A HISTORY

OF

MODERN ITALY,

FROM THE FIRST FRENCH REVOLUTION TO THE YEAR 1850.

BY

RICHARD HEBER WRIGHTSON.

Longa est injuria, longæ
Ambages,—sed summa sequar fastigia rerum.
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PREFACE.

A DETAILED narrative of the events which have taken place in the various States of Italy during the last half century, would form a very long and complicated Work, and one which, though it might occasionally be consulted, would perhaps seldom be read. It is by no means intended to claim for this volume the name and title of a history in any such extended sense. A compendious sketch of those occurrences which have contributed to decide the destiny of the Peninsula, and which have prepared the way for its present condition, is all that can be attempted in these pages.

The purpose in view, is to present such a retrospect of the past, as may be useful in estimating the hopes and probabilities of the future; and to deprecate, rather than recommend, any interference by foreign *sympathizers*, in questions which can only be brought to a satisfactory solution by the intelligence and fortitude of the people whom they concern.

The subjects of the British crown, who have at any

time taken part in the revolutionary convulsions of the Italian States, have been few and uninfluential: but though instances of this kind are rare, it may happen that English travellers, grieved at what they hear or witness, and relying too implicitly on one-sided statements, may give way to the impulses of an ill-informed philanthropy, and hazard expressions of opinion; forgetting that Italians are for the most part unacquainted with the political sentiments and habits which prevail in this country, and are prone to draw conclusions in accordance with their own ideas and wishes.

In Italy, the so-called liberal party, is composed of divers and ill-assorted elements. In its ranks are to be found the wise and the unwise; the patriot, who desires, by just and suitable means, to promote the welfare and restore the glories of his Father-land; and the demagogue, who does not shun debasing connexions and flagitious means, in order to satisfy his own craving for power or notoriety.

He who without sufficient information as to the past and present state of the Peninsula, and an acquaintance with the materials which compose its society, expresses in vague and general terms, sympathy with the liberal cause, may have his words understood in a sense which he little anticipates. In this way, many Italians have been betrayed into erroneous impres-

sions. It is desirable that the people of Italy should become aware—if they are not so already—that public opinion in this country does not, in any degree, tolerate the absurd and pernicious combinations of sectarian conspirators; but that England is at all times ready, by just and honourable means, and by the full weight of her influence, to support the independence of those states which are, *de jure*, and by the force of treaties, independent; and that she will use her good offices, when the opportunity may occur, in favour of social progress and constitutional liberty. Such, though some errors may have been committed, has been the general scope and tendency of British policy, whether directed by Whigs or Tories; nor is it too much to say, that nearly all Englishmen who are acquainted with the actual condition of the Italian people, entertain corresponding sentiments. This being the case, it is important that the liberalism of the British public should not be confounded with something that is very different. It does not follow, that because we deplore an anti-national and arbitrary system of government, we should approve of the complots of Young Italy; or that we should desire a remedy more noxious than the disease itself.

The only safeguard against errors and mis-apprehensions of this nature, is to be sought in the diffusion of information, drawn from authentic sources, as

to the true position of affairs and parties, past, as well as present.

The division of the Peninsula into several States, each of which has a history of its own, and each of which took a distinct share in the national struggles of 1848 and 1849, makes it difficult to obtain a correct idea of the contemporary acts and scenes of that intricate drama. A variety of publications and documents must be read or consulted—many of which cannot be obtained by travellers, when most wanted—personal observation and enquiry may supply much that is valuable and interesting, but a reference to books is much more easily accomplished in London or Paris, than at Rome or Florence.

Some general outline of the political condition and relations of the Italian States is the more needed, on account of the great and increasing influx of visitors and residents, who form, as it were, English colonies in the principal cities. While the friendly counsels of the British Government, or the recorded opinions of our public men, may occasionally be attended with advantage, a minor, but not unimportant, moral agency is constantly at work in the social intercourse of our countrymen with Italians. Those amongst our countless tourists and sojourners, who do not confine their attention to the monuments of vanished greatness, but feel some interest with regard to the living,

and participate in the hopes and fears of the present generation, will not unfrequently be appealed to for their opinions on passing events. Such persons, in proportion as they are well or inadequately informed, as to the nature and causes of the more recent transactions in the Peninsula, and as to the characters of the individuals, whose names are associated with those transactions, may exert, in a limited sphere, a beneficial or a baneful influence.

The progress of sound and practical ideas amongst the educated classes of Italy, is a fact which must not be overlooked; and one which is proved by the wide and increasing circulation obtained by writings of a constitutional tendency.* Before the French Revolution of February 1848, a movement had commenced in favour of limited monarchy. Had that form of government been maintained in France, institutions of a kindred stamp, suited to the wants and genius of the people, might by degrees have taken root and flourished in the Italian soil. In Naples, Piedmont, Tuscany, and even in Rome, representative systems had been established; and these concessions were cordially approved and supported by England, and also by France, whose councils were directed by M. Guizot, and whose ambassador at Rome, was Count Rossi. In those days, little more seemed requisite than a spirit of mutual

* See chapter x.

confidence and forbearance. The interests of the governments were in the way to become reconciled and identified with those of the nation; and the time appeared to be at hand, when a defensive as well as commercial league, might have led to great advantages.

At this critical moment, the constitutional monarchy of France, which, with all its imperfections, had been successful in securing to that country a large amount of liberty and prosperity, fell; not through the might or number of its assailants, but through the fatal errors of the government itself. So long as France continued to prosper under a limited monarchy, an important and significant example could be referred to; and a proof was afforded that the liberties of the people are not incompatible with the rights of the throne; and that practical freedom may be enjoyed, together with an exemption from the fierce contentions and restless instability which are the bane of republican institutions. The unforeseen result of a Parisian *émeute* changed the face of affairs in Italy; and stimulated the ambition of the Mazzinists and democrats; who, having obtained the direction of the *sette*, were prepared to undermine and pull down whatever might stand in the way of their own exaltation.

It was in vain to expect the sapling constitutions of the Italian States to withstand a revolutionary tempest, which shook the most established and powerful govern-

ments of the continent. The judicious and enlightened views and counsels, which, during the years immediately preceding, had been promulgated by Count Balbo, Massimo D'Azeglio, and other leaders of the moderate party, were for a time disregarded or forgotten. While agitators were exulting in a short-lived triumph, and tumultuous assemblies were grasping at shadows, substantial advantages were sacrificed, and a fair opportunity lost. Reliance was placed on the republican government inaugurated at Paris, both as a model, and as a sure and ready ally. Then it was that Lamartine proclaimed to the world that monarchies, however limited, are imperfections in the eyes of the philosopher, and a disgrace in the eyes of the historian; and that at best they are but guardianships,—admissions by the people, that they are yet minors. France, he added, would not suffer in peace, that any nation seeking its liberties should be repressed.

These oracular effusions of a generous and gifted poet, however gratifying to the managers of the Italian *sette,* were of ominous import to the Princes who had recently accorded constitutional rights to their people; and who had been assured that in so doing, they would secure the stability of their thrones.

Before the occurrence of the Parisian catastrophe,—the ascendancy of the constitutionalists, the unbounded popularity of Pio Nono, and the commanding attitude

assumed by Charles Albert, in relation to the impending war, had become distasteful to the Mazzinists, and mortifying to the long cherished hopes of revolutionary aspirants. The inauguration of the French Republic revived the energy of these parties, and raised their expectations. Why should Italy any more than France remain in a state of tutelage? Why should not her regeneration be accomplished by citizens as clear-sighted and eloquent as those who were presiding over the destinies of the French nation? Such were the day-dreams of the *esaltati*, and the aspirations of their idolized leaders. The reaction under which Italy now groans, is the rueful but natural consequence of these delusions.

If noble and generous sentiments still linger in the hearts of the princes and statesmen of Europe, some effort must be made, some remedy devised, to alleviate the condition of a people which once led the way in literature and civilization. Should an appeal to high and chivalrous feelings be rejected, as at variance with the spirit of the age, one not less cogent may be made to the calculations of self interest. The crying grievances of Italy, if much longer neglected, will probably result in war. Her present tranquillity has nothing of the sweetness or security of peace, but rather bears the aspect of a precarious truce; neither is there any hope for the future, until Austria shall

have adopted a wiser and a loftier policy than that which she has too long pursued. The relations of that empire with Italy can only be compared to the military occupation of a hostile country, and are a perpetual cause of weakness and embarrassment. The time would seem to be at hand, when, not only Austria, but other powers, whose peace and reputation are placed in jeopardy, may find it necessary to put an end to the effete and incorrigible government of the Roman States. Austria and France are equally interested in finding some outlet from the equivocal position in which they stand, as upholders by armed force of a system long ago condemned by their respective governments, in the well-known *memorandum* of 1831.* Temporary expedients have already been tried to the uttermost; and an abstraction of the Papacy from the cares and responsibilities of mundane dominion agreed upon and carried out by the great Catholic powers, appears alike indispensable to the welfare of Italy and the repose of Europe. Nor is this all that is required; another work, originating with and dependent on the Italians themselves, must be achieved, before they can regain that dignity in the scale of nations, which they justly consider their birthright. They must exhibit the *coraggio civile* which D'Azeglio † eloquently commended, and of which he set the example, when he

* See chapter viii. p. 144. † See chapter x. p. 168.

published in 1845, his remarks on the insurrection of Rimini. In that appeal he denounced the whole system of sectarian plots and conspiracies, and exhorted all Italians to join in what he calls a *congiura al chiaro giorno;* to avow their just sentiments with boldness and fortitude openly, and in the face of day. He pointed out to his erring countrymen a line of conduct which would enlist on their side the approval of the civilized world; and encouraged them to rely for the result on the irresistible force of its opinion.*

These warnings were not dissimilar in spirit to those which had long before been uttered by Ugo Foscolo, when he declared "*per rifare l'Italia, bisogna disfare le sette.*"†

The organized existence of secret factions, whose powers are wielded by irresponsible leaders, has been a continual obstacle to improvement. So long as these associations continue to inspire alarm and propagate distrust, the smallest change, the most harmless innovation is dreaded, as liable to be perverted and made subservient to some ulterior object. The error of expecting any permanent or good result from plots and conspiracies, must be abandoned; the Utopian schemes which have caused so much disappointment and suffer-

* Questa congiura al chiaro giorno col proprio nome scritto in fronte ad ognuno, é la sola utile, la sola degna di noi e del favore dell' opinione.— Casi di Romagna, p. 107.

† See chapter i.

ing, must be relinquished. Until Italy is cured of these delusions, her soil will continue to be trodden by foreign armies; and her cravings for a happier and more national existence, must remain unsatisfied.

The bitter experience of recent years has done much to dissipate these errors; and the deplorable and atrocious character of some of the later outbreaks have opened the eyes of thousands, who begin to ask, what can be the object of these cold-blooded and criminal attempts, except to compromise as many victims as possible; and by multiplying suffering, to aggravate discontent? Public feeling in Italy, and all other countries, recoils from the employment of such means. Let Englishmen beware, lest by word or deed, they countenance a system which stands abhorred and condemned by every right-minded Italian, as constituting at once the scourge and disgrace of his country.

If the brief notices contained in these pages should not afford all the information which may be required, or if the conclusions arrived at should appear questionable, an advantage will nevertheless be secured, if enquirers are induced to make acquaintance with the writings of those Italians who have narrated the history of their own times, and discussed events in which they themselves bore a part.

In proportion as authentic relations and documents are referred to, and the statements of all parties sifted

and compared, will the conviction be strong that the *sette*, whatever cause they may profess to serve, and under whatever designations they may be known, have been, and are, fatal instruments of national degradation; and in treating of the recent revolutions, condition, and prospects of Italy, the origin and progress of these societies will form an important subject of enquiry.

Though the original intention was merely to delineate the course of events from the first French Revolution, it has been found requisite to go back a little, in order to review the circumstances which led to the establishment of the existing dynasties in Tuscany, Lombardy, and the Two Sicilies.

A continuous narrative of the affairs of so many different States is obviously impracticable; but the reader, by referring to the Table of Contents, can easily follow the thread of contemporary occurrences.

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A

HISTORY OF MODERN ITALY.

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SEVEN and thirty years are gone by since the political societies or sects of Italy were denounced by the sagacity of Foscolo,* as the chief impediment to the national welfare.

Secret fraternities appear to have prevailed in the

* A rifare l'Italia bisogna disfare le sette. Potrebbe se non disfarle, reprimerle il ferro straniero ; ma allo straniero gioverà prima istigarle, onde più sempre signoreggiare per mezzo d'esse l'Italia.—*Foscolo, Prose Politiche, della Servitù d'Italia.*

Peninsula during remote ages; and in more recent times, when combinations of this nature have become extinct or unimportant in other countries, their existence, as if congenial to the mind or circumstances of the people, has been revived and prolonged, and still continues, under different names and modifications, to affect the destinies of the Italian States.

When in the year 1799* the Neapolitan republicans were compelled to seek a refuge from the persecutions of the restored government, they betook themselves to the wilds of the Abruzzo and the mountains of Calabria. In those retreats many of them continued to sojourn, nourishing their hatred against everything that bore the impress of royalty. Their hostility to Joseph Bonaparte and Murat was no less vehement than that which they had previously entertained towards the Bourbons, and was heightened by the dislike of foreign domination. Having found a home in those rugged and woodland districts, where the manufacture of charcoal forms the chief occupation, they acquired the name of *Carbonari*, and the secret meetings of their society were called *Vendite*, or charcoal sales.

As the French government became more and more unpopular, and impatience of a foreign yoke increased, the new sect extended its ramifications, and obtained numerous proselytes in the Roman and other states.

* See chapter v.

When the awe of Napoleon's sceptre forbade all open expression of opinion, the secret conventions of the *Carbonari* afforded to the discontented a refuge and a solace, and in these associations the charm of mystery was combined with the enjoyment of a hidden freedom.

During the years of imperial victory and triumph, the extension of the *sette* was circumscribed, not only by the dread of the great conqueror's power, but by the homage and admiration which accompanied his wonderful career. Under the eagles of the empire Italian soldiers had won back their ancient renown; they had shown their courage and discipline on the great battle-fields of Europe. It was no part of the policy of Bonaparte to thwart or depress the national feeling. By him a *kingdom* of *Italy* had been established, which might one day grasp an independence of which its name was the shadow.

It was not till the tide of victory had ebbed, and demands for men and money began to press on an exhausted population, that the leaven of discontent found sufficient materials to work upon. After the disasters of the Russian campaign, the increase of the *Carbonari* in the kingdom of Naples was enormous. Their influence began to be felt and acknowledged, and their adherence and support was courted by the competitors for power—by the Bourbons then reigning

in Sicily, against the French, and by Murat, first against Napoleon, and afterwards against the allies. In 1815, King Joachim was abetted by the Carbonari in his disastrous struggle, and not only was the anathema of Pius the VIIth launched against them, but the Court of Rome connived at the formation of an antagonistic sect, whose members obtained the appellation of *Sanfedisti*, and engaged to defend the Roman Catholic religion and the interests of the Papacy. Unhappy are the governments which condescend to prop their authority by alliance with the irresponsible organs of secret societies! Those of Rome and Naples were far too weak to direct or control these dangerous allies, and many subsequent deeds of impolicy and injustice may be traced to the dictation or uncontrolled agency of the *Sanfedisti* and *Calderari*.* The animosity of the hostile factions made them little scrupulous as to the members they admitted or the means which they employed. When once the war of sects began, the profligate and reckless rushed into the ranks of either party, and were never discouraged or refused, lest they should enlist with the opponents. Assassination was hardly considered a crime. Hatred and revenge destroyed the charities of life, and severed the links of society.

The cause of freedom and justice, which prospers

* See p. 116.

best when openly embraced and avowed in the face of day, has derived nothing but loss from the plottings of the *sette*. In the hidden conclaves of conspirators the bad become emboldened and the good perverted. The secrecy and caution which are necessarily observed in such assemblies preclude the salutary influence of deliberate discussion. Councils of a desperate and indefensible character are apt to prevail, and are readily approved by spirits impatient for action. Were it possible that designs of this nature should meet with more than a temporary and isolated success, a long and fruitless series of revolutionary violence and bloodshed would be the consequence; but experience has shown that even such temporary success is next to impossible—and that sectarian plots are no sooner resolved upon, than they are discovered, either by the vigilance of the police or by the treason of false brethren. In Italy the demagogue is not unfrequently a suborned agent of the police, and against this danger there is no security.*

The history of the Peninsula from the peace of 1814 presents little more than a tissue of revolutionary failures, in which the efforts and sacrifices of the patriotic and intelligent have been perverted and sterilized by the fatal agency of the *sette*. These repeated outbreaks have led to no better result than an increase

* Gualterio, Gli ultimi Rivolgimenti Italiani, vol. ii. chap. xxxi.

of the national depression. Italy has thus been robbed of the benefits which other nations have derived from the long continuance of peace. Had her states been exempt from intestine disturbances, how readily would capital have been embarked in connecting by railroads their rich and populous capitals, and in providing such as are inland with an access to the sea! What a field would thus have been opened to the unequalled taste and ingenuity of their inhabitants! With the increase of intelligence which accompanies commercial and manufacturing prosperity, how much better would the communities have been prepared for the exercise of civil and constitutional functions! Instability and distrust have been the constant obstacle to those ameliorations which, in time of security, gradually win their way. The governments harassed by incessant alarms, and engrossed by dangers which threatened their existence, were constantly compelled to defer administrative and commercial reforms, of which they acknowledged the necessity.

These evils being obvious and admitted, it becomes in the next place, necessary to inquire into the causes which have prolonged the existence and augmented the importance of the *sette*.

The arrangement of the Peninsula during the latter years of Napoleon's reign was as follows:—

The kingdom of Italy, of which Eugene Beauharnais

was viceroy, was composed of the Milanese, the Venetian provinces, the duchy of Mantua, and the Papal Legations.

Rome, with the patrimony of St. Peter, Tuscany, Lucca, Parma, Genoa, and Piedmont, formed part of Imperial France.

The kingdom of Naples had been conferred upon Murat, and the Islands of Sardinia and Sicily still remained under the sway of their legitimate sovereigns.

By the fiat of the pacificators, Austria, in addition to her ancient possession of the Milanese, obtained the Venetian provinces; and as a counterpoise, Genoa was annexed to the inheritance of the House of Savoy. The Pope was reinstated, and after the rash enterprise of Murat, the King of Naples resumed his continental dominions.

It is useless at the present day, to enter upon discussions as to the merits or demerits of a settlement under which Europe enjoyed a prolonged exemption from the evils of war. The state of the continent during the progress of the negotiations, accounts for many of the arrangements of the treaty of Vienna. While Bonaparte was in Elba, ready to take advantage of whatever chances might occur, the army of Italy as well as that of France being still attached to his cause, it was natural that the first object of the allies should be to guard against a revival of his power, and to

secure the maintenance of peace. The day was gone by when Venice or Genoa could stand alone; and an augmentation of the influence of Austria appeared the most probable means of guarding against the re-establishment of French dominion.

The administration of the Lombard-Venetian provinces by Prince Metternich did not confirm the impression which formerly prevailed, as to the paternal gentleness and delicate tact of Austrian rule; but the fusion of Genoa and Piedmont is now generally admitted to have promoted the interests of both.

The condition of Italy in 1815, was one in which old things struggled with new. Her soldiers, after having served with credit under Napoleon, were either hastily disbanded, or called upon to transfer their allegiance to powers against which they had often been arrayed. The transition from war to peace is apt to bear hardly upon men whose services are no longer required, and whose career is brought to a close. Where feelings of goodwill and mutual confidence exist, such hardships are felt, but do not rankle. From the restored governments of Italy the veterans of Napoleon's armies obtained little sympathy. Their case was not generously or wisely considered, and their feelings, as well as claims, were disregarded. Distinction, whether military or civil, obtained under the French empire, was viewed with narrow-minded aversion. At a crisis when the

greatest delicacy was required, the generous confidence and noble forbearance which win the allegiance of the heart, were wanting; and the prejudices of retrogradist counsellors were allowed to prevail. At Milan, disgust was excited by the presence of a German army, and by the employment of foreign officials. At Turin, and still more at Naples, Royalist factions were allowed to monopolize and abuse the powers of the state. In the Papal territories, the laity was excluded from public functions. Thus peace, which had been hailed with so much joy, was robbed of its sweetness; the exactions of the French were forgotten, and the impartiality of their administration began to be regretted. Then it was, that the *Carbonari* became dangerous, not only by their alliance with the resuscitated embers of Jacobinism—smothered, but not extinguished by Bonaparte—but by the strength which they derived from a general feeling of disappointment. All confidence in the wisdom and justice of the restored government was shaken, and the public mind was prepared to acquiesce in any change.

The unconciliatory spirit in which Austria resumed her Italian possessions revived the old enmity against the *Tedeschi*, and the influence of the *sette* was strengthened by their participation in the national antipathy.

It has been the error of the modern statesmen of

Vienna to keep alive and exasperate the unhappy prejudices of race. The legitimate influence of a mighty empire is thus diminished, and its power made to rest on the insecure foundation of force. In its zeal for centralization, the Austrian government has overshot the mark. By an oppressive attempt to fuse and amalgamate the nations of which the empire is composed, and to obliterate sub-nationalities, whose existence, when regarded with indulgence, is not only harmless but often salutary, a bitter and resentful feeling has been evoked.

It can only be with feelings of regret that an Englishman can join in the condemnation of a power, the ancient ally of his country, and one which for a long series of years was distinguished for the mild and beneficent character of its government. It must nevertheless be admitted that the conduct and administration of Austria have not been calculated to win the attachment of her Lombard-Venetian population, or to promote the peace and welfare of Italy.

Had the wise and great-hearted policy by which the Emperors Joseph and Leopold secured the prosperity and contentment of their dominions been kept in remembrance and followed, a very different result might have been anticipated. By those princes, while the purity and independence of the Catholic Church were promoted, a stop was put to the undue pretensions

of Rome. Their zeal in the prosecution of ecclesiastical and civil reforms was not less remarkable than the refined tact and benevolent courtesy, by which they conciliated the good-will of the various nations and races subjected to their rule. Had such precedents been clung to and cherished, as the noblest and most enviable inheritance of the house of Lorrain, the Lombard-Venetian kingdom might have been made, what Lombardy was, when administered by Count Firmian,—an example of contentment and prosperity, to the rest of Italy. Austria would thus have attained a moral influence, far more advantageous than any which her bayonets can enforce, and her Cisalpine possessions would have become a source of wealth and strength, instead of being, as they now are, a perpetual cause of weakness and disquietude.

It may be confessed, that the task imposed on the Cabinet of Vienna in 1814, was one which required the highest attributes of statesmanship. Venice still clung to the recollections of her vanished greatness. Milan unwillingly relinquished her pre-eminence, as the metropolis of the kingdom of Italy. Eugene Beauharnais, though unpopular as a foreigner, was not without adherents, and a considerable party, including a majority of the army, was averse to a renewal of the German connexion. The relations with republican and imperial France, which, beginning

with the treaty of Campo Formio in 1797, continued till the peace of Paris, had obscured the recollection of a time, when not only at Milan, but at Vienna, the highest distinctions of the empire were open to Italians.

The assumption of the Iron Crown by Napoleon, and the brilliancy of his career, had given a new current to men's minds. To deal successfully with this altered state of public feeling required consummate tact and delicacy; and on the example set in Lombardy, the welfare of the other Italian states depended. The restored princes had no small difficulties to contend with. They were surrounded by men, who, having struggled in their cause, or shared their misfortunes, considered that they had a claim to the direction of affairs; and, amid the violence of opposite factions, it was hard to carry out an impartial government.

Austria had the vantage-ground of ample power, and of counsels unfettered by party-spirit. Had her policy been suitable to her position, and to the requirements of the times, the result might have been incalculably beneficial.

Unfortunately for Italy, and not less unfortunately for the mighty empire whose interests he laboured to promote, the dealings of Prince Metternich were marked by distrust. His system with regard to Italy was timid and astute, rather than bold and long-

sighted. In times of disaster and difficulty, his persevering energy and watchful caution had saved the state amid many dangers;—when those dangers were over, and a frank and generous treatment was required, in order to reconcile the Milanese and Venetians to a change of sovereignty, his course became temporizing and undecided. By vigilant repression he strove to maintain a *status*, in the permanency of which he had but little faith. While warding off immediate perils, he seems never to have envisaged the necessity of obviating their recurrence, or to have attempted the higher task of providing for future stability. Though careful for the physical well-being and elementary education of the people, he appears to have disregarded the moral condition, sentiments, and contentment of the upper classes. Mortification and discontent were the result of the heavy indifference exhibited towards their just and natural expectations. Though inferior offices were bestowed on the Emperor's Italian subjects, no honourable career was laid open to their ambition; while a constant reference to Vienna inspired disgust, and impeded all transactions. The unconciliatory habit of the government was well described by the admission of an Austrian diplomatist —"Nôtre gouvernement n'est pas sévère, *mais il est désobligeant.*" The irritation thus kept up interrupted that social intercourse, between Italians and

Austrians, which might have been attended with mutual advantage.

To the primary errors above alluded to, many of the woes of Italy may be traced. When a system of repression, supported by a numerous and vexatious police, was adopted by Austria, it was but too readily imitated elsewhere. The general dissatisfaction which ensued, gave strength and vitality to the *sette*, which would soon have ceased to be mischievous, had gentler and more efficient remedies been provided for the distempered condition of society.

The operations of these secret factions have generally been carried on under the direction of those who have been driven into exile, either by their own rashness and folly, or by the injustice and impolicy of the governments under which they lived. Such persons are apt to acquire, in the estimation of their countrymen, the dignity and authority of martyrs. It is natural that men so circumstanced should long for a return to their hearths, and especially a return accompanied by their own exaltation and the triumph of their party. The opinions and calculations of the *fuorusciti* are invariably influenced by their hopes, and their readiness to recommend and foment revolutionary projects, is proverbial. Their bias is always in favour of action, and to their impatient ardour may be attributed the greater part of those abortive

enterprises which, from 1815 to 1845, constitute the theme of Italian history, and which were generally in some way connected with party struggles in France.

In 1830, an Italian revolution was planned at Paris, and intended to have been contemporaneous with that which placed the Duke of Orleans on the throne. As this movement was abetted in France not only by the republicans, but by a numerous party, who did not partake in their opinions, so in Italy, the projected outbreak had not only the support of the *carbonari*, but of many who held aloof from their societies. Louis-Philippe was no sooner acknowledged, than, conscious of the strength of the monarchical principle, and appreciating the instability and inherent weakness of a throne supported by republicanism, he perceived the necessity of a cautious policy abroad. Thus the expectation of French aid, so readily entertained in Italy, was disappointed; and the malcontents were at the same time deserted by the Duke*

* In Francis IV., the father of the present Duke of Modena, the type of a restless and unscrupulous chieftain of the middle ages is re-produced. Gifted by nature with energy and courage, he longed to attain the rank of a potentate, and to make the narrow inheritance of Beatrice d'Este, restored to him in 1815, the stepping-stone to a wider dominion. Having married a daughter of King Victor Emanuel, he entertained, after the Piedmontese revolution of 1821, sanguine expectations that Austria would find a pretext for setting aside the Prince of Carignan, and investing him with the succession to the Sardinian throne. When this hope was disappointed, he

of Modena, who had promised to assist them. They nevertheless persevered, in the hope that France would at all events prevent the intervention of Austria. In this they were also mistaken, and the enterprise of 1831, though extensively supported, was undertaken without any fixed plan, and ended in complete discomfiture. The scattered and persecuted *sette*, when once more rallied and united, carried on their operations under a new name; and the ill-starred faction, which was destined to mislead and vitiate the national impulse of 1848, assumed the title of Young Italy. "L'Austria," says Gualterio, "acquistava in questa setta un novello alleato."

In 1831, a young Genoese, Giuseppe Mazzini, obtained celebrity by the publication of a letter in which he exhorted Charles Albert, who had just succeeded to

prepared for eventualities by accumulating money. Discerning the approach of a political tempest in Italy, as well as France, he resolved to fish in the troubled waters. He entered into relations with the *comité cosmopolite*, which had its sittings at Paris, and resolved to make use of the republicans, as the republicans intended to make use of him, in the furtherance of ulterior designs. When, on the expulsion of the elder Bourbons, the monarchical feeling was found to prevail in France, and the Duke perceived that his designs would not be supported by Louis-Philippe, he abandoned his revolutionary allies, and they, in their turn, conspired against him in his own capital. Having put down an insurrection there, Francis became and continued a remorseless persecutor of all sectarians and liberals who fell into his power, and a zealous adherent of Austria. For a detailed and interesting account of these dark and iniquitous transactions, see Gualterio's Rivolgimenti Italiani, vol. i. ch. iv. and v.

the throne, to undertake the liberation of Italy. The boldness and self-confidence displayed in this production was admired by the *cervelli bollenti* of the day; and the exiles and refugees, whose disappointment was recent, and who were smarting under persecution, were predisposed towards one whose counsels were uttered with oracular authority, and who cheered them with new and undefined hopes.

Mazzini soon became the acknowledged centre of the new sect, of which the establishment was contemporary with that of *Young France* and *Young Germany*, and which was intended to transform and assimilate those already in existence, and to give them unity of purpose and command. Political objects had hitherto been exclusively aimed at; a social and religious revolution was now held out to Italians under the vague motto of *Dio—e popolo*. Hitherto the exiles had awaited in patience the course of events, and sought to avail themselves of such opportunities as the vicissitudes of Europe and the condition of their own country might present—Mazzini introduced a change of system. Invoking the aid, and enlisting the services of foreign sympathizers, he encouraged his adherents in Italy to brave death and imprisonment by assurances of external succour. Thus the custom of the middle ages was revived—when the vanquished factions of the turbulent Italian republics raised money and soldiers

abroad. A system generally unsuccessful, and productive of nothing but suffering, even in times when military establishments were unknown, was relied upon as effective against governments supported by regular armies and powerful alliances.

The first trial of these tactics was made in 1834, when the chief of Young Italy, having collected a body of Polish and Italian refugees on the Swiss frontier, placed them under the command of one Ramorino, a Nizzardo, of doubtful character, and made an irruption into Savoy. This enterprise * had a speedy and ignoble termination, and gave strength to the Sardinian government, which it was intended to overthrow.

Notwithstanding their untoward commencement, Mazzini and his supporters displayed indefatigable perseverance in availing themselves of every means by which the influence of their sect might be extended. By them the repeated outbreaks, which from time to time took place were, more or less organized and directed; and the facility with which isolated insurrections were got up, led them to conclude that the country was ripe for a general movement. When in 1843 they resolved to hazard a combined effort, the opposition they most feared was that of the moderate party, which had gained strength in proportion as the

* Louis Blanc. Histoire de dix ans, vol. iv., chap. iv.

people began to perceive, that unsuccessful revolutions serve only to deteriorate their condition.

While the aged Pope was making a progress through his dominions in quest of health and recreation, the agents of Young Italy were traversing them with another intent. These men drew largely on the faith of the parties to whom they were accredited. The malcontents of Bologna were told to expect Neapolitan co-operation, and the assistance of the whole Spanish legion was promised as a matter of certainty. To the Italians who had served in that legion, and gained military experience in Spain, but were ignorant of the actual state of their own country, the entire population was described as ready to take arms. "To say the truth," writes Farini,* "they obtained little credit, especially in the Romagna, which had too often endured sufferings in the cause of conspiracy. Small confidence was placed in the *fuorusciti*, and none in Mazzini, because his doctrines were unattractive to the majority, and because the Savoy affair disinclined men to commit absurdities at his bidding or instigation."

In Bologna there was a knot of Mazzinians who, receiving their orders from London or Malta, pretended that they were acting with a numerous party which was determined to support an expected movement of

* Vol. i. c. vii. p. 86.

the Neapolitans. Their real object was to compromise as many persons as possible, and to secure the doubtful and wavering, by bringing down upon them the suspicions and persecutions of the government. Being conscious of the general unwillingness to embrace desperate undertakings, they were induced to accept the services of the lowest partisans, and entered into fellowship with smugglers and assassins.* Notwithstanding these degrading compliances, the conspiracy of 1843 never attained any formidable proportions. The Neapolitan rising was waited for in vain, and a feeble attempt at Bologna was promptly suppressed, and severely punished.

A principal part of the Austrian navy being officered and manned by Venetians, Mazzini was led to entertain hopes in that quarter. Two sons of Admiral Bandiera and their brother officer Domenico Moro, overcome by the fascinations of Young Italy, entered into a plot for a naval revolt. The project being discovered, they effected their escape to Corfu. Neither the failure of an attempted outbreak in Calabria, nor the entreaties of their friends, could prevent these infatuated men from leaving Corfu and landing on that coast in June, 1844, with some twenty followers. Meeting with no support, and being betrayed by one

* Fecero comunella coi sicarii, contrabandieri, ed anche con altra peggior genia che, in Bologna, e molta.—Farini, vol. i. c. vii. p. 88.

of their own party, they were overpowered, made prisoners, and put to death; expiating by the fortitude, with which they met their untimely doom, the error which had induced them to violate their engagements.

Notwithstanding these deplorable results, the sect of Young Italy continued to exist till it obtained, in 1848, a great accession of power through an intimate alliance with the republicanism of France. To the disunion and misgivings caused by its subversive intervention, may be traced the frustration of an important national movement, and the loss of Italy's fairest opportunity.

CHAPTER II.

The military resources of Italy—The forces of Piedmont and Naples—Result to be looked for from their alliance—The Austrian army—Its peculiar organization—Confidence reposed by Radetzky on its fidelity—Ancient connexion of the Milanese with Austria—It is conquered by the French—Erection and dissolution of the kingdom of Italy—Count Confaloniere at Paris—His interview with Lord Castlereagh—Lombardy and Venice are assigned to Austria—The conspiracy of 1821—Protracted trial of Confaloniere and his associates—Focus of discontent occasioned by the misgovernment of the Roman States.

In considering the present condition and future prospects of Italy, it is essential to form some estimate of her available military means and resources.

The only Italian governments whose land or sea forces can be regarded as important, are those of Piedmont and Naples. The gallantry of the Sardinian army, and its efficiency in every branch of the service, with the exception of the commissariat, was sufficiently proved during the last war. That of Naples is not only numerically strong, but its discipline has been greatly improved. The artillery, which has been formed by experienced foreign officers, is said to be good; and the Swiss regiments are distinguished for their fine appearance and soldier-like qualities.

The combined land and sea forces of these two Italian powers might effect important results in a popular and defensive warfare. Their cordial alliance, even without resort to arms, might go a great way towards checking foreign interference. Unfortunately the besetting sin of jealousy renders such a co-operation a possible, rather than a probable contingency.

The military organization of Austria must next be considered.

Of the Imperial army it has been well remarked that it is, in itself, *almost a nation*.* Though derived and selected from various races, the whole body is animated by one feeling. Amid perils, foreign and domestic, its fidelity and endurance have made it the palladium of the empire. The dangers arising from territorial position and conflicting interests have kept alive, even in times of peace, a watchfulness which insures efficiency. The wants, and even the comforts of the hardy soldier are provided for, and anticipated by his Kaiser's admirable commissariat: he feels that he is cared for, and that no pains are spared to alleviate unavoidable privations.

The officers of each regiment are taken without distinction from the various realms and provinces which constitute the Austrian monarchy; but it is arranged that an adequate portion of them should be connected

* Quarterly Review, July, 1853.

with the district where the regiment is recruited. The sub-officers are selected from the privates, and serve, in case of need, as interpreters between them and their officers. The infantry is drawn indiscriminately from all parts of the empire; but, in the other branches, a different system is observed. The Light Cavalry is all Hungarian; the Lancers are Gallicians; the Dragoons and Cuirassiers are from the German provinces; the Artillery is almost entirely German. With such a composition, it is obvious that, in case of a revolt by any great section of the monarchy, the troops derived from such section would not form a complete army; but precaution does not end here. Even in matters civil and religious, the soldier is kept aloof from all extrinsic influences by separate tribunals—and by the appointment of a bishop, whose exclusive duty it is to superintend the military chaplains. In consequence of these regulations few points of contact, and but slender connecting links, remain, between the troops and the people amongst whom they move; and they exist in the midst of their fellow-subjects, much in the same manner that they would do in a foreign land. Thus the army is a world within itself, and is accustomed to reverence no authority, save that which is in direct connexion with the central government.

It is related that on one of the battle-fields of 1848 fears were expressed to Radetzky as to an approaching

dismemberment of Austria. "Look there," replied the veteran marshal, pointing to the mingled bodies of Germans, Hungarians, Croats, and Italians, who had encountered death under his standard. "He could not," says Le Masson, "have described more eloquently, the unity and consequent strength of that heterogeneous army, by which the integrity of the empire is upheld."

Italians are apt to consider the emancipation of Lombardy and Venice as an essential preliminary to the well-being of their country. They would have that Fatherland,

> Che natura dalle altre ha divisa
> E recinta colle Alpi e col mar,

reject, with scorn, the claims of the *straniero*. It is impossible to find fault with an idea so poetical as well as patriotic;—but will a great military power allow itself to be deprived of rich possessions which it holds by a fundamental treaty, and to which no other claimant can advance a pretension?

It may in this place be well to consider the devolution of the Milanese, the origin of the Imperial dominion, and the circumstances under which Austria regained her footing in the north of Italy.

When the conquest of Charlemagne had put an end to the sovereignty of the Lombard kings, the Milanese, together with its dependencies, passed through his

descendants to the emperors of Germany. The Archbishop of Milan, as guardian of the *Corona di ferro*, with which it was his exclusive privilege to crown the kings of Italy, enjoyed considerable political influence; and the church of which he was the head, possessing a liturgy and customs of its own, acknowledged but little dependence on the Roman Pontiff.

During the strife between the empire and the papacy, the cities of Lombardy acquired extensive privileges; and though they did not disavow the sovereign rights of the Emperor, they often resisted the authority of his feudatories. Milan took the lead in the assertion of rights and privileges, which amounted to a virtual independence. The struggle maintained by the Lombard Municipalities against Frederick I.* forms one of the most interesting episodes in the history of the twelfth century; but though Milan led the way in the progress towards freedom, her existence as an independent republic was only transitory, and was succeeded by a return to her previous condition, as a fief of the empire.

In 1395 the territory of the Milanese was erected into a duchy in favour of the Visconti; and, on the decease of the last of that family in 1497, it was obtained

* A very interesting history of this contest has lately appeared, from the learned and eloquent pen of the Cavaliere Testa.

by Francis Sforza, the son of James Sforza, who, having begun life as a labourer, became constable of Naples and Gonfaloniere of the Holy Church.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century Louis XII. and his successor, Francis I., laid claim to the Milanese as descendants of the Visconti. Their pretensions were effectually opposed by Charles V., who, on the decease of the last of the Sforzas, invested his own son, Philip II. The duchy remained subject to the Spanish Crown till the death of Charles II. in 1700. In the war of the succession it fell to the house of Austria, and remained under that dominion, till by the treaty of Campo Formio, Milan became the centre of the Cisalpine republic, and afterwards of the kingdom of Italy.

Had the people of that kingdom been satisfied with the government of Eugene Beauharnais, his claims might, on the downfall of Napoleon, have been acquiesced in by the allies. He had the support of his father-in-law, the King of Bavaria, and, what was more important, that of Russia.

In April, 1814, when the news of the abdication of Fontainebleau arrived, the French troops, which formed a considerable part of Eugene's army, returned to their own country, and, his means being thus reduced, he was obliged to enter into a convention with Bellegarde, the Austrian commander, but continued to occupy with

his Italian army a considerable portion of the kingdom. It was agreed that delegates should be sent to convey to the allied powers the wishes of the people. The Duca Melzi, president of the council, proposed that the senate should send a deputation to act in concert with one already despatched by the army and to plead for the independence of the country, under the sovereignty of Beauharnais. A protest against this measure was got up by Counts Confaloniere and Porro, and the other leaders of the Italian party, and signed by a hundred and fifty influential persons, who wished, at all hazards, to get rid of Beauharnais. A violent commotion ensued;—the senate was forcibly ejected by the populace, and Prina, one of the ministers, was barbarously murdered. Disgusted at these hostile demonstrations, Eugene, the only possible sovereign under whom the independence of the kingdom of Italy might have been established, retired to Munich; and the Italian party became aware, when it was too late, that it had blindly forwarded the views of Austria, whose troops were admitted into Milan by a provisional government set up after the departure of the viceroy.

When the territorial arrangement of the north of Italy was already decided at Paris, a deputation arrived from Milan, praying for the preservation of the kingdom of Italy as an independent state. Confaloniere, who took the lead in this application, having

received, as was natural, little encouragement from the Emperor of Austria, obtained an interview with Lord Castlereagh, of which a report is preserved and printed in an Appendix to Foscolo's discourse *Della Servitù d'Italia.* The Count began by alluding to the flattering assurances held out by the Generals Wilson and Macfarlane, and by Lord William Bentinck, to the Italian patriots, and expressed his hope that the influence of England would be exerted, to prevent his country from falling under the dominion of Austria. Lord Castlereagh at once declared that he could not promise the required support, or be bound to fulfil all the expectations to which unauthorized expressions of English officers might have given rise. Confaloniere reiterated the desire felt by his countrymen for a sovereign of their own, even should that sovereign be an Austrian; and for representative institutions similar to those of Great Britain. Upon this the English diplomatist is reported to have expressed doubts as to the applicability of such institutions to all times and circumstances, and to have alluded to the ill success of the experiment so recently made in Sicily. He added, that against a despotism like that of Napoleon, he would have joined the deputation in pressing for every possible guarantee; but that, under the family which filled the Austrian throne, no instance had occurred of any abuse of power; and that by a

government, noted for its mild and paternal character, the wishes as well as the interests of the people would not fail to be regarded.

Such impressions, founded on the wise and beneficent administrations of the Emperors Joseph and Leopold, were, at that time, generally entertained.

The Austrian government was no sooner in possession, than it alienated the feelings of the Lombards by abrogating the sub-nationality enjoyed under the French. The impolicy of such a beginning will be apparent, when it is considered that Bonaparte was then meditating an escape from Elba, and that Murat was hoping to unite his forces with the discontented legions of Lombardy, and to make Italian independence his war-cry.

It appears that Prince Metternich perceived his error; for, after the restoration of peace in 1815, he constituted the Lombard-Venetian kingdom, a concession which would have been more gratefully received, if it had been less tardily executed. This act, though beneficial in its tendency, was not accompanied by any change of system. The irritating and repulsive demeanour of the Imperial government eradicated by degrees that sincere and disinterested loyalty to the House of Lorrain, which had been cherished and handed down in many families.*

* Gualterio, vol. ii. c. xxxi. p. 178.

Though the French party, which consisted principally of those who had served under Napoleon, was gradually diminishing, that of the Italian patriots, which had its head-quarters in the house of Count Confaloniere, was constantly on the increase, and vainly hoped to make use of the Carboneria in furtherance of a national movement. The Neapolitan revolution of 1820 produced great excitement at Milan as well as at Turin, and Confaloniere and his friends, strangely miscalculating the chances of success, participated in the designs of the Piedmontese revolutionists of 1821. The moment was thought favourable because a portion of the Austrian army had been sent to Naples, though the remaining portion was not only sufficient to render any outbreak hopeless, but was supported by large reinforcements assembled in the Tyrol.

After the ill-starred Spanish constitution had been put down in Piedmont as well as in Naples, the Imperial government slowly and deliberately proceeded to wreak its vengeance on those who had allowed themselves to be compromised. As no overt act had taken place, a more gentle and magnanimous policy might have been expected; but the Emperor had been irritated by a cold reception at Milan; and hopes appear to have been entertained, that by bringing Confaloniere and his companions to trial, some proof* might be elicited

* Gualterio, vol. i. c. iv. p. 56.

as to the participation of the Prince of Carignan in their conspiracy, and that a pretext might thus be found for depriving him of his inheritance.

The greater part of the Milanese conspirators saved themselves by voluntary exile. Confaloniere, Andryane, and some of their less prudent associates, were arrested in December, 1821. Their protracted trials were only brought to a close in January, 1824. That the lives of these men were forfeited, according to the letter of the law, cannot be denied; but the imperturbable severity displayed in the whole transaction is strangely at variance with the character of a mild and paternal government, ever reluctant to inflict unnecessary punishment upon its erring children.

The narratives of Andryane and Pellico have revealed the mysteries of Spielberg. A letter written by Count Gabrio Casati, and published by Gualterio, contains a touching relation of the attempt made by himself and by his venerated sister, Teresa Confaloniere, to obtain a mitigation of her husband's sentence. The generous intercession of the kindhearted Empress,—the stern inflexibility of her consort,—the mysterious interview of Prince Metternich with the condemned Count, and the pains which were taken to extract from him some important revelation, are there graphically portrayed.

It was only when he found that the sentence of

death upon a gibbet did violence to the feelings of society at Vienna, that Francis could be induced to substitute one of perpetual imprisonment (*carcere duro*), in which all access, even of the nearest relations, was denied. As the conduct of the Emperor had not previously rendered him amenable to the charge of cruelty, his more than Stoical indifference on this occasion, may possibly have arisen from an erroneous and overstrained sense of duty; but the necessity, or even the policy, of these rigours, can hardly be defended. The conspiracy, whatever may have been its true character, was never carried out; and it cannot be alleged that an undertaking so completely abortive, required, as a matter of state necessity, severe examples. By a government so powerful, a generous forbearance might safely and advantageously have been displayed, and such a course would probably have calmed down the spirit of disaffection, which was only irritated and kept alive by vindictive proceedings.

A long period succeeded, during which the Lombard-Venetian kingdom presented the outward appearance of a calm; and rapid progress was made in material prosperity,—but an under-current of discontent ran deep and strong. Secret societies were constantly on the increase. The vigilance of the police was unable to prevent the silent approaches of Young Italy, and at length the terrific explosion of the *cinque giorni*

proclaimed the failure of Prince Metternich's system of repression.

Having considered the origin and principal causes of discontent in the Lombard-Venetian provinces, it becomes necessary, in the next place, to view the conduct of Austria in her relations with other Italian states. Her interference, sometimes excessive, has not unfrequently been rendered indispensable by dangers emanating from the great nucleus of disorder existing in the Papal territory. There the approach of the *Tedeschi* has, ere now, been welcomed by the population as a protection against more intolerable evils.* So long as it is thought necessary by the Catholic powers, to uphold the supreme Pontiff in his present isolated and unnatural position, the presence of foreign bayonets in central Italy can hardly be dispensed with. While Rome is in the possession of a French garrison, it does not seem unreasonable that Austria should occupy Bologna. Experience seems to have shown that it is impossible for any Pontiff to surmount the difficulties which beset his path as a temporal ruler. While other ecclesiastical principalities have long ago been secularized, this remains, —an isolated vestige of a different age,—and of an obsolete polity. The territorial dominion of the Papacy has hitherto been upheld, not so much from

* Farini, vol. i. p. 55.

any belief that its preservation can be serviceable to religion, as from a fear of the difficulties and jealousies which might attend its abolition. In the mean time the interests of three millions of people are sacrificed; Italy is kept in a perpetual ferment, and Austria not only acquires an evil name, but her independence and dignity are impaired by the critical state of her Cisalpine affairs.

The wrongs of central Italy were publicly acknowledged by the leading powers of Europe so long ago as 1831. The advice then tendered in the famous *Memorandum** was, on the cessation of immediate danger, evaded and forgotten. The evils pointed out by that document, as incompatible with good order and tranquillity, remain unabated or increased, and appear to be inseparable from a system, which has become effete for any other purpose than that of placing the Pope and Cardinals in an invidious position.

Hac fonte derivata clades,
In patriam populumque fluxit.

Though Italians naturally desire to see the entire peninsula emancipated from extraneous dominion and influence, it would be unwise in them to neglect attainable advantages, while waiting for the fulfilment of an improbable condition. It will probably be

* Farini, vol. i. c. iv.

admitted by dispassionate observers, that the connexion of Lombardy and Venice with the Austrian empire, does not present any such insuperable impediment to the well-being and progress of the nation, as that which arises from a prolongation of ecclesiastical misgovernment in the Roman States.

If, by an agreement of the great Catholic powers, this perennial source of disorder could be taken away, and some other arrangement effected, whereby suitable revenues might be secured to the Pope and the Sacred College, the excuse for armed invention would soon cease; and Austria, no longer occupied in guarding her territories from the contagion of discontent, would perceive the advantage and policy of satisfying reasonable expectations.

Happy will it be for Austria as well as Italy, if the Emperor, Francis Joseph, whose star has so lately appeared in the horizon, and whose character is still to be developed, can rise superior to the influences by which his youth has been surrounded, and vindicate to himself a better than imperial inheritance, as successor to the princely virtues of Joseph and Leopold of Lorrain.

CHAPTER III.

The condition of Piedmont at the commencement of the revolutionary war —Prolonged resistance to the French—The convention of Cherasco, and death of the King—He is succeeded by Charles Emanuel IV., who enters into an alliance with France, and being undermined by the republicans, is compelled to abdicate—The successes of Suwarrow, who obtains possession of Turin—The return of Napoleon from Egypt—He is victorious at Marengo and annexes Piedmont to France—The King retires to Sardinia—Resigns the crown in favour of his brother Victor Emanuel—The treaty of Vienna and union with Genoa—The Carbonari —The discontents of the army—Prospero Balbo minister—The Prince of Carignan—His character and antecedents—Santarosa and the revolution of 1821—Abdication of Victor Emanuel—Carlo Felice King—Regency of the Prince of Carignan—In 1831 he succeeds to the throne —The difficulties of his position—His character and designs.

FROM the termination of the war of the succession to the outbreak of the French revolution, the attitude of Piedmont was that of armed independence. Its destinies were bound up with those of the time-honoured house of Savoy, which, by military and domestic virtues, had won the sympathy and attachment of a hardy and generous people. The feelings and desires of all classes were in unison. The court, though adhering to the forms of ancient etiquette, resembled the head-quarters of a military leader. Not only did the whole body of the aristocracy regard the

profession of arms as its peculiar calling, but every cottage contained a soldier, whose generalissimo was his sovereign. All orders and degrees of men were animated with the same love of their country—the same contentment amid poverty, the same martial loyalty. Powerful neighbours were fain to respect a state, which, although inferior in wealth and population, was ever prepared for defence. Neither France nor Austria could afford to see the military prowess of the sub-Alpine warriors united to that of a rival.

On the breaking out of the revolutionary war, the weakness and corruption of other Italian States presented a tempting field for conquest and spoliation, but the hardy soldiers of Piedmont were equally unmoved by the doctrines of the French republicans and by the terror of their arms.

France at that time unsheathed a two-edged sword, dangerous alike to friend and foe. She combined the lever of opinion with vast military power, and was thus prepared to shake the foundations of all existing governments. Between the peril of accepting her insidious alliance, and that of taking part in a monarchical coalition, Victor Amadeus III. was compelled to make his choice. Inheriting the predilections as well as the virtues of his race, his pride and reliance were centered in an army which had been the constant object of his solicitude. The over-weening

confidence of his own officers, and the flattering representations of the expatriated French royalists, contributed to blind him to the danger of his position.

From 1792 to 1796, Piedmont, inadequately supported by Austria, maintained an heroic struggle. It was only by reiterated attacks and overwhelming numbers that Scherer or Massena could obtain advantages over the skilful perseverance of Colli, and the firmness of the Piedmontese battalions; and when after a series of desperate conflicts, retreat became necessary, it was effected in such a manner as to afford little triumph to the republicans. The direction of the French forces was at length entrusted to a chief whose consummate military talents were backed by his intuitive astuteness as a politician.

The task imposed upon Napoleon by the Directory was one of no ordinary difficulty. He was not only expected to compel the King of Sardinia to negotiate, and to drive the Austrians from Italy, but to support his own troops by forced contributions, and to gratify the Parisian democracy with the spoils of a country which he was sent to liberate.

To the French army, long habituated to the hardships of mountain warfare, dominion, riches, and ease were promised as the guerdon of its toils; but its leader at once perceived that he could only accomplish his arduous undertaking by turning to account the

political dissensions of the times. He also knew that in Piedmont there existed no sufficient germ of revolutionary feeling; but he availed himself of the exertions of foreign agitators, and fomented popular demonstrations in the hope of intimidating the Sardinian government. Wherever the smallest opening presented itself, the arts of seduction were sedulously employed by French propagandists, and the King's apprehensions of civil discord were worked upon.

By such devices Bonaparte was enabled to extricate himself from a position of considerable risk. The Piedmontese army had never been broken, and, though compelled to fall back in the direction of the fortresses, might with their support have defied the invaders, ill provided as they were with artillery, and destitute of provisions.

The Italian enterprise had become necessary to the republican government of France, and its abandonment or failure would have obscured the prospects of Napoleon, and have given to his dearly purchased victories an indecisive character. At this critical moment, the King, instead of imitating the constancy of his ancestors, yielded to the apprehension of intestine strife. His counsels were, at the same time, influenced by an opinion which began to gain ground, that Austria derived the chief advantage from a struggle in which she was not the immediate sufferer.

The contest had at first been undertaken in the hope of invading France, and of effecting a diversion in favour of the royalist party which was numerous at Lyons and in some other places. These expectations had been doomed to disappointment, and it was evident that the penalties of war must continue to fall heavily upon the sub-Alpine people. No valid aid was to be expected from Venice, Rome, or Naples. The best-informed Italians began to perceive that France was destined to obtain the upper hand, and that their country must submit, for a season, to her supremacy. Except in the Sardinian States, neither the higher nor lower classes of Italy were animated by any strong feeling of attachment to their governments. A change being regarded as inevitable, men began to consider in what manner the current, which could not be resisted, might be guided into beneficial channels, and looked upon the approaching French domination, as a state of transition to a better and more national existence.

The Sardinian monarch, deceived in his hopes of support from the French royalists, and deriving no encouragement from his Italian allies, was at last induced to adopt the views of the peace party, and acceded to the truce of Cherasco. As soon as the preliminaries were entered upon, the most importunate and oppressive demands were advanced by the French

government, and Victor Amadeus did not long survive a convention which left him a discouraged army, an exhausted treasury, and a realm no longer independent. His successor, Charles Emanuel IV., though endowed with estimable qualities, was incapable, through feeble health, of grappling with the dangers of his position. However opposed to revolutionary principles, he regarded the alliance of France as more advantageous than that of Austria, to the permanent interests of Piedmont. He only hesitated to accept the offensive and defensive league desired by the Directory, from an apprehension lest he should find himself placed in opposition to the Pope. Count Balbo, the father of the late distinguished statesman whose patriotic career has entitled him to the grateful remembrance of all Italians, was charged with the maintenance of Piedmontese interests at Paris. The aim of the Sardinian envoy was not merely the safety but the aggrandizement of his country; and if his designs partook of a grasping and unscrupulous character, they were not at variance with the spirit of the government to which he was accredited.

The policy of augmenting the Sardinian States, and of securing an ally, by whose services the Austrian preponderance might be destroyed, was urged upon the Directory. The suit of Count Balbo had the support of Napoleon, who, despising the Milanese

democrats, declared that one of the King of Sardinia's regiments, was worth more than the whole power of the cis-Alpine republic.

Piedmont at length agreed to furnish a military contingent, to be placed under the command of the French generalissimo, and France engaged to protect Sardinia from all enemies, foreign and domestic. The King's scruples with regard to the Holy See were relieved by a stipulation that he should not be obliged to wage offensive war, except against the Emperor of Germany.

In obtaining the ratification of this treaty, Balbo had many difficulties to contend with; but his arguments were supported by ample pecuniary means, and he was thus enabled, says Botta,* to obtain *molta entratura.* In vain did Talleyrand point out the palpable inconsistency of engaging to uphold a monarchy against the attacks of those democratic assailants, to whom France was indebted for so large a portion of her success. Bonaparte, eager to obtain the disposal of the Piedmontese troops, pressed for the ratification; and the appliances of the Sardinian diplomatist prevailed with many, who saw no disgrace in being parties to an engagement which they knew would not be observed any longer than might be found convenient.

* Libro xi.

While the Directory, by these means, obtained, during the continuance of the war, an ally, which it was prepared to swallow up on the conclusion of peace, the seeds of revolution, which had already produced an ample harvest in Genoa and Milan, began to fructify in Piedmont. Secret conspiracy was followed by open rebellion. War taxes, paper money, and a general scarcity helped forward the work of political incendiaries. Neither the virtues of the sovereign, nor the angelic disposition of his consort, were able to avert the calamity of civil strife. Though the royal family was deservedly respected, the nobles, tenacious of antiquated privileges, exposed themselves to popular dislike. Fatal errors were committed by the civil and military authorities in the repression of the first tumults, and several well-meaning and harmless individuals suffered, while the guilty were allowed to escape. Tenivelli, the accomplished historian of Piedmont, fell a victim to the undiscriminating violence of the re-action. His amiable character and ruthless condemnation are pathetically narrated by his friend and pupil Botta.

It was impossible that a small state, isolated as Piedmont then was, should permanently repel the tide of democracy which flowed in on every side. Genoa and Milan, as well as France, supplied a host of indefatigable agitators. The effect of concession

was tried. Primogeniture and feudal rights were abolished; but these attempts to conciliate were unsuccessful. The kingly government had still the support of a faithful army and the good-will of Bonaparte; and when his refusal to assist the insurgents became known, the rebellion was easily crushed, and the worsted republicans were treated with a severity which laid a foundation for future troubles.

During the absence of Napoleon in Egypt, which extended from May, 1798, to October, 1799, the machinations of the Directory against the Sardinian government, assumed a more decided character. Though the guise of friendship was maintained, the French minister was instructed to seek a pretext against the King, by subjecting him to gross and studied insults, and the embassy became the centre of subversive plots. On the plea of preventing civil disturbances, a force was sent to Turin under the command of General Brune, who obtained possession of the citadel. The King's palace was no sooner commanded by republican cannon, than his ears were daily greeted with the Jacobin airs of the French bands, and his court and family subjected to the greatest indignities. The ministers of England and Russia then took their leave of a prince who no longer possessed the shadow of independence.

While the best army and most gifted general of

France were engaged in distant warfare, a new European combination was formed against her, and the Emperor Paul united his forces with those of Austria. The Directory, conscious of its own misdoings, and of the gratuitous insults which it had heaped upon Charles Emanuel, began to fear that Piedmont might once more be arrayed with the enemies of the republic. It finally determined to throw aside the mask; and a force was sent under Joubert with orders to subvert and expel the dynasty of Savoy.

On the 9th of December, 1798, the King was obliged to abdicate, and by a hasty departure, escaped additional insults. His fidelity to his engagements with France would not otherwise have saved him from being dragged as a prisoner to Paris, where it was intended to gratify the Jacobins by the spectacle of a royal captive.

The demeanour of Charles Emanuel in taking leave of the abode of his ancestors was noble and disinterested. With a delicate sense of honour he refused to carry with him the crown jewels, or to bereave the royal palaces of their ornaments. These treasures were sealed up, and left at the disposal of the future government; but the seals were soon broken, and the regalia and heir-looms of Philibert Emanuel and his successors became the prey of political adventurers.

Piedmont was hardly annexed to France, when the fortune of war placed its capital and territory at the

disposal of Suwarrow. The Russian general was anxious to restore the King's authority; but his Austrian allies had other views, and were indignant at Charles Emanuel's prolonged adherence to a French alliance.

On the 10th of October, 1799, Napoleon, having escaped the English cruisers, arrived at Paris. The sudden return of the conqueror of Egypt, while it dismayed the Directory, revived the hopes of the French people, then groaning under every aggravation of evil which a weak and oppressive government could inflict. The heads of the army, supported by the universal desire, determined to put an end to a government of lawyers, and to bring the agony of factions to a close. The eyes of all were directed to Napoleon, and by the revolution of the 18th Brumaire he became, under the title of first consul, invested with supreme authority. Order was rapidly restored. Thousands of state prisoners were set at liberty, and the discouraged armies of the republic were once more led to victory.

In the middle of June, 1800, Marengo placed the whole of Italy at the disposal of the victor; and after a painful interval of doubt and uncertainty, the long-projected annexation of Piedmont to France, was carried into effect. Many of the nobles then emigrated to Sardinia, determined to share the fortunes of their

sovereign. The bulk of the population yielded a constrained obedience, and, though cherishing the memory of independence, conformed to the laws, and followed the standards of France.

On his arrival in the island of Sardinia, the King appealed to Europe against the perfidious conduct of the Directory. In 1802 he resigned the crown in favour of his brother, Victor Emanuel the First, a prince who was always more inclined to dwell on the past glories of his family and country, than to appreciate correctly the altered circumstances and requirements of the times in which he lived. When on the escape of Bonaparte from Elba, Europe was once more plunged in war, the chief of the house of Savoy did not appeal in vain to the courage and loyalty of his subjects. Though the nationality of the sub-Alpine people had long been in abeyance, they did not hesitate to obey the call of their sovereign, who, following the example of his predecessors, placed himself at the head of his troops, and was speedily surrounded by a respectable army.

By the treaty of Vienna the territory of Genoa became united to that of Piedmont, and a system of government was adopted, which, though praiseworthy for its nationality, and the repugnance exhibited to Austrian interference, was strongly tinctured with ancient predilections. The restored monarch did not

dissemble his dislike to the changes, whether good or bad, which had been effected during his absence. This leaning, fostered and encouraged by those who had shared his adversity, and by the numerous adherents of the ancient *régime*, impaired by degrees the King's popularity. A nucleus of discontent existed in the old Jacobins, who, not daring to avow themselves openly during the reign of Napoleon, had enrolled themselves as members of the Carbonari clubs. The union of Genoa with Piedmont, though conducive to the solid and lasting advantage of both countries, was galling to the Genoese, proud of their historical greatness. The concealed embers of disaffection were fanned into a flame by the errors of the retrogradists.

With all sections of liberals, the foremost idea and desire was to see the nationality and independence of Italy established. Many influential persons, with whom democratic principles found no favour, were anxious that Piedmont should exhibit to the rest of the Peninsula the advantages arising from a mixed constitutional government. A moral influence it was thought might thus be acquired, antagonistic to that of Austria. An union of the northern provinces under one government, strong enough to protect the natural frontier, seemed an indispensable preliminary to the formation of a national league. The fact that the Piedmontese forces had during four successive years

maintained the contest with those of the French republic was not forgotten. By the voluntary amalgamation of Lombardy and Venice with the Sardinian States, a military power might, be formed capable of holding the keys of Italy. Such were the hopes at that time entertained by minds which had become emancipated from what Gualterio calls "il gretto cerchio delle idee municipali." At that period the *sette politiche* were in their vigour; for their mischief and inutility had not then been tested by experience. Irritated by the narrow and exclusive prejudices of the dominant faction, some joined the Carbonari, others a sect which assumed the title of the *federalisti.* The general dissatisfaction extended itself to the army, which could not fail to appreciate the superiority of the officers who had served under Napoleon, over those who owed their advancement to Court favour.

Finding that the army participated in the general desire, the King determined to abandon, or at least to modify, his previous system of government. Count Prospero Balbo was named minister, and from this first concession, to public opinion, may be dated the commencement of that *egemonia* which Piedmont has subsequently exerted in Italian affairs.

There being no male descendant of any of the brothers who successively filled the throne, Charles

Albert, Prince of Carignan, began to be regarded as the future head of the house of Savoy.

After the events of 1798 and 1799, when the King and the rest of the royal family retired to the island of Sardinia, the branch of Carignan, at that time remote from the Crown, continued to reside at Turin. Nurtured and educated in times of revolutionary excitement, Charles Albert had ample opportunities of becoming acquainted with the realities of public life, and of studying the feelings and desires of his countrymen. His manhood was adorned not only by a dignified exterior and chivalrous manners, but by solid attainments, united with an enthusiastic spirit. By education, and the hereditary instinct of his race, a soldier,—and naturally proud of the military distinction of Piedmont—he was, above all, an Italian. By those who mourned over the humiliation of the Peninsula, he was already regarded as its destined regenerator. The leaders of the *sette* began to take alarm at his growing popularity, and in order to preserve their own influence, were glad to countenance and propagate an absurd belief that the Prince of Carignan was enrolled as a Carbonaro. Times of trouble were approaching. The reforms of Prospero Balbo were much too substantial to please the retrogradists, but not sufficiently subversive to gratify the desires of the *sette*. Victor Emanuel, notwithstanding

his antecedents, was sincerely desirous of conforming to the reasonable wishes of his subjects. "Lo spirito della riforma," says Gualterio, "era, malgrado tutte le opposizione e resistenze, penetrato nelle sale del palazzo."

At this juncture the events which were occurring at Naples emboldened the *esaltati* of Piedmont; and the year 1821 commenced with an ominous *emeute* on the part of the students of the university, which was suppressed with needless violence and injudicious severity. After this untoward beginning, the boasts and threats of the absolutists widened the breach and irritated even the more moderate portion of the liberals. The anger and energies of the discontented were soon collected into a focus by the courage, abilities, and rashness of Santarosa. That chief was warned of the perilous nature of his enterprise, and entreated by his friends to wait for the gradual development of liberal opinions, and for the accession of a prince, whose aspirations were known to be in unison with those of the country. Santarosa would hear of no delay: "L'ora," he said, "é gia suonata, bisogna carpire l'occasione." * Being supported by a large portion of the army, he resolved to hazard a military revolution, and to undertake a war of defence in the first instance, hoping that the example set by Naples

* Gualterio, vol. iii. c. xxxvii.

and Piedmont would soon be followed by a general rising under the banner of Italian independence.

Before proceeding to extremities, the agitators, knowing the patriotic sentiments of the Prince of Carignan, attempted to gain his support. The propositions made to him were so framed as to do the least possible violence to his loyalty. He was assured that no intention was entertained adverse to the reigning monarch, whom the army desired to proclaim King of Italy, and thus to draw on a war with Austria. Charles Albert, though incapable of dissimulating his real sentiments, and unguarded, perhaps, in his expressions of sympathy, discouraged the attempt as rash and impracticable, and declined the proposed participation. This act of prudence was subsequently stigmatized as treason, by a disappointed and embittered faction. The conspirators, unable to obtain the countenance of the Prince, determined to risk an outbreak. On the 10th of March, 1821, the insurrection, hurried forward by the *carbonari* and the *exaltés*, broke out simultaneously at Turin and Alexandria. Possession was obtained of the latter, but at Turin the insurgents were not equally successful. The King published a manifesto, deploring, in earnest and truthful terms, a movement which could only expose his defenceless country to the miseries of a foreign occupation. His first idea was to place himself at the head of the troops

and to attempt the recapture of Alexandria; but finding that the army was unwilling to be employed in such an enterprise, and still desired the Spanish constitution, which he had engaged himself to the allied sovereigns, then sitting in congress at Laybach, not to grant, Victor Emanuel resolved to abdicate the throne. His brother and successor, Charles Felix, being at Modena, the King, before his abdication, desired the Prince of Carignan to assume the reigns of government *ad interim*. This short-lived regency was arranged with a view to reconcile parties, and the ex-King hoped, by such an expedient, to afford time for reflection, and possibly to avert a crisis.

In the discharge of his trust, as regent, Charles Albert displayed an anxious desire to accomplish these objects, and to ward off impending miseries from a country torn and paralyzed by contending factions. When pressed and menaced by Crivelli, the mouth-piece of the revolutionists, he repelled those menaces by the declaration, "Io sono risoluto a morire per quelli che rappresento." He boldly and honestly declared to his countrymen that he was invested with no powers to grant the desired constitution, and that such an act could not possibly be of any avail, and would only expose them to an invasion which they were unprepared to resist.

The insurgents having succeeded in obtaining

possession of the citadel, threatened to bombard the city, unless the Spanish constitution was immediately proclaimed; and, in order to prevent a catastrophe, the regent permitted the proclamation, but reserved to the King and Parliament the right to make such alterations and modifications as might be found expedient.

The agents and abettors of Austria, regarding with the utmost jealousy and dismay any progress of constitutional principles in Piedmont, rejoiced in the ascendancy of the *cervelli bollenti.* They were well satisfied that the carbonari should take the wind out of the sails of the constitutionalists, and would have rejoiced to see the Prince of Carignan induced to exceed his powers or violate his trust. A pretext would thus have been afforded for his exclusion from the throne, and for conferring the inheritance on the Duke of Modena.* A false move on the part of Charles Albert might have handed over Piedmont to a minion of the house of Austria. His scrupulous adherence to legality and good faith, frustrated these designs. The loyalty with which he fulfilled, and, when the proper moment arrived, resigned the office of regent, was branded by the insurgents as a betrayal of their cause; but the

* See the curious relation given by Gualterio of Prince Metternich's interview with Count Confaloniere, and of the pains taken to obtain evidence of the Prince of Carignan's participation in the plans of the conspirators.—Rivolgimenti d'Italia, vol. i. c. iv.

course which he pursued was the only one by which the permanent interests of Piedmont or Italy could be secured.*

After the resignation and departure of the regent, Santarosa, supported by the Federalists, became invested with ephemeral power, and, notwithstanding the protest of the sovereign, prepared to maintain and defend by force of arms, the Spanish constitution.

The revolution in the first instance received its impulse from the generous but blind impetuosity of a chief whose hopes were soon blighted, and whose influence was undermined, by the divisions and strife of the liberal party.

Santarosa used every effort to gain the military, but he found that the ancient watchword of *Viva il ré*, had more authority with the soldiers, than any which he could substitute. The flower of the army did not conceal its dislike of the revolution, and a royalist force, under the command of General della Torre, superior in numbers to that of the Constitutionalists, was assembled at Novara, and being joined by the Austrians under General Bubna, routed the insurgents, who endeavoured to oppose their march to

* Luigi Cibrario, a distinguished senator and historical writer of Piedmont, has published some very interesting reflections written by Charles Albert himself, in reference to these transactions, and which furnish a complete answer to the calumnies of the absolutists, as well as to those of the opposite faction, whose constant aim it was to make him its tool.

Turin. Thus the Piedmontese revolution of 1821 ended like that of Naples, in an increase of Austrian influence, and was followed by a proscription of undue severity and extent. The Prince of Carignan was accused by the infatuated and persecuted liberals as the author of their misfortunes, and the betrayer of an enterprise which he had never adopted or encouraged. The anxiety evinced by the Austrian government to deprive him of his inheritance, sufficiently proves that his conduct had not rendered him liable to any such reproach.

On the death of Carlo Felice in 1831, Louis-Philippe being then established on the throne of France, Charles Albert at length succeeded without dispute to that of his ancestors. He had learned from the experience of 1821, that the liberation of Italy was not likely to be accomplished by the orators of the Piazze, or by any other agency, save that of a numerous and disciplined army, retained in a state of readiness for some favourable juncture in the affairs of Europe. It was impossible for him either to gratify the impatience of his countrymen, or to explain his conduct, without sacrificing his long-cherished desire to strike a well-timed and effectual blow for Italian independence. Reserve and dissimulation, approaching to duplicity, were the only weapons with which he could hope to baffle the watchful and astute policy of Austria.

The *scorreria di Savoia* of 1834, has already been alluded to. Mazzini, in order to encourage his followers, and gain adherents to that ridiculous enterprise, had boasted that he had many proselytes amongst the officers and soldiers of the Piedmontese regiments. Charles Albert, who regarded the hopes of Italy as depending on the loyalty and discipline of his army, was naturally, though perhaps unduly, alarmed at this declaration. A strict investigation was instituted, and some of the authorities to whom it was entrusted, animated by over-zeal or party feeling, were hasty and severe in the execution of their charge. Twelve non-commissioned officers and soldiers were put to death, and others were condemned to severe punishments. These rigours were regretted by the King, and gave a handle to his calumniators, who now renewed their attacks with increased virulence. He longed in vain for an opportunity of revealing himself to Italy, and continued his preparations; while the unpopularity which he incurred, enabled him to elude the suspicions of Prince Metternich. He knew that appearances must, for a time, be against him, and was aware that his position was one of danger as well as difficulty. In conversing with the Duc d'Aumale, he is reported to have said,* "Je suis entre le poignard des carbonari et le chocolat des Jesuites!"

* Gualterio, vol. iii. c. xl.

At this time the mode in which certain commercial questions were handled by Prince Metternich augmented the popularity and promoted the views of Charles Albert. As a reprisal for the infringement of an obsolete commercial treaty, the wines of Piedmont, largely consumed in the Milanese, were subjected to prohibitory duties. The King's protest against this encroachment not only called forth the enthusiasm of his own subjects, but proclaimed to the whole Peninsula, that there existed a sovereign prince of Italian lineage, who dared to assume an attitude of independence. The demeanour of that prince, since his accession to the throne, had been a subject of disappointment to many who did not understand or appreciate his character. The state of Europe and of Italy, and his own peculiar position, had hitherto compelled him to restrict his exertions to administrative improvements, the enrichment of the treasury, and the organization of the army, while the ultimate scope of his policy had been prudently concealed. The juncture for which he had long been preparing, at length approached. The Sardinian monarch was already regarded with aversion by the leaders of the *sette*, who dreaded his increasing popularity, as an obstacle to their wild and visionary ambition. As to the real nature of his intentions, whether worthy of praise or of blame, there can be little doubt. To expel the

Austrians, to unite the north of Italy under one sceptre, to secure for himself and his descendants a position suitable to the defenders of independence, these were Charles Albert's long-cherished aspirations. A time was at hand when such a design, if cordially supported by the Italian nation, might have been realized. The causes and events which led to the frustration of these hopes and to the ultimate triumph of Austria, will be treated of in a subsequent chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

Early connexion of Naples and Sicily with Spain—The changes produced by the war of the succession—Don Carlos expels the Imperialists, and obtains the sovereignty of the Two Sicilies—Bernardo Tanucci minister—Civil and ecclesiastical reforms—The King's marriage—He defeats the Austrians at Velletri—Embellishment of the capital—Discoveries at Herculaneum and Pompeii—Charles succeeds to the crown of Spain—His third son Ferdinand is declared King of the Two Sicilies.

EMBRACING more extensive territories, and numbering a greater population than any of its neighbours, the kingdom of the Two Sicilies would seem to contain within itself the requisites for a happy and independent existence. Though no kindred origin or community of feeling cements the union of the continental and insular races, political circumstances as well as geographical position, have tended to separate both of them from intimate relations with the rest of Italy. The sovereign of these favoured realms might well be expected to lay aside all desire of territorial extension. The boundary of the Garigliano seems as it were to seclude the beautiful *Regno* from the turmoils of Europe, while the insular position and inexhaustible resources of Sicily afford an unbounded field for the

revival of industry, the extension of commerce, and the beneficent triumphs of civilization.

These dominions, transmitted by Ferdinand of Arragon to his descendants, long formed part of the vast possessions of Spain, and were subjected to vice-regal exaction and misrule. During the war of the succession, the Neapolitan territory was overrun by the Imperialists under Prince Eugene, and on the restoration of peace, the Spanish Crown, being confirmed to Philip V., was deprived of its Italian dependencies. Naples, Sardinia, and the Milanese, sharing the fortunes of the low countries, were handed over to the Emperor, while Sicily was awarded to Amadeus of Savoy.

Before three years had elapsed, Philip became dissatisfied, and without any reasonable pretext, invaded Sardinia and Sicily. Upon this, an alliance was contracted in London between the Emperor, the Kings of England and France, and the Duke of Savoy, for the purpose of putting a stop to Spanish aggression. In 1720, the allies reconquered both islands, and the Emperor, retaining possession of Sicily, relinquished Sardinia to the Duke.

These arrangements subsisted for a period of about ten years, when Philip, instigated by his second consort, Elizabeth Farnese, began to regret the rich possessions of which his Crown had been bereft, and to

participate in the Queen's desire of obtaining, for her two sons, dominions in Italy. Parma having already fallen to Elizabeth by inheritance, she entertained the design of securing its states, and also the reversion of Tuscany, for her youngest son Philip, and of grasping, for Don Carlos, the crown of the Two Sicilies.

In furtherance of this plan, Charles was despatched to Italy, in 1732, to take possession of the states of Parma; and at the same time, to ingratiate himself with the friends and adherents of his family. His departure was marked by significant formalities. The King and Queen being seated on the throne, and surrounded by a brilliant court, the young prince knelt before his parents, and Philip, having made the sign of the cross upon his head, girded him with a jewelled sword, saying, "This sword was placed on my side by my grandfather, Louis XIV., when he sent me forth to win these Spanish realms; may it bring to thee entire success, unalloyed by the perils and sufferings of war."

Charles was well received at Florence by Gaston de' Medici, who was already disposed to name one of the *Infantes* as his successor. The projects of the Spanish Court were forwarded by a contention which arose in 1734, with regard to the crown of Poland. Louis XV. supported the claims of his father-in-law, Stanislas Leczinski, and declared war against the Emperor, who

abetted those of the Elector of Saxony. While the French under Villars were invading the Milanese, a Spanish armament was assembled at Parma and Leghorn, and placed under the command of Don Carlos, who was guided by the experience of the Duke of Montemar. This enterprise, expressly undertaken for the conquest of Naples and Sicily, attracted the Duke of Berwick and many officers of distinction, and the Infante was surrounded by Italian princes and nobles as well as by Spanish grandees. Unheeded amid that brilliant assembly, or observed only for the modesty of his deportment, was Bernardo Tanucci, an advocate of Pisa, who had been appointed auditor to the Spanish army, and afterwards became celebrated as the prime minister of Charles, and the promoter of his reforms.

The easy conquest of Naples and Sicily which ensued, was, in great measure, owing to the feelings of weariness and dislike entertained by the inhabitants towards the Imperial government, and to the hopes of an ameliorated and independent condition, held out to them by the *Infante.*

The Emperor finding himself without allies, and being exposed to the attacks of France, as well as those of Spain, accepted the mediation of England, and a treaty was concluded in 1737, which, investing Don Carlos with the sovereignty of the Two Sicilies,

compelled the Court of Spain to relinquish Parma and to transfer the reversion of Tuscany to the Duke of Lorrain. This arrangement disappointed, for a time, the views of Elizabeth Farnese with regard to her younger son, Don Philip; but that Prince ultimately obtained his mother's inheritance, which was ceded by Maria Theresa in 1748.

When Naples and Sicily thus regained the condition of independent states, the laws of both kingdoms were to be sought for, in an entangled maze of decrees, constitutions and customs, imposed or introduced under various dynasties. The condition of the finances was not less confused, the taxes having long been levied with no better method than that which short-sighted cupidity suggested.

The privileges, and immunities of both nations were respected by Charles; but while the Parliament of Sicily continued to exercise its functions, that of Naples had fallen into desuetude.

The Neapolitan nobles, deprived of the power which they once exercised, in resisting kingly and papal encroachments, preserved only an arbitrary and pernicious authority over their own vassals. Ecclesiastical affairs were administered by twenty-two archbishops, one hundred and sixteen bishops, and about one hundred and ten thousand inferior clergy, amongst whom the ascendancy of the Court of Rome

was upheld by all the allurements of mundane riches and splendour. A long continuance of this vitiated condition in Church and State, had produced its natural consequences. The thieves of Naples were estimated at thirty thousand. Assassinations were frequent in the capital, and deeds of open violence prevailed in the provinces. Poisonings were so common, that a separate tribunal, the *giunta de' veleni*, was instituted for their repression.

The young King, bent upon the elevation of his people, laboured to redress these complicated evils, and his plans were matured by an able and honest minister. The reforms of Charles and Tanucci, though not of a sweeping character, were sincerely and zealously undertaken, and the private as well as public conduct of the sovereign, had an extensive and salutary influence.

A few years after his accession, Charles contracted a marriage with Amélie, daughter of Frederic Augustus, King of Poland, a princess whose amiable character and exemplary life shed lustre on her station.

By the measures of Tanucci, financial disorders were remedied, the burdens of the people lightened, and the coffers of the State replenished. A concordat was obtained from the Pope, which removed many impediments to amendment. Lay jurisdiction in temporal affairs became established; the circulation

of papal bulls, unless approved by the King, was forbidden; and the number of the clergy was reduced to the proportion of one, for every hundred souls.

The people were beginning to reap the fruits of an enlightened and judicious administration, when Charles was called upon to suspend, for a time, his peaceful labours.

On the decease of Gaston, the last of the degenerate Medici, Tuscany became vested, according to treaty, in the Duke of Lorrain; and on that of the Emperor Charles VI., the Spanish Sovereigns, hoping to obtain the Grand Duchy for Don Philip, assembled an army and joined the coalition against Maria Theresa. The King of Naples, obeying the injunction of his parents, had despatched a contingent to take part in the war, when the appearance of an English fleet in the Bay, compelled him to recal his troops. The Austrian commander, victorious over the Spaniards, was already on the frontier, and attempting to shake the fidelity of the Neapolitans, when Charles renounced a neutrality, already violated by his opponents, and prepared for war.

The capital was placed in a state of defence, and for greater security, the Queen and her infant daughter were sent to Gaeta. The King, placing himself at the head of his troops, effected a junction with Gages, the Spanish commander, and awaited the

attack of the Austrian army, under Lobkowitz. That general, expecting to be supported by an Imperialist movement in Naples or Sicily, delayed operations until compelled to risk a battle, through want of provisions. An action at length took place at Velletri, which resulted in the defeat of the Austrians; and Charles, to whose firmness and good conduct this success was mainly owing, had the satisfaction of entering Rome in triumph. He then returned with the Queen to Naples, and was greeted by the undissembled joy of a people whom he had shown himself competent to defend, as well as to govern.

The Neapolitan troops continued to take part in the war, which was distinguished by two events interesting and consolatory to the friends of the Italian nation. The first of these was the campaign of Velletri, already described, which proved the loyalty and courage of the Neapolitans, under a sovereign deserving of their confidence. The other was the expulsion of the Austrians from Genoa, effected in 1746, by the efforts of the inhabitants, who thus regained for a time their ancient independence. When peace was restored by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, Parma and its dependent duchies of Placentia and Guastalla were conceded to Don Philip, as already mentioned.

By an improved administration of the finances, Charles was enabled to adorn Naples with costly works

of embellishment and utility. The unrivalled theatre of San Carlos, completed in the short space of six months, and the colossal palace of Caserta, attest the genius and resources of Neapolitan architects; but the most felicitous of the King's undertakings were those by which the treasures of Herculaneum and Pompeii were brought to light. The interest which Charles took in the progress of the *scavi*, was intense, and a story is handed down, that having selected and carried home from Pompeii a mass of indurated cinders, he extracted from it, after days of labour, coins of various kinds; and lastly, from the centre of the lump, a ring engraven with masks. This he at once placed on his finger as the guerdon of his toil. On succeeding to the crown of Spain, he refused to deprive Naples of the smallest of these treasures, and even the favourite ring was relinquished, and deposited in the National Museum.

As Don Philip, the eldest of the King's sons, laboured under incurable infirmities of mind and body, and the second, Don Charles, became, in consequence of that misfortune, heir to the Spanish monarchy, the third son, Ferdinand, then in the eighth year of his age, was solemnly proclaimed King of the Two Sicilies in October, 1759. Charles having first appointed a regency, took his leave of Naples. The entire population of the city assembled

near the port, or crowded on the flat roofs of the houses, to witness his departure; and the mournful silence of a countless multitude, expressed, far better than words could do, the universal sorrow.

CHAPTER V.

The minority of Ferdinand—Expulsion of the Jesuits—The King's marriage—Ganganelli elected Pope—He decrees the suppression of the Jesuits—His death—Disputes with Pius the Sixth—His journey to Vienna—Dismissal of Tanucci—Sir John Acton minister—The Court joins the coalition, and attempts to form an Italian league—Dethronement and imprisonment of Pius the Sixth—King Ferdinand takes possession of Rome, but is obliged to retire, and seek refuge in Sicily—Sanguinary struggle between the Royalists and Republicans—The French enter Naples, and proclaim a Republic—On their retreat the Court returns, and a fierce reaction takes place—The execution of Caracciolo—Rome is again occupied by Neapolitan troops—The election of Pius the Seventh—Napoleon dictates the terms of peace—Renewal of hostilities—The King again retires to Sicily, and Joseph Bonaparte is proclaimed at Naples—The Battle of Maida—Joseph is replaced by Joachim Murat—The Russian campaign—King Joachim's jealousy of Beauharnais—Murat joins the Allies, but deserts them after Bonaparte's escape from Elba—He is defeated by the Austrians—Restoration of the Bourbons at Naples—Murat lands in Calabria, is made prisoner, and put to death.

In this chapter, an attempt will be made to describe, in outline, the affairs of Naples, from the abdication of Charles III. to the restoration of the Bourbons in 1815.

After the King's departure, a regency, of his appointment, acting under the direction of Tanucci, proceeded to complete the emancipation of the state

from the trammels of ecclesiastical power. Clement XIII. contended in vain, for the Papacy no longer retained any strong hold on the religious feelings of the people and governments of Europe. The influence of the Jesuits had become more considerable than any which the Pope could command, and it was only by placing itself under their tutelage, that the Court of Rome could hope to maintain a semblance of its former power.

The essence of Jesuitism, is an unceasing opposition to Church reformation. The animosity which led to the overthrow of the Company, is considered by Ranke as chiefly attributable to its defence of the Roman see. The Catholic governments of that day, observing the superior advances made by Protestant states in power and civilization, became ambitious of securing, for their own dominions, corresponding advantages. In order to do so, it became necessary to put a stop to the pretensions which, notwithstanding its altered position, were still pertinaciously clung to, by the Papacy. The Jesuits stood in the way of this design. Their importance was well described by Frederick of Prussia, when he said, "The suppression of the Jesuits by his Holiness, would be much the same thing as if I were to disband my grenadiers."

The powerful organization attained by this fraternity, which possessed many of the characteristics of a

secret society; the reputation acquired by its members for learning and intelligence; their complete subordination and unity of action, had contributed to the growth of a power which aimed at universal control. There was hardly a prince or noble in any Roman Catholic country, whose affairs were not under the cognizance of some open or concealed member or agent of the Company, or whose public as well as private conduct was not liable to be biassed by its subtle and all-pervading influence. Monarchs, whose forefathers had trampled upon feudal opposition, were in danger of becoming the puppets of a monastic order. The approach of this danger, had long been foreseen and guarded against, by the wary statesmen of the Venetian commonwealth, before it raised the jealousy of less vigilant governments. The Jesuits were expelled from Portugal in 1759, and from France in 1764:—and in 1767, they were banished from the whole of the Spanish dominions. Charles III. then induced the Neapolitan Regency to follow his example; and all the convents and houses of the Company, in the Two Sicilies, were at once broken up, and the inmates seized and hurried off to the sea-ports, where vessels were in readiness to carry them to Terracina. The possessions of the Society were confiscated, or handed over to charitable uses. Such were the decisive and stringent measures adopted by the Catholic governments of that day

against a corporation whose unscrupulous competition for power, they dreaded.

In 1768, Ferdinand, whose education had been greatly neglected, contracted a marriage with the Arch-duchess Maria Carolina, one of the daughters of Maria Theresa. The Austrian princess, uniting the fascinations of youth and beauty to considerable mental endowments, soon obtained an influence superior to that of her careless and unambitious husband.

During the following year, the Papal throne became vacant by the death of Clement XIII. Not only the fate of the Jesuits, but the future relations of the Catholic powers with the head of the Latin Church, hung on the decision of the conclave. The importance of this crisis, and the diplomacy employed to influence the election, are fully described by Saint-Priest.* After long delay the suffrages were declared to be unanimous in favour of Cardinal Ganganelli, who assumed the name of Clement XIV.

The new Pontiff, aware of the risks incurred by his predecessors in their frequent contentions with the Catholic powers, and anxious, at any cost, to avert the danger of a schism, had pledged himself to the absolute suppression of the obnoxious fraternity. Instead of carrying out his resolution with the firmness,

* Histoire de la Chûte des Jesuites par le Comte Alexis de Saint-Priest, c. iii.

moderation and humanity, which ought to accompany a severe, but necessary public measure, he began to interpose delays, and used every effort to defer an act of which he dreaded the consequences. When Florida Blanca, the Spanish ambassador, insisted on the fulfilment of the Pope's engagement, Ganganelli entreated that the suppression might be postponed till after the death of Ricci, the aged general of the order. The representative of Charles III. replied by conjuring the Pontiff to put an end to so dangerous a controversy, and hinted, that his refusal might be followed by an attack on other religious orders. Ganganelli perceiving the danger of his position, after having appealed in vain to the religious feelings of Maria Theresa, signed the fatal brief on the 21st of July, 1773, expressing a conviction that his own death would be the consequence.*

The aged Ricci was then imprisoned, and treated with undue severity. He was detained in the castle of St. Angelo till after the accession of Pius VI., and died in confinement, denying to the last the criminality of his order.

The Pope, when the struggle was over, appeared to regain his usual spirits, and to enjoy the popularity which accrued to him from the immediate restitution of Avignon and Benevento, by France and Naples.

* "Questa suppressione mi darà la morte."

His health remained good till about the period of the Holy Week, in the following year, when a sudden change took place. After this, he shut himself up in his palace, and refused to see even the foreign ambassadors, until August. When at length induced to receive them, his appearance was entirely changed, and an approaching conclave began to be whispered of, as certain. In a few weeks more, after six months of extreme suffering, he breathed his last, and the symptoms observed before and after his death, and minutely described by contemporary witnesses, led to a conclusion, the soundness of which can never be absolutely proved or disproved, that he died from the effect of poison.

His successor, Cardinal Braschi, who assumed the title of Pius VI., was selected by the Sacred College as a prelate whose prepossessing exterior, dignified address, and love of splendour, might revive the waning influence of the Papacy. His election was not in accordance with the wishes of the Neapolitan Court, and on the occasion of a vacancy which soon occurred in the Archbishopric of the Metropolis, the King claimed an absolute right to the appointment, forbidding the form, "*per grazia delle sede Apostolica*," to be used. The Pope refused to an Archbishop of Naples, thus constituted, the compliment of a Cardinal's hat, which for ages had been conceded to his predecessors.

Soon afterwards, the bishopric of Potenza was in like manner conferred upon Serao, a learned ecclesiastic, whose Jansenist principles were well known, and who had written in defence of lay jurisdictions. The Pope refused to consecrate Serao till warned by the King that according to the ancient discipline of the Church the Neapolitan bishops were competent to perform that ceremony.

Shortly afterwards, an opportunity was taken of discontinuing the annual tribute of a white palfrey and 7000 ducats, which had long been rendered, as an act of vassalage to the Roman See. These demonstrations of open revolt against the Papacy, were in harmony with the proceedings of the Queen's brothers, the Emperor Joseph,* and the Grand Duke. Pius was so much alarmed at the tone assumed by the former, that he undertook, in 1782, a journey to the Austrian capital, in order to try the effect of a personal remonstrance. He was received with hospitable civility; but his imposing presence produced no effect on the Emperor, or upon his minister, Prince Kaunitz, who committed the not *unintentional* solecism of cordially shaking the hand of his Holiness, when held out to be kissed! Joseph, being better versed in Church history

* Many of the German sees were at that time filled by Jansenist bishops, who, like Bishop Hontheim, their leader, denied the right of the Pope to any temporal dominion.

than the Pope himself, was prepared to argue, but not to concede. After a month's sojourn at Vienna, Pius returned, mortified and disconcerted, to his own capital, and his differences with the reforming princes of the House of Austria were only terminated by the approach of a common danger from the side of France, which threatened the existence of kingly, as well as Papal power.

In 1777, Tanucci having attempted to set limits to the profuse expenditure of the palace, incurred the queen's displeasure and fell from power. After wielding the helm of the state during three and forty years, he survived in honoured poverty till the year 1788. His successor, the Marchese Caracciolo, being advanced in years, soon gave place to Sir John Acton, an English naval officer, who having first been employed by the Queen's brother, Leopold of Tuscany, had subsequently the direction of the Neapolitan Marine. The leaning of the Court and of the prime minister were in favour of an alliance with England and Austria, and, after the death of Charles III. in 1788, family ties between the Bourbons of Naples and those of France and Spain, almost ceased to be regarded. Marriages were arranged by the Queen for two of her daughters, with their cousins the archdukes Francis and Ferdinand, and a third alliance with the House of Austria was ensured, by the betrothal of the infant heir-

apparent of the crown, to the archduchess Maria Clementina.

In 1790, the wrongs of Marie Antoinette, the Queen's sister, decided the court to join the coalition against France. An attempt was made to secure the support of Venice as well as Piedmont, and thus to form an Italian league. The degenerate Venetians adhered to a neutral and temporizing policy,* and the presence of a French fleet at Naples in 1793, shook the resolution, though it did not alter the secret intentions of the court. Armistices and treaties were subsequently entered into with the French republic, but on these engagements, no great reliance could be placed by either party.

In 1797, Pius VI. having joined the coalition, and being unable to defend his territory against the French, was compelled by the treaty of Tolentino, to surrender Avignon, Bologna, and Ferrara, and to see the galleries which he had beautified and enriched, despoiled of their treasures. A French army under General Berthier, took possession of Rome. The Papal authority was superseded, a tree of liberty was planted in the Campo Vaccino, and Pius, refusing to acknowledge the Roman Republic, was ordered to quit the Vatican. The aged Pontiff found a refuge in the Certosa convent near Florence, where, through the intercession of the Grand

* See Chapter xxiv.

Duke Ferdinand, he was allowed to remain, until that prince was deprived of his dominions by the Directory. He was transmitted from one fortress to another, and treated like a criminal, and after eighteen months of exile and imprisonment, died at Valence. On his death-bed, he was refused the solace of bequeathing even the smallest tokens of remembrance to his friends, and was told that everything he had, belonged to the state, whose prisoner he was.

The cardinals and ecclesiastical dignitaries found an asylum at Naples; but General Berthier demanded their expulsion, and the dismissal of Acton. The King relying on the aid of England and Russia, prepared for war. Bonaparte's departure to Egypt averted, for a time, the impending danger, but this interval which ought to have been employed in promoting unanimity and preparing the means of defence, was wasted in the gratification of party revenge. Persons of worth and eminence, whose only crime was opposition to a dominant camarilla, were brought to trial as political delinquents. The conduct of the magistrates on this occasion, was creditable to the national character. Though strongly urged to employ torture, they refused to do so, and by a just and courageous sentence acquitted the prisoners.

At this juncture, Nelson arrived from Aboukir, with his victorious fleet, and was enthusiastically received

by the Court and people. The Neapolitan troops then advanced into the Roman States,—and the French forces being at that moment insufficient for the defence of Rome, retired, and left to King Ferdinand the triumph of a public entry. What had been spared by the agents of the Directory, was now gleaned by a new horde of liberators, and the destruction of Raphael's frescoes in the *loggie* of the Vatican attest the mischievous propensities of the Neapolitan soldiery. Ferdinand's occupation of the Eternal City was of brief duration. He was compelled to retire before the French forces, and his hasty retreat was followed by an ignominious flight from his own capital. The embarkation of the court for Palermo, when the means of defence were by no means exhausted, destroyed the *prestige* of royalty, and emboldened the republicans. A bloody conflict ensued between them and the dispirited royalists, which was followed by the entrance of the French army under Championnet, and by the proclamation of a republic.

After a triumphal entry, the French general proceeded with his officers to pay respect to the relics of Saint Januarius, and to witness the miracle of the sacred phial, which is said to have taken place on that occasion with unwonted celerity.

The festivities which ushered in the new form of government, were hardly concluded, when a heavy

subsidy was required to defray the expenses of the war. Discontent and penury ensued. The adherents of the Bourbons continued to maintain a successful struggle in the provinces, and the French were soon obliged to withdraw their troops, and to abandon the unfortunate and short-lived Parthenopeian republic to its fate.

The royal family immediately returned from Sicily, and the restored government, instead of restraining the excesses of its partisans, set an example of violence and revenge which was followed and surpassed by a depraved and excited populace. In those days of sanguinary misrule, Cardinal Ruffo and Fra Diavolo attained an evil celebrity, and the atrocities of the reign of terror in France, were rivalled by those of a royalist faction.

Happy would it have been for Nelson, by whose aid this counter-revolution was effected, if his powerful influence had been exerted on the side of humanity and conciliation. Overcome by the flatteries of the Court, and led astray by the fascinations of a thoughtless and unprincipled woman, he allowed himself to be swayed by the passions of the dominant party, and to participate in its impulses.

Admiral Caracciolo, a brave and skilful Neapolitan commander, who had often served with honour in conjunction with the fleets of England, forgetful of his

engagements to his sovereign, had espoused the republican cause. The court-martial by which he was tried, was held on board the flag-ship of the English admiral, and Neapolitan writers assert that the severity of the tribunal was aggravated, instead of alleviated, by his interference. Though Caracciolo's culpability must be admitted, the rigour which, setting aside all consideration of past services, consigned him to a felon's death, was at once cruel and impolitic; and it is painful to confess that Lord Nelson's share in this transaction can only be mentioned with grief and condemnation.

In October, 1799, the French, menaced by the military and naval forces of Austria and England, again retired from Rome, which was occupied by those of King Ferdinand. During this occupation the government was carried on without any reference to the Papal authority, and though many priests returned and resumed their functions, the Conclave which met to chuse a successor to Pius VI. assembled at Venice. In the beginning of 1800, when Cardinal Chiaramonte was elected, and assumed the title of Pius VII., he declined an invitation to reside in the Pontifical States till his rights had been acknowledged by the King of Naples, who preferred a claim to them as obtained by conquest from the French.*

* Colletta, libro v. section 18.

After Bonaparte's return from Egypt, the fortunes of France were retrieved by his brilliant passage of the St. Bernard, and by the hard-fought and decisive victory of Marengo. These events changed the aspect of Europe, and blighted the ambitious hopes of the Neapolitan court; which by an ill-timed and unsuccessful invasion of Tuscany had aggravated the wrath of the first consul.

The new Pontiff, on his arrival in Rome, began his reign with acts of moderation, and put a stop to the political persecutions which had been carried on by the Neapolitan authorities. About this time the Jesuits began to re-establish themselves, in an unobtrusive manner, and were protected by the King of Naples, who solicited and obtained a Papal brief in their favour.

Napoleon, after having settled his differences with Austria and Russia, dictated terms of peace to Ferdinand, who was only allowed to retain his dominions out of deference to the wishes of the Czar, and was obliged to support a French army of occupation.

The marriage of Francis, the heir-apparent, with the Arch-duchess Maria Clementina, has already been adverted to. That princess, when she gave birth to a son, was entitled by the custom of the Court to demand three favours of the sovereign. She only asked for one, and that was the pardon of a young woman named

Sanfelice, whose execution as a political offender had been respited on account of pregnancy. The humane and modest request was brutally rejected, and the ill-fated Maria Clementina died soon afterwards in the twentieth year of her age, having already survived her infant son. "*Morta,*" says Colletta, "*arrecò lutto al popolo, bruno alla reggia.*" After her death a double connexion was arranged with the Spanish Bourbons. Francis found a second wife in the Infanta Isabel, and his sister was married to the Prince of Asturias.

By the peace of Amiens, the kingdom obtained relief from the burden of a foreign occupation, but on the resumption of hostilities the French forces returned. Ferdinand and the Queen irritated against France, and encouraged by the disembarcation of an English and Russian force, resolved to risk another war. The fate of Italy hung on the German campaign, which was brought to an abrupt conclusion by Mack's disgraceful surrender at Ulm, and by the defeat of the Russians at Austerlitz. When these events became known, the English and Russian troops were withdrawn to Sicily and Corfu. The Court, elated by the battle of Trafalgar, and believing the Russians to be invincible, had again exposed itself to the anger of Napoleon, who, in January, 1806, proclaimed that the perfidious Bourbons of Naples had ceased to reign. Massena then advanced with a

powerful army, and was accompanied in his rapid march upon Naples, by Joseph Bonaparte.

The Queen, whose courage was unshaken, attempted to excite a popular and religious war; the King found a refuge in Sicily; and the princes joined their adherents in Calabria. Massena entered Naples without opposition, and when Joseph assumed the reins of government, he was openly supported by the republicans, whose hatred of the Court had been exasperated by the persecutions of 1799. The colossal power of Napoleon was regarded as a sufficient guarantee against any future re-action.

Joseph did not possess decision of character, nor was he endowed with that ready eloquence, or those personal advantages which conciliate popular favour. His administration, though stained by some instances of cruelty and injustice, which the violence of party-feeling and the unsettled state of the country made it difficult to avoid, was, in the main, intelligent and judicious. His reign, of little more than two years, was continually disturbed by commotions and conspiracies. The adherents of the Bourbons were still powerful in the provinces. Capri was taken and held by the English. Regnier, who commanded in Calabria, having incautiously attacked a British force of 6000 men, which had been disembarked from Sicily, under the command of General Stewart, sustained

a signal defeat at Maida. The Prince of Hesse Philipstadt, who had engaged in the service of the King of Naples, distinguished himself by a brave and skilful defence of Gaëta, and afterwards in a war of posts, which continued to rage, with varied success, in the southern extremities of the kingdom.

In 1818, King Joseph departed to assume a greater and more doubtful sovereignty, and in the autumn of that year, Joachim Murat, with his consort Caroline Bonaparte and four beautiful children, were welcomed by the Neapolitans as their future rulers.

The chivalrous bearing and prepossessing exterior of King Joachim, when leading the French cavalry, had won for him the fame of a paladin, and the nickname of *le beau Sabreur*. He undertook and accomplished the reconquest of Capri from the English; but a more difficult task remained, that of reconciling his duties, as a sovereign prince, with the submission required by his Imperial brother-in-law. He was not only called upon to defend his shores from a powerful and active foe, and to tread out the smouldering ashes of civil war, but to carry into practical operation the undigested reforms of his predecessor, and to overcome the reluctance and incapacity of subordinates.

In order to grapple with these difficulties, independence of action was required, no less than persevering energy. Murat, with the name of King, had barely

the power of a vassal. His public labours and anxieties were not alleviated by domestic harmony. The Queen, idolizing her brother's greatness, did nothing to support the authority of her husband, who lived to regret the day when, as a simple officer, he had superiors, but no master.

When Napoleon assembled his army for the Russian expedition, he could not dispense with the services of the King of Naples, who accordingly departed with his contingent, and commanded the vanguard of the mighty host. His audacity and skill were constantly displayed during the conflicts of that memorable campaign. On the Emperor's return to Paris, Murat conducted the retreat from the Niemen to the Oder. When this arduous undertaking was concluded, and Napoleon's power had already received a significant shock by the defection of Prussia, King Joachim resigned the command of the army to the Viceroy Eugene, and hastily retired to Italy with the remains of the Neapolitan forces.

The implicit obedience of Eugene, whose deference to his father-in-law was so complete, that he had even been employed to announce to the French Senate in 1809, the repudiation of his mother Josephine, was more favourably regarded by Napoleon than the brilliant services of his rival. Murat, stung with jealousy, and impressed by the altered aspect of Europe, resolved

to consult his own interests. When reproached by the Emperor for this desertion, he replied by a bitter and indignant letter. He began to listen to the instigations of those who longed for the union of Italy, and made secret proposals to Lord William Bentinck. Before these proposals could receive the sanction of the English government, his resolution was shaken by letters from Ney and Fouché, urging him to remove the scandal and discouragement caused by his absence from the French army. Fouché informed him of a proposed congress, in which, if he rejoined his brother-in-law, he would be invited to bear his part; but what moved him most, was the desire of the French cavalry, expressed through Ney, for the return of their favourite leader. Considerations of policy and self-interest gave way before the instinctive impulse of the soldier, and in August, 1813, Murat once more arrived in the French camp, was embraced by the Emperor, and welcomed by his old companions. In the battle of Dresden he led the right wing to victory, while Napoleon and Ney commanded the centre and the left. All previous offences were now forgotten, and he continued, by his courage and example, to support the waning fortunes of Napoleon till the retreat of the French army terminated at Erfurt. He then departed to his own kingdom, having exchanged with Bonaparte assurances of mutual attachment and regard.

At this time the constitution of Sicily, lately remodelled in conformity with that of England, began to be regarded by the Neapolitans with admiration and envy; and the Bourbons, by whom these liberties had been conceded, were, once more, looked upon with favour. Even the Carbonari, whose views and doctrines had not then * assumed an implacable or malignant character, partook in this feeling; being disgusted by the vigilance of Murat's police, and the severity of his his government.

The political judgment of King Joachim was never sound, nor were his constancy and good faith to be relied on. Wearied by the discontents of his subjects and anxious to guard against the danger which the decline of Napoleon's star was sure to bring upon his satellites, he entered into a treaty with Austria, which was followed by an armistice with England, and, after some hesitation, joined his forces to those of the Allies.

When the abdication of Fontainebleau put a stop to further hostilities, it was agreed by the pacificators that the affairs of Italy should be referred to the Congress of Vienna.

A cordial understanding between Murat and the Viceroy Eugene might, at that moment, have been productive of important results; for both were

* "La Carboneria si depravò col crescere, ma, in quel tempo era innocente."—*Colletta*, libro vii. 53.

possessed of considerable military means, and both had reason to distrust the deliberations of Vienna. The ambition of King Joachim, and his jealousy of Beauharnais, prevailed over the dictates of prudence. To one who, having begun life as a private soldier, had in his fortieth year ascended the steps of a throne, confidence in his future destinies was natural. When Napoleon escaped from Elba, King Joachim tried to deceive the allies by assurances of fidelity to his engagements, but at the same time prepared to encounter all hazards, and to strike a blow for the crown of Italy. His hasty resolution, and fruitless struggles with the Austrian forces, were, from the first, disapproved by Bonaparte, and, on the 20th of May, he was compelled to relinquish the contest, and embark for France. He landed at Frejus, and though his proffered services were declined by Napoleon, his absence was felt and regretted on the field of Waterloo.

Nothing more remained to impede the restoration of Ferdinand, which took place a few days before that action, and was inaugurated by professions of liberality. A difficult task remained, that of reconciling the adverse claims of the officers who had followed the fortunes of Murat and of those who had adhered to the Bourbons. The latter were retained in the capital, while the former were stationed with such of their regiments as were not disbanded, at Salerno.

At the time when Murat arrived at the south of France, a civil war was raging between the adherents of Napoleon and the Bourbonists. Being unable to proceed by land to Paris, he hoped to obtain a passage to Havre, and from thence to reach the capital. When foiled in this intention, he betook himself to Corsica, and there remained till the hopes entertained by the Neapolitans on Ferdinand's restoration had been disappointed, and the disgust of the army had increased. The ex-King had still many adherents, and relied on the support of the troops assembled at Salerno. Having collected a band of some 250 Corsicans, he sailed for that port, but his vessels were dispersed by storms, and, being driven to Pizzo in Calabria, he madly landed with eight-and-twenty followers, was made prisoner, and, after an interval of four days, was shot by order of the government.

CHAPTER VI.

Connexion of Sicily with Spain — Ancient Feudal Constitution — The Bourbons retire from Naples, and take refuge at Palermo—English protection—The King levies taxes without consent of Parliament—Remonstrance—Imprisonment of the five Barons—The Queen's secret understanding with Napoleon—Measures of Lord William Bentinck—Subsequent difficulties—Lord William leaves the Island—Suspension of the constitution—Conduct of the British Government—Restoration of King Ferdinand at Naples—Increase of the Carbonari—The Spanish constitution proclaimed—The King goes to the Congress of Laybach—His conduct—Regency of the Dukes of Calabria—Approach of the Austrian forces—Defeat and flight of Pepe—Suppression of the Spanish constitution—The death of Ferdinand—Corruption of the Government under Francis the First—Accession of Ferdinand the Second—Dal Carrotto—The King's marriages—Ravages of the cholera—The Scientific Congress at Naples — Insurrection of Palermo — Popular demonstration at Naples—The King grants a constitution—Pepe is appointed to command the army sent against Austria—The insurrection of the 13th May—The land and sea forces are recalled.

PROTECTED against invasion by their insular position, and the alliance of England, the Sicilians were but little affected by the events and excitements of the French revolutionary war. So limited had been the progress of education in the island, that the whole number of the inhabitants who could read and write was estimated at about 1500.* There was no middle

* Paper on the state of Sicily, published in the eighth volume of Lord Castlereagh's Letters and Despatches.

class, and the disproportion of fortunes was very great, but the passion for national independence characterized alike the noble and the beggar.

The old constitution, by which the barons engrossed a principal share of the parliamentary authority, had never been abrogated. During the period when Sicily was governed by Spanish Viceroys, they received on their appointment the significant warning—*Coi baroni siete tutto, senza di essi, siete nulla.*

When Charles III. expelled the Imperialists, he never advanced the claim of conquest, but considered himself as a legitimate and hereditary sovereign—bound to respect the customs and liberties of the realm.

Before revolutionary ideas and principles had swept away the ancient land-marks of public law, prescriptive right was, for the most part, held sacred, even by conquerors, for upon that basis the prerogatives of princes as well as the rights of subjects were supposed to rest. An honourable adherence to reciprocal engagements formed the very essence of feudal relations. The wholesome prevalence of this feeling may be traced in public as well as private transactions. Even the ill-administered dependencies of Spain were allowed the benefit of this general regard for established rights and customs, and we find the shadows of the mediæval constitutions preserved during the

dominion of the Spaniards at Milan and Naples, while the more substantial liberties of Sicily were also respected.

The legitimate monarchs who leagued against Napoleon, and at last accomplished his overthrow, had long envied the centralization of power attained by the great revolutionary autocrat. They desired to adopt his system, and to imitate the perfections of his army and police. The Papacy, though reinstated in its territorial possessions, could no longer stand alone, and was obliged to support itself by an alliance with military despotism. Thus the bayonet, the police, and the authority of the Roman Church began to constitute the *trinoda necessitas* of modern times, and the just expectations of the governed were set at nought. In pursuance of this system, we find the ancient franchises of Sicily, which had survived so many changes of dynasty, and which formed a noble basis for a free and well regulated constitutional monarchy, disregarded and abrogated.

It now becomes necessary to take a retrospective glance at the affairs of that magnificent island during the nine years when its connexion with Naples was suspended.

Deprived of their continental dominions, Ferdinand and his Queen were received with welcome by all classes at Palermo; but the Neapolitan courtiers and

refugees by whom they were surrounded, were regarded with jealousy and dislike.

In 1808, ten thousand British troops were landed at Messina for the defence of the island, and the Sicilian government began to receive a subsidy from England. Though the Queen's necessities compelled her to grasp at pecuniary aid, she soon became weary of English protection. In 1810, the marriage of Napoleon with her grand-daughter, the Arch-duchess Maria Louisa, revived her restless and ambitious spirit with new hopes. She began to harbour the design of rendering herself useful to Bonaparte, and of regaining, through his favour, the crown of Naples. With this view she secretly engaged herself to assist in the expulsion of the English, and to co-operate with a French army which was to be embarked from the extremity of Calabria.*

At this time a proposal was introduced into the *Braccio* of the barons, which was supported by the *Braccio ecclesiastico*, to equalize the taxation of all classes. The project was resisted by the Queen and her party, through jealousy lest the parliament should acquire importance by a just and popular act. The Prince of Belmonte, who stood forward as the leader of the patriotic party, supported this measure and incurred the displeasure of the ministry, which began

* Colletta. Libro vii. c. xxvi.

to call in question the right of parliament to a definitive decision on financial questions. The Duke of Orleans, who then resided at the Court of his father-in-law, took part with Belmonte; and the King was obliged to make a declaration, that he would not infringe the ancient constitution which had ever been maintained and supported by the authority of the Crown. From this moment the parliament, which had long been regarded as a pageant, acquired respect and importance.

During the following year, the government attempted to impose a tax of one per cent. on all payments. A memorial against this project was drawn up and signed by the parliamentary barons. Belmonte and four other noblemen, who took the lead, were thrown into prison. The Duke of Orleans deprecated this illegal violence, but appealed in vain to the imperious and obstinate spirit of his mother-in-law, who no longer expecting to regain the throne of Naples through English intervention, relied entirely on her recent family connexion with Napoleon.

Lord William Bentinck was sent out to cut the thread of these intrigues, and arrived at Palermo a few days after the arrest of the five barons. Having obtained during a short residence some acquaintance with the posture of affairs, he revisited England, desiring to confer with the government, and to obtain

further instructions. On his return, he made a formal demand for a change of administration, for the appointment of Sicilian instead of Neapolitan ministers, for the liberation of the five barons, and the abolition of taxes not authorized by parliament. These terms, which were accompanied by a claim to have the Sicilian forces placed under his own direction, were rejected by the King, who refused any longer to speak to the English representative, on public affairs. Bentinck, having already suspended the subsidy, resorted to military force, and compelled the Court to submit.

The hereditary prince was appointed Vicar of the kingdom, and Belmonte placed at the head of a constitutionalist ministry. An attempt was then made to obtain securities for future good government, by remodelling the ancient parliament after the English constitution. The proposal was grateful to the people, as tending to destroy Neapolitan influence, and received, through the Prince Vicar, the royal assent. Soon afterwards, a law for the abolition of entails sowed the seeds of dissension. This change, which amounted to an interference with the rights of property, was opposed, but in vain, by Belmonte and Lord William Bentinck, and, by alienating many, proved injurious to the cause of liberty.

In 1813, Bentinck was appointed to command the

British forces in Catalonia, but before his departure he induced the Queen, partly by compulsion and partly by undertaking the payment of her debts, to leave the island, and fix her residence in Germany. Notwithstanding this precaution, the workings of faction soon began to show themselves. The royalists coalesced with the demagogues. The parliament indefinitely postponed the consideration of the finances, and occupied itself in passing absurd laws for fixing the price of provisions. The ministers, no longer able to obtain a majority, resigned, and the plague breaking out, a cry was raised that it had been introduced by the English. Lord William found himself obliged to relinquish his command at Tarragona, and return to Sicily. On the 31st of August he wrote to Lord Castlereagh to that effect, expressing at the same time a desire to be relieved from an arduous political charge, and allowed to follow, without further interruption, his military career. "I am convinced," he says, "that such is the weakness of the hereditary Prince, and such will be the incapacity of any set of men who may be placed at the head of the government; such also the silly, the interested and depraved character of the people, that it will be impossible for the British political authority ever to absent himself." On his arrival at Palermo, in October, he attempted to rally the friends of the constitution, and to strengthen them

by a coalition. A new ministry was installed, and parliament dissolved. As the representative of Great Britain, Bentinck undertook a journey in mid-winter to the principal towns, in order to give a favourable impulse to the elections. The recent victories of Leipsic and Vittoria kindled enthusiasm, and he was everywhere received with respectful and festive demonstrations. His advice was tendered in plain and unambiguous terms. At Catania especially, he is stated by Palmieri to have exhorted the civic council, "che nel prossimo parlamento non venissero scelti *les mêmes fripons de l'année dernière!*" *

In the beginning of 1814, Lord William went to Italy, to concert with Murat, measures of hostility against Bonaparte. The parliament then assembled, and a large majority of the deputies was inclined to support the constitution; but an unfortunate disagreement between Belmonte and the Prince of Castelnuovo caused division amongst those, whose unanimity was essential to the public interest.

In June, Belmonte proposed, as a matter of policy and conciliation, that the King should be invited to resume the functions of royalty. This step was not opposed by the English minister, and, contrary to the general expectation, Ferdinand accepted the offer,

* Palmieri, Storia Costituzionale, p. 225.

declaring that he intended to govern "*con i poteri che la esistente costituzione garantisce alla corona.*"

Notwithstanding these professions, he immediately gave himself up to the Neapolitan, and absolutist faction. Lord William Bentinck took his final leave of Sicily in July, and his successor, Mr. A'Court, in a letter to Lord Castlereagh dated the 6th of the following month, thus describes the posture of affairs: "The King and his ministers continue to make great parade of their constitutional sentiments, but not a day passes without some flagrant violation of the constitution. In all this they are aided and abetted by Count Mocenigo, the Russian minister, an *intrigant* of the first class."

When peace was restored, the Duke of Orleans, before he removed his family to France, earnestly advised his royal father-in-law to adhere to his engagements, and by maintaining the just liberties of his Sicilian subjects, to secure their respect and attachment to himself, and to his family.

Belmonte, whose health was impaired, accompanied the Duke to Paris, and died shortly afterwards. On their departure, all hope of good government was at an end. The ministry was composed of men utterly unfit for their position, and the King's secret advisers encouraged the follies and extravagances of the democrats, in order to have a plea for getting rid of the

constitution. Parliament was dissolved without any just reason, and the elections for a new one, were purposely allowed to fall into the worst hands. "Si volea un parlamento scompigliato per poi trar profitto dallo scompiglio .... *e l'effetto ben corrispose.*" * The meeting of the chambers was delayed on account of the Queen's death at Vienna, and seven months were then consumed in frivolous and undignified discussions. The incapacity evinced by the deputies for any worthy or competent discharge of their duties, combined with the imbecility of the ministry, brought all public business to a stand. The Prince of Castelnuovo, the last remaining stay of the constitution, made a fruitless attempt to remedy these misfortunes, and then retired from public life, devoting his time and fortune to the advancement of agriculture.

After again dissolving Parliament, the King departed to resume possession of the throne of Naples. The Hereditary Prince was named Viceroy of Sicily, and the constitution, unsustained by any healthful or intelligent public feeling, was tacitly extinguished.

On the restoration of the Bourbons at Naples, the British Minister received from Lord Castlereagh instructions, which that statesman considered suited to the altered relations of Naples and Sicily. Mr. A'Court's conduct, and that of the English ministry

* Palmieri, Storia Costituzionale, p. 253.

are grossly assailed by Palmieri, who seems to think that Great Britain having once interfered to establish the constitution, was bound to maintain it under all circumstances. In the third series of Lord Castlereagh's Correspondence, published by Mr. Murray in 1853, materials will be found for forming a more impartial judgment on this subject, than can be expected from a Sicilian writer, grieved and irritated at the lamentable condition of his own country. From those letters, which are of a confidential character, an insight may be obtained, as to the views of the government, and also as to those of Lord William, whose letter of the 6th of February, 1814, leaves no doubt with regard to his anxiety for the permanent annexation of Sicily to the British empire, as the only means by which the interests and prosperity of the people could be secured. He there avows that he had sounded the Hereditary Prince on the subject, holding out to him either a territorial equivalent, or else pecuniary compensation: "Sicily," he says, "with a free constitution, could only be governed by Great Britain." But would the Sicilians, proverbially jealous of foreigners, have acquiesced in such an arrangement?

Lord William's project, and the *confidential insinuations* thrown out by him to the Prince Vicar, were not in any degree prompted or justified by his instructions. They were complained of by the Sicilian

Minister in London, and reproved by Lord Castlereagh as inconsistent with the views of the government.* The very parties who expressed the greatest indignation at the abandonment of the constitution, would have been the first to condemn an arrangement which could only have been carried into effect with the aid of British troops. Those troops had been introduced into the island on the plea of protecting it from a French invasion. After the general pacification, in what light would their retention have been regarded?

The influence of the English representative, though counteracted by the intrigues of the Russian minister, *was* exerted in favour of the constitution, of which at least a *verbal* acknowledgment was extorted—and also for the protection of those Sicilians, who, relying upon England, had rendered themselves obnoxious to the Court. Had the brief existence of representative institutions been attended with happier results, and the conduct of the deputies been such as to inspire confidence in their patriotism and discretion, the remonstrances of the British Government might have been interposed with much greater efficacy. In estimating the difficult position of that government, it must be borne in mind that Lord William Bentinck, who had so many opportunities of forming a correct

* See Lord Castlereagh's Letter of the 3rd of April.

judgment, and whose zeal for the liberties of Sicily was undoubted, had already declared, "that with a free constitution" it could only be governed by Great Britain. Such was the conclusion to which he had been drawn by his experience of the weakness and insincerity of the Court, the incompetency of those by whom it was surrounded, and the moral and intellectual prostration of the people.

These remarks are only intended to show that the British Government of that day was not justly amenable to the accusations brought againt it, and by no means to excuse or palliate the King's conduct, or the unworthy measures into which he was betrayed. It was the first duty of that unfortunate prince and of his advisers to have maintained inviolate the royal word; and, by setting an example of firmness, good faith, and forbearance, to have given the constitution a fair trial. Above all, King Ferdinand was bound to show the utmost consideration for the feelings of the Sicilian people, whose idol was their nationality, and by whom he had been welcomed and sustained during the years of his adversity.

It now becomes necessary to turn to the affairs of Naples, where the popularity of the Bourbons had been rudely shaken by the events of 1799, and where during ten years of French domination many ancient ties had been severed.

Unfortunately, the demeanour of the Court at this critical period, was exactly what was required to prevent the re-establishment of confidence. A paltry jealousy was betrayed of every individual who had served the state under Joseph and Murat, and of every improvement which had been effected during the King's absence. Persons who had accepted appointments under the French rulers, were, in some cases, allowed to retain office, on account of their experience and ability, but they were regarded with aversion. The fountains of justice were poisoned, for the magistrates were made subordinate to an arbitrary police. Carbonari societies increased and multiplied, for in them was found a protection which the laws had ceased to afford.

The Spanish revolution, which originated at Cadiz in 1819, resulted in the establishment of a constitution, accepted by the King, acknowledged by foreign powers, and sworn to by the King of Naples himself, as an *Infante* of Spain. This event was full of interest to the Neapolitans, who felt their own need of a similar guarantee. A change which appeared so beneficial, and which had been effected with little bloodshed or sacrifice, was regarded as a model. That change had been brought about through the instrumentality of the Spanish army. The heroism of Riego and Quiroga threw a veil over their dereliction of military duty;

and perjury, committed in the cause of liberty, began to be regarded as a virtue.

A small section of the Neapolitan army, seduced by the agents of the clubs, was persuaded to follow so plausible an example. The government betrayed hesitation and alarm, and by giving time to the defaulters enabled them to boast of impunity. The unchecked mutiny soon assumed a more formidable character. The ringleaders were loud in their professions of fidelity to a constitutional King. The revolutionary watchword, *Dio, Re, Costituzione*, appeared to the multitude harmless or commendable, and men began to think that the cause which had triumphed in Spain, must ultimately prevail in Naples. The movement was pushed forward by the carbonari, who at that time had many members and adherents in the ranks of the army, and was zealously supported by General Pepe, who had served under Murat. The King was at length persuaded to yield to the current, and promised a constitution.

The leaders of the insurrection soon became conscious of their power, and, refusing the government any discretion or voice in the matter, insisted on the instant adoption of the Spanish model.

Pepe, though by no means the author of this military revolution, obtained its chief direction. Gratified at an elevation to which he was not entitled either by his

services or by his abilities, he wrote to the Duke of Calabria, whom the King, unable or unwilling to meet the difficulties of the times, had appointed Vicar of the realm, and named a day for his own public entry into the capital at the head of the constitutionalists. On that occasion after the troops had defiled, a body of 7000 Carbonari, composed of nobles, plebeians, priests, friars, honest men, rogues, and assassins, closed the procession. This motley array was headed by a certain abbate, Menechini, dressed as a priest, but armed, and covered with the symbols of the sect. When it arrived at the palace, the Duke of Calabria, who was in a balcony surrounded by the Court, commanded every one to place on his breast the colours of the Carbonari, which had been provided by the Duchess. A few days afterwards the King and his sons solemnly confirmed, in the chapel royal, the oath which they had already taken, to observe and maintain the constitution.

A revolutionary change, which derived its impulse from the *sette*, its power from military defection, and its success to the weakness and indecision of the government, was little calculated to inspire confidence or to acquire stability. In the state, legality was trodden under foot, and discipline no longer existed in the army. The only real power was vested in the *carboneria*, which pervaded all departments military as well as civil, and, instead of seeking concealment,

made open display of its supremacy. A public procession of the sect took place, in which priests and friars, armed, like the rest, with daggers, occupied the front rank. The insignia of the *cugini* were carried into a church, and blessed by a minister of religion. Without the pale of the society, no man, however blameless, was safe; within it, impunity was secured by the most abandoned.

While the ominous demonstrations, above described, were amusing, or terrifying the public mind, intelligence arrived of an insurrection at Palermo.

A passion for self-government appears to be indestructible in the Sicilian race:

> ——— per damna, per cædes, et ipso
> Ducit opes animumque ferro.

The intensity of this *Sicilianismo* was heightened by an attack made upon it in 1816, when an arbitrary decree was promulgated for the union of the two crowns, and the King, whose proper style was Ferdinand III. of Sicily and IV. of Naples, assumed the title of "Ferdinando, primo re del *regno* delle due Sicilie."

During the domination of Spain, the affairs of the two kingdoms being administered by distinct vice-regal governments, national jealousy was precluded. Under the beneficent sway of Charles III. and the Regency,

Sicily was never interfered with, except when some benefit was to be conferred. It remained for King Ferdinand to inflict upon his faithful Sicilians, the misery of feeling that their cherished independence was trampled on.

This act was not suggested by the general mania for centralization, but proceeded from a desire to reduce the laws and institutions of the two countries to a uniform standard, and thus to get rid of the dreaded phantom of a Sicilian parliament. The ingratitude as well as injustice of this policy rankled in the heart of the people, and in 1820, their long-smothered indignation burst into a flame.

The unfortunate prejudices of race, always exasperated by attempts at fusion, were keenly reciprocated by the Neapolitans, of whatever party. The Jacobins hated the Sicilians for their fidelity to the Bourbons. The absolutists disliked them because they talked of their Parliament, and were proud of their ancient liberties.

The Spanish constitution was proclaimed without consulting the Sicilians, who were by no means prepared to accept blindly what might seem good to the Neapolitan Carbonari. They already possessed, *de jure*, a constitution of their own, and though the democracy of the island preferred the Spanish model, the first object with all parties was a separate government.

This feeling was treated as rebellious, and a struggle was provoked, in which the Neapolitan troops were worsted, and driven from the island. A large force was sent from Naples to avenge this affront, under the command of General Florestan Pepe, the brother of the democratic leader. The Sicilians, being overpowered, retired into the city of Palermo, and were dependent, for their supply of water, on the clemency of their opponents.

The octogenarian Prince of Paternò undertook, and successfully fulfilled, the office of negotiator. It was agreed that the forts should be given up to the Neapolitan troops, that the Spanish Constitution should be accepted, and that the representatives of the people should be convoked, with power to decide the question of unity, or separation.

These conditions were universally reprobated at Naples, where a popular commotion was raised against them. The government, refusing to ratify the treaty, declared that Florestan Pepe had acted contrary to his instructions, and transferred the command to General Colletta, who succeeded in enforcing submission.

While precious time was consumed in these contentions, the hostility of Prince Metternich was testified by active preparations.

The Courts of Austria and Russia, never friendly to representative institutions, regarded those of Naples

with peculiar abhorrence, as the offspring of subversive societies and of military delinquency; and the sovereigns then assembled at Troppau, invited the King to meet them at Laybach, and concert measures which might terminate political agitation.

Ferdinand, who could not, by the terms of the constitution, absent himself from the realm without the consent of the Chambers, determined to send a message to the deputies, expressing his desire to go to the Congress, as the mediator of peace and the protector of liberty, and declared that whatever might be the fate of the present constitution, he hoped to obtain such terms as would secure the representation of the people and the benefits of a responsible government. When the purport of the intended message became known, it was scrutinized and condemned in the nightly conclaves of the carboneria as an abandonment of the constitution. Messengers were at once despatched to the provinces, and an agitation was set on foot in order to intimidate the Chambers. The Sectarians, though distrustful of the King, considered that his absence would favour their views, and desired to see the Duke of Calabria, who was believed to be almost a carbonaro, invested with power. The deputies were therefore enjoined to vote for the King's departure, but at the same time to declare their determination to resist the smallest modification. In order

to insure obedience, the city was filled with armed bands from the provinces, and the cry of "La costituzione de Spagna o la morte" was raised. Though that constitution was admitted by all persons of sound and moderate views to require alteration, the King, anxious to effect his own escape, sent a second message, in which he undertook to uphold it, and declared that if unsuccessful in obtaining the consent of the Congress, he would return to his kingdom, and take arms in its defence. He even stooped to wear the colours of the Carbonari when on board the English man-of-war which conveyed him to Trieste; and in a private letter to the Duke of Calabria reiterated his determination to maintain the Spanish model.

A calm then succeeded, and all parties, with different degrees of hope, awaited the result of the King's negotiations. After a long delay, a letter arrived which informed his family and friends of his prosperous journey and good health, conveying at the same time the information, that his *greyhounds had beaten those of the Emperor of Russia!* This letter, though containing no allusion to public affairs, was communicated to the Chambers, in order to allay the general impatience.

After a further delay, communications of a very different character astonished and alarmed the public mind. Advices were received that an Austrian army

was on its march, and at the same time a long epistle, from the King to the Regent, announced in terms sufficiently explicit, his own dereliction of the course which he had promised to pursue, and the determination of the allied sovereigns, to put down the constitution by force of arms.

A joint note was then presented to the Regent by the ministers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, informing him of the approach of the Austrian forces, supported by those of Russia, and of the necessity of submission.

Parliament was assembled—the Regent declared that he would act according to its decisions. The Chambers, by an unanimous decree, resolved upon resistance. A defensive war was undertaken. Two armies were formed under the Generals Carascosa and Pepe. The latter having hastily and unnecessarily risked an engagement at Rieti, afforded an easy triumph to the Austrians, and returned a fugitive to Naples. After this disaster, the Chambers, abandoning all hope of maintaining the Spanish constitution, decreed an address of submission to the King. Of the *carbonari*, many fled to Spain or America, while others secured themselves by betraying and persecuting their brethren. The position of the Regent was one of the utmost difficulty, and what his real sentiments at that time were, will never be known; but it is certain that those who were compromised as authors of the revolu-

tion, received from him every possible assistance in their misfortune.

The deputy Poerio then drew up a moderate and dignified protest against the destruction of the constitution by foreign interference, and was supported by a small number of his party, who had the courage to assemble for the last time; and at this inauspicious moment, as if to complete the grief and dismay of the liberals, news arrived of the Piedmontese revolution, which they had no longer any means of supporting.

Thus ended an attempt to establish a form of government, entirely unsuitable to the condition of an excitable and uneducated people. A wise and patriotic sovereign might have directed the popular aspirations into useful channels, and there were not wanting in Naples and Sicily persons of talent and integrity to whom the labours of reform and civilization might have been entrusted; but what could be expected of a Prince whose narrow and perverted education incapacitated him for state affairs,—who had been habituated from his early years to rely upon cunning rather than wisdom, and upon superstitious observances and compliances, rather than upon religion; and who was constantly led blindfold by the prejudiced intriguers of his Court? *

* Ferdinando III., non regnò mai, ma fu sempre vittima degl' intrighi della sua Corte e strumento del dispotismo ministeriale.—*Palmieri, Saggio Storico.*

On the 23d of March, 1821, the Austrian troops entered the capital, and garrisoned the forts. The restoration of the old arbitrary system was no longer doubtful; and instead of the tricolor of the Carboneria, so recently adopted, and worn by royalty, cockades were distributed by the Court with the motto, "Viva l'assoluto potere di Ferdinando Primo."

The King then threw himself into the hands of the *Calderari*, a sect instituted in 1816 for the support of despotic monarchy, and of which the Prince of Canosa was the head. The *Calderari* no less than the Carbonari admitted and courted the fellowship of the reckless and depraved, by whose unscrupulous services their revenge might be gratified. False witnesses and assassins, who had been fellow-workers with Fra Diavolo in the Bourbonist reaction of 1799, now ventured to leave their hiding-places. Canosa was not new to office, having filled the post of Minister of Police in 1816. His conduct was then so bad as to call for the interposition of the Austrian and Russian ministers, at whose request he was dismissed. Being obliged to leave the country, he took up his residence in Tuscany. In going to Laybach the King had an interview with his banished favourite, and another on his return. At the Congress, Ferdinand made profession of great moderation; and while he declared that he should renounce the constitution, as having been

extorted by violence, he at the same time expressed his intention of punishing those only, who had been guilty of military defection; and of regarding with merciful oblivion, errors, in which the executive, as well as the people had participated. Notwithstanding these declarations, it appears that the influence of Canosa had already vitiated his mind, for no sooner was his authority re-established, than the expectations and wishes of his allies were set at nought. Canosa was reinstated, and judging that the powers, at that moment occupied and irritated by a revolutionary outbreak in Piedmont, would not interfere with his proceedings, he gave scope to his own cruel and revengeful propensities, and those of his myrmidons. Ancient hatreds were disinterred and vengeance was sought, not only against those who had taken part in the recent revolution, but against all who had at any time, or in any way, rendered themselves obnoxious to the absolutist faction, whether by adherence to Murat, or by leanings in favour of the English constitution in Sicily.

A loan having become necessary, the Rothschilds insisted on the dismissal of Canosa, and the appointment of the Cavaliere Medici, as head of a new administration; but a change of men brought no change of measures, and political persecutions did not cease.

In 1825, Ferdinand died, and was succeeded by his

son, Francis I., who, in ascending the throne, forgot or ignored the principles which he had professed, while Regent. His reign of five years, if less stained by cruelty than that of his father, was disgraced by public corruption. The higher classes, beggared by the French law of succession, became more than ever dependent on the Court. Appointments were openly disposed of, for ready money, by the King's favourites. Justice and honours became matters of bargain and sale, and before the death of Francis, which occurred soon after the French Revolution of 1830, excesses of rigour in the province of Salerno, added the reproach of tyranny to that of a corrupt and feeble administration.

The present monarch succeeded to a realm degraded and impoverished by long-continued misrule. His dislike of his father's favourites, and the disgust with which he regarded their peculation and venality, were well known. His first acts confirmed the hopes entertained on his accession, and calmed down for a season the desire of change, to which the French revolution of February had given impulse.

Endowed with considerable vigour of intellect, Ferdinand II. appears to have assumed the kingly office, with a sincere desire of elevating the character of the government, and restoring the resources of the country. Though animated by good intentions, his views were entirely despotic; and he sought to concen-

trate the powers of the state in his own hands. The ministerial corruption which he had witnessed, may in some degree explain this jealousy; but happy would it have been for a prince whose path was beset with difficulties, had he secured from the first the counsel and support of an able and honest minister.

The measures adopted for regulating the disordered finances were just and salutary; and the King's exertions in improving the efficiency of the land and sea forces were unremitted. The mutual criminations which arose after the rout of Rieti, had sown discord between the liberal party and the military. Ferdinand, by restoring the discipline and self-respect of the army, acquired its confidence and attachment.

The constitutionalists, at that time few in number, regarded these improvements with satisfaction; and undefined hopes began to prevail. Men of moderation and patriotism had not then been schooled by bitter experience, nor warned, as they have since been, to eschew all communion and fellowship with sectarian conspirators.

After the establishment of Louis-Philippe on the throne of France, a belief gained ground that constitutional governments would become general. Intonti, the Neapolitan Minister of Police, a man of ambition and of no fixed principles, shared in that expectation. Hoping to augment his own importance, he began to

pay court to the liberals, and at the same time, did not scruple to use the means which his office gave him, of fomenting an insurrection in order to frighten the King, and dispose him to acquiesce in his plans. On the eve of execution, his treason was discovered. The circumstances of this transaction, and the complicity of many persons of high station * in such a scheme, afford a lamentable, but by no means singular illustration, of the low state of political morality.

The fallen police minister was succeeded by the Marchese del Carretto, who as a military commander had already become noted for severity, and who, when subsequently engrossing the powers of the state, became obnoxious to the charge of tyrannical cruelty. As to the *degree* in which this accusation is borne out by truth, it is difficult to arrive at any exact conclusion. By many Neapolitans, the conduct of del Carretto is palliated if not defended, while it is admitted by all parties that he fulfilled his odious office with consummate ability and intelligence. Whatever may be thought of the minister, the system cannot be too severely condemned, which transfers to the Bureau of the Police, judicial power and authority.

In 1835, the King's marriage with an amiable and gifted Princess, Christina of Savoy, whose memory is still revered at Naples, was welcomed as an *Italian*

* Gualterio, Ultimi Rivolgimenti Italiani, c. xlviii.

alliance. During the following year the birth of an heir-apparent, the present Duke of Calabria, was celebrated by an amnesty, which increased the King's popularity. This act was followed by the return of many exiles: amongst them were the Baron Poerio, father of the unfortunate statesman whose cruel and protracted imprisonment has been a subject of general reprobation, and the Cavaliere Bozzelli, who in 1848 became prime minister.

The death of Queen Christina, soon after the birth of her son, was felt as a public calamity; and Ferdinand's second marriage with a daughter of the Archduke Charles renewed the connexion with Austria. The desolations of the cholera followed, and were attributed by the ignorance of the Calabrian and Sicilian populace, to poison. Commerce and industry languished, and the inevitable sufferings of the people were turned into political capital by the emissaries of Mazzini. Isolated and hopeless attempts, such as that in which the brothers Bandiera perished, were continually fomented by the central board of agitation at Paris. The government became more and more irritated and suspicious, and in 1844, Bozzelli, Carlo Poerio, and other leaders of the moderate party were arrested and consigned to the Castel Sant-Elmo. This impolitic persecution only served to increase the feeling of discontent, and gave to the complots of

Young Italy an importance which they would not otherwise have possessed, by causing a belief that they were connected with a general movement, in which men of character and intelligence would participate.

The prospect of a better change than any which sectarian conspiracy could accomplish now began to loom in the distance. The writings of the Abbé Gioberti and Count Balbo had paved the way for a reconcilement of differences between the people and governments of Italy, and inspired the hope of a national confederacy. King Ferdinand, having paid unceasing attention to the military and financial resources of the Two Sicilies, was prepared as well as inclined to uphold the independence of his crown, and, though tenacious of his own authority, was by no means averse to an Italian league. Gualterio* has divided his reign into two periods, the former distinguished by *speranze*, the latter by *disinganni*. It is only fair to say that the cessation of the *speranze* and the commencement of the *disinganni* were in no small degree attributable to the mischievous and criminal conspiracies so frequently organized against him.

In 1845, the scientific congress was held at Naples, and was received by the King with princely hospitality. Political exiles were allowed free ingress and

* Rivolgimenti Italiani, iv. xlix.

egress, during the continuance of its sittings. The prime minister, Santangelo, was appointed president of the meeting, but all endeavours to restrict its attention to professed and legitimate objects, were made in vain; and it is to be regretted that the favour shown to science by all the governments of the Peninsula, except that of the Pope, was not met in a better spirit; and that the *savans* had not the loyalty and discretion to silence the babblings of the Prince of Canino and others, who, on this, and similar occasions, converted their learned assemblies into arenas for political agitation.

The King becoming more and more distrustful, fell into the hands of men, whose interests and party feelings were opposed to all concession, and whose policy was abetted by his grasping and wily confessor, Monsignor Cocle, Archbishop of Patrasso.

In the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, as elsewhere, the accession, and first acts of Pio Nono, were regarded as the commencement of a new era, and before the close of 1847, the agents of Mazzini were engaged in attempts to turn the excitement to the advantage of their faction. They watched the temper of the times, fomenting disturbances of a trivial character, and encouraging demonstrations in favour of the Pope and his amnesty, and against del Carretto and Cocle.

In September 1847, the secret revolutionary com-

mittee assembled at Naples, instigated an outbreak at Reggio, where a provisional government was set up; but the movement was isolated, and those who had been induced to take part in it, suffered the penalty of their misplaced confidence.

Early in 1848, a revolt of a singular nature, took place at Palermo. The Sicilians having petitioned, in vain, for a redress of their grievances, openly announced to the King's lieutenant, the Duke of Majo, their intention to take arms on the 12th of January, which was Ferdinand's birthday. They kept their word,—overpowered the troops,—repulsed a considerable reinforcement sent from Naples, and established a provisional government under Ruggiero Settimo. A Sicilian parliament was once more assembled, but the negotiations entered into with the King, led to no decisive result. In the mean time, the success of this revolution produced intense excitement at Naples. The King, giving way to the universal feeling, dismissed his confessor; and del Carretto was removed from office, and from the kingdom, being embarked on board a steamer by the King's order. On the 27th of January, these concessions were celebrated by a multitudinous gathering, in which the Italian tricolor was unfurled amid cries of *Viva la Costituzione*. The leaders of this demonstration were summoned to desist; the troops were

called out, and cannon was planted on the Toledo, but no actual collision took place.

The military authorities, anxious to avoid extremities, and aware that the army, though attached to the King, participated in the feeling of the country, advised their Sovereign to gratify the general desire for representative institutions. Ferdinand declared himself willing to accede to that desire. A new ministry was appointed, and the advocate, Bozzelli, who had been banished in 1820, and imprisoned in 1844, was employed to draw up a constitution after the French model. Before the copy was completed, the original was destroyed. The Parisian revolution of February, immeasurably increased the difficulties of the ministers, alarmed the King, and encouraged wild expectations. It was no longer enough that the Sovereign should declare his adherence to the national cause, urge forward the conclusion of an Italian league, and send all his disposable forces against the Austrians. Republicanism was once more in the ascendant. The King was allowed no credit for what he had done, and Bozzelli himself became distrusted, as the framer of a constitution similar to that which had just been rejected by France.

About the end of March, Guglielmo Pepe, who had spent seven-and-twenty years in exile, was enabled to return to Naples, and was welcomed by his brother,

General Florestan Pepe, a man of moderate views and respected by all parties. The hero of democracy was immediately received at Court, and has published an amusing account of the interview which he had with the King, and of his own *programme* of a ministry in which he expected to occupy the first place. He proposed to dispense with the Chamber of Peers, and to entrust the fortresses to the national guard, while the regular troops were to be sent to Lombardy. "Il est hors de doute," he says, "que le roi, *pour prévenir de plus grands malheurs*, avait resolu de me confier la direction entière des affaires, et qu'il en fut détourné par les courtisans, et par Bozzelli lui-même." *

Though disappointed in his hope of being prime minister, Pepe was appointed to command the army destined for the north of Italy, and received instructions, bearing date the 3rd of May, to concentrate his force on the left bank of the Po, and await further orders.

On the approach of the 15th of May, which was the day appointed for the meeting of parliament, the ministry gave notice of the ceremonial intended to be observed on its inauguration. It was required that the deputies should take an oath of fidelity to the

* The Ministry of which Bozzelli was the mainspring, became unpopular, and was succeeded on the 3rd of April by that of Troja, which zealously promoted the war.

King, and the constitution. An objection was raised to this proposal, because the ministerial notice expressed nothing as to any right of extending and altering the provisions of the *statuto*. The powers of a constituent assembly were desired; and on this unreasonable plea, the deputies, in preparatory meetings, betrayed distrust of the King and want of confidence in the ministry. A storm was thus blown up, which could not so easily be laid, and the deputies stand condemned—even by Pepe—as having evinced a "défiance injuste" and a "mécontentement fatale, qui précipitèrent la catastrophe et ruinèrent les espérances."* During the night of the 14th and on the following morning, barricades were erected in the Toledo, and the day, which ought to have been memorable for the foundation of liberty, became disgraced by acts of unjustifiable rebellion and by sanguinary reprisals. The troops were frequently repulsed, but the steadiness of the Swiss regiments ultimately prevailed. The national guard, which took part with the insurgents, was then disarmed—the city was declared in a state of siege—and parliament was dissolved; but the King solemnly engaged himself to preserve the constitution.

Whatever may have been Ferdinand's secret jealousy of Charles Albert, it is obvious that the lamentable

* See Pepe's Histoire des Revolutions d'Italie, ch. ix. p. 121.

catastrophe of the 15th of May, and the sectarian conspiracies which were hatching in Calabria, afforded but too valid a reason for the recall of the troops, and an order to that effect was despatched on the 18th. The volunteers were allowed, by that order, to proceed, if they thought good, and join the pontifical forces under General Durando. On the 22nd, Pepe took upon himself to write to the minister of war at Turin, and informed him, that, notwithstanding the instructions he had received, he was ready to cross the Po, and to place his forces at the disposal of the King of Sardinia! That very day he received the order from his own government to return with his army, or else to resign its direction to General Statella. Knowing that he did not possess the confidence of the troops, he adopted the latter alternative; but subsequently, yielding to the intreaties of the national guard and people of Bologna, who threatened Statella's life, he attempted to resume the command. He then determined to cross the Po, but his orders were disregarded, and only two battalions, a small force of artillery, and some volunteers, accompanied him to Venice.

When the military events of 1848 come to be considered, it will be seen how fatal was the result of the withdrawal of the Neapolitan land and sea forces at the most critical period of the war.*

* See chapter xvi.

It is now necessary to revert to the progress of the Sicilian revolt. On the 13th of April the Parliament declared that Ferdinand and his dynasty had ceased to reign, and that Sicily would call to the throne an Italian Prince, as soon as her constitution was definitively settled. This resolution was signed by the Marchese Torrearsa, president of the lower chamber; by the Duca Serra di Falco, president of the peers; and by Ruggiero Settimo, the head of the provisional government. In July, the crown was offered to the Duke of Genoa, but declined by that prince.

In August, a powerful Neapolitan expedition arrived at Messina. The place was bombarded during four days, and, and after a struggle, in which atrocious acts of cruelty were committed by both parties, was compelled to surrender. Palermo and other towns continued to resist; and in December, the English and French ministers, supported by the authority of their governments, offered themselves as mediators.

In March 1849, the King agreed to guarantee a constitution, which was considered by Mr. Temple and M. de Rayneval as sufficiently satisfactory to induce them to exert all their influence in favour of its acceptance by the Sicilians.* They even accompanied Admirals Baudin and Parker, the commanders of the combined squadrons, to Palermo; but all their efforts

* Annual Register, 1849.

were in vain. The provisional government, instead of listening to their counsels, excited the people to persevere in a hopeless resistance. General Filangieri then resumed hostilities, and soon compelled the surrender of Palermo and the unconditional submission of the whole island.

When, after the sanguinary contest of the 15th of May, the King dissolved the Neapolitan parliament, he promised to maintain the constitution. A new chamber was elected, but the *ultra* party again obtained a majority, and acted in concert with the democrats of Rome and other parts of Italy. This parliament met on the 1st of February, 1849, but its acts were dictated by faction, sufficient supplies were refused, and the government, being thwarted at every step, was obliged to resort to a fresh dissolution on the 12th of March.

Since that period the constitution has been suspended, and the blame has fallen upon the King and his advisers. It ought, however, to be remembered that the conduct of the Neapolitan deputies in two parliaments was highly censurable, and that the pretensions advanced by them, were inconsistent with monarchical government.

The revelations which have, of late years, been made as to the atrocious state of the prisons, and the barbarous treatment of their unfortunate inmates, have thrown heavy disgrace on the administration of the kingdom;

yet at Naples, King Ferdinand enjoys a certain popularity, and all culpability is thrown upon his ministers. His conduct in private life is said to be free from reproach, and it is probable that his errors as a sovereign may be traced to the ascendancy of the factions, into whose hands he was thrown by the disloyal conduct of the liberals. His disgusts and disappointments have since been worked upon by selfish camerillas, and by sordid and artful confessors, who turn his religious feelings to their own advantage.

The years 1848 and 1849 afforded no fair criterion as to the fitness of the community for civil institutions. During those years the events which took place at Paris and Vienna, unsettled the whole political world. The leaders of the Italian *ultras*, who then obtained the ascendancy, had no faith in monarchy, or in anything but the plenitude of their own wisdom; they disdained the praise of loyalty, a nd refused to acknowledge that princes had any rights, or that their feelings ought in any degree to be consulted. These doctrines, and the men who held them, have been tried in the balance and found wanting.—It remains for the Princes of Italy to redeem, in more propitious times, the pledges by which they are still bound.

CHAPTER VII.

Views of Bonaparte with regard to the Papacy—The Concordat of 1801—Pius the Seventh at Paris—The coronation—The treatment of the Pope after his return to Rome—Napoleon's letter, and the Pontiff's reply—Pius a prisoner in his own palace—He is deprived of all his territories; is carried off as a captive, and detained three years at Savona—His removal to Fontainebleau—The Concordat of 1813—Liberation and restoration of Pius on the fall of Napoleon—The policy of Consalvi opposed by the retrogradists—Disturbed condition of the Roman States before the death of Pius—Administrative reforms of Leo the Twelfth—Revival of obsolete customs—Leo's propensity to arbitrary government—The brief Pontificate of his successor, Pius the Eighth.

It has been remarked by the learned German historian of pontifical affairs, that the constituent assembly endeavoured to emancipate itself entirely from the Pope; that the Directory wished to annihilate his authority; and that Bonaparte's notion was to retain him, but *in a state of absolute subjection.*

Desirous of restoring hierarchical subordination, the first consul despatched the Bishop of Vercelli from the field of Marengo, to enter into negotiations with Pius VII., and by the concordat of 1801, conceded such a re-establishment of the French clergy, as was consistent with his own policy; but his views were

unchangeably anti-Roman. In Germany he was the chief agent in uprooting the proud edifice of the Church, and invested temporal princes, without regard to their Protestantism or Catholicism, with its bishoprics and princely dominions. In Italy, he enforced the sale of ecclesiastical property, and compelled the Court of Rome to relinquish all official appointments.

In 1804, Pius condescended to undertake a journey to Paris, and to solemnize by his benediction the crowning of Napoleon and Josephine, expecting to obtain in return, ample concessions and the restoration of the legations.* His hopes were bitterly disappointed. Though allowed to return to Rome, he was subjected to the most revolting treatment. In October 1805, the French troops took possession of Ancona, and when the Pope remonstrated, Napoleon wrote to him, explaining, in the clearest terms, the position to which he intended to reduce him. "All Italy," he said, "must be subject to my law. Your situation requires that you should pay me the same respect in temporal, which I do you in spiritual matters. . . You are sovereign of Rome, but I am its emperor. All my enemies must be its enemies. No Sardinian, English, Russian, or Swedish envoy can be permitted to reside at your capital." The reply of Pius was dignified and

* Las Casas, v. 262.

becoming. "Your Majesty," he said, "lays it down as a fundamental principle, that you are sovereign of Rome. The supreme pontiff recognizes no such authority, nor any power superior in temporal matters to his own. There is no emperor of Rome; it was not thus that Charlemagne treated our predecessors. The demand to dismiss the envoys of Russia, England, and Sweden, is positively refused: the father of the faithful is bound to remain at peace with all, without distinction of Catholics or heretics." *

In 1807, after the peace of Tilsit, Bonaparte renewed his attack upon the independence of the papacy. In February, 1808, a third of its dominions was annexed to the kingdom of Italy. The Cardinal-secretary, Pacca, having become obnoxious to the French authorities on account of his firmness and ability, an attempt was made to arrest him; which was only evaded by his remaining in the Pope's apartments.

Pius, reduced to the condition of a prisoner in his own palace, endured these insults with fortitude and resignation, and constantly refused his assent to the French ultimatum, by the terms of which he was called upon to institute bishops appointed by Napoleon, and to yield to him the selection of one-third of the Cardinals.

* These two letters are quoted by Mr. Alison, in a note to his "History of the French Revolution."

By an Imperial decree of the 17th of May, 1809, the remainder of the Roman States were annexed to the French empire. Upon this, a Bull of excommunication, already prepared, was launched against Bonaparte. Miollis, the French commander, immediately surrounded the Quirinal with troops and artillery, and when Pius refused to withdraw the sentence, the doors of the palace were hewn down, and he was arrested together with Cardinal Pacca, and carried off to Florence. They were then separated—the Cardinal being consigned to the state prison of Fenestrelles, while the Pope was conveyed to Savona, where he was detained three years, before he was transferred to Fontainebleau.

Bereft of his faithful minister, and terrified by representations as to the confusion which would ensue if he persisted in refusing to institute Bonaparte's bishops, he yielded that point, but held out against further demands.* When, after the Moscow campaign, he was removed to Fontainebleau, Pacca, released from his Alpine dungeon, was allowed to rejoin his sovereign, who, by the concordat of the 25th of March, 1813, agreed to reside in France.† Thus the Pope became virtually a subject of the French empire, but

* Ranke, viii. xxi.

† The Concordat of Fontainebleau was framed on the preliminary condition that the Pope should not return to Rome.

he obtained in return for this degradation, considerable advantages for his church.

The prospects and expectations of Pius and his advisers, improved with the successful progress of the allied armies. Napoleon, conscious of the disgust excited by the continued imprisonment of the head of the Church, became anxious to remove this cause of scandal, and made secret offers to set him at liberty, and to restore a portion of his territory. These proposals being rejected, he was conveyed to the South of France, and detained at Tarascon, until liberated by the provisional government, after the abdication of Fontainebleau.

While the supreme pontiff was enduring an unjust and prolonged captivity, the Roman States derived no small advantage from the intelligent administration of the French; but the people, weary of the conscription, and of foreign rule, began to partake in the general longing for peace. The patience and fortitude which Pius had displayed in adversity, inspired respect and confidence, and an expectation prevailed, that his restoration would be accompanied by measures adapted to the circumstances of the age. His disposition and character were in harmonious keeping with the nature and dignity of his office. His subjects delivered from a foreign and military bondage, and from the sacrifices and vicissitudes of war, rejoiced in the prospect of a

change, which re-established a national government under a prince, whose spiritual supremacy restored to Rome a portion of her lost pre-eminence.

Those who had once viewed with satisfaction the progress of revolution, and hailed with delight the ascendancy of French democracy, had lived to see their hopes extinguished by the triumph of military despotism. The adherents of the ancient *régime* had been taught by bitter experience the folly of a blind adherence to a system, suited indeed to the genius of the middle ages, but which had survived the objects for which it was instituted.

All parties had been schooled by adversity, and it was natural to suppose that all would have learned something from her lessons. The liberal professions of the allied potentates, the mild and benevolent disposition of the restored pontiff, and the worth and ability of his prime minister, Cardinal Consalvi, encouraged these flattering expectations.

While Consalvi was engaged at Vienna, in maintaining the territorial claims of the papacy, his presence and authority were greatly required at Rome, to give a tone of moderation to the restored government. He might, at that time, have succeeded in tempering the zeal of his brethren, and in repressing a faction which he was afterwards unable to control. The fanatics of the restoration became powerful during his absence,

and over-ruled the inclinations of the Pope. When Consalvi returned, the opposition which he was able to offer to this party, was not always successful. He failed in bringing about a combination of the good of the old system, with the advantages of the new; and his attempts at such a reconcilement, ended in an ill-adjusted and inconvenient compromise.

The reforms, which, before the close of the last century, were effected in Tuscany, Naples, and the Milanese, though distasteful to the hierarchy, were acquiesced in, as the work of legitimate sovereigns. The changes which had been made at Rome, were of a different origin, and were regarded with unmixed aversion by the retrogradists, who resolved to restore, as far as possible, the ancient system.

To a people accustomed to the readiness and intelligence of Napoleon's officials and administrators, the substitution of unpractised ecclesiastics in all the departments of public business, must needs have been felt as an abrupt and singular vicissitude. Though there existed at that time in the college of cardinals, and amongst the ecclesiastical body, individuals of distinguished worth and moderate principles, who supported the views of Consalvi, the efforts of these men were counteracted and rendered nugatory by a prejudiced majority. The difficulties of the government increased with the increasing years of the Pontiff.

When, in 1820 and 1821, Italy was in a state of civil commotion, no actual outbreak took place in the pontifical states, but the violence of contending factions found vent in political assassinations; and many persons, supposed to be implicated in the undertaking of Count Confaloniere, were delivered up on the demand of Austria, or driven into exile. The refugees found shelter and hospitality in Tuscany, which, under the just and patriotic administration of the Grand-duke Ferdinand, formed an enviable contrast to the rest of Italy.

On the death of Pius VII., in 1823, the legations, as well as Rome itself, were distracted by party rage, and the pontifical government was neither loved at home, nor respected abroad.

Cardinal della Genga was elected Pope in the seventy-fourth year of his age, and assumed the title of Leo XII. The evil and the good which marked his pontificate, corresponded with his character and views, which were those of a sincere and zealous, but prejudiced and narrow-minded churchman. Though an enemy to the prevailing corruptions, he hated all new ideas, and his principal aim was to maintain the power of the clergy, and to restore the ancient discipline. Neither his advanced age, nor the precarious state of his health, prevented him from carrying out with vigour, such improvements as were consistent with his own

opinions and those of his party. The revenue was improved by a better system of collection. Roads and bridges were constructed; political assassinations were checked by condign punishment, and the country was freed from the marauders and banditti by which it had become infested. Prisons, hospitals, and charitable institutions were carefully inspected, and purified from abuse.

These meritorious works were, unfortunately, counterbalanced by the encouragement afforded to the violence and injustice of the *Sanfedista* party. The Jews were compelled to sell whatever property they had acquired, and were once more confined to the Ghetto, and many obsolete customs of the Roman Court were revived. The most severe and arbitrary measures were resorted to in order to crush the *carbonari*, and the infamous trade of the informer was encouraged. Wholesale condemnations, in which those charged with disaffection were confounded with assassins and criminals of the lowest grade, destroyed all respect for the tribunals. Absolute principles were then in the ascendant. The Spanish constitution having been condemned by the Congress of Verona was put down by French intervention, and the *Duc d'Angoulême* received from the Pope distinguished and public tokens of approbation.

Thus the vessel of the state was steered in direct

opposition to the spirit of the age, and the administration of the pontifical territory presented a strong and unfavourable contrast to that which prevailed in the adjoining state of Tuscany, where the present Grand Duke had commenced his reign by retaining the respectable and patriotic ministry of his father.

Before the death of Leo, in 1829, party government had produced its fruits in the excitement of bitter dissensions, and in the general alienation of a laity excluded from all participation in public affairs.

During the pontificate of Pius VIII., who, being elected in the seventy-eighth year of his age, reigned for the short period of nineteen months, little was effected at Rome of good or evil; but this brief interval was marked by great events in Europe. The fall of Charles X. from the throne of France, the Belgian revolution, and the struggle which was going on in Poland, revived the hopes of the discontented and excited the apprehensions of their opponents.

CHAPTER VIII.

Election of Gregory the Sixteenth—General insurrection, in which the present Emperor of the French and his elder brother took part—Intervention of Austria—Memorandum of the five powers—The policy of Cardinal Bernetti, renewed commotions—Efforts of the moderate party to restore concord—French occupation of Ancona—Cardinal Lambruschini succeeds Bernetti as minister—Illness and death of the Pope.

In February, 1831, while the conclave was engaged in the election of Cardinal Capellari, a general insurrection was already planned, and in progress. The new pontiff, originally a monk, assumed the title of Gregory XVI., and, though a learned churchman, was without any experience of political affairs. This circumstance was of the less importance, as his position was one, in which the statesmanship of a Richelieu would have been exerted in vain. Disaffection pervaded the papal territory, and the government was devoid of all force, physical or moral. Neither respect, nor toleration, was any longer felt for a system, under which, during fifteen years of general tranquillity, the blessings which should accompany peace, had not been tasted.

On the very first outbreak, the soldiers abandoned their ranks, and joined the insurgents. The insurrection, which, beginning at Bologna, soon became general, met with no resistance. Though unstained by excesses, this movement seems to have been conducted without union, foresight, or energy. The avowed object was * to put an end to the temporal authority of the papacy, as an incurable evil; and the government had recourse to the usual expedient of applying to Austria for succour, which would probably have been afforded, even if it had not been asked.

In this unresisted, but short-lived rebellion, which extended to Parma and Modena, the present Emperor of the French, and his elder brother, bore arms; but so convinced were the members of the provisional government, that Louis-Philippe was their patron, and would effectually protect them against the Austrians, and so careful were they to avoid whatever might be offensive to him, that they not only prevented the young Bonapartes from taking a prominent part, but forbade them to serve at all, and sent them to Forli, where the eldest fell ill, and died of the measles. It is needless to say, that the hope of French assistance, was disappointed. Louis-Philippe's government was no sooner acknowledged by the great powers, than it became studious to cultivate their good-will, and to get rid, as

* Farini, vol. i. c. iv.

quietly as possible, of all connexion with revolutionists in Italy or elsewhere.

When the Austrian forces had put down the insurrection, and dissolved the provisional governments, the cabinets of Austria, France, Russia, England, and Prussia, became anxious to prevent the risk of war which might arise from continued perturbations in Central Italy. The five powers concurred in the significant and important step of presenting a memorandum to the Court of Rome. This document, which speaks volumes, as to the necessity of an entire change of system, recommended the admission of laymen to administrative and judicial functions. It alluded to promises which had been made, but had not been carried into effect, with regard to a better regulation of the legal tribunals, and suggested their fulfilment. It advised the formation of electoral municipalities, and of provincial councils, to aid the governors in carrying on their administrations; reform and publicity in the management of the finances; and the institution of a central deliberative *consulta*, to be composed of members selected from the municipal councils: such were the leading features of the *memorandum*.

Cardinal Bernetti, who exercised the functions of the Pope's prime minister, with the astute intelligence peculiar to the statesmen of the Sacred College, professed agreement in the advice thus tendered, and

some ostensible measures were taken in order to give colour to an apparent acquiescence; but there is little ground for supposing that the Court of Rome had any serious intention of entrusting its temporal affairs to laymen, or of being interfered with by the deliberations of a *consulta*. Nevertheless, the presentation of this remonstrance by the five powers, must be regarded as an historical fact of the highest importance. A day of grace was then afforded to the papal system, and had the Pope and the College of Cardinals been capable of taking a correct view of what their interests required, the decay of the temporal sovereignty of the Court of Rome, might possibly have been arrested. Had the views of the five powers been acted upon, there is reason to believe that a vast majority of the people would have been satisfied, and the fomenters of discontent, defeated. The evasions at that time resorted to by the pontifical government, could not be palliated by any dread of ulterior demands. The powers which on this occasion had urged reforms, were a sufficient guarantee against revolutionary encroachments, or the pressure of unreasonable demands. The truth is, that the *Curia Romana* hated to be reformed, and that personal and party interests were allowed to predominate. It appears, on good authority, that Cardinal Bernetti acknowledged these evils in the following expressive words—" C'est comme

un gouvernement mis à ferme, ou chacun pense à soi, sans s'occuper du bien général." *

After compliance with the recommendations of the memorandum had been promised, and the Austrian troops had been withdrawn, the struggle of factions recommenced. An attempt was made by the moderate party to interpose and negotiate between the violence of the democrats, and the retrograde tendencies of the court, and to secure the fulfilment of the professions and promises which had been made by the latter. With this view a deputy from each province was sent to Rome, and these were supported by the diplomacy of France and England in their endeavour to obtain an agreement; but the excitement of the times, and the want of mutual confidence, rendered any such attempt impracticable, and the holders of moderate and constitutional principles were hated and disparaged by both the contending parties. At this time, many excesses and crimes strengthened the Sanfedista faction, which had thus a pretext for saying, that the proposed innovations would never secure tranquillity with a population so turbulent and intractable.

In proportion as men of good information and practical views became persuaded of the damage and inutility of clandestine combinations, and stood aloof,† wild and reckless theorists insinuated themselves into

* Gualterio, vol. i. c. x. p. 139. † Idem, vol. i. p. 170.

the counsels of the *sette*, and obtained their direction. The distracted state of central Italy was favourable to these operations, and the influence of such leaders was exerted to promote dissension, and to place difficulties in the way of those tranquillizing reforms which the interposition of the allied powers had rendered possible.

An open rupture was hastened by the refusal of the National Guard to act in concert with the regular troops, or to adopt the pontifical banner. That flag, it must be admitted, was not one which could claim respect as having been associated with any very flattering achievements; but its rejection by the Pope's subjects was nevertheless an act of rebellion. The government now collected a body of troops at Rimini and Ferrara, which was reinforced by recruits obtained from Switzerland; and with these, supported by the forces of Austria, it was determined to proceed against the malcontents. This step was approved by the ministers of France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia; but England stood aloof, on the ground that the recommendations contained in the memorandum had not been complied with; and a protest was made by Sir George Seymour, who immediately left Rome and returned to his post at Florence.

Many persons of respectability were compromised in this rebellion, and its suppression was followed by

extensive proscriptions. The pontifical troops, whose ranks were filled by recruits of a low and motley description, committed great excesses, and on entering Bologna, after its surrender, were greeted with insult and derision, while the Austrian regiments by which they were accompanied, were welcomed as a protection against the reckless and undisciplined soldiery of the Pope.

"Cardinal Bernetti," says Gualterio, "was not a man to rely implicitly on the Catholic devotion and disinterested views of Prince Metternich." He appears on the contrary, to have been alive to the objections against exclusive and continued reliance on Austrian support. When pressing dangers were removed, his first study was to hide the real debility and *nothingness* of the Roman government, and to preserve a show of independence. The part which France might at that time take in the affairs of Europe was involved in some uncertainty, and the republicans of Italy were rashly counting on French aid. Bernetti saw deeper, and, forming a more correct estimate of the views of Louis-Philippe, had the address to make use of France as a counterpoise to Austria.

The sudden and forcible occupation of Ancona by the French forces, caused no surprise at the Vatican, and, though made the subject of a formal remonstrance, was regarded with secret complacency. The officers

and troops employed in that expedition, imagined that they were sent to support the Italian liberals—many of whom betook themselves to Ancona, entertaining a confident reliance on the protection of France. The real object of the expedition was to save appearances, and to gain time, at home, as well as in Italy; and to mask, and render less abrupt, the abandonment of revolutionary connexions.

The generals, who in the first instance had addressed to the discontented population of Ancona the language of encouragement and sympathy, were, after a time, removed to Algiers, and succeeded by others who had not committed themselves. Thus the presence of the French troops supported the jealous policy of the Court of Rome.

The Austrian Cabinet, after this lesson, began to watch its opportunity, and to exert all its means in order to supplant Bernetti. That minister, with a view to obtain a military force on which he could depend, had engaged, at great expense, the services of two Swiss regiments. He had also enrolled a large body of volunteers, whose ranks were filled, partly with *Sanfedisti*, and partly by men whose only inducement, was love of violence and plunder. The discipline and good conduct of the Austrians formed a striking contrast to the disgraceful irregularities of these pontifical bands. All this had its effect in increasing the

unpopularity of Cardinal Bernetti, who, after a series of intrigues, was dismissed. His successor Cardinal Lambruschini, a man of learning, and irreproachable as a Roman prelate, was of an unbending temperament and a devoted supporter of the ancient *régime*. The new minister descended into the arena of public life, resolved to struggle against the spirit of innovation, and to yield nothing.

During the French and Austrian occupation, a show of tranquillity was maintained, but the prisons were crowded with political offenders, and thousands who remained at large, were *ammoniti*, that is to say, branded with the charge of disaffection, and interdicted from the exercise of any public office or employment. Meantime the government, composed of an exclusive caste, maintained by the presence of foreign troops, and overawed by foreign influences, was itself looked upon as foreign.

In 1836, lay functionaries were excluded even from such secondary offices and employments as they had held on sufferance, since 1831, and to which they had been appointed, only to make a show of deference to the suggestions of the memorandum. A fresh proof was thus afforded, that no permanent concession can be obtained from the Court of Rome, and the bitter proverb, "*coi Preti non si transige*," received a fresh illustration, and once more became a by-word.

After the termination, in 1838, of the protracted French and Austrian occupation, though the emissaries of Mazzini were actively employed in the Roman states, they did not meet with any very flattering encouragement. The disgrace of the *Scorreria di Savoia** was not yet forgotten, and though the feeling against the system of the government, was great, and constantly increasing, that system, it was remembered, had already been condemned by the chief powers of Europe. Hopes began to be entertained, which led men to think of reform, rather than of revolution. The circulation obtained by the writings of the moderate party, and the manifesto of Rimini, which will be adverted to in the next chapter, were proofs of this feeling.

In the controversies which took place with respect to the persecution of the Roman Catholic religion in Poland, by the Emperor of Russia, the firm and dignified attitude assumed by Gregory XVI. is spoken of by Italian writers of all parties, with unqualified approbation. Questions of this nature, however important in themselves, have little connexion with Italian politics, but it is a curious fact that during these disputes, a Russian intrigue was more than suspected, which envisaged nothing less than a transfer of the Pope's temporal sovereignty to the Emperor's son-

* See chapter i.

in-law, the Duke of Leuchtenberg. Whatever may have been the origin of such a belief, it is certain that the pontifical government thought it prudent, by a great financial effort, to purchase the large possessions which that prince held in the Roman States, with a view, as it would appear, to destroy the influence which such possessions might confer.

The age and increasing infirmities of the Pope made it easy for those by whom he was surrounded, to conceal from him the ruinous state of the finances and the discontents of his subjects. During his latter years, none were admitted into his presence, who were likely to disturb his tranquillity by discoursing on public affairs.

Some estimate of the condition of central Italy, and of the general working of the pontifical government, may be obtained from a consideration of the facts and circumstances already touched upon. Those who wish for detailed accounts, should consult the interesting and important works of Farini and Gualterio, and the original documents collected by the latter.

CHAPTER IX.

The influence of France on the affairs of Italy, in 1793, 1830, and 1848—The manifesto of Rimini—Increase of the moderate party—Example of England—Views of M. Guizot.

THE proximity of France, the facility of her language, and the seductive influence of her example, have always given to the political movements of that country, a prompt and important action on the affairs of Italy.

In 1793, the contagion of French republicanism was fatal to the progress of Italian regeneration. In 1830 the movement which placed the Duke of Orleans on the throne, had the effect in Italy, of strengthening the constitutional party; by the ascendancy of which, a foundation was already laid for practical liberty, when the Parisian revolution of 1848 again disturbed the current of affairs, and caused a destructive overflow.

Before the outburst of the first French revolution, Naples, Tuscany, and the Milanese were amongst the best governed states of the continent. The reforms of Charles III., and the enlightened administrations of the Emperors Joseph and Leopold, were at that time producing the most successful results. The encroaching

spirit of Rome was curbed, and while state abuses were probed and remedied, ecclesiastical corruption was boldly attacked and exposed.

The loss of these solid advantages, and the destruction of this valuable groundwork by the surging flood of French democracy, is acknowledged and lamented by Italian writers of all shades of opinion.* Nor was the impulse of French democracy in 1848, less fatal than that of 1793, to the expanding hopes and brightening prospects of their country.

During these two great European convulsions, England remained tranquil, desiring only to uphold and strengthen her ancient safeguards of liberty, and never swerving from her attachment to constitutional monarchy.

The calm and dignified freedom, the unbroken social order, and the permanent prosperity thus enjoyed, have induced many, who were once inclined to republican ideas, to place their hopes for the future on the mixed or parliamentary form of government. It has been well observed that liberty is most durable when maintained by a spirit, which religiously respects the rights of others. If this be true, it would seem to follow that a monarchy, where the prerogative is exercised in accordance with constitutional limits, and

* See Botta, Storia d'Italia, libro i.; Cesare Cantù, Storia di cento anni, and the Vita di Guerrazzi, p. 20.

where the executive government performs its functions with the consent and support of an upper and lower Chamber, the powers of which are likewise defined by law and usage—affords the most likely means of attaining such liberty, and of fostering the sentiments which insure its permanency.

In 1830, such opinions appear to have gained ground in France, where, on the expulsion of the elder Bourbons, Louis-Philippe found the constitutional feeling so much stronger than the republican, that he was enabled to reign for eighteen years, in opposition to the latter.

During this interval, the moderate party in Italy acquired considerable weight, and while France was in the enjoyment of great prosperity under a limited monarchy, the same system became established in Spain and Belgium, and may be said to have prevailed throughout western Europe.

These circumstances were considered and appreciated by the most intelligent minds of Italy, and an impression became widely diffused, that the miseries caused by the action and reaction of contending sects, and the disgrace of foreign intervention, could only be prevented in one way; and that a reconcilement of jarring interests must be sought, by means of an acquiescence of the governments and people of Italy, in the principle of representative institutions.

Men of character and commanding talent were now required to direct this new tendency of the public mind, and these were chiefly supplied by Piedmont. Turin succeeded Milan in intellectual supremacy, and a capital which before Alfieri's time was hardly considered Italian, furnished a constellation of political writers who could not only reason with depth and sagacity on questions which affected the public interests of Italy, but express their ideas in language of Tuscan purity. The writings of the Abbé Gioberti, Count Balbo, Massimo d'Azeglio, and Giacomo Durando, of which some account will be given in another chapter, obtained a wide circulation, inspired new hopes, and gave a salutary impulse to public opinion. The spread of constitutional ideas was testified by the manifesto of Rimini, which was published by the moderate party in 1845, in order to avert and discourage a democratic movement, in which Mazzini, and the sect of Young Italy, were at that time engaged.

The attempt to support this protest by *an armed remonstrance*, like other ill-timed appeals to force, was a failure; but the just and temperate tone of the manifesto* itself, is remarkable. It sets forth the wrongs and sufferings of the inhabitants of the pontifical states in terms of much truth and moderation. The disappointment of the hopes which had been held out, on

* Farini, vol. i. libro i. c. ix.

the restoration of Pius VII., and the continued and increasing aggravations of misrule, which prevailed under his successors, are described in strong but faithful colours. The reforms recommended by the five powers, in their diplomatic note of 1831, and the evasions and delays by which those recommendations were defeated, are detailed. The continued exclusion of the laity from the administration of secular affairs, is complained of. Party persecutions, carried on by means of a corrupt police and servile tribunals, are deprecated; and these, together with the violence of a mercenary and ill-disciplined soldiery, are denounced as the true cause of the frequent acts of popular revenge and lawless retaliation, which are both admitted and deplored. "We venerate," says this remonstrance, speaking in the name and on behalf of the laity, "the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the clergy, and we hope that following the teachings of the gospel, that body will regard Catholicism in its true, noble, and beneficent essence, and not with the pitiful and uncatholic views of an intolerant sect."

The moderation of this document, which breathed no revolutionary spirit, threatened no existing government, and asked for the disturbance of no treaty, but which appealed to the advice which the great powers of Europe had proffered to the Court of Rome, and demanded a remedy for disorders, the existence of

which was notorious, produced a deep impression. The *Journal des Débats,* then the interpreter of the sentiments of M. Guizot and the French cabinet, supported these remonstrances, and condemned in strong terms the conduct of the papal government.

CHAPTER X.

Political writers of the moderate party—Vincenzo Gioberti—Effect produced by the publication of his *Primato*—His hostility to the Jesuits—M. de Montalembert's opinions—Gioberti's return to Piedmont—His efforts in promoting the *fusione*—Accepts office, and attempts to rally the constitutional party—Unsuccessful mission to Paris—His *Rinnovamento Civile*, later opinions and death—The *Speranze d'Italia* of Count Balbo—Massimo D'Azeglio publishes his *Casi di Romagna*—The tendency of his writings—Giacomo Durando, his work *Della Nazionalità Italiana*—His views with regard to the military resources of Italy, and on Eastern affairs—Farini's *Stato Romano*—Gualterio's *Rivolgimenti Italiani*—Colletta's History of Naples—Palmieri's work on the Constitution of Sicily.

Of the political writings, which,—condemning alike the anti-national policy followed by Italian governments and the pernicious workings of clandestine combinations,—maintain a spirit of hope and reconciliation, the first, in point of time and importance, is the *Primato morale e civile degl' Italiani*. This remarkable book was published at Brussels in 1843, by the Abbé Vincenzo Gioberti, a Piedmontese exile of 1821, than whom, Italian nationality has had no more ardent champion.

At that time, the Pope was leaning on Austrian support, and the political tendencies of other govern-

ments had produced a general disgust, which, stimulated by an under-current of French Jacobinism, had greatly strengthened the tendency to anti-papal and radical principles.

Though opposed to the popular current of the day, the Primato bore a title flattering to Italian feelings. Its author was regarded with favour, not only as a man of known attainments, but as an *exile*, and it soon obtained unbounded popularity and success.

At a moment when the principal efforts of the revolutionary party were directed against the papal government, and when that government was carrying out the severest measures of repression, Gioberti proclaimed the seeming paradox, that nothing should be done against the Pope, or without the Pope; for that no real good could be brought about, save that which was to be effected, by and through the Papacy. The patriots of Italy were called upon to lay aside their most rooted impressions, to hope where they had feared, and to venerate that which they had ceased to respect. They were exhorted to regard the papal authority as the great means of social and political regeneration—as a beneficent and harmonizing power by which liberty was to be consecrated, and license restrained. The pages of the Primato unite the force of reasoning with the charm of eloquence, in urging a reconcilement of princes and

people, and in advocating a confederacy of which the Pope was to be the head. If a belief has subsequently gained ground in Italy, that to reform is better than to destroy; that violent revolutionary changes bring with them the germs of instability; and that independence can only be grasped by an unanimous effort, in which all existing interests shall unite and be conciliated,—this change in the current of opinion, received its first and greatest impulse from Gioberti. By him, republican Utopias, unitarian dreams, and the fantastic schemes of *Young Italy*, were placed in their true light. He proposed to his countrymen the attainment of their wishes, not by the destruction or expulsion of their princes, but by enabling and encouraging them to identify the honour of the throne with the happiness of the people. Under the presiding influence of the papacy, the foundations of safe and durable liberty were to be laid. The strife of factions was to cease, and be absorbed in love and allegiance to the common fatherland. The Roman Pontiff, himself an Italian, was to become the guardian and protector of the Italian race, an arbiter among princes, and the venerated chief of a confederate nation.

The idea of Gioberti was bold, and found its way to the hearts and imaginations of his countrymen; nor were his eloquent reasonings without their effect on the candid and impressionable spirit of the gentle

bishop of Imola. The exiled Abbé became the precursor of Pio Nono; and to the hopes and aspirations evoked by the *Primato*, the reigning pontiff was indebted for the enthusiasm and veneration which once accompanied his name.

Though Gioberti led the way in a previously untrodden path, and though his writings produced a lasting impression, his views are sometimes liable to objection, as over-speculative. While he pursues with fervour his dominant idea, he is apt to overlook practical difficulties and disturbing causes. It does not appear to have occurred to him that the duties of the chief of an Italian league, and those of the head of the Latin Church, were liable to be at variance, or that the Pope might find himself in the dilemma of having to decide between the interests of his country, and those of the papal system, which he is bound, above all other considerations, to uphold. The Abbé's unmeasured and impassioned hostility to the Jesuits, appears to have been injurious to the cause which he had at heart. It was, at all events, impolitic, at such a crisis, to commence hostilities against a widely extended and influential corporation, whose views and interests are not necessarily opposed either to Italian independence or representative governments. The Jesuits are, no doubt, aware that the pretensions of the see of Rome, which they have always laboured

to support, have been most effectually checked by absolute monarchies. Abundant illustrations of this fact are afforded by the annals of the last century, in the conduct of the emperors of the house of Lorrain,* and in that of Charles III., of Naples and Spain.

M. Montalembert, no small authority on such a subject, has declared in his recent work *Des Intérêts Catholiques*, that parliamentary government is *favourable to the Roman Church.* It is true that under such a government, that Church does not rule with absolute sway; but she is able to watch her opportunities, and deploy her forces at the most favourable junctures; when parties are nearly balanced, and in times, when her keen and long-sighted policy insure her a great advantage.† At the foot of the absolute throne, the Church is in the position of a suppliant. In the Chamber of Representatives she preserves her dignity, and her claims are urged as demands, which, sooner or later, she knows how to enforce. In Belgium, the interest of the Jesuits had been found to coincide with those of the national and constitutional party. When Gioberti commenced his warfare against them, by the publication of the *Prolegomeni al Primato*, there was no reason to suppose that they had any

* Saint-Priest, Histoire de la Chûte des Jesuits, c. vi.

† Des Intérêts Catholiques, par C., Comte de Montalembert.

predilection for Austria, which had generally opposed and thwarted them, and whose government had not then purchased their favour, by a tame surrender of the nationality of the Austrian Church, to the encroaching spirit of ultramontanism.

After the first successes of Charles Albert, in 1848, Gioberti returned to his own country, where he acquired great consideration and influence. It was principally through his intervention, that the Lombard-Venetian provinces consented to the *fusione* with Piedmont. At Rome and elsewhere, he laboured with sincerity and devotion to exorcise the evil spirits of jealousy and distrust, and to give to the movement that unanimity, in which it was so deficient. In the presence of his applauding fellow-countrymen, he maintained the same political creed, and offered the same counsels, which he had maintained and advocated in exile. By the oracles of the clubs, and the agents of the republican or Mazzinist party, he was hated and calumniated, and an attempt was made to detract from his popularity by representing him as the advocate and abettor of Piedmontese interests.

It would, perhaps, have been happier for Gioberti, if the fame which he had acquired as a political writer, had not tempted him to accept office. A short time before the renewal of the struggle against Austria, in 1849, he was empowered by Charles Albert to form

an administration.* As soon as he became minister. he used every exertion to support the moderate party throughout the Peninsula, and to effect a rally in favour of constitutional monarchy. By so doing, he hoped to secure the confidence of those parties in and out of Italy, which were favourable to the independence of the country, but opposed to the designs of the republicans, then basely intriguing to obtain for themselves, the direction of affairs. He wished to prove to the world, that the policy of Piedmont was not subversive. With this object, he sent representatives to the Pope and the King of Naples, but they were received with coldness and neglect, nor were his views cordially acquiesced in, or his policy supported, by his own colleagues. A feeling had arisen, that Piedmont had made sacrifices enough, and should look to her own concerns. The persevering zeal of Gioberti, and his desire to prolong the struggle for the deliverance of the common fatherland, met with no response, and he was obliged to resign his office. After the fatal battle of Novara, he was sent as minister to Paris, but his attempts to negotiate a French intervention, with a view of obtaining better terms of peace from Austria, were ill-supported by his own government, and failed. In his last work, the *Rinnovamento Civile*, which he published at Paris in 1850, he complains that he was

* See chapter xix.

only sent there, in order to remove him from Turin, where his presence was inconvenient. He stigmatized the Pinelli administration, which sent him, as actuated by narrow views, and a tendency to *municipalismo*—a term which he uses to express the preference of local and provincial interests over those of the Italian nation; and complains of the abandonment by the government of the *egemonia* of Italy, in order to secure the interests of Piedmont, whose isolated independence he regards as precarious.

The *Rinnovamento Civile* unmasks with no sparing hand the faults and errors of all parties. The chapter *della nuova Roma* is very remarkable, inasmuch as he there treats of the temporal power of the papacy as a thing that has been tried in the balance and found wanting, thus renouncing the hopes, which he had once so enthusiastically entertained, and so powerfully excited.

With a venial egotism, the Abbé regards himself as the originator of the *risorgimento*, as the one individual who completely understood its nature and interests, and whose counsels, if they had been implicitly followed, would have secured the triumph of the Italian cause. His latter days were spent at Paris, where he died in October, 1852, in the forty-fifth year of his age.

The impulse given by the *Primato*, gave rise to other

publications of a kindred scope and character: and of these the most remarkable, was that of a distinguished Piedmontese statesman, the late Count Cesare Balbo. The great circulation and success obtained by his *Speranze d'Italia*, proved, that his attempt to guide and encourage his countrymen, was not made in vain. He exposed, with even-handed justice, the lamentable mis-direction of the governments, and the not less fatal errors of those Italians, who, relying on clandestine combinations, seek to form institutions out of elements which Italy never possessed, or has long ceased to possess. He does not conceal his conviction that the most solid and lasting guarantees for liberty, are to be found in constitutional monarchy. While he condemns the fantastic speculations of Young Italy, he points to a reconcilement of the interests of the princes and people, and to the formation of a political and commercial league, as the means by which the prosperity and dignity of the nation might be restored.

Under a system of rigorous restriction, the writings of the republicans had for a long time obtained a sort of monopoly, through the agency of a clandestine press; but, under the government of Charles Albert, the censorship had become so far mitigated as to allow circulation to those of the constitutional party. The *Speranze*, though severely truthful, and therefore unacceptable to many, produced a deep impression,

and became a sort of political catechism, as well as a standard, by which popular errors, and discordant or unsettled opinions, might be guided and rectified.

While Count Balbo cordially accepted what he called the *gran pensiero* of Gioberti, and approved of a league, as the basis of all future improvements, he dissented, with the foresight of a statesman, from the mediæval idea of a papal *egemonia*.

In 1845, Massimo d'Azeglio, then only known as a popular and accomplished Piedmontese gentleman, and an enthusiastic lover of the arts, was travelling in central Italy, in the prosecution of his favourite pursuits. Having become privy to the desperate and reckless undertakings then in agitation, he endeavoured to demonstrate the injurious tendency of attempts which could only result in fruitless sacrifices. He exhorted the friends of Italy to reserve their courage and devotion for a suitable occasion, and to abstain from projects of a rash and equivocal character. These counsels were not without their effect, and were followed up by the publication, in 1846, of his celebrated pamphlet entitled, *Dei Casi di Romagna*. D'Azeglio condemned and exposed the weak and tyrannical conduct of the papal government, and owned entire sympathy in the universal longing for Italian nationality; but, at the same time, made an earnest and convincing appeal to the good sense and moderation

of his countrymen. He told them that miniature revolutions could lead to nothing but irritation and mischief; that no changes can be permanently advantageous, except such as are supported or acquiesced in by some or all of the leading powers; that Spain and Greece only succeeded in establishing their independence, through foreign aid and alliances.

This work, which was published at Florence, was offensive to the administration which had then recently been appointed, the members of which, did not adhere to the traditional principles of liberty and independence, held sacred by their predecessors, Don Neri Corsini and Fossombroni. To converse with D'Azeglio became a crime, and spies watched his steps. Ere long the influence of the same power, which had already forbidden his residence at Milan, forced him to quit Florence. A demand for his expulsion was made through the Austrian minister, and complied with. From the day of his departure, which did not take place without marked demonstrations in his favour, D'Azeglio became an influential leader of the moderate party, and entered upon a career, which has been alike honourable to himself, and beneficial to his country.

In alluding to the writers of the moderate party, who have contributed to the formation of public opinion in Italy, the name of Giacomo Durando must not be

omitted. Like his brother Giovanni, who during the campaign of 1848 commanded the pontifical army, he had served with distinction in Portugal and Spain, against the Miguelists and Carlists. In both those countries he had experienced the determined opposition of the clergy, and on that account, was less inclined, than either Gioberti or Count Balbo, to venerate the papal system. In his work, which is entitled *Della Nazionalità Italiana*, there is a map which explains his views with regard to a new distribution of Italy, in which the territory allotted to the Pope is of very reduced dimensions, and is coloured green, upon which it was remarked, "*Che aveva ridotto il Papa al verde.*"

Durando, as well as Count Balbo, looked forward to an approaching expulsion of the Ottomans from Europe, with the hope that Austria might, in that event, find it politic to relinquish the Lombard-Venetian provinces, and seek for compensation and aggrandizement, on the side of Turkey. His general views are highly speculative, but when treating on subjects connected with his own profession, and of military resources and capabilities, his ideas are interesting and original. He looks forward to a future alliance between Naples and Piedmont, in the cause of nationality, and is of opinion that their united navies would be superior to those of Austria, and their land forces capable of a defensive

warfare, if supported by an energetic and unanimous movement on the part of the population.

An idea has long been current amongst Italians, that the prospects of their country would be brightened by a relegation of the Turks from Europe. On this account England, being considered the principal stay of *Turkey as it is*, is often regarded with no small jealousy and dislike. The arguments of Durando on this question, if not very sound, are ingenious, and possess some interest at the present crisis. He describes the persistence of England in sustaining Ottoman sovereignty at Constantinople, as an attempt *to galvanize a skeleton, which can only be restored to life and power, by a future concentration of its elements in the realms of Asia!* *

Farini's *Stato Romano* treats of the affairs of Rome and Italy, from 1815 to 1850. The three first volumes of this work, having been translated by Mr. Gladstone, it is powerfully recommended to English readers. Signor Farini is said to have penned the manifesto of Rimini.† He filled the office of under-secretary of state in the Antonelli ministry, by which he was sent on a special mission to the camp of Charles Albert. He had thus opportunities of becoming intimately acquainted with most of the transactions of

* Durando, Nazionalità Italiana, p. 299.

† See chapter ix.

those times, and his testimony is invaluable, as that of a fair and observant witness.

The Marchese Gualterio, the author of an unfinished work entitled *Gli Ultimi Rivolgimenti Italiani*, possesses, like Farini, the advantage of having borne a part in the contests which he has undertaken to describe. The four volumes hitherto published, are only introductory to his principal subject —the revolutions of 1848 and 1849, and are taken up by an examination of antecedent causes and events. The superiority to party spirit, displayed by Gualterio in this preliminary labour, and his industry in supplying a rich store of original documents, are an earnest of the value and importance of what is to follow.

Besides the Italian authors whose writings are more immediately connected with the eventful period which followed the election of Pio Nono, others may be adverted to, whose works seem not less destined to exercise an influence in the formation of public opinion. To the pen of General Colletta, the Neapolitans are indebted for a faithful and interesting history of their country, from 1734 to 1825. Having attained distinction in the army of Murat, Colletta received the appointment of military *intendente* of Lower Calabria, and administered during two years, the affairs of that province. He afterwards filled with great public advantage the office of *Ministro dei ponti*

e strade, and was subsequently placed at the head of the ordnance.

After the restoration of the Bourbons, though regarded with coldness, as an officer who had served under King Joachim, he was allowed to retain his military rank, and his services were not rejected. He foresaw, but never promoted, the revolution of 1820. At that juncture, when called upon by the King for advice, his words were those of sincerity and patriotism. During the brief existence of the constitutional government, he was appointed to command in Sicily, and on his return filled the office of minister of war during the ineffectual attempt to resist the Austrian invasion. After the Carbonari revolutionists, abandoned by the wily advisers of the Court to their own follies and excesses, had ruined the cause of liberty; and the reactionary faction, headed by Canosa, commenced its career of violence and injustice, he was thrown into prison, but released through Austrian intervention, and carried off to Moravia. There he had commenced his history, when his health being injured by the climate, he obtained permission to reside at Florence. In that capital he enjoyed the society of political and literary friends, and was encouraged to persevere in a work, which, as the production of a man whose life had been spent in military toil and active duties, is truly admirable. His pages bear the impress

of a manly and honest spirit, unwarped by party feelings.

While the annals of Naples are ably chronicled by Colletta, those of Sicily are illustrated by the classical work of Palmieri.* Both these historians betray a feeling of irritation towards the English government, and both are influenced by the unfortunate antipathy which prevails between the Sicilian and Neapolitan races; but their works abound with original and interesting matter, and will richly repay the attention of the reader.

* Saggio Storico e Politico sulla Costituzione del Regno di Sicilia.

CHAPTER XI.

The deliberations of the conclave—Election of Cardinal Mastai—General amnesty—Antecedents and character of the new Pope—Count Rossi's remarks—Cardinal Gizzi minister—The Prince de Joinville at Rome—The Jesuits—Ciceruacchio—Discontent of the Austrian ambassador—Encouragement afforded by Rossi—Want of decision—The Prince of Canino, and the Scienziati at Genoa—General excitement—Views of the constitutionalists, and those of the Mazzinists.

On the 13th of June, 1846, the conclave was opened with the accustomed formalities. Count Rossi, as the representative of France, had previously made known his resolution of abstaining from any exercise of the *veto*. This politic forbearance may have tended to lull the vigilance of Prince Metternich; for we find that Cardinal Gaysruck, who was entrusted to watch the interests of Austria, did not arrive till after the election.

The Cardinal, who previously to the demise of the triple crown has been exercising the functions of prime minister, is generally considered as ineligible; for it is a traditional maxim in the sacred college that *no man may be Pope more than once.** Nevertheless,

* *"Non potersi essere due volte Pontefice."—Rivolgimenti Italiani*, vol. iv. c. lxv.

on this occasion the partisans of the Cardinal Secretary, Lambruschini, were numerous.

The deliberations of the conclave were concluded in the unusually short space of three days. Twice, the smoke from the iron tube, which projects from one of the windows of the Quirinal, announced to the watchful by-standers, that the *schede*, or voting papers, were consumed, and, consequently, that the voting had been indecisive.

In the second scrutiny, Lambruschini had fewer votes than in the first, for the conclave was split into sections, and many of the ex-minister's own party were, for some private pique or reason, opposed to his elevation. The tact and experience of Cardinal Bernetti, were employed in turning these jealousies to good account, and materially contributed to the defeat of an adversary, by whom he had been superseded; and on the third scrutiny, the votes required for a valid election, were pronounced to be in favour of Cardinal Mastai Ferretti.

The first announcement of this event caused neither joy nor sorrow. The people wished for Cardinal Gizzi, who had won esteem as a provincial governor, and had been praised by Massimo D'Azeglio. Little was known as to the political bias of the new pontiff, whose election had not been anticipated, either by himself, or by his countrymen; and the suspense was

not removed by the immediate appointment of a ministry, for Pio Nono commenced his reign by the nomination of a ministerial commission selected from the members of the sacred college, without any reference to politics. A significant act soon evinced the benevolent and generous impulses of his heart. The question of a limited or general amnesty was propounded to the ministerial commission; but Pio had already resolved to adopt that alternative which was most congenial to his own feelings; and no exceptions were made. A declaration was however required, by which each individual was called upon to acknowledge a certain culpability, and to promise future allegiance. This condition, whether politic or the contrary, ought, when once laid down, to have been insisted on; but the government had not the resolution to do so, and many exiles returned without any such admission or pledge.

Few princes have been more erroneously estimated, or more unduly praised and censured, than the gentle and inoffensive prelate, whose misfortune it was, to be placed, at this critical juncture, in a position of difficulty and danger, as sovereign of the Roman States.

Giovanni Maria Mastai Ferretti was born at Sinigallia, in 1792. On the restoration of Pius VII., being a member of a noble and respected family, he solicited a commission in the *guardia nobile*. The infirmity of

his health, which had been enfeebled by epileptic fits, prevented him from obtaining the desired appointment, and he then determined to devote himself to the service of the church. After he had assumed the ecclesiastical habit his constitution improved, and he continued to pursue with assiduity, the studies and duties of his profession. In 1823, he accompanied a commission to Chili, where he remained about two years, and having, after his return, discharged with reputation, various employments in the church, was named Bishop of Spoleto by Leo XII., and Bishop of Imola by Gregory XVI., from whom he also received his appointment as Cardinal.

Attached by the ties of birth and residence to the people of whom he unexpectedly became the ruler, he had witnessed with his own eyes, the lamentable evils of their misgovernment. His youth had not been spent under the influence of that seclusion and peculiar training which often gives an irretrievable bias to the minds of Roman ecclesiastics. Being elevated to the throne at a less advanced period of life than most of his predecessors, he was not old enough to be swayed by a blind attachment to the ancient *régime;* and the known family leanings, as well as the personal qualities of the new pontiff suggested a hope, that, under his auspices, the papacy might once more become, what it was during the middle ages, an instrument of

civilization and progress, and a means of restoring to peace and harmony, the disordered elements of society.

These sanguine anticipations rested on an imaginary basis. Though sprung from a family of enlightened and patriotic principles, and endowed with a good and generous disposition, Pio Nono was deeply imbued with the sentiments of his caste. With the exterior and accomplishments of an Italian gentleman, he was, above all other things, a devoted churchman. On the attainment of unsought dignity and power, he did not indeed, forget or disregard the wants and aspirations of his countrymen, but ecclesiastical interests formed the paramount object of his solicitude. To elevate the Italian race from its fallen condition, through the mediation and agency of the papacy, and so to regain for the Holy See a portion of its lost popularity and importance, was the task which he longed to accomplish, and of which he did not suspect the difficulty.

When the humane and generous expressions contained in the Act of Amnesty were read and repeated, "it seemed," says Farini, "as if a ray of divine love had suddenly descended on the eternal city." So great was the contrast which this measure presented to the severities of the previous reign.

In writing to M. Guizot, Rossi thus expressed his own as well as the general impression: "The amnesty is not all. It is a great step that has been taken.

I entertain the hope that a new course is now entered upon, and that the Holy Father will be able to follow it out, notwithstanding the obstacles by which he will not fail to be opposed."

On the 8th of August, Cardinal Gizzi was declared minister. The zeal of that prelate in the promotion of administrative improvements, was well known; and thus, not only was the Pope perceived to be a reformer, but he was served and supported by a cardinal secretary who shared his sentiments. Pio Nono, little anticipating the trials which awaited him, was already basking in the sunshine of a brilliant popularity. The joy of his own subjects was universal, and the journals united in an harmonious chorus of praise. Louis-Philippe sent the Prince de Joinville on a mission of congratulation; and many foreigners of distinction flocked to Rome. Even the Jesuits, though not amongst the foremost to express their satisfaction, celebrated *the triumph of clemency* in the church of St. Ignatius; but the popular feeling was unfriendly to them, and the demonstration was condemned as tardy and insincere. The long-cherished antipathy to this influential order had of late been aggravated by the writings of Gioberti, and the fathers, whether justly or unjustly, were regarded as allies of Austria and secret foes of Italian independence.

A contentment so general and heartfelt, found vent

in popular rejoicings; and at that time Angelo Brunetti, better known as Ciceruacchio, having acquired a competency by letting out horses and carriages, began to be a coryphæus of the Roman *popolani*. The imperturbable self-sufficiency and rustic *bonhommie* of this man had given him an extensive influence over his equals; and the Pope himself is said to have accepted with complacency, the harmless and spontaneous flatteries, of which he was the harbinger.

The Austrian minister now began to take umbrage at certain cries of *Via gli stranieri*, which were said to have been tolerated by the government; but from the French representative, Pio Nono received the most encouraging assurances. "Your Holiness," said Rossi, "has commenced a great pontificate, and will not permit so fair an enterprise to be disconcerted. These noble and generous intentions will have the warm support of my august sovereign and his government. Our policy is known. We applaud whatever may tend to consolidate the independence of states, the prosperity of nations, and the peace of the world." The sentiments of England being in complete accordance with those expressed by France, the advantages of the Pope's position seemed greatly to outweigh the countervailing difficulties, which, though foreseen by a few, had not yet assumed a formidable aspect. The dangers which already loomed in the distance could only

be averted by a firm and unhesitating course of action. Unfortunately, the new government confided too much in its popularity, and instead of adopting a determinate plan, waited to receive the impulse from without. Yielding to a weak and impolitic fear of alarming the opponents of change, the Pope shrunk from the responsibility of taking the initiative. An attempt was made to please all parties, and many *Gregoriani*, whose conduct during the late reign had been oppressive, were allowed to retain their appointments. Thus the vessel of the state was left to drift, without any positive direction. At the same time numerous commissions were appointed to enquire and deliberate. In this way every thing became unsettled; the most extravagant expectations began to be formed, and a foundation was laid for future embarrassment and disappointment.

The scientific congress was held this year at Genoa; and the Pope's subjects were, for the first time, allowed to attend. Many whose energies had been directed to politics rather than science, availed themselves of this opportunity of holding converse with their countrymen. Reform and nationality became favourite topics of public, as well as private discussion. The Prince of Canino did not confine himself to natural history, but was diffuse in his laudations of Pio Nono, whom he afterwards contributed to dethrone. Ardour was easily

kindled in a cause which was said to be supported by the head of the Church, and also by the King of Sardinia, whose differences with Austria were already notorious.

Towards the close of 1846, a century having elapsed since the expulsion of the Austrians by the Genoese, that event was celebrated in many cities of the Peninsula, by political banquets and illuminations. *Italy for the Italians*, began to be the watchword which expressed the general feeling; yet two distinct parties were already observable. The first of these placed its hopes for the future on a change in the views and policy of the legitimate Italian governments, and desired to conciliate the support of the princes, as well as of the people, in favour of a great national effort. It demanded reforms and institutions, but chiefly as a means by which the *unum necessarium*—independence—might be secured, and hoped to see that object accomplished, by the establishment of an Italian league. The aim of another party, was not to reform or to convert, but to destroy. It desired to expel and sweep away, all existing dynasties and territorial arrangements, and to erect a new fabric of society, as well as of government, on the ruins of the old.

Such was the scheme attributed to Signor Mazzini, whose complete ascendancy over the sect of Young Italy, has already been noticed. According to the

views and principles of that sect, the reigning princes might be flattered and made use of, for a season, but were ultimately to be subverted and dethroned, in the prosecution of the great ultimate design of an Ausonian republic—*una e indivisibile.*

CHAPTER XII.

Commencement of 1847—Institution of the Consulta—Impatience for more decisive measures—Concession of the civic guard—Rossi's letter to M. Guizot—Monster processions—Alarm of the government—Cardinal Gizzi retires, and is succeeded by Cardinal Ferretti—Rumours of a Sanfedista conspiracy—Tumults and disorders—The Austrians occupy Ferrara—Monsignor Corboli sent to Florence and Turin to negotiate a league—The meeting of the Consulta—The Prince of Canino at Florence and Venice—Lord Minto's visit to Rome—License of the press—M. Delessert's exposure of the designs of Young Italy—Commencement of 1848—Power falls into the hands of the agitators—Degradation of the Pope—Events at Naples—Resignation of Ferretti—Changes of ministry—The French Revolution of February—Outcry against the Jesuits—They are recommended to leave Rome—The Antonelli administration.

On the commencement of 1847, when the diplomatic body approached the papal throne with the usual felicitations, it was not, as previously, an insignificant matter of form. The attitude assumed by the Court of Rome, had excited the surprise and curiosity of Europe, and the attention of the world was once more directed to the Vatican. This feeling was not confined to Christian powers: on the 20th of February, Chekib Effendi was received in audience, and declared, with all the magnificence of eastern diction, the esteem

entertained by the Grand Seignior, for the character and office of Pio Nono.

On the 12th of March, Cardinal Gizzi published an edict, by which a council, consisting of four lay and one ecclesiastical members, was appointed to decide questions connected with the press. By this law, the censorship was conducted according to fixed rules, and considerable freedom was allowed. Journals, good and bad, obtained an increased circulation, and amongst the latter the *Contemporaneo*, a weekly paper edited by Sterbini, an exile of 1831, who had returned to Rome under the amnesty, became remarkable for its violence and inconsistency.

During the following month, the government proclaimed the institution of a *consulta*, or deliberative chamber. The cardinals, prelates, legates, and delegates, were to name three persons of consideration from whom the Pope was to select one *consultatore* for each province. The assembly thus composed, was to have its sittings at Rome, for at least two years, and to assist the government *by its counsels* in carrying into effect, administrative reforms. This edict was received with great satisfaction, in Rome and the provinces. Nevertheless, a feeling of impatience began to prevail; civil equality had no existence, for state employments were still monopolized by a dominant caste, to the exclusion of the laity. At the same time the hateful

presence of Austrian garrisons at Ferrara and Comacchio, though sanctioned by the treaty of Vienna, was a constant source of irritation. It is not therefore surprising, that the desire, then universal in Italy, should have been felt, and expressed most ardently, in the States of the Church.

The Gregorian police, intent only on the repression of liberalism, had neglected that of crime, and allowed the establishment and increase of bands of depredators. As a protection against these, and also as a security against alleged *sanfedista* conspiracies, the principal towns had for some months, urged the establishment of a civic guard. This demand, though considered reasonable by the Pope, was strongly objected to, by his Court, and was in the end conceded reluctantly, and as of necessity.

A year had now elapsed since the accession, and no better description can be given of the state of affairs than that contained in a letter of Count Rossi to M. Guizot: "Nothing is yet done. Hitherto we have promises only, and propositions, and commissions which do not work. It is therefore no wonder if the country begins to lack confidence, and to feel disquietude; it does not indeed accuse the Pope of insincerity, but it suspects him of weakness. Hence it becomes more than ever important to tranquillize the public mind,—showing by judicious reforms that the promises

of his Holiness have not been illusory, and that nothing prevents their accomplishment. I have, with entire frankness, told the Holy Father that every delay must occasion disturbance; and that if, on the other hand, the *acts* of the government should re-assure men's minds, I feel confident, that full time would be allowed for his Holiness to proceed with requisite deliberation."

While the ministry remained passive and undecided, public rejoicings, processions, and benedictions continued. The anniversary of the Pope's election was celebrated with peculiar demonstrations. Each *rione* or district of the city had its capo-popolo, each capo-popolo, his banner. Ciceruacchio was master of the ceremonies. On the arrival of the multitude at the Quirinal, the Pope was called for, and appeared on the balcony to thank and bless his people. The excitements of the day, were succeeded, at night, by illuminations, songs, and shoutings. On the morrow, the anniversary of the coronation was kept with similar observances. Farini, in his account of these proceedings, alludes to a prophecy made to him at the time by an eye-witness well versed in public affairs, that the festive revolution then in progress was not destined to have a festive termination.*

The government began to entertain fears which it did not like to avow, and in a few days a proclamation

* Stato Romano, libro ii. c. iv.

appeared, by which popular assemblies were deprecated, rather than forbidden, on the plea that they interrupted the studies of the young, the labours of the industrious, and the transaction of business. The unpopularity of this edict fell on Cardinal Gizzi, who was immediately charged with duplicity, and accused of being connected with the *retrivi;* but the Pope was exonerated. The Cardinal, though friendly to administrative improvements, had always been averse to any fundamental change in the system of clerical governments, and regarded with dismay Pio Nono's readiness to comply with popular demands. Having been minister for a year, he resolved to retire, and, on renouncing power, declared that no other cardinal would be able to retain it for half that period.

On the 10th of July, Cardinal Gabriel Ferretti was sent for, and accepted office. He was induced to do so, not by any selfish or ambitious motive, but by a sincere desire to serve and uphold a pontiff for whose election he had laboured, and to whom he was cordially attached. If any minister could have averted the dangers which were then gathering round the papal throne, the devotion, zeal, and character of Ferretti, seemed to qualify him for such an undertaking.

The ability and courage of the new cardinal-secretary were soon put to the test. On the 17th of July the city of Ferrara was occupied by Austrian troops.

This aggression, which was not entirely unprovoked,* appears to have been ordered with a view to intimidate the Pope, and deter him from the prosecution of further innovations; it was, however, strongly protested against, by the local authorities, and believed by the people to be nothing less than a demonstration made in support of a *Sanfedista* conspiracy. Any such infringement of the rights of the Holy See would appear to have been impolitic, and had an evident tendency to irritate Pio Nono, and to throw him into closer union with the liberals, who desired nothing so much as a quarrel with Austria. The national sentiment was stimulated, and an opportunity was afforded for the municipal, and other public bodies to come forward with gifts and assurances of support. Contributions were volunteered not only by the laity, but by bishops and religious orders. The Roman youth was glad of a pretext for military exercises. The civic guard was fully equipped, and its banners were blessed by the priests.

The idea of a defensive as well as commercial league, was now eagerly resorted to by the Pope, whose friend, Monsignor Corboli-Bussi — an ecclesiastic of great abilities and most respectable cha-

* Mazzini had given instructions to his supporters "*to irritate Austria by every possible means.*" See his letter printed in the Parliamentary Papers, July 1849.

racter—was despatched to Florence and Turin in furtherance of that design.*

As the existence of any administration now depended on its popularity, the hostile attitude assumed by the Court of Vienna was favourable to Cardinal Ferretti; for it enabled him to take the initiative in a cause regarded with universal sympathy. For a time, the Court and the ministry appeared to be acting in unison. Assurances of support were received from France and Piedmont, and the good graces of Ciceruacchio were conciliated.

On the day appointed for the inauguration of the Consulta, the members proceeded in a body to the palace to receive the Pope's benediction and good wishes for the success of their labours. This occasion was taken advantage of by several of the leading agitators, who intruded themselves, uninvited, and insulted their Sovereign by a display of usurped importance. †

In the autumn of 1847, the Prince of Canino, with a *codazzo*, departed from Rome to attend the scientific congress at Venice. During a brief sojourn at Leghorn, Pisa, and Florence, his appearance in the uniform of the Roman national guard, and the display

* An agreement for a commercial and custom-house league was actually concluded in November, 1847, through the exertion of Monsignor Corboli, between the Roman States, Tuscany, and Piedmont.—Farini, libro ii. c. vii.

† Farini, libro ii. c. viii.

of his eloquence in the coffee-houses and *Piazze*, excited no little astonishment. The Austrian government, regardless of the loss which science might sustain, refused him permission to remain at Venice, and he was obliged to recross the frontier.

Before the commencement of winter, Lord Minto arrived at Rome, having undertaken, at the request of the ministry to which he belonged, a peculiar mission to the princes and people of Italy. It is difficult to describe the exact character of this extraordinary embassy. The good intentions with which it was planned and executed, cannot be doubted; but the expediency of such a demonstration, in times of great excitement, when every word and act was liable to be misinterpreted, will hardly be defended.

The cardinal-secretary was assisted and supported by his two brothers—men of upright character and experienced in public affairs. Through Count Cristoforo Ferretti's exertions at Milan, a settlement of the Ferrara dispute was at length accomplished, but the government still found itself surrounded by great embarrassments. The press, which in the case of nations inured to liberty, is safely allowed the utmost freedom, became, in a polity constituted like that of the Roman states, an engine of destruction; yet all attempts to restrain its violence were abortive. Tuscany was in a state of civil commotion, and the

excitement kept up at Florence had its reaction at Rome.

Though it was impossible for Ferretti to satisfy the extravagant expectations of those times, his administration was marked by many substantial, though ill-appreciated improvements. By a motu-proprio, bearing date the 30th of December, 1847, the various departments of public business were for the first time defined, and placed under distinct and responsible heads; and a system of entire publicity was established in the administration of the finances. Notwithstanding these praiseworthy endeavours, the ministry was inadequately supported. The *moderati* were not trusted or understood, either by the Court or the people, and the *immoderati* acquired every day greater authority in the *piazze*. The Mazzinists and *fuorusciti* regarded with impatience and aversion, the exertions and counsels of those whose views were directed to the attainment of good government and independence, without the intervention of revolutionary changes.

In January 1848, M. Delessert, the prefect of the police at Paris, in a letter* to Louis-Philippe's minister of the interior, expressed himself to the following effect:—"I am told that Mazzini has been at Paris consulting with his friends, as to the collection of

* Quoted by Farini.

funds for the maintenance of emissaries in Tuscany, Piedmont, Rome, and Naples. These men are charged to second the movement which is now going on in those states, and to obtain the confidence of the patriots. They have been enjoined to study the character of the Roman *popolano* Ciceruacchio; and to endeavour to attach him to their party, by persuading him that everything will be done to promote the glory of Pio Nono. In short, the plan of Mazzini is—to avail himself of the present agitation, by turning it to the advantage of Young Italy, which rejects every kind of monarchy, and to accomplish this by joining in the cries of '*Viva il Granduca di Toscana*,' '*Viva Carlo Alberto*,' '*Viva Pio Nono.*'"

The result corresponded with M. Delessert's intimations. Many of the *fuorusciti* and others who had been entrusted with the commission described by him, arrived at their appointed stations, took a part in whatever agitations were going on, and succeeded, by persevering flatteries, in gaining over Ciceruacchio, who had previously been attached to the moderate party.

The effect of these tactics was soon perceptible, and the new year was ushered in by the spectacle of a sovereign pontiff carried in mock triumph through the streets of his own capital.

The first of January was fixed upon for a popular gathering. Early in the evening, when the multitude

was congregated in the Piazza del Popolo, with banners, music and torches, ready to march to the Quirinal, news arrived that the palace was surrounded by troops, who had orders to resist the approach of the procession. The police, suspecting a seditious movement, had expressed apprehensions. Ferretti, at the desire of the terrified Court, had ordered these precautions. An uproar ensued; imprecations and threats were raised against the ministry and the police. The octogenarian Prince Corsini, who held the dignity of *Senatore di Roma*, undertook the office of peace-maker. He was received at the Quirinal, and on his return announced to the multitude that the troops were dismissed; that the Holy Father confided in his people, and would, on the following day, give proof of that confidence. *Vivas* were then heard for Pio Nono, and for the *Senatore*, and all the blame of the military preparations was allowed to fall on Ferretti. An able, faithful, and attached minister was sacrificed, in order to stave off a present difficulty. Such is the too common error of weak and irresolute princes!

On the morrow, the trembling Pope went forth to give the required proof of his *confidence*. The Corso was prepared as for a festive display, but the aspect of the crowd was threatening, and when the pale and dejected Pontiff proffered his blessing, the tokens of reverence were scanty, and he was greeted by cries of,

"Down with the ministers! Down with the police and the Jesuits!" The civic guard surrounded the carriage, and Ciceruacchio having taken his place behind it, unfurled, amid the vociferations of the frenzied multitude, a banner inscribed with the words, *Santo Padre, fidatevi del Popolo!*

The establishment and composition of the *consulta* has already been touched upon. Though the powers of this assembly were limited to giving advice, each member had the right of making whatever propositions he might think proper, and the deliberations being public, were liable to external influences. As an instance of this, we find that a violent address was presented to the *Consultatori* in the name of the Roman people, demanding a new military organization. The assembly, unwilling to be considered lukewarm, immediately advised the government to engage foreign officers, by whose directions and experience the army might be re-modelled. An application was consequently made to Charles Albert, and the services of General Durando and other Piedmontese officers obtained. The necessity of some such measure will readily be admitted, but the whole transaction shows that the powers of the state were no longer exercised either by the executive, or by the deliberative Council, but had fallen into the hands of the rulers of the *Piazze*.

At this time unexpected events at Naples contributed to the embarrassment of the Pontifical counsels. Till the beginning of 1848, the Neapolitan government, confiding in its own strength, had looked down on those of Rome and Tuscany as yielding through weakness to popular demands, and had withstood the counsels of England and France. All at once, on the approach of danger, it not only abandoned its previous policy, but by hasty and ill-considered measures, increased the general agitation. This abrupt change was caused by the King's apprehensions lest the revolt which had lately broken out at Palermo should be followed by a doubtful struggle at Naples. Finding that the chiefs of his army would be unwilling to act against the people, he at length resolved to surpass the other princes by the amplitude of his concessions, and so to re-instate himself in the affections of his subjects.*

The intelligence of these transactions produced additional difficulties at Rome. Cardinal Ferretti, who had long been anxious to retire, was replaced on the 7th of February by Cardinal Bofondi. The following day there was a considerable tumult, and imprecations were again heard against the ministers and against the Jesuits, whose brethren at Naples had recently been subjected to expulsion. By the inter-

* See Chapter vi. p. 125.

vention of the *Senatore*, and of other influential individuals, the multitude was appeased, and the Pope's assent to another change of ministers obtained. In a proclamation, dated the 10th of February, an increase of the lay members of the ministerial council was promised; and assurances were re-iterated as to an improved organization of the army, and the employment of efficient foreign officers. This document, though extorted by fear, did not disguise the fact that, in making the promised concessions, all other interests would be considered as secondary to those of the Church. "*Salvi i nostri doveri verso la chiesa*," is the significant saving clause. The dread of possible schisms, and the fear of giving offence to Catholic powers, is constantly observable.

The proclamation was immediately followed by the appointment of a cabinet which included the Prince of Teano, Count Guiseppe Pasolini, Sturbinetti and other lay members, of unblemished character and high repute for ability as well as integrity. The helmsmen were good—but the ship did not answer to the rudder. That a ministry so well entitled to confidence should have been unable to maintain itself for more than a month, is a proof the unmanageable nature of the difficulties by which it was beset.

A commission, composed entirely of ecclesiastics, and consisting of Cardinals Orsini, Castracani, Orioli,

Altieri, Antonelli, Bofondi, and Vizzardelli, and of the Prelates Corboli-Bussi, Bernabo, and Mertel, was now intrusted with the task of considering such further changes as might be deemed consistent with the peculiar nature of the Pontifical government.

When the news of the revolution of February arrived from Paris, the establishment of a republic in France was rapturously hailed by multitudes who little foresaw the sinister influence which that event was destined to exert on the brightening prospects of Italy.

Idleness and poverty were the inseparable consequences of diurnal agitation. The people could not live on *fêtes* and processions, and attempts were made to supply by charitable contributions the pressing wants which resulted from a suspension of industry. Political assassinations became frequent, and were, too often, committed with impunity. The treasury was empty, and could only be replenished by a resort to fresh loans.

About this time the outcry against the Jesuits greatly perplexed Pio Nono, who, though by no means disposed to encourage all their pretensions, felt it hard to condemn and persecute an order which had laboured to extend the influence of the papacy, and whose objects and desires were, in many respects, congenial with his own. In order to avoid the risk of a popular outbreak, a middle course was resorted to, and the

fathers were recommended to abandon their establishment and to quit the Roman territory. In the official document, by which the compromise was announced, they were spoken of as victims rather than offenders, and were lauded as *unwearied labourers in the Lord's vineyard.*

The agitation of this question was fraught with mischief to the cause which it was intended to advance; for the Pope, whose name and countenance were a tower of strength to the liberals, was disconcerted and humiliated. He was made to feel himself in thraldom, and was subjected to dictation even in matters within the sphere of his ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Jesuits, whose interests have sometimes, as in the case of Belgium, been found perfectly compatible with representative institutions, were unnecessarily converted into deadly enemies, and their influence was, at the same time, increased rather then diminished by persecution; for they departed as martyrs, approved by the head of the Church, and became the disseminators of fear and distrust. Other religious societies took the alarm, and the number of those who viewed the recent concessions, with regret and aversion was augmented.

On the 10th of March another change of administration took place, and a ministry, composed almost entirely of laymen, selected from the most distinguished members of the constitutional party, and presided over

by Cardinal Antonelli, was arranged. Farini, the historian, at this time took office as under-secretary of state for the interior.

*Strani tempi correvano.** The new ministers, conscious of their inability to curb the revolutionary spirit, tried to gain over those who bore sway in the Piazze, by vain attempts at conciliation. In order to court popularity, one Galletti, a Bolognese, who possessed no other recommendation than that of having suffered punishment as a conspirator, was entrusted with the administration of the Police.

* Farini, libro ii. c. xi.

CHAPTER XIII.

The statuto—The powers conferred on the chambers—Those reserved to the College of Cardinals—The consulta falls into disuse—Its utility and zeal in the promotion of administrative improvements—Excitement against Austria—Military preparations—The revolt of Milan and Venice—Affairs of Parma and Modena—The departure of the troops, and march to the frontier—General enthusiasm—The Pope's anxiety for the league—His hesitation with regard to offensive warfare—Durando crosses the Po, and occupies Ostiglia and Governolo.

THE drawing up of a constitution, suitable to the peculiar nature of the Pontifical government, was confided to the College of Cardinals, aided by the ecclesiastical commission mentioned in the last chapter. This course was adopted in order, as it was said, that no doubt might be entertained, or question raised by foreign powers, as to the voluntary nature of the concession.

It was natural that cardinals and Roman prelates should wish to retain for themselves and their brethren the largest possible portion of that power which had long been theirs; and accordingly we find that the *statuto* conferred upon the upper and lower chambers, the semblance rather than the reality of legislative authority. The publication was greeted with much

enthusiasm, and little inquiry was made as to details. The establishment of an *alto consiglio* and a *consiglio dei deputati* was hailed by the Roman public as a sufficient guarantee; and it was not at first discovered that the proceedings of those assemblies were to be fettered by the powers reserved to the Sacred College. To that body, whose deliberations are carried on, and decisions made in secret Consistory, an absolute veto was reserved; and without its sanction no law was valid. Nor was this the only impediment to the free exercise of constitutional functions by the chambers. They were incapacitated from proposing any law which affected what are called *affari misti;* that is to say, matters in which any rights or interests of the Church are involved. They were also forbidden to introduce any change which might impugn the ecclesiastical canons and discipline. At Rome there are few matters of importance that are not interwoven and connected with ecclesiastical rights and jurisdictions; and it is obvious that these restrictions would render the prosecution of any substantial reform extremely difficult. The result was, that the *consiglio dei deputati* became a place where opinions might be advanced, and where agitators might acquire *political capital;* where a Sterbini, by displaying the insolence of a democrat, or a Canino by indulging in mischievous and endless loquacity, might draw down the applause of the

galleries; but where men of a higher and better mould, of whom there were many, had few opportunities of serving their country. Meantime, the power which had been withheld from the chambers was rapidly sliding into the hands of the *circoli*.*

On the promulgation of the *statuto*, the *consulta* was virtually abrogated. Before revolutionary ideas had made progress, that institution had been regarded as a benefit throughout the Roman States, and such indeed it was. The *Consultori* were men of the highest character, and were appointed without any regard to political leanings. The president and vice-presidents were ecclesiastics; the rest of the members, with the single exception of Monsignor Pacca, were laymen. It was the Pope's desire, that the consulta should abstain as much as possible from political discussions; but in questions of administrative financial and commercial reform, searching inquiries were instituted, and laboriously and faithfully followed up. Political events, and ministerial changes, withdrew many of the most distinguished members from their useful labours; and the same causes soon put an end to the existence of an institution from which great benefit might have been derived.

The political horizon now began to wear a threatening aspect, the influence of the ultra liberals was

* See note to chapter xviii.

greatly increased by the Parisian revolution, and the events which in rapid succession excited the hopes and fears of Europe, were celebrated at Rome by monster processions, in which the papal banner was united with the Italian tricolor. When the news arrived of the revolution at Vienna, the Imperial arms were torn down from the Palazzo di Venezia, and a crowd, composed of all ranks, proceeded in a frenzy of joy to the church of Ara Cœli, to offer a public thanksgiving. A petition was presented to Pio Nono beseeching him to support the national cause by the convocation of an Italian diet at Rome. The ministry decreed the formation of an army, which was to be placed under the command of General Durando, who had obtained distinction and experience during the constitutional struggle in Spain. At the same time a corps of volunteers was enrolled under the direction of Colonel Ferrari, a Neapolitan, who had lately quitted the service of France. The success of the insurgents at Milan, bravely obtained, and generously used, increased the exultation. The sustained and heroic effort, which, in conjunction with the attitude assumed by Charles Albert, compelled Radetzky to evacuate that city on the 23rd of March, formed as it were, the first scene in the war of independence. What the Milanese effected by a struggle, in which noble and peasant fought side by side, Venice extorted from the

weakness of the authorities, and thus the flag of revolt waved over the two chief cities of Austrian Italy. On the death of the Archduchess Maria Louisa, which occurred in 1847, when the Italian ferment was at its height, the Duchy of Parma passed, according to the arrangements of the treaty of Vienna, to the representative of the Bourbons, its former sovereigns. That of Modena was held by a descendant of the illustrious house of Este. Both these princes adhered to the Austrian cause, and were soon obliged to quit their dominions.*

On the 24th of March, the troops left Rome under the command of Durando. His aides-de-camp were Count Casanova, and Massimo d'Azeglio, whose influential writings, and subsequent career as a distinguished Italian statesman, are well known. The regular troops were followed by the civic guard and volunteers, under Ferrari. The whole array departed with the blessing of the Pope, and was no sooner on its march than the news of the invasion of Lombardy by Charles Albert arrived at Rome, and was celebrated by *fêtes* and illuminations.

These were golden hours of joy and hope, in which all classes participated. The cardinals and Roman princes gave their horses for the artillery. The matrons offered their jewels, nor were the contribu-

* See chapter xxi.

tions of the poor less generously and freely given than those of the rich. Nobles, citizens and peasants were animated by one feeling, and the trade of the agitator and demagogue was for a while suspended. Two of the Pope's nephews were enrolled in the corps of volunteers, which amounted to twelve thousand men. Subsequent disappointments, failures and sufferings, will never obliterate from Roman hearts the recollection of those days. It was a time to which Italians may look back with consolation and encouragement; for a proof was then afforded, that there exists amid the varied and discordant elements of their society, a hidden vein of generous and unselfish feeling, which may one day obtain the mastery, and overcome evil with good.

The Roman forces effected in four weeks their march to Ferrara, a distance of about four hundred miles. They were everywhere greeted with welcome, and furnished with needful supplies. Ravenna sent out its own corps of volunteers, under the command of Montanari, who, marching upon Comacchio, compelled the Austrian commander of that fortress to capitulate. The Bolognese made a similar attempt to get possession of Ferrara; but the Austrians shut themselves up in the fortress, from whence they were prepared, if attacked, to destroy the town, and to hold out to the last extremity. Durando was unable to

undertake the siege for want of necessary artillery; and his energies were sufficiently required and taxed in giving to his troops the training and discipline which they so greatly needed. He was directed by his instructions to establish himself within the limits of the frontier, to stand on the defensive, and to await ulterior orders. Though not authorized to undertake operations beyond the Roman territory, he was desired to act in concert with Charles Albert, whose wish it was that the papal forces should be concentrated near the frontier, in the greatest possible numbers. In pursuance of these directions colonel D'Azeglio was sent to the King's head quarters, in order to afford information as to the state of the troops, and the instructions under which his general was acting.

Early in April, Monsignor Corboli-Bussi, who had previously been engaged in a similar negotiation, was despatched to the camp of Charles Albert in order to accelerate an Italian league, and with a request that deputies from Sardinia might be sent to Rome. That the Pope should have sent a valued friend and devoted supporter on this mission, evinces the sincerity of his desire to secure such advantages for Italy as might be consistent with the interests of the papal system. Had Charles Albert frankly acceded to this proposal, the national cause would have been advantaged, for he would not only have relieved himself from the sus-

picion of ambitious motives, but would have propitiated and secured Pio Nono by allowing him to enjoy whatever credit and influence might have accrued from such an arrangement.*

Durando soon found it necessary to inform the Roman government that it would be difficult for him to prevent the volunteers from passing the frontier; upon which the ministers expressed to the Pope their fears as to the effect of hesitation, and gave him to understand they would sooner resign than expose themselves to the charge of not favouring the war. His Holiness replied that "he had not yet come to a determination, and that he *awaited intelligence from the King of Sardinia on the subject of the league;* that the ministry ought not on that account to resign, but that they should be guided by circumstances." When one of the ministers remarked that the question was not merely as to the passage of the Po, but involved all co-operation in the war, which could not be considered as legitimately undertaken by the Roman forces without the express command and sanction of the sovereign; the Pope reassured him by saying, that it would be time to withdraw the troops when he determined not to take part in the war. Such expressions, though not so explicit as might have been desired, were repeated to Aldobrandini, the minister of war; who

* Farini, Stato Romano, vol. ii. c. iii. p. 54.

being thus encouraged, authorized Durando to cross the Po.

That general, when he received instructions to place himself in communication with Charles Albert, addressed to the troops an order of the day, which gave great annoyance to the Pope, of whose sentiments he assumed the interpretation. He enjoined them, as soldiers whose arms had been blessed by the head of the Church, to adopt the emblem of the cross, and denounced all opponents as *enemies of religion.* This attempt to give the war a religious character was justly objected to by Pio Nono, and could only be excused by the prevailing excitement.

About the beginning of April some corps of volunteers, full of confidence and enthusiasm, and impressed with the belief that the power of Austria was broken, crossed the Po; and, on the 21st of that month, the passage was effected by Durando, who encamped at Ostiglia and Governolo. Thus the banner of the keys was carried into a territory once papal, and which, though given to Austria by the treaty of Vienna, had only been relinquished by the pontifical government under protest. *Roma si rassegna, ma non cede:* and though scruples were entertained as to the embarking in the struggle for Italian independence, none were felt as to the occupation of a territory once papal.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Pope's fears of a German schism—His wishes with regard to a league are thwarted by Piedmont—The *Allocuzione*—Antonelli and his colleagues resign—Popular irritation and tumults—Pio Nono's projected journey to Milan—The ministry resumes office—The Roman forces are placed at the disposal of Charles Albert—The Antonelli cabinet resigns, and is succeeded by that of Mamiani—The Pope's letter to the Emperor of Austria—The Austrian minister leaves Rome —Approaching revolution.

GERMANY was at this period occupied with plans for the more complete development of its own nationality; but the views of the Teutonic patriots were eminently ambitious, and they were by no means prepared to relinquish what they regarded as the territorial rights of their race, or to forego the advantages to be derived from the rich provinces and commercial outlets of Austrian Italy.

When the Roman levies marched under the papal banner to fight for the integrity and independence of their country, Pio Nono began to be considered as an enemy to German interests. The existence of this feeling was turned to the best advantage by those whose policy it was to disturb the Pope's conscience by hints of a possible schism. He had been pro-

foundly troubled when Durando proclaimed to the troops a crusade for Italy, but he still entertained hopes that by the speedy conclusion of a league he might have got rid of the charge of embarking in a war of aggression; and that while, as a temporal prince, he furnished his contingent to a federal army, he might, as pontiff and head of the league, have followed such a course, and instituted such negotiations as might have satisfied or tranquilized the German Catholics.

In this hope he was foiled by the Piedmontese government, which not only rejected the overtures of Monsignor Corboli, and declined to send delegates to Rome, as Naples had already done, and Tuscany was willing to do, but proposed a congress in the north of Italy, which was to fix the conditions of a military alliance, alleging that, while the war continued, nothing else ought to be deliberated upon, or discussed. Pio Nono very naturally apprehended, that instead of his favourite scheme of a confederation under the patronage of the Holy See, it was intended to establish a military and offensive league under that of the sub-Alpine monarch.

The conduct of the Sardinian government was highly impolitic. It ought to have perceived that the position of the pontiff was one of great delicacy, and that the utmost deference was due to his wishes. Had delegates been sent to Rome, their presence

might have been of use in preventing intrigues and vacillations; and such a course would have tended to allay the jealousy with which Charles Albert began to be regarded at Naples and elsewhere.

The primacy in an Italian league being denied to the Pope, the ministers became alarmed, and dreaded the effect of such a disappointment on his views and feelings: they were also acquainted with the arts employed to turn his fears of schism to the advantage of Austria. They were supported by Count Rossi in the opinion, that unless the pontifical government by a zealous promotion of the war, assumed the guidance of the popular impulse, that impulse would soon become a weapon in the hands of the *sette*. The cabinet therefore determined, unanimously, and of this resolution there was no more energetic supporter than Cardinal Antonelli, to present to his Holiness a written statement of its conviction. This document which is given at length by Farini, bears date the 25th of April, and entreats the Pope, not indeed to declare war, but to consent to its being waged by his subjects.

Pio Nono began to suffer the tortures of indecision. He was neither for war, nor for peace. "*Si ondeggiò*," says Rossi, "*fra due. Spiaceva la guerra non fu ne dichiarata ne impedita. Il paese fè un po di guerra il Papa servò la pace.*" * No reply was given to the

* Letter published by Farini. Stato Romano, vol. ii. libro iii. c. xiii.

ministerial declaration, but in the Consistory held four days later, the fatal *allocuzione* was delivered.

In this document, the Pope's fears, with regard to a schism, are not concealed. The *memorandum* of the Allied powers, addressed to the Court of Rome in 1831, is alluded to, and his own acts and concessions are defended as consistent with its recommendations. He denies having given the pontifical forces any other commission than that of *defending the states of the Church.* He repudiates all intention of making war against Austria, and asks, whether, at a time when so many powerful sovereigns were unable to control the movements of their subjects, it was possible that he should restrain the ardour of his own, who were led on by the example of their countrymen in other states.

The *allocuzione* was regarded as a disavowal of the war. It destroyed all hope of an independence fostered and protected by the papacy; revived the opinion, entertained by Dante and Macchiavelli, that the temporal power of the Pope was an insurmountable impediment to the welfare of Italy; and was considered by those who were fighting under Durando, to abrogate their rights as lawful belligerents.

The ministry of the 10th of March was beset, from the very first, by great and almost insuperable difficulties. Many of its members were new to

office, and all had the disadvantage of serving a prince, who, though inclined to promote the independence of the Italian states, and the good of his own subjects, felt bound to postpone all other interests to the safety and welfare of the Roman Church.

The Antonelli cabinet consisted principally of lay members, and it was not likely that the ecclesiastical body, long accustomed to a monopoly of office, and proud of its experience in public affairs, should defer to the judgment of laymen, who did not possess this advantage.

The liberals, while they professed to venerate Pio Nono, made no secret of their hatred of the Sacred College, from, and by which he had been elected, and which, according to the terms of the *statuto*, formed his political senate. The violent animosity displayed on all occasions against a body so closely connected with the Pope himself, increased the difficulties of the ministry. Rome was well furnished with agitators no less than with the elements of agitation. The popular press was under the absolute direction of Sterbini, who though neither loved nor respected, wielded the passions of an excitable and unemployed multitude. The oracles of the Piazze having, during the ministry of Cardinal Ferretti, established their influence, and obtained a footing in the state, had learnt the art of making themselves indis-

pensable. They expected to be listened to, and caressed; and also to receive from the cabinet the earliest information on all matters of interest. As ministers in former times were obliged to secure the good offices of court minions, those of Pio Nono were dependent on the favourites of the *circoli*. Every hour added to the boldness of the leaders of the movement. Every step was in the downward direction of revolution. Such were the difficulties with which a constitutional ministry had to contend in the capital, in the provinces fewer impediments presented themselves; but there, even more than at Rome, government by a caste had long been odious, and now that the ancient system had been broken in upon, the preference still accorded to the clergy produced dissatisfaction and distrust. "*Il prete*," says Farini, "*come uom di governo, era così scaduto nell'amore e nella estimazione de' governati, che poco giovavano i miracoli di Pio Nono a tirarlo su.*" *

To a ministry already oppressed by these embarrassments, the unexpected and hostile tenor of the allocution, left no other course but that of immediate retirement. As soon as this event was announced, the populace, trained for agitation and headed by Ciceruacchio, was stimulated by the harangues of Sterbini. Prince Doria, the Duke of Rignano, and

* Farini, Stato Romano, vol. ii. p. 69.

the Senator, Prince Corsini, mingled in the throng in the hope of preventing mischief, and of calming down irritation. In this endeavour they were aided by Count Terenzio Mamiani, who had recently returned from exile, and whose great abilities ere long secured to him an important part in the affairs of his country.

The ex-ministers entreated Rignano, Doria, and Corsini to undertake, for the Pope, the formation of a new cabinet, but these personages declined the proposal, asserting that it was impossible for any ministry, which opposed the national sentiment, to tranquilize the city or govern the state; and exhorted them to resume their places—as the only administration which could then be formed, in which the people would have any confidence.

Mamiani, Sterbini, and others were now admitted by Cardinal Antonelli as delegates of the *circoli*, and spoke of the general irritation, and the necessity of persevering in the war. On this occasion certain threats, uttered by Sterbini, were strongly and instantly disavowed and reproved by Mamiani.

The Pope professed himself astonished at the way in which his allocution had been received, and declared that sooner than yield, he would leave Rome a prey to her own passions; but he at the same time denied that he had any intention of abandoning the national cause.

After some delay, Mamiani was sent for, but declined

office, and expressed his belief that the excitement would subside if the ministers resumed their posts; having first obtained from his Holiness some assurance in favour of the war. It was at last arranged that they should do so; and Farini, the faithful historian of these transactions, who occupied the office of under-secretary of state for the interior, was sent to the camp of Charles Albert, to succeed Monsignor Corboli, and to negotiate an agreement by which the Pope placed all the Roman forces, then engaged in warfare beyond the Po, at the King's disposal.

Farini was also directed to inquire into, and remedy as far as possible, the discontents and disorders which existed in the pontifical territories and cities, through which he had to pass. As a means of allaying the irritation produced by the *allocuzione*, a suggestion was made, and cheerfully acquiesced in by the Pope, that his Holiness should undertake a journey to Milan,* and there propose terms of peace, on the basis of Italian independence. Such a demonstration on the part of the pontiff might have produced a moral impression of considerable importance; but the *esaltati*, at that time in the zenith of their confidence, were averse to papal intervention, and the offer was rudely rejected by Signor Piazzoni, the representative of the Milanese provisional government at Rome.

* Farini, Stato Romano, l. iii. c. vi. p. 102.

The ministry, whose temporary return to office took place on the 1st of May, was without any sufficient force or authority to repress the license and insubordination which were constantly on the increase. Finding that the civic guard made common cause with the *circoli*, the cabinet again resigned, and Count Mamiani accepted the charge of forming a new one, with an understanding that the administration of the foreign *temporal* affairs of the papacy was to be transferred, from the cardinal secretary, to a lay minister. He obtained for his colleagues, persons of exalted rank and high character. Prince Doria was chief of the war department, the Duke of Rignano accepted the bureau of public works, agriculture and commerce, Mamiani himself that of the interior, and Count Marchetti, a man of letters and a moderate liberal of unblemished reputation, was foreign secretary. The individual thus placed by the Pope at the head of his government, had not only been proscribed as a political offender, but had published works which stood condemned in the Index; and had returned from banishment without conforming to the terms of the amnesty!

On the 4th of May, the Mamiani ministry entered upon its functions, and its first difficulty was to avert disturbances which threatened the public tranquillity. The *allocuzione* was deeply resented in the provinces.

Situated at the extremity of the papal dominions, the Bolognese had never been cordially attached to Rome, and looked back with regret on the connexion which once existed between them and their northern neighbours, when their territory formed part of the kingdom of Italy. The ascendancy of the clergy was universally reprobated. The enthusiasm in favour of Pio Nono had, for a while, mitigated this feeling, but it now broke out with redoubled violence. When Farini arrived at Bologna on his way to the King's head-quarters, he found that a project had been formed for setting up an independent government, till the fate of Italy should be decided.

The change of ministry produced a temporary lull, but the self-appointed committees of war, and the *circoli*, were constantly gaining strength, and Mamiani, who, as a private citizen, had favoured these illegal combinations, could not condemn them when minister. Thus legality, the only foundation of true liberty, was trampled upon. The provinces were more than ever afflicted and disgraced by political assassinations, which were of constant occurrence, and were perpetrated at noon-day, throughout the cities of the pontifical dominions.* Governors did not dare to arrest, nor could the judges or the citizens venture to condemn or accuse the assassins. Neither was the example set by

* Stato Romano, libro iii. c. xiii.

Galletti, the police minister, of a nature to revive confidence or inspire firmness; for the administration of that department exhibited a culpable connivance at popular outrage and crime.

The Pope desiring to remedy the ill-effects of his *allocuzione*, became anxious to assume the character of a pacificator. He despatched a legate to Inspruck, where the Court of Vienna was then residing, with a letter to the Emperor of Austria,* urging a cessation of hostilities, and proposing himself as the mediator of a peace, founded on the independence of Italy.

The Mamiani ministry intimated to the Austrian ambassador that his presence at Rome was a cause of scandal and disturbance; and sent him his passport at the very time when Pio Nono was attempting to conciliate the Court of Vienna. Strange as these proceedings may appear, they were not more inconsistent than those which had occurred with regard to the army, which, a fortnight after the repudiation of the war by the Pope's *allocuzione*, had been deliberately and advisedly placed at the disposal of Charles Albert.

Mamiani, though distinguished even in exile for the moderation of his opinions, and as a constant opponent of the doctrines and practices of Mazzini, was a fervent supporter of the war, and, as such, was trusted and

* For the text of this letter see Farini, vol. ii. c. vii.

beloved, not by the republicans—who only wished to make him a stepping-stone to their own power—but by the young and generous of the Roman population. He was reluctantly accepted and tolerated by the court, and his position is well described by Farini in these words—"*fu ministro, ma non consigliero.*"

It was said of Lord Chatham, that with one hand he wielded the aristocracy of England, while with the other he smote the house of Bourbon. The task of the Italian minister was not less arduous, for he was called upon to quell the fears and intrigues of the Court of Rome, and to place a curb upon a democracy habituated to license. Towards the end of May, it became evident that a revolution—looked forward to with joy by the republicans, and regarded by the bulk of the population as an unavoidable necessity—was attaining maturity. Priests and friars were not the least active agents of sedition. Father Gavazzi is mentioned by Farini as one of the first who carried his pulpit into the Piazze, and preached war against the rich, as well as against the *straniero*. The variance and entire distrust which existed between the Pope and his ministry was no longer concealed, and in proportion as the prospect became gloomy, the hopes of the *sette* rose.

Mamiani was more remarkable for philosophical and literary attainments, than for political tact or

knowledge of mankind. Adhering to the doctrines of the moderate party,—averse to the *sette*, and entirely opposed to the Unitarians, he judged all men as honest as himself, and placed undeserved reliance on the motives and intentions of the agitators. He failed in securing the confidence either of the Pope or of the democracy. He was an ardent promoter of the league, and on this subject alone his views coincided with those of his sovereign. An ancient intimacy gave him some influence with Bozzelli, who was then at the head of the Neapolitan ministry, and this circumstance, combined with the exertions of Gioberti, which will be mentioned in a subsequent chapter, might have led to some favourable result, had the Sardinian government persevered in the course recommended by the Abbé.

CHAPTER XV.

Commencement of the campaign of 1848—Radetzky retreats from Milan and concentrates his forces—Charles Albert secures the bridges of the Mincio—Makes fruitless attempts to gain Peschiera and Mantua—The relative strength of the combatants—The King is successful at Pastrengo—His attempt against Verona—Action of Santa Lucia—Intrigues of the republicans—Approach of Austrian reinforcements under Nugent—He is opposed by Durando—Defeat of the Roman forces commanded by Ferrari at Cornuda—The emissaries of the *circoli* in the camp.

After the struggle of the *five days*, Radetzky,* apprehending the approach of the Piedmontese army, withdrew his diminished garrison from the walls of Milan. He was engaged in collecting his forces on the Mincio, when Charles Albert commenced the war, for which he had long been making preparation.

On the 29th the King crossed the frontier at Pavia, and was met by the Milanese deputies, who assured him, that the Tedeschi were incapable of serious resistance, and were hastening in disorder to recross the Alps. They even talked of following them, and

* Born in Gallicia in 1765, Radetzky had attained his eighty-third year. Though so late invested with supreme command, his talents had long been known ; and he had been entrusted with important functions by the Allies during the campaign of 1813.

of reconquering the ancient Italian possessions in Illyria; but on arriving at Lodi, it was ascertained that the Austrian forces, concentrated and in good order, occupied the plain of Montechiari.

The veteran marshal had taken up that position in order to delay the advance of the Piedmontese, and gain time for the arrival of reinforcements. On the 8th of April, Charles Albert attacked and carried the bridges over the Mincio before they could be effectually destroyed, and thus opened the campaign under favourable auspices.

Instead of crossing the river, of which he had secured the passage, the King being ill informed as to the state of Peschiera, made an unsuccessful attempt to gain that fortress, without siege artillery. This fruitless enterprise was followed by one of a similar description against Mantua, and the state of preparation in which both these places were found, sufficiently proved that the accounts of the demoralization of the Austrians were purely imaginary.

About the end of April, the Piedmontese army, concentrated on the Mincio, amounted to 60,000 men; Charles Albert had also the disposal of a division which had arrived from Tuscany under the command of General Laugier,—of the Roman forces, under Durando, and of some four or five thousand Lombard volunteers. A Neapolitan army, of from fourteen to

fifteen thousand men, was advancing through the Papal States under the command of General Pepe, and Ferdinand, who at that time was hailed as a powerful ally in the cause of independence, had despatched a considerable naval force to the Adriatic, to act in concert with the Sardinian squadron.

To these resources may be added the co-operation—moral and physical—of Venice, and that of the volunteers who flocked to the Piedmontese standard.

Before the breaking out of the insurrection, the forces under the command of Radetzky amounted to about 70,000 men. The losses which he had sustained, including garrisons which had surrendered, and a certain amount of desertion, left him about 50,000, of whom some 8,000 or 10,000 were Italians. This army was certainly in a discouraging position; but it was commanded by officers admirably instructed, and fully acquainted with the ground. It occupied four places of strength,—Peschiera and Mantua on the Mincio, Verona and Legnano on the Adige. These fortresses convert the space included between the two rivers into one of the strongest imaginable positions. The only communication which remained open to the Austrians, was that by the valley of the Adige, which was effectually protected by Verona.

Charles Albert has been accused of neglecting to encourage a general insurrection, in order that he

might secure to himself the entire glory of being the liberator of Italy. It may be true that more energy might have been employed in fomenting insurrectionary movements; but it is also true, that the bulk of the population was indifferent, and that the blind security of the Lombards themselves, and their absurd belief that the struggle was already decided, were adverse to any important effort of this nature. The commencement of the campaign by the siege of Peschiera, when, by a bold advance across the Adige, Radetzky might have been placed in an isolated position before his reinforcements could arrive, has also been criticized by military writers. Had the latter operation been successful, the fortresses, it is argued, would not long have held out.

When it was determined to besiege Peschiera, it became necessary to dislodge the Austrians from a series of positions which covered that fortress, and this was effected on the 30th of April by the successful action of Pastrengo. A delay then ensued from the want of a battering train, and the King was induced, by vague reports of the probability of an insurrection at Verona, and of the disaffection of the garrison,—which was composed of Hungarians and Italians,—to turn his attention to that city. He hoped that his appearance would induce Radetzky to advance against him with the main body of his forces; and that in the

mean time the inhabitants, aided by a part of the garrison, might possess themselves of the fortress. With this expectation, several strong outposts in the neighbourhood of Santa Lucia were assailed by General Bava. After a severe struggle, the attack was successful, and a view was obtained of the city and its fortifications; but no indication was perceived of any insurrectionary movement, or of any intention on the part of Radetzky to risk an engagement; and consequently the positions, which had been conquered at a great sacrifice, were relinquished. These operations, though ill conceived, and indecisive, were effected in a manner highly creditable to the Piedmontese troops, whose courage and perseverance enabled them to triumph over many difficulties. The respect with which their conduct inspired their opponents, was not without its value on subsequent occasions; but such an advantage was dearly purchased by the discouragement which the younger soldiers experienced in witnessing so much fruitless bloodshed. The agents of the revolutionary party made the most of this opportunity, and Farini, himself a witness of the scene, relates that on the evening of the 6th of May, when he and other civilians visited the camp, for the purpose of succouring the wounded, the emissaries of the Milanese *circoli* were there for a different purpose, and were busily exerting themselves to undermine the confidence of

the soldiers in their commanders, and shake their loyalty to their sovereign.*

After this unfortunate enterprise, which had in fact been undertaken with a view to satisfy the impatience of the ultra-party, Charles Albert confined his attention to the siege of Peschiera, and remained unmolested by the enemy, who awaited the arrival of reinforcements.

General Nugent had been charged to collect in all haste a *corps d'armée* on the Isonzo, to penetrate into the Venetian territory, and to effect a junction with Radetzky. He had to force his way through a country intersected by rivers, and guarded by fortresses which had already fallen into the hands of the insurgents. Nugent overcame these difficulties, and the government of Venice, alarmed at his approach, made urgent application to Durando for succour. Charles Albert directed Durando to oppose the advance of the Austrians; but the Roman forces were quite inadequate to such an undertaking, especially as the cities of Feltre and Belluno, which had promised to hold out, had already surrendered. On the 8th of May, General Ferrari, with a portion of Durando's army, sustained an attack at Cornuda, where the Romans held their ground with obstinacy. The following day the combat was renewed, and Ferrari was obliged to

* Farini, ii. p. 127.

retreat. The fortitude of his young soldiers, who had conducted themselves bravely in the field, now gave way. The retreat, which soon became a rout, was stained by crimes and excesses; and the volunteers belonging to the ultra party, readily attributed their misfortunes to the fault of their leaders, whom they branded as royalists and traitors.

The political intrigues carried on by the Mazzinists or republicans—if republicans they may be called—were already undermining the Italian cause; and there can be little doubt that Radetzky was well aware of that fact, when he exhorted his government to persevere, and assured it of ultimate success.

The practices of this party began at a very early stage in the war. On the 6th of May, as has already been noted, its emissaries had penetrated into the camp of Charles Albert and were tampering with the fidelity and discipline of the soldiers; and two days later we find that the very existence of Durando's army was endangered by agents of a similar description, amongst whom were Fathers Gavazzi and Bassi, zealous preachers of sedition and active subverters of discipline and subordination.

CHAPTER XVI.

The progress of the war—Durando throws himself into Vicenza and repulses the Austrians—The Tuscans overpowered at Curtatone—Charles Albert defeats Radetzky at Goito—Durando is obliged to capitulate—Censures of the republican press—Discouragement of the Piedmontese—Withdrawal of the Neapolitan forces—Its fatal effect—French politicians averse to the formation of a powerful state in upper Italy—Proposed mediation of England—Defeat of the Piedmontese army at Custoza—It falls back upon Milan—Charles Albert is obliged to capitulate—His life is attempted by the Milanese populace—After the armistice Venice renounces the *fusione*—Termination of the campaign—The *guerra dei popoli* proclaimed by the Mazzinists.

AFTER the rout sustained by Ferrari at Cornuda, Durando, finding it impracticable to keep Nugent in check on the Piave, became anxious to secure Vicenza, and his advanced guard, arriving there on the 19th of May, was in time to repulse that of Radetzky, which approached on the 20th. Vicenza being the point from which the roads to the Tyrol diverge, was important to the Austrians, as it commanded their communications. It was attacked by them at night with superior forces, but was successfully defended by Durando. The citizens shared in the toils and dangers of the defence, and illuminated the streets to facilitate the movements of the troops. Though

Radetzky was repulsed with a loss of 2,000 men, it was evident that the Roman force, unless relieved, could not eventually maintain itself against superior numbers, or prevent the junction of Nugent's corps. The Piedmontese generals, being afraid of weakening their main army, would not consent to the chivalrous proposal of the Duke of Genoa, to conduct a detachment to Durando's succour.

While Radetzky was supposed to be occupied in planning relief to Peschiera, he was contemplating a blow by which he hoped to regain the possession of Lombardy. The reinforcements which he had already received, the discouragement of the Piedmontese army since the fruitless action at St. Lucia, and certain intrigues * which were going on at Milan, induced him to resume the offensive.

The army of Charles Albert occupied an extensive line between Mantua and Pastrengo, the greater part of his force being in the neighbourhood of Peschiera. The Tuscan division had formed an entrenched camp at Curtatone, near the extremity of this line, and was somewhat isolated, but it had hitherto repulsed and kept in check the garrison of Mantua.

On the 27th of May, while Charles Albert was engrossed with the siege of Peschiera, Radetzky marched out of Verona with thirty thousand men, and

* Le Masson : Campagna d'Italia, 1848, p. 79.

arrived the following evening in the neighbourhood of Mantua, the garrison of which consisted of from ten to twelve thousand. By this junction he had at his disposal an available force of about forty thousand men.

The Tuscan division, amounting to about seven thousand, and commanded by General Laugier, was attacked on the 29th, in its fortified position, by immensely superior forces, and, after having sustained, during three hours, a desperate combat, was completely broken. A battalion, composed of the students of the universities, accompanied to the field by their professors, was destroyed in this lamentable affair, and a monument is now seen in the *Campo Santo* at Pisa, recording the brave conduct of these young men, and of Professor Pilla, a learned geologist, who shared their fate.

Having overpowered the Tuscan force before it could be supported, Radetzky reascended the Mincio with a view to fall on the magazines, and rear of the Piedmontese army. By means of this division he hoped that an opportunity would be afforded for a convoy, already prepared, to be introduced into Peschiera.

On the news of the action of Curtatone, Charles Albert's disposable force was immediately assembled at Goito, and dispositions were made by General

Bava to repel the enemy. The following day Radetzky commenced his attack with a force of about twenty-four thousand men. His efforts were successfully resisted, and the excellent practice of the Piedmontese artillery told with fearful effect upon his ranks. On the right of the position, the Austrians at first obtained some advantage, but were eventually repulsed at all points, and compelled to retreat. The King and the Duke of Savoy were both slightly wounded; but the loss sustained by the Piedmontese was not more than one-third of that inflicted on their assailants, which amounted to about three thousand in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The attempt to throw a convoy into Peschiera having failed, the garrison was forced to capitulate, and this twofold success was hailed as decisive, by the soldiers of Charles Albert, who immediately saluted their monarch as King of Italy.

The force which had besieged Peschiera being now at liberty, and the army full of confidence and enthusiasm, the Piedmontese leaders have been blamed for not turning their victory to greater profit. Radetzky retired to a position between Goito and Mantua, which he fortified. The losses he had sustained, though considerable, were not sufficient to cripple him, or to prevent his resuming the offensive. The King collected a formidable force at Goito, with the intention

of attacking him in the position he had taken up, upon which he retired to Mantua and from thence to Legnano.

On the approach of a fresh reinforcement of fifteen thousand men under Welden, who was advancing from Bassano, Radetzky resolved to effect a junction with that general, and to fall upon Durando at Vicenza, with an overwhelming force. Having left sufficient troops at Legnano to mask his departure, he hastened to accomplish this project.

Durando, encouraged by the recent successes of the Piedmontese, and hoping that he should be relieved, or that some diversion would be made in his favour, stood his ground; but his means were quite inadequate to resist the force brought against him. After a gallant struggle he was forced to retire into the town, and obtained an honourable capitulation. His troops were allowed to retire with arms and baggage, on the single condition of not serving against Austria for three months. Thus the Roman army was lost to the cause, but not from any fault of its chief, who, under circumstances of no common difficulty, had displayed much tact and perseverance; nor from any want of courage in the troops of which it was composed, for these had often combated superior forces with intrepidity. It must be remembered that, with the exception of the Swiss regiments, Durando's army was composed of

imperfectly-trained soldiers and volunteers, and that it was opposed to troops thoroughly disciplined and well commanded. The constancy and subordination of the Roman levies, was from the very first tampered with by the agents of political intrigue. The emissaries of the *sette* seized upon moments of discouragement or privation, and used their arts in order to shake all confidence in the ability and integrity of the commanders.*

That Durando should, with these odds against him, have been able to accomplish what he did, and that Charles Albert should have resisted with success the legions of Austria under the command of Radetzky, seems to justify the boast of Tasso—

> "—— ch'alla virtù latina
> O nulla manca, o sol la disciplina."

After the capture of Vicenza, Radetzky returned by forced marches to Verona, where he arrived in time to prevent an attack with which it was threatened by Charles Albert, who vainly hoped, by this means, to effect a diversion.

Both parties now awaited the arrival of reinforcements; but the moral condition of the two armies was widely different. Though victorious in the field, the Piedmontese began to feel that their efforts were pro-

* Farini : Stato Romano, vol. ii. c. vii. p. 135; and Le Masson, Custoza, libro iv. p. 115.

ducing no effect. They were discouraged by the want of any general sympathy or valid support, and disheartened by the violent and unjust censures of the radical press at Milan. The revolutionary party there did not scruple to brand the high-minded prince and brave army by which the cause of Italy was sustained, with treason and cowardice. Charles Albert has been blamed * for not using strong measures in order to put down these ruinous intrigues, by which his own sacrifices and those of Piedmont were rendered nugatory. Hard is the task of the leader, whose fate it is to contend, at the same moment, with foreign armies and domestic seditions!

Ferdinand of Naples, after he had yielded to the desire of his people, and consented to a constitution, was hailed as a powerful auxiliary in the national struggle. He had paid unremitting attention to the land and sea forces of the kingdom, and had furnished, as has already been mentioned,† a corps of about fifteen thousand men, which had been sent, under General Pepe, to take part in the war against Austria. A portion of the fleet had, at the same time, sailed for the Adriatic, in order to support that of Sardinia in the waters of Venice.

Whatever opinion may be entertained of the subse-

* Le Masson: Custoza, v. 105—115.

† Chapter vi.

quent conduct of the King of Naples, the manner in which he was treated by the ultra-liberals, who had gained a majority in the chamber of deputies, was little calculated to secure his confidence. Though Sicily was in open rebellion, he had sent a considerable part of his forces to support the cause of independence. Finding that he was regarded by the deputies with unconcealed jealousy and distrust, he became, in his turn, distrustful. The army, which remained under his exclusive direction, was irritated and disgusted at the noisy hostility of the agitators,—agents of the *sette*, —and foreign intriguers. When parliament was about to assemble, the deputies held previous meetings, objected to take an oath of fidelity to the constitution, as then established, and disapproved of a chamber of peers. "*Si speculava*," says Farini, "*il bello ideale, tenendo a vile il bene possibile.*" The King, it seems, in the first instance, made a point that the oath should be taken in a church instead of in the chamber. The republican party thought the crisis favourable, and the storm, which had long been gathering, at length broke forth. Barricades were erected; and while the insurgents and the national guard on the one side, and the regular troops on the other, were standing in hostile attitude, the King's consent was obtained that the oath should be taken in the chamber. Nevertheless, a first shot having been fired by one of the national guard, a

sanguinary contest commenced, which terminated in the triumph of the royal forces.

This formidable insurrection,* as well as the disturbed state of Calabria, afforded a valid reason for the recall of Pepe's army. And Ferdinand's abandonment of the Italian cause at this critical moment effectually turned the scale in favour of Austria.

In addition to these disadvantages, the attitude assumed by the provisional government of France, which was then in the hands of Lamartine, Ledru Rollin, Crémieux and Louis Blanc, was discouraging. The views of that government are thus recorded by its most gifted and influential member in his work entitled *Le passé, le présent, et l'avenir de la république*:—"The republic observed a rigid neutrality, but foresaw and provided for coming events. It foresaw that the King of Sardinia would experience in Lombardy a great failure. France assembled on her own frontier an army of sixty thousand men. If the King should have succeeded in driving the Austrians from Upper Italy, and in adding Milan, Venice, Parma, Modena, and perhaps Tuscany to his own states, France could not have permitted that a second-rate power, existing at her threshold, should be changed into a first-rate power. The frontier of this new Italian kingdom

* See Le Masson's Campagna d'Italia, nel 1848, libro v. p. 118; and Farini's remarks—Sulle cose di Napoli, Stato Romano, libro iii. c. 8.

would touch as it were on the gates of Lyons. In the case of an alliance between this new power and Austria, the defensive condition of France would become entirely changed. The Alps are of twofold value in the hands of their possessor. France, in such a case, must have two pledges delivered into her hands, Nice and Savoy. If, on the other hand, Piedmont should have succumbed and Austria should have sought its depression, or desired to occupy its fortresses, which are indirectly ours, France must have descended into Piedmont in the character of an armed mediator. The Sardinian forces would have been reformed behind our lines. Italy, reassured, would have armed herself under the shadow of our protection. The Austrian army would have halted in front of that of France. Europe would have dreaded to hear the first cannon shot. England would have sent her envoys to the camp, and would have supported its diplomacy by ships at Genoa and in the Adriatic. The conferences would have been opened, and our influence in Italy would been have augmented. Semi-national political existence would have been secured to Lombardy and Venice, the reward of their sacrifices and blood, under the guarantee of France and England; and thus a groundwork would have been laid for Italian emancipation."

The jealousy entertained by republican France of a

powerful and independent Italian state is here openly avowed; nor is it likely that this jealousy will cease under any other form of government.

As long as the states of Italy remain divided, France may favour their independence, and may be a valuable ally against Austrian encroachment. She may consent to a confederation, as she was prepared to do in 1848, but it is improbable that she will ever view with complacency an union of any main portion of the peninsula in one republic, or under one sceptre.

On the 23rd of May, the cabinet of Vienna, having demanded the mediation of England, offered, through Baron Hummelauer, to recognize the independence of Lombardy, which was to be at liberty to form a separate government, or to join with any other Italian state, on condition of being responsible for a part of the national debt of the empire. The duchies of Parma and Modena were to be allowed to unite with Lombardy; and a separate administration was offered to Venice, which was to have a distinct army under the Emperor's command. On the 3rd of June, Lord Palmerston, according to Farini,* declared himself unwilling to accept the mediation, unless Austria should include the cession of a portion of the Venetian provinces, and instructed Lord Ponsonby to use

* Stato Romano, vol. ii. libro iii. c. 12.

his endeavours with the imperial court, then resident at Inspruck, to that effect. Public opinion at Vienna was opposed to these demands, and the government, reassured by Radetzky, not only rejected the English proposals, but became inclined to withdraw those which it had already offered. In June the weakness and discord of parties in Italy became better known, and the confidence of Austria increased.

The pontifical troops had already repassed the Po. The Tuscan corps was nearly annihilated. The diet of Frankfort favoured Austria, and Radetzky was daily receiving fresh reinforcements. Yet the Italians, though they had only the Piedmontese army in the field, could not bear that peace should be spoken of. Charles Albert was eventually urged to undertake some important enterprise; and for no better reason than a wish to comply with these absurd expectations, and to escape the reproaches of the republican press, he was induced to think of active operations, when he ought to have confined himself to the defence of strong positions.* From the moment that he consented, without any sound military reason, to resume the offensive, there remained for him only a choice of errors. In various encounters, and especially in that of Volta, the reputation of the Piedmontese arms was well sustained. But these partial successes were of

* See Le Masson's Custoza e la Campagna del 1848, p. 127.

no avail. Three days of continued fighting, in which the losses of the Austrians exceeded those of their opponents, and which terminated on the 25th of July in what is commonly called the battle of Custoza, decided the fate of the campaign.

After these engagements Charles Albert found himself in a most critical position. His troops were unprovided with food, and disheartened at finding that all their efforts had been made in vain. A retreat upon Goito was the only one possible, and this was allowed to be effected, though it might have been cut off by Radetzky, who had fresh troops at his disposal.

Despair now seized both officers and soldiers. The representatives of the provisional government of Milan fled, and the attack of the whole Austrian army was hourly expected. In this state of affairs the King yielded to the advice of his generals, and proposed an armistice; which would have been acceded to, had he consented to retire behind the Adda. Having refused these terms he fell back with his dispirited army in the direction of Cremona. He still hoped to protect a part of Lombardy, and to defend Milan. Radetzky pursued with caution, for the conduct of the Piedmontese troops at Volta and Custoza had inspired respect; and it was only under the walls of Milan that the truth became apparent. The King having been induced to proceed in that direction, by the urgent instances of

the Milanese, expected to find some preparations for defence, and necessary supplies for his army. These expectations were miserably disappointed. The troops which had been raised, amounting to about six or seven thousand men, were, for the most part, gone, under the command of Garibaldi, to protect Brescia. The national guard was incapable of affording any effectual aid, but a portion of the population was eager to resist.

The Piedmontese force, which took up its position under the walls of Milan on the 4th of August, amounted to about twenty-five thousand men. It was assailed by thirty-five thousand, and Radetzky had ten thousand more, within a few hours' march, at Pavia.

After repeated attacks the Austrians, favoured by the inequality of the ground, penetrated the line of the Piedmontese, and forced them to fall back into the city. There was now no resource but to treat for its surrender. The King offered to retire behind the Ticino, and it was agreed that he should be allowed two days to re-enter Piedmont. It was stipulated that the persons and property of the Milanese should be respected, and a free exit allowed to those who might think proper to depart within twenty-four hours.

On the morning of the 5th of August, when this capitulation, which, under the circumstances, was ex-

tremely favourable, became known, a popular ferment was excited; and the King was induced, by the urgent exhortations of the municipality, to declare that if the Milanese were ready to bury themselves under the walls of their city, he would share their fate; and he hastily tore the capitulation.

The municipality, perceiving afterwards the folly of its conduct, sent a deputation to Radetzky, and it was finally settled that the Austrians should enter the following day. A part of the populace fired shots at the windows of the King's palace, and attempted to set it on fire. In order to avoid a collision he departed at night, assailed by outrage, and by the bullets of assassins, from a city which he had made the greatest sacrifices to protect. The disgrace of this proceeding attached to a depraved minority; for the mass of the population appreciated the conduct of the unfortunate King and of his army.

When Radetzky made his entrance into Milan, the perfect military keeping and martial appearance of his troops contrasted singularly with the worn and dilapidated appearance of the Piedmontese soldiers; and the calm and inoffensive demeanour of the victors, evinced their discipline and good feeling. The article which allowed the departure of those who conceived themselves to be compromised, was strictly observed; but the greater portion of these had not awaited the entry

of the Austrians. Many had fled on the first rumours of a capitulation, and even before the combat by which it was preceded.*

Radetzky had nothing to gain by further hostilities. An invasion of Piedmont would only have produced difficulties for his government, and might have led to French intervention. On the 9th of August an armistice was concluded for forty-five days, the duration of which was subsequently extended. The evacuation of Peschiera and other Austrian fortresses held by the King, and the withdrawal of the Sardinian fleet from the waters of Venice, were the only conditions insisted upon.

The terms of this truce, though loudly protested against, were quite as favourable as could have been hoped for; but time was necessary in order to dissipate the illusions by which the public mind had been buoyed up. Piedmont having retired from the contest, Venice immediately rejected the *fusione* and proclaimed a republic. Two thousand Piedmontese soldiers, who had been sent by Charles Albert to assist in its defence, then returned to their own country; having been

* "Primi a fuggire furono Mazzini e tutti quei demagoghi che tanto avevano contribuito alla catastrofe. Perche fuggivano essi? di che avevano a temere? Forse che non furono essi i migliori ausiliari dell'Austria, la causa principale delle vittorie di Radetzky? Fortunato il generale che deve combattere una nazione presso la quale trovansi insensati simili, o simili perversi!" Custoza, e la Campagna del 1848, libro vii. p. 170.

solicited in vain by General Pepe to violate their oaths and renounce their allegiance.

Welden was now directed to cross the Po, and proceeded as far as Bologna, where he met with a determined resistance. The efforts of the Bolognese being backed by protests from Rome, he consented to withdraw his forces. The duchies of Parma and Modena were occupied without opposition, but the Austrians did not enter the Tuscan territory.

Such was the unlooked-for termination of the first campaign of the war of independence, the chances of which were wrongly estimated by Europe, being generally supposed to be greatly adverse to Austria, whose power was paralyzed for a season, but not destroyed. It soon became obvious that Charles Albert, regarded with jealousy by the governments of the Peninsula, and undermined by the revolutionists, was too weak to withstand the reinforced armies of a mighty adversary. His heart-stirring watchword, *Italia farà da sè*, had lost its efficacy, for the hope of an unanimous effort, in which it had been exultingly uttered, was extinguished. The patriots of Italy beheld revolutionary fanaticism, with its wild passions and inapplicable theories, rise before them; and that fanaticism, even more than Austrian arms, insured the ruin of the national cause. The spirit of faction prevailed over the spirit of devotion to the common father-

land, and a golden opportunity was lost. A nation, supposed to be united, was found to be at strife within itself. It was distracted on the one hand, by the separate interests and desires of the Court of Rome, and on the other, by the vain and reckless ambition of the revolutionary leaders.

The Pope's predominant and not unnatural anxiety was to restore and augment, in troublous times, the power and influence of the papacy; while the leading object of the revolutionists was to pull down, by any means and at any cost, existing institutions, and to establish a system of their own. To both these parties, the restoration of their country to dignity and independence would have been gratifying, if it could have been attained in a manner consistent with the advancement of their own peculiar and primary objects, but not otherwise.

With the armistice of Milan the *national* movement may be said to have terminated. The obstinate but ill-combined struggles which succeeded, though possessing a melancholy interest, and distinguished by many acts of heroism, were but the prolonged and convulsive termination of a contest, the result of which was already foreseen. The democrats and Mazzinists, who had secretly laboured to undermine Charles Albert, rejoiced in the failure of an enterprise, of which they were not the leaders. They openly

accused their political opponents of treason to the cause of independence, and declared that the war of the rulers being over, that of the people should begin. That which the army of Piedmont, supported by the Roman and Tuscan forces had failed to accomplish, was now to be achieved by the *guerra dei popoli.*

CHAPTER XVII.

The progress of events at Rome—Differences between the Pope and the Mamiani ministry—Jealousy of Piedmontese aggrandizement—Gioberti's visit to Rome—Liechtenstein at Ferrara—Popular commotions—Conduct of Galletti as police minister—Count Rossi invited to form an administration—Is denounced by Sterbini—Formation of the Fabbri administration—The Bolognese resist the Austrians, who retire—Subsequent disorders at Bologna—The mediation of England and France accepted by Piedmont—Austria is not inclined to treat—Rossi minister—His views and plans for a confederacy—Rosmini's mission—He is obliged to resign his embassy, and is created a cardinal—The injurious effects of the Piedmontese refusal—Sterbini and Canino in Tuscany—Garibaldi at Bologna—Zucchi is sent there to repress disorders—The conspiracy against Rossi—His own suspicions and demeanour—Opening of Parliament—The *reduci*—Rossi's death—The conduct of the deputies and their president—That of the officer in command of the carabineers—Infamous rejoicings.

THE flattering commencement, successful progress, and disastrous termination of the campaign of 1848 having been briefly described, it now becomes necessary to revert to what was passing at Rome, where the Mamiani ministry, unsupported by the confidence of the sovereign, and resting only on the fickle approbation of the populace, dragged on a precarious existence. When the fifth of June, the day appointed for the inauguration of the parliament, drew near, the opening

speech prepared by the ministers was objected to by the Pope, in whose name it was to be delivered. The particulars of this dispute are detailed by Farini, who was himself employed to attempt a reconcilement. While such differences were undermining the remnant of authority still possessed by the government, a new source of uneasiness arose. The successes of Charles Albert, and the fusion of Lombardy with Piedmont, were looked upon with alarm by the Pope, the King of Naples, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany,—who felt the jealousy of rival sovereigns,—and also by the revolutionary leaders, who judged that a powerful monarchy in the north of Italy, however favourable to the independence of the country, would be fatal to their own prospects and designs. The latter foresaw, that should peace be obtained on such terms as might preclude the fear of foreign intervention, their vocation would come to an end, and their hopes of distinction would be cut short by the establishment of settled constitutional governments. The visit of Gioberti, who came to Rome about this time, and was accused of promoting the ambitious designs imputed to the sub-alpine monarch, increased this feeling, though, in fact, the abbé, during his tour through the cities of Italy, only repeated, *vivâ voce*, the same exhortations to concord between princes and people, which had already been put forward in his eloquent pages.

During the first month of Mamiani's administration, while the prospects of the war were encouraging, his task was sufficiently arduous; but when Austrian perseverance began to prevail over Italian impulse, and the Roman forces were obliged to capitulate at Vicenza, the difficulties of his position became insurmountable. On the invasion of the papal territory by Prince Liechtenstein, neither the protests of the Pope nor the authority of the Chambers were of any avail in allaying popular irritation. On the 19th of July, while the Prince of Canino was engaged in delivering one of his effusions, a tumult was heard in the Piazza adjoining the palace, where the deputies were assembled, and in a moment the hall was filled with men who demanded arms. When the confusion abated, Sterbini declared that grave events were at hand, and that the people must be satisfied. The Duke of Rignano then informed the chamber, that a portion of the civic guard insisted upon being put into possession of the gates, and of Castel Sant' Angelo. Galletti, the minister of the police, was sent for, and said that it was true that the civic guard had made such a demand, but that no danger could accrue from its admission, as that force was the palladium of liberty; and—that as to the alleged tumult—the people were only exercising their right of petition.

On the proclamation of a republic in France, the

functions of Count Rossi ceased; but he continued to reside at Rome as a private citizen, and was looked up to and occasionally consulted by the constitutionalists. When Mamiani could no longer hold his ground, the ex-ambassador, whose talents for public life had been proved by his own singular career, began to be regarded as the one individual by whom the miseries of a revolution might still be averted. Born at Carrara in 1787, Rossi was educated for the law, and had already obtained high distinction at the Bolognese bar, when, in 1815, having joined the standard of Murat, he was obliged to expatriate. Having received naturalization in Switzerland, he filled the chair of law-professor, at Geneva. In 1832 the celebrity of his writings led to his nomination to the important office of chief commissioner for a revisal of the Federal constitution. The ability and penetration which he evinced in the execution of this task, still further enhanced his reputation, but his plans were too practical and judicious to suit the ideas of the extreme democrats. After this he proceeded as minister of the cantons to Paris, where M. de Broglie and M. Guizot urged him to make France his adopted country. These overtures were ultimately accepted, and the exiled advocate of Bologna became a member of the Institute, Counsellor of the University of Paris, and President of the *école de droit;* in 1845, he was created

a peer by Louis Philippe, and sent as ambassador to Rome.

Such having been the antecedents of Rossi, it is not wonderful that his name should have been hateful to the republicans, and to the lovers of anarchy and license. When proposals, which he did not accept, were first made to him by the Pope, Sterbini sounded the alarm, and denounced him in the Chamber of Deputies as the minister of Louis Philippe and the friend of Guizot, and declared that should such a man dare to present himself as the Pope's adviser, he would be stoned!

After Rossi had declined the formation of a ministry, not from any reluctance to encounter danger, but because he perceived some vacillation in the mind of the Pope, a proclamation appeared, dated the third of August, announcing the resignation of the Mamiani ministry, and the appointment of Count Fabbri to form a new one. Of this cabinet, Cardinal Soglia was president, and it was composed of men whose characters entitled them to respect. Count Fabbri, as governor of Pesaro, had acquired esteem, but he was already advanced in years, and of infirm health. The deputies were aware of his inability to grapple with the difficulties of the time, but they respected his age and unsullied reputation, and were indulgent to a government, the members of which had not

sought office. Out of doors, a different feeling prevailed.

An Austrian force, under Welden, at this time threatened Bologna, and met with a vigorous resistance from the inhabitants. It was natural that such conduct should inspire sympathy at Rome. The Fabbri administration protested against the invasion, and encouraged resistance to the uttermost; but its exertions were not appreciated by the revolutionists, because the ministers were known to be attached and loyal subjects of the Pope; and, as such, they incurred the disfavour of the *circoli*.

Bologna was full of disbanded soldiers, fugitives, and deserters, who had flocked thither after the reverses in the north; and when an attack was threatened by Welden, these were formed into a free corps, the ranks of which were swelled by all who offered to enrol themselves. When, on the remonstrances of the pontifical government, Welden retired, and all danger had ceased, an immense number of persons still insisted on being paid as soldiers, and supported at the public expense. No funds could be obtained to meet such a charge, and the city was soon at the mercy of an armed multitude. The prisons were opened, houses pillaged, and many respectable citizens brutally hunted down, and put to death in the public streets.

After the defeat of Custoza, the Piedmontese govern-

ment applied to General Cavaignac for assistance; and the English cabinet, averse to the armed intervention of France, proposed to join the French executive in an attempt to mediate. The terms offered by Austria,* in the month of May, were to be the basis of the mediation, which was definitively accepted at Turin; but the cabinet of Vienna, no longer anxious for peace, interposed delays, and towards the end of August its unwillingness to negotiate became apparent. Count Colloredo was at length despatched to Brussels, where the conferences were to be held, but claimed to adhere to the terms of the treaty of Vienna. The Tuscan government, then presided over by Capponi, sent as its representative, Cosimo Ridolfi, whose instructions, bearing date the 22nd September, 1848, are preserved by Farini, and can hardly be read without admiration of the disinterested and truly Italian spirit which animated the constitutional leaders in Tuscany, and of the firmness and judgment which they displayed in promoting the liberties and independence of their country. The instructions given by Gioberti to the representative of Piedmont were of a similar tendency, and, though the negotiations were fruitless, such documents afford sufficient disproof of the calumnies, circulated by the revolutionary party, against those whose

* See page 241.

conduct and integrity presented an obstacle to their projects.

The Fabbri ministry, attacked on the one hand by the revolutionists, and on the other by the retrogradists, was daily losing ground: and on its resignation, which took place about the middle of September, the Pope sought once more to avail himself of the abilities of the ex-French Minister. Aware of the difficulties by which he would be surrounded, and having counted the cost, Rossi resolved to confront the perils which threatened his country, and to forget his own. On assuming the reins of power, he encountered the undisguised hatred of the republicans, and the secret hostility of the *Sanfedisti*. Both regarded with dismay the ascendancy of one whose courage, abilities, and reputation were calculated to overawe their proceedings, and baffle their designs.

To defend constitutional liberty against democratic violence—to restore confidence and revive industry—to carry into effect financial and administrative reforms —to place the military establishment on an improved footing—and, above all, to lay the foundation of independence by means of a confederacy, were the primary objects of Rossi's aspirations. As an Italian, he beheld in the Pontificate the sole remaining greatness of his country. He desired to preserve that greatness;

and this sentiment, combined with the firmness and vigour of his intellect, seemed likely to secure to him the requisite ascendancy over the generous but vacillating spirit of Pio Nono.

The repeated applications made by the Court of Rome to that of Turin in favour of the league, have been already noticed. In April, the proposals of the Pope's legate, Monsignor Corboli, had been declined by Count Balbo, who was averse to a confederacy in which the foremost place should not be awarded to his own sovereign. His ministry was, ere long, superseded by that of which Casati was president; and which, being composed, in part, of men who were not natives of Piedmont, was animated by Italian, rather than Piedmontese sentiment. Gioberti, then recently returned from his visit to Lower Italy, was offered a seat in this cabinet, which he at first declined. When, subsequently, induced to support and join Casati, he no sooner accepted office than he proposed to his colleagues to send the Abbé Rosmini to Rome, with full powers to accept the proposal of a federative league under the presidency of the Pontiff. The high character of Rosmini, and his reputation as a learned and enlightened churchman, eminently fitted him for such a mission. The moment was propitious. Tuscany had all along been favourable to the league, and there was reason to hope that Naples might be induced to

appoint representatives.* It unfortunately happened, that when Rosmini had succeeded in arranging the preliminaries with the Tuscan and Sardinian Ministers at Rome, the Casati ministry was replaced by one which did not share its sentiments. Rosmini immediately resigned his mission, but remained at Rome, was distinguished by the favour of the Pope, and created a cardinal.

In all the transactions connected with the proposition of a league, Pio Nono's consistent support is remarkable. On the Piedmontese government must be charged the repeated discouragement of a measure which might have obviated the besetting jealousies of rival states, put an end to the fears of sub-alpine ambition, relieved the scruples of the Pope, and greatly contributed to the successful prosecution of the war. The authority of an Italian congress, and the interest attached to its proceedings, would have overawed the *sette* and the demagogues, and given a new current to public feeling.

Rossi was immediately engaged in turning to the best account the resources of Central Italy. His name and judicious vigour had already restored financial credit. The disaffected provinces were becoming reconciled to Rome, and Bologna testified her faith in the Pope's Minister, by electing him as her

* Massari, Casi de Napoli.

representative. Zucchi, a general officer, of character and experience, was employed to re-organize the army. All these exertions were neutralized, and the aid, which the cause of independence might have derived from them was sacrificed by the final rejection of the proposed league. This failure in the accomplishment of an object, desired alike by the Pope and the people, impaired, at a most critical moment, the moral influence of the new government, while the power of the revolutionists was proportionably augmented.

In a state where corruption and neglect had long prevailed, reforms which, on their first announcement, were greeted with satisfaction, became unpalatable when reduced to practice; and a host of idle and inefficient officers, civil and military, were annoyed and offended by changes which interfered with their own ease or interests. Many of these did not hesitate to assist in undermining a minister, bold enough to grapple with abuses which others had winked at.

At this time Tuscany was completely revolutionized. The *Costituente Italiana* was already proclaimed in Florence and Leghorn; and these cities became centres of democratic propaganda. Sterbini and Canino, who had been to Turin under the pretence of atttending the *Academia*, had conferences, on their return, with the Tuscan agitators, and assisted them in rousing the passions of the *circoli* and the

piazze. These worthies, on arriving at Rome, were clamorous in favour of the *costituente*, and redoubled their attacks on Rossi. Garibaldi having traversed Upper Italy with a troop of partisans, composed of various nations, was approaching Bologna; and, to prevent renewed disorders, General Zucchi was sent there, and entered into an arrangement with the hero of Monte Video; by which he and his followers agreed to proceed to Ravenna, from whence they might embark for Venice. Bologna was still infested by bands of robbers and assassins, but Zucchi disarmed all persons who were not enrolled in the civic guard, arrested malefactors, and sent *padre* Gavazzi, the indefatigable preacher of sedition, to Rome.

These measures, however needful, excited the fierce indignation of the *capipopolo;* and the government received information from Tuscany, that on the day of the opening of parliament an attempt would be made,—"*si tenterebbe novità.*" The determination to effect the destruction of Rossi's government was not dissembled. Every act of precaution on the part of the ministry was denounced as a *coup d'état*, or an attack upon liberty. Rossi boldly avowed his determination to maintain order, and to employ all the means at his disposal in resisting the threatened violence. This haughty and fearless bearing exasperated the hatred of those who preferred their own

importance and private ends, to the peace and welfare of their country. Such men saw that there was little chance of advancement until they could rid themselves of a minister, who stood between them and the objects of their ambition.

On the eve of the 15th of November, the day appointed for the opening of the Chambers, the deputies, as they arrived at Rome, were subjected to flatteries and intimidations. The agitators had so long possessed the ascendancy, that the bulk of the community had become habituated to submit to whatever was done by them, in the name of the people. Few were those who ventured to disapprove or question the morality or honesty of this new despotism.

Rossi was aware of the coming storm. He anticipated a demonstration in favour of the *costituente*, petitions to the Pope, and violence to himself. He suspected the *Sanfedisti* of secretly fomenting the revolution, in order to prepare the way for their own ultimate triumph. The government newspapers denounced this twofold conspiracy, and threatened both factions with defeat and exposure. On the other hand, the *Contemporaneo* stigmatized Rossi as the tool of the absolute party, and the fellow-worker with Metternich and Guizot.*

* "Rossi e incaricato di fare in Roma sperimento della politica dei Metternich e dei Guizot. . . . Egli cadrà accompagnato dalle risa e dal disprezzo del popolo." Contemporaneo, November 15, 1848.

On the morning of the 15th of November, the general aspect of Rome was tranquil. Small knots of persons might be seen engaged in discussions, and a few excited countenances were observable; but there was no symptom of popular anger or commotion. The carabineers were in their quarters, with orders to be in readiness, and nothing more was known than the general rumour of a conspiracy to compel the Pope to submit to the "*costituente*," already proclaimed at Florence. The troops were few in number, and of that few, a portion had been tampered with, and gained over by the conspirators.

The regiments which had returned to Rome after the capitulation of Vicenza, had been re-organized and despatched to garrison Forli, and resist the Austrian invasion; but a considerable number of men of inferior repute, for conduct and discipline, had been drafted out of them, and some hundred and forty of these *reduci* formed themselves into a corps, and elected one Grandoni, a man of bad character, as their commander.

Rossi had, at various times, received and disregarded anonymous letters, warning him of his danger. On the morning of the 15th, one of these, says Farini, brought "*aviso, anzi che minaccia, di morte.*" Such intimations were little regarded by one who had long been aware that his life might at *any time* be cut short

by assassination, and who was prepared to encounter far greater dangers in the fulfilment of his task. His only anxiety was, to bring forward those measures which, with the full consent of the sovereign, his fertile genius and Italian heart had devised and matured for the preservation of his country. By the announcement of them, he hoped to silence calumny, to quell the hatred of his opponents, and to secure the support of the two chambers.

As the hour of the opening of Parliament approached, a crowd began to assemble in the *piazza della cancelleria*, where the civic guard was drawn up. Neither in the court, nor in the palace of the deputies, was any military precaution taken; but many individuals of the *reduci*, in old volunteer uniforms, and armed with short swords, were observed in the space between the door and the staircase. Rossi arrived, accompanied by Righetti, the finance minister. As their carriage drove under the porch, a howl was raised, which resounded through the hall where the deputies were slowly assembling; ferocious gestures were seen, and bitter imprecations uttered. When the two ministers had alighted, and were advancing towards the staircase, Righetti was kept back by the conspirators; and Rossi, surrounded by uplifted daggers, received a mortal wound in the neck, and fell speechless. Some of the *reduci*, who were on the stairs, then came down,

formed a circle round the victim, and when they saw that he was expiring, rejoined their companions. In the chamber, the first intimation of some catastrophe was given by a cry for help, which was heard at the back of the public gallery. A report soon arrived that the minister was wounded, but some time elapsed before the truth was ascertained. When the fatal tidings were received, the deputies and their president, Sturbinetti, took their departure. Such was the surprise and confusion of the moment, or such, perhaps, the abject prostration of spirit, that no expression of horror was recorded, nor did any voice appeal to heaven against the foul, premeditated murder of their most distinguished member; but one unworthy representative was heard to exclaim, "A che tanto affanno? è forse il rè de Roma?"* As the deputies departed to their homes, the faces of the many were contracted with fear and astonishment, but some were hideous with infernal joy.

The first rumour which reached the Quirinal was that of a tumult—then came another, that Rossi was wounded—and lastly, the too certain intelligence of his death. The Pope, bowed down with grief, desired Montanari, the minister of commerce, to assume the temporary direction of the government. The other ministers assembled at his house, and sent for Cal-

* Farini, Stato Romano, vol. ii. c. xviii.

derari, the officer in command of the carabineers, who stated that no knowledge could be obtained of the name or quality of the murderer or of his accomplices; that the agents of the police, who were present, could not see for the crowd; that he had given charge to make strict enquiry; that the city was tranquil, the police on the alert, and his people ready. When told that it was his duty to arrest certain parties on whom public suspicion had fallen, and whose previous words of menace and subsequent boastings were notorious, he appeared undecided, demanded written orders, and departed with promises to make investigation, and return in the evening. The days were short; and before that evening arrived, the democratic leaders perambulated the city, secured the favour or neutrality of the civic guard, and then proceeded to the head-quarters of the carabineers. Calderari came out and addressed them, attempting to cloak his own cowardice by abject professions of liberalism. Turning to his men, he advised them to fraternize with a mob of about a hundred miscreants, whom he called the people. The greater part of the soldiers were indignant at the conduct of their commander, but some were led astray by his example, and by the seductions of the agitators. The tricolor was hoisted, and a procession, graced by a mixture of the Pontifical uniform, passed along the Corso. Gathering recruits

from the wine-shops, it proceeded, by torch-light, to the house of mourning, where the members of Rossi's family were assembled, and insulted their anguish by songs, imprecations, and infamous *tripudii*. No attempt was made by any functionary or public body, civil or military, to interfere with these orgies; and the Bacchanalia of assassination were only interrupted by the advancing night.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Attack on the palace—Monsignor Palma is killed—The Pope, under duress, names a democratic ministry—His escape to Gaeta—He disavows the ministry and appoints a commission of Regency—Deputations are sent to solicit his return—Rejection of these overtures—The King of Naples at Gaeta—General Cavaignac's announcement of a French intervention—Provisional junta—Projected constituent assemblies—Retirement of Mamiani—Sterbini directs the government—Convocation of the *costituente Romana.*

THE morning of the 16th dawned heavily on the Quirinal. Of the friends and courtiers of Pio Nono, some were resigned, while others yielded to grief and despair; but no one was found capable of any timely counsel, or vigorous effort. The president of the two chambers and the *senatore* were sent for, and before they arrived, intelligence came that a movement was in progress, for the purpose of demanding a ministry favourable to the convocation of a constituent assembly. While various measures were discussed, the hours glided by, and nothing was decided, either as to the appointment of new ministers, or preparations for the defence of the palace. "*Il tempo volò, cosi come vola quando il pericolo incalza, e il fato tira.*" *

* Farini, Stato Romano, lib. iii. c. xviii.

The capipopolo were already assembling their forces, when the two presidents arrived. Time and dignity were then thrown away in seeking for some ignoble compromise. The name of Galletti, whose conduct, in the direction of the police, has been described, was put forward as likely to be acceptable to the revolutionists. He was sent for, and had an interview with the Pope, which led to no result. The arrayed multitude, interspersed with national guards and soldiers, proceeded from the Piazza del Popolo to the Palazzo della Cancelleria, where its leaders hoped to find some deputies who might join them in enforcing the Pope's consent to their demands. When the concourse, swelled by numbers who had joined it on the way, arrived at the Quirinal, the gates of the palace were closed. The only troops on duty were the Swiss and a handful of carabineers, amounting together to less than 100 men. Galletti, who on his return had fallen in with the procession, Sterbini, Mariani, and some other leading agitators, were admitted, and the guards drew up in front of the chief entrance. When Galletti brought word that the Pope refused to yield, the populace became furious. Some rushed upon the soldiers, and were driven back; a cry of vengeance was raised, and the Swiss, being forced to give ground, discharged their muskets, and succeeded in closing the gates. The *reduci*, civic guard, and the soldiers who had

taken part in the procession, ran for their arms, surrounded the palace, and getting on the neighbouring walls and buildings, began to fire at the windows. The Swiss returned the fire, and a cry spread through the city, that they were butchering the people and the national guard. Upon this, Calderari marched up with a strong party of carabineers. It was doubtful at first whether he came to support or to suppress the insurrection; but presently, having received a slight hurt, he declared that he came as the friend of the people. The firing continued, and the balls fell in the Pope's antechamber, where his private secretary, Monsignor Palma, an ecclesiastic of exemplary character, was killed. Nothing could exceed the firmness of the Swiss Guard; but no succour arrived, and a piece of artillery having been brought by the insurgents to blow down the gates of the palace, the Pope, who was surrounded by the diplomatic body, protested against the constraint under which he was placed. He then yielded to the terms of Galletti, who announced to the people the names of a new administration, at the head of which he had, without any authority, placed that of Cardinal Rosmini. The chambers, he said, would at once proceed to discuss the *costituente*. The struggle being over, the insurgents departed with acclamations in favour of the democratic ministry. The list was as follows:—

Cardinal Rosmini . . .	President.
Mamiani	Foreign affairs.
Galletti	Interior.
Sereni	*Grazia e justizia.*
Sterbini	Commerce and Public Works.
Lunati	Finance.
Campello	War.

Rosmini indignantly refused the post assigned to him, and Monsignor Muzzarelli, President of the *alto consiglio*, was nominated by his Holiness as head of the ministry, of which Sterbini, having the support of the *circoli*,* assumed the chief direction and control. The Pope was obliged to submit to the disarming of the Swiss Guards. After their removal, the Quirinal was rigorously watched, and the visits of the absolutists were regarded with less jealousy than those of persons belonging to the constitutional party; who received significant intimations, that they would consult their

* The *circoli* had their origin in the Circolo Romano, which was instituted with the knowledge and approbation of the government. There, as is the case in most of the Italian cities, the members, consisting of respectable citizens of all ranks, resorted to read the newspapers and converse. In times of excitement this club acquired something of a political character, but its tendencies were never revolutionary; and some of the members who did not possess the influence they coveted, sought a more favourable audience, and established *circoli* in taverns and wine-shops, until a regular place of meeting could be obtained. This was accomplished in November, 1847, when Monsignor Savelli authorized a new society, entitled the *Circolo Popolare*, of which he hoped to limit and restrain the proceedings, but which soon became the head quarters of the *Sollevatori*. Before the close of 1848, *circoli* had become organized throughout the Roman States, and had entered into communication with those of Tuscany. All these societies were directed and controlled by a central committee resident at Rome.

own safety by abstaining from all intercourse with the court.

While the revolution was thus triumphant, and the Pope was at the mercy of those upon whom it had conferred power, the assassination of Rossi was celebrated by illuminations and *tripudii* in the cities of the Roman states, and in other parts of Italy, especially at Leghorn. These humiliating scenes were not the work of the people, but of a lost and degraded few, led on by agitators who, in an evil hour, enjoyed a temporary ascendancy.

The chambers retained but little power, nearly all the members of the *alto consiglio* seceded, and many of the deputies resigned their seats. The Pope, having resolved to attempt an escape from the thraldom to which he was reduced, confided his intention to a few intimate friends and to the representatives of France and Spain. On the 25th, at nightfall, he left Rome in disguise; and having reached a carriage which had been provided by Count Spaur, the Bavarian minister, and was waiting beyond the walls, he proceeded by Terracina to Gaeta.

Mamiani, who was absent from Rome, did not return till the evening of the 23rd. On the day which preceded the Pope's departure, he had an interview with his Holiness, and enquired whether, if he accepted office, he would be considered to have committed an act of

treason. Pio replied that he would not; but intimated that nothing was agreed upon between himself and his new ministry. Upon this Mamiani held aloof; he was, however, subsequently induced, by the impending public danger, to accept the charge of foreign affairs.

The Pope left a note with his *maggior duomo*, the Marchese Sacchetti, desiring him to invite the ministers to protect the palaces and their inmates, who, he declared, were ignorant of his intention of leaving Rome. His flight was no sooner known, than it was felt by all classes as a heavy misfortune. On arriving at Gaeta, he published a Brief, denouncing as sacrilegious the violence to which he had been subjected, and disavowing all subsequent acts, as executed under duress. He also appointed a commission to govern in his absence. The commissioners were Cardinal Castracane, Monsignor Roberti, the Prince of Ruviano, Prince Barberini, Bevilacqua, Ricci, and General Zucchi. Though this commission was composed of men whose opinions did not entirely coincide, a majority of them were anxious to preserve the *statuto*. Zucchi was disliked and feared by the revolutionists as the friend of Rossi, and the chastiser of insurrectionary excesses at Bologna. Roberti, Ricci, and Bevilacqua, belonged to the constitutional party.

After the Pope's Brief had been received, the ministers could no longer lay claim to any legal

authority, and, at the suggestion of Mamiani, they resigned their offices. Thus Rome was left in a state of anarchy; for the Pope's commissioners had no means of enforcing their authority, and never made any attempt to do so. Bevilacqua and General Zucchi, who were at Bologna, decided, at once, that they would repair to Gaeta, and endeavour, as supporters of liberty and of the national cause, to effect a reconciliation. Their example was followed by Ricci and Barberini. Zucchi could not traverse Tuscany, as his arrest had been ordered by the revolutionary government of that state, and being obliged to go round by Spezzia, he did not reach Gaeta till the first of January. Bevilacqua and Ricci arrived about the middle of December, and were favourably received by the Pope, and also by Cardinal Antonelli, who appears to have been at that time inclined to the maintenance of the *statuto*, and to have adhered to the political views of the moderate party.

The deputies, having disavowed the Brief as an unconstitutional document, decided that the ministers should continue to exercise their functions—that a commission should be sent to negotiate for the Pope's return—and that the *alto consiglio* should be invited to concur, by appointing a deputation for the same purpose.

The municipality entrusted the *senatore* with a

similar mission; and the three deputations, being in accord with the ministry, proceeded at once towards Gaeta. They were instructed to inform the Pope as to the state of public feeling; and, at the same time, to entreat him to return to his capital, or else to choose some other residence within his own States, and to appoint a government which, according to constitutional usages, might possess authority during the absence of the sovereign.

Though the political career of the octogenarian senator, Prince Corsini, had not been remarkable for consistency, he could hardly be suspected of subversive or revolutionary tendencies, and he was accompanied by Monsignor Mertel and many others whose fidelity and attachment to Pio Nono could not be doubted. Nevertheless, the deputations were not permitted to pass the Neapolitan frontier. Returning to Terracina, they forwarded an application to Cardinal Antonelli, requesting him, as prefect of the palace, to use his good offices in order to enable them to fulfil their mission. The answer was in the negative, and Pio Nono, by the rejection of this overture, threw away a last, and not unfavourable opportunity of reconciliation. In the provinces, even more than in Rome, the recent outrages had given rise to regrets and apprehensions. The feelings of veneration towards the Holy See, and of confidence in Pio Nono, though they

had lost their fervour, were still cherished at Venice, and in some other parts of Italy. Had the deputations been received, power might have eluded the grasp of the Sterbinis and Gallettis, and an administration might have been constructed of men who, like Cardinal Rosmini, were loyal supporters of the papal throne, as well as friends of progress and Italian independence.

While the escape of the Pope was being planned, the Duc d'Harcourt was anxious that he should avail himself of French protection. Martinez della Rosa hoped that he would go to Spain; while Count Spaur, the Bavarian minister, entrusted, *ad interim*, with the affairs of the Austrian legation, covertly, but sedulously laboured in favour of a resort to Naples. To the acceptance of the latter proposal Antonelli was supposed to have contributed; but Farini gives good reasons for believing that the bias of the cardinal was in favour of a temporary residence at Civita Vecchia, or some other place within the limits of the papal territory. Such a position would undoubtedly have been more favourable to a speedy and peaceable *dénouement* of the revolutionary struggle.

Throughout these transactions, it is obvious that the great Catholic powers, while they professed unbounded zeal to serve the Pontiff, were but too ready to turn his misfortunes to their own account, and showed little or no concern at the distracted and

pitiable condition of the three millions of people subjected to his temporal sovereignty. To have aggravated instead of healed the disorders of the state,—to have unsettled everything and settled nothing,—to have disappointed, by a timid and vacillating course, the high-wrought expectations of his countrymen,—were the heaviest misfortunes of Pio; but neither France, Spain, nor Austria were disposed to assist him in re-establishing his government on such a basis as might have quelled the revolution, preserved the dignity of the Papacy, and satisfied the reasonable desires of the people. The Pope's disposition was generous and benevolent—had his allies been actuated by a sincere and unselfish spirit, his fears and hesitations might have been overcome; but they were wholly occupied with their own interests. France, humiliated by the revolution of February, was eager to assume a position as protectress of the head of the Church; Spain thought the conjuncture favourable for a renewal of her ancient ties with Rome, and wished to revive her claim to the title of *la cattolica*, which had been weakened by the destruction of the monasteries, and the confiscation of Church property; Austria was averse to a constitutional government in central Italy, and to whatever else might give strength and security to the position of Pio Nono, and enable him to carry into effect his favourite project of an Italian league.

On arriving at Mola di Gaeta, the Pope is said to have betrayed disappointment at not finding a Spanish ship to convey him to Majorca. Spaur who had accompanied him, immediately hurried off to Naples to confer with the King, who was especially anxious to obtain approbation and countenance from the head of the Church. Ferdinand instantly set out to Gaeta, and studied, by lavish offers and obsequious attentions, to gain credit for catholic zeal.

At Rome, the return of the Pope was desired by all who did not belong to the revolutionary faction: nor is there any reason to doubt that a corresponding feeling existed in the heart of Pio Nono; though a fear of appearing too ready to overlook the recent enormities, restrained him from making advances. In the chamber of deputies, the desire of a reconciliation was overawed by the public galleries, which represented the pretensions and power of the *circoli*. On the 8th of December, a proposal was made by the deputy Pantaleone, that a committee of five members should be appointed to devise means for obviating the difficulties produced by the absence of the sovereign. This motion was carried, and the members appointed were Rusconi, Sturbinetti, Rezzi, Sereni, and Lunati. It is obvious that such a step was adverse to an accommodation, and calculated to prolong the residence of the Pope in an atmosphere, vitiated by

the arts of the *Sanfedisti*, and the intrigues of foreign diplomacy.

Sterbini, under the pretence of giving employment, maintained a host of idlers, criminals and *sicarii*, at the public expense. This force, disciplined and ready for purposes of intimidation, was held in hand by Ciceruacchio. In the provinces, as well as in the capital, the mass of the people had, during the last two years, been accustomed to the flatteries of the sovereign, the court and the ministers. Unbounded expectations had been excited, but not fulfilled. The republicans now flattered in their turn; and the completion of the revolution was represented as the last step towards the attainment of some great imaginary advantages, supposed to be in store, though not yet realized. Meantime, General Cavaignac announced to the French assembly that an expedition was prepared and would sail for Italy, to defend the person, and provide for the liberty of the head of the Church.

Though, according to the terms of the Pope's Brief, it was competent for any three of the commissioners to exercise the functions of the executive, they never ventured to assert their authority. Castracane and Roberti being at Rome, were applied to by the committee of the deputies; they said that they awaited the result of negotiations, which they hoped were making favourable progress at Gaeta, and deprecated any

hasty decision. After this, Rusconi, on the part of the committee, introduced a set of resolutions which repudiated altogether the authority of the Pope's commissioners; declared that the applications made to the court at Gaeta had been fruitless, and recommended to the chambers a decree for the nomination of a supreme provisional junta.

This proposition was carried by the deputies, and agreed to by fourteen members of the *alto consiglio;* all the others having resigned or withdrawn. The junta was composed, in the first instance, of Prince Corsini, Zucchini the Senator of Bologna, and Count Filippo Camerata, the Gonfaloniere of Ancona. Zucchini, whose character for integrity and patriotism was unsullied, declined the proffered honour, and his place was filled up by Galletti, who was never known to refuse an office. Corsini, Camerata, and Galletti then published a declaration, that the authority accepted by them was only temporary, and would cease on the convocation of a constituent assembly, which they pronounced to be called for by universal desire. Armellini, a lawyer of some eminence, already advanced in years, was appointed to succeed Galletti as minister for the interior.

The appointment of the junta was regarded at Gaeta as an act of sacrilegious usurpation, and was equally unacceptable to the republicans. About the close of

1848, the constitutionalists being disavowed by Pio Nono, became completely discouraged, and the revolutionists were reinforced by an influx of Lombard and Neapolitan emigrants. The Mazzinian party was already prepared to grasp at power. It possessed in Accursi—who, under Armellini, occupied the post of secretary for the interior—an active and unscrupulous agent; and commanded, through its emissaries, the united strength of the Italian *circoli*.* It had also engaged the services of many foreign officers and soldiers of fortune, and of Garibaldi, who was looked up to and caressed as their future military champion, by all who desired to overturn the existing governments, and to establish one central and several local constituent assemblies. The former was to be entitled the *Costituente Italiana*, and was intended to regulate the affairs of the whole peninsula; the latter was to remodel the institutions of the component states.

Mamiani, who had always been opposed to these schemes, and was an upholder of constitutional monarchy, resigned his office. On his secession from the government of which he had been the stay, its powers became centred in Sterbini, who though condemned by the public voice as the chief author of the disorders which led to the assassination of Rossi,

* Farini, vol. iii. lib. iv. c. vi. See note. p. 271.

wielded the physical force of a paid rabble, and exerted for a season, the sway of a plebeian despot. When, on the creation of the junta, a change was made in some of the ministerial appointments, he still retained place and influence as head of the *Lavori pubblici*, and being impatient to get rid of the few deputies who continued to assemble, and had the courage to oppose his dictation, obtained the consent of his colleagues to dispense with the parliament. The *alto consiglio* was already deserted by its members, and the authority of the junta was weakened, if not destroyed, by the resignation of Prince Corsini. Galletti and Camerata joined with the ministers in signing, on the 29th of December, a decree for the convocation of the *costituente*. It was declared that this assembly should consist of two hundred members, elected by universal suffrage, and that it should meet on the 5th of February.

Thus ended the experiment of a representative system in the Roman states. The trial was made under circumstances of singular difficulty; and the unfortunate result cannot fairly be attributed to any defect in the composition of the two chambers, for a majority of their members were men of just views and political integrity. The true cause of the failure must rather be sought in the disturbing effect of the French revolution, and in the vacillating counsels of the sovereign. Pio Nono's solicitudes, as head of the

Roman Church, interfered with his desires and duties as an Italian prince. Had the parliament and the moderate party received from him a firm and consistent support, it is possible that the revolutionary ferment might by degrees have subsided, and the papal government been saved from the reproach of dragging on a precarious existence, destitute of all vital energy, and dependent on the support of foreign arms.

CHAPTER XIX.

Lombard emigration—Discord of parties—The Piedmontese ministry retires, and a new one is formed under Gioberti—His plans for the re-establishment of constitutional monarchy—He sends an embassy to Gaeta—His proposals are supported by the Duc d'Harcourt, but are declined by Pio Nono—The *Monitorio*—The Pope demands the aid of Austria, France, Spain and Naples—Rome becomes the centre of democratic agitation—Arts employed by the republicans to obtain a majority in the Roman *Costituente*—Its composition and first meeting—Proclamation of the republic—Discouragement of the constitutionalists—Arrival and projects of Mazzini.

AFTER the capitulation of Milan, the emigration of the Lombards was enormous; 300,000 are computed to have left their hearths, of whom a large portion betook themselves to Turin. There, under the name of the *Consulta Lombarda*,* they established a sort of provisional government, and the refugees of Parma and Modena were allowed a voice in their assembly. Unanimity, though urgently required by the condition of Italy, was not the result of the common misfortunes, and time was wasted in useless complaints and recriminations. Rome, Florence, and Milan were too ready to lay the blame on Piedmont, which, more

* Farini, lib. iv. c. v.

than any other state had borne, and was still ready to bear, the brunt of the contest. The armistice was condemned as if it had been a matter of choice, rather than of necessity. One party was impatient to renew the war, without soldiers or money; another recommended the maintenance of an armed truce until the result of French and English mediation should be ascertained. The Sardinian ministry, of which Perrone and Pinelli were the leaders, adhered to the latter opinion. Their policy was condemned by the *circoli*, the *fuorusciti*, and the *fervida gioventù*, as too much inclined to consider the separate welfare of the Sardinian monarchy, and as not sufficiently Italian. Being condemned by the deputies, the cabinet unanimously resolved to retire, and on the 16th of December, 1848, a new administration was arranged by Gioberti, composed of more democratic elements, and of men less engrossed by Piedmontese interests. The Abbé hoped to reconcile democracy with monarchy. He announced to the Chambers the intention of persevering in warlike preparations with a view to the *riscatto commune*, but avowed a profound conviction, that constitutional governments could alone give unity and strength to Italy, sufficient to preserve her from internal disorders and foreign assaults.*

* Gioberti in his ministerial programme, which is quoted by Farini, approved of a *costituente Italiana*, but only in the sense of a federative

A reconciliation of conflicting parties, and the exclusion of foreign interference, were the objects aimed at by Gioberti. With these views, he sent the Bishop of Savona and the Marchese Montezemolo as envoys extraordinary to Gaeta, with an autograph letter from Charles Albert, and instructed them to urge upon Pio Nono the acceptance of Piedmontese aid in bringing about his own restoration, and that of the constitution. The envoys arrived on the 28th of December, and had a gracious reception; but were informed by his Holiness, that he had already applied to his allies for counsel as to the means of restoring order in the States of the Church, and was unwilling to come to any decision before he had received the expected answers. The envoys pleaded the known catholic zeal of their sovereign, and of his minister, and the satisfaction with which the acceptance of Italian, rather than of foreign assistance, would be regarded by the people. The Pope, in reply, adverted to the frequent changes which had taken place in the Piedmontese ministry, as productive of inconvenience and uncertainty, and expressed his regret at the

council, intended to promote union, and to combine the resources of the Peninsula, and not empowered to overturn established dynasties and territorial arrangements, or to interfere with the *autonomia* of the different states. Such was the plan which the Abbé desired to substitute for the subversive *costituente a mandato illimitato*, put forward by the republicans.—*Stato Romano*, vol. iii. lib. iv. c. v.

abrupt termination * of the negotiations for a league. He also complained that agents had been sent to Rome and Florence to treat with reference to an Italian constituent assembly, and that he had reason to fear that there was a disposition on the part of the Sardinian government to make terms with those who had usurped his rights. He added, that he despaired of overcoming the desperate faction which had gained the ascendancy at Rome, except by force; and that he doubted the power of the King of Sardinia to afford the requisite support. The envoys explained that the agents alluded to had only been sent to watch the proceedings with regard to the Italian constituent, and delared that their Sovereign would never consent to anything inconsistent with established rights. These endeavours to defend the conduct of Piedmont, and to recommend the objects of the mission, were unsuccessful; and it became evident, from the Pope's language, and from the tone adopted by Cardinal Antonelli, that the mind of the Holy Father was made up to avail himself of foreign armies. Notwithstanding this repulse, Gioberti persevered, and the deputy Berghini was sent to treat with the provisional governments at Florence and Rome for the admission of a Piedmontese corps of from 10,000 to 12,000 men, to assist in the defence of Central Italy from Austrian

* See pp. 258 and 259.

invasion. This request was reluctantly entertained by the Tuscan triumvirs;* and at Rome, all that Berghini could obtain, was a conditional assent to the proposed occupation, which was only to be permitted after the actual commencement of hostilities. A secret agreement to this effect was entered into on the 18th of January, 1849.

After the flight of the Pope, Pareto, the Sardinian minister, had accompanied the rest of the diplomatic body to Gaeta. Count Martini was now appointed by the Gioberti ministry, as his successor, and the secret instructions given to that diplomatist, bearing date the 30th December, are the best answer to the charges so frequently urged against the Piedmontese government, of following a grasping and ambitious policy, and of wishing to subvert the temporal authority of the Papacy by encouraging rebellion at Rome. In those instructions, Martini was enjoined to confer, in his way to Gaeta, with the Roman constitutionalists; to discourage, as far as possible, the convocation of a Roman constituent assembly; and to consider the Pope's restoration to the constitutional sovereignty of his states as indispensable.

When the new ambassador arrived at the papal court, a demur was raised because his name had not been previously submitted for approbation, and also

* See Chapter xxi.

because the Sardinian government had held communication with the Roman rebels, and received their agent at Turin. Martini made the best excuses he could, insisting on the loyal and religious principles of Charles Albert. The next day he was admitted to an audience as a private visitor, and deprecated the introduction of foreign armies. The Pope replied to the effect that the Church was universal, and not national, that his responsibilities as its head far outweighed those which devolved upon him as an Italian sovereign, and that he regarded the *moderati* with suspicion. From these expressions the determination of his Holiness to admit the Austrians became obvious, and the Pope observing Martini's grief and emotion, added, "*Che vuole? l'hanno voluto.*"*

The readiness of the conclave to rely on Austrian support, excited the jealousy of the French representative, the Duc d'Harcourt, who, supporting the views of Gioberti, remonstrated against the treatment experienced by the Sardinian minister; and Martini was consequently received as ambassador. On the first of January, 1849, the Pope addressed an admonitory epistle to his *amatissimi sudditi*, in which he complained that he had only received a bare invitation of return, without one word of regret for the outrages to which he had been subjected, or any assurance against

* Farini, lib. iv. ch. x.

their repetition. He at the same time fulminated excommunication against all who should favour or take any part in the *costituente*.

The effect of this brief was to promote the objects of the republicans. In the provinces, and especially in the Bolognese, there was a strong anti-revolutionary feeling; but the *Monitorio* by forbidding any participation in the elections, prevented constitutionalists from coming forward as candidates. A numerous and important party was ready to have taken arms, and run all risks in defence of Pio Nono and the *Statuto*, but its ardour was chilled, and its exertions were discouraged by the entire want of sympathy exhibited by the Court.

On the 17th of January, the Archbishop of Cambray arrived at Gaeta, and in the name of the French clergy, but with the knowledge and consent of the executive, entreated the Pope to take up his residence in France.

On the 23rd, Martini had an audience, but could not shake Pio's persuasion that his restoration would be most properly effected by the arms of Christian princes in general, and not by those of Italy only. On the 4th of February, Count Maurice Esterhazy arrived from Vienna, and on the 14th the aid of Austria, France, Spain, and Naples was demanded, to the exclusion of Piedmont.

The proceedings of the republicans had, in fact, rendered an intervention not only probable, but, humanly speaking, certain. Nor was it difficult for those by whom the pontiff was surrounded, to win his consent. The idea that Catholic nations must at all times be ready to march in defence of the Holy See, was one on which he seems to have dwelt with complacency, and one which had repeatedly transpired in his proclamations and addresses. As early as the 10th of February, 1848, we find allusions to the "*innumerevoli figliuoli,** who would sustain the centre of Catholic unity as the house of their common father." Transparent as were the professions of Austria, and of King Ferdinand, and dictated, as they evidently were, by the calculations of self-interest, they were accepted and believed because they fell in with a dominant idea, and flattered a cherished delusion. The dream of a pontificate, rendered glorious by a revival of Italian greatness, to be achieved under the auspices of the papacy, had once soothed and enchanted the imagination of Pio Nono. When the hope of reigning in the hearts of twenty-four millions of Italians was doomed to disappointment, his sanguine mind found solace in the vision of a confederate Christendom, arming to vindicate the rights of the Roman Church. His impressionable judgment was

* See the Pope's proclamation of that date. Farini, lib. ii. ch. x.

as liable to be misled by the arts of diplomacy, as it had previously been by the incense of popular applause. In adversity as in prosperity, he clung to the belief that the papacy was still regarded by the "*orbe cattolico*" with undiminished veneration, and that the offers he received were dictated by no lower motive than zeal to protect his sacred person and office.

Rome being designated as the seat of the intended *Costituente Italiana*, became more and more a centre of republican agitation. Montanelli and Guerrazzi having obtained the direction of the Tuscan government, despatched thither La Cecilia, a Neapolitan of reckless character, as a revolutionary agent. This individual, who had raised himself into notice during the insurrection at Leghorn, had the confidence of a vast number of Neapolitan and Milanese refugees, and effectually promoted the objects of his mission.*

Castellani, the representative of Venice, and Padre Ventura, the legate of Sicily, held themselves aloof from these machinations. The conduct of the former was uniformly that of an upright Italian patriot who foresaw and bewailed the approaching miseries. The latter, however zealous for Sicilian independence, never swerved from his allegiance to the head of his Church, and refused a seat in the Roman constituent.

* See Chapter xxi.

A central committee of the Italian *circoli* had watched the elections, and no exertion was spared to promote the success of the approved candidates, and to cry down all others as retrogradists and *doctrinaires*. Fidelity to the constitution was regarded as treason to the people, and in Rome, as well as in the provinces, juntas of public safety were appointed, by which those who resisted the will of the dominant faction were persecuted and brought under accusation.

When the time appointed for the meeting of the Roman constituent drew near, every art was employed to influence the members and to secure their votes. In these preliminaries the Prince of Canino took an active part, and was openly and courageously withstood by Mamiani. When the fifth of February arrived, Armellini, the minister for the interior, who was the mouth-piece of the provisional government, opened the session by a speech in which he declared that "the Italy of the Popes, like that of the Cæsars, had ceased to exist, except in the ruins which it had left behind." He invited his fellow-citizens "to found upon those ruins an Italy of the people." Before the applause had ceased, Canino vociferated, "*Long live the republic!*" Mamiani endeavoured, but in vain, to stem the torrent, and proposed that the future institutions of the Roman states should be referred to a federative constituent assembly. Sterbini at first stammered sentences of

timidity and prudence, but soon saw reason to change his tone, and, taking his cue from the public galleries, ended by proposing that the republic should be solemnly proclaimed from the Capitol. This being agreed to, the arrangement of the ceremonial was confided to Galletti, whose previous services had entitled him to the distinction of president of the assembly, the Prince of Canino having been appointed vice-president.

After the proclamation of the republic, the next act of the assembly was to name an executive committee, consisting of three members, Armellini, Montecchi and Salicetti. The first has already been mentioned—Montecchi was a sincere republican, who had suffered imprisonment under Gregory XVI., and had recently borne arms at Venice · Salicetti, a Neapolitan exile of good character, but moderate capacity. Under these triumvirs an administration was appointed, in which three of the late cabinet, Sterbini, Muzzarelli, and Campello, retained their places. To these were added Carlo Rusconi, of Bologna, for foreign affairs; Aurelio Saffi, of Forli, for the interior; Giovita Lazzarini, as minister of justice ; and Guiccioli, of Ravenna, as head of the finances. It is needless to say that the executive remained entirely dependent on the will and direction of the sovereign *costituente*. Of that assembly, a large proportion consisted of young and inexperienced members; for youth and inexperience had been con-

sidered as a recommendation by the republican committees. Some of them were endowed with noble and generous dispositions; but these were greatly outnumbered by a pernicious crowd of men remarkable for nothing but blighted character and hunger for office.

> . . . . . Cattivo coro
> Degli angeli che non furon ribelli,
> Ne pur' fedeli a Dio, ma per se foro.

This numerous section, which acquired the ignoble appellation of *il ventre*, watched the changes of feeling in the galleries, and voted in abject submission to the fickle will of an idle and depraved portion of society which had usurped the name of the people.

The constitutionalists having no banner under which they might rally, the united sections of the republican party were left to organize anarchy, and to provide for the pressing necessities of the time as best they might. An attempt was made to alleviate the deplorable state of the finances by paper money, forced loans, and the confiscation of ecclesiastical property. The repression of assassination and rapine was a task which admitted of no delay; and in this respect the exertions of the occupants of precarious power, though those exertions were not very successful, entitled them to praise; but their blindness as to the real position and prospects of the republic, and ignorance as to the condition and

feeling of Europe, is unaccountable. The dissatisfied at home were supposed to be insignificant in numbers and importance. Austria was presumed to be in a state of dissolution, and the red republicans of France were relied upon as a sure support. Naples, distracted at home, was believed to be incapable of giving trouble. Though Charles Albert was distrusted, the allegiance of his troops was, it was said, not to be depended upon should he attempt to interfere.

In June, 1848, the onward course of revolution had been arrested, and its boldest champions had been struck down or discouraged by Cavaignac's sanguinary and decisive victory in the streets of Paris. The tone more recently assumed by the French president, the triumph of Austria in Bohemia, the repression of democracy at Berlin, and the prudent counsels of England, were warnings which could hardly be mistaken. An European reaction had taken place, and the restoration of the Pope's temporal authority was already certain; the only question which remained was as to the terms upon which it might be effected: yet the republican rulers of Rome were so fascinated by an ephemeral success, that they could not, or would not, be aroused from their dream of power.

Castellani, the representative of Venice, used his endeavours to dispel these delusions, and Mamiani, having vainly attempted to do so, resigned his seat.

At this season of dismay, when there was no longer any name or power which had not lost its influence, Mazzini arrived, and was declared, by acclamation, a Roman citizen. On the sixth of March he entered the hall of the constituent assembly amid the applause of the members and of the galleries, and had a place assigned him next to that of the president. Having recently been engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to bring about the union of Tuscany with the Roman States, he still persevered in that project, and, at his suggestion, a deputation, of which Ciceruacchio formed part, was sent to Florence, but the sister republic rejected these overtures. At Rome the idea of abolishing all territorial distinctions, and founding a vast Italian commonwealth, obtained readier acceptance. The Pontifical provinces having been acquired at distant intervals, from a variety of previous possessors, had never constituted a distinct Italian state. They had never, like Naples or Tuscany, enjoyed even a subnationality; no glories, civil or military, were interwoven with their history, and they only existed as an *appanage*, by which the splendour of the papacy might be maintained. Their annals, if annals they can be said to possess, are barren of all interest, and resemble the sterilized and monotonous Campagna, in which no bright or cultivated spot gives hope or encouragement for future improvement.

At a crisis when priestly misgovernment had become more than ever intolerable, the accession of Pio Nono was hailed as the dawn of a new era. The people were led to believe that they had at length a sovereign pontiff who sympathized in their desires. Intense enthusiasm was succeeded by despair, which was encouraged and worked upon by those who were capable of turning it to the advantage of their own long cherished designs. Revolutionists and retrogradists were alike indifferent or hostile to reforms and institutions, such as were really suited to the condition and requirements of the people. The Pope was already bewildered by contending factions, when the overturn of Louis-Philippe's government deprived him of his best support. That of protestant England could ill supply the place, and does not appear to have understood the nature of the crisis. Its interference, though well intentioned, only led to misapprehension and mischief. When the *facilis descensus* of revolution had terminated in the flight of the outraged sovereign, and the door of reconciliation was closed, Mazzini appeared upon the scene. His way had been prepared by the labours of his emissaries, and he was not slow to advance his pretensions as the High Priest and Law-giver, by whom the regeneration of Italy was to be accomplished.

CHAPTER XX.

Affairs of Tuscany—Retrospect—The first establishment of the House of Lorrain—Commencement of the struggle between the civil and ecclesiastical power—Accession and reforms of Leopold—His attempt to purify the Tuscan Church—Scipio Ricci and the Synod of Pistoia—Leopold becomes Emperor, and on his departure from Tuscany, Ricci's reforms are reversed—The French Revolution puts an end to the labours of the Reformers—Accession of Ferdinand—He refuses to join the coalition against France, but is driven from his dominions by the Directory—Tuscany under the French—A counter-revolution—Persecution of Ricci—Return of the French, and establishment of the kingdom of Etruria—Ricci's submission to Pius VII.—The Restoration in 1814—The Fossombroni ministry—Ferdinand's desire to establish representative institutions.

CONTEMPORARY with the inauguration of a republic at Rome was the fall of monarchy at Florence. Before describing the circumstances which preceded and accompanied that event, it will be requisite to take a retrospective view of the progress and condition of Tuscany under the princes of the house of Lorrain.

By virtue of a treaty concluded at Vienna in 1737, which has already been referred to * in its relations to Naples and Sicily, the pragmatic sanction by which Charles VI. had declared the wide dominions of the

* See p. 64.

house of Austria to be the inheritance of Maria Theresa, was admitted; and Francis, Duke of Lorrain, who had recently become the consort of that princess, ceded his hereditary duchy to France. He obtained in return the reversion of the Tuscan territories, which fell into possession during the same year, on the death of Gaston, the last Grand Duke of the house of Medici.

After visiting his new dominions, and residing for a few months at Florence, Francis returned to Vienna, where greater interest and more arduous duties engrossed his attention. Thus, Tuscany became an Austrian province, and remained so during the eight and twenty years which elapsed before the accession of Leopold. In this interval, little occurred of any general interest, except the struggle which gradually arose between the civil and ecclesiastical authority.

The Medici, who owed much to their alliance with the papacy, were always willing to support its pretensions and overlook its encroachments. The evils which had arisen from this acquiescence had attained a formidable magnitude, and the difficult task of reducing and restraining ecclesiastical usurpations, was confided to the senator Rucellai, an able and persevering minister, who strenuously upheld the rights of the crown, transferred the censorship of the press to the civil authorities, and laid a foundation for those reforms which were afterwards carried out.

When Francis became Emperor, his intention was to have made his son, Leopold, governor and captain-general of Tuscany, but when that prince was affianced to an Infanta of Spain, Charles III. refused to give his daughter to any younger son who was not invested with an independent sovereignty. The Emperor reluctantly agreed to this demand; and on his death, which occurred in 1765, shortly after the marriage, Leopold and his bride ascended the grand-ducal throne.

The lofty sentiments, just views, and conciliatory spirit evinced by the family which thus succeeded to the honours of the extinct Medici, more than compensated their foreign extraction. The reign of Leopold, embracing a quarter of a century, is dwelt upon with complacency by Italian annalists, as a bright page amongst many dark ones. The energies of his powerful mind were, during the whole of that period, perseveringly directed to promote the welfare of his subjects, by the removal of abuses in Church and State. In eradicating the latter he was eminently successful; and to his beneficent labours the Tuscan people have been indebted for a singular immunity from social evils, and for years of happy and peaceful progress. His attempt to purify the church, though thwarted and ultimately defeated by papal opposition, was conceived in a just and righteous spirit, and in

more propitious times, might have been attended with greater results.

The suppression of the Jesuits in 1773, had tended to weaken the charm of papal infallibility, and to encourage a demand for further concessions. When Scipio Ricci became Bishop of Pistoia, the writings of the Port Royal divines had already created a considerable sensation, and the necessity of some reform was felt by a large portion of the clergy.

The religion of Leopold was too sincere to allow him to tolerate the scandalous abuses which prevailed in many Tuscan monasteries. The heads and inmates of those establishments refused submission to the episcopal authority, and acknowledged no jurisdiction but that of Rome, which being at a greater distance was more liable to be deceived. The Grand Duke, like his brother the Emperor, was prepared to strike at the root of these evils, and to assert the right of his government to regulate, except in matters of a purely spiritual nature, the ecclesiastical as well as the civil affairs of the state.

Ricci, though educated by the Jesuits, and related to their general, Lorenzo Ricci, who, after the suppression of the order, died in prison, was an earnest opponent of their views and principles. His desire to purify the church from mediæval distortions, as well as from more recent corruptions, and to resist the

arrogant claims of the Roman See, was well known. In conformity with the instructions given by the Grand Duke to the bishops of the Tuscan States, he convoked a synod at Pistoia in 1786,* in which important questions of doctrine and discipline were mooted and discussed. This assembly declared that bishops were Vicars of Christ, and not of the Pope, and that their authority was derived immediately from the Divine Head of the Church, and not from the Roman Pontiff; that there should be but one altar in the churches; that the Liturgy should be read distinctly, and in the vernacular tongue; that paintings representing the Holy Trinity, and such images as were distinguished from others by peculiar veneration, should be disallowed; that the church has no power to introduce new dogmas; that its decrees are not infallible, except when in conformity with Holy Scripture, and authentic tradition; that every christian should read the Scriptures; that an indulgence only relieves from ecclesiastical penances. These, and other important conclusions of a like tendency, were in the course of seven sessions, deliberately adopted by the synod, which also declared its adhesion to the *four propositions* of the Gallican Church.

It is needless to say that these proceedings were

* Botta, Storia d'Italia, lib. i. p. 24; Cantù, Storia di cento anni, i. 467; Roscoe's Life of Scipio Ricci.

regarded at Rome with anger and dismay. A violent controversy ensued. By the friends of church liberty the movement was approved, as calculated to place a salutary check on papal usurpation; by adherents of the papacy, it was viewed as the commencement of a dangerous schism.

During the continuance of this dispute, many of the bishops and clergy, who were at first disposed for reform, or willing to comply with the wish of the sovereign, became alarmed at the extent of the proposed innovations, or terrified by the displeasure of the pontiff. Some monasteries having been suppressed, and the corruptions which prevailed in others inquired into and exposed, the monks commenced a strenuous opposition, and seconded the partisans of Rome in raising a popular outcry against Ricci's reforms, and especially against the decree, which, forbidding a plurality of altars, interfered with the habits and predilections of the worshippers.

In 1787, Leopold, against the advice of Ricci, convoked an assembly of the bishops at Florence, by the aid of which he hoped to reconcile differences; but in this expectation he was deceived, for the prelates, notwithstanding their apparent candour and tractability, were resolved to maintain their allegiance to the Pope, and to shut the door against innovation.

As soon as it became known at Pistoia that a

majority of the bishops disapproved of Ricci's reforms, many curates, even in his own diocese, petitioned the Grand Duke and the Archbishop of Florence, to restore ancient usages, and replace the images. In order to support these demands, a violent tumult was raised at Prato, which was only appeased by promises of concession. Ricci, deeply grieved at these disturbances, was the first to entreat the Grand Duke's pardon for the rioters, and tendered his own resignation, which was refused. The prelates assembled at Florence were then dismissed by Leopold, who frankly told them that if they did not choose to redress abuses, he should use his own power and discretion. He then proceeded to dispense with the residence of a nuncio at his Court, ordered that the monasteries should be subject only to the bishops, and directed Ricci to persevere in the work which he had undertaken.

The partisans of Rome, too politic to attack the Grand Duke, concentrated their efforts against the weaker assailant; and when on the death of Joseph II. in 1790, Leopold departed to assume the imperial dignity, Ricci, whose opponents were to be found even in the ranks of the ministry, became subject to open attacks. His reforms were violently reversed. The churches of Pistoia and Prato were occupied by fanatics, and the bishop, according to the wish of the magistrates, withdrew from scenes of violence and

disorder. His retreat had not the effect of restoring tranquillity, and a reaction against ecclesiastical reforms became general. Altars were restored, images replaced, and monasteries re-established.

In April, 1791, the Emperor revisited Tuscany, accompanied by his son Ferdinand, in whose favour he declared his intention of resigning the Grand-Duchy. He was immediately besieged with petitions for the removal of Ricci and the restoration of ancient usages. Though the petitioners were coldly received, Leopold weary of the contest, hinted to the bishop that his retirement would promote the repose of the country, and accepted his resignation. This concession did not satisfy the reactionists, and immediately after the death of the Emperor, which occurred in 1792, Ricci was cited by Pius VI. to appear at Rome, but excused himself on the score of health.

The Spanish government at that time contemplated an attack upon ecclesiastical abuses, and proposed to take for its model the acts of the Synod of Pistoia, which had acquired celebrity throughout Europe. In order to deprive them of all weight, they were condemned, together with the bishop, by the Bull *auctorem fidei*, published at Rome in 1794.*

Ricci, thus branded and condemned, was no longer

* This Bull was forbidden by the Grand Duke Ferdinand to be sold or published in Tuscany.

supported by the approbation of his sovereign, or comforted by the society and encouragement of friends and fellow-workers. Those who had once participated in his views, and shared his labours, were scared from their enterprise by the crimes and impieties of the French revolution. During the years of bloodshed and violence which followed, men had little desire or leisure to embark in religious controversies, and a prostration of spirit ensued, very favourable to the vigilant perserverance of Rome.

Ferdinand III. imbued with the principles by which his father had secured the well-being of the Tuscan people, identified his interests with those of the country in which he had been born. He was not only honoured as the sovereign, but revered as "*il primo galantuomo dello stato.*" Disregarding the ties of family, and the solicitations and reproaches of Austria, he refused to join the coalition against the French republic. "Il Granduca," says his private secretary Fiaschi, in a letter to Don Neri Corsini, "è nato in Italia, forma una famiglia Italiana, e non appartiene ad alcuna lega, e, l'ha ben fatto vedere col sistema da lui adottato." In maintaining a position so becoming in an Italian prince, he was supported by the respectable chiefs of the Leopoldine party, and by the talents and good sense of Fossombroni, who during a public life of more than half a century, laboured

for the best interests of his sovereign and fellow-citizens.

Though Ferdinand had constantly refused to take part against France, the undoubted right of Tuscany to exist as a neutral and independent power, was unjustifiably trampled upon by the French Directory. Few of the crimes of conquest have been less provoked than this ruthless interference of republican France with a defenceless people, which desired no greater boon than to have its neutrality respected, and to be left in the enjoyment of peace and civilization. The patriot Grand Duke was driven into exile, and a provisional government was formed by the French invaders in 1799; but in a few months, the defeat of Macdonald by Suwarrow and Melas, on the banks of the Trebbia, followed by a general rising, obliged them to retreat. Arezzo took the lead in this movement, and the insurgents marching under the banner of the Virgin, entered Florence, and excited a violent persecution against all who had taken any share in the French administration. Ricci, who happened to be in the city, was arrested and thrown into prison, and subsequently removed to the convent of St. Mark, where he was detained for above a-year. He was first accused as a political delinquent, a favourer of the French, and holder of anti-monarchical opinions, and afterwards told that he would be sent a prisoner to

Rome to answer the charge of heresy. By these persecutions, the Archbishop of Florence hoped to extort a retractation.

On the election of Pius VII., Ricci, encouraged by the mildness of his character, wrote to him, expressing entire submission to the apostolic chair, but justifying his own opinions as orthodox. Cardinal Gonsalvi replied in the name of his Holiness, by insisting on a recantation.

In October, 1800, the Pope's nuncio, and the whole band of persecutors, were put to flight by the return of the French; but in the course of the following year, Louis, hereditary Prince of Parma, was established in Tuscany by Bonaparte with the title of King of Etruria. Under that prince the views and objects of the Holy See were promoted, and the nuncio, Morozzo, renewed the attempt to prevail over Ricci. On the death of Louis, the Queen, Maria Louisa, was declared Regent during her son's minority. Her advisers were men who would willingly have exercised the powers of the inquisition, but the influence of the French minister mitigated the spirit of persecution; and the Queen was induced to try the effect of conciliation. She persuaded Pius VII. to visit Florence on his return from the coronation of Napoleon; and an interview was arranged between his Holiness and the ex-bishop, whose spirit was broken

by his sufferings. He was at length prevailed upon to sign a declaration in which he accepted the Bull *auctorem fidei*, and all acts of the Roman See by which the writings of Baius, Jansenius, and Quesnel, had been condemned. After this he was received by the Pope and the Queen in the Palazzo Pitti, with every mark of consideration and regard.

Thus Rome obtained from the infirmity of an aged and helpless adversary, an unwilling and tardy submission; and was enabled to say that Ricci, the Tuscan reformer, had recanted.

In 1807, the Queen of Etruria and her son were compelled to abdicate. Tuscany was soon afterwards annexed to the French empire, and subjected to French laws; but it was again erected into a grand duchy in 1809, in favour of Napoleon's sister, Eliza Bonaparte, Duchess of Lucca and Princess of Piombino. During the nominal reign of that princess, the use of the Tuscan language in the courts of law was restored, and the government was carried on with good sense and forbearance; but the pure manners and simple tastes of the Florentines were contaminated by the introduction of Parisian habits; and the establishment of public gaming-houses, by the French, is still remembered in many families as a fatal source of ruin and corruption. Jacobinical doctrines, derived from the same source, though re-

pressed during the reign of Napoleon, regained vitality on the declension of his power. After the restoration, these social evils were aggravated by difficulties which arose in the external relations of the Grand Duchy. Austria having acquired a preponderance in the north of Italy, began to adopt a policy which has proved detrimental to the interests of the peninsula, as well as injurious to her own fame and dignity.

Ferdinand, having borne his adverse fortunes with philosophic indifference, resumed authority, free from all party and vindictive feelings. As an Austrian prince, he retained the possibility of a succession to the imperial throne, and Metternich availed himself of this circumstance to claim a right of interference in the affairs of Tuscany. The firmness and vigilance of Fossombroni was constantly employed in parrying these attempts.

There is good evidence of Ferdinand's desire to introduce a representative system,* but he was unable to withstand the remonstrances of the Court of Vienna, grounded as they were on the unsettled state of Italy. At that time the agents of the *sette* received some encouragement at Florence, and the government was urged to join in the work of suppression. When a list of persons, supposed to be compromised, was

* See the Grand Duke's conversation with Senator Covoni, quoted by Gualterio, vol. i. c. xxi. ; and Cantù's Storia di cento anni, vol. iii. p. 516.

presented to him, Ferdinand generously and wisely tore the document. After his decease, the encroaching spirit of Austria was again manifested, and hints were thrown out that the present sovereign should not be proclaimed, till advices, or rather orders, had been received from the imperial head of his family. Fossombroni replied to these pretensions by an immediate proclamation.

CHAPTER XXI.

Accession of the present Grand Duke—The French Revolution of 1830—Guerrazzi and Young Italy—Suppression of the Antologia—Political arrests—Liberation of the accused—Educational movement—The Scientific Congress at Pisa—Ministry of Neri Corsini—Change of policy after his death—Desire to propitiate Rome and Austria—Surrender of Renzi, a refugee—Expulsion of Massimo d'Azeglio—Effect of Pio Nono's concessions—Rejoicings and processions—Institution of the National Guard—The Ridolfi ministry—The constitution—Departure of the troops—Lucca becomes united to Tuscany—Parma and Modena adhere to the kingdom of Alta Italia—Gino Capponi minister—Triumph of sedition at Leghorn—Defection of Montanelli, who joins Guerrazzi and forms a democratic ministry—The Grand Duke retires to Siena and embarks from Santo Stefano for Gaeta—Gioberti's offers to assist in his restoration.

WHEN Leopold II. commenced his reign, he had the advantage of being surrounded by advisers thoroughly experienced in the peculiar difficulties of the times, and who had hitherto been successful in maintaining concord at home and respect abroad. While revolutionary movements in the surrounding states were repressed by foreign arms, Tuscany remained free from any such calamities. A generous hospitality was afforded to refugees, and the freedom of the press was preserved; but it is easy to imagine how difficult it

must have been for the government of a small state, to steer clear of the surrounding dangers of revolution and reaction.

During the latter years of the Fossombroni ministry, a project for draining the *Maremme* engrossed the attention of its chief, as well as that of the Grand Duke. The expenses incurred in this undertaking exhausted the coffers of the treasury, which had been enriched by the good husbandry of Ferdinand.

The connexion of the French Revolution of 1830,* with an extensive Italian conspiracy, has already been noticed. The triumphs of the barricades were hailed with joy by a large body of political refugees at that time congregated in Tuscany, and by a small number of native *sympathizers*. While Fossombroni was engrossed with the *Maremme*, Ciantelli, the president of the council, whose ideas were not in accordance with those of his colleagues, and who appears to have been pliant under the pressure of foreign influence, encouraged the police in a system of *espionage*. This departure from long-established and popular principles of government, gave rise to a feeling of irritation, which was turned to the best advantage by the agents of the *sette*. The liberal party became divided, and while the majority retained its loyalty, and looked to acquire security for good government, and all needful

* See page 15.

reforms, by and through the sovereign, the hopes of a numerous section were fixed on the radical and unitarian conspiracy, which received life and impulse from the Italian exiles, acting under the direction of Mazzini.

Without being actually enrolled in the ranks of *Young Italy*, many students of the universities were captivated by the misty and speculative doctrines of its chief. In 1832, a few sectarians were detected at Siena, and Guerrazzi, who had attained a certain reputation as a writer of political plays and romances, began to be regarded as a leader by the disaffected. In the course of the following year, the liberty of the press was infringed by the suppression of a number of the *Antologia*, a periodical publication of considerable merit. The condemned number contained criticisms on Austria and Russia. The *buon governo* reimbursed the proprietor, Vieusseux, for his loss, and by many, the proceeding was regarded as an act of venial and perhaps necessary deference to powerful allies. By others it was looked upon as the commencement of a censorship, though none was in reality introduced till after the death of Neri Corsini, in 1845.

In the autumn of 1833, the police, which, with the connivance of Ciantelli, appears to have received its impulse from Austrian agents, raised a cry of conspiracy, and numerous arrests were made. Many of

the supposed conspirators were not even acquainted with each other; and Salvagnoli, a staunch constitutionalist and opponent of the *sette*, was involved in the same accusation with Guerrazzi and others, of whose connexion with Mazzini there appears to be little doubt.* The unpopularity of Ciantelli, and the dislike of police persecutions, found vent in open murmurs under the windows of the Palazzo Pitti, and the obnoxious minister was pensioned and dismissed. The state prisoners were at the same time liberated, with injunctions to be quiet, and to avoid the society of suspected persons.

After this warning, the Grand Duke seemed determined to adhere to the hereditary maxims and policy of his family. He also stood foremost as a patron of science and letters. With the approbation of the government, many distinguished professors, driven by political persecution from other parts of Italy, established themselves at Pisa. Normal schools were founded, and an improved system of education introduced. The Marchese Cosimo Ridolfi exerted himself, as a wealthy and intelligent landed proprietor, in the establishment of an educational system for the rural districts. His plans were carried out with great perseverance and success, and obtained for him the gratitude and approbation of his countrymen. When

* Gualterio, vol. ii, c. xxiv. p. 50.

Fossombroni was prevented by age from taking an active part in public affairs, he was succeeded in the direction of the government by Don Neri Corsini, who, at the Congress of Vienna, had maintained the independence of Tuscany, and whose character commanded respect at home and abroad. The increase of public wealth had been the leading object of Fossombroni; his successor applied himself with equal assiduity to the instruction of the people. Some important judicial reforms were also effected, and many persons who had been compromised or suspected in 1831, were now entrusted with appointments. These acts, together with the protection and liberty extended to political emigrants, in permitting them to attend in security the scientific congress, did away with the unpopularity caused by the suppression of the *Antologia*, and reinstated the Grand Duke in the good opinion of the moderate party. The first of these meetings was held at Pisa in 1839, and inaugurated by Leopold in person. While Tuscany allowed safe conduct to exiled *savans*, —and the other governments, including that of Austria, did so under certain restrictions—the Pope's subjects were strictly forbidden to attend, and no one was suffered to land or to pass through the smallest portion of the Pontifical territory for that purpose. The Court of Rome availed itself of a prescriptive right to confound science with irreligion; but did not

perhaps take an exaggerated view of the danger of such *réunions*, in a country disordered and excited as Italy then was. It was hardly possible that Italians, thus gathered from the east and from the west, should forget their own sufferings and the fallen condition of their country, and confine their attention to those objects, for the sake of which, they were once more allowed to breathe the pure air, and converse in the harmonious language of their father-land. By such meetings the sentiment of Italian brotherhood was fostered, and a desire was awakened to enjoy in security and permanency that intercourse which, from the very precariousness of its tenure, appeared doubly valuable. The enthusiasm thus kindled, could not fail to be accompanied with bitter grief. The state of central Italy was not only deplored by the just and enlightened of all parties, but had been pronounced intolerable by the great powers of Europe. By their unanimous voice, the Pontifical government had been warned that its system was too bad to be secure; but the remonstrance had been uttered in vain. Amid these unparalleled circumstances, it can hardly excite surprise that political feelings should prevail over devotion to science. By degrees, the doors of these assemblies were thrown open to numbers who had no claim to such an association; and the *congressi scientifici* abusing their privileges, and the favour and

indulgence shown to them, became centres of agitation.

After the outbreak of 1843, Roman refugees still found an asylum in the Grand Ducal territory, and in 1845, when the frontier was beset, not by individual fugitives, but by bodies of men who had retreated in that direction, these were admitted on the simple condition of laying down their arms. The surrender of Renzi, a leader of one of these bands, was demanded by the Papal government, on the pretext of an existing treaty. The application of that treaty to such a case, was disputed, and Renzi, to avoid further question, was allowed to retire into France, under an engagement that he would not return. This promise he broke, and on his re-appearance in Tuscany, the Court of Rome, supported by Austria, renewed its demand to have him delivered up. At this juncture, Neri Corsini died, and the old Leopoldine party lost the predominance which it had long enjoyed. The composition of the succeeding ministry betokened a change of measures, as well as of men. Cempini, the president, had always been considered as a constitutionalist, but his associates were of another stamp, and among them was Baldasseroni, the chief of the actual ministry at Florence, who was supposed to be inclined to absolutism, and Paver, whose connexion with the Jesuits was notorious.

The inclination of the new government to get rid of continual controversies with Rome and Austria, and by yielding to the wishes of those powers to obtain their support, was generally believed in.

Whether this change in the councils of the Grand Duke was voluntary, or forced upon him by circumstances, admits of considerable doubt. Educated in Leopoldine traditions, and having long enjoyed popularity and respect, as the best and most liberal of Italian princes, he had every inducement to maintain a position so flattering and advantageous; but the practicability of such a course may be questioned. If, in resisting the encroachments of Rome and Austria, he had felt that he had the support of an united people, he might have persevered in the liberal and independent policy of his father and grandfather; but this was no longer the case. The old patriotic party was undermined and paralyzed by the operations of the *sette*, directed by active and unscrupulous leaders. The *sanfedisti* would gladly have seen the government in the hands of a revolutionary faction; being persuaded that the intervention of Austria would soon follow, and that an end would thus be made of the Leopoldine system, which had always been regarded with aversion by the adherents of Rome. As a refuge from this dilemma, and as the most probable means of averting a revolution, a return to a cordial under-

standing with Rome and Austria was open. To the Grand Duke's reluctant adoption of this alternative, the ties of family and a desire to put an end to painful controversies with the head of his church, may have contributed.

Thorny questions having arisen as to certain ecclesiastical claims at Pisa, Gregory XVI. is said to have resorted to a private interdiction, which troubled the mind of Leopold, and, still more, that of his consort; and it appears that during a visit to Rome, the Grand Duke pledged himself, or was considered to have pledged himself, to a partial abandonment of the Leopoldine laws. On his return to Florence, Neri Corsini and the whole of the ministry refused to have any hand in impairing these bulwarks against Papal ambition. The project was abandoned, and the Pope gave utterance to his disappointment in terms of bitterness. In an allocution to the Consistory, he thus expressed himself, "*sed celsissimus ille dux, quæ nobis promisit, non tenuit!*"

The termination of the affair of Renzi betrayed, in the clearest manner, a change of policy. That adventurer had been warned, that if he returned to Tuscany, he would be punished by three months of imprisonment. The crime had been foreseen, and its penalty fixed. When the Pope's demand was renewed, every effort was made to dissuade the government from

a dereliction of consistency and independence. After a month's delay, the ministry yielded to the persuasions of foreign diplomacy, and to the necessity of being on good terms with the Courts of Rome and Vienna. Renzi, the unworthy cause of this controversy, instead of being subjected to the appointed term of imprisonment, was given up; and on his arrival at Rome, he purchased his own safety by a base denunciation of his companions.

In March 1846, another act of deference to Austria occurred. Massimo d'Azeglio having published at Florence his work, "*dei casi di Romagna,*" was expelled from the States of Tuscany, as he had previously been from the Milanese. About the same time, the adherents of the Jesuits, hitherto few in number, began to receive encouragement. The fathers purchased a palace at Pisa, and notwithstanding the remonstrances of the professors and inhabitants, were supported by Paver, and the rest of the ministry.

These unwelcome acts and tendencies of the government, combined with the vexatious conduct of the police, were productive of general dissatisfaction, and enabled the emissaries of Young Italy to obtain recruits, especially amongst the mixed and turbulent population of Leghorn.

In 1847, the enthusiasm and unlimited expectations

caused by the acts of Pio Nono, increased the general ferment.

On the 8th of May, in consequence of a public petition numerously and respectably signed, which was, with the concurrence of Gino Capponi, presented to the Grand Duke, the press was declared free; and the journals of Florence soon obtained great repute and circulation in the Roman, as well as in the Tuscan States. Salvagnoli became the editor of the temperate and constitutional *Patria*, while Montanelli conducted the mystic and fickle *Italia:* and other publications of a less able, but not less exciting stamp, were continually stimulating desires which could never be fulfilled.

Though the ancient institution of the *consulta* was at this time revived, it will be observed that at Florence, as at Rome, the press was emancipated, the populace flattered, and its leaders permitted to acquire a dangerous ascendancy, *before* the establishment of those representative institutions, by which alone freedom can be tempered. The Grand Duke was greeted by the acclamations, and yielded to the will of the multitude from the windows of the Pitti, as Pio Nono did from those of the Quirinal. Agitations and festive processions at Florence kept pace with those at Rome. Leghorn became the scene of uproar and sanguinary broils, such as had not been known for ages in the

tranquil domains of Tuscany. When the overbearing conduct of the Austrians at Ferrara seemed to challenge Italy to the struggle, the fire of national resentment was everywhere kindled. Innumerable petitions demanded the organization of a National Guard, and on the 4th of September its institution was celebrated with tumultuous rejoicings. Thus, the voice of the people, instead of being expressed by lawful representatives, was uttered sometimes in flattery, sometimes in menace, at the bidding of demagogues. Direct popular power having once been tasted, is not readily surrendered, and the subsequent introduction of constitutional safeguards, is apt to be regarded with indifference or aversion.

A signal demonstration was made on the 12th of September, 1847, when each city and province of Tuscany sent forth its delegates, with the ancient banners and emblems of republican times. The population of Florence was swelled by that of the neighbouring towns and thickly-peopled villages: and parties of foreign residents, preceded by their national flags, joined the array, which is said to have consisted of thirty thousand. The tricolor was hoisted, and cheers were raised in front of the palace; not only for the Grand Duke and Pio Nono, but for those Italians who, in ancient or modern times, had obtained praise, as the friends and martyrs of liberty.

By the ministry which derived its name and popularity from Cosimo Ridolfi, a custom-house league was concluded with Rome and Piedmont; and on the 11th of February a constitution was inaugurated; the parliament being composed, as in France, of two chambers, the one consisting of members appointed by the Sovereign, the other elected by the tax-payers.

Ridolfi, Capponi, Centofanti, Savagnoli, and in those days, Montanelli, were all equally opposed to the *sette* and to Guerrazzi; and the government received valuable support by the accession of Don Neri Corsini, Marchese di Lajatico, the first person of eminence who recommended to his sovereign the adoption of a representative system; and who, with the name, inherits the loyal and patriotic principles of his relative, the colleague and successor of Fossombroni.

Though the *esaltati* and sectarians did not relax their secret efforts, those parties were greatly outnumbered by the constitutionalists, and the danger of civil strife having, as it was thought, been sufficiently guarded against, no pains were spared by the government to organize a contingent for the war. Three thousand regular troops, and about the same number of volunteers were assembled, and after being reviewed by the Grand Duke, commenced their march to Lombardy, under the command of General Laugier.*

* For an account of the services of the Tuscan division, see chapter xvi.

Charles Louis Bourbon, Duke of Lucca, who chose for his minister Thomas Ward, an English stud groom, after various inconsistencies,* adopted a policy of repression; and punished such of his subjects as celebrated by public rejoicings the accession of Pio Nino: but the popular feeling ultimately prevailed, and he was obliged to seek his safety by flight.

After the death of the Archduchess, Maria Louisa, which occurred in December, 1847, Lucca, according to the stipulations of the treaty of Vienna, was merged in Tuscany, and Charles Louis became Duke of Parma, but he was driven from his new dominions as he had previously been from Lucca.

In January, 1846, Francis V., the young Duke of Modena, succeeded his father Francis IV.† Being completely under the guidance of Austria, he refused to join in the war of independence, and in March, 1848, his subjects, aided by the Bolognese, forced him to

* Charles Louis, at one period, made Lucca an asylum for political refugees from Modena. In 1834 he showed a leaning in favour of popular government, and attempted to obtain for his liberal designs the approval of Austria. He even contemplated the elevation of a Protestant banner in Italy, and is said to have renounced publicly at Trieste his allegiance to the Church of Rome. This act, whether proceeding from ambition, conviction, or levity of mind, caused terror at the Vatican, and no pains were spared to hush up and counteract so dangerous a beginning. The efforts of the Pope were seconded by those of the Jesuits, and in 1842 the Duke and some of his Court who had followed his example and declared themselves Protestants, recanted and submitted to penance.—See Farini, vol. i. p. 263.

† See note, chapter i. p. 15.

abandon his territories. After this, Modena as well as Parma adhered to the *fusione;* and both duchies were, for a few months, incorporated with the kingdom of Alta Italia, and contributed their aid to the war.

Though the gentle and civilized Tuscans regarded with intense interest, the national contest, they were by no means disposed to acquiesce in the doctrines of Mazzini, or to listen with complacency to revolutionary instigations. The main nucleus of discontent existed at Leghorn. There the population was debased by foreign influx, and augmented by the outcasts of various nations, many of whom were enrolled as members of young France or Young Italy. With such materials to work upon, it was easy for Guerrazzi to place himself at the head of a dangerous movement. He was arrested by Ridolfi on the charge of sedition, and though shortly restored to liberty did not forget or forgive the injury:—*legossi al dito l'offesa.*

The Ridolfi government being dissolved, through want of union amongst its supporters, was succeeded by one of similar principles under Gino Capponi; and the Grand Duke while he carried on the government by means of his constitutional advisers, appeared to enter with cordiality into the desires and feelings of his subjects.

When, after the fatal battle of Custoza, the mediation of France and England was accepted by Piedmont, the

Marchese Ricci was deputed by Gioberti to attend the conference at Brussels, and Ridolfi was named by Capponi as the representative of Tuscany. Little reliance was placed by the Italian patriots in that conference; for Austria, after her successes, was averse to concede. On the 2nd of December the mild and imbecile Ferdinand renounced the crown in favour of his nephew, the present Emperor, and Prince Schwarzenberg, an uncompromising enemy of Italian independence, had assumed the direction of the Imperial councils. Nevertheless it appeared important to Gioberti, and to all who viewed the condition of Italy through a less deceitful medium than that of their own impatience or ambition, to gain at least an interval for needful preparation.

After the disasters of the campaign, the malcontents of Leghorn were strengthened by the arrival of fugitive soldiers and volunteers from Lombardy, and the ominous presence of Gavazzi forboded mischief. The Padre was sent away by the government, but Guerrazzi was allowed to remain, and soon acquired an evil eminence. Massimo d'Azeglio, who was detained in Tuscany by a hurt, which he had received at Vicenza, exerted himself to sustain the authority of the government, and exposed the madness and folly of the republican conspirators, but there was no adequate military force, and the National Guard as usual in such

cases, was not to be relied upon. At that time, Montanelli, who had been wounded and taken prisoner at Curtatone, and was supposed dead, returned in safety to Florence, to the great joy and surprise of his friends. He was welcomed by Capponi, and immediately entrusted with a mission of conciliation to Leghorn. Thither he went, having received from his sovereign the appointment of governor, but he no sooner arrived there, than he made common cause with Guerrazzi, whom he had always professed to despise, proclaimed the Italian constituent, and used the insurrection as a means of forcing himself and his new ally into the places of those whom he had deceived and betrayed.

Tuscany, whose interests had long been presided over by statesmen of respectable character, now fell into the hands of political adventurers. Magnificent promises were made, and specious hopes held out, but the ministers, whose power was derived from the motley and depraved populace of Leghorn, soon found that they must obey those to whom they owed their promotion. The country was overrun by emissaries, and commissioners of the *sette*, who gave their orders to the democratic ministry. Most of the respectable Florentine families left the city, and retired to their villas, feeling that they could no longer be of any service to a sovereign who had surrendered himself and his people to such a domination.

In November, Montanelli and Guerrazzi, finding that their opponents possessed a majority in the *consiglio dei deputati*, dissolved parliament, having first vested the powers of the police in the hands of their own unscrupulous adherents. In many instances all freedom of election was destroyed; but so great was the general distrust of the democratic leaders, that they still failed to secure a majority.

In those days Gioberti, who had obtained the direction of affairs in Turin, formed a design, which has already been spoken of,* for checking the downward course of revolution, and hoped by effecting a rally of the constitutional party, to prevent the cause of independence from being irretrievably ruined. He charged the deputy Berghini to proceed to Florence, and to demand permission to send a Piedmontese force into Tuscany, which might either establish itself there or proceed onwards to the Romagna. The passage of the troops was unwillingly conceded, and the report which Berghini made, after witnessing what was going on, was not encouraging. "Little reliance," he said, "could be placed on the government, hoodwinked as it was by the Mazzinists, and hostile to the establishment of the kingdom of *Alta Italia;* because it would never give up the conceit of the *costituente a poteri illimitati*, since by means of that, it hoped to hoodwink Piedmont

* See Chapter xix.

also; for that being the lure by which the ministers had risen to power, they were afraid of falling, if they rejected it; and finally, because whatever might be the arrogance and pretensions of the occupants of office in Tuscany, they could not contribute a dollar or a soldier to the war."*

The Grand Duke tamely acquiesced in the democratic tutelage of his new ministers; but after the Pope's flight to Gaeta in November, he became melancholy and irresolute. He consented, in January 1849, to send representatives to the Italian constituent, and subsequently retired to Siena, where his family had been for some time residing. From thence, after conversing with Montanelli on public business, but without betraying the smallest hint of any such intention, he set out on the 17th of February to Santo Stefano, a fishing town on the coast, leaving behind him a document which he desired his ministers to publish, in which he declared that in order to avoid disturbances he had consented to the introduction of a law which should authorize the sending Tuscan representatives to an Italian constituent; that against any such assembly ecclesiastical censures had subsequently been issued, and that having understood that it was intended to invest the *costituente* with *unlimited* powers (mandato illimitato), he had written to consult the head of the

* Berghini's letter, quoted by Farini.—Stato Romano, vol. iii. c. vii.

church, and had received a reply to the effect that those censures did in fact impend over Tuscany and its ruler. He added that he was prepared to resign his authority sooner than incur such a misfortune.

When the Grand Duke's flight became known at Florence, the city was seized with astonishment and dismay. The ministers in the first instance held a council amongst themselves, and then communicated with the *Sollevatori.* A paid* rabble was easily collected, and being headed by one Nocciolini, a man of infamous character, invaded and overawed the legislative assembly. A provisional government was set up, and Guerrazzi, Montanelli, and Mazzoni, being named triumvirs, first proclaimed and then disavowed a republic. On the very day of Leopold's retreat to Santo Stefano, Mazzini arrived, and was received with festivities. Montanelli's ancient devotion to *Giovane Italia* received a new impulse; but Guerrazzi was averse to the project of a *fusione*, which would have made Tuscany a Roman province.

The Sardinian Minister, Count Villamarina, proceeded according to Gioberti's instructions to Santo Stefano, with assurances that Piedmont would not acquiesce in the destruction of a constitutional government, and with offers of assistance and hospitality.

* Quaranta scudi, tratti dal publico tesoro, tiravano cotestoro in piazza. —Farini, vol. iii. lib. v. c. i.

The whole diplomatic body shortly afterwards joined the Court, and was informed by the Grand Duke that he accepted the generous offer of the King of Sardinia, but that he had no intention of leaving Santo Stefano, unless affairs took an unfavourable turn, in which case it was his intention to proceed to Gaeta, or Spezzia. The ambassadors then expressed an opinion that he should remain if possible in his own territory, and to this suggestion he replied, That he would go to Viareggio or Massa, and so place himself in the midst of his own troops, and in the vicinity of the Piedmontese forces.

Meantime, the Tuscan Triumvirs dissolved parliament, and convoked a general assembly to be elected by universal suffrage, upon which General Laugier, commandant of the Tuscan troops, marched from the Piedmontese frontier, where he was posted, and combined measures with the constitutionalists for the restoration of Leopold. These arrangements, supported as they were by Piedmont, disconcerted the plans of the democrats, and though Guerrazzi and his friends did their best to excite a civil war, the term of their power seemed likely to be cut short; but it was prolonged, for a while, by a sudden vacillation in the councils of the sovereign.

Influenced by communications from the legitimatist camerilla of Gaeta, by a letter from the Austrian

ambassador, and by one from the Pope himself, the Grand Duke again assembled the diplomatic body, and announced that he had received information that Austria would by no means consent to the occupation of Tuscany by Piedmont, and that should any such attempt be made, Radetzky would march upon Turin. He declared that he would never be the cause of the misfortunes which thus threatened the King of Sardinia—that he therefore renounced the proffered support of the Piedmontese troops, and had sent orders to General Laugier, to desist from the enterprise with which he had been entrusted. It was suggested by one of the diplomatists, that there had not been time for any resolution of the Austrian government, as to the proposed Piedmontese occupation of Tuscany; and also that the threatened invasion of the Sardinian States was not likely to be hastily decided upon by Austria, or to be acquiesced in by France and England. The Grand Duke appeared to be impressed by these considerations, and had actually written a second letter to Charles Albert, when a roar of cannon at Orbetello announced the proclamation of the republic,* and a report was brought that the *Livornesi* were coming. Though an English frigate and steam ship were in the port, the Court was greatly alarmed, and

* The republic was first proclaimed at Leghorn, by Carlo Pigly, who had been appointed governor by Montanelli on the 17th of February.

the Grand Duke having once more summoned the foreign ministers, spoke of the dangers which threatened, and of the violent proceedings of the provisional government; and added, that matters having arrived at such an extremity, he must remove his family to Gaeta. The ambassadors once more advised him not to abandon his faithful subjects, who had already incurred all risks in order to secure his restoration. Nevertheless, on the following day, the 21st of February, Leopold embarked on board the *Bull-Dog*, and joined the conclave at Gaeta. This event caused lively regret to those who, appreciating his father's virtues and his own good qualities, had considered him worthy to occupy the position of an independent Italian Prince: it was celebrated with vain rejoicings by the revolutionists of Rome and Tuscany, and hailed by the reactionary party as a step towards the accomplishment of their own ultimate triumph.*

On the 25th of March the Tuscan constituent met, declared Guerrazzi dictator, and declined the *fusione* with the Roman States, which had been planned and recommended by Mazzini. After this, Montanelli betook himself to Genoa, with a view to support the republican insurrection there, and subsequently proceeded on a mission to Paris.

* "Non l'aspettavamo *così presto*," was the remark by which one of the courtly circle accompanied his congratulations on the accession obtained by the Grand Duke's arrival.

The Neapolitan exile and sectarian La Cecilia, whose connexion with Roman affairs was mentioned in the nineteenth chapter, raised himself into notice during the ferments at Leghorn. This man was recommended for promotion by Carlo Pigly, who had been entrusted by the revolutionary government with the management of the restless *Livornesi*. He was, notwithstanding his notorious bad character, appointed Consul at Civita Vecchia, and, being possessed of considerable energy and abilities, was subsequently employed at Rome by Montanelli, to stimulate the revolution, and push forward the design of an Italian constituent with unlimited powers, of which the Roman constituent was regarded as the nucleus.*

The gentle and hospitable Florentines were condemned to see their character belied by the acts of an infuriated populace. The constitutionalist leaders were burnt in effigy. D'Azeglio, who, having received a hurt at Vicenza, had not yet recovered his strength, was threatened and driven from the city; and the blindness of the venerable Capponi did not exempt him from insult. The popular reaction and counter-revolution which followed, will be noticed in the twenty-third chapter.

* Farini, vol. iii. lib. iv. p. 147.

CHAPTER XXII.

The Novara campaign—State of parties—The Pope demands aid of Austria France, Spain and Naples—Disappointments and resignation of Gioberti—Defective state of the Piedmontese army—Resumption of hostilities—Chrzanowski appointed to the chief command—Misconduct of Ramorino—The Austrians effect the passage of the Ticino—Defeat and demoralization of the Piedmontese at Novara—Abdication of Charles Albert—Victor Emanuel II. concludes an armistice—Ill-timed insurrection and cruel fate of Brescia—Revolt of Genoa, its capture by General La Marmora—The King accepts and maintains the constitution—Massimo d'Azeglio minister—Count Balbo's mission to Gaeta—Results of constitutional government in the Sardinian states.

In February 1849, the progress of revolution at Rome and Florence, and the announcement of an Italian constituent assembly, with unlimited powers, having destroyed all chance of reconciliation, the Neapolitan troops were put in motion, and the courtiers of Gaeta began to boast that Austria and Naples would soon re-establish the old régime. Their hopes were ultimately fulfilled, but not without many intervening fears, nor in the way which had been anticipated. France declared that in the case of an Austrian intervention, she must also take a part; and Piedmont together with offers of assistance, announced that the entry of the Imperial troops into the Romagna would

be accounted a *casus belli.* The desire to exclude foreign interference was, in the first instance, supported by the French minister, who recommended that the arms of Naples should be associated with those of Sardinia.*

The Pope and his advisers were distrustful of Piedmont, and not less so of republican France. "*Le armi Francesi,*" said Antonelli, "*non possono essere sicuro presidio del Papa.*" Nevertheless, the Court of Rome was too politic to give open offence to the greatest of Catholic powers. The unhappy condition of Tuscany, and the excesses of the *Livornesi,* afforded an additional reason for avoiding any further delay, and on the 18th of February, a note was addressed by the Cardinal Secretary to the whole diplomatic body, announcing that the aid of Austria, France, Spain, and Naples had been solicited by his Holiness.

Piedmont, whose offers were rejected,† was overwhelmed with internal difficulties. Gioberti had dissolved the parliament, in the hope of obtaining a new one which would enter more readily into his views, as to a reconcilement of parties through the re-establishment of constitutional monarchy. In this expectation he was disappointed; for the democrats, making use of his name and popularity, obtained a majority and immediately voted against him.

* Farini, vol. iii. lib. v. chapter iii. † See chapter xix.

When the Pope and the Grand Duke declined his offers, the plans of the Abbé were entirely disconcerted. Those plans, which have already been explained, are praised by Farini as *forti ed arditi consigli:* and such indeed they were: but Gioberti desired to make Piedmont assume the position of umpire in a way which neither the Pope, the republicans, or Austria would tolerate. His scheme encountered the opposition of his own colleagues, as well as that of the King and the chambers. Had Louis-Philippe continued to reign, England and France, acting in concert, might have afforded the requisite support and encouragement to the constitutionalists, but it was difficult for the French republic to recommend to its neighbours a re-establishment of monarchical institutions.

On the 18th of February, 1849, Gioberti, already branded as a traitor by the republicans, retired; and the generals Chiodo and Colli, during a short interval, successively presided over the Sardinian counsels. The state of parties in Italy was such, as to afford but little choice either of measures or of time. The impatience of the *esaltati* left to Charles Albert no better alternative than that of rushing into a war for which he was insufficiently prepared, or else of submitting to a separate and ignominious peace.

When the misfortunes of the first campaign had increased the ascendency of the democrats and Maz-

zinists, they boasted that the war of the princes having terminated, that of the people would begin: from that moment, peace on any attainable terms was scoffed at. The enfranchisement of the Milanese was considered insufficient unless accompanied by a total relinquishment, on the part of the Imperial government, of the Venetian territories. Such were the pretensions with which the *esaltati* insisted on a renewal of the contest.

The intimate relations recently entered into by the Pope and the Grand Duke with Austria, gave to the republicans the appearance of standing alone in a cause for which they professed much, and did nothing; for they only made use of the war question as a lever by which they hoped to accomplish in Piedmont, what they had already effected in the Roman and Tuscan states.

When, on the 12th of March, the pacific counsels of the French President were rejected, and the armistice was renounced, General Colli, being persuaded that neither the state of the army, or the feeling of the country, were such as to justify a resumption of hostilities, resigned his post as minister, and De Ferrari being named as his successor, drew up a manifesto defending the views and motives of Piedmont.

War being determined upon, Signor Valerio was sent to solicit the aid of Rome and Tuscany. The revolutionary rulers of Tuscany were neither able nor

willing to afford any valid assistance, and at Rome the extreme section of the republicans was averse to join in an enterprise in which a kingly government took the lead. This excess of party feeling was condemned by Saffi, the Minister for the Interior, and deprecated by Mazzini himself, who declared that there existed but two sorts of Italians, those who were ready to stand forward in the cause of independence, and those who were not. The enthusiasm of 1848 was once more rekindled. Hatred and distrust were, for a while, exorcised. At that moment, says Farini, "*Tutti ci sentimmo di nuovo migliori;*" but the sectarian poison had been long and copiously administered, the antidote came too late, and the amendment was transitory and delusive.

During the suspension of hostilities, the numerical strength of the Piedmontese infantry had been increased, but its effectiveness was impaired by the want of experienced officers, and the cavalry and artillery, though good, were deficient in numbers.

The violence and injustice of the revolutionary press had disgusted the loyal soldiers of Charles Albert, and destroyed all harmony of feeling between them and the democratic volunteers of Lombardy. Bava and the other generals who had conducted the operations of the preceding campaign, were completely ruined in public estimation by the unscrupulous criti-

cisms of the journalists. Some change had become necessary, and the Polish general, Chrzanowski, who had attained a certain celebrity during the contest with Russia in 1831, was appointed to the chief command. Though cognizant of the art and theory of war, the new leader laboured under the disadvantage of being unacquainted with the language and customs of the country, nor does he appear to have possessed the higher endowments of a military chief.

It was evident that with an army thus composed and commanded, offensive operations could not be attempted without extreme risk. Nevertheless, deputations were constantly arriving at head quarters which urged the King to undertake at once some important enterprise. The army, consisting of about 85,000 men, was formed into seven divisions, commanded by the King's two sons, by Generals Perrone, Bes, and La Marmora, by Giovanni Durando, who, in the previous campaign had led the Pontifical forces, and by Ramorino. The last was an *eroe da club*, who being forced upon the King and the ministry by the democrats, obtained the command of the Lombard division. This individual was already too well known as the leader of the *scorreria di Savoia* in 1831.

The disposable force of Austria amounted to about 90,000 combatants; many of the regiments were composed of Hungarians and Italians. The revolution of

Vienna and the revolt of Hungary had severely tried the subordination and fidelity of these troops. Desertions had taken place, but they were not numerous. The general could still depend upon his army, and his excellent commissariat formed a contrast to that of his opponents.

Chrzanowski knew the defects of the army placed under his direction, but he had not the moral courage to declare them. The 20th of March was the day fixed for the resumption of hostilities, and he left the government to suppose that he should then be in a condition to undertake offensive operations. The Sardinian ministers weakly imagined that Radetzky would be taken by surprise, when in fact he was acquainted with their plans, both from the newspapers in which they were propounded and discussed, and also from his own spies and agents, many of whom were at that time figuring as orators in the Piazze. At Rome and Florence, the denouncement of the armistice was hailed with wordy ebullitions, and levies *en masse* were talked of, but the republican governments were more intent on overturning the thrones of Naples and Piedmont, than on emancipating Italy from the dominion of the *Straniero*. Venice was fully occupied in her own defence, and it was evident that no important insurrectionary movement could be counted upon, unless preceded by decisive successes.

Notwithstanding these adverse circumstances, there was a total neglect of the precautions by which the consequences of a reverse might have been mitigated. No intrenched camp had been formed to which a worsted army could retire; nor was the genius of Chrzanowski competent to form any device to remedy these omissions. By a bold invasion of the Milanese, he would have endangered Radetzky's communications, but he does not appear to have understood or appreciated the maxim, that a country is often better defended by movements than by positions.

While the divisions which composed the Sardinian army were still scattered, those of the Austrians were assembled in the neighbourhood of Pavia. Radetzky secured to himself the advantage of the initiative, and determined to fight a battle before the Piedmontese could be concentrated. Ramorino, who had received instructions to occupy La Cava, to defend the passage of the Ticino, and, if the opportunity offered, to take possession of Pavia, disobeyed his orders, and remained on the right bank of the Po, sending only a small detachment of his force to the point where the whole of it was required. D'Aspre was thus enabled to cross the Ticino on the 20th of March, without any serious opposition; and the Austrian army, amounting to 70,000 men with 200 pieces of cannon, obtained a footing on the Piedmontese territory.

Ramorino, who ought never to have been entrusted with any command whatever, was summoned to head quarters, superseded, and subsequently condemned and executed.

The details of the successive engagements which, during the following days, took place at Mortara, La Bicocca,* and under the walls of Novara, and which ended in the complete discomfiture and demoralization of the Piedmontese army, would possess, at this day, little general interest. The numerical loss sustained by the vanquished did not greatly exceed that inflicted upon their opponents; but the ranks of the infantry had fallen in complete disorder. The conduct of Ramorino was regarded by the Piedmontese soldiers as premeditated treason. In their anger and disgust they refused to obey the commands or listen to the exhortations of their officers. After the beaten army had retired into the city of Novara, lamentable excesses were perpetrated, and their continuance was only prevented by the employment of force.

Charles Albert, who had exposed himself to all the perils of the conflicts, in which he had three horses shot under him, sent an officer to propose a truce, but Radetzky replied by inadmissible demands. He insisted upon the surrender of Alexandria, and in-

* In this action the brave Perrone was killed while attempting to rally his division.

sinuating that he could not rely upon the King's word, required the Duke of Genoa as an hostage.

Upon this, Charles Albert consulted his generals as to the possibility of a retreat upon Alexandria, and being assured of its impracticability, at once resigned the crown in favour of the Duke of Savoy, and became an exile from the land which he had generously, though not wisely, striven to liberate.

The internal condition of the Sardinian states, as well as the complete disorganization of the army, imposed upon his successor the necessity of terminating hostilities. Radetzky had nothing more to gain, and might have aroused the jealousy of France by a march upon Turin. He was, moreover, glad to be at liberty to quell the spirit of insurrection in Lombardy, and to watch over Austrian interests elsewhere. An armistice was concluded on the 24th of March, and though Piedmont was compelled to bear the expenses of the war, the terms insisted upon were not unreasonable.

The campaign of the preceding year had occupied a period of four months, and its misfortunes had been chequered and relieved by many circumstances of an encouraging character. That which has just been described, was brought to a more decisive and inglorious conclusion during the brief interval of four days.

The Cabinet of Turin, in estimating the chances of

success, appears to have been misled by an undue reliance on insurrectionary movements in Lombardy. Preparations of this nature were undoubtedly in progress, and though Milan was kept in awe by the citadel, the departure of the Austrians to the war was, in some of the northern towns, the signal for a rising. These attempts, which were fomented by bodies of Italian refugees who issued from the Swiss frontier, were frustrated by the defeat of the Piedmontese army. Brescia alone unfurled in earnest the banner of revolt. That city, the second in Lombardy, then contained a population of 40,000. It was the first to adopt the *fusione* in 1848, and had evinced no little energy in the prosecution of the war.

The insurrection commenced on the very day of the battle of Novara. The small garrison which had been left in the citadel was able to resist the attacks of the insurgents, till General Haynau arrived from Padua with a force of from 3000 to 4000 men. The unfortunate Brescians were thus hemmed in, and exposed at once to the fire of the citadel and that of a besieging force. Buoyed up by the assurances of reckless agitators, they would not believe the accounts given to them by the Austrians of the termination of the campaign. A desperate but useless resistance was persevered in. Each house was the scene of some deadly conflict, and Brescia, wasted by fire and the sword,

was subjected at length to the rapacity and cruelty of a remorseless victor.

Genoa had long been a centre of republican intrigue, through which the democrat rulers of Rome and Tuscany maintained communications with their partizans in Upper Italy. Even before the battle of Novara, the city was full of refugees and adventurers, and the defeat and abdication of Charles Albert appeared to favour the long cherished designs of Mazzini against the monarchical institutions of the Sardinian states. The agents of Young Italy were busily employed in reviving the old jealousy of the Genoese against Piedmont, and the disasters of the war were attributed to the treason of a sovereign who had risked his life and sacrificed a throne in its prosecution. The revolt began on the 31st of March: the garrison consisted of about 3000 regular troops, but many of the most important posts had been confided to the National Guard, which took part with the insurgents. A contest was maintained for some days, in which the Palazzo Doria, the noble monument of Andrea's greatness, suffered much injury. A capitulation was then agreed to, and the troops surrendered the arsenal and evacuated the city, leaving behind them a small number of the soldiers who were induced to abandon their colours. A provisional government was established, and the arsenal furnished arms and ammunition, both

to the population of Genoa and to that of the neighbouring coast. The insurgents were encouraged by the promised aid of the Lombard division, and also by the fact that the Sardinian navy was principally manned by Genoese. An insurrection which had thus obtained a footing in one of the strongest and best fortified cities of Europe, began to assume a formidable aspect.

Fortunately for the Sardinian monarchy, and not less so for the best interests of Genoa itself, the task of quelling this rebellion was entrusted to an officer of energy and ability. Alfonso La Marmora was at that moment withdrawing his division from the Duchy of Parma in fulfilment of the terms of the armistice. By a rapid march he anticipated the Lombard division, which, against the wishes of a portion of its officers, was hastening to join the Genoese insurgents. Before the spirit of revolt had time to develope itself, the decisive measures of La Marmora were attended with the desired effect, and, after a brief struggle, the municipality, supported by a large portion of the inhabitants, set the provisional government at defiance, and treated for a surrender. An amnesty was conceded, in which all, except the leaders, were included. After this, the agitators relaxed their efforts, and the bulk of the population beheld with thankfulness the re-establishment of tranquillity and order. Piedmont intent on repairing the losses of the war, necessarily assumed a

passive attitude, but the government, presided over by Massimo d'Azeglio, adhered to a wisely liberal policy. The first act of Victor Emmanuel II., was to swear fidelity to the constitution—an oath which has been faithfully observed. The provocations and misdoings of the Mazzinists were multiplied. The temptation to reaction was potent, but the loyalty and good sense of the youthful sovereign and of his minister prevailed, and to their consistency and moderation, in a season of no ordinary difficulty, one portion of Italy is indebted for the preservation of freedom and independence.

When in the summer of 1849, the intervention of a French army had prepared the way for the Pope's restoration, Count Balbo was, at the instance of D'Azeglio, despatched to Gaeta. While the representatives of other powers instigated or acquiesced in the contemplated abrogation of civil institutions in the Roman states, the Sardinian envoy, whose veneration for the papal authority was not less sincere than his patriotism, pleaded for the maintenance of the Pontiff's engagements, and for the preservation of the *Statuto Ma i suoi ragionamenti, non fecero frutto :* * nor were similar exhortations addressed to the Courts of Naples and Tuscany attended with any better result.

The renewal of pacific relations with Austria, in no degree altered the independent attitude of Piedmont.

* Farini, Stato Romano, vol. iv. ç. ix. p. 194.

The constitutional government, piloted by D'Azeglio and Cavour through the shoals and quicksands which endangered the commencement of its career, though prepared for war, has successfully cultivated the arts of peace. A vast increase of public wealth has alleviated the pecuniary burdens incurred during the national struggle, and within the Sardinian boundaries, a generous hospitality has constantly been experienced by the exiles of less favoured regions.

CHAPTER XXIII.

The Papal court is averse to the views of the French government, and desires an unconditional restoration—Overtures of the French agents to the constitutionalists—Effect of the tidings from Novara—Mazzini, Armellini and Saffi, Triumvirs—Counter-revolution in Tuscany—Affairs of Naples and Sicily—Prevalence of outrage and assassination in the Roman States—Renewed attempts of France to combine measures with the constitutionalists—The intended occupation of Civita Vecchia is announced—The Roman government prepares for resistance—Landing of General Oudinot—He marches upon Rome and is repulsed—Roman delegates in London — Devastations caused by the Committees of Defence—Proceedings in the French Assembly—Mission of M. Lesseps and conclusion of an armistice—Roman expedition against the Neapolitans—Bologna surrenders to the Austrians—Inconsistencies and recall of Lesseps—Recommencement of hostilities—Failure of a revolutionary attempt at Paris—A breach being effected, the French prepare to storm —The Assembly declares further resistance useless—Resignation of the Triumvirs—Their successors—Last acts of the republic—Adventures of Garibaldi—The Pope avoids giving any pledge—Popular indignation against the French—Restoration and acts of the ecclesiastical authorities—The Pope's return and subsequent position.

BEFORE describing the struggles which marked the conclusion of the war of independence, it is important to call attention to the mode in which successive events paved the way for the Pope's unconditional restoration, and to mark the gradual steps by which Pio Nono and his advisers appear to have arrived at a determination

to dispense with and repudiate the *Statuto*. That compact had been freely entered into by the sovereign, its terms had been deliberately settled by his own ecclesiastical advisers,* and framed by them in such a manner as they deemed consistent with the peculiar nature of the Pontifical government.

The disavowal of such an engagement was a bold and, perhaps, irreparable step, and would seem to preclude all hope that the inherent weakness and prostration of the Papacy, as a temporal power, can be remedied by civil institutions; or that its dominion will ever be rendered tolerable through any recognition of reciprocal rights, on the part of the sovereign and of the people.

Before the commencement of the campaign of 1849, the French government, hoping to restore peace and order through its own mediation, sent M. Mercier to Italy with the design of dissuading Charles Albert from a renewal of the war. Having failed in the accomplishment of that object, M. Mercier proceeded to Gaeta, and after he had made himself acquainted with the posture of affairs, was charged by the Duc d'Harcourt with a mission to Rome. He was directed to declare to the persons then in possession of power and influence, that a restoration of the Pope's temporal authority being determined upon by Europe, the only

* See chapters xii. and xiii.

choice which remained to them was either to submit to force, or else to demand a mediation.

After an inconclusive interview with Armellini, M. Mercier conferred with Mamiani, to whom he was the bearer of a letter from d'Harcourt, inviting the co-operation of the moderate party in the re-establishment of constitutional monarchy.

It appears that no difficulty was then contemplated as to the Pope's inclination to respect the *statuto*, and M. Mercier bore witness that Cardinal Antonelli was quite angry if any one expressed a doubt on that subject.

Mamiani, having consulted with some of his friends, replied to the French plenipotentiary, that a people of three millions ought to be allowed to choose its own form of government, but recommended, that since foreign intervention was inevitable, France should make a public declaration to that effect; that she should guarantee the liberties conceded by the *statuto*, and invite the constitutionalists and national guard to interpose between the extreme parties. M. Mercier, after promising his good offices, returned to Gaeta.

On the 27th of March, when the fatal tidings from Novara became known to the Roman government, Signor Valerio, the Sardinian envoy, was requested to explain to the assembly his views as to the nature of the crisis. His statements led to the conclusion that

the damage was not irreparable, and orders were given that the troops should march that very night to the succour of Piedmont.

The executive power was immediately concentrated in a triumvirate, in which Armellini and Saffi * were associated with the chief of Young Italy, who wielded, in reality, the powers of a dictator.

The revolt of Genoa raised, for a short interval, the hopes of the republicans; but Mazzini had soon the bitter task of announcing to the assembly the disappointment of his own sanguine expectations, and the submission of his native city to General La Marmora.

This decisive blow was followed by a counter-revolution in Tuscany, where democratic license prepared the way for a spontaneous reaction. The *sollevatori* of Leghorn had conducted a mixed and dissolute rabble by railway to Florence, and Guerrazzi himself became alarmed at the lawless and disgraceful conduct of those by whom he had been raised to a dictatorship. The indignation of the peaceable and industrious Florentines was at length aroused, and they declared that the time was come *per finirla coi Livornesi.* After a bloody contest the intruders were expelled, and Guerrazzi was glad to escape the wrath of the people by shutting himself up in the fort of San Giovanni. Alarmed by the failure of the republican cause at Genoa, he desired,

* See chapter xix.

when it was too late, to make his peace with the supporters of legitimacy, protesting that he too was anxious for a restoration. He was nevertheless detained in prison;* and the municipality assumed the government in the name of the Grand Duke.

About the beginning of March the King of Naples, accepting the mediation of France and England, consented to put an end to the contest which was then raging at Palermo, on the condition that a separate parliament and administration should be secured to Sicily; but the members of the provisional government† rashly rejected these terms, and were ultimately reduced to an unconditional submission.

Piedmont having retired from the contest, Lombardy was at the mercy of Austria, but Venice still maintained her attitude of defiance. Her efforts, which will be described in the next chapter, were prolonged till the 2nd of August, when they terminated in a capitulation.

Notwithstanding the general discouragement, Mazzini resolved to persevere, and was assisted by Sterbini and Galletti in his attempts to secure the popular support. The tax on salt was reduced, and the property of religious corporations was divided amongst the needy; a redeemable rent-charge being reserved to the state.

The Austrian army was already approaching from

* After a protracted detention and trial, Guerrazzi received a sentence of banishment.

† See page 129.

Ferrara; the Spaniards, under Cordova, had landed at Fiumicino; and the Neapolitan forces were assembling on the frontier; but the unfortunate inhabitants of the Roman states were then groaning under a misery more degrading than foreign invasion. The laws had ceased to afford protection, and the outcasts of society had an opportunity which they did not neglect, of wreaking their vengeance on those whom they regarded as their oppressors. This was an evil which from the time of the first meeting of the assembly had urgently required a remedy, and Saffi, then minister for the interior, appears to have felt severely the helplessness of his position, and to have exerted himself, but without much success, for the restoration of some kind of order. Proclamations and decrees were published in rapid succession, but such displays on the part of the triumvirs and the ministers were fruitless. Their enactments were a dead letter, and the perpetrators of crime were in too many instances shielded, as indispensable supporters of the dominant faction. In Rome barbarous and unheard of outrages* were committed with impunity; the provincial cities were reduced to a still more abject condition. In Ancona, men of ruined reputation were invested with magisterial authority, and uniting the functions of judge and executioner

* See Farini, lib. v. c. iv.; and lib. vi. chapters iii. and viii. where the deliberate butcheries of Zambianchi are described.

glutted their private enmities, and their avarice. "Happy was the man," says Farini, "who was enabled to save his life by flight, or to ransom it for gold." In the other towns the same reign of terror prevailed.

The constitutionalists, having no banner, were unable to effect a rally. M. d'Harcourt, who would gladly have seen the re-establishment of monarchy at Rome and Florence accompanied by civil institutions, commissioned M. Mercier a second time to negotiate with the leaders of the moderate party in the Roman states, and to see whether the National Guard and Carabineers could be gained over. Unfortunately the French diplomatist could extract no pledge from Cardinal Antonelli, who, as the Pope's prospects improved, became every day more anxious for an *unconditional* restoration, nor were they empowered to give any guarantee on behalf of their own government. Under these circumstances a rising of the constitutionalists would have been useless and unjustifiable, and all that could be hoped for by d'Harcourt was some expression from the municipalities, favourable to French intervention. In compliance with the wishes of M. Barrot and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Mamiani who saw clearly that such an intervention afforded the best remaining hope, exhorted the Bolognese constitutionalists to set an example, and drew up for their adoption an address to Louis Napoleon. In this document the Prince President was reminded

of having once borne arms against papal oppression,* and the fullest confidence was expressed, that any arrangement sanctioned by France under his auspices, would be accompanied by sure guarantees for future good government.

Though the Bolognese municipality consisted chiefly of constitutionalists, it was deterred from the required demonstration by the known resolution of the Pope and of those by whom he was surrounded, to resist any pledge for the maintenance of the *statuto*, and also by the inability of the French diplomatists to give any definite assurance that such a pledge would be insisted upon.

An invasion had now become imminent; and on the 18th of April, the Roman assembly, on the proposition of the deputy, Audinot, who foresaw the coming storm, decided that a statement should be drawn up and addressed to the French assembly, and the English parliament. In this manifesto, the Roman republic declared its readiness to admit the spiritual jurisdiction of the Pope, but justified the abolition of his temporal authority, and deprecated the restoration of a government, irreconcilably opposed to freedom and civilization. The aid of France and Great Britain was invoked to save a people of three millions from a state of hopeless bondage, and to preserve Italy from those evils which

* See page 143.

the existence of such a government in her centre was calculated to perpetuate.*

General Cavaignac's announcement of an intended French intervention, in favour of the Pope, has already been alluded to, and about the middle of April 1849, M. Drouyn de Lhuys intimated through the French minister at Vienna, that as the intentions of Prince Schwarzenberg with regard to Italy were notorious, France would take measures to assert her just influence, by sending troops to the Pontifical states. M. de Lhuys at the same time expressed his belief that the inhabitants of those states were weary of revolutionary government, and would hail with pleasure the return of the Pope, as soon as they could feel themselves secure against a reaction. The object of the French expedition was, he said, to facilitate a reconciliation.

The Duc d'Harcourt was then instructed to suggest to Cardinal Antonelli the publication of a manifesto guaranteeing to the Pope's subjects institutions suited to the requirements of the age.

M. Odillon Barrot, the president of the council, being interrogated in the assembly as to the intentions of his government, replied, that it wished to preserve the just influence of France, and to give its support to liberal institutions. General Lamoriciere expressed

* Stato Romano, lib. v. c. vii.

himself in a similar strain; and the assembly approved the expedition. General Oudinot was appointed to the command, and received written instructions from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, by which he was informed that the re-establishment of order in such a manner as might be consistent with the rights and wishes of the people, was to be the object of his mission. He was desired on his arrival at Civita Vecchia, to place himself in communication with M. d'Harcourt and M. de Rayneval, the representatives of France at Gaeta; and was told, that by marching upon Rome he would expedite that object, and restore courage to the well disposed.

Before leaving Marseilles, the French General addressed an order of the day to his troops, bearing date the 20th of April, in which he made no mention of the Pope, but spoke of the expedition as intended to protect the inhabitants of the Roman states against all dictation or tyranny, whether proceeding from foreign interference, or domestic faction.

On the 24th, the proceedings of the French government became known at Rome; but the departure of the expedition was not considered as imminent, and hopes were entertained that its purposes would not, at all events, be hostile. That very day a steamer arrived at Civita Vecchia with an aide-de-camp of General Oudinot, who requested the Governor to give orders for the admission of the French forces. The same

officer was the bearer of a letter which might well be expected to rouse the jealousy of the Roman republicans: for the French commander therein declared that the object of his government was *to put an end to the condition under which the population had groaned during many months*, and to facilitate an order of things, equally distinct from the *anarchy of recent times*, and from the abuses which had prevailed prior to the elevation of Pio Nono.

The Governor replied by refusing to permit a landing till he had received instructions from Rome. Orders for resistance were promptly conveyed to him, but the populace at Civita Vecchia, being cajoled by General Oudinot's aide-de-camp, Espivent, tumultuously opposed their execution; and the French soldiers, uttering cries of *Vivent les deux républiques*, were disembarked without further hindrance.

After a hasty and excited deliberation, the assembly and the triumvirs resolved to repel force by force. The French commander suggested in vain that an Austrian invasion was imminent, and that Rome, if left by France to her own resources, must soon be reduced to submission. Armellini and Saffi were at first inclined to attend to this argument, but Mazzini stood firm, and the voices of the deputies were united with the cries of those who filled the public galleries, in condemning any attempt to negotiate,

Preparations for resistance then commenced. The Carabineers and other regular troops which had been sent to the frontier, under the command of General Roselli, were recalled. The National Guard, whose devotion to the republic was by no means universal, was reviewed by the members of the assembly, and harangued by Sterbini. The popular feeling was then declared to be unanimous, high pay was held out to all who enrolled themselves as combatants, and assurances were reiterated that the French nation would speedily disavow the acts of its government. Enrico Cernuschi, a Milanese who had distinguished himself in the struggles of the *cinque giorni*, and who, like Mazzini, had been honoured with a place in the constituent assembly, was entrusted to superintend the barricades.

The party called Catholic, a very powerful one in France, was impatient for Oudinot's advance upon Rome, and believed that he would be received as a liberator. The French ministers were also impatient, because they expected that when once their troops were in possession of the city, they would be able to overcome the obstinacy of the Papal Court.

On the 28th of April, Oudinot having published an order of the day in which he declared that the Pope had been banished, and the Roman republic set up by a factious minority, put his forces in motion, and his

followers encouraged each other in the assurance "*Les Italiens ne se battent pas.*"

Incredible exertions had been made to place the crumbling walls and gates in a state of defence. Garibaldi with a division of about 3000, in which his own *vieilles moustaches* were intermixed with brave and hot blooded Italian recruits, took up a position outside, between Porta Portese, and Porta San Pancrazio. Placards were posted on the line of march appealing to the republican sympathies of the French soldiers.

On the morning of the 30th, General Oudinot commenced a somewhat careless attack. His troops after experiencing a vigorous and unexpected resistance in their front, were assailed in flank by Garibaldi, whose furious onslaught, though at first repulsed, being supported by fresh troops, was ultimately successful. After a loss of 300 killed, and as many prisoners, the French troops were withdrawn, and Oudinot wrote to his government, demanding numerous and prompt reinforcements.

Success achieved against an enemy by whom their efforts had been despised, inspired the defenders of Rome with unbounded exultation. It was vainly hoped that the valour displayed by the garrison would have its effect elsewhere.

Since the departure of the Pope, *oratori* and agents

had, on various occasions, been sent to London and Paris, commissioned to buy arms, and procure money, or invested with diplomatic functions. Those who were thus employed in the French capital received a twofold commission, being accredited to the parties who were conspiring to overturn the government* as well as to the government itself. After the repulse of Oudinot, Accursi, an active Mazzinist, was directed to proceed to Paris; and the deputy Marioni, being at that time in London, was instructed to sound the feelings of the English cabinet and public. He obtained from Lord Palmerston, nothing more than a repetition of the same prudent and judicious counsels, which had previously been bestowed by that statesman upon his predecessor, Canuti, who had been sent by Mamiani, and had been courteously received, as an envoy whose objects were peace and reconciliation.

In a letter dated May 23rd, Marioni made a faithful report as to the unwillingness of England to interfere in behalf of the Roman republic. That letter was concealed by Mazzini, but before its arrival, Rusconi, resigning the portfolio of foreign affairs into his hands, undertook a journey to London, and, at the request of Lord Palmerston, made a written statement of his views and objects; but failed in effecting anything either there or at Paris, which he visited on his return.

* Stato Romano, libro v. c. vii.

While the French were waiting for reinforcements, the triumvirs, ministers, and commissioners of defence, harangued the people, exhorting them to defend the city as the Palladium of Italian liberty. A holy and interminable war was proclaimed against the *Straniero*, and the temporal dominion of the Pope was denounced as contrary to the doctrine of the Saviour.

The cessation of commerce, and the flight of the wealthier inhabitants, increased the financial difficulties, and though severe measures of confiscation were resorted to, the peculations of officials often intercepted the requisite supplies. Committees of defence commenced their labours of devastation, in the execution of which, the love of plunder and many a private grudge, found occasion for indulgence. During the progress of these alleged works of necessity, many of the beautiful villas which encircle Rome were irreparably injured. The noble gardens of the Villa Borghese, which, being open to the public, were the pride and solace of all classes, and whose diversified attractions of temples, fountains, statues, stately groves, and cheerful lawns, had long been the admiration of foreigners, were ruthlessly destroyed.

In the French Assembly, M. Barrot and his colleagues were charged with favouring the interests of the Pope and of absolutism, under the pretence of protecting Italian liberties from the rage of Austria.

The explanations rendered by the ministers were not considered satisfactory, and the Assembly came to a resolution that the government should be invited to adopt such measures as might prevent the Italian expedition from being used in furtherance of objects different from those which it had been sent to secure. The cabinet acquiesced, or appeared to acquiesce, and agreed to nominate M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, as a diplomatic agent who was to direct the proceedings of the General.

On the 7th of May, Garibaldi sallied forth to Palestrina, and after a successful skirmish with the Neapolitans, returned to Rome on the 12th. M Lesseps arrived on the 15th, and was preceded by Accursi, who made a favourable report of the disposition of the French ministry; but the instructions* delivered to the new diplomatic agent, which were accompanied by an injunction from the Prince President, that the army should on no account act in concert with the Austrian or Neapolitan forces, do not appear to have differed very widely from those previously given to General Oudinot.

M. de Lesseps, in a conference with the triumvirs declared that he came to ascertain the truth, as to the opinions and feelings of the people. On the 17th, hostilities were, at his desire, suspended, and the news

* See M. de Lesseps' instructions, quoted by Farini, vol. iv. c. iii.

of this event, combined with the haughty and repulsive demeanour of the French authorities, caused no little alarm in the camp of King Ferdinand, where a number of priests and dignitaries of the Church were congregated. The moment being favourable, General Roselli, who had lately returned from the frontier, and was invested with the supreme command of the Roman forces, marched against the Neapolitans, who retired from Albano, in the direction of Velletri. Garibaldi who accompanied him, having advanced to within a mile of the town, was attacked by superior forces, but succeeded in repulsing them. Roselli coming up to his support, prepared to assault Velletri the next morning, and met with no resistance; the King having withdrawn his forces, not without considerable confusion, during the night.

This affair, in which the loss of both parties amounted to about 100 men, was exaggerated into an important victory.

Roselli wished to reconduct the army to Rome and to improve its defences, and would thus have been ready, had the relations with France taken a favourable turn, to have marched against the Austrians, whose forces in Umbria and in the neighbourhood of Ancona, were somewhat isolated. Garibaldi, whose successful temerity had rendered him more than ever popular, was allowed to remain with 6,000 men, but

effected nothing more than the dispersion of some small bands which had erected the papal banner within the Neapolitan confines. When recalled, to assist in the defence of Rome, he returned with recruited ranks; for outlaws and brigands * of various nations had joined his standard; and the savage and truculent appearance of his host helped to overawe such of the citizens as were lukewarm in the cause. Though attracted by no higher motive than the hope of plunder and free quarters, these desperadoes were soon reduced to obedience by the stately bearing and calm determination of their chief. Though eminently gifted as a guerilla leader, the hero of Monte Video was ignorant of military art, and the fortifications, constructed by the forced labour of the peaceable inhabitants, were planned by French and Polish officers.

Oudinot and Lesseps desired to obtain the resignation of the triumvirs, and the appointment, by the Assembly, of some temporary ruler, who might exercise authority, till the wishes of the people could be ascertained, and the requisite guarantees obtained from Gaeta. It was not very probable that a man of Mazzini's enthusiastic views, whose mind had long been occupied with a dominant idea, and who, by a singular combination of circumstances had reached

* Malvagi, che di preda non di gloria andavano a procaccio.—*Farini.*

the summit of his ambition, should hastily relinquish so flattering an eminence. The objects of the two parties were entirely incompatible—that of the triumvirs being to have the Roman republic and themselves, as its chiefs, acknowledged—while that of the French government was, by getting its troops into Rome, to make itself an arbiter of the terms upon which the Pope's restoration should take place. When all hope of agreement was at an end, Mr. Cass, the American Minister, attempted to interpose his good offices, but General Oudinot refused to attend to his suggestions.

Many French socialist refugees had established themselves at Rome, and Lesseps began to apprehend that the fate of Rossi might be his. Returning to the camp, he wrote a letter to his government, in which he designated Mazzini as "a man of rare intelligence, but not above the influence of vulgar ambition; as inspired only by the genius of conspiracy, and unable to comprehend the advantage of relying on the conservative element; as continuing, even when in power, his pernicious complots with the *sette*, and as labouring under a political blindness and rancorous animosity against society, the effect of long-continued imprisonment."*

On the 16th of May, Bologna, after an obstinate resistance, surrendered to Wimpfen, and Ancona was

* M. de Lesseps was in error as to this fact.—Farini, vol. iv. c. vi.

threatened by the Austrian forces. The anger of M. de Lesseps against Mazzini, then gave place to his jealousy of Austria, whose troops had already advanced to Perugia, and on the 26th of May he wrote to Paris, attempting to do away with the effect of his former letter. He, at the same time, urged the French commander to allow time for a renewal of negotiations. Oudinot, after writing to the Austrian commander at Perugia, and warning him to suspend his further progress, as offensive to France, agreed reluctantly to relinquish siege operations till orders arrived from Paris.

When these hesitations and changes became known to M. de Rayneval, then minister plenipotentiary of the French republic at Gaeta, he hastened to the camp, and openly charged Lesseps with following his own inspirations, and with acting in opposition to his instructions, and those of his diplomatic colleagues. By such conduct, France, he declared, would be subjected to the charge of inconsistency and double-dealing.*

Lesseps replied, that the Duc d'Harcourt and M. de Rayneval himself, having been unssuccessful in their attempts to bring the Court of Rome to conciliatory measures, he had been obliged in some degree to change his ground, and admitted that he had done so on his own responsibility. After thus excusing him-

* See M. de Rayneval's letter, quoted by Farini.

self, Lesseps resolved to persevere; and notwithstanding the arrival of General le Vaillant with positive orders for a recommencement of hostilities, entered into a treaty with the triumvirs, by which it was stipulated that the French forces should retire upon Albano. General Oudinot indignantly refused compliance, and immediately informed the Roman authorities that he held any such agreement as null and void. Lesseps was then recalled, and his recent acts were disavowed by the French government.

It would be useless to describe the various combats and operations of the siege, which continued during the whole of June. The besiegers amounted to 35,000 men. The garrison consisted of about 19,000, including national guards and volunteers. A small band of French refugees was organized, and another of Poles, but their united numbers did not exceed 400. Of Italians, not natives of the Roman states, there were about 1,800.

General Cordova, who occupied Terracina with a Spanish force of 8,000 men, expressed a wish to cooperate with the French, and the King of Naples did the same; but these advances were rejected, and France, as the first-born of the Church, claimed the entire glory and responsibility of restoring the temporal authority of the Pope.

On the 12th, the city being fully invested, Oudinot

apprised Roselli, that unless the gates were thrown open, he should proceed to extreme measures. The assembly replied by referring to the agreement entered into by Lesseps, which it declared could not be violated without a breach of national law, and proclaimed its resolution to defend to the uttermost, the banner of the Republic.

The hopes of the triumvirs now rested on the efforts of Ledru Rollin and the red republicans of Paris, who were conspiring to overturn the existing government. Their projected outbreak took place on the 12th of June, and, being promptly suppressed by General Changarnier, had only the effect of strengthening the ministry, and of increasing the influence of the Catholic party. Rusconi, who was commissioned to watch his opportunity and to foment this socialist conspiracy, informed his employers that they had nothing more to hope for from that quarter.

It now became evident that the Mazzinian republic, —"*governo di setta non di popolo*,"—was doomed; but its chief was loth to abandon the sweets of power. At his bidding, but not from any devotion to his cause, the struggle was prolonged. Luciano Manara, and the brave men who either perished with him, or fought and endured to the last, did not contend for any form of government, but for an independent Italy. They

* Farini.

combated, under the flag of their fatherland, against that of the *straniero*.

On the 30th of June the breach became practicable, and, after a severe struggle, the French columns obtained a footing within the walls. Their impetuous attack was bravely opposed. Four hundred of the defenders were bayonetted where they stood, and the artillery on the bastion was spiked. The next morning the constituent assembly met in the capitol, and Cernuschi, wishing to avert the horrors of an assault, proposed a resolution that all further resistance was impracticable. His opinion being doubted, Garibaldi himself was introduced, and, with a soldier's frankness, declared the truth. The proposal of Cernuschi, though opposed by Mazzini, was then adopted, and the task of negotiating with the French was imposed upon the municipality. Mazzini and his colleagues renounced the triumvirate, and Saliceti, Mariani, and Calandrelli were appointed to succeed them. The negotiations were fruitless, and on the 2nd of July the French entered without opposition; Garibaldi, with about 4000 infantry and 800 horse, having effected his retreat during the previous night, by the Porta San Giovanni.

The agonies of the siege did not deter the constituent assembly from the execution of its appointed task of laying down the fundamental laws by which

the Roman republic was to be regulated. The termination of their undertaking was by a singular coincidence contemporary with the entrance of the French army, and the last hours of the assembly were occupied in a solemn proclamation of this political code. The brief authority of the new triumvirs was only signalized by one act—the appointment of citizen Charles Lucien Bonaparte, the Prince of Canino, as minister plenipotentiary of the Roman commonwealth to England, France, and the United States!

A small body of French soldiers dispersed the deputies, who had assembled for the last time to protest against the invasion, and General Oudinot deputed an officer to Gaeta to lay the keys of the city at the Pope's feet.

In the meantime the ex-triumvirs, ministers and all who considered themselves to be compromised, were allowed to depart. Cernuschi alone was detained at Civita Vecchia, but was liberated after a short imprisonment. A downcast and incongruous multitude, consisting of nobles and plebeians, Romans and foreigners, and in which the good were mingled with the depraved, crowded the transports at Civita Vecchia.

Garibaldi, with Ciceruacchio for his guide, effected his retreat to Tivoli, and, when all hope of maintaining the contest within the Roman confines was over,

attempted to reach Venice. Though deserted by many of his followers, he at length succeeded in baffling or eluding the Austrian, Spanish, and Neapolitan forces; and, having hired thirteen fishing vessels, steered for the Lagunes. When within sight of the domes of Venice, his flotilla was discovered and attacked by the Austrian ships of war. Eight of his boats were taken, but with the rest he regained the Roman shore. Before he could reach Ravenna his Brazilian wife, Anita, the faithful partner of his fortunes, sank under the hardships which she had long and bravely endured. Garibaldi then found his way to Genoa, and from thence proceeded to the United States, where his energy and courage have obtained employment in the pursuits of commerce and navigation.

M. de Corcelles, the French civil agent at Rome, did all that a man of sense and moderation could do, in assisting the military authorities to organize a Roman provisional administration for the city, but his task was by no means an easy one; for the best men of all parties were reluctant to accept office. The constitutionalists were deterred by misgivings as to the Pope's intentions. The partisans of the old régime, distrustful of the French, were biding their time till a restoration after their own hearts could be achieved.

The representatives of France at Gaeta repeatedly

urged the publication of a manifesto expressive of humane and liberal intentions, but the court insisted that the embers of revolution should first be trodden out, and that a full and complete restoration ought to precede concession.

That being effected, *Il Papa*, it was said, *proviederebbe da Papa*, and would be able to concede without the appearance of constraint or dictation. The French government began to fear that Pio Nono, if pressed, might throw himself into the arms of Austria.

Thus a noble opportunity was lost. Had the Pope's spirit been of such a mould as to enable him to break through the selfish and narrow influences by which he was surrounded, he might, by declaring his determination to maintain the *statuto*, have secured inestimable advantages. Such a resolution would have been supported by France, and could not have been contravened or objected to, by any other power. The people, instructed by experience, had learned to appreciate the emptiness of the schemes and the fallacy of the promises by which they had been beguiled. They would have hailed with gratitude the reign of equal laws; and the temporal sovereignty of the Pontiff, instead of being impatiently endured, might once more have been regarded with satisfaction.

On the 14th of July, Oudinot published a proclama-

tion which concluded with these words—"Romans! the Pontiff appreciates your desires; France knows that he does so; your hopes shall not be deluded." On the 21st, a manifesto arrived from Gaeta, in which Pio spoke with complacency of his own restoration, but carefully avoided any pledge. The people now began to distrust the French, and to regard them with hatred, as the restorers of a sacerdotal oligarchy. All who showed them any kindness were in danger of assassination, and the Pope's brief was torn down and trodden under foot.

The French officers and soldiers who had invariably displayed the most exact discipline and the greatest forbearance, were naturally annoyed at the treatment to which they were subjected, and felt no sympathy for a people who regarded them with unconcealed aversion. On the last day of July General Oudinot resigned the civil power into the hands of Cardinals Della Genga, Vannicelli, and Altieri, who were named by the Pope, with full powers to carry on the government in his absence, and who received from the people the title of *i triumviri rossi!*

The administration of the provinces was confided to prelates invested with arbitrary powers. Monsignor Bedini who, as the Pope's representative, had accompanied the Austrian army, was appointed to preside over the Legations, and in concurrence with the wishes

of General Wimpfen, not only dissolved the municipality of Bologna because it had petitioned in favour of the *statuto*, but imposed a pecuniary fine on all who had ventured to sign the petition. Such were the measures resorted to, in order to check any expression of public opinion.

On the 4th of April, 1850, Pio Nono having announced his intention of returning to Rome, bid adieu to Portici, where he had resided since the month of September. During his progress through the Neapolitan territory, he was accompanied by his host, King Ferdinand, and was greeted by the population with every token of reverence. On the 12th, he re-entered his capital in triumph. French soldiers composed his escort, and lined the streets. The windows were decked with festive hangings, and the pealing of bells was mingled with the roar of artillery. The spectacle was gorgeous, but the hearts of the spectators were cold. On the French, the Papal benediction descended with all the unction and charm of novelty. To the Roman bystanders, the benevolent expression and graceful gestures of the Holy Father were well known, but the recollections which they evoked were not of a happy or elevating character. Those benedictions had been too often lavished at the bidding of designing agitators, upon multitudes arranged by the *capipopolo*, for purposes of intimidation.

When the ambassadors were summoned to the Vatican to receive for their sovereigns the thanks of the Pontiff, Martinez de la Rosa, as *Doyen* of the diplomatic body, replied, that the Catholic powers had done their duty and no more, and that they would always be prepared to defend the head of the Church. Years have glided by since these words were spoken, yet the Pope has not hitherto been enabled to dispense with the aid of foreign bayonets. The French at Rome and the Austrians at Bologna preserve an equilibrium; but the waters of bitterness have never subsided, and are still ready to overflow. Such appears to have become the normal condition of the papacy, with regard to its temporal dominion; and such is the sovereignty which it is thought requisite to prolong, in order to secure dignity and independence to the supreme Bishop of the Latin Church!

CHAPTER XXIV.

Prolonged existence and gradual decline of the Venetian Commonwealth—Its condition at the commencement of the revolutionary war—Timid and undecided policy—Indignation of Napoleon—The revolutionists, aided by the French, overturn the ancient government—By the treaty of Campo Formio, Venice is handed over to Austria—After Austerlitz, it is incorporated with the kingdom of Italy, but reverts to Austria in 1815—Venice prospers, and is declared a free port—The revolution of Vienna—Liberation of Manin and Tommaseo—A national guard is conceded—The Austrian constitution is published—Enthusiasm and fraternization—Assassination of Marinovich—Manin obtains possession of the arsenal—Conduct of Count Palffi the civil governor—General Zichy capitulates—A republic proclaimed, but abandoned on the *fusione* with Piedmont—After Novara the republic is again set up—Progress of the siege—Conduct of Pepe—Dictatorship of Manin—Termination of the siege.

WHILE barbarism was carrying on its ruthless contests, and devastating the fairest regions of Europe, the patriarchs of the Venetian State were converting the barren sand-banks of a remote and neglected shore, into a refuge from oppression, and an emporium for commerce. By those men, and by their sons, a a nucleus of civilization was preserved, by their genius and fortitude it was expanded. They laid the foundation of an enduring polity, and elevated a small community into a flourishing nation, which by degrees

assumed the dimensions of a first rate power, and at one time defied the arms of united Europe.

Independence was the ruling passion of the statesmen of Venice. Never was the interference or dictation of foreign potentates for a moment tolerated or endured. The power of the commonwealth was self-sustained. In ecclesiastical as well as civil affairs, the idea which modern Italian writers express by the word, *autonomia*, was realized and reduced into practice. No act of the Roman See was allowed to be published, or to have any force, until it had received the sanction of the government. Any ecclesiastic who contravened these laws, or interfered in politics was punished by banishment, and his goods were confiscated. Concessions to the Court of Rome were never entertained. In no country was there more religion, or less ecclesiastical abuse. Venice was at once Catholic and tolerant; within her boundaries persecution was unknown; and her noble institutions of beneficence bore witness to the living influence of Christianity.

Causes which no human foresight could have averted undermined at length the commercial pre-eminence of the Queen of the Adriatic. In the thirteenth century of her existence, the sinews of her might waxed feeble. She struggled against an inevitable destiny, and her independence, no longer based on intrinsic power,

began to rest for support on a venerable prescription; but after the commencement of the French revolutionary war, right, unaccompanied by might, was little regarded.

At the beginning of that struggle, the resources of the Venetian government were still considerable. Besides the Italian provinces, it possessed Istria and Dalmatia, and held in the Ionian Islands, the keys of the Adriatic. Its naval force was respectable, and the condition of the finances and population was such as to justify the maintenance of from 40,000 to 50,000 combatants. Such a force, considering the almost unassailable locality of the capital, might have ensured respect.

Though the *Signoria* had adhered in 1793 to the coalition against France, no act of hostility was committed, and the earliest opportunity was taken of falling back upon the timid policy of neutrality, equally offensive to both parties.

In 1796, after the early successes of Napoleon, the seat of war was transferred from Piedmont and Lombardy to the Venetian territory, and a choice of evils was all that remained. Apart from considerations of internal policy, an alliance with France presented important advantages. It was known that Austria regarded with a longing eye that portion of the Venetian provinces which separates the Tyrol from

the Milanese; but, on the other hand, all contact with the French revolutionists was dreaded by the chiefs of an aristocratic commonwealth.

When, in the beginning of 1797, Napoleon after his victory at Rivoli, conceived the idea of marching on Vienna, the friendship of Venice became essential to him, as affording marine co-operation during the continuance of the war, and as dispensing with the necessity of leaving garrisons in his line of march. The *Signoria* unmoved by proffers of territorial aggrandizement, persisted in its neutral policy; and the youthful conqueror, though thwarted and annoyed, persevered in his design. When within five days march of the Austrian capital, finding that the French army of co-operation, which was advancing from the Rhine had been delayed, and wishing to gain time, he proposed an armistice, which was gladly accepted by the Arch-duke Charles. During this suspension of hostilities, the Austrians made great efforts to strengthen the Arch-duke, while the forces opposed to the other French army were comparatively weak. Bonaparte now began to fear that Vienna, if gained at all, might be the prize of a fortunate rival. Being empowered by the Directory to treat for peace, and knowing that the policy of the French people was opposed to a prolongation of hostilities, he resolved to assume the functions of a pacificator. Egypt loomed

in the distance—peace became a primary object—but the disappointment inflicted by the obstinacy of the *signoria* was not forgotten.

The Directory desired to secure the Austrian Netherlands, and to obtain Mayence for France, and Mantua for the Cisalpine republic, which had been set up at Milan. Venice was regarded as a rich and tempting equivalent, which might be sacrificed to Austria, but the Emperor being on terms of amity with its government, could hardly be expected to make himself a party to so flagrant an act. In order to remove this difficulty, it was resolved to foment a revolution, and to do away with the *Doge* and the *signoria*. Milanese republicans intermixed with French agitators, were permitted to use their arts in the cities of the *terra firma*. With the tacit aid of the French military they enlisted the services of the discontented and necessitous; but the forced revolutions which they effected, were followed by sanguinary re-actions, caused by the spontaneous indignation of the people. These commotions were construed into acts of hostility against the French nation, and were made an excuse for insolent dictation, and, subsequently, for a declaration of war. Assailed by an astute admixture of force and fraud, the venerable and illustrious commonwealth at length succumbed, and the democratic faction had no sooner prevailed, than it admitted the French troops into the capital.

The imperial government then condescended to accept the ill-gotten spoil, and by the treaty of Campo Formio, which terminated the negotiations commenced at Leoben, the fate of Venice was sealed.

When that treaty was ratified, Bonaparte, who had previously kept alive the hopes of the Venetians, suddenly changed his tone. During thirty days, the French garrison retained possession of the city, but only to complete its spoliation. Those who disliked the dominion of Austria, were allowed a refuge in the Milanese. The *chefs d'œuvres* of the galleries, and the celebrated horses of Lisippus, were already on their road to Paris; the naval stores were transferred to the French arsenals, and strict orders were given, that nothing should be left which might be of service to the Austrian Marine. A portion of the public property was sold for the support of such republicans as might choose to establish themselves in the Cisalpine territory. Unfinished ships and stores, which could not be disposed of with advantage, were burnt or hewn to pieces.

The patricians and populace of Venice now united in useless lamentations, and bewailed the ruin of their ancient independence, by a catastrophe which a moderate share of union and foresight might have averted. After an interval of eight years, Austria was compelled by the result of the Austerlitz campaign to relinquish

the Venetian states; and they were united with the newly established kingdom of Italy. Subsequently to this union, Napoleon became attentive to the interests of the inhabitants, and tried, by works of utility and ornament, to efface the recollection of Campo Formio; nor were these tardy benefits unthankfully received, for his name is still respected by the very people whose independence and commerce he destroyed. The Berlin and Milan decrees dried up the small remaining sources of maritime activity; and when in 1815 the Austrian troops once more entered Venice, the decay of all that once formed her glory was already complete.

As an emporium and free port, enjoying the protection and traffic of a powerful empire, considerable benefits were secured. The merchants of Trieste found the advantage of having warehouses at Venice, and the value of all kinds of property within its confines underwent an enormous increase. Unfortunately, the imperial government, relying on a strict and impartial administration of justice, made no efforts to overcome the national dislike. Having given to its subjects the means of material prosperity, it did nothing to conciliate their affections, and showed no sympathy with the feelings of any class or party. Italians must love or hate, and this phlegmatic and unostentatious system was entirely uncongenial to

their nature. Nevertheless, the insurrection of 1848 could never have taken place, except under an extraordinary concurrence of circumstances.

On the 17th of March, the news of the revolution of Vienna arrived. Undefined hopes and longings for a national government which had begun to prevail since the Pope's accession, and had been stimulated by the French revolution of February, now received a new and more dangerous impulse. The excited multitude flocked into the Piazza San Marco, and demanded the liberation of Manin, an advocate of Jewish extraction, and of Tommaseo, a political writer, who had been imprisoned on charges of sedition. Without awaiting the reply of the government, they were both forcibly liberated. This riot was followed by collisions between the military and the populace; and the municipality, in conjunction with many respectable individuals, entreated Palffi, the civil governor, to authorize the institution of a civic guard, as a means of securing tranquillity. Palffi, having conferred with the military commandant, General Zichy, these two Hungarian functionaries had the weakness to comply, and the citizens were enrolled and armed. Immediately afterwards, a steamboat arrived from Trieste, with a copy of the new Austrian constitution. The whole city became a scene of rejoicing. The windows were adorned with tapestry and banners, and the governor himself read

the constitution to the delighted multitude. In the enthusiasm of the moment the people embraced the Austrian soldiers, and the two governors, reassured by these amicable demonstrations, dispensed with any further precautions.

Though the national prejudice had been laid aside for a season, a circumstance soon occurred which sufficed for its revival. The workmen of the Arsenal had become dissatisfied with their superintendent, Colonel Marinovich, whom they accused of severity. A mutiny ensued, and the obnoxious official was rescued with some difficulty by the civic guard. The following day Marinovich imprudently showed himself in the arsenal, and the mutineers, who had been pacified by an assurance that he would not re-appear, rushed upon him, and put him to a violent death.

At this juncture, accounts of the contest which was then raging at Milan arrived, and Manin placed himself at the head of a popular movement. Aided by the mutineers, he gained possession of the arsenal, which was guarded by Italian soldiers. These troops joined the insurgents, and their officers were made prisoners. Zichy, into whose hands the civil governor had resigned his powers, proved unequal to the emergency. Allowing himself to be intimidated, he submitted to a capitulation, by which he consented to embark with such of the troops as retained their allegiance, leaving

the public money, and the whole of the military and naval stores in the hands of the insurgents.

A republic was immediately proclaimed, and a provisional government appointed, of which Manin and Tommaseo had the direction. These events were accompanied or followed by the surrender or evacuation of Padua, Treviso, Vicenza, Udine, the fort of Osopo, and the fortress of Palma Nova, where General Zucchi, who has already been mentioned in connexion with Roman affairs, had been confined as a state prisoner since 1831.

Of the eight provinces composing the Venetian territory, Verona alone remained under Austrian domination. The army of Radetzky, reduced by combats, capitulations, and desertion, was confined to the space included between the Mincio and the Adige, and the four fortresses of Mantua, Peschiera, Verona, and Legnago; its only remaining communication being by the valley of the Adige.

These complicated disadvantages, coupled with the approach of the Sardinian army, seemed to leave little hope for Austria, save that which might arise from the errors of her opponents.

It was not long before a fatal oversight was committed by Charles Albert and the Piedmontese generals. The condition of Austria was such as to justify them in hazarding a bold advance. Had the opportunity

been seized, Radetzky's communications might have been entirely cut off. Had the King decided to cross the Adige, and penetrate at once into the Venetian states, the position of the Austrian army would have become desperate.*

The provisional government, of which Manin was the life, gave way to the prevalent folly of regarding the Austrians as entirely occupied in devising means for an escape across the Alps. Through a blind security, time was lost in turning the advantages which presented themselves to the best account. The arms found in the arsenal were allowed to be appropriated by the first comers, without discrimination. The Austrian fleet, which was manned by Venetians, lay at Pola, and by a little more activity, might probably have been gained over. But time was given for the authorities at Trieste to take every precaution, and though many sailors and some officers deserted, they were not able to bring any ship with them. Instead of husbanding the finances, the government impaired them by popular remissions of taxation. The Italian soldiers who had served under Austria, and who, being thoroughly disciplined, might have formed the best nucleus of a military force, were looked upon with distrust, and too much reliance was placed upon volunteers.

At the request of the government, Charles Albert

* See page 227.

deputed General la Marmora, as an officer of experience, to whom the defence of Venice and its military organization might be entrusted. He arrived in April, but owing to the prejudice which existed against Piedmont, his efforts were not cordially supported.

General Pepe, who had been entrusted with the command of the Neapolitan forces, was on his march towards the Po, when the insurrection broke out at Naples. The King then recalled the army, and the bulk of it obeyed the order, but Pepe refused to do so, and advanced with about 2000 soldiers and volunteers who adhered to him, as far as Rovigo.* When, on the 10th of June, Durando and the Roman forces were obliged to capitulate at Vicenza, the Neapolitan general betook himself, with his followers, to Venice. His conduct towards his own government made him all the more acceptable to the republicans, and though he had never displayed any military talent, he was allowed to supersede La Marmora.

The land forces within the lagunes amounted to 21,000 men, including 6000 Romans and 2000 Piedmontese. Being composed of many distinct corps, and commanded by officers unacquainted with their duties, for the most part self-appointed, or nominated by the clubs; these armed bands could not be depended upon, in conflicts with regular troops.

* See page 128.

On the land side, Welden maintained an imperfect blockade with about 8000 Austrians, but no advantage was taken of his weakness, and the opportunity of doing so with effect, was allowed to pass.

Venice, during some months, had little to fear by land or sea. The Austrian marine, weakened by desertion, was unable to establish a blockade, even before the arrival of the Sardinian and Neapolitan ships had given to the Italian cause a decided naval superiority.

About the beginning of July, the question of the *fusione* with Piedmont came on. The government tried hard to avert it; but the provinces having already declared themselves in favour of this union, the decision was referred to representatives chosen for that purpose by universal suffrage, when the proposal was carried by 127 votes against 6. Manin retired, and the republican party driven from power, immediately betrayed its disappointment in a manner detrimental to the cause which it professed to uphold with the greatest ardour.

The *fusione* being already adopted at Milan, the kingdom of *Alta Italia* was for a season established, but the expulsion of the *Tedeschi* remained to be achieved. The high wrought hopes of the Italian patriots were abating. Enthusiasm had begun to give place to weariness and discouragement; and the

democrats, notwithstanding their boasted zeal, opposed obstacles to the war, and became the best allies of Austria.

The principal centre of this faction was at Milan. "Its effect," says a *military historian of the war, "was tantamount to that of an armed force, acting under the command of Radetzky on the rear of the Piedmontese army, and placing it between two fires."

The news of the series of disasters which terminated in the battle of Custoza, became known at Venice on the 31st of July. At this inauspicious moment, the Piedmontese commissioners sent by Charles Albert to take possession, and to exercise authority in his name, arrived. On the 7th of August, the formal incorporation of Venice with the Sardinian States took place. On that very day, the newly proclaimed sovereign of Upper Italy retired with his discomfited army across the Ticino.

When the capitulation of Milan became known, the unfortunate commissioners found themselves in a false position. Rumours of treason were immediately circulated by the republicans, the armistice was branded as a wilful dereliction of the cause, and the irritated multitude flocked into the Piazza San Marco with cries of "Abasso il Re," "Viva Manin, Salvatore della patria." The commissioners were obliged to lay down

* Alexandre le Masson, Venezia, lib. ii. p. 104.

their authority, and a bloodless revolution at once vested in Manin the powers of a dictator; though two colleagues, the one naval and the other military, were associated with him in a nominal triumvirate.

While the bulk of the Austrian forces were engaged in following up their victory, Pepe neglected a favourable opportunity of attacking Welden with greatly superior forces, and no offensive operations were undertaken against the enemy's lines, until October. When Vienna was in open revolt, and the contest then raging in Hungary threatened the disruption of the empire, two attacks were planned and carried out with success. By the first of these, the Austrians were driven from their posts at Cavallino; by the second they sustained a considerable loss, including 600 prisoners and six guns, which were taken at Mestre, and brought in triumph to Venice. These advantages raised the spirits of the defenders, and might have been followed up; but France at that moment hoped to get Venice comprised in the armistice, and deprecated active hostilities. No further action of any importance took place until the end of March, 1849, when the war between Austria and Piedmont was renewed.

Soon after the engagement at Mestre, the Sardinian fleet, which had been withdrawn according to the stipulations of the armistice of Salasco, returned to the Venetian waters, on account of a dispute with

Radetzky, as to the interpretation of that treaty. The Austrians were then compelled to raise the blockade which they had established, and this circumstance, combined with the increasing perplexities by which the Imperial government was surrounded, gave hopes of an approaching change for the better.

Notwithstanding the abjuration of the *fusione*, Venice was on the best terms with the democratic ministry of Turin. The first object with the Italian republicans was to hurry Piedmont into a renewal of the war. In this desire Pepe and Manin joined, and the most fallacious reports as to the weakness and ill-condition of the Austrian forces, were forwarded to the Sardinian government. The rupture of the armistice on the 20th of March, 1849, urged forward by these influences, had a fatal effect on the prospects of Italy. By this step, Charles Albert at once put an end to the conferences then opened at Brussels for the arrangement of Italian affairs. Had he been allowed time to reorganize his army, he might, on the failure of these negotiations, have availed himself of a far more favourable opportunity, during the month of May, when the difficulties of Austria were at their height.

On the recommencement of hostilities by Piedmont, the garrison of Venice resumed the offensive with great zeal and enthusiasm; but Pepe, though a fertile manufacturer of projects, was timid and irresolute in execu-

tion. He wasted precious time in waiting for a Roman contingent which was expected from Bologna, but which never crossed the Po; and did not even avail himself of the opportunity then afforded for the collection of provisions. After some indecisive affairs, in which his troops showed no want of courage, the rapid and disastrous termination of the campaign of 1849, put an end to all operations save those of defence.

Welden, being appointed to command in Hungary, was succeeded by General Haynau, who informed the Venetian government of the battle of Novara, and of the termination of the campaign. The choice remained between an immediate surrender and resistance at all costs.

Although a nearer approach to unanimous feeling prevailed at Venice than had shown itself either at Rome or Milan, and the efforts of the government were better supported, still, political distractions presented a formidable difficulty. So long as danger did not press, the elections, the last news from the Roman or Milanese *circoli*, or the Italian constituent, which, possessing neither men nor money, was expected to conquer Austrian armies, and to dispose at will of the entire peninsula, were the topics which engrossed attention. The war became a secondary object, and the enemy, though in no great force, was allowed to remain unmolested in the precincts of the lagunes.

When these day dreams vanished, Venice found herself alone in the struggle, and Pepe was obliged to fix his attention on those duties and responsibilities which he had hitherto regarded as of inferior importance to politics.

France was still unsettled, and might at any moment have been drawn into the contest. Austria, for the moment over-matched in Hungary, had ceased to be on terms of amity with Prussia. These circumstances decided Manin to persevere, and to protract a struggle the mere prolongation of which, might have been attended with important results.

On the 2nd of April, the dictator replied to the summons of General Haynau by sending him a decree for resistance to the uttermost. A manifesto was then published invoking the sympathy of Europe, but England and France having had their attempt to negotiate in favour of Italy foiled by the Piedmontese resumption of hostilities, were reluctant to interfere between Austria and Venice, whose refusal to submit was regarded as an act of desperation. It was only by a long and gallant defence that the besieged could hope to extort sympathy, and the timely accumulation of warlike stores and provisions requisite for such a purpose, had been unaccountably neglected.

Before the end of April, Radetzky, though impeded by the brave resistance of the ill-fated Brescians, by

threats of a Milanese insurrection, and by the necessity of detaching troops to the legations, raised the force at Haynau's disposal to 30,000 men, and supplied him with all the requisites for a siege. The Austrian fleet at the same time re-established the blockade, and the investment was complete as far as the singular locality permitted.

During the bombardment of Malguera, which constituted the first operation,* Radetzky himself was present, and by the inconsiderable effect produced, had his eyes opened as to the real difficulties of the undertaking. Nevertheless, he called upon the Venetian government to submit, and the answer he received is worthy of attention, because it seems to indicate the views which Manin, who in judgment and intelligence surpassed most of his compatriots, at that time entertained.

Venice, he said, would persist in the resolution of defending herself, and relied on the good offices of France and England, but would be ready to treat on the basis of a guarantee for her political existence, under conditions suited to her nationality and habits.

It would appear from this, that Manin would have accepted for Venice, the condition of a free imperial

* The military details of the siege are described in a clear and interesting manner by Alexandre le Masson, from whose work, entitled Venezia nel 1848 e 1849, and published in French and Italian, the leading circumstances here recited, have been taken.

city. Such an existence, secured by sufficient guarantees, and carried out with mutual loyalty and good faith, might not perhaps be unsuited to the present condition and requirements of the people.

After sustaining repeated attacks, the fort of Malguera was abandoned before the means of its defence were entirely exhausted, and the deputies beginning to be dissatisfied, appointed three military commissioners of energy and experience. This step, as interfering with the unity of command, threatened mischief, but was skilfully remedied by Manin, who exerted his dictatorial authority, and named Pepe president of the commission. The services of the commissioners were thus rendered useful; but the time was gone by, when any exertion of the garrison or its officers could be of much avail, or compensate for past omissions. A deficiency of food and gunpowder was already felt. The price of provisions, which had doubled before the end of May, was constantly increasing, and the attempts to manufacture gunpowder were twice thwarted by explosions. Great sickness prevailed in the city, as well as in the besieging army.

Though hostilities continued, negotiations were renewed by the Austrians, and carried on during the whole of June. Kossuth at this time engaged to purchase English steam ships, and to send aid of men and money from Hungary. These promises combined

with the disposition to negotiate shown by Austria, misled Manin into a belief that events were turning in his favour.

When the negotiations were again broken off, the condition of Europe and Italy presented a far more discouraging aspect than it had previously done; and the chances which might have favoured the Venetians had, one after another, turned against them. Austria was rapidly emerging from her difficulties; her troops were already in the occupation of Tuscany and the Legations; Rome was struggling bravely, but in vain, against a French army, while Piedmont was counting her sacrifices, and had no inclination to renew the war.

Twenty-four consecutive days of bombardment followed, and were endured with great fortitude by the citizens and the garrison. The fire could only be returned with parsimony and diminished effect, on account of the scarcity and bad quality of the powder. The government was still sustained by the confidence of the people, and remained unshaken. When the Patriarch, supported by an insignificant portion of the inhabitants, petitioned for a surrender, his palace was attacked and its furniture destroyed by the indignant multitude.

The fleet, which consisted of four corvettes, five brigs, a steam ship, and four smaller vessels, never

responded to the hopes which had been placed upon it, nor to the expense which had been incurred in its equipment and maintenance. It is true that the force to which it was opposed was superior, but that superiority was not so great as to preclude the possible success of a daring and well concerted enterprise. And in such an emergency, the risks ought not to have been calculated.

Resignation and indifference now became the prevalent feeling. The term of the assembly being expired, no fresh election could be thought of. The powers of the state became concentrated in the hands of Manin, whose last hope was destroyed by the failure of Kossuth, and the termination of the Hungarian struggle. The ravages of the cholera, and a deficiency of bread, rendered further resistance, not only useless, but cruel. The capitulation was signed on the 2nd of August. Officers, who being subjects of the Emperor, had taken arms against him, all foreign soldiers of whatever rank, and forty civilians who were named, were ordered to leave the city.

The English and French ships of war received every one who desired to depart, whether compromised or not. On the 27th, Manin, Tommaseo, and Pepe embarked, and on the 30th Radetzky came over from Milan, and heard the Te Deum performed at St. Mark's by the unfortunate Venetian priests.

It is evident from the merest outline of these events, that of the seventeen months, during which they were beleaguered, the last four were much the most trying to the fortitude and perseverance of the Venetians. The rapid and calamitous termination of the campaign of Novara was well calculated to shake their constancy; but their courage proved equal to the emergency. Had military and civil power been united, from the first, in the hands of one man possessing the twofold attributes of a general and of a statesman, this indomitable spirit might have been turned to greater account.

Many were the errors and oversights of the leader who conducted the defence. Many were the precautions neglected by those, on whom the responsibilities of the executive devolved. Pepe possessed neither the energy of a young general, nor the judgment of an old one. Manin, whose abilities and conduct commanded respect, was not exempt from the frailties of ambition, and his path was beset with difficulties. On the one hand his vigilance was required in order to uphold his own power, which was based on no surer foundation than the breath of the multitude; on the other he was called upon to perform the delicate task of correcting the follies and delinquencies of his own supporters. With a just allowance for these circumstances, it will be admitted that he performed his part with prudence and courage, and that his generous and disinterested

character presents an agreeable contrast to those of contemporary republican *notabilities* at Rome and Florence. While such praise is accorded to the dictator, still more is it due to the people of Venice, who not only displayed moderation in times of revolutionary madness, but endured privations and sufferings with resignation and fortitude worthy of a better fate.

The revival of Venetian greatness is a dream that can only be indulged in by those who wilfully shut their eyes to the present condition of the world. Yet what civilized nation or government would not long to arrest the impoverishment and decay of the *Citta bizzarra*, and desire for her children such a share in the blessings of civilization and progress as might still be theirs? Who would not desire that her time-hallowed domes, and wave-reflected palaces, should be preserved and handed down for the admiration and instruction of future generations?

POPULATION OF THE ITALIAN STATES

ACCORDING TO THE LATEST RETURNS.

Sardinian States	Terra Firma . .	4,368,136	4,916,084
	Island of Sardinia and other Islands	547,948	
Austrian Italy	Lombardy . .	2,667,202	4,918,910
	Venetian States . .	2,251,708	
Tuscany			1,778,021
Roman States	Christian population .	2,898,115	2,908,115
	Jews, about . .	10,000	
Duchy of Modena			586,458
Duchy of Parma			502,841
Naples .	The "*Regno*" .	6,612,892	8,704,472
	Sicily . . .	2,091,580	
San Marino			7,600
	Total . .		24,372,501

DATES

SHOWING THE SUCCESSION OF EVENTS IN ITALY, FROM THE ELECTION OF THE POPE, UNTIL HIS RETURN TO ROME IN 1850.

1846.

June 16.—Cardinal Giovanni Maria Mastai Ferretti, Bishop of Imola, is elected Pope, and assumes the title of Pio Nono.

July 16.—He grants a general amnesty for political offences.

August 18.—Cardinal Gizzi is appointed Secretary of State.

In *October*.—The Italian Scientific Congress is held at Genoa.

In *December*.—The centenary of the expulsion of the Austrians from Genoa is kept with rejoicings in many parts of Italy.

1847.

In *January*.—The *Capo d'anno* is celebrated at Rome by public demonstrations expressive of the national desire for independence.

March 12.—The laws relating to the press are relaxed by Cardinal Gizzi.

April 14.—Gizzi publishes the decree for a *Consulta di stato*.

June 16.—The anniversary of the Pope's election is made an excuse for a display of physical force.

June 22.—Gizzi publishes a decree against popular assemblages.

July 8.—The Civic Guard is instituted at Rome, on the pretext of a *Sanfedista* conspiracy.

July 10.—Gizzi resigns, and is succeeded by Cardinal Ferretti.

July 17.—The Austrians occupy the city of Ferrara. Charles Albert offers to take arms in defence of the Pontiff.

September.—At Florence, Cosimo Ridolfi is minister, a Civic Guard is instituted, and popular demonstrations are frequent.

At Milan the Austrian authorities are insulted, and the people combine against the use of tobacco, of which the Imperial government has a monopoly.

Cries of *Pio Nono ed Italia* are forbidden by the governments of Naples, Parma, and Modena.

The Italian Scientific Congress is held at Venice.

October.—The members of the Roman *Consulta* are named. Lord Minto visits Italy.

November.—A commercial league is concluded between Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Pontifical States. *Circoli popolari* are established in Rome and other Italian cities.

December.—The Pope's differences with Austria on the subject of Ferrara are arranged; his ministers are declared responsible; and laymen are admitted to hold office.

December 18.—The Archduchess Maria Louisa dies, by which event Parma devolves on the Duke of Lucca, and Lucca becomes annexed to Tuscany.

1848.

January.—Agitation assumes a menacing aspect at Rome. Cardinal Ferretti having ordered the troops to protect the Quirinal, is not supported by the Pope. Ciceruacchio triumphs. Commotions take place in Lombardy and the Venetian States. The Roman *Consulta* recommends that foreign officers should be employed to re-organize the army.

January 6.—Guerazzi having placed himself at the head of the insurrection at Leghorn, is arrested by the Ridolfi government.

January 12.—A revolution at Palermo.

January 29.—The King of Naples grants a constitution after the French model.

February 7.—Ferretti resigns, and Cardinal Bofondi is named as his successor.

February 8.—An outcry is raised against ecclesiastical ministers, and against the Jesuits. The Pope consults Count Rossi.

A constitution is promulgated at Turin.

February 12.—A new ministry is appointed by the Pope, consisting of the Prince of Teano, Pasolini, Sturbinetti, Monsignor Pentini, Monsignor della Porta, Don Vincenzo Colonna, and Prince Cosimo Conti.

February 15.—The Grand Duke of Tuscany grants a constitution.

March 5.—The Parisian revolution of the 22nd February becomes known at Rome.

March 10.—A new ministry is formed under the presidency of Cardinal Antonelli; Galletti, a Bolognese conspirator, who had returned from exile under the amnesty, is entrusted with the administration of the police.

March 14.—The *Statuto* is proclaimed at Rome.

March 21 to 24.—The news of the Viennese revolution reaches Rome. After the struggle of the *Cinque giorni*, the Austrians evacuate Milan. A republic is proclaimed at Venice. The Grand Duke of Tuscany reviews the troops intended to take part in the war, and publishes a proclamation in favour of Italian independence. The Roman forces, having received the Pope's blessing, march towards the frontier under General Durando. The Duke of Modena is driven from his States, and the Modenese declare Charles Albert their king.

March 26.—A Sicilian parliament declares that the Bourbons have ceased to reign. Ruggiero Settimo is appointed regent.

March 27.—The King of Naples declares himself in favour of the war.

March 29.—The Princess Belgiojoso sails from Naples with a body of volunteers, and one of the King's regiments, to join Charles Albert, who had crossed the Milanese frontier, and occupied Pavia.

April 5.—Durando, having received orders to act in concert with Charles Albert, proclaims, to the Roman forces, a crusade against the Austrians.

The Grand Duke of Tuscany publishes an address to his people in favour of the war.

April 7.—The King of Naples having appointed Carlo Troia his Prime Minister, makes a similar manifesto.

1848.

April 10 to 19.—The Duke of Parma is expelled by his subjects, who adopt the "fusione," and place themselves under the sceptre of Charles Albert. Charles Albert seizes the bridges of the Mincio, and threatens Peschiera and Mantua.

April 29.—The Pope delivers an *allocuzione*, in which he disavows the war. The ministry resigns, but, being reassured by his Holiness, consents to resume office, sends Signor Farini to the camp of Charles Albert, and places the Pontifical troops at his disposal.

April 30.—The Piedmontese defeat d'Aspre at Pastrengo.

May 3.—General Pepe is instructed to conduct the Neapolitan army to the right bank of the Po.

May 4.—The Antonelli ministry, being thwarted by the Roman *circoli*, and not being able to rely on the national guard, definitively retires, and is succeeded by that of Mamiani.

May 6.—Charles Albert approaches Verona. Engagement between his forces and the Austrians at Santa Lucia.

May 8.—General Nugent defeats the Romans at Cornuda. The emissaries of the Milanese *circoli* intrigue against Charles Albert.

May 15.—The ultra-liberals get up an insurrection at Naples and erect barricades, but are ultimately subdued. A republican movement takes place in Calabria. King Ferdinand resolves to recall his troops from the war. Bozzelli resumes office.

May 19.—Durando repulses the Austrians at Vicenza. The Abbé Gioberti, having returned from exile, promotes the *fusione* of Lombardy, Venice, Parma, and Modena, with Piedmont, and the formation of the kingdom of *Alta Italia* under Charles Albert. He opposes the designs of Mazzini.

May 22.—Pepe refuses to return to Naples, and offers to place himself and his troops at the disposal of Charles Albert. The bulk of the army declines his solicitations, and returns according to the king's command.

May 29.—The Tuscan forces are overpowered by the Austrians at Curtatone.

May 30.—Charles Albert defeats Radetzky at Goito and obtains possession of Peschiera.

June 10.—Durando capitulates at Vicenza, and the Roman forces retire from the contest.

June 13.—Pepe arrives at Venice with a small portion of the Neapolitan army, and is entrusted with the defence of the city.

July 11.—The crown of Sicily is offered by the Parliament to the Duke of Genoa, but declined.

July 25.—Radetzky defeats the Piedmontese army at Custoza.

August 2.—Mamiani resigns, and the Pope appoints Count Fabbri to succeed him as minister.

August 4.—Charles Albert is defeated under the walls of Milan. A capitulation is concluded, and the king, renouncing the kingdom of *Alta Italia*, retires within his ancient boundaries.

September 16.—Count Fabbri resigns, and is succeeded by Count Rossi.

October 5.—An insurrection at Leghorn is headed by Guerrazzi. Montanelli being sent there by the Capponi ministry, coalesces with Guerrazzi, and a democratic ministry is formed.

November 15.—Rossi is assassinated.

November 24.—The Pope escapes to Gaeta.

November 26.—The Perrone and Pinelli administration resigns, and a new Piedmontese ministry is formed under Gioberti.

November 28.—General Cavaignac announces a French intervention in favour of the Pope.

December 2.—Ferdinand, Emperor of Austria, resigns the crown in favour of his nephew, Francis Joseph.

December 11.—Louis Napoleon chosen President of the French republic.

December 28.—Gioberti sends envoys to Gaeta to dissuade the Pope from asking the aid of foreign powers.

December 29.—The provisional government of Rome decides that a constituent assembly shall be elected by universal suffrage.

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January 1.—The Pope issues a *Monitorio* from Gaeta, forbidding all participation in the election for the Roman constituent assembly.

January 9.—The Grand Duke of Tuscany, under the dictation of Montanelli and Guerrazzi, acquiesces in the project of an Italian constituent, and afterwards retires to Siena.

February 5.—The Roman constituent meets, and proclaims a republic.

February 7.—The Grand Duke escapes to Santo Stefano.

February 9.—A provisional government is established at Florence—Guerrazzi, Montanelli, and Mazzoni triumvirs. Mazzini arrives in Tuscany, and on the 17th assists in the proclamation of a republic at Leghorn.

February 18.—The Pope demands the intervention of Austria, France, Spain, and Naples. Gioberti is obliged to resign his post as head of the Sardinian ministry.

February 21.—The Grand Duke embarks for Gaeta.

March 6.—Mazzini arrives in Rome.

March 20.—Hostilities recommence. The Austrians take the initiative and cross the Ticino.

March 23.—The Piedmontese army is defeated at Novara. Charles Albert abdicates.

March 26.—An armistice is concluded between Austria and Piedmont.

March 27.—Guerrazzi is named dictator by the Tuscan constituent.

March 31.—General Haynau takes Brescia by storm.

April 3.—The Venetian assembly passes a resolution to resist the Austrians at any cost.

April 6.—General Marmora puts down a republican insurrection at Genoa.

April 11.—The *Livornesi* are driven out of Florence by the people, the constitutional government is restored, and Guerrazzi is detained in prison.