

701
Biography

E 13706

THE LIFE

GENERAL, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR DAVID BAIRD, BART.

G.C.B. K.C. &c. &c.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

RICHARD BENTLEY, NEW BURLINGTON STREET.

(LATE COLBURN AND BENTLEY.)

1832.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY SAMUEL BENTLEY,
Dorset Street, Elyot Street.

CONTENTS

OF

THE SECOND VOLUME.

CHAPTER I.

Lord Cavan assumes the command of the army—Embarrassment with respect to the Beys—Correspondence with General Baird—General Baird's remonstrance against the union of the armies—Suggestions for negotiations at Cairo—Colonel Ramsay's judicious conduct—General Stuart goes to Cairo—Anxiety of Baird to return to India—Lord Elgin's arrival expected—Official news of a general peace—Letter from General Fox in answer to the reference of General Baird—Fresh distribution of forces—Despatches from England—General Baird named second in command of the whole army—Negotiations continued—Arrival of Mr. Stretton—Conferences at Gizeh and Cairo—Abandonment of the Beys—General Stuart's accident—The Beys determine on flight—They quit Gizeh—The Vizier's request—Is superseded—Encamps outside of Cairo, and prepares to take the field . . . 1

CHAPTER II.

Despatches from Lord Wellesley—Expedition to Batavia and Mauritius abandoned—General Baird's solicitude to return to India as soon as possible—Sir Home Popham appointed political commissioner in the Red Sea—His arrival—General Baird's distress for money—Application for assistance to Lord Cavan refused—Draws bills on the East India Company—Letter of the Pacha of Egypt—Account of the signing of the definitive treaty—Evacuation of Egypt—Letter of Lord Ho-

bent to General Fox—Movements consequent upon its receipt
 —Suggestions of General Baird—Purchase of horses—Departure
 from Alexandria—Gizeh—Visit to the Pacha—The
 Pacha's visit in return—The Desert—Arrival at Suez—Ap-
 pearance of the plague—Great activity of Sir Home Popham—
 Letter to him—Letter to Lord Cavan—General Baird sails in
 His Majesty's ship Victor from Suez—Arrival at Kosseir—
 Mocha—Madras Roads—Departure for Calcutta . . . 39

CHAPTER III.

General Baird arrives at Calcutta—His reception there—
 Marks of distinction conferred on the native troops—General
 Baird removed at his own request to the staff of the Madras
 army—Appointed to the command of a division—March to
 Arcot—Neglect of the collector of the district—Continuation
 of March—Arrival at the Pass—Reaches the banks of the
 Toombudra—General Welleseley joins the army—Great dimi-
 nution of General Baird's division in consequence thereof—
 General Baird applies to be relieved—Obtains leave of absence
 —Proceeds to Fort St. George—Quits India in disgust—
 Arrival at St. Helena—Intelligence of War between England
 and France—Takes his passage in a South Sea whaler—Is
 captured by a French privateer—Recaptured off Coruña—
 Arrives in England—Appointed to a command in the Eastern
 District of England under Sir James Craig . . . 69

CHAPTER IV.

Sir David Baird removed from the Eastern District—Ap-
 pointed to command an expedition against the Cape of Good
 Hope—Letter of Lord Castlereagh—Proceeds to Cork—Arrival
 of Sir Home Popham—Sailing of the expedition—Arrival at
 Funchal—St. Salvador—Loss of two ships—Death of Brigadier
 General Yorke—Departure for the Cape—Arrival there—
 Landing—General Beresford detached to Saldanah Bay—
 March of the troops—Action with the enemy under General
 Janssens—Their defeat—Despatch of Sir David Baird to Lord

Castlereagh — General Janssens retires into the country — Sir David Baird marches upon Cape Town — Surrender of Cape Town — Operations against General Janssens — Letter to him — Result thereof — Negotiations — Termination of them by the surrender of General Janssens and the whole of his force — General Baird assumes the Government — Report of French expedition against the Cape — Departure of General Janssens and the garrison for Holland — Capture of the French frigate *La Volontaire* 84

CHAPTER V.

Fresh accounts of the French fleet — Its departure for the West Indies — Sir Home Popham's plan of attacking the South American Colonies developed to Sir David Baird — His reluctance to accede to the request of Sir Home for troops — Statements of Sir Home — Sir David Baird ultimately consents — Letter to Colonel Gordon — Departure of the expedition — Letter of Sir Home Popham to Mr. Marsden — Internal administration of the Cape — Wise regulations of Sir David Baird — Improvements of the colony — Intimation of recall by the Whig ministers — Acknowledgement of his despatches by Mr. Windham — Success of the South America expedition — Sir David sends reinforcements to General Beresford — Disastrous events at Buenos Ayres — Capitulation of the English — Sir Home Popham recalled — Sir David Baird recalled — Quits the Cape of Good Hope — Addresses presented to him — Sails for England — Arrives there 132

CHAPTER VI.

Change of ministry — Sir David Baird's letter to Lord Castlereagh — Treaty of Tilsit — Anticipated consequences of the alliance between Russia and France — Demand of the English Government for the deposit of the Danish fleet — Expedition to the Sound — Sir David Baird appointed to the command of a division — Sailing of the expedition under Lord Cathcart and Admiral Gambier — Landing and movements of the army —

Conclusion of the negotiations — The siege commenced — Attack of Copenhagen — Sir David Baird twice wounded — Flag of truce — Capitulation — Lord Cathcart's despatch — Return of the expedition to England — Sir David Baird appointed to the command of the camp of instruction in Ireland — Proceeds to Dublin 178

CHAPTER VII.

Sir David Baird removed from Dublin — Ordered to take the command of an expedition to Spain — Proceeds to Cork — Sails with the army to Coruña — Arrival there — Disappointments — Correspondence between Sir David Baird and Sir John Moore — Sir David Baird reaches Astorga 198

CHAPTER VIII.

Continuation of correspondence with Sir John Moore — Observations on Sir Walter Scott's Life of Napoleon and Colonel Napier's Work — Colonel Sorell's Notes — Sir David Baird visits Leon — Interview with Romana — General Moore resolves on retreating — Defeat of Castanos — Remonstrances of Romana — Lord Londonderry's interview with Sir John Moore — Mr. Frere's letter — Retreat commenced 235

CHAPTER IX.

Communication with Don Thomas Morla — Colonel Charmilly — Dismissal — Mr. Frere's letters — Sir David Baird's opinion — Lord Londonderry's view of the case — Continuation of Sir John Moore's correspondence — Colonel Sorell's Notes — Sir Walter Scott's Life of Napoleon — Colonel Symes visits the Marquis de la Romana — His report — Change of Affairs 265

CHAPTER X.

Fresh intelligence received by Sir John Moore — Change of plans consequent thereupon — Despatches from Mr. Frere — Sir

John Moore moves to Castronuevo—Sir David Baird to Benavente—Affairs with the enemy—Gallant conduct of English cavalry—Forward movement decided upon—Abandoned—Retreat commenced	290
--	-----

CHAPTER XI.

Point of embarkation of the army changed—Passage of the bridge of Otero del Rey—Difficulties of the retreat—Privations of the troops—Halt at Betanzos—Arrival before Coruña—Proceedings there—Attack of the French—Details of the battle—Sir David Baird leads his division into action—Is severely wounded—Sir John Moore wounded—Sir David compelled to quit the field—Proceeds on board the <i>Ville de Paris</i> —His left arm amputated at the shoulder—Colonel Sorell's detail of events—Death of Sir John Moore—Despatch of General Hope to Sir David Baird—Sir David's letter to Lord Castlereagh—Arrival in England—Sir David invested with the red riband	317
---	-----

CHAPTER XII.

Motions of thanks to Sir David Baird in both Houses of Parliament—Sir David's reply—Retires into the country—Created a Baronet—Marries—Removes to Scotland—Visits London—Prefers his claims to a military peerage—They remain unnoticed—Appointed to the command of the army in Ireland—Letter to the Duke of York—Sir David's opinions upon the state of that country—He is sworn of the Privy Council—Visit of King George the Fourth to Dublin—Sir David renews his claim to the Peerage—Reduction of the troops in Ireland—Sir David's remonstrance—Lord Wellesley appointed Lord Lieutenant—Command reduced to that of a Lieutenant-General—Sir David returns to England—Letter to the Duke of York—His Royal Highness's answer—Letter from Mr. Peel—Sir David	
---	--

meets with a serious accident—Consequent illness—Appointed Governor of Fort George—Attends the King's levee—Retires to Edinburgh—Increased illness—Is removed to Fern Tower—Temporary amendment—Suffers a relapse—His Death—Concluding observations, and details 348

APPENDIX.

No. I. Letter of General Janssens, announcing to the Dutch Government the capture of the Cape of Good Hope, January 27, 1806 384

No. II. Letter from Joseph Marryat, Esq. Chairman of the Committee of the Patriotic Fund, to Sir David Baird, April 16, 1806 412

No. III. Letter addressed by Colonel Sorell to Sir Walter Scott, October 1827 414

No. IV. Letter of Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore, dated Astorga, 29th Nov. 1806 430

No. V. Account of the Defeat of General Blake's army, transmitted by Captain, now Colonel Pasley, C.B. 17th Nov. 1808 434

ERRATA.

VOL. II.

P. 11, line 3, for "deserts" read "desert."

P. 14, line 2, for "objects" read "object."

P. 47, note, line 14, for "was voted" read "were voted."

P. 117, line 23, for "Pellaw" read "Patton."

P. 261, line 1, *et passim*, for "Major-General Stewart" read "Brigadier-General Stewart."

P. 300, line 20, for "was deep and universal" read "were."

P. 302, line 9, after the word "division" read "will recollect."

THE LIFE

OF

GENERAL, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR DAVID BAIRD, BART.

G.C.B., K.C., &c. &c.

CHAPTER I.

LORD CAVAN ASSUMES THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY—EMBARRASSMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE BEYS—CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL BAIRD—GENERAL BAIRD'S REMONSTRANCE AGAINST THE UNION OF THE ARMIES—SUGGESTIONS FOR NEGOCIATIONS AT CAIRO—COLONEL RAMSAY'S JUDICIOUS CONDUCT—GENERAL STUART GOES TO CAIRO—ANXIETY OF BAIRD TO RETURN TO INDIA—LORD ELGIN'S ARRIVAL EXPECTED—OFFICIAL NEWS OF A GENERAL PEACE—LETTER FROM GENERAL FOX IN ANSWER TO THE REFERENCE OF GENERAL BAIRD—FRESH DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES—DESPATCHES FROM ENGLAND—GENERAL BAIRD NAMED SECOND IN COMMAND OF THE WHOLE ARMY—NEGOCIATIONS CONTINUED—ARRIVAL OF MR. STRETTON—CONFERENCES AT GIZEH AND CAIRO—ABANDONMENT OF THE BEYS—GENERAL STUART'S ACCIDENT—THE BEYS DETERMINE ON FLIGHT—THEY QUIT GIZEH—THE VIZIER'S REQUEST—IS SUPERSEDED—ENCAMPS OUTSIDE OF CAIRO AND PREPARES TO TAKE THE FIELD.

THE first intimation which General Baird received of the actual departure of Sir John Hutchinson, and the delivery over (without farther communication with him) of the command of the *whole* army to Lord

Cavan, was conveyed to the General in a letter which Lord Cavan wrote in reply to that of which M. Rosetti was the bearer, or rather, to that which General Baird forwarded by express, addressed to General Hutchinson, but which, of course, his successor in authority opened.

In reply to General Baird's letter, Lord Cavan replied, that with regard to the presents sent from Constantinople, he left it entirely to the General's superior judgment and discretion, whether to accept or decline them, although he admitted that there was one point upon which he was clearly decided, (which in fact was the only material one,) namely, that no present should be accepted from any Turk actually in Egypt, pending the negotiations respecting the Mamelukes.

Lord Cavan expressed himself not a little embarrassed by the position in which he found himself left by Sir John Hutchinson, with respect to these people, (whose number now exceeded two thousand,) and his Lordship expressed his regret to General Baird that Sir John's explanatory letter upon the subject contained in reality no explanation at all of his wishes, or his views, or his intentions concerning them. This termination to an affair, in which Sir John Hutchinson had, as Commander-in-chief, taken so decided a line, and assumed so high a tone, could not fail to be somewhat disappointing to all parties. But the Beys, even thus abandoned as they certainly appeared to be, were still sure of one unflinching and uncompromising friend and

advocate in the person of the gallant subject of our memoir.

The day before Sir John Hutchinson quitted Egypt he wrote to General Baird, regretting the indispensable necessity of his immediate departure, suggesting it as probable that Lord Cavan would not remain in Egypt more than a month or six weeks from the time of his going. Sir John had seen the officer who was the bearer of the Grand Vizier's official letter, in which he demanded the delivery of the Beys who were in the possession of the English, and concluded his career in Egypt, as he himself says, by giving the Vizier's messenger no satisfaction, but, on the contrary, ordering him, not only out of his presence immediately, but out of Alexandria in a quarter of an hour. And it must be admitted that this last active measure, which Sir John took to exhibit his disposition towards the enemy and oppressor of the Beys, however honest and natural, was not very likely to conciliate his Highness's favour or materially serve the cause of his intended victims after Sir John should have quitted the country.

Although Sir John Hutchinson was resolved to maintain to the last the tone he had at first assumed towards the Vizier, he was in point of fact very apprehensive that the affair would cause great irritation, and probably something more serious; and although he had at the time thought it judicious to write the monitory letter to the Grand Vizier which has already been submitted to the

reader, he expressed in confidence to General Baird his entire conviction of the impossibility of acting up to the spirit of his threats, or of dispossessing the Turks of Cairo, in case they should offer resistance.

Sir John indeed seemed to have made up his mind that the fate of the unfortunate Beys was sealed, more especially as just at this juncture a report of the proclamation of a peace between England and France had reached Egypt, which, if true, would naturally crush the last remaining hope that could be entertained for their preservation by the continuance of a British force in that country, which the ratification of the rumoured treaty would not only render needless, but of course wholly out of the question.

On the 6th of November, as we have already stated, Lord Cavan assumed the command of the whole army; and upon that day the Capidan Pacha informed his Lordship of his intended departure from Alexandria, stating that he should send Isaac Bey and his secretary to his Lordship on the following morning, to enter into negotiations: but Lord Cavan declined seeing them, unless they brought an assurance that the Beys at Cairo should be given up. To this the Capidan Pacha merely returned for answer, a repetition of his determination to quit Alexandria, although Lord Cavan had particularly requested him to postpone his departure until some definitive arrangement had been made about the Mamelukes.

Lord Cavan felt that it was too late for him to prevent the Capidan Pacha's going, and his Lordship was particularly desirous of abstaining from any threats or menaces of hostility, for the successful execution of which he did not possess the means.

"I have experience sufficient of this in this late affair," says Lord Cavan, in a letter to General Baird, dated November 7, 1801, "and therefore I must be cautious in what I declare. I do not think myself justified in going to war with the Turks, but I am, I conceive, justified in interrupting every sort of communication with them. I mean, by keeping them at such a distance as to prevent their acting with hostility, even to the total exclusion of them from the harbour of Alexandria, should the Vizier persist in his detention of the Beys."

The letter which contained this passage contained also orders to General Baird from Lord Cavan, as Commander-in-chief of the *united army*.

It had been, as we have before mentioned, the wish and intention of General Baird, whenever the two armies were thus incorporated, to quit Egypt, and it seems, that at one time he intended to proceed to England by the way of Malta; that he subsequently abandoned not only this arrangement, but altogether relinquished his plan of leaving Egypt, we find by a letter which he addressed to Lord Cavan in reply to his Lordship's of the 6th, from which we have just quoted the passage relative to his Lordship's intentions as regarded the Turks.

After having informed Lord Cavan that he had published the general order for blending the two

armies, and replied to some official questions of his Lordship, General Baird proceeds to say, in allusion to the correspondence which was inclosed,—

“Your Lordship is now in possession of my sentiments on this delicate subject, and since the conversation I had the honour to have with you at Alexandria,* circumstances have so materially changed, that I cannot think of deserting the army I brought from India.

“The very disagreeable situation in which we are placed with regard to the Turks, and the hourly expectation I have of receiving orders to return with this army to India, in consequence of the general peace, (the reports of which appear to be generally believed,) *compel* me to remain. It is therefore my duty, in the mean time, to obey your Lordship’s commands; and I shall on all occasions forward the service to the utmost of my power.

“Your Lordship,” continues General Baird, “is pleased to mention, that ‘you do not think yourself justified in going to war with the Turks; but you do conceive yourself justified in interrupting every sort of communication with them, by keeping them at such distance, as to prevent their acting with hostility, even to the total exclusion of them from the harbour of Alexandria, should the Vizier persist in his detention of the Beys.’ Permit me, my Lord, to call your attention to the situation of the army I have brought from India, and which I have to presume, will be ordered to return by way of the Red Sea, most probably by the very first despatch from England.

“Through this country we can only march as *friends* or *enemies*. If as enemies, we must necessarily form an alli-

* Probably announcing his determination to quit Egypt in the event of the union of the armies.

ance with the Mamelukes for mutual support, or we must embark for England.

“Your Lordship has done me the honour to repeat the expression of your reliance upon receiving every assistance from my advice and experience. Your Lordship may rest assured I shall at all times be happy to afford you such assistance as may be in my power, and I will avail myself of the present occasion to suggest to your Lordship, the propriety of sending an able negociator to his Highness the Vizier, in order to have matters amicably settled. It might perhaps be done with advantage to the Beys, by obtaining a pension or a sum of money for them, with permission for them to reside in any country they please, as the Turks seem determined to get them out of Egypt. By this measure, the honour of the British nation may be saved, and harmony restored between us and the Vizier: but this suggestion I only presume to offer, under the supposition that nothing regarding the Mamelukes is specifically mentioned in the treaty of peace, which it seems generally believed has been signed. I need not add, that should it meet your Lordship’s approbation, no time is to be lost in setting it on foot, and none so proper as the present, immediately after your Lordship’s assuming the chief command.”

To this letter Lord Cavan replied on the 9th, and after acknowledging its receipt, his Lordship says:—

From the private conversation I had with you before I was in command, I really confess to you I did not feel easy at the idea of your declining to act in any military command, when the two armies were united. Your letter of yesterday has entirely relieved me, and I personally am thankful to you for your expressions of readiness to assist

me with your counsel and advice on all occasions to forward the service.

Believe me, I am sincere, I did not assume the command of the two armies as one, from any selfish motive of extending or increasing my authority, but solely on a principle, that under existing circumstances, I was acting according to the rules of the service, and that had I not so done, a precedent might have been established, that hereafter might be attended with great inconvenience.

I wrote to you early this morning,* requesting you would order a Djerm to Rahamanie, for Brigadier General Stuart to-morrow, whom I send by that route to the Grand Vizier at Cairo, as the shortest and most expeditious. He carries a letter from me to his Highness, and will be able to express my ideas, and make many arrangements better than can be done by letter; adhering, at the same time, to my original resolution, that the liberation of the Beys is the *sine quâ non* to atone for the insult given, and to restore friendship and harmony between us. From communications I have had through Isaac Bey, from the Capidan Pacha, I have great hopes of obtaining their liberation.

A French schooner from Terrente arrived yesterday with letters for General Menou. She brings news of the universal rejoicings in England and France, on account of the peace, the preliminaries of which were signed in London on the 1st of October by Lord Malnesbury and M. Otto.

The certainty of the conclusion of peace naturally increased the anxiety of General Baird for the fate of his unhappy adherents; the General, however, had ascertained, that the report of the murder of one of the Beys at Cairo was not true; this circumstance, and Lord Cavan's hint of a probability

* After the receipt of General Baird's letter and suggestion.

that their deliverance might yet be effected, gave him some little hope; but scarcely sufficient to counteract in any very satisfactory degree the apprehensions he so rationally and seriously entertained.

The reader will recollect the visit of Colonel Ramsay to the Grand Vizier, and the earnestness with which his Highness repelled the charge of assassination; but however anxious he might then have appeared to exonerate himself from the horrible imputation, he never, in his subsequent communications with Sir John Hutchinson, could be brought to any definite point with respect to the Mamelukes, whom he still seemed to consider as subjects and even slaves of the Porte; although he continued to state (and continued to force *them* to state also), that they were willing subjects, and so happy under the mild rule of their own Government, that they would on no account quit Cairo, to go to Gizeh and place themselves under the protection of the English; while on the other hand, it was but too evident that those who were already under the protection of the English, and at Gizeh, could by no means be persuaded to go to Cairo, and submit themselves to the Grand Vizier.

From a letter which General Baird, about this period, addressed to Colonel Ramsay, containing an extract from a letter of Lord Cavan's, highly approving of that officer's conduct, we find that General Baird, upon receiving authentic intelligence of the actual conclusion of the treaty of peace, immediately began to make arrangements for proceeding to India,

with the army under his command. The General's intention, in case the despatches, which were hourly expected from England, should direct the return of the troops to the various Presidencies to which they belonged, was to proceed by the route they had taken in coming, and to embark again at Kosseir. His principal motive for adopting his former line of march, was his anxiety to escape the plague season, which was fast approaching, by quitting the Delta as expeditiously as possible, and moving towards Upper Egypt.

If the orders for their return, however, should not arrive as he anticipated, the General was prepared to try the route by Suez and the Red Sea; in the possibility of which alternative, he directed Colonel Ramsay to make every requisite inquiry as to the number of camels, water-bags, and other actual necessities that could be procured for the march across the Desert; as well as to the practicability of establishing posts on the way to Suez, and the extent of provisions which might be supplied for the army at that place.

In reply to these inquiries, Colonel Ramsay informed the General, that he heard from good authority that the Arab chiefs, who are accustomed to furnish camels and mules for the large caravans, travelling with merchandize from Cairo to Suez, would be able to supply an adequate number for the army: which intelligence, coupled with the almost equally important announcement, that as the coldness of the season permitted meat to be kept

good for three days, by killing bullocks and sheep for the march, at Gizeh, the necessity of establishing posts across the deserts, would be in a great degree if not altogether obviated, was extremely agreeable to General Baird.

A detachment under Lieutenant Annesly, which had recently crossed the desert in four short days' marches, and which could, had it been necessary, have accomplished the *trajet* in three, found no difficulty whatever to impede its progress; the road from Suez, until just in the neighbourhood of Cairo, being hard and good for marching on, and the weather not at all too hot for moving troops during the day-time. Water they did not meet with; but that circumstance having been ascertained, the remedy was easily provided during so short a journey.

In the mean while, Lord Cavan continued extremely uneasy with respect to the Beys and Mamelukes. General Stuart had been gone eight days on the 17th of November, and his Lordship had received no intelligence from him. Two letters which have been already noticed, which the Vizier wrote to General Hutchinson, had reached Lord Cavan, containing, as the reader is aware, a detailed account of the happy contentedness of the captives, and the statement that they preferred proceeding to Constantinople, to going over to Gizeh.

A letter had also been received by Lord Cavan, addressed to General Hutchinson, from Lord Elgin, our ambassador at the Porte, announcing his intended arrival at Alexandria; and a similar announcement

was made by his Excellency to the Capidan Pacha. The proposal of a visit from Lord Elgin was extremely agreeable to Lord Cavan, because he naturally looked forward to some definitive arrangement of the difficulty in which it was but too clear the English were involved with the Turks. Indeed, Lord Elgin in his letter stated that he had received instructions from England relative to the final settlement of that affair. Lord Elgin stated his intention of embarking at Constantinople, in His Majesty's ship *Niger*, on the 26th of October.

During all this period, the anxiety which General Baird had evinced in his request to Colonel Ramsay to make every inquiry with respect to the facilities of marching by Suez, in case of being delayed in Egypt, preyed considerably upon his mind; he felt convinced that the immediate removal of *his* army would be the natural consequence of the peace. He knew that if that removal were ordered to take place forthwith, it would be impossible to sail by the Red Sea, the season for leaving which, does not generally begin before the end of February at the earliest; while on the other hand, the route by Kosseir would at that period of the year entail upon the troops a march of nearly seven hundred miles—a march which the General was convinced, by experience of what they *did* encounter, the army could not accomplish under three months.

In addition to the urgency of the case as concerned the great loss of time to the troops and their gallant commander, whose services could now no longer be

required in Egypt, there was another consideration by no means to be overlooked. The East India Company were sustaining a monthly expense of no less a sum than £40,000 for the maintenance of the shipping necessarily detained in the Red Sea, for the re-embarkation of the troops. Let us add to these circumstances, the fact, to which the General referred in his letter to Colonel Ramsay, that the plague season in the Delta was close at hand ; that in point of fact, that destructive malady had actually made its appearance in the camp, and that the speedy removal of the army to Upper Egypt, while it diminished the expenditure of the Company, and restored the troops to a sphere of action in which their services might be made available to the country, would rescue perhaps thousands of brave men from the effects of the most tremendous disease with which human nature is assailed; and we shall not be surprized at General Baird's anxiety. Such indeed was the General's conviction of the vital importance of despatch, that he addressed a letter to his Excellency General Fox, Commander-in-chief at Malta, on the subject.

Pressing as were the emergencies by which General Baird was surrounded, and careful as he might have been of the resources of the East India Company, the reader, who by this time must be pretty well acquainted with his character, and quite aware of his love of activity and thirst for glory, may perhaps perceive in this constant solicitude for removal from a service in which no opportunity of distinguishing himself could offer, a still

more honourable desire of accomplishing, by his speedy return, the never-forgotten objects of his ambition, the original design of the expedition against Mauritius and Bourbon. In fact, although by his ready and conscientious performance of every duty required of him, nobody would have suspected it, his expectations had been frustrated, and his hopes disappointed. The assumption of the general command of the army by Lord Cavan, had necessarily reduced him to a situation comparatively of no importance; the regiments composing his force were to be scattered and divided; and the sepoy, whose faith and confidence in *him* were unbounded, were to be marched to Alexandria, to join the garrison of that place.

But it was not these matters which chiefly preyed upon his mind and spirits; it was the reflection, that after having overcome all the difficulties of the march, he had found the war, in fact, ended—and that he had arrived only in time to witness the surrender by capitulation of the last hold of the French upon Egypt. Yet in the midst of all these mortifications, and the personal annoyances which the new arrangements of the army for so many reasons occasioned him, such was the universal confidence reposed in his honour and sincerity, his energy and his discipline, that in this instance (and indeed throughout the whole of the correspondence with which this memoir is so copiously illustrated,) it will be found, that although actuated by a high spirit of independence and conscientiousness, and by an ardent affection for his sol-

diers, and an assiduous attention to their comfort and welfare, and that the matters in dispute were freely and largely discussed, every man connected with the existing question, whatever it may be, expresses himself satisfied that no personal feeling or private pique would ever be suffered by General Baird to interfere, in the slightest degree, with the good of the service to which he was so heartily, so honestly, and so entirely devoted.

With respect to the negotiations of General Stuart during the period of his residence at Cairo, they appear to have been extremely successful; for on the 10th of November, being a week after his departure from Alexandria, we find that the Vizier, after conferences and a correspondence which lasted only two days, gave up the Beys who were at Cairo (although with a very bad grace); and that, in consequence of his decision, Ibrahim Bey, attended by a Turkish officer, and Stephano the interpreter to the Porte, together with *ten* other Beys, and their followers, proceeded to Gizeh.

At this period a new difficulty arose—one of meaner importance, perhaps, but which embarrassed General Baird considerably. The surrender of the Beys, and the consequent eagerness with which their followers sought the protection of the English, which had been so justly and promptly afforded them, had so increased the number of refugees, that it became a question of some consequence to ascertain what means were to be applied to their subsistence, and whether the charges actually in course of accumula-

tion under that head were to be borne by the English Government, or the East India Company.

Considering the benefits which both armies (before they were united) had received from the faithful fulfilment of all the engagements entered into with their adherents and allies, it seemed to Lord Cavan only just and equitable that each party should keep a separate account of its peculiar expenditure, and that all matters connected with the subject should be left to an ulterior settlement between the King's Government at home, and the East India Company, in case it should turn out that Lord Elgin, upon his arrival in Egypt, was not authorized to make any definitive arrangement on the spot.

The Grand Vizier had, in the early part of the negotiations, promised, as he said, out of affection for the British Government, to maintain the Beys himself; but as General Baird anticipated, when matters drew to a conclusion, his promise was forgotten, and although General Stuart particularly urged his Highness upon that particular point, he could obtain no satisfactory answer up to the 29th of November.

Till that time, all the Beys had maintained themselves and their personal followers, excepting Solyman Aga, who having been plundered by the Turks of every thing he possessed, was considered by Colonel Ramsay to have a full claim to be provided for, from the period of his claiming and receiving his protection at Gizeh. The restoration of his property was also made a point of, by General Stuart;

but he succeeded in recovering only a very small portion of it from the Grand Vizier.

In order to shew in its true colours the real character of Turkish diplomacy, and the just idea which the high functionaries of the Sublime Porte have, or had at that time, of the solemn obligations of a great and powerful Government, it will be necessary to inform the reader, that the Grand Vizier having, on the 16th of November, surrendered the captive Beys with great formality to the English officers, expressed his most earnest desire, on the 25th of the same month, that they should again return to Cairo; affecting to look upon the serious demand made for their liberation by General Stuart, in the name of the British Government, as a mere political fulfilment of a point of honour, which he seemed quite sure the General would feel to have been completely satisfied by his Highness having sent the prisoners over to Gizeh to drink coffee with him; implying, if not actually stating, his understanding, that after that ceremony had been concluded they were to have been sent back to him, justifying the probability of this supposition by an observation strikingly characteristic of Turkish policy, that by thus securing the Beys for a week or ten days, the English would have entirely acquitted themselves of any breach of faith, to a sufficient extent, to satisfy the urgency of the case, and to have fulfilled the promises and redeemed the pledges which they had given to their confiding allies.

It would be impossible to describe in adequate

terms the disgust and indignation expressed by General Stuart when this paltry subterfuge was reported to him : the only effect he suffered it to produce upon his conduct was, the strengthening his determination, and hastening his measures with regard to the settlement of the Beys out of the power of the Vizier ; and although his Highness endeavoured to delay any farther discussion until the arrival of M. Rosetti, from whose mediation (although apparently friendly to the Beys) his Highness appeared to have very great hopes, General Stuart continued to press for a decision, urging as the certain consequence of delay the establishment of the Beys in Upper Egypt, whence no power could remove them, and where, after what had occurred, the authority of the Turkish Government would immediately be much weakened, and, in all probability, eventually annihilated.

Lord Cavan in the midst of these negotiations still continued anxiously expecting Lord Elgin ; for until his arrival he felt a difficulty, (notwithstanding the shameful conduct of the Grand Vizier,) in permitting the Beys to proceed to Upper Egypt to lay the foundation of a powerful opposition to the Turkish influence there, while his Highness expressed such an anxiety that they should not, at all events, yet be permitted to do so. Accordingly, his Lordship requested General Baird to direct Colonel Ramsay (for Lord Cavan believed General Stuart to have been on his return from Gizeh to Alexandria) to recommend to the Beys that they should remain at Gizeh until Lord Elgin's arrival, as, from

the contents of his Excellency's letter, his Lordship entertained strong hopes that the instructions to which he referred, might apply to the settlement of this important part of the question; adding, that as it would facilitate the conferences which might naturally be expected to take place between Lord Elgin and the Beys, he should suggest the probability that their presence might be required at Alexandria, should his Excellency not feel disposed to proceed to Gizeh.

On the 1st of December General Baird received a letter from General Fox, the Commander-in-chief at Malta, in answer to that which he had forwarded through Lord Cavan, with copies of the correspondence which passed between him and General Hutchinson on the subject of the incorporation of the two armies, and which, as the reader will recollect, contained an appeal to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief against the opinions of Lord Cavan and General Hutchinson, by which General Baird was deprived of his command, and indeed, of the troops over whom the command had been before exercised. That letter we submit to the reader, as conveying, with the confirmation of the decision against General Baird, another testimony of the well-founded reliance universally entertained in his zeal for the good of the service.

Malta, 15th Nov. 1801.

SIR,

I am honoured with your letter of 22nd October, enclosing a correspondence with Lieutenant-General Sir John Hutchinson, and Major-General the Earl of Cavan.

I must confess I entirely coincide in opinion with Lieutenant-General Sir John Hutchinson, and Major-General the Earl of Cavan, that there can be but one officer commanding in chief in Egypt, and that the blending the armies together, and forming them into one connected corps, must, as far as I can judge at this distance, be expedient, and for the advantage of His Majesty's service. I must therefore refer you, in all matters, pecuniary ones excepted, to Major-General the Earl of Cavan, who will be the officer commanding in chief upon the departure of Lieutenant-General Sir John Hutchinson, which, I presume, will have taken place long before this reaches you.

I shall transmit your letter, and the correspondence accompanying it, to his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief, by the Ajax, which sails for England to-morrow; but I trust and hope that His Majesty's decisive commands on this subject have been already expedited, which upon their arrival will remove every difficulty. In the mean time, your own assurances, in your letter to Sir John Hutchinson, and your well-known zeal for His Majesty's service, will, I am confident, prevent any inconvenience from arising.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

H. E. FOX.

Immediately after the receipt of this letter, and as it appears not before, Lord Cavan proceeded to issue orders for a change in the disposition of the troops detailed in the following letter.

Alexandria, 30th November 1801.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

As I have received no official accounts from Europe of the peace, nor any instructions for my future conduct in

regard to my command in this country, but judging from the non-official statement of the preliminary terms of the peace, in which it is stipulated that we are to evacuate Egypt in three months after the signing of the definitive treaty, which probably may be distant and uncertain, I have thought it expedient for the good of the service, to change the disposition of the troops under your command according to the enclosed plan, subject to any alteration that you may think necessary to make to me that can better forward the service.

The first of the two divisions of the 10th regiment I wish should march to the caravansera on Friday the 4th of December for Alexandria; the second division on the 5th; the first of the 61st regiment on the 6th; and the second of the 61st on the 7th of December, also for the same place. The two ferries render the divisions bringing much baggage or camp equipage with them extremely inconvenient; you will, therefore, send only a sufficient quantity of tents for one division to the caravansera, where those tents will remain until the last division is past. I will order a sufficient number of tents to be pitched about two miles on this side the Block-house, on Friday evening, the 4th of December, there to remain for each division as it arrives; and will have a sufficient number of tents for the whole of the two regiments immediately on their arrival here, to continue with them until the arrival of their own camp equipage by Djerms from Rosetta. The sooner, therefore, you are able to avail yourself of this fine weather to send some part of the baggage and tents of those regiments the better, even before they march. I will order from hence as many camels and mules as possible, to be at the Block-house on Friday and the following day, on which the divisions march to convey such baggage as the regiments may have to their camps near the Block-house and here.

The guns of the artillery (excepting two at Rosetta and

four at Gizeh) to be at Rhamanhie, together with all the cavalry now with you at the latter place, except a small detachment of dragoons for expresses at Rosetta.

As by these movements your command will be diminished and separated, I will thank you to communicate to me what are your wishes respecting yourself, and I will attend to them. You have Rhamanhie, Gizeh, and this place at your option to remain at. Should you not come here, Colonel Beresford will have the brigade of the 10th and 61st regiments.

I have not time to add more at present, but will write you more fully to-morrow. No movements are to take place, except the 10th and 61st regiments, until you hear farther from me.

I have the honour to be, my dear General,

Your much obliged, faithful, humble servant,

CAVAN, *Maj.-Gen.*

General Baird's answer to this letter, offering, as Lord Cavan had requested him to do, advice upon certain points, was so entirely characteristic of the soldier, and so worthy of the man, that we subjoin it.

*Camp, near El Hamed,
December 1, 1801.*

MY LORD,

I am just honoured with your Lordship's letter of yesterday, and have given the necessary orders for the movements of the 10th and 61st regiments, according to your Lordship's instructions. Colonel Ramsay has been ordered to detain the detachment of the 86th at Gizeh; that of the 10th is ordered down. I shall take every possible step in my power to forward your Lordship's further intentions.

It is necessary, my Lord, for me here to mention, that

in my opinion the 61st regiment can no longer draw the Indian allowances. I beg leave to inclose for your Lordship's information, a copy of the orders of Ministers upon that head. Should, however, your Lordship's opinion differ from mine, I have to request your commands, so as to prevent any confusion hereafter.

I am also to state to your Lordship, from the dispersed state of the troops from India, I apprehend some difficulties may arise and expenses occur in regard to the Paymaster and Commissary of Provisions departments, as it will probably be necessary to appoint deputies at the different stations.†

* * * * *

In the event of the further movements taking place, I conceive it will be absolutely necessary that the whole of the troops from India should make monthly returns to some head, and that musters be taken of them and the followers, agreeable to the regulations of the three different presidencies, so as to ensure regularity of payment and to prevent abuses.

I have the honour to be, &c.

D. BAIRD.

The Right Hon. Earl of Cavan, &c.

On the next day Lord Cavan again wrote a letter to General Baird, from which the following passages are extracts.

“ I was not able to write to you so fully yesterday as I could wish, as a visit from the Turkish Admiral and some official business prevented me.

“ The arrangement I proposed yesterday for the quarters

† The passage which follows, relates to some temporary and local occurrences of no present interest.

of the troops under your command, except the 10th and 61st, I meant not as finally settled.

“I have always thought your camp at Rosetta a bad position to afford any assistance to Alexandria, and nothing prevented my sooner moving it, but the expectation of instructions and a definitive peace. Disappointed in the first, and little appearance of the second being soon concluded, are the motives for deciding me to change it.

“I think it would be best to have each regiment as much collected as possible at one quarter, to obtain which the 80th could be at Gizeh with the whole of the 7th Bombay regiment; the 86th regiment, the Bengal Volunteers, and 1st Bombay regiment at Rhamanhie; and the 88th at Rosetta; the remainder of the 61st here; though as to the latter it would be as well to leave them at Gizeh or Rhamanhie.

“The artillery, as I mentioned yesterday, excepting two guns at Rosetta and four field-pieces at Gizeh, to be at Rhamanhie.

“The cavalry, consisting of a troop of the 8th and the detachment of the 26th dragoons and Hompesch's, with all your spare artillery horses, to be at Rhamanhie; the heavy baggage of the troops to be at Gizeh. Upon this disposition I will thank you to communicate to me your opinion, and to suggest whatever alterations you may think proper.

“I have to request you will send as soon as possible an officer of the Quartermaster-General's department to Rhamanhie, or in the neighbourhood of it, to make choice of the ground for the troops to encamp upon, and to make such reports thereon as may be necessary. As Captain Cox's presence at the above department will not be necessary here with the 10th and 61st regiments, perhaps you will think that he can be well employed upon that service; if so you will be pleased to send him.

“I have had a private letter from General Fox, of the

19th of November. He then had received no official accounts of the peace, at which he appears surprised.

"Lord Elgin embarked with his baggage on the 5th of last month, on board the Niger frigate, at Constantinople; I consequently hourly expect him."

The next day General Baird despatched the following letter to Lord Cavan.

*Camp near El Hamed,
December 2nd, 1801.*

MY LORD,

I am to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of yesterday. I have already done myself the honour to reply in part to that of the 30th ult.

Your Lordship is pleased to mention, that with regard to the disposition of the troops, you will thank me to give my opinion. Availing myself of the latitude you are pleased to allow me, I should think it better for the detachment of the 86th regiment to remain at Gizeh, and the two detachments of the 80th regiment to join at Rhamanie. As to the detachment of the 61st at Gizeh, it appears to me proper, for the reason mentioned by your Lordship respecting each corps being collected as much as possible at one quarter, and as it would also save trouble in the pay and provision departments, that it should join the head-quarters of that regiment.

Captain Cox will immediately proceed to Rhamanie agreeably to your Lordship's instruction, and for the purpose directed.

In your Lordship's letter of the 30th ultimo, you are pleased to say, "that as my command will be now diminished and separated, you would wish me to communicate to you my wishes respecting myself, and that you would attend to them." "That I have the option to remain at

Gizeh, Rhamanhie, or Alexandria, but in case I should decline the latter place, Colonel Beresford will have the brigade of the 10th and 61st regiments." I beg leave to return to your Lordship my best thanks for the very obliging indulgence you are pleased to offer me, but as I conceive it, at present, a circumstance of little consequence where I am stationed, it cannot be to me any matter of choice, and I shall leave it entirely to your Lordship's better judgment, to place me wherever you may think proper.

I have the honour to remain,

Your Lordship's faithful servant,

D. BAIRD.

With regard to striking off the 61st Regiment from the Indian allowances upon the union of the two armies, Lord Cavan differed entirely from General Baird. His Lordship thought that the movement of that regiment (or indeed of any other part of the army which the General brought from India) to Alexandria, and from under his immediate command, did by no means "disentitle them to the continuation of those allowances."

Under the circumstances in which the army was at that period placed, Lord Cavan was decidedly of opinion that it was neither in General Baird's power nor his own, to make any alteration in the pecuniary allowances to corps or individuals, which they had up to that period received from the East India Company. His Lordship stated, that as far as he was concerned, he certainly had no authority to impose any additional expense on the Honourable Company beyond that, which it incurred when it sent a particular

force to Egypt; and thence his Lordship argued, that he could have no right to curtail the troops which belonged to its establishment of the additional emoluments which the Company were accustomed to afford. His Lordship therefore desired that General Baird would continue to issue to the 61st regiment the same allowances as they had received in Egypt before his Lordship assumed the command; and this instruction was equally to apply to every corps and every individual who had come from India upon the expedition.

Lord Cavan agreed in the necessity of mustering the troops from India every month, but he stated that the monthly returns would be forwarded by his Lordship to India, and that all recommendations for vacant commissions were to be made through the Commander-in-chief, General Fox.

The letter in which Lord Cavan makes these communications to General Baird concludes with a reiteration of his Lordship's acknowledgments for the General's continued exertion for the good of the public service.

On the 5th of December Lord Cavan received despatches from General Fox, which induced his Lordship to suspend the movement of the troops, and to write off to General Baird, requesting him to come to him immediately at Alexandria.

"It will not," says Lord Cavan, "be necessary, except to arrange any private concerns of your own, for you to return to Rosetta; you will therefore on your departure leave the command of the troops in your camp at Rosetta

to Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, or to the senior officer there."

"I desired Colonel Auchmuty," continues Lord Cavan, "to communicate to you, that it is not my intention to give you the command of any particular brigade, but that of commanding and superintending the whole under me. I would wish, for their own accommodation, that the troops should be made acquainted that they will in a very few days be ordered to march to Alexandria, and therefore be prepared accordingly.

"Your regiment, the 54th, and its second battalion, are to garrison Gibraltar, with the 2nd or Queen's; the 13th to Malta; the Queen's German regiment (Stuart's), to England; Watteville's and the Chasseurs Britanniques from Malta here; 26th Dragoons to remain here; and Hompesch's to England. These are the principal movements.

"The official letters I have from England, of the 13th of October, reckon on General Hutchinson in command, with Moore, yourself, and Brigadier-General Wellesley under him, and all the other Generals, excepting one Brigadier to Malta, and another to Minorca, are ordered to England."

The official communication of the signing the preliminaries of peace arrived, with the despatches, from which the preceding paragraphs are extracts, in His Majesty's ship *Hind*.

By a letter from Colonel Ramsay, dated Gizeh, the 8th of December, it appears that General Stuart was still at that place, but that nothing was positively concluded; the same system of procrastination and evasion which he had adopted in the earlier part of the negotiation, from the time of releasing the Beys, was rigidly adhered to by the Vizier, who

it was quite evident was endeavouring to gain time till the arrival of Lord Elgin, whose determination he seemed to imagine would be favourable to the Turks. From some indications which the conduct of the Beys betrayed about this time, Colonel Ramsay began to think it not impossible, that they would very shortly withdraw themselves altogether from Gizeh, and proceed of themselves to Upper Egypt without farther consultation with their English allies; and the suspicions which he had begun to entertain, were rather strengthened than decreased by the arrival at Gizeh of three more Beys from Alexandria, where they had left Osman Bey Perdicci to wait the coming of Lord Elgin, with whom he was selected to negotiate.

In the sequel, however, Lord Elgin did not himself arrive. His Lordship despatched Mr. Stretton, the Secretary of Legation at Constantinople, to Egypt in his place, who early in January reached Alexandria, and announced himself to Lord Cavan as being fully authorized by Lord Elgin to treat with the Vizier upon the subject of the Beys, his Excellency being himself prevented by matters of greater importance, from leaving Constantinople at that time.

It appears by a letter of General Baird's to Lord Wellesley, that the terms upon which Mr. Stretton was empowered to treat were these—"That as a *sine quâ non*, the Beys should evacuate Egypt; that they were to have the option of residing in any other province of the Turkish dominions; in England; or in any of the British possessions in India, with pen-

sions to be paid by the Porte, and guaranteed to them, if they desired it, by the British Government."

M. de Noé, (since one of the Peers of France, and for some time in the household and confidence of Charles the Tenth) from whose work relative to the Egyptian expedition we have already made several extracts, who was at this period attached to the personal staff of Colonel Ramsay at Gizeh, and was employed on several missions to the Vizier from that officer, gives a detailed account of the persecution of the Beys, from the beginning of the Egyptian campaign, which is so correct and so interesting, that we regret the impossibility of embodying it in this work. We shall make some quotations from it, and if it should be eventually found possible, give the whole chapter which the Count devotes to this particular subject in an Appendix.

Count de Noé, whose situation afforded him every opportunity of seeing and knowing what was passing, says—

"On the 19th of January Mr. Stretton, the English Secretary of Legation at Constantinople, and Lord Cavan, who thought proper to accompany him, arrived at Gizeh, under a salute from the garrison.

"The Beys, informed of the arrival of the Commander-in-chief, had solicited permission of General Stuart to furnish a house for his Lordship; but to their regret, and from motives which I do not pretend to understand, his Lordship preferred a residence at Cairo—a preference which seemed ominous as regarded the result of the negotiations which were about to be opened.

“ Lord Cavan and Mr. Stretton paid a visit to the Beys, and immediately after entered upon their conference with the Grand Vizier. The unhappy Beys had at this period the misfortune to be deprived of the support of General Stuart, who up to that time had deeply interested himself in their fate, and proved himself their sincere friend. As they were embarking, to cross the Nile to Cairo, he received a kick from his horse, which obliged him to return to his house, and keep his room for several days, which incapacitated him from supporting the claims of the Beys in the conferences to which he would otherwise have been a party; and deprived Lord Cavan of the assistance of a man who knew the circumstances of the case thoroughly, and who, endowed with a strong mind, would have been extremely useful to his Lordship at this particular juncture.

“ Osman Bey Perdicci, Mohammed Elfy Bey, and Achmet Bey, who had escaped from the massacre of their comrades, arrived from Alexandria two days after Lord Cavan, and encamped with their Mamelukes to the north of Gizeh, near the gate of Embaba.

“ On the 23rd of January the Beys began to perceive how little they ought to reckon on a happy issue to their affairs; on the contrary, they saw the ascendancy the Vizier had obtained, and were fully assured of the ultimate result of the deliberations in progress in an interview which Lord Cavan had with Ibrahim, who shortly afterwards called a meeting of his brethren, when they took the resolution of withdrawing themselves to Upper Egypt.

“ General Stuart was very much irritated at what he found was going on, and sent word to Lord Cavan, that since things had taken so adverse a turn, he felt it his duty, as a man of honour, to inform the Beys, so that they might make their arrangements in order to prevent surprise or capture; but they were already decided, and (as Colonel

Ramsay had anticipated) they began to move immediately, and pitched their tents in the first instance close to the Pyramids.

“Never was man more affected than General Stuart was at this unexpected turn of affairs—we had given up the men who up to that moment had afforded the most powerful assistance to the army, to whom the protection of the English Government was pledged, and who naturally thought themselves entitled to claim it. What motive could have induced the English commission to act thus, it is impossible for me to know, but this I can safely say, that the hopes of the Beys and Mamelukes were most cruelly disappointed. There can be no doubt that Mr. Stretton had positive instructions from his Government, which must have been grossly deceived as to the actual state of affairs: to this conclusion I am the more readily drawn by the fact, that at a subsequent period, attempts were made on the part of the English authorities to renew the conferences in favour of the Beys, which, as the Turks had carried their point, were made in vain.

“All the garrison of Gizeh,” continues the Count, “sympathised in the regret of the General, and we saw these brave fellows preparing to leave us with sincere regret. Nothing could be more moving than our separation; ever since October we had constantly lived with them upon terms of the most perfect sociability. How great is the superiority of the Mamelukes over the Turks!—candid, faithful, generous, and brave, they were popular with all of us. We looked upon them, if I may be allowed the expression, as fellow countrymen—it may easily be imagined how much we lamented their departure.

“Before they went, Selim Bey came to take leave of Colonel Ramsay, and to make his acknowledgment for all the kindnesses the Colonel had bestowed upon him and his,

which, with tears in his eyes, he assured him he should never forget. He begged the Colonel to accept as a small token of his friendship a gold Roman coin, which had been in his possession for a long time—"Keep it," said he, "keep it in remembrance of one who owes you everything; it is the only thing in the world I have left which is at all worthy of your acceptance."

"In the evening Colonel Ramsay returned his visit, and found him seated under a tree surrounded by his Mamelukes; the Turks had not left him a single tent. He was still suffering from the effects of the illness with which, it will be remembered, he was afflicted when he first arrived at Gizeh, but his spirits had rallied since he thought he saw a probability of revenging himself upon his cruel enemies. The Colonel gladly took this opportunity of making him a present, which he knew would be agreeable to him; he ordered a dozen tents to be sent to him immediately, of which he begged his acceptance.

"The Beys fled, and before their departure, announced to General Stuart, that since they found they were abandoned by Lord Cavan, they felt themselves entirely free to act as they pleased; but in order to show their respect to the English, they would not commence operations against the Turks until after they had reached Syout; that they would not even halt till they arrived at that place, but that if the Turks harassed them on their way thither, they should repel force by force."

This extract contains a detail of circumstances, probably not known at the time either to Lord Cavan or General Baird; certainly we find no mention made in any official letters of more than the fact, that the Beys withdrew themselves from Gizeh on the night of the 24th, and that they had esta-

blished themselves in force, amounting to about four thousand Mamelukes, near Bemsouef.

As soon as their flight was made known to the Vizier, his Highness requested the aid of a British force to pursue them ; but to this request, neither Lord Cavan nor Mr. Stretton thought themselves at liberty to accede. The Vizier then suggested, that a body of Turkish troops might be admitted into Gizeh, or that the English should evacuate it altogether ; both of these propositions were also rejected, on the ground that it would not be advisable to mix the British and Turkish troops together in so small a garrison ; and that the evacuation of it was wholly out of the question, as it was the principal *depôt* for the English stores of every description.

After Lord Cavan and Mr. Stretton quitted Gizeh, the Vizier made a similar application to General Baird, who, after consulting Lord Cavan, returned an answer to a similar effect with those which his Highness had already received upon the same subject.*

Up to the middle of February, it appears that no collision had actually taken place between the Beys and the Turks, although it was impossible to say how soon hostilities might break out. General Baird's anxiety and hope were, that he might be able to quit the country without being forced into taking part with either side ; indeed, it would have been scarcely

* It seems that Lord Cavan, although he refused to deliver up Gizeh to the Grand Vizier, did actually restore Fort Ibrahim to him.

possible for him to have acted in opposition to the Mamelukes, who had conducted themselves so admirably.

The treatment these people met with, we must admit, reflects no great credit on our national character. Lord Cavan clearly had no option left, after Mr. Stretton arrived with positive instructions for his conduct in the negotiations; but it is curious to find his Lordship, having taken the trouble to go to Cairo, so readily acquiescing in the proposed arrangements, while in his letter we find a fervent, and of course, sincere expression of hopes, that "no political object might interfere with the safety and protection of the Mamelukes."

Shortly after this, the Turks appear to have made an insurrectionary attack upon Gizeh, which was easily quelled. General Stuart quitted it on the 28th of January, Lord Cavan on the 30th, and both returned to Alexandria; and very soon after, the Grand Vizier himself prepared to leave Cairo, the Porte having appointed his successor, Mohammed Yousouf Pacha, with the rank and character of Viceroy. This personage arrived at Cairo, in February, and the Vizier immediately encamped his army outside of Cairo, and gave orders for it to hold itself in readiness to march.*

* Count de Noé mentions a circumstance which exhibits in a striking point of view the scrupulous honour of the Beys, and the rigid honesty of the inferior Arabs. Sir William Burroughs, formerly Advocate-General in Bengal, (created a baronet December 1st, 1801,) arrived at Gizeh about the

It does not fall within our province in this narrative, to pursue minutely the history of the conflicts

end of March, having travelled from India by the route which General Baird's army had taken. When he embarked on the Nile at Ghennah, his servant left behind him in the house where they were lodged, a small case, or box, which contained jewels, trinkets, money, bills, and other valuable articles; the lock had been injured, and it might be opened without any difficulty, and unluckily the servant did not discover its loss until they had proceeded a considerable distance down the river.

When Sir William reached Gizeh, he mentioned the circumstance to Colonel Ramsay, and begged him to interest himself in the matter with Ibrahim and Selim Bey; the Colonel immediately wrote and despatched his letter by a courier, not without some uneasiness for his safety in a time of such commotion in the country. Nevertheless, before that letter could reach its destination, the Sheik of Ghennah, to whom the box had been delivered, gave notice of it to Ibrahim, who immediately ordered the son of one of the Bedouin chiefs to proceed to Cairo by the desert (to avoid the Turks), and to carry the box to Colonel Ramsay, to whom he wrote, expressing the pleasure he felt, in having it in his power to do anything by which he might prove his gratitude for the favour and kindness with which he had been loaded. "I received the casket," says Count de Noé, "by the Colonel's orders, and although it was open, and the lid only fastened by a string sealed with Ibrahim's seal, it proved, according to the inventory left in my hands by Sir William Burroughs, that nothing whatever was missing."

"The Arab required a receipt which should set forth that the box had been delivered in the state in which it was sent, and an answer to the letter of Ibrahim Bey, both of which Colonel Ramsay gave him, and moreover offered him a reward for himself; this the Arab refused, because, as he told us, Ibrahim had strictly prohibited his receiving any." — *Expedition, &c.* p. 253, 254.

between the Turks and the Beys any farther, although the details are particularly interesting. They continued for a considerable time a desultory warfare with the Turks, and having subsequently accumulated a considerable force, defeated them in many engagements, and, if the English had not interfered, would have exterminated them in Upper Egypt altogether.

After this, an armistice was agreed upon between them, and in that interval the Turks, utterly regardless of the pacific engagement they had entered into, formed the design of surprising the camp of the Mamelukes by night, and putting every man of them to the sword. This barbarous plot, however, was discovered to the Mamelukes by an Arab, and when the night closed in, they quietly left the camp and posted themselves in ambuscade at some little distance from it.

When the Turks arrived and found the camp deserted, they betook themselves to plunder, and in the midst of the confusion which naturally ensued, the Mamelukes fell upon them and destroyed upwards of two thousand of them. In addition to this mishap, it seems that eight thousand Albanians, who were sent to Fiume to oppose the Mamelukes, deserted to them, and that in consequence of this reinforcement they resolved to quit Upper Egypt and form a junction with the British troops still at Alexandria. In this design they were successfully opposed by the Grand Vizier, and were subsequently made to understand that they were to expect no

assistance from the English, whose only object was to bring the Porte to terms with them by amicable means.

Subsequently, the Beys advanced to Gizeh, where they encamped in great force, and the Albanians at the same time (1803) took possession of Rosetta; they afterwards were joined by the Arnauts, who were in a state of rebellion, and the combined armies under the command of Ibrahim Bey, entirely defeated the Turks, and left several thousand of their troops dead on the field. Eventually, they became masters of the whole of Lower Egypt, and finally entered into a negotiation with the Porte declaring their readiness still to acknowledge her Sovereignty, provided the Grand Seignior engaged not to encourage or admit a French force in the country.

It is quite clear, that it must be considered an extremely fortunate circumstance that the Beys and Mamelukes thought proper to act independently of the English at the conclusion of Lord Cavan's and Mr. Stretton's negotiations; for the step they at that period spontaneously took, at once relieved the British Generals from any responsibility, not only as regarded present events, but as related to future circumstances.

CHAPTER II.

DESPATCHES FROM LORD WELLESLEY—EXPEDITION TO BATAVIA AND MAURITIUS ABANDONED—GENERAL BAIRD SOLICITED TO RETURN TO INDIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE—SIR HOME POPHAM APPOINTED POLITICAL COMMISSIONER IN THE RED SEA—HIS ARRIVAL—GENERAL BAIRD'S DISTRESS FOR MONEY—APPLICATION FOR ASSISTANCE TO LORD CAVAN REFUSED—DRAWS BILLS ON THE EAST INDIA COMPANY—LETTER OF THE PACHA OF EGYPT—ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNING OF THE DEFINITIVE TREATY—EVACUATION OF EGYPT—LETTER OF LORD HOBART TO GENERAL FOX—MOVEMENTS CONSEQUENT UPON ITS RECEIPT—SUGGESTIONS OF GENERAL BAIRD—PURCHASE OF HORSES—DEPARTURE FROM ALEXANDRIA—GIZEH—VISIT TO THE PACHA—THE PACHA'S VISIT IN RETURN—THE DESERT—ARRIVAL AT SUEZ—APPEARANCE OF THE PLAGUE—GREAT ACTIVITY OF SIR HOME POPHAM—LETTER TO HIM—LETTER TO LORD CAVAN—GENERAL BAIRD SAILS IN HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP VICTOR FROM SUEZ—ARRIVAL AT KOSSEIR—MOCHA—MADRAS ROADS—DEPARTURE FOR CALCUTTA.

ABOUT this time General Baird received a despatch from the Governor-General, Lord Wellesley, dated the 17th of October, 1801, in which his Lordship expresses his entire approbation of the activity, zeal, and judgment manifested in the various arrangements which General Baird had adopted, for concentrating the army under his command at Kosseir, and for supplying it with the means of advancing into Egypt. His negotiations with the Sheriff of

Mecca, Lord Wellesley was also pleased to approve, and to express his opinion that they had had the desired effect of influencing the disposition of that chief in favour of British Interests. .

Lord Wellesley continues :—

I received with particular pleasure the details of the activity, perseverance, military skill and judgment, which enabled the army under your command to surmount the difficulties which opposed its march through the desert from Kosseir to Ghennab.

Lord Wellesley, in the course of this despatch, apprises General Baird of the reasons which induced him to withhold the reinforcements which his Excellency had at first intended for the army. The difficulty of proceeding up the Red Sea at the earliest period of time at which those reinforcements could have embarked, would have prevented their arrival at any point whence they could have proceeded to join the General, until he had made considerable progress in Egypt; and the hazard and difficulty of forming a junction, would have been proportioned to the delay in their arrival, and to the extent of the distance by which they were separated from the advanced part of the army.

Aware, as Lord Wellesley was, of the recent glorious victory of the British army in Egypt, (of which his Lordship had received intelligence,) and in anticipation of entire success in that quarter, his Excellency considered the troops who were with General Baird, fully adequate to the purposes which had

been mentioned by General Hutchinson ; while at the same time, the troubled aspect of affairs in India rendered it extremely imprudent to diminish the military force there. However convincing and satisfactory to General Baird, Lord Wellesley's reasons for not having increased the force under his command might have been, (and as events had turned out, they could not fail to be so, since even the troops who had actually arrived in Egypt had not themselves been called into action ; and since the augmentation would only have increased the charges and difficulties of conveying them back to India ;) there was yet part of the despatch which greatly annoyed and disturbed the General.

Lord Wellesley announced to him, with regard to the ulterior object to be gained by increasing his force, namely, that of proceeding with the army on its return from Egypt direct, to the attack of Batavia or Mauritius, that the great change in public affairs operated by the events which had occurred since the General's departure, together with other considerations connected with the internal state of India, had determined his Excellency to relinquish altogether the intention of carrying into effect both or either of those enterprises.

In consequence of this resolution, it was the Marquess Wellesley's wish, that when the services of General Baird's army should no longer be required in Egypt, or under any other circumstances which might leave the General at liberty to proceed under his former instructions to the attack of either

of those places, he should, instead of doing so, return with the troops, or at least such portion of them as it might not be considered necessary to leave in Egypt, to the nearest port in India.

This was a severe blow upon General Baird, who saw in this decision of the Governor-General, the overthrow of his hopes of service ; however, it was impossible not to admit the prudence of Lord Wellesley's decision, more especially as his Excellency had made application for a reinforcement of troops to the government of the Cape of Good Hope, and had received for answer a statement that it was quite impossible to diminish the garrison of that colony.

Lord Wellesley speaks in terms of high satisfaction at having opened a communication with Sir Home Popham, whose clear and perspicuous details of service connected with the Red Sea, had afforded his Excellency an opportunity of making arrangements, calculated not only to accelerate the movements of the army in its return, but to secure the British interests in that quarter ; and in consequence of the impression made upon his Excellency by the talents and activity of Sir Home, he had confided to that officer the regulation and superintendence of the naval service connected with the expedition.

Lord Wellesley at the same time had invested Sir Home Popham, under the sanction of the Secret Committee of East India directors, with a political commission, for the purpose of negotiating the terms of a permanent alliance and connection between the East India Company and the Arab chieftains occu-

pying the shores of the Red Sea, which negotiation was to provide for any arrangement with the Sheriff of Mecca, whose alliance and co-operation, it may be recollected, General Baird was so anxious to secure.

In consequence of issuing this commission to Sir Home Popham, and of confiding to him the exclusive charge of all political concerns in the Red Sea, Lord Wellesley sent instructions to the Bombay Government to abolish the office of political commissioner there, which had up to that period been held by Colonel Murray; but in order to mark to that officer a just sense of his valuable services, his Excellency directed General Baird to convey to him his entire approbation of his public conduct, and to state to him that the abolition of his office had been resolved upon, merely with a view of uniting all the powers necessary for negotiating with the Arab chiefs, in the hands of the one individual, specially appointed for the purpose by the Secret Committee.

In order to facilitate the proceedings of Sir Home Popham in his diplomatic capacity, Lord Wellesley directed Mehedy Aly Khan to place himself under Sir Home's orders.

Lord Wellesley proceeds in his despatch, to inform General Baird, that the same intelligence, and the same views formed upon receiving it, which had induced him to withhold any further reinforcement of troops, had also led him to issue orders to stop the supply of any more provisions; and then his Lordship continues :—

I entirely approve all the appointments which you have notified in your several despatches; you have anticipated my wishes, in modifying those appointments in such a manner, as to prevent their interfering with the arrangements of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief, with relation to the officers who arrived in the Red Sea with Sir Home Popham.

I am satisfied that you have observed the utmost degree of economy in your expenditure, consistently with the exigencies of the public service; and I have no doubt, that you will continue to pay the same attention which you have hitherto given to that subject.

Lord Wellesley then goes on to suggest, that it would be highly advantageous to the public service in India, if those of His Majesty's regiments on the Indian establishments, which were under General Baird's command, could, during their stay in Egypt, be completed to the regulation strength, by drafts from the regiments which had been sent from England; and his Excellency desires General Baird to communicate his wishes to General Hutchinson (whom he still supposes to be there in command) on the subject, and through him to his Royal Highness the Duke of York; and after some further details of minor importance, the Governor-General thus concludes:—

I cannot close this despatch without renewing to you the assurance of my most cordial approbation of the manner in which you have executed the most important service for which I selected you. I consider your conduct in Egypt to have added to the honour which you had justly acquired by your brilliant services in Mysore; and I antici-

pate, with confidence, the assistance which General Hutchinson will derive from the co-operation of your talents, zeal, and experience, if any exigency should demand your further active service in Egypt.—Your return to India however at the earliest period of time will be highly acceptable to me.

In a subsequent despatch from the Governor-General, dated Lucknow, February 8th, 1802, the following passages occur ; his Lordship says :—

The appointments specified in the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th paragraphs of your letter of the 27th of August, appear to me to have been perfectly proper.

I consider it to be my duty upon this occasion, to express to you the high sense which I entertain of the zeal, fortitude, and ability which have distinguished your conduct in the execution of the arduous duties committed to your charge, since you have held the important command of that part of the army of India, destined to co-operate in the expulsion of the French from Egypt. The successful march of the army under your command through Upper Egypt, under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty, embarrassment, and danger, is to be ascribed principally to your prudence and perseverance, aided by the approved skill and determined spirit of your officers, and by the discipline and firmness of your troops.

It will afford me the highest satisfaction to submit to His Majesty's ministers, and to the honourable the Court of Directors, my cordial approbation of your eminent merits and services, and those of your officers and men, on the late important service.

Although the rapid progress of the British arms under the able conduct of the late Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, and of Lieutenant-General Sir John Hut-

chinson, precluded the troops under your command from participating in the glory of those operations which terminated in the conquest of Egypt, you omitted no exertion to render your approach useful to the common cause ; and if the course of events had required your exertions, and those of the army of India in the field, I am confident that your conduct, and that of your army, would have been correspondent to the character which you have acquired in this quarter of the globe, and to the renown of the British arms in India.

I desire you to consider this despatch as a public record of my thanks to you, and to your army, for your services in the execution of my orders, and you will be pleased to make such notification of these sentiments as you may think proper, to the officers and troops under your command.

Higher testimonials than these could not well be received by man ; and they were the more gratifying coming from Lord Wellesley, as it so happens, that in all his Excellency's despatches to England after the capture of Seringapatam, the name of General Baird does not once appear ; a fact rendered more striking, because General Harris has observed a similar silence in all the despatches which *he* addressed to the Governor-General. We might, perhaps, rather say, that the silence of the Governor-General upon the conduct of General Baird arose from the apparently studied omission of his name in all the documents upon which his Excellency had to form an opinion of the various merits of the officers concerned in that brilliant affair.*

* It is not our province to assign motives or arraign intentions, more especially as years have passed since the occurrence

Amongst other difficulties which General Baird had now to encounter, the want of money was by no means the least serious. In consequence of the delay in Sir Home Popham's arrival from India, he had been obliged to raise 450,000 piasters, equal to

of the events here recorded, and the gallant object of our care and affection is gone to a place where neither malice can assail nor envy thwart him; but it is a curious circumstance that in nothing communicated by General Harris to Lord Wellesley, except general orders, mention is made of General Baird personally; nor, as we have observed in the text, does Lord Wellesley name him in any despatch to England; nor does General Harris speak of him in his despatch to the Directors of the East India Company; so that, for all that could be understood in England, it would seem that General Harris, who was in camp at a distance from the scene of action, had himself performed some active and personal feat of bravery in the capture of Seringapatam. But (which is still more remarkable) when the thanks of the Court of Proprietors was voted to the captors of Seringapatam, an amendment, which included General Baird's name, was over-ruled, and a general compliment to the storming party substituted.

The motion proposed was this:—"It appearing to the satisfaction of this Court, from the documents which have been read, that on the 4th of May 1799, when the British forces took by assault the fortress and city of Seringapatam, they were crowded with a strong garrison and numerous inhabitants, their property in flames from the fire of our numerous artillery, and the whole subject to the dreadful calamity and confusion peculiar to a military assault, by which the lives and property of the garrison became the liable forfeit of resistance; and that Major-General Baird, who so judiciously commanded the storming party, in the moment of success, promptly and happily adopted measures and arrangements which prevented the farther effusion of blood, and the farther destruction of property,

50,000 Dutch ducats, which he obtained through Lord Elgin's agent at Constantinople, for which amount he gave bills, upon his own personal responsibility, and desired that gentleman (Mr. Tooke) to negotiate them, either on the Court of Directors or the Supreme Government of India ; and although it was not according to the strict regulations of the Company to address them in their corporate capacity in London except through their Governments

protected the families of the fallen Sultaun in the palace, and restored general order and tranquillity :

“ That the thanks of the East India Company, in this Court especially assembled, for the purpose of considering the nature and importance of the late acquisition of Seringapatam and its dependencies, are particularly due to Major-General David Baird and the officers of the storming party under his command, for their exemplary and brilliant display of British humanity and military discipline, at once most honourable to their duty and to their feelings as men, and highly characteristic of the only principles by which the East India Company have uniformly marked and endeavoured to govern the nation of India, now so conspicuously distinguishing the final success of the expedition ; and that the chairman be requested to communicate the thanks of this Court to Major-General Baird accordingly.”

To this motion an objection was made, to which we must confess a considerable portion of it, renders it somewhat obnoxious—that of being a disquisition instead of a resolution. Add to this, the extraordinary exemplification of a desirable mode of governing native princes, in the capture of Seringapatam, and the annihilation of its sovereign, and we need not be very much surprised that the particular resolution was negatived. Its proposition, however, seems to shew that a strong feeling did exist amongst the Proprietors upon the point ;

in India, the General, pressed by the urgency of the case, announced to the Honourable Court direct, the measure he had felt himself justified in adopting.

At this period the weather in Egypt became so immoderately cold as not only to destroy the comforts of the native troops in the army, but seriously to endanger their lives. General Baird found it necessary to equip them with bedding and warm clothing, even to great-coats, and to increase their provisions. In order to strengthen the women and followers and servants, and to enable them to withstand the apparently anomalous attacks of the inclement weather and the contagion of the plague, they were put upon the same allowance as the sepoys, and their children upon half rations. These increased charges were, it is quite clear, inevitable, but the embarrassment they caused may be easily understood, when the reader is told, that on the arrival of the long-expected Sir Home Popham at Suez, it was found

although from the inefficiency of the mover and the tediousness of his motion, the point was not carried. The annexed resolution was however added to the general thanks.

“And especially for the exemplary humanity displayed by the assaulting party, under circumstances which reflect equal honour on their discipline, valour, and exalted generosity.”

If the reader will compare this resolution with the description of the state in which Seringapatam actually was, in the hands of the storming party, until General Baird personally interfered, with his accustomed firmness and resolution, to check the plunder and destruction which were going forward, the judiciousness of leaving out *his* name, and thanking the party *generally*, will be tolerably well ascertained and duly appreciated.

that he brought with him no supply of money, to which the General had so anxiously and confidently looked forward.*

Meanwhile the Turks began to manifest a strong disposition to commence hostilities against the Beys and Mamelukes, who had deemed it prudent to retire further into Upper Egypt from Syout; and from the general appearance of affairs, it seemed now quite certain, as had been anticipated, that the departure of the British forces from the country would be the signal for the opening of a campaign between them.

* In cases of plague, a nourishing regimen has been found generally serviceable. The Count de Noé, in his book, already often quoted, relates the following circumstance, for the truth of which he vouches :

“The plague,” says the Count, speaking of the period to which we are now referring, “had begun to shew itself in Boulac, at Cairo, at Rahmanie, and in Middle Egypt; the General (Colonel Ramsay) in consequence took the strongest measures to preserve Gizeh from the pestilence. Communication with the capital was prohibited, and the Djerms which navigated the river were subjected to quarantine. The necessity for these precautions was rendered more urgent by the fact that Gizeh was almost the only town in Egypt that had escaped the contagion.” * * *

“A circumstance occurred with respect to a private soldier of the 26th Light Dragoons, which deserves to be recorded. The man, who had been attacked by the disease, felt his end fast approaching, in the midst of all the tortures of burning thirst, — ‘I have but a few moments to live,’ said he to the surgeon who was attending him; ‘give me a bottle of port-wine—perhaps it may relieve the agonies I am suffering.’ Considering it a dying request, we suppose, the surgeon gave him the

Here, then, was General Baird detained in Egypt, without a command and without a prospect of service; a civil war between two allies of England impending—the plague increasing—his finances exhausted, and his army nearly four months in arrear of pay.

When General Baird, however, made inquiries of Sir Home Popham on the subject of the disappointment occasioned by his coming thus “empty-handed,” it appeared that the omission was not one of either thoughtlessness or neglect. Lord Wellesley’s resolution not to transmit treasure to General Baird was grounded upon intelligence which his Excellency had received, that two frigates had been despatched from England for Egypt, with money for the forces employed there.

Upon gaining this information, General Baird considered himself fully justified in making an application to Lord Cavan for such assistance from the

bottle, the contents of which the dragoon swallowed at a draught, and immediately after fell asleep. He awoke from his slumber, feeling much better; his thirst was gone; the excruciating pain in his bowels had subsided; his courage recovered with his strength, and in a short time he was perfectly restored.

“The surgeon afterwards administered port wine to all his patients, and lost none of them; and it is certain, that although several soldiers perished by the plague, not one officer died. Is it,” asks the Count, “because their mode of living was superior, that they escaped? It seems extremely probable.” And this supposition of the Count’s has been borne out by the general results of the more recent epidemic of the present year, called by many people, cholera.”

military chest, as might enable him to pay the troops, offering, of course, to grant his Lordship such receipts as would become available vouchers in any subsequent settlement of the question of expenditure between the British Government and the East India Company.

But no : although Lord Cavan, and those military officers of higher rank, to whom the question had been referred, entertained no doubt whatever as to the necessity and regularity of uniting the two armies for the sake of bringing them under one command, his Lordship considered that, *in a financial point of view, they were as much separate as ever*; for his Lordship, in answer to General Baird's application upon the subject, says—

Respecting that part of your letter wherein you request me to advance you money from the public purse for the subsistence of the troops upon the Indian establishment, I conceive I should not act correctly if I so did, unless under circumstances such as made it impossible for you any where else to obtain cash ; in which case it certainly would become my duty to afford you such assistance as you require ; but as this is not so, from your informing me in your letter that you have several offers of cash for your bills on England, and which I have no doubt but that the India Company would honour, (if you will pardon my presumption in advising you on this subject) I recommend your availing yourself of them, as the necessity of the case fully justifies. Exclusive of this opinion, the state of the military chest is not so considerable as to admit of my advancing you a sum therefrom, equal to what you might want, without hazarding, from the present unsettled appearance of affairs concerning peace, an hereafter great

inconvenience to that *part* of the army which is on the British establishment.

In consequence of this refusal, General Baird was compelled to have recourse to the somewhat informal measure to which we have already referred, of drawing upon the Honourable East India Company in London.

Whatever doubts Lord Cavan might have entertained with respect to the conclusion of the peace, they were set at rest on the 23rd of April, five days after the date of his letter, by the arrival of a vessel from Leghorn, after a passage of seventeen days, which brought copies of the definitive treaty, signed at Amiens on the 25th of March.

Expecting now every day to receive orders for commencing his return to India, General Baird, in addressing Lord Wellesley, writes thus :—

On this occasion, my Lord, I deem it my particular duty to report to your Excellency, that during the whole of the service this army has been employed on, which from its commencement has been of a fatiguing and harassing nature, I have ever found a most zealous and strict attention to duty, both in officers and men, and the utmost cheerfulness in combating every hardship and surmounting every difficulty.

I deeply regret that I had not an opportunity of bringing them into action against the enemy, as I am well convinced, from their superior state of discipline, and led on, as they would have been, by the able and active officers at the heads of brigades (Colonels Ramsay and Beresford, Lieutenant-Colonels Montresor and Harness), and corps,

that they would have done honour to themselves, and gained the approbation of their King and country, by maintaining the character which the Indian army have so long and well supported.

From the general, as well as my own personal staff, I have derived every assistance which in their respective situations they could possibly afford me; but more particularly from that active and distinguished officer, Colonel Auchmuty, whose ability and professional knowledge have been of the very greatest benefit to the service. In a word, it is particularly gratifying to me to have to declare, that from the first formation of the army under my command to the present moment, it has been actuated but with one spirit of zeal and cordiality.

Such a testimonial, so highly honourable to this gallant body of men, should not be lightly passed over, although, in describing the merits of the Indian army, we shall not content ourselves with the commendations of the brave General who commanded them. The following extract from a letter, addressed to General Baird, by the Pacha of Egypt, deserves a place amongst the records of the expedition, and affords, from the pen of a chief, whose impartiality is beyond suspicion, a striking corroboration of the report which the General made to the Marquess Wellesley.

Témoin oculaire des services memorables, et signalés par des victoires que les braves troupes de Sa Majesté Britannique ont rendus à la Sublime Porte en Egypte, je ne puis exprimer combien je suis comblé de joie et de satisfaction pour avoir été très heureux de servir dans une

expédition si glorieuse, en grand intelligence et harmonie avec vos habiles officiers et vos troupes si braves et si distinguées, que je ne cesserai jamais de me louer de leur bonne conduite, probité, et honnêteté, aussi bien que des règles de justice qu'ils ont suivies très exactement envers les habitants d'Egypte.*

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

On the 30th of April the Chamelion sloop-of-war arrived at Alexandria from Malta, bringing the long-expected despatches which were to decide the future movements of the assembled force. At the time the Chamelion left Malta no official accounts of the signing of the definitive treaty had reached that island from England, but General Fox had received a despatch from the English minister at Naples, informing him of the event.

The letter by which the proceedings of General Baird and his army were to be regulated, was addressed by Lord Hobart, at that time Secretary of State for War and Colonies, to General Fox, and is subjoined.

* "Eye-witness as I have been of the memorable and victorious services which the brave British troops have rendered to the Turkish Government in Egypt, I cannot sufficiently express to you how truly happy I feel in having been employed in so glorious an expedition, in perfect friendship and harmony with officers so skilful, and soldiers so brave and well disciplined; and I never shall cease to bear the highest testimony to their good conduct, probity and honesty, and the strict justice which they have uniformly observed towards the inhabitants of Egypt."

Downing Street, 18th March, 1802.

SIR,

It being judged expedient that the native troops from India serving in Egypt, should be sent back to their establishments by the ships now at Suez, I have His Majesty's commands to direct that you will, upon the receipt hereof, take the necessary measures for carrying this service into execution, and that you will order Major-General Baird to proceed with those corps, and with such detachments of the European corps belonging to the Indian establishments as the separate instructions of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief may point out to you.

You will give instructions to Major-General Baird to consult with the naval officer in command of His Majesty's ships in the Red Sea, at what port in India it may be most advisable to land the sepoys of the Bombay establishment, as well as to concert with him respecting the debarkation of the European detachments.

The Bengal sepoys should be sent by sea to Calcutta, unless the Governments of India should have otherwise directed, or unless, from well-authenticated information relative to the situation of affairs in the southern provinces, Major-General Baird should be induced to think it essential to the public service that the troops under his command should be landed to reinforce the army in those provinces; in which event it will be proper that he should immediately acquaint the Governments of India with the motives of his conduct, and conform to whatever instructions he may receive from them.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

HOBART.

A duplicate of this despatch was forwarded to Lord Cavan, with the following letter, specially addressed to his Lordship.

Downing Street, 18th March, 1802.

MY LORD,

Inclosed I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of my letter to General Fox, and I have to signify to you His Majesty's pleasure that you should consider it as an instruction for your conduct, and that you should immediately act upon it without waiting for orders from General Fox.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient and humble servant,

HOBART.

Immediately on the receipt of these despatches Lord Cavan, having consulted with General Baird, sent the following letter to the officer commanding His Majesty's ships in the Red Sea.

Alexandria, 3rd May, 1802.

SIR,

I have the honour to inclose you extracts of a letter from Lord Hobart to me respecting the embarking the troops at Suez, that are to return to India. I have desired Major-General Baird, under whose directions they will be marched to Suez, to transmit to you embarkation returns of their numbers. The last division of them leave this garrison to-morrow, and the General follows on the 7th instant. From our distance rendering a speedy communication impossible, I beg to refer you to Major-General Baird, who will be at Gizeh, near Cairo, to make such arrangements as you may accordingly think necessary. The General has my direction to carry them into execution without waiting for orders from me.

As I have reason to believe some volunteers from the British regiments at Malta, that have been enlisted from the Militia for a limited time and service, will be re-enlisted

for unlimited service into the 80th and 86th regiments, about to embark at Suez, it will be necessary that some ship should be left at Suez, after your departure with the troops, to convey them to India. I cannot give any guess at their numbers. I should not conceive they could possibly exceed two hundred and fifty men.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient very humble servant,

(Signed) CAVAN,

Major-General, Commanding-in-chief

H. M. Troops in Egypt.

As soon as the orders were issued for striking off from the Indian allowances those regiments which were to return to England, it occurred to General Baird, that as in consequence of the great diminution of the force ordered to return to India, there would be a considerable portion of spare tonnage on board the transports, it would be a measure of great importance to purchase as many good and serviceable horses for the use of the cavalry regiments in India, as could be accommodated in the different vessels which were destined to convey the army to the different Presidencies.*

It appears also, that General Fox had received instructions in compliance with the directions of Lord Wellesley, and the suggestion of General Baird, to allow the men of the militia regiments at Malta,

* The regiments ordered to return to Europe were the 10th, 61st, and 88th; and the number of horses for which the accommodation intended for those corps, could be made available, was about 220 or 230.

who were only engaged for a particular time, to enlist into the regiments on the East Indian establishment, as well as the limited service men of the 61st regiment. For the accommodation of these troops, it will be seen by Lord Cavan's letter to the senior naval officer at Suez, that a ship was to be left at that place, in which they were to follow the main body of troops to India.*

No sooner had these preliminary measures been taken, than General Baird, with his usual readiness and foresight, sent forward parties from Gizeh, to be stationed along the desert, in order to dig for water; and he appears in all the measures which he took for facilitating the march of his army by that route, to have been greatly cheered and encouraged by the certainty which he felt in his mind, of the zealous and active co-operation of Sir Home Popham, of whose professional abilities he had evidently formed the highest opinion from their earliest acquaintance.

It was on the 7th of May that the General himself quitted Alexandria. He arrived at Gizeh about noon on the 11th, having passed through a remarkably fine country, with good roads, and an ample supply of provisions and water. In the course of the march, the General did not himself fall in with any of the Bedouin Arabs, but from intelligence which he obtained from different officers of the army who had visited their camps, it appeared that they were

* These recruits and volunteers from Malta, and the foreign corps serving in Egypt, amounted to three hundred and sixty, all healthy and serviceable men.

extremely civil and friendly, not only to the troops, but even to the followers of the army.

As soon as General Baird reached Gizeh, he sent to the Pacha, announcing his arrival, and informing him that he expected every necessary assistance from him during the march across the Desert to Suez; to which demand, or request, the Pacha replied with great cordiality and good will, assuring General Baird that he might rely upon his aid and co-operation; indeed, the whole prospect before the General, was now cheering and agreeable, and in addition to the actually prosperous appearance of affairs, it may easily be conceived that Lord Wellesley's despatch of the 8th of February, which we have already quoted, but which the General received at this period, was extremely gratifying.

While recounting the various marks of favour and approbation with which the General appeared destined to be loaded at this juncture, we cannot omit the detail of his reception by the Pacha on the 15th, on which day he paid his Highness a visit of ceremony, for which account we are indebted to an officer of General Baird's army.

On the 15th, the General, attended by his staff and other officers, with an escort of the 8th light dragoons, crossed the river from Gizeh to Cairo in the morning, where a Turkish guard of honour of horse and foot were drawn up to receive him. On landing, the General was met by the Pacha's chief secretary and interpreter.

After the usual compliments and honours being paid, the guards moved off in front at a slow pace towards his

Highness's palace, the kettle-drums and other music of the Turkish cavalry playing during the procession, while the heralds proclaimed the approach of the English General.

On coming near the palace—formerly General Kleber's residence, and in which he was assassinated—we found the streets lined with Albanian guards up to the steps of the great staircase. The appearance of the soldiers was more sanguinary than martial; every man, besides his musket and bayonet, being armed with a brace of pistols, a sabre, and a dagger. Having arrived at the palace, the General dismounted, when he was received by the officers of state, and conducted to the Chamber of Audience. Here the Pacha met the General at the door, and received him in the most flattering and distinguished manner. After being served with coffee, sherbet, &c. and the compliments customary on such occasions had passed, as well as a conversation of some length, relative to the march of the army across the Desert, in the forwarding of which his Highness offered in the most unreserved manner, every assistance in his power, the General rose to take his leave, when the Pacha requested his acceptance of a war horse fully caparisoned, and a sword; adding that they were the gifts of esteem and friendship. The staff and other officers of the General's suite, each received a sword.

The General was requested by the Pacha, as a particular honour, to mount the horse when he left the palace, which he accordingly did, and was saluted with nineteen guns on crossing the great square.

We then returned home in the same manner we came, amidst an immense concourse of people; and as is usual in most Mussulmaun countries, were importuned for bucksheas (money) on all sides.

The saddle presented to General Baird was of solid silver, gilt, the furniture of crimson velvet, with stars and crescents

of the like metal. The horse was one of the most beautiful animals I ever beheld, and of the finest breed in Turkey. The General's sword was no less costly; the scabbard and mounting being made entirely of gold, and the blade one of the true Damascans. We afterwards learnt that the whole of them had been sent by the Grand Signior to the Pacha, upon raising him to his present high station in the empire.

Two days afterwards the Pacha returned the General's visit. His Highness came to the Gizeh side of the river in his state barge, attended by a great number of others, full of *grandeess*, Janissaries, and attendants. The morning being remarkably fine, heightened the interest of the scene. The effect of the Turkish music on the water, and the gay appearance of the various flags and pendants, were truly striking; add to this, the reflections arising from a proper pride on beholding a British—and a British Asiatic army, from “farther Ind,” drawn out upon the banks of old father Nile, to do honour to the Ottoman crescent, and you will, I think, envy us, as well as regret in no common degree your absence on such an occasion.

The Pacha, on landing, was received by two of the General's staff, a salute of cannon was immediately fired; the troops formed in a street, presented arms, and the bands began to play. His Highness seemed highly pleased, bowed to the officers as he passed with much urbanity, and frequently remarked to the Pacha of the Albanians, and the other great officers of his suite, the fine and martial appearance of the soldiers. The sepoy's attracted much of his attention.

A few yards from head-quarters (formerly the country house of Morad Bey), the General, accompanied by the principal officers of the army, met the Pacha, and after welcoming him to the garrison, and the usual compliments having passed, the whole procession entered the grand

saloon, which had previously been fitted up in the Turkish style, with divans, carpets, &c. Here the officers formed a circle, and coffee, sherbet, &c. were served in the Oriental manner, the band of the 86th playing all the time. The Pacha seemed particularly delighted with the music; he remarked that the tambourine and triangle, very nearly Turkish, afforded him much pleasure, especially in the "Battle of Prague," in which Kotzwarro has introduced one of their national airs as the quick step. The eyes of the Janissaries kindled at hearing their favourite call to battle.

After being entertained for a considerable time in this manner, and much civility having been exchanged, the Pacha rose to take leave. The General then requested his Highness and his principal officers to accept of some arms of English workmanship, consisting of fusees, pistols, &c. He also presented the Pacha with some jewels, set in the Eastern mode.

On his Highness leaving the gateway, the General having ordered two of the finest Mocha bulls to be brought there, begged his Highness's acceptance of them. This last present the Pacha seemed highly pleased with, as the breed is unknown in Turkey. The humps on their shoulders occasioned many observations from the attendants.

The General having accompanied the Pacha a few yards towards the river, his Highness requested he would go no farther. He expressed himself highly gratified with his reception, and repeated his professions of friendship, and anxious wish to assist the army in their march across the Desert. He then embarked under the accustomed honours and salute.

Having thus detailed to you this ceremony, I shall not intrude longer on your patience, and only add, that from the cordial and friendly disposition of the Pacha, I think we shall accomplish this march across the Desert to Suez,

without much loss or difficulty, and unattended by those fatigues and hardships so severely felt, yet so nobly surmounted in the former ordeal, from the shores of the Red Sea across the arid, burning desert of the Thebaid.

General Baird, immediately after his arrival at Gizeh, put the army in motion, and began the march to Suez, which place he himself reached on the 25th. The troops crossed the Desert in successive divisions, in five easy marches each, without experiencing much inconvenience, and with the loss of only three Europeans.*

In describing this march, and the state of the army to the Governor-General, General Baird says—

As the troops are now about to return, I experience a satisfaction in reporting to your Excellency that they are for the most part healthy, nor have we suffered lately from the plague. I am sorry, however, to add, that in consequence of the disease having appeared in the 7th Bombay regiment, I ordered that corps to be halted on the first stage on the Desert, there to remain in quarantine till all the army had passed on, and on its arrival at Suez, afterwards to complete the stated period, previous to embarkation. I am also constrained to mention, that since my arrival here, a case of plague has appeared in the Madras Ordnance


* It should be recollected, that this brief account of the march, is from the pen of General Baird himself, the last man in the world to magnify difficulties, or mention the success of his own exertions, in reducing them. The fact is, however, that the distance from Gizeh, or rather Cairo, to Suez, is twenty-three leagues, and that without such precautions as were taken by the General, not one drop of water is procurable between Birket El Hadji, at the entrance of the Desert, and Suez itself.

*AB The black figures denote the places we have
tried at for water.*

*The red figures the stages, on the lower road,
for the Army to halt at.*

*The spot N^o 6 was pointed out by an Arab, water
contained in the wells that were dug only 4 days.*

*At N^o 7, water was procured in abundance the whole
time the Army was encamping: it was rain water
lodged in the sand, no appearance whatever of
a spring.*



Department, which corps will likewise have to remain until they have completed their quarantine; the other part of the troops I have every reason to believe will embark free from any latent infection of this malady.

From the unremitting exertions and indefatigable activity of Sir Home Popham, the transports were ready to receive the troops nearly as soon as they arrived, and those ships which were destined for the horses, were fitted with incredible rapidity, so that the General felt assured that he should be able to sail from Suez on the first week in June.*

Previously to crossing the Desert, it appeared to General Baird, that the ordnance stores remaining on hand were scarcely worth the difficulty and charge of transport through the march, and having obtained the report of a committee of officers, which entirely justified his view of their value, he resolved upon delivering the whole of them over to the Turkish government, as a return for the aid and assistance afforded to the army by the Pacha of Egypt, and for grain and other provisions which he had provided. The same course was adopted at Suez, for cogent reasons, with regard to the gunpowder and ammunition which they had carried with them across the Desert.

* The Count de Noé says, speaking of General Baird's departure from Gizeli—"Nous nous en séparâmes avec regret : ce digne chef s'étoit toujours distingué par le vif intérêt qu'il prenoit aux officiers sous ses ordres ; et par sa sollicitude envers le soldat.—Sévère, mais juste, dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, il étoit également chéri et respecté de tous ses subordonnés."—*Expédition Anglaise*, p. 260.

On the 5th of June, the General embarked on board His Majesty's ship *Victor*, Captain Collier, having previously given orders, that the whole of the troops, (except those belonging to the Presidency of Bombay, who would of course proceed thither direct,) should touch in the first instance at Madras, whence, in case their services should not be required there, the Bengal troops would proceed immediately to Calcutta.

Just on the point of embarkation, General Baird wrote two letters, one to the Earl of Cavan, and the other to Sir Home Popham, extracts from which we submit to the reader as forming the conclusion of his services in connexion with those officers, as far as relates to the Egyptian expedition.

To Lord Cavan, after detailing the state of his proceedings, General Baird says—

“ I beg your Lordship to accept my warmest thanks for the ready assistance you have given me ; I have been in consequence enabled to cross the Desert with great facility, comparatively little fatigue, and with the loss of but three men. On this subject I have taken the liberty to express my sentiments to his Royal Highness the Duke of York, and shall not fail to do so to his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.

“ Allow me to assure your Lordship, that I am highly sensible of, and much gratified by, the handsome manner in which you have been pleased to carry on the service with me since I have had the honour to be under your Lordship's command, and for the very flattering terms in which your Lordship has been pleased to express your approba-

tion of my conduct in public orders, and in your letters to me on that subject."

To Sir Home Popham, the General, speaking almost prophetically in some part of his letter, says—

"The object of the expedition on which we have been mutually employed, being now so happily brought to a conclusion, and as we are so soon to separate, I deem the present a fit occasion publicly to express how much I have at all times been sensible, and felt the value of your zealous exertions and cordial co-operation in forwarding the service.

"It has been a duty on me, no less just towards you than a pleasing tribute to my own feelings, to convey these my sincere and perfect sentiments of your meritorious conduct and able assistance to his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief, and to his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General of India.

"Should it ever be my lot on any future occasion to be on active service, where the navy and army may be required to act together, I can only add that it will be to me a source of real satisfaction, again to co-operate with you, and if not, I shall wish it may be my good fortune to meet with an officer possessed of your zeal, ability, and military experience."

Having written these letters, and being as we have already said on the point of embarkation, the General was informed that three new cases of plague had made their appearance: these, like the former ones, were ordered into strict quarantine, and in the evening of the 5th the General sailed on board the *Victor*.

On the 7th of June, General Baird reached Kosseir, where he found that Paymaster Melville, who had been charged with despatches for him, had arrived about a fortnight before, and had proceeded overland by way of Ghennah to Cairo to join the army ; this, however, now that the General was rapidly proceeding homewards, (if India might be called his home,) was a mortification of no great importance. On the 16th he reached Mocha, and on the 6th of July, exactly one month after his departure from Suez, anchored in Madras Roads, where he merely remained while the ship replenished her water, and then proceeded to Calcutta.

CHAPTER III.

GENERAL BAIRD ARRIVES AT CALCUTTA—HIS RECEPTION THERE—MARKS OF DISTINCTION CONFERRED ON THE NATIVE TROOPS—GENERAL BAIRD REMOVED AT HIS OWN REQUEST TO THE STAFF OF THE MADRAS ARMY—APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND OF A DIVISION—MARCH TO ARCOT—NEGLECT OF THE COLLECTOR OF THE DISTRICT—CONTINUATION OF MARCH—ARRIVAL AT THE PASS—REACHES THE BANKS OF THE TOOMBUDRA—GENERAL WELLESLEY JOINS THE ARMY—GREAT DIMINUTION OF GENERAL BAIRD'S DIVISION IN CONSEQUENCE THEREOF—GENERAL BAIRD APPLIES TO BE RELIEVED—OBTAINS LEAVE OF ABSENCE—PROCEEDS TO FORT ST. GEORGE—QUITS INDIA IN DISGUST—ARRIVAL AT ST. HELENA—INTELLIGENCE OF WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE—TAKES HIS PASSAGE IN A SOUTH SEA WHALER—IS CAPTURED BY A FRENCH PRIVATEER—RECAPTURED OFF CORUÑA—ARRIVES IN ENGLAND—APPOINTED TO A COMMAND IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ENGLAND UNDER SIR JAMES CRAIG.

WE now come to the period when General Baird was to receive the honours to which his conduct of the Egyptian expedition so fully entitled him. At Calcutta rejoicings of every kind awaited his arrival.

In the periodical prints of the time we find the details of the General's reception at Fort William, from which, as well as the official documents, which it will be our duty to lay before the reader, a tolerably fair estimate may be made of the feeling of admiration and respect which his gallantry and perseverance had so generally excited.

The following is a copy of the general order issued on the day of General Baird's arrival :

G. O.

Fort William, July 31st, 1802.

Major-General Baird, commanding the forces employed in the late expedition from India to Egypt, arrived this day at the Presidency, attended by the Governor-General's state boats, and was received on his landing at Chaundpaul Ghaut, by the officers of his Excellency's staff.

The Governor-General in Council derived sincere satisfaction from the highly honourable testimony borne by Major-General the Earl of Cavan to the services of Major-General Baird, and of the troops from the establishments of India lately employed in Egypt. Under a grateful impression of the important aid derived to the common cause of our country, by the able and successful conduct of the expedition from India to Egypt, his Excellency is pleased to order that honorary medals be conferred on all the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, troops, and sepoys, golaundaza, and gun lascars, who have been employed on service in Egypt.

The following is an extract of the Earl of Cavan's letter to his Excellency the Governor-General, alluded to in the above order, dated Alexandria, May 6th, 1802.

“ I am sensible no opinion of mine can increase the very high and deserved estimation that the professional abilities of Major-General Baird have acquired. But it is a justice I owe to him, and the troops he brought under his command from India, to testify to your Excellency the very full satisfaction they have given me on every occasion since I have had the honour of having them under my command.

“ Their excellent discipline and obedience, and their patience under great fatigue and hardship, have been equalled by their highly exemplary conduct in the correct

and regular discharge of every duty of soldiers; and though they may lament that circumstances rendered it impossible for them to have taken part in the brilliant actions of this country during the last campaign, it must be a satisfaction for them to know that their services in Egypt have been as important, and as essential to their country, as those of their brother soldiers that gained such distinguished victories in it.

“ I have requested of them to accept of my humble approbation and very best thanks; and I beg leave to recommend General Baird and them strongly to your Excellency's notice.”

On the 9th of August his Excellency the Governor-General entertained at breakfast, in the new Government House, Major-General Baird and the officers of the army returned from Egypt.

At eight o'clock a. m. the flag was hoisted at Fort William, and a royal salute was fired in honour of the return of the army from Egypt.

As we are now concluding the account of the Egyptian campaign, we think it more convenient (although without some explanation it might involve us in a charge of anachronism) to bring together at this point the official testimonials to the conduct of General Baird, in the different departments of service to which his active and capacious mind had been devoted during the enterprise.

The first of these documents is a letter from Captain Hook, Secretary to Government in the military department, addressed to General Baird, under date Council Chamber, Fort William, Sept. 14th, 1802.

Sir,

I am directed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council, to acquaint you, that such of the staff appointments specified in the extracts delivered by you to his Excellency, of general orders issued by you to the army under your command during the late expedition to Egypt, as have not been already approved and confirmed by his Excellency, *are* approved and confirmed by his Excellency in Council.

His Excellency the Governor-General in Council is perfectly satisfied of the propriety and necessity of your having made the several staff appointments specified in the extracts of orders referred to.

With respect to the allowances which may have been drawn by the several staff officers nominated by you, it will be proper that their allowances should undergo the usual examination of the public officers at the Presidency, and should be reported on, if necessary, to the Governor-General in Council, according to the established rules of proceeding in the government.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

L. Hook,

*Secretary to Government in the
Military Department.*

From this communication we derive the opinion of the Governor-General in Council as to the wisdom and propriety of all the staff appointments made by General Baird. The next letter, which is also from Captain Hook, is addressed to Captain Salmond, the military Auditor-General, and settles the question of finance, which alone remains incomplete in the one already quoted.

To Captain Salmond, Military Auditor-General.

SIR,

I am directed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, with the report referred to in your letter, on sundry contingent charges incurred by the Indian army in Egypt under the command of Major-General Baird.

His Excellency the Governor-General in Council considers the charges detailed in the several bills included in your report, to have been necessarily incurred, and the charges appear to his Excellency to have been sanctioned with particular attention to economy on the part of Major-General Baird. His Excellency in Council also observes, from your report, that the charges are so well vouched that you recommend their being passed.

On these grounds, his Excellency the Governor-General in Council has been pleased to pass the whole of the charges detailed in the bills received with your report.

The remainder of this letter relates to two small items, upon which directions are given to the auditor. But we think it is no small addition to the glory of the hazardous enterprize just ended, that in every detail, either of patronage or finance, General Baird's conduct should have thus authoritatively met with the most unqualified sanction and approbation.

General Baird did not, however, continue very long at Fort William. He appears always to have had a strong feeling in favour of the Madras establishment, to which he first belonged; and accordingly we find the following letter addressed to him, under date the 9th of September 1802.

SIR,

I am commanded by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council, to acquaint you that his Excellency in Council (in compliance with the wish signified by you to his Lordship, and also to the Commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General Lord Lake,) has been pleased to transfer you to the staff of the establishment of Fort St. George.

I am also commanded by his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, to state, that the orders of his Excellency in Council for transferring you to the staff of the establishment of Fort St. George, have been transmitted to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council at that Presidency, and also to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

L. Hook,

Sec. Mil. Dep.

General Baird quitted Calcutta for Madras almost immediately after the receipt of this letter, and almost as soon as he arrived at the latter place, was again called into active service.

It will be recollected by the reader, that some time previous to the period of which we are now treating, the Mahrattas had formed a most extensive and powerful combination against the British power in India; and that the ancient Rajahs of Satarah, who had originally laid the foundations of the Mahratta empire, had gradually sunk into a state of privacy and insignificance.

The ministers of the Peshwa had persuaded him

to allow the seat of government to be removed to Poonah, and to constitute that city the capital of the empire, until by degrees he was shorn of his dignity, and deprived of his sovereignty, and eventually driven by Holkar's army beyond the confines of his own territories.

In order to restore something like a balance of power between these contending chiefs, and release the British Government from the danger which was inseparable from the usurpation of the whole of the Mahratta dominions by one individual, a treaty of alliance was entered into with the Peshwa by the East India Company, at his Highness's earnest solicitation, which treaty was as speedily as possible ratified at Bassein, to which place he had fled, to escape the barbarities of Holkar.

By this treaty, it was stipulated that the Peshwa should be restored to his dominions, and to the enjoyment of his power and authority, on condition of maintaining, for the protection of his territories, a force of 10,000 British troops.

As soon as this treaty was signed, General Wellesley, at the head of 12,000 men, marched to Poonah, which place he took, and expelled the enemy from that country. Preparations were immediately made for the restoration of the Peshwa, which event was celebrated with every mark of rejoicing by the people.

These successes, however, and the consequent triumph of the Peshwa over his enemies, seemed to awaken in the breasts of the other chiefs, a new

spirit of hostility towards those allies, by whose instrumentality his restoration had been effected; Scindiah and the Rajah of Ragpore entered into a league to frustrate the fulfilment of the stipulations contained in the treaty of Bassein; and each of these chiefs collected a powerful army, which proceeded from different quarters to a given point of assembly, fixed in the neighbourhood of the territories of the Nizam, a prince in alliance with the East India Company.

In order to counteract this formidable combination, five different armies were brought into the field, in order to invade the extensive dominions of the enemy simultaneously: a plan rendered more easy of execution by the alliances which Lord Wellesley had formed with the Peshwa and the Nizam, their territories being open to the British forces to the very boundaries of the Mahratta country.

From the west they were invaded by Colonel Murray, and a strong detachment of troops from Bombay. On the northern extremity of Scindiah's dominions, and where the main body of his army, together with General Perron's brigade was stationed, General Lake was to attack him. In Bundelcund, on the east, the same mode of operation was to be adopted; and on the south, a large portion of the Madras army was put in motion, of which General Baird was appointed to command a division, and on the 12th of January, 1803, he joined the detachments encamped at Vellout, consisting of the artillery from the Mount, His Majesty's Scotch

brigade, and a detachment from the 17th regiment of native infantry.

On the 17th of January General Baird encamped near Arcot, after a march, which appears by his letters to the Secretary of the Commander-in-chief to have been anything but easy or agreeable, principally owing to the defective state of the bazars.

The inhabitants of the villages through which they passed, demanded such exorbitant prices for all the necessaries of life, that the public officers were unable to purchase; and with respect to grain, they positively denied having any to sell, so that the followers of the camp were reduced literally to a state of starvation.

General Baird complained seriously of the inattention, or rather studied neglect which the conduct of the Collector exhibited; who, although apprized of the intended march of the troops through his district, remained at his ease at Carrangoolie, between fifty and sixty miles from the scene of action.

At Arcot, General Baird's division was augmented by the 19th light dragoons, and five companies of the 74th regiment; and on the 20th of January, he encamped within two miles to the north of Vellore, where he found Major Bownas and Captain Sir John Sinclair, with the magazines and stores, and Major Tauner with four brass eighteen pounders, ten six-pounders, two eight-inch howitzers, two five and a half ditto, two twelve-pounders, and twenty-six ammunition tumbrils. Colonel Bell was ordered to take the command of the artillery, and every pre-

paration for moving forward was made with that energy and clearness, and regard for the comforts of the men, which invariably distinguished the General's proceedings on service.

It was arranged by General Baird, that as the troops reached the Pass, each department of the army should move so as to have the Pass entirely to itself during the march. On the 25th of January he was eleven miles from the Pass, on which day Colonel Bell, with the artillery, reached the top; on the following day Major Robinson ascended, and the next day General Baird himself proposed bringing up the rear, and halting one day on the top; but it appears that Colonel Bell found it necessary to make four marches to gain the foot of the Pass (28 miles), and to halt on the fifth; however, the General ordered him forward, and on the 28th of January he was himself at the head of it.

General Baird, the following day, encamped at Vinkelghurry. In the mean time, General Wellesley arrived with a strong reinforcement of troops, and moved forward across the Toombudra, taking with him a very large portion of the Madras army.

Up to this period, excepting a few hours necessarily devoted to rest, General Baird was never off his horse; no sooner was the day's march terminated, and the encampment formed, than he visited every corps, examined into the state of the Commissariat, and every other department, and afterwards reconnoitred the country, through which the troops were to move the next day.

From these excursions he galloped back so as to be in time for evening parade, when he again minutely inspected every regiment. This was no easy duty under the burning sun of India; and some persons in the army of less active habits, and with less of the *esprit du corps* about them than the General possessed, seemed to be of opinion that such constant exertion was scarcely necessary. Of this, General Baird was perfectly aware; but he used to say, that in *his* opinion, all that he did was absolutely necessary to maintain the proper discipline of the troops, and that he should receive ample recompense for any trouble or fatigue, whenever he could place them opposite to the enemy in the field. "Then," said the General, "they will be thankful to me for keeping them in effective order; they may grumble now, but they will forget all these little annoyances when they cross bayonets with the enemy."*

* It was to this indefatigable energy and activity of mind as well as of body, that the success of his memorable march across the Desert of Egypt, may in a great degree be attributed. Almost immediately after Sir David's arrival at Kosseir, and while reconnoitring the country in its neighbourhood, attended by his staff, he observed that the Arabs who accompanied them as guides, invariably galloped away from them at some period of the day until they were out of sight, and after a certain space of time reappeared in their places.

Convinced that these men must have some purpose to answer, and some object to attain by their sudden excursions, Sir David, one day, without communicating his intention to any of the officers with him, the moment he saw them dart

Shortly after reaching the river Toombudra, finding his command so considerably reduced by the drafts made from the detachment of the army he commanded by General Wellesley, and feeling that he was again destined to be thwarted and neglected, General Baird made a remonstrance upon the subject to the Government of Madras, which was the cause of a correspondence between him and the government. Its character and tendency were not such as to satisfy General Baird of the groundlessness of his unpleasant anticipations, and its result was an application on his part for leave of absence.

Knowing General Baird's sentiments and attributes, the reader will readily believe that it must have been no unimportant grievance which could induce him to relinquish a command at the opening of a campaign. To this resolution, however, it seems he was driven, and having received permission to proceed to Europe, he left the banks of the Toombudra for Fort St. George, at which place he remained no longer than was absolutely necessary, and quitted the land of his early sufferings and his later glory for ever,

away in their accustomed manner, dashed after them, and being himself mounted on a fleet Arab horse, succeeded in coming up with them just as they were assembled round some wells which they had dug in the sand.

Taken by surprise, they seemed extremely anxious to conceal their resources, and actually began to fill up the wells on the General's approach. Upon this discovery we have been told that Sir David founded his successful plan of digging for water in the Desert.

in the Honourable Company's ship *True Briton*, accompanied by several officers of his staff.

In rounding the Cape of Good Hope, they encountered one of those tremendous storms which are peculiar to that tempestuous region ; in consequence of which, they were prevented making the Cape, and being driven considerably to the southward, they eventually reached St. Helena, upon their arrival at which place news having been received there of the renewal of hostilities between England and France, the *True Briton* was detained for convoy.

This delay was most unseasonable to General Baird, to whom the intelligence of war gave hopes of service and distinction, and he determined to remove himself and his staff into a South Sea whaler, which he engaged for the voyage, and as soon as she could be got ready for sea, they quitted St. Helena in her for England.

This design of gaining time was however frustrated ; for in crossing the Bay of Biscay, considerably to the westward, they were chased and captured by *Le Brave*, French privateer, Captain Etienne.

When the whaler was taken, General Baird sent one or two of his staff on board the privateer, to request permission to remain in the prize, in which all his baggage, and that of his friends were stowed. To this, the French captain demurred, and expressed some apprehensions of his own fate if by any accident an English General should escape.

After much argument and persuasion, however, he

at length consented, on condition that General Baird should give him a written declaration, purporting that he and his officers considered themselves prisoners of war, and that they would not in any way impede the voyage of the prize to Bourdeaux, whither she was ordered to proceed. He also required as hostage an officer of rank, who accordingly proceeded on board the privateer.

These terms and conditions having been agreed upon and concluded, the prize took leave of the captor, and shaped her course for Bourdeaux, but the weather falling calm, and provisions and water being scant, the prizemaster determined to make for Coruña. This change of destination proved extremely fortunate for General Baird and his staff, for they were within sight of the Spanish coast, when His Majesty's ship *Sirius*, Captain Prowse, was seen bearing down upon them; in less than an hour the vessel was recaptured, and in the course of the day joined the squadron to which the *Sirius* belonged, and which was under the command of Sir Edward Pellew, now Lord Exmouth.

It happened that His Majesty's cutter, *Mary*, was on the point of sailing, to join the fleet under Admiral Cornwallis, off Ushant, and in her, General Baird and his staff embarked.

Here again they had some narrow escapes, and found themselves early in the morning close to a French battery, which they had approached somewhat too nearly during a dark and foggy night, and from which several shots were fired into the cutter, one

of which passed within a few inches of General Baird's head, while he was standing at the gangway reconnoitring the enemy.

At length, however, the General reached Falmouth in safety, and proceeded immediately to London, where it was decided, that although recaptured, he had so pledged himself to the French government, that he could not serve again, until exchanged with a French officer of equal rank. This exchange was effected with the French General Morgan, and almost immediately afterwards General Baird was appointed to the staff of the Eastern district of England, under the command of Sir James Craig.

CHAPTER IV.

SIR DAVID BAIRD REMOVED FROM THE EASTERN DISTRICT—APPOINTED TO COMMAND AN EXPEDITION AGAINST THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE—LETTER OF LORD CASTLEREAGH—PROCEEDS TO CORK—ARRIVAL OF SIR HOME POPHAM—SAILING OF THE EXPEDITION—ARRIVAL AT FUNCHAL—ST. SALVADOR—LOSS OF TWO SHIPS—DEATH OF BRIGADIER GENERAL YORKE—DEPARTURE FOR THE CAPE—ARRIVAL THERE—LANDING—GENERAL BERESFORD DETACHED TO SALDANAH BAY—MARCH OF THE TROOPS—ACTION WITH THE ENEMY UNDER GENERAL JANSSENS—THEIR DEFEAT—DESPATCH OF SIR DAVID BAIRD TO LORD CASTLEREAGH—GENERAL JANSSENS RETIRES INTO THE COUNTRY—SIR DAVID BAIRD MARCHES UPON CAPE TOWN—SURRENDER OF CAPE TOWN—OPERATIONS AGAINST GENERAL JANSSENS—LETTER TO HIM—RESULT THEREOF—NEGOCIATIONS—TERMINATION OF THEM BY THE SURRENDER OF GENERAL JANSSENS AND THE WHOLE OF HIS FORCE—GENERAL BAIRD ASSUMES THE GOVERNMENT—REPORT OF FRENCH EXPEDITION AGAINST THE CAPE—DEPARTURE OF GENERAL JANSSENS AND THE GARRISON FOR HOLLAND—CAPTURE OF THE FRENCH FRIGATE LA VOLONTAIRE.

From the command of the Eastern District, General Baird was destined soon to be removed for more active service. In July 1805 he received a letter from Lord Castlereagh, of which the following is a copy, and which we insert here, as detailing the objects of the expedition which was about to be entrusted to his care, as well as exhibiting a fresh proof of that confidence in his great abilities, which

we have already so frequently shown to have been felt by those who best knew how to appreciate his merits and his virtues.

Downing Street, 25th July, 1805.

SIR,

In consequence of information having been received that the Cape is now defended by not more than from fifteen hundred to two thousand regular troops, not of the best description, and that the militia and inhabitants look with anxiety for the arrival of a British force, and also from the facility afforded to an operation against that settlement from the troops now embarked and proceeding to India, being applicable without inconvenience to the service, in progress to their ultimate destination, it has been determined on to attempt the reduction of that colony by a combined operation of a force from Cork, added to that now on board the East India Company's ships at Falmouth.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that His Majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for the command of this expedition, and that directions have been given to embark, with the utmost despatch, the regiments named in the margin, (24th, 38th, 71st, 72nd, 83rd, 93rd,) in transports now lying at Cork to be employed on this service.

As the troops cantoned in the neighbourhood of Cork have been directed to embark on board transports, which are kept constantly in readiness and victualled for six months, I have every reason to hope that the armament will be in readiness to put to sea in the course of a few days; and the whole naval and military force, when assembled at the Madeiras, will be as follows:—

Naval Force.

Diadem	.	.	.	64 guns.
Raisable	.	.	.	64

Belliqueux	.	.	.	64 guns.
Diomedé	.	.	.	50
Narcissus	.	.	.	32
Leda	.	.	.	32

Military.

24th Foot	.	.	.	504 rank and file.
38th	.	.	.	925
59th	.	.	.	1000
71st	.	.	.	768
72nd	.	.	.	730
83rd	.	.	.	750
98th	.	.	.	890
20th Lieut. Dragoons	.	.	.	221
Artillery and Artificers	.	.	.	320
Recruits	.	.	.	546

Total 6654 rank and file.

It is of the utmost importance that the object of this expedition should not transpire; and lest the enemy should be apprised of your approach, the troops at Cork have been directed to embark under your command for the Mediterranean. The India fleet has been ordered to proceed at once to India: both fleets will therefore sail with these ostensible destinations, but having sealed orders, to be opened in a certain latitude, directing them to rendezvous at the Madciras, where the whole naval and military force, including the Company's ships, will be directed to place themselves under your orders, and those of Sir Home Popham.

It is His Majesty's pleasure that you delay as short a time as possible at Madeira, and that even there every precaution is to be taken to prevent the object of the expedition being made public, which will best be done by

giving out that the Cork fleet is to separate at a certain latitude for the West Indies.

Having departed from the Madeiras, you are to proceed at once to the Cape, unless the officer in command of His Majesty's ships should think it advisable to land at St. Helena, in which case you will use your utmost diligence to obtain the latest and most precise information with respect to the state of the Cape, its garrison, defences, means of subsistence, &c. ; and you will confer with the Governor of St. Helena (who is directed to render you every aid consistent with the security of that island) as to the possibility of making any of the resources at his disposal applicable to the success of the expedition.

Having arrived off the Cape, you will, should you have no previous reason to suppose that your approach has transpired, endeavour, by a vigorous and immediate attack (having previously summoned the garrison to surrender) to avail yourself of the probable neglect of due vigilance and precaution on the part of the garrison.

As it is not impossible, however, that two French ships-of-the-line, which sailed in May from Rochefort, with troops on board, and which are yet unaccounted for, may have thrown themselves into the Cape with a reinforcement, you will not rely with too much confidence on the enemy's means of resistance being confined to the numbers stated at the outset of their embarkation.

Should you be of opinion that the reduction of the place may be facilitated by opening a communication with the inhabitants and persons in authority, you are authorised and directed, in conjunction with the officer in command of His Majesty's naval force (taking care not to waste too much time in such negotiations), to grant to the inhabitants and the garrison such favourable and liberal terms of capitulation as may appear to you best calculated to ac-

quire possession of the place in the most expeditious manner, and with the least loss or hazard to the ships and troops employed on the service.

Upon the surrender of the place to His Majesty's arms, taking possession of it in the King's name, and duly attending to the stipulations of any capitulation which may be previously agreed upon, you will take upon yourself, under the title of Lieutenant Governor, the Civil Government of the settlement, until His Majesty's further pleasure is declared, and continue to carry on the administration (preserving to the inhabitants the enjoyment of their private property, usages, and religion), as nearly as may be, according to the system laid down and established by His Majesty's authority during the late war, and under which the colony enjoyed, till the period of its restitution, so much prosperity and happiness.

As I understand the troops now in garrison at the Cape are mostly Germans, and much disgusted with the Dutch service, you will take the earliest opportunity of inducing them to enter into His Majesty's 60th regiment, attaching them in equal proportions as supernumeraries to the regiments in garrison, until measures can be taken for transferring them under their own officers. If, after using your best endeavours to procure the whole of these men for His Majesty's service in the manner above directed, any foreigners (not being French subjects), having so declined to engage, should nevertheless be willing to enlist for service in the East Indies, you will engage them for the service of the East India Company, according to the terms of enlistment usual in the European branch of their army, a statement of which you will receive herewith enclosed, and you will use your own discretion in retaining or enlisting Hottentots, in case the public service should appear to you absolutely to require that this additional expense should be incurred.

As it is important that the Company's ships directed to co-operate in the expedition, and placed with a view to this special service under the orders of the naval officer in command, should be delayed at the Cape as short a time as possible, I have His Majesty's commands to direct that you use your utmost diligence to have the troops and recruits destined for India expeditiously re-embarked, in order that they may proceed under the convoy of the *Belliqueux* to their ultimate destination, notifying by them, or by the earliest opportunity which you can find, the surrender of the Cape, to the several Presidencies in India, in order that the accustomed intercourse with the Colony may be opened, and such supplies received as may be required for the use of the settlement.

In the event of circumstances arising either to discourage you from landing the troops, or (in the event of your having made good your landing) to determine you to desist from the enterprize (contingencies, I trust, equally improbable), it is His Majesty's pleasure (the India ships being detached to their destination) that you do return with the remainder of your force to St. Helena, there to refresh the troops and squadrons, and to receive further orders for the direction of your conduct.

In case you should not find fresh instructions at St. Helena, continuing there not longer than fifteen days, unless the refreshment of the squadron should render a longer stay indispensable, you will at the end of that period return to Cork, unless you should receive a different destination at Fayal, where you are directed to call and enquire for orders.

His Majesty has entrusted to you the conduct of the military part of this service, under a full confidence in your experience, zeal, and discretion; and His Majesty implicitly relies on your cultivating the most cordial good understanding with the officer to whom the command of his naval

force has been confided—the ultimate success of the expedition principally depending on the cordial co-operation of the respective services. His Majesty is persuaded that their united exertions will be such as to entitle them to His Majesty's gracious and unqualified approbation.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

To Major General Baird,

&c. &c. &c.

To General Baird this summons was sufficient to rouse all his energy, and awaken all his activity, and accordingly we find him at Cork busily employed superintending the arrangements of the expedition, the destination of which was commonly believed to be the Mediterranean, in order to favour which belief, it is said, that some horses belonging to the garrison of Gibraltar, were actually shipped on board one of the transports.

General Baird, however, upon an inspection of the force which he was destined to command, was apprehensive that it would not be adequate to the success of the enterprise. It was quite possible, and even most probable, that the ships from Rochefort which Lord Castlereagh had spoken of, and which it was supposed had on board a very considerable number of troops, had thrown them into the Cape, as a reinforcement; having, in addition to this probability, obtained information from an officer who had recently arrived from the Cape in a Danish ship, that its garrison was infinitely

larger than our Government thought it to be, the General solicited an increase of strength; for although, according to his calculation, the force under his command might exceed that of the enemy by 1200 or 1500 men, when it was considered that the garrison would be covered and protected by walls and batteries, and commanded by experienced French officers, and that the invading force would have to make good its landing through a heavy surf, and in the face of their lines and forts, it seemed next to impossible to imagine that they would not oppose an obstinate defence; and although General Baird was the last man alive to object to the glorious work of duty, he had been told in the instructions contained in the letter of Lord Castlereagh just quoted, that his object was to be to get possession of the Colony in the most expeditious manner possible, and with the least possible loss or hazard to the troops or ships under his command.

His apprehensions, however, with regard to the Rochefort squadron were soon set at rest, for in Lord Castlereagh's reply to his request for additional troops, his Lordship informed the General that it had been ascertained that the ships in question had proceeded to the West Indies.

General Baird had, of course, received from his Royal Highness the Duke of York all the instructions for the details of service, but as the substance of those details is embodied in Lord Castlereagh's letter, it is unnecessary here to give that of the Commander-in-chief.

Upon the arrival of Sir Home Popham at Cork, in His Majesty's ship *Diadem*, General Baird immediately removed his head-quarters into that ship from the *Narcissus* frigate, on board of which Brigadier-General Beresford took his passage, while Brigadier-General Ferguson went in the *Leda*.

On the 27th His Majesty's ship *Diomedé* arrived, and with her, the additional artillery and artificers under Brigadier-General Yorke, and the detachment of the 20th light dragoons; but the General was still disappointed by the non-arrival of the volunteers from the militia regiments, who had nevertheless passed Plymouth several days before the departure of the artillery, and were supposed to be lying in some port near the Land's End, with their convoy the *Pelter* sloop of war. Of this apparent neglect, General Baird very naturally complained to Lord Castlereagh, in a letter dated August 28th, and again solicited—even in consequence of the loss of their services—for the addition of the 8th regiment to his expedition, but he failed to carry his point.

The whole armament was now collected. The outward bound East India fleet, under convoy of the *Belliqueux*, which had arrived for the purpose of embarking the 59th regiment, and the detachments for the regiments serving in India was also ready; and after encountering various delays of different sorts, orders arrived for the departure of the expedition, and on the 31st of August it put to sea.

The passage to Madeira was both tedious and boisterous, and the ships did not reach Funchal

until the 28th of September. The troops were all in excellent health. At Madeira, General Baird found the officers of the Commissariat, and two sloops of war which had arrived the day before, but he was greatly disappointed at not finding also Sir Samuel Auchmuty, whom he hoped to meet there, or the 8th regiment, which he to the very last expected would be added to the expedition.

From Funchal, General Baird, with the concurrence of Sir Home Popham, despatched His Majesty's frigate *Narcissus* to St. Helena, in order to procure information, and sent forward in her, Captain Sorell of the 86th regiment, an officer of great talent and judgment, and in whom he reposed the highest confidence, as bearer of a despatch to the Honourable Robert Patton, the Governor of the island, in which he requested him to give him whatever intelligence he could respecting the state of the Cape, and the power it possessed of resisting the expedition; at the same time informing him of his intentions, and those of Sir Home Popham, to fall back upon St. Helena in case of failure, and bespeaking his good offices in order to afford them such accommodation as might be in his power, should that extremity occur. The General referred Mr. Patton for all farther particulars to Captain Sorell, and concluded by again pressing him to give him every information in his power.

On the 10th of November, General Baird with the expedition arrived at St. Salvador. Sir Home Popham and the General had agreed that the rendezvous should be at Rio de Janeiro; but the

voyage having been extremely tedious, and some of the transports being crippled in their masts and rigging, they deemed it advisable to put into St. Salvador on the 10th, where they remained some time to replenish their water, and take in fresh provisions, as well as to refresh the men, and make some new arrangements as to their distribution.

This last measure was rendered more immediately necessary by the loss of the King George transport, and the Britannia East Indiaman, which were wrecked on the morning of the 1st, on a low sandy island called the Roccas, which is surrounded by rocks, and lies in latitude $3^{\circ} 53'$ south, longitude $33^{\circ} 54'$ west.

By this accident the hulls, stores, and cargoes (with the exception of twelve chests of dollars saved from the Britannia,) of both ships were lost; but providentially only three individuals perished; amongst the number, however, was Brigadier-General Yorke, commandant of the artillery.

After the occurrence of this unfortunate event, Major Spicer succeeded to the command of the artillery, and by removing the provisions out of two of the victualling transports, and engaging an extra East Indiaman, the General was able to accommodate the people of the lost ships comfortably, at the same time providing them with such articles of clothing as could not be purchased on the spot.

During the time that the fleet remained at St. Salvador, the regiments were successively landed, and carefully inspected by their indefatigable com-

mander, who had every reason to be satisfied with their condition and state of health. He also succeeded in procuring about fifty horses for the 20th light dragoons, but they were of an inferior breed, and, as it proved, incapable of enduring much fatigue. At length, however, every necessary arrangement being completed, the fleet again put to sea on the 28th of November, and after a favourable passage made the coast of Africa, a short distance to the northward of Cape Town, in the afternoon of the 4th of January 1806.

The accounts of Table Bay and Cape Town are so numerous, and so accurate, that a few words upon the subject here will be quite sufficient; although in order to give the reader a just idea of the attack, it is right that his memory should be refreshed by a brief description of the localities.

Table Bay, on the shore, and almost in the centre of which Cape Town stands, receives its name from that extraordinary eminence called Table Mountain, which rises about 3687 feet above the level of the sea, and which terminates in a perfectly flat surface at that height, whence the face of the rock on the side of Cape Town descends almost perpendicularly. To the eastward of the mountain, separated from it by a chasm, is Charles's Mount, more generally called the Devil's Tower; and on the westward of the Table Mountain a round hill rises on the right hand of the bay, called the Lion's Head, from which a ridge of high land, terminating in another smaller hill, called the Lion's Rump, runs to the sea.

Cape Town stands in the valley at the foot of the Table Land; and although from the sea it appears a place of small size and importance (probably from the gigantic character of the country by which it is surrounded), it is, on approaching it, a beautiful and capacious town—the streets are broad, airy, and long, intersecting each other at right angles; the houses are built chiefly of stone, with stoops or terraces before them; the public walks, the Hergraat, the Company's gardens, and the spacious parade for the troops, on the opposite side of which, from the town, stands the castle, give an air of gaiety and comfort to the place, which the continued exertions of our Government have since contributed greatly to improve, rendering Cape Town one of the handsomest and most agreeable colonial towns in the world.

Table Bay, although the usual place of resort for merchant vessels, on account of the contiguity of the colonial capital, is by no means a secure port—the violent gusts which rush down the valley from the mountains are perfectly irresistible.

“The prevailing winds at Table Bay, and near the Cape of Good Hope, are from south-east and southward during the summer, the south-east wind blowing more or less in every month in the year, and generally being settled weather.

“The summer is from October to April, in which season it has been thought safe for ships to lie in Table Bay; notwithstanding which His Majesty's ship *Sceptre* and several other ships were wrecked by a severe north-west

storm in November 1799. These north-west gales are occasionally experienced about the Cape in every season of the year; but they seldom blow home into Table Bay from November to May; and although several ships have been driven on shore by them more than once in April, the Dutch fixed the 10th of May as the period for all vessels to leave this place, the strong north-west winds being then daily expected. Such a mountainous sea is forced into the bay by some of the north-west gales, that it is almost impossible for any ship to lie safe."*

Excepting in the bays, and at particular seasons, it would be impossible to effect a landing; for from March to October the eastern coast is protected by the prevalence of the south-easterly winds, rendering an approach to the land dangerous; and during the rest of the year the western coast is equally well secured from the incursion of an enemy by the north-westers which Horsburgh has described, and which continually succeed each other during that period.

In the season when the north-west gales prevail, a secure anchorage may be found in Symonds Bay, which is a bay within a bay, of considerable extent, called False Bay. At Symonds Town, situated in the bay, which takes its name from it, the dock-yard, victualling-offices, naval storehouses, and hospitals, have been erected, and there at present all the men-of-war employed on the station or touching at the Cape may lie at anchor; but according to the arrangements made by General Baird for his opera-

* Horsburgh, vol. i. p. 74.

tions against the colony, this place, which is nearly twenty miles from Cape Town, could not be selected for the landing, although in the former successful expedition against the Cape the British forces had landed in its vicinity.

At the time of General Baird's arrival at the Cape, the colony was governed by General Janssens, an officer whose gallantry was universally acknowledged, and who, in addition to his military reputation, had a high character for ability in his civil capacity. He was extremely popular as chief of the administration at the Cape, and judging from all the testimonials which are yet extant, to his numerous good qualities, very deservedly so.

The garrison consisted of a strong detachment of Batavian artillery, of the 22nd Dutch regiment of the line, a German regiment of Waldecks, and a corps of Hottentots, disciplined to act as light infantry. To this more regular description of troops were added several battalions of Colonial militia, and a numerous corps of cavalry, composed of Boors and farmers, well mounted, and armed with long guns, capable of throwing shot to a much greater distance than ordinary muskets.

To co-operate with the land force, General Janssens had the support of an auxiliary battalion, formed of the seamen and marines belonging to the *Atalanta* frigate and the *Napoleon* corvette: the former vessel having been stranded in Table Bay during a heavy gale of wind, and the latter having been

driven on shore in Houts Bay by His Majesty's ship *Narcissus*, Captain R. Donnelly, which vessel, the reader will recollect, had been despatched by General Baird from Madeira to St. Helena, and had arrived off the Cape a few days before the expedition.

The means of resistance in the enemy's hands were by no means inefficient, and as far as numbers went, they were considerably superior in strength to the English. General Janssens considering the defence of Cape Town a secondary object, as it must at all events follow the destinies of the colony, and as he justly believed would of itself be untenable by an enemy for any length of time if he could deprive it of supplies from the country, resolved, if attacked by a force with which he could not contend in the field, to retire into the interior with the greatest part of his regular army, leaving only a sufficient number of men as a garrison to Cape Town to ensure a capitulation; and thus supported by the country militia, over whom he possessed unbounded influence, carry on a desultory warfare against the invaders, in order to gain time until he might be relieved by the arrival of a Dutch or French fleet from Europe.

This plan of defence, had he resolutely persisted in it, must inevitably have led to the desolation of the colony, but it would have made its final subjection to the invading force a matter of infinite difficulty. Such, however, was the posture of affairs,

when in the afternoon of the 4th of January 1806, the whole expedition anchored off Table Bay, just beyond the range of the batteries which protect it.

The weather was at that time extremely favourable, and the troops both eager and ready to land immediately. It appeared however to General Baird that the day was too far advanced to make it possible to get them all on shore before night set in; the evening was, therefore, employed in the duty of taking soundings along the coast, and in reconnoitring the different defences of the town.

After a careful investigation upon these points, it was determined that the most favourable and accessible place for effecting the landing would be Lospard's Bay, a small indent of the sea within Table Bay, and about sixteen miles to the eastward and northward of the town. As soon as this was finally settled, the ships proceeded to take their stations accordingly, and the men-of-war were placed in such a position as to cover the landing in case any opposition should be offered.

In the morning at daybreak the men were all in readiness to step into the boats, when it was discovered that the surf had so considerably increased during the night, as to render it impossible for them to reach the shore at the proposed point. General Baird and Sir Home Popham then deliberated whether it would not be preferable at once to proceed to Saldanah Bay, where the fleet would be in perfect safety, and where disembarkation might at all times be effected.

Yet notwithstanding these two advantageous circumstances, there were several powerful objections against adopting the expedient. The distance of Saldanah Bay from Cape Town would render it difficult to carry forward the necessary supplies, while as the army advanced, the communication between it and the fleet, upon which it must necessarily depend for the means of subsistence, would be rendered more difficult, and as the distance between them increased, the men would be subject to harassing attacks from the enemy throughout a march of seventy English miles, principally through heavy sand, for the greatest part destitute of water in the hottest season of the year.*

These, it must be confessed, were objections too powerful to be easily overcome, and they had their due weight with the Commander-in-chief; but the uncertainty of a favourable change in the weather at a time of year when strong winds are generally prevalent, added to a consciousness of the exposed situation of the fleet at its present anchorage, at length induced General Baird to detach Brigadier-General Beresford to Saldanah Bay; and accordingly that officer left Table Bay in the evening of the 5th, with the 20th light dragoons and the 38th regiment, and it was at the time of his departure

* "Saldanah Bay entrance lies in latitude 33° 6' S., sixteen or seventeen leagues to the N.N.W. of Table Bay, having at its mouth the two islands of Jutten and Malagsen, lying north and south of each other, between which is the proper passage."—*Horsburgh*, vol. i. p. 71.

intended that the rest of the armament should follow in the morning.

This arrangement had been submitted to with considerable reluctance by General Baird, but he found himself unable to withstand the reasonings of those to whose judgment upon this and several other occasions he deferred; and even after General Beresford's departure, his mind still dwelt upon the superior advantages of effecting the landing if it were possible, at the place he had originally fixed upon.

The morning of the 6th had scarcely dawned, when the General was himself aloft in the main-top of the head-quarter ship, with his glass in hand, making his own observations on the appearance of the coast; and perceiving that the surf in Lospard's Bay had very much subsided, he immediately communicated that fact to Sir Home Popham, and not an hour had elapsed before the troops were all ready for landing, and the three regiments, the 71st, 72nd, and 93rd, forming the Highland brigade, under Brigadier-General Fergusson, were successively put into the boats, and pulled towards the shore.

The bay had previously been examined by General Fergusson, and a safe channel had been buoyed off by the naval officers; yet notwithstanding these precautions, such was yet the violence of the surf, that a boat containing part of the 93rd regiment, was unfortunately upset, and thirty-five men of that corps were drowned.

This was the principal loss which attended the operation. The enemy had thrown some light troops

along the sand-hills and in the brushwood which adjoin the place of landing; but these were speedily driven off by the light infantry, under Major Graham, of the 93rd, and the embarkation proceeded without further molestation.

By the morning of the 8th, the whole of the troops, with four six-pounders and two howitzers, having been brought on shore, Sir David Baird commenced his march on the road, or rather pathway, which leads towards Cape Town, the guns being dragged through the heavy sands by seamen from the fleet. No enemy appeared until the troops approached the Bleuberg, which forms part of an elevated ridge or chain of hills, intersecting the line of road nearly at a right angle, at the distance of about four miles from Lospard's Bay, where parties of the Burgher cavalry were seen on the heights in front, and it was soon ascertained that General Janssen was in force on the opposite side of the hill with the design of disputing our further progress. The British were immediately formed into two parallel columns of brigades. The right brigade, or column, consisting of the 24th, 59th, and 83rd regiments, under Lieutenant-Colonel Baird, of the 83rd regiment, who commanded it in the absence of Brigadier-General Beresford; and the left column of the 71st, 72nd, and 93rd Highland regiments, under Brigadier-General Fergusson.*

* Lieutenant-Colonel, afterwards Major-General Baird, was brother to the distinguished subject of these memoirs. He was an excellent man and a brave officer. He married the Ho-

In this order they advanced, and on crowning the heights of Bleuberg, the whole Batavian force was discovered in the plain below ; their infantry formed in two lines, supported by a large body of burgher cavalry and twenty-five pieces of cannon, which immediately opened their fire, whilst the cavalry, extending themselves to the left of the infantry, and bringing forward their left, showed an intention of turning the right of the British.

General Baird having observed this movement, immediately deployed his columns into line, and whilst the right brigade inclined towards its right and skirmished with the enemy's cavalry and kept it in check, the left brigade advanced rapidly under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry from their lines of infantry, which broke at the moment the British were preparing to charge, and the whole fled, leaving a very considerable number of killed and wounded on the field.

The British must have suffered severely, had the enemy's artillery (to whose fire they were unavoidably much exposed) been better directed. One captain and fourteen rank and file were killed ; and three field officers, one captain, five subalterns, seven serjeants, three drummers, and one hundred and seventy rank and file were wounded. The want of cavalry prevented any pursuit, and enabled the enemy to withdraw their guns.

nourable Esther Caroline Tonson, sister to the present Lord Riversdale, and died at the Cape of Good Hope, where he was second in command, in the year 1816.

After halting a short time on the field they had so gallantly won, the British troops were again put in motion. During the advance, it was ascertained that General Janssens, quitting the road to Cape Town, had taken an easterly direction towards Hottentots Holland and the interior of the colony, with a view to the system of defence already explained. To follow him in the line of retreat he had chosen was out of the question, not only because, without a superior force of cavalry, it would have been impossible to procure supplies, and it was hopeless to expect to bring him again to action; but because it was more desirable to gain possession of Cape Town as speedily as possible, in order to provide for the security of the fleet, which was lying at an exposed and insecure anchorage, as well as to open a communication with the ships, and to obtain thence the means of equipping the troops for the field, should the further proceedings of General Janssens render such a measure necessary.

The men suffered severely during the advance, not only from the difficulties which the nature of the country presented, the extreme heat of the weather, and a total want of water on the road, but from the circumstance of their long previous confinement on shipboard, which made them doubly sensible of the fatigue they had to undergo. It was therefore late before they reached Reit Valley, a Dutch farming establishment belonging to the Government, where they bivouacked for the night.

To this place some casks of salt provisions which

had been floated through the surf from the fleet had been conveyed, and Sir Home Popham himself, who had landed with a party of marines, also arrived there. A scanty supply of water was obtained from the springs which furnish the farm, very inadequate however to the wants of the men, who in their anxiety to assuage the thirst by which they were so grievously tormented, were only prevented by the personal exertions of Sir David Baird himself, from destroying the sources whence they procured the refreshment they so ardently coveted.

Although success had hitherto attended his operations, the situation in which Sir David Baird found himself on his arrival at Reit Valley, was little calculated to relieve his mind of anxiety for the ultimate issue of the expedition. He had, it is true, defeated his enemy with little comparative loss, but a very incorrect estimate of the nature of war, is to be formed by judging of the difficulties of an enterprise, solely by the casualties which occur in the field; and this observation, although generally true, applies with peculiar force to conjunct expeditions, where an army possesses no other base for its operations than the fleet from which it has been landed; to which it must look entirely for its supplies, and on which its movements must consequently entirely depend.

Another march would bring the British in front of the enemy's lines. These were well known to the Commander of the Forces, who during his residence and command in the colony had made him-

self perfectly master of their strength, but he had no positive information as to the amount of the force by which they were defended. General Janssens, although severely checked, had hitherto shown no disposition to submit, and was indeed more formidable, whilst he kept the field, even after defeat, than he would have been had he waited the approach of the enemy within the town, and limited his power of resistance to the defence of its works. In that case the country would have been open to the English, and would have supplied their wants; while on the other hand, famine must at no great distance of time, have compelled *him* to surrender. By keeping the field, he preserved that moral influence over the minds of the inhabitants which is always attached to an established Government, and might by means of his light troops cut off the opposing army from all communications with the interior; reducing it to a state of absolute dependence on the ships, with which its intercourse was liable to be interrupted by every change in the wind or weather. These were subjects for deep and anxious reflection, and Sir David Baird has frequently declared that the night he passed at Reit Valley was one of the most anxious of his life.

The defences which cover Cape Town on the side the British were approaching, consist of a chain of redoubts connected by a parapet with banquettes and a dry ditch, extending from the lofty mountain called the Devil's Berg to the sea, whence it is distant about eight or nine hundred yards. Along the

face of the mountain which advances into the plain, various enclosed works and open batteries had been constructed to flank the approach. The whole of these, as well as the redoubts on the lines, were mounted with a powerful force of artillery, consisting of upwards of one hundred and fifty pieces of heavy cannon and howitzers. Troops advancing to attack the lines, must therefore expose their left flank to the fire from the heights, which from the scarped nature of the mountains, are nearly inaccessible. The principal part of these works had been either constructed or greatly improved by the English during the time they formerly held the colony. One battery with its protecting blockhouse is placed on a shoulder of the mountain about one thousand three hundred feet above the level of the plain.

Behind the lines, at the distance of about a mile, and immediately at the entrance of the town, is seated the Castle of Good Hope, a regular pentagon with outworks sufficiently respectable to make it necessary to break ground and approach it regularly. The side of the town towards the Bay is covered by heavy batteries, which, with the fire of the castle, effectually protect it from insult by land.

To attack works of the formidable character here described with a small corps of infantry and a few pieces of light artillery only, seemed to be an enterprise of equal boldness and uncertainty. The force originally landed did not exceed four thousand rank and file, and these had been sensibly diminished by casualties, and the fatigues the men had undergone.

Still the situation in which the British were placed appeared to admit of no alternative, as delay might prove altogether fatal to the success of the whole affair. Sir David Baird, therefore, on the 9th, took up a position in the neighbourhood of the Salt River, a narrow lake or inlet of the sea a short distance from the lines, which afforded at its entrance a favourable point for communicating with the fleet; and here he determined to disembark some additional guns, with such a re-inforcement of seamen and marines as the navy might be able to furnish for the intended attack.

The enemy, however, were little disposed to bring matters to so serious an issue. Shortly after the British had reached their ground, a flag of truce arrived at head quarters from the Commandant of Cape Town, to propose an armistice for forty-eight hours, to give time to negotiate a capitulation. As every moment was of importance on account of the uncertainty of our communication with the fleet, Sir David Baird immediately despatched Brigadier-General Fergusson and Lieutenant-Colonel Brownrigg (Deputy-Quarter-Master-General), to the town with a reply to this overture; requiring possession of the lines within six hours, and granting thirty-six hours further suspension of arms to arrange the conditions of a capitulation. These proposals having been acceded to within the stipulated time, Fort Kreocke, the principal work on the lines, was immediately occupied by the 59th regiment.

In the mean time, Sir Home Popham visited Sir

David Baird, and after a consultation between the two Commanders, and various communications with the Dutch authorities, the terms were finally agreed on, which placed the British once more in possession of Cape Town and its defences.

We here subjoin a copy of the despatch addressed by Sir David Baird to Lord Castlereagh, which contains the official details of these proceedings.

Cape Town, January 12, 1806.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to announce to you the capitulation of the town and garrison of Good Hope to His Majesty's arms.

In my despatch of the 24th ultimo from St. Salvador, I had the honour to apprise your Lordship of the measures adopted to refresh the forces under my command, and having with much difficulty procured about sixty or seventy horses for the cavalry, and the sick being recruited, the expedition sailed on the 26th of that month, and we had the good fortune to reach Table Bay on the 4th instant.

It had been intended to disembark the army immediately, and with a view of covering our design, before entering the bay the 24th regiment, under the command of the Honourable Lieut.-Colonel Macdonald, was detached under the charge of the *Leda* frigate, to make a demonstration of landing in Camps Bay, but the winds having failed, the fleet did not arrive at its anchorage until the day was too far advanced to attempt a landing.

On the morning of the 5th the 1st brigade, under the orders of Brigadier-General Beresford, was embarked in boats, and proceeded towards the only accessible parts of the shore in a smaller bay sixteen miles to the northward of Cape Town, whence it appeared practicable to effect a

debarkation ; but the surf had increased so considerably, that combined with the local difficulties of the spot, it was found necessary to abandon the attempt.

The rest of the day was devoted to a careful examination of the coast from Lospard's Bay to within gun-shot of the batteries in Cape Town, but which only produced the distressing conviction that the chance of effecting a landing depended on contingencies very unlikely to be realized, except in a perfect calm.

In consequence of this inference, and in order to obviate the disadvantages of delay in adopting a resolution which I apprehended would at last be necessarily imposed on me, I directed Brigadier-General Beresford to proceed with the 38th regiment and the 20th light dragoons, escorted by H. M. S. *Diomedé* to Saldanah Bay, where the debarkation could be accomplished with facility, and a prospect was afforded us of procuring horses and cattle ; and I proposed following with the main body of the army in the event of the beach where we were being impracticable the ensuing morning. The surf along the shore of Lospard's Bay having considerably abated next morning, I determined, with the concurrence of Commodore Sir Home Popham, to make an effort to get the troops a-shore ; and accordingly the Highland brigade, composed of the 71st, 72nd, and 93rd regiments, effected that object, under the command of Brigadier-General Fergusson.

The shore had been previously very closely inspected by the Brigadier, and by his spirited exertions and example our efforts were crowned with success, although a confined and intricate channel to the shore (which had been accurately pointed out by beacons which had been laid down by the diligence and activity of the boats of H. M. S. *Diadem*,) and a tremendous surf opposed the passage of the troops.

The enemy had scattered a party of sharpshooters over

the contiguous heights commanding the landing; but the casualties of this service arose principally from natural difficulties, and it is with the deepest concern I have the honour to inform your Lordship that we lost thirty-five rank and file of the 93rd regiment, by the oversetting of one of the boats, notwithstanding every possible effort to rescue these unfortunate men.

The remainder of the troops could only be brought on shore on the succeeding day, when the extraordinary obstacles to all intercourse with the fleet, which nothing but the courage and perseverance of British seamen could surmount, barely enabled us to obtain the indispensable supplies of water and provisions for immediate subsistence.

On the morning of the 8th the army, consisting of the 24th, 59th, 71st, 72nd, 83rd, and 93rd regiments, about four thousand strong, was formed into two brigades, with two howitzers and six light field-pieces, and moved towards the road which leads to Cape Town; and having ascended the summit of the Blauwe berg or Blue Mountains, and dislodged the enemy's light troops, I discovered their main body drawn up in two lines, prepared to receive us, and even in motion to anticipate our approach.

The enemy's force apparently consisted of about five thousand men, the greater proportion of which was cavalry, and twenty-three pieces of cannon, yoked to horses. The disposition and the nature of the ground occupied by the enemy's troops, made it evident that they meant to reserve their right wing, and with their left attempt to turn our right flank. But to frustrate their design, I formed the army into two columns, the second brigade under Brigadier-General Fergusson keeping the road, while the first struck off to the right, and took the defile of the mountains.

Having accomplished my purpose, our line was formed with equal celerity and order, and the left wing, composed of the Highland brigade, was thrown forward, and ad-

vanced with the steadiest step under a very heavy fire of round shot, grape, and musketry. Nothing could surpass or resist the determined bravery of the troops, headed by their gallant leader, Brigadier-General Fergusson, and the numbers of the enemy who swarmed in the plain served only to augment their ardour and confirm their discipline.

The enemy received our fire and maintained his position obstinately, but in the moment of charging, the valour of British troops bore down all opposition, and forced him to a precipitate retreat.

The first brigade, composed of the 24th, 59th, and 83rd regiments, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Baird in the absence of Brigadier-General Beresford, was unavoidably precluded by its situation from any considerable participation in the triumph of the British arms. The flank companies of the 24th, however, had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves in dislodging a number of horse and riflemen from the heights on our right flank. This brilliant achievement was, however, clouded by the loss of Captain Forster, of the Grenadiers, whose gallantry is recorded in the hearts of his brother soldiers and the universal regrets of the army.

It is utterly impossible to convey to your Lordship an adequate idea of the obstacles which opposed the advance, and retarded the success of our army; but it is my duty to inform your Lordship, that the nature of the country, a deep, heavy, and dry sand, covered with shrubs, scarcely pervious by light bodies of infantry; and above all, the total privation of water under the effect of a burning sun, had nearly exhausted our gallant fellows in the moment of victory; and with the greatest difficulty were we able to reach Reit Valley, where we took our position for the night.

A considerable portion of the provisions and necessaries with which we started, had been lost during the action, and

no united service ever was performed with more harmony than has uniformly been manifested by both branches of His Majesty's forces. Such of His Majesty's ships as could be spared from the service of Leopard's Bay, constantly coasted the enemy's shores, throwing shot amongst her troops and people, and contributing to keep him ignorant of the actual place of our debarkation; and a very spirited effort was made by the marines of the fleet, and a party of seamen from the Diadem, under the commodore's immediate command, to occupy a position in Reit Valley, and co-operate with the army.

The marines, and the Honourable Company's recruits, as well as their cadets, headed by Lieut.-Colonel Wellesley, of the Bengal establishment, have been usefully employed in different branches of the service; but I have to regret the deprivation of the services of the 20th light dragoons, and the 38th regiment, under conviction that they could not have failed to discharge their duty in the same exemplary manner as the rest of His Majesty's troops engaged in action.

Public as well as personal considerations induce me to lament the absence of Brigade-General Beresford, from whose talents and experience I should have derived the most essential assistance in our disputed and difficult progress from Leopard's Bay.

The duties of the Quarter-Master-General's department were very ably and judiciously discharged by Lieut.-Colonel Brownrigg; and although the army had the greatest cause to lament the absence from severe illness of Major Tucker, Deputy Adjutant General, yet the zeal and activity manifested by Major Trotter of the 83rd, and his Assistant-Adjutant-General Captain Munro, happily precluded all deficiencies in that department.

The absence with the Saldanah detachment of Captain Smyth, of the Royal Engineers, was also matter of great

regret to me ; for his knowledge of the country would have relieved me from much embarrassment.

To the several commanding officers of corps, I am under considerable obligation for their spirited, gallant, zealous, and judicious conduct in leading their men to the enemy. British troops, headed by such men, must ever, under Providence, command success ; and every man has, it will I trust be considered, preserved the character of the British soldier, and faithfully discharged his duty to his King and country.

This despatch will be delivered to your Lordship by Lieut.-Colonel Baird, to whom I beg leave to refer your Lordship for any additional information you may wish to obtain respecting our proceedings, and I beg leave to recommend this zealous and meritorious old officer to your Lordship's protection.

I take the liberty of mentioning to your Lordship, that not having been joined by the *Narcissus* frigate prior to our debarkation or subsequent operations in the field, I have unfortunately been deprived of the service of Captain Sorell, Assistant-Adjutant-General, who was charged with my despatches from Madeira to Governor Pellew, at St. Helena, and with the execution of my wishes to procure intelligence relative to the strength and condition of this colony, and from whose extensive local knowledge and professional talents, I expected to derive great assistance.*

Herewith I have the honour to enclose for your Lordship's information, a return of the ordnance found in the

* The writer of this memoir begs in this place to acknowledge the very great obligations he is under to Captain, now Lieut.-Colonel Sorell, for the greater part of the details connected with the Cape expedition. In another part of this work, Colonel Sorell's communications will be found to be even more important.

citadel and other defences of the settlement, but which is perhaps inaccurate for the reason assigned by the commanding officer of artillery.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

With the greatest respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

D. BAIRD,

Major-General Commanding-in-chief.

To the Right Honourable

Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

By the articles of capitulation, to which Sir David Baird refers in this despatch, the regular troops in garrison, including the French seamen and marines, became prisoners of war, such officers as were domiciliated in the town having liberty to remain there on parole. The inhabitants who had borne arms were allowed to return to their homes and occupations. All private property was to be respected, and the burghers and other inhabitants were confirmed in their rights and privileges. The paper money which formed the principal part of the circulating medium, was to remain current until the King's pleasure should be known. These formed the leading conditions of the treaty, which was dictated in a spirit of liberality towards the vanquished, consistent with the known wish of the British Government to protect and improve the colony rather than to weaken or oppress it. The number of guns mounted on the different works and lines which surround the town, according to the official return,

amounted to four hundred and fifty-six pieces of cannon and mortars, generally of heavy calibre.

The possession of Cape Town, although it did not necessarily ensure the conquest of the colony, was of the greatest importance to the British Commanders. The fleet immediately after the surrender, took up the usual anchorage inside the bay, whilst Sir David Baird was fully occupied in providing for the internal administration of the place, and in preparing for a campaign in the interior, should General Janssen persevere in his resistance.

The colonial militia was disarmed, and the tranquillity of the town assured by vigilance and wholesome regulations. A requisition was made of all horses used for pleasure, which might be fit for the use of the cavalry and artillery. These were paid for, at a rate fixed on by English and Dutch Commissioners, with a condition that they might be reclaimed by their owners, on repaying the amount of their valuation, at the conclusion of the service for which they were required.

Whilst these preparations were in progress, detachments were sent to take possession of Symonds Town, Muisenberg and Wynberg; and our troops occupied those posts without meeting with any resistance.

On the morning of the 13th January, Brigadier-General Beresford, who had previously arrived at Cape Town from Saldanah Bay with the cavalry and 38th regiment, moved thence with the 59th

and 72nd regiment, accompanied by a detachment of artillery with four six-pounders and two howitzers, to take post at the village of Stellenbosch, situated about twenty miles from Cape Town, partly in the direction taken by the enemy. The object of this movement was twofold. It gave us possession of an extensive tract of country, whence the town was in a great measure supplied with provisions, and it threatened the position taken by General Janssens at Hottentots Holland Kloof, not only in front, but by a very circuitous route to its rear, through the Roode-Sand Kloof and the district of Sulback.

In order to give a correct idea of the relative situation of the forces, it may be proper to furnish a brief sketch of the nature of the country in which the events we are recording took place.

Cape Town is seated on the shores of Table Bay, in a narrow valley, between the sea and the northern end of a mountainous and rocky tract of country, which extends from thence to Cape Point, at the southern extremity of the African continent. This mountainous range is connected with the main land by a low sandy plain, or isthmus, of considerable width, (over which the sea at some remote period undoubtedly flowed,) and which occupies the space between False Bay to the south, and Table Bay to the north, extending from Cape Town to a vast range or accumulation of mountains, which separate, at different distances, varying from twenty-five to forty miles, the Cape district (properly so called) from the rest of

the colony. The general features of this plain are those of flatness and sterility, but wherever the ground rises into hills, or water is to be found, the soil, although light, is very productive. Through the mountain barrier just mentioned, three principal openings connect the Cape district with the interior, and form the only lines of communication between the seat of Government and the various subordinate establishments in remote parts of the country. The pass at Groenkloof leads towards Saldanah Bay and the country immediately to the north. The Hottentots Holland Kloof towards Swellendam and the extensive and fertile districts which border the sea to the east, whilst the Roode-Sand Kloof (placed between the other two) communicates with the more central portions of the settlement.

The plan of operations determined on by Sir David Baird, as the position taken by General Janssens at Hottentots Holland Kloof was unattackable in front, was to turn it on its right by a force detached through the Roode-Sand Kloof; whilst a second detachment proceeded by sea to False Bay, and landed in his rear towards the left. By this combined movement it was expected either to induce him to retire farther into the interior from a fear of being enclosed, or, if he waited until it was completed, so to straiten him in his position at the Kloof, as to compel him to a speedy surrender from a want of supplies. This latter expectation was very much strengthened when it was ascertained that, shortly after his arrival at the Kloof, he had

dismissed the Country militia and Burgher cavalry, who had accompanied him on the retreat, retaining only the regular troops, amounting to 1000 or 1200 men, with from twenty to thirty pieces of cannon.

Indeed the disposition of General Janssen ill-accorded with his expressed intention of having recourse to those extremities by which his resistance might have been prolonged, although with little chance of its proving finally successful. Brave in the field, but mild, humane, and kind-hearted in all the private relations of life, when the hour of trial came, he shrank from the cruel system of defence which he had previously contemplated, upon the conviction that it must lead to the devastation of the country, and the ruin of its helpless and unoffending inhabitants, to whom he appears to have been very much attached.

Sir David Baird was desirous of profiting by the indecision which marked the Batavian General's conduct, at the same time that he fully appreciated the honourable motives which occasioned it. His generous disposition sympathized warmly in the painful situation to which a gallant soldier was reduced, who, anxious to fulfil to the utmost his duty towards his Government and country whilst the slightest chance of success might remain, felt at the same time a paternal anxiety to spare the interesting colony confided to his care, from the ruin which inevitably menaced it, should he adhere to a scheme of resistance. In order to hasten his determination, Sir David Baird determined to open a communica-

tion with him, through the medium of General Beresford, who moved for this purpose from Stellenbosch towards Hottentots Holland, and took post at an extensive farm not far distant from the entrance into the pass, threatening the enemy's position in front.

A letter to General Janssens, of which the following is a copy, was at this juncture transmitted to him through General Beresford.

Cape Town, 11th January, 1806.

SIR,

You have discharged your duty to your country, as became a brave man, at the head of a gallant though feeble army. I know how to respect the high qualities of such a man; and do not doubt that the humanity which ever characterises an intrepid soldier, will now operate in your breast to check the fatal consequences of a fruitless contest. The naval and military forces of His Britannic Majesty which have possessed themselves of the seat of your recent Government, are of a magnitude to leave no question respecting the issue of further hostilities, and therefore a temporary resistance is all you can possibly oppose to superior numbers. Under these circumstances, nothing can result but the devastation of the country you casually occupy, and such a consequence can never be contemplated without anguish by a generous mind, or be gratifying to the man who feels for the prosperity and tranquillity of the colony, lately subject to his administration. But if unhappily your resolution is formed to oppose an enemy of such superior force, by protracting a contest which must entail misery and ruin on the industrious and peaceably disposed settlers of this colony, I shall be exonerated from the reproach of my own conscience by this

frank overture; and you must justify to yourself and to your countrymen, the further effusion of blood, and the desolation of the country.

You are necessarily so well acquainted with the extent of the calamities in which the interior of the country may be involved, that I shall not enlarge on your power of causing mischief to be done to all its inhabitants; but I persuade myself that considerations of a more laudable nature will influence your decision on this occasion, and that you will manifest an immediate disposition to promote a general tranquillity.

I have the honour to subscribe myself,

With sentiments of the highest consideration,

Sir, Yours, &c.

(Signed) D. BAIRD,

Major-General Commanding-in-chief.

To Lieutenant-General Janssens.

This letter was accompanied by a notice from Brigadier-General Beresford, that he was vested with powers to treat for the final settlement of the colony.

This communication led to a truce for the purpose of entering into a negotiation, but the pretensions urged by General Janssens in objection to the terms offered, rendering his final acquiescence doubtful, the 59th and 72d regiments were moved to Roode-Sand Kloof, and replaced by the 93d at the post in front of the enemy, whilst the 83d embarked and sailed on the 16th of January for Mosell's Bay to the eastward, in order to cut the enemy off from Swellendam, should he endeavour to retreat in that direction.

At length, when nearly every hope of bringing the negotiation to a favourable issue had vanished, General Janssens despatched his military secretary, Captain Debittz, to Sir David Baird (who had joined the troops in the neighbourhood of his position) with a modified draught of the terms which had been just sent to him. Sir David, however, refused to consent to any change in the conditions which he had originally proposed; and after a good deal of discussion, and a further reference to the Batavian General, these were finally acceded to by General Janssens, and a capitulation to the following effect signed accordingly.

The whole of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope and its dependencies, and all the rights and privileges held and exercised by the Batavian Government, were surrendered to His Britannic Majesty. The Batavian troops to march from their present camp within three days, or earlier if convenient, to Symond's Town, with guns, arms, and baggage, and the honours of war, retaining their private property, and the officers their swords and horses, but the arms of the troops and public property of every description, including the cavalry and artillery horses, were to be given up. In consequence of their gallant conduct, the troops to be embarked and sent direct to Holland, at the expense of the British Government, without being considered prisoners of war, but under an engagement not to serve against His Britannic Majesty or his allies until landed in that country. The Hottentots under

arms to be permitted to return to their homes, or to enter into His Majesty's service as they might think proper. The Batavian troops to be subsisted at the expense of the British Government until embarked, and the sick and wounded to be sent after their recovery, in like manner, to Holland. All the inhabitants of the colony to participate in the terms granted to Cape Town, by the capitulation of the 10th, with the exception of their remaining liable to have troops quartered upon them in consequence of the different circumstances in which they were placed.

Such were the principal conditions of the treaty which placed the colony of the Cape a second time under British protection.

We do not propose here to enter into a detailed account of the civil administration of General Baird during the short time he was permitted to hold the Government of the Cape; but it may be proper briefly to notice such acts and regulations as the particular circumstances in which he found the colony gave rise to, or which seem to have had a permanent and beneficial influence on its condition and prospects.

His government in general was marked by the same unbending firmness, strict impartiality, and love of justice, which distinguished every action of his life; and its best eulogy will be found in the universal regret which his removal occasioned, not only to the garrison, but to the Dutch inhabitants, and even in the sentiments frequently and warmly expressed by his immediate successor, General Grey,

in these concise but memorable words, "On my arrival at the Cape, I found much to admire, and nothing to change."

On his return from Hottentots Holland to Cape Town, the objects which first engaged the attention of General Baird, were those of carrying into effect the conditions of the capitulation with General Janssens; receiving the submission of the authorities attached to the country districts; and extending a vigorous system of responsibility and superintendence over the whole, so as to provide for the due administration of justice, and secure the general tranquillity of the settlement. Such public officers as were qualified and recommended by their honourable conduct, were permitted to retain their respective employments. Few removals consequently took place; but as it was of the highest importance to put persons of unquestionable loyalty into the more immediately confidential situations, Captain Carmichael Smyth, of the Engineers, was named Colonial Secretary, and Mr. Reynevelt appointed Fiscal. The latter gentleman had long held the same office under the former British Government, and was one of the very few who joined our colours before the capitulation.

But another and far more important circumstance soon called forth all the energy of General Baird's character. Intelligence was brought by a neutral vessel that a strong French squadron was at sea; and it was ascertained by intercepted correspondence, that its destination was the Cape of Good Hope.

Its force was greatly superior to that, under Sir Home Popham, which, by the departure of the India fleet, was reduced to the *Diadem* of sixty-four guns, the *Diomede* of fifty, the *Leda* and *Narcissus* frigates, and two or three gun-brigs, whilst the French Admiral *Villeaumez* was known to have six or seven heavy ships of the line, besides inferior vessels. To meet this great disproportion of force, a plan of defence was concerted with the British Commodore. The ships of war took up a defensive position, so as to give a clear range to the heavy batteries which protect the anchorage, and command the usual channel into the bay, whilst their broadsides were placed so as to produce a cross and raking fire on any approaching enemy. The batteries were provided with furnaces and fuel for heating shot, and a strong draft of picked men from the line, was attached to the artillery, as the strength of the latter corps was insufficient to man the whole of the works which bear on the sea; whilst the light company of the 71st was embarked as a reinforcement to the marines of the squadron.

To prevent Admiral *Villeaumez* from receiving information that the colony had fallen under the dominion of Great Britain, an embargo was laid on all vessels lying in Table Bay.

Nor was the protection of the interior neglected. As it was by no means improbable that the French Admiral, if he got intelligence of the surrender of the colony at no great distance from the African coast, might find it necessary to seek an anchorage

to refit and water his ships, and for this purpose put into Saldanha Bay, posts were established in its neighbourhood, and on the line of communication between that place and Cape Town, and a considerable force equipped for field service, and held in constant readiness to proceed to any part of the colony which might be threatened.

Thus prepared, the arrival of the enemy in Table Bay was ardently desired by every individual in the two services, from a conviction that the result of an attack would be equally advantageous and honourable to his Majesty's arms.

But the hopes thus eagerly indulged in, of adding to the laurels already won, those which would have attended the destruction or capture of a fleet which ranked among its captains, a brother of Buonaparte,* were not destined to be realized! Admiral Villeaumez, having received intelligence of the change which had taken place in the government of the colony, either by a neutral vessel, or by touching at the Island of Noronha, immediately altered his course, and proceeded to St. Salvador, where he arrived in the month of June, and shortly afterwards sailed for the West Indies.

The precautions, however, which had been adopted to deceive an approaching enemy, were not altogether unproductive of advantage. The French frigate, *La Volontaire*, of forty-four guns, which sailed from France to join Admiral Villeaumez's

* Jerome Buonaparte was Captain of a seventy-four gun ship in Admiral Villeaumez's squadron.

fleet at the Cape of Good Hope, fell in with an English transport from Gibraltar, having a company of the 2d foot, and a company of the 54th on board. After taking out the troops, she suffered the transport to proceed on her voyage, and pursued her course to the Cape, where she arrived on the 4th of March, having left Brest on the 13th of December.

Perceiving the Dutch colours flying on the forts, and shipping, the Captain, confident of meeting a hospitable reception from his friends, brought his ship into the usual anchorage, where he was permitted quietly to establish himself, and as soon as every chance of his escape was terminated, as well by his position under the batteries as by the manœuvres of two English frigates which had immediately got under weigh, and cut off his retreat, a shot was fired across her bows from the Chevron battery, and the Dutch flag being at the same moment hauled down, and the British union hoisted, the French Captain instantly struck his colours. By this stratagem, a fine frigate was captured from the enemy, and nearly two hundred English soldiers were instantly released from imprisonment, rendered more distressing by the crowded state of the vessel.*

* The detail of this capture is given from an account, the accuracy of which is unquestionable; but as a public document also exists, which gives a somewhat different account of the circumstances, we think it right to submit it to the reader. The document in question is a letter from Sir Home Popham to Mr. Marsden, Secretary of the Admiralty.

SIR,

Diadem, Table Bay, March 4, 1806.

I beg you will do me the honour to inform my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the *Diadem*, *Leda*, and

Two or three days previous to the arrival and capture of this ship, General Janssens, the late Governor, had quitted the Cape in a British vessel for Holland, together with the French and Batavian troops, who had capitulated with him; and owing to the kind consideration of General Baird, several wounded officers who were not included in the surrender at Hottentot Hollands Kloof, were permitted also to return on their parole.

Diomedé, anchored here yesterday evening; and at nine this morning a ship was discovered coming from the southward under a press of sail, and soon after two more, one of which the station on the Lion's Rump reported to be of the line, and an enemy's ship. As the Marengo and Belle Poule were hourly expected, I thought it possible it might be them, and I directed the Diomedé and Leda to slip and keep on the edge of the south-easter, which had partially set in on the east side of the bay.

At eleven the headmost ship hoisted French colours, and stood towards the Diadem, and by this time I was satisfied, from the judicious manœuvres of the two ships in the offing, that they could be no other than the *Raisonné* and the *Narcissus*.

At twelve the French frigate passed within hail of the Diadem, when we changed our colours from Dutch to English, and desired her to strike, which she very properly did immediately, and I sent the Hon. Captain Percy, who was serving with me as a volunteer, to take possession of her. She proved to be *La Volontaire*, the forerunner of Admiral Villeaumez's squadron; she is nearly eleven hundred tons, and mounts forty-six guns, with a complement of 360 men on board.

I congratulate their Lordships, that by this capture, detachments of the Queen's and fifty-fourth regiments, consisting of 217 men, who were taken in two transports in the Bay of Biscay, are restored to His Majesty's service.

I have the honour to be, &c.

W. Marsden, Esq.

HOME POPHAM.

At first sight there appears a discrepancy between the letter and our detail; it will however be easily reconciled, when it is recollected that our narrative describes what occurred as it appeared *from the shore*.

CHAPTER V.

FRESH ACCOUNTS OF THE FRENCH FLEET—ITS DEPARTURE FOR THE WEST INDIES—SIR HOME POPHAM'S PLAN OF ATTACKING THE SOUTH AMERICAN COLONIES DEVELOPED TO SIR DAVID BAIRD—HIS RELUCTANCE TO ACCEDE TO THE REQUEST OF SIR HOME FOR TROOPS—STATEMENTS OF SIR HOME—SIR DAVID BAIRD ULTIMATELY CONSENTS—LETTER TO COLONEL GORDON—DEPARTURE OF THE EXPEDITION—LETTER OF SIR HOME POPHAM TO MR. MARSDEN—INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE CAPE—WISE REGULATIONS OF SIR DAVID BAIRD—IMPROVEMENTS OF THE COLONY—INTIMATION OF RECAL BY THE WHIG MINISTERS—ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF HIS DESPATCHES BY MR. WINDHAM—SUCCESS OF THE SOUTH AMERICA EXPEDITION—SIR DAVID SENDS REINFORCEMENTS TO GENERAL BERESFORD—DISASTROUS EVENTS AT BUENOS AYRES—CAPITULATION OF THE ENGLISH—SIR HOME POPHAM RECALLED—SIR DAVID BAIRD RECALLED—QUITS THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE—ADDRESSES PRESENTED TO HIM—SAILS FOR ENGLAND—ARRIVAL THERE.

WHEN the *Volontaire* arrived and was captured, General Baird obtained much important information from her officers—it appeared that she had sailed from Brest in company with eleven sail of the line, and some frigates and corvettes; soon after getting to sea, they separated into two divisions, one of four, and the other of six line-of-battle ships, each taking a proportion of the smaller vessels. The first division steered to the westward, the second to the southward; but from what could be collected

from the officers, both divisions were eventually intended for the Cape of Good Hope, whence they were to proceed to India.

Jerome Buonaparte, whom we have already mentioned as commanding one of the line-of-battle ships, the *Veteran*, of seventy-four, had with him, it was said, a commission as Commander-in-chief of the French forces and possessions eastward of the Cape.

“ Since,” says General Baird (in a letter to Colonel Gordon, Secretary to the Commander-in-chief, dated March 8th, 1806,) “ Since the receipt of this information, which gives us reason to expect a visit from the enemy, every preparation has been making, both on the part of Commodore Sir Home Popham and myself, to receive him as becomes us. It is ascertained that there are no troops on board the squadron, and therefore no apprehensions need be entertained for the safety of the colony—so great a number of ships of the line, however, may annoy us considerably, both in Table and Symonds Bay ; but, although we cannot hope to frustrate altogether the projects they may have formed against our Indian commerce and possessions, yet it may be in our power to retard the execution of them, by damaging and crippling their ships.”

One precaution General Baird felt it necessary to take on the receipt of this intelligence—the French prisoners of war at the Cape were accumulating ; and accordingly we find the General in a subsequent paragraph of the same letter, informing Colonel Gordon, “ that Sir Home Popham had determined to send the officers and crew of the *Volontaire* to France direct, in two transports, as

it might not be prudent to have them here (at the Cape) at the time of an attack from a French squadron. For the same reason," adds the General, "I intend to send to France in a similar manner the captains, officers, and crews, late of the *Atalante* frigate, and the *Napoleon* corvette.

About a fortnight after the despatch of this letter, an English whaler arrived in Saldanah Bay, which reported having seen on the 25th of February, in lat. $33^{\circ} 31'$ south, long. $2^{\circ} 50'$ east, eight large ships; and a neutral vessel which came in, about the same period, gave an account of her having been boarded on the same day by a boat from a seventy-four gun ship, supposed to be French, in company with seven others, in lat. $33^{\circ} 23'$ south, long. $10^{\circ} 14'$ east.

From the coincidence of time, latitude, and number of ships, Sir David Baird entertained no doubt of these being the same ships as those seen by the whaler—the difference of longitude he accounted for by the known inaccuracy of foreign merchant vessels in their reckonings.

At this juncture, General Baird renewed an application which he had previously made to the Commander-in-chief in England, for a reinforcement of cavalry—he stated that during the Dutch government of the colony, the force had greatly exceeded that of the detachment now with him, which in his opinion was not only inefficient from the smallness of its number, but from being composed of foreigners;

in the proportion at least of three fourths. The result of this application we shall hereafter see.

Shortly after the receipt of the intelligence which led the General to expect a visit from the French fleet, some other neutral vessels arrived, from which it was satisfactorily ascertained that Admiral Villeaumez, either from having fallen in with some vessels coming from the Cape, or by touching at some port in his way, had discovered that that settlement had fallen into the hands of the English; for he had changed his course, and was, when last seen, steering towards the coast of Brazil and the West Indies.

This being the case, and no attack even from their ships being apprehended, Sir Home Popham developed to General Baird a plan which he had long meditated of making an attack upon the Spanish settlements at the Rio de Plata.

The anxiety of Sir Home upon this point was so great, as to induce Sir David Baird to listen with attention to an officer of whose merit and zeal, an intimate professional acquaintance, both in Egypt, before, and at this very period at the Cape, had given him the highest opinion; and he was more easily led to lend a favourable ear to the representations of his gallant friend, because, in order to induce Sir David to co-operate in the project, he told him distinctly that the enterprize he then proposed was founded on an understanding with the British ministry, whose sentiments he knew would be favourable to the undertaking.

This statement had naturally a powerful effect upon Sir David, who was too excellent a disciplinarian not to feel the difficulty and delicacy of venturing to detach any part of the military force under his command for the purpose of attempting the capture of another colony; and it was by this representation of Sir Home's, added to the admitted influence which he had gained over Sir David Baird, that Sir David's consent to join him in the proceeding was ultimately obtained.

Our duty compels us to say, that however much the statement of Sir Home contributed to carry his favourite point, it was not supported as might have been expected by events; for on the trial of Sir Home Popham, it appeared by the evidence of Lord Melville, that although Sir Home Popham had been originally appointed to the *Dia-dem* (before the Cape expedition was determined on) for the purpose of co-operating with General Miranda, to the extent of taking advantage of any of his proceedings which might tend to our obtaining a position on the continent of South America favourable to the trade of the country; yet that he was fully aware that all views of the kind were for the present, through deference to Russia, abandoned; nor had he when he sailed for the Cape, any instructions whatever, either public or private, which could be construed into giving him authority to employ the squadron under his command on any service unconnected with the conquest and preservation of that particular colony.

Notwithstanding the strength and earnestness of Sir Home Popham's application, Sir David continued to hesitate; until at length determined, as it appeared, to bring the matter to a decided and final issue, Sir Home declared that Sir David's refusal to afford him military assistance in the enterprize would not prevent his making the effort with the naval force he had under his command, unaided by troops, and expressed his determination of taking the fleet to Rio de Plata, convinced that the opportunity then presented itself for striking a blow, which might prove in the highest degree advantageous to his country.

He maintained that the risk was by no means commensurate with the important results which must accrue to the political and commercial interests of Great Britain by success, and declared his knowledge of the fact, that the Spanish force at Buenos Ayres was very feeble, and that the people were in an actual state of discontent and ferment.

Having made all these statements and declarations, he ended his conversation by telling Sir David Baird that it only remained for him to determine how far he would be justified in hazarding the success of an enterprize which *should and would be undertaken without his co-operation*, by refusing a few troops, which now all apprehension of an attack upon the colony had entirely subsided, might be spared with perfect security; adding that the light company of the 71st was already embarked as marines,

and all he asked was the remainder of that regiment and a few artillery men.

Sir Home Popham, aware that the leading feature of Sir David Baird's character was an entire devotion to the interests of his King and country, assailed him with unremitting assiduity upon the subject of this favourite expedition; and having, as we have just stated, declared his intention of making the attempt with ships alone, should the General refuse his concurrence, left, as it were, upon *him*, the responsibility of the failure of a design, for the success of which, he could not be made responsible in any ordinary course of circumstances. Sir Home, however, had struck the right chord; his solicitations for support were eventually successful, and accordingly a force consisting of the 71st regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Pack, with a small detachment of artillery, and a few light field-pieces, was embarked on board Sir Home Popham's squadron, under the command of Brigadier-General Beresford, who particularly requested the appointment.

The garrison left at the Cape consisted of the 21st light dragoons, the 24th, 38th, 72nd, and 93rd regiments, with a Hottentot light infantry corps, about three hundred strong, and the two companies of the 2nd and 51st, which had been released from captivity on board the French frigate.

Sir David Baird's despatch to Colonel Gordon, Secretary to the Commander-in-chief, dated April 14th, will best describe his views and feelings upon

the subject of the assistance he had felt it his duty, in consequence of the strong representation of the Commodore, to afford that officer in the undertaking.

Cape Town, April 14th, 1806.

SIR,

In my private letter to you, by *La Volontaire* frigate, I took occasion to mention that I had been much pressed by Sir Home Popham to detach a regiment with the squadron under his command, for the purpose of making an attack upon the Spanish settlements at Rio de la Plata, but that many reasons combined at the moment to prevent my acquiescence in the Commodore's wish.*

The additional intelligence (since) received here of the weak and defenceless condition of those settlements, the great advantages derivable to Great Britain from the possession of them, particularly as opening a fresh and profitable channel for the exportation of our manufactures, the certainty that Admiral Villeaumez has proceeded to India, and cannot for some months interrupt the present tranquillity of this colony, and the rapidly increasing strength and discipline of the Cape regiments, have together united in determining me to detach a small part of the force under my command upon this service.

I am aware that I have taken upon myself a high responsibility, but the importance of the object in a national point of view will, I trust, bear me out, and ensure to me the

* It is remarkable, as a proof of the great carefulness on the part of Sir David Baird not to leave Sir Home Popham under the imputation of blame, that although the statement contained in this paragraph is made to Colonel Gordon (to whom he had previously written privately on the subject), it is omitted in his despatch of the same date to Lord Castlereagh, and the despatch to his Lordship begins with the second paragraph of this letter.

approbation of His Majesty, and of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief.

As I deemed it essential to the success of the undertaking that the command should be entrusted to an officer of rank, and of approved ability, judgment, and zeal, I selected Brigadier-General Beresford, although I shall experience by his absence the want of his valuable services.

Having also considered that, in the event of success, the officer discharging the civil and military duties of His Majesty's Lieutenant Governor and Commandant should possess a high military rank, I have taken upon myself to desire that Brigadier-General Beresford should assume, upon landing in South America with the troops under his command, the rank of Major-General in that country only—as the standing of this officer in the service, induces the belief of his having already been appointed to that rank by his Majesty, I am the more induced to hope my making this appointment will meet with the approbation of his royal highness the Commander-in-chief.*

If success attend this undertaking, and His Majesty shall determine upon retaining possession of the Spanish settlement which may surrender to her arms, a reinforcement of troops cannot be despatched to General Beresford too soon—the country is well adapted to cavalry, and any number of dragoons may be expeditiously and well mounted.

It will also be expedient to replace as soon as possible the troops detached from this, as well as to send out two general officers in the room of Generals Beresford and Ferguson; and were I permitted on this occasion to express an opinion in favour of any individual, I should certainly

* It is curious enough, that by the brevet expected by Sir David Baird, eighteen Major-Generals were made, and the promotion stopped exactly at the one before Colonel Beresford.

point out Sir Samuel Auchmuty, whose assistance I hoped for in the expedition against this colony, and whom I know to be qualified in an eminent degree for the situation of second in command here.

In the despatch from which these are extracts, there is, as we have already said, no evidence of Sir David's having been over-persuaded into consenting to the detachment of this force; not the slightest reference is made to the assertions or sophistry of Sir Home Popham, or the urgent importunity of General Beresford, who was equally anxious to obtain his consent. Sir David at once takes upon himself the responsibility, which ought never, in fact, to have rested upon his shoulders. We have no intention here to enter at any length into a discussion of the merits of Sir Home's enterprize; but although founded, as his conduct doubtlessly was, upon zeal for the service, it is impossible to deny that the example of an officer in command departing so entirely from the line of his instructions, and on his own responsibility, undertaking an expedition of such infinite importance in its probable results, without any authority beyond the knowledge that similar views had *some time before* engaged the attention of Government, was most difficult of defence or justification.

The part really taken by Sir David was of a distinct and even secondary character: he had no share in the design, and could at any rate have had no control over the proceedings of the squadron; still,

by yielding to the solicitations of the Commodore, (of whom, as we have more than once had occasion to show, he had the highest opinion,) so far as to grant him the support of a body of troops, he was considered to have implicated himself sufficiently in the affair to partake of the censure with which it was eventually visited, and which afforded a pretext for the Whig ministry to recall him from the government of the colony.

On the 12th or 13th of April, the small military force above recapitulated, together with the whole fleet under Sir Home Popham's command, left Table Bay; and we consider it our duty here to submit to the reader a letter written by that officer, dated *Diadem, St. Helena, 30th April 1806*, addressed to Mr. Marsden, the Secretary of the Admiralty, as conveying *his* views of the expedition, and of the grounds he had for venturing to undertake it under circumstances of such difficulty and delicacy as those which we have already endeavoured to describe. It contains, in fact, all that could be said on his part, in vindication of his conduct.

Diadem, St. Helena, 30th April 1806.

SIR,

In consequence of my having borne up for St. Helena, as mentioned in my letter of this day's date, and a Company's packet giving me the opportunity of a safe conveyance to write on the subject of Rio de la Plata, I deem it right to trouble you with this letter for their Lordships' information.

To satisfy their Lordships, in the first instance, that the

project has not arisen from any sudden impulse, or the immediate desire of gratifying an adventurous spirit, I take the liberty of transmitting for your perusal the copy of a paper which I wrote by the desire of Lord Melville when he was at the Board of Admiralty, after having previously had a conference with Mr. Pitt and his Lordship on that subject.

You will observe, Sir, that the paper in question holds out, under certain combinations, some prospects of a general emancipation in South America, and that the great organ of action in this undertaking is General Miranda, who is now in London.

Rio de la Plata is one of the points proposed to be attacked, and was considered more a military position than one of absolute negociation, though considerable dependence was placed on the effect which a successful issue in other places might have had in that respect.

If therefore such an enterprise on general grounds of advantage to the kingdom has been so long in agitation by different cabinets, I have reason to conclude no formidable objection has ever existed either to the principle or policy of the measure.

I am aware, however, that much has been said on the expediency of foreign territorial acquisition taken simply as a conquest, but the arguments applied to situations without commercial resources, and which were exceedingly remote from the inspection or intercourse of the mother country.

In the present expedition no such objection exists: the destination of it is contiguous to that important colony, the Cape of Good Hope, and if the possession of Monte Video and Buenos Ayres is not absolutely necessary to its existence, it will be materially conducive to its prosperity and advantages; and were I only on this calculation to consider the importation of corn to the Cape, I trust in that

article alone the beneficial consequences even speculatively taken, will far exceed any risk or expense that can be fairly said to attach to this enterprize.

This, Sir, is the least important consideration, and if the records of the Admiralty were to be examined, or the still better evidence, the living testimonies of the merchants of London resorted to, you will, I have no doubt, find that Buenos Ayres is the best commercial situation in South America. It is the grand centre and emporium of the trade of all its provinces, and is the channel through which a great proportion of the wealth of the kingdom of Chili and Peru annually passes.

These advantages have been so strongly urged in a provincial weekly publication which I am in possession of, that the Spanish Government was obliged to interfere, and stop its further progress; as it was evidently written to invite foreign protection, and to induce Great Britain to profit of the neglected state in which those valuable colonies were left by the mother country.

The productions according to this statement, exclusive of gold, silver, and precious stones, are cocoa, indigo, cochineal, copper, wool, hemp, hair, wheat, gums, drugs, horns, besides hides and tallow, which I consider to be the great staple. It appears also by the work already quoted, (the Mercantile Telegraph of Buenos Ayres,) that about six hundred coasters enter inwards annually at Monte Video, and one hundred and thirty European ships, and about the same number clear outwards; but in this commercial intercourse, the exactions, duties, and restrictions, are so arbitrary, that the natives are in a state not many removes from open revolt.

I have hitherto dwelt principally on the export trade of these colonies, which enjoys all the advantages of easy transport by the Paraguay and other fine rivers that are navigable, several hundred miles from Buenos Ayres.

These advantages apply also to the importation of manufactures from Great Britain; and when we consider that at least six millions of inhabitants are within the reach of such a supply, I do presume to submit whether even a temporary encouragement to our manufacturing towns under such prospects of benefit as are eventually held out, is not sufficient to justify the attempt in agitation, even under a less favourable promise of success.

I know, Sir, that in ordinary cases the opening a new channel for the consumption of our manufactures is not only a measure of extreme policy to the state, but of equal popularity to the existing Government of the country; and although it may be urged that an officer has nothing to do with the latter consideration, yet I cannot admit the principle until I hear it confirmed by a paramount authority.

It may be also thought that I have in some respects exceeded the bounds of discretion which are vested in a commanding officer; if, however, I have given too liberal a construction to that power, I have done so because I thought it would essentially serve my country; and I have had the satisfaction of obtaining by manifest demonstrations of eventual benefits, the concurrent sentiment of Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird to the policy of this measure, followed up by a co-operation of a detachment of his army under Brigadier-General Beresford.

Viewing this project in the most limited way, I trust I shall not be thought too arrogant, if, in addition to the prospects of advantage which may appear likely to result from its successful issue, I add that it may be considered as an equivalent of some moment on any pacific negotiation, and it will be the means of totally preventing the enemy during the war, from enjoying the benefits of its valuable productions, which it does now to the greatest extent, by the systematical intervention of neutral flags.

Taking, however, a more enlarged view, and such a one

as would be justified by the favourable reception that the enclosed memoir has received from His Majesty's Ministers, then I must consider the benefits of the position in question as incalculable in its relation of assistance to General Miranda's plan through the province of St. Fe de Bogota and the Caraccas: and if it should at this period of the war, and under the general derangement of our allies on the continent, be thought expedient to prosecute this scheme, either to obtain a balance of foreign territory against the continental aggrandizement of the French Government, or to cut off those resources which it derives through Spain from South America, then I trust the measure I am about to carry into execution will be approved, as laying a successful foundation to that great enterprise.

General Miranda, if not already sailed, is, I conclude, in a state of readiness to proceed to Trinidad and the Caraccas, without a moment's loss of time, and the small military force which he requires will, I trust, bear scarce any degree of comparison to the probable ulterior benefits of its application on South America.

It is necessary to observe, that in consequence of bearing up to St. Helena, an additional force has been obtained of one hundred and fifty infantry, and one hundred artillery, consequently we shall leave this with the 71st regiment (750), and twenty-five artillery; one hundred and fifty St. Helena infantry, one hundred artillery; and in the first instance we shall be able to land about eight hundred men from the fleet.

It may now probably be right that I should give the most concise account possible of the information I have received of the state and defences of the enemy's possessions in La Plata.

In addition and corroboration of all the intelligence I obtained last war, Mr. Wilson, an eminent merchant of the city of London, informed me a few days before I left town,

and which communication I made to Mr. Pitt, that Monte Video was very defenceless, and that a thousand men would easily obtain possession of that place and Buenos Ayres, which is an open town; and after the Spanish troops were sent from the country, the natives would easily keep possession of it under an amelioration of their export and import duties and some other heavy and oppressive taxes.

At St. Salvadore, where there is a continual intercourse with La Plata, we obtained information similar to that already quoted; and an Englishman who had been eleven months a ship-carpenter at Monte Video, and had only just arrived in a Spanish vessel, has, under every kind of cross-examination, adhered without variation to this account—that there are not above two hundred and fifty regular troops at Monte Video, and some provincial cavalry and militia; that the walls of the town are in a ruinous state; and that he believes the inhabitants would force a surrender without firing a shot.

The letter from Mr. Wayne, master of the Elizabeth American ship, conveys his sentiments; and he is now on board the Diadem.

There is also an Englishman who was taken by the Polyphemus, who had been a resident eight years at Buenos Ayres, and two of which he was interpreter to the Custom-house. His information is much the same as the preceding person with respect to Buenos Ayres, which is an open town: he asserts that there never was a thousand regular troops while he was at Buenos Ayres, and at this moment he does not conceive that there are six hundred in both places; and the disposition of the inhabitants so averse to their existing Government, that they will materially assist in the conquest of the place.

We have many other similar testimonies of its military weakness and its political disaffection: under such infor-

mation, therefore, we may presume on success, and if it is to be commanded by the physical extent of our force, we may look forward with pleasure to the issue, from its zeal, energy, and spirit.

There can be no idea of moving a man into the country; the object will be to gain that by negociation, and the offer of a liberal trade, and make Monte Video, which is the key of the river, as strong as possible, till some reinforcements arrive from Europe; and we can only hope that if it is possible to spare two regiments, they will be sent without loss of time in fast-sailing ships. Every expedient that I possess shall be adopted to create a diversion on the merits of such intelligence as I may receive after we are in possession of the place.

The expedition will sail to-morrow evening, and we calculate on four weeks passage, but I trust that this small armament will only be considered as a floating force to keep up the national characteristic enterprise, and ready to apply to any point of the enemy's possessions which have been neglected, provided there is moral certainty of success, and no risk beyond the common calculation under such circumstances.

I have the honour to remain, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) HOME POPHAM.

Having thus developed Sir Home Popham's intentions and views, and exhibited the objects to which his operations were to be chiefly directed, we shall return to the Cape of Good Hope, where, just at the period of the departure of the expedition for South America, and in the midst of all the excitement so naturally attending it, a question of a very different and far less animating character, claimed the

anxious solicitude of the newly-established Government. The supply of wheat brought to Cape Town had progressively diminished in quantity, and the result of the inquiries which were immediately instituted as to the cause of this deficiency, was the alarming certainty that the stock on hand in the interior, would prove very inadequate to the wants of the population until the return of the harvest, augmented as that population was by the presence of a strong British garrison, and by the numerous arrivals from Europe and India, which the change of circumstances had occasioned and would continue to produce. The most active measures were immediately adopted to avert the threatened evil. The Northumberland Indiaman, which happened to be in the bay, was despatched to St. Helena, in the hope of obtaining a cargo of rice. The operation of the laws which regulated the introduction of grain into the colony was suspended, and the ports thrown open to its free admission, a bounty being offered on the importation of wheat, during a period sufficiently extended to admit of supplies being brought from the North American States.

But the views of Sir David Baird on this interesting and important subject were not limited to the mere application of a temporary remedy for an existing mischief. The colony, during the time it had been formerly under the Government of England, as well as after its restoration to its original founders, had been repeatedly visited by similar indications of scarcity.

It certainly appeared strange, that a country thinly inhabited and essentially agricultural in its character, possessing an almost unlimited extent of territory, generally capable of producing grain, should be thus periodically liable to suffer from a deficiency in so important an article as wheat, notwithstanding the various regulations which had been framed for the encouragement of husbandry. But the too frequent interference of Government upon former occasions appeared rather to have augmented than corrected the evil, which may in some degree be traced to the local circumstances in which the farmers were placed, spread over a vast extent of country, without such means of communicating with each other as might in some measure enable them to regulate the supply by the demand. It sometimes happened that a year of scarcity, from the stimulus which the high prices it occasioned gave the farmers, and from a large quantity of land being consequently brought under cultivation, was succeeded by one of over production, which reduced the value of wheat considerably below the expense of bringing it from the more distant districts to market at Cape Town. This uncertainty of being able to procure a remunerating price was very discouraging to the farmers, and the mischief was greatly aggravated by the laws which regulated the supply and management of the public granaries or Government corn magazines.

The importance of guarding against the effects of scarcity in a colony circumstanced as the Cape of

Good Hope was, could not fail of engaging the attention of the local authorities at an early period of its history. Too remote from the mother country, and too far removed from other friendly settlements to enable it in times of difficulty to depend on foreign supply, its only reliance was upon its internal resources, a failure in which might not only involve the fate of its own population, but seriously compromise the safety of the Dutch ships trading to India, which from the length of time required to perform the voyage at the period of which we are now treating, found it always necessary to touch at the Cape to renew their provisions and water.

In order to be at all times prepared to meet this essential but fluctuating demand, and at the same time to ensure a constant supply of bread to the garrison and inhabitants of Cape Town, the Dutch Government had appointed a particular administration, called the Grain Commission, with proper store-houses for the reception and preservation of corn. The proceedings of this Commission were regulated by proclamations issued from time to time by the Government; but as the system varied according to the different views of the subject taken by different governors, it had not that character of permanency, nor was it dictated in that spirit of liberality, which could alone reconcile the interest of the farmers with the object in view, and ensure such a growth of wheat in the interior as would prove adequate to every want. The freedom of the market was destroyed by a law, which gave the Grain Commission

a priority of right to make such purchases as it might think proper at a price fixed by authority, and in general much below what might have been obtained by an unconstrained sale.: Whilst the land-roots (or chief magistrates of districts) were authorized in certain cases to compel the farmers to send to the Government stores such portion of the grain which they had raised as might be judged expedient at the rate thus arbitrarily fixed, without reference to any other consideration than the extent of the demand for the public service.

The pernicious tendency of this injudicious interference was proved by the irregularity of the supply, and by the fact that many farmers in the interior preferred to feed their cattle secretly with wheat, rather than incur the risk and fatigue of taking it to Cape Town; fearful if the quantity at market should be large, of not being able to obtain sufficient even to cover the expenses of the journey, or if smaller, of being obliged by the Grain Commission, to lodge it in the public stores at a price far below what might be obtained elsewhere.

To remedy these evils permanently, Sir David Baird determined to new model this Grain Commission, and place it on a footing which might in a great measure tend to equalize the supply with the demand, and prevent for the future those ruinous variations in prices, which had on many occasions proved injurious to the farmer, alarming to Government, and distressing to the inhabitants of Cape Town. The plan he proposed, and which

was adopted, was as simple as we have reason to think it has proved efficacious, for since it was brought into operation, about twenty-four years ago, we believe a period of scarcity has not been known at the Cape.

A proclamation was issued rescinding all former regulations relative to the corn trade, and notifying that the Government stores would be open for a specified time to receive wheat of a certain quality, at the rate of sixty rix dollars per muid, and to issue the same at the rate of eighty dollars. These rates (having been in the first instance fixed by a mixed English and Dutch Commission, after careful investigation,) were to be revised at certain epochs, and varied according to the circumstances of the colony and the state of its agriculture. By this regulation the farmer became secure of obtaining a moderately remunerating return for his wheat, whatsoever might be the quantity brought to market, whilst the consumer was protected from the consequences of a short supply, as he might in all cases have recourse to the public stores, should the market price exceed eighty dollars per muid.

Besides these advantages, this arrangement secured the profits accruing to the Grain Commission from the fluctuations in the public market, and the different rates at which it purchased and delivered wheat from its magazines, so as not only to cover all the charges of the administration, but to accumulate a fund sufficient to keep a large stock of corn always in store, and eventually to reimburse the public

treasury in the advances originally made to the Institution.

The beneficial effects of this change of system soon became apparent. Many farmers had concealed stores of corn, which they now hastened to produce for the purpose of profiting by the new regulations, and instead of being compelled to continue to make issues from the public granary to compensate for an insufficient supply, the markets were soon amply furnished with wheat from the interior; the prices progressively fell, and the fears which had universally prevailed of an approaching scarcity were gradually dissipated.

Bearing in mind that one of the most effectual measures for promoting the improvement of a country is to increase its means of communication, and facilitate an intercourse between its inhabitants, Sir David Baird determined to create a post-office establishment for the conveyance of letters between the seat of Government and the interior. The plan was modelled after that of India: the letter bags being carried by men on foot, who were permanently stationed at farm houses on the different lines of road, and relieved each other at the distance of a moderate day's journey. Hottentots of tried fidelity were selected for this service. These aboriginal inhabitants of the southern extremity of Africa, by no means deserve the contempt by which they have been visited; generally inoffensive and well-disposed, frequently intelligent, and almost universally capable of enduring the greatest privations and fatigue, they

might, but for the manner in which their race has been diminished by the oppressive and cruel treatment of the Dutch settlers, have formed a numerous and valuable portion of the population of the colony.

Whilst everything was proceeding at the Cape in a course of steady progress towards a state of prosperity, the tone of the communications received from England, led Sir David Baird to conclude that his stay in the colony would not be very long. The death of Mr. Pitt had been followed by the appointment of a new Ministry, differing in its views and policy from that under which the expedition had been planned. The arrival of the despatch which announced the capture of the Cape, was received in London with joy by the people, but with coldness by the Administration.

When it is recollected that the conquest of the colony in 1795 (although it then possessed inferior means of defence), had been rewarded by the bestowal of two red ribands, one on the Commander-in-chief of the Forces, and another on Sir James Craig; and that Sir George Elphinstone, who commanded the naval force upon the occasion, having previously received that decoration, was created Baron Keith in March 1797, on his return to England, and that the thanks of Parliament were unanimously voted to all those officers; it may be thought perhaps, that the following acknowledgment of Sir David Baird's despatch announcing the capture of the colony in 1806, is as dry and as cold as might be expected, although it was *all* that His Majesty's Government thought fit to bestow upon the successful General.

Downing Street, 1st March, 1806.

SIR,

I have received and laid before the King your despatches, dated the 12th and 13th of January, containing an account of your proceedings with the attack and capture of the Cape of Good Hope, and I feel great gratification in having it in my power to convey to you, His Majesty's approbation of your conduct in the course of that service, as well as of the conduct of the troops under your command.

It would have been more gratifying to His Majesty's feelings to have obtained possession of the Cape of Good Hope without any effusion of blood, but from the resistance you describe, His Majesty feels great satisfaction in observing, that the loss in killed and wounded was not so considerable as might have been apprehended. The measures which you have pursued after the capitulation of Cape Town, appear to have been perfectly judicious; and I trust that General Janssens will have been either induced by the overtures which you had authorized General Beresford to make to him, or compelled by prompt and well-judged movements on your part, to abandon the project of maintaining any farther resistance.

In order to guard against a failure in the measures which you have pursued for procuring a supply of provisions, two victuallers laden with beef and pork, and two other vessels laden with wheat, meal, and flour, have been ordered to proceed with all possible despatch to the Cape consigned to you; the two former are to take advantage of the present East India convoy, and the two latter, if they should not be in time to profit by that advantage, will be directed to proceed as soon as circumstances will permit.

I will take an early opportunity of conferring with his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief on your representation respecting a reinforcement of cavalry, and although the services of the 59th regiment of infantry, and the re-

cruits destined for India, appear from the latest accounts from that country to be urgently necessary there, still your detention of that regiment seems to be warranted by the circumstances of the case.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

W. WINDHAM.

The doubts which Sir David began to entertain of the permanency of his command from the way in which his services appeared to be appreciated by the King's new Ministers, were soon changed into certainty by the news he received of the disastrous termination of the South American expedition. The reluctance with which Sir David Baird had been brought to engage in that enterprize, has been already noticed; but circumstances having subsequently occurred to connect him more closely with its ill-fortune, it may be proper to give a brief outline of the proceedings of an expedition of which in a military point of view he was virtually Commander-in-chief.

The reader is already aware of the success with which Sir Home Popham exerted his influence over the Governor of St. Helena, to add to the strength of his force. He left that island on the 2nd of May, and shortly afterwards quitted the fleet and pushed on in the *Narcissus* frigate, Captain Donnelly, accompanied by Captain Kennett of the Engineers, in order to examine the channel and coast of the Rio de la Plata, and of deciding upon a place of landing previous to the arrival of the body of the armament.

The fleet, baffled by fogs and contrary winds, did not rejoin the *Narcissus* until six days after it reached the river. A consultation was immediately held between Sir Home Popham and General Beresford, whether it would be advisable first to attack Buenos Ayres, the capital of the province, or the fortified town of Monte Video, which is more accessible from the sea. The former being resolved on, the troops were removed from the heavy ships into the *Narcissus* and the smaller vessels, which, ascending the river about ninety miles through an intricate channel, rendered more difficult by the prevalence of contrary winds and fogs, anchored opposite the city of Buenos Ayres, at about eight miles from the shore on the evening of the 24th June. On the 25th, the fleet approached the coast, and the troops were disembarked at the Point de Quilmes during that day and the succeeding night.

The enemy made no opposition to the landing, but posted themselves to the number of about two thousand men (principally mounted), on a chain of heights about two miles in front of the landing place, having their right flank covered by the Village of Redaction. On the 26th the British troops advanced against the front of the position, from which they soon drove the enemy with the loss of some men and four guns. The Spaniards retreated behind the River Chesilo, the bridge over which they destroyed, and took up a fresh position along its banks, whence, after a slight resistance, they were

again driven by General Beresford, who crossed the river on the 27th, by means of rafts and boats, in the construction and collection of which a detachment of seamen which had been landed from the ships of war proved of the greatest utility. No further opposition to an entrance into the city being offered, motives of humanity induced General Beresford to send his acting aid-de-camp, Ensign the Honourable A. Gordon, of the 3rd Guards, with a summons to the Governor to deliver up the town and fortress, in order to prevent the excesses which might occur if the troops entered in a hostile manner; at the same time informing him that the British character would ensure to the inhabitants the full exercise of their religion, and protection to their persons and private property.

In reply, the Governor despatched an officer to General Beresford, requesting a delay of some hours to draw up conditions, but as this was considered to be inconvenient under the circumstances in which the British were placed, General Beresford, as soon as his whole force had passed the Chesilo, commenced his march upon the city, and was met near its entrance by another Spanish officer, who was the bearer of a number of written conditions prepared by the Governor. To these General Beresford returned a verbal answer, that he had not time to discuss their merits, but that he would confirm in writing what he had promised after his entrance into Buenos Ayres; which engagement was most

honourably fulfilled by the General and Sir Home Popham, after the former had taken possession of the place.

Intelligence of the successful result of the attack on Buenos Ayres, speedily reached the Cape of Good Hope. Whatever might have been the opinion of Sir David Baird as to the propriety in the first instance of undertaking so important an enterprise without specific instructions from the competent authorities, and on a mere verbal understanding that it would be approved of, he felt no hesitation whatever as to the expediency of employing every means to secure the advantages already gained, now that the die was finally cast. Every possible exertion was therefore made to meet General Beresford's application for a reinforcement, and on the arrival at the Cape of two regiments for India, Sir David thought the crisis so important that he ventured to change the destination of one of them, and despatched the 47th, under Colonel Backhouse, with other detachments from the garrison of the Cape, to the Rio de la Plata.

But these reinforcements were not destined to arrive in time to avert the catastrophe which impended. Although the most liberal and conciliatory line of policy seems to have been pursued both by the General and Commodore, they do not appear to have succeeded in reconciling the mass of the inhabitants to the change of Government; whilst the influence of the clergy was secretly but powerfully employed to excite discontent, and promote a scheme for recapturing the city before the arrival of

any additional British troops. Indeed, when the Spaniards obtained the means of quietly contemplating the handful of men to whom they had yielded, they could not avoid feeling deeply humiliated by the fact that a city containing upwards of sixty thousand inhabitants, had submitted to a force which on shore never exceeded one thousand six hundred men.

The following extract from a despatch addressed by General Beresford to the Colonial Minister, affords honourable testimony of the liberal conduct adopted by the British Commanders.

“ I trust the conduct adopted towards the people here has had its full effect in impressing on their minds the honour, generosity, and humanity of the British character. His Majesty’s Ministers will see, by the detail of our proceedings, that after the army had passed the Rio Chiselo, the city of Buenos Ayres remained at our mercy, and that, in fact, the only conditions on which I entered, were such as I myself pleased to offer, and which humanity and a regard to our character, naturally induce me to give under any circumstances. However, to quiet the minds of the inhabitants, I not only consented to put in writing my promises, but acceded to many conditions not expected by them ; and contrary to direct stipulations, gave up to the proprietors all the coasting vessels captured, with their cargoes, of which I annex a return, the value of which amounted to one million and a half of dollars.”

In a Proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, the General, with a view of pointing out the advantages they must derive from the change of Government, observes—

“The Major-General thinks it necessary to acquaint the general and commercial interests of the country, that it is His Majesty’s most gracious intention, that a free trade shall be opened and permitted to South America, similar to that enjoyed by all others of His Majesty’s colonies, particularly the Island of Trinidad, whose inhabitants have felt peculiar benefits from being under the government of a Sovereign, powerful enough to protect them from any insult, and generous enough to give them such commercial advantages as they could not enjoy under the administration of any other country.”

This language was well calculated to awaken in a trading community a sense of the benefits the new Government was disposed to bestow. But the Buenos Ayreans do not seem to have been sufficiently prepared for so sudden and important a revolution. Devotedly submissive to the will of their priests, and attached from long habit to the country whence they originally sprang, it could scarcely be expected that they would become immediately reconciled to the dominion of a nation which was vilified by their clergy as undeserving the title of Christian, and by their leaders as the bitterest enemy of Spain.

While a deceitful calm hung over the surface of affairs, a secret conspiracy was in active operation for recapturing the city and repelling the invaders. As we have already said, the influence of the clergy was employed in exciting the people to revolt, whilst a French officer of the name of Liniers, who it is understood had originally established himself at Rio de la Plata for the purpose

of carrying on some commercial speculation, and who held a commission as Colonel of Militia in the service of Spain, was engaged in assembling a force capable of attacking the British. For this purpose men were collected from Monte-Video and Sacramento, and the Militia which had been driven from the town at its capture again approached it. On the 12th of August the British troops were attacked in every direction; General Beresford would have evacuated the place, and have re-embarked his men, but the state of the weather had for several days prevented any communication with the fleet. Some very severe fighting took place in the great square, but the English troops were exposed to a severe and galling fire from the tops of the public buildings and private houses. The fate of the day, considering the nature of the contest and disproportion in the numbers, could not long continue in suspense. General Beresford, after a determined resistance, was compelled to lay down his arms, on conditions which were violated by Liniers, who contrary to his engagements retained the British, prisoners of war. Our loss consisted of one hundred and sixty-five killed and wounded; and about one thousand three hundred men laid down their arms to the Spaniards.

Although the British Ministers were disposed to profit by the success which had in the first instance attended the expedition under Sir Home Popham, and not only sent large reinforcements to South America, but issued orders in Council for regulating

the trade with Buenos Ayres, and with such other possessions as might subsequently be acquired in that part of the world, still, while they were yet ignorant of the subsequent disaster which had occurred, they were by no means disposed to approve of the manner in which the enterprize had been undertaken after they knew of its failure, and the result of all his anxieties and exertions was the recall of Sir Home Popham, accompanied by circumstances of sharpness and asperity which it really seems no conduct of his could have justified.

In one of his letters to Sir David Baird, dated November 17th, 1806, previous to his recall, he says—

“ Surely the Government is highly reprehensible in not sending out some vessel with instructions to the armament in this country. They knew on the 15th June that we were here, and they have been gambling upon the issue ever since; indeed, there has been ample time for a return to the letters by the *Narcissus*, if they had the least activity. I have, however, said in all my letters, that I concluded they were highly pleased with this measure of enterprize, as they had not sent to stop it in its progress, as they were in possession of my despatches in the middle of June; and this is the inference, any rational man must allow, it is fair to draw, and such as I will draw in the strongest colours.

“ They have thrown down the gauntlet at the Cape, and if they throw it down here, I will take it up. I wish for quietness with everybody, as that is the natural bent of my disposition, but if political revenge is to be carried to such a length as to injure the interests of the country, the

country must know it, and John Bull and the Ministers must then fight their own battles.

“ If I had not been a partisan of Mr. Pitt’s and Lord Melville’s, we should have had long ere this, despatches, generals, reinforcements, and everything necessary for them, on the most extensive scale : the time, however, may come, when all will be right again, and it will be our ‘ watch on deck.’ At present I shall say little more, because, in the first place, I expect that you will be in England, or on your way home, before this can reach you at the Cape; and in the next, because I think that I shall soon meet you in London to talk over all these broils and ill-usages, which, however, sit lighter upon me than anybody else, as I am more used to them.”

On the 10th of December the blow fell which Sir Home Popham had so justly anticipated, and so bravely prepared to receive; on that day he writes to Sir David Baird from Maldonado.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Here I am, once more, a private gentleman in South America, holding up my head against the most arbitrary measure that ever disgraced the most vindictive and tyrannical Minister. I am superseded in my command by Admiral Stirling. He has refused me a ship to go to England in; he has refused to give me a transport, and he has refused to allow me to stay here to settle my accounts, which are necessarily open for the accommodation and provisioning of the squadron at Rio Grande and Rio de Janeiro; those I have accordingly publicly abandoned, and throw the consequences upon him.

He has now declared that he will force me to go by the *Sampson*, *viâ* the Cape and St. Helena; my answer is, that the order from the Admiralty directs me to proceed

forthwith, which, in the English language, means *quickly*. I, therefore, cannot voluntarily go by the Cape, and as I am now upon half-pay, I have referred him to the twenty-ninth chapter of Magna Charta, which so particularly protects the liberty of the British subject; besides, I told him I would never voluntarily submit to have a precedent established through me, that would give so dangerous a weapon to any minister who might be enabled to send home an officer from Asia by the way of America, which would be just as justifiable as sending home an officer by the way of Africa, who was directed to return forthwith to Europe.

I propose to take my passage in an American prize, although he has threatened to prevent me, and absolutely declares he will take the men-of-war's men out, if she stays one hour after the Sampson.*

In the former resolution, I doubt whether he will be stedfast; in the latter he probably may, although it will be acting contrary to the general usages of the service, and materially affect the interest of the captors; and it will also be establishing a precedent on such an occasion, that it can be used without touching the interest of the person using it. At all events I have taken up one principle, and I shall pursue one steady line of conduct; nothing shall make me give way: you know me, and you may trust to my firmness.

The correspondence between me and Admiral Stirling is the fire of ink. He has had his lesson cut and dried, and presuming on the style of letter which he would have

* This may to some readers require a word of explanation—in war time, a Captain of the Navy may at his pleasure take out of any merchant-ship as many men who are serving on board of her, who may have previously served in the Navy, as he chooses.

to write, I thought they might have been prepared, and legal opinions obtained upon them. I, therefore, changed the ordinary course of writing, and took up what I thought a new ground.

From a perusal of this portion of Sir Home Popham's letter, the reader will form some opinion of that decision and energy which in the earlier part of their acquaintance so strongly prepossessed Sir David Baird in the writer's favour. The following paragraphs seem to give plainer and clearer reasons for the recent failure of our South American expedition, and the disastrous defeat of our troops, than have yet appeared—at least so concisely, before the public.

After expressing his anxiety to get home in time for the general election, and his anxiety to fight his South American battles over again, Sir Home says—

“The case, as well as I can make out, stands exactly thus. When our despatches arrived by the *Margaret*, they had abundance of troops from the collection which returned from the continent, and not having any immediate service for them, a proportion was selected for this country, and they waited for other accounts of the progress and results of our operations.

“The arrival not being so early as was expected, and the cause of Portugal intervening, as well as a demand for an additional force in the Mediterranean, they changed their plan, and having speculated upon a total failure here in the first instance, declared upon the immediate necessity of removing us, under a heavy load of abuse and vituperation.

“Admiral Stirling was ordered to sail directly with the *Sampson*, a gun-brig, and some victuallers, and to inquire

at Rio de Janeiro what had become of us. Finding that we were here, hither he came, Brigadier-General Grey having been suddenly appointed to the Cape, and sent out with him.*

“About a fortnight after the sailing of Admiral Stirling, it appears the *Narcissus* arrived in England, when all the current of abuse against us was changed into high panegyric. The newspapers say that you, Beresford, and myself have been voted the freedom of the city. Six thousand men are coming out here; three thousand cavalry and three thousand infantry. Sir Arthur Wellesley reported to command.†

“It is also hinted that all will be well with me if I do not ride too high. I enter into no compromise with any minister. Lord Melville shall judge of my case, and with his decision I shall be satisfied. *If any energy had existed in the Government, if Miranda had been supported, and they had sent us out some reinforcements three days after the receipt of our letters, we should have had all South America now.* However, when the troops do arrive, they will even yet get it, and all the ingenuity of ministers will never persuade John Bull but we are entitled to the credit of the project. I will draw a good contrast between the promptness of our decision and execution at the Cape, and the inertness of theirs. As General Tarleton says, “They have behaved on this occasion like a set of drones.”

Long before the arrival of this letter, Sir David Baird had received his official recall from the Cape.

* Now General Grey, G.C.B. and brother of Earl Grey, K.G. who at the date of Sir Home Popham's letter, was Mr. Grey, First Lord of the Admiralty.

† This expedition was commanded by General Whitelock; its results are too well remembered to need a word of comment.

The following letter from Mr. Windham, then Secretary for War and Colonies, bearing date, Downing Street, July 26th, 1806, will sufficiently exhibit the tone taken by His Majesty's then ministers upon the subject.

SIR,

I have received and laid before the King your letter, dated the 16th of April, communicating that from intelligence which you had received of the present defenceless state of the Spanish settlements at Rio de la Plata, you had been led to detach a small force, with a view to attempting, in conjunction with the squadron under Sir Home Popham, the possession of those settlements. And I am commanded to acquaint you in reply, that it is impossible a proceeding so extraordinary as that of detaching a considerable force on one service, destined by His Majesty's Government for another, without sanction or authority, either direct or implied, can meet with the Royal approbation, particularly as the measure is not to be justified on the ground of necessity; as you might reasonably have presumed that if His Majesty's Government had had it in contemplation to attack the Spanish settlements at Rio de la Plata, a force more adequate to the service would have been employed than that which you detached under the command of General Beresford; and as you might have presumed also, that if such an enterprize had been meditated by His Majesty's Government, the measure might have been hazarded by your attempting prematurely to accomplish the object of it.

I have it further in command to inform you, that His Majesty having been pleased to *order your recall* from the Cape of Good Hope, a communication to that effect will be made to you by His Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief; and I am to add, that Lord Caledon having been

appointed Governor, and Major-General the honourable Henry George Grey Lieutenant Governor, you are to deliver over the civil government to either the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, whichever of them may first arrive at the Cape of Good Hope.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Sir David Baird, K.C.

W. WINDHAM.

&c. &c. &c.

Here we have another proof of the returns for public services, which it was the fate of Sir David Baird to receive, and that too at a moment when not only the most perfect tranquillity prevailed throughout the whole colony, but that universal satisfaction was apparent amongst all classes of the community.

It is a curious coincidence, that on the very day on which Mr. Windham conveyed the decision of the ministry upon General Baird's conduct, he was himself writing a despatch to Mr. Windham, in which he says:—

“ Having lately made a short tour in the upper districts, as far as Swellendam and Tulbagh, I had the pleasure of seeing the country in a higher state of cultivation than it has been for years; and of hearing everywhere among the peasantry and others, expressions of their happiness at seeing His Majesty's government once more established in this settlement.”

That despatch also contains copies of proclamations which General Baird had issued, the tendency of which was the advancement of the best interests

of the colony, which seemed rapidly thriving under his paternal sway ; however, the affair was concluded, and a similar fate to that to which Sir Home Popham had been doomed, awaited Sir David Baird ; although the latter had no share whatever in planning the expedition, which with all his admiration of Sir Home Popham's talents, was in the first instance undertaken against his inclinations, and in opposition to the objections he started upon its first suggestion.

It is clear, that Sir Home Popham succeeded eventually in convincing Sir David Baird, of what we have no doubt he was himself convinced, that he had some discretionary power delegated to him upon the point ; and it is equally clear, admitting as we are quite ready to admit a very strong prepossession on the part of General Baird in favour of Sir Home Popham's skill and activity, that believing him to be in any degree authorized from home to plan or execute an enterprize towards the reduction of the Spanish colonies, it would have been most extraordinary if General Baird had resolutely determined to refuse all military aid to his proposed expedition against Buenos Ayres. We have already recorded Sir Home Popham's avowed determination to attempt the expedition even without a single soldier, had Sir David persisted in his refusal. Let us suppose that this had been the case, and the enterprize had failed in consequence—the whole blame of the misfortune, and the whole discredit of the defeat, would then have fallen upon Sir David Baird.

As to the increased responsibility incurred by Sir David Baird, by sending further reinforcements, that appears beyond the reach of censure. He might in the warmth of his zeal have erred in the first instance—he might in the outset have miscalculated or even exceeded his powers; but having taken the line, and admitted the principle, he was not the man either to sacrifice the honour of his country or the lives of her soldiers, by flinching from the increased responsibility of sending reinforcements.*

Things however were decided; and after some time passed in the expectation of the arrival of his successor, the gallant and distinguished brother of the then first Lord of the Admiralty, the honourable Major-General Grey arrived in January 1807, on board the *Asia* of sixty-four guns, bearing the flag of Admiral Stirling, with instructions to that officer, of which Sir David Baird had been

* On the 6th of March, 1807, Sir Home Popham was tried by a court martial at Portsmouth, on the charge of withdrawing the whole of His Majesty's naval force at the Cape of Good Hope, and attacking the Spanish settlements at *Rio de la Plata*, for which he *had no direction or authority*. He was found guilty, and sentenced to be severely reprimanded, which was done accordingly.

It is a curious circumstance, and strongly illustrative of the charge made by Sir Home Popham against the Whig ministry of the time for negligence and inefficiency, that General White-lock's army, destined to follow up the blow struck by Popham and Beresford, actually sailed the *day after* the court martial assembled, by which Popham was reprimanded for undertaking it, *and nine months after the undertaking had succeeded*.

already apprised, to take upon himself the civil government of the colony, in case Lord Caledon should not previously have arrived.

General Baird had by this time become too much accustomed to ill treatment, to feel severely upon this occasion for himself; less of course as he had been previously acquainted with the arrangement; but it certainly did affect him deeply to quit a colony, which, short as had been the period of his government, he saw rapidly advancing in prosperity and civilization under his care; nor was this feeling—however agreeably blended with them—mitigated by the strong and general expression of popular affection and respect which manifested itself upon his Excellency's departure.

Besides numerous testimonials of regard and esteem from all the Dutch inhabitants of the highest classes, the following addresses were presented to his Excellency, the value of which, as evidence to the goodness and wisdom of his administration, is not a little enhanced by the recollection that they were presented to an Ex-Governor, who had conquered them, and who was recalled *in disgrace*!

*To His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird,
K.C. &c. &c. &c.*

SIR,

We the undersigned, constituting the Court of Justice, Burgher Senate, and other public boards, civil and ecclesiastical, having heard with the deepest regret of your Excellency's intended departure, being called upon by several of the inhabitants of this colony, beg leave, as well

for them as for ourselves, to request your Excellency's acceptance of our most grateful thanks for the paternal protection we have experienced during your Excellency's administration here, by your wise and well directed measures for our internal government, together with the unparalleled discipline of the troops under your Excellency's command; our rights have been guarded, and the whole colony enjoys at this moment a state of tranquillity and plenty, seldom, if ever equalled.

Though we have not a moment's doubt of the fatherly care of His Majesty to have appointed a successor every way qualified to fill the important situation of the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, still however we cannot help expressing our sincere sorrow at the loss of your Excellency; and we beg leave to assure your Excellency, that our gratitude for the blessings the colony has experienced under your government, will never be obliterated from our memory. Accept then, worthy Sir, of our most heartfelt acknowledgments, and may the Almighty giver of all good grant your Excellency every happiness and prosperity this life affords, in which we may assure your Excellency we are joined by every well thinking inhabitant of this colony.

We have the honour to be,

With the most grateful regard,

Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient and humble servants,

W. W. REYNEVELT,

Fiscal and Acting President in Court.

Court of Justice.

Matthiessen.

G. Diernel.

L. C. H. Strubberg.

W. Hiddingh.

A. Fleck.

Beetaerts van Blohland,

J. S. Truter.

Secretary of the Court.

Burgher Senate.

J. J. Vos, President.	E. S. Taliradorg.
And. Brink.	J. C. Brasler.

Orphan Chamber.

W. W. Reyneveld,	A. V. Breda.
President.	W. Wilerck.
Darius de Naas,	G. E. Overbeck.
Vice President.	J. C. Faure,
A. V. Bengh.	Secretaries.

Vestry of the Lutheran Church.

C. H. F. Hesse, V.D.M.	F. S. Tyneman.
E. S. Taliradorg.	J. Wrensch.
S. Zeibbrandt.	C. Freislich.

Vestry of the Reformed Church.

J. P. Serrurier, V.D.M.	S. Hiergent.
Chr. Fleck.	S. Stronck.
J. H. v. Manger, V.D.H.	A. Baup, Deputy.
Johs. Ms. Hertzog.	

Matrimonial Court.

E. Brandt, President.	H. E. Blanckenberg.
J. H. Vos.	F. Hiergent.
Gt. Hs. Maasdorp.	A. O. Weal,
D. J. Apseling.	Secretary to the Court.

Chamber for regulating Insolvent Estates.

O. M. Beryl.	W. S. Van Strodrings.
J. F. Serrurier.	A. Moorzees.

Lombard Bank.

N. Grant.	Nelson.
A. V. Bengh.	H. D. Maynier.

Cape of Good Hope,

this 16th day of January, 1807.

The following address was also presented to the General by the English residents.

To Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird, K.C. Governor and Commanding-in-chief His Majesty's Military Forces at the Cape of Good Hope and its Dependencies, &c. &c. &c.

SIR,

We the British inhabitants of this colony, on the eve of your Excellency's departure, beg leave to approach you, under the strongest impressions of gratitude, for our relief and return to the protection of our good and most gracious sovereign, through your exertions and intrepidity.

We waive the tracing of your merits through all your military achievements; these are too well known to the world, to require any compliment from us.

We nevertheless feel ourselves highly gratified in having it in our power to congratulate your Excellency on our having witnessed, under your command, a discipline and good order in the army never experienced before in this colony; and from the wisdom, justice, and moderation of your civil government, you have the singular satisfaction of a conqueror leaving the conquered beloved and regretted by them.

We unanimously and most sincerely wish you the reward due to your distinguished services, health and happiness, and long life to enjoy these blessings.

We have the honour to be,

With the most perfect respect,

Your Excellency's

Most obedient and most devoted servants,

John Murray.

John Wells.

John Elmore.

Evan Rogers.

R. J. Johnson.

Thomas Melvill.

George Anderson.	W. H. Sturgis.
Thomas Hudson.	Richard Heartley.
Alex. Watts.	Thomas W. Doughty.
James Morrison.	Murdoch Morrison.
George Ross.	James Dick.
H. Home.	Robert Rous.
William Caldwell.	A. M'Donald.
J. Osmond.	A. Scott.
Joseph Davis.	R. Ross.
Alexander Tennant.	Joseph Ranken.
Samuel Eusebius Hudson.	S. Murray.
James Callander.	William Duckitt.
John Marshall.	Alexander Robertson.
William Wood.	J. E. Mestaer.
Nicholas Lindun.	

Cape of Good Hope,
16th January, 1807.

Besides these affectionate testimonials, others from the constituted authorities of the provincial districts were forwarded to him; and when at length Sir David embarked on board the ship, which was to convey him from the scene of his conquest and his government, to England, he was accompanied to the water's-edge by all the principal inhabitants of the colony, who expressed the warmest wish that they might be so fortunate as shortly again to be placed under his care and protection.

Under these circumstances, Sir David Baird left Table Bay on the 19th of January, 1807, in the *Paragon* transport, and after a moderately good passage, arrived safely in England in March of the same year.

CHAPTER VI.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY—SIR DAVID BAIRD'S LETTER TO LORD CASTLE-REACH—TREATY OF TILSIT—ANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES OF THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND FRANCE—DEMAND OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT FOR THE DEPOSIT OF THE DANISH FLEET—EXPEDITION TO THE SOUND—SIR DAVID BAIRD APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND OF A DIVISION—SAILING OF THE EXPEDITION UNDER LORD CATHCART AND ADMIRAL GAMBIER—LANDING AND MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY—CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS—THE SIEGE COMMENCED—ATTACK OF COPENHAGEN—SIR DAVID BAIRD TWICE WOUNDED—FLAG OF TRUCE—CAPITULATION—LORD CATHCART'S DESPATCH—RETURN OF THE EXPEDITION TO ENGLAND—SIR DAVID BAIRD APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND OF THE CAMP OF INSTRUCTION IN IRELAND—PROCEEDS TO DUBLIN.

UPON the arrival of Sir David Baird in England, he found that the brief existence of the Whig ministry, ironically designated "All the Talents," had terminated; but however fortunate for the country the change might have been, it arrived too late to stop the blow which *had* fallen upon Sir David, whose abrupt removal from the command of the colony he had himself obtained for his country, was perhaps one of the most outrageous exhibitions of party spirit that ever was made.

Sir David, when he reached London, found that however deeply his feelings might have been wound-

ed by so much of the proceedings of the Government as he before knew of, more indignities yet had been offered him, and more ill treatment inflicted upon him, in letters from the office of the Secretary for War and Colonies, which had crossed him on his way home; the validity of decisions which he had made for the advantage of all parties concerned, was disputed, and orders he had made, and judgments he had given, were unceremoniously revoked and annulled. In short, it appeared as if it were not sufficient to persecute him for the crime of taking one of the most valuable colonies the enemy possessed, but that it was necessary to add insult to injury, by overturning every arrangement and rescinding every regulation which he had judiciously made for the quiet government of our new acquisition.

When Sir David returned, his late Royal Highness the Duke of York, the friend of the soldier and the country, received him with his usual warmth and kindness, and expressed, through Colonel Gordon, his entire approbation of every part of Sir David's military conduct at the Cape.

Sir David, under these circumstances, wrote the following letter to Lord Castlereagh, who had been restored to his office of Secretary for War and Colonies, between the date of Mr. Windham's letters and the arrival of Sir David Baird in England.

London, April 15th, 1807.

MY LORD,

Upon reporting to the Commander-in-chief my arrival from the Cape of Good Hope, his Royal Highness was

pleased to cause it to be intimated to me that he entirely approved of the whole of my military conduct during the period of my late command in that colony, and in recalling me, had only acted in conformity with directions to that effect from his Majesty's ministers.

In consequence of this communication my feelings prompted me to address your Lordship on the subject of that recall.

During a series of many years' service it has always, my Lord, been my anxious wish and endeavour to discharge my duty to my Sovereign and my country with the strictest rectitude, zeal, and fidelity, and I have ever deemed it incumbent on me to respect to the best of my ability the existing administration of the country, without adverting to the individuals who might compose it.

These principles have invariably governed my conduct in every act of my public life, but in no one to a greater degree than in the measure to which I have to attribute my recall.

My Lord, that measure was not adopted by me but on very mature deliberation, nor until Sir Home Popham, with whom it originated, had convinced me (by adducing a variety of arguments and documents) of the strong probability, or rather entire certainty of its success, and of the many advantages which in all likelihood would result from it.

Under this conviction, I considered it my duty to meet his wishes and solicitations, by uniting with his squadron a small detachment from the troops under my command (the absence of which from the Cape could not endanger the security of that colony), and placing them under the orders of Brigadier-General Beresford, an officer in whose abilities, gallantry, and discretion I had the most implicit reliance.

For this act, my Lord, which at most can be considered an error in judgment, I have not only been dismissed from the charge of a colony, the conquest of which was achieved by an army under my personal command, but dismissed in a way that has mortified my feelings in the keenest manner, and must have disgraced me in the eyes of the army and of the nation at large, by apparently imputing to me a degree of criminality of conduct of which I am proudly unconscious.

Until the actual arrival of the Honourable Lieutenant-General Grey at the Cape, who had been appointed to succeed me, I had received no intimation whatever of my supersession, or of any disapprobation on the part of his Majesty's ministers of my conduct. That officer was sent out in the Sampson man-of-war, arrived on the 15th, and landed at Cape Town on the 16th of last January. I made immediate arrangements for resigning my command to him, and accordingly did so on the 17th.

It was my desire to proceed to England in the Sampson, but on expressing my wish to that effect to Captain Cummings, the commander, I was informed, that he would be most happy to accommodate me, but that he had received positive orders from Rear-Admiral Stirling to remain at the Cape only twenty-four hours.

I urged Captain Cummings to continue until the 18th, on which day I would be ready to accompany him; but he produced me his orders, which were peremptory. I had therefore no alternative but to embark in a common transport, much to the astonishment of the army and inhabitants at Cape Town, who attended me to the beach, and had the risk of missing the East India convoy, and falling into the hands of the enemy.

From this statement your Lordship must be sensible how deeply and cruelly my feelings have been wounded,

as well by the act itself as by the manner of my dismissal from my late command, as such dismissal must have cast a slur in the public opinion, on the character and reputation of an old and faithful servant of the Crown, who presumes to flatter himself that his services to the state have been neither unimportant nor inglorious.

I confidently trust that his Majesty's present ministers will consider that I have not deserved the harsh and mortifying treatment I have experienced, but that, as my degradation has been as public as unmerited, so ought it to be as publicly done away.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

With perfect esteem,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servant,

D. BAIRD, *Lt.-Gen.*

*The Right Hon. Viscount Castlereagh,
Downing Street.*

To this letter we are not prepared to state what reply was made by Lord Castlereagh; but this inability on our part proceeds from the accidental loss of his Lordship's answer. Such an appeal could not have remained unnoticed; and certainly upon looking through all the main incidents of Sir David's life, from the reward he met, for his conduct early in his military career at Tanjore, to the return from General Harris for his triumphant exertions at Seringapatam, to the subsequent neglect of his claims in India, and to crown all, his recall from the Cape of Good Hope, it does appear as if he had been fated to meet reproach where others reaped the praise, and to incur displeasure for con-

duct which in all other cases of a similar nature had been rewarded by honours, titles, and decorations.*

* Although perhaps rendering ourselves liable to a charge of anachronism, we cannot avoid here mentioning, what appears to be a most striking and extraordinary sequel to this series of rewards.

In the spring of 1813, when Sir David Baird was in London, an officer, who had just returned from the Cape of Good Hope, informed him that Sir John Cradock (since created Lord Howden,) who was at that time Governor of the Cape, had determined to come home. The officer mentioned this to Sir David, thinking that it would be desirable to him, who was so well acquainted with the colony, and had quitted it under circumstances which he appeared deeply to feel, to be appointed to that Government, more especially as from the severity and nature of Sir David's wound he had been disabled from more active service.

In consequence of this information Sir David wrote to the Commander-in-chief, expressing a hope, that should Sir John Cradock be relieved, he might be permitted to succeed him. To this application Sir David received the following answer:

Horse Guards, 24th June, 1813.

SIR,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday, and to acquaint you, that I have heard nothing of the desire of Sir John Cradock to be relieved at the Cape of Good Hope; but, upon such an event, I shall be glad to pay every attention in my power to the wishes which you have expressed upon the subject.

I am, Sir, yours,

FREDERICK,
Commander-in-chief.

This reply appeared so favourable to Sir David, that he went into Scotland to wait the event, and prepare privately for his

Although we have not before us any written document to prove the effect which Sir David's letter, and the aggravated injustice he had received at the hands of the Whig ministers, produced, the reader will find, that Government sought the earliest opportunity of again employing him upon active and important service.

It will be recollected, that just about the period of which we are now treating, the memorable interview between the Emperor of Russia and Buonaparte, at that time called Emperor of the French, on a raft at Tilsit, created a very general alarm amongst the European Powers not immediately connected with the league then formed; and, one of the subjects considered to be most importantly connected with the apprehension so generally felt, as to the consequences of this extraordinary coalition, was the preparation of a Danish fleet of sixteen sail-of-the-line, which were actually ready for sea.

Circumstances more than suspicious induced our ministers to secure this dangerous addition to the forces of our allied enemies; and somewhat expedi-

departure. But these preparations were fruitless, for, upon the resignation of Lord Howden, Lord Charles Somerset was appointed to the government.

This arrangement, it appears, was more ministerial than military; but however strong, and particularly strong under some peculiar circumstances, the political claims of the illustrious house of Beaufort were at that period, the nomination of another, and a junior officer, to the Cape, did certainly seem to set the seal to the injustice under which Sir David had suffered, as far as that valuable and important colony was concerned.

tiously, it must be admitted, and without waiting to ascertain whether the Emperor of Russia had really any serious intentions of pressing that force into his service, it was resolved in Downing Street, to take the unprecedented precaution of seizing upon the neutral ships of our allies the Danes.

In order to carry this great measure into effect, a special minister was despatched to Copenhagen, in order to represent to the Danish Government the imminent danger in which it would be placed in case the French and Russian Governments should demand the aid and co-operation of the fleet then ready for sea, demanding at the same time its surrender to England, under a guarantee that it should be returned to the Danes whenever England should be at peace with France.

In order to render this negotiation perfectly efficient, a military force, of no less importance than twenty thousand men, and a fleet of twenty-seven sail-of-the-line, were ordered to proceed to the Sound, to be at hand, ready to act, as might be rendered necessary by the answer of the Danish Government to our minister.

It was to this force, commanded in chief by Lord Cathcart, that Sir David Baird was attached. To Lord Gambier the naval command of the expedition was confided; the supposed destination of the combined services was Flushing, and eventually Antwerp. On the 13th of August Lord Cathcart joined the expedition off Elsinour, all attempts at negotiation upon our terms having been rejected by the Danes.

On the 14th of August, the fleet being between Elsineur and Helsingberg, notwithstanding the prevalence of calms and contrary winds, the transports assembled by brigades, each under the charge of one of his Majesty's ships. On the 15th the fleet worked up to Vedbeck; the reserve anchoring nearest the shore, covered by the *Surveillante* and several gun-brigs.

Major-General Spencer's brigade, under convoy of Admiral Essington, with a division of the fleet, anchored higher up the Sound, to make a diversion; the coast was during the day well reconnoitred, and dispositions made for landing next morning.

On the morning of the 16th, at five o'clock, the reserve landed with the ordnance of another light brigade; a squadron of the 1st Light Dragoons, and the horses for the two brigades of artillery, and for the staff, were also disembarked.

Shortly after this movement a proclamation, of which the following is a copy, was issued in the joint names of Lord Cathcart and Admiral Gambier.

Whereas the present treaties of peace, and the changes of government and territory, acceded to by so many Powers, have so far increased the influence of France on the Continent of Europe as to render it impossible for Denmark, although it desires to be neutral, to preserve its neutrality, and absolutely necessary for those who continue to resist the French aggression, to take measures to prevent the arms of neutral powers from being turned against them: In this view the King cannot regard the present position of Denmark with indifference, and his Majesty has sent nego-

tiators, with ample powers, to his Danish Majesty, to request, in the most amicable manner, such explanations as the times require, and a concurrence in such measures as can alone give security against the farther mischiefs which the French meditate through the acquisition of the Danish navy.

The King our royal and most gracious Master, has therefore judged it expedient to desire the temporary deposit of the Danish ships of the line in one of his Majesty's ports. This deposit seems so just, and to be so indispensably necessary, under the relative circumstances of the neutral and belligerent Powers, that his Majesty has farther deemed it a duty to himself and his people to support this demand by a powerful fleet, and by an army amply supplied with every preparation necessary for the most active and determined enterprize.

We come, therefore, to your shores, inhabitants of Zealand ! not as enemies, but in self-defence, to prevent those who have so long disturbed the peace of Europe from compelling the force of your navy to be turned against us. We ask deposit. We have not looked to capture. So far from it, the most solemn pledge has been offered to your Government, and is hereby renewed, in the name and at the express command of the King our Master, that if our demand is amicably acceded to, every ship belonging to Denmark shall, at the conclusion of a general peace, be restored to her in the same condition and state of equipment as when received under the protection of the British flag.

It is in the power of your government by a word to sheath our swords, most reluctantly drawn against you ! But if on the other hand the machinations of France render you deaf to the voice of reason and the call of friendship, the innocent blood that will be spilt, and the horrors of a besieged and bombarded capital, must fall on your own

heads, and on those of your cruel advisers. His Majesty's seamen and soldiers when on shore, will treat Zealand, as long as your conduct to them permits it, on the footing of a province of the most friendly power in alliance with Great Britain, whose territory has the misfortune to be the theatre of war. The persons of all those who remain at home, and who do not take a hostile part, will be held sacred.

Property will be respected and preserved, and the most severe discipline will be enforced. Every article of supply furnished or brought to market will be paid for at a fair and settled price ; but as immediate and constant supplies, especially of provisions, forage, fuel, and transports are necessary to all armies, it is well known that requisitions are unavoidable, and must be enforced. Much convenience will arise to the inhabitants, and much confusion and loss to them will be prevented, if persons in authority are found in the several districts to whom requisitions may be addressed, and through whom claims for payment may be settled and liquidated. If such persons are appointed, and discharge their duty without meddling in matters which do not concern them, they shall be respected, and all requisitions shall be addressed to them through the proper channels and departments of the navy and army ; but as forbearance on the part of the inhabitants is essential to the principle of these arrangements, it is necessary that all manner of civil persons should remain at their respective habitations ; and any peasants or other persons found in arms singly, or in small troops, or who may be guilty of any acts of violence, must expect to be treated with rigour.

The government of his Danish Majesty having hitherto refused to treat this matter in an amicable way, part of the army has been disembarked, and the whole force has

assumed a warlike attitude ; but it is as yet not too late for the voice of reason and moderation to be heard.

Given in the Sound, under our hands and seals, this 16th day of August, 1807.

CATHCART, *Lieutenant-General*,

J. GAMBIER, *Admiral*.

This appeal to the people produced as little effect as the previous negotiation with the government, and accordingly the preparations for attack went on.

“ The whole of the force having been landed, the army marched in the evening of the 16th by their left to Lyngbyl, the centre to Jagersborg, and the left to Charlottenburg, where they lay upon their arms. The next morning at daybreak, the army marched by its right in three columns to invest the town ; the left column established a post at Bagernes Mill, and extended from Freborg to Emdrup, that from Jagersborg by Gladsacks and Vanloes to Fredericksburg, extending towards the sea on the right, and towards Falconergard on their left.

“ The reserve from Lyngbyl now marched by Bangede and Emdrup, and occupied the space between the two other divisions. Two brigades of the King’s German Legion remaining at Charlottenfurd, to cover the disembarkation of the artillery and cavalry.

“ While these operations were in progress, Major-General Spencer and his brigade landed at Shoreshard, and marched to their post on the left of the line. Head quarters were now established at Hel-

lerup, and the disembarkation of the cavalry began at Shoreshard.

“ About noon our picquets on the left near the town were attacked by the enemy, whose gun boats about the same time rowed out of the harbour, and began cannonading the left of the English line with round and grape shot. The picquets being ably supported by the line, drove back the enemy, and resumed their post, while the English gun brigs having been towed into the harbour as far as possible, opened such a fire upon the enemy’s boats, as induced them to retire ; the next morning, however, they renewed their attack upon the brigs, trusting to their superior weight of guns ; but the English brigs having, during the night, substituted long eighteen pounders for the carronades, repulsed them severally for a time, but they returned to the attack greatly increased in numbers ; a brigade of nine-pounders were then brought to play upon them, which taking them in flank, induced them to turn their fire upon the lines, and after cannonading for some time, they were again repulsed.

“ Preparations were now made for the construction of approaches, and on the 18th, 600 men (relieved every four hours) were set to work upon them ; considerable progress was made at the mill, and the cavalry moving to the quarters at Vanloes, Charlottenburg, and Jagersborg, supported by the 1st battalion of the German Legion, under Brigadier-General Decker, a chain of posts was established. Towards the evening of the 19th, a howitzer battery

was finished in the rear of the mill with traverses, and a course for the men, and the frigates and gun brigs began throwing shells into the town.

“ This afternoon General Decker surprised and captured the post of Frederickswork, commanded by a Major, who was aide-de-camp to the Crown Prince, who capitulated with 850 men and officers, together with a depôt of powder, and a foundry for cannon.

“ On the 20th, more troops and artillery were landed, and several parties of prisoners were sent in ; the following day, Lord Rosslyn's division landed in the back part of Koega bay, with two batteries of artillery, sending round the rest of the transports to Shoreshard.

“ At this period, the King and his household, and the princesses, and lastly Prince Ferdinand of Denmark and his tutor, were permitted by passports to quit the town, but notice was given that no more passports would be granted, and at the same time a recommendation was sent to the General commanding, to consider the dreadful consequences of making the capital city stand a siege and bombardment like an ordinary fortress.

“ This day the pipes which conduct the water from Emdrup to Copenhagen were cut off, a trench was formed, and a battery, three hundred yards in advance, was pushed forward. Brigadier-General Macfarlane's brigade landed at Shoreshard. The battering train and stores were rapidly bringing on shore, and the only delay now occasioned was in

completing a battery on the right, which was intended to take the enemy's line of advanced posts in reverse, and secure the advance of the British army to a new position."

The further progress of the siege and its final results will be gathered from the following despatch :

Citadel of Copenhagen, September 8, 1807.

MY LORD,

It has fallen to my lot to have the great satisfaction of forwarding to your Lordship the ratified capitulation of the town and citadel of Copenhagen, including the surrender of the Dutch fleet and arsenal in this port, which are placed at His Majesty's disposal.

The object of securing this fleet having been attained, every other provision of a tendency to wound the feelings or irritate the nation has been avoided ; and although the bombardment and cannonade have made considerable havoc and destruction in the town, not one shot was fired into it until after it was summoned with the offer of the most advantageous terms, nor a single shot after the first indication of a disposition to capitulate ; on the contrary, the firing, which lasted three nights, from His Majesty's batteries, was considerably abated on the 2nd, and was only renewed to its full vigour on the 3rd, on our supposing from the quantity of shells thrown from the place, that there was a determination to hold out.

On the evening of the 5th a letter was sent by the Danish General, to propose an armistice of twenty-four hours for preparing an agreement, on which articles of capitulation might be founded. The armistice was declined, as tending to unnecessary delay, and the works were continued ; but the firing was countermanded, and Lieutenant-Colonel Murray was sent to explain that no proposal of capitulation could be listened to, *unless accompanied by the surrender of the fleet.*

This basis having been admitted by a subsequent letter on the 6th, Major-General Wellesley, whom I had sent for this purpose from his command in the country, where he had distinguished himself in a manner so honourable to himself and so advantageous to the public, was appointed, with Sir Home Popham and Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, to prepare and sign articles of capitulation.*

These officers having insisted on proceeding immediately to business, the capitulation was drawn up in the night between the 6th and 7th, the ratification was exchanged in the course of the morning, and at four in the afternoon of the same day, Lieutenant-General Burrard proceeded to take possession. The British grenadiers present, with detachments from all the other corps of cavalry and infantry, under the command of Colonel Cameron, of the 97th, with two brigades of artillery, marched into the citadel, while Major-General Spencer having embarked his brigade at the Kalk Brandiere, landed in the dock yard, and *took possession of each of the line of battle ships*, and the arsenal: his Danish Majesty's guards withdrawing when those of His Majesty were ready to replace them, and proper officers attending to deliver stores as far as inventories could be made up.†

* It is remarkable that Sir David Baird and Sir Home Popham should have again met on service so shortly after the removal of one from his government, and the trial of the other by a court martial; but it is more remarkable, that after having been brought in contact with General Wellesley upon several occasions in India, he should here again have been joined with him in his first campaign in Europe.

† General Spencer entered the service in 1778, and having served in the West Indies, was taken prisoner at St. Kitts. He obtained the rank of Major in 1791. In 1794, 95, and 97, he was actively employed in the West Indies, and was entrusted with the evacuation of San Domingo by General Mait-

everything that has occurred here and at Stralsund, and will be able to give any further details that may be required.

CATHCART.

The attainment of the objects desired by the British Government of course terminated the active service of the army upon this occasion ; the ships having been delivered up, and the treaty completely fulfilled, the troops returned to England.

In the course of the siege of Copenhagen, it appears that the number of lives actually lost did not exceed 700. The cathedral and the college were burned, and about 250 houses were destroyed.

The measures adopted by the English ministry might be considered somewhat harsh and peremptory, had it not transpired, from the admission of the Danes themselves, that the fact of their intended co-operation with France, which it was supposed our government only suspected, was in fact unequivocal.

The evacuation of Zealand by the English was completed by the 20th of October, and in a few days the troops and vessels employed upon the expedition returned to England.*

* The Danish ships delivered up to the British forces were as follows : --

	Guns.		Guns.
Christian VII.	96	Oden	74
Neptune	84	Crown Princess	74
Princess Sophia	74	Danemark	74
Justice	74	Norway	74

Shortly after Sir David Baird's arrival in London, it was judged expedient to form a "drill camp," or as it was officially termed, a camp of instruction, on the Curragh of Kildare, in which a body of upwards of thirteen thousand men was to be collected. The well-known professional abilities, and soldier-like qualities of Sir David, so pre-eminently calculated to accelerate the formation, and ensure the discipline of this newly-organized force, attracted the attention and notice of the government, and he was appointed to command it. He accordingly proceeded to Dublin to commence his arduous duty, and when it is recollected how many of the brave fellows who have since that period contributed to exalt the fame, and secure the happiness of our country, went forth to battle from that school, it is impossible to doubt for a moment the wisdom and judgment which selected Sir David for its head.

	Guns.		Guns.
Princess Caroline . . .	74	Triton	28
Dalmarksene	64	Fredrigstern	28
Conqueror	64	Little Belt	24
Maso	64	St. Thomas	22
Pearl	44	Fylla	24
Housewife	44	Elbe	20
Liberty	44	Egderen	20
Venus	44	Gluckstad	20
Nyade	36	6 brigs and 25 gun-boats.	

CHAPTER VII.

SIR DAVID BAIRD REMOVED FROM DUBLIN—ORDERED TO TAKE THE
COMMAND OF AN EXPEDITION TO SPAIN—PROCEEDS TO CORK—SAILS
WITH THE ARMY TO CORUÑA—ARRIVAL THERE—DISAPPOINTMENTS
—CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SIR DAVID BAIRD AND SIR JOHN MOORE
—SIR DAVID BAIRD REACHES ASTORGA.

WE now come to another highly interesting epoch of our narrative, when its hero was again called into active service, and again gave his country proofs of his zeal and activity.

After the conclusion of the well-known convention of Cintra, Sir Hugh Dalrymple was recalled to England under circumstances strongly indicative of the dissatisfaction which the country felt at the state of affairs in the Peninsula. Sir Arthur Wellesley, and many other officers of high rank, quitted the army, and Sir Harry Burrard became Commander-in-chief. This post, however, he did not long occupy—his health would not permit him to encounter its difficulties and privations, and he shortly followed the example of those who had obtained leave of absence, and returned to England, leaving the British forces under the command of Sir John Moore.

On the 6th of October Sir John received from England the official announcement of his appoint-

ment to the chief command of an army to consist of 40,000 men, which was to co-operate with the Spanish troops in the expulsion of the French forces from the Peninsula.

In the mean while, Sir David Baird had been removed from the command of the camp of instruction, with his appointment to which our last chapter concluded, on the Curragh of Kildare, and directed to take under his orders the force destined to be added to that already under Sir John Moore in the Peninsula, and which was collecting at Cork and Falmouth.

The Marquess de la Romana, who had escaped with part of his division from the shores of the Baltic, had then recently arrived in England, and had been consulted by our ministers as to the best mode of employing a considerable body of English troops in aid of the Spanish nation. He recommended the northern provinces of Spain as the most advantageous field for their operations, inasmuch as an auxiliary force in that quarter would immediately come to the aid and support of the native armies then moving on the Ebro, who had been represented to the English in the most glowing colours, as powerfully efficient in their military character, and perfectly enthusiastic in their natural disposition.

In consequence of the adoption of this opinion, it was resolved that the 9000 men brought by Romana from the Baltic, after being properly refitted in England, should be sent direct to Gyon or Santan-

der, where they should disembark, and join the army of the left, under General Blake (of which the Marquess de la Romana was to take the chief command); while the force under General Baird should proceed to Coruña, and effect a junction at some point, subsequently to be fixed upon, with 20,000 men, who for that purpose were to be detached from the British army in Portugal.

In the month of September 1808, Sir David Baird proceeded to Cork, where with his usual activity and diligence, he superintended the embarkation of that part of the force which was to proceed from Ireland; and having completed every arrangement connected with the expedition, accompanied it himself to Falmouth, at which place he found already assembled the other troops forming the whole division, amounting altogether to about 11,000 men. Not a moment was lost by Sir David, in pushing forward this force, and the whole fleet of transports were under weigh on the 8th of October, and after a favourable passage of five days, anchored at Coruña on the 13th of the same month.*

The reception which our army and its commander met with on their arrival, proved to be remarkably at variance with the expectations which had been

* Sir Walter Scott in his *Life of Napoleon*, vol. vi. p. 266, states that Sir David Baird was sent to Coruña by Sir John Moore. Sir John Moore, as we have just stated, was serving in Portugal, under Sir Harry Burrard, at the period of Sir David's appointment to the command of this division.

raised ; indeed, the descriptions which had been given, not only by the Spaniards themselves, but by persons of high rank and consideration in our service, appear to have been the most deceptive and illusory.

Lord Londonderry, speaking of the state of the Spanish population at this period, says in his narrative, (p. 144,) “ The very best spirit was said to prevail in all quarters in Spain—every Spaniard was, or disposed to be a soldier—there was therefore nothing to be apprehended by us, let us enter the country where we might. It was even asserted, that unless we made good haste, there would be nothing left for us to effect, since it seemed in the highest degree probable that, before we should be able to arrive at the scene of action, the French would be everywhere driven across the Pyrenees. Such were the cheering communications which poured in upon us, not only from the Spaniards themselves, but from some of our own functionaries ; and it was with hopes naturally elevated to the highest pitch, that we looked forward to the prospect before us.”

In a similar manner had the expectations of Sir David Baird been raised by the accounts which he had even authoritatively received. He expected that he should find every arrangement made for the reception and accommodation of his troops ; and putting faith in the accounts of the enthusiasm by which the whole nation was said to be actuated and influenced, concluded that his brave companions in arms would be hailed with rapture, not only by

the Government, but by the people, who might be expected to receive them as friends and associates in the great cause of their liberation.

The disappointment of Sir David can hardly be appreciated, when he found not only that the arrival of the English force was unexpected, but that the Junta of Galicia, then sitting in Coruña, declared its arrival to be as useless as unlooked for; that they wanted nothing but money and arms, and so far from hailing the arrival of their allies with pleasure or enthusiasm, they positively refused to sanction the disembarkation of the troops without the orders of the Central Junta, which had been established at Madrid on the very day of the arrival of the expedition at Coruña.

The character of Sir David Baird's reception, and the nature of the difficulties by which he was assailed, may be best gathered from his own correspondence with Sir John Moore, to whom on the day of his arrival he despatched the following letter :

Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore, at Lisbon.

Coruña, 13th October, 1808.

SIR,

I have the honour to report to you my arrival in the port of Coruña, in command of a division of His Majesty's forces, and to transmit, for your information, a return of the strength of the different corps of which it is composed.

My instructions from Lord Castlereagh direct me, after reporting my arrival to you, to lose no time in disembarking the troops, and, immediately on clearing the infantry

transports, to send them to Lisbon, for the purpose of receiving on board part of our force there, destined to act in this part of Spain, in conjunction with the troops from England, under your orders.

An unexpected difficulty has, however, arisen to prevent an immediate obedience to these orders, as the Junta of this province does not consider itself authorised to receive us, or to permit our disembarkation, without the previous sanction of the Supreme Government of the kingdom.

An extraordinary courier has accordingly been despatched to Madrid to obtain this permission; and I have written to Lord William Bentinck, in that city, urging him to use every effort in his power to obtain a speedy and favourable reply to our application; on receipt of which I shall lose no time in carrying my instructions into effect, &c.*

On the 15th of October, Sir David wrote again to Sir John Moore.

“Instead of arrangements being made for our reception, as I was led to expect would be the case, the provincial government was not only unprepared to receive us, but appears disinclined to afford us any active assistance.

“As we brought no money with us, I have been compelled to endeavour to obtain a supply, and I am in expectation of procuring five thousand pounds. I am afraid we shall find great difficulty in fulfilling that part of my instructions which relates to the purchase of horses and mules, as these appear to be extremely scarce in this province.”

General Baird, anxious as he was to equip his

* Lord W. Bentinck had been employed on a political mission at Madrid. Mr. Stuart had succeeded here at this period, but his Lordship remained in that city in communication with the Spanish government.

division for field service, for which it was immediately destined as soon as it should be permitted to land, was completely crippled in his efforts by the unexpected difficulty, not only of getting assistance, but of procuring any article whatever, without prompt payment; but even this most singular evidence of zeal and enthusiasm on the part of a people whose cause we espoused, and whose liberty and property our troops had come to protect, would have been overcome, if it had not turned out that at the very time they were refusing to part with any of the articles necessary for the equipment of the troops without payment, they declined negotiating any bills drawn by the General upon the Treasury in England.

Sir David was nevertheless indefatigable in his exertions—he fixed his residence in Coruña, and was unremitting in his representations to the Junta, who listened to them with respect and attention, and promised largely for the future, and as regularly failed in the execution of their promises; and thus it was, that in a country abounding with cattle, fresh meat could rarely be procured for the soldiers.

On the 18th of October, Sir David wrote to Lord Castlereagh, describing the state of destitution to which the army was reduced; he also applied to the Consul at Oporto, as well as to Sir John Moore.

Sir John Moore had written to Sir David, from Lisbon, on the 12th of October, the day before the

expedition under Sir David's command anchored at Coruña, as follows :—

“ I need hardly say the satisfaction it afforded me when I found that I was to have you for my colleague.

* * * * *

“ I received,” continues Sir John, “ the notification of my appointment to the command in Spain on the 6th inst. Sir Harry Burrard was directed to turn over twenty thousand infantry to me, besides two regiments of cavalry, and a proportion of artillery ; at this time no preparation had been made, nor was a single regiment equipped so as to enable it to take the field.

“ It was left to my option to march through Spain and Portugal, or to embark and join you at Corunna by sea—for many reasons I have preferred the march. There is much to do in the way of preparation ; mules must be purchased for the light baggage of officers, and for the carriage of such stores as are indispensable ; and provisions must be forwarded on the line by which the troops are to march.

“ In this country (Portugal) the roads are abominable, and the means of carriage very limited. There are many other difficulties to encounter, with which I shall not trouble you, yet in spite of them I do not despair to have the army completely equipped and passed the frontier of Portugal before the wet season sets in.

“ I mean to move upon Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo by three different roads ; when arrived there, our progress will in every respect be easier ; our march from thence will be on Burgos, and at some intermediate place, which shall afterwards be settled, our junction must be made. In the mean time, when landed, you will place the troops in the most convenient cantonments in and about Coruña, and take steps for the immediate equipment of them to take the

field. I have directed the Adjutant-General, Clinton, to send you some regulations with respect to regimental equipment, which I shall thank you to follow, besides which, you will endeavour to procure the means of carriage for the ammunition, medical, commissariat, and other stores, in such proportions as should attend a corps of your number.

“ I have not yet sufficient information to discover the points most proper for the establishment of magazines for the army when united ; you may perhaps be able to procure information on this head, which you will be good enough to communicate to me in your correspondence.

“ Let me know often the progress of your equipment ; and it will be well to put your commissary and chief officers of the Quarter-Master and Adjutant-General's departments in communication with their respective chiefs, who are with me ; this will both be useful and save you and me much trouble.

“ It is possible that you will be pressed by General Blake, who commands the Galician army, or by some others to join them, or at least to send them some portion of the artillery or cavalry ; it may happen that some of the British officers who are attending upon the Spanish armies, may join in the request ; but this you will on no account agree to, as it is quite contrary to the wishes of the British Government, that any part of the British force should be committed partially, or act until the whole is united.

“ You will hear from me frequently ; you will have due notice of my progress when we can agree as to the period when you can commence your march from Coruña ; and as to the place of junction, Coruña will necessarily be the place for our general depôt, and you will judge the propriety of landing any and what proportion of the stores and provisions for the army, or of leaving them in the ships until wanted.

“ I find, by a letter from Lord Castlereagh, of the 30th

of September, which I received yesterday, that in a supposition of all our transports here being employed in carrying the French to France, he has ordered the transports, after landing you at Coruña, and the Spaniards at St. Andero, to proceed to Lisbon. But this is quite unnecessary; I have determined to march by land. At all events I have transports here sufficient to convey twelve or fourteen thousand men.

“ When I shall be able to get fairly under weigh, I cannot yet say, it depends so much upon commissariat arrangements, and the procuring a sufficient means of carriage; but I am shoving on the regiments partially on their respective routes.”

The rest of the letter contains a mere detail of some changes which Sir John Moore wishes to be made in the arrangements of certain regiments, but from the extract we have given will be seen the resolution which Sir John had taken to avail himself of the discretionary power confided to him, and of proceeding by land to effect the desired junction with his reinforcement. This discretionary power, however, had only reference to the infantry of his army; it was a specific instruction from England that the cavalry should at all events march by land.

Sir David Baird still remained in the most anxious suspense. Shortly after his arrival at Coruña, a fleet of transports brought a reinforcement of three regiments of hussars, and a few days afterwards appeared the Marquess de la Romana himself. Sir David heard of his arrival with great satisfaction, naturally concluding that the presence of a Spanish General of his character and eminence, would sti-

mulate the proceedings of the local government, and induce it to form a better estimate of the real state of the country, and of the duties which they owed it, than they yet appeared to have made.

It is true that the Junta included some extremely intelligent men; but it was, as a body, extremely ignorant of the actual position of Spain, and lamentably deficient in energy and spirit. Instead of forming, augmenting, and improving the military force in Galicia, with a population sincerely anxious and unanimously ready to obey their call, and who might have been amply equipped from the supplies furnished by England, they consumed their time and occupied their sittings in the discussion of questions relative to civil government, in no degree whatever applicable to the existing order of things.

As the author of "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns*," says vol. ii. p. 10—

"England had furnished Spain with supplies, she had poured arms and munitions into the country with a profuse hand; but she had taken no efficacious measures for their judicious application. She exercised little influence on the counsels of the Spanish Government, and even while providing the very 'strength and sinews' of the war, her voice was seldom listened to with obedience or respect.

"Arms placed at the disposal of men swayed by petty views and local interests, were wasted and misapplied; and the supplies of money, clothing, and ammunition, so liberally afforded, became a bone of contention and of petty jealousy to the civil authorities; in fact, the provincial governors were actuated by no liberal or enlarged view of the public benefit. Supine in danger, and vain-glo-

rious in prosperity, at once untalented and unenlightened, no men could be more unfitted to direct the resources of a nation with vigour and effect."

It was the mingled supineness and vain glory, and the confidence innate in the Spanish character, that caused the neglect of all precautionary measures of defence; and while the French concentrated themselves behind the Ebro, quietly waiting there, for reinforcements, and the signal to disperse and dissipate the irregular masses, called armies, by which they were encircled, the Spaniards actually dreaded the escape of the enemy, and never condescended to doubt of their entire annihilation, if they ventured to remain. To this feeling, which seemed universal, the Marquis de la Romana himself appeared to yield. The favourite object of the Spaniards was, by interposing their armies between the French and the Pyrenees, to cut them off from the frontier, and renew the scenes of Baylen and Andugar.

In the midst of these extraordinary ideas and propositions, Sir David Baird still remained anxiously waiting the return of the courier from Madrid. The following letter he received from Sir John Moore, after a reply to his first letter of the 13th.

Lisbon, Oct. 22nd, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

The Champion arrived here yesterday, and Captain Gordon delivered to me your two letters, private and public.

I take it for granted, that the letters from Lord Castle-

reagh and Lord William Bentinck, announcing your intended arrival, had not reached Madrid, otherwise I must suppose that no difficulty would have been opposed to your landing. I trust that before this reaches you, every facility will have been afforded to you; and from everything I have hitherto heard of the conduct of the Spaniards towards the English, I dare say that whatever the country affords in the way of cantonment and supply for the troops, will have been cheerfully given.*

We are in such want of money in this place, that it is with difficulty I have been able to spare 8000*l.* which went in the *Champion* to you this day. This sum is so inadequate to your wants, that if it had not been to show you my good will, I should not have thought it worth sending to you.

It is to be hoped that money is at this moment on its passage from England; and as it will probably call at Coruña, I beg you will not take more than is absolutely necessary for your wants, and that you will send me the rest, for I am beginning my march with very little, and if it does not come soon, in the heart of Spain we shall be in very great distress.

At present I can give you no directions beyond what I conveyed to you in my former letter. Your first object is to equip your corps, so as to make it serviceable, and I should imagine when the regiments are on shore, the officers will soon contrive to get the mules they require. You will observe that a great many are not wanted, as I want to go light; but a good many will be required for

* This was written before General Moore had discovered, by sad experience, how very erroneous the prevalent descriptions of Spanish enthusiasm and affection for the English were. These expressions of his, distinctly show how thoroughly he believed them.

other services, to carry the ammunition, medical, and commissariat stores. I should hope, for forwarding what may be necessary to place in depôt, the means may be hired in the country.

I should willingly go to you, but I have a perfect confidence that you will be able to do, without my assistance, everything that is necessary; and I have an operation to conduct in this march, which requires every attention I can pay to it.

Most of the regiments are in march; but the badness of the roads and the difficulties of subsistence, make the progress slow, and I am obliged to send the artillery, the cavalry, and a corps of infantry, under Hope, round almost by Madrid.

As I advance I shall give you notice when to move forward, and determine the place of junction: in the mean time make arrangements to enable you to advance when you are directed. It will be, of course, by the great road which, I believe, leads by Lugo to Astorga.

When the cavalry arrives, if the difficulty is great in procuring forage in that part of Galicia, they may be sent forward a little, but with positive instructions to Lord Paget, or whoever commands them, to join no Spanish army, nor to risk committing the cavalry in any shape until it joins me and the British army. It must be sent forward, if necessary, for the mere purpose of subsistence, but quite aloof from the enemy or the Spanish forces.

I hear from Captain Gordon that the 2nd battalions I had named to go, as the worst, are by no means so; but you will of course send those you yourself think least fitted for service. I take from this the 50th regiment, and the Buffs, about 1600 rank and file, so you may safely send three, if you have so many that are bad. They will form here, and can join us afterwards on service. Send with them Major-General Mackenzie, and those officers of the

staff named by his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief for the army in Portugal.

I should think you will find sufficient occupation in equipping the troops, and in preparing them for a movement; and I hope you will take steps to ensure their good conduct towards the inhabitants.

I have desired Clinton to send you the few regulations I have given with respect to baggage, &c. I send you a warrant for holding courts-martial.

I hope to hear from you soon, of your being more comfortable than when you wrote last, and that your difficulties are found less than you expected. I have my share of them here, but I shall think them all over when we are able to join.

Believe me always very faithfully,

JOHN MOORE.

On the day on which Sir John Moore wrote this letter, the courier despatched by Sir David from Coruña to Madrid returned, and Sir David wrote thus:—

Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore.

Coruña, 24th October 1808.

— The courier who was sent to Madrid on the subject of our disembarkation, returned on the 22nd instant; and another messenger arrived from that city yesterday, and brought me letters from Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart. The answer of the Supreme Government to our application, as read by Mr. Frere last night, in presence of the Junta of this province, is certainly very different from what I expected. Instead of expressing any anxiety to promote our views, or dissatisfaction at the impediments thrown in our way by the Galician government, it merely *permits* us to land here in the event of it being

found impracticable to send us by sea to St. Andero ; and directs that, if a disembarkation takes place, it shall be made in detachments of two or three hundred men each, which are to be successively pushed on into Castile, without waiting for the necessary equipment of mules and horses. As the execution of this plan might bring part of my division in contact with the enemy (in the event of the Spanish armies experiencing a defeat) before a junction with you, and is in direct opposition to the instructions I received from Lord Castlereagh, and to your orders, I felt it my duty to object to it in the strongest terms, and finally to declare, that unless I was permitted to quarter the troops in this province until the necessary provision of draught cattle could be procured, I should feel myself compelled to suffer them to remain on board until I had communicated with you, and received your further orders.

At length, after a great deal of discussion and much opposition on the part of the Junta, it has been decided that we should be cantoned in the towns and villages on the two principal roads leading from this place towards Leon and Castile, until such time as the necessary equipment could be effected to enable us to take the field.

Now it was, that the jealousy and suspicion which the appearance of the British force at Coruña had in the outset excited, became most evident. Instead of pressing forward with anything like activity to carry into effect the objects of the British General, instead of manifesting any signs either of pleasure or gratitude at the arrival of their friends, the Supreme Junta at last merely *permitted* the disembarkation, if it should be found impossible to send the troops by sea to any point nearer the scene of action.

In pursuance, however, of this ungracious sanction for their landing, the troops were successively brought on shore; but even in the details, so many new difficulties were started, that Sir David Baird was actually obliged to apply to Mr. Stuart, at Madrid, for the purpose of getting a Spanish officer appointed, to carry on the necessary intercourse with the local authorities.

It became perfectly clear, as time passed away, that the Spaniards were in great doubt, anxiety, and uncertainty, as to the real intentions of the English. Eleven days had expired after the arrival of the troops off Coruña, before a single article of fresh provision could be procured for them; and as a proof that we are correct in supposing the Spaniards to have been alarmed, instead of gratified, at our proceedings, we need only state, that upon no consideration whatever would they consent to the admission of a single British soldier into Ferrol; and that their anxiety with regard to the naval arsenal there was so great, that two or three English officers who had ridden over from mere curiosity to see the place, were peremptorily refused admission, and it was reported that a detachment of Spanish troops, which was proceeding from the southern part of Galicia to join General Blake's army, was suddenly ordered to Ferrol, to secure that fortress against any sinister designs which their suspected allies might have attempted.

In a letter from Sir David Baird to Colonel Gordon, dated October 25th, we find him complaining

bitterly of the total inactivity of the provincial government, and stating to him the fact we have already mentioned, that until the 24th, he had been unable to procure an ounce of bread for the men. However, the energy and perseverance which we have before had such frequent occasions to admire in the character of Sir David, were, as usual, brought to bear upon the harassing and mortifying difficulties which presented themselves; and accordingly we find that the leading division of his column, composed of the light brigade under Brigadier-General Craufurd, was actually on its march towards Astorga on the 28th of October, six days only after the permission to land the troops had arrived at Coruña. This first movement Sir David announces in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated October 27th.

“ We have, indeed, procured a sufficient sum of money to pay the troops up to the 24th of this month; but the balance remaining is so small, that unless we speedily receive a considerable sum in addition, it will be impossible to proceed with our arrangements, as the Spaniards require payment in specie, not only for mules and horses, but for every article of provisions they furnish.”

“ We have hitherto been unsuccessful in our endeavours to procure draught cattle; four or five mules being all we have as yet been able to get.”

“ Notwithstanding these circumstances, three regiments will commence their march on the road towards Leon tomorrow, and will proceed as far as Lugo. They would have moved yesterday; but just as they were setting out, the person who had contracted to supply them with pro-

visions in their cantonments refused to fulfil his engagement."

"The rains have just set in with great violence," &c.

The following letter from Sir John Moore describes his proceedings up to the 26th of October, on which day it is dated from Lisbon.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

My baggage leaves this, this day, and I shall follow tomorrow. I take the road by Abrantes, and shall reach Almeida about the 3rd of November, by which time the head of the division which marched by Coimbra will be approaching; that with Fraser by Abrantes will be at no great distance. I cannot say until I get to Almeida where I shall collect them, but my present intention is not to pass Salamanca until you and Hope get nearer to me. I have been obliged to send Hope with the artillery and cavalry, and a corps of infantry, round by the great road from Badajoz to Madrid; no other could be found fit for artillery. He does not go through Madrid, but turns to the left at some place short of it, which at present I do not recollect, and marches upon Epinar, from whence I can direct him where to join me.

I wish you to march on Astorga, and I should hope that by the time this reaches you, you will be equipped and ready to begin.* If not, you will move the moment you are ready, and in such divisions as the route in which you are to march can cover and supply.

The governor of the province at Coruña or at Ferrol, I

* General Craufurd's brigade, as we have already observed, was actually on the march not only before this letter of Sir John Moore's was received at Coruña, but before it was despatched from Lisbon.

take it for granted, can give you every information on this head, and will give you every aid for procuring the supplies upon your march.*

You will regulate your march as you think best. As far as Astorga you are safe enough ; beyond that we must both be guided by the movements and position of the enemy. If he continue, as at present, a good way behind the Ebro, our junction may be forward ; if not, we must make it further back. You will direct to me at Almeida, but desire your messenger to ask for me at Salamanca, or any other town through which he may pass which has British troops in it. Let me know the day you begin to move, and that in which the head will reach Astorga.

I wish you would take measures to forward to Astorga a dépôt, with as little delay as possible—

Provisions, but principally beef and pork, for 20,000 men for ten days.

Camp equipage for 10,000 men.

5000 blankets.

1000 camp-kettles.

5000 haversacks and canteens.

Shoes to as great a number as you have.

With respect to medical and purveyor's stores, I have desired Dr. Shafter, the Inspector-General with me, to write upon this subject to Dr. Hogg, his deputy with you, and to him I must refer you. With respect to ammunition and ordnance stores, Colonel Harding is not at present with me, and I cannot write with the same correctness ; but I should think one hundred rounds a gun, and a hundred rounds of musket-cartridges for 20,000 men, should be forwarded in the first instance, and to be followed after-

* These are fresh proofs of the ignorance in which those who ought to have had the best information were kept with respect to the popular feeling in Spain.

wards by as much more. I mean all this for *depôt*, independent of what is carried with the army.

Colonel Harding did write pretty fully to the officer commanding the artillery with you on the subject of his equipment, by Captain Gordon, and I shall desire him to write again when I see him, which will be in a few days; but in the mean time the letter he has received, together with what I have now stated to you, will suffice for what is immediately required.

If you are in want of the means to make this *depot*, for I have no account of what provisions or stores are sent with you, be so good as to let me know, and I will order ships round with them from this.

It can only be by means of the carts and mules of the country that you can be enabled to forward the stores to Astorga, but by demanding them of the public authorities they can be procured. Mr. Erskine, the commissary-in-chief, will write to his deputy with you on this subject. If the carts are paid for, and not taken a great distance from their homes, but relieved by others upon the road, they will not be much averse to it.

In forwarding these stores, the preference should be given to the ammunition, the provisions, the stores, medicines, and blankets. The camp equipage cannot be so pressing; of shoes we have few or none. The commissary-in-chief tells me that 50,000 pair are somewhere afloat, and we hope they are with you.

I have mentioned Astorga as the place for this *depôt*, but merely from the map, as I see it is a town upon the great road; but if from better information you should prefer Leon, or any other town in that neighbourhood, you will do it.

Corufia must be our principal magazine while we continue in the north of Spain. It is the only port, and Ferrol,

from whence a road leads into Spain. From St. Andero, or the ports in the Asturias, there are only mule-paths.

It will be necessary, therefore, to leave a small garrison in Coruña, under the command of an intelligent officer with whom we can at all times communicate, and who can aid in forwarding whatever is wanted. Any of the battalions the least fit for service may be appropriated for this; but the officer commanding at Coruña, must be active, and have certain qualities.

I know what a troublesome task I am imposing upon you, but you will see the necessity of the arrangements I propose, and you will execute them in the manner you think best for the good of the service. Our communication will now be shorter, and you will be so good as to inform me of whatever you determine. Should the heavy rains overtake you upon the march, it will be best to make a halt; they seldom last above a few days, but are tremendous, and after them there is generally a spell of fine weather.

Believe me always, my dear General,

Faithfully yours,

JOHN MOORE.

P.S. From the number of artillery horses stated in the return you sent me, you will not be able to horse more than three brigades: it will be best not to bring any more than you can fully horse and man. What other artillery you have, will do to replace hereafter. I have not said anything of the cavalry in this letter. I know not whether they are arrived; but as you will regulate your march as you think best, you will of course send them first or last at your pleasure.

J. M.

It fortunately happened about this period, that Mr. Frere, who had been appointed Minister Pleni-

potentiary from the Court of St. James's to Madrid, arrived at Coruña, on his way to that city, bringing with him a very considerable sum of money, which had been transmitted as a donation from the Government of England to that of Spain.

It must be admitted that nothing could appear more extraordinary than that, at the very moment when the British generals, (for, as we have seen, Sir John Moore was suffering from the want of funds as well as Sir David Baird,) found the absolutely necessary preparations for equipping the army obstructed by their poverty, large amounts of specie were periodically shipped from England, to meet the insatiable demands of the Spanish authorities.

The supply brought by Mr. Frere was for the Central Government at Madrid; how much it was subsequently misapplied, subsequent events too clearly show; however, at the urgent solicitation of Sir David Baird, Mr. Frere spared him 40,000*l.* as a loan for the use of the British army, and thus, rather by the personal consideration of Mr. Frere than the care of the Government at home, his wants were temporarily relieved.

Notwithstanding these checks, we have already seen the fruits of Sir David's activity in the march of General Craufurd's brigade on the 28th of October. The reader will, perhaps, not be surprised to find that the same energetic efforts were continued with an indefatigable constancy; and that on the 3rd of November, the whole division, with the exception of a battalion of the 60th foot, which was left in gar-

rison at Coruña, were in motion. The brigade of guards, under General Warde, being sent, in the first instance, to St. Jago, the entire force comprised a body of nearly 2000 cavalry and about 11,000 infantry, with six brigades of guns.

The cavalry, consisting of the 7th, 10th, and 15th hussars, were in the highest possible condition ; and the infantry, being almost all first battalions of regiments, was in the best order. All they wanted was that practical knowledge of the art of war, which of course can only be acquired by experience in the field, and of which, before the glorious campaigns of the Peninsula were over, they had innumerable opportunities of gaining, and by which, it must be allowed on all hands, they profited most completely.

In a letter to Sir John Moore from Sir David Baird, dated Coruña, 3rd November 1808, in reply to that which we submitted to the reader a page or two back, he says :—

“ All the regiments of my division (with the exception of the third battalion 60th) are now on shore, and moving slowly towards Astorga. I cannot at this moment positively fix the day when my advance will reach that place, but I trust nothing will, at all events, occur to delay it beyond the 13th of this month.”

The following passage in this letter is remarkable :

“ In the mean time measures are concerting for the establishment of a dépôt ; and the first division of waggons with provisions left Coruña for Astorga this morning. From all the information I have been able to collect, that

town is a very proper place for the establishment of a magazine. *The only doubt I entertain respecting it is, whether it may not be rather too far advanced.*"

The wisdom of this doubt future events singularly and unfortunately confirmed; for Colonel Napier in his work, (p. 470,) speaking of the retreat, to which we must hereafter come, through Astorga, says,—

"In the preceding month, large stores had been gradually brought up to that town by Sir David Baird, and as there were no means of transport to remove them, orders were given, after supplying the immediate wants of the army, to destroy them; but Romana, who would neither defend Leon nor Mansilla, had, contrary to his promises, preoccupied Astorga with his fugitive army; and when the English division marched in, such a tumult and confusion arose, that no orders could be executed with regularity, no distribution be made, nor the destruction of the stores be effected."

We have already shown, by submitting Sir John Moore's letter of the 26th of October, that Sir David Baird merely obeyed the orders of that officer.

To Sir David Baird's letter of the 3rd of November, Sir John Moore despatched the following answer:

Ciudad Rodrigo, 11th November 1808.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

I had the pleasure, on my road to this place, to receive your letter of the 3rd instant. I have not been able, from different causes, to get on so fast as I intended, and only reached this to-day. I proceed to-morrow, and shall be at

Salamanca on the 13th, about which time the heads of Beresford's and Fraser's divisions will be showing themselves. They have all passed Almeida. Paget's first regiment arrives here on the 13th. I shall assemble the whole at Salamanca.

The French have got considerable reinforcements, 27,000; and the Spaniards are less numerous than was thought. A considerable alarm is excited, and it becomes particularly necessary that we should get together as soon as possible.

Bathurst's letter to Colonel Murray states the troops which will be at Astorga on the 15th, and where others will be on the same day; but it does not appear from his letter whether those which are short of Astorga halt, or continue their march till they get there—we suppose the latter.

I should wish to proceed from Astorga to Benevente in as large corps as can be conveniently covered, taking care, first, that provisions are ready for them. On my arrival at Salamanca I shall take steps to have them prepared; in the mean time you will advance all the rear corps to Astorga as fast as can be with convenience to the troops, and from Astorga on Benevente by corps of such numbers as can be covered, as soon as supplies can be provided for them.

Thus half of your corps might be at Benevente and half at Astorga; I should then have it in my power to bring on those from Benevente, if circumstances made it necessary, when the other half from Astorga would in that case follow.

You must be guided in all your movements by what you hear of the enemy. If they continue beyond the Ebro, you may safely send on the troops as above detailed; but if they pass it, you must be more cautious. If the cavalry are arrived, bring them on amongst the first.

When the troops pass Astorga, *means must be prepared to bring on the depôt.* On this I can write hereafter.

I forward a letter from Colonel Harding to Colonel Sheldrake, which is quite explicit as to artillery stores, &c. I should wish the blankets to be brought on with the first stores, or as soon after as can be.

Your arrangement about artillery horses is perfectly good, and the sum given to the officers for the purchase of others for themselves is quite proper. Kennedy's appointment shall be confirmed : and hiring the mules I believe, for many reasons, preferable to purchasing them. Continue to write home, by every opportunity, for money and shoes. Major-General Mackenzie must go to Lisbon. I am sorry for it ; but he is placed by the Duke on that staff, and cannot, therefore, be employed on this.

Believe me always, my dear General, faithfully,

JOHN MOORE.

It seems quite clear by the tone of his letter, that General Moore began to see difficulties thickening round him. His anxiety for the junction with Baird—his evident disappointment at the inefficiency of the Spanish troops—are all indications of the new and true light which was breaking upon him ; while the experience he had gained in that part of his march which he had achieved, to Ciudad Rodrigo, no doubt disabused his mind of the erroneous description he had received of the state of the roads, the reported badness of which, had induced him as has already been stated, to divide his force, and march upon Salamanca by three routes instead of one.

A corps of 6000 men, under the command of Lieutenant-General Hope, marched through the

Alenteijo by the route of Badajos, Merida, Truxillo, Talavera, and the Escorial.

Two brigades under General Beresford marched by Coimbra and Almeida ; and three brigades under Lieutenant-General Fraser, marched by Abrantes, and so to Almeida ; and with them a brigade of light six-pounders was ordered to the latter place. However unimpeachable his motives may be, it is clear that, besides dividing his force at a time when he was not exactly certain of the position or strength of the enemy, Sir John Moore naturally delayed its junction with Baird's division by this arrangement. Probably these considerations, added to the report of the important reinforcements of the French army, gave a tone to the letter we have just submitted, which is anything but exhilarating or confident.

Nor was General Baird less anxious to join Sir John Moore, than Sir John himself could be that he should do so ; and his reasons for this anxiety, no particle of which was founded on selfishness, will be considered tolerably strong, when the reader is told, or recollects, that from letters and other papers which had fallen into his hands, he had obtained information that the reinforcements which the French were to receive before the 10th of the month, would amount, instead of 27,000 men, as Sir John Moore had stated it, to no less a force than 78,000.

Sir David wrote to Mr. Frere, to enforce the necessity of having a Spanish commissioner with the

British forces. The Galician Junta afforded him no assistance ; the necessity for the junction with Moore became alarmingly evident : but all the representations of our General had no effect upon the authorities at Coruña, nor did the despatch containing the details of the defeat of General Blake, addressed to themselves, produce any more powerful sensation ; they seemed to be in a state of infatuation, stupified by an overweening confidence in themselves, and a striking absence of it in the English.

Sir David, however, wrote to Sir John Moore, to report progress ; the state of affairs may easily be judged by his own letters.

He wrote to Sir John on the 7th of November :

“ — The troops continue their route towards Astorga. The first division will arrive there (if no unlooked for accident should delay it), on the 13th ; and by the 19th I expect we shall have seven regiments in that town, and in its immediate neighbourhood. We are also forwarding provisions and ammunition as quickly as our circumscribed means will permit. We have derived no sort of assistance from the government. The Junta have repeatedly promised us carts, but have invariably failed in sending them ; and we have been compelled to rely solely on our own efforts to obtain the means of conveyance,” &c.

“ — The first division of carts with provisions will reach Astorga about the 18th instant, and every exertion shall be made to complete the depôt you propose establishing there. I think, however, it may become a question (which you will hereafter be able to decide), whether it may not be advisable that a principal magazine should be formed further back, and in rear of the defiles leading from Ga-

licia into Leon. I transmit copies of some letters and other documents respecting the state and proceedings of the Spanish armies, and the reinforcements which have arrived, or are expected by the French, in Navarre and Biscay; by which it appears that the enemy in those two provinces only, will receive an accession to his force of 78,000 men by the 10th instant.

“ — It is my intention to leave Corusia about the 10th or 12th instant for Astorga,” &c.

On the 12th of November, Sir John Moore writes to Sir David Baird from Ciudad Rodrigo, the following letter :

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

Just as I had despatched a courier to you last night, your aide-de-camp Captain Gordon arrived. I am glad you are making such progress. I have letters this morning from Madrid, which state that an officer is sent from Madrid to attend your corps on its march, and provide for its wants; and this gentleman will, I should hope, remove the difficulties made by the political and other parties, as he is charged with full power from the Spanish Government.

An officer of like description is with Hope. You will see by my letter of last night, that I was aware of the intelligence sent to you of the French reinforcements—we shall have enough to do. I wish we were once united, and that our commissariat knew how to feed us, and that the Spaniards were more firm and decided; for whilst at Madrid they are wrangling, and all the Generals are separate and independent, we can look to nothing but disasters, if the French are once in sufficient force to move forward. However, we must hope and do for the best.

Sir Harry Burrard is ordered to England immediately to attend at the intended investigation of Sir H. Dalrymple. Burrard is an excellent man, honourable, and liberal. I shall be exceedingly sorry, if anything unpleasant ever befall him. He does not deserve it. I enclose a letter from him to Major-General Mackenzie, who must immediately make the best of his way to Lisbon.

Yours faithfully,

JOHN MOORE.

The next day to that on which this letter was written, the intelligence reached Sir John Moore which he had so long anticipated with so much gloom and apprehension. The French were in sufficient force to advance, and did advance, as the following extract from another despatch to Sir David Baird, dated Salamanca, November 13th, will sufficiently explain.

Sir John Moore to Sir David Baird.

“ Salamanca, 13th November, 1808.

“ — The French have entered Burgos, and have driven from it part of the Estremaduran army. In what force they are, or whether their intention is to advance farther, I know not. If they advance whilst we are assembling, they will embarrass us. I do not understand the movements of the Spanish Generals: they are separated without the possibility of aiding each other, the one in Biscay, the other on the Alagon, leaving the whole country in our front, whilst we are collecting, to the enemy. I have addressed Castaños to know his views, when I shall be better able to decide what step to take. In the mean time, the great object for us is to unite. I wish, as soon as you have ascertained that they can be subsisted, that you would

push on your corps to Benevente. I shall probably, by the time they reach that, order them to continue on to Zamora, and ultimately we may be able to have the whole assembled in Zamora, Toro, and this place.

“ — In all this, however, you must be guided by the information you receive of the enemy. Were they to advance immediately, whilst the regiments on this side were moving forward in succession, I should have no option but to fall back, in which case also you must get back to Astorga, and prepare, if pressed, to get back into Galicia. From the account I have of the road, this to you would not be difficult. If once all my regiments were assembled here, probably, rather than separate you, I would by a flank march join you ; in short, we can only be regulated by circumstances, and we should be in constant communication.

“ I still think that the probability is, that the French are not in force to advance beyond Burgos, while such strong corps as Blake's and Castaños' are on their flanks — the one of 40,000, the other 50,000 men. If we were once together, I should not care, and had two or three days to organize and arrange ourselves ; but whilst collecting, it is distressing.

“ We soldiers must do the best, and hope for the best ; there is no use in dwelling upon evils which may, but which perhaps never will occur.”

On the 16th of November Sir John writes :

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

In the night of yesterday, I was informed that the French had entered Valladolid on the 13th. This morning the post from Valladolid did not arrive, and the report of the French being there is confirmed. Their force is not stated ; but as it is to be presumed that a small force durst

not have ventured so far, *I am preparing to retire upon Ciudad Rodrigo*, in order to concentrate my force, which is now marching on, and from that place to this, two regiments came in here yesterday, and two are coming in to-day; the whole will not be here before the 25th.

Under such circumstances, I have no option but to fall back upon Ciudad Rodrigo; my motions afterwards will depend on circumstances. I expect hourly intelligence of the movements of the enemy.

I shall not quit this place till I find they are marching on it; in the mean time I keep every thing.

You must of course not separate your force, by sending any part of it towards this, until you find that the enemy have retired from Valladolid, and that I continue here; in short, you must now look to yourself—be ready to fall back if necessary on Coruña, or take such steps as circumstances direct. You shall hear from me daily, as long as I am here, and as the communication is open. I can after that, communicate with you through Portugal.

The event has happened which I always said was a possible one; but as it was the very worst that could befall us, I was in hopes our good fortune would have saved us from it. There is no help for it—we have done what we could, to join, and be of use to this nation; if we have not succeeded, it is their fault, not ours. We had a right to expect that they would have been able to cover us until united.

My dear Sir David, yours faithfully,

JOHN MOORE.

The next day Sir John Moore wrote again.

Salamanca, 16th November.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

I expect in the course of this day, accurate information of the movement of the French from Burgos; it does not

appear that they have been at Valladolid in any number, and certainly, I believe, they have not yet been beyond it. In the present circumstances, I think you should collect your whole force at Astorga, and its neighbourhood: by means of your cavalry you can keep a good look out, and by other means you can be informed of every movement the enemy makes towards you; and at the same time that you keep your corps in readiness to join me when I desire it, you must prepare to retreat on Coruña should circumstances render it necessary. Of these last circumstances, you alone must be the judge.

You must retire rather than commit in any degree the safety of your corps—it is when united, we can alone do good; not by fighting separately partial actions, if they can be avoided.

Castañón has been superseded, and the Marquis of Romana appointed in his place, to command the armies of the centre and the left. I shall be guided by what I hear of his intentions, as well as by the movements which I perceive the enemy to make, in the order I shall send you to join me; in the mean time, I expect to hear from you your progress, and whatever comes to your knowledge of transactions on your side.

Buonaparte is come himself, and his army amounts to 80,000 men—if we can unite, we shall, I hope, do our duty.

Believe me faithfully,

JOHN MOORE.

On the 17th, the next day, Sir John Moore again wrote to Sir David Baird as follows.

Salamanca, November 17th, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

Last night an officer I had sent out for information returned—he was in Valladolid. All the inhabitants—the

magistrates, and fifty or sixty people excepted -- had abandoned it on the arrival of the French, who entered the town on Sunday afternoon, the 12th instant, with a thousand cavalry and two pieces.

They stayed the night, plundered some of the houses, and then retired to Valencia, on the road to Burgos; whether they are still at Valencia, he could not find out; but I shall know this to-day. No infantry seems to have advanced from Burgos; but Marshal Bessieres commands there a body of 14,000 men.

Colonel Murray received a letter this morning from Colonel Craufurd at Astorga, by which I am sorry to find that no part of his brigade is equipped, and he seems to be looking forward to some quiet cantonment, where all this will be done at leisure. I was in hopes that you would have done as we have done, start with as much equipment as you could, and complete it by every means as you went on; by this means a little is procured from every district, and the country where we stop ultimately, will easily provide for the final wants of the whole; but affairs are in that state that we must not look forward to halting any time anywhere.

My wish is, if possible, to assemble the army between Zamora and this place. I hope the enemy is not yet prepared to disturb us; but in coming to me, you must use your discretion, and act upon the information you receive of his movements. I shall let you know all I hear, that can be of any use to you. By the time you receive this, you will perhaps be prepared to forward to Benevente a considerable part of your force; let it march in as large bodies as can be covered, and include a proportion of artillery and of cavalry, if any of the latter are come up.

Whilst this is doing, the rest of your corps will be collecting at Astorga, and as it moves forward to Benevente,

that already there, may advance to Zamora, at which place there is cover for a great many men, and before they can reach it Colonel Murray will have prepared the cantonment for the whole of your corps, in the manner it may be proposed to take it up.

The artillery, stores, ammunition, blankets, &c. as mentioned in my former letter, you will forward to Zamora, at such intervals and in such manner as you judge best; and you will leave directions with each corps or officers, as may be judged expedient, to remain for a time at Astorga, with respect to the second division of artillery, stores, and ammunition, which may perhaps not have reached it at the time the rest of the troops move forward.

In short, my dear General, consider yourself as coming to me with a complete division of the army. The things which should attend it, have at different times been explained; others have been left to your own judgment and discretion, and I look to you to manage the whole in such manner as you think best, and as circumstances will admit. As we approach nearer, our communication becomes shorter, and may be as frequent as we please; and the heads of your departments writing to their chiefs with me, may get every information and instruction. By sending forward proper officers, every necessary supply will be provided.

A letter from Colonel Murray to Colonel Bathurst, accompanies this. With respect to equipment, the mules for regimental purposes, viz. officers' baggage, camp kettles, &c. should be bought, and if Spanish muleteers, as Batmen, are hired, one would be sufficient for the care of the mules of a company, and employ fewer soldiers; the mules required for the departments it will be best to hire.

Believe me faithfully,

JOHN MOORE.

To Sir David Baird.

These letters, which are extremely curious and interesting, as exhibiting the unsettled and conflicting feelings of Sir John Moore's mind at a moment of infinite embarrassment, were all received by Sir David Baird on the road from Coruña to Astorga; the former place he quitted on the 13th of November, and after inspecting the different corps which he passed on their march, reached Astorga late on the night of the 19th of that month.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONTINUATION OF CORRESPONDENCE WITH SIR JOHN MOORE—OBSERVATIONS ON SIR WALTER SCOTT'S LIFE OF NAPOLEON AND COLONEL NAPIER'S WORK—COLONEL SORRELL'S NOTES—SIR DAVID BAIRD VISITS LEON—INTERVIEW WITH ROMANA—GENERAL MOORE RESOLVES ON RETREATING—DEFEAT OF CASTANOS—REMONSTRANCE OF ROMANA—LORD LONDONDERRY'S INTERVIEW WITH SIR JOHN MOORE—MR. FREERE'S LETTER—RETREAT COMMENCED.

THE moment Sir David Baird reached Astorga, on the night of Saturday the 19th of November, he sat down to reply to the four letters which we have just submitted.

Sir David in his despatch says :

In addition to the information you communicate respecting the movement of French troops, I have received positive intelligence that the army of General Blake, after sustaining repeated attacks, has been completely defeated, and almost entirely dispersed. The General himself, with the very small portion of his force which he was able to keep together, has retired to the mountains bordering on the Asturias; and it appears that a few of the fugitives and some artillery are collecting at Leon, which is threatened by the enemy.

I enclose copies of some reports which have been addressed to Colonel Craufurd and myself upon the subject.

Under these circumstances, I confess I am of opinion, that it would be attended with much danger if I were to make any partial advance on Benevente, until some cavalry has come up, and a considerable portion of my force is collected; as it would be easy for the enemy, if they are in strength, to intercept and cut off the communication between my advanced corps and the rest. By the 28th or 29th, we shall have at this place at least one regiment of dragoons, the horse artillery, three brigades of six-pounders, and the greater part of my infantry; and I should then be in sufficient force to advance with some degree of security.

Should you, however, be desirous that I should move forward with what troops I have at present here, I will instantly do so; and I beg to assure you, my dear Sir John, that in every instance, and on every occasion, it will be my most anxious desire to meet your wishes and views.

In pursuance of the advice and directions in your letter of the 15th, I am making arrangements to secure my retreat on Galicia, should such a measure unfortunately become indispensable. Coruña would be a bad point to retire on, as the harbour is completely commanded from the surrounding heights. I have sent directions to have Vigo and the neighbouring sea-ports examined, and I expect reports on the subject very soon.

Every possible effort has been made to complete the equipment of the division, but owing to the total want of assistance which we experienced in Galicia from the local authorities, and which I have had repeated occasion to notice to you, our success has not been great. In this province I hope, however, to be more successful, and that we shall very speedily be able to collect the number of horses and mules we require.

It must be admitted that the position in which Sir

John Moore at this moment found himself, was one of considerable difficulty. When the English Government sent a British force into Spain, that force was intended to co-operate with the native armies, to which it was to become a *point d'appui*, or reserve; and it was hoped and expected, that those armies would not be committed in any imprudent contest with the enemy, until their allies were collected, and that they had effected a junction with them.

By what had occurred, however, the original design of the campaign, and the mode of prosecuting the war were entirely deranged before even the British troops themselves could be collected together; for from the ease with which it appeared that the army of Blake had been defeated by the French, it was naturally to be concluded that those under Castaños and Palafox would be overcome with similar facility; yet Sir John still anxiously looked forward to the union of the British forces, and to the arrival of General Hope's division, which the reader will recollect Sir John had been induced to send by a circuitous route on account of the alleged badness of the roads; we say alleged, for the descriptions which he had received of the difficulties of moving artillery by the same route which the infantry had taken, proved in the sequel to have been grossly if not purposely exaggerated.

On the 21st Sir John wrote to Sir David Baird from Salamanca.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

As I was sending off an officer to you with the enclosed,* your letter of the 19th arrived. My wish all along was, and still is, that you should use your entire discretion in obeying whatever orders I send you; and I shall only feel comfortable in proportion as I am assured that you will do so. Do not therefore advance a man from Astorga until you think it safe to do so.

When you are ready you will apprise me, and I shall move a corps from this to Zamora, and shall probably go with it myself; but if the French, in consequence of Blake's defeat, turn a force against you, we must give up the junction, and you must retreat and re-embark. In this it would be well to send the cavalry, for which no ships will be found, through Portugal to Lisbon, from whence they might join me, and you yourself, with the troops, sail for that port, at which place I should write to you for your further proceedings.

Upon your retreat I should like to take the best care of myself I could. If Villa Franca is preferable for a depôt, establish it there. Bring on to Astorga only what is necessary to accompany the army. Salt provisions, when once you are at Astorga, will probably not again be wanted, therefore your consuming a part of what is coming forward is of no importance.

It does not appear from the information we have here, and I believe it is pretty correct, that the French have been in Valladolid, or in front of Valencia, since the 14th. On leaving Valladolid on that morning, they took the road to Leon, but after following it a few miles they turned to Valencia. They were 1000 cavalry, with two pieces of artillery.

* A duplicate of Sir John's letter of the 17th, to which at that moment he had not received Sir David's answer.

The country has been thrown into such a state of alarm in consequence of the late defeats, that rumours are spread of French parties much more numerous than they are; no doubt, however, we must pay attention to rumours in our present comparatively defenceless situation, and act with much circumspection. I beg you will continue to let me hear from you everything you think of the least importance, and apprise me of all your movements.

I doubt if you will find a better place than Coruña for a re-embarkation, should you be reduced to such an alternative; the probability is, that you will be closely followed through that mountainous country; but Vigo, I suspect, is quite open."

It will be seen, that still up to the 21st of November Sir John Moore had not given up all his hopes. On that day Sir David Baird wrote him a letter, from which the following is an extract :

"—— I enclose a letter I received late last night from General Leith, communicating the entire defeat and dispersion of Blake's army, and a report from Captain Pasley of the Royal Engineers, upon the same subject. From that army I can now expect no assistance or support. A number of fugitives from that and the Estremaduran corps, entirely destitute of order and without proper officers, have, I understand, entered Leon, and joined a small party already in that city. The whole may amount to about 150 cavalry and 2000 or 3000 infantry; and they have some artillery and thirty-four pieces of ordnance belonging to Blake's army in that town. The commanding officer of the artillery came here last night, and proposed joining me with his guns, which I directed him to do, as there is no chance of Leon being successfully defended if the enemy advances in any force. I have also ordered the cavalry to

join me as speedily as possible, as they may prove of great service in reconnoitring, &c. until such time as our own dragoons come up.

“ — In my last letter of the 19th, I pointed out, that as far as I was then able to judge, it would not be advisable to make any partial advance of the troops at present here, until such time as part of the cavalry, the ammunition, and the money, were come up; and until we were able to procure some positive information respecting the movements and views of the enemy, who in addition to Bessieres' force, (stated at 14,000 or 15,000,) which advances by the road to Burgos, have now the army that defeated Blake unoccupied.

“ By the 29th I expect to have the greater part of my infantry, with one regiment of cavalry and a troop of horse-artillery, in the neighbourhood, and I should then be able to move with greater confidence and security, if not previously compelled to fall back by the advance of a superior force of the enemy. Should I at present advance to Benavente, and the French approach, a retreat would become very difficult for infantry through an open country and in face of a powerful cavalry.

“ I must, however, repeat, that if you are desirous that I should immediately advance what troops are here, I shall instantly do so, although I think such a measure might be attended with considerable danger, as, in addition to our want of cavalry, we are at this moment *destitute of spare ammunition*, which, from Colonel Murray's letter to Bathurst, *appears also to be the case with your force*.

“ I have caused persons to be sent forward by Leon, and on the road to Palencia, to obtain information, and I shall not fail to communicate the result of their observations to you. I enclose two reports, which reached me this morning. I have also despatched engineer officers to the rear, for the purpose of ascertaining what impediments to the

progress of the enemy we might occasion by the destruction of the bridges, &c. in the event of being hard pressed, and compelled to fall back on Galicia."

At this point the correspondence between Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird assumes a peculiar degree of interest, as throwing a strong light upon certain passages contained in two works of acknowledged talent and authority—Sir Walter Scott's *Life of Buonaparte*, and Colonel Napier's *History of the War in the Peninsula*.

With a view of correcting some errors into which both the historians of these times have evidently fallen, Lieutenant Colonel Sorrell, who was military secretary and aide-de-camp to Sir David Baird during the campaign (and to whose kindness and ability the writer of this narrative is highly indebted for much valuable information), published in 1828 a pamphlet, called "*Notes on the Campaign of 1808-9 in the North of Spain*," for the purpose of showing—

1st. That every effort was made to prepare the division when landed at Coruña, for the field, and to effect its junction with that under Sir John Moore.

2nd. That Sir David Baird did not, as stated by Lieutenant-colonel Napier in his *History of the War in Portugal*, return from Astorga to Villa Franca until ordered to do so by Sir John Moore.

And 3rd. That the disorder and irregularity which attended the retreat, ought principally to be ascribed to the fatigues and privations which the army underwent, and not to any want of exertion on the part of the officers in command.

In thus professing the intention and object of his "Notes," Colonel Sorrell disclaims "the slightest intention to detract from the general merits of the works to which he has occasion to refer, but is solely actuated by considerations of public justice and private friendship."

We have already noticed the error of Sir Walter Scott, who states, vol. vi. p. 266, that Sir David Baird was despatched to Coruña by Sir John Moore, and we now extract from Colonel Sorrell's "Notes" the following observations upon the letter of Sir David Baird just submitted to the reader.

"And yet," says Colonel Sorrell (note, p. 20), "Sir Walter Scott, in his *Life of Napoleon Buonaparte*, volume vi. p. 275, states 'a retreat into, if not through Galicia, was the only mode of avoiding the perils by which the British were surrounded. The plan of defending this strong and mountainous province, or at least of effecting a retreat through it with order and deliberation, had been in view for several weeks. Sir David Baird's division had passed through it on their advance to Astorga; yet so imperfect at that time was the British general staff, that no accurate knowledge seemed to have been possessed of the roads through the country, of the many strong military positions which it presents, or of the particular military advantages which it affords for defensive war.'

"The reasons," continues Colonel Sorrell, "which led Sir David Baird to think it would be injudicious to advance farther than Astorga before the 29th of November, have already been shown by his letters. Until that day he would not have sufficient force up to enable him to move with security, as the country between Astorga and Benevente is an open plain, and he was without cavalry.

Colonel Napier says, p. 431, that the movement which Sir John Moore contemplated in case he could draw the wings of his army together in good time, was to abandon all communication with Portugal, and throwing himself into the heart of Spain, to rally Castaños' army (if it yet existed) upon his own; to defend the southern provinces, and trust to the effect which such an appeal to the patriotism and courage of the Spaniards would produce.

"This," says Colonel Sorrell, "I think must be a mistake; we shall presently see what Sir John Moore himself says upon the subject; at all events, it is more certain that any movement at the moment alluded to, which would have caused us to abandon all communication with Portugal and Galicia (and this would have been a necessary consequence of throwing ourselves into the heart of Spain), must inevitably have been followed by the ruin of the British army.

"A considerable portion of Sir David Baird's division was still in the rear. The whole of Sir John Moore's force was not yet collected; but what was of still more importance, both divisions were *deficient in ammunition*, as appears by Sir David Baird's letter to Sir John Moore, dated the 21st."

The position of Sir John Moore at this crisis is ably described by the author of "Annals of the Peninsula Campaigns," vol. ii. p. 6.

"The situation of Sir John Moore at Salamanca, with respect to the Spanish, was very extraordinary. He was at the vertex of a triangle, the base of which, at the distance of between two hundred and fifty and three hundred miles, was the French position; the points of the extremities at the base, that is, the French flanks, were the positions of the Spanish armies.

“ The army of Castafios was at this period posted in the neighbourhood of Tudela, but on the opposite or north side of the Ebro, and about three hundred miles to the north-east of Salamanca. The French were thus completely interposed between the Spanish and British armies, and might at any moment advance on the latter in overwhelming force. For this state of things Sir John Moore was unprepared: all his arrangements had been framed on the assurance that the assembling of his forces would be protected by the Spanish armies. To effect the union of his isolated divisions, had now become an operation of danger and difficulty. He was placed as a central point between the two wings of his army, and found it impracticable to approach the one without hazarding the safety of the other.

“ Thus compelled to remain inactive at Salamanca, Sir John Moore endeavoured to stimulate the local authorities into the adoption of such measures of promptitude and vigour as were suited to the exigence of the crisis. In this effort he failed. The Spanish people, though influenced by fierce and unmitigated hatred towards their invaders, were no longer animated by that uncalculating and convulsive energy which in the commencement of the struggle had goaded them like madness into furious resistance; the fierceness of the paroxysm had passed, and though in the cause of their country every Spaniard was prepared to grasp the sword, the blows it dealt were directed with an erring aim and a feeble arm; their detestation of a foreign yoke was undiminished, but it had become a fixed and inert sentiment, rather than a fierce uncontrollable and all-pervading impulse.”

The policy of the plan supposed by Colonel Napier to have been that of Sir John Moore, it is now useless to discuss. That it could never have been

executed, was rendered certain by the entire defeat of the army under Castaños, which he proposed to join at Tudela on the 20th, the very day on which Sir David Baird wrote the following letter to Sir John Moore.

Astorga, 23rd November, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

I wrote to you on the 19th and 21st from this place, explaining the nature of our situation; and was in hopes I should have had the satisfaction of hearing from you in reply to my first communication, before this. The length of time which has elapsed since I despatched that letter, makes me apprehensive that you may have felt it expedient to fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo, or that our communication may be intercepted.

The more I consider our situation, the more I am convinced of the danger that would attend my making, at the present moment, any movement in advance, or attempt to join you, before my force is more collected. We have no kind of support to expect from the Spaniards, who are completely dispersed, and driven from the field; and if I were to move forward the infantry I have at present here, I should necessarily expose myself to be beaten in detail, without a chance of being able to oppose any effectual resistance.

The enemy are certainly at Mayorga, and their parties have pushed forward almost close to Beneventé. From my present want of cavalry, I have not been able to ascertain how forward their infantry may be.

— I enclose a copy of some intelligence communicated by a person who was sent from Leon to obtain information respecting the movements of the French, and of a letter written by Colonel Graham from the head-quarters of Castaños' army.

From the latter, it is clearly apparent how very much exaggerated the accounts generally circulated of the strength of the Spanish armies have been. In all probability, Castaños and Palafox *may by this time have experienced a reverse similar to that of Blake*, in which case the Spaniards would have no force deserving the name of an army in the field.

The last paragraph of this letter is singularly prophetic, for at the moment Sir David Baird was writing it, the extermination of Castanos' force was actually going on.

The Marquis de la Romana was at this period at Leon, and in constant communication with Sir David, whose anxiety with respect to Sir John Moore was very much augmented by the fact that he had not heard from him for several days. He began to apprehend that Sir John might have been compelled to retire, and accordingly made all his arrangements for falling back on Galicia, communicating his intentions to do so, both to Sir John Moore and Lord Castlereagh.

At the same time he wrote to apprise the Marquis de la Romana of his plan of proceeding in case either of the retreat of Sir John Moore or the advance of the enemy in force upon Astorga, and recommended him, supposing such a movement necessary, to fall back on the Asturias.

The following letter, which Sir David received from Sir John Moore, rendered these measures for the present unnecessary.

Salamanca, 26th Nov. 1808.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

I had the pleasure to receive your letters of the 23rd and 24th yesterday.

I do not believe that yet the enemy has any considerable corps at Rio Seco or Ampudia; my information is very incorrect if they have any infantry so near. For some days past they have had 800 or 900 cavalry in Valladolid, and have patrolled as far as Tordesillas and Puente de Duero; but as yet, I hear, nothing but cavalry. All your precautions are perfectly good. I have explained myself to you already so fully, that I need say no more. Whatever you do, I am certain will be right, and I shall approve. Give me notice that I may conform.

You will of course keep Major-Gen. Leith with you, and if you can spare Mackenzie, he is much wanted in Portugal. I am in hopes of seeing the Marquis of Romana, who I think must pass this on his way to Madrid. It is very important that I should see him, and if he is still within your reach, I wish you would present my compliments to him, and tell him so.

As they know at Madrid that you are in correspondence with me, Lord W. Bentinck and Mr. Frere think it probably unnecessary to write to you.

I have not a shilling! I wish you would bring on the blankets.

In case of your retreat, you cannot be followed with heavy artillery. I cannot therefore but think Coruña perfectly safe. Have your people looked at Balanzos Bay and the peninsula which divides it from Ferrol, or even Ferrol itself? I suppose the enemy without cannon beyond six-pounders.

Believe me sincerely,

JOHN MOORE.

I have written my sentiments fully to Government by this messenger; do not detain him longer than to write yours, which I believe will not differ much from mine, and the sooner the eyes of the good people of England are opened the better.

In consequence of the receipt of this letter, Sir David Baird went over to Leon, and visited the Marquis de la Romana, who appeared still sanguine, and expressed his hopes that he should be able to collect in a few days a force of 8 or 10,000 men; but from the appearance of those who were already assembled, very little expectation could be formed of their efficiency or utility; they seemed completely destitute of every requisite for the field.

It was on his return from this visit that Sir David Baird wrote to Lord Castlereagh, stating, that as he had heard from Sir John Moore that the communication between them was still open, and as the enemy had neither advanced rapidly nor in such force as might have been anticipated, he had abandoned the intention of retreating, and should endeavour to effect a junction with Sir John Moore as soon as his force could be collected.

The following letter from Sir John Moore, dated November 27th, shows that he was stimulated by a similar feeling to that by which Sir David was actuated. He says—

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

The officer charged with your letter of the 24th was detained at Zamora, and did not reach this till this morning at six.

The letter which I wrote to you yesterday will satisfy you that I did not believe in any force being collected at Rio Seco, and has therefore, I hope, induced you to stop your retreat, and to hurry everything forward as fast as possible. In Rio Seco, and in all this neighbourhood, there is nothing but cavalry. As soon as you are ready to move on Beneventé, I shall move to Zamora and join, but take measures at the same time to forward the ordnance stores, ammunition, *money*, shoes, and *blankets*. I have none of the latter, and the men want them. In short, the more you can bring forward the better; even the salt pork would be an advantage, in order to give the commissariat occasionally a spare day to prepare fresh meat.

I believe the French are moving against Castafios, in order to beat him, and then to turn upon us; but that at present they have cavalry alone in Leon and the neighbouring provinces. I am in hopes of seeing the Marquis of Romana as he passes: with him I could come to some understanding.

Should you be forced, before we join, to retreat, consider whether the cavalry could not, under Lord Paget, make a push to join me; and if it be possible, let him try it, keeping well to his right.

As to the march through Portugal, it would meet no impediment but from want of food and roads. The enemy could not go in force, and dare not go in small numbers. A ship with forage could be sent to meet them at Oporto and Coimbra; but if it could, to embark the cavalry, and to place it in security until embarked, would be preferable to such a march.

I remain, my dear Sir David,

Yours sincerely,

JOHN MOORE.

Lord Proby is this instant come from Tordesillas— a patrol of French cavalry came into the town when he was

there.—He had been there for ten days, and he was perfectly known, but not a man betrayed him. When the patrol left the town, he came out, and found the people in the streets, who declared, although they were unarmed, that they would have died rather than have allowed him to be taken. I have heard nothing in these parts that has shown so much character.

On the 28th, Sir John writes again to Sir David Baird.

Baron Tuyll brought me your letter of the 26th, yesterday, about four o'clock, P.M. The Marquis of Romana's intelligence is wrong—the French have no infantry on this side of Burgos; they have infantry, I believe, at Aranda de Duero—they are moving against Castaños, and had reached Soria—they have intercepted his communications with Madrid, and have in view to force his left, whilst probably another corps attacks him in front. A French corps had also arrived at Medina Celi, and a firing was heard on the 25th in the direction of Sigüenza. The Junta have taken the alarm, and will retire to Toledo, if not to Cordova.

They deserve to be hanged, for it is owing to their imbecility, that this country is so unprepared.

I see my situation, and that of the army I command, in as unfavourable a light as you or any one can do. I have given it my best consideration. I know that you should have landed at Cadiz, and I should have met you at Seville, where the army could have been united and equipped, but it was ordered otherwise; and it is our business to make every effort to unite here, and to obey our orders and the wishes of our country, to aid the Spaniards as far as lies in our power—it would never do to retreat without making the attempt.

If the enemy prevent us, there is no help for it ; but if he does not, I am determined to unite the army ; when that is done, we shall act according to circumstances : we shall be from 32,000 to 35,000 men.

I have still a chance that the presence of so large a British force may give spirit to the Spaniards ; and I shall hope, if the cause is at last to be given up, to be able to make our retreat. I can give no orders more positive than I have already given you.

I hold my resolution to remain, and form the junction in the manner already explained in my former letters. In the execution of this, you will use your own discretion, as I do mine. If the enemy move against you, you cannot do it ; you will in that case retreat, giving me notice. If he moves against me, I must do the same, and I shall give you notice. Your retreat cannot be more difficult than mine. I have but one brigade of artillery, and no cavalry.

On the 1st of December you will be able to move with one regiment of cavalry, and such number of infantry as you choose to take. I wish, therefore, you would do so, as far as Benevente, where you may arrive on the 2nd. I shall move from this on the 1st, towards Zamora and Toro, at each of which places we shall arrive from this also on the 2nd. I shall myself be with the corps at Toro, where I will communicate with you.

You may leave orders for your cavalry to follow you to Benevente, in squadrons or by regiments, as you deem best, as well as such infantry as may not march with you at first to Benevente. You will make what arrangements you think proper for having a corps at Astorga, and forward the money and stores of every description to Zamora, and probably the Marquis de Romana may occupy Astorga when you leave it.

As I shall have no cavalry, I shall want a regiment of

yours at Toro, as soon as a second joins you ; but on this and other subjects we can communicate when you arrive at Benevente, and I at Toro."

Upon the receipt of this letter, Sir David Baird put every thing in train for moving forward on the 1st of December ; it was clear that the demonstration of popular feeling at Tordesillas had again awakened his hopes of support from the Spanish people, and his anxiety to aid them increased with the prospect of their co-operation.

All the arrangements however for the advance were as suddenly put a stop to, as they had been promptly begun. The following letter from Sir John Moore, written only a few hours after the one just cited, again changed the whole state of affairs.

Salamanca, 28th November, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

I have received this evening, despatches from Mr. Stuart, at Madrid, announcing the defeat and dispersion of Castaños' army. The French, in Spain, are estimated at 80,000 men, and 30,000 are expected in the course of a week. It certainly was much my wish to have run great risks in aid of the people of Spain ; but after this second proof of how little they are able to do for themselves (the only two armies they had having made so little stand), I see no right we have to expect from them much greater exertions. At any rate, we should be overwhelmed before they could be prepared.

I see no chance of our being able to form a junction, as certainly at Burgos the French have a corps, which will now move forward.

I have, therefore, determined to retreat upon Portugal,

with the troops I have here, and if possible with Hope's corps, if by forced marches he can join me. I wish you to fall back on Coruña. Send back immediately your stores under such part of your force as you judge proper. You may then stay with the rest a little longer, if you can depend upon knowing the movements of the enemy. I propose this, as were you at once to retire, it might encourage the enemy to push at once at Hope and me, and prevent our junction, which is the more necessary, as I must stop on the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon as long as possible.

On your arrival at Coruña, you will, of course, embark and sail for the Tagus, where orders shall be waiting you. Write immediately to England, and give notice of what we are doing, and beg that transports may be sent to Lisbon; they will be wanted, *for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defended.*

Believe me, &c.

JOHN MOORE.

When General Moore had thus made up his mind to retreat, he called a meeting of general officers, and having submitted to them the information he had received, confided to them the resolution to which he had come. He explained to the assembled officers that he had not summoned them either to ask their advice, or to relieve himself of any of the responsibility of the retreat, by inducing them to commit themselves even by giving an opinion. He had called them together, merely to inform them of his determination, and to desire them to take the most prompt and efficient measures for carrying that determination into effect.

After this meeting had taken place, Sir John wrote again to Sir David.

Salamanca, 29th November, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

I have nothing to add to what I wrote to you last night. You will make your retreat, concealing your intentions as long as you can. I had written to the Marquis de la Romana, that I should assemble the army, and act, if possible, with him. That is now out of the question, tell him.

When on the frontier of Portugal, I shall be ready to retire, if circumstances render it eligible, or by embarking and going round to another part of Spain, we may be more useful. We by no means abandon the cause of Spain, but only withdraw from a situation, where, without aiding it, we should ourselves be destroyed.

We want money—if it can be sent by land, as Murray wrote to Bathurst, do it : if not, land it at Oporto. Order inquiries to be made what victuallers are there, and if not sufficient, direct one or two of light draft of water to enter that port, as also a ship with oats.

I remain faithfully,

JOHN MOORE.

It is not our province, nor at this period is it necessary to enter into any discussion upon the wisdom of General Moore's decision. The Spaniards had no longer any thing like an army in the field, and the British force, even if united, was not of sufficient strength to contend with the French single-handed. The most natural course for the enemy to pursue, was to turn round upon the English, prevent the junction of the two armies, and attack

them in detail, while separate. Every sound principle of war, no doubt, suggested a retreat ; yet, nevertheless, the announcement of Sir John Moore's resolution was received by all ranks of the army with the most unqualified discontent and dissatisfaction.

When Sir David Baird received Sir John's letter of the 28th, he resumed all the preparations for retreat, and despatched the following to the Marquis de la Romana.

Astorga, 30th Nov. 1808.

I feel great concern in acquainting your Excellency that at a late hour last night I received a despatch from Sir John Moore, announcing the defeat of General Castaños' army, and directing me immediately to fall back, for the purpose of joining him, either by sea or by the way of Portugal ; it being impossible, under existing circumstances, to effect our junction by the road through Benevente and Zamora.

I lose no time in apprising your Excellency, that in consequence of these orders I am preparing to move the infantry to the rear ; the cavalry I propose leaving at Astorga a few days longer.

As I have reason to believe that the Spanish troops are in great want of shoes, blankets, canteens, and havresacks, I beg to acquaint you, that I shall be able to spare you a quantity of each kind (which were intended for Sir John Moore's division), and to request you will appoint proper persons to receive them, at Villa Franca and Lugo," &c.

At this period it was thought prudent to prepare an address to the inhabitants of Leon and Galicia, which was accordingly written, translated into the Spanish language, and printed. It is subjoined.—

The unfortunate events which have recently occurred in Biscay and on the Ebro, and the consequent movements of the enemy, having rendered it indispensably necessary that His Britannic Majesty's forces in Spain should unite and concentrate, for the purpose of being enabled to afford effectual support and succour to the Spanish people in the glorious efforts they are making in defence of their independence: Lieut.-General Sir David Baird, commanding the division in Leon and Galicia, announces to the loyal inhabitants of their kingdom, that he has received orders from Sir John Moore, Commander-in-chief of the British armies in Spain, to lose no time in proceeding to join him by way of Portugal.

The object of this movement is in no way connected with any intention of withdrawing from Spain or abandoning its cause, so dear to Great Britain, but solely with a view of assembling the British army for the purpose of acting upon some point where its services may be more required and more useful.

The kingdom of Galicia, strong from the nature of the country, will require no force to defend it beyond its own brave army, now assembling at Leon under the Marquis de la Romana; and the presence of an additional number of troops in its passes and on its mountains, would but tend to exhaust its resources without adding to its security.

To the inhabitants of these kingdoms the warmest acknowledgments of the British army are due, for the friendly reception it has met with; and the Lieutenant-General trusts that the same sentiments of attachment and regard which now exist will continue to animate the two nations towards each other for ages to come.

In quitting, probably for a short time, this part of the Peninsula, the Lieutenant-General feels it his duty to call upon the inhabitants of these districts, by their loyalty to their king, their affection for their families, and by every

tie they may venerate or hold dear, to rise in defence of their religion and their country ! Without the most vigorous efforts on the part of the people and the government, the cause of Spain is in danger ; if these are made, it cannot, with the assistance of Divine Providence, fail of being successful.

However well calculated this address might have been to soothe the apprehensions and quiet the alarm of the Spanish people in general, the Marquis de la Romana was most sensibly affected by the announcement of General Moore's determination, and of Sir David Baird's consequent preparations for retiring from Astorga. He wrote to Sir David, entreating, almost imploring him, to delay his retrograde movement, and expressing his conviction of the ruinous consequences to the Spanish cause, of withdrawing the British troops from Astorga.

To this appeal from the Marquis Sir David made the following reply :

Astorga, 3rd Dec. 1808.

I have this instant had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of yesterday, and although, in obedience to my orders, I had commenced the retreat of my division on Villa Franca, yet, in consequence of your Excellency's opinion that the continuance of a British force at Astorga is essential to afford security to the Spanish army assembling at Leon, and to enable it to retire upon Galicia in safety, I am induced to halt the troops in their present positions, and to direct the cavalry to remain at Astorga for a few days, by which I shall afford time and opportunity to Sir John Moore to send me any fresh instructions he may wish, in case he should have any such intention.

I have the honour, &c.

Colonel Sorell, in his "Notes,"* in referring to the above letter, says—

"The above extracts will prove that Colonel Napier mistakes in supposing that Sir David Baird had fallen back on Villa Franca without instructions to do so from Sir John Moore. Sir David Baird received the order to retreat on the 29th of November; on the 3rd December he was still at Astorga with all the cavalry, and the greater part of the infantry. The cavalry, indeed, never retrograded, but proceeded a few days afterwards, under Lord Paget, to join Sir John Moore.

"It may be asked why, if the cavalry could join Sir John Moore from Astorga, the whole force there might not have done the same? Experience has proved that this was practicable; but it was doubted at the time. Cavalry could move with much greater security through an open country than infantry, and they might make longer marches. Perhaps, also, Sir John Moore, having determined to retreat on Portugal, did not wish to be embarrassed by any additional infantry; and certainly it was important not to uncover the road from Astorga to Coruña, which would have risked the loss of the depôts and stores of the army on that line."

On the 2nd of December Sir David Baird received the following letter from Sir John Moore :

Salamanca, 2nd Dec.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

I have received both your notes of the 29th and 30th, acknowledging the receipt of my letter to you of the 28th.

My junction with General Hope is now pretty secure. The enemy are wholly occupied with Castaños and Madrid, and I have every reason to believe that at this moment

* "Notes on the Campaign," pp. 30, 31.

they have no infantry in front of Burgos, and no great body of cavalry in Castille, I should not think above a couple of thousand, and these much separated.

As you have transports but for one regiment of cavalry, and you will perhaps be under the necessity of marching the other two through Portugal, I should be glad if you would send one to me. I do not think it will run the smallest risk at this moment on the route of Benevente to Zamora.

I say this upon the supposition that you have not sent them all already back towards Coruña, in which case I should not wish one to be brought back ; but if one of the regiments is still at Astorga, and your intelligence, like mine, assures you that it can be done without risk, I should wish to have it here. Both at Zamora and Benevente, forage may be procured by sending on a day before, and the intermediate stages one day's forage can be carried.

You will let me hear your decision on this subject by courier, and apprise me of the march and arrival at Zamora, when orders shall be sent for the further proceedings of the officer commanding.

When you leave Coruña, General Broderick should be left there with a small garrison, for the sake of communication, as long as it is left open ; but he must have the means left with him to embark, should such measure become necessary.

Buonaparte is at Burgos, probably waiting the arrival of reinforcements, to move forward in this direction. Whether my junction with you could have been accomplished or not, I know not. It would have been attended with the risk of the destruction of the whole, and if accomplished, would have left us to contend single-handed with the whole French army, for the Spaniards are dispersed, and until the present Government is changed, and men of more ability are brought forward, there is little chance of their

being able to force anything to join us, or to resist France. If they *are* able, we shall see, and shall be able to go to their assistance. I am satisfied with the decision I have made; how it will be viewed by others, or approved in England, God knows.

I remain, faithfully,

JOHN MOORE.

On the 4th of December Sir David Baird proceeded from Astorga to Villa Franca, and established his head-quarters in the castle of that place, as a central point whence he might be able to direct and regulate the retrograde movement upon Coruña. In this old chateau, built by the celebrated Duke of Alba, he remained several days, fully occupied in giving orders for a movement which required every caution in the arrangement of its details.

Independent of the troops on the march, and of the guns and artillery, and commissariat waggons, brought from England, every cart, horse, or mule, which could be hired or purchased in the country, was in motion with stores and provisions towards the interior. All was moving on one single line of road carried over tremendous mountains and through formidable defiles, and affording little shelter to men or cattle in the midst of winter. It had suddenly become necessary to give a directly opposite direction to this mighty mass, and it will easily be conceived that much care and skill were requisite to prevent it, in flowing back, from mixing and falling into inextricable disorder.

It was on the day of Sir David Baird's arrival at

Villa Franca that Lord Londonderry (then the Hon. Major-General Stewart) reached Salamanca ; and the description given by his Lordship in his narrative,* of his interview with Sir John, entirely confirms the state of his mind and feelings exemplified in the various letters we have already submitted to the reader.

“ He spoke,” says Lord Londonderry, “ warmly in condemnation of the Spanish Government, and of the nation generally, and enlarged upon the absence of all right understanding among the generals, as well as upon the absurdity of their military movements, which had subjected them all to be beaten in detail. He expressed his sincere regret that they had not marched as they ought to have done when he first began to enter the country, so as to unite themselves with him ; and declared, that with a force as yet uncollected, and having nothing but the remains of a defeated corps on his flanks, a choice of evils alone remained for him. The determination to which he had come was not formed without extreme pain to himself, but the duty of preserving his army, situated as it now was, presented to his mind a consideration paramount to every other, and he was therefore resolved to retreat.

“ Though I could not but deeply feel at such a declaration, I deemed it a respectful duty to say little in reply, further than expressing my regret that so strong a necessity for the measure should exist, and my apprehensions of its consequences to the cause. The slightest indication of a retrograde movement at such a moment as this would, I feared, produce fatal effects, for Spain would fall, Portu-

* “ Narrative of the War in Spain and Portugal, by Charles Marquis of Londonderry,” p. 179.

gal would fall, and the whole of Europe be once more at the feet of the enemy.*

“Then what would become of Madrid, whose inhabitants were enduring the severest privations, chiefly with the hope of receiving aid from us; and of Castaños, and Palafox, and Blake, all of whom, in the same explicit understanding, were labouring to reassemble their scattered troops. ‘No doubt,’ I added, ‘the General’s information was more likely to be correct than mine, but I dreaded the heavy disappointment which his proposed step would occasion the people of England, whose very hearts seemed set upon the success of his undertaking, and whose mortification at his failure would be bitter in proportion to the degree of hope with which they saw him embark upon it.’ I then retired, with the painful conviction on my mind that the army would begin its backward journey in the course of a day or two at the farthest.”

“The feelings of regret under which I laboured were not, I soon found, confined to my own breast; even the General’s personal staff sought not to conceal the chagrin at the adoption of a system which seemed so unsatisfactory. General Hope having by this time joined, there were at Salamanca and in the neighbourhood full twenty thousand British troops, in a state, both from their equipment and discipline, to oppose any French force of almost double the number. General Baird, with a strong reinforcement, particularly in cavalry, was at Astorga, nor were there any impediments whatever in his way, which should hinder him from arriving within six days at the farthest. But if it should be deemed unsafe to wait so long here, why not

* That Sir David Baird’s opinion coincided with that of Lord Londonderry on this point, the address to the people of Leon and Galicia, which he caused to be circulated, and which we have already given, is a strong and striking proof.

move towards him, and concentrate the division behind the Douro, whence offensive operations might be undertaken?

“Anything, in short, was preferable to a retreat, which, independently of the disgrace which it must bring upon the British arms, must expose Madrid to destruction, and cause the certain annihilation of Palafox’ and Castaños’ armies. Seldom did men, situated as we were, venture to speak out so boldly against the measures of their chief; but murmurings and remonstrances were vain—the die was cast, and it could not be recalled.

In addition to the expressions of dissatisfaction, which could not fail to reach, as no pains were taken to prevent it, the ears of the General, he received a letter from Mr. Frere, our minister at Madrid, in reply to one communicating his intention of retreating, in which that gentleman protested strongly against the measure, as being deeply deprecated by the Spanish Government, and pressed upon him, in the most energetic terms, the expediency of advancing as rapidly as possible upon Madrid.

Mr. Frere in that letter says—

“Of the zeal and energy of the people I have no doubt. The Governments are new, and have hitherto been too numerous to be very active; but I trust that this inconvenience will soon be remedied. They are resolute, and I believe every man of them determined to perish with the country. They will not at least set the example which the ruling powers and higher orders of other countries have exhibited of weakness and timidity.”

Mr. Frere, however, offered another alternative to Sir John Moore’s choice, in the supposition that he should still feel it rash and hazardous to proceed

towards Madrid; and that was, to take up a position in the strong country near Astorga; "because," says Mr. Frere, "a retreat from Astorga to Coruña would be less difficult than through Portugal and Lisbon, and he ought in that position to wait for the reinforcements of cavalry from England, which would enable the army to act in the flat country, which opens immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and Old Castile. The representation of Mr. Frere, however, did not shake the determination of Sir John Moore, and by the 7th of December the whole of Sir David Baird's division, with the exception of the three regiments of cavalry, which he had sent to Sir John Moore, was fairly on its road to Coruña.

CHAPTER IX.

COMMUNICATION WITH DON THOMAS MORLA—COLONEL CHARMILLY—
DISMISSAL—MR. FRERE'S LETTERS—SIR DAVID BAIRD'S OPINION—
LORD LONDONDERRY'S VIEW OF THE CASE—CONTINUATION OF SIR
JOHN MOORE'S CORRESPONDENCE—COLONEL SORELL'S NOTES—SIR
WALTER SCOTT'S LIFE OF NAPOLEON—COLONEL SYMES VISITS THE
MARQUIS DE LA ROMANA—HIS REPORT—CHANGE OF AFFAIRS.

ON the 5th of December Sir John Moore received a letter, written jointly by Don Thomas Morla, who had been Governor of Cadiz, and was at the moment head of the Junta, and possessing great influence at Madrid; and the Prince of Castelfranco, informing him that about twenty-five thousand troops belonging to the army of Castanos, were falling back on Madrid; that ten thousand from the Somosierra were likewise concentrating; and that nearly forty thousand other troops were prepared to join in the defence of the capital. With these forces Sir John Moore was strongly invited to unite his army, or else to take such a direction as would enable him to fall on the rear of the French. "The Junta," concluded the letter, "cannot doubt that the rapidity

of your Excellency's movements will be such as the interests of both countries require.*

“ Before Sir John Moore had made any decision upon the contents of this letter, Colonel Charmilly, a French emigrant in the British service, arrived with despatches from Mr. Frere. On the 1st of December, Charmilly had been in Madrid; he had witnessed the strongest and most unequivocal demonstrations of ardour among all classes of the people. The whole mass of the population was rising in arms; the streets were broken up, the houses were barricadoed, and peasants from all quarters were flocking into the city to bear a part in the defence. The Duke del Infantado had commissioned him to make known this state of things to the British General, and to entreat him to make some movement that might operate as a diversion for the capital, which its defenders had determined to hold out to the last extremity.”†

It seems that Mr. Frere, who had proceeded with the Junta to Talavera, had given Colonel Charmilly two letters, addressed to Sir John Moore; one of which he was to deliver on his arrival, strongly urging him not to persist in his intention of retreating. The second was to be delivered only in case Sir John appeared resolved on maintaining his present determination.

Mr. Frere's first letter was extremely energetic, and it appeared to many officers on the spot, fully competent to form an opinion upon the subject, that

* “ Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns,” vol. ii. † Ibid.

the tone and style assumed by that gentleman, in urging points of a purely military character upon Sir John Moore, upon whom alone all the responsibility connected with the safety and honour of the army rested, were not exactly suitable to his official situation. Mr. Frere when pressing Sir John not to retreat, at a time when the retreat had actually been ordered, says, "I have no hesitation in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach to this advice, as I consider the state of Spain to depend absolutely for the present on the resolution you may adopt. I say *for the present*, for such is the spirit and character of the country, that even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of ultimate success."

Upon the pertinacious adherence of Mr. Frere to the point of diverting Sir John Moore from his intentions of retreating, Lord Londonderry, however, expresses himself in very different terms from those employed by the officers more particularly attached to Sir John Moore.

"Mr. Frere," says his Lordship, "was doubtless fully justified in writing in this strain. As minister from the Court of England, he was perfectly authorized to give advice respecting the course to be pursued by the English general, even if that officer had abstained from requesting it; but Sir John Moore having repeatedly solicited his opinion as to the prudence or imprudence of schemes in agitation, his right to speak, or write strongly, became increased fourfold."

"Mr. Frere, however, in my humble judgment, erred in desiring that Colonel Charmilly should be examined before

a council of war, prior to any movement being made. Respecting Colonel Charnilly's trust-worthiness, I beg to be understood as offering no opinion. He might have been a very good and a very prudent man, or he might have been the reverse; but in either case, it would have been not only insulting to the Commander of the forces to have the judgment of an unofficial emigrant set up in opposition to his own, but the consequences might have been every way ruinous. Sir John Moore dismissed that person with marks of dissatisfaction, and I think I should have done the same.*

"In spite of all this, however, and in spite of the excessive timidity of the Supreme Junta, which on the first alarm of danger, had fled to Badajos, at the very extremity of the kingdom, only one opinion can I conceive be formed as to the soundness of the views taken by Mr. Frere on the present occasion."†

We have reason to know, that Sir David Baird himself was of opinion that Mr. Frere's conduct about Colonel Charnilly was not perfectly justifiable, neither did he approve of the tone of his letters to Sir John Moore. Sir John's resolution, however, was at

* It seems that the second letter which Charnilly delivered to Sir John was couched in these terms:—"Sir—In the event, which I did not wish to presuppose, of your continuing the determination already announced to me, with the army under your command, I have to request that Colonel Charnilly, who is the bearer of this, and whose intelligence has been already referred to, may be examined before a council of war.

"I have the honour, &c.

J. H. FRERE."

—This letter very naturally irritated Sir John Moore. He ordered Colonel Charnilly out of his presence, and the next day directed him peremptorily to quit Salamanca, which he did.

† Lord Londonderry's Narrative. pp. 184-5.

all events shaken by the combination of intelligence which had reached him. Whatever doubt he might have had with respect to Morla, who appears to have been but of very equivocal respectability, and the representations he made of the state of popular feeling, he felt convinced that our own minister would not have suffered himself to be led away by exaggerated rumours or treacherous misrepresentations, and accordingly, on the evening of the 5th he addressed the following letter to Sir David Baird :

Salamanca, 5th Dec. 1808.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

The city of Madrid has taken up arms, has refused to capitulate to the French. The people are barricading the streets, and say, they are determined to suffer every thing rather than submit. This arrests the French ; and people who are sanguine entertain great hopes from it. For myself, I fear this spirit has arisen too late, and that the French are now too strong to be resisted in this manner. There is, however, no saying, and I feel myself the more obliged to give it a trial, that Mr. Frere has made a formal representation, which I received this evening. I must beg, therefore, that you will suspend your march until you hear from me again, and make arrangements for your return to Astorga, should it be necessary.

All this appears very strange and unsteady ; but if the spirit of enthusiasm does arise in Spain, there is no saying in that case what our forces may do. I hope in the mean time the cavalry is coming to me which I asked you for.

Believe me, very faithfully,

Sir David Baird.

JOHN MOORE.*

* It should be here mentioned, that the anger which Sir John Moore felt at the affront offered him by Mr. Frere, in sending Colonel Charmilly to be examined before a council of

As soon as Sir John Moore had despatched this letter, he sent off Colonel Graham to Madrid, for the purpose of personally ascertaining and reporting upon the actual state of affairs in that city.

Colonel Graham had only arrived at Salamanca a few days before, bringing intelligence of the defeat of St. Juan's army, and the forcing of the Somosierra Pass by a corps of Polish lancers. In consequence of this misfortune, Colonel Graham, on his return, had to take a circuitous route, in order to avoid the enemy, a circumstance which could not fail to be extremely disagreeable to the English army, inasmuch as they believed their future movements very much to depend upon the report which the Colonel might bring back.

"In these uncertain measures," says Lord Londonderry, "and still more in the general tenor of his conversation, it was easy to perceive marks of the gloom which at this time overshadowed the mind of General Moore. That he was an officer of great distinction, every one acknowledged during his life, and posterity will never deny it; but it was too manifest that a fear of responsibility, a dread of

war, never induced him to forego the respect he owed to the representative of his Sovereign. In reply to Mr. Frere's letters, Sir John said, "I shall abstain from any remark on the two letters delivered to me last night and this morning by Colonel Charmilly. I certainly did feel and express much indignation at a person like him, being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me. These feelings are at an end, and I dare say will never be excited towards you again. If M. Charmilly is your friend, it was perhaps natural for you to employ him, but I have prejudices against all that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him."

doing that which was wrong, of running himself and his troops into difficulties from which they might not be able to extricate themselves, were a great deal too active to permit either his talents or his judgment properly to exert their influence. Sir John Moore had earned the highest reputation as a general of division. He was aware of this, and perhaps felt no inclination to risk it ; at all events, he was clearly incapable of dispersing partial obstacles in the pursuit of some great ultimate advantage. Of this, no more convincing proof need be given than the fact, that even at the moment when preparations for an advance were going on, his whole heart and soul seemed turned towards the Portuguese frontier.

“ Did any one talk to him of the possibility of gaining Valladolid : and then, in case of the worst, of retiring into the northern provinces, and acting on the defensive, he would answer by a declaration, that in the north there were no supplies ; and that it was a country in every point of view most unfavourable for military evolution. Perhaps this might be true. The northern provinces are certainly barren enough, and we should doubtless have been met by a variety of inconveniences, had we made them the theatre of our operations ; but with the sea open to us, what had we to apprehend ? Besides, even upon the supposition that our first and greatest object was to defend Portugal, it was by no means certain that we might not cover it as effectually by taking up positions in the heart of Spain, as by falling back at once upon the frontier. Unless the French possessed a disposable force much greater than we had reason to believe they did, it was extremely improbable that they would venture to pass us by ; whereas, were we to retire, they would of course pursue, and thus the whole of the Peninsula would be overrun.*

* The highly-talented author of “ *Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns*,” speaking of Sir John Moore at this period says :—

"But though," continues his Lordship, "our leader seemed in no way disposed to embark upon any hazardous undertaking, he showed himself well inclined, in the event of a favourable communication from Colonel Graham, to attempt something. Of the motions and strength of the enemy, no tidings had of late been received; but our own force was in the highest spirits, and the best possible order. The hospitals were almost entirely tenantless, and the regiments of infantry were complete, not only in numbers, but in their equipments and clothing, and everything necessary for taking the field. The cavalry again were in admirable case, whilst of the artillery it is necessary to say no more than it never presented a more imposing appearance. How sincerely did all regret that the unhappy delay occasioned by Baird's retrogression, should have kept such an army idle, even for a single day." *

We must here beg to call the reader's attention, not only to the last paragraph of the quotation from

"In truth, the minds of Mr. Frere and Sir John Moore were of different mould and consistency. The one, ardent and enthusiastic, was disposed to rely with too facile a credence on the energy and devotion of the assertors of a noble cause. The other, too strongly disgusted perhaps with repeated proofs of ignorance and imbecility in the Spanish leaders, regarded the scene around him with the eye of a General. He felt little disposed to anticipate a fortunate issue to the resistance which popular enthusiasm might oppose to military skill, and highly disciplined troops. They beheld," says this eloquent writer, "the same events through different *media*. In the picture of the one, the sun was mounting in the horizon, and the landscape was bathed in a flood of prospective radiance; in that of the other, the last rays of departing light had faded from the sky, and the face of nature lay hid in darkness." Vol. ii. 25, 26.

* Lord Londonderry's Narrative, pp. 187, 188.

Lord Londonderry's work; but, as it appears a fitting opportunity for doing so, to an observation contained in the *Life of Napoleon*, by Sir Walter Scott.

Lord Londonderry speaks of "Baird's retrogression," as if the retreat, or the intention of retreating, had originated with him. The letter of General Moore, already given, dated December the 2nd, will sufficiently prove that Sir David Baird merely acted under the orders which that letter contains. So far as we are concerned, we think it our duty to refer to his lordship's narrative, in order to clear up a passage, which certainly admits of misconstruction.

With respect to the passage in Sir Walter's Scott's *Life of Napoleon*, we have only to call the attention of the reader to an extract from a letter written to Sir Walter by Colonel Sorell, and who subsequently published, with the same laudable view of correcting a mistake injurious to the fame and reputation of Sir David Baird, "*Notes on the Campaign of 1808-9*," from which we have already made several extracts.

At page 286 of the *Life of Napoleon*, this passage occurs.

"Yet he (Sir John Moore) finally ordered Sir David Baird, whose retreat upon Coruña *was already commenced, again to occupy Astorga*. It might," says Colonel Sorell, "naturally be inferred from this passage, that Sir David Baird had commenced his retreat on his own authority, and without instructions from his superior in command. This was not the case. Sir John Moore, immediately after

the dispersion of the Spanish armies, ordered Sir David Baird to retire forthwith to Coruña: to send back all the stores which had been brought forward for the use of the army when united, and to embark and proceed by sea to join him at Lisbon: himself at the same time intending to retire on Portugal.

“The retreat was commenced accordingly, and to reconcile the minds of the population to this retrograde movement, an address to the Spanish people was published, containing assurances, that it was in no way connected with an intention of abandoning the cause, but solely for the purpose of concentrating the British forces on a point where their services might be more generally useful. Sir David Baird's head quarters had reached Villa Franca on the road to Coruña, when he received orders first to suspend his march, and afterwards to retrace his steps to Astorga, preparatory to a junction of the two divisions, with a view to the movement in advance, which afterwards took place.”

To the letter containing this correction, and the correction of another error (which we shall presently have to notice) Sir Walter Scott made no reply, nor did he even acknowledge it.

But to return from our digression to the narrative of passing events. Sir John Moore having on the evening of the 5th of December directed Sir David Baird to stop his retrograde movement, and hold himself in readiness to retrace his steps again to Astorga, despatched the following letter to Sir David in the course of the 6th.

Salamanca, December 5th, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

I wrote to you last night to suspend your retrograde movement. I now write to you to beg that you will put

to the right about, and return bag and baggage to Astorga. The people of Madrid, it is said, are enthusiastic and desperate, and certainly at this moment do resist the French. The good which may result from this it is impossible to say; I can neither trust to it, nor can I altogether despise it. If the flame catches elsewhere, and becomes at all general, the best results may be expected. If confined to Madrid, that town will be sacrificed, and all be as bad or worse than ever; in short, what is passing at Madrid may be decisive of the fate of Spain, and we must be at hand to aid and to take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country, and our duty, demand this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended.

I mean to proceed bridle in hand, for if the bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it. Let your preparations (as far as provisions, &c. go) continue for a retreat, in case that it should again become necessary; establish one magazine at Villa Franca, and one or two farther back, to which let salt meat, biscuit, rum or wine, forage, &c. be brought up from Corufia. Send to me to Zamora two regiments of cavalry and one brigade of horse artillery, keeping one regiment of cavalry, and one brigade of horse artillery with yourself, and send on your corps by brigades to Benevente. The enemy have nothing at present in that direction, we must take advantage of it by working double tides, to make up for lost time.

By means of the cavalry patrols, you will discover every movement immediately near you, and I take for granted you have got other channels of information, and both you and me, although we may look big and determined to get everything forward, yet we must never lose sight of this, that at any moment affairs may take that turn which will render it necessary to retreat.

I shall write by this opportunity to the Marquis of Romana, and it would be satisfactory if you kept an officer

constantly with, or sent one occasionally to him, to judge his force and its state of preparation for service, to let us know how far we can depend upon it in action.

I remain, my dear Sir David, yours faithfully,

JOHN MOORE.

To Sir David Baird,

&c. &c. &c.

On the receipt of Sir John Moore's letter of the 5th, Sir David Baird of course made every arrangement for checking the retreat, and early on the morning of the 8th, he wrote the following letter to Sir John :

Villa Franca, December 8th, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

At a late hour last night I received your letter of the 5th instant. In compliance with your desire, immediate orders were sent off to halt the regiments in the different positions they occupied, and to suspend any farther preparation for re-embarkation. One brigade had reached within a day's march of St. Jago on the road to Vigo.

I trust long ere this letter reaches you, that you will have been joined by Lord Paget and the cavalry. I was induced to send the three regiments for the reasons I have already stated in two former letters.

It has frequently occurred to me that, in the event of our being obliged to adopt defensive measures, it might be more advantageous for the combined British army to cover Galicia and part of Leon, than, by my proceeding to join you at Salamanca, to abandon the defence of these provinces. The Asturias might be occupied by the troops of the Marquess de la Romana, and if you judged it proper, by a flank movement, to join us in the neighbourhood of Astorga, I entertain a confident belief that, by occupying the strong ground behind it, we should be able to cover

the country in our rear, and might wait until it is seen what efforts the Spanish nation is disposed and determined to make in defence of the national independence. The royal road from Coruña to this place and Astorga is remarkably good, although mountainous; and, with the sea open to us, we should be able to receive with facility such reinforcements and supplies as the British government might deem it proper to send. I do not think much difficulty would be experienced for a few months, from a want of provisions. The country abounds with cattle; bread, indeed, would be required; but flour might be obtained from England; and, in the mean time, Galicia would have an opportunity of arming under our protection; and our presence in Spain would furnish a rallying point, and act as a stimulus to the Spaniards.

I merely submit these points, my dear Sir John, to your consideration. I had before written a letter upon the subject to you, which I did not send, in consequence of receiving accounts of Castaños' defeat, at the moment I was about to despatch it.

Believe me, dear Sir John, yours faithfully,

D. BAIRD.*

Lieutenant General Sir John Moore.

In this place it becomes our duty to refer to the second correction by Colonel Sorell, of the second error made by Sir Walter Scott; and we shall have

* No copy appears to have been kept of the letter here mentioned by Sir David, but there is good reason to believe it contained a very minute and elaborate detail of Sir David's views and opinions upon the subject; indeed, the copy of the letter here published seems rather to consist of detached notes of the one sent to Sir John, which from what subsequently appears was more detailed, and at greater length.

recourse to the same mode of detail as that which we before adopted, namely, giving the passage *verbatim* as addressed by the Colonel to Sir Walter.

“ But,” says Colonel Sorell, “ in continuation from that part of his letter at which we before broke off, “ it is more particularly of your account of the subsequent retreat through Galicia, that I find reason to complain. So far from being ignorant of the strength or inattentive to the resources of that country, Sir David Baird wrote to Sir John Moore from Villa Franca (when the latter, intending to commence his retreat from Salamanca on Lisbon, had expressed his conviction that Spain once lost, Portugal could not be defended), to propose that he should make a flank movement to his left, and uniting the entire British force on the frontiers of Galicia, cover that province, supported by the remains of the army of Romana, strengthened by such reinforcements as might be organized in our rear.

“ The probable advantages of such a measure were fully pointed out. It was observed, that Galicia contained nearly one seventh part of the entire population of Spain, and consequently was capable of furnishing numerous recruits to the patriotic cause ; that from the strength of the country there could be little doubt of our ability to defend it ; that it would afford a sufficient supply of cattle to ensure our subsistence, and that by occupying a position on the confines of Leon, we should threaten the right flank of the French line of operation from the Bidassoa to Madrid, which must act as a favourable diversion, if it did not paralyze the exertions of the enemy in the southern provinces, whilst the port of Coruña being open in our rear, would enable the British government to reinforce or withdraw us, as it might seem most expedient, when it became fully acquainted with the real condition of Spain.

“ I need not add that this proposal was not acted upon, but the disorders which afterwards took place in traversing this country, most certainly did not arise from ignorance of its character to defensive purposes ; but principally from the unexampled rapidity of the retreat which exhausted the physical strength of the men, and prevented all possibility of keeping them with their colours. Neither had there been any want of attention to the formation of *depôts* on the road, but our means of conveyance were extremely limited, and the effects of this difficulty were greatly aggravated by the first order to retreat from Astorga ; in consequence of which, everything which was being brought forward on the line from Corufia to that place, was put in motion again towards the rear, to be re-embarked for Lisbon ; still a considerable magazine of forage and provisions existed at Villa Franca, which might have afforded a sufficient supply to the troops, had it been practicable to make a regular distribution ; but as at Smolensko and Wilna, in Bucnaparte’s retreat from Moscow, as well as on many other similar occasions, more was wasted than usefully applied.

“ A desire,” continues Colonel Sorell, “ to speak with impartiality of the conduct of every individual noticed in the work—even when that individual has been the enemy of Britain—is so apparent throughout the ‘ Life of Napoleon Buonaparte,’ that I feel confident of the interest you will take in these explanations to extend the same principle of justice towards one of the best and bravest soldiers our country had the good fortune to possess in the days of trial and difficulty.”

Having now done justice to the knowledge and foresight of Sir David Baird, with respect to the province of Galicia, and to the honourable zeal of

Colonel Sorell, exhibited in the General's vindication, we resume our narrative.

On the 8th, Sir John Moore wrote to Sir David as follows:—

Salamanca, December 8th, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

Madrid still holds out, and I have some reason to believe that some efforts are making to collect a force at Toledo, and a still larger one on the other side of the Sierra Morena. As long as there is a chance we must not abandon this country. The conduct of Madrid has given us a little time, and we must endeavour to profit by it. My first object must be to unite with you, and then connect myself with the Marquess Romana.

I shall move a corps from this on the 10th to Zamora and Toro, to which last place I shall move head quarters. I should wish you to push on your people by brigades to Benevente.

Here follow some private communications to Sir David, which it is not necessary to quote. Sir John then proceeds.

In the mean time I am anxious to know the real strength and condition of the troops La Romana and Blake are assembling, and I will thank you to send an intelligent officer to Leon to see them, who is capable of judging without allowing himself to be humbugged.

You will of course order whatever troops arrive at Corufia to be immediately landed, and sent forward. I have sent Colonel Graham (90th regiment) to Madrid, and expect to hear from him this evening.

I remain, my dear Sir David, yours faithfully,

JOHN MOORE.

Sir David Baird.

In consequence of the directions contained in this letter, Sir David Baird despatched Colonel Symes to Leon, in order to ascertain, by personal inspection, the real state of the forces the Marquess de la Romana had at his disposal. Colonel Symes reached Leon in the evening of the 13th, and his report will be found under date the 14th in a subsequent page.

On the 10th of December Sir John Moore wrote to Sir David as follows:—

Salamanca, December 10th, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

Lord Paget, with the cavalry, is at Toro. His brother, the Lieutenant-General, with the reserve, marches to-morrow, and will be with it, with Beresford's brigade, on the 12th.

I shall also move Hope's and Fraser's divisions on the 11th and 12th, on the roads to Tordesillas and Valladolid, and should wish, with the whole of mine in this quarter, to proceed to the latter place, if you, with any considerable portion of yours, will be ready to join me there. You may send on yours by brigades to Benevente with safety, and from thence to Valladolid. Your march either by one or two brigades could be concerted with ours, so as to make it perfectly secure.

I am impatient to hear from you, to judge when to expect you at Benevente. Bring on a proportion of ammunition both for guns and musquets to Benevente.

I have written twice lately to the Marquess de la Romana, but have received no answer. Will you have the goodness to let him know my intention to move, in order to put myself in conjunction with him, and to concert what can best be done for the general good? As we shall occupy Zamora and Toro, he had better not interfere with us on that line.

Madrid has capitulated, but the people say that the Duke of Castlefranca and Don Morla have betrayed them, and they refuse to part with their arms. The French have the gates, the Retiro, and the Prado. Madrid thus continues to occupy a part of the French army. Saragossa still holds out, and they say they are endeavouring to collect forces in the south. They all cannot be directed against us, and we must try our hands."

On the 12th Sir David received the subjoined from Sir John, who was still at Salamanca.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

I have received both your letters of the 8th, in answer to mine of the 5th and 6th.

Lord Paget is at Toro, to which place I have sent the reserve to General Beresford's brigade. The rest of the troops from this are moving to the Duero. My quarters to-morrow will be at Alaejos—Hope's at Torrecillo—Frazer will be with me with his divisions on the 14th; on which day Lord Paget, with the cavalry and infantry from Toro, will move along the Ducro towards us, so as to enable the whole to reach Tordesillas and its neighbourhood by the 15th, and Valladolid the 16th.

I have no answer from the Marquess de la Romana, to whom I wrote upon the 6th, and with whom it is my wish to form a junction, and to co-operate; but although I am disappointed in not hearing from him, and must forego every assistance from him; and though your corps will not be up in time, yet I think it an object with the troops. I have to march to Valladolid, from whence, according to the information I receive, I may move on to Placencia and Burgos, and thus threaten the enemy's communications, and may cause a diversion in favour of Madrid or Saragossa, or any movement which may be in contemplation from the south of the Tagus.

I shall at all events cover you while assembling at Astorga and Benevente, and may bring you on to me, or fall back upon you, as occasion requires; and in the mean time I shall be just as safe as at Salamanca or Zamora.

I think I shall call in to me, Colonel Craufurd with his corps, either by Toro or Medina de Rio Seco, of which I shall give you notice from Alaejos.

I have attached a brigade of artillery to each division of the army; whatever is over, is considered as reserve. To each division also there is attached ten rounds of musket cartridge per man, carried in carts, and four mules with pack saddles for the purpose of bringing up the cartridges from the carts to the troops when wanted; besides which, I am forwarding musket ammunition, and ammunition for guns to Zamora.

I think if you bring on with the troops two brigades of artillery, besides the two of horse artillery, one of which is with Lord Paget, this will suffice. Leave the other two at Astorga, ready to come forward when called for.

I wish you would make the same arrangement for carrying with your brigades and divisions ten rounds a man, besides the sixty in the pouches. I shall enclose a letter from Colonel Harding, commanding the artillery, explanatory of everything else. I consider Benevente as a place to have certain stores advanced to, the rest you should divide between Astorga and Villa Franca: all the money should be brought up to Villa Franca; we shall want it.

I am much obliged to you for your opinion upon the Galicias and Vigo, and it is that which now I shall probably follow, should such a measure become necessary. I am therefore most anxious that magazines should be formed on that communication. I have written home to direct that all transports, &c. should call at Coruña, and go to Vigo, unless otherwise directed. Coruña must be

the place for all supplies from England; the communication through Portugal is difficult and tardy.

Forward the enclosed to the Marquess de la Romana as soon as possible, and send me any letters which may come from him without delay. An officer will remain in Salamanca to forward letters to me. Should you not prefer the direct road by Toro to Tordesillas, or Valladolid, you will not think it necessary to have more cavalry with you while I am in your front.

I shall enclose a letter for Lord Castlereagh, which I shall thank you to forward to Coruña.

Believe me, yours sincerely,

JOHN MOORE.

On the 14th of December Sir John Moore received the long-expected despatch from the Marquess de la Romana, expressing his satisfaction at the measure now taking by the English army, and announcing his determination to use every effort in his power to effect a junction with him. On the very day, however, upon which Sir John Moore received this warm and friendly declaration of the Marquess' feelings and intentions, Colonel Symes, who had, at Sir John Moore's desire, been despatched by Sir David Baird to Leon, to examine into the state of Romana's army, forwarded the following report to Sir David.

Leon, 14th Dec. 1808.

SIR,

I have the honour to acquaint you that I arrived at Leon yesterday evening; the difficulty of procuring post horses greatly retarded my journey. Between Membabre and Maugenal I met a brigade of Spanish artillery, viz. two howitzers and six field-pieces. They were proceeding

to Ponteferada, for what precise purpose I could not learn, possibly to defend the passes of the mountains.

At a league north of Astorga I came on another brigade of Spanish guns, drawn up on a rising ground. These guns had only three or four men to guard them, and no regular sentinel. I was told that the gunners and cattle were in the neighbouring villages. I examined the state of the guns and the ammunition as closely as I could without giving offence. They appeared very defective. The men said they came from Leon fifteen days ago, and knew not when or whither they were to proceed.

At Orbigo, four leagues from Leon, I found the place occupied by a numerous body of troops, I was told four thousand, under Major-General Don Tenaro Figador. There were five regiments; three of the line—El Rey, Majorca, and Hibernia, and two of militia, the Maldonado and another. The equipment and appearance of these troops were miserable. I had an opportunity of inspecting the arms of the general's guard, which were extremely defective. The springs of the locks do not often correspond; either the main-spring or the feather-spring too weak to produce certain fire from the hammer. I tried sixteen; of this number six only had bayonets, and these were short and bad; the ammunition pouches were not proof against rain. The clothing of the soldiers was motley, and some were half naked. They were in general stout, fine young men, without order or discipline, but not at all turbulent or ferocious, and nothing like intoxication was observable. Soon after I left Orbigo I met the regiment of Vittoria, on its march from Leon, destined, as I was told, for Ponteferada. The men were wretchedly clad and armed.

I got to Leon early in the evening, and waited on the Marquis Romana. He had not heard of the capitulation of Madrid; expressed himself vaguely on the subject of

moving; stated his forces at twenty-two thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; complained much of the want of officers; had intended to form his army into five divisions, but could not find officers to put at their head; he therefore meant to divide his army into wings, one under General Blake, and the other under himself; that his force was daily increasing, by the return of fugitives. He expressed hopes that we had light troops to oppose to those of the French, who were very expert; and added, that he was training six thousand of his men to that species of warfare.

There was a general review the next day, at which I expressed a desire to have the honour to attend his Excellency.

In the morning I waited on his Excellency, and pressed him, as far as I could with propriety, on the subject of joining Sir John Moore; to which he evaded giving any more than general assurances. He does not think that the forces of the enemy in the north exceeds 10,000 men in all, and that there is no danger to be apprehended of their penetrating into Asturias. He recommends to Sir John Moore to break down all the bridges between Toro and Aranda, four in number; that Zamora be fortified, and made a depôt, and that magazines be formed at Astorga and Villa Franca; again regretted his want of cavalry; expressed a wish to procure 2000 English firelocks, and shoes for his army. When I asked *him* for 100 draft mules for General Baird's army, he replied, it was impossible, he had not one to spare.

Whilst we were talking, a courier brought an account from Benevente of the repulse of the French at Madrid. It may be true, but it seems at present to stand in need of confirmation.

I attended the review. The troops were drawn up in three columns: each might perhaps consist of 2500 men.

The Marquis, on horseback, addressed each column separately. When that was over, the troops formed into line; the right wing was badly armed and worse clothed; the left was better, being chiefly provided with English firelocks, and a corps of 1000 men in uniform, who, I was informed, were light troops, might be called respectable.

The movement from column into line was very confusedly performed, and the officers were comparatively inferior to the men. There was only one brigade of artillery in the field, and I doubt whether there is more in Leon. The guns were drawn by mules. No ammunition-waggons were brought for inspection.

On the whole, from what I have been able to observe since I came here, and from the tenor of my conversations with the Marquis, I am disposed to doubt his inclination of moving in a forward direction to join Sir John Moore; I suspect he rather looks to secure his retreat into Galicia, unless the aspect of affairs alters materially for the better; and if he were to join Sir John, I doubt whether his aid would prove essentially useful.

My reasons for these conclusions are as follow:—If the Marquis meant to advance, why send his artillery and troops into the rear, and why, as he is assured of the time when Sir John Moore intends to be at Benevente, decline to fix any precise day to make movement? I do not know what communication he may have with you through Captain Doyle, or by letter to Sir John Moore, to whom he says he has written fully; but to me he has certainly given no cause whatever to suppose that he will move in concert with your army, or that of Sir John Moore. I hope I may be mistaken.

My motive for doubting whether the aid which he might bring would be of any importance, arises from a sense of the inefficient state of his arms, and the want of discipline in his men. It is morally impossible that they can stand

before a line of French infantry. A proportion of at least one third of the Spanish musquets will not explode, and a French soldier will load and fire his piece with precision three times before a Spaniard can fire his twice. Men, however brave, cannot stand against such odds.

As to charging with the bayonet, if their arms were fit for the purpose, the men, although individually as gallant as possible, have no collective confidence to carry them on, nor officers to lead them. They will therefore disperse, probably on the first fire, and can never be rallied, until they voluntarily return to their general's standard, as in the case of the Marquis Romana's present army, almost wholly composed of fugitives from the battles of the north.

A striking instance of this is given by the Marquis himself, who assured me that the Spaniards did not lose above 1000 men in their late actions with the French, a proof, not of the weakness of the French, but of the incapacity of the Spaniards to resist them. In fact, the French light troops decided the contest; the Spaniards fled before a desultory fire. They saved themselves, and now claim credit for having escaped.

By a repetition of such flights and re-assemblings the Spaniards may in the end become soldiers, and greatly harass the enemy, but as we cannot practise that mode of warfare, our allies are not calculated to be of use to us on the day of battle, when we must either conquer or be destroyed.

I do not mean to undervalue the spirit of patriotism of the Spaniards, which I highly respect, and which may in the end effect their deliverance, but they are not now, nor can they be for a long time, sufficiently improved in the art of war to be coadjutors with us in a general action. We must therefore *stand or fall through our own means*, for if we place any reliance on Spanish aid for success in the field, we shall, I fear, find ourselves egregiously deceived.

I think the Marquis Romana should immediately be called upon to say on what day he will march, and on what day and at what place he will join Sir John Moore.

I have thought it my duty, Sir, thus to enter at length into the subject, with a view to prevent hereafter any disappointment in a matter of such high importance.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

With the greatest respect,
Your most obliged faithful servant,
MICH. SYMES, *Lt.-Col.**

Lt.-Gen. Sir David Baird.

This letter, it must be confessed, was little calculated to increase the anxiety which Sir John Moore felt for a junction with the Marquess Romana. Events, however, speedily occurred which gave an entirely new turn to the course of proceedings.

* Lieutenant Colonel Symes very shortly after the date of this report, that is to say, immediately after the battle of Coruña, died on board the *Mary* transport, as he was returning to England. The causes of his death were the extraordinary exertions and fatigues he underwent during the campaign.

He was a gentleman whose civil and military qualities and accomplishments were equally conspicuous; and in all the private relations of life he was universally esteemed. He was twice Ambassador at the Court of Ava; and of his first mission there, the account he published obtained for him considerable literary reputation. His remains were interred in the church of St. Margaret, Rochester, and were attended to the grave by a long train of relations and friends, anxious to pay the last tribute to departed merit, virtue, and valour.

CHAPTER X.

FRESH INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED BY SIR JOHN MOORE.—CHANGE OF PLANS CONSEQUENT THEREUPON.—DESPATCHES FROM MR. FRERE.—SIR JOHN MOORE MOVES TO CASTRONOVO.—SIR DAVID BAIRD TO BENEVENTE.—AFFAIRS WITH THE ENEMY.—GALLANT CONDUCT OF ENGLISH CAVALRY.—FORWARD MOVEMENT DECIDED UPON.—ABANDONED.—RETREAT COMMENCED.

It now becomes our duty to explain the nature and character of the intelligence, which effected the sudden and total alteration of the pre-determined arrangements of Sir John Moore, immediately after his arrival at Alaejos on the 13th of December. The following letter from Sir John to Sir David Baird will best answer the purpose :

Head Quarters, Alaejos, 14th of December.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

I received last night your letters of the 10th and 11th instant. It was my intention to have moved to-morrow on Valladolid, but a letter from Buonaparte to Marshal Soult at Saldanha, which we have intercepted, (the officer who carried it having been murdered by the peasantry,) has induced me to change my direction, and shall be to-morrow, with all the troops I have, at Toro and its immediate neighbourhood. It appears that Marshal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie, has with him two divisions at Saldanha, besides one under the Duc d'Abrantes, which is collecting at Burgos, and another under the Duc de Treviso, which has received

orders to march on Saragossa, but which of course may be recalled. Madrid has submitted and is quiet, and the French from thence are marching upon Badajos. Their advanced guard was at Talavera la Reina on the 10th instant. My object is now to unite the army as soon as possible, you at Benevente, and I at Toro, from whence, either by a forward or flank movement, the two corps can be joined. I shall direct all my stores from Zamora to be forwarded to Benevente. The arrangement with respect to yours, which I communicated to you in my letter of the 12th, may go on, by which we shall have a certain portion at Benevente and the rest at Astorga and the rear. It appears from the intercepted letter, from deserters, and from prisoners we have taken, that the French are in complete ignorance of our present movements, and think we have retreated. As they will now know the truth, what change this may make in their march on Badajos, I know not, but Marshal Soult will certainly be checked in his intended operations, which were projected upon the supposition that he had nothing but Spaniards to oppose him. Every arrangement which I before directed with a view to enable us to live in the Galicias, should be strictly attended to, for though in the first instances, we may not have opposed to us more than we can face, it will be in the power of the enemy to increase their force far beyond our strength.

I have received a letter from the Marquess de la Romana, and I expect an officer from him every hour. Whatever I determine with him shall be communicated to you. In the mean time I shall thank you to let him know that I have changed my intention of going to Valladolid in consequence of information, and that I am collecting the army at Toro and Benevente.

Believe me, my dear Sir David,

Yours faithfully,

JOHN MOORE.

On the 16th of December, Sir David Baird arrived at Benevente, and on the same day, Sir John Moore reached Toro: from Toro on that day he addressed the following letter to Sir David.

Toro, 16th December 1808.

MY DEAR SIR DAVID,

Upon my arrival here yesterday, I received from the messenger your letter of the 12th. To-morrow I purpose to march to some villages, which I understand will hold all the corps, within two or three leagues of Benevente. I shall then be so near to you as to give perfect security to the assembling of your corps at that place. I shall also be able to have the pleasure of meeting you.

I cannot help again pressing you to take every measure for the forming of magazines at Astorga, Villa Franca, and on the road to Coruña, for though we may do something here, we must always look to a retreat on Galicia. For the present, while the army united is so near, I do not see that any corps of the enemy can attempt to disturb the passage of our stores by Astorga, or endeavour to place himself between us and the pass into Galicia. They have no corps at present at hand, that when united we should hesitate to attack.

I have not yet seen the officer from the Marquess de la Romana. If he goes to Zamora he must hear of my being here. Be so good as to inform the Marquess of my march to this place, and of my anxiety to see the officer he promised to send me.

The messenger who carries this, proceeds to England, and will take charge of any letters you wish to send. I have written to Lord Castlereagh to send every transport to Vigo, and to call at Coruña for orders. Be so good as to inform Broderick that all empty transports so sent are to

rendezvous at Vigo, and there wait ; and whatever troops arrive are to be disembarked, but the transports kept.

Believe me ever sincerely,

JOHN MOORE.

Head Quarters on the 17th will be at Castronuovo ; Frazer's division at St. Martin de Villardiga and Villardiga. The cantonment will be extended on the right, but when upon the spot it can be closed in next day.

The intercepted letter mentioned the other day, states, that small craft are ordered from France to St. Andero, to take to France from that place merchandize and guns. It will perhaps be right to give this notice to the Admiral at Coruña.

While Sir John Moore was at Toro, it appears that he received a despatch from Mr. Frere again, most earnestly remonstrating against the conduct he was pursuing ; but, of course, aware of the alteration which had so recently taken place in Sir John Moore's arrangements and plans, he urges upon him the vast responsibility which he incurs in adopting a measure, the immediate result of which must be the final, if not the immediate ruin of our ally, and the indelible disgrace of the country, with whose resources he was entrusted.

Mr. Frere adds :—

“ I am unwilling to enlarge on a subject on which my feelings must be stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence, which, with such an interest at stake, I should be unwilling to excite ; but thus much I must say, that if the British army had been sent for the express purpose of doing mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single

exception of not firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the measures now announced, or about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose."

In this letter, Mr. Frere enclosed one from the Supreme Junta addressed to himself, in which they express their decided hostility to the measure of retreat; at the same time assuring Mr. Frere, that if Sir John Moore would immediately engage the enemy, he would find that the enthusiasm of the Spanish people had not been at all diminished by the defeats of their armies, and promised that he should be immediately joined by 14,000 men from Romana's army.

As Sir John Moore had not himself seen that army, and had, therefore, not such an opportunity of judging of the benefits to be derived from so great an accession of its force, as Colonel Symes had, the proposition might have had some effect; but Mr. Frere's letter came too late. Sir John's plans were decided; and as may be seen through the whole of the correspondence which we have submitted to the reader, the subject of his constant contemplation was the probable necessity of retreat. With this apprehension strong upon his mind, it appears that at this period he declined the offer which was made him of the chief command of the Spanish armies.

The plan of operations which Sir John Moore communicated to Sir David Baird, in his letter of the 14th, from Alaejos, was, therefore, adhered to; and having ascertained that Marshal Soult occupied Saldanha and the line of the river Carrion, he deter-

mined, if possible, to make a dash at his detachment, in the hope of beating him before any other force could come to his support ; the head of the British columns were, therefore, directed on Sahagun and Mayorga. On the 18th, Sir John Moore moved on to Castronuovo. Sir David Baird's head-quarters on that day were at Benevente, forty miles distant. On the 19th, the march of the army was continued on Villalpando and Valderas ; and on the 20th of December the long-anticipated junction of the armies of Moore and Baird was effected at Mayorga.

At this time, the total effective amount of the combined armies is said to have been twenty-three thousand infantry, and two thousand five hundred cavalry : about one thousand seven hundred were on detachment, and four thousand in hospital.

It was while the head-quarters of the combined army were at Mayorga, that those brilliant skirmishes with the enemy occurred, which first decided the question of the superiority of English over French cavalry ; but although they were of the most gallant and heroic character, they were not calculated to produce any result adequate to the mischievous effect they produced, by injuring the efficiency of that most important arm. Amongst other disadvantages arising from the rapid and desultory nature of these enterprizes, was the consequent impossibility of attending to the shoeing of the horses, which suffered dreadfully in consequence of the inevitable carelessness upon that point, as well as from exposure to the inclemency of the seasons.

Lord Londonderry, then Major General Stewart, had distinguished himself in several gallant affairs of this nature previous to this period. One in particular at a small town called Rueda. "Having caused it to be reconnoitred," says his Lordship, "and finding that the French seemed quite ignorant of our proximity, I determined to surprise them if possible ; and at all events to bring them to action. With this intention, a squadron of the 18th proceeded against them on the night of the 12th, and having happily made good our entrance unobserved, we soon threw them into confusion. The greater number were sabred on the spot, many were taken, and only a few escaped to inform General Franceschi, who occupied Valladolid with a body of two or three thousand horse, that the British had not retreated."*

While head quarters were at Mayorga an affair of a more serious character occurred at Sahagun. That place was occupied by General Debelle, with the 21st regiment of French dragoons. On the night of the 20th of December Lord Paget moved on Sahagun with the 10th and 15th hussars, in advance of Sir David Baird's division, and finding on approaching it, just before daybreak of the 21st, that it was in possession of the enemy, he ordered the 10th to proceed direct on the town, whilst with the 15th he made a circuit round it, for the purpose of cutting off their retreat.

According to these instructions, General Slade,

* Lord Londonderry's Narrative, p. 191.

following the course of the river Cea, proceeded towards the town; but Lord Paget had not advanced any great way before he fell in with a picket of the enemy. The picket was charged, and the whole of it, with the exception of one man, was either cut down or made prisoners. "But," as Lord Londonderry observes, "the escape of one, was as injurious, under existing circumstances, as the escape of the whole, for the alarm was given, and before the 15th could reach the place the enemy were prepared to receive them. Their force was mounted and under arms near the road leading from Sahagun to Carrion.

For some time the two corps moved parallel to each other in columns, the nature of the intervening ground making it impossible for the British to close with their opponents. At length, the ground although still difficult, becoming more favourable, Lord Paget, who had rather headed the enemy by the superior trotting of our horses, wheeled the 15th into line, and immediately charged.

The French instantly halted, and forming six deep, received the charge of the British. The shock was tremendous—the result instantaneous—in a few minutes the whole body was literally overwhelmed, and scattered on the plain, which was covered with killed and wounded. Few of the French were sabred; they were absolutely borne down and unhorsed by the superior activity and weight of our hussars, and thirteen officers and 140 men were taken prisoners. Upwards of eighty of

the scattered horses were also secured and brought in, by the British dragoons, whose loss was comparatively trifling, although Colonel, now General Sir Colquhoun Grant, who commanded the regiment, and the adjutant, were both wounded. This rencontre was highly honourable to the 15th, as its strength at the time did not exceed 400 men, whilst the French were certainly 600 strong.

On the same day Sir David Baird's division occupied the town from which the enemy had been thus gallantly driven. The brigade of guards were quartered in its magnificent convent, under Major-General Warde. Here, too, Sir John Moore established his head quarters, and the troops were held in readiness to move against the enemy on the night of the 23rd, so as to reach their different points of attack by day-break on the following morning.

It was intended to make a demonstration, in the direction of Saldanha, where the head quarters of Marshal Soult were supposed to be, whilst the principal effort should be directed against the bridge at Carrion, which was the destination given to Sir David Baird's division.

It was at Sahagun that Sir John Moore received a despatch from the Marquess de la Romana, dated Leon, December 19th, in which he expressed his entire approbation of the forward movement of Sir John, and his immediate readiness to co-operate in the proposed attack upon Soult; but what appeared extremely strange in the letter, was the fact, that the Marquess appeared by its contents not to be aware of

the surrender of Madrid, which, as the reader will recollect, had taken place nearly twenty days before.

Another letter which Sir John Moore received the same day, informed him that Soult had about 10,000 men with him, of which 1000 were cavalry, and eight or ten pieces of artillery—these he had posted behind the Carrion. In his proposed co-operation, the Marquess de la Romana offered 10,000 of his best men, who should move forward the moment he received Sir John Moore's orders.

On the following morning Sir John Moore despatched a message to the Marquess, informing him that he should that night march to the town of Carrion, and the next day move on Saldanha. "If your Excellency," said Sir John, "would march from Mansilla, either direct on Saldanha or pass the river a little above it, while I march from Carrion, I think it would distract the attention of the enemy, and considerably aid my attack. My march from Carrion will probably be in the night. Any information of your movements I shall thank you to address to me at Carrion, where I shall be at daylight to-morrow."

This resolution taken, orders were given for an immediate advance. Again, every heart beat high with the anticipation of service and victory, and by eleven o'clock at night Sir David Baird's division, destined to move upon the bridge at Carrion, was formed in columns of march on the road leading to that place. The order to move forward was on the point of being given, when Sir David Baird was sum-

moned to attend Sir John Moore, who stated to him that he had just received information in a despatch from the Marquess de la Romana, that Buonaparte having become acquainted with the forward movements of the British, had not only turned against them the troops which were marching on Portugal, but was himself advancing from Madrid with an overwhelming force to cut off the English armies from Galicia; that in consequence of this information, he Sir John Moore, had determined to abandon the proposed movement upon Carrion, and to lose no time in regaining the neighbourhood of Astorga, from whence the retreat of the troops would be comparatively secure.

The division was accordingly dismissed for the night, and on the following day preparations were made for retracing their steps towards Galicia. The disappointment and gloom which this new change of destination and new frustration of their hopes and wishes cast over the army, was deep and universal; for although the reasons which dictated the measure might have been in the highest degree judicious, the officers and soldiers were ignorant of the causes of the alteration, and therefore were unable duly to appreciate the motives of the General in resolving upon it.

“It would be no easy matter,” says Lord Londonderry, “to describe the effect which this unlooked for event produced upon every man and officer in the army. The troops, who had long panted to meet the enemy, and who but an hour ago were full of life and confidence, suddenly

appeared like men whose brightest hopes were withered, and their favourite expectations overthrown. Few gave vent to their feelings either by complaint or murmur; but all retired to their quarters in a state of sullen silence, which indicated more powerfully perhaps than any words could have done, the extent of the mortification under which they laboured."

"We rose next morning," continues his Lordship, "perfectly ignorant, and to a certain degree quite indifferent, as to the fate which awaited us; nor were our spirits greatly heightened, when we saw hour after hour pass away without the occurrence of movement either to the front or rear. There is good reason to believe that Sir John Moore himself had hardly determined on the course which it behoved him to follow. He was still imperfectly informed as to the amount of the different corps which were advancing against him; though the natural temperament of his disposition induced him to rate them at the highest; and he was extremely unwilling to commence a rapid retreat until it should have become indispensable; besides, despatches came in this day from Romana, announcing that he had advanced with all the disposable part of his army, in the whole amounting to 7000 men, for the purpose of co-operating in the projected attack upon Soult. It was necessary to countermand this movement, as well as to make such arrangements with the Spanish General as should prevent the two armies from incommoding or coming into collision with each other during the retreat. In settling this point, as well as in preparing the hospitals and stores for a speedy removal, the whole of the 23rd was spent."*

It becomes our duty now to describe more particularly the movements of Sir David Baird's division,

* Narrative, pp. 201, 202.

after the decision of Sir John Moore to abandon the "forward movement."

From the points occupied by the British army, two principal roads lead on Astorga. That, on the north, crossing the Eslar by a bridge at Mansilla de los Mulos, and passing through Leon, is the more direct line of communication; but that, as the reader, who is already aware of the movement of the Marquess de la Romana's division, was already occupied by that force, the amount and condition of which has just been described.

The southern line crosses the Eslar by the bridge at Castro Gonzalo, about a league in front of Benevente, through which town it passes. It was along this latter road that Sir John Moore and the principal part of the army began to retreat; whilst Sir David Baird was directed with his division to take an intermediate direction by cross roads, leading to Valencia de Don Juan, a town situated on the Eslar, about equidistant from the bridges before mentioned, at which place the river is passable by a large ferry-boat, and in a dry season at a ford in the neighbourhood.

Accordingly, on the 25th, (Christmas day,) he marched by the most execrable roads to some villages half way between Sahagun and Valencia de Don Juan, where he halted for the night, and moving at an early hour on the 26th, reached the Eslar in time to pass the entire division over that river considerably before night-fall, partly by means of the ferry-boat, immediately under the noble ruin

which gives its name to the town, and partly at the ford already noticed. But the rains which had recently fallen, had caused the river to swell greatly, and even while the troops were passing, the water rose so rapidly, that some lives were lost, and immediately afterwards the passage by the ford was abandoned.

After crossing, the division occupied the town of Villa Manian, and some villages close to the Eslar. Strong posts were placed on its banks, to defend its passage, and Sir David Baird immediately wrote to the Marquess de la Romana at Mansilla, urging him to blow up the bridge at that place.

At this period, the fact was unquestionable, that the English army was completely hemmed in by the French. Between the 20th and the 24th, Soult had been so powerfully reinforced, that his army alone was numerically superior to that of the British. Junot, with the army liberated by the memorable convention of Cintra, had reached Palencia; while Buonaparte himself, having left Madrid with whatever force he could avail himself of, had passed through Tordesillas, a town fifty miles from Benevente, on the day that the van of the English army quitted Sahagun; and Lefebvre, with a strong corps was marching on Salamanca; thus cutting off the retreat of the English into Portugal; so that in point of fact the whole force of the enemy was advancing from four or five different points upon the British army, as to the centre of a circle.

It is impossible, although we do not profess to

give a general account of the campaign, to pass over unnoticed one or two events which, although not immediately connected with the thread of our narrative, are so highly honourable to the British character. Buonaparte, when he reached Tordesillas, sent on strong detachments of cavalry as far as Villalpando and Mayorga. On the 26th, at the latter place, they were discovered in considerable force, drawn up on the brow of some rising ground, "apparently," as Lord Londonderry says, "ready to cut off any stragglers who might wander from the ranks." Lord Paget, who was at Mayorga, directed Colonel Leigh, at the head of two squadrons of the 10th hussars, to dislodge them.

Colonel Leigh, dividing his little band into two lines, rode briskly forward, one squadron leading and the other supporting, until he reached the top of the hill. Here the men were ordered to rein up, for the purpose of refreshing their horses after the ascent; they did so under a heavy fire from the French. But the horses had no sooner recovered their wind, than the word "charge" was given, and in a few minutes the French were overthrown. Many were killed; many more wounded, and upwards of one hundred taken prisoners.*

* "The 10th, however, was not the only cavalry corps which succeeded in distinguishing itself. It was remarked by all, that as often as the French and our people came into contact, the superiority of the British cavalry was shown to a degree far beyond anything which had been anticipated. They seemed to set all odds at defiance, and in no single instance was

When Sir David Baird had established himself in Villa Manian, it appeared to him to be of the first importance to hold the line of the Upper Eslar, till the march of Sir John Moore by the more circuitous route through Benevente was secured, most especially as the two nearest roads from the French position on the Carrion to Astorga lead through Mansilla and Valencia de Don Juan. Sir David felt that his division was a perfectly sufficient protection for the passage of the river at the latter place; but, as might have been expected, the Marquess de la Romana neglected to blow up the bridge at Mansilla, and the consequence would have been, that if the enemy had pushed on briskly, they would have reached Astorga before Sir John Moore, who would consequently have been placed between Buonaparte and Soult. Indeed, when Soult, after some unaccountable delay, did advance on Mansilla, the Spaniards, who had taken no precaution about destroying the bridge, abandoned it without even attempting to defend it.

Sir David Baird halted on the banks of the Eslar, on the 27th and 28th, in order that the main body of the army might have time to effect its passage of the river at Benevente. On the 29th he resumed

their temerity punished by defeat, or even by repulse. Matters went so far at last, that Captain Jones, of the 18th, ventured with no more than thirty men of his regiment to attack one hundred French cavalry; and he put them to the rout, killing fourteen and making six prisoners."—*Lord Londonderry's Narrative*, p. 205.

his march upon Astorga, the road from Villa Manian to which city, crosses the river Orbigos at the bridge of that name. This place was occupied by the rear division of Romana's army, who had abandoned Leon on the first approach of the enemy. Nothing could be more deplorable than the appearance and condition of these troops, nor anything more unlike a military body, than the half-armed, half-clothed peasantry which composed the corps left in observation at the Puente d'Orbigos.

On the evening of the 29th Sir David Baird reached Astorga. The town was already occupied by the divisions of Generals Hope and Frazer, as well as by the Spaniards under Romana, except those left at the Puente d'Orbigos. The confusion which the concentration of so many men arriving from different points occasioned in a town of small extent, was inconceivably great. The streets and plazas were rendered impassable by the throng of soldiers who bivouacked in them, and by the 'guns and numerous carriages of all descriptions, which necessarily attend an army in the field. Only a small portion of the troops could find shelter in the public buildings and private houses. Sir David Baird resumed his former quarters at the Episcopal Palace, which received also the brigade of guards, the men of which absolutely covered the entire surface of its numerous galleries and corridors, as well as its large court yards.

At four o'clock the next morning the division was again on its march towards Manzanal, having been

preceded by those of Generals Hope and Frazer. The weather was severe, and many stragglers dropping behind, made it necessary very frequently to halt the columns. It was therefore late in the evening when it reached Manzanal, a small village seated in the midst of stupendous mountains deeply covered with snow.

Here it was intended to pass the night. The men had received a supply of bread from Astorga ; but owing to the shortness of their stay, and the confusion which prevailed, from the accumulation of so many troops in that place, it had been found absolutely impossible for the commissariat to make anything like a regular issue of provisions. At Manzanal some bullocks were procured, and immediately slaughtered ; but fuel was wanting, and unfortunately the miserable cabins of the inhabitants suffered in consequence. This irregularity was checked and severely reprimanded by Sir David Baird as soon as discovered.

The small surface round the village, and the depth of the snow in most places, led the men, who were infinitely too numerous to find a sufficient space clear of snow in the immediate neighbourhood, to establish themselves on the beaten roads in front and rear, as well as on the sides of the village, where they could obtain from the banks and inequalities of the ground some shelter from the piercing wind, which blew sharply and bitterly. When, therefore, an order was received, very soon after the column had halted, and long before the greater part

of the men had been able to dress their victuals, to proceed by a night-march to Bemibre, about twelve miles further on the road, it was a work of time and difficulty to collect and assemble the different corps.

The greater proportion of the men were yet fasting; the greater part of the meat was yet uncooked; when at ten o'clock at night the whole column was again in motion down the long descent, which extends for eight miles from Manzanal to the village of Torre; a most trying and arduous service at that hour of the night, in that season of the year, and in the state of hunger and exhaustion in which our brave soldiers were.

The division reached Bemibre just as the morning of the 31st of December dawned. The place evidently could not afford shelter or cover to one third of the men. The inhabitants, roused out of their sleep by the heavy tramp of the coming column, were naturally averse from opening their doors to foreign troops at such an hour, and under such circumstances. All the houses were closed; but the urgency of the case rendering the men deaf to refusals, they were speedily broken open; the wine-cellars were immediately invaded, and the exhausted state of the men rendering them more obnoxious to the effects of the liquor, those who drank most, fell into a state of torpor, from which it was extremely difficult to rouse them when the march was again to be continued.

It was on the first of January, that Buonaparte reached Astorga, where only a day or two before,

the wreck of Romana's army had been consummated. His infantry became disorganized and separated, while he with his few cavalry and guns retired to the valley of the Mencia.

Buonaparte left Ney with eighteen thousand men to keep Leon in subjection, and directed Soult to continue the pursuit of the English. On the night of New-year's-day, so closely did the French press the British rear, that their patrols fell in with the pickets of the retreating army. At this period Buonaparte countermarched the rest of his army, and returned to France.

The repose Sir David Baird's division obtained at Bembibre was very short. Soon after its arrival, orders were again received to continue the retreat immediately to Cacavellos. The soldiers were therefore got under arms as quickly as their exhausted condition would permit. By ten o'clock, with great exertion, the division was formed immediately beyond the town. Sir John Moore had already arrived with the reserve, which continued to form the rear-guard of the army. Sir David Baird's division therefore pursued its route as far as Cacavellos, having thus marched upwards of fifty miles during the last thirty-six hours.*

* Colonel Sorell, in his "Notes," (p. 49,) has the following observations upon these events :—

"The halt at Bembibre was but for a very few hours: the early arrival of the commander of the forces with the reserve made it necessary to proceed; and before noon the division was again on the march to Cacavellos. The effects, however, of this unrelenting march were now becoming so apparent,

From Cacavellos the retreat of the division was continued the following morning through Villa Franca to Herrieras; and on the succeeding day, the 2nd of January, the tremendous mountain of Pietra Fita was passed, during some severe storms of wind and snow. This day's march was distinguished by the deaths of several of the women and children who accompanied the army. Some soldiers also sank under their fatigues, and altogether the division presented a scene of distress seldom to be met with, even in war. The snow on each side of the road on the upper ground and summit of the mountain was much higher than the points of the men's bayonets when carried fixed to their firelocks; and the road itself, which in the valleys was deep in mud and melted snow, was in these high regions frozen hard and slippery.

The men's shoes were totally worn out, and general, previously to quitting Bembibre, I was sent by Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore (whilst the former was attending the punishment of some soldiers for their excesses in the town), to submit to the commander of the forces whether, under all the circumstances of the case, it might not be better to risk a loss of men by endeavouring to make a stand, than incur the certainty of diminishing our force and means by urging the retreat. The commander of the forces being, however, of opinion that circumstances made it necessary to proceed, the division moved to Cacavellos, where it arrived late on the evening of the 31st; having thus marched nearly sixty miles since the morning of the preceding day, during which period it had, with very short intervals, been constantly under arms.*

* I state the distance from recollection; but I think I have rather underrated the length of the march in question.

rally thrown aside, and the progress of the column was rendered slow and tedious by the constant falling of the horses employed in dragging the guns or other carriages, or by accidents to the carriages themselves.

In the long descent which leads to the town of Nogales, where the road runs along the edge of a mountain with a deep precipice on the one side and bold projecting rocks on the other, a remarkable accident occurred. An artillery-waggon, into which a number of women and children had been admitted, rolled over the precipice. Its descent was checked by trees and shrubs at some distance from the summit. Some of the horses which drew it were killed, but neither the women nor children were hurt. Poor ill-fated wretches, they were in all probability reserved to perish by the fatigues and sufferings they were destined to undergo in a more advanced period of the retreat.

On the 5th instant the division reached Lugo, having passed the night of the 3rd in the village of Constantinhos, and continued its march throughout the whole of the 4th. At Lugo, where it had been generally supposed Sir John Moore intended to try the issue of a battle, it enjoyed some short repose. On the 7th it moved on, and occupied the left of the position taken up by Sir John Moore in front of Lugo, for the purpose of carrying his long-meditated design of bringing Soult to action.

The French collected a force in face of this position on the following day, and towards evening some

very smart skirmishing took place between the advanced posts and pickets of the two armies, in which the enemy lost two or three hundred men. That night Sir John Moore issued an animating order to the army, pointing out that the troops must perceive the moment to have arrived which they had so long, and so ardently desired, of measuring themselves with the enemy; that he had the most perfect reliance upon their valour; and that all he thought it necessary to recommend to them was steadiness, and never to throw away their fire.

This appeal made the soldiers forget all their previous fatigues, and the night was passed in preparations for the expected combat. The state of the army was, however, beyond measure distressing; the greater part of the men were not only without shoes, but without stockings, and the constant rains had completely saturated the clothes which yet clung to their backs.

The division bivouacked along the edge of a thin wood, which extends to the left of the main road leading from Lugo towards the enemy, who occupied a range of hills in front of the heights on which the British were posted. It rained heavily at intervals during the night, but not sufficiently to extinguish the numerous fires which blazed along the front of the two armies, and marked in flame the hostile lines.

Sir David Baird, with Major-General Manningham, passed the night at a small farmhouse immediately in the rear of the centre of his division. Long before daylight the whole line was under arms.

The morning broke heavily, with drizzling rain. Contrary to Sir John Moore's expectation, the French, whose numerical force evidently exceeded that of the English, made no movement, and evinced no disposition to attack. The decided superiority of the French cavalry (for a very large portion of the English horses had already perished) restrained Sir John Moore from becoming the assailant. It was evident that Marshal Soult was either waiting for additional reinforcements in our front, or for the effect of some flank movement, which might have been made by the 6th corps under Marshal Ney, which was following in his rear. At all events, the day of the 8th was passed by both in mutual observation; another excitement was followed by another disappointment, and towards evening orders were again issued to continue the retreat, after dark.

The description given by Lord Londonderry of the retreat of the main body of the army, ought, we conceive, to be quoted here as a parallel to that of Sir David Baird's division. His Lordship, in giving that description says, speaking of the road to Herrieras—

“The country became from this point such as to render cavalry of no avail; it was universally steep, rocky, precipitous, and covered with wood, and where in the few spots it was otherwise, too much enclosed with vineyards and mulberry plantations, to allow even a squadron of horse to form up or act. The cavalry were accordingly sent on at once to Lugo, whither the infantry and artillery followed as fast as extreme exhaustion, and the nature of the road by which they travelled would allow; but they followed both painfully and slowly; for though as many as forty

miles were performed in one march, that march comprehended not the day only but the night also.

“This was more than men reduced to the low ebb to which our soldiers had fallen could endure. They dropped down by whole sections on the way-side; some with curses, others with the voice of prayer in their mouths. It was dreadful likewise to know that not only men, but women and children were subjected to this miserable fate.

“By some strange neglect, or the indulgence of a mistaken humanity, Sir John Moore’s army had carried along with it more than the too large proportion of women allotted by the rules of the service to armies in the field—and these poor wretches were now heightening the horror of passing events by a display of suffering even more acute than those endured by their husbands.

“Some were taken in labour on the road, and in the open air, amidst showers of sleet and snow, gave birth to infants which perished, with their mothers, as soon as they had seen the light; others, carrying perhaps each of them two children on their backs, would toil on, and when they came to look to the condition of their precious burdens, would find one or both frozen to death. Then the depth of moral degradation to which they sank—their oaths and cries uttered under the influence of intoxication were hardly less appalling than the groans which burst from them, as all hope of aid abandoned them, and they sat down to die.

“I am well aware that the horrors of this retreat have been again and again described in terms calculated to freeze the blood of such as read them; but I have no hesitation in saying, that the most harrowing accounts which have yet been laid before the public, fall short of the reality.”*

* Lord Londonderry’s Narrative, pp. 217, 218.

Disappointing as the order for the continuation of the retreat from Lugo, where Sir John Moore had always avowed his intention to offer battle, must have been, yet as the principal object he had in view was the safety of his army, and its re-embarkation with as little loss as possible, it certainly would have been out of the question to prolong a struggle for the defence of Galicia. If that had been decided upon, it must have been settled before the advanced movement on Sahagun was begun; every arrangement would then have been directed to that one object, and there would have been time to prepare a resistance, which in all probability would have successfully baffled every effort of the enemy; but the advanced movement on Sahagun had impaired the equipment and efficiency of the British army too seriously to leave the possibility of defending any portion of the country after the retreat had once begun.

The enemy who had now collected against the British were too numerous and too powerful to be resisted without previous preparation, and the selection and strengthening of the different points of defence, which the nature of the country affords. Besides, had no other consideration militated against the possibility of resistance, the actual want of provisions must have driven the English from Lugo. The store of bread was nearly exhausted, and scarcely enough remained to supply the men on the march they had yet to perform.

In expressing the disappointment felt by the

troops at the order to continue the retreat from Lugo, it is but just to state, that during the day, the English found several opportunities of displaying their valour. In the morning of the 7th, the enemy advanced four guns, covered by a few squadrons of cavalry towards the centre, and opened a sharp fire, which was returned by the British with such effect, that one of the guns was dismounted, and the rest were silenced.

The enemy, about an hour after this, made a feint on the right of the British line, to cover the advance of a strong column of infantry, and five guns on the left. Sir John Moore galloped to the spot, and believed the movement only the precursor of a serious and general attack; he arrived just as a considerable body of French troops began to mount the rising ground, and press upon the 76th, which had possession of it. The 76th fell back gradually till it joined the 51st, in which regiment Sir John Moore had been an ensign; he spoke a few words to that corps, stating the fact, and expressing his entire confidence in them. The appeal had a magical effect upon the brave fellows, who after a few volleys of musketry, charged the French with the bayonet, and drove them in utter confusion down the hill.

This however was the last manifestation of hostilities—the painful suspense of the next day we have already noticed, and on the night of the 8th the fires were again lighted along the heights to deceive the enemy, and the retreat was continued.

CHAPTER XI.

POINT OF EMBARKATION OF THE ARMY CHANGED — PASSAGE OF THE BRIDGE OF OTERO DEL REY — DIFFICULTIES OF THE RETREAT — PRIVATIONS OF THE TROOPS — HALT AT BETANZOS — ARRIVAL BEFORE CORUÑA — PROCEEDINGS THERE — ATTACK OF THE FRENCH — DETAILS OF THE BATTLE — SIR DAVID BAIRD LEADS HIS DIVISION INTO ACTION — IS SEVERELY WOUNDED — SIR JOHN MOORE WOUNDED — SIR DAVID COMPELLED TO QUIT THE FIELD — PROCEEDS ON BOARD THE VILLE DE PARIS — HIS LEFT ARM AMPUTATED AT THE SHOULDER — COLONEL SORELL'S DETAIL OF EVENTS — DEATH OF SIR JOHN MOORE — DESPATCH OF GENERAL HOPE TO SIR DAVID BAIRD — SIR DAVID'S LETTER TO LORD CASTLEREAGH — ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND — SIR DAVID INVESTED WITH THE RED RIBAND.

IT ought, perhaps, to be here stated, that it had been the original intention of Sir John Moore, when he commenced his retreat, to have re-embarked at Vigo, which had been recommended in preference to Coruña, by Admiral De Courcy, who commanded the fleet; because at Vigo the anchorage for the transports was out of the reach of shot from the shore, which was not the case at Coruña, where the whole of the harbour was commanded by the surrounding heights.

It was with this view, therefore, that the men-of-war and transports had been collected at Vigo; and

the light brigade, under Brigadier-General Craufurd, had been despatched from Astorga direct on that place, by the road of Fuencevadon and Orense.

Although, in a maritime point of view, it may readily be admitted that Vigo was a preferable post to Coruña, many very important military considerations combined to operate in favour of the latter, as a point of re-embarkation.

From Lugo, where the road to Vigo branches off, the distance is nearly double that which it is to Coruña ; besides, Sir John Moore had received a report, which induced him to believe that the embarkation might be effected from the neighbourhood of Betanzos, on the river, or arm of the sea, which extends inland towards that town. Had this been in fact practicable, it would very considerably have shortened the distance which the men had to march ; but, unfortunately, the report was incorrect and ill-founded, which is the more to be lamented, as it certainly had a strong influence on the determination which he subsequently formed to fall back upon Coruña shortly after he left Astorga, when instructions were forwarded to Vigo for the transports to proceed immediately to that place.

It was some time after dark on the night of the 8th, when the retreat again commenced ; and at about ten o'clock, Sir David Baird's division moved from its position to the rear. The night was dark, gloomy, and wet : every barn or open building to which it was possible for them to find access, was filled with men of the divisions in advance, who had

lagged behind in the hopes of some little shelter and repose.

Sir David Baird, who rode in rear of the column, was indefatigable in his visits to these scattered buildings, and in his exertions to push the men forward,—a task of no small difficulty under the sufferings and privations to which they had by circumstances been reduced.

At Otero del Rey, the Minho is crossed by a narrow stone-bridge. The passage of this bridge by the troops, guns, and carriages of all descriptions, was, in the peculiar situation of the army, found in itself to be an operation of some hours: the stragglers, foot-sore, and, above all, heart-sore at the renewal of the retreat, were forced on by the greatest exertions; the staff and other mounted officers assisted Sir David in his unwearying anxiety to get everything across the river; but such were the inevitable delays and insurmountable difficulties, that the day broke before it was effected, and was far advanced by the time the division reached the Venta of Guiteritz, which had been fixed on as the halting-place.

The descriptions given of the state of the advanced part of the army during this day and night are frightful. After marching, jaded and half-famished, barefoot and knee-deep in mud, their fatigue was so excessive, that the men threw themselves down upon the ground, and lay sleeping for hours, exposed to the "pitiless pelting" of a heavy rain; and even then their slumbers were continually broken by the

cry of the "enemy:" and at every such alarm, the advanced guard of course fell in.

As to Sir David Baird's division, its sufferings were by no means less than those of the troops of the main body with Sir John Moore. The latter part of the road from the Vaámonde is scarcely practicable for carriages of any description: it is carried along a chain of rocky heights, through a bleak and desolate country; and during the whole of this night and morning, the rain blew strongly, and drove the falling hail and rain full in the faces of the men.

It was melancholy to see the brave soldiers, who feared no mortal foe, thus beaten by the elements, and crouching from their fury: they lined the ditches which border the road, creeping along under the dwarf banks and enclosures, to screen themselves from the cutting sharpness of the tempest;—the calls and exhortations of their officers unheeded and unattended to, not from any feeling of disrespect or insubordination, but literally and purely from animal exhaustion. The men came into the bivouack which surrounded the Venta of Guiteritz in small parties, as their waning strength permitted, but without anything like order or regularity. The different regiments were so entirely mixed and blended, that it was found wholly impossible to collect the men round their own colours.

The sufferings of the soldiers in Sir David Baird's division during this wretched halt, it is scarcely possible to describe: like those of the advance, they

lay scattered over a bleak and desolate heath, with nothing to protect them from the violence of the gusts of wind and torrents of rain and hail: many perished on the ground where they laid themselves to rest, and two brave fellows died at the gate of the Venta, close to Sir David Baird, before any relief could be afforded them.

Soon after dark, in pursuance of Sir John Moore's order to continue the retreat night and day (an order against which Sir David Baird had in vain remonstrated), the drum was beat to collect the men for another night-march to Betanzos. The rain had ceased, but the darkness was profound. The well-known sound of the drum was heard, but it was disregarded. In vain was every exertion used to rouse the wearied men quickly from their wretched slumbers; and even when this was partially effected, it was found nearly impossible to direct them to their respective regiments in the midst of the obscurity which prevailed. One most distinguished and gallant officer, commanding a remarkably well-disciplined regiment, came to Sir David Baird, and declared, under feelings of the greatest distress and anxiety, such as were natural to a zealous, good, and brave soldier, that he neither could collect, nor even find his corps, so entirely was it dispersed and mixed up with others.

Those who have not witnessed such scenes, may wonder how such confusion arose, and even go the length of criticising it after it had occurred; but the physical faculties of man have their limits, and upon

this sad occasion, the human power of endurance had been overstrained.

The head of the column necessarily commenced its march before the rear could be collected. Sir David Baird, however, with an invincible resolution to do his duty, never stirred from the rear until he had assembled and pressed forward the men. On arriving at Betanzos, some regiments brought very few with their colours; they, however, came in slowly, but surely, and as the division halted the whole day, it was again tolerably collected before night.

Another march yet remained to be accomplished; the distance was but sixteen miles, but in the then state of the army, a march of sixteen miles to be immediately undertaken, was a serious enterprize; they knew, however, it was the last; and they hoped and believed that they were not to be permitted to fly to their ships for shelter, without, at least, once in this ill-fated campaign, trying their strength with the enemy. These feelings had their effect, and when the column was formed in the morning, strength, firmness, and discipline, seemed to be in a great measure resumed.

The halt at Betanzos was marked by the loss to the army of a most gallant and accomplished soldier, Brigadier-General Anstruther. He sank under his fatigues, and to such a state of exhaustion was he reduced, that he found it impossible to mount his horse: he died shortly after at Coruña. Other brave and valuable officers had perished before him, and

many more carried with them to England the groundwork of disorders from which they never recovered. Amongst the number was Major-General Manningham, who never rallied from the fatigues of the campaign.

Sir David Baird's division, which had followed those of Generals Frazer and Hope during the greater part of the retreat, now moved into the town, where it rested until the morning of the 14th, when it marched out, and took the right of the position, in which Sir John Moore determined to await the arrival of the fleet from Vigo, no part of which had yet made its appearance. Here it was determined to give battle to the enemy if he pressed on and sought the contest. In the course of the day the fleet hove in sight, and came to anchor in the evening.

The ground in front of Coruña, although hilly, much broken, and intersected by enclosures, does not offer any good defensive position for covering the town, particularly to a force not exceeding 15,000 men, which was, at the period of which we are now speaking, the full amount of the British army.

The position selected by Sir John Moore is a rocky ridge, distant about a mile and a half from the city, which, terminating on the left at an arm of the sea leading to Borgo, where it is high and commanding, and where it is crossed by the royal road to Madrid, on which the army had retreated, gradually declines in height until it reaches the village of Elvina; there the ridge recedes, and the ground

suddenly sinks into the hollow in which the village is situated.

Along this ridge two divisions of the British army were posted ; that of Lieutenant-General Hope on the left, extending to the sea, and that of Sir David Baird on the right, with its extreme right, (composed of part of Lord William Bentinck's brigade,) thrown back along the receding part of the ridge, so as to front the village of Elvina, which was also occupied.

The division of Lieutenant-General Frazer was placed in the rear, and further to the right, covering the road called the Road of Portugal, which was formerly that also to Santiago, and protecting the right flank of Sir David Baird's division, which would otherwise have been much exposed and liable to be turned. The reserve under Major-General Edward Paget, was posted in reserve on the main road.

Immediately in front of the right, and beyond the narrow valley or hollow in which Elvina is seated, the ground suddenly swells into a bold and commanding hill, connected with a chain of other hills, terminating at the sea : through an opening in these hills, the road, already noticed as being the Road of Portugal, passes. The hill immediately in front of the English right, overlooking the whole position, and being considerably within the range of grape-shot, was in the first instance intended to be included in it, and was, therefore, occupied by a strong picket.

On the 14th, a large magazine, containing four

thousand barrels of powder, which had been brought from England, was blown up, lest it should fall into the hands of the enemy. The explosion was beyond conception tremendous. The whole city of Coruña was shaken to its foundations; huge pieces of timber and fragments of rock were hurled through the air, and several lives were lost by this necessary sacrifice to the immediate security of the army.

Sir David Baird established his head-quarters at a small quinta, or country-house, immediately in the rear of his division; but neither men, nor officers in general, could find shelter, except in a few sheds on the other side of the ridge. The troops were under arms, and formed on the top of the ridge an hour before daybreak each morning.

On the 14th, the enemy had collected a force in the front of the British line, and it was considered by Sir John Moore necessary to withdraw the picket posted on the hill in face of the right, as being too much exposed. Sir David Baird, in consequence of this determination, proceeded at daybreak of the 15th to the hill; and the sentries were about to be withdrawn, when they were attacked by the French light infantry. A slight skirmish ensued; but as it was not intended to maintain the post, the picket gradually evacuated it.

In the course of the day, a considerable body of French troops and artillery, under Marshal Soult, was perceived ascending the abandoned hill. Eleven guns or howitzers were placed upon its summit in battery, whence they enfiladed, and completely com-

manded the right of the English line. All the artillery belonging to the British army, excepting two pieces, had already been embarked; four or five Spanish cannon were added to these two, but as it turned out, their calibre did not agree with our shot: they were of no use whatever.*

During these proceedings, Sir John Moore was actively employed in taking advantage of the arrival of the fleet on the 15th, and the women and children, the sick and the wounded, and such ammunition stores as could be spared, were all safely got on board. The artillery, as we have already said, was sent off to the ships, for the ground now occupied by our army was not adapted to their use; and the cavalry, after destroying their horses, had also embarked, so that in fact nothing remained except the most efficient of the infantry.

On the morning of the 16th the line was under arms before daybreak as usual; but everything appearing perfectly quiet in the enemy's position, the regiments were dismissed, and the last preparations for the conclusion of the embarkation were made. Orders were issued for the gradual retreat of the different divisions, and the boats of the fleet were collected in the harbour and along the beach to

* "It was during this day, towards the evening, that Colonel Mackenzie, of the 5th, perceived two of the enemy's guns not far distant, and imagined that, by a sudden attack, he might surprise them—the attempt failed. Colonel Mackenzie was killed during the advance, and his party were driven back with loss."—*Annals*, p. 89, vol. ii.

receive the regiments on board as fast as they should arrive at the water's edge, so that during that night and the following morning the whole of the troops might be embarked; and such was the confident expectation that no farther attempt would be made to molest our forces in the retreat, that several officers went into town to get their effects and private property on board.

Shortly after noon, however, some movements were perceived in the enemy's line, and soon afterwards four strong columns of infantry, preceded by a cloud of skirmishers, were seen descending the hill, covered by a heavy fire of shot and shells from the eleven guns or howitzers posted on the height.

This happened just as Sir John Moore had given his final directions about the embarkation, and had mounted his horse to visit the outposts. Sir John expressed his high satisfaction at the intelligence, and consequent chance of action, which was corroborated by a deserter, who had just come in.

The left column of the French was directed against Elvina, and the right of Sir David Baird's division; whilst the other advanced against General Manningham's brigade. At the same time the left of the army was assailed by a third column, which advanced by the main road; but the weight of the conflict at its commencement fell chiefly on Sir David Baird's division. The enemy's object was evidently to turn and penetrate the British right, and by so doing, drive him back upon the sea. Sir John Moore, seeing the enemy's design, immediately galloped off to

that part of the field ; and as the enemy's columns, which descended the hill to attack Sir David Baird's division, approached, Sir David asked Sir John Moore if he did not think it was time to move forward to meet them, inquiring also, if Sir John would give the word of command. He replied, " No, Baird ; do you." The order was instantly given to advance, and the fire of musketry soon began.

The column which rapidly and impetuously advanced against the right, on approaching Elvina, lined the different enclosures which surround the village, and commenced a murderous fire upon Lord William Bentinck's brigade ; whilst a part of it rushing into the village itself, was closely opposed by the 50th regiment, under Major Napier, who was severely wounded and taken prisoner, and the second Major, Stanhope, killed.*

After a severe contest with the bayonet in the streets, the enemy were driven from the village, although the action had now become general along the line. The 42nd, after having received and returned several volleys, crossed bayonets, and, supported by a battalion of the guards, repulsed a strong body of the enemy, who had endeavoured to possess itself of the height on the left. It was in the act of watching and applauding this charge, that Sir John Moore was struck off his horse by a cannon shot.

But even previous to this, and very early in the

* The Hon. Major Stanhope was brother of the present Earl Stanhope.

action, Sir David Baird, who was conspicuous by his activity and animation, had received a grape-shot in his left arm, at about an inch from the shoulder. He did not fall from his horse, but dismounted, almost stunned by the blow. On recovering his recollection, he made an effort to remount, but finding that impossible, he consented to retire to the rear, and accompanied by his aid-de-camp, Captain William Baird, was conveyed first to the quarters which he had occupied at Duke de Veragas' in Coruña, and thence on board the *Ville de Paris*, in which ship he had previously arranged to embark for England.

Notwithstanding the pain Sir David suffered, from a wound which had literally shattered the bone to pieces, his countenance and manner were so calm and unchanged, that several officers whom he passed as he was *walking* into Coruña, were perfectly unconscious that he was even wounded. Amongst others, Lord Charles Manners was not aware that he had received any injury, until he saw him acknowledge the salute of the guard with his right hand, and saw at the same time that his left arm was supported by his sash, which had been converted into a sling for the purpose. When he arrived on board the *Ville de Paris*, the surgeon of that ship, upon being called to him, and seeing the composed and tranquil state in which he was, expressed his opinion that he "should soon be able to set all to rights again."

This confident suggestion deeply offended the

gallant suffering soldier, who angrily asked the surgeon, if he imagined that he should have quitted the field for a trifling hurt.

On baring his arm, the surgeon was satisfied of the justice of Sir David's displeasure with him for the hasty opinion he had formed of the injury he had received—he at once expressed his conviction that amputation was absolutely necessary, at the same time observing, that the operation had better be deferred until the morning, as Sir David must naturally feel exhausted.

Sir David at first expressed a doubt as to the necessity for taking off the limb, but the surgeon of Sir Samuel Hood's ship, the *Barfleur*, who had in the mean time arrived on board, being in the cabin, Sir David calmly asked if it was their united opinion that such a course was indispensable, and upon their both declaring their conviction that it was absolutely necessary for the preservation of his life, he replied, that he was quite ready to undergo at the moment whatever operation was considered requisite.

Upon a closer inspection, it was found that the wound was so near the shoulder that the ordinary mode of amputation could not be adopted, since in all probability the bone was splintered close to the cap of the shoulder. It was therefore thought necessary to remove the arm out of the socket. The preparations for this painful, and at that period unusual operation, were immediately made; and during its progress Sir David Baird exhibited the

same firmness of nerve which so eminently distinguished him on every occasion through life. He sat leaning his right arm on a table, without uttering one syllable of complaint, except at the moment when the joint was finally separated, when one single exclamation of pain escaped his lips. The blow, however, was one of complicated danger and difficulty, for the shot, which shattered the bone of the arm to pieces, inflicted another severe wound in the side, from which Sir David suffered severely for many years.

It appears to us that the most satisfactory information, as regards the subsequent occurrences connected with this campaign, up to the arrival of Sir David Baird in England, and of the principal events of the action after he was compelled to quit the field, will be best conveyed to the reader by the following narrative of the highly-gifted officer of Sir David's staff, to whom we have already offered our sincere thanks for his valuable communications, and by a copy of the despatches forwarded to the Government of England on the occasion.

"I remained," says the gallant officer, "on the field until the close of the action, at which time the enemy was completely repulsed, and our line considerably in advance of the ground it had occupied at the commencement of the contest, when being extremely anxious to ascertain the state of Sir David Baird's wound, I hastened into town, and passing the house to which Sir John Moore had been removed, I learned with inexpressible regret, that he had just then expired.

“ Proceeding to the hotel of the Duke of Veragua, in the upper city, where the head quarters of our division had been established during the two days we had remained in Coruña, I found Sir David Baird’s own man, who had just come on shore from the *Ville de Paris*, who told me that Sir David’s wound was seriously severe, and that he must lose his arm.

“ I immediately returned with him to the ship, and upon entering the General’s cabin, learned that the operation of extracting the limb had just been performed—indeed the surgeons were then applying the dressings.

“ Sir David received me in his usual affectionate manner, gave me his remaining hand, and expressed great pleasure at seeing me unhurt. He then made anxious inquiries respecting the events of the day, deeply lamenting the loss of Sir John Moore, at the same time advertizing to the necessity of his resigning the command of the army, in consequence of his wound, the surgeons considering it proper that he should be kept perfectly quiet after so severe an operation. I saw him placed on a camp-bed, which had been prepared in an adjoining cabin, and then left him for the night, which he passed tranquilly under the influence of a powerful opiate.

“ Early the next morning Sir David sent to desire me to come to him; and having despatched his aid-de-camp, the Honourable Captain Gordon, to Lieutenant-General Hope to notify his situation, and to request a detailed report of the action, he directed me to write a letter to the Secretary of State, to accompany the report. The letter and the report being ready, he signed the former with his own hand, and they were despatched to England in charge of his nephew, the Honourable Captain Gordon, by His Majesty’s ship *Slaney*.

“ The embarkation of the army was completed on the morning of the 17th, and the same evening the fleet got

under way for England. The *Ville de Paris* had received on board upwards of sixty officers (several of whom were wounded) and above a thousand men of different regiments. The wind blowing a heavy gale from the south, the Admiral, considering Sir David Baird's situation, made a signal for the *Ville de Paris* to part company, in order that she might not be delayed by the heavy-sailing transports."

We now submit, as best with regard to the chronological arrangement of events, the letter of Lieutenant-General Hope to Sir David Baird, containing an account of the battle of Coruña, together with Sir David's letter to Lord Castlereagh.

Ville de Paris, at Sea, Jan. 18th 1809.

MY LORD,

BY the much-lamented death of Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, who fell in action with the enemy on the 16th instant, it has become my duty to acquaint your Lordship that the French army attacked the British troops in the position they occupied in front of Corunna, at about two o'clock in the afternoon of that day.

A severe wound, which compelled me to quit the field a short time previous to the fall of Sir John Moore, obliges me to refer your Lordship for the particulars of the action, which was long and obstinately contested, to the enclosed report of Lieutenant-General Hope, who succeeded to the command of the army, and to whose ability and exertions in direction of the ardent zeal and unconquerable valour of His Majesty's troops, is to be attributed, under Providence, the success of the day, which terminated in the complete and entire repulse and defeat of the enemy at every point of attack.

The Honourable Captain Gordon, my aid-de-camp, will

have the honour of delivering this despatch, and will be able to give your Lordship any further information which may be required.*

Yours, &c.

D. BAIRD, *Lt.-Gen.*

The following is the enclosure to Sir David Baird from Lieutenant General Hope.

Audacious, off Corunna, Jan. 18.

SIR,

IN compliance with the desire contained in your communication of yesterday, I avail myself of the first moment I have been able to command, to detail to you the occurrences of the action which took place in front of Corunna on the 16th instant.

It will be in your recollection, that about one in the afternoon of that day, the enemy, who had received reinforcements, and who had placed some guns in front of the right and left of his line, was observed to be moving troops towards his left flank, and forming various columns of attack, and that extremity of the strong and commanding position, which in the morning of the 15th he had taken in our immediate front.

This indication of his intention was immediately succeeded by the rapid and determined attack which he had made upon your division, which occupied the right of our position. The events which occurred during that period of the action you are fully acquainted with.

The first effort of the enemy was met by the commander

* By reference to the Gazette Extraordinary of January 24th, 1803, it will be seen that it is there stated that "the Honourable Captain Hope arrived late last night, with a despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird to Lord Viscount Castlereagh."

of the forces, and by yourself, at the head of the 42nd regiment, and the brigade under Major-General Lord William Bentinck. The village on your right, became the object of obstinate contest. I lament to say, that soon after the severe wound which deprived the army of your services, Lieut.-General Moore, who had just directed the most able disposition, fell by a cannon shot.

The troops, though not unacquainted with the irreparable loss they had sustained, were not dismayed; but by the most determined bravery, not only repelled every attempt of the enemy to gain ground, but actually forced him to retire, although he had brought up fresh troops in support of those originally engaged.

The enemy, finding himself foiled in every attempt to force the right of our position, endeavoured by numbers to turn it;—a judicious and well-timed movement, which was made by Major-General Paget with the reserve, which corps had moved out of its cantonments to support the right of the army, by a vigorous attack, defeated this intention.

The Major-General having pushed forward the 95th (rifle corps), and the first battalion of the 51st regiment, drove the enemy before him, and in his rapid and judicious advance, threatened the left of the enemy's position. This circumstance, with the position of Lieut.-General Fraser's division (calculated to give further security to the right of the line), induced the enemy to relax his efforts in that quarter; they were, however, more forcibly directed towards the centre, where they were again successfully resisted by the brigade under Major-General Manningham, forming the left of your division, and a part of that under Major-General Leck, forming the right of the division under my orders.

Upon the left the enemy at first contented himself with an attack upon our picquets, which however, in general,

maintained their ground; finding however his efforts unavailing on the right and centre, he seemed determined to render the attack upon the left more serious; and had succeeded in obtaining possession of the village through which the great road to Madrid passes, and which was situated in front of that part of the line; from this post, however, he was soon expelled with considerable loss, by a gallant attack of some companies of the 2nd battalion, fourteen regiments under Lieut.-Colonel Nichols.

Before five in the evening, we had not only successfully repelled every attack made upon the position, but had gained ground in all points, and occupied a more forward line than at the commencement of the action; whilst the enemy confined his operations to a cannonade, and the fire of his light troops, with a view to draw off his other corps.

At six the firing entirely ceased—the different brigades were reassembled on the ground they had occupied in the morning, and the picquets in advanced posts resumed their original station.

Notwithstanding the decided and marked superiority which at this moment the gallantry of the troops had given them over the enemy, who from his numbers, and the commanding advantages of his position, had no doubt expected an easy victory, I did not, on reviewing all circumstances, consider that I should be warranted in departing from what I knew was the fixed determination of the late commander of the forces, to withdraw the army on the evening of the 16th, for the purpose of embarkation: the previous arrangements for which had already been made by his order, and were in fact far advanced at the commencement of the action.

The troops quitted their position about ten at night, with a degree of order that did them credit. The whole of the artillery that remained unembarked, having been

withdrawn, the troops followed in the order prescribed, and marched to their respective points of embarkation in the town and neighbourhood of Corunna. The picquets remained at their posts till five of the morning of the 17th, when they were also withdrawn with similar orders, and without the enemy having discovered the movements.

By the unremitting exertions of Captains the Hon. H. Gurzon, Gosselin, Boys, Rainier, Serret, Hawkins, Digby, Carden, and Mackenzie, of the royal navy, who, in pursuance of the orders of Admiral De Courcy, were entrusted with the service of embarking the army; and in consequence of the arrangements made by Commissioner Rowen, Captains Bowen and Sheppard, and the other agents for transports, the whole of the army was embarked, with an expedition which has seldom been equalled. With the exception of the brigades under Major-General Hill and Beresford, the whole was afloat before daylight.

The brigade of Major-General Beresford, which was alternately to form our rear guard, occupied the land in front of the town of Corunna; that of Major-General Hill was stationed in reserve on the promontory in rear of the town. The enemy pushed his light troops towards the town soon after eight o'clock on the morning of the 17th, and shortly after occupied the heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour; but, notwithstanding this circumstance, and the manifold defects of the place, there being no apprehension that the rear-guard could be forced, and the disposition of the Spaniards appearing to be good, the embarkation of Major-General Hill's brigade was commenced and completed by three o'clock in the afternoon.

Major-General Beresford, with that zeal and ability which are so well known to yourself and the whole army, having fully explained to the satisfaction of the Spanish Government the nature of our movement, and having made every

previous arrangement, withdrew his corps from the land front of the town soon after dark, and was with all the wounded that had not been previously moved, embarked before one this morning.

Circumstances forbid us to indulge the hope that the victory with which it has pleased Providence to crown the efforts of the army, can be attended with any very brilliant consequences to Great Britain. It is clouded by the loss of one of her best soldiers—it has been achieved at the termination of a long and harassing service. The superior numbers and advantageous position of the enemy, not less than the actual situation of this army, did not admit of any advantage being reaped from success. It must be however to you, to the army, and to our country, the sweetest reflection, that the lustre of the British arms has been maintained amongst many disadvantageous circumstances.

The army which entered Spain amidst the fairest prospects, had no sooner completed its junction, than owing to the multiplied disasters that dispersed the native armies around us, it was left to its own resources. The advance of the British corps from the Duero afforded the best hopes that the South of Spain might be relieved; but this generous effort to save the unfortunate people, also afforded the enemy the opportunity of directing every effort of his numerous troops, and concentrating all his principal resources for the destruction of the only regular force in the north of Spain.

You are well aware with what diligence this system has been pursued—these circumstances produced the necessity of rapid and harassing marches, which diminished the numbers, exhausted the strength, and impaired the equipment of the army. Notwithstanding all these disadvantages, and those more immediately attached to a defensive position

which the imperious necessity of covering the harbour of Corunna for a time had rendered indispensable to assume ; the nature and undaunted valour of British troops was never more conspicuous, and must have exceeded what even your own experience of that invaluable quality so inherent in them might have taught you to expect.

When every one that had an opportunity seemed to vie in improving it, it is difficult for me in making this report to select particular instances for your approbation. The corps chiefly engaged were the brigades under Major-Generals Lord William Bentinck, Manningham, and Leith, and the brigade of guards under Major-General Warde. To these officers, and the troops under their immediate orders, the greatest praise is due. Major-General Hill, and Colonel Catlin Craufurd, with the brigades on the left of the position, ably supported their advanced posts. The brunt of the action fell upon the 4th, 42nd, 50th, and 31st regiments, with parts of the brigade of guards, and the 28th regiment.

From Lieut.-Colonel Murray, quarter-master-general, and the officers of the general staff, I received the most marked assistance. I had reason to regret that the illness of Brigadier-General Clinton, Adjutant-General, deprived me of his aid. I was indebted to Brigadier-General Slade during the action, for a zealous offer of his personal services, although the cavalry were embarked.

The greatest part of the fleet having gone to sea yesterday evening, the whole being under weigh, and the corps in the embarkation necessarily much mixed on board, it is impossible at present to lay before you a return of our casualties. I hope the loss in numbers is not so considerable as might have been expected. If I was obliged to form an estimate, I should say that I believed it did not exceed in killed and wounded from 700 to 800. That of

the enemy must remain unknown ; but many circumstances induce me to rate it at nearly double the above number.

We have some prisoners ; but I have not been able to obtain an account of the number, it is not however considerable.

Several officers of rank have fallen or been wounded, among whom I am only at present enabled to state the names of Lieut.-Colonel Napier, 92nd regiment ; Majors Napier and Stanhope, 50th regiment, killed ; Lieut.-Colonel Winch, 4th regiment ; Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell, 26th regiment ; Lieut.-Colonel Fane, 59th regiment ; Lieut.-Colonel Griffiths, guards ; Majors Miller and Williams, 81st regiment, wounded.

To you, who are well acquainted with the excellent qualities of Lieut.-General Sir John Moore, I need not expatiate on the loss his country and the army have sustained by his death. His fall has deprived me of a valuable friend, to whom long experience of his worth had sincerely attached me ; but it is chiefly on public grounds that I most lament the blow. It will be the conversation of every one who loved or respected his manly character, that after conducting the army through an arduous retreat with consummate firmness, he has terminated a career of distinguished honour, by a death that has given the enemy additional reason to respect the name of a British soldier. Like the immortal Wolfe, he is snatched from his country at an early period of a life spent in her service ; like Wolfe, his last moments were gilded by the prospect of success, and cheered by the acclamations of victory ; like Wolfe also, his memory will for ever remain sacred in that country which he sincerely loved, and which he had so faithfully served.

It remains for me only to express my hope, that you will speedily be restored to the service of your country, and to lament the unfortunate circumstance that removed

you from your station in the field, to throw the momentary command into far less able hands.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN HOPE, *Lieut.-General.*

To Lieut.-General Sir David Baird,

&c. &c. &c.

We cannot quit this part of our narrative without more particularly referring to the circumstances immediately connected with the death of Sir John Moore ; for although the details which have already been before the country are manifold and minute, we are enabled to adduce from the testimony of a principal actor in the scene, one or two facts worthy of record.

It will be recollected, that at the moment the 42nd Highlanders were making a splendid charge, he sent Captain (now Major-General the Right Honourable Sir Henry) Hardinge, to order up a battalion of Guards to the left flank of the Highlanders ; upon which the officer commanding the light company conceived, that as their ammunition was nearly expended, they were to be relieved by the Guards, and began to fall back ; but Sir John discovering the mistake, said to them, " My brave 42nd, join your comrades ; ammunition is coming, and till it arrives, you have your bayonets." They instantly obeyed, and all moved forward.

" Captain Hardinge now returned to report that the Guards were advancing ; while he was speaking and pointing out the situation of the battalion, a hot fire was kept up, and the enemy's artillery played incessantly on the

spot. Sir John Moore was too conspicuous—a cannon ball struck his left shoulder, and beat him to the ground.” *

The following letter from Captain Hardinge is most deeply interesting, and although it is to be found in Mr. James Moore’s Narrative of the Campaign, we make no apology for inserting it here, inasmuch as it gives a vivid picture of the last moments of a British hero, and at the same time corrects an erroneous statement which has been widely circulated, and has even found its way into that generally accurate work, the Annals of the Peninsular Campaign.

“ The circumstances,” says Sir Henry Hardinge, “ which took place immediately after the fatal blow, which deprived the army of its gallant commander, Sir John Moore, are of too interesting a nature not to be made public for the admiration of his countrymen. But I trust that the instances of fortitude and heroism of which I was a witness, may also have another effect, that of affording some consolation to his relatives and friends.

“ With this feeling, I have great satisfaction in committing to paper, according to your desire, the following relation.

“ I had been ordered by the Commander-in-chief, to desire a battalion of the guards to advance, which battalion was at one time intended to have dislodged a corps of the enemy from a large house and garden on the opposite side of the valley ; and I was pointing out to the General the situation of the battalion, and our horses were touching at the very moment, that a cannon shot from the enemy’s

* Moore’s Narrative, pp. 215-16.

battery carried away his left shoulder, and part of the collar bone, leaving the arm hanging by the flesh.

“ The violence of the stroke threw him off his horse on his back—not a muscle of his face altered, nor did a sigh betray the least sensation of pain.

“ I dismounted, and taking his hand, he pressed mine forcibly, casting his eyes very anxiously towards the 42nd regiment, which was hotly engaged ; and his countenance expressed satisfaction, when I informed him that the regiment was advancing.

“ Assisted by a soldier of the 42nd, he was removed a few yards behind the shelter of a wall. Colonel Graham, and Captain Woodford, about this time came up, and perceiving the state of Sir John’s wound, rode off for a surgeon.*

“ The blood flowed fast ; but the attempt to stop it with my sash was useless from the size of the wound.

“ Sir John assented to being removed in a blanket to the rear. In raising him for that purpose, his sword hanging on the wounded side, touched his arm, and became entangled between his legs. I perceived the inconvenience, and was in the act of unbuckling it from his waist, when he said in his usual tone, and in a very distinct manner, ‘ It is as well as it is. *I had rather it should go out of the field with me.*’

“ Here I feel that it would be improper for my pen to venture to express the admiration with which I am penetrated in thus faithfully recording this instance of the invincible fortitude and military delicacy of this great man.

“ He was borne by six soldiers of the 42nd, and guards, my sash supporting him.

“ Observing the resolution and composure of his features,

* Colonel Graham, now Lieut.-General Lord Lynedoch, G.C.B.

I caught at the hope that I might be mistaken in my fears of the wound being mortal; and remarked, that I hinted when the surgeons dressed the wound, that he would be spared to us, and recover. He then turned his head round, and looking steadfastly at the wound for a few seconds, said, 'No, Hardinge, I feel that to be impossible.'

"I wished to accompany him to the rear, when he said, 'You need not go with me—report to General Hope that I am wounded, and carried to the rear.'

"A serjeant of the 42nd, and two spare files, in case of accident, were ordered to conduct their brave General to Coruña, and I hastened to report to General Hope.

"I have the honour to be,

"H. HARDINGE." *

The prevalent error which this letter tends to correct is contained in the statement that the hilt of Sir John's sword entered the wound, an error over

* Major-General the Right Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge, entered the army very young, and joined his regiment in Canada before he was fifteen years old. At the peace of Amiens, he returned to England; in 1804 he obtained the rank of Captain in the 57th, and entered himself student at the Military College, where having sedulously devoted himself to the more scientific branches of his profession, he was selected to fill a staff appointment in the expedition to Spain in 1807, under Sir Brent Spencer.

In 1808, the corps of Sir Brent Spencer was united with the army of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and Sir Henry Hardinge became actively employed in the campaign in which Junot was driven from Portugal, and was present at the battles of Roleia and Vimiera, in the latter of which he was severely wounded, notwithstanding which he was selected by Government to convey some important despatches to Sir John Moore; and was, as we see, at the battle of Coruña.

and over again repeated. Sir Henry Hardinge's statement gives the exact circumstances.

After the *Ville de Paris* parted from the fleet, Sir David Baird was but four days on his passage to England, "during which period," says Colonel Sorell, "I was almost constantly at his bedside. His mind constantly dwelt upon the events of the campaign; and his anxiety for the safety of the troops during the stormy weather which prevailed, was so intense as literally to endanger his recovery. On his arrival at Spithead he was met by his brother, General Joseph Baird, and on the following day was disembarked, and carried from the landing-place by sailors, on a litter, to the apartments which had been prepared for him at Portsmouth, amidst the sympathy of the populace."

He then returned to England, where he obtained his majority, and went to Portugal with Marshal Beresford, by whom he was appointed Deputy Quarter-Master-General of the army. He served at the passage of the Upper Duero, and was afterwards present at the battle of Talavera.

In the campaign of 1810, under the Duke of Wellington, &c. he eminently distinguished himself at Badajoz, Busaco, and Albuera. In 1815 he was placed at the head-quarters of the Prussian army under Marshal Blucher, and at the Marshal's side during the battle of Waterloo, his left hand was carried away by a cannon shot. Sir Henry tied his handkerchief round the stump, and continued on horseback till the battle was over.

At the conclusion of the war he was returned to Parliament, and has successively filled the important offices of Secretary of State for Ireland, and Secretary at War. He is a Knight Commander of the Bath; of very many foreign orders; and a Privy Councillor.

On the 25th January the *Ville de Paris* arrived at Portsmouth, and we find the following particulars of the landing of Sir David Baird in the Morning Chronicle of January 28th and 30th of that year.

“Portsmouth, Jan. 26th. Sir David Baird has no fever. He is in good spirits. His appetite is good, and upon the whole he is wonderfully well. The boisterous weather to-day prevented his coming ashore from the *Ville de Paris*; he will to-morrow if it moderates. It is a wonderful fact, that the spirit, zeal, and energy of this officer enabled him to support himself in the field more than an hour after he received his wound, holding up his arm.

“When he was taken to the surgeon from faintness, he desired that the limb might be amputated instantly, if necessary. It was the wish of the surgeon to delay the operation a day, but Sir David Baird said, “No; I wish not to keep it longer if it is necessary to be done.” The ball struck him so high up, that the arm is not only taken out of the socket, but the upper part of the shoulder is much torn up.”

“Portsmouth, Jan. 27th. This morning Colonel Baird (brother of Sir David), Captain Gregory, and Dr. M’Grigor (who attends Sir David), went off to the *Ville de Paris* in her barge, to bring Sir David on shore.*

“At noon Sir David was landed in a large cot, which is used for swinging ladies on board ship in. He was carried

* Dr. (now Sir James) M’Grigor, Bart. K.C.T.S. &c. &c. was the friend as well as medical attendant of Sir David Baird. The writer of this memoir takes this opportunity of making his acknowledgements for the kind attention and valuable communications connected with this work, which he has received from that eminent and valuable public officer.

in the arms of several of the crew of the *Ville de Paris* to Mrs. Bilstead's lodgings, in the High Street. A crowd of persons assembled, whose hearts seemed big with the sight. They were so affected as not to be able to utter a word. The huzzas which would have attended his landing, were repressed by the affecting appearance of Sir David, whose fine manly figure and countenance seemed worn with fatigue, anxiety, and pain. We are, however, happy to hear that he is as well as can be expected."

As soon as the state of Sir David's wound permitted, he removed from Portsmouth to London, where he had the advantage of the advice and attendance of the late Sir Everard Home, Sir James M'Grigor, and other professional men of eminence. Although the operation of removing the arm had been performed with considerable skill, its nature, and the unfavourable circumstances under which it took place, made it long before a perfect recovery was effected.

One of the first public duties Sir David Baird performed after he was able to quit his house, was to attend a levee of his late most excellent Majesty King George the Third, when he received the insignia and kissed hands, upon being appointed a Knight of the Bath.

CHAPTER XII.

MOTIONS OF THANKS TO SIR DAVID BAIRD IN BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT—SIR DAVID'S REPLY—RETIRES INTO THE COUNTRY—CREATED A BARONET—MARRIES—REMOVES TO SCOTLAND—VISITS LONDON—PREFERS HIS CLAIMS TO A MILITARY PEERAGE—THEY REMAIN UNNOTICED—APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY IN IRELAND—LETTER TO THE DUKE OF YORK—SIR DAVID'S OPINIONS UPON THE STATE OF THAT COUNTRY—HE IS SWORN OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL—VISIT OF KING GEORGE THE FOURTH TO DUBLIN—SIR DAVID RENEWS HIS CLAIM TO THE PEERAGE—REDUCTION OF THE TROOPS IN IRELAND—SIR DAVID'S REMONSTRANCE—LORD WELLESLEY APPOINTED LORD LIEUTENANT—COMMAND REDUCED TO THAT OF A LIEUTENANT-GENERAL—SIR DAVID RETURNS TO ENGLAND—LETTER TO THE DUKE OF YORK—HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS'S ANSWER—LETTER FROM MR. PEEL—SIR DAVID MEETS WITH A SERIOUS ACCIDENT—CONSEQUENT ILLNESS—APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF FORT GEORGE—ATTENDS THE KING'S LEVEE—RETURNS TO EDINBURGH—INCREASED ILLNESS—IS REMOVED TO FERN TOWER—TEMPORARY AMENDMENT—SUFFERS A RELAPSE—CONCLUDING DETAILS AND OBSERVATIONS.

ON the 25th of January, Lord Liverpool in the House of Peers, and Lord Castlereagh in the House of Commons, moved the thanks of Parliament to Sir David Baird, and the officers and troops under his command, "for their gallant conduct in repulsing a superior French force before Coruña."

In the debate which strangely arose out of this motion, Lord Moira arraigned the conduct of minis-

ters, as having marred the greatest opportunity that ever presented itself, and declared, that all hopes which might have been formed of establishing an alliance on the Continent had utterly vanished ; and his lordship, having declared that not a state in Europe would have anything to say to England, added, that nothing but the interference of the country itself could save it, by putting an end to a system of weakness and incompetence that was hurrying it into ruin.

Lords Mulgrave and Sidmouth ably defended the policy of the Government, and the latter noble lord, in repelling the gloomy forebodings of the noble earl, said, in eulogizing the conduct of the gallant officers concerned in the campaign, that when he considered the disadvantages under which the battle of Coruña was fought ; that it was after a rapid march of seventeen days successively, by routes hardly practicable, through a country affording no resources ; it appeared to him as one of the most noble instances of courage and patience that the military annals of any country could boast.

Lord Grenville, who, in common with all the noble lords who spoke, eulogized the valour and perseverance of the Generals commanding, and the gallantry of every individual composing the army, took a similar tone with Lord Moira :—" The conduct of the troops," said his lordship, " is above all praise. They discharged their duty to their country. The failure and slaughter through which they had passed to the last exhibition of their valour,

they owed solely to the disastrous councils which employed that valour *upon a frantic and impracticable object.*" His lordship subsequently denounced the expedition as "visionary and frantic," and concluded an eloquent speech, replete with praises of the army and its commanders, with this prophetic sentence: "Disasters might have been expected, but success was *impracticable.* The fault was in the system, in the *advisers of this notable plan for opposing the overwhelming power of France,* and not in the brave men who were charged with the desperate task of executing it. Of a country so governed, and so content to be governed, *no sanguine expectations could be entertained.*"

Lord Grenville and Lord Moira were replied to, by Lord Westmoreland, who observed, that it was rather strange that the latter noble earl, who had expressed such deep and unfeigned concern for the failure of the expedition to Spain, had none of those poignant feelings for the *little* military disasters that took place under the administration of which he formed a part, — for the brilliant enterprise at Alexandria, the no less noble achievement at Constantinople, or the triumphs of Buenos Ayres.

"It was strange," continued the noble Earl, "that the noble baron (Grenville,) also never gave vent to his sorrow in that house when the subject of the return through Holland, much more calamitous than this to Coruña, was under discussion, or when the troops were brought away from the Helder. Their Lordships heard nothing upon

those occasions from the two noble lords, of useless sacrifices of British blood and valour. He lamented that they did not then display a portion of that exquisite feeling with which they appeared to overflow at present."

The motion of thanks was carried unanimously.

Lord Castlereagh, in the House of Commons, moved the thanks of the House to General Sir David Baird, and all the other Generals and Officers engaged in the battle of Coruña, and of high approbation of the conduct of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the army, for the valour displayed by them on that day. This motion was carried unanimously.

On Monday, January 31st, the Lord^s Chancellor acquainted the House that he had received a letter from Sir David Baird, expressing his gratitude for the honour conferred upon him by their vote of thanks for his conduct in the battle of Coruña.

On the following day, in the House of Commons, the Speaker acquainted the House that he had received a letter from Sir David Baird, in answer to the communication he had made to that gallant officer, of the vote of thanks passed on Wednesday last to him, and to the army under his command.

The Speaker then read Sir David's letter, which shortly expressed his thanks to the House for the honour thus conferred on him, and the army under his command, and a high sense of the approbation of Parliament. It concluded by requesting the Speaker to make these sentiments known to the House, and

particularly thanking him for the very polite and flattering manner in which he had conveyed the sense of Parliament.

After receiving these testimonies of national gratitude, and having been honoured with the red ribbon, Sir David suffering extremely, not only from the amputation, or rather, extraction of his arm from the socket, but from a wound, simultaneously inflicted by the same shot, in his side, sought the advantages of repose after his long and arduous course of service; and accordingly purchased a small estate in Hertfordshire, called Yardleybury, at which place he constantly resided, with the exception of occasional visits to London, until the spring of 1810.

On the 13th of April 1809, he was created a baronet, with remainder, in default of male issue, to his brother, Mr. Baird, of Newbyth; a distinction, however, which he considered so inadequate to his services, that it was with reluctance he accepted it at the persuasion of his friends.*

On the 4th of August 1810, Sir David Baird married Miss Campbell Preston, niece of Sir Robert Preston, of Valleyfield, Bart.†

* A baronetcy of Scotland has been in the family of Baird ever since the year 1695. On the demise of Sir David, he was succeeded in the new baronetcy of 1809 by his nephew, now Sir David Baird, who married August 10th, 1821, his cousin, the Right Honourable Lady Anne Kennedy, eldest daughter of the Marquis of Ailsa.

† The family of Preston is of great antiquity; their original seat was Craig Millar Castle, near Edinburgh, the magnificent

After his marriage, he generally resided on an estate in Perthshire, which Lady Baird inherited from her maternal grandmother. He enlarged the house, embellished the grounds, and lived in a style of splendid hospitality, beloved, honoured, and respected, by all ranks in the neighbourhood. His active mind soon found occupation and amusement in superintending his farms and plantations, and the various improvements in progress on his estate; and, although the severity of his wound, and the loss of his arm, disabled him in a degree from enjoying some of his favourite sports, still he was enabled to pursue others, and was on horseback for several hours every day; and *shot*, as he himself said, as well as ever he did in his life.

Happy in domestic life, he here appeared to forget the mortifications and disappointments which it had been his fortune to encounter, during his long and brilliant military career. Nor did his generous heart harbour one jealous feeling towards his more favoured companions in arms. He took an anxious interest in the progress of the Peninsular war, sincerely and cordially rejoicing in the success of the Duke of Wellington. Every fresh victory was

ruins of which attest the wealth and importance of its owner. A younger son of Sir Simon Preston of Craig Millar, was a great favourite at the court of James the Sixth, then frequently resident at Dumfarlane, and he obtained a grant of the estate of Valleyfield in that neighbourhood, and was afterwards, in the year 1637, created a baronet of Nova Scotia. From him the present worthy and venerable baronet is directly descended.

hailed by him with unaffected delight ; and at no board was the health of that illustrious commander drunk with more ardent enthusiasm, than at that of Sir David Baird.

In 1814, when Sir David was in London, at the time the Emperors and the King of Prussia were on a visit to England, a creation of military Peers took place, and Lords Lynedoch, Hill, Beresford, Niddry, and Combermere, as forming the Duke of Wellington's "staff," had titles and pensions of £2000 a-year each, conferred upon them. Sir David was urged by his friends to state his claims to a similar reward. He did so, in a plain unvarnished memorandum of his services, to Lord Liverpool ; but this, like all his other applications, remained unnoticed and unattended to.

It would sound, perhaps, illiberal to attribute the continuous neglect of Sir David's claims to an interest exerted against him in influential quarters ; but certain it is, that the annals of military history do not record a similar instance of inattention or coldness, exhibited towards a soldier first amongst the bravest and best, who never hesitated to put himself in the front of the battle, and who never, where he commanded, quitted the field but triumphantly.

At a subsequent period, upon the removal of Lord Cathcart from the command in Scotland, a request from Sir David to succeed his Lordship there, met with as little success as any of those which had preceded it. The cause, (at least the

ostensible cause,) of this failure, however, was the decision of Government to reduce the command to that of a major-general.

In the year 1820 another application from Sir David for the command of the forces in Ireland, was more successful, and accordingly we find the following acknowledgement of the appointment, dated Brighton, 27th February, in that year, addressed to his Royal Highness Field Marshal the Duke of York, Commander-in-chief.

€
SIR,

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter of the 26th instant, informing me that His Majesty has been graciously pleased to appoint me to the command of the forces in Ireland, and that it is essential I should relieve Sir George Beckwith at my earliest convenience after the 24th proximo. And at the same time your Royal Highness is pleased to express your satisfaction at my appointment, for which I beg leave to offer you my best acknowledgments.

Be assured, Sir, I am highly sensible of the honour done me by intrusting to me so important a command, and it shall be my earnest endeavour to merit a continuance of His Majesty's and your Royal Highness's confidence and approbation.

In obedience to the commands contained in your Royal Highness's letter, I shall be in Dublin about the 24th of March, in order to carry them into effect.

I have the honour to remain,

With the highest respect,

Sir,

Your Royal Highness's most obedient and faithful servant,

D. BAIRD, *Gen.*

At the period of Sir David's appointment to the command in Ireland, that country was happily placed under the government of Earl Talbot, a nobleman of sound constitutional principles, a rigid adherence to which, could alone have saved it from the state of ruin and rebellion into which it has fallen by the mistaken adoption of a system of concession, which, in the teeth of long-recorded evidence, the English Government unfortunately adopted, in the belief, or perhaps we should rather say, the hope, that what was called Religious Emancipation, would produce Political tranquillity.

The opinions of Sir David Baird were strongly opposed to this principle; he felt—how truly and justly subsequent events have completely shown—that to yield one point was only to encourage a further demand. He was convinced that the boasted panacea would *not* tranquillize Ireland, while it must inevitably lead to the overthrow of the established Church; and he proceeded to assume the command firmly convinced in his own mind that things were gradually getting worse in that country, and that the sooner the Government took its stand the better. Better, indeed, and more humane, we are sure would it have been, had such a course been pursued.

Sir David Baird was extremely happy in the command in Ireland. It afforded him sufficient occupation to amuse and employ his mind. The duty was not more than he could perform with ease to himself and advantage to his country, while his

return to active life, and the military habits of earlier days, evidently improved his health and spirits. In Dublin he was respected, honoured, and caressed, and the firmness of character which he invariably exhibited in matters of duty, did not prevent his being one of the most popular generals that ever held the appointment.

At this period he was sworn of His Majesty's most honourable Privy Council in Ireland.

In 1821 his late lamented Majesty, King George the Fourth, visited Dublin, and evinced the highest personal consideration towards Sir David Baird; and as the coronation had already been marked by the creation of some new Peers, and it was considered extremely probable that one or two more might be added to the number, the friends of Sir David judged that to be a favourable opportunity, (now that the Peninsular heroes had been rewarded,) again to urge his claim; and it was at this period that he transmitted to Lord Sidmouth the original letter of Lord Wellesley, with regard to the offer of the red ribband or the pension, to which we have before referred, in order to prove to his lordship, that although Sir David received the Order of the Bath after the battle of Coruña, in which he lost a limb, he had, in the opinion of the Governor-General of India, earned it ten years before.

To these claims he received no favourable answer, although perhaps we ought not to omit to notice the

general opinion, that a peerage was actually destined for him about the time of his lamented death : this, although but a report, we mention from a desire to be impartial ; supposing it to have been well-founded, the delay gave an ungracious character to the intention, and as results unfortunately proved, rendered it altogether nugatory. We should add, however, that Sir David himself had no reason whatever for believing the rumour.

It was during his Majesty's stay in Dublin that a partial reduction of the troops on the Irish Establishment took place, contrary to the earnest remonstrances of Sir David Baird ; remonstrances founded on a thorough knowledge of the *real* state of the country. Two companies of each regiment, and the 19th regiment of dragoons, were at once disbanded ; and the carrying this reduction into effect was left as a duty for Sir David himself to perform, in direct opposition to his own feelings and judgment.

About the same period it was intimated to Sir David, that in all probability the Irish command itself would, after the example of Scotland, be reduced. It is most likely that the disturbed state of the country, which began to manifest itself shortly after the departure of the King, delayed this arrangement.

To any person who reads, and certainly to the person who writes this memoir, nothing can appear more curious as a coincidence than the frequent col-

lisions on service between Lord Wellesley and Sir David Baird. At the period of which we are now treating, a change of public affairs brought Lord Wellesley to Ireland as the successor of Earl Talbot in the high office of Lord Lieutenant.

His Excellency arrived in Dublin about the 30th of December, 1801, and Sir David Baird continued Commander of the forces until the following June, when the anticipated reduction of the importance of the command was carried into effect upon a principle of economy. The commander of the forces was removed, and his place supplied by a Lieutenant-General commanding. The latter functionary, however, was to have an allowance for table-money, thus making this economical arrangement, which disqualified Sir David from holding the appointment, turn out as we believe, to be no economy at all.

Under the new system, Sir Samuel Auchmuty, whose name has frequently appeared in the course of this memoir, who was on Sir David's staff in the memorable passage across the Desert, and who had at the period of which we are now treating attained the rank of Lieutenant-General, was appointed to the modified command.*

* Sir Samuel enjoyed this appointment but a very short time ; he was riding in the Phoenix Park on Sunday the 11th of August following his arrival, accompanied by Colonel Thornton the Deputy-Adjutant-General, when he fell from his horse in a fit of apoplexy, and expired. He was carried into the mili-

We find the following letter from Sir David, addressed to Sir Herbert Taylor, at present the private secretary of His Majesty King William the Fourth, and who, in 1822, held the responsible situation of secretary to the Commander-in-chief.

Royal Hospital, Dublin, 24th June, 1822.

SIR,

Having in obedience to His Majesty's orders delivered over the command of the army, in Ireland, to Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Auchmuty, I feel anxious to submit to his Royal Highness a few brief observations on the state of the country at the moment of my departure from Dublin.

Considering the agitation and alarm which prevailed generally towards the close of the last, and in the early part of the present year, and the character of open insurrection which the disorders had assumed in the south, it cannot but be a source of gratification to contemplate the tranquil state of the country at the present moment.

No act of outrage worth recording has occurred since my military secretary addressed to you the usual confidential report at the commencement of June, and I trust the severe check and consequent lesson the disaffected have received, may serve to show them the danger of acting upon

tary hospital, but no sign of life remained. At the time of this melancholy event, he was a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath, and Colonel of the 78th regiment of foot.

In consequence of this distressing circumstance, the Lord Lieutenant postponed the celebration of His Majesty's birthday, and the anniversary of his landing in Ireland. Sir Samuel was a most distinguished officer, and universally beloved and respected in private life. His remains were embarked for England under military honours, and attended by a large concourse of persons of all classes.

the distresses and prejudices of the peasantry, and of misleading them into schemes subversive of the Government and public peace.

In expressing this hope, I must however accompany it by my humble opinion, (founded on all the observation I have been able to make since my arrival in Ireland,) that the number of disaffected is very considerable, although they may be deficient in leaders of rank or influence; that they entertain designs hostile to the Government, and the present order of things; and that they act under the obligation of an oath which binds them to secrecy and mutual support.

The small number of arms which have been surrendered by the peasantry, will unfortunately justify a belief that there is no general disposition towards a final relinquishment of their designs.

The distress for food arising principally from the want of means to purchase it, continues to prevail in various districts; and the late accounts from the south and west are of the most afflicting character. Colonel Patrickson, whose regiment (the 43rd) has lately relieved the 57th in Galway, reports the scenes which that town presents to be truly distressing. Hundreds of half-famished wretches arrive almost daily from a distance of fifty or sixty miles; many of them so exhausted by want of food, that the means taken to restore them fail of effect from the weakness of the digestive organs, occasioned by long fasting.

Every effort is making by the Government to alleviate this distress, and the liberality of individuals has been very praiseworthy;—in the work of benevolence the military have borne their share.

Although I have repeatedly had occasion to report favourably of the conduct of this army, yet I feel it to be a duty incumbent on me in quitting it, again to assure his Royal Highness, that its conduct whilst under my

command, has been most exemplary and excellent. I have had reason to be fully satisfied with every department and branch of the service.

The general officers, the heads of departments, and the staff, have supported me with zeal and intelligence; and the officers and troops in general by their discipline, their temper, and their orderly conduct, have merited the esteem of the people amongst whom they are serving, and my best and warmest commendation. They have had harassing and painful duties to perform in the south, and the nature of the service generally in Ireland exposes the military to many privations and much fatigue, and to a dispersion which in a worse constituted army would prove fatal to its discipline and character.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

D. BAIRD.

Sir Herbert Taylor,

&c. &c. &c.

In reply to this letter, Sir David Baird received the following from his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief.

Horse Guards, June 29, 1822.

DEAR SIR,

Sir Herbert Taylor having communicated to me your letter of the 24th instant, written upon the occasion of your having delivered over the command of the army in Ireland to Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Auchmuty, I directed him to convey it to Mr. Peel, and I have now the satisfaction of sending you the copy of a letter from him, expressing his sense of your services, in the command which you have quitted.

I cannot do so without assuring you how cordially I concur in the sentiments which Mr. Peel's letter conveys,

and how persuaded I am that there is not a member of His Majesty's Government who is not equally disposed to acknowledge the value of your meritorious and zealous services, under circumstances often very trying, and always requiring assiduous and laborious attention.

I am more particularly called upon to thank you for your steady and unwearied exertions to preserve the discipline and efficiency of the troops; and I feel great satisfaction in assuring you, that in this respect, as in every other, you have discharged the important duties confided to you in a manner which has secured to you His Majesty's entire and unqualified approbation, and has fully confirmed the opinion of your character which your previous long, faithful, and gallant services in various climes had established.

Believe me, dear Sir, yours very sincerely,

FREDERICK,

Commander-in-chief.

The Right Hon. General Sir David Baird,

G.C.B. &c. &c. &c.

This handsome and gratifying letter enclosed the following from Mr. Peel, at that time Secretary of State for the Home Department.

Whitehall, 27th June, 1822.

SIR,

I have the honour to return your Royal Highness the enclosed letter, which Sir Herbert Taylor, by your Royal Highness's commands, placed in my hands.

I trust you will allow me to avail myself of this opportunity of expressing my sense of the services of Sir David Baird in the command of the army in Ireland, and my regret at the loss of them.

I well know the difficulties of the situation in which he has been placed, and the conflicting feelings that constantly

arise from a desire on the one hand to aid the Civil Government in the maintenance of peace ; and on the other to preserve the efficiency and discipline of the military ; and I cannot but express my warm approbation of the manner in which Sir David Baird has overcome those difficulties, and reconciled those feelings.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Royal Highness's obedient humble servant,

ROBERT PERL.

His Royal Highness the Duke of York.

A word need not be said upon such testimonials as these with which Sir David quitted Ireland, and returned again to England, to the enjoyment of the charms of private life, which he so conspicuously adorned; again, were all those amiable qualities which had before distinguished his domestic career brought into play, and he continued for nearly seven years the friend of the friendless, and the comforter of the needy and distressed.

In the autumn of 1823 an accident befell Sir David, the effects of which were extremely severe. As he was returning in the evening from a ride, his favourite horse fell with him. He was severely hurt, but he contrived to remount, and reached home not without much difficulty. He himself made light of the accident, and apparently recovered from the shock ; in the winter he proceeded with Lady Baird to England.

During his residence in London he was seized with a giddiness, which was followed by a long and violent illness ; and from that period he was never

completely re-established. However, by a rigid attention to diet, and the directions of his friend and medical adviser, Sir James M'Grigor, he continued to enjoy a tolerable state of health, and never experienced any similar attack.

No person unacquainted with the constant care which the nature of his complaint rendered absolutely necessary, could have guessed, from the cheerfulness of his manner, his uniform good spirits, his even temper, and the interest he took in all passing events, that he himself considered his life as extremely precarious: even when accession of illness brought the subject more immediately into notice, he would endeavour to lead the minds of those he loved, to contemplate with composure and resignation an event, which he thought might probably take place at a moment when they were least prepared to expect it.

In the spring of 1829 Sir David appeared considerably better, and proceeded to London, in order to be present at the King's levee on the 23rd of April, to kiss hands upon his appointment to the government of Fort George. From London he went to Leamington, and there he first began to complain of violent pains in his head; and having returned to London, he left that city for Edinburgh in June, still suffering excruciating pain in his temples.

By the time he reached Edinburgh he became so much worse that it was determined he should stay there to avail himself of the best professional assistance; very shortly after he was attacked by

fever, from which he only sufficiently recovered to be removed, on the 20th of July, with great fatigue, and difficulty, to Fern Tower.

Here, in his favourite home, he began apparently to revive; but even while these fallacious symptoms of improvement threw a gleam of hope upon those to whom he was so justly dear, he himself felt that the case was hopeless. With that calmness and composure, which forsook him neither in the day of danger nor in the hour of death, he arranged all his worldly affairs as if he had been merely preparing for an ordinary journey, and amidst the accumulating pains and increasing debility which he suffered, he endeavoured, when he saw they were observed, to cheer those around him with hopes which he did not himself entertain. This he did in tenderness to the affections of others, for he was a true Christian, and his hopes were beyond this world. On the 16th of August he suffered a severe relapse—on the 18th he breathed his last.

Thus quitted this transitory world, one of the best and bravest of men.—Not upon the evidence of facts alone, nor upon the proofs afforded us of his high qualities by the deeds which have immortalized his name, do we pronounce this unqualified praise of

his merits and his virtues ; but, in combination with all those recorded testimonials to his fame and honour, from the concurrent declared opinions of every individual who had the honour and happiness of knowing him ; opinions not expressed alone by men of his own country, or his own profession.

The native Princes of India, the chiefs of Arabia, the Beys of Egypt, the inhabitants of Southern Africa, the people of Spain, all have in turn expressed their admiration of his valour and intrepidity as a soldier, and their reliance upon his honour and consideration as a negotiator. The frequently repeated "general orders" of his superior officers in the earlier part of his career, establish the prudence and perseverance which he displayed in the maintenance of discipline, and the earnestness and readiness of the soldiers to follow him as their leader to conquest and to glory, are of themselves incontrovertible proofs that the rigour of command was wisely and justly tempered by care of their comforts, and consideration for their advantage.

From the letters and notes of military men of all nations, we have collected the highest possible praises of these qualities ; and to the letter of the late illustrious Commander-in-chief, upon Sir David's removal from Ireland, we may proudly refer as the crowning testimony to their extent and value.

"He was," says one who knew him well, "a perfect warrior, without fear and without reproach. —He was absolutely free from guile. It is possible that his generous and confiding nature may have

been over-reached by treachery and deceit in others ; but no man in existence durst avow an evil intention in his presence."

There is in these striking words an evidence of the nobleness, integrity, and generosity of his principles and conduct, which it is impossible to regard without something like veneration ; and assuredly it is only necessary to look back on this memoir to perceive the truth and force of what might otherwise seem the language of overcharged panegyric. The compiler of this narrative feels entitled to claim for the subject of it, the full amount of such evidence. That engrossing feeling of interest in the hero of his tale, which renders every writer more or less liable to the charge of partiality, he has no reason to disavow ; because he has been only called upon to record facts which speak for themselves, and which of themselves are the best commentaries on the exemplary life of Sir David Baird.

There is, however, another testimony to the worth and excellence of that distinguished man, which as little requires the colouring of friendship or the skill of authorship ; namely, the unmingled feeling of respect and esteem entertained towards him by the numerous circle in which he moved, in the comparative retirement of the latter years of his eventful and chequered career.

It was in private life that the glories and virtues of his public conduct were traced to their true source ; and thus have they been even more richly embalmed in the recollection of many a stranger as well as

friend; for the same uprightness of purpose and intention which had inspired him with utter fearlessness in the discharge of his duty, whether in the Desert, the council, or the camp, still marked his conduct there. *There* he was ever seen to seek but for "the TRUTH," and to seek it only that he might be directed by it, to that which with him was synonymous, DUTY—or in the words of one who had many opportunities of observing the workings of his noble mind,—“He seemed in every case, whether personally interested or not, to be anxious to discover what was *right to be done, only that he might do it.* Anything like selfish considerations he never would suffer to interfere with this his favourite object; and by a look, “more in pity than in anger,” would he sometimes show what he felt, when he thought he observed the conduct or meaning of others less influenced by this high principle than himself.

Of the benevolence and kindness of his disposition, no one who knew him in private life could even doubt. It was manifest in his look and manner, no less than in the daily—we might almost say hourly—proofs he afforded of his desire to relieve, assist, and comfort. He had indeed “joy and delight,” in such deeds of beneficence and mercy; and the tenderness with which he listened to, and sought to minister to the relief of, any case of suffering, or bereavement, or distress which happened to be reported to him, or which he was called to witness, will long be remembered by the many who were

either the objects of his bounty, or who recollect the encouragement they received, when, telling him how and where he could lessen the pressure of suffering or want, they beheld the complacency, and gratitude, and thankfulness of the look with which he sought to repay them for thus affording him the luxury of doing good.

Many, indeed, had been the scenes in which the stern calls of duty required him to suppress the workings of such feelings for a time, when, amidst the shouts and defiance of opposing hosts, it was his DUTY to lead his troops to battle, to bloodshed, and to death ; but those scenes had passed away, and he who was remembered as the lion in the field, was now seen in the privacies of domestic retirement, seeking his favourite occupation in the kindest contrivances, and the tenderest endeavours to relieve, to comfort, and make happy all who came within the sphere of his benign influence.

While he thus sought to fulfil the second great commandment, he was seen to be under a deep-grounded conviction of the still higher and more important obligations of the first. Amidst the din of war, the great realities of that religion which he professed were never absent from his mind ; and no sooner did he quit those scenes in which he had experienced so many wonderful deliverances, than he showed, like every good and great man, how perfectly he knew and felt to whom he was indebted for a life preserved amidst such fearful hazards, and to

whose service he was especially bound by so many ties, to dedicate what yet remained of it.

Accordingly, his respect for religion and its sacred ordinances, was marked and sincere. He was a devout man ; and there might have been observable in him an even anxious earnestness to become more and more acquainted with that scheme of divine mercy on which he felt that his highest hopes must depend ; for if simplicity and pious sincerity of purpose have any virtue, or merit any praise, they seem to have been his, who in religion, no less than in conduct, appeared to desire to know the truth, in order, as we have already said, to follow it.

The comfort and support which he received from cherishing and acting upon such principles, were happily manifest in his last sufferings. No murmur—no complaint escaped his lips ; he spoke not of his own distress ; he only sought to soothe the spirits of those whose affection called them to witness it. He saw his end approaching without distraction—without fear—and with all the calmness and dignity which settled hope inspired ; and with a full confidence in the merits of his Redeemer, he waited the somewhat tardy advances of his last enemy, till the appointed hour came, which released the spirit from its shattered mansion—and even then the hand of death left untouched the fine traces of the calm and manly bearing of him whose soul had fled.

The respect and esteem in which this admirable man was held in his own neighbourhood, may best be understood by a perusal of the subjoined inscription on a tablet, raised to his memory in the parish church of Crieff, by those amongst whom he lived so happily and cordially.

To the memory of

Gen. the Right Hon. SIR DAVID BAIRD, BART.

G.C.B. K.C. &c.

This Tablet is gratefully inscribed,

by

The Inhabitants of the Parish of Crieff and
its Neighbourhood,

Not to commemorate his martial achievements, for these
are recorded in the annals of his country ;

But as their humble testimony to those excellences in his character, which they desire to see handed down to posterity, that they may be held in remembrance " while there is any virtue, or any praise, in things that are true, and honest, and just, and pure, and lovely, and of good report."

In him the sterner virtues of uprightness and unbending integrity were blended with all the charities of the kindest and most generous nature. " He was a father to the poor, and the cause which he knew not he searched out."

Nor was the disinterestedness of his benevolence more sincere than was his respect for religion and its ordinances. And to his unceasing exertions are this congregation chiefly indebted for the comforts and accommodations which they enjoy, of having now a fit temple in which to worship the God of their fathers.

It would be useless to enumerate the proofs which have been placed upon record, of the general sentiment towards Sir David Baird ; there is, however, yet a duty permitted us to perform, which we cannot fulfil without sincerely—we might almost venture to say devoutly—feeling its importance.

Lady Baird, the widow of this great and good man, when she was bereft of him who to her was ALL,—resolved to raise in the country where he first drew his breath, and where he at last resigned it, a monument, which, though perhaps he needed it not as a hero, she felt, in the devotion of her attachment, and in the tenderness of her regards, was her dear but melancholy duty to consecrate to his memory.

The Nation might have been proud to do as much, but it was reserved for *her*, who mingled with the highest veneration for his public qualities the sincerest affection for his private virtues, to rear a column which might serve for “ever and aye” to record the deeds of one whose name will never die ; and which, while it exhibits a splendid testimony of domestic attachment, will present to future generations a powerful excitement to conduct, such as it has been our pride and happiness to record.

The obelisk of which we speak is founded on a most romantic and beautiful hill on Lady Baird’s estates, and is exactly of the dimensions of Cleopatra’s Needle.

The following account of the ceremony of laying the first stone of this magnificent testimonial, will

be read with deep interest ; nor can we suffer the beautiful prayer of the clergyman who officiated upon the occasion, to pass, without that tribute of unqualified praise which it so richly deserves.

The first stone of the obelisk (a view of which, as it now appears, is submitted to the reader at the conclusion of this memoir,) was laid upon the 4th of May 1832.

Upon the peculiar circumstances connected with that memorable day, enough has been said in this memoir to render any further observations here unnecessary. The 4th of May was selected for the foundation of this column, because on *that* day General Baird TOOK SERINGAPATAM BY STORM.

We here subjoin a detail of the ceremony :—

“ CRIEFF.—It is no easy task to give a description of the imposing and interesting ceremony which took place in this neighbourhood on Friday last, when the foundation stone of the monument to be erected to the memory of the late General Sir David Baird was laid with masonic ceremonies and honours by the Provincial Grand Master of the western district of Perthshire, the Earl of Ormelie. It was not the wish of those most nearly concerned to draw together an unnecessary crowd on that occasion, and only a limited deputation from each of the nearest Lodges was requested to meet at the cottage at the entrance to that beautiful road which has lately been formed, and which leads to the summit of *Tom-a-Chastel*. They met at twelve o'clock ; and there they

found Lord Ormelie, with a number of gentlemen who composed the deputation from the Grand Lodge of Scotland, in their appropriate costume, with their insignia of office, jewels, &c. (which had been sent from Edinburgh with the proper officer for the occasion,) and the Rev. Mr. Touch, minister of Kinnoul, who officiated as chaplain. The procession was then formed, preceded by the tenants of Lady Baird's estates, a most respectable body, above fifty in number, dressed in black. They were followed by the masonic body in regular order, with their bands of music, and slowly ascended the hill. The interest excited in this neighbourhood, where the gallant General had spent the evening of his eventful life, beloved and honoured by all who knew him, had attracted multitudes to pay their last tribute of respect; and by this time, no less than three thousand respectable and well dressed people were on the spot, but so quiet and orderly, that not the least confusion ensued, and the procession reached the place where the obelisk is to be erected, without the least interruption.

The Grand Master took his place with the members of the Grand Lodge, and opposite to him, standing on the magnificent block of granite selected for the foundation-stone, was the chaplain, in his gown, who offered up one of the most beautiful and appropriate prayers we ever heard, to him who has said the memory of the righteous shall be had in everlasting remembrance.

The scene at this moment was imposing in the highest degree; the day was fine, the sun shone with unusual brightness. The romantic beauty of the situation, and the splendid view from Tom-a-Chastel, cannot be surpassed; and none, we believe, who have witnessed it can ever forget it. When the prayer was ended, (during which the assembled multitude listened with the most respectful silence,) the business of the laying the foundation-stone began. A bottle containing, as usual, coins, &c. was deposited in an excavation made for the purpose, on which was placed a brass plate, with a simple but appropriate inscription.

From the admirable arrangements made by Mr. Stirling, the architect, and Mr. Gordon, the superintendant of the works, the magnificent stone, not less than five tons in weight, was raised, moved forward, and laid on its bed, with the most perfect ease.

The usual masonic ceremonies having been performed, the Grand Master, in a most feeling and animated address, noticed before the multitude, the occasion on which they had assembled, the high renown and military achievements of the hero, and the domestic and Christian virtues of the man, energetically appealing to the attentive auditory whether amongst the many recorded proofs of his gallant conduct, this day did not recall one of the most striking, and whether they were not ready to rejoice with him in the recollections with which the

experience of many could this day furnish them, of the benevolence and generosity of his conduct and manners during the many years he had dwelt amongst them.

When his Lordship concluded, the band struck up the plaintive and beautiful air, "Rest warrior, rest;" the effect produced had in it something solemn and affecting in the highest degree, and many an eye was moistened with a tear.

The following is part of the eloquent minister's prayer upon the occasion, than which we think no conclusion to this memoir can be more appropriate.

"We bless Thee, that we live in a land of light and liberty.—Over all that is dear to us, Thou hast long created a defence, still permitting us to sit under our vine, and our fig-tree, with none to hurt us, or make us afraid. The battle hath been kept from our gates; long hast Thou maintained peace in our borders.

"From time to time hast Thou raised up brave and honest men, who have counted nothing too dear by which our rights and liberties might be preserved and defended. We bless thee for that undaunted boldness—that fearlessness even unto death, by which Thou hast made them the instruments of securing to us what we this day enjoy—of such Thou permiest us to cherish the remembrance.

"Behold us then, O our GOD! as we are now assembled before Thee—refuse not thy countenance to the purpose of our meeting. Thou hast thyself

declared the memory of the just to be blessed—we only seek to perpetuate it. Look then, we beseech Thee, down upon us with an eye of benignity and favour; for while we are this day called to minister to those feelings of respect and esteem, and conjugal affection, which seek to express themselves by an enduring remembrance, we too would rejoice in the work of founding a pillar of memorial to one whom we have so long been accustomed to hold in estimation.

“ Lord! prosper the undertaking. Extend, Almighty Architect of the Universe, Thy countenance and protecting care to those of our brethren who shall be engaged in this work. Cause them to go on successfully, that at last they may ‘bring forth the head-stone with shoutings;’—and thus may a goodly monument be reared, on which the eye of pious affection may delight to rest, and which may teach our children, and our children’s children, to think of things that are just, and true, and honest, and lovely, and of good report.

“ When they behold it from afar, may they be reminded that he, who had been one of his country’s bravest defenders, amid those scenes of havoc and of death in which he was often called to take so fearfully dangerous a part, was no less distinguished as the friend of his country by those gentler virtues which he cherished in the stiller scenes of private life, and by the exercise of which he sought to minister to the relief, the happiness, and the comfort of all around him. For we this day rejoice to


remember, that after he had long toiled, and often had suffered and bled in his country's cause, Thou didst at length permit him to rest upon his shield, and after laying down the weapons of his warfare, to spend the evening of his days in the land of his fathers, far from those fields of conflict and of blood, where his dauntless bearing had been marked and recorded ;—and, that neither the triumphs he had achieved, nor the trophies which he won, nor the honours with which a grateful country had invested him, could lead him to forget that GOD who had been his protector and strong tower, and the rock of his defence, in whom he had ever trusted.

“ We bless Thee, that while he continued to the last, to testify his veneration and gratitude to Thee the Lord of Hosts, he had joy, as the steward of thy bounty, in doing good to those who had none to help them ; and, that while we saw in him the lover of truth and uprightness, and unbending integrity, the patron and supporter of things that are excellent, we beheld those virtues blending themselves in him with all the charities of the kindest and most generous nature. We would this day remember the many proofs of its workings,—that the only reward he desired, he received, in the blessings of many who were ready to perish, whose cause he had searched out, and whom he had delighted to deliver. And, that, in the faith of the Gospel, with humble confidence in its promises, and with an earnest desire to be made meet for the inheritance which it reveals, Thou didst prepare him to meet

the last enemy with whom he had yet to combat, with composure, and hope, and peace in believing; and that he was thus enabled to achieve the greatest of his victories through the Lord JESUS CHRIST. Blessed, O God, is the man whose heart is stayed upon Thee!

“ We too, desire to put our trust in Thee, who art the confidence of all the ends of the earth, that through faith and patience we may be the followers of those who are now inheriting the promises. To Thee would we now commit ourselves, and all our interests,—as a nation, as a community, and as individuals. Let thy choicest blessings, and thy continued protection, rest upon our King, our country, and our laws; and let the spirit of that pure and undefiled religion, which alone exalteth nations and individuals, be more and more cherished amongst us,—that through its hallowed influences it may still be well with us, and with our children after us; so that, when at last this goodly scene which we now inhabit, with all its varied objects, shall have been swept from existence, and when the “ everlasting hills” themselves, together with the fond memorials of our respect, and gratitude, and affection, which they had long sustained, shall have passed away, as if they never had been, we may have a building of GOD, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens; and be permitted to enter into those mansions of light, and purity, and bliss, where men shall learn the art of war no more, where all strife and contention shall cease; where there shall be no enemy to

encounter, no danger to alarm, no fear of change to disturb us ; but where peace, and love, and joy, for ever reign ; where sorrow and separation can no longer be felt, and where death-divided friends shall meet to part no more, and Thou, O GOD ! thyself, shalt wipe away every tear from our eyes !”



APPENDIX.

The following is the despatch of General Janssens announcing to the Dutch Government the capture of the Cape of Good Hope; which is thought sufficiently curious to interest the reader.

South Africa, Cape of Good Hope, January 27, 1806.

J. W. JANSSENS, Commander of the Batavian troops, who constituted the late garrison of the colony, to his Excellency the Right Honourable S. J. SCHIMMELPENINCK, Pensionary of the Republic.

RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR,

I have to perform a most grievous duty in informing your Excellency, that the whole of this colony has been obliged to be surrendered to an enormous superior force.

The capital capitulated on the 10th instant, and was compelled so to do; and I myself, with the remnant of a small defeated army, was also under the same necessity in the Hottentot's Holland's mountain, on the 18th following.

Copies of these capitulations are hereunto subjoined. My conscience tells me I have nothing to reproach myself with.

Could the colony have been defended by as many hundreds of brave men as the enemy had thousands, she would have been preserved.*

* The accuracy of this supposition will be best ascertained by a comparison of the numbers actually employed on each side.

My grief is extreme ; not at my own misfortune, but at the calamities which oppress so uncommonly our unfortunate country.

I beg leave hereunto to subjoin a relation of the whole of the occurrence, which is not, perhaps, fit to be published as it is ; but in this, as well as in every other matter, I have thought it incumbent on me to inform the Government of my country as accurately as possible.

A part only excepted, the troops and all the Burghers behaved so as to deserve a better fate than that of being vanquished.

For the rest I beg leave to refer myself to the relation, and have the honour to subscribe myself, with unalterable attachment to my unfortunate country, as well as with the profoundest veneration of your Excellency,

The most obedient very humble servant,

(Signed) J. W. JANSSENS.

Sundry intelligence was brought, about sixteen months ago, of the probability of an enemy's expedition against this settlement. We were as much prepared to receive them as our means of defence allowed. Zeal and faithfulness of the armed burghers, rendered it possible for the Governor then to take the field with a corps, composed of men of various classes and colour, well disposed, and tolerably well provided with necessaries ; at present, the means of defence were less, with regard both to men and necessaries. Cloth had lately been imported for the poorly clothed troops, but had not been able to be made up. A year's scarcity of bread was now followed by the new crop, which was to begin to be reaped ; the last provisions, collected for the troops at several quarters, were consumed, and Government felt happy when a sufficient quantity of bread was secured for the next day in Cape Town. All the tents were worn out ; mortality, sickness, and crimes, had con-

siderably diminished the number of troops, and the harvest required the absence of a part of the burgher cavalry; nevertheless, the very small and singularly composed army was always kept on a ready and moveable footing.*

In this situation of things, verbal intelligence, and European newspapers, were brought on the 26th of December, which rendered it somewhat probable that, within a few days, we might be attacked by a most formidable force; not one moment was lost to complete all the arrangements already made against such a circumstance, and to be prepared for any event that might ensue.

On the 4th of January, at eight A.M., signal was made from the West of the Cape for a large fleet, and at nine o'clock from the Lion's head also. Reinforcements were then sent to Simonsbay, Muizenburg, Steinbergen, and other posts; the burgher cavalry were called from their cantonments to Cape Town; the alarm guns, for the interior districts, were fired. The commanding officers of the several corps were called to receive the necessary instructions, and the command of the castle and town was, on the former footing, conferred on the Lieutenant-Colonel von Prophalow.

The corps of armed burghers and auxiliaries mounted guard, and the army were ready to march. Military dispositions were making, and the light troops, with the Java light artillery, were marched to Blauweberg, to observe the enemy.

At five o'clock P.M. a large part of the fleet were already seen; namely, fifty-nine sail, between the Blauweberg and Robben Island.

In the morning of the 5th, at three o'clock, the army

* Nothing can more strongly illustrate the advantages of the subsequent arrangements of Sir David Baird with respect to the supply of grain to Cape Town, than this particular passage.

were assembled on their several places of alarm; the enemy were this day hoisting out many boats; and a company of burgher cavalry, commanded by the meritorious Captain Linde, were detached to Rietwalley and Blauweberg. A division of burgher cavalry of Stellenbosch were placed at the foot of the Tiger Hills, to wait for further orders.

On the 6th of January, intelligence being received of the enemy making some movements to land, the army marched at two o'clock P.M. to the Rietwalley, and took with them from the sea-lines a part of the crew of the stranded French frigate *L'Atalante*, who were armed. At six o'clock the army halted at Rietwalley. At seven o'clock we were joined by the light troops, who with the Java artillery, consisting of six one-pounders, and a part of the cavalry of Captain Linde, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Le Sueur, had observed the enemy at Blauweberg, and who had orders to retreat to Rietwalley, in case of their meeting with a superior force. This corps had, at their first engagement, two killed, three wounded, and three missing. Captain Linde and Lieutenant Albertus of the riflemen, remained behind to reconnoitre. They returned at nine o'clock to head-quarters, and made their report to the General. A council of war was then held with the commanding officers of the several corps and staff, respecting both the enemy's and our own position, and the necessary orders were given accordingly.

The 7th the army advanced at six o'clock A.M. to the enemy: the left wing in the downs, consisting of—two companies Hottentot light infantry, the two other companies being detached to Muizenburg and Simonsbay; the 9th battalion rifleman; a detachment of the burgher cavalry of Wium; a party of the light dragoons.

The centre at the right side of the downs in the plain;

consisting of — the 22nd battalion infantry ; the 5th battalion of Waldeck ; the French sailors ; the artillery.

The right wing, further in the plain ; consisting of — the squadron of light dragoons ; the horse artillery ; the riflemen of Waldeck ; the burgher cavalry of Human.

The company of Linde having been sent before to reconnoitre the enemy.

At nine o'clock the army halted ; the General himself, with a part of the staff, went to reconnoitre the enemy at a very short distance. He found several regiments in the downs between Blauweberg and the sea, covered by their ships ;—he estimated the number to be about 6000 men. Lieutenant Klapp reported from Saldanha bay, that an enemy's fleet had also entered that bay, and preparations were making for landing. Orders were sent to him, in case of necessity, to retreat as far as Stellenbosch, but previously to observe the enemy as long as possible, with his detachment, consisting of fifteen men.

At three o'clock P.M. the army advanced to Blauweberg's Valley's Plain, where they took a position, and the necessary precautions.

The General had by himself irrevocably resolved to attack the enemy, whatever their force might be. In the position in which they were, the attack was not easily practicable, as the troops must then, in their march through the downs between the sea and Blauweberg, be exposed to the fire from the ships before they could come up with the enemy, who were then still masters to refuse the battle, and to leave us exposed to the fire from the shipping. It was not much easier, but did not, however, seem impossible, to attack the enemy through a wide flat passage, having Blauweberg on the left, and a lower hill on the right side, although the fire from the ships could not be avoided, and the enemy, declining to accept the battle, and

moving to the left, could frustrate the intention, and turn the consequences against the undertakers themselves; but, as upwards of 1000 men were landed in Saldanha bay, and as similar landings might take place in other parts also, hesitating could only be attended with dishonourable consequences.

The General was convinced in his own mind that victory was impossible; but the honour of his country obliged him to combat, whatever might be the result. This he determined to effect next morning, and in the mean while consulted with the commanding officers of the several corps respecting the movements to be made, concealing from every person, two only excepted, (one of whom was the French Colonel Gaudin Beauchêne, late Commandant of the frigate *L'Atalante*,) his opinion of the hopeless state of things; endeavouring on the contrary to inspire all with confidence, without which no success in battle can be expected.

At night, between eight and ten o'clock, the enemy's ships cannonaded heavily against our waggons at Rietwalley; but the Burgher Captain, Van Reenen, caused them to be removed, so that the cannonading could not materially damage them. The intelligence received from some of the military and burghers, who were at the fore posts, made the General rest assured that he would be timely and correctly informed of any of the enemy's movements, so that he could allow to the principal army a short repose, and which was not disturbed by a heavy fire of musketry at midnight in the downs, which created a false alarm of the enemy's approach. The General being already convinced of the prudence and skill of the second captain, Linde, and lieutenant of the riflemen, Albertus, sent them to reconnoitre, who, not without danger, restored order, the confusion being occasioned by drunkenness of an European Ser-

grant, stationed with a party of Hottentot soldiers at the out-post on the beach.

On the 8th of January, being the day appointed for the battle, the troops were at three o'clock A.M. under arms.

The European troops consisted of men of all nations of Europe; the others were taken from the meanest, as well as from the most respectable families, even Java and Mosambick slaves were among the number.

The General assembled the commanding officers of the several corps, ordering them to proceed with the French Colonel G. Beauchêne, if practicable without danger, to the place where, the preceding day, he had been able very distinctly to reconnoitre the enemy, in order to render themselves acquainted with their position, and with the situation of the ground, while the said French Colonel would judge what the enemy's ships might be able to execute; in the mean time the different corps of this little army were to be commanded by the officers second in command, who would place them in the position in which they were to attack the enemy, and then to be rejoined by their commanding officers.

But before this plan could be executed, reports were received from the Burgher Captain, Linde, that the enemy were approaching, which however did not occasion any other alteration in our plan, than our marching to meet the enemy, without the projected reconnoitring having taken place.

At four o'clock we perceived the enemy in front of our right wing, beginning to form their order of battle; whatever might be their intention on that side, we could be assured of their not quitting the protection of, and the communication with their ships, but of their occupying the whole interval to the beach. To appear as if covering the whole of the enemy's front, we were obliged to change ours

by an eighth of a circle, which was effected in the best order, and our order of battle became as follows:—The greatest part of the squadron of light dragoons, with the horse artillery, formed the right wing, in order to be able to fall into the enemy's left flank.. The 9th battalion riflemen, two howitzers, and three six-pounders; the 22nd battalion infantry, *les marins François*; the 5th battalion of Waldeck; the two companies of the battalion of Hottentot light infantry; three six-pounders, and six pieces Java artillery one-pounders; the riflemen of Waldeck; further the burgher cavalry Van Linde and Human, and the division of that of Wium. The guns were occasionally taken from the line, and placed where they were required.

From the beach through the downs to the hills, no more than fifty men, viz. twenty riflemen and thirty Hottentots, could be stationed, who formed only a line of sentinels at great intervals.

The Captains Linde and Human had dismounted with a small party of brave burghers, and posted themselves on the heights.

Had we formed our order of battle properly and closely, we should then have made only a point before an extensive line. The cavalry were therefore ranged to the right as well as left in a single row, leaving between each other a roomy interval: the infantry in two files, with some space, not only between the men, but, because of the before-mentioned reasons and of the enemy's having but few cavalry, with large intervals between the different small corps.

At five o'clock the enemy attacked the left wing, in order to pass through and along the downs towards the hills. They had more horses than we could have expected—these had been taken on board at St. Salvadore. They brought six field pieces against us, and at first their howitzers were principally directed to our centre, where the General

stood a few paces before the line with his staff. A French Captain, by name Ricard, who came here from the Isle of France, was at his request joined to the staff; the first howitzer struck the said Captain Ricard's horse, and the General had the satisfaction to perceive that neither he nor any of the other officers near him were in the least confused at this or at any other of the following throws. Colonel Henry was almost always at his side, and the Adjutant-General Rancke also, unless called elsewhere by his duty. Colonel G. Beauchêne; the commander of the artillery, Steffens; the aide-de-camp, Verkouteren; the late Captain Engineer under the former Government, Thibault; the Lieutenant of the Navy, Pfeil; the Adjutant of the Commandant, Ayffmorth; the Burgher Adjutants, Breda, Munnik, Van Reenen John's Son, Van Reenen Jacob's Son, together with the cadet of the artillery, acting as under Adjutant, J. R. Dibbetz, preserved a coolness and cheerfulness, which I believe cannot be exceeded by any other troops. All of them received the orders as on parade, and communicated the same speedily and correctly; and that they might not appear to wish to avoid the danger, they would not even separate from the General, though he observed to them that their standing so closely was detrimental to the service they had to perform, and only augmenting their danger unnecessarily.

One of the first howitzers struck the right wing of Waldeck, which created more confusion than the General could have supposed. More howitzers fell into that corps, and the soldiers did not appear to answer the opinion which might be expected of them, from their general known conduct, and particularly in the campaign of 1794.

Before the fire commenced, but when the enemy were in sight, the General rode along the line, and addressed each troop in such a manner as he thought would produce the

best effect ; *all* of them then exclaimed with enthusiasm—*Huzza*—the privates of Waldeck, it appeared, more boldly. The General, however, entertained great expectations of the troops in general, and many of them answered it, for they did not show the least apprehension at the immense superiority of force before them, which now proved much stronger than it was supposed the day before, when it could not be properly estimated, from the whole of the enemy not being visible.

Besides a considerable corps of cavalry, although not mounted, and the artillery, it consisted of the 24th, 38th, 59th, 71st, 72nd, 93rd, regiments of foot ; one of which, however, was not on the field, but at Saldanha bay.

Those troops are the flower of the British army, and many of the regiments more than complete ; to these were added some hundreds of marines, and upwards of a thousand sailors armed with pikes, part of whom were employed in drawing the guns.

Returning to the narration of the beginning of the action, it must now be added, that the fire of the artillery becoming general, our artillery, burghers, and riflemen, considerably annoyed the enemy, and even caused different movements in some of their corps.

A fine and numerous Scotch corps advanced in front of our small number of infantry, and discharged a full round, but it being at too great a distance, few or none of them were wounded. This was a fortunate circumstance, according to the plan the General had formed from the beginning, which was to wait till the enemy had approached within a few paces, and then to fire a tremendous round from our side ; but the Waldeck battalion retreated in confusion. He rode up to them, conjuring them by their former glory—by the honour of Germany and Waldeck—by their beloved prince, and by every thing he could say, to stand, and show that they were brave soldiers ; but

neither this nor the request of their officers had any effect ; they did not retreat, but most shamefully fled.

As any longer stay with them would have drawn him back to too great a distance, he left the cowards, and returned to the more brave French troops, who still kept their position. He then observed, to his still greater distress, that the left of the 22nd battalion were retreating ; these, however, attended to his orders, and showed themselves willing to obey, but the confusion became too general to reform the line. The French, abandoned both to the right and left, were necessitated to retreat with great loss. Colonel G. Beauchêne, an officer of the name of Du Bellor, a cousin of the Archbishop of Paris, remained to the last, and the latter was severely wounded. Riding along the line, he found the grenadiers and riflemen also retreating, but not flying. The dragoons had formed together, and upon his order, marched off. He then first sent the Adjutant-General Rancke, and afterwards Colonel Henry, to Rietwalley, to make the retreating troops stand, and form a new position, while he with all the officers about him, and joined by the director in chief of the hospitals, R. de Klerk Dibbetz, kept the rear of the flying troops. The brave and steady tranquillity of those belonging to the staff was the same as at the beginning of the action ;—his aide-de-camp, the meritorious Verkouteren, captain of the cavalry, received a musket ball in his side, as also the commanding officer of the artillery, Steffens, though with less consequence. The French Captain, Ricard, had two horses shot under him ; a ball struck the General, but rebounded on something he had in his waistcoat pocket, by which means he was not wounded. The officers of the staff then requested him not to expose himself further unnecessarily, as they were of opinion that his presence might promote the restoration of order among the troops.

The artillery behaved exceedingly brave : only one piece

of those under the command of Lieutenant D. J. Dibbetz was lost ; but not till six of the horses, some artillery-men and cannon drivers, had been killed and wounded ; but the piece was spiked before it was abandoned.

A very heavy cannonade was still continually heard ; the General having ascended a height, with all the satisfaction he could enjoy at that period, perceived the red feathers of our horse artillery, who alone on the field of battle, continued a heavy and regular cannonade. Having come up to them, he found them acting with regularity, deliberation, and activity ; he expressed his satisfaction, and represented to the commanding officer, Lieutenant Pelegrini, that as they would in future be of further use, they ought not unnecessarily to expose themselves to the risk of being lost without having a prospect of an equivalent advantage, and that therefore they ought to retreat with the other troops ; this they considered as an advice, not as an order, and therefore continued to fire a number of well-directed shots, till the General gave positive orders to the officer to leave the field, and cover the retreat as much as possible, appointing him at the same time, in the name of Government, Captain of dragoons.

The General, on his way to Rietwalley, was constantly considering what was to be done under these unfortunate circumstances : the small useful remainder of his army could but be very trifling ; the town had almost no other defenders but its own inhabitants ; there was scarcely bread sufficient for two days, and it was impossible to have provided better ; there were also several other wants, and many more might ensue ;—by retreating into the town, all kind of communication with the country would be immediately cut off ;—the enemy might without firing a single shot, have compelled it by hunger, in a few days, to sue for a capitulation, the terms of which, from their enormous

superior force, they might not think proper to accept of; and the capital, protected by miserable works only, would have been attacked, and in the end destroyed, without any use whatever to us, particularly from the sea side; and the General, had he retreated into it, could not have proposed a capitulation without dishonour to himself. It is particularly to be remarked, that the English, neither on their landing, nor on approaching the town, sent any summons to surrender. The proofs of fidelity, vigilance, and attachment, shown by the brave burghers, did not deserve that their property should be unnecessarily destroyed, particularly as the surrender could not be delayed for any length of time; he therefore resolved to retreat towards the hills, in preference to marching into town.

In this situation, Simon's Bay, Muizenberg, and Steenberg (where two companies of Hottentots, and some artillery were detached,) were now no longer of any use to him. He therefore ordered Lieutenant Pfeil to proceed thither with all possible expedition, and to desire Major Horn, who commanded first, to cause the Government ship *Bato* to be burned; the ammunition to be spoiled, and thrown into the sea; the guns to be spiked, and the carriages destroyed; and then to march with the troops under his command to Hottentot's Holland's Kloof, the defence of which pass he would take upon himself: all of which was executed in the most expeditious and satisfactory manner.

At Rietwalley the troops were very judiciously posted by their commanding officers, far from the sea, in order to be without the reach of the fire of the shipping. There the General with great pain saw the remains of the Waldeck regiment, of whom he formerly had so good an opinion, at the same time firmly persuaded that what had happened was without the fault of, and with an inexpressible sorrow

to, Colonel Muller and some of his officers. He however conceived, that in such circumstances he ought not to show any weakness, and therefore ordered that corps, with an indignation denoting what had happened, to march to town immediately, and that the other troops should share the fate of their General.

The riflemen of that battalion, who had been posted at another place, behaved well; the General, therefore, gave every one of them his choice, either to join their battalion, or to stay with him, all of whom begged to stay, and the officers turned out but one man whom they deemed not worthy of that favour.

The position we were now in, could lead to nothing but being surrounded; orders were therefore given to march to Tiger Mountain, to the place called Rooseboom, there to refresh the troops, and procure them some rest.

At eleven o'clock at night, they marched from thence to the Erste river; and in the morning of the 9th of January, at nine o'clock, we formed a position there.

Having examined into the state of the troops, the loss sustained was found as appeared by the annexed lists.

The enemy's loss was considerable; but as this cannot be precisely ascertained, and as we do not wish to state anything in this report without being certain of its accuracy, we prefer being silent on this head.

The French marines (for several reasons wisely alleged by Colonel Gaudin Beauchêne,) could not with any apparent advantage follow the remainder of the army; they were therefore, towards evening, sent to Cape Town, in such a way that they might, by marching round the hills, still be able to get into town, so that in case of necessity they could be employed on the batteries, where they would be of much more service than by carrying muskets.

In the evening, the burghers from the neighbourhood of the town reported that the red flag from the castle (de-

noting martial law) had been struck, and a white one hoisted in its place.

Although the truth of this report could not be ascertained, it however rendered the retreat to the Hottentot's Holland's mountains necessary, and in consequence thereof the baggage was sent on.

It being impossible in the mountains to take care of the wounded, some of them were sent to Stellenbosch, fully relying on the good intentions of the inhabitants, and in full confidence that they had nothing to fear, even if the enemy were to take possession of that village.

In the morning of the 10th, at half past three o'clock, the troops moved on to the foot of Hottentot's Holland's Kloof, where they found Major Horn with the two companies of Hottentots and artillery that had formed the garrison at Simon's Town and Muizenburg; they immediately proceeded to transport through the Kloof every thing that was to go to the other side of the mountains.

The next night, at one o'clock, the report came that the Cape Town had surrendered by capitulation.

On the 11th we remained in the same position, and continued transporting the guns, provisions, and other baggage over the mountains.

On the 12th the following temporary organization of the divisions and companies of the different corps was effected, in consequence of the weakness of their numbers.

Grenadiers; riflemen of the 9th battalion; Waldeck riflemen; Musqueteers of the 22nd battalion; Hottentots; horse artillery; dragoons; artillery.

The quarter-masters were ordered under the commissary of war, and the surgeons and physicians under the director of the hospitals, to be employed as circumstances might require; the auxiliary artillery, and the Java light artillery having their dwellings, wives, children, and other property in Cape Town, were honourably discharged.

In the morning of the 13th, at one o'clock, a detachment for Zwellendam was sent on, under the command of Major Horn, and the men unfit for service were sent to Stellenbosch.

In the course of that day a report came in, that the enemy were marching forwards, and had approached near Stellenbosch; also, a Proclamation from the British Commander; whereupon the General issued a counter proclamation, copies of which were forwarded to the Landdrosts and Heemraaden. The burgher cavalry, commanded by the Captains Wium, Morkel, and Van Reenen, whose dwellings were in those districts already occupied by the enemy, were honourably discharged, and sent back to their homes, together with the under adjutants of the burghers. Their parting was affecting. The burghers shed tears when they took leave of their unfortunate Governor. The guns and baggage being carried over, the small corps d'armée followed at eleven o'clock in the forenoon. At four o'clock in the afternoon a British major, with a flag of truce, arrived at the advanced posts, and delivered to the General, who had proceeded thither accompanied by the director of the hospitals, R. de Klerk Dibbetz, two letters, one from the Commander-in-chief, General Baird, and the other from Brigadier-General Beresford, who commanded a large detachment, and was charged with the execution of the farther operations against us.

The said major was also charged verbally to invite the General to what the said letters contained. The General, without binding himself in any manner, observed, "that he had not been officially informed of any thing that had happened in Cape Town, and that he wished to see one of those who composed the late civil government. The major said, that there would be no difficulty in complying, and asked whom he wished for? The Governor replied, the Colonial Secretary; and it was promised he should be sent

to him. The General had always a correct account of the British force, and the British were equally correctly informed of his situation. The major knew, and mentioned our force, and asked for what length of time the General required suspension of arms; in reply to which was said, no more than would be necessary for him to pass the Kloof, as the English could easily conceive that about five hundred soldiers would not move from out of the mountains, and march through or by Stellenbosch, there to attack a considerable army; an armistice could therefore only be for our benefit, and as such, we did not desire that favour.

On the 14th nothing particular took place, except that Lieutenant La Ruelle, of the 22nd battalion, having got drunk on the advanced post, was dismissed, our circumstances not permitting any judicial form to take place.

The present position of the troops now sufficiently insured them from any attack on that day; the General therefore gave the necessary orders to the officers of the several detachments, for reconnoitring the ground, and taking every circumstance into consideration, to point out the best measures to be adopted for the interest of our unfortunate but beloved republic; and he himself, accompanied by a young officer, ascended the highest mountain, which afforded him the most interesting and extensive view.

Although the General was very well acquainted with the situation of the ground which he occupied, this view presented everything more distinctly to his mind; one thing, however, was certain, that among the enemy's officers some were just as well acquainted with everything as himself.

Desertion, which had already taken place, and everything denoting it, would increase; he made a calculation of what number of troops he could muster, exclusive of the Zwellendam detachment, when he found the number of Europeans (who still diminished every day) to be very

trivial. The remainder of the burgher cavalry was in a great measure employed in carrying on the correspondence with the interior of the country, and particularly with those places where it was most probable the enemy would attempt to surround us. But it could not be expected from these brave people, nor even required of them, to make any great resistance in their present circumstances; besides this, their number was scarcely sufficient to communicate intelligence to and fro, and of course far from being able to resist.

The small remainder longed for their homes; the English proclamation had made an impression upon them, that the General could not remove. There still was left a small stock of provisions, which would have lasted for some days, but the forage for the horses was mostly consumed. The soldiers not having received any clothing for some time back, were in the most miserable state with respect to that necessary. Almost all the guns were now useless, and became a great burthen; and it was proposed, if the plan which the General had formed could be found practicable, to destroy them altogether; for which purpose the necessary preparations were making. In order to be in some measure safe, it was absolutely necessary to have detachments of a sufficient strength in all those bays, and places where the enemy might land, not only on the coast, but also at any passes where it was likely they would endeavour to come through; but the smallness of the army did not permit this, and it was impossible to guess what the enemy's intentions were, as was proved from different correct reports received by the General. Some of the informers were well paid; but the best information came from honest, intelligent, and faithful farmers, attached to our Government.

Although a fine and numerous British force had approached at some distance in front of the Klouf, and of

Hottentot's Holland's mountains, no attack from that quarter was apprehended; but their numerous army, spreading their forces on all sides, and we having only a few men to oppose to them, it was not impossible but that by some efforts, executed at once at different points, they might be able to succeed in gaining the tops of the mountains. Several of the enemy's troops were embarked to be landed at the entrance of the Breede Rivier, Mossel bay, and different other places, which it is not necessary to mention, while one column was to march through the Roode Land's Cloof, and some other troops, except the waggon park at Fran-Sche Hoek, were to force through at different places. The position of our troops could, therefore, only be momentary, as we should be obliged to depend entirely on the enemy's mercy if a surrounding should be effected.

Our situation could therefore be but momentary, for the enemy having once surrounded us, we were entirely left to their mercy; to which is to be added, that an extensive tract of land was to be defended, and our cavalry, for want of water, were placed at too great a distance from our magazines, which were without covering, to be able to run to their assistance when attacked.

Small as our corps was, the situation of the interior parts did not at the present moment allow us to act with effect. The only plan, therefore, the General, upon a mature deliberation, found practicable, was to elect 200 volunteers from the wretched remainder of his troops, and to get rid of everything that could impede his motions. Every one of those was to have one horse allowed him, though it was not expected he should fight on horseback, a good musket or rifle, according to their fancy, with the necessary ammunition, and which was to be called the Governor's Legion, in order to keep the name of Governor still alive; but the ammunition wanted for this purpose

could not be carried by the men, and there was no prospect of having a supply of forage for some time to come. With this corps the General meant to march into the interior of the country, and although not able to do anything of importance, he could, notwithstanding, annoy the enemy for a considerable time before the last of his troops were destroyed, but to effect which it was requisite that almost naked men should not demand clothing, forget their daily pay, not think of receiving their rations, and, far from wishing for a house, not even a tent must be asked for. If all this could be effected, the result was, that the General hoped to incite some of the countrymen, who had formerly shown such an aversion to the British, to accompany him in his Arabian expedition.

But the legion being obliged to alter its position every moment, of course not one point could possibly be defended, and the whole country would in consequence be ruined. Such of the enemy as would be opposed to the legion neither could nor would have spared the property of those farmers who had assisted the General. The idea of the great misfortunes of the country might induce those who till now were attached to the Netherlands, to join the British, in order to preserve their family and property; and a great part of the Hottentots might, by a reward of money and liquor, and a prospect of unpunished licentiousness, be much easier procured by the British, who had abundance of everything, than by the unfortunate Dutch commander. If this plan would have effected the opposition of a considerable British force for any length of time, these considerations would, in that case, not have had much weight, but the country itself, with the assistance of a few English, would soon yield sufficient to destroy the legion, and the principal part of this numerous British army might easily be kept in a situation to oppose any European force that might come to assist us.

Acquainted with the situation of the country, the General returned to head-quarters without fear or illusion, and communicated to the officers of the staff as much as he thought necessary of his thoughts on the nature of their situation.

The General had the greatest interest in the case, and therefore perseverance would have been but a trifling merit in him. Certain it is, that some would have remained faithful to him and the Netherlands to the last extremity, whatever misery might have ensued ; but few are possessed of such a degree of perseverance, for which not only a good mind, but also a strong constitution is required.

On the 15th Mr. Truter, late colonial secretary, arrived in the morning at eight o'clock. He had brought with him the capitulation on which Cape Town had surrendered, and confirmed the reports we had received with respect to the enemy's formidable strength ; from which it appeared clearly, that on the battle of the 8th instant imagination had not exaggerated the number of the enemy ; on the contrary, it had been estimated rather too short. The British, now in possession of the richest and most populous part of the country, had the means of procuring forage horses for their cavalry subsistence, and whatever they might further stand in need of, by which their strength was considerably increased.

The General having been informed of every thing he desired, though not fond of deliberation in military matters, resolved to take the opinion of the different commanding officers, the sharers of his fate. The General, to avoid unnecessary repetitions, represented to them the true situation of affairs, in the same manner as mentioned in this on the 14th, however, at the same time lightening, as much as possible, the appearance of the difficulties attached to their situation. The officers then present were : The General ; Colonel Henry ; Lieutenant-Colonel Harlingh ; Lieute-

nant-Colonel Le Sueur ; Adjutant-General Rancke ; Commissary of War Deel ; Director-in-chief Dibbetz ; Captain Steffens ; Captain Thyssen ; Captain Contamine ; Captain Van der Voorn ; Captain Pelligriny of Dragoons ; Lieutenant Matern.

Those belonging to the staff, who were not consulted, were : The French Captain Ricard ; Pfeil, Lieutenant of Marine ; Auffmorth, Lieutenant and Adjutant ; Lieutenant Thirio ; Lieutenant Klapp. Lieutenant Matern of Waldeck was not consulted. From what happened to that battalion, he could not give but a desperate opinion.

In the annexed papers, the different opinions may be found, and although there is no doubt of the bravery of the officers, it clearly appears that they were unanimously of opinion to make an honourable capitulation.

The General, though not inclined to weakness, would not, however, merely for bombast, contradict the opinions of all the others ; he only observed, that the best capitulation, how honourable soever it may be, is always disagreeable and humiliating ; but that, if such was to be the case, in order to soften the disagreeable feelings which must ensue from the surrender of the colony, they should stipulate in the capitulation for a free retreat ; for the army to retain their arms and property, and, without being prisoners of war, to be transported to the Republic free, and without any expense to them ; that for this purpose he would go and meet General Beresford, but at the same time promised, upon no account whatever to bind himself to anything decisive, and also give them previous information of his conference, and what the enemy would agree to, and what they would reject.

Secretary Truter was sent back to appoint the time for the meeting of the two Generals.

The volunteers for the Legion were now called for, and

noted down, and the General receiving a letter from Mr. Truter, departed that night, accompanied by the Director of the Hospitals, Dibbetz, who acted as his secretary.

The meeting took place in a house where the roads from Hottentot's Holland, Stellenbosch, and the Cape Town cross each other.

On the 16th, at seven o'clock in the morning the Generals met, and after the usual ceremonies, the negotiation began immediately. As no diplomatic forms or false representations could be of any use, the Dutch General began to state the case just as it really was, openly acknowledging his apprehensions, but at the same time strongly urging the damages and disadvantages he could yet occasion. His opinion was, that the colony becoming British, the interest thereof became of course the interest of that Government; but he soon discovered the great difference between the sentiments of a foreign Government and those of the mother country. The preservation of peace and happiness to the country people must, in its consequences, be equally favourable to the British troops and fleets; but the British General Beresford was of opinion that some sacrifices on our part ought to be made for the safety and happiness of the country people, as their only concern was merely to hold the place in order to prevent it from coming into the possession of a stronger enemy. The British insisted on the delivery of the arms; and this was the most essential point to us, in case the colony must be surrendered, as the remainder who still carried them had carried them till now with honour. The British said, that the honour of their arms required it; in answer to which we observed, that honour was acquired by victory, and would be increased by generosity to a small army like ours; but our observations proved fruitless.

After a troublesome and serious conversation of some

hours, the result was still the same. The Dutch General delivered to the British General his preliminary demand, consisting of two articles.

The British General then delivered in his demand, in writing, which he called the ultimatum.

They parted without having come to any terms. The Dutch General declared that he could not desist from his demand, and that he would inform his fellow soldiers of what had passed; and if any new proposals were to be made, they should (without binding the British in anything) be immediately forwarded to Stellenbosch. On taking leave, the British General was so kind as to ask for what length of time we wished to have a suspension of arms, which in a very polite manner we declined entirely.

At four o'clock in the afternoon the General came back to his head quarters, and at six all the officers that had assisted at the conference of the former day were again assembled.

The General having represented the true state of affairs, gave the three following points into their consideration.

1st. Whether everything should be refused; all unnecessary ammunition, cannon, &c. destroyed; and everything risked, as had been conditionally proposed at the last conference.

2nd. If any further proposals should be made to the British General, and what they ought to be.

3. In case these further proposals should be refused by the British General, whether others should be made.

Everybody having given his opinion on these points, it was unanimously resolved to make a new proposal, containing an offer to give up the ammunition and some of the cannon, &c. provided we should be allowed to retain all the arms made use of in the battle of the 8th instant; in compensation for which the officers offered to give up all the private property they had with them. (A copy of the

records of this day shows the particular opinions of Colonel Henry and the Commissary of War.) Although the whole of them concurred in forwarding the above-mentioned proposals to the British commanders, several seemed inclined, in case of necessity, to accept of the English proposals as they now were.

The General had examined and considered upon the list of volunteers for the Governor's legion. The number, excepting the officers, was very trifling; and as it was natural to conceive, many of them had offered themselves more from a principle of duty than from real inclination; and moreover Colonel Henry, with others, had observed that many of the soldiers who had volunteered had done so more for the sake of getting a horse into their possession, for the more easy execution of their particular projects, than from true attachment to the cause, demonstrating the truth of their arguments by the circumstance of some of the volunteers having deserted last night.

In the evening the acting secretary, R. de Klerk Dibbetz, departed for Stellenbosch, with a letter for the British General Beresford.

At four o'clock of the morning of the 17th the enemy was discovered at a certain distance from our advanced posts, consisting of one Scotch regiment, two pieces, and about fifty dragoons, all mounted, where they remained, and in the afternoon pitched their camp.

At break of day the General came to the Kloof, and from thence reconnoitred the movements of the enemy; and comparing this circumstance with the information received last night, that a strong column of the enemy had penetrated Fransche Hoek and further; and also of ships steering towards the entrance of Breede River, Mossel Bay, &c. he easily guessed what the enemy could and would do; which was the very thing that would be the most detrimental to us. He went along the mountains, through

the whole position, and addressed the officers and men of each different corps in the following manner :—" That it was not impossible to come to an honourable capitulation with the enemy. That the advantage or disadvantage depended entirely on the constancy and valour of the troops. That he believed he had foreseen what might happen, and assured them, that by obeying strictly the commands of their officers, so as they would obey his, the result would prove honourable to them, whatever the enemy might do. That in the event of an attack, which might be a general one, he would, as soon as the impossibility of making resistance appeared to him, immediately cause proposals to be made to the enemy then present, and that he would even do so as soon as they should have repelled with courage and bravery the first onset of the enemy, as it might naturally be expected they would constantly renew their attacks in greater force."

This measure unhappily became necessary, to prevent the total desertion of the men.

He further observed, " That he would give the soldiers one friendly advice, not to desert in consequence of want or fatigue, as in that case they would be obliged to enter into the enemy's service, who would send them on to Bengal, from whence they could not expect ever to return to their native country; whereas, by fidelity, they had the most certain prospect of going home."

The General had chosen a height in a valley, at a small distance from the chains of mountains, for his last retreat.

Although all the troops protested that they would strictly obey the General's orders, it was, however, easy to perceive that the not accepting of the enemy's proposals was not pleasing to some of them.

In the afternoon, between one and two o'clock, a burgher arrived with a letter from General Beresford, in answer to that which the Director of the Hospitals, Dibbetz, had

carried to Stellenbosch the day before, in which was inclosed a letter from the Director, and one from Secretary Truter.

If the situation of affairs was desperate on the day of the action, it had now increased every hour; the reports from the interior of the country proved that the owners of the ground which we occupied, from an apprehension of revenge, had ceased to assist us. Such of the officers as were present, who composed the former meeting, having been assembled for the last time, the result of their opinions was, that we were necessitated to yield to force, particularly as it appeared from the letter of the Director Dibbetz that some mitigations were offered.

The bitter draught was now to be drunk, and a letter was forwarded, to acquaint the British General, Beresford, that a capitulation would be entered into. All misfortunes now combined; the money sent to Zwellendam to be in safety, did not return till late in the night-time, which put it out of our power to make that use of it, which, had it arrived sooner, we might have done without any breach of faith.

After the arrival of the above-mentioned letter from the General, the Director Dibbetz arrived at head-quarters on the forenoon of the 18th, informing us that the British Generals were waiting at Hottentot's Holland, and that Secretary Truter would be at the foot of the mountains.

The General then repaired to an appointed place at Hottentot's Holland, in the afternoon, accompanied only by the Director R. de Klerk Dibbetz, when the capitulation was signed in the evening, with very great affection on the part of the Dutch. On several inferior points we did not meet with that indulgence we could have wished, for many articles more than have been mentioned were proposed, but as the answers proved very unfavourable, we thought it better to withdraw them.

In the night-time, between the 18th and 19th, the General returned to head-quarters, in that state of mind every true patriot must feel at a moment when an important and heavy loss happens to his country.

On the 19th the contents of the capitulation were put in the orders of the day. General Beresford paid a visit at head-quarters, and the ammunition and other necessaries which we did not intend to carry with us on our march, were given up to the English.

Orders were sent to Major Horn, commanding at Zwelendam, in consequence of the capitulation, to join head-quarters.

Early in the morning of the 20th the British took charge of the different posts in the Kloof, and at six o'clock we marched to Hottentot's Holland. The British General had the good feeling to keep his troops at some distance, probably to soften our unpleasant situation.

On the 21st the General repaired to Cape Town, in order to arrange several matters, leaving Colonel Henry in the command; and, agreeable to the arrangement with the British commanders, despatched an order for the troops to come to the neighbourhood of Cape Town, instead of marching to Simons Town, as they were to be embarked in Table Bay.

On the 22nd the troops came as far as Eerste River, and on the 23rd they pitched their camps at the Liesbecks River, where they had been encamped a year before, with much better prospects than at present.

After the General's arrival in town he was constantly occupied in making the necessary arrangements for his embarkation, and that of the troops. Many more, and still greater difficulties than he could have foreseen, occurred, with respect to other affairs, which will be stated to the first magistrate of the Republic, but are not material in this narration.

On this day, the 27th, it appears, from the worthy sentiments of the British General, Baird, that part of the above-mentioned difficulties will be removed.

Colonel Prophalow, who had the command of the town, having this day sent in his report, we hereunto annex a copy thereof, and of the documents accompanying it, and as his surrendering by capitulation, without having made any defence, may make an unfavourable impression, the General thinks that he would act very wrong in hesitating to declare "that it was impossible for this commander to make any defence, and in consequence could not but act so."

The British General now sending on some despatches. the General has been permitted to send home his by his aide-de-camp, Captain Verkouteren, of the dragoons, who still suffers from his wound.

This worthy officer the General may in confidence commend, with some other brave ones, to the protection and attention of Government.

That honourable, clever, attentive, and unwearied Commissary of War, J. Deel, did as much as under those troublesome circumstances, and even more than could be expected from the most celebrated administrators; grown old in the execution of the duties attached to that station, the returns hereunto annexed, will show, that if the embarkation of the troops does not immediately take place, the remainder of them will soon disappear by desertion.

After the misfortune which has befallen us, the General does not wish to make his own apology; the only thing he wishes for is, that every Dutchman, and particularly those by whom they are governed, may be thoroughly acquainted with all the particulars of his actions and conduct from the day of his arrival in this colony till the moment of his unfortunate removal.

(Signed) J. W. JANSSENS.

Castle of Good Hope, 27th January, 1806.

This document affords a striking illustration of the character of Sir David Baird; for even at the moment in which General Janssens is describing the sad results of his victory, we find him paying the highest tribute to his humanity, generosity, and good feeling.

No. II.

The following is a copy of a letter from the late Joseph Marryat, Esq. Chairman of the Committee of the Patriotic Fund, enclosing certain resolutions of that body.

London, April 16th, 1806.

SIR,

I have the honour to inclose you the resolutions passed at a General Meeting of the Committee for managing the Patriotic Fund, on taking into consideration your official despatches, relative to the Cape of Good Hope. They consider this event as of the highest importance to the security of the British empire in India; and as accomplished under circumstances peculiarly honourable to the commanders and forces employed on the expedition, from the great local difficulties which attended the disembarkation, and from the superior number of the enemy being such as encouraged him to contest the victory in the open field, till, in your own animated language, the British bayonet bore down all opposition.

I also inclose you a copy of the resolutions passed by this committee, in consequence of the late glorious victory obtained off Cape Trafalgar, to which the present resolutions allude.

The gratuities voted to several of the officers under your command, the nature of whose wounds was not specified in the returns, were founded on the idea of their being slight; one of them being mentioned as severe, which it is pre-

sumed was intended to be contra-distinguished from the others. Any mistake in this respect, will readily be corrected upon more particular information; and in making out the returns of the privates, you will have the goodness to request the surgeons to divide them into three classes:—slightly wounded, severely wounded, and those whose wounds are attended with disability or loss of limb.

From the cordial unanimity, as well as talent, which have marked the operations of this expedition, the same favourable consequences which have attended its first steps, may be expected to crown its future progress; and I trust this presage will be fulfilled, by a series of successes, equally honourable to yourself, and advantageous to your country.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

JOSEPH MARRYAT, *Chairman.*

Major-General Sir David Baird.

Lloyd's, 15th April, 1806.

At a General Meeting of the Committee for managing the
Patriotic Fund held this day,

JOSEPH MARRYAT, Esq. in the Chair,

Read from the London Gazette of the 28th of February, letters from Major-General Sir David Baird, and Commodore Sir Home Popham, with an account of the capitulation of the town and garrison of the Cape of Good Hope to His Majesty's forces under their command; also the London Gazette of the 8th instant, containing an extract of a letter from Major-General Sir David Baird, relating his subsequent operations against the Batavian forces, commanded by Lieutenant-General Janssens, which terminated in the subjection of the whole colony.

Resolved—That a vase of the value of £300, with an appropriate inscription, be presented to Major-General Sir David Baird, for the gallantry with which he effected a

landing in the face of a superior force of the enemy, and achieved this important conquest.

Resolved—That a vase of the value of £200, with an appropriate inscription, be presented to Commodore Sir Home Popham, for his zealous, able, and spirited co-operation in this arduous service.

Resolved—That relief be afforded to the widows, orphans, parents, and relatives depending for support on the officers, seamen, and marines killed; and that gratuities be given to those wounded, on the same scale of distribution as that adopted towards the sufferers in the late glorious engagement off Cape Trafalgar.

Resolved—That letters signed by the Chairman be written to Major-General Sir David Baird, and Commodore Sir Home Popham, requesting they will communicate the foregoing resolutions to his Majesty's forces under their respective commands, and furnish the committee with the names of the killed and wounded, together with such particulars as can be collected respecting the families of these brave men who have fallen in the service of their country on this occasion.

J. P. WELSFORD, Sec.

Extract from the Minutes.

No. III.

The following is a copy of the letter addressed by Colonel Sorell to Sir Walter Scott.—While these sheets were at press, that illustrious man was taken from us—we nevertheless print the letter; because as Sir Walter Scott *never made any reply to it*, it does not appear to be an act of injustice to give it publicity now.

Tours, October 1827.

SIR,

My absence from England, and other accidental circumstances, have prevented me from having an opportunity of

reading your "Life of Napoleon Bonaparte" until lately. Having learned that you are preparing a second edition for the press, I feel anxious to bring under your notice some passages in the work, which appear to have been written on very imperfect information.

I allude to your account of the campaign of 1808-9, in the north of Spain, under the late Sir John Moore, in which I had the honour to serve as military secretary to Sir David Baird, the second in command. The few remarks I am about to offer will, therefore, be founded either on personal observation or on the authority of original documents still in my possession.

I must, however, first observe, that the only copy of the work to which I have had access, is, of an edition published in English on the Continent by Treuttel and Wurtz, at Paris, and Strasburgh. This may occasion some little confusion in referring to the *numbers* of the pages.

The first passage to which I shall refer is at page 278, vol. vi. chap. 10, where you state, that "to accomplish the purpose of Government, Sir John Moore deemed it most convenient to divide his forces. *He sent* ten thousand men under Sir David Baird, by sea, to Corunna, and determined to march himself," &c. &c. This paragraph is full of errors. Sir John Moore was in Portugal, in command of the British force in that country. Sir David Baird was sent, with about 11,000 men, *direct* from England to Corunna, with instructions to put himself in communication with, and under the orders of Sir John Moore, on arriving in Spain. The general plan of the campaign was framed by the British ministry in London, under the advice of the Marquis de la Romana. The two British Generals were to form a junction at a point to be determined on by Sir John Moore, each moving separately on that point with his division of the army. Some want of information certainly prevailed at Lisbon, as to the state of

the roads between that city and Salamanca, which induced Sir John Moore to send his cavalry and artillery by a very circuitous route ; but no similar doubts were experienced by Sir David Baird in advancing from Corunna to Astorga, as the road was known to be excellent, from the report of British officers who had been sent in advance to examine it. The Spanish authorities insisted, that the troops should move in small bodies, under a pretence of ensuring subsistence, and to prevent unnecessary inconvenience to the inhabitants ; and, indeed, threw a thousand vexatious difficulties in our way ; but none arose from a want of knowledge of the nature of the country we had to pass through, as it had been sufficiently reconnoitred before we advanced.

At page 284 you state : “ Amidst the accumulation of disasters which overwhelmed the Spanish cause, Sir John Moore arrived at Zaragossa. This, probably, is a mere typographical error, from which the London edition may be free. For Zaragossa read Salamanca.

Page 286. “ Yet he finally ordered Sir David Baird, *whose retreat upon Corunna was already commenced*, again to occupy Astorga.” It might naturally be inferred from this passage, that Sir David had commenced his retreat on his own authority, and without instructions from his superior in command. This was not the case. Sir John Moore, immediately after the dispersion of the Spanish armies, ordered Sir David Baird to retire forthwith to Corunna ; to send back all the stores which had been brought forward for the use of the army when united, and to embark and proceed by sea, to join him at Lisbon ; himself at the same time intending to retire on Portugal. The retreat was commenced accordingly ; and to reconcile the minds of the population to this retrograde movement, an address to the Spanish People was published, containing assurances that it was in no way connected with an inten-

tion of abandoning their cause, but solely for the purpose of concentrating the British forces on a point, where their services might be more generally useful. Sir David Baird's head quarters had reached Villa Franca, on the road to Corunna, when he received orders, first, to suspend his march, and afterwards, to retrace his steps to Astorga, preparatory to a junction of the two divisions, with a view to the movement in advance, which afterwards took place.

But it is more particularly of your account of the subsequent retreat through Galicia, that I find reason to complain. So far from being ignorant of the strength, or inattentive to the resources of that country, Sir David Baird wrote to Sir John Moore from Villa Franca, (when the latter, intending to commence his retreat from Salamanca on Lisbon, had expressed his conviction that "Spain once lost, Portugal could not be defended,") to propose that he should make a flank movement to his left, and uniting the entire British force on the frontiers of Galicia, cover that province, supported by the remains of the army of Romana, strengthened by such reinforcements as might be organized in our rear. The probable advantages of such a measure were fully pointed out. It was observed, that Galicia contained nearly one seventh part of the entire population of Spain, and consequently was capable of furnishing numerous recruits to the Patriotic cause. That, from the strength of the country, there could be little doubt of our ability to defend it. That it would afford a sufficient supply of cattle to ensure our subsistence; and that by occupying a position on the confines of Leon we should threaten the right flank of the French line of operation from the Bidassoa to Madrid, which must operate as a diversion in favour of, if it did not paralyse the exertions of the enemy in the southern provinces; whilst the port of Corunna being open in our rear, would enable the British Government to reinforce or to withdraw us, as it might

deem most expedient, when it became fully acquainted with the real condition of Spain. I need not add, that his proposal was not acted on; but the disorders which afterwards took place in traversing this country most certainly did not arise from ignorance of its character for defensive purposes, but principally from the unexampled rapidity of the retreat, which exhausted the physical strength of the men, and prevented all possibility of keeping them with their colours. Neither had there been any want of attention to the formation of the depôts on the road; but our means of conveyance were extremely limited, and the effects of this difficulty were greatly aggravated by the first order to retreat from Astorga, in consequence of which everything which was being brought forward on the line from Corunna to that place, was put in motion again towards the rear, to be re-embarked for Lisbon. Still, a considerable magazine of forage and provisions existed at Villa Franca, which might have afforded a sufficient supply to the troops, had it been practicable to have made a regular distribution; but, as at Smolensko and Wilna, in Buonaparte's retreat from Moscow, as well as on every other similar occasion, more was wasted than usefully applied.

A desire to speak with impartiality of the conduct of every individual noticed in the work, even when that individual has been the enemy of Britain, is so apparent throughout the "Life of Napoleon Buonaparte," that I feel confident of the interest you will take in these explanations; and of your disposition to extend the same principle of justice towards one of the best and bravest soldiers our country had the good fortune to possess in her days of trial and difficulty.

I have the honour, &c.

T. SORELL.

Sir Walter Scott, Bart.

&c. &c. &c.

We submit the following extract from Colonel Sorell's notes on the campaign, supplementary to our own details.

I shall now proceed to offer a few observations on the advanced movement which followed the concentration of the army.

It is a maxim in war, which ought never to be departed from, that the object in view should be adequate to the risks to be incurred in endeavouring to attain it.* That the object was not worth the risk in the present instance, in the opinion of Sir John Moore himself, is evident by his letters.† The advance was originally intended as a diversion in favour of the southern provinces (for Madrid was

* Perhaps the Duke of Wellington's campaigns in the Peninsula furnish the best practical illustration of this principle upon record.

† See various passages in the extracts from Sir John Moore's letters already given. See also his letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated Astorga, 31st of December.

"From a desire to do what I could, I made the movement against Soult. As a diversion, it answered completely; but as there is nothing to take advantage of it, I have risked the loss of the army for no purpose."

"— This army, I have no doubt, would have distinguished itself, had the Spaniards been able to offer any resistance; but from the beginning it was placed in situations in which, without the possibility of doing any good, it was itself constantly risked."

Also his letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated Coruña, 13th of January, 1809.

"— Your Lordship knows that had I followed my own opinion as a military man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca. The Spanish armies were then beaten. There was no Spanish force to which we could unite."—*Moore's Narrative*, Appendix, pages 128, 129, 130. 132.

known to have fallen), and to this object was subsequently added (in consequence of the intelligence obtained at Alaejos on the 13th of December,) the chance of successfully attacking Soult. Considered solely as a diversion, if it could have been made before the surrender of the capital, it might perhaps have been of some value. But after that "bubble had burst," there was nothing known to be in arms, to take advantage of it; and the risk was far too great to be incurred on vague rumours of troops being about to assemble in the south; the value of such rumours being well understood by the commander of the forces. In regard to the chance of defeating Soult, the consummate skill with which the movements of the French were directed, was too well known to justify us in calculating on the blunders of our enemy; and certainly it was too manifestly the interest of the French marshal to draw us on as far as we would go, to make it reasonable to suppose that he would not have gradually retired as we advanced, to give time to a superior force from the south, to intercept our retreat, and cut us off from Galicia.

In a despatch from Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere, dated Downing Street, 10th of December, 1808, Mr. Canning observes :

* "You will recollect that the army which has been appropriated by His Majesty to the defence of Spain and Portugal, is not merely a considerable part of the disposable force of the country: it is, in fact, the British army. The country has no other force disposable. It may, by a great effort, reinforce the army for an adequate purpose, but another army it has not to send.

"—— You are already apprised, by my former despatch (enclosing a copy of General Moore's instructions), that the British army must be kept together under its own

* See Appendix to Colonel Napier, page 73.

commander; must act as one body for some distinct object, and on some settled plan.

“It will decline no difficulty, it will shrink from no danger; when, through that difficulty and danger, the commander is enabled to see his way to some definite purpose; but, in order to this, it will be necessary that such purpose should have been previously arranged, and that the British army should not again be left, as that of Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird have recently been, in the heart of Spain, without one word of information, except such as they could pick up from common rumour of the events passing around them,” &c.

This despatch was written under a supposition that Sir John Moore had continued his retreat on Portugal; and could not have reached Mr. Frere in time to have had any influence on the events of the campaign; but it refers to former instructions, breathing a similar spirit; and yet Mr. Frere thought himself justified in urging the commander of that army to hazard its fortunes and safety upon the most loose and uncertain information.

It is much to be lamented that Sir John Moore did not feel himself fully at liberty to follow the dictates of his own excellent judgment, instead of yielding to suggestions and opinions which, being founded on false data, scarcely merited serious attention. When the British minister at Madrid urged him to advance, he was himself deceived and deluded. He grounded his advice on statements respecting the strength and success of the Spanish armies, which the commander of the forces knew to be erroneous. The advice thus given, under false impressions, ought not perhaps to have had any influence, but the situation of Sir John Moore was one of great and almost unexampled difficulty.

Perhaps it is to be regretted that the suggestion thrown out in Sir David Baird's letter of the 8th of December

from Villa Franca was not adopted, as an alternative between the dangers of an advance, and the inconveniences of a retreat.

Had the British army been collected on the frontiers of Galicia about the middle of December, there can be little doubt that it would have been able to have maintained itself, at least during the winter; and, long before spring, the face of affairs was completely changed by the departure of Napoleon, and of the force which followed him, to the Austrian war. The question of a defence of Galicia was very different at the time when the letter alluded to was written, from what it became when we were retiring rapidly through the country, with an enemy pressing upon our rear. When the suggestion was offered, our strength was unimpaired, our equipment perfect, and the great body of the French was occupied with Madrid. Between the 8th of December, when the letter was despatched from Villa Franca, and the 29th, when we retreated through Astorga, much might have been done to improve our situation; besides, the enemy, in the hope of intercepting our retreat, were drawn on us, in consequence of our advance, earlier than would otherwise have been the case. In the breathing time which probably would have been allowed us, Lugo and other points might have been fortified, positions taken up and strengthened, depôts established, and, by a judicious disposition of our force, the danger of being turned by the road through Orense, and by those from the north of Portugal and the Asturias, might have been sufficiently guarded against. The road which passes through Orense is particularly difficult, and had been reported to Sir David Baird, by the officers he sent to examine it, as susceptible of defence by a very inferior force. The others are still more impracticable; and were, at the time, almost impossible from the season and the snow.

The kingdom of Galicia contains upwards of a million

and a half of inhabitants (perhaps nearly one sixth of the whole population of Spain). The army of Romana might have recruited itself under our protection; and I very much question whether the presence of a British force on the frontiers of that province (particularly, considering its geographical position on the right of the French line of communication from the Bidassoa to Madrid,*) would not have operated more effectually, as a diversion in favour of the south of Spain, than our momentary irruption into Castile.

I see no reason to suppose that we should have experienced any serious difficulty in subsisting the army. Salt provisions might, if necessary, have been drawn from the provision ships which accompanied our division to Coruña; and although the mountains of Galicia are barren, the valleys are fruitful, and amply stored with cattle. Indeed, a country that feeds a population of fifteen hundred thousand souls, cannot want the means of supporting thirty or forty thousand additional individuals, particularly when the latter possess the power of enforcing requisitions.

* The opinion of Buonaparte on the influence which the occupation of Galicia by an enemy to France might have had on the war in Spain, is recorded in a letter which was written under his direction to General Savary, at Madrid, a short time before our arrival at Coruña. In speaking of the relative importance of the operations of the different French corps, and in alluding to that commanded by Marshal Bessieres, who was acting against the army in Galicia, the Emperor says: "Enfin, le moindre insuccès du Maréchal Bessieres intercepte tous les communications de l'armée, et compromettrait même sa sûreté: le General Dupont se bat pour Andujar, et le Maréchal Bessieres se bat pour les communications de l'armée, et pour les opérations les plus importants aux affaires d'Espagne," &c.—See *Colonel Napier*, Appendix, page 32.

But the situation of the enemy in our front would have been very different. Colonel Napier says, at page 474, that, "sweeping the rich plains of Castile with their powerful cavalry, they might have formed magazines at Astorga and Leon; and from thence been supplied in abundance, while the English were starving."

I do not think it probable that the French, at that season of the year, could have formed magazines any where near the entrance of the mountainous districts of Leon and Galicia; and to have remained in force for any considerable time in the gorges of the mountains would have been impossible. Indeed, it does not appear that the French have ever formed magazines to any extent in Spain, or have been able to keep a large army concentrated in that country for any considerable length of time. In the progress of his work, Colonel Napier will have more than one occasion to notice the inflexible firmness with which the Duke of Wellington maintained his defensive positions on the confines of Portugal, in face of a very superior force, until the want of provisions compelled the enemy to separate, which became a signal for offensive operations on his part.

That Sir John Moore thought favourably of the plan in question, is apparent, both from his letters to Sir David Baird of the 12th, 14th, and 16th of December, already referred to; and from a passage in a despatch he addressed to Lord Castlereagh from Salamanca, almost immediately after he had received Sir David Baird's suggestion. In this despatch, dated the 12th of December, he observes: "If am I forced to retreat, it will probably be on the Galicias. The road is good, and the country is capable of being defended. In this case we shall want flour, as the country produces only cattle in abundance."* Thus repeating the information Sir David Baird had communicated on the subject.

* See Moore's Narrative, Appendix, page 92.

It only remains for me to notice the retreat. In alluding to it generally, it must certainly be admitted that much disorder prevailed, and that many irregularities were committed by the troops. This always has been, and ever must be the case, where soldiers are required to make greater efforts than their physical powers are calculated to support; especially when under those feelings of moral depression which always attend a retreating army. Similar scenes have occurred on every similar occasion; and if examples were necessary to prove the truth of this remark, they would be furnished by what has happened under the two greatest commanders of the age: in the retreat from Burgos in 1812, and in the almost total disorganization of the French army during Napoleon's retreat from Moscow.

The question then seems to be,—to what cause ought principally to be ascribed the disorders and losses which attended the retreat to Coruña? Did they proceed from any defect in the character and composition of the army? from a want of proper attention to their duties on the part of the officers? or from the force of the circumstances in which the army was placed?

A retreat in the face of a powerful and active enemy, is always an operation of infinite difficulty; but various unfavourable circumstances combined with the rapidity with which the one in question was conducted, to render it peculiarly disastrous. I do not mean to question the necessity which dictated this speed, but it may fairly be urged in extenuation of the charges which have been brought against the army. Colonel Napier admits that the conduct of the troops was excellent during the advance: I see no sufficient reason to suppose they would not have continued to merit the same praise, had not their discipline been impaired by over-exertion. When the moral and physical powers of the officer are exhausted by fatigue, it is fruitless to expect that he can be attentive to the conduct of

the men ; and when the soldier is worn down by constant marching and want of food, he becomes deaf to the voice of his officer, and indifferent to every thing but to a sense of his own immediate necessities.

Sir John Moore wrote to Lord Castlereagh from Benevente on the 28th of December, shortly after the commencement of the retreat :*

“ Since I had the honour to address to you, on the 16th, from Toro, the army has been almost constantly marching through snow, and with cold that has been very intense. The weather within these few days has turned to rain, which is much more uncomfortable than the cold, and has rendered the roads almost impassable.” And again, from Astorga, on the 31st :† “ It is impossible to deny that its (the army’s) discipline has been affected by the late movements : the shoes and necessaries are destroyed ; and for some time after it reaches the coast, the men will be in the worst state.” And this was said when the army had still two hundred miles to march, and before the commencement of our most formidable difficulties !

A reference to dates, and to the map of the country, will show the length of the marches which the army performed. But it was not the length of the marches, so much as their almost incessant continuance, the nature of the country they had to traverse, and the inclemency of the season and weather, which prostrated the strength and depressed the moral energies of both officers and men. Compelled to move on one road, carried in many places over, or along the sides of stupendous mountains, and completely broken up by the constant passage of heavy carriages, the progress of the column was necessarily very slow. To the difficulties of the road were added the ob-

* See Moore’s Narrative, Appendix, page 121.

† Moore’s Narrative, Appendix, page 180.

studies caused by the fall of horses, and other accidents to the train of guns and artillery-waggon which accompanied the troops. These broke the order of the march, and occasioned numerous delays, more distressing by far to the soldier than a continued progress; as he remained, without the power of resting or sheltering himself, exposed to the violence of frequent storms of snow and hail. The men's shoes were worn out, or lost in the snow and mud: some died from fatigue and cold; and what greatly added to the distress of the scene, many women and children had accompanied their husbands and fathers on the advance. Most of these unfortunate beings now perished; and their sufferings furnished pictures of human distress and misery which it would be difficult for the imagination to colour too highly.

This is not an overcharged representation of what the army endured: I am confident it will be confirmed, in its fullest extent, by every officer in Sir David Baird's division who witnessed the march over the mountain near Nogales, the night march from the position in front of Lugo to Guiteritz, and that of the succeeding night, from Guiteritz to Betanzos.

I own I feel jealous for the honour of the army which served in Galicia. Much was expected from it by the country, and much I think it would have done to merit its approbation and gratitude, had the course of events been more favourable to a developement of its energies. Although the difficulties by which it was environed made it impossible that it could acquire renown; perhaps, if circumstances had permitted its commander to follow the principles which guided Fabius, it might at least have been sufficiently fortunate to have escaped reproach.

At page 476, Colonel Napier says, "The reserve and the cavalry marched during the night to Bembibre. On their arrival, Baird's division proceeded to Villa Franca;

but the immense wine vaults of Bembibre had such temptation, that many hundreds of his men remained behind inebriated," &c.

Sir David Baird's division left the banks of the Ezla on the morning of the 29th of December. It reached Astorga, a distance of about twenty miles, on the evening of the same day. The town was fully occupied by other troops, including the Spanish army of Romana. Much difficulty was consequently experienced in getting the men under cover; and before that could be effected, and a very scanty supply of provisions procured, the night was far advanced. As early as four o'clock on the following morning (30th of December) the division was on its march for Manzanal (a village in the mountains, on the road towards Corufia), where it was intended to bivouac for the night. The weather was most severe, and the snow deep on the sides of the road; the road itself a mass of mud, from causes which have already been explained. The column reached Manzanal towards the close of a winter day. There was little cover for the men; but they skreened themselves as well as they could from the wind, under banks and inequalities of the ground. Provisions were wanting; but, after considerable delay, some bullocks were procured and slaughtered; and the men were preparing their meal, when orders were received from the commander of the forces to proceed forthwith to Bembibre (another long march towards the sea), and the whole was in motion by ten o'clock the same night. A large portion of the men had not had time or means to prepare their food: yet, thus fasting, they proceeded on their way; and it was six o'clock on the following morning (the 31st) before they reached Bembibre, worn down by fatigue and want of sleep. The inhabitants closed their houses, and refused admission to the soldiers: the consequence was, that some were broken into; and as, when open, the men poured into them in

search of food and rest, many of the wine-cellars were entered, and much intoxication was the consequence; the effect of the wine being evidently increased by the exhausted state of the soldiers.

The halt at Bembibre was but for a very few hours: the early arrival of the commander of the forces with the reserve made it necessary to proceed; and before noon the division was again on the march to Cacavellos. The effects, however, of this unrelenting march were now becoming so apparent, that, previously to quitting Bembibre, I was sent by Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore (whilst the former was attending the punishment of some soldiers for their excesses in the town), to submit to the commander of the forces whether, under all the circumstances of the case, it might not be better to risk a loss of men by endeavouring to make a stand, than incur the certainty of diminishing our force and means by urging the retreat. The commander of the forces being, however, of opinion that circumstances made it necessary to proceed, the division moved to Cacavellos, where it arrived late on the evening of the 31st; having thus marched nearly sixty miles since the morning of the preceding day, during which period it had, with very short intervals, been constantly under arms.*

At Cacavellos, and in the neighbouring villages, the troops were quartered for the night, and moved on the following day, through Villa Franca to Herrerias. At Villa Franca the division only halted to receive rations. A considerable depôt of provisions and forage had been formed in that town: but much had been consumed or wasted by the divisions which preceded us. This evil did not arise from a want of exertion on the part of the commissariat:

* I state the distance from recollection; but I think I have rather underrated the length of the march in question.

it was an almost inevitable consequence of our situation, and must always occur, to a certain extent, where sufficient time cannot be allowed to preserve order, or to make the requisitions and distribution with regularity. As appears to have been the case at Smolensko and at Wilna, on Buonaparte's retreat from Moscow, the soldiers crowded round the magazines, and the provisions disappeared as soon as produced, without regard to weights and measures: and thus a store, which was calculated to have subsisted the whole army several days, yielded, under our unfortunate circumstances, only a partial and irregular supply.

It may naturally be asked, why were not impediments thrown in the way of the advancing enemy, to retard his progress, as proposed, in the event of a retreat through Galicia, in Sir David Baird's letter to Sir John Moore, of the 21st of November? It was one of the fatalities we were doomed to experience, that an order which was given by Sir John Moore at Astorga, to destroy the intrenching tools, on account of a deficiency in the means of transport, was too literally interpreted, and too largely applied. The consequence was, that the engineer officers who were employed to mine two or three bridges, could not procure the instruments which were necessary to form the mines properly, and they therefore exploded partially, without producing their full effect. This was no fault in the officers, but arose, I believe, entirely from the cause I have mentioned.*

No. IV.

The following letter is here inserted because it was accidentally omitted where it ought to have appeared in the Memoir according to its date.

* Notes on the Campaign, pp. 39 to 50.

Astorga, 29th Nov. 1808.

MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 27th instant, this morning, and in compliance with your wishes have made arrangements for bringing everything forward as speedily as possible. With respect to the money, Bathurst has already written to have 500,000 dollars, out of the additional sum expected from England, brought on by the way of Orense, as soon as it arrives.

Although it certainly is not my province to offer an opinion as to the measures it might be most advisable to adopt in the present state of affairs in this country, yet the very critical situation in which we are placed, prompts me to submit to your consideration a few ideas and remarks, which have occurred from the observations I have made, and the intelligence I have been able to obtain.

Should the British army unite at Benevente, Zamora, and Toro, it might become a question, as to what should be its future object. The enemy are in force at Potas; the Junta of Oviedo fear for the province of Asturias; perhaps their fears may be groundless; but by the city of Leon being left open to them, the enemy, when in possession of that place, might push immediately by the rear of Astorga, near Bembibre, into Galicia, where, by occupying the passes, the communication to Corunna would instantly be cut off, and in a very short time Galicia, gone as far as the British army is concerned. Thus, the two posts of re-embarkation, Corunna and Vigo, together with all the stores, money, &c. are lost, and the British army, when concentrated, can look no longer to that kingdom. In its present state, Leon seems to be safe, with the Marquis de la Romana, and his 5 or 6000 men; Galicia, the Asturias, and probably part of Leon, might be preserved, were the British troops to keep the line of Astorga and Leon, rather than to advance, where in a short time the principal

part of the enemy's force, in all probability double its number at least, might be brought to act against it. The British army seems likely to be left entirely to itself as soon as the French have either dispersed Castanos' force, or so far driven it away as to care no longer about its interference. Therefore it should be well considered, before the British army by its movements gives up all these advantages, what the object should be, and whether by so doing it is not going exactly into the trap the enemy, with a long hand, is preparing for it. Of the possibility of the retreat of an army of 30,000 men by the high road of Ciudad Rodrigo, I do not presume to judge. That such a retreat will be eventually necessary, appears but too probable, should the enemy, as he is accustomed to do, and considering the means in his power, bear down with concentrated force, caring little about his flanks, and bring to oppose the British army 70 or 80,000 men. Provisions he cannot want; the country they pass through, and the means they use to procure them, ensure their supply; and they have had the fertile province of Alava and Irun in their rear, to obtain them from, and probably water-carriage to bring them forward, not to mention the immense magazines they are said to have formed at Pampeluna and St. Sebastian's. Their object will be a fixed one, the annihilation of the British army, with immense means, or the forcing it to make a precipitate and disadvantageous retreat. The question is, how this army can be so placed as to avoid this; and whether, should the enemy even push for Lisbon, the British troops, by embarking at Corunna or Vigo, or at both these places, might not be sooner there than they could possibly be.

The united British troops, together with the Galician force, and that of the Marquis de la Romana, might, it is to be presumed, keep a good part of the Asturias, all Galicia, and part of Leon, which is said to be a fertile country.

But when the left flank of the army is turned by the enemy, little or no option will remain. Galicia we know to be strong, and her 30,000 British troops, aided by the peasants, might probably defy all the efforts of the enemy; the roads too, are remarkably good, and might afford greater facilities for bringing up supplies to the position that might be chosen, than Portugal could offer; and in a short time, perhaps, it might be better seen what the army could do, according as circumstances arose.

The line of the river Esla is said to be strong, and supposing our junction to be practicable, might probably be defended for the present. It is likely that the enemy may not be sufficiently advanced or prepared, to prevent us from uniting. Besides, he may rather wish to see the British army collected, and moving forward, as he would then have only one specific object respecting it.

Under these circumstances, I am induced to suggest, whether it might not be more advisable, that, by a flank movement of your corps, the junction should be formed on my right, rather than that I should proceed towards Salamanca, and thus uncover Galicia, and abandon the protection of the Asturias.

I had an interview with the Marquis de la Romana yesterday, at a village half way between this and Leon. He does not appear to have the least intention of proceeding to Madrid at present. He talked of being able to join me in eight or ten days with about 10,000 men and twelve pieces of cannon. I am, however, assured that he has not at present more than 5 or 6,000 men with him, and these are completely disorganized, and in want of almost everything; indeed, from a letter which he wrote to the Marquis de la Valeadez, who was here, and which was not perhaps intended to be shown to me, he avows, that without he should be able to procure refitment for his troops, the whole of them will disperse; at the same time that he

made the confession, he assured me that in a few days he should be able to assemble 20,000 men.

I sent a few days ago Captain Carrol to Oviedo, for the purpose of reporting any movement the enemy might be making in that province; as, however, I understand his health is very bad, I have despatched another officer, Captain Miller, of the 95th, to that place to-day.

I inclose copies of two letters from Rear-Admiral De Courcy, upon the subject of the ports of Corunna and Vigo. I also transmit a newspaper, and beg to call your attention to a paragraph marked with a star.

I remain, my dear Sir John,

Most faithfully and truly yours,

Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Moore, K.G. &c. D. BAIRD.

No. V.

The following account of the defeat of General Blake's army, transmitted by that highly distinguished officer, Captain, now Colonel Pasley, C.B. was also omitted in its proper place.

Astorga, the 17th Nov. 1808.

SIR,

I took an opportunity of reporting to you before I left England, that after being appointed to serve in the expedition then preparing under your orders, I was ordered to proceed to Spain, and put myself under the command of Major-General Leith.

I was at Santander with General Leith at the time that the army of the left was so often and so warmly engaged with the enemy. On the 11th and 12th instants great numbers of fugitives, officers as well as men, had come into Santander by various routes, giving most gloomy accounts of the fate of the army; but nothing authentic or official in regard to the military operations subsequent to the 7th

instant being known, Major-General Leith ordered me to proceed to General Blake's head quarters, and remain there, reporting without delay every movement and operation.

I reached Reynosa at 2 A.M. on the morning of the 13th, and presented myself to General Blake, with whom I had a conference some hours afterwards. He told me, that his loss in the various actions, though severe, was of little consequence, but that the dispersion of his troops had reduced the force he then had with him to a handful of men, on whom he could not for the present depend, until they recovered from their panic. That it was therefore his intention, the moment he heard of the enemy's approach, to fall back by way of Leon, on the British army, but, as long as he was not pursued, he would keep his position, and collect the fugitives and stragglers. He seemed of opinion that he would be unmolested for some days; I therefore wrote to Santander, by his desire, to forward some provisions, for the use of the army, to Reynosa.

General Blake had been engaged with the enemy five several times in the short space of twelve days; on the 31st of October, and on the 5th, 7th, 8th, 10th, and 11th days of November. Captain Jones, of the Engineers, was present in the action of the 31st October; Captain Birch, of the same corps, in that of the 7th of November, in which he was wounded; and Captain Carroll (Lieutenant-Colonel Spanish service) was with the army in all its operations. Without entering into details, which those gentlemen will be able to give, I think it right to lay before you a general view of those affairs, which reduced the army of the left to its present unfortunate condition.

In consequence of a plan of operations, agreed upon by Generals Castaños and Palafox at Zaragoza, and in which General Blake was invited to co-operate, the army of the left was advancing by way of Bilboa towards Durango.

When they occupied the latter place, it was hoped that the communication with Castile being open, as well as the post of Bilboa, &c. they would be at no loss for provisions, the want of which, in a country at all times poor in bread, but then exhausted by the presence of the armies, was greatly felt. At the same time this position enabled the Lords of Biscay to assemble in order to send deputies to the Supreme Central Government, and take preliminary measures for arming their province.

All this was entirely frustrated by the action of the 31st ultimo, in which General Blake was attacked by General Lefevre, in his position between Zornosa and Durango, and, after an obstinate contest, obliged to retreat by way of Bilboa and Valmaseda, to Nava, where he was on the 4th instant. The Asturian corps, commanded by General Azevedo, and the 2nd division of the Galician troops, were not engaged, being posted near Orduña; and retreated by a different route, having no communication with the rest of the army for several days. It does not appear that the French army was equal to Blake's in numbers, but they contrived to bring a superior force against every point of attack. They were too roughly handled in the engagement, which lasted nine hours (commencing at daylight), to be able to harass the retreat, which was made in good order.

All the Spanish troops engaged are said to have behaved gallantly, but, what is extraordinary, those who were in reserve, and out of fire, got into confusion, and several dispersed, spreading, as is always the case with fugitives, the most gloomy and exaggerated accounts of the fate of the army.

Early on the morning of the 5th General Blake, having had previous intelligence that the two divisions which I mentioned before, were separated from the army, and were coming to join him, by way of Orantia, then in possession

of the enemy, attacked and dislodged the French from that place and Valmaseda, taking some prisoners, and two or three field-pieces, with ammunition; and the junction of the Asturians and second division, who arrived in time to share the honour of the victory, was happily effected. The French, who were commanded in this affair by General Viliat, had not the whole of their force present.

On the 7th General Blake made a second attack upon the enemy, who had retired and concentrated themselves near Guenes. He succeeded in turning their left wing, but his own centre giving way, he was obliged to retreat. A division which he had sent by the Portugalete road, to act against the enemy's right and in rear, was separated from the army, and took the coast road towards Santander. The action of the 8th was partial, and consisted merely in attacks on the rear guard.

About one o'clock P.M. on the 10th instant the French made a general attack on the Spanish army at Espinosa de los Monteros, which was obstinately resisted till after sunset, with doubtful success. The infantry of the division of the North, who had distinguished themselves wherever they were engaged, suffered most in this action. The brave Conde de San Roman, who commanded them, was mortally wounded, and is since dead, a man whose loss is much to be regretted in the present critical circumstances of his country. The Galicians and Asturians, the latter of whom are all peasants, officers as well as men, fought very well in this engagement.

At daybreak next morning the French renewed their attack upon the Spanish army, which still kept the same position. The left wing, posted upon an eminence, and which was principally composed of Asturians, gave way with little resistance. When the rest of the army saw this position, which commanded the road, in possession of the enemy, a panic seized them, and a precipitate retreat took

place, with much confusion, great numbers dispersing in various directions.

When it is considered that the greatest part of this army was composed of new levies, imperfectly disciplined, without uniforms or great coats, many without shoes, exposed in this situation for such a length of time to the inclemency of the weather, and that for many days together they were almost starving with hunger, having no rations of bread or biscuit, but subsisting entirely on the cattle they found on the mountains (meat without salt, a food so repugnant to the usual habits of the Spanish peasantry), it will rather be wondered at that the army kept together so long, than that it should at last melt away.

The officers, particularly the Asturians, were the first, I am sorry to say, that abandoned their colours. On my way to Reynosa I met more than twenty, *all unhurt*, who advised me to return to Santander, or I should certainly be taken. Of the three Asturian Generals, one (Luiros) was killed, and the others wounded, so that one cannot be surprised that the Asturians were so soon routed in the last action. Several hundreds of them were on their way home at the time I allude to. The Galicians were also making the best of their way towards their own province.

On the evening of the 13th, General Blake had intelligence that the French were advancing to attack him at Reynosa, at the same time sending from Burgos (from which they had driven the Estremadurans on the 10th) a corps to Aguilar del Campo, which rendered it impossible for him to retire according to his plan mentioned before. He therefore retreated into the valley of Cabueringa, in the province of las Montañas de Santander. His conduct in the whole of his operations is said to have been very cool and gallant. He personally shared the hardships of his army, exposed himself in every action, and was always with the rear guard of his army when obliged to retreat.

He had only about 7000 or 8000 men with him when he left Reynosa, but as there were at that time at Santander 5000 militia and provincials, who had never joined the army, and several thousands of the fugitives and stragglers, amongst others, a whole division that had separated before the last action, I have no doubt but that the Marquis de la Romana, who had been at Santander since the 9th, and was, when I left it, on the point of setting out to assume the command, would in a few days be able to collect more than 20,000 men (including the dismounted cavalry from Funen, who might be armed as infantry,) and if he retired into Asturias, which I have no doubt he would be able to effect, with the reserve of that province, 10,000 in number, and the many stragglers that might be collected, he might in a short time be at the head of more than 35,000. For it is to be observed, that all the deserters and stragglers, although without uniform, or anything to distinguish them from the body of the peasantry, carefully preserved their arms, which appears a proof of what they declared was their intention, not to give up the cause of their country.

The very severe actions they fought with the best troops of France, show how formidable the Spaniards may become. All that is wanting, is to ensure the soldiers their rations, and to make a few terrible examples of the officers and men (particularly the former) who abandoned their colours, with seasonable promotions of those who distinguished themselves. But if officers are allowed to abandon their regiments with impunity, when opposed to the enemy, under any pretext whatever, the cause of Spain is altogether hopeless.

Patriotism in every class is not wanting; but this is not sufficient to keep new levies firm in time of action, unless certain death and infamy are held out to those who misbehave. Unless the Spanish Government and Generals adopt this rigorous system, cowardice and desertion will

become so common as to cease to be held disgraceful. What is no less fatal, these fugitives of every description poison the minds of the people wherever they go, by false accounts of the enemy's force and the loss of the Spanish armies, which may produce a panic, terror, and despondency all over the country.

Having related what I know of the state of things, it remains to explain the motives that induced me to come here instead of remaining with the Spanish army, according to my orders. I knew that General Leith intended to send some other officer of his staff from Santander to meet the British army, to whom it appeared to me extremely important to give the earliest intelligence of the disasters of the Spaniards; but the moment that the enemy entered Reynosa, which we were informed took place the same night we left it, I was aware that it would be impossible for him to communicate from Santander. Under these considerations, I thought it best, for the good of the service, to embrace the opportunity (whilst it was not too late) of proceeding with the intelligence to the British army, as I also knew that General Leith could be at no loss in sending another officer from Santander in my place to the head quarters of the Spanish army, where Captain Carroll also remained.

I therefore, by General Blake's approbation, having written to Major General Leith the evening before, left the Spanish army at Soto on the morning of the 14th, and by way of the mountains, arrived at Cervera that night, passing near Aguilar del Campo, where the French were said to have 4000 men, who had taken some baggage and guns of General Blake's army there the night before.

By false information of the position of the British army, who were said to be at Segun and Carrion de los Condes, I was induced to take a circuitous route. At Saldafia next day I found Colonel Candano, of the Spanish artillery, who had retreated there from Aguilar del Campo

with the field train of General Blake's army, consisting of one 12-pounder, twelve 8-pounders, ten 4-pounders, and five 7-inch howitzers, with a proportion of ammunition complete, drawn by mules.

After communicating with me, he determined to retreat to Leon to meet the British army, and marched immediately for Sagun. The guard of this train consisted of 800 men of the regiment of Zaragosa, but one half of whom were raw recruits. Also, 1200 men of the regiment of Blandargues, but all, excepting 100, untrained.

At Sagun, where I arrived before the artillery, I found about 300 infantry of raw recruits, 400 Spanish cavalry, and some infantry, had marched out of the town that day for Mayorga.

At ten o'clock that night I had ordered post horses, and was preparing to set out, when an alarm was given, that detachments of French dragoons were patrolling in all the avenues of the place, and that two had been seen in the town, the Spanish troops at that time being all asleep, or at least, not on the alert.

On account of this alarm I was disappointed in horses, and obliged to walk with a guide by by-ways, to a village on the Leon road, with much anxiety about the fate of the Spanish artillery. I there got a horse, and travelling day and night, with little intermission, reached Astorga on the morning of the 17th, which very small progress, in proportion to the exertion used, will not appear extraordinary, as I was not able to travel post most part of the way, and two nights successively my guides lost the road.

At Mansilla, three leagues before I reached Leon, I heard that the French had entered Mayorga, but I suppose this alarm must have been occasioned by the appearance of the Spanish cavalry from Sagun.

From Soto, the first part of my way was by a wild mountainous country, but not so impassable as the frontier of Asturias. By a deep wooded ravine and stream the

road descends to Aguilar del Campo, and goes by a valley to Cervera. From Cervera the country is plain and open, and fit for cavalry, with few inequalities. From Sagun to Leon great part is a perfect level, with scarcely a tree, bush, or any object but the mud-built villages. The rapidity with which I travelled (great part of the way by night) prevented me from being very minute in my observations and inquiries. I hope that the steps I have taken since I left Santander will meet your approbation, and have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

CHARLES W. PASLEY,
Captain of Royal Engineers.

If I may be allowed to say anything in praise of the conduct of a superior officer, I ought to mention, that General Leith's seasonable supplies of money, arms, and provisions, to the troops from the North, as well as Blake's army, were of the most essential service, or they might have been obliged to fall back, or even disperse without a battle. But the rapid and uncertain movements of the troops after the 31st ultimo, rendered his supplies of provisions less effective than they would have been if the army had had a fixed position, though great activity was used in endeavouring to forward them where they could most readily reach the army.

THE END.

