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THE

HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION,

BY

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HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION.

CHAPTER I.

EUROPE—ITS SOCIETY.

Society is founded upon the agreeable. It is embodied in the manners and customs of a people. It culminates in the principles of politeness. Its mission is to gratify the social instinct.

The very existence of society presupposes the fact of order. Human propensities and passions, and even sentiments, must first be subjected to the restraint of law, before society can even be rendered possible. That law must possess sufficient strength to impose proper limits upon their exercise; and then society, with all its convivialities and bland exhibitions, is like the flame that glows on the summit of the volcano, whose rock-ribbed sides, representing the force of law, stand a perpetual guard keeping within their proper bounds the fearful elements of commotion that rage within. Thus the element of government must precede that of society in those successive elemental developments that make up the record of civilization.

The illustration just referred to may still further serve our purpose. The flame and substances issuing from its crater indicate two facts:

1. The nature and character of those molten masses that roll and rage, and boil within.

2. The actual condition and state of activity, at any given time, of those liquid masses, as to their being violently agitated, or in a state of repose.

Thus society, as it gathers up all the law, will permit of the exhibition of propensity, passion, and sentiment; will, as she exhibits herself to us at different times, proclaim the true nature and character of those internal hidden forces and powers of action, which the law, at times, finds it hard to control. And so also will she enable us, at any given period of time, to understand the then state and condition of those forces and powers, in respect of their activity or repose.

Again, the volcano finds in its crater a safety valve, through which a portion of those fiery elements seek their vent, and without which the stout mountain sides could not keep imprisoned its fierce and terrible inmates. And so may society be regarded as the safety valve of every age and people, through which those propensities, passions and sentiments find their natural means of escape, which might otherwise endanger the existence of every social and political fabric. Thus society, while it evidences the existence and activity of those energetic forces that are inherent in human nature, serves also, at the same time, the purpose of a safety valve to prevent their restrained action from the production of hurtful effects.

But society is not alone the offspring of propensity, passion, and sentiment. Its sources lie deep among the fundamental facts of man's individual being. It gathers up its strength, and receives its supplies, from every active power of his nature, whatever its office, whether to think or to feel. While the intellect is shaping its conceptions, and giving form and definiteness to its ideas, the mirthful may be impressing them with its own laughter-loving qualities, or the ideal hanging around them its spell of beauty.

Society is an instrument that vibrates to all tones. Now it kindles at the voices of gayety and gladness, lighting up its torch at the fires of a rejoicing heart; anon it sinks into gloom and sadness, covered with the mantle of mourning and the weeds of woe. Now it is an inhabitant of earth, with earthly facts for its basis, and earthly fancies for

its adornment; then it penetrates the depths of man's spiritual nature, and evokes from them modifications of thought and feeling that are not of this world. While at times it is free and open as the day, at others it seeks the veil of mystery, and claims acquaintance with the unknown. It presides over marriage with its song and dance; over the pastimes of childhood with its happy faces and joyous hearts; over the sports and convivialities of middle age, with its fullness of health and strength; over the graver socialities of more advanced life, with its lines of care, its results of experience, and its wealth of wisdom; and, at last, with its funereal torch, throws its glare over the inanimate body as it sinks to its final resting place.

Thus it is that society, in all its different phases, reveals to the outward world what had its birth in the inward. All the inner promptings of our nature, all the thoughts, feelings, instincts, propensities, passions and sentiments, whose ceaseless action goes to make up the history of our inner life, and which do not endanger the existence of society itself, will, in some form or other, become revealed to the outward world under the auspices of society. And this revelation, carefully noted, will, at any given epoch, constitute society a very excellent barometer, to determine what are the workings of the inward man, what the then condition of civilization itself.

It must not, however, be understood, that the law is the only restraining power for the purpose of preventing the interior communings of the soul and mind, from passing into outward act and show. There are conservative forces even in society itself, that bring about the same result. Society has everywhere its own code of laws, although they may vary essentially among different nations and peoples. It has also its own peculiar sanctions by which its laws are enforced. These consist in the approvals it bestows upon the obedient, and the blasted name, and sometimes utter exclusion, which awaits those who are guilty of a violation.

In the history of society, especially of the European, that of the female sex will be largely included. It is in this element that this sex finds its appropriate place in the history of civilization. The nature and the endowments of woman eminently fit her for a commanding position in the higher and more refined circles of society. She has usually a correct moral feeling, a great susceptibility to enjoyment, strong feelings of affection, a love of approval and a desire of pleasing others, united with a vivid imagination, a happy facility of observation, and a ready and discursive intellect, which eminently fit her for the regulation and government of society. It has hence resulted that in all the civilized countries of Europe she has either actually presided over it, or taken the lead, in its varied developments. Her faultless taste and natural tact find here the materials which can give them constant employment. Were religion, society, and art annihilated, the mere woman would have little to do with civilization, and her fate would be indeed deplorable. But in each of these she is fitted largely to participate, and thus to play no inconsiderable a part in the onward progress of civilization.

The development of the social instinct is modified by the action of several causes. One of these, and perhaps the most important, is climate. This operates as a modifier of society in two ways:

1. By the direct influence it exerts. This is primarily upon the physical organization, and through that upon the mental and moral. This fact becomes the most clearly revealed when we look upon men in the different zones, the frigid, temperate and torrid. Like all the other productions of nature the race presents its varieties in different zones. These varieties are the most manifested: 1. In their form of body. 2. In their capacity for endurance. 3. In the varieties of temperament. 4. In their intellectual, social and moral developments. The most perfect men, those who have swayed the world, have always been

found in the northern temperate zone. They have contrasted strongly with the man of the torrid zone. To the former have belonged strength, deliberation, reflection, a persistency in the pursuit of their objects, a perseverance of effort through all opposing obstacles, and a great coolness and calculation in their loves and hatreds. The latter have possessed less power of endurance; are quick, hasty and excitable; are less steady and constant in their course; their intellect possesses less of depth, their powers of imagination are larger and more vivid; their susceptibility to pleasure and pain greater; and their passions ever liable to burst forth into terrible activity.

> Know ye the land where the cypress and myrtle
> Are emblems of deeds which are done in their clime,
> Where the rage of the vulture, the love of the turtle,
> Now melt into sadness, now madden to crime,
> 'Tis the land of the east, 'tis the clime of the sun.

The soul is there stirred to its inmost depths by its loves and hatreds, and jealousy is a passion of fearful activity. So thoroughly is love there aeclimated, that it has the reputation of always and everywhere being a "torrid zone to the human heart."

2. The climate also exerts an indirect influence, which in the end is perhaps equally important in its results. The colder climate lays upon man the heavy demands of labor. The earth produces less spontaneously than in warmer climates. Men are more under the necessity of attending to seed-time and harvest. The demand for food cannot be satisfied without labor. And food is required to be of a different quality from that which will satisfy in the torrid zone. It must be stronger, more concentrated, possessing in a higher degree those elements that contribute largely to nutrition, growth, and strength.

Other demands, also, are about equally as imperative. Substantial buildings as a shelter from the cold of winter, and warm clothing as a protection from the inclemencies of

the weather, imposes the necessity for labor beyond the mere supply of food. Under the pressure of all these demands, the internal energies of man's nature are roused into activity. Resistance is to be overcome, obstacles surmounted, the wonder-workings of industry to be exhibited, and all these affect the man, his qualities, manners, habitudes, and character. The sterner virtues have their growth or outcrop in the man of the temperate north. The spirit of personal liberty is there nourished. Patriotism prevails, because one's country is there his own by reason of the labor he has expended in its reduction, and his own participation in its institutions.

Society is greatly influenced by the varying pursuits embraced in the industrial element. The different kinds of industry exert each a different influence upon man as a social being. The agricultural, the mechanic, and manufacturing, and the commercial, each, obviously surrounds the man with different influences, affecting all his associations, and varying his social manners and customs. In old countries society has been, for ages, in the process of stereotyping; each successive repetition only fixing more permanently the general result. The tendency is to run into a state very greatly resembling that of caste among the eastern nations. The son follows the occupation of the father; not as in the east from a political and moral necessity, but because such is the usual and customary mode, and selection is made of that in preference to any other. Thus to all appearance he is entirely free, and yet the force of circumstances would hardly permit him to do otherwise.

This succession of the son to the occupation of the father tends to the perpetuation, in the same classes, of the same forms of society. Each class has, in some respects, its own manners and customs, which run down through generations and centuries with very little variation.

Society has also been essentially modified by the religious element. This modification has been effected in two ways:

I. By its direct effect upon the human soul. Pure religion, in its simplicity and grandeur, and considered as an element of power alone, imparts to the human soul a vitality, an energy, a strength of moral purpose, an ability to do or suffer, which without it would never be possessed or manifested. These run into and essentially qualify all that goes to constitute character. They breathe a living power into society itself, and animate its forms as with a new life.

It is the special province of religion to awake in the silent depths of the soul three wonderful powers: faith, hope, and love; and these, once in action, and properly directed, exert a transforming influence upon the character. The more strength those three great powers can gather in their legitimate exercise upon the deep things of God, the better are they qualified to take hold of earthly objects and push them forward with energy and success. And this they do for the reason, that, once in activity, and their quenchless fires kindled upon the altar of eternal truth, they are likely to carry into all their spheres of action the same power, energy and success. This is strongly exemplified in the history of the English puritans. Stiff and uncourtly in their manners; little, if at all, given to mere matters of amusement, regarding society itself rather as a means for the accomplishment of something beyond, than as an end to satisfy by the enjoyment it could bring; they pursued their own aims and ends with directness, perseverance, and success. The high-toned, stern religious character has always displayed itself more or less strongly in the social manners and customs, thus modifying more or less essentially the society of the people.

2. In the second place, it exerts indirectly a modifying influence upon the character and society by the forms and ceremonies it introduces, by its various rites and observances. The more these are multiplied, and rendered attractive, grand, or imposing, the greater the influence they exert, and the stronger they draw and concentrate upon themselves all the attention and energies of mind

and soul. Thus the influence of pure religion is little felt in the midst of splendid rites and a gorgeous ceremonial. The soul is entranced and wholly absorbed in these outward performances and displays, that are entirely sensuous in all their essential characteristics. Thus society is here modified by the forms, ceremonies, rites and observances introduced by religion.

Another modifier of society is found in the element of government. The modification here is produced in two ways:

1. By the greater or less degree of freedom enjoyed by the people. In the same proportion in which civil freedom is enjoyed will individual dispositions, instincts, propensities and sentiments, exhibit themselves the most unrestrained, and all the forms of society approach nearer to their primitive character. But wherever despotism prevails, whether governmental or religious, its effect is to repress all those social displays that have anything public in their character. Society bows beneath it, and seeks concealment by withdrawing from the public gaze.

2. The second modifying influence is exerted in all those governments which are presided over by courts. In such cases, society takes its lead from the examples there exhibited. In the capital and court all the elite of the nation are assembled. Fashion reigns supreme. The laws of etiquette are far more imperative than those of morals. Society is brilliant, its exhibitions highly attractive; but vice and immorality are too frequently concomitants, and dissipation of every possible character far too universally prevalent. Thus society is splendid, but both corrupt and corrupting; refining the manners while it deadens the heart; the air of paradise lying around a pandemonium, and the spirit of love and of beauty hovering around those whose dispositions are often fiend-like in character.

An artificial and what may perhaps be termed, a highly refined state of society is found in the higher circles in old monarchies, and in those which approach towards the

pure aristocratic character. In republics, more especially in those partaking largely of the democratic element, the developments of the social instinct are plainer, more common, more natural.

Society is also modified by the element of art. The prevalence in any community of the æsthetic spirit will exercise a great influence in refining, idealizing, and intellectualizing mind and manners. The power of music spell-binds and softens the human soul. The drama, in its higher and purer revelations, opens up a thousand sources of social enjoyment. Most of the forms of artistic life are beautiful in the contemplation. The sphere of mind is enlarged by the marvels of art that are presented to it. Pleasures, beyond those of mere sense, become the all-engrossing objects of pursuit. Society, as a consequence, is higher, but not always purer in its forms.

The social instinct is entirely human in its character. The beaver, and some other of the animal species, herd together, but men only associate. A purely gregarious instinct is all that animates or influences the action of animal natures. But in man both the intellectual and moral element prevails, and this places society at an infinite remove above the gregarious instinct.

Society everywhere may be found in its simple elementary state in the family. There it should be first studied in its primal home. There its power is more felt. The first natural association is that of the two sexes. Then come the other ingredients, the smaller responsibilities, that contribute to make up the family. The magic circle finally becomes complete. The paternal, filial, fraternal relations weave around each heart their ever enduring bonds. The family becomes a small community, a little world in miniature. Although forming but a single element in a larger society, yet it is complete in itself, and really offers and affords far more of social life than is elsewhere to be found.

The farther back we trace the history of society, the nearer we approach the primitive ages, the more strictly

do we find the family containing and limiting within its own circle, all the elements of social life. And the more strict this limitation, the purer have been all the social developments. In the family the tendencies are to virtue; and society, although homely in its aspect, is honest and truthful in its character.

But the continuance of the race is conditioned upon passing the family barrier. New families must be founded which serve as fresh centres of social life, at the same time that they answer the purpose of connecting links between those older families from which the founders of the new were derived. Thus in early patriarchal times we find an aggregate of families united together, and all looking to one head, the venerable patriarch. This is a widening of the family circle, the creation of a complex family, in which, in some respects, all are members of a single one, while in others it presents the features of families united with families.

From the family the ascent is extremely natural and easy to the clan, tribe, or horde. As the family is composed of several individuals, so each one of these is made up of several families. Illustrations of these may be found in the Scottish clan, the German tribe, and the Tartar horde.

As the members of the same family usually bear towards each other strong resemblances in their forms and characters, so the families composing a clan, tribe, or horde, are very like each other in all material respects. Their associations have always been with each other. They have come up under the same influences, have participated in the same sports, and have mutually moulded and modeled each other's character.

From the clan, tribe, or horde, another ascent brings us into a larger association. Each one of these uniting together forms a nation or a race of men. Thus we have the German race or races, the Tartar races and others, all having many features in common, and yet with considerable diversity among the different tribes or hordes.

The history of European society could be much more easily studied and written if the original nations and races that compose the present population of Europe had remained pure and unmixed to the present time. But that is far from being the fact. Their different migrations and settlements, together with their mixing up with the older population, have, in many, perhaps in most, instances, so intermingled and blended them together, as that the original character of each is almost or entirely lost. Scarcely a people now in Europe, unless kept separate by their religion, who do not exhibit a compound, an amalgamation, of several different nations or peoples. Witness Italy, Spain, and even France and England.

European society will be best developed under the following heads:

I. Society as it existed among the early European races.

1. The Scandinavian, the Celtic, and the Germanic.
2. The Slavic.
3. The Turkish.

II. Society as it existed in the middle ages, and under the feudal system.

III. Society as it existed in the age of chivalry.

IV. Society as it existed in the age of the troubadours.

V. Society as it has developed and is developing itself in the different European nations, as:

1. In the Spanish peninsula.
2. In the Italian peninsula.
3. In Switzerland.
4. Among the Germanic nations.
5. In France.
6. Among the Scandinavian nations.
7. In the British isles.

I. *Society as it existed among the early European races.*

1. The Scandinavian, the Celtic, and the Germanic; these are all regarded as different branches of the same great family of nations. Original differences, no doubt, existed

in their different developments of social life, and yet the great general features of their character were essentially the same. For all practical purposes, therefore, they may be considered together.

And here it may be well to inquire, in the first place, if there be any, and what, leading feature in the character of these early peoples; anything which can be regarded as giving a tone or direction to all their principal movements whether industrial, political, religious or social. And to this it may undoubtedly be answered that the martial or war spirit, with all its usual concomitants, appears to have been the prevailing one through all the early centuries. As occurs among all primitive savage people, a preeminence was only to be gained by personal qualities. The children of the chiefs, and all others, lived together,[1] and were brought up under the same influences, until through the exercise of genius or the display of valor, they acquired a superiority. Different tribes were constantly bringing their rivalships and disputes to a bloody arbitrament, and thus opportunities of becoming distinguished in war were frequently presented. These nations knew no other profession than that of arms. If a tribe happened for some time to languish in ease, its youthful heroes sought out other tribes that were engaged in wars to find opportunities for displaying their valor.

The German tribes principally carried on their contests on land, while the Saxons, Danes and Norwegians, frequented the seas, led the roving life of the Vikings, and subsisted upon the fruits of piracy and plunder. All were prodigal of life, enterprising, and emulous of danger. Their prejudices, customs, occupations, amusements, every action of their lives, bore the stamp of the warrior. In times of peace, they had their mock-battles, reviews, tournaments, and wrestling, boxing and racing matches.[2] Other times they spent in hunting, public business, drinking and sleep-

[1] *Stuart's View*, 3. [2] *Mallet*, 195.

ing. Even the most warlike, when nothing was present to arouse them, passed much of their time in indolence, feasting and sleep.

The chase probably, next to war, engaged the most of their attention. They were also addicted to games of hazard, especially to that of dice, often risking their liberty and persons on the last throw. They were hospitable, warm in their attachments, generous in their sympathies and gifts, adopting heartily the resentments equally as the friendships of their relatives and kindred.[1]

In the food upon which they subsisted there was great simplicity. It consisted principally of wild apples, recently killed venison and curdled milk. They, however, delighted in feasting, when intoxicating liquors were used in excess. The most common of these liquors were beer, mead, or wine, which were drank out of earthen or wooden pitchers, or horns of wild bulls.[2] The Germans were accustomed to consult together at the table upon their most important concerns, such as those of peace and war, and the election of their princes. Here also were formed those associations by which solemn obligations were entered into for mutual protection and defense on all occasions, to revenge each other's deaths at the hazard of their own lives. Oaths to this effect were taken and renewed at these festivals.

The mode of living by these nations was not in cities, or even towns. They could not endure contiguity in their dwellings, the bubbling fountain, the extended plain, or the beautiful grove, presented attractions which the man of simple, natural tastes could not resist. The idea of property in land had not then been born. About the only product of the earth which they required was corn.

In their buildings they used neither mortar nor tiles, but only rude materials, regardless of beauty or proportion. Some spent the winter months in caves, in which they found a retreat from cold.[3]

[1] *Stuart*, 4. [2] *Mallet*, 196. [3] *Tacitus*, 545.

The clothing worn by the Germans consisted of a loose mantle made fast with a clasp or a thorn. This was their only covering. The rich wore a garment drawn so tight that the form and limbs were clearly disclosed. The skins of wild animals were frequently used for clothing. There was very little distinction in dress between the two sexes.

Perhaps the strongest contrast that presents between the German and Scandinavian nations, and the southern and eastern nations of the world is to be found in the relations of the sexes, and in the constancy and sterner virtues of their women. Modern civilization owes much, if not all, to the simplicity, purity and virtue exemplified in these relations.

Monogamy was almost universally practiced among the German and northern nations. The marriage ceremony consisted in little more than an exchange of gifts. The bride brought with her no portion. In the presence of her parents and relations the future husband tendered a dowry, which, if accepted, the match was approved. The presents were substantial, never appealing to female vanity. Oxen, the caparisoned horse, the shield, the spear and the sword, were the articles presented. She, in return, made a present of arms. Thus, in the character of the gifts interchanged, is furnished the intimation of the kind of relations established. The yoked oxen, the caparisoned horse, the arms, all serve to inculcate the lesson, that the woman is received as a partner in toil and danger, that the arts of peace and the dangers of war are to be enjoyed and dared together. The armor she receives as a sacred treasure to be transmitted to her sons.

The marriage tie was not contracted while the parties were young and immature. Both parties waited to attain their full growth. The bridegroom must first leave the house of his father, and be invested with arms. Then he became a member of the state, could enter into contracts, and among others, that of marriage. The maturity of the

parents afforded a sufficient guaranty of the vigor and strength of constitution of the children.

Celibacy was regarded as disgraceful, and the aged were honored in proportion to the number and the merits of their descendants.[1] The mother was the nurse of her own children. Her companionship with the stronger sex was such among the Germans,[2] that she was admitted into their councils, and their consultations on business of state. They were even regarded as prophetesses both among the Germans and Gauls, delivered oracular information, pretended to cure the most inveterate maladies, assume whatever shape they pleased, to raise storms, chain up the winds, travel through the air, and perform every function of the fairy art. Thus regard was had both to their admonitions and answers. The same feature seems to have prevailed among the Scandinavians.

The almost constant occupation of the men, either in war or hunting, left to the women the acquisition of some branches of useful knowledge. They studied simples, and the art of healing wounds. They always dressed the wounds of their husbands or lovers. They were also gifted in the art of interpreting dreams, which was of no small consequence in a superstitious age.

But the purity of life led in the marriage state was of much greater consequence. In the simplicity of their manners was found a preservation against vice more effectual than the laws of cultivated states. There were no allurements of public shows and entertainments to relax their virtue, no incitements of luxury to inflame their desires and expose them to corruption.

In some of the German states it was unlawful for a widow to marry a second husband,[3] the doctrine being that she must receive one husband, as she had done one body and one life, and could entertain no thoughts or desires beyond him. All such preserved the honors of widowhood

[1] *Stuart*, 20. [2] *Mallett*, 200. [3] *Stuart*, 21.

unsullied, and even continued the usage after settlements were made in the Roman provinces.

Thus marriage was considered as a strict and sacred institution. The fidelity of the married woman, and her constancy of attachment, rarely ever knew any exception. The crime of adultery was seldom heard of, and when it did occur its punishment was severe and immediate,[1] and was inflicted by the husband himself. He cut off her hair, which was regarded as a great ornament, divested her of her garments, and, in the presence of her assembled relations, expelled her from his house and whipped her through the whole village. A violation of modesty was never pardoned. Chastity once prostituted was never forgiven. In the absence of it no youth, or beauty, or riches, could ever procure a husband.

The children were reared up under such circumstances as to give them great physical perfection. They were subjected to no restraint. They ran about naked, and in time grew up to great strength and size. The son of the slave and the cheiftain were brought up together. Until the age of manhood, they passed their days alike, running over the same ground and mixing with the same cattle.

The laws of hospitality were inviolable among the Germans. The stranger was always welcomed by the master of the house and regaled to the best of his ability.[2] If his stock fell short, he conducted his guest to the house of his neighbor, where could be found a more abundant table. No invitation was necessary. A cordial reception was always certain, and no distinction was made between an intimate and an entire stranger. Gifts were interchanged, the departing guest receiving as a present, whatever he desired, and the host, in return, expressing his desires with the same freedom. No obligation was thought to be conferred or incurred in the giving or receiving of presents.

[1] *Stuart*, 19, 20. [2] *Tacitus*, 551.

The first thing on rising in the morning was the bath. The next was their morning meal, which, having completed, they proceeded, completely armed, to dispatch the business of the day. Much of their business was done at their convivial meetings. The reconciliation of enemies, forming of family alliances, election of chiefs, even questions of peace and war, were discussed in their carousing festivals. They maintained that the convivial moment, when the mind was naturally the most open, was the true season for business.[1] But on the following day the subject of debate was again taken into consideration, and decided upon; thus having the benefit of being debated when the mind was warm, and decided when it was cool.

Their public spectacles had little variety. There seems to have been but one spectacle, and that often repeated at their meetings. This was the dance of a band of young men entirely naked amidst pointed swords and javelins. This performance, by frequent repetition, became an art, which was executed with grace and elegance. It was, however, a voluntary performance, and never done for pay.

All the German nations were migratory in their character. The tribe or state would take possession of a certain tract proportioned to its number of hands, making allotments to individuals according to their rank and dignity.[2] The land was abundant in quantity and a partition was easily made. The ground was tilled one year and allowed to lie fallow the next, a sufficient quantity always remaining to supply the demand for cultivation.

It only remains to inquire what disposition the Germans and northern nations made of their dead.[3] We find at a very early period the practice prevailing among the northern nations of burning their dead on funeral piles. The ashes were afterwards collected in an urn, or small stone chest. Over this a low mound not more than a yard high was raised.

[1] *Tacitus*, I, 552. [2] *Idem*, 555. [3] *Mallet*, 209.

Another custom, which also had an early origin, and a very general practice, was that of burial.

Sometimes the body was merely covered with a rude heap of stones; at others, and more frequently, it was placed in a species of vault formed of loose stones, those outside being laid up in regular order. These are more frequently met with in Norway, and seem never to have been covered with earth.

When a person of rank or distinction died, a high mound, generally termed a barrow, was raised over his remains. This barrow burial was very extensive, being not only practiced by the German and Scandinavian nations, but also by several Slavic and Celtic tribes.[1] Barrows are traced from the eastern shores of the Black sea through the steppes of Tartary to the wilds of Silesia in a north-easterly direction, while in a north-westerly, they stretch through Russia and northern Germany to Scandinavia and the British islands. They are scarcely to be found in Austria, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and Baden, very few in Iceland and Norway, more in Denmark, and the most abundant in Sweden.

But the dead were not allowed to repose alone or unprovided for. The poor deposited with the body some of their most necessary utensils and a little money. With the rich and noble were deposited his arms, his gold and silver, and his war horse. The German in life always prized the most his arms and his horse. These, therefore, he was the most desirous of taking with him to the spirit land. In addition, his dependents and most particular friends often sacrificed themselves upon his tomb in order to attend his shade to the hall of Valhalla. Those ancient superstitions still retain their hold upon the mind, and the Laplanders, even at the present day, provide their dead with a flint and everything necessary for lighting them along the dark passage through which they are

[1] *Mallet*, 213.

doomed to wander after the soul has become separated from the body.[1] Thus almost all nations, in their rudest state, are found to render homage to the great idea of a continued being after death has passed upon all that is mortal.

2. Society as it exists among the Slavic races.

These, we have seen, were among the latest born of the European population. The Celtic, Cimbrian, Gothic, and Teutonic, or German races, all preceded them in their entrance upon the continent of Europe. As the Slavic nations were the latest, hitherto considered, in their settlement, are the most eastern of the European peoples in their location, and have always maintained relations more or less direct with the eastern world, we may naturally expect to find among them many traits of eastern character. In fact, very many of their distinguishing characteristics are still Asiatic, although among the higher circles may be found much imported from western Europe.

All these races are bound together and subject to one political dominion, viz: the Russian. Along the immense frontiers of the Russian empire are scattered more than a hundred peoples, speaking a hundred different idioms,[2] while the Slavonian or Russian race alone, occupying the vast interior, number some fifty million souls. Of these, thirty-six millions inhabiting Great Russia, speak identically the same language, while the dialects of the White Russians and of seven millions of Little Russians is slightly different.[3] Among the Great Russians also prevails the most surprising uniformity of manners and customs.

It is curious to observe here how the patriarchal principle, borrowed from the east, has met and mingled with political principles derived from the west. The social organization of Russia is a hierarchy, every step resting on some patriarchal power. The first, the commencement, is the

[1] *Mallet*, 214. [2] *Eclectic, June*, 1854, 236. [3] *Idem*, 237.

family, in which the father is the absolute sovereign. Upon his death, the eldest son takes his place, exercising the paternal authority. The family property belongs in common to all the males, the assent of the father, or his representative, being necessary to its disposition.[1] This feature alone must prevent the formation of any landed aristocracy.

Next to the family, we have the village, or township, governed by an elected father, or starost. His power during the three years for which he is elected, is absolute. All the inhabited and cultivated lands of the village are held in common, as undivided property. The starost divides the fruits or profits of the whole amongst them.

Again, all these villages, or townships, form the nation, a nation of men equal among themselves, but all equally subject to the chief of the empire and the race, the emperor, autocrat or czar, whose authority is absolute, while the obedience rendered is patriarchal rather than servile. All the political and social institutions of Russia are governed by the doctrine of passive obedience, which runs through and pervades all the relations of the people to the state, in domestic life, and even in the avocations of daily business. To enforce this obedience, whether in the army, in the family, among nobles and serfs, resort is had to the cudgel. Everybody beats; the father his child, the husband his wife, the landlord the peasant, the noble his serf. And yet all this without any breach in the affections, any interruption of friendship, and without the slightest trace of ill-feeling.

To this law of the cudgel all Russia seems to be turned over except the nobility, and one of their special privileges consists in exemption from it. The nobles, altogether, form a pretty large class of society, and have large possessions; and yet having no corporate existence, or tendency to any common object, they have little esprit du corps, and

[1] *Eclectic, June*, 1854, 237.

do not, as in western Europe, constitute a powerful aristocracy.

One of the peculiarities of Russian society is the serfdom that there so generally prevails. The number of Russian serfs exceeds the whole population of France or Austria,[1] and has even been estimated at no less than one-twentieth part of mankind.

The serf is the absolute property of the master. It is out of this large body that new recruits are obtained for the army, a certain number being drafted for that purpose every year. No serf can obtain or hold property, all their earnings legally belonging to the master. His body is subject to the master's caprice, and the use of the cudgel or whip is universal. Even the virtue of the female serf is wholly within the master's power. In regard to popular education, there are, in the four great metropolitan districts of St. Petersburgh, Kieff, Moscow and Curan, one hundred and ninety parochial schools, containing in all seventeen thousand five hundred and eighty students. While Russia contains so small a number of students, she contains no less than one hundred and thirty-four thousand five hundred and seventy-eight priests and monks.

The charge has been made against Russia that "she draws her strength from the resources not of civilization, but of barbarism; possessing among her higher classes just as much knowledge of European arts and civilization as is necessary to destroy them;[2] and in her lower orders a state of ignorance so dense, and of opinions so degraded as to find in a single man their lawgiver, their sovereign, and almost their God."

The Russians possess some extent of imitative skill, but the imitation is rather of results than of the power that produces them. Before the reign of Peter I, almost everything in Russia was Asiatic in its character. He imported from Europe sufficient civilization to gild the edges of society, and perhaps some portion of its surface, but the

[1] *Eclectic, June,* 1854, 239. [2] *Idem,* 241.

close observer could still detect, beneath all this, evident traces of the Tartar horde, the low moral level of a half savage people, and many manners and customs indicating the small advance that has yet been made in any of the higher arts of life.

There is no doubt very great diversity in social life in Russia. The variation in climate alone, if no other cause existed, would go far to produce such a result. The popular ideas as to the climate, the habits, and customs of the people are chiefly limited to the capital and the northern part of Russia. But as regards a large portion of Russia, especially the European part of it, it lies under a southern sun, the heat being almost as insupportable as that of the tropics, and the character of the people so influenced by it, as that their manners are soft, luxurious and free, and just as open to sensuous enjoyments as those residing in the south of France, or even in the Italian peninsula.

Another cause having a strong operation is the civil condition of Russia. There not only fails to be a homogeneous people through her vast empire, but even among those who are, the civil distinctions are such as to create almost as many causes of separation as if they belonged to different races and countries. The eastern doctrine of castes, although not in form introduced into Russia, is yet, to a large extent felt, and its disadvantages realized through the Russian dominions. There we have the nobility, the middle classes, and the peasantry including serfs.

The Russian nobles live in towns, and although many of them have country residences, yet they seldom frequent them except for a few weeks in the summer. They have no special reverence for patrimonial property, and hence, there is among them no stability of territorial possession. The neglect of the rule of primogeniture, and the adoption in its place of the rule of equal division of property among all the sons of the family, prevents the continuation of estates in the same family. A large fortune there rarely ever descends to the third generation.

The Russian nobles are notoriously extravagant; cultivating expensive and often wasteful habits. These, taken in connection with the removal of all barriers to the transfer of property by sale or mortgage, lead to the frequent result that they ruin themselves and come to utter destitution.

The Russian peasants, although not possessing the same muscular strength as many other people, are, nevertheless, seldom outdone in their power of endurance and support of fatigue. The Russian soldier is probably called upon to endure greater hardships in his long and painful marches, in his rigid discipline, his hard fare, and the severe corporal punishments to which he is subjected,[1] than almost any other human being. Living upon dry biscuit he may be compelled to traverse desert steppes in which there is no water, or to winter in subterranean huts in which there is no fire. So also the amount of punishment undergone by a criminal often almost exceeds belief. Their strength and power are passive rather than active, and consist more in endurance than in the production of positive results.

An accurate idea of the Russians generally cannot well be obtained without adverting to the difference between the Great and Little Russians. The latter are the more ancient, retaining their national physiognomy, being distinguished by their finer features, dark and hazel eyes,[2] loftier stature, and more harmonious language. The former have red or yellow hair, coarser features, and a more stupid expression of countenance. They are selfish, cunning and avaricious, resorting more to the chicanery of trade, less conscientious and more punic in their dealings. The Little Russians are more indolent, confiding and generous, caring little for the future, never laboring except from necessity, and trusting their affairs to the management of others.

[1] *Malte Brun*, VI, 581. [2] *Idem*, 580.

There is much variety in the characteristic traits of the Russians, but most of them have white teeth, small and dull eyes,[1] a narrow forehead, and a strong beard. The hair has various shades of color from dark chestnut to red. The Russians have quick ears, and what many would not be led to expect, are alive to the power of music. The national music of Russia is possessed of much originality and beauty. Their popular songs are pervaded with a plaintive melancholy; full of images borrowed from nature; and mingled with superstitious ideas, and breathings of tender sentiment. Like most other primitive people their conceptions are linked with external nature. They abound in comparisons and symbols. The nightingale and cuckoo, for instance, are the compassionate birds that answer to their griefs. The swallow bears their messages.[2] The rainbow rising over a dwelling indicates the habitation of a betrothed. The moon hides itself for sorrow at the death of the emperor. The field over which enemies have passed bears bitter herbs. The warrior is a falcon, the girl a swan. The flowing tears are rivers, the falling, simply dews. They have songs for love, for war, for festivals, and occasions of family rejoicing. Songs for many of the callings and pursuits of life, both innocent and criminal. The following, for example, is the song of the robber.[3]

"Make no sound, my little green forest; my mother, do not disturb my thoughts; for on the morrow I must go to answer before that terrible judge, even before the tsar himself.

"The tsar will address himself to me, and he will say, Answer, answer, my child, son of the peasant, with whom hast thou taken up the life of a robber? Hast thou many companions?

"I will answer, tsar, my hope, tsar, very Christian, I will show thee all the truth. Of comrades I had four: the first

[1] *Malte Brun*, VI, 582. [2] *Eclectic, for October*, 1855, 812. [3] *Idem*, 12.

was the dark night, the second was my sharp blade, the third my good horse, the fourth my well strung bow. My messengers were the barbed arrows, hardened at the fire.

"Then the tsar, my hope, the tsar, very Christian, will say to me, 'Honor be to thee, my son, who knowest so well how to steal and how to speak; for thy reward I will make thee a fair present, I will give thee a palace in the middle of the fields, two stakes and a hempen cord.'"

The Russians are generally very superstitious, their superstitions mingling with all their family rejoicings,[1] and religious practices, in the daily habits of private life, and in all situations of an extraordinary character. They believe in sorcery and witchcraft, in the influence of a legion of supernatural beings, and in the virtue of various talismans and conjurations.

Their religious songs are possessed of great interest. In one of them to the book of the dove, the holy gospel, the tsar asks:

"Whence come light, the beautiful sun, and the young moon? Whence come the multitudes of stars, the dark nights, the purple dawns, the rushing winds? Whence comes human reason? From where do our thoughts reach us? Whence come our people, our hard bones, our body, and our blood?"

The book answers:

"The white light comes from God, the beautiful sun from the face of God, the young moon from his bosom, the myriads of stars are his garments, the dark nights are the eyelids of the Lord, the purple dawns are his glances, the strong winds are his breath. Reason comes from Christ, from Christ the tsar of the skies; thoughts come from the clouds of the sky, people from Adam, had bones from stone, the body from soft earth, the blood from the dark sea."

All these and such like songs are recited by poor blind people from door to door; by aged people to their

[1] *Eclectic for October*, 1855, 816.

families assembled round the stove in the long northern winter evenings; by the young men at the festivals; every little circumstance in public or private life affording an opportunity for their use. They are everywhere entwined around the heart of the people.

A strong passion for song prevails among the peasantry,[1] who often join to very fine voices remarkable executive powers. It is not unusual with them to engage in contests for supremacy in this exquisite art, and on such occasions, the power of music, and the secret charm it exerts upon the soul, are most fully displayed.

The Russian women, even in the northern part of Russia, present one anomalous fact in the early period at which they mature. They are marriageable at the age of twelve or thirteen,[2] in this respect almost rivaling India. This premature development, however, is upon much the same principle as that invoked in the case of the hot-house plant, the severe climate being counteracted by keeping them during the winter months in apartments heated by a stove to a vast degree, and then exposing them to the two or three summer months of burning heat. Superadded to this is the use made of the warm or vapor baths. The consequences of this premature development are, that the firmness and elasticity of flesh so essential to constitute beauty are wanting; and also that premature development is necessarily succeeded by premature decay. The charms of youth soon disappear, while the indications of old age are early exhibited. There are, however, some other causes, aside from those just enumerated, which may conduce to this result. The principal of these are the immoderate use of rouge or paint, and the savage treatment they experience from their husbands. In this latter respect the Slavonic present a marked contrast with the Teutonic races. The lower classes of females, more especially, are in Russia, doomed to a life of incessant labor and hardship.

[1] *Eclectic, October*, 1854, 238. [2] *Malte Brun*, VI, 582.

Although they cannot be said to desire beatings and stripes for their own sake, or as special tokens of affection from their husbands, yet one thing seems certain, that when a man ceases to beat his wife it is a sure indication either that he has given her up as incorrigible, or that he has so wholly attached himself to other women as to relinquish all concern about her,[1] and his domestic affairs. The wife of a Russian may, therefore, rest assured that her husband no longer loves her when he refrains from chastising her.

The ceremonies, both of marriage and of burial, have some variety, and undoubtedly differ, to some extent, at different periods of time. In regard to the former it has generally been customary for two families to settle an alliance before the parties have ever seen each other.

Before the match is finally agreed upon, the bride is critically examined by a council of elderly matrons, with the view of discovering whether any bodily defects exist, and if so,[2] to determine if possible and prescribe what will remedy them.[3] The bride on her wedding day is crowned with a garland of wormwood, to imply the bitterness of the married state. When the marriage ceremony by the priest at the altar is concluded, the clerk or sexton sprinkles on her head a handful of hops, expressing, at the same time, a wish that she may prove to be as fruitful as that plant. The custom has been in some places observed for the bridegroom to desire the bride to pull off one of his buskins, informing her that one of them contains a whip, and the other a jewel or a purse of money. She takes her choice. If she finds the purse, she interprets it as a good omen; but if the whip, it is regarded as an unhappy presage, and she immediately receives the lash as a specimen of what she is to expect.

After the decease of a person, the first care is to close the eyes and mouth, and the next is to lay out the body and to wash it with water, after which, the priest is sent for, who prays over the corpse, purifies it with incense, and

[1] *Meiners*, I, 160. [2] *Marriage Rites*, 98, 99. [3] *Malte Brun*, VI, 583.

sprinkles it with holy water until it is consigned to the dust.[1] He writes a passport for heaven, which is signed by the bishop, and if he be absent, by some other dignitary. The paper is put into the bier between the hands of the deceased. The last ceremony is the kiss given by the priests first, and then by the relations and friends; some kissing the body and some the coffin. The lowering of the coffin into the grave is the signal for loud cries and horrid yells. The attendants then return to the house of the deceased and greatly mitigate, or wholly drown, their excessive grief at a great feast, which, by the higher orders, is kept up for some forty days. But during all this period of festivity the priest is delivering prayers over the grave; the dead, it is imagined, being consoled by these exorcisms, are enabled to arrive with less fatigue at the end of their long journey.

In Russia, a dismal lent is succeeded by the great festival of the resurrection. The sudden advent of this festival drowns the fasting and mourning in mirth and amusement. The large bells, for which the Russians seem to have a special passion, and which are the largest and deepest toned in the world, ring out their solemn peal in sounds resembling the rolling of distant thunder, while the brilliant glare of many thousand wax lights, and the dazzling splendor of the clerical costume add to the novelty of the scene. Everywhere joy reigns supreme, and the loud cry of *Christos voskress*, Christ is resuscitated, resounds throughout the empire.

In the Russian costume there is great variety. The peasants in Great Russia, in the winter, wear sheepskins descending to the middle of the leg, with cloth stockings and bark shoes, a round hat in summer, and a fur cap in winter. What would appear singular in so cold a climate, the neck is always bare, but it seems not to be unfavorable to health.

[1] *Malte Brun*, VI, 588.

The dress of women is considerably various, but the most costly ornaments are reserved for the head. A band adorned with pearls, or precious stones of different colors, and resembling a tiara, or open crown, is worn about Novogorod, while the peasant girls in the western provinces wear a fillet studded with paste or mock pearl. A bonnet rising perpendicularly in the form of a crescent, prevails in Oka and the neighborhood of Kasimow. In Little Russia, nets, ribbons and flowers are bound round the head, a chain is suspended from the neck, and red boots are worn upon the feet.

The houses of the peasants are all built on substantially the same plan. The inner court forms an oblong, and is surrounded by sheds, a hay loft being erected at one extremity, with a kitchen garden extending beyond it. The building materials are trees, laid horizontally above each other, the interstices being filled with moss. The family chamber is on the second story, the ascent to which is by a stair or ladder. A fourth part of the room is taken up by a stove.

The furniture is made up principally of wooden wares and earthen pots, a wretched bed or pallet, with many figures of the saints.

The Russian villages are generally composed of one street with houses on each side. Their length is sometimes very considerable. All the houses have the same shelving roofs projecting considerably beyond the body of the house, and the same façade rising in a cone towards the top. The villages belonging to the emperor look much better than those which belong to the nobility.

One remarkable custom of the Russians is deserving of notice, and that is their use of baths. It is customary with the Russians of all ranks to use the steam bath at least once a week. There are no public baths except in cities; but in villages every family have their own small baths, which are constructed at some distance behind their houses, to prevent accidents from fire.

The public baths in cities are situated upon the banks of rivers, from which they receive their supplies of water by means of swing buckets. Each public bath is divided into two partitions, one for the men and boys, the other for the women and girls. The bathing rooms are heated by ovens, the temperature often rising as high as from 104° to 120° of Fahrenheit. The cavities of the ovens are filled with iron balls or stones, which are heated to a red heat, and upon which every five minutes water is thrown in order to fill the bathing room with steam. By this means the temperature is occasionally raised as high as 131°. The bather lies upon an elevated bench some six or seven feet from the floor, and two or three feet from the ceiling, where the steam and heat are most concentrated. There he is soaped and rubbed with bundles of birch twigs with their leaves on. Many persons on quitting the bath plunge into the adjoining river, or even roll in the snow when the thermometer is 10° below zero. How this may be done consistent with health it is hardly possible to determine, unless we suppose that the functions of the system become so intensified in their action through the effect of the heat and friction, that the sudden change to the cold water or snow, is scarcely, if at all, perceptible.

The Russians in their industry have not even yet arrived at the principle of the division of labor.[1] Different arts are exercised by the same individual. In Moscow and other large towns will be found that curiosity, the house market. This is held in a large square in the suburbs, where a variety of materials for building, and houses wholly made of wood, are usually exhibited. The purchaser has only to repair to the spot, examine the quality of the wood, state how many rooms are required, and conclude the bargain. The seller removes and raises the building on the spot designated by the purchaser. Thus a house may be purchased, transported, erected and inhabited all within a single week.

[1] *Malte Brun*, VI, 589.

Such dwellings, however, are not durable, seldom lasting much time, and easily demolished in a few hours. The Russian villages are generally composed of wooden dwellings, and hence when a fire occurs it is very destructive.

Another curiosity in the way of market is that of frozen provisions. Soon after the commencement of winter, the farmers kill their cattle, pigs, and poultry, all which they subject to the freezing process. The same also applies to fish and game. All these frozen carcases are poured into St. Petersburgh. They are brought from the Frozen ocean on the north, and from the borders of the Caspian sea on the south. The great market opens just before the Christmas holidays; it covers several acres of ground, and from the piles of animals, birds and fish, with their several skins, feathers and scales on, presents altogether a most ludicrous appearance. The average price is about thirty per cent cheaper than if killed fresh, and is about equally as good.

Another assemblage sometimes met with in Russia is the village council. This is an assembling together of the elders and inhabitants on certain occasions, such as levying recruits among the young men of the village, regulating the taxes payable to the landlord, and such like matters. The meeting is called the peace meeting, and is held in the high street of the village. The oldest man presides, and is distinguished from the rest by a white wand fresh cut from the hedge, and stripped of its bark. He selects his locus standi close by a new laid cow's dung, and sticks the lower point of his wand into it. Then the council are in readiness for the transaction of business.

The Russians have many amusements. Among these are swings which are made to turn upon a cylinder between two pillars. Eight poles are fixed crossways in the cylinder, between each pair of which is fixed a seat for two persons. These poles are turned round either by men or machinery. Another species of swing is turned round horizontally upon a cylinder which stands upright in the centre. These, to-

gether with booths of strolling players, tumblers, exhibitions of wild beasts, the dress carriages and gay liveries of court, nobility and gentry, form a great part of the amusement of the Easter week.

We have before noticed the strong love for music which animates even the Russian peasantry. There is a curious kind of music, or rather musical instrument, which seems to be peculiar to Russia. This is horn music, and the instrument a horn. It is a perfect living organ, where every pipe or tone is sounded by one man, who cannot produce any other but that one individual tone on his horn. A complete band of horn musicians consists of near forty performers, never less than twenty-five, who sound the completest symphonies of every kind with admirable skill and accuracy.

The Russians have boxing matches, which they perform with large stiff leather mittens. They appear to fight without guarding the body, and aim their blows at random. Not unfrequently a considerable number fight on each side, and it often proves fatal to some one or more of the party.

Another amusement of which the Russians are extremely fond is the horse race. Many keep race horses which they run both on wagers and for pleasure on the ice of the river Neva. A place opposite the imperial palace is railed in for the purposes of these races. It presents a splendid scene, and is attended by crowds of spectators on foot, in coaches, and sledges, more especially on Sundays and holidays.

There is also on Sundays and holidays a village amusement consisting of a dance by the village girls. They appear dressed in their best apparel, in which there is displayed great taste, and amuse themselves and others by joining in a dance much resembling that called thread the needle. No one, however, but the village girls unite in it, and it is always accompanied with singing by every one of the company, as well as by the dancers themselves.

Another kind of exercise in which the men only participate is wrestling. Here, in common with the same thing among other people, the effort is to give their adversary a fall with as much dexterity as they are masters of. The difference in the mode is, that the Russians hold by the sash they constantly wear round their waists.

The swing is also enjoyed in Russia. Generally a lad and lass stand at each end of the swinging board, striving alternately who can give it the highest pitch. The rest of the company sit on the board, and a song encourages and adds to the enjoyment.

The usual dance of the Russians is a mimical representation of courtship. The dancer, by his steps and gestures, appears to court his mistress, who after many windings and turnings, and marks of refusal and disdain, at last relents, and joins with him in a merry dance called the golubetz, which concludes the scene.

Another species of amusement, much enjoyed in Russia, is sliding down ice hills. Villagers, and especially their children, imitate the great towns, by smoothing the declivity of a small hillock, or making an artificial one, and pouring water upon it, to give it a crust of ice, from which they slide down on small wooden sledges.

But in St. Petersburgh the ice hills are built on a magnificent scale. The ice is smoothed very carefully in a straight line about one hundred fathoms long and twenty feet wide. At the end of this sliding place another hill of the same size is built, from which the sliding place runs parallel again with the other. Guides are appointed at each hill, who sit upon small sledges of wood, about eighteen inches long, eight or ten inches broad, and a few inches high, with iron shoes or skates under them on each side. The person desiring to slide sits upon the lap of the guide with his legs close together between those of the guide, who shoves himself forward with his hands to the brink of the precipice, from which he rushes down with great velocity to the end of the sliding place.

Another exercise is jumping on a board. This is usually the amusement of two girls, who balance a board on a few billets or stones, and by degrees suffer themselves to be thrown up to an extraordinary height, by the elasticity and spring of the board. To attain any proficiency requires great courage and skill. It is also not unattended with danger, for were the board to swing horizontally, or the performers not to fall perpendicularly, a broken leg might easily be the result.

The old women in Russia are much respected, and have great confidence reposed in them by the younger ones. All negotiations of marriage in the villages are carried on through their medium, and a young man as soon as his affections have centered in their object applies to one of these, either of his own acquaintance, or one who may be recommended to him by her skill in conducting these delicate affairs. Some of them are much esteemed for their supposed power of divination, and are applied to in all cases of losses to point out the means of repossession. They also act as midwives among the Russian peasantry.

The married women in Russia are easily known by the care they take to hide their hair under the coif or cap which they wear on their heads. The immediate change that takes place on entering the marriage state, in the whole of their exterior, is very striking, for as they marry very young, you often see a giddy young girl of twelve or thirteen, assuming all the serious formality of the steady matron of sixty. They bring up their children with great hardiness, suffering them to be always in the air, and exposed to the severest weather, with no other clothing, perhaps, than a little linen shirt hardly reaching to the knees, and yet slight as this is, such is the force of habit, that they never feel any inconvenience from it. They are hospitable, good managers in their domestic concerns, watchful for their husband's interest, and frugal even to parsimony, yet extremely fond of show and ostentation,

sometimes expending on an entertainment more than would keep them and their families decently for half a year.

The clothing of the common Russians is still the old national dress which is probably best adapted to the exigences of the climate. It consists of a long coat reaching to the calves of the legs, sitting close to the body, with a great number of gathers at the bottom of the waist, and lapping over the bosom. About his middle he ties a sash, in which he tucks his gloves, whip or axe. His neck is entirely bare even in winter, and his lower garment consists of wide linen trowsers. He wears no stockings, but wrapping his feet in linen rags, draws on his boots, which are at times exchanged for shoes of matted linden bark or leather, with neither buckles or ties. The covering of his head is a very deep crowned hat with a narrow brim, which he exchanges in winter for a cap, and his coat for a sheepskin pelisse, which he also girds about him with a sash.

The Russian plough is truly primitive in its character, being little other than a crooked stick with which he merely rakes the surface of the earth. But notwithstanding the rudeness of this, and all his other implements, he generally reaps good harvests, and grows excellent corn and grain.

The mode of living among the Russians particularly in their villages, is that all the family, men, women and children, live together in one room, which serves for their kitchen, dining room and bed-chamber. A broad wooden bench runs along two sides of the room, in the form of a Greek Γ, in the angle of which stands a large wooden table for the family. The opposite corner of the room is occupied by a large oven, in which they cook their victuals. The top of it is flat, and serves in lieu of bedstead for all the family.

Thus we have endeavored to depict some of the peculiarities of home life in Russia. Very much it will be seen still remains to bring them up to the European level of civilization. Long and intimate communication with

the other nations of Europe, aided by the naturally imitative character of the Slavonian mind, will undoubtedly, in the course of time, work great changes in the manners, customs, pastimes, and general society of Russia.

3. Society as it exists among the Turks. The Turks were the latest of all the races that have entered upon the possession of any part of Europe. Their early origin is involved in much obscurity. Those who succeeded in establishing themselves in Europe were termed Osmanli, or Ottoman Turks, from Othman, or Osman, their founder. They belonged originally to the great Turkish family of nations, many of which, at various times, passed over the Oxus into Khorasan, and from thence advanced gradually westward into the countries lying on the western side of the Euphrates and Mount Taurus. Their entrance into Europe was signalized by the taking of Constantinople by Mahomet II in 1453, and the establishment of their dominion upon the ruins of the Greek empire. A little over four centuries have elapsed since these nomades have held dominion on the banks of the Bosphorus, and, by their possession of Constantinople, controlled the gateway between Europe and Asia. This dominion presents, much more effectually than Russia, the introduction of Asia into Europe. The Slavonian races, although Asiatic in their original cast of character, were, nevertheless, so constituted, especially in the higher circles of their court and nobility, as to become gradually the recipients of a European civilization. But the Turks being originally a horde of nomadic wanderers, professing the Mahometan religion, and with manners, customs, and everything of the social character, quite unlike, if not entirely the reverse, of everything European, have found all assimilation to European manners, customs, and social forms, extremely difficult, if not utterly impossible. Hence, perhaps, the Turkish can be hardly considered as constituting an element in European society, and yet it may be interesting, if for no other purpose than

by way of contrast, to bring these last intruders into Europe very briefly under review.

And here the first obvious remark is that the doctrine of contraries which we shall find so generally to prevail, is evidenced even in their political relations with the other powers of Europe. On their first advent, and for several generations succeeding the establishment of their dominion in Europe, those powers strongly desired, and as far as possible exerted themselves to dislodge them from Europe, and send them back into Asia. But for several generations past, the idea has been constantly gaining strength, that the mutual jealousy and rivalry between Great Britain and Russia has been such that the other European powers have felt the political necessity of continuing the Turks in Europe, in order to preserve the peace of the continent. The moment the balance of power was endangered or destroyed by the fall of the crescent and expulsion of the Turks, that moment would commence the contest between Great Britian and Russia, for the dominion of the Bosphorus and Black sea, which would not probably cease within a long period of years.

The Turk, in his exterior, bears little resemblance to the Mongol, but differs little from other Tartar nations except in a nearer assimilation to the Indo-European races. They are described as a large, well formed, robust, fine looking race of men, seldom below middle size, with lofty foreheads, dark eyes, often a noble physiognomy, a tawny complexion, with black or dark brown hair. Not unfrequently the Arab, Grecian, Persian and Circassian blood may flow in the veins of an Ottoman, and to this crossing of races and mingling of bloods may be largely attributed the fine physical forms so frequently met in Turkey.

The delightful climate, and the richness of the soil, make slight demands upon labor for the supply of the necessaries, and many of the luxuries of life. The Turk is no plodding laborer. His house is built with small reference to the rules of architecture; his gardens laid out without order

or taste; and his furniture simple, and adapted rather to the habits of a vagrant people, than to the usages of settled life. In their meals they are extremely frugal; their food consisting principally of rice, which they dress in a variety of ways. Their principal drink is coffee, of which they consume large quantities. Their religion wisely prohibits the use of wine or strong drink, but this injunction, although exercising considerable influence, is not strictly obeyed.

The dress of the Turks is remarkably free from ligatures. They confine neither the neck nor waist, wrist, knees or feet. The garments they wear are loose and flowing. Although they may prove an encumbrance in quick motion, yet they sit easily and gracefully upon them when walking with their usual gravity, or reclining on the sofa or divan. The lower parts of the body are covered with wide drawers, or trowsers. On the upper parts is worn a a kind of wide vest bound with a sash, and over all a long flowing gown. Slippers, instead of shoes, cover the feet, and on the head is very uniformly worn a turban.

The female dress, like that of the men, consists of long, loose flowing robes, differing not materially from it in form. Instead of the turban, the head is very often covered with a stiff kind of cap. Another indispensable part of a female dress when she appears abroad is a veil, which operates as a complete disguise.

The art of bathing has attained great perfection in Turkey. The public baths are elegant and noble structures, built with hewn stones, having in them several apartments, the entrance being a spacious and lofty hall, round the sides of which are high and broad benches, on which are arranged mattrasses and cushions. The inner chambers are capacious, and paved with slabs of the rarest and most beautiful marble. In these rooms the body and limbs are thoroughly cleansed by means of friction with a horse hair bag, and washed and rubbed with a lather of perfumed soap. Those describing the luxuries of an oriental bath,

say that a very comfortable sensation is communicated during the continuance in the heated rooms, and that it is heightened into luxury when the bather reposes himself on a couch after the ablution. This species of delicious repose, however, has many charms for a Turk and an oriental, which a European would fail to appreciate. The latter delights in action, while to the former every custom invites to repose, and every object inspires an indolent voluptuousness. Their earthly paradise is well nigh being attained, when they can recline on soft verdure beneath the shade of trees, musing without any fixedness of attention, lulled into a half unconscious state by the tinkling of a fountain or the murmuring of a rivulet, at the same time inhaling lazily through their pipe a gentle inebriating vapor. The Turk derives a positive pleasure from the abandonment of his organization to those physical influences which in that mild climate and delightful atmosphere, are naturally exerted upon it.

Besides the bathing, the Turks make frequent ablutions. Their religion imposes upon them the necessity of washing their arms, legs and necks from three to five times a day in cold water. This is done generally at the fountains before the mosques, and by this means they protect themselves against catarrhal affections.[1] By their frequent use of the bath, cold and vapor, they also escape many disorders. The formidable diseases of gout, rheumatism, head-ache, and consumption are unknown in Turkey.

Smoking is a luxury in which the Turks almost uniformly indulge themselves. It is a custom, all but universal, even in the Turkish harem. The length of the pipe, according to the dignity of the smoker, is often six or seven feet, being sometimes carried by two servants, the bowl being supported by wheels.

To enjoy inebriation without having recourse to liquors, which their religion prohibits, they resort to opium. This

[1] I, 174.

is not in as extensive use now as formerly. The object of it is to excite the imagination, to act vividly in the creation of pleasing images. In all the large cities of Turkey coffee houses are constantly open, where may be at any time procured both coffee and opium.

In a Turkish house there are no chambers exclusively appropriated as bed-rooms. Every room in it serves for every purpose, and the furniture in all differs only in fineness of quality or richness of ornament. The sofa or divan extends around three sides of the chamber, on a frame raised a few inches from the floor. The use of chairs and tables is almost unknown.

The dinner is served up on a large circular tray of copper placed on a low stool at a corner of the sofa, around which the guests are arranged sitting cross-legged. Instead of a table cloth a long napkin is spread over the knees of the guests. They make no use of plates, nor even of knives and forks. The chief of the family serves himself with the fingers of his right hand, and invites the company to follow his example.

The Turk is in almost all things the antipode of the Frank, the term which in Turkey designates a European. He has also many seeming contradictions with himself. He is fond of riding, and has no roads, and of visiting his friends in state, but has no carriage. His streets are neither named nor numbered. Having few formalities he is quick in business, although slow in his movements. He veils and imprisons his wives, and yet on certain occasions allows them to go where they please unaccompanied.

In Turkey, superiors salute inferiors. When a present is given, instead of the receiver thanking the giver, the giver thanks the receiver. A guest invited to dinner is thanked for coming. While the Frank uncovers his head as a mark of respect, the Turk, for a similar manifestation,[1] takes off his shoes. In speech he uses few words, seldom

[1] *Eclectic, August*, 1856, 457.

exaggerating, but he delights in listening to long stories, and the most improbable freaks of the imagination. As he is a firm believer in fate and destiny, he suffers evils uncomplainingly. He has a great contempt for ancestry, and yet surrenders his life up cheerfully at the demand of the sultan, who is regarded as the descendant of the prophet.

The following curious practical differences have been noticed. The Turkish barber pushes the razor from him in shaving; the Frank draws it to him. The Turkish carpenter draws the saw to him, for all the teeth are set in; the Frank pushes it from him, for all the teeth are set out. The Turkish mason sits while he lays the stones; the Frank always stands. The Turkish scribe writes on his hand from right to left; the Frank on a desk or table from left to right. The Frank begins at the bottom of a frame house and finishes to the top; The Turk at the top and finishes to the bottom. The Frank wife often brings a dowry to her husband; the Turkish husband pays a sum of money to her parents for his wife.

Marriage with the Turks is viewed in the light of a civil contract. It states with great particularity the dowry to be settled on the wife in case she survived her husband or be divorced. If she brings any property it also states that which at her death or separation must be fully restored. The parties rarely see each other until the contract is completed. The wedding lasts four days, from Monday morning until the evening of Thursday. The wedding festivities in the houses of both parents are kept up by the men and women separate.[1] They consist principally in banquets, the intervals being filled up with coffee, sherbet, confectionery, perfumes, and pipes. A grave hilarity presides over these meetings, which are enlivened at times by bands of jugglers and story-tellers. The ceremonies on each one of the four days are different. At their conclusion

[1] *Eclectic for November*, 1855, 973.

the husband is at liberty to lift the mysterious veil, and the parties, probably for the first time, behold each other.

Polygamy is practiced among the Turks. The laws of Mahomet allow a man to have four wives, and as many concubines as he can afford to maintain. Practically, however, examples of polygamy are quite uncommon. The Turk has no money-making genius, and this is too expensive a luxury. The law obliges the man who marries several wives to give each a separate apartment with every thing proportioned to his means,[1] and also to the family of his wife. He must also separately endow each, and keep up separate establishments throughout, as to suites of apartments, furniture, servants, etc. It is, therefore, only the great and wealthy who can think of enjoying so great a luxury.

The wife is bound to pay to the husband implicit obedience, to remain standing in his presence, and to serve him at table. But in return she enjoys a sovereign rule in the harem. She there has the management of the household, brings up the children, and superintends the servants and slaves.

The married women in Turkey lead very monotonous lives within the harem, arising from the difficulty of filling up their leisure hours. They do not read, are poor musicians, and have little inclination for needle-work. Their time is principally spent in dressing, bathing, visiting, and playing at school girl's games.

The Turk through the day conducts himself with great gravity in all his movements. Slow, solemn, taciturn, he appears in all things a man of destiny. With stolid indifference he awaits the occurring of events, and then, whatever their character, renders praise to Alla. But when he returns to his harem at the close of the day, he throws off his deep-toned solemnity. The orgies of the evening in most harems are conducted with all the levity of licentious-

[1] *Eclectic, November*, 1855, 972.

ness, and the gravity of the Moslems totally disappears; their roars of laughter are to be heard in the adjoining houses.[1] So far is this carried that in the opinion of some the gravity of the Turk during the day is only the exhaustion of his spirits from previous excitement.

II. *Society as it existed in the Middle Ages, and under the Feudal System.*

We have taken a rapid glance at the Teutonic nations in their primitive seats, and the manners and customs by which they were distinguished. In their migrations and settlements in the more western and southern provinces wrested from the Roman empire at least three effects followed having a bearing upon domestic life and manners. These were:

1. The intermixtures that occurred between the new invading races, and the original population which had for long periods of time filled the provinces. That old population, although far more refined and highly civilized, so far as related to matters of intellect and of taste, were nevertheless depraved in morals, having a blunted or vitiated conscientiousness, seeking after physical pleasures and enjoyments without much regard to the means by which they were to be secured. A disregard of right, annihilation of female virtue, and the exercise of refined cruelty, often marked their course of conduct. These could not but exercise a corrupting influence upon the less refined but, in some respects, more virtuous barbarians, inferior as they most palpably were to the conquered in all the arts of life.

2. The conversion of these races to the Christian religion. Although the change from paganism to Christianity worked its effect upon several of the great elements of character, yet the identity of the individual, psychological as well as physical, was preserved; and hence the roughness,

[1] *Bell's Geography*, II, 507.

harshness, warlike tendencies, propensity to action and enjoyment, which had previously so marked the character still continued to exert their influence. Peculiar individual idiosyncrasies still remained in full force. When the heart of Clovis, the founder of the Frank or French kingdom, was warmed up by the story of the cross and the crucifixion, it was only a characteristic outburst when he said "Had I been there with my valiant Franks we should have been amply avenged." Notwithstanding, therefore, the work of grace upon the heart, there was undoubtedly much of harshness and severity, much even of violence and disorder, during the dark ages. Still the influence of religion was undoubtedly restraining and salutary.

3. The change in occupation that occurred on the settlement in the Roman provinces. Previous to that, as we have already seen, the German nations were made up of tribes dwelling in dense forests, and subsisting mainly upon the products of hunting and fishing, together with what they derived from their flocks and herds. The cultivation of the earth was accounted disgraceful, and entirely unworthy of freemen. To such belonged the higher, more exciting and glorious occupations of the chase and of war. The more ignoble pursuits of common industry were assigned to women, to children, and to the aged.

But when the soil of the Roman provinces came to be parceled out among the invading tribes, and individuals became the owners of landed property, the pursuits of agriculture assumed an importance until then unknown. They found already a high state of cultivation in the provinces, and to take possession of cultivated farms, without continuing to cultivate them, seemed to be unreasonable and inexpedient. Hence men began to turn their attention more and more to agricultural pursuits and to cultivate the lands they had conquered and were obliged to defend. The occupations of the men in pushing forward the pursuits of agriculture, in undertaking the various labors of the field, naturally led to confiding to women the

superintendence of all their domestic concerns, and the education of their children. To them belonged the economy of the fireside, and the performance of all those domestic duties, which resulted in rendering the wife and mother the centre of so many interesting relations.

This change in the industrial habits and pursuits of the people led, of course, to changes in manners and customs, forms of intercourse, and modes of life. These, however, were all modified by the introduction and action of a new system to which the exigences of the times gave birth, and which has exerted no small amount of influence upon all subsequent history. This was the feudal system, which, in its bearings upon the element of government, has already been considered. But its bearings on society still remain for our consideration.

In order to understand properly the foundations from which the society of western and southern Europe took its rise it should be remembered that, prior to the conquest, the great proprietors of the Gallo-Roman population lived either in cities, or in beautiful and expensive houses in the neighborhood of cities,[1] or in rich plains upon the banks of rivers. In the country districts were dispersed the villæ, which were great buildings serving for the improvement of estates, and also for the dwelling of the laborers or serfs, who cultivated them.

All these were inviting prizes for the conquering German. He had emerged from his native forests, and the wonderful products of civilization filled him with astonishment, and animated him with the wish to become their possessor. He accordingly established himself in the habitations of the old Roman proprietors, whether in the cities, or in the villæ in the country. The latter were undoubtedly more agreeable, as they were more in conformity with his previous habits.[2] Accordingly the villæ continued to remain almost the same after, as before, the

[1] *Guizot*, III, 398. [2] *Idem*, 398.

barbarian invasion. They were so many centres of improvement and habitation of great domains. They presented the singular fact of buildings scattered throughout the country districts, where Germans and Romans, conquerors and conquered, masters, free men, laborers and slaves all lived together.

But notwithstanding this continued uniformity in appearance, causes were in operation which in time wrought great changes. Nothing was permanent or stable. New invasions succeeded. Those behind continued to press onward, and coveted as much the products of civilization as their predecessors. Hence violence, disorder, pillage, and bloodshed, kept on their course with little, if any, interruption.

This compelled the first invaders to resort to the arts of defense. These were rendered necessary more as a protection against new invaders than the original inhabitants. The villæ, therefore, ceased to present its former peaceful aspect. It presented the insignia of war. It became girded by moats and ramparts, and the appearances of defense and of fortification everywhere presented themselves.

Another result followed. The universal prevalence of disorders, and the constant necessity of facing dangers, led to a searching out of places of strength and security. The plains, readily accessible to invaders, were, in many instances, abandoned,[1] while a more secure refuge was sought in the heights and in places which were very difficult of access. These were surrounded by fortifications, in order to secure a more complete protection.

Thus the heights, and places of difficult access, more and more bristled with castles, whose turrets, and ramparts, and moats, and drawbridges, with other means of defense, were fast overspreading the land, after the reign of Charlemagne and during the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

[1] *Guizot*, III, 399.

Beneath, and around, lay the feudal village, protected by the castle, but composed of a very different order of people. We have already seen the political relations established between the two, and the nature of the political bond connecting the suzerain with his vassal. But the political was the only bond that bound the one to the other. In society they were almost as widely separated from each other, as if the castle and feudal village had been located on different planets.

Thus the castle, although surrounded with different forms of life, was, nevertheless, in a state of social isolation. No foot ever pressed its draw-bridge to cross its moat except upon the performance of a great number of formalities, that were deemed necessary to insure its safety. Notwithstanding this state of isolation in which the castle existed, we must enter it and inquire into the social life which is led there.

The first thing that strikes us upon our entrance is the little there is to do within.[1] Its lordly possessor has no round of duties to perform, no regular occupations, nothing affording permanent employment. His fields were improved by his vassals, and hence nothing of an agricultural nature could occupy his attention. He could hunt as a pastime, but no necessity was imposed upon him to hunt as a means of living. No industrial pursuit of any kind pressed upon him. Neither was he subjected to any political activity. Lord only of a small domain, he was comparatively a king without subjects, a sovereign without strength; and yet possessed of tendencies to action intensified by the peculiarities of his circumstances and situation.

A being thus constituted could not be expected to find in mere domestic life all that the cravings of his more active nature demanded. Hence he spent much of his time abroad in search of adventures. Something of ro-

[1] *Guizot*, III, 407, 408.

mance mingled itself with scenes and events around which lingered many a stern reality. It is to this that much of the tangled webb of history, during this era, owes its origin, interest, and importance. Robbery, rapine, violence, bloodshed, in all their various forms, attest the pressure of those fierce and ever restless activities, that finally found their culminating point in the Crusades, precipitating Europe upon Asia in several successive ill-directed but terrible invasions.

And yet the feudal chieftain, however given to violence, however earnestly seeking after adventures, could not abandon his castle, his home. Thither he was forced to return, if for no other purpose, for that of defending it. The more he waged warfare against others, the stronger the necessity imposed upon him to defend his own. His castle once taken his empire was overturned, and himself sent abroad a wanderer.

Certain home necessities, therefore, grew out of its own temporary abandonments, but we should undoubtedly do the feudal chieftain great injustice by denying to other causes their reasonable share of influence. The roughness of his nature, as evidenced by its outward manifestations, was not always steeled against those inward feelings which claim and will find in every human bosom a lodgment and a power.

His castle was not alone a thing to be defended, thus linking him with the warfares of his age. It was not alone his resort in times of peril. It was over, and beyond all these a home; where the treasures of his heart were garnered up; where his wife and children were ever ready to welcome his return, to rejoice in his triumphs, to share in his perils, to soothe him in times of trouble, and, by their social qualities, and ever ready appliances, to renovate, refit, and restore him to scenes in which he delighted to participate. Society during that period which was strictly feudal, was limited almost to the domestic circle; the greater the limitation, the more intense

the action of the social affections upon their respective objects. It results from all this, that we find amid the disturbances, perils, and desolations that characterized the feudal period and the sources from which are derived the development of that simple element, so important in the formation of society, the family. The suzerain could not regard his vassals as socially his equals. This was rendered impossible by their political relations. But his wife and children presented higher claims. They were not his vassals, owed him no fealty, were so many parts of himself. They were socially his equals, and that sense of social equal ity produced its animating and elevating effect upon the wife and children, and thus, in its turn, rendered them more worthy that equality.

Another general fact is also worthy an attentive consideration. In the absence of the suzerain from his castle in his huntings, wars, and search after adventures, the wife was naturally, and almost necessarily, his representative. To her belonged its defense if besieged in his absence. Its safety until his return rested upon her discretion and valor. Whatever of action was required to be done during his absence devolved upon her. She stood in his place, and acted in his stead. The exigences of such a position, and the necessity of being called upon to act under such circumstances, not only exercised a powerful effect in developing the mind of woman, but also served to elevate her in the estimation of the sterner sex. Equality was much more readily conceded where the pressure of equal duties was felt, and at times actually experienced.

Another fact of importance has its bearing upon the children. Here was a fief, an inheritance to descend. This required an heir, or heirs; and the feudal policy determined that the first-born should inherit. This right of inheritance embraced not only the property, but along with it the political power which was incidental to it, and which properly constituted feudalism. Where the rights of property and of sovereignty were to become united in the same

heir, it was important that his education and training should be such as to fit him for the judicious exercise of such high powers. Hence that other element of a family besides the wife, viz: children, especially the first-born son, grew in importance and came to demand a large share of attention. This brought with it a strong feeling for posterity; a desire to render the coming generation competent to fulfill the trusts which the course of events would inevitably devolve upon it.

The most important customs, peculiarly constituting the feudal system, have already had their consideration under the element of government. As we there found that system to be the matrix in which originated, and in some degree, were shaped those struggling forces, that subsequently achieved their enfranchisement, and became the fundamental animating principles in the different governments of Europe, so we find it here, also, performing the same important function in presenting to the European world that nucleus around which all society gathers, that element so essential to its existence in any, and all its forms, the family. We shall have occasion, presently, to consider some peculiar institutions, the outgrowths of the feudal system, which have exercised a great and permanent influence upon society; but, before proceeding to their consideration, we will notice some of the social results which have flowed from the operation of that system.

One of these was to give the land owner a superior social position to that occupied by men equally rich in other kinds of property. This naturally arose from the fact that land was the only species of property originally that conferred upon its owner political power. Hence the deep rooted prejudice in the minds of men all over western Europe, of the comparatively greater value and importance of the landed interest. With that interest, nobility, the offspring of feudalism, allied itself, and hence rank has stepped in to add to its importance, and to surround it with greater attractions. The merchant, or even the

professional man, although possessed of vastly more wealth than the landed proprietor, could never attain the political or social position of the latter. That alone, of all the different species of property, down to the present time, has continued to send its representatives to constitute a co-ordinate branch of the British parliament.

Another result intimately connected with that last mentioned, is to be found in the origin given by it to the nobility or privileged classes. These are the direct and natural outgrowth of the feudal system. That system by giving origin to special privileges, such as were not, and could not, be enjoyed by the common people; and superadding to that their perpetuation by descent in the families in which they were enjoyed, easily and naturally led to the establishment of the nobility. The feudal suzerain of the tenth and eleventh centuries, exercising his baronial powers, partly political, partly proprietary, over the vassals of his fief, became easily metamorphosed into the noble of the fifteenth and subsequent centuries, retaining all his proprietary rights, but yielding up his political to the stronger demand for a more centralized form of government. In exchange, however, for this loss of political power he acquired a social position and standing, which, in connection with an advancing civilization, was a more than compensation.

Some of the social peculiarities attending the nobility are among the legitimate outgrowths of the feudal system. One of these has been already alluded to, the perpetuation of landed estates, and the privileges thereby conferred. Another is to be found in the greater warlike propensities and proclivities of the nobles. They were naturally the foremost in all military enterprises. Their education partook of a military character. The arts of peace, especially in the early ages of their existence, were held in little estimation by them. Mercantile occupations were everywhere, except in England, regarded as unbecoming a gentleman; and even there men of rank have seldom

ever engaged in them. When an old French noble desired to embark in trade to make money, he gave up his sword, the emblem of his nobility, until he laid aside the merchant to resume again the noble.[1] So far has this been carried that in some countries, lawyers, and in many, physicians, are not, at the present day, admitted into the highest society; nor were they formerly in England except in particular cases.

The class of nobles throughout almost all Europe, in virtue of their special privileges and exemptions, of their somewhat peculiar proprietary rights, of their remnants, in many, of political power, of their habits of association with each other and the exclusion from their society of the common people have formed a species of caste, although not with lines of demarkation so strongly and so exclusively drawn as in the eastern countries. Still, so far as society is concerned, it has not fallen very far short of it.

Another result is in the sentiment, veneration for the past, which was a proper outgrowth of the feudal system. This has had no small influence upon European civilization. Antiquity of family; the possession of ancient castles; old and well settled customs and usages; even ideas and notions that had floated down from generation to generation, until they became, in a manner, fixed in the minds of men; all acquired that sacred and venerable character that secured for them the highest amount of consideration. All these served as links to connect the present with the past and the future, and so to bind the future to the past as to prevent the race from becoming too progressive, and to insure to it an unfailing identity.

This, it is true, had its evils. It often hallowed abuses, and consecrated customs, usages and ideas, which the advancing spirit of the age had outgrown. It became a great conservative principle, which, as far as its influence was felt, operated to resist all change, to destroy all progress, and

[1] *Brougham*, 319.

to tie Europe down to a changeless, moveless, statu quo. This feature of conservatism in all the elements of civilization, and especially the social, has greatly affected the destiny of Europe, and presented a great point of distinction between the peoples of the old and the new world. And yet, although adverse to progress, its operation has, undoubtedly, been beneficial. It has kept back a too rapid advancement; prevented frequent and premature changes, and held the hearts and minds of men firmly fixed in willing loyalty to social customs and habits, processes of activity, and even to methods of thought and modes of development, until all the principles involved had been fully brought out, thoroughly tested, and all the possible applications of them made. Thus, although the race may not have ran so fast, or developed so much within a given period of time, yet it has been constantly acquiring strength in its progress, and thus preparing itself for a longer and a stronger run, and a more full and perfect development of all the principles that are embraced in the elements of its civilization.

Another result is the sense or feeling of superiority possessed by the privileged class, and of inferiority by the lower classes. This has probably worked greater effects in the social than in any other element. It was another necessary outgrowth of the feudal system. Such a sense, or feeling could not but originate in the privileges and exemptions of the one, and the exclusion of the other. This worked both a bad and a good effect in society. The bad was the habit it engendered of looking up to rank and station; of confounding them with merit; of being overawed in the presence of nobles; and of being led to regard them as a superior race of men.[1] On the one hand it produced meanness, subserviency, and timidity. On the other, pride, insolence, and arrogance. "Persons of rank regarded all beneath them as of an inferior nature; while persons of

[1] *Brougham*, 317.

none looked up to their superiors as more than ordinary mortals." These feelings have penetrated and pervaded, more or less thoroughly, all ranks and grades of society in Europe; and everywhere worked out their legitimate results, which have been antisocial, inharmonious, and, in the highest degree, prejudicial.

The other, and good effect, is found in the fact that it did produce a considerable influence in softening the manners of the age. Despotic governments are marked by great politeness and refinement of manners.[1] Where fear pervades all hearts and minds, habits of restraint are easily acquired, and the rougher exhibitions of human nature are not suffered to exhibit themselves. In the circles first of the feudal lord, and of the subsequent noble, all were under the influence of some restraint, and hence the softening of manners and the originating among the common people of customs and usages less gross and revolting.

Another result, or outgrowth of the feudal system, is to be found in the habits of fidelity which were formed under it. "The relation of lord and vassal taught to the one party the duty of protecting the weak, and to the other that of repaying protection with allegiance."[2] In the previous history of the world not only had been manifested cruelty and oppression, but also treachery, frequently in its most repulsive forms. In grand contrast with all previous forms of government, the feudal system rested its very existence upon the exercise of good faith between man and man. The feudal lord imposed upon himself the duty of protection, and the vassal that of obedience. The one was the condition of the other, and good faith the essential bond of both. To this principle, thus implanted, we undoubtedly stand largely indebted for the elevated tone of moral feeling in modern times, which has operated to refine the sentiments of men and to implant in them a strong sense of personal honor. This also, together with the warlike ten-

[1] *Brougham*, 321. [2] *Idem*, 324.

dencies of the age, the disorders of the times, the protection of the weak against the strong, and the feeling of gallantry that began to actuate the stronger sex, gave birth to the institution of chivalry, and to the manners and customs of that peculiar age.

III. *Society as it existed in the Age of Chivalry.*

The curious institution of chivalry has been reserved to this time and place because it belongs more strictly to society than to any other element. In its origin, however, it had little to do with anything merely social. It was an outgrowth from early Teutonic customs, modified by the feudal system.

The early customs of the German nations forbade any one to bear arms unless duly admitted to that privilege. As the road to honor lay only through the use of arms, such use was considered too important a privilege to be left to chance or the choice of the individual himself. The mode of admission was to assemble the council of the district to which the candidate belonged. His age and qualifications were then inquired into, and the council decided upon the application.[1] If the decision was in favor of his admission to the privileges of a soldier or chieftain, the father, or some one of his kindred adorned him with the shield and the lance. This act was equivalent to a removal from mere domestic concerns, the offices of the family and a dedication of him to the public. Henceforth, he belonged to his tribe, and could participate in its wars, its customs and its pastimes. In this simple ceremony is discovered much of what subsequently constituted the feudal investiture.

In confirmation of this, it is worthy of remark that the institution itself in its perfection, and all its glory and extravagances, existed only among the German tribes, or

[1] *Stuart*, 47.

those in which they so largely mingled as to impregnate them with the Teutonic spirit. In Italy, for example, where a different civilization already prevailed, modifying essentially that spirit when it was introduced, chivalry was never fully developed. It had, however, a large theatre upon which it displayed itself with varying degrees of power. Germany, the Scandinavian nations, England, France and Spain, all witnessed its exhibitions and felt its effects.

The more direct and immediate origin of chivalry may probably be traced to the feudal system. That system we have seen to be one of isolation, at least in its origin. The castle sat frowning upon its solitary crag with few immates except the family, the wife and children of the suzerain. The more wealthy of that class, those having large domains, soon became desirous of making the castle the home of a more extended society, and of one too whose tastes were more in harmony with their own. Hence the habit of having constantly about them numbers of retainers, whose relations with the suzerain were more social than feudal. These were made up very generally of ambitious young men, often the sons of their vassals, who were always ready for the feast and festival, and also to do and dare whatever their superior chose to direct. The vassal, it is true, owed his military services to his suzerain when called upon, but the necessity of devotion to agriculture soon made him a better farmer than soldier, the cultivation of excellence in each being in the inverse ratio to each other. That change was progressing in society which by slow but sure degrees separates from each other the great departments of human effort, making the farmer and the soldier two distinct beings. The one cultivated his farm, the other frequented the castle.

Arriving at the end of the tenth, or the middle of the eleventh century, we find the castle of the great suzerains the home of quite a busy population. A little court there sits and dispenses justice. A train of officers there present themselves. The count of the palace, the seneschal, the mar-

shal, the cup-bearers,[1] chamberlains, butlers, porters, falconers, etc., were borrowed from the empire; and in addition there were pages, varlets, grooms, and squires of the body, the chamber, the stable, the pantry, etc., all offices of newer creation. These offices were most of them given in fief, like lands, thus carrying the feudal principle into the very bosom of domestic life. This implies, of course, that those upon whom they are bestowed are freemen, otherwise there would be no power to consent to receive the fiefs and undertake to perform the conditions upon which they were bestowed. The sons of their vassals were those who were the more generally the recipients of these gifts. By these means the large landed proprietors, ecclesiastics as well as laymen, surrounded themselves with a numerous train.

This originated the same contest in the bosom of the castle as we have seen going on in the feudal village, without, viz: that in relation to inheritance, the son claiming by inheritance the office of the father, and the suzerain insisting that it was simply a life estate. The result was that although in some few cases they became hereditary, yet the instances are of much more unfrequent occurrence than in the case of landed fiefs.

The result of all these facts was, that, the castle becoming the theatre of so many attractions, it became a very desirable object for the more ambitious sons of the vassals to become its inmates, and to hold its offices. A new tie was thus created between the suzerain and the vassal, and this was of a continuance corresponding with that of the new relations that had grown up between the former and the son of the latter.

Having shown in what manner the castle naturally became the resort of ambitious young men desirous of devoting themselves to the interests of its proprietor, and to carve out their own fortunes through his influence, nothing now remained but the resuscitation of an old German

[1] *Guizot*, IV, 11.

usage to produce in its original form, the knight of chivalry. That was the custom before alluded to, of admitting the young man to the privilege of bearing arms. This custom followed the German, and was perpetuated upon the Roman territory after the invasion. An illustrious instance of this occurred at Ratisbon, in 791, when Charlemagne solemnly (in the language of the old chronicler), girt the sword about his son Louis le Debonaire; and another in 838 when the latter conferred the same honor,[1] with the same solemnity, upon his son Charles le Chauve. In the eleventh century, in the feudal castle, when the son of the lord arrived at the age of manhood, the same ceremony was performed. The sword was girded on, and the son declared admitted to the rank of warrior.

Nor was it upon the son of the suzerain alone that this honor was conferred. The sons of his vassals who were the frequenters of the castle, enjoying its privileges, and perhaps holding its offices, were also eligible to the same distinction. The ceremony was performed in the court of the castle, which in this respect replaced the council of the district.

The result of this ceremony was the same as among the ancient Germans. By delivering to the aspirant the arms and titles of the warlike life, it was an admission to the rank and honors of warriors.

All this, it is true, creates no strictly feudal tie between the suzerain and the recipient of the privilege. No obligation of protection on the one hand, or of obedience on the other, flows from it. And yet the suzerain, in arming a young man knight, accepted him, in a manner, for his man,[2] and declared that he should one day be his vassal. It was like an investiture given in advance, anticipating, in the future, the creation of feudal homage.

Thus we have the origin of chivalry, but it was only the origin. We have the admission to the rank of warrior, but only to a general, not a special one. It required other

[1] *Guizot*, IV, 16. [2] *Idem*, 17.

influences, feelings and facts, to develop fully this peculiar institution.

It owed its origin entirely to the military spirit; but, once in existence, "religion and imagination, the church and poetry, took possession of it, and made it a powerful means of attaining the ends which they pursued, and of fulfilling the moral needs which it was their mission to satisfy." Society also came in with its claim, and demanded the employment of its agency, in the advancement of itself. Thus chivalry, fully developed, will be found to embrace the following elements of character: 1. The warlike spirit. 2. A lofty devotion to the female sex. 3. An undefinable thirst for glory, connected with feudal independence. 4. Elevation above the drudgery of daily toil. 5. An uniformity of character and purpose inspired by the influence of a common religion. From the great importance possessed by these elements of character, it is obvious that the education of the future knight could not well be neglected.

One of the great beauties of chivalry was its accessibility. Every descendant of a gentleman, every free born person, could bear arms and aspire to knighthood; but a train of services was required to fit him for acting in that capacity. From an early period in his life, he was an inmate of the castle, and an attendant upon the court of his lord. Here he was supposed to learn all the knightly virtues: "The emulation of his equals, the example and admonitions of his chief, and the company of the ladies, from whose number he was to select the accomplished fair one, to whom he was to ascribe all his sentiments and his actions, inflamed in him the passion for war, infused into his mind a zeal for religion, and instructed him in all the arts of a respectful gallantry."[1] From performing domestic duties, he was called to the management of horses and of armor.

[1] *Stuart*, 57.

The character, or station, which preceded knighthood, was that of armor bearer.[1] The candidate for chivalry had formerly been a page or valet; but these terms were not then, as now, expressive of meanness and low condition.

The age of knighthood probably varied with the nature and weight of the arms which were in use at different periods. That of twenty-one years has in general been fixed upon, but it admitted of easy departure, in favor of signal merit or high birth. The novitiate commenced in the seventh year; an early period to direct attention to the art of war, the mistress, or catechism.

When the time of knighting arrived, the candidate was first bathed, as a symbol of purification. He was then clothed: 1st. In a white tunic, a symbol of purity. 2d. In a red robe, a symbol of the blood he was bound to shed in the service of the faith.[2] 3d. In a saga, or close black coat, a symbol of the death which awaited him in common with all men.

The next act was to observe a rigorous fast for twenty-four hours, then to pass the night in prayers in a church. The day following, was his confession, absolution, and the administration to him of the eucharist. Then approaching the altar, he placed his sword upon it, which the priest returned to him with his benedictions.

Next followed the knightly equipments, with which he was armed. These were:[3] 1. The spurs. 2. The hauberk, or coat of mail. 3. The cuirass. 4. The vambraces and gauntlets. 5. The sword.

Thus equipped, the lord or superior, gave him the accolade, that is, three blows with the flat of the sword on his shoulder or nape of the neck, by which he was dubbed a knight. His helmet and horse were then brought to him, and those, together with his lance, furnished his complete equipment.

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[1] *Stuart*, 299. [2] *Guizot*, IV, 20. [3] *Idem*, 21.

Before entering the career of knighthood several oaths were to be taken. Among these were the oath: To fear, revere, and serve God, and the sovereign prince. To maintain the just right of the weak. To obey the orders of their generals, and captains, and to observe the honor, rank, and order of their companions. To keep faith inviolably with all the world, and particularly with their companions. To love, honor, and succor each other. To serve, protect, and save, from all danger and insult, a lady or maiden. To be faithful, courteous, humble, and never fail in their word, for any ill or loss that might thence happen to them.

The true knight who lived up to his oaths and undertakings, was a character held in great estimation. He was in the enjoyment of very special privileges. He was admitted to the company and tables of the nobles and sovereign.[1] He could surpass others in the richness of his dress and arms, being permitted to wear fur, gold, and silk. He was distinguished in his own order by his ensigns, armorial, and the peculiarities of his blazonry. He enjoyed certain privileges in hunting; neither his horse nor armor could be taken in executions for debt; the courts, in his favor, awarded fines beyond the usual proportion to compensate his wrongs; and, when taken prisoner, his rank preserved him from unworthy or ignominious treatment. Presents and pensions awarded his prowess. He was enriched both by the spoils of the enemy, and by the ransoms of his captives. His usual appearance was on horse-back, attended by his squire; and if he could afford it, he could have knights in his train, using a banner or a standard like the barons. As the chief strength of armies consisted, at this time, of cavalry, the skillful management of a horse was one of the great accomplishments of a knight or warrior.

Although the knight was bound to defend the state and advance the reputation of his chief, yet the praise of his

[1] *Stuart*, 59.

mistress was the spring of his valor, and the source of his activity. To her consecrated all his trophies. Her form was ever present to his mind, her wish the inspiration to his every action. His enterprise, courage, renown, proclaimed the power and fame of her perfections.

All this could not fail of acting strongly upon the delicate susceptibilities of the female mind. Woman felt her power and dominion. The rivalship of beauty unfolded all its excellence and charms. "The respectful intercourse they held with the knights, the adoration paid to them, the tournaments at which they presided, the virtues they inspired, the exploits achieved to their honor, all concurred to promote their elevation and lustre. To their enamored votaries they seemed to be divinities; and toils, conflicts, and blood purchased their favor, and their smiles."

Thus aroused, and stimulated by every motive to effort, not only womanly graces and sensibilities were developed, but the higher powers of mind and stronger elements of character were frequently brought out and displayed. "Concerned in great affairs, they were agitated with great passions. They partook in the greatness they communicated. Their softness mingled with courage, their sensibility with pride. With the characteristics of their own sex, they blended those of the other."

In the stirring events of the time, they took a large share of interest. Acts of generosity, enterprise, and valor; the events of public and private wars, employed much of their thought and conversation. In all their seasons of festivity, more especially in the jousts and tournaments, where mimic battles were fought in time of peace, the ladies largely interested themselves. These jousts and tournaments may be well claimed as the culminating points of chivalry.

The only institutions to which they bear any striking analogy, are the Olympic games of ancient Greece, and to

[1] *Stuart*, 61.

these they were, in many respects, decidedly superior. The sight of naked racers, wrestlers, and boxers must have tended to corrupt the manners of the Greeks, and contrast most unfavorably with the splendid decorations of the knights, armed in complete panoply, and reflecting the highest military and social attainments of the age. A corresponding elevation is to be found in the nature of the contests. Instead of running, wrestling, and boxing, the joust and tournament presented an impressive image of the real business of the field. "The single combat, the general skirmish, the defense of a pass or castle, were rehearsed as in actual service; and the contest, both in real and mimic war, was decided by the superior management of the horse and lance."

The difference between the joust and the tournament was, that the former consisted in single combats between two knights, while the latter was performed between two parties of cavaliers. Again, the difference between the greater and the lesser tournaments was, that the former were those given by sovereigns and princes, to which knights were invited from every part of Europe, and the latter, those given by the barons.

Of these tournaments we have the most magnificent description. "Judges were appointed to determine in them,[1] and to maintain the laws of chivalry. They were generally selected from among the aged knights, who came in crowds to live over again the scenes they had acted, and to encourage and direct the intrepidity and skill of the aspiring youth. The combatants entered the lists slowly, and with a grave and majestic air, pronounced aloud the names of the ladies to whom they had vowed their hearts and their homage. This privilege they obtained at the expense of many a gallant achievement, and they were presented by the fair ones with a ribbon, a bracelet, a veil, or some detached ornament of their dress,

[1] *Stuart*, 62.

which they affixed to their helmets or their shields, and considered as the pledges of victory. This present was called faveur; and long afterwards, even to the present day, pieces of lace or ribbon are sometimes distributed at marriages, and are termed brides' favors.

"Every signal advantage won in the conflicts, was proclaimed by the instruments of the minstrels, and the voices of the heralds. Animated by the presence of the ladies, by the sense of their former renown, and of that of their ancestors, the champions displayed the most brilliant feats of activity, address, and valor. And the ladies, entering into their agitations, felt the ardors of emulation, and the transports of glory.

"On the completion of the tournament the prizes were distributed with a ceremonious impartiality. The officers who had been appointed to observe every circumstance which passed in the conduct of the combatants, made their reports to the judges. The suffrages of the spectators were collected. After serious deliberation, in which the most celebrated personages, who were present, were proud to assist, the names of the conquerors were pronounced. Ladies were then chosen, who were to present to them the symbols of victory; and in these fortunate moments, they were permitted to imprint a kiss on the lips of these fair disposers of renown.

"Amidst the contending praise of the judges and the knights, the music of war, and the shouts of the people, the victors were now conducted to the palace of the prince or the noble who exhibited the tournament. There, at the feast, which concluded their triumph, they were exposed to the keen look, and the impassioned admiration of whatever was most accomplished in beauty and in arms. And, in the height of a glory, in which they might well have forgot that they were mortal, they employed themselves to console the knights they had vanquished, and ascribed their success to fortune not to valor; displaying a demeanor complacent and gentle, disarming envy by modesty, and

enhancing greatness by generous sympathy and magnanimous condescension."

Thus glorious and exalted in many of its brighter aspects was the age of chivalry. It was the age of activity, of heroism, of romance, and of gallantry. From the eleventh century its ceremonies, duties, and adventures, constituted the mine whence poetry derived its materials to charm the people, excite the imagination, and elevate the aims and purposes of life.[1]

All these incentives to love and glory were advanced and inspirited by religion. To defend Christianity with his sword and his life became a sacred vow, to which every knight was ambitious to submit. He considered himself a saint as well as hero, and was ever ready to encounter any peril in defending the church or carrying warfare against its enemies.

Another stimulus was afforded in the opportunity of redressing wrongs, by which the sense of justice was invigorated. The age of chivalry occurred in a period of disorder and confusion. It was a part of knighthood to vindicate the wrongs of the injured. The weak and the oppressed, the orphan and the widow, had always a special claim upon the knight. To disobey their call, was to infringe a law of chivalry, to incur dishonor and infamy. The introduction of such an element, the thrusting of such a moral force into an age of violence and oppression, asserting everywhere the right, redressing everywhere the wrong, clothing force with a moral purpose, and sending it on a moral mission, produced a mighty effect upon the social progress of that and all subsequent ages.

So very strong did this motive become, and so powerfully did the ardor of redressing wrongs seize upon many knights,[2] that attended by their squires, they actually wandered about in search of objects whose misfortunes and misery required their assistance and succor. As the ladies

[1] *Guizot*, IV, 25. [2] *Stuart*, 308.

engaged more particularly their attention, the relief of unfortunate damsels was the achievement they most courted. This gave rise to knight-errantry, and to all those adventures that make up so much of the romance of that period.

"Thus war, devotion, and gallantry all conspired to form the character of the true knight.[1] And these manners, so lofty and so romantic, were for ages to give a splendor to Europe by directing the fortunes of its nations, and by producing examples of magnanimity and valor, which are unequaled in the annals of mankind." The efficacy of these was the most fully displayed in communicating to society a higher and purer tone. "The spirit of humanity which has been progressing both in periods of war and of peace; the gallantry prevailing in our conversations and private intercourse; the point of honor which corrects the violence of the passions, by improving our delicacy, and sense of propriety and decorum, and, by teaching us the importance of others, makes us value our own; all these have grown out of chivalry, and discriminate the modern from the ancient world."

By thus bringing the two sexes of the higher portions of society together both were mutually improved. The knight was perhaps the most benefited. Not only did it add graces to external behavior, but it also improved his natural sensibility and tenderness. To him the lady was the embodiment of perfection. No rude hand could, with impunity, invade her possessions; no unruly tongue slander her character. The roughness of war was smoothed over with politeness. The knightly courtesy more especially practiced in the castle was extended to all the business and intercourse of civil life. Elegance of manners became an especial object of study. Generosity and delicate attentions to the vanquished shone conspicuous among the knightly virtues. No indecent joy, or brutal ferocity, disgraced his triumphs. His rank, duties and

[1] *Stuart*, 66.

cares all urged upon him the necessity of aiming at the perfection of virtue. He ever possessed the most scrupulous adherence to truth and justice. Even the utterance of a falsehood was punished by degradation from knighthood. The act of degradation was accomplished by the solemn taking away of the sword,[1] the cutting of the spurs, the tearing from the body the coat of arms, and the bruising every piece of the knight's armor.

But while we are thus exhibiting the bright side of chivalry, we should not be unmindful of the fact that the age in which it flourished was one of great dissoluteness in morals, and that even knighthood itself has its dark, and its ridiculous, as well as its bright side. In courts and in large cities, more especially, an extreme degree of licentiousness was practiced. Prostitutes formed a particular class, enjoying governmental protection,[2] paying distinct taxes, and possessing the right of proceeding at law against all those who undertook to follow the profession, without being admitted to the freedom of the sisterhood. The first magistrates of London and other cities kept public brothels. At the feast of fools, during the Christmas holidays, from the eleventh to the sixteenth century, it was the custom through large portions of Europe, for laymen and even ecclesiastics to dance naked in the streets and in the churches. When in 1461, Louis XI entered Paris, its inhabitants selected the most beautiful damsels of their city, who, in the character of sirens, sung, quite naked, all kinds of pastoral compositions. It was customary to dance naked at weddings, and at the balls and festivities which accompanied and concluded the tournaments, much the same exhibitions were made. On such occasions those passions, at all times possessing great strength and activity, were inflamed by wine; and there was said to be nothing which the knights would not demand, and which females of the highest rank were not prepared to grant. Notwith-

[1] *Stuart*, 311. [2] *Meiners's History of the Female Sex*, I, 205.

standing the knight's oath and obligation to protect females, nothing was more common than their persecution and ravishment,[1] and the crimes of incest and adultery were of frequent commission. Even polgyamy was practiced, and concubinage was so universal among even the higher ranks as to do away with the disgrace of illegitimate birth.

Amid this deplorable state of morals it may be well doubted whether much genuine affection, attachment and esteem really existed. There was the exterior respect for the fair sex, and also the affectation of piety and valor, and this kept increasing until the commencement of the fifteenth century. But their piety displayed itself in fasting, castigation, and other penances. The treasures they squandered in tournaments and feasts were too often obtained from rifled churches and convents, and plundered merchants and travelers; while their valor and courage were less displayed in the defense of their country than in oppressing their inferiors, invading their equals, rebelling against their superiors, and engaging in adventures often romantic and ludicrous. Many of the knights evinced little fidelity to their wives, or care in educating their daughters,[2] but their love and esteem were all embraced in empty ostentation and ridiculous extravagance. Much of the incense which they offered at the shrine of the female sex was simply the result of custom, habit and fashion. A great deal was apparent, but very little real.

It is, however, admitted by all, that in every country, and in every age, there were knights who conscientiously fulfilled all the vows they took upon themselves, ever conducting themselves as living patterns of every knightly virtue. So also at every period were there high, pure and noble minded ladies, who endeavored, and successfully, to render themselves worthy of the esteem of such knights. Nor is it probable that the examples of these were lost upon the thought and actions of others.

[1] *Meiners*, I, 207. [2] *Idem*, 212.

We have before barely alluded to knight-errants. They were coeval with chivalry, and in some sense applied to all knights, for all were, more or less, wandering about in pursuit of adventures. The term came to be more especially applied to those who, by command of their mistresses, or from motives of gratitude, or to render themselves more worthy the favor of the fair, and to exalt their own glory, made it their especial business to travel into foreign countries, and with sword and lance to maintain the superior virtue and beauty of their ladies,[1] against all expressing a doubt upon that subject. Among them were those who set themselves up for the protectors of innocence and the deliverers of the oppressed, who claimed to be the descendants and rivals of the knights of the round table. These encountered giants, took enchanted castles, and were the heroes of romance.

The amorous knight-errants, who traveled in obedience to the commands of their mistresses, wore green armor, weapons, and apparel, to denote the verdure of their youth, and the flower of their strength. Their expeditions were generally undertaken in obedience to certain vows which they had, in moments of amorous intoxication, voluntarily placed themselves under, or which their mistresses had required of them. A knight of Mantua was so intoxicated at being selected as a partner for a dance, by Johanna, queen of Naples, that he vowed to travel in France, Burgundy, England, Spain, Germany, and other countries, until he had vanquished two knights, to present to her as slaves. And this vow he actually accomplished. In another instance, the mistress had the cruelty to impose on a French knight, the following:[2] She promised to resign herself to him, with heart and hand, and to place her fortune at his disposal, if he would bring her the portraits of thirty fair ladies, whose admirers he had vanquished out of love to her. The knight took upon him the vow, and

[1] *Meiners*, I, 228. [2] *Idem*, 287.

in less than a year, returned with thirty portraits of the mistresses of conquered knights.

The extravagances of knight-errantry finally became so great, that the age could not relish them, and they became a subject of ridicule. Don Quixote was the last of the knight-errants. In the fourteenth century it had nearly died out. We have, however, in that century, a description of one who called at the castle of Montbazon.[1] He sounded the horn before the great gate of the castle. No trumpeter answered from within, which was the usual custom, and he turned his horse and departed. The pages ran after him and succeeded in bringing him back. He enters with his squire, both entirely clothed with plates of brass, making much the same noise as mules loaded with copper utensils ill packed. The helmet of the knight being taken off by the squire, his head appeared half bald, and half sprinkled with white hair, his left eye covered with a piece of green cloth. He had made a vow to see only from the right side, and to eat only from the left, until after the accomplishment of his enterprise. The ladies proposing that he should refresh himself, his only answer was to throw himself at their feet, swearing to them all eternal love, saying, that although his arms were of the best temper, they could not defend him from their features; that he should die of them, that he felt himself dying, that he was undone, and a thousand other similar fooleries. He made but a short stay, setting out some hours after.

Even the joust and the tournament that presented so many points of attraction that would seem to insure it perpetuity, gradually lost their hold on the affections of men and finally died out. But the brilliant fires they had lit up, especially the latter, during the middle ages, were difficult of extinguishment. The tournament, with some interruptions, was continued in Sweden down to the commencement of the present century, if not the present time. "Every

[1] *Gutzot*, IV, 30.

year," says Joseph Acerbi, of the date of 1802,[1] "an exhibition takes place at Drottningholm, at the king's expense, representing a tournament, in which all the laws of chivalry are observed with the greatest exactness. It is generally attended by an immense crowd of spectators. The fete lasted several days, everything being attended to which belonged to the ancient tournaments. The prizes were distributed the last day under the direction of the queen, according to the sentence of the appointed judges. The knights might wear upon their armor the ribbons of favors of their ladies. The ladies might propose prizes for which the knights were to contend. This seems to be the only instance in which this once popular diversion was restored and so long kept up."

A beneficial result of the tournament while in its glory, has not yet been mentioned, and that is the direct intercourse between the different nations of Europe, which the exhibition of it produced.[2] "When there were no express prohibitions, knights followed the more important tournaments wherever they were celebrated, for the purpose of studying the art of war, and that they might find signal and proper opportunities of distinguishing themselves, and of cultivating the friendship and acquaintance of illustrious persons of both sexes. It was even the fashion for knights to avoid the restraint of marriage for some years after their installation into the order, that they might consecrate them to the traveling into distant countries, and the visiting of foreign courts."

The spirit of chivalry left behind it a worthy successor. This was found in the gentleman, who succeeded the knight, and who distinguishes European society during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,[3] as fully as the knight did the preceding ages. In his composition, we discern the same jealous sense of honor, ceremonious gallantry and politeness, high pride of birth, and feeling of

[1] *Acerbi's Travels*, I, 50. [2] *Stuart*, 303. [3] *Hallam*, 519.

independence, together with a sympathy for martial honor, which served so strongly to characterize the knight during the age of chivalry.

IV. *Society in Europe as it existed in the Age of the Troubadours.*

The early youth of nations has rarely been insensible to the magic influence of poetry and song. These, especially the latter, have done much to mould the character of every people. The power of song is felt among those rude natures who have never attained to any of the arts of civilized life. It is precisely those who stand the most in need of its softening, humanizing influences, and who are the most affected by it. It is those who compose the songs and ballads of a nation, and not those who enact its laws, who give it its direction, and are the most responsible for its actions. The Marseillaise hymn, whether falling upon the ear in the silence of secluded valleys, or sounding forth its terrible notes amid the thoroughfares of Paris, has wrought more upon the hearts of Frenchmen, than all the laws or acts of her Bourbon kings.

But it is in the infancy or early youth of a people, ere criticism has issued its canons so rigidly severe as to freeze the genial currents of the soul, or art has constructed its rules so precise and definite, as to fetter every outgrowth from the springs of feeling, that the power of song may be expected to exert its largest and its deepest influence. It is then that the heart of the nation beats responsive to its notes. It is then that its every tone finds in every heart, its echo. It is then that the whole soul, tremblingly alive in its every fibre, is held spell-bound beneath an influence that floats through it so mysteriously. There are few things that demonstrate more clearly that there are chords in every link of humanity's lengthening chain that vibrate to a common influence, than this wonderful power exercised by poetry, music, and song. And of these, the

latter combines the two former, for a song is poetry set to music.

The age of chivalry passed not away with the armed knight and the steel-clad warrior; with the joust and the tournament; with all its fetes and extravagant excesses. The spirit it enkindled in the hearts of men was pushed out into other and still more interesting social developments. It could not fully perform its mission without invoking the power of song. This brings us to the age of the troubadour, the most beautiful period of the middle ages.

The name is derived from the French word trouver, indicating the ease of their poetry. The home of the troubadour was France, a part of upper Italy, and the kingdoms of Catalonia and Arragon, in the Spanish peninsula. The period in which he flourished extends from the tenth to the middle of the thirteenth century.

Through the whole of the middle ages, France was divided by the Loire into two distinct countries. These were marked by two distinct dialects; the one the langue d'oil, the Walloon romance, the other, the langue d'oc, the Provençal romance. Although these two dialects owned a common source, yet their characters were marked by strong lines of difference. The Walloon romance, the mother of the modern French language, was that cultivated by the trouveres, the poets of northern France, whose poetry bore more of the epic character, and whose songs and chivalrous romances described the fabulous exploits of the knights of the round table, of Amadis, and of Charlemagne with his peers. They proceeded chiefly from Normandy, and spread over France and England; in the latter, under the name of minstrels. They flourished from the twelfth century, until the rise of the modern French literature.

But south of the Loire we find a different region, a different language, or dialect, and a different people. "The beautiful shores of Provence, Languedoc, and Guienne,

together with Gascony, had earlier become susceptible of civilization, through their intercourse with the Romans; and the victorious German tribes found in these regions much stronger inducements to exchange their savage life for gentle manners than in the north of France. Less isolated than Spain, these provinces shared with that country all the luxuriance of the south. Rich pastures, with the finest productions, romantic valleys and hills, in the fertile Cevennes, a long extent of coast on the Mediterranean sea, give loveliness to the country, and a gay, pleasure-loving character to the inhabitants."

The chivalry of the people inhabiting this region of country was more gallant than that of the north, and softer and brighter than that of the Spanish peninsula. There was more in it of show and festivity. It had an opportunity of more perfect development. The storms which desolated France under the Merovingian and Carlovingian races were little, if at all, felt among the Provençals. In those southern provinces, the power of the great barons, dukes, and counts, was more and more developed, while the authority of the king was correspondingly declining. They succeeded in not only making their own dignity hereditary, but also encroached continually on the royal territory. Thus the gay, smiling climate of the south of France, combining with the independence, superiority and freedom of its political institutions, called forth the earliest fruits of chivalry, and its attendant, song. As early as in the tenth century, while northern France was a prey to intestine commotions, Provence, and part of Burgundy,[1] and its dependencies enjoyed repose under the mild sway of Conrad the Pacific. The courts of the Berengers, the sovereigns of Catalonia, and part of southern France, became the principal nurseries of the opening talent, and the centre of union with other European nations. In the eleventh century, during the reign of Ray-

[1] *Lays of Minnesingers*, 15, 16.

mond Berengerius, count of Barcelona, the Provençal poetry was introduced into Barcelona and Catalonia. Under Alphonso the Second, the empire of love and poetry was extended over a great portion of the south-western district of Spain.

The eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries form together a period of fermentation, during which the elements of European civilization were not only in great commotion, but were in the act of separating from each other,[1] and fashioning themselves for the reception of new forms. Everywhere principles were crude and undigested, but feeling was strong. Chivalry was cherishing its wild dreams, outraging all common sense in their extravagance. The servile worship of the female sex was productive of effects almost ludicrous, and yet it may well be regarded as the commencement of that important revolution in society which ultimately fixed on the firm basis of religious justice the destinies of one-half of the human race.

During this period courteousness and gallantry were nowhere so fully developed as in Provence. The beauty of woman became a boast and a treasure, and was worshiped as little less than a divinity. The heart of man was bolder, his arm firmer, than in the days of dull reality, and the spirit of adventurous knighthood became softened into heroic gentleness and gallant love. The German emperor, Frederic Barbarossa, and the English king, Richard Cœur de Lion invited Provençal knights to their courts to receive instruction from them in the usages and ceremonies of chivalry.

All the elements of society were thus, to a certain extent, drawn together by an uniting sympathy, and by a common zeal in the promotion of objects, which could not but tend in some degree to temper their asperities. The kings of nations, the aristocracy, and the people were united in emulation in the field, and the inequalities of rank were

[1] *Lays of Minnesingers*, 4.

still further mitigated by the value set upon poetic talent, by whomsoever it might be displayed. It was the mind's early springtime; the season of unfolding intellect and mental blossoming. The troubadour knight was at one time breathing the fire of martial glory, and animating his followers to heroic enterprise; at another turning his muse into a powerful political engine; and at another still melting into the soft and delightful harmony of love.

Love, now an universal birth,
From heart to heart was stealing;
From earth to man, from man to earth,
It was the hour of feeling.

The chivalry and the poetry of these ages are inseparably connected. They are both the fruits of one great moral revolution. They sprung up together, and are mutually illustrative of each other. They have similar blemishes and similar redeeming qualities. While the ancient or classic poetry was essentially masculine in its character, the Provençal owes much of its charm to that gentleness and mildness of spirit which the different position of woman in society necessarily infused into it. In the early ages the new feeling, coming upon the heart with all its vivid freshness, was wildly and extravagantly pursued. It was as if the springs of a new life were opened in the human heart, and their joyous outgushings were a necessity of their very being.

Among the curious institutions of which this new feeling and the song of the troubadour were productive, were the tribunals or courts of love which originated in the twelfth and continued through the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. To their establishment and continuance the gallantry originating in chivalry and tournaments; the exterior respect paid to the sex; the indolent leisure, and frequent festivities of the princes, gentlemen and knights, together with the inventive imagination of the troubadours, all contributed. The largest number of these, as

also those which were the most celebrated, were held in Provence, the land of the troubadour.

These courts had their presidents like other tribunals, and also the different offices belonging to a parliamentary organization, and which were filled by ladies and gentlemen of the highest rank. The persons who presided over them were either kings or princes, or celebrated princesses. Their jurisdiction was very extensive. They heard and decided all disputes between lovers, enacted ordinances respecting the rights of man and wife, and of lovers of both sexes; introduced new customs and abolished old ones; discussing particularly all questions relative to the essence and expressions of love, the excellencies and failings of the fair sex, and the privileges, duties, and sacrifices of lovers. The following may be cited as samples of the questions discussed: "Which is the most easy to be endured, the death or inconstancy of a mistress?" "Should you rather see me leave your mistress as you approach, or appproach as you retire?" "Who suffers most, a husband whose wife, or a lover whose mistress, is unfaithful?" "Can true love exist between husband and wife?" Thus love, instead of constituting the romance, was made the serious business of life among the higher classes. After the discussion in these courts came the decision pronounced after the manner of the parliaments. So important were they deemed that their decisions have been collected and published. From these, as from all other things connected with their organization, it seems that the jurisprudence and the philosophy of love in the middle ages very perfectly resembled the jurisprudence, the divinity, and the philosophy of the schools, that is, that they were equally subtle and unprofitable, adding nothing whatever to the stock of valuable knowledge, and entirely barren of results.

These courts culminated in France under the reign of Charles VI. This was mainly through the influence of his consort, Isabella of Bavaria, whose court was established

in 1380. Even under Louis XIV an academy of love was established by Cardinal Richelieu, at Ruel, which was an imitation of the courts of love.

The cessation of the formal courts of love about the close of the fourteenth century was signalized by the rise of another institution called the amorous court.[1] This afforded instances of the same kind of mockery of an actual court as the tribunals of love were imitations of real parliaments. This court had the same officers as the courts of the French and other monarchs, such as marshals, treasurers, chamberlains, secretaries, advocates, huntsmen and the like. Among its officers and members were included not only ladies and gentlemen of the highest rank but also doctors of divinity, canons, preachers, and ecclesiastics of the superior orders.

It was thus that the belle passion, arising in a lovely climate, among a people of sensuous organization and of active and sensitive temperament, and fanned into a flame by the poetry of the troubadours, sought to exhibit itself in every possible form, and to work out its own peculiar character through every possible avenue. This, without doubt, exercised a strong influence upon society in Europe, and more especially in France in the subsequent centuries.

But the influence wrought by poetry and song during these ages was not confined to the troubadour and the south of France. In northern France we find the trouveres, who, proceeding from the duchy of Normandy, and spreading over France and England, flourished from the twelfth century till the rise of the modern French literature. In England they were known by the name of minstrels. These trouveres were the epic poets of France, whose songs and romances described the fabulous exploits of the knights of the round table, of Amadis, and of Charlemagne and his peers.

[1] *Meiners*, I, 250, 251.

At about the same period, the poetic talent began to develop itself in the minnesingers of Germany, but between their songs and those of the troubadours was a wide difference. The Teutonic mind paid less adoration to the female sex than the Provençal. In Provence this exaltation of the sex was a recent innovation, a feeling which had taken possession of the mind with the power of novelty, and might, therefore, be expected to be pushed out rapidly into its peculiar results. The Teutonic mind, although strong in its attachments, restrained, nevertheless, its modes of expression, and while assigning to woman a superior rank in the scale of society, refused to acknowledge her as a divinity, or to bow down to her temporal and spiritual authority.

But although exciting into activity the trouveres and the minnesingers, yet the song of the troubadour was destined to die out in its own land. The crusade against the Albigenses occurred in the thirteenth century, which filled the whole land of Provence with scenes of cruelty and bloodshed. This was fatal to the troubadours, whose light was extinguished never again to be revived.

Never again with one exception. Our own time is witnessing a revival of the song of the troubadour. In the town of Agen, on the Garonne, lives a peasant poet, Jacques Jasmin, commonly called the last of the troubadours.[1] He is a barber and hair-dresser, and earns his living by following his calling. The language he makes use of is the old Provençal, the first of those languages to which the Latin gave birth after the inroads of barbarism, one which reached its highest degree of perfection during the twelfth century from 1150 to 1220. This language he uses as it was written in purer times, and wherever he goes he is understood even by the Catalonians.

He reaches the heart of the people, and his songs and poems are in the mouths of those who labor in the fields, or

[1] *Eclectic Magazine*, January to April, 1853, 192-4.

who sit by their firesides. He tells the story of the people in fictions at once so true, beautiful, and familiar, that he charms the peasant life. The bare announcement of his name draws together immense audiences, and his appearance everywhere excites enthusiasm. When he recites before assemblies of people, sometimes two thousand in number, the ladies tear the flowers and feathers out of their bonnets to weave them into garlands for him. He refuses all pay for his recitations, returning to his regular calling to furnish him with the means of living. He is about fifty-six years old, and every way worthy of being the last of the troubadours.

V. *Society as it has developed, and is developing itself in the different European nations.*

1. In the Spanish peninsula.

The Pyrenean wall separates this peninsula from the rest of Europe. On its northern slope, the French side, we meet with a singular people, inhabiting the territory of Cerdagne and Roussillon.[1] They cling to old thoughts, customs and institutions; and in character and imagination carry one back to the mediæval times. On Sunday and Saints' day are performed now those ancient and traditional mysteries, which were the origin of the modern drama. With slight differences they are the same now as when enacted in Italy and Germany, in the middle ages and time of the troubadours. We find here, therefore, the point of transition between mediæval and modern times.

Ascending the northern slope we still find existing as a distinct race,[2] and scattered in the villages and valleys of the Pyrenees, the Cagots. They are low in stature, weak and tottering; their complexions sallow; and their appearance evidencing weakness of intellect.[3] They are a pro-

[1] *Eclectic*, January to April, 1857, 111. [2] *Idem*, 109. [3] *Idem*, 109, 110.

scribed race, denied the rights of worship and of sepulture; separated from the rest of the congregation while living; limited to a distinct portion of the churchyard when dead; admitted to the benefit of the holy water, but excluded from the reception of the sacraments. They present the clear evidence of having groaned under the weight of persecution of one thousand years. It is yet an unsolved problem whether they are the descendants of the invading Goths of the fifth century; or the remnants of those Saracenic invaders who were defeated by Charles Martel at Poictiers in the eighth; or the Albigenses who were dispersed in the twelfth century.

The Pyrenees, like an immense wall, separate the Spanish peninsula from the rest of Europe. The fortunes of that peninsula have been peculiar, and the teachings of history in reference to its different peoples, full of instruction. In industry, religion, and government, we have already seen that its lessons are admonitory. They are like the beacon fires upon a rocky coast, fuller of warning than of winning.

In casting our eye over the peninsula with a view to the gathering up of such fragments as may instruct us in the development of the social element, we are struck with two facts, which, in the outset, present themselves as strong modifying causes. These are: 1. The physical peculiarities of the peninsula. Although seemingly set apart from the rest of the world, and apparently designed to constitute a little world in itself, yet, on examination, it presents no unity of plan, but, on the contrary, is so ridged with mountains, and furrowed with river valleys, as to present many natural boundaries to states and kingdoms. 2. The second fact is, the many different peoples, originally varying essentially from each other, who, by centuries of amalgamation, have come to constitute the people of Spain and Portugal. It is like many different colored rills pouring their confluent streams into the same

common reservoir. First, we have the Iberians, the original inhabitants. Next, the Celts, whose invasion at first met with resistance, but ultimately, both people agreed to possess the country in common, and to remain forever united.[1] Hence we have the Celtiberians, in many respects, deserving to be regarded as the primitive inhabitants of the peninsula. Then we have the early, and considerably extensive, colonization of the southern part by the Phœnicians. The Phœnician power fell with the downfall of Carthage, and Spain two centuries before the Christian era became a Roman province, the latter introducing their manners, customs, and even language, into the peninsula. It was long, however, before the northern part, afterwards composing old Castile, Arragon, and Catalonia, became wholly subdued.

Again, on the downfall of the Roman empire, and in the beginning of the fifth century, the Sueves, Vandals and Visigoths invaded the peninsula, and mixing, in large numbers, with the original Celtiberians, produced the different races, the traces of which are still observable in Spain. The Sueves made Braga their centre; the Vandals, Toledo, from which they were afterwards driven into Africa by Theodoric; but the Visigoths ultimately ruled from the Ebro to the straits of Gibraltar. So great was the concession of power and privilege to the Gothic race that the title hijo del Goda,[2] son of the Goth, becoming afterwards changed into hidalgo has ever since signified the title of a noble, or free and powerful man, among a people of slaves. The extent of the Gothic rule and its power and influence in the moulding of character may be inferred from its code of laws, which so long and so perfectly governed the people.

But invasion, conquest, and settlement had not yet ceased, for in these respects Spain has had a larger proportion than other nations. Three centuries later and the

[1] *Malte Brun*, VIII, 18, 19. [2] *Idem*, 24.

commencement of the eighth century was signalized by the advent of the Arabs. They introduced refinement, and many of the arts of life. They cultivated letters and the arts; and embellished Cordova, Grenada and other towns.

But among the mountains of the Asturias was gradually nurturing a power, which, after more than four centuries of struggle, finally under Ferdinand and Isabella achieved a reconquest of the kingdom, ultimately expelling the Moors. But their domicile, in Spain, of eight centuries duration, could not avoid leaving its impress upon character, and originating many manners and customs, which, but for them, would have had no existence. Thus while the Italian peninsula has furnished to Europe its battle-fields, and its different portions have been the prey of the conqueror, that of Spain has been more domiciliary in its character, furnishing homes to its different invaders. There is no doubt but the Spanish character has been essentially modified from this circumstance.

The ancient Iberians and Lusitanians (inhabitants of Spain and Portugal) amused themselves with dances that were light and lively, requiring much activity.[1] The old Celtiberians held an assembly every year in which they examined what the women had with their own hands made, within the year, giving a reward to her whose work they thought the best.[2] They considered corpulency a reproach, and the men were measured every year by a cincture of a certain breadth, inflicting some punishment on those who had become too large. The age of marriage was fixed by law, the girls choosing their husbands from among the young warriors, the surest means of obtaining their preference being the presentation to the fair one of the head of an enemy slain in battle.

Many of the Celtiberian women wore iron collars with iron rods rising behind, and bent in front. To these rods was attached the veil, their usual ornament. Others wore

[1] *Malte Brun*, VIII, 22, 23. [2] *Idem*, 23.

a sort of broad turban, and some twisted their hair round a small ring about a foot above the head appending from the ring a black veil. A shining forehead was considered great beauty, and to add as much as possible to it they pulled out their hair, and rubbed their brows with oil.

From the many different elements that enter into the Spanish character, and the different periods of time at which these contributions have been furnished, it is obvious that the Spanish character will be found to differ with different periods of time. Not only that, but it varies also, in the different provinces.[1] The shades of character are even better defined in each Spanish province, than in other European kingdoms. To this result, several causes conduce, as: 1. The low state of industry leading to very little intercommunication between the people in the different provinces. 2. The badness, or entire want of roads, by which this intercourse could be promoted. 3. The strong natural barriers that separate states. All these present so many obstacles to that frequent intercourse and communication, so essential to diffuse an uniform character over a whole population. Thus we have the light and graceful forms of the Biscayans, the lofty stature of the Gallicians and Catalonians, the dark complexions of the Estremadurans, the strength of the Castilians, and the pale complexions of the Murcians.

The moral, not less than the physical character, differs in the different provinces. The Biscayans are haughty, irascible, and passionate; the Gallicians, melancholy and unsocial, although laborious and brave; the Catalonians, impetuous and indocile; the Arragonese, devoted to their country, and strongly attached to its ancient customs; the Castilians, grave and proud; the Estremadurans, indolent and vain; the Andalusians, proud and arrogant; the Murcians, slow and dull; and the Valencians, gay and inconstant, ingenious and industrious.

[1] *Malte Brun*, VIII, 57.

Under this state of things, it can excite but little surprise if different travelers have given different accounts of the Spaniards, or even if we have different accounts of the inhabitants of the same provinces at different times. It is no doubt, true, however, that there has been some approximation towards a uniformity in character, manners, and customs; and hence that, subject to some modifications, it is competent of such as being Spanish. Another fact also should be borne in mind, and that is that neither the Spanish character, nor the circumstances under which it has been developed, are at all favorable to those changes which occur to people under other circumstances, as under American institutions. The character is there formed and develops itself in obedience to the same manners, customs, social habits, and institutions, that might have been followed for centuries, and thus acquired fixedness and unchangeability. We shall now proceed to describe, briefly, some of the peculiarities of the Spanish character, and some of their manners and customs.

The Spaniard is described as short, thin, and well proportioned; his complexion olive;[1] his strong desire to expend in display all the means at his command. In the former part of the sixteenth century the Spanish, in conjunction with the Austrian, in the person of Charles V, was the ruling power in Europe, at the same time claiming exclusive sovereignty in the new world. While the wealth of the new world was pouring into Spain, everything seemed to bow before her in the old. The Spaniard thus acquired a consequence in the eye of the world, which aiding a preexisting tendency, gave him great dignity of character, loftiness of bearing, and that inflation of pride which was constantly displaying itself in his gestures, language and writings. He seemed enveloped in an atmosphere of grandeur, and his character acquired elements which it has ever since retained; for although the living

[1] *Travels through Europe*, IV, 18, 19.

Spaniard of the sixteenth century has disappeared yet his mask still remains. He still preserves in his air and gesture the marks of his ancient greatness. There is a gravity and haughtiness that marks all his actions, but, as a compensating quality, it gives to the mind that elevation and loftiness that operates as a safeguard against every species of littleness and meanness.

One natural effect of this is a reserve and taciturnity especially in the presence of strangers. Another is a slowness, calmness and evident marks of deliberation in all their movements. One traveler remarks that "that listless indolence, equally dear to the uncivilized savage, and to the degenerate slave of despotism,[1] is nowhere more indulged than in Spain. Thousands of men in all parts of the realm, pass day after day, wrapt up in a cloak, standing in rows against a wall, or dozing under a tree. In total want of every incitement to action, the springs of their intellectual faculties forget to play, and their views grow confined within the narrow sphere of mere existence. The poor Spaniard does not work, unless urged by irresistable want, because he perceives no advantage from industry. Naturally abstemious, his scanty fare is easily procured; blessed with a warm climate, clothes are not much an object."

If slowness be, as some contend, an element of progress, the Spanish people ought to be preeminently progressive. In political measures, in war, in all the operations of government, in the common occurrences of life even, when others act, they still deliberate. Mistrustful and circumspect, they fail by slowness where others do by precipitation. There is little doubt that the arbitrary government under which they have so long lived, and more especially the inquisition, that for so many generations has sent its system of espionage into every city and hamlet and human habitation in Spain, have exercised a powerful in-

[1] *Mavor's Voyages*, XIV, 186.

fluence in implanting caution, reserve, and suspicion as strong elements in the character of her people.

This fact becomes more apparent when we are informed by intelligent travelers that the Spanish is by no means, naturally, a serious, melancholy nation. That every village resounds with the music of voices and guitars. That their fairs and Sunday wakes are remarkably noisy and riotous. That they talk louder and argue with more vehemence than even the French or Italians,[1] and gesticulate with equal, if not superior eagerness.

Besides this tendency to gayety it has been remarked that the Spaniard, though so slow and deliberate when nothing extraordinary moves him, is, nevertheless, inflamed to enthusiasm when his haughtiness, resentment, or any of the passions which compose his character, are awakened either by insult or opposition.[2] Hence it is that the Spanish nation, apparently the most grave, cold, and slow in Europe, sometimes becomes one of the most violent, when circumstances deprive it of its habitual calm, and deliver it up to the empire of imagination and passion.

The Spanish soldiers have always proved themselves brave and patient of hardships. They follow without flinching the lead of their officers, but they require their example first to be set.

The Spaniards have well preserved their ancient virtues of patience and sobriety. Through the first they are rendered constant in their enterprises, and indefatigable in their labors; while the latter preserves them from excesses too common in the more northern countries of Europe.

The relations between the sexes present a subject of interest in the study of the Spaniard. Although travelers do not perfectly agree in their statements, yet the young Spanish lady is described as possessing great attractions. "A face perfectly oval; hair of a fine clear auburn, equally divided on the forehead, and only bound by a silk net;

[1] *Travels through Europe*, IV, 20. [2] *Idem*, 20.

large black eyes; a mouth full of graces; an attitude always modest; a simple habit of neat black serge,[1] exactly fitting the body, and gently pressing the waist, a little hand perfectly proportioned; in fine, everything charms in these youthful virgins."

The countenance of the Spanish women is extremely sensible, and full of vivacity. They are generally small in size, and thin, but have large sparkling black eyes, full of expression. They talk rapidly, and are hasty, opinionated and passionate, but easily yield to reason. They never paint, as in France, and are endowed by nature with a great deal of wit and lively repartee. At the same time they have little talent, and that scarcely at all cultivated; doing little, if anything, at working, reading, writing, or even playing upon a musical instrument.

The human form, both of the male and female, in Spain, is early developed. Females are reckoned marriageable at twelve, and males at fourteen.[2] Thus marriage is entered into early, and with little reflection. The law denies here the same extent or amount of veto power which it usually gives in other countries. The only plea it admits for a parent withholding his consent to the marriage, is inferiority of birth, thus conceding to this single circumstance, an importance beyond bad conduct, disparity of age, incompatibility of temper, and inequality of fortune.

In Spain, as in other purely catholic countries, marriage is a sacrament, and taken in charge by the church. When the parties declare in the presence of a priest, that they take each other for husband and wife, the marriage is considered legal, notwithstanding the nonpublication of banns, and the opposition of parents.

Marriages in Valencia are attended with an enormous expense, caused by a great display of extraordinary magnificence. For some days previous to the ceremony, the

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[1] *Travels through Europe*, IV, 25. [2] *Marriage Rites*, 136, 137.

presents already received as well as those intended for her, are publicly displayed to different companies as they come in. The luxury in the wedding feasts, in the ball that follows, and the equipages which are provided, is enormous and expensive in the extreme.

There is a great deal of domestic unhappiness in Spain, which is largely attributable to the fact that a great proportion of the marriages take place so early in life that the promptings of passion govern rather than the dictates of reason. Jealousy was formerly a much more prevalent passion among the Spaniards than it is at present. The female sex now enjoys much more liberty than in former times. The Saracens or Moors, who so long held dominion over a large part of Spain, brought with them many customs of the east, and among others, that of carefully guarding the women from the public gaze. Married ladies of quality were kept more retired in their houses than a Carthusian in his cell.[1] Many females of rank durst not admit visitors without the permission of their husbands. Married men seldom or never associated with their wives. Even at table the husband sat down alone, while the wife and children were seated cross-legged, after the oriental custom, on carpets or cushions spread upon the floor.[2] The ordinary occupations of the Spanish ladies were embroidery, the society and conversation of their female attendants, and of their dwarfs of both sexes, and their religious exercises.[3] The restraints thus imposed upon the Spanish ladies increased in proportion to their rank and birth.

But this confinement, and these restraints have almost entirely disappeared. Nor is the same amount of jealousy at present evidenced in the Spanish character.

The Spanish gallants are termed cortejos, and they are similar to the cecisbeos of the Italians. Of them a total sacrifice is required. They must give proofs of this at all hours of the day,[4] accompanying the lady to the public

[1] *Meiners*, III, 8. [2] *Idem*, 10. [3] *Idem*, 12. [4] *Travels through Europe*, IV, 27.

walk, the theatre, and even the confessional. Some in the higher walks have more than one cortejos. One presides over this amusement, another over that.[1] Nor is it reputable for a lady to change her cortejos, retaining them sometimes until old age.

The Spanish are very fond of the dance, and possess the greatest aptitude to excel in that art. Among them dancing is considered as an essential part of their education. Besides the dances of other countries they have some peculiar to their own. Of these latter, one is the sequidilla.

The figure here is formed by eight persons. A Spanish female dancing the sequidilla, dressed in character, accompanying the instruments with castinets, and precisely marking the measure with her heel,[2] presents one of the most seducing objects which love can employ to extend his empire.

But the most celebrated dance peculiar to Spain, is the fandango, which has been defined to be "a very lively dance, which the Spaniards have learned from the Indians."

There are two kinds of fandangos, although both are danced to the same tune. The one is the decent dance; the other is gallant, full of expression; and as a French author expresses it,[3] "is accompanied with certain attitudes perpetually exhibiting an alluring picture of voluptuous joy." It is danced by two persons only, who never touch so much as the hand of each other. "When we view their reciprocal allurements, their retreats and approaches, when we observe the female, in the moment when her languor announces an approaching defeat, suddenly acquire new courage to escape from her conqueror, who pursues her, and is pursued in his turn; the manner in which these emotions are expressed by their looks,[4] gestures, and attitudes, it is impossible not to confess that

[1] *Marriage Rites*, 140. [2] *Travels through Europe*, IV, 30. [3] *Idem*, 29. [4] *Idem*, 29.

these scenes are, to the real combats of Cytherea, what military evolutions in peace are, to the real display of the art of war."

The Spaniards have their tertulias and refrescos;[1] the former very similar to those of France. The latter are only light repasts, prepared for persons from whom visits are received, and serve as a prelude to the tertulias. But on certain great occasions, when a wedding, christening, or birthday of the head of the family is to be celebrated, the refresco becomes an important and a very expensive affair.

After dinner, the Spaniards generally sleep for two or three hours. This is termed the siesta, or afternoon nap, and generally continues until two or three o'clock. During this time, the shops are shut in Madrid, and few persons, except foreigners, are to be met with in the streets.[2] Their usual time for their visits, is in the evening. They frequently take breakfast and supper in bed.

Beggars swarm in every part of Spain, and are as troublesome as in Italy. There is also a great want of cleanliness among the Spaniards.

The funerals are conducted much after the same manner as in all catholic countries. The dead are borne to the grave with their faces uncovered, preceded by a long procession of priests and people, with lighted tapers in their hands, singing psalms and litanies. The grandees are dressed in their princely robes, and are buried in them.[3] The young and unmarried have a crown of artificial flowers on their heads. The number of priests and tapers varies with the wealth of the deceased.

They pay great respect to their dead, strewing flowers and holy water over their sepulchres.[4] They suppose each drop of holy water extinguishes so much of the fire of purgatory.

[1] *Travels through Europe*, 30, 32. [2] *Manners and Customs*, II, 64. [3] *Travels through Europe*, IV, 33. [4] *Idem*, 33.

Immediately after death, the next thing to be done is to offer up masses for the repose of the soul, and its delivery from purgatory. The devout desire to benefit departed souls is universal in Spain. The masses a man appoints to be said for him after his death, are privileged. His soul is preferred to his creditors.[1] Philip V provided by his will that one hundred thousand masses should be said in his behalf; but not supposing anywhere near so great a number would be necessary to conduct his soul to heaven, he very generously turned over all the surplus to the benefit of those poor solitary souls that were thought very little of while living, and still less when dead.

The Portuguese have manners and customs mostly similar to the Spaniards. They are neither so tall, nor so well proportioned as the latter. Their women are beautiful when young, their features regular, and their eyes black, sparkling, and expressive, their brilliancy remaining after many other charms are fled. They have great vivacity of manner, their veins, according to Voltaire's opinion of the ladies of southern climates,[2] being filled with quicksilver, while those of the northern are with milk. They are perpetually dancing, singing, laughing, and talking, and are sprightly and vivacious in the highest degree. In Portugal all are in love from the day of their nativity to that of their decease. Love, on the Tagus, is the predominating passion.

An amusement which is almost peculiar to Spain and Portugal is the bull fight. This savage sport seems to have had its origin among the Romans, and to have been a remnant of their gladiatorial displays.[3] They were early known in Italy, but it was reserved to the Spanish peninsula to render them perpetual.

These crowning scenes of the circus are performed with great ceremony and excite immense interest. A flourish of trumpets precedes the commencement of the combat.

[1] *Travels through Europe*, IV, 34. [2] *Idem*, 265. [3] *Bell*, II, 257, note.

From a small hut, at the side of an area enclosed for the purpose, the animal springs into the enclosure, runs around every part of it, seeking in vain an avenue of escape. Around him arranged on seats are twelve or fifteen hundred persons, waving their handkerchiefs and hats,[1] and sending up their shouts of joy, which only has the effect still more to frighten or enrage him. He bounds from side to side and makes his first attack upon the picadores, prickers, whose pantaloons are lined with iron, and who are armed with spears or lances, and mounted on horses. The picadore receives him with a lance, and with its iron point galls the bull, and renders him more furious. The contest between the bull and picadores becomes more exciting and dangerous, requiring great dexterity on the part of the latter. The bull, through this contest, retains his strength, and frequently unhorses the picadore, goring the horse so that he falls dead on the arena. The horses formerly used for these purposes were of the choicest kind, but at present those of the most ordinary character are made use of, the expectation and design being that some of them shall be killed.

After the contest has been carried on sufficiently long between the bull and the picadores, and a sufficient number of horses have been slain, the picadores retire, give place to the chulos or tormentors, who are on foot, and carry with them long scarlet scarfs. Theirs is the perilous task of plunging the banderilla into the body of the animal at the junction of the neck and shoulders. This is a small staff about two feet long, furnished at one extremity with a bent spike, while at the other are attached squibs and crackers. The performances of the chulos are much aided by the scarlet scarfs which they keep waving before the eyes of the bull, thus creating constant deceptions, of which they can take the advantage. These pedestrian chulos approach the animal with caution; avoid all his attacks with

[1] *Malte Brun*, VIII, 92.

agility and address; and one of them fixes in his neck the banderilla, or if he happens to fail by missing his mark, he is wounded and tossed into the air by his furious adversary. Tormented by the iron and the fire, the bull bellows, bounds, turns and fights with desperate fury.

After the war with chulos has been waged a sufficient length of time, and their arts of attack and defense are exhausted, a flourish of trumpets announces the approach of another enemy more formidable than any yet encountered. This is the matadore, holding in one hand a sword and in the other a flag, which he unfurls and, with it, attracts the eye of the enraged animal. The bull has now become considerably exhausted by loss of blood, and still more by his excessive exertions against his various assailants. He now approaches to his last encounter. Here is a single conflict between the man and the bull, and hence the office of the matadore is always regarded as one of peril. The spectators now bestow their excited attention. The flag being the most regarded by the bull he springs forward towards that, and by so doing, passes under the left arm of the matadore, who, with his right hand strikes the sword into its withers, and separating two vertebræ, dispatches his victim at a single blow. If he thus succeeds he is hailed with the applauses of the whole assembly, but if he so far fails to cause instant death as that the bull is enabled before he dies to reach some other place than that prescribed by the rules of art, hisses and groans are his only reward. If the matadore misses his mark, and the bull kills him, the people continue shouting bravo until he falls by the hand of another.

These sanguinary spectacles retain much of the barbarous gallantry of the middle ages, and impress the stranger with no very favorable idea of Spanish civilization. The people in these cases are not generally satisfied until ten or twelve bulls and about twenty horses have fallen, or at least one matadore has lost his life.

2. Society as it has developed, or is developing itself in the Italian peninsula.

The Italian peninsula in several respects bears a resemblance to the Spanish:

First. Nature has here, as in the Spanish peninsula, walled it out from the rest of Europe. On the north she has planted the Alps, which, more effectually than the Pyrenees, shut out Italy from the continent to which it belongs.

Second. The people of the Italian peninsula, in like manner with those of the Spanish, are diverse in origin and hence variant in character. We have before had occasion to inquire as to the early ethnography of Italy, and have found there in primitive periods many peoples of different origin and character. Although under the Roman sceptre, and during its sway of centuries, these different peoples may have attained to considerable uniformity of character, yet when that sceptre came to be broken, the sudden inrush of barbarians planted all over Italy a new and a strange people. The Goth, the Lombard, the Norman, and others of different tribes, although of the same general character, carried south of the Alps, and under the arch of Italian skies, the customs, habits, and modes of life, reared and perfected amid the forests of Germany. Here was required a second time the exercise of the amalgamating process, and in the course of centuries this, together with other causes, has brought about, in some respects, an uniformity of character.

Third. The religious influences under which for a great number of successive centuries the people of the two peninsulas have lived and have been similar. The same fasts, feasts, and festivals, the same holy days, the same inquisition, although more stern and fearful in Spain, the same cumbersome ceremonial encircling the being at his very birth, and never for a single moment leaving him until, if he have left sufficient means, he is fairly delivered out of purgatory, must all tend in some degree to assimilate the character of the peoples of the two peninsulas.

Fourth. The climate, soil and productions, all the physical influences under which life sustains its burdens, discharges its responsibilities, and develops its powers, are essentially the same upon both peninsulas. These probably produce the greatest effect in the different quantities of labor which are required for the purpose of continued existence. A busy or an idle life may reasonably be expected to produce different habits, and even different manners, customs and social forms.

Fifth. The same absolute form of government has generally on both peninsulas relieved the people from much active interference in its concerns, and left them to spend their time in such other matters and employments as they could devise. All these things tend to render the inhabitants of the two peninsulas similar in their character and social developments, and yet in the midst of some things that are common we shall find many entirely unlike.

Assuming that each one of these peninsulas presents a people of a homogeneous character, the contrasts they present to each other are less marked and peculiar than those presented between each respectively, and the people of France. The French people constitute a kind of social centre in Europe, and present many points of comparison, mostly of contrast, with the people of surrounding nations. In France, severe labor, strong passions, and, in some instances, great wretchedness, wear out life much earlier than in Italy, where heat blunts the appetite, so that they live on little, where their habits are extremely temperate, their thirst quenched by the cool waters descending from the snows of the Apennines; where the climate almost dispenses with the necessity of clothing; and sleep holds much longer in its gentle embrace a people who spend their days without care, and their nights without a thought of the morrow. The Italians are little subject to disease, the relaxation occasioned by heat preventing the chronic, and the perspiration arising from the climate, avoiding the acute.

In regard to briskness and vivacity, the Italians very much resemble the Spaniards, and contrast strongly with the French. Although in the pulpit, on the theatre, and even in conversation, the Italians practice a good deal of action,[1] yet ordinarily in their external deportment, they have a grave solemnity of manner, serious, and at times almost gloomy in its character. They move with a slow, composed pace, apparently preferring the unconstrained attitude of an antique statue, to the artificial graces of a French dancing master, or the erect strut of a German soldier.

In regard to beauty, a style of face peculiar to its own inhabitants is said to prevail in each different nation of Europe. But this must of course be greatly varied, and marked with every degree of discrimination between the extremes of beauty and ugliness.

The Italian female head presents a great profusion of dark hair, sometimes so encroaching upon the forehead as to render it short and narrow; the nose either aquiline or continued in a straight line from the lower part of the brow; the upper lip full and short; the eyes large, and of a sparkling black. The Italian eye is wonderfully expressive, but it labors under one disadvantage and that is, as the iris and pupil have the same color, the contraction and dilatation of the latter is little seen by which the eye is abridged of half its powers. The complexion is of a clear brown, sometimes fair, but very seldom florid, or of that bright fairness which is common in England and Saxony.

Nature, it is said, could not place more happily,[2] nor accord with more effect, the forehead, eyes, nose, mouth, chin, ears and neck, than in the Roman women; she could not possibly employ purer, softer, or more correct forms; all the distinct parts are finished, and the whole is complete. And yet, although nature has endowed the Roman woman with so much beauty of form, and proportion, and complexion, yet she has denied her those fugitive graces

[1] *Travels through Europe*, I, 12. [2] *Idem*, 16.

that give so much charm and attraction. The eyes have but one look, the mouth but one smile. The brow is one of marble, of unvarying aspect, disclosing the footprints neither of pleasure nor of pain. The beautiful features, although moulded upon a classic model, are yet deficient in those gentle undulations and infinite diversity of movements that proclaim the power of sentiment and emotion. The highest style of beauty is found only in those features that are thoroughly permeated by a soul.

The Roman beauty fades early and rapidly. Unsustained by the power of mind and soul, never cultivated by exercise, overwhelmed with sleep, the features soon become plump, and the whole form loses its proportion. Besides it is kept too much shut up, and in the shade, to continue its full bloom.

That part of Italy which most resembles fable land is Venice. A city in the sea, whose streets are long canals of water, whose carriages are gondolas, presents both to the eye and ear a miracle of wonder. No rattling carriage, no clatter of hoof, or hardly sound of footstep greets the ear. Nought but the noiseless dip of the oar, and the arrow-like speed of the gondola, redeem many parts of Venice from being to all appearance a city of the dead. And yet here are the remains of that wealth that was once garnered up from every quarter of the world.

Once a year, on Ascension day, was performed the ceremony of marrying the Adriatic to the doge. The morning was ushered in by the ringing of bells and the firing of cannon. About noon the doge, attended by a numerous party of the senate and clergy, goes on board the Bucentaur, round which a number of splendid yachts and gondolas row, with bands of music, to St. Lido, a small island about two miles from Venice. Prayers are then said, after which the doge drops a plain gold ring into the sea, with these words, "Desponsamus te mare, in signum veri, perpetuiique dominii." "We espouse thee, oh sea, in sign of true and perpetual dominion." And the sea, like a modest bride,

of course assents by silence, and thus the espousal is rendered complete.

The Venetians are a lively, ingenious people, extravagantly fond of public amusements, with an uncommon relish for humor, and yet more attached to the real enjoyments of life, than to those which depend on ostentation. They are in general tall and well made, with a ruddy brown color and dark eyes. The common people are remarkably sober, obliging to strangers, and gentle in their intercourse with each other. The women exhibit a fine style of countenance with expressive features, and a skin of a rich carnation.

The Venetians are extremely fond of theatrical plays, of regattas or rowing matches, entering most heartily into the follies and entertainments of the carnival. Their disguises give occasion to many love adventures; and there is said to be something much more intriguing in the amours of Venice than in those of other countries. During the festivals, riot, debauchery, and licentiousness are carried to the greatest excess.

The Venetian ladies are amorously inclined; and having little check upon inclination, each is very much governed by immediate impulse. They have no resources of study, no duties of family management, and hence very little of a serious, useful character to occupy their time. They were formerly kept much in confinement, but now enjoy a great degree of freedom. There seems to be a great revolution wrought in Venetian husbands. They have, to a large extent, banished from Venetian gallantry not only jealousy, but also poison and the stiletto, having substituted in their places the innocent mask. Those who walk the streets, or go to the play houses with masks actually covering their faces, are either engaged in some love intrigue, or would have others think so, for some desire that reputation, whether actually meriting it or not.

The Venetian courtesans have, at times, enjoyed the special protection of government. Very many, if not the most of these, are sold by their friends in their infancy.

The agreement of sale is reduced to writing, specifying the sum to be paid, and the time at which the young lady is to be delivered up. All this is done before a notary public and stands valid in a court of justice.

Among the Roman women love is a passion possessed of great power. It is with them a matter of business or caprice, but is soon worn out. Their heart loves the instant it arrives at maturity. The subject of love, like the weather, forms a common place topic of conversation. When the daughter does not eat or sleep, the mother speaks of her as having a fit of love as if it were a fit of disease, as a fever.

The girls employ their early youth in practicing, under the maternal eye, the lessons they have received on the art of catching a husband.[1] But in this they are often foiled, as the men are found on their guard. The most notorious gallantry does not seem to affect their reputation.

But it has been remarked that we look in vain among the women for that tenderness of heart which penetrates, satisfies, and enchants; that intimate and secret life, the mutual bliss of two lovers; that tenderness which forms a pleasure of pain, which delights in sacrifices, and increases by enjoyment; that moral love which, if it does not enchain or govern the physical passion, at least decorates and veils it. Nor is there here found those two delightful kinds of friendship between the sexes, the one of which succeeds to love, the other imitates it, and both of which so closely resemble it as to be often mistaken for it.

But a lady speaking of Italian gentlemen says: "Nothing can exceed the agreeableness of a well bred Italian's address,[2] when speaking to a lady, whom they alone know how to flatter, so as to retain her dignity, and not to lose their own; respectful, yet tender; attentive, not officious. The politeness of a man of fashion here is true politeness; free from all affectation, and honestly expressive of what he

[1] *Travels through Europe*, I, 24. [2] *Idem*, 21.

really feels, a true value for the person spoken to, without the smallest desire of shining himself; equally removed from foppery on one side or indifference in the other."[1]

The Italians are accounted the greatest loungers in the world. While walking in the fields, or stretched listlessly in the shade, they seem to enjoy the serenity and genial warmth of their climate with luxurious indulgence. They neither run into the excesses of the English, or display the great frisky vivacity of the French, or the invincible phlegm of the German.[2] They discover a species of sedate sensibility to every source of enjoyment from which they seemingly derive a large share of happiness.

Society is on a very agreeable footing in Florence. Besides the converzationes which are enjoyed here as in other towns in Italy, the nobility are in the habit of meeting daily at the casino. This meeting much resembles the clubs in London. They employ themselves in playing various games, as billiards, cards, etc., or converse the whole evening just as they think proper. Women as well as men are admitted members.[3]

The Sicilians are very animated in conversation, and their action so expressive of their sentiments that without hearing the language used, a person may comprehend the subject of their discourse.[4] The Sicilian ladies are sprightly and agreeable, have remarkable fine hair and adorn it to the greatest advantage. They are amorous, marry young, and frequently live to see the fifth or even sixth generation.

Naples, the fabled product of the siren, has never belied its origin. The people here have few avocations of business to excite their activity; no public walks or gardens to which they can resort, and are, therefore, far more frequently than elsewhere, seen sauntering and conversing in the streets. In the streets of other great European cities the noise of carriages falls with its ceaseless din upon

[1] *Travels through Europe*, 1, 21. [2] *Idem*, 34. [3] *Idem*, 206–7. [4] *Idem*, 377–8.

the ear, but in Naples it is that of human voices. Whole streets are full of talkers, the aggregated clack of whose voices fairly drown the noise of carriages. And yet although almost all the people are in the streets, and all talking to the very top of their voices, there are very few riots or outrages that ever happen in Naples. This arises from two causes, one the national character of the Italians, which is quiet, submissive, and averse to all kinds of riot and sedition. The other cause is to be found in the fact that the common people are universally sober, never being inflamed with strong and spirituous liquors, as they are in the northern countries.[1] This latter characteristic may be said to extend through all the southern countries of Europe, and this fact goes very far to show that God has adapted the tastes of men to the necessities of their physical organizations. Did the same tastes in this respect prevail at the south as at the north, the greater heat of the climate, the finer organization, and the higher nervous susceptibility of the people, would undoubtedly drive them on to excesses which might entirely depopulate the whole region. In Naples, iced water and lemonade, carried about in little barrels, and sold in small quantities for the merest trifle, are among the luxuries of the very lowest of the people.

It is in Naples that we meet with the Lazzaroni, a very numerous class of people, computed at more than thirty thousand, the far greater part of whom have neither home nor fixed habitation. Favored by a climate the most benign, they spend their days in the street, and their nights under porticos, piazzas, or any kind of shelter they can find. Some of them fish, others carry burdens, but in general they will engage in no labor except under the spur of necessity, and whenever driven to it will relapse into their former indolence as soon as they have earned sufficient to buy a few slices of melon, or some maccaroni. They are the very princes of loungers, and more commonly are exhi-

[1] *Travels through Europe*, I, 327.

bited half naked in the streets. The dress of all the lower people is miserable, and yet quite picturesque, consisting principally of a brown cloak thrown over the shoulders in graceful folds. These classes very seldom taste butcher meat, but subsist almost entirely upon fruit, onions, vegetables and fish.

A full knowledge of the manners and customs of the Italians cannot be had without a brief consideration of the carnival. This is an annual religious festival, some traces of which may be found in all catholic countries, but it is more especially celebrated among the Italians, and in the cities of Venice and Rome, more than in other cities of Italy. It has been less celebrated in Venice for some years past, so that Rome, in this respect, has become the great centre of interest. The eight days preceding Ash Wednesday are given up to its festivities. They are held principally in the corso, a street about a mile in length, very narrow, and lined with lofty houses having over-hanging balconies. These approach so near to each other, that persons on opposite balconies are not only brought within speaking distance, but are enabled to exchange bouquets and sugar plums. All these balconies, upon carnival days, are crowded with men and women, many of the latter gayly dressed. In the street below numerous carriages are in motion, filled with gay parties, while crowds of pedestrians masked, and clad in every variety of costume, are playing all kinds of pranks that come within the bounds of decency. Among the masks are punchinellos with enormous noses, and protuberant backs and stomachs; harlequins in parti-colored vestments, wielding daggers of lath; quack doctors with long catalogues of nostrums for all imaginable diseases, and lawyers gowned and wigged, some after a most strange and grotesque fashion. Bonbons and confetti are thrown down from the balconies, and persons become so covered from head to foot, as to resemble millers. The natural gravity of the Roman citizens becomes suddenly changed into the extreme of mirthful vivacity,

and every kind of amusement is followed with the greatest eagerness. No theatrical entertainments are permitted in Rome, except during the carnival, and then they are pushed to excess, as if to make amends for their long privation. The carnival is altogether of six weeks' continuance, but it only becomes extremely intensified during the last eight days. Then all classes enter into it, and the outbursts of humor spread to men, women, and children, descending to the lowest ranks and becoming universal. Even those who are unmasked, reject their usual clothes, and assume some whimsical dress. Young people are found assuming the long beard, tottering step, and other concomitants of old age, while the aged choose the bib and rattle of childhood. At five o'clock, P. M., commence the horse races. The horses have no riders, but are urged forward by metal balls, full of sharp points, which are fastened to the trappings, and which pierce the more the greater the speed. To these the crowd in the corso give way, and they rush over the pavement as if animated by personal passions. In the evening the windows are all illuminated. There is probably no more perfect sample of bedlam anywhere to be found, than Rome during the last eight days of the carnival. It is so called from carni vale, farewell to meat, as from Ash Wednesday, the first day of lent, there is a strict abstinence from all eating of meat for forty days.

At Rome there are reckoned three classes of persons, the pope, the clergy, and the people.[1] The secular and regular clergy are reckoned at a sixth of the entire population. The character of the people is described as possessing little reason, a tolerable share of wit, and a great deal of imagination. Rome is one of the few places in Europe in which the onward march of time dispenses habits without bestowing experience. The Roman people have lost their identity. Every house in Rome on which a cardinal has

[1] *Travels through Europe*, I, 292.

placed his arms, becomes a place of refuge for creditors against judicial executions.[1] These asylums are very numerous, and not unfrequently made a traffic of by some of the cardinals. Impunity from the payment of debts is a source of revenue at Rome.

There is one custom remaining to be noticed, which has no doubt largely influenced the social life of the Italians. I mean that embraced in cicisbeism. Formerly married women were under great restraint in Italy, owing to the jealousy of their husbands. When the free manners of France came to prevail, these unnatural restraints required modification or abandonment. The compromise made was that the wife should go into public under the guidance of a friend of the husband's choosing.[2] Thus a married woman appeared in public leaning on the arm of a man, who, from their frequently whispering together, was called her cicisbeo. It was, at the same time, stipulated that the lady while abroad should converse with no other man but in his presence, and with his approbation.

In process of time, however, as might reasonably be expected, the lady came to have something to say relative to the choice of her cicisbeo, and hence from the husband's it came to be the wife's friend who was the object of choice. In many instances, he was a poor relation or humble friend, who, by this means, procured an admission into society, and was carried about to public diversions as an appendage to the lady.

The cicisbeo visits the lady at her toilet, and, having arranged the plan of passing the evening, retires before dinner. It is usual all over Italy for the husband and wife to dine together except on great occasions, as on that of a public feast. After dinner the husband retires and the cicisbeo returns, and, taking possession of the lady, conducts her to the public walk, the converzatione, the opera, or other place of amusement. He tends upon her with

[1] *Travels through Europe*, I, 291. [2] *Mavor*, XVII, 181.

the most pointed assiduity until the amusements of the evening are over. He then accompanies her home and delivers up his charge to the husband. The husband is also generally engaged in a similar manner, and both resign their charges when the business of the evening is over.

This custom, so similar to the cortejos of Spain, has prevailed the most extensively in Genoa, although its influence has been felt all over Italy. It is now somewhat in a state of decay. It has given rise to much scandal, and in some instances undoubtedly with good reason, but the wholesale charges that have been made against it have generally been considered as without adequate foundation.

It is a matter of no little surprise how men, both in Spain and Italy, can pass so much of their time with women. But the answer which is substantially the same in both is quite satisfactory. The mild climate and great fertility of soil render labor and business very little necessary for the support of life. The nobility dare not intermeddle in politics. They find, in Italy, no employment in the army or navy. They have no hunting amusements, and their temperance forbids all those that arise out of drinking. Gaming it is true, is an avenue into which some rush to avoid the ennui of mere existence. But that is but a single avenue, and all have not a turn for gaming. Nor may those who have, desire to be thus constantly occupied. Under all these circumstances it must cease to surprise that so many are driven to the company and conversation of women to lighten the burdens which time lays so heavily upon them.

3. Society as it has developed, or is developing itself in Switzerland.

The primitive inhabitants of Switzerland were the ancient Helvetii. At the fall of the western Roman empire the Alemanni, Burgundians and Ostrogoths took possession of the almost depopulated country, permitting the aborigines, the Helvetians, to retain their customs and

laws. These latter are supposed to have sprung from a very ancient branch of the Celtic race. By means of their intermixture with the former, the German element came largely to predominate.[1] There are exceptions to this, however, in the inhabitants of the canton of Tessin, who are of Italian descent, and also in those of the canton of Geneva, who are of French lineage.

In the latter, the city of Geneva is much celebrated. Education is there cheap and liberal, and the citizens of both sexes are remarkably well instructed. Even mechanics in the intervals of their labor are said to amuse themselves with the works of Locke, Montesquieu and Newton.[2]

There is here one peculiar and very excellent custom. Parents form societies for their children at a very early period of their lives. These societies consist of ten, twelve, or more children of the same sex, and nearly of the same age and situation in life. They assemble once a week in the houses of their respective parents, who entertain them with tea, coffee, biscuits and fruit, and then leave them to indulge in free conversation. This connection, thus early commenced, is strictly kept up through the whole of life, whatever changes may occur in individual circumstances. To their latest hours, they continue to pass some evenings every year with the companions and friends of their youth.[3] Such a fraternity, thus early established, and life-long in its continuance, is both delightful and instructive.

During several months every year a large number of citizens are much occupied in firing at a mark which is placed at a proper distance, and the most expert marksman,[4] after a sufficient number of trials, is declared king, before whom a mock battle was fought with great spirit by two nearly equal bodies of troops.

The Swiss are an interesting subject of study. Shut out from the rest of Europe by the mountain barriers by

[1] *Iconographic Encyclopædia*, III, 153. [2] *Mavor*, XVI, 202, 203. [3] *Idem*, 204. [4] *Idem*, 205, 206.

which they are surrounded, their homes planted amid scenery that reveals to the beholder visions of terror and sublimity, their intercourse is more with nature than with man, and the character reared under such influences is a matter of curious investigation. The true Swiss character is found the most clearly displayed in the forest cantons, amid the recesses of the Alps. In Glacis, for instance, the antiquated manners of its inhabitants, and their still more ancient habitations,[1] render it like a place of the fifteenth century. The date of their construction is marked on almost all the houses, and some of them have stood more than five hundred years. They are painted with various colors, and on many of them historical events are represented. The streets are crooked and narrow, and the lofty mountains shut out the sun except for about four hours each day.

Much of Switzerland is inhabited by shepherds and husbandmen. These are far removed from the sphere of ambition and intrigue, and apparently are leading a very quiet and peaceful life amid their mountain seclusion. They appear honest, simple, and possessed of much moral purity. But all that is probably overrated, as well as the enviable degree of happiness they are supposed to enjoy. The traveler who visits them in the most favorable season of the year, himself impressed by the grandeur of the scenery by which he is surrounded, finding himself the subject of new sensations and emotions, looks with a charmed eye upon all the people, and naturally transfers to them those qualities and virtues which he supposes those extraordinary physical influences would tend to produce. But there is no doubt a simplicity and honesty there prevailing far in advance of most, if not all, other European countries. But neither in Switzerland, nor in other countries do we find ignorance and poverty united with high moral qualities. In some of the cantons, however, where

[1] *Malte Brun*, VII, 574.

education is diffused, and industry and commerce have become sources of wealth, the people are contented and happy.

The Swiss have little taste for general society.[1] Hence they have few social habits, and little that is purely artificial. The men meet to converse, smoke, and walk about. The usages of society hang so lightly about them, and so great is the simplicity of manners, that it is not difficult to discover the character of the individual, almost at the first interview. There is a great diversity of physiognomies among people of every age, but more especially in the young; there is an extreme mobility of feature; and their expressions are characterized by ingenuousness and vivacity.

But what is lacking in general society is probably more than made up in other ways. It is not too much to suppose that their converse with nature is a source of much quiet enjoyment. But aside from this, the Swiss enter more largely into a realization of home pleasures. It is too often the case, that these, and those of general society, bear to each other an inverse ratio. Domestic happiness, conjugal and parental affections, as well as the other virtues of private life, are far more common in Switzerland, than in countries where social pleasures are better understood, and where the feelings are less concentrated.

The Swiss are generally tall, well proportioned, active and laborious. Bravery, love of labor, attachment to their country, and respect for ancient customs and institutions, form the principal features in the national character:

> Dear is that shed to which his soul conforms,
> And dear that hill which lifts him to the storms;
> And, as a child, when scaring sounds molest,
> Clings close and closer to the mother's breast;
> So the loud torrent, and the whirlwind's roar,
> But bind him to his native mountains more.

[1] *Malte Brun*, VII, 567.

The mass of the people are more enlightened than in other countries; in some of the cantons, not only the wealthy, but the peasantry also, cultivate literature and the arts. A general simplicity of manners, an open and unaffected frankness, and an invincible spirit of freedom characterizes the inhabitants of most of the cantons. Different costumes, of which the origin is very ancient, distinguish the people in most of the cantons. In several, sumptuary laws have been introduced, to banish all the tendencies to luxury. Games of chance are prohibited, but gymnastic exercises are the daily amusements of the young. They employ themselves frequently in the race, in wrestling, in throwing the dart, or in shooting at a target.

The cleanliness of the houses and the people, are peculiarly striking. In the city of Berne the streets, and every part of the city, are kept thoroughly clean by the numerous fountains and limpid streams which water it. In the country the original simplicity of the pastoral life is still preserved, and one often meets with venerable figures with long beards resembling the pictures of the ancient patriarchs. There is great frankness of manner, and a fund of original humor. They are remarkable for quickness of repartee, and rude sallies of wit. There prevails among them great equality, not only political, but in many places also of condition.[1] The houses are built of wood, large, solid and compact, with great pent-house roofs, that hang very low and extend beyond the area of the foundation. This peculiar structure serves to keep off the snow, and accords well with the beautiful wildness of the country.

So very great is the simplicity prevailing in some remote parts of Switzerland, that neither attorney nor notary is to be found there,[2] and contracts instead of being written on parchment, are inscribed on pieces of wood. There are there neither locks, thieves, nor pilferers. In one of the forest cantons, on each side of the road, are to be found

[1] *Manners and Customs*, II, 83. [2] *Idem*, 85.

several ranges of shops uninhabited,[1] yet filled with various goods of which the prices are marked. Those desiring to become purchasers enter the shops, take away the merchandise and deposit the price, which the owners call for in the evening.

A very remarkable circumstance attending the city of Berne is, that it contains a particular street in which, until recently or even at the present time, the inhabitants enjoy the privilege of acquitting or condemning any one of their own body in affairs of life and death;[2] and as every individual who resides in it possesses the right of voting on these occasions, houses are there considerably more valuable than in other quarters of the town.

In that part of Switzerland called the Vallais, idiots and those afflicted with the goitres are frequently to be met with. The latter are large excrescences of flesh that grow from the throat, and often increase to an enormous size. Idiocy also often abounds among these. The same causes probably operate to produce both, but what they are seems never to have been very well understood. According to some accounts the idiots meet with great respect among the people,[3] being considered as blessings from heaven. This is very probably confined to the lower classes of people. They call them "souls of God without sin," and are often preferred by their parents before their other children, because they are incapable of intentional criminality, and are therefore considered certain of future happiness.

4. Society as it has developed or is developing itself among the German nations.

The valleys of the Rhine, the Weser, the Elbe, the Oder, and the upper Danube, are peopled by the German race. The descendants of the old Teutonic stock are still found in the homes of their ancestors. Their country, occupying the centre of Europe, presents great variety in its surface,

[1] *Manners and Customs*, II, 85. [2] *Idem*, 87. [3] *Idem*, 94.

diversity in its soil, and difference in its physical aspects and influences. The different stocks into which the old Teutonic race have become divided are so far modified, or variant from each other, as to be well adapted to the conditions under which they exist.

There is but little strong feeling of race existing among the Germans. This great country, with its teeming population, after sending off so many swarms of emigrants, is far from presenting any true unity either in itself or its people. It presents, and has through all the centuries, a strange instance of a people essentially one, and yet so split up into different principalities, powers, and nations, as to have their sympathies, and almost communications with each other, limited to the subjects of the king, elector or landgrave under whose sway they lived. It is owing to this strange political anomaly that the power of the German has been so little directly felt in Europe. The manners, customs, and social life of the German have been very considerably modified by it.

A love of liberty has ever been a strong characteristic of the German mind, and yet Germany has, for many centuries, been divided into a great number of little petty principalities, in which the sovereigns, in attempting to ape those of larger domains, have been necessarily compelled to oppress their subjects, fettering all their energies by subjecting them to a grievous load of taxation. This applies more especially in those earlier divisions known as the marquisate of Brandenburg, Pomerania, Lusatia, Moravia, Bohemia and Austria.[1] In the free imperial cities, the burghers generally enjoy great privileges, and the peasants in some portions of the country, as on the Rhine and in Franconia, have been much less oppressed than in others. The political condition of a people always exerts a strong influence upon their manners, customs, and the spirit lying at the foundation of their social life.

[1] *Travels through Europe*, II, 29, 30.

The modern Germans have large heads, with the anterior part of the cranium elevated and fully developed.[1] This peculiarity of form exists in them in a greater degree than either the French or English. Their intellectual power is great, especially the reflective. They love research, and profound investigation. They have a strong moral sense, a deep love of truth and rectitude, unshaken fidelity, veneration for the female sex, and attachment to the ruling princes. They have ever been esteemed an honest, hospitable people, free from artifice and disguise, open and social in their general manner. They are naturally phlegmatic and saturnine, requiring very little variety, and enduring the languid uniformity of life always with patience, and often with satisfaction.

The German character exhibits nothing of the fire of the south, and little of the elasticity that prevails in more southern climes. It is distinguished by no nicety of taste, by no rapidity in the movement of its elements. It lacks, also, the duplicity that too frequently characterizes the movements of the southern mind. But it possesses sterling qualities.[2] The frame is powerful; the features strongly marked; the hair mostly blonde; the eyes blue or gray; the carriage firm and sedate; the manner fixed and determined.

The ladies have generally fine complexions, and some of them, especially in Saxony, possess great delicacy of feature and shape. Although the French exhibit more expression in the countenance, yet the Germans have the advantage in the fairness of their skin, and the bloom of their complexion.

The Germans are great smokers and drinkers. It is a most wise provision of Providence, that the strong taste for stimulating liquors should be limited, in a great degree, to the old Teutonic stock; to men of large bodies

[1] *Prichard*, III, 393. [2] *Iconographic Review*, III, 181.

and phlegmatic temperament, whose powers, both of body and mind, are so slow, as to render a resort to stimulants often salutary, and seldom injurious, unless indulged in to excess.

The common people are laborious and honest, but slow and heavy;[1] the merchants, fair in their dealings, hospitable and complaisant; the nobility, men of great honor, but valuing themselves very greatly upon birth and family. All the sons of noblemen inherit their fathers' titles, and this, while it is agreeable to a sense of justice, and does credit to the German feeling, at the same time greatly perplexes the heralds and genealogists of that country. Many of the princes being poor, their younger sons often engage in the service of the emperor, the electors, or some sovereign state; or procure some of the ecclesiastical preferments so numerous in catholic countries.

Germany has always been divided into numerous political divisions. At one period the number of these was about three hundred. At present they number about thirty-six. They have been subject to great changes.

Each political division must of course have its court, its palace, its officers, its standing army. All this requires a heavy amount of taxation upon the people.

The feudal system has probably lingered longer, and left in the social fabric more remains in Germany than in any other country of Europe. The castle-crowned hills that mark the course of the Rhine, more strongly perhaps than other parts of Germany, proclaim the strongholds of the feudal barons. One of the consequences of the firm establishment and long continuance of the system was the extension of serfdom over almost the whole of Germany. Wherever this prevails a barrier is erected between the ownership and the cultivation of lands, between idleness and labor. The first reaps where it has not sowed; the second sows where it cannot reap. That great natural law

[1] *Travels through Europe*, II, 29.

that should award to labor the result of its own toils is most signally violated. But although down-trodden for centuries yet its self-assertion must in the end prevail.

Men have everywhere the strongest desire to own the land upon which they labor. This desire has lain at the foundation of many a great political revolution. The French revolution was stimulated by it. All over Europe, with the exception of Great Britain, the last half century has been witnessing the abolition of serfdom, until it may now perhaps be said to be confined principally to Russia, and even there to be in the process of abolition.

Under the feudal system, or as a result of it, the land was possessed by a class of nobles who held the peasants on their estates as serfs. These nobles alone in the greater part of Germany could hold and purchase land that was free from servitude. The peasant holdings, or feud lands, which were held under services, often of a personal and degrading kind, were the only landed estates that a capitalist, not of noble birth, could purchase or hold.[1]

The first step towards giving freedom to the German serf, was taken in 1807, but it was not until 1810 that their freedom was secured.[2] The object first sought was to secure to the feud-holding peasantry the possession of their lands, they rendering rent for their use.[3] This served to legalize their claim. The next step was to include the serfs who lived on the outskirts of the land, and who paid for the use of the small patches they cultivated by their daily labor. Then came the final measure, rendering them absolute proprietors of their several holdings and patches upon conditions so easy as almost to render them free gifts to all. This was more especially the course of things in Prussia, next to Austria, the most leading of all the German states. But most of the other German states soon followed the example, and thus came such a multitude of small proprietors and little patch-work fields throughout

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 56. [2] *Idem*, 55. [3] *Idem*, 57.

all Germany.[1] It was not until the year 1821, that the bondage of serfdom was completely removed.

This abrogation of signorial rights, which had been recognized for centuries, required the strong exercise of despotic power to effect, and probably any power less than despotic would have failed to accomplish. The result was to elevate the serf into the proprietor, without, however, giving him political rights, while a large body of the aristocracy, deprived of their income, were reduced to a very uncomfortable situation. This has given rise to commotion and change among the social elements of Germany.

A problem of no inconsiderable importance presented itself in the inquiry as to what should be done with the great numbers thus deprived of their subsistence. It was finally solved by their employment as government officials, and hence the swarms of these dignitaries, that are found in every German court. Their dependence is immediately upon the king or head of the state from whom they receive their appointment, and whose interests, therefore, they are bound to subserve. Their support is wrung by heavy taxation from the pockets of the people. The real result, therefore, is in imparting strength to the kings, princes, and courts by means of these new aids, which are identified with them in interest, and in transforming the rents, by which they were formerly supported, into taxes, by which they are now enabled to live. The serf, it is true, has become the nominal owner of his land, but his real condition is not so essentially changed.

It is, however, a singular fact that this great change, from serfdom to proprietorship, has had scarcely an appreciable effect upon the social condition of the Germans. Such a change we should naturally expect would lead the peasantry gradually to adopt the dress, the manners, and modes of living of those above them. It is everywhere else true

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 55.

that the country imitates the town. But in Germany scarce anything of this kind is perceptible. Within the walls of the city we encounter the dress, customs, foibles and frivolities of fashionable life. Outside of those walls we are in the domain of peasant life; a life that seems stereotyped; that in all its material features has remained the same for a thousand years. Desolating wars have swept over the country; new thrones and principalities have been erected and overthrown; new dynasties come and gone; the life of serfdom ran its course and terminated; and yet essentially the same social condition has all along stamped the same impress upon peasant life.

Is this for the reason that this life contains within itself no principle of progress, no means of improvement, no aspirations after higher styles of life and enjoyment? We suppose not. There is, no doubt, truth in the fact that the phlegmatic character of the German is indisposed to change, and also that the heavy weight of centuries render it a matter of difficult accomplishment. But a stronger cause than all these is probably to be found in the ceaseless and severe pressure from above. The higher class, centering in the court, and the more commonly culminating in despotism, presses with terrible severity upon all below. The great agent through which this pressure is more especially manifested is the severe taxation to which the people are subjected. As the court and all that appertains to it, the standing army, and the army of hungry officials, are all nourished and sustained through the taxes levied upon the people, it must be obvious that all that cannot be effected without very great oppression. This, together with the harsh usage, on many occasions bestowed by the higher upon the lower classes, has largely contributed to keep them where they are, and thus prevent any rise in their condition. The bad state of feeling engendered between the former land holders and the serfs who have risen to the rights of ownership, has no doubt had its share in bringing about the result.

The social life of the Germans is susceptible of two divisions. The one embraces the life spent at the different courts, and this presents nothing very peculiar. The customs of the highest circles, and the manner of life led by those who compose them, will be found nearly the same through the civilized world. In the highest development of that which constitutes the social element, we find everywhere that uniformity that proclaims the unity of man and the identity of the race to itself.

The fashions of the different courts are taken principally from Paris; but it is observed that each little court has an entirely distinct costume in many points peculiar to itself. This may, perhaps, be resorted to with the view of giving it prestige and importance. The same motive actuates different noble families in England to dress their servants and attendants in livery, so that they may be more readily distinguished.

One feature, however, marks in a stonger manner than elsewhere the higher life of the German, and that is the rigid formality and strict etiquette that are carried through all their social arrangements. This, although chilling to every warm and spontaneous impulse, yet tends certainly to preserve an unvarying uniformity, and to continue unbroken, from generation to generation, the same manners, customs, and modes of life.

It is when we direct our inquiries towards the country, and the peasant life of Germany, that we find presenting many points of interest. The one relates to guilds or trade associations. We have already seen in the element of industry the agency exercised by these guilds in the development of that element. We now only contemplate them in their social aspects.

One of the rules of the guild is that everyone after serving his apprenticeship at his trade must travel for the space of three years practicing his trade,[1] and must then produce

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 118, etc.

a specimen of his workmanship, and this, together with a certificate from the master of the guild as to his capacity and fitness, may be sufficient to procure him employment.

There are several kinds of guilds, some of which are peculiar to cities, and some to villages. In both they essentially control the carrying on of the trade and handicraft to which they belong. No one can establish a business except under their auspices. When a young man has completed his apprenticeship he procures his certificate of birth, time spent in service, the rules of his guild, and passport from the police, and then starts off on his travels.

In all large towns there is an inn for journeymen of each particular handicraft, which is known by the sign exhibited, such as a boot, watch, horse-shoe, barrel or any symbol of a particular trade. To this the journeyman resorts, and, having deposited his certificate, goes forth in search after work. He calls at each shop where his particular craft is carried on, and offers his services. When his services are wanted his credentials are examined, and, if satisfactory, he works out the engagement he makes, and then shoulders his pack and recommences his travels.

Thus, on every high road, may be seen these wandering journeymen traversing the whole country generally two by two, demanding work in every city and village. When in one place they obtain and work out an engagement, they travel on to another.

It may happen that no employment can be found, and to meet this contingency, some of the guilds raise a fund by the payment of a small sum annually, which is devoted to the support of those who cannot find employment while seeking it. The employment is dependent entirely upon the fact of belonging to a guild, and each guild has its rules, punishing by exclusion those who do not conform to them.

As a general thing the members of each guild only associate with each other, and their meetings of boisterous merriment, for drinking, and the song, or dance, are limited

to themselves and their friends, and exhibit a good degree of rowdyism.

The object of these traveling journeymen is to acquire varied information, presuming that each place can teach something new; but that which originally was undoubtedly an excellent custom, has, through the lapse of centuries, completely annihilated its own benefit, in that all the particulars of every handicraft have come to be as well known in one place as another. Such a mutual exchange has been kept up between the shops of Germany, that a great sameness is everywhere observable, and "in every house from the Black sea to the Baltic, and from the Volga to the Rhine, may be seen the same tables, chairs, sofas, the same knives, plates and candlesticks, the same door handles, window fastenings, flower-pots, brooms, brushes, mops and dishcloths, all of the same pattern."

One bad effect of this guild system is, that the master builder is the only one who can, by the rules of the guild, superintend building.[1] He may be old fashioned, and belong to a past century, and totally unable to give such a construction as will satisfy either taste or utility, and yet, to the exclusion of all enterprising young men, he must be employed as long as he is supported by the guild.

Nor is this all. The widow of a master workman possesses the privilege of promoting another to that desirable situation. She has even the privilege of offering herself to a young man in the factory or shop where he has served his apprenticeship, and in case of his declension, he will be dismissed from service. Hence, it so often occurs that young men are found married to women, sometimes twice as old as themselves.

The beneficial results to agriculture which have flowed from the elevation of the serf into the proprietor, are everywhere decisively marked. Proprietary rights are very

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 119.

limited in extent; expensive implements of husbandry, employed by large farmers, cannot profitably be used; and the free use of the spade, the hoe, and the rake, give, in many places, the whole country the appearance of a garden. Much attention in Germany is given to agriculture as a science. It is taught in the universities, and in the agricultural schools.

Besides, there are meetings of agricultural societies, at which much information concerning different styles of culture is gathered up, and every possible inquiry made in reference to every matter of interest to agriculture.[1] All the statements are carefully compared by a committee, and advice given in reference to changes and improvements. Women in all parts of Germany are employed to work in the field. One thing that tends to render this necessary, is the great number of men, who, from the mistaken policy of Europe, are compelled to lead a soldier life.

A curious superstition prevails in Brunswick, that one called upon to testify in a court of justice, only thinks himself bound to tell the truth when occupying a certain position; his left hand being held down by the side,[2] his right in front of the breast, with the two forefingers pointing outward. They are carefully watched while testifying, to see that they do not change their position, because, if such should be the fact, they would feel themselves at liberty to deviate as much as they pleased.

Among the peculiar institutions of Germany, are the fairs and markets, held for the purpose of supplying the daily wants of the people. They answer the purpose of shops and provision stores in other countries. There are usually four more important than others, which correspond with the four seasons. Besides these, in each duchy, or principality, there are the great fairs, held twice a year, at Leipsic, Brunswick, and Frankfort, to which

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 128. [2] *Idem*, 149.

people resort from all parts of Germany.[1] At these are exhibited the manufactures and other industrial products of the Germans. Along the squares and main street are erected little booths, and tables are spread, where all manner of wares are offered for sale.

These fairs are looked forward to with great interest, because in their train come toys, pictures, and various amusements. The circus is present.[2] Panoramas, dioramas are present. Year after year, and century after century, the some position is occupied by the same shop or exhibition. Everything that is bought and sold in the whole country finds a place here, and samples are often shown, and orders taken to be afterwards supplied. A custom has lately grown up of employing runners to carry around specimens for exhibition, and to take orders.

At these fairs the law fixes the hour of sale, which is ushered in by musicians, and this they continue to do during the three weeks the fair is in session.[3] They have also agricultural fairs as well as those for the exhibition and sale of manufactured articles.

There is much distinction of rank in Germany. The first grade consists of the clergy.[4] The second of the nobles. In this there are several varieties such as princes, counts, barons, knights. The third is made up of the burghers and peasantry. The nobles live isolated in their castles, which are situated on the peaks of mountains, or in the depths of forests, or upon solitary plains. Much of their subsistence, and no small share of their pleasures are derived from the chase. Their proud air, and measured haughty step, everywhere distinguishes them from the common people.[5] They consider it debasing to follow an honest occupation, or to wed an ignoble woman.

In all the great cities will be found two classes of citizens: the one composed of the common people, mechanics,

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 151. [2] *Idem*, 158. [3] *Idem*, 159. [4] *Idem*, 179. [5] *Idem*, 179.

manufacturers, merchants; the other of the noble born, generally younger sons of the great families, following no occupation publicly, monopolizing the offices, and styling themselves patricians.

In some parts of Germany, and formerly in almost all parts of it, is another social condition, viz: that of the serf, who tills the earth, living in villages or lonely cottages. The dwelling is a rude hut, constructed of mud and wattles, and thatched with straw, his garb a coarse gown and straw hat; his food black sour bread with thin porridge or pulse soup; his drink water or milk; his toil is incessant; and his treatment often harsh and severe.

The Germans are full of legends and superstitions. They believe in signs and wonders, ghosts and hobgoblins, and almost every act of their lives is influenced by some light or shadow which has fallen upon their path, and which they attribute to some supernatural being.[1] More especially are the old castles hung with legendary lore, and tradition faithfully bears from one generation to another tales of love and war, the doings of the bold knight and his lady love. The superstition of the death-call prevails in Germany among the common people; that is, if one heard, or imagined he heard, a voice, he was sure it was the angel of death summoning him to judgment.[2]

Many of the social customs and habits of the Germans flow from their industrial pursuits. Among these those of the vintage are not the least considerable.

Many districts in Germany are vast vineyards, although the vine seems somewhat capricious in regard to the circumstances under which its growth commences and matures. It must be a sunny slope or a sheltered valley, and to these must be added a clime both uniform and genial. This necessity of resorting to the sunny hillside and the sheltered vale results in giving variety and picturesque beauty to those regions where the vine culture is

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 189. [2] *Idem*, 290.

carried to the greatest perfection. The Rhine Gau, formed by a sudden change in the direction of the Rhine by which it is made to describe a semicircle between Mayence and Coblentz has been called the paradise of Germany. Not only within its limits, but far away in every direction, are hills crowned with castles and smiling with vineyards.[1]

Neither vineyards nor fields in Germany are surrounded with fences. Everything is open and apparently exposed. But a more careful observation will discover that as soon as the fields grow productive, watchers are stationed by government among the hills and valleys, who exercise both day and night such a ceaseless vigilance, that while the harvests are ripening, a man may not even enter his own field without permission.[2] When the harvest is ripe it is the police that fixes the day for gathering it. This arrangement saves the expense of fences which are unnecessary to protect against cattle as they are kept all safe in their stalls.

The vintage usually commences about the twelfth of October. On the week previous the police give a formal notice, accompanied by the ringing of bells.[3] The evening previous the bells are again rung, and in the early morning they ring out a merrier peal, which is signalized by the issuing forth of the vintagers in their holiday costume, with basket in hand, and singing as they go, to gather the ripe grapes. Thus the full swell of song is made to echo among the hills while their well filled baskets are sometimes deposited in large vats in the fields,[4] and in others carried to barns or granaries preparatory to pressing in mills very similar to the process of making cider from apples.

The old and universal custom was to tread the grapes upon the spot, and this is still the practice in many of the provinces. This is accomplished by placing the grapes in a large flat tub, and then setting men with naked feet to

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 205. [2] *Idem*, 200. [3] *Idem*, 215. [4] *Idem*, 217.

trample upon them until the juice is all pressed out. Another mode, still, is by pounding them in small troughs, and then allowing the juice to settle before pouring it into tuns, hogsheads and barrels. When the vintage is over, a ball is celebrated in every village.

The grape cure is the one grand remedy for all diseases, and does sometimes effect astonishing cures. This is the mode by which it is administered.[1] Those desiring it spend the vintage season where they can procure grapes in abundance, and eat many pounds a day, as long as they last. The blood, by these means, is supposed to be wholly renewed and purified, and thus a change radically wrought in the system.

An occasion of gathering together among the Germans is also presented in the apple-bee, at which the cutting and drying the winter store of apples takes place. Here it is that the maiden consults the oracle of the future by swinging three times around her head the long paring, and then watching the form into which it falls, confidently expecting it to cut the initials of her lover's name.[2]

Among the Erz mountains live the miners, the weavers of linen, the makers of lace, and the manufacturers of wooden ware.[3] They are all poor, but extremely industrious. Three or four families live under one straw-thatched roof, being separated from each other by chalk marks for dividing lines. The running brook, by a simple machinery of wheels and paddles is made to rock the cradle of the infant, while its unbroken music hushes the little one to slumber. Potatoes and salt are almost their only living, while the shuttle and the bobbin, the hammer and the pick-axe through all the day preserve their unvaried monotony of sound. And yet, even here, the young men spend the long winter evening in wooing, and the old in telling of the olden times, and Christmas brings its song and conviviality.

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 219. [2] *Idem*, 329. [3] *Idem*, 373.

In Westphalia and Oldenbarg they have a singular custom of keeping alive the fire in the great family room.[1] They never permit it to go out except when the head of the household dies, and then it must be rekindled by the new heir. "Take a place by my fire," is the phrase of hospitality to all who come under the roof.

The Germans are a people much attached to festivity. One great evidence of this is their mingling the festive with the useful. When, for instance, a village raising is to occur, and the roof is ready to be placed on the walls,[2] the neighbors are invited to attend, and when the rafters are joined, a man ascends to the highest point with a large wreath, with which he crowns the rafters when united, then makes a speech, and takes a bottle of wine which he hurls to the earth.[3] If it do not break no luck will come to the house or its owners. Afterwards a procession is formed, and a feast and dance closes the concern.

During the winter, the spinning circle moves from house to house being held twice or three times a week.[4] Each maiden is accompanied by her lover, who carries her wheel, and sits by her during the evening. These circles do not always end as decorously as they begin.

The Thuringians, uniting the qualities both of the north and the south, are true-hearted, hospitable, reflecting and diligent. It has been said of them that "there is ever a deep thought in their heads, and ever a light song upon their lips." They are rich in sagas and superstitions, and abound in festivals.

The young in Germany are greatly given to amusements. Almost everything begins and ends with a dance. Even church celebrations offer no exceptions. Every village inn has its ball room, which is the best finished and most pleasant room in the house.[5] The balls, especially in the catholic portions of Germany, frequently occur

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 376. [2] *Idem*, 312. [3] *Idem*, 312. [4] *Idem*, 313. [5] *Idem*, 226.

on Sundays. They are accompanied with smoking and drinking, and often last through the entire night. These two vices are extremely common throughout Germany.

The reason why balls and dances are so immensely popular is because that affords the best, and in fact almost the only, opportunity to the young of each sex to become acquainted with each other. In Germany the homes of the people are not often the scenes of social gatherings, where the young of the sexes can become acquainted with each other. The young female spends her time at home, except on the occasion of public balls and festivals; while the young man frequents the club room, where drinking and smoking are indulged in often to excess. The result of this is most unfortunate upon the manners of the people. The men are rough and harsh, wanting in refinement and politeness, and although not absolutely vicious, yet are ill fitted to become the companions of refined and delicate ladies.

Another result of this is that in Germany the manœuvering tactics to spread and catch in the matrimonial net are very little practiced. As soon as the young men are fairly embarked in business for themselves, they are regularly besieged by mothers having marriageable daughters, and in the end each probably finds it for his interest to take one in order to get rid of all the others.

The entire freedom of the ball-room, and the easy access of both sexes to it, affords large means of forming acquaintance. A matron, it is true, accompanies each young lady, but while there she is entirely free to dance and talk with whoever she pleases.[1] This appears to be a very general custom among both high and low.

There is nothing very peculiar in the German betrothal and wedding, and ceremonies observed are not very uniform. A very important church ceremony observed in Germany is that of confirmation. All persons by law must

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 229.

be members of the church,[1] and somewhere, between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, must be confirmed, and thus received into full communion. To this rite or ceremony is attached vast importance. No one can enter upon any profession or business until its performance. It is no less important to girls. With them it is the passport to young ladyhood and its privileges.[2] It entitles them to doff the short dresses and deck themselves in the long skirts of woman, and to attend public balls and dances.

At Whitsuntide, as in England on the first of May, the May-pole is reared in the country, many of them often shooting up in every village, dressed from top to bottom,[3] and also little arbors in front of every door, called lovers' bowers, in which they sit and sing, or dance and play. At the same time the first thing that meets the opening eye of the maiden in the morning is the wreaths of evergreen and flowers that are hung about their doors and windows.

Funerals in Germany are generally attended in the morning, sometimes very early. In protestant Germany a minister is seldom in attendance.[4] The pall-bearers are appointed by the state, but paid by the family. They are of three different ranks, depending upon difference in the amount of their charge. In Hamburg, hired mourners attend, but the expense attending upon these exhibitions has resulted in their being limited to the rich. In the churchyards during the summer the monuments are hung with wreaths, and in cold weather artificial flowers often supply the place of the natural. In the country burial grounds one portion is allotted to the aged and married, another to the youth, and another, still, to the children.

In the northern part of Prussia some singular funeral customs prevail among the peasantry. Immediately upon the death of a person the window is opened to give the spirit free egress,[5] and a piece of money is placed in the

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 249. [2] *Idem*, 351. [3] *Idem*, 349. [4] *Idem*, 224. [5] *Idem*, 376.

mouth to furnish it with the means of support while on its way to the other world or while there.[1] In the coffin are placed a bowl and spoon, the comb which belonged to the deceased, and the hair last combed from his head. The body is accompanied to the grave with songs in the belief that the more they sing the happier will the spirit be in heaven. Each relative deposits something in the coffin, a piece of his coat, or shirt, or handkerchief, and a lock of hair, with a flask of brandy.

In some districts of lower Austria and in Styria, especially in those mountainous parts bordering on Hungary, there prevails a strange custom, which has grown into a habit of eating arsenic. The peasantry are more especially given to it, commencing with a small quantity weighing less than half a grain, which they take while fasting several mornings in the week for a considerable time. Very carefully and gradually they increase the dose according to the effect produced, until some take at one time a quantity weighing four grains. When once entered upon, this custom is generally kept up during life.

The object is two-fold, one to obtain a fresh, healthy appearance, to acquire a certain degree of embonpoint. The young of each sex, by this means, render themselves more attractive to each other, for it is the youthful poison eaters that are the most distinguished by a blooming complexion, and an appearance of exuberant health.

The other object is to make them better winded, that is, to render their respiration freer and easier when ascending the mountains. They often practice taking a small quantity when about to ascend heights, and the effect it has upon respiration, and the movements of the chest is truly surprising.

Although some fall victims to the practice, especially from over doses at the commencement, yet in those in whom the habit is thoroughly established there is no trace of an

[1] *Peasant Life in Germany*, 376.

arsenical cachexy discernible, and the symptoms of a chronic arsenical poisoning never show themselves in individuals who adapt the dose to their constitution. But what is very remarkable is that when, for any reason, the use is discontinued and the habit broken up, symptoms of illness appear resembling those produced by poisoning from arsenic, such as difficulty in breathing, a burning pain from the pylorus to the throat, want of appetite, indifference to persons and things, great personal anxiety, and various distressing sensations, for all which there is but one remedy, viz: a return to the habit.

Thus the commencement and continuance creates the necessity not only of keeping up the habit, but of taking constantly increasing doses, until the system can endure nothing further, and death occurs from a demand which it becomes equally fatal either to grant or refuse.

5. Society as it has developed or is developing itself in France.

The French people are a mixture of the ancient Celts, Romans and Germans, and while they form a connecting link between the people of the south and those of the north, they will be found in their general traits of character and social habits to bear a stronger resemblance to the inhabitants of the south of Europe. There are also other distinct stocks, as the Bretons in the Amorican peninsula, the Basques and Gascons at the foot of the Pyrenees, and the Walloons near Belgium, that enter into and modify French character.

Thus, taken altogether, the French people present much variety in their development of social life. While the inhabitant of Brittany is distinguished for violent passions, and stubbornness,[1] the people of Normandy are crafty, selfish and quarrelsome. On the banks of the Somme, the people are plain in their habits, and irritable in disposition.

[1] *Iconographic Encyclopædia*, III, 194.

In northern France, Flemish customs prevail. The people are unsocial, and addicted to spirituous liquors. On the Maine, and in the region of the upper Seine, in what was formerly Champagne, the manners of the inhabitants are very plain. Among the mountaineers of Vosges we find a prevalence of German blood, and hence a people candid, open-hearted, hospitable, and phlegmatic. The inhabitants of the Jura are temperate and frugal, and free from violent passions. In the valleys of the Rhone, Dordogne, Garonne and Adour, the people are generally of a very lively temper, impassioned, and fond of the figurative style of language. In Languedoc these same traits are associated with refined and amiable manners, while in Provence it is much the reverse of this. In Guyenne and Gascony the inhabitants have little of frankness in their character; while among the mountains of Auvergne and Limousin, the people are poor but good-natured and candid, charitable and hospitable. These original diversities in disposition should have their weight in any estimate to be formed of social life in France.

The origin of these diversities is probably largely owing to the different ethnic races, or different types of the human race, that occupy the soil of France. The name France, is derived from the Franks, a tribe of the Teutonic type, who, on the overthrow of the Roman power, established themselves in that territory, and became the dominant race. This German element was the most strongly prevalent in the north of France and hence the reign of feudalism which it brought along with it,[1] was there the most thoroughly established and continued the longest to exert its influence. In Normandy, another cognate race, of the same ethnic type, the Normans, long subsequently established themselves, and gave to that province the same dominant race that afterwards so strongly impressed the great features of its character upon English civilization.

[1] *Hotz's Gobineau*, 183,

But deeply underlying these German types are the remains of the old Allophilian race, which has already been alluded to in another connection, supposed by many to be the aborigines of Europe, and found more in the southern than in the central and northern parts of France; and intermediate between that and the German, are the first migrating or Celtic race, the remains of which are found in the western, central and southern provinces. Of these different races, so far as their types have been preserved, the Teutonic and Celtic have exerted the strongest influence in moulding the character and guiding the destiny of the French people.

The first mentioned of these two, early became dominant in the north of France, while everywhere else, with the exception of Normandy, the ancient Gauls, principally of Celtic origin, formed the great bulk of the population. This preponderance of the German element guided the policy of the country until the forepart of the fifteenth century, when the threatened annihilation of the French monarchy, under the English invasion, aroused the population of the central provinces, who, rallying around Charles VII, drove back the English invaders, restored the French nationality, and infused into it that taste for military life, glory and conquest which are more Celtic than Teutonic, and which have ever since very strongly prevailed.

Another change occurred towards the close of the sixteenth century when the Bourbon dynasty in the person of Henry IV, from the south, with his Aquitanian followers, not only brought with it a still stronger desire for military achievement, but also that centralization of power, which was derived from Rome, and was most favorable for success. This ascendancy of the southern populations, accompanied by the military spirit and the centralization of power, was one of the principal agencies that gave to Paris in modern times such a mighty preponderance,[1] rendering it really the

[1] *Hotz's Gobineau*, 184.

sovereign of the state. This great capital contains a population which is a motley compound of all the most varied ethnical elements. The expression so common that "Paris is France," refers to its scientific, social, and political domination, and not to its occupying a representative character.

There are classes in other large cities that enable them to resemble Paris, but between the capital and the country there is hardly a single point of resemblance. It has long since been observed that "Paris is separated from the rest of France by a line of demarkation so decided and accurately defined,[1] that at the very gates of the capital, a nation is found, utterly different from that within the walls. Although much is said about the French character as if it were homogeneous, yet there is really very little similarity of thoughts, of views, of feelings, or of aught that goes to make up a nationality.[2] It has been boldly asserted by an enlightened Frenchman that there is not one principle that governs society and is connected with French civilization, which is understood in the same manner in all the departments. No reference is here had to the peculiarities that characterize the native of Normandy, of Brittany, Angevin, Limousin, Gascony and Provence, in each one of which the population differs from all the others in its tendencies, modes of thinking, and even physical appearance. But it is the different rural populations of France, the great body of the peasantry, among whom the very rudiments of knowledge remain an impenetrable mystery, very few of them being acquainted with reading and writing. This is not owing to the want of educational means.[3] The smallest village affords ample opportunities for common education. It arises from a reluctance to acquire knowledge. Even beyond this, it has been traced to a feeling of positive hostility to French civilization. Although some are legally compelled to submit to an elementary education, yet they

[1] *Hotz's Gobineau*, 292. [2] *Idem*, 292. [3] *Idem*, 293.

return forever to the local patois of their birth place which in many cases bears but little resemblance to the French language,[1] sometimes, as in Landes, differing even in the roots of which it is composed.

Among these peasant populations the greatest taciturnity and reserve prevails.[2] Between them and the bourgeoise, as they are termed, or the landed proprietors, there is but little communication and less sympathy. In their isolation from the civilization of the age, they do not appear actuated by a feeling of degradation. Their affections and antipathies do not arise from mere accidental circumstances, but are based upon clearly conceived and well defined ideas. These populations are found more prevalent in central and southern France where the Teutonic element has no existence or is possessed of little strength. They regard themselves as a distinct race, a race that is weak and depressed, a race,[3] therefore, that can accomplish nothing by force, and whose only resort is to cunning and stratagem. They do not constitute a class but a caste, as strongly marked almost as those of ancient Egypt or modern India.

Among these populations may still be found the local costumes of the middle ages. Their manners, customs and modes of thinking are peculiar to themselves. It is among them that the clergy are compelled to battle with mysterious superstitions, or hereditary tendencies, all the more formidable because they are seldom openly avowed, but are cherished in silence and solitude.[4] There are still parishes in France where the superstitions of heathenism still prevail.[5] In catholic Brittany even in the last centuries, the bishop in vain attempted to withdraw his flock from the worship of an idol of stone. The rude image was thrown into the water, but rescued by its obstinate adorers, and even the assistance of the military was rendered necessary to break it in pieces.

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[1] *Hotz's Gobineau*, 294. [2] *Idem*, 297. [3] *Idem*, 300. [4] *Idem*, 296. [5] *Idem*, 137.

These populations, fortunately, are neither wicked nor ill disposed.[1] Among themselves they are kind-hearted, charitable and obliging. They stand in mysterious terror of the laws, have no part in their making, and hate and distrust all those above themselves. There are among them wealthy people, and, in general, they are not as poor as the lower classes in cities. Sunk in apathetic indifference they take no interest in the political movements of the country. With the single exception of the peasant war of La Vendee, the French peasantry have taken no interest whatever in the revolutions through which France has passed within the last century. Whether Bourbon, Orleanist, or republic is triumphant, is to them a matter of indifference.[2] There were rural districts in which the peasants did not hear of the expulsion of the Bourbon dynasty until years afterwards.

It is obvious, that this lower stratum of population in France can exert little, if any, influence upon social life or the progress of civilization. It has been computed that of the thirty-six millions in France only ten participate in the ideas and mode of thinking upon which French civilization is based,[3] while the remaining twenty-six altogether ignore them, being indifferent and even hostile to them.

There is a kind of population above the peasantry, who may be better designated as a class than a caste. This also consists of laborers, but they are those employed in the manufactories,[4] and in the large cities. These are easily induced to learn to read and write. They generally acquire the rudiments of knowledge, but the culture bestowed upon them is intellectual, not moral. While their moral nature is suffered to run to waste, they come up with clear intellectual perceptions of their own social degradation, and of the many enjoyments of every description of those above them. To them, therefore, life offers little except in the line of revolution. They readily imbibe ideas and senti-

[1] *Hotz's Gobineau*, 300. [2] *Idem*, 302. [3] *Idem*, 303. [4] *Idem*, 295.

ments subversive of all social order. Toward the civilization which they can comprehend and appreciate, but never hope to enjoy, they entertain an uncompromising hostility. It is among these that the projectors of the wildest and most incendiary schemes, readily recruit their partisans. It is here that socialism is nourished; tha tcommunity of goods and wives becomes a cherished dream of the fancy; and that all the ills and abuses that afflict the social system find an all powerful remedy in the destruction of that system. To these men life offers little of enjoyment under the present constitution of things, and hence they care little for its continuance. They are ever ready to risk its loss for the realization of what a change may bring. Their employment, not isolated like that of the peasantry, brings them much together, and enables them to compare ideas and arrange their plans. These are the men of blouses and of barricades, who are ever ready to welcome a revolution because it brings a change, and who expect to find amidst the wild conflict of political forces the long sought panacea for all social evils.

There are, however, portions of country to which this picture has no application. Among the agricultural and manufacturing populations of the north and north-east, information is readily received, is very general, and productive of good fruits.[1] These people are intelligent and orderly. They are the descendants of the Franks, the old Teutonic stock, to which civilization, all the world over, is so very largely indebted.

It has been estimated that two-thirds of the entire population of France are actually engaged, or interested as landlords and proprietors, in the pursuits of agriculture. While in England the land is all owned by a comparatively few landed proprietors, constituting what is termed the landed aristocracy, in France a very different policy has prevailed, and the subdivision of landed property has been

[1] *Hotz's Gobineau*, 296.

carried to a very great extent under the encouragement of positive enactment, as well as the influence of traditional habits.[1] There are fields there measuring one and a half yards by two, and instances of a farmer owning and cultivating a single furrow, and that not a long one. It is estimated that there are about a million and a quarter of land proprietors in France,[2] and that none of them hold more than five acres of land. This great subdivision of landed property exerts an unfavorable influence upon agriculture, as it fails to furnish either the land or the capital necessary to an enlarged and extended system of agricultural operations.

Another class, order, or what came very near being a caste, was the old French noblesse. These began to be hereditary upon the downfall of the Carlovingian dynasty. We have before referred to them politically in connection with the governmental element. Their social standing depended much upon their antiquity of origin. Nobility of four hundred years duration was requisite for a presentation at court. Among them, wealth was but little regarded. It was blood, pure noble blood, that had coursed through the veins of their progenitors for centuries, that gave them all their consequence. They were many of them poor, and supported by little offices within the gift of the court. But their poverty detracted nothing from the respect with which they were treated.

The noblesse never would marry out of their own ranks. In this respect they are unlike the English, who often recruit their blood and replenish their exhausted estates, by intermarriages with the daughters of energetic, enterprising and wealthy commoners. But this, with the old French noblesse, would be regarded with holy horror.

The French revolution waged a war of extermination against the whole order of the nobles. They were deprived of their oppressive privileges, and exclusive rights,

[1] *Transactions of Agricultural Society*, 1853, p. 25. [2] *Idem*, 29.

by the decree of August 4, 1789. And by that of June19, 1790, all hereditary rank was abolished. Under the detested name of aristocrat, hundreds were sent to the guillotine. Of the one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three victims who perished by that instrument, between August, 1792, and the same month in 1794, it has been ascertained that one thousand and eighty-four were of the highest nobility of France, being princes, dukes, marshals, generals, and other officers;[2] six hundred and thirty-six were of the gentry, being members of parliament, judges, etc.; while one hundred and thirteen were of the bourgeoise, including noncommissioned officers and soldiers. So fierce and exterminating was the warfare waged, that very few escaped, except those who sought safety in exile.

Under Napoleon, in 1806 and 1808, a new nobility were created, but upon the restoration of the Bourbons the old noblesse were reinstated.

In France there are, at the present, three kinds of nobility. 1. The legitimists, the old noblesse, or the old aristocracy of the Bourbon stock. This finds its culminating head in the person of Henry V, Duc de Bordeaux, now an exile in Italy. 2. The Orleans nobility, the family of the late Louis Philippe, represented in the person of the young Count de Paris. 3. The Napoleonic nobility, that of the empire, based originally upon military genius, and finding its head in the present emperor, Napoleon III.

The old noblesse of the present day present both politically and socially the fossilized relics of a former period. Before the revolution they basked in the sunshine of royalty, and to them the cumbersome etiquette of Versailles was their only living faith. Regarding with lofty contempt all the aspirations and efforts of industry, they welcome poverty without any feeling of disgrace, and submit cheerfully to its privations while looking back to

[2] *Gobineau, by Holtz*, note, 162.

an ancestry presenting names rendered illustrious by the events of French history. Their salons may be in a garret, but the airs of nobility will still flourish around them. The great tidal movements of life around them, its ebb and flow, its convulsive upheavings and its calmer courses, they regard with listless eye where their own safety is not emperiled. Their society is confined to themselves, and thus they are enabled to cherish the memories of past generations. They are in fact relics of the past, having very little to do with the present and still less with the future. Their moral power and intellectual energy died out under the reign of the Bourbons. The manners and customs of a court, especially of a Bourbon court, were illy adapted to the preservation of either. While embellishments of person and light accomplishments were regarded as affording the most effectual passports to court favor, all the higher graces of mind and morals were accounted as nothing, and the latter as fatal incumbrances. It was the power of fascinating, the graces of person and of manner, the easy virtue of the females, the refined gallantry of the males, the apparent abandon, and the thousand little attentions and graceful activities that made up society, that secured the commendations of the old noblesse. It was from this cause that the court of the Bourbon kings was altogether the most corrupt and corrupting that ever existed on earth. There is probably no period in the annals of history that can equal the reign of Louis XV in acts showing an utter disregard of principle, an abandonment even of the virtue of modesty, a shameless surrender to prostitution, and a virtual denial of God, and even of a moral element in man. The orgies, and bacchanalian revels, and strange acts and things to which society gave itself up during this and the preceding and subsequent reigns, together with the iron oppression which was necessary in order to wring from the people the expensive means by which these depths of infamy could be attained, at length maddened the people to that degree that the whirl-

wind of the revolution swept away with terrible energy the decayed and worn out relics of a social system, which in its conscious debasement had lost the respect even of itself. Madame de Créquy, one of the finest and purest samples of the ancient aristocracy, whose long life connected together the empires of Louis XIV, and Napoleon I, by both of whom her hands were respectfully kissed, by the former when she was eleven years of age and by the latter in her ninety-eighth year, testifies in her memoirs, that the order of nobles perished by its own inherent vices. She says Bonaparte wished to call about him the high nobility, who never would have been of any service to him.[1] "The greater part of the great lords had been educated without piety, and had commenced to live too young. Incapable of exercising the authority of rank, they were of races enervated by luxury, weakened in intelligence, and spoiled by domination." It is thus clear from its own confession that the old French noblesse had reached that point where their existence, except as a mere fossil, must necessarily cease, and it accordingly did so.

And what effect had the revolution and the reign of terror upon French society? Probably, ultimately, but very little. It arrested, for a time, by violence, all its ordinary, normal movements. It swept away, temporarily, the throne, the clergy, and the order of noblesse. It rendered ever after, unless the Bourbon dynasty should be permanently restored, that order fossiliferous, a mere form without a living inherent energy. But outside of courtly and noble life, and priestly ministrations, it disturbed very little the existing order of things. It never seemed to affect the national gayety. Amid all the scenes of revolutionary carnage, Paris, to all appearance, continued to be one of the happiest cities in the world. While the terrible notes of the Marsellaise were hymned forth from its streets by the Girondists while going to execution, only become fainter and feebler

[1] *Parisian Sights and French Principles*, 2d series, 26.

as one head after another fell beneath the axe, while the screams of massacre appallingly resounded in some parts of the city; in others, actors and mountebanks were performing to crowded theatres, eliciting the most clamorous applause, and exhibiting nothing but the most unbounded enjoyment. The tale of the revolution has not been without its moral in all places of the civilized world, except in the cities and among the people, where its terrible scenes were enacted.

It may very well be asked whether in view of the different races of men, or rather of the different types of the same race, that have for centuries occupied the French soil, there is such a thing as French character, French social life, or French manners and customs? To this question, I suppose the answer should be that each type really develops its own social life through the instrumentality of those manners and customs which are in harmony with it, and which, altogether, give the appropriate character to each; and that thus the complete knowledge of social life upon the French soil could only be gathered from a careful investigation of each one of these types. Each, no doubt, possesses and displays its own peculiarities, and along with these there are probably modified results, which combine and present an amalgam of two or more. But this would present a task which few, if any, would be willing to enter upon. Besides, the materials are scant for such an undertaking.

How is it then that we hear so much of French character, and of the ease and facility of learning, understanding, and estimating its relative value? It is because what is known as French character, and French social life, that which meets our view in Paris; the queen city that, from the banks of the Seine, dispenses fashion to the civilized world. It is from this cause, and also from the revolutions which have there originated, that we have the expression so often reiterated that "Paris is France." There is, no doubt, but the other great cities of France, or the most of

them, exhibit manners, customs and social habits much the same as in the great capital; but of course the life that abounds in the rural districts, must be quite different.

The French character as thus developed, has been differently described and estimated as different phases of it have been brought under special review. The following sketch of the French national character, taken from the *Edinburgh Encyclopædia* will be found to hit off very briefly many points of great interest. "An excessive mobility and a perpetual restless activity, produced by an exuberance of animal spirits, form the essential ingredients of French character. They are quick, ingenious, fertile in expedients buoyant against difficulty or adversity; but mutable, trifling, confident, vain, credulous, and incapable of moderation. With much that renders them amiable in society, as readiness to oblige, delicate attentions, kind sympathy, and lively sensibility, they are often of insecure commerce from laxity of principle, unmeaning professions, jealous irritability, and a strong propensity for intrigue. Their feelings of every kind verge to excess; and there is nothing materially good or bad of which they are not capable under the influence of their impetuous ardor. The French are, beyond all example, the creatures of society. By it their manners and sentiments are fashioned, and in it are centered their chief pleasures and gratifications. They would excel all other nations in the art of conversation, were not the desire of shining too universal. The love of glory operates upon them with extraordinary force, and stimulates them to great exertions; but it is often attended with empty ostentation and gasconade."

These are the salient points of the French character, those lying at the foundation of the social workings of the French people. The two men who, of all others, the most perfectly comprehended the real nature, inner composition and outward working of this character were Louis XIV, and Napoleon I. The first arrived at it instinctively, the second by observation and study. Probably no two sove-

reigns ever so grievously oppressed the French people either by a system of arbitrary taxation that extracted from their pockets often the last dollar to enable them to carry on a reckless but splendid expenditure, or by a cruel conscription that consigned their young men to be butchered upon foreign battle-fields. And yet no two names ever acquired such wide, deep, and lasting popularity. Every Frenchman felt a lively interest in everything pertaining to the grand monarch, and all his expensive but splendid structures, and the great wars he carried on were only the means of linking him still more effectually to the very hearts of the French people. This experience was not lost upon Napoleon. In his reign, and the acts by which it was marked, we perceive a mirror reflecting with great fidelity the outlines of French character. He was always in motion. At the head of armies, on the boulevards, sauntering in the Louvre, he was the same ever restless, ever moving body, striking where least expected, and astonishing by the rapidity of his combinations, the celerity of his movements, and the success that waited on the development of his plans. His brilliant victories and splendid achievements; no matter at what an expenditure of blood and treasure they were secured, only served to enshrine him in the national heart. He made himself an embodiment, the representative man of France. While absent on his Egyptian expedition, the people of Paris became restive, and a letter informed him that the people were on the eve of an outbreak, a new revolution. He wrote back simply a direction to "gild the dome of the Invalids." It was done immediately, and all Paris in the talk about the new gilded dome, in its criticisms and speculations concerning it, forgot all about outbreak and revolution. He knew that all that was necessary to turn the popular mind from blood and barricades was to occupy it with something novel and brilliant.

Any one viewing the development of the social element in France will be probably the most struck with the pecu-

liar position which woman has occupied, and the power and influence she has exercised in both the private and public affairs of the French government. The age of chivalry strongly impressed itself upon the vivid conceptions of the French people. When it passed away it bequeathed to them the legacy of ideas which it had been its mission to develop. Those consisted in great part of the gallantry, respect, and even adoration which were paid to women.

The reign of Francis I, near the commencement of the sixteenth century, was signalized by the introduction into the French court of the ideas of chivalry so far as related to the treatment of women. His admiration and devotion to the sex continued through life, and he had many mistresses who, more or less, influenced his conduct. His doctrine was that "a court without women is a spring without flowers," and, filling his palaces with courtiers and ladies, he encouraged an easy intercourse between them. This was soon found to produce very different consequences from chivalry which sent its knight abroad in pursuit of adventures while his lady-love remained at home but so far isolated from society, especially of the other sex, as to remain free from its corruptions. But when brought within the seductive influences of a court, where every species of allurement was practiced, and all that the most enervating luxury could do was superadded, it is not certainly surprising that every moral bond should be weakened or destroyed, and all the vices become alarmingly prevalent.

The whole system of French society took its hue and coloring from the mould into which it was cast at this period, and the ideas which then came to prevail. That which seemed to shut out all hope of improvement, was that the most debasing immoralities were embellished with the highest style of elegance; that every kind of thing was tolerated, provided it was done with grace and courtliness. Gallants affected the most generous homage, in imitation of the

age of chivalry, when the motive was purely selfish. A certain mysteriousness was invoked where all was plain, and certain things whispered about as secrets, which all the world knew. The court became the hot-bed of intrigues of every kind, and to these, the female mind proved about as fully competent as the male. Into these intrigues, all more or less entered, and they were about equally important and absorbing, whether they related to a national war, or the securing of a mistress to the monarch. The latter was certainly an affair of no small moment, as it amounted to surrendering him up for the time, to the influences which the new comer had it in her power to exert. It might effect as great a revolution in the administration of the government, as a change of vote in the English parliament on the fate of the ministry.

The social system, thus inaugurated, continued through the religious wars, the wars of the Guises, of the League, the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and the secret poisonings of the period of Brinvilliers and La Voisin. Through all this period, the influence and intrigues of women had their full share in bringing about those fearful calamities.

On the accession of the house of Bourbon, towards the close of the sixteenth century, and during the reign of the great Henry the IV, the women reigned with almost unbounded sway, at court. So far as related to balls, entertainments, hunting parties, and other diversions, their wishes entirely controlled. But they never could succeed in prevailing upon him to discard his great minister, Sully, and although his mistress, the fair Gabrielle, was admitted to the deliberations on affairs of state, yet her, and their influence over the cabinet and state councils, was not permitted to be controlling.

The reign of his successor, Louis XIII, or more properly of his minister, Cardinal Richelieu, was very free from the interference of women in the affairs of state. The monarch himself, was less devoted to mistresses, and the imperious Richelieu would suffer no intrigues, except to

advance his own objects. But the death of the great cardinal and of Louis XIII, and the surrender of the government to the regency of Anne of Austria, during the minority of Louis XIV, afforded an opportunity, by no means to be neglected, to the reestablishment of female influence and intrigue in matters of state.

These were the times of the Fronde, and perhaps no other period of history presents a greater amount and variety of female intrigue. The memoirs of the Cardinal De Retz, and the secret history of the French court, by Cousin, give full details of the intrigues of this period. Madame de Chevreuse, the Duchess de Montbazon, the Duchess de Longueville, and others, largely participated with the Cardinal de Retz, in the intrigues and cabals of that period.

The long reign of Louis XIV, covering the last half of the seventeenth, and the forepart of the eighteenth century, presents a period of great development of the social life in France. It is court life of which the record has been kept, and it was that which more or less influenced all the lower forms. It has been said that at no other period did any other court combine "so much external splendor, with so much internal wretchedness; pleasures so diversified and so turbulent, with a silence so uniform and so profound; such ostentatious piety with such abominable depravity, such a pompous etiquette, with such a shameless violation of all the laws of decorum; finally, such a refinement of language, and of the bon ton of society, with such a want of real good sense,[1] as the court of Louis XIV." He required all families, and persons of distinction, who could by any possibility afford it, to make the court their usual residence, and thus to swell his magnificent train. The hotels of the great, like the courts of the king, became the schools of politeness, where not only the graces, but the vices of the courtiers were disseminated in the capital

[1] *Meiners's History of the Female Sex*, III, 69.

and communicated to the provinces. So expensive was the style of living, that a large portion of the nobility were reduced by it to indigence. Under no other monarch was the love of amusement and conviviality so generally communicated by the court to the higher classes, and thus diffused through the metropolis and provinces.[1] During his reign occurred an important invention, a fertile source of new profligacies, which has ever since played an important part in society in France. That was the masqued balls, at which under the most perfect disguise, the greatest moral enormities were practiced. The etiquette introduced into the court of Louis XIV became that of most of the other courts of Europe. It was principally distinguished by its exemption from all restraint, and by its pomp and solemnity.

It has been remarked that during the reign of Louis XIV, the women of the higher ranks were not only more polished but possessed more solid attainments than the men. They, more than the men, contributed to the improvement of the language, of the bon ton in society, and of good taste in composition.[2] They set the best examples of wit, equally delicate, pleasing and refined. It was the age of Madame de Sevigne, the Grignans, De Villars, and a multitude of others, ladies happy in the selection and employment of their words and phrases, who could often express a whole sentiment in a single word, and charm by the succession and connection of their ideas.

The state of morals during this period is described as beyond measure deplorable. Chastity and conjugal fidelity became subjects of ridicule. Married people first began to be ashamed of each other. Husband and wife hardly ventured to appear together in public.[3] Fashion taught that any other man had a better right to wives than their husbands, and that any other woman had a better right to husbands than their wives. The women lived continually

[1] *Meiners's History of the Female Sex*, III, 106. [2] *Idem*, 121. [3] *Idem*, 177.

in the company of strange men, and the men in the society of other women. Both sexes mutually encouraged the depravity of each other. As the women lost the delicate sense of modesty and shame, the men of course lost all respect for them. The women who were the greatest favorites of the men, were so much the worse wives and mothers. Faithless wives became an occurrence so extremely common, that their husbands escaped both pity and ridicule.

It is certainly not surprising that the blood of the French nobility became depraved, and the distinctions of rank almost abolished.[1] Beautiful women were ready to sacrifice their own honor, and that of their families to the happiness of being the mistress of the king. Whole families built the hope of honors and fortune on the beauty of their daughters, encouraging them to make it their study to gain the affections of the king.

The love of pleasure, pomp, and profusion worked a total revolution in the general system of life, in dress, habitations, furniture, conveniences, and in the table, not only among the higher, but also among the middling classes, and through them, among the lowest orders of the people.[2]

The regency of the duke of Orleans that succeeded the death of Louis XIV, surpassed his court in almost every vice. All hypocrisy was now abandoned, and the most shameless licentiousness prevailed.

The reign of Louis XV, so far as related to the immoralities of the monarch, exceeded all former reigns. Among the many profligacies of his reign was the parc aux cerfs in which Madame de Pompadour, the ruling, reigning mistress, caused numbers of beautiful young girls to be educated and trained for the use of the king. The depravity of this reign was greater, more public and more generally imitated, than that of the regency which pre-

[1] *Meiners's History of the Female Sex*, III, 186 [2] *Idem*. 192.

ceded it. So great was the depth of the French female depravity, and such momentum had its corrupt current acquired, that it continued among all classes, even after the monarchs, both in principle and practice, gave a contrary lesson to their subjects.

Louis XVI, the son of the most corrupt of monarchs, and brought up in the most corrupt of courts, was entirely different from his predecessors, and had the strongest inclination to everything good. The stream of corruption in general society kept on its course unbroken until it became engulfed in the abyss of the revolution, when the heads of the royal family, and all that remained in France of the noblesse, fell beneath the guillotine; the subversion of female manners and morals was as fundamental as that of every other part of the social state, and the vices of the women fully kept pace with those of the men. It is true the age of splendor, magnificence, and refinement had passed away, but that of depravity had not. All the specious gilding had vanished, and nothing but the naked depravity remained, but that far exceeded all that had yet been seen. Marriage, being one of the sacraments of the catholic church, fell with the church.[1] Hence the marriage vow ceased to possess any force, and the commerce of the sexes became promiscuous. The women took an active part in all the massacres that were perpetrated. They laid aside their refined immorality and courtly prostitutions for blacker crimes. In the development of the social element history offers no darker page than the reign of terror.

From the social and political convulsion of the revolution emerged, through a rapid succession of changes, the France of the present day. It will be readily perceived that its social element, more especially, has traveled through a history more extraordinary than that of any other people, and which may well affect the character of its present and future populations.

[1] *Chenevix*, II, 399.

All classes of people but one, or possibly two, are represented in Paris. The peasant class, large in number, although not in wealth or influence, have there no representatives. It may be also well doubted whether the small land holders, which are a very numerous body, are there at all represented. With the exceptions of rural life, and everything appertaining to it, it may perhaps be safe to assume that "Paris is France."

The French in their persons are rather shorter than their neighbors, and not quite as robust or large. The pure type of the Teutonic stock, and even the mixtures of that stock as they exist in England, are of a considerably larger size. But the French are extremely active and well proportioned, and more exempt from bodily deformity than other nations. Their complexions are, in general, dark or sallow, and this may, perhaps, have given rise to the custom so generally practiced among the ladies of painting their faces. The women in France have always been more celebrated for vivacity and wit than personal beauty.

The superior people are particularly careful to accomplish themselves in the exercise of dancing, fencing, and riding, in all which they generally excel their neighbors in point of gracefulness. Some few of the princes of the blood, and a few of the nobility, are more magnificent in their palaces and equipages, than any of the English; but, as a general thing, and taking it especially throughout France, they are much inferior to them in those respects.

The two points in which English and French life are brought into marked contrast, are the domestic and social. In the former, centre the English; in the latter, the French. The former seek for their pleasures in their homes; the latter, in general society. There is probably no species of life so eminently social as the French. From these two points, home, and the social circle outside of home, radiate very many of the peculiar traits that characterize each nationality.

Social life tends to become diffuse and varied, frivolous, and restless. It originates the desire of pleasing. Gayety and vivacity are its constant attendants. Sparkling witicisms, the elegant bon mot, the ready retort, are the ever current coin of French society. To render one's self happy by constantly making everybody else so, is the great effort of the higher classes. Even in the lower, and among the common people, the practice of politeness, of mutual deference to each other's wants and wishes, is always practiced. That which preeminently constitutes the social element, the unceasing study and practice of the agreeable, is more fully carried out by the French, than by any other people. This, it is true, has led to the charge that they are heartless and hypocritical. The answer to the first is, that heart has nothing whatever to do with the matter. Neither affection, nor real benevolence, have necessarily anything to do with the finest development of the social element.

The answer to the last is, that there is no designed hypocrisy practiced. The Frenchman, in his lavish professions of the most intimate regard, is using words in accordance with the custom of his country. He means them in the sense only in which Frenchmen understand them. They are intended for the meridian of Paris, and not for that of London. They are only made use of as forms of expression, and never as a cloak to conceal hostility. Frenchmen are never deceived by them, a very good evidence that the charge is groundless.

The French character and mode of developing social life is so directly the antipodes of the English that it is hardly possible for the one to entertain a proper appreciation of the other. With the latter it is the home and inner life that are the most cultivated; with the former, society and the outer life. The points of divergence commence early, and continue to grow as they progress.

That union from which all society is derived, and the principles presiding over married life, offer peculiarities

among the French differing from those of most other people. Marriage among them is a union of interests, very seldom indeed of the affections. It is a mere business arrangement for the mutual convenience of both parties. It is preceded by a life of seclusion on the part of the female. Girls in the higher classes are either educated by governesses, or placed in boarding schools where all communication with the other sex is cut off. So full of depravity is the external world regarded, that the boys are subjected to the same kind of treatment. Both boyhood and girlhood in France, among the higher classes, are passed in great seclusion. From the silent, listless boy and girl, knowing little, and seeming to care still less, about how things are going on in the world, guarded night and day as securely as if they were criminals, evincing no liveliness of tongue or manner, spiritless of limb and sluggish of movement, one would hardly expect as an outgrowth, the kind of character which after years exhibits so fully to the world. It only evidences what in almost everything else is fully apparent, viz: that the French character is full of many seeming paradoxes, some very difficult to be reconciled with each other.

To the boy manhood, to the girl marriage bring the same thing, viz: social liberty; and the excesses of which both are often guilty in its enjoyment are no doubt due in part to the studied seclusion in which they are brought up.

The marriage is a mere matter of business. It is the result of a negotiation with the parent or guardian of the lady in which age or health, or even beauty, are but little regarded, the great point of inquiry relating to the amount of dowry she can bring. The husband is purchased by the money which the bride is enabled to furnish. In this manner great inequalities of age and incompatibilities of temper are very frequently brought together. This to the female would be utterly insupportable in idea, were it not for the liberty, the free enjoyment of what life offers, with all the brilliant anticipations which a life of seclusion is so

ready to promise, which married state brings along with it. This is generally a sufficient inducement to gain her consent to wed a man almost or quite a stranger.

But those who suppose that a French heart can subsist without love are much mistaken. Nature is true to her trust there as everywhere else. When married, they love their partners if they are able. If not, then somebody else. But they always preserve appearances. An elopement would violate the proprieties of life, and hence is seldom, if ever, witnessed. There is constantly practiced great mutual discretion. Husbands and wives are blind to the loves of each other. They have no right in strictness to be otherwise. Neither can complain that there is any violation of faith. Both have got what they bargained for, the one, liberty; the other, money. Love was no party to the contract. He would undoubtedly be welcomed were he to make his home with them. Not arriving, each seeks a congenial companion. The husband continues the habits of his bachelor life, the wife revels in the new liberty of which she finds herself the possessor. "Every man is believed to have his mistress," and every married woman, her liberty; and how far she pushes the enjoyment of that is never a matter to be presumed.

The modes often resorted to, to bring about marriage, are in harmony with the character of it once effected. The French have great directness in the means of accomplishing their purposes. You will read in the public paper a notice to the effect that "A female orphan, possessing a good fortune, having immediate occasion to marry, desires a husband. Address, etc., etc." Marriage agencies are established all over Paris,[1] and advertisements are found, "M. de Foy, negotiator of marriages, to mothers of families." The house of M. Foy in France has branches in England, Belgium, Germany and America.

[1] *Parisian Sights, etc.*, I, 29.

In marriages thus effected, and upon such principles, what shall be thought of the homes of France? Even the French language hardly admits it. It is simply "chez-moi" a spot where the individual "moi" may be located, sometimes where he sleeps, oftener where he eats; where he finds it most for his individual pleasure to be. "It is wherever he shines brightest or dazzles most. His pleasures consist in the outer life, the external gilding; bright and beautiful without,[1] but often like gold leaf, covering what is decayed and hollow within." There lacks the motive to surround his home with delights, and the difference in his appearance there and elsewhere is generally well marked.

Few things in France strike a stranger with more force than the intimate relations existing between the social and political elements, and the intimate dependence of the former upon the latter. Instead of the government resting upon the aggregate of persons living under it, as in England and America, there is here a complete reversal, and the individual rests upon the government, which itself forms the great base of society. This is more especially apparent in its police, and its charities.

It is astonishing to what minutiæ the police regulations extend. In Paris alone, its prefect has a corps of three hundred clerks. His bureau is divided into several different departments, each having its own special functions, but all, when necessary, rendering mutual assistance. There is, for instance, the chief of the conservators of public safety, who ferrets out the perpetrators of crime; the chief who watches over all persons of doubtful political views, clandestine gaming houses, etc.; one who regulates the houses of ill-fame; another the public vehicles; another, the boats that navigate the Seine, prescribing what they shall bring, and how they shall unlade their cargoes;

[1] *Parisian Sights, etc.*, II, 52.

another regulates the price and sale of provisions, which they suppose if left to regulate itself,[1] would by its fierce competition, either ruin those who should embark in it, or injuriously affect their customers by the frauds they would be driven to perpetrate. Another still has the charge of everything relating to the public health, such as drains, closets, gas establishments, etc. Thus, the government is made to extend to, and regulate the most common affairs of life. Every steam engine must be thoroughly tested, before being used; every manufacture deleterious to health must be completely isolated; not a pig can be killed in Paris; the exterior of every building is subjected to rigid supervision, to see that there are no faulty chimneys, insecure shutters, sign boards, or encumbered side-walks. Each profession is supervised,[2] and required to be competent to exercise its calling. Quackery is compelled to contest with the police, with little chance of success. No patent medicines can be vended or advertised, until they have been examined and approved. Provisions are also subject to the same thorough inspection, as medicines. Wines and liquors have their regular tasters. Even the price of meat and bread is a matter of police regulation.

The system of French police is, perhaps the most perfect in existence. It is by no means confined to its uniformed agents, who, being known, are easily avoided. Besides these, there are the secret agents, whose eyes and ears are in every cafe, restaurant, corner, or place of assemblage, viewing, unseen; and hearing, unheard. Of Protean shape and chameleon color, they are at home in all localities. The musician at his organ, the commissionaire at the corner of the street, the porter at the door, who, through the kitchen, can learn what transpires in the parlor; each has his mission, and all aid in perfecting a system of espionage which ramifies through all classes of society. They are not alone in the employ of the government. Their ser-

[1] *Parisian Sights, etc.*, I, 138, 139. [2] *Idem*, 141.

vices, for a consideration, can be enlisted by individuals, Through their aid, the husband can follow his wife, and the wife her husband, through all the devious windings of Paris.

This rigid system of police seems to be a necessity in France. It has lived and thrived through every government, the monarchy, empire, and republic. It has also adopted means the best calculated to effect its ends. Every workman is required to have a livret, or species of passport, indorsed by the police, without which he is treated as a vagabond, and any one employing him is subject to a heavy fine.

But on the other hand vice has its own systematized organization. The world of robbers is a numerous one, and embraces every category of crime. There exist in Paris professors of robbery, who hold regular courses of lectures,[1] in which they explain theoretically every species of theft, accompanying them with practical illustrations upon manikins constructed for the purpose.

So also beggary has its organization, its schools and professors. The French give to distress very generously, and perhaps somewhat indiscriminately. The official number of mendicants in France is 4,000,000, or one in nine of the entire population. The scale on which France organizes her benevolence is stupendous. Her expenditures for hospitals are enormous. The Foundling Hospital receives all the infants brought to it for support. Among the most beneficial organizations for the purposes of benevolence are the sisters of charity, which alone of all the institutions of the catholic church, went through the reign of terror not only unmolested, but sustained and respected. French wit, philosophy, skepticism, and revolutions, have always equally respected the sisters of charity. "Their rule is that of universal brotherhood, their sacrifice the entire renunciation of the world, and their faith that active charity which is the bond of peace and good will among

[1] *Parisian Sights, etc.*, I, 145.

men." "Their post is at the bedside of disease and death, carrying help and hope across the threshold of poverty, comforting and taming maniac violence and criminal desire by that principle whose soft answers and heavenly deeds turn away wrath, and bring alike all human passion submissive and hopeful at the feet of a Saviour." Well, therefore, may infidels and atheists, republicans and imperialists, enemies and friends of Rome acknowledge their services to humanity. Those composing this sisterhood are not alone the disappointed and afflicted whom the world has cast off.[1] They are often the young, the comely, who have left homes of affluence. They are at liberty at any time to return and reunite with the circle they had forsaken. "Theirs is the unorganized charity of the heart, the spontaneous offering of individual piety." "While distinctions and organizations exist among men, the humble garb of the sisters of charity, as they pass silently and quietly through the streets of Paris on their errands of mercy, will serve to remind both the protestant and the catholic that the religion that visits and comforts the widow and fatherless still exists in the world." This institution, in its real spirit and essence, is peculiarly French, and as it often exhibits the most complete self-renunciation in the very midst of the highest degree of worldly enjoyment, affords one of the instances in illustration of the strange anomalies, not to say contradictions, that are to be found in the French character.

Another institution peculiarly French, and of which the offices of the sisters of charity rendered by the bedside of the dying is suggestive, is the morgue of Paris. It is the place of the dead, a plain Doric building in which behind a glass partition,[2] entirely naked with the exception of waist cloths, and laid out upon inclined slabs, having tiny streams of water directed over them to keep them fresh, are kept for three days the bodies of all persons found

[1] *Parisian Sights, etc.*, I, 303. [2] *Idem*, 49.

divested of life. There are deposited the bodies of all those who encounter death by accident or suicide. The latter furnishes the largest contributions, for it is another anomaly, or seeming contradiction, in French character, that in the very midst of all lifes' highest and brightest enjoyments, without any, or with the slighest apparent reason, the fatal step is taken that plunges its subject into the unkonwn future. The annual number of suicides in France is about twenty-five hundred.

The object of this is the identification of the bodies by their friends, and if not identified and claimed within the three days they are buried at the public expense.

This is a strange show in the very heart of civilization. Its daily exhibition attracts a constantly changing crowd of young and old of both sexes, who, with prying curiosity, cold and speculating in its character, examine the lifeless remains, often accompanying their scrutiny with coarse jests and ribald laughter. In a city, however, where death by accident or suicide is so constantly occurring, such an institution has its obvious utility, and its suddenly breaking upon one's vision amid so many scenes of surrounding life and action, furnishes another of those contrasts or strange contradictions everywhere diversifying the social life of the French people.

The French, in large cities, especially in Paris, so construct their houses as to form a hollow square with a court yard in the centre. This admits of two ranges of apartments, the one facing the street, the other the court yard, while the two connecting arms contain the kitchen and other conveniences. They are from five to nine stories high, each range or story having its wide circular staircase for the gentry and its small dark way for the domestics. While the ground floor is devoted to shops, stables, and the porters' quarters, the stories above accommodate two families on each floor, each having its separate kitchen and drains, and the residents of the different stories being generally strangers to each other.

But the French have a great reputation for living out of doors. They seem ever ready to escape from their home nests, of which they are not particularly vain, especially of the odors that visit the olfactories in each apartment with the accessions derived from every other. The city cafes and restaurants meet with very extensive patronage, especially those of lesser magnitude, on Sunday, a day when it is asserted no Frenchman dines under his own roof.[1] The rush is then fearful both of individuals and entire families. The habit is very early formed by the Frenchman of becoming familiar with restaurants and cafes, spending his evenings at the latter, reading the journals, dissipating and playing chess or other games. It is the cafe that does much to educate the Frenchman, while the club is about equally important in the education of the Englishman. A Frenchman breakfasts at noon, dines when the American sups, and returns from balls at a not very early hour in the morning.[2] Much of French life in Paris is spent on the boulevards; in the baths on the Seine, and at the salons, theatres, balls and places of amusement.

The boulevards are the broad avenues surrounding old Paris. Spacious, shaded, and bounded by palatial structures, they constitute the empire of the curious, the vain, and the idler of every fashionable class. The macadamized way is as smooth as a jointed floor, allowing thousands of gay equipages to roll noiseless over its surface. At certain times in the day it is the great focus of Parisian life. Every fashion finds itself a home. It is the jubilee of fashions, and the paradise of manners. The Parisian crowd has been compared in its onward flow to the current of a deep river. The very crowd is so instinct with politeness that there is no invasion of individual rights, or if any such should happen by accident the prompt apology is ever ready, leaving behind an agreeable reminiscence rather

[1] *Parisian, Sights and French Principles*, 1, 17. [2] *Idem*, 25, 26.

than the contrary. At night the splendors of gas are superadded, and the boulevards are in a blaze of light. It is then that they appear to the best advantage, and that every one is abroad for pleasure.

Next to the boulevards the banks of the Seine present as if in strong contrast the march of working life as the heavy arm of labor plies its tasks on the quays, and in stores, vessels and workshops. A feature of no small interest, here, are the bathing houses, with every variety of drice and every style of luxury. Here Monsieur, having made and remade his bath, "nicely graduating the temperature to his varying and delightful sensations," spends sometimes hours in dosing or in reading. But no Frenchman can be long happy without talking, and accordingly at the head of every bathing tub there is a slide in the partition, which by pushing back enables him to discharge his excess of volubility upon his neighbor in the next room who may happen to be similarly engaged. Sometimes the apparatus is double-tubbed, thus affording both the opportunity of exercising their colloquial powers without interruption from others.

To the French, more than to any other people, amusements seem to be a matter of necessity. The demand originating from this necessity, has called into existence a number and variety nowhere else found. Among these the theatre plays a conspicuous part. The Frenchman could not exist without the play-house. "It is his school of manners; his forum of education; his teacher of history; the parent of his ideas; a living monument, in which antiquity reappears in the present. The clergy have been banished and massacred; the churches sacked and desecrated; but the drama has triumphantly held its own, through every revolution, oftener giving law to society than imitating it."

It is not alone the higher classes that frequent the theatre. All classes, except perhaps the very lowest, go to them. The theatres present the means of action the most direct,

the most prompt, and the most continuous upon the masses. Their mission is not simply to amuse, but also to inspire a correct taste, to counteract an increasing tendency to coarseness of manners, and to teach the art *de vivre* among the French people.

But, unfortunately, while its agency in polishing the manners, refining the conduct, and in giving a good taste in the use of language may be admitted, yet its influence upon morals has always been unfortunate. The vice lying at the foundation of everything in France is that the art de vivre as understood there does not embrace useful and solid qualities, the purity of domestic life, or the development of correct principles. The theatre can therefore have no moral aim. This is noticeable in Compt's theatre[1] for children, at which, although a slight attempt is occasionally made to point a moral, yet the great burden of the performance is to amuse by jokes, and ludicrous spectacles or to frighten by phantoms and hobgoblins. Among these a bear hunt and giving a clyster to a cat may be mentioned as illustrations.

The general character of the pieces performed at the theatre is loose and corrupting. Their tendency is to increase the prevailing sentiment of ridicule toward a deceived husband, and to enlist the sympathies in the success of the intriguing of either sex. Besides, they pander grossly to the taste for double entendre and the wanton exposure of the female person. They cannot exhibit the poetry of motion without nature unadorned. And what renders everything the more dangerous is that the subtle poison of the stage, is united with so much that is captivating to the senses and gratifying to the intellect.

The direction of the theatres is too important to be left to chance. In this, also, the government has a right to interfere, which it not unfrequently exercises. This right rests in part upon the support which it is compelled to ren-

[1] *Parisian, Sights and French Principles*, I, 190.

der them. The annual amount which has been paid by the French government for the support of the theatres in Paris has amounted to two hundred and eighty thousand dollars.[1]

There is a system of claquery connected with the conducting of the French theatre. This consists of a body of claquers, some fifty persons, located in the centre of the parquette, just under the chandelier, who are most thoroughly drilled in the art of applauding. They are an organized body, having their regular leaders, whose motions they follow with great regularity. They bestow their applause in accordance with the movements of their chief, and a dramatic performance is either applauded into notice or dismissed with a sullen silence as the compensation bestowed rises or diminishes in amount.

The women have always played an important part in the social and even the political life of the French people. Their aptitude and adroitness at private intrigue have nowhere been so fully tested as at Paris. There has probably been no other instance in which political power has drawn from social life so much to sustain and give it efficacy. No other government has ever been so largely indebted to gallantry in the shaping of its plans and purposes, and in devising means for their execution. Cardinal Mazarin being congratulated on the repose he was about to taste, replied "that one never can promise himself repose in France and that even the women there are greatly to be feared.[2] You Spaniards may well speak of your ease. Your women trouble themselves about nothing but love, but it is not so in France. We have three there now who would be quite capable of governing or of overthrowing three great kingdoms, the Duchess de Longueville, the princess palatine, and Madame de Chevreuse." The political life of the latter, so fully given by Cousin, extends through much of the reign

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[1] *Parisian Sights and French Principles*, 1, 194. [2] *Cousin's Secret History of the French Court*, 5.

of Richelieu and Mazarin. It was in reference to her that Cousin says, "I never saw any one else in whom intuition could supply the place of judgment.[1] She often suggested expedients so brilliant that they seemed like flashes of lightning, and so wise that they would not have been disowned by the greatest men of any age." And yet Madame de Chevreuse was a woman in the fullest sense, and in this lay her strength and also her weakness. Her first impulse was love or gallantry, and she espoused the interests of the one she loved. This lady was the opponent of Richelieu in the adroit political intrigues, which signalized the close of the reign of Louis XIII; and in the struggle of Cardinal Mazarin at the commencement of his ministry, he encountered no more powerful adversary, or none who gave him more anxiety than she.[2] It was mainly to the intrigues of women that the wars of the Fronde owed their origin, continuance and conclusion.

France, more than any other modern nation,[3] has reproduced the Grecian period of Aspasia. Ninon de l'Enclos and Marion Delorme inherited both the accomplishments and the vices of their Grecian sister. It was by no means the beauty alone of these modern Aspasias, that secured them success. The intellectual fascinations, and refinements, epicurean and corrupting, of which they had so thorough a mastery, gave to their other charms irresistible power. Women, uniting in themselves education, beauty, and wit, maintain an empire in Paris, unequaled elsewhere, in extent and influence. Nowhere else can be found so many women of wit and genius mingling in the assemblies and festive occasions of literary men; and probably in no part of the world is literary society so refined, so brilliant, and so intellectual, as in Paris.

But woman there, in acquiring and perpetuating her supremacy, has the good sense to depend upon her own

[1] *Cousin's Secret History of the French Court*, 9. [2] *Idem*, 6. [3] *Parisian Sights and French Principles*, 2d series, 85.

legitimate attractions. Her beauty is less marked and characteristic than that of the German, English, Italian or Spanish. Her force and power lies more in the peculiar spirit by which her beauty is animated, and also in the resources at her command, in resisting the assaults of time. While the women of other nations lose their hair, teeth, lustre of eye, and elasticity of step,[1] the French woman, by resorting to the arts of the toilet, is enabled to baffle, for a long time, the tendencies to decay, and retain her empire in its integrity. She seems ever embalmed in the spirit of youth. Society in France is not limited to the young and thoughtless, whose highest aim is amusement. It is not the graces of dancing that are alone cultivated. The art of conversation is cultivated and carried to a high degree of perfection. The Parisian lady, so long as she can enter a drawing room, never grows old. While she preserves the delicacy of the woman, she acquires the good sense of the man. Having outlived the day of passion, she enters, undisturbed, the empire of reason. The attention she receives then flows from respect as well as affection. While her memory is a storehouse of anecdotes for the young, her experience and observation furnish wise suggestions to the mature.[2] It has been said that "every statesman, artist, poet, in short, every man, who has not passed some years in the intimacy of old Parisian women, has failed in his education of the world; and that sooner or later, his life will resent this wrong." The men of fashion go from one salon to another on the same night, equally at home with every one, but once in the street, only their former associates are remembered. While in society, each contributes his individual quota to the general enjoyment; while out, resuming his individual liberty and retirement.

The salon and cafe is to French society very much what the club is to the English. The first, however, has been

[1] *Parisian Sights and French Principles*, 2d series, 86. [2] *Idem*, 88.

subject to much variation. It was the most brilliant at the breaking out of the revolution of 1789. There was a lingering remnant kept alive by Madame de Stael, and a temporary revival under Madame Roland, but still the melancholy truth became apparent that the salons and the scaffold could not coexist together.

The former sank beneath the reign of terror, but revived on its termination. It was brilliant under the empire, and under the restoration came a new reign, that of eleven women, with some beauty but more of the aristocratic manners.[1] With the government of Louis Philippe came a new race of women, characterized by boldness of conception, cavalier-like manners, sensibilities susceptible of deep emotions, but only for positive things, or where their interests were concerned.

Another development of social life in France, and one in which the activities of women are unceasing, relates to the changing style of fashion. Paris dispenses fashion to the civilized world. In dress, ornament, and manners, she controls without a rival. In all the changes for which fashion is so proverbial, she takes the initiatory step. These changes depend upon no law except simply the love of variety. To bring them about requires invention, activity, and ingenuity. It depletes the purses of the rich, while it feeds, clothes, and houses half of France. Having borrowed from every nation its peculiarity, and passed it through the alembic of its own taste, it is again returned in its modified form for use. To attempt to trace out the different fashions as they have been promulgated through the outcrop of Parisian life, would present an almost endless task, and in the end would be productive of little else than to show the strange extent to which the whim or the fancy of the hour could carry the moving masses of humanity.

The French have in some instances manifested great levity of character. As an illustration of this it is stated

[1] *Eclectic Magazine*, 1805, 888.

that while those in prison were almost daily decimated by the guillotine during the reign of terror, yet their daily amusement was to play at charades and the guillotine.[1] To do this all assembled in one of the halls, where they formed a revolutionary tribunal, consisting of accusers and judges, and all the necessary adjuncts of a court. "Then came the mock trial, and the sentence of death following close upon the accusation. They simulated the toilet of the condemned, preparing the neck for the knife by feigning to cut the hair and collar. The sentenced were then attached to a chair reversed, to represent the guillotine. The knife was of wood, and, as it fell, the individual thus sporting with approaching fate, tumbled down as if actually struck by the iron blade. Often while engaged in this play they were summoned to pass through the awful reality."

The French character taken altogether is very much of a puzzle. There are certainly many elements of greatness in the composition of the French mind. To its profoundest exercises science is largely indebted for its advancement in modern times.

6. Society as it has developed and is developing itself among the Scandinavian nations.

Scandinavia offers very great variety in its population. There reside the Danes, the Swedes, the Norwegians, the Lapps and the Finns. Very few countries of the same extent present so many distinct nationalities.

We have before had occasion to speak generally of the early Scandinavians; their love of liberty; their energy of purpose and of character; their strong military tendencies; the manliness of their sports and habits. All this had reference more especially to the inhabitants of Denmark, Sweden and Norway. We shall now speak of them separately, and in regard to their more modern exhibitions.

[1] *Parisian Sights and French Principles*, 2d series, 136, 137.

The Danes are divided into several classes. There are: 1. The nobility, the owners of fiefs,[1] the privileged class, formerly of great importance. 2. The titular nobility, the companions of the Danish orders of knighthood, persons filling the higher offices of the state. 3. The inferior clergy, lawyers, and students. 4. The merchants and the citizens of great towns. 5. The seamen and population engaged in agriculture.

The Danes have regular and well formed features; frequently fair or brownish hair, blue eyes, and a body capable of sustaining great fatigue. The women are of a more delicate frame, with a dazzling white complexion, but their features possessing little animation, and subject to early decay.

The nobility formerly resided on their own estates, living independent lives, with great magnificence and hospitality, and when the states were convened, meeting the king with retinues both numerous and superb. But their condition became entirely changed when the king assumed absolute sway.[2] Then they became impoverished by exorbitant taxes, so that many of them often found it difficult to procure the means of subsistence. The consequence was, that if they lacked the interest at court to obtain a civil or military appointment, they lived obscurely in their half ruined palaces, sheltering them from the exactions of collectors by all the industry, influence and address they were master of. Compelled to live in this manner, they could not expect to inherit the spirit and virtues of their ancestors. They would naturally become servile, indolent, ostentatious, extravagant, and oppressive.

It has been suggested that possibly the humidity of the atmosphere,[3] and the quantity of salted meat and fish used by the Danes, may have contributed to render their character dull, patient, and difficult to move. The portrait of

[1] *Bell's Geography*, I, 137. [2] *Travels through Europe*, III, 215. [3] *Malte Brun*, VIII, 577.

the Dane has been thus given: "He is brave, but pacific; possessed of little enterprise, but laborious and persevering, He is diffident, but proud; hospitable, but not officious; cheerful and open with his countrymen, but somewhat cold and ceremonious towards strangers; loving his ease more than show; more economical than industrious; sometimes from vanity, and sometimes from laziness, an imitator of others; a judicious observer, a profound thinker, but slow and minute; endowed with an imagination more strong than rich; constant, romantic, and jealous in his affections; capable of great enthusiasm, but rarely of those flashes of intellect, or sallies of wit, which, by their unexpectedness, demand and obtain victory and applause; strongly attached to his native soil, and to the interests of his country, but caring little about national glory; accustomed to the calm of monarchy, but the enemy of slavery and arbitrary power."

Extravagance of every kind is still a very general disposition of the Danes. It displays itself in various ways. The country seats of the nobility still retain a portion of their ancient splendor, although with a great declension of their former magnificence. There are still many families exhibiting much of elegance and refinement.

Danish extravagance is very likely to manifest itself in sumptuous burials and splendid monuments. It is quite common to keep the corpse of a person of quality in a vault,[1] or in the chancel of some church, for several years till a fit opportunity presents itself for celebrating the funeral obsequies with great magnificence.

To the eyes of the traveler, Dr. Clarke, a journey from London to Copenhagen might exhibit the retrocession of a century; everything being found, in the latter city,[2] as it existed in the former a hundred years before. And this observation he extends not only to the amusements, the dress and the manners of the people, but to the general

[1] *Bell's Geography*, I, 137. [2] *Clarke's Travels in Scandinavia*, I, 82.

state of everything connected with Danish society. In literature, neither zeal nor industry is wanted; but, compared with the rest of Europe, the Danes are always behind in the progress of science.

Sweden is thinly peopled. The Swedish monarch, it has been said, should be styled the lord of the woods, because of the interminable forests that are spread over his domain. The woods having no undergrowth, the eye is enabled to penetrate into the depth of shade, and in the distance strange forms appear visible,[1] which might be taken for supernatural appearances, and thus give origin to stories of ghosts, goblins and demons dimly passing in the thickest gloom of the wilderness.

The inhabitants of the south and the north of Sweden are described as differing from each other.[2] In the south is an admixture of the people of other nations; but in the north the inhabitants are more strictly Swedes. They are the descendants of a Germano-Celtic tribe, and are related to the Normans and Danes.

The change of the seasons varies much the amusements and occupations of the people. During summer those possessed of fortune quit the town and retire into the country, where they have houses fitted up in a style of great magnificence and luxury.[3] There the ceremonies and stiffness that prevail at town entertainments are, as much as possible, laid aside. The merchants are the richest class of society, and they live in the most unrestrained manner, so far as etiquette is concerned, their houses being the most agreeable and the best maintained. The nobility find it impossible wholly to divest themselves of that formality which seems to be a part of their inheritance, and consequently are less fitted for enjoying the pleasures of the country.

The Swedes have no horse-racing, or hunting, or hawking. They have sometimes carriage races and boat races, called regattas, but their great social occupation is found

[1] *Clarke's Scandinavia*, I, 112. [2] *Idem*, 209. [3] *Acerbi*, I, 45.

in the playing of cards and other games of hazard. Both ladies and gentlemen, old and young, dream of no other enjoyment than this. In all their social gatherings this game occupies a prominent position. Balls are also included among the winter amusements. These are frequented only by people of fashion. But there are also side apartments for card-players.

The Swedish ladies are handsome.[1] Their countenances express tranquillity and composure of mind, and indicate nothing of that passion and fire visible in the features of the French and Italian ladies. They pass much of their time alone or amongst themselves, and hence when in company with the other sex, they manifest a less happy art of supporting conversation with vivacity than the French and Italian ladies. They pay great attention to dress, endeavoring to outshine their rivals in elegance and splendor. They are fond of admiration and praise, and desire public notice and distinction. Not only their passions but their sentiments of friendship and attachment are less strong than in those of warmer climates.

But this coldness of temperament on the part of females is assigned as the cause of excessive licentiousness in the inferior orders. They think they can never give enough, because they feel so little in bestowing the greatest favors.[2] There are no women of the town in Stockholm, but there are kept mistresses who maintain a rank in society much above their condition in life. The only passport to their favors is through an introduction, and a formal courtship. They exact from their favorites that attention and respect in public that appears extraordinary to a foreigner. Even officers of distinction have been known in public places to bow and kiss their hands to women of loose conduct and character.

The Swedes during the day are occupied with their business, and their evenings they generally spend at cards,

[1] *Acerbi*, I, 63. [2] *Idem* 64.

and more rarely in company with the ladies. There is a want of music and enlivening conversation in Swedish society. There are no friendly dinners where a few meet to enjoy each other's society. The Swedish dinner parties are formal and expensive. The company are often strangers to each other. Before sitting down to dinner they visit a side table where they partake of bread and butter,[1] cheese and pickled salmon, washed down with brandy. After this, the guests arrange themselves about the dinner table, upon which all the dishes are put at once, and no one is allowed to ask for what he likes best, but must wait his turn, the dishes being handed round in regular succession. No wine is drank, and immediately after dinner the guests adjourn to the drawing room, where the company, after thanking the master and mistress of the house with a polite and rather ceremonious bow for their good cheer, are regaled with tea and coffee.

The Swedish court intrenches itself behind a vast many forms and ceremonies, but this is within what may be called its own precincts. The king and princes, nevertheless, mix very familiarly with the people. Although the kingly dinners are very formal, yet the private suppers are entirely the reverse. At these no formality is observed even towards the royal family.

There are few countries in Europe where the elements of knowledge are so universally diffused among all classes of people as in Sweden.[2] All the people in towns, villages, and hamlets, without exception, are taught to read. The peasantry are a frank, open, kind-hearted, gay, hospitable, hardy, and spirited people. There seems to be a happy union of genius, bravery, and natural probity of disposition. They are called by many the gascons of Scandinavia. Although poor, they feel no pressing wants that are not gratified.[3] Besides bread and milk, they have in their stores salted or smoked meat, as well as fish, and

[1] *Acerbi*, i, 67. [2] *Idem*, 136. [3] *Idem*, 180.

sometimes even beer and brandy. Both they, and their children are well fed. Their houses and manner of clothing protect them from the severity of the cold. Their firesides are always well provided with wood, and their apartments warm and comfortable. The traits of innocence, simplicity, and contentment which light up the countenances of the inmates of the cabin, are described to be such as moves the sensibility, and interests the feelings of a stranger.[1]

There is a custom in the country of strewing the floors of their apartments with sprigs of juniper, and upon this is often scattered a considerable quantity of sand, a practice once common in the presence chambers of sovereigns. It conduces to uncleanliness, and the reek of the decaying vegetables is not wholesome.[2]

The peasants, after laying the wooden planks upon their dwellings, often cover them with fresh turf, from which grass springs, giving in summer, the cottages the appearance of the surface of a meadow. This preserves the interior from the penetrating moisture of melting snow.

The Swedish peasants attain generally, to a healthy maturity, and appear characterized by a sturdiness of form and the most athletic stature, many of them seeming to belong to a race of giants, possessing nerves of iron. There is a kind of family likeness very generally prevailing. The men have a long and pale face, rather bony, with a high forehead and long chin; a peculiar expression about the eyes, and stout muscular limbs.

Marriages in Sweden are governed by the will of the parents, and are founded upon interest. As the parents retain their property until death, young people are in no condition to marry until they are thirty or more years of age, unless they obtain some office or employment.

In Sweden is still preserved the old custom of suspending garlands upon upright poles, adorned like the Maypoles in England. Around these, and through the arch,

[1] *Acerbi*, I, 181. [2] *Clarke's Scandinavia*, 134.

a new married couple,[1] followed by the bridemaids and friends of the bridegroom, danced, a great concourse of people joining in the festivities.

There is probably no country in Scandinavia, that possesses greater interest than Norway. This interest is derived:

First. From the features of the country. There, in the eloquent words of modern traveler,[2] are "forests, whose vastness and shade, and solitude and silence, banish in an instant from the mind, all associations with song of bird, and bower, and gay sylvan scene; lakes, whose deep seclusion put to flight images of mere grace and beauty; valleys, which, from their depth and gloom, we might fancy to be the avenues to abodes of a more mysterious creation; mountains, whose dim, and rugged, and gigantic forms, seem like the images of a world that we might dream of, but never behold." Can it be a subject of wonder, that scenery like this should nurture human spirits and forms, that were destined to exert no unimportant influence in the affairs of men?

Second. During the early periods of European history the hardy Norman played a very conspicuous part, establishing his dominion in Sicily and southern Italy, wrenching the province of Normandy from France, and ruling over it for centuries, and ultimately establishing his dominion in the British isles. The ancestry of England came from the shores of Norway.

Third. While in all Southern and Central Europe the feudal system became established, and was the all fruitful source of domestic, governmental, and social institutions, it never prevailed in Norway. Although the Normans were instrumental in planting it in England, yet they brought it from Normandy and not from Norway.

[1] *Clarke's Scandinavia*, 116. [2] *Conway's Travels in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark*, 84.

Fourth. Another feature disclosed by the jurisprudence of Norway, and which gives interest to the development of the social element, is the equal division of the property of the parent, at his death, among all the children.[1] This principle has prevailed there for more than a thousand years, and yet it has not had the effect of reducing the landed estates below what is necessary to support a family. Whenever such a reduction is threatened, a portion of the heirs sell out to others, or the whole is sold, and the proceeds of the sale equally divided. The effect of this equality of right to inherit, is to bring about great equality in the condition of the people.

Norway has three classes of population, when considered in reference to their employment.

First. The strand-sitters, or sea-faring peasantry, occupying the islands, and the coast side of all the fiords, extending sometimes a hundred miles into the interior.[2] They have small farms, but their chief subsistence depends on fishing.

Second. The bonder, or agricultural peasantry, constituting the kernel of the nation, each being the proprietor of his own farm, and occupying the country from the shore side to the hill foot, and up every valley or glen, as far as as corn will grow.[3] The Norwegian yeomanry are as fine as any in Europe, and in as happy a condition. It is a body of small landed proprietors, each with his thirty or forty acres. They are strong, athletic men, building their own houses, making their own agricultural implements, and rearing up their own families.

Third. The Fjelde bonder, who live on the mountains or uplands of Norway, who also possess land and have houses, although small, and who live by the produce of cattle, and the felling of timber, and the selling of game. They live a hard and laborious life, and have a strong frame of body, and an active character. They are rough and ready, re-

[1] *Laing's Norway*, 22. [2] *Idem*, 255. [3] *Idem*, 258.

taining the dress, manners, character and athletic forms which we attribute to the men of ancient times. Each district and valley has its peculiarity of costume, pronunciation,[1] and even character. Intermarriages between those of different districts or valleys are rare, and lines of descent can be traced far backward.

There are no privileged classes in Norway. Nor are there any created by wealth. And yet there are distinctions in society. These grow out of the fact that individuals naturally form social relations with those most like themselves.[2] There is here no mixture of persons of incongruous stations, habits, and education. What are termed people of condition compose one class, which is made up of the cultivated part of the community, the clergy, public functionaries, half pay officers, and the educated. But the tradesmen and dealers form a highly respectable class, whose dress, appearance and deportment, are described as fully equal to the other. Its members have leisure, enjoy social intercourse,[3] and are polished in their manners. In Norway, good manners go deeper down through society than in other countries.

The most common national dances of Norway are called the halling and the polsk; the first where the performer stands upon his head and kicks his heels about in the air,[4] the dance of Hippoclides, the Athenian, when contending with other rivals for the daughter of Clisthenes. The other also answers to the description of an Attic dance performed to the Emmeleia.[5]

Many of the early customs of England are to be found in Norway, reminding the Englishman of the manners of his ancestors. Among these are "old ballads pasted on the wall, story books of witches and giants, huge heavy carved work upon the cupboards and furniture, rows of shining pewter plates and earthenware, brown mugs for beer,

[1] *Laing's Norway*, 260. [2] *Idem*, 129. [3] *Idem*, 130. [4] *Clarke's Scandinavia*, II, 198 [5] *Idem*, 323.

and hogs puddings and sausages dangling from the roof."[1] The Norwegians also drink toasts with solemnity, mingling with them songs as did the ancestors of the old Teutonic tribes.

There is a great equality of manners among all ranks, and they are habitually good among the lower ranks. On getting up from table each person goes round the whole company, and shakes hands with every one, with the complimentary phrase "tak for mad," thanks for the meal; or "well bekomme," may it do you good.[2] Even the husband and wife unite in this, and in a large party it presents the appearance of a dance around the table, every one going round to pay the compliment. Even a laborer never passes another at work, or at his meal, without a complimentary expression wishing him luck in the one, or good from the other.

The laboring class of people have meat at least twice a week in their families. They have four regular meals a day with two drams. Potato brandy is made at every farm house, and is therefore cheap and very universally drank;[3] and yet intoxication is not common under circumstances and in situations in which sobriety is specially required. Their potations are taken mostly at weddings, baptisms, burials, Christmas, hay and corn harvest homes, and other festivals.

A check upon improvident marriages is found in the fact that the Lutheran church includes two ceremonies, the betrothal and the final ceremony. The one precedes the other for one, two, and often for several years.[4] Both in law, and in society, the betrothed parties have a distinct and acknowledged status. This custom, so well established, interposes a seasonable pause before the expenses of a house and family are entered upon. It is a probationary period, and one allowing character to develop itself; and idle and drunken habits, if such exist, to mature and show themselves in time to prevent the final and irreparable step.

[1] *Laing's Norway*, 385. [2] *Idem*, 108. [3] *Idem*, 190. [4] *Idem*, 100.

This custom of betrothal had its origin long before the introduction of Christianity, and at a period when the young men of Norway were so frequently absent for considerable periods of time on piratical expeditions to distant countries.

The household ways of the Norwegian gentry strongly remind one of the olden times of England. The family room is like the old English manor-house of the days of Queen Elizabeth. Leaves fresh and bright green are sprinkled upon the floor.[1] An eight-day clock stands in one corner, a cupboard graces another. Around the room are ranged benches and straight-backed wooden chairs. All the family occupations are going on. In one corner the carding of wool or flax is in progress. Two or three spinning wheels are lifting up their music near the stove. To diversify the scene a young lady takes her guitar to play and sing, or gallopades across the room with a sister. The breakfast is laid out on a tray at one end of the room, which is spacious and lighted from both sides. This is the breakfast of old times in England, consisting of slices of bread and butter, smoked meat, sausages, dried fish, ale and French or Norwegian brandy, the coffee having been taken an hour or two before.[2] This meal is taken while standing or walking, and the walking and talking, and giving orders to the servants, and waltzing of children, presents altogether a scene of great life and activity.

The people have not here two sets of manners, the one for home, the other for company.[2] The manners are habitually good, even among the lower ranks. Owing to the general diffusion of property, there is an uncommon equality of manners among all ranks; and the general standard is not low. In the secluded glens of Norway have been preserved many of the usages and forms of politeness which once prevailed generally in the good society of ancient Europe. The children seem, from the first, to be treated with consideration and respect like grown persons. They are never-

[1] *Laing's Norway*, 106. [2] *Idem*, 107, 108.

theless wild, romping, joyous creatures, and not diminutive old men or prim old maids. The women of Norway have much to do with the real business of life, and with those concerns which require mental exertion and talent.

The Christmas, or Yule, as it is there called, is kept in great style for fourteen days, the time being passed in feasting and merriment, and in giving and receiving entertainment. In their party assemblages the company walk about the room and converse, few hackneyed subjects being introduced, wind and weather being allowed to shift for themselves, everybody seeming to have something to say, there being a total absence of all pretense in their character, no one appearing to desire to seem otherwise than they naturally are.

The husbandman in Norway dwells in the midst of his lands, the houses being remarkably good and clean. The floors of the rooms, at least once a week, are strewed over with the green tops of the fir or juniper.[1] Their use is the same as that of yellow sand which is of more modern use. At funerals, the road into the church yard and to the grave is also strewed with the same green sprigs.

The Norwegians drink toasts with the solemnities of a public ceremony,[2] mingling with them songs, as was the custom among the different branches of the Teutonic tribes. At the conclusion of dinner, there is no separation of the two sexes, as in England, but both men and women retire together. The old custom that prevailed in Greece, and also among the Goths and Getæ, of scattering flowers upon the tombs, prevails also in Norway.[3]

In the mountainous parts of Norway, where the powers of nature are the most frequently displayed, are a number of superstitious beliefs.[4] There is the supernatural being, Nipen, whose power is supposed to be general and controlling, and exercised sometimes for good, and at others, for

[1] *Laing's Norway*, 61. [2] *Clarke's Scandinavia*, 385. [3] *Idem*, 445. [4] *Norway, Sweden, and Denmark*, 219.

evil. Next in rank are the local intelligences, which are supposed to preside over different parts of the surface of the country, as the mountain demon, the wood demon, the river demon, whose power also extends over lakes. The demon in the Norwegian mountains is single and invisible. Each river has not its distinct demon, but one is supposed to preside over all. He, also, like the mountain demon, is invisible, excepting only his hand. The wood demon differs from all the others, in being supposed to be visible. On midsummer eve, in order to allow the wood demon to begin the operations of the following year,[1] every woodman strikes his axe into a tree, and there leaves it, that he may, if he pleases, fell one of the trees. He is supposed to have great skill in music, and by means of it, to entice women into the forest. Many also believe in a mine demon, whose habitation is underground. There is also a very general belief in a race called the subterraneous people, who live under the earth, but occasionally appearing above it. This race seems allied to the ancient race of magicians, as they have the power of assuming any form, and also of changing the form, either of animate or inanimate beings, and of exercising power by means of magic.

The Scandinavian peoples, thus far briefly alluded to, are obviously all cognate races and stems of the old Indo-German stock. But there are two other peoples dwelling in the northern and eastern parts of this interesting region of country, who, in their physical structure, language, and social habits, fully proclaim their derivation from other and remote stocks. These are the inhabitants of Lapland and Finland, who are regarded as the aborigines of the country, as having once extended considerably south of their present habitations, but as having been, previous to the historic period, driven north and east by the stronger Indo-German. These, although differing from each other

[1] *Norway, Sweden, and Denmark*, 232.

in stature, physiognomy and manners, are yet regarded as kindred nations, as being branches of the Jotun race, who originally inhabited all Scandinavia, and stretched thence eastward toward the Uralian chain of mountains.[1]

The Laplanders are regarded as probably the earliest inhabitants of Sweden and Norway, and the first adventurers from Scythia, being driven from the southern parts of Scandinavia into the more dismal regions lying towards the frozen ocean by subsequent hordes seeking for room and subsistence.[2] They are described as short in stature, of a swarthy and dark complexion, the hair black and short, the mouth wide, the cheeks hollow, the chin somewhat long and pointed, the eyes weak and watery, proceeding probably from long exposures to smoke and snows.[3] They are a very hardy race, consuming large quantities of train oil and accustomed to feats of activity and the practice of agility from childhood. He goes so rapidly on the snow-shoe or skate that the air whistles in his ears, and his hair becomes erect with the motion, and yet if his cap fall, or anything lies in his way he can pick it up without stopping his course.[4] Their small stature very much favors their great agility.

The dress of the men consists of a cap made of kersey cloth, and resembling a sugar loaf worn upon the head, a tunic, or close garment, called a tock, made of sheep's skin, the wool being on and the wooly side inwards, an upper coat made of coarse cloth or skin of the reindeer, a sort of pantaloons made of kersey or leather, and having a close fit; shoes having but one sole and made of deerskin, with the hair on, all the vacant space being filled with straw and rushes. The dress of the women is very similar.

The occupations of the sexes in Lapland are somewhat reversed to those of other countries. All the economy of the house in cooking and other matters belongs to the men,

[1] *Prichard, Physical History*, III, 274, 298. [2] *Acerbi's Travels*, II, 146. [3] *Idem*, 151. [4] *Idem*, 154.

while the manufacture of all articles of dress and of quite a proportion of utensils of wood is the work of the women.[1] They are the best sculptures of Lapland.

The huts of the maritime Laplanders are constructed with four posts bent together in an oval form, with a small door, and an opening in the roof to let out the smoke.[2] The roof is made of birch bark covered with sods. The interior is divided into compartments, covered with boughs of trees, and these spread with the skin of the reindeer. The sheep and cattle have a stall near the entrance of the hut to which they repair by the same door as the rest of the family.[3]

The winter tent of the mountain Laplander differs but little from the hut. The summer tent resembles the winter except that the covering is of canvass cloth, and it lacks the wall of snow by which the former is surrounded.

The bed upon which the Laplander reposes is made of the skins of reindeer spread over branches of trees, his outer coat serving as a pillow, and a prepared sheep skin, the woolly side inwards, as a blanket,[4] over which is laid a woolen rug. The beds are separated by a log of wood on each side.

The mountain Laplander lives the life of a Nomad, wandering about,[5] and pitching his tent wherever circumstances favor it. His principal article of food is venison, while that of the maritime is beef and mutton, both also subsisting on bears, wolves and foxes, otters, seals, and all animals except swine.[6] They make little use of bread, but preserve carefully the milk of the reindeer, making out of it cheese and butter, and keeping preparations of it frozen. They also make use of train oil, and enjoy as luxuries tobacco and brandy.

The maritime Laplanders change their habitation twice a year in spring and autumn, leaving their huts standing until their return, but the mountain Laplander is continually

[1] *Acerbi's Travels*, II, 170. [2] *Idem*, 171. [3] *Idem*, 173. [4] *Idem*, 179. [5] *Idem*, 190. [6] *Idem*, 186.

wandering from place to place. Their more general movement is towards the sea coast in mid-summer, and a return to the mountains on the approach of autumn.

When a Laplander inclines to marry he communicates his wish to his own family,[1] and they all repair in a body to the dwelling of the parents of the girl, taking with them a small present for her and a quantity of brandy to drink. Ariving at the door they enter and the principal spokesman offers a bumper of brandy to the girl's father, who if he accepts it, shows that he approves of the match. The brandy is then handed round, the chief spokesman makes a speech, and the young aspirant has an opportunity of pressing his suit. The parents of the girl at length signify their full assent, the suitor offers the maiden his present, and all the preliminaries are arranged. Should the parents of the girl afterwards recede, then they must pay all the expenses, even the brandy drank at the first visit.

At the nuptials the bride is dressed in her gala habit. These are celebrated in a frugal manner, and presents are made to the bride. The bridegroom generally remains with the parents of his bride during one year after marriage, after which, receiving what they are enabled to furnish towards an outfit, he takes his departure to try his own fortune in the world.

The sports and amusements of the Laplanders consist in various exercises, such as shooting at a mark, throwing at a mark with a javelin; leaping over a stick held in a horizontal position; fastening their hands in each other's belt; striving to raise one another from the ground, and thus to give to each other a fall; and wrestling. They have no particular festivals, no games of cards, but they do play the game of fox and geese.[2] Even music and dancing are unknown among the Laplanders.

It is a practice among the Laplanders, on the birth of a child, to assign a female reindeer, with all her future off-

[1] *Acerbi's Travels* II, 284. [2] *Idem*, 286.

spring, as a provision for the child when it shall grow up, and this provision the child is always entitled to whatever may become of the estate.[1]

The funerals, since the conversion of the Laplanders to Christianity, are conducted with little ceremony. Previously there were some interesting performances. Such were the placing an axe with a tinder box by the side of the corpse, if a man, and a scissors and needle if a woman. Also a quantity of provisions; also for the space of three years digging holes by the side of the grave and depositing therein tobacco, or something that the deceased was fondest of when living.[2] All this was upon the presumption that they were assisting, and contributing to the enjoyment of their friends in the other world. They supposed the felicity of a future state to consist in feasting, smoking tobacco, drinking brandy, and similar amusements.

The magic art is practiced in Lapland. The magician is called the Noaaid, who has his runic drum, his ganic flies, and his juoige, or song of incantation. The first has in appearance, the head of a common drum, the wooden frame of which is hung around with brass rings, so close together that they strike and rattle upon the least touch of the instrument. Upon the skin stretched over it, certain characters are painted, representing the old Lapland deities,[3] and other mystical figures, to the number of forty-five symbols. These drums are of the more value, the greater their antiquity. The drum is consulted by placing a ring, used for this purpose only, upon it, and then by a smart stroke, shaking or driving it over the surface from side to side, which, as it touches certain figures of good or bad omen, admonishes him of success or failure, in what he was about to undertake. If the ring move according to the course of the sun, it augurs success; if contrary, failure. Families in general, possess such a drum, and are guided by it as to the common avocations, as hunting, fishing, or the like.

[1] *Acerbi's Travels*, II. 293. [2] *Idem* 292, 293. [3] *Idem*, 307.

The ganic flies are evil spirits, under the control of the Noaaid, transmitted through a long series of magicians, kept in a box, and invisible except to the Noaaid. When a person is suspected of having stolen property, the Noaaid, pretending first to have discovered his face figured in a dish of brandy, threatens to let loose upon him a swarm of ganic flies who shall continue to torment him until he makes restitution.

The juoige, or song of incantation, is another instrument used by the Noaaid while in the exercise of his magicial function.[1] It is the most hideous kind of yelling that can be conceived. It is supposed to have power to drive away the wolf, and thus to protect the herd, and if the former be within hearing it is not wonderful that he should be frightened away by the noise.

The Finlander is described as having "shorn features long dark unbending hair, and sallow countenance; eyes extending lengthways, and half closed; a peaked nose, frequently inclining upwards, but always pointed;[2] sharp and square chin; elevated cheek bones, and pinched mouth; large, high, and prominent ears; a small head; thin scanty eyebrows, turned upward at their extremities, like those of the Chinese; high shoulders; short and small fingers; knees bent, and projecting forwards."[3] The Finns have quite a resemblance to the Lapps, but are not so diminutive in stature. They are regarded by some as a second colony of Scythians or Tartars who settled in Scandinavia, the first being the Lapps.[4]

The dress of the Finns very much resembles that of the Lapps, and of a considerable part of the inhabitants of Russia. It consists of a jacket or coat made of white sheepskin leather, which is dressed, and worn with the wool inwards, as a lining, towards the body. This is fastened by a sash or girdle about the waist.[5] Long trou-

[1] *Acerbi's Travels*, 311. [2] *Clarke's Travels in Scandinavia*, 381-2. [3] *Idem*, 383. [4] *Idem*, 345. [5] *Idem*, 337.

sers or pantaloons reach below the calf of the leg, and are bound about the instep. The feet are covered either with fur boots or socks made of skins, over which are worn sandals made of the bark of trees. A fur cap is worn upon the head, and, what is very common among Finns, Lapps and Russians, the neck and often the bosom is bare in extremely cold weather.

The inhabitants of the north have many more wants than those of the south. Their necessities for activity are, therefore, greater, and from thence flow many little diversities of character which serve to distinguish them from those of the south. During the winter, the Finns employ themselves in making nets, cutting wood and transporting things from one place to another. Hunting and fishing are also among their winter avocations. In their manner of hunting the seal and attacking the bear they show much adroitness and courage. Their fishing is done by hooks, nets, and striking a heavy blow with a club on the ice immediately over the fish, which has the effect of so stunning and stupifying the fish that it immediately rises to the surface and is seized with an instrument made for the purpose.[1]

Some singular social habits prevail in Finland. One is mentioned by the traveler Acerbi as prevailing in the Uleaborg. It is there a custom, as soon as the entertainment is over,[2] for all the ladies, young and old, who wish to testify the pleasure they have enjoyed in your company, to give you a slap with the hand upon your back, when you least expect it; and it is established as a rule, that the more forcibly the hand is applied, the more emphatic is the lady's declaration in your favor.

The peasants of Savolaxa in Finland have a singular mode of making love.[3] The young man commissions some aged dame to acquaint the lady with his devotion to her interests, sending her at the same time some pre-

[1] *Acerbi*, I, 287, 288. [2] *Idem*, 276. [3] *Idem*, 293.

sents. The dame seeks out a favorable opportunity, expatiates largely on the young man's merits and virtues, and slips the presents into her bosom. The girl, if she retains the present, is understood as yielding the point. If she simply gives back the present, that is not regarded as a fatal negative. A repetition of his attempts may yet accomplish his object. But if by unloosing the cincture of her dress she lets the present fall between her breast and shift to the ground, that is a rejection that banishes all hope and precludes any further negotiation.

On the wedding day some peasant orator does the honors of the feast, and is expected to make extempore verses suitable to the occasion, or to any incidental circumstances that may arise. On the day following, the guests are also assembled as on the day of the wedding, and the orator makes a speech in verse or prose, and thumps the bride lustily with the bridegroom's breeches, saying at the same time: "Be fruitful, woman, and don't fail of producing heirs to your husband."

In one part of Finland young women wear suspended at their girdles, the case or sheath of a knife, as a sign that they are unmarried, and would have no objection to changing their condition. The young man who would like to be instrumental in effecting the change, contrives slily to slip a knife into the sheath, without her perceiving it.[1] If she allows it to remain it is a favorable symptom, if not, a refusal.

In another part the young couple, without quite undressing, have a custom of sleeping together for one week before the day appointed for the wedding. This is called the week of the breeches. If mutually satisfactory the marriage takes place. If not, it is thrown up.

Their baths and manner of bathing affords another curious instance of the social customs of the Finns. Almost all the Finnish peasants have a bath house, consisting

[1] *Acerbi*, I, 296.

of one small chamber, in the innermost part of which are placed a number of stones, which are first heated to a red heat. Water being thrown upon these stones, is immediately converted into vapor.[1] Men and women use the bath promiscuously, without any concealment of dress, and are enveloped in a thick cloud of vapor. The heat is raised to a very high degree, but the bathers, nevertheless, remain in the bath, for the space of half an hour, and sometimes a whole hour. During all this time, they are occupied in rubbing themselves, and lashing every part of their bodies, with switches, formed of twigs of the birch tree. In the severe winter season, they often go out of the bath in a state of nudity, to roll themselves in the snow, thus passing instantaneously from an atmosphere of seventy degrees of heat, to one of thirty degrees of cold, a transition of a hundred degrees, the same as going out of boiling into freezing water; and all without the least inconvenience. The peasants insist that the baths are a necessity. That by their means their strength is recruited as much as by rest and sleep, and that without them, they could not sustain, during the whole day, their severe labors.

The Finns are not insensible to the charms of poetry and music. The species of verse they make use of, is the runic, composed of lines of eight trochees, or long and short syllables. They do not rhyme with corresponding endings, but are alliterative, having like beginnings, that is, having two at least or more words which agree in a letter or syllable. These runic verses are sometimes uttered extempore at their public meetings, and sometimes studied for the occasion, but are rarely written or printed.[2] A circle is formed of the auditors, in the midst of which, stand the improvisitor and his repetitory coadjutor. Every line given by the former is repeated in the same tune by the latter. While the latter is repeating, the former has time to prepare the succeeding line, and thus they both

[1] *Acerbi*, I, 297. [2] *Idem*, 303.

proceed, the coadjutor always taking up the last words of the improvisitor's line, and then repeating it by himself, until the performance is completed. And this, with the aid of beer and brandy, sometimes continues to a late hour.

Much of the amusement at fairs, or at their private meetings, consists in these kind of songs, or recitations, sometimes accompanied by the harp. The Finns have also many runic verses,[1] which are supposed to contain healing powers, and those are styled sanat, or charms. Thus there are mandan sanat, charms for the bite of a serpent; tulen sanat, charms to cure scalds or burns; and raudan sanat, charms to heal wounds. The national instrument of Finland is the harpu, which much resembles the harp.

The Finns have no national dance, but there is one consisting of rustic jumping, without the smallest grace, mixed with certain capers, there being no variety in step, nor passion in attitude, nor expression in countenance.[2] The only variety consists in a difference in the position of their arms, which are alternately laid one over the other.

There is also another, termed the bear's dance, in which a peasant resting his hands upon the ground supports himself on his legs, so as to keep his body in a horizontal position, similar to the bear when it walks on all fours.[3] Remaining constantly in the same attitude, he begins to dance, and by his leaps and jumps, attempts to keep time with the music. Its execution is attended with great labor and fatigue, so that it is difficult for a peasant to go on with it more than three or four minutes without falling into the most violent perspiration. It is an exercise well calculated for strengthening the muscles of the arms, and hence highly useful to the natives whose laborious exertions in ascending the cataracts in summer require very great vigor and muscular power. Address and bodily strength

[1] *Acerbi*, I, 321. [2] *Idem*, 329. [3] *Idem*, 391, 392.

are qualities in the highest repute among the peasantry, and besides this dance, they have other exercises which demand a high degree of activity and firmness in their limbs.

7. The development of society in the British isles.

England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, together with the adjacent isles, make up the British empire. These are all united under one political head, and all their different peoples have, therefore, necessary relations with each other. These relations bring them more or less into contact, and thus gradually lead to an assimilation to each other. Lines of influence extend from the capital and reach the Highlander in his clan, the Welshman amid his mountains, and the Irishman as he plies his daily task. The cities of the empire take their fashions and social life from the capital; the villages take theirs from the cities, while the country lags along sometimes a good deal in the rear of the villages.

The rapid extension of the same manners, customs, and social life does not, however, depend on being under the same head, or subject to the same law. It is governed more by the frequency of intercourse among the people. Hence in cities and villages where people are so much in contact with each other, social life presents less variety, while in the country there often lingers very long the remnants of manners, customs, and superstitions that belonged to a former age.

In the British isles the greatest barrier that presents itself to uniformity in manners, customs and social life is in the difference of race that prevails among its different peoples. Nowhere else within the same geographical limits are exhibited the same diversity of race, and also the same progress in the formation, out of that diversity, of a homogeneous people.

The Celtic race appear to have been the first that migrated from their distant homes in the east crossing the breadth of Europe north of the Alps. While a portion of that race

are supposed by many to have passed through Spain and across the Bay of Biscay into Ireland,[1] where they permanently settled, another passed from Brittany over the channel, and were the early occupants of England. Through this, or some other channel, were derived the highlanders of Scotland, who are Celtic in their origin and language.

Besides these two avenues, the Scandinavians early overrun a great part of the isles and adjacent districts of the main land, bringing with them, however, few or no women;[2] so that in their settlement, and in the formation of domestic ties, there was a marked tendency towards a homogeneous result. This same fact in other cases may have also exerted a strong influence.

It is on the soil of England that the contest between races has been the most severe and unmitigated. There the Briton or Celt was first disturbed by the Roman invasion, and for almost five hundred years England was a Roman province. Next after the withdrawal of the Romans came the Saxons and Angles under Hengist and Horsa, and by these the Britons were subdued. Then came the heptarchy, the rule of Saxon law, characterized by a thorough engrafting of Saxon manners and Saxon language upon British soil. Many remnants of the old Britons took refuge in the mountainous tracts of Wales, and perhaps the purest sample of an unmixed race anywhere upon the British isles are yet to be found in that country. "From the mountains of Wales the descendants of the ancient Cimri or Celts have seen their brethren in the west and north melt away in the great stream of mingling populations,[3] while they have themselves retained their old Celtic speech, and their features of Celtic nationality."

Of the invading Angles and Saxons the former took possession of the north and north-west portion of England,[4] while to the Saxons were assigned the south and south-east.

[1] *Prichard, Researches*, III, 152. [2] *Letters from Scotland*, I, XXIV.
[3] *Vaughan*, I, 164. [4] *Idem*, 160.

There was also a belt of land inhabited by the Britons extending along nearly the whole of the western side of the island from Cumberland to Cornwall.[1]

But the Anglo-Saxon conquerors of England were not permitted to enjoy their triumphs in quiet. The Danes and other Northmen commenced making their descents and settlements on the English coast. During the latter half of the tenth century a powerful Norwegian migration appears to have set in,[2] with little noise, but with much steadiness and effect, on Cumberland and the adjacent parts. At the commencement of the eleventh occurred the massacre of the Danes by the Saxons,[3] followed by the Danish invasions under Sweyn and Canute, and the subjugation of England under Danish rule.

The Danish blood in England became the most prevalent in East Anglia,[4] and along the eastern coast between the Humber and the Forth. Also in the midland counties, forming the kingdom of Mercia, while in the west, the admixture was more between the Saxons and the British, Thus the blood of the Northmen, either Danes or Saxons,[5] became the dominant blood along the whole of the lowlands between the Mersey and the Clyde.

The year 1066 brought the Norman under William the conqueror, who, at the battle of Hastings, overthrew the Saxon power, took possession of the kingdom; parcelled out the realm among his Norman followers; established, in all its rigor, the feudal system; planted all over England the baronial castle; depopulated a belt of land in the northern part of England by sweeping away a hundred thousand lives;[6] excluding the English people from all offices, except the lowest, both in church and state; thus endeavoring everywhere to establish a ruling caste, the Norman, whose right was that of the sword. These Normans were originally Northmen from Scandinavia, but on

[1] *Vaughan*, 1, 161. [2] *Idem*, 165. [3] *Idem*, 152. [4] *Idem*, 165. [5] *Idem*, 166. [6] *Idem*, 289, 290, 291.

their settlement in Normandy, and intermixture by marriage with the Frank population, while they retained their warlike habits,[1] their pride, and their love of independence and adventure, they threw aside their Scandinavian customs, ceased to speak their mother tongue, adopted the religion of the Franks, and with it their modes of legislation and of judicature, and their general usage.

Thus the England of to-day is constructed out of the conflict and the mingling of races. It is not to be lost sight of that each successive invading host was composed mostly if not entirely of men; that of these very many would find their wives among those whom they had conquered; and that thus relations would inevitably spring up between the different races, tending to the creation, in the end, of a homogeneous people. It is probably to this circumstance that England owes so much of her greatness and acknowledged superiority in all or most of the elements of a great and still advancing civilization. Her gallantry and admiration of the heroic and the sublime she derives from the Norman stock; her pluck and steady persistence in carrying out the great principles that lie at the ground-work of her action, from the Anglo-Saxon; while from the Danish viking comes the daring spirit that sends her navies over all the waters of the globe, and renders her the undisputed mistress of the seas.

The Norman had many generous qualities. He practiced a kind of gross hospitality and indiscriminate charity,[2] which afforded some compensation for his baronial despotism. He seems to have been made up of the most opposite qualities. He was acutely discerning, and yet ignorant and credulous; honorably brave, though most atrociously cruel; respectful to the fair sex even to adoration, and yet brutually licentious to individuals; effeminate in his dress and manners, whilst he was capable of undergoing the greatest fatigues.

[1] *Vaughan*, I, 261. [2] *Great Britain*, II, 284.

What has already been said relative to European society as it existed among the early European races, the Scandinavian, the Celtic, and the Germanic; and also in the middle ages and under the feudal system; and in the age of chivalry, has an application to English social life in its various transitional stages, and may here be entirely passed over. What remains to be said relative to the development of that life may be included under:

First. Certain traits of character of the English people.
Second. Dwellings of the English people and home life.
Third. Their dress and costume.
Fourth. Their social habits and customs.
Fifth. Their sports, pastimes, and amusements.

First. Traits of character. The English have been characterized as large-natured,[1] having a mild aspect, and a ringing, cheerful voice. They are large of stature, good livers, understanding and acting the most perfectly upon the true philosophy of living. They rear up the physical man into its largest and most beautiful proportions: 1. By bestowing upon it food of the most nutritious quality, mostly animal, at such times, in such quantities, and of such quality, as is best adapted for that purpose. 2. By subjecting it from the earliest periods to great varieties of exercise in the open air, and mostly of that kind that affords, at the same time, a healthy mental stimulus, such as riding, racing, hunting, and various other species of severe exercise. 3. By giving that species of mental culture, that looks to the solid, rather than to the superficial, bestowing greater depth than surface, and securing strength and power, with little regard to mere accomplishments.

The Englishman lives in a world of realities, and is willing to deal with them as such. His great possession, that which is worth all things else, is a sound and invinci-

[1] *Traits, Emerson*, 181.

ble common sense, giving a clear and accurate conception of the necessary conditions of things, and inspiring right thinking and action amid the many diversities that are here presented. There is little of mere fancy or play of the imagination in his character. His poetry prefers rather to limit its revelations to home life, and to weave its garlands of beauty for the baronial hall and for the shepherd and cottager; investing rural pursuits and matters of every day life, with an ideal character, instead of peering into the unknown, and endeavoring to clothe the unsubstantial with the forms of reality. His philosophy is decidedly realistic and materialistic. It is the philosophy of Bacon and Locke; that which takes its views entirely from the empirical stand point; which questions nature by experiment, and deduces from phenomena their law; which feels thoroughly at home only in physical science, and which delights in the whirling spindle and the pounding trip hammer. Its highest and only real test, is utility.

The Englishman is thoroughly utilitarian in all his tendencies. His inquiry is whether a thing will pay; whether it will ultimately succeed, and what it may fairly be presumed to accomplish in the way of becoming productive capital. The science which the English may be said to have originated, studied, tested, practiced upon, and carried almost to its extremest limits in every possible direction, is that of political economy. The science of values, of productive capital, of the rent of land, wages of labor and profits of stock, has, through several generations, been constantly developing through the economic action of the English people. The revelations of the stock exchange present the culminating point in which all England, and in fact all Europe, are constantly feeling the most lively degree of interest. England has so long subsidized the different continental powers that she may now be regarded as holding the purse strings of Europe. Wealth is worshiped in England. The bank possesses the elements of immense power. Its alternate contraction and expansion,

like the systole and diastole of a mighty heart, sends its strong pulsations to the extremes of the civilized world. At its bidding, human muscles and machinery, and spinning jennies, and all the wonderful complications of steam, perform their respective work with all the order, regularity and system as if they had been drilled to nothing else ever since the creation. If the fashions of the world look to Paris, and everywhere acknowledge the control of the belle monde, of the French capital; so the prices of commodities all over the globe no less refer to London, and are governed by the developments of the stock exchange in that wonderful city. The colossal power of English wealth acknowledges no superior on the surface of the globe.

Englishmen ever keep steadily in view the objects which they propose to accomplish. Selecting the means with great care, and with reference to their peculiar efficacy, they persist in their employment until the object is attained, or its impossibility rendered entirely clear.

Englishmen are generally honest and truth loving. In this respect they constitute no exception to the old Teutonic stock. This honesty and truthfulness are more especially manifested in business transactions. In all these, they both practice and require promptness and plain dealing. Should the government omit to pay the interest on the national debt the day it falls due, the shock of a terrible earthquake would not more excite, alarm, or terrify the nation. This trait in the English character is their sheet anchor in all the markets of the globe. All the dealers in English products and English stocks, the world over, trust with unwavering confidence to those elements of truth, capacity, and straightforwardness that enter into the English character. They have no respect for adventurers, and an innate horror of everything that appears like humbug.

The law of primogeniture has exercised a great influence upon English character. The descent of property and peerage to the eldest born has perpetuated an aristocracy

who are distinguished in part by wealth, but more by manners, title and personal privilege. It is this that has scattered palaces, halls, villas and magnificent parks all over England. The aristocracy receives abundant support, notwithstanding its special privileges, from the large, wealthy, and influential middle class, who might be naturally supposed to be hostile by reason of such privileges. And the principal reason is that there are two avenues to the ranks of this same aristocracy. The one lies through great wealth, the other through commanding talents. The wealthy purchase land, identify themselves with that interest, and seek through it as early an introduction as possible into the aristocratic body. The other strengthen their minds, improve their powers, and make themselves felt through their exercise, and thus seek admission through this avenue into the same body. Besides, there is a sort of pride which the English possess in cherishing the old nobility. There belong to it many illustrious names, names identified with English triumphs, with the success of English principles, and the establishment of English rights.

The great point that marks the difference between the French noblesse and the English nobles is that the former flourish only in the atmosphere of a court; the latter only in that of their own country homes. The former dazzle and captivate only as they reflect the rays that have fallen upon them from royalty. The latter shed a light of their own, which, if it is less strong, is more satisfactory and enduring. The former go to their country residences as to a place of banishment; visit their tenantry only to extort from them all the money possible; which instead of expending in the country they carry to the capital, and there lavish in splendor and display. Between them and their country tenantry there can be nothing but coldness, estrangement, and even hostility. The latter living at home in the midst of their tenantry preserve with them friendly relations, and thus secure a popularity where it must be the most agreeable.

The English noble, instead of giving the land his own names, takes his from the land, wearing the token of the glebe that gave him birth, and representing the country that nourished and reared him up.[1] Thus associations grow up between the names of places and those of families, and these in time acquire a high degree of permanence.

By living in this manner, the English nobles lead quiet, unostentatious lives, having the lead in "matters of state and of expense; in questions of taste, in social usages, in convivial and domestic hospitalities."[2] If they have not the most powerful brains they have the best manners. There is with them a sense of superiority, "the absence of all the ambitious effort which disgusts in the aspiring classes, a pure tone of thought and feeling, and the power to command, among their other luxuries, the presence of the most accomplished men in their festive meetings."[3]

The English hate all craft and subtlety. They are ever ready to wage warfare, but it is always an open one. Poisonings and assassinations they seldom resort to. Their philosophy is to bring force manfully in conflict with force, and to fight on until one proves the stronger and the other gives up.

With these traits lying at the foundation of English character, it remains to be seen in what manner they have been developed in English social life.

Second. Dwellings of the English people and home life.

The dwellings of the ancient Britons were of the rudest kind, little better than thickets, dens and caves. Their towns were made up of wicker huts, which they placed at short distances from each other in a tract of woody land,[4] surrounding them by a trench to secure them from their enemies. These were more especially for summer. Their winter lodgings, and also places of retreat in time of war, were dug deep in the ground and covered with earth, and thus rendered secure and warm.

[1] *Emerson*, 181. [2] *Idem*, 186. [3] *Idem*, 188. [4] *Manners and Customs*, 16.

Their first advance upon this was to construct wooden houses, having high tapering roofs with apertures at the top for the admission of light, and emission of smoke. They bore a strong resemblance to sugar loaves, the holes at the top serving for windows as well as chimneys.

During the reign of the Anglo-Saxon, the dwellings were hovels built of wood or earth,[1] and thatched with straw or the branches of trees. They were full of crevices. Their largest and best buildings were constructed of wood, and covered with thatch. The houses of the most wealthy had glass windows, but the huts of the poor had only a small hole with a bit of horn for a window. The floor consisted of bare ground strewed with rushes. These the wealthy changed frequently, but the poor allowed them to remain for a long time. Stoves and chimneys were unknown, the fire being made upon the floor, the smoke escaping either through the doorway, or a hole in the roof. The method resorted to by the Saxon to test the courage of his young son was to put him on the slanting side of the house, and there leave him. If he looked afraid and began crying, they predicted a coward, but if he clung boldly to the roof, and appeared fearless,[2] they foretold the brave man and the warrior.

An advance was made by the Norman. In the twelfth century great improvements were made in architecture, although the country people still lived very generally in hovels. Glass windows came into general use in 1180. In John's reign came the invention of chimneys. Previous to that the smoke had no other avenue of escape than either through the doorway, or through a hole in the roof. The Normans, however, introduced very few articles of furniture in the eleventh century.

The houses in London were mostly thatched with straw till the reign of Henry III, when it was ordered that all houses in the city should be covered with tiles or slates.[3]

[1] *Manners and Customs.* 42. [2] *Idem,* 31. [3] *Idem,* 121.

Architecture, with some other arts of design made a progress in England in the fourteenth century. A greater profusion of ornament was used. The architects kept together, lived in movable huts, and called themselves freemasons.[1] Many of the domestic buildings were still erected for defense. They were moated, contained but few rooms, the hall being much larger than the rest. Fires except for cooking were little used in private houses. Chimneys were by no means common. Painted ceilings and walls in the houses of the wealthy prevailed before the time of Henry III. Also painted glass windows.

During the next, or the fifteenth century, Gothic architecture improved, and the wealthy abandoned the moated castle and commenced inhabiting large rambling mansions, constructed of timber, and covered with plaster.[2] These were generally built round one or two quadrangles, often possessing a great variety of exterior detail. Within, the great hall with its open groined roof, the kitchen, and the buttery were the most observable. At the upper end of the hall was the raised floor on which stood the table, around which the gentlemen were seated on wooden benches, and the ladies on low stools.[3] A music gallery was at the lower end, the fireplace in the centre, and instead of chimneys a hole to permit the smoke to escape. The floors were strewn with rushes, overhead were perches for hawks. The walls were hung with arras. The beds were usually straw pallets, with a log of wood for a bolster, and a horse cloth for a coverlet. In farm houses the same plan of building round a quadrangle was adhered to. In towns the houses were chiefly of wood. The houses of the great barons were very extensive, and surrounded inner courts. Some of them could accommodate one thousand men. But these large dwellings were more stately than comfortable.

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 120, 121. [2] *Idem*, 163. [3] *Idem*, 164.

During the Tudor dynasty, the dwellings of the wealthy were large, comfortless places, surrounded by walled courts, which had more the appearance of prisons, than of gentlemen's habitations. In the time of Elizabeth, the last of the Tudors,[1] the style of the houses adopted by the wealthy, was something between a castle and a mansion. To each residence belonged a moat, a gateway, and one or two strong turrets. Enter, and the furniture is quaint, but often rich and picturesque. The walls are hung with tapestry; the chairs, high-backed, carved, stuffed, and covered with velvet or satin.[2] The beds are apparently comfortable, often elegant. Looking glasses are just being introduced, in the place of steel mirrors. There is the silver spoon, but forks are not yet generally used. China ware is unknown, although crockery is in use. But carpets were unknown, even in the age of the last of the Tudors. Instead of them, you will find the floors strewn with rushes, and the filth, which was allowed to accumulate, was often the cause of infectious diseases.[3]

The farm houses were built of timber, and those of laborers, of mud, or wattle and mud;[4] many having no chimneys. Straw beds and pillows of chaff were common. Trenchers and wooden spoons were in use. But this was near the commencement of the reign of the Tudors, in the latter part of the fifteenth century. In the last of the sixteenth, the houses were much improved.[5] Wood or wattle gave way to stone or brick; wooden trenchers to pewter plates; and straw and chaff mattresses to feather beds.

In the beginning of the seventeenth century the interior of houses began to be greatly embellished.[6] Rich velvets and silks, embroidered with cloth of gold and of silver, and colored satins, abounded, of the most gorgeous hues. Carpets took the place of rushes on the floors. There were

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 194, 195. [2] *Idem*, 195. [3] *Idem*, 196. [4] *Idem*, 216. [5] *Idem*, 218. [6] *Idem*, 252, 253.

carved cabinets of oak ebony and ivory. Superb ornaments of ivory and china came from the east; and altogether the houses of the wealthy presented a scene of stately elegance and luxury that has continued from that period down to the present time.

Third. The dresses and costume of the British people.

The early Britons wore a mantle which enwrapped the whole body, and was fastened in front with a clasp, and occasionally a thorn.[1] These were smooth inside, and covered with long hair on the other. The southern Britons wore a tunic ornamented with flowers, and loose garments called braecæ, covering their legs and thighs like the trousers worn by sailors of the present day. Their shoes were of coarse skin with the hair outwards. They had a cassock or cloak of chequer-work, united by laces on the inside, giving the appearance of flowers. Sometimes a short woolen jacket was worn without the tunic. Sometimes it was girded by a belt, or ornamented with gold and silver.

But in the northern parts of the country, away from the Roman power and influence, even so late as A. D. 207, the Britons appear to have been naked, their necks and waists rudely decorated with large rings and chains of iron, and their bodies marked with various figures, and stains of woad. The desire of exhibiting the figures and stains may have operated to prevent a resort to any kind of covering.

The British females were ornamented with golden chains, rings and bracelets, and their hair hung loose upon their shoulders,[2] being turned back and falling down behind without tying or braiding.

The Anglo-Saxon costume consisted of a linen shirt, a linen or woolen tunic, according to the season, descending to the knees, and having long, close sleeves, over which was worn a short cloak, like the Roman pallium, fastened

[1] *Great Britain*, II, 284. [2] *Idem*, 236–7.

sometimes on the breast, and sometimes on one or both shoulders with brooches or fibulæ.[1] The linen or woolen tunic was fastened with a belt round the waist. The smock-frock of the present day is its lineal descendant and almost precisely like it. What the Saxons termed brech and hose consisted of drawers reaching half way down the thigh, and stockings meeting them. Over these latter they wore bands of cloth, linen or leather, commencing at the ankle and terminating a little below the knee, either in close rolls, or crossing each other sandal-wise. The shoes were usually painted black with an opening down the instep, and fastened by a thong. These garments composed the dress of all classes, the wealthy being distinguished from the poor, not by difference in form but by richness and ornament.

The Anglo-Saxon females wore long loose garments reaching to the ground, which was called by different names as tunic, gunna or gown, cyrtel or kirtle, and mantle.[2] The head-dress was a veil, or long piece of linen or silk wrapped around the head and neck. The Anglo-Saxons wore their hair long, parted on the forehead, and falling naturally down the shoulders. The beard was worn long. The Danish costume in many respects resembled that of the Anglo-Saxon.

The dress of the Anglo-Norman nobles and gentry consisted of a long and close gown reaching to the feet,[3] the lower edge often embroidered with gold. Over this was thrown a long cloak, buckled over the breast, a hood hanging behind it. The close gown was put on over the head like a shirt, and fastened round the waist by a girdle. The nether stock and stockings were of fine cloth. The noble women of the Anglo-Normans, wore loose gowns girdled round the waist, and trailing on the ground; but married females had an additional robe over the gown, hanging down before, with a purse or pouch hanging to

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 34. [2] *Idem*, 37. [3] *Great Britain*, II, 275.

the girdle. The Anglo-Norman wore his hair long, but his face shaved.

In the reign of Richard II the dress of the men was long,[1] very luxurious, and often with open sides, and preposterously long-toed shoes. A dandy of the fourteenth century is thus described.[2] "He wore long pointed shoes, fastened to his knees by gold or silver chains; hose of one color on one leg, and of another color on the other. Short breeches, not reaching to the middle of the thigh; a coat, one-half white, and the other half black or blue; a long beard, a silk band buttoned under his chin, embroidered with grotesque figures of animals, dancing men, etc., and sometimes ornamented with gold, silver, and precious stones." The women of the thirteenth century wore their gowns so gay and so long, that a poet compares them to peacocks and magpies. Another complaint of this period is tight lacing,[3] the waists of women being pinched in to make them look very slim.

The fifteenth century saw English dress carried to a great degree of absurdity.[4] The jackets were worn so short that a statute was passed in 1463 ordering them to be worn a certain length behind. The dandies wore sometimes a boot on one leg, and a stocking on the other. The head-coverings were fantastical. The men had tight breeches or hose; wore petticoats over their lower clothing. Their doublets were laced in the front like a woman's stays across a stomacher; and their gowns were open in the front to the girdle, and again from the girdle to the ground. The women appear in gowns, sometimes having enormous trains, corsets were worn over the other dress. The head-dresses were worn immoderately high and broad.[5] Two of them were peculiar, and were called, the one the horned, and the other the steeple head dress. The first consisted of two elevations, like a mitre worn edgeways, or like a

[1] *Great Britain*, II, 117. [2] *Manners and Customs*, 18. [3] *Idem*, 119.
[4] *Great Britain*, II, 300. [5] *Fosbroke*, II, 840.

heart in cards, with the bottom cut off.[1] These horns rose up from the cap or bonnet, enclosing it from behind, and rearing their lofty points into the air, like those of some wild bison. These were covered with some richly patterned silk or velvet. The other, or the steeple, presented a round tower with battlemented tops, and huge transparent shades, enclosing the face, and running to a point half a yard before and behind them. Others again had conical frames half a yard high set upon their heads, covered with lace or velvet. These are even now worn by the peasant women in some parts of the province of Normandy.

At the close of the fifteenth century, the English costumes were so fantastical and absurd, that it was difficult to distinguish one sex from the other. The ordinary costume of the nobility of the age of Henry VIII, 1509, consisted of a full skirted jacket, or doublet,[2] with large sleeves to the wrist, over which was worn a short, but equally full coat or cloak, with loose hanging sleeves, and a broad rolling collar of fur, a brimmed cap, adorned often with jewels, and an ostrich feather, stockings, and square-toed shoes. Ruffs or ruffles were worn on the wrists.

About the middle of the reign of Elizabeth, 1580, a change occurred in the female costume.[3] The body was imprisoned in whalebone to the hips, while the shoulders sported an enormous ruff rising to nearly the height of the head behind, and which encircled the wearer like the nimbus or glory of a saint. From the bosom descended an interminable stomacher, on each side of which, jutted out horizontally, the enormous vardingale, the prototype and precursor of the more modern hoop. The cap, or coif, was occasionally exchanged for a round bonnet like that of the men. So enormously long had the ruffs become, that persons were stationed at the gates of the different streets, to cut down every ruff which exceeded three feet in width.[4] This fashion continued, until a lady, Mrs. Tur-

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 61. [2] *Idem*, 188. [3] *Idem*, 190. [4] *Idem*, 191.

ner was hung up by her ruff for committing a murder, and that put an end to it. In the time of the Tudors, in the place of pockets, a loose pouch was sometimes suspended from the girdle. In this we find the rudiments of the pocket, which had not yet found its way into costume.

The large ruff was not confined to the costume of women.[1] The paintings of the age of Elizabeth show the men's costume to consist of the large trunk hose, the long waisted doublet, the short cloak or mantle with its standing collar, the ruff, the hat band and feather, the shoes and roses.

In the reign of Charles I, 1625 to 1648, the costume of the cavalier or royalist was picturesque. It consisted of a doublet of silk, satin, or velvet,[2] with large loose sleeves, slashed up the front, the collar covered by a falling band of the richest point lace. A short cloak was worn carelessly on one shoulder. The long breeches, fringed or pointed, met the lops of the wide boots, which were also ruffled with lace or lawn. A broad-leafed Flemish beaver hat, with a rich hat-band and plume of feathers, was set on one side of the head, and a Spanish rapier hung from a most magnificent baldric, or sword-belt, worn sash-wise over the right shoulder. The doublet was occasionally exchanged for the buff coat, which was richly laced. The hair was worn long, and the beard very peaked, with small upturned mustaches.

The large ruff having expired with Mrs. Turner, so great a change occurred in the costume of the ladies that one of that day would scarcely be distinguished from one of this, saving the article of hoops. The dress fell naturally without hoops, and the broad collar fell gracefully on the shoulders. On the head was the broad, high-crowned hat.

With the return of the merry monarch, Charles II, fashion again regained her throne.[3] "Taste and elegance were abandoned for extravagance and folly; and the male

[1] *Manners and Customs*, II, 194. [2] *Idem*, 239. [3] *Idem*, 242.

costume, which, in the time of Charles I, had reached the highest point of picturesque splendor, degenerated and declined from this moment, and expired in the square coat, cocked hat, full-bottomed wig, and jack boots of the following century." The peruke, or periwig dates from the reign of Charles II.

The beauties of the reign of Charles II are thus described: "their glossy ringlets, escaping from a simple bandeau of pearls, or adorned by a single rose, fall in graceful profusion upon snowy necks, unveiled by even the transparent lawn of the band or the partlet; and the fair round arm, bare to the elbow, reclines upon the voluptuous satin petticoat;[1] while the gown, of the same rich material, piles up its voluminous train in the back ground."

The reign of queen Anne, 1702, banished the costume of chivalry except the sword, and that, even at the present day, is necessary to complete the full dress of the court of St. James.[2]

"Square cut coats and long flapped waistcoats with pockets in them, the latter meeting the stockings, still drawn up over the knee so high as to entirely conceal the breeches, but gartered below it; large hanging cuffs and lace ruffles; the skirts of the coats stiffened out with wire, or buckram, from beneath which peeped the hilt of the sword, deprived of the broad and splendid belt, in which it swung in the preceding reigns; blue or scarlet silk stocking; lace neckcloths; square-toed short quartered shoes, with high red heels and small buckles; very long and formally curled perukes, black riding wigs, bag wigs, and night-cap wigs; small three-cornered hats, laced with gold or silver galloon, and sometimes trimmed with feathers, composed the habit of the noblemen during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I."

During the reigns of the first, second and third Georges, hats underwent great changes; the old three-cornered

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 244. [2] *Idem*, 246.

cocked hat having found a refuge on the heads of the state-coachmen; while the wig, in the last half of the eighteenth century, gradually diminished in size, the practice of frizzing, plastering, and powdering the hair, coming in to supersede its use. The square cut coat and long-flapped waistcoat of the reign of Queen Anne, and the first two Georges, underwent an alteration about the middle of the reign of their successor. The skirts were unstiffened and the waists shortened, and the cut of the present court suit introduced.

It has been well remarked that "fashion has been such a varying goddess, that neither history, tradition nor painting, has been able to preserve all her mimic forms.[1] In 1735, a lady's dress was short, and very much like a great drum; and in 1745, it was even wider. Indeed the fashions of women's dresses are like a weathercock, always changing and never fixed."

Fourth. Their social habits and customs.[2] The ancient Britons were hospitable. The stranger was ever made welcome, and if he washed himself in the water furnished, and delivered his arms to the master of the house, it was equivalent to a consent to spend at least one night with the family. Then they prepared a meal, introduced the harp and made merry. They were great feasters, there being no public assembly, no marriage, no birthday, no treaty of peace or alliance, not even a funeral, without a jolly time of feasting.[3] Many of their feasts lasted for a week, sometimes longer. They sat in a circle upon the ground, their seats being grass, hay, or the skins of animals. They took up the meat with their hands tearing it off with their teeth.[4] They took their little children in the winter time to some stream or lake, and plunged them into it, to harden their bodies.

They sometimes buried their dead, but the South Britons oftener burned them.[5] In the former case they buried with

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 249. [2] *Idem*, 18. [3] *Idem*, 19. [4] *Idem*, 20. [5] *Idem*, 23.

them their swords, bows, and arrows, and generally their dogs. In the latter they sometimes consigned to the same fire those friends, servants, animals and things in which the deceased was known mostly to have delighted. The most important and solemn thing was the funeral song, which recited the good qualities of the deceased, and was sung by a number of bards to the music of their harps. On this song they thought depended the rest and happiness of the soul in the world to come.

The period of courtship was brief. The authority of the father was absolute.[1] The husband had a right of chastising his wife in three cases. 1. Infidelity to his bed. 2. Embezzling his goods. 3. Abusing his beard. Among them the law of succession was that at a man's death his property was equally divided among his sons. The highest ranks of the Anglo-Saxons lived in a kind of rude pomp surrounded by officers, friends and servants. Both Saxons and Danes were even fonder of feasting and merry-making than the ancient Britons.[2] They lived chiefly upon pork and fish, drinking large quantities of ale and mead. The Thanes spent a large portion of their time in giving entertainments to their friends and followers. The wealthy sat at a table raised above that of the inferior guests. Horns were much used at table, glass vessels being little known prior to the Norman conquest. The harpers and gleemen, or merry makers, were important characters at Anglo-Saxon festivals. The latter were jugglers and pantomimists, as well as minstrels; were accustomed to associate in companies, and amuse by displays of feats of strength and agility, dancing and slight of hand tricks.[3]

The minstrel proper came with the conquest, and enjoyed many special privileges.[4] His person being held sacred, he could travel in perfect safety from place to place in time of war as well as of peace, and wherever he went was received with the warmest welcome and hospitality.

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 26. [2] *Idem*, 45. [3] *Idem*, 46. [4] *Idem*, 47.

Every great baron kept a jester as a part of his household establishment.

The marriage ceremonies of the Anglo-Saxons and Danes were preceded by a day spent in feasting and merriment.[1] The next morning the bride was escorted with great ceremony to the house of her future husband. There the nuptial benediction was given, and both bride and bridegroom crowned by the priest with crowns made of flowers. The wedding dresses were only used on that occasion. On retiring at night they drank of the marriage cup with all who were present. Early on the following morning, before the two arose, the company assembled in the bedroom to hear the husband declare what was called the morning gift, or what settlement and indulgences he would allow his wife. That being declared, his relations undertook to see the promise performed. Then feasting and rejoicing continued for several days. In case of adultery by the wife, the husband cut off her hair, stripped her almost naked, turned her out of his house, and whipped her from one end of the village to the other. After this, her character was irrecoverably lost.

The Anglo-Saxons were superstitious and sought to foretell future events. This they endeavored to accomplish by bits of wood, distinguished by different marks,[2] or by the singing or flight of birds, or the neighing of horses, particularly those of a white color.

With the Normans came the age of chivalry. They were originally from the same parent stem as the Danes and Saxons, but important modifications had occurred from their long residence in Normandy. "They became distinguished throughout Europe for their military skill, their love of glory, their encouragement of literature, the splendor of their habiliments,[3] the cleanliness of their persons, and the courtesy of their demeanor." To the Anglo-Normans is owing the introduction of many elegancies and

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 50. [2] *Idem*, 51, 52. [3] *Idem*, 72.

refinements in the habits of common life and customs of the table. The Normans were more temperate in eating and drinking than the Saxons.[1] They had only two meals a day, dinner and supper; dining at nine o'clock A. M. and supping at 5 P. M., according to the following lines:

> To rise at five, to dine at nine,
> To sup at five, to bed at nine.
> Make a man live to ninety-nine.

The Normans, however, grew less temperate after they had for some time lived in the country.

The custom of tolling the curfew bell at eight o'clock every evening, which is still kept up in some parts of the country, dates back to the time of William the Conqueror, by whose command,[2] the bell was tolled at that hour every night, that the people might know when to put out their fires and lights.

The ages of feudalism and chivalry, through which the English people passed upon the accession of the Norman, in their relations to society, have already been briefly considered. Towards the conclusion of the fourteenth century, the wealthy barons began to discontinue dining in their great halls with their dependents, which had been their former custom;[3] and in the place of it their dinners were served up in private parlors with a few familiar friends. In the forepart of the same century, eleven o'clock A. M. was the most fashionable dinner hour, and six P. M., the supper hour. In the reign of Richard II, 1377, first occurs the practice of the rich having breakfast. In the reign of Edward III, 1326,[4] intemperance in eating and drinking had rendered the English such monstrous gormandizers that a law was passed forbidding them to have more than two courses at dinner. The drinks of the common people at this period were ale and cider, but the wealthy consumed large quantities of foreign wines. Down to the

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 79. [2] *Idem*, 90. [3] *Idem*, 113, 114. [4] *Idem*, 114.

commencement of the thirteenth century there were no regular shops,[1] but traders went about like hawkers to sell their goods.

The advancement of the English people during the fourteenth century, has been thus summed up: "In arms they had won eternal and unrivaled fame; in poetry, literature, and art, they had made brilliant advances. Their churches were piles of glorious architecture. In poetry they had a Chaucer; in architecture, a Wykeham; in philosophy, a Bacon and a Grostete. Wycliffe had made the Bible common property, infusing new life into religion, which penetrated the cottage and the dwelling of the industrious citizen. In the constitution, the great charter had been confirmed, as well as many excellent statutes, restraining the royal and baronial power, and extending that of the people. Gunpowder and cannon had been employed in warfare, making strong castles useless. Manufactures had been introduced by the noble Queen Philippa of Hainault. As a whole, it must be pronounced a distinguished and progressive era,[2] which did its duty to the common country, and to posterity; but fell short in the two important domains of morals and of humanity."

From the commencement to past the middle of the fifteenth century, the larger barons still kept up their feudal style of living, having their minstrels, jesters, buffoons and tumblers; their four meals a day, breakfasting at seven, dining at ten, or rather, from ten to one, P. M., being in the meantime entertained by songs and harps, and by jests, tricks, and dances; supping at four in the afternoon, and having a meal called the livery, just before going to bed.[3] The common people were later in their hours, and had but three meals a day, viz: at eight, twelve, and six.

Five times in the year glutton-masses were celebrated in the churches by the secular clergy. Early in the morning

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 132. [2] *Idem*, 149. [3] *Idem*, 152, 153.

the people brought into the church roasted and boiled meats and strong drinks, and as soon as the mass was ended,[1] they all fell to, and finished the day in riot and intemperance, the feast itself finally degenerating into an orgy.

At this period, all ranks were extremely hospitable, especially the wealthy. Neville, earl of Warwick, the last of the barons, was accustomed to have six oxen eaten at a breakfast, and no fewer than thirty thousand people are said to have lived daily at his expense in his different manors and castles.

Post-horses and stages, or regular resting places, date their origin from the time of Richard III, 1483.

About those times a very singular charge of sorcery was made against the Duchess of Gloucester. The allegation was that she had procured from an accomplice a wax figure, which was so moulded by art, that when placed before the fire, as it melted away, the flesh of the king would melt away also,[2] his marrow dry up, and his health fade.

In the sixteenth century there was great formality and severity of manners in families. The aged were haughty and reserved, exacting from the young the most abject deference. No child presumed to sit in the presence of its parents, or to speak without permission. The son stood uncovered and silent in the father's presence,[3] the daughters like statues by the doorway, not being permitted to sit without leave. A formality somewhat similar even now prevails in the palaces of kings.

The English of this period are described as gross eaters, and great drunkards; as extremely fond of good cheer, and frolic-making, merry-making and music; as rude in manners, and disorderly in all their habits. In the Elizabethan age, the breakfast hour was at eight o'clock,[4] the dinner hour at eleven, and the supper hour at six. At entertainments a

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 155. [2] *Idem*, 178. [3] *Idem*, 183. [4] *Idem*, 184.

salt cellar was placed in the middle of the table, and the rank of the guests was discriminated by their situation above or below it.

When Henry VIII proclaimed himself the head of the English church, and gave the people permission to read the Bible in their own language, the custom was adopted of chaining a Bible to the reading desk of every parish church in the country, to which access was had at all hours of the day. The consequence was that the churches were daily crowded, and thousands learned to read for the sole purpose of reading the scriptures.[1]

From the restoration of Charles II, in 1660, to the reign of George II, a period of seventy years, the national morality was at a very low ebb. Men were knavish, intriguing, unscrupulous. "They hid their hatred in a smile, and their infamy in a bow." Even women of rank were destitute of delicacy and probity.[2] They mingled with men in taverns, amid tobacco smoke, obscene songs, and conversation of the most ribald character. They were desperate gamblers, and both sexes seemed to unite their efforts to make debauchery and villainy fashionable. The practice of duelling, the remnant of the age of chivalry, was rendered fashionable at this period, and prevailed more than it ever has at any other before or since.[3]

During the reign of James I, family pride greatly prevailed; the wealthy distinguished themselves from the poor by a conceited demeanor,[4] an expensive style of living, an exhibition of pomp and show, and the attendance of a numerous retinue.

Probably no greater social contrast was ever presented among the same people than that presented by the puritans and cavaliers during the English revolution and reign of the commonwealth. The cavaliers were a jolly set of merrymakers, who lived for no other purpose than enjoyment. Deriding everything solemn and religious, sneering

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 211. [2] *Idem*, 221. [3] *Idem*, 228. [4] *Idem*, 224.

at priests and churches, flippant in oaths and blasphemies, destitute of principle, attached to drink and debauchery, they spent their lives in feeding upon the pleasures and vanities of the hour, without ever appearing to realize any of the responsibilities of existence. On the other hand was the puritan in his straight, plain, sober-colored dress, studiously avoiding all ornament, as if it were a pest; his manners and social maxims grave, harsh, and even repulsive; using a sedate and chastened style of speech; full of reverence for sound and Christian principles; believing and acting upon the principle that life was a gift granted upon severe conditions; that its mission was to perform duties and not to enjoy pleasures; that everything here was significant of realities; everything had a solemn meaning; and that if enjoyment was to be found anywhere it was in the performance of duty, and in always so feeling, thinking and acting as to secure the approbation of a conscience formed upon Bible doctrines. They revered God and his word, were obedient to law, and devoted to truth and justice. They were not pure stoics in their belief, and yet they had much of the lofty sentiment that constituted the stoic philosophy. With such marked characters and contrasts, the success of the puritans, or independents, under Cromwell, could be easily predicted without possessing the spirit of prophecy. They marched to battle, as they marched to church, under a solemn sense of duty. The cavaliers, although inured to war, and naturally brave, melted away before a self-constituted soldiery, who sent up the morning and evening prayer, and marched on to the conflict singing psalms and hymns. Having once attained power England was merry England no longer. They carried everywhere the utmost severity. Nymphs and graces, the work of Ionian chisels,[1] were handed over to puritan stonemasons to be made decent. All betting was prohibited. Adultery was punished with death. Public

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 228.

amusements, from the masks exhibited at the mansions of the great, down to the wrestling matches and grinning matches on village greens, were vigorously attacked. May-poles were hewn down, theatrical diversions proscribed, play-houses dismantled, bear-baiting totally forbidden, and rope-dancing, puppet shows, bowls, and horse-racing, were all regarded with no friendly eye. The long parliament even laid its ruthless hand on Christmas, a day that had ever been devoted to national jollity, to hilarity, feasting and enjoyment, and enacted that it should be strictly observed as a fast, and that all men should pass it in humbly bemoaning the great national sin, which they and their fathers had so often committed on that day, by romping under the mistletoe, eating boar's head, and drinking ale flavored with roasted apples.[1]

Although there was a reaction against these severe reforms introduced by the puritans, yet there can remain no doubt of the purifying influence they ultimately exerted upon English character. "From the accession of Queen Anne to the present day, the morality of the English has greatly improved; and though it is now far from being what it ought to be, considering the vast number of men who profess to preach Christiantiy,[2] yet for religion, morality, courage, honesty, sobriety, and manliness, old England ranks first in the great family of nations."

The acts of the long parliament furnish by no means the only instance in which legislation has been invoked to mend the social state. In 1770 an act was passed providing "that all women, of whatever age,[3] rank, profession, or degree, whether virgins, maids, or widows, that shall, from and after such act, impose upon, seduce, and betray into matrimony, any of his majesty's male subjects, by the scents, paints, cosmetic washes, artificial teeth, false hair, Spanish wool, iron stays, hoops, high-heeled shoes, etc., shall incur the penalty of the law now in force against witchcraft and

[1] *Manners and Customs*, 230. [2] *Idem*, 231, 232. [3] *Idem*, 261, 262.

like misdemeanors, and that the marriage, upon conviction, shall stand null and void." It is to be hoped that by means of such severe legislation, his majesty's male subjects were enabled to escape the many snares that seem to have been so artfully laid to entrap them.

Fifth. The sports, pastimes and amusements of the English people.

A brief reference to some of the most important of these will aid essentially in giving a clearer insight into the English character. When a people unbend themselves, and relax from the severer cares and business of life, the direction which their sports, pastimes, and amusements take will indicate very clearly the true bent and tendencies of their disposition and character. To justify the appellation of merry England it is necessary that the English people should have developed themselves in various sports, pastimes and amusements.

A kind of sport that from the earliest times has occupied the attention of the English is that of hunting. The ancient Britons were hunters. Those, especially of the northern parts of England, acquired much of their subsistence by hunting. The Saxons, in common with other German nations, were strongly attached to the sports of the field. Under their rule the privileges of hunting were restricted, being gradually withdrawn from the people and appropriated by the chiefs and leaders. As early as the ninth century, hunting constituted an essential part of the education of a young nobleman.[1]

The Danes, equally with the Saxons, were possessed of the hunting propensity; but it was the Norman who reduced this sport to a system as severely oppressive upon the common people on the one side, as it contributed to the enjoyment of the king and his barons upon the other. Under his rule, thousands of acres were withdrawn from the purposes of husbandry and enclosed in parks for the

[1] *Strutt's Sports*, 3.

rearing of deer and other game, for the chase and slaughter. For the protection of game a system of game laws came to be established, most oppressive in their character, requiring the life of a man as an equivalent for the killing of a hare. So oppressive were these laws that their modification found an appropriate place in the forest charter which was wrenched from King John.

So popular has this sport been among the higher classes, that even ladies have frequently embarked in it, sometimes accompanying the gentlemen,[1] at other times forming hunting parties by themselves. In the fourteenth century they rode horseback in precisely the same manner as men.[2]

The animals hunted were in three classes, the first including the hare, the hart, the wolf and wild boar; the second, the buck, the doe, the fox, the martin and the roe; and the third, the gary or badger, the wild cat and the otter.

Great care was taken in rearing dogs for the chase. For this purpose they made use for the grayhound, and the bulldog, and also the mastiff and the spaniel, the latter especially for hawking.

The sportsmen have had various methods of hunting, some requiring the hunter to be on horseback and some on foot. Sometimes this exercise took place in the open country; sometimes in woods and thickets, sometimes in parks, chases and forests, where the game was usually enclosed with a hegde or fence-work of netting, supported by posts driven into the ground for that purpose.[3] It was always attended with the highest degree of excitement, resulting in the almost total self-abandonment of those who entered fully into it. The winding of the hunter's horn, the rapid flight of the deer, the eager pursuit of the barking pack of dogs, the hunters on their fleet horses, all tend to render the whole scene one of deep and absorbing interest.

The game is pursued by its scent, and hence it becomes important for the hunter to determine when that is the

[1] *Strutt*, 11, 13. [2] *Idem*, 14. [3] *Idem*, 20.

best. And with reference to that the following rule is laid down: "When the tobacco smoke seems to hang lazily in the air, scarcely sinking or rising, or moving from the place where it is emitted from the pipe, producing at the same time a strong smell, which lasts some time in the same place,[1] after the smoke is apparently dispersed, we may, on that day, be sure that the scent will lay well."

It is remarked by an old writer of the twelfth century, John of Salisbury, that hunting and hawking are esteemed the most honorable employments by the nobility, who think it the height of worldly felicity, to spend the whole of their time in these diversions, preparing for them with more solicitude, expense, and parade, than they do for war; and pursuing the wild beasts with greater fury than they do the enemies of their country.[2] "By constantly following this way of life, they lose much of their humanity, and become as savage, nearly, as the very brutes they hunt." This strongly expresses the moral effect of a sport or pastime which no one can doubt, has for more than a thousand years, either for good or evil, run its thread of adamant through the English character. While it has tended to give it hardihood, and power of persisting, it has invested it with that pluck and indomitable energy, that has carried British arms and arts in triumph over the world.

Another sport nearly allied to that of hunting, was hawking; the art of training and flying of hawks for the purpose of catching other birds, and which was frequently termed falconry. This was a country pastime, and practiced by both sexes, as well on foot as on horseback. Its origin dates as far back as the middle of the fourth century. It was highly esteemed by the Anglo-Saxon nobility, and under the Norman rule it became oppressive by its limitation to the larger barons. The hawk was so trained that, when loosed, it would, when on the wing, seize upon

[1] *Hone's Every Day Book*, 1, 1378. [2] *Strutt*, 6.

its prey, and return with it to the falconer. This sport commenced waning from the discovery and use of fire-arms, as they were found much more effectual than the hawk in bringing down birds, even when on the wing. It expired with the seventeenth century.

Another sport of a character allied to hunting is horse-racing. This seems to have been known and practiced by the Anglo-Saxons, but was probably confined to persons of rank and opulence, and practiced only by way of amusement. In the middle ages the nobility indulged themselves in running horses in certain seasons of the year, and more especially during the Easter and Whitsuntide holidays.

The Chester races, and probably most of the others, owed their institution originally merely to amusement; but in the course of time, they furnished occasions for betting, and large sums were usually dependent upon the event of each race. Thus, although originally a liberal pastime, and practiced for pleasure rather than profit, yet it ultimately degenerated into a system of gambling, so that Burton, near the close of the seventeenth century,[1] says that "horse races are desports of great men, and good in themselves, though many gentlemen by such means gallop quite out of their fortunes."

Another art carried to a high degree of perfection in England, and which was originally conspicuous as a mode of warfare and subsequently as a sport, was archery. From being a fearful instrument of destruction in war, it became in peace an object of amusement.

Both the Anglo-Saxons and Danes were acquainted with the use of the bow.[2] So also the Normans used the bow as a military weapon, and both improved and diffused the practice of archery. When it became an amusement the ladies were accustomed to practice it.

In the thirteenth century every man with a small annual income was obliged to have in his possession a bow and

[1] *Strutt*, 45. [2] *Idem*, 50.

arrows.[1] There were two kinds of bows, the cross bow and the long bow. The latter were those the most commonly possessed by the English. By an ordinance of Edward IV, every man was to have a bow of his own height.[2] The arrows made use of at the battle of Agincourt were a full yard in length. The bow string might be made of hemp, or flax, or silk. The arrow had three essential parts, viz: the stete or wand, the feathers, and the head. The invention and introduction of fire-arms entirely superseded the use of the bow in war, or in hunting, and thus limited archery to be merely practiced as an amusement. It is now much less practiced for that purpose than it was formerly.

Another manly exercise, and which requires a good deal of art to practice it effectively, is that of slinging. The Saxons also seem to have been skillful in the management of the sling.[3] It was used by them as far back as the eighth century. These were also instruments of war. Sometimes the sling was attached to a staff or truncheon three or four feet in length, wielded with both hands, and charged with a stone of considerable size. These slings were used in besieging cities, and on ships in engagements at sea. Men armed with slings formed a part of the Anglo-Norman soldiery, but their use was almost entirely superseded by the bow at the commencement of the fifteenth century. It required much practice to handle this instrument with much certainty,[4] for if the stone, in the act of throwing, was ejected from the sling, either sooner or later than it should be, the desired effect was sure to fail.

Throwing the spear, or javelin, was also a military exercise, but was sometimes practiced as a trial of strength, when it was attempted to throw it beyond a certain boundary, or to exceed a competitor in distance; and of skill, when the spear was cast at a quintain, or any other determined mark. It was one of the sports of the Londoners in the reign of Henry II.

[1] *Strutt*, 54. [2] *Idem*, 63. [3] *Idem*, 72. [4] *Idem*, 74.

The pitching of quoits, or coits, is a mere pastime or amusement, and the exercise of it depends less upon superior strength than superior skill. This game has continued its popularity to the present time.

Foot-racing, in the middle ages, was considered an essential part of a young man's education.[1] Two centuries back, running was deemed an exercise by no means derogatory to the rank of nobility, but in the present day, foot races are little encouraged by persons of fortune, and seldom happen but for the purpose of betting.

Wrestling is at the present time confined to the lower class of the people. It formerly was practiced among the higher classes.[2] The inhabitants of Cornwall and Devon have been celebrated for their expertness in this sport. The Cornish hug has been a proverbial expression. The citizens of London were formerly expert in the practice of this art, and were accustomed annually to indulge in it. Its decline among the higher classes was followed by a slower one among the lower, until it became, as we now find it, confined pretty much to wakes and fairs, where it is still occasionally witnessed. The art, as practiced two centuries ago, is thus described by Carew: "The beholders then cast or form themselves into a ring, in the empty space whereof the two champions step forth, stripped into their doublets and hosen, and untrussed, that they may so the better command the use of their lymmes; and first shaking hands, in token of friendship, they fall presently to the effect of anger; for each striveth how to take hold of the other with his best advantage, and to bear his adverse party downe; wherein, whosoever overthroweth his mate, in such sort, as that either his backe or the one shoulder, and contrary heele do touch the ground is accounted to give the fall."[3]

Another exercise of great antiquity is that of swimming, which is mentioned by an old writer as one of the requi-

[1] *Strutt*, 78. [2] *Idem*, 80. [3] *Strutt*, 83, 84.

sites for a complete gentleman. So also those of sliding, skating, rowing, and sailing, have received each their proper share of attention.

Another sport, or pastime, which has presented a great variety in its modes of exhibition is that of ball-playing. The introduction of this into England was as early at least as the fourteenth century.[1] In the sixteenth, tennis courts were common in England, and this species of ball-playing was much in favor by the higher classes.

Hurling was originally a species of the hand ball, and in playing it the contending parties endeavored to force the ball one from the other,[2] and they who could retain it long enough to cast it beyond an appointed boundary were the conquerors.

Foot-ball, where the ball was driven about by the feet instead of the hands, was formerly much practiced by the common people. Two goals were here placed at the distance of eighty or an hundred yards from each other, and the object of each party is to drive the ball through the goal of their antagonists, by the achievement of which the game is won. When the game gets at its height, the players become much excited, and there is such a kicking of shins that some of them are overthrown at the hazard of their limbs.[3]

The goff, or bandy-ball, required the assistance of a club or bat in the playing of it. This is played by two players having each his bat and ball. The game consists in driving the ball into certain holes made in the ground.[4] He who achieves this in the shortest time, and by the fewest number of strokes secures the victory. The distance between the holes was sometimes two or three miles. There were also intervening holes. The ball must be struck into the holes, and not beyond them. This was a fashionable game among the nobility at the commencement of the seventeenth century.

[1] *Strutt*, 91, 92. [2] *Idem*, 98. [3] *Idem*, 100. [4] *Idem*, 102.

Another old game very popular in the reign of Charles II (and from which the walk in St. James's Park, called the Mall, received its name) was the pall-mall. In the playing of this a round box ball is struck with a mallet, through a high arch of iron, which he that can do at the fewest blows, or at the number agreed upon, wins. There are two of these arches, one at either end of the alley.

The game, however, which is more than all others at the present day celebrated as an English game, is that of cricket, which is of comparatively recent origin, no trace of it by that name occurring earlier than the commencement of the last century. This has lately become very popular among the nobility. It is played with bat and ball, and consists of single and double wicket. The wicket has experienced some change. It now consists of three stumps and two bails; the middle stump being added to prevent the ball from passing through the wicket without beating it down. Single wickets require five players on each side, and double, eleven. At the former, the striker with his bat is the protector of the wicket, the opponent party standing in the field to catch or stop the ball,[1] while the bowler, who, is one of them, takes his place by the side of a small batten, or stump, set up for that purpose twenty-two yards from the wicket, and thence delivers the ball with the intention of beating it down. Two stumps are now usually set up with a bail across, which the batsman, when he runs, must beat off before he returns home. If the bowler is successful the batsman retires from the play; but if the ball is struck by the bat and driven into the field, the striker runs to the stump at the bowler's station, touching it with his bat and then returning to his wicket. If performed before the ball is thrown back, it is called a run. If not, and the wicket is beaten down with it, he is out of the play. The same if he strikes the ball into the air and it is caught before reaching the ground. The

[1] *Strutt*, 106.

batsmen are accounted in as long as they remain at their wickets, and their party is called the in-party,[1] and those in the field with the bowlers, the out-party; both parties having two innings, and the side that obtains the most runs in the double contest claims the victory.

There are also some other kinds of ball, as trap-ball, anterior to cricket, northern spell, and tip cat, a rustic pastime, deriving its name from a piece of wood called a cat, shaped much like a double cone. This is laid on the ground, the player striking it smartly with his cudgel causing it to rise with a rotary motion, high enough for him to beat it away as it falls. A large ring is made upon the ground,[2] in the middle of which the striker takes his station, and his business is to beat the cat over the ring. Failing to do that he is out, and another takes his place.

The sports of jousts, or justs, and the tournament, were all-absorbing during the middle ages, but these have already been briefly alluded to in considering European society during that period. There were also many sports and pastimes, which served as origins for the drama, and from which the theatre received in time its full development, but these fall more appropriately in another connection.

Another sport which has been, and in regard to one portion of it, is yet very extensively indulged in, is that of dancing and tumbling. Both these, together with balancing, originated in the early performances of the gleemen and minstrels, having the same source as the dramatic exhibitions.

In the middle ages, dancing was reckoned among the genteel accomplishments of neeessary acquisition by both sexes. It was constantly practiced by the nobility, on all occasions of festivity, and countenanced by the example of the court. The example of the nobility was very soon followed by the middling classes, and these were

[1] *Strutt*, 107. [2] *Idem*, 110.

imitated by their inferiors, who were accustomed to spend much of their leisure time in dancing, more especially upon holidays. An old practice, as far back as the twelfth century, prevailed among the damsels of London, to spend their holiday evenings in dancing before their master's doors. So also the country lasses were accustomed to perform this exercise upon the greens, with all their rustic simplicity. They danced in measures, rounds and jigs. There were many varieties of dancing; such as dancing to a bear, which consisted in approaching and receding from the bear with great agility. The sword dance, in which young men, having first stripped themselves, dance among the points of swords and spears, with most wonderful agility, and with the most elegant and graceful motions. The morris dance, which was most frequently joined to processions and pageants, especially those connected with the celebration of May games. The dancers here had garments adorned with bells of unequal sizes, and differently denominated, and which rang out as they danced. To these should be added the egg dance and the ladder dance. Most of the ancient dances were of the jocular kind, and sometimes executed by one person. And then there was tumbling, wire dancing, rope dancing, ballet dancing, leaping, vaulting and balancing, besides many other such kind of performances.

Another extensive class of sports and pastimes consists of the different varieties of bowling. This sport, whether practiced upon open greens or in bowling alleys, was probably an invention of the middle ages. It consisted at first in simply placing two small cones upright at a distance from each other, and the business of the players was to bowl at them alternately, the successful candidate being the one who could lay his bowl the nearest to the mark. Out of this ultimately grew the game of nine-pins and skittles, both using the same number of pins, but differing in the mode of playing. In the former, the player standing at the proper distance casts the bowl at the pins, and the

successful candidate is he who can beat down the greatest number in the fewest throws. In the latter, there is a double exertion, one by bowling, and the other by tipping;[1] the first being performed at a given distance, and the second standing close to the frame upon which the pins are placed, and throwing the bowl through in the midst of them.

Another sport, that was once extremely popular, was that of bull-baiting, or worrying bulls with dogs, which was formerly practiced in almost every town or village throughout the kingdom. Another nearly allied to it was the bull-running, at which, on proclamation made, the bull was turned out, "and the hivie-skivy,[2] tag and rag, men, women, and children of all sorts and sizes, with all the dogs in the town, promiscuously running after him with their bull clubs, spattering dirt in each other's faces, that one would think them to be so many furies started out of hell for the punishment of Cerberus."

Another sport quite kindred to this was that of cock-fighting. As early as the reign of Edward III, this famous sport became a fashionable amusement.[3] It soon began to be productive of pernicious consequences, and in 1366 it was prohibited by a public proclamation. Henry VIII adorned his palace at Whitehall with a cockpit, and James I resorted to the diversion twice a week. The most cruel and disgraceful of this species of game was that called Welch main, which consisted of a certain number of pairs of cocks,[4] say sixteen, which are allowed to fight with each other until half of them are killed. Then the sixteen conquerors are pitted a second time in like manner until half of them are slain. Then the same course is followed with the eight survivors, and then with the four and then lastly with the two. So that in this way no less than thirty-one cocks are sure to be inhumanly murdered for the sport and pleasure of the spectators. From the evidence afforded by

[1] *Strutt*, 272. [2] *Idem*, 278. [3] *Idem*, 281. [4] *Idem*, 282.

old illuminated manuscripts, it seems pretty clear that the arming of the heels with sharp points of steel in the way of artificial spurs is a refinement in cruelty which was reserved for times comparatively modern. It is a practice unknown in former ages.

A pastime, which, at the present day, has superseded many others, admitting of much variety, and being very universally and deservedly popular, is that of billiards. The invention of this game is attributed to the French. It is too well known to require any description.

The game of dice is one of ancient origin, but in the many frauds to which it has given rise, has led to many evil consequences. Its invention is referred to Palamedes, son of Nauplius, king of Eubœa.[1] The ancient Germans were excessively attached to this game, and the Saxons, Danes, and Normans, were much addicted to it. The perfect equality of chances in this game when it is fairly played, has led professed gamblers to resort to trick and chicanery, to secure an advantage. Hence we hear of the loaded dice, and dice of the high cut.

Another game, whose invention has been referred to the same origin, but which requires a strong exertion of intellect, and great powers of calculation to play it successfully, is that of chess. There have been no less than forty-four different names given to so many games of chess.

A game of more modern invention, and somewhat resembling chess, is that of draughts. Being less intricate it is more easily learnt,[2] for the pieces are of equal value until they become kings, and can only move one way, that is diagonally; but, like chess, it depends entirely upon skill, and one false move frequently occasions the loss of the game.

There are several other games, as merelles, or nine men's morris, fox and geese, backgammon, domino, which have enjoyed great popularity in England and in this country; but the game of cards has undoubtedly been more employed

[1] *Strutt*, 306. [2] *Idem*, 316.

as an instrument for gambling than any other game. The origin of this celebrated game is not clearly settled. In the last quarter of the fourteenth century it appears in Spain, France, and it is claimed also in Germany and England. The early specimens of cards differ little in form from those now in use, but the figures and devices that constitute the different suits of the cards,[1] depending as they must upon the taste and invention of the card makers, did not bear the least resemblance to those in present use.

There are many different games played with cards,[2] but that of whist, formerly written whisk, is the one held in the highest estimation. At the commencement of the last century, this is said to have been a favorite pastime with clergymen, who played the game with swabbers, these being certain cards by which the holder was entitled to part of the stake, in the same manner that the claim is made for the aces at quadrille.

There are other pastimes that have formerly prevailed in England, that derived their popularity mostly from the lower orders of the people. Among these, is the pastime, termed the lord of misrule, supposed by some to have been peculiar to England. The reign of this merry king once extended through the greater part of the holidays, but his government has been extinct for many years. His merry gambols were not confined to the court, or even the houses of the nobility, but he was elected in various parishes.[3] Upon his appointment or election, he formed his own cabinet, consisting of from twenty to an hundred kindred spirits, and then with various decorations, jingling bells, hobby-horses, dragons and other antiques, with pipers and drummers, they would strike up the devils' dance, marching towards the church full of people, dancing and singing with every possible exhibition of the wildest uproar and confusion.[4] They had their bowers, arbors and banqueting houses set up, spending the sabbath day, and often

[1] *Strutt*, 329. [2] *Idem*, 335. [3] *Idem*, 341. [4] *Idem*, 342.

night in feasting, banqueting and dancing. This was distinct from the church-ales, wakes and May-games. This and other pastimes, involving whimsical transpositions of dignity, were probably derived from the ancient saturnalia or feasts of Saturn, when the masters waited upon their servants who were honored with mock titles, and permitted to assume the state and deportment of their lords.[1]

The festival of fools, in which acts outraging all sense of morality and religion were perpetrated, seems never to have been practiced to the full extent in England, but we find there an old festival obviously derived from it, called the boy bishop.[2] This consisted in the appareling of a boy in the episcopal vestments, with a mitre and crozier, to bear the title and state of a bishop. He, together with his fellows, dressed like priests, took possession of the church, and with mock dignity, performed all the ceremonies and offices which might have been celebrated by a bishop and his prebendaries. This silly mummery was discontinued after the death of Mary.

Another impious pastime was the wakes, which consisted in the assembling together of a motley group of people on the evening preceding a saint's day, and coming to the church with candles burning,[3] originally it would seem to wake, and tend to their devotions. But afterwards, as an old writer says: "The people fell to lecherie, and songs, and dances, with harping and piping, and also to gluttony and sin, and so turned the holiness to cursedness; wherefore the holy fathers ordained the people to leave that waking and to fast the evening." The pedlars and hawkers soon attended to sell their wares, so that by degrees the religious wake became converted into a secular fair.[4] At length, the nocturnal meetings were suppressed, and the regular fairs established.

These fairs were not alone for the purpose of traffic. A great variety of sports and pastimes were there indulged

[1] *Strutt*, 344. [2] *Idem*, 346. [3] *Idem*, 365. [4] *Idem*, 366.

in. Among these were the jingling match, which consisted in forming a circle enclosed with ropes, within which nine or ten persons were placed, all, with one exception, blindfolded. That exception was the most active, who was the jingler, the game being for the blindfolded to catch the jingler, who, by his jingling, was constantly apprising them of his whereabouts.

Sack running was where men tied up in sacks, every part of them being enclosed except the head, were to make the best of their way to some given distance, where the first arriving obtains the prize.

Smock races, performed by the young country wenches, so called because the prize is a holland smock or shift.

The wheelbarrow race, performed in an open field, is where the candidates are all blindfolded, and every one having his wheelbarrow, is to drive with it from the starting place to a mark set up for that purpose, at some considerable distance, he who first reaches the mark being the conqueror. The windings and wanderings of these knights of the wheelbarrow were productive of much merriment.

The grinning match is where two or more persons, each with his head thrust through a horse's collar, endeavor to exceed every other in excessive grinning.

Then there is a yawning match for a Cheshire cheese, which began about midnight, when the whole company were disposed to be drowsy; and he that yawned the widest, and the most naturally, so as to call forth the greatest number of yawns from the spectators, bore off the cheese.

Another result of the wake were the church ales which occurred on some of the holidays. The avowed purpose of this pastime was, through their means, to collect such sums of money as were necessary for the support and repairs of the church. To accomplish this the most readily the churchwardens and chief parish officers brewed a certain portion of strong ale which they sold to the people; most of the better sort contributing something beyond what they thus

paid. An old writer of the period of Queen Elizabeth says: "Then, when this nippitatum, this huffe-cappe, as they call it, this nectar of life, is set abroach, well is he that can get the soonest to it, and spends the most at it, for he is counted the godliest man of all the rest, and most in God's favor, because it is spent upon his church forsooth."

The farmers of the country annually hold two feasts; the one in spring, the other at the end of summer, or beginning of autumn. The first is the sheep shearing, the second, the harvest home. These, in former times, were celebrated with feasting, and a variety of rustic pastimes. At present, there is little except dinner or supper at the conclusion.

Another much celebrated pastime of former days consisted in the May games. The first of May was called May-day, and "the juvenile part of both sexes were accustomed to rise a little after midnight,[1] and walk to the neighboring wood, accompanied with music and blowing of horns, where they break down branches from the trees, and adorn them with nosegays, and crowns of flowers. When this is done, they return with their booty homewards, about the rising of the sun, and make their doors and windows to triumph with their flowery spoils; and the after part of the day is chiefly spent in dancing around a tall pole, which is called a May-pole; and being placed in a convenient part of the village, stands there, as it were, consecrated to the goddess of flowers, without the least violation being offered to it in the whole circle of the year."

It was a custom at the celebration of the May games, to elect a lord and lady of the May, who presided over the sports. These were decorated with scarfs, ribbons, and other fineries. A pleasant character dressed out with ribbons and flowers, figured in the village May games, under the name of Jack-in-the-green. He carried a long

[1] *Strutt*, 351.

walking stick, with floral wreaths, whisking it about as he performed the rustic dances.

These Mayings as they were termed, probably differed in the kind and character of the sports indulged in according to the different places and periods of time at which they were celebrated. It was the breaking forth of the spirit of the spring, and was characterized everywhere with the fresh ebullition of young life. It was a pastime entirely rustic in its character, and the neighborhood of cities and villages was selected for its enjoyment. It was widely diffused, prevailing not only in England, but also in Ireland and Scotland.

May-day has been kept up in the neighborhood of Dublin, where a high pole is decorated with garlands, and visitors come in from the country and dance around it, the best male and female dancer being chosen king and queen, and placed on chairs.[1]

So also in Edinburgh there is a pastime called gathering the May-dew, which is on the first of May when about four o'clock in the morning, at the ringing of bells, folk of all clans,[2] arrayed in all the colors of the rainbow, are seen hurrying to a neighboring hill which in half an hour appears like a moving mass of animation. At its summit are a company of bakers, and other craftsmen, dressed in kilts, dancing round a May-pole. The ever varying and unceasing sounds of the bagpipes, tabours, fifes and other instruments of music, almost stun the ear. About eight o'clock the fun is all over, and by nine or ten only a few staggering drunkards indicate that anything unusual has occurred.

On the old May day is annually held in some parts of Scotland the Beltane or Beltein.[3] A town in Perthshire is called Tillee Beltein, that is the eminence (or high place) of the fire of Baal. Near this are two Druidical temples of upright stones with a well adjacent to one of

[1] *Hone's Every Day Book*, II, 596. [2] *Idem*, 610. [3] *Idem*, 659.

them, still held in great veneration for its sanctity, and, on that account visited by vast numbers of superstitious people. In the neighboring parish of Callander upon Beltein day, they cut a circular trench in the ground, sufficient to enclose the whole company assembled. They kindle a fire, and dress a repast of eggs and milk in the consistence of a custard. They knead a cake of oatmeal, which is toasted in the embers against a stone. Having eaten the custard, they divide the cake into as many equal parts as there are persons present, and one part is made perfectly black with charcoal. The bits of cake are then put into a bonnet, and are drawn blindfold, and he who draws the black bit is considered as devoted to be sacrificed to Baal, and is obliged to leap three times through the flame.

In Ireland, the Beltein is celebrated on the twenty-first of June at the time of the solstice. There they make fires on the tops of hills, and every member of the family is made to pass through the fire, as they reckon this ceremony to ensure good fortune during the succeeding year. And in Ireland, May day is called la na Beal tina, and May eve neen na Beal tina,[1] that is, day and eve of Beal's fire, from it having been, in heathen times, consecrated to the god Baal, or Belus. From this cause the month of May is termed in Irish mi na Beal tine. There is also a ceremony practiced on May eve, of making the cows leap over the lighted straw, or faggots. The reason assigned for that practice now is to preserve the milk from being plifered. It would thus seem as if fragments of the old worship of Baal, following the course of the Celtic emigration, had early drifted to the British isles, and there entered into the social life of the people.

[1] *Hone's Every Day Book*, I, 594.

CHAPTER II.

ELEMENT OF PHILOSOPHY IN MODERN EUROPE.

Scholastic Philosophy.

Philosophy regards the true in itself. Its search is after truth; the truth of thought, and the truth of things.

Man has two modes of existence, the spontaneous, and the reflective. In the first, his mental faculties perform their functions in a manner analogous to his bodily organs spontaneously. They act by virtue of their original constitution as they were made to act, and never stop to inquire as to the how, why, or wherefore, or as to the degree of trust and confidence that may be reposed in their action. They care as little how their minds produce ideas as they do how their liver secretes bile, or by what means the food taken into their stomachs produces growth. These are the men of action. Those who do the business of the world. They both think and reason; but their thoughts and reasonings all have reference to phenomena without them. They are busied and wholly occupied with what are termed life's realities and utilities; and they use both their bodies and minds in accomplishing what the most obviously appear to be life's purposes here, without once seeming even to dream that thought or knowledge, or existence, may present any problems in themselves that are worthy of solution. As the mill, without inquiry, grinds the grain placed in its hopper, so their powers both of body and mind spontaneously perform their varied functions without expending a single thought upon the curious and complicated machinery by which the results are produced. They begin, grow, produce their legitimate fruits, and die; and thus the great body of the world is made up. But not

all. There are those who reflect, and whose mode of existence is reflective. In these the thought, after it has gone forth spontaneously, and entered into outward phenomena, returns again to inquire as to itself; to ask by what warrant it came to exist; what are the conditions of its existence; how it is enabled to exist and act; why it can act thus and not otherwise; and what are the guaranties that its action is in accordance with the truth of things. The first impulse of the reflective is to account to itself for its own thought; to cast a searching glance into the movements of its own machinery. When once the action of thought in its outward career is arrested, and it is turned inward upon itself, then arises the conviction of the mysteries of being. Questions are to be asked and answered, inquiries to be made and satisfied, problems to be proposed and solved, of which the man of mere action has, and can have, but little, if any, conception. The riddle of existence presses with all its weight for a satisfactory solution.

And this is the task philosophy proposes to itself. The problems with which it immediately employs itself have little to do with the transactions of the world's business or its general concerns; although the investigations and discoveries, which they have originated, really lie at the foundation of almost every department of human industry. Let the man of mere action sneer, if he chooses, at the unproductiveness of philosophy. It is a world into which he has never entered. It deals in problems of which he can know nothing. But this he can do if he will set himself about it. He can estimate, to some extent, what would have been his own status and condition, as well as that of all the rest of the civilized world, if the Baconian philosophy had never originated the sciences to which industry, with all its ten thousand results, is, and ever will be, so largely indebted.

The man who first reflected was the first philosopher. His reflections may have been, and undoubtedly were, crude and undigested. But he had entered into a world

that was new, and entirely different from that in which those around them were moving and acting. From those he could have little sympathy. But once having thrown his sounding line into the depths of his own being, he had ample occupation for all his powers. Once coming face to face with the mysteries of his own existence, and all its varied modes of activity, he had enough to do.

Let me recall attention to some of the problems which did or might present themselves for solution. What is the character of my thought, and how is it conditioned? What are my mental faculties, what the modes of their activity, and the conditions under which they act? What originates, directs, and controls their action? In what consists my own personal identity? What are the elements of this *ego* or *I*, of which my own consciousness makes me acquainted? Is there an external world without me, and, if so, what are its conditions, and what its relations with the internal world within me? How can I be certified of the existence of an external world, and how far can I come to have a knowledge of it? What are the means, and what the sources of knowledge, and what the degree of certainty it is capable of attaining? How can I attain to the knowledge of the infinite, the unconditioned, and to what degree of certainty? What is the object and end of my being, and what the aims that are the best calculated to secure such object and end? What are my relations with other beings, and what the foundations of politics and morality?

Such are some of the problems presented, and which demand of philosophy a solution. It will be readily perceived that it is entirely different from science. This latter consists in general laws, in obedience to which certain related phenomena occur. Philosophy is the parent of science, as it prescribes the methods of scientific research, and investigates the certainty of knowledge upon which repose scientific results.

We have identified philosophy with reflection, but we must here call attention to two important facts as consti-

tuting two steps or stages in the progress of philosophy. The first may be denominated the spontaneous stage, a stage in which the reflection was without method. It was illustrated in Socrates, and, to a large extent, in the world's early philosophers. It was reflection upon all subjects without a method in any.

This stage had its use. It was free from any bondage. It was open to every inquiring spirit. Questions of every character could be asked, problems of every nature proposed for solution. There was also freedom in their discussion, and in the arriving at conclusions. But the conclusions, or results arrived at, had less of the character of certainty. The old world's philosophy was more vague, uncertain, less practical. But it was one well calculated to reflect its history.

In the modern world we encounter the second stage. Here we find reflection as still the important element, but it is no longer free and unrestrained. It is reflection conducted in accordance with method. Both Bacon and Descartes, the two great founders of modern philosophy, had each his method. Hence this will be found more inseparably connected with modern philosophizing. The coupling of these together, the pursuing of the one in accordance with the other, has led to greater rigor in the pursuit, and to a greater degree of certainty in the conclusions arrived at. The history of modern philosophy is more consecutive, and more satisfactory than that of the ancient.

The systems of modern philosophy that bear to each other certain relations, that are developed in a certain order; and in which human thought appears to move on consecutively in its course, have their commencement with that of the seventeenth century. From that period the history of this element is replete with interest and instruction.

But the periods that preceded this cannot be entirely passed over in silence. As the current systems of philosophy always reflect the peculiar features of the age in

which they exist, they are never without interest to any one desiring to comprehend humanity in all its forms and phases, and periods of development. However little of interest they may possess of themselves; however slight may be the connection between them; however apparently jumbled together the ideas of which they are composed; yet as the mirror in which the features of their age is reflected they possess a significancy which must ever render them objects of attraction and interest. Even the so-called scholastic philosophy, so much derided in itself, so replete with mere verbal distinctions; so full of subtleties without meaning, and of reasonings without premises or conclusions; so barren in its results, and so willingly dismissed from the field of its labors, comes to us charged with a special mission when recognized as the mirror of its age.

So far as regards any element of humanity, the middle ages present in themselves very little that is attractive to the student of history. But when viewed as a link in the chain of historical development, and more especially as presenting a soil in which we are to seek for the roots of institutions, which had their growth and development in subsequent ages, we are compelled to regard them with no inconsiderable an amount of interest. The great characteristic of the middle ages is that of conflict; conflict between the elements of humanity, conflict between the old and the new, the Roman and the Teutonic; conflict between the principles and ideas that had been accustomed to exercise dominion in the old Roman world, and others that originated in the Teutonic, or had grown out of the relations between the two; conflict between a theology that had become dry and barren, and a philosophy that had become strongly connected with it. This last brings to view the great feature of the scholastic philosophy. It was a union and yet a struggle between theology and philosophy, and its great mission is to exhibit the fruits of that union, and that struggle. It continued while the union was preserved, it became extinct when the final separation was effected.

The middle ages commence with Charlemagne. He first opened the schools and encouraged learning. These were opened in the episcopal sees, in the monasteries, cloisters, and convents,[1] so that these became, in fact, the cradles of modern philosophy. Here also were the homes of theology. It was domiciled here before the entrance of philosophy. The theology was that of the Roman Catholic church. Its doctrines present themselves as the faith of the middle ages. They constituted the bases upon which all thinking must be conducted. Hence, philosophy, or reflection, must busy itself with those doctrines. It can only aid in investigating, and more clearly settling, the elements of faith. Its office must be subordinate, and, hence, always subject to restraint. The social, the moral, the thinking, even the political, were almost wholly subject to the ecclesiastical power. Philosophy, on its summons, came to its aid, although in bonds; and employed, as its means, logic and metaphysics, or dialectics, thus giving birth to the scholastic philosophy.

There are reckoned three distinct periods in scholasticism: 1. That which is characterized by the absolute subordination of philosophy to theology. 2. That marked by the alliance of philosophy with theology.[2] 3. That in which occurs the commencement of a separation, feeble at first, but which little by little increases until the birth of modern philosophy.

In the first, scholasticism is the employment of philosophy, simply as the form in which theology should present itself. It commences with the ninth, and extends to the middle of the eleventh century. During this period, with the exception of Erigena, nothing appears but partial conceptions, without the idea of constructing a philosophy. The first impulse was given by Alcuinus, who was called from an English cloister by Charlemagne, and whose labors in France were principally directed to bring about

[1] *Cousin*, II, 16. [2] *Idem*, 17.

the union of the two social elements, force and intellect; and to make the throne of the one the seat of the other, a mission well adapted to such an age of force. He created schools, but no philosophical system.

He was succeeded by John Scotus, surnamed Erigena, from the fact of his being an Irishman, who was also invited by Charles the Bold to France, where he found himself the centre of intellectual activity. This system regarded philosophy as the science of the principles of all things, and as inseparable from religion. God was regarded as the essence of all things, and from the plenitude of his nature they are all derived, and to him ultimately return. It was in truth a vast system of pantheism, and subjected him to the charge of heresy. His ideas were mostly borowed from the ancient philosophies, and not being the product of his age, astonished far more than they instructed it.

St. Anselm, born at Aost in Piedmont, in 1034, was a second Augustine, and superior to those of his age in the clearness of his understanding, and powers of logic. He planned a system of religious philosophy, to be effected by combining the results of controversies on such subjects, in accordance generally with the views of St. Augustine. He endeavored to state systematically the great truths of religion on principles of common reason, at the same time presupposing the more solid foundation of religious conviction. He also sought to prove the existence of God from the fact of one idea of an Almighty power. He is regarded as the inventor of scholastic metaphysics, but subsequent ideas and systems have in a great measure superseded those which he put forth.

In the latter part of the eleventh century, and therefore coming within the second period above indicated, appeared Roscellin, who established the school of nominalism in contradistinction to that of realism, which had held undisputed sway through the previous period. The former was claimed to derive its origin from Plato, the latter from

Aristotle. The great war carried on in the bosom of scholasticism was waged by the adherents of these two schools, and this controversy, under modified forms, has prevailed during subsequent periods in the history of philosophy. It is important, therefore, to inquire what was the point of the controversy.

This related to the word genus, and the word species. The question raised is whether these words represent an actual something, existing externally, or is it a mere name, which designates a certain collection of individuals? These words, genus and species, came under the denomination of universals.

The realists held fast to the objective reality of the universals, and William de Champeaux maintained that genera and species, so far from being mere names, nominal entities,[1] are the only entities that exist, and that the individuals, in which it has been attempted to resolve genera, have existence themselves only through relation to what is universal. He claimed that all that exists is humanity, of which all men are but fragments. These were the disciples of Aristotle.

On the other hand, the nominalists maintained that genera and species are simple abstractions which the mind forms by the comparison of a certain number of individuals, which it reduces to a common idea; that all such were simply names, representations, without any reality. They held that there were no universal conceptions, no species, no class, and that everything which is, exists only as separate in its pure individuality. There can, therefore, be no pure thinking, but only a representation and sensuous perception. This doctrine had its consequences. If every genus is a mere word, there can be no reality except in individuals. Unities can be no other than simple abstractions, and hence in the Holy Trinity there is nothing real

[1] *Cousin*, II, 31.

except the three persons, nothing but a nominal unity, a simple sign representing the relation of the three.

Again, if the individuals are the only realities, it would follow that the senses, which perceive individual existences, are at bottom the only sources of knowledge, and, further than this, there can be no absolute affirmation respecting things, since all absolute affirmation implies a general idea, which according to this system is destitute of all real reality. This opens the direct road to skepticism.

But if the realist doctrine be true, especially as expounded by William de Champeaux, that the objects represented by general ideas are the only realities, of which individuals are only the fragments or forms, then we have opened up the road to pantheism. And although these consequences were not at first clearly apprehended, yet it was seen from the first that there was at the foundation of the question, matter of the greatest importance, and that the destiny of human reason was involved in the controversy.

The ultimate limit of realism was reached by William de Champeaux, about the close of the eleventh century, who, in seeking to place it upon impregnable grounds, arrived at the theory that universals individualize themselves in particular beings in such a way that individuals, identical as their essence, differ only by the variety of their accidents or transient forms.

This brings us to the celebrated Peter Abelard, born in Brittany in 1079, died in 1142, aged sixty-three years. He was a brilliant genius, and possessed great power as a disputant and lecturer. He signalized himself by attacking and ultimately vanquishing in debate his teacher, William de Champeaux. But in overthrowing realism he did not establish nominalism. He first put forth a middle ground, that of conceptualism. He refused to consider universals as mere words, pure conventions, but considered them as forms of the mind. Every individual, according to him, is composed of matter and form; the animal is the matter, a unit; the form is various, diverse. The species is com-

posed by a collection of essences, which sustain individual forms, while the genus is composed by a collection of the substantial differences of different species. The particular essence which forms the genus animal, results from a certain matter, essence of body, and substantial forms which can only exist essentially there. But the active mind of Abelard could not rest in quiet without claiming the supremacy for that which lay at the foundation of its activity, the reason. The theology of that period, under the guiding care of St. Anselm, had given the predominance to faith as the rule of philosophy, claiming that "faith had its own proper certainty, independent of the philosophical conceptions by which the reason attempts to penetrate to a comprehension of the revealed doctrine.[1] Abelard sought to reverse this doctrine, claiming that faith had no certainty except in so far as it was transformed into philosophy; that previous to this transformation it could be nothing but a provisional opinion. In the enforcement of his opinions he brought logic as an independent power into the arena of theological debate, and in undertaking to bring faith within the empire of reason, and insisting that all dogmas should be presented under a rational form, he made a commencement which marks a new epoch in the history of speculative philosophy, viz: that which marks the struggle of reason against authority, some centuries later the foundation of the reformation.

There now occurred a triple reaction against the abuse of dialectics, and from useless speculations upon abstractions, tending to dry up the human mind, philosophy first took refuge in mysticism, and Hugh and Richard of St. Victor called the attention of mankind to the great truth that God is love, and summoned the dialecticians to suspend, for a moment, their dry wrangling and stop to contemplate. They claimed for intuition a high place in the working of the mind.

[1] *History of Philosophy*, I, 288.

The second reaction against the abuse of scholasticism consisted in the recall to more positive studies under the guidance of Peter Lombard, the master of sentences, who collected the opinions of the fathers upon the principal points of theology and philosophy, which, for a long time, was received as a classical text book for the explanations of professors.

The third reaction was in the criticism of John of Salisbury, who died in 1180. He called attention to the fact that the science of dialectics always remains a barren or dead science unless it receives fruitfulness and life from other sciences, and he accused the dialecticians of never arriving at any applications, and of reversing the natural order of science.

Another refuge still was found in the pantheistic systems of Amaury de Chartres, and David de Dinant. These held that "everything is God, and God is everything. The creator and the creature are one and the same being. Ideas are at once creative and created. God is the end of all things, in the sense that all things must return to him in order to constitute with him an immutable individuality. Just as Abraham and Isaac are nothing but individualizations of human nature, so all beings are only individual forms of one sole essence." This was the ideal pantheism of de Chartres. De Dinant held to a material pantheism that "God is the universal matter, and that the forms, that is, everything not material, are but imaginary accidents."

A fact in history now brought a fresh accession to the philosophical mind of Europe. The Arabs passed into Spain, and there founded an empire. On the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean they had everywhere encountered the Alexandrians and Aristotle. The Arabian mind seized with avidity the doctrines of the great peripatetic, and having passed through that subtle alembic they were introduced into the schools of Spain. To these schools came some of the theologians of Europe to study, and this gave a new activity to philosophical speculations in the last half

of the twelfth century. A new power was given to Aristotle. He was in a manner installed the sovereign and infallible arbiter of truth and falsehood in all matters of science. A new impulse was given to dialectics. The circle of the sciences, and the field of inquiry was enlarged. New ideas and new combinations came forth. Philosophy and science came to be distinguished from each other and to have each its appropriate place.

Several philosophers, or theologians, distinguish this era, but all the anterior conceptions seem to be summed up and systematized by the labors of the two most celebrated doctors of the middle ages, Bonaventura and Thomas Aquinas. Of these, the object of the first was to establish the union of the peripatetic philosophy with the doctrines of the mystic school, to make proclamation of bans between logic and intuition. The second "reared upon the basis of logic alone a vast edifice of which the different stories corresponded to all orders of human knowledge."

The first was a Tuscan and born in 1221, died in 1274, He promulgated the doctrine of illumination distinguishing four modes of the communication of the light.[1]

1. The external light, and this explains the mechanical arts, and subserves the corporeal wants of man. Its divisions correspond with the divisions of human industry.

2. The inferior light, which produces sensitive knowledge, and enlightens external forms. The sensitive spirit resides in the nerves, and its essence is multiplied in the five senses.

The internal light which produces philosophical knowledge, seeking after hidden causes by means of principles of truth contained in the nature of man. Truths are of three sorts, as they are related to words, to things, or to actions. Hence philosophy has three branches, the rational, natural, and moral. The rational, taken in relation to ideas, is grammar; in relation to teaching, logic; and in

[1] *Hist. Phil.*, 1, 291.

the production of emotions, rhetoric. The natural comprehends physics, mathematics, and metaphysics, which, embracing the universe of beings, refers them back, according to typical ideas, to God, the source from which they sprang. The moral is divided into monastic, economic, and political, according as it relates to the individual, to the family or to the state.

4. The superior light, which comes from grace and the Holy Scriptures, and which gives the knowledge of truths that sanctify. This light is simple and single in so far as it makes known the literal sense of revelation, and threefold in so far as it makes known the spiritual sense, which is either allegorical, moral, or analogical. The whole scripture doctrine refers to three points, the eternal generation and incarnation of the logos or word; the rule of life; and the union of God and the soul; the first belonging to the doctors, the second to the preachers, and the third to the mystics. He seeks in the mechanic arts, and in the sphere of sensitive knowledge, for images of the generation of the logos, of the rule of life, and of the alliance of the soul with God.

Thomas Aquinas, more generally known as St. Thomas, was a Neapolitan, born in 1227, and died in 1274. His system is both diversified and extensive, foreshadowing some of the points and principles that have received their full development in modern philosophy.

He considered the intellectual sphere under three relations, viz: First. The knowledge of causes as explaining effects. Second. The point of difference between the intellect and the senses, the latter referring to particular things, the former embracing the universal. Third. The intelligibility of things depends upon their proportion to the intellect, which is the greater the more it is freed from material conditions. Things become, therefore, the more intelligible the more they are separated from matter. Hence the most intellectual and regulative science is metaphysics. All other speculative sciences are subordinate,

while the practical, being related to the particular activity of man, are destitute of the greatest generality.

As to human science he proposes this important question.[1] Do its principles result from a preexisting experimental knowledge? In the principles of science he distinguishes two elements: 1. The terms which are the matter of these principles. 2. The relations of these terms. The knowledge of the first, he states, depends upon a notion furnished by experience; while that of their relation, or the complexus, as he terms it, of the terms, is not derived from experience. As the preexisting habit of virtue leads to the virtuous act, so the acquisition of science implies that there preexisted in our minds the germs of rational conceptions. Thus is dimly shadowed forth the philosophy of Kant. This principle he carries out by maintaining that all scientific demonstration results from the union of two elements, the one empirical, the other rational; the one furnishing the matter of the demonstration, the other its productive form.

The question of universals he solved by applying his ideas concerning form and matter. The matter of the universal idea is the union of the attributes of human nature. Hence universals are a part of the thing; their matter exists solely in each individual. Their form is the character of universality applied to this matter, this character being obtained only by abstracting what is peculiar to each individual in order to consider what is common to all. Universals are, therefore, a part of the intellect.

He demonstrates the existence of God in five different ways, in each of which demonstrations there is a double element, viz: one furnished by experience, and one from the reason. Of these five demonstrations, we have:

1. That from the fact of motion. Experience establishes this fact. But motion can only be communicated through the influence of a being who is himself in motion. The col-

[1] *History of Philosophy*, I, 295.

lective whole of mutable things cannot pass from the potential to the active state, except there exist a being who has motion in act, without having it in mere potentiality, that is, a being who can cause to move without being himself mutable. The rational element in this demonstration is all motion supposes an immutable principle.

2. That from cause and effect. Experience establishes that there exists in the sensible world a series of causes and effects. Everything is cause and effect, or there exists a being who is cause without being effect. The first supposition is contradictory, as no being can be at once cause and effect of himself. The rational element here is, every series of effects supposes a primary cause.

3. That from generation and dissolution. Experience establishes that there exists in nature, a law of generation and dissolution of things. Everything subject to it is simply possible, not necessary, as there was a time when it did not yet exist. But the possible suppose the necessary. Therefore there exists a being who is necessary. The rational element here is, the possible supposes the necessary.

4. That from goodness and perfection. Experience teaches that in the various beings that compose the universe there are various degrees of goodness and perfection. But degrees of perfection cannot be conceived except as they participate of a perfection which admits of no degrees. The rational element here is, the relative supposes the absolute.

5. That from design. Experience teaches that bodies destitute of intelligence are ever tending to a good and useful end. This proves intention, design in nature. But things destitute of intelligence cannot tend to an end, except as directed by intelligence. There exists, therefore, an ordaining intelligence. The rational element here is, order supposes intelligence.

These rational principles are all deduced from two notions: 1. The notion of necessary and absolute existence, without which the relative and contingent are not conceivable. 2. The notion of cause, without which neither suc-

cession, nor motion, nor order of phenomena could be conceived.

He connected cosmology with theology by considering nature as a representative of that which is in God, as a mirror of the divine essence. This representation, however, is not an image, but a vestige, which, without reproducing the form of the cause, merely attests its action. All creatures are the representation of the trinity in the way of vestige.

He repudiated the doctrine of Origen, that bodies, are the prison of the soul, and were created only to punish in them the faults of intelligent creatures, but held that they must partake of the quality of good, and are an effect of the divine goodness that, although imperfect, yet they concur to the perfection of the universe, which ought to comprehend a hierarchy of beings, subordinate one to another, according to the degrees of perfection they possess.

He held that there are three souls in man in the sense only that the mind, which in its essence is one, possesses a threefold life, viz: "the rational life, which exerts its functions without any corporeal organ; the sensitive life, which has need of a corporeal organ; and the vegetative life, which needs not only a corporeal organ, but a corporeal force besides. The rational life is divided into two branches, corresponding to intelligence and will.

Immediately succeeding Thomas Aquinas was Duns Scotus, born in Northumberland in 1275, and who died in 1308, who attacked the system of Thomas Aquinas, and endeavored to ascertain some certain principle of knowledge, whether intellectual or sensible, and applied himself to demonstrate the truth and necessity of revelation. He asserted that the universal is contained in the particular, not merely in posse but in actu; that it is not created by the understanding, but communicated to it; and that the nature of things is determined to particular or universal by a higher principle. He was the founder of a

school, the Scotists, who distinguished themselves for subtilty of disputation, and for incessant disputes with the Thomists.

We now arrive at the third period in scholasticism, at which some symptoms we have previously seen, begin to develop themselves more freely, tending to a separation between philosophy and theology. Two very remarkable men mark its first movements. These were Roger Bacon, and Raymond Lulli. The first an Englishman, born in 1214, died in 1294. He acquired great celebrity by his knowledge of mathematics, chemistry, physics, and the languages, as also by his many original ideas and inventions. He detected the false principles of the philosophical system of his time, and instead of the frivolous distinctions then established, was desirous of opening new paths to inquiry through the study of nature and the languages. He fully realized the truth that every theory of the physical world should have its basis in observation of the processes of nature. He saw, also, that to simple observation must be joined experiment. He arraigned the scholastic philosophy at the bar of human reason, and brought forward against it three principal accusations: 1. He reproached it for its blind credulity, in submitting so unreservedly to the authority of Aristotle. 2. He charges it with gross ignorance of antiquity both sacred and profane, and ignorance so deep and profound, that even its Aristotle is only a counterfeit one, a substitute of his Arabic and other commentators in the place of the real one. 3. He accuses it of moving in a circle of abstractions, of ignoring all that is real, and of entirely neglecting the observation of nature; of being artificial, subtle, disputatious, and pedantic; in fine, of shutting up the human mind within the schools, far away from nature and the works of God. Upon the correctness of these accusations the coming centuries have pronounced their unmistakable verdict. He was thus, in a two-fold aspect, the precursor of the great Bacon, but he was three centuries too early. The monkish

spirit of the time could afford him no toleration, and he was persecuted as a sorcerer.

Raymond Lulli was a Majorcase, born in 1234, died in 1315. He invented what he termed the ars magna, the great art, by which he hoped to reform philosophy and the sciences. It made the mind a kind of automaton, whose action consisted in combining mechanically tables of ideas disposed in such a way that their different correlations would furnish answers to all imaginable questions. The object was to procure at will, in such or such a case, in such or such a circle, such or such a principle. The invention was really ingenious, and that universal instrument, which was to dispense with all other labor, excited at first great enthusiasm; but the intellectual mechanism proved to be nothing but the dialectic method carried to its last consequences, and showed only the barrenness of that mere verbal science.

In the beginning of the fourteenth century the doctrine of nominalism was revived in the person of Occam, an Englishman, who was an independent thinker, refusing to submit to authority unsustained by reason. He maintained that "genera can have existence only in things or in God. In things there are no genera, for in them they would exist either wholly or partially; in God they are not as an independent essence, but as a simple object of knowledge, in the mind they are nothing more.

"Prior to this period, scholasticism had maintained that between the exterior bodies placed before us, and the mind of man,[1] there are images which belong to the exterior bodies and make more or less a part of them, certain images or sensible forms which represent external objects by the conformity which they have with them. So the mind was supposed to be able to know spiritual beings only through the medium of intelligible species."

Occam combated this doctrine, maintaining that there is nothing real but spiritual or material beings, and the

[1] *Cousin*, II, 32.

mind of man, which directly conceives them. He was the forerunner of Reid and the Scotch school. He claimed that a knowledge of God was only attainable through his attributes, and that we can only know substances through their attributes, and hence have no idea of the nature of substances. That the soul can only be known through its qualities, and that we have no knowledge of the substance of the soul. One of the answers made by the theological realists to the nominalists was, that "it is so true that there are genera, entirely distinct from the individuals, to which it is sought to reduce them,[1] that nature, to which the nominalists incessantly appeal, sports with forms and preserves the genera, and that every genus represents a real unity."

The controversies bearing more especially upon the realistic and nominalistic doctrines were thus carried on through most of the fourteenth century, but without producing any fruits or results at all proportioned to the amount of intellectual activity employed about them. This led towards the latter part of the fourteenth and the forepart of the fifteenth, to a double reaction. The first sought a refuge in mysticism. Its representative was Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, a Frenchman, born 1363, died 1429.

According to Gerson, ordinary philosophy proceeds by a train of arguments, and leads regularly but slowly to God, by setting out through a multitude of media either from nature or from man.

The other reaction was found in the tendency which had for its object the union of religious speculations with the observation of nature and of man. The representative of this tendency was Raymond of Sebonde who taught at Toulouse in 1436. He asserted "that man had received from the Almighty two books,[2] wherein he may discover the important facts which concern his relation to his crea-

[1] *Cousin*, II, 36. [2] *Tenneman*, 257.

tor, viz: the book of revelation and that of nature; the latter of which was the most universal in its contents, and the most perspicuous. He endeavored by argument to deduce the theology of his age, even in its more peculiar doctrines, from the contemplation of nature and of man.

Transition from the Scholastic to the Modern Philosophy.

Although the days of scholasticism were not absolutely numbered with the declining years of the fourteenth century, yet its real life, that which made it a vital, living system, might be said to expire with that century. It had had its day, performed its mission, and was now passing away. What was the purpose it answered by existing?

Among the fundamental laws of evolution is reckoned the following taken by analogy from the human organism. "Every function is successively executed by two (sometimes more) organs; of which one is primitive, transitory, provisional; the other secondary, definite, permanent."[1] The relations between the two are that the first is found first supplying the place of the second, then coexisting with it during the early phases of the latter's evolution; and finally when the second has acquired due development, the first either ceases its function altogether, or performs it incompletely. Illustrations in the living organism. Provisional milk teeth; down afterwards replaced by hair; the brachiæ of the tadpole. The changes in organs occurring in the embryonic system of viviperous animals offer a further illustration.

Under the operation of this law the scholastic philosophy will, finds its place in the evolution of philosophy historically, among the primitive, transitory, provisional organs. It is something more than a mere scaffolding constructed for the sole purpose of uprearing and perfecting the great

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 33.

philosophical edifice, because it is for the time being the edifice itself, and is destined forever to form some part of it.

The scholastic philosophy allowed thought only upon one condition, that it should coincide with theology. Thus, it carried along with it, and held the mind through the centuries, to an unvarying unity. This, of itself, gave to the European mind, while in its formative stages, a temperament, character, and habitude, strong and robust. Its discussions, and the ideas it put forth, also had the effect to root deeply in the human intelligence, two fundamental ideas, those of God and his creation. Many of the metaphysical and moral conceptions of that philosophy are still living, having received their full development at later periods in the history of philosophy. It is true, the method employed by it was radically vicious, as it sought in conceptions purely logical, the principle of the explanation of things; whereas, such conceptions can really furnish nothing but the means of scientific classification and arrangement. And yet that method required development, and it must now be acknowledged that the great logical force which distinguishes the modern mind, is due to the adoption and systematic carrying out of this method.

Besides, although it gave to the things an entire and complete supremacy, yet it did make the objects of faith also the objects of thought. It raised men above the sphere of unconditional faith. It admitted of doubt, of investigation, of the acquisition of knowledge, and thus by its very effort at demonstration in theology, it contributed to establish the authority of reason. Having thus introduced into the world the thinking spirit, and appealed to its actions in matters of faith, it is not certainly surprising that that spirit, gathering continued strength by its very action upon that appeal, should ultimately claim its own rights and prerogatives, and thus lead to the development of the modern system of philosophy.

But although the scholastic philosophy closed with the fourteenth century, yet modern philosophy did not commence until the beginning of the seventeenth. What relations then do the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries sustain to the history of philosophy? Very much what the first decade of years immediately succeeding puberty, sustain to the life of the individual.

The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were characterized by intense activity, enterprise, discovery, and invention. All the elements and ideas that had long been acquiring a partial development under the sway of the church, now became clamorous for a wider field, and greater freedom in action. Europe seemed to awake, if not from the slumber, at least from the stationary stand point of centuries, and to feel the pulses of a new life. Her different peoples began each to enter upon their respective missions, and the development and solution of those principles and problems, which, in the world's advancing civilization, had been confided to them.

A number of important events and facts precede and occupy this period. Among the more prominent of these are the Crusades, the invention of printing, the conquest of Constantinople, the discovery of the passage around the Cape of Good Hope to India, the discovery of the new world, the reformation, the growing independence of the church in the life of the state, the influence acquired by public opinion, the stronger consolidation of the civil authority, the advancement of experimental knowledge and the sciences, and the cultivation and improvement of the languages of modern Europe based upon a more intimate knowledge of the classics.

Of all these, the most important in its bearing upon the destinies of philosophy was the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks, occurring about the middle of the fifteenth century. Within the walls of that city were collected the treasures of ancient learning, the works of the Grecian philosophers. There lay Plato and Aristotle embalmed in

their original Greek. There were the most faultless models of composition then existing in the world. To all these was applicable the language of the caliph Omar when he consigned to the flames the vast Alexandrian library, viz: that if they contained nothing but the Koran they were useless; if anything not within the Koran, they were irreligious, and in either case should be destroyed.

These treasures, therefore, could not abide in Constantinople. They became the property of Europe, first of Italy, then of France, Spain, Germany and England. They awoke the mind everywhere to a new life.

The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries constitute the period of transition between the scholastic and modern philosophy. The introduction of the Greek language, literature and philosophy into Europe aroused and intoxicated the minds of her scholars. The first process was that of absorption. The various Greek systems, in the language in which they were written, were received into the European mind, that mind so recently imbued with theological learning, and just making its escape from the rigid bonds of scholastic reasoning.

The next process was its transforming influence upon the receptive mind. It is a property of the mind "to grow by what it feeds on." It is the spark issued from great mental batteries that "touches the electric chain wherewith we are darkly bound." The bringing the mind of Europe directly in contact with those great original thinkers, and that through those peerless models of taste and beauty, which the Greek language was more especially qualified to embody and present, could not but work great changes, not in the original constitution, but in the modes of action and the manner of thinking of the European mind.

The third and last process was in the reproduction of the Grecian systems of thought with such modifications as the European mind, acting upon its original constitution, and yet carrying along with it many of the principles of its earlier scholastic culture, and also strongly impressed

with the spirit of its own age, would be likely to originate. Neither the philosophers nor the philosophizing of this transition period are subjects of profitable study, certainly not to any extent of detail. It will be more profitable, with a view to the better understanding of the future developments of philosophy, to inquire here into the four great systems, or rather into the four great channels, into some one of which, all philosophical thinking must necessarily run, and the full and complete development of each one of which, it is for all coming time to unfold and explain. These channels are sensualism, idealism, skepticism and mysticism. In some one of these singly, or in two or more combined together, are to be found all the schools and systems of philosophy that ever existed.

It is important here to observe that the one ground common to all these, the one power to which they all appeal, the one arbiter to whose decrees they all submit, is that of personal consciousness. That this is the same in every individual all reasoning on these subjects assumes, and this is the one great fact which identifies every human being as a member of one and the same race. In regard to this it is true that consciousness is the "universe in the limits of human perception," and that whatever cannot find a recognition in the consciousness of the individual, cannot, as to him, exist at all.

It is in the facts of consciousness that we find the four great channels to which reference has just been made. The first and the most obvious is sensualism.

The organs of sense are variously affected through agencies apparently external to ourselves. The sensations produced are recognized in the consciousness, and thus become facts of the mental being. They are referred to the impression made upon the organs, and thus become connected with the organism. At the same time, reference is made to external objects, which then become the root of our sensations, and hence of our ideas.

It is an incontestible truth that there are quite a large number of phenomena of such a character that we can neither produce nor destroy them, neither augment nor diminish them. Thus the emotions, desires, passions, propensities, exist within us, and a series of phenomena to which they are related, without us; introducing into the soul sensations, not simply irrespective of its will, but in spite of it. Thus the phenomenon of sensation is, therefore, clearly without the empire of the will. It is also equally clear that very many of the motives to action, influencing conduct, spring from the sensations. And so also observation and analysis show that large classes of ideas, and the knowledge which they constitute, are derived from the same source.

With these concessions the sensualistic schools and systems go further, and claim that we are purely creatures of sensation, and have no ideas, and no knowledge, except what is derived from this source; that consciousness finds its limits in sensation, and thus the ultimate result is materialism.

This doctrine in its extent can only be true on condition that consciousness cannot render up a single element which sensation cannot produce and explain. But there are elements wholly inexplicable upon that principle. Whence the will, the voluntary principle; the idea of personal identity; the idea of unity; that of time and space; the idea of infinity; in other words, the elements that enter into the composition of the human soul. Those are necessarily purely psychological and derive nothing from sensation.

Upon the strength of these facts and the reasonings connected with them, idealism builds up its exclusive systems. Finding so many and such powerful elements in the soul, and looking singly at them, it annihilates the material world, and founds on the soul alone its systems of thought and philosophy.

All the systems and schools, whether sensualistic or idealistic, are dogmatical in their character. They are so because

their doctrines are all positive affirmations, and must be met by an admission, a denial, or a qualification. When these systems and schools are pushed to their extremest limits, and arrive at their ultimate conclusions, what are they? The one banishes the human soul, the other the material world. What are the avenues of escape aside from the reasonings by which their conclusions may be combated.

There are two, skepticism and mysticism. The first receives those that think; the second, those that feel.

Skepticism is wholly oppose to dogmatism. While acting upon its legitimate principles, it affirms nothing. It simply doubts, inquires, asks solutions. "It is the first appearance of common sense upon the stage of philosophy." It should properly precede or lie at the foundation of every sensualistic and idealistic system. It should accompany those systems in each process and progress. In the sensualistic it should ask: Is every sensation by itself infallible? Are two sensations more infallible than one? Admitted that reason rectifies them. But is reason a product of sensation? Again, what is the instrument of all your system? Is it not a perpetual generation, an engendering of ideas from sensations, and whence do you derive the cause? Whence do you derive even the very unity of your system?

To the idealistic system makers, it asks whether there are not ideas which the reason unaided could never furnish? It pushes away from idealism the external world, which to be consistent with itself it must reject, and then asks what it expects to perform when it has no other theatre than its own material, a spirit which can act only upon itself, exhausted in the solitary contemplation of its own forces, and its own laws.

Thus "reflection, in occupying itself with one of the parts of consciousness, the sensational part, has arrived at sensualism. In occupying itself with the intellectual part and the ideas which pertain to reason, it has arrived at idealism. In returning upon itself, upon its powers and

their legitimate employment, and upon the two systems which it had already produced, it has arrived at skepticism."

But skepticism is liable to its abuse, as well as sensualism and idealism. There are in all the sensualistic and idealistic systems, some things that are true and some that are false. Skepticism is legitimately employed only when it doubts the false. Its abuse consists in doubting equally the false and the true, and in extending its doubt to all systems whatever. In fact, when it pushes its doctrine to its last possible result, and comes to the positive conclusion that there is no truth, no certainty, it then ceases to combat the dogmatism of other systems, and becomes itself dogmatic, from being a mere negation, it is transformed into a positive system of philosophy quite as exclusive, dogmatic, and extravagant as any other.

There is one remaining source of philosophical schools and systems, or rather channel, through which flows both thinking and feeling, and that is mysticism. It may also furnish a retreat to those who are mourning over the abuses of sensualism, idealism, or skepticism.

We have before alluded to the spontaneous action of the mental powers, as contradistinguished from the exercise of reflective power, and giving rise to the active business men of the world. We now wish to call attention to the original spontaneous movements of the human soul and mind, and which being seized and appropriated by reflection, constitutes mysticism. Prior to all reflection, "all our faculties, in their spontaneous energy, enter into exercise; the reason with the senses, the senses with the reason, free activity with the reason and the senses."[1] The experience here invoked is neither that of the reason nor the senses, but the consciousness of a certain number of sentiments and phenomena which occur in the inmost recesses of the religious soul. It appropriates all the phenomena of intuition. When the sentiments and the

[1] *Cousin*, I, 357.

phenomena flow on with the same spontaniety as that which gave them origin, then all are within the empire of religion; when the same, as seized and appropriated by reflection, to philosophy. The first gives rise to a kind of inspiration, which is primitive and anterior to all reflection; the second, to a knowledge of the secret workings of the soul, prior to that period when its own will enters into and modifies them. It is generally found mingling religion with philosophy, and partaking more largely of the former then the latter.

Of these four channels in which have run the currents of reflection by far the greatest number of the schools and systems of thought are included in the two first mentioned. Each one of these presents a stand point, peculiarly its own, which characterizes all its modes of thinking and reflecting. That of sensualism is termed the objective, in which reflection applies itself to, and develops the objects of perception. The external universe, nature, all the processes by which the physical world is enabled to present its many-sided phenomena, become matters of observation, investigation, and ultimately of knowledge.

That of idealism is termed the subjective, in which reflection turns its eye inward upon its own processes, endeavors to sound the depths of its own spiritual being; brings distinctly within the empire of consciousness all the phenomena of thought; and seeks from the elements of the reason, with the aids of the understanding, to deduce the phenomena of the universe. Different schools, as we shall have occasion to see, plant themselves upon each one of these stand points; and by claiming and seeking to explain all phenomena upon its own peculiar and exclusive principles, leads to the general result of developing, to the greatest possible extent, everything relating to each stand point.

Down to the commencement of the fifteenth century, the currents of European thought and reflection, so far as philosophy was concerned, were limited to three of these

channels. Skepticism was the one excluded. The church, which furnished the basis of reflection, would never admit of doubt. Its dogmatizing was positive, wholly precluding the skeptical element. But during the transition period, which carries us through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to the commencement of modern philosophy, there are schools and systems of thought coursing through each of these channels, although far less regular and clearly defined in their character and outline than those which subsequently came upon the stage of action.

The first schools of much importance that arose in the fifteenth century originated in Italy, and were idealistic and sensualistic, the first claiming Plato as its guide, and teacher, the second Aristotle. The representative of the first was Marsilio Ficino, a Florentine, born 1433, died 1489. Under the auspices of Cosmo de Medici, he founded the academy in Florence in 1460. His great object was to apply his views of the Platonic system to the defense and explanation of Christianity. He won over John Picus, count of Mirandula, who held in great esteem the cabalistical writings, almost ascribing to them a divine origin, and considering them necessary to explain the Christian religion. He endeavored to prove the consistency of the Aristotelian and Platonic systems.

Platonic idealism, thus setting out from the Florentine academy, under Ficino, marched on through the French Ramus, the German Taurellus, the Dalmatian Patrizi, until it culminated in the Neapolitan, Giordano Bruno, who died its martyr. Ramus, born in Picardy in 1515, and who perished in the massacre of St. Bartholomew, undertook the reform of logic. Aristotle reigned at that time supreme in the University of Paris. He assailed the Aristotelian logic, as being inapplicable to the sciences, the arts, and the affairs of life. He subjected its methods to severe criticism, and produced much excitement in the schools.

The most remarkable man who is reckoned as belonging to this school is Giordano Bruno, born at Nola, in Italy,

about the middle of the sixteenth century, and who expired at the stake in Rome the first year of the seventeenth.

Bruno held that God is one, comprehending in himself all essences, being the substance of all things and also their cause, the soul of the universe, which permeates all things, bestowing upon them their forms and attributes. The end contemplated is the perfection of all things, consisting in the development of the various modifications of which the different parts of matter are susceptible. The great first principle is incomprehensible because absolute and uncompounded.[1] His substance and creative energies being determined by his nature. His will a necessity. He is in all things, and all things in him. He pervades the smallest portions of the universe, as well as its infinite expanse, influencing every atom as well as the whole. All things are animated; all good, because proceeding from a being essentially good.

The world is also one, infinite, eternal, and imperishable, the shadow of the supreme principle. The matter which is its element was originally formless, but from its union and identification with the primitive and eternal form, it virtually contains all possible modifications of form. He held to the Pythagorean system of numbers as explaining the manner in which all things are derived from the infinite being as unity. The first principle, by the multiplication of its own unity causes the production of multiplicity, diversity, and variety, and while giving birth to species and individuals, is itself unlimited and unconfined by number, measure, or relation. It remains always one, and in every respect indivisible. By it all things are animated. The universe may be represented as a living being, an immense and infinite animal, in which all things live and act.

That the world is eternal is shown: 1. From the immortal destiny of man. 2. From the infinitude of the

[1] *Tennemann*, 286.

Creator's power. 3. From the goodness of the divine being. 4. From our ideas of infinite space. 5. From the impossibility of finding a central point. The latter he applies to the defense and confirmation of the Copernican system. Our knowledge consists in the perception of similitudes and relations, and we gradually arrive at the idea of unity by combining the multifarious objects presented to our senses. The recognition of unity existing in contraries, is the end of all philosophy. In every individual the soul assumes a particular form. As it is simple and uncompounded it is immortal, and by extension and contraction it forms and fashions its own body. Birth is the consequence of expansion of the centre. Life consists in the maintenance of a spherical shape, while death is the contraction into the same centre. The highest end of all free agents is the same with that of the divine intellect, viz: the perfection of the whole.

Thus the system of Bruno resolved itself into a species of pantheism, and by many was misunderstood as a system of atheism. In it may be found some of the roots of the subsequent ones of Spinoza and Schelling.

But the European mind could not easily relinquish its hold of Aristotle, although the Aristotle of the middle ages, even after having passed through the alembic of the Arabian mind, was considerably different from him of the dispersed Greeks of Constantinople.

The first school of the new peripatetic sensualism was also of Italian origin, and established in the philosophical school of Bologna and of Padua by Peter Pomponatius, who was born at Mantua in 1462, and died at Bologna in 1525. He discussed many questions of interest as free-will, fate, providence, and the question whether the phenomena of nature, which bear the appearance of being marvelous, are produced by the agency of spirits, or by that of the constellations. In reference to the soul and its immortality he maintained that according to the peripatetic doctrine the soul thinks by virtue of itself, but that it never thinks

except on condition that there is also in the consciousness an external image. As this image is attached to the sensibility, and this to the existence of the body, it would follow that on the dissolution of the body the image also perishes, and with it the thought upon which it was conditioned. Hence, there could be no proof of the soul's immortality. This brought him into conflict with the church, but here he finally took refuge in the doctrine that it was for revealed and not natural religion to establish the soul's immortality.

The school of Padua produced several celebrated personages. By its doctrine "God was considered not as the cause but the substance of the world.[1] Consequently the demonstration of God's existence is no longer made per motum, as among the Alexandrians, but by emanation of light, per lucem." Finally Vanini, a Neapolitan, born 1585, was burned at Toulouse in 1619, on the allegation of atheism. His atheism was gathered from his mode of demonstrating the existence of a God, viz: "not from the necessity of a first cause, but from the necessity of an infinite being, not as cause, but as substance."

Near the commencement of the sixteenth century appeared Bernado Telesio, a Neapolitan, born in 1508, and died in 1588, who was a strong advocate for physical science, admitting God as the creator, but allowing him no intervention in the theory of the world. He maintained that it was necessary to set out from real entities, and not from abstractions. He also combats scholasticism, and recalls his age to the sentiment of reality, to the study of nature. He asserts the experience of the senses as the only rule of philosophical induction, and thus was the forerunner of Bacon.

Another Italian, a Calabrian, Thomas Campanella, born in 1568, died in 1639, undertook the reform of every

[1] *Cousin*, II, 262.

part of philosophy. He admitted the existence of two sources, and only two, of all knowledge, viz: revelation and nature. All intelligence he reduced to the faculty of feeling, of perceiving the modifications of our own being. Thought is nothing but the generalization of various perceptions, and sentiment is their collective whole. Logic he regarded as an intellectual instrument to be appropriated particularly to the study of nature.

He was the contemporary of Bacon, and like him commenced with deducing all knowledge from experiment. But instead of pursuing the track he launches off into a vast system of metaphysics, considering all creatures as composed of being and non-being; the former constituted by power, wisdom and love, and having for their object essence, truth and goodness, while non-being has weakness, ignorance, and hatred. The three primordial qualities of being subsist originally in the supreme being, composing one, yet distinct. In drawing all things from non-being, he transfers his ideas into matter under the condition of time, the image of eternity, and upon the basis of space he communicates to finite beings the three qualities which become the principles of the universe under the triple law of necessity, of providence, and of harmony. With this, metaphysics, as the centre of all his speculations, are coordinated a physical philosophy, a physiological philosophy, and a social or political philosophy. All these are mere speculations, now of little value. It has been well said, that he recommended experience without practicing it, and showed the necessity of a revolution without consummating it."

The skepticism of modern times had its origin during the transition period. It had its origin in Montaigne, a Frenchman born in 1533, and died in 1592. "His acute observation of the disagreement existing between all philosophical theories produced in him a way of thinking akin to positive skepticism, in matters of philosophy; and he pronounced the uncertainty of human knowledge and the

feebleness of human reason to be the grand conclusions to which all his observations had led him. He reposed, however, with sincere faith on the authority of divine revelation.[1] The uncertainity ascribed by him to all human science he extended even to matters of practice, without, however, denying the truth of practical obligations. Thus was skepticism fairly announced about the middle of the sixteenth century, but its legitimate fruits, as also its abuses, belong to the development of modern philosophy.

Mysticism had an earlier commencement and a fuller development during the transition period. It may be regarded rather as a continuation from an earlier period. Nicholas de Cusa was a German, and born near Treves in 1401, and died in Italy, in 1464. He divided philosophy into two orders, viz: "transcendental science, whose object is the primitive, absolute, indefinite, unity; and inferior science, which has multiplicity for its object."

The absolute unity can be known only by its symbols.

All beings proceeded from a primal unity, like fractions from their unit.

The phenomena of nature and mathematics have a correspondence to each other. And so human reason operates not except by means of ideas of numbers. Such being its constitutive form.

Humanity aspires after unity or perfection, without desiring to lose its own proper nature. "Humanity, that by which all men are men, is one, and the movement of my human nature has for its object the attainment of God in man."

Theophrastus Paracelsus, a Swiss, born in 1493, and who died at Saltzburg, 1541, aimed at rendering himself a reformer in medicine, and took as the basis of his reformation, and of all his physical speculations, theosophy, that

[1] *Tenneman*, 289.

is, a direct communication of the soul with God by means of illumination. Thus he is brought within the empire of mysticism.

He maintained that the soul so far resembles God that it contains in its own depths all truth that man can know. It is full of sciences, but its notions are veiled or obscured. The truths of science can only be arrived at by retiring within one's self, into the essential intelligence which lies in the depths of his own nature, where the truth is perceived, not actively but passively, but by divine illumination, purity of heart being its condition, and prayer its means of attainment.

The plan of creation is one, and the universe is made after the same model as man. All parts of the universe are full of souls, who are not gifted with intelligence, man only being created in the image of God. Souls are enveloped in matter, a dark and dead thing. Between souls and matter or bodies, exists the spirit, a sort of fluid, the physical means of the universal life. Thus is constituted his trinity of nature, the soul, the fluid, the body, a counterpart, in some respects, of the divine trinity.

Man contains in himself three principles, three worlds, three heavens. 1. The soul, by which he communicates with God, or the archetypal world. 2. The material body, which puts him in connection with the elementary world. 3. The spiritual body, which, being formed of etherial fluid, is in perpetual communication with the angelic, astral world.

Thus the triple nature of man and of the world being identical, there exists in man a force of attraction by which he aspires to the life of the world. This attraction is developed: 1. In a magnetic power, which draws from the elements the nourishment of his flesh and blood.[1] 2. In a superior magnetism, which attracts the spiritual fluid, the

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 11, 12.

principle of sensations and of worldly wisdom. 8. The whole of this is subordinated to the aspiration by which the soul is nourished from God.

But he also held that while man attracts all the forces of nature he improves them in himself, and recalls them all to God, the universal centre. Thus, according to his philosophy, the world is a flux and reflux of the divine life by means of man.

J. Baptist Van Helmont, born at Brussels 1577, died at Vienna 1644, attached himself to the doctrines of Paracelsus, deriving all knowledge from direct and immediate revelation. He attacked the processes of logic, claiming that the knowledge of the relation which exists between the terms of a syllogism,[1] exists in our mind prior to the conclusion, and that logic is therefore nothing more than a means of recapitulating anterior notions, which can have no other use than to facilitate the exposition of ideas on the part of a speaker, and the recollection of them on that of the hearer. The conclusion he drew from this was that all true science was independent of demonstration, and can be acquired only by pure intuition. The internal cause of phenomena he called archeus, and held that it consisted in the union of spirit, of the vital breath, with the seminal image, or internal type of each being.

The latest, and perhaps the most perfect representative of the mysticism of this period, is to be found in Jacob Böhme, a poor shoemaker of Göilitz, born in 1575, and who died in 1624. He is called the Teutonic philosopher. The fundamental points of his doctrines are: "1. The impossibility of arriving at truth by any other process than illumination. 2. A theory of the creation. 3. The relations of man to God. 4. The essential identity of the soul and of God, and the determination of their

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 12.

difference as to form. 5. The origin of evil. 6. The reintegration of the soul. 7. A symbolical exposition of Christianity."

Thus we are brought to the close of the transition period, the termination of the sixteenth century. We have seen the four great channels into which philosophy runs, more properly, perhaps, and certainly more conveniently, denominated the four great principles lying at the foundation of all reflection, sensualism, idealism, skepticism and mysticism, partially but very incompletely developed. The following are their distribution among the nationalities of Europe:

The two first mentioned originated in Italy, and passed thence into the other countries of Europe.[1]

Skepticism was wholly confined to France.

Mysticism, although derived from an Italian source, yet spread principally in Germany, claiming stronger affinities with the elements of the Teutonic mind.

Modern Philosophy — Bacon.

Modern philosophy commences with the seventeenth century. The period had arrived in the history of the world's thinking at which reflection could commence upon system, and by means of successive schools and systems of thought, carry out and exhibit consecutively, those forms, phases and processes which mark its advancement, and proclaim the different stages in its course of development. It had traveled a long way to reach this period. To say nothing of its sojourn among the oriental nations, it had occupied the Greek mind for twelve centuries, extending from Thales and Pythagoras, to the closing of the schools at Athens, by Justinian. It had demanded of the mingled races of Italy, the Teutonic and Celtic combinations of

[1] *Cousin*, II, 73.

France, and the purer Teutonism of Germany and England, the recognition of its claims, and the exercise of its powers, for eight centuries, from the commencement of the ninth to that of the seventeenth. It had served a long apprenticeship with theology; and finally, its term being accomplished, it had separated from it, and proclaimed its independence. It had reproduced in the modern European mind, with such modifications as the new elements in its composition demanded, many of the early systems and forms of thought, that had stirred the brains of the Grecian philosophers.

And now it is about to make its entrance upon the seventeenth century. The demands of the age upon it are heavy and imperative. Industry and enterprise have been at work, opening up new avenues and new worlds to man's restless spirit. Physical science is urging its claims and making its discoveries. Galileo had pointed his telescope to the stars; Copernicus discovered the true solar system; and Kepler, the laws of planetary motion. Problems of profound and practical importance were pressing for solution. One great question was moving in the minds of men, and that related to the origin and the certainty of knowledge. Investigations were also being made as to the ultimate grounds of moral right, and of moral obligation. From this time onward, we may expect order, and system, and method to preside over the workings of reflection.

Modern philosophy has been so rich a field of investigation that the laborers in it have been numerous. We can, of course, notice only those who are the most prominent, who are themselves the authors of systems, or whose labors have been productive in the development of particular schools.

Again, there are two plans or principles upon which to exhibit modern philosophy; the one the most usually adopted, is the chronological plan or principle, to detail

the schools and systems as they succeed each other in the order of time. The other, not hitherto fully attempted, is to follow out the schools and systems in the natural order of their succession, irrespective of time. To be governed by the idea of development. To trace out a principle, system, or school, including all its principal developments, down to the present time.

The latter is alone calculated to render a consecutive idea of the course of philosophy. It shows how one system, or school, occasions or produces another, and into what the more comprehensive finally resolve themselves. This mode of treatment has been only possible when applied to the modern philosophy. Neither the ancient nor that of the middle ages, could be brought within any such plan or principle.

It will be apparent from this exhibition that although the Italian mind was greatly instrumental in giving the impulse to philosophy during the transition period including the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, yet that it has done comparatively little in aiding to develop modern philosophy. The contributions to this latter have come almost wholly from the working of the English, French, Scottish and German mind. Of these the first may be termed empirical in its tendencies; the second, materialistic; the third, skeptical and common sense; and the fourth, transcendental. It required each one of these to furnish its entire contribution in order that the development of philosophy might be full and complete.

Near the commencement of the seventeenth century appear, the one in England, the other in France, two philosophies; the one empirical, having an objective stand point, and its root in sensualism; the other, rationalistic, with a subjective stand point, and having its root in idealism. It is the development of these two philosophies, together with the revolts, reactions, and refuges, which their ultimate resu[illegible] have compelled, which we now pro-

ceed to investigate. We shall do so in the order exhibited in the following programme:



The first great root of this philosophical tree is the EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY.

By *empirical* I mean experimental, the results of reflective and active experience commenced and carried out in accordance with the laws of thought.

By the *objective stand point*, I mean that this empiricism is directed not to the subject that thinks, but to the objects of sense that constitute the external universe, together with the laws by which it is governed.

By SENSUALISM is meant that philosophy that seeks and finds in the senses alone the sources of all ideas, and of all knowledge.

This philosophy in modern time has its first and great representative in Bacon.

Francis Bacon, an English lawyer and lord chancellor under James I, was born in London in 1561, and died in 1626.

Bacon was no metaphysician. He originated no system of philosophy. But he did a method of philosophizing. To understand clearly the difference between him and Descartes, the author of the rationalistic system, it may be well to recall to mind that every course of thought, which is logical in itself, is determined by two points, viz: that from which it proceeds, and that to which it tends; the first being the starting point, the last the goal. The first marks the rationalistic, the last the sensualistic philosophy. In the first, thought, mind, constitutes the premiss, and then the course of ideas is but a series of conclusions. In the second, thought is the goal, and with respect to that all the premises are framed.

The method of each is different. In the first, the guiding point is an axiom, or fundamental proposition, in the second, a problem. The axiom has deductions; the problem solutions.[1] The first is the synthetic, the second, the analytic method. Thus is indicated the mental working which lies at the foundation of the two philosophies.

[1] *Fischer*, 39, 40, 41.

That of Bacon was the analytic. He first apprehended the problem. The goal was in the distance. He busied himself principally about the means of solution. The great object or goal of all his wishes and aspirations was, so to extend the intellectual world that it may be able to comprehend the material, such as the latter had become in his day.[1] In his view, the dominion of man over things was the highest end the human mind could propose to itself. Hence the ultimate purpose of his philosophy was the foundation and augmentation of human dominion, and to his mind the nearest means to that end are supplied by that kind of culture which converts physical forces into instruments fitted for man. And it was by opening the widest prospects into the realm of science, and by indicating goals and setting up problems in every direction, that he proposed, not to unfold a system, but to set free a spirit of investigation, invention, and discovery, which, under the processes he indicated, might pursue its course without end or limit.[2]

Bacon has incorporated much of his philosophy in the six following aphorisms:

1. Man, the minister and interpreter of nature, can act and understand in as far as he has, either in fact or in thought, observed the order of nature; no more he can neither know nor do.

2. The real cause and root of almost all the evils in science is this: that, falsely magnifying and extolling the powers of the mind, we seek not its real helps.

3. There are two ways of searching after and discovering truth: the one, from sense and particulars, rises directly to the most general axioms, and resting upon those principles, and their unshaken truth, finds out intermediate axioms, and this is the method in use; but the other raises axioms from sense and particulars by a continual and gradual ascent, till at last it arrives at

[1] *Fischer*, 46. [2] *Idem*, 63.

the most general axioms, which is the true way, but hitherto untried.

4. The understanding, when left to itself, takes the first of these ways; for the mind delights in springing up to the most general axioms, that it may find rest; but after a short stay there, it disdains experience, and these mischiefs are at length increased by logic, for the ostentation of disputes.

5. The natural human reasoning we, for the sake of clearness, call the anticipation of nature, as being a rash and hasty thing; and the reason duly exercised upon objects we call the interpretation of nature.

6. It is false to assert that human sense is the measure of things, since all perceptions, both of sense and mind, are with relation to man, and not with relation to the universe; but the human understanding is like an unequal mirror to the rays of things, which, mixing its own nature with the nature of things, distorts and perverts them.

In addition, he says, relating to the nature and character of the commencement of his method: "The only remaining hope and salvation is to begin over again the whole task of the mind so that from the very first, the mind may not be trusted to itself, but continually directed."

Thus a wise and judicious skepticism lay at the foundation of the Baconian philosophy, purifying, supporting, and sustaining it. And hereafter we shall see the same skepticism in its abuse, in the hands of Berkley, attacking and destroying that external nature which lay at its foundation.

In the exercise of this skepticism, Bacon's first object in his *Novum Organum* was to point out the causes that had retarded and vitiated science. These he terms idols, and he enumerates four kinds, viz:

Idols of the tribe.
Idols of the den.
Idols of the forum.
Idols of the theatre.

Idols of the tribe are those common to all men. The propensity prompting to the spirit of system, which seeks to find a greater degree of order, simplicity, and regularity than is actually indicated by observation, is an illustration.

Idols of the den spring from the peculiar character of the individual. Some men, for instance, are best adapted to mark the differences of things, others to catch at resemblances.

Idols of the forum are those which arise out of the intercourse of society, and from the use of language. Men believe that their thoughts govern their words. But it also happens that their words frequently govern their thoughts.

Idols of the theatre are the deceptions which have arisen from the dogmas of different schools. These, unlike the others, are of labored acquisition. Thus these different idols are the "peculiarities of human nature and of individuals, the conventionalities of social intercourse, and the authorities confirmed by history."

The great and only object of the Baconian philosophy was fruit, productive results. Hence Bacon confined himself mainly to the realm of physics. His philosophy had its adaptations accordingly. Hence he rejected all consideration of final causes as appertaining to metaphysics, and as belonging more to the nature of man than to that of the universe: They had their origin in reasoning, and not in experience. He, therefore, confined himself to efficient, physical causes.

The first work of experience is the observation and collection of facts and phenomena, together with all their modifications and varieties. These are the capital of science, the description of nature, natural history.

The three main problems proposed by Bacon were: 1. By what means does natural history become natural science? 2. By what means does the description of nature become the interpretation of nature? 3. In more general

terms, by what means does ordinary experience become scientific experience?

Experience proceeds from the facts of nature, and directs itself to their causes. "To know truly," says Bacon, "is to know from causes." Having thus got the capital, the description, the natural history, the next question is now to find the essential conditions. And this question is answered by setting aside whatever is nonessential, or contingent. The residue will consist of those which are essential and true. The discovery of contingencies, and the separation of them from the other data, is one of the great purposes and aims of the Baconian experience.

The mode of doing this is by a comparison of a number of similar instances. This may be two-fold: 1. A comparison of several instances in which the same phenomena occurs under various conditions. 2. With these instances compare others, where, under similar conditions, the same phenomenon does not occur. "Thus, by accurate and frequent comparison, nonessential conditions are detected, and by their exclusion, the essential conditions are retained. Thus experience proceeds from fact to fact, till it arrives at a law. It confirms fact by experiment; discovers, by a fitting comparison of facts, the universal law, principle, or axiom, by which the operation of nature is guided. Thus, experience ascends from the experiment to the axiom. This is the method of induction."

Before a conclusion can be safely arrived at by experience it must be rendered clear that there are no negative instances. To these, Bacon attaches the highest importance. They stand as a security against too credulous reliance on individual experience. They are with him the criterion of empirical truth. Their occurrence destroys any affirmative conclusion. With him, it is common experience that simply collects; but it is critical experience that collects by sifting, and is thus both experimental and intellectual, uniting reason with experience.

One great problem proposed by Bacon to his age was the subjection of science to the spirit of invention, and the liberation of this spirit from the chance by which human inventions had previously been governed.[1] Chance was to give place to design. Invention is the parent of discovery, and that was the great demand of the Baconian age.

Another problem that presented itself to the mind of Bacon was: How can knowledge attained by the way of experience, become invention? *Answer.* By the application of the discovered laws. If all the forces by which lightning is guided and attracted are known, the invention of the lightning rod becomes an easy matter.

Thus the Baconian induction proceeds from experiment to axiom. But that, once attained, becomes a subject matter upon which deduction acts, taking the inverse course, and proceeding from axiom to experiment. The first is the method of interpretation, the last that of application. The first end with the discovery of a law, the last with an invention.

There occurs this difficulty with the Baconian method. A single negative instance, we have seen, destroys a conclusion. Certainty, therefore, requires the impossibility of a negative instance, the affirmative proof that there are none. This clearly can never be furnished by experience, for "nature is richer than experience." This brings us to the prerogative instances of Bacon. These are certain cases, or instances, one of which is equal in value to a series of others. They are pregnant instances, from which much may be inferred by an accelerated induction, by a rapid separation of the contingent from the necessary. It is where a single observation may save many others. Thus, for instance, if the question is of specific gravity, the mere fact that quicksilver is so much heavier than gold, is sufficient to show that the specific gravity of a body is regulated by its mass, and not by the cohesion of its

[1] *Fischer*, 47.

parts. Bacon has enumerated twenty-seven of these prerogative instances.

Another instance made use of by Bacon is analogy. This assumes the unity, the entirety, of nature, a generalization gathered from a constantly ascending induction. Granting the truth of this general fact, analogies are beautifully expressed as the "first chords, that we hear of harmony of the universe." "They are," says Bacon, "the first and truest steps towards the union of nature. They do not at once establish an axiom, but only indicate and observe a certain conformity of bodies to each other. But although they do not conduce much to the discovery of general laws, which are called by Bacon forms, they are, nevertheless, of great service in disclosing the fabrication of parts of the universe, and practice a sort of anatomy upon its members. Thence they sometimes lead us, as if by hand, to sublime and noble axioms, especially those that relate to the configuration of the world rather than to simple natures and forms."

Thus it was by the aid of analogy that induction itself was invoked to bring unity into natural science, and by such means to discover that spiritual connection of things that can never be apprehended through a mere description of parts, for it is by analogy that nature can be united, and the foundations of science laid.[1]

But no other than essential resemblances should be admitted, and hence Bacon insists that in all these a severe and rigid caution be observed, and none others accepted as similar and proportionate instances except those that denote natural resemblances, that is, real and substantial, not merely casual and superficial.

The analogies suggested by Bacon are far-seeing and comprehensive, stretching through organic and inorganic nature. The idea of an analogy pervading all natural phenomena is clearly before his mind, and thus he sought

[1] *Fischer*, 130.

what the common forms of induction could not alone have discovered, the unity of nature as manifested in the affinity of all things.

Such was the method of Bacon, and the result of his philosophy and the logical order of its ideas is thus admirably and comprehensively stated by Fischer:[1]

"1. Science should serve man by being useful to him. Its use consists in inventions; the object of which is the dominion of the human race.

"2. Science can only become inventive through an exact knowledge of things, and this is only to be obtained by an interpretation of nature.

"3. A correct interpretation of nature is only possible through pure and methodical experience. Experience is pure when it does not judge according to idols and human analogies, when it does not anthropomorphize things, when it is mere experimentalizing perception. Experience is methodical as true induction. Induction is true when, by an accurate and critical comparison, it infers laws from a number of particular instances. Comparison is critical when it opposes negative to positive instances. Moreover, the process of inductive reasoning is accelerated by the investigation of prerogative instances. Experience, thus disciplined, avoids from first to last all uncertain and premature hypotheses."

The merit of Bacon consists not alone in being the founder of methods, in simply pointing out the way. He was also the expositor of his methods. He traveled along the way he had pointed out so far as to initiate others, and to enable them to make a further progress.

The labors of Bacon were by no means limited to the suggestion and exposition of his method. He also attempted an arrangement and classification of all the kinds, varieties, and departments of knowledge. The principle lying at the foundation of his division was psychological.

[1] *Fischer*, 140.

He would divide the total intellectual image of the world into so many parts as there were faculties in the human mind to copy and reproduce it.[1] These faculties were memory, imagination, and reason. There must, therefore, be a copy of the world referable to memory, or experience; another to imagination, and another to reason. The purely empirical, or experience copy, is history; the imaginary, poetry; the rational, science.

All the possible objects of human knowledge are God,[2] nature, and our internal essence. Of these, our knowledge of nature is immediate, that of God is derived through nature, and that of ourselves through reflection. The great fundamental thought that appears to have lain at the foundation of his philosophy, and that impelled him to seek analogies everywhere was, that the aggregate of things, from the humblest of creatures to the deity himself forms a regular ascending scale.[3]

The true distinction between physics and metaphysics, he held to be, that the first was employed to investigate the material of things, and their efficient forces;[4] the latter, the forms of things and their fitness to an end. Thus, they contemplate different sides of the same nature; the former, in matter and force; the latter, form and purpose.

Bacon often speaks of forms, and by these he means permanent causes. Those being efficient, he elevates into the form of universality. That, for instance, which, in every case, produces heat, is called by him, the form of heat. Thus, his forms are the last true differences to which the conditions of natural phenomena are reducible; the factors absolutely necessary for the qualities of bodies.

To physics, Bacon assigns efficient causes; to metaphysics, final.[5] The former show a nature conformed to laws; the latter, to ends. These, he insists, should never be

[1] *Fischer*, 234. [2] *Idem*, 246. [3] *Idem*, 250. [4] *Idem*, 255. [5] *Idem*, 262.

mingled together. "The excursions," he remarks, "of final causes into the limits of physical causes, hath bred a vastness and solitude in that track." He would purify physics, by banishing final causes to the region of metaphysics.

The soul was supposed by Bacon to be a corporeal substance, having its local seat in the brain, and invisible, on account of its subtilty.[1] But the mind, he declared incomprehensible, transferring the idea of it from the scientific sphere into that of religion. Thus, referring the soul to the body, and the mind to the deity, he fell necessarily into a dualism, which, once forced upon the mind, is so difficult to get rid of.

Bacon had admitted, what must be obvious to every inquirer, that his philosophy was incapable of explaining the mind.[2] He had, therefore, but one of two possible courses before him, viz: to refer it to the deity, and thus create a dualism, without any possible mode of connecting the two together; or to declare it a corporeal substance, and thus merge it all in materialism. The former was preferred by Bacon; the latter, we shall see, by some of those who succeeded and more fully developed his philosophy in some of its phases.

Bacon made metaphysics the stepping stone to natural theology; for he assigned final causes to metaphysics, and the perception of these in nature shows us a world regulated for certain ends, and such a world cannot be conceived without a regulating intelligence. Natural theology, in his view, is the image of the deity as the creative regulator of the world, and faith in such a deity is a scientific necessity.

But a deity thus proclaimed by the course of nature must necessarily be limited by it, and must, therefore, belong to natural philosophy. It is clear that as the course of nature only is here taken, that can reveal nothing of the supernatural essence of the deity, or of his

[1] *Fischer*, 271. [2] *Idem*, 270.

decrees for the benefit of man. As the kingdom of grace, the realm of revealed religion lies out of nature; it is obvious there can be no pathway leading from one to the other; and hence as there was between mind and body, so also between deity and the world there was, according to Bacon, a necessary dualism.

The dualism thus forced upon the Baconian philosophy excludes all intercommunication and reciprocal influence between religion and philosophy. A blind unquestioning faith belongs to the one; reason with all its processes to the other. Religious faith stands beyond science, rests upon a basis totally different, must be unconditional, without rational ground, or logical aid, and hence totally a blind faith.

Thus the Baconian philosophy was as little capable of explaining religion as the human mind. Religion is the connection between the divine and the human mind. For the apprehension of this connection it possessed neither the comprehension nor the required organs. If both deity and mind were inexplicable upon its principles, how could it understand the relation between them. All its knowledge came through the medium of experimentalizing experience, and how could that possibly fathom either the human or divine mind. True to itself, it admitted, as it could not do otherwise, that the mind, God and religion, were to it unfathomable objects. It had, therefore, no choice but either to reject or acknowledge, and in either case unconditionally, and without a reason. Bacon's rejection of all final causes in the domain of physics would naturally have led to its rejection, although it may well be doubted whether a more enlarged and liberalized empiricism would not be able to discover and even demonstrate ends in the creation, final purposes to which all the physical arrangements were made subservient.

It will be readily seen, therefore, that the Baconian philosophy carried along with it its own recommendation and condemnation. It was emphatically the philosophy de-

manded by its age. The yearning of human thought was then towards discovery; development of nature's physical resources through the agency of mind. Into the midst of it came the method of Bacon, with its levers and screws, and various modes of experimentalizing experience, having one persistent aim, the extorting from nature the secrets of her operations, and through them the controlling of herself.

It was eminently successful. It gave to physical science a new impulse. It offered to the pent-up faculties of mind a new field of effort, a new course and direction in which to expend their energies. The offer was gladly accepted. Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood, and Newton the laws of gravitation. In process of time steam opened up its resources, and electricity became a willing worker in the affairs of men. It would not perhaps be too much to say that the mighty advancements of physical science; the profound knowledge of nature's processes, which the last two centuries have yielded up; the almost unquestioned command attained by man over the forces of nature, and by which he has been enabled so rapidly and thoroughly to develop her physical resources; are all mainly owing to the use and successful employment of the Baconian methods of philosophy. The progress of this philosophy was by successive generalizations, and newly discovered facts and phenomena. As soon as a sufficient number of the latter came to be known, a generalization broad enough to cover them was sought out and deemed satisfactory. In the progress of knowledge, other facts and phenomena would naturally present themselves, which not being at the time known, the preceding generalizations would be inadequate to explain. This would demand wider generalizations. These, in their turn, would be furnished, and thus all obstacles being cleared away, another advance onward would be made until another barrier would be reached, and other new and unexplained facts and phenomena would telegraph back, requiring

generalizations still more comprehensive and sweeping for their solution. And thus in successive oscillations between the two would swing the mighty pendulum that marks out the mind's progress on the dial plate of centuries.

At the same time it must now be admitted that this philosophy in its principle and scope was narrow, limited, partial, unilateral. It ignored mind, and was confined to matter. It groveled, and upon its own principles, as expounded by Bacon, forever must, within the realm of physics. But its denial of final causes, as embraced within the sphere of its method, it effectually cut off all avenue to any other realm. To man, as a being of this world, as the subject merely of physical enjoyments, as having only to do with the blind forces of nature, it offered all that was desirable. But to man who could entertain and busy himself with the problems of life and death and destiny, whose thoughts would seek to apprehend God and his eternity, who felt that his spiritual nature had relations reaching far beyond the domain of physical science, it could offer nothing.

But while thus sensible of its deficiencies, we should recognize the truth, that God has all time at his disposal; that mind cannot at once sound all the depths of its reflection; that these depths must be opened up successively; and that every great system of thought should appear partial, limited, and conditioned, in order that all its resources, and contained treasures, may be all brought out and fully developed.

The Baconian philosophy only commences with Bacon. Although so limited in its principle and scope, yet his genius could develop but a single phase of it. That phase related to his method. That has stood, and will continue to, the test of ages. But there lay within the principle he assumed, as the basis of his method, germs of thought, ideas, doctrinal results and consequences, that he probably never dreamed of. It is thus demonstrated, that "every body is wiser than any body," and that the race carries

on from age to age, its successive stages of thinking, until it completes in the end, its great philosophical systems.

The sensualistic philosophy, having established through Bacon, its methods, next passes through the alembics of Hobbes and Locke, developing through the first its morals and politics; and through the latter, its metaphysics. Not yet by any means exhausted, it then takes two directions, the one running off through Hartley, Darwin, Condillac, and the other French philosophers, into utter hopeless materialism; the other, through Berkley, into the annihilation of all sensuous objects, the material world, through skepticism. Not yet having exhausted all its resources, we shall find it again reappearing, near the middle of the nineteenth centuy, under a different garb, and a different name, viz: the positivism of Auguste Comte.

Results of the Baconian Philosophy—Hobbes, Locke.

Thomas Hobbes, the contemporary and friend of Bacon, was born at Malmesbury, England, in 1588, and died in 1679. Hobbes was a clear, strong writer. His general doctrine may be summed up as that of social materialism.

Bacon had declared physics the mother of the sciences. On this foundation not only were astronomy, optics, mechanics, etc., to be renovated, but also morals, politics and logic. But Bacon himself left morals undeveloped, and politics untouched. Hence the necessity of Hobbes.

The moral world was to be explained on naturalistic principles, that is,[1] the natural state of man being ascertained, how does the moral order of things result from it? This is the problem for Hobbes to solve in the spirit of the Baconian philosophy.

The natural state of man, according to Hobbes, is a war of all against all, because the human forces, by their very nature, are opposed in hostility to each other. This war

[1] *Fischer*, 417.

perils the safety of all, and hence contravenes that law of nature by which every individual seeks safety, life, and enjoyment. On the strength of this law peace results, but it results from a contract, out of which the state is derived. All agree to abandon their natural rights, or rather to transfer them to a third party, the state. The contract is formed by this reciprocal transfer of rights, and constitutes the essence of the state in human society. The state thus originates from the law of necessity, and is armed with all the rights and powers of the individual members who compose it. All the conditions required are natural laws, the sum total of which constitutes, according to Hobbes, the only real morality.[1]

The contract once made is irrevocable. It holds the same position in politics that an axiom does in science. The state wields absolute sway; as it unites all rights and powers within itself. Its power is sole, unlimited, indivisible. It rules alone, and is alone free. In its presence all are subjects, who are bound to obey. It is and must be, absolute.

This power may be lodged with one person or many. The form may be monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic, but the power of the state must, in all cases, be absolute and indivisible. As a means of conducing to this, the legislative must not be separated from the governing power, nor the judicial from the other two. All the powers are united in a single hand, and are best and most naturally united in a single person. An absolute monarchy is thus the most perfect form of government. The king is the embodied law, and no moral conscience or religious freedom are to prevail against him. The state he calls the "mortal God," the "great leviathan" which recklessly swallows up individuals.

Religion and morality, according to Hobbes, are only rendered possible through the state, for it is by the state

[1] *Fischer*, 426.

that they are first made. Religious faith is nothing more than political obedience, unconditional, cold and external. It is a state edict, a royal command.

He resolves all good and evil into selfishness. The object of a selfish desire is, according to Hobbes, termed good; that of a selfish aversion, bad. We seek what is useful and avoid what is hurtful to ourselves. Private interest is the sole arbiter as to what is good, and what is bad. Nothing is in itself good or bad, beautiful or ugly. There is no such thing as natural morality.

The state, by its laws, declares what is good and bad for all.[1] It marks the distinctions between actions that are just and those that are unjust. It also determines what are to be the objects of belief, what deity is to be worshiped and in what form. Thus the law of the state really constitutes both morality and religion. "The public law," says Hobbes, "is the citizen's only conscience."

All generic ideas, according to him, are mere names and words, and these are nothing but conventional expedients for mutual intercourse. "Words," says he, "are wise men's counters.[2] They do but reckon by them. But they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas Aquinas."

Hobbes also inquired into the origin of our knowledge, and here he takes the same instrument and applies it to the limitation of knowledge, which was applied by Bacon to that of science, viz: experience. Here he is the precursor of materialism.

"Concerning thoughts of man," says Hobbes, "I will consider them first singly, and afterwards in a train or dependence upon one another. Singly they are every one a representation or appearance of some quality or accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an object, which object worketh on the eyes, ears, and other parts

[1] *Fischer*, 423. [2] *Idem*, 417.

of a man's body, and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of appearance. The original of them all is that which we call sense, for there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original."

And again, "when a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next thought after that is not altogether so casual as it seems to be.[1] Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination whereof we have not formerly had sense in whole or in parts, so we have no transition from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this: all fancies, i. e., images, are motions within us, relics of those made in sense; and those motions that immediately succeed one another in the sense, continue also together after the sense; inasmuch as the former coming again to take place and be predominant, the latter followeth by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner as water upon a plain table is drawn, which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first is unguided, without design, and inconstant, wherein there is no passionate thought to govern and direct those that follow to itself, as the end and scope of some desire or other passion; in which case the thoughts are said to wander and seem impertinent one to another as in a dream. Such are commonly the thoughts of men that are not only without company, but also without care of anything; though even then their thoughts are as busy as at other times, but without harmony; as the sound which a lute out of tune would yield to any man; or in tune to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependence of one thought upon another."

[1] *Lewes*, 422.

Hobbes makes the sole object of philosophy to be the study of bodies. These he divides into two classes: natural bodies and political bodies. The latter have been already considered. To the former he assigns two sorts of faculties, viz: faculties of the body, and faculties of the mind. Those of the former he sums up under three heads, viz: power nutritive, power generative, and power motive. The faculties of the mind are two, viz: cognitive and imaginative, or conceptive and motive.

To understand the power cognitive he says: "We must remember and acknowledge that there be in our minds continually certain images or conceptions of the things without us. This imagery and representation of the qualities of things without, is that which we call our conception, imagination, ideas, notice, or knowledge of them; and the faculty or power, by which we are capable of such knowledge, is that I here call cognitive power, or conceptive, the power of knowing or conceiving." * * * "All the qualities called sensible are, in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter by which it presseth on our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything else but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but motion."

Sense furnishes us with conceptions. Then we have imagination, which is defined by Hobbes to be "a conception remaining, and by little and little decaying, from and after the act of sense." It is, therefore, but a decaying sense. The term memory is used by Hobbes to express the act of decay, and to signify that the sense is fading, old, and past. Imagination is used by him in a very general sense, that of ideation.

"Whatsoever we imagine," says he, "is finite. Therefore there is no idea, no conception of anything we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite power. When we say that anything is infinite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive

the ends and bounds of the thing named, having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And, therefore, the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him, for he is incomprehensible,[1] and his greatness and power are inconceivable, but that we may honor him. Also, because whatsoever we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense."

He admits, however, that in virtue of the law of association, which unites the sensations,[2] and which leads the human mind to ascend from cause to cause, we arrive at the idea of God, as a physical cause, although the whole notion of the divine nature is absolutely unintelligible.

The discovery seems due to Hobbes, that our sensations do not correspond with any external qualities ;[3] that what are called sensible qualities, are nothing but modifications of the sentient being.

Hobbes held that there were two kinds of knowledge:[4] "whereof, the one is nothing else but sense, or knowledge original, and remembrance of the same; the other is called science, or knowledge of the truth of propositions, and how things are called; and is derived from understanding. Both of these sorts are but experience; the former being the experience of the effects of things that work upon us from without; and the latter, experience men have from the proper use of names in language, and all experience being, as I have said, but remembrance, all knowledge is remembrance."

Thus, on the assumption that all our thoughts are nothing more than the images of the objects of sense — an assumption, the truth of which a moment's reflection must dissipate, for what are the images of heat, cold, music, etc.— he erects, upon the foundation of experience, a system entirely materialistic in all its tendencies.

[1] *Lewes*, 424. [2] *History of Philosophy*, II, 32. [3] *Lewes*, 420. [4] *Idem*, 425.

His theory of reasoning is very peculiar. According to him, all reasoning is reduced to seeking either the whole by the addition of all its parts, or a part by the subtraction of the rest;[1] from whence it follows, that deduction and induction are only forms of equation, which is the general process of the reason; or in other terms, that all human cognitions should be expressible in mathematical formulas, and that everything which is not expressible in that way, has no reality, or, at least, no reality accessible to our intelligence.

The success of Hobbes was never great in England, but he may well rank as the father of the materialistic systems of the French philosophers.

John Locke, the metaphysician of the Baconian philosophy, was born at Wrington, England, in 1632. He died in 1704. His Essay on the Human Understanding, a specimen of calm, and apparently well considered reasoning, has exerted a vast amount of influence throughout the whole realm of thought.

Bacon had insisted that the understanding, through experience, arrived at the laws of nature. The questions arising out of this, are: 1. What is the understanding? 2. How do we arrive at experience, or how does experience result from the human mind?[2]

It was the problems which these questions present, that Locke undertook to solve. That he takes root in Bacon is quite evident from the two foundations upon which his philosophy rests. His entire system reposes upon two thoughts:

1. There are no innate ideas.
2. All our knowledge arises from experience.

Both these thoughts are absolutely indispensable to the maintenance of the sensualistic philosophy, because if there are innate ideas sensation is not the only source of know-

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 32. [2] *Fischer*, 435, 436.

ledge, and the same result would equally follow if we could attain to any knowledge independent of experience.

The following is the plan which Locke lays down for himself:

"First. I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them,[1] which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

"Secondly. I shall endeavor to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence and extent of it.

"Thirdly. I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith and opinion; whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth we have yet no certain knowledge; and we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent." His great object and peculiar merit consists in the investigation of the origin, reality, limits and uses of knowledge.

The method which Locke pursued was purely psychological, although the results he arrived at were physiological in their tendency, and hence legitimately employed in the erection of materialism. In carrying out this method he descended into the depths of his own consciousness, and there employed himself in patiently observing phenomena, watching the operations of his own mind, sitting at the sources of thought, scanning the thinking process, and stealing from it the secret of its operations, and of the numerous combinations it was capable of producing. Thus in his method, he is well and properly styled the founder of modern psychology.

Locke, in all his investigations and reasonings, never loses sight of his three great primary objects: 1. The sources of knowledge. 2. Its reality and uses. 3. Its legitimate limits.

[1] *Lewes*, 486.

What Bacon left as an implication is taken as the starting point of Locke. He had insisted that the mind should divest itself of all idols, all preconceived ideas and notions, in order to clear away all hindrances to scientific progress. In this work of clearing away, he makes no exception; and hence there is not a single idea or notion of which the mind is unable to rid itself, not one which is firmly anchored there as innate.

In precise accordance with this is the starting point of Locke, viz: that there are no innate ideas; that the mind originally is a mere tabula rasa, upon which experience writes its vast varieties of knowledge. The only real difference is that Bacon insists that the mind shall be made like an empty casket, while Locke says that it is this by nature.

In coming upon ground purely psychological, and denying the existence of innate ideas, Locke was in direct conflict with Descartes, and subsequently with Leibnitz. In this denial he went, and to be effectual he must go the whole length, that is, that in the human mind there are no innate laws, either of the thought, or of the will, neither axioms nor maxims; hence no natural knowledge, morality, or religion.[1]

This doctrine he seeks to establish by means of the "negative instances" of the Baconian method. His argument, in brief, is, if there are innate ideas, all men must have them, whereas experience shows that most men know nothing of the axioms, which he brings forward as instances of innate ideas,[2] indeed many times never acquire a knowledge of them during their entire lives. There can, therefore, be no innate ideas, and the human mind, independent of experience, is a tabula rasa.

Thus, according to Locke, there is no natural knowledge, in the sense of something originally given.[3] There is only a natural history of human knowledge, as something

[1] *Fischer*, 439. [2] *Idem*, 441. [3] *Idem*, 441.

gradually acquired. The principal object of the essay is to describe the natural history of the human understanding.

Locke did not seem to consider that in destroying everything innate, and in constructing upon no other foundation than experience every individual, he was destroying the foundation upon which nationalities repose, and all history is erected. That foundation is well expressed by Socrates when he says: that he is obliged to obey the laws of his country, for he has already preexisted in his ancestors as a citizen of Athens. If he had come into the world an entirely new being, his mind, a tabula rasa, which was yet to have its development and history, and that to be only his own individual experience, it is clear he could have had no such preexistence, and hence have been under no such obligation. Men, upon that principle, could no more form governments based upon a moral element, and which could be the subjects of history, than flies or horses.

In respect to the origin and sources of ideas, the commencement and progress of this natural history of the understanding, Hobbes had said that all our ideas are derived from sensations, that there is nothing in the intellect which was not before in the sense.

Locke was a psychologist and not a materialist. He does not, therefore, limit himself to this source. In the depths of his own consciousness he had discovered that there was a thinking subject and thinking process, that there was there an element entirely overlooked by Hobbes, viz: that of reflection. Thus he declared that "although sensation was the great source of most of our ideas, yet there was another fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas; and this source though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be termed internal sense." This is what he calls reflection.

Thus, in terms, Locke separated himself from Hobbes and the materialistic school. But the doubt has been whether that separation was not apparent rather than real. He superadds an inner sense, that by which the mind becomes cognizant of its own operations, and he terms that reflection. But the important question is: does this reflection busy or employ itself about any ideas that were not originally derived through the senses? The answer to this question must decide the standing of Locke. If in the affirmative, he was a psychologist; if in the negative, he must be ranked not perhaps as a pure materialist, but certainly as one holding to doctrines clearly materialistic in their nature and tendency. The negative will have to be conceded, for as he obtains everything from experience, reflection can do nothing more than to furnish consciousness, with a knowledge of thinking processes, or modes of mental activity, and not with ideas. Locke seems to admit no idea whose root was not originally in the sense. Besides, he holds that reflection, although different from sensation; as it does not refer to an external object, yet has a fundamental characteristic in common with it,[1] as they both imply a feeling and a sentiment; and hence to both belongs equally the term sense, that one being external and the other internal.

Another point going to show that the negative is the correct answer is the time stated by Locke at which both these sources go into activity. "If it be demanded," says he, "when a man begins to have ideas, I think the true answer is, when he first has any sensation. For since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with sensation."

Again more explicitly in reference to these sources. "In time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 39.

new set of ideas, which I call ideas of reflection. These are the impressions which are made on our senses by outward objects that are extrinsical to the mind, and its own operations proceeding from powers intrinsical, and proper to itself, which when reflected on by itself, becoming also objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said, the original of all knowledge. Thus the first capacity of the human intellect is that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it; either through the senses by outward objects or by its own operations when it reflects on them."

Having ascertained the sources, Locke next busies himself about the ideas themselves, which, in their aggregate, constitute knowledge. These ideas are: 1. Simple. 2. Complex. The first are derived immediately from perception. So far as they are simple ideas of sensation, they are those impressed from without upon the understanding while it remains in a passive state, very much as the images of objects are represented in a mirror. But as thinking and willing are also objects of internal perception, we have also simple ideas of reflection."

Locke is quite ingenious in the manner of deriving ideas, thus:

"The idea of space is given us by sight and touch; it is resolved at bottom into that of body.[1]

"The idea of time comes from the reflection of the soul on the series of ideas which follow after each other.

"The idea of infinity, very obscure and purely negative, is resolved into the idea of number conceived as indefinitely repeated by the mind.

"The idea of personal identity from the union of memory and consciousness, a union in virtue of which we judge that such or such a past action was done by the same being who actually represents it himself.

"The ideas of cause and effect are derived both from sensation and from reflection; from sensation, inasmuch as they

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 40.

express a succession of phenomena, of which one constantly takes place after another; from reflection because the idea of power is principally furnished by the consciousness of our own internal activity or our will.

"The idea of right and wrong is radically nothing, but the idea of happiness or misery attached to the observance or infraction of a maxim proposed as a law, that is to say, to the idea of a reward or punishment."

The idea of substance was of very difficult explanation by Locke. He explains its origin by stating that we find both in sensation and reflection that a certain number of simple ideas seem often to be connected together. But as these ideas seem not to have been produced through themselves, we are accustomed to furnish them with a ground in some existing substratum, which we indicate by the word substance. Substance is, therefore, something to us entirely unknown, and is conceived of as possessing those qualities which are necessary to furnish us with simple ideas. We do not know what is the archetype of substance, and of substance itself we are acquainted only with its attributes.

In reference to complex ideas, Locke says, "that when the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure, new complex ideas." "But," he adds, "it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind not taken in by the ways aforementioned."

Locke next investigates the question which concerns the principle of knowledge, or the correspondence of ideas to things. But as language exerts a great influence in the formation of abstract ideas, and becomes the occasion of many errors,[1] he first treats of the relation of

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 41.

words to ideas, in order to discover the illusions of which words are the source, and comes then to the relation of ideas to things, or to knowledge.

Locke was here called upon to grapple with the problem of human knowledge, its reality, certainty, and limits; a problem which still lacks a satisfactory solution.

As to the nature of knowledge, whether it be objective or subjective, a knowledge appertaining to or inherent in the object, or existing only in the subject, or thinking being, he took a half way stand, thus accommodating both sides of the question. He taught that there were primary and secondary qualities in bodies, and that our ideas of the former are resemblances of what really exist in the bodies themselves, but that the ideas produced in us by secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. Thus, he says, "It is evident that the bulk, figure, and motion of several bodies about us, produce in us several sensations, as of colors, sounds, tastes, smells, pleasure and pain, etc. These mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with those ideas they produce in us—there being no conceivable connection between any impulse of any sort of body, and any perception of a color or smell which we find in our minds—we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience; and can reason about them no otherwise than as the effects produced by an infinitely wise agent, which perfectly surpass our comprehensions. * * * * The things that, as far as our observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law set them; but yet by a law that we know not, whereby, though causes work steadily, and effects constantly flow from them, yet their connections and dependencies being not discoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimental knowledge of them."

Even in regard to the reality of the primary qualities, he does not seem perfectly well assured, for he has taken the precaution to warn us "that so we may not think, as perhaps usually is done, that they (ideas) are exactly the

images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us than the names that stand for them are likenesses of our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us."

This taken in connection with his idea, or rather non-idea of substance, will justify the conclusion that according to Locke, we never perceive the intrinsic nature of things,[1] but only their outward manifestation and qualities. This was really an abandonment of metaphysics, as the metaphysics profess to be the knowledge of the substance of things.[2]

Locke even doubted the immateriality of the soul, as he says, "perhaps" it may be material.[3] "He inquires how our ideas can be representatives of finite spirits;[4] and as he cannot find in the ideas, as he has conceived them, the principle of such a representation, he concludes we can no more know by our ideas the existence of finite spirits, than we can know the existence of fairies by the ideas which we form of them."

And yet on the theological stand point, Locke has taken for his foundation the point which he had doubted in his psychology,[5] basing his proof of the existence of the deity, upon the thinking, that is, the spiritual nature of the human soul, and the existence of finite spirits. The argument is, "There are spirits; therefore, as their cause, there must be an eternal spirit, since the spiritual cannot proceed from the spiritless, the thinking from the unthinking. So that either there is no thinking being at all,[6] or a thinking being existed from all eternity." The existence of the supreme being could not be demonstrated upon the principles of Locke's philosophy.

It is important to understand the precise point reached by Locke as to the problem of human knowledge, with the

[1] *Fischer*, 443. [2] *Idem*, 444. [3] *Idem*, 445. [4] *History of Philosophy*, II, 42. [5] *Fischer*, 445. [6] *Idem*, 445.

view of connecting with him the skeptical and materialistic schools. He had arrived, as we have already seen, at the subjective nature of all human knowledge, with the single exception of asserting its objective nature as to the primary qualities of bodies, but at the same time admitting there could be no idea of substance. He seems however, to have assumed the entire subjectivity of knowledge, and grounded upon that, to have even advanced his outposts into a region beyond. "Since," says he, "the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them. Knowledge, then, seems to me nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any one of our ideas.

"* * * It is evident that the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with the things themselves?"

Thus is the problem stated by Locke, with a clearness that only renders more apparent the difficulty of its solution. The following is Locke's solution:

"There are," says he, "two sorts of ideas, the simple and the complex; or, to use more modern language, perceptions and conceptions. The first must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind,[1] in a natural way, and producing those perceptions, which, by the wisdom and will of our maker, they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us, really operating upon us; and so carry with them all the conformity which was intended, or which

[1] *Lewes*, 446.

our state requires; for they represent things to us under those appearances, which they are fitted to produce in us."

This, it will be perceived, rests altogether short of absolute certainty. His position is, that "ideas may be true for us, without being at all true when considered absolutely."

Thus we arrive at Locke's limits of the human understanding. It was as far as his own principles could carry him. He had attempted to physchologize experience, and this was the best he could do. He was in reality the philosopher of experience, and could not go beyond it. Arrived at its limit he sits down contentedly with the consoling reflection: "The candle that is set up within us shines bright enough for all our purposes."

The principles enfolded within the philosophy of Locke, and still more plainly perceptible in that of Hobbes, were not suffered to remain in obscurity. They were there, and must be developed in the world's thinking. We follow this thinking in two main currents, the one materialistic, the other skeptical. As before stated, the following is the form of its expression:



Outgrowths of the Baconian Philosophy—Materialism: Hartley Darwin, Condillac, Helvetius, Holbach, Cabanis, DeTracy. Skepticism: Berkeley.

David Hartley was born in Yorkshire, England, in 1705, and died in 1757. His is the philosophy of vibration, and

it constitutes probably the first attempt to explain psychological, or purely mental phenomena upon physiological principles.

He assigns the white medullary substance of the brain, spinal marrow, and nerves, as the immediate instrument of sensation and motion.[1] Then his position is that "external objects impressed upon the senses occasion, first in the nerves on which they are impressed, and then in the brain, vibrations of the small, or, as one may say, infinitesimal medullary particles. These vibrations are motions backwards and forwards, of the same kind as the oscillation of pendulums, and the tremblings of the particles of sounding bodies. They must be conceived to be exceedingly short and small, so as not to have the least efficacy to disturb or move the whole bodies of the nerves or brain. For that the nerves themselves should vibrate like musical strings is highly absurd."

The nervous ether penetrating the nerves, is the seat of these oscillations. The vibration theory makes sensation the result of a nervous oscillation. All this, however, is a mere hypothesis. But it lacks the quality that can alone render a hypothesis of any value, viz: it is wholly incapable of verification.

Erasmus Darwin was born at Elton, England, in 1731, and died in 1802. His theory in principle varied but little from Hartley's; for in the place of the vibrations of the latter he substitutes sensorial motions. By sensorium he means not only the medullary part of the brain, but also that living principle or spirit of animation,[2] which resides throughout the body without being cognizable to our senses, except by its effects. He terms the changes, which take place in the sensorium, sensorial motions.

The medullary substance, according to him passes along the nerves, and mingles with the muscular fibres. The or-

[1] *Lewes*, 509, 510. [2] *Idem*, 512.

gans of sense consist of moving fibres enveloped in the medullary substance. An idea is a contraction or motion, or configuration of the fibres, which constitute the immediate organ of sense. He subordinated all psychological phenomena to the laws of life.

But it was in France, the home of Descartes, that the materialistic tendencies contained in the philosophy of Locke were to receive their full development.

Etienne de Condillac was born at Grenoble in 1715, and died in 1780. He was at first a disciple of Locke, and in his first work lays down as a fundamental principle that "sensations and the operations of the mind are the materials of all our knowledge, materials which reflection sets in action by seeking their combinations and relations." [1]

But Locke had placed great stress upon the sensuous origin of our knowledge, and Condillac, in his subsequent reflections, was led to the conclusion not only that the senses were the origin of knowledge, but that their action, the sensations produced by them, constituted knowledge itself. He went so far as to find that not only all ideas, the elements and substance of every variety of knowledge,[2] but even all our faculties, those which constitute the mind, an ever living, acting organism, were nothing more than mere sensations, or derivatives direct from our sensual organs. Instead of mind, with certain, elementary faculties, he sets out with but one elementary faculty, that of sensibility, out of which all the faculties are evolved by the action of external objects on the senses. This was going a great way beyond Hobbes, who, although he maintained that there was nothing in the intellect, which had not before been in the sense, yet he could not dispense with faculties to gather up what was derived from the sense and clothe it with intellectual forms.

Condillac's reasoning on this subject is very curious.

[1] *Lewes*, 496. [2] *Idem*, 496.

"If," says he, "a multitude of sensations operate at the same time with the same degree of vivacity, or nearly so, man is then only an animal that feels; experience suffices to convince us, that then the multitude of impressions takes away all activity from the mind. But let only one sensation subsist,[1] or without entirely dismissing the others let us only diminish their force; the mind is at once occupied more particularly with the sensation which preserves its vivacity, and that sensation becomes attention, without its being necessary for us to suppose anything else in the mind. If a new sensation acquire greater vivacity than the former, it will become in its turn attention. But the greater the force which the former had, the deeper the impression made on us, and the longer it is preserved. Experience proves this. Our capacity of sensation is, therefore, divided into the sensation we have had, and the sensation we now have. We perceive them both at once, but we perceive them differently: the one seems as past, the other as present. The name of sensation designates the impression actually made upon our senses; and it takes that of memory when it presents itself to us as a sensation which has formerly been felt. Memory, therefore, is only the transformed sensation. When there is double attention there is comparison; for to be attentive to two ideas or to compare them, is the same thing. But we cannot compare them without perceiving some difference or some resemblance between them: to perceive such relations is to judge. The acts of comparing and judging are therefore only attention; it is thus that sensation becomes successively attention, comparison, judgment."

This is a specimen of the reasoning of Condillac the first great direct advocate of the materialistic school.

Claude Adrian Helvetius, born at Paris in 1715, the same year as Condillac; died in 1771, applied the sensualistic sys-

[1] *Lewes*, 498.

tem, now sunk into materialism, to the subject of morals. Assuming that Condillac had proved his doctrine, and that in the sphere of intelligence there is nothing but sensations, he proceeded to lay down the doctrine that there can therefore be in the sphere of the will nothing but pleasure and pain. This he attempted to prove by showing that the will can act only upon elements furnished by the intelligence, and claiming that sensations in their relation to the will are nothing more than pleasure or pain.

The system of Helvetius contains two orders of ideas.[1] One deduces from the principles of sensualism the morality of self-interest. This is a clear, logical deduction. The one naturally, if not necessarily, flows from the other.

The other order seeks to find in this morality of self-interest the foundation of duty, obligation and virtue. Here comes his great difficulty; to find in pure selfishness the root of principles that are unselfish and can only be expanded in an atmosphere free from every selfish taint. This was a task to which he proved incompetent. But if intelligence, with all its faculties, could be merged in sensation, it might reasonably be expected that duty, obligation and virtue could be found flowing from self-interest. Every philosophy, if accurately examined, will be found consistent in the principles it seeks to carry out.

Paul H. D. Baron Von Holbach, born in 1723, died in 1789, applied the principles of sensualism to a theory of the universe. This was done in a work attributed to him alone, or in conjunction with his associates, in a work entitled, the *System of Nature*. In this work it is asserted that there is nothing in the universe but matter and motion. That both these are inseparably connected together. All particular beings are nothing but the different combinations which motion produces in matter. The moving force grows out of attraction and repulsion, and all the

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 44.

different motions we behold are the product of these two; and out of, and by means of, all these vast varieties of motion, "arise the various connections, and the whole manifoldness of things." These principles of motion are eternal.

This moving force is developed in various degrees.[1] The first or lowest degree of it suffices for the production of unorganized bodies; the second, for bodies that are organized; and the highest, for those organized bodies that are possessed of sensibility, which is itself only the effect of a certain kind of organization. All human actions are the necessary result, either of the internal motion of the organization, or of those external motions by which they are modified.

Thought is only a modification of the brain. The mind of man is wholly material, because that which is not material can never act upon matter, can never set matter in motion, for there is no point of contact between the two.

There is no God other than the moving power, in matter. Any other is the product of fear, and the author of superstition. The true system of nature is atheistic.

As a natural, and even necessary, consequence of this system, all freedom is merged in necessity, and being terminates with life. Man is a blind instrument in the hands of necessity, as the universe itself is only an endless series of necessary motions, perpetuating themselves, and constantly expanding in every possible direction. The soul being only a modification of a substance, must of course cease with the cessation of the substance. To live in the memory of posterity is the only immortality.

Previous to the publication of the *System of Nature*, and even the birth of Von Holbach, as early as 1713, and which was continued to 1784, was published in France, the *Philosophical Encyclopædia*, by Diderot and d'Alembert, which more than any other, reflected the inner consciousness of

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 45.

the French people of that epoch.[1] Well seasoned with wit and sarcasm, and in the spirit of Voltaire, it "reasoned away law from the state, freedom from morality, and spirit and God from nature, though all this was done only in scattered, and, for the most part, timorous intimations."

The sensualistic philosophy, under the lowest form of materialism, ran quite through the eighteenth century in France, furnishing two of its representatives near the close of the century.

Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis was born at Cognac in 1757, and died in 1808. He sought to complete what Locke originally, and Condillac succeeding him, had left defective. Locke had shown the sensational origin of ideas; Condillac that all ideas and faculties were derived from, or mere modifications of sensation. It remained for Cabanis to investigate sensation itself, to physiologize materialism.

This he has done by referring sensation to the nervous system. He makes it depend on every impression made upon the extremities of any set of nerves, being followed by a reaction from the centre of the organ towards the extremities. Thus sensibility is made to unfold itself in two distinct stages.[2] In the second it reacts. In the first it flows back from the circumference to the centre. In the second it returns from the centre to the circumference. This action and reaction must both exist before the sentiment or impulse intended to be produced can take place. Thus, upon the principles before established in this school, all intellect, moral feelings, volitions, emotions, even mental faculties, were reducible to sensation. Now sensation itself was shown to be simply an affection of the nerves, so that man, and all the phenomena of possible production by him are all resolvable into nerves.

[1] *Schwegle*, 206, 207. [2] *History of Philosophy*, II, 214.

This theory had a wonderful simplicity. All that was required to be given was the nerves. Then an impression received, an action and reaction of the nerves, a sentiment or idea resulting, and the theory is complete.

The relations between the physical, and the moral and intellectual in man, were thus solved upon this theory, the intellectual and moral faculties are the effect, the physical nervous organization the cause. Idea or sentiment is at once the last term of the phenomena which constitute life, and the first of those which we attribute to mind.

He explained the great facility by which age, sex, temperament, climate, influence the intellectual and moral character of men, by insisting that they were only so many circumstances affecting the nervous system, and through that the sensibility, intelligence and will. Ascertain the causes acting upon the nerves, and the feelings that result from them, and all moral and intellectual phenomena are of easy explanation.

He also drew a parallel between the action of the stomach in digestion, and that of the brain in thinking. The impressions from without he called the food of the brain. Upon this, the properties of the brain react as the gastric juice of the stomach does upon its contents, and the result is that thought is secreted.

This should have been the last shot fired by materialism, as Cabanis occasionally discovers glimpses of higher principles, and before his death fairly awoke to the conviction that the soul is not a result of the organization, but is a distinct living force present in it.[1]

Count Destutt De Tracy, born in 1754 and publishing his *Elements of Idealogy* in 1801, is the metaphysician, as Cabanis was the physiologist, of the materialistic school.

All he has done is to explain more clearly, and to carry a little further the principles of Condillac. He held that

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 216.

the mind was nothing but sensibility, and this sensibility was succeptible of four sorts of impressions:

1. Those arising from the present action of objects upon the organs.

2. Those resulting from their past action, by means of a certain disposition which that action left upon the organs.

3. Those of things which have relations, and may be compared.

4. Those which spring from our wants, and lead us to seek satisfaction for them.

"Everything comes from the affection of the sensibility through impressions made upon the organs of sense. When the sensibility is affected by the first sort of impressions it feels simply.

When by the second, it repeats or recollects.[1]

When by the third, it feels relations or judges.

When by the fourth, it desires or wills.

Thus sensation, according to the nature of its objects, manifests itself respectively as pure perception, or memory, or judgment, or will. It is, therefore, the sole principle of all our faculties, and of all operations of the mind, since there is none of them which may not be reduced to one or the other of these forms of sensibility."

We have now, with one single exception, arrived at the ultimate limit of the sensualistic philosophy inaugurated by Bacon, developed morally, politically, and metaphysically by Hobbes and Locke, and materialistically by the French philosophers. That exception exists in the POSITIVISM of Comte, which, although closely allied to the sensualistic, yet we shall consider as a transition from the schools originated by the CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

It seems to have been the mission of the French mind, first to give birth to idealism, the rationalistic philosophy, in the person of Descartes; and then to push out into

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 217.

their ultimate results the principles involved in sensualism, until everything embraced in the materialistic philosophy was fully brought out and even ostentatiously displayed in all their startling proportions. To do this required the whole of the eighteenth century, and thus during three successive generations, France surrendered herself to the reign of materialism. During the most of this period there was no psychology, no mind, except what could be collected from the action of the organs of sense, no morality except what could be extracted from self-interest, no God, except the moving power in nature, and no immortality except the memory of men. All veneration for the supreme being, all reverence for the authority of law, all the deep feelings which could proceed only from the soul, had nearly died out from the Gallic heart. The moral bonds that bind man to the state, and connect man with man, and family with family, were materially loosened, if not destroyed.

The result must be told by history; for this voluntary self-abrogation of human prerogatives; this denial of a God in heaven and a man on earth, this sinking of the human into the mere animal nature, could not be suffered to pass unavenged. Nor did it. The revolution came, and the bitter fruits of materialism ripened into the reign of terror.

And yet the lesson was necessary, the principles legitimately embraced in sensualism must be fully developed and pushed into their ultimate results. This could be done only by surrendering up a people and a century to its philosophy.

We now turn to the other branch, the other current into which flows the course of thinking of sensualistic reflection, and here we encounter the SKEPTICISM of Berkeley.

George Berkeley was an Irishman, born in 1684, and died in 1753. His real position in philosophy has been

much of a puzzle, and given occasion for difference of opinion. He has very generally been ranked as an idealist, and hence belonging to the rationalistic, not the sensualistic school. But I think it can be shown quite clearly that he is to Locke, and the sensualistic school, what Hume is to Descartes and the rationalistic, and that he is therefore a link in the series that marks the transition to Hume, the most profound of the skeptics.[1] Berkeley's dialogues, in which his peculiar doctrines are developed, were directed against the skeptics, and he does not seem to be aware that within his own theory he was nursing the germ of a skepticism that was subsequently to receive a masterly development by his acute successor.[2]

Berkeley was a clergyman, and ultimately a bishop, and was probably shocked at the materialism towards which the sensualistic philosophy was so rapidly tending. But where could lie the error? Locke had fully demonstrated that "all our knowledge consists in ideas as the immediate objects of consciousness." His psychology was, therefore, unassailable. But the method of transition from the inward world of ideas to the outward world of things was the point upon which Berkeley fastened, and in which he supposed he had detected the error.

Locke had divided bodies into those possessing primary qualities, as extension, mobility, solidity, and those possessing secondary qualities as color, and admitted that in the latter there is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. That those, therefore, exist only in idea, are subjective. But as to the former, our inward ideas must necessarily imply some objective material existence,[3] which they resemble and by which they are originated. He supposed there must exist a substance which was really a mere figment of the mind, a substratum which served to unite the qualities or attributes, and in which they all inhered.

[1] *Fischer*, 454. [2] *Idem*, 462. [3] *Morell*, 141.

This inferred substance was attacked by Berkeley, who claimed that the same doctrine should apply to bodies with primary qualities, as to those with secondary, and that "all the qualities we perceive in bodies are but the powers to produce sensations in us;[1] and that it is we who attribute to the causes of these sensations a form analogous to their effects."

Berkeley asserted that as we cannot possibly get beyond our ideas, these ideas, and nothing else, must be the real objects of our knowledge.

His main positions were that the "objects of knowledge are ideas, and nothing but ideas. All human knowledge can only be the knowledge of ideas, and of nothing but ideas. Objects being identified with ideas, and we having no idea of an object but as it is perceived, the esse of objects to us is percepi."

Two questions only remain:

1. What did Berkeley doubt the existence of, and dispose of in getting rid of the material world?

2. What, in reality, were the ideas which his philosophy admitted the existence of?

In reference to the first, when Berkeley denied the existence of matter, it is clear that what he meant by matter was that unknown substratum, which existed as a mere inference of Locke, that fancy created noumenon, supposed to underlie all phenomena; that something in which all accidents might inhere. In reference to this he says: "It is a mere abstraction. It is unknown, unknowable; it is a figment, and I will none of it; for it is a figment, worse than useless; it is pernicious as the basis of all atheism. If by matter you understand that which is seen, felt, tasted, and touched, then I say matter exists:[2] I am as firm a believer in its existence as any one can be, and herein I agree with the vulgar. If, on the contrary, you understand by matter, that occult substratum

[1] *Lewes*, 444. [2] *Idem*, 463.

which is not seen, not felt, not tasted, that of which the senses do not, cannot, inform you, then I say I believe not in the existence of matter, and herein I differ from the philosophers and agree with the vulgar."

Again: "I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sensation or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hand, do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence I deny, is that which philosophers call matter, or corporeal substance.

As to the second question, he says: "I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception, which according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves."

And again: "That what I see, hear, and feel, doth exist, i. e., is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being; but I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof of anything which is not perceived by sense."

Hence it is obvious that what are called things in ordinary language, he calls ideas, or things in us, which, as such, are as real, and stand on as secure a basis as they do in the opinion of the unthinking, who fancy that nature is external to ourselves.[1]

We do not perceive things themselves, but only their copies in our minds; we only perceive our own impressions. This will be admitted by all. But most persons believe that the real things stand behind their impressions, and are the originals that are copied and reflected in our senses.[2] It is the belief in the originals of the copies, external to ourselves, which Berkeley seeks to destroy; and he does so by converting, as he styles it, ideas into things, that is, the copies themselves into the originals.

[1] *Fischer*, 460. [2] *Idem*, 460, 461.

In this view of the case, which is strongly sustained by the language of Berkeley, the conclusions of Dr. Fischer possess great force. "If," says he, "we would arrive at the sum total of Berkeley's philosophy,[1] it is deduced from the proposition that sensuous perceptions are things, which proposition is itself no more than the conclusion and final result of sensualism. If perceptions are things, it follows that all human knowledge is, in truth, empirical self-knowledge, that in all cases we only experience our own given state, and that thus all experience can merely be self-experience. Berkeley has done more than establish this fact. If knowledge altogether is more than experience, as Bacon has said; if all experience is no more than sensuous perception, as Locke has said; we must then conclude, with Berkeley, that we know nothing but our own impressions, that our impressions are the things themselves, and that, therefore, the knowledge of things, if we rightly investigate the matter, is no more than a knowledge of ourselves, or, more strictly speaking, experience of ourselves."

Thus whichever branch we take of the Baconian philosophy, we terminate alike in profound sensualism, the one materialistic, the other idealistic; the one merging the senses in matter, the other, mind in the senses.

And this philosophy, from its very nature, must be empirical, sensational. If all we get is derived from experience, if no idea or impression can enter the mind except through the avenue of sense, what possibility is there of arriving at any idea, even the faintest, of spiritual natures, or of any spiritual attributes? Further, how can there be, through the entire range of existences, any spiritual beings? And how can the supreme being, the spiritual source of all being, be apprehended? And if the senses are the only inlets of feeling, ideas, knowledge, what kind of existence is that which survives their total annihilation? It is a philosophy conditioned by sensation. The moral, intellec-

[1] *Fischer*, 467.

tual, spiritual part is shut up, and forever confined within the circle of the senses. This is the most favorable view of it. It is the philosophy of Locke. But this was far from reaching the limit. Its legitimate results must follow. This same part must become a mere modification of sensation, and thus constitute the materialism of the French philosophers; or it merges ideas in the senses, thus constituting the idealistic sensationalism of Berkeley.

Rationalistic Philosophy — Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza.

Having from the objective stand point traced sensualism, the empirical philosophy, through its various phases into its legitimate results, we now return to the first half of the seventeenth century to view the other great foundation of all philosophy, to contemplate IDEALISM erecting its *subjective stand point*, and from it, *developing the* RATIONALISTIC PHILOSOPHY. This had its origin in the mind of a Frenchman.

Rene Descartes (Cartesius) was born in Touraine, of Breton parents, in 1596, and died in 1650. Bacon was thirty-five years old at the birth of Descartes, and the latter had attained the age of thirty-six at the birth of Locke and Spinoza. It will be seen, therefore, that the great founders of the two philosophies were contemporaries.

It is well to bear in mind here at the outset that in passing from the philosophy of Bacon to that of Descartes, we are to visit a new philosophy, and one so entirely different from that almost contemporaneous in its origin, that it might, without violence, have belonged to a different planet. It was different in its stand point; in its method, in its processes, and in its objects.

The stand point of Bacon was the objective, the external world, all the facts and processes of nature. That of Descartes was the subjective, the mind, that living spiritual organism which observes and reasons.

The method of Bacon was the inductive. That of Descartes the deductive.

Bacon argued from effects to causes, from known to unknown. Descartes deduced effects from causes explaining phenomena by noumena.

They both cultivated physics, but for widely different purposes. The object of Bacon in its cultivation was to render it the basis of all the sciences, and to extend the dominion of man over nature. That of Descartes was to illustrate his own principles, and to enlarge man's knowledge of his own mind.

They both agreed in the separation of religion from philosophy, but they differed in this, that the former declared the problems of religion insoluble by reason, and beyond the pale of philosophy, while the former declared them soluble only by reason, and that it was the first object of philosophy to give them a solution. And yet both began by invoking substantially the same spirit, the skeptical. Bacon insisted on rejecting all the idols that had preoccupied the mind, upon commencing the work of indirection upon sound and accurately scientific principles.

Descartes would not only throw aside all idols but everything else except the thinking principle. He began by adopting the most sweeping skepticism. Every idea, every portion of the mental furniture, was successively detached and thrown away, until he reached the power that was at work in rejecting, and that alone remained. He doubted the truth and verity of everything until he arrived at the thing that doubted, and there he was obliged to stop. His object was to find a starting point from which to reason, a certainty that, under all circumstances, must be true and absolute, and that he found in his own consciousness. "Doubt as I may," says he, "I cannot doubt my own existence, because my very doubt reveals to me a something which doubts." Hence the "cogito, ergo sum," "I think, therefore I am," lies at the foundation of the Carte-

sian philosophy. This was purely psychological; and, although Locke commenced psychologically, yet he did not continue and close in the same manner. But Descartes preserved throughout the same principle. Thus, although the first may be styled the father, yet the second is the founder of modern psychology.

From this single proposition the whole nature of mind was determined. It would follow that if existence is identified with thinking and the one was only rendered possible and provable by the other; hence the characteristic of the mind must consist in thought. The mind can have no extension, figure, or other quality of body. Its sole element is the reason, intelligence, power of comprehension; its sole essence, thought.

He had now found himself in his consciousness, and that he could repose upon with certainty. But this alone would never carry him beyond himself. Was he the only being in the universe? Was there nothing external to his own thinking being?

Descartes travels from himself into the external world by means of consciousness. "Consciousness," said he, "is the basis of all knowledge; it is the ground of absolute certainty. Whatever it distinctly proclaims must be true. The process, then, is simple.[1] Examine your consciousness, and its clear replies. All clear ideas are true. Whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived is true."

Again, "we have no knowledge whatever of anything external to us except through the medium of ideas. Whatever we find in the ideas must necessarily be in the external things. It is only in our minds that we can seek whether things exist, or not. There cannot be more reality in an effect than in a cause. The external thing, being the cause of the idea, must therefore, possess as much reality as the idea, and vice versa. So that whatever we conceive as existent, exists."

[1] *Lewes*, 371.

As the reality, in fact the existence of things objective, is made dependent upon ideas, it becomes important to understand the rules for the detection of these ideas. He lays down for that purpose the four following rules:

1. Never to accept anything as true, but what is evidently so; to admit nothing but what so clearly and distinctly presents itself as true, that there can be no reason to doubt it.

2. To divide every question into as many separate questions as possible, that each part being more easily conceived, the whole may be more intelligible.

3. To conduct the examination with order, beginning by that of objects the most simple, and therefore the easiest to be known, and ascending little by little, up to knowledge of the most complex.

4. To make such exact calculations, and such circumspections, as to be confident that nothing essential has been omitted.[1]

Descartes appears to have had in view two great objects. The one, the establishment of absolute certitude. This he found in the consciousness of the thinking process; the other, the method by which this certitude could have all possible application.

To understand what may have guided him to his method, it is necessary to remark that he was a very distinguished mathematician.[2] At the age of twenty-three, he discovered the application of algebra to geometry. He supposed the mathematics to contain an immense capacity of application. He was deeply impressed with the certitude of the mathematics, and conceived the idea of applying mathematical reasoning to the subject of metaphysics. He imagined he discovered in them a certitude which would correspond to the certitude of consciousness; that while the first would afford the ground, the second would the method of the same certitude.

[1] *Lewes*, 372. [2] *Idem*, 372.

Hence the establishment of the deductive method of Descartes. The premises having been furnished, the conclusions must now result from the deduction of consequences,[1] and this he would apply as well to physics as to psychology; as he declares his intention "of giving a short account of the principal phenomena of the world, not with a view of using them as reasons to prove anything, for" he adds "we desire to deduce effects from causes, not causes from effects, but only in order that out of the innumerable effects which we learn to be capable of resulting from the causes, we may determine our minds to consider some rather than others."

And in accordance with this declaration he adopts, in his physics, a method which allows him to set aside the qualities and material forms of bodies, and to consider only the relations of number, figure and motion, thus recognizing in physics only mathematical problems, and thus resulting in giving the mathematical side of physics.

Descartes recognizes three kinds of ideas, the acquired, the self-originated, and the innate, comprehending under the term idea "all that can be in our thoughts." Among the innate he includes the idea of God,[2] mind, body, triangle, and generally all those which represent true, immutable and eternal essences. From the innate ideas of Descartes have grown the necessary truths of a more modern philosophy.

Thus Decartes clearly recognized the doctrine that we have ideas independent of experience, and this point of departure from the Baconian philosophy has for the most part been adhered to in speculative philosophy.

The idea of God is adduced by Descartes both as an argument to prove the existence of innate ideas and also as one of the fruits of that doctrine. He claims that we find within ourselves the idea of God. Whence comes the idea? Clearly not from ourselves. We have a concep-

[1] *Lewes*, 473. [2] *Idem*, 282.

tion of a nature higher than our own, and that conception could only come from him whose nature is actually more perfect. Again, we are finite. To the idea of God belongs the infinite. Such an idea could only be given us through or by a being actually infinite. It is an idea that could not be derived from sense, for it is one that could neither be added to nor diminished.

Again, the conception of God must arise from a sense of our own imperfection. The consciousness of existence is as a being imperfect, finite, in all respects conditioned. But consciousness also informs that this finite, limited, conditioned being is not the all. The very existence of finitude, imperfection, limitation, conditionality, necessarily imply their correlatives, infinitude, perfection, the unconditioned. Hence necessarily arises the idea of God. But, according to Descartes an idea in the consciousness implies the existence out of it of the thing of which it is the idea. His argument therefore, might be stated in the following syllogism:

"All that we clearly and distinctly conceive as contained in anything, is true of that thing.[1]

"Now we can conceive, clearly and distinctly, that the existence of God is contained in the idea we have of him. Therefore God exists." But it is obvious that error is intermingled with truth in all our ideas, and knowledge. What guaranty, therefore, have we that the being we conceive as perfect is really so? To answer this it is necessary to ask, whence comes error? To this he answers that it cannot come from the intelligence, as intelligence produces ideas; and no idea can be false,[2] because then the idea of a thing would not contain what it contained. Errors, therefore, do not proceed from the understanding. They proceed from the will, which being more extensive than the understanding, is not restrained within the same limits, but is extended to things beyond it, and hence is productive of errors.

[1] *Lewes*, 376. [2] *History of Philosophy*, II, 53.

Having found in consciousness, self and God, the creator, a perfect being unmingled with error, because proceeding from the intelligence, Descartes has found a road to the creation. Still, his creator, being a creature of his own conceptions, could put forth no other powers, and produce no other results than such as he could make objects of conception. Thus he was driven back to consciousness as a revealer of creation. But he finds it adequate to the task.

He finds in his consciousness two sorts of ideas: the one of thought, the other of extension, and to one of these two categories belong all human ideas. The world then comprehends two classes of beings, each possessed of different natures, spirits and bodies. The peculiar and exclusive characteristic of the first was thought; that of the second, extension. This was the fundamental principle lying at the bottom of all his theories, which naturally fell into two divisions, the philosophy of spirits, and the philosophy of bodies.

Descartes appears to have been aware of the difficulties, that have so strongly pressed themselves upon other minds arising from passing the limits of consciousness, and hence of arriving at the understanding of bodies. He therefore seeks to fortify, or rather ground, his position that "whatever we find in the ideas must necessarily be in the external things," upon confidence in God. We find in our minds the conviction of this identity of minds and things. An all wise and all perfect being would not have planted such a conviction there unless it was an absolute verity. We have therefore his guaranty of its truth, and although, therefore, the knowledge of bodies must rest upon belief, and that of spirits upon conception, yet we can be equally as well assured of the truth of the one as of the other.

His theories of spirits and bodies were correlative. To spirits belong thought, which is essential; and will, which is thought in motion.[1] To bodies belong extension,

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 56.

which is essential, and motion produced in it. Physical philosophy is, then, and radically, the theory both of the immutable properties of extension and of the changeable properties which depend upon motion. Hence all explanations of material phenomena ought to flow from mechanics, and rest on the basis of mathematics. Making in this way the universe a purely mechanical one, Decartes's philosophy, alike with that of Bacon's, shut out entirely the consideration of final causes.

Descartes gave a mighty extension to the mechanical or natural philosophy. He included within it, all phenomena not purely psychological. From the inorganic universe he banished space, because the essence of substance, or bodies, being extension, wherever there is extension, there must necessarily be substance; and hence space is an impossibility. He rejected the idea of atoms, and held to the infinite divisibility of matter, and along with this, to its unlimited extension. Out of extension and vacuum, and some other mechanical principles, he deduced his theory of vortexes to account for planetary motions; a theory which disappeared soon after the discovery of gravitation.

He brought the organic universe also under the principles of the mechanical philosophy. Animals are only automata,[1] all their movements being referable to the laws of motion. He also brought the organic life of man under the same principles, allowing the sensations and passions their seat in the spiritual principle, but referring their physical causes to the general theory of mechanics.

There are, at least, two difficulties discoverable in the philosophy of Descartes; the one growing out of an assumption of his; the other, an unavoidable conclusion from his own premises. The assumption is that before alluded to, that "whatever we find in the ideas, must necessarily be in the external things. This he grounds upon two reasons:

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 57, 58.

1. The evidence of consciousness.
2. The guaranty of God.

In regard to the first, consciousness furnishes no evidence whatever as to the reality of external things. It can only furnish evidence of the state and condition of our own thinking being. The shining of the sun is no part of our consciousness. No part of the external world at all enters into it. It lies wholly outside of it.

The guaranty of God is by a being of our own conception, and of his existence we can no more be conscious than of that of the external world. The guaranty therefore falls with the ability of the guarantor.

As to the other, the conclusion, that arises out of the distinctness and entirely separate nature of his two philosophies. If body is essentially extension, and mind essentially thought, and the two have nothing in common with each other, then this dualistic relation between body and mind must extend to body and soul, and the union between them can be conceived only as a mechanical one. Each is an independent factor, distinct from and even opposed to the other, their only union can be a powerful bringing of the two together. Being distinct, independent, and even opposed, they cannot interpenetrate each other, but can touch only at one point when they are thus brought together. This point of contact, this seat of the soul, is, according to Descartes, the pineal gland, a little kernel near the middle of the brain.[1] He selected this for the reason, that the other parts of the brain are two-fold, and if the soul had its seat in any of them all objects would appear double. As this gland appeared a unit in its construction, Descartes assigned to it the seat of the soul, the place where all our thinking is performed.

Nicolas Malebranche was born at Paris, in 1638, and died in 1715. We can only here consider him as a link in

[1] *Schwegle*, 178.

the chain of development of the Cartesian philosophy. He starts with the Cartesian view of the relation between mind and matter, regarding the two as separate, distinct, and opposed to each other. He then asked the same question, which Descartes had attempted to answer, viz: how, if there be this perfect distinctness and opposition, nothing existing between them in common, can the mind travel out of, or beyond itself, and make any acquaintance with matter? It can certainly neither gain any knowledge of external things from itself, nor from the things themselves. Not from itself because it cannot idealize, cannot overcome the opposition existing between it and external things. Not from external things, because they, composed of matter, are antithetic to mind, and absolutely unintelligible. There is no power, therefore, in either to act or react upon the other. But there is a power superior to both, and to which neither has any opposition. That power is God, absolute substance, absolute ideality, the infinite power to spiritualize all things. In him are all things spiritually and ideally. The whole world, as intellectual or ideal, is God. His doctrine is, that "it is in and through the divinity that we apprehend all things,[1] which are comprehended intellectually in his essence; that the divinity is the intellectual world; infinite and universal reason, and the abode of spirits. By the doctrine of occasionalism he was further led to assign to the soul and body a sort of passive activity, and to represent the deity as the original cause of all their operations.

Thus to overcome the dualism bequeathed to philosophy by Descartes, Malebranche identified the entire ideal or intellectual world with God, and when reminded that if we see the archetypes of all things in God,[2] there was no need of a material world, and why, therefore, should its existence be assumed? He replied by referring to that statement in revelation, that "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."

[1] *Tenneman*, 880. [2] *Morell*, 128.

The same year, 1632, that witnessed the birth of John Locke, was also signalized by the birth of Baruch or Benedict Spinoza, who was a Jew, born at Amsterdam, and died in 1677.

Spinoza, like Malebranche, began with Descartes. As the materialistic school, and, when rightly understood, the Berkelian also, were only the strict and logical developments of the Baconian philosophy; so also were the systems of Malebranche and Spinoza, that of the Cartesian. It required the full development of both these philosophies to prepare the way for the skepticism of Hume.

Descartes had derived everything from one principle, that of perfection in the great cause. He had left a fatal dualism with spirit and its thought, and body with its extension, standing over against, and in opposition to each other, with the equivocal term substance equally belonging to both, the one being a thinking, the other an extension substance. Spinoza claimed that perfection, thought and extension were nothing more than attributes and that the substance in which they inhered was one, was absolute existence.

Descartes entertained the idea that the mathematical method might be applied to metaphysics. Spinoza actually made the application, and his system presents itself as the result of this method thus applied. As geometry has its definitions, axioms, propositions and scholia, so has the system of Spinoza.

This system rests upon three fundamental conceptions, from which, granting the truth of his definitions, axioms and propositions, it is deduced with mathematical certainty. These conceptions are substance, attribute, and mode.

Substance he defines to be "that which exists in itself, and is conceived per se, the conception of which does not require the conception of anything else antecedent to it." Descartes had defined it to be "that which needs nothing else in order to its existence." Thus Spinoza starts from Descartes.

Atribute, he defines to be "that which the mind perceives as constituting the very essence of substance."

By modes, he understands "the accidents of substance; or that which is in something else, through which also it is conceived." [1]

By God, he understands "a being absolutely infinite; i. e., the substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an infinite and eternal essence."

By being free, he understands "that which exists by the sole necessity of its nature, and by itself alone is determined to action. And that is necessary or constrained, which owes its existence to another, and acts according to certain and determinate causes."

By a thing which is its own cause, he understands a thing, "the essence of which involves existence, or the nature of which can only be considered as existent."

Specimens of axioms: "Everything which is, is in itself, or in some other thing." "That which cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through itself." "The knowledge of an effect depends on the knowledge of the cause, and implies it." "Things that have nothing in common with each other, cannot be understood by means of each other." "A true idea must agree with its object."

Specimens of propositions: "Substance is prior in nature to its accidents." "Two substances having different attributes, have nothing in common with each other." "Of things which have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other." "If they have nothing in common, they cannot be conceived by means of each other." "Things are distinguished among themselves, either through the diversity of their attributes, or through the diversity of their modes." "It is impossible that there should be two or more substances of the same nature, or of the same attributes. "One substance cannot be created

[1] *Lewes*, 398.

by another substance." "It pertains to the nature of substance to exist." "All substance is necessarily infinite."

Spinoza's doctrine is derived from his definitions, axioms and propositions. He held to one infinite substance, and that he called God.[1] Whatever is, is God; and without him nothing can be conceived. He is the sole substance, the universal being, of which all things are the manifestations. This god is the god of the pantheist, and his nature should be fully understood.

1. He is free, for there is nothing to limit his power. But to this freedom there is no volition, no act of self-willing. It consists only in eternally unfolding his own essential being, without obstruction or restraint.

2. He has infinite extension, and yet that implies nothing material. It is rather pure abstract extension. A power in posse, and not necessarily carried out into act.

3. God is eternally thinking, and yet without ideas, without the flow of consciousness, without understanding in its ordinary meaning. Again, as he unites in himself both subject and object, the being thinking and thought upon, his only object of contemplation can be himself.

4. He is not a creating god, but he is being itself, an unchangeable essence, underlying all phenomena. As being, and the subject of necessary development, he has attributes; and these attributes are two in number and both infinite, as they are only modifications of the same infinite substance. These attributes are infinite thought and infinite extension. These attributes involve an infinite number of finite determinations, and these determinations constitute the phenomenal world.

Thus the god of Spinoza is exhibited under two aspects:

1. As the eternal substance, the natura naturans, the absolute, containing all things potentially in his own infinite nature.[2]

[1] *Lewes*, 404. [2] *Morell*, 127.

2. As this same substance in actual development, the natura naturata, absolute being, expanding itself into an infinite number of finite determinations, embracing all the modifications of thought and extension which the universe presents. Thus everything is a mode of God's attribute of extension; every thought, of his attribute of thought.

Thus body and soul are one and the same thing, only viewed under different attributes. Mind is the same as body, only being viewed under the attribute of thought, it is regarded as mind.[1] That which in one point of view is bodily motion, in another is an act of thought. Between the world of bodily things and that of ideas, reigns the most perfect parallelism.

But while body and soul are regarded as different attributes of the same substance,[2] individual beings are comprehended under the conception of accidents or modes, these latter being only the changing forms of substance. The finite has no existence as such, only as a mode of the infinite. And yet substance is not regarded as being made up of modes.

Spinoza reckons two ways of knowledge: the imagination, and the reason. To the former belong experience, and all that is abstract, superficial, and confused.[3] To the latter, the collection of all fitting ideas. The former isolates and individualizes, while the latter comprehends things in their unity. Hence mere accidents or modes are viewed by the former as things, by the latter simply as modes of the one eternal substance.

The morals and politics of Spinoza flowed directly from his metaphysics, and were in harmony with his general system. There could obviously, upon his principle, be no such thing as free will, as man is only a mode, and hence, like every other, a link in the chain of causes eternally conditioning each other. Good and evil are not qualities in the things themselves, but only express

[1] *Schwegle*, 188. [2] *Idem*, 189. [3] *Idem*, 189.

relative conceptions formed from a comparison of things with each other.[1]

As the absolute being, the god of Spinoza can exercise no volition, he can give birth to no law; and hence, in no moral sense, can there be such a thing as evil or sin. Hence Spinoza defines good to be that which is useful to us; and evil that which hinders us from partaking of a good. Again, "that is only useful to us which aids us in knowing, as our true being is knowledge."

In politics he maintained that everything which is commonly designated by the name of rights is reduced to the notion of force,[2] and that justice relatively to each being, can be conceived only as the measure of his power. As all idea of volition, of free will, of law, is utterly excluded from his system, it would necessarily follow that right could be the only correlate of power, and could never be really violated except by a deficiency of might. This would lead to the inevitable result, the only one his system could tolerate, viz: the object of all government is the exercise of force, and all law is limitation.

Thus we have the extremes of sensualism and idealism; the one represented by Hobbes, the other by Spinoza, meeting in their politics, each being results of their different systems.[3] The first sets out from the diversity of human individuals as naturally hostile, the second from their absolute identity. The first excludes from his social theory all notion of the infinite element, the ground of the principle of moral obligation; the second, all notion of finite beings, subjects of these obligations. The result was that both were compelled by their respective systems to construct the politics of force, which in the system of Hobbes culminated in pure despotism; in that of Spinoza, in pure anarchy.

The way was now thoroughly prepared for Hume. The Baconian philosophy had achieved its two possible limits,

[1] *Schwegle*, 190. [2] *History of Philosophy*, II, 76. [3] *Idem*, 76.

materialism, and idealistic sensualism. The Cartesian had also reached its two limits, that of seeing all things in God, and that of seeing God in all things. Both were idealistic limits,[1] for Spinoza expressly teaches that the subjective idea is the actual image or complete expression of the objective fact; that the order and connection of ideas is precisely the order and connection of things. The one, therefore, having buried itself in realism, and the other in idealism, we must invoke the skepticism of Hume to erect their monuments.

Skepticism — Hume. Monadology — Leibnitz.

David Hume was a Scotchman, born at Edinburgh in 1711, and died in 1776. He followed in the wake of Berkeley and was the precursor of Kant. His connection with idealism is twofold: 1. In the method of philosophizing, viz: by deduction. 2. In the abolition of that *ego* out of which arises the subjective stand point of its philosophy.

His connection with sensualism is also twofold: 1. In his starting point, and in his derivation from it all there is of the positive in his philosophy, all except his negations. 8. In the abolition of that material universe, out of which arises the objective stand point of its philosophy.

According to Hume, all our representations are either sensuous impressions or their copies. Their only distinction is in degree, according as they are stronger or weaker, more or less lively.[2] Those existing in the strongest degree, being the liveliest, are the impressions themselves; the weaker are the thoughts or ideas. The impressions are the originals, the ideas are the copies, and the latter, without exception, are deduced from the former. There is no idea that did originate from an impression, and hence the idea must be related to the impression as the copy to the original. The explanation of the idea, therefore, con-

[1] *Lewes*, 411. [2] *Fischer*, 469.

sists in showing its impression, as our impressions are the originals of all our representations. Thus, according to Hume, the whole fabric of knowledge is to be built out of impressions and ideas, and no idea is to be received that cannot be traced to an impression.

This constituted the positive, the dogmatic portion of his philosophy, at least according to his own view of it, and in this respect he appears as the systematizer of experience. But only grant to him the truth of what he thus posits with so much apparent plausibility. His deductions will lead logically to the annihilation of the material universe; of the thinking subject; of the relation of cause and effect, and through that, of all knowledge.

He found the material world already annihilated. That had been the mission of Berkeley. It also followed as a clear deduction from his own positions. There is nothing existing but impressions and ideas, the latter being derived from, and copies of the former. The material universe, if it exist at all, must lie behind the impressions, and must furnish the originals of which the latter must be copies. Of the existence of these there is not a particle of proof. But supposing there are, by possibility, such originals, a knowledge of them would only become possible, if clear impressions of them existed in ourselves.[1] But how can we know this? We can only know it by means of an impression, and there is none that decides on the clearness of an impression, or the relation between an impression and a thing. There is, therefore, no criterion which can secure the objectivity of our ideas. If, therefore, there be any knowledge, its objects are only ideas, which themselves are nothing but copies of impressions. Thus we only comprehend our impressions, not the objective nature of things. There can, therefore, be no objective knowledge.

This was the sensualistic phase of his reasoning. But the rationalistic was substantially of the same character,

[1] *Fischer*, 470.

and resulted in the negation of the thinking subject. Of that subject there could be no impression, and hence no idea. All that we have any experience of, is impressions and ideas."[1] The substance of which these are supposed to be impressions, is a mere inference. The substance in which these impressions are supposed to be, is a mere inference. Matter is but a collection of impressions. Mind is but a succession of impressions and ideas." In accordance with this doctrine, philosophy has thus written the epitaph inscribed upon the tomb of Hume:

> Beneath this round idea vulgarly called tomb,
> Rest the ideas and impressions that constituted Hume.

But there was still another deduction, which he made from his positions, which constitutes his theory of causation. In accordance with his system, he asks what is the impression of which the idea of causality is a copy? He claims that every impression is a fact that we perceive, but that the connection between facts we do not perceive. There is no impression the copy of which could be the idea of causality. We have no other experience of causation than simply that of a constant succession. We have an antecedent and a consequent, and that is all. We do, indeed, attribute to the antecedent a power of causing the consequent, but we have no experience, no idea of such a power. We can never perceive any quality that binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence to the other. We only find that the one does in fact follow the other. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects. Consequently there is not, in any single instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection.

[1] *Lewes*, 481.

Bacon placed all knowledge in the knowledge of causes, and it is quite obvious that therein is garnered up all empirical knowledge. We are driven to this dilemma by Hume, viz: either to give up as impossible, and regard as utterly incomprehensible, all our empirical knowledge together with causality, or we must deduce this idea from an impression. But this impression is nowhere given.

But our belief in the existence of the power is admitted by Hume. What then is the foundation of that belief? It is custom, habit. And thus Hume solves the problem of knowledge.[1] All human knowledge is either demonstrative, as in the case of mathematics, or empirical. All empirical knowledge consists in the causal connection of facts. The idea of causalty is founded on a belief, this belief upon a feeling, this feeling upon a habit, which itself consists in nothing else than an oft repeated experience. Consequently, there is no knowledge that is objective and necessary. Thus beyond experience there can be no knowledge whatever, and within experience it is limited by custom and habit. And these latter can never prove. They only induce belief. They are the basis of all human thought and action. Hence Hume calls custom "the great guide of human life." What Schiller puts into the mouth of Wallenstein very clearly, in this respect, expresses the philosophy of Hume:

> What we have most to dread
> Is common place, perpetual yesterday,
> That ever warning, ever still returns;
> Potent to-morrow, through its force to-day,
> For man of common places is compact,
> And to his nurse the name of custom gives.

Hume's philosophy had, however, at least one positive result; a result that did not consist in negation. By thus giving effect to the force of custom, he renders man a

[1] *Fischer*, 478.

creature of history. What Wallenstein is again made to say:

> There is a sanctifying power in years
> What age has rendered gray, appears divine.

He therefore attacks the "social contract" doctrine propounded by Hobbes and Rousseau, as the foundation of society and government. Such a contract, according to Hume, is opposed to all historical experience and possibility. In order to have any validity, it must presuppose a human community, or some form of existence similar to a state.[1] Before men could have been united by an express contract they must already have been united by necessity. Hence in the place of a contract Hume puts custom.

It has been shown by Dr. Fischer that in regard to the matter of custom Hume reasoned in a circle. "How," he asks, "did Hume explain experience? By the idea of causality,[2] which connects our impressions. And how how did he explain this idea? By custom. And how this? By oft repeated experience. Thus Hume explains experience by experience. He presupposes what he has to explain. He therefore thinks dogmatically, and commits the very fault which the skeptics of antiquity had remarked in the dogmatic philosophers."

Whatever there is of the positive in Hume's philosophy flows from his negations. In politics, as we have already seen, he would ground everything upon custom. He is an enemy to all revolutions, as they come to a direct rupture with custom. All forms of government rest upon usage. Even hoary abuses are sanctioned by custom. Hence he was consistently a tory in politics.

His moral philosophy bears traces of the same origin. There being in the universe nothing but impressions and ideas, would exclude the existence of a God. Besides, the only possible method and that of very doubtful success by

[1] *Fischer*, 486. [2] *Idem*, 494.

which the empirical philosophy can claim to prove the existence of a supreme being, is by carrying out his system of inductive reasoning, and thus arriving at God as the last generalization of cause. But Hume denies the existence of any cause in the sense in which it is used in the empirical philosophy, viz: as a power in one thing or being to produce another. Thus the existence of God is effectually negatived.

Nor is the doctrine of immortality less effectually disposed of. As there is nothing existing but impressions and ideas, what is termed the soul, or spiritual part, must be made up of them entirely. But all these are evanescent. They fade away and disappear. They come and go in succession, and hence there can be no such thing as immortality.

The negation of God, and immortality, and the limitation of all existence to impressions and ideas, necessarily destroys all high moral sources, and dwarfs morality itself, to that which is little, if at all, elevated above mere expediency. As man's entire being is limited necessarily within the sphere of sensations,[1] he can have no other reasonable motive of action, than the notion of his own personal interest; and, as the idea of virtue implies something distinct from selfishness, it can have no principle in the intelligence. Virtue can proceed only from a sentiment destitute of all rational motive, and which Hume considers analogous to taste. But even this sentiment, on his system, can have no foundation which the reason can conceive, and hence, the only resource here, is skepticism.

As to free will, as a moral element, going to experience, we feel very clearly that we will, but we feel nothing further. Internal experience, which establishes the fact of

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 47.

volition, can teach us nothing in regard to the origin of the fact which is attributed to a free power.

There is another objection to freedom of will which can be urged by the sensualistic philosophy, but not by Hume, viz: that the notion of freedom itself is contradictory in this, that a free choice is not possible without motives; and every determining motive, is, in the last analysis, only a stronger sensation, which necessarily constrains the will. As this will be perceived to include the idea of cause, of efficient power to produce, it cannot, of course, be available to Hume.

The system of Hume brings us to the termination of one great cycle in the history of philosophy. It lasts from about the beginning of the seventeenth, to near the middle of the eighteenth century. During this period, sensualism, from its objective stand point, and with its inductive method, had marched onward, giving origin, efficiency, and reliability, to the physical sciences; sowing its pathway with evidences of man's achievements in overcoming the obstacles interposed by nature, by the subdued powers and agencies which nature herself afforded; until, in one extreme it merged psychology in physiology, mind in matter, ending in a pure and imbruted materialism; while in the other, it shook off the material world, and sought a refuge in idealistic sensation.

On the other side, idealism from its subjective stand point, and with its deductive method, had also marched onward, exhibiting as its trophies, the mathematics greatly enlarged, improved, and rendered susceptible of new applications, and a deductive logic in exercise clear, vigorous and conclusive; until mind, unable to lean on matter, had wandered away into the depths of pantheism, and finally found its grave in the skepticism of Hume. Thus these two great systems had each accomplished its destined work, and they had been enabled to do so by working separately and independent of each other. Neither had accomplished

anything in the way of self-explanation. Each had ran its cycle of effort, and ended either as it began, or worse. The riddle had only become deeper and more inexplicable, with all the attempts to explain it. But while each line of effort was thus barren and unproductive in its own self-explication, its outcrops were everywhere fruitful, and everywhere furnishing evidence of progress. The sciences, both physical and exact, or mathematical, had taken their points of departure from each line of march, opening up long vistas to the delighted vision, and furnishing unfailing supplies to human civilization. Thus, again, as in the cycle that closed the irregular and more unsystematic efforts at thinking of the middle ages, we find in the bare efforts of philosophy at self-explication, nothing but a scaffolding, upon and by means of which, other, and enduring structures, have been reared. While the structures are received, the scaffolding is knocked away, and consigned to oblivion.

It is easy now in the light of history to detect the reason why each one of these systems has accomplished so little for itself. It was because each adopted, and throughout adhered to, its own principle, stand point and method; claiming its sufficiency to explain itself and everything else. But each principle, stand point, and method, although containing the truth, yet did not contain all the truth, and hence when put forward as containing all, became error. Thus each being in point of fact, narrow, partial, and one-sided, but at the same time claiming to be broad, entire, and complete, in its expositions, failed as a necessary consequence.

Again, between each there was at the commencement, and continued through the entire course, to be a fatal dualism. They were entirely unlike and opposite in principle, stand point, and method, and neither contained within itself any resources by which to pass over and include the other. As there is confessedly truth in each, but that only partial, limited, one-sided; and as each when fully

carried out, and having all its interior principles developed, ends where it began and accomplishes nothing for itself, it is obvious that the line of effort must be changed in order to its becoming productive.

And that line of effort is accordingly changed. Hitherto we have witnessed sensualism and idealism, each with its separate and independent lines of effort, working out in its own way its results, and ending where it began. Each now having all its principles brought out and fully developed, what now remains is to reconcile each with the other, and to construct a philosophy of such breadth and comprehensiveness, as to embrace and include all the true and living principles in each, in such a manner as that each principle shall have assigned its appropriate place, and all shall, in the end interpenetrate, coalesce, and harmonize with each other. Such is hereafter to be the line of effort, and the completion of some future cycle in the history of philosophy will, it is to be hoped, witness its accomplishment.

Even the mind of the great Lord Bacon reached forward and anticipated these different philosophies. He saw clearly the error both of the pure sensualists and the pure rationalists, and thus characterizes them by a happy comparison. The empirics, who derive everything from sensation, he compares to the ant, which, by an ever busy industry employs itself in heaping up and using what it finds. These are the philosophers who never rise above what they receive through sense. The rationalists he compares to the spider, which, resorting to nothing exterior to itself, spins its web out of its own bowels. These are the philosophers who deal in à prioris, who ignore facts and experiences, and resort to the pure reason alone. The true philosophers he compares to the bee, which gathers material from all flowers, and by a power within itself, changes its character, and converts it into honey.

The line of effort just referred to has been hitherto developing itself in three different directions; and has en-

listed in its prosecution three orders of mind, three different nationalities. These are the German, Scottish, and French. The German gives us monadology and the critical philosophy; the Scottish, the school of common sense; and the French, the eclectic.

Of these the first in order is the monadology of Leibnitz, and as this precedes the skepticism of Hume, it will be proper to give it the first consideration, following it up with the Scottish, German, and French schools, or systems of philosophy.

Gottfried William Leibnitz was born at Leipsic in 1646, and died in 1716. He was the contemporary of Locke, Malebranche and Spinoza, immediately succeeding Bacon and Descartes. His life was, therefore, cast in a period when the elements both of the sensualistic, and idealistic systems of philosophy were in state of intense activity, but previously to their final results being worked out in the materialistic schools of France, and the skepticism of Berkeley and Hume. But at this early period he conceived the idea of a broader and more complete philosophy which should unite and harmonize the two systems. In the order of time he is the first great German philosopher, possessing a mind of vast capacity, and whose thoughts have largely influenced all subsequent thinking.

Leibnitz entirely differed from Locke in his position that there is nothing in the understanding which did not first pass through the senses, claiming that there was the understanding itself, the innate faculty of forming ideas, and also necessary truths both in mathematics and philosophy,[1] that were never derived from experience; and that these were the primary sources or elements of human knowledge.

He also differed from Descartes principally in this, that the former had limited himself to giving extension as the

[1] *Morell*, 147.

only essential quality of bodies, assuming that the natural state of bodies was that of repose, and that motion came not from the activity of any internal principle, but from forces acting without. The great principle of Leibnitz, on the contrary, and that which lay at the foundation of all his philosophy,[1] was that "one substance cannot receive from any other the power of acting, but that the whole force is preexistent in itself."

Setting out from the necessary laws of the understanding, he claimed that all philosophical truth must arise from the analysis of the primary ideas they involve, and that the pure à priori conceptions of the reason are the only ideas which are adequate to the full expression of the objective reality to which they answer. The ideas derived through the senses are contingent, limited, confused, and inadequate. To distinguish those of the pure reason from those of the senses he proposed, as a test of the former, the principle of identity and contradiction, and of the later, that of sufficient reason. By the first, he proposed to test all those ideas which arise from the necessary laws of thought; and by the last, everything relating to the contingencies of life. He means by it the determination of what has the most perfect adaptation to bring about the best results, and then judge of everything by its final cause.

Leibnitz was a great mathematician, and investigated the possibility of a universal language, which might represent the discoveries in art and science in much the same way that arithmetical and algebraic signs express the proportions of numbers. His speculations in philosophy are principally embraced in his monadology, his preestablished harmony, and his optimism.

MONADOLOGY, the doctrine of monads, was at its foundation, an hypothesis, but unfortunately one not susceptible

[1] *Morell*, 147.

of verification. The object of its author was to account, by means of it, for the actual phenomena of the universe. Descartes had given to matter the property of extension, and considered all motion as communicated, as, therefore, coming from without, and hence making the universe itself one great mechanism, and its movements governed by mechanical laws. Leibnitz evoked a force from within, and governed its movements upon dynamical principles. Hence the origin of the monad.

The monad was a simple being, indivisible, unextended, immaterial, and hence not exposed to any influences from without, and being indissoluble, can never perish. Inasmuch as movements do take place perpetually, the force must come from within, and hence the law that "all monads must contain an inward energy, by virtue of which they develop themselves spontaneously."

The monads are not all alike,[1] but each possesses its own inward attributes, by virtue of which its own particular being is developed. Those which compose material objects are in a state of stupor, arising from an undeveloped power of perception. Others are possessed of a less or greater power of perception and consciousness, indistinct in animals, but distinct in the souls of men. God is the one absolute, original monad, giving origin to all the others, and whose existence we are, by the laws of our being, necessitated to admit.

No one monad exerts any specific influence upon another, and each one is so constructed as to imply multiplicity in unity.[2] All come under the law of change, and each monad, to be subject to this law, must contain within itself a plurality of susceptibilities, modifications, and relations. Each, therefore, is a microcosm, a living image of the whole universe. Its internal principle of force is susceptible of indefinite development and variation. As it is

[1] *Morell*, 149. [2] *History of Philosophy*, II, 84, 85.

not composed of parts, such variation is unlimited. So, also, as it is simple, its development is without a limit. It therefore, must contain within itself the capacity of all modes of possible being, and hence is itself a representative of the whole universe.

Thus far in the doctrine of the monads, it is obvious that there is no union between the subjective and objective. We have not yet passed beyond the limits of the subjective. Our path from the subjective to the objective is through the absolute, original monad, God.

God is a being whose logical possibility implies his actual existence. He is the prime monad, the unity of unities,[1] and all the others are produced by his perpetual flashings, as of lightning, and which have no other limitation than the receptivity of creatures. The same thing that exists in created monads, exists without limits in the uncreated monad. As there exists in monads a force which is the foundation of all their activities, so there exists in the supreme monad a power which is the source of all things. As there is in each monad inward attributes, a schema which determines their own peculiar character, so there is in the supreme monad a schema of ideas. And as there is in each monad an internal appetency which makes it pass from one state to another, tending to its greatest good, so in the supreme monad is there a good will which is moved by the motive of the greatest good.

This hypothesis of monads enabled Leibnitz to find in the universe the most complete unity with the most extended variety.[2] As the evolutions of each monad were adapted to those of all the others, the most perfect unity would be the necessary result. But each monad, at the same time, by its own internal constitution, reflects, in its own point of view, the whole universe, there results the greatest possible variety. The universe, though essentially

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 89. [2] *Idem*, 92.

one, is thus multiplied by the different points of view furnished by the innumerable monads. Thus, as a consequence of this, on the one hand everything is animated, since nothing exists but monads, whose very essence is activity. On the other hand, each monad, being in itself the representative of all nature, is constantly modified by its internal activity, as if it received the echo of everything that passes in the universe to the farthest limits of creation.

But there was still a difficulty in carrying out the monadological hypothesis of Leibnitz, which rendered necessary still another hypothesis. In the system of Descartes there was a fatal dualism between mind and matter, each being referred to a different substance. This was avoided by Leibnitz, as he had reduced mind and matter to the same essence; the former being represented by conscious, and the latter by unconscious, monads. But still the monads composing matter, and those composing mind, differ totally from each other, and the principle had long been acknowledged that two substances entirely differing from each other, can exert no mutual influence.[1] Hence each order of monads, the mental and the material, must be held to contain the laws of its own development, and to fulfill its own purposes independent of the other. To connect the two together he was, therefore, under the necessity of originating another hypothesis, which, unfortunately, like the monadological, was incapable of verification.

This was the hypothesis of the preestablished harmony. According to this hypothesis, the human mind and the human body are two independent, but corresponding machines. The former consisting of self-conscious monads, and the latter, of aggregations of simple monads; each act solely according to their own internal force; the former as if there were no body in existence, and the latter, as if there were no mind. The hypothesis of Leibnitz is, that there

[1] *Morell*, 150.

is a preestablished harmony of action between the two. "God," he says, "has created the soul in such a manner at first,[1] that it should represent within itself, all the simultaneous changes in the body;[2] and he has made the body also in such a manner, as, that it must, of itself, do what the soul wills; so that the laws, which make the thoughts of the soul follow each other in regular succession, must produce images which shall be coincident with the impressions made by external objects upon our organs of sense; while the laws by which the motions of the body follow each other are likewise so coincident with the thoughts of the soul as to give to our volitions and actions, the very same appearance as if the latter were really the natural and the necessary consequence of the former." Thus, by this preestablished harmony, the corporeal world and the spiritual world are like two clocks,[2] which, though reciprocally independent, mark simultaneously by the same hours, in consequence of an internal mechanism in which the clock maker has realized his own ideas.

Both these hypotheses naturally lead to a third, which may, perhaps, be claimed as a result of the other two; that of optimism, according to which God has brought into being the best possible order of things. This position brought him face to face with metaphysical, physical, and moral evil. The possibility of evil he derives from the limitation of creatures. Metaphysical evil, which is the imperfection of creatures, must subsist in the most perfect world, as created things are not susceptible of infinite perfection. It consists simply in limitation. Physical evil, or pain, is the result of limitation. It is the punishment of moral evil, and hence, conduces to good. It is also often in itself a necessary agent in the production of a greater good. As to moral evil, its permission may be the condition of the greatest good, as it does not follow

[1] *Lewes*, 459. [2] *History of Philosophy*, II, 92.

but that the perfection of the world absolutely required that God should permit this effect of the free will of man.

He held to a philosophical necessity, as being the only kind of liberty which is consistent with the preestablished order of the universe. Thus it will be seen that problems, the largest, most comprehensive, and most difficult, occupied the mind of Leibnitz, and his writings sowed the seed of philosophical thinking in Germany.

The teachings of his successor, Christian Wolf, born 1679, died 1764, neither sought nor accomplished but little more than the reduction to system of what Leibnitz had left in a detached and fragmentary condition.

The Scottish School: Common Sense Philosophy — Reid, Stewart, Hamilton.

The next school we shall consider is the *Scottish School*, that of COMMON SENSE, which commences with Reid.

Thomas Reid was born at Glasgow, Scotland, in 1710. He died in 1796. He was the contemporary of Condillac, Hartley, Malebranche, Helvetius, and Kant. And was, therefore, posterior to Bacon, Locke, Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley and Hume. It was the speculations of the two last named, and especially the latter, that gave origin to Reid as a metaphysician and founder of the Scotch school of common sense. Hume had conducted philosophical speculation to the very verge of annihilation. Human thought, under his guidance, had arrived at a point where nothing existed but impressions and their copies, ideas. It could progress no further. It had, therefore, no other alternative but to sound a retreat; and reexamine the grounds upon which its positions had been taken, its principles laid down, its convictions adopted and its reasonings conducted. This it did in Scotland under the auspices of Reid; in Germany, under those of Kant.

Although Reid is entitled to the honor of originating the Scottish school, generally known as that of common sense; of imparting to it some of its peculiar features, and of infusing into it the spirit, which has served as its animating principle, yet the completion of it as a system, the perfecting of it as a philosophy, is due to the more successful efforts of other and later men. The Scottish school more than any other, has had a history, which will be found developed in the writings of its principal representatives, Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart and Sir William Hamilton. It will be perceived that one link in this chain of representation is omitted, viz: Thomas Brown. Dr. Brown succeeded Stewart in the chair of moral philosophy in the University of Edinburgh.[1] The following exhibits the plan of his arrangement:



This idea of considering all mental phenomena as only different states of the same thinking and feeling substance, called mind, is not in accordance with the Scottish philosophy, and although popular at the time, has never since been adopted. Dr. Brown's system can, therefore, hardly be considered as, in any way, contributing to the

[1] *Morell*, 377.

formation of the Scottish school, and hence he cannot form a link in the chain of its representatives.

The Scottish school, as proclaimed in the writings of Reid, Stewart and Hamilton, has never received its merited share of attention from the historians of philosophy. The writings of Reid and Stewart, especially of the latter, have been extensively read and studied in America, having been mostly made use of as text books in academies and colleges. And yet the real merits of the Scottish school only stand out in their larger proportions in the works of Sir William Hamilton. Giving to the subject of metaphysical philosophy the long continued efforts of a great and mature mind, he has enabled this school to command the respect, and, to a great extent, the confidence of the British isles, while his writings published at the time of his death have given him a commanding position on the continent and in America. His lectures, now issuing from the press, give in a more detailed and systematic form, the results of his reflection, and will bestow upon the school, to which he belonged, a wider knowledge, and a more enduring perpetuity.

The system of philosophy evolved from the Scottish school is a pure psychology. It limits itself entirely to an exposition of mental phenomena. Its method is one of observation, a careful observation of the facts of consciousness. With these facts it begins and ends. Its peculiar mission appears to be to develop and proclaim the truths embraced in consciousness; to ascertain its limits; and to establish the conclusiveness of its testimony as to all those things of which it clearly speaks. In the fulfillment of its mission it not only observes, but also establishes, in respect to many points, the limit of observation and reasoning. The great and principal point of distinction which serves to separate it from every other, and to give it its character, consists mainly in the circumstance that it resolves into ultimate facts many things that had previously presented insurmountable difficulties in their explanation. As an

illustration of this statement take the following principles, or ultimate facts, which, according to Reid, are the judgments of common sense relating to contingent truths :[1]

1. Everything which is attested to me by consciousness and the internal sense really exists.

2. The thoughts of which I am conscious are thoughts of a being whom I call *I*.

3. The things which memory distinctly recalls to me really happened.

4. I am certain of my personal identity from the remotest period to which my memory can reach.

5. Objects which I perceive by the aid of my senses really exist, and are as I perceive them.

6. I exert some degree of power upon my actions and determinations.

7. The natural faculties by which I distinguish truth from error are not delusive.

8. My fellow men are living and intelligent creatures like myself.

9. Certain expressions of countenance, certain sounds of the voice, and certain gestures, indicate certain thoughts and certain dispositions of mind.

10. We have naturally some regard for the testimony of men in matters of fact, and even for human authority in matters of opinion.

11. Many events which depend upon the free will of our fellow men may nevertheless be foreseen with more or less probability.

12. In the order of nature, that which is to take place, will probably resemble that which has taken place in similar circumstances.

The Scottish school contains reflectively the three ideas which constitute the elements of all human knowledge, viz: the finite mind, nature, and God. But it regards all these from an experimental, rather than an abstract or

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 147-8.

fundamental point of view, and hence bears less of a speculative character, and is accounted less deep and profound in its researches.[1] It may, however, well be doubted whether the views it takes, which will be found admirably harmonizing together in the production of a consistent whole, are not in themselves well calculated to assign to intelligence its proper sphere, surrounding it everywhere with its proper limitations. It recognizes philosophy, in its more extensive signification, to be a knowledge of things by their causes, while, in its stricter meaning, it is confined to the sciences which constitute,[2] or hold immediately of, the science of mind. The causes of philosophy, those which invite or compel to its study are two in number. 1. The necessity we feel to connect causes with effects. 2. The carrying up of all our knowledge into unity.[3]

Regarding all method as a rational progress, a progress towards an end; and the ends or final causes of philosophy to be the discovery of efficient causes; and the generalization of all knowledge into unity; it follows two processes in the development of its principles. Of these we have

1. Analysis which decomposes compounds into their simple primary elements, which resolves effects into their constituted causes.

2. Synthesis which recomposes the primary elements into their compound, reconstructs causes out of their effects. And the one it considers as correlative of the other.

It makes of psychology, or the philosophy of mind, a threefold division, viz: 1. Phenomena, in general. 2. Laws. 3. Inferences; results. It asks of philosophy a response to three questions, viz: 1. What are the facts or phenomena to be observed? 2. What are the laws which regulate these facts, or under which these phenomena appear? 3. What are the real results which these facts or phenomena warrant us in drawing?

[1] *Morell*, 399. [2] *Hamilton*, 45. [3] *Idem*, 46.

There are also subdivisions of these, which will appear from the following tabular view of the distribution of philosophy:

MIND, OR CONSCIOUSNESS, *affords*

Facts		Cognitions
Phenomenology		Feelings
Empirical Psychology		Conative Powers — Will and Desire
Laws	Cognitions — Logic	
Nomology	Feelings — Æsthetic	
Rational Psychology	Conative Powers	Moral Philosophy Political Philosophy
Results		
Ontology	Being of God	
Inferential Psychology	Immortality of the soul, etc.	

This is the division proposed by Sir William Hamilton,[1] the previous divisions having been generally either into the theoretical and practical, or the speculative and practical.

The first important position taken by the Scottish school, and it is one that interpenetrates, and lies at the foundation of all its philosophy, is that all knowledge is relative, that we know nothing absolute, nothing existing absolutely, nothing either of mind or matter except as it has relation to human faculties.[2] All, therefore, that we do or can know is existence in certain special forms or modes, and these, likewise, only in so far as they may be analogous to our faculties. It holds that all knowledge is only relative: "1. Because existence is not cognizable absolutely and in

[1] *Hamilton*, 88. [2] *Idem*, 96, 107.

itself,[1] but only in special modes. 2. Because the modes can be known only if they stand in a certain relation to our faculties. 3. Because the modes, thus relative to our faculties, are presented to, and known by, the mind only under modifications determined by these faculties themselves."

There are, therefore, two opposite series of expressions: 1. Those which denote the relative and the known. 2. Those which denote the absolute and the unknown. To the first belong phenomenon, mode, modification, state, quality, property, attribute, accident. To the latter, subject, substance, substratum.

Existence may have a thousand modes, and yet they can be nothing to us unless we possess faculties accommodated to their apprehension. But even if we were endowed with faculties to apprehend these thousand modes, still would our whole knowledge be, as it is at present, only of the relative. We should still only apprehend existence in certain special modes, in certain relations to our faculties of knowledge. It is these modes that are known under the names of qualities, properties, accidents, phenomena, manifestations, appearances, and so forth, while the unknown ground, which affords them support, is termed their substance or subject.

Having established the relativity of all knowledge, this philosophy next proceeds to a distribution of mental phenomena, to a classification of the powers and faculties of the mind. In this respect it has a history, has made a progress. Reid's classification — and it is substantially the one adopted by Stewart — is the following: 1. The powers we have by means of our external senses. 2. Memory. 3. Conception. 4. The powers of resolving and analyzing complex objects, and compounding those that are more simple. 5. Judging. 6. Reasoning. 7. Taste. 8. Moral perception; and last of all, consciousness.

[1] *Hamilton*, 104.

The later and better considered distribution under Sir William Hamilton, assumes consciousness as the foundation of all mental phenomena, and identifies what are denominated powers or faculties of mind, as so many special modifications under which it is manifested.

This philosophy, under the lead of Sir William Hamilton, investigates consciousness with all the lights which itself affords.[1] He compares it to an internal light, by means of which, and which alone, what passes in the mind is rendered visible. It is simple and undecompounded; always resembling itself. Although not in itself definable, yet it admits of analysis;[2] and this is effected by observing and holding fast, the phenomena or facts of consciousness; comparing them; and from this comparison, evolving the universal conditions under which alone an act of consciousness is possible.

Consciousness being the self-recognition that we know, feel, desire, etc., exists and manifests itself under the following limitations and conditions: 1. It is an actual or living, and not a potential or dormant knowledge. 2. It is an immediate, and not a mediate knowledge. 3. It supposes a contrast, a discrimination, a distinguishing of something which is from something which is not. 4. It involves judgment, for it is impossible to discriminate without judging. 5. Its possible exercise is only through memory, for without that our mental states could not be held fast, compared, distinguished from each other, and referred to self.

Both Reid and Stewart considered attention as a mental faculty distinct from consciousness,[3] but as now understood in that school it is merely an act of will or desire, subordinate to the following law of intelligence, viz: the greater the number of objects to which our consciousness is simultaneously extended, the smaller is the intensity with which it is able to consider each, and consequently the less vivid and distinct the information it obtains of the several objects.

[1] *Hamilton*, 126. [2] *Idem*, 132. [3] *Idem*, 164.

That effort of will by which we exclude, or shut out from the view of consciousness, some objects, by means of which those which remain are the more intensified, is called attention. It is of three degrees or kinds: 1. A mere vital and irresistible act. 2. An act determined by desire, which, though involuntary, may be resisted by our will. 3. An act determined by a deliberate volition.

Consciousness acts, and evolves its phenomena in subordination to three laws: 1. The law of parsimony, which precludes the assumption of anything as a fact of consciousness unless it be ultimate and simple. 2. The law of integrity, by which the whole facts of consciousness are to be taken without reserve or hesitation, whether given as constituent, or as regulative data. 3. The law of harmony, by which nothing but the facts of consciousness are to be taken, or, if inferences of reasoning be admitted, that these at least be recognized as legitimate only as deduced from, and in subordination to, the immediate data of consciousness, and every position rejected as illegitimate, which is contradictory of these.

An important point for the Scottish philosophy to settle, and one which interpenetrates its whole substance is, what is a fact of consciousness? To this it is answered: 1. That it is primary and universal. Whenever, in our analysis of mental phenomena we arrive at an element which we cannot reduce to a generalization from experience, but which lies at the root of all experience, and which we cannot, therefore, resolve into any higher principle, it is a fact of consciousness. It is the last result of analysis, an ultimate principle. 2. It must have upon it the stamp of necessity. It must be impossible not to think it. 3. It must be accompanied with a belief in its reality.[1] Its existence must be given and guarantied by an original and necessary belief.

Consciousness brings along with it the evidence of three facts: 1. That of our own self-existence. 2. That of our

[1] *Hamilton*, 188.

it. He established it as the doctrine of the Scottish school, that there was no representation whatever in perception; that its act instead of being mèdiate, was immediate; and that thus all the perceptible things of the outer world were brought into direct realization by the inner. This was probably a refuge into which Dr. Reid threw himself to escape from the sweeping skepticism of Berkeley and Hume; and laying down, as he did, consciousness as a special faculty of the mind, instead of a common revelator to all the faculties, he found great difficulties in maintaining his position. But more recently the mind of Sir William Hamilton has brought to the consideration of it the full maturity of his powers, and the refuge has become a fortress that bids open defiance to all other schools and systems. He complains that the old doctrine in all its forms rests wholly upon an hypothesis, and this hypothesis he objects to. 1. As in no degree necessary, That consciousness supplies as an ultimate fact all that this hypothesis seeks to establish, and that in itself it is not more intelligible than the fact it displaces. 2. It subverts the very thing it was devised to explain. It was to explain the act of consciousness in perception, but it denies its testimony to our immediate perception of an outer world. 3. That the fact which it is devised to explain, viz: the existence of the outer world is itself hypothetical and not proved. 4. That it sunders and subverts the phenomenon to be explained. 5. That the fact, the external world which is to be explained lies without the sphere of experience and that all legitimate hypotheses explain only those which lie within it. 6. That it is not single, but attempts to explain the knowledge of an unknown world by the ratio of a representative perception, while it is impossible by any conceivable relation to apply the ratio to the facts.

He asserts the duality of consciousness in the act of perception. "We are,"[1] he says, "immediately conscious in

[1] *Hamilton*, 200.

perception of an *ego* and a *non-ego* known together, and known in contrast to each other. This is the fact of the duality of consciousness. It is clear and manifest, when I concentrate my attention in the simplest act of perception, I return from my observation with the most irresistible conviction of two facts, or rather two branches of the same fact, that I am, and that something different from me exists. In this act I am conscious of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external reality as the object perceived; and I am conscious of both existences in the same indivisible moment of intuition. The knowledge of the subject does not precede, nor follow, the knowledge of the object; neither determines, neither is determined by, the other."

And again "consciousness not only gives us a duality, but it gives its elements in equal counterpoise and independence.[1] The *ego* and *non-ego*, mind and matter, are not only given together, but in absolute coequality. The one does not precede, the other does not follow; and, in their mutual relations, each is equally dependent, equally indedendent."

This doctrine rests distinctly upon the veracity of consciousness, and the assertion that, as to us, there can be no higher authority. All reasoning must be based upon it, and no appeal can be taken to any higher power. It is to us a primal law, and whatever it gives us must be received as given. Perception being given by consciousness is an ultimate fact; and is utterly incapable of explanation, because no explanation can be given that is not ultimately based upon the same consciousness that proclaims the fact.

Upon this doctrine the external world is received just as consciousness gives it. As that gives the conviction of its reality, so it is to be received as really existing as the *ego*, the *I*, that receives it.

[1] *Hamilton*, 203.

Thus the Scottish philosophy bridges the chasm between the interior and the exterior world, resting its abutments upon the strong irreversible convictions of mankind furnished through consciousness. As auxiliary to this doctrine, it investigates the law of perception and sensation in their reciprocal relation, and ascertains it to be that although these are always coexistent, yet they are always in the inverse ratio to each other.[1] This it proves: 1. From a comparison of the several senses; finding that precisely as a sense has more of the one element, it has less of the other. 2. From a comparison of the several impressions of the same sense, and ascertaining there, that, above a certain limit, perception declines in proportion as sensation rises. In connection with this, it also asserts the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter; holding extension and solidity to be the only primary qualities, while all the others are secondary.

Our knowledge of all the qualities of matter is merely relative. Still, in different perceptions, one term of the relation may predominate, or the other.[2] "Where the objective element predominates, where matter is known as principal, in its relation to mind, and mind only known as subordinate in its correlation to matter, we have perception proper, rising superior to sensation; this is seen in the primary qualities. Where, on the contrary, the subjective element predominates, where mind is known as principal in its relation to matter, and matter is only known as subordinate in its relation to mind, we have sensation proper rising superior to perception; and this is seen in the secondary qualities."

The presentative faculty, it will be remembered, has two forms: external and internal, perception and self-consciousness. They are thus contrasted: "Perception is the power by which we are made aware of the phenomena of the external world;[3] self-consciousness the power by which

[1] *Hamilton*, 336. [2] *Idem*, 347. [3] *Idem*, 401.

we apprehend the phenomena of the internal. The objects of the former are all presented to us in space and time; space and time are thus the two conditions, the two fundamental forms, of external perception. The objects of the latter are all apprehended by us in time and in self, time and self are thus the two conditions, the two fundamental forms, of internal perception or self-consciousness." This faculty of self-consciousness corresponds with the reflection of Locke.

II. Next to the presentative faculty comes the conservative memory, which denotes the power the mind possesses of retaining hold of the knowledge it has acquired. The question here is raised as to how a mental activity ever vanishes; and the answer is found in the fact that as every mental activity belongs to the one vital activity of mind in general, and as there is a given quantity or degree of force to be exercised among all the activities, so will each rise and decline successively as this force is differently distributed among them. The mind upon the Scottish system is always active.

The law of retention extends over all the phenomena of mind alike.

III. Next follows the reproductive faculty, the function of which consists in the process of recovering the absent thought from unconsciousness.[1] It is of two kinds: Without will, and with will; the former termed suggestion, the latter reminiscence. In the first, reproduction is governed by the laws which regulate the association of the mental train, and here the succession is governed by special laws,[2] according to which, certain kinds of modification exclusively precede, and exclusively follow each other. In the last it is governed by an act of volition, which, by concentrating attention upon a certain determinate class of associ-

[1] *Hamilton*, 275. [2] *Idem.* 429.

ating circumstances,[1] bestows upon these an extraordinary vivacity, and, consequently, enables them to obtain the preponderance, and exclusively to determine the succession of the intellectual train.

As to the conditions under which reminiscence is determined to exertion, it is to be noted: 1. That, at every crisis of our existence, momentary circumstances are the causes which awaken our activity, and set our recollection at work to supply the necessaries of thought. 2. It is as constituting a want, a result either of an act of desire or of volition, that the determining circumstance tends principally to awaken the thoughts with which it is associated. Each circumstance, constituting a want, suggests the notion of that which is calculated to satisfy it.

IV. Next follows the representative faculty, imagination, which means the power the mind has of holding up vividly before itself the thoughts which, by the act of reproduction, it has recalled into consciousness.

There are two powers by which the representative faculty is determined to energy: 1. The reproductive faculty, as the immediate source from which it receives both the materials and the determination to represent; the laws of the former governing also the latter.[2] 2. Comparison, the faculty of relations, plays also a conspicuous part, in determining in what combinations objects are represented. By it complex objects are separated into parts, analyzed, and again recombined, or compounded in every variety of fashion.

In subordination to these two determinants, there are three principal orders in which imagination represents ideas: 1. The natural order, that according to which our thoughts spontaneously group themselves. 2. The logical order, subdivided: 1st. Induction, presentation of particulars and ascending to the universal which they constitute. 2d. Deduction, presentation of universals, and derivation

[1] *Hamilton*, 441. [2] *Idem*, 453.

thence of particulars. 3d. The poetical order consisting in seizing individual circumstances, and in so grouping them that the imagination shall represent them so as they might be offered by the sense.[1]

The imagination employs the organs of sense in the representations of sensible objects, and by its attractive or repulsive pictures, according to our habits and associations, fills the frame of our life with enjoyment or misery.

V. The elaborative faculty, the faculty of relations, comparison, gives us what we may strictly denominate thought. All the previous faculties have been subsidiary to this. It is this which acts upon what the others furnish, and hence affords us an instance purely of intellection. This faculty is determined by objective conditions: 1. Its first and simplest act is the discrimination of existence from non-existence.[2] 2. In affirming the existence of the *ego* and the *non-ego*, we also affirm their existence in duality, in difference in mutual contrast. 3. The recognition of the multiplicity of the coexistent or successive phenomena, presented either to perception or self-consciousness, and the judgment in regard to their resemblance or dissimilarity. 4. The comparison of phenomena with the native notion of substance, and the judgment is the grouping of these phenomena into different bundles, as attributes of different subjects, in the external world constituting the distinction of things; in the internal that of powers. 5. The collation of successive phenomena under the native notion of causality, and the affirmation or negation of their mutual relation as cause and effect.

The Scottish school refer to this faculty a series of operations which by many other philosophers have been made the functions of specific powers. Such are: 1. Composition or synthesis.[3] 2. Abstraction, decomposition, or analysis. 3. Generalization. 4. Judgment. 5. Reasoning.

[1] *Hamilton*, 455. [2] *Idem*, 465. [3] *Idem*, 473.

VI. The regulative faculty is the last, and the one that brings to view several important features of the Scottish school. The term is employed not to denote the proximate cause of any definite energy, but the power the mind has of being the native source of certain necessary, or à priori cognitions,[1] which, as they are the conditions, the forms, under which our knowledge is possible, constitute so many fundamental laws of intellectual nature. This faculty is the complement of such laws. It is the locus principiorum. By some it is called reason, by others common sense.

The distinction was taken by Leibnitz, between necessary truths, or those apprehended by demonstration,[2] and those which become known to us by induction alone; the former of which can only be approved to us by principles native to the mind. Such are the notions of being, of substance, of one and the same, of the true, of the good, and many others innate to the mind.[3] It is the quality of necessity which discriminates a native from an adventitious element of knowledge.

All that is conceivable in thought lies between two extremes,[4] which, as contradictory to each other, cannot both be true; but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must. Take, for instance, space. In one extreme, it cannot be considered as illimitable, for over whatever space we travel, we are still in the finite. In the other extreme, it is equally impossible to reach its commencement, for on the principle of infinite divisibility, we can never reach a point so small, as that no smaller will remain. The same may said of time. Thus, the conceivable, the intermediate, is in every relation bounded by the inconceivable, and this is what Sir William Hamilton calls the law of conditioned. His position in reference to this is that the conditioned is that which is alone conceivable;[5] the unconditioned that which is inconceivable. That everything thinkable or conditioned, lies between two extremes or

[1] *Hamilton*, 512. [2] *Idem*, 516. [3] *Idem*, 525. [4] *Idem*, 527. [5] *Idem*, 530.

poles, each of which is unconditioned, inconceivable, and exclusive or contradictory of the other. The absolute, the infinite, the unconditioned, are utterly inconceivable by us. We know God according to the finitude of our faculties, but we believe much that we are incompetent to know—faith. Belief is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond our knowledge.

The philosophy of the conditioned is invoked to furnish principles to solve the problems of cause and effect, and of substance and phenomenon, or accident.

That particular effects have particular causes, which may be determined, is contingent, individual, a datum of experience. But that every event should have its causes is necessary and universal, a condition of intelligence itself.

There are two classes of opinions explanatory of the causal judgment. The first rests either immediately or mediately upon experience; the second, either immediately or mediately on a native principle of the mind itself. In order to understand how this judgment is brought within the law of the conditioned, it is necessary to advert to the fact that all thought implies the thought of existence,[1] and that hence existence may be laid down as a necessary form of thought. So also is time the necessary condition of every conscious act. Thought is only realized to us as in succession, and succession is only conceived by us in time. Existence, and existence in time, is thus an elementary form of our intelligence.

But as the absolute and the infinite must be entirely excluded, it is obvious that we conceive existence only as conditioned in time. And existence conditioned in time expresses at once and in relation[2] the three categories of thought, which afford us in combination the principle of causality. The explanation is this:

As existence and time are established as the categories of all thought, whenever anything is thought to exist, it

[1] *Hamilton*, 548. [2] *Idem*, 548.

must be thought to exist in time. That is either present, past, or future.[1] A thing once in existence we can never conceive as nonexistent either in the past or the future.

But it is now existing. How came it so? That the phenomenon presented to us began, as a phenomenon, to be, we know by experience. We are compelled to believe that the object whose phenomenal rise into existence we have witnessed, did really exist, prior to this rise, under other forms. But to say that a thing previously existed under other forms is the same thing as saying that it had causes, and thus vindicates the causal judgment under the law of the conditioned.

Mental phenomena, according to the Scottish philosophy as expounded by Sir William Hamilton, are divided into three classes: cognitions, feelings, conations. These are all revealed by consciousness, but they are revealed as possessing qualities, attributes and characteristics peculiar to themselves, and hence its testimony favors their distribution into different classes. The Scottish philosophy, therefore, holds that the phenomena of pleasure and pain constitute a distinct order of internal states,[2] thus establishing the capacity of feeling as one of the fundamental powers of the human mind.

In actual life the feelings occupy a position intermediate between the cognitions and the conations. This is one of necessity,[3] for without the previous cognition there could be neither feeling nor conation, and without the previous feeling there could be no conation. The objective presented in thought excites the feeling, and that in its turn gives rise to volition. The manifestations of the conative powers are determined by the feelings. This is apparent: 1. Because all objects known in the same manner and degree, are not equal objects of desire or will. 2. Because different individuals are desirous of different objects. Points of difference between the three classes:[4] In the cognition,

[1] *Hamilton*, 554. [2] *Idem*, 559. [3] *Idem*, 567. [4] *Idem*, 571.

consciousness distinguishes between the object known and the subject knowing. In the feeling, consciousness fuses the mental state with itself; there is nothing but the subjective, no object different from self. In the conation, there is an object, and that an object of knowledge, but it differs from cognition in the fact that it is accompanied by a want which excites the will to supply it.

Pleasure and pain are the phenomena which constitute the essential attribute of feeling, under all its modifications.[1] The first is a reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power, of whose energy we are conscious; the latter a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power.[2]

All feeling is a state in which we are conscious of some of the energies or processes of life, and as these differ from each other,[3] so will the correlative feelings. There will, therefore, be as many different feelings as there are distinct modes of mental activity.

In this view of the feelings, referring their differences to the differences of the powers which they attend, there are two great classes, viz:

1. Sensations, those which accompany the vital processes more immediately connected with the corporeal organism.

2. Sentiments, those which accompany the mental processes, and which, if not wholly inorganic, are less immediately dependent on the conditions of the nervous system.

The sensations are again subdivided into two orders: 1. Those which accompany the action of the five determinate senses. 2. Those which accompany or constitute the manifestations of the indeterminate, or vital sense,[4] such as heat and cold, hunger and thirst, etc.

The sentiments are also subdivided into two orders: 1. The contemplative, those which are the concomitants of our cognitive powers.[5] 2. The practical, the concomitants of our powers of conation. The former are again divided

[1] *Hamilton*, 578. [2] *Idem*, 577. [3] *Idem*, 613. [4] *Idem*, 614. [5] *Idem*, 616.

into: 1. Those of the subsidiary faculities. 2. Those of the elaborative. The former are divided into two classes according as they are the concomitants of the lower or subsidiary, or the higher or elaborative faculty of cognition. To the former belong those of self-consciousness, or internal perception; to the latter those of imagination, referring to the imagination the relative faculty of reproduction. The latter, or elaborative class, include all those feelings which arise from the gratification of the regulative faculty, the reason or intelligence. Those feelings which arise from the acts of imagination and understanding in conjunction are principally those of beauty and sublimity.

The conative powers give rise to the practical feelings, and they are relative, either: 1. To our self-preservation; or, 2. To the enjoyment of our existence; or, 3. To the preservation of the species; or, 4. To our tendency towards development and perfection; or, 5. To the moral law.

The freedom of the human will is a postulate of the Scottish school. That could not but be affirmed by a philosophy whose peculiar mission is the development of consciousness. Besides, it derives this freedom from the very nature of the moral law. That law is a law of duty, which unconditionally commands the fulfillment of its behests.[1] This supposes an ability to fulfill them, and the liberty of human action is thus involved in the datum of the law of duty.

We now bid farewell to the Scottish school of philosophy. We have given it essentially as contained in the teachings of Sir William Hamilton, its latest and ablest representative. We have endeavored to do it that justice which it has failed to receive from the writers of the history of philosophy. It is a school which preserves throughout an entire consistency with itself; and, as it proposes only to develop the phenomena of consciousness, it accomplishes all it professes. Its whole course is characterized by ex-

[1] *Hamilton*, 633.

treme caution. By arriving at the external world through the duality of consciousness, and by confining itself within the region of the conditioned, it has clipped the wings of speculation, and thus prevented its diving to depths profound, or soaring to dizzy heights; but by these very means, it has given to its philosophy a practical character; kept it within the region of the comprehensible; and thus rendered it an aid and a guide to man, instead of a wonder, and a marvel, and a mystery. If, by its own self-limitations, it has failed to render up all that man's deepest wants seem to demand, it has supplied all that his necessities require, and perhaps all that God intended him to receive.

Phrenology — Gall, Spurzheim, Combe.

Before passing to the consideration of the German school, embracing the critical philosophy, it will be necessary to pay some attention to the phrenological school, whose great chiefs are Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe. The originator of this school is Francis Joseph Gall, who was born at Tiefenbrunn in Suabia, on the 9th of March, 1757. The main principle, however, upon which this school is based, is much earlier than Dr. Gall. Prochasta had long previously asked this interrogatory. "Do each of the divisions of the intellect occupy a separate portion of the brain?" and then proceeds to say: "It is by no means improbable that each division of the intellect has its allotted organ in the brain, so that there is one for the perceptions, another for the understanding; probably others also for the will, and imagination, and memory, which act wonderfully in concert, and mutually excite each other to action." This, it will be seen, shadows forth the principle upon which Gall proceeds. It was left, however, entirely undeveloped. This may have suggested to Dr. Gall the principle of his system, although the statement is that he was led to its adoption from observing, while a boy, the differences of character and talents displayed by members of the same family, taken in connection with

certain peculiarities of the head corresponding with these differences. In corroboration of this last it seems very clear that Gall's first work for a number of years, was one of observation. He possessed a shrewd nack of discriminating character, and of comparing cranial development with its various manifestations. A lunatic asylum at Vienna afforded him opportunities of comparing the exhibitions made by certain monomaniacs with peculiar forms and configurations of the skull. He also resorted to prisons and courts of justice to make his observations on form and manifestation. Finally, after spending about twenty years in observation and dissection, he gave his first course of lectures in Vienna in 1796. The result was the creation of a great sensation. It was starting the human mind on a new track of inquiry. It was opening up a new avenue to the investigation and ascertainment of character. If men really carried on the exterior of their crania the marks by which the interior could be arrived at; if, from the inspection of the former, the contents of the latter could be revealed, it was a science that could claim for itself a great amount of consideration.

In 1800, Dr. J. G. Spurzheim, who was born at Longwich, near Treves, on the Moselle, on the 31st December, 1776, assisted for the first time Dr. Gall in his course of lectures; and in 1804, after having completed his medical studies, he became associated with Dr. Gall in the labor of unfolding the anatomy, physiology and pathology of the brain and nervous system. On the 30th October, 1806, they entered Paris. In 1808, they presented to the Institute their *Memoire on the Anatomy and Physiology of the Nervous System in general, and of the Brain in particular;* and in 1810 appeared the first volume of their great work, under the same title, which work was remodeled in 1823 and published in six volumes octavo, under the title of *Fonctions du Cerveau.* After laboring long together, Drs. Gall and Spurzheim finally separated from each other, each pursuing his investigations on his own account. The latter subse-

quently gave courses of lectures, and while giving one at Edinburgh in 1816, he had the good fortune to enlist the attention, and finally to secure the convictions to his doctrines of George Combe, Esq., whose services in the cause of phrenology both in Europe and America have been most eminently successful. Both these last named gentlemen have lectured much in Europe and America, Dr. Spurzheim dying in Boston in 1833 while delivering in that city his first course of lectures in this country.

After the separation of Gall and Spurzheim, each one separately, as also Mr. Combe, pursued the study, lecturing and publishing works on the general subject. The most important of these have been reprinted in this country. Dr. Gall's work *On the Origin of the Moral Qualities and Intellectual Faculties of Man and the Conditions of their Manifestation*, in six volumes, was published in Boston in 1835. Dr. Spurzheim's work entitled *Phrenology, or the Doctrine of the Mental Phenomena*, in two volumes, was also published in Boston in 1834. And Mr. Combe's work entitled *a System of Phrenology*, was also published in the same city during the same year.

The so-called science of phrenology asserts and maintains the truth of three propositions, viz:

1. That the brain is not the one single organ of mind, but on the contrary, a congeries of organs.

2. That the mind is not the one single general power equally capable of acting in any direction, but that it consists of a plurality of faculties, each having its own specific function.

3. That each faculty is developed through, or connected with, its organ, and that this connection of faculty with organ is determinable, and has been determined by observation.

Thus phrenology is made to rest upon three foundations: 1. The anatomical or physiological, which relates to the brain. 2. The phrenological, which relates to the mind. 3. The empirical, or observational, which assigns faculty to organ, and thus connects the two together.

Aside from the empirical element, phrenology may be substantially summed up in three inquiries:

I. The material organ, its location, size, and the conditions that affect it.

II. The mental faculty, how it may be defined, what its peculiar function.

III. The modes of activity which are common to all the faculties of a particular class or order.

I. The first relates to the organology of the science, or what is frequently termed craniosopy. As there is nothing here but matter, as we might naturally suppose, Gall and Spurzheim made the structures of the nervous system, and especially of the brain, a subject of close and critical examination. It seems generally admitted that they have opened new avenues of knowledge relating to the structure and physiology of the brain. They have unfolded its parts, shown its fibrous structure, traced its convolutions, and exhibited its different connections, in such a manner as to throw new light on its physiology. The organology, however, of the science is not very much aided by these discoveries. We cannot find in the brain distinct organs for the residence of the separate faculties. On the contrary, the brain, although it has distinct parts, yet these do not correspond with the different organs of the faculties. The faculties as we shall hereafter see, have primarily two great divisions, the affective and intellectual.

The first of these are susceptible of two divisions: propensities and sentiments. The second, in like manner, are divided into perceptive or knowing, and reflective faculties. The first great point to determine is the regions of the brain in which these several classes of faculties are located. With this view figure 1 in the plate is presented. The ideal line, which may be conceived as running directly through from one ear to the other, thus connecting the two meati auditorii together, is taken as an axis, and the proportion of brain lying in different directions around it

is the measure or criterion of intellect or of feeling. If the mass of brain between this axis and the forehead is large, the organs of the perceptive, knowing and reflective faculties are fully developed. If that which lays behind and immediately above—forming the back and lower central part of the head—is extensive, indicates a full development of the organs, and consequently possession of the faculties, common to man and animals. A large portion of brain in the upper, lateral and horizontal region of the head indicates that the organs of those faculties which manifest the sentiments proper to man are voluminous. To arrive at the relative proportions of these different regions, suppose a line drawn from the centre of that axis to that point at the top of the head near where the frontal and sagital sutures meet, the line marked E G on the plate. The region behind this line is called the occipital, that before, the frontal. The length of this line measures the height of the head. Again, suppose a line drawn from the middle of the forehead, or from the organ of eventuality to the point of union between the parietal and occipital bones, DF, on the plate. The part below this line is the basilar, that above the sincipital or coronal region of the brain. The basilar is the region of the propensities, the sincipital or coronal that of the sentiments. In estimating the development of these regions the width of the head must be compared with its height. A low head, with the basilar or lower region of the brain widely and largely developed, indicates the predominance of the animal nature; a high head, as that of Sir Walter Scott, with the sincipital or upper region similarly developed, indicates the predominance of the moral nature. While the propensities are located in the lower or basilar region of the brain, and the sentiments in the upper or sincipital, the intellectual faculties are situated in the frontal region. The perceptive and knowing occupy the lower, and the reflective the upper part of that region.

The following is the mode by which the comparative development of these two classes of faculties can be esti-

NAMES

Phrenological Organs,

Referring to the figures indicating their relative position.

I. Propensities.

1. Amativeness.
2. Philoprogenitiveness.
3. Inhabitiveness, or Concentrativeness.
4. Adhesiveness.
5. Combativeness.
6. Destructiveness.
7. Secretiveness.
8. Acquisitiveness.
9. Constructiveness.

II. Sentiments.

10. Self-esteem.
11. Love of Approbation.
12. Cautiousness.
13. Benevolence.
14. Veneration.
15. Firmness.
16. Conscientiousness.
17. Hope.
18 Wonder, or Marvelousness.
19. Ideality.
20. Wit, or Mirthfulness.
21. Imitation.

III. Intellect

1. *Perceptive.*

22. Individuality.
23. Form.
24. Size.
25. Weight.
26. Order.
27. Locality.
28. Number.
29. Coloring.
30. Eventuality.
31. Time.
32. Tune.
33. Language.

2. *Reflective*

34. Comparison.
35. Causality.



FIGURE 1.

FIGURE 2.



FIGURE 3.



FIGURE 4.



FIGURE 5.



mated: In figure 1, suppose the line AB to represent a plane passing through the pupil of the eye directly through the axis, or line, connecting the two meati auditorii, to the back part of the head. Suppose another plane to be represented by the line BC, passing from the surface of the reflecting faculties over those of the perceptive and knowing, until it intersects the plane represented by the line AB. The angle ABC, formed at the point of intersection of the two planes, represented by the lines AB and CB, will indicate the comparative development of those two classes of faculties. The larger the angle the more will the reflecting faculties preponderate over the perceptive and knowing. The more acute the angle, the greater the comparative strength of the perceptive and knowing over those of the reflecting.

Having determined the different regions of the brain in which the organs of the different classes of faculties are located, the phrenologist next proceeds to the location of the several organs. These he determines by observing what faculties predominate in the character of the individual, and what particular portions of the brain have an uniform development wherever those faculties are manifested. The cranium in a healthy organization, with the exception of the frontal sinus, corresponds in the main with the brain surface which it covers. On the cranium the phrenologist has marked the location of the different faculties, the organs of which are ideal cones having the base at the cranial surface, and the apex at the medulla oblongata, which nearly corresponds to the axis, or line connecting the meati auditorii. Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5, of the plate will exhibit the manner of mapping out the different organs, and the faculties at the margin of the plate will be found placed opposite to their corresponding numbers. In reference to organs it has been observed:

1. That in all ascertained instances, different functions are never performed by the same organ, but that each function has an organ by itself. Thus the stomach does

nothing but digest food, the liver nothing but secrete bile, the lachrymal gland, tears, etc.

2. That the various mental powers of man appear in succession, and as a general rule, that the reflecting or reasoning faculties are those which arrive latest at perfection.

3. That genius is almost always partial, and is owing to the predominance of some large organ in the cerebral organization.

4. That the phenomena of dreaming are at variance with the supposition of the mind manifesting all its faculties by means of a single organ, while they are claimed to be consistent with, and explicable by, that of a plurality of organs.

5. The admitted phenomena of partial idiocy, and partial insanity, are only properly explainable upon the principle of plurality of faculties and organs.

The general rule in relation to organs is that where other things are equal, size of organ is a measure of strength and power in the faculty with which it is connected. This comparison of size, however, must be made of organs in the head of the same individual. When compared with similar organs in the heads of different individuals other things than size are to be taken into consideration. The condition of the individual, and the temperaments, lymphatic, sanguine, bilious, and nervous, are then found very considerably to modify the principle that size is a measure of power. The indicia of these temperaments, however, are pretty clearly ascertainable, and hence their influence upon size, within the limits of calculation.

II. The second inquiry regards the mental faculty. How defined, and what its peculiar function. Shall the mind be regarded as a single general power, equally capable originally of operating to the same effect in every possible direction, or shall it be viewed as consisting of a plurality of faculties, each independent of the others, and

possessing its own specific function? The latter is the principle assumed by the doctrine of phrenology. It considers each faculty in its nature primitive and designated by the following rules: 1. It may exist in one kind of animals, and not in another. 2. May vary in the two sexes of the same species. 3. Is not necessarily proportionate to the other faculties of the same individual. 4. Does not necessarily manifest itself simultaneously with the other faculties. 5. May act or rest singly. 6. Is descendible in a direct line from parents to children. 7. May singly preserve its proper state of health or disease.

The ascertainment of the faculties, subject to the application of these rules, depends upon a profound mental analysis, which to be complete must be exhaustive, and include every distinct faculty with which humanity has been endowed.

The faculties are primarily divisible into two great orders. These are:

1. Feeling, and are termed affective faculties.
2. Intellect, and are termed intellectual faculties.

The two orders are again divisible each into two genera.

The affective faculties are divided into: 1. Propensities. 2. Sentiments. The first are applied to internal impulses, which invite only to certain actions. The second designate other feelings, not limited to inclination alone, but which have superadded an emotion of a peculiar kind. It is characteristic of both these genera, however, that they give birth only to blind impulses and emotions. They have nothing intellectual or enlightening in their composition. They contain all the impulses to action, each in the direction of its own specific function. In excess, they are productive only of evil. How then are they directed, restrained and modified? By the action or influence of the intellectual faculties. These form ideas, foresee consequences, enlighten, and thus, in connection with some of the sentiments, serve to restrain, modify, and direct the propensities.

The intellectual faculties are divided into:

1. Perceptive faculties.
2. Reflective faculties.

The first take cognizance of things and their relations, while the second reason upon them. According to the doctrine as expounded by Spurzheim and Combe, the propensity faculties are nine in number, the sentiments twelve, the perceptive faculties twelve, and the reflective two, in all thirty-five. These faculties will be found stated on the plate. The names of many of them will suggest the function of the faculty to which the name belongs. The different works on phrenology are largely taken up in designating the function of each faculty. This is a matter into which we do not propose to enter. So that we may next consider.

III. The modes of activity which are common to all the faculties of a particular class or order. The faculties were all framed for action as fully as the muscles were for movement. Those whose office it is to produce propensities and sentiments cannot be excited to activity by any direct effort of the will. They act: 1. From an internal excitement of the organs. 2. Upon the presentment of external objects fitted by nature to excite them. 3. By an indirect effort of the will; that is by the formation, by the intellectual faculties of the ideas of objects fitted by nature to excite them; and on the presentment of those objects these faculties act. The idea, for instance, of a being in distress excites the action of the faculty of benevolence.

The perceptive, knowing, and reflective faculties, constituting the intellect, become active from three causes: 1. From internal excitement of the organs. 2. Upon the presentment of external objects fitted by nature to excite them. 3. By acts of volition.

When excited to activity all the faculties possess certain modes of acting in common. The first of these, which is confined to the affective faculties, and is independent of will,

is sensation. This is common to all the affective faculties. It is they only that feel.

The perceptive, knowing, and reflective faculties, that form ideas and perceive relations have the following modes of action, viz:

1. Perception, which occurs on the presentment of external objects in their nature fitted to excite them. It is independent of will. Each faculty perceives only those kinds of qualities, objects and relations, which it was originally formed to perceive. When these same intellectual faculties are active, not from the presentment of external objects, but from the internal excitement of their organs, the second mode of activity occurs, which is:

2. Conception. And if the act amounts to a very high degree of vivacity, it is called imagination. Both these reproduce previous perceptions. Each faculty conceives and imagines within its own appropriate sphere. When the faculties that form ideas become preternaturally active through a morbid excitement, or from other causes, the objects conceived or imagined become fixed, are invested with a fearful reality, and thus constitute a species of insanity. The phenomena of apparitions, or spectral illusions, are explained upon these principles. It is the conceptions formed by the internal activity of the organs that constitute dreams. The activity of some of the organs, accompanied with the quiescent state of others, explains their incongruity.

When the intellectual faculties are excited to action by the direct influence of the will, there occurs the third mode of activity, viz:

3. Memory, which implies past time and a consciousness of the previous existence of the ideas recalled. The same faculty that originally perceives the object, quality, or relation, is alone instrumental in recalling the perception. Hence the great difference in men in their exercise of the power of recollection, as they are found to differ greatly from each other in regard to the extent with which they

are endowed with the perceptive, knowing and reflective faculties.

There is one mode of activity peculiar to the reflective faculties, and that is:

4. Judgment, which results from a powerful development of comparison and causality. It is the decision of the reflective faculties upon the feelings furnished by the propensities and sentiments, and upon the ideas furnished by the perceptive and knowing ones. In estimating the effect of the reflective faculties in ordinary life, the phrenologists maintain that the propensities and sentiments furnish the desires which prompt to action, and also the feelings which regulate conduct; while reflection, without being able to alter their nature, judges of the motives presented by them to its consideration, and in so doing, takes in an extent of view, greater or less, in proportion to the size of the intellectual organs.

Consciousness means the knowledge which the mind has of its own existence and operations. It is mind recognizing itself in the varieties of its action. It is no faculty itself, but appertains equally to every fundamental faculty, each organ communicating consciousness of the feelings and ideas which it serves to manifest.

Association expresses the mutual influence of the faculties upon each other. It is claimed that there are no laws by which ideas may be associated together, "that one may as well expect by studying the forms and hues of the clouds, which flit along the sky to-day, to be able to discover laws, by which their succession will be regulated to-morrow; as by reflecting on the ideas which passin one mind, to discover links of association, by which ideas in the minds of mankind, in general, will be uniformly connected, and introduced in a determinate succession." But while the phrenologist repudiates any special law of association among ideas, he holds that the powers that produce them, the faculties themselves, are subject to association; that there are natural associations betwixt certain external ob-

jects and the internal faculties; and that artificial associations may be formed betwixt objects and feelings of the mind. The faculties that produce propensities and sentiments are associated with those that are productive of ideas; as the conceiving an object in distress excites the faculty of benevolence. Thus association becomes the mutual bond through which the action of one faculty generates the activity of another. The perceptive, knowing, and reflective faculties are associated with, and mutually assist each other.

Passion is the highest degree of activity of every faculty. The passions may, therefore, be as numerous as the faculties, and their kinds as various as their different functions.

It has been objected to phrenology that the science of mind it proposes is essentially based on materialism. But an attentive examination of the subject will convince any one that there is nowhere a confounding of the faculties with their organs; that no phrenologist anywhere asserts that mind is the product of organization, but, on the contrary Spurzheim expressly says: "Both Dr. Gall, and I, have always declared that we merely observe the affective and intellectual manifestations, and the organic conditions under which they take place; and that in using the word organs, we only mean the organic parts by means of which the faculties of the mind become apparent, but not that these constitute the mind." No one will deny but that the brain is the general organ of the mind, in the sense that the powers and faculties of the one are developed, manifested, or made to appear, through the material organization of the other. In precisely the same way the phrenologist asserts that each special faculty of the mind exists here in connection with its organ, and that by means of such connection it is enabled to display itself in the performance of its function. If this be materialism, every other system of metaphysics must be amenable to the same objection.

From the very imperfect idea we have been enabled to give of the doctrine of phrenology, it will be apparent that the same character of remark made at the close of the Scottish school of philosophy applies also with the same, or greater, force to this. It makes no attempt to fathom depths beyond human comprehension. It seeks not to discover the essence of mind or of matter; but regarding man as he exists in this sublunary world, proposes merely to investigate the laws which regulate the connection between the organs of the mind, and the faculties which are manifested through those organs. Those faculties, all must admit, are to be found in the mind, and the phrenologist asserts in connection with the special organs in and through which they were designed to be manifested. It is in the special functions of these faculties; in their connection with their respective organs; and in their general modes of operation, that the phrenologist claims that he has brought to light important truths not only bearing upon physiology and psychology, but also upon man in his social and moral relations, and upon mind in the multiplied forms of disease to which it may be subject, and also upon the criminal jurisprudence of the nations of the world.

The German School: Critical Philosophy — Kant.

The CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY of the *German school* is another rebound from the skepticism of Hume. Its exponent is Emmanuel Kant, born at Konigsberg, in Prussia, in 1724, and died in 1804. He was the contemporary of Reid.

The point of rebound, which produced the Scottish school, was that of annihilation of the material and mental worlds. Hence the idea of the duality of consciousness.

The point of rebound, which gave origin to the critical philosophy, was the denial of all necessary connection between successive events the principle of causality. Hence the resort to original necessary truths, the recognition, by philosophy, of the rationalistic element.

The two points, two problems, presented by Hume, one regarding the existence of the material and mental worlds, the other the reality of cause, were to be met and solved. Hume had presented them, and defined them so sharply that no one could avoid them. He had marked out the road that would not lead to their solution. It remained for those who might follow, to find a new road, to present a new solution. We have seen in what manner the philosophy of common sense has done it. It now remains to examine the critical philosophy.

This philosophy had its origin in Kant, as the empirical had in Bacon. The former took the same position with regard to experience and human knowledge that the latter had taken with respect to nature. To the former came for explanation the facts of experience; to the latter, the facts of nature. The explanation of a fact is the showing under all circumstances, the conditions under which it occurs. These must necessarily precede the fact,[1] and be sought before the fact itself. The only knowledge known and acknowledged by Hume, and by the great majority of philosophers, was an empirical knowledge. Descartes and Leibnitz, it is true, had taught differently, but the former had insisted upon innate ideas, and the latter had given only scattered hints, which, although they no doubt had their influence upon the German mind, were, nevertheless, not wrought into a perfect system.

It remained, therefore, for Kant to seek out and explain the conditions of empirical knowledge. Where was he to seek and find them? The German metaphysicians had gone above knowledge, and sought its conditions in innate ideas, and failed to find them there. The English and French sensualists had them in knowledge itself with a like failure. Kant sought them before knowledge. He sought the powers and faculties of knowledge, which in action constitute experience. Those conditions, which as necessary

[1] *Fischer*, 497.

functions, precede experience, he called "transcendental." Thus what Kant supposed to be prior to knowledge is not itself knowledge,[1] but consists of the knowledge-forming faculties, that in themselves are empty. These pure faculties he denominated the "pure reason." Thus we pass from the tabula rasa of Locke, and the "innate idea" of Descartes and Leibnitz, to the "pure reason," the aggregate of powers and knowledge-forming faculties that constitute man as man, that give the essence of humanity.

Bacon discovered empirical philosophy in seeking the necessary laws of nature, and Kant the critical in the necessary laws of experience. It is the great merit claimed by Kant that he brought experience to the test of higher laws; that he found something fixed and permanent to which he could anchor its fluctuating phenomena; something necessary by which to rule and govern the contingent.

Kant started with the same objects as Locke had done before him. The purpose of the latter was to investigate the powers and limits of the human understanding. That of the former to "search into the true origin of our ideas,[2] and to define the proper boundaries of human knowledge." But although starting with the same general objects in view, yet the roads they pursued were entirely different.

The great endeavor of Locke was to deduce the laws, or more properly the necessity of thinking, from external objects, the objective. The foundation upon which Locke rested was, that our ideas were representation, produced by outward objects, and are only truthful, if and in so far as they owe their origin to outward objects, and are not produced by ourselves. This, we have seen, led to two results, both legitimate; the one materialistic, the other skeptical. The latter had been pushed by Hume into its ultimate consequences, and in the denial of cause and effect the foundation of all knowledge was destroyed.

[1] *Fischer*, 498. [2] *Morell*, 154.

Kant affirmed the skepticism of Hume. Upon Hume's ground, taken from Locke, that experience was the only source of knowledge, he admitted that there was between successive events no necessary connection. But he made the origin of experience itself the object of investigation, to ascertain under what conditions its developments were made, and to what laws they were subject. Instead, therefore, of going into the objects of knowledge, and educing from them a system of philosophy, Kant went into the consideration of the mind, the subjective; criticizing its faculties, determining its capacities and seeking after those laws, or conditions, upon which the verity of all knowledge reposes. His primary division of all mental phenomena is threefold, the same in substance as that adopted from him by Sir William Hamilton. These are:

KANT.	SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.
1. Knowing,	Cognitive Faculties.
2. Feeling,	Feeling Faculties.
3. Desire and Will,	Conative Faculties.

All these faculties have their ground, origin, cause, or media, in or through which they are enabled to act, in three great sources: the sensory; the understanding; the reason. Of these the first has its intuitions; the second is conceptions formed under its categories; and the third its ideas.

As in the ideas of the latter are found intelligence, unity and identity rendering it the highest in the scale, Kant divides that into: the theoretical reason, and the practical reason. In the former are contained the principles of knowledge; in the latter those of desire and will. And to unite the two together is required: the judgment, which term, however, is here employed in a different sense from that ordinarily in use. Hence the three critics of Kant:

1. The critic of the pure — theoretical — reason.
2. The critic of the practical reason.
3. The critic of the judgment.

It is mainly in the first that the knowledge-problem is sought to be solved, and that in a manner different from any ever before devised.

To the existence of all our cognitions, notions, or ideas, two factors, as they are termed, are essential, viz: The sensory and the understanding. These are commonly called the two factors of all knowledge, or, as Kant has termed them, the two stacks of our knowledge, whether springing from a common root, or not, we may never be able to determine.

The operation singly of either one of these factors would be entirely unproductive, and accomplish nothing. It is in the contributions of each, and the union of both, that we are to seek for the result. The sensor brings the matter, the bare material, of which our sensous cognitions are formed. That is all it can furnish.

The elements thus contributed by this factor, are to have added to them, or woven about them connections, relations, forms. They are to become conceptions of the understanding formed under its categories. These came entirely from within, and belong, therefore, to the subjective element. It is this that can alone furnish the form under, or in obedience to which, cognitions take place. By destroying the sensor factor, therefore, no material could be furnished, and by annihilating the understanding factor, the very conditions under which experience becomes possible would be rendered of no effect. The first is receptive in its character; the second spontaneous. The receptivity of the one induces the spontaniety of the other. It is when the intuitions of the one become clothed with the à priori connections, relations or forms furnished by the other, that an idea or cognition becomes perfect.

As an illustration. Events in succession are presented by the sensor factor, but nothing more. They are intuitions. But on the perception of successive events arises the conception of a cause. This is the principle of causality, and comes from the understanding. It is that factor

supplying the connection, relation, form; and this, together with the facts, gives the perfect idea. The intuitions, without the form, are totally blind, and wholly lacking in significance. And so also the form, the conception of the understanding, without the intuition, would be empty, amounting to nothing.

Kant investigates the understanding in order to determine all the modes or forms of the judgment of which it is susceptible, and these he proposes to be exhaustive. They are four in number: 1. Quantity. 2. Quality. 3. Relation. 4. Modality. The first embraces judgments which are individual, particular, universal. The second those which are affirmative, negative and limitative. The third those which are categorical, hypothetic and disjunctive; and the fourth those which are problematical, assertory and necessary.

From these modes of the judgment are derived the following categories:

Quantity	Unity
	Plurality
	Universality
Quality	Reality
	Negation
	Limitation
Relation	Substance and accident
	Causality and dependence
	Action and reaction
Modality	Possibility and impossibility
	Existence and nonexistence
	Necessity and contingence

Thus we have twelve categories under the frame-work of which are conceived all the notions of which we are sus-

ceptible. These are the conditions standing before all knowledge. They supply the connections, relations, forms in which all intuitions are clothed. They are all à priori in their character. They are neither influenced nor modified by any intuition, but are called into action by those intuitions which are fitted to excite them to activity. They have the characteristic of laws; of laws that preside over experience, and that govern the intuitions which it punishes. The attributes that belong to them, and are developed by their action, are universality and necessity.

These are the machinery of the understanding; but, like all machinery, they are empty of themselves, and only become productive of effects when the proper material is brought within the sphere of its action. This material is the intuitions furnished by the sensor factor. These intuitions arise upon the presentation of phenomena to the sensory. The inquiry is made by Kant whether the sensor factor has not also its categories, or forms of its intuitions, as well as the understanding; and these he finds upon investigation to be two in number, viz: space and time. These are not termed by Kant categories, but general schemata, or forms of sensuous intuition. The warrant for this is found in consciousness. The moment any intuition gives us a perception we feel constrained to place it in some space, and in a given time. These are as essential to the intuition as the categories of the understanding are to the conception. They are the conditions which precede the possibility of experiencing any perception. They are, therefore, à priori in their character, and are the modes in which the soul behaves itself when in a state of intuition. Space belongs to the external sense, and time to the internal. By the former objects external to ourselves become intuitions. By the latter, the facts of our own internal consciousness. We arrive at the former by abstracting everything belonging to the matter of our sensations; and at the latter by abstracting everything belonging to the matter of our inner sense. These schemata, according to Kant, stand

on a kind of middle ground between the categories and the intuitions, having something in common with each. In their à priori character they are assimilated to the categories, and in the fact that everything phenomenal must be represented in space or time they find their relations with intuitions. It is through them that we are enabled to apply the conceptions formed under the categories to phenomena.

The inquiry naturally suggests itself here as to what is subjective and objective in our cognitions. Everything punished à priori must come from the mind, is subjective, while everything à posteriori comes from the object, and is objective. The conditions, connections, relations, forms of thought, as also space and time, all proclaim the notion forming process to be subjective. What is there remaining that can belong to the object? Its whole appearance and contents, as presented in idea, is subjective, and we have nothing that we can figure to ourselves as being a quality of the object itself. All we can certainly give credit to as an à posteriori is the actual phenomenon and its presence at the time of the cognition. It must also have conceded to it the power of causing the formation of conceptions by the understanding, but aside from an existing phenomenon and such a power, which again is entirely subjective in its effect, we are, and must forever, remain in utter and hopeless ignorance of any qualities that may lie back of the phenomenon and belong to the object itself. Even Kant has somewhere thrown out the conjecture whether the *ego* and the thing in itself may not possibly be the same thinking substance. Thus the Kantian system must fail to show us the road, so often sought in vain, that leads from the subjective to the objective.

In reference to the occurrence of phenomena, Kant states the following principles as the postulates of empirical thinking: "1. That which coincides with the formal conditions of experience is possible[1] and can become pheno-

[1] *Schwegle*, 245.

menon. 2. That which agrees with the material conditions of experience is actual and is phenomenon. 3. That, whose connection with the actual is determined according to the universal conditions of experience, is necessary, and must be phenomenon."

We have hitherto been limited to the sensory and the understanding. Superadded to these is the reason, the faculty of the unconditioned. As the categories of the understanding bring order and connection into our intuitions, so is it the province of the reason to infuse unity and connection into the conceptions of the understanding. This it does by drawing conclusions.[1]

The reason has its ideas, and these by exhibiting to the understanding the unconditioned, that perfectness which is its great aim, imparts to it something beyond what experience could ever furnish. The reason has as many ideas as we have ways of connecting together our judgments into conclusions. These are three in number: 1. The categorical. 2. The hypothetical. 3. The disjunctive. The first gives the relationship of substance and accident. The second, that of ground and consequence. The third that of parts and a whole.

The question may be asked whether reason can be isolated from the understanding, and become, of itself a source of notions and judgments. The reply is, that reason, being different from the understanding, may be separated and isolated.[2] That to the understanding belongs experience, and to the reason the perfecting of our subjective consciousness. That while the understanding furnishes the subjective laws of thinking as applied to experience, and depending on the sense world for confirmation and material, the reason, having to do with ideas, "is occupied with itself alone and ruminates on its own notions." As the cognitions of the understanding are furnished in experience, so its principles may look to that for confirmation,

[1] *Chalybaus*, 52. [2] *Idem*, 55.

while the ideas of the reason, not having been given by experience, cannot be confirmed or refuted by it.

The relations between the reason and the understanding, under the Kantian system, are very well set forth by Jacob as the special terms of agreement between the two. "Reason," says he, "is to forbid to the understanding all power of denying, and understanding to reason all power of affirming.[1] Reason is to acknowledge and respect the understanding, and to be kept by it within positive limits. But the limitation of the understanding, by reason, is only to appearance and negative, and the former without surrendering its own proper activity, employs the ideas of reason for the purpose of enlarging as much as possible its own province. Reason occupies the upper, understanding the lower house. It is the latter which represents sensibility, the real seat of sovereignty, without the ratification of which nothing can possess any validity."

From the three ideas of the reason, before mentioned, the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive, giving rise to the three relationships of substance and accident, ground and consequence, parts and whole, three avenues are opened up: the first to absolute subject, the immortal soul; the second the idea of nature or world; the third, that of the most perfect being, God: the first affording the rational psychology; the second cosmology; and the third theology. And yet when the reason attempts to apply the categories of the understanding to the unconditioned, it ends in paralogism, illusion; or in antinomies, contradictions.

For instance, as regards the first, the absolute subject, the immortal soul, its conceptions and feelings being its accidents, its own mere modifications and changes ought to proclaim a something really existing at the foundation, a pure subject, whose existence is evidenced by consciousness. But Kant replies that this is a paralogism, because

[1] *Chalybaus*, 57, 58.

the consciousness is really limited to the modifications and changes, the conceptions and feelings, and can give a knowledge of nothing beyond these. The subject itself remains unknown, never being the object either of external or internal experience. We know as little, according to Kant, of the essence of our souls as of that of external objects.

The same attempt of reason to educe a pure cosmology leads to antinomies, inasmuch as reason can neither conceive that the world had a commencement in time,[1] nor that it had not; neither that it has or has not a limitation in space. This and other contradictions always present themselves whenever the forms of the finite are sought to be transported into the infinite, or to make an application of the infinite to the finite. The real character of the one we can never change into the other. The world, and everything about it, is finite, and we can never change its character, never clothe it with the forms of the infinite. The formula which could embrace the infinite with the finite, keeping the two united without identifying them, could never be found by Kant.[2]

The search made by reason after an all perfect being, God, is equally unsuccessful. It is urged here, that it is impossible to destroy such a being in our thinking, and hence his existence must necessarily remain. But Kant replies that here one of two things must be true. Either: 1. This being is identical with our thinking, and then does not exist in and by itself; or, 2. He is not identical with it, and then to destroy or take him away will not involve any contradiction with our thinking.

In the first part of the alternative, Kant was treading on the very verge of pantheism, so very near that some of his followers readily passed over, and identified thought with existence, subject with object.

The argument of inferring the existence of God from the traces of design everywhere observable in creation, can, ac-

[1] *Chalybaus*, 61. [2] *Idem*, 63.

cording to Kant, lay no claim to absolute certainty; because the only inference authorized to be drawn is that from analogy of human works,[1] God can only be the author of the form of the world, and not of its substance or matter; as simply an architect, but not as creator, nor as an original essence. Another answer is that from all this order and design, the inference may be a law of life inherent in nature, and operating blindly in the production of results.

Thus the theoretical, or pure reason, leaves man forever to grope his way in the sphere of the conditioned without a rational psychology, cosmology, or theology, without any real light from reason relating either to the soul, the world, or to God. Although it makes the strongest possible efforts towards the apprehension of each one of these, yet being tied down to the categories of the understanding, and these again acting upon the sensor intuitions, all such effects are, and ever must be, utterly unavailing. This brings us:

2. To the critic of the practical reason, where the deficiencies of the theoretical are sought to be supplied. We leave the sphere of knowledge with the theoretical or pure reason, and with the practical enter that of rational faith. Here we find certainty, but it differs from knowledge. We have here no cognitions. We are amidst the principles of ethics.

Kant, to be consistent with himself, could only acknowledge a moral philosophy sufficient to lead the soul to itself, to the world, and to God, when it was purged of every empirical element. The ethical element embraces not what is, which is derived from the empirical, but what ought to be, which should come from the rational.

As the essential condition of all ethical evolution, Kant evokes the principle of liberty "that innermost and highest

[1] *Chalybaus*, 69.

principle of our soul, which it was felt impossible to grasp as substance, and as *me* in theoretical reason."[1] This he constituted as the centre of gravity of his entire system. As the supersensual and the unconditioned had escaped the utmost reaching of the theoretical reason, so he here commenced by leaving the principle of freedom completely void, undetermined, and abstract. He gives it no determined character, no fixed organization. It is at bottom simply unlimited and unconditioned freedom, going forth from itself indetermined into that which is external, and taking from it its shape and character. The inclinations and desires, what are termed by Kant the contents of this freedom, are derived from the empirical principle. With these it has to contend, and out of this contest are virtue and morality born. To be free it is requisite to set aside natural desires, and to practice that which is right only because it is right, and not because it may accord with inclination. This is termed by Kant the "law of the categorical imperative," and is engaged in a continuous opposition against the external.[2]

There is, therefore, according to Kant, a possible moral law, and out of an entire obedience to it arises the possibility of a perfect virtue, and from this last a perfect happiness.

From the possibility of the moral law he derives the reality of the idea of freedom;[3] from that of a perfect virtue the idea of the soul's immortality; and from the necessary demand of a perfect happiness, the idea of God. Neither the soul's immortality, nor the idea of God are matters of cognition. They have no existence in thought. They belong purely to feeling, and their recognition in that is conditioned upon the fact: that in that is apprehended freedom which it given to us à priori, as an inner fact, a fact of the inner experience; arising in ourselves, and having nothing to do with our outward experience.

[1] *Chalybaus*, 72. [2] *Idem*, 73. [3] *Schwegle*, 258.

But in passing out of its own charmed circle it encounters on the one hand the law of the categorical imperative, which flows from the reason; and on the other, the desires and inclinations, which, as they arise from the experience of what is felt as pleasing or displeasing, are due to an empirical origin.

It is obvious from this statement, that at least in one view of it, the ethics of Kant cannot be regarded as purely rationalistic, but that the empirical is mixed up with the rational in his theory. To escape from it we are driven back, and limited to the principle of pure freedom, and are obliged to recognize in that the very centre of gravitation in Kant's entire system. Around this revolves virtue, happiness, the soul's immortality and God. But it has, at least, this impediment and obstruction, that in passing out of itself it meets a nature, and empiricism, something external, which, upon the system of Kant, had baffled all the powers of cognition to make its acquaintance, and which now presents itself as an equal barrier to the will. An intelligence should be invoked sufficient to comprehend the objective, to recognize in external nature something more than phenomena, before man can stand forth an object comprehensible to himself.

Kant himself felt that there was a gap left between his theoretical and practical reason. The one had built up a world of conceptions by applying categories to the intuitions of sense; while the other had constructed a moral world, having for its key-note the principle of freedom. Where lay the road from the one to the other? This introduces his third division, viz:

3. Critic of the faculty of judgment, which is the middle link between the understanding as the faculty of conceptions, and the reason as the faculty of principles.

The principle of freedom, in order to be such, must exercise an influence upon nature. But nature proceeds necessarily, and in accordance with its own laws. As the

one, therefore, is apparently wholly independent of the other, the inquiry naturally arises how the two can be connected together.

The link by which this is effected is found in the feelings, those especially of pleasure and pain, those which we have seen entering the domain of freedom, and contesting with the law of the categorical imperative, the domination over the will. This is accomplished by what Kant calls the faculty of judgment.

The object of this faculty may be briefly expressed as the conception of design in nature. It is found in the agreement or fitness of means to ends. This is developed in the actions of free beings, and is susceptible of transference into the actions of nature by a conception of the union of nature with the freedom which acts in it and by it.

The faculty of judgment — the latter term having here a different meaning from that ordinarily given to it — has two modes of operation. By means of one mode it takes into consideration that concurrence of means in the forms of things, and of means to ends, and all those admirable arrangements in creation which give rise to the sentiment of pleasure, which develop in our nature the esthetical. Here we have his theory of the sublime and beautiful, both being purely subjective in their nature.

The beautiful is found by Kant in the consciousness of an ability we possess to bring that vast variety which the imagination represents to us to one idea of the understanding. As one great regulative process of the reason is to unify, and as the exercise of its function is always attended with pleasure, so the perception of unity in the midst of variety always gives rise to a pleasant sensation. There is also accompanying it the sentiment of our own power in successful exercise, and this accompaniment gives additional satisfaction.

The sentiment of the sublime, on the contrary, arises out of the consciousness of our utter inability to embrace by any effort of imagination ideas which the reason presents

to us.[1] The immensity of this disproportion in our power is accompanied with a feeling of sadness, as it gives us a realizing sense of our weakness. But it is also accompanied by a feeling of exaltation because we feel ourselves superior by our reason to the world of sensible things.

The other mode by which this faculty acts is termed by Kant the teleological. It is this judgment which seeks to penetrate the inner design of nature, and to understand for what purpose that design develops itself in organic products. It carries into the theory of nature the principle of final causes, or the relation of means to ends, applied not to the forms, but to the real constitution of things. In nature's organic product it regards every one of its parts as end, and every one also as means or instrument. "In the process of generation, the natural product appears as species,[2] in growth it appears as individual, and in the process of complete formation, every part of the individual shows itself." In view of this judgment beings are organized to attain certain particular ends, and each special organization is to be regarded as a dependence of a general organization of nature in which particular ends are only the means of a supreme and universal end.

The philosophy of Kant obviously leaves the great life problem wholly unsolved. He marks out no pathway from the subjective to the objective. In fact, he annihilates the objective by denying that any of the qualities of things in themselves are brought to our minds. We are living according to him, in a phenomenal world, those phenomena being the intuitions of the sense as moulded and made such by the categories of the understanding. By attributing to these categories such great and general powers, and by investing them with the qualities of universality and necessity, he in effect surrenders nature up to mind, and verges hard on upon a terrible idealism, an entire absorption of all the outward creation into mind.

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 109, 110. [2] *Schwegle*, 267.

His attempted deduction of the immortal soul and of God from the practical reason betrays the weakness of his system, because the theoretical reason is the only possible avenue to knowledge, and the practical can have no other basis than in the ideas borrowed from it. Hence if in the theoretical he furnishes the intelligence with no means of arriving at these great truths, he shuts out the being forever from any apprehension of them.

We ought not, however, to be unmindful of the great merits of Kant. He was a great and profound thinker. His system furnishes the evidence of more deep, continuous, systematic and elaborate thinking than that of any previous modern, and, perhaps, ancient philosopher. He took much clearer distinctions than any before him of the different kinds of mental operations, and sought to mark out, by clear and definite boundaries, the empires respectively of the sense, the understanding and the reason. By marking out clearly the line of demarkation between the conceptions of the understanding and the intuitions of sense, and by attaching to the latter the qualities of the varied, limited, contingent, and to the former those of universality and necessity, he indicated a criterion by which to distinguish two great bodies of human knowledge; the one empirical, the result of experience, bearing about it the uncertainty that flows from the varied, limited, and contingent; the other the exact, mathematical, clothed with all the certainty which can be gathered up from the universal and the necessary.

The system of Kant was indeed a fruitful soil. In it we shall find the germ of many philosophies.

Idealism: Fichte.

There are four German philosophies having their roots in the system of Kant. These are severally represented by Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart and Jacobi.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born in upper Lusatia in 1762, and died in 1814.

It is, says Chalybaus, in the writings of Fichte, and thes e only, that we can obtain the key to the understanding of all modern philosophers.[1]

It was not to be expected that the reflecting mind of Europe, especially of Germany, would long rest satisfied with the system of Kant. It contained within itself principles that required to be developed to be pushed into results which Kant himself did not anticipate. Fichte commenced with being a disciple of Kant, and supposed himself only unfolding his system, until the latter was driven to a formal protest against the interpretation which the former was placing upon his doctrine.

The two factors, sensor and understanding, given in the philosophy of Kant, were to be developed. Of these two, the leaning was much the strongest towards the understanding, in whose categories were recognized the forms fixed and permanent, in subjection to which all thought must necessarily occur. This gave a strong preponderance to the subjective element, and indicated that as the one first to be pursued into its ultimate consequences. Hence the mission of Fichte.

The later writings of Fichte are found to modify somewhat his earlier views. His system of philosophy as first promulgated, has been styled a subjective idealism. It is that which looks to consciousness alone, not only as the means of revealing, but also as the subject matter of what is revealed. The Scottish school had introduced the external world through the duality of consciousness. The school of Kant had denied this duality, and by assuming the unity of consciousness had limited the reality of the knowledge obtained from it to the interior operations of the thinking being itself, while the external creation, the objective, standing apart and exterior to the subjective, although it

[1] *Schwegle*, 183.

may have a reality in itself, yet that reality could never be known to us, and that all our knowledge must be limited to the phenomena, the appearances there presented.

Fichte starting from the Kantian stand point, merely deduced its logical consequence. The interior operations, those of the mind itself, being those only of which consciousness could take cognizance, its testimony must be limited to those alone. When we have arrived at the limits of consciousness we have attained the limits of all knowledge. Neither have we any right to posit existence or being beyond our knowledge of it. Thus all objective existence, as such, is rendered impossible, totally excluded. The phenomena, appearances, are to us the objects, and the only objective that we are capable of recognizing. But these have no real objectivity. They are only the phases, phenomenal outcrops, so to term them, of our own consciousness.

Fichte did not in terms deny the reality of the external world. He only denied the existence of it as a thing in itself, and as separate and independent of the thinking principle. His position was, that as consciousness alone brought us a knowledge of it, and afforded us no other intimation of its origin than as coming from ourselves, and as we have no other warrant for knowledge than that which is furnished by consciousness, we are necessarily shut up to the conclusion that what appears to us as external is nothing more than a reflex of ourselves; that we from the depths of our own nature, actually produce, give origin, to all those varied appearances of the external universe with which we become acquainted. That the trees, and fields, and streams, and thousand other objects, that are passing before us in their almost infinite variety, are nothing but creations of our own thinking principle, only evolutions from ourselves.

When reminded that our consciousness, on whose testimony he relied, referred us to an external world as containing objects possessing the qualities it authorized us to

attribute to them, his reply was that this very reference was subjective, an outgrowth of the thinking principle, and that we were, therefore, still within the circle of our own consciousness.

There was, however, another question presented very difficult of answer. Assuming the ground of Fichte that everything apparently external is in reality only a reflex image, a representation of an internal evolution, how is it that we are compelled to receive it in the order in which it is presented? We can recall to our minds a varied landscape, and by our own internal mental activity we can rearrange its objects, or we can create one in our own minds, giving to it whatever variety we choose. That is owing to the entire freedom we possess and exercise over the movements of our own minds. But if the objects and scenes which enter into the composition of that landscape are originally a part of our own thinking principle, nothing but internal creations of our own minds, why can we not actually perceive them just as our will would dictate? All external objects have to our perception the same relative location. However variously we may imagine a landscape, we cannot perceive one except as it presents itself to us. Whence come the fetters that bind our will in the one case, leaving it to its entire freedom in the other? Whence the fixed determinateness of object that everywhere greets our original perceptions?

To meet this objection Fichte was compelled to descend to a sphere below that of consciousness. He was compelled to assume that there is such a thing as unconscious representations; or that there were determinations, modifications of the inner man, states of the soul, that had an existence prior to the active exercise of consciousness. Fichte everywhere takes for granted that consciousness is only a becoming acquainted with that which is already existent, and that when that which is thus existent, appears in consciousness, it appears under fixed determinations caused not by itself but by something else.

It might be answered that consciousness must have a very singular modification, to allow it to be nonexistent in regard to matters which are themselves the creation, and a part of its possessor. And it may be asked whence is derived the law that renders consciousness nonexistent, or at least nonobservant as to all physical arrangements; that compels all souls to receive as fixed and unchangeable, all those matters of perception, which are derived wholly from themselves, and upon the disposition and arrangement of which so large a portion of their happiness depends?

Fichte, it is true, points the final cause or reason why these original determinations should exist. He denominates the soul a free activity, and gives it originally an unlimited freedom, attributing to it the power of acting, moving, and developing in every direction alike. If therefore it had no limits imposed upon it, it would go off in an unlimited expansion; or taking one direction, would progress eternally in it, without ever returning.

He therefore regards it as evidencing the highest wisdom that the *me*, as he terms it, the *ego*, *I*, should be restrained in its otherwise entirely free operations by the limitations which it encounters in the *not me*, the *non ego*, by which it everywhere surrounds itself. The *me*, according to Fichte, "presupposes something,[1] and that external to, and which is not itself. It perceives within itself a defect, a negation of its individual self-activity in regard to its intuitions, and as everything must have a cause, presupposes other existences to determine these intuitions. It affirms a *not me*, and ascribes to it that activity and causality which it is conscious itself does not exercise. Hence the assumption or representation of objects without us is only a conception of the *me*, an assumption made by the *me* itself. It is true, it is an assumption to which we are forced to have recourse, but only in the sense of being forced upon us by the peculiar subjective laws of thinking of the *me*, viz: by the law

[1] *Chalybaus*, 188.

of thought relating to a causa sufficiens, which law is, of course, again to be traced to the *me* and nothing else."

Thus the doctrine of Fichte affirms that there are in us representations and images which we get in some way of which we are not conscious; and after that we conceive objects external to ourselves, in order to account for the origin of these images. Thus, man by thinking, creates objects to himself, represents them to himself, conceives them as there, and in no other sense have they any existence for him. These objects are only the reflex of our own internal laws of intuition, and at the same time also their product. As they cannot be deduced from the influences exerted by anything external, we must regard them as the ultimate limit of all our knowledge.

Fichte did not start with the idea of originating a new system of philosophy. It was his desire to furnish a doctrine of science, and this he proposed to build upon a single principle, and thus to give it a perfect unity. This principle was subjectivity, and the witness he brought forward on all occasions to establish his positions was consciousness. This was a witness no one could impeach, and yet its testimony was very differently construed by the Scottish and Fichtian schools. It was important, therefore, for Fichte to furnish a clear idea of consciousness.[1]

According to Fichte, consciousness may be looked upon as the central point in which all representations unite. It is the faculty, the power which perceives. It is not any substratum, but the activity, the perceiving itself. Hence that which manifests itself immediately to us, is not an existence, nor a substance, but an activity. It is the representing, the internal imaging, the consciousness. This he compares to an inward eye, sleepless in its character, situated in the centre of our being, and which takes in one after another, all the image objects which are passing before it during the whole course of life.

[1] *Chalybaus*, 194.

Fichte lays down three fundamental laws of all thinking:

1. The original act of all knowing is that the *me* affirms itself. That is, the *me* represents itself to itself; presents to itself its own image as object, and thus renders itself the object of its own intuition.

2. The second law is that the *me* affirms a *not me*. That is, the same consciousness opposes its own self to everything else, and distinguishes between itself as a definite representation and everything else which is not that representation, and comes to know itself all the more perfectly by the contrast thence arising.

3. The law of mutual limitation arising out of these two representations, and is thus expressed. The *me* is, what the *not me* is not, and the *not me* is, what the *me* is not. The two are directly opposed to each other in consciousness, and yet the latter is preserved in its full integrity. The formula embodying the law is the *me* affirms itself as determined or limited by the *not me*. The representation of the *not me*, or objects always flows from the proper activity of the *me* although such activity cannot be regarded as a spontaneous one. It is a necessary activity, but that necessity arises out of its own nature.

Idealism, according to Fichte, views intelligence as acting,[1] and not something active. It deduces definite representations, as external objects, from the acting of that intelligence. As intelligence is itself the highest ground of explanation, its acting must be determinate, and determined by the intellect and its essence. As intelligence, in virtue of its peculiar being, can only act in a certain way, it must have its necessary laws of acting. It is those laws that give it the feeling of environment, although those definite representations, apparently coming from without, are only the limits of its own being. There is nothing objective, but the soul's activity discloses the process of becoming, and brings to the light of consciousness the way

[1] *Chalybaus*, 197.

in which we ourselves have produced a representation. Even if there were any existence other than our own, it could be to us only a conceived existence, and not one self-produced. In the higher consciousness all objective existence wholly disappears as being actual. Nothing remains as really actual except the activity within us. There is only a thinking, representing, forming, an activity fixed to certain laws that are inherent to itself. These laws are nothing more than the unchanging method of that spontaneous and free activity,[1] and that activity is itself the absolute, and that which alone is actual.

Fichte's system had also a practical, as well as theoretical, aspect. The limits which the *me* as theoretic has set over against itself in the not *me*,[2] it must, as practical, seek to destroy, and absorb again the *not me* into itself, or to conceive it as only the self-limitation of the *me*. The practical, reason, in effect, says, "there ought to be no *non ego* since the *non ego* can in no way be united with the *ego*." By the *ego*, or the *me*, Fichte means to be understood not any individual, but the universal *ego*, the universal rationality.[3] The *ego*, so far as it belongs to the practical, has the tendency to pass beyond the actual world, and establish an ideal one. But this striving is always confined to the finite partly through itself, because it goes out towards objects, and objects are finite, and partly through the resistance of the sensible world. We ought to seek to reach the infinite, but we cannot do it; this striving and inability is the impress of our destiny for eternity. Thus Fichte sums up "an original of our absolute being; an effort to reflect upon ourselves,[4] in order to gain this idea; a limitation, not of this striving, but of our own existence, which first becomes actual through this limitation, or through an opposite principle, a *non ego*, or our finiteness; a self-consciousness, and especially a consciousness of our practical strivings; a determination accordingly of our representations, and through

[1] *Chalybaus*, 199. [2] *Schwegle*, 294. [3] *Idem*, 285. [4] *Idem*, 295.

these of our actions; a constant widening of our limits into the infinite."

There is then a possibility of carrying out all that our moral nature demands, and then the whole phenomenal world of sensible objects attains,[1] from this practical stand point, its aim, significancy, and solemn importance of necessity.

Fichte thus derives his theory of rights. We are concious of a free activity; of its limitation in what is apparently an external world, and as a part of it of other rational beings, possessing also a free activity. But these free activities cannot exist without a relation of rights. In virtue of such relation each one has his freedom limited by conceiving the possibility of the other's freedom; but only under the condition that this other also limits his own freedom through that of the first. Hence the maxim, or rule of limitation "limit thy freedom through the conception of the freedom of every other person with whom thou canst be connected." Thus the original right he considers to be the absolute right of the person to be only a cause in the sensible world, though he may be, in other relations, an effect.

Thus the absolute, universal *ego* of science is split up by Fichte in his theory of rights, into a great multiplicity of *egos*, each possessing rights. But the problem of ethics is to bring it out again in its unity. He regards right and morals as essentially different, the one being the external necessity to do or omit something in order not to infringe upon the freedom of another, while the other is the inner necessity to do or omit something wholly independent of external ends, constitutes the moral nature of man. As right arises out of conflict of the impulse of freedom in different subjects, so ethics arise from conflict between impulses of the same person. "There must," says Fichte, "be a course in whose progress the *ego* can conceive itself as ap-

[1] *Chalybaus*, 204.

proximating towards absolute independence.[1] This course is determined in infinity in the idea; there is, therefore, no possible case in which it is not determined what the pure impulse should demand. We might name this course the moral determination of the finite rational being. The principle of ethics is, therefore, always fulfill thy destiny."

Although, upon the principles of Fichte it was easy to account for the external world, as being nothing but a reflex of the *ego*, yet in recognizing the being of a God there were many difficulties to be encountered.

As the idealist regards the word-image as his own product, he is obliged to regard himself as the creator, and can, therefore, never get beyond himself in his search after God. The only real, ultimate ground from which anything can proceed is the *ego* or *me*, and that which, in appearance, hovers before it, is only a modification of its own activity. The elevation, therefore, of the creator of nature into God is, and can be, only self-deification.

But although Fichte in strong terms affirms that the *me*, or absolute activity, is only manifested as the ground and origin of all its modifications, and that all we can declare about it is that it is spontaniety, its essence consisting in self-subsistence, independence and freedom, every limitation known to consciousness existing within yet he maintains that spontaneous operation is on that account in itself not arbitrary, as it places before it an end, not from without but within. It is the self-formed aim of the *me*, beyond which it is impossible to go. It is the reason in concreto, the true essence of the human spirit. This self-formed aim he regards as the innermost and deepest truth of our nature, that which essentially constitutes us, and is the object of our desire and volition. It is not an aim forced upon us, but one self-proposed. It is the pressing and longing of one's nature after its development, and all that the doctrine of science does is to exhibit the method of

[1] *Schwegle*, 298.

that self-development of the consciousness, showing how it gradually comes to remember its contents.

We are here only conscious of the purpose for which a world must necessarily present itself to our view; such appearance being the only means, or the only condition of attaining our self-formed aim, as without it definite action would be impossible. Hence everything contained in that appearance, from the self-formed aim in the beginning to the crude material of the world at the end,[1] are so many mediating links in the chain of progress. All these are but appearance, phenomena, the only thing really true and actual being our self-subsistence and freedom, the inherent barriers and limitations of which are only the form of human consciousness, that of the intellectual side of our activity.

There is an aim in the world's forcing itself upon us as something real. As our own nature manifests itself in the behest of duty as conscience, so the reality of the world also makes itself known, as such, inasmuch as the highest aims of existence can only be carried out in it, and by means of it.

Hence the world's reality rests not on knowledge, but on faith, and this originates from the necessity to carry out the behest of duty, and which requires just such a world to carry it out. And thus, while, on the one hand, it is admitted that the whole world is nothing but the image and reflex of our hidden nature and its manifestation, so on the other, it is evident, that as a whole, it is a moral arrangement throughout, and one subservient to moral purposes. This living and operating moral order is God, the only God that according to Fichte, we require, or can apprehend. Thus God, in Fichte's view, is not substance. He is not even existence, but is pure action. He is the life and principle of a super-sensible world. Order in the some way as I, a finite intelligence, am not an existence,

[1] *Chalybaus*, 205.

but pure acting, an acting in accordance with duty, as being a member of that super-sensible world, order. Thus Fichte very clearly laid himself open either to the charge of atheism, or to that deifying the *ego*.

The system of Fichte maintained that the *ego* alone was both the first and the only immediately real,[1] that it comprised the whole totality of conditions; that it was the sum and contents of everything, the entirely independent and free, the absolute creator for itself and of everything that was going on in it.

But here we meet with a difficulty upon his own principles. Granting all he claims for the *ego*, still it only affirms itself in the opposition to the *non ego*. It only arrives at the consciousness of itself in the fact of its opposition to everything else. Hence as the opposition is mutual, both parts of it, the *ego* and *non ego* equally require to be affirmed. The destruction of either one would extinguish the other. The condition of the one being retained in the consciousness is the presence of its opposite. Fichte's principle, therefore, involved the germ of realism just as fully as of idealism, and hence in the place of the monism he was seeking, we find a dualism fully established.

This objection may have led to a modification of his doctrine, some time previous to his death, which however,[2] retains his former teaching, only breaking through and going beyond it. His doctrine had hitherto been a subjective idealism, but his later efforts endeavored to throw a realistic element into this idealism. He seeks for the real, not like the sensualists without the *me* and in things, but only in the *me* and in the deepest ground thereof. "Here in the self-consciousness of the individual finite *me*, one general universal self-consciousness gradually opens up before him a *me* in and by itself or an absolute *me*, in the broad ground of which all the individual *me* have struck root, and to the unity of which they all go back,[3] while purely apprehend-

[1] *Chalybaus*, 210. [2] *Idem*, 215. [3] *Idem*, 216.

ing their own essence. Thus an all unity of the absolute, under and in all the particular, opens up before him. This reality which he assumed, he found only in the *me*, and it consisted in that creative moral will, which projects the world and all its phenomena by means of those *me* which are infinitely variously endowed. We are by no means that absolute existence, that universal *me*, but we stand connected to it in the innermost root of our existence, as without it we should not at all be capable of existing. This absolute *me*, which he designates as pure knowledge, absolute consciousness, must be apprehended just like the *me* of man, or as pure activity. It is the all prevailing, by itself existent, reason, which, although it does not consist in the knowledge of any one object, is the super-sensual ground of all actual knowledge, the active all penetrating moral world order, the law indeed, but the living, the absolute law, and which is termed the absolute and actual will, on account of that never quiescing activity, in which it consisteth. * * * The absolute taken in and by itself, is that unbounded and undetermined, that infinite One, which is the same in all the *me;* but at the same time it is the ground, and the original ground of all and in all. The individual *mes* apprehend themselves in it only as the manifold revelations of that which is grounded in him. Their existence is the function of letting that general enter into the state of oppositeness of the understanding, that is into reflection, which is peculiar to the *me*, and hence of letting it enter into actual consciousness. Hence it is in them first that being is distinguished from thinking. * * * Thus the *me*, as particularized, constitute, when taken together, the totality of the modes of revelation of the absolute, and from out of its own immanent genius every *me* manifests that which, in its own place, in the total connection is that which is necessary and which should not exist differently, that which is commanded and is in accordance with duty. That absolute then is God, and internally in himself, God is one and not

many; in himself he is one, and the same without change or alteration. * * * * The divine being does not enter wholly and undividedly into those points of liberty (the *me*), which mutually exclude each other, it only enters one-sidedly into them; but beyond those points, and without being veiled by any cover which is only grounded in those points, it enters; it enters just as it is in itself, continuing to form into infinity, and in that form of onflowing life which is inseparable from its life, which in itself is simple. This eternal on-flowing of the divine life is the proper, innermost, and deepest root of existence. It is the continuous, eternal, and unchangeable will of absolute reality, to continue to develop itself in the manner in which it necessarily requires to develop itself."

Fitche does not attribute consciousness to the absolute in and by itself. In his view the absolute is "that fundamental momentum found in the *me* themselves,[1] that part of the *me* which, while presented as the source and spring of activity, is, by itself and without the other momentum of the *not me*, without determination and indifferent." Thus the latter system of Fichte is a sort of idealistic Spinozism. His absolute resembles the immense structures reared by the coral insect, which lie in the back ground, and serve as the basis and foundation of all activity. The entire structure is without determination, and graduated at the point of indifference, from its deep ocean depths to the surface, and there a scene of life and activity presents itself. All along the upper surface the millions of little insects, representing an infinity of *mes* are performing their life labor, each one in building up for itself its own little stony habitation, serving both for its cell and its sepulchre, the home of its joys and its sorrows, and the tomb of its remains. Each possesses a will and a determinateness of its own, in accordance with its constitution and relations; and like the *me* of humanity, is surrounded by an environ-

[1] *Chalybæus*, 219.

ment of its own creation. The root of its own existence, as also that of its environment, is found in the immense structure of which it forms a part. And when its own cell is completed, which constitutes its sepulchre its life labor is ended; its existence as a separate living entity ceases; and it drops back into the absolute, contributing to form a part of that out of which it derived its origin and from which it took its departure.

In one respect, perhaps, may Fichte render the aspirations of his *me* superior to those of the coral. He saw clearly enough that although he might term his absolute an abstract fundamental momentum, in and by itself, yet that the *me* like the coral, always finds itself shut up within "incomprehensible limitations." Yet Fichte makes it propose to itself the task of breaking through these barriers for the purpose of setting itself free. He points psychologically and historically, to a progress in that unceasing work of destruction, which follows a certain definite plan, and constitutes a philosophy of the history of mankind.

He distinguishes in this three stages, or periods. First, the *me* occupies the sensor's standing point of felicity.[1] "For," says he, "as every *me* is a one-sided and partial existence of the divine all-being, and represents some one particular function of the divine will, it also apprehends itself first of all in that particularity, and looks upon itself as being a whole, by opposing itself to the other volitions, which are in the same way particular, and by thus asserting and claiming exclusive being. Hence its will is not one with the universally divine will, but stands in antagonism to it."

This brings us to the second stage, or period, that of choice, in which the *me* makes a choice between the two volitions, and has to carry out a resolution as to whether it is to be determined in accordance with its own individual volition, or with the eternal one. This position he terms the standing point of the law.

[1] *Chalybaus*, 220.

The third stage, or period, consists in the destruction or removal of this oppositeness, in order that at last the stage of pure and free morality, and with it that of blessedness, may be attained. Here the individual *me* disappears. It sinks into the absolute. It has no will apart from the divine will. "In the end, and where is the end? (says Fichte), everything must after all cast anchor in the secure harbor of eternal rest and blessedness; in the end the kingdom of God must come forth in its might, in its power and in its glory."

These different stages, or periods, appear better adapted to the experience, or life history, of each individual *me*, than to that of the race taken as a unit; and even if it applies to the latter, to continue our former figure, what is the sinking of every individual *me* into the absolute but the arrival of the coral structure to the ocean's surface, when all coral life becomes extinct, and nothing but the dead structure, the absolute, alone remains?

Pantheism — Schelling, Hegel.

Frederick William Von Schelling was born at Leonberg, in Wirtemberg, in 1775, and died at Ragaz, in Switzerland, in 1854. Historically, he sprang from Fichte, as he takes him for his starting point.

Fichte's first stand point makes all our knowledge to be summed up in a subjective activity; that no person is capable of knowing or of experiencing more than what lies or what goes on within the sphere of his *me*,[1] that is, of his self-consciousness, and everything that is going on there, is a self-activity of the consciousness. This was a subjective idealism, and Schelling was not long in perceiving the one-sided subjectivity of that system, and the knowledge it proposed to furnish. He accordingly, in his early speculations, maintained that if there was to be knowledge there

[1] *Chalybaus*, 238.

must be something that is to be known, there must be existence, referring, however, only to the antagonism between the finite *me* and the external world. He called attention to the antagonism between the absolute producing *me*, the subject, on the one hand, and the product, the representation, the object, on the other hand; claiming that the ideal and the real are, as far as their root is concerned, identical. He burst through all the obstacles and fetters of subjectivity, extending the limited *me* of Fichte, into the universal world, sphere, thus taking his stand at once both in the absolute and the real. The absolute ground being absolute activity, time and space are the form of its movement. Space is only activity enlarging and extending itself, and time is given as the limitation of that activity. Time and space are the necessary conditions of all intuition,[1] that first or original mental activity found in the consciousness. Thus movement is a compound of time and space, and is that which externally corresponds to the succession of representations. Expansion and contraction constitute the form of what is termed material nature, which is externally beheld by us, or of the life of nature in general.

The great universe, under the magic wand of Schelling, becomes the one grand unity, the world-*me*, which has its movements in time and space, which movements result in the production of all objects, all that exists. The individual, finite *me*, in virtue of its internal activities, brings forth an infinitude of intuitions, but being itself only a part of the grand totality, it is the universal world-nature, which is working in each individuality as one of the many points in or through which it acts and works. It is this world-nature, which, on the system of Schelling, has organized itself into human souls, and through them, knows, or becomes cognizant of itself. These individual souls, he regards as the numberless individual eyes by which the

[1] *Chalybaus*, 244.

infinite world-spirit contemplates itself.[1] We all constitute, taken together, the world-spirit; and the term being, in its full acceptation, can only apply to the universal life-force and power of nature, in the pulsations and successive formations of which our particular terrestrial organizations also is one passing momentum.

But this great world-spirit, in its activity cannot, according to Schelling, contemplate itself, cannot become aware of that which it is and does. Objects of nature are never objects to themselves, but to others. Man alone is both subject and object to himself. He alone acts, and becomes conscious of his activity. He alone is subject-object.

In perfect self-consciousness, the self,[2] or existence to be known, coincides with the knowing; and when we come to know that a being is internally, in its hidden contents, only the play of the same activities which also constitutes knowing, then only does the knowing and known, the ideal and the real, perfectly correspond to each other. Then only does knowledge interpenetrate nature, and everywhere in nature finds again itself.

The question as to how impressions of corporal objects gain an entrance into our incorporal souls is a puzzler to the German philosophers.[3] They seem rather to regard it as a general psychological fact, as an internal experience, and an immediate necessity. This is declining to explain it, and leaving it upon ground very analogous to that of the Scottish school.

The intuitions are just images existent in the soul, which, although occasioned by something external and at first unconsciously as far as concerns the soul, are still self-actively produced by it. The only respect in which the notions originate empirically is that they are repetitions or portraitures of intuitions which actually exist in the consciousness, and about whose external or internal origin nothing has as yet been determined. It is by means of

[1] *Chalybaus*, 246. [2] *Idem*, 247. [3] *Idem*, 250.

intellectual intuition that the mind penetrates into the innermost depths of nature, and through it; for nature is the all-one, and the individual man only an integral part of it, and hence all the other parts of nature are to him thoroughly one and the same with what he is himself.[1] The essence of nature is mind, though still slumbering and dreaming on many lower stages of self-development. But all nature's activities are in themselves nothing else but the activities which are observed objectively by us as movements, and which subjectively we bring to self-consciousness within ourselves as activity of the mind. Existence, reality, or life, is that universal nature which continually effects itself, the natura naturans which, in unfolding gives form to itself, and which in all its forms only manifests its own essence which is thus brought forward, and its own life. In its innermost and deepest point it is the absolute *meity;* the living ground of subjectiveness, which brings, by an absolute self-development, everything out of itself, transforms the possible into the actual, the subjective into the objective.[1] That eternal evolution constitutes nature, and it has ever had a gradual progress from that which is lower to that which is higher. Nature has therefore a progress and a history. The ultimate end of all evolution is attained where the life which at first had been blindly operating acquires self-consciousness. All along its progress and everywhere, the mode of activity is the same, viz: a self-objectivizing, a pendulum-like swing between subjectivity and objectivity; a pulsating of expansion and contraction, a going out of and returning to one's self. It operates unconsciously in the lower stages, and reaches self-consciousness only in the higher. But as that fundamental essence which in man is self-consciousness, recognizes again its own life and essence in the rest of nature, and beholds there objectively that which it had subjectively perceived within itself, it results that all know-

[1] *Chalybaus*, 259. [2] *Idem*, 260.

ledge has two poles, presents two distinct aspects, subject and object, knowing and known. This gives origin to two fundamental sciences, or rather two aspects of one and the same life from two different points of view:

1. The philosophy of the mind, the self-consciousness of the subject—transcendental idealism; the idealism of knowing considered by itself.

2. The philosophy of nature, existence or life, objectively considered from its real aspect and its own self-development. These two supplement each other, presuppose one another, and in starting from the one we are driven to the other.

Schelling's theory of nature was that perfection was only attained when all nature could resolve itself into an intelligence; that its lifeless and unconscious products are only its unsuccessful attempts to reflect itself, and hence is only non-matured intelligence; that its becoming wholly object to itself is only attainable in its last and highest reflection,[1] which is nothing else than what we term reason, by which nature returns perfectly into itself, thus proving that originally it is identical with that which we recognize in ourselves as furnished with intelligence and consciousness.

The views entertained by Schelling varied at different periods of his life. His philosophy of nature, as originally developed by him, presents a splendid scheme of pantheism; a scheme bearing throughout a semblance of science. This philosophy consisted essentially in self-development; in assuming that this is based at the foundation upon self-movement. This in its lowest stage is a mere obscure tendency of nature, and in its highest is reason, that which perceives and knows itself. So far as regards essence, everything is considered one and the same.[2] Beyond tendency, movement and activity, there is nothing; the real and material only consisting in the play of those activities which mutually determine each other.

[1] *Chalybaus*, 262. [2] *Idem*, 265.

The essence, all the powers and forces of nature exist: 1. In potentiality, in ability to become a universe simply as natura naturans. 2. In actuality, in having become a world or universe, as natura naturata. Both these together are unitous, constituting a whole, are the absolute. It is the same original essence which entering into all the shapes and forms of nature constitutes their interior, and thus the absolute and infinite being is neither above nor without nature, but within it, and all objects, we ourselves, everything around us is only that omnipresent eternal existence and being in its development. The life-power starts from a single point, a point of indifference, and works itself out into product, which is the self-exhibition of its own essence becoming object to itself.[1] That power once set free, must, by its own working, go out into the periphery.

In the individual, as in the general, there is a law at work elaborating and pushing out the germ that which lay within it, and that unconsciously and blindly. This law appears objectively as a blind, internal necessity. But it is in no sense a law imposed by a higher power. "It is the desire of the germ after development.[2] It is the moving force of its own nature. Its working is the successive self-deliverance and self-satisfaction, and hence the manifestation of freedom."

There is a uniformity in the working of nature.[3] It works in the grand whole just as in every individual germ. In both, the original tendency organizes itself into actuality, that which first existed as mere potentiality works itself out both in the totality and the diversified parts. It is the potence and the working unitedly, inseparably, that constitutes the first identity.

This potence, in as far as it has attained in nature to actuality, is termed subjectivity; and so also existence, in as far as it is the ground of itself is subjectivity, but in as far as it is borne up by an internal ground, it is objectivity. In

[1] *Chalybaus*, 266. [2] *Idem*, 268. [3] *Idem*, 269.

actuality these are one and the same; and existence is the identity of subjectivity and objectivity.

Thus we have at the foundation being in itself, absolute existence, infinite and without difference. But it becomes membered and determined into the greatest possible variety. These diversified parts, whether considered by themselves or compared with each other, will apparently, some more than others, belong to the subjective or objective side of the infinite being. Every difference in existence can only depend on a relative preponderance either of subjectivity or of objectivity.

Existence is self-activity, but as our own self-activity consists in thinking, so we conceive the self-activity of nature to consist also in thinking. And as our thought-images are mere nonentical objects, so those of the universal spirit of nature also are formations which, as such, possess no essentiality in themselves. But as they are only the spirit-assuming form, they are, nevertheless, actual and real, even as our own thought-images are the spirit which has assumed those shapes, and which have thus a claim to existence. Our thought-images appear non-real to us, because we perceive the subjectiveness of our conceptional objects. But in the same manner the infinite being looks through the subjectiveness of all his creatures, and knows (if possessed of consciousness) that those formations which we term natural objects are only his own thoughts, and are not separated from him.

But although all nature is in itself absolute self-movement, yet every individual part or organ in that nature is not in its individuality capable of perceiving itself in this self-movement. There are individual beings in which that self-movement has not yet been matured into self-intuition. Matter, for instance, is existence in its first form, the root of all things, whose two factors are expansion and contraction. These two factors in the world of matter are analogous to intuition and apprehension in that of mind. The expansive force is the first positive factor as it produces

space and extension. Time is the negation of space, that which retards in the movement, and constitutes the succession in activity. By it the universe obtains unity, and the individual its boundaries. So also the universe its eternity, and the individual its relative duration.

Schelling regards gravity as the relatively preponderating force in objective nature, and that it appears as matter. On the contrary, light, which he defines to be the internal tremulous motion of matter, he regards as the thinking, the internal intuition of nature by herself. It is the soul, the spiritual activity of the world. The whole formation of nature has proceeded from the mutual struggle of light and gravity. This necessarily supposes a history,[1] and this history a progress. There is no rational life without progress, and no life without struggle.

The process into which light and matter first enter is the magnetic-electro-chemical one. The chemical one is the arrested organic process. In the stage of the finite light is the soul or moving principle of nature, ruling over matter as far as gravity will permit. In this struggle matter is developed into its thousand diversified forms; those forms constituting individually finite inorganic pieces, but when considered in the total, are the life-endowed members of the infinite body of nature, or of the whole material world.

Gravity manifests itself between individual bodies as power of cohesion, or as magnetism, endeavoring to comprehend together all individuality, and to exhibit matter as a continuity. The totality of material existence to which this tends is represented under the schema of an infinite magnet; and by this he means a line whose poles exhibit existence, that is the coming forward of the expansive and contractive force in their activity. Electricity he regards as the eternal universal bond, which manifests in the individual the imperfectness of every individual as such, and hence only the completeness of two that are antago-

[1] *Chalybaus*, 287.

nistic, while magnetism, as the temporal bond, endeavors at the apprehension of the same in the individualities. Magnetism is the expression of the unity of two opposites. It is in *one*, what electricity is in *two* bodies.

Gravity and light are antagonistic; the first producing a stronger cohesion, a more perfect magnet, expelling the luminous essence which manifests itself as heat; the latter expanding and loosing the bonds of cohesion.

If nature is regarded as one infinite organism, then every part is only serviceable to the whole, and has by itself no existence and no aim; the only aim of its existence being to fulfill a definite function for the whole. But nature, by virtue of its final aim, more perfectly to develop its proper essence, and in that development to render it object for itself, tends always to greater and greater individuation of objects, even in the individual. Hence it aims, as much to exhibit relative totalities in the individual, as, on the other hand, it again swallows up all these totalities in the one grand organism. Hence the individual may exhibit a microcosm, an organism, a perfected exhibition by one particular life of the universal life of the substance.

"It is," says Schelling, "that same unity of the grand whole and its individual parts which contains and provides everything,[1] which moderates the movements of universal nature, those silent and continuous ones as well as the violent and sudden changes in accordance with the idea of the whole, and always brings back everything into the eternal circle; it is that same divine unity which, infinitely desirous of affirmation, also forms itself into animal and into plant, and which, if once the moment of its coming forward is decided, aims with irresistible power to transform earth, air, and water into living beings, into images of its universal life."

The chemical process Schelling regards as organizing, but one which continnally miscarries. This arises out of

[1] *Chalybaus*, 283.

the fact that nature is as yet perfectly detained and occupied in the fluctuating, and is unable to apprehend or seize itself at any point, as each individual part obeys a law situate without itself. Hence nature presents itself no where as self-subsistent life in itself. This it only attains when it reaches the organism of the individual.

"The life and existence of organic beings depend upon this, that the chemical process which is running out in them is always again renewed, that an antagonistic process is continuously opposed in them to the former process and thus organic life is a process of processes, which, in their succession, do mutually anew call forth each other."

The two organized bodies are the plant and the animal. In the former the chemical process effects a continuous decomposition into hydrogen and oxygen. The continued and fresh supply of the latter is accomplished by means of light. In the latter the continuous restoring of capacity in the organs, consists in the irritability with which they are endowed, and which manifests itself as mobility. The system of its movements is a mechanism shut up within itself, and by that means enabling it to attain free or self-movement. But the actual attainment of it depends on another faculty of animal nature, which stands opposed to irritability, and that is sensibility which first awakens in the animal. Irritability and sensibility mutually determine each other,[1] the former furnishing the material, the positive; the latter the form, the negative, while only both of them together produce the formation, which may be considered as the peculiar life of organic beings. The comprehending together in one notion irritability and sensibility gives, according to Schelling, the notion of instinct, that being the tendency to motion determined by sensibility.

Irritability and sensibility belong wholly to the sphere of blind activity, which obtains also in the animal portion of human life. They are devoid of consciousness. The latter

[1] *Chalybaus*, 287.

only occurs when the activity which had at first wholly entered in, and been absorbed by its product, separates itself from that product, spontaneously repeats itself, has intuition of itself, as activity, and thus becomes an object to itself in the same manner it had formerly been to an on-looker standing without. When the activity, which first takes place blindly and instinctively, makes itself within itself the object, then the tremulous movement that which had been felt, and which had been unconsciously present, would be transformed into sensation, which is the first stage of consciousness. So long as the activity of the living subject continues to enter wholly into its product, no consciousness can take place. The feeling will be as in a dream. There is no feeling that it feels.

Nature attains its highest stage in man. Here everything which had hitherto only existed as objective, as the whole sphere of unconsciously operative nature, passes immediately to the other side, viz: that of objectiveness, leaving behind it only pure subjectiveness.

Schelling concedes that nature throughout acts in conformity to a design, but not with purpose, and hence that all its products will also be conformable to design, although not brought about with the consciousness of any such. While, therefore, nature exhibits adaptation to design, and wisdom, it is accounted for only on the ground that the unconscious activity of nature, "the dream life of the spirit of nature in its unconsciousness necessarily harmonizes with the conscious activity," the former being in itself the same as the latter has actually become to itself.

While the mechanism of nature is blind, it is still in that mechanism adapted to a design, The charm possessed by organic nature in all its surroundings grows out of the contradiction that while itself the product of blind natural forces, it is nevertheless all through, both externally and internally, adapted to design.[1] The immanent life in nature

[1] *Chalybaus*, 293.

is that unreflected mode of intuition which, although unconscious, yet acts like consciousness and as blind tendency in nature, is all the more certainly operating according to design.[1] Hence," says Schelling, "although we see animals moving, as it were, unconsciously we witness their performance of innumerable effects, which are much more splendid than themselves. We see the bird intoxicated, as it were, by music, surpassing itself in melodies full of deep feeling; the little creature, endowed with art performing without practice or instruction works of architecture, but all of them are directed by one all powerful spirit, which while in them it shines forth in individual flashes of cognition, yet displays itself only in man as the sun in his full strength."

In arriving at man we have reached the spiritual region. Here there is nothing but knowing, a knowing which has the whole real world of existence presented to it as something placed over against it, as existence. That world has become the intuition of its own intuition. The infinite here dwells in, and mingles with, the finite. It exists in the finite as that which is ideal, as knowing, as consciousness. It gives to man all his poetry, all his inspiration, all his longings after the beautiful, all his yearnings for the sublime. The first revelation of the infinite, therefore, is art. The whole art-world is only a projection from the infinite.

A second stage of the infinite is that of religious faith. While this is absorbed in apprehending the all-unitous, as the all-one in the highest abstraction of being, it loses sight of what is sensuous and finite, by considering it as a mere momentum of the all-one, and as in itself thoroughly nonentical.

The third, and last stage, consists in a comprehension of the true relationship between the subjective and the objective, in absolute knowledge or in true philosophy, which unites the objectiveness of art with the subjectiveness of

[1] *Chalybaus*, 293.

religion. In the accomplishment successively and successfully of these different stages, "the infinite world-drama unfolds itself as a history, whose commencement dates from the eternity that preceded the present creation."[1]

As to the origin of finite beings it is obvious that upon the system of Schelling there can be no such thing as a creation in the proper sense of that term. His system completely reverses the course of creation. As we understand it, the infinite spirit preceded creation, and, by his own self-moved, creative act, called into being everything that exists. According to Schelling, matter in its purely inorganic form was the original substance, and only preceeded by the potentia which as yet did not exist. Then the progress was by successive steps and stages. "The subjective rose in matter more and more victoriously from stage to stage, as life, light, and spirit, until it attained absolute subjectiveness, that is, pure ideality, to which everything else had become objective, had assumed the garb of the real." Thus spirit, according to Schelling, was not the first but the last which came forth, nor can we, in any sense, consider it as the creator of the world. This infinite spirit, absolute subject, world-*me*, is in its highest stage the world-spirit, which is in the macrocosm that which human consciousness is in the microcosm. In the same sense as the human impregnated germ, without purpose or object, develops itself into a perfect organism, and at last arrives at self-consciousness, so infinite nature developed itself in the world until it entered upon the stage of spirituality, that is, it came to know, came to objectivize itself in its own perfected work, the same work which at the same time always is and remains. And when arrived at this stage the activity of nature has reached its limit and ceases to be productive. It then turns to thinking and becomes only ideal. It becomes purely subjective, and produces only thoughts, ideas, formal repetitions of the

[1] *Chalybaus*, 298.

creative activity. "It exists as a particular function of the life-activity, as a higher one, as *meity*, self-consciousness, without being in itself really different from the life power.[1] Thus the individual human soul is both the blind working and self-formative tendency of life, and is in a higher function, at the same time also self-contemplative, thinking, or self-consciousness."

The absolute is all-producing nature, and acts in and through all its products, nor is in any way separated from them. These products, all natural objects, do not exist at all by themselves, and as separate beings. They are only the activity of nature arresting and fixing itself in the course of its own operations. It is only in man that the absolute becomes perfect subject, becomes actual knowledge, and is no longer mere real working. Nature, in man steps out of its workshop and contemplates itself. Man is that thought of nature in which it represents itself, he is the perfect portraiture of the absolute, for he is absolute himself. His absoluteness consists in his freedom, he has within himself the principle of *meity*, and, in this respect, represents the absolute *meity* of the world-*me*.

The world-spirit continued marching on in its eternal process of production until it attained the stage of self-consciousness. Then occurred the antagonizing of subjectiveness and objectiveness; the last object presented being the idea of man, of reason, cognizing itself.

Schelling maintains that everything which proceeds out of the unity of absolute existence,[2] or which appears to separate itself from it, must possess in it already the possibility of existing by itself; but the actuality of separate existence can only be found in that which is separated itself; and this separation can again only be ideal, and can only take place in the measure, that a being has been rendered capable of existing as unity to itself, by the mode of its existence in the absolute.

[1] *Chalybaus*, 300. [2] *Idem*, 303.

But here occurs a difficulty. How is the finite, the product, connected with the absolute? If it owes both its origin and continuance to the all-unitous absolute, having in it its root, and deriving from it its nourishment, as a part from the whole then must it cease to have any separate or independent existence. And if not, then it must be absolute in itself, and then we should have a plurality of absolutes, and no one supreme. This difficulty bears directly upon human freedom and the freedom of the absolute. If the absolute is everything, and things only its temporary forms, or if it alone exists giving birth out of itself to all the transformations which result in things, it is obvious that beyond it can neither be a material nor a spiritual world. All individuality, or prevalence of individual will, would be annihilated.

To obviate this difficulty Schelling endeavors to establish a theory of creation in accordance with which man, so far as regards his essence, may have his root in the absolute; but as to the form of his existence, may be self-subsisting. At the same time the absolute, although entering into all its productions, still appears, as to its form, the absolute, persisting by itself above and without those productions. He does not intend wholly to separate things, or men, so far as regards their real essence from the absolute, or to disjoin them from all connection with universal powers. He thinks it conceivable that, so far as concerns man's real essence, he may be an integral part in the absolute, while he continues in a form of existence which clothes him with the character of the absolute, or of self-subsistence. He is well termed a consequence and a modification of the absolute, but in that respect, he has only a one-sided relationship to the universal absolute, while in other respects, he may be the very opposite as a child is the consequence of his parent, although he may possess very opposite qualities.

Schelling claims that the immanency of the absolute in us, or our immanency in the absolute, is the only means of

preserving our freedom. But here another difficulty occurs relating to the existence of evil. If everything originates from, and is sustained by, the absolute, how is the existence of evil to be accounted for? Schelling attempted explanation in some of his later writings, and in doing so, he penetrated beyond the limits of his former philosophy of nature, and seems to feel that the ultimate key to the enigma of the world is not to be sought in the physically and blindly operating laws, nor in the categories of nature, but in the ethical categories of liberty. He asserts that it is in freedom that the last potentiating act is to be sought, by which all nature transforms itself into sensation, into intelligence, and finally into volition. That in the last and highest instance, there is no other existence, save willing. That willing is original existence, and all the predicates of that existence apply to it alone, viz: groundlessness, independence of time, and self-affirmation, and that all philosophy aims only to find that expression.[1]

Still the difficulty occurs of freeing the absolute from the charge of evil. And to effect this he suggests "that the immanency of the absolute in the finite may not be surrendered, but that part of the absolute or of the divine, which is immanent in the finite being, cannot be the whole absolute essence of the deity, nor can it be especially that, which in the absolute peculiarly constitutes that which is divine.[2] But this leads us to a distinguishing something in God himself, which even in him cannot be designated as divine, or to an aspect of the absolute, from which if it be looked upon, itself is not divine; for, if things are to be separated from God in some manner, and if their immanency is nevertheless to be preserved, then must they have their ground in that which in God is not God himself."

But it may be asked what that is in God which is not himself? Or, from what aspect is it, that if the absolute be viewed, it is not to be designated as God.

[1] *Chalybaus*, 312. [2] *Idem*, 314.

The above position of Schelling is put forward barely as a suggestion, as a possibility, but it is quite obvious that its truth would mar his entire system, if not utterly destroy it; for if the identity between the absolute and the finite is to be preserved, then the essence, which is originally one and absolute, must in some way or other, enter into the finite, and be immanent in it. Thus we have a system of pantheism which identifies creative power with the thing created, transforms God into the world-spirit, and acquaints us with no higher intelligence than that which is found in the self-consciousness of man.

George William Frederick Hegel was born at Stuttgard, in the year 1770. He was professor successively at Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin, where he died of the cholera in 1831.

Hegel took root both in Schelling and Fichte. He adopted the method of the latter and the philosophical stand point of the former. His undertaking was to reduce that, "which by the vision of genius the author of the modern philosophy of nature had discovered and sketched in an aphoristic manner,[1] into the stable form of a regular scientific system." His endeavor was to fuse together the scattered elements of Schelling's philosophy by means of the absolute method. While he lacked the invention of Schelling, he possessed greater logical acumen, and a far more rigorous method.

The German philosophy had been in a constant state of development, or evolution, from the time of Kant. His system admitted a double principle as the basis of all philosophizing. The one was found in the subjective forms of the understanding. The other in the empirical element, which, uniting with these forms, gave rise to real knowledge. Thus he proclaimed the bans between the idealistic and the realistic, placing, however, the ultimate control rather with the former than the latter.

[1] *Chalybaus*, 344.

Next followed Fichte, who exalted idealism to so enormous a height, that it remained alone without a competitor. He resolved all knowledge into human consciousness, affirming that we can know nothing with any certainty except it be the act of our own consciousness. With him, philosophy takes its stand upon the subjective principle, and all knowledge, like the web spun by the spider, is to be drawn entirely from the action of the mind in and upon itself.

Schelling very clearly perceived that this exaltation of the *ego*, rendered it the absolute generating principle of all things, and reduced the world to occupy simply the position of a shadow projected by its own laws. Or if he allowed the terms of subject and object to have a distinct existence he failed in presenting a single and absolute basis for human knowledge, and philosophy once more returned to lose herself in the wranglings and controversies of the realist, the idealist, and the skeptic. To escape from this difficulty he affirmed the fundamental unity and intimate identity of subject and object, regarding them as the two poles of existence, which although separate in their manifestations, were nevertheless always infallibly leading the one to the other. Schelling was never able to give unity to his system. He could never find the point of indifference. The poles always remained apart. There were no forces contained in his system that could compel them to come into proximity with each other.

Hegel, following Schelling, goes further and affirms that subject and object, thought and existence, are absolutely one, and that the only actual reality is that which results from their mutual relation. Take for illustration the idea of a mountain. Fichte would derive it from the mind's own inward activity. Schelling would claim that its outward existence and inward perception are both real, are the two poles of its existence, and both are but manifestations of the absolute essence in different stages of its development.

Hegel would deny both the outward existence and the inward perception in their separateness of existence, claiming that neither could exist alone. He finds the only reality in the relation, or synthesis of the two, and makes the essence or nature of being itself to consist in the coexistence of two opposites. Ideas, in his view, arising from the union of two opposites, are concrete realities, and the process of their evolution is, at the same time, that of all existence, the absolute God. He also makes logic the necessary basis of absolute idealism.

The Hegelian philosophy begins by attempting a conception of the laws of thought. The following is his explanation of the process of knowing, This is accomplished through consciousness, and is rendered complete in three movements:

The first is that in which consciousness is so conditioned that it is one with the object.[1] The knowledge of the external world could never be derived from pure sensation. All that can be extracted from it is bare feeling. To attain a knowledge of any object, there must be a complete blending of subject and object.

In the second we objectify, sensation becomes perception, and our feeling is referred to some real outward existence, as the cause. Here appears the understanding, the faculty by which the separation between subject and object is effected.

The third process is that in which our consciousness again returns into a state of complete union with the object. In this we perceive the object as a product or process of our own minds. While as an outward reality it is destroyed, as a process of our own consciousness it is preserved. This has the same relation to the reason as the former had to the understanding. This procedure by which everything comes into being is regarded as the soul and essence of life, nature, and even the absolute; and deity itself

[1] *Morell*, 459.

which in other systems was an original and self-existent reality, is here reduced to a simple process or movement, whose essence consists in ever unfolding itself, and in never being completely unfolded.[1] God has no other realization than that which is attained by him in the progress of human consciousness, but the process by which this realization is affected is absolutely synonymous with himself. Thus with Hegel everything is resolvable into dialectic process. It is nature, his method, his deity, his everything. All are but pulsations of this movement, God himself being only the same law taken absolutely in its whole comprehension. Thus we have a universe made out of pure relations, and the process — method — elevated to the absolute idea, God.

Hegel's stand point is the absolute idea. But this is neither infinite substance, nor infinite subject, nor infinite mind. It is only a perpetual process, an eternal thinking, which is equally without beginning or end. This thought process is with him identical with the logical evolution of ideas in the human mind. In this evolution he finds the idea dividing itself into two opposites, the one being the negation of the other, the idea hanging in a balance between the two. But this negation is met by another negation which restores the idea. The same process is again repeated, at each turn evolving the idea to a higher degree, and thus it proceeds until it reaches the absolute idea itself.

The threefold movement discernible in the human mind was transferred by Hegel to the whole universe of thought. There, also, he claimed there were three successive steps, or stages. The first, is the infinite idea in itself. The second, the idea in its objective form. The third, the idea in its regress. These movements give: 1. Bare thought. 2. Thought externalizing itself, nature. 3. Thought returning to itself, mind.

[1] *Morell*, 461.

This gives occasion to a threefold division of philosophy, viz:

I. Logic.
II. Philosophy of nature.
III. Philosophy of mind.

The first appropriates the region of bare thinking.

The second, that of thought in its objective forms.

The third that of thought in its reflective movement in the human soul.

The whole mission of philosophy, according to Hegel, is to develop existence from its most empty and abstract form up successively through logic, nature and mind, to its highest and purest elevation as attained in the human consciousness. And here again, he finds the same process perpetually repeating itself, and gaining something fresh at every pulsation, until it reaches its highest point of possible perfection.

I. Logic exhibits the first and most undeveloped form of the absolute. It deals with thought in its subjective processes, and is never satisfied until it has reached a method by which the empty may gradually become rich and full. He starts by claiming that all knowledge consists in a separation or distinguishing of one thing from another. In his analysis of thought he finds two parts standing opposed, both absolutely necessary to give it a meaning. This applies equally to sensation, perception and reflection. In reference to each there must be something separated, defined, distinguished, or placed in opposition to something else. Illustrations of this are found in the fact, the finite and the infinite, cause and effect, subjective and objective. Neither of these can be conceived without the other.

There can, therefore, be no absolute unity. Every idea must consist of two sides, a positive and a negative, and it is the combination of these that forms the perfect idea.

This he terms the doctrine of contradiction. In his view in every conception of the reason every other is contained implicite, and may be dialectically developed from it. The domain of logic he considered to be truth as it is *per se* in its native character, characterizing it as the representation of God as he is in his eternal being. He thus carries logic into a domain of shadows, but of simple essences wholly freed from all sensuous matters "in whose diamond net the whole universe is constructed."

At the basis and foundation of all thought and being lie the pure conceptions of reason, which determine all subjective knowledge and objective reality, ideas in which the ideal and the real have their point of coincidence. The reason must be held responsible for deducing the whole system of knowledge purely from itself, without anything being taken for granted, and in the doing of this some principle must be sought which should be of itself certain, and from which everything else could be derived.

The Hegelian logic is divided into three parts, or as he terms them doctrines. We have:

1. The doctrine of being.
2. The doctrine of essence.
3. The doctrine of conception.

1. Being, in the view of Hegel, is the primary and most abstract of all notions. With him thought and existence are identical. To solve the problem of creation he goes backward until he comes to nothing, and takes that as his starting point. In thus going back and negativing everything, he denies that the result is what we understand by nothing. His position is that the act of negation is affirmation; that a pure negative is a concrete positive; and that the negation of one is the affirming of many.

Thus in applying this to the doctrine of being: in the negation of everything he posits something. Thus the nothing out of which all being issues, is a positive idea, and without it we could never have that of being. The two stand to one another as opposites, and must combine

together to form a complete notion, and this combination is the point of production, or the becoming of something out of nothing. This is his first step, the original primary pulsation of the dialectic process. In it, something or being, and nothing, stand as the two opposite poles, and out of their conjunction arises the notion of existence. In these three, the two opposites, as poles, and the result, we recognize the type or symbol of all thought, there being no complete idea possible except as the combination of two opposites. Neither one of these, whether it be being or the negation of all being, nothing can exist as a reality of itself, and the one no more than the other. Each, in reference to each other, stands on a platform of perfect equality, and is but the opposite pole of the other. It is at their point of indifference that the act of coming into existence first makes its appearance.

Having reached simple existence, at the indifferential point, that is seized hold of, and subjected to the dialectical process. It is viewed either in relation to itself, or in relation to the things around it. Here arises another opposition, the two poles of which are this and that. A thing can only be this because it is not that. The office of the one must be to limit or bound off the other, Simple existence alone could give no other than a general and undefined idea. There would be nothing to compare it to, and by which to define it. The notion of a distinct existence, that which is itself a reality, is impossible to be entertained without the negation, as well as the affirmation, of being. It is impossible to affirm any real thing without implying in it the negation of a certain amount of attributes. An animal can be such only because it is not a plant, or something possessing other than animal attributes. Here then is a resort to the category of quality, and by means of the affirmation and negation applied to this category, being limited and determined results. It is by a course of reasoning similar to this, that we arrive at the notions of the finite and infinite. The finite is a something distinguished

from all other things, being limited, circumscribed, and bounded off by them. Remove those boundaries, destroy those limitations, and it goes back into infinity. According to this, no complete ideas of the finite or the infinite can be formed alone or disconnected from each other, as the one is necessary to the other, and both are the results of that dialectical process by which we are enabled to rise from the bare notion of being, to that of some particular existence.

While the category of quality relates to the inner nature of things, that of quantity regards their outward form. This may relate to greatness, number or degree.

2. The doctrine of essence, or thought, in its communication, gives to being a more determined, definite form. The immediate being of things is represented as a covering or curtain, behind which the essence is concealed. When, therefore, in contrast with the essence the immediate being standing over against it, is a mere negative, simply an appearance, the being appearing in the essence. In the development of essence are presented the same determinations found in the development of being, but not in an immediate form. They are here exhibited in a reflected form. In the former, were being and nothing as the two poles; in the latter, the forms of the positive and negative.

This second movement of the logical process answers to that second movement in mind in which the understanding separates the object from the consciousness, and places it before us as a distinct reality. The threefold division occurs here also. Essence may appear either: 1. As the ground or substratum of existence, or; 2. As phenomenon, that is, as expressing those qualities of objects which cannot be separated from them. 3. A real thing in contradistinction from that universal essence of which it forms a part is conceived of by uniting the notion of substratum and attribute. Under each of these divisions are included many philosophical ideas that have played an important part in most metaphysical systems. Under the

first is contained the deduction of the notions of identity and difference; of concrete existence; and of a thing as containing properties peculiar to itself.[1] Under the second are included the ideas of a phenomenal world, of matter and form, and of relation generally, deduced in philosophical order. Under the third we have the union of the other two, giving the categories of substance, of cause, and of action and reaction. The dialectic process, under the Hegelian logic, having now carried us from being alone to essence presenting us with the distinct, essential, real thing, we have only to advance:

3. To the doctrine of conception, or thought, in its regress, in which it forms a complete idea in itself. In regarding generally the three parts, or divisions, of the Hegelian logic, we find that in the first the doctrine of being is made to answer to the abstract conceptions of time and space, giving only those ideas which are purely qualitative or quantitative. That of essence answers to time and space, not in the abstract but the concrete, filled up; the one with actual existence; the other with real phenomena, such as those of substance, attribute, cause and effect.

Lastly comes the doctrine of conception, or of notion, referring to all those things having peculiar characteristics of their own, those which are real and definable objects whether they relate to existence organized or unorganized. This doctrine also, like the two preceding, has its three divisions:

1. The conception or notion in its subjective point of view. This gives the various movements of the mind itself in its different acts or states, as it is seen in the apprehension, the exercise of judgment, the power of reasoning.

2. The objective point of view. This gives us the conceptions of the three realms of nature, the mechanical, the chemical, and the organized. The mechanism gives us the relation of objects to each other; the chemism the inter-

[1] *Morell*, 465.

penetration of objects and their neutralization; the teleology, or organism, the inner design of objects.

3. The idea, the union of subject and object, the end accomplishing itself. This also has three successive steps, for the Hegelian philosophy advances mostly in triads: 1. The process of life the immediate existence of the idea. 2. Intelligence. 3. The absolute idea, which is the highest extent to which the power of conception can reach, and is synonymous with deity.

In all this, however, there is nothing beyond the empire of pure thinking. By means of it the evolution of thought is traced upwards through its more empty and abstract forms, imparting to it at every step a greater fullness and power of meaning until those conceptions are reached that have their embodiments in nature and the soul. These are the true platonic archetypes, pure thought in themselves, to which the universe itself is perfectly conformable.

The march or evolution of the Hegelian Logic, in its triadical projections, may be thus exhibited:

The three doctrines: being, essence, conception.

Triune division of being: 1. Quality. 2. Quantity. 3. Measure.

1. Quality subdivided into: *a.* Being. *b.* Existence. *c.* Independent existence.

2. Quantity is subdivided into: *a.* Pure quantity. *b.* Divisible quantity. *c.* Degree.

3. Measure consists in the unity of quality and quantity.

Triune division of essence: 1. Ground of existence. 2. Phenomenon. 3. Reality, union of ground and phenomenon.

1. Ground of existence subdivided into: *a.* Pure notions of essence. *b.* Essential existence. *c.* Thing.

2. Phenomenon subdivided into: *a.* Phenomenal world. *b.* Matter and form. *c.* Relation.

3. Reality subdivided into: *a.* Relation of substance. *b.* Relation of cause. *c.* Action and reaction.

Triune division of conception: 1. Subjective. 2. Objective. 3. Idea.

1. Subjective subdivided into: *a.* Notion as such. *b.* Judgment. *c.* Inference.

2. Objective subdivided into: *a.* Mechanism. *b.* Chemism. *c.* Teleology.

3. Idea subdivided into: *a.* Life. *b.* Intelligence. *c.* Absolute idea.

II. Philosophy of nature. This is the second pillar, or second term, in the triad, upon which reposes the Hegelian system, that of logic being the first. The region of logic was limited to pure intellection, and its philosophy concerns only the forms of thought. But in nature we arrive at a different region. Here is the idea in the form of differentiation. It is still thought, but it is thought in its objective movement. It is thought externalizing itself. It is mind estranged from itself. It is exactly the opposite to logical thinking. The problem presented is to seek out the intelligence which is hidden in nature, and, as far as possible, to pursue the process by which nature loses its own character and becomes mind. The products of nature neither have a reference to themselves, nor correspond to the conception, but grow up in unrestrained contingency. Nature, according to Hegel, is a bacchanalian god, who neither bridles nor checks himself. It represents no ideal succession, rising ever in regular order; but, on the contrary, it everywhere obliterates all essential limits by its doubtful structures, which always defy every fixed classification.

To account for the existence of nature, Hegel is compelled to make the absolute idea descend from its original unity as subject-object into a state of separation, much the same as in pure logical thinking he makes the understanding to separate what was one in the original consciousness.

The pantheism of Hegel is, therefore, different, from that of Schelling. The latter regarded nature as a part of the

process by which the absolute realized itself. With him, therefore, the process of development was necessary, and all existence was the play of a supreme fate. According to Hegel, the dialectic movement by which the absolute separates itself and externalizes itself in nature, is perfectly free, so that his pantheism did not profess to destroy the notion of the freedom and absolute personality of God.

Although, however, this separation is free, yet it has its steps or stages of progress. Commencing with the immediate determination of nature, with the abstract universality of its being extra *se*, space and matter, it seeks as its end the dissevering of the mind from nature in the form of a rational and self-conscious individuality, man. Having sought and found the intermediate link between these two extremes, the Hegelian philosophy then attempts to follow out successively the increasingly successful struggles of nature to raise itself to self-consciousness, to man. As in logic the absolute process appeared in its threefold movement, so also does it appear in the three corresponding ones in nature. Nature, as well as logic, has its triads of progress, passing through three principal stages. Of these we have:

1. Mechanics, in which nature is exhibited in its most empty, undetermined forms. Here we have the purely mathematical ideas of matter, as existing in time, space and motion. There are also the mechanical properties of matter as gravitation, etc., and, in addition, the absolute properties as viewed at large in the construction of the material universe. Gravity he regards as the being *in se* of matter, the guiding thread of natural philosophy, that which evidences or proclaims the desire of matter to come to itself, and thus shows the first trace of subjectivity. It is a universal centralizer, and this tendency to centralization is its fundamental conception. Then we have:

2. Physics, which has to do with matter, which has particularized itself in a body, in an individuality. Matter by virtue of its possessing qualities becomes an object of

physics. It therefore regards all the general forms of matter; also the phenomena of specific gravity, of cohesion, elasticity, etc., and in addition all the specific forms which it may assume, as acids, alkalies, metals, etc. To this province belongs inorganic nature, its forms and reciprocal references. Then we have:

3. Organics. The purely inorganic properties, as cohesion, etc., are lost in the chemical process, and this latter is, in its turn, overcome by the organic or living process of nature. The living body resists chemical process. Life is self-preservation, self-end. Nature in physics had risen to individuality, in organics to subjectivity. Here again we have three successive steps or stages. Life appears:

1. In the mineral kingdom, the geological organism. This exhibits only its general image. The mineral kingdom is the result and residuum of a life process and formation already passed. "The primitive rock is the stiffened crystal of life and the geological earth is a giant corpse."

2. In the vegetable kingdom the organism of plants. The plant is the product of a formative process, but it has not yet risen to a totality perfectly organized in itself. It has not attained to a true unity, a perfect individuality. Its parts are indifferently related to each other. The branches may become roots and the roots branches. Each part is, in one sense, the whole individual, each twig the whole tree. Another advance brings us:

3. To animal kingdom, animal organism. Here is first found an uninterrupted intres-susception, free motion, and sensation. In man, which is its highest form, the spirit, which works through nature, apprehends itself as the *ego*, the conscious individuality. In doing this it becomes a free, rational self, having completed its self-emancipation from nature.

Let us now see how the philosophy of nature is also cast in triads. We have:

1. Mechanics.
2. Physics.
3. Organics.

1. Mechanics is included under: *a.* Mathematical properties. *b.* Mechanical properties. *c.* Properties of absolute motion in space.

2. Physics is included under: *a.* General forms of matter. *b.* Relative forms of matter. *c.* Specific forms of matter.

3. Organics is included under: *a.* Geological structure. *b.* Vegetable structure. *c.* Animal structure.

III. Philosophy of mind supplies the third and only remaining pillar of Hegel's system. This philosophy begins where that of physics terminates. Like all that precedes it, it is projected in triads. Of these we have:

1. The subjective mind, and this is mind removed from its estrangement, and becomes identical with itself. Its formal essence is freedom, which embraces the possibility of abstracting itself from everything else. Its material essence consists in the capacity of manifesting itself as mind, as a conscious rationality. But in order to reach its highest possible point of attainment it must pass through a series of stages or emancipative acts. Of these the

First is anthropology, which expresses that mind which is at first soul or spirit of nature; which comes from nature, and rises from its externality to being. As a spirit of nature, it sympathizes with the general planetary life of the earth, is affected by difference in climate, in seasons and in different geographical portions. It is related to diversity, race. It bears a national type, and is determined by mode of life, formation of body, etc., and these, in their turn, work upon the intelligent and moral character. This doctrine regards the soul in its original constitution, but varying according to the physical peculiarities, the national characteristics, and different idiosyncrasies of individuals.

Second, psychology. This elevates us into the region of sensation or feeling, which in its lower form is sensation, *in se*, and in its higher or completed, is self-feeling, which is the preliminary step to consciousness. Out of the depth

of sensation and consciousness emerges the *ego*, the living point or organism in which are preserved all these sensations, representations, thoughts and cognitions. Mind was previously interwoven with nature, but the awaking of the *ego* is the act by which the objective world is created. At the same time the subjective world, the conscious *ego*, springs into existence as contradistinguished from it; for the *ego*, over against the objective world is consciousness. This becomes self-consciousness by passing through the successive stages of immediate sensuous consciousness, perception, and understanding. But the Hegelian system claims that self-consciousness becomes universal, or rational self-consciousness, through the conflicts of the *ego* with the objective world, and with other self-consciousnesses by means of which is found the proper mean between command and obedience. This latter has emancipated itself from nature, and is free.

Third. Will, which is theoretical in having to do with the rational as something given; and practical, as expressing the highest attainments of the *ego* in subjectivity. It is the ultimate end of the theoretical; as the theoretical mind in its way to the practical, passes successively through the stages of intuition, representation, and thought, and ultimately forms itself into a free will through impulse, desire, and inclination.

2. The objective mind. This introduces us to the whole range of moral and political philosophy, or mind in its relations to those without. The immediate objective being of the free will is the right. As the right of one is limited by that of others there arises a conflict between will and will, and this results in a compact, which is the embodiment of a common will. This is the first step towards the formation of the state, but not the only one, as the state does not rest wholly upon compact, the will of the individual being wholly inadequate to decide as to whether he will or will not live in it. Compact refers to private property, and is the origin of right. It is the conflict between the indi-

vidual will and the right or the universal will that gives rise to the first division of mind viewed objectively, viz:

a. Jurisprudence, which dispenses law and guards the rights of person and property. Next we have:

b. Morality, which is found in the self-determination of a free will as modified or influenced by the conscience. This latter has three elements: 1. That of resolution, the inner determination of the acting subject. 2. That of purpose, the completed act being regarded not according to its consequences, but according to its relative worth in reference to the acting subject. 3. That of the good, by which the act is judged according to its universal worth. Then follows the last triad of mind viewed objectively, viz:

c. Politics. This regards the state, which in its analysis refers back to the family, and that again has its foundation in marriage. Of this there are three elements, that unite in composing it, viz: 1. The sexual relation, founded upon a difference in sex. 2. The civil contract entered into between the parties. 3. The love that either originally did, or should come to exist between them.

Next to the family, Hegel ranks civil society in which the members, though still independent individuals, are nevertheless bound together by three bonds: 1. By their wants. 2. By the constitution of rights as a means of security for person and property. 3. By an outward administrative arrangement.

Lastly, in Hegel's system comes the state, the ethical whole, in the will of which is merged the individual and the right of individuality.[1] "States" say he, "and the minds of individual races pour their currents into the stream of the world's history. The strife, the victory, and the subjection of the spirits of individual races, and the passing over of the world-spirit from one people to another, is the content of the world's history. The development of the world's history is generally connected with some ruling

[1] *Schwegle*, 362.

race, which carries in itself the world-spirit in its present stage of development, and in distinction from which the spirits of other races have no rights. Thus these race-spirits stand around the throne of the absolute spirit, as the executors of its actualization, as the witnesses and adornment of its glory."

3. The third and last general division in Hegel's philosophy of mind is absolute mind. In this we no longer view it as the property of the individual, but as belonging to the race; and its development is to be looked for not in the life of a single man but in the history of the world. In this we have:

1. Æsthetics, art developments, in which the beautiful is the appearance of the idea through a sensible medium, as a crystal, color, tone, poetry, in and through which it becomes actualized in the form of a limited phenomenon. It is to the different ways in which matter and form are connected that we are indebted for the different forms of art. Of these there are three kinds: 1. The symbolic form of art is that in which the matter preponderates, the thought passing through and bringing out the ideal only with much difficulty. 2. The classic form of art, in which the ideal has attained its adequate existence in matter in which content and form are found absolutely befitting each other. 3. The romantic art, in which mind predominates; where the matter is the mere appearance and sign through which the mind everywhere breaks out, and struggles up above the material. A sample of the symbolic form is architecture, in which the sensible matter preponderates, and the object of the art is to seek the true conformity between content and form. A sample of the classic is sculpture, which gives to stone a bodily form, makes it represent the body, and compels it in the end wholly to disappear in the ideal, nothing being left of the material which does not serve the idea. A sample of the romantic art is painting, which represents the look, the disposition, the heart, all, in fine, that goes to constitute the life of the soul.

He enumerates two other forms of art, viz:

a. Music, whose material is sound, the vibration of a sonorous body. It leaves the field of sensuous intuition, and works in the sensitive soul.

b. Poetry, the unloosed tongue of art, the speaking art, which can represent everything. All other arts return, and find their embodiment in poetry. 1. As epic, it represents the figurative history of races, and thus corresponds to the plastic arts. 2. As lyric, it expresses some inner condition of the soul, corresponding to music. 3. As dramatic, it exhibits the struggles between characters acting out of opposite interests, and thus marks the point of union between both these arts.

2. Next to æsthetics follows religion, to which poetry forms the transition. The object of every religion is to reconcile the finite with the infinite, the subject with God. All seek a union between the divine and the human. Here, again, there are three steps or stages: 1. The pagan religions of the old world, in which God was only a power of nature. 2. Judaism, in which God emerges from nature, and attains to an exalted subjectivity full of power and wisdom. 3. Christianity, in which a reconciliation between God and the world is effected by means of the unity of the divine and human in the person of Christ.

3. In the third place, we have the absolute philosophy, which consists in thought knowing itself as all truth, and reproducing the whole natural and intellectual universe from itself, having the entire system of philosophy for its development "a closed circle of circles." In the age of philosophy, religion rises to its purest reflective form, and truth comes forth from her symbols to appear in her naked reality.

Let us now see how the philosophy of mind is cast in triads. We have:

1. Subjective mind.
2. Objective mind.
3. Absolute mind.

1. Mind viewed subjectively presents us with: *a.* Anthropology. *b.* Psychology. *c.* Will.

2. Mind viewed objectively presents us with: *a.* Jurisprudence. *b.* Morals. (Elements: 1. Resolution. 2. Purpose. 3. Good). *c.* Politics. (Gradations. 1. The family based on the marriage triad. *a.* Sexual relation. *b.* Civil contract. *c.* Love. 2. The civil society with its triune bond. *a.* Wants. *b.* Securities. *c.* Outward administrations, *d.* The state).

3. The absolute mind presents us with: *a.* Æsthetics, with its three forms of art, and three illustrations, viz: 1. Symbolic form: illustration — architecture. 2. Classic form: illustration — sculpture. 3. Romantic form: illustration — painting. *b.* Religion exhibited in three stages. 1. Pagan. 2. Judaism. 3. Christianity. *c.* Absolute philosophy.

The Hegelian system is not perfectly clear of comprehension. It turns upon two fundamental points. First, the unity of contradictories, or opposites, as the principle of all human knowledge; and, second, the identity of being and thought.

The philosophy of Kant contained two elements: the idealistic and the realistic. We have now traced the idealistic to its culminating point. Its highest subjective movement was realized in Fichte, its objective in Schelling. In the former the absolute is to every one his own individual self, beyond whose powers and perceptions we are unable to go. In the latter, the absolute is made the living soul of the universe, of which everything both in the natural and mental world, is only an expansion. In Hegel the absolute becomes a mere process, ever unfolding and renewing itself in the world, and that in a manner identical with the process of thought, with the method of philosophy. Idealism had thus reached here its highest point because the matter of our knowledge had here become synonomous with its form, and thought all one with existence. The ideal and the real thus being one, thought and existence

identical, the process by which the former is developed must be the process of the whole of nature; while the laws of logic must be the laws of the universe; and the dialectic movement the method by which all things come into being and subsist. This deity is reduced simply to a process which is ever going on but is never accomplished, the divine consciousness being absolutely one and identical with the advancing consciousness of mankind. The hope of immortality dies out from his stupendous system, which at death returns the individual to the bosom of the infinite, thus annihilating the individual man, but investing the deity with an eternity of progress. Human freedom pales and vanishes under the shadow of his system. The man is but the mirror of the absolute. His consciousness must ever roll onward by the fixed law of all being. His personality is sunk in the infinite. The annihilation of freedom destroys moral obligation, and the law of progress being fixed, man becomes irresponsible. Thus the philosophy of Hegel has aided much in building up the lofty structure of German rationalism.

Mysticism — Jacobi. Realism — Herbart.

Speculative philosophy in its idealistic phase reached its extremest limit in the system of Hegel. That system was a regular outgrowth from those of Schelling, Fichte, and Kant. Although the German mind, in its speculative tendencies, has strongly followed this line of development yet there have not been wanting sturdy efforts to escape from it. Two shelters from it have been sought out: the one in mysticism, the other in realism. The first is represented by Jacobi, the second by Herbart.

Frederick Heinrich Jacobi, was born at Dusseldorf in 1743. He agreed with Kant as to the office of the understanding, that all it could do was to give form and arrangement to that material which is drawn from other sources. The

understanding he held to be that faculty in man which observes itself, finding the representations, sensations and feelings always ready made. The process by which things, from without become sensations in us and thus are enabled to enter the soul through the senses, he deemed an inpenetrable mystery. That there was a reciprocal action between things objective and the subjective faculties that take cognizance of them is apparent, but how the one could produce an impression upon the other, each differing so entirely from the other, is a mystery and a miracle,

Kant had admitted a mutual action between the senses and their objects, but he held that our feelings resulting from this action were so thoroughly mixed up with an ingredient furnished by our understanding, termed by him imagination, that the sense-perceptions might be regarded as subjective products, which no longer corresponded to the object. Jacobi took the directly opposite of this position. He maintained that the images or the whole multiplicity of representations in us are really and actually existing.

Jacobi also differed from Kant as to the reason, which Kant held to be a logical faculty. He held it to be that sense or faculty by which we have immediate perception of that which, in the super-sensual sphere of mind or intelligence, has existence for us. He maintained that we could neither explain the mode of acquiring our sensuous impressions, nor of those ideas which we find actually in us. But yet their existence is undeniable, and requires no further demonstration. Jacobi here reached, and, in his mode, remedied the fundamental error of Kant, which consisted in grounding that which is immediately certain, which should itself serve as the basis of everything else, upon something else which was still deeper.

The great merit of Jacobi consists in his presenting actuality as the true test and foundation by and upon which all knowledge may be recognized. He said to philosophers practically, " whatever you are to acknowledge as

valid must be deduced from higher grounds.[1] You require that everything be demonstrated. But what are you to do with the highest principle, with the last and final truth? There you cannot proceed any further, and have after all to stop short at mere actuality of existence."

Jacobi demonstrated that the logical and synthetic method could not be applied to metaphysics, and he did not agree with Kant that the presentiments of the high and the divine, which are in us, are nothing more than the secret pressure of those logical fetters which are experienced in drawing conclusions. He regarded them rather as the peculiar treasure, and the hidden riches of the human spirit. What he at first simply termed faith, and afterwards feeling and inward revelation, he ultimately designated the name of reason. He did not design to develop any system. In fact he regarded all systems with doubt and suspicion, fearing that the more there was of unity, and of keeping to rules, the greater tendency there must be to materialism, idealism, naturalism or fatalism. He held it impossible to comprehend the unconditioned, because the assumption of such knowledge does not disclose the connection between the unconditioned and the conditioned, although it necessarily refers the latter to the former. Yet we can discover no necessary transition from the one to the other. The general cannot immediately descend into the particular, nor unity into variety; and God cannot be apprehended as merely a formal summing up, a comprehending and containing of those objects in nature which are separated from one another.[2] He maintained that a God who could be proved was no God, for the ground of proof is ever above that which is to be proved, the latter having its whole reality from the former. In proving the existence of God, therefore, he would be derived from a ground which was both before and above him. Hence the paradox of Jacobi:[3] "It is for the interest of science that there be

[1] *Chalybaus*, 85. [2] *Idem*, 87. [3] *Schwegle*, 273.

no God, no supernatural, and no extra or supermundane being. Only upon the condition that nature alone is, and is, therefore, indep endent and all in all, can science hope to gain its goal of perfection, and become, like its object itself, all in all."

The faith within which Jacobi took refuge was intended to be a rational one, not one of authority merely, that would be satisfied with everything, a mere passive receiving and accepting, but one invested with powers of criticism, and possessing the right of choosing or refusing. The flight from cognition through conception to faith, he calls the salto mortale of the human reason. "Every certainty through a conception demands another certainty, but in faith we are led to an immediate certainty which needs no ground nor proof, and which is, in fact, absolutely exclusive of all proof." He calls faith a confidence which does not arise from arguments, and claims that we know through it alone the sensible equally as the supersensible; and that there are but two sources of all human knowledge, viz: revelation and faith.

In opposition to Kant he defends empiricism, affirming the truthfulness of the sense-perception, and denying the à priority of space and time. The philosophy of Jacobi was that of faith and feeling. The latter expresses more accurately that which he had in view, than the term reason which was afterwards employed. In feeling, a substantial unity is presupposed between him who feels and that which is felt. While feeling, according to him, we have that which is real, actual, and essential, and still in connection with that which is ideal. Afterwards in the reflection of the understanding, this element of reality vanishes entirely, and nothing remains but what is ideal. Hence he says: "There is light in my heart, but it goes out whenever I attempt to bring it into the understanding, which is the true luminary of these two?[1] That of

[1] *Schwegle*, 278.

the understanding, which though it reveals fixed forms, shows behind them only a baseless gulf? Or that of the heart, which points its light promisingly upwards, though determinate knowledge escapes it? Can the human spirit grasp the truth unless it possesses these two luminaries united in one light? And is this union conceivable except through a miracle."

Thus Jacobi, at a time when idealism was threatening to absorb everything into itself, to consign to nihility the external world; and to sweep away all the great boundaries of human knowledge; stood forth boldly in defense of realism, a realism which reposed wholly upon faith in our direct intuition of truth, whether it be human or divine. He demanded that the human soul should yield up something more than a dead and empty mechanism of logical thinking and shadowy representations. He claimed that in the human spirit there is a deep and inviolable treasure. And although concealed behind the veil of Isis, he could at least point to its reality. He felt and believed more than he reasoned, and hence has been ranked among the mystics, and consigned to the realm of mysticism.

John Frederick Herbart was born at Oldenburgh in the year 1776. He was professor of philosophy successively in the university of Gottiugen, at Koningsberg, and again at Gottingen where he died in 1841.

The philosophy of Herbart was a reaction produced by the bold idealism inaugurated by Kant, and carried to its ultimate legitimate results by Fichte. Kant had undermined the foundations of all sensuous experience, and transformed it from reality into mere appearance, and yet had frequently referred to the matter of sensations as being the material of knowledge. Thus he had furnished starting points both to the idealistic and the realistic, the former of which was seized hold of by Fichte, and the latter by Herbart. He took the objective stand point, and urged the claims of empiricism upon the attention. He claimed that what is

actually furnished from without constitutes the necessary basis for all philosophical investigation. That we can only philosophize on that which is furnished to us. That we can only rectify by reflection our representations, notions and ideas, but can never create something out of one general and empty idea.[1] Hence he would define philosophy to be nothing else than "a scientific elaborating and rectifying of our general notions, for the purpose of cognizing that which is actually furnished to us." That the end and aim of all reflection is to understand and attain to correct notions of nature both in and out of ourselves.

In order to this we are to accept whatever our consciousness furnishes, but not as what is all really true and yet as containing the elements of all truth and mass of material out of which the one connected whole of truth is to be formed.

Although things may be different from what they appear, yet there must be some ground upon which the appearance proceeds, and we must look to what actually is not only for a starting point, but also as the only means by which to verify and rectify the results at which we have arrived.

Our ordinary notions of objects and their mutual connection involve us in contradictions. It is obvious that what are termed the secondary qualities of objects belong to ourselves and form no part of the objects. This is the entrance wedge of skepticism, and from thence it proceeds to doubt and question the reality of all qualities we are accustomed to regard as belonging to external objects. Thus it goes back until it strikes upon the idealistic foundation of Descartes' cogito, ergo sum, upon which, as an abutment, the idealist seeks to throw a bridge across into the real world. Herbart denies that this is practicable, and hence is led to seek in objects and their mutual connections and relations the evidence of their existence.

In order to this he takes a distinction between simply to be and that which is, insisting that the former being is

[1] *Chalybaus*, 94, 95.

not of itself an entity any more than standing, walking, or running is, while that which is, or existence, implies in itself a something, a *what*, that does exist. This, therefore, he terms a real, a something to which reality belongs, although it is inseparable from existence itself.

Inasmuch, then, as the real must have some application to nature, and everything must necessarily be illusory, and as many qualities will not allow of absolute position, or of reality in themselves, it becomes important to inquire what the idea of absolute position, or of existence implies. And that is:

1. That it contain no negation or limitation which would have the effect of destroying absoluteness. A thing which exists not by itself but only as it leans against another object, and depends upon it, can have no existence in the proper sense of the term.

2. That things affirmed as absolute be such that, in reference to its quality, it can be conceived as entirely simple; that is neither as a multiple or as having internal contradictions.

3. That it be wholly indeterminable by notions of magnitude. That that which is in and by itself real be never viewed as a quantum, as divisible, and as occupying definite space and time. Space and time are denied to the notion of the real in itself, it being considered in reference to space much the same as a mathematical point. The notion of the real does not exclude the idea of numerical multiplicity, only the union of many parts and qualities in one and the same real. But the notion of absolute reality must never be confounded with that which is existing, or the real itself. The objects themselves constitute the latter, while the former is only the way and mode of conceiving them.

Herbart holds that the import of a notion is not one and the same with the intellectual process of forming it, and that while we possess a notion of the real and the existing, we must be careful not to confound our notion, viz: the

manner in which the object that is viewed takes shape in our minds, with that object itself.

The question here occurs as to whence is derived the something or the what that is joined to, and gives reality to existence? It is immediately furnished in sensation. It is that which is actual, and without which it would be impossible to demonstrate that anything actually existed. That only exists, and really exists, which is not merely appearance, and it alone can be furnished. We must find the idea of it somewhere, otherwise everything would be represented as nonentity.

The philosophical system of Herbart had a threefold division: 1. Logic. 2. Metaphysics. 3. Æsthetics. But these are neither bound together by any common principle, nor do they acknowledge the control of any one general fundamental doctrine. There is nothing peculiar in his logic. His metaphysics are:

1. General, occupying the place of what was formerly ontology.

2. Applied metaphysics, which again is divisible into psychology, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of religion.

The metaphysics of Herbart start from sensations or determinations which are empirically furnished. These are first elaborated into representations, and these again into general or collective notions, in which our consciousness comprehends together that which is common to different phenomena, making abstraction of that which is peculiar to each. These notions can only be considered as abbreviations of experience, the point of importance being that these single objects do really exist, and have really been furnished in sensation.

The metaphysics are more especially conversant with general and abstract notions, and these more especially regard the following three, viz: thing, matter, and the *me*. The thing appears both compound and variable. It is the *me* that more especially opens up the world of immediate inward experience. These three fundamental ideas, each

giving rise to a separate contradiction, point us to three branches of metaphysics, viz:

1. Ontology, which has reference to the thing manifold in itself, and changing.

2. Synechology, which has reference to matter, or the appearance of the real in time, space and motion.

3. Eidolology, having reference to those peculiar phenomena which are revealed through our consciousness, or in the *me*.

In the first, or ontology, the great problem to be solved is to show how different predicates can coexist in one substance; and conversely, how one simple substance can exhibit a plurality of predicates. This problem is sought to be explained through the medium of a principle termed by Herbart the method of relations. Agreeable to this principle we must suppose a thing to be composed of many essences, all independent of each other, instead of one absolutely simple one. And it is owing to the different relations in which they stand to each other, that the appearance is presented of many predicates existing in one subject.[1] Thus, as an illustration, a binary star appears as one to the naked eye, but through the medium of the telescope is seen to consist of two. And so an object in nature may appear to be one, but by means of philosophy is discovered to be manifold. The separate and independent essences which enter into and serve to compose all things, ever remain absolutely the same, because they are entirely self-sustained. But when they come to be viewed in different lights, and from different stand points in relation to each other, then they exhibit a multitude of different characteristics.

To account for this, the doctrine of accidental views is introduced. By this is meant that one and the same notion may, without any alteration of its essence, be often

[1] *Morell*, 486.

viewed as standing in very different relations to other notions. Thus one and the same line may often be viewed either as sine, tangent, or radius of a circle, without ever ceasing to be a straight line, and the same identical straight line. A tone in music may be viewed as a third, a fifth, a seventh, and as being harmonious or discordant, without having ceased to be one and the same tone. It is not essential, but merely accidental to that higher notion of a straight line that it stands in such relations as to be either sine, tangent, or radius.

This philosophy views each separate and apparently simple thing as composed of an aggregate of many simple reals, which occurring together in our experience we are led to regard as one. The reals that play so conspicuous a part in Herbart's philosophy bear some analogy to the atoms of the atomatic theory, and to the monads of Leibnitz. They differ from the former, however, in not being impenetrable, and from the latter in having in themselves no power of representation, nor any peculiar inner circumstances. They have, however, been termed monads, and the doctrine a system of monadology.

One great point of inquiry in Herbart's philosophy relates to the mutual influence of one real, or monad, upon another, the relation of causality. The notion of a real is that it is simple, unchangeable, and without extension as to time or space. It is self-existent. Their appearance in certain continually recurring groups demands an inquiry into their actual connections. How can one real, or monad, in an assemblage be regarded as the cause of their being joined together? Unity is a phenomenon that is furnished, and how is it of possible attainment? It is owing to the fact that one of the many reals assembled together occupies the place of a central point of union. To it all the others point, and like radii of the total appearance are joined together in it, as in a central point.

Alteration in bodies may take place in three ways: 1. From external causes. 2. From self-determination. 3.

As absolute becoming. The first is here the only subject of inquiry.

The alterations in the thing which the given appearance points out to us, are produced only by the coming together and separating of the monads, more briefly by their coming and going. But if their coming together produces different phenomena, owing to the different qualities of each,[1] then every single monad must be instrumental, upon every other, in causing a difference of appearance. Thus each monad acts upon every other, and the internal state of each must be determined or altered by that coming together. But as each monad is in its nature unchangeable, such change can be only apparent, not actual. To account for what is really going on in every one of the monads during that change, recourse is had to the accidental views before mentioned. The activity in all changes tends to self-preservation, and the mode of this latter will vary according to the relation in which its own peculiar quality stands to that of another monad. Thus the antagonistic states of the monad, while in combination with each other, may be regarded as so many active and efficient forces, all whose tendencies meet, on the other hand, with a corresponding resistance, and this is assumed as sufficient ground for all actual phenomena.

The second part of metaphysics is: 2. Synechology, which seeks to resolve the problem of corporeal matter. The great problem here presenting itself for solution is — how monads, which themselves fill no space, and have no extension, can, when compounded, constitute an essence apparently extended, such as matter. Kant had declared that time and space were only the subjective forms of intuition, but Herbart denies this and insists that, constrained by our very thinking, we feel obliged to ascribe to them objective truth; that they continue to assert their right to be considered as actual on speculative grounds, just because

[1] *Chalybaus*, 127.

these categories manifest themselves as relations which require to be thought. If we conceive a single monad by itself we cannot determine any locality in which it exists. It only attains locality when we conceive a second point between which and itself there is to be a certain definite distance. The representations of standing still and of movement cannot be observed on one single point, nor conceived of in the case of one single point. Both can only be ascribed to the relation in which many real things are conceived to stand towards one another. Our idea of motion arises out of the conception of a net work of relations, no absolutely fixed or moveable stand point of connection being found, the whole representation only indicating a relative relationship, and that one relating to the observer. Space and time, or measure of celerity, are nothing more than the elements of which motion is compounded, and hence are objective, and released from the categories of Kant.

The external grouping of things, according to Herbart, is derivable from the internal activity of the essences, the internal principle of which is that of self-preservation.

The fundamental principle of Herbart's philosophy is the simplicity and absolute immutability of the real or the monad. But the actual state of things cannot be satisfactorily accounted for without also assigning to it a kind of internal capacity of formation, although this would not be entirely consistent with the principles upon which Herbart's philosophy proceeds.

The third part of metaphysics is: 3. Eidolology, the *me*, the doctrine of the human soul. The *me* is our person, and implies everything belonging immediately to our body and to our spirit. It is not, however, the personal, but the pure and absolute *me*, which is only arrived at after everything which is only state of the soul has been thrown aside. It is found only in the inmost depth of self-consciousness. It is found in the sensations, representations, aspirations, all the activities of inner life. It is the central, connecting

point of all thinking and doing. Its office consists not only in representing to itself the outer world, but also the inner, or its own self.

The first question presented is: Is the *me* merely self-consciousness, or is it an essence? Knowledge, although a mere state or activity, yet cannot be conceived without some being in that state, or author of that activity. The *me* must in itself be something real.

But the *me* has many properties, states, powers, faculties. It is, therefore, a real, or monad, with many varying characteristics. It knows about itself, and hence is the subject to which its own portrait is presented as an object. The image, however, is the same as the subject, and Fichte designated the *me* as the absolute subject-object, or as the identity of subject and object. Herbart, however, denies that the eye can see itself, or that it will ever be possible to pronounce subject and object the same without involving a contradiction.

The *me* is given or furnished just as it exists, and is multiplied, beholding itself in many different states, as that of feeling, thinking, willing, all representations of ourselves, and designated as our *me*. Thus the object has to be multiplied, and something is to be true in the combination of these *me*-objects which cannot be of any one singly. And when a number of objects are represented, something about them must appertain to him who represents them, and that is their comprehension into one representation, and the results to which this gives rise. Something has to be noticed with reference to the various objects which would not apply to any one of them taken singly, and the representation of ourselves is in some degree made dependent on the representation of objects, referring to, but not coinciding with them.

But all the possible states cannot exhaust the *me*, as it must possess the capacity of opposing and distinguishing itself from all these different states. It remains as the ever identical to itself in all these states. We live first in the

objective, and are wholly taken up by it, and through it attain gradually to self-consciousness; and then from it and through the individual states we reach ourselves, and then may contrast the essence of the *me* with all those states and determinations.

Again, in the representing of the objective by or to self-consciousness there must be a mutual conditioning of one another. One sensation must modify or exclude another. It is this conditioning, contradicting, impeding or disturbing that brings motion into the soul. This peculiar mode of eliciting self-consciousness from the mutual conditioning of the objective dispenses with different powers and faculties in the soul, as of feeling, memory, representation, etc.

The conditioning of one thing by another does not here occur as between real essences, but as between representations merely, which depend for their existence only on the self-preservation of the soul.

The individual representations are powers which resist but do not destroy each other. While resisting they remain unchanged. The only alteration is in the degree of intensity on which their vividness, distinctness or obscurity depend. Everything depends on the sum and the proportion of the resistance. The former is the burden to be distributed arising from the antagonisms of the representation. One representation is always more especially present, and that one is generally engaged in a struggle with another. One by gaining a prominence over the rest, weakens or impedes the others; although one cannot wholly suppress the other, where there are but two. The very ground of the struggle is inconsistent with the entire suppression. In a struggle between three one may be entirely pushed aside. But those thus suppressed do not wholly disappear. They wait on the threshold of consciousness, for the favorable moment when they can reappear. These representations while thus kept back and operating only in the dark, are the feelings, which are to be distinguished from sensations. As their tendency to push forward is attended with

more or less success, they become desires, and these, inspired with the hope of success, mature into volitions. There is no special faculty of the will, but only individual, determined motions within the province of the self-preservations of the soul. The soul-monad, with reference to its self-preservation, is capable of containing within itself such states as may, under favorable circumstances, become, with other monads, the cause of definite external formation and movement, and this furnishes a principle of assimilation and organization, upon which living phenomena are susceptible of explanation.

In regard to the seat of the soul, Herbart assigns no one permanent seat, but supposes the whole middle region, the sensorium commune, may furnish its place of residence. He supposed the soul might move forwards or backwards upon or within the pons varolii.

The philosophy of Herbart was a protest against the all-absorbing idealism of Fichte, an idealism that started from the single factor subjective and ultimately derived everything from itself. In opposition to this he claimed, and correctly, that it is impossible to account for a multiplicity of phenomena on the supposition of one abstract factor. One of the objections urged against his system is that the objective truth of a substantial and unitous connection is entirely wanting, while we have it in ourselves subjectively, but only subjectively. Again, that we have no one single principle as a starting point, but are directed to an infinite multiplicity of commencements; and that unity which is the ultimate aim of all science, is only found in the last instance, in the result. The whole system is opposed to a genetical one, of which a pure idealism is an instance. The unity is only subjective, and not objective, as it applies to knowledge and not to existence.

We can linger no longer with the German school of philosophy. We have seen the necessity in which it originated. We have traced it from Kant, who in endeavoring

to plant himself upon both the subjective and objective stand points, gave a decided preponderance to the former. This was taken up by Fichte at the point where Kant had left it, and carried out with an unflinching logic into all its startling results and conclusions. Then legitimately follows the pantheism of Schelling and Hegel. In the mean time to escape from the merciless idealism of Fichte, philosophy took refuge in the mysticism of Jacobi, and the realism of Herbart. We have presented the great names, and the most important speculative problems which they have proposed and endeavored to solve. It must certainly be conceded that the rationalistic philosophy, as developed from the subjective stand point, into a pure and unmitigated idealism, has been more perfectly unfolded, more clearly displayed; and pushed into all its results, in a manner far more satisfactory than had ever before been accomplished. So also the splendid pantheisms of Schelling and Hegel had left little to be desired by those who are willing to dispense with a superintending providence in the government of the universe. From the fact that the German mode of thinking is somewhat peculiar; that it is first given to the world in the German language, and is known to Englishmen and Americans, only through the reading of the German and by translations, it results that there is much difficulty in the finding of such terms as will convey the ideas with precision, and yet be fully understood by the Anglo-Saxon mind. With far more pretensions than the Scottish philosophy, it claims to satisfy deeper wants, and to solve profounder problems; but no one can arise from its attentive study without feeling that the human mind can ask more questions than it can answer, and propose more problems than satisfactory solutions. We seem conscious that we have been gazing upon an edifice of stupendous proportions, and yet its outlines reach so far into the land of shadows that we are unabled to grasp its dimensions, or even to feel that we have formed with it a very intimate acquaintance. It does, however,

add some necessary links to that ever lengthening chain, which the human mind is dragging onward, ever nearing and yet never reaching the point, at which it can fully proclaim its own self-comprehension, and along with it all those matters and things which are to it objects of knowledge.

Eclectic Philosophy — Cousin.

We have seen that the critical philosophy was a rebound from the skepticism of Hume. So also was the ECLECTIC PHILOSOPHY a rebound, a protest, a refuge from the sensualism, materialism, and idealogy of Condillac, Cabanis, De Tracey and other French writers. The materialistic school that had merged all in sensation, and derived from the organism of the brain and nervous system everything, whether of thought or of feeling that belongs to man, had run its course, and having developed all there was in it, had, in a manner, ceased to be attractive. There must, therefore, be a change. A new philosophy was demanded by the intellect of France. M. Laromiguiere born in 1756, the pupil of Condillac, was the point of divergence. Condillac had based the sensualistic system upon the great fundamental faculty of sensation, where, upon that system, it can alone belong. M. Laromiguiere substitutes in its place that of attention, thus, by a single word, effecting a transfer from a physiological to a psychological stand point. This he carries out by a psychological system. He separates the powers and capacities of the mind into two classes, the understanding and the will, using these terms to denote two distinct assemblages of mental phenomena. He makes three faculties of the understanding, viz: 1. Attention. 2. Comparison. 3. Reasoning. Attention being the fundamental principle from which the others proceed.

So under the class of will, he makes the foundation of all voluntary action to be desire, and springing from this

as a basis, the two corresponding phenomena of preference and liberty. Finally he shows that desire itself is only a peculiar form of attention, and that thus the fundamental principle of intellectual and voluntary life is the same.

As to the origin of ideas he makes the material of all knowledge come from our sensibility, but he makes that of four kinds. 1. That produced by the action of external things upon the mind. 2. That produced by the action of our faculties upon each other. 3. That produced by the recurrence and comparison of several ideas together, giving the perception of relations. 4. That produced by the contemplation of human actions as right or wrong which is the moral faculty. Thus the source, or origin, of ideas is much broader than that proposed by Locke.

There are also two other French metaphysicians who precede and prepare the way for Victor Cousin. One of these was Peter Paul Roger-Collard, who introduced the doctrines of the Scottish school, giving the appellation of intellectual instinct to what Reid calls principles of common sense; and Stewart, primary laws of reason.

The other was M. Maine de Biran who, penetrating the depths of consciousness, developed the activity of the human mind, the power of the will. He proclaimed the doctrine that the soul is a cause, a force, an active principle, and that the voluntary nature of its thoughts and impulses can alone explain the phenomena of consciousness. He even held that the idea of substance was to us nothing more than that of a cause, and that the dynamical theory of the universe, or the identity of substance and force, was the true philosophical basis.

In the analysis of any voluntary act, M. Biran detects three elements: 1. The consciousness of a voluntary effort.[1] 2. The consciousness of a movement produced. 3. A fixed relation between the effort on one hand and the movement on the other. The source of all is the will,

[1] *Morell*, 639.

which is the representative of the personality. This is the efficient cause both of thinking and of acting, regulating the flow of thought as well as the course of action.

M. Biran's philosophy may be essentially summed up in three positions:

The first consists in placing in the will all the elements of human activity. The immediate effect of its exertion is seen in all the muscular movements of the organism with which it is connected.

The second consists in identifying the will with personality, itself thus resolving the soul into a collection of forces that are always aggressive, ever acting, and never passive.

The third consists in evoking the idea of causality from the consciousness of our own acts of volition. Here the power exerted, and the effects produced, are facts revealed through our consciousness. The idea of cause thus originated is transferred into the objective world, and reposing upon analogy we conclude that there also exists the necessity of a sufficient power for the production of every effect. In the exposition of this third and last position he affirms that the universe consists of certain powers or causes which are in operation;[1] and that these powers or causes are only known as objective realizations of our own inward personal effort. It will thus be seen that M. Biran was in the highway, and already far advanced towards the idealism of Fichte.

This brings us to Victor Cousin, who is the great exponent of the school of ECLECTICISM, to the consideration of which we now approach. Cousin was born in 1792, and enjoyed rare opportunities for the study of philosophy. He made himself familiar not only with the teachings of the three we have just mentioned, but also with the critical philosophy, and the doctrines of the German teachers, as well as those of Leibnitz, Descartes, Locke, and others. From all these he derived the eclectic doctrine. His thought was

[1] *Morell*, 641.

that the world's thinking had progressed far enough to justify the conclusion that the germs of all truth had been presented, but always mixed with error. That error is nothing but an incomplete view of truth. That all systems are incomplete views of the reality, but are set up for complete images of the reality. That all systems containing a mixture of truth and error have only to be brought together,[1] and the error would be eliminated by the juxtaposition of system with system. That the truth, or portion of the truth, found in one system would be assimilated with the portions of the truth which are in other systems. And that, consistent with these principles, eclecticism means the bringing together of all discovered truths eliminated from their accompanying errors, and the elaboration of a system out of this body of truths.

In the development of this philosophy we are naturally first attracted to his method. Of this there are two: the rationalistic, which seeks to grasp at once the absolute or fundamental principle from which everything proceeds, and then to follow it out into all its varieties of application; the psychological, which merely observes, arranges, classifies, and thus ultimately arrives at the principle or law. The one is the deductive method of Aristotle; the other the inductive of Bacon. The one is synthesis; the other analysis. The one descends from generalities; the other ascends from particulars.

The psychological method is that adopted by Cousin. He considers philosophy as well as physics to be a science of facts. The main difference is that in physics, these facts are given by the senses, in philosophy by consciousness, but that in both cases the application of the inductive method is substantially the same, and is governed by the same general rules.

Neither would he rest on mere observation of facts alone. As a system of experimenting and reasoning forms a part

[1] *Lewes*, 649.

of the Baconian method in physics, so also, according to him does it in philosophy. In the latter, reflection is the instrument of experiment, and fills the place of artificial instruments and reproductive processes in physical science.

M. Cousin makes psychology the basis and starting point of all true philosophy. He would first examine and classify the phenomena of mind. He would enter by reflection into the chambers of the soul, investigating every fact of the consciousness there presented; and having obtained these data, would reason upon them with precision, in accordance with a sound logic.

In beginning with the psychology he differs from the German school. That commences with the absolute, and reaches psychology through a combination of metaphysics and physics. It is rather constructive than inductive.

In the different applications of this method come up for solution some of the most profound of philosophical problems. M. Cousin has not given to the world any complete philosophical system. In his *Philosophical Fragments* and *Lectures on the History of Modern Philosophy* are to be found his views on philosophical questions. These he puts forth boldly, and clearly compared with those of the German writers. As they are drawn from all the past and present of philosophy they are always ingenious, often convincing, and never unworthy an attentive examination.

The first subject of consideration to which his method is directed, is:

I. Psychology, and in this he makes a complete escape from the fetters that formerly in France had so effectually bound everything under the heavy weight of materialism. In his exposition of psychological phenomena he in great part follows out the course already marked out by M. Maine de Biran. He goes into the depths of consciousness, and undertakes first the classification of its phenomena. These he divides into three classes, referable to

three great elementary faculties, which in their combinations comprise and explain all others. These are:

1. Those of the will.
2. Those of the reason.
3. Those of sensation.

These three are capable of simultaneous exercise, and are blended together in the unity of consciousness. But although constituting a perfect unity in intellectual life, yet in their nature and essential characteristics they are perfectly distinct.

The faculty of will is placed first, because in its exercise is found that element which peculiarly constitutes our distinct personality. It also involves causality. Those things that possess no personality are such as are wholly under external influence. All that which we express by the word nature is impersonal. It is wholly subject to that which is extrinsic, and has no source of power in itself. The sensations arising from contact with the external world, and the ideas which spring spontaneously from the constitution of our faculties, are wholly irrespective of will. The power and the influence of both are as certain and as necessary as the outward force which controls the movements of the material objects around us. When all the conditions either of a sensation or a rational idea are complete, the will cannot prevent the sensibility or the reason from entering into exercise. Neither the sensation nor the idea ask or obtain permission of the will to become facts of consciousness.

Before the will comes into existence, man is but a part of nature and subject to the play of the physical and spiritual forces by which he is surrounded. But the consciousness of an inner power changes the entire character. Man no longer submits passively to the action of causes from without or within. The will has become a power that wells up from the depths of his own personality, and makes him, in turn, a cause which reacts upon others, thus essentially modifying his course of life. The will must, therefore, be

regarded as the constituent element of personality. It is only in its activity that we are able to recognize ourselves. It is only by distinguishing ourselves from our sensations and their objects that we can have self-consciousness.

In the consciousness of our own personal activity we awake to the first notion of cause. In its very essence the will is, in fact, a cause, a power, a force. The primitive notion of our own will as a personal cause, becomes the type and condition of the notion of cause in general, and of external impersonal causes.

All mere personal acts have their cause in an active power, the only cause of particular actions being referred to the activity itself. Hence results freedom. The very notion of liberty is that of a power which acts by an inherent energy of its own, by a power of self-determination. Liberty is not self-determination in act, but in power; and the causal energy of the will is entirely distinct from its instruments or external manifestations. There may exist a perfect paralysis of the muscles of locomotion, and yet the will may exist with all its energy.

There is another result of no small importance flowing from this doctrine, and that is the fact of moral obligation. The will is a power with which man is intrusted, and there is devolving upon him a moral obligation to exert himself for the accomplishment of his proper destiny in the world. Wherever he goes he carries this power, and is ever in the midst of duties and rights. He is the master of his own actions, and hence is morally responsible for those he elects to perform.

2. Another very interesting portion of Cousin's philosophical teaching relates to the reason. In this are bound up the elements of our intellectual life, as those of our active, responsible, and moral life, are in those of the will. The first position that strikes us is the impersonality of reason. It is no part of our free activity. It is absolute in its essence, and one with the eternal and divine reason. It is relatively human, and only as it manifests itself in the

phenomena of human consciousness. "Reason," says Cousin, "does not modify itself to seek our pleasure. We do not think as we wish to think. Our understanding is not free. We do not make the laws of our reason, nor is reason our personal property. Ideas are the conceptions of that universal and absolute reason which we do not cause to exist, but which makes its appearance in us, and which is a law to all individuals, of that reason which Fenelon found always at the end of his researches, and from which he in vain endeavored to abstract his thought, without ever being able to separate it from himself; and which, unceasingly returning into all his thoughts, finally drew from him the expression: 'O Reason, Reason, art not thou he whom I seek.'" He allows, however, that reason which, in itself, is universal and absolute, and consequently infallible, after having entered into human perceptions, and thereby become connected with perceptions of the senses, the passions and the imagination, is no longer infallible. Truth is obtained by first separating it from the fallible reason of man, and then referring it to universal, absolute and infallible reason.

The necessary convictions of reason which we find in our consciousness cannot be conceived by us as merely relative to our minds or to those of others. They appear as universal truths, truths for all intelligences,[1] truths to the divine intelligence equally as to us, but no more than to us; that is, they are truths in themselves, truths absolute, such as we can neither make, deny, nor modify, by any act of our own will, and which no will in the universe can make, deny or modify. Such truth is the common patrimony of every rational nature. It is the decision of reason, which, within its own province, possesses an authority little short of divine.

Reason, according to Cousin, has a two-fold development. The first is primitive, unreflective, instinctive; the second

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 244.

ulterior, reflective, voluntary. The first is spontaneous, the second, reflective.[1] "We do not," says Cousin, "commence with seeking ourselves, for this would imply that we already know that we exist; but, on a certain day, at a certain hour, or moment solemn in existence, without having sought ourselves, we find ourselves. Thought in its instinctive development, discloses to us that we are. We affirm our existence with profound assurance, with an assurance unmingled with any negation whatsoever. This affirmation, anterior to all reflection, the human race have called inspiration. Inspiration belongs not to us. It is in all languages distinguished from reflection. It is the perception of truth without the intervention of volition and of individual personality."

"It is," he remarks, "by observation that within the penetralia of the consciousness I have succeeded in seizing and analyzing the instantaneous, but veritable fact of the spontaneous apperception of truth, an apperception which, not immediately reflecting itself, passes unperceived in the depths of the consciousness; yet is the real basis of that, which later under a logical form, and in the hands of reflection, becomes a necessary conception. All subjectivity and reflectivity expires in the spontaneity of apperception. But the primitive light is so pure, that it is unperceived.[2] It is the reflected light which strikes us, but often in doing so, sullies with its faithless lustre the purity of the former. Reason becomes subjective by its connection with the free and voluntary *me*, which is the type of all subjectivity; but in itself it is impersonal; it does not appertain any more to one than to another; it does not even appertain to humanity as a whole; its laws emanate only from itself."

This appeal to a primitive, original, impersonal reason in which every human being floats, almost unconsciously, will find its verification among the facts of consciousness. There are periods of intellectual life in which the mind

[1] *History of Philosophy*, 164. [2] *Morell*, 651.

mingles up no element whatever of its own personality, and yet in which there is an apperception of certain truths which it simply receives. The thought sometimes comes suddenly like a flash of inspiration; and it is often after laying aside all personal effort, after the workings of the intellect in obedience to the will have ceased, and the still conscious soul has laid aside all its personal regalia, and retired within itself, thoughts come to it as if from another sphere, and it almost realizes that in shutting out from itself its own personality, it has entered the gateway of heaven. And if there be such a power of receiving absolute truth without any intermixture of personality, it is obvious that the reason viewed as a spontaneous principle, must possess an absolute and all controlling authority. Here repose the foundations of faith, faith in reason; and these foundations are such that they cannot be shaken. Here, upon this strong ground, Cousin combats that exclusively idealistic subjective philosophy that renders the thinking subject, the *ego*, the life and centre of everything that is, and he invokes the lofty authority of this primitive reason as furnishing in itself the evidence of that objective reality which the highest and purest forms of idealism so completely banish from created things. And thus he would establish the objective validity of the external universe on the ground that its evidence can be subjected to no test higher than itself.

This philosophy differs essentially from the critical, as Kant made all our necessary ideas and à priori conceptions to be simply the results of the subjective laws of our own minds. He made all abstract truth but the personification, or the reflection of our own intellectual constitution.

But although the primitive, unreflective reason is infallible, in all its decisions, yet it is otherwise with that which is ulterior, reflective, voluntary. It then becomes mixed up with motives, passions, volitions, intellection, and thus partakes of the imperfections of that reflective power of which it is made the instrument. "Spontaneity," says Cousin, "gives truth, reflection, produces science. One

furnishes a broad and solid basis for the developments of humanity; the other impresses upon these developments their veritable form. But by reflection nothing can be given that was not contained in the first affirmation, in the phenomenon to which reflection was applied."

Reflection, therefore, presupposes an anterior operation of the reason and intelligence. It only adds itself to what was already in the mind. It goes back and distinguishes, analyzes, but does not create the elements to which it applies itself.

Having arrived at the reflective power involving will, personality, he employs it in analyzing the phenomena of our rational life, with the view of reducing its multiplicity of facts to their primary elements. This had been before attempted, but with little success. Aristotle had framed a table of categories, but had classified from the objective point of view. His arrangement was arbitrary, not corresponding to the development of intelligence. The Cartesian philosophy admitted necessary truths, but did not attempt a complete enumeration of them. The sensualistic schools recognized none. The Scottish did, but gave no complete account of them. Kant had done this the most perfectly. His categories were deduced from the subjective stand point, and he gives us a deduction of all those laws or forms of the understanding, by which the material of our knowledge is shaped into distinct ideas. Cousin, bringing to the task all the lights he could obtain from the different schools and systems of philosophy, claims to reduce the whole phenomena of our reason to three integrant and inseparable elements, which constitute its true nature, and govern all its manifestations.

The first element, or category, is substance, which every quality supposes. This is exhibited under various forms, and yet all having a certain relation to each other. These are variously expressed under the terms: unity, identity, the absolute, the infinite. This is logically the first in order.

The second is the category of causality, as it embodies the principle of all change, of all the passing phenomena

of the universe. As every quality supposes a substance, so every phenomenon supposes a cause. This is chronologically the first in order, as the idea of cause must be first in the order of acquisition as the condition of the idea of substance. This also is exhibited under various forms having the same kind of relation to each other. They are in direct opposition to the former, and are expressed under the terms plurality, difference, the conditioned, the finite, the phenomenal.

These two are the fundamental principles of which all others are derivatives. They are given to us contemporaneously in the unity of consciousness. The absolute only finds its manifestation in the phenomenal, while the phenomenal can only subsist in the absolute. But here we arrive at a third element, or category, and that is found in the mutual relation which these two categories bear to each other.

The three together are always in manifestation wherever the human reason is seen in operation. They form the type under which every subject is viewed. They control the operations of an intellectual nature, and govern its whole development. The following table will show the extent of this doctrine of categories:

In the first category are included:	*In the second category are included:*	
Unity	Multiplicity	*The third category consists of* Relations between the two.
Absolute Space	Bounded Space	
Absolute Existence	Dependent Existence	
Eternity	Time	
Infinite	Finite	
Primary Cause	Secondary Cause	
Substance	Phenomena	
Mind	Thoughts	
Beau Ideal	Beau Ideal	
The Perfect	The Imperfect	
Contraction	Expansion	
Subject	Object	

According to Cousin, the human understanding neither begins with unity and the infinite, nor with the finite, the

contingent and multiple. If it begin with unity alone it can never reach multiplicity; if it depart from multiplicity alone it can never arrive at unity. If it depart from phenomenon alone it will never arrive at the first cause,[1] at substance. The two fundamental ideas to which reason is reduced, are two ideas contemporaneous in reason; two which reason cannot be without, and which moreover arrive at the same time. In the order of the acquisition of knowledge the one supposes the other. As we do not begin with the senses and experience alone, and as we do not, any more, begin with abstract thought and intelligence alone; and as we must unite these two points of departure into one; so the human mind begins neither with idealism nor with realism; neither with unity nor multiplicity. It begins, and cannot but begin, with one and the other. The one is the opposite of the other. It is a contrary implying its contrary; one is, only on the condition that the other is at the same time. This is their relation in the order of the acquisition of our knowledges. But it is the relation of these two ideas in the mind, and not their relation in themselves. Thus all perceptible existence, all reality, consists in the unity of these two elements. They must coexist, that, from their existence, there may result reality. The fundamental vice of the schools consists in placing unity on one side and multiplicity on the other; and establishing such an opposition between them, that all passage from one to the other seems impossible.

The method of solution adopted by Cousin is that immensity, eternity, infinity, substance, being in itself, the absolute, each is also a cause; not a relative, contingent, and finite cause, but an absolute cause, and unity or substance, being an absolute cause, cannot but pass into act, cannot but develop itself. If being in itself is an absolute cause, creation is not only possible, it is necessary, and the world cannot but be. Thus unity in itself, as absolute cause,

[1] *History of Philosophy*, 114.

contains the power of becoming variety and difference. And as soon as this power is put forth, it is no longer the primitive unity; it is a unity rich with its own fruits, and in it, multiplicity, variety, and life meet together.

3. The third division of psychology relates to the phenomena of sensation. By sensation he means that faculty which acquaints us with the facts and changes of the outward world. Whatever knowledge we have of external nature arises from internal impressions made by it upon the mind through the medium of sensation. But the question arises what is it that creates the impressions? Is it a hard, impenetrable, and passive material, composed originally of atoms; or is it powers, forces, causes, something active and productive of impulse? The common sense of mankind decides for the former, but science deals in statics and dynamics, regards forces, and looks upon all material phenomena as the productions of certain powers acting with different intensities and in different directions. Cousin adopts the latter explanation, inquiring what natural philosopher, since Euler, seeks after anything beyond forces and laws? And if modern science occupies itself only with forces and laws, I conclude, he says, rigorously from hence, that natural philosophy, whatever it may know, or not know, is by no means materialistic;[1] that it became spiritualistic, the very day it rejected all other methods, except observation and induction, which can lead us to nothing but forces and laws. Laws he defines to be the necessary relations which are derived from the nature of things.[2]

Cousin is, therefore, a species of idealist, but he does not lose sight of the fundamental idea of nature. He denies its passive, inert, atomic character. He views it entirely under the type of power or cause, and thus makes it, in a manner, homogeneous with mind; but it is mind in its lower and as yet unconscious state of development.

[1] *Morell*, 653. [2] *History of Philosophy*, 102.

The second subject of attention to which his method is directed is:

I. Ontology, and this is viewed by philosophers in three different lights:

1. The German school regards it as the starting point of all intellectual science. It constructs the entire universe by adding one attribute after another to being which it assumes to be originally general and abstract. Having determined the essence of things it then expands the law by which it rises through all the multiplicity of its changes and gradations to its most fully developed character.

2. The Scottish school inderdicts ontological science as being beyond the reach of our faculties.[1] It confines itself to psychology, the analysis and classification of our mental phenomena. It accepts as true in regard to ourselves whatever the universal testimony of the human faculties attests; but leaves, without any attempted explanation, the mysteries of absolute existence.

3. The eclectic school of Cousin seeks to find a middle course, which shall combine the truths of both without the errors of either. His commencement is with the Scottish school, analyzing the facts of our conscious existence, but instead of finding in psychology an ultimate limit, he affirms the possibility of finding a solid passage from the subjective world to the objective, from the phenomenal to the real. He finds in the impersonality of reason, and in the spontaneity of its action and reception of truth, the bridge that spans the abyss intervening between the subjective and objective worlds.

In the view of Cousin the fundamental fact of consciousness is a complex phenomenon composed of three terms, which he denominates the *me*, the *not me*, and the relation between the two. "When I perceive myself," says he, "I distinguish myself from all which is *not me;* and in distinguishing myself from all that is *not me*, I do two things:

[1] *Morell*, 654.

First. I affirm my own existence; Secondly, I also affirm the existence of that from which I distinguish myself. Man, then, does not discover his own existence, without discovering at the same time, the existence of some other thing, which surrounds and therefore limits him.[1] The *me* is, therefore, finite; and it is only, inasmuch as it is limited and finite, that it is *me*. But if the exterior world bounds the *me*, and opposes to it a kind of obstacle in every direction, so the *me* acts upon the world, modifies it, opposes itself to its action, and impresses its own action upon it to a certain degree; and this degree, however feeble, becomes to the world a bound, a limit. Thus the world, which in its opposition to the *me*, is the limit of the *me*, or is the *not me*, is in its turn opposed, modified, limited by the *me*; which, while it is obliged to acknowledge itself limited, bounded and finite, yet also impresses the character of bounded, limited and finite, upon the exterior world, the *not me*, from which it is distinguished. It is in this mutual opposition that we lay hold upon ourselves; this opposition is permanent in the consciousness of man; it endures while there is any consciousness. But this opposition resolves itself into one single notion, that of the finite. The *me*, which we are, is finite; the *not me*, which limits and is limited by the *me*, is also finite. We are, therefore, still in the sphere of the finite.

But while the consciousness apprehends the *me* as finite, in its opposition to the *not me*, which is also finite, it refers both this *me* and this *not me*, which are finite, bounded, relative, contingent, to a superior, absolute, and necessary unity, which contains and explains them, and which has all the characteristics that are in opposition to those which the *me* finds in itself, and in that *not me* which is analogous to it. This unity is absolute, whilst the *me* and the *not me* are relative. This unity is a substance, whilst the *me* and the *not me* are in themselves simple phenomena.

[1] *History of Philosophy*, 149, 150.

"But this superior unity is not a substance only, it is also a cause. Indeed the *me* only apprehends itself in its acts, as a cause which acts upon the exterior world; and the exterior world comes within the knowledge of the *me*, only by the impressions it produces, by the sensations which the *me* experiences, which it does not cause and cannot destroy, and which it, therefore, cannot refer to itself, and consequently refers to something foreign to itself as a cause. This foreign cause is the world; and as it is a finite cause, and as the *me* is also a finite cause, therefore that unity, that substance, which comprehends both the *me* and the *not me*, being also a cause, must consequently be, in its nature, an infinite cause. Thus we refer both this world and ourselves to something better, beyond which it is impossible for us to conceive anything, of existence, of duration, of power, and of wisdom."

In this manner Cousin would apprehend the infinite, the eternal God; but it would seem to follow from this that God must comprehend the universe in himself, and that all finite existence is but the emanation from his infinite existence.

He endeavors, however, to avoid exhibiting the deity in a pantheistic light,[1] and he asserts that "the God of consciousness is not an abstract God, a solitary sovereign, banished beyond creation upon the throne of a silent eternity and an absolute existence, which resembles existence in no respect whatever; he is a God at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause; being substance only inasmuch as he is cause, and being cause only inasmuch substance; that is to say being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, essence and life, end and middle, at the summit of existence, and at its base, infinite and finite together; in a word, a trinity, being at the same time God, nature, and humanity."

[1] *Morell*, 655.

He claims that the human mind can comprehend the absolute, the unconditioned. In reference to this there have been four different opinions among philosophers.

1. The absolute is altogether inconceivable. This we have seen is the doctrine of the Scottish school as expounded by Sir William Hamilton.

2. The absolute, though not an object of real knowledge, yet exists subjectively within our consciousness as a regulative principle. This was the opinion of Kant.

3. The absolute cannot be comprehended in consciousness and reflection; but it can be gazed upon by a higher faculty, that of intellectual intuition. This was the opinion of Schelling.

4. The absolute can be grasped by reason, and brought within the compass of our real consciousness. This was the opinion of Cousin. He maintained that God is not absolutely incomprehensible, because being the cause of the universe he passes into it, and is reflected in it, as the cause is in the effect, and therefore we recognize him. Again all nations have petitioned him, since the first day of the intellectual life of humanity. But God is not absolutely comprehensible. "He is," says Cousin, "both invisible and present, revealed and withdrawn in himself, in the world and out of the world, so familiar and intimate with his creatures, that we see him by opening our eyes, that we feel him in feeling our hearts beat, and at the same time inaccessible in his impenetrable majesty, mingled with every thing and separated from everything; manifesting himself in universal life and causing scarcely an ephemeral shadow of his eternal essence to appear there, communicating himself without cessation, and remaining incommunicable; at once the living God, and the God concealed." He maintains that God was perfectly free to create or not to create; but that he has created because he has found creation to be more in conformity with his wisdom and his goodness.

These are the main eclectic doctrines as expounded by Cousin. It will be seen that one of the peculiarities of this

system consists not merely in making the absolute and infinite a matter of positive cognition, but also in holding the twofold distinction of reason into spontaneous and reflective, and in making the former as impersonal, and, therefore, not subjective, the faculty of immediately knowing the absolute and infinite. The spontaneous reason apprehends the absolute and infinite by an act of positive knowledge, it reveals them in consciousness, but without thereby making them merely subjective.[1]

There is much in this system that is worthy of careful study by the student of philosophy. It has been objected to it that in rendering the thoughts that flow in from the spontaneous, impersonal reason infallible, it enables it to usurp the place of inspiration, rendering the immediate reception of divine light nothing more than the natural play of the spontaneous reason, nothing more than has been witnessed and will be again in men of great genius.

Another objection made against it is that it is a system of pantheism in that its deity, although possessing a conscious personality, yet still is one which contains in itself the infinite personality and consciousness of every subordinate mind. That such a theory is inconsistent with moral evil, and with human liberty. But this is met by Cousin with a direct denial. Pantheism is certainly not expressed anywhere in his writings, but the reverse. It is also denied that it is a necessary consequence from his principles. That he neither confounds the infinite with the finite, thus making God nothing but the collective whole of the universe; nor the finite with the infinite, thus denying the substantial existence of the finite, and making the infinite one the only being. There is, perhaps, some difficulty in steering entirely clear of these objections, although the fuller and more complete development of the system may remove many that now appear to be objectional features.

[1] *History of Philosophy*, II, 256, 257.

Positive System of Philosophy — Comte.

Auguste Comte was born in 1797, and has recently deceased. He is the author of the POSITIVE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY, the last link in the chain of speculative thought.

This system begins by defining philosophy, which according to it,[1] is the explanation of the phenomena of the universe. Any one who studies the system, however, would recognize as a better definition, an inquiry into the succession of these phenomena. It is in this that the essence of this philosophy consists. It really seeks no explanation any further than what is involved in such succession. It makes no appeal to any power, agency, or even principle, that can render an explanation in any degree intelligible. It utterly exiles God from creation. It banishes from it every metaphysical creation, or entity, that can come under the denomination of cause. It recognizes no causes whether final, physical or immediate. Although it nominally admits laws, yet it is merely nominal, and as a kind of concession to the ignorance and prejudice of the age. It does not, and cannot consistently with itself, really admit them. It says itself "the conception implied in laws of nature is the last and most refined expression of the metaphysical stage of speculation.[2] In it law replaces the ancient principle. In it law is the delicate abstract entity superadded to the phenomena." It therefore objects to the use of the term law unless it can be defined to be the mere relation of coexistence and succession." It proposes to substitute methods in the place of laws,[3] understanding by method, a path leading onwards, a way of transit. The methods of nature would, therefore, suit it much better, as they would express the paths along which the activities of nature traveled to phenomena. If cause and law are banished from the system, surely a first cause and a lawgiver must be the merest supernumeraries.

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 18. [2] *Idem*, 52. [3] *Idem*, 55.

The method by which the positive philosophy proposes to arrive at scientific results does not differ essentially from the Baconian. It teaches that "a law of nature can only be discovered by induction or deduction.[1] Often, however, neither method is of itself sufficient without our previously making temporary suppositions regarding some of the very facts of which we are in search." The condition upon which progress in science depends may be thus stated: "that we must never imagine any hypotheses which are not by nature susceptible of a positive verification sooner or later, and which shall have exactly that degree of precision ascertainable in the study of the corresponding phenomena. In other words, truly philosophical hypotheses must always present the character of simple anticipations of what experience and reasoning are capable of at once discovering when the circumstances of the problem are more favorable." Thus Newton's great discovery was at first only an hypothesis. It became a theory after verification. Kepler made nineteen hypotheses respecting the form of the planetary orbits, and abandoned them, one by one, till he settled on the elliptical form, which, on verification, proved correct, and then was no longer an hypotheses.

But this philosophy limits the employment of hypotheses to things which are accessible to observation and to reason. It asserts that all scientific inquiries are restricted to the analysis of phenomena, to discover their laws, and in no sense to discover their causes, either essential or final. That every hypothesis which transcends the limit of positive science leads to endless discussion without any chance of agreement.

Comte distinguishes hypotheses into two classes. The one simply refers to the laws of the phenomena. The other relates to the determination of the general agents supposed to produce the different kinds of phenomena. He claims the first can only be legitimately employed. In

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 105.

his philosophy there are no agents producing different kinds of phenomena; and the assumption of any such instead of explaining phenomena only has the effect of increasing the number of things requiring explanation; because they, in their turn, demand explanation as much as the phenomena they are introduced to explain.

The positive philosophy, according to Comte, rests upon three initial conceptions:[1]

1. That all the sciences, whether physical, moral, or social, are all branches of one science, and are therefore to be investigated on one and the same method.

2. The fundamental law of human development, or evolution, which he thus states: "There are but three phases of intellectual evolution, for the individual as well as for the mass, the theological, the metaphysical and the positive."

3. The classification of the sciences, commencing with the study of the simplest phenomena, and proceeding successively to the most complex and particular, arranging them according to their dependence on each other.

The first and third of these conceptions may be very well considered together, as really constituting but one.

The second presents a curious theory, which, although as such, may not be necessary to enter into the constitution of positivism, yet the absolute annihilation of everything theological or metaphysical must take place before positivism can be possible.

In the first, or theological phase, the mind not only seeks after causes, but also strives to attain the essences of things as well as the how and why of their operation. It looks to the supernatual, and regards the pleasure or displeasure of some god as the foundation of unusual phenomena.

In the metaphysical phase there is a marked progress from the theological. The mind here dispenses with all supernatural agents. It has passed beyond the necessity of

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 9, 10, 11.

having gods to worship and to influence phenomena, and substitutes in their place abstract forces, causes, or entities supposed to inhere in various substances, and to be capable of engendering phenomena.

In the third, or positive phase, the mind has become convinced of the futility of all inquiry into both essences and causes, and restricts itself to the observation and classification of phenomena, and to the discovery of the invariable relations of succession and similitude which things bear to each other, or to sum it up to the discovery of the laws of phenomena.

The theological phase, according to Comte, is the primitive spontaneous exercise of the speculative faculty proceeding from the known to the unknown. The metaphysical, the more matured effort of reason, to explain things. But the reasoning is without proofs, and upon subjects transcending human capacity. The positive explains phenomena by ascertained laws, which are not only shown to be demonstrable to reason but accordant with fact. It holds it to be idle, to penetrate beyond the laws which regulate phenomena.

The theological stage marks the infancy of man, and also the earlier periods of the race. I say earlier periods, for it is difficult to conceive how in accordance with this system the race can have an infancy. It regards nature as the theatre upon which the wills and caprices of superior powers are constantly playing their various parts. Men, having then had less experience, are startled at unusual occurrences, and entertain conceptions of gods in order to explain them. An eclipse, for instance, was owing to a monster swallowing up the sun: The prayers and sacrifices of man may, by conciliating some god, bring down showers of rain upon the parched earth.

This stage, however, has a progress, and three successive stages that clearly mark it.[1] The earliest and lowest period

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 273.

is that of fetichism. This regards all exterior bodies as animated with a life essentially analogous to our own. In this stage there are no such thing as laws. Every phenomena depends upon the arbitrary will of the corresponding fetiche.

The next advance brings us to simple polytheism. In the passage from one to the other we recognize an effort at generalization. As each fetiche was endowed with a material individuality, it was impossible for one to exist and be common to various bodies. In polytheism it became necessary to assimilate the corresponding fetiches, and finally to reduce them to the principal amongst them, who from that time was raised to the rank of a god. He thus became an ideal and invisible agent, and indeterminable as to space. This passage to polytheism indicates the preponderance of general over individual ideas.

Monotheism was simply a further advance, a limitation to one god of the same powers that had formerly been exercised by several.

In all these different theological stages, the mind is ever looking beyond the fact for its explanation, and this same tendency to imagine an agency superadded to the phenomena is also visible in the metaphysical period.

This period, according to Comte, yet lingers, and still continues to exercise a strong influence upon the minds of men. The idea of invariableness is admitted, but for the purpose of explaining it some entity or principle is imagined. Thus there is still the vis inertiæ, the overcoming, in natural philosophy; the affinities in chemistry; and the animating principle in animals and plants. The existence of organic agents is assumed to produce and regulate vital phenomena. So also that of intelligent agents.

In the positive stage, our province is to study the laws of nature, to trace her processes, and to sit down in contented ignorance of all transcendent subjects. To accept nature as she presents herself never seeking beyond the facts for fantastic entities.

Comte illustrates the fundamental law of evolution by analogies derived from the human organism. One of the laws of embryology he states to be that "every function is successively by two, and sometimes more, organs; of which one is primitive, transitory, provisional; the other secondary, definitive, permanent." [1]

Between the two are the relations of function, development, and duration. The provisional organ first supplies the place of the permanent one, then coexists with it, and finally either ceases or performs incompletely. Instances: the milk teeth and down in the human species; the tails of tadpoles; the optic lobes of the brain, the thymus gland, etc. So also the three forms of circulation that succeed each other in the embryonic development,[2] the first prior to the complete formation of organs or exercise of their functions, the second known as the fœtal circulation, and the third after the lungs have entered upon their function; each characterized by the creation of new vascular systems, and the decay of those that preceded them.

The result of all, which are thus summed up:

1. "Everything which is primitive is only provisional, at least in the higher animals; and everything that is permanent has only been established secondarily, and sometimes tertiarily."

2. "That, consequently, the embryo of the higher animals successively renews its organs and its characteristics, through a series of metamorphoses which give it permanent conditions, not only different, but even directly contrary to those which it had primitively." The claim is that the three phases, theological, metaphysical, and positive, through which humanity necessarily passes in its growth, represent the primitive, transitory, and permanent phases of the organism, and that the theological and metaphysical phases are provisional organs in the development of humanity.

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 33. [2] *Idem*, 34.

Another argument for the truth of his system, Comte derives from the construction or necessity of the human mind. Although all knowledge must be founded on observation of facts, yet in order to observe some sort of theory is necessary, as mere isolated observation undirected by any object in view, and unguided by any theory can never be of any value. The mind is, therefore, forced to theorize. A theory is necessary to observation, and a correct theory to correct observation.[1] The first mental act, therefore, is theorizing, devising adequate causes. The cause which its activity compels it to assume it seeks out of nature, in the supernatural, theological region. As man is conscious of self-willing, so he concludes that everything else also wills, and hence fetichism.

Then comes the metaphysical, which is the transition stage, as the theological and the positive are so far removed from each other as to require intermediate notions to bridge over the chasm. "In substituting an entity inseparable from phenomena for a supernatural agent, through whose will these phenomena were produced, the mind became habituated to consider only the phenomena themselves." The metaphysical entities, by gradually fading away, became finally lost in the mere abstract names of the phenomena. This introduced the positive stage, in which the mind having ceased to interpose either supernatural agents or metaphysical entities between the phenomena and their production, attended solely to the phenomena themselves. These it reduced to laws, or rather, expressing it according to Comte's idea of a law, arranged them according to their invariable relations of similitude and succession.

As to the classification of the sciences, the problem he desired to solve was: "how to arrange the sciences that the classification may itself be the expression of the most general fact apparent on a profound investigation of the

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 36, 37.

objects which this classification includes." And the solution lies in this "the dependence of the sciences can only result from that of the corresponding phenomena."

The positive philosophy is divided into five fundamental sciences, whose succession is determined by a necessary and invariable subordination, based upon the simple but profound comparison of the corresponding phenomena. These are: 1. Mathematics, including astronomy. 2. Physics. 3. Chemistry. 4. Physiology. 5. Sociology. It is in the order thus laid down, that this philosophy claims that the different theories held by mankind reached successively,[1] first, the theological state, next, the metaphysical state, and lastly the positive state.

Mathematics is the science of magnitude, the aim always being to determine one magnitude from another, by means of the exact relations which exist between them. This science is the perfect exponent of the positive philosophy. It is wholly within the fold of positivism, and as in the law of evolution. Comte denies that each of the three periods had a separate and exclusive existence,[2] maintaining on the contrary, that the theological, metaphysical, and positive elements have always coexisted, it is very difficult to conceive what there is in the mathematics that could ever have belonged either to the theological or the metaphysical. The positive philosophy itself, so far as its essential principle is concerned, appears to be little more than applying principles derived from the mathematics to all the other sciences. To this position Comte himself gives direct countenance by asserting, that "science is essentially destined to dispense with all direct observation,[3] by allowing us to deduce the greatest possible number of results from the smallest possible number of immediate data." And again that "mathematical analysis is the true and rational basis of the complete system of our positive knowledge."[4]

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 47. [2] *Idem*, 51. [3] *Idem*, 60. [4] *Idem*, 62.

Astronomy "has for its object the discovery of the laws of the geometrical and mechanical phenomena presented to us by the heavenly bodies." In it he finds the three tendencies: theological, metaphysical, and positive; the first interpreting all phenomena according to human analogies; the second, arguing instead of observing; and the third, limiting inquiry to accessible relations and rejecting as idle all speculation which transcends our means. He brings to view here an important philosophical law, viz: "That in proportion as the phenomena to be studied become more complex,[1] they are, from their nature, susceptible of more extended and more varied means of exploration." Or that the very complexity of the phenomena implies a greater variety of sources through which they can be investigated.

He also takes occasion to analyze the art of observing into three different processes:

1. Observation proper, viz: the direct examination of the phenomenon as naturally presented.

2. Experiment, contemplating the phenomena modified by circumstances artificially created by us, with the view to a more perfect exploration.[2]

3. Comparison, the gradual consideration of a series of analogous cases in which the phenomena become more and more simplified.

Of these, astronomy is limited to the first, while the science of organized bodies, embracing phenomena the most difficult of access, permits the union of all three of the processes. Of the different fundamental sciences this is the only one which Compte deems really and finally purged of all theological or metaphysical considerations.

Physics are contradistinguished from chemistry by the fact that the phenomena considered in the former refer to the masses, and in the latter to the molecules. The ultimate object of the former is to foresee, as exactly as possible, all the phenomena which may be presented by a body

[1] *Lewes's Comte.* 79. [2] *Idem,* 79.

placed in any given circumstances, excluding always those which could alter its nature.

While astronomy only studies bodies in reference to their forms and movements, in physics they are accessible to all our senses, the general conditions characterizing their actual existence are considered, and they are studied under a great number of different and mutually complicated relations.

Physics admit of the application both of experiment and mathematics in their investigation. They may be said to have created the art of experiment. In regard to mathematics their application ought only to take place when assurance has been obtained of the reality of the physical facts from which the mathematical deductions are to be made. It is in physics that, for the last few centuries, the struggle of the positive spirit with the metaphysical has been going on. In them natural phenomena first begin to be really modifiable by human intervention. The two things to be had in view are:

"1. The exact and rational prevision of phenomena.

"2. The possibility of modifying them, so as to promote our own ends and advantages."

By following out these two general processes, Comte proposes to subvert the theological conception which subjects all phenomena to supernatual volition,[1] and hence renders them eminently and irregularly variable. The speculative perfection of a science is to be principally measured by these two distinct but correlative properties, coordination, and power of prevision, the latter being the most decisive criterion, as it is the principal object of every science.

Chemistry is less advanced in its progress and more wanting in positivism than physics. This is owing: 1. To its greater complexity. 2. To the fact that when the phenomena are intense in action they bear a striking resem-

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 102.

blance to those of life. It occupies a position between physics and physiology, and is distinguished from each by the general character of its phenomena. Chemical action is something more than physical, and less than vital. It is the character of chemical activity to produce an essential and permanent change in the very composition of the particles, irrespective of altèrations in structure and state of aggregation. As to chemical phenomena it is noticeable:

1. That every substance is susceptible of chemical action, and hence its phenomena are general, while physiological belong only to organized bodies.

2. In order to their production, it is necessary that the antagonistic particles be brought into immediate contact.

Under all these considerations he defines chemistry[1] "as having for its general object the study of the laws of those phenomena of composition and decomposition which result from the mutual molecular and specific action of different substances, natural or artificial." The problem presented by chemistry is thus well stated:

"Given, the chemical properties of certain substances, simple or compound, placed in chemical relation, under well defined circumstances, to determine exactly in what their action will consist, and what will be the principal properties of the new products."

Compounds present two general modes of classification:

1st. The simplicity, or greater or less degree of composition of the primary combinations.

2d. The number of the combined elements. The higher the order of composition of substances, the more difficult does chemical action between them become. Chemistry has this for its ultimate object. "Given the property of all simple substances, to find those of all the compounds which they can form." It illustrates the law previously stated "that the complexity of the sciences, and their means of exploration, increase together."

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 116.

Chemistry, unlike astronomy, and even physics, levies its contribution on all the senses. Its investigations also enjoy the advantage of a verification by means of the double process of analysis and synthesis.

Comte draws another distinction between physics and chemistry. In the first we study the laws of motion communicated; in the last, the laws of motion excited. In the first, we see a force communicated from one body to another. In the last, a force combining with another force to excite a change in the phenomena of both, the result of which is unlike either.

Comte affirms that chemistry is more undeveloped, more within the empire of the metaphysical stage than physics. He cites the doctrine of affinities, which, although now rapidly losing its hold, is nevertheless clearly within the metaphysical domain. Another example of metaphysical chemistry is also found in the notion of a catalytic force, this being a convenient form for expressing all that we do not comprehend. In all these, and especially in the doctrine of affinities, he perceives only an attempt to conceive the hidden nature of chemical phenomena which he considers as utterly inaccessible.

But if chemistry from increase of complexity, is defective in one of the attributes tending to its emancipation from theology and metaphysics, viz: prevision of phenomena, he consoles himself that there is a compensation furnished in another fact, viz: the power of modifying them at our pleasure; inasmuch as neither can coexist with the idea of a government by providential volitions.

He divides organic chemistry into two different parts:[1]

1. That which relates to chemistry properly so called.
2. That which relates to physiology.

His rule for distinguishing between the two is: "to examine whether the proposed problem can be solved by the application of chemical principles alone, without the aid of

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 133.

any consideration of physiological action whatever." The same elements are common both to organic and inorganic bodies, the differences in the phenomena are only owing to differences in the arrangement of these elements. From the dawn of organic life upwards, we perceive an ascending complexity,[1] owing primarily to the greater multiples of the elementary equivalents. Between the inorganic and the organic there is mainly a difference of combination, an increasing complexity in the lines of direction of force. Comte denies all creation in the organic kingdom. He consigns to oblivion all vital forces as belonging to the metaphysical era.[2] He denies the existence of any new force in organic action, but explains such action, by the complication of the phenomena, owing to the varieties in direction of the one unknown force, calling it a new evolution, not a new creation. In passing from inorganic to organic life he evolves the following laws:

Law I. "The elements which compose organic substances are the same as those which compose inorganic substances; but in the organic they occur as higher multiples." This has before been mentioned.

Law II. "The presence of higher multiples is accompanied by an indefinite composition in lieu of a definite composition, and by a characteristic immediate synthesis of the elements."

Before proceeding to the third stage, or final law, he proposes to reject altogether the classification of matter as organic and inorganic, and as a substitute for it, to consider matter under three aspects, viz: 1st. Nonorganized, which he terms the anorganic, such as water, salts, minerals, etc. 2d. Organizable, partly organized, which he calls merorganic, being matter in an intermediate state, either wanting some addition, to become organized, or having lost some of the elements it had when organized, as the blastema from which cells are made. 3d. Organized, called

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 135. [2] *Idem*, 139.

teleorganic, in which the cell, fully equipped, can and does, perform its function. The passage from the inorganic to the organic is not direct, but the anorganic passes into the merorganic, and that into the organic. Crystallization approaches the phase termed organic, because we there first meet with definite constituent forms,[1] the crystal being conditioned upon these forms. He would define crystals to be arrested life.

He disposes of the proximate principles of the organism into three classes:

1. Those of mineral origin which are crystallizable, and leave the organism such as they entered it.

2. Those which are crystallizable, formed in the organism, and leaving it in excremental products, such as they were at their formation.

3. Those which are coagulable but not crystallizable, formed in the organism with the aid of materials, for which the first class serve as a vehicle, and decomposed in the place of their formation, thus furnishing the materials for the principles of the second class. These are the only true organic principles.

The form, which being universal,[2] is indispensable to all organic life, is the cell. This is the lowest type. The second stage is an association of cells. The third a transformation of those cells into a tissue. We now come to

Law III. "Merorganic substances become teleorganic by the assumption of a spherical form."

He learns from Dr. Carpenter that "in animals as in plants all the parts in which active vital changes are taking place essentially consist of cells,"[3] and considers that sufficient evidence exists to show that the spherical form is a constituent element of organic life. He denies all possibility of knowing the cause which determines these higher multiples to assume the spherical form. He regards life as an evolution, and not a separate creation.

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 153. [2] *Idem*, 155. [3] *Idem*, 158.

In regard to the science of life, biology, he gives several definitions that have been proposed of life. As that:

"Life is the sum of the functions by which death is resisted."— *Bichat.*

Life is the result of organization, metaphysical.

"Life is the principle of individuation," or the power within which combines many qualities into one individual thing. And finally the one adopted by him:

"Life is the twofold internal movement of composition and decomposition, at once general and continuous." In the immense majority of organized beings, he says, animal life is but a supplement, an additional series of phenomena, superposed on the fundamental organic life. He asserts that the earliest forms of life are vegetative, and that to them the study of animal life must be subordinate, and that this results from the greater generality of vegetative life, and also from the fact that the vegetative life is continuous, whereas the functions of animal life are intermittent.

The idea of life presupposes the constant correlation of two indispensable elements, the organism and a medium, or the surrounding circumstances essential to its existence. Hence he deduces the formula of the twofold biological problem, given the organ or the organic modification, to find the function or the act, and reciprocally.

He divides all life into two grand divisions, vegetative and animal, or organic life and relative life. The first vital act is assimilation, and if the act of reproduction be superadded, it gives the whole life of the cell, which is the simplest of all organisms.

As the organs are made up of tissues, he assumes that we must commence with their study, and thence proceed to the analysis of the laws of their combination into organs, and finally, to the consideration of the grouping of those organs into systems. Of these tissues the cellular is the primary and essential basis of every organism, and the only one universally present. It remains the sole basis of the

vegetable world, and also of the lowest form of the animal. This being the primordial tissue, its modification produces others, which are more widely separated from the primary one just in proportion as their first appearance takes place in the more special and the more complex organisms. The nervous, for instance, is the farthest removed,[1] being absent from the vegetable and lower animal organisms, and found only in the higher. The great object of philosophical anatomy, he claims to be, "to reduce all the tissues to one primordial elementary tissue, from which they are developed by modifications more and more special and profound, first of structure and then of composition."[2]

In advancing into vital dynamics, physiology, he affirms the division of vegetative and animal life, giving to the amimal the twofold life-organic and relative, and gives to property the same physiological relation that he does to tissue anatomically, and claims that the idea of function corresponds with that of organ, so that the notion of function and property corresponds with those of organ and tissue. As the tissues were divided into:

1. One primordial generative tissue, the cellular —

2. The secondary special tissues resulting from it; so physiologically the properties are divided into:

1. Those which are general, and belong to all the tissues.

2. Those which are special, which characterize the most distinctive modification, as the muscular and nervous.

He affirms from Chevreul that: "There is an intimate relation between the chemical composition of an aliment and the organism which it nourishes. Hence the more complex the organization, as in the higher forms of animal life, the more complex are the aliments which nourish it."

It is hardly necessary to say that the principles of Comte's system lead directly to the most unmitigated materialism, and hence he holds that the convolutions of the brain are the centre of intellectual action, and that every-

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 185. [2] *Idem*, 189.

idea of the mind is associated with a corresponding change in some part or parts of these convolutions.

In his cerebral theory he adopts in some respects that of Dr. Gall, claiming, however, what many of the adherents of the latter deny, that the mental faculties are merely the functions of their several and respective organs. But curiously enough he departs from the system of Gall in that point most of all in harmony with his own, viz: the objective part of it, that which seeks to establish by means of observation of function and of form, the locality of the several organs. In this the only instance, in which he really founds anything upon the subjective method, and in which it is the least entitled to prevail, he gives it the priority, and seeks to build up his system not objectively by the empirical method of Gall,[1] but à priori, that is by the consideration of the mental functions, their order of development, and relative dignity; seeking to locate organ and corresponding function so as to bring those together that are similar in their modes of manifestation.[2] Thus he rejects in Gall what he and his followers have always claimed to be the basis upon which his doctrine rests, viz: that the organs and faculties are established by a long series of strict and rigid observations.

The fifth and most remote planet that Comte seeks to make revolve around his central positive sun is sociology, under which term he includes social science.[3] He admits that this has yet to be created, yet to get itself to be recognized as a possible science; and yet he does not despair of bringing it under the dominion of the same positive principles that preside over mathematics and physics.

Order and progress, he says, must form the basis of every real political system, and the one must be compatible with the other. They must ultimately present themselves as the two necessarily inseparable aspects of one principle, the one involving the other. Thus society is conceived as an

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 217. [2] *Idem*, 218, *et seq.* [3] *Idem*, 233.

organism, in which incessant movement accompanies constant stability of form.

The principle of sociology consists in conceiving social phenomena as inevitably subjected to natural laws, the peculiar character of which should first be fixed. A distinction must be drawn between the study of the conditions whereby sociology exists, and that of the laws of its continuous movement. This corresponds with order and progress.

Two states of society present themselves for investigation:

The first is the static, which has for its object the positive study of the mutual action and reaction which all the portions of the social system continually exercise upon each other. The second is the dynamic, in which are studied the laws of succession, as contradistinguished from those of coexistence. The first presents the forms of order; the second furnishes the theory of progress.[1]

The plan to be pursued in the static state consists in examining successively the three principal orders of sociological considerations, more and more complex and special by taking into consideration the general conditions of social existence; first with relation to the individual, then to the family, and finally to society which, having attained its entire scientific extension, tends to embrace the totality of the human species.

In reference to the individual, there is a marked predominance of the emotional, or affective, over the intellectual faculties; and besides this general ascendancy, our least elevated instincts, those most specially egotistical, have a very great predominance over those nobler tendencies directly relative to sociology.

In the family is found the true social unity, the different natures becoming almost fused into one. The sociological theory of the family may be reduced to the examination of two orders of necessary relations, viz:

1. The subordination of sex.
2. That of age.

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 253.

The first of these institutes the family, while the second maintains it. The life of the family will remain the school of social life both in respect of obedience and command.

It is the union of families, not individuals, that compose general society. In this we find a high degree of complication. It is truly wonderful to notice "that regular and continuous convergence of an immensity of individuals, each endowed with an existence distinct, and to a certain degree independent, and nevertheless all ceaselessly disposed,[1] notwithstanding the differences of their talents and characters, to concur by a multitude of various means to one general development, without having in the least concerted together, and most frequently in active unconsciousness, all fancying they are only following their personal impulses." Here we have the effect of the division of labor; each individual following out unrestrained the natural bent of his own inherent prompting, and yet, in the result, each unconsciously contributing his proportion to the establishment of a social edifice whose arch spans the entire surface of society. It leads us to regard, not only individuals and classes, but also different peoples, as participating in an immense common labor, of which the gradual development connects the actual operators with their predecessors, as well as with their successors. Thus considered, social organization tends to repose on an appreciation of individual differences, by distributing employments in such a manner as to place each in the position he can best fill, not only in accordance with his own vocation, but also with his education and actual position.

The gradual subdivision of employments must establish an ever increasing subordination which tends more and more to the growth of government out of the very heart of society itself. This subordination is not only material, but also moral and intellectual.

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 263.

In relation to the individual, the family, and society, the first, or individual life, is characterized by direct predominance of personal instincts; domestic, by the continuous operation of sympathetic instincts, and social, by the special development of intellectual influences.

In social dynamics intellectual evolution is the necessarily predominating principle, and although our feeble intelligence needs the first awakening and continuous stimulus of appetites, passions and sentiments, it is under intellectual direction that human progress has always been accomplished.

Material development must follow a course not only analogous, but also perfectly corresponding to that of intellectual development. The primitive tendency of man is to a military life, and his final destination is to an industrial existence. The primitive races entertained an antipathy for all regular labor, leaving no opportunity for the exercise of activity except in the military life.

The military regime carried with it the individual slavery of the producers. By that means the warriors were left free to develop their characteristic activity. The preponderance of military activity was, however, merely provisional, and its importance constantly decreased as industrial existence was able gradually to develop itself. It is in social dynamics that Comte more especially insists upon the indispensable succession of three general states: the primarily theological; and transitorily metaphysical; and the finally positive; through which our intelligence passes in all speculations. He claims that there is a natural affinity between the theological and the military spirit, and between the scientific and the industrial, and the two transitory functions of metaphysicians and lawyers.

He also considers catholicism and the feudalism of the middle ages as being both of a transitory nature, and as perishing by the mere conflict of their principal elements. Each one was merely provisional in its character. Protestantism, or the right of private judgment, always, how-

ever, confined within the limits of Christian theology,[1] he regards as "the anarchial spirit of discussion" which was to ruin the admirable system of catholic hierarchy. The deism, or philosophy of the eighteenth century, removed all limits to the right of private judgment; but all endeavors to restrain metaphysical discussion within the bounds of monotheism, he regards as idle.

The opening of the fourteenth century marks the rise of the industrial order.[2] The first stage in this was the substitution of serfdom for slavery. This fixed the cultivator to the soil he tilled, thus laying the foundation for families and social rights. Now commenced the contest between privileged classes, ascendancy of birth, and that wealth which is acquired by labor. Another contrast and contest also now began its development between the industrial population and standing armies, the result of the military spirit, the consequence of which was that the latter became a constantly diminishing minority. The discovery of the compass, and the invention of fire-arms, and of printing, came in aid of the industrial development. These and other things led to the gradual abolition of serfdom, and the industrial movement became at last the permanent object of European policy, which everywhere placed the military at its service.[3]

The æsthetic development originated about the same time as the industrial. The latter consolidated the influence of the catholic and feudal manners by pervading all classes with dispositions most favorable to the action of the fine arts.[4] Could the catholic and feudal have continued, the æsthetic must have had a much larger development, the industrial movement being less favorable to it.

The scientific development owes something to transitory monotheism, as it began by patronizing the study of nature's marvels in order to the more perfect appreciation of providential optimism.

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 303. [2] *Idem*, 305. [3] *Idem*, 311, 312. [4] *Idem*, 314.

There is still a further development, the philosophic, which in scholasticism had realized to its utmost the social triumph of the metaphysical spirit, the profound impotence of which was unrecognized during several ages, from its incorporation with the catholic constitution. The metaphysical philosophy at length possessed itself of the spiritual authority it had always coveted, even among nations nominally catholic; and about the same period the scientific spirit began to display itself in its true character, "by the gradual convergeance of its spontaneous elaboration towards decisive discoveries; a character entirely incompatible with the ancient philosophy, metaphysical as well as theological. In Germany were Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, and Kepler.[1] In England, Italy, and France were Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes. Comte insists that the entire evolution of modern philosophy constitutes merely a preliminary elaboration, the essence of which resides in a plan for human regeneration.

Thus we have the latest phase of human thought in the positive philosophy. In principle and method it bears some analogy to the inductive method of Bacon. It differs from it, in that:

1. The latter admits axioms of a purely rational or à priori character, which lie at the basis of all inductive reasoning; the former denies all such.[2]

2. The latter admits that its method is not applicable, in the same sense, to the higher philosophical questions generally, as to physical investigations. It was, in fact, designed for the latter. The former extends it to every possible species of human research.

3. The latter admits the sphere of internal consciousness, as legitimately embraced in its system, while the former strikes its whole region out of the bounds of human research, and banishes it as a mere impalpable nonentity.

[1] *Lewes's Comté*, 318. [2] *Morell's Lectures*, 26.

One of the great difficulties with the positive philosophy is, that, granting all it claims, it does not, and upon its own principles cannot, solve any great philosophical problems. It avoids them all either by excluding them from its system, or by pronouncing them insoluble. While the words development, hierarchical, solidarity, evolution. elaboration, subordination, coordination, reorganization, and regeneration abound in it, there is no place found for such words as God, the soul, immortality. The great internal facts of man's spiritual nature and relations with his creator are utterly ignored. We are never to step beyond the region of outward phenomena, and the generalizations drawn from them. It aims solely at advancing the material interests of humanity, and thus views things only upon their lower and utilitarian ground. It deals only with facts, laws, and logical processes. It seizes upon effects denying their causes; upon laws denying the lawgiver; upon the order of nature shutting out its author. In robbing the universe of its creator it annihilates that beauty, splendor and benevolence which it reflects of creative wisdom and goodness.

But if it fail in its exposition of the loftiest conceptions of the universe, how much more in its explication of man. Here while its system is materialistic in all its tendencies, and its method of classifying the mental faculties is objective, according to their objects, yet in its location of organs it departs from its great method, observation, and appeals to the relationship of functions to each other.

Another formidable objection consists in its ignoring all the great problems to which human existence necessarily gives birth.

1. It embraces no final causes, no inquiry into the reasons or motives why, or for what, a mode of existence is thus and not otherwise.

2. All questions of fatality and freedom are utterly excluded.

3. All questions as to evil, whether moral or physical, are ignored. To it virtue is refined selfishness, and religion weak puerility.

4. The reconciliation of sensualism with idealism, of the objective with the subjective, the *ego* with the *non ego*, so puzzling to almost all other systems, creates no difficulty here. Its sensualistic tendencies are so strong as to banish all such inquiries.

5. All the puzzling problems of causality, relating to cause and effect, are consigned by it to the metaphysical region, and do not, therefore, belong to the positive philosophy.

6. Everything relating to the absolute, the unconditioned, the infinite, whether it concern the possibility of comprehending it, or of connecting it with the relative, the conditioned or the finite, is exiled from the lofty region of the positive philosophy and sent far back to the theological region, to the world in its infancy.

But although these difficulties are banished from all discussion by the nature of positivism itself, yet there are other difficulties that are not so easily got rid of. How can any system that admits a law or anything equivalent to it, escape the absolute? Take, for instance, Comte's great law that is to explain the world problem, viz: the three successive stages through which humanity is to pass in its development, viz: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive, on what does this depend? If upon something behind it, and which gave it a being, and annexed to it its conditions, then that something is the absolute. If upon nothing, if there is no principle, no mind, no force, no power prior to it, then the law is itself the absolute, and thus positivism is compelled to admit what its very essence consists in denying.

The positive philosophy extends through six volumes, and these being completed, Comte next attempts to reorganize society on the basis of that philosophy. But here his own disciples refuse to follow him. "I, for one," says

Lewes, his great expositor,[1] "deem these attempts premature."

"He begins," says Lewes, "with religion as the keystone of the social arch; the bond which binds the divergent tendencies of human beings into unity, and which binds together the diverse individualities into society. Religion, which at first was spontaneous, next inspired, then revealed, now in this final state becomes demonstrated; following thus the laws of evolution which have presided over science. Religion is not this or that form of creed, but the harmony proper to human existence, individual and collective, constituting for the soul a normal consensus similar to that of health for the body. It gathers into its bosom all the tendencies of our nature, active, affectionate and intelligent. It presides over politics, art, and philosophy. * * * *

"Religion must subordinate our existence to an external and irresistible power. This is, in fact, nothing more than the development of the biological notion of the necessary subordination of an organism to a medium. * * * *

"Humanity is the great collective life of which human beings are the individuals; it must be conceived as having an existence apart from human beings, just as we conceive each human being to have an existence apart from, though dependent on the individual cells of which his organism is composed. This collective life is in Comte's system the *etre* supreme; the only one we can know, therefore the only one we can worship."

This, Lewes very properly says, makes religion purely and simply what has hitherto been designated morals. He also further objects that even upon Comte's own showing, humanity can only be the supreme being of our world; it cannot be the supreme being of the universe.

These objections are obviously well taken, but unfortunately they lie not against Comte, but against the positive

[1] *Lewes's Comte*, 339.

philosophy itself. In all this Comte did nothing but legitimately follow out the principles of his system. The laws of logic could not have permitted him to construct any other religion. He had banished God from his system. All the high and mighty sanctions, therefore, which the law maker could dispense, were to him as nothing. What power could he invoke higher than a moral one, and even that has no higher principle than the "harmony proper to human existence," the order which is its proper result. His disciples here arrive at a gulf from which they recoil, but it is one to which they are necessarily led by a stern logic from the first step taken in the positive philosophy.

> Ye should have known what fruit would
> Spring from such a seed.

In the element of philosophy we have now arrived at the end of our journey. All further links in the chain of the world's thinking await the development of the future. There are few, if any, outgrowths of our common humanity that more fully proclaim the unity of the race than the continuous persistent efforts of mind at its own explication. We have before intimated that these efforts follow great cycles in the history of thought, and our belief is that there are laws at the foundation, in accordance with which all the developments in speculative philosophy take place. The last cycle we indicated as being brought to a close by the skepticism of Hume. His rigorous logic consigned to nonentity the separate efforts of the rationalistic and sensualistic systems to establish on their own distinct foundations a superstructure that should be permanent in its character.

Then commenced a new cycle to be characterized by a different line of effort; or one not directed to the building up either of a purely rationalistic or sensualistic system, but to the reconciling of each one with the other, and to

the construction of a system that should embrace both, and find in the proper explanation of each a union of both. This had even then already found its commencement in the monadology, preestablished harmony, and optimism of Leibnitz. This great thinker laid the foundation of this line of effort, and although he framed no perfect system yet his profound suggestions have done much to aid all the efforts of modern thinkers, so that Cousin has said: "The more I advance and the more I believe in philosophy, the more clearly I seem to see into the mind of that great man; and all my progress consists in understanding him better."[1]

Next we have the Scottish school of common sense, as expounded by Reid, Stewart and Sir William Hamilton, characterized by the same line of effort.

Then follows the German school, the critical philosophy of Kant, which came very near being successful in embracing within its ample range both the rationalistic and sensualistic elements in such a manner as to enable them to render mutual aid to each other.

But these two elements being thus distinctly presented, they were again seized hold of by new minds, and each carried out into their full and perfect development. This gives us the absolute idealism of Fichte, and the pantheistic idealism of Schelling and Hegel on the one side, and on the other the mysticism of Jacobi and the realism of Herbart.

This leads naturally to the eclecticism of Cousin, in which all the truth contained in all the philosophies is sought to be embodied, while all the error is rejected. This would naturally complete another cycle, in which although the conclusions arrived at are far from being satisfactory to all minds, yet when contrasted with the results attained at the termination of the previous cycle, the gain will be perceived to be immense.

[1] *Morell*, 653.

Lastly comes the positive philosophy, which may be the commencement of a new cycle, destined to be yet more comprehensive in its sweep, and, at its termination, to plant the human mind with the results of its profound speculations, on a foundation at once satisfactory and permanent.

But as it now stands the great mind and world problem is yet unsolved, and to the philosopher who is ever busily employed in seeking its solution, may be appropriately applied the following beautiful passage from Hegel in reference to Jacobi:

"He is like a solitary thinker, who in the morning of his day has found a very ancient riddle hewn upon an eternal rock. He believes in this riddle, but endeavors in vain to interpret it. He carries it about with him the whole day, he elicits from it meanings full of importance, which he moulds into doctrines and images that delight the hearer, and inspire him with noble wishes and hopes; but the interpretation fails, and he lays him down at even with the hope that some divine dream, on the next waking, will pronounce to him the word for which he longs, and in which he has so firmly believed."

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