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NAPOLEON THE THIRD:

REVIEW

OF HIS

LIFE, CHARACTER, AND POLICY;

Extracts from his Writings and Speeches,

REFERENCES TO CONTEMPORARY OPINIONS.

BY

A BRITISH OFFICER.

LONDON:

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1857.

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To my Wife.

THE INTEREST WHICH YOU HAVE TAKEN IN THE PROGRESS OF THIS WORK,
AND YOUR INNATE LOVE OF TRUTH AND JUSTICE,
ASSURE ME THAT YOU APPRECIATE AN EFFORT INTENDED TO ELUCIDATE
GREAT PRINCIPLES AND MOTIVES,
TO REMOVE MISCONCEPTIONS,
AND TO BRING FORWARD FACTS,
UNDISGUISED BY PREJUDICE OR PARTIALITY.

HAVING APPROVED MY OBJECT, AND SYMPATHISED WITH MY LABOURS,
TO NO ONE COULD

This Volume

BE MORE APPROPRIATELY DEDICATED.

THE AUTHOR.

P R E F A C E.

THE object of this volume is plain and direct. It is to describe, in their true colours, public events and personal conduct which, in former years, were the subjects of much misapprehension and prejudice.

Noble deeds, nobly performed, have in great measure dissipated the prejudice alluded to. Esteem and confidence are taking the place of the opposite sentiments, both with respect to the Emperor of the French and to the Nation which he so wisely governs. We can appreciate honour, courage, consistency. When these qualities have approved themselves through a career of unusual vicissitude, we are candid enough to recognise them, whoever be the men by whom they are displayed. And when it is made evident that friendship for us has been all through, as it still is, one of his ruling sentiments, we can hold out the hand of fellowship, and frankly accept that friendship, equally honourable to both parties.

If, through the influence of the Emperor, the feelings of England towards France have undergone a salutary change, those of our neighbours have, with regard to ourselves, experienced an equally wholesome alteration. It is moderate to affirm that history presents no example of two great nations passing so speedily, and

on grounds so reasonable and intelligible—on grounds, too, independent of political combinations—from coldness to confidence. The auspicious change is no transitory ebullition of feeling, no offspring of temporary circumstances: it is founded on the better knowledge of each other which, in England and France, has been produced by the policy and labours of Napoleon the Third.

In accomplishing this, he has conferred substantial service on mankind. For the effect of his policy embraces even a wider scope of view than that comprised in the thorough reconciliation of the two nations which are the leaders and representatives of Christian civilisation. The most prominent passages of his career, as well as the position which the French Empire now occupies in Europe, shall be temperately considered in the following pages.

True though it be, that the character and principles of the Emperor are better understood than they were a few years back, it has appeared to the writer desirable to put forward, in a durable shape, a candid exposition of sundry points which are still the subjects of controversy, to clear up the obscurity which envelopes many circumstances, and to bring the whole life of Napoleon the Third fairly into review. As is elsewhere explained, it is intended in this work rather to elucidate principles by reference to leading events, than to give a narrative of minute details; and the author trusts that this plan has been so carried out as to do justice to the great man who stands so honourably conspicuous amongst the sovereigns of Europe.

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NAPOLEON THE THIRD.

SECTION I.

GENERAL REMARKS.

THE task which I propose to myself is one not to be hastily undertaken, or lightly dealt with. It is that of setting forth, in the language of truthful fidelity, the character, as indicated in the career and astonishing fortunes, of one who has marked himself pre-eminently as the Man of this Our Age.

Born and cradled in Imperial splendour, his sponsors the great Emperor, and an Empress, the daughter of a long line of Cæsars; reared under the tutelage of a mother gifted, beautiful, and good, in vicissitude, danger, and exile; educated in the hardy instructive school of adversity; sojourner by turns in many different countries; driven hither and thither through the terror with which dynastic combinations were filled by the sound of a great name; subject, alike in youth and manhood, to misconception and misrepresentation, the present Emperor of the French has maintained, with a constancy and consistency of which history scarcely furnishes us with a parallel, the characteristics which distinguish him, and with equal

constancy has adhered to the faith and principles which inspired him from his youth. At the period, for example, when he was peculiarly the object of hostility and insult by the power then reigning in France, his inextinguishable love of country, his confidence in her destinies, his self-identification with her honour and her fortunes, were as entire and as explicitly avowed, as when, free from all influences save her own sentiments and convictions, she chose him for her foremost man. At a time when his prospect of revisiting his country seemed utterly extinct to every one save himself, his conduct was governed by a regard for her as ruling and complete as if there had not existed edicts, proclamations, and treaties, declaring his connection with her at an end for ever.

The instances in which this feeling was exemplified are almost literally innumerable. One or two may be here glanced at. His position with respect to France was discouraging indeed—the very name of Bonaparte was proscribed from her soil—when, in answer to inquiries, proceeding from more quarters than one, as to his willingness to share the throne of the young Queen of Portugal*, he at once replied negatively, on the express ground that his acceptance of that elevation would interfere with his undivided allegiance to France. Upon several occasions, whilst residing in Switzerland, a similar sentiment was elicited. Under all circumstances the expression of his heart's strongest wish pointed to residence in France upon *any* honourable terms. *That* was an object which no pressure, no temptation, ever succeeded in inducing him to relinquish.†

* Queen Doña Maria, lately deceased.

† Perhaps the coldly selfish policy of King Louis Philippe, in sternly rejecting the entreaty of the young soldier for permission

When, after confinement for years in the gloomy solitude of Ham, offers were made of immediate liberation on condition that he should give pledges separating him from his hopes for France, he resolutely refused the condition. At that time his situation appeared in all respects that of a prisoner for life. He had been several years in confinement, one of the chief solaces of his solitude being the composition of books still shadowing forth his undying attachment to France. And there was a peculiar motive, superadded to the instinctive love of liberty, making release, even for a brief interval, an object doubly dear to him. It was to visit the bed of a dying parent. With one in whom filial reverence has always been a prominent trait, this motive must have been very powerful. It was so. He went the length of preferring repeated requests to the King for permission to perform this sacred duty, and then return to his prison. He pledged his word of honour, that, at any moment when called on, he would return, a resigned if not a willing prisoner. But this was a pledge of the description appreciated only by men of generosity, and Louis Philippe was scarcely a generous man. The result was, that, firmly fixed in his resolution to give no pledge compromising his duty to France, or hampering his course during that future into which, taking subsequent events into account, we now know that he looked with astonishing perspicacity, the prisoner remained until released by means independent of the generosity, or humanity, or

to reside in and serve his country, was, after all, a mistaken one. The harsh tone of his dealing with Queen Hortense and the young Napoleon was, at all events, the reverse of grateful, considering that the mother and sister of the "Citizen King" had been under weighty personal obligations to the generosity of Napoleon the First.

powerless parties were ready to join him in any endeavour to excite insurrection in France under a watchword recalling the name of Napoleon, and at the same time excluding the principle of monarchy. An empire founded on the votes of the people, destined to renew in its integrity the grand policy of the Imperial system—this was ever the object of his aspirations; and he pointed to the descendant of the Great Emperor, as the individual around whom the sympathies of the nation would gather most naturally, most fervently and unanimously, in order to give reality and success to that aspiration.

The wonderful consistency of the man, his immovable fidelity to a great guiding principle, accompanied him through every phasis of his chequered life. During his forced sojourn in America, some years after the publication of the work just mentioned, he declared that his object in making the attempt which led to his voyage to the New World, was to “spare France conflicts and blood,” to spare her the otherwise inevitable ordeal of another sanguinary revolution. How perfectly was this view of coming probabilities realised! The dynasty of 1830 lingered on for a while longer—the future Emperor was transported to a distant country. Louis Philippe continued surrounding himself with fancied securities, “strengthening his position,” as he imagined, by family alliances, by courting influences some of which were notoriously opposed to the honour and interests of the country which he governed; yet his government *could not stand*, because it was based upon another foundation than the hearts and convictions of the people. The “conflicts and the blood” came; and the king who had sought to reign by craft, by bribery, and legerdemain, was driven with ignominy from the throne.

In the several essays of which Napoleon the Third is author, embracing a great variety of topics, military, political, social, scientific, his appreciation of the importance of works of internal improvement, of measures for promoting industry, and for ameliorating the social and domestic condition of the people, is everywhere conspicuous. This latter is a subject of which he especially loved to treat; and his sincerity has been evidenced by the number and extent of the undertakings of national utility which, notwithstanding the distracting influence of a great war, have been set on foot since his accession to power.

It was remarked by persons who knew Paris of old, and who revisited the renowned capital whilst the Great Exhibition of 1855 was open, that in five years it had sprung into a new city. The remark was not altogether an exaggeration. The fact is, that from the year 1850 much more has been done to increase the beauty, the healthfulness, the salubrity of the city, than during five-and-thirty years from 1815. In truth, not merely more, but incomparably more, has been effected in the shorter space of time than in the longer. Besides that works, some contemplated, some commenced, under the first Imperial reign, and afterwards suffered to fall into oblivion or into decay, have been vigorously proceeded with, many wholly new ones, founded on the present advanced state of sanitary science, have been undertaken, and promise to make Paris the most salubrious as well as the most beautiful of the great capitals of Europe. And it is not only in Paris that the process of improvement has advanced. In remote departments the existence of an enlightened, vigorous, work-doing, example-setting administration is felt with salutary effect; and municipalities, shaking off the lethargy

in which these bodies were immersed during the régime of bureaucracy, are putting forth their energies, and redeeming their boundaries from the opprobrium of uncleanness, inconvenience, and unhealthfulness. Marseilles itself is aroused to useful action in this particular. Those who remember the city and harbour as they were in 1848, and who may happen to spend a day or two there in 1856, will recognise the difference, to their special comfort and safety. As respects the harbour, Mr. Dickens, in some future edition of his latest work, will, I dare say, have much pleasure in subjoining a note, containing his testimony that "they order things better" there now. A similarly desirable impulse has been imparted to the minds and movements of the authorities in Lyons, Bordeaux, and, in short, all the towns and cities throughout France.

In truth, the local authorities, everywhere, have now something else and something better to think of than keeping a fragmentary section of electors in order, for the return of a convenient majority to the Chamber of Deputies. They have time for the performance of their proper work, and they perform it to their own credit and to the unspeakable advantage of the communities whose local affairs they regulate.

But it is not only with respect to works coming under the category of material improvements, that the present Emperor carries out on a noble scale the designs and principles which were enunciated by him when his position was that of an unwilling exile. The fine arts have received from him an amount of enlightened encouragement which presents a gratifying contrast to the coldness, the neglect—the neglect approaching to humiliating insult—with which they were treated by successive kings. The painter, the sculptor, the architect, stand honoured before the Imperial throne, and

their claims to respect are recognised as those of men whose pursuits are calculated to elevate the tastes and aspirations of the people. Himself, personally, a generous patron, the Emperor infuses a wise and discriminating liberality into every department of the administration—a liberality which is so far from being associated with extravagance, that, as is evident from the mode of its dispensation, it is founded on a conviction that the appropriation of a moderate portion of public money to works calculated to promote a taste for innocent and intellectual, in preference to sensual pleasures, is a truly economical and useful expenditure.

Education—another leading topic of the writings of Napoleon the Third—education, of which so grand a plan was laid down by the councils of the first Napoleon, receives a large share of the attention of the present Imperial government. It is treated, not as a mere instalment of a given literary routine, but as something intended to prepare young people for the honourable fulfilment of their duties in any position to which Providence may call them. I am here speaking of popular education in the ordinary acceptation of that term,—the education which is regarded as indispensable in the training of youth in the most humble station; and I really believe that in no country in Europe, Prussia not excepted, is the system of popular teaching more calculated to develop the capacities of the young than is that now existing in France. It is not a mere taxing of the memory; it is a system which naturally leads to the salutary exercise of the faculty of thinking, of reasoning, of reflecting upon facts and propositions. It is an education carried so far, that any one of ordinary intelligence may, upon the foundation of knowledge and intelligence created by it, attain, by his own exertions, a high degree of proficiency in various branches of learning.

This great educational system is, like many of the noble institutions of France, a legacy of the Empire, and, as others of these institutions, it languished and decayed for nearly forty years, under the dynastic incubus which a policy I do not here stop to discuss imposed on an indignant people. It is revived, it is being improved, extended, adapted to the new requirements and circumstances of our own time. Probably the day is not distant when an uneducated class will be a thing non-existent in France.

On the arrangements relating to the inculcation of the higher departments of knowledge, and the measures initiated and encouraged for the promotion of scientific progress, I do not deem it necessary to dwell in detail, inasmuch as these matters, attracting notice from time to time in the journals of the day, are probably in some degree familiar to the reader. Suffice it to say, that they are on a scale commensurate with that noble scheme of improvement and advance, in all departments of humanising effort, which originated in the genius of Napoleon the First, and has been worthily reproduced in the policy of the present Emperor.

In the development of the productive resources of the country and the industrial capacities of the people, the existing policy has employed itself not less vigorously, sagaciously, successfully. The results presented by the Paris Exhibition of 1855, when compared with those of our own Exhibition of 1851, showed a progress amongst our French neighbours, in the useful, mechanical, and manufacturing arts, which astonished all who had an opportunity of observing and comparing the two.* That this progress is in some measure due to the active and ingenious spirit of the French manufacturers, is unquestionable; but that it is likewise connected with

* Even more remarkable were the results of the late Agricultural Exhibition.

the interest taken by the Emperor himself in everything bearing on industrial prosperity, will scarcely be doubted by any one who knows in what relation the degree of progress attained between the two periods 1851—1855, stands to that effected in any former period of equal length.

Not that great progress had not been made between 1815 and 1850. France, beyond all doubt, had advanced very much in wealth, in commerce, in agricultural productiveness, and in many of the elements of national prosperity. But let us consider to what she was indebted for that advance. In the first place she had peace, that bounteous parent of wealth—peace, which she would have had long before 1815, had the wishes and solicitations of the first Napoleon been attended to by ourselves. Again, look to her commercial code; look to her laws relating to those matters in which the prosperity, the confidence, the energy of traders and merchants are most immediately concerned. How far back can we trace them? To the Empire! Some two or three years since, a convention or assembly met at Liverpool, composed chiefly of eminent commercial men, delegates from the Chambers of Commerce of the principal towns in the United Kingdom. The object was to consult on measures for the removal of the confusion and anomalies abounding in our mercantile laws; to abolish the mischievous absurdity of different sets of laws in different districts of the same kingdom, each not merely varying from, but often directly antagonistic to, the others; to introduce something like intelligibility and consistency into our mercantile enactments; to put an end to the interminable prolixities of litigation; to obtain some definition of the boundaries of right and wrong, and some certainty that disputed questions should be decided by reference thereto, and not by quirks, quibbles, and worthless formulæ,

puzzling even the practised ingenuity of lawyers ; to put an end to a state of things in which, in the everyday transactions of business, it has been impossible for a man to be certain at any time whether he were acting legally or illegally, and whether the most innocent action of his might not turn out a violation of some obscure law or by-law, wholly unknown to him, but the slightest infraction of which would subject him to ruinous penalties.

And at this Convention, when remedies were proposed, when a model was looked for, on the plan of which (making allowances for the different habits and circumstances of different countries) a rational, intelligible, economical code might be composed, the thoughts of the majority dwelt upon the system introduced into France under the auspices of Napoleon the First. Previously to the Imperial epoch, the mercantile and every other portion of the laws of France—or rather of the laws *in* France, for almost every district had its peculiar system or no-system—were in a state of chaotic complication, more barbarous, if possible, than our own. They are now plain, simple, adapted to the comprehension of every person of average capacity. Most true and just was the declaration of Lord Brougham, that if there were nothing else to render the memory of Napoleon illustrious, he would go honourably to posterity with his Code in his hand.

There is one feature in the conduct of the present Emperor, which has not been sufficiently noticed in any work I have met with, though, when considered in its bearings on the relations between England and France, it must be profoundly interesting to the people of both countries. It relates to the sentiments he has frequently expressed with regard to the British nation, and to the relations which ought to exist between the

two countries. Those sentiments have breathed amity, esteem, a conviction that mutual friendliness constitutes the interests of both. To him, beyond doubt, more than to any other man living, is due the downfall of that baleful prejudice of "natural enmity," which until recently formed part of the political creed of millions of good Frenchmen and Englishmen. Friendship, alliance, interchange of good offices,—these are the relations which he has repeatedly described as the true national policy for the governments on either side of the Channel. For years resident amongst us, he learned to esteem us, without diminution of his ardent affection for his own country.

Thoughts of England—full of friendship and respect—seem to have been seldom absent from his mind, whatever the circumstances which surrounded him. When confined in Ham, the memory of England was only secondary to incessant aspirations for the honour and happiness of France. In a letter to an English lady, written in January 1841, he says:—

"With the name I bear, I must either be in the seclusion of the dungeon or in the brightness of power.

"If you will deign, madam, to write to me occasionally, and to give me some news of a country in which I have been too happy not to love it, you will confer on me a great pleasure."

England, her past, present, and future, and the great lessons which her history contains for the statesman, the economist, the philanthropist, the lawgiver, were favourite contemplations. In his seclusion, the dulness of solitude was enlivened by meditations upon her history.

Men are not apt to select for study, reflection, and investigation, subjects which have no hold on their hearts. In a letter, dated August 1841, the captive of Ham writes:—

“My life passes here in a very monotonous manner. * * * Nevertheless I cannot say that I am dull, for I have created for myself occupations which interest me. I am, for instance, writing ‘Reflections upon the History of England;’ and I have planted a small garden in the corner of the yard in which I am located. But all this fills up the time without filling the heart, and sometimes we find it very void of sentiment.

“I am very much pleased at what you tell me of the good impression which I have left behind me in England; but I do not share in your hope as to the possibility of soon being in that country again; and, indeed, notwithstanding all the pleasure I should have in again finding myself there, I do not complain in the least of the position to which I have brought myself, and to which I am completely resigned.”

And when the expression of hostile sentiments would have procured him a certain kind of popularity with more than one party in France,—when a son of King Louis Philippe was courting such popularity by propounding bombastic plans of invasion and conquest,—the exile Louis Napoleon, representative of Imperial traditions, did not shrink from avowing his belief that the real glory of France, her greatness, dignity, and happiness, consisted rather in living in friendship with us, than in threatening our internal quiet; rather in promoting amicable intercourse, than in planning, or affecting to plan, measures of hostile collision.

It has been pretended that the celebrated allusion to the battle of Waterloo, contained in the Prince’s address to the Chamber of Peers, on his trial for the Strasburg affair, indicated a desire to wage a deadly war with England. Now, it might possibly be sufficient, in refutation of this assumption, to appeal to the whole course of his life, to the whole tenour of his

words when out of power, and of his actions when in power, on all points connected with "England and the English." But it is not necessary to rely on inferential argument: the words themselves may, with reason and probability, convey a meaning quite different from that which has been imputed to them. The passage runs to this effect:—

"I represent before you a principle, a cause, and a defeat. The principle is the sovereignty of the people; the cause is that of the Empire; the defeat is that of Waterloo. The principle, you have recognised it; the cause, you have served in it; the defeat, you would avenge it."

Looking well into these expressions and their context, it will be evident that the *consequences* of the defeat were what the speaker chiefly contemplated. There are other modes of revenge besides that involved in bristling bayonets. It was to the consequences of the battle of Waterloo that the prisoner ascribed the fact, that France was, as he declared, "enfeebled, and passed over in silence at the congress of sovereigns." He might well have indicated that the restoration of the Imperial system—of its vigour, its dignity, its courage—would place France in such an attitude as would enable her, by her moral weight, by the demonstration of energetic and really national instead of bureaucratic councils, to "revenge" the defeat and its consequences—to rebuke and humiliate those who had insulted and virtually degraded her. Every politician knows that, at the "settlement" of 1815, some of the negotiators pressed for a harsh and degrading treatment of France, and that it was England that stepped in, and, checking the zealotry of these vindictive councils, imposed something like moderation on the policy of diplomatists, whose maxim was the

cool one, that France should be crushed into the proportions of a second-rate power. Every politician is likewise aware that not only since the Revolution of 1830, but during the fifteen years preceding, certain continental influences had systematically endeavoured to ignore the voice of France in all questions of consultation between the great powers, England alone declining to participate in any such combination. This system, or policy, or whatsoever it may be called, was carried to greater extremes than ever after the accession of Louis Philippe, whose overtures of submissive conciliation were met with a sort of derisive disdain, by which France was insulted in the person of her temporary ruler. Who forgets the tour of visits made by the late Czar in the year 1844, and the ostentatious contemptuousness with which he went out of his way rather than pass through France, lest the condescension of countenancing that "dangerous people" should be imputed to him? That circumstance we all remember. Again, every reader of history is acquainted with the harsh behaviour of the Prussians subsequent to the victory of Waterloo—not only immediately after the battle, but in their progress through the French territory, and in Paris itself. I do not think that the meaning of Napoleon the Third, when a captive addressing the Chamber of Peers, was that the severities alluded to should be avenged in blood; but I do maintain that the words of the passage referred to, and which have been quoted and re-quoted *ad infinitum* by partisan writers as evidences that sanguinary projects against England were revolving in the mind of the Prince, point much more probably to the consequences of the battle of Waterloo, and to the necessity of putting a stop to the long series of humiliations to which France had

been subjected by certain continental powers, than to any indication of enmity to us. Coupling this reasonable view of probabilities with the disposition which Napoleon the Third has at all stages of his career manifested towards this country, the conclusion which I have suggested can scarcely be disputed.

Few rational persons ever believed that Prince Joinville was sincere in his preposterous scheme of invasion ; but the very mooted of it betrayed a willingness to pander to bad passions for the sake of attracting factitious popularity to the Orleanist dynasty. From such meretricious devices to win the good graces of any section of his countrymen, Prince Louis Napoleon ever held aloof. And the tone which he formerly held towards England was the precursor of a policy adopted immediately on his accession to power, and which, every good man hopes, is the harbinger of a prolonged era of cordial "peace and good-will" between us and our neighbours. Even when the object of the most virulent, irritating, unscrupulous, unfounded abuse and calumny ever poured out against a man in high station,—when he had reason, if man ever had reason, to feel exasperated at the slanders uttered daily in this country,—he never once deviated from this tone and this policy. Resisting the secret blandishments and solicitations of Russia, he remained true to his motto, "Friendship and alliance with England ;" and his rare fortitude and constancy are likely to produce immense advantages to the cause of humanity and civilisation throughout Europe—throughout the world.

Whilst on this subject it is proper to observe, that the policy of friendliness towards England is one which really appears to have been, "in his heart of hearts," ever present to the mind of the first Napoleon. Circumstances which we must all deplore, and which it

would now be useless to recapitulate, led to demonstrations and events of a different kind; but it is certain that Napoleon was anxious to cultivate the friendship of England. The indications of this do not rest solely on his own conversations during the latter years of his life. From these, indeed, we learn, that at the very period when the two countries were immersed in the hottest crisis of the great war, when we were subsidising a multitude of faithless or imbecile allies, whom, after paying to fight, we ourselves were obliged to fight for—nay, when our armaments assumed the most gigantic magnitude, when the sovereigns of the Continent were prostrate before the fortunes of the Empire, that even then, with his fortunes at their climax, peace with Great Britain was an object which he would willingly have courted and made signal concessions to attain, if the policy at that time paramount in this country had admitted the possibility of a basis of negotiation. But it is not only to Napoleon's language in St. Helena that we can turn for evidences of this disposition. The volumes of memoirs, biographies, diplomatic revelations, and State papers which have appeared in such rapid succession during the last thirty years, contain numerous collateral proofs of this having been in reality a predominant feeling in the mind of the Emperor, and that his general impression was that if peace could be made with England, and really cordial relations established, the two leading nations of civilisation would be mutually strengthened, enriched, and benefited. After the lapse of half a century, this truth has been recognised and accepted in practice.

The career of Napoleon the Third, from the time when the Revolution of 1848 abolished the law of banishment against the Imperial family, down to the day when the enthusiastic assent of millions of French-

men called him to the throne, has been frequently criticised, and scarcely less frequently misrepresented. A brief and candid outline of it will be in place.

The Provisional Government attempted at first to make an unfavourable exception in his case, and to maintain the sentence of banishment against him. This attempt filled the people with indignation, which reached such a height that disturbances were apprehended. To preclude all danger of fatal collisions he twice retired to England, although nominated representative in several departments. On one occasion he entered a protest, from which the following is an extract:—

“If the people were to impose duties on me I should know how to fulfil them. * * * My name is a symbol of order, of nationality, of glory; and it would be with the liveliest grief that I should see it made use of to augment the troubles and dissensions of my country. In order to avoid such a misfortune, I shall prefer remaining in exile. I am ready to make every sacrifice for the happiness of France.”

The people were resolved that they *would* impose duties on him. At the new elections he was chosen in five departments. He chose to sit for Paris. Nominated for the Presidency, he was elected by an immense majority over the aggregate of votes given for all the other candidates. This circumstance was a manifestation that he had not been mistaken in the opinion which in hundreds of instances he had energetically expressed—that the national will, the national hopes, were bound up with the glorious name he bore, with the cause of which he was the representative.

And now came the conflict of faction and passion in the Assembly. The members soon showed that they were occupied with any thoughts rather than those

relating to the consolidation of order, the restoration of tranquillity, the promotion of prosperity and confidence in the great industrial operations which had been inevitably interrupted by the events of the revolution. Amid the discord of factions, and the intrigues of the several leaders, each bent on furthering his own objects, it became evident that, unless averted by the interposition of energetic and sagacious councils, scenes of anarchy and bloodshed were at hand.

The plain facts are, that in 1851 a revolution of the most hideous kind—a revolution factious, furious, conscienceless, implacable—was impending. I have conversed with many of our countrymen who were residing in Paris at that critical period; and the overwhelming preponderance of their opinion is to the effect, that but for the conception and success of the masterly stroke of statesmanship which received the name of the *Coup d'Etat*, order, society, property, would within a few weeks have been overthrown.*

A vast amount of mystification has arisen with respect to the lawfulness or rightfulness of the change which was effected in the Constitution as it stood prior to the 2nd of December. It has been argued by some writers, in real or affected ignorance of the facts, that that Constitution was immutable in all its details. Nothing could be more contrary to fact. Those who pretend that the Constitution was thus unchangeable in any one of its particular parts, would reduce the

* In 1851, the Bourbonite partisans withdrew even the scanty measure of support which they had occasionally given to the Executive upon questions involving the existence of any government at all, and were frequently seen joining the Socialists and Communists in proceedings of which the object was to thwart and harass the President. Under the auspices of the majority in the Assembly, society was hurrying towards anarchy.

enlightenment of its constructors to a level with that of the ancient propounders of the immutability of the laws of the Medes and Persians. No; it was not any one detail, or any part of its details, that was unchangeable; it was its *principle*. That principle was the national will, which had created it, which had not abandoned its supremacy to it, but to which it was necessarily and naturally subject. The Constitution was made for and by the people, not the people for the Constitution. The Constitution, in short, meant the national will. The promise to maintain it, meant allegiance to the national will. Whoever pretends the reverse, abnegates that principle of the supremacy of the suffrage of the nation without which the Constitution could have had neither meaning nor vitality, but would have been a mere medley of barbarous impracticability.

The circumstances of the period had convinced the man to whom the nation had entrusted the high responsibility of establishing and maintaining good and secure government for France, that there was an imperative necessity for calling on the people to exercise their undoubted right of deciding for or against a revision of particular details which had been found incompatible with secure government, had been found to work mischievously, and threatened to produce more mischief still.

But the step of suggesting, or proposing, or initiating the salutary change, was one fraught with peril and difficulty — one from which the nerves of an ordinary man, however honest and well-meaning, might have shrunk — one which would have appalled any man not possessing the indomitable resolution, the inexorable regard for duty, the uncompromising patriotism, which have distinguished the career of Napoleon the Third, and to which, even more than to hereditary associations,

he owes his position as pre-eminently the man of the age. The views of Orleanist, Legitimist, Socialist, diametrically opposite in other respects, met on common ground when the question was, tranquillity or disturbance. In the chapter of accidents created by the latter, the leaders of each faction imagined that something favourable to their own purposes might arise. Accordingly, disagreeing in everything else, they concurred in this,—that it was desirable to have as frequent returns as possible of seasons of discord and confusion. There were certain features in the Constitution which presented periodical opportunities for fomenting riots; and these, it was hoped, might, by ingenious irritation, be inflamed into insurrection, in which, amid terror, blood, and confusion, either or any party would have a chance of grasping power.

It is unnecessary, in this place, to go through the details of the events which followed the 2nd of December. The measures taken to ensure success were of a description justified by the extraordinary importance of the object in view—that of saving society from dissolution. It was impossible that they should not be accompanied by some cases of hardship—some cases of unmerited suffering. But very many of those who suffered—I mean of those who suffered innocently—have confessed that the operation was conducted with as little harshness, as little intentional invasion of personal feelings and comfort, as was consistent with certainty and completeness of accomplishment.

That it was eminently successful I need not say. That blood flowed in the streets of Paris, was a calamity to be profoundly regretted, but one which plainly proved the inveterate malignity of the factions, and the magnitude of the danger which was averted. That a measure which was soon ratified by the votes of

7,439,219 Frenchmen, and dissented from by only the fractional minority of 640,737, should, through unscrupulous intrigues, have been made the pretext for exciting tumults ending in blood, showed how utterly the instigators of the outbreak disregarded the wishes of the great body of the people. That, indeed, was a consideration which never entered into their thoughts. What they wanted was — disorder; for in disorder lay their single chance of preventing the settlement of the government on a secure basis. The blood which they caused to be spilt — the delusions and falsehoods, the ingenious complications of calumny, by which they succeeded in inflaming the passions of a section of the Parisian populace — the atrocious misrepresentations — since detected — of fact, purpose, and principle, by which they got up riots which it was necessary to repress speedily and resolutely, and which were repressed as much by the operation of public opinion as by military demonstrations — bear witness against themselves and their designs. But the good genius of the nation prevailed. The great idea was triumphant; the imminent, deadly peril of France — and, with France, of Europe — was overcome: life, property, order, justice, were rescued and saved.

True and memorable, and nobly fulfilled in the future, were the words in which the President expressed his appreciation of the signal proof of his country's confidence contained in the electoral returns — "If I congratulate myself on this immense adhesion, it is not from pride, but because it gives me power to speak and act as becomes the head of a great nation!"

The national feeling which converted the Presidential chair into an Imperial throne was the result of salutary facts working on public convictions. The people of France saw what had been accomplished for them during the short time that had elapsed since the President had released himself and them from the incubus of factious obstruction. They saw tranquillity, substituted for a disorder hastening to anarchy. They saw industrial prosperity and commercial confidence taking place of stagnation and nerveless terror. They saw the spirit of governmental energy instilling itself into the movements of private enterprise, and, without attempting to stand in the place of individual efforts, opening facilities and encouragements for these efforts. They felt themselves more happy, more comfortable, more secure. They felt that they had some guarantee of internal quiet and order, through which honourable industry of every kind might hope to reap in peace the fruits of that which it had sown. They knew that for several years to come they need not fear either a Reign of Terror on the one hand, or a despotism of corrupt and extortionate bureaucracy on the other. They already experienced many of the blessings of efficient government,—of a government at once strong and popular, possessing power to effectuate the measures of utility which it contemplated, without being constantly thwarted by factious intrigue; and they felt that what had been thus early accomplished was but an instalment of the benefits which they would enjoy when, in the fulness of time, the effects of a wise policy should be matured. But this was the contingency which excited uneasiness—Was it certain that that policy would be allowed time to mature itself—to work out its beneficent objects? Here was a question of deep and solemn import. The power of the President was, after all, only a temporary

power, limited to a term of years. This circumstance encouraged the factious, no longer able to play their fantastic tricks in the Legislature, to plot and combine for the purpose of curtailing that term, and producing new scenes of confusion tending to bloodshed and counter-revolution. And this danger it was that the people had in view, when they demanded that the authority of the Chief of the Executive should be consolidated and made permanent by the revival of the Empire.

And how worthily and loyally their chosen man has acquitted himself in his high position; how implicitly, how unreservedly, he acknowledges the source and origin of his power; how emphatically he avows that his title to that power was the national will recognising a great principle! How wisely he spoke when, in answer to the congratulations addressed to him on the birth of the heir-apparent—the “Child of France”—he referred all his glory, his honours and dignity to the People—when, in language elevated by the simple majesty of truth and sincerity, he ascribed all that he had attained to the People, entrusting to him the guardianship of their interests.

The war just closed has cemented and confirmed the alliance which the Emperor has always regarded as constituting the state of relations most congenial to the mutual interests of England and France. The two countries, actuated by a common object, entered into a prodigious struggle, in which each bore its part with equal honour and success. It is not to be expected that the enthusiastic compliments which we have been interchanging during the crisis of the contest will, in times of peace, and in every detail of intercourse, continue to be heard. There may, there probably will, arise differences, discussions, upon many

subjects, as is often the case between the warmest friends. But fundamental amity between the two nations is established, and will not easily be disturbed. We have learned to respect each other, to understand and appreciate each other's better qualities, instead of keeping our eyes fixed exclusively, as was formerly the fashion of quasi-patriotism, on faults and weaknesses. The good which has been planted it will be impossible to root up. France and England, the foremost nations of civilisation, will henceforward be, in the main, foremost in the example of reciprocal good services.

He who has been, under Providence, the instrument by which these salutary results have been accomplished, is truly worthy the grateful esteem of France, of England, of the world. No one has sustained more slanderous misrepresentation,—no one has more nobly refuted them by his actions.

The present work is intended to be not so much a minute chronological narrative, as a review of the leading features of a great career, and a temperate exposition, both as respects motives and incidents, of various events which have been frequently discussed and almost as frequently misdescribed. Some of the very proceedings for which Napoleon the Third has been most "plentifully abused," which at one time procured him unlimited vituperation in England and elsewhere, are those which, fairly analysed and considered in relation to surrounding circumstances, illustrate most vividly his unflinching integrity and fortitude. With a perfect knowledge that the performance of his duty would subject him to much passing obloquy, would furnish his enemies with slanderous pretexts which they would not fail to turn to account, still resolutely, if sometimes

with pain, he adhered to that duty. Those things require to be explained and cleared up. To this day, false impressions, created by the calumnies once so rife, linger in the minds of many persons. To remove these false impressions is one of my principal objects. I purpose to do so, not by evading any point, not by glossing over any fact, but by a candid appeal to truth and reason.

SECTION II.

1808 to 1840.



CHAPTER I.

BIRTH, EXILE, CHILDHOOD.—EDUCATION.—LIFE IN SWITZERLAND.—
THE ITALIAN WAR.—THE GRATITUDE AND CLEMENCY OF KING
LOUIS PHILIPPE.

IN the year 1808, on the 20th of April, in the Palace of the Tuileries, was born a child who was hailed by the people of the French Empire as heir presumptive of his uncle, the great Emperor; and who, though soon afterwards removed from that position by the birth of his cousin the King of Rome, and, when seven years old, apparently shut out from all prospect of ever residing, far less reigning, in his native country, was destined to fulfil in due time the high expectations which attended his birth—to succeed to the policy and mission of Napoleon the First; to resuscitate the Imperial system in the integrity of its vigour and grandeur; to restore France to that foremost rank, from which she had temporarily fallen back, amongst the nations of Europe.

From end to end of the realm of Napoleon, enthusiastic acclamations saluted the event. They were the acclamations of a great people, rejoicing in the presence of an heir to the Emperor of their choice, and recognising in him a pledge of the permanence of a

dynasty which they identified with the honour, dignity, and happiness of the nation.

The present Emperor of the French is the son of Louis (younger brother of the Emperor Napoleon), by Hortense, the beautiful, amiable, and accomplished daughter of the Empress Josephine. When the Imperial infant was born, his father was King of Holland, but soon after resigned his throne in consequence of an impression that, in the circumstances of the period, he could not hold it consistently with the interests of Holland and France. The conduct of King Louis in taking this step may have been erroneous; it is possible that he may have taken an inaccurate view of his position and duties. Without discussing that question, truth and fairness call for the admission that the motives which swayed him were of a nature indicative of a pure, high-minded character.

The young Prince was baptized Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte; his sponsors were the Emperor and the Empress Marie Louise, whom Napoleon had married in the interval between the birth and the baptism of the future Napoleon the Third. The name "Charles" was a merely formal or honorary prefix, adopted in compliment to Charles Bonaparte, the Emperor's father. The Prince scarcely ever subscribed it in his correspondence: "Louis Napoleon," "Napoleon Louis," are the signatures which he usually employed prior to his accession to the Imperial dignity.

In infancy he was an especial favourite with the Emperor, whose affection was not diminished by the birth of the King of Rome. An anecdote is on record which possesses all the marks of authenticity, and which exhibits in a remarkable manner that semi-prophetic tone which characterised many of the sayings of Napoleon the First. It is related that when the Emperor

was preparing to leave Paris for his last campaign, the little Prince, then only seven years old, one day entered his cabinet, and climbing his knee, entreated him to remain at home, for that, if he did not do so, the enemy would take him away, and he should never see him more. The Emperor, it is added, was affected to an unusual degree, and handing the child to the mother, Queen Hortense, exclaimed, "There, embrace your son; look well to him; come what may, he will have a good heart and a noble mind. *Perhaps, after all, he is the hope of my race.*" What solemn significance these words contained! How strangely they accord with the course of events, then hidden deep in the womb of an inscrutable future — of a future, the most remote resemblance to the events and vicissitudes of which, human genius and sagacity could not have contemplated.

How Napoleon fell before a combination of power such as the world never before witnessed, and probably will never witness again, — before a succession of adverse circumstances as unforeseen as they were insuperable, — is known too well to require any elaborate recapitulation. That England was the soul, the animating spirit of the combination, is equally well known. That the policy which actuated the British government in presenting such an implacable front of hostility to the Emperor was not the wisest, is a proposition which the people of this country have of late years shown an increasing disposition to entertain and accept. But during our war with the Emperor, the struggle was, doubtless, popular in England. A reverend gentleman*, who in the course of last year delivered and published some intelligent lectures on the character

* The Rev. Henry Christmas, M.A.

of the present Emperor, has made some observations in reference to the sentiments then existing in England, so apposite in many respects, that I shall take the liberty of quoting a few passages. Adverting to the strong feeling created in England by some of the more violent acts committed during the first French Revolution, and to the excitement which was got up against Napoleon as the representative of that revolution, the reverend lecturer says:—

“There arose a prejudice against the Emperor Napoleon, the strength and virulence of which we can scarcely conceive in the present day. To see some of the caricatures which were then in vogue, some of the papers which were then printed and circulated, some of the language which was then uttered, we should scarcely believe that we were looking upon a record of the human race in a state of civilisation. We should say, Surely these were things that could only be tolerated when men were as ignorant as they were barbarous. Under these circumstances it will hardly excite our wonder that the English government should be strongly supported in its attempts to overthrow the French Republic.

“But we must here pause a moment, and show a slight distinction between the feelings of the nation and the feelings of the Government. They had, undoubtedly, different objects in view. The government felt that as long as the disturbance existed which the French Revolution had caused, as long as men believed they had political rights which could not lawfully be taken away from them, as long as they could see that kings derived their power from the people, and not from an assumed divine right, so long no government founded on the principles previously maintained in Europe could stand. All the continental powers were despotic

—they were constructed on the principle that the will of the Sovereign, under certain nominal restrictions, was to be the law of the land; that the Court was to rule the whole people; that the intrigues of the Court were to be the sole means whereby power was to be obtained; that all the traditions of the middle ages were to be perpetuated under disguise; and that men were to be ruled just as they were in those darker eras, and according to those principles which prevailed when mankind were most ignorant of the reasons why one man ruled, and another man obeyed. Since 1714, our Court had been closely connected with some of the smaller German states; and to preserve these German governments our rulers willingly exasperated the popular feeling, and threw its weight into the popular scale, in order to put a stop, if possible, to the progress of the French Republic and the French Empire. Looking at these things in the light which we derive from a greater knowledge of political philosophy, we can now see that if the French nation chose to have Napoleon for Emperor, we had no right to interfere. If the French felt his authority to be beneficial to the interests of society, we had no right to object to their choice; for we had ourselves under similar circumstances changed not only the dynasty of our rulers, but also the character of our government. With such instances before them as those of Charles the First and James the Second, it might have been thought that the English people would have been the last to interfere with the French for choosing Napoleon the First as their monarch. Nevertheless, however erroneous the principle upon which we proceeded, this much is certain, that the wars in which we then engaged were eminently popular."

No doubt there is much truth in these observations. That Napoleon the First would, at almost any stage

of his career, have willingly and gladly made an equitable peace with England, is a fact of which there now exists little doubt: as little doubtful is it that the inexorable policy — or mispolicy — of the English government, the factitious and false prosperity created in England by the war, and the prejudices with which the minds of our fathers were inoculated, rendered the attainment of the Emperor's desire an impossibility. It has been argued that, considering that in the downfall of his uncle, the repression of the Imperial system, and the humiliation of France, the power and persistence of Great Britain were so prominently instrumental, the mind of the young Prince Louis Napoleon must, as soon as he reached the age of reason and reflection, have conceived sentiments of hostility towards this country. But it is useless to discuss conjectural hypotheses of the kind. The facts are before us: these facts show that, whatever feelings the Prince might have been considered likely to entertain for us, those which he did manifest, and with his usual consistency has adhered to from very early manhood to the present time, partook not of enmity, but of amity, — the only difference between his recently expressed sentiments in this respect, and those which were avowed by him many years ago, being that the amicable views, then comparatively cold, have since assumed a tone of thorough and cordial friendship.

To return from this digression. The events of 1815 led to the expulsion from the French territory of the family and relatives of the Emperor. The ex-king of Holland had adopted the modest title of Count St. Leu; and his wife, taking with her the illustrious subject of these pages, passed into Bavaria. But political acrimony pursued her thither. Representations from the ministers of Louis the Eighteenth soon

forced her to seek another refuge. It was at that time not easy to find a spot on the continent of Europe not overshadowed by the system of intimidation and coercion which constituted the policy of the potentates who had formed themselves into the league so well known in history as the Holy Alliance. The court of Bavaria was compelled to insist on the departure of the illustrious exiles. Their first place of sojourn was Switzerland, — they then removed to Rome. Finally, they established themselves permanently in Switzerland, and resided for several years in the Castle of Arenenberg. Here the Prince's education was continued under the superintendence of his mother. From the simple people amid whom they dwelt, the admirable qualities of the ex-Queen, and the masculine, generous, though somewhat reserved character of the Prince, attracted warm and affectionate esteem. That his studies were of a solid and comprehensive kind—of the stamp calculated to prepare him for the high destiny which lay in the future—is evidenced by the subjects chosen by him in the several published works which are more particularly noticed in subsequent chapters. To such studies, to the contemplation of the science of government, of political and military organisation, and in general to topics connected with the interests and happiness of nations, the natural bent of his mind disposed him; and on his arrival at manhood, he was probably more deeply versed in the leading principles and circumstances of European politics than many grey-haired statesmen who had passed their lives in the bureau and the cabinet.

It is not my purpose to overload this volume with multitudinous anecdotes of a merely personal nature. There is one, however, which (illustrative as it is of the intrepidity and presence of mind for which Louis Na-

poleon has always been distinguished) I think it worth while to copy verbatim, as I find it in a contemporary work of reputation:—

“On one occasion he gave proof of a generous courage, which it would be wrong to omit citing. One day, as he was taking his usual ride, his attention was attracted by cries of alarm. Two horses, harnessed to a carriage, had taken fright, and were galloping furiously towards a precipice. The coachman was already thrown down; a lady and two children were in the vehicle, shrieking with terror. No sooner did Louis Napoleon perceive their dangerous situation than he dashed his horse across the fields in order to arrive before the carriage at the precipice. He reached it at the very edge, seized one of the horses by the bit, and turned him so vigorously that the animal fell down, and the carriage was stopped, amidst the plaudits and delight of a crowd of frightened villagers, who now, in the brave and skilful horseman, recognised the Prince.”

Numerous similar anecdotes are related; and it has been observed with much truth, that “he won the hearts of the people by his bravery and the simplicity of his habits.” The well-informed writer of the above-cited passage remarks:—

“He not only studied literature and the sciences at Arenenberg, but he took advantage of the vicinity of the camp at Thun to make himself acquainted with military duties. Every year he carried the knapsack on his back, ate the soldiers’ fare, handled the shovel, the pickaxe, and the wheelbarrow—would climb up the mountains, and after having marched many leagues in the day, return at night to repose under the soldiers’ tent.”

Such were the lessons of self-command, of willing submission to hardship and discipline, in pursuit of the practical experience so necessary to complete and exemplify theoretical principles, which the Prince imposed on himself. Meet preparation for a great destiny.

The Revolution of 1830, inaugurated and commemorated amid such high and futile hopes,—hopes the failure of which was rendered all the more bitter by the confidence with which they had been cherished,—brought about a change in the peaceful, studious, retired, and laborious life of the future Emperor. He had supposed that, with the nominal abolition of the anti-national system of 1815, such accompaniments of that system as the exile of the family of the great Emperor might have been removed. He was disappointed. A meeting of members of the Imperial family took place at Rome; the spirit of Bourbon intrigue took the alarm, and the Prince was conducted, under a military escort, beyond the pale of the Papal territory. Next came the Italian revolution, in which, regarding it as a protest against the incubus of despotism which bound down the soul of Europe, Louis Napoleon and his elder brother took an active part. The particulars of the campaign it is unnecessary to describe. I am content to take the summary of its events from the hand of a writer somewhat remarkable for hostility to the Prince:—

“Louis Napoleon and his brother formed moving columns, and endeavoured to organise the revolutionary efforts. Aided by General Sercognani, they defeated the Papal forces in several places. Great rejoicing prevailed in the camp of the insurgents; alarm and confusion filled the Vatican. Both were of short duration. The crooked and double-tongued policy of the French and Austrian rulers gained the upper hand.

The two princes were deprived of their command, and banished from the soil of Italy. Meanwhile the elder brother fell sick at Faenza, with an attack of internal inflammation, and shortly afterwards died, March 27th, 1831."

The Prince was now in a critical position. Literally in the territory of his enemies, surrounded by Austrian soldiers, who exercised the utmost vigilance to capture him, he was only extricated from his difficulty by assuming the livery of a servant of his mother, who, on hearing of his danger, had hastened to offer him succour and counsel. Mother and son ultimately reached Cannes—the spot at which the Emperor, on leaving Elba in 1815, had first set foot on the soil of France, and the name of which has of late become more familiar than before to English ears, from being the chosen retirement of Lord Brougham. Here they were still involved in danger of arrest; for it will be remembered that the proscription of the Imperial family remained in force under the monarchy of July.

They chose a bold and high-minded course,—to endeavour to reach Paris, and make an appeal to the good feeling which they were willing to attribute to the King. They succeeded in entering the capital, and put themselves into communication with Louis Philippe. Setting aside the character of the man whom they had to deal with, they had good reason for making this appeal, and for entertaining some confidence as to its result. But here, as in most instances where any argument save the cunning suggestions of self-aggrandisement was submitted to King Louis Philippe, the application was unsuccessful. This king had peculiar causes for gratitude to Queen Hortense. It was mainly through the intercession of that princess that the Emperor had been induced to permit the mother

and aunt of Louis Philippe to reside in France, at a time when all the branches of the Bourbons were plotting or fighting against the Empire. It was her intercession, in great measure, which had obtained for them, from the Imperial generosity, the annuities of 400,000 and 200,000 francs respectively. But of Louis Philippe it could not be said, as it was of the elder branch of his family, that he had "forgotten nothing." He had a convenient facility of forgetfulness as to favours received, when the memory thereof did not harmonise with his immediate views. Queen Hortense, to whose generous, womanly humanity he owed so much, appealed to him,—she desired only to live and die in France. The Prince, her son, asked permission to serve in the French armies in any capacity, no matter how humble—that of a private soldier not being excluded. The reply was a peremptory order to leave the French territory immediately. Haply the King blundered here. Had he been a little more trustful, a little more grateful, and had he followed up such trustfulness and gratitude by the manifestation of a willingness to govern France for the French instead of for his own family circle, to maintain her honour and dignity throughout the world, and to consult and labour for her domestic interests, her industrial prosperity, her social, intellectual, educational elevation,—he might possibly have secured a fast friend. For it was not so much the *personnel*, it was the principles of government, that at all times occupied the meditations and aspirations of the present Emperor.

CHAP. II.

THE SECOND SOJOURN IN SWITZERLAND.—THOUGHTS, STUDIES,
OCCUPATIONS, AND ASPIRATIONS.

REPELLED from the land to which their affections were so inseparably wedded, the exiles, after a short sojourn in England, returned to their former residence in Switzerland. In 1832 the Council of the canton of Thurgovia offered the Prince the rights and privileges of citizenship, in a letter which well attests the character* of mother and son:—

“We, the President of the Petty Council of the Canton of Thurgovia, declare that the commune of Sallenstein having offered the right of communal citizenship to his Highness the Prince Louis Napoleon, out of gratitude for the numerous favours conferred upon the canton by the family of the Duchess of St. Leu since her residence in Arenenberg, and the Grand Council having afterwards, by its unanimous vote of the 14th of April, sanctioned this award, and decreed unanimously to his Highness the right of honorary burgess-ship of the canton, with the desire of proving how highly it honours the generous character of his family, and how

* A trait still remembered and spoken of by the old inhabitants of the district, was the peculiarly generous and charitable disposition shown by the Prince at a very early age—in fact, from childhood. Whilst yet a youth, the allowance received from his mother, instead of being expended in the objects of personal display and indulgence, which usually engross the thoughts of young people, was almost wholly employed in offices of benevolence and good service to his poor neighbours.

highly it appreciates the preference they have shown for the canton, declare that his Highness Prince Louis Napoleon, son of the Duke and Duchess of St. Leu, is acknowledged as a citizen of the Canton of Thurgovia."

In acknowledging and accepting this compliment, the Prince does not omit referring to his position as an exile in the cause of the Imperial nationality of France. He says:—

"My position, as an exile from my country, makes me the more sensible of this mark of attention on your part. Believe me, that under all the circumstances of my future life, as a Frenchman and a Bonaparte, I shall be proud of being the citizen of a free nation. My mother desires me to say how much she is touched by the interest you have shown towards me."

The circumstance just described took place in the year 1832. Towards the close of that year the death of his cousin, the Duke of Reichstadt, son of the Emperor by the Archduchess Marie Louise, drew the Prince into closer relationship than before with the rights and traditions inherited from the Empire.

During 1832 and 1833 he published two remarkable works. The first was the well-known "*Rêvères Politiques*;" the second—less known in other countries, though evidencing an extent of practical and theoretical knowledge extraordinary in a young man of five-and-twenty—was the "*Considérations Politiques et Militaires sur la Suisse*." *

As one of my designs is to exhibit the course of thought which has influenced the Emperor throughout his life, I shall insert a few extracts from these early

* When still very young, he wrote a work upon artillery, which obtained warm eulogiums from high authorities on the subject.

productions. It will be observed that, whatever the subject immediately under consideration, his mind ever reverted to France,—to the memories associated with that loved name, — to the grandeur and beneficence of the Imperial system. Some of his allusions to republicanism—that is to say, the school of republicanism which repudiates monarchy—are very striking. He does not conceal his appreciation of those qualities in republican administration, which, abstractedly, are worthy of all admiration. But neither does he conceal his sense of the several considerations which might render that form of government unsuitable in many respects to France. By such candid acknowledgments of his convictions he was decidedly weakening himself, in point of popularity, with parties in France who would have been happy to obtain the sanction of his name and co-operation in measures directed against the government of the day. But this was a temptation to which he rose superior. Steadfast in his belief as to the policy which would secure the real interests of the nation, and in his confidence of the ultimate triumph of that policy, he never deviated from expressions indicative of these sentiments. He possessed the capacity of looking beyond the small expedencies of the moment, and regulated his language, as his actions, by a far-seeing regard for the contingencies of the future.*

* The framework or outline of a constitution, which he appended to the "*Rêveries Politiques*," contained some features differing from those of the present form of government in France, or rather contained features not included in the latter. But in spirit and essence they are similar. And as respects divergencies of detail, it would be well to consider that the system which it might be desirable to adopt in a country untroubled by the plots and intrigues of conflicting dynastic pretensions, of reckless, bloodthirsty factions, and conspirators against all orderly government,—against property, against society itself,—may be, and obviously must be, widely dif-

In the "Rêveries Politiques" (published in 1832), I find the following passages:—

"A government can be a strong one only when its principles are in harmony with its nature. Thus, the nature of the government of the Republic consisted in the desire to establish the reign of equality and liberty; and the feelings by which it was actuated were a love of country, and a desire to exterminate her enemies. The nature of the Empire was to consolidate a throne based on the principles of the Revolution, to heal the wounds of France, to regenerate the people. The passions of that government were love of native country, love of glory, love of honour. The nature of the [Bourbon] Restoration consisted in the restriction of liberty, that men might forget the glory of the past, and its passions in the re-establishment of the ancient privileges of classes, and a tendency to arbitrary power. The nature

ferent from that which it would be *possible*, with prudent regard for public tranquillity, the interests of industry, and the rights of property, to adopt in a country in which these evils abound. To this day the conduct of many of the leading men of the French factions (witness the "Fusionist" negotiations, and such manifestations as the various incendiary "letters" to the Italians) proves the absolute necessity, in the interests of peace, nay, of society, for energetic and vigilant rule. Moreover, it must be remembered that experience often disproves the practicability of measures or systems which may be good in theory. Circumstances, after all, must ever govern the course of human affairs; and true wisdom is shown in deciding on the steps which, under their controlling pressure, is most accordant with the public welfare. In the working of the constitutional systems which were put on their trial after the Revolution of 1848, the President of the Republic strenuously endeavoured to maintain and carry them out in their spirit. The factions rendered this impossible: it proved a physical as well as a moral impracticability. The nation reeled on the verge of the most sanguinary anarchy recorded in history. It awoke to a sense of its frightful peril: it emphatically co-operated with the wise and comprehensive plans by which that peril was averted.

of the Royalty of 1830 consisted in a revival of the glories of France, the sovereignty of the people, and the reign of merit: but its passions were timidity, selfishness, and cowardice.

“The agitation which prevails in all parts of the world, the love of liberty which has taken possession of the minds of all men, the energy which a feeling of confidence and a good cause have begot in all hearts, all these indications of an imperious will cannot but lead us ultimately to a happy result. Yes; the day will come, and perhaps is not far off, when fallen virtue will triumph over intrigue, when merit will be stronger than prejudice, when glory will crown liberty. For the attainment of this end, every one in his dreams has devised various means. For my part, I think we can only arrive at the desired result by a re-combination of the two popular causes of the day,—that of Napoleon the Second, and that of the Republic. The son of the great man, of the First Napoleon, is the sole representative of the highest amount of glory, as the Republic is the embodiment of the greatest amount of natural liberty.”

The constant, consistent reference to the restoration of the Empire, as a great national object to which patriotic Frenchmen should aspire, is remarkable; and it will be noticed that, in association with these convictions, the son of the great Napoleon is specially distinguished as the “sole representative” of the Empire. So far was personal ambition, in the vulgar sense of the term, from being a ruling passion with Louis Napoleon. It was only when death had removed those who stood nearer than himself as heirs of Napoleon the First, that he asserted his own position as the personal representative of the Empire. That the recklessness of faction should have made it unavoidable, in view of the paramount object of preventing the total disruption of society, to

postpone the fulfilment of the aspirations which associated republican freedom with Imperial vigour and grandeur, is the fault of a combination, as profligate in purpose, as discordant in its elements, as ever dishonoured the name and principle of representation.

Proceeding in his exposition of principles, the writer appeals to the memory of the Emperor:—

“Frenchmen! let us not be unjust; let us be grateful to him who, coming from amongst the ranks of the people, did everything for their well-being; who spread abroad the light of intelligence, and secured the independence of the country. If, one of these days, the people of France should become free, it is to Napoleon that they will owe it. He it was who habituated men to virtuous actions, the only sure basis of a republic. Do not reproach him for his dictatorial power; it was that which led to freedom, as the iron plough which breaks the clods prepares the fertility of the soil. It was he who brought true civilisation to the world, from the Tagus to the Vistula; it was he who implanted in the mind of France the principles of the Republic—equality before the laws, the superior claims of merit, the prosperity of commerce and industry, the enfranchisement of all nations; these were the objects with which he led us onward. * * * The misfortune of the Emperor Napoleon was, that he was not able to reap all that he had sown—that, having delivered France, he was unable to leave her free.”

Some of the opinions entertained by the Prince, upon the practical question at issue between the monarchical and the purely republican forms of government in their probable bearings upon the welfare of France, may be gathered from the following passages:—

“In order that the enjoyments of life may be equally spread amongst all classes, it is necessary not only that

taxation should be diminished, but also that the government should wear an aspect of stability, calculated to tranquillise the minds of men, and warrant a dependence upon the future. The government will be stable when institutions are not exclusive; that is to say, when, without favouring any class, they are tolerant of all, and above all are in harmony with the requirements and the desires of the majority of the nation. Then will merit be the only passport to success, and services rendered to the country the only ground for reward.

“From the opinions which I have advanced, it will be seen that my principles are republican. And indeed what nobler theme can there be than to dream of the empire of virtue, of the development of the human faculties, and of the progress of civilisation? If in my scheme of a constitution I give preference to the monarchical form of government, it is because I consider that such a government would be best adapted for France, inasmuch as it would give more guarantees of tranquillity, greater strength and greater liberty, than any other.

“If the Rhine were a sea — if virtue were the sole motive of human actions — if merit alone attained to authority, then would I have a pure and simple republic. But, surrounded as we are by formidable enemies, who have at their disposal millions of soldiers who might re-enact upon our soil an irruption of barbarians, I apprehend that a republic would not be able to repel foreign aggression and repress civil troubles, unless by having recourse to rigorous steps which would be prejudicial to liberty. As for public virtue and merit, we have frequently seen that under a republic they have only been able to attain to a certain point; after which they become corrupted by ambition or destroyed by jealousies. For this reason men of transcendent genius

are often rejected, on account of the distrust which they inspire; and intrigue then triumphs over merit, which might have rendered the country illustrious. I wish to see established a government which should ensure all the advantages of a republic, without having these inconveniences in its train; in a word, which should be strong without despotism, free without anarchy, independent without recourse to conquest."

The principle that the people alone, in the unsettled condition of France, had the right of deciding on the form of government to be permanently adopted — a principle enunciated and acted on by Napoleon the First, and faithfully adhered to by the present Emperor, whose elevation is emphatically the expression of the national suffrage—is thus enforced; and on the supposition that the corrupt and undignified government then existing would inevitably fall, an appeal is made to the honest and patriotic of all parties to have recourse to the great ultimate tribunal of decision: —

"Although each one forms to himself a beau-ideal of a government, thinking that such or such a form is most appropriate for France, the consequence of the establishment of the principles of liberty is to acknowledge that, presiding over all partial convictions, there is a supreme judge, which is the people. This is the point at which all good Frenchmen, of whatever party they may be, ought to meet; all Frenchmen who would prefer the well-being of their common country to the triumph of their particular doctrines. Let those of the Carlist party who do not make common cause with the betrayers and enemies of France, but who participate in the generous sentiments of Chateaubriand — let those amongst the Orleanist party who have not been accomplices in the murders committed in Poland, in Italy, and upon patriot Frenchmen — let all republicans and

Napoleonists unite before the altar of the country to ascertain the will of the people."

An attentive perusal of the above passages will show how entirely consistent with his proceedings, when afterwards holding the most important position in France, is the rule laid down for basing a permanent form of government on the expressed suffrages of the people. It was these suffrages that named Louis Napoleon President of the Republic; these that pronounced, by an overwhelming majority, in favour of a revision of the first crude conception of a constitution; it was these suffrages that enlarged and prolonged his authority, and that ultimately made that authority permanent, and decorated it with the Imperial insignia.

The "*Considérations Politiques et Militaires sur la Suisse*" appeared in 1833. In this production the author analyses the social, political, and industrial position of Switzerland, pointing out those portions of the Helvetic system which, in his opinion, call for amendment, reform, or abolition, and offering the suggestions which appear to him calculated to increase the happiness of the people and promote the stability of the Confederation. He reminds the Swiss of the extent to which they are indebted, for the improvement that had already taken place in their position, to the good offices of the Emperor Napoleon, "whose intentions," he affirms, "will be viewed with greater and still greater admiration, the more his actions, his principles, and his

tendencies are scrutinised with close impartiality." On the general or abstract principles of political government he makes a few observations, and insists that the system of Napoleon the First was that which most effectually represented the nation, to the exclusion of no class :—

"In almost all governments power has unfortunately ever been in the hands of a single class. In a theocracy it is in the hands of the priests; in a military government, in those of the generals; in an aristocratic monarchy, in those of the nobility; in a monarchy founded on the aristocracy of money, in those of the wealthy; lastly, even in a republic, authority is too frequently in the hands of a few families, such as those of the Golden Book of Venice, or in those of the lawyers, as is actually the case in the United States of America. During our French Revolution the power was by turns in the hands of a single section of the nation. We may then, probably, affirm with justice that the government of Napoleon, the Emperor of the people, presents to us the first instance of a government where all classes were received, none excluded."

This, in truth, was the proposition enforced again and again, upon every occasion where allusion could be appropriately made to the system of Napoleon. We shall see, by and by, how, in very different circumstances—indeed, in numerous varieties of circumstance,—it is brought forward.

The financial affairs of Switzerland are carefully examined in the "*Considérations*." The system of Napoleon is held up as a model for financiers; and assuredly the following contrast between the war budgets of Napoleon and the peace budgets of the Restoration and of the Government of July is somewhat startling :—

“Under a wise government, and where the leader takes care that the public revenues are not wasted, great economy may be effected without obstructing the various branches of the administration. The budget of Napoleon, notwithstanding the war, never exceeded six or seven hundred millions. In 1814 alone, it reached 1,076,800,000 francs; and he met this enormous expense without borrowing. He said that a budget of 600,000,000 francs ought to be sufficient for France in time of peace*;—yet at the present time, notwithstanding peace, the budget is 1,160,053,658 francs, or 400,000,000 more than it was under Napoleon, and 500,000,000 more than it ought to be in time of peace.

“The Emperor is often accused of having introduced new taxes. He can at most be accused of having shifted them. He established the *droits-réunis*, that he might abolish the vexatious tolls at the barriers, and reduce the land-tax by several millions. The force of circumstances, the perpetual wars, obliged him to resort to extreme measures, which would have been, in great part, laid aside with the return of peace.”

Proceeding from his consideration of the political condition, necessities, and prospects of Switzerland, whose interests he regards as closely connected with those of France, the author goes on to treat of military organisation, and of the measures best calculated to create an effectual system of armed national defence readily available in emergencies. In these sections he displays an elaborate acquaintance with various branches of the art of war, bestowing particular attention upon the artillery arm. This, the military section

* In connection with the expenditure under Napoleon the Third, it should be remembered that a large portion of it is occasioned by the extensive works of improvement, which for a long time had been almost totally neglected.

of the "*Considérations*," has been long regarded by professional men as a valuable addition to the library of strategic literature. But its subject renders it unnecessary for me either to quote or comment upon it.

In the year 1833 the government of the canton of Berne, in recognition of the high degree of practical and theoretical knowledge displayed by the Prince in his work upon artillery, nominated him a captain in that department of the army. To this compliment he responded in modest and becoming terms, still suggesting reflections upon his own position with respect to France. Indeed he never omitted, on any fitting opportunity, to recall and enunciate the principle of which he felt himself to be the representative.

The circumstances connected with the marriage negotiation proposed between the Queen of Portugal and Prince Louis Napoleon strikingly exemplified the fidelity with which he adhered to the hope of being one day able to perform good service for France, and the constancy of purpose that prevented him from taking, for any consideration, no matter how tempting and seductive, any step which could possibly trammel him in his plans for the promotion of the welfare and prosperity of his country. Doña Maria had just lost her husband. There were many competitors for the hand of the fair young queen, and there was a difficulty in the case — a danger that certain alliances which were proposed might entangle the relations between several European courts. In this embarrassment the eyes of many were directed towards a Prince who, whilst having no engagements which could create any complications of the kind referred to, was closely related to Imperial honours. The Queen herself was understood to be well disposed towards the union; it is said that advances were actually made to Prince Louis

Napoleon, and articles in the public journals went the length of announcing the affair as "settled." But, France still uppermost in his thoughts, he put an end, in the following letter, alike to rumours and negotiations:—

"Several journals have noticed the news of my departure for Portugal, as though I were pretending to the hand of the Queen Doña Maria. However flattering to me might be the idea of a union with a youthful queen, beautiful and virtuous, the widow of a cousin who was very dear to me, it is incumbent upon me to refute such a rumour, because there is no circumstance, of which I am aware, which could give rise to it.

"It is due to myself also to add that, in spite of the lively interest which attaches to the destinies of a people who have but recently acquired their rights, I should refuse the honour of sharing the throne of Portugal, should it perchance happen that any persons should direct their eyes to me with that view.

"The noble conduct of my father, who abdicated a throne in 1810 because he could not unite the interests of France with those of Holland, has not left my memory.

"My father, by his example, proved to me how far the claims of one's native land are to be preferred even to a throne in a foreign land. I feel, in fact, that habituated since infancy to cherish the thought of my native land above every other consideration, I should not be able to hold anything in higher esteem than the interests of France.

"Persuaded as I am that the great name which I bear will not always be regarded by my fellow-countrymen as a ground of exclusion—since that name recalls to them fifteen years of glory—I wait with composure, in

a hospitable and free country, until the time shall come when the nation shall recall to its bosom those who in 1815 were expatriated by the will of two hundred thousand strangers.

“This hope of one day serving France as a citizen and as a soldier, fortifies my soul, and is worth, in my estimation, all the thrones in the world.”

After the publication of this letter, we hear little more about a Portuguese marriage. The domestic happiness of the future Emperor was destined to be secured by a union which circumstances rendered more glorious than if the bride had been of the daughters of the oldest and most powerful of the dynastic houses of Europe.

CHAP III.

STATE OF FRANCE IN 1836. — THE ADVENTURE OF STRASBURG. — EXPOSITION OF MOTIVES AND PRINCIPLES. — THE COMPULSORY VOYAGE. — THE RETURN. — THE CALUMNY. — THE REFUTATION. — DEATH OF QUEEN HORTENSE. — VINDICTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. — REMINISCENCES OF RESIDENCE IN ENGLAND.

ON the 30th of October, 1836, occurred the unsuccessful enterprise historically known as the "Affair of Strasburg." The circumstances preceding and accompanying this movement must be impartially weighed before we can arrive at anything like a fair estimate of the reasons and motives which swayed the principal actor.

The point of time which we have reached is not so remote, but that many of us can refer to our own memories for a picture of the state of feeling prevalent in France with respect to the government of Louis Philippe. It was that of disgust, disappointment, anger on the part of the bulk of the nation — on the part of all who, either in sentiment or overt action, had honestly assisted in consummating the Revolution of July; whilst the small but active section of Legitimists looked on in expectation that in this disgust, in this disappointment, they might find some opportunity to promote the reviving hopes of the expelled branch of the Bourbons.

Prince Louis Napoleon had been, though a tranquil, not an inattentive spectator of this state of national feeling. He had not been unobservant of the indig-

nation with which the noblest minds of France saw all their hopes and expectations of "citizen-kingship" not only disappointed, but systematically warred against. The suffrage was a mere mockery. About a quarter of a million, probably less, might have represented the number of electors throughout the whole kingdom. By the creation of innumerable petty offices at a profligate waste of public money, and by other devices of craft and intrigue, the Court might have been said to carry these votes in its pocket. The national will was an absolute nullity.

The future Emperor knew all this. He knew, moreover, from personal residence amongst ourselves, that the errors and prejudices which had excited us to implacable hostility towards Napoleon the First no longer existed in their former virulence; whilst our course with respect to the Revolution of July had proved that our government had discerned the error of unnecessary interference in the domestic concerns of other nations.

His position at the time has been well sketched by a respectable writer already quoted :—

"He had carefully made his observations upon the scenes around him,—he had studied the history of his own country,—he had seen the vicissitudes through which it had passed, and how the popular will had at last so far prevailed, that a king hostile to the elder branches of the Bourbons had been placed upon the throne. But in what light could he have regarded the throne of Louis Philippe? To have regarded him with esteem was an impossibility: he could but consider him as the representative of the bourgeoisie of Paris, who cared not what became of the honour of France, provided they themselves remained in the position which they enjoyed; and the whole government of the Citizen

King, as he was called, was but the reflection of this idea. The exiled Prince, with the memory of his uncle's glorious reign before him, had perhaps a better idea of the French king's real character than any of the continental statesmen. As to ourselves, we possibly felt more respect for him [the king], because we knew less of the principles on which he had ascended the throne of France. No sooner had Louis Philippe seated himself upon that throne than he required to be recognised as king by the great Powers of Europe. Of those Powers the English government frankly admitted the right of the French nation to choose a king for themselves. They did not thereby express their approbation of the choice,—they did not say that they were pleased to see the Duke of Orleans raised to the dignity of king of France,—but they virtually said, 'We waged war for the purpose of restoring the elder branch of the Bourbons to power; but finding that they have disappointed the expectation of the nations of Europe, we will recognise the right of the French people to choose a sovereign for themselves, and to expel those who have shown that they are unworthy of the title.' Hence, a feeling of respect for the French nation, and not a regard for the new king, made the English government recognise him as the ruler of France. Nor was this fact lost upon Louis Napoleon. He perfectly understood why it was that the English people had recognised Louis Philippe, though they had formerly refused to recognise Napoleon the First. He saw the progress which true political philosophy had made in England; and he saw that should he himself ever be called upon to fill the throne of France, he should no longer receive that bitter hostility from the English nation which had pursued his uncle, but that he might, if he had a due regard to

the welfare of humanity, calculate upon the friendship of England."

The House of Orleans has fallen definitively from its high estate—fallen beyond all possibility of recovering the position which the obliquities and delinquencies of its chief member forfeited. I have no wish to heap opprobrium upon the memory of the deceased king; I would willingly forbear allusion to the intrigue of the "Spanish marriage," which many politicians regard as the directly moving cause of his fall. Willingly would I modify the force of the accusations in which it has been said—

"That this nationally-elected king had imposed upon the people; that he had consulted his own dynastic interests rather than those of his subjects; that his sole idea was to aggrandise himself and his family—to make alliances for them amongst all the nations of Europe, and to do this at the expense of all that kings and men are bound to hold inviolable; that his oath was regarded by him as nothing, if a chance appeared by which he could elevate his children to a higher degree of power and splendour than that which they already possessed; that [in connection with the Spanish intrigue] by his attempt to impose upon the English people by saying one thing and meaning another, he lost the small confidence here which he had hitherto possessed, and rendered himself as contemptible to the English as Napoleon had been formidable, until he was regarded with the most profound indifference, and it was apparent that he could under no circumstances look again for the support of this kingdom;" that through the system introduced by him "there was at length hardly any office that was not in the patronage of the sovereign; that corruption rose to such a height that it could only be exceeded in the Russian empire; that

with these fraudulent proceedings on the part of the Crown the French people continued to struggle on in material prosperity and moral disgrace, until Louis Philippe was hurled from the throne with as much indignation, and far greater contempt, than that which attended the expulsion of Charles the Tenth."

Reluctant as we may be to press hardly on his memory — desirous to spare the feelings of surviving relatives — common truth and justice compel the admission that the circumstances attending the expulsion of Louis Philippe *were* far more ignominious, more disgraceful to himself personally, than those which had accompanied the fall of his predecessor. The latter had promised nothing — had made no conditions with the people. He was forced on them by the concentrated and misdirected power of Europe: to force he owed his throne, — by force he endeavoured to maintain it, — by the unconcealed repression of the national will. It was a stand-up fight between him and the people; — he failed, and fled. With Louis Philippe the case was different. High hopes, high expectations of national regeneration, of a government having for its basis the support and confidence of the people of France — expectations assented to and encouraged by the new king — attended the opening of Louis Philippe's reign. And what was the result? From the first the machinery of intrigue was put in motion, — intriguing, manœuvring, with the specific design of performing as little as possible, of avoiding as much as possible, of what he had solemnly undertaken; of perpetuating, under a crafty and specious disguise, the system of crushing, ignoring, repudiating the sentiments of the people of France — of maintaining a system even more hateful than the previous one, because it was more mean, more tricky, more sordid, more disingenuous,

more impregnated with the leaven of objects of pecuniary and personal aggrandisement tending to enrich the king and his family.

It was in this state of affairs,—when the dynasty of July, strong only in the mercenary support of those whom corruption had mustered around it, was sunk in the depths of moral abasement, and was alike the object of national hatred and European contempt,—that the public were surprised by the attempt made at Strasburg to rally the voice of France around the Imperial standard. It may be said that the enterprise was a rash, an ill-arranged one. Granted that it was so. Granted that it was but the imprudent manifestation of impulses and convictions that had long revolved in the mind of the chief actor, guiding his acts, engrossing his thoughts, making themselves heard and known by all with whom he held correspondence. Well; it was, after all, a generous and magnanimous experiment—a proof of sincere and profound convictions—one, the failure of which could not compromise the safety of many, whilst success, once initiated, would lead on, by certain, inevitable procession of cause and effect, to a bloodless triumph. And success, too, was an issue which at one crisis of the enterprise seemed far from improbable. It was lost by the clock,—the lapse of half an hour made all the difference.

His own views and intentions, when setting out from his peaceful home, are described in the subjoined extract from a letter to his mother:—

“To give you a detailed recital of my misfortunes will be to renew your sorrows and mine; but at the same time it will be a consolation both for you and for me to put you in possession of all the impressions which were on my mind, of all the emotions which have agitated me since the close of last October. You know

what was the pretext which I held out on my departure from Arenenberg; but what you do not know is that which was then passing in my heart. Strong in my conviction, which had long made me look upon the cause of Napoleonism as the cause of the nation in France, and as the only civilising cause in Europe—proud of the nobleness and purity of my intentions—I had firmly resolved to elevate again the Imperial eagle, or to fall a victim to my political belief. * * * I shall be asked what it was that impelled me to abandon a happy existence, to run all the risks of a hazardous enterprise. I answer, that a secret voice led me on, and that for no consideration on earth would I have postponed to another time an attempt which seemed to present so many chances of a successful issue.

“And the most distressing consideration in the matter is, that now that experience has taken the place of suppositions, and that instead of merely imagining I have actually witnessed the circumstances of the case, and am enabled to form a judgment on the matter, the result is, that I remain the more convinced in my belief, that if I could have followed the plan which I had traced out for myself in the first instance, instead of now being an exile beyond the equator I should be in my native country. What care I for the clamour of the multitude who will call me mad because I have not succeeded, and who would have exaggerated my merit if I had triumphed! I take upon myself all the responsibility of the event, for I have acted upon conviction, and not by inducement of others. Alas! if I had been the only victim of my act I should have nothing to regret. I have experienced from my friends a devotedness without limit, and I have nothing for which to reproach anyone.”

It was on the evening of the 28th of October that

the Prince arrived at Strasburg. On the day following he met Colonel Vaudrey, his principal supporter in the enterprise, to whom he communicated his plan of operations, which was far more practical and matter-of-fact than that which was actually followed. Unfortunately enthusiasm entered somewhat too abundantly into the Colonel's zeal for the Imperial cause. He urged the Prince merely to present himself at the head of his (the Colonel's) regiment to General Voirol, the commander of the garrison, urging that "an old soldier of the Empire would not be able to resist the sight of the Emperor's nephew, and of the Imperial eagle." No doubt this advice was honest, but no doubt it was ill-judged. The Colonel measured everyone's feelings by his own. Generous, manly, confiding, devoted, he was more a soldier than a politician. Perhaps the Prince did not feel perfectly easy in assenting to Colonel Vaudrey's proposal; but this much may be said in extenuation of any imprudence involved in that assent, — that the Colonel, who was in constant communication with General Voirol, might have been supposed to be well acquainted with that officer's sentiments. At this stage of the affair, the Prince observed to his companion: —

"What confidence, what a profound conviction one must have of the truth and nobility of a cause, to face, not the dangers which we are going to meet, but public opinion, which will load us with reproaches, which will tear us to pieces if we do not succeed. Nevertheless, I call God to witness, that it is not to gratify personal ambition, but because I believe I have a mission to fulfil, that I risk that which is more dear to me than life — the esteem of my fellow-citizens."

On the morning of the 30th, the Prince, accompanied by about a dozen officers, proceeded to the quarters of

the 10th Regiment of Artillery, Colonel Vaudrey's regiment, and in which Napoleon the First had in early life served as captain. The men had been drawn up in order of battle by their colonel, and the Prince's address was received enthusiastically. The Imperialists next proceeded to General Voirol's quarters ; but here their reception was very different from that which had been painted by the sanguine anticipations of Colonel Vaudrey. The General peremptorily refused taking part in the enterprise, and was placed under arrest. On leaving him, the Prince addressed a body of soldiers, amongst whom hesitation had manifested itself in consequence of some doubts having been circulated as to his own identity. "As" (to use the Prince's own words) "we were losing time in an unfavourable position, instead of hastening to the other regiments which were expecting us, I told the Colonel that we ought to quit the place. He, however, urged me to remain, and some minutes afterwards it was too late."

The decisive moment had, unfortunately for the enterprise, been allowed to pass without being taken advantage of. A tumult ensued. The General had escaped from arrest, and ultimately the Prince, and several of his friends, were captured. On being conveyed to the guard-house he met M. Parquin, one of his most zealous followers, and offered him his hand. "Prince," observed Parquin, "we shall be shot, but we will die nobly." "Yes," replied the Prince, "we have fallen in a grand and noble enterprise."

General Voirol now arrived. His first remark was, "Prince, you have found only one traitor in the French army." The allusion was to Colonel Vaudrey. The Prince's reply was prompt and characteristic: "Say, rather, General, that I have found one Labédoyère." Never for a moment did he descend from the

dignity of self-assertion, or from assertion of the cause which for the time was unsuccessful. His bearing in defeat filled his followers with as much admiration as could have been inspired by success. One of them, M. Querelles, pressed his hand, and, raising his voice to a high pitch, exclaimed, "Prince, notwithstanding our defeat, I am still proud of what I have done."

In the course of the examination which took place, a number of questions and answers similar to the following were exchanged:—

"What was it that impelled you to act as you have done?"

"My political opinions, and my desire again to set my country free, which I have been prevented doing by foreign invaders. In 1830 I demanded to be treated as a citizen. I was treated as a pretender. Well; I have since conducted myself as a pretender."

"You intended to establish a military government?"

"I wished to establish a government founded upon election by the people."

"What would you have done if you had succeeded?"

"I would have called together a national congress."

The following narrative of the events at Strasburg is contained in a letter addressed by the Prince, when in America, to a friend in Europe. The material particulars coincide with those above given, but it may be desirable to give likewise his own account of the affair:—

"At five o'clock in the morning of the 30th of October the signal was given in the Austerlitz Barracks. At the sound of trumpets, the soldiers were aroused, and,

seizing their muskets and swords, they hurried impetuously down into the court-yard. They were drawn up in double line around it, and Colonel Vaudrey took his post in the centre. A short pause ensued, awaiting my arrival, and a dead silence was preserved. On my appearance I was immediately presented to the troops in a few eloquent words from their colonel: 'Soldiers,' he said, 'a great revolution begins from this moment. The nephew of the Emperor is before you. He comes to put himself at your head. He is arrived on the French soil, to restore to France her glory and her liberty. He is here to conquer or die in a great cause—the cause of the people. Soldiers of the 4th Regiment of Artillery, may the Emperor's nephew count on you?' The shout which followed this brief appeal nearly stunned me. Men and officers alike abandoned themselves to the wildest enthusiasm. Flourishing their arms with furious energy, they filled the air with cries of 'Vive l'Empereur!'

"If misgivings had ever crossed me of the fidelity of the French heart to the memory of Napoleon, they vanished for ever before the suddenness and fierceness of that demonstration. The chord was scarcely touched, and the vibration was terrific. I was deeply moved, and nearly lost my self-possession. In a few moments I waved my hand, signifying my desire to speak. Breathless silence ensued: 'Soldiers!' I said, 'it was in your regiment the Emperor Napoleon, my uncle, first saw service. With you he distinguished himself at Toulon. It was your brave regiment that opened the gates of Grenoble to him, on his return from the Isle of Elba. Soldiers! new destinies are reserved to you. Here,' I continued, taking the standard of the eagle from an officer near me, 'here is the symbol of French glory;—it must henceforth become the symbol of liberty.' The effect of these

simple words was indescribable ; but the time for action had come. I gave the word to fall into column ; the music struck up, and putting myself at their head, the regiment followed me to a man. Meanwhile my adherents had been active elsewhere, and uniformly successful. Lieutenant Laity, on presenting himself, was immediately joined by the corps of engineers. The telegraph was seized without a struggle. The cannoneers, commanded by M. Parquin, had arrested the prefect. Every moment fresh tidings reached me of the success of the different movements that had been concerted. I kept steadily on my way, at the head of the 4th Regiment, to the Finkmatt Barracks, where I hoped to find the infantry ready to welcome me. Passing by the head-quarters where the commander-in-chief of the department of the Bas Rhin, Lieutenant-General Voirol, resided, I halted, and was enthusiastically saluted by his guard with the cry 'Vive l'Empereur !' I made my way to the apartment of the General, where a brief interview took place. On leaving, I thought it necessary to give him notice that he was my prisoner, and a small detachment was assigned to this duty. From his quarters I proceeded rapidly to the Finkmatt Barracks ; and although it was early in the morning, the populace were drawn out by the noise, and, mingling their acclamations with those of the soldiers, they joined our cortège in crowds. An unlooked-for error here occurred, and had a most deplorable effect on the whole enterprise, which had thus far gone on swimmingly. We had reached the Faubourg de Pierre, when, being on foot, the head of the column lost sight of me ; and instead of following the route agreed on, and proceeding at once to the ramparts, they entered a narrow lane which led direct to the barracks. Amid the noise and confusion it was impossible to retrieve this mischance ;

and I took, hurriedly, what measures I could to provide against its worst consequences. Fearing a possible attack on my rear, I was compelled to leave one half of the regiment in the main street we had left, and hastening forward I entered the court-yard of the infantry with my officers and some four hundred men. I expected to find the regiment assembled ; but the messenger entrusted with the news of my approach was prevented, by some accident, from arriving in time, and I found all the soldiers in their rooms, preparing themselves for the Sunday's inspection. Attracted, however, by the noise, they ran to the windows, where I harangued them ; and on hearing the name of Napoleon pronounced, they rushed headlong down, thronged around me, and testified, by a thousand marks of devotion, their enthusiasm for my cause. The battalion of the Pontonniers and the 3rd Regiment of Artillery, with MM. Poggi and Conard and a great number of officers at their head, were all in movement, and on their way to join me, and word was brought that they were only a square off. In another moment I should have found myself at the head of five thousand men, with the people of the town everywhere in my favour ; when of a sudden, at one end of the court-yard, a disturbance arose, without those at the other extremity being able to divine the cause. Colonel Taillander had just arrived, and, on being told that the Emperor's nephew was there with the 4th Regiment, he could not believe such extraordinary intelligence, and his surprise was so great that he preferred attributing it to a vulgar ambition on the part of Colonel Vaudrey, rather than credit this unexpected resurrection of a great cause. ' Soldiers,' said he, ' you are deceived. The man who excites your enthusiasm can only be an adventurer and an impostor.' An officer of his staff cried out at the same time, ' It is not the Emperor's

nephew; it is the nephew of Colonel Vaudrey: I know him.'

"Absurd as was this statement, it flew like lightning from mouth to mouth, and began to change the disposition of the regiment, which a moment before had been so favourable. Great numbers of the soldiers, believing themselves to be the dupes of an unworthy deception, became furious. Colonel Taillander assembled them, caused the gates to be closed, and the drums to beat; while on the other hand the officers devoted to me gave orders to have the *général* beaten, to bring forward the soldiers who had embraced my cause. The space we occupied was so confined that the regiments became, as it were, confounded together, and the tumult was frightful. From moment to moment the confusion increased, and the officers of the same cause no longer recognised each other, as all wore the same uniform. The cannoners arrested infantry officers, and the infantry in their turn laid hold of some officers of artillery. Muskets were charged, and bayonets and sabres flashed in the air; but no blow was struck, as each feared to wound a friend. A single word from myself or Colonel Taillander would have led to a regular massacre. The officers around me repeatedly offered to hew me a passage through the infantry, which could have been easily effected; but I could not consent to shed French blood in my own cause. Besides, I could not believe that the 46th Regiment, which a moment previously had manifested so much sympathy, could have so promptly changed their sentiments. At any risk I determined to make an effort to recover my influence over it, and I suddenly rushed into the very midst; but in a minute I was surrounded by a triple row of bayonets, and forced to draw my sabre to parry off the blows aimed at me from every side. In another

instant I should have perished by French hands, when the cannoneers, perceiving my danger, charged, and, carrying me off, placed me in their ranks. Unfortunately this movement separated me from my officers, and threw me amongst soldiers who doubted my identity. Another struggle ensued, and in a few minutes I was a prisoner."

The Prince emphatically insisted that "as he alone had organised the whole affair, and led on and involved the other prisoners, so he alone ought to endure the whole responsibility." He wrote to General Voirol, telling him "that in honour he was bound to interest himself for Colonel Vaudrey, for that it was probably to the Colonel's attachment for him *, and the consideration with which he had treated him, that the non-success of the enterprise was attributable;" and insisting that the whole rigour of the law should fall upon himself (the Prince), "the leader of the attempt, and from whom alone anything was to be feared."

After the lapse of eight or nine days, the Prince was informed that he must be separated from his fellow-prisoners. Against this measure he strenuously protested. It was then announced to him that he was to be taken to Paris. His emotions on this occasion are described in his correspondence with his mother:—

"When I perceived that my departure from Strasbourg was inevitable, and that my lot was to be separated from that of the other accused parties, I experienced a grief which it would be difficult to describe. There I was, forced to abandon men who had devoted themselves to me; I was deprived of the means of making known, in my defence, my views and intentions;

* In reference to the delay which had occurred whilst parleying with the General.

I felt that I was receiving a pretended favour from one to whom I had wished to do the greatest injury. I wasted my breath in complaints and regrets; but all I could do was to protest."

Meanwhile Queen Hortense, inspired by maternal affection and alarm, had made an appeal to Louis Philippe on behalf of her son. It was one to which the king was not indisposed to listen; but, as on all occasions, he desired *conditions*. He was quite willing to get rid of a "troublesome" business—of a "troublesome" appellant to the suffrages of France—provided that the troublesome personage in question would only pledge himself to absent himself for ever from the country. He even wished to obtain from him a formal renunciation, in writing, of his Imperial aspirations. It would have been a cheap, a most advantageous, mode of getting credit for an act of clemency. No proposition of the kind was made directly to the Prince—probably because it was known that he would have disdainfully rejected it. Indeed, all through the business he demanded, as a matter of justice, that he should share the destiny of his companions. It is, however, not improbable that Queen Hortense, inspired by the strong impulses of maternal affection, had, without his consent or knowledge, given some kind of implied understanding, not at all binding upon him, but which the government, not well knowing "what to do" with the prisoner, — the formal trial and condemnation of whom might produce an "inconvenient" movement in the public mind,—was fain to accept, *faute de mieux*, and of course to interpret adroitly in the manner most accordant with its own wishes. Being made aware of the activity of his mother's intercession, and of its result in his compulsory transportation to America, he

sent her a letter, which, whilst conveying the same sentiments of affectionate regard that marked all his correspondence with her, and manifesting his earnest interest in the fate of his followers in the Strasburg business, shows how remote was the idea of participation in any arrangement for his removal without trial from France:—

“ My dear Mother,

“ I perceive in the step which you have taken all the affection which you feel for me. You thought only of the danger which I incurred, but you did not reflect that honour obliged me to share the fate of my companions in misfortune. It has caused me poignant grief to forsake those men whom I led on to their ruin, when my presence and my depositions might have influenced the jury in their favour. I wrote to the king to beg of him to regard them with lenity; it is the only favour which can touch my heart.

“ I am about to embark for America; but, my dear mother, I implore you not to follow me if you would not add to my grief.

* * * * *

“ I beg of you, dear mother, to watch over the wants of the prisoners of Strasburg. Take care of the two sons of Colonel Vaudrey, who are at Paris with their mother. I could easily reconcile myself to my fate, if I knew that my companions in misfortune would not be deprived of their lives*; but to have on one's conscience the death of brave soldiers is a bitter grief which cannot be effaced.

* It is pleasant to have to add that the prisoners of Strasburg were acquitted.

“Adieu, my dear mother. Receive my thanks for all the proofs of affection which you give me. Return to Arenenberg; but do not come and join me in America; it would make me too unhappy. Adieu, receive my affectionate embrace. I love you always with all my heart.

“Your affectionate and respectful son,

“NAPOLEON LOUIS.”

In another letter to his mother he writes :—

“I told the Prefect that I was in despair at not being allowed to share the fate of my companions in misfortune; that being thus withdrawn from prison without having undergone a general examination (the first being only a summary proceeding), I was deprived of the opportunity of deposing to several matters which were in favour of the accused; but my protestations proving to be of no avail, I took the step of writing a letter to the king, in which I told him that when I found myself thrown into prison, after having taken up arms against his government, there was only one thing of which I was apprehensive, namely his clemency, since it might deprive me of the sweetest consolation that could remain to me—the possibility of sharing the fate of my companions in misfortune.”

To M. Odillon Barrot, whom he had requested to conduct the defence of Colonel Vaudrey and the other prisoners, from whom he was forcibly separated, he wrote as follows :—

“I am deeply affected at leaving my co-accused, as I have an idea that, if I were present with them at the bar of the court, my depositions in their favour might influence the jury, and throw a light upon the case. Denied the consolation of being of service to men whom I have led to their destruction, I am obliged to

confide to an advocate that which I am not able to state in person to the jury.

“On the part of my co-accused there has been no conspiracy. It was nothing but the excitement of the moment that influenced them. I alone it was who planned everything, and made all the necessary preparations. I had indeed seen Colonel Vaudrey previous to the 30th of October, but he did not conspire with me. Up to the 29th, at eight o'clock at night, no one except myself was aware that the movement was to take place the next day. It was later than that hour when I saw Colonel Vaudrey. M. Parquin had come to Strasburg on business of his own. It was not till the night of the 29th that I sent for him. The other parties were aware of my presence in the French territory, but were ignorant of my motives. It was not, then, until the 29th that I assembled the persons who are now under accusation, and then for the first time informed them of my intentions. Colonel Vaudrey was not at this meeting. The officers of engineers came amongst us without being aware of what was going forward. Undoubtedly we are all guilty, in the eyes of the established government, of having taken up arms against it; but I am the most guilty.”

It was thus in spite of his earnest and indignant protestations — despite of reiterated demands that he should be tried with those who had co-operated with him in his endeavour to effect that change which, under all circumstances, he predicted must occur sooner or later — that the Prince was deported to America. Yet there have not been wanting persons so replete with the virus of partisan malignity as to insinuate that that deportation, against which he exclaimed so energetically, was accompanied by a promise or under-

taking on his part not to return to Europe for a period of ten years. All the facts and circumstances of the case belie such a supposition. His deportation was a compulsory one. He demanded, he entreated, to remain in France, and to take the chance of life or death. And it required the very essence of ingenious malice to assume that any man, borne, despite his remonstrances, into a remote place of exile, would have bound himself down by an extraneous and embarrassing pledge as the condition upon which he was to be transmitted to such exile. There is, in short, little need for argument on the matter. The facts and probabilities, on all grounds of reason and consistency, are too clear to require it. It is, however, satisfactory to insert the following letters, in which the Prince himself alludes to and disposes of the question. The first was written in New York, almost immediately on his arrival there, and is addressed to his faithful supporter, Colonel Vaudrey. The second was written in London, in the year 1846, and is addressed to M. Capefigue, who, with strange inadvertence, had repeated what the Prince quietly designates "a very old calumny."

"My dear Colonel,

"You cannot imagine how happy it made me, on my arrival in the United States, to hear of your acquittal. For four months and a half I was incessantly harassed by fears as to your fate. From the moment of my imprisonment up to my departure from France, I never ceased to do all in my power to soften the condition of my companions in misfortune, always taking care, as you will readily believe, whilst making intercessions in their favour, not to do anything to compromise the dignity of the name I bear. Before

embarking, I wrote to you under cover to the Procureur-General Rossé. He did not deliver the letter to you, because it might have been useful in your defence: how shameful! As for me, they took care to send me on my travels to hinder me from having any communication with you before your trial was over. But I do not complain. I was on board a French ship, which is a kind of fatherland afloat. How unaccountable are human feelings! During my ill-fated enterprise, my tears betrayed my grief but twice: first, when, hurried far away from you, I knew that I was not to be put on my trial; and the second time, when I was leaving the frigate, and was about to be set at liberty. The letter you wrote me gave me great pleasure. I am happy to think that all your sufferings have not altered the friendship you bear me, and which I value so highly. For two months I sailed between the tropics, under the breeze of St. Helena. Alas! I could not view the historic rock; but it seemed to me as if the breezes wafted to me those last words of the expiring Emperor to the companions of his adversity:—‘I have sanctioned all the principles of the Revolution; I have infused them into the laws—into my acts; there is not one which I have not consecrated: circumstances, unhappily, were too overwhelming. France judges me with indulgence; she gives me credit for my intentions; she cherishes my name, my victories. Imitate her; be faithful to the opinions which we have supported, to the glory we have acquired. Without this, all is shame and confusion.’

“These admirable words, Colonel, you have well understood. Here I am in America, far from all that is dear to me. I know not yet what I shall do, or how long I shall stay here. At all events, Colonel, and in whatever country I may be, you will always find in me a

friend on whom you can rely, and who will be proud to give you proofs of his feelings towards you.*

"Adieu, Colonel; continue to serve France. As for me, nothing remains for me but to pray for her welfare. Adieu! — Do not forget me.

"Your friend,

"NAPOLEON LOUIS BONAPARTE.

"P.S. I have no occasion to clear myself in your eyes of the calumnies heaped upon me. They could not make me sign any engagement, as all I asked was to be left peaceably in prison; besides, they did not endeavour to do so. They accuse me of having intrigued. But M. Thiers will defend me,—he who has said (*'L'Histoire de la Révolution,'* vol. ii. p. 119), 'All parties, when compelled to act in the dark, are reduced to expedients which are called intrigues when unsuccessful.' Some accuse my enterprise; but M. Thiers will defend me,—he who, speaking of the funeral honours rendered to the remains of Marat, expresses himself thus: 'And if history recall such scenes, it is to teach men to reflect on the effect of casual and fleeting prepossessions; to urge them to examine themselves closely, when they mourn for the powerful or curse the departed of the day.' (*'L'Histoire de la Révolution,'* vol. v. p. 87., 4th edit.) When the future flies before us, it is in the past we must seek for consolation. Adieu! Adieu!"

The letter to M. Capefigue ran as follows:—

* On his accession to power, Napoleon the Third showed that these were no empty professions. Colonel Vaudrey has been appointed to a high and dignified post. Napoleon the Third possesses the faculty of well remembering friendship and service; and he has signally proved that he does *not* possess the faculty of so well remembering insult and injury.

" London, Nov. 10. 1846.

" Sir,

" The serious accusation against me contained in the ninth volume of your ' History of Europe ' compels me to address you, for the purpose of refuting a very old calumny, which I did not expect to see again brought forward by an historian who, in his ' History of Charlemagne,' had addressed some flattering words to me.

" You believe that, in 1836, when I was suddenly seized and carried off, in spite of myself, out of France, I gave my promise to remain in perpetual exile in America, and that my prompt return to Europe was a violation of my word of honour. I here renew my formal denial, so often given, of the truth of this accusation.

" In 1836 the French government did not even seek to negotiate terms of freedom with me, because it was well aware that I preferred a solemn trial and sentence to liberty. It therefore exacted nothing from me, because it could exact nothing; and I could promise nothing, because I was asked for nothing. In 1840, M. Frenckarrie himself, procureur-général to the Chamber of Peers, was obliged to declare that I had been set at liberty *without conditions*. Such is his own expression, reported in the ' Moniteur ' of September 1840. You will, I hope, place faith in the words of the man who, whilst expressing himself thus, read the act of accusation to the Chamber of Peers. I returned, therefore, to Europe in 1837, because no moral obligation prevented me from coming to close my mother's eyes.

" If, engrossed by this pious duty, I had had the weakness to violate a promise given, the French government would not have required, after the death of my mother, to assemble an army in order to force me to quit Switzerland: it would only have needed to call upon me to

keep my word. Had I violated one promise, the French government would not have placed any reliance on a second ; while, on the contrary, it frequently caused me to be informed, during my residence in Ham, that immediately on my entering into an engagement with the reigning dynasty, the doors of my prison should be opened. And had I, as you seem to believe, trifled with good faith, I should have subscribed to all the proposals made to me during my captivity ; whilst, on the contrary, I preferred remaining six years a captive. I preferred running the risks of an escape, to submitting to conditions which I thought dishonourable.

“ Blame, Sir, if you will, my political conduct ; distort my actions ; falsify my intentions ; — you exercise your right to judge. But I will never permit any person to attack my honour, since, thanks be to God, I have preserved it untainted during many cruel trials.

“ I trust, Sir, that you will give to this just refutation a publicity as wide as the circulation of the writings which flow from your pen.

“ Receive, &c.,

“ NAPOLEON LOUIS.”

Had there been a possibility of impugning a single word of these declarations, how gladly would the opportunity have been embraced ! — how eagerly would any inaccuracy — much more untruth — have been seized and commented on with “ indignant eloquence ” by the parties whose occupation it was to “ do ” that department of business for the ruling power of the day !

The vessel in which the Prince sailed touched first at a South American port. He was finally carried to New York, and, whilst in the United States, employed himself in studying the constitution, the laws, the social and domestic condition and general policy of the

people amongst whom he was sojourning. He won good opinions from all classes; and there was probably no foreign visitor so popular, during his stay amongst the great republican community, as the intrepid and uncompromising assertor of the principles of the Empire, — the advocate and champion of the revival of the Imperial system. There is some reason to believe that his opinions respecting the general working of pure republican institutions did not become more favourable in consequence of the observations made by him during this visit.

I have already inserted some extracts from the letter in which he communicated to Queen Hortense his impelling motives in the enterprise which failed at Strasburg. But in the circumstances in which the Prince found himself after the failure of that attempt — compelled, against his earnest protest, to separate his lot from that of his followers, and hurried on board a vessel, not through motives of humanity or generosity on the part of the government of Louis Philippe, but for the purpose of ridding it of what was regarded as a perilous *embarras*, — he deemed it necessary to give a more public explanation of those motives. In one of his letters* we find the following remarkable expressions, well worthy of being remembered in connection with subsequent events:—

“New York, April 30. 1837.

“It is time now that I should give you some explanation of the motives which actuated my conduct. I had, it is true, two lines of conduct open to me; the one, which in some sort depended upon myself,—the other, which depended upon events. In deciding upon

* Addressed to M. Villaud.

the former, I became, as you very truly say, a means; in waiting for the other, I should only have been a resource. According to my views and my convictions, the first part appeared to me much preferable to the other. The success of my project would offer to me the following advantages: I should have done in one day, and by a *coup de main*, the work of perhaps ten years: successful, I spared France the conflicts, the troubles, the disorders attendant upon a state of general confusion, *which must, I think, occur sooner or later*. 'The spirit of a revolution,' M. Thiers observes, 'consists in an ardent passion for the object in view, and a hatred for those who oppose an obstacle to its attainment.' Having led the people with us, by means of the army, we should have had all the noble passions, without animosities; for animosity only results from a conflict between physical force and moral force. For myself, my position would have been clear, simple, and easy. Having carried a revolution with the aid of fifteen persons, if I had arrived in Paris, I should have owed my success to the people only — not to any party: arriving there victorious, I should, of my own free will — without being compelled to it — have laid down my sword upon the altar of my country; and then they might well have confidence in me, for it was no longer my name alone, but my person, which became a guarantee for my conduct. In the other case supposed, I could only have been called upon by a fraction of the people; I should have had as my enemies, not only a debilitated government, but a crowd of other parties — themselves, too, perhaps, of a national character.

"In short, it is easier to prevent anarchy than to repress it: it is easier to direct the masses than to follow up their passions. If I had come only as a *resource*, I should only have been one flag the more

thrown into the *mêlée*, the influence of which, immense though it might be in an act of aggression, would have been powerless for a rally.

"To conclude: under the first supposition, I became, as it were, the rudder of a vessel, which had but one resisting medium to overcome; under the second, on the contrary, I should have been upon a vessel assailed by winds from every quarter, and which, in the midst of the storm, would not have known what route to follow. It is true, that just as the success of the first plan promised me advantage, so its non-success devolved blame on me. But when I entered France, I had not thought upon the course I should have to take in case of defeat. I thought, in case of misfortune, on my proclamation as a testament, and on my death as a blessing. Such is my way of thinking."

Was ever language more accurately indicative of future events! Reconsider these words—"Successful, I should have spared France the conflicts, the troubles, the disorders attendant upon a state of general confusion, which I think must occur sooner or later!" This sentence was written eleven years previous to the Revolution of 1848, and in a foreign country, to which the Prince had been transported as a trophy of the ascendant fortunes of King Louis Philippe, who, notwithstanding the regicidal attempts of Fieschi and others, and the unconcealed dislike of the body of the nation, appeared, so far as dynastic connections were concerned, seated impreguably on the throne. Indeed, the attempts on his life, so far from indicating dynastic weakness, or any feeling on the part of the extreme Republican party that the power of the House of Orleans was in danger, rather showed a conviction, in the minds of his enemies, that nothing but some act of treachery and murder

could shake its position. It was a token that the Red Republicans and Socialists, and other enemies of all regular government, felt that insurrection in the existing state of affairs was hopeless, and that their only chance lay in throwing the community into a state of confusion by the murder of the reigning king.

Yet in this season of Orleanist triumph and supremacy, — when the bureaucratic system of Louis Philippe appeared perfectly consolidated; when any whisper, even in foreign countries, of the possibility of disturbing the existing regime was received not so much with a frown of rebuke as with a smile of derision,—the Imperial exile, never swerving for an instant from the purpose, the object, and the conviction of his life, does not hesitate to express his confidence that the system was one which could not stand; that it was one which, if not abolished otherwise, *must* give way amid confusion and disorder; and that he, the heir and representative of the great Emperor, the impersonation of the Imperial ideas, was the man who above all others would prove most prominently instrumental in restoring the dignity, the influence, the power, the prosperity of France, and imparting to her political institutions the stability so indispensable to the tranquillity and happiness of the whole people.

It is probable that the Prince might have prolonged his stay in America, interested as he was in the process of investigation and observation upon which he had entered with his usual energy when in pursuit of practical information, but that an unforeseen circumstance, of the nature most calculated to arouse his sympathies, called him back to Europe. The immediate cause of his return was the dangerous, and, as it ultimately proved,

fatal illness of his mother, Queen Hortense. The most tender relations of love and reverence had ever existed between mother and son, and were not my business more with the public than with the private character of Napoleon the Third, I might refer to many touching incidents illustrative of these relations. The letter in which the mother apprises the son of her precarious state of health, will be read with respectful interest:—

“My dear Son,

“I am about to undergo an operation which has become absolutely necessary. In case it should not terminate successfully, I send you, in this letter, my blessing. We shall meet again—shall we not?—in a better world, where may you come to join me as late as possible! And you will believe that, in quitting this world, I regret only leaving yourself, and your fond, affectionate disposition, which alone has given any charm to my existence. This will be a consolation for you, my dear friend—to reflect that, by your attentions, you have rendered your mother as happy as circumstances would allow her to be. You will think also of all my affection for you; and this will inspire you with courage. Think upon this, that we shall always have a benevolent and distinct feeling for all that passes in this world below, and that, assuredly, we shall all meet again. Reflect upon this consolatory idea; it is one which is too necessary not to be true. And that good Arese! I send him my blessing as to a son. I press you to my heart, my dear friend. I am calm, perfectly resigned; and I would still hope that we may meet again, even in this world.

“Your affectionate mother,

“HORTENSE.

“3rd April, 1837.”

pressed, but to show myself to my fellow-countrymen such as I am, and not such as interested enmity had represented me. But if one day the movements of parties should overthrow the existing powers (and the experience of the past fifty years authorises us in the belief)—and if, accustomed as they have been for the last thirty-three years to despise authority, they should undermine all the foundations of the social empire, then perhaps the name of Napoleon may prove an anchor of safety for all that is noble and truly useful in France.”

The issue of the trial was what might have been expected, considering the unscrupulousness with which the constitutional government of July was in the habit of bringing to bear every kind of sinister influence, for the purpose of putting “the screw” on the tribunals, whenever it had an object to carry, spite to gratify, or an opponent to crush. Lieutenant Laity was pronounced guilty of sedition, and sentenced to pecuniary fine and to imprisonment for five years.

The energetic tone in which, on all appropriate occasions, the Prince continued to assert the principles and objects for which he lived, gave much uneasiness to a government which was aware that, however seemingly strong, its foundation was not sound and safe. The ministry of Louis Philippe sent to the Helvetic Confederation a pressing demand for the expulsion of the illustrious exile. The answer was a firm refusal, upon which an army was sent towards the frontier, with the avowed object of forcing the republic into compliance. The Swiss, on their part, presented a gallant and unflinching front, and, disproportionate as were their means of resistance to the colossal military power which threatened them, resolutely prepared to meet force with force. But the subject of this contention determined that the country which had so long af-

forded him a hospitable asylum, and the government of the country which was the object of his love and hope, should not, on his account, be plunged into an unequal conflict—desperate and ruinous, though honourable, on one side, disgraceful, even if successful, on the other. The armies of France, he was resolved, should never draw the sword against a Bonaparte. He decided on retiring to England, and announced his intention to the Council of the Canton of Thurgovia in a letter gracefully acknowledging the “generous protection” offered to him by the canton, and the “marks of esteem and affection” which he had received from the Swiss people.

The residence of Prince Louis Napoleon in England has been adverted to as below, by a writer who evidently possessed means of obtaining authentic information. The parenthetical observations in which the position of the First Napoleon towards Europe, and towards this country in particular, is considered, are recommended to the reader’s attention:—

“During his residence here, he appears to have carefully studied the English constitution and the English people; and it was here that he formed those profound views of political philosophy which we find elaborated in his published works.

“We were so long accustomed to regard the First Napoleon as one who acted solely from the dictates of his own will, and as one who wisely, but tyrannically, governed his own dominions by his spontaneous notions, that we do not even yet give him credit for that profound investigation of political philosophy which really constituted the greater part of his glory. Knowing the value of nationality, he declared that those who perpetrated the crime of abolishing the Polish independence

had laid themselves open to a fearful retribution in time to come. He saw that the remaining nationalities of Slavonian race could not be safely entrusted to one hand ; he saw that it would be at the cost of an unexampled loss of human life and liberty—that it would be at the risk of the vastest misery—that the partition of Poland could be carried out so as to blot the name of Poland from the map of the nations of Europe. This proved that his views of political philosophy were far in advance of his day. * * *

“These are not solitary instances in the career of Napoleon I., a man who was understood by few in the age in which he lived, but whose benefits to France are acknowledged by the universal respect paid to his memory in that country. We are not surprised, then, to find the heir of this great man residing in England, a country which had been so hostile to his uncle, carefully studying the history and politics of the kingdom, in order to ascertain why it acted as it did towards his predecessor, and also to learn how, in time to come, when he believed he should fill the throne of France, he might best treat with those haughty islanders by whom that predecessor had been overthrown.

“When in England, Louis Napoleon made many friends, who seem to have been so impressed with the energy of his character, that they remained his fast adherents even in his most adverse fortunes. The English people generally, too, regarded him with a species of respect and admiration ; not merely because of the name he bore, nor of the purpose which he cherished — for his prospects were then far off and indistinct ; but mainly because they saw in him the promise of a great man. It is curious now to note what was said concerning his personal appearance, his manners, and deportment. He has been differently

described. By some he has been spoken of as having a peculiarly expressive countenance. * * Others, however, who have perhaps been better able to describe him, state that his looks impressed the spectator with an idea both of benevolence and nobility; but that which was both interesting and remarkable in him was an indescribable shade of sadness and deep thought, which might have resulted from the trials of youth. His tastes and habits were ever grave and simple; always dressing in the morning at once for the day; nor even, when quite young, did he ever employ much of the allowance given him by his mother in dress, having a great contempt for mere vanities; but, on the contrary, spent almost the whole of it in acts of charity, and especially in assisting schools."

This reference to his propensity for "assisting schools," indicates one of the passions of Napoleon the Third. The subject of education in all its branches has always been one of those which engaged a large share of his attention, and has not lost its interest since he has attained Imperial authority.

CHAP. IV.

THE POLICY OF THE EMPIRE AS EXPOUNDED BY PRINCE LOUIS
 NAPOLEON.—EXCERPTA FROM “LES IDÉES NAPOLEONIENNES.”—
 PROTEST AGAINST SYMPATHY WITH SOCIALIST CONSPIRACIES.

IF, in preparing this volume, I occupy much space with authentic reproductions of the opinions of Napoleon the Third at different periods of his career, it is because its design is rather that of an exposition of principles than a narrative of dry facts. Explanation, elucidation of objects and motives, will, in such an undertaking, be more interesting, as well as more informing, than a minute register of occurrences, unaccompanied by an examination of their moral. For this reason I think it desirable to occupy some space with quotations from the celebrated “*Idées Napoléoniennes*,” which appeared whilst its illustrious author was residing in England, in 1839. The object of the work was to correct misconceptions, and furnish truthful information respecting the actions, the opinions, the projects of the Great Napoleon, both as respected France in particular, and Europe in general; to give a correct general idea of what he had accomplished in the midst of war, and of what he would further have accomplished had not the force of circumstances, too powerful for mortal genius and energy to contend with, precluded him. Identifying himself, as he has ever done, with the policy of Napoleon the First, the prince who was destined to re-establish and develop that policy laboured to impress the world with accurate opinions as to its tendencies and objects.

In the short introduction which precedes the "Idées," he observes : —

"The Emperor is no more, but his spirit survives. Deprived of the possibility of defending his tutelary power with my sword, I can at least defend his memory with my pen. To enlighten public opinion by developing the thoughts which presided over his high conceptions, to recall the memory of his vast projects — this is a task which gladdens my heart and consoles me in exile. The fear of encountering adverse opinions will not deter me. Ideas which are under the aegis of the greatest genius of modern times may be proclaimed without circumlocution ; they cannot be subject to the variations of the political atmosphere."

After preliminary remarks upon forms and principles of government, and references to the state in which, after the revolutionary convulsions, Napoleon found France, the writer proceeds : —

"Napoleon, advancing upon the stage of the world, saw that it was his part to be the testamentary executor of the Revolution. The destructive fire of parties was extinct ; and when the Revolution, dying but not vanquished, bequeathed to Napoleon the accomplishment of its last wishes, it might have said to him, 'Concentrate upon solid foundations the principal results of my exertions ; reunite the divided people of France ; repulse feudal Europe, leagued against me ; heal my wounds ; enlighten the nations ; extend in breadth that which I have done in depth. Be for Europe what I have been to France ; and even though you water with your blood the tree of civilisation, though you see your projects misrepresented, and your family wandering about the world without a native land to own them, never abandon the sacred cause of the French people, but lead it to

triumph by all the means which genius calls into being, and which humanity approves. * * *

"The Emperor Napoleon contributed more than any other man to accelerate the reign of liberty by preserving the moral influence of the Revolution, and by diminishing the fears which it inspired. But for the Consulate and the Empire, the Revolution would have been merely a great drama, leaving behind it grand memories, but few traces. The Revolution would have been drowned in the counter-revolution; whereas the precise contrary took place, because Napoleon planted in France, and spread in Europe, the principal advantages of the grand crisis of '89, and because, to employ one of his own expressions, he sobered the Revolution, consolidated the dynasties of kings, and elevated the people. * * * The Emperor may be considered the Messiah of the new ideas; for it must be borne in mind that, in the times that immediately follow a social convulsion, the essential work is not to apply principles in all the subtlety of their theories, but to take possession of the regenerative genius, to identify oneself with the sentiments of the people, and boldly direct them towards the object they desire to obtain. In order to be capable of accomplishing such a task, it is necessary, in his own words, 'that your heart should respond to that of the people;' that you should feel as they feel, and that your interests should be so intimately intermingled, that you must conquer or fall together. It was this union of sentiments, interests, and wills which constituted the power of the Emperor."

And most truthfully it may be affirmed that in a similar union of interests and sentiments resides the secret of the moral power which the present Emperor possesses in the deep convictions of the people of France. Like his great predecessor, he founds his rule

essentially on the will of the nation. In the "Idées Napoléoniennes" he quotes the votes by which the Consulate and the Empire were established:—For the Consulate, assentient, 3,011,007; dissentient, 1562: for the Consulate for life, assentient, 3,568,888; dissentient, 8374: for the hereditary Empire, assentient, 3,521,675; dissentient, 2579.—In a future chapter it will be shown that the present Emperor owes his position to a still more extensive expression of the national wish; and that taking into consideration the numerous factions which lately distracted France (none of the members of which factions was excluded from voting), even the *proportion* of votes was not less satisfactory than in the case of his uncle.

Vindicating the memory of the Emperor from the imputation of having accepted power from a mere impulse of personal vanity or ambition, he argues that "to obviate the want of fixity and continuity, the absence of which is the great defect of democratic republics, it had become necessary to create an hereditary family, to be the conservator of the general interests;" and thus apostrophises the illustrious memory: "Let his soul be comforted! Long since the masses have rendered him justice; each day that passes, as it shows some one of the social maladies which he cured, of the evils which he removed, amply explains his noble objects; and his great thoughts, glittering all the more brilliantly amid the wavering obscurity of the present times, are as a glorious beacon, showing to us, amidst the darkness and the storm, a beacon of future safety."

The tolerant and comprehensive spirit in which, as argued by the writer, the First Napoleon exercised his enormous power, is dwelt upon with affectionate reverence. He represents to us Napoleon, rising superior to the solicitations of party or personal considerations, opening the doors of employment and distinction to all,—

even to those whom he had least reason to regard as friends—whenever he could discern a probability of their being serviceable to France; forgetting petty jealousies, removing proscriptions, and governing France for the benefit of all the French:—

“Let us admire the Napoleonian spirit—never exclusive, never intolerant. Superior to the petty passions of party, generous as the people he was called to rule, the Emperor always professed this maxim,—that in politics we must cure evils, never avenge them.

“The abuse of the Royal power, the tyranny of the nobility, had produced the immense reaction which was called the Revolution of 1789. This led to other opposite and fearful reactions. With Napoleon all reactionary passions ceased. Strong in the assent of the people, he rapidly proceeded to abolish all unjust laws; he healed all wounds, recompensed merit wherever it was found, adopted all glories, and made the French co-operate towards one single end—the prosperity of France.

“Scarcely invested with power, the First Consul revoked the laws which excluded the relatives of emigrants and the ex-nobles from the exercise of political rights and public functions. The law of forced loans was superseded by an extraordinary subvention in addition to the ordinary contributions of the public. Napoleon abolished requisitions in kind, and abolished the law of hostages. He recalled the writers condemned to transportation by the law of the 19th Fructidor; such as Carnot, Portalis, Simeon. He recalled the conventionalists, Barrère and Vadis. He opened the gates of France to more than 100,000 emigrants, amongst whom were members of the Constituent Assembly. He reinstated in their employments several Conventionalists whom it had been purposed to keep out of the public service. He pacified La Vendée, he organised the administration

of the municipalities of Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux. He exclaimed one day in the Council of State, 'To govern by a party is to put oneself, sooner or later, in its power. I will not be so involved. I am national. I avail myself of all those who have the capacity and the will to go with me. It is for this reason I have composed my Council of State of members who were called Moderates (or Feuillants?), as Defermon, Rœderer, Regnier, Regnault; of Royalists, as Devaines and Dufresnes; of Jacobins, as Brune, Real, and Berlier. I love honest men of all parties.' Prompt to honour great memories as to recompense recent services, Napoleon placed in the Hôtel des Invalides, side by side with the statues of Hoche, Joubert, Marceau, Dugomier, and Dampierre, that of Condé, and placed also there the ashes of Turenne and the heart of Vauban. He revived in Orleans the memory of Jeanne d'Arc, at Beauvais that of Jeanne Hachette. In 1800 he made the delivery of a great citizen, La Fayette, the ultimatum of a treaty. Later, he took for aides-de-camp officers like Drouet, Lobau, and Bernard, who had been opposed to the Consulate for life. With similar good feeling he treated the senators who had voted against the establishment of the Empire. Always faithful to the principles of conciliation, the Emperor in the course of his reign gave a pension to the mother of Robespierre, as well as to the mother of the Duke of Orleans. He solaced the misfortunes of the widow of Bailly, President of the Constituent Assembly, and supported in her old age the last descendant of Du Guesclin."

The references to parties and persons in favour of whom the Emperor had relaxed laws which exiled many of them from France, whilst he advanced numbers to positions of trust and influence from which a less generous and self-reliant genius would have ex-

cluded them, may remind us of the courageous magnanimity with which the present Napoleon has overlooked the complicities of innumerable individuals who had compromised themselves in actual plots, not merely for the overthrow of his own government, but for the introduction of sheer anarchy, or, the re-imposition upon France of the hated dynasties which she has expelled — men whom, in the strict rule of legality, he would have been justified in shutting up for life, or in perpetually banishing from the soil of France—men who had vied in efforts to traduce, to injure, to destroy him. And of the multitudes whom the absolute requirements of public security rendered it necessary to remove for a while from France, but whom, as soon as the danger caused by their misconduct was overcome, he permitted to resume the enjoyment of all the rights of Frenchmen, how many would now have been so situated, if, under the policy pursued by the Bourbon family, they had taken similar measures against the power and supremacy of that family? Most bravely, most humanely, he has illustrated in practice the conduct which he had applauded in theory.

The writer compares the state of France and Europe with that which was contemplated by the Imperial policy:—

"Having as general, consul, and emperor, done everything for the people, could he fear that he should be reproached with conquests which had for their sole aim the prosperity and greatness of France, the peace of the world? No,—it was not a government resplendent with civil and military laurels that could dread the light of day. * * *

"By means of Napoleon, the nation was approximating, without shock or agitation, to a normal state, wherein liberty would have been the support of power

and the guarantee of the general well being, instead of being a weapon of war, a torch of discord.

"It is with the impression left by an exciting dream, that one pauses to contemplate the future of happiness and stability which Europe would have presented if the great projects of the Emperor had been accomplished. Each country, circumscribed by its natural limits, united with its neighbour by the relations of mutual interest and friendship, would have enjoyed within itself all the benefits of independence, peace, and liberty. The sovereigns, exempt from fear and suspicion, would have applied themselves solely to the amelioration of their people's condition, and to the diffusion amongst them of all the blessings of civilisation.

"Instead of this, what have we now in Europe? Every man, when he seeks his pillow at night, fears the morning dawn; for the germ of evil is everywhere;—and the honest heart almost regrets good, by reason of the sacrifices necessary to obtain it. Disciples of liberty, ye who rejoiced in the fall of Napoleon, how lamentable was your error! How many struggles and sacrifices must there be before you again reach the point to which Napoleon brought you! And you, statesmen of the Congress of Vienna, who have made yourselves masters of the world on the wreck of the Empire, your part might have been a noble part, but you did not comprehend it! In the name of liberty, and even of license, you roused the nations against Napoleon. You placed him under the ban of Europe, as a despot and a tyrant; you proclaimed that you had delivered the nations and secured them repose. For a moment they believed you. But nothing solid can be built upon a lie and a blunder. Napoleon had closed the gulf of revolutions;—that gulf, when you overthrew him, you reopened. Take care lest it swallow you up."

When perusing passages of this kind, the English reader will reflect that they are written by one profoundly, affectionately, reverentially attached to the memory of the great man to whom they relate. Without calling upon Englishmen to endorse the minute details of every opinion set forth, it is desirable to fix their attention on the consistent tenacity of principle and conviction manifested in every allusion to the subject, and the accordance of the writer's sentiments with the course which he pursued when the changes predicted by him were brought about. It was under no mistake as to the objects, the wishes, the convictions, of the nephew of their great Emperor, that the people of France placed power in his hands. These objects—these wishes—these principles—all comprehended in the reconstitution, in its integrity, of the grand Imperial system, he had explained, avowed, insisted on, through all changes and vicissitudes of position. And joyfully the French nation approved and accepted them!

Vindicating the general wisdom of the Emperor's administration, the Prince compares (certainly in a spirit of no limited admiration of his great relative) the social and domestic effects produced upon England by a successful war, with those produced on France by an unsuccessful war. Bearing in mind that the writer is a Frenchman and a Bonaparte, inspired by all the prepossessions involved in these predicates, it is interesting to mark the emphasis with which he adheres to his proposition, that the war was not a war of France in the initiative against England, but of England in the initiative against France:—

"The period of the Empire was a mortal war of England against France. England triumphed; but, thanks to the creative genius of Napoleon, France, though defeated, lost materially less than England.

The finances of France are still the most prosperous in Europe; England bends under the weight of her debt. The impulse given to industry and commerce was not stayed by our reverses; and now the continent of Europe supplies itself with most of the productions which were formerly furnished to it by England. And let us ask, who are the greatest statesmen—those who have governed countries which have gained notwithstanding their defeat, or those who have governed countries which have lost notwithstanding their victory?

"The period of the Empire was that of war against the old European system. The old system triumphed; but notwithstanding the fall of Napoleon, Napoleonic ideas have spread in all directions. The conquerors themselves have adopted the ideas of the conquered, and nations are wearying themselves with efforts to restore that which Napoleon had established among them.

"In France there is an incessant demand, under other names or other forms, for the realisation of the ideas of the Emperor. Whenever a great measure or a great public work is effected, it is generally a project of Napoleon that is executed—or merely completed. Every act of power, every proposition of the Chamber, is made to refer to Napoleon, in order to obtain popularity. On one word fallen from his lips, men now construct an entire system."

Enumerating a catalogue of nations which, since 1815, had struggled for a restoration of the systems introduced amongst them by the Emperor, the writer proceeds:—

"Again, then, let us ask, who were the greatest statesmen—those who founded a system which is crumbling

away on all sides despite their supremacy; or those who founded a system which survives their defeat, and springs anew from their ashes?

"The Napoleonian ideas bear the character of ideas which regulate the movement of societies, since they advance of their own force, though deprived of their author, like a mass which, launched into space, arrives by its own gravity at its destined goal. There is no need to reconstruct the system of the Emperor—it will reconstruct itself. Sovereigns and people, all will aid to re-establish it, because every man will see in it a guarantee of order, of peace, and of prosperity.

"And where should we now find [a parallel to] that extraordinary man who dominated the world by the respect due to superiority of conceptions? The genius of this age requires nothing more than simple reason. Thirty years ago it was necessary to see and to prepare; now it is necessary only to see and to gather in. * * *

"To conclude,—the Napoleonian idea is not an idea of war, but a social, industrial, commercial idea,—an idea of humanity. If to some it seems ever surrounded by contests, the reason is simply, that it was indeed too long enveloped in the smoke of cannon and the dust of battles. But the clouds have dispersed, and men discern, through the effulgent glory of arms, a civil glory, greater and more enduring."

The political, judicial, financial, educational, and general administrative organisation of the Consulate and Empire; the measures for the encouragement of agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing industry; the steps taken by the First Napoleon, immediately on finding himself at the head of affairs, to reopen the portals of France to tens of thousands of exiles and refugees, are considered in elaborate chapters by the author of

the "Idées." He refutes the notion that the rule of the Empire was a military one:—

"Never, in fact," he writes, "was internal power less military than that of the Emperor. In all his actions we see the tendency to give civil order predominance over military order. Under the Imperial rule, no place in the civil administration was filled by a military man. He who created civil dignities to equipoise those of the army; who, by the institution of the Legion of Honour, sought to recompense in the same manner the services of the citizen and the services of the soldier; who, from his accession to power, applied himself to improve the condition of civil servants of the State; who always gave precedence to the latter; who, at home, and even in conquered countries, caused councillors of State to be invested with an administrative authority superior to that of the general,—such is the man whom party spirit has chosen to describe to us as the patron of military rule. * * *

"That was a strange military government where tranquillity was maintained throughout the vast Empire without a soldier*, whilst the Chief of the State and the army were hundreds of leagues from the capital."

Some of the paragraphs in which the Prince descants upon the foreign policy of the Emperor are peculiarly worthy of attention. He denies that that policy was fundamentally a warlike policy, and asserts that if Napoleon the First prosecuted war vigorously, it was with the object of obtaining a solid and permanent peace:—

"To secure the independence of France, to establish

* Substantially correct. We are informed by Thibaudeau that when the Emperor Napoleon was at Vienna, the garrison of Paris consisted of only 1200 men! a force infinitely smaller than is usually quartered in the environs of tranquil London.

a solid European peace — such was the aim he was so near attaining, notwithstanding the complication of events and the continual conflict of opposing interests. The more the secrets of diplomacy become revealed, the more will men become convinced of this truth — that Napoleon was led, step by step, and by the force of circumstances, to that gigantic power which war created and war destroyed. He was not the aggressor ; on the contrary, he was incessantly compelled to repulse the coalitions of Europe. If at times he has the appearance of anticipating the projects of his enemies, it is because in the initiative lies the guarantee of success. And as Mignet observes, 'The real author of a war is not he who declares it, but he who renders it necessary.'"

Englishmen will read the following passages with painful interest:—

"All our wars came from England. England would never listen to any propositions of peace. Was it that she imagined the Emperor sought her ruin? He had never any such thought. All that he ever did towards her was in the way of reprisal. The Emperor esteemed the English people, and he would have made every sacrifice to obtain peace — every sacrifice, all sacrifices, save such as would have compromised his honour. In 1800 the First Consul thus wrote to the King of England:—'Is the war which has now, for eight years, been desolating the four quarters of the globe, to be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an arrangement? How can the two most enlightened nations in Europe, already more powerful than their safety and their independence require — how can they sacrifice, to ideas of futile grandeur, the extension of commerce, internal prosperity, the happiness of families? How is it that they do not

feel that peace is the first of necessities, as it is the first of glories ?'

"In 1808, the Emperor addressed to the same sovereign the following words : 'The world is large enough for both our nations to live in it, and reason has wherewith to furnish the means of conciliation, if on both sides we provide the will. Peace is the wish of my heart, though war has never been contrary to my glory. I conjure your Majesty not to deny yourself the happiness of yourself granting peace.'

"At Erfurt, Napoleon united with Alexander in an endeavour to bring over the British Cabinet to ideas of conciliation.

"Lastly, in 1812, when the Emperor was at the very apogée of his power, he again made the same propositions to England. He ever demanded peace after victory — he never consented to one after a defeat. * * *

"It were too painful to suppose that the war was kept up merely by the malignant passions or the interests of parties. If so ferocious a struggle was so long maintained, it is doubtless because the two nations were unacquainted with each other, and because each government reciprocally misconceived the state of its neighbour. England, perhaps, only saw in Napoleon a despot, oppressing his country, and exhausting all its resources in the gratification of his warlike ambition : it did not see that the Emperor was the elected of the people, and that he represented all those interests, moral and material, for which France had been fighting since 1789. It may in the same way be supposed that the French government, confounding the enlightened aristocracy of England with the feudal aristocracy that weighed so heavily on France before the Revolution, thought it had to do with an oppressive government. But the English aristocracy is like the Briareus of

fable: it is knitted with the people by a hundred thousand roots; it has obtained from the people as many sacrifices as Napoleon obtained from the French nation."

The ultimate policy of the Emperor is thus interpreted and described by his representative:—

"To substitute amongst the nations of Europe the social state for the state of nature—such was the idea of the Emperor. All his political combinations tended to this great result; but to attain it, it was necessary that he should bring England and Russia heartily to second his views. 'So long as there is fighting in Europe,' said the Emperor, 'that will be civil war. The Holy Alliance is an idea which they stole from me,—that is to say, the Holy Alliance of peoples by the medium of kings, and not that of kings against peoples.' Therein lies the vast difference between his idea and the manner in which it was realised. Napoleon had displaced sovereigns for the actual interest of the peoples: in 1815, the peoples were displaced for the special interest of the sovereigns. The statesmen of that period, consulting only rancour and passion, based the balance of power in Europe on the rivalries of two great powers, instead of basing it on general interests; and, as a necessary result, their system has crumbled to pieces.

"The policy of the Emperor, on the contrary, was to found a solid European association, by resting his system on nationality completed and general interests satisfied. If fortune had not abandoned him, he would have had in his hands all the means of reconstructing Europe. * * * To cement the European association, the Emperor (to quote his own statement) would have caused the adoption of a European code, and a European Court of Cassation, correcting the judicial

errors of universal Europe, as the Court of Cassation in France corrects the errors of the tribunals of France. He would have founded a European institute, to animate, direct, and bring into harmonious co-operation, all the learned institutions of Europe.* The uniformity of monies, weights and measures, and the uniformity of legislation, would have been secured by his intervention.

“The last great change, then, would have been accomplished for our continent; as, in the beginning, communal interests raised themselves above individual interests, and then civil interests above communal interests, and then national interests above provincial interests, so also European interests would have risen dominant to national interests, and humanity would have been satisfied; for it cannot be the will of Providence that one nation alone should be happy at the expense of the rest, or that there should be in Europe only conquerors and conquered, instead of the reconciled members of one and the same great family.”

From the close of the year 1838, down to August 1840, when he left England for Boulogne, not for the purpose of exciting a sanguinary revolution, as has sometimes been absurdly asserted, but frankly with the hope and object of obtaining a spontaneous expression of the national will of France, in reference firstly to the government of Louis Philippe, and secondly to the form and principle of government most accordant with the honour and interests of the country, the Prince

* In exemplification of the comprehensive nature of the Emperor's views on this subject, the Prince mentions the fact, that “Napoleon had in reality begun a system of European scientific association, by giving European prizes for new inventions and discoveries; and that, despite the existence of war, Davy in London and Hermann in Berlin gained prizes awarded by the Institute.”

resided in England. Here those amicable sentiments which, from the first time when he became acquainted with us, had superseded any prejudices that might possibly (though the fact does not appear) have been at one time entertained by him respecting a nation which was the primary and leading cause of the downfall of his family, strengthened into feelings of cordial friendship. He did not live the life of a recluse. True, he passed much of his time in study,—some of it in literary composition, as is shown by the publication of the work which has just been quoted; but he did not confine himself, in his search for practical information, to the kind of knowledge which is derived from books. He studied us through ourselves as well as through our literature; and by mingling in general society, observing men, women, thoughts, habits, and institutions, obtained, in all probability, a more intimate acquaintance with our real state and condition than is possessed by some of those who share in making our laws and giving the tone to our policy, domestic and external.

When, about this time, he declared that one of the objects of the policy of Napoleon the First had been to defeat the Russians and depress the English system, and that he was himself prepared to justify and defend that object, it would have been necessary, in order to obtain a correct understanding of the meaning of the expression, to take time, place, and circumstance into account, instead of jumping to a conclusion that it implied any hostile feeling towards England on the part of the writer. We must consider what had actually been the nature of the "English system" at the period when the policy in question was entertained by the Emperor. Looking back to it, we find that a foremost characteristic was an unrelenting resolution to

drive him from his throne — that resolution which, after a Titanic struggle, was accomplished, but which millions of Englishmen now believe to have been as little conducive to the interests of our own country as it was to those of France. Well, our policy was one implacably hostile to Napoleon; incompatible with the very existence of the sovereignty which he held by the will of the French people. It was a policy of war to death against his political existence. We have seen that whilst he deplored, and of course resented, he made strenuous endeavours to conciliate, or rather dissipate, the passionate prejudices on which that policy rested: we have seen how entirely alien to fundamental hatred or enmity were his own sentiments towards us; how ardent was his desire for peace and amity; how energetic his representations to our own political authorities — nominally addressed, as they were, to a king whose unfortunate state of mind, combined with the obstinacy of a too famous “War Minister,” had been mainly instrumental in keeping alive the flame of war — how energetic were his representations of the wisdom, the necessity, of peace — his entreaties to the statesmen of this country “not to refuse themselves the happiness of granting peace!” But as peace would not be granted — as nothing less than the annihilation of the Imperial system would satisfy the policy then dominant in England — what alternative had the object of all this uncompromising, and, as most of us now think, wrong-headed enmity, but to endeavour to “depress” that policy?

And did such endeavour imply hostility to us as a people? By no means. It was one mainly of self-defence — of self-preservation; an effort suggested by the necessity of averting ruin, not only from himself, but from the system approved and enthusiastically upheld

by his people. When the present Emperor expressed his concurrence with these views of Napoleon the First, his observations were retrospective — directed to the circumstances under which such views had been entertained; — they fairly and reasonably set forth what he, or any man of spirit and energy, must have done, if surrounded by similar contingencies. — He gave a candid, manly statement of facts, in reference to a subject which had been grievously misunderstood.

It was whilst he was living, thinking, and observing amongst us, that the Socialist *émeute*, or insurrection, under Barbès, occurred in France. It was impossible that a man holding the position of Prince Louis Napoleon in the eyes of Europe—the heir, the representative, the vindicator of the Empire, the denouncer and opponent of the system of corruption by which France was at that time weakened and degraded,—it was impossible that a man holding such a position should not have had enemies, powerful, ingenious and unscrupulous. And he had enemies,—he had many of them. Every one of those who felt themselves personally interested in the maintenance of the system against which his life, words, and actions were standing protests, was his enemy. There could be no more effectual mode of injuring him than to depreciate his “good name,” — his public and private character. Of the effectiveness of a dexterous use of slander, none were more profoundly aware, from experience and indefatigable practice, than the dependents of Louis Philippe’s court; and they had exercised their talents without let or limit, as indeed they continued to do for a long time afterwards, in propagating every description of calumny — specious, audacious, and sometimes, through excess of zeal, simply impudent and ridiculous — respecting a personage so obnoxious, and

whom, even in his exile, they felt to be formidable. The Barbès affair suggested an opportunity not to be neglected. Up rose a vehement outcry, supported by a legion of ribaldrous tongues, and unfortunately, it must be added, by not few mercenary pens, against the deadly, levelling, Socialist, bloodthirsty objects of a movement of which the Prince, it was gravely asserted, was the head and soul! The accusation was so opposed to every reasonable inference deducible from the Prince's antecedents, to the sentiments emphatically enunciated by him on all occasions, as to the paramount importance, to every State and people, of the preservation of order, and the sacred inviolability of the rights of property, that really well-informed persons could scarcely be imposed on by it. But the slanderers, if not wise, were cunning in their generation. They knew well that every community contains a large proportion of individuals too prone to be persuaded by assertions boldly made and followed up.

The Prince, too, in consideration of this fact, thought it necessary to make public a formal denial of any connexion with the affair alluded to. This he did in the following letter, addressed to the editor of a London newspaper, into the "Paris Correspondence" of which some sinister influence had contrived, probably by working on the credulity of the gentleman who conducted that department, to procure the insertion of a defamatory paragraph:—

"SIR,

"I observe with pain, in your Paris Correspondence, that it is sought to throw upon me the responsibility of the late insurrection. I count upon your kindness to refute the insinuation in the most formal manner. The news of the sanguinary scenes

which have just taken place, equally surprised and afflicted me. If I were the soul of a conspiracy, I should be the leader of it in the day of danger, and I should not deny it after a defeat.

“ Receive &c.,

“ NAPOLEON LOUIS BONAPARTE.”

Perhaps it would have been politic for the Prince — so far as respected temporary expediency — to have caused the denial to be made in a manner less direct and explicit. Such a course might have been equally effectual in undeceiving individuals of moderate opinions opposed to such projects as those of Barbès, and, at the same time, been less offensive to the extreme party in France, who were ready to place themselves at the disposal of any combination directed against the existing order of things. In short, to use our English phrase, such a course might have been an astute way enough of “running with the hare and holding with the hounds.” But devices of this sort he disdained and cast utterly from him. He ever refused to give countenance, implied or expressed, to principles or objects contrary to those which he had laid down as the rule of his conduct and the goal of his aspirations. The faithful truthfulness and sincerity of the man manifested themselves in this, as in so many emergencies in which, during his eventful career, they were put upon trial. And by truthfulness and sincerity he achieved that grand success which has astonished the world.

SECTION THE THIRD.

1840 to 1848.

CHAPTER I.

THE ENTERPRISE OF BOULOGNE. — OBJECTS AND PLANS. — RESULTS, IMMEDIATE AND DEFERRED. — THE TRIAL. — DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. — THE JUDGMENT.

THE circumstances under which the Boulogne expedition was undertaken have been discussed and re-discussed by writers of all parties and opinions. Long previous preparation, combination, and secret organisation of supporters, have been imputed. No imputation could be less like probability. Had there been conspiracy, preparation, organisation, it would not have been with a retinue consisting of about fifty persons, and without a single individual awaiting him or expecting him, that he would have landed at Boulogne. Had he chosen, for the convenience of the moment, to shuffle and equivocate as to the objects of the expedition, and the measures which he deemed necessary for the regeneration of his country — had he, giving way in the smallest degree to the policy of dissimulation, entered into correspondence with the leaders of the Jacobin and Socialist clubs, and held out to them any hope of countenance from himself in the event of the enterprise being successful, he might have had many looking for

the raising of his finger as the signal for a popular revolt. But on this, as on all occasions, he rose superior to tricky subterfuge.

There was, in fact, no combination, no organisation, no preparation for him. The attempt at Strasburg has been described, and the causes of its failure considered, in a previous chapter. That it was a brave and chivalrous, if not a prudent or well-considered experiment, cannot be denied; but the landing at Boulogne with a few followers, of the principal of whom were Count Montholon and General Voison, presented an excess of chivalrous valour. Here he had not a Colonel Vaudrey to receive him. Nobody expected him. A few proclamations were scattered, concerning a change in the Government. The little party marched through the town towards the guardhouse, shouting "Vive l'Empereur!" The troops at the guardhouse were invited to join them, but the soldiers were taken by surprise at so unexpected a summons—perhaps, too, there arose some doubts as to the Prince's identity, as had been the case at Strasburg. It was not unnatural that suspicion, or at least hesitation, should arise, when they saw not one of their own officers, with the exception of a young subaltern, Lieutenant Aladenize, appear in support of the movement. The consequence was, that time was again lost. The "National Guard"—at that time the incarnation of the small-office-seeking bourgeoisie so relied on by Louis Philippe—began to muster. The numbers of the Napoleonite party receiving no considerable increase, the Prince retreated towards the Column of Napoleon, a little way out of the town, and there planted the Imperial flag; but it was so early in the morning, that few persons were about, and the National Guard, with some of the soldiery, began to surround the Prince

and his followers. Under these circumstances—finding that the enterprise had failed even more completely than had that at Strasburg, where, for a while, there did exist some appreciable chance of success—the Prince, who acted all through with the imperturbable intrepidity that never forsakes him in moments of danger, reluctantly confessed to himself that the time for the fulfilment of his long-cherished hopes had not yet arrived. He therefore ordered a retreat towards the sea. But it was too late to effect that operation. A short conflict took place on the beach. Little blood was shed—in fact, the odds were too overwhelming to render anything like regular fighting possible. Though the Prince had, with great gallantry, made his dispositions for resisting capture, and, by the exposure of his own person to serious peril, endeavoured to make a diversion in order that as many as possible of his friends might make their escape, the result was that one or two were shot down, and the others, including their leader, were taken prisoners. The Prince himself, Generals Voison, Montholon, and a few of the more eminent actors in the affair, were in a short time conveyed to Paris, to be tried, on a charge of high treason, before the Chamber of Peers.

I have already devoted some space to a consideration of the motives which impelled Prince Louis Napoleon to the enterprises of Strasburg and Boulogne. That they were the result of profound convictions as to the necessity, for the sake of the best interests of France, of re-establishing the system of the Empire, no one can doubt who has seen with what fidelity the future Emperor had clung to these convictions. But that the measures themselves did not proceed from any long-prepared arrangements, is equally evident from all the circumstances. They were the offspring of

generous, confiding impulses, which would fain have believed that all who entertained the same opinions were inspired with the same devotion. The Prince knew that the hearts of the people of France were with the cause which he represented ; but so utterly strange to his disposition were the arts of under-handed intrigue, that he had omitted the necessary precaution of forming a nucleus of organised supporters. He felt (to use one of his own pregnant aphorisms) that his cause was everywhere, though his party was nowhere because it had not been organised. Beyond doubt, the total neglect of organisation was an error, but an error which at all events evidenced the sincere character of the convictions which moved him. His object was not to force upon the community the recognition of the Empire—a step, I may observe, for which little force could have been required, seeing that the aspirations of the vastly preponderating majority had never ceased to look in that direction. What he intended was, by the provisional establishment of a machinery through which the people could clearly express their feelings as to the government which they preferred, to enable them to found a system based on the broadest and most comprehensive principles of nationality. It must be admitted that little doubt can exist as to what the result of that decision would have been.

It would be wrong to take for granted, that though the affairs of Strasburg and Boulogne were unsuccessful with respect to their immediate objects, they were without effect in promoting the ultimate triumph of the principles of their originator. Nothing in the world is more easy than *ex post facto* criticism. It is a task in the performance of which the most obtuse of mortals can exhibit a prodigious fund of satire and acuteness, at the smallest possible expenditure of

reasoning power. What more easy than to say that a given line of conduct was mad, desperate, chimerical, because it did not immediately succeed? But how if it had succeeded? Would it then have been called mad or chimerical? Would it not have been hailed as an emanation of genius and wisdom transcending ordinary capacities? How true an appreciation of the fallibility of human nature, in this respect, is exhibited in the quiet allusion made by the Prince to those who "would call him mad because he had not succeeded, but would have exaggerated his merit if he had triumphed!" These few words open up a whole chapter of human nature, with its sensitiveness to the influence of circumstance in preference to the admonitions of principle.

But, after all, were the two enterprises in question such unmitigated failures, in their ultimate effect, as they were represented to have been? That question deserves consideration — deserves to be considered in connexion with subsequent events. That the cause of the Empire was one which, in the affections of the people of France, had survived all shocks and vicissitudes, has been proved by practical demonstration too patent to be seriously disputed: but a cause, however powerful, however revered in the abstract, can scarcely possess vital efficacy unless it have a living representative. And who was the representative, the acknowledged representative, of the Imperial cause? Surely the man who, in its assertion, had twice confronted death, and had endured prolonged penalties for so doing. And now let the reader ask himself, would the Prince have been so pre-eminently the representative and embodiment of that cause,—would it have risen to people's minds so spontaneously and energetically at the very mention of his name, if he had not been the "hero," as the phrase goes, of the affairs of Strasburg

and Boulogne? Surely not. Did not these affairs, however faulty we may admit them to have been in matters relating to strategy and tactics,—did not these affairs tend powerfully to keep alive the memories of the Empire, to remind France that there was a living heir to its principles? Were they not heartfully remembered when the time came for decision on a permanent and solid system of government for France? And had they not an influence in keeping the attention of the nation fixed on him who, in good report and evil report, had never despaired of the cause, but had found, even in circumstances which appeared to others calculated to strengthen and perpetuate the supremacy of its enemies, elements of hope, grounds for confidence of its future triumph?

We must regard these transactions in their effect on the great events of the future; we must consider them in their meaning and entirety, before we can be justified in pronouncing judgment upon them. Granted all the imputations which have been uttered as to crudeness and rashness of conception, inadequacy, or rather absence, of preparation, mismanagement in execution, — who, after all, can deny their immense influence on the events which followed the Revolution of 1848?

Entire as is my persuasion of the good faith with which Prince Louis Napoleon undertook, in 1848, a task which it afterwards became evident was an impossible one — viz., to carry out the system of government then experimentalised on — I cannot ignore the manifest truth that it was his writings and his *acts*, in support of the Imperial system, that pointed him out to the people of France as the man most fit to be entrusted with power, and him on whom it afterwards became right, and necessary for the salvation of the country, to confer increase and permanence of power.

A French writer, who has published an essay on the genius and fortunes of the present Emperor, has put the point so strikingly that I will venture to extract a few passages from his observations. The reader, making allowance for the dramatic style so popular amongst our neighbours, will attend to the course and substance of the argument, which, amid a superfluity of rhetorical ornament, is logically reasoned out:—

“Here is a man who has twice conspired against an established government, and who, in the space of four years, has raised the standard of revolt and civil war both upon the inland frontier and on the coasts of his country. This man seeks to become Emperor.* He enters on the continent; he disembarks on the shore as a pretender; he causes treasons and provokes rebellion. He engages in a hopeless struggle, and falls at once by the defenceless state of his own cause. He is insulted, judged, condemned; almost forgotten in America, and in the dungeon of Ham. * * * And yet this is the very man who, some years later, becomes, first, the favourite of the people, and then the chosen of the nation. Scarcely has his name been breathed in public places before it passes from lip to lip, as a dear remembrance, as a hope for the future. A murmur runs along the streets; passes the gates; spreads over the country. It is echoed far and wide among the humble villages of the land. It swells like the waves of the ocean, till it takes the

* An error, or rather, an exaggeration of terms—a fault which the writer is apt to fall into, but which does not affect the force and truth of his main proposition. The Prince did not seek to become Emperor. He sought to give the French people an opportunity of deciding on the establishment of a vigorous, permanent, national government, and of pronouncing whether or not that object ought to be sought through the re-establishment of the Imperial system.

form of a great popular opinion, and speaks by the voice of six millions of votes given without motive, without calculation, and as if by an irresistible and spontaneous impulse of the nation. 'True 'tis strange, strange 'tis true.' *Strasburg and Boulogne were the causes of the Election of the 10th of December.* Had not Louis Napoleon Bonaparte put himself forward as a pretender to the Empire, he would probably never have become President of the French Republic. Is it a matter of doubt? Then here is a fact which will dissipate all uncertainty on this head. The Bonaparte family did not await a signal from the prisoner of Ham to appear in France, on the stage of the new Republic. The very day after the Revolution, two young men of the family hastened to take their part in the victory. One, the son of Lucien, a republican like his father, uniting the Corsican intrepidity to a patriotism almost Roman; the other, the son of Jérôme, active, young, intelligent, clever, the living image of that historical countenance which is engraven on more hearts than medals. But who cared to recognise these representatives, these heirs of an heroic period, in the midst of the storms, agitations, and convulsions of the revolutionary crisis? What recollections went back to them? What hopes were founded on their names? What promise was there imprinted on their brows? They passed by unknown and unnoticed by the people, from whom nothing escapes, and who see everything. They mounted guard merely as patriotic volunteers at the door of the Provisional Government. They were elected by Corsica, and arrived to take their seats as representatives, without awakening a single emotion, or one presentiment. *They had not appeared either at Boulogne or Strasburg.* Let Reason humiliate herself, but let Conscience reserve her empire. For-

tune, fate, the caprice of the populace, the accident of events, can complete nothing ;— but the designs of Providence must be accomplished ; the mystery which surrounds the means is the secret of His omnipotence. That which appears senseless or culpable is often, in the design of Providence, but means to overrule human reason by defeating all calculation. The Empire had on two occasions fallen in a few days, under the assault of a million of men, headed by the Kings of Europe. The Emperor, hurled from a power the most universal and most glorious ever devolved on a man, seemed to have borne away with him, to a rock in the midst of the ocean, all the hopes of his race. One might have believed that nothing could remain of that epoch save a sublime epic poem.

“ Betrayed by those whom he had raised, humbled and martyred by those whom he had vanquished ; without country, without family, delivered into the custody of an agent of the British Government, he died at St. Helena, without his last agony causing any pang, or his last sigh being noticed by the world. His son, whose cradle was surrounded by so many expectations, so many hopes, died almost before he began to live. He died in the palace of Schönbrunn, a soldier of Austria, after having been the heir of the conqueror of kings and the dictator of nations. Who would believe that this double blow could leave a chance for the Empire ? Who could believe that a new shoot was about to spring up, to quicken again its vital principle and its force, after the trunk had been uprooted along with the branch sprung from its bark ? Nevertheless a young man whom no one knows appears. He attempts enterprises the success of which is impossible. He is scoffed at, tried, sentenced, and imprisoned —

then forgotten. And he, the man who had entered Strasburg and landed at Boulogne, — whom we have beheld sitting between two gendarmes on the bench of the accused, leaving a prison like a criminal, to become a fugitive and a wanderer — this man is Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. Oh Providence! who can deny that you govern the world, and who can doubt, in presence of these lessons given by your hand, that great trials nobly endured are the apprenticeship of great destinies nobly fulfilled?"

These passages, replete as they are with redundancies of expression, cannot fail to carry conviction of the substantial truthfulness of their general tenor. As to the impulses under which the attempts of Strasburg and Boulogne were made, the writer proceeds to argue that the object of the Prince was to assert a principle, not to excite a civil war: he maintains the impossibility of there having been anything like pre-arranged plot, either at Strasburg or Boulogne; and he reminds us of an act of magnanimity performed after the Prince had obtained power — an act which may take its place amongst the innumerable instances in which Napoleon the Third has shown that indulgence in personal spite or vindictiveness forms no element in his nature: —

"Now what did Louis Napoleon intend by his enterprises of Strasburg and Boulogne? Did he simply come to overturn a government and take its place? Did he come like Charles Edward, at the head of his partisans, to stake his right and his sceptre on the chances of a battle? Did he come to decide, hand to hand, a party contest in a final duel on the banks of the Rhine, and on the sea-shore? No. He was not a conspirator of an ordinary kind. If you

will have my frank opinion, I will not hesitate to add that his character, his habits, his ideas, his education, his nature, must have profoundly revolted from projects of conspiracy. What proves the assertion is the rashness of the acts, and the absolute impossibility of success*, which becomes evident on a simple examination of the combinations on which the two expeditions of Strasburg and Boulogne depended. In fact, the hero of these enterprises did not take the trouble of ascertaining whether he had any partisans in France.† He prepares nothing — he organises nothing; his plans are not warranted by strategy. His efforts are connected with no secret arrangements. He can reckon only on a few inferior officers, who tender their swords and their allegiance. It is not on Paris, the centre of the territory, that he brings his action to bear, to ramify afterwards through the whole of France. No; he appears suddenly, like his uncle, in a corner of the territory, and he believes that his march will be one long triumphant and popular procession. A few proclamations, a constitution — such are his implements of war. His name, his prestige, a dozen friends, who consent to share his fate, constitute his army. It has been said, I know, that the enterprise of Strasburg, in particular, was connected with a formidable organi-

* This condition of impossibility is assumed, without being proved by the writer. Success was anything but impossible at Strasburg. It was prevented through a concurrence of some of those exceptional accidents which, insignificant under ordinary circumstances, become of supreme importance when a few moments may decide a great contingency.

† There was no necessity for doing this. The fact was certain enough. It would have been more correct, though perhaps less dramatically effective, to have said that he had taken no measures to prepare or organise his "partisans." These partisans were — the nation itself.

sation, which encircled all the eastern frontier towns, their populations, and their garrisons. It has been said also, that several general officers only awaited a first success to pronounce themselves in its favour, and risk their fortunes in a cause in which they recognised the remembrance and enthusiasm of their youth. The judicial proceedings, so searching and complete, which took place before the magistrates and the Chamber of Peers, the debates that shed light on all the particulars and all the intricacies of this 'conspiracy,' have not produced a single indication of the pretended confederacy. I have seen and read everything relating to the subject. Time, which has altered the tide of events, and has converted into a title to govern that which was then a cause of degradation, has proved none of these covert treasons which hide themselves in the time of defeat, and without a blush raise their heads in the time of triumph to receive or claim their reward. An old soldier of the Empire, whose heart might have been moved, but whose conscientiousness could not be shaken, received overtures from the Prince. He declined them with the inflexibility of duty, but with grief for the signal defeat he anticipated for a name he revered. Bonaparte, having become President of the Republic, has not remembered this refusal; or, speaking more correctly, he has remembered it, and has given the baton of Marshal of France to him who, sacrificing the devotion of his feelings to his oath of allegiance, nobly refused to surrender to him his honour and his sword. Thus he did not conspire; for conspiracy implies action and organisation, and neither seriously existed at Strasburg or Boulogne.

"It was not the defection of a few officers, or the devotedness of a few friends, that could secure to him means sufficiently substantial and powerful to impose

himself on a nation. In his mind he reckoned only on moral force — on a revolution of opinion,* when showing himself unexpectedly on the frontier with a standard and an eagle. This clearly appears from a conversation, curious and authenticated, which he had, some days previous to his first attempt, with Colonel Vaudrey, at a hotel in Baden. ‘If the government,’ said he, ‘have committed faults enough to render a revolution desirable to the people—if the cause of Napoleon have left recollections engraven deeply enough in French hearts, it will be enough for me to show myself alone to the soldiers, and to recall to them their recent wrongs and their past glories, in order to gain them over to my standard. Should I succeed in making one regiment follow me—if the soldiers who do not know me personally take fire at the sight of the Imperial Eagle, then all the chances are in my favour. My cause will have triumphed in spite of any accidental obstacle which may arise to impede it.’

“To obey destiny, to follow his star, to sound France with the sword of Napoleon, to bring to light what feelings of affection it contained for the name of Bonaparte and the Empire; to call upon the people to declare their will upon the system which, as he believed, engrossed all their favour and enthusiasm — this, sincerely and impartially, was what Louis Napoleon Bonaparte had faith in, and endeavoured to bring about, in entering Strasburg, sword in hand, on the 30th of October, 1836, and in disembarking at Boulogne on the 6th of August, 1840.”

* Or, revolution *through* public opinion. A demonstration of opinion would be the correct phrase. No revolution in public opinion was required: what was wanted was the manifestation of opinions which already existed.

The trial of the illustrious aspirant and of his principal adherents in the Boulogne affair, took place before the Court of the Chamber of Peers, sitting in Paris. The details of the proceedings need not be repeated here. But it would be wrong not to mention the fact, that the insulting tone in which the prosecution was conducted by the law officers of the Government, and the extreme measures to which that Government resorted in order to ensure a conviction, excited indignation, not only amongst the Prince's friends, but amongst many of those who, politically speaking, might have been reckoned amongst his opponents.

In 1836, King Louis Philippe's power was not, perhaps, in his own opinion, sufficiently "consolidated" to render it safe to bring the prisoner to trial. But in 1840, the process of "consolidation" was considered sufficiently matured to permit of the experiment being made, and in the most vindictive manner.

The proceedings on the part of the prosecution were of a character revolting to the spirit of what in England we call "fair play." Many English periodicals expressed their feelings in no equivocal terms, and some of the French publications, restricted as they were by Ministerial influence or intimidation, were honest enough to do the same.

In the course of the trial before the Chamber of Peers, the Prince delivered a speech in which, whilst repudiating the intention of attempting a restoration of the Empire by any coercive pressure on the national will, he enunciated the principle that the time had arrived when the people should have an opportunity of deciding whether or not such restoration were required by the honour and interests of France. I quote some paragraphs from this memorable address, strikingly con-

sistent as are the propositions set forth in it with the course taken by the speaker at a subsequent period: —

“For the first time in my life, it is permitted to me to lift my voice in France, and to speak freely to Frenchmen. * * * *

“Without pride, but also without weakness, if I recall the rights deposited by the nation in the hands of my family, it is solely to explain the duties which those rights have devolved upon us.

“Since the principle of the sovereignty of the people was asserted fifty years ago by the most powerful revolution which ever occurred in the history of the world, never was the national will so solemnly proclaimed, never was it asserted by suffrages so numerous and so free, as on the occasion when it adopted the constitution of the Empire.

“The nation has never revoked that grand act of its sovereignty, and the Emperor has declared it — ‘What-ever is done without its authority is illegal.’

“At the same time, do not allow yourselves to believe that, led away by the impulses of personal ambition, I have wished by these acts to attempt a restoration of the Empire in France.* I was born the son of a king who descended without regret from a throne on the day when he had reason to believe that it was no longer possible to reconcile with the interests of France those of the people whom he had been called on to govern.

“The Emperor, my uncle, preferred to abdicate the Empire rather than accept by treaty curtailed frontiers, in doing which he must have exposed France to the insults and menaces in which foreign nations to this

* In the sense of forcing himself on the throne.

day presume to indulge. I have not been a single day forgetful of such lessons. The unmerited and cruel act of proscription under which for twenty-five years I have endured a lingering existence — beginning at the steps of the throne, where I was born, and now stopping at the dungeon from which I have just come — has been alike powerless to irritate as to fatigue my heart. It has not been able for a single day to estrange from me the glory, the rights, and the interests of France. My conduct and my convictions sufficiently attest the fact.

“In 1830, when the people reconquered the sovereignty, I had expected that the policy of the succeeding period would have been as loyal as the conquest itself, and that the destinies of France would have been established for ever. Instead of this, the country has undergone the melancholy experiences of the last ten years. Under such circumstances, I considered that the vote of four millions of fellow-countrymen, which had elevated my family to supreme power, imposed upon me at least the duty of making an appeal to the nation, and inquiring what was its will. I thought, also, that if, in the national congress which I intended to convene, certain pretensions should have made themselves heard, I should have had the right to revive the glorious memories of the Empire; to speak of the elder brother of the Emperor; of that virtuous prince, who, in precedence to me, is his sole heir; and to contrast face to face France as she now is, enfeebled and passed over silently in the congress of sovereigns, with the France of that day when she was so strong at home, and so powerful and respected abroad. The nation would then have replied to the question, ‘Republic or Monarchy; Empire or Kingdom?’ And upon the free discussion of the nation upon this question

depends the termination of our sorrows and of our dissensions.

"With respect to my enterprise — I repeat it — I had no accomplice. It was I alone who determined everything. Nobody knew beforehand my plans, or my resources, or my hopes. If I am guilty as against anybody, it is against my friends only. Nevertheless, I hope that they will not accuse me of having lightly trifled with courage and devotion such as theirs. They will understand the motives of honour and of prudence which prevent me from revealing, even to themselves, how widely based and how powerful were my reasons for hoping for a successful result.

"One word more, gentlemen. I represent before you a principle, a cause, and a defeat. The principle is the sovereignty of the people; the cause is that of the Empire; the defeat is that of Waterloo. The principle — you have recognised it; the cause — you have served it; the defeat — you would revenge it. No, then, there is no discord between you and me. * * *

"Representing a political cause, I cannot accept a political tribunal as the judge of my intentions and of my acts. Nobody will be imposed on by your forms. In the struggle which is taking place, there will be but one conqueror, one vanquished. If you are in the ranks of the conqueror, I cannot expect justice at your hands, and I will not accept your generosity."

In the opening section of this work, special reference has been made to the Prince's allusion to Waterloo, and to the misconception which led to the assumption that his mention of that event indicated a feeling hostile to England. I will not in this place reiterate the proof that the language used by him might have been uttered with a meaning very different from

that which was attributed to it by persons whose interest it was to keep up the delusion that the Empire meant conquest, war, and war against England in particular. It may be worth the reader's while to refer to the chapter in which this point is fully treated; and I do not doubt that the conclusion arrived at by unprejudiced intelligence will be, that thoughts not inimical to our country were revolving in the Prince's mind at the moment when he made use of the words which have been tortured into a hostile meaning.

The defence of the Prince and of General Montholon was conducted by M. Berryer, the celebrated Legitimist lawyer, who, notwithstanding his political opinions, had acted as the advocate of various persons prosecuted by the Government of the Restoration as well as by that of Louis Philippe. On this, as indeed on all other occasions calling for the exercise of forensic talent, M. Berryer acquitted himself with great ability. Addressing the assembled peers — many of whom had been in the service of Napoleon the First, and were indebted to that great man for their present prosperity — M. Berryer made an appeal which must have gone home to the hearts and consciences of some of those who listened to it: —

“ Standing where I do, I do not think that the claims of the name in which this project was attempted can possibly fall humiliated by the disdainful expressions of the Procureur-General. You (turning to that official,) make remarks upon the weakness of the means employed, upon the poverty of the whole enterprise, which made all hopes of success ridiculous. Well, if success be anything, I will say to you who are men — you who are the first men in the State — you who are members of a great political body — there is an inevitable and an eternal Arbitrator between every judge and every

accused who stands before him. And now, before giving your judgment, being in presence of this Arbitrator, and in the face of the country which will hear your decree,—tell me this, without regard to weakness of means, but with the merits of the case, the laws and the institutions before your eyes, and with your hands upon your hearts, as standing before your God, and in presence of us, who know you,—will you say this?—‘If he had succeeded—if his pretended right had triumphed, I would have denied him and it; I would have refused all share in his power,—I would have denied and rejected him!’—For my part, I accept the Supreme Arbitration which I have mentioned;—and whoever there may be amongst you, who, before their God and their country, will say, ‘If he had succeeded, I would have rejected him!’—such a one will I accept for judge in this case.”

After some days’ delay, the Court delivered its judgment and sentence. No doubt there had been differences and disagreements in the deliberations of that high tribunal. No doubt, amongst its component members were men who felt how truthful and magnanimous—how pregnant with the elements of France’s real honour and dignity—were the principles so candidly avowed by the prisoner. No doubt, too, there were amongst them men who felt, in the depths of their consciences, that the test suggested by the eloquent counsel was one which they would not care to encounter. But an influence was at work which neutralised their better emotions, and ensured the requisite majority for the Crown. On the principle of “the greater the truth, the greater the libel,” it would perhaps be libellous—but assuredly it would not be false—to affirm that, long before the trial commenced, the nature of its result was as well known to the Government as forthcoming

verdicts in political trials used to be some fifty years ago, during the days of packed juries and "crammed" witnesses, to the Crown prosecutors in Great Britain and Ireland. The Prince and his companions were, *of course*, convicted, with only three exceptions. The heaviest sentences were those passed on the Prince, on General Montholon, and on Aladenize, the young officer who had endeavoured to excite a movement in favour of the Prince at Boulogne. The sentence on Aladenize was transportation; on M. Montholon, imprisonment for twenty years; and the principal personage in the affair was sentenced to imprisonment for life in a French fortress. The first words of the Prince, on hearing the sentence, are said to have been: "At least, I shall have the happiness of dying in France!"

CHAP. II.

THE IMPRISONMENT. — FAITH, COURAGE, AND ENDURANCE. — THE DYING PARENT. — PATERNAL SOLICITUDE AND FILIAL REVERENCE. — THE GAGE OF HONOUR: ITS REJECTION. — THE TEMPTATION: ITS REPULSE.

THE Prince's prolonged imprisonment in the fortress of Ham brought into conspicuous manifestation his constancy, fortitude, and resolute fidelity to principle. He entered the fortress in the autumn of 1840. For a seclusion which threatened to be a life-long one he prepared himself, if not with content at least with dignified resignation, declaring that the knowledge that, though a prisoner, he was living on the soil of France, would be ample consolation in his solitude. His active and well-disciplined mind soon found occupation in pursuits worthy of one who was the representative of a great cause, and who, even in this extremity, was far from relinquishing the hopes and aspirations of that cause. Here he composed the treatises, *Considérations sur la Question des Sucres*, *L'Extinction de la Paupérisme*, the *Fragments Historiques*, and essays on various subjects of national and general interest. In a letter to a friend* he gives an interesting account of his studies and occupations, amongst which that of gardening is specially mentioned. The spirit of his exclamation on his sentence being communicated to him, — "At least, I shall have the happiness of dying in France!" — upheld him in his monotonous privacy. In his communications with

* Quoted in Section I.

friends outside, he did not fail to make frequent allusions to the cause and the principle which he felt to be in his keeping, and the triumph of which he never omitted from his expressed anticipations of the future.

Certain annoyances and indignities to which he found himself subjected, induced him, in May, 1841, to address a protest to the French Government, from which I propose to make an extract or two. The tone of this protest is eminently characteristic. Requiring, as a matter of right and justice, that the vexations which he complains of should be removed, he does not omit, even when engaged on a subject connected directly only with his personal convenience in prison, to introduce some remarks of another kind—pertinent and emphatic—which could not fail to speak to the feelings of any man retaining sentiments of regard for the honour of France. The great idea was never absent:—

“In the nine months during which I have now been in the hands of the French Government, I have submitted patiently to indignities of every description. I will, however, be no longer silent, nor authorise oppression by my silence.

“My position ought to be considered under two points of view—the one moral and the other legal. Morally speaking, the Government which has recognised the legitimacy of the head of my family is bound to recognise me as a prince, and to treat me as such.

“Policy has rights which I do not dispute. Let Government act towards me as towards its enemy, and deprive me of the means of doing it any harm; so far, it would be justified. But, on the other hand, its conduct will be dastardly if it treat me, who am the son of a king, the nephew of an emperor, and allied to all the sovereigns of Europe, as an ordinary prisoner.

"In referring to foreign alliances, I am not ignorant that they have never been serviceable to the conquered, and that misfortune severs all bonds; but the French Government ought to recognise the principle which has made me what I am—for it is through that principle it exists. The sovereignty of the people made my uncle an emperor, my father a king, and me a French prince by birth. Have I not, then, a right to the respect and regard of all those in whose eyes the voice of a great people, glory and misfortune, are everything?

"If, for the first time in my life, I perchance boast of the accident which has presided over my birth, it is because pride suits my position."

After touching, in a tone of dignified remonstrance, upon some of the annoyances to which he had been exposed, the prisoner continues, never ceasing to call to mind the proper position of his family in relation to the French people, and the veneration of that people for the cause of which his family were the "representatives":—

"The simplest civility of look is regarded as a crime; and all who would wish to soften the rigours of my position without failing in their duty, are threatened with being denounced to the authorities, and with losing their places. In the midst of this France, which the head of my family rendered so great, I am treated like an excommunicated person in the thirteenth century. * * *

"The insulting inquisition which pursues me into my very chamber, which follows my footsteps when I breathe the fresh air in a retired corner of the fort, is not limited to my person alone, but is extended even to my thoughts. My letters to my family, the effusions of my heart, are submitted to the strictest scrutiny;

and if a letter should contain any expressions of too lively a sympathy, the letter is sequestrated, and its writer is denounced to the Government.

"By an infinity of details too long to enumerate, it appears that pains are taken, at every moment of the day, to make me sensible of my captivity, and cry incessantly in my ears, *Vae victis!*"

"It is important to call to mind that none of the measures which I have pointed out were put in force against the ministers of Charles the Tenth, whose dilapidated chambers I now occupy. And yet these ministers were not born on the steps of a throne: and, moreover, they were not condemned to simple imprisonment, but their sentence implied a more severe treatment than has been given to me; and, in fine, *they were not the representatives of a cause* which is an object of veneration in France. The treatment, therefore, which I experience is neither just, legal, nor humane.

"If it be supposed that such measures will subdue me, it is a mistake. It is not outrage, but marks of kindness, which subdue the hearts of those who suffer."

There is reason to believe that this remonstrance was not quite ineffectual. Perhaps it was policy — perhaps it was generosity; but the seclusion of the Imperial captive was rendered less irksome than it had been.

Two years thus passed away. In the year 1843, the continued imprisonment of the Prince became the subject of uncomplimentary remarks by many foreign and by some French journals; and there were public men, not the least influential, who expressed the opinion that in this lengthened incarceration of the nephew of the great Emperor, the Government of King Louis Philippe did not evince much consciousness of strength or security. It is possible that the Prince may have been sounded

on the subject of an amnesty, of liberation "on certain conditions." However this may have been, he wrote a letter, from which I reprint the passages in which he states the conditions on which he would accept an offer of liberation:—

"If to-morrow the doors of my prison were to be opened to me, and I were told, 'You are free; come and seat yourself as a citizen amid the hearths of your native country—France no longer repudiates her children'—ah! then indeed a lively feeling of joy would seize my soul. But if, on the contrary, they were to come to offer me to exchange my present condition for that of an exile, I should refuse such a proposition, because it would be, in my view, an aggravation of punishment. I prefer being a captive on the soil of France to being a free man in a foreign land. * * *

"In a word, I should repeat—supposing that the occasion presented itself to me—that which I declared before the Court of Peers—'I will not accept of generosity, because I know how much it costs.'"

Still true to the France of his love!—to the objects of his mission!

Even in those moments of despondency which will cross the strongest minds, as year after year of prolonged captivity rolls by in dreary monotony, he looks far into the future, and derives hope and consolation from the vision. In 1845, he writes:—

"Ham, 6th Jan., 1845.

"Years roll on with a discouraging uniformity, and it is only in the promptings of my conscience and my heart, that I find strength to stand up against this

laden atmosphere which surrounds and suffocates me. Nevertheless, the hope of a better future never entirely abandons me."

But a time was approaching when the captive's fidelity to the principle on which he had staked fortune, liberty, and life, was to be put to the sternest trial. It has already been remarked that intense filial affection formed a marked feature in his character. His father, who had been long living in retirement, was rapidly declining. In the year 1815 he felt that death was approaching, and caused an appeal to be made to King Louis Philippe not to withhold from him the consolation of seeing his son before he died. The request was not complied with. But from all the circumstances of the negotiations which ensued, it is apparent that the crafty king and his ministers would have been glad to part with one whose residence in France, even as a prisoner, for so long a period, was becoming "a difficulty,"—that they would have been happy to release him, and, by so doing, obtain credit for an act of generosity, if they could at the same time entangle him in such *terms* as would suit their own views, and tie him down, by the bonds of honour, from any future proceedings that could be troublesome to them. Terms of the kind were certainly proposed. It was a powerful temptation,—a temptation which few men in the world, so sensitively alive to the emotions of filial tenderness as the captive, could have resisted. But he *did* resist it. He sunk the individual in the cause. No inducement—not even this, probably the strongest that could have presented itself—could cause him to swerve from the course which he had marked out for himself, or to commit himself to a pledge which might compromise him in the fulfilment of the mission

which he felt to be his own. He would not make a declaration amounting to an acknowledgment of a foregone offence: he would not promise to look on passively at the proceedings of a dynasty which, he believed, was betraying the honour and interests of his country: he would not renounce his high objects and aspirations. But he took just such a step as would have occurred naturally to a man of high, honourable, chivalrous feelings, situated as he was. It is explained in the following letter to the Minister of the Interior:—

“Sir,

“My father, whose age and infirmity require the attention of a son, has requested the Government to allow me to go to him. His application has not been attended with a favourable result.

“The Government, as I am informed, required a formal guarantee from me. Under the circumstances, my resolve cannot be doubted, and I am prepared to do everything compatible with my honour, in order to be allowed to offer to my father those consolations to which he has so many claims.

“I now therefore declare to you, Sir, that if the French Government consent to allow me to go to Florence, to discharge a sacred duty, I will promise, upon my honour, to return and to place myself at the disposal of the Government whenever it shall express a desire that I should do so.

“Accept, Sir, &c. &c.,

“NAPOLEON LOUIS BONAPARTE.”

But neither the monarch nor his ministers were men on whom an appeal of this kind, emanating from the spontaneous impulses of a generous mind, was likely

to produce the desired effect. Napoleon the Third possesses a reputation for the quality of seeing deeply into character, but he had no close acquaintance with Louis Philippe. He did not "know his man." The object of Government was to drive a hard bargain; to make what they, we may presume, would have called a good bargain—to make "a good thing" of the natural emotions of father and son. They had no idea of allowing the old chivalric principle of honour to enter into the transaction. The Prince's proposition was therefore declined by them; and upon this intimation being made to him, the prisoner wrote to the King himself: —

"Sire,

"It is not without deep emotion that I approach your Majesty, and ask, as a favour, permission to quit France, even for a very short time. For five years I have found, in breathing the air of my country, ample compensation for the anguish of captivity; but my father is now aged and infirm, and calls for my attentions and care. He has applied to persons known for their attachment to your Majesty, in order to obtain my liberation; and it is my duty to do everything which depends upon me to meet his desires.

"The Council of Ministers has not felt itself competent to accede to the request which I made, to be allowed to go to Florence, engaging to return, and again to become a prisoner as soon as the Government might desire me to do so. I approach your Majesty with confidence, to make an appeal to your feelings of humanity, and to renew my request by submitting to your high and generous interposition.

"Your Majesty will, I am convinced, appreciate a step which, beforehand, engages my gratitude, and,

affected by the isolated position in a foreign land of a man who upon a throne gained the esteem of Europe, will accede to the wishes of my father and myself.

"I beg your Majesty to receive the expressions of my profound respect.

"NAPOLEON LOUIS BONAPARTE."

Still the same result. The King wanted his terms, and these terms the captive was not prepared to concede.

Many of the most eminent men in France now interested themselves actively to obtain the liberation of the Prince on some conditions which he should consider consistent with his duty. But all was in vain. He must give *quid pro quo*. He must bind himself down in such a manner as to render it impossible for him ever again to do or say anything disagreeable to the House of Orleans. The letter in which the Prince announces his final and entire repudiation of any such conditions, deserves to be reproduced *in extenso*.

"Sir,

"Before replying to the letter which you have been good enough to address to me, allow me to thank you, as well as your political friends, for the interest you have shown, and the spontaneous steps which you have thought it consistent with your duty to take, in order to lighten the weight of my misfortunes. Be assured that my gratitude shall never be wanting to those generous men who, in such painful circumstances, have extended towards me a friendly hand.

I now proceed to state to you, that I do not think it consistent with my duty to attach my name to the

letter of which you have sent me a copy. The brave man who finds himself alone face to face with an adversary, alone in the presence of enemies interested in depreciating his character, ought to avoid every kind of subterfuge, everything equivocal, and take all his measures with the greatest degree of frankness and decision. Like Caesar's wife, he ought not to be suspected. If I signed the letter which you and many other deputies have recommended me to sign, I should, in fact, sue for pardon. Without avowing the fact, I should take shelter behind the request of my father. * * I consider such a course unworthy of me. If I thought it consistent with my position and honour merely and simply to invoke the royal clemency, I would write to the King, 'Sire, I ask pardon.'

"Such, however, is not my intention. For six years I have endured, without complaining, an imprisonment which is one of the natural consequences of my attack upon the Government; and I shall endure it for ten years longer, if necessary, without accusing either my destiny or the men who inflict it. I suffer; but I say to myself every day, 'I am in France.' I have preserved my honour unstained. I live without enjoyments, but also without remorse; and every evening I go to repose in peace. No steps would have been taken by me to disturb the calm of my conscience and the repose of my life, had not my father signified an earnest desire of having me near him again during his declining years. My filial duty roused me from a state of resignation, and I took a step of the gravity of which I was well aware, and to which I imparted all that frankness and honesty which I wish to exhibit in all my actions. I wrote to the head of the State, to him who alone had the legal power to alter my position; I asked to be allowed to go and see my father, and spoke to him of

honour, humanity, generosity, because I have no hesitation in calling things by their proper names.

“The King appeared satisfied, and said to the worthy son of Marshal Ney, who was good enough to place the letter in his hands, that the guarantee which I offered was sufficient; but he has as yet given no intimation of his decision. His Ministers, on the contrary, enclosing their resolution in a copy of my letter to the King, which I sent to them with respectful firmness, taking advantage of my position and their own, caused an answer to be transmitted to me, which was merely an insult to misfortune.

“Under the blow of such a refusal, and still unacquainted with the King’s decision, my duty is to abstain from taking any step, and above all not to subscribe a request for pardon under the disguise of filial duty.

“I still maintain all that I said in my letter to the King, because the sentiments which I expressed were deeply felt, and were such as appeared suitable to my position; but I shall not advance a line farther. The path of honour is narrow and slippery, and there is but a hair’s breadth between the firm ground and the abyss.

“You may, moreover, be well assured, Sir, that, should I sign the letter in question, more exacting demands would be made. On the 25th of December, I wrote a letter to the Minister of the Interior, requesting permission to see my father. On the 14th of January, I determined on a very serious step: I wrote a letter to the King, in which I spared no expression which I thought might conduce to the success of my request. The answer was an impertinent one.

“My position is clear: I am a captive; but it is a consolation to me to breathe the air of my country. A sacred duty summons me to my father’s side. I say to the Government, ‘Circumstances compel me to entreat

from you, as a favour, permission to leave Ham. If you grant my request, you may depend on my gratitude, and it will be of the more value, as your decision will bear the stamp of generosity; for the gratitude of those who would consent to humiliate themselves in order to gain an advantage, would be valueless.'

"Finally, I calmly await the decision of the King, a man who, like me, has lived through thirty years of misfortune.

"I rely on the support and sympathy of generous and independent men like you; I commit myself to destiny, and prepare to resign myself to its decisions.

"Accept, Sir, the assurance of my esteem.

"NAPOLEON LOUIS BONAPARTE."

This letter, having been seen by M. Louis Blanc, the well-known ultra-Democratic partisan, elicited the one below, which expresses admiring approval of the heroic constancy with which the illustrious prisoner rejected every overture tending to compromise his position with respect to France, or to bind him down in any way as to his future proceedings towards the Government of that country. I insert it not so much on account of any intrinsic importance ascribable to the "sympathy" expressed by the writer, and shared by men of all parties save the immediate dependents of the Bourbonite interests, but in order to put in its true light the nature of the correspondence which about this time took place between the Prince and several of the most active of the French politicians. It was not unnatural that many of them should visit in his seclusion a man who (whether wisely or unwisely, the future alone could prove) had rendered himself so remarkable, had made his name a household word in France, and whom, it was quite certain, any disturbance of the existing order of things would bring into an active and prominent

position. Equally natural it was that written communications should occasionally pass on the subjects which mainly engrossed his thoughts. In fact, the maintenance of such correspondence he regarded as at once a duty, a recreation, an agreeable and necessary task. The tone in which he is addressed by the vehement Communist partisan indicates the groundlessness of the accusations which, in accordance with the systematized policy of direct and indirect calumny, have been brought against the Prince, of having coquetted with extreme opinions, — of having yielded so far to temporary expediency as to have given an implied assent to views contrary to those propounded in his written works, insisted on in his public addresses, adhered to by him in all his authenticated conversations with men of whatsoever party, and afterwards carried out to successful completion. We find Louis Blanc signifying his regret that the Prince could not be persuaded to surrender his faith and reliance on the traditions of the Empire; expressing his hope that "those who loved the Prince without embracing his opinions," would one day bring him over to their own. But this hope, it will be perceived, is but a faint and shadowy one — rather a formal than an affirmative expression. Had any ground for entertaining it been afforded by anything that had dropped from the Prince during his intercourse with Louis Blanc, the latter — who if not blessed with much political sagacity or (as was made but too convincingly evident in 1848, if his administrative capacity, even in the execution, with ample means, of his own projects, be of no very high order), is scarcely equalled in acuteness as a controversialist, and not exceeded for the rapidity with which he can perceive an advantage in the conduct of a written or spoken argument — was about the least likely man in France to omit reference thereto, or to neglect the op-

portunity of making the most of it. But no such advantage, no such opportunity, was afforded to him. The tenor of the Prince's words, thoughts, and writings, was too consistent, too straightforward, too superior to subterfuge or equivocation, to leave room for any question as to what he wished, what he meant, and what he would do, whensoever time and events should enable him.

“ Prince,

“ One of our mutual friends, M. Poggioli, has handed me a letter which you were good enough to write to me. It is needless to say how much I am touched with the expressions of sympathy which it contains, and which my feelings so completely reciprocate.

“ M. Poggioli, whom we are both fortunate in being able to call a friend, and whose attachment to your person is not less enlightened than ardent, has furnished me with a copy of your letter to M. Odilon Barrot. Although you are, at this moment, a captive and in misfortune, I should hesitate to express towards you the sentiments of esteem and compassion which the perusal of your letter has awakened in my mind, had I not had previous opportunities of knowing you. You remember, perhaps, Prince, the visit which I had the honour of paying to you at Ham, and with how much frankness I explained to you in what respects my opinions differed from yours. An independent man and a republican, guided wholly by conviction, and without expectations from any quarter, I have little fear that anything which falls from my mouth or flows from my pen, however eulogistic, can be suspected of flattery. I confess, therefore, sincerely, that your answer to M. Odilon Barrot affected me to the bottom

of my heart. The resolution which it contains was the only one worthy of you, and you are the very last person, in my opinion, who ought to have sacrificed what you owe to your character, as the price of opening your prison doors. Be assured that by a course of conduct so noble you have filled all your true friends with joy and your enemies with great vexation.

“If you could decide on devoting to the greatness of your country, to equality, and to the Republic, what you think you owe to the traditions of the Empire and to a sort of family veneration for your name, with what eagerness would my heart fly towards you. Let us hope—all of us, who love your person without embracing your opinions—that in favour of these democratic tendencies a conviction will one day possess your mind, in combination with the disinterested inspiration which it already exhibits. Nothing can more fairly justify us in indulging this hope, than the constancy and dignity with which you bear your misfortunes.

“Receive, &c.

“LOUIS BLANC.”

Further attempts were made to induce the King to relax the crafty and selfish rigour of his conditions; but the result was failure. In communicating this issue of the matter to the captive, M. Odilon Barrot does not conceal the disgust with which the conduct of the ruling powers had inspired him. His letter to the Prince runs as follows:—

“Your Highness, -

“Our renewed negotiations have proved a failure; and if I have delayed to inform you of the fact, it was because, up to yesterday, I still retained some hope. The Government speak of present difficulties

—the state of Italy, of Switzerland. Those circumstances would nevertheless have been overlooked, had a more comprehensive guarantee been given in your letter, because then they could have dispensed with the Council of Ministers; but politics not having been put out of the question, it was found necessary to yield to the considerations relating to public order which prevailed in the Council; and for the present, considering the circumstances, no liberation is to be looked for.

"It is with great pain that I inform you of this result. I had begged Vahny to say to the King, that, if we had completely differed, since 1830, in political opinions, I hoped that at least we agreed in sentiments of humanity and generosity. I now see that this is another of my Utopian ideas, which I shall be compelled to renounce.

"Accept, &c.

"ODILON BARROT."

Even the proverbially cautious Monsieur Thiers—always nervously bent on the policy of "not committing himself"—ventures the opinion that the request ought, under all the circumstances, to be conceded on the honest, manful condition set forth by the Prince. He writes:—

"Prince,

"I have received the letter which you have done me the honour to address to me, in order to make me acquainted with the refusal which has been given to your request. It seems to me that the desire of seeing a dying father, accompanied by the promise of returning to prison on the first requisition of the Minister of the Interior, ought to have been regarded as sufficient. In my opinion, such a measure might have been adopted without inconvenience, upon the responsibility of the

minister who had sanctioned it. I am sorry, Prince, not to have it in my power to serve you in these circumstances. I have no influence with the Government, and publicity would serve you little. On every occasion on which I can possibly contribute to solace your misfortune without contravening my duty, I shall be happy to have it in my power to give fresh proofs of my sympathy with the glorious name you bear.

“A. TULERS.”

The whole course of these correspondences and negotiations, coupled with the dignified reserve with which the Prince had previously abstained from the faintest whisper of any complaint that could have been construed into an appeal for release, exhibits at once the strength of the ties which bound him in love and reverence to his dying father, and the force of that engagement into which he had entered with himself never to swerve from the high purpose of redeeming, regenerating his country, and replacing her in that position of influence and regard amongst the nations, which had been so deplorably compromised as to appear in danger of being irretrievably forfeited. When the first request was made by the aged Count St. Leu, through individuals who held friendly and confidential relations with the court of Louis Philippe, an excellent opportunity—an opportunity not to be allowed to pass without being made full use of — an opportunity to obtain certain ends by working upon filial tenderness, and “turning the screw” tightly upon honourable misfortune — seemed to present itself. And no means were left untried to turn that opportunity to advantage. But the guileful craftiness of plot, design, and execution were signally disappointed by the firmness and sagacity of him

upon whom those "ingenious devices" were played off. King Louis Philippe would have profited more, if he could have persuaded himself, for once, to be generous. We shall presently see that, instead of the temporary release which was refused to honour and generosity, the captive obtained a permanent release by means which exempted him from any obligation to the King, though that release was, by a proceeding as mean as it was foolish and unnecessary, rendered ineffectual for the pious purpose which had chiefly dictated the bold proceeding that procured it.

CHAP. III.

THE ESCAPE. — THE INTERDICT. — DIPLOMACY WARRING WITH NATURE. — DEATH OF THE EX-KING OF HOLLAND.

THE tone of Louis Philippe's Ministers had rendered it evident to the Prince, that no concession reconcilable with honour—with the high duties which he had undertaken as the object and business of his life—could obtain for him, in that quarter, permission to attend his dying parent. There was, then, no alternative but to endeavour, by some means irrespective of the grace or power of the Government, to effect compliance with the reiterated and earnestly expressed desire of the Count St. Len. It was May, 1846, after an imprisonment of six years, that the Prince's escape took place — alike to the disgrace and mortification of those who, if they had been only less meanly jealous, might have granted temporary instead of permanent liberation, and in a manner honourable to themselves.

The Prince's escape was graphically described by himself in a published letter: —

"My desire to see my father once more in this world made me attempt the boldest enterprise I ever engaged in. It required more resolution and courage on my part than at Strashurg and Boulogne; for I was determined not to submit to the ridicule which attaches to those who are arrested escaping under a disguise, and a failure I could not have endured. The following are the particulars of my escape: —

"You know that the fort was guarded by four hundred men, of whom sixty soldiers acted daily as sentries outside the walls. Moreover, the principal gate of the prison was guarded by three gaolers, two of whom were constantly on duty. It was necessary that I should first elude their vigilance; afterwards traverse the inside court, before the windows of the commandant's residence; and, on arriving there, I should still have to pass by a gate which was guarded by soldiers.

"Not wishing to communicate my design to any one, it was necessary to disguise myself. As several rooms in the part of the building which I occupied were undergoing repair, it was not difficult to assume the dress of a workman. My good and faithful valet, Charles Th  lier, procured a smock-frock and a pair of sabots, and, after shaving off my moustaches, I took a plank on my shoulders.

"On Sunday morning I saw the workmen enter at half-past eight o'clock. Charles took them some drink, in order that I should not meet any of them on my way. He was also to call one of the turnkeys, whilst Dr. Conneau conversed with the others. Nevertheless, I had scarcely got out of my room before I was accosted by a workman, who took me for one of his comrades; and at the bottom of the stairs I found myself in front of the keeper. Fortunately, I placed before my face the plank which I was carrying, and succeeded in reaching the yard. Whenever I passed a sentinel or any other person, I always kept the plank before my face.

"Passing before the first sentin  l, I let my pipe fall, and stopped to pick up the bits. There I met the officer on duty; but as he was reading a letter he paid no attention to me. The soldiers at the guardhouse appeared surprised at my dress, and a chasseur turned round several times to look at me. I next met some

workmen, who looked very attentively at me. I placed the plank before my face; but they appeared to be so curious, that I thought I should never escape, until I heard them say, 'Oh! it is Bertrand!'

"Once outside, I walked quickly towards the road to St. Quentin. Charles, who had the day before engaged a carriage, shortly overtook me, and we arrived at St. Quentin. I passed through the town on foot, after having thrown off my smock-frock. Charles procured a post-chaise, under pretext of going to Cambrai. We arrived, without meeting with any obstacles, at Valenciennes, where I took the railway. I had procured a Belgian passport, but I was nowhere asked to show it.

"During my escape, Dr. Conneau, always so devoted to me, remained in prison, and caused them to believe that I was unwell, in order to give me time to reach the frontier. Before I could be persuaded to quit France, it was necessary that I should be convinced that the Government would never set me at liberty, if I would not consent to dishonour myself. It was also a matter of duty that I should exert all my efforts, in order to be enabled to solace my father in his old age."

The affectionate and generous devotion of Dr. Conneau, who, by remaining in the prison after his sentence for implication in the Strasburg affair had expired, was enabled to become a principal instrument in effecting the Prince's liberation, cannot be too much admired. It has been truly described as an instance of "noble disinterestedness" rarely paralleled—the more complete and exalted, too, because, after the Prince's departure, Dr. Conneau might, without any question, have himself left the fortress; but, on the contrary, he chose, in the words of a contemporary

writer, to remain, "in order, by every manœuvre that ingenuity could suggest, to conceal, until the latest possible moment, the fact of the Prince's escape." By this conduct the Doctor put himself once more in the power of the authorities; but it is pleasant to state that his sentence (with what honest pride and self-respect — with what perfect assurance of the esteem of all true hearts — he must have heard it!) was not more severe than three months' imprisonment. On the faithful valet, Thélér, who, it has been seen, accompanied his master, and of course did not make his appearance, the form of a sentence *en contumace*, of six months' imprisonment, was passed.

Dr. Conneau's terse, straightforward, and gallantly self-approving account of the affair, on his examination before the local tribunal, when interrogated, as is customary in the French law courts, is interesting. Zeal and affection furnished ingenuity with pretexts and devices which otherwise might not have occurred to it:—

"I tried," replied Dr. Conneau, in answer to the questions put to him, "to conceal the departure of the Prince, in order to give him time to escape. I was anxious to gain, in this way, at least twenty-four hours, if possible. First of all, I closed the door leading from the prisoner's chamber into the saloon. I kindled a strong fire, although the weather was really very hot, to support the supposition that he was indisposed. About eight o'clock a packet of violet-plants arrived by the diligence. I told the keeper to fill some pots with earth, and prevented him from entering the Prince's saloon. About half-past eight o'clock the man-of-all-work came and asked me where we would breakfast. 'In my room,' I replied. 'I shall fetch the large table,' said

he. 'It is unnecessary,' I answered; 'the General is unwell, and will not breakfast with us.'

"My intention was, in this manner, to push off further knowledge till the next day. I said the Prince had taken medicine. It was absolutely necessary that it should be taken, accordingly I took it myself. I then took some coffee, and threw it into a pot of water, with some crumbs of bread, and added nitric acid, which produced a very disagreeable smell; so that the man-of-all-work might be persuaded that the Prince was really ill.

"About half-past twelve I saw the commandant for the second time, and informed him that the Prince was somewhat easier. * * * Every time that I came out of the small saloon, in which the Prince was supposed to be lying on a sofa, I pretended to be speaking to him. The man-of-all-work did not hear me. If his ears had been at all delicate, he would have been quite able to hear me speaking.

"The day passed on very well till a quarter past seven o'clock. At this moment the commandant entered, with an air somewhat stern. 'The Prince,' said I, 'is a little better, Commandant.' 'If,' replied he, 'the Prince is still ill, I must speak to him—I must speak to the Prince.'

"I had prepared a large stuffed figure, and laid it in the Prince's bed, with the head resting upon the pillow. I called the Prince, who, *naturally enough*, made no reply. I retired towards the commandant, and indicated to him, by a sign, that the Prince was asleep. This did not satisfy him. He sat down in the saloon, saying, 'The Prince will not sleep for ever—I will wait.'

"He now remarked to me, that the time for the arrival of the diligence was passed, and expressed his wonder that Thélér was not returned. I stated to

him that he had taken a cabriolet. The drum beat, and the commandant rose, and said, 'The Prince has moved in the bed—he is waking up.'

"The commandant stretched his ears, but did not hear him (the supposed Prince) breathe. I did the same, and said, 'Let him sleep on.' He drew near the bed, and found a stuffed figure. He immediately turned towards me, and said 'The Prince is gone! At what time did he go?'—'At seven in the morning.' 'Who were the persons on guard?'—'I know nothing!'—These were the only words which were interchanged between us. The commandant left the room."

The preparations for the escape of the Prince were conducted with such secrecy, that even the brave and devoted De Montholon had not been apprised of what was about to take place. It was prudent and necessary that no one should know anything respecting the business in hand, save those who were to take part in it. Monsieur de la Guéronnière, in his essay upon Napoleon the Third, has the following paragraph:—

"No one except Dr. Conneau and the Prince's valet-de-chambre was cognizant of the Prince's intention to escape. The evening before the Prince had visited De Montholon in his room. * * The Prince had affectionately embraced both him and the Countess de Montholon, a noble and generous woman, who reminded one of another heroine, a former prisoner, the Princess de Polignac. Such external marks of affection were not habitual to Louis Napoleon. General de Montholon and his wife observed it—they conceived a vague suspicion. The next day they learned that the prisoner of Ham had escaped, passed the French frontier, and embarked for England, *viâ* Belgium."

The character of Dr. Conneau is thus outlined with vigour and truth :—

“The prisoner had accepted his position with dignity. Not a complaint escaped him. He seemed to follow his destiny wherever it led him. The dungeon of Ham, far from appalling or saddening him, appeared to him as a destiny in his life, and perhaps as a halting-place in the march of his fortunes. * * * Ham was to him a resting-place on the road to the Elysée. The interior of the prison, like its exterior, was gloomy and silent. Prince Louis Napoleon resided within the fortress with a faithful friend, devoted to his country, who is, at the present hour, the sincere and disinterested friend of his prosperity. Dr. Conneau is gifted with one of those lofty and refined natures which science quickens and enlarges instead of drying up. He had attached himself to this cause without selfish views, without arrogant claims. * * * He watched night and day over the son of Queen Hortense, with all that solicitude so assiduously tender, which the heart alone can inspire, and which is rather a feeling than a duty. He was more than a companion in adversity — more than a medical attendant — he was a friend. He it was who subsequently prepared, and assisted to execute, the plan of escape which was crowned with such signal success. Summoned to trial for this noble fault, he was acquitted [?] because he was absolved by the conscience and the hearts of his judges the moment he appeared in Court.”

This complimentary tribute is eminently deserved by its object. The fortitude and devotion of Dr. Conneau win our warm admiration — are more emphatically entitled to it than was the heroism of Madame de Lavalette, who, it will be borne in mind, incurred no personal danger at all approaching that which devolved

on Dr. Conneau. Madame de Lavalette was a woman and a wife, — she had not been previously compromised with Government. Dr. Conneau, on the contrary, was already a “marked man.” The responsibility, the amount of punishment, which he confronted by his part in the Prince’s escape, could not be calculated on. The most extreme measures might have been brought into force against him.*

If the circumstances just related have been perused with interest and pleasure, the next fact to be recorded will be read with pain. It will hardly be believed that the French Government of the day could have had the meanness to use its influence with foreign courts for the purpose of preventing the Prince from carrying into effect the prime object which had impelled him to escape. Too true, however, it is. It was certainly in great measure through the representations of the French Government, that Count Dietrichstein, Austrian ambassador at the Court of London, and who likewise represented Tuscany in a diplomatic capacity, refused to sign the passport necessary to enable the Prince to visit his dying father. The Austrian embassy would not have perpetrated

* It is obvious that no disrespect to the Count de Montholon was involved in the fact of his not having been admitted to a knowledge of the Prince’s intention to escape. The essence of the plan was, that it should be known only to those who had conceived, arranged, and were to take part in it. General de Montholon would, without doubt, have cordially co-operated had it been necessary, and would never have paused to calculate the danger in which such co-operation might have involved himself. But it was not necessary to ask him. If the object could not be accomplished by the aid of Dr. Conneau and Charles Thellier, it could not be facilitated by the introduction of a larger number of co-operators; and this being the case, it would have been exceedingly wrong—opposed to all the fundamental rules of good policy—to have enlarged the circle of confidants.

so obvious a piece of oppression were it not for representations coming from Paris. The venerable parent of the future Emperor was, through this intrigue, deprived of the consolation of seeing his son before he died, and the immediate object of the Prince's escape from Ham was thus frustrated. This proceeding on the part of the authorities was the more wanton and oppressive, inasmuch as, almost immediately on his arrival in London, the Prince had forwarded to the Count de St. Aulaire, at that time diplomatic representative of Louis Philippe at our Court, the following letter, the promise contained in which he scrupulously kept, notwithstanding the insolent and continued provocations which he received — the incessant fire of ribaldrous calumny of which he was made the subject by persons systematically employed and paid to do so, and acting in the interests of his enemies: —

“ M. le Comte,

“ I hasten to declare frankly to one who was the friend of my mother, that in quitting my prison I have not been actuated by any design to renew against the French Government a war which has been disastrous to me, but that my sole object was to be free to attend on my aged father.

“ Before taking the step in question, I had used every effort to obtain from the Government permission to go to Florence, and I offered every guarantee consistent with my honour; but at length finding that my applications were fruitless, I resolved to have recourse to the last measures, such as those which, in the reign of Henry IV., had, in similar circumstances, been adopted by the Duc de Nemours, and the Duc de Guise.

"I beg you, M. le Comte, to inform the French Government of my pacific intentions; and I trust that this spontaneous assurance from me may shorten the captivity of the friends whom I have left in prison."

A moment's reference to what subsequently occurred, will remind the reader how faithfully and substantially—like all pledges entered into by the Prince—this promise was kept by him, even when he had reason to believe—indeed, when he well knew—that the agents of the existing dynasty, then so near that fall which he had foreseen and confidently predicted, were putting into exercise every device of perverted ingenuity to injure his reputation, to depreciate him in the eyes of the world, to distort and misrepresent his every act and word.

Contemplating the respective positions of Louis Napoleon in May, 1846, and in February, 1848, a French writer, remarkable for the vivacity of his style, draws the following duplicate picture. It cannot fail to remind us of the hard measure dealt out by Louis Philippe, when at the apex of his fortunes, to the man who was within a few years to occupy the palace furtively quitted by the disgraced King:—

"On the 26th of May, 1846, a man of marked features, with a clouded and melancholy brow, with a deep and thoughtful look, with a stiff gait, and attired like a labourer, descended the staircase of the fortress, crossed the prison yard with a steady step, passed through the ranks of soldiery, went by the sentinels, and in an instant reached the country adjacent to Saint Quentin. This man was Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of the Emperor, the future President [and future Emperor].

"On the 24th of February, 1848, another personage

escaped clandestinely, not from a prison but from a palace, and entered a hackney-coach on the Place de la Révolution, the spot where Louis XVI. had perished on the scaffold. He hastened away, a fugitive wanderer, in a disguise not much unlike that put on by the prisoner of Ham, to find a small vessel to convey him to England. This man was Louis Philippe d'Orleans, King of the French.

"What a mockery of fortune! What a caprice of destiny! or, speaking more correctly, what a lesson from above! Let us bow down our heads, and humble ourselves in the dust. Let us acknowledge that the acts of Providence are something more than mere chance! Can we avoid acknowledging that mysterious and providential conjunction of causes and effects which proves the eternal reign of right and justice, even in the most unexpected accidents, and in revolutions the least foreseen?"

The Prince, prevented from visiting his dying parent, continued to reside in England. "In that country," observes one of his friends, "whose customs and manners he admired, he awaited with quiet patience and confident anticipation the advent of his destinies. Captivity had neither changed himself, nor vitiated the goodness of his heart or the power of his mind. He came from his painful trial such as he had been, without personal enmity, without rancour; neither accusing man, nor distrusting Providence. This attitude was neither affected nor strange. In showing himself thus, he showed himself naturally. Such as he was in England he had been in the solitudes of Arenenberg, in the perils of Strasburg, in America, at Boulogne, upon his trial in the Chamber of Peers, and in the prison of Ham. His firm trust in his destiny had never deserted him."

The characteristic here alluded to was exemplified on

several occasions. Illustrative of it, a curious anecdote is related : —

“A few days after his arrival in England he went to see his cousin, Lady Douglas * (a princess of Baden). ‘Well,’ said the young princess to him, ‘at last you are free. Will you now be quiet? Will you lay aside those fallacies which have cost you so dear, and the cruel delusions of those dreams which have brought such misery on those who love you.’ ‘My dear cousin,’ replied the late prisoner of Ham, ‘I do not belong to myself—I belong to my name and to my country. It is because my fortune has twice betrayed me that my destiny is nearer its accomplishment. I bide my time.’

“This,” continued the relator of the anecdote, “at the time appeared ludicrous enough. The star of Louis Napoleon was veiled from all eyes, even from those of his relations who best loved him. He, alone, saw and followed it.” †

The Count St. Leu, deprived of the consolation of embracing his son, did not survive long. In his will, he expressed an earnest desire that his remains, as well as those of his son Charles, who had died in Italy, should be conveyed for interment to the village of St.

* This lady is now Duchess of Hamilton.

† From the same quarter I borrow another illustration of the unswerving constancy of hope and confidence which never forsook him. The period referred to is that of the first days of the Revolution of 1848:—“The name of Bonaparte was never mentioned in that Revolution, save with taunts, obloquy, and demonstrations of dislike. ‘Down with Bonapartism!’ cried the Provisional Government, in one of its proclamations from the Hôtel de Ville. Louis Napoleon perceived at once the tendency and results of this great agitation. On learning the dethronement of Louis Philippe, he said to his cousin, Lady Douglas, ‘Before the year is out, I shall direct the government of France.’ On the 10th of December this prediction was fulfilled.”

Leu, situated near Paris, and the spot from which he had adopted the title borne by him after abdicating the throne of Holland. "I have," said he, "borne the name of that village for forty years, and I liked the place better than any other in the world." The French Government could scarcely refuse compliance with this modest and affecting request; it was accordingly granted, and the concession was trumpeted by the Orleanist party as a great act of grace. A guard of honour, consisting of veteran soldiers of the army of the Empire, attended the funeral. A large concourse of the public, and of soldiers old and young, was likewise present, and testified, by their demeanour, their profound respect for the memory of a man whose amiable private qualities, not less than the great associations connected with his name and antecedents, had rendered him an object at once of affection and esteem. In the following letter to Captain Le Comte, the officer who acted in command of the guard of honour at the funeral, the Prince thus expressed his feelings of thankfulness, of regret, and filial duty:—

"Sir,

"The testimonies of respect offered to the memory of my father on the 29th of September* have deeply affected me; and I was, above all, touched on learning that a great number of the ancient warriors of the Empire had assisted at this pious ceremony.

"Through the medium of their worthy leader, I thank those glorious veterans of our army, for the tribute of respect which they have bestowed upon an old companion in arms.

"It is not the man whom chance and the fortune of war made king for a brief period, that you have

* The day of the funeral.

honoured with your regrets, but the old soldier of the Republican armies of Italy and Egypt,—a man who remained but a short time upon the throne, and who paid for a few years of glory by forty years of exile, and died in a foreign land. The sympathy which has attended his obsequies is something more than an act of homage—it is a reparation for the past.

“Permit me, therefore, to thank you for attending; for you have expressed my own sentiments of gratitude towards the deceased; have mitigated the bitter grief which I experienced at not having had an opportunity of kneeling before the tomb of my family; have made me forget, for a moment, that I am condemned, in appearance, to remain for ever separated from the men whom I love best, and from the objects which are most dear to me.

“Receive, &c.,

“LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.”

CHAP. IV.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848.—THE ATTEMPTED BAN.—THE NATION'S
REPLY.—LOUIS NAPOLEON IN THE ASSEMBLY.—THE DIN OF FAC-
TIONS.—THE INSURRECTION OF JUNE.—A SPECIMEN OF POLITICAL
FORESIGHT.—ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

IN February, 1848, the government of Louis Philippe was overthrown by the indignation of the people whom it had deceived. Prince Louis Napoleon was in London. It will be believed that he was not the man whose pulses beat least quickly at an explosion which he had long foreseen. He lost no time in adopting the conduct of a good Frenchman. The 24th of February was the great day of the Revolution,—the Prince was in Paris on the 28th. The sentence of banishment against the Emperor's family had not been removed,—there was, in fact, no regular authority in existence,—but it had become suspended and placed in abeyance by the astounding events of the week. The Prince proceeded to pay his respects to the Provisional Government, such as it was. But the Provisional Government, for reasons best known to two or three of its members who are yet living, caused it to be intimated to him that they feared his presence might possibly lead to tumults. Always a friend and supporter of order, he at once withdrew, and returned to London, where, in the month of April, he gave a new pledge of the opposition of his views to those of the friends of anarchy, by enrolling himself as a special constable on an occasion when it was apprehended that the public

peace would be disturbed by organised bands of incendiaries.

Meanwhile, however, the secret friends or employés of the Bourbon dynasties, with the "Red" or Socialist factionists—all whose wishes were centred, not in the establishment and maintenance of good government, but in the attainment of their respective partisan views,—all these, however discordant on every other point, were united on this,—that Prince Louis Napoleon, the living embodiment of a national and therefore powerful government—of a government which, founded firmly on the people, could not be upset by an intrigue or a mere partisan combination—that this man, the man of the French nation, was dangerous to the success of all their plots, cabals, and counter-plots; that, however they might tear each other to pieces, they must make common cause against him. A proposal was made in the National Assembly, that the law of banishment against the Imperial family should be retained against him alone.

This proposal elicited from the Prince the following communication to the National Assembly:—

"Citizen Representatives,

"I learn by the newspapers of the 22nd inst., that it has been proposed in the *bureaux* of the Assembly to retain against me alone the law of exile which has been in force against my family since the year 1816. I now apply to the representatives of the people, to know how I have merited this penalty?

"Can it be for having always publicly declared that, in my opinion, France was not the property either of an individual, or of a family, or of a party?

"Can it be because, desiring to accomplish the triumph, without anarchy or license, of the principles of

national sovereignty, which alone can put an end to our dissensions, I have been twice the victim of my hostility to a government which you have overthrown?

"Can it be for having consented, out of deference to the wish of the Provisional Government, to return to a foreign country, after having hastened to Paris upon the first news of the revolution?

"Can it be because I disinterestedly refused seats in the Assembly which were proffered to me, resolved not to return to France until the new constitution should be agreed upon, and the Republic firmly established?

"The same reasons which have made me take up arms against the Government of Louis Philippe would lead me, if my services were required, to devote myself to the defence of the Assembly, the result of universal suffrage.

"In the presence of a king elected by two hundred deputies, I might have recollected that I was heir to an empire founded by the consent of four millions of Frenchmen. In the presence of the national sovereignty, I cannot and will not claim more than my rights as a French citizen; but these I will demand with that energy which an honest heart desires, from the knowledge of never having done anything to render it unworthy of its country."

Some of the phrases in this letter require a brief remark, because, like other expressions which from time to time have fallen from Napoleon the Third, they have been the subjects of much misrepresentation. The Prince's conviction that the system of the Empire, in all its integrity, was that most accordant with the interests of France, he never denied; but he was now, as he had always been, ready to accept and support any government really founded on the national will, for

which he claimed the right of pronounciation and decision. The excessive, rancorous, unappeasable malignity of factions, making any efficient government absolutely impossible so long as they remained unrepressed, was as yet unproved; the raging passions, the mutual hatreds, the greed, and recklessness, and disregard of the proper objects of legislation—these evil characteristics of the leaders of parties, rendering the Assembly a nullity for good—the impracticability of an orderly republic, with such passions and such factions let loose, had not received the damning proofs which subsequent events brought with them. Nor did they ever reach the height in the National Assembly which they obtained in its successor, the “Constituent Assembly.” Any government really French, really national, proceeding from an explicit declaration of the will of the whole people, and acting accordantly therewith, the Prince was ready to adopt and support. But of what elements the Assembly called “National” was at that time composed—how far it was disposed to act equitably and fairly—may be partly judged from the fact, that its members actually refused to permit the above letter to be read, though, at the very same sitting, they had listened, some of them with laudatory demonstrations, to various epistles and protests from the princes of Louis Philippe’s family.

In fact, the work of intriguing for rival dynasties and factions had already set in, and he whose position and principles were antagonistic to such manœuvres was of course the common object of hatred from the intriguers.

The discord which prevailed in the Assembly itself rendered it meanwhile the object at once of contempt and dislike. Scarcely a day passed without some

"scene" between the representatives, not of the people, but of factions.

The Prince had now been elected by several constituencies as their representative; it was towards the middle of June, just previous to the dreadful "Red" Revolution, when the Executive Committee gave a curious illustration of its capacity for discerning where lay the real source of danger to public order, by bringing forward an edict which declared that, although three members of the Imperial family had been allowed to take their seats as representatives, the law of exile should still be maintained against Prince Louis Napoleon.

In order to form a correct judgment of the quality of the political wisdom by which this edict was inspired, dates here become important. It was between the 10th and 13th of June that the exceptional decree of banishment against the Prince was propounded, and on the 22nd of June took place the sanguinary revolt which the Prince, had he been in France, would have been amongst the first to denounce. The Government directed all its energies towards repressing an imaginary danger from "Napoleonism,"—it could not see the real, immediate danger—the danger actually pressing and present from the Socialist, Communitistic, "anti-property" factionists—from the factions whose maxim was that the very word "property" meant robbery.

The Prince, who had already set out for Paris, again returned to London when this manifesto was made known to him. He did so in order to preclude any possibility of being the cause of disorder. But he took care to address to the President of the Assembly, as well as to the Departments which had elected him, a forcible expression of his sentiments on the occasion.

His letter to the President of the Assembly contained the following passage:—

“If the people were to impose duties upon me, I should know how to fulfil them. But I disown all those who attribute to me intentions which I do not hold. My name is a symbol of order, of nationality, of glory; and it would be with the liveliest grief that I should see it made use of to augment the troubles and dissensions of my country. In order to avoid such a misfortune, I shall prefer remaining in exile. I am ready to make any sacrifice for the happiness of France.”

It is possible—it is probable—that, had the anarchic leaders witnessed the presence in Paris of the man who was really the representative of the cause which the people had at heart—that, had they witnessed the cause of order supported, as it would have been, heart and soul, by the Prince, they would not have ventured, reckless though they were, on the attempt which led to such dire bloodshed. The Executive Committee sought to prevent disorder, and it set about doing so by excluding the very man, above all others, whose name and presence, identified as he was with the whole nation, would have most effectually discouraged the machinations of the disorderly.

I will here insert, from a contemporary work, the author of which is anything but friendly to Napoleon the Third, a short narrative of the Red and Socialist insurrection of June. It will illustrate the manner in which the Republican Government of that day “averted” disorder. Twelve days previously an edict had passed, exiling a particular individual, lest his pre-

sence should endanger order. And now came the movements of the factions in which M. de Lamartine could see no danger, — was it because, above all others, they were hostile to the principles of Louis Napoleon? —

“ The battle was begun by the National Guards at the Portes St. Denis and St. Martin, from which the barricaders were repulsed after considerable loss on both sides. The fighting continued all day on both sides of the river, with great slaughter, but little practical result, the insurgents being only driven from their more advanced positions to rally again in other places. About five o'clock, Cavaignac, accompanied by Lamartine, Pierre Bonaparte, and other representatives, led an attack in person against the Faubourg du Temple. For three hours the barricades withstood the fire of four pieces of cannon; and two generals and 400 soldiers were killed or wounded in the conflict. The troops behaved with admirable steadiness throughout the day, and the young soldiers of the Garde Mobile especially distinguished themselves. At four o'clock on Saturday morning the battle began again, and raged with intense violence on both sides of the river. Both parties had been reinforced during the night. Barricades ten or twelve feet high, and of great strength, crossed the streets at every dozen paces. The houses, too, were for the most part in the hands of the insurgents, and covered with mattresses, bags of sand, and other protections against musketry, from behind which showers of missiles were poured down on the assailants. At eleven o'clock, the National Assembly passed a resolution declaring Paris in a state of siege, and appointed General Cavaignac dictator, with unlimited power, civil and military. The Executive Committee

instantly resigned. Orders were then issued that the National Guard should occupy the streets, prevent the assembling of crowds, and watch over the safety of private property. The rest of the inhabitants were to remain at home, and keep their windows closed, as a security to the soldiers in the streets that they should not be fired on from the houses. Every person out of uniform, who was found abroad without a written pass, was searched, and either taken prisoner or led by a National Guard to his own door. In pursuance of this plan, many persons were arrested conveying ammunition and other aid to the insurgents. At noon Cavaignac sent a flag of truce to the insurgents, offering a general amnesty if they would yield before two o'clock. The offer was rejected without hesitation, or a moment's interruption of the firing. During the earlier part of the day, the fight raged chiefly in the city and on the southern bank of the river. To obtain possession of the Hôtel de Ville and the Préfecture of Police was a cardinal point with the insurgents. In Parisian warfare, the loss of the Hôtel de Ville is what the loss of its colours is to a regiment in the field; it was therefore a matter of primary importance to the Government to pierce the enemy's lines at that central point, towards which all his efforts converged. The church of St. Gervais was carried after a heavy cannonade; next the bridges were carried with great slaughter, and thus the means of communication between the insurgents on the two banks were completely cut off. Pursuing their success, the troops possessed themselves of the church of St. Séverin, the head-quarters of the insurgents on that side. Their stronghold, the Pantheon, was carried at one o'clock at the point of the bayonet, after the great iron doors and railings had been broken by cannon. By four o'clock the Government was master of the

whole left bank of the river. For four days, altogether, the fight continued to rage with furious bravery. The number of killed and wounded on both sides, as ascertained by actual reckoning, exceeded 8000; but, besides these, many perished of whom no accurate account could be taken. Multitudes of dead bodies were cast into the Seine before they were yet cold. The remains of others were found by the reapers in the fields around Paris. Nearly 14,000 prisoners were made by the Government, and of these more than a thousand died of jail fever. Of eleven generals who commanded, two—viz., Generals Negrier and Bréa—were killed, and six were wounded, five of them mortally; whilst the Archbishop of Paris was also amongst the victims of the barricades. At the end of four days Cavaignac had triumphed, and was absolute ruler of the destinies of Paris and of France."

The last few words contain an exaggerated figure of speech; but they do really represent, in substance, the prostrate condition of the country at the time.

It would be a painful and somewhat repulsive task to portray the anarchy of which the Assembly was the scene, from the period when the insurrection was thus suppressed until it was decided that new elections should take place, and another Assembly be convened. Fortunately, the subject does not immediately concern that of this volume, and I am, therefore, spared the necessity of dwelling on it.

The day appointed for the elections was the 17th of September. In reply to a communication from General Piat, the Prince, who was still in London, wrote the following letter:—

"London, August 28, 1848.

"General,

"You ask me if I would accept the post of representative of the people, if I were to be re-elected. I unhesitatingly reply, 'Yes.'

"Now that it has been demonstrated beyond contradiction, that my election by five Departments simultaneously was not the result of intrigue, and that I have kept myself apart from all demonstrations and political intrigues, I should consider myself wanting in my duty, were I not to respond to the call of my fellow-citizens.

"My name can now no longer be made a pretext for political commotions. I am anxious, therefore, to re-enter France, and to take my seat amongst the representatives of the people, who desire to organise the Republic upon a broad and solid basis. In order to render impossible the return of the governments which have passed away, only one thing has to be done—and that is, to do better than they;—for you are aware, General, that we have not really abolished the past until we have replaced it by something else.

"Accept, &c.,

"LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE."

That the Prince's confidence in the people's attachment to the cause which he represented had been well founded, was strikingly manifested by the result of the elections. Five different Departments returned him, in each case by large majorities over the other candidates proposed to them. On the 26th of September he appeared in the Assembly, and delivered a short address in conformity with the views which he had previously indicated in his letters. Very soon, however, the new Assembly became, like the old one, a scene of

violent commotions, in which dignity and order were utterly lost amid the accusations and recriminations of violent partisans. The future Emperor discerned the true character of the motley assembly. He saw that it was wanting in all the more important elements of that representative character which it affected;—he saw it, in fact, converted into an arena for the conflict of factions. His own name, being that which alone presented the possibility of annihilating discord, by reconciling parties and interests, was the frequent object of impertinent allusion. His “pretensions,” as they were called, were frequently dwelt on,—indeed, so loudly and persistently, that if the memory of the Empire, and the presence of the Imperial heir, had not been already firmly fixed in the mind of the nation, these reclamations would have been enough to recall them. Only once he condescended to allude to these outbursts of ribaldry,—it was on the 12th of October, a day following an explosion of unusual violence. This, with the exception of his short opening address, was, I believe, the only occasion on which he addressed the Assembly; and it has been observed, that his silence was more eloquent than any language could have been. A passage or two from this address will be read with interest. It should be remarked that such was the chaotic disorder of the state of things caused by the June insurrection, and the unnatural governmental machinery existing, that it had been determined to elect a President of the Republic; Cavaignac, who had laid down his dictatorship, having in the interim acted under the title of President of the Council, with power to choose his own ministers. The 12th of October was the day fixed for the election of a President

of the Republic. The name of Louis Napoleon was that which at once occurred to the majority of the nation as that of the man most fitted for the highest office in the State; he had, naturally enough, been proposed as one of the candidates, and M. Clement Thomas had risen in the Assembly, and delivered a violent invective against the Imperial family in general, but against Prince Louis Napoleon in particular, inquiring why he assumed to present himself as a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic,—as if the Prince, who had *not* presented himself, but been nominated by others to the candidature, were not as free in the matter as any other man in the country!

Amongst the observations made by the Prince, in reference to these indecent scenes, occur the following:—

“I deplore being obliged to speak again of myself, because it is painful to me to see the Assembly constantly engaged with questions of a personal nature, when we have not a moment to lose for the discussion of the great interests of the country.

“I will not speak of my sentiments, or of my opinions: I have already manifested them to you; and nobody has ever yet doubted my word.

“As to my parliamentary conduct, in the same way that I would never pretend to call to account any of my colleagues for what they may have thought proper to do, so I will recognise the right of no man to bring me to account. This is an account which I owe to no man but to my constituents.

“Of what am I accused? Of having accepted, without having sought it, a candidature for the Presidency? Well, yes! I accept that candidature, by which I am honoured,—I accept it, because the result of these numerous elections, and the unanimous decree of the

Assembly reversing the decree of proscription against my family, authorise me to believe that France regards the name which I bear as one which may conduce to the consolidation of society, which has been shaken to its foundation, and to the stability and prosperity of the Republic! * * *

“Is there no other way [besides words] of serving one's country? What it is in want of, above all things, is deeds. What it wants is a government—firm, intelligent and wise—which will think more of healing the wounds of society than of avenging them—a government which shall put itself boldly in the van of sound ideas, in order to repel, with a thousand times more efficacy than could be done by means of bayonets, theories which are not founded upon experience and reason.

“I know there are some who wish to beset my path with snares and ambushes; but I shall not fall into them. I shall always follow the line of conduct which I have traced out for myself, without troubling myself with anxieties, and without halting. Nothing will deprive me of my calmness,—nothing will make me forget my duties. * * I declare, therefore, to those who would wish to organise against me a system of provocation, that henceforward I shall not reply to any attacks, or to anything which may be done to excite me to speak when I choose to remain silent. Strong in the approval of my conscience, I shall remain unshaken amidst all attacks, impassible and unmoved by calumny.”

The voice of the chosen of the French nation was heard no more in that assemblage of clashing factions.

On the 10th of December, 1848, took place the elec-

tion of President of the French Republic. General Cavaignac might be described as the official candidate. He brought a respectable name, the recollection of public services, the powerful influence attached to his position at the head of the existing Government. Prince Louis Napoleon brought with him a principle—the principle for which he had lived and suffered; the principle of which his name was a symbol, and which was planted deep in the affections of the nation. The issue, stated in numerical order, was as follows:—

Louis Napoleon Bonaparte	.	.	.	5,434,226
General Cavaignac	.	.	.	1,448,107
M. Ledru Rollin	.	.	.	370,119
M. Raspail	.	.	.	36,900
M. de Lamartine	.	.	.	17,910
General Changarnier	.	.	.	4,790

Now here was a decision sufficiently convincing in itself as to the sentiments of France upon the principles avowed by the Prince. In order fully to appreciate the force and meaning of this decision, it is necessary to bear in mind all the circumstances under which it was given. We have seen how rancorous was the conduct of the factions in the Assembly, with respect to the motives and character of the illustrious elect. Pains were not spared to propagate unfavourable prejudices; and without disparagement of so respectable a man as General Cavaignac, it may be taken for granted that numerous individuals, connected, directly or indirectly, with the actual Government, consulted their private interest by voting in such a way as to disfavour any change in the *personnel* of the Executive. That there were many honourable exceptions—many persons who voted *against* the imme-

diate suggestions of private interest, rather than compromise their duty to their country—I am happy to have reason to believe. But there still remains the self-evident fact, that General Cavaignac “went to the country” with numerous incidental circumstances in his favour. Still how pre-eminently triumphant proved the principle, the hope, the conviction, represented by the heir of Napoleon !

SECTION IV.

1848—1851.

THE REPUBLICAN EXPERIMENT.—THE PRESIDENCY.

CHAP. I.

VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION. — HIS LABOURS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE EXPERIMENT OF 1848. — THE FACTIONS IN THE ASSEMBLY.—BOURBONITE INTRIGUES AND SOCIALIST CONSPIRACIES. — RIOTINGS IN THE CHAMBER.—FEROCIOUS AVOWALS OF THE REDS. — FOREIGN AND NATIVE EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION.—PARDONS AND AMNESTIES. — CLEMENCY AND PRUDENCE. — CHARITIES AND BENEFICENCES. — LOUIS NAPOLEON FACE TO FACE WITH THE DIS-AFFECTED. — FRANCE AND ITALY. — THE ROMAN EXPEDITION.—REFLECTIONS ON ITS POLICY AND MORALITY.

If, in the foregoing chapters, I have dwelt at much length upon sundry passages in the earlier life of Napoleon the Third, which appear unimportant when compared with the grand events of his matured career, it is because they indicate, eloquently and significantly, the object and principle which actuated him from the first, and to which he has adhered with unexampled constancy. They may be briefly described. The object was the greatness, happiness, dignity of France, which he saw degraded in the eyes of all Europe beneath the incubus of dynasties effete or perfidious: the principle was the national will, — the will of the

whole French people, expressed freely and universally—as the fulcrum through motion of which the object was to be accomplished.

These aspirations are everywhere recognisable. With respect to his views on GOVERNMENT, the system of the Empire, — the system founded by Napoleon the Great—that which was the parent of so many beneficial institutions, which not even the corruption and imbecility of a subsequent epoch could wholly neutralise—was that towards which, he frankly avowed, his own convictions tended. Intimately conversant with the history of his country, he could trace back to the days of the Empire the germs of all those branches of peaceful, ameliorative, elevating progress which, despite after difficulties, have fructified so abundantly. His long-cherished opinion—an opinion set forth frankly, when two stood between himself and the heirship to the rights of the Emperor—was, that the Imperial system, with the heir of the great Napoleon at its head, would constitute, executively and administratively, the government most accordant with the genius of the French, and beyond comparison most conducive to the happiness of the people.

These were Prince Louis Napoleon's opinions. They were not concealed from the world. He had made them well known. Never for a moment, upon any occasion in his life, in the greatest emergencies, when subjected to the most pressing temptations in view of temporary convenience, expediency, or popularity, had he ceased to avow them. There was not a man in the National Assembly who was not aware of his sentiments in this respect. There was not a man in that Assembly—unless we suppose, which is not improbable, that pre-eminent stupidity was a characteristic of some

of its members — who did not well understand the simple, honest, substantial sense in which the Prince gave his adhesion and promised his support to any system founded on the universal suffrage of Frenchmen. His previously expressed opinions he never compromised by act, word, or insinuation. His opinion was as complete as ever, that the Imperial system, with an imperial head, was the government best suited to France. But he found a republican form existing; and his desire was that that form should be administered in its reality and integrity, independent of factions, irrespective of persons. This it was that he bore in mind, when he protested against the time of the Assembly being wasted in personal altercations. This it was that he had in view, when he expressed his hope that he should be able to “assist in the consolidation of society, which had been shaken to its foundation.” This it was that he pointed to, when he called on all Frenchmen to prefer national interests to party interests, and to unite in endeavouring to promote “the stability and prosperity of the Republic.”

But it was not to be expected that these great objects could be effected, unless by the union of influential men, — unless he who was charged with the chief executive authority should be honestly supported by the leading men in the Assembly. It was vain to expect it if he were to be thwarted, hampered, defied, conspired against,—by Orleanists on one hand, who, whilst claiming a share in the councils of the State, were flitting backwards and forwards between France and England, concerting measures with Louis Philippe and his family for the restoration of one branch of the Bourbons; by Legitimists on the other, passing into Germany to consult with *their* master, the Comte de Chambord, in relation to his prospects of ruling over a

resurrection of the *ancien régime*; by ultra-levellers from another side, desirous of nothing so much as to throw all things—property, laws, institutions—into the boiling cauldron of anarchy. The *possibility* of maintaining a republic practically realising its name implied an abandonment of hostile plots and combinations against it, a willingness to co-operate with the head of the Executive,—at least, the absence of any systematic plan of obstruction and hostility.

Without such conditions a republic was impossible in France. It was on the supposition that they might be fulfilled, that, unconnected as he was with party, and acting without reference to it, his own example might arouse the more generous emotions of those around him, might assuage angry passions, and impart union, strength, and cohesion to the governmental power, that Louis Napoleon promised, in good faith and sincerity, adhesion to the republican experiment.

Were these conditions fulfilled?

They were not.

There was not a man in France who worked so hard as the President to procure the fulfilment of the conditions,—not a man in France who so strenuously exerted himself to procure success for the experiment,—to maintain the integrity of the Republic, so long as there existed the shadow of a chance of preserving it. And when his exertions failed, when the malignity of factious conspiracy had shown that it would not rest, that it would not be pacified whilst it possessed the power of disturbance,—then there remained but one course for any man having at heart the welfare of society, and endowed with courage to give effect to his desires.—That course was to deprive faction of its sting by depriving it of its power, and appealing to the nation for its decision as to the mode of government

which would give peace and security to society, and act for the benefit of the universal people.

The years 1849 and 1850 were years of trial of the system introduced in the haste, confusion, and terror caused by the insurrection of June. They were years of experiment as to the possibility of composing the furious passions of factions, of maintaining order and security by the exercise of the powers given to the President under the terms of the Constitution of 1848. From the first, sinister omens attended this experiment. We find the President entreating the Assembly to co-operate with him in measures of practical improvement for the success of which cordiality and unity of action were indispensable,—we find the Assembly replying, through its most prominent speakers, with taunts, upbraiding, ridicule, accusation. One of the leading party politicians, instead of applying his energies to the service of the country, occupied himself in writing a work purporting to demonstrate the impossibility of good government for France on any principle not involving a restoration of the Bourbons. The Assembly was the scene of disgraceful tumults, of “disgusting brutalities,” to use the too accurate phrase of a spectator. “Liar,” “perjurer,” “coward,” were epithets commonly interchanged between its members; even the President of the body was himself denounced as a liar by some of the gentlemen amongst whom he vainly strove to keep order. And these violences were not confined to words. In the very Chamber blows were exchanged, the effect of which at least attested the pugilistic prowess of debaters. But whilst the war raged fiercely between contending parties, and even in the councils of these respective parties, they were often seen uniting when a ne-

gative had to be pronounced upon any practical proposal emanating from the head of the Executive. Then they could all agree that the proposition, whatsoever its nature, was a dangerous one, an ambitious one, one prompted by his desire to court popularity, to establish himself in the affections of the people. And no doubt one of his objects was to deserve and retain the national affection by a course calculated to promote general happiness through the encouragement of industry. The inconsistency of the Assembly, and of its partisans in the press, would have been amusing if its consequences were not so seriously mischievous. Whilst presenting vexatious obstructions to all measures of improvement, they continually reproached the President for not accomplishing improvements of all kinds, for not doing that which he was most anxious to do, but which they themselves, abusing the power entrusted to them, obstinately prevented him from doing.

The "Red" or Socialist party was active in the Chamber, in the press, and in the clubs. The motto that "property is robbery" was openly promulgated by many of its members; programmes of policy were considered, including such rules as "refusal to pay taxes; disobedience to all decrees and ordinances emanating from the Government; disobedience to all citations of courts of justice," and so on. On the walls of Paris, and of several of the provincial towns, placards were posted, invoking "Blood, blood! extermination of the rich, and of all government officials; houses to the flames, the rich to the guillotine or the gibbet!" In some of the clubs, doctrines substantially affirming these views were avowed amid loud applause, and sympathisers in the Assembly adopted language scarcely more moderate.

These distractions and menaces, threatening not only

the tranquillity of France but of all Europe, could not fail to attract attention in England :—

“ Whilst (it was observed) sedition and conspiracy are allowed to muster in their recognised strongholds, the clubs of Paris, government of a stable and permanent nature, no matter what its form, is impossible in France. It is a patent fact, which no one denies, that the clubs of the French capital are not mere peaceful assemblies from which resolutions embodying the sentiments of the meeting, or petitions addressed to the Legislature, emanate in a manner suitable to the modesty that ought to characterise memorials. * * * * It is not resolutions, but revolutions; it is not petitions, but insurrections; it is not addresses, but barricades, which have systematically and notoriously emanated from these clubs ever since their appearance. They are sinks and pestholes from which an intermittent evil of incurable and fatal malignity has at frequent intervals, and with frightful precision, arisen and seized the body politic and the body social. This is a fact recorded in very legible characters of blood and devastation, and scarred and seared into the condition of France—scarred indeed, and seared so deeply, that through the sides of that tortured country all Europe has been marked and impressed with the signs thereof. * * Louis Napoleon has practically experienced that he cannot carry on his government while these clubs are suffered to exist; he probably sees also that NO GOVERNMENT could be carried on which sanctioned obstructions so systematic and so formidable in its own path.”

That there is no exaggeration in this description, that the clubs and their connections were not merely hostile to a particular government, but to any government which recognised the sacredness of family ties and of property as a national institution—had been fearfully

exemplified by the insurrection of June against the democratic government of Lamartine and Cavaignac. The anarchic faction, even in Paris, where it was strongest, was numerically insignificant when compared with the vastly preponderating majority of honest and well-disposed persons. On a national poll, its leaders were aware, it had not the shadow of a chance: in sudden acts of violence lay the only possibility of its acquiring an ascendancy; but it had already been proved that it possessed regular organisation, and on a scale so extensive as to be always dangerous. The infatuation of the Legitimists and Orleanists in the Chamber, bent solely on damaging and annoying the President, and too frequently playing into the hands of the enemies of all order, rendered that body absolutely unmanageable. Even in this country it was already prophesied that Louis Napoleon would be ultimately compelled—not only for objects personal to himself, but by his duty to France—to take energetic measures for putting an end to the incongruous state of things existing. Commenting on the position in which the President was placed, an English writer remarked:—

“On the question of moral and public right, this point may be considered—Would not Louis Napoleon be *justified* (we say nothing of expediency and policy, which in this case are seemingly more determinably legible and simple to understand),—would he not be justified in forcibly dissolving the National Assembly? We put this question on the hypothesis of the continuance, stability, and consistency of republicanism itself in France. There are two incorporations of power—the President on the one hand, and the Legislature on the other: they are equally expressions of

universal suffrage, except that the President represents a more concentrated and more enthusiastic sentiment than the Assembly. Each is now in fixed opposition to the other. The Government cannot proceed with such an entanglement unresolved. It is a deadlock.

* * Neither power can effect what is desired by either; neither can do *anything*. Were they created to do nothing? Has universal suffrage stultified itself, and stultified itself in the hands of Frenchmen? Surely this is what no Frenchman would allow. Well, Louis Napoleon might fairly say, 'Let us appeal to universal suffrage again: go before the country with my disapproval on your heads. If a different legislature be returned, I remain in power; if *you* be again returned, I will at once resign. Only let us appeal to our common parent and common arbiter in this matter, since we cannot settle it between ourselves. I was chosen last; I may fairly conclude that I am the expression of more recent, more mature, and now actually prevalent, sentiments. If you doubt this, or dislike my conclusion, falsify and refute it by appealing yourselves to that criterion on the authority of which I stand.'

"What reasonable answer could be given to this language? Can an assembly which professes to be the impersonation of the national sentiment, betray, without ruining its own credit, any dread or hesitation respecting an appeal to the power on which its credit depends?"

The President was, however, unwilling to proceed to extremities. He desired that in his hands the experiment of 1848 should have a full and fair trial. He laboured with patience and fortitude to secure it such a trial. And when, after the lapse of two years more, the effort

became evidently hopeless, it was his own policy and motives that he submitted to the ordeal of approval or disapproval by the country. Holding firmly to the course which he had chosen—that of independence of all party influences—he found himself necessarily in opposition to many of those who had been engaged in the overthrow of Louis Philippe. A judicious remark was made on some of the reproaches uttered against him on this score:—

“Of course he does, and of course he must. Authority, at all times and under all forms, if it wish to exist and to last, must accept the conditions of authority, one of which is stern and uncompromising resistance to anarchy.”

Whilst thus maintaining a resolute—fortunately, in the long run, a successful—struggle to preserve France from the horrors into which the reckless violence of some, and the flagitious dishonesty and infatuation of others, would have plunged her, he could not resist those impulses of clemency, his indulgence in which has more than once elicited remonstrance. A considerable number of the “prisoners of June” were liberated by his order. These men, on obtaining freedom, did not evince much gratitude for the leniency with which they had been treated, or inclination to behave honestly and peaceably for the future. The curses and imprecations, the vows of deadly vengeance on the rich, uttered by them on their route to Paris, were described as something hideous. The republican general, Cavaignac, under whom the insurrection had been repressed, and by whom thousands of the insurgents had been imprisoned and transported, was the especial object of their maledictions. Amongst those who protested that in giving freedom to such persons the President was

acting too boldly, was General Lamoricière, who declared that the insurgents were treated far too gently, that it was a hazardous thing to let them loose upon the society which they had attempted to upset, and to which their enmity was implacable. In these objections there may have been much truth. Certainly the President, on this as on other occasions, carried mercy, forgiveness of offence, to the utter verge of prudence. If he erred in so doing, the only defence which need be set up for him is, that the error was of the kind to which generous and noble natures are prone.

Not content with riotings in the Assembly, invectives in the press, and plottings in the clubs, the "Reds" exhibited a disposition to try the patience of the public and the Executive by demonstrations in the streets. In the early part of 1849, they got up an *émeute* on a somewhat extensive scale; the result of which, however, tended to prove how little they represented the sentiments of the general body of the people. Whilst the movement was at its most critical stage, and great alarm pervaded the minds of the Ministers, the President took a step, which, if a bold and perilous one, tended effectually, by its very boldness, to discomfit the plans of the disturbers. This gallant proceeding was thus described:—

"Louis Napoleon told them (the Council of Ministers) that he should put on his uniform and take a canter up the Boulevards and along the quays. Vain were the efforts to dissuade him from his resolve, and accordingly at half-past ten, the Prince, accompanied by Edgar Ney and another aide-de camp, his *fortemque* *Gyru fortemque Cloanthum*, and with an escort of twelve cuirassiers, left his palace, and trotted up the Boulevards. His reception was most enthusiastic, and this display of personal bravery, which in no country is more

highly esteemed than here, will secure him more popularity than all the millions which were scattered by Louis Philippe in bribery and corruption. Along the whole route the Prince was accompanied by a 'running accompaniment' of the mob, who greeted him with the deafening cheers of devotion and affection which were heard by Bolingbroke as he rode into London.

* * Whether he will or no, you may rest assured that greatness will be thrust upon him." *

This was far from being the only instance in which, by the display of that unflinching personal courage,

* There is much point in the subjoined remarks, made by a periodical print, in reference to the coolness and resoluteness displayed by the President during crises which would have unnerved a man not possessing consummate courage and fortitude. The brave respect the brave. The French people would despise and spurn a man who shrunk aghast from them. They could respect and admire one who would reason with them—who would confront them—who would withstand that which he considered wrong, and hold to his conviction of the right, even though the former should seem, for the moment, the stronger and more popular cause. It so happened, however, that the policy of Louis Napoleon was always the popular one—the one approved by the nation, as contradistinguished from factions, which, numerically, were weak in the aggregate, and insignificant individually, though capable, by organisation and intrigue, of causing serious and mischievous disturbance of the public peace:—

"We may safely say, that any ruler who wishes the French to love him must not fear the French. Nor does this arise from a spaniel-like or abject character, but perhaps from the very opposite disposition in the people. They would feel it a sort of insult to ask them to bow to a timid or flinching authority. They could not obey a power which they saw trembling before them. They must admire their ruler, and they never could admire faint-heartedness. The man of their affections—the man who will enthrall their loyalty permanently,—must have a gallant bearing, a prompt spirit, and a fearless heart. If a man were to approve himself such, theories and abstractions and artificial minutiae, and mechanical, self-working forms of constitution and government, would pale before him as artificial lights pale before the sun."

which is amongst the most eloquent passports to the respect of a Frenchman, the President threw a complete damp upon projects of disorder, and nipped in the bud quite a promising *émeute*. Frequently, almost unattended, he has mounted his horse, penetrated the very depths of the recesses which were looked on as the head-quarters of disaffection; and whilst timid spirits prophesied his death, he has ridden back, not only unharmed, but accompanied by the cheers of many of those who, a little while previously, had imagined that nothing could have given them more pleasure than to shoot him down incontinently. The calm, immovable intrepidity of the man disarmed them; practically illustrating the rustic philosophy, that if you look a raging bull in the face he will not harm you, but that symptoms of fear will make him rush upon you.

And whilst clemency and courage thus signally exhibited themselves in the more public proceedings of the President — whilst he was occupied by a multiplicity of important duties, and by the onerous task of steering “the vessel of the State” safely through the innumerable dangers which surrounded her—he contrived to find time for the exercise of a virtue, less demonstrative in its character, but not less entitled to esteem. Those who have best and longest known Napoleon the Third, concur in describing him as one of those men whose hands are “open as day to melting charity.” From his earliest youth this has been one of his passions; and in circumstances when such a disposition could not be indulged without inconvenience, he has frequently chosen the latter alternative, rather than see want unrelieved, or distress unsolaced. His accession to power, and the cares, labours, and responsibilities which his position imposed upon him, so far from diminishing the force of this natural

tendency, probably rather added to it. The man whose endeavours to secure happiness for a nation were so constantly and systematically obstructed, would be apt to take more than ordinary pleasure in doing that which was in his power — giving happiness to individuals. Notwithstanding the private and unostentatious manner in which his acts of kindness were performed, they were so frequent, and brought him inevitably into contact with so many — for he loved to be himself the messenger of good tidings to the bereaved and afflicted, — that they would sometimes become publicly known. Alluding to instances of the kind, and to the happy and kindly grace with which, by his manner of bestowing, he enhanced the value of his gifts, an English literary man paid him the following well-merited tribute : —

“We call that a great destiny which largely influences the position of fellow creatures, and which is bound up with the destiny of millions of human beings. Of such a destiny, therefore, that man shows an intrinsic presentiment, whose mind is, even in the most distracting personal misfortunes, incessantly directed to the condition of others, to the condition of a whole people in its largest and most suffering classes. This is not only a gentle feeling, in that sense of the word ‘gentle’ which probably originated the word ‘gentleman,’ but it is a feeling even princely. Nations want not and need not, for governing the State, those who are absorbed in *themselves* ; — nations need those who care for nations, and those who so care are not inappropriately placed, when they are raised to the most exalted stations.

“We are glad that the fine qualities which Louis Napoleon exhibited in adversity have stood the far harder test of dazzling success. We are glad that, even

in the smallest and most unpremeditated acts, he has evinced an unparalleled consistency. We are glad that he displayed such fortitude and bravery in misfortune; we are still more glad that he shows such moderation, firmness, and gentleness in power. We are glad of this for the sake of France, and indeed for the sake of the world.

“We now feel confident, that whatever future betides him, he will act a dignified, a true, and an honourable part. He has been tried by the two great ordeals, and has passed them both unscathed. Had he been cowardly, we should have seen it long ago; were he insolent, we should see it now.”

Without question, the personal qualities of courage, gentleness, and generosity, greatly contributed to convert into affection for himself the feeling of approval of the principles which he represented, and of veneration for the name he bore. For example, it may be admitted — it can hardly be disputed — that the attempts of Strasburg and Boulogne were not merely daring, but extremely rash. He has himself, standing near the scene of his lengthened imprisonment, acknowledged that they were so, and has not hesitated to accept that measure of blame which, to some extent, attaches to all who, even with the most virtuous motives, attack any established government, and incur the danger of civil war. Yet it is undeniable that the very rashness, — the supererogative bravery displayed in these enterprises, contributed essentially to strengthen him in the good-will of the French. In correspondence with his own relatives, during his residence at Ham, he remarked that one of his impelling motives was the conviction, that even if he should perish, his proceedings would keep the cause alive,

would awaken glorious memories, and recall the contemplations of France to the beneficent features of the Imperial system. Is it to be supposed that this total merging of self was lost upon the people of France? Is it to be supposed that they did not remember it on the 10th of December? It is quite reasonable to argue that the attempts of 1836 and 1840 would not have been made by an older man; but it would be ignoring historical facts to infer that these affairs were, in the long run, unaccompanied by an effect favourable to the objects of their promoter.

Few public acts excited more comment, or led to greater differences of opinion amongst the friends as well as the foes of the President, than the intervention in the affairs of Italy. The policy and motives of the expedition to Rome have been discussed and re-discussed in all the moods and tenses of political prejudice and predilection. Perhaps the most accurate mode of estimating it would be, to consider whether there were anything in the relations between Paris and Rome which caused events transpiring in the latter place to have a peculiarly active influence in the former. Now, the parties who at the time had the ascendant in Rome were avowed propagandists of their extreme doctrines. They never ceased from exciting the passions of European populations, and they were especially energetic in their efforts to arouse the ultra-Democratic and Socialist sections in France to demonstrations of sympathy with them — demonstrations which, beyond all doubt, would have been tantamount to open insurrection. They wished and expected to entangle France in their quarrel. It is scarcely unjust to them to say, that they set up the trade of general

incendiaries — of agitators against neighbouring governments; and already their disturbing influence was seriously felt in France.* The point is, whether, with due regard to the interests of France, the President could any longer have abstained from interference. His position was thus described: —

“ Now, France is but one of the great human family of nations, interested in maintaining the internal forms of order subsisting in each of her kindred states, whatever species of constitution they may have assumed. She no longer seeks to pull down the authorities established in other countries, that she may set up new powers after her own model. * * She holds that there may be in other countries good and honourable institutions, though different in character from those at which she sprang frantically through blood and ruin in the last century, and which in the present she accepts at the hand of the chapter of accidents. * * * If we cast away the merely external associations of past history, there is every reason that the French republic should enlist itself in the cause of European order. No other European government is so much interested in asserting the principle of the visible presentation of a national authority. This being the case, we can readily conceive and

* It has been remarked that, in addition to the attitude assumed by the Roman incendiaries, “ the nature of the connexion existing between the Pope and Roman Catholic powers gives, to all governments recognising that religious persuasion, a special interest in the temporal as well as spiritual affairs of the Pontiff, conferring on them certain rights, and imposing on them certain duties, of interference for the protection of his authority.” Into this argument I will not enter: the consideration of it would lead to a digression foreign to the subject of this book; and I confine myself to the fact of justification on the ground of necessity, in view of the actual position of affairs, and of the efforts made by the Roman dictators to obtain support through means gravely menacing the internal peace of France.

acknowledge the reasonableness of the proposed or supposed intervention, on the part of France, in the restoration of the violated rights of Italy, that France may at once interpose a gap between her own agitators and those of foreign countries, and prevent the hands of the former from being strengthened by the identification of the national cause with the trading disaffection of the latter. As a republic, France is compelled to assume a most decided position, in order to spurn the solicitations of demagogues like Mazzini and his compeers, who, fabricating wrongs which they would not dare to redress if they existed, endeavour to advance their private ends by involving her in their quarrel. * * * *

* * “ France has already incurred the indignation of the extreme parties, by unequivocally showing that she prizes order more than any particular form of government. The vast majority of the French people have declared that their aim is to construct, and not to destroy, and their present Government has shown itself fully prepared to carry out this policy, both in its domestic and foreign relations. Such being the case, neither the Government nor the people of France can do otherwise than repel with scorn any attempt to link them with the imbecile and butcherly knaves, whom the chances of disturbance, as if in mockery of revolutions, have made tyrants over the fair cities of Italy.”*

* Monsieur Emile Girardin, the celebrated editor of “*La Presse*,” stated confidently that the British Foreign Minister, Lord Palmerston, regarded the Italian revolutionary party with distrust and dislike; that he had instructed his agents to declare that “England would consider the Italian Constituent Assembly as an inexhaustible source of political troubles and disasters to Italy, and that he should contend against it with all his moral influence; that Great Britain would never acknowledge, in international relations, the legality of the

Italian Constituent Assembly, not being able to admit the principle of a league between the different peoples of Italy without the spontaneous concurrence of their respective governments." It also appeared that his Lordship had instructed our diplomatic representatives in Italy to exert themselves strenuously to prevent the Italian governments from sending agents to the Roman Constituent Assembly. Now, if the minister of a country so little in danger of disturbance from Italian disorders found himself called on to take so decided a course as this, it may reasonably be presumed that the chief magistrate of a state situated as France was—the constant object of incendiary appeals and intrigues emanating from the most active members of the demagogue party,—would have considered himself bound to adopt still more energetic measures. Mazzini's utter recklessness as to the consequences which his proceedings might entail on Europe, has, since 1850, been but too abundantly proved by the proclamations in which that incendiary has endeavoured to renew the horrors of bloodshed and civil war, to sow sedition, and stir up populace against governments. There may come a time when a pains-taking and truth-telling historian, looking back at all the circumstances preceding and accompanying the French occupation of Rome, will recognise in it a proceeding which averted a terrible train of disasters. The stabbers, the assassins, the atheists, who constituted so large a portion of the "vitality" of what was miscalled the liberating party in Italy, will, doubtless, never forgive the French Government for stepping forward so actively—taking upon itself the responsibility and unpopularity of interference. But this resoluteness in pursuing the course which he believed to be that of duty, without being turned aside by calculations of popularity or unpopularity, has been frequently manifested by Napoleon the Third; and time has generally vindicated his conduct and motives. Amongst these motives, besides the necessity of protecting France from the contagion with which the frantic declamations and bloodthirsty intrigues of persons of the Mazzini class would have infected her, might be mentioned the wish to preserve Italy herself from being, throughout her whole length and breadth, laid utterly prostrate at the feet of Austria. If a French army had not been sent to Rome, the Austrians would have advanced, and settled matters exactly in accordance with their own views of expediency. The movement of the French was, in reality, a counter-check upon Austria: it rendered impossible the execution of such designs as those which, a few months previously, had, justly or not, been attributed to the Court of Vienna by the same persons who turned round and abused the French Government for the very measure which removed the danger of Italy being, in their own

phrase, "absorbed" by Austria. The French occupation was, of all things which could have occurred, that most disagreeable to Austria; and what added to her dislike of it was the declaration, soon afterwards made by Louis Napoleon, that, on his part, there was no idea of stifling Italian liberty, and that no parties need look to him for abetting abuses or tyrannical exercise of power. It is quite in the chapter of possibilities that, but for the policy pursued by France, Italian nationality would, by this time, have almost disappeared under the pressure of Austrian concentration.

CHAP. II.

LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. — WISE FORBEARANCE OF THE PRESIDENT.
 — INCREASING IMPRACTICABILITY OF THE ASSEMBLY — ANTI-BRITISH
 INTRIGUES. — FIDELITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO FRIENDLY RELATIONS
 WITH ENGLAND. — PROVINCIAL TOUR. — ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION.
 — POSITION AND PRETENSIONS OF GENERAL CHIANGARNIER. — PER-
 SISTENT SLANDERS AGAINST THE CHIEF OF THE STATE.

IN 1849, after innumerable memorials calling for the dissolution of the Assembly, the election of a new Chamber was impending. The Socialists were on the alert; a committee consisting of the most prominent members of that faction drew up certain articles, the acceptance of which was to be a test of the eligibility of candidates. The spirit of these articles may be judged from the following:—"The most severe of tyrannies is that of capital. The national representation can and ought to pursue the abolition of that tyranny." Monsieur Prudhon's maxim, that property is robbery, was enunciated in its substance, only with somewhat more ambiguity of phraseology. On the other hand, the President received requisitions from the people, expressing entire confidence in him, and asking him to indicate persons whom he regarded as likely to be useful members of the new Assembly. To these requests he replied, in an official paragraph:—"The President of the Republic daily receives from different parts of France, and particularly from the Departments of the Meurth and the Vosges, letters requesting him to indicate candidates for the Legislative Assembly, or committees with whom the electors may correspond.

Thanking for their confidence the several parties who have addressed themselves to him, the President declares that he is a perfect stranger to all electoral committees, and that he cannot designate any candidate for the suffrages of the electors. Penetrated with a sense of his duties, he cannot, as President of the Republic, exercise any influence, direct or indirect, over the electors."

It would, perhaps, have been conducive to the election of an Assembly really disposed to aid in carrying on the business of the country, if the President had not so rigidly observed the principle here laid down. But, in the ultimate result, his policy was, doubtless, the most beneficial one, inasmuch as it left no pretext for saying that the Constitution of 1818 had been tampered with, or impeded in carrying out the objects of its constructors. Hitherto he had himself been constantly thwarted and obstructed by the different factions in the Assembly. He had disappointed them all, for he had coalesced with none. Holding his power from France, he recognised no interest save hers, and denied the right of any particular clique to set itself up as exclusively representing the country. "His firmness and consistency," it was remarked, "have belied the predictions of his enemies, open and disguised. He has carried out in every part the principles on which he accepted power, despite the alternate threats and cajolery of those who had imagined that in the Chief Magistrate they would find but a puppet and a tool." If France were not yet prosperous and contented, if she had not a sense of security, if she did not yet venture to put trust in the future, it was because she saw no end of strifes, intrigues, conspiracies, seeking to make the executive power a nullity, and to re-open that "era of revolutions"

which the President declared it was his object to close. The effect of the feeling of insecurity thus created was well described by himself:—"The want of security at present, and of faith in the future, destroys credit, puts a stop to public works, diminishes public and private incomes, renders loans impossible, and dries up the sources of wealth." He did not disguise the state of the case. He said plainly that the conduct of the factions in the Assembly indefinitely postponed the accomplishment of many plans of public utility, and that until a different course was adopted the elements of national prosperity could not be developed. Nevertheless, the country had recovered, or was recovering from, the industrial paralysis of 1848. This partial recovery was owing to the general feeling that there was at the head of affairs a mind capable of appreciating all the difficulties of the situation, and of initiating the measures necessary to meet them. The operation of the recuperative energies of the country on one hand, and the antagonistic effect of factionous obstructiveness on the other, were alluded to in a Paris journal:—"On one side we behold the whole country recovering that vitality which springs from confidence, industry, and prosperity; in one word, from order. On the other side we see a faction, feeble in numbers, in virtue, and in enlightenment, exhausting itself, struggling against the tendencies and hopes of society." The writer might have added that there were more factions than one. There was on one side a source of confidence, tending to prosperity; on the other side were sources of fear and mistrust, opposing that tendency and operating for confusion and alarm.

On the eve of the elections, a relative of the President had made observations imputing to the Chief of the State a policy of manœuvring, which the latter felt

called on to repudiate. He did so in the following letter, addressed to the personage in question : —

“It is pretended that in passing through Bordeaux you held language of a nature to sow division among the best intentioned persons. You are reputed to have said, ‘that hampered by the chiefs of the reactionary movement, I did not freely act upon my inspirations; that impatient of the yoke, I was ready to throw it off; but that in order to assist me to do it, it was necessary, at the approaching elections, to send to the Chamber men hostile to my government, rather than men of the moderate party.’ Such an imputation from you may well astonish me. You know me sufficiently to be sure that I will never submit to any ascendancy on the part of any body, and that I will constantly endeavour to govern in the interest of the masses, and not in that of a party. I honour the men who, by their capacity and experience, can give me good counsel. I daily receive advice of an opposite nature, but I obey only the impulses of my reason and my heart. It was for you less than any other person to blame in me a moderate policy; you who disapproved of my manifesto because it had not the entire sanction of the chiefs of the moderate party. * * * To bring closer together all the old parties, to unite, to reconcile them, is the object of my efforts. This is the mission attached to the great name which we bear. It would fail if it were to tend to divide instead of rallying together the supporters of the government. * * In future I hope that you will exert yourself to enlighten, as to my real sentiments, the persons who may be in relation with you, and take care not to accredit, by inconsiderate language, the absurd calumnies which state that my policy is influenced by sordid interests. Nothing, repeat this aloud, nothing will disturb the calmness of my judgment or

shake my resolutions. Free from control, I will pursue the path of honour, with my conscience for my guide ; and when I shall relinquish power, if I may be reproached with faults which were inevitable, I shall have at least performed what I sincerely believed to be my duty."

To the people he said, when the periodical recurrence of attempts at disturbance made it necessary to take stringent and vigilant measures for the repression of rioting in Paris : —

"Elected by the nation, the cause which I defend is yours, is that of your families and your property, and that of the poor as well as the rich,—that of all civilisation. I shall not shrink from anything that may cause its triumph."

At Amiens, responding to the toast, "To the elect of six millions, who has taken for his motto 'God, family, and property' : " —

"I do not know how to express to you the gratitude which is inspired in my mind at the reception which I have met with from the town of Amiens. Up to this time I have done too little not to attribute this reception to the name that I bear. The inhabitants of this Department desire order and peace. It is to that object that my conduct has been, and ever will be, directed. My efforts will constantly tend to give you order and peace. Gentlemen, it was the desire of the Emperor Napoleon to establish a durable peace. It was in this very hall, the name of which has become historical, that was signed the peace of Amiens ; that treaty by which he wished to establish a lasting peace between the two greatest powers of Europe — England and France. These views of peace are also mine. But understand well, gentlemen, it is an honourable peace that I desire ; a peace which, by rendering security certain abroad,

shall be in no one point of a nature to compromise the dignity of France."

On few subjects did the President dwell more frequently, when in presence of large bodies of Frenchmen, than on the necessity—for the sake of both nations—of maintaining a good understanding with Great Britain. The importance of a friendly international policy he took every opportunity of impressing on the minds of his countrymen. It is right that this should be remembered, in correction of the idea that his friendship for us is merely one of temporary expediency, and referable to circumstances connected with the late war. Long before the contingency of a collision between the Western Powers and Russia was thought of, his opinions upon this point were as explicitly declared as they have since been. They were as energetically set forth when he formed a stock-subject of vehement abuse to many in England, as when he was welcomed by us as "our true and faithful ally." The calm, moderate, conciliatory, but resolute tone of his replies to public addresses, elicited such expressions as the following:—

"The feeling of every man of calm good sense, after reading the addresses, must doubtless be, that France is very fortunate in having fallen into hands so prudent, so careful, so moderate, so anxious to make the best of untoward circumstances, and to restore order and security to their position as the guardian principles of society."

The tours of visits which the President made through many of the provincial districts, brought out strongly those exhibitions of popular sentiment with regard to him, which marked him as the true representative of the nation. Nor were they idle visits—mere visits of pageantry. The "inauguration" (to use the French

establish a good administration, which creates confidence and secures the future. The greatest danger of modern times arises from the false notion that a government can do everything, and that the essence of any system whatever is to meet all exigencies and to remedy all evils. Improvements are not accomplished in a moment; they are produced by those which have preceded them. * * * Let us not, therefore, give birth to vain hopes, but endeavour to accomplish all that it is reasonable to expect. Manifesting a constant solicitude for the interests of the people, let us realise, for the benefit of those who labour, the philanthropic wish of a better share in the profits, and a more prosperous future."

He desired his hearers to tell their workmen, that the foundation of his policy was that of "love of everything good,—antagonism to error and falsehood;" and thus concluded:—

"Regardless alike of calumnies and seductions, without weakness as without boasting, I will watch over your interests, which are my own, and will maintain my rights, which are also yours."

At a banquet at the Hôtel de Ville, in commemoration of the election of the 10th of December, he said:—

"What gives irresistible vigour even to the most humble of mortals is to have before him a great cause to attain, and behind him a great cause to defend. For us, this cause is that of universal civilisation."

And amongst the objects comprehended in that cause, he indicated the maintenance of order and national credit, the encouragement of industry, the welfare of the labouring classes, the protection of morality and religion. He called on Paris and all France to assist him in his labours for the attainment of these objects. It was time to do so, for the agents and emissaries of

the anarchists were actively engaged in the dissemination of sedition, in attempting to excite popular passions against all who possessed property—all who did not say “aye” to the doctrines of the Fourriers and the Prudhons. Pardons had been again granted to a large number of the culprits of June. Even Liberal journalists thus remonstrated against “too often renewed” acts of clemency:—

“The amnestied prisoners have scarcely quitted their pontoons, when they seem to desire to justify the opposition made to their being set at liberty. Their gratitude is shown in a manifesto written in the most violent terms. If the head of the State reckoned for a moment on better sentiments, he ought now to be undeceived. He sowed benefits, and reaps insult and ingratitude. * * If he is aware of the sentiments which they have expressed relative to him, he must now be edified as to the result of the measures which his generosity led to. The hearts and projects of these men remain the same; there is merely more irritation and thirst of vengeance. * * * It is true that these experiments, *too often renewed*, should serve as lessons for the time to come. One may well fall into an error once in a way; but when the public tranquillity is compromised, it would be to play the part of a dupe to listen further to the counsels of clemency. When society is in presence of irreconcilable enemies, it is a duty to combat them sternly. Generosity may be thought of when only oneself is concerned; but when the fate of thirty-five millions of individuals is at stake, all vain hesitation must be put aside, and the end steadily proceeded to. * * There are two principles in a state of open opposition; and so long as the struggle lasts, it is at least useless for the Government to furnish arms and means of action to the parties leagued against society.”

An eloquent French statesman, after describing the leaders of the Socialist plots as a set of "wretched, petty haranguers," powerful, however, for mischief, gave the subjoined outline of their objects. It is to be regretted that, instead of coquetting with impossible dynastic pretensions, he did not himself give a more hearty and consistent support to the Government which was defending society against the projects he so vigorously denounced:—

"Is it merely some refinement in civilisation which they aim at? No; it is the very A B C of social life which they attack. It is property and family ties which France has seen herself obliged to defend for the last two years. The Academy of Moral and Political Sciences has been actually called on to reply to these men, who dare to call in question principles which are acknowledged even by savages."

The English correspondence from France described the activity of Socialist propagandists in the provinces. The working population of Paris had become disgusted with their schemes, and a plan was accordingly formed to act in the provinces. The plan failed, not through want of diligence on the part of the emissaries of its concoctors and agents. The lower class of rural and village schoolmasters were the individuals to whom they specially addressed themselves, as likely, in consideration of petty bribes, to become zealous auxiliaries:—

"The clubs have disappeared in the towns; but believe me that such is not the case in the country. The rural club is installed at the wine-shop. It is there that the agitators of the Red Republic, taking advantage of the numerous meetings which take place on the Sunday, open a class of anarchical policy. They there read aloud papers and pamphlets, with which the

Socialist propagandists inundate the country. * * * Declamations against the bourgeoisie and the rich, diatribes against the Government and against social order, calumnies about reaction, apologies for the acts and tenets of the heroes of the demagoguical party,—such is the usual theme of Peter the Hermit of the Socialist crusade. This work of proselytism is renewed every Sunday and every fête day. Is it astonishing, then, that such mischievous doctrines, with which the working classes in the towns are becoming disgusted, should now begin to affect the labouring population of the country?"

Meantime, the newly elected Assembly had become the scene of excesses more frantic, declamation more fierce, obstruction more obstinate, than its predecessors. One day the members would amuse themselves with discussions about the "impeachment" of the President, — for what cause did not appear, unless it were that he had adhered to the duties of his position, whilst they hourly violated theirs. Another day, the "Mountain," or Socialist leaders, would give an exposition of their plans, one of the most notable being that, on the day after their triumph, they would set about the pleasant work of confiscating property; "they would examine into the origin of the fortunes and capital existing." Staggering to and fro amid the din of contradictory doctrines, the Assembly unfitted itself for the discharge of the most ordinary functions of legislation, and sealed, by its own language and conduct, the condemnation of the parliamentary system in France. The motion brought forward by M. Larochejaquelin may convey an idea of the unsettlement of men's minds: —

"That on the first Sunday in the coming month of June, the nation should be called upon to pronounce definitively on the form of government which it should

choose to select; that every elector should be called upon to inscribe upon his bulletin, "Monarchy," or "Republic;" that if the Republic should acquire the majority, it should be proclaimed in the Chamber by the President of the Republic; and if the Monarchy obtained the majority, it should be proclaimed by the President of the Assembly."

The Chamber continued to occupy itself with every subject save those connected with the practical objects of government. The hybrid Constitution of 1848 had so confounded executive and legislative functions, as to render efficient administration an impossibility. Memorials were forwarded in hundreds to the President, beseeching him to interpose with a strong hand and strong will, and exercise the plenary authority which he had proved himself so capable of worthily wielding. English writers commented in this tone:—

"Louis Napoleon is bound to elaborate, if possible, from the elements placed in his hands, such a principle of government as shall be adapted to the times, compatible with the powers allotted to him, and with the *prestige* he may rightfully claim, and, above all, suited to the necessities of the French people. * * We cannot but admire the judgment and firmness which he has hitherto displayed, and by which he has, we think, entitled himself to the good wishes and assistance of all Frenchmen under present circumstances."

A favourite project with some of the Orleanist leaders (perhaps suggested by the discussion which arose upon the affairs of Greece) was that of embroiling France and England — fomenting discord and war notions, in the expectation, peradventure, that "something would turn up" advantageous to their purposes. Possibly they imagined that, by pandering to national prejudices, they would obtain a modicum of the popularity of which

their cause was so sadly in need. It was a species of popularity which the President despised and disowned. Replying to a toast at the Cherbourg banquet, in which the mayor associated his name with a hint that Government aid, in completing unfinished public works, would be acceptable in that locality, he took notice of the presence of the numerous English guests:—

“The further I travel in France, the more do I see how much is expected from the Government. I do not traverse a single town, department, or even a village, without being asked by the mayor, municipal authorities, or representatives, for means of communication, canals, railroads, or the completion of public works and enterprises — in short, measures which might rescue suffering agriculture or lend spirit to drooping commerce. Nothing can be more natural than the expression of these desires, nor do they fall, believe me, upon an inattentive ear; but at the same time I should tell you that these results are not to be attained unless you give me the means of accomplishing them, and it is in your power, by your assistance, to give me the means of strengthening the existing power, and warding off danger for the future.

“How was it that, in spite of war, the Emperor was enabled to cover France with those imperishable works which one meets at every step, but nowhere in such wonderful force as here? It is because, independently of his genius, he lived in an age when the nation, harassed by revolutions, gave him the necessary power to crush anarchy, put down factions, and enable him to triumph abroad by means of peace and tranquillity at home, and by the vigorous impulse given to the national interests. * * * Is not this port, created by such gigantic efforts, a striking testimony of French unity, fostered in the teeth of revolutions—

unity which has made us a great nation? But we must not forget that a great nation maintains its position only so long as its institutions are in accord with the exigencies of its internal condition and its national interests. * * The presence of our numerous English guests here to-day shows that, if we desire peace, it is not from motives of weakness, *but from a feeling of that community of interests and mutual esteem which keeps the two most civilised nations closely bound to each other.*"

When opening a line of railway at St. Quentin, he explained his policy, opinions, and convictions, and referred to the source from which he had derived them:—

"Had I been free to carry out my will, I would have come among you without pomp or circumstance. I would have liked to have mingled among you, unknown and unnoticed, in your factories as well as your fêtes, in order that I might have been able to form a correct opinion of your real feelings and sentiments. But it seems that fate has raised up a barrier between us, and I deeply regret that I never had the opportunity of being a simple citizen of my country. You know that I passed six dreary years of my life within a few leagues of this town; but moats and walls separated me from you, and even now the duties of my official position again separate me from you. Thus it is that I am scarcely known to you, and there are those who seek to misrepresent to you all my words and actions; but the name which I bear is happily a sufficient guarantee to you, and you know the source from which I derive my opinions and convictions. Forty-eight years ago the First Consul came here to inaugurate your canal,—my mission is now similar. I come here to inaugurate your railroad. He then said to you, 'Remain

quiet. The storm has swept onwards. I will cause the triumph of the great battle of the Revolution, but I will repel with a strong hand ancient prejudices as well as new-fangled errors, by re-establishing security and encouraging useful enterprises. I would improve the condition of the people by the cultivation of your fields and the formation of new branches of industry.' Such were the words of the First Consul, and I have only to look around me to see that he has kept his word—his duties as well as prophecies have been fulfilled. And my task is the same. I must avail myself of the good instincts of the Revolution, and boldly combat those which are bad. The people must be benefited by means of institutions which good sense and reason would approve, and they must be convinced that order is the source of all prosperity. But order is not to me a mere empty word, which any one may interpret after his own fashion. It is the maintenance of that which has been chosen and consented to by the people—it is the national will triumphing over all factions. Courage, then, inhabitants of St. Quentin; continue in your present course, and assist the government in its efforts to protect your enterprises and improve the condition of the poor."

Addressing the workmen, he said:—

"I am happy to find myself in the midst of you, and I seek with pleasure those opportunities which place me in contact with the great and generous people who elected me; for my most sincere and devoted friends are not in palaces: they are under the thatched roof. They are not in gilded halls, but in the workshops, in public places, in the country. I feel, as the Emperor said, that the fibres of my heart respond to yours, and that we have the same instincts and the same interests. Persevere in the honest and industrious path

which leads to content, and let these *livrets*, which I am glad to offer you as a feeble mark of my sympathy, remind you of the too short sojourn which I made amongst you."

At Dijon:—

"The acclamations of which I have been the object tend to prove to me that the revolutionary torrent is returning to its bed, and that the population of this district, a short time ago so agitated, appreciates the efforts of us all to re-establish order. The governments which come after revolution have an ungrateful task before them—namely, that of repressing at first, in order to ameliorate afterwards; of dissipating deceptive illusions, and of substituting the language of cool reason for the wild, disorderly accents of passion. Accordingly, many a government has worn out its popularity in this great and difficult undertaking; and when I find that my name still preserves its influence over the masses—an influence due to the glorious chief of my family—I congratulate myself on the fact, not for myself, but for you, for France, for Europe."

The inauguration of the "Mutual Aid Society Pension Fund" at Lyons gave the President an opportunity to express his views upon one of the objects which had always profoundly interested him—that of elevating the condition of the workman by bringing him into friendly communication with the more wealthy classes. How different these plans from the sanguinary dreams and impracticable theories of Socialism!

"The institution which you have invited me to inaugurate is one of those which ought to produce the most salutary effects on the position of the labouring classes. For I cannot believe that there are men so

perverse as to preach up evil, knowing that they do so. But when men's minds become excited by social convulsion, pernicious ideas are disseminated amongst the people, and lead to wretchedness. The cause of visionary schemes is ignorance, and systems the most attractive in appearance are often quite inapplicable in practice. The exercise of reason is sufficient to overcome false doctrines, and it is by the application of practical ameliorations that they are most effectually put down. Mutual aid societies, as I understand them, have the advantage of uniting together the different classes of society, of putting an end to any jealousies which may exist amongst them; of neutralising in a great measure the effects of want, by causing the rich man to co-operate from the superfluity of his fortune, and the working man from the produce of his economy, in an institution where the industrious workman will find counsel and support. In this way an object of emulation is given to the different communities; classes are reconciled and individuals rendered moral. It is, consequently, my intention to make every effort to establish throughout France mutual aid societies; for, in my opinion, these institutions, once established everywhere, would be amongst the best means, not of solving problems which are unsolvable, but of succouring real sufferings by stimulating alike probity in the working man and charity in the wealthy one."

Talking to the people of Strasburg about advice which he had received not to visit their district, in consequence of rumours of disaffection, he tells them :—

"I said that it was my duty to go wherever there were dangerous illusions to dispel, or honest men to reassure."

Acknowledging, at Rheims, the enthusiastic welcome given to him on his visit, he dwells on the infinite numerical preponderance of the friends of order and peace :—

“The reception which I have met with confirms that which I have myself seen during my journey through France, and which I have never for a moment doubted. Our country wishes for order, religion, and rational liberty. During my journey I have been convinced of this fact, that the number of agitators is infinitely small, whilst the number of good citizens is infinitely great. God grant that they do not disagree amongst themselves !”

Several of the passages just quoted are taken from speeches delivered by the President during an autumnal visit to the Departments, in the course of which he received convincing proofs that the Socialist propagandists had made but little way in corrupting the minds of the people at large. Gratitude, esteem, and affection spoke in the addresses which poured in from all classes, and effectually rebuked the ebullitions of factious malignity. But whilst the people were thus pronouncing, gentlemen calling themselves Legitimists were flocking to Wiesbaden, where the Comte de Chambord was holding a little court, and there they enacted quite a “demonstration” of re-actionary predilections. The excursions to Wiesbaden by one section of Bourbonite intriguers, the trips to Claremont by the other section, were not without object. And the President took care to make known that *his* journeys through France, and face-to-face communications with the people, had likewise an object :—

“My object, said he, “in these journeys, is to become acquainted with the populations, to place myself in direct communication with their real organs, and to

learn thoroughly their wishes and their interests. Religion and family are, with authority and order, the bases of all durable society. The constant object of my efforts is to consolidate these essential elements of the happiness and prosperity of the country."

In fact, these meetings, and the interchanges of sentiment to which they led, caused the President and the people of France to "understand each other better" than they had previously done. The name which he bore, the principles which he had enunciated in his published writings, the trials which he had gone through in vindicating them, had created a prestige which was elevated and strengthened by these personal meetings. The nation began to value him more than ever for himself. The more they knew and saw of him, the more this feeling grew and spread, as was afterwards well manifested by the successively augmenting majorities giving increase and durability to his power.

In connexion with the active and scarcely disguised intrigues of the Bourbonite partisans, the following observations were made on the course which might probably become the duty of the President:—

"The menacing attitude assumed during the last few months by the monarchical party has excited much feeling both in Paris and in the Departments. The country has a right to know what are the projects of Louis Napoleon, in the event of the Royalists, united or disunited, of the two branches, seeking to prevent the necessary prolongation of the Presidential power.

"We think we are acquainted with these projects, and will state them in a few words. * * His object is the re-establishment of order, confidence, and credit—in a word, to close the era of revolution. But to accomplish the mission of peace, which has been reserved for him by Providence, it is necessary that the power of the

President should have stability and duration. Louis Napoleon would not be carrying out the wishes of the 6,000,000 of his fellow-citizens, who chose him as the symbol of the ideas of order and progress inaugurated in 1789, if he were to bow his head humbly to the Royalist coalition which now impudently agitates the country. Louis Napoleon hopes, then, that when the moment shall arrive for the discussion of the future condition of France—that is to say, to consolidate power definitively or to decree anarchy—the National Assembly will comprehend the duty imposed on it by circumstances, that vast responsibility which would be laid upon it in the pages of history, if it were to hesitate to vote the immediate revision of the Constitution. If the National Assembly forgets that France requires, above all things, to be tranquillised, and refuses to adopt a measure imperatively required by the public safety, Louis Napoleon should not hesitate to make an appeal to the entire people, from whom he has received his mission, and that appeal would decide whether the President should adopt for his motto, *Abnegation* or *Preservation*."

The good which had already been effected by the President, notwithstanding the obstructions, insults, and vexatious opposition which met him at every step, was thus referred to :—

"Whether there exist Bonapartists or not, we know not ; but we do know that there are men who wish for peace, for security, and for order, and who accept these blessings with gratitude, from whatever government or whatever man will assure them ;—we do know that in eighteen months the government of the President has stifled faction [?] at home and raised the name and honour of France abroad. We do know that whatever demand for labour, whatever confidence, whatever pros-

perity exist at present, are due to him ; we do know that in France there are millions of men in whom, especially since the last eighteen months, the name of Napoleon inspires ideas of liberty, of public order, of religion, of property, of family. Such men will repeat that name in every one's hearing. Let one be found more deserving, more popular, and more glorious."

To some words in the above passage, an exception might have been taken. No doubt the courage and honesty of Louis Napoleon had already conferred important services on the country. But on one point the writer was too sanguine. The President had *not* stifled faction, though by his energy and fortitude he had succeeded so far in keeping it in check. How long he could maintain that check remained to be seen. He had hitherto preserved order ; but the fearful contemplation of what would happen should the reins of government either be wrenched violently from him, or drop passively from his hands, disturbed the minds of those who recognised in a stable and pacific government—a government cultivating substantial interests to the exclusion of chimeras—the only hope for the salvation of France. A conviction of the absolute necessity, for the sake of the vital interests of society, of prolonging a power which had been so nobly and beneficially exercised, was establishing itself in the minds of the people. The following passage was merely the echo of the national sentiment upon this subject :—

"The marvellous prestige which has already, on one occasion, produced in the country districts miracles of enthusiasm, can belong only to the heir of the name of Napoleon. All other candidateship would inevitably fall to pieces before the indifference of the rural populations. That prestige is so powerful that, in 1852, as in 1848, the President of the Republic, whether eligible or not,

will be re-elected. The interests of the country ought consequently to induce all prudent men to rally round him. That conviction, deciding our conduct and inspiring our policy, naturally induces us to look for the revision of the Constitution and the prolongation of the President's power as the only means of ensuring to France years of calm and stability, leaving the chances of the future to each of the great parties of order. If the parties opposed to the President had another combination, of a practical character, to offer us, we would examine its chances of success. But these parties only hold out to us the prospect of a revolution more frightful than those which have been seen for the last sixty years, — they can only lead to the triumph of the demagogical principles, to public ruin, pillage, and incendiarism, the scaffold, proscription, and universal misery — in fine, to the reign of the Communists. We love our country too well ever to consent to play that terrible and sanguinary game."

In fact, the impracticable conduct of the Legislature was bringing public business of every kind to a standstill, neutralising the ameliorative plans of the President, paralysing government, rendering improvement impossible. The year 1851 was destined to witness an aggravation of these symptoms of "something rotten" in the theoretical system which had been patched up with little regard for the interests of France, with little consideration for the real wants and disposition of her people. It has been seen with what difficulty order was maintained in 1849—50. In May of the last-named year, a new electoral law—drawn up by a committee, many of whose members were the leaders of the re-actionary Royalist party—had been passed. The Government hoped that this law would baffle the Socialist tactics of triple and quadruple voting. The chief clause in it

enacted that settled residence for three years, instead of only six months, as before, should be required to qualify for voting. The intention of the Government was chiefly to defeat a fraud which, it had been ascertained, was contemplated by the Socialist "managers" — viz., causing one individual to vote three or four times over in different electoral districts. But the reactionary gentlemen on the committee, versed as they were in the mysteries of electioneering manœuvres, foresaw an effect which was about the very last thing that the President would knowingly assent to. Three years' fixed residence is a far longer average than is maintained by a large proportion of the population of France; and it was soon discovered that the substantial operation of the change would be to strangle the principle of universal suffrage — to disfranchise about three millions of electors. *That* was an effect quite agreeable to the Bourbonites — restriction of the franchise was what they earnestly desired; but nothing could be more contrary to the wish of the President, who based his authority on the widest possible expression of the national will. No sooner, therefore, had he become acquainted with the tendency of the new law than he demanded its abolition, on the ground that it deprived so large a number of Frenchmen of their electoral rights. But the "majority" in the Assembly — the coalition of Legitimists and Orleanists — rejected this demand. They would doubtless have been glad to confine the electoral area within a much narrower circle than that ordained by the law of May; nothing, at all events, was farther from their intention than to extend it to its original proportions. They had failed to brow-beat the President, — they had failed to intimidate him, though on all possible opportunities, of course including the debates on the requisition for the expenses of re-

presentation *, they had diligently exerted themselves with that object. Insults and calumnies were equally powerless to subdue or unnerve that brave heart, sustained by the consciousness of right, and by confidence that the right would ultimately prevail. The most frivolous pretexts were seized on as grounds of accusation against the President. Thus, the distribution of refreshments, by his orders, to troops who had gone through the fatiguing manœuvres of a lengthened review, was represented as a subtle process of bribery and corruption of the army, — the veracious

* In reference to these pecuniary requisitions, it ought to be explained that, independently of the dignified hospitality maintained by the President, of his munificent personal encouragement of art, science, and useful industrial enterprises, and of the continual stream of charity which flowed from his palace, he had incurred numerous expenditures of a purely public character, and which ought to have been defrayed by the State treasury. For instance, during the troubles of 1848, a formidable body of brigands spread terror and desolation through some of the districts contiguous to Paris. Murder and rapine accompanied their movements. They had burnt one of the national palaces, and threatened to destroy others. A considerable body of the National Guard mustered, and the confusion of public affairs being such as to preclude any effectual assistance from Government, they scoured the country, took up their quarters, at their own expense, in the neighbourhoods most exposed to danger, and rooted out the malefactors. In this operation they incurred much sacrifice of money as well as of time; but when they applied for compensation, various difficulties were raised. The President, resolved that they should not be losers by their spirited conduct, paid them out of his own income. Calls of an analogous kind, properly belonging to the account of the State, but which, in the chaotic condition of the Assembly, it was vain to submit for liquidation in that quarter, frequently presented themselves, and were met in a liberal spirit by Louis Napoleon. Such magnanimous generosity more than once sheltered the Assembly from the opprobrium which its own conduct would have drawn upon it; — but of these matters, when the day of reckoning came, that patriotic body usually found itself oblivious.

individuals who propounded this notion not remembering, or not caring to remember, that in most countries such indulgences are usually granted on similar occasions. When he expressed an interest in subjects bearing practically, irrespective of politics, on the welfare of the country,—when he dwelt on the necessity of preserving national and private credit, of encouraging agriculture, manufactures, and commerce,—when he spoke of matters connected with the interests of the working classes, of savings banks, mutual benefit societies, caisses de retraite,—when he recommended steps for increasing the comfort and healthfulness of the dwellings of operatives, and invited the Assembly to suspend vain brawling and co-operate with him in ameliorative measures, it was forthwith proclaimed that he wanted to “seduce” the people. Things were really coming to that “deadlock” alluded to in one of the above-quoted passages. And it could not be said that the attitude of General Changarnier, the commander of the Army of Paris, tended to lessen the difficulty. That officer had rendered some service by the judiciousness of his arrangements for thwarting incipient émeutes, and he had received from the head of the State marks of distinction quite equivalent to his merits. Unfortunately for his own reputation, he did not bear his honours modestly. He assumed a position much overstepping the line of his duties, and indicating a sort of *imperium in imperio*—an authority separate from, indeed preponderant to, the power of the Civil Executive. In this conduct he was countenanced by the factions, each of which, perhaps, hoped to see him, at some crisis, drawing his sword in support of its particular views. The general impression was, however, that his leanings were towards the restoration of the line of Charles the Tenth. The partisans of that dynasty began

to hail him as their champion. He had contrived to persuade a large proportion of the public — and quite probably had persuaded himself — that the Army of Paris was entirely devoted to him. The forbearance of the President might have contributed to confirm him in this idea, the fallacy of which was to be demonstrated as soon as the General had carried things so far as to become seriously mischievous, and to render his peremptory dismissal expedient. The General conceived himself to be the “man of the situation,” — a little time yet, and, to his profound mortification, he was to figure in the character of a man *out* of a situation.

CHAP. III.

ANOMALOUS STATE OF PARTIES IN 1851. — THE CHANGARNIER BUBBLE EXPLODED.—THE "FUSION" NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE BOURBONITES.—INEFFICIENCY OF THE CONSTITUTION.—NATIONAL DEMAND FOR ITS REVISION; AND FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE ELECTORAL DISFRANCHISEMENT LAW.—CORDIAL SYMPATHY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PEOPLE.—AUDACITY OF THE ANTI-SOCIAL FACTION.—IMMINENCE OF ANARCHY AND BLOOD.

EARLY in 1851 the systematic opposition to every movement of the Executive, whether such movement took the shape of a proposal for carrying on or facilitating public works, for improvements in the practical administration of the law, or what not, became more open and insulting than ever. The business of the country was brought almost to a stand-still, in order that factions in the Legislature might have time to fight out their particular quarrels, and in the intervals to concert with each other plans for annoying and undermining him who was the object of dislike to all and each of them. The "attitude" of General Changarnier became more demonstrative than ever. At the head of a powerful army, he was regarded by many, and he appeared to regard himself, as paramount to every other person in the State. He did not conceal his antagonism to the President. Ministerial crises occurred. The President endeavoured, by selections independent of party, to constitute a Ministry through which public business could be carried on. In vain. The Assembly appeared bent on one line of policy, and no other; and that was, to prevent anything being done — to put a stop to every project of improvement,—its one policy, in short, was

that of impracticability ; and it was to the power and influence of Changarnier that it looked for support in carrying out this reckless game. In fact, the object of the majority in that body was to effect the restoration of one or the other of the fated Bourbon race, and Changarnier imagined that he was to figure in the operation as the Monk of English history.

But there was a master mind—a resolute heart—which remained unperplexed and unappalled by these intrigues. At several interviews which the President had with members of the various parties, he declared himself prepared to forego every minor consideration, in order to create a good understanding with the Assembly, but that on one point he was determined—viz., the dismissal of General Changarnier, a man who had shown himself willing to play into the hands of faction against the interests of the public service. “I am,” said the President, “prepared to form a Ministry in the sense of the majority ; I will do everything but one, and that is, to sacrifice the right which I possess to revoke (dismiss) a subordinate.” On this point he remained inflexible. How the public pulse beat in reference to this attitude is indicated by the circumstance that “When the determination to dismiss General Changarnier was rumoured about, the funds immediately rose. The intelligence of this fact was communicated in the Chamber to Changarnier ;—and the countenance of the General, who had previously been in high spirits, began to fall.”

Bold as the General was, he found that he had to deal with one as bold as himself, and more wisely so. Folks had talked about the President not daring to take so resolute a measure as that of dismissing the redoubtable General, — the General himself held up a standing challenge. Well, the President took up the challenge,—

he went the whole length of what he was dared to. The calm, silent, modest man, proved more than a match for perfidy, intrigue, and insolence combined; and the General, who was to have done as he pleased with the Government of France, was fain to take his dismissal with a quietude which astonished those who had expected such wondrous things from him.

Before resorting to this step, the President had given proof that it was not for his own purposes that he insisted on the displacement of this dangerous person. He had declared his willingness that the command of the Army of Paris should be divided amongst several generals, or even that it should be entrusted to General Cavaignac, but that under no circumstances, come what could, would he consent that an officer should retain the command who made use of that command to carry on a warfare against the Executive.

An observer of these events, by no means friendly to the President, was candid enough on this occasion to acknowledge that

“All right-thinking people must admit that the President was quite right to dismiss an officer who was set up as a rival, and as a greater man than himself.”

As a greater man, indeed! Changarnier had, in truth, accepted the position of a medium through the instrumentality of which France was to be brought back to the point from which she had started in 1830. I have no desire to impugn the General's motives,—I have nothing to do with them. What I affirm is, that the Legitimists, and to some extent the Orleanists, —forming a majority in the Assembly, and always plotting the restoration of the Bourbons,—looked to the retention by Changarnier of the chief military command at Paris as a tower of hope and strength,—as

a pledge that when the "opportunity" should come, which they were determined to create—when, by obstructing, maligning, opposing, and every other sinister artifice, they should have rendered the President's government as inefficient, unfortunate, and unpopular as possible—they would have at hand a support so powerful as to ensure the success of any attempt they might set on foot.

It must be remembered that negotiations were all this time going on for the "fusion" of the interests of the two Bourbon branches. The communications between them and their adherents were notorious. So long as Changarnier retained his post, the policy of the two Royalist parties had been to support the Executive, so far as to keep the "Reds" and Levellers in check,—to harass, annoy, humiliate, and degrade it, but still to give it so much support as to preclude an explosion until a convenient season.

The sagacious foresight of the President postponed that convenient season *sine die*. It discomfited the tactics of intrigue. The wrath of the party of "order," as the two Royalist factions presumed to call themselves, knew no bounds. It has been affirmed that that of the Legitimists—the adherents of the Count de Chambord—was fiercest.

"It is evident (observes a contemporary writer, every one of whose opinions I by no means subscribe) that Changarnier was all along the general of the Legitimists. The speech of M. Berryer avows as much, and is considered, both by Bonapartists and Republicans, as a declaration of war. For three years, since the Revolution of February, the Legitimist party had disappeared as a political party. It had veiled its altar, folded up its colours; postponed to other times the vindication of its old right: confounded in the ranks of the reaction,

it had co-operated, by its votes in the Assembly, in that work of resistance which, by ruse or force, has taken back from the democracy all the advantages which the latter had wrested from the monarchy. It is the common thought of self-preservation which has been the cementing bond of the majority. Born from fear, the majority necessarily ended in violence. The Orleanists and the Legitimists, terrified at the same danger, fought together against the Republic, which appeared to them to be the forerunner of Socialism. * * The Legitimists and Orleanists formed together what is called the party of order—that is, a party without principles, without character, without object—which could not propose anything, found anything, organise anything. The presence of the Count de Chambord near the frontiers of France, the Legitimists at Wiesbaden, the Orleanists at Claremont, have proved that this neutral situation of the majority reached its term, and that a new situation was about to commence. M. Berryer's speech was only the parliamentary declaration of a political act already executed. After that speech, no illusion is possible. The white flag has been raised from the dust in which it had fallen : it now floats in the ranks of the majority. In a word, the Legitimist party has ceased to be one of the divisions of what is called the party of order. It is a hostile camp. La Vendée has risen in the parliament."

Looking back at what then occurred, and at the transactions of the two years preceding, it is difficult to suggest a reasonable doubt that there was a specific design to overthrow the President before the completion of his appointed time of office. The opportunity, the convenient season, for plunging all things into confusion, and crushing national opinion through the power wielded by Changarnier—this seems, accord-

ing to the most logical interpretation of the events of the period, to have formed the hope of the Royalists. In the speech of M. Berryer, alluded to in the passage just quoted, that gentleman had boldly avowed his visit to Wiesbaden to consult with his master the Count de Chambord, declared that he was a Legitimist, as he had been for fifty-eight years, and should continue while he lived; and made marked allusions to the existence of a person whose presence on the soil of France would soon put down popular manifestations. For these expressions he was brought to task by General Cavaignac. On the occasion in question—which was one of the eternally recurring motions for defeating every Ministry formed by the President, and, to use the words of an English journalist, “utterly stopping all the wheels of government,” — M. de Lamartine made some creditable observations in deprecation of the factious proceedings which—rendering public confidence, industrial development, and social tranquillity and progress impossible—“were driving the country to ruin.” But the workings of faction did not cease. Repeatedly the President endeavoured to conciliate the obstructives, calling around him men whose position gave him some hope that they might be able to aid him in carrying on at least the ordinary business of administration. But nothing could conciliate men pre-resolved not to be conciliated—whose policy was that of discord and confusion, not of progress and peace. Every description of insulting demonstration was resorted to. “Committees of Safety” were got up by parties whose own conduct was the greatest enemy to public safety; laws were proposed for vesting the Assembly with extraordinary military powers, and constituting sundry hypothetical acts “treason” on the part of the President.

“We cannot,” observes an English journalist, (whom

I purposely quote as being anything rather than friendly to the President,) "we cannot be blind to the facts which are passing before our eyes, and which prove to us most clearly that the various opponents of his government are putting themselves most egregiously in the wrong at every turn, and that by contrast the forbearance and moderation of the majority shine out most conspicuously."

It was not merely on such questions as that of pecuniary supplies, partly personal to the President, that the system of chronic annoyance was maintained. The most obvious and necessary measures of public business were furiously opposed, and no pretext was neglected on which insult and calumny could be founded. This system proceeded so far that attempts were actually made, and were more than once near succeeding, to break faith with railway companies and other establishments engaged in works of public utility, and to which the State had entered into solemn pledges with respect to pecuniary advances.

Having alluded to the subject of pecuniary requisitions proceeding personally from the head of the Executive, it may be expedient to mention an incident illustrative of the real tone of public feeling in France. The bill referred to having been rejected, a national subscription to make up the sum required was proposed. The public, indignant and disgusted with the conduct of the factions in the Assembly, were willing to mark their sentiments, and, if the plan had been carried out, the money subscribed would have far exceeded the sum mentioned in the bill. The President, however, declined this demonstration of national sympathy, stating his reasons in the following letter, which appeared in the "Moniteur":—

"The President of the Republic is deeply touched by

the efforts made to organise a national subscription in respect of the rejection of the bill on the expenses of representation, which has just taken place, and he thanks all those who have entertained this thought, which is an imposing manifestation of sympathy and approbation for the conduct of the President. But he deems it his duty to sacrifice any personal consideration to the repose of the country. He knows that the people render him justice, and that is sufficient for him. The President, therefore, declines any subscription, however spontaneous and national its character may be."

So profoundly concerned was he to avoid all occasions of disturbance or collision, and to preclude the excitement of passionate emotions, that whilst faction was raging with most blatant demonstration, he would not, for any object directly or indirectly personal to himself, permit the incurral of even so much of "ferment" as might be elicited by the organising of a subscription. He was, in short, as has been before observed, working harder than any man in France to procure a fair trial for the Republic—to render it a possibility—to save it from premature fall. With this object in view, he adopted every step of conciliation which honour and self-respect permitted, whilst, on the other hand, the Assembly, affecting to represent the people, acted in diametrical opposition to this policy.

It was in view of this perilous state of affairs, that the President delivered, in Dijon, in the month of June, an address, of which the following is the purport. The occasion was the opening of a new line of railway—one of that class of "celebrations" which, identified as they were with the practical interest of the country, he most loved to honour:—

"Gentlemen, I wish that those persons who have doubts as to the future could have accompanied me in

my journey through the populations of the Yonne and the Côte d'Or ; they would have been able to have judged for themselves as to the true state of public opinion. They would have seen that neither the intrigues, nor the attacks, nor the passionate discussions of parties are in harmony with the sentiments and condition of the country. France neither desires the return of the *ancien régime*, under whatever form it may disguise itself, nor the trial of impracticable and Utopian schemes. It is because I am the most natural enemy of both one and the other, that France has placed confidence in me. If this were not the case, how could we explain the affecting sympathy of the people towards me, which resists the most adverse assertions, and which acquits me of being the cause of their sufferings. If my government has not been able to realise all the ameliorations which it had in view, we must attribute the failure to the manœuvres of the factions who paralyse the good intentions of assemblies as well as of governments most devoted to the public welfare. It is because you have thus comprehended the state of the question, that I have met, in patriotic Burgundy, a reception which is for me an approbation and an encouragement. I take advantage of this banquet, as of a tribune, to lay my heart before my fellow-citizens. A new phasis has commenced in our political life. From one end of the country to the other, petitions are being signed for the revision of the Constitution. I await, with confidence, the manifestations of the country."

These words indicate the strong desire of the speaker to encourage, by language of respect and courtesy, any lingering feeling of magnanimity and love of country which, he could yet hope, existed amongst the members of the body of which he was speaking. They were the expressions of hope against hope, proceeding

to the utter limits of candour. But such hope as did remain was soon to be dissipated.

There was a particular passage in this speech which was, at the time, the subject of much dispute. It was variously reported and construed. It may be satisfactory to the reader to give the two versions most widely circulated. The first is taken from the report published in the "*Moniteur*:"—

"Since I have been in power, I have proved, I think, how much, in presence of the great interests of society, I have made an abstraction of all that affects myself personally. Neither the most unmerited attacks, nor the excitements of the impatient, have made me desist from my duty. But if, one day, France, thinking that no one has a right to dispose of her destiny without consultation, should make an appeal to my patriotism to protect her against factions, then will I place at her service my energy and my courage, as I have hitherto given my calm and my patience. Believe me, gentlemen, France shall never perish in my hands."

The passage, as rendered in other quarters, differed materially from this, though the tendency and principle in both interpretations are identical. The President is represented as pointing directly to the factions by which he was thwarted and prevented from effecting many useful objects which he contemplated.

The strong probability is, that the above is the correct rendering; nevertheless, I will likewise give another, which was circulated largely in journals whose vocation was that of opposition, and opposition at that time meant conspiracy, vituperation, and slander. Supposing that it was fabricated and published for the purpose of injuring the President, it will serve to indicate the course taken by his enemies: it will serve to indicate the tone which, in their opinion, he might

have adopted when alluding to their conduct. That conduct, so far as the "majority" was concerned, was regulated by the determination of bringing the government of the Republic into disgrace, by destroying its working efficiency, by thwarting every measure which, in producing public benefit, could do credit to the Executive:—

"For three years I have been able to prevent mischief, but I have met with insurmountable obstacles in my desire to do good. If repression and punishment were in question, I received a salutary support; but if, on the contrary, it was attempted to found anything durable, to fortify authority, to develop the institutions of credit and benevolence, to recompense the old remains of our glorious armies, to finish promptly our great lines of railway, and finally, to give to that democracy which is overflowing a check and an object, I found only inertness and resistance. The greater number of the projects announced in my manifestoes have, in spite of me, remained without result."

Whether or not these words were ever uttered by the Prince President, certain it is that he might have used them without violating truth. They describe an actual state of things; they describe the course that had been pursued towards him by persons who, endowed with certain privileges as representatives of the nation, used those privileges as means for effecting sinister designs. On his accession to the Presidency he had at once applied himself to objects which had always been present to his mind, and which form prominent topics in his writings—the institution and completion of useful public works; the development of the natural resources of France, by giving facilities to industrial enterprise; the encouragement of arts, manufactures, and all branches of wealth-creating productiveness. He had hoped, notwith-

standing the indecent scenes which had taken place in the National Assembly, that its successor, the "Constituent Assembly," would have exhibited more grace and considerateness; that he should have succeeded in obtaining some degree of honest co-operation in plans which, whatever might be the ruling power in France, must tend to the welfare of the community at large. He had not yet sounded the profound depths of recklessness which may be reached by a body composed of numerous hostile factions, each warring for a different purpose from all the others, but all alike warring against *one* purpose,—that which would be fatal to them—viz., the consolidation of society, the restoration of public confidence, the existence of a vigorous and efficient Executive, possessing strength sufficient to carry out salutary plans, and so to govern as to produce contentment, satisfaction, and prosperity. He had yet to learn that the production of a state of affairs the very contrary of this was what substantially constituted the policy of those with whom he had to deal. It took him three years to learn this, but he did learn it at last. He had in the interval exhausted every resource of honest ingenuity, of conciliation, of energetic remonstrance, of appeal and entreaty, to prevail upon the leading party-men, not to give up their party biases—*that* was hopeless—but to work with him in a national spirit upon matters having nothing to do with party. Futile efforts! Every practical measure of good accomplished, everything furnishing cause for tranquillity and satisfaction, was considered by them as a card turned against themselves. What they sought was to excite such a revulsion of popular feeling as might facilitate a counter-revolution in favour of the Bourbon family.

It took some time to ascertain the full extent of this political turpitude. Pending the interval of test and

experiment, the Prince President's demeanour had been marked by a respectful moderation which his enemies, and the enemies of France, did not understand. Clever people! They mistook for stolidity, or timidity, that which was the result of conscientious forbearance, and of a wise observance of time and circumstance. It may be regarded as certain, that many months had not elapsed before he became aware, from experience, of the utter inadequacy of the "Constitution" of 1848 to enable an Executive inspired by wishes for the public good to deal with the elements of which the Assembly was composed. It was, in fact, impossible that he should not discover this; the painful fact was forced upon his notice at every turn, on every occasion when he sought to carry out the higher functions of his position. Nor could he fail to discern, and step by step to experience, that his hopes of working in harmony with the Assembly were doomed to disappointment: that that body was not to be conciliated, because the object of its preponderating component was discord, not peace; confusion, not stability or permanency; weakness and ignominy, not strength and dignity, in the Executive machinery. Still he felt it to be his duty to persist, whilst there lingered any vestige of hope, in the endeavour to reconcile conflicting elements, and to administer the government according to the theories of the Constitution as he found it.

Men of sharpness and smartness, clever men, crafty men, but men who were his inferiors in length of foresight, in humanity, in courage, in sagacity—factious men of all shades, imagined all the while that they were terrifying or imposing on him; that his moderation was the effect of their clever tactics, of their combinations, their concert with Changarnier, their power, their audacity. Profound was their mistake. Not a

move did they make but his eye was upon it; not a device did they weave that his perspicacity did not penetrate. This was especially the case during the year 1851, when, having, as they imagined, completed the web of difficulties which they had woven for him, they began to organise measures for hastening the consummation of their object.

One of the "demonstrations" on the part of the Bourbon partisans in 1851 was setting up the name of the Prince de Joinville as candidate for the Presidency. According to the law then in operation, the election was to take place in 1852, but it was considered advisable to "air" the subject betimes, haply to beget such a feeling as might enable the partisans to dispense with an election altogether, and leave the Legitimists and Orleanists to settle between themselves, without regard for the people, which branch of the family should occupy the throne vacated by Louis Philippe. The year 1852 was, in short, to be a year in which several mines, all directed against the President, were to be exploded. The Bourbonists, in both their sections, were to be "fused;" many gentlemen of the Assembly were continually on the road on business relating to this touching reconciliation of family interests; and the whole power of the family forces was to be brought into play, to follow out any advantage which the turmoil of agitation might cast up. The Socialists and Levellers, or "Red" party, had pretty plainly intimated that *their* intention was neither more nor less than the disruption of all the bonds of society: that, as they could hope for nothing by taking the voice of the nation at large, they would try to plunge everything into blood and anarchy, and effectuate the meaning of their long-avowed principle that property meant robbery.

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