

Hindustani Music and Two Idioms of Aesthetic Concern

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A widely acknowledged meaning of the word *aesthetic* is 'relating to aesthetics'; and in so far as, historically, *aesthetics* has been generally regarded as that branch of philosophy which is concerned with the principles of beauty in art, all the major ways of our *aesthetic concern*—such as aesthetic attitude/experience/viewpoint, and aesthetic judgement (in exercising which we use aesthetic predicates like *beautiful*, *graceful*, and *sublime*)—have to be considered largely in the context of art. It is true that in contemporary thinking *beauty* and *art* are not the only concerns of aesthetics, and that *nature* and artistic *meaning or significance* are also given due thought. But in so far as our present concern is with the *art* of music alone, lack of frequent references to nature in this essay may well be allowed to pass. What is more, we may not find it possible all along to reflect on the ways of aesthetic concern we have distinguished in utter separateness from each other. This limitation is forced on us by the fact that instead of being concerned with the mere *concept* of, say, the aesthetic attitude or aesthetic judgement, our attempt will be to bear in mind their *actual exercise* as well. Now, when we in fact adopt the aesthetic attitude in respect of a work of art we may well be captivated by it (aesthetic *experience*) because we find it, say, beautiful (aesthetic *predicate*) and happily say so (aesthetic *judgement*). At the same time, care will have to be taken to bring out the individual uniqueness of the ways in question. After all, even the most intense focusing of attention on a work—say, an epic—may not enable one to conclude definitively whether it is to be called merely grand (or majestic) or sublime, that is, whether it only impresses us, if overwhelmingly, or also tends to make us feel elevated for a while.

In this essay we may deal only with aesthetic attitude and aesthetic experience, for the concepts of aesthetic viewpoint and judgement are closely related to art criticism, and so call for elaborate treatment in a separate essay. Now, to turn first to aesthetic *attitude*, we may note that—quite in consonance with the fact that the word *attitude* means *any way of thinking or behaving*—perceiving, attending, and following discriminatingly are all directly involved in the aesthetic attitude at work. This indeed is duly provided for when Stolnitz defines this attitude as that of

... disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone.¹

However, even a casual look at some of the closing words of this quote ("any object of awareness") may suggest some sceptical questions. Is it justifiable to say that the attitude in question can be adopted in respect of *any object of awareness*? It would surely be rash to

say, *yes*. If a patient, writhing in pain, is able to give to his physician a precise account of the nature of his discomfort, may be because he is used to such introspective activity, will it be proper to regard it as an exercise of the aesthetic attitude simply because the pain has been very carefully attended to and "for its own sake alone", that is, quite without any thought of what has brought it about, or of its possible curability? And would not an affirmative answer to this question run counter to the fact that the actual exercise of the aesthetic attitude always leaves us satisfied, or even happy, if not rapturously so. Further, has it actually been found that the attitude in question can be adopted in respect to any (or every) object of awareness? Even if we give no thought to what may occupy our attention in future, have we been able to consider *all* the objects that can be available to awareness in the present?

However, questions such as these need not disturb us; for, I repeat, our concern is only with the *art* of music; and even where it seems to be generally bedewed with pathetic feeling, classical singing, because of the very semblance of feeling it is able to evoke effectively, does not make us sad, but may only satisfy us deeply and even elicit our open applause.

Such consummate singing, however, does not only *require us to adopt* the aesthetic attitude, but may itself easily elicit it, say after the first few moments of vocal warm-up through a round or two of *sthayi*-singing. Here, at once, another question may suggest itself. Is our aesthetic attitude to music adopted *by us* wilfully, or are we just induced into it *by the power of music itself*? The question may be answered as follows, bit by bit, but strictly in light of actual experience:

Those who enter a concert hall are neither equally interested in, nor evenly capable of enjoying classical music. Now, the case of those who just drop in casually and look on music as only a kind of relief from their routine jobs—or as something by appearing to care for which they can raise their status in society—may well be ignored by us, if only because they may be taken to look on music as simply a matter of agreeable sounds and not as a specific art with its own distinctive craft, structural devices, and potential to engage and refine our imagination and sensibility, nay, even our whole personality. In respect of classical music, the aesthetic attitude—even if it is taken to involve only one activity, namely, *intelligent* following—just cannot be adopted by those who are ignorant of the basic grammar of the art. This is a patent fact; yet it is precisely this which is ignored by the definition we chose for discussion at the very start,—a defect which just cannot be avoided by attempts to characterize the attitude in question quite generally, that is, without relating it to any particular art. Why *such* relating is essential can be clarified thus:

Take the case of sculpture, architecture and painting. Here, what the contemplator has to start from is all given to the eye (may be, through varying slants) though its precise or full artistic significance may have to be thought out or visualized painstakingly. In music, on the other hand, aesthetic pace enters at the very outset; and this has to be held on to ideally; so attention, here, has to be vitally mental from the very beginning. Where the art object attended to is a beautiful building or painting, factual details signified by such terms as *front-back, around, side by side, up and below* are all open to perception, though (as in the case

of some sculptures of Rodin) some parts which are literally incomplete may have to be given wholeness by the onlooker's trained and sympathetic imagination. In music, on the other hand, neither *laya* nor *pitch*-differences (which make the notes appear higher or lower) are given to mere perception; these have all to be held on to ideally, this is, by means of a mental effort; so, the "sympathetic attention" of which our definition speaks is, from the very beginning, *not quite of the same kind* here as in the case of the visual arts. There is another subtle difference which is very likely to be missed by those who do not adopt a meticulously phenomenological approach to our experience of listening to music *and* of looking at the other arts. Where a trained contemplator of paintings finds that in a work, which he is presently looking at, a particular shade of colour does not go well with its immediate neighbour, he will surely feel *disturbed*, but *hardly shocked*, because his expectation with regard to proper colouring in the work (in question) has not been quite definitely predetermined by the picture itself. In music it is different; here, because a definite *laya* has been established by the very opening line (*sthayi*)—of course with the help of, the 'accompanying' *theka*—even a minuscule deviation of singing from the set pace will feel like a painful jab at the *rasika's* heart. As a knowledgeable response to a work of art, aesthetic experience does not gladden or suffuse our being—or determine or ruffle our relish—*identically* in the case of *different* arts. The *visual* images that the close reading of a good poetic line may evoke are utterly unlike the criss-cross of rhythm within the ambit of a single cycle, or the decorative patterns against the ground of the selfsame *raga* which are both relished *ideally* (yet *non-calculatively*) as the charm of efflorescence, so to say, of a determinate singleness.

How exactly our attention is *directed* in listening to music and how varying are the demands which it can make on the listener is, however, yet to be brought out clearly. First, as the *rasikas* wait for the music to begin, their attitude is just a readiness to receive, not the focusing of mind on any specific object. Yet it is not wholly passive either, because it is necessarily a more or less willed, if not quite unremitting abstention from all thought except the indeterminate one of what the opening recital is going to be. The compere's prefatory remarks at once make the attitude oriented towards the *raga-tala* of the opening composition 'announced'—peaceably in the case the *raga* is a familiar one, and a little wonderingly if it is a rare (*aprachalit*) one. Here it should be clear that if we speak of the aesthetic attitude, quite generally, as just one of sympathetic attention to the object contemplated, we only miss the little affective changes that enliven the aesthetic attitude when it is actually adopted. All along, however, what here persists as the essence of the aesthetic attitude is a quiet waiting for the music to unfold itself—passive (as patient) necessarily, but at the same time watchful; so that, if not the whole-form of the *raga* (if it *aprachalit*), at least the tone of the *swaras* it comprises, as also the requisite evenness of *laya*, are both all along duly checked.

It is also important to see how, barring of course what we have characterized as its abiding essence, the aesthetic attitude varies in respect of its little details in accordance with the individual genre of the music contemplated. Yet, whatever be the kind of music we are listening to, how the performer *looks related* to the opening *swara* or *swaras*—that is,

merely physically or as inwardly attuned—importantly determines, as a quiet working of empathy, whether the beginning of singing will help or hinder continuance of our aesthetic attitude. This is not quite covered by the norm of *shuddha mudra* which only calls for a pleasing or unconstricted facial bearing.

The determinant we have just emphasized is perhaps more pressing in the case of listening to *alapa* of the *dhrupada* manner than where the object of attention is *khayal*-singing. In the latter case, if the opening utterance does not appear to surge from within, the possible lack of its impact on listeners can be easily redressed by the rhythmically formed look of the *sthai*. No such alternative is open to the *alapiya*. As the music moves on, the *khayal-sthai* gratifies the (knowledgeable) listener with its self-completing wholeness; provides him with a definite object for *effortless* contemplation because it embraces a *diversity of swaras* (it being obvious that what is quite without inner differences cannot be easily held in attention); and is happily welcome if the raga projected is not difficult to identify. On the other hand, where the music presented is *alapa*, the listener's attitude is not only one of feeling *interested in* (assuming that the singing is sweet) but *importantly that of looking forward to* what is to come next. There are some seasoned *rasikas* who feel so satisfied on listening to a well-structured (*khayal*) *sthai-antara* presentation that they may not feel like caring too much for what is to follow. In listening to *alapa*, on the other hand, as it develops by degrees, the *rasikas'* attitude is at least as much of looking forward to the next musical step as of focusing on the immediate *swara-samooha*. The attitude and the related experience are necessarily open-ended, so to say.

It is true that in its earlier stages *khayal*-singing too shows a glimpse of a leisurely unfoldment of the raga chosen—say, in the way of what is freely called *बद्ध*; but it is too brief, and not quite without the use of words; and so it cannot be regarded as a true parallel of the idiom of *alapa*. What is more, the two genres differ in what they are anchored in during actual singing. The *khayaliya* steadies himself anew (in respect of renewing his feel of the raga-tala chosen) by returning to the rhythm-bound *sthai* after every few *tanais* which distinguish this genre of singing; and so what the listener here experiences is a figuration of patterns *against* a set ground which has its own determinate form. What the *alapiya* returns to, off and on, is only the tonic which surely has a character (because it has to sound sweet), but is quite without *form* regarded as a coherent singleness of *many swaras*. Yet, in spite of the obvious sustenance it provides to the total singing, the *shadja* cannot be regarded as the *distinctive* anchor of *alapa*, just because it has the same sustaining role to play in every kind of singing. In our music as it so far is, every successive note has to relate itself rightly to the tonic which has therefore to be kept in mind all along and in *every* form of singing. The true anchor of *alapa* is only the *raga-rupa* as the individual singer visualizes it; and so, as they appear to the listener, the soothing stretches of *alapa* are no mere melodic lattice-work *against* a settled frame, but the flowering, so to say, of the melodic matrix itself, this is, the raga-form. Here, what the listener is finally rewarded with its the feel of “an intense diffusion, a serene Omnipresence”²—determinate, to be sure, because of the raga's specific identity,

but by no means circumscribed because it is just a sweet ambience and no mere object. One here feels encompassed by or (so to say) swamped in, rather than confronted with what the *alapīya* has been able to conjure up.

Yet, though our actual experience of music and the intenseness of our attention to it naturally vary with the precise quality (which is itself changeable) of what we listen to, there are some features of the *aesthetic attitude* which (are required to) persist in our concern with every work of art. This becomes clear when we focus on the following words in the definition we have been reflecting on: *disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of*. It is obvious that the first of these words, *disinterested*, cannot be taken in the merely negative sense of 'lack of interest in'; for such interpretation will clearly clash with the words that follow, that is, *sympathetic attention to*. The word has rather to be taken to mean, first, that (as Kant pointed out long ago) our attention here is not determined by considerations of reality or actual existence (or occurrence in) in space and time; and secondly, not even by purely personal considerations which can easily take the following forms: 'this is truly the music of the *gharana* to which I am proud to belong'; and 'listening to it watchfully is essential, for it can give me some relevant material for the project I am presently working at'. Similarly, my attitude will be quite non-aesthetic if I began listening with the insistent expectation that, in so far as it is going to be an essay in classical singing, the imminent recital must last at least two hours. Again, the listening will be just as clear a deviation from the aesthetic attitude if it begins with the preconception that the music expected is very likely to be good because its venue is the prestigious Kamani auditorium, or because the performing artist is going to be my own mentor in music. It may seem unnecessary to project such negations to which no one would object; but the fact is that, as in life so in art contemplation, it is difficult to be impersonal in judging the value of objects (or persons) we have to deal with.

Anyway, the word *disinterested*, as used in the definition in question, is to be taken to stand for an impartial way of looking at the art object; and therefore it is quite as true to hold that the aesthetic attitude *has to be adopted by us* as to say that it is often elicited by the winsomeness of good music itself. Both sides of the matter are supported by the actual experience of listening.

But there are two other details of the way we have proceeded so far which are yet to be put together acceptably. If, as is unchallengeable, how music appears to a listener depends (in part) on his (a) uniquely trained imagination and sensibility, how can we say, at the same time, that the aesthetic attitude calls for (b) non-subservience to purely personal factors? The answer here is that whereas what we have put as 'a' directly makes for discriminating attention to what is actually there in the music contemplated, the considerations we have listed as 'b' call for abstention from those factors (namely, emphases such as '*my gharana*', '*my mentor*') which are likely to divert listeners' attention from music's own character to his own individual interests; and that therefore 'b' only (indirectly) supports, instead of colliding with 'a'.

If there is still some vagueness in our understanding of what the aesthetic attitude really

is, the following should dispel it:

Consider how we contemplate a beautiful object of nature, say, a rainbow. We just keep looking at it delightedly, quite without wondering if it *really* exists as it seems to. In fact, we will only feel disturbed if someone begins to explain what really conjures up this mere appearance of the rainbow as overhanging the sky. Here, the sheer delight of the experience is enough for us³. We do not wish to *understand* the phenomenon. At the same time, we do not keep looking at the rainbow explicitly *for the sake of* becoming happy; the delight is incidental. In other words, our attitude here is neither scientific (or theoretic), nor practical; it is aesthetic, the attitude of just contemplating what meets the eye. No extraneous consideration here determines our attention.

It is also obvious that to register the beauty of (raw) nature we do not need any prior training. Nor do we raise any question of moral rightness here. Contemplation of works of art is not so simple. Indeed, as incidental to it, the aesthetic attitude calls for a fuller account, say, as follows:

- a. We may roughly say that an aesthetic attitude, in the wider sense of the term, is being adopted whenever an object is apprehended or judged without reference to its utility or value or moral rightness, or when it is merely contemplated.⁴
- b. This is the attitude of *perception*, the *activity of the spectator pure and simple*, the mental stance and the posture of attention which are habitual in those who have developed a trained skill to appreciate.⁵

Looking at these quotes in the context of our music we may well make some points of value:

1. The aesthetic attitude (of discriminating perception) cannot be adopted by those who have not trained themselves for the purpose; and those who *have* become so eligible look at music habitually as an intelligent and intelligible structure of *swaras* (and as making a specific raga) and not as a mere medley of sounds, however sweet they may be. This is indeed why genuine *rasikas* look for much more in a recital of classical vocal music than mere agreeableness to the ear. They do not register the *swaras* simply as several impressions of sweetness, but as ordered in a specific way and as making a whole of intelligible identity, namely, the raga chosen for rendering. Naturally, they see much more in music than mere *kanarasiyas*; and *their* attitude alone is at once an incipient sensing of aesthetic value, if not an explicit and worded assessment of it.
2. However, it would not be proper to speak of the attitude in question as that of a mere "spectator pure and simple" where the object contemplated is an *absorbing* music recital and where the contemplator is a *rasika*. A spectator only looks at, but does not get into the spirit of (or identify himself imaginatively with) what is looked at. To such a way of attending to works of art our traditional emphases on *tadatmya* and *tanmayi bhavana* would be simply irrelevant; but quite apart from such semantic considerations, is it not a fact that a top class vocal recital, which is not only grammatically correct but also deeply moving, often leaves us just feeling enwrapped in willing surrender to

the music's lingering sweetness? How otherwise could music be said to be capable of refining, in a way, our entire personality, as it surely can, though not without the help of some helpful qualities in our own personalities? The impact of a work of art as rightly contemplated does not end with the overt act of attending; and it is not for nothing that in respect of contemplating a melody, aestheticians have spoken emphatically as follows:

When music relapses . . . definitively into silence, that silence is not nothingness or privation, but possession and fulfilment. When real sonority fades away, then is born the remembered sonority of thought.⁶

It may be added, in passing, that as in Wordsworth's communion with the daffodils, the delighted contemplation of an object of natural beauty may not only keep reverberating, but abide in one's memory, and serve as a recurring source of delight⁷.

3. Yet, there is a good deal of sense in the first of the two quotes we have cited, I mean in its emphasis that the aesthetic attitude is free from determination by considerations of utility and morality. A fervent lover of music will only feel amused or irritated if a hard-headed person tried to wean him from the 'addiction' with the argument that listening to music does not serve any practical purpose. Nor will he buy the argument that the *dhrupada* form is to be preferred to *khayal*-singing simply because its thematic content is far richer in respect of ethico-religious significance than that of *khayal* compositions. However, this is not to deny that situations may arise when we are forced to determine the comparative importance of the moral and aesthetic values, say, from the viewpoint of social welfare taken generally, and so may have to raise the question of the possible moral impact of some kinds of compositions of vocal music. But when we are actually listening to some music the wonder if the act is going to be of some mortal help to us is just not there. What is more, in respect of our classical instrumental music, it clearly does not make sense to ask if our attention to it squares with the demands of morality.

Indeed, so long as our attitude to music remains truly aesthetic, no purely personal or public consideration is allowed to influence it. If I focus attention on a *sthai* simply because it is a part of the repertoire of the *gharana* to which I belong—or because (in virtue of its being a Sadarang composition) it has been acclaimed by many a maestro—and not essentially because of its own character, my attitude will be non-aesthetic (because it is not *disinterested* or objective as impartial). Further, to be truly aesthetic, our attitude here has to be one of "sympathetic attention". The word *sympathetic* in this context obviously does not mean 'being inclined in favour of' (because such an interpretation would clash with what the word *disinterested* signifies), but only *understanding* or *intelligent*. In other words, the overall structure and inner details of the object, here a *sthai*, are to be duly registered. The aesthetic attitude is surely no casual or indeterminate concern; and it is very clearly not so where the object is a work of art. The word *contemplation* reinforces the emphasis.

What art *contemplation* really is has, however, to be brought out. In its secular uses, the

word generally means: 'to go over something mentally', 'to look thoughtfully at something'. Now, where the object looked at *thoughtfully* is a recital of classical music, the 'looking' in question can only mean discriminating listening, that is, a listening which registers *everything* that the music has to offer. By 'everything', I mean here not only the sensed (or merely heard) character of the melody and its constituent notes, but its grammatical identity—which is an object of understanding because, if only implicitly, it is explicitly identified on the basis of its distinctive 'approach phrase' (पकड़) and/or *vadi-samvadi* relation, and so is also distinguished (if implicitly) from other 'neighbouring' ragas; further, its basic pace and the variations within or across this pace; and, above all, the various melodic figurations which make the inner filling of the music, as also its general evocativeness, that is, its ability to suggest some feeling, height or depth, or sheer exuberance. Now, all these requirements of thoughtful listening cannot be met unless the listener has acquired the ability to do so, *and* unless the object, that is, the ongoing music, is somehow *isolated* for attention not only from its immediate surroundings, but (I repeat) from all non-aesthetic—that is practical, theoretical, and moral—considerations. Now, the fact that the aesthetic attitude which is "paradigmatic for aesthetic experience"⁸ has to be cultivated is common knowledge; and as for the *isolation* we have spoken of, it may be understood in the light of the following from Osborne's *The Art of Appreciation*:

Music is a structure built up of artificial sounds which do not occur in nature[,] and concentration within the world of structure which they create is ordinarily so intense that the listener is no longer fully aware of his surroundings [,] and [hence] the intrusion of an alien sound impinging willy-nilly on the attention—such as the blare of motor-horn—causes disproportionate shock.⁹

We may add that *our* music is 'framed apart' for attention also by the cyclic quality of the rhythm as marked on the 'accompanying' drums. However, for a clear understanding of how exactly the aesthetic attitude *differs from our attitudes in real life* we have to turn to the following pointed words:

The greater part of our waking life . . . is lived in such a way that present experience is coloured by expectations for the future and associations from the past. This happens not only when we . . . are planning ahead . . . [but] in our most ordinary and everyday perceptions. Whenever we are expectant, . . . apprehensive, hopeful, confident, or exultant, . . . [;] whenever we become aware of something as suspect, dangerous or innocuous—in all such situations as these we are moulding the present experience in the light of its implications for the future . . . [Similarly,] when we are surprised, disappointed, moved by regret or self-congratulation, soothed by a comfortable feeling of familiarity, or disturbed by a sense of the unfamiliar, we are experiencing the present in the context . . . of a selected past. All such attitudes and emotions are foreign to aesthetic contemplation . . .¹⁰

Now, it is noteworthy that this elaborate account of how aesthetic contemplation is not coloured by anything extraneous is all covered by just two of the many qualifications that

Bharata has used to distinguish rasa-experience: *vedyantaraspārshashunyo* (or being void of contact with any other thing) and 'non-determination' by *nijasukhadukkhadiviveshibhava* (or preoccupation with one's joys and sorrows). Be that as it may, there is an unmistakable air of detachment about the aesthetic attitude and the experience it generates. Both differ qualitatively from our everyday attitudes and experiences.

Yet, merely to distinguish *our experience of listening to music* from our everyday experiences is not the same thing as to see what it positively is; and to provide the needed supplement it is by no means enough to consider all that the music itself offers. We have also to take account of its *varying relatedness to the listener*—in a fuller way than we have done so far. The need is heightened by the fact that some aestheticians of note, like Clive Bell and Pepita Haezrahi, look on aesthetic experience as the only true starting-point of aesthetics. Quite a few other philosophers of art maintain that aesthetic discourse (or our talk about art) makes sense only if it is somehow done in the light of aesthetic experience¹¹. So, partly on the basis of the points already made, a succinct account of aesthetic experience (of music, in particular) may here be given, say, as follows:

From first to last, aesthetic experience is importantly an exercise in *perceptiveness* not in the simple sense of ordinary seeing or hearing, but as discernment or comprehension, that is, as a making out. Where the object is a music recital the listener may or may not find any emotion in the music, for this depends as much on the quality of what strikes his ears as on his own perceptiveness; but he must be able to grasp the grammatical and aesthetic character of the raga and its constituent *swaras*, as also of the rhythm to which the singing is set. Acuity of both listening and identifying (though not analyzing) what is heard is indeed the prime requirement here. Such listening, however, is not brought about by any merely immediate effort of the will. It calls for a trained ear and a cultivated ability to focus on even such melodic details as he is not familiar with so far. Such equipment arises from long and repeated direct exposure to music, and willing reminiscence of its more striking melodic details or overall impact, may be even well after the end of actual listening; and it itself gains in quality after every exercise. As a result, the *rasika* is able to register not merely such obvious details as the composure of a seasoned singer and his abstention from *striving* after effects, or the due projection of pivotal notes like the *Darbari gandhar*, but to see, partly on looking back after actual listening, how the *wondrous delight* produced by Bade Ghulam Ali's meteoric arrivals at the *sama*—by way of *tanas* of three clear but very close segments—differs from (so to say) the *sucking of sheer melodic sweetness* (रस के से घूट पीना) provided by his blissful sustainment of some individual higher (*tara*) *swaras* in a regally open *akara*; or how the two *madhyams* of *Kedara* or the *nishads* of *Mian ki malhar* appear markedly soothing when their adjacence is projected as a glide and not as a mere succession of two discrete *swaras*. Such advances in discriminating listening are actively cherished by a *rasika*; and though he cannot show them off to others, he quietly revels in his growing perceptiveness, and feels enriched on the inside. Riches of aesthetic sensitiveness, we may note, are quite as definite as spiritual ones (*daivi sampada*), and though they may not elevate one morally, they cer-

tainly provide a sense of inner fullness and contentment. This partly explains why quite a few of our *gharanedar* musicians, in whose families music has been the sole commitment for many generations, find it possible to bear “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”¹² and neglect without for a moment thinking of resorting to another means of livelihood. This inner, abiding gain in respect of imperturbability of commitment to aesthetic values—which results from the cumulative experience of dealing with music for years—is however not so easy to verify as what the *rasika* experiences during the course of actually listening to Hindustani music. In this context, as distinguished from that of aesthetic experience taken generally, we may finally say the following:

Except in the case of reading literary works, where attention to the very sound of words (as in reading poetry) is never of considerable importance, the starting-point of an aesthetic experience is always some pointed attention to the perceptual details of the object. Yet, however subtle and trained it be, mere perception is never the whole of aesthetic experience. A measure of felt collectedness, arising in part from temporary freedom from worldly worries and preoccupation with the self, is also always there. Nor is sheer vividness of perception, along with the ability to make out what is seen or heard, ever without a sense of satisfaction. What is more, in emphasizing the role of perception alone, we do not provide for the following actual features of aesthetic experience:

... say, its many felt movements; the sense of flowing with, or of following, the course of the art-work [as it unfolds its meaning or form]; the exchanges of being, so to say, between self and the object—for instance, the radiation of being with wonder and delight on seeing a resplendent sunrise; or the suck of the [moving] sweetness of a musical *svara* or phrase that seems to yearn for something far away. Aesthetic experience is indeed pretty often a very rich mass of organized sensations, thought, half-blown impulses to visualize what may come next, and occasional uneasiness at the thought that ... say, the *tara sadja* has not been duly ‘fed’ [—that is, its aesthetic potential has not been quite brought out] or that the *sthayi* has not been ... [effectively] established. What is more, when we admire the expressiveness of a song, aesthetic experience often include the recognition—and sometimes the actual experience [, if only as a passing whiff] of the emotion projected [by, or rather] in the work.¹³