment forward. For the effect of his defeat must have been that the vote of the Senate which he indicted, was brought forward and passed in the public assembly; and that Demosthenês must have received a public coronation.[2] In no other way, under the existing circumstances of Athens, could Demosthenês have obtained so emphatic a compliment. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that such a mortification was insupportable to Æschinês. He became disgusted with his native city. We read that afterwards, in his rhetorical school at Rhodes, he one day declaimed, as a lesson to his pupils, the successful oration of his rival, De Coronâ. Of course it excited a burst of

[1] See the various lives of Æschinês—in Westermann, Scriptores Biographici, pp. 268, 269.

[2] Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 315. ἀλλὰ νυνὶ τήμερον ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφανωθῆναι δοκιμάζομαι, τὸ δὲ μήδ' ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν ἀνωμολόγημαι—σοὶ δὲ συκοφάντῃ μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖν ὑπάρχει, κινδυνεύεις δὲ εἴτε δεῖ σε ἔτι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἤδη πεπαῦσθαι μὴ μεταλαβόντα τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, &c.

Yet Æschinês had become opulent, according to Demosthenês, p. 329.

admiration. "What, if you had heard the beast himself speak it!" — exclaimed Æschinês.

From this memorable triumph of the illustrious orator and defendant, we have to pass to another trial —a direct accusation brought against him, from which he did not escape so successfully. We are compelled here to jump over five years and a half (August 330 B.C. to January 324 B.C.) during which we have no information about Grecian history; the interval between Alexander's march into Baktria and his return to Persis and Susiana. Displeased with the conduct of the satraps during his absence, Alexander put to death or punished several, and directed the rest to disband without delay the mercenary soldiers whom they had taken into pay. This peremptory order filled both Asia and Europe with roving detachments of unprovided soldiers, some of whom sought subsistence in the Grecian islands and on the Lacedæmonian southern coast, at Cape Tænarus in Laconia.

B.C. 324. Subsequent accusation against Demosthenês, in the affair of Harpalus.

It was about this period (the beginning of 324 B.C.) that Harpalus the satrap of Babylonia and Syria, becoming alarmed at the prospect of being punished by Alexander for his ostentatious prodigalities, fled from Asia into Greece, with a considerable treasure and a body of 5000 soldiers.[1] While satrap, he had invited into Asia, in succession, two Athenian women as mistresses, Pythionikê and Glykera, to each of whom he was much attached and whom he entertained with lavish expense and pomp. On the death of the first, he testified his sorrow by two costly funereal monuments to her memory; one at Babylon, the other in Attica, between Athens and Eleusis. With Glykera he is said to have resided at Tarsus in Kilikia—to have ordered that men should prostrate themselves before her, and address her as queen—and to have erected her statue along with his own at Rhossus, a seaport on the confines of Kilikia and Syria.[2] To please these

Flight of Harpalus to Athens—his previous conduct and relations with Athens.

[1] Diodor. xvi. 108. He states the treasure brought out of Asia by Harpalus as 5000 talents.

[2] See the fragments of the letter or pamphlet of Theopompus addressed to Alexander, while Harpalus was still at Tarsus, and before his flight to Athens—Theopomp. Fragm. 277, 278, ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 586-595. Theopompus speaks in the present tense—καὶ ὁρᾷ (Harpalus) ὑπὸ τοῦ

mistresses, or perhaps to ensure a retreat for himself in case of need, he had sent to Athens profuse gifts of wheat for distribution among the people, for which he had received votes of thanks with the grant of Athenian citizenship.[1] Moreover he had consigned to Chariklês, son-in-law of Phokion, the task of erecting the monument in Attica to the honour of Pythionikê, with a large remittance of money for the purpose.[2] The profit or embezzlement arising out of this expenditure secured to him the goodwill of Chariklês—a man very different from his father-in-law, the honest and austere Phokion. Other Athenians were probably conciliated by various presents, so that when Harpalus found it convenient to quit Asia, about the beginning of 324 B.C., he had already acquired some hold both on the public of Athens and on some of her leading men. He sailed with his treasure and his armament straight to Cape Sunium in Attica, from whence he sent to ask shelter and protection in that city.[3]

False reports conveyed to Alexander, that the Athenians had identified themselves with Harpalus.

The first reports transmitted to Asia appear to have proclaimed that the Athenians had welcomed Harpalus as a friend and ally, thrown off the Macedonian yoke, and prepared for a war to reestablish Hellenic freedom. Such is the colour of the case, as presented in the satyric drama called Agên, exhibited before Alexander in the Dionysiac festival at Susa, in February or March 324 B.C. Such news, connecting itself in Alexander's mind with the recent defeat of Zopyrion in Thrace and other disorders of the disbanded mercenaries, incensed him so much, that he at first ordered a fleet to be equipped, determining to cross over and attack Athens in person.[4] But he was presently calmed by more

λάου προσχυνουμένην (Glykera), &c. Kleitarchus stated these facts, as well as Theopompus (Athenæ. ibid.).

[1] Athenæus, xiii. p. 596—the extract from the satyrical drama called Agên, represented before Alexander at Susa, in the Dionysiac festival or early months of 324 B.C.

[2] Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Pausanias, i. 37, 4; Dikæarchi Fragment. 72. ed. Didot.

Plutarch's narrative is misleading, inasmuch as it seems to imply that Harpalus gave this money to Chariklês *after* his arrival at Athens. We know from Theopompus (Fr. 277) that the monument had been finished some time before Harpalus quitted Asia. Plutarch treats it as a mean structure, unworthy of the sum expended on it; but both Dikæarchus and Pausanias describe it as stately and magnificent.

[3] Curtius, x. 2, 1.

[4] Curtius, x. 2, 1. "Igitur triginta navibus Sunium transmittunt" (Harpalus and his company), "unde portum urbis petere decreverunt. His

correct intelligence, certifying that the Athenians had positively refused to espouse the cause of Harpalus.[1]

The fact of such final rejection by the Athenians is quite indisputable. But it seems, as far as we can make out from imperfect evidence, that this step was not taken without debate, nor without symptoms of a contrary disposition, sufficient to explain the rumours first sent to Alexander. The first arrival of Harpalus with his armament at Sunium, indeed, excited alarm, as if he were coming to take possession of Peiræus; and the admiral Philoklês was instructed to adopt precautions for defence of the harbour.[2] But Harpalus, sending away his armament to Krete or to Tænarus, solicited and obtained permission to come to Athens, with a single ship and his own personal attendants.

B.C. 324. Circumstances attending the arrival of Harpalus at Sunium—debate in the Athenian assembly—promises held out by Harpalus—the Athen-

cognitis, rex Harpalo Atheniensibusque juxta infestus, classem parari jubet, Athenas protinus petiturus." Compare Justin, xiii. 5, 7 — who mentions this hostile intention in Alexander's mind, but gives a different account of the cause of it.

The extract from the drama *Agên* (given in Athenæus, xiii. p. 596) represents the reports which excited this anger of Alexander. It was said that Athens had repudiated her slavery, with the abundance which she had before enjoyed under it,—to enter upon a struggle for freedom, with the certainty of present privations and future ruin:—

A. ὅτε μὲν ἔφασκον (the Athenians)
δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι βίον,
ἱκανὸν ἐδείπνουν· νῦν δὲ, τὸν χέδροπα μόνον
καὶ τὸν μάραθον ἔσθουσι, πυροὺς δ' οὐ μάλα.

B. καὶ μὴν ἀκούω μυριάδας τὸν Ἅρπαλον
αὐτοῖσι τῶν Ἀγῆνος οὐκ ἐλάττονας
σίτου παραπέμψαι, καὶ πολίτην γεγονέναι.

A. Γλυκέρας ὁ σῖτος οὗτος ἦν· ἐστὶν δ' ἴσως
αὐτοῖσιν ὀλέθρου κοὐκ ἑταίρας ἀρράβων·

I conceive this drama *Agên* to have been represented on the banks of the *Choaspes* (not the *Hydaspes* – see my note in the Chapter immediately preceding), that is, at Susa, in the Dionysia of 324 B.C. It is interesting as a record of the feelings of the time.

[1] Nevertheless the impression, that Alexander was intending to besiege Athens, must have prevailed in the army for several months longer, during the autumn of 324 B.C., when he was at Ekbatana. Ephippus the historian, in recounting the flatteries addressed to Alexander at Ekbatana, mentions the rhodomontade of a soldier named Gorgus—Γόργος ὁ ὁπλοφύλαξ Ἀλέξανδρον Ἄμμωνος υἱὸν στεφανοῖ χρυσοῖς τρισχιλίοις, καὶ ὅταν Ἀθήνας πολιορκῇ, μυρίαις πανοπλίαις καὶ ταῖς ἴσαις καταπέλταις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις βέλεσιν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανοῖς (Ephippus ap. Athenæum xiii. p. 538. Fragment. 3. ed. Didot.).

[2] Deinarchus adv. Philokl. s. 1. φάσκων κωλύσειν Ἅρπαλον εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ καταπλεῦσαι στρατηγὸς ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὰ νεώρια καὶ τὴν Μουνυχίαν κεχειροτονημένος, &c. Dein-

What was of still greater moment, he brought with him a large sum of money, amounting, we are told, to upwards of 700 talents, or more than 160,000*l*. We must recollect that he was already favourably known to the people by large presents of corn, which had procured for him a vote of citizenship. He now threw himself upon their gratitude as a suppliant seeking protection against the wrath of Alexander; and while entreating from the Athenians an interference so hazardous to themselves, he did not omit to encourage them by exaggerating the means at his own disposal. He expatiated on the universal hatred and discontent felt against Alexander, and held out assurance of being joined by powerful allies, foreign as well as Greek, if once a city like Athens would raise the standard of liberation.[1] To many Athenian patriots, more ardent than long-sighted, such appeals inspired both sympathy and confidence. Moreover Harpalus would of course purchase every influential partisan who would accept a bribe; in addition to men like Chariklês, who were already in his interest. His cause was espoused by Hyperidês,[2] an earnest anti-Macedonian citizen, and an orator second only to Demosthenês. There seems good reason for believing that,

Athenians seem at first favourably disposed towards him.

archus adv. Aristogeiton. s. 4. ὃς παρ' Ἁρπάλου λαβεῖν χρήματα ἐτόλμησεν, ὃν ᾔσθεθ' ἥκειν καταληψόμενον τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν, &c.

[1] See the new and interesting, though unfortunately scanty, fragments of the oration of Hyperidês against Demosthenês, published and elucidated by Mr. Churchill Babington from a recently discovered Egyptian papyrus (Cambridge, 1850). From Fragm. 14 (p. 38 of Mr. Babington's edition) we may see that the promises mentioned in the text were actually held out by Harpalus—indeed we might almost have presumed it without positive evidence. Hyperidês addresses Demosthenês—ταῦτας ὑπ . . . . ις τῷ ψηφίσματι, συλλαβὼν τὸν Ἅρπαλον· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἅπαντας πρεσβεύεσθαι πεποίηκας ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον, οὐκ ἔχοντας ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν ἀποστροφήν· τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους, οἳ αὐτοὶ ἂν ἦκον φέροντες εἰς ταὐτὸ τὴν δύναμιν, ἔχοντες τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ὅσους ἕκαστος αὐτῶν εἶχε, τούτους σύμπαντας οὐ μόνον κεκώλυκας ἀποστῆναι ἐκείνου τῇ συλλήψει τοῦ Ἁρπάλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ . . .

From the language thus used by Hyperidês in his accusation, we are made to perceive what prospects he (and of course Harpalus, upon whose authority he must have spoken) had held out to the people when the case was first under discussion.

The fragment here cited is complete as to the main sense, not requiring very great help from conjecture. In some of the other fragments, the conjectural restorations of Mr. Babington, though highly probable and judicious, form too large a proportion of the whole to admit of our citing them with confidence as testimony.

[2] Pollux, x. 159.

at first, a strong feeling was excited in favour of taking part with the exile; the people not being daunted even by the idea of war with Alexander.[1]

Phokion and Demosthenês both agree in dissuading the Athenians from taking up Harpalus.

Phokion, whom Harpalus vainly endeavoured to corrupt, resisted of course the proposition of espousing his cause. And Demosthenês also resisted it, not less decidedly, from the very outset.[2] Notwithstanding all his hatred of Macedonian supremacy, he could not be blind to the insanity of declaring war against Alexander. Indeed those who study his orations throughout, will find his counsels quite as much distinguished for prudence as for vigorous patriotism. His prudence on this occasion, however, proved injurious to his political position; for while it incensed Hyperidês and the more sanguine anti-Macedonians, it probably did not gain for himself anything beyond a temporary truce from his old macedonising opponents.

Demand by Antipater for the surrender of Harpalus — the Athenians refuse to comply, but they arrest Harpalus and sequestrate his treasure for Alexander.

The joint opposition of politicians so discordant as Demosthenês and Phokion, prevailed over the impulse which the partisans of Harpalus had created. No decree could be obtained in his favour. Presently however the case was complicated by the coming of envoys from Antipater and Olympias in Macedonia, requiring that he should be surrendered.[3] The like requisition was also addressed by the Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, who arrived with a small squadron from Asia. These demands were refused, at the instance of Phokion no less than of Demosthenês. Nevertheless the prospects of Macedonian vengeance were now brought in such fearful proximity before the people, that all disposition to support Harpalus gave way to the necessity of propitiating Alexander. A decree was passed to arrest Harpalus, and to place all his money under sequestration in the acropolis, until special directions could be received from Alexander; to whom, apparently, envoys were sent, carrying with them the slaves of Harpalus to

[1] Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, p. 531. τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ὡρμημένων Ἁρπάλῳ βοηθεῖν, καὶ κορυσσόντων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον, ἐξαίφνης ἐπεφάνη Φιλόξενος, ὁ τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πραγμάτων Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγός· ἐκπλαγέντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου, καὶ σιωπῶντος διὰ τὸν φόβον, ὁ Δημοσθένης—Τί ποιήσουσιν, ἔφη, πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον ἰδόντες, οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι πρὸς τὸν λύχνον ἀντιβλέπειν;

[2] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 21; Plutarch, Demosthen. 25.

[3] Diodor. xvii. 108.

be interrogated by him, and instructed to solicit a lenient sentence at his hands.[1] Now it was Demosthenês who moved these decrees for personal arrest and for sequestration of the money;[2] whereby he incurred still warmer resentment from Hyperidês and the other Harpalian partisans who denounced him as a subservient creature of the all-powerful monarch. Harpalus was confined, but presently made his escape; probably much to the satisfaction of Phokion, Demosthenês, and every one else; for even those who were most anxious to get rid of him would recoil from the odium and dishonour of surrendering him, even under constraint, to a certain death. He fled to Krete, where he was soon after slain by one of his own companions.[3]

Demosthenês moves the decree for arrest of Harpalus who is arrested, but escapes.

At the time when the decrees for arrest and sequestration were passed, Demosthenês requested a citizen near him to ask Harpalus publicly in the assembly, what was the amount of his money, which the people had just resolved to impound.[4] Harpalus answered, 720 talents; and Demosthenês proclaimed this sum to the people, on the authority of Harpalus, dwelling with some emphasis upon its magnitude. But when the money came to be counted in the acropolis, it was discovered that there was in reality no more than 350 talents. Now it is said that Demosthenês did not at once communicate to the people this prodigious deficiency in the real sum as compared with the

Conduct of Demosthenês in regard to the treasure of Harpalus — deficiency of the sum counted and realized, as compared with the sum announced by Harpalus.

[1] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69. ἐὰν τοὺς παῖδας καταπέμψῃ (Alexander) πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς νῦν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνακεκομισμένους, καὶ τούτων ἀξιοῖ τὴν ἀληθείαν πυθέσθαι, &c.

[2] See the fragment cited in a preceding note from the oration of Hyperidês against Demosthenês. That it was *Demosthenês* who moved the decree for depositing the money in the acropolis, we learn also from one of his other accusers—the citizen who delivered the speech composed by Deinarchus (adv. Demosthen. sect. 68, 71, 89)—ἔγραψεν αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ Δημοσθένης, ὡς δηλονότι δικαίου τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος, φυλάττειν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὰ εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀφικόμενα μετὰ Ἁρπάλου χρήματα.

Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 97-106) accuses Demosthenês of base flattery to Alexander. Hyperidês also makes the same charge—see the Fragments in Mr. Babington's edition, sect. 2. Fr. 11. p. 12; sect. 3. Fr. 5. p. 34.

[3] Pausan. ii. 33, 4; Diodor. xvii. 108.

[4] This material fact, of the question publicly put to Harpalus in the assembly by some one at the request of Demosthenês, appears in the Fragments of Hyperidês, p. 5, 7, 9, ed. Babington—καθήμενος

announcement of Harpalus, repeated in the public assembly by himself. The impression prevailed, for how long a time we do not know, that 720 Harpalian talents had actually been lodged in the acropolis; and when the truth became at length known, great surprise and outcry were excited.[1] It was assumed that the missing half of the sum set forth must have been employed in corruption; and suspicions prevailed against almost all the orators, Demosthenês and Hyperidês both included.

Suspicions about this money—Demosthenês moves that the Areopagus shall investigate the matter—the Areopagites bring in a report against Demosthenês himself, with Demadês and others, as guilty of corrupt appropria-

In this state of doubt, Demosthenês moved that the Senate of Areopagus should investigate the matter and report who were the presumed delinquents[2] fit to be indicted before the Dikastery; he declared in the speech accompanying his motion that the real delinquents, whoever they might be, deserved to be capitally punished. The Areopagites delayed their report for six months, though Demosthenês is said to have called for it with some impatience. Search was made in the houses of the leading orators, excepting only one who was recently married.[3] At length the report appeared, enumerating several names of citizens chargeable with the appropriation of this money, and specifying how much had been taken by each. Among these names were Demosthenês himself, charged

κάτω ὑπὸ τῇ κατατομῇ, ἐκέλευσε ..., τὸν χορευτὴν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν Ἅρπαλον ὁπόσα εἴη τὰ χρήματα τὰ ἀνοισθησόμενα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν· ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι ἑπτακόσια, &c.

The term κατατομὴ (see Mr. Babington's note) "designates a broad passage occurring at intervals between the concentrically arranged benches of seats in a theatre, and running parallel with them."

[1] Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p. 846. In the life of Demosthenês given by Photius (Cod. 265. p. 494) it is stated that only 308 talents were found.

[2] That this motion was made by Demosthenês himself, is a point strongly pressed by his accuser Deinarchus—adv. Demosth. s. 5. 62. 84, &c.: compare also the Fragm. of Hyperidês, p. 59, ed. Babington.

Deinarchus, in his loose rhetoric, tries to put the case as if Demosthenês had proposed to recognise the sentence of the Areopagus as final and peremptory, and as if he stood therefore condemned upon the authority invoked by himself. But this is refuted sufficiently by the mere fact that the trial was instituted afterwards; besides that it is repugnant to the judicial practice of Athens.

[3] Plutarch, Demosth. 26. We learn from Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 46) that the report of the Areopagites was not delivered until after

with 20 talents—Demadês charged with 6000 golden staters—and other citizens, with different sums attached to their names.[1] Upon this report, ten[2] public accusers were appointed to prosecute the indictment against the persons specified, before the Dikastery. Among the accusers was Hyperidês, whose name had not been comprised in the Areopagitic report. Demosthenês was brought to trial first of all the persons accused, before a numerous Dikastery of 1500 citizens,[3] who confirmed the report of the Areopagites, found him guilty, and condemned him to pay fifty talents to the state. Not being able to discharge this large fine, he was put in prison; but after some days he found means to escape, and fled to Trœzen in Peloponnesus, where he passed some months as a dispirited and sorrowing exile, until the death of Alexander.[4] What was done with the other citizens included in the Areopagitic report, we do not know. It appears that Demadês[5]—who was among those comprised, and who is especially attacked, along with Demosthenês, by both Hyperidês and Deinarchus—did not appear to take his trial, and therefore must have been driven into exile; yet if so, he must have speedily returned, since he seems to have been at Athens when Alexander died. Philoklês and Aristogeiton were also brought to trial as being included by the Areopagus in the list of delinquents; but how their trial ended, does not appear.[6]

tion. Demosthenês is tried on this charge, condemned, and goes into exile.

an interval of six months. About their delay and the impatience of Demosthenês, see Fragm. Hyperidês, pp. 12-33, ed. Babington.

[1] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 92. See the Fragm. of Hyperidês in Mr. Babington, p. 18

[2] Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton. s. 6. Stratoklês was one of the accusers.

[3] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 108, 109.

[4] Plutarch, Demosth. 26.

[5] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 104.

[6] See the two orations composed by Deinarchus, against Philoklês and Aristogeiton.

In the second and third Epistles ascribed to Demosthenês (p. 1470, 1483, 1485), he is made to state, that he alone had been condemned by the Dikastery, because his trial had come on first—that Aristogeiton and all the others tried were acquitted, though the charge against all was the same, and the evidence against all was the same also—viz. nothing more than the simple report of the Areopagus. As I agree with those who hold these epistles to be probably spurious, I cannot believe, on such authority alone, that all the other persons tried were acquitted—a fact highly improbable in itself

Was Demosthenês guilty of such corrupt appropriation? Circumstances as known in the case.

This condemnation and banishment of Demosthenês—unquestionably the greatest orator, and one of the greatest citizens, in Athenian antiquity—is the most painful result of the debates respecting the exile Harpalus. Demosthenês himself denied the charge; but unfortunately we possess neither his defence, nor the facts alleged in evidence against him; so that our means of forming a positive conclusion are imperfect. At the same time, judging from the circumstances as far as we know them, there are several which go to show his innocence, and none which tend to prove him guilty. If we are called upon to believe that he received money from Harpalus, we must know for what service the payment was made. Did Demosthenês take part with Harpalus, and advise the Athenians to espouse his cause? Did he even keep silence, and abstain from advising them to reject the propositions? Quite the reverse. Demosthenês was from the beginning a declared opponent of Harpalus, and of all measures for supporting his cause. Plutarch indeed tells an anecdote — that Demosthenês began by opposing Harpalus, but that presently he was fascinated by the beauty of a golden cup among the Harpalian treasures. Harpalus, perceiving his admiration, sent to him on the ensuing night the golden cup, together with twenty talents, which Demosthenês accepted. A few days afterwards, when the cause of Harpalus was again debated in the public assembly, the orator appeared with his throat enveloped in woollen wrappers, and affected to have lost his voice; upon which the people, detecting this simulated inability as dictated by the bribe which had been given, expressed their displeasure partly by sarcastic taunts, partly by indignant murmuring.[1] So stands the anecdote in Plutarch. But we have proof that it is untrue. Demosthenês may indeed have been disabled by sore-throat from speaking at some particular assembly; so far the story may be accurate. But that he desisted from opposing Harpalus (the real point of the allegation against him) is certainly not true; for we know, from his accusers Deinarchus and Hyperidês, that it was he who made the final motion

[1] Plutarch, Demosth. 25: compare also Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt p. 846; and Photius, Life of Demosth. Cod. 265 p. 494.

for imprisoning Harpalus and sequestrating the Harpalian treasure in trust for Alexander. In fact, Hyperidês himself denounces Demosthenês, as having, from subservience to Alexander, closed the door against Harpalus and his prospects.[1] Such direct and continued opposition is a conclusive proof that Demosthenês was neither paid nor bought by Harpalus. The only service which he rendered to the exile was, by refusing to deliver him to Antipater, and by not preventing his escape from imprisonment. Now in this refusal even Phokion concurred; and probably the best Athenians, of all parties, were desirous of favouring the escape of an exile whom it would have been odious to hand over to a Macedonian executioner. Insofar as it was a crime not to have prevented the escape of Harpalus, the crime was committed as much by Phokion as by Demosthenês; and indeed more, seeing that Phokion was one of the generals, exercising the most important administrative duties—while Demosthenês was only an orator and mover in the assembly. Moreover, Harpalus had no means of requiting the persons, whoever they were, to whom he owed his escape; for the same motion which decreed his arrest, decreed also the sequestration of his money, and thus removed it from his own control.[2]

Demosthenês could not have received money from Harpalus, since he opposed him from first to last.

[1] See the fragment of Hyperidês in Mr. Babington's edition, pp. 37, 38 (a fragment already cited in a preceding note), insisting upon the prodigious mischief which Demosthenês had done by his decree for arresting (σύλληψις) Harpalus.

[2] In the Life of Demosthenês apud Photium (Cod. 265), the service alleged to have been rendered by him to Harpalus, and for which he was charged with having received 1000 Darics, is put as I have stated it in the text—Demosthenês first spoke publicly against receiving Harpalus, but presently Δαρεικοὺς χιλίους (ὥς φασι) λαβὼν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντας μετετάξατο (then follow the particular acts whereby this alleged change of sentiment was manifested, which particular acts are described as follows)—καὶ βουλομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων Ἀντιπάτρῳ προδοῦναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀντεῖπεν, τά τε Ἁρπάλεια χρήματα εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἔγραψεν ἀποθέσθαι, μηδὲ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν ἀποσημηνάμενος.

That Demosthenês should first oppose the reception of Harpalus—and then afterwards oppose the surrender of Harpalus to Antipater's requisition—is here represented as a change of politics, requiring the hypothesis of a bribe to explain it. But it is in reality no change at all. The two proceedings are perfectly consistent with each other, and both of them defensible.

The charge therefore made against Demosthenês by his two accusers, that he received money *from* Harpalus,—is one which all the facts known to us tend to refute. But this is not quite the whole case. Had Demosthenês the means of embezzling the money, after it had passed out of the control of Harpalus? To this question also we may reply in the negative, so far as Athenian practice enables us to judge.

Had Demosthenês the means of embezzling, after the money had passed out of the control of Harpalus? Answer in the negative.

Demosthenês had moved, and the people had voted, that these treasures should be lodged, in trust for Alexander, in the acropolis; a place where all the Athenian public money was habitually kept—in the back chamber of the Parthenon. When placed in that chamber, these new treasures would come under the custody of the officers of the Athenian exchequer; and would be just as much out of the reach of Demosthenês as the rest of the public money. What more could Phokion himself have done to preserve the Harpalian fund intact, than to put it in the recognized place of surety? Then, as to the intermediate process, of taking the money from Harpalus up to the acropolis, there is no proof,—and in my judgement no probability,—that Demosthenês was at all concerned in it. Even to count, verify, and weigh, a sum of above 80,000*l.*—not in bank notes or bills of exchange, but subdivided in numerous and heavy coins (staters, darics, tetradrachms), likely to be not even Attic, but Asiatic—must have been a tedious duty requiring to be performed by competent reckoners, and foreign to the habits of Demosthenês. The officers of the Athenian treasury must have gone through this labour, providing the slaves or mules requisite for carrying so heavy a burthen up to the acropolis. Now we have ample evidence, from the remaining Inscriptions, that the details of transferring and verifying the public property, at Athens, were performed habitually with laborious accuracy. Least of all would such accuracy be found wanting in the case of the large Harpalian treasure, where the very passing of the decree implied great fear of Alexander. If Harpalus, on being publicly questioned in the assembly—What was the sum to be carried up into the acropolis,—answered by stating the amount which he had originally brought, and not that which he had remaining—Demosthenês might surely repeat that

statement immediately after him, without being understood thereby to bind himself down as guarantee for its accuracy. An adverse pleader, like Hyperidês, might indeed turn a point in his speech[1]—"*You* told the assembly that there were 700 talents, and now *you* produce no more than half" —but the imputation wrapped up in these words against the probity of Demosthenês, is utterly groundless. Lastly, when the true amount was ascertained, to make report thereof was the duty of the officers of the treasury. Demosthenês could learn it only from them; and it might certainly be proper in him, though in no sense an imperative duty, to inform himself on the point, seeing that he had unconsciously helped to give publicity to a false statement. The true statement was given; but we neither know by whom, nor how soon.[2]

Reviewing the facts known to us, therefore, we find them all tending to refute the charge against Demosthenês. This conclusion will certainly be strengthened by reading the accusatory speech composed by Deinarchus; which is mere virulent invective, barren of facts and evidentiary matter, and running over all the life of Demosthenês for the preceding twenty years. That the speech of Hyperidês also was of the like

Accusatory speech of Deinarchus against Demosthenês—virulent invective destitute of facts.

[1] Fragm. Hyperidês, p. 7. ed. Babington—ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἑπτακόσια φήσας εἶναι τάλαντα, νῦν τὰ ἥμισυ ἀναφέρεις;

In p. 26 of the same Fragments, we find Hyperidês reproaching Demosthenês for not having kept effective custody over the person of Harpalus; for not having proposed any decree providing a special custody; for not having made known beforehand, or prosecuted afterwards, the negligence of the ordinary gaolers. This is to make Demosthenês responsible for the performance of *all* the administrative duties of the city; for the good conduct of the treasurers and the gaolers.

We must recollect that Hyperidês had been the loudest advocate of Harpalus, and had done all he could to induce the Athenians to adopt the cause of that exile against Alexander. One of the charges (already cited from his speech) against Demosthenês, is, that Demosthenês prevented this from being accomplished. Yet here is another charge from the same speaker, to the effect that Demosthenês did not keep Harpalus under effective custody for the sword of the Macedonian executioner!

The line of accusation taken by Hyperidês is full of shameful inconsistencies.

[2] In the Life of Demosthenês (Plutarch, Vit X Oratt. p. 846), the charge of corruption against him is made to rest chiefly on the fact, that he did not make this communication to the people—καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀναχωμισθέντων μεμηνυκὼς μήτε τῶν φυλαττόντων ἀμελείαν, &c. The biographer

desultory character, the remaining fragments indicate. Even the report made by the Areopagus contained no recital of facts—no justificatory matter—nothing except a specification of names with the sums for which each of them was chargeable.[1] It appears to have been made *ex-parte,* as far as we can judge—that is, made without hearing these persons in their own defence, unless they happened to be themselves Areopagites. Yet this report is held forth both by Hyperidês and Deinarchus as being in itself conclusive proof which the Dikasts could not reject. When Demosthenês demanded, as every defendant naturally would, that the charge against him should be proved by some positive evidence, Hyperidês sets aside the demand as nothing better than cavil and special pleading.[2]

Change of mind respecting Demosthenês, in the Athenian public, in a few months.

One farther consideration remains to be noticed. Only nine months after the verdict of the Dikastery against Demosthenês, Alexander died. Presently the Athenians and other Greeks rose against Antipater in the struggle called the Lamian war. Demosthenês was then recalled; received from his countrymen an enthusiastic welcome, such as had never been accorded to any returning exile since the days of Alkibiadês; took a leading part in the management of the war; and perished, on its disastrous termination, along with his accuser Hyperidês.

apud Photium seems to state it as if Demosthenês did not communicate the amount, *at the time* when he proposed the decree of sequestration. This last statement we are enabled to contradict, from the testimony of Hyperidês.

[1] Hyperid. Fragm. p. 18, ed. Babington. τὰς γὰρ ἀποφάσεις πάσας τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων Ἁρπάλου, πάσας ὁμοίως ἡ βουλὴ πεποίηται, καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς κατὰ πάντων· καὶ οὐδεμία προσγέγραφε, δι' ὅτι ἕκαστον ἀποφαίνει· ἀλλ' ἐπικεφάλαιον γράψασα, ὁπόσον ἕκαστος εἴληφε χρυσίον, τοῦτ' οὖν ὀφειλέτω...

[2] Hyperid. Frag. p. 16, ed. Babingt. ἐγὼ δ' ὅτι μὲν ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, ἱκανὸν οἶμαι εἶναι σημεῖον τοῖς δικασταῖς, τὸ τὴν βουλὴν σοῦ κατ αγνῶναι (see Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 46. and the beginning of the second Demosthenic epistle).

Hyperid. p. 16, ed. Babingt. Καὶ συκοφαντεῖς τὴν βουλήν, προκλήσεις προτιθεῖς, καὶ ἐρωτῶν ἐν ταῖς προκλήσεσιν, πόθεν ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, καὶ τίς ἦν σοὶ ὁ δούς, καὶ πῶς; τελευταῖον δ' ἴσως ἐρωτήσεις, καὶ εἰ ἐχρήσω τῷ χρυσίῳ, ὥσπερ τραπεζιτικὸν λόγον παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀπαιτῶν.

This monstrous sentence creates a strong presumption in favour of the defendant,—and a still stronger presumption against the accuser. Compare Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 6, 7.

The biographer apud Photium states that Hyperidês and four other orators procured (κατεσκευά-

Such speedy revolution of opinion about Demosthenês, countenances the conclusion which seems to me suggested by the other circumstances of the case—that the verdict against him was not judicial, but political; growing out of the embarrassing necessities of the time.

Probable reality of the case, respecting the money of Harpalus and the sentence of the Areopagus.

There can be no doubt that Harpalus, to whom a declaration of active support from the Athenians was matter of life and death, distributed various bribes to all consenting recipients, who could promote his views,—and probably even to some who simply refrained from opposing them; to all, in short, except pronounced opponents. If we were to judge from probabilities alone, we should say that Hyperidês himself, as one of the chief supporters, would also be among the largest recipients.[1] Here was abundant bribery—notorious in the mass, though perhaps untraceable in the detail—all consummated during the flush of promise which marked the early discussions of the Harpalian case. When the tide of sentiment turned—when fear of Macedonian force became the overwhelming sentiment—when Harpalus and his treasures were impounded in trust for Alexander—all these numerous receivers of bribes were already compromised and alarmed. They themselves probably, in order to divert suspicion, were among the loudest in demanding investigation and punishment against delinquents. Moreover, the city was responsible for 700 talents to Alexander, while no more than 350 were forthcoming.[2] It was indispensable that some definite individuals should be pronounced guilty and punished, partly in order to put down the reciprocal criminations circulating through the city, partly in order to appease the displeasure of Alexander about the pecuniary deficiency. But how to find out who were the guilty? There was no official Prosecutor-general; the number of persons suspected would place the matter beyond the reach of private accusations; perhaps the course recommended by Demosthenês himself was the best, to consign this preliminary investigation to the Areopagites.

σαν) the condemnation of Demosth. by the Areopagus.

[1] The biographer of Hyperidês (Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p. 48) tells us that he was the only orator who kept himself unbribed; the comic writer Timoklês names Hyperidês along with Demosthenês and others as recipients (ap. Athenæ. viii. p. 342).

[2] See this point urged by Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69, 70.

Six months elapsed before these Areopagites made their report. Now it is impossible to suppose that all this time could have been spent in the investigation of facts—and if it had been, the report when published would have contained some trace of these facts, instead of embodying a mere list of names and sums. The probability is, that their time was passed quite as much in party-discussions as in investigating facts; that dissentient parties were long in coming to an agreement whom they should sacrifice; and that when they did agree, it was a political rather than a judicial sentence, singling out Demosthenês as a victim highly acceptable to Alexander, and embodying Demadês also, by way of compromise, in the same list of delinquents—two opposite politicians, both at the moment obnoxious. I have already observed that Demosthenês was at that time unpopular with both the reigning parties; with the philo-Macedonians, from long date, and not without sufficient reason; with the anti-Macedonians, because he had stood prominent in opposing Harpalus. His accusers count upon the hatred of the former against him, as a matter of course; they recommend him to the hatred of the latter, as a base creature of Alexander. The Dikasts doubtless included men of both parties; and as a collective body, they might probably feel, that to ratify the list presented by the Areopagus was the only way of finally closing a subject replete with danger and discord.

Such seems the probable history of the Harpalian transactions. It leaves Demosthenês innocent of corrupt profit, not less than Phokion; but to the Athenian politicians generally, it is noway creditable; while it exhibits the judicial conscience of Athens as under pressure of dangers from without, worked upon by party intrigues within.[1]

B.C. 324. Rescript of Alexander to the Grecian cities, di-

During the half year and more which elapsed between the arrival of Harpalus at Athens and the trial of Demosthenês, one event at least of considerable moment occurred in Greece. Alexander sent Nikanor to the great Olympic festival held

[1] We read in Pausanias (ii. 33, 4) that the Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, having afterwards seized one of the slaves of Harpalus, learnt from him the names of those Athenians whom his master had corrupted; and that Demosthenês was *not* among them. As far as this statement goes, it serves to exculpate Demosthenês. Yet I cannot assign so much importance to it as Bishop Thirlwall seems to do.

in this year, with a formal letter or rescript, directing every Grecian city to recall all its citizens that were in exile, except such as were under the taint of impiety. The rescript, which was publicly read at the festival by the herald who had gained the prize for loudness of voice, was heard with the utmost enthusiasm by 20,000 exiles, who had mustered there from intimations that such a step was intended. It ran thus: "King Alexander to the exiles out of the Grecian cities. We have not been authors of your banishment, but we will be authors of your restoration to your native cities. We have written to Antipater about this matter, directing him to apply force to such cities as will not recall you of their own accord."[1]

Rescripting that the exiles should be recalled in each.

It is plain that many exiles had been pouring out their complaints and accusations before Alexander, and had found him a willing auditor. But we do not know by what representations this rescript had been procured. It would seem that Antipater had orders farther, to restrain or modify the confederacies of the Achæan and Arcadian cities;[2] and to enforce not merely recall of the exiles, but restitution of their properties.[3]

That the imperial rescript was dictated by mistrust of the tone of sentiment in the Grecian cities generally, and intended to fill each city with devoted partisans of Alexander—we cannot doubt. It was on his part a high-handed and sweeping exercise of sovereignty—setting aside the conditions under which he had been named leader of Greece—disdaining even to inquire into particular cases, and to attempt a distinction between just and unjust sentences—overruling in the mass the political and judicial authorities in every city. It proclaimed with bitter emphasis the servitude of the Hellenic world. Exiles restored under the coercive order of Alexander were sure to look to Macedonia for support, to despise their own home authorities, and to fill their respective cities with enfeebling discord. Most of the cities, not daring to resist, appear to have yielded a reluctant

Purpose of the rescript—to provide partisans for Alexander in each of the cities—Discontents in Greece.

His narrative of the Harpalian transactions is able and discriminating (Hist. vol. vii. ch. 56 p. 170 *seqq.*).

[1] Diodor. xix. 8.

[2] See the Fragments of Hyperidês, p. 36, ed. Babington.

[3] Curtius x. 2, 6.

obedience; but both the Athenians and Ætolians are said to have refused to execute the order.[1] It is one evidence of the disgust raised by the rescript at Athens, that Demosthenês is severely reproached by Deinarchus, because, as chief of the Athenian Theôry or sacred legation to the Olympic festival, he was seen there publicly consorting and in familiar converse with Nikanor.[2]

In the winter or early spring of 323 B.C. several Grecian cities sent envoys into Asia to remonstrate with Alexander against the measure; we may presume that the Athenians were among them, but we do not know whether the remonstrance produced any effect.[3] There appears to have been considerable discontent in Greece during this winter and spring (322 B.C.). The disbanded soldiers out of Asia still maintained a camp at Tænarus; where Leosthenês, an energetic Athenian of anti-Macedonian sentiments, accepted the command of them, and even attracted fresh mercenary soldiers from Asia, under concert with various confederates at Athens, and with the Ætolians.[4] Of the money, said to be 5000 talents, brought by Harpalus out of Asia, the greater part had not been taken by Harpalus to Athens, but apparently left with his officers for the maintenance of the troops who had accompanied him over.

B.C. 323 (Summer). Effect produced in Greece by the death of Alexander.

Such was the general position of affairs when Alexander died at Babylon in June 323 B.C. This astounding news, for which no one could have been prepared, must have become diffused throughout Greece during the month of July. It opened the most favourable prospects to all lovers of freedom and sufferers by Macedonian

[1] Curtius x. 2, 6. The statement of Diodorus (xviii. 8)—that the rescript was popular and acceptable to all Greeks, except the Athenians and Ætolians—cannot be credited. It was popular, doubtless, with the exiles themselves, and their immediate friends.

[2] Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 81: compare Hyperid. Fragm. p. 36, ed. Babington.

[3] Diodor. xvii. 113. There seem to have been cases in which Alexander interfered with the sentences of the Athenian Dikastery against Athenian citizens: see the case of a man liberated from a judicial fine at his instance. Pseudo-Demosthenês, Epistol. 3. p. 1480.

[4] Diodor. xvii. 111; compare xviii. 21. Pausanias (i. 25, 5; viii. 52, 2) affirms that Leosthenês brought over 50,000 of these mercenaries from Asia into Peloponnesus, during the lifetime of Alexander, and against Alexander's will. The number here given seems incredible; but it is probable enough that he induced some to come across.—Justin (xiii. 5) mentions that armed resistance was prepared by the Athenians and Ætolians against Alexander him-

dominion. The imperial military force resembled the gigantic Polyphemus after his eye had been blinded by Odysseus:[1] Alexander had left no competent heir, nor did any one imagine that his vast empire could be kept together in effective unity by other hands. Antipater in Macedonia was threatened with the defection of various subject neighbours.[2]

The Athenians declare themselves champions of the liberation of Greece, in spite of Phokion's opposition.

No sooner was the death of Alexander indisputably certified, than the anti-Macedonian leaders in Athens vehemently instigated the people to declare themselves first champions of Hellenic freedom, and to organise a confederacy throughout Greece for that object. Demosthenês was then in exile; but Leosthenês, Hyperidês and other orators of the same party, found themselves able to kindle in their countrymen a warlike feeling and determination, in spite of decided opposition on the part of Phokion and his partisans.[3] The rich men for the most part took the side of Phokion, but the mass of the citizens were fired by the animating recollection of their ancestors and by the hopes of reconquering Grecian freedom. A vote was passed, publicly proclaiming their resolution to that effect. It was decreed that 200 quadriremes and 40 triremes should be equipped; that all Athenians under 40 years of age should be in military requisition; and that envoys should be sent round to the various Grecian cities, earnestly invoking their alliance in the work of self-emancipation.[4] Phokion, though a

self during the latter months of his life, in reference to the mandate enjoining recall of the exiles. He seems to overstate the magnitude of their doings, before the death of Alexander.

[1] A striking comparison made by the orator Demadês (Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 181).

[2] See Frontinus, Stratagem. ii. 11, 4.

[3] Plutarch, Phokion, 23. In the Fragments of Dexippus, there appear short extracts of two speeches, seemingly composed by that author in his history of these transactions; one which he ascribes to Hyperidês instigating the war, the other to some unknown speaker, supposed by C. Müller to be Phokion, against it (Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. p. 668).

[4] Diodor. xviii. 10. Diodorus states that the Athenians sent the Harpalian treasures to the aid of Leosthenês. He seems to fancy that Harpalus had brought to Athens all the 5000 talents which he had carried away from Asia; but it is certain, that no more than 700 or 720 talents were declared by Harpalus in the Athenian assembly—and of these only half were really forthcoming. Moreover, Diodorus is not consistent with

pronounced opponent of such warlike projects, still remained at Athens, and still, apparently, continued in his functions as one of the generals.[1] But Pytheas, Kallimedon, and others of his friends, fled to Antipater, whom they strenuously assisted in trying to check the intended movement throughout Greece.

The Ætolians and many other Greeks join the confederacy for liberation—activity of the Athenian Leosthenês, as general. Athenian envoys sent round to invite co-operation from the various Greeks.

Leosthenês, aided by some money and arms from Athens, put himself at the head of the mercenaries assembled at Tænarus, and passed across the Gulf into Ætolia. Here he was joined by the Ætolians and Akarnanians, who eagerly entered into the league with Athens for expelling the Macedonians from Greece. Proceeding onward towards Thermopylæ and Thessaly, he met with favour and encouragement almost everywhere. The cause of Grecian freedom was espoused by the Phokians, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænianes, Athamânes, and Dolopes; by most of the Malians, Œtæans, Thessalians, and Achæans of Phthiôtis; by the inhabitants of Leukas, and by some of the Molossians. Promises were also held out of cooperation from various Illyrian and Thracian tribes. In Peloponnesus, the Argeians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Trœzenians, Eleians, and Messenians, enrolled themselves in the league, as well as the Karystians in Eubœa.[2] These adhesions were partly procured by Hyperidês and other Athenian envoys, who visited the several cities; while Pytheas and other envoys were going round in like manner to advocate the cause of Antipater. The two sides were thus publicly argued by able pleaders before different public assemblies. In these debates, the advantage was generally on the side of the Athenian orators, whose efforts moreover were powerfully seconded by

himself, when he says afterwards (xviii. 19) that Thimbron, who killed Harpalus in Krete, got possession of the Harpalian treasures and mercenaries, and carried them over to Kyrênê in Africa.

[1] It is to this season, apparently, that the anecdote (if true) must be referred.—The Athenians were eager to invade Bœotia unseasonably; Phokion, as general of eighty years old, kept them back, by calling out the citizens of sixty years old and upwards for service, and offering to march himself at their head (Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 818).

[2] Diodor. xviii. 11; Pausanias, i. 25, 4.

the voluntary aid of Demosthenês, then living as an exile in Peloponnesus.

To Demosthenês the death of Alexander, and the new prospect of organizing an anti-Macedonian confederacy with some tolerable chance of success, came more welcome than to any one else. He gladly embraced the opportunity of joining and assisting the Athenian envoys, who felt the full value of his energetic eloquence, in the various Peloponnesian towns. So effective was the service which he thus rendered to his country, that the Athenians not only passed a vote to enable him to return, but sent a trireme to fetch him to Peiræus. Great was the joy and enthusiasm on his arrival. The archons, the priests, and the entire body of citizens, came down to the harbour to welcome his landing, and escorted him to the city. Full of impassioned emotion, Demosthenês poured forth his gratitude for having been allowed to see such a day, and to enjoy a triumph greater even than that which had been conferred on Alkibiadês on returning from exile; since it had been granted spontaneously, and not extorted by force. His fine could not be remitted consistently with Athenian custom; but the people passed a vote granting to him fifty talents as superintendent of the periodical sacrifice to Zeus Soter; and his execution of this duty was held equivalent to a liquidation of the fine.[1]

Assistance lent to the Athenian envoys by Demosthenês, though in exile. He is recalled to Athens, and receives an enthusiastic welcome.

What part Demosthenês took in the plans or details of the war, we are not permitted to know. Vigorous operations were now carried on, under the military command of Leosthenês. The confederacy against Antipater included a larger assemblage of Hellenic states than that which had resisted Xerxês in 480 B.C. Nevertheless, the name of Sparta does not appear in the list. It was a melancholy drawback to the chances of Greece, in this her last struggle for emancipation, that the force of Sparta had been altogether crushed in the gallant but ill-concerted effort of Agis against Antipater seven years before, and had not since recovered. The great

B.C. 323. (Autumn). Large Grecian confederacy against Antipater, nevertheless without Sparta. Bœotia strongly in the Macedonian interest. Leosthenês with the confederate

[1] Plutarch, Demosth. 27.

army marches into Thessaly.

stronghold of Macedonian interest, in the interior of Greece, was Bœotia. Platæa, Orchomenus, and the other ancient enemies of Thebes, having received from Alexander the domain once belonging to Thebes herself, were well aware that this arrangement could only be upheld by the continued pressure of Macedonian supremacy in Greece. It seems probable also that there were Macedonian garrisons in the Kadmeia—in Corinth—and in Megalopolis; moreover, that the Arcadian and Achæan cities had been macedonized by the measures taken against them under Alexander's orders in the preceding summer;[1] for we find no mention made of these cities in the coming contest. The Athenians equipped a considerable land-force to join Leosthenês at Thermopylæ; a citizen force of 5000 infantry and 500 cavalry, with 2000 mercenaries besides. But the resolute opposition of the Bœotian cities hindered them from advancing beyond Mount Kithæron, until Leosthenês himself, marching from Thermopylæ to join them with a part of his army, attacked the Bœotian troops, gained a complete victory, and opened the passage. He now proceeded with the full Hellenic muster, including Ætolians and Athenians, into Thessaly to meet Antipater, who was advancing from Macedonia into Greece at the head of the force immediately at his disposal—13,000 infantry and 600 cavalry—and with a fleet of 110 ships of war cooperating on the coast.[2]

Battle in Thessaly—victory of Leosthenês over Antipater, who is compelled to throw himself into Lamia, and await succours from Asia—Leo-

Antipater was probably not prepared for this rapid and imposing assemblage of the combined Greeks at Thermopylæ, nor for the energetic movements of Leosthenês. Still less was he prepared for the defection of the Thessalian cavalry, who, having always formed an important element in the Macedonian army, now lent their strength to the Greeks. He despatched urgent messages to the Macedonian commanders in Asia—Kraterus, Leonnatus, Philotas, &c., soliciting reinforcements; but in the mean time

[1] See the Fragments of Hyperidês, p. 36, ed. Babington. καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς κοινοὺς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων. . . . We do not know what was done to these district confederacies, but it seems that some considerable change was made in them, at the time when Alexander's decree for restoring the exiles was promulgated.

[2] Diodor. xviii. 13.

he thought it expedient to accept the challenge of Leosthenês. In the battle which ensued, however, he was completely defeated, and even cut off from the possibility of retreating into Macedonia. No better resource was left to him than the fortified town of Lamia (near to the river Spercheius, beyond the southern border of Thessaly), where he calculated on holding out until relief came from Asia. Leosthenês immediately commenced the siege of Lamia, and pressed it with the utmost energy, making several attempts to storm the town. But its fortifications were strong, with a garrison ample and efficient—so that he was repulsed with considerable loss. Unfortunately he possessed no battering train nor engineers, such as had formed so powerful an element in the military successes of Philip and Alexander. He therefore found himself compelled to turn the siege into a blockade, and to adopt systematic measures for intercepting the supply of provisions. In this he had every chance of succeeding, and of capturing the person of Antipater. Hellenic prospects looked bright and encouraging, nothing was heard in Athens and the other cities except congratulations and thanksgivings.[1] Phokion, on hearing the confident language of those around him, remarked—"The stadium (or short course) has been done brilliantly; but I fear we shall not have strength to hold out for the long course."[2] At this critical moment, Leosthenês, in inspecting the blockading trenches, was wounded on the head by a large stone, projected from one of the catapults on the city-walls, and expired in two days.[3] A funeral oration in his honour, as well as in that of the other combatants against Antipater, was pronounced at Athens by Hyperidês.[4]

Leosthenês forms the blockade of Lamia: he is slain.

The death of this eminent general, in the full tide of success, was a hard blow struck by fortune at the cause of Grecian freedom. For the last generation, Athens had produced several excellent orators, and one who combined splendid oratory with wise and patriotic counsels. But

Misfortune of the death of Leosthenês. Antiphilus is named in his

Relaxed efforts of the Grecian army.

place. during all that time, none of her citizens, before Leosthenês, had displayed military genius and ardour along with Panhellenic purposes. His death appears to have saved Antipater from defeat and captivity. The difficulty was very great, of keeping together a miscellaneous army of Greeks, who, after the battle, easily persuaded themselves that the war was finished, and desired to go home—perhaps under promise of returning. Even during the lifetime of Leosthenês, the Ætolians, the most powerful contingent of the army, had obtained leave to go home, from some domestic urgency, real or pretended.[1] When he was slain, there was no second in command; nor, even if there had been, could the personal influence of one officer be transferred to another. Reference was made to Athens, where, after some debate, Antiphilus was chosen commander, after the proposition to name Phokion had been made and rejected.[2] But during this interval, there was no authority to direct military operations, or even to keep the army together. Hence the precious moments for rendering the blockade really stringent, were lost, and Antipater was enabled to maintain himself until the arrival of Leonnatus from Asia to his aid. How dangerous the position of Antipater was, we may judge from the fact, that he solicited peace, but was required by the besiegers to surrender at discretion[3]—with which condition he refused to comply.

B.C. 323-322 (Autumn to Winter). Leonnatus, with a Macedonian army from Asia, arrives in Thessaly. His defeat and death. Antipater escapes from Lamia, and takes the command.

Antiphilus appears to have been a brave and competent officer. But before he could reduce Lamia, Leonnatus with a Macedonian army had crossed the Hellespont from Asia, and arrived at the frontiers of Thessaly. So many of the Grecian contingents had left the camp, that Antiphilus was not strong enough at once to continue the blockade and to combat the relieving army. Accordingly, he raised the blockade, and moved off by rapid marches to attack Leonnatus apart from Antipater. He accomplished this operation with vigour and success. Through the superior efficiency of the Thessalian cavalry under Menon, he gained an important advantage

from Egypt in a papyrus, and is about to be published by Mr. Churchill Babington.

[1] Diodor. xviii. 13—15.

[2] Plutarch, Phokion, 24.

[3] Diodor. xviii. 11; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.

in a cavalry battle over Leonnatus, who was himself slain;[1] and the Macedonian phalanx, having its flanks and rear thus exposed, retired from the plain to more difficult ground, leaving the Greeks masters of the field with the dead bodies. On the very next day, Antipater came up, bringing the troops from Lamia, and took command of the defeated army. He did not however think it expedient to renew the combat, but withdrew his army from Thessaly into Macedonia, keeping in his march the high ground, out of the reach of cavalry.[2]

War carried on by sea between the Macedonian and Athenian fleets.

During the same time generally as these operations in Thessaly, it appears that war was carried on actively by sea. We hear of a descent by Mikion with a Macedonian fleet at Rhamnus on the eastern coast of Attica, repulsed by Phokion; also of a Macedonian fleet, of 240 sail, under Kleitus, engaging in two battles with the Athenian fleet under Eetion, near the islands called Echinades, at the mouth of the Achelous, on the western Ætolian coast. The Athenians were defeated in both actions, and great efforts were made at Athens to build new vessels for the purpose of filling up the losses sustained.[3] Our information is not sufficient to reveal the purposes or details of these proceedings. But it seems probable that the Macedonian fleet were attacking Ætolia through Œniadæ, the citizens of which town had recently been expelled by the Ætolians;[4] and perhaps this may have been the reason why the Ætolian contingent was withdrawn from Thessaly.

B.C. 322 (Spring).

Reluctance of the Greek contingents to remain on long-continued service. The army in Thessaly

In spite of such untoward events at sea, the cause of Panhellenic liberty seemed on the whole prosperous. Though the capital opportunity had been missed, of taking Antipater captive in Lamia, still he had been expelled from Greece, and was unable, by means of his own forces in Macedonia, to regain his footing. The Grecian contingents had behaved with bravery and unanimity in prosecution of the common purpose; and what had been already achieved was quite

[1] Plutarch, Phokion, 25; Diodor. xviii. 14, 15: compare Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 1.

[2] Diodor. xviii. 15.

[3] Diodor. xviii. 15.

[4] Diodor. xviii. 8.

is thinned by many returning home.

sufficient to justify the rising, as a fair risk, promising reasonable hopes of success. Nevertheless Greek citizens were not like trained Macedonian soldiers. After a term of service not much prolonged, they wanted to go back to their families and properties, hardly less after a victory than after a defeat. Hence the army of Antiphilus in Thessaly became much thinned,[1] though still remaining large enough to keep back the Macedonian forces of Antipater, even augmented as they had been by Leonnatus—and to compel him to await the still more powerful reinforcement destined to follow under Kraterus.

Expected arrival of Kraterus to reinforce Antipater. Relations between the Macedonian officers.

In explaining the relations between these three Macedonian commanders—Antipater, Leonnatus, and Kraterus—it is necessary to go back to June 323 B.C., the period of Alexander's death, and to review the condition into which his vast and mighty empire had fallen. I shall do this briefly, and only so far as it bears on the last struggles and final subjugation of the Grecian world.

State of the regal family, and of the Macedonian generals and soldiery, after the death of Alexander.

On the unexpected death of Alexander, the camp at Babylon with its large force became a scene of discord. He left no offspring, except a child named Heraklês, by his mistress Barsinê. Roxana, one of his wives, was indeed pregnant; and amidst the uncertainties of the moment, the first disposition of many was to await the birth of her child. She herself, anxious to shut out rivalry, caused Statira, the queen whom Alexander had last married, to be entrapped and assassinated along with her sister.[2] There was however at Babylon a brother of Alexander, named Aridæus (son of Philip by a Thessalian mistress), already of full age though feeble in intelligence, towards whom a still larger party leaned. In Macedonia, there were Olympias, Alexander's mother—Kleopatra, his sister, widow of the Epirotic Alexander—and Kynanê,[3] another sister, widow of Amyntas (cousin of Alexander the Great, and put to death by him); all of them disposed to take advantage of their relationship to the deceased conqueror, in the scramble now opened for power.

[1] Diodor. xviii. 17.

[2] Plutarch, Alexand. 77.

[3] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

After a violent dispute between the cavalry and the infantry at Babylon, Aridæus was proclaimed king under the name of Philip Aridæus. Perdikkas was named as his guardian and chief minister; among the other chief officers, the various satrapies and fractions of the empire were distributed. Egypt and Libya were assigned to Ptolemy; Syria to Laomedon; Kilikia to Philôtas; Pamphylia, Lykia, and the greater Phrygia, to Antigonus; Karia, to Asander; Lydia, to Menander; the Hellespontine Phrygia, to Leonnatus; Kappadokia and Paphlagonia, to the Kardian Eumenês; Media, to Pithon. The eastern satrapies were left in the hands of the actual holders.

Philip Aridæus is proclaimed king: the satrapies are distributed among the principal officers.

In Europe, the distributors gave Thrace with the Chersonese to Lysimachus; the countries west of Thrace, including (along with Illyrians, Triballi, Agrianes, and Epirots) Macedonia and Greece, to Antipater and Kraterus.[1] We thus find the Grecian cities handed over to new masters, as fragments of the vast intestate estate left by Alexander. The empty form of convening and consulting a synod of deputies at Corinth, was no longer thought necessary.

All the above-named officers were considered as local lieutenants, administering portions of an empire one and indivisible under Aridæus. The principal officers who enjoyed central authority, bearing on the entire empire, were, Perdikkas, chiliarch of the horse (the post occupied by Hephæstion until his death), a sort of vizir,[2] and Seleukus, commander of the Horse Guards. No one at this moment talked of dividing the empire. But it soon appeared that Perdikkas, profiting by the weakness of Aridæus, had determined to leave to him nothing more than the imperial name, and to engross for himself the real authority. Still, however, in his disputes with the other chiefs, he represented the imperial family, and the integrity of the empire, contending against

Perdikkas the chief representative of central authority, assisted by Eumenês of Kardia.

[1] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. *ut supra*; Diodor. xviii. 3, 4; Curtius x. 10; Dexippus, Fragmenta ap. Photium, Cod. 82. ap. Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. iii. p. 667. ed. Didot (De Rebus post Alexandrum).

[2] Arrian and Dexippus—De Reb. post Alex. *ut supra*: compare Diodor. xviii. 48.

severalty and local independence. In this task (besides his brother Alketas), his ablest and most effective auxiliary was Eumenês of Kardia, secretary of Alexander for several years until his death. It was one of the earliest proceedings of Perdikkas to wrest Kappadokia from the local chief Ariarathês (who had contrived to hold it all through the reign of Alexander), and to transfer it to Eumenês, to whom it had been allotted in the general scheme of division.[1]

List of projects entertained by Alexander at the time of his death. The generals dismiss them as too vast. Plans of Leonnatus and Kleopatra.

At the moment of Alexander's death, Kraterus was in Kilikia, at the head of an army of veteran Macedonian soldiers. He had been directed to conduct them home into Macedonia, with orders to remain there himself in place of Antipater, who was to come over to Asia with fresh reinforcements. Kraterus had with him a paper of written instructions from Alexander, embodying projects on the most gigantic scale; for western conquest — transportation of inhabitants by wholesale from Europe into Asia and Asia into Europe—erection of magnificent religious edifices in various parts of Greece and Macedonia, &c. This list was submitted by Perdikkas to the officers and soldiers around him, who dismissed the projects as too vast for any one but Alexander to think of.[2] Kraterus and Antipater had each a concurrent claim to Greece and Macedonia, and the distributors of the empire had allotted these countries to them jointly, not venturing to exclude either. Amidst the conflicting pretensions of these great Macedonian officers, Leonnatus also cherished hopes of the same prize. He was satrap of the Asiatic territory bordering upon the Hellespont, and had received propositions from Kleopatra, at Pella, inviting him to marry her and assume the government of Macedonia. About the same time, urgent messages were also sent to him (through Hekatæus despot of Kardia) from Antipater, immediately after the defeat preceding the siege of Lamia, entreating his cooperation against the Greeks. Leonnatus accordingly came, intending to assist Antipater against the Greeks, but also to dispossess him of the government of Macedonia and marry Kleopatra.[3] This scheme remained unexecuted,

[1] Diodor. xviii. 16. [2] Diodor. xviii. 4. [3] Plutarch, Eumenês, 8.

because (as has been already related) Leonnatus was slain in his first encounter with the Greeks. To them, his death was a grave misfortune; to Antipater, it was an advantage which more than countervailed the defeat, since it relieved him from a dangerous rival.

It was not till the ensuing summer that Kraterus found leisure to conduct his army into Macedonia. By this junction, Antipater, to whom he ceded the command, found himself at the head of a powerful army—40,000 heavy infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 3000 archers and slingers. He again marched into Thessaly against the Greeks under Antiphilus; and the two armies came in sight on the Thessalian plains near Krannon. The Grecian army consisted of 25,000 infantry, and 3500 cavalry—the latter, Thessalians under Menon, of admirable efficiency. The soldiers in general were brave, but insubordinate; while the contingents of many cities had gone home without returning, in spite of urgent remonstrances from the commander. Hoping to be rejoined by these absentees, Antiphilus and Menon tried at first to defer fighting; but Antipater forced them to a battle. Though Menon with his Thessalian cavalry defeated and dispersed the Macedonian cavalry, the Grecian infantry were unable to resist the superior number of Antipater's infantry and the heavy pressure of the phalanx. They were beaten back and gave way, yet retiring in tolerable order, the Macedonian phalanx being incompetent for pursuit, to some difficult neighbouring ground, where they were soon joined by their victorious cavalry. The loss of the Greeks is said to have been 500 men; that of the Macedonians, 120.[1]

B.C. 322. Kraterus joins Antipater in Macedonia with a powerful army. Battle of Krannon in Thessaly. Antipater gains a victory over the Greeks, though not a complete one.

The defeat of Krannon (August 322 B.C.) was no way decisive or ruinous, nor would it probably have crushed the spirit of Leosthenês, had he been alive and in command. The coming up of the absentee contingents might still have enabled the Greeks to make head. But Antiphilus and Menon, after holding council, declined to await and accelerate that junction. They thought themselves under the necessity of sending to open negotiations for peace with Antipater;

Antiphilus tries to open negotiations with Antipater, who refuses to treat, except with each city singly. Discouragement

[1] Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.

among the Greeks. Each city treats separately. Antipater grants favourable terms to all, except Athenians and Ætolians.

who however returned for answer, that he would not recognise or treat with any Grecian confederacy, and that he would receive no propositions except from each city severally. Upon this the Grecian commanders at once resolved to continue the war, and to invoke reinforcements from their countrymen. But their own manifestation of timidity had destroyed the chance that remained of such reinforcements arriving. While Antipater commenced a vigorous and successful course of action against the Thessalian cities separately, the Greeks became more and more dispirited and alarmed. City after city sent its envoys to entreat peace from Antipater, who granted lenient terms to each, reserving only the Athenians and Ætolians. In a few days, the combined Grecian army was dispersed; Antiphilus with the Athenians returned into Attica; Antipater followed them southward as far as Bœotia, taking up his quarters at the Macedonian post on the Kadmeia, once the Hellenic Thebes—within two days' march of Athens.[1]

B.C. 322. Antipater and his army in Bœotia—Athens left alone and unable to resist. Demosthenês and the other anti-Macedonian orators take flight. Embassy of Phokion, Xenokratês, and others to Antipater.

Against the overwhelming force thus on the frontiers of Attica, the Athenians had no means of defence. The principal anti-Macedonian orators, especially Demosthenês and Hyperidês, retired from the city at once, seeking sanctuary in the temples of Kalauria and Ægina. Phokion and Demadês, as the envoys most acceptable to Antipater, were sent to Kadmeia as bearers of the submission of the city, and petitioners for lenient terms. Demadês is said to have been at this time disfranchised and disqualified from public speaking—having been indicted and found guilty thrice (some say seven times) under the Graphê Paranomôn; but the Athenians passed a special vote of relief, to enable him to resume his functions of citizen. Neither Phokion nor Demadês, however, could prevail upon Antipater to acquiesce in anything short of the surrender of Athens at discretion; the same terms as Leosthenês had required from Antipater himself at Lamia. Kraterus was even bent upon marching forward into Attica, to dictate terms under

[1] Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 26.

the walls of Athens; and it was not without difficulty that Phokion obtained the abandonment of this intention; after which he returned to Athens with the answer. The people having no choice except to throw themselves on the mercy of Antipater,[1] Phokion and Demadês came back to Thebes to learn his determination. This time, they were accompanied by the philosopher Xenokratês—the successor of Plato and Speusippus, as presiding teacher in the school of the Academy. Though not a citizen of Athens, Xenokratês had long resided there; and it was supposed that his dignified character and intellectual eminence might be efficacious in mitigating the wrath of the conqueror. Aristotle had quitted Athens for Chalkis before this time; otherwise he, the personal friend of Antipater, would have been probably selected for this painful mission. In point of fact, Xenokratês did no good, being harshly received, and almost put to silence, by Antipater. One reason of this may be, that he had been to a certain extent the rival of Aristotle; and it must be added, to his honour, that he maintained a higher and more independent tone than either of the other envoys.[2]

Severe terms imposed upon Athens by Antipater.

According to the terms dictated by Antipater, the Athenians were required to pay a sum equal to the whole cost of the war; to surrender Demosthenês, Hyperidês, and seemingly at least two other anti-Macedonian orators; to receive a Macedonian garrison in Munychia; to abandon their democratical constitution, and disfranchise all their poorer citizens. Most of these poor men were to be transported from their homes, and to receive new lands on a foreign shore. The Athenian colonists in Samos were to be dispossessed and the island re-transferred to the Samian exiles and natives.

It is said that Phokion and Demadês heard these terms with satisfaction, as lenient and reasonable. Xenokratês

[1] Democharês, the nephew of Demosthenês, who had held a bold language and taken active part against Antipater throughout the Lamian war, is said to have delivered a public harangue recommending resistance even at this last moment. At least such was the story connected with his statue, erected a few years afterwards at Athens, representing him in the costume of an orator, but with a sword in hand—Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p. 847: compare Polybius xii. 13.

[2] Plutarch, Phokion, 27; Diodor. xviii. 18.

entered against them the strongest protest which the occasion admitted,[1] when he said—"If Antipater looks upon us as slaves, the terms are moderate; if as freemen, they are severe." To Phokion's entreaty, that the introduction of the garrison might be dispensed with, Antipater replied in the negative, intimating that the garrison would be not less serviceable to Phokion himself than to the Macedonians; while Kallimedon also, an Athenian exile there present, repelled the proposition with scorn. Respecting the island of Samos, Antipater was prevailed upon to allow a special reference to the imperial authority.

Disfranchisement and deportation of the 12,000 poorest Athenian citizens.

If Phokion thought these terms lenient, we must imagine that he expected a sentence of destruction against Athens, such as Alexander had pronounced and executed against Thebes. Under no other comparison can they appear lenient. Out of 21,000 qualified citizens of Athens, all those who did not possess property to the amount of 2000 drachmæ were condemned to disfranchisement and deportation. The number below this prescribed qualification, who came under the penalty, was 12,000, or three-fifths of the whole. They were set aside as turbulent, noisy democrats; the 9000 richest citizens, the "party of order," were left in exclusive possession, not only of the citizenship, but of the city. The condemned 12,000 were deported out of Attica, some to Thrace, some to the Illyrian or Italian coast, some to Libya or the Kyrenaic territory. Besides the multitude banished simply on the score of comparative poverty, the marked anti-Macedonian politicians were banished also, including Agnonidês, the friend of Demosthenês, and one of his earnest advocates when accused respecting the Harpalian treasures.[2] At the request of Phokion, Antipater consented to render the deportation less sweeping than he had originally intended, so far as to permit some exiles, Agnonidês among the rest, to remain within the limits of Peloponnesus.[3] We shall see him presently

[1] Plutarch, Phokion, 27. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πρέσβεις ἠγάπησαν ὡς φιλανθρώπους τὰς διαλύσεις, πλὴν τοῦ Ξενοκράτους &c. Pausanias even states (vii. 10, 1) that Antipater was disposed to grant more lenient terms, but was dissuaded from doing so by Demadês.

[2] See Fragments of Hyperidês adv. Demosth. p. 61—65, ed. Babington.

[3] Diodor. xviii. 18. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες πλείους τῶν μυρίων (instead of δισμυρίων, which seems a mistake) καὶ δισχιλίων μετεστάθησαν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος· οἱ δὲ τὴν ὡρισμένην

contemplating a still more wholesale deportation of the Ætolian people.

Hardship suffered by the deported poor of Athens—Macedonian garrison placed in Munychia.

It is deeply to be lamented that this important revolution, not only cutting down Athens to less than one-half of her citizen population, but involving a deportation fraught with individual hardship and suffering, is communicated to us only in two or three sentences of Plutarch and Diodorus, without any details from contemporary observers. It is called by Diodorus a return to the Solonian constitution; but the comparison disgraces the name of that admirable lawgiver, whose changes, taken as a whole, were prodigiously liberal and enfranchising, compared with what he found established. The deportation ordained by Antipater must indeed have brought upon the poor citizens of Athens a state of suffering in foreign lands analogous to that which Solon describes as having preceded his Seisachtheia, or measure for the relief of debtors.[1] What rules the nine thousand remaining citizens adopted for their new constitution, we do not know. Whatever they did, must now have been subject to the consent of Antipater and the Macedonian garrison, which entered Munychia, under the command of Menyllus, on the twentieth day of the month Boedromion (September), rather more than a month after the battle of Krannon. The day of its entry presented a sorrowful contrast. It was the day on which, during the annual ceremony of the mysteries of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, the multitudinous festal procession of citizens escorted the God Iacchus from Athens to Eleusis.[2]

τίμησιν ἔχοντες περὶ ἐννακισχιλίους, ἀπεδοίχθησαν κύριοι τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Σόλωνος νόμους ἐπολιτεύοντο. Plutarch states the disfranchised as above 12,000.

Plutarch, Phokion, 28, 29. Ὅμως δ' οὖν ὁ Φωκίων καὶ φυγῆς ἀπήλλαξε πολλοὺς δεηθεὶς τοῦ Ἀντιπάτρου· καὶ φεύγουσι διεπράξατο, μὴ καθάπερ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν μεθισταμένων ὑπὲρ τὰ Κεραύνια ὄρη καὶ τὸν Ταίναρον ἐκπεσεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἀλλ' ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ κατοικεῖν, ὧν ἦν καὶ Ἀγνωνίδης ὁ συκοφάντης.

Diodorus and Plutarch (c. 29) mention that Antipater assigned residences in Thrace for the expatriated. Those who went beyond the Keraunian mountains must have gone either to the Illyrian coast, Apollonia or Epidamnus—or to the Gulf of Tarentum. Those who went beyond Tænarus would probably be sent to Libya: see Thucydidês, vii. 19, 10; vii. 50, 2.

[1] Plutarch, Phokion, 28. ἐκπεπολιορκημένοις ἐψήφισαν: compare Solon, Fragment 28. ed. Gaisford.

[2] Plutarch, Phokion, 28.

B.C. 322 (October). Demosthenês, Hyperidês, and others, are condemned to death in their absence. Antipater sends officers to track and seize the Grecian exiles. He puts Hyperidês to death.

One of the earliest measures of the nine thousand was to condemn to death, at the motion of Demadês, the distinguished anti-Macedonian orators who had already fled—Demosthenês, Hyperidês, Aristonikus, and Himeræus, brother of the citizen afterwards celebrated as Demetrius the Phalerean. The three last having taken refuge in Ægina, and Demosthenês in Kalauria, all of them were out of the reach of an Athenian sentence, but not beyond that of the Macedonian sword. At this miserable season, Greece was full of similar exiles, the anti-Macedonian leaders out of all the cities which had taken part in the Lamian war. The officers of Antipater, called in the language of the time the Exile-Hunters,[1] were everywhere on the look-out to seize these proscribed men; many of the orators, from other cities as well as from Athens, were slain; and there was no refuge except the mountains of Ætolia for any of them.[2] One of these officers, a Thurian named Archias, who had once been a tragic actor, passed over with a company of Thracian soldiers to Ægina, where he seized the three Athenian orators—Hyperidês, Aristonikus, and Himeræus—dragging them out of the sanctuary of the Æakeion or chapel of Æakus. They were all sent as prisoners to Antipater, who had by this time marched forward with his army to Corinth and Kleonæ in Peloponnesus. All were there put to death, by his order. It is even said, and on respectable authority, that the tongue of Hyperidês was cut out before he was slain; according to another statement, he himself bit it out—being put to the torture, and resolving to make revelation of secrets impossible. Respecting the details of his death, there were several different stories.[3]

Having conducted these prisoners to Antipater,

[1] Plutarch, Demosth. 28. Ἀρχίας ὁ κληθεὶς Φυγαδοθήρας. Plutarch Vit. X Oratt. p. 846.

[2] Polybius, ix. 29, 30. This is stated, as matter of traditional pride, by an Ætolian speaker more than a century afterwards. In the speech of his Akarnanian opponent, there is nothing to contradict it—while the fact is in itself highly probable.

See Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland, ch. 71, note 4.

[3] Plutarch, Demosthen. 28; Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p. 849; Photius, p. 496.

B.C. 322 (October). Demosthenês in sanctuary at Kalauria—Archias with Thracian soldiers comes to seize him—he takes poison, and expires.

Archias proceeded with his Thracians to Kalauria in search of Demosthenês. The temple of Poseidon there situated, in which the orator had taken sanctuary, was held in such high veneration that Archias, hesitating to drag him out by force, tried to persuade him to come forth voluntarily, under promise that he should suffer no harm. But Demosthenês, well aware of the fate which awaited him, swallowed poison in the temple, and when the dose was beginning to take effect, came out of the sacred ground, expiring immediately after he had passed the boundary. The accompanying circumstances were recounted in several different ways.[1] Eratosthenês (to whose authority I lean) affirmed that Demosthenês carried the poison in a ring round his arm; others said that it was suspended in a linen bag round his neck; according to a third story, it was contained in a writing-quill, which he was seen to bite and suck, while composing a last letter to Antipater. Amidst these contradictory details, we can only affirm as certain, that the poison which he had provided beforehand preserved him from the sword of Antipater, and perhaps from having his tongue cut out. The most remarkable assertion was that of Democharês, nephew of Demosthenês, made in his harangues at Athens a few years afterwards. Democharês asserted that his uncle had not taken poison, but had been softly withdrawn from the world by a special providence of the Gods, just at the moment essential to rescue him from the cruelty of the Macedonians. It is not less to be noted, as an illustration of the vein of sentiment afterwards prevalent, that Archias the Exile-Hunter was affirmed to have perished in the utmost dishonour and wretchedness.[2]

[1] Plutarch, Demosth. 30. τῶν δ' ἄλλων, ὅσοι γεγράφασί τι περὶ αὐτοῦ, παμπολλοί δ' εἰσί, τὰς διαφορὰς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπεξελθεῖν, &c.

The taunts on Archias's profession, as an actor, and as an indifferent actor, which Plutarch puts into the mouth of Demosthenês (c. 29), appear to me not worthy either of the man or of the occasion; nor are they sufficiently avouched to induce me to transcribe them. Whatever bitterness of spirit Demosthenês might choose to manifest, at such a moment, would surely be vented on the chief enemy, Antipater; not upon the mere instrument.

[2] Plutarch, Demosth. 30; Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p. 846; Photius, p. 494; Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

Miserable condition of Greece—life and character of Demosthenês.

The violent deaths of these illustrious orators, the disfranchisement and deportation of the Athenian Demos, the suppression of the public Dikasteries, the occupation of Athens by a Macedonian garrison, and of Greece generally by Macedonian Exile-Hunters—are events belonging to one and the same calamitous tragedy, and marking the extinction of the autonomous Hellenic world.

Of Hyperidês as a citizen we know only the general fact, that he maintained from first to last, and with oratorical ability inferior only to Demosthenês, a strenuous opposition to Macedonian dominion over Greece; though his persecution of Demosthenês respecting the Harpalian treasure appears (as far as it comes before us) discreditable.

Of Demosthenês, we know more—enough to form a judgement of him both as citizen and statesman. At the time of his death he was about sixty-two years of age, and we have before us his first Philippic, delivered thirty years before (352—351 B.C.). We are thus sure, that even at that early day, he took a sagacious and provident measure of the danger which threatened Grecian liberty from the energy and encroachments of Philip. He impressed upon his countrymen this coming danger, at a time when the older and more influential politicians either could not or would not see it; he called aloud upon his fellow-citizens for personal service and pecuniary contributions, enforcing the call by all the artifices of consummate oratory, when such distasteful propositions only entailed unpopularity upon himself. At the period when Demosthenês first addressed these earnest appeals to his countrymen, long before the fall of Olynthus, the power of Philip, though formidable, might have been kept perfectly well within the limits of Macedonia and Thrace; and would probably have been so kept, had Demosthenês possessed in 351 B.C. as much public influence as he had acquired ten years afterwards, in 341 B.C.

Throughout the whole career of Demosthenês as a public adviser, down to the battle of Chæroneia, we trace the same combination of earnest patriotism with wise and long-sighted policy. During the three years' war which ended with the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians in the main followed his counsel; and disastrous as were the ultimate military results of that war, for which Demosthenês could not be responsible—its earlier periods were creditable and

successful, its general scheme was the best that the case admitted, and its diplomatic management universally triumphant. But what invests the purposes and policy of Demosthenês with peculiar grandeur, is, that they were not simply Athenian, but in an eminent degree Panhellenic also. It was not Athens alone that he sought to defend against Philip, but the whole Hellenic world. In this he towers above the greatest of his predecessors for half a century before his birth—Periklês, Archidamus, Agesilaus, Epaminondas; whose policy was Athenian, Spartan, Theban, rather than Hellenic. He carries us back to the time of the invasion of Xerxês and the generation immediately succeeding it, when the struggles and sufferings of the Athenians against Persia were consecrated by complete identity of interest with collective Greece. The sentiments to which Demosthenês appeals throughout his numerous orations, are those of the noblest and largest patriotism; trying to inflame the ancient Grecian sentiment, of an autonomous Hellenic world, as the indispensable condition of a dignified and desirable existence[1]—but inculcating at the same time that these blessings could only be preserved by toil, self-sacrifice, devotion of fortune, and willingness to brave hard and steady personal service.

From the destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335 B.C., to the Lamian war after his death, the policy of Athens neither was nor could be conducted by Demosthenês. But condemned as he was to comparative inefficacy, he yet rendered material service to Athens, in the Harpalian affair of 324 B.C. If, instead of opposing the alliance of the city with Harpalus, he had supported it as warmly as Hyperidês—the exaggerated promises of the exile might probably have prevailed, and war would have been declared against Alexander. In respect to the charge of having been corrupted by Harpalus, I have already shown reasons for believing him innocent. The Lamian war, the closing scene of his activity, was not of his original suggestion, since he was in exile at its commencement. But he threw himself into it with unreserved ardour, and was greatly instrumental

Dishonourable position of Phokion at Athens, under the miserable condition of the people, and the Macedonian occupation.

[1] Demosthenês, De Coronâ, p. 324. οὗτοι—τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ μηδένα ἔχειν δεσπότην αὐτῶν, ἃ τοῖς προτέροις Ἕλλησιν ὅροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατετραφότες, &c.

in procuring the large number of adhesions which it obtained from so many Grecian states. In spite of its disastrous result, it was, like the battle of Chæroneia, a glorious effort for the recovery of Grecian liberty, undertaken under circumstances which promised a fair chance of success. There was no excessive rashness in calculating on distractions in the empire left by Alexander—on mutual hostility among the principal officers—and on the probability of having only to make head against Antipater and Macedonia, with little or no reinforcement from Asia. Disastrous as the enterprise ultimately proved, yet the risk was one fairly worth incurring, with so noble an object at stake; and could the war have been protracted another year, its termination would probably have been very different. We shall see this presently when we come to follow Asiatic events. After a catastrophe so ruinous, extinguishing free speech in Greece, and dispersing the Athenian Demos to distant lands, Demosthenês himself could hardly have desired, at the age of sixty-two, to prolong his existence as a fugitive beyond sea.

Of the speeches which he composed for private litigants, occasionally also for himself, before the Dikastery—and of the numerous stimulating and admonitory harangues, on the public affairs of the moment, which he had addressed to his assembled countrymen, a few remain for the admiration of posterity. These harangues serve to us, not only as evidence of his unrivalled excellence as an orator, but as one of the chief sources from which we are enabled to appreciate the last phase of free Grecian life, as an acting and working reality.

# CHAPTER XCVI.

## FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS AND HELLENISM.

THE death of Demosthenês, with its tragical circumstances recounted in my last chapter, is on the whole less melancholy than the prolonged life of Phokion, as agent of Macedonian supremacy in a city half-depopulated, where he had been born a free citizen, and which he had so long helped to administer as a free community. The dishonour of Phokion's position must have been aggravated by the distress in Athens, arising both out of the violent deportation of one-half of its free citizens, and out of the compulsory return of the Athenian settlers from Samos; which island was now taken from Athens, after she had occupied it forty-three years, and restored to the Samian people and to their recalled exiles, by a rescript of Perdikkas in the name of Aridæus.[1] Occupying this obnoxious elevation, Phokion exercised authority with his usual probity and mildness. Exerting himself to guard the citizens from being annoyed by disorders on the part of the garrison of Munychia, he kept up friendly intercourse with its commander Menyllus, though refusing all presents both from him and from Antipater. He was anxious to bestow the gift of citizenship upon the philosopher Xenokratês, who was only a metic, or resident non-freeman; but Xenokratês declined the offer, remarking, that he would accept no place in a constitution against which he had protested as envoy.[2] This mark of courageous independence, not a

[1] Diodor. xviii. 18; Diogen. Laert. x. 1, 1. I have endeavoured to show, in a previous portion of this History (Ch. LXXIX.), that Diodorus is correct in giving forty-three years, as the duration of the Athenian Kleruchies in Samos; although both Wesseling and Mr. Clinton impugn his statement. The Athenian occupation of Samos *began* immediately after the conquest of the island by Timotheus, in 366–365 B.C.; but additional batches of colonists were sent thither in later years.

[2] Plutarch, Phokion, 29, 30.

little remarkable while the Macedonians were masters of the city, was a tacit reproach to the pliant submission of Phokion.

B.C. 322-321 (Autumn to Winter). Antipater purges and remodels the Peloponnesian cities. He attacks the Ætolians, with a view of deporting them across to Asia. His presence becomes necessary in Asia: he concludes a pacification with the Ætolians.

Throughout Peloponnesus, Antipater purged and remodelled the cities, Argos, Megalopolis, and others, as he had done at Athens; installing in each an oligarchy of his own partisans—sometimes with a Macedonian garrison—and putting to death, deporting, or expelling, hostile, or intractable, or democratical citizens.[1] Having completed the subjugation of Peloponnesus, he passed across the Corinthian Gulf to attack the Ætolians, now the only Greeks remaining unsubdued. It was the purpose of Antipater, not merely to conquer this warlike and rude people, but to transport them in mass across into Asia, and march them up to the interior deserts of the empire.[2] His army was too powerful to be resisted on even ground, so that all the more accessible towns and villages fell into his hands. But the Ætolians defended themselves bravely, withdrew their families into the high towns and mountain tops of their very rugged country, and caused serious loss to the Macedonian invaders. Nevertheless, Kraterus, who had carried on war of the same kind with Alexander in Sogdiana, manifested so much skill in seizing the points of communication, that he intercepted all their supplies and reduced them to extreme distress, amidst the winter which had now supervened. The Ætolians, in spite of bravery and endurance, must soon have been compelled to surrender from cold and hunger, had not the unexpected arrival of Antigonus from Asia communicated such news to Anti-

[1] Diodor. xviii. 55, 56, 57, 68, 69. φανερὸν δ' ὄντος, ὅτι Κάσσανδρος τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀνθέξεται, διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν αὐτῶν πατρικαῖς φρουραῖς φυλάττεσθαι, τὰς δ' ὑπ' ὀλιγαρχιῶν διοικεῖσθαι, κυριευομένας ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀντιπάτρου φίλων καὶ ξένων.

That citizens were not only banished, but deported, by Antipater from various other cities besides Athens, we may see from the edict issued by Polysperchon shortly after the death of Antipater (Diod. xviii. 56) — καὶ τοὺς μεταστάντας ἢ φυγόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων στρατηγῶν (i. e. Antipater and Kraterus), ἀφ' ὧν χρόνων Ἀλέξανδρος εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διέβη, κατάγομεν &c.

[2] Diodor. xviii. 25. διεγνωκότες ὕστερον αὐτοὺς καταπολεμῆσαι, καὶ μεταστῆσαι πανοικίους ἅπαντας εἰς τὴν ἀρημίαν καὶ πορρωτάτω τῆς Ἀσίας χειμερίην χώραν.

pater and Kraterus, as induced them to prepare for marching back to Macedonia, with a view to the crossing of the Hellespont and operating in Asia. They concluded a pacification with the Ætolians—postponing till a future period their design of deporting that people—and withdrew into Macedonia; where Antipater cemented his alliance with Kraterus by giving to him his daughter Phila in marriage.[1]

Another daughter of Antipater, named Nikæa, had been sent over to Asia not long before, to become the wife of Perdikkas. That general, acting as guardian or prime minister to the kings of Alexander's family (who are now spoken of in the plural number, since Roxana had given birth to a posthumous son called Alexander, and made king jointly with Philip Aridæus), had at first sought close combination with Antipater, demanding his daughter in marriage. But new views were presently opened to him by the intrigues of the princesses at Pella—Olympias, with her daughter Kleopatra, the widow of the Molossian Alexander—who had always been at variance with Antipater, even throughout the life of Alexander—and Kynanê (daughter of Philip by an Illyrian mother, and widow of Amyntas, first cousin of Alexander, but slain by Alexander's order) with her daughter Eurydikê. It has been already mentioned that Kleopatra had offered herself in marriage to Leonnatus, inviting him to come over and occupy the throne of Macedonia: he had obeyed the call, but had been slain in his first battle against the Greeks, thus relieving Antipater from a dangerous rival. The first project of Olympias being thus frustrated, she had sent to Perdikkas proposing to him a marriage with Kleopatra. Perdikkas had already pledged himself to the daughter of Antipater; nevertheless he now debated whether his ambition would not be better served by breaking his pledge, and accepting the new proposition. To this step he was advised by Eumenês, his ablest friend and coadjutor, steadily attached to the interest of the regal family, and withal personally hated by Antipater. But Alketas, brother of Perdikkas, represented that it would be hazardous to provoke openly and immediately the wrath of Antipater. Accordingly Perdikkas resolved to accept Nikæa for the moment, but

Intrigues with Perdikkas, and with the princesses at Pella.

[1] Diodor. xviii. 18 25.

to send her away after no long time, and take Kleopatra; to whom secret assurances from him were conveyed by Eumenês. Kynanê also (daughter of Philip and widow of his nephew Amyntas), a warlike and ambitious woman, had brought into Asia her daughter Eurydikê for the purpose of espousing the king Philip Aridæus. Being averse to this marriage, and probably instigated by Olympias also, Perdikkas and Alketas put Kynanê to death. But the indignation excited among the soldiers by this deed was so furious as to menace their safety, and they were forced to permit the marriage of the king with Eurydikê.[1]

Antigonus detects the intrigues, and reveals them to Antipater and Kraterus.

All these intrigues were going on through the summer of 322 B.C., while the Lamian war was still effectively prosecuted by the Greeks. About the autumn of the year, Antigonus (called Monophthalmus), the satrap of Phrygia, detected these secret intrigues of Perdikkas, who, for that and other reasons, began to look on him as an enemy, and to plot against his life. Apprised of his danger, Antigonus made his escape from Asia into Europe to acquaint Antipater and Kraterus with the hostile manœuvres of Perdikkas; upon which news, the two generals, immediately abandoning the Ætolian war, withdrew their army from Greece for the more important object of counteracting Perdikkas in Asia.

Unpropitious turns of fortune for the Greeks, in reference to the Lamian war.

To us, these contests of the Macedonian officers belong only so far as they affect the Greeks. And we see, by the events just noticed, how unpropitious to the Greeks were the turns of fortune, throughout the Lamian war: the grave of Grecian liberty, not for the actual combatants only, but for their posterity also.[2] Until the battle of Krannon and the surrender of Athens, everything fell out so as to relieve Antipater from embarrassment, and impart

[1] Diodor. xviii. 23; Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92. Diodorus alludes to the murder of Kynanê or Kynna, in another place (xix. 52).

Compare Polyænus, viii. 60—who mentions the murder of Kynanê by Alketas, but gives a somewhat different explanation of her purpose in passing into Asia.

About Kynanê, see Duris, Fragm. 24, in Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 475; Athenæ. xiii. p. 560.

[2] The fine lines of Lucan (Phars. vii. 640) on the effects of the battle of Pharsalia, may be cited here:—

"Majus ab hac acie, quam quod sua sæcula ferrent,
Vulnus habent populi: plus est quam vita salusque

to him double force. The intrigues of the princesses at Pella, who were well known to hate him, first raised up Leonnatus, next Perdikkas, against him. Had Leonnatus lived, the arm of Antipater would have been at least weakened, if not paralysed; had Perdikkas declared himself earlier, the forces of Antipater must have been withdrawn to oppose him, and the battle of Krannon would probably have had a different issue. As soon as Perdikkas became hostile to Antipater, it was his policy to sustain and seek alliance with the Greeks, as we shall find him presently doing with the Ætolians.[1] Through causes thus purely accidental, Antipater obtained an interval of a few months, during which his hands were not only free, but armed with new and unexpected strength from Leonnatus and Kraterus, to close the Lamian war. The disastrous issue of that war was therefore in great part the effect of casualties, among which we must include the death of Leosthenês himself. Such issue is not to be regarded as proving that the project was desperate or ill-conceived on the part of its promoters, who had full right to reckon, among the probabilities of their case, the effects of discord between the Macedonian chiefs.

B.C. 321. Antipater and Kraterus in Asia—Perdikkas marches to attack Ptolemy in Egypt, but is killed in a mutiny of his own troops. Union of Antipater, Ptolemy, Antigonus, &c. New distribution

In the spring of 321 B.C., Antipater and Kraterus, having concerted operations with Ptolemy governor of Egypt, crossed into Asia and began their conflict with Perdikkas; who himself, having the kings along with him, marched against Egypt to attack Ptolemy; leaving his brother Alketas, in conjunction with Eumenês as general, to maintain his cause in Kappadokia and Asia Minor. Alketas, discouraged by the adverse feeling of the Macedonians generally, threw up the enterprize as hopeless. But Eumenês, though embarrassed and menaced in every way by the treacherous jealousy of his own Macedonian officers, and by the discontent of the soldiers against him as a Greek—and though compelled

Quod perit: in totum mundi prosternimur ævum.
Vincitur his gladiis omnis, quæ serviet, ætas.
Proxima quid soboles, aut quid meruere nepotes,
In regnum nasci?" &c.

[1] Diodor. xviii. 38. Ἀντιπάτρου δ' εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διαβεβηκότος, Αἰτωλοὶ κατὰ τὰς πρὸς Περδίκκαν συνθήκας ἐστράτευσαν εἰς τὴν Θετταλίαν, &c.

of the satrapies, made at Tiparadisus.

to conceal from these soldiers the fact that Kraterus, who was popular among them, commanded on the opposite side—displayed nevertheless so much ability that he gained an important victory,[1] in which both Neoptolemus and Kraterus perished. Neoptolemus was killed by Eumenês with his own hand, after a personal conflict desperate in the extreme and long doubtful, and at the cost of a severe wound to himself.[2] After the victory, he found Kraterus still alive, though expiring from his wound. Deeply afflicted at the sight, he did his utmost to restore the dying man; and when this proved to be impossible, caused his dead body to be honourably shrouded and transmitted into Macedonia for burial.

This new proof of the military ability and vigour of Eumenês, together with the death of two such important officers as Kraterus and Neoptolemus, proved ruinous to the victor himself, without serving the cause in which he fought. Perdikkas his chief did not live to hear of it. That general was so overbearing and tyrannical in his demeanour towards the other officers—and withal so unsuccessful in his first operations against Ptolemy on the Pelusiac branch of the Nile—that his own army mutinied and slew him.[3] His troops joined Ptolemy, whose conciliatory behaviour gained their goodwill. Only two days after this revolution, a messenger from Eumenês reached the camp, announcing his victory and the death of Kraterus. Had this intelligence been received by Perdikkas himself at the head of his army, the course of subsequent events might have been sensibly altered. Eumenês would have occupied the most commanding position in Asia, as general of the kings of the Alexandrine family, to whom both his interests and his feelings attached him. But the news arriving, at the moment when it did, caused throughout the army only the most violent exasperation against him; not simply as ally

[1] Plutarch, Eumenês, 7; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenês, c. 4. Eumenês had trained a body of Asiatic and Thracian cavalry to fight in close combat with the short pike and sword of the Macedonian Companions — relinquishing the javelin, the missiles, and the alternation of charging and retiring, usual to Asiatics. Diodorus (xviii. 30, 31, 32) gives an account at some length of this battle. He as well as Plutarch may probably have borrowed from Hieronymus of Kardia.

[2] Arrian, ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Justin, xiii. 8; Diodor. xviii. 33.

[3] Diodor. xviii. 36.

of the odious Perdikkas, but as cause of death to the esteemed Kraterus. He, together with Alketas and fifty officers, was voted by the soldiers a public enemy. No measures were kept with him henceforward by Macedonian officers or soldiers. At the same time several officers attached to Perdikkas in the camp, and also Atalanta his sister, were slain.[1]

By the death of Perdikkas, and the defection of his soldiers, complete preponderance was thrown into the hands of Antipater, Ptolemy, and Antigonus. Antipater was invited to join the army, now consisting of the forces both of Ptolemy and Perdikkas united. He was there invested with the guardianship of the persons of the kings, and with the sort of ministerial supremacy previously held by Perdikkas. He was however exposed to much difficulty, and even to great personal danger, from the intrigues of the princess Eurydikê, who displayed a masculine boldness in publicly haranguing the soldiers—and from the discontents of the army, who claimed presents, formerly promised to them by Alexander, which there were no funds to liquidate at the moment. At Triparadisus in Syria, Antipater made a second distribution of the satrapies of the empire; somewhat modified, yet coinciding in the main with that which had been drawn up shortly after the death of Alexander. To Ptolemy was assured Egypt and Libya—to Antigonus, the Greater Phrygia, Lykia, and Pamphylia—as each had had before.[2]

War between Antigonus and Eumenês in Asia. Energy and ability of Eumenês. He is worsted, and blocked up in Nora.

Antigonus was placed in command of the principal Macedonian army in Asia, to crush Eumenês and the other chief adherents of Perdikkas; most of whom had been condemned to death by a vote of the Macedonian army. After a certain interval, Antipater himself, accompanied by the kings, returned to Macedonia, having eluded by artifice a renewed demand on the part of his soldiers for the promised presents. The war of Antigonus, first against Eumenês in Kappadokia, next against Alketas and the other partisans of Perdikkas in Pisidia, lasted for many months, but was at length successfully finished.[3] Eumenês, beset by the constant

[1] Plutarch, Eumenês, 8; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenês, 4; Diodor. xviii. 36, 37.

[2] Diodor. xviii. 39. Arrian, ap. Photium.

[3] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandr. lib. ix. 10. ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Diodor. xviii. 39, 40, 46; Plutarch, Eumenês, 3, 4.

treachery and insubordination of the Macedonians, was defeated and driven out of the field. He took refuge with a handful of men in the impregnable and well-stored fortress of Nora in Kappadokia, where he held out a long blockade, apparently more than a year, against Antigonus.[1]

B.C. 319-318. Sickness and death of Antipater. The Athenian orator Demadês is put to death in Macedonia.

Before the prolonged blockade of Nora had been brought to a close, Antipater, being of very advanced age, fell into sickness, and presently died. One of his latest acts was, to put to death the Athenian orator Demadês, who had been sent to Macedonia as envoy to solicit the removal of the Macedonian garrison at Munychia. Antipater had promised, or given hopes, that if the oligarchy which he had constituted at Athens maintained unshaken adherence to Macedonia, he would withdraw the garrison. The Athenians endeavoured to prevail on Phokion to go to Macedonia as solicitor for the fulfilment of this promise; but he steadily refused. Demadês, who willingly undertook the mission, reached Macedonia at a moment very untoward for himself. The papers of the deceased Perdikkas had come into possession of his opponents; and among them had been found a letter written to him by Demadês, inviting him to cross over and rescue Greece from her dependence "on an old and rotten warp"—meaning Antipater. This letter gave great offence to Antipater—the rather, as Demadês is said to have been his habitual pensioner—and still greater offence to his son Kassander; who caused Demadês with his son to be seized—first killed the son in the immediate presence and even embrace of the father—and then slew the father himself, with bitter invective against his ingratitude.[2] All the accounts which we read depict Demadês, in general terms, as a prodigal spendthrift and a venal and corrupt politician. We have

[1] Plutarch, Eumenês, 10, 11; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenês, c. 5; Diodorus xviii. 41.

[2] Plutarch, Phokion 30; Diodor. xviii. 48; Plutarch, Demosth. 31; Arrian, De Reb. post Alex. vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

In the life of Phokion, Plutarch has written inadvertently *Antigonus* instead of *Perdikkas*.

It is not easy to see, however, how Deinarchus can have been the accuser of Demadês on such a matter—as Arrian and Plutarch state. Arrian seems to put the death of Demadês too early, from his anxiety to bring it into immediate juxtaposition with the death of Demosthenês, whose condemnation Demadês had proposed in the Athenian assembly.

no ground for questioning this statement: at the same time we have no specific facts to prove it.

B.C. 318.

Antipater sets aside his son Kassander, and names Polysperchon viceroy. Discontent and opposition of Kassander.

Antipater by his last directions appointed Polysperchon, one of Alexander's veteran officers, to be chief administrator, with full powers on behalf of the imperial dynasty; while he assigned to his own son Kassander only the second place, as Chiliarch or general of the body-guard.[1] He thought that this disposition of power would be more generally acceptable throughout the empire, as Polysperchon was older and of longer military service than any other among Alexander's generals. Moreover, Antipater was especially afraid of letting dominion fall into the hands of the princesses;[2] all of whom—Olympias, Kleopatra, and Eurydikê—were energetic characters; and the first of the three (who had retired to Epirus from enmity towards Antipater) furious and implacable.

Kassander sets up for himself, gets possession of Munychia and forms alliance with Ptolemy and Antigonus against Polysperchon.

But the views of Antipater were disappointed from the beginning, because Kassander would not submit to the second place, nor tolerate Polysperchon as his superior. Immediately after the death of Antipater, but before it became publicly known, Kassander despatched Nikanor with pretended orders from Antipater to supersede Menyllus in the government of Munychia. To this order Menyllus yielded. But when after a few days the Athenian public came to learn the real truth, they were displeased with Phokion for having permitted the change to be made—assuming that he knew the real state of the facts, and might have kept out the new commander.[3] Kassander, while securing this important post in the hands of a confirmed partisan, affected to acquiesce in the authority of Polysperchon, and to occupy himself with a hunting-party in the country. He at the same time sent confidential adherents to the Hellespont and other places in furtherance of his schemes; and especially to contract alliance with Antigonus in Asia and with Ptolemy in Egypt. His envoys being generally well received, he himself soon quitted Macedonia suddenly, and

[1] Diod. xviii. 48.
[2] Diod. xix. 11.
[3] Plutarch, Phokion 31. Diodor. (xviii. 64) says also that Nikanor was nominated by Kassander.

went to concert measures with Antigonus in Asia.[1] It suited the policy of Ptolemy, and still more that of Antigonus, to aid him against Polysperchon and the imperial dynasty. On the death of Antipater, Antigonus had resolved to make himself the real sovereign of the Asiatic Alexandrine empire, possessing as he did the most powerful military force within it.

Even before this time the imperial dynasty had been a name rather than a reality; yet still a respected name. But now, the preference shown to Polysperchon by the deceased Antipater, and the secession of Kassander, placed all the great real powers in active hostility against the dynasty. Polysperchon and his friends were not blind to the difficulties of their position. The principal officers in Macedonia having been convened to deliberate, it was resolved to invite Olympias out of Epirus, that she might assume the tutelage of her grandson Alexander (son of Roxana)—to place the Asiatic interests of the dynasty in the hands of Eumenês, appointing him to the supreme command[2]—and to combat Kassander in Europe, by assuring to themselves the general goodwill and support of the Greeks. This last object was to be obtained by granting to the Greeks general enfranchisement, and by subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies and military governments now paramount throughout the cities.

B.C. 318-317.

Plans of Polysperchon —alliance with Olympias in Europe, and with Eumenês in Asia—enfranchisement of the Grecian cities.

The last hope of maintaining the unity of Alexander's empire in Asia, against the counter-interests of the great Macedonian officers, who were steadily tending to divide and appropriate it—now lay in the fidelity and military skill of Eumenês. At his disposal Polysperchon placed the imperial treasures and soldiers in Asia; especially the brave, but faithless and disorderly, Argyraspides. Olympias also addressed to him a pathetic letter, asking his counsel as the only friend and saviour to whom the imperial family could now look. Eumenês replied by assuring them of his devoted adherence to their cause. But he at the same time advised Olympias not to come out of Epirus into Macedonia;

Ineffectual attempts of Eumenês to uphold the imperial dynasty in Asia: his gallantry and ability: he is betrayed by his own soldiers and slain by Antigonus.

[1] Diodor. xviii. 54.

[2] Diodor. xviii. 49—58.

or if she did come, at all events to abstain from vindictive and cruel proceedings. Both these recommendations, honourable as well to his prudence as to his humanity, were disregarded by the old queen. She came into Macedonia to take the management of affairs; and although her imposing title, of mother to the great conqueror, raised a strong favourable feeling, yet her multiplied executions of the Antipatrian partisans excited fatal enmity against a dynasty already tottering. Nevertheless Eumenês, though his advice had been disregarded, devoted himself in Asia with unshaken fidelity to the Alexandrine family, resisting the most tempting invitations to take part with Antigonus against them.[1] His example contributed much to keep alive the same active sentiment in those around him; indeed, without him, the imperial family would have had no sincere or commanding representative in Asia. His gallant struggles, first in Kilikia and Phenicia, next (when driven from the coast), in Susiana, Persis, Media, and Parætakênê—continued for two years against the greatly preponderant forces of Ptolemy, Antigonus, and Seleukus, and against the never-ceasing treachery of his own officers and troops.[2] They do not belong to Grecian history. They are however among the most memorable exploits of antiquity. While, even in

[1] Plutarch, Eumenês, 11, 12; Cornelius Nepos, Eumenês, c. 6; Diodor. 58—62.

Diodor. xvii. 58. ἦκε δὲ καὶ παρ' Ὀλυμπιάδος αὐτῷ γράμματα, δεομένης καὶ λιπαρούσης βοηθεῖν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καὶ ἑαυτῇ· μόνον γὰρ ἐκεῖνον πιστότατον ἀπολελεῖφθαι τῶν φίλων, καὶ δυνάμενον διορθώσασθαι τὴν ἐρημίαν τῆς βασιλικῆς οἰκίας.

Cornelius Nepos, Eumenês, 6. "Ad hunc (Eumenem) Olympias, quum literas et nuntios misisset in Asiam, consultum, utrum repetitum Macedoniam veniret (nam tum in Epiro habitabat) et eas res occuparet—huic ille primum suasit ne se moveret, et expectaret quoad Alexandri filius regnum adipisceretur. Sine aliquâ cupiditate raperetur in Macedoniam, omnium injurarum oblivisceretur, et in neminem acerbiore uteretur imperio. Horum illa nihil fecit. Nam et in Macedoniam profecta est, et ibi crudelissime se gessit." Compare Justin, xiv. 6; Diodor. xix. 11.

The details respecting Eumenês may be considered probably as depending on unusually good authority. His friend Hieronymus of Kardia had written a copious history of his own time; which, though now lost, was accessible both to Diodorus and Plutarch. Hieronymus was serving with Eumenês, and was taken prisoner along with him by Antigonus; who spared him and treated him well, while Eumenês was put to death (Diodor. xix. 44). Plutarch had also read letters of Eumenês (Plut. Eum. 11).

[2] Diodor. xviii. 63—72; xix. 11, 17, 32, 44.

a military point of view, they are hardly inferior to the combinations of Alexander himself—they evince, besides, a flexibility and aptitude such as Alexander neither possessed nor required, for overcoming the thousand difficulties raised by traitors and mutineers around him. To the last, Eumenês remained unsubdued. He was betrayed to Antigonus by the base and venal treachery of his own soldiers, the Macedonian Argyraspides.[1]

For the interests of the imperial dynasty (the extinction of which we shall presently follow), it is perhaps to be regretted that they did not abandon Asia at once, at the death of Antipater, and concentrate their attention on Macedonia alone, summoning over Eumenês to aid them. To keep together in unity the vast aggregate of Asia was manifestly impracticable, even with his consummate ability. Indeed we read that Olympias wished for his presence in Europe, not trusting any one but him as protector of the child Alexander.[2] In Macedonia, apart from Asia, Eumenês, if the violent temper of Olympias had permitted him, might have upheld the dynasty; which, having at that time a decided interest in conciliating the Greeks, might probably have sanctioned his sympathies in favour of free Hellenic community.[3]

Edict issued by Polysperchon at Pella, in the name of the imperial dynasty — subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies in the Grecian

On learning the death of Antipater most of the Greek cities had sent envoys to Pella.[4] To all the governments of these cities composed as they were of his creatures, it was a matter of the utmost moment to know what course the new Macedonian authority would adopt. Polysperchon, persuaded that they would all adhere to Kassander, and that his only chance of combating that rival was by enlisting popular sympathy

[1] Plutarch (Eumenês, 16—18), Cornelius Nepos (10—13), and Justin (xiv. 3, 4) describe in considerable detail the touching circumstances attending the tradition and capture of Eumenês. On this point Diodorus is more brief; but he recounts at much length the preceding military operations between Eumenês and Antigonus (xix. 17, 32, 44).

The original source of these particulars must probably be, the history of Hieronymus of Kardia, himself present, who has been copied, more or less accurately, by others.

[2] Plutarch, Eumenês, 13; Diodor. xviii. 58.

[3] Plutarch, Eumenês, 3.

[4] Diodor. xviii. 55. εὐθὺς οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων παρόντας πρεσβευτὰς προσκαλεσάμενοι, &c.

and interests in Greece, or at least by subverting these Antipatrian oligarchies—drew up in conjunction with his counsellors a proclamation which he issued in the name of the dynasty.

cities, restoring political exiles and granting free constitutions to each.

After reciting the steady goodwill of Philip and Alexander towards Greece, he affirmed that this feeling had been interrupted by the untoward Lamian war, originating with some ill-judged Greeks, and ending in the infliction of many severe calamities upon the various cities. But all these severities (he continued) had proceeded from the generals (Antipater and Kraterus): the kings were now determined to redress them. It was accordingly proclaimed that the political constitution of each city should be restored, as it had stood in the times of Philip and Alexander; that before the thirtieth of the month Xanthikus, all those who had been condemned to banishment, or deported, by the generals, should be recalled and received back; that their properties should be restored, and past sentences against them rescinded; that they should live in amnesty as to the past, and good feeling as to the future, with the remaining citizens. From this act of recall were excluded the exiles of Amphissa, Trikka, Pharkadon, and Herakleia, together with a certain number of Megalopolitans, implicated in one particular conspiracy. In the particular case of those cities, the governments of which had been denounced as hostile by Philip or Alexander, special reference and consultation was opened with Pella, for some modification to meet the circumstances. As to Athens, it was decreed that Samos should be restored to her, but not Orôpus; in all other respects she was placed on the same footing as in the days of Philip and Alexander. "All the Greeks (concluded this proclamation) shall pass decrees, forbidding every one either to bear arms or otherwise act in hostility against us—on pain of exile and confiscation of goods, for himself and his family. On this and on all other matters, we have ordered Polysperchon to take proper measures. Obey him—as we have before written to you to do; for we shall not omit to notice those who on any point disregard our proclamation."[1]

[1] Diodor. xviii. 56. In this chapter the proclamation is given *verbatim*. For the exceptions made in respect to Amphissa, Trikka, Herakleia &c., we do not know the grounds.

Reference is made to prior edicts of the kings—ὑμεῖς οὖν, καθάπερ ὑμῖν καὶ πρότερον ἐγράψαμεν, ἀκούσετε

Such was the new edict issued by the kings, or rather by Polysperchon in their names. It directed the removal of all the garrisons, and the subversion of all the oligarchies, established by Antipater after the Lamian war. It ordered the recall of the host of exiles then expelled. It revived the state of things prevalent before the death of Alexander—which indeed itself had been, for the most part, an aggregate of macedonizing oligarchies interspersed with Macedonian garrisons. To the existing Antipatrian oligarchies, however, it was a death-blow; and so it must have been understood by the Grecian envoys—including probably deputations from the exiles, as well as envoys from the civic governments—to whom Polysperchon delivered it at Pella. Not content with the general edict, Polysperchon addressed special letters to Argos and various other cities, commanding that the Antipatrian leading men should be banished with confiscation of property, and in some cases put to death;[1] the names being probably furnished to him by the exiles. Lastly, as it was clear that such stringent measures could not be executed without force,—the rather as these oligarchies would be upheld by Kassander from without—Polysperchon resolved to conduct a large military force into Greece; sending thither first, however, a considerable detachment, for immediate operations, under his son Alexander.

Letters and measures of Polysperchon to enforce the edict. State of Athens: exiles returning: complicated political parties: danger of Phokion.

To Athens, as well as to other cities, Polysperchon addressed special letters, promising restoration of the democracy and recall of the exiles. At Athens, such change was a greater revolution than elsewhere, because the multitude of exiles and persons deported had been the greatest. To the existing nine thousand Athenian citizens, it was doubtless odious and alarming; while to Phokion with the other leading Antipatrians, it threatened not only loss of power, but probably nothing less than the alternative of flight or death.[2] The state of interests at Athens, however, was now singularly novel and complicated. There were

τούτου (Πολυσπέρχοντος). These words must allude to written answers given to particular cities, in reply to special applications. No general proclamation, earlier than this, can have been issued since the death of Antipater.

[1] Diod. xviii. 57.

[2] Plutarch, Phokion, 32. The opinion of Plutarch, however,

the Antipatrians and the nine thousand qualified citizens. There were the exiles, who, under the new edict, speedily began reentering the city, and reclaiming their citizenship as well as their properties. Polysperchon and his son were known to be soon coming with a powerful force. Lastly, there was Nikanor, who held Munychia with a garrison, neither for Polysperchon, nor for the Athenians, but for Kassander; the latter being himself also expected with a force from Asia. Here then were several parties; each distinct in views and interests from the rest—some decidedly hostile to each other.

Negotiations of the Athenians with Nikanor, governor of Munychia for Kassander.

The first contest arose between the Athenians and Nikanor respecting Munychia; which they required him to evacuate, pursuant to the recent proclamation. Nikanor on his side returned an evasive answer, promising compliance as soon as circumstances permitted, but in the mean time entreating the Athenians to continue in alliance with Kassander, as they had been with his father Antipater.[1] He seems to have indulged hopes of prevailing on them to declare in his favour—and not without plausible grounds, since the Antipatrian leaders and a large proportion of the nine thousand citizens could not but dread the execution of Polysperchon's edict. And he had also what was of still greater moment—the secret connivance and support of Phokion: who put himself in intimate relation with Nikanor, as he had before done with Menyllus[2]—and who had greater reason than any one else to dread the edict of Polysperchon. At a public assembly held in Peiræus to discuss the subject, Nikanor even ventured to present himself in person in the company and under the introduction of Phokion, who was anxious that the Athenians should entertain the proposition of alliance with Kassander. But with the people, the prominent wish was to get rid altogether of the foreign garrison, and to procure the evacuation of Munychia—for which object, of course, the returned exiles would be even more anxious than the nine thousand. Accordingly, the assembly refused to hear any propositions from Nikanor; while Derkyllus with others

that Polysperchon intended this measure as a mere trick to ruin Phokion, is only correct so far—that Polysperchon wished to put down the Antipatrian oligarchies everywhere, and that Phokion was the leading person of that oligarchy at Athens.

[1] Diodor. xviii. 64.

[2] Plutarch, Phokion, 31.

even proposed to seize his person. It was Phokion who ensured to him the means of escaping; even in spite of serious wrath from his fellow-citizens, to whom he pleaded, that he had made himself guarantee for Nikanor's personal safety.[1]

Nikanor seizes Peiræus by surprise. Phokion, though forewarned, takes no precautions against it.

Foreseeing the gravity of the impending contest, Nikanor had been secretely introducing fresh soldiers into Munychia. And when he found that he could not obtain any declared support from the Athenians, he laid a scheme for surprising and occupying the town and harbour of Peiræus, of which Munychia formed the adjoining eminence and harbour on the southern side of the little peninsula. Notwithstanding all his precautions, it became known to various Athenians that he was tampering with persons in Peiræus, and collecting troops in the neighbouring isle of Salamis. So much anxiety was expressed in the Athenian assembly for the safety of Peiræus, that a decree was passed, enjoining all citizens to hold themselves in arms for its protection, under Phokion as general. Nevertheless Phokion, disregarding such a decree, took no precautions, affirming that he would himself be answerable for Nikanor. Presently that officer, making an unexpected attack from Munychia and Salamis, took Peiræus by surprise, placed both the town and harbour under military occupation, and cut off its communication with Athens by a ditch and palisade. On this palpable aggression, the Athenians rushed to arms. But Phokion as general damped their ardour, and even declined to head them in an attack for the recovery of Peiræus before Nikanor should have had time to strengthen himself in it. He went however, with Konon (son of Timotheus), to remonstrate with Nikanor, and to renew the demand that he should evacuate, under the recent proclamation, all the posts which he held in garrison. But Nikanor would give no other answer, except that he held his commission from Kassander, to whom they must address their application.[2] He thus again tried to bring Athens into communication with Kassander.

Mischief to the Athe-

The occupation of Peiræus in addition to Munychia was a serious calamity to the Athenians, making them worse off than they had been even under

[1] Plutarch, Phokion, 32.

[2] Diodorus, xviii. 64; Plutarch, Phokion, 32; Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2.

Antipater. Peiræus, rich, active, and commercial, containing the Athenian arsenal, docks, and muniments of war, was in many respects more valuable than Athens itself; for all purposes of war, far more valuable. Kassander had now an excellent place of arms and base, which Munychia alone would not have afforded, for his operations in Greece against Polysperchon; upon whom therefore the loss fell hardly less severely than upon the Athenians. Now Phokion, in his function as general, had he been forewarned of the danger, might have guarded against it, and ought to have done so. This was a grave dereliction of duty, and admits of hardly any other explanation except that of treasonable connivance. It seems that Phokion, foreseeing his own ruin and that of his friends in the triumph of Polysperchon and the return of the exiles, was desirous of favouring the seizure of Peiræus by Nikanor, as a means of constraining Athens to adopt the alliance with Kassander; which alliance indeed would probably have been brought about, had Kassander reached Peiræus by sea sooner than the first troops of Polysperchon by land. Phokion was here guilty, at the very least, of culpable neglect, and probably of still more culpable treason, on an occasion seriously injuring both Polysperchon and the Athenians; a fact which we must not forget, when we come to read presently the bitter animosity exhibited against him.[1]

nians, as well as to Polysperchon, from Nikanor's occupation of Peiræus; culpable negligence, and probable collusion, of Phokion.

The news, that Nikanor had possessed himself of Peiræus, produced a strong sensation. Presently arrived a letter addressed to him by Olympias herself, commanding him to surrender the place to the Athenians, upon whom she wished to confer entire autonomy. But Nikanor declined obedience to her order, still waiting for support from Kassander. The arrival of Alexander (Polysperchon's son) with a body of troops, encouraged the Athenians to believe that he was

Arrival of Alexander (son of Polysperchon): his treacherous policy to the Athenians: Kassander reaches Peiræus.

[1] Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2. "Concidit autem maxime uno crimine: quod cum apud eum summum esset imperium populi, et Nicanorem, Cassandri præfectum, insidiari Piræo Atheniensium, a Dercyllo moneretur: idemque postularet, ut provideret, ne commeatibus civitas privaretur — huic, audiente populo, Phokion negavit esse periculum, seque ejus rei obsidem foro pollicitus est. Neque

come to assist in carrying Peiræus by force, for the purpose of restoring it to them. Their hopes however were again disappointed. Though encamped near Peiræus, Alexander made no demand for the Athenian forces to cooperate with him in attacking it; but entered into open parley with Nikanor, whom he endeavoured to persuade or corrupt into surrendering the place.[1] When this negotiation failed, he resolved to wait for the arrival of his father, who was already on his march towards Attica with the main army. His own force unassisted was probably not sufficient to attack Peiræus; nor did he choose to invoke assistance from the Athenians, to whom he would then have been compelled to make over the place when taken, which they so ardently desired. The Athenians were thus as far from their object as ever; moreover, by this delay the opportunity of attacking the place was altogether thrown away; for Kassander with his armament reached it before Polysperchon.

Intrigues of Phokion with Alexander—he tries to secure for himself the protection of Alexander against the Athenians.

It was Phokion and his immediate colleagues who induced Alexander to adopt this insidious policy; to decline reconquering Peiræus for the Athenians, and to appropriate it for himself. To Phokion, the reconstitution of autonomous Athens, with its democracy and restored exiles, and without any foreign controlling force — was an assured sentence of banishment, if not of death. Not having been able to obtain protection from the foreign force of Nikanor and Kassander, he and his friends resolved to throw themselves upon that of Alexander and Polysperchon. They went to meet Alexander as he entered Attica—represented the impolicy of his relinquishing so important a military position as Peiræus, while the war was yet unfinished,—and offered to cooperate with him for this purpose, by proper management of the Athenian public. Alexander was pleased with these suggestions, accepted Phokion with the others as his leading adherents at Athens, and looked upon Peiræus as a capture to be secured for himself.[2] Numerous return-

ita multo post Nicanor Piræo est potitus. Ad quem recuperandum cum populus armatus concurrisset, ille non modo neminem ad arma vocavit, sed ne armatis quidem præsse voluit, sine quo Athenæ omnino esse non possunt."

[1] Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 33.

[2] Diodor. xviii. 65. Τῶν γὰρ Ἀντιπάτρῳ γεγονότων φίλων τινὲς (ὑπῆρχον,) καὶ οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα φοβούμενοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων τιμωρίας, ὑπήντησαν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, καὶ

ing Athenian exiles accompanied Alexander's army. It seems that Phokion was desirous of admitting the troops along with the exiles, as friends and allies within the walls of Athens, so as to make Alexander master of the city—but that this project was impracticable, in consequence of the mistrust created among the Athenians by the parleys of Alexander with Nikanor.[1]

Return of the deported exiles to Athens—public vote passed in the Athenian assembly against Phokion and his colleagues. Phokion leaves the city, is protected by Alexander, and goes to meet Polysperchon in Phokis.

The strategic function of Phokion, however, so often conferred and re-conferred upon him—and his power of doing either good or evil—now approached its close. As soon as the returning exiles found themselves in sufficient numbers, they called for a revision of the list of state officers, and for the re-establishment of the democratical forms. They passed a vote to depose those who had held office under the Antipatrian oligarchy, and who still continued to hold it down to the actual moment. Among these Phokion stood first: along with him were his son-in-law Chariklês, the Phalerean Demetrius, Kallimedon, Nikoklês, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Philoklês. These persons were not only deposed, but condemned, some to death, some to banishment and confiscation of property. Demetrius, Chariklês, and Kallimedon sought safety by leaving Attica; but Phokion and the rest merely went to Alexander's camp, throwing themselves upon his protection on the faith of the recent understanding.[2] Alexander not only received them courteously, but gave them letters to his father Polysperchon, requesting

διδάξαντες τὸ συμφέρον, ἔπεισαν αὐτὸν ἰδίᾳ κατέχειν τὰ φρούρια, καὶ μὴ παραδιδόναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις μέχρις ἂν ὁ Κάσσανδρος καταπολεμήθῃ.

[1] Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Diod. xviii. 65, 66. This seems to me the probable sequence of facts, combining Plutarch with Diodorus. Plutarch takes no notice of the negotiation opened by Phokion with Alexander, and the understanding established between them; which is stated in the clearest manner by Diodorus, and appears to me a material circumstance. On the other hand, Plutarch mentions (though Diodorus does not) that Alexander was anxious to seize Athens itself, and was very near succeeding. Plutarch seems to conceive that it was the exiles who were disposed to let him in; but if that had been the case, he probably would have been let in when the exiles became preponderant. It was Phokion, I conceive, who was desirous, for his own personal safety, of admitting the foreign troops.

[2] Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 35.

safety and protection for them, as men who had embraced his cause, and who were still eager to do all in their power to support him.[1] Armed with these letters, Phokion and his companions went through Bœotia and Phokis to meet Polysperchon on his march southward. They were accompanied by Deinarchus and by a Platæan named Solon, both of them passing for friends of Polysperchon.[2]

Agnonidês and others are sent as deputies to Polysperchon, to accuse Phokion, and to claim the benefit of the regal edict.

The Athenian democracy, just reconstituted, which had passed the recent condemnatory votes, was disquieted at the news that Alexander had espoused the cause of Phokion and had recommended the like policy to his father. It was possible that Polysperchon might seek, with his powerful army, both to occupy Athens and to capture Peiræus, and might avail himself of Phokion (like Antipater after the Lamian war) as a convenient instrument of government. It seems plain that this was the project of Alexander, and that he counted on Phokion as a ready auxiliary in both. Now the restored democrats, though owing their restoration to Polysperchon, were much less compliant towards him than Phokion had been. Not only they would not admit him into the city, but they would not even acquiesce in his separate occupation of Munychia and Peiræus. On the proposition of Agnonidês and Archestratus, they sent a deputation to Polysperchon accusing Phokion and his comrades of high treason; yet at the same time claiming for Athens the full and undiminished benefit of the late regal proclamation—autonomy and democracy, with restoration of Peiræus and Munychia free and ungarrisoned.[3]

Agnonidês and Phokion are heard before Polysperchon—

The deputation reached Polysperchon at Pharyges in Phokis, as early as Phokion's company, which had been detained for some days at Elateia by the sickness of Deinarchus. That delay was unfortunate for Phokion. Had he seen Polysperchon,

[1] Diodor. xviii. 66. Προσδεχθέντες δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (Alexander) φιλοφρόνως, γράμματα ἔλαβον πρὸς τὸν πατέρα Πολυσπέρχοντα, ὅπως μηδὲν πάθωσιν οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα τἀκείνου περφρονηκότες, καὶ νῦν ἐπαγγελλόμενοι πάντα συμπράξειν.

This application of Phokion to Alexander, and the letters obtained to Polysperchon, are not mentioned by Plutarch, though they are important circumstances in following the last days of Phokion's life.

[2] Plutarch, Phokion, 33.

[3] Diodor. xviii. 66.

and presented the letter of Alexander, before the Athenian accusers arrived, he might probably have obtained a more favourable reception. But as the arrival of the two parties was nearly simultaneous, Polysperchon heard both of them at the same audience, before King Philip Aridæus in his throne with the gilt ceiling above it. When Agnonidês,—chief of the Athenian deputation, and formerly friend and advocate of Demosthenês in the Harpalian cause—found himself face to face with Phokion and his friends, their reciprocal invectives at first produced nothing but confusion; until Agnonidês himself exclaimed—"Pack us all into one cage and send us back to Athens to receive judgement from the Athenians." The king laughed at this observation, but the bystanders around insisted upon more orderly proceedings, and Agnonidês then set forth the two demands of the Athenians—condemnation of Phokion and his friends, partly as accomplices of Antipater, partly as having betrayed Peiræus to Nikanor—and the full benefit of the late regal proclamation to Athens.[1] Now, on the last of these two heads, Polysperchon was noway disposed to yield—nor to hand over Peiræus to the Athenians as soon as he should take it. On this matter, accordingly, he replied by refusal or evasion. But he was all the more disposed to satisfy the Athenians on the other matter—the surrender of Phokion; especially as the sentiment now prevalent at Athens evinced clearly that Phokion could not be again useful to him as an instrument. Thus disposed to sacrifice Phokion, Polysperchon heard his defence with impatience, interrupted him several times, and so disgusted him, that he at length struck the ground with his stick, and held his peace. Hegemon, another of the accused, was yet more harshly

Phokion and his colleagues are delivered up as prisoners to the Athenians.

[1] Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Cornel. Nepos, Phokion, 3. "Hic (Phocion), ab Agnonide accusatus, quod Piræum Nicanori prodidisset, ex consilii sententiâ in custodiam conjectus, Athenas deductus est, ut ibi de eo legibus fieret judicium."

Plutarch says that Polysperchon, before he gave this hearing to both parties, ordered *the Corinthian Deinarchus* to be tortured and to be put to death. Now the person so named cannot be Deinarchus, the logographer—of whom we have some specimens remaining, and who was alive even as late as 292 B.C.—though he too was a Corinthian. Either, therefore, there were two Corinthians, both bearing this same name (as Westermann supposes—Gesch. der Beredtsamkeit, sect. 72), or the statement of Plutarch must allude to an order given, but not carried into effect—which latter seems to me most probable.

treated. When he appealed to Polysperchon himself, as having been personally cognizant of his (the speaker's) good disposition towards the Athenian people (he had been probably sent to Pella, as envoy for redress of grievances under the Antipatrian oligarchy), Polysperchon exclaimed—"Do not utter falsehoods against me before the king." Moreover, king Philip himself was so incensed, as to start from his throne and snatch his spear, with which he would have run Hegemon through,—imitating the worst impulses of his illustrious brother—had he not been held back by Polysperchon. The sentence could not be doubtful. Phokion and his companions were delivered over as prisoners to the Athenian deputation, together with a letter from the king, intimating that in his conviction they were traitors, but that he left them to be judged by the Athenians, now restored to freedom and autonomy.[1]

Phokion is conveyed as prisoner to Athens, and brought for trial before the assembly. Motion of his friends for exclusion of non-qualified persons.

The Macedonian Kleitus was instructed to convey them to Athens as prisoners under a guard. Mournful was the spectacle as they entered the city; being carried along the Kerameikus in carts, through sympathising friends and an embittered multitude, until they reached the theatre, wherein the assembly was to be convened. That assembly was composed of every one who chose to enter, and is said to have contained many foreigners and slaves. But it would have been fortunate for Phokion had such really been the case; for foreigners and slaves had no cause of antipathy towards him. The assembly was mainly composed of Phokion's keenest enemies, the citizens just returned from exile or deportation; among whom may doubtless have been intermixed more or less of non-qualified persons since the lists had probably not yet been verified. When the assembly was about to be opened, the friends of Phokion moved, that on occasion of so important a trial, foreigners and slaves should be sent away. This was in every sense an impolitic proceeding; for the restored exiles, chiefly poor men, took it as an insult to themselves, and became only the more embittered, exclaiming against the oligarchs who were trying to exclude them.

Intense exasperation

It is not easy to conceive stronger grounds of exasperation than those which inflamed the bosoms of these returned exiles. We must recollect that

[1] Plutarch, Phokion, 33, 34; Diod. xviii. 66.

at the close of the Lamian war, the Athenian democracy had been forcibly subverted. Demosthenês and its principal leaders had been slain, some of them with antecedent cruelties; the poorer multitude, in number more than half of the qualified citizens, had been banished or deported into distant regions. To all the public shame and calamity, there was thus superadded a vast mass of individual suffering and impoverishment, the mischiefs of which were very imperfectly healed, even by that unexpected contingency which had again thrown open to them their native city. Accordingly, when these men returned from different regions, each hearing from the rest new tales of past hardship, they felt the bitterest hatred against the authors of the Antipatrian revolution; and among these authors Phokion stood distinctly marked. For although he had neither originated nor advised these severities, yet he and his friends, as administering the Antipatrian government at Athens, must have been agents in carrying them out, and had rendered themselves distinctly liable to the fearful penalties pronounced by the psephism of Demophantus,[1] consecrated by an oath taken by Athenians generally, against any one who should hold an official post after the government was subverted.

Of the returned exiles against Phokion—grounds for that feeling.

When these restored citizens thus saw Phokion brought before them, for the first time after their return, the common feeling of antipathy against him burst out in furious manifestations. Agnonidês the principal accuser, supported by Epikurus[2] and Demophilus, found their denunciations welcomed and even anticipated, when they arraigned Phokion as a criminal who had lent his hand to the subversion of the constitution,—to the sufferings of his deported fellow-citizens,—and to the holding of Athens in subjection under a foreign potentate; in addition to which, the betrayal of Peiræus to Nikanor[3] constituted a new crime; fastening on the people the yoke of Kassander, when autonomy had been promised to them

Phokion is condemned to death—vindictive manifestations against him in the assembly, furious and unanimous.

[1] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 96, 97; Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. s. 127.

[2] *Not* the eminent philosopher so named.

[3] Cornel. Nepos, Phok. 4. "Plurimi vero ita exacuerentur propter proditionis suspicionem Piræi, maximeque quod adversus populi commoda in senectute steterat."

by the recent imperial edict. After the accusation was concluded, Phokion was called on for his defence; but he found it impossible to obtain a hearing. Attempting several times to speak, he was as often interrupted by angry shouts; several of his friends were cried down in like manner; until at length he gave up the case in despair; and exclaimed, "For myself, Athenians, I plead guilty; I pronounce against myself the sentence of death for my political conduct: but why are you to sentence these men near me, who are not guilty?" "Because they are your friends, Phokion"—was the exclamation of those around. Phokion then said no more; while Agnonidês proposed a decree, to the effect, that the assembled people should decide by show of hands, whether the persons now arraigned were guilty or not; and that if declared guilty, they should be put to death. Some persons present cried out, that the penalty of torture ought to precede death; but this savage proposition, utterly at variance with Athenian law in respect to citizens, was repudiated not less by Agnonidês than by the Macedonian officer Kleitus. The decree was then passed; after which the show of hands was called for. Nearly every hand in the assembly was held up in condemnation; each man even rose from his seat to make the effect more imposing; and some went so far as to put on wreaths in token of triumph. To many of them doubtless, the gratification of this intense and unanimous vindictive impulse,—in their view not merely legitimate, but patriotic,—must have been among the happiest moments of life.[1]

Death of Phokion and his four colleagues.

After sentence, the five condemned persons, Phokion, Nikoklês, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Pythoklês, were consigned to the supreme magistrates of Police, called The Eleven, and led to prison for the purpose of having the customary dose of poison administered. Hostile bystanders ran alongside, taunting and reviling them. It is even said that one man planted himself in the front, and spat upon Phokion; who turned to the public officers and exclaimed—"Will no one check this indecent fellow?" This was the only emotion which he manifested; in other respects, his tranquillity and self-possession were resolutely maintained, during this soul-subduing march from the theatre to the prison, amidst

[1] Diodor. xviii. 66, 67; Plutarch, Phokion, 34, 35; Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2, 3.

the wailings of his friends, the broken spirit of his four comrades, and the fiercest demonstrations of antipathy from his fellow-citizens generally. One ray of comfort presented itself as he entered the prison. It was the nineteenth of the month Munychion, the day on which the Athenian Horsemen or Knights (the richest class in the city, men for the most part of oligarchical sentiments) celebrated their festal procession with wreaths on their heads in honour of Zeus. Several of these horsemen halted in passing, took off their wreaths, and wept as they looked through the gratings of the prison.

Being asked whether he had anything to tell his son Phokus, Phokion replied—"I tell him emphatically, not to hold evil memory of the Athenians." The draught of hemlock was then administered to all five—to Phokion last. Having been condemned for treason, they were not buried in Attica; nor were Phokion's friends allowed to light a funeral pile for the burning of his body; which was carried out of Attica into the Megarid, by a hired agent named Konopion, and there burnt by fire obtained at Megara. The wife of Phokion, with her maids, poured libations and marked the spot by a small mound of earth; she also collected the bones and brought them back to Athens in her bosom, during the secrecy of night. She buried them near her own domestic hearth, with this address—"Beloved Hestia, I confide to thee these relics of a good man. Restore them to his own family vault, as soon as the Athenians shall come to their senses."[1]

[1] Plutarch, Phokion, 36, 37. Two other anecdotes are recounted by Plutarch, which seem to be of doubtful authenticity. Nikoklês entreated that he might be allowed to swallow his potion before Phokion; upon which the latter replied—"Your request, Nikoklês, is sad and mournful; but as I have never yet refused you anything throughout my life, I grant this also."

After the four first had drunk, all except Phokion, no more hemlock was left; upon which the gaoler said that he would not prepare any more, unless twelve drachmæ of money were given to him to buy the material. Some hesitation took place, until Phokion asked one of his friends to supply the money, sarcastically remarking, that it was hard if a man could not even die *gratis* at Athens.

As to the first of these anecdotes—if we read, in Plato's Phædon (152-155), the details of the death of Sokratês,—we shall see that death by hemlock was not caused instantaneously, but in a gradual and painless manner; the person who had swallowed the potion being desired to walk about for some time, until his legs grew

Alteration of the sentiment of the Athenians towards Phokion, not long afterwards. Honours shown to his memory.

After a short time (we are told by Plutarch) the Athenians did thus come to their senses. They discovered that Phokion had been a faithful and excellent public servant, repented of their severity towards him, celebrated his funeral obsequies at the public expense, erected a statue in his honour, and put to death Agnonidês by public judicial sentence; while Epikurus and Demophilus fled from the city and were slain by Phokion's son.[1]

Explanation of this alteration. Kassander gets possession of Athens, and restores the oligarchical or Phokionian party.

These facts are ostensibly correct; but Plutarch omits to notice the real explanation of them. Within two or three months after the death of Phokion, Kassander, already in possession of Peiræus and Munychia, became also master of Athens; the oligarchical or Phokionic party again acquired predominance; Demetrius the Phalerean was recalled from exile, and placed to administer the city under Kassander, as Phokion had administered it under Antipater.

No wonder, that under such circumstances, the memory of Phokion should be honoured. But this is a very different thing from spontaneous change of popular opinion respecting him. I see no reason why such change of opinion should have occurred, nor do I believe that it did occur.

heavy, and then to lie down in bed, after which he gradually chilled and became insensible, first in the extremities, next in the vital centres. Under these circumstances, the question — which of the persons condemned should swallow the first of the five potions—could be of very little moment.

Then, as to the alleged niggardly stock of hemlock in the Athenian prison—what would have been the alternative, if Phokion's friend had not furnished the twelve drachmæ? Would he have remained in confinement, without being put to death? Certainly not; for he was under capital sentence. Would he have been put to death by the sword or some other unexpensive instrument? This is at variance with the analogy of Athenian practice. If there be any truth in the story, we must suppose that the Eleven had allotted to this gaoler a stock of hemlock (or the price thereof) really adequate to five potions, but that he by accident or awkwardness had wasted a part of it, so that it would have been necessary for him to supply the deficiency out of his own pocket. From this embarrassment he was rescued by Phokion and his friend; and Phokion's sarcasm touches upon the strangeness of a man being called upon to pay for his own execution.

[1] Plutarch, Phokion, 38.

The Dêmos of Athens, banished and deported in mass, had the best ground for hating Phokion, and were not likely to become ashamed of the feeling. Though he was personally mild and incorruptible, they derived no benefit from these virtues. To them it was of little moment that he should steadily refuse all presents from Antipater, when he did Antipater's work gratuitously. Considered as a judicial trial, the last scene of Phokion before the people in the theatre is nothing better than a cruel imposture; considered as a manifestation of public opinion already settled, it is one for which the facts of the past supplied ample warrant.

Life and character of Phokion.

We cannot indeed read without painful sympathy the narrative of an old man above eighty,—personally brave, mild, and superior to all pecuniary temptation, so far as his positive administration was concerned,—perishing under an intense and crushing storm of popular execration. But when we look at the whole case—when we survey, not merely the details of Phokion's administration, but the grand public objects which those details subserved, and towards which he conducted his fellow-citizens—we shall see that this judgement is fully merited. In Phokion's patriotism—for so doubtless he himself sincerely conceived it—no account was taken of Athenian independence; of the autonomy or self-management of the Hellenic world; of the conditions, in reference to foreign kings, under which alone such autonomy could exist. He had neither the Pan-hellenic sentiment of Aristeidês, Kallikratidas, and Demosthenês —nor the narrower Athenian sentiment, like the devotion of Agesilaus to Sparta, and of Epaminondas to Thebes. To Phokion it was indifferent whether Greece was an aggregate of autonomous cities, with Athens as first or second among them—or one of the satrapies under the Macedonian kings. Now this was among the most fatal defects of a Grecian public man. The sentiment in which Phokion was wanting, lay at the bottom of all those splendid achievements which have given to Greece a substantive and pre-eminent place in the history of the world. Had Themistoklês, Aristeidês, and Leonidas resembled him, Greece would have passed quietly under the dominion of Persia. The brilliant, though chequered, century and more of independent politics which succeeded the repulse of

Xerxês would never have occurred. It was precisely during the fifty years of Phokion's political and military influence, that the Greeks were degraded from a state of freedom, and Athens from ascendency as well as freedom, into absolute servitude. Insofar as this great public misfortune can be imputed to any one man—to no one was it more ascribable than to Phokion. He was stratêgus during most of the long series of years when Philip's power was growing; it was his duty to look ahead for the safety of his countrymen, and to combat the yet immature giant. He heard the warnings of Demosthenês, and he possessed exactly those qualities which were wanting to Demosthenês —military energy and aptitude. Had he lent his influence to inform the short-sightedness, to stimulate the inertia, to direct the armed efforts, of his countrymen, the kings of Macedon might have been kept within their own limits, and the future history of Greece might have been altogether different. Unfortunately, he took the opposite side. He acted with Æschinês and the philippizers; without receiving money from Philip, he did gratuitously all that Philip desired—by nullifying and sneering down the efforts of Demosthenês and the other active politicians. After the battle of Chæroneia, Phokion received from Philip first, and from Alexander afterwards, marks of esteem not shown towards any other Athenian. This was both the fruit and the proof of his past political action—anti-Hellenic as well as anti-Athenian. Having done much, in the earlier part of his life, to promote the subjugation of Greece under the Macedonian kings, he contributed somewhat, during the latter half, to lighten the severity of their dominion; and it is the most honourable point in his character that he always refrained from abusing their marked favour towards himself, for purposes either of personal gain or of oppression over his fellow-citizens. Alexander not only wrote letters to him, even during the plenitude of imperial power, in terms of respectful friendship, but tendered to him the largest presents—at one time the sum of 100 talents, at another time the choice of four towns on the coast of Asia Minor, as Xerxês gave to Themistoklês. He even expressed his displeasure when Phokion, refusing everything, consented only to request the liberation of three Grecian prisoners confined at Sardis.[1]

[1] Plutarch, Phokion, 18; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 188.

The Lamian war, and its consequences, were Phokion's ruin. He continued at Athens, throughout that war, freely declaring his opinion against it; for it is to be remarked, that in spite of his known macedonizing politics, the people neither banished nor degraded him, but contented themselves with following the counsels of others. On the disastrous termination of the war, Phokion undertook the thankless and dishonourable function of satrap under Antipater at Athens, with the Macedonian garrison at Munychia to back him. He became the subordinate agent of a conqueror who not only slaughtered the chief Athenian orators, but disfranchised and deported the Dêmos in mass. Having accepted partnership and responsibility in these proceedings, Phokion was no longer safe except under the protection of a foreign prince. After the liberal proclamation issued in the name of the Macedonian kings, permitting the return of the banished Dêmos, he sought safety for himself, first by that treasonable connivance which enabled Nikanor to seize the Peiræus, next by courting Polysperchon the enemy of Nikanor. A voluntary expatriation (along with his friend the Phalerean Demetrius) would have been less dangerous, and less discreditable, than these manœuvres, which still farther darkened the close of his life, without averting from him, after all, the necessity of facing the restored Dêmos. The intense and unanimous wrath of the people against him is an instructive, though a distressing spectacle. It was directed, not against the man or the administrator—for in both characters Phokion had been blameless, except as to the last collusion with Nikanor in the seizure of the Peiræus—but against his public policy. It was the last protest of extinct Grecian freedom, speaking as it were from the tomb in a voice of thunder, against that fatal system of mistrust, inertia, self-seeking, and corruption, which had betrayed the once autonomous Athens to a foreign conqueror.

I have already mentioned that Polysperchon with his army was in Phokis when Phokion was brought before him, on his march towards Peloponnesus. Perhaps he may have been detained by negotiation with the Ætolians, who embraced his alliance.[1] At any rate, he was tardy in his

B.C. 317 (April). War between Polysperchon and Kassander

[1] Diodor. xix. 35.

in Attica and Peloponnesus. Polysperchon is repulsed in the siege of Megalopolis, and also defeated at sea.

march, for before he reached Attica, Kassander arrived at Peiræus to join Nikanor with a fleet of thirty-five ships and 4000 soldiers obtained from Antigonus. On learning this fact, Polysperchon hastened his march also, and presented himself under the walls of Athens and Peiræus with a large force of 20,000 Macedonians, 4000 Greek allies, 1000 cavalry and sixty-five elephants; animals which were now seen for the first time in European Greece. He at first besieged Kassander in Peiræus, but finding it difficult to procure subsistence in Attica for so numerous an army, he marched with the larger portion into Peloponnesus, leaving his son Alexander with a division to make head against Kassander. Either approaching in person the various Peloponnesian towns —or addressing them by means of envoys—he enjoined the subversion of the Antipatrian oligarchies, and the restoration of liberty and free speech to the mass of the citizens.[1] In most of the towns, this revolution was accomplished; but in Megalopolis, the oligarchy held out; not only forcing Polysperchon to besiege the city, but even defending it against him successfully. He made two or three attempts to storm it, by moveable towers, by undermining the walls, and even by the aid of elephants; but he was repulsed in all of them,[2] and obliged to relinquish the siege with considerable loss of reputation. His admiral Kleitus was soon afterwards defeated in the Propontis, with the loss of his whole fleet, by Nikanor (whom Kassander had sent from Peiræus) and Antigonus.[3]

Increased strength of Kassander in Greece—he gets possession of Athens.

After these two defeats, Polysperchon seems to have evacuated Peloponnesus, and to have carried his forces across the Corinthian Gulf into Epirus, to join Olympias. His party was greatly weakened all over Greece, and that of Kassander proportionally strengthened. The first effect of this was, the surrender of Athens. The Athenians in the city, including all or many of the restored exiles could no longer endure that complete severance from the sea, to which the occupation of Peiræus and Munychia by Kassander had reduced them. Athens without a port was hardly tenable; in fact, Peiræus was considered by its great constructor, Themistoklês, as more indispensable to

[1] Diodor. xviii. 69. [2] Diodor. xviii. 70, 71. [3] Diodor. xviii. 72.

the Athenians than Athens itself.[1] The subsistence of the people was derived in large proportion from imported corn, received through Peiræus; where also the trade and industrial operations were carried on, most of the revenue collected, and the arsenals, docks, ships, &c. of the state kept up. It became evident that Nikanor, by seizing on the Peiræus, had rendered Athens disarmed and helpless; so that the irreparable mischief done by Phokion, in conniving at that seizure, was felt more and more every day. Hence the Athenians, unable to capture the port themselves, and hopeless of obtaining it through Polysperchon, felt constrained to listen to the partisans of Kassander, who proposed that terms should be made with him. It was agreed that they should become friends and allies of Kassander; that they should have full enjoyment of their city, with the port Peiræus, their ships, and revenues; that the exiles and deported citizens should be readmitted; that the political franchise should for the future be enjoyed by all citizens who possessed 1000 drachmæ of property and upwards; that Kassander should hold Munychia with a governor and garrison, until the war against Polysperchon was brought to a close; and that he should also name some one Athenian citizen, in whose hands the supreme government of the city should be vested. Kassander named Demetrius the Phalerean (*i. e.* an Athenian of the Dême Phalerum), one of the colleagues of Phokion; who had gone into voluntary exile since the death of Antipater, but had recently returned.[2]

This convention restored substantially at Athens the Antipatrian government; yet without the severities which had marked its original establishment—and with some modifications in various ways. It made Kassander virtually master of the city (as Antipater had been before him), by means of his governing nominee, upheld by the garrison, and by the fortification of Munychia; which had now been greatly enlarged and strengthened,[3] holding a practical command over Peiræus, though that port was nominally relinquished to the Athenians. But there was no slaughter of

**Restoration of the oligarchical government at Athens, though in a mitigated form, under the Phalerean Demetrius.**

[1] Thucyd. i. 93.

[2] Diodor. xviii. 74.

[3] See the notice of Munychia, as it stood ten years afterwards (Diodor. xx. 45).

orators, no expulsion of citizens; moreover, even the minimum of 1000 drachmæ, fixed for the political franchise, though excluding the multitude, must have been felt as an improvement compared with the higher limit of 2000 drachmæ prescribed by Antipater. Kassander was not, like his father, at the head of an overwhelming force, master of Greece. He had Polysperchon in the field against him with a rival army and an established ascendency in many of the Grecian cities; it was therefore his interest to abstain from measures of obvious harshness towards the Athenian people.

Administration of the Phalerean Demetrius at Athens, in a moderate spirit. Census taken of the Athenian population.

Towards this end his choice of the Phalerean Demetrius appears to have been judicious. That citizen continued to administer Athens, as satrap or despot under Kassander, for ten years. He was an accomplished literary man, friend both of the philosopher Theophrastus, who had succeeded to the school of Aristotle—and of the rhetor Deinarchus. He is described also as a person of expensive and luxurious habits; towards which he devoted the most of the Athenian public revenue, 1200 talents in amount, if Duris is to be believed. His administration is said to have been discreet and moderate. We know little of its details, but we are told that he made sumptuary laws, especially restricting the cost and ostentation of funerals.[1] He himself extolled his own decennial period as one of abundance and flourishing commerce at Athens.[2] But we learn from others, and the fact is highly probable, that it was a period of distress and humiliation, both at Athens and in other Grecian towns; and

[1] Cicero, De Legg. ii. 26, 66; Strabo, ix. p. 398; Pausanias, i. 25, 5. τύραννόν τε Ἀθηναίοις ἔπραξε γενέσθαι Δημήτριον, &c. Duris ap. Athenæum, xii. 542. Fragm. 27. vol. iii. p. 477. Frag. Hist. Græc.

The Phalerean Demetrius composed, among numerous historical, philosophical, and literary works, a narrative of his own decennial administration (Diogenês Laert. v. 5, 9; Strabo, ib.)—περὶ τῆς δεκαετίας.

The statement of 1200 talents, as the annual revenue handled by Demetrius, deserves little credit.

[2] See the Fragment of Democharês, 2; Fragment. Historic. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 448, ap. Polyb. xii. 13. Democharês, nephew of the orator Demosthenês, was the political opponent of Demetrius Phalereus, whom he reproached with these boasts about commercial prosperity, when the liberty and dignity of the city were overthrown. To such boasts of Demetrius Phalereus probably belongs the statement cited from him by Strabo (iii. p. 147) about the laborious works in the Attic mines at Laureium.

that Athenians, as well as others, welcomed new projects of colonization (such as that of Ophellas from Kyrênê) not simply from prospects of advantage, but also as an escape from existing evils.[1]

What forms of nominal democracy were kept up during this interval, we cannot discover. The popular judicature must have been continued for private suits and accusations, since Deinarchus is said to have been in large practice as a logographer, or composer of discourses for others.[2] But the fact that three hundred and sixty statues were erected in honour of Demetrius while his administration was still going on, demonstrates the gross flattery of his partisans, the subjection of the people, and the practical abolition of all free-spoken censure or pronounced opposition. We learn that, in some one of the ten years of his administration, a census was taken of the inhabitants of Attica; and that there were numbered, 21,000 citizens, 10,000 metics, and 400,000 slaves.[3] Of this important

[1] Diodor. xx. 40. ὥσθ' ὑπελάμβανον μὴ μόνον ἐγκρατεῖς ἔσεσθαι πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι.

[2] Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Dinarcho, p. 633, 634; Plutarch, Demetrius, 10. λόγῳ μὲν ὀλιγαρχικῆς, ἔργῳ δὲ μοναρχικῆς, καταστάσεως γενομένης διὰ τὴν τοῦ Φαληρέως δύναμιν, &c.

[3] Ktesiklês ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 272. Mr. Fynes Clinton (following Wesseling) supplies the defect in the text of Athenæus, so as to assign the census to the 115th Olympiad. This conjecture *may* be right, yet the reasons for it are not conclusive. The census may have been taken either in the 116th, or in the 117th Olympiad; we have no means of determining which. The administration of the Phalerean Demetrius covers the ten years between 317 and 307 B.C. (Fast. Hell. Append. p. 388).

Mr. Clinton (ad ann. 317 B.C. Fast. Hell.) observes respecting the census—"The 21,000 Athenians express those who had votes in the public assembly, or all the males above the age of twenty years; the 10,000 μέτοικοι described also the males of full age. When the women and children are computed, the total free population will be about 127,660; and 400,000 slaves, added to this total, will give about 527,660 for the total population of Attica." See also the Appendix to F. H. p. 390 *seq.*

This census is a very interesting fact; but our information respecting it is miserably scanty, and Mr. Clinton's interpretation of the different numbers is open to some remark. He cannot be right, I think, in saying—"The 21,000 Athenians express those who had votes in the assembly, *or* all the males above the age of twenty years." For we are expressly told, that under the administration of Demetrius Phalereus, all persons who did not possess 1000 drachmæ were excluded from the political franchise; and therefore a large number of males above the age of twenty years would have no vote

enumeration we know the bare fact, without its special purpose or even its precise date. Perhaps some of those citizens, who had been banished or deported at the close of the Lamian war, may have returned and continued to reside at Athens. But there still seems to have remained, during all the continuance of the Kassandrian oligarchy, a body of adverse Athenian exiles, watching for an opportunity of overthrowing it, and seeking aid for that purpose from the Ætolians and others.[1]

B.C. 317 (Autumn). Kassander in Peloponnesus—many cities join him—

The acquisition of Athens by Kassander, followed up by his capture of Panaktum and Salamis, and seconded by his moderation towards the Athenians, procured for him considerable support in Peloponnesus, whither he proceeded with his army.[2] Many of the cities, intimidated

in the assembly. Since the two categories are not coincident, then, to which shall we apply the number 21,000? To those who had votes? Or to the total number of free citizens, voting or not voting, above the age of twenty? The public assembly, during the administration of Demetrius Phalereus, appears to have been of little moment or efficacy; so that a distinct record, of the number of persons entitled to vote in it, is not likely to have been sought.

Then again, Mr. Clinton interprets the three numbers given, upon two principles totally distinct. The two first numbers (citizens and metics), he considers to designate only males of full age; the third number, of οἰκέται, he considers to include both sexes and all ages.

This is a conjecture which I think very doubtful, in the absence of farther knowledge. It implies that the enumerators take account of the *slave* women and children—but that they take no account of the *free* women and children, wives and families of the citizens and metics. The number of the free women and children are wholly unrecorded, on Mr. Clinton's supposition. Now if, for the purposes of the census, it was necessary to enumerate the *slave* women and children—it surely would be not less necessary to enumerate the *free* women and children.

The word οἰκέται sometimes means, not slaves only, but the inmates of a family generally—free as well as slave. If such be its meaning here (which however there is not evidence enough to affirm), we eliminate the difficulty of supposing the slave women and children to be enumerated—and the free women and children *not* to be enumerated.

We should be able to reason more confidently, if we knew the purpose for which the census had been taken—whether with a view to military or political measures—to finance and taxation—or to the question of subsistence and importation of foreign corn (see Mr. Clinton's Fast. H. ad ann. 444 B.C., about another census taken in reference to imported corn).

[1] See Dionys. Halic. Judic. de Dinarcho, p. 658 Reisk.

[2] Diodor. xviii. 75.

or persuaded, joined him and deserted Polysperchon; while the Spartans, now feeling for the first time their defenceless condition, thought it prudent to surround their city with walls.[1] This fact, among many others contemporaneous, testifies emphatically, how the characteristic sentiments of the Hellenic autonomous world were now dying out everywhere. The maintenance of Sparta as an unwalled city, was one of the deepest and most cherished of Lykurgean traditions; a standing proof of the fearless bearing and self-confidence of the Spartans against dangers from without. The erection of the walls showed their own conviction, but too well borne out by the real circumstances around them, that the pressure of the foreigner had become so overwhelming as not to leave them even safety at home.

the Spartans surround their city with walls.

The warfare between Kassander and Polysperchon became now embittered by a feud among the members of the Macedonian imperial family. King Philip Aridæus and his wife Eurydikê, alarmed and indignant at the restoration of Olympias which Polysperchon was projecting, solicited aid from Kassander, and tried to place the force of Macedonia at his disposal. In this however they failed. Olympias, assisted not only by Polysperchon, but by the Epirotic prince Æakidês, made her entry into Macedonia out of Epirus, apparently in the autumn of 317 B.C. She brought with her Roxana and her child —the widow and son of Alexander the Great. The Macedonian soldiers, assembled by Philip Aridæus and Eurydikê to resist her, were so overawed by her name and the recollection of Alexander, that they refused to fight, and thus ensured to her an easy victory. Philip and Eurydikê became her prisoners; the former she caused to be slain; to the latter she offered only an option between the sword, the halter, and poison. The old queen next proceeded to satiate her revenge against the family of Antipater. One hundred leading Macedonians, friends of Kassander, were put to death, together with his brother Nikanor;[2] while the sepulchre of his deceased brother

B.C. 317 (Autumn). Feud in the Macedonian imperial family—Olympias puts to death Philip Aridæus and Eurydikê—she reigns in Macedonia: her bloody revenge against the partisans of Antipater.

[1] Justin, xiv. 5; Diodor. xviii. 75; Pausan. vii. 8, 3; Pausan. i. 25, 5.

[2] Diodor. xix. 11; Justin, x. 14, 4; Pausanias, i. 11, 4.

Iollas, accused of having poisoned Alexander the Great, was broken up.

During the winter, Olympias remained thus completely predominant in Macedonia; where her position seemed strong, since her allies the Ætolians were masters of the pass at Thermopylæ, while Kassander was kept employed in Peloponnesus by the force under Alexander, son of Polysperchon. But Kassander, disengaging himself from these embarrassments, and eluding Thermopylæ by a maritime transit to Thessaly, seized the Perrhæbian passes before they had been put under guard, and entered Macedonia without resistance. Olympias, having no army competent to meet him in the field, was forced to shut herself up in the maritime fortress of Pydna, with Roxana, the child Alexander, and Thessalonikê daughter of her late husband Philip son of Amyntas.[1] Here Kassander blocked her up for several months by sea as well as by land, and succeeded in defeating all the efforts of Polysperchon and Æakidês to relieve her. In the spring of the ensuing year (316 B.C.), she was forced by intolerable famine to surrender. Kassander promised her nothing more than personal safety, requiring from her the surrender of the two great fortresses, Pella and Amphipolis, which made him master of Macedonia. Presently, however, the relatives of those numerous victims, who had perished by order of Olympias, were encouraged by Kassander to demand her life in retribution. They found little difficulty in obtaining a verdict of condemnation against her from what was called a Macedonian assembly. Nevertheless, such was the sentiment of awe and reverence connected with her name, that no one except the injured men themselves could be found to execute the sentence. She died with a courage worthy of her rank and domineering character. Kassander took Thessalonikê to wife—confining Roxana with the child Alexander in the fortress of Amphipolis—where (after a certain interval) he caused both of them to be slain.[2]

B.C. 316. Kassander passes into Macedonia—defeats Olympias, and becomes master of the country—Olympias is besieged in Pydna, captured, and put to death.

While Kassander was thus master of Macedonia—and while the imperial family were disappearing from the

[1] Diodor. xix. 36. [2] Diodor. xix. 50, 51; Justin, xiv. 5; Pausan. i. 25, 5; ix. 7, 1.

scene in that country—the defeat and death of Eumenês (which happened nearly at the same time as the capture of Olympias[1]) removed the last faithful partisan of that family in Asia. But at the same time, it left in the hands of Antigonus such overwhelming preponderance throughout Asia, that he aspired to become vicar and master of the entire Alexandrine empire, as well as to avenge upon Kassander the extirpation of the regal family. His power appeared indeed so formidable, that Kassander of Macedonia, Lysimachus of Thrace, Ptolemy of Egypt, and Seleukus of Babylonia, entered into a convention, which gradually ripened into an active alliance, against him.

B.C. 315. Great power of Antigonus in Asia. Confederacy of Kassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Seleukus against him.

During the struggles between these powerful princes, Greece appears simply as a group of subject cities, held, garrisoned, grasped at, or coveted, by all of them. Polysperchon, abandoning all hopes in Macedonia after the death of Olympias, had been forced to take refuge among the Ætolians, leaving his son Alexander to make the best struggle that he could in Peloponnesus; so that Kassander was now decidedly preponderant throughout the Hellenic regions. After fixing himself on the throne of Macedonia, he perpetuated his own name by founding, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallênê and near the site where Potidæa had stood, the new city of Kassandreia; into which he congregated a large number of inhabitants from the neighbourhood, and especially the remnant of the citizens of Olynthus and Potidæa,—towns taken and destroyed by Philip more than thirty years before.[2] He next marched into Peloponnesus with his army against Alexander son of Polysperchon. Passing through Bœotia, he undertook the task of restoring the city of Thebes, which had been destroyed twenty years previously by Alexander the Great, and had ever since existed only as a military post in the ancient citadel called Kadmeia. The other Bœotian towns, to whom the old Theban territory had been

B.C. 315-314. Kassander founds Kassandreia, and restores Thebes.

[1] Even immediately before the death of Olympias, Aristonous, governor of Amphipolis in her interest, considered Eumenês to be still alive (Diodor. xix. 50).

[2] Diodor. xix. 52; Pausanias, v. 23, 2.

assigned, were persuaded or constrained to relinquish it; and Kassander invited from all parts of Greece the Theban exiles or their descendants. From sympathy with these exiles, and also with the ancient celebrity of the city, many Greeks, even from Italy and Sicily, contributed to the restoration. The Athenians, now administered by Demetrius Phalereus under Kassander's supremacy, were particularly forward in the work; the Messenians and Megalopolitans, whose ancestors had owed so much to the Theban Epaminondas, lent strenuous aid. Thebes was re-established in the original area which it had occupied before Alexander's siege; and was held by a Kassandrian garrison in the Kadmeia, destined for the mastery of Bœotia and Greece.[1]

After some stay at Thebes, Kassander advanced towards Peloponnesus. Alexander (son of Polysperchon) having fortified the Isthmus, he was forced to embark his troops with his elephants at Megara, and cross over the Saronic Gulf to Epidaurus. He dispossessed Alexander of Argos, of Messenia, and even of his position on the Isthmus, where he left a powerful detachment, and then returned to Macedonia.[2] His increasing power raised both apprehension and hatred in the bosom of Antigonus, who endeavoured to come to terms with him, but in vain.[3] Kassander preferred the alliance with Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus—against Antigonus, who was now master of nearly the whole of Asia, inspiring common dread to all of them.[4] Accordingly, from Asia to Peloponnesus, with arms and money, Antigonus despatched the Milesian Aristodêmus to strengthen Alexander against Kassander; whom he farther denounced as an enemy of the Macedonian name, because he had slain Olympias, imprisoned the other members of the regal family, and re-established the Olynthian exiles. He caused the absent

B.C. 314.

Measures of Antigonus against Kassander—he promises freedom to the Grecian cities—Ptolemy promises the like. Great power of Kassander in Greece.

[1] Diodor. xix. 52, 54, 78; Pausan. ix. 7, 2-5. This seems an explanation of Kassander's proceeding, more probable than that given by Pausanias; who tells us that Kassander hated the memory of Alexander the Great, and wished to undo the consequences of his acts. That he did so hate Alexander, is however extremely credible: see Plutarch, Alexand. 74.

[2] Diodor. xix. 54.

[3] Diodor. xix. 56.

[4] Diodor. xix. 57.

Kassander to be condemned by what was called a Macedonian assembly, upon these and other charges.

Antigonus farther proclaimed, by the voice of this assembly, that all the Greeks should be free, self-governing, and exempt from garrisons or military occupation.[1] It was expected that these brilliant promises would enlist partisans in Greece against Kassander; accordingly Ptolemy, ruler of Egypt, one of the enemies of Antigonus, thought fit to issue similar proclamations a few months afterwards, tendering to the Greeks the same boon from himself.[2] These promises, neither executed, nor intended to be executed, by either of the kings, appear to have produced little or no effect upon the Greeks.

The arrival of Aristodemus in Peloponnesus had reanimated the party of Alexander (son of Polysperchon), against whom Kassander was again obliged to bring his full forces from Macedonia. Though successful against Alexander at Argos, Orchomenus and other places, Kassander was not able to crush him, and presently thought it prudent to gain him over. He offered to him the separate government of Peloponnesus, though in subordination to himself: Alexander accepted the offer, becoming Kassander's ally[3]—and carried on war, jointly with him, against Aristodemus, with varying success, until he was presently assassinated by some private enemies. Nevertheless his widow Kratesipolis, a woman of courage and energy, still maintained herself in considerable force at Sikyon.[4] Kassander's most obstinate enemies were the Ætolians, of whom we now first hear formal mention as a substantive confederacy.[5] These Ætolians became the allies of Antigonus as they had been before of Polysperchon, extending their predatory ravages even as far as Attica. Protected against foreign garrisons, partly by their rude and fierce habits, partly by their mountainous territory, they were almost the only Greeks who could still be called free. Kassander tried to keep them in check through their neighbours the Akarnanians, whom he induced to adopt a more concentrated habit of residence,

[1] Diodor. xix. 61.
[2] Diodor. xix. 62.
[3] Diodor. xix. 63, 64.
[4] Diodor. xix. 62, 67.
[5] Diodor. xix. 66. Ἀριστόδημος. ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν διαιτολογησάμενος, προστρέψατο τὸ πλῆθη βοηθεῖν τοῖς Ἀντιγόνου πράγμασιν, &c.

consolidating their numerous petty townships into a few considerable towns,—Stratus, Sauria, and Agrinium—convenient posts for Macedonian garrisons. He also made himself master of Leukas, Apollonia, and Epidamnus, defeating the Illyrian king Glaukias, so that his dominion now extended across from the Thermaic to the Adriatic Gulf.[1] His general Philippus gained two important victories over the Ætolians and Epirots, forcing the former to relinquish some of their most accessible towns.[2]

B.C. 312. Forces of Antigonus in Greece. Considerable success against Kassander.

The power of Antigonus in Asia underwent a material diminution, by the successful and permanent establishment which Seleukus now acquired in Babylonia; from which event the era of the succeeding Seleukidæ takes its origin. In Greece, however, Antigonus gained ground on Kassander. He sent thither his nephew Ptolemy with a large force to liberate the Greeks, or in other words, to expel the Kassandrian garrisons; while he at the same time distracted Kassander's attention by threatening to cross the Hellespont and invade Macedonia. This Ptolemy (not the Egyptian) expelled the soldiers of Kassander from Eubœa, Bœotia, and Phokis. Chalkis in Eubœa was at this time the chief military station of Kassander; Thebes (which he had recently re-established) was in alliance with him; but the remaining Bœotian towns were hostile to him. Ptolemy, having taken Chalkis—the citizens of which he conciliated by leaving them without any garrison—together with Oropus, Eretria, and Karystus—entered Attica, and presented himself before Athens. So much disposition to treat with him was manifested in the city, that Demetrius the Phalerean was obliged to gain time by pretending to open negotiations with Antigonus, while Ptolemy withdrew from Attica. Nearly at the same epoch, Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Leukas, found means, assisted by an armament from Korkyra, to drive out Kassander's garrisons, and to escape from his dominion.[3] The affairs of Antigonus were now prospering in Greece, but they were much thrown back by the discontent and treachery of his admiral Telesphorus, who seized Elis and even plundered the sacred treasures of

[1] Diodor. xix. 67, 68; Justin, xv. Ætolischen Volkes und Bundes, 2. See Brandstätter, Geschichte des p. 178 (Berlin, 1844).

[2] Diodor. xix. 74. [3] Diodor. xix. 77, 78, 89.

Olympia. Ptolemy presently put him down, and restored these treasures to the God.[1]

In the ensuing year, a convention was concluded between Antigonus on one side—and Kassander, Ptolemy (the Egyptian) and Lysimachus, on the other, whereby the supreme command in Macedonia was guaranteed to Kassander, until the maturity of Alexander son of Roxana; Thrace being at the same time assured to Lysimachus, Egypt to Ptolemy, and the whole of Asia to Antigonus. It was at the same time covenanted by all, that the Hellenic cities should be free.[2] Towards the execution of this last clause, however, nothing was actually done. Nor does it appear that the treaty had any other effect, except to inspire Kassander with increased jealousy about Roxana and her child; both of whom (as has been already stated) he caused to be secretly assassinated soon afterwards, by the governor Glaukias, in the fortress of Amphipolis, where they had been confined.[3] The forces of Antigonus, under his general Ptolemy, still remained in Greece. But this general presently (310 B.C.) revolted from Antigonus, and placed them in cooperation with Kassander; while Ptolemy of Egypt, accusing Antigonus of having contravened the treaty by garrisoning various Grecian cities, renewed the war and the triple alliance against him.[4]

B.C. 311. Pacification between the belligerents. Grecian autonomy guaranteed in name by all. Kassander puts to death Roxana and her child.

Polysperchon,—who had hitherto maintained a local dominion over various parts of Peloponnesus, with a military force distributed in Messênê and other towns[5]—was now encouraged by Antigonus to espouse the cause of Hêraklês (son of Alexander by Barsinê), and to place him on the throne of Macedonia in opposition to Kassander. This young prince Hêraklês, now seventeen years of age, was sent to Greece from Pergamus in Asia, and his pretensions to the throne were assisted not only by a considerable party in Macedonia itself, but also by the Ætolians. Polysperchon invaded Macedonia, with favourable

Polysperchon espouses the pretensions of Hêraklês son of Alexander, against Kassander. He enters into compact with Kassander, assassinates the young prince, and

[1] Diodor. xix. 87.
[2] Diodor. xix. 105.
[3] Diodor. xix. 105.
[4] Diodor. xx. 19.
[5] Messênê was garrisoned by Polysperchon (Diodor. xix. 64).

is recognized as ruler of Southern Greece.

prospects of establishing the young prince; yet he thought it advantageous to accept treacherous propositions from Kassander, who offered to him partnership in the sovereignty of Macedonia, with an independent army and dominion in Peloponnesus. Polysperchon, tempted by these offers, assassinated the young prince Hêraklês, and withdrew his army towards Peloponnesus. But he found such unexpected opposition, in his march through Bœotia, from Bœotians and Peloponnesians, that he was forced to take up his winter quarters in Lokris[1] (309 B.C.). From this time forward, as far as we can make out, he commanded in Southern Greece as subordinate ally or partner of Kassander;[2] whose Macedonian dominion, thus confirmed, seems to have included Akarnania and Amphilochia on the Ambrakian Gulf, together with the town of Ambrakia itself, and a supremacy over many of the Epirots.

B.C. 308. Assassination of Kleopatra, last surviving relative of Alexander the Great, by Antigonus.

The assassination of Hêraklês was speedily followed by that of Kleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great, and daughter of Philip and Olympias. She had been for some time at Sardis, nominally at liberty, yet under watch by the governor, who received his orders from Antigonus; she was now preparing to quit that place, for the purpose of joining Ptolemy in Egypt, and of becoming his wife. She had been invoked as auxiliary, or courted in marriage, by several of the great Macedonian chiefs, without any result. Now, however, Antigonus, afraid of the influence which her name might throw into the scale of his rival Ptolemy, caused her to be secretly murdered as she was preparing for her departure; throwing the blame of the deed on some of her women, whom he punished with death.[3] All the relatives of Alexander the Great (except Thessalonikê wife of Kassander, daughter of Philip by a Thessalian mistress) had now successively perished, and all by the orders of one or other among his principal officers. The imperial family, with the prestige of its name, thus came to an end.

[1] Diodor. xx. 28; Trogus Pompeius—Proleg. ad Justin. xv; Justin, xv. 2.

[2] Diodor. xx. 100-103; Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 6. King Pyrrhus was of προγόνων ἀεὶ ὀλοσυλευκότων Μακεδόσι—at least this was the reproach of Lysimachus (Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 12).

[3] Diodor. xx. 37: compare Justin, xiii. 6; xiv. 1.

Ptolemy of Egypt now set sail for Greece with a powerful armament. He acquired possession of the important cities—Sikyon and Corinth—which were handed over to him by Kratesipolis, widow of Alexander son of Polysperchon. He then made known by proclamation his purpose as a liberator, inviting aid from the Peloponnesian cities themselves against the garrisons of Kassander. From some he received encouraging answers and promises; but none of them made any movement, or seconded him by armed demonstrations. He thought it prudent therefore to conclude a truce with Kassander and retire from Greece, leaving however secure garrisons in Sikyon and Corinth.[1] The Grecian cities had now become tame and passive. Feeling their own incapacity of self-defence, and averse to auxiliary efforts, which brought upon them enmity without any prospect of advantage—they awaited only the turns of foreign interference and the behests of the potentates around them.

Ptolemy of Egypt in Greece—after some successes, he concludes a truce with Kassander. Passiveness of the Grecian cities.

The Grecian ascendency of Kassander, however, was in the following year exposed to a graver shock than it had ever yet encountered—by the sudden invasion of Demetrius called Poliorketês, son of Antigonus. This young prince, sailing from Ephesus with a formidable armament, contrived to conceal his purposes so closely, that he actually entered the harbour of Peiræus (on the 26th of the month Thargelion—May) without expectation, or resistance from any one; his fleet being mistaken for the fleet of the Egyptian Ptolemy. The Phalerean Demetrius, taken unawares, and attempting too late to guard the harbour, found himself compelled to leave it in possession of the enemy, and to retire within the walls of Athens; while Dionysius, the Kassandrian governor, maintained himself with his garrison in Munychia, yet without any army competent to meet the invaders in the field. This accomplished Phalerean, who had administered for ten years as the viceroy and with the force of Kassander, now felt his position and influence at Athens overthrown,

B.C. 307. Sudden arrival of Demetrius Poliorketês in Peiræus. The Athenians declare in his favour. Demetrius Phalereus retires to Egypt. Capture of Munychia and Megara.

[1] Diodor. xx. 37.

and even his personal safety endangered. He with other Athenians went as envoys on the ensuing day to ascertain what terms would be granted. The young prince ostentatiously proclaimed, that it was the intention of his father Antigonus and himself to restore and guarantee to the Athenians unqualified freedom and autonomy. Hence the Phalerean Demetrius foresaw that his internal opponents, condemned as they had been to compulsory silence during the last ten years, would now proclaim themselves with irresistible violence, so that there was no safety for him except in retreat. He accordingly asked and obtained permission from the invader to retire to Thebes, from whence he passed over soon after to Ptolemy in Egypt. The Athenians in the city declared in favour of Demetrius Poliorketês; who however refused to enter the walls until he should have besieged and captured Munychia, as well as Megara, with their Kassandrian garrisons. In a short time he accomplished both these objects. Indeed energy, skill, and effective use of engines, in besieging fortified places, were among the most conspicuous features in his character; procuring for him the surname whereby he is known to history. He proclaimed the Megarians free, levelling to the ground the fortifications of Munychia, as an earnest to the Athenians that they should be relieved for the future from all foreign garrison.[1]

B.C. 307. Demetrius Poliorketês enters Athens in triumph. He promises restoration of the democracy. Extravagant votes of flattery passed by the Athenians towards him.

After these successes, Demetrius Poliorketês made his triumphant entry into Athens. He announced to the people, in formal assembly, that they were now again a free democracy, liberated from all dominion either of soldiers from abroad or oligarchs at home. He also promised them a farther boon from his father Antigonus and himself—150,000 medimni of corn for distribution, and ship-timber in quantity sufficient for constructing 100 triremes. Both these announcements were received with grateful exultation. The feelings of the people were testified not merely in votes of thanks and admiration towards the young conqueror, but also in effusions of un-

[1] Philochor. Fragm. 144, ed. Didot; Diodor. xx. 45, 46; Plutarch, Demetrius, 8, 9. The occupation of Peiræus by Demetrius Poliorketês is related somewhat differently by Polyænus, iv. 7, 6.

measured and exorbitant flattery. Stratoklês (who has already been before us as one of the accusers of Demosthenês in the Harpalian affair) with others exhausted their invention in devising new varieties of compliment and adulation. Antigonus and Demetrius were proclaimed to be not only kings, but Gods and Saviours: a high priest of these Saviours was to be annually chosen, after whom each successive year was to be named (instead of being named after the first of the nine Archons, as had hitherto been the custom), and the dates of decrees and contracts commemorated; the month Munychion was re-named as Demetrion—two new tribes, to be called Antigonis and Demetrias, were constituted in addition to the preceding ten:—the annual senate was appointed to consist of 600 members instead of 500; the portraits and exploits of Antigonus and Demetrius were to be woven, along with those of Zeus and Athênê, into the splendid and voluminous robe periodically carried in procession, as an offering at the Panathenaic festival; the spot of ground where Demetrius had alighted from his chariot, was consecrated with an altar erected in honour of Demetrius Katæbates or the Descender. Several other similar votes were passed, recognizing, and worshipping as Gods, the Saviours Antigonus and Demetrius. Nay, we are told that temples or altars were voted to Phila-Aphroditê, in honour of Phila wife of Demetrius; and a like compliment was paid to his two mistresses, Leæna and Lamia. Altars are said to have been also dedicated to Adeimantus and others, his convivial companions or flatterers.[1] At the same time the numerous statues, which had been erected in honour of the Phalerean Demetrius during his decennial government, were overthrown, and some of them even turned to ignoble purposes, in order to cast greater scorn upon the past ruler.[2] The demonstrations of servile flattery at Athens, towards Demetrius Poliorketês, were in fact so extravagantly overdone, that he himself is said to have been disgusted with them, and to have expressed contempt for these degenerate Athenians of his own time.[3]

Two new Athenian tribes created.

[1] Plutarch, Demetrius, 9-11; Diod. xx. 47; Democharês ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 253.

[2] Diogen. Laert. v. 77. Among the numerous literary works (all lost) of the Phalerean Demetrius, one was entitled Ἀθηναίων κατα-δρομή (ib. v. 82).

[3] Democharês ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 253.

B.C. 307. Alteration of tone and sentiment in Athens, during the last thirty years.

In reviewing such degrading proceedings, we must recollect that thirty-one years had now elapsed since the battle of Chæroneia, and that during all this time the Athenians had been under the practical ascendency, and constantly augmenting pressure, of foreign potentates. The sentiment of this dependence on Macedonia had been continually strengthened by all the subsequent events—by the capture and destruction of Thebes, and the subsequent overwhelming conquests of Alexander—by the deplorable conclusion of the Lamian war, the slaughter of the free-spoken orators, the death of the energetic military leaders, and the deportation of Athenian citizens—lastly, by the continued presence of a Macedonian garrison in Peiræus or Munychia. By Phokion, Demetrius Phalereus, and the other leading statesmen of this long period, submission to Macedonia had been inculcated as a virtue, while the recollection of the dignity and grandeur of old autonomous Athens had been effaced or denounced as a mischievous dream. The fifteen years between the close of the Lamian war and the arrival of Demetrius Poliorketês (322-307 B.C.), had witnessed no free play, nor public discussion and expression, of conflicting opinions; the short period during which Phokion was condemned must be excepted, but that lasted only long enough to give room for the outburst of a preconceived but suppressed antipathy.

During these thirty years, of which the last half had been an aggravation of the first, a new generation of Athenians had grown up, accustomed to an altered phase of political existence. How few of those who received Demetrius Poliorketês, had taken part in the battle of Chæroneia, or listened to the stirring exhortations of Demosthenês in the war which preceded that disaster![1] Of the citizens who yet retained courage and patriotism to struggle again for their freedom after the death of Alexander, how many must have perished with Leosthenês in the Lamian war! The Athenians of 307 B.C. had come to conceive their own city, and Hellas generally, as dependent first on Kassander, next on the possible intervention of his equally overweening rivals, Ptolemy, Antigonus, Lysimachus, &c. If they shook

[1] Tacitus, Annal. i. 3. "Juniores quotusquisque reliquus, qui rempost Actiacam victoriam, seniores publicam vidisset?" plerique inter bella civium, nati:

off the yoke of one potentate, it could only be by the protectorate of another. The sentiment of political self-reliance and autonomy had fled; the conception of a citizen military force, furnished by confederate and cooperating cities, had been superseded by the spectacle of vast standing armies, organized by the heirs of Alexander and of his traditions.

Contrast of Athens as proclaimed free by Demetrius Poliorketês with Athens after the expulsion of Hippias.

Two centuries before (510 B.C.), when the Lacedæmonians expelled the despot Hippias and his mercenaries from Athens, there sprang up at once among the Athenian people a forward and devoted patriotism, which made them willing to brave, and competent to avert, all dangers in defence of their newly-acquired liberty.[1] At that time, the enemies by whom they were threatened, were Lacedæmonians, Thebans, Æginetans, Chalkidians, and the like (for the Persian force did not present itself until after some interval, and attacked not Athens alone, but Greece collectively). These hostile forces, though superior in number and apparent value to those of Athens, were yet not so disproportionate as to engender hopelessness and despair. Very different were the facts in 307 B.C., when Demetrius Poliorketês removed the Kassandrian mercenaries with their fortress Munychia, and proclaimed Athens free. To maintain that freedom by their own strength—in opposition to the evident superiority of organized force residing in the potentates around, one or more of whom had nearly all Greece under military occupation,—was an enterprise too hopeless to have been attempted even by men such as the combatants of Marathon or the contemporaries of Periklês. "Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow!" but the Athenians had not force enough to strike it; and the liberty proclaimed by Demetrius Poliorketês was a boon dependent upon him for its extent and even for its continuance. The Athenian assembly of that day was held under his army as masters of Attica, as it had been held a few months before under the controlling force of the Phalerean Demetrius together with the Kassandrian governor of Munychia; and the most fulsome votes of adulation proposed in honour of Demetrius Poliorketês by his partisans, though perhaps disapproved by many, would hardly find a single pronounced opponent.

[1] Herodotus, v. 78.

Opposition made by Democharês, nephew of Demosthenês, to these obsequious public flatteries.

One man, however, there was, who ventured to oppose several of the votes—the nephew of Demosthenês—Democharês, who deserves to be commemorated as the last known spokesman of free Athenian citizenship. We know only that such were his general politics, and that his opposition to the obsequious rhetor Stratoklês ended in banishment, four years afterwards.[1] He appears to have discharged the functions of general during this period—to have been active in strengthening the fortifications and military equipment of the city—and to have been employed in occasional missions.[2]

Demetrius Phalereus condemned in his absence. Honourable commemoration of the deceased orator Lykurgus.

The altered politics of Athens were manifested by impeachment against Demetrius Phalereus and other leading partisans of the late Kassandrian government. He and many others had already gone into voluntary exile; when their trials came on, they were not forthcoming, and all were condemned to death. But all those who remained, and presented themselves for trial, were acquitted;[3] so little was there of reactionary violence on this occasion. Stratoklês also proposed a decree, commemorating the orator Lykurgus (who had been dead about seventeen years) by a statue, an honorary inscription, and a grant of maintenance in the Prytaneum to his eldest surviving descendant.[4] Among those who

[1] Plutarch, Demetr. 24.

[2] Polybius, xii. 13; Decretum apud Plutarch. Vit. X Oratt. p. 851.

[3] Philochori Fragm. 144, ed. Didot, ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 636.

[4] Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p. 842-852. Lykurgus at his death (about 324 B.C.) left three sons, who are said, shortly after his death, to have been denounced by Menesæchmus, indicted by Thrasiklês, and put in prison ("handed over to the Eleven"). But Demoklês, a disciple of Theophrastus, stood forward on their behalf; and Demosthenês, then in banishment at Trœzen, wrote emphatic remonstrances to the Athenians against such unworthy treatment of the sons of a distinguished patriot. Accordingly the Athenians soon repented and released them.

This is what we find stated in Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p. 842. The third of the so-called Demosthenic Epistles purports to be the letter written on this subject by Demosthenês.

The harsh treatment of the sons of Lykurgus (whatever it may have amounted to, and whatever may have been its ground) certainly did not last long; for in the next page of the very same Plutarchian life (p. 843), an account is given of the family of Lykurgus, which was ancient and sacerdotal; and it is there stated that his sons

accompanied the Phalerean Demetrius into exile was the rhetor or logographer Deinarchus.

The friendship of this obnoxious Phalerean, and of Kassander also, towards the philosopher Theophrastus, seems to have been one main cause which occasioned the enactment of a restrictive law against the liberty of philosophising. It was decreed, on the proposition of a citizen named Sophoklês, that no philosopher should be allowed to open a school or teach, except under special sanction obtained from a vote of the Senate and people. Such was the disgust and apprehension occasioned by the new restriction, that all the philosophers with one accord left Athens. This spirited protest, against authoritative restriction on the liberty of philosophy and teaching, found responsive sympathy among the Athenians. The celebrity of the schools and professors was in fact the only characteristic mark of dignity still remaining to them —when their power had become extinct, and when even their independence and free constitution had degenerated into a mere name. It was moreover the great temptation for young men, coming from all parts of Greece, to visit Athens. Accordingly, a year had hardly passed, when Philon—impeaching Sophoklês the author of the law, under the Graphê Paranomôn—prevailed on the Dikastery to find

Restrictive law passed against the philosophers—they all leave Athens. The law is repealed next year, and the philosophers return to Athens.

after his death fully sustained the dignified position of the family.

On what ground they were accused, we cannot make out. According to the Demosthenic epistles (which epistles I have before stated that I do not believe to be authentic), it was upon some allegation, which, if valid at all, ought to have been urged against Lykurgus himself during his life (p. 1477, 1478); but Lykurgus had been always honourably acquitted, and always held thoroughly estimable, up to the day of his death (p. 1475).

Hyperidês exerted his eloquence on behalf of the sons of Lykurgus. A fragment, of considerable interest, from his oration, has been preserved by Apsinês (ap. Walz. Rhetor. Græc. ix. p. 545). Ὑπερείδης ὑπὲρ Λυκούργου λέγων—Τίνα φήσουσιν οἱ παριόντες αὐτοῦ τὸν τάφον; οὗτος ἐβίω μὲν σωφρόνως, ταχθεὶς δ' ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων εὗρε πόρους, ᾠκοδόμησε δὲ τὸ θέατρον, τὸ ᾠδεῖον, τὰ νεώρια, τριήρεις ἐποιήσατο καὶ λιμένας· τοῦτον ἡ πόλις ἠμῶν ἠτίμωσε, καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἐδίωξεν αὐτοῦ.

This fragment of Hyperidês was pointed out to my notice by Mr. Churchill Babington, the editor of the recently-discovered portions of Hyperidês.

him guilty, and condemn him to a fine of five talents. The restrictive law being thus repealed, the philosophers returned.[1] It is remarkable that Democharês stood forward as one of its advocates; defending Sophoklês against the accuser Philon. From scanty notices remaining of the speech of Democharês, we gather that, while censuring the opinions no less than the characters of Plato and Aristotle, he denounced yet more bitterly their pupils, as being for the most part ambitious, violent, and treacherous men. He cited by name several among them, who had subverted the freedom of their respective cities, and committed gross outrages against their fellow-citizens.[2]

B.C. 307. Exploits of Demetrius Poliorketês. His long siege of Rhodes. Gallant and successful resistance of the citizens.

Athenian envoys were despatched to Antigonus in Asia, to testify the gratitude of the people, and communicate the recent complimentary votes. Antigonus not only received them graciously, but sent to Athens, according to the promise made by his son, a large present of 150,000 medimni of wheat, with timber sufficient for 100 ships. He at the same time directed Demetrius to convene at Athens a synod of deputies from the allied Grecian cities, where resolutions might be taken for the common interests of Greece.[3] It was his interest at this moment to raise up a temporary self-sustaining authority in Greece, for the

[1] Diogen. Laert. v. 38. It is perhaps to this return of the philosophers that the φυγάδων κάθοδος mentioned by Philochorus, as foreshadowed by the omen in the Acropolis, alludes (Philochorus, Frag. 145, ed. Didot, ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 637).

[2] See the few fragments of Democharês collected in Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum, ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 445, with the notes of Carl Müller.

See likewise Athenæus, xiii. 610. with the fragment from the comic writer Alexis. It is there stated that Lysimachus also, king of Thrace, had banished the philosophers from his dominions.

Democharês might find (besides the persons named in Athenæ. v. 215, xi.508) other authentic examples of pupils of Plato and Isokratês who had been atrocious and sanguinary tyrants in their native cities—see the case of Klearchus of Herakleia, Memnon ap. Photium, Cod. 224. cap. 1. Chion and Leonidês, the two young citizens who slew Klearchus, and who perished in endeavouring to liberate their country—were also pupils of Plato (Justin, xvi. 5). In fact, aspiring youths, of all varieties of purpose, were likely to seek this mode of improvement. Alexander the Great, too, the very impersonation of subduing force, had been the pupil of Aristotle.

[3] Diodor. xx. 46.

purpose of upholding the alliance with himself, during the absence of Demetrius; whom he was compelled to summon into Asia with his army—requiring his services for the war against Ptolemy in Syria and Cyprus.

The following three years were spent by Demetrius—1. In victorious operations near Cyprus, defeating Ptolemy and making himself master of that island; after which Antigonus and Demetrius assumed the title of kings, and the example was followed by Ptolemy, in Egypt—by Lysimachus, in Thrace—and by Seleukus, in Babylonia, Mesopotamia, and Syria[1]—thus abolishing even the titular remembrance of Alexander's family. 2. In an unsuccessful invasion of Egypt by land and sea, repulsed with great loss. 3. In the siege of Rhodes. The brave and intelligent citizens of this island resisted for more than a year the most strenuous attacks and the most formidable siege-equipments of Demetrius Poliorketês. All their efforts however would have been vain had they not been assisted by large reinforcements and supplies from Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Such are the conditions under which alone even the most resolute and intelligent Greeks can now retain their circumscribed sphere of autonomy. The siege was at length terminated by a compromise; the Rhodians submitted to enrol themselves as allies of Demetrius, yet under proviso not to act against Ptolemy.[2] Towards the latter they carried their grateful devotion so far, as to erect a temple to him, called the Ptolemæum, and to worship him (under the sanction of the oracle of Ammon) as a God.[3] Amidst the rocks and shoals through which Grecian cities were now condemned to steer, menaced on every side by kings more powerful than themselves, and afterwards by the giant-republic of Rome—the Rhodians conducted their political affairs with greater prudence and dignity than any other Grecian city.

Shortly after the departure of Demetrius from Greece to Cyprus, Kassander and Polysperchon renewed the war in Peloponnesus and its neighbourhood.[4] We make out no particulars respecting this war. B.C. 307-303. His prolonged war, and

[1] Diodor. xx. 53; Plutarch, Demetr. 18.

[2] Diodor. xx. 99. Probably this proviso extended also to Lysimachus and Kassander (both of whom had assisted Rhodes) as well as to Ptolemy—though Diodorus does not expressly say so.

[3] Diodor. xx. 100.

[4] Diodor. xx. 100.

ultimate success in Greece, against Kassander.

The Ætolians were in hostility with Athens, and committed annoying depredations.[1] The fleet of Athens, repaired or increased by the timber received from Antigonus, was made to furnish thirty quadriremes to assist Demetrius in Cyprus, and was employed in certain operations near the island of Amorgos, wherein it suffered defeat.[2] But we can discover little respecting the course of the war, except that Kassander gained ground upon the Athenians, and that about the beginning of 303 B.C. he was blockading, or threatening to blockade, Athens. The Athenians invoked the aid of Demetrius Poliorketês, who, having recently concluded an accommodation with the Rhodians, came again across from Asia, with a powerful fleet and army, to Aulis in Bœotia.[3] He was received at Athens with demonstrations of honour equal or superior to those which had marked his previous visit. He seems to have passed a year and a half, partly at Athens, partly in military operations carried successfully over many parts of Greece. He compelled the Bœotians to evacuate the Eubœan city of Chalkis, and to relinquish their alliance with Kassander. He drove that prince out of Attica—expelled his garrisons from the two frontier fortresses of Attica—Phylê and Panaktum,—and pursued him as far as Thermopylæ. He captured, or obtained by bribing the garrisons, the important towns of Corinth, Argos, and Sikyon; mastering also Ægium, Bura, all the Arcadian towns (except Mantineia), and various other towns in Peloponnesus.[4] He celebrated, as president, the great festival of the Heræa at Argos; on which occasion he married Deidameia, sister of Pyrrhus, the young king of Epirus. He prevailed on the Sikyonians to transfer to

[1] That the Ætolians were just now most vexatious enemies to Athens, may be seen by the Ithyphallic ode addressed to Demetrius Poliorketês (Athenæus, vi. p. 253).

[2] Diodor. xx. 50; Plutarch, Demetrius 11. In reference to this defeat near Amorgos, Stratoklês (the complaisant orator who moved the votes of flattery towards Demetrius and Antigonus) is said to have announced it first as a victory, to the great joy of the people. Presently evidences of the defeat arrived, and the people were angry with Stratoklês. "What harm has happened to you?—(replied he)—have you not had two days of pleasure and satisfaction?" This is at any rate a very good story.

[3] Diodor. xx. 100; Plutarch, Demetrius 23.

[4] Diodor. xx. 102, 103; Plutarch, Demetr. 23-25.

a short distance the site of their city, conferring upon the new city the name of Demetrias.[1] At a Grecian synod, convened in Corinth under his own letters of invitation, he received by acclamation the appointment of leader or Emperor of the Greeks, as it had been conferred on Philip and Alexander. He even extended his attacks as far as Leukas and Korkyra. The greater part of Greece seems to have been either occupied by his garrisons, or enlisted among his subordinates.

So much was Kassander intimidated by these successes, that he sent envoys to Asia, soliciting peace from Antigonus; who, however, elate and full of arrogance, refused to listen to any terms short of surrender at discretion. Kassander, thus driven to despair, renewed his applications to Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus. All these princes felt equally menaced by the power and dispositions of Antigonus—and all resolved upon an energetic combination to put him down.[2]

B.C. 302-301. Return of Demetrius Poliorketês to Athens —his triumphant reception—memorable Ithyphallic hymn addressed to him.

After uninterrupted prosperity in Greece, throughout the summer of 302 B.C., Demetrius returned from Leukas to Athens, about the month of September, near the time of the Eleusinian mysteries.[3] He was welcomed by festive processions, hymns, pæans, choric dances, and bacchanalian odes of joyous congratulation. One of these hymns is preserved, sung by a chorus of Ithyphalli—masked revellers, with their heads and arms encircled by wreaths,—clothed in white tunics, and in feminine garments reaching almost to the feet.[4]

This song is curious, as indicating the hopes and fears prevalent among Athenians of that day, and as affording a measure of their self-appreciation. It is moreover among the latest Grecian documents that we possess, bearing on actual and present reality. The poet, addressing Demetrius as a God, boasts that two of the greatest and best-

[1] Diodor. xx. 102; Plutarch, Demetr. 25; Pausanias, ii. 7, 1. The city was withdrawn partially from the sea, and approximated closely to the acropolis. The new city remained permanently; but the new name Demetrias gave place to the old name Sikyon.

[2] Diodor. xx. 106.

[3] That he returned from Leukas about the time of these mysteries, is attested both by Democharês and by the Ithyphallic ode in Athenæus, vi. p. 253. See also Duris ap. Athenæum xii. p. 535.

[4] Semus ap. Athenæum xiv. p. 622.

beloved of all divine beings are visiting Attica at the same moment—Dêmêtêr (coming for the season of her mysteries), and Demetrius, son of Poseidon and Aphroditê. "To thee we pray (the hymn proceeds); for other Gods are either afar off—or have no ears—or do not exist—or care nothing about us; but *thee* we see before us, not in wood or marble, but in real presence. First of all things, establish peace; for thou hast the power—and chastise that Sphinx who domineers, not merely over Thebes, but over all Greece—the Ætolian, who (like the old Sphinx) rushes from his station on the rock to snatch and carry away our persons, and against whom we cannot fight. At all times, the Ætolians robbed their neighbours; but now, they rob far as well as near."[1]

Helpless condition of the Athenians—proclaimed by themselves.

Effusions such as these, while displaying unmeasured idolatry and subservience towards Demetrius, are yet more remarkable, as betraying a loss of force, a senility, and a consciousness of defenceless and degraded position, such as we are astonished to find publicly proclaimed at Athens. It is not only against the foreign potentates that the Athenians avow themselves incapable of self-defence, but even against the incursions of the Ætolians, —Greeks like themselves, though warlike, rude, and restless.[2] When such were the feelings of a people, once the most daring, confident, and organizing—and still the most intelligent—in Greece, we may see that the history of the Greeks as a separate nation or race is reaching its close—and that from henceforward they must become merged in one or other of the stronger currents that surround them.

After his past successes, Demetrius passed some months in enjoyment and luxury at Athens. He was lodged in the Parthenon, being considered as the guest of the Goddess

[1] Athenæus, vi. p. 253.

Ἄλλοι μὲν ἢ μακρὰν γὰρ ἀπέχουσιν ἢ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὦτα, [θεοί,
ἢ οὐκ εἰσίν, ἢ οὐ προσέχουσιν ἡμῖν σὲ δὲ παρόντ' ὁρῶμεν, [οὐδὲ ἔν-
υδρ ξύλινον, οὐδὲ λίθινον, ἀλλ' ἀληθινόν.
Εὐχόμεσθα δή σοι·
ρῶτον μὲν εἰρήνην ποιῆσον, φίλτατε,
κύριος γὰρ εἶ σύ.
Ἢν δ' οὐχὶ θηβῶν, ἀλλ' ὅλης τῆς
Σφίγγα περικρατοῦσαν, [Ἑλλάδος,
Αἰτωλὸς ὅστις ἐπὶ πέτρας καθήμενος,
ὥσπερ ἡ παλαιά,
τὰ σώματ' ἡμῶν πάντ' ἀναρπάσας
κοὐκ ἔχω μάχεσθαι· [φέρει,
Αἰτωλικὸν γὰρ ἁρπάσαι τὰ τῶν πέλας,
νυνὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ πόρρω—
μάλιστα μὲν δὴ κόλασον αὐτός· εἰ δὲ
Οἰδίπουν τιν' εὗρε, [μή,
τὴν Σφίγγα ταύτην ὅστις ἦ κατα-
ἢ σπίνον ποιήσει. [χρημνιεῖ,

[2] Compare Pausanias, vii. 7, 4.

Athênê. But his dissolute habits provoked the louder comments, from being indulged in such a domicile; while the violences which he offered to beautiful youths of good family led to various scenes truly tragical. The subservient manifestations of the Athenians towards him, however, continued unabated. It is even affirmed, that, in order to compensate for something which he had taken amiss, they passed a formal decree, on the proposition of Stratoklês, declaring that every thing which Demetrius might command was holy in regard to the Gods and just in regard to men.[1] The banishment of Democharês is said to have been brought on by his sarcastic comments upon this decree.[2] In the month Munychion (April) Demetrius mustered his forces and his Grecian allies for a march into Thessaly against Kassander; but before his departure, he was anxious to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries. It was however not the regular time for this ceremony; the Lesser Mysteries being celebrated in February, the Greater in September. The Athenians overruled the difficulty by passing a special vote, enabling him to be initiated at once, and to receive, in immediate succession, the preparatory and the final initiation, between which ceremonies a year of interval was habitually required. Accordingly he placed himself disarmed in the hands of the priests, and received both first and second initiation in the month of April, immediately before his departure from Athens.[3]

B.C. 301. Idolatry of Demetrius at Athens. He is initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries, out of the regular season.

[1] Plutarch, Demetr. 24.

[2] Such is the statement of Plutarch (Demetr. 24); but it seems not in harmony with the recital of the honorary decree, passed in 272 B.C., after the death of Democharês, commemorating his merits by a statue, &c. (Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p. 850). It is there recited that Democharês rendered services to Athens (fortifying and arming the city, concluding peace and alliance with the Bœotians, &c., ἐπὶ τοῦ τετραετοῦς πολέμου, ἀνθ' ὧν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον. Οἱ καταλύσαντες τὸν δῆμον cannot mean either Demetrius Poliorketês, or Stratoklês. Moreover, we cannot determine when the "four years' war," or the alliance with the Bœotians, occurred. Neither the discussion of Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. 302 B.C., and Append. p. 383), nor the different hypothesis of Droysen, are satisfactory on this point—see Carl Müller's discussion on the Fragments of Democharês, Fragm. Hist. Gr. v. ii. p. 446.

[3] Diodor. xx. 110. παραδοὺς οὖν αὐτὸν ἄνοπλον τοῖς ἱερεῦσι, καὶ πρὸ τῆς ὡρισμένης ἡμέρας μυηθείς, ἀνέζευξεν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν.

The account of this transaction in the text is taken from Diodorus,

B.C. 301. March of Demetrius into Thessaly—he passes into Asia and joins Antigonus—great battle of Ipsus, in which the four confederates completely defeat Antigonus, who is slain, and his Asiatic power broken up and partitioned.

Demetrius conducted into Thessaly an army of 56,000 men; of whom 25,000 were Grecian allies—so extensive was his sway at this moment over the Grecian cities.[1] But after two or three months of hostilities, partially successful, against Kassander, he was summoned into Asia by Antigonus to assist in meeting the formidable army of the allies—Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Before retiring from Greece, Demetrius concluded a truce with Kassander, whereby it was stipulated that the Grecian cities, both in Europe and Asia, should be permanently autonomous and free from garrison or control. This stipulation served only as an honourable pretext for leaving Greece; Demetrius had little expectation that it would be observed.[2] In the ensuing spring was fought the decisive battle of Ipsus in Phrygia (B.C. 300)

and is a simple one; a vote was passed granting special licence to Demetrius, to receive the mysteries at once, though it was not the appointed season.

Plutarch (Demetr. 26) superadds other circumstances, several of which have the appearance of jest rather than reality. Pythodôrus the Daduch or Torch-bearer of the Mysteries stood alone in his protest against any celebration of the ceremony out of time: this is doubtless very credible. Then (according to Plutarch) the Athenians passed decrees, on the proposition of Stratoklês, that the month Munychion should be called Anthesterion. This having been done, the Lesser Mysteries were celebrated, in which Demetrius was initiated. Next, the Athenians passed another decree, to the effect, that the month Munychion should be called Boêdromion — after which, the Greater Mysteries (which belonged to the latter month) were forthwith celebrated. The comic writer Philippidês said of Stratoklês, that he had compressed the whole year into one single month.

This statement of Plutarch has very much the air of a caricature, by Philippidês or some other witty man, of the simple decree mentioned by Diodorus — a special licence to Demetrius to be initiated out of season. Compare another passage of Philippidês against Stratoklês (Plutarch, Demetr. 12).

[1] Diodor. xx. 110.

[2] Diodor. xx. 111. It must have been probably during this campaign that Demetrius began or projected the foundation of the important city of Demetrias on the Gulf of Magnesia, which afterwards became one of the great strongholds of the Macedonian ascendency in Greece (Strabo, ix. p. 436-443, in which latter passage, the reference to Hieronymus of Kardia seems to prove that that historian gave a full description of Demetrias and its foundation). See about Demetrias, Mannert, Geogr. v. Griech. vii. p. 591.

by Antigonus and Demetrius, against Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus; with a large army and many elephants on both sides. Antigonus was completely defeated and slain, at the age of more than eighty years. His Asiatic dominion was broken up, chiefly to the profit of Seleukus, whose dynasty became from henceforward ascendent, from the coast of Syria eastward to the Caspian Gates and Parthia; sometimes, though imperfectly, farther eastward, nearly to the Indus.[1]

The effects of the battle of Ipsus were speedily felt in Greece. The Athenians passed a decree proclaiming themselves neutral, and excluding both the belligerent parties from Attica. Demetrius, retiring with the remnant of his defeated army, and embarking at Ephesus to sail to Athens, was met on the voyage by Athenian envoys, who respectfully acquainted him that he would not be admitted. At the same time, his wife Deidameia, whom he had left at Athens, was sent away by the Athenians under an honourable escort to Megara, while some ships of war which he had left in the Peiræus were also restored to him. Demetrius, indignant at this unexpected defection of a city which had recently heaped upon him such fulsome adulation, was still farther mortified by the loss of most of his other possessions in Greece.[2] His garrisons were for the most part expelled, and the cities passed into Kassandrian keeping or dominion. His fortunes were indeed partially restored by concluding a peace with Seleukus, who married his daughter. This alliance withdrew Demetrius to Syria, while Greece appears to have fallen more and more under the Kassandrian parties. It was one of these partisans, Lacharês, who, seconded by Kassander's soldiers, acquired a despotism at Athens such

B.C. 300. Restoration of the Kassandrian dominion in Greece. Lacharês makes himself despot at Athens, under Kassander. Demetrius Poliorketês returns, and expels Lacharês. He garrisons Peiræus and Munychia.

[1] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hell. B.C. 301) places the battle of Ipsus in August 301 B.C.; which appears to me some months earlier than the reality. It is clear from Diodorus (and indeed from Mr. Clinton's own admission) that winter-quarters in Asia intervened between the departure of Demetrius from Athens in or soon after April 301 B.C., and the battle of Ipsus. Moreover Demetrius, immediately after leaving Athens, carried on many operations against Kassander in Thessaly, before crossing over to Asia to join Antigonus (Diodor. xx. 110, 111).

[2] Plutarch, Demetr. 31.

as had been possessed by the Phalerean Demetrius, but employed in a manner far more cruel and oppressive. Various exiles, driven out by his tyranny, invited Demetrius Poliorketês, who passed over again from Asia into Greece, recovered portions of Peloponnesus, and laid siege to Athens. He blocked up the city by sea and land, so that the pressure of famine presently became intolerable. Lacharês having made his escape, the people opened their gates to Demetrius, not without great fear of the treatment awaiting them. But he behaved with forbearance, and even with generosity. He spared them all, supplied them with a large donation of corn, and contented himself with taking military occupation of the city, naming his own friends as magistrates. He put garrisons, however, not only into Peiræus and Munychia, but also into the hill called Museum, a part of the walled circle of Athens itself[1] (B.C. 298).

While Demetrius was thus strengthening himself in Greece, he lost all his footing both in Cyprus, Syria, and Kilikia, which passed into the hands of Ptolemy and Seleukus. New prospects however were opened to him in Macedonia by the death of Kassander (his brother-in-law, brother of his wife Phila) and the family feuds supervening thereupon. Philippus, eldest son of Kassander, succeeded his father, but died of sickness after something more than a year. Between the two remaining sons, Antipater and Alexander, a sanguinary hostility broke out. Antipater slew his mother Thessalonikê, and threatened the life of his brother, who in his turn invited aid both from Demetrius and from the Epirotic king Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus being ready first, marched into Macedonia, and expelled Antipater; receiving as his recompense the territory called Tymphæa (between Epirus and Macedonia), together with Akarnania, Amphilochia, and the town of Ambrakia, which became henceforward his

B.C. 298-296. Death of Kassander. Bloody feuds among his family. Demetrius acquires the crown of Macedonia.

[1] Plutarch, Demetr. 34, 35; Pausan. i. 25, 5. Pausanias states (i. 26, 2) that a gallant Athenian named Olympiodorus (we do not know when) encouraged his fellow-citizens to attack the Museum, Munychia, and Peiræus; and expelled the Macedonians from all of them. If this be correct, Munychia and Peiræus must have been afterwards reconquered by the Macedonians; for they were garrisoned (as well as Salamis and Sunium) by Antigonus Gonatas (Pausanias, ii. 8, 5; Plutarch, Aratus, 34).

chief city and residence.[1] Antipater sought shelter in Thrace with his father-in-law Lysimachus; by whose order, however, he was presently slain. Demetrius, occupied with other matters, was more tardy in obeying the summons; but, on entering into Macedonia, he found himself strong enough to dispossess and kill Alexander (who had indeed invited him, but is said to have laid a train for assassinating him), and seized the Macedonian crown; not without the assent of a considerable party, to whom the name and the deeds of Kassander and his sons were alike odious.[2]

Demetrius became thus master of Macedonia, together with the greater part of Greece, including Athens, Megara, and much of Peloponnesus. He undertook an expedition into Bœotia, for the purpose of conquering Thebes; in which attempt he succeeded, not without a double siege of that city, which made an obstinate resistance. He left as viceroy in Bœotia the historian, Hieronymus of Kardia,[3] once the attached friend and fellow-citizen of Eumenês. But Greece as a whole was managed by Antigonus (afterwards called Antigonus Gonatas) son of Demetrius, who maintained his supremacy unshaken during all his father's lifetime; even though Demetrius was deprived of Macedonia by the temporary combination of Lysimachus with Pyrrhus, and afterwards remained (until his death in 283 B.C.) a captive in the hands of Seleukus. After a brief possession of the crown of Macedonia successively by Seleukus, Ptolemy Keraunus, Meleager, Antipater, and Sosthenês—Antigonus Gonatas regained it in 277 B.C. His descendants the Antigonid kings maintained it until the battle of Pydna in 168 B.C.; when Perseus, the last of them, was overthrown, and his kingdom incorporated with the Roman conquests.[4]

B.C. 294. Antigonus Gonatas, son of Demetrius, master of Macedonia and Greece. Permanent footing of the Antigonid dynasty in Macedonia, until the conquest of that country by the Romans.

Of Greece during this period we can give no account, except that the greater number of its cities were in dependence upon Demetrius and his son Antigonus; either under occupation by Macedonian

Spirit of the Greeks broken—isolation of

[1] Plutarch, Pyrrhus 6.

[2] Plutarch, Demetr. 36; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 264 *seq.*; Pausanias ix. 7, 3; Justin, xvi. 1, 2.

[3] Plutarch, Demetr. 39.

[4] See Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, Append. 4. p. 236-239.

the cities from each other by Antigonus.

garrisons, or ruled by local despots who leaned on foreign mercenaries and Macedonian support. The spirit of the Greeks was broken, and their habits of combined sentiment and action had disappeared. The invasion of the Gauls indeed awakened them into a temporary union for the defence of Thermopylæ in 279 B.C. So intolerable was the cruelty and spoliation of those barbarian invaders, that the cities as well as Antigonus were driven by fear to the efforts necessary for repelling them.[1] A gallant army of Hellenic confederates was mustered. In the mountains of Ætolia and in the neighbourhood of Delphi, most of the Gallic horde with their king Brennus perished. But this burst of spirit did not interrupt the continuance of the Macedonian dominion in Greece, which Antigonus Gonatas continued to hold throughout most of a long reign. He greatly extended the system begun by his predecessors, of isolating each Grecian city from alliances with other cities in its neighbourhood—planting in most of them local despots—and compressing the most important by means of garrisons.[2] Among all Greeks, the Spartans and the Ætolians stood most free from foreign occupation, and were the least crippled in their power of self-action. The Achæan league too developed itself afterwards as a renovated sprout from the ruined tree of Grecian liberty,[3] though never attaining to anything better than a feeble and puny life, nor capable of sustaining itself without foreign aid.[4]

With this after-growth, or half-revival, I shall not meddle. It forms the Greece of Polybius, which that author treats, in my opinion justly, as having no history of its own,[5]

[1] Pausanias, i. 4, 1; x. 20, 1. Τοῖς δέ γε Ἕλλησι κατεπεπτώκει μὲν ἐς ἅπαν τὰ φρονήματα, τὸ δὲ ἰσχυρὸν τοῦ δείματος προῆγεν ἐς ἀνάγκην τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀμύνειν· ἐώρων δὲ τὸν τε ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀγῶνα, οὐκ ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας γενησόμενον, κάθα ἐπὶ τοῦ Μήδου πότε . . . . . ὡς οὖν ἀπολωλέναι δέον ἢ ἐπικρατεστέρους εἶναι, κατ' ἄνδρα τε ἰδίᾳ καὶ αἱ πόλεις διέκειντο ἐν κοινῷ. (On the approach of the invading Gauls.)

[2] Polyb. ii. 40, 41. πλείστους γὰρ δὴ μονάρχους οὗτος (Antigonus Gonatas) ἐμφυτεῦσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. Justin, xxvi. 1.

[3] Pausanias vii. 17, 1. Ἅτε ἐκ δένδρου λελωβημένου, ἀνεβλάστησεν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸ Ἀχαϊκόν.

[4] Plutarch, Aratus 47. ἐθισθέντες γὰρ ἀλλοτρίαις σώζεσθαι χερσὶν, καὶ τοῖς Μακεδόνων ὅπλοις αὐτοὺς ὑπεσταλκότες (the Achæans), &c. Compare also c. 12, 13, 15, in reference to the earlier applications to Ptolemy king of Egypt.

[5] Polybius i. 3, 4; ii. 37.

but as an appendage attached to some foreign centre and principal among its neighbours — Macedonia, Egypt, Syria, Rome. Each of these neighbours acted upon the destinies of Greece more powerfully than the Greeks themselves. The Greeks to whom these volumes have been devoted—those of Homer, Archilochus, Solon, Æschylus, Herodotus, Thucydidês, Xenophon, and Demosthenês —present as their most marked characteristic a loose aggregation of autonomous tribes or communities, acting and reacting freely among themselves, with little or no pressure from foreigners. The main interest of the narrative has consisted in the spontaneous grouping of the different Hellenic fractions—in the self-prompted coöperations and conflicts—the abortive attempts to bring about something like an effective federal organization, or to maintain two permanent rival confederacies—the energetic ambition, and heroic endurance, of men to whom Hellas was the entire political world. The freedom of Hellas, the life and soul of this history from its commencement, disappeared completely during the first years of Alexander's reign. After following to their tombs the generation of Greeks contemporary with him, men like Demosthenês and Phokion, born in a state of freedom — I have pursued the history into that gulf of Grecian nullity which marks the succeeding century; exhibiting sad evidence of the degrading servility, and suppliant king-worship, into which the countrymen of Aristeidês and Periklês had been driven, by their own conscious weakness under overwhelming pressure from without.

The Greece of Polybius cannot form a subject of history by itself, but is essentially dependent on foreign neighbours.

I cannot better complete that picture than by showing what the leading democratical citizen became, under the altered atmosphere which now bedimmed his city. Democharês, the nephew of Demosthenês, has been mentioned as one of the few distinguished Athenians in this last generation. He was more than once chosen to the highest public offices;[1] he was conspicuous for his free speech, both as an orator and as an historian, in the face of powerful enemies; he remained throughout a long life faithfully attached to the democratical constitution, and was banished for

Evidence of the political nullity of Athens— public decree in honour of

[1] Polybius xii. 13.

Democharês—what acts are recorded as his titles to public gratitude.

a time by its opponents. In the year 280 B.C., he prevailed on the Athenians to erect a public monument, with a commemorative inscription, to his uncle Demosthenês. Seven or eight years afterwards, Democharês himself died, aged nearly eighty. His son Lachês proposed and obtained a public decree, that a statue should be erected, with an annexed inscription, to his honour. We read in the decree a recital of the distinguished public services, whereby Democharês merited this compliment from his countrymen. All that the proposer of the decree, his son and fellow-citizen, can find to recite, as ennobling the last half of the father's public life (since his return from exile), is as follows:—1. He contracted the public expenses, and introduced a more frugal management. 2. He undertook an embassy to King Lysimachus, from whom he obtained two presents for the people, one of thirty talents, the other of one hundred talents. 3. He proposed the vote for sending envoys to King Ptolemy in Egypt, from whom fifty talents were obtained for the people. 4. He went as envoy to Antipater, received from him twenty talents, and delivered them to the people at the Eleusinian festival.[1]

When such begging missions are the deeds for which Athens both employed and recompensed her most eminent citizens, an historian accustomed to the Grecian world as described by Herodotus, Thucydidês, and Xenophon, feels that the life has departed from his subject, and with sadness and humiliation brings his narrative to a close.

[1] See the decree in Plutarch, Vit. X Oratt. p. 850. The Antipater here mentioned is the son of Kassander, not the father. There is no necessity for admitting the conjecture of Mr. Clinton (Fast. Hell. App. p. 380) that the name ought to be *Antigonus*, and not *Antipater*; although it may perhaps be true that Democharês was on favourable terms with Antigonus Gonatas (Diog. Laert. vii. 14).

Compare Carl Müller ad Democharis Fragm. apud Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 446, ed. Didot.

# CHAPTER XCVII.

## SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS.—AGATHOKLES.

Constitution established by Timoleon at Syracuse—exchanged for an oligarchy.

IT has been convenient, throughout all this work, to keep the history of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks distinct from that of the Central and Asiatic. We parted last from the Sicilian Greeks,[1] at the death of their champion the Corinthian Timoleon (337 B.C.), by whose energetic exploits, and generous political policy, they had been almost regenerated — rescued from foreign enemies, protected against intestine discord, and invigorated by a large reinforcement of new colonists. For the twenty years next succeeding the death of Timoleon, the history of Syracuse and Sicily is an absolute blank; which is deeply to be regretted, since the position of these cities included so much novelty—so many subjects for debate, for peremptory settlement, or for amicable compromise—that the annals of their proceedings must have been peculiarly interesting. Twenty years after the death of Timoleon, we find the government of Syracuse described as an oligarchy; implying that the constitution established by Timoleon must have been changed either by violence or by consent. The oligarchy is stated as consisting of 600 chief men, among whom Sosistratus and Herakleidês appear as leaders.[2] We hear generally that the Syracusans had been engaged in wars, and that Sosistratus either first originated, or first firmly established, his oligarchy, after an expedition undertaken to the coast of Italy, to assist the citizens of Kroton against their interior neighbours and assailants the Bruttians.

[1] See Ch. LXXXV.

[2] Diodor. xix. 3. It appears that Diodorus had recounted in his eighteenth Book the previous circumstances of these two leaders; but this part of his narrative is lost: see Wesseling's note

Italian Greeks—pressed upon by enemies from the interior—Archidamus king of Sparta slain in Italy.

Not merely Kroton, but other Grecian cities also on the coast of Italy, appear to have been exposed to causes of danger and decline, similar to those which were operating upon so many other portions of the Hellenic world. Their non-Hellenic neighbours in the interior were growing too powerful and too aggressive to leave them in peace or security. The Messapians, the Lucanians, the Bruttians, and other native Italian tribes, were acquiring that increased strength which became ultimately all concentrated under the mighty republic of Rome. I have in my preceding chapters recounted the acts of the two Syracusan despots, the elder and younger Dionysius, on this Italian coast.[1] Though the elder gained some advantage over the Lucanians, yet the interference of both contributed only to enfeeble and humiliate the Italiot Greeks. Not long before the battle of Chæroneia (340-338 B.C.), the Tarentines found themselves so hard pressed by the Messapians, that they sent to Sparta, their mother-city, to entreat assistance. The Spartan king Archidamus son of Agesilaus, perhaps ashamed of the nullity of his country since the close of the Sacred War, complied with their prayer, and sailed at the head of a mercenary force to Italy. How long his operations there lasted, we do not know; but they ended by his being defeated and killed, near the time of the battle of Chæroneia[2] (338 B.C.).

Rise of the Molossian kingdom of Epirus by Macedonian aid—Alexander the Molossian king, brother of Olympias.

About six years after this event, the Tarentines, being still pressed by the same formidable neighbours, invoked the aid of the Epirotic Alexander, king of the Molossians, and brother of Olympias. These Epirots now, during the general decline of Grecian force, rise into an importance which they had never before enjoyed.[3] Philip of Macedon, having married Olympias, not only secured his brother-in-law on the Molossian throne, but strengthened his authority over sub-

[1] See Chaps. LXXXIII; LXXXV.

[2] Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Camill. 19; Pausan. iii. 10, 5. Plutarch even says that the two battles occurred on the same *day*.

[3] The Molossian King Neoptolemus was father both of Alexander (the Epirotic) and of Olympias. But as to the genealogy of the preceding kings, nothing certain can be made out: see Merleker, Darstellung des Landes und der

jects not habitually obedient. It was through Macedonian interference that the Molossian Alexander first obtained (though subject to Macedonian ascendency) the important city of Ambrakia; which thus passed out of a free Hellenic community into the capital and seaport of the Epirotic kings. Alexander farther cemented his union with Macedonia by marrying his own niece Kleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias. In fact, during the lives of Philip and Alexander the Great, the Epirotic kingdom appears a sort of adjunct to the Macedonian; governed by Olympias either jointly with her brother the Molossian Alexander —or as regent after his death.[1]

B.C. 332-331. The Molossian Alexander crosses into Italy to assist the Tarentines. His exploits and death.

It was about the year after the battle of Issus that the Molossian Alexander undertook his expedition into Italy;[2] doubtless instigated in part by emulation of the Asiatic glories of his nephew and namesake. Though he found enemies more formidable than the Persians at Issus, yet his success was at first considerable. He gained victories over the Messapians, the Lucanians, and the Samnites; he conquered the Lucanian town of Consentia, and the Bruttian town of

Bewohner von Epeiros, Königsberg 1844, p. 2-6.

[1] A curious proof of how fully Olympias was queen of Epirus is preserved in the oration of Hyperidês in defence of Euxenippus, recently published by Mr. Babington, p. 12. The Athenians, in obedience to an oracular mandate from the Dodonaan Zeus, had sent to Dodona a solemn embassy for sacrifice, and had dressed and adorned the statue of Diônê there situated. Olympias addressed a despatch to the Athenians, reproving them for this as a trespass upon her dominions—ὑπὲρ τούτων ὑμῖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἦλθε παρ' Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς, ὡς ἡ χώρα εἴη ἡ Μολοσσία αὐτῆς, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἱερόν ἐστιν· οὐκ ὂν προσῆκεν ὑμῖν τῶν ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ ἓν κινεῖν. Olympias took a high and insolent tone in this letter (τὰς τραγῳδίας αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς κατηγορίας &c.).

The date of this oration is at some period during the life of Alexander the Great — but cannot be more precisely ascertained. After the death of Alexander, Olympias passed much time in Epirus, where she thought herself more secure from the enmity of Antipater (Diodor. xviii. 49).

Dodona had been one of the most ancient places of pilgrimage for the Hellenic race—especially for the Athenians. The order here addressed to them,—that they should abstain from religious manifestations at this sanctuary — is a remarkable proof of the growing encroachments on free Hellenism; the more so, as Olympias sent offerings to temples at Athens when she chose and without asking permission — we learn this from the same fragment of Hyperidês.

[2] Livy (viii. 3-24) places the date of this expedition of the Molossian

Tereina; he established an alliance with the Pœdiculi, and exchanged friendly messages with the Romans. As far as we can make out from scanty data, he seems to have calculated on establishing a comprehensive dominion in the south of Italy, over all its population—over Greek cities, Lucanians, and Bruttians. He demanded and obtained three hundred of the chief Lucanian and Messapian families, whom he sent over as hostages to Epirus. Several exiles of these nations joined him as partisans. He farther endeavoured to transfer the congress of the Greco-Italian cities, which had been usually held at the Tarentine colony of Herakleia, to Thurii; intending probably to procure for himself a compliant synod like that serving the purpose of his Macedonian nephew at Corinth. But the tide of his fortune at length turned. The Tarentines became disgusted and alarmed; his Lucanian partisans proved faithless; the stormy weather in the Calabrian Apennines broke up the communication between his different detachments, and exposed them to be cut off in detail. He himself perished, by the hands of a Lucanian exile, in crossing the river Acheron, and near the town of Pandosia. This was held to be a memorable attestation of the prophetic veracity of the oracle; since he had received advice from Dodona to beware of Pandosia and Acheron; two names which he well knew, and therefore avoided, in Epirus—but which he had not before known to exist in Italy.[1]

Assistance sent by the Syracusans to Kroton—first rise of Agathoklês.

The Greco-Italian cities had thus dwindled down into a prize to be contended for between the Epirotic kings and the native Italian powers—as they again became, still more conspicuously, fifty years afterwards, during the war between Pyrrhus and the Romans. They were now left to seek foreign aid, where they could obtain it, and to become the prey of adventurers. It is in this capacity that we hear of them as receiving assistance from Syracuse, and that the formidable name of Agathoklês first comes before us—seemingly about 320 B.C.[2] The Syracusan force, sent to Italy to assist the Krotoniates against their enemies the Bruttians, was commanded by a general named Antander, whose

Alexander eight years earlier; but it is universally recognized that this is a mistake.

[1] Livy, viii. 17-24; Justin, xii. 2; Strabo, vi. p. 280.

[2] Diodor. xix. 3.

brother Agathoklês served with him in a subordinate command.

To pass over the birth and childhood of Agathoklês—respecting which romantic anecdotes are told, as about most eminent men—it appears that his father, a Rhegine exile named Karkinus, came from Therma (in the Carthaginian portion of Sicily) to settle at Syracuse, at the time when Timoleon invited and received new Grecian settlers to the citizenship of the latter city. Karkinus was in comparative poverty, following the trade of a potter; which his son Agathoklês learnt also, being about eighteen years of age when domiciliated with his father at Syracuse.[1] Though starting from this humble beginning, and even notorious for the profligacy and rapacity of his youthful habits, Agathoklês soon attained a conspicuous position, partly from his own superior personal qualities, partly from the favour of a wealthy Syracusan named Damas. The young potter was handsome, tall, and of gigantic strength; he performed with distinction the military service required from him as a citizen, wearing a panoply so heavy, that no other soldier could fight with it; he was moreover ready, audacious, and emphatic in public harangue. Damas became much attached to him, and not only supplied him profusely with money, but also, when placed in command of a Syracusan army against the Agrigentines, nominated him one of the subordinate officers. In this capacity Agathoklês acquired great reputation for courage in battle, ability in command, and fluency of speech. Presently Damas died of sickness, leaving a widow without children. Agathoklês married the widow, and thus raised himself to a high fortune and position in Syracuse.[2]

Agathoklês distinguishes himself in the Syracusan expedition—he is disappointed of honours—

Of the oligarchy which now prevailed at Syracuse, we have no particulars, nor do we know how it had come to be substituted for the more popular forms established by Timoleon. We hear only generally that the oligarchical leaders, Sosistratus and Herakleidês, were unprincipled and sanguinary men.[3] By this government an expedition was despatched from Syracuse to the Italian coast,

[1] Timæus apud Polybium, xii. 15; Diodor. xix. 2.

[2] Diodor. xix. 3; Justin, xxii. 1. Justin states the earliest military exploits of Agathoklês to have been against the Ætnæans, not against the Agrigentines.

[3] Diodor. xix. 3, 4. Diodorus had

becomes discontented and leaves Syracuse.

to assist the inhabitants of Kroton against their aggressive neighbours the Bruttians. Antander, brother of Agathoklês, was one of the generals commanding this armament, and Agathoklês himself served in it as a subordinate officer. We neither know the date, the duration, nor the issue, of this expedition. But it afforded a fresh opportunity to Agathoklês to display his adventurous bravery and military genius, which procured for him high encomium. He was supposed by some, on his return to Syracuse, to be entitled to the first prize for valour; but Sosistratus and the other oligarchical leaders withheld it from him and preferred another. So deeply was Agathoklês incensed by this refusal, that he publicly inveighed against them among the people, as men aspiring to despotism. His opposition being unsuccessful, and drawing upon him the enmity of the government, he retired to the coast of Italy.

He levies a mercenary force—his exploits as general in Italy and Sicily.

Here he levied a military band of Grecian exiles and Campanian mercenaries, which he maintained by various enterprises for or against the Grecian cities. He attacked Kroton, but was repulsed with loss; he took service with the Tarentines, fought for some time against their enemies, but at length became suspected and dismissed. Next, he joined himself with the inhabitants of Rhegium, assisting in the defence of the town against a Syracusan aggression. He even made two attempts to obtain admission by force into Syracuse, and to seize the government.[1] Though repulsed in both of them, he nevertheless contrived to maintain a footing in Sicily, was appointed general at the town of Morgantium, and captured Leontini, within a short distance north of Syracuse. Some time afterwards, a revolution took place at Syracuse, whereby Sosistratus and the oligarchy were dispossessed and exiled with many of their partisans.

Under the new government, Agathoklês obtained his recall, and soon gained increased ascendency. The dis-

written more about this oligarchy in a part of his eighteenth book; which part is not preserved: see Wesseling's note.

[1] Diodor. xix. 4; Justin, xxii. 1. "Bis occupare imperium Syracusarum voluit; bis in exilium actus est."

In the same manner, the Syracusan exile Hermokratês had attempted to extort by force his return, at the head of 3000 men, and by means of partisans within; he failed and was slain — B.C. 408 (Diodor. xiii. 75).

possessed exiles contrived to raise forces, and to carry on a formidable war against Syracuse from without; they even obtained assistance from the Carthaginians, so as to establish themselves at Gela, on the southern confines of the Syracusan territory. In the military operations thus rendered necessary, Agathoklês took a forward part, distinguishing himself among the ablest and most enterprising officers. He tried, with 1000 soldiers, to surprise Gela by night; but finding the enemy on their guard, he was repulsed with loss and severely wounded; yet by an able manœuvre he brought off all his remaining detachment. Though thus energetic against the public enemy, however, he at the same time inspired both hatred and alarm for his dangerous designs, to the Syracusans within. The Corinthian Akestoridês, who had been named general of the city—probably from recollection of the distinguished services formerly rendered by the Corinthian Timoleon—becoming persuaded that the presence of Agathoklês was full of peril to the city, ordered him to depart, and provided men to assassinate him on the road during the night. But Agathoklês, suspecting their design, disguised himself in the garb of a beggar, appointing another man to travel in the manner which would be naturally expected from himself. This substitute was slain in the dark by the assassins, while Agathoklês escaped by favour of his disguise. He and his partisans appear to have found shelter with the Carthaginians in Sicily.[1]

Change of government at Syracuse—Agathoklês is recalled—his exploits against the exiles—his dangerous character at home.

Not long afterwards, another change took place in the government of Syracuse, whereby the oligarchical exiles were recalled, and peace made with the Carthaginians. It appears that a senate of 600 was again installed as the chief political body; probably not the same men as before, and with some democratical modifications. At the same time, negotiations were opened, through the mediation of the Carthaginian commander Hamilkar, between the Syracusans and Agathoklês. The mischiefs of intestine conflict, amidst the

Farther internal changes at Syracuse—recall of the exiles—Agathoklês readmitted—swears amnesty and fidelity.

[1] Diodor. xix. 5, 6. A similar stratagem is recounted of the Karian Datamês (Cornelius Nepos, Datamês, 9). That Agathoklês, on leaving Syracuse, went to the Carthaginians, appears to be implied in the words of Diodorus, c. 6—τοὺς αὐτῷ πρότ-

numerous discordant parties in the city, pressed hard upon every one, and hopes were entertained that all might be brought to agree in terminating them. Agathoklês affected to enter cordially into these projects of amnesty and reconciliation. The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, who had so recently aided Sosistratus and the Syracusan oligarchy, now did his best to promote the recall of Agathoklês, and even made himself responsible for the good and pacific behaviour of that exile. Agathoklês, and the other exiles along with him, were accordingly restored. A public assembly was convened in the temple of Dêmêtêr, in the presence of Hamilkar; where Agathoklês swore by the most awful oaths, with his hands touching the altar and statue of the goddess, that he would behave as a good citizen of Syracuse, uphold faithfully the existing government, and carry out the engagements of the Carthaginian mediators —abstaining from encroachments on the rights and possessions of Carthage in Sicily. His oaths and promises were delivered with so much apparent sincerity, accompanied by emphatic harangues, that the people were persuaded to name him general and guardian of the peace, for the purpose of realising the prevailing aspirations towards harmony. Such appointment was recommended (it seems) by Hamilkar.[1]

ρον συμπορευθέντας πρὸς Καρχηδονίους (see Wesseling's note on the translation of πρὸς). This fact is noticed merely incidentally, in the confused narrative of Diodorus; but it brings him to a certain extent into harmony with Justin (xxii. 2), who insists much on the combination between Agathoklês and the Carthaginians, as one of the main helps whereby he was enabled to seize the supreme power.

[1] The account here given is the best which I can make out from Diodorus (xix, 5), Justin (xxii. 2), —Polyænus (v. 3, 8). The first two allude to the solemn oath taken by Agathoklês—παραχθεὶς εἰς τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ὥμοσε μηδὲν ἐναντιωθήσεσθαι τῇ ὁμοκρατίᾳ—"Tunc Hamilcari expositis ignibus Cereris tactisque in obsequia Pœnorum jurat." "Jurare in obsequia Pœnorum" can hardly be taken to mean that Syracuse was to become subject to Carthage; there was nothing antecedent to justify such a proceeding, nor does anything follow in the sequel which implies it.

Compare also the speech which Justin puts into the mouth of Bomilkar when executed for treason by the Carthaginians—"objectans illis (Carthaginiensibus) in Hamilcarem patruum suum tacita suffragia, quod Agathoclem *socium illis facere, quam hostem maluerit*" (xxii. 7). This points to previous collusion between Hamilkar and Agathoklês.

All this train of artifice had been concerted by Agathoklês with Hamilkar, for the purpose of enabling the former to seize the supreme power. As general of the city, Agathoklês had the direction of the military force. Under pretence of marching against some refractory exiles at Erbita in the interior, he got together 3000 soldiers strenuously devoted to him—mercenaries and citizens of desperate character—to which Hamilkar added a reinforcement of Africans. As if about to march forth, he mustered his troops at daybreak in the Timoleontion (chapel or precinct consecrated to Timoleon), while Peisarchus and Deklês, two chiefs of the senate already assembled, were invited with forty others to transact with him some closing business. Having these men in his power, Agathoklês suddenly turned upon them, and denounced them to the soldiers as guilty of conspiring his death. Then, receiving from the soldiers a response full of ardour, he ordered them immediately to proceed to a general massacre of the senate and their leading partisans, with full permission of licentious plunder in the houses of these victims, the richest men in Syracuse. The soldiers rushed into the streets with ferocious joy to execute this order. They slew not only the senators, but many others also, unarmed and unprepared; each man selecting victims personally obnoxious to him. They broke open the doors of the rich, or climbed over the roofs, massacred the proprietors within, and ravished the females. They chased the unsuspecting fugitives through the streets, not sparing even those who took refuge in the temples. Many of these unfortunate sufferers rushed for safety to the gates, but found them closed and guarded by special order of Agathoklês; so that they were obliged to let themselves down from the walls, in which many perished miserably. For two days Syracuse was thus a prey to the sanguinary, rapacious, and lustful impulses of the soldiery; four thousand citizens had been already slain, and many more were seized as prisoners. The political purposes of Agathoklês, as well as the passions of the soldiers, being then sated, he arrested the massacre. He concluded this bloody feat by killing such of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and banishing the rest. The total number of expelled or fugitive

Agathoklês, in collusion with Hamilkar, arms his partisans at Syracuse, and perpetrates a sanguinary massacre of the citizens.

Syracusans is stated at 6000; who found a hospitable shelter and home at Agrigentum. One act of lenity is mentioned, and ought not to be omitted amidst this scene of horror. Deinokratês, one among the prisoners, was liberated by Agathoklês from motives of former friendship: he too, probably, went into voluntary exile.[1]

Agathoklês is constituted sole despot of Syracuse.

After a massacre thus perpetrated in the midst of profound peace, and in the full confidence of a solemn act of mutual reconciliation immediately preceding—surpassing the worst deeds of the elder Dionysius, and indeed (we might almost say) of all other Grecian despots—Agathoklês convened what he called an assembly of the people. Such of the citizens as were either oligarchical, or wealthy, or in any way unfriendly to him, had been already either slain or expelled; so that the assembly probably included few besides his own soldiers. Agathoklês—addressing them in terms of congratulation on the recent glorious exploit, whereby they had purged the city of its oligarchical tyrants—proclaimed that the Syracusan people had now reconquered their full liberty. He affected to be weary of the toils of command, and anxious only for a life of quiet equality as one among the many; in token of which he threw off his general's cloak and put on a common civil garment. But those whom he addressed, fresh from the recent massacre and plunder, felt that their whole security depended upon the maintenance of his supremacy, and loudly protested that they would not accept his resignation. Agathoklês, with pretended reluctance, told them, that if they insisted, he would comply, but upon the peremptory condition of enjoying a single-handed authority, without any colleagues or counsellors for whose misdeeds he was to be responsible. The assembly replied by conferring upon him, with unanimous acclamations, the post of general with unlimited power, or despot.[2]

Thus was constituted a new despot of Syracuse about fifty years after the decease of the elder Dionysius, and twenty-two years after Timoleon had rooted out the Dionysian dynasty, establishing on its ruins a free polity. On accepting the post, Agathoklês took pains to proclaim that he would tolerate no farther massacre or plunder,

[1] Diodor. xix. 8, 9; Justin, xxii. 2. [2] Diodor. xix. 9.

and that his government would for the future be mild and beneficent. He particularly studied to conciliate the poorer citizens, to whom he promised abolition of debts and a new distribution of lands. How far he carried out this project systematically, we do not know; but he conferred positive donations on many of the poor—which he had abundant means of doing, out of the properties of the numerous exiles recently expelled. He was full of promises to every one, displaying courteous and popular manners, and abstaining from all ostentation of guards, or ceremonial attendants, or a diadem. He at the same time applied himself vigorously to strengthen his military and naval force, his magazines of arms and stores, and his revenues. He speedily extended his authority over all the territorial domain of Syracuse, with her subject towns, and carried his arms successfully over many other parts of Sicily.[1]

B.C. 317. His popular manners, military energy, and conquests.

The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, whose complicity or connivance had helped Agathoklês to this blood-stained elevation, appears to have permitted him without opposition to extend his dominion over a large portion of Sicily, and even to plunder the towns in alliance with Carthage itself. Complaints having been made to Carthage, this officer was superseded, and another general (also named Hamilkar) was sent in his place. We are unable to trace in detail the proceedings of Agathoklês during the first years of his despotism; but he went on enlarging his sway over the neighbouring cities, while the Syracusan exiles, whom he had expelled, found a home partly at Agrigentum (under Deinokratês), partly at Messênê. About the year 314 B.C., we hear that he made an attempt on Messênê, which he was on the point of seizing, had he not been stopped by the interference of the Carthaginians (perhaps the newly-appointed Hamilkar), who now at length protested against his violation of the convention; meaning (as we must presume, for we know of no other convention) the oath which had been sworn by Agathoklês at Syracuse under the guarantee of the Carthaginians.[2] Though thus disappointed

B.C. 317-310. Progress of Agathoklês in conquering Sicily. The Agrigentines take alarm and organise a defensive alliance against him.

[1] Diodor. xix. 9; Justin, xxii. 2.

[2] Diodor. xix. 65. καθ' ὃν δὴ χρόνον ἦκον ἐκ Καρχηδόνος πρέσβεις, οἱ τῷ μὲν Ἀγαθοκλεῖ περὶ τῶν πραχθέντων

at Messênê, Agathoklês seized Abakœnum — where he slew the leading citizens opposed to him,—and carried on his aggressions elsewhere so effectively, that the leaders at Agrigentum, instigated by the Syracusan exiles there harboured, became convinced of the danger of leaving such encroachments unresisted.[1] The people of Agrigentum came to the resolution of taking up arms on behalf of the liberties of Sicily, and allied themselves with Gela and Messênê for the purpose.

They invite the Spartan Akrotatus to command—his bad conduct and failure.

But the fearful example of Agathoklês himself rendered them so apprehensive of the dangers from any military leader, at once native and energetic, that they resolved to invite a foreigner. Some Syracusan exiles were sent to Sparta, to choose and invoke some Spartan of eminence and ability, as Archidamus had recently been called to Tarentum — and even more, as Timoleôn had been brought from Corinth, with results so signally beneficent. The old Spartan king Kleomenês (of the Eurysthenid race) had a son Akrotatus, then unpopular at home,[2] and well disposed towards foreign warfare. This prince, without even consulting the Ephors, listened at once to the envoys, and left Peloponnesus with a small squadron, intending to cross by Korkyra and the coast of Italy to Agrigentum. Unfavourable winds drove him as far north as Apollonia, and delayed his arrival at Tarentum; in which city, originally a Spartan colony, he met with a cordial reception, and obtained a vote of twenty vessels to assist his enterprize of liberating Syracuse from Agathoklês. He reached Agri-

ἐπετίμησαν, ὡς παραβαίνοντι τὰς συνθήκας· τοῖς δὲ Μεσσηνίοις εἰρήνην παρεσκεύασαν, καὶ τὸ φρούριον ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποκαταστῆσαι τὸν τύραννον, ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Λιβύην.

I do not know what συνθῆκαι can be here meant, except that oath described by Justin under the words "in obsequia Pœnorum jurat" (xxii. 2).

[1] Diodor. xix. 70. μὴ περιορᾶν Ἀγαθοκλέα συσκευαζόμενον τὰς πόλεις.

[2] Diodor. xix. 70. After the defeat of Agis by Antipater, the severe Lacedæmonian laws against those who fled from battle had been suspended for the occasion; as had been done before, after the defeat of Leuktra. Akrotatus had been the *only* person (μόνος) who opposed this suspension; whereby he incurred the most violent odium generally, but most especially from the citizens who profited by the suspension. These men carried their hatred so far, that they even attacked, beat him, and conspired against his life (οὗτοι γὰρ συστραφέντες πληγάς τε ἐνέφόρησαν αὐτῷ καὶ διετέλουν ἐπιβουλεύοντες).

This is a curious indication of Spartan manners.

gentum with favourable hopes, was received with all the honours due to a Spartan prince, and undertook the command. Bitterly did he disappoint his party. He was incompetent as a general; he dissipated in presents or luxuries the money intended for the campaign, emulating Asiatic despots; his conduct was arrogant, tyrannical, and even sanguinary. The disgust which he inspired was brought to a height, when he caused Sosistratus, the leader of the Syracusan exiles, to be assassinated at a banquet. Immediately the exiles rose in a body to avenge this murder; while Akrotatus, deposed by the Agrigentines, only found safety in flight.[1]

To this young Spartan prince, had he possessed a noble heart and energetic qualities, there was here presented a career of equal grandeur with that of Timoleon—against an enemy able indeed and formidable, yet not so superior in force as to render success impossible. It is melancholy to see Akrotatus, from simple worthlessness of character, throwing away such an opportunity; at a time when Sicily was the only soil on which a glorious Hellenic career was still open — when no similar exploits were practicable by any Hellenic leader in Central Greece, from the overwhelming superiority of force possessed by the surrounding kings.

Sicily the only place in which a glorious Hellenic career was open.

The misconduct of Akrotatus broke up all hopes of active operations against Agathoklês. Peace was presently concluded with the latter by the Agrigentines and their allies, under the mediation of the Carthaginian general Hamilkar. By the terms of this convention, all the Greek cities in Sicily were declared autonomous yet under the hegemony of Agathoklês; excepting only Himera, Selinus, and Herakleia, which were actually, and were declared still to continue, under Carthage. Messênê was the only Grecian city standing aloof from this convention; as such, therefore still remaining open to the Syracusan exiles. The terms were so favourable to Agathoklês, that they were much disapproved at Carthage.[2] Agathoklês

Peace concluded by Agathoklês with the Agrigentines—his great power in Sicily.

[1] Diodor. xix. 71.

[2] Diodor. xix. 71, 72, 102. When the convention specifies Herakleia, Selinus, and Himera, as being under the Carthaginians, this is to be understood as in addition to the primitive Carthaginian settlements of Solus, Panormus, Lilybæum, &c., about which no question could arise.

recognized as chief and having no enemy in the field, employed himself actively in strengthening his hold on the other cities, and in enlarging his military means at home. He sent a force against Messênê, to require the expulsion of the Syracusan exiles from that city, and to procure at the same time the recall of the Messenian exiles, partisans of his own, and companions of his army. His generals extorted these two points from the Messenians. Agathoklês, having thus broken the force of Messênê, secured to himself the town still more completely, by sending for those Messenian citizens who had chiefly opposed him, and putting them all to death, as well as his leading opponents at Tauromenium. The number thus massacred was not less than six hundred.[1]

He is repulsed from Agrigentum—the Carthaginians send an armament to Sicily against him.

It only remained for Agathoklês to seize Agrigentum. Thither he accordingly marched. But Deinokratês and the Syracusan exiles, expelled from Messênê, had made themselves heard at Carthage, insisting on the perils to that city from the encroachments of Agathoklês. The Carthaginians alarmed sent a fleet of sixty sail, whereby alone Agrigentum, already under siege by Agathoklês, was preserved. The recent convention was now broken on all sides, and Agathoklês kept no farther measures with the Carthaginians. He ravaged all their Sicilian territory, and destroyed some of their forts; while the Carthaginians on their side made a sudden descent with their fleet on the harbour of Syracuse. They could achieve nothing more, however, than the capture of one Athenian merchant-vessel, out of two there riding. They disgraced their acquisition by the cruel act (not uncommon in Carthaginian warfare) of cutting off the hands of the captive crew; for which, in a few days, retaliation was exercised upon the crews of some of their own ships, taken by the cruisers of Agathoklês.[2]

The defence of Agrigentum now rested principally on the Carthaginians in Sicily, who took up a position on the hill called Eknomus—in the territory of Gela, a little to

[1] Diodor. xix. 72: compare a different narrative—Polyænus, v. 15.

[2] Diodor. xix. 103. It must be noticed, however, that even Julius Cæsar, in his wars in Gaul, sometimes cut off the hands of his Gallic prisoners taken in arms, whom he called rebels (Bell. Gall. viii. 44).

the west of the Agrigentine border. Here Agathoklês approached to offer them battle—having been emboldened by two important successes obtained over Deinokratês and the Syracusan exiles, near Kentoripa and Gallaria.[1] So superior was his force, however, that the Carthaginians thought it prudent to remain in their camp; and Agathoklês returned in triumph to Syracuse, where he adorned the temples with his recently acquired spoils. The balance of force was soon altered by the despatch of a large armament from Carthage under Hamilkar, consisting of 130 ships of war, with numerous other transport ships, carrying many soldiers—2000 native Carthaginians, partly men of rank—10,000 Africans—1000 Campanian heavy-armed and 1000 Balearic slingers. The fleet underwent in its passage so terrific a storm, that many of the vessels sunk with all on board, and it arrived with very diminished numbers in Sicily. The loss fell upon the native Carthaginian soldiers with peculiar severity; insomuch that when the news reached Carthage, a public mourning was proclaimed, and the city walls were hung with black serge.

B.C. 310. Position of the Carthaginians between Gela and Agrigentum—their army reinforced from home.

Those who reached Sicily, however, were quite sufficient to place Hamilkar in an imposing superiority of number as compared with Agathoklês. He encamped on or near Eknomus, summoned all the reinforcements that his Sicilian allies could furnish, and collected additional mercenaries; so that he was soon at the head of 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry.[2] At the same time, a Carthaginian armed squadron, detached to the strait of Messênê, fell in with twenty armed ships belonging to Agathoklês, and captured them all with their crews. The Sicilian cities were held to Agathoklês principally by terror, and were likely to turn against him, if the Carthaginians exhibited sufficient strength to protect them. This the despot knew and dreaded; especially respecting Gela, which was not far from the Carthaginian camp. Had he announced himself openly as intending to place a garrison in Gela, he feared that the citizens might forestal him by calling in Hamilkar. Accordingly he detached thither, on various pretences, several

Operations of Agathoklês against them—his massacre of citizens at Gela.

[1] Diodor. xix. 103, 104.

[2] Diodor. xix. 106.

small parties of soldiers, who presently found themselves united in a number sufficient to seize the town. Agathoklês then marched into Gela with his main force. Distrusting the adherence of the citizens, he let loose his soldiers upon them, massacred four thousand persons, and compelled the remainder, as a condition of sparing their lives, to bring in to him all their money and valuables. Having by this atrocity both struck universal terror and enriched himself, he advanced onward towards the Carthaginian camp, and occupied a hill called Phalarion opposite to it.[1] The two camps were separated by a level plain or valley nearly five miles broad, through which ran the river Himera.[2]

B.C. 310. Battle of the Himera, between Agathoklês and the Carthaginians.

For some days of the hottest season (the dog-days), both armies remained stationary, neither of them choosing to make the attack. At length Agathoklês gained what he thought a favourable opportunity. A detachment from the Carthaginian camp sallied forth in pursuit of some Grecian plunderers; Agathoklês posted some men in ambush, who fell upon this detachment unawares, threw it into disorder, and pursued it back to the camp. Following up this partial success, Agathoklês brought forward his whole force, crossed the river Himera, and began a general attack. This advance not being expected, the Grecian assailants seemed at first on the point of succeeding. They filled up a portion of the ditch, tore up the stockade, and were forcing their way into the camp. They were however repulsed by redoubled efforts, and new troops coming up, on the part of the defenders; mainly, too, by the very effective action of the 1000 Balearic slingers in Hamilkar's army, who hurled stones weighing a pound each, against which the Grecian armour was an inadequate defence. Still Agathoklês, noway discouraged, caused the attack to be renewed on several points at once, and with apparent success, when a reinforcement landed from Carthage—the expectation of which may perhaps have induced Hamilkar to refrain from any general attack. These new troops joined in the battle, coming upon the rear of the Greeks; who were intimidated and disordered by such unforeseen assailants, while the Carthaginians in their front,

Total defeat of Agathoklês by the Carthaginians.

[1] Diodor. xix. 107, 108.

[2] Diodor. xix. 108, 109.

animated to more energetic effort, first repulsed them from the camp, and then pressed them vigorously back. After holding their ground for some time against their double enemy, the Greeks at length fled in disorder back to their own camp, recrossing the river Himera. The interval was between four and five miles of nearly level ground, over which they were actively pursued and severely handled by the Carthaginian cavalry, 5000 in number. Moreover, in crossing the river, many of them drank eagerly, from thirst, fatigue, and the heat of the weather; the saltness of the water proved so destructive to them, that numerous dead bodies are said to have been found unwounded on the banks.[1] At length they obtained shelter in their own camp, after a loss of 7000 men; while the loss of the victors is estimated at 500.

The Carthaginians recover a large part of Sicily from Agathoklês.

His depressed condition at Syracuse.

Agathoklês, after this great disaster, did not attempt to maintain his camp, but set it on fire, and returned to Gela; which was well fortified and provisioned, capable of a long defence. Here he intended to maintain himself against Hamilkar, at least until the Syracusan harvest (probably already begun) should be completed. But Hamilkar, having ascertained the strength of Gela, thought it prudent to refrain from a siege, and employed himself in operations for the purpose of strengthening his party in Sicily. His great victory at the Himera had produced the strongest effect upon many of the Sicilian cities, who were held to Agathoklês by no other bonds except those of fear. Hamilkar issued conciliatory proclamations, inviting them all to become his allies, and marching his troops towards the most convenient points. Presently Kamarina, Leontini, Katana, Tauromenium, Messênê, Abakænum, with several other smaller towns and forts, sent to tender themselves as allies; and the conduct of Hamilkar towards all was so mild and equitable, as to give universal satisfaction. Agathoklês appears to have been thus dispossessed of most part of the island, retaining little besides Gela and Syracuse. Even the harbour of Syracuse was watched by a Carthaginian fleet, placed to intercept foreign supplies. Returning to Syracuse after Hamilkar had renounced all attempts on

[1] Diodor. xix. 109.

Gela, Agathoklês collected the corn from the neighbourhood, and put the fortifications in the best state of defence. He had every reason to feel assured that the Carthaginians, encouraged by their recent success, and reinforced by allies from the whole island, would soon press the siege of Syracuse with all their energy; while for himself, hated by all, there was no hope of extraneous support, and little hope of a successful defence.[1]

He conceives the plan of attacking the Carthaginians in Africa.

In this apparently desperate situation, he conceived the idea of a novelty alike daring, ingenious, and effective; surrounded indeed with difficulties in the execution, but promising, if successfully executed, to change altogether the prospects of the war. He resolved to carry a force across from Syracuse to Africa, and attack the Carthaginians on their own soil. No Greek, so far as we know, had ever conceived the like scheme before; no one certainly had ever executed it. In the memory of man, the African territory of Carthage had never been visited by hostile foot. It was known that the Carthaginians would be not only unprepared to meet an attack at home, but unable even to imagine it as practicable. It was known that their territory was rich, and their African subjects harshly treated, discontented, and likely to seize the first opportunity for revolting. The landing of any hostile force near Carthage would strike such a blow, as at least to cause the recall of the Carthaginian armament in Sicily, and thus relieve Syracuse; perhaps the consequences of it might be yet greater.

His energy and sagacity in organizing this expedition. His renewed massacre and spoliation.

How to execute the scheme was the grand difficulty—for the Carthaginians were superior not merely on land, but also at sea. Agathoklês had no chance except by keeping his purpose secret, and even unsuspected. He fitted out an armament, announced as about to sail forth from Syracuse on a secret expedition, against some unknown town on the Sicilian coast. He selected for this purpose his best troops, especially his horsemen, few of whom had been slain at the battle of the Himera: he could not transport horses, but he put the horsemen aboard with their saddles and bridles, entertaining

[1] Diodor. xix. 110.

full assurance that he could procure horses in Africa. In selecting soldiers for his expedition, he was careful to take one member from many different families, to serve as hostage for the fidelity of those left behind. He liberated, and enrolled among his soldiers, many of the strongest and most resolute slaves. To provide the requisite funds, his expedients were manifold; he borrowed from merchants, seized the money belonging to orphans, stripped the women of their precious ornaments, and even plundered the richest temples. By all these proceedings, the hatred as well as fear towards him was aggravated, especially among the more opulent families. Agathoklês publicly proclaimed, that the siege of Syracuse, which the Carthaginians were now commencing, would be long and terrible—that he and his soldiers were accustomed to hardships and could endure them, but that those who felt themselves unequal to the effort might retire with their properties while it was yet time. Many of the wealthier families—to a number stated as 1600 persons—profited by this permission; but as they were leaving the city, Agathoklês set his mercenaries upon them, slew them all, and appropriated their possessions to himself.[1] By such tricks and enormities, he provided funds enough for an armament of sixty ships, well filled with soldiers. Not one of these soldiers knew where they were going; there was a general talk about the madness of Agathoklês; nevertheless such was their confidence in his bravery and military resource, that they obeyed his orders without asking questions. To act as viceroy of Syracuse during his own absence, Agathoklês named Antander his brother, aided by an Ætolian officer named Erymnon.[2]

The armament was equipped and ready, without any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginian fleet blockading the harbour. It happened one day that the approach of some corn-ships seduced this fleet into a pursuit; the mouth of the harbour being thus left unguarded, Agathoklês took the opportunity of striking with his armament into the open sea. As soon as the Carthaginian fleet saw him sailing forth, they neglected the corn-ships, and prepared for battle, which they presumed

He gets out of the harbour in spite of the blockading fleet. Eclipse of the sun. He reaches Africa safely.

[1] Diodor. xx. 4, 5; Justin, xxii. 4. Compare Polyænus, v. 3-5.
[2] Diodor. xx. 4-16.

that he was come to offer. To their surprise, he stood out to sea as fast as he could; they then pushed out in pursuit of him, but he had already got a considerable advance and strove to keep it. Towards nightfall however they neared him so much, that he was only saved by the darkness. During the night he made considerable way; but on the next day there occurred an eclipse of the sun so nearly total, that it became perfectly dark, and the stars were visible. The mariners were so terrified at this phenomenon, that all the artifice and ascendency of Agathoklês were required to inspire them with new courage. At length, after six days and nights, they approached the coast of Africa. The Carthaginian ships had pursued them at a venture, in the direction towards Africa; and they appeared in sight just as Agathoklês was nearing the land. Strenuous efforts were employed by the mariners on both sides to touch land first; Agathoklês secured that advantage, and was enabled to put himself into such a posture of defence that he repulsed the attack of the Carthaginian ships, and secured the disembarkation of his own soldiers, at a point called the Latomiæ or Stone-quarries.[1]

He burns his vessels—impressive ceremony for effecting this, under vow to Dêmêtêr.

After establishing his position ashore, and refreshing his soldiers, the first proceeding of Agathoklês was to burn his vessels; a proceeding which seemed to carry an air of desperate boldness. Yet in truth the ships were now useless—for, if he was unsuccessful on land, they were not enough to enable him to return in the face of the Carthaginian fleet; they were even worse than useless, since, if he retained them, it was requisite that he should leave a portion of his army to guard them, and thus enfeeble his means of action for the really important achievements on land. Convening his soldiers in assembly near the ships, he first offered a sacrifice to Dêmêtêr and Persephonê—the patron Goddesses of Sicily, and of Syracuse in particular. He then apprised his soldiers, that during the recent crossing and danger from the Carthaginian pursuers, he had addressed a vow to these Goddesses—engaging to make a burnt-offering of his ships in their honour, if they would preserve him safe across to

[1] Diodor. xx. 6. Procopius, Bell. Vand. i. 15. It is here stated, that for nine days' march eastward from Carthage, as far as Juka, the land is παντελῶς ἀλίμενος.

Africa. The Goddesses had granted this boon; they had farther, by favourably responding to the sacrifice just offered, promised full success to his African projects; it became therefore incumbent on him to fulfil his vow with exactness. Torches being now brought, Agathoklês took one in his hand, and mounted on the stern of the admiral's ship, directing each of the trierarchs to do the like on his own ship. All were set on fire simultaneously, amidst the sound of trumpets, and the mingled prayers and shouts of the soldiers.[1]

Though Agathoklês had succeeded in animating his soldiers with a factitious excitement, for the accomplishment of this purpose, yet so soon as they saw the conflagration decided and irrevocable—thus cutting off all their communication with home—their spirits fell, and they began to despair of their prospects. Without allowing them time to dwell upon the novelty of the situation, Agathoklês conducted them at once against the nearest Carthaginian town, called Megalê-Polis.[2] His march lay for the most part through a rich territory in the highest cultivation. The passing glance which we thus obtain into the condition of territory near Carthage is of peculiar interest; more especially when contrasted with the desolation of the same coast, now and for centuries past. The corn-land, the plantations both of vines and olives, the extensive and well-stocked gardens, the size and equipment of the farm-buildings,

Agathoklês marches into the Carthaginian territory—captures Tunês—richness and cultivation of the country.

[1] This striking scene is described by Diodorus xx. 7 (compare Justin, xxii. 6), probably enough copied from Kallias, the companion and panegyrist of Agathoklês: see Diodor. xxi. Fragm. p. 281.

[2] Megalê-Polis is nowhere else mentioned—nor is it noticed by Forbiger in his list of towns in the Carthaginian territory (Handbuch der Alten Geographie, sect. 109).

Dr. Barth (Wanderungen auf den Küsten-Ländern des Mittelmeeres, vol. i. p. 131-133) supposes that Agathoklês landed at an indentation of the coast on the western face of that projecting tongue of land which terminates in Cape Bon (Promontorium Mercurii), forming the eastern boundary of the Gulf of Carthage. There are stone quarries here, of the greatest extent as well as antiquity. Dr. Barth places Megalê-Polis not far off from this spot, on the same western face of the projecting land, and near the spot afterwards called Misua.

A map, which I have placed in this volume, will convey to the reader some idea of the Carthaginian territory.

the large outlay for artificial irrigation, the agreeable country-houses belonging to wealthy Carthaginians, &c., all excited the astonishment, and stimulated the cupidity, of Agathoklês and his soldiers. Moreover, the towns were not only very numerous, but all open and unfortified, except Carthage itself and a few others on the coast.[1] The Carthaginians, besides having little fear of invasion by sea, were disposed to mistrust their subject cities, which they ruled habitually with harshness and oppression.[2] The Liby-Phenicians appear to have been unused to arms—a race of timid cultivators and traffickers, accustomed to subjection and practised in the deceit necessary for lightening it.[3] Agathoklês, having marched through this land of abundance, assaulted Megalê-Polis without delay. The inhabitants, unprepared for attack, distracted with surprise and terror, made little resistance. Agathoklês easily took the town, abandoning both the persons of the inhabitants and all the rich property within, to his soldiers; who enriched themselves with a prodigious booty both from town and country—furniture, cattle, and slaves. From hence he advanced farther southward to the town called Tunês (the modern

[1] Justin, xxii. 5. "Huc accedere, quod urbes castellaque Africæ non muris cinctæ, non in montibus positæ sint: sed in planis campis sine ullis munimentis jaceant: quas omnes metu excidii facile ad belli societatem perlici posse."

[2] Seven centuries and more after these events, we read that the Vandal king Genseric conquered Africa from the Romans—and that he demolished the fortifications of all the other towns except Carthage alone—from the like feeling of mistrust. This demolition materially facilitated the conquest of the Vandal kingdom by Belisarius, two generations afterwards (Procopius, Bell. Vandal. i. 5; i. 15).

[3] Livy (xxix. 25), in recounting the landing of Scipio in the Carthaginian territory in the latter years of the second Punic war, says, "Emporia ut peterent, gubernatoribus edixit. Fertilissimus ager, eoque abundans omnium copiâ rerum est regio, et imbelles (quod plerumque in uberi agro evenit) barbari sunt: priusque quam Carthagine subveniretur, opprimi videbantur posse."

About the harshness of the Carthaginian rule over their African subjects, see Diodor. xi. 77; Polyb. i. 72. In reference to the above passage of Polybius, however, we ought to keep in mind—That in describing this harshness, he speaks with *express and exclusive reference* to the conduct of the Carthaginians towards their subjects during the first Punic war (against Rome), when the Carthaginians themselves were hard pressed by the Romans and required everything that they could lay hands upon for self-defence. This passage of Polybius has been sometimes cited as if it attested the *ordinary* character and measure of Carthaginian dominion; which is contrary to the intention of the author.

Tunis, at the distance of only fourteen miles south-west of Carthage itself), which he took by storm in like manner. He fortified Tunês as a permanent position; but he kept his main force united in camp, knowing well that he should presently have an imposing army against him in the field, and severe battles to fight.[1]

Consternation at Carthage—the city-force marches out against him—Hanno and Bomilkar named generals.

The Carthaginian fleet had pursued Agathoklês during his crossing from Syracuse, in perfect ignorance of his plans. When he landed in Africa, on their own territory, and even burnt his fleet, they at first flattered themselves with the belief that they held him prisoner. But as soon as they saw him commence his march in military array against Megalêpolis, they divined his real purposes, and were filled with apprehension. Carrying off the brazen prow-ornaments of his burnt and abandoned ships, they made sail for Carthage, sending forward a swift vessel to communicate first what had occurred. Before this vessel arrived, however, the landing of Agathoklês had been already made known at Carthage, where it excited the utmost surprise and consternation; since no one supposed that he could have accomplished such an adventure without having previously destroyed the Carthaginian army and fleet in Sicily. From this extreme dismay they were presently relieved by the arrival of the messengers from their fleet; whereby they learnt the real state of affairs in Sicily. They now made the best preparations in their power to resist Agathoklês. Hanno and Bomilkar, two men of leading families, were named generals conjointly.

They were bitter political rivals,—but this very rivalry was by some construed as an advantage, since each would

[1] Diodor. xx. 8. Compare Polyb. i. 29, where he describes the first invasion of the Carthaginian territory by the Roman consul Regulus. Tunês was 120 stadia or about fourteen miles south-east of Carthage (Polyb. i. 67). The Tab. Peuting. reckons it only ten miles. It was made the central place for hostile operations against Carthage, both by Regulus in the first Punic war (Polyb. i. 30),—by Matho and Spendius, in the rebellion of the mercenary soldiers and native Africans against Carthage, which followed on the close of the first Punic war (Polyb. i. 73)—and by the revolted Libyans in 396 B.C. (Diodor. xiv. 77).

Diodorus places Tunês at the distance of 2000 stadia from Carthage, which must undoubtedly be a mistake. He calls it *White Tunês*; an epithet drawn from the chalk cliffs adjoining.

serve as a check upon the other, and as a guarantee to the state; or, what is more probable, each had a party sufficiently strong to prevent the separate election of the other.[1] These two generals, unable to wait for distant succours, led out the native forces of the city, stated at 40,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, derived altogether from citizens and residents—with 2000 war-chariots. They took post on an eminence (somewhere between Tunês and Carthage) not far from Agathoklês; Bomilkar commanding on the left, where the ground was so difficult that he was unable to extend his front, and was obliged to admit an unusual depth of files; while Hanno was on the right, having in his front rank the Sacred Band of Carthage, a corps of 2500 distinguished citizens, better armed and braver than the rest. So much did the Carthaginians outnumber the invaders—and so confident were they of victory—that they carried with them 20,000 pairs of handcuffs for their anticipated prisoners.[2]

Inferior numbers of Agathoklês—his artifices to encourage the soldiers.

Agathoklês placed himself on the left, with 1000 chosen hoplites round him to combat the Sacred Band; the command of his right he gave to his son Archagathus. His troops—Syracusans, miscellaneous mercenary Greeks, Campanians or Samnites, Tuscans, and Gauls—scarcely equalled in numbers one-half of the enemy. Some of the ships' crews were even without arms—a deficiency which Agathoklês could supply only in appearance, by giving to them the leather cases or wrappers of shields, stretched out upon sticks. The outstretched wrappers thus exhibited looked from a distance like shields; so that these men, stationed in the rear, had the appearance

[1] Diodor. xx. 10.

[2] Diodor. xx. 10-13. See, respecting the Sacred Band of Carthage (which was nearly cut to pieces by Timoleon at the battle of the Krimesus), Diodor. xvi. 80, 81; also this History, Chap. LXXXV.

The amount of native or citizen-force given here by Diodorus (40,000 foot and 1000 horse) seems very great. Our data for appreciating it however are lamentably scanty; and we ought to expect a large total. The population of Carthage is said to have been 700,000 souls; even when it was besieged by the Romans in the third Punic war, and when its power was prodigiously lessened (Strabo, xvii. p. 833). Its military magazines, even in that reduced condition, were enormous,—as they stood immediately previous to their being given up to the Romans, under the treacherous delusions held out by Rome.

of a reserve of hoplites. As the soldiers however were still discouraged, Agathoklês tried to hearten them up by another device yet more singular, for which indeed he must have made deliberate provision beforehand. In various parts of the camp, he let fly a number of owls, which perched upon the shields and helmets of the soldiers. These birds, the favourites of Athênê, were supposed and generally asserted to promise victory; the minds of the soldiers are reported to have been much reassured by the sight.

Treachery of the Carthaginian general Bomilkar—victory of Agathoklês.

The Carthaginian war-chariots and cavalry, which charged first, made little or no impression; but the infantry of their right pressed the Greeks seriously. Especially Hanno, with the Sacred Band around him, behaved with the utmost bravery and forwardness, and seemed to be gaining advantage, when he was unfortunately slain. His death not only discouraged his own troops, but became fatal to the army, by giving opportunity for treason to his colleague Bomilkar. This man had long secretly meditated the project of rendering himself despot of Carthage. As a means of attaining that end, he deliberately sought to bring reverses upon her; and no sooner had he heard of Hanno's death, than he gave orders for his own wing to retreat. The Sacred Band, though fighting with unshaken valour, were left unsupported, attacked in rear as well as front, and compelled to give way along with the rest. The whole Carthaginian army was defeated and driven back to Carthage. Their camp fell into the hands of Agathoklês, who found among their baggage the very handcuffs which they had brought for fettering their expected captives.[1]

Conquests of Agathoklês among the Carthaginian dependencies on the eastern coast.

This victory made Agathoklês for the time master of the open country. He transmitted the news to Sicily, by a boat of thirty oars, constructed expressly for the purpose—since he had no ships of his own remaining. Having fortified Tunês, and established it as his central position, he commenced operations along the eastern coast (Zeugitana and Byzakium, as the northern and southern portions of it were afterwards denominated by the Romans) against the towns dependent on Carthage.[2]

[1] Diodor. xx. 12. The loss of the Carthaginians was differently given—some authors stated it at 1000 men—others at 6000. The loss in the army of Agathoklês was stated at 200 men.

[2] Diodor. xx. 17.

Religious terror and distress of the Carthaginians. Human sacrifice.

In that city, meanwhile, all was terror and despondency in consequence of the recent defeat. It was well known that the African subjects generally entertained nothing but fear and hatred towards the reigning city. Neither the native Libyans or Africans,—nor the mixed race called Liby-Phenicians, who inhabited the towns[1]—could be depended on if their services were really needed. The distress of the Carthaginians took the form of religious fears and repentance. They looked back with remorse on the impiety of their past lives, and on their omissions of duty towards the Gods. To the Tyrian Hêraklês, they had been slack in transmitting the dues and presents required by their religion; a backwardness which they now endeavoured to make up by sending envoys to Tyre, with prayers and supplications, with rich presents, and especially with models in gold and silver of their sacred temples and shrines. Towards Kronus, or Moloch, they also felt that they had conducted themselves sinfully. The worship acceptable to that God required the sacrifice of young children, born of free and opulent parents, and even the choice child of the family. But it was now found out, on investigation, that many parents had recently put a fraud upon the God, by surreptitiously buying poor children, feeding them well, and then sacrificing them as their own. This discovery seemed at once to explain why Kronus had become offended, and what had brought upon them the recent defeat. They made an emphatic atonement, by selecting 200 children from the most illustrious families in Carthage, and offering them up to Kronus at a great public sacrifice; besides which, 300 parents, finding themselves denounced for similar omissions in the past, displayed their repentance by voluntarily immolating their own children for the public safety. The statue of Kronus,—placed with outstretched hands to receive the victim tendered to him, with fire immediately underneath,—was fed at that solemnity certainly with 200, and probably with 500, living children.[2] By this monstrous holocaust the full

[1] Diodor. xx. 55.

[2] Diodor. xx. 14. ἠτιῶντο δὲ καὶ τὸν Κρόνον αὐτοῖς ἐναντιοῦσθαι, καθόσον ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις θύοντας τούτῳ τῷ θεῷ τῶν υἱῶν τοὺς κρατίστους, ὕστερον ὠνούμενοι λάθρα παῖδας καὶ θρέψαντες ἔπεμπον ἐπὶ τὴν θυσίαν· καὶ ζητήσεως γενομένης, εὑρέθησάν τινες τῶν καθιερουργημένων ὑποβολιμαῖοι γεγονότες· τούτων δὲ λαβόντες

religious duty being discharged, and forgiveness obtained from the God, the mental distress of the Carthaginians was healed.

Operations of Agathoklês on the eastern coast of Carthage—capture of Neapolis, Adrumetum, Thapsus, &c.

Having thus relieved their consciences on the score of religious obligation, the Carthaginians despatched envoys to Hamilkar in Sicily, acquainting him with the recent calamity, desiring him to send a reinforcement, and transmitting to him the brazen prow-ornaments taken from the ships of Agathoklês. They at the same time equipped a fresh army, with which they marched forth to attack Tunês. Agathoklês had fortified that town, and established a strong camp before it; but he had withdrawn his main force to prosecute operations against the maritime towns on the eastern coast of the territory of Carthage. Among these towns, he first attacked Neapolis with success, granting to the inhabitants favourable terms. He then advanced farther southwards towards Adrumetum, of which he commenced the siege, with the assistance of a neighbouring Libyan prince named Elymas, who now joined him. While Agathoklês was engaged in the siege of Adru-

ἐννοίαν, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πρὸς τοῖς τείχεσιν ὁρῶντες στρατοπεδεύοντας, ἐδεισιδαιμόνουν ὡς καταλελυκότες τὰς πατρίους τῶν θεῶν τιμάς· διορθώσασθαι δὲ τὰς ἀγνοίας σπεύδοντες, διακοσίους μὲν τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παίδων προκρίναντες ἔθυσαν δημοσίᾳ· ἄλλοι δ' ἐν διαβολαῖς ὄντες, ἑκουσίως ἑαυτοὺς ἔδοσαν, οὐκ ἐλάττους ὄντες τριακοσίων· ἦν δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀνδριὰς Κρόνου χαλκοῦς, ἐκτετακὼς τὰς χεῖρας ὑπτίας ἐγκεκλιμένας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, ὥστε τὸν ἐπιτεθέντα τῶν παίδων ἀποκυλίεσθαι καὶ πίπτειν εἴς τι χάσμα πλῆρες πυρός. Compare Festus ap. Lactantium, Inst. Div. i. 21; Justin, xviii. 6, 12.

In this remarkable passage (the more remarkable because so little information concerning Carthaginian antiquity has reached us), one clause is not perfectly clear, respecting the three hundred who are said to have voluntarily *given themselves up*. Diodorus means (I apprehend) as Eusebius understood it, that these were fathers who gave up *their children* (not themselves) to be sacrificed. The victims here mentioned as sacrificed to Kronus were children, not adults (compare Diodor. xiii. 86); nothing is here said about adult victims. Wesseling in his note adheres to the literal meaning of the words, dissenting from Eusebius: but I think that the literal meaning is less in harmony with the general tenor of the paragraph. Instances of self-devotion, by persons torn with remorse, are indeed mentioned: see the case of Imilkon, Diodor. xiv. 76; Justin, xix. 3.

We read in the Fragment of Ennius—"Pœni sunt soliti suos sacrificare puellos:" see the chapter iv. of Münter's work, Religion der Karthager, on this subject.

metum, the Carthaginians attacked his position at Tunês, drove his soldiers out of the fortified camp into the town, and began to batter the defences of the town itself. Apprised of this danger while besieging Adrumetum, but nevertheless reluctant to raise the siege,—Agathoklês left his main army before it, stole away with only a few soldiers and some camp-followers, and conducting them to an elevated spot—half-way between Adrumetum and Tunês, yet visible from both—he caused them to kindle at night upon this eminence a prodigious number of fires.[1] The effect of these fires, seen from Adrumetum on one side and from the army before Tunês on the other, was, to produce the utmost terror at both places. The Carthaginians besieging Tunês fancied that Agathoklês with his whole army was coming to attack them, and forthwith abandoned the siege in disorder, leaving their engines behind. The defenders of Adrumetum, interpreting these fires as evidence of a large reinforcement on its way to join the besieging army, were so discouraged that they surrendered the town on capitulation.[2]

[1] Diodor. xx. 17. λάθρα προσῆλθεν ἐπί τινα τόπον ὀρεινόν, ὅθεν ὁρᾶσθαι δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτὸν ὑπό τῶν Ἀδρυμητινῶν καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τῶν Τύνητα πολιορκούντων· νυκτὸς δὲ συνταξας τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐπὶ πολὺν τόπον πυρὰ καίειν, δοξαν ἐποίησε, τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις, ὡς μετὰ μεγάλης δυνάμεως ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πορευόμενος, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκουμένοις, ὡς ἄλλης δυνάμεως ἀδρᾶς τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς συμμαχίαν παραγεγενημένης.

[2] Diodorus xx. 17. The incident here recounted by Diodorus is curious, but quite distinct and intelligible. He had good authorities before him in his history of Agathoklês. If true, it affords an evidence for determining, within some limits, the site of the ancient Adrumetum, which Mannert and Shaw place at Herkla—while Forbiger and Dr. Barth put it near the site of the modern port called Susa, still more to the southward, and at a prodigious distance from Tunis. Other authors have placed it at Hamamat, more to the northward than Herkla, and nearer to Tunis.

Of these three sites, Hamamat is the only one which will consist with the narrative of Diodorus Both the others are too distant. Hamamat is about forty-eight English miles from Tunis (see Barth, p. 184, with his note). This is as great a distance (if not too great) as can possibly be admitted; both Herkla and Susa are very much more distant, and therefore out of the question.

Nevertheless, the other evidence known to us tends apparently to place Adrumetum at Susa, and not at Hamamat (see Barth, p. 142-154; Forbiger, Handb. d. Geog. p. 845). It is therefore probable that the narrative of Diodorus is not true, or must apply to some other place on the coast (possibly Neapolis, the modern Nabel) taken by Agathoklês, and not to Adrumetum.

He fortifies Aspis—undertakes operations against the interior country—defeats the Carthaginians again.

By this same stratagem—if the narrative can be trusted—Agathoklês both relieved Tunês, and acquired possession of Adrumetum. Pushing his conquests yet farther south, he besieged and took Thapsus, with several other towns on the coast to a considerable distance southward.[1] He also occupied and fortified the important position called Aspis, on the south-east of the headland Cape Bon, and not far distant from it; a point convenient for maritime communication with Sicily.[2]

By a series of such acquisitions, comprising in all not less than 200 dependencies of Carthage, Agathoklês became master along the eastern coast.[3] He next endeavoured to subdue the towns in the interior, into which he had advanced as far as several days' march. But he was recalled

[1] Diodor. xx. 17.

[2] Strabo, xvii. p. 834. Solinus (c. 30) talks of Aspis as founded by the *Siculi*; Aspis (called by the Romans Clypea), being on the eastern side of Cape Bon, as more convenient for communication with Sicily than either Carthage, or Tunis, or any part of the Gulf of Carthage, which was on the western side of Cape Bon. To get round that headland is, even at the present day, a difficult and uncertain enterprise for navigators: see the remarks of Dr. Barth, founded partly on his own personal experience (Wanderungen auf den Küstenländern des Mittelmeeres, i. p. 196). A ship coming from Sicily to Aspis was not under the necessity of getting round the headland.

In the case of Agathoklês, there was a farther reason for establishing his maritime position at Aspis. The Carthaginian fleet was superior to him at sea; accordingly they could easily interrupt his maritime communication from Sicily with Tunis, or with any point in the Gulf of Carthage. But it was not so easy for them to watch the coast at Aspis; for in order to do this, they must get from the Gulf round Cape Bon.

[3] Diodor. xx. 17. The Roman consul Regulus, when he invaded Africa during the first Punic war, is said to have acquired, either by capture or voluntary adhesion, two hundred dependent cities of Carthage (Appian, Punica, c. 3). Respecting the prodigious number of towns in Northern Africa, see the very learned and instructive work of Movers, Die Phönikier, vol. ii. p. 454 *seqq.* Even at the commencement of the third Punic war, when Carthage was so much reduced in power, she had still three hundred cities in Libya (Strabo, xvii. p. 833). It must be confessed that the name cities or towns (πόλεις) was used by some authors very vaguely. Thus Posidonius ridiculed the affirmation of Polybius (Strabo iii. p. 162), that Tiberius Gracchus had destroyed three hundred πόλεις of the Celtiberians; Strabo censures others who spoke of one thousand πόλεις of the Iberians. Such a number could only be made good by including large κῶμαι.

by intelligence from his soldiers at Tunês, that the Carthaginians had marched out again to attack them, and had already retaken some of his conquests. Returning suddenly by forced marches, he came upon them by surprise, and drove in their advanced parties with considerable loss; while he also gained an important victory over the Libyan prince Elymas, who had rejoined the Carthaginians, but was now defeated and slain.[1] The Carthaginians, however, though thus again humbled and discouraged, still maintained the field, strongly entrenched, between Carthage and Tunês.

Proceedings of Hamilkar before Syracuse—the city is near surrendering—he is disappointed, and marches away from it.

Meanwhile the affairs of Agathoklês at Syracuse had taken a turn unexpectedly favourable. He had left that city blocked up partially by sea and with a victorious enemy encamped near it; so that supplies found admission with difficulty. In this condition, Hamilkar, commander of the Carthaginian army, received from Carthage the messengers announcing their recent defeat in Africa; yet also bringing the brazen prow-ornaments taken from the ships of Agathoklês. He ordered the envoys to conceal the real truth, and to spread abroad news that Agathoklês had been destroyed with his armament; in proof of which he produced the prow-ornaments,—an undoubted evidence that the ships had really been destroyed. Sending envoys with these evidences into Syracuse, to be exhibited to Antander and the other authorities, Hamilkar demanded from them the surrender of the city, under promise of safety and favourable terms; at the same time marching his army close up to it, with the view of making an attack. Antander with others, believing the information and despairing of successful resistance, were disposed to comply; but Erymnon the Ætolian insisted on holding out until they had fuller certainty. This resolution Antander adopted. At the same time, mistrusting those citizens of Syracuse who were relatives or friends of the exiles without, he ordered them all to leave the city immediately, with their wives and families. No less than 8000 persons were expelled under this mandate. They were consigned to the mercy of Hamilkar, and his army without; who not only suffered them to pass, but

[1] Diodor. xx. 17, 18.

treated them with kindness. Syracuse was now a scene of aggravated wretchedness and despondency; not less from this late calamitous expulsion, than from the grief of those who believed that their relatives in Africa had perished with Agathoklês. Hamilkar had brought up his battering-engines, and was preparing to assault the town, when Nearchus, the messenger from Agathoklês, arrived from Africa after a voyage of five days, having under favour of darkness escaped, though only just escaped, the blockading squadron. From him the Syracusan government learnt the real truth, and the victorious position of Agathoklês. There was no farther talk of capitulation; Hamilkar—having tried a partial assault, which was vigorously resisted, —with drew his army, and detached from it a reinforcement of 5000 men to the aid of his countrymen in Africa.[1]

B.C. 309. Renewed attack of Hamilkar upon Syracuse—he tries to surprise Euryalus, but is totally defeated, made prisoner, and slain.

During some months, he seems to have employed himself in partial operations for extending the Carthaginian dominion throughout Sicily. But at length he concerted measures with the Syracusan exile Deinokratês, who was at the head of a numerous body of his exiled countrymen, for a renewed attack upon Syracuse. His fleet already blockaded the harbour, and he now with his army, stated as 120,000 men, destroyed the neighbouring lands, hoping to starve out the inhabitants. Approaching close to the walls of the city, he occupied the Olympieion, or temple of Zeus Olympius, near the river Anapus and the interior coast of the Great Harbour. From hence—probably under the conduct of Deinokratês and the other exiles, well-acquainted with the ground—he undertook by a night-march to ascend the circuitous and difficult mountain track, for the purpose of surprising the fort called Euryalus, at the highest point of Epipolæ, and the western apex of the Syracusan lines of fortification. This was the same enterprise, at the same hour, and with the same main purpose, as that of Demosthenês during the Athenian siege, after he had brought the second armament from Athens to the relief of Nikias.[2] Even Demosthenês, though conducting his march with greater precaution than Hamilkar, and

[1] Diodor. xx. 15, 16.

[2] See Ch. LX. of this History; together with the second Plan of Syracuse, annexed to the volume in which that Chapter is contained.

successful in surprising the fort of Euryalus, had been driven down again with disastrous loss. Moreover, since his time, this fort Euryalus, instead of being left detached, had been embodied by the elder Dionysius as an integral portion of the fortifications of the city. It formed the apex or point of junction for the two converging walls—one skirting the northern cliff, the other the southern cliff, of Epipolæ.[1] The surprise intended by Hamilkar—difficult in the extreme, if at all practicable—seems to have been unskilfully conducted. It was attempted with a confused multitude, incapable of that steady order requisite for night-movements. His troops, losing their way in the darkness, straggled, and even mistook each other for enemies; while the Syracusan guards from Euryalus, alarmed by the noise, attacked them vigorously and put them to the rout. Their loss, in trying to escape down the steep declivity, was prodigious; and Hamilkar himself, making brave efforts to rally them, became prisoner to the Syracusans. What lent peculiar interest to this incident, in the eyes of a pious Greek, was that it served to illustrate and confirm the truth of prophecy. Hamilkar had been assured by a prophet that he would sup that night in Syracuse; and this assurance had in part emboldened him to the attack, since he naturally calculated on entering the city as a conqueror.[2] He did indeed take his evening meal in Syracuse, literally fulfilling the augury. Immediately after it, he was handed over to the relatives of the slain, who first paraded him through the city in chains, then inflicted on him the worst tortures, and lastly killed him. His head was cut off and sent to Africa.[3]

The Agrigentines stand forward as champions of Sicilian

The loss and humiliation sustained in this repulse—together with the death of Hamilkar, and the discord ensuing between the exiles under Deinokratês and the Carthaginian soldiers—completely broke up the besieging army. At the

[1] For a description of the fortifications added to Syracuse by the elder Dionysius, see Ch. LXXXII. of this History; also Plan III. at p. 316 of the volume.

[2] Diodor. xx. 29, 30. Cicero (Divinat. i. 24) notices this prophecy and its manner of fulfilment; but he gives a somewhat different version of the events preceding the capture of Hamilkar.

[3] Diodor. xx. 30. τὸν δ' οὖν Ἀμίλκαν οἱ τῶν ἀπολωλότων συγγενεῖς δεδεμένον ἀγαγόντες διὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ δειναῖς αἰκίαις κατ' αὐτοῦ χρησάμενοι, μετὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕβρεως ἀνεῖλον.

same time, the Agrigentines, profiting by the depression both of Carthaginians and exiles, stood forward publicly, proclaiming themselves as champions of the cause of autonomous city government throughout Sicily, under their own presidency, against both the Carthaginians on one side, and the despot Agathoklês on the other. They chose for their general a citizen named Xenodokus, who set himself with vigour to the task of expelling everywhere the mercenary garrisons which held the cities in subjection. He began first with Gela, the city immediately adjoining Agrigentum, found a party of the citizens disposed to aid him, and, in conjunction with them, overthrew the Agathoklean garrison. The Geloans, thus liberated, seconded cordially his efforts to extend the like benefits to others. The popular banner proclaimed by Agrigentum proved so welcome, that many cities eagerly invited her aid to shake off the yoke of the soldiery in their respective citadels, and regain their free governments.[1] Enna, Erbessus, Echetla,[2] Leontini, and Kamarina, were all thus relieved from the dominion of Agathoklês; while other cities were in like manner emancipated from the sway of the Carthaginians; and joined the Agrigentine confederacy. The Agathoklean government at Syracuse was not strong enough to resist such spirited manifestations. Syracuse still continued to be blocked up by the Carthaginian fleet; though the blockade was less efficacious, and supplies were now introduced more abundantly than before.[3]

freedom against Agathoklês and the Carthaginians.

The ascendency of Agathoklês was thus rather on the wane in Sicily; but in Africa, he had become more powerful than ever—not without perilous hazards which brought him occasionally to the brink of ruin. On receiving from Syracuse the head of the captive Hamilkar, he rode forth close to the camp of the Carthaginians, and held it up to their view in triumph; they made respectful prostration before it, but the sight was astounding

Mutiny in the army of Agathoklês at Tunês—his great danger, and address in extricating himself.

[1] Diodor. xx. 31. διαβοηθείσης δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀγραγαντίνων ἐπιβολῆς κατὰ πάσαν τὴν νῆσον, ἐνέπεσεν ὁρμὴ ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

[2] Enna is nearly in the centre of Sicily; Erbessus is not far to the north—east of Agrigentum; Echetla is placed by Polybius (i. 16) midway between the domain of Syracuse and that of Carthage.

[3] Diodor. xx. 32.

and mournful to them.[1] While they were thus in despondency, however, a strange vicissitude was on the point of putting their enemy into their hands. A violent mutiny broke out in the camp of Agathoklês at Tunês, arising out of a drunken altercation between his son Archagathus and an Ætolian officer named Lykiskus; which ended in the murder of the latter by the former. The comrades of Lykiskus rose in arms with fury to avenge him, calling for the head of Archagathus. They found sympathy with the whole army; who seized the opportunity of demanding their arrears of outstanding pay, chose new generals, and took regular possession of Tunês with its defensive works. The Carthaginians, informed of this outbreak, immediately sent envoys to treat with the mutineers, offering to them large presents and double pay in the service of Carthage. Their offer was at first so favourably entertained, that the envoys returned with confident hopes of success; when Agathoklês, as a last resource, clothed himself in mean garb, and threw himself on the mercy of the soldiers. He addressed them in a pathetic appeal, imploring them not to desert him, and even drew his sword to kill himself before their faces. With such art did he manage this scene, that the feelings of the soldiers underwent a sudden and complete revolution. They not only became reconciled to him, but even greeted him with enthusiasm, calling on him to resume the dress and functions of general, and promising unabated obedience for the future.[2] Agathoklês gladly obeyed the call, and took advantage of their renewed ardour to attack forthwith the Carthaginians; who, expecting nothing less, were defeated with considerable loss.[3]

[1] Diodor. xx. 33. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, περιαλγεῖς γενόμενοι, καὶ βαρβαρικῶς προσκυνήσαντες, &c.

[2] Compare the description in Tacitus, Hist. ii. 29, of the mutiny in the Vitellian army commanded by Fabius Valens, at Ticinum.

"Postquam immissis lictoribus, Valens coercere seditionem coeptabat, ipsum invadunt (milites), saxa jaciunt, fugientem sequuntur. — Valens, servili veste, apud decurionem equitum tegebatur." (Presently the feeling changes, by the adroit management of Alphenus Varus, prefect of the camp)—then, "silentio, patientiâ, postremo precibus et lacrymis, vetiam quærebant. Ut vero defor iis et flens, et præter spem incolumis Valens, processit: gaudium, miseratio, favor: versi in lætitiam (ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes gratantesque circumdatum aquilis signisque in tribunal ferunt."

[3] Diodor. xx. 34.

In spite of this check, the Carthaginians presently sent a considerable force into the interior, for the purpose of reconquering or regaining the disaffected Numidian tribes. They met with good success in this enterprise; but the Numidians were in the main faithless and indifferent to both the belligerents, seeking only to turn the war to their own profit. Agathoklês, leaving his son in command at Tunês, followed the Carthaginians into the interior with a large portion of his army. The Carthaginian generals were cautious, and kept themselves in strong position. Nevertheless Agathoklês felt confident enough to assail them in their camp; and after great effort, with severe loss on his own side, he gained an indecisive victory. This advantage however was countervailed by the fact, that during the action the Numidians assailed his camp, slew all the defenders, and carried off nearly all the slaves and baggage. The loss on the Carthaginian side fell most severely upon the Greek soldiers in their pay; most of them exiles under Klinon, and some Syracusan exiles. These men behaved with signal gallantry, and were nearly all slain, either during the battle or after the battle, by Agathoklês.[1]

B.C. 308-307. Carthaginian army sent to act in the interior—attacked by Agathoklês with some success—his camp is pillaged by the Numidians.

It had now become manifest, however, to this daring invader, that the force of resistance possessed by Carthage was more than he could overcome —that though humbling and impoverishing her for the moment, he could not bring the war to a triumphant close; since the city itself, occupying the isthmus of a peninsula from sea to sea, and surrounded with the strongest fortifications, could not be besieged except by means far superior to his.[2] We have already seen, that though he had gained victories and seized rich plunder, he had not been able to provide even regular pay for his soldiers, whose fidelity was consequently precarious. Nor could he expect reinforcements from Sicily; where his power was on the whole declining, though Syracuse itself was in less danger than before. He therefore

Agathoklês invites the aid of Ophellas from Kyrênê.

[1] Diodor. xx. 39.

[2] Diodor. xx. 59. Ὁ δὲ τῆς πόλεως οὐχ ἦν κίνδυνος, ἀπροσίτου τῆς πόλεως οὔσης διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ὀχυρότητα.

resolved to invoke aid from Ophellas at Kyrênê, and despatched Orthon as envoy for that purpose.[1]

Antecedent circumstances of Kyrênê. Division of coast between Kyrênê and Carthage.

To Kyrênê and what was afterwards called its Pentapolis (*i. e.* the five neighbouring Grecian towns, Kyrênê, its port Apollonia, Barka, Teucheira, and Hesperides), an earlier chapter of this History has already been devoted.[2] Unfortunately information respecting them, for a century and more anterior to Alexander the Great, is almost wholly wanting. Established among a Libyan population, many of whom were domiciliated with the Greeks as fellow-residents, these Kyreneans had imbibed many Libyan habits in war, in peace, and in religion; of which their fine breed of horses, employed both for the festival chariot-matches and in battle, was one example. The Libyan tribes, useful as neighbours, servants, and customers,[3] were frequently also troublesome as enemies. In 413 B.C. we hear accidentally that Hesperides was besieged by Libyan tribes, and rescued by some Peloponnesian hoplites on their way to Syracuse during the Athenian siege.[4] About 401 B.C. (shortly after the close of the Peloponnesian war), the same city was again so hard pressed by the same enemies, that she threw open her citizenship to any Greek new-comer who would aid in repelling them. This invitation was accepted by several of the Messenians, just then expelled from Peloponnesus, and proscribed by the Spartans; they went to Africa, but, becoming involved in intestine warfare among the citizens of Kyrênê, a large proportion of them perished.[5] Except these scanty notices, we hear nothing about the Graeco-Libyan Pentapolis in relation to Grecian affairs, before the time of Alexander. It would appear that the trade with the native African tribes, between the Gulfs called the Greater and Lesser Syrtis was divided between Kyrênê (meaning the Kyrenaic Pentapolis) and Carthage—at a boundary point called the Altars of the Philæni, ennobled by a commemorative legend; immediately east of these Altars was Automala, the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.[6] We cannot doubt

[1] Diodor. xx. 40.

[2] See Ch. XXVII.

[3] See Isokratês, Or. iv. (Philipp.) s. 6, where he speaks of Kyrênê as a spot judiciously chosen for colonization; the natives near it being not dangerous, but suited for obedient neighbours and slaves.

[4] Thucyd. vii. 50.

[5] Pausan. iv. 26; Diodor. xiv. 34.

[6] Strabo, xvii. p. 836; Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. p. 126.

that the relations, commercial and otherwise, between Kyrênê and Carthage, the two great emporia on the coast of Africa, were constant and often lucrative—though not always friendly.

Thimbron with the Harpalian mercenaries is invited over to Kyrênê by exiles. His chequered career, on the whole victorious, in Libya.

In the year 331 B.C., when the victorious Alexander overran Egypt, the inhabitants of Kyrênê sent to tender presents and submission to him, and became enrolled among his subjects.[1] We hear nothing more about them until the last year of Alexander's life (324 B.C. to 323 B.C.). About that time, the exiles from Kyrênê and Barka, probably enough emboldened by the rescript of Alexander (proclaimed at the Olympic festival of 324 B.C., and directing that all Grecian exiles, except those guilty of sacrilege, should be recalled forthwith), determined to accomplish their return by force. To this end they invited from Krete an officer named Thimbron; who, having slain Harpalus after his flight from Athens (recounted in a previous chapter), had quartered himself in Krete, with the treasure, the ships, and the 6000 mercenaries, brought over from Asia by that satrap.[2] Thimbron willingly carried over his army to their assistance, intending to conquer for himself a principality in Libya. He landed near Kyrênê, defeated the Kyrenean forces with great slaughter, and made himself master of Apollonia, the fortified port of that city, distant from it nearly ten miles. The towns of Barka and Hesperides sided with him; so that he was strong enough to force the Kyreneans to a disadvantageous treaty. They covenanted to pay 500 talents,—to surrender to him half of their war-chariots for his ulterior projects—and to leave him in possession of Apollonia. While he plundered the merchants in the harbour, he proclaimed his intention of subjugating the independent Libyan tribes, and probably of stretching his conquests to Carthage.[3] His schemes were however frustrated by one of his own officers, a Kretan named Mna-

[1] Arrian, vii. 9, 12; Curtius, iv. 7, 9; Diodor. xvii. 49. It is said that the inhabitants of Kyrênê (exact date unknown) applied to Plato to make laws for them, but that he declined. See Thrige, Histor. Cyrênês, p. 191. We should be glad to have this statement better avouched.

[2] Diodor. xvii. 108, xviii. 19; Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandr. vi. apud Photium, Cod. 92; Strabo, xvii. p. 837.

[3] Diodor. xviii. 19.

siklês; who deserted to the Kyreneans, and encouraged them to set aside the recent convention. Thimbron, after seizing such citizens of Kyrênê as happened to be at Apollonia, attacked Kyrênê itself, but was repulsed; and the Kyreneans were then bold enough to invade the territory of Barka and Hesperides. To aid these two cities, Thimbron moved his quarters from Apollonia; but during his absence, Mnasiklês contrived to surprise that valuable port; thus mastering at once his base of operations, the station for his fleet, and all the baggage of his soldiers. Thimbron's fleet could not be long maintained without a harbour. The seamen, landing here and there for victuals and water, were cut off by the native Libyans, while the vessels were dispersed by storms.[1]

The Kyreneans, now full of hope, encountered Thimbron in the field, and defeated him. Yet though reduced to distress, he contrived to obtain possession of Teucheira; to which port he invoked as auxiliaries 2500 fresh soldiers, out of the loose mercenary bands dispersed near Cape Tænarus in Peloponnesus. This reinforcement again put him in a condition for battle. The Kyreneans on their side also thought it necessary to obtain succour, partly from the neighbouring Libyans, partly from Carthage. They got together a force stated as 30,000 men, with which they met him in the field. But on this occasion they were totally routed, with the loss of all their generals and much of their army. Thimbron was now in the full tide of success; he pressed both Kyrênê and the harbour so vigorously, that famine began to prevail, and sedition broke out among the citizens. The oligarchical men, expelled by the mere popular party, sought shelter, some in the camp of Thimbron, some at the court of Ptolemy in Egypt.[2]

The Kyreneans invite aid from the Egyptian Ptolemy, who sends Ophellas thither. Defeat and death of Thimbron.

I have already mentioned, that in the partition after the decease of Alexander, Egypt had been assigned to Ptolemy. Seizing with eagerness the opportunity of annexing to it so valuable a possession as the Kyrenaic Pentapolis, this chief sent an adequate force under Ophellas to put down Thimbron and restore the exiles. His success was complete. All the cities in the Pentapolis were reduced; Thimbron, worsted

[1] Diodor. xvii. 20 [2] Diodor. xviii. 21.

and pursued as a fugitive, was seized in his flight by some Libyans, and brought prisoner to Teucheira; the citizens of which place (by permission of the Olynthian Epikidês, governor for Ptolemy), first tortured him, and then conveyed him to Apollonia to be hanged. A final visit from Ptolemy himself regulated the affairs of the Pentapolis, which were incorporated with his dominions and placed under the government of Ophellas.[1]

Kyrênaica annexed to the dominions of Ptolemy, under Ophellas as viceroy.

It was thus that the rich and flourishing Kyrênê, an interesting portion of the once autonomous Hellenic world, passed like the rest under one of the Macedonian Diadochi. As the proof and guarantee of this new sovereignty, we find erected within the walls of the city, a strong and completely detached citadel, occupied by a Macedonian or Egyptian garrison (like Munychia at Athens), and forming the stronghold of the viceroy. Ten years afterwards (B.C. 312) the Kyreneans made an attempt to emancipate themselves, and besieged this citadel; but being again put down by an army and fleet which Ptolemy despatched under Agis from Egypt,[2] Kyrênê passed once more under the viceroyalty of Ophellas.[3]

B.C. 322.

To this viceroy Agathoklês now sent envoys, invoking his aid against Carthage. Ophellas was an officer of consideration and experience. He had served under Alexander, and had married an Athenian wife, Euthydikê,—a lineal descendant from Miltiadês the victor of Marathon, and belonging to a family still distinguished at Athens. In inviting Ophellas to undertake jointly the conquest of Carthage, the envoys proposed that he should himself hold it when conquered. Agathoklês (they said) wished only to overthrow the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily, being well aware that he could not hold that island in conjunction with an African dominion.

B.C. 308.

Position and hopes of Ophellas

He accepts the invitation of Agathoklês. He collects colonists from Athens and other Grecian cities.

[1] Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92; Diodor. xviii. 21; Justin, xiii. 6, 20.

[2] Diodor. xix. 79. Οἱ Κυρηναῖοι..... τὴν ἄκραν περιεστρατοπέδευσαν, ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα τὴν φρουρὰν ἐκβαλοῦντες, &c.

[3] Justin (xxii. 7, 4) calls Ophellas "rex Cyrenarum;" but it is noway probable that he had become independent of Ptolemy—as Thrige (Hist. Cyrênês, p. 214) supposes. The expression in Plutarch (Demetrius, 14), Ὀφέλλᾳ τῷ ἄρξαντι Κυρήνης, does not necessarily imply an independent authority.

To Ophellas,[1] such a invitation proved extremely seducing. He was already on the look-out for aggrandisement towards the west, and had sent an exploring nautical expedition along the northern coast of Africa, even to some distance round and beyond the Strait of Gibraltar.[2] Moreover, to all military adventurers, both on sea and on land, the season was one of boundless speculative promise. They had before them not only the prodigious career of Alexander himself, but the successful encroachments of the great officers his successors. In the second distribution, made at Triparadeisus, of the Alexandrine empire, Antipater had assigned to Ptolemy not merely Egypt and Libya, but also an undefined amount of territory west of Libya, to be afterwards acquired;[3] the conquest of which was known to have been among the projects of Alexander, had he lived longer. To this conquest Ophellas was now specially called, either as the viceroy or the independent equal of Ptolemy, by the invitation of Agathoklês. Having learnt in the service of Alexander not to fear long marches, he embraced the proposition with eagerness. He undertook an expedition from Kyrênê on the largest scale. Through his wife's relatives, he was enabled to make known his projects at Athens, where, as well as in other parts of Greece, they found much favour. At this season, the Kassandrian oligarchies were paramount not only at Athens, but generally throughout Greece. Under the prevalent degradation and suffering, there was ample ground for discontent, and no liberty of expressing it; many persons therefore were found disposed

[1] Diodor. xx. 40.

[2] From an incidental allusion in Strabo (xvii. p. 826), we learn this fact — that Ophellas had surveyed the whole coast of Northern Africa, to the Strait of Gibraltar, and round the old Phenician settlements on the western coast of modern Morocco. Some eminent critics (Grosskurd among them) reject the reading in Strabo—ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀφέλα (or Ὀφέλλα) περιπλοῦ, which is sustained by a very great preponderance of MSS. But I do not feel the force of their reasons; and the reading which they would substitute has nothing to recommend it. In my judgement, Ophellas, ruling in the Kyrênaica and indulging aspirations towards conquests westward, was a man both likely to order, and competent to bring about, an examination of the North African coast. The knowledge of this fact may have induced Agathoklês to apply to him.

[3] Arrian, De Rebus post Alex. 34, ap. Photium, Cod. 92. Αἴγυπτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ Λιβύην, καὶ τὴν ἐπίκειναν ταύτης τὴν πολλὴν, καὶ ἴ, τι περ ἂν πρὸς τούτοις δ' ὅριον ἐπικτήσηται πρὸς δυσμαῖνου ἡλίου, Πτολεμαίου εἶναι.

either to accept army-service with Ophellas, or to enrol themselves in a foreign colony under his auspices. To set out under the military protection of this powerful chief—to colonize the mighty Carthage, supposed to be already enfeebled by the victories of Agathoklês—to appropriate the wealth, the fertile landed possessions, and the maritime position of her citizens—was a prize well calculated to seduce men dissatisfied with their homes, and not well informed of the intervening difficulties.[1]

March of Ophellas, with his army, and his colonists, from Kyrênê to the Carthaginian territory—sufferings endured in the march.

Under such hopes, many Grecian colonists joined Ophellas at Kyrênê, some even with wives and children. The total number is stated at 10,000. Ophellas conducted them forth at the head of a well-appointed army of 10,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 100 war-chariots; each chariot carrying the driver and two fighting men. Marching with this miscellaneous body of soldiers and colonists, he reached in eighteen days the post of Automolæ,—the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.[2] From thence he proceeded westward along the shore between the two Syrtes, in many parts a sandy, trackless desert, without wood and almost without water (with the exception of particular points of fertility), and infested by serpents many and venomous. At one time, all his provisions were exhausted. He passed through the territory of the natives called Lotophagi, near the lesser Syrtis; where the army had nothing to eat except the fruit of the lotus, which there abounded.[3] Ophellas met with no enemies; but the sufferings of every kind endured by his soldiers—still more of course by the less hardy colonists and their families—were most distressing. After miseries endured for more than two months, he joined Agathoklês in the Carthaginian territory; with what abatement

[1] Diodor. xx. 40. πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προθύμως ὑπήκουσαν εἰς τὴν στρατείαν· οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, ἔσπευδον κοινωνῆσαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ἐλπίζοντες τήν τε κρατίστην τῆς Λιβύης καταλήρουχήσειν, καὶ τὸν ἐν Καρχηδόνι διαρπάσειν πλοῦτον.

As to the great encouragement held out to settlers, when a new colony was about to be founded by a powerful state, see Thucyd. iii. 93, about Herakleia Trachinia—πᾶς γάρ τις, Λακεδαιμονίων οἰκιζόντων, θαρσαλέως ἦει, βεβαίαν νομίζων τὴν πόλιν.

[2] Diodor. xx. 41.

[3] Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iv. 3. p. 127, ed. Schneider.

The philosopher would hear this fact from some of the Athenians concerned in the expedition.

of number, we do not know, but his loss must have been considerable.[1]

B.C. 307. Perfidy of Agathoklês—he kills Ophellas—gets possession of the colonists.

Ophellas little knew the man whose invitation and alliance he had accepted. Agathoklês at first received him with the warmest protestations of attachment, welcoming the new-comers with profuse hospitality, and supplying to them full means of refreshment and renovation after their past sufferings. Having thus gained the confidence and favourable sympathies of all, he proceeded to turn them to his own purposes. Convening suddenly the most devoted among his own soldiers, he denounced Ophellas as guilty of plotting against his life. They listened to him with the same feelings of credulous rage as the Macedonian soldiers exhibited when Alexander denounced Philotas before them. Agathoklês then at once called them to arms, set upon Ophellas unawares, and slew him with his more immediate defenders. Among the soldiers of Ophellas, this act excited horror and indignation, no less than surprise; but Agathoklês at length succeeded in bringing them to terms, partly by deceitful pretexts, partly by intimidation: for this unfortunate army, left without any commander or fixed purpose, had no resource except to enter into his service.[2] He thus found himself (like Antipater after the death of Leonnatus) master of a double army, and relieved from a troublesome rival. The colonists of Ophellas—more unfortunate still, since they could be of no service to Agathoklês—were put by him on board some merchant vessels, which he was sending to Syracuse with spoil. The weather becoming stormy, many of these vessels foundered at sea,—some were driven off and wrecked on the coast of Italy—and a few only reached Syracuse.[3] Thus miserably perished the

[1] Diodor. xx. 42. See the striking description of the miseries of this same march, made by Cato and his Roman troops after the death of Pompey, in Lucan, Pharsalia, ix. 362-940:—

"Vadimus in campos steriles, exustaque mundi,
Quà nimius Titan, et raræ in fontibus undæ,
Siccaque letiferis squalent serpentibus arva.
Durum iter."

The entire march of Ophellas must (I think) have lasted longer than two months; probably Diodorus speaks only of the more distressing or middle portion of it when he says—κατὰ τὴν ὁδοιπορίαν πλεῖον ἢ δύο μῆνας κακοπαθήσαντες, &c. (xx. 42).

[2] Diodor. xx 42; Justin, xxii. 7.

[3] Diodor. xx. 44.

Kyrenean expedition of Ophellas; one of the most commanding and powerful schemes, for joint conquest and colonization, that ever set out from any Grecian city.

It would have fared ill with Agathokles, had the Carthaginians been at hand, and ready to attack him in the confusion immediately succeeding the death of Ophellas. It would also have fared yet worse with Carthage, had Agathoklês been in a position to attack her during the terrible sedition excited, nearly at the same time, within her walls by the general Bomilkar.[1] This traitor (as has been already stated) had long cherished the design to render himself despot, and had been watching for a favourable opportunity. Having purposely caused the loss of the first battle—fought in conjunction with his brave colleague Hanno, against Agathoklês—he had since carried on the war with a view to his own project (which explains in part the continued reverses of the Carthaginians); he now thought that the time was come for openly raising his standard. Availing himself of a military muster in the quarter of the city called Neapolis, he first dismissed the general body of the soldiers, retaining near him only a trusty band of 500 citizens, and 4000 mercenaries. At the head of these, he then fell upon the unsuspecting city; dividing them into five detachments, and slaughtering indiscriminately the unarmed citizens in the streets, as well as in the great market-place. At first the Carthaginians were astounded and paralysed. Gradually however they took courage, stood upon their defence against the assailants, combated them in the streets, and poured upon them missiles from the house-tops. After a prolonged conflict, the partisans of Bomilkar found themselves worsted, and were glad to avail themselves of the mediation of some elder citizens. They laid down their arms on promise of pardon. The promise was faithfully kept by the victors, except in regard to Bomilkar himself; who was hanged in the market-place, having first undergone severe tortures.[2]

Terrible sedition at Carthage—Bomilkar tries to seize the supreme power—he is overthrown and slain.

[1] Diodor. xx. 43.

[2] Diodor. xx. 44; Justin, xxii. 7. Compare the description given by Appian (Punic. 128) of the desperate defence made by the Carthaginians in the last siege of the city, against the assault of the Romans from these house-tops and in the streets.

B.C. 307. Farther successes of Agathoklês in Africa — he captures Utica, Hippo-Zarytus, and Hippagreta.

Though the Carthaginians had thus escaped from an extreme peril, yet the effects of so formidable a conspiracy weakened them for some time against their enemy without; while Agathoklês, on the other hand, reinforced by the army from Kyrênê, was stronger than ever. So elate did he feel, that he assumed the title of King;[1] following herein the example of the great Macedonian officers, Antigonus, Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander; the memory of Alexander being now discarded, as his heirs had been already put to death. Agathoklês, already master of nearly all the dependent towns east and south-east of Carthage, proceeded to carry his arms to the north-west of the city. He attacked Utica, —the second city next to Carthage in importance, and older indeed than Carthage itself—situated on the western or opposite shore of the Carthaginian Gulf, and visible from Carthage, though distant from it twenty-seven miles around the Gulf on land.[2] The Uticans had hitherto remained faithful to Carthage, in spite of her reverses, and of defection elsewhere.[3] Agathoklês marched into their territory with such unexpected rapidity (he had hitherto been on the south-east of Carthage, and he now suddenly moved to the north-west of that city), that he seized the persons of three hundred leading citizens, who had not

[1] There are yet remaining coins —Ἀγαθοκλέους Βασιλέως—the earliest Sicilian coins that bear the name of a prince (Humphreys, Ancient Coins and Medals, p. 50).

[2] Strabo, xvii. p. 832; Polybius i. 73.

[3] Polybius (i. 82) expressly states that the inhabitants of Utica and of Hippu-Akra (a little farther to the west than Utica) remained faithful to Carthage throughout the hostilities carried on by Agathoklês. This enables us to correct the passage wherein Diodorus describes the attack of Agathoklês upon Utica (xx. 54)—ἐπὶ μὲν Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν ἀφεστηκότας, ἅφνω δὲ αὐτῶν τῇ πόλει προσπεσών, &c. The word ἀφεστηκότας here is perplexing. It must mean that the Uticans had revolted *from Agathoklês*; yet Diodorus has not before said a word about the Uticans, nor reported that they had either joined Agathoklês, or been conquered by him. Everything that Diodorus has reported hitherto about Agathoklês, relates to operations among the towns east or south-east of Carthage.

It appears to me that the passage ought to stand—ἐπὶ μὲν Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν οὐκ ἀφεστηκότας, *i. e.* from Carthage; which introduces consistency into the narrative of Diodorus himself, while it brings him into harmony with Polybius.

yet taken the precaution of retiring within the city. Having vainly tried to prevail on the Uticans to surrender, he assailed their walls, attaching in front of his battering engines the three hundred Utican prisoners; so that the citizens, in hurling missiles of defence, were constrained to inflict death on their own comrades and relatives. They nevertheless resisted the assault with unshaken resolution; but Agathoklês found means to force an entrance through a weak part of the walls, and thus became master of the city. He made it a scene of indiscriminate slaughter, massacring the inhabitants, armed and unarmed, and hanging up the prisoners. He further captured the town of Hippu-Akra, about thirty miles north-west of Utica, which had also remained faithful to Carthage—and which now, after a brave defence, experienced the like pitiless treatment.[1] The Carthaginians, seemingly not yet recovered from their recent shock, did not interfere, even to rescue these two important places; so that Agathoklês, firmly established in Tunês as a centre of operations, extended his African dominion more widely than ever all round Carthage, both on the coast and in the interior; while he interrupted the supplies of Carthage itself, and reduced the inhabitants to great privations.[2] He even occupied and fortified strongly a place called Hippagreta, between Utica and Carthage; thus pushing his posts within a short distance both east and west of her gates.[3]

In this prosperous condition of his African affairs, he thought the opportunity favourable for retrieving his diminished ascendency in Sicily; to which island he accordingly crossed over, with 2000 men, leaving the command in Africa to his son Archagathus. That young man was at first successful, and seemed even in course of

B.C. 306-305. Agathoklês goes to Sicily, leaving Archagathus to

[1] Diodor. xx. 54, 55. In attacking Hippu-Akra (otherwise called Hippo-Zarytus, near the Promontorium Pulchrum, the northernmost point of Africa), Agathoklês is said to have got the better in a naval battle—ναυμαχίᾳ περιγενόμενος. This implies that he must have got a fleet superior to the Carthaginians even in their own gulf; perhaps ships seized at Utica.

[2] Diodor. xx. 59.

[3] Appian distinctly mentions this place *Hippagreta* as having been fortified by Agathoklês—and distinctly describes it as being between Utica and Carthage (Punic. 110). It cannot therefore be the same place as Hippu-Akra (or Hippo-Zarytus); which was considerably farther from Carthage than Utica was.

command in Africa. Successes of Archagathus in the interior country.

enlarging his father's conquests. His general Eumachus overran a wide range of interior Numidia, capturing Tokæ, Phellinê, Meschelæ, Akris, and another town bearing the same name of Hippu-Akra—and enriching his soldiers with a considerable plunder. But in a second expedition, endeavouring to carry his arms yet farther into the interior, he was worsted in an attack upon a town called Miltinê, and compelled to retreat. We read that he marched through one mountainous region abounding in wild cats—and another, in which there were a great number of apes, who lived in the most tame and familiar manner in the houses with men—being greatly caressed, and even worshipped as Gods.[1]

B.C. 305. Redoubled efforts of the Carthaginians—they gain two great victories over Archagathus.

The Carthaginians however had now regained internal harmony and power of action. Their senate and their generals were emulous, both in vigour and in provident combinations, against the common enemy. They sent forth 30,000 men, a larger force than they had yet had in the field; forming three distinct camps, under Hanno, Imilkon, and Adherbal, partly in the interior, partly on the coast. Archagathus, leaving a sufficient guard at Tunês, marched to meet them, distributing his army in three divisions also; two, under himself and Æschrion, besides the corps under Eumachus in the mountainous region. He was however unsuccessful at all points. Hanno contriving to surprise the division of Æschrion, gained a complete victory, wherein Æschrion himself with more than 4000 men were slain. Imilkon was yet more fortunate in his operations against Eumachus, whom he entrapped by simulated fight into an ambuscade, and attacked at such advantage, that the Grecian army was routed and cut off from all retreat. A remnant of them defended themselves for some time on a neighbouring hill, but being without water, nearly all soon perished, from thirst, fatigue, and the sword of the conqueror.[2]

[1] Diodor. xx. 57, 58. It is vain to attempt to identify the places mentioned as visited and conquered by Eumachus. Our topographical knowledge is altogether insufficient. This second Hippu-Akra is supposed to be the same as Hippo-Regius; Tokæ may be Tucca Terebinthina, in the south-eastern region or Byzakium.

[2] Diodor. xx. 59, 60.

By such reverses, destroying two-thirds of the Agathoklean army, Archagathus was placed in serious peril. He was obliged to concentrate his force in Tunês, calling in nearly all his outlying detachments. At the same time, those Liby-Phenician cities, and rural Libyan tribes, who had before joined Agathoklês, now detached themselves from him when his power was evidently declining, and made their peace with Carthage. The victorious Carthaginian generals established fortified camps round Tunês, so as to restrain the excursions of Archagathus; while with their fleet they blocked up his harbour. Presently provisions became short, and much despondency prevailed among the Grecian army. Archagathus transmitted this discouraging news to his father in Sicily, with urgent entreaties that he would come to the rescue.[1]

B.C. 305. Danger of Archagathus—he is blocked up by the Carthaginians at Tunis.

The career of Agathoklês in Sicily, since his departure from Africa, had been chequered, and on the whole unproductive. Just before his arrival in the island,[2] his generals Leptinês and Demophilus had gained an important victory over the Agrigentine forces commanded by Xenodokus, who were disabled from keeping the field. This disaster was a fatal discouragement both to the Agrigentines, and to the cause which they had espoused as champions—free and autonomous city-government with equal confederacy for self-defence, under the presidency of Agrigentum.[3] The outlying cities confederate with Agrigentum were left without military protection, and exposed to the attacks of Leptinês, animated and fortified by the recent arrival of his master Agathoklês. That despot landed at Selinus—subdued Herakleia, Therma, and Kephaloidion, on or near the northern coast of Sicily—then crossed the interior of the island to Syracuse. In his march he assaulted Kentoripa, having some partisans within, but was repulsed with loss. At Apollonia,[4] he was also unsuccessful in his first

B.C. 306-305. Agathoklês in Sicily. His career at first prosperous. Defeat of the Agrigentines.

[1] Diodor. xx. 61.

[2] Diodor. xx. 56. Ἀγαθοκλῆς δέ, τῆς μάχης ἀρτι γεγενημένης, καταπλεύσας τῆς Σικελίας εἰς Σελινοῦντα, &c.

[3] Diodor. xx. 56. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀκραγαντῖνοι ταύτῃ τῇ συμφορᾷ περιπεσόντες, διέλυσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν τὴν καλλίστην ἐπιβολήν, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων τὰς τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐλπίδας.

[4] Apollonia was a town in the interior of the island, somewhat

attempt; but being stung with mortification, he resumed the assault next day, and at length, by great efforts, carried the town. To avenge his loss which had been severe, he massacred most of the citizens, and abandoned the town to plunder.[1]

B.C. 306-305. Activity of Agathoklês in Sicily—Deinokratês in great force against him.

From hence he proceeded to Syracuse, which he now revisited after an absence of (apparently) more than two years in Africa. During all this interval, the Syracusan harbour had been watched by a Carthaginian fleet, obstructing the entry of provisions, and causing partial scarcity.[2] But there was no blockading army on land; nor had the dominion of Agathoklês, upheld as it was by his brother Antander and his mercenary force, been at all shaken. His arrival inspired his partisans and soldiers with new courage, while it spread terror throughout most parts of Sicily. To contend with the Carthaginian blockading squadron, he made efforts to procure maritime aid from the Tyrrhenian ports in Italy;[3] while on land, his forces were now preponderant—owing to the recent defeat, and broken spirit, of the Agrigentines. But his prospects were suddenly checked by the enterprising move of his old enemy—the Syracusan exile Deinokratês; who made profession of taking up that generous policy which the Agrigentines had tacitly let fall—announcing himself as the champion of autonomous city-government, and equal confederacy, throughout Sicily. Deinokratês received ready adhesion from most of the cities belonging to the Agrigentine confederacy—all of them who were alarmed by finding that the weakness or fears of their presiding city had left them unprotected against Agathoklês. He was soon at the head of a powerful army—20,000 foot, and 1500 horse. Moreover a large proportion of his army were not citizen militia, but practised soldiers for the most part exiles, driven from their homes by the distractions and violences of the Agathoklean æra.[4] For military purposes, both he and his soldiers were far more strenuous and effective than the Agrigentines under Xenodokus had been. He not only kept the field against Agathoklês, but several times offered

to the north-east of Enna (Cicero, Verr. iii. 43).

[1] Diodor. xx. 56.

[2] Diodor. xx. 62.

[3] Diodor. xx. 61.

[4] Diodor. xx. 57. καὶ πάντων τούτων ἐν φυγαῖς καὶ μελέταις τοῦ πονεῖν συνεχῶς γεγονότων, &c.

him battle, which the despot did not feel confidence enough to accept. Agathoklês could do no more than maintain himself in Syracuse, while the Sicilian cities generally were put in security against his aggressions.

Amidst this unprosperous course of affairs in Sicily, Agathoklês received messengers from his son, reporting the defeats in Africa. Preparing immediately to revisit that country, he was fortunate enough to obtain a reinforcement of Tyrrhenian ships of war, which enabled him to overcome the Carthaginian blockading squadron at the mouth of the Syracusan harbour. A clear passage to Africa was thus secured for himself, together with ample supplies of imported provisions for the Syracusans.[1] Though still unable to combat Deinokratês in the field, Agathoklês was emboldened by his recent naval victory to send for Leptinês with a force to invade the Agrigentines—the jealous rivals, rather than the allies, of Deinokratês. The Agrigentine army—under the general Xenodokus, whom Leptinês had before defeated—consisted of citizen militia mustered on the occasion; while the Agathoklean mercenaries, conducted by Leptinês, had made arms a profession, and were used to fighting as well as to hardships.[2] Here, as elsewhere in Greece, we find the civic and patriotic energy trampled down by professional soldiership, and reduced to operate only as an obsequious instrument for administrative details.

Agrigentine army under Xenodokus—opposed to the mercenaries of Agathoklês—superiority of the latter.

Xenodokus, conscious of the inferiority of his Agrigentine force, was reluctant to hazard a battle. Driven to this imprudence by the taunts of his soldiers, he was defeated a second time by Leptinês, and became so apprehensive of the wrath of the Agrigentines, that he thought it expedient to retire to Gela. After a period of rejoicing, for his recent victories by land as well as by sea, Agathoklês passed over to Africa, where he found his son, with the army at Tunês in great despondency and privation, and almost mutiny for want of pay. They still amounted to 6000 Grecian mercenaries, 6000 Gauls, Samnites, and Tyrrhenians—1500 cavalry—and no less than 6000 (if the number be

Defeat of Xenodokus by Leptinês—Agathoklês passes over into Africa—bad state of his army there—he is defeated by the Carthaginians.

[1] Diodor. xx. 61, 62.

[2] Diodor. xx. 62.

correct) Libyan war-chariots. There were also a numerous body of Libyan allies; faithless time-servers, watching for the turn of fortune. The Carthaginians, occupying strong camps in the vicinity of Tunês, and abundantly supplied, awaited patiently the destroying effects of privation and suffering on their enemies. So desperate was the position of Agathoklês, that he was compelled to go forth and fight. Having tried in vain to draw the Carthaginians down into the plain, he at length attacked them in the full strength of their entrenchments. But, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, his troops were repulsed with great slaughter, and driven back to their camp.[1]

Nocturnal panic and disorder in both camps.

The night succeeding this battle was a scene of disorder and panic in both camps; even in that of the victorious Carthaginians. The latter, according to the ordinances of their religion, eager to return their heartfelt thanks to the Gods for this great victory, sacrificed to them as a choice offering the handsomest prisoners captured.[2] During this process, the tent or tabernacle consecrated to the Gods, close to the altar as well as to the general's tent, accidentally took fire. The tents being formed by mere wooden posts, connected by a thatch of hay or straw both on roof and sides, —the fire spread rapidly, and the entire camp was burnt, together with many soldiers who tried to arrest the conflagration. So distracting was the terror occasioned by this catastrophe, that the whole Carthaginian army for the time dispersed; and Agathoklês, had he been prepared, might have destroyed them. But it happened that at the same hour, his own camp was thrown into utter confusion by a different accident, rendering his soldiers incapable of being brought into action.[3]

B.C. 305. Desperate condition of Agathoklês—he deserts his army

His position at Tunês had now become desperate. His Libyan allies had all declared against him, after the recent defeat. He could neither continue to hold Tunês, nor carry away his troops to Sicily; for he had but few vessels, and the Carthaginians were masters at sea. Seing no

[1] Diodor. xx. 64; Justin, xxii. 8.

[2] Diodor. xx. 65. See an incident somewhat similar (Herod. vii. 180) —the Persians, in the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, sacrificed the handsomest Grecian prisoners whom they captured on board the first prize-ship that fell into their hands.

[3] Diodor. xx. 66, 67.

resource, he resolved to embark secretly with his younger son Herakleidês; abandoning Archagathus and the army to their fate. But Archagathus and the other officers, suspecting his purpose, were thoroughly resolved that the man who had brought them into destruction should not thus slip away and betray them. As Agathoklês was on the point of going aboard at night, he found himself watched, arrested, and held prisoner, by the indignant soldiery. The whole town now became a scene of disorder and tumult, aggravated by the rumour that the enemy were marching up to attack them. Amidst the general alarm, the guards who had been set over Agathoklês, thinking his services indispensable for defence, brought him out with his fetters still on. When the soldiers saw him in this condition, their sentiment towards him again reverted to pity and admiration, notwithstanding his projected desertion; moreover they hoped for his guidance to resist the impending attack. With one voice they called upon the guards to strike off his chains and set him free. Agathoklês was again at liberty. But, insensible to everything except his own personal safety, he presently stole away, leaped unperceived into a skiff, with a few attendants, but without either of his sons,—and was lucky enough to arrive, in spite of stormy November weather, on the coast of Sicily.[1]

and escapes to Sicily.

So terrible was the fury of the soldiers, on discovering that Agathoklês had accomplished his desertion, that they slew both his sons, Archagathus and Herakleidês. No resource was left but to elect new generals, and make the best terms they could with Carthage. They were still a formidable body, retaining in their hands various other towns besides Tunês; so that the Carthaginians, relieved from all fear of Agathoklês, thought it prudent to grant an easy capitulation. It was agreed that all the towns should be restored to the Carthaginians, on payment of 300 talents; that such soldiers as chose to enter into the African service of Carthage, should be received on full pay; but that such as preferred returning to Sicily should

The deserted army kill the two sons of Agathoklês and capitulate with the Carthaginians.

[1] Diodor. xx. 69; Justin, xxii. 8. . . . . τὸ δὲ πλῆθος, ὡς εἶδεν, εἰς ἔλεον ἐτράπη, καὶ πάντες ἐπεβόων ἀφεῖναι· ὁ δὲ λυθεὶς καὶ μετ' ὀλίγων ἐμβὰς εἰς τὸ πορθμεῖον, ἔλαθεν ἐκπλεύσας κατὰ τὴν δύσιν τῆς Πλησιάδος, χειμῶνος ὄντος.

be transported thither, with permission to reside in the Carthaginian town of Solus (or Soluntum). On these terms the convention was concluded, and the army finally broken up. Some indeed among the Grecian garrisons, quartered in the outlying posts, being rash enough to dissent and hold out, were besieged and taken by the Carthaginian force. Their commanders were crucified, and the soldiers condemned to rural work as fettered slaves.[1]

African expedition of Agathoklês—boldness of the first conception—imprudently pushed and persisted in.

Thus miserably terminated the expedition of Agathoklês to Africa, after an interval of four years from the time of his landing. By the *vana mirantes*,[2] who looked out for curious coincidences (probably Timæus), it was remarked that his ultimate flight, with the slaughter of his two sons, occurred exactly on the same day of the year following his assassination of Ophellas.[3] Ancient writers extol, with good reason, the bold and striking conception of transferring the war to Africa, at the very moment when he was himself besieged in Syracuse by a superior Carthaginian force. But while admitting the military resource, skill, and energy of Agathoklês, we must not forget that his success in Africa was materially furthered by the treasonable conduct of the Carthaginian general Bomilkar—an accidental coincidence in point of time. Nor is it to be overlooked, that Agathoklês missed the opportunity of turning his first success to account, at a moment when the Carthaginians would probably have purchased his evacuation of Africa by making large concessions to him in Sicily.[4] He imprudently persisted in the war, though the complete conquest of Carthage was beyond his strength—and though it was still more beyond his strength to prosecute effective war, simultaneously and for a long time, in Sicily and in Africa. The African subjects of Carthage were not attached to her; but neither were they attached to him;—nor, in the long run,

[1] Diodor. xx. 69.

[2] Tacit. Annal. i. 9. "Multus hinc ipso de Augusto sermo, plerisque *vana mirantibus*—quod idem dies accepti quondam imperii princeps, et vitæ supremus—quod Nolæ in domo et cubiculo, in quo pater ejus Octavius, vitam [illegible] nivisset," &c.

[3] Diodor. xx. 70.

[4] This is what Agathoklês might have done, but did not do. Nevertheless, Valerius Maximus (vii. 4, 1) represents him as having actually done it, and praises his sagacity on that ground. Here is an example how little careful these collectors of anecdotes sometimes are about their facts.

did they do him any serious good. Agathoklês is a man of force and fraud—consummate in the use of both. His whole life is a series of successful adventures, and strokes of bold ingenuity to extricate himself from difficulties; but there is wanting in him all predetermined general plan, or measured range of ambition, to which these single exploits might be made subservient.

Proceedings of Agathoklês in Sicily—his barbarities at Egesta and Syracuse.

After his passage from Africa, Agathoklês landed on the western corner of Sicily near the town of Egesta, which was then in alliance with him. He sent to Syracuse for a reinforcement. But he was hard pressed for money; he suspected, or pretended to suspect, the Egestæans of disaffection; accordingly, on receiving his new force, he employed it to commit revolting massacre and plunder in Egesta. The town is reported to have contained 10,000 citizens. Of these Agathoklês caused the poorer men to be for the most part murdered; the richer were cruelly tortured, and even their wives tortured and mutilated, to compel revelations of concealed wealth; the children of both sexes were transported to Italy, and there sold as slaves to the Bruttians. The original population being thus nearly extirpated, Agathoklês changed the name of the town to Dikæopolis, assigning it as a residence to such deserters as might join him.[1] This atrocity, more suitable to Africa[2] than Greece (where the mutilation of women is almost unheard of), was probably the way in which his savage pride obtained some kind of retaliatory satisfaction for the recent calamity and humiliation in Africa. Under the like sentiment, he perpetrated another deed of blood at Syracuse. Having learnt that the soldiers, whom he had deserted at Tunês, had after his departure put to death his two sons, he gave orders to Antander his brother (viceroy of Syracuse), to massacre all the relatives of those Syracusans who had served him in the African expedition. This order was fulfilled by Antander (we are assured) accurately and to the letter. Neither age nor sex—grandsire or infant—wife or mother—were spared by the Agathoklean

[1] Diodor. xx. 71. We do not know what happened afterwards with this town under its new population. But the old name Egesta was afterwards resumed.

[2] Compare the proceedings of the Greco-Libyan princess Pheretimê (of the Battiad family) at Barka (Herodot. iv. 202).

executioners. We may be sure that their properties were plundered at the same time; we hear of no mutilations.[1]

Great mercenary force under Deinokratês in Sicily—Agathoklês solicits peace from him, and is refused—he concludes peace with Carthage.

Still Agathoklês tried to maintain his hold on the Sicilian towns which remained to him; but his cruelties as well as his reverses had produced a strong sentiment against him, and even his general Pasiphilus revolted to join Deinokratês. That exile was now at the head of an army stated at 20,000 men, the most formidable military force in Sicily; so that Agathoklês, feeling the inadequacy of his own means, sent to solicit peace, and to offer tempting conditions. He announced his readiness to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and to be content, if two maritime towns on the northern coast of the island—Therma and Kephaloidion—were assigned to his mercenaries and himself. Under this proposition, Deinokratês, and the other Syracusan exiles, had the opportunity of entering Syracuse, and reconstituting the free city-government. Had Deinokratês been another Timoleon, the city might now have acquired and enjoyed another temporary sunshine of autonomy and prosperity; but his ambition was thoroughly selfish. As commander of this large army, he enjoyed a station of power and licence such as he was not likely to obtain under the reconstituted city-government of Syracuse. He therefore evaded the proposition of Agathoklês, requiring still larger concessions: until at length the Syracusan exiles in his own army (partly instigated by emissaries from Agathoklês himself) began to suspect his selfish projects, and to waver in their fidelity to him. Meanwhile Agathoklês, being repudiated by Deinokratês, addressed himself to the Carthaginians, and concluded a treaty with them, restoring or guaranteeing to them all the possessions that they had ever enjoyed in Sicily. In return for this concession, he received from them a sum of money, and a large supply of corn.[2]

[1] Diodor. xx. 72. Hippokratês and Epikydês—those Syracusans who, about a century afterwards, induced Hieronymus of Syracuse to prefer the Carthaginian alliance to the Roman—had resided at Carthage for some time, and served in the army of Hannibal, because their grandfather had been banished from Syracuse as one concerned in killing Archagathus (Polyb. vii. 2).

[2] Diodor. xx. 78, 79. Some said that the sum of money paid by the Carthaginians was 300 talents. Timæus stated it at 150 talents.

Relieved from Carthaginian hostility, Agathoklês presently ventured to march against the army of Deinokratês. The latter was indeed greatly superior in strength, but many of his soldiers were now lukewarm or disaffected, and Agathoklês had established among them correspondences upon which he could rely. At a great battle fought near Torgium, many of them went over on the field to Agathoklês, giving to him a complete victory. The army of Deinokratês was completely dispersed. Shortly afterwards a considerable body among them (4000 men, or 7000 men, according to different statements) surrendered to the victor on terms. As soon as they had delivered up their arms, Agathoklês, regardless of his covenant, caused them to be surrounded by his own army, and massacred.[1]

Battle of Torgium—victory of Agathoklês over Deinokratês.

It appears as if the recent victory had been the result of a secret and treacherous compact between Agathoklês and Deinokratês; and as if the prisoners massacred by Agathoklês were those of whom Deinokratês wished to rid himself as malcontents; for immediately after the battle, a reconciliation took place between the two. Agathoklês admitted the other as a sort of partner in his despotism; while Deinokratês not only brought into the partnership all the military means and strong posts which he had been two years in acquiring, but also betrayed to Agathoklês the revolted general Pasiphilus, with the town of Gela occupied by the latter. It is noticed as singular, that Agathoklês, generally faithless and unscrupulous towards both friends and enemies, kept up the best understanding and confidence with Deinokratês to the end of his life.[2]

Accommodation and compact between Agathoklês and Deinokratês.

The despot had now regained full power at Syracuse, together with a great extent of dominion in Sicily. The remainder of his restless existence was spent in operations of hostility or plunder against more northerly enemies—the Liparæan isles[3]—the Italian cities and the Bruttians—the island of Korkyra. We are unable to follow his proceedings in detail. He was threatened with

B.C. 301.

Operations of Agathoklês in the Liparæ, Italy and Korkyra—Kleonymus of Sparta.

[1] Diodor. xx. 89.

[2] Diodor. xx. 90.

[3] Diodor. xx. 101. This expedition of Agathoklês against the Liparæan isles seems to have been described in detail by his contemporary

a formidable attack[1] by the Spartan prince Kleonymus, who was invited by the Tarentines to aid them against the Lucanians and Romans. But Kleonymus found enough to occupy him elsewhere, without visiting Sicily. He collected a considerable force on the coast of Italy, undertook operations with success against the Lucanians, and even captured the town of Thurii. But the Romans, now pushing their intervention even to the Tarentine Gulf, drove him off and retook the town; moreover his own behaviour was so tyrannical and profligate, as to draw upon him universal hatred. Returning from Italy to Korkyra, Kleonymus made himself master of that important island, intending to employ it as a base of operations both against Greece and against Italy.[2] He failed however in various expeditions both in the Tarentine Gulf and the Adriatic. Demetrius Poliorketês and Kassander alike tried to conclude an alliance with him; but in vain.[3] At a subsequent period, Korkyra was besieged by Kassander with a large naval and military force; Kleonymus then retired (or perhaps had previously retired) to Sparta. Kassander, having reduced the island to great straits, was on the point of taking it, when it was relieved by Agathoklês with a powerful armament. That despot was engaged in operations on the coast of Italy against the Bruttians when his aid to Korkyra was solicited; he destroyed most part of the Macedonian fleet, and then seized the island for himself.[4] On returning from this victorious expedition to the Italian coast, where he had left a detachment of his Ligurian and Tuscan mercenaries, he was informed that these mercenaries had been turbulent during his absence, in demanding the pay due to

historian the Syracusan Kallias: see the Fragments of that author, in Didot's Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 383. Fragm. 4.

[1] Diodor. xx. 104.

[2] Diodor. xx. 104; Livy, x. 2. A curious anecdote appears in the Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mirabilibus (78), respecting two native Italians, Aulus and Caius, who tried to poison Kleonymus at Tarentum, but were detected and put to death by the Tarentines.

That Agathoklês, in his operations on the coast of southern Italy, found himself in conflict with the Romans, and that their importance was now strongly felt—we may judge by the fact, that the Syracusan Kallias (contemporary and historian of Agathoklês) appears to have given details respecting the origin and history of Rome. See the Fragments of Kallias, ap. Didot. Hist. Græc. Fragm. vol. ii. p. 383; Fragm. 5—and Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. i. 72.

[3] Diodor. xx. 105.

[4] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 2. p. 265.

them from his grandson Archagathus. He caused them all to be slain, to the number of 2000.[1]

As far as we can trace the events of the last years of Agathoklês, we find him seizing the towns of Kroton and Hipponia in Italy, establishing an alliance with Demetrius Poliorketês,[2] and giving his daughter Lanassa in marriage to the youthful Pyrrhus king of Epirus. At the age of seventy-two, still in the plenitude of vigour as well as of power, he was projecting a fresh expedition against the Carthaginians in Africa, with two hundred of the largest ships of war, when his career was brought to a close by sickness and by domestic enemies.

B.C. 300-289. Last projects of Agathoklês—mutiny of his grandson Archagathus—sickness, poisoning, and death of Agathoklês.

He proclaimed as future successor to his dominion, his son, named Agathoklês; but Archagathus his grandson (son of Archagathus who had perished in Africa), a young prince of more conspicuous qualities, had already been singled out for the most important command, and was now at the head of the army near Ætna. The old Agathoklês, wishing to strengthen the hands of his intended successor, sent his favoured son Agathoklês to Ætna, with written orders directing that Archagathus should yield up to him the command. Archagathus, noway disposed to obey, invited his uncle Agathoklês to a banquet, and killed him; after which he contrived the poisoning of his grandfather the old despot himself. The instrument of his purpose was Mænon; a citizen of Egesta, enslaved at the time when Agathoklês massacred most of the Egestean population. The beauty of his person procured him much favour with Agathoklês; but he had never forgotten, and had always been anxious to avenge, the bloody outrage on his fellow-citizens. To accomplish this purpose, the opportunity was now opened to him, together with a promise of protection, through Archagathus. He accordingly poisoned Agathoklês, as we are told, by means of a medicated quill, handed to him for cleaning his teeth after dinner.[3] Combining

[1] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 3. p. 266.

[2] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 4, 8, 11. p. 266-273.

[3] Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 12. p. 276-278. Neither Justin (xxiii. 2), nor Trogus before him (as it seems from the Prologue), alludes to poison. He represents Agathoklês as having died by a violent distemper. He notices however the bloody family feud, and the murder of the uncle by the nephew.

together the various accounts, it seems probable that Agathoklês was at the time sick—that this sickness may have been the reason why he was so anxious to strengthen the position of his intended successor—and that his death was as much the effect of his malady as of the poison. Archagathus, after murdering his uncle, seems by means of his army to have made himself real master of the Syracusan power; while the old despot, defenceless on a sick bed, could do no more than provide for the safety of his Egyptian wife Theoxena and his two young children, by despatching them on shipboard with all his rich moveable treasures to Alexandria. Having secured this object, amidst extreme grief on the part of those around, he expired.[1]

Splendid genius of action and resource—nefarious dispositions—of Agathoklês.

The great lines in the character of Agathoklês are well marked. He was of the stamp of Gelon and the elder Dionysius—a soldier of fortune, who raised himself from the meanest beginnings to the summit of political power—and who, in the acquisition as well as maintenance of that power, displayed an extent of energy, perseverance, and military resource, not surpassed by any one, even of the generals formed in Alexander's school. He was an adept in that art at which all aspiring men of his age aimed—the handling of mercenary soldiers for the extinction of political liberty and security at home, and for predatory aggrandisement abroad. I have already noticed the opinion delivered by Scipio Africanus—that the elder Dionysius and Agathoklês were the most daring, sagacious, and capable men of action within his knowledge.[2] Apart from this enterprising genius, employed in the service of unmeasured personal ambition, we know nothing of Agathoklês except his sanguinary, faithless, and nefarious dispositions; in which attributes also he stands preeminent, above all his known contemporaries, and above nearly all predecessors.[3] Notwithstanding his often-proved perfidy,

[1] Justin (xxiii. 2) dwells pathetically on this last parting between Agathoklês and Theoxena. It is difficult to reconcile Justin's narrative with that of Diodorus; but on this point, as far as we can judge, I think him more credible than Diodorus.

[2] Polyb. xv. 35. See above in this History, Ch. LXXXIII.

[3] Polybius (ix. 23) says that Agathoklês, though cruel in the extreme at the beginning of his career, and in the establishment of his power, yet became the mildest of men after his power was

he seems to have had a geniality and apparent simplicity of manner (the same is recounted of Cæsar Borgia) which amused men and put them off their guard, throwing them perpetually into his trap.[1]

Hellenic agency in Sicily continues during the life of Agathoklês, and becomes then subordinate to preponderant foreigners.

Agathoklês, however, though among the worst of Greeks, was yet a Greek. During his government of thirty-two years, the course of events in Sicily continued under Hellenic agency, without the preponderant intervention of any foreign power. The power of Agathoklês indeed rested mainly on foreign mercenaries; but so had that of Dionysius and Gelon before him; and he, as well as they, kept up vigorously the old conflict against the Carthaginian power in the island. Grecian history in Sicily thus continues down to the death of Agathoklês; but it continues no longer. After his death, Hellenic power and interests become incapable of self-support, and sink into a secondary and subservient position, overridden or contended for by foreigners. Syracuse and the other cities passed from one despot to another, and were torn with discord arising out of the crowds of foreign mercenaries who had obtained footing

once established. The latter half of this statement is contradicted by all the particular facts which we know respecting Agathoklês.

As to Timæus the historian, indeed (who had been banished from Sicily by Agathoklês, and who wrote the history of the latter in five books), Polybius had good reason to censure him, as being unmeasured in his abuse of Agathoklês. For Timæus not only recounted of Agathoklês numerous acts of nefarious cruelty — acts of course essentially public, and therefore capable of being known — but also told much scandal about his private habits, and represented him (which is still more absurd) as a man vulgar and despicable in point of ability. See the Fragments of Timæus ap. Histor. Græc. ed. Didot, Fragm. 144-150.

All, or nearly all, the acts of Agathoklês, as described in the preceding pages, have been copied from Diodorus; who had as good authorities before him as Polybius possessed. Diodorus does not copy the history of Agathoklês from Timæus; on the contrary, he censures Timæus for his exaggerated acrimony and injustice towards Agathoklês, in terms not less forcible than those which Polybius employs (Fragm. xxi. p. 279). Diodorus cites Timæus by name, occasionally and in particular instances; but he evidently did not borrow from that author the main stream of his narrative. He seems to have had before him other authorities — among them some authors whose feelings would lead them to favour Agathoklês — the Syracusan Kallias — and Antander, brother of Agathoklês.

[1] Diodor. xx. 63.

among them. At the same time, the Carthaginians made increased efforts to push their conquests in the island, without finding any sufficient internal resistance; so that they would have taken Syracuse, and made Sicily their own, had not Pyrrhus king of Epirus (the son-in-law of Agathoklês) interposed to arrest their progress. From this time forward, the Greeks of Sicily become a prize to be contended for—first between the Carthaginians and Pyrrhus—next, between the Carthaginians and Romans[1]—until at length they dwindle into subjects of Rome; corn-growers for the Roman plebs, clients under the patronage of the Roman Marcelli, victims of the rapacity of Verres, and suppliants for the tutelary eloquence of Cicero. The historian of self-acting Hellas loses sight of them at the death of Agathoklês.

[1] The poet Theokritus (xvi. 75-80) expatiates on the bravery of the Syracusan Hiero II., and on the great warlike power of the Syracusans under him (B.C. 260-240), which he represents as making the Carthaginians tremble for their possessions in Sicily. Personally, Hiero seems to have deserved this praise—and to have deserved yet more praise for his mild and prudent internal administration of Syracuse. But his military force was altogether secondary in the great struggle between Rome and Carthage for the mastery of Sicily.

# CHAPTER XCVIII.

## OUTLYING HELLENIC CITIES.

1. IN GAUL AND SPAIN.
2. ON THE COAST OF THE EUXINE.

To complete the picture of the Hellenic world while yet in its period of full life, in freedom and self-action, or even during its decline into the half-life of a dependent condition —we must say a few words respecting some of its members lying apart from the general history, yet of not inconsiderable importance. The Greeks of Massalia formed its western wing; the Pontic Greeks (those on the shores of the Euxine), its eastern; both of them the outermost radiations of Hellenism, where it was always militant against foreign elements, and often adulterated by them. It is indeed little that we have the means of saying; but that little must not be left unsaid.

Massalia—its situation and circumstances.

In my twenty-seventh chapter, I briefly noticed the foundation and first proceedings of Massalia (the modern Marseilles), on the Mediterranean coast of Gaul or Liguria. This Ionic city, founded by the enterprising Phokæans of Asia Minor, a little before their own seaboard was subjugated by the Persians, had a life and career of its own, apart from those political events which determined the condition of its Hellenic sisters in Asia, Peloponnesus, Italy, or Sicily. The Massaliots maintained their own relations of commerce, friendship or hostility with their barbaric neighbours, the Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians, without becoming involved in the larger political confederacies of the Hellenic world. They carried out from their mother-city established habits of adventurous coast-navigation and commercial activity. Their situation, distant from other Greeks and sustained

by a force hardly sufficient even for defence, imposed upon them the necessity both of political harmony at home, and of prudence and persuasive agency in their mode of dealing with neighbours. That they were found equal to this necessity, appears sufficiently attested by the few general statements transmitted in respect to them; though their history in its details is unknown.

Their city was strong by position, situated upon a promontory washed on three sides by the sea, well fortified, and possessing a convenient harbour securely closed against enemies.[1] The domain around it however appears not to have been large, nor did their population extend itself much into the interior. The land around was less adapted for corn than for the vine and the olive; wine was supplied by the Massaliots throughout Gaul.[2] It was on shipboard that their courage and skill was chiefly displayed; it was by maritime enterprise that their power, their wealth, and their colonial expansion were obtained. In an age when piracy was common, the Massaliot ships and seamen were effective in attack and defence not less than in transport and commercial interchange; while their numerous maritime successes were attested by many trophies adorning the temples.[3] The city contained docks and arsenals admirably provided with provisions, stores, arms, and all the various muniments of naval war.[4] Except the Phenicians and Carthaginians, these Massaliots were the only enterprising mariners in the Western Mediterranean; from the year 500 B.C. downward, after the energy of the Ionic Greeks had been crushed by inland potentates. The Iberian and Gallic tribes were essentially landsmen, not occupying permanent stations on the coast, nor having any vocation for the sea; but the Ligurians, though chiefly mountaineers, were annoying neighbours to Massalia as well by their piracies at sea as from their depredations by land.[5] To all these landsmen, however, depredators as they were, the visit of the trader soon made itself felt as a want, both for import and export; and to this want the Massaliots, with

[1] Cæsar, Bell. Gall. ii. 1; Strabo, iv. p. 179.

[2] See Poseidonius ap. Athenæum, iv. p. 152.

[3] Strabo, iv. p. 180.

[4] Strabo (xii. p. 575) places Massalia in the same rank as Kyzikus, Rhodes, and Carthage; types of maritime cities highly and effectively organized.

[5] Livy, xl. 18; Polybius xxx 4.

their colonies, were the only ministers, along the Gulfs of Genoa and Lyons, from Luna (the frontiers of Tuscany) to the Dianium (Cape della Nao) in Spain.[1] It was not until the first century before the Christian era that they were outstripped in this career by Narbon, and a few other neighbours, exalted into Roman colonies.

Colonies planted by Massalia—Antipolis, Nikæa, Rhoda, Emporiæ—peculiar circumstances of Emporiæ.

Along the coast on both sides of their own city, the Massaliots planted colonies, each commended to the protection, and consecrated by the statue and peculiar rites, of their own patron Goddess, the Ephesian Artemis.[2] Towards the east were Tauroentium, Olbia, Antipolis, Nikæa, and the Portus Monœki; towards the west, on the coast of Spain, were Rhoda, Emporiæ, Alônê, Hemeroskopium, and Artemisium or Dianium. These colonies were established chiefly on outlying capes or sometimes islets, at once near and safe; they were intended more as shelter and accommodation for maritime traffic, and as depôts for trade with the interior,—than for the purpose of spreading inland, and including a numerous outlying population round the walls. The circumstances of Emporiæ were the most remarkable. That town was built originally on a little uninhabited islet of the coast of Iberia; after a certain interval it became extended to the adjoining mainland, and a body of native Iberians were admitted to joint residence within the new-walled circuit there established. This new circuit however was divided in half by an intervening wall, on one side of which dwelt the Iberians, on the other side the Greeks. One gate alone was permitted, for intercommunication, guarded night and day by appointed magistrates, one of whom was perpetually on the spot. Every night, one third of the Greek citizens kept guard on the walls, or at least held themselves prepared to do so. How long these strict and fatiguing precautions were found necessary, we do not know; but after a certain time they were relaxed and the intervening wall disappeared, so that Greeks and Iberians freely coalesced into one community.[3] It is not often that we are allowed

[1] The oration composed by Demosthenês πρὸς Ζηνόθεμιν, relates to an affair wherein a ship, captain, and mate, all from Massalia, are found engaged in the carrying trade between Athens and Syracuse (Demosth. p. 882 *seq.*).

[2] Brückner, Histor. Massiliensium c. 7 (Göttingen).

[3] Livy, xxxiv. 8; Strabo, iii. p.

to see so much in detail the early difficulties and dangers of a Grecian colony. Massalia itself was situated under nearly similar circumstances among the rude Ligurian Salyes; we hear of these Ligurians hiring themselves as labourers to dig on the fields of Massaliot proprietors.[1] The various tribes of Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians extended down to the coast, so that there was no road along it, nor any communication except by sea, until the conquests of the Romans in the second and first century before the Christian era.[2]

Oligarchical government of Massalia—prudent political administration.

The government of Massalia was oligarchical, carried on chiefly by a Senate or Great Council of Six Hundred (called Timuchi), elected for life—and by a small council of fifteen, chosen among this larger body to take turn in executive duties.[3] The public habits of the administrators are said to have been extremely vigilant and circumspect; the private habits of the citizens, frugal and temperate—a maximum being fixed by law for dowries and marriage-ceremonies.[4] They were careful in their dealings with the native tribes, with whom they appear to have maintained relations generally friendly. The historian Ephorus (whose History closed about 340 B.C.) respected the Gauls as especially phil-Hellenic;[5] an impression which he could

160. At Massalia, it is said that no armed stranger was ever allowed to enter the city, without depositing his arms at the gate (Justin, xliii. 4).

This precaution seems to have been adopted in other cities also: see Æneas, Poliorket. c. 30.

[1] Strabo, iii. p. 165. A fact told to Poseidonius by a Massaliot proprietor who was his personal friend.

In the siege of Massalia by Cæsar, a detachment of Albici—mountaineers not far from the town, and old allies or dependents—were brought in to help in the defence (Cæsar, Bell. G. i. 34).

[2] Strabo, iv. p. 180.

[3] Strabo, iv. p. 181; Cicero, De Republ. xxvii. Fragm. Vacancies in the senate seem to have been filled up from meritorious citizens generally—as far as we can judge by a brief allusion in Aristotle (Polit. vi. 7). From another passage in the same work, it seems that the narrow basis of the oligarchy must have given rise to dissensions (v. 6). Aristotle had included the Μασσαλιωτῶν πολιτεία in his lost work Περὶ Πολιτειῶν.

[4] Strabo, *l. c.* However, one author from whom Athenæus borrowed (xii. p. 523), described the Massaliots as luxurious in their habits.

[5] Strabo, iv. p. 199. Ἔφορος δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσαν τῷ μεγέθει λέγει τὴν Κελτικήν, ὥστε ὑσπερ νῦν Ἰβηρίας καλοῦμεν ἐκείνους τὰ πλεῖστα προσνέμειν μέχρι Γαδείρων, φιλέλληνάς τε ἀποφαίνει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ πολλὰ ἰδίως λέγει περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐοικότα τοῖς νῦν. Compare p. 181.

hardly have derived from any but Massaliot informants. The Massaliots (who in the first century before Christ were *trilingues*, speaking Greek, Latin, and Gallic[1]) contributed to engraft upon these unlettered men a certain refinement and variety of wants, and to lay the foundation of that taste for letters which afterwards became largely diffused throughout the Roman Province of Gaul. At sea, and in traffic, the Phenicians and Carthaginians were their formidable rivals. This was among the causes which threw them betimes into alliance and active cooperation with Rome, under whose rule they obtained favourable treatment, when the blessing of freedom was no longer within their reach.

Hellenising influence of Massalia in the West—Pytheas, the navigator and geographer.

Enough is known about Massalia to show that the city was a genuine specimen of Hellenism and Hellenic influences—acting not by force or constraint, but simply by superior intelligence and activity—by power of ministering to wants which must otherwise have remained unsupplied—and by the assimilating effect of a lettered civilization upon ruder neighbours. This is the more to be noticed as it contrasts strikingly with the Macedonian influences which have occupied so much of the present volume; force admirably organized and wielded by Alexander, yet still nothing but force. The loss of all details respecting the history of Massalia is greatly to be lamented; and hardly less, that of the writings of Pytheas, an intelligent Massaliotic navigator, who, at this early age (330—320 B.C.),[2] with an adventurous boldness

It is to be remembered that Ephorus was a native of the Asiatic Kymè, the immediate neighbour of Phokæa, which was the metropolis of Massalia. The Massaliots never forgot or broke off their connexion with Phokæa: see the statement of their intercession with the Romans on behalf of Phokæa (Justin, xxxvii. 1). Ephorus therefore had good means of learning whatever Massaliot citizens were disposed to communicate.

[1] Varro, Antiq. Fragm. p. 350, ed. Bipont.

[2] See the Fragmenta Pytheæ collected by Arfwedson, Upsal 1824. He wrote two works—1. Γῆς Περιόδος; 2. Περὶ Ὠκεανοῦ. His statements were greatly esteemed, and often followed, by Eratosthenès; partially followed by Hipparchus; harshly judged by Polybius, whom Strabo in the main follows. Even by those who judge him most severely, Pytheas is admitted to have been a good mathematician and astronomer (Strabo, iv. p. 201) —and to have travelled extensively in person. Like Herodotus, he must have been forced to report a great deal on hearsay; and all

even more than Phokæan, sailed through the Pillars of Hêraklês and from thence northward along the coast of Spain, Gaul, Britain, Germany—perhaps yet farther. Probably no Greek except a Massaliot could have accomplished such a voyage; which in his case deserves the greater sympathy, as there was no other reward for the difficulties and dangers braved except the gratification of an intelligent curiosity. It seems plain that the publication of his "Survey of the Earth"—much consulted by Eratosthenês, though the criticisms which have reached us through Polybius and Strabo dwell chiefly upon its mistakes, real or supposed—made an epoch in ancient geographical knowledge.

Pontic Greeks—Pentapolis on the south-west coast.

From the western wing of the Hellenic world, we pass to the eastern—the Euxine Sea. Of the Pentapolis on its western coast south of the Danube (Apollonia, Mesembria, Kalatis, Odessus, and probably Istrus)—and of Tyras near the mouth of the river so called (now Dniester)—we have little to record; though Istrus and Apollonia were among the towns whose political constitutions Aristotle thought worthy of his examination.[1] But Herakleia on the south coast, and Pantikapæum or Bosporus between the Euxine and the Palus Mæotis (now Sea of Azof), are not thus unknown to history; nor can Sinôpê (on the south coast) and Olbia (on the north-west) be altogether passed over. Though lying apart from the political headship of Athens or Sparta, all these cities were legitimate members of the Hellenic brotherhood. All supplied spectators and competitors for the Panhellenic festivals—pupils to the rhetors and philosophers—purchasers, and sometimes even rivals, to the artists. All too were (like Massalia and Kyrênê)

that he could do was to report the best hearsay information which reached him. It is evident that his writings made an epoch in geographical inquiry; though they doubtless contained numerous inaccuracies. See a fair estimate of Pytheas in Mannert, Geog. der Gr. und Römer, Introd. i. p. 73-86.

The Massaliotic Codex of Homer, possessed and consulted among others by the Alexandrine critics, affords presumption that the celebrity of Massalia as a place of Grecian literature and study (in which character it competed with Athens towards the commencement of the Roman empire) had its foundations laid at least in the third century before the Christian era.

[1] Aristotle, Politic. v. 2, 11; v. 5, 2.

adulterated partially—Olbia and Bosporus considerably—by admixture of a non-hellenic element.

Of Sinôpê, and its three dependent colonies Kotyora, Kerasus and Trapezus, I have already said something,[1] in describing the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks. Like Massalia with its dependencies Antipolis, Nikæa, and others—Sinôpê enjoyed not merely partial independence, but considerable prosperity and local dignity, at the time when Xenophon and his companions marched through those regions. The citizens were on terms of equal alliance, mutually advantageous, with Korylas prince of Paphlagonia, on the borders of whose territory they dwelt. It is probable that they figured on the tribute list of the Persian king as a portion of Paphlagonia, and paid an annual sum; but here ended their subjection. Their behaviour towards the Ten Thousand Greeks, pronounced enemies of the Persian king, was that of an independent city. Neither they, nor even the inland Paphlagonians, warlike and turbulent, were molested with Persian governors or military occupation.[2] Alexander however numbered them among the subjects of Persia; and it is a remarkable fact, that envoys from Sinôpê were found remaining with Darius almost to his last hour, after he had become a conquered fugitive, and had lost his armies, his capitals, and his treasures. These Sinopian envoys fell into the hands of Alexander; who set them at liberty with the remark, that since they were not members of the Hellenic confederacy, but subjects of Persia—their presence as envoys near Darius was very excusable.[3] The position of Sinôpê placed her out of the direct range of the hostilities carried on by Alexander's successors against each other; and the ancient Kappadokian princes of the Mithridatic family (professedly descendants of the Persian Achæmenidæ),[4] who ultimately ripened into the kings of Pontus, had not become sufficiently powerful to swallow up her independence until the reign of Pharnakês, in the second century

Sinôpê—its envoys present with Darius in his last days—maintains its independence for some time against the Pontic princes—but becomes subject to them ultimately.

[1] See Ch. LXXI.

[2] See the remarkable life of the Karian Datamês, by Cornelius Nepos, which gives some idea of the situation of Paphlagonia about 360-350 B.C. (cap. 7, 8). Compare Xenoph. Hellenic. iv. 1, 4.

[3] Arrian, iii. 24, 8; Curtius, vi. 5, 6.

[4] Polybius, v. 43.

before Christ. Sinôpê then passed under his dominion; exchanging (like others) the condition of a free Grecian city for that of a subject of the barbaric kings of Pontus, with a citadel and mercenary garrison to keep her citizens in obedience. We know nothing however of the intermediate events.

The Pontic Herakleia—oligarchical government—the native Mariandyni reduced to serfs.

Respecting the Pontic Herakleia, our ignorance is not so complete. That city—much nearer than Sinôpê to the mouth of the Thracian Bosporus, and distant by sea from Byzantium only one long day's voyage of a row-boat—was established by Megarians and Bœotians on the coast of the Mariandyni. These natives were subdued, and reduced to a kind of serfdom; whereby they became slaves, yet with a proviso that they should never be sold out of the territory. Adjoining, on the westward, between Herakleia and Byzantium, were the Bithynian Thracians—villagers not merely independent, but warlike and fierce wreckers, who cruelly maltreated any Greeks stranded on their coast [1]. We are told in general terms that the government of Herakleia was oligarchical; [2] perhaps in the hands of the descendants of the principal original colonists, who partitioned among themselves the territory with its Mariandynian serfs, and who formed a small but rich minority among the total population. We hear of them as powerful at sea, and as being able to man, through their numerous serfs, a considerable fleet, with which they invaded the territory of Leukon, prince of the Kimmerian Bosporus. [3] They were also engaged in land-war with Mithridatês, a prince of the

[1] Xenoph. Anab. vi. 6, 2.

[2] Aristot. Polit. v. 5, 2; v. 5, 5. Another passage in the same work, however (v. 4, 2), says, that in Herakleia, the democracy was subverted immediately after the foundation of the colony, through the popular leaders; who committed injustice against the rich. These rich men were banished, but collected strength enough to return and subvert the democracy by force. If this passage alludes to the same Herakleia (there were many towns of that name), the government must have been originally democratical. But the serfdom of the natives seems to imply an oligarchy.

[3] Aristot. Polit. vii. 5, 7; Polyæn. vi. 9, 3, 4: compare Pseudo-Aristotle, Œconomic. ii. 9.

The reign of Leukon lasted from about 392-352 B.C. The event alluded to by Polyænus must have occurred at some time during this interval.

ancient Persian family established as district rulers in Northern Kappadokia.[1].

Towards 380-370 B.C. the Herakleots became disturbed by violent party-contentions within the city. As far as we can divine from a few obscure hints, these contentions began among the oligarchy themselves;[2] some of whom opposed, and partially threw open, a close political monopoly—yet not without a struggle, in the course of which an energetic citizen named Klearchus was banished. Presently however the contest assumed larger dimensions; the plebs sought admission into the constitution, and are even said to have required abolition of debts with a redivision of the lands.[3] A democratical constitution was established; but it was speedily menaced by conspiracies of the rich, to guard against which, the classification of the citizens was altered. Instead of three tribes, and four centuries, all were distributed anew into sixty-four centuries, the tribes being discontinued. It would appear that in the original four centuries, the rich men had been so enrolled as to form separate military divisions (probably their rustic serfs being armed along with them)—while the three tribes had contained all the rest of the people; so that the effect of thus multiplying the centuries was, to divest the rich of their separate military enrolment, and to disseminate them in many different regiments along with a greater number of poor.[4]

Political discord at Herakleia, banishment of Klearchus—partial democracy established.

Still however the demands of the people were not fully granted, and dissension continued. Not merely the poorer citizens, but also the population of serfs—homogeneous, speaking the same language, and sympathising with each other, like Helots or Penestæ—when once agitated by the hope of liberty, were with difficulty appeased. The government, though greatly democratised,

B.C. 364. Continued political troubles at Herakleia—assistance invoked from without.

[1] Justin xvi. 4.

[2] Aristot. v. 5, 2; 5, 10.

[3] Justin, xvi. 4.

[4] Æneas, Poliorket. c. 11. I have given what seems the most probable explanation of a very obscure passage.

It is to be noted that the distribution of citizens into centuries (ἑκατοστύες) prevailed also at Byzantium; see Inscript. No. 2060 ap. Boeck. Corp. Inscr. Græc. p. 130. A citizen of Olbia, upon whom the citizenship of Byzantium is conferred, is allowed to enroll himself in any one of the ἑκατοστύες that he prefers.

found itself unable to maintain tranquillity, and invoked assistance from without. Application was made first, to the Athenian Timotheus—next, to the Theban Epaminondas; but neither of them would interfere—nor was there, indeed, any motive to tempt them. At length application was made to the exiled citizen Klearchus.

Character and circumstances of Klearchus—he makes himself despot of Herakleia—his tyranny and cruelty.

This exile, now about forty years for age, intelligent, audacious and unprincipled, had passed four years at Athens partly in hearing the lessons of Plato and Isokratês—and had watched with emulous curiosity the brilliant fortune of the despot Dionysius at Syracuse, in whom both these philosophers took interest.[1] During his banishment, moreover, he had done what was common with Grecian exiles; he had taken service with the enemy of his native city, the neighbouring prince Mithridatês,[2] and probably enough against the city itself. As an officer, he distinguished himself much; acquiring renown with the prince and influence over the minds of soldiers. Hence his friends, and a party in Herakleia, became anxious to recall him, as moderator and protector under the grievous political discords prevailing.

[1] Diodor. xv. 81. ἐζήλωσε μὲν τὴν Διονυσίου τοῦ Συρακουσίου διαγωγήν, &c. Memnon, Fragm. c. 1; Isokratês, Epist. vii.

It is here that the fragments of Memnon, as abstracted by Photius (Cod. 224), begin. Photius had seen only eight books of Memnon's History of Herakleia (Books ix.-xvi. inclusive); neither the first eight books (see the end of his Excerpta from Memnon), nor those after the sixteenth, had come under his view. This is greatly to be regretted, as we are thus shut out from the knowledge of Heraklean affairs anterior to Klearchus.

It happens, not unfrequently, with Photius, that he does not possess an entire work, but only parts of it; this is a curious fact, in reference to the libraries of the ninth century A.D.

The Fragments of Memnon are collected out of Photius, together with those of Nymphis and other Herakleotic historians, and illustrated with useful notes and citations, in the edition of Orelli; as well as by K. Müller, in Didot's Fragm. Hist. Græc. tom. iii. p. 525. Memnon carried his history down to the time of Julius Cæsar, and appears to have lived shortly after the Christian era. Nymphis (whom he probably copied) was much older; having lived seemingly from about 300-230 B.C. (see the few Fragmenta remaining from him, in the same work, iii. p. 12). The work of the Herakleotic author Herodôrus seems to have been altogether upon legendary matter (see Fragm. in the same work, ii. p. 27). He was half a century earlier than Nymphis.

[2] Suidas, v. Κλέαρχος.

It was the oligarchical party who invited him to come back, at the head of a body of troops, as their auxiliary in keeping down the plebs. Klearchus accepted their invitation; but with the full purpose of making himself the Dionysius of Herakleia. Obtaining from Mithridatês a powerful body of mercenaries, under secret promise to hold the city only as his prefect, he marched thither with the proclaimed purpose of maintaining order, and upholding the government. As his mercenary soldiers were soon found troublesome companions, he obtained permission to construct a separate stronghold in the city, under colour of keeping them apart in the stricter discipline of a barrack.[1] Having thus secured a strong position, he invited Mithridatês into the city, to receive the promised possession; but instead of performing this engagement, he detained the prince as a prisoner, and only released him on payment of a considerable ransom. He next cheated, still more grossly, the oligarchy who had recalled him; denouncing their past misrule, declaring himself their mortal enemy, and espousing the pretensions as well as the antipathies of the plebs. The latter willingly seconded him in his measures—even extreme measures of cruelty and spoliation—against their political enemies. A large number of the rich were killed, imprisoned, or impoverished and banished; their slaves or serfs, too, were not only manumitted by order of the new despot, but also married to the wives and daughters of the new exiles. The most tragical scenes arose out of these forced marriages; many of the women even killed themselves, some after having first killed their new husbands. Among the exiles, a party, driven to despair, procured assistance from without, and tried to obtain by force readmittance into the city; but they were totally defeated by Klearchus, who after this victory became more brutal and unrelenting than ever.[2]

He was now in irresistible power; despot of the whole city, plebs as well as oligarchy. Such he continued to be

[1] Polyænus, ii. 30, 1; Justin, xvi. 4. "A quibus revocatus in patriam, per quos in arce collocatus fuerat," &c.

Æneas (Poliorket. c. 12) cites this proceeding as an example of the mistake made by a political party, in calling in a greater number of mercenary auxiliaries than they could manage or keep in order.

[2] Justin, xvi. 4, 5; Theopompus ap. Athenæ. iii. p. 85. Fragm. 200, ed. Didot.

for twelve years, during which he displayed great warlike energy against exterior enemies, together with unabated cruelty towards the citizens. He farther indulged in the most overweening insolence of personal demeanour, adopting an Oriental costume and ornaments, and proclaiming himself the son of Zeus—as Alexander the Great did after him. Amidst all these enormities, however, his literary tastes did not forsake him; he collected a library, at that time a very rare possession.[1] Many were the conspiracies attempted by suffering citizens against this tyrant; but his vigilance baffled and punished all. At length two young men, Chion and Leonidês (they too having been among the hearers of Plato), found an opportunity to stab him at a Dionysiac festival. They, with those who seconded them, were slain by his guards, after a gallant resistance; but Klearchus himself died of the wound, in torture and mental remorse.[2]

He continues despot for twelve years—he is assassinated at a festival.

His death unfortunately brought no relief to the Herakleots. The two sons whom he left, Timotheus and Dionysius, were both minors; but his brother Satyrus, administering in their name, grasped the sceptre and continued the despotism, with cruelty not merely undiminished, but even aggravated and sharpened by the past assassination. Not inferior to his predecessor in energy and vigilance, Satyrus was in this respect different, that he was altogether rude and unlettered. Moreover he was rigidly scrupulous in preserving the crown for his brother's children, as soon as they should be of age. To ensure to them an undisturbed succession, he took every precaution to avoid begetting children of his own wife.[3]

B.C. 352. Satyrus becomes despot—his aggravated cruelty—his military vigour.

[1] Memnon, c. 1. The seventh epistle of Isokratês, addressed to Timotheus son of Klearchus, recognises generally this character of the latter; with whose memory Isokratês disclaims all sympathy.

[2] Memnon, c. 1; Justin, xvi. 5; Diodor. xvi 36.

[3] Memnon, c. 2. ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ τὸ πρῶτον ἡνέγκατο· τὴν γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοῖς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ παισὶν ἀνεπηρέαστον συντηρῶν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τῆς αὐτῶν κηδεμονίας λόγον ἐτίθετο, ὡς καὶ γυναικὶ συνὼν, καὶ τότε λίαν στεργομένῃ, μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι παιδοποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μηχανῇ πάσῃ γονῆς στέρησιν ἑαυτῷ διὰσαι, ὡς ἂν μήδ' ὅλως ὑπολίποι τινὰ ἐφεδρεύοντα τοῖς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ παισίν.

In the Antigonid dynasty of Macedonia, we read that Demetrius, son of Antigonus Gonatas, died leaving his son Philip a boy. Antigonus called Doson, younger

After a rule of seven years, Satyrus died of a lingering and painful distemper.

The government of Herakleia now devolved on Timotheus, who exhibited a contrast, alike marked and beneficent, with his father and uncle. Renouncing all their cruelty and constraint, he set at liberty every man whom he found in prison. He was strict in dispensing justice, but mild and even liberal in all his dealings towards the citizens. At the same time, he was a man of adventurous courage, carrying on successful war against foreign enemies, and making his power respected all around. With his younger brother Dionysius, he maintained perfect harmony, treating him as an equal and partner. Though thus using his power generously towards the Herakleots, he was, however, still a despot, and retained the characteristic marks of despotism—the strong citadel, fortified separately from the town, with a commanding mercenary force. After a reign of about nine years, he died, deeply mourned by every one.[1]

B.C. 345. Despotism of Timotheus, just and mild—his energy and ability.

Dionysius, who succeeded him, fell upon unsettled times, full both of hope and fear; opening chances of aggrandisement, yet with many new dangers and uncertainties. The sovereignty which he inherited doubtless included, not simply the city of Herakleia, but also foreign dependencies and possessions in its neighbourhood; for his three predecessors[2] had been all

B.C. 336. Despotism of Dionysius—his popular and vigorous government—his prudent

brother of Demetrius, assumed the regency on behalf of Philip; he married the widow of Demetrius, and had children by her; but he was so anxious to guard Philip's succession against all chance of being disturbed, that he refused to bring up his own children—Ὁ δὲ παιδῶν γενομένων ἐκ τῆς Χρυσηΐδος, οὐκ ἀνεθρέψατο, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ Φιλίππῳ περισώζων (Porphyry, Fragm. ap. Didot, Fragm. Histor. Græc. vol. iii. p. 701).

In the Greek and Roman world, the father was generally considered to have the right of determining whether he would or would not bring up a newborn child. The obligation was only supposed to commence when he accepted or sanctioned it, by taking up the child.

[1] Memnon, c. 3. The Epistle of Isokratês (vii.) addressed to Timotheus in recommendation of a friend, is in harmony with this general character, but gives no new information.

Diodorus reckons Timotheus as immediately succeeding Klearchus his father — considering Satyrus simply as regent (xvi. 36).

[2] We hear of Klearchus as having besieged Astakus (afterwards

dealing with the Macedonians, during the absence of Alexander in the East.

enterprising chiefs, commanding a considerable aggressive force. At the commencement of his reign, indeed, the ascendency of Memnon and the Persian force in the north-western part of Asia Minor was at a higher pitch than ordinary; it appears too that Klearchus—and probably his successors also—had always taken care to keep on the best terms with the Persian court.[1] But presently came the invasion of Alexander (334 B.C.), with the battle of the Granikus, which totally extinguished the Persian power in Asia Minor, and was followed, after no long interval, by the entire conquest of the Persian empire. The Persian control being now removed from Asia Minor—while Alexander with the great Macedonian force merely passed through it to the east, leaving viceroys behind him—new hopes of independence or aggrandisement began to arise among the native princes in Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Kappadokia. The Bithynian prince even contended successfully in the field against Kalas, who had been appointed by Alexander as satrap in Phrygia.[2] The Herakleot Dionysius, on the other hand, enemy by position of these Bithynians, courted the new Macedonian potentates, playing his political game with much skill in every way. He kept his forces well in hand, and his dominions carefully guarded; he ruled in a mild and popular manner, so as to preserve among the Herakleots the same feelings of attachment which had been inspired by his predecessor. While the citizens of the neighbouring Sinôpê (as has been already related) sent their envoys to Darius, Dionysius kept his eyes upon Alexander; taking care to establish a footing at Pella, and being peculiarly assiduous in attentions to Alexander's sister, the princess Kleopatra.[3] He was the better qualified for this courtly service, as he was a man of elegant and ostentatious tastes, and had purchased from his namesake, the fallen Syracusan Dionysius, all the rich furniture of the Dionysian family, highly available for presents.[4]

Nikomedia)—at the interior extremity of the north-eastern indentation of the Propontis, called the Gulf of Astakus (Polyænus, ii. 30, 3).

[1] Memnon, c. 1.
[2] Memnon, c. 20.
[3] Memnon, c. 3.
[4] Memnon, c. 3. See in this History, Ch. LXXXV.

By the favour of Antipater and the regency at Pella, the Herakleotic despot was enabled both to maintain and extend his dominions, until the return of Alexander to Susa and Babylon in 324 B.C. All other authority was now superseded by the personal will of the omnipotent conqueror; who, mistrusting all his delegates—Antipater, the princesses, and the satraps—listened readily to complainants from all quarters, and took particular pride in espousing the pretensions of Grecian exiles. I have already recounted how, in June 324 B.C., Alexander promulgated at the Olympic festival a sweeping edict, directing that in every Grecian city the exiles should be restored—by force, if force was required. Among the various Grecian exiles, those from Herakleia were not backward in soliciting his support, to obtain their own restoration, as well as the expulsion of the despot. As they were entitled, along with others, to the benefit of the recent edict, the position of Dionysius became one of extreme danger. He now reaped the full benefit of his antecedent prudence, in having maintained both his popularity with the Herakleots at home, and his influence with Antipater, to whom the enforcement of the edict was entrusted. He was thus enabled to ward off the danger for a time; and his good fortune rescued him from it altogether, by the death of Alexander in June 323 B.C. That event, coming as it did unexpectedly upon every one, filled Dionysius with such extravagant joy, that he fell into a swoon; and he commemorated it by erecting a statue in honour of Euthymia, or the tranquillising Goddess. His position however seemed again precarious, when the Herakleotic exiles renewed their solicitations to Perdikkas; who favoured their cause, and might probably have restored them, if he had chosen to direct his march towards the Hellespont against Antipater and Kraterus, instead of undertaking the ill-advised expedition against Egypt, wherein he perished.[1]

Return of Alexander to Susa—he is solicited by the Herakleotic exiles—danger of Dionysius, averted by the death of Alexander.

The tide of fortune now turned more than ever in favour of Dionysius. With Antipater and Kraterus, the preponderant potentates in his neighbourhood, he was on the best terms; and it happened at this juncture to suit

[1] Memnon, c. 4.

the political views of Kraterus to dismiss his Persian wife Amastris (niece of the late Persian king Darius, and conferred upon Kraterus by Alexander when he himself married Statira), for the purpose of espousing Phila daughter of Antipater. Amastris was given in marriage to Dionysius; for him, a splendid exaltation—attesting the personal influence which he had previously acquired. His new wife, herself a woman of ability and energy, brought to him a large sum from the regal treasure, as well as the means of greatly extending his dominion round Herakleia. Noway corrupted by this good fortune, he still persevered both in his conciliating rule at home, and his prudent alliances abroad, making himself especially useful to Antigonus. That great chief, preponderant throughout most parts of Asia Minor, was establishing his ascendency in Bithynia and the neighbourhood of the Propontis, by founding the city of Antigonia in the rich plain adjoining the Askanian Lake.[1] Dionysius lent effective maritime aid to Antigonus, in that war which ended by his conquest of Cyprus from the Egyptian Ptolemy (307 B.C.). To the other Ptolemy, nephew and general of Antigonus, Dionysius gave his daughter in marriage; and he even felt himself powerful enough to assume the title of king, after Antigonus, Lysimachus, and the Egyptian Ptolemy had done the like.[2] He died, after reigning thirty years with consummate political skill and uninterrupted prosperity—except that during the last few years he lost his health from excessive corpulence.[3]

B.C. 322-304. Prosperity and prudence of Dionysius—he marries Amastris—his favour with Antigonus—his death.

Dionysius left three children under age—Klearchus, Oxathrês and a daughter—by his wife Amastris; whom he constituted regent, and who, partly through the cordial support of Antigonus, maintained the Herakleotic dominion unimpaired. Presently Lysimachus, king of Thrace and of the Thracian Chersonese (on the isthmus of which he had founded the city of Lysimacheia), coveted this as a valuable alliance, paid his court to Amastris, and married her. The Hera-

B.C. 304. Amastris governs Herakleia—marries Lysimachus—is divorced from him—Klearchus and Oxathrês kill

[1] Strabo, xii. p. 565.

[2] Memnon, c. 4: compare Diod. xx. 53.

[3] Nymphis, Fragm. 16. ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 549; Ælian, V. H. ix. 13.

kleotic queen thus enjoyed double protection, and was enabled to avoid taking part in the formidable conflict of Ipsus (300 B.C.); wherein the allies Lysimachus, Kassander, Ptolemy, and Seleukus were victorious over Antigonus. The latter being slain, and his Asiatic power crushed, Lysimachus got possession of Antigonia, the recent foundation of his rival in Bithynia, and changed its name to Nikæa.[1] After a certain time, however, Lysimachus became desirous of marrying Arsinoê, daughter of the Egyptian Ptolemy; accordingly, Amastris divorced herself from him, and set up for herself separately as regent of Herakleia. Her two sons being now nearly of age, she founded and fortified, for her own residence, the neighbouring city of Amastris, about sixty miles eastward of Herakleia on the coast of the Euxine.[2] These young men, Klearchus and Oxathrês, assumed the government of Herakleia, and entered upon various warlike enterprises; of which we know only, that Klearchus accompanied Lysimachus in his expedition against the Getæ, sharing the fate of that prince, who was defeated and taken prisoner. Both afterwards obtained their release, and Klearchus returned to Herakleia; where he ruled in a cruel and oppressive manner, and even committed the enormity (in conjunction with his brother Oxathrês) of killing his mother Amastris. This crime was avenged by her former husband Lysimachus; who, coming to Herakleia under professions of friendship (B.C. 286), caused Klearchus and Oxathrês to be put to death, seized their treasure, and keeping separate possession of the citadel only, allowed the Herakleots to establish a popular government.[3]

Amastris—are killed by Lysimachus.

Lysimachus, however, was soon persuaded by his wife Arsinoê to make over Herakleia to her, as it had been formerly possessed by Amastris; and Arsinoê sent thither a Kymæan officer named Herakleidês, who carried with him force sufficient to re-establish the former despotism, with its oppressions and cruelties. For other purposes too, not less mischievous, the influence of Arsinoê

Arsinoê mistress of Herakleia. Defeat and death of Lysimachus. Power of Seleukus.

[1] Strabo, xii. p. 565. So also Antioch, on the Orontes in Syria, the great foundation of Seleukus Nikator, was established on or near the site of another Antigonia, also previously founded by Antigonus Monophthalmus (Strabo, xv. p. 750).

[2] Strabo, xii. p. 544.

[3] Memnon, c. 6.

was all-powerful. She prevailed upon Lysimachus to kill his eldest son (by a former marriage) Agathoklês, a young prince of the most estimable and eminent qualities. Such an atrocity, exciting universal abhorrence among the subjects of Lysimachus, enabled his rival Seleukus to attack him with success. In a great battle fought between these two princes, Lysimachus was defeated and slain—by the hand and javelin of a citizen of Herakleia, named Malakon.[1]

This victory transferred the dominions of the vanquished prince to Seleukus. At Herakleia too, its effect was so powerful, that the citizens were enabled to shake off their despotism. They at first tried to make terms with the governor Herakleidês, offering him money as an inducement to withdraw. From him they obtained only an angry refusal; yet his subordinate officers of mercenaries, and commanders of detached posts in the Herakleotic territory, mistrusting their own power of holding out, accepted an amicable compromise with the citizens, who tendered to them full liquidation of arrears of pay, together with the citizenship. The Herakleots were thus enabled to discard Herakleidês, and regain their popular government. They signalised their revolution by the impressive ceremony of demolishing their Bastile—the detached fort or stronghold within the city, which had served for eighty-four years as the characteristic symbol, and indispensable engine, of the antecedent despotism.[2] The city, now again a free commonwealth, was farther reinforced by the junction of Nymphis (the historian) and other Herakleotic citizens, who had hitherto been in exile. These men were restored, and welcomed by their fellow-citizens in full friendship and harmony; yet with express proviso, that no demand should be made for the restitution of their properties, long since confiscated.[3] To the victor Seleukus, however, and his officer Aphrodisius, the bold bearing of the newly-emancipated Herakleots proved offensive. They would probably have incurred great danger from him, had not his mind been first set upon the conquest of Macedonia,

B.C. 281. Herakleia emancipated from the despots, and a popular government established—recall of the exiles—bold bearing of the citizens towards Seleukus—death of Seleukus.

[1] Memnon, c. 7, 8.
[2] Memnon, c. 9; Strabo, xii. p. 542.
[3] Memnon, c. 11.

in the accomplishment of which he was murdered by Ptolemy Keraunus.

The Herakleots thus became again a commonwealth of free citizens, without any detached citadel or mercenary garrison; yet they lost, seemingly through the growing force and aggressions of some inland dynasts, several of their outlying dependencies—Kierus, Tium, and Amastris. The two former they recovered some time afterwards by purchase, and they wished also to purchase back Amastris; but Eumenês, who held it, hated them so much, that he repudiated their money, and handed over the place gratuitously to the Kappadokian chief Ariobarzanês.[1] That their maritime power was at this time very great, we may see by the astonishing account given of their immense ships,—numerously manned, and furnished with many brave combatants on the deck—which fought with eminent distinction in the naval battle between Ptolemy Keraunus (murderer and successor of Seleukus) and Antigonus Gonatas.[2]

Situation and management of Herakleia as a free government—considerable naval power.

It is not my purpose to follow lower down the destinies of Herakleia. It maintained its internal autonomy, with considerable maritime power, a dignified and prudent administration, and a partial, though sadly circumscribed, liberty of foreign action—until the successful war of the Romans against Mithridatês (B.C. 69). In Asia Minor, the Hellenic cities on the coast were partly enabled to postpone the epoch of their subjugation, by the great division of power which prevailed in the interior; for the potentates of Bithynia, Pergamus, Kappadokia, Pontus, Syria, were in almost perpetual discord —while all of them were menaced by the intrusion of the warlike and predatory Gauls, who extorted for themselves

Prudent administration of Herakleia, as a free city, among the powerful princes of Asia Minor—general condition and influence of the Greek cities on the coast.

[1] Memnon, c. 16. The inhabitants of Byzantium also purchased for a considerable sum the important position called the Ἱερὸν, at the entrance of the Euxine on the Asiatic side (Polybius, iv. 50).

These are rare examples, in ancient history, of cities acquiring territory or dependencies *by purchase*. Acquisitions were often made in this manner by the free German, Swiss, and Italian cities of mediæval Europe; but as to the Hellenic cities, I have not had occasion to record many such transactions in the course of this History.

[2] Memnon, c. 13: compare Polyb. xviii. 34.

settlements in Galatia (B.C. 276). The kings, the enemies of civic freedom, were kept partially in check by these new and formidable neighbours,[1] who were themselves however hardly less formidable to the Grecian cities on the coast.[2] Sinôpê, Herakleia, Byzantium,—and even Rhodes, in spite of the advantage of an insular position,—isolated relics of what had once been an Hellenic aggregate, become from henceforward cribbed and confined by inland neighbours almost at their gates[3]—dependent on the barbaric potentates, between whom they were compelled to trim, making themselves useful in turn to all. It was however frequent with these barbaric princes to derive their wives, mistresses, ministers, negotiators, officers, engineers, literati, artists, actors, and intermediate agents both for ornament and recreation—from some Greek city. Among them all, more or less of Hellenic influence became thus insinuated; along with the Greek language which spread its roots everywhere —even among the Gauls or Galatians, the rudest and latest of the foreign immigrants.

Grecian Pentapolis on the south-west of the Euxine—Ovid at Tomi.

Of the Grecian maritime towns in the Euxine south of the Danube—Apollonia, Mesembria, Odêssus, Kallatis, Tomi, and Istrus—five (seemingly without Tomi) formed a confederate Pentapolis.[4] About the year 312 B.C., we hear of them as under the power of Lysimachus king of Thrace, who kept a garrison in Kallatis—probably in the

[1] This is a remarkable observation made by Memnon, c. 19.

[2] See the statement of Polybius, xxii. 24.

[3] Contrast the independent and commanding position occupied by Byzantium in 399 B.C., acknowledging no superior except Sparta (Xenoph. Anab. vii. 1)—with its condition in the third century B.C. —harassed and pillaged almost to the gates of the town by the neighbouring Thracians and Gauls, and only purchasing immunity by continued money payments: see Polybius, iv. 45.

[4] Strabo, vii. p. 319—Philip of Macedon defeated the Scythian prince Atheas or Ateas (about 340 B.C.) somewhere between Mount Hæmus and the Danube (Justin, ix. 2). But the relations of Ateas with the towns of Istrus and Apollonia, which are said to have brought Philip into the country, are very difficult to understand. It is most probable that these cities invited Philip as their defender.

In Inscription, No. 2056 c. (in Boeckh's Corp. Inscript. Græc. part xi. p. 79), the five cities constituting the Pentapolis are not clearly named. Boeckh supposes them to be Apollonia, Mesembria, Odêssus, Kallatis, and Tomi; but Istrus seems more probable than Tomi. Odêssus was on the site of the

rest also. They made a struggle to shake off his yoke, obtaining assistance from some of the neighbouring Thracians and Scythians, as well as from Antigonus. But Lysimachus, after a contest which seems to have lasted three or four years, overpowered both their allies and them, reducing them again into subjection.[1] Kallatis sustained a long siege, dismissing some of its ineffective residents; who were received and sheltered by Eumelus prince of Bosporus. It was in pushing his conquests yet farther northward, in the steppe between the rivers Danube and Dniester, that Lysimachus came into conflict with the powerful prince of the Getæ—Dromichætês; by whom he was defeated and captured, but generously released.[2] I have already mentioned that the empire of Lysimachus ended with his last defeat and death by Seleukus—(281 B.C.). By his death, the cities of the Pontic Pentapolis regained a temporary independence. But their barbaric neighbours became more and more formidable, being reinforced seemingly by immigration of fresh hordes from Asia; thus the Sarmatians, who in Herodotus' time were on the east of the Tanais, appear, three centuries afterwards, even south of the Danube. By these tribes—Thracians, Getæ, Scythians and Sarmatians —the Greek cities of this Pentapolis were successively pillaged. Though renewed indeed afterwards, from the necessity of some place of traffic, even for the pillagers themselves —they were but poorly renewed, with a large infusion of barbaric residents.[3] Such was the condition in which the exile Ovid found Tomi, near the beginning of the Christian era. The Tomitans were more than half barbaric, and their Greek not easily intelligible. The Sarmatian or

modern Varna, where the Inscription was found; greatly south of the modern town of Odessa, which is on the site of another town *Ordêssus*.

An Inscription (2056) immediately preceding the above, also found at Odêssus, contains a vote of thanks and honours to a certain citizen of Antioch, who resided with.....(name imperfect), king of the Scythians, and rendered great service to the Greeks by his influence.

[1] Diodor. xix. 73; xx. 25.

[2] Strabo, vii. p. 302-305; Pausanias, i. 9, 5.

[3] Dion Chrysost. Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenitica) p. 75, Reisk. εἶλον δὲ καὶ ταύτην (Olbia) Γέται, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐντοῖς ἀριστέροις τοῦ Πόντου πόλεις, μέχρι Ἀπολλωνίας· ἔθεν δὴ καὶ σφόδρα τακεινὰ τὰ πράγματα κατέστη τῶν ταύτῃ Ἑλλήνων· τῶν μὲν οὐκέτι συνοικισθεισῶν πόλεων, τῶν δὲ φαυλῶς, καὶ τῶν πλείστων βαρβάρων εἰς αὐτὰς συῤῥεόντων.

Getic horse-bowmen, with their poisoned arrows, ever hovered near, galloped even up to the gates, and carried off the unwary cultivators into slavery. Even within a furlong of the town, there was no security either for person or property. The residents were clothed in skins or leather; while the women, ignorant both of spinning and weaving, were employed either in grinding corn or in carrying on their heads pitchers of water.[1]

Olbia—in the days of Herodotus and Ephorus—increased numbers, and inroads of the barbaric hordes.

By these same barbarians, Olbia also (on the right bank of the Hypanis or Bug near its mouth) became robbed of that comfort and prosperity which it had enjoyed when visited by Herodotus. In his day, the Olbians lived on good terms with the Scythian tribes in their neighbourhood. They paid a stipulated tribute, giving presents besides to the prince and his immediate favourites; and on these conditions, their persons and properties

[1] The picture drawn by Ovid, of his situation as an exile at Tomi, can never fail to interest, from the mere beauty and felicity of his expression; but it is not less interesting, as a real description of Hellenism in its last phase, degraded and overborne by adverse fates. The truth of Ovid's picture is fully borne out by the analogy of Olbia, presently to be mentioned. His complaints run through the five books of the Tristia, and the four books of Epistolæ ex Ponto (Trist. v. 10, 15).

"Innumeræ circa gentes fera bella minantur,
Quæ sibi non rapto vivere turpe putant.
Nil extra tutum est: tumulus defenditur ægre
Mœnibus exiguis ingenioque soli.
Cum minime credas, ut avis, densissimus hostis
Advolat, et prædam vix bene visus agit.
Sæpe intra muros clausis venientia portis
Per medias legimus noxia tela vias.
Est igitur rarus, rus qui colere audeat, isque
Hac arat infelix, hac tenet arma manu.
Vix ope castelli defendimur: et tamen intus
Mista facit Græcis barbara turba metum.
Quippe simul nobis habitat discrimine nullo
Barbarus, et tecti plus quoque parte tenet.
Quos ut non timeas, possis odisse, videndo
Pellibus et longâ corpora tecta comâ.
Hos quoque, qui geniti Graiâ creduntur ab urbe,
Pro patrio cultu Persica bracca tegit," &c.

This is a specimen out of many others: compare Trist. iii. 10, 53; iv. 1, 67; Ex Ponto, iii. 1.

Ovid dwells especially upon the fact that there was more of barbaric than of Hellenic speech at Tomi—"Graiaque quod Getico victa loquela sono est" (Trist. v. 2, 68). Woollen clothing, and the practice of spinning and weaving by the free women of the family, were among the most familiar circumstances of Grecian life; the absence of these feminine arts, and the use of skins or leather for clothing, were notable departures from Grecian habits (Ex Ponto, iii. 8):—

were respected. The Scythian prince Skylês (son of an Hellenic mother from Istrus, who had familiarised him with Greek speech and letters) had built a fine house in the town, and spent in it a month, from attachment to Greek manners and religion, while his Scythian army lay near the gates without molesting any one.[1] It is true that this proceeding cost Skylês his life; for the Scythians would not tolerate their own prince in the practice of foreign religious rites, though they did not quarrel with the same rites when observed by the Greeks.[2] To their own customs the Scythians adhered tenaciously, and those customs were often sanguinary, ferocious, and brutish. Still they were warriors, rather than robbers—they abstained from habitual pillage, and maintained with the Greeks a reputation for honesty and fair dealing, which became proverbial with the early poets. Such were the Scythians as seen by Herodotus (probably about 440 to 430 B.C.); and the picture drawn by Ephorus a century afterwards (about 340 B.C.) appears to have been not materially different.[3] But after that time it gradually altered. New tribes seem to have come in—the Sarmatians out of the East—the Gauls out of the West; from Thrace northward to the Tanais and the Palus Mæotis, the most different tribes became intermingled—Gauls, Thracians, Getæ, Scythians, Sarmatians, &c.[4] Olbia was in an open plain, with no defence except its walls and the adjoining river Hypanis, frozen over in the winter. The hybrid Helleno-Scythian race, formed by intermarriages of Greeks with Scythians—and the various Scythian tribes who had become partially sedentary cultivators of corn for exportation—had probably also acquired

"Vellera dura ferunt pecudes; et Palladis uti
Arte Tomitanæ non didicere nurus.
Femina pro lanâ Cerealia munera frangit,
Suppositoque gravem vertice portat aquam."

[1] Herodot. iv. 16—18. The town was called *Olbia* by its inhabitants, but *Borysthenês* usually by foreigners; though it was not on the Borysthenês river (Dnieper), but on the right bank of the Hypanis (Bug).

[2] Herodot. iv. 76—80.

[3] Strabo, vii. p. 302; Skymnus Chius, v. 112, who usually follows Ephorus.

The rhetor Dion tells us (Orat. xxxvi. init.) that he went to Olbia in order that he might *go through the Scythians to the Getæ*. This shows that in his time (about A.D. 100) the Scythians must have been between the Bug and Dniester—the Getæ nearer to the Danube—just as they had been four centuries earlier. But many new hordes were mingled with them.

[4] Strabo, vii. p. 296—304.

habits less warlike than the tribes of primitive barbaric type. At any rate, even if capable of defending themselves, they could not continue their production and commerce under repeated hostile incursions.

Olbia in later days—decline of security and production.

A valuable inscription remaining enables us to compare the Olbia (or Borysthenês) seen by Herodotus, with the same town in the second century B.C.[1] At this latter period, the city was diminished in population, impoverished in finances, exposed to constantly increasing exactions and menace from the passing barbaric hordes, and scarcely able to defend against them even the security of its walls. Sometimes there approached the barbaric chief Saitapharnês with his personal suite, sometimes his whole tribe or horde in mass, called Saii. Whenever they came, they required to be appeased by presents, greater than the treasury could supply, and borrowed only from the voluntary help of rich citizens; while even these presents did not always avert ill treatment or pillage. Already the citizens of Olbia had repelled various attacks, partly by taking into pay a semi-Hellenic population in their neighbourhood (Mix-Hellenes, like the Liby-Phenicians in Africa); but the inroads became more alarming, and their means of defence less, through the un-

[1] This inscription — No. 2058 — in Boeckh's Inscr. Græc. part xi. p. 121 *seq.*—is among the most interesting in that noble collection. It records a vote of public gratitude and honour to a citizen of Olbia named Protogenês, and recites the valuable services which he as well as his father had rendered to the city. It thus describes the numerous situations of difficulty and danger from which he had contributed to extricate them. A vivid picture is presented to us of the distress of the city. The introduction prefixed by Boeckh (p. 86-89) is also very instructive.

Olbia is often spoken of by the name of *Borysthenês*, which name was given to it by foreigners, but not recognized by the citizens. Nor was it even situated on the Borysthenês river; but on the right or western bank of the Hypanis (Bug) river; not far from the modern Oczakoff.

The date of the above Inscription is not specified, and has been differently determined by various critics. Niebuhr assigns it (Untersuchungen über die Skythen, &c. in his Kleine Schriften, p. 387) to a time near the close of the second Punic war. Boeckh also believes that it is not much after that epoch. The terror inspired by the Gauls, even to other barbarians, appears to suit the second century B.C. better than it suits a later period.

The Inscription No. 2059 attests the great number of strangers resident at Olbia; strangers from eighteen different cities, of which the most remote is Milotus, the mother-city of Olbia.

certain fidelity of these Mix-Hellenes, as well as of their own slaves—the latter probably barbaric natives purchased from the interior.[1] In the midst of public poverty, it was necessary to enlarge and strengthen the fortifications; for they were threatened with the advent of the Gauls—who inspired such terror that the Scythians and other barbarians were likely to seek their own safety by extorting admission within the walls of Olbia. Moreover even corn was scarce, and extravagantly dear. There had been repeated failures in the produce of the lands around, famine was apprehended, and efforts were needed, greater than the treasury could sustain, to lay in a stock at the public expense. Among the many points of contrast with Herodotus, this is perhaps the most striking; for in his time, corn was the great produce and the principal export from Olbia; the growth had now been suspended, or was at least perpetually cut off, by increased devastation and insecurity.

Olbia pillaged and abandoned—afterwards renewed.

After perpetual attacks, and even several captures, by barbaric neighbours — this unfortunate city, about fifty years before the Christian era, was at length so miserably sacked by the Getæ, as to become for a time abandoned.[2] Presently, however, the fugitives partially returned, to re-establish themselves on a reduced scale. For the very same barbarians who had persecuted and plundered them, still required an emporium with a certain amount of import and export, such as none but Greek settlers could provide; moreover it was from the coast near Olbia, and from the care of its inhabitants, that many of the neighbouring tribes derived their supply of salt.[3] Hence arose a puny after-growth of Olbia—preserving the name, traditions, and part of the locality, of the deserted city—by the return of a portion of the colonists with an infusion of Scythian or Sarmatian residents; an infusion indeed so large, as seriously to dishellenise both the speech and the personal names in the town.[4]

[1] On one occasion, we know not when, the citizens of Olbia are said to have been attacked by one Zopyrion, and to have succeeded in resisting him only by emancipating their slaves, and granting the citizenship to foreigners (Macrobius, Saturnal. i. 11).

[2] Dion Chrys. (Or. xxxvi. p. 75) —ἀεὶ μὲν πολεμεῖται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἁλίσκεται, &c.

[3] Dion Chrysost. Orat. (xxxvi. Borysthenit.) p. 75, 76, Reiske.

[4] See Boeckh's Commentary on

Visit of Dion the rhetor—Hellenic tastes and manners—ardent interest in Homer.

To this second edition of Olbia, the rhetor Dion Chrysostom paid a summer visit (about a century after the Christian era), of which he has left a brief but interesting account. Within the wide area once filled by the original Olbia—the former circumference of which was maked by crumbling walls and towers—the second town occupied a narrow corner; with poor houses, low walls, and temples having no other ornament except the ancient statues mutilated by the plunderers. The citizens dwelt in perpetual insecurity, constantly under arms or on guard; for the barbaric horsemen, in spite of sentinels posted to announce their approach, often carried off prisoners, cattle, or property, from the immediate neighbourhood of the gates. The picture drawn of Olbia by Dion confirms in a remarkable way that given of Tomi by Ovid. And what imparts to it a touching interest is, that the Greeks whom Dion saw contending with the difficulties, privations, and dangers of this inhospitable outpost, still retained the activity, the elegance, and the intellectual aspirations of their Ionic breed; in this respect much superior to the Tomitans of Ovid. In particular, they were passionate admirers of Homer; a considerable proportion of the Greeks of Olbia could repeat the Iliad from memory.[1] Achillês (localised under the surname of Pontarchês, on numerous islands and capes in the Euxine) was among the chief divine or heroic persons to whom they addressed their prayers.[2] Amidst Grecian life, degraded and verging towards its extinction,

the language and the personal names of the Olbian Inscriptions, part xi. p. 108-116.

[1] Dion, Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenit.) p. 78, Reiske. ..... καὶ τἆλλα μὲν οὐκέτι σαφῶς ἑλληνίζοντες, διὰ τὸ ἐν μέσοις οἰκεῖν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ζμως τήν γε Ἰλιάδα ὀλίγου πάντες ἴσασιν ἀπὸ στόματος. I translate the words ὀλίγου πάντες with some allowance for rhetoric.

The representation given by Dion of the youthful citizen of Olbia—Kallistratus—with whom he conversed, is curious as a picture of Greek manners in this remote land; a youth of eighteen years of age, with genuine Ionic features, and conspicuous for his beauty (εἶχε πολλοὺς ἐραστάς); a zealot for literature and philosophy, but especially for Homer; clothed in the costume of the place, suited for riding—the long leather trowsers, and short black cloak; constantly on horseback for defence of the town, and celebrated as a warrior even at that early age, having already killed or made prisoners several Sarmatians (p. 77).

[2] See Inscriptions, Nos. 2076, 2077, ap. Boeckh; and Arrian's Periplus of the Euxine, ap. Geogr. Minor. p. 21, ed. Hudson.

and stripped even of the purity of living speech—the thread of imaginative and traditional sentiment thus continues without suspension or abatement.

Bosporus or Pantikapæum.

Respecting Bosporus or Pantikapæum (for both names denote the same city, though the former name often comprehends the whole annexed dominion), founded by Milesian settlers[1] on the European side of the Kimmerian Bosporus (near Kertch), we first hear, about the period when Xerxês was repulsed from Greece (480-479 B.C.). It was the centre of a dominion including Phanagoria, Kepi, Hermonassa, and other Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the strait; and is said to have been governed by what seems to have been an oligarchy—called the Archæanaktidæ, for forty-two years[2] (480-438 B.C.).

Princes of Bosporus—relations between Athens and Bosporus.

After them we have a series of princes standing out individually by name, and succeeding each other in the same family. Spartokus I. was succeeded by Seleukus; next comes Spartokus II.; then Satyrus I. (407-393 B.C.); Leukon (393-353 B.C.); Spartokus III. (353-348 B.C.); Parisadês I. (348-310 B.C.); Satyrus II., Prytanis, Eumelus (310-304 B.C.); Spartokus IV. (304-284 B.C.); Parisadês II.[3] During the reigns of these princes, a connexion of some intimacy subsisted between Athens and Bosporus; a connexion not political, since the Bosporanic princes had little interest in the contentions about Hellenic hegemony—but of private intercourse, commercial interchange, and reciprocal good offices. The eastern corner of the Tauric Chersonesus, between Pantikapæum and Theodosia, was well suited for the production of corn; while plenty of fish, as well as salt, was to be had in or near the Palus Mæotis. Corn, salted fish and meat, hides, and barbaric slaves in considerable numbers, were in demand among all the Greeks round the Ægean, and not least at Athens, where Scythian slaves were numerous;[4] while oil and

[1] Strabo, vii. p. 310.

[2] Diodor. xii. 31.

[3] See Mr. Clinton's App. on the Kings of Bosporus—Fast. Hellen. App. c. 13. p. 280, &c.; and Boeckh's Commentary on the same subject, Inscript. Græc. part. xi. p. 91 *seq.*

[4] Polybius (iv. 38) enumerates the principal articles of this Pontic trade; among the exports τὰ τε δέρματα καὶ τὸ τῶν εἰς τὰς δουλείας ἀγομένων σωμάτων πλῆθος, &c., where Schweighäuser has altered δέρματα to θρέμματα,

wine, with other products of more southern regions, were acceptable in Bosporus and the other Pontic ports. This important traffic seems to have been mainly carried on in ships and by capital belonging to Athens and other Ægean maritime towns; and must have been greatly under the protection and regulation of the Athenians, so long as their maritime empire subsisted. Enterprising citizens of Athens went to Bosporus (as to Thrace and the Thracian Chersonesus) to push their fortunes; merchants from other cities found it advantageous to settle as resident strangers or metics at Athens, where they were more in contact with the protecting authority, and obtained readier access to the judicial tribunals. It was probably during the period preceding the great disaster at Syracuse in 413 B.C., that Athens first acquired her position as a mercantile centre for the trade with the Euxine; which we afterwards find her retaining, even with reduced power, in the time of Demosthenês.

Nymphæum among the tributary cities under the Athenian empire—here it passed under the Bosporanic princes.

How strong was the position enjoyed by Athens in Bosporus, during her unimpaired empire, we may judge from the fact, that Nymphæum (south of Pantikapæum, between that town and Theodosia) was among her tributary towns, and paid a talent annually.[1] Not until the misfortunes of Athens in the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, did Nymphæum pass into the hands of the Bosporanic princes; betrayed (according to Æschinês) by the maternal grandfather of Demosthenês, the Athenian Gylon; who however probably did nothing more than obey a necessity rendered unavoidable by the fallen condition of Athens.[2] We thus see that Nymphæum,

seemingly on the authority of one MS. only. I doubt the propriety of this change, as well as the fact of any large exportation of live cattle from the Pontus; whereas the exportation of hides was considerable: see Strabo, xi. p. 493.

The Scythian public slaves or policemen of Athens are well known. Σκύθαινα also is the name of a female slave (Aristoph. Lysistr. 184). Σκύθης, for the name of a slave, occurs as early as Theognis, v. 826.

Some of the salted preparations from the Pontus were extravagantly dear; Cato complained of a κεράμιον Ποντικῶν ταρίχων as sold for 800 drachmæ (Polyb. xxxi. 24).

[1] Harpokration and Photius, v. Νυμφαῖον — from the ψηφίσματα collected by Kraterus. Compare Boeckh, in the second edition of his Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii. p. 658.

[2] Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 78. c. 57. See my preceding Ch. LXXXVII.

in the midst of the Bosporanic dominion, was not only a member of the Athenian empire, but also contained influential Athenian citizens, engaged in the corn-trade. Gylon was rewarded by a large grant of land at Kepi—probably other Athenians of Nymphæum were rewarded also—by the Bosporanic prince; who did not grudge a good price for such an acquisition. We find also other instances,—both of Athenian citizens sent out to reside with the prince Satyrus,—and of Pontic Greeks who, already in correspondence and friendship with various individual Athenians, consign their sons to be initiated in the commerce, society, and refinements of Athens.[1] Such facts attest the correspondence and intercourse of that city, during her imperial greatness, with Bosporus.

Alliance and reciprocal good offices between Satyrus, Leukon, &c. and the Athenians. Immunities of trade granted to the Athenians.

The Bosporanic prince Satyrus was in the best relations with Athens, and even seems to have had authorised representatives there to enforce his requests, which met with very great attention.[2] He treated the Athenian merchants at Bosporus with equity and even favour, granting to them a preference in the export of corn when there was not enough for all.[3] His son Leukon not only continued the preference to Athenian exporting ships, but also granted to them remission of the export duty (of one-thirtieth part), which he exacted from all other traders. Such an exemption is reckoned as equivalent to an annual present of 13,000 medimni of corn (the medimnus being about 1⅓ bushel); the total quantity of corn brought from Bosporus to Athens in a full year being 400,000 medimni.[4]

[1] Lysias, pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi. s. 4; Isokratês (Trapezitic.), Or. xvii. s. 5. The young man, whose case Isokratês sets forth, was sent to Athens by his father Sopæus, a rich Pontic Greek (s. 52) much in the confidence of Satyrus. Sopæus furnished his son with two ship loads of corn, and with money besides—and then despatched him to Athens ἅμα κατ' ἐμπορίαν καὶ κατὰ θεωρίαν.

[2] Isokratês, Trapezit. s. 5, 6. Sopæus, father of this pleader, had incurred the suspicions of Satyrus in the Pontus, and had been arrested; upon which Satyrus sends to Athens to seize the property of the son, to order him home,—and if he refused, then to require the Athenians to deliver him up—ἐπιστέλλει δὲ τοῖς ἐνθάδε ἐπιδημοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου τά τε χρήματα παρ' ἐμοῦ κομίσασθαι, &c.

[3] Isokratês, Trapezit. s. 71. Demosthenês also recognizes favours from Satyrus—καὶ αὐτὸς (Leukon) καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι, &c. (adv. Leptin. p. 467).

[4] Demosth. adv. Leptin. p. 467.

It is easy to see moreover that such a premium must have thrown nearly the whole exporting trade into the hands of Athenian merchants. The Athenians requited this favour by public votes of gratitude and honour, conferring upon Leukon the citizenship, together with immunity from all the regular burthens attaching to property at Athens. There was lying in that city money belonging to Leukon;[1] who was therefore open (under the proposition of Leptinês) to that conditional summons for exchange of properties, technically termed Antidosis. In his time, moreover, the corn-trade of Bosporus appears to have been farther extended; for we learn that he established an export from Theodosia as well as from Pantikapæum. His successor Parisadês I. continuing to Athenian exporters of corn the same privilege of immunity from export duty, obtained from Athens still higher honours than Leukon; for we learn that his statue, together with those of two relatives, was erected in the agora, on the motion of Demosthenês.[2] The connexion of Bosporus with Athens was durable as well as intimate; its corn-trade being of high importance to the subsistence of the people. Every Athenian exporter was bound by law to bring his cargo in the first instance to Athens. The freighting and navigating of ships for that purpose, together with the advance of money by rich capitalists (citizens and metics) upon interest and conditions enforced by the Athenian judicature, was a standing and profitable business. And we may appreciate the value of equitable treatment, not to say favour, from the kings of Bosporus—when we contrast it with the fraudulent and extortionate behaviour of Kleomenês, satrap of Egypt, in reference to the export of Egyptian corn.[3]

Political condition of the Greeks of Bosporus

The political condition of the Greeks at Bosporus was somewhat peculiar. The hereditary princes (above enumerated), who ruled them substantially as despots, assumed no other title (in respect to the Greeks) than that of Archon. They paid

[1] Demosth. adv. Leptin. p. 469.

[2] Demosth. adv. Phormion. p. 917; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 34. The name stands Berisadês as printed in the oration; but it is plain that Parisadês is the person designated. See Boeckh, Introd. ad Inscr. No. 2056, p. 92.

Deinarchus avers, that Demosthenês received an annual present of 1000 modii of corn from Bosporus.

[3] Demosth. adv. Dionysidor. p.

tribute to the powerful Scythian tribes who bounded them on the European side, and even thought it necessary to carry a ditch across the narrow isthmus, from some point near Theodosia northward to the Palus Mæotis, as a protection against incursions.[1] Their dominion did not extend farther west than Theodosia; this ditch was their extreme western boundary; and even for the land within it, they paid tribute. But on the Asiatic side of the strait, they were lords paramount for a considerable distance, over the feebler and less warlike tribes who pass under the common name of Mæotæ or Mæêtæ—the Sindi, Toreti, Dandarii, Thatês, &c. Inscriptions, yet remaining, of Parisadês I., record him as King of these various barbaric tribes, but as Archon of Bosporus and Theodosia.[2] His dominion on the Asiatic side of the Kimmerian Bosporus, sustained by Grecian and Thracian mercenaries, was of considerable (though to us unknown) extent, reaching to somewhere near the borders of Caucasus.[3]

—the princes called themselves archons—their empire over barbaric tribes.

Parisadês I. on his death left three sons—Satyrus, Prytanis, and Eumelus. Satyrus, as the eldest, succeeded; but Eumelus claimed the crown, sought aid without, and prevailed on various neighbours—among them a powerful Thracian king named Ariopharnês—to espouse his cause. At the head of an army said to consist of 20,000 horse and 22,000 foot, the two allies marched to attack the territories of Satyrus, who advanced to meet them, with 2000 Grecian mercenaries,

B.C. 310-304. Family feuds among the Bosporanic princes—war between Satyrus and Eumelus—death of Satyrus II.

[1] Strabo, vii. p. 310, 311.

[2] See Inscript. Nos. 2117, 2118, 2119, in Boeckh's Collection, p. 156. In the Memorabilia of Xenophon (ii. 1, 10), Sokratês cites the Scythians as an example of ruling people, and the Mæotæ as an example of subjects. Probably this refers to the position of the Bosporanic Greeks, who paid tribute to the Scythians, but ruled over the Mæotæ. The name *Mæotæ* seems confined to tribes on the Asiatic side of the Palus Mæotis; while the Scythians were on the European side of that sea. Sokratês and the Athenians had good means of being informed about the situation of the Bosporani and their neighbours on both sides. See K. Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, b. ii. p. 216.

[3] This boundary is attested in another Inscription, No. 2104, of the same collection. Inscription No. 2103 seems to indicate Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Leukon: about the mercenaries, see Diodor. xx. 22.

Parisadês I. is said to have been worshipped as a God, after his death (Strabo, vii. p. 310).

and 2000 Thracians of his own, reinforced by a numerous body of Scythian allies—20,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, and carrying with him a plentiful supply of provisions in waggons. He gained a complete victory, compelling Eumelus and Ariopharnês to retreat and seek refuge in the regal residence of the latter, near the river Thapsis; a fortress built of timber, and surrounded with forest, river, marsh, and rock, so as to be very difficult of approach. Satyrus, having first plundered the country around, which supplied a rich booty of prisoners and cattle, proceeded to assail his enemies in their almost impracticable position. But though he, and Meniskus his general of mercenaries, made the most strenuous efforts, and even carried some of the outworks, they were repulsed from the fortress itself; and Satyrus, exposing himself forwardly to extricate Meniskus, received a wound of which he shortly died—after a reign of nine months. Meniskus, raising the siege, withdrew the army to Gargaza; from whence he conveyed back the regal corpse to Pantikapæum.[1]

Prytanis, the next brother, rejecting an offer of partition tendered by Eumelus, assumed the sceptre, and marched forth to continue the struggle. But the tide of fortune now turned in favour of Eumelus; who took Gargaza with several other places, worsted his brother in

[1] Diodor. xx. 24. The scene of these military operations (as far as we can pretend to make it out from the brief and superficial narrative of Diodorus) seems to have been on the European side of Bosporus; somewhere between the Borysthenês river and the Isthmus of Perekop, in the territory called by Herodotus *Hylæa*. This is Niebuhr's opinion, which I think more probable than that of Boeckh, who supposes the operations to have occurred on the Asiatic territory of Bosporus. So far I concur with Niebuhr; but his reasons for placing Dromichætês king of the Getæ (the victor over Lysimachus), east of the Borysthenês, are noway satisfactory.

Compare Niebuhr's Untersuchungen über die Skythen, &c. (in his Kleine Schriften, p. 380), with Boeckh's Commentary on the Sarmatian Inscriptions, Corp. Ins. Græc. part xi. p. 83-103.

The mention by Diodorus of a wooden fortress, surrounded by morass and forest, is curious, and may be illustrated by the description in Herodotus (iv. 108) of the city of the Budini. This habit, of building towns and fortifications of wood, prevailed among the Slavonic population in Russia and Poland until far down in the middle ages. See Paul Joseph Schaffarik, Slavische Alterthümer, in the German translation of Wuttke, vol. i. ch. 10 p. 192; also K. Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, p. 91.

battle, and so blocked him up in the isthmus near the Palus Mæotis, that he was forced to capitulate and resign his pretensions. Eumelus entered Pantikapæum as conqueror. Nevertheless, the defeated Prytanis, in spite of his recent covenant, made a renewed attempt upon the crown; wherein he was again baffled, forced to escape to Kêpi, and there slain. To assure himself of the throne, Eumelus put to death the wives and children of both his two brothers, Satyrus and Prytanis—together with all their principal friends. One youth alone—Parisadês, son of Satyrus—escaped and found protection with the Scythian prince Agarus.

B.C. 309. Civil war between Prytanis and Eumelus—victory of Eumelus—he kills the wives, children, and friends of his brother.

Eumelus had now put down all rivals; yet his recent cruelties had occasioned wrath and disgust among the Bosporanic citizens. He convoked them in assembly, to excuse his past conduct, and promised good government for the future; at the same time guaranteeing to them their full civic constitution, with such privileges and immunities as they had before enjoyed, and freedom from direct taxation.[1] Such assurances, combined probably with an imposing mercenary force, appeased or at least silenced the prevailing disaffection. Eumelus kept his promises so far as to govern in a mild and popular spirit. While thus rendering himself acceptable at home, he maintained an energetic foreign policy, and made several conquests among the surrounding tribes. He constituted himself a sort of protector of the Euxine, repressing the piracies of the Heniochi and Achæi (among the Caucasian mountains to the east) as well as of the Tauri in the Chersonesus (Crimea); much to the satisfaction of the Byzantines, Sinopians, and other Pontic Greeks. He received a portion of the fugitives from Kallatis, when besieged by Lysimachus, and provided for them a settlement in his dominions. Having thus acquired great reputation, Eumelus was in the full career of conquest and aggrandisement, when an accident terminated his life, after a reign of rather more than five years. In returning from Scythia to Pantikapæum, in a four-wheeled carriage (or waggon) and four with a tent upon it, his horses took fright

His reign and conquests—his speedy death.

[1] Diodor. xx. 24.

and ran away. Perceiving that they were carrying him towards a precipice, he tried to jump out; but his sword becoming entangled in the wheel, he was killed on the spot.[1] He was succeeded by his son Spartokus IV., who reigned twenty years (304-284 B.C.); afterwards came the son of Spartokus, Parisadês II.; with whose name our information breaks off.[2]

Decline of the Bosporanic dynasty, until it passed into the hands of Mithridatês.

This dynasty, the Spartokidæ, though they ruled the Greeks of Bosporus as despots by means of a mercenary force—yet seem to have exercised power with equity and moderation.[3] Had Eumelus lived, he might probably have established an extensive empire over the barbaric tribes on all sides of him. But empire over such subjects was seldom permanent; nor did his successors long maintain even as much as he left. We have no means of following their fortunes in detail; but we know that about a century B.C. the then reigning prince, Parisadês III., found himself so pressed and squeezed by the Scythians,[4] that he was forced (like Olbia and the Pentapolis) to forego his independence, and to call in, as auxiliary or master, the formidable Mithridatês Eupator of Pontus; from whom a new dynasty of Bosporanic kings began—subject however, after no long interval, to the dominion and interference of Rome.

Monuments left by the Spartokid princes of Bosporus—sepulchral tumuli near Kertch (Pantikapæum).

The Mithridatic princes lie beyond our period; but the cities of Bosporus under the Spartokid princes, in the fourth century B.C., deserve to be ranked among the conspicuous features of the living Hellenic world. They were not indeed purely Hellenic, but presented a considerable admixture of Scythian or Oriental manners; analogous to the mixture of the Hellenic and Libyan elements at Kyrênê with its Battiad princes. Among the facts attesting the wealth and power

[1] Diodor. xx. 25.

[2] Diodor. xx. 100. Spartokus IV.—son of Eumelus—is recognized in one Attic Inscription (No. 107), and various Bosporanic (No. 2105, 2106, 2120) in Boeckh's Collection. Parisadês II.—son of Spartokus—is recognized in another Bosporanic Inscription, No. 2107—seemingly also in No. 2120 b.

[3] Strabo, vii. p. 310. Deinarchus however calls Parisadês, Satyrus and Georgippus, τοὺς ἰχθύστους τυράννους (adv. Demosth. s. 44).

[4] Strabo, vii. p. 310. οὐχ οἷός τε ὢν ἀντέχειν πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους

of these Spartokid princes, and of the Bosporanic community, we may number the imposing groups of mighty sepulchral tumuli near Kertch (Pantikapæum); some of which have been recently examined, while the greater part still remain unopened. These spacious chambers of stone—enclosed in vast hillocks (Kurgans), cyclopian works piled up with prodigious labour and cost—have been found to contain not only a profusion of ornaments of the precious metals (gold, silver, and electron, or a mixture of four parts of gold to one of silver), but also numerous vases, implements, and works of art, illustrating the life and ideas of the Bosporanic population. "The contents of the tumuli already opened are so multifarious, that from the sepulchres of Pantikapæum alone, we might become acquainted with every thing which served the Greeks either for necessary use, or for the decoration of domestic life."[1] Statues, reliefs, and frescoes on the walls, have been found, on varied subjects both of war and peace, and often of very fine execution; besides these, numerous carvings in wood, and vessels of bronze or terra cotta; with necklaces, armlets, bracelets, rings, drinking cups, &c. of precious metal —several with coloured beads attached.[2] The costumes, equipment, and physiognomy represented, are indeed a

φόρον πραττομένους μείζω τοῦ πρότερον, &c.

[1] Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, p. 503.

[2] An account of the recent discoveries near Kertch or Pantikapæum, will be found in Dubois de Montpéreux, Voyage dans le Caucase, vol. v. p. 135 *seqq.*; and in Neumann, Die Hellenen im Skythenlande, pp. 488-533. The last-mentioned work is peculiarly copious and instructive; relating what has been done since Dubois' travels, and containing abundant information derived from the recent memoirs of the St. Petersburg Literary Societies.

The local and special type, which shows itself so much on these works of art, justifies the inference that they were not brought from other Grecian cities, but executed by Grecian artists resident at Pantikapæum (p. 507). Two marble statues, a man and woman, both larger than life, exhumed in 1850, are spoken of with peculiar admiration (p. 491). Coins of the third and fourth century B.C. have been found in several (p. 494-495). A great number of the so-called Etruscan vases have also been discovered, probably fabricated from a species of clay still existing in the neighbourhood: the figures on these vases are often excellent, with designs and scenes of every description, religious, festal, warlike, domestic (p. 522). Many of the sarcophagi are richly ornamented with carvings, in wood, ivory, &c.; some admirably executed (p. 521).

Unfortunately, the belief prevails and has long prevailed, among

mixture of Hellenic and barbaric; moreover, even the profusion of gold chains and other precious ornaments, indicates a tone of sentiment partially orientalized, in those for whom they were destined. But the design as well as the execution comes clearly out of the Hellenic workshop; and there is good ground for believing, that in the fourth century B.C., Pantikapæum was the seat, not only of enterprising and wealthy citizens, but also of strenuous and well-directed artistic genius. Such manifestations of the refinements of Hellenism, in this remote and little-noticed city, form an important addition to the picture of Hellas as a whole,—prior to its days of subjection,—which it has been the purpose of this history to present.

I have now brought down the history of Greece to the point of time marked out in the Preface to my First Volume—the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander—the epoch, from whence dates not only the extinction of Grecian political freedom and self-action, but

the neighbouring population, that these tumuli contain hidden treasures. One of the most striking among them—called the Kul-Obo—was opened in 1830 by the Russian authorities. After great pains and trouble, the means of entrance were discovered, and the interior chamber was reached. It was the richest that had ever been opened; being found to contain some splendid golden ornaments, as well as many other relics. The Russian officers placed a guard to prevent any one from entering it; but the cupidity of the population of Kertch was so inflamed by the report of the expected treasure being discovered, that they forced the guard, broke into the interior, and pillaged most of the contents (p. 509). The Russian authorities have been generally anxious for the preservation and gradual excavation of these monuments, but have had to contend against repugnance and even rapacity on the part of the people near.

Dubois de Montpéreux gives an interesting description of the opening of these tumuli near Kertch—especially of the Kul-Obo, the richest of all, which he conceives to have belonged to one of the Spartokid kings, and the decorations of which were the product of Hellenic art:—

"Si l'on a enterré (he observes) un roi entouré d'un luxe Scythique, ce sont des Grecs et des artistes de cette nation qui ont travaillé à ses funérailles" (Voyage autour du Caucase, pp. 195, 213, 227). Pantikapæum and Phanagoria (he says) "se reconnoissent de loin à la foule de leurs tumulus" (p. 137).

also the decay of productive genius, and the debasement of that consummate literary and rhetorical excellence which the fourth century B.C. had seen exhibited in Plato and Demosthenês.[1] The contents of this last Volume indicate but too clearly that Greece as a separate subject of history no longer exists; a considerable portion of it is employed in depicting Alexander and his conquests—ἄγριον αἰχμητὴν, κρατερὸν μήστωρα φόβοιο[2]—that Non-Hellenic conqueror into whose vast possessions the Greeks are absorbed, with their intellectual brightness bedimmed, their spirit broken, and half their virtue taken away by Zeus—the melancholy emasculation inflicted (according to Homer) upon victims overtaken by the day of slavery.[3]

One branch of intellectual energy there was, and one alone, which continued to flourish, comparatively little impaired, under the preponderance of the Macedonian sword—the spirit of speculation and philosophy. During the century which we have just gone through, this spirit was embodied in several eminent persons, whose names have been scarcely adverted to in this History. Among these names, indeed, there are two, of peculiar grandeur, whom I have brought partially before the reader, because both of them belong to general history as well as to philosophy; Plato, as citizen of Athens, companion of Sokratês at his trial, and counsellor of Dionysius in his glory—Aristotle, as the teacher of Alexander. I had at one time hoped to include in my present work a record of them as philosophers also, and an estimate of their speculative characteristics; but I find the subject far too vast to be compressed into such a space as this volume would afford. The exposition of the tenets of distinguished thinkers is not now numbered by historians, either ancient or

[1] How marked that degradation was, may be seen attested by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, De Antiquis Oratoribus, pp. 445, 446, Reiske—ἐν γὰρ δὴ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν χρόνοις ἡ μὲν ἀρχαία καὶ φιλόσοφος ῥητορικὴ προπηλακιζομένη καὶ δεινὰς ὕβρεις ὑπομένουσα κατελύετο. ἀρξαμένη μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνος τελευτῆς ἐκπνεῖν καὶ μαραίνεσθαι κατ' ὀλίγον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἡλικίας μικροῦ δεῖσασα εἰς τέλος ἦφανίσθαι. Compare Dionys. De Composit. Verbor. p. 29, 30, Reisk.; and Westermann, Geschichte der Griechischen Beredtsamkeit, s. 75-77.

[2] Hom. Iliad. vi. 97.

[3] Hom. Odyss. xvii. 322:—

ἥμισυ γάρ τ' ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνυται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
ἀνέρος, εὖτ' ἂν μιν κατὰ δούλιον ἦμαρ ἕλῃσιν.

modern, among the duties incumbent upon them, nor yet among the natural expectations of their readers; but is reserved for the special historian of philosophy. Accordingly, I have brought my history of Greece to a close, without attempting to do justice either to Plato or to Aristotle. I hope to contribute something towards supplying this defect, the magnitude of which I fully appreciate, in a separate work, devoted specially to an account of Greek speculative philosophy in the fourth century B.C.

# APPENDIX.

## ON ISSUS AND ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD AS CONNECTED WITH THE BATTLE.

THE exact battle-field of Issus cannot be certainly assigned upon the evidence accessible to us. But it may be determined, within a few miles north or south; and what is even more important—the general features of the locality, as well as the preliminary movements of the contending armies, admit of being clearly conceived and represented. The Plan, of the country round the Gulf of Issus, will enable the reader to follow easily what is certain, and to understand the debate about what is matter of hypothesis.

That the battle was fought in some portion of the narrow space intervening between the eastern coast of the Gulf of Issus and the western flank of Mount Amanus—that Alexander's left and Darius's right, rested on the sea, and their right and left respectively on the mountain—that Darius came upon Alexander unexpectedly from the rear, thus causing him to return back a day's march from Myriandrus, and to reoccupy a pass which he had already passed through and quitted—these points are clearly given, and appear to me not open to question. We know that the river Pinarus, on which the battle was fought, was at a certain distance *south* of Issus, the last town of Kilikia before entering Syria (Arrian, ii. 7, 2)—ἐς τὴν ὑστεραίαν προὐχώρει (Darius from Issus) ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Πίναρον—Ritter erroneously states that Issus was *upon* the river Pinarus, which he even calls *the Issus river* (Erdkunde, Theil iv. Abth. 2. p. 1797-1806). We know also that this river was at some distance *north* of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria, through which Alexander passed and repassed.

But when we proceed, beyond these data (the last of them only vague and relative), to fix the exact battle-field, we are reduced to conjecture. Dr. Thirlwall, in an appendix to the sixth volume of his History, has collected and discussed very ably the different opinions of various geographers.

To those whom he has cited, may be added—Mr. Ainsworth's Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates (in the Transactions of the Geographical Society for 1837)—Mützell's Topographical Notes on the third book of Quintus Curtius—and the last volume of Ritter's Erdkunde, published only this year (1855); ch. xxvii. p. 1778 *seqq.*

We know from Xenophon that Issus was a considerable town close to the sea—two days' march from the river Pyramus, and one day's march northward of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. That it was near the north-eastern corner of the Gulf, may also be collected from Strabo, who reckons the shortest line across Asia Minor, as stretching from Sinôpê or Amisus *to Issus*—and who also lays down the Egyptian sea as having its northern termination *at Issus* (Strabo, xiv, p. 677; xvi. p. 749). The probable site of Issus has been differently determined by different authors; Rennell (Illustrations of the Geography of the Anabasis, p. 42—48) places it near Oseler or Yusler; as far as I can judge, this seems too far distant from the head of the Gulf, towards the south.

In respect to the maritime pass, called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, there is much discrepancy between Xenophon and Arrian. It is evident that, in Xenophon's time, this pass and the road of march through it lay between the mountains and the sea,—and that the obstructions (walls blocking up the passage), which he calls insurmountable by force, were mainly of artificial creation. But when Alexander passed no walls existed. The artificial obstructions had disappeared during the seventy years between Xenophon and Alexander; and we can assign a probable reason why. In Xenophon's time, Kilikia was occupied by the native prince Syennesis, who, though tributary, maintained a certain degree of independence even in regard to the Great King, and therefore kept a wall guarded by his own soldiers on his boundary towards Syria. But in Alexander's time, Kilikia was occupied, like Syria, by a Persian satrap. Artificial boundary walls, between two conterminous satrapies under the same master, were unnecessary; and must even have been found inconvenient, during the great collective military operations of the Persian satraps against the revolted Evagoras of Cyprus (principally carried on from Kilikia as a base, about 380 B.C., Diodor. xv. 2)—as well as in the subsequent operations against the Phenician towns (Diodor. xvi. 42). Hence we may discern a reason why all artificial obstructions may have been swept away before the time of Alexander; leaving only the natural difficulties of the neighbouring ground, upon wich Xenophon has not touched.

The spot still retained its old name—"The Gates of Kilikia and Syria"—even after walls and gates had been dispensed with. But that name, in Arrian's description, designates a difficult and narrow point of the road *over hills and rocks;* a point which Major Rennell (Illustrations, p. 54) supposes to have been about a mile south of the river and walls described by Xenophon. However this may be, the precise spot designated by Xenophon seems probably to be sought about seven

miles north of Scanderoon, near the ruins now known as Jonas's Pillars (or Sakal Tutan), and the Castle of Merkes, where a river called *Merkes*, *Mahersy*, or *Kara-su*, flows across from the mountain to the sea. That this river is the same with the Kersus of Xenophon, is the opinion of Rennell, Ainsworth, and Mützell; as well as of Colonel Callier, who surveyed the country when accompanying the army of Ibrahim Pacha as engineer (cited by Ritter, Erdk. p. 1792). At the spot here mentioned, the gulf indents eastward, while the western flank of Amanus approaches very close to it, and drops with unusual steepness towards it. Hence the road now followed does not pass between the mountain and the sea, but ascends over a portion of the mountain, and descends again afterwards to the low ground skirting the sea. Northward of Merkes, the space between the mountain and the sea gradually widens, towards Bayas. At some distance to the north of Bayas occurs the river now called Delle Tschai, which is considered, I think with probability, to be the Pinarus, where the battle between Alexander and Darius was fought. This opinion however is not unanimous; Kinneir identifies the *Merkes* with the Pinarus. Moreover, there are several different streams which cross the space between Mount Amanus and the sea. Des Monceaux notices six streams as having been crossed between the Castle of Merkes and Bayas; and five more streams between Bayas and Ayas (Mützell ad Curtium, p. 105). Which among these is the Pinarus, cannot be settled without more or less of doubt.

Besides the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, noted by Xenophon and Arrian in the above passages, there are also other Gates called *the Amanian Gates*, which are spoken of in a perplexing manner. Dr. Thirlwall insists with propriety on the necessity of distinguishing the *maritime* passes, between Mount Amanus and the sea—from the *inland* passes, which crossed over the ridge of Mount Amanus itself. But this distinction seems not uniformly observed by ancient authors, when we compare Strabo, Arrian and Kallisthenês. Strabo uses the phrase, *Amanian Gates*, twice (xiv. p. 676; xvi. p. 751); in both cases designating a *maritime pass*, and not a pass *over* the mountain—yet designating one maritime pass in the page first referred to, and another in the second. In xiv. p. 676—he means by αἱ Ἀμανίδες πύλαι, the spot called by modern travellers Demir Kapu, between Ægæ and Issus, or between Mopsuestia and Issus; while in xvi. 751—he means by the same words that which I have been explaining as the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, on the eastern side of the Gulf of Issus. In fact, Strabo seems to conceive as a whole the strip of land between Mount Amanus and the Gulf, beginning at Demir Kapu, and ending at the Gates of Kilikia and Syria—and to call both the beginning and the end of it by the same name—the Amanian Gates. But he does not use this last phrase to designate the passage over or across Mount Amanus; neither does Arrian; who in describing the march of Darius from Sochi into Kilikia, says (ii. 7, 1)— ὑπερβαλὼν δὴ τὸ ὄρος Δαρεῖος τὸ κατὰ τὰς πύλας τὰς Ἀμανικὰς καλουμένας, ὡς ἐπὶ Ἴσσον προῆγε, καὶ ἐγένετο κατόπιν Ἀλεξάνδρου λαθών. Here, let it be observed, we do not read ὑπερβαλὼν τὰς πύλας—nor can I think that the words mean, as the translator gives them—"transiit Amanum, *eundo per Pylas Amanicas*." The words rather signify, that Darius "crossed over the mountain where it adjoined the Amanian Gates"—*i. e.* where it adjoined the strip of land skirting the

Gulf, and lying betweenthose two extreme points which Strabo denominates *Amanian Gates*. Arrian employs this last phrase more loosely than Strabo, yet still with reference to the maritime strip, and not to a *col* over the mountain ridge.

On the other hand, Kallisthenês (if he is rightly represented by Polybius, who recites his statement, not his words, xii. 17) uses the words *Amanian Gates* to signify the passage by which Darius entered Kilikia - that is, the passage *over* the mountain. That which Xenophon and Arrian call the *Gates of Kilikia and Syria*—and which Strabo calls *Amanian Gates* is described by Polybius as τὰ στενὰ, καὶ τὰς λεγομένας ἐν τῇ Κιλικίᾳ πύλας.

I have marked on the Plan the pass by which Darius crossed Mount Amanus, as it stands on Kiepert's Map, and on Chesney's Map; in the line from Aintab to the head of the Gulf, near the 37th parallel. It seems pretty certain that this must have been Darius's line of march, because he came down immediately upon Issus, and then marched forward to the river Pinarus. Had he entered Kilikia by the pass of Beylan, he must have passed the Pinarus *before* he reached Issus. The positive grounds for admitting a practicable pass near the 37th parallel, are indeed called in question by Mützell (ad Curtium, p. 102, 103), and are not in themselves conclusive; still I hold them sufficient, when taken in conjunction with the probabilities of the case. This pass was, however, we may suppose, less frequented than the maritime line of road through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, and the pass of Beylan; which, as the more usual, was preferred both by the Cyreians and by Alexander.

Respecting the march of Alexander, Dr. Thirlwall here starts a question, substantially to this effect: "Since Alexander intended to march through the pass of Beylan for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp at Sochi, what could have caused him to go to Myriandrus, which was more south than Beylan, and out of his road?" Dr. Thirlwall feels this difficulty so forcibly, that in order to eliminate it, he is inclined to accept the hypothesis of Mr. Williams, which places Myriandrus at Bayas, and the Kiliko-Syrian Gates at Demir-Kapu; an hypothesis which appears to me inadmissible on various grounds, and against which Mr. Ainsworth (in his Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates) has produced several very forcible objections.

I confess that I do not feel the difficulty on which Dr. Thirlwall insists. When we see that Cyrus and the Ten Thousand went to Myriandrus, in their way to the Pass of Beylan, we may reasonably infer that, whether that town was in the direct line or not, it was at least in the *usual* road of march—which does not always coincide with the direct line. But to waive this supposition, however—let us assume that there existed another shorter road leading to Beylan without passing by Myriandrus—there would still be reason enough to induce Alexander to go somewhat out of his way, in order to visit Myriandrus. For it was an important object with him to secure the sea-ports in his rear, in case of a possible reverse. Suppose him repulsed and forced to retreat,—it would be a material assistance to his retreat, to have assured himself beforehand of Myriandrus as well as the other sea-ports.

In the approaching months, we shall find him just as careful to

make sure of the Phenician cities on the coast, before he marches into the interior to attack Darius at Arbela.

Farther, Alexander, marching to attack Darius, had nothing to gain by haste, and nothing to lose by coming up to Sochi three days later. He knew that the enormous Persian host would not try to escape; it would either await him at Sochi, or else advance into Kilikia to attack him there. The longer he tarried, the more likely they were to do the latter, which was what he desired. He had nothing to lose therefore in any way, and some chance of gain, by prolonging his march to Sochi for as long a time as was necessary to secure Myriandrus. There is no more difficulty, I think, in understanding why he went to Myriandrus than why he went westward from Tarsus (still more out of his line of advance) to Soli and Anchialus.

It seems probable (as Rennell (p. 56) and others think), that the site of Myriandrus is now some distance inland; that there has been an accretion of new land and morass on the coast.

The modern town of Scanderoon occupies the site of Ἀλεξανδρεία κατ' Ἰσσον, founded (probably by order of Alexander himself) in commemoration of the victory of Issus. According to Ritter (p. 1791), "Alexander had the great idea of establishing there an emporium for the traffic of the East with Europe, as at the other Alexandria for the trade of the East with Egypt." The importance of the site of Scanderoon, in antiquity, is here greatly exaggerated. I know no proof that Alexander had the idea which Ritter ascribes to him; and it is certain that his successors had no such idea; because they founded the great cities of Antioch and Seleukeia (in Pieria), both of them carrying the course of trade up the Orontes, and therefore diverting it away from Scanderoon. This latter town is only of importance as being the harbour of Aleppo; a city (Berœa) of little consequence in antiquity, while Antioch became the first city in the East, and Seleukeia among the first: see Ritter, p. 1152.

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