



III, 3.

- 1—4. There is unity of knowledge in the *Saguṇā Vidyāh* also. Consistency of the Vedānta texts.
5. Union of the different *Vijñāna*'s therefore necessary.
- 6—8. Of the differences in the *prāṇa-samvāda* Chând. 1, 3, Brih. 1, 3.
9. Relation between *om* and *udgîtha* Chând. 1, 1, 1.
10. The parallel passages Brih. 6, 1, 14, Chând. 5, 1, 13, Kaush. 2, 14 on the *prāṇa-samvāda* to be combined.
- 11—13. Qualities of Brahman of general and those of occasional validity, explained by Taitt. 2.
- 14—15. In Kâth. 3, 10—11 no gradation of powers but only the pre-eminence of *Purusha* is intended.
- 16—17. To Brahman applies Ait. 1, 1 [or Brih. 4, 3, 7—4, 25 and Chând. 6, 8-16].
18. Chând. 5, 2, Brih. 6, 1 *vâsovijñānam*, not *âcamanam* is recommended.
19. The *Çaṇḍilya-vidyâ* of Çat. Br. 10, 6, 3 to be combined Brih. 5, 6.
- 20—22. But Brih. 5, 6 *ahar* and *aham* to be separated.
23. Also the *vibhûti*'s in the Rânâyaniya-Khila's and Chând. 3, 14.
24. Also the *purusha-yajña* of the Tâṇḍin's, Paṅgin's, and Taittiriya's.
25. Different opening passages of the Upanishad's, not part of the Vidyâ.
26. Chând. 8, 13, Muṇḍ. 3, 1, 3 etc. to be completed by Kaush. 1, 4.
- 27—28. The shaking off of good and bad works at death.
- 29—30. The *devayâna* valid only in the *saguṇā vidyâh*.
31. But in this universally. Of the difference of *satyam* (Brih. 6, 2, 15) and *tapas* (Chând. 5, 10, 1) in the *Pañcâgni-vidyâ*.
32. Possibility of a new body in the case of one liberated, for the purpose of a mission.—Direct certainly of liberation.
33. The passages (Brih. 3, 8, 8, Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 6), of *aksharam*, mutually complementary.
34. The passages *ritam pibantau* (Kâth. 3, 1) and *dvâ suparnâ* (Muṇḍ. 3, 1) belong to each other.
- 35—36. Also Brih. 3, 4 and 3, 5. Brahman free from (1) causality,—(2) suffering.
37. Brahman and the worshipper separated for the purpose of meditation.
38. Brih. 5, 4 and 5, 5 [not Brih. 5, 4, 5 and Chând. 1, 6, 7] are one Vidyâ.
39. Unity and difference of Chând. 8, 1, 1. 5 and Brih. 4, 4, 22.
- 40—41. Ritual questions concerning the *Vaiçvânara-vidyâ* Chând. 5, 11-24.
42. Relation of conceptions like Chând. 1, 1, 1 to works.
43. Brih. 1, 5, 21-23 and Chând. 4, 3 *adhyâtmam* and *adhidaivam* are to be separated for purposes of adoration.
- 44—52. In the Agnirahasyam *manaçcit* etc. Çat. Br. 10, 5 belongs to the Vidyâ.



- 53-54. Episode on the immortality of the soul.
 55-56. Conception connected with works like Chând. 1, 1, 1. 2, 2, 1.
 Ait. âr. 2, 1, 2, 1. Çat. Br. 10, 5, 4, 1 are valid not only for
 their own Çâkhâ, but, like the Mantra's etc. generally.
 57. Chând. 5, 11-24 the *samasta*, not the *vyasta* is to be worshipped.
 58. Passage where unity of dogma, difference of method.
 59. For the last, choice, not union holds good.
 60. Teachings referring to special wishes can be united.
 61-66. For those mentioned 55-56 either union or choice.

III, 4.

- 1-17. The Upanishad teaching without works leads man to the goal.
 Position of the sage to works.
 18-20. Difference between Jaimini and Bâdarâyana about the *Âgrama*'s.
 21-22. Passages like Chând. 1, 1, 3. 1, 6, 1. Çatap. Br. 10, 1, 2, 2. Ait.
 âr. 2, 1, 2, 1 are not mere *stuti*, but part of the *upâsanam*.
 23-24. Limited validity of the legends Brih. 4, 5, Kaush. 3, 1, Chând. 4, 1.
 25. Resumé of 1-17: knowledge without works leads to the goal.
 26-27. *Yajña, dânam, tapas* etc. as means to knowledge.
 28-31. In mortal danger neglect of the laws as to food is lawful.
 32-35. He who does not strive after knowledge, must also perform the
âgrama-karmâni, which only further, but do not produce,
 knowledge.
 36-39. Those who through want have no *âgrama* are also called to
 knowledge.
 40. *Character indelebilis* of the *Ûrdhvairetas* vow.
 41-42. How far is penance possible for a fallen *Brahmacârin*?
 43. Exclusion of him after *mahâpâtaka*'s and *upapâtaka*'s.
 44-46. Whether the *upâsana*'s belong to the *yajamâna* or the *ritvij*?
 47-49. How far Brih. 3, 5, 1 are the *Âgrama*'s to be understood?
 50. "ἐὰν μὴ γένησθε ὡς τὰ παῖδια..."—"λάθε βιώσαζ."
 51. Knowledge as fruit of this means follows here, where there is
 no stronger *atîndriyâ çaktiḥ*, otherwise in the next life.
 52. A "more" or "less," according to the different strength of the
sâdhana's exists only in the *saguṇâ vidyâḥ*, not in the *nirguṇâ*
vidyâ.

IV, 1.

- 1-2. The *pratyaya* of the *âtman* is to be practised, until Intuition
 is reached.
 3. Then follows identity of self and Brahman; for the awakened
 there is no evil, no perception, no Veda.
 4. "Thou shalt not make to thyself any image (*pratîkam*)!"
 5. In Chând. 3, 19, 1 ("*âdityo brahma*") *brahman* is predicated of
âditya.



6. But Chând. 1, 3, 1 *âditya* is predicated of *udgîtha*.
- 7—10. *Upâsanam* is to be practised sitting, not lying or standing.
11. Place, time, direction are indifferent, only entire freedom from disturbance necessary.
12. The *upâsana*'s have as aim partly *samyagdarçanam* partly *abhyud-aya*; the former are to be practised till the goal is reached, the latter till death.
13. On attainment of knowledge, former sins are destroyed, further sins impossible. (The power of *karman* is paralysed.)
14. Destruction of good works also. Why?
15. Persistence of the body, in spite of liberation, until the extinction of works entered on. Potter's wheel; double moon.
- 16—17. Sacrifices etc. are not binding for the *Brahmavid*, though they are for the *Sagunavid*.
18. Purifying effect of sacrifices etc. with, but also without knowledge.
19. After expiation of *karman*: Death and with it *Kaivalyam*.

IV, 2.

- 1—2. (*Aparavidyâ*.) At death the *indriya*'s enter *manas*,
3. the *manas* enters the *prâna*,
- 4—6. the *Prâna* enters the *vijnânâtman* (*jîva*), this enters the elements.
7. Hence the *Avidvân* goes to re-embodiment, the *Vidvân* to immortality: This *amritatvam* is *âpekshikam*.
- 8—11. Persistence of the "subtle body." Its nature described.
- 12—14. (*Paravidyâ*.) For the *Akâmayamâna* (*Parabrahmavid*) there is no departure of the soul; he is already Brahman.
15. His *prâna*'s enter Brahman, the coarse becomes earth etc.
16. His dissolution is without residue, not, as otherwise, with a residue.
17. (*Aparavidyâ*.) The *Vidvân* (he who knows exoterically) goes out through the 101st channel (the others through others);
- 18—19. Thence by a sun ray, which, by day and night,
- 20—21. in summer and winter, ever exists. (*Sânkhya*-*Yoga* differ.)

IV, 3.

1. Stations on the way: *nâdî*,—*raçmi*,—*arcis*,—
2. *ahar*,—*âpûryamânapaksha*,—*yân shad udañ eti*,—*saṃvatsara*,—*vâyu*,—*âditya*,—
3. *candra*,—*vidyut*,—*varuṇaloka*,—*indra*,—*prajâpati*.
- 4—6. These are guides of the soul whose organs, as they are enveloped do not act.
- 7—14. Terminus: *Brahman*, not the all-present *param brahma*, but the, *aparam*, *sagunam brahman*, which as *kâryam* is transitory. *Kramamukti*.
- 15—16. But those who worship Brahman under a *pratîkam*, have other rewards.

Introduction.

IV, 4.

- 1—3. (*Paravidyâ*.) Identity of the liberated soul with the soul bound in ignorance, suffering, perishableness.
4. *Unio mystica*.
- 5—7. (*Aparavidyâ*.) Characteristics of the (imperfectly) liberated.
- 8—9. The "wishes" (Chând. 8, 2) of the liberated soul. Then freedom.
- 10—14. Does the liberated possess organs (*manas* etc.)?
- 15—16. His wonderful powers; animation of several bodies together.
- 17—22. His *aigvāyam* and its limits. Description of *Brahmaloka*. After he has there gained *Samyagdarśanam* he also enters the everlasting, perfect *Nirvāṇam*.



II. Aim of the Vedânta: The destruction of an innate error.

1. The fundamental thought of the Vedânta and its previous history; a glance at allied theories in the west.

IN the introduction which Çaṅkara prefixes (p. 5-23) to his Commentary on the Brahmasûtra's, he introduces us at once to the fundamental concept of the system, declaring all empirical, physical knowledge to be ignorance (*Avidyâ*), to which he opposes the metaphysics of the Vedânta, as knowledge (*Vidyâ*).—Before we approach this thought in detail, let us call to mind certain truths suited to throw light on its philosophic meaning, and thereby on the Vedânta system of which they are the root.

The thought that the empirical view of nature is not able to lead us to a final solution of the being of things, meets us not only among the Indians but also in many forms in the philosophy of the west. More closely examined this thought is even the root of all metaphysics, so far as without it no metaphysics can come into being or exist. For if empirical or physical investigation were able to throw open to us the true and innermost being of nature, we should only have to continue along this path in order to come at last to an understanding of all truth; the final result would be PHYSICS (in the broader sense, as the teaching of φύσις, nature), and there would be no ground or justification for METAPHYSICS. If, therefore, the metaphysicians of ancient and modern times, dissatisfied with empirical knowledge, went on to metaphysics, this step is only to be explained by a more or less clear consciousness that all empirical investigation and knowledge



amounts in the end only to a great deception grounded in the nature of our knowing faculties, to open our eyes to which is the task of metaphysics.

Thrice, so far as we know, has this knowledge reached conviction among mankind, and each time, as it appears, by a different way, according to conditions of time, national and individual character; once among the Indians, of which we are to speak, again in Greek philosophy, through Parmenides, and the third time in the modern philosophy through Kant.

What drove the Eleatic sage to proceed beyond the world as " $\tau\acute{o} \mu\eta \acute{\epsilon}\nu$ " to the investigation of "the existent" seems to have been the conception, brought into prominence by his predecessor Xenophanes, of the Unity of Being, that is, the unity of nature (by him called $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$), the consequence of which Parmenides drew with unparalleled powers of abstraction, turning his back on nature, and for that reason also cutting off his return to nature.

To the same conviction came Kant by quite another way, since with German patience and thoroughness he subjected the cognitive faculties of mankind to a critical analysis, really or nominally only to examine whether these faculties be really the fitting instruments for the investigation of transcendent objects, whereby, however, he arrived at the astonishing discovery that, amongst others, three essential elements of the world, namely, Space, Time and Causality, are nothing but three forms of perception adhering to the subject, or, if this be expressed in terms of physiology, innate functions of the brain; from this he concluded, with incontestable logic, that the world as it is extended in space and time, and knit together in all its phenomena, great and small, by the causal nexus, *in this form* exists only for our intellect, and is conditioned by the same; and that consequently the world reveals to us "appearances" only, and not the being of "things in themselves." What the latter are, he holds to be unknowable, regarding only external experience as the source of knowledge, so long as we are restricted to intellectual faculties like ours.



These methods of the Greek and German thinkers, admirable as they are, may seem external and cold, when we compare them with the way in which the Indians, as we may assume even in the present condition of research, reached the same concepts. Their pre-eminence will be intelligible when we consider that no people on earth took religion so seriously, none toiled on the way to salvation as they did. Their reward for this was to have got, if not the most scientific, yet the most inward and immediate expression of the deepest secret of being.

How the development which led them to this goal is to be conceived in detail, we cannot yet accurately determine; it seems to us specially matter of question how the historical relation between *Brahman* and *Âtman*, the two chief concepts on which Indian metaphysics grew, and which already in the Upanishad's, so far as we see, are used throughout as synonyms, is to be considered: whether the concept of *Âtman* developed itself from that of *Brahman* through a mere sharpening of the subjective moment lying therein, or whether we have rather to distinguish between two streams, the one, more ecclesiastical, which raised *Brahman* to a principle; the other, more philosophical, which did the same for *Âtman*, until both, closely connected in their nature, were led into a common bed. Putting aside these questions for the present, let us briefly, by a few selected examples, indicate the steps along which the Indian genius probably raised itself to the conception of the world, which we are then to set forth.

1. We have already pointed out how the Indians, setting out from the worship of personified powers of nature, recognised in that raising of the feeling above the consciousness of individual existence which occurs in prayer, that is, in the *Brahman*, the central force in all the forces of nature, the shaping and supporting principle of all Gods and all worlds; the word *Brahman* in the whole Rîgveda never meaning anything else than this lifting and spiritualising power of prayer. (With the history of this concept may be compared that of the Logos (Λόγος) of the fourth Gospel, which rests on a similar abstraction and hypostasis.) From the standpoint of this apprehension of the *Brahman* as a cosmic potency inherent

in the subject, the *Taittirîya-Brâhmanam* (2, 8, 9, 6) for example, takes up a question put in the *Rigveda* (X, 81, 4) and answers it as follows:—

“Where was the tree and where the wood,
“From which the heaven and earth were shaped?
“Musing in mind seek that, ye wise,
“Whereon the bearer of them stood!” (*Rigv.* 10, 81, 4)
“The Brahman was the tree, the wood,
“From which the heavens and earth were shaped,
“Musing in mind, I say, ye wise,
“On Him the bearer of them stood!”

2. To this is joined the idea that Brahman is the innermost and noblest in all the phenomena of the world; it is, as the *Kâthaka-Up.* (5, 1—3) expresses it, changing and deepening the sense of the verse *Rigv.* 4, 40, 5, the sun in the firmament (*hansaḥ çucishad*), the God (*vasu*, the good) in the atmosphere, the Hotar at the altar, the guest at the threshold of the house, it dwells everywhere, is born everywhere,—but he only is free from sorrow and sure of liberation, who honours it, the unborn, unassailable spirit, in “the city with eleven doors” (the body), wherein it dwells, with the powers of life round it,—

“And in the middle sits a dwarf,
“Whom all the godlike Powers adore.”

3. Here “in the lotus of the heart” the Brahman is now nothing else than the *Âtman*, that is, the soul, literally “the self.” We select an example from *Chândogya-Up.* 3, 14:

“Verily this universe is Brahman; as *Tajjalân* [in it be-
“coming, ceasing, breathing] it is to be adored in silence.
“Spirit is its material, life its body, light its form; its decree
“is truth, its self endlessness [literally æther]; all-working is
“He, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting²⁷ comprehending the
“All, silent, ungrieved:—this is my soul (*âtman*) in the inmost
“heart, smaller than a grain of rice, or of barley, or of mus-
“tard-seed, or of millet, or a grain of millet’s kernel;—this is
“my soul in the inmost heart, greater than the earth, greater

²⁷ Otherwise Max Müller and Oldenberg (*Buddha*¹, p. 31); cf. how-
ever Brih. 4, 3, 24 and the οὔλος ὀρέα, οὔλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὔλος δὲ τ’ ἀκούει
of Xenophanes.



“than the atmosphere, greater than the heaven, greater than
“these worlds.—The all-working, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-
“tasting, embracing-the-All, silent, ungrieved, this is my soul
“in the inmost heart, this is Brahman, into him I shall enter
“on departing hence.—He to whom this happens, he, verily,
“doubts no more!—Thus spoke Cāṇḍilya, Cāṇḍilya.”

4. The last-mentioned entering into the true Self after death presupposes the consciousness of a difference between the empiric self, that is, the bodily personality, and the highest Self (*paramâtman*), which is the Soul, that is, God. This difference is the subject of a lesson, which Prajâpati gives to Indra, *Chândogya-Up.* 8, 7—12, and in which he leads him up step by step to ever truer knowledge. To the question: “What is the Self?” comes as the first answer: 1) “The Self is the body, as it is reflected in the eye, in water, in a mirror.” To the objection, that then the Self is also affected by the defect and dissolution of the body, follows the second explanation: 2) “The Self is the soul, as it enjoys itself in dream.” To the objection that the dreaming soul, if it does not suffer, still believes itself to suffer, it is replied: 3) “When “he who has sunk to sleep has come altogether, fully, and “wholly to rest, so that he beholds no dream,—that is the “Self, the undying, the fearless, the Brahman.” To the objection that in this condition consciousness ceases, and that it is like entering into nothing, Prajâpati at last answers: 4) “Mortal, verily, O Mighty one, is this body, possessed by “death; it is the dwelling-place of that undying, bodiless Self. “The embodied is possessed by pleasure and pain, for while “he is embodied, there can be no escaping of pleasure and “pain. But pleasure and pain, do not touch the bodiless one.— “Bodiless is the wind;—clouds, lightning, thunder are bodiless. “Now as these arise from the atmosphere [in which they are “bound, like the soul in the body], enter into the highest light, “and thereby appear in their own form, so also this full rest “[that is, the Soul, in deep sleep] arises from this body, enters “into the highest light and reaches its own form; that is the “highest Spirit.”—

In similar fashion the *Taittirîya-Up.* 2, 1—7 leads from the

bodily self, by stripping one covering after another off it, at last to the true Self. It distinguishes: 1) the Self consisting of food; in this, as in a case, is held 2) the Self of breath, in this 3) the Self of manas, in this 4) the Self of knowledge, in this finally as innermost 5) the Self of bliss. "Verily, this is the Essence (*rasa*); he who reaches this "essence, is filled with bliss; for who could breathe and who "could live, if this bliss were not in space?—For he it is that "causes bliss; for when one finds peace and support in this "invisible, bodiless, unspeakable, unfathomable one, then has "he entered into peace; but if he in this also [as in the four "first] recognises a hollow, an "other," then he finds unrest; "this is the unrest of him who thinks himself wise."

5. The Self, in this sense, is, according to *Chândogya-Up.* 6, 2, 1 "the existent," "the One without a second," and, answering to this, *Bṛihadâraṇyaka-Up.* 2, 4, 5 refers and limits all investigation to the Self: "The Self, verily, o Maitreyî, must "be seen, heard, thought on, and investigated; he who sees, "hears, thinks on, and investigates the Self, has understood "all this world." "These worlds, these Gods, these beings, all "these are what the Self is." It is the point of union (*ekâ-yanam*) for all, as the ocean for the waters, the ear for sound, the eye for forms, and so on; all outside it is as devoid of being as the sound that goes out from a musical instrument; he who has laid hold on the instrument has therewith also laid hold on the sounds that spring from it (*loc. cit.*, 2, 4, 6—11). It is, according to *Chândogya-Up.* 6, 1, 4, that from which all the world has come into being, as a mere transformation of it: he who knows this One, therewith knows all, "just as, oh dear "one, by a lump of clay, all that is made of clay is known; "the transformation is a matter of words, a mere name; in "reality it is only clay!"—

6. In conformity with this, the *Içâ-Up.* 1, 6 bids us "sink the whole world in God," that is, in the Self:

"Who, seeking, finds all being in the Self

"For him all error fades, all sorrow ends;"

and the *Kâṭhaka-Up.* (4, 10—11) warns us not to admit a multiplicity, anything different (*nânâ*) from the soul:



II. Aim of the Vedānta: the destruction of an innate error. 53

"For what is here is there, and what is there is here;
 "From death to death he hastes who here another knows!
 "In spirit shall ye know, here is no manifold;
 "From death to death is he ensnared who difference sees."

7. It was a simple consequence of these conceptions when the Vedānta declared the empirical concept which represents to us a manifold existing outside the Self, a world of the Object existing independently of the Subject, to be a glamour (*māyā*), an innate illusion (*bhrama*) resting on an illegitimate transference (*adhyāsa*), in virtue of which we transfer the reality, which alone belongs to the subject, to the world of the object, and, conversely, the characteristics of the objective world, *e. g.*, corporeality, to the subject, the Self, the Soul.

Concerning this, let us hear Ṣaṅkara himself.

2. Analysis of Ṣaṅkara's Introduction (p. 5-23).

"Object (*vishaya*) and Subject (*vishayin*)", he says at the beginning of his work, "having as their province the presentation of the 'Thou' [the not I] and the 'I,'²⁸ are of a nature "as opposed as darkness and light. If it is certain that the "being of the one is incompatible with the being of the other, "it follows so much the more that the qualities of the one "also do not exist in the other. Hence it follows that the "transfer (*adhyāsa*) of the object, which has as its province "the idea of the 'Thou,' and its qualities, to the pure spiritual subject, which has as its province the idea of the 'I,' "and conversely, that the transfer of the subject and its "qualities to the object, is logically false.—Yet in mankind "this procedure resting on false knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna-nimitta*) of pairing together the true and untrue [that is, "subjective and objective] is inborn (*naisargika*), so that they

²⁸ *Yushmad-asmāt-pratyaya-gocara*; Banerjea translates: "indicated by the second and first personal pronouns," and so p. 15, 2 *asmāt-pratyaya-vishayatvāt*: "because it (the soul) is the object of the first personal pronoun," which, however, gives us no clear meaning, for only presentations, not pronouns, have objects,—The soul is therefore subject (*vishayin*), yet not (empiric) subject of knowledge as which the *ahampratyayin* (that is, the *manas*, to distinguish from the *ahamkartar*) figures, to which the soul again stands opposed as object (*vishaya*); cf. the passages in notes 29 and 30, and further in the course of the work (Chap. XXVII, 3).



"transfer the being and qualities of the one to the other, not "separating object and subject, although they are absolutely "different (*atyanta-vivikta*) and so saying, for example: 'This "am I,' 'That is mine.'"²⁹

However this transference be defined, (p. 12, 1—14, 3) in any case it comes to this, that qualities of one thing appear in another, as when mother-of-pearl is taken for silver, or when two moons are seen instead of one (p. 14, 3—5). This erroneous transference of the things and relations of the objective world to the inner Soul, the Self in the strictest sense of the word, is possible because the soul also is, in a certain sense, object, namely, object of presentation to the "I," and, as our author here affirms, in no sense something transcendent, lying beyond the province of perception (*paroksham*).³⁰

²⁹ By this the objective, *e. g.*, the body, is sometimes treated as subject, sometimes as a quality of it. As explanation the following passage may serve, p. 20, 8: "As one is accustomed, when it goes ill or well with his "son or wife and the like, to say, 'it goes ill or well with me,' and thus "transfers the qualities of outer things to the Self (soul, *âtman*) [cf. p. 689, "3 ff.], in just the same way he transfers the qualities of the body, when "he says: 'I am fat, I am thin, I am white, I stand, I go, I leap,' and "similarly the qualities of the sense organs when he says: 'I am dumb, "impotent, deaf, one-eyed, blind,' and similarly the qualities of the inner "organ [*antahkaranam* = *manas*, cf. 2, 3, 32], desire, wish, doubt, resolution "and the like;—thus also he transfers the subject presenting the 'I' "*(aham-pratyayin)* to the inner soul, present solely as witness (*sâkshin*) "of the personal tendencies, and conversely the witness of all, the inner "soul, to the inner organ and the rest" [that is, to the sense organs, the body and the objects of the outer world].

³⁰ P. 14, 5: "Question: but how is it possible to transfer to the inner "soul, which is no object, the qualities of objects? For everyone transfers "[only] to one object standing before him another object: and of the "inner soul thou maintainest that it is cut off from the idea of 'Thou' "[not-I] and is no object [I read with Govinda: *avishayatvam*]?"—Answer: "Not in every sense is it non-object; for it is the object of perception "of the 'I'" [*asmat-pratyaya-vishaya*; taken strictly and according to p. 78, 6, cf. 73, 5. 672, 1, not the *sâkshin*, but only the *kartar*, that is, the individual soul already endowed with objective qualities, is *aham-pratyaya-vishaya*], "and the [whole] assumption of an inner soul rests "on this, that it is not transcendent (*aparoksha*). It is also not necessary "that the object, to which we transfer another object, should stand before "us; as, for instance, when simple people transfer to space (*âkâśa*),



"This transference, thus made, the wise term IGNORANCE (*avidyā*), and, in contradistinction to it, they call the accurate "determination of the own nature of things" (*vastu-svarūpam*, of the being-in-itself of things, as we should say) "KNOWLEDGE" (*vidyā*). If this be so, it follows that that to which a [similar, "false] transfer is thus made, is not in the slightest degree "affected by any want or excess caused thereby" (p. 16, 1—4).

The object of knowledge, the Soul, thus remains, as made clear in these words, entirely unaltered, no matter whether we rightly understand it, or not. From this we must conclude that the ground of the erroneous empirical concept is to be sought for solely in the knowing subject; in this subject the *avidyā*, as repeatedly (p. 10, 1. 21, 7, 807, 12) asserted, is innate (*naisargika*); its cause is a wrong perception (it is *mithyā-jñāna-nimitta*, p. 9, 3); its being is a wrong conception (*mithyā-pratyaya-rūpa*, p. 21, 7);—all these expressions point to the fact that the final reason of the false empirical concept is to be sought—where, however, the Vedānta did not seek it—in the nature of our cognitive faculty. An analysis of this, as Kant undertook it, would in fact give the true scientific foundation of the Vedānta system; and it is to be hoped that the Indians, whose orthodox dogmatics, holding good still at the present day, we here set forth, will accept the teachings of the "Critique of Pure Reason," when it is brought to their knowledge, with grateful respect.³¹

"which is not an object of perception, the dark colour of the ground, "and the like. In just the same way is it possible to transfer to the "inner soul what is not soul."

³¹ Also Kant's axiom that the transcendental ideality of the world does not exclude its empiric reality, finds its full analogy in the concepts of Caṅkara: cf. p. 448, 6; "All empiric action is true, so long as the "knowledge of the soul is not reached, just as the actions in dream, "before awaking occurs. As long in fact as the knowledge of unity with "the true Self is not reached, one has not a consciousness of the unreality "of the procedure connected with standards and objects of know- "ledge and fruits of works, but every creature, under the designation of "I' and 'mine,' takes mere transformations for the Self and for charac- "teristics of the Self, and on the other hand leaves out of consideration "their original Brahman-Selfhood; therefore before the consciousness

On the soil of this natural Ignorance stands according to Ćaṅkara, all human knowledge, with the exception of the metaphysics of the Vedānta; thus, not only the empirical thought, that is, thought by means of the sense-organs, of common life, but also the whole ritual canon of the Veda, with its things commanded and forbidden under promise of reward and punishment in another world (p. 16, 4—17, 1).

The immediate ground on which both worldly and Vedic actions must be referred to the sphere of Ignorance, lies in this, that both are not free from the delusion (*abhimāna*) of seeing the "I" in the body; for neither knowledge nor action is possible unless one considers as belonging to the Self,³² the sense-organs and the body bearing them, and the ritual part of the Veda also cannot but transfer many circumstances of the outer world erroneously to the Soul.³³

A further ground for the inadequacy of all empirical knowledge is, that it is only distinguished from that of animals in degree through higher evolution (*vyutpatti*), but is in kind similar to it, so far as, like it, it is wholly subservient

"of identity with Brahman awakes, all worldly and Vedic actions are "justified."

³² P. 17, 2: "But how is it possible that the means of knowledge, "perception and the rest, and the [ritual] books of doctrine are limited to "the province of Ignorance?—Answer: Because without the delusion that "I' and 'mine' consist in the body, sense-organs, and the like, no "knower can exist, and consequently a use of the means of knowledge "is not possible. For without calling in the aid of the sense-organs, "there can be no perception, but the action of the sense-organs is not "possible without a resting place [the body], and no action at all is "possible without transferring the being of the Self (the Soul, *ātman*) "to the body, and without all this taking place no knowledge is possible "for the soul, which is independent [reading *asaṅgasya*] [of embodied "existence]. But without action of knowing, no knowing is possible. "Consequently, the means of knowledge, perception and the rest, as "as well as the books of doctrine [in question] belong to the province "of Ignorance."

³³ P. 20, 5: "For when it is said, for example: 'Let the Brahman "offer', the like ordinances rest on the fact of transferring the castes, "Āgrama's, ages of life and similar differences to the soul; this trans- "ference is, as we have said, the assumption that something is where it "is not."



to egoism, which impels us to seek for what is desired and to avoid what is not desired; and it makes no difference here whether these egoistic aims, as in the case of worldly actions, reach their realisation already in this life, or, as in the case of the works ordained by the Vedas, only in a future existence, thus presupposing a knowledge of it. Quite otherwise the Vedānta, which, on the contrary, leaves the whole sphere of desire behind, turns its back on all differences of position in outer life (even if, as we shall see, not quite consistently), and raises itself to the knowledge that the Soul is in reality not the least involved in the circle of transmigration (*samsāra*).³⁴

³⁴ The interesting passage which gives us an insight into the Indian idea of the difference between man and animals, reads in its entirety as follows, (p. 18, 4ff.):—"For this reason also" [worldly and Vedic knowledge belongs to the province of Ignorance], "because [thereby] no difference is made between man and animals. For just as the animals, when, for instance, a sound strikes their ears, in case the perception of the sound is disagreeable to them, move away from it, and in case it is agreeable, move towards it,—as, when they see a man with an upraised stick before them, thinking: 'He will strike me,' they try to escape, and when they see one with a handful of fresh grass, approach him [one sees that when the Indian speaks of an animal, he thinks of a cow, somewhat as we think of a dog]: so men also whose knowledge is more developed (*vyutpanna-cittāḥ*), when they perceive strong men of terrible aspect, with drawn swords in their hands, turn away from them, and turn towards the contrary.—Thus with reference to the means and objects of knowledge, the process in men and animals is alike. Of course in the case of animals perception, and the like, goes on without previous (!) judgment (*viveka*); but as can be seen by the resemblance, even in the case of [spiritually] developed (*vyutpattimatām*) men, perception and the like for the time [of false knowledge] is the same; and if according to the spiritual canon the performance of works is permitted only to one who has gained insight (*buddhi*), and not to one who has not recognised the connection of the soul with the other world, yet for this permission it is not imperative that one [should have recognised] the truth concerning the soul freed from the *Samsāra*, to be taught by the Vedānta, which leaves behind hunger and the other [desires], and turns away from the difference between Brahmans, warriors and the rest. For this truth is not implied in the injunction [of the work of sacrifice], but is rather in contradiction to it. And while the canon of ordinances is valid [only] for this degree of knowledge of the soul, it does not rise above the province of Ignorance."

For all those laws of empirical knowledge and action are valid for us only so long as we are influenced by the Ignorance, resting on a false transference, which nature imposes on us, of which it is said in conclusion (p. 21, 7): "Thus it stands "with this beginningless, endless, innate transference, which "in its essence is a false assumption, producing all the conditions of doing and enjoying [or suffering] and forming the "[natural] standpoint of all men. To remove this, the root "of the evil, and to teach the knowledge of the unity of the "soul,—this is the aim of all the texts of the Vedānta."³⁵

This aim the Vedānta reaches by separating from the soul (the Self, *âtman*) everything that is not soul, not Self, and is only transferred thereto falsely, thus, in a word, all *Upâdhi*'s, or individualising determinations, clothed (*upahitam* 163, 9. 690, 5. 739, 7) in which the Brahman appears as individual soul. Such *Upâdhi*'s are: 1) all things and relations of the outer world (cf. note 29), 2) the body, consisting of the gross elements, 3) the *Indriya*'s, that is the five sense-organs and five organs of action of the body, represented as separate existences, 4) *Manas*, also called the inner organ (*antahkaraṇam*), the central organ for the sense-organs as well as for the organs of action, in the first place closely approaching what we call understanding, and in the latter almost synonymous with, what we call conscious will, the unified principle of conscious life, as 5) the *Mukhya prâṇa* with its five offshoots, is the unified principle of unconscious life, subserving nutrition. —All this, of which more in our psychological part, metaphysics cuts away, in order to retain the soul, that is, the real Self or "I," which is present as spectator (*sâkshin*) of all individual actions, but itself only apparently individualised by the *Upâdhi*'s, is on the contrary in reality identical with the highest godhead, and, like this, is pure spiritual nature, pure consciousness (*caitanya*).

³⁵ Cf. for the doctrine of the Avidyâ also the following passages: p. 98, 8. 112, 3. 182, 12. 185, 12. 199, 5. 205, 10. 343, 4. 360, 2. 433, 13. 452, 2. 455, 4. 473, 17. 483, 6. 507, 1. 660, 10. 680, 12. 682, 3. 689, 1. 690, 5. 692, 14. 787, 13. 804, 1. 807, 11. 837, 2. 860, 15. 1056, 1. 1132, 10. 1133, 12. 1133, 15.



II. Aim of the Vedânta: the destruction of an innate error. 59

And here we touch the fundamental want of the Vedânta system, which, among other things, causes the absence of its proper morality, however near this, in its purest form, lay to its principle.³⁶ Rightly the Vedânta recognises, as the sole source by which we may reach true knowledge, true apprehension of being-in-itself, our own "I," but it wrongly halts at the form in which it directly appeals to our consciousness, as a knower, even after it has cut away the whole intellectual apparatus, and ascribed it to the "not I," the world of phenomena, just as it has also, very rightly, indicated as the dwelling of the highest soul, not, as Descartes did, the head (about which Brih. 2, 2 treats), but the heart.

Meanwhile, as we shall see, the spiritual (*caitanya*) is, in our system, a potency which lies at the root of all motion and change in nature, which is therefore also ascribed, for example, to plants, and means thus rather the capacity of reaction to outer influences, a potency which, in its highest development, reveals itself as human intellect, as spirit.

³⁶ The command "ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτὸν" ["Love thy neighbour as thyself"] is an immediate consequence of the fundamental concept of the Vedânta, as the following verses of the *Bhagavadgîtâ* (18, 27-28) may show:—

"This highest Godhead hath his seat in every being,
"And liveth though they die; who seeth him, is seeing,
"And he who everywhere this highest God hath found,
"Will not wound self through self. . . ."

III. Who is called to the Study of the Vedânta?

1. The indispensable Condition.

The question, who is to be admitted to the saving teaching of the Vedânta, and who is to be excluded from it, is discussed in an episode of the first Adhyâya of the Brahmasûtra's with great fulness (p. 280—323), and the result is, that there are called to knowledge, all those who are reborn (*dvija*) through the Sacrament of the *Upanayanam* (the initiation by a teacher with the solemn investiture with the sacred thread), therefore if they fulfil this condition, all Brâhmana's, Kshatriya's and Vaigyas, and further also the gods and (departed) Rishis; that, on the contrary, the Qûdra's (belonging to the fourth, non-Aryan, caste) are excluded from it.

Both the exclusion of the Qûdra's and the inclusion of the gods, give rise to long and interesting discussions.

2. Exclusion of the Qûdra's.

At first sight it may appear strange considering the principle of the Vedânta, that the Qûdra's are shut out from the path of salvation. Of course birth in a particular caste is not a matter of chance, but the necessary consequence of conduct and works in a former existence; but, as the Vedânta makes no difference between the three higher castes, it should have been a logical consequence of its views (first however drawn by Buddhism), to admit the Qûdra too; for he also has a soul, he also is Brahman, and there is no conceivable reason why he also should not become conscious of this, and thus partake of the saving knowledge, especially as it is recognised that he is in need of it (p. 315, ll. 317, 3), and further the objector's argument of the Qûdra's qualification for know-

ledge (p. 315, 11) is not contested from a worldly point of view (p. 317, 4), as also his right, admitted by the Smṛiti, to participate in the hearing of the *Itihāsa*'s and *Purāṇa*'s (the epic and mythological poems) is not denied (p. 322, 14).

But the same accommodation to national prejudices which determines the philosophers of the Vedānta to derive all their knowledge, even by the most tortuous procedure from the Veda, makes it also impossible for them to admit the Çūdra; for a condition precedent to the study of the Vedānta, is the study of the Veda and a knowledge of its contents (p. 316, 9), for this again, the *Upanayanam* (initiation by a teacher), to which the Çūdra cannot attain (p. 317, 2, 320, 6), as the law (*smṛiti*) further forbids the reading aloud of the Veda, even in the presence of a Çūdra (p. 322, 2, 6).

With this is connected the discussion of certain cases occurring in the Veda itself, where a doctrine is apparently imparted to a Çūdra, or man of doubtful caste.

The first is that of the *Samvarga-vidyā*, a theory (reminding one of Anaximenes) of *Vāyu* (wind) and *Prāṇa* (breath) as "*saṃvargāḥ*" (absorbers), on the one hand, of the elements, on the other, of the life-organs, which Chând. 4, 1—3 Raikva imparts to Jânaçruti, even after he has previously called him a Çūdra.³⁷

³⁷ The wording of this legend, which shows in very drastic fashion that the knower of Brahman, be he ever so wretched, stands higher than the richest and best who does not know it, is as follows (Chând. 4, 1—2): "Jânaçruti, the grandson [of Janaçruta] was a dispenser, giving much, cooking much. He had houses of rest built on all sides, that men from all parts might eat with him. Once geese [or flamingoes] flew past in the night. Then spoke one goose to the other: Ha there! dim-eyed, dim-eyed [seest thou not] the splendour of Jânaçruti the grandson is extended like the heaven; approach it not, burn not thyself.'—To her the other said: 'Who is he of whom thou speakest, as though he were Raikva with the car!'—'What is this—of Raikva with the car?'—'As [at dice] to him who has won with the kṛita [the highest] throw [or perhaps *viçitāya* from *viç*, cf. Rîgv. I, 92, 10 *viçah*] the lower throws are also counted with it, so to him [Raikva] comes home all the good the creatures do; and he who knows what he knows, for him also is this true.'—This Jânaçruti the grandson over-heard. As soon as he rose, he spoke to his steward [who praised him in the way the

On the other side, Çāṅkara reminds us firstly that a single case does not make a rule (p. 317, 9), and that what was right in the case of the *Samvarga-vidyā* need not therefore be transferred to all other things (p. 318, 1); but after this both *Sūtram* and scholion (315, 6. 318, 10) affirm that "Çūdra" in the foregoing case is not to be taken in its tra-

"*Vaitālika*'s were afterwards wont to do]: 'Thou speakest [of me] as if "I were Raikva with the car.'—'What is this—of Raikva with the car?'—'As to him who has won with the *kṛita* throw, the lower throws are also counted, so to him comes home all the good the creatures do; and he who knows what he knows, for him also is this true.'—Then went the steward forth to seek him. He came back and said 'I have not found him.'—He [*Jānaçruti*] spoke to him: 'Go seek him where a "*Brāhmaṇa* [in the full sense, as *Bṛih.* 3, 5, 1. 3, 8, 10] is to be sought [in solitude, in the forest, on a sandbank, in the river, in a remote place,—as the scholiast explains].—There sat one under his car, scratching his sores. To him he made obeisance saying: 'Art thou, venerable one, Raikva with the car?'—'I am verily he,' he answered,—The steward returned and said: 'I have found him.'—Then took *Jānaçruti* the grandson six hundred cows, a golden necklace, and a waggon with mules, and went to him and said: 'Raikva! here are six hundred cows, here is a golden necklace, here is a waggon with mules, teach me, venerable one, the Godhead whom thou worshippingest.'—To him answered the other: 'Ha, ha! for a trinket and a yoke, thou Çūdra! keep them for thyself, with thy cows.'—Then took *Jānaçruti* the grandson again a thousand cows, a golden necklace, a waggon with mules and his daughter; he took them, and went to him and said: 'Raikva! here are a thousand cows, here is a golden necklace, here is a waggon with mules, here is a wife, here also is the village in which thou sittest;—teach me, venerable one!'—Then raised he her face [sunk in shame] and said: 'He has brought these [cows]; through this face alone, Çūdra, thou wouldst have made me speak.'—Those are the [villages] called *Raikvaparna*, in the country of the *Mahāvṛisha*'s, where he dwelt [at his invitation] and he spoke to him."

Then follows, in the mouth of Raikva, the *Samvargavidyā*, which has, however, not the slightest connection with the foregoing narrative, so that one could substitute for it, quite as suitably, almost any other extract from the *Upanishad*'s. Also the systematising at the beginning, the legend of *Kāpeya* and *Abhipratārin* in the middle, with its *Trisṭubh* verses, and the promise "*ya' evam veda*" at the conclusion, go to show that here, as so often in the *Upanishad*'s, we have to do with two quite independent passages, originally placed side by side only perhaps because the *kṛita* throw occurs in both, carelessly united by a later editor, and in later times (*e. g.* by Çāṅkara, p. 1006, 7) expressly maintained to be connected with each other.



ditional sense (*rūḍhārtha*), but in its etymological sense (*avayavārtha*); namely because Jānaçruti from sorrow (*çu-cā*) at the humiliating speech of the goose, had run (*du-drā-va*) to Raikva, this Rishi, who, through supernatural knowledge, became aware of what happened, and wished to make this evident, called him "*çū-dra*" (!). A subsequent (p. 319—320) direct proof that Jānaçruti was a Kshatriya, must be termed utterly inadequate, so far as it seeks by all kinds of quibbles to make it probable that the Abhipratârin mentioned in the Saṃvargavidyâ (Chând. 4, 3, 5) was a Kshatriya,—and therefore also Jānaçruti, because he is mentioned in the same Vidyâ (!). It is more arguable, as Çaṅkara insists in this connection, that Jānaçruti must have been a Kshatriya because he had a steward (*kshattar*) (p. 320, 2);—however this may be, the whole zealously prosecuted investigation only proves for us that, for the time of Çaṅkara and also for that of Bâdarâyana, it was by no means held to be self-evident that a man of princely wealth and pomp like Jānaçruti, could not have been a Çûdra, which is interesting from the point of view of the history of culture.

A further case is that of the boy Satyakâma, to whom his mother Jabâlâ declares she cannot tell him from what family (*gotram*) he comes, because in her youth she had had to do with too many; with childlike naiveté, Satyakâma (whose name, as M. Müller fittingly observes, means Φιλαλήθης) repeats this to the teacher who asks him concerning his family; the teacher finds that only a Brahman can be so sincere, and imparts the knowledge to him as such.³⁸

³⁸ *Chândogya-Upanishad* 4, 4: "Satyakâma, the son of Jabâlâ, said to his mother: 'Venerable one, I would enter as a Brahman student; tell me of what family I am.'—She said to him: 'This I know not, my boy, of what family thou art: in my youth I went about much as a maid; there I got thee; I myself know not of what family thou art; my name is Jabâlâ, and thy name is Satyakâma; so call thyself [instead of after the father] Satyakâma, son of Jabâlâ.'—Then went he to Hâridrumata the Gautama, and said: 'I would enter with thee, venerable one, as Brahmachârin, deign to accept me, venerable one!' He said to him: 'Of what family art thou, dear one?'—He said: 'I know not, oh master, of what family I am. I asked my mother, and she answered

In this story Bâdarâyana (p. 321, 5) and Çaṅkara (p. 321, 6) find a confirmation of the rule excluding the Çûdra, because Satyakâma is admitted only "after it is decided that he cannot be Çûdra because he spoke the truth" (!—*satya-vacanaena Çûdratva-abhâve nirddhârîte*,)—but we might rather conclude from it that in ancient times liberality was greater, and that there was a disposition to let the question of Brahmanhood by birth alone, where a Brahmanhood of heart and mind existed.³⁹

However this may be, for our authors, the Çûdra, so long as he has not been raised on the path of transmigration to a higher caste,⁴⁰ remains entirely excluded from all share in the teaching of salvation. On the other hand the boundary of admission, which is so ungenerously narrowed below, is very generously widened above, so that not only all men of the three Aryan castes, but also the Gods, and the departed Rishis, are called to the study of the saving Brahmavidyâ.

"me: 'in my youth I went about much as a maid; there I got thee; I myself know not of what family thou art; my name is Jabâlâ, and thy name is Satyakâma;' so am I called Satyakâma, the son of Jabâlâ, oh master."—He said to him: 'only a Brahman can speak so frankly; bring the fuel, dear one [that is necessary to the ceremony], I will take thee because thou hast not departed from the truth.'"

In the continuation (Chând. 4, 5-9) Satyakâma while he is keeping cows, is first taught concerning the four four-fold feet of Brahman (4 cardinal points, 4 parts of the world, 4 sources of light, 4 organs of life), in order, by the bull, the fire, the goose and the diver, until he also receives the teacher's doctrine which "brings furthest." In the following section (Chând. 4, 10-15) Satyakâma is in his turn teacher of Upakosala, in whose case the supernatural teachings (like the miracles of Elija in the case of Elisha) are repeated.

³⁹ Cf. for this especially the Upanishad translated in Anquetil Duperron II, 372-377 under the name of "*Tschhakli*" (according to Stenzler's view = *Châgaleya*) and Weber's analysis of it, Ind. Stud. IX, 42-46.

⁴⁰ Chând. 5, 10, 7; *Âpastamba-dharmasûtra* 2, 5, 11, 10; *Manu* 10, 65.—In our work this one hope for the Çûdra so severely dismissed is, peculiarly enough, nowhere directly proclaimed; *implicitly* it is contained in the much used passage, Chând. 5, 10, 7, as also in the Smṛiti passage, Bhag. G. 6, 45, quoted p. 1045, 7.



3. Admission of the Gods; their rôle in the Vedânta system.

One would err if one held the being of the Gods (*deva*, *devatâ*) to be incompatible with the strict monistic teaching of our system of the Brahman as the Lord (*îçvara*) the omnipresent (*sarvagata*), the one without a second (*ekam eva advitīyam*). On the contrary, they are as real as the rest of the world: the phenomenal existence which the latter has, they also have, and the Gods of the Indian popular creed (whose retention was besides already necessitated by the recognition of the *Karma-kāṇḍa* and the *Karma-māmāṃsā* cf. above p. [18ff.]), are as little denied by the Vedânta as the Gods of Greece were by Plato or Epicurus, even if, as in the latter case, they play no particular rôle, and the ideas of them which are occasionally found cannot very well be made to agree.

In general the Gods, at whose head as a rule, *Indra* is mentioned,⁴¹ are, for our authors, still what they were in the *Rigveda*, personifications of natural forces and natural phenomena; and an attempt to resolve them into the corresponding natural elements⁴² is rejected in the following way (p. 309, 11):

⁴¹ *Indra-ādayaḥ* p. 281, 8. 9. 282, 5. 7. 287, 4, etc.—From quite different ideas came the sporadically occurring *Hiranyagarbha-ādaya' îçvarāḥ*, who at the disappearance of the world do not disappear like the other Gods and beings, but, as it seems, only pass the time in sleep, and at the new creation of the world, help the *îçvara*; p. 300, 3. 4. 9. 301, 1. 303, 9; cf. *Hiranyagarbha* as *prathamaja* p. 339, 3, as *adhyaksha* in the lower world of Brahma p. 1121, 13; *mahân* (Kâth. 3, 11) as *Hairanya-garbhi buddhiḥ* p. 343, 3; *sarva-karana-âtmani Hiranyagarbhe brahma-loka-nivâsini* p. 247, 6; *samashti-vyashti-rūpeṇa Hairanyagarbhena prânât-manâ* 724, 8; and the (*râja*-)*Vaivasvata-ādaya' îçvarāḥ* p. 397, 8.

⁴² (P. 307, 4). "To the disk of light dwelling in the heaven, which "lightens the world, mightily wandering by day and night [and the other "corresponding natural phenomena] apply the words which speak of Gods "as *Āditya* [the sun-god] and the like, as the ordinary use of the word, "as also the consistent sense of the passages shows, and it is not fitting "to ascribe to the light-disk individuality (*vigraha*) with a heart etc., "spirituality and needs and the like, as it is clear that, like the earth etc., "they are without spirit (*cetanâ*). This holds good also for Agni [Fire "and God of fire] and the others."

"The names of the Gods, like *Âditya* and so forth, even if they refer to light etc., compel us, according to the scriptures, to assume spiritual beings corresponding [to the elements] gifted with *aiçvaryam* (ruling power); for they are thus used in the Mantra's and Brâhmaṇa's; and the Gods have, in virtue of their *aiçvaryam*, the power of remaining as the Self (*âtman*) of light etc., or, according to their pleasure, of taking this or that individuality (*vigraha*); for the scriptures say, in explaining the *Subrahmanyâ* formula [Shadvîṇça-br. 1, 1]: '*O ram of Medhâtithi*,'—that is as *ram* he [Indra, as Çaṅkara adds] *once stole Medhâtithi, the scion of Kânva*;' and as the Smṛiti relates [Mahâbh. 1, 4397], *Âditya*, as a man visited Kuntî; also the earth etc. have, according to the scriptures, spiritual overseers, for it is said [Çatap. Br. 6, 1, 3, 2. 4] '*the earth said*'—'*the waters said*'; and, even if the natural elements, as the light in the sun, and so on, are without spirit, still they have, to judge by the part they play in the Mantra's and Brâhmaṇa's, God-like beings as their spiritual overseers."

As such "overseers" and "disposers," the Gods act especially in the life-organs (p. 186, 6: *devatâ-âtmâ indriyasya adhi-shthâtâ*, p. 728, 9: *karaṇânâṃ niyantrîṣhu devatâsu*), in which they entered according to Ait. 1, 2, 4, *Agni* as speech, *Vâyu* as breath, *Âditya* as eye, and so on (p. 423, 14); for, though the organs in themselves are capable (*çakta*) of doing their own work, yet they do it only like a cart, which must be drawn by an ox (p. 727, 1); however, the Gods do not therefore take part in the enjoyment [and suffering] which in the body is the lot only of the individual soul (p. 727, 13;—the Gods are only *bhoga-upakaraṇa-bhûta*, the soul alone is *bhoktar*, enjoyer, p. 379, 4), for the soul alone is stained by good and bad, affected by pleasure and pain (p. 728, 3), while the Gods are free from all evil (p. 728, 6); as also at death they do not wander forth with the life organs and the soul, but withdraw their assisting power (p. 745, 8), partly in order to hold intercourse on the moon with the (temporarily) blessed (p. 750, 5), partly, to show the way through the different heavenly regions, to the soul entering into the Brahman (p. 1117, 11).



As for the rest, the Gods dwell in the highest region of sovereignty (*parasmin aiçvarye pade* p. 728, 4), but all their *aiçvaryam* is dependent on the *Parameçvara* (p. 217, 7), the "highest lord," that is the Brahman: this is the *Âtman* (the Self), as in everything else, so also in the Gods (*Âtmâ devânâm* Chând. 4, 3, 7); it is the *Antaryâmin* (inner ruler), which, according to Brih. 3, 7, inwardly rules all beings, all organs, and so also all Gods without their being conscious of it themselves, being for that reason, in this sense, different from their empirical self (*devatâtman*, p. 196, 6). The *Îçvara* (Lord), as the Brahman is called by preference in these exoteric discussions, is further the power that creates Gods, men and beasts, being guided in doing so strictly by the merit and demerit of the soul in a previous existence (p. 492, 12), and in accordance with this, has destined animals to unending suffering, men to a middle state, and the Gods to "unending enjoyment" (p. 491, 6). But this "unending enjoyment," like everything except the Brahman, comes at last to an end; the immortality of the Gods is a relative one (*âpekshikam* p. 326, 4, 241, 14) and means only longevity (p. 193, 12); they are also entangled in the *Samsâra* (the circle of transmigration), are mere products (*vikâra* p. 195, 13, 280, 3) doomed to transitoriness and want; for, as the scripture (Brih. 3, 4, 2) says: "whatever is different from Him is subject to sorrow" (p. 241, 15), and for this reason the Gods also are called to the saving knowledge, as we shall now consider more closely.

First it is to be noted that the Gods are nowhere in the scriptures excluded from the Brahmanvidyâ (p. 281, 1). They have, it is true, no part in the *Upānayanam* (initiation by a teacher), but they do not require this; for the aim of this ceremony is merely admission to the study of the Veda, which is of itself revealed (*svayam-pratibhâta*) to the gods (p. 281, 3). Moreover, there are even instances of gods and Rishis becoming Brahman pupils, like Indra of Prajâpati (Chând. 8, 7—12) and Bhrigu of Varuṇa (Taitt. 3, 1). In the hearts of the Gods too (according to Kâth. 4, 12) dwells the *Purusha* (Brahman) "a thumb's breadth in height," for the purpose of knowledge,—

naturally in the case of the gods, we are to understand the breadth of a God's thumb (p. 282, 1).

Moreover, the Gods are capable of liberation, because, according to the witness of the Mantra's, Brâhmaṇa's, Itihâsa's, Purâṇa's and popular belief, they possess individuality (*vigraha-vattvam*) (p. 280, 9), and need liberation, because their power (*vibhûti*) belongs to the sphere of the changeable and is therefore transitory (p. 280, 7).

Now against these two assumptions very serious difficulties are raised.

First objection: The asserted individuality of the gods, says the opponent, is neither real nor possible. It is not real, because, although the gods are present when sacrifices are offered to them, they are not perceived (p. 282, 7), and it is not possible, because individuality cannot be in several places at the same time; but the gods can so, since Indra for instance is often recipient of offerings in several places at the same time (p. 282, 8).

To this it is to be rejoined: The gods are not seen at sacrifices, because they have the power to make themselves invisible (p. 284, 5), and they can be in several places at the same time, because they are able to divide their being (*âtman*) into different forms (p. 284, 4); for if even the *Yogin*, according to the *Smṛiti* (Mahâbhârata 12, 11062), can multiply his body a thousand-fold, in order to enjoy the things of sense in one form, and to undergo frightful penances in another (p. 283, 9), how much more to the gods, who, according to one Vedic passage (Bṛih. 3, 9, 1), are first counted as 303 and 3003, that is 3306, and then as only 33, with the explanation that the greater number indicates only their powers (*mahimânas*), as the 33 are again reduced to one only, since the being of them all is *Prâṇa*, the Life (that is, here, the Brahman) (p. 283).

Second objection: If the gods are, like ourselves, individuals, they must also, like ourselves, be born and die⁴³; now

⁴³ P. 285, 7; a quite correct deduction, which is also not contested by Çaṅkara, but is in another place expressly stated by him (p. 598, 11:

the Veda is eternal (in the spirit of the Creator, who "breathed it out" as the Vedānta affirms, p. 48, 6 after Brih. 2, 4, 10), and the Veda speaks of the gods. How is this possible if the gods are not also eternal (p. 285, 8)?

This objection forces the composer of the commentary, and, perhaps, even the composer of the Sūtra's (cf. 1, 3, 30), to a very remarkable theory, which comes very close to Plato's doctrine of ideas; and, as we have no ground at all for supposing that either side has borrowed from the other, this bears witness to the fact, that there is something in the nature of things, which tends towards Plato's teaching, to lead to which the teaching of the Indian can be of use.

It is true, he says, the individual Gods are transitory, and the word of the Veda, which speaks of them, is eternal; but the words of the Veda, for instance the word "cow" occurring in the Veda, does not refer to individuals (to any separate cow), but to "the object of the words: cow etc." (*śabda-artha* p. 286, 6), that is, to the species; and in just the same way the word "Indra" means, not an individual, but a certain position (*sthāna-viśeṣa*), something like the word "General;" whoever occupies the position, bears the name (p. 287, 5).

Therefore we must make a distinguish between the individuals (*vyakti*, p. 286, 7, and also p. 464, 5, literally: "manifestation"), which are transitory, and the species (*ākṛiti*, that is "form," "shape," "εἶδος,") which are eternal; p. 286, 7: "For though the individuals, as cows etc. originate, their "species do not thereby originate; for in substances, qualities "and activities originate the individual appearances (*vyakti*), "not the forms of the species (*ākṛiti*), and only with the species, "not with the individuals are the words [of the Veda] connected, "for with the latter, on account of the eternity [of the Veda],

yadd hi loke iyattā-paricchinnaṃ vastu ghaṭa-ādi, tad antavad dṛiṣṭam) with a profound feeling that what is limited in space must be so in time also; of which the sole exception, perhaps is matter (that is) if its quantity in space is limited, (which we do not know), which, however, as such, is an abstraction without individual existence.—Among the Greeks this thought was expressed by Melissos, ap. Simplic. in Aristot. *Phys.* fol. 23b: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ εἶναι ἀνυστόν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶν ἐστὶ.

"no connection can be admitted. Therefore, though the individuals originate, the species, in words like cow etc., are eternal; therefore there is no contradiction; in just the same way there is no contradiction in the case of names [of the gods] like Vasu and the like, because the species of the gods are eternal, even when an origin is admitted for the individuals."

These eternal species of things, as they are stored up in the Veda as the everlasting repository of all wisdom and knowledge, are, however, for our author not mere forms (*ākṛiti*, εἶδος), but the conception of them, exactly as in Plato (Soph. p. 247 D. ff.) approaches that of the efficient powers (*śakti*, δυνάμις), from which the universe, after its disappearance, originates again and again; p. 303, 1: "This world in truth disappears, but in such fashion that the powers remain, and these powers are the root from which it comes forth anew; for otherwise we should have an effect without a cause. Now it cannot be assumed that the powers [from which the world comes forth anew] are different in kind [from those from which it formerly came forth]. Therefore it must be granted that, in spite of the constantly repeated interruption [of the course of the world], a necessary determination (*niyatatvam*) exists in the beginningless Samsāra for the [newly] developing series of worlds, as the earth etc., for the series of groups of living beings, gods, animals and men, and for the different conditions of castes, Ācrama's, duties and rewards, like the necessary determination in the correlation of the [five] sense-organs with the [five] elements: for in the case of these also, we cannot admit as possible a difference for each new creation, so that there might be a sixth sense-organ and element.⁴⁴ While therefore the process of the world in all world-periods (*kalpa*) is similar and makes it possible [in a

⁴⁴ P. 303, 7: *śaśthā-indriya-vishaya*; in the same way, as an example of impossibility p. 415, 1: *śaśthasya iva indriya-arthatya*.—Of other scholastic examples, to indicate impossibility, there occur in our work: *bandhyā-putra* (the son of the barren) p. 570, 12 and *gaṇa-vishāṇam* (hare's horn) p. 564, 1. 4. 8. 565, 7. Cf. 332, 8: *sa prâçîm api diçam prasthâpitah prâçîm api diçam pratishtheta* (for "for him all things are possible"); the same image as Xenoph. *Memorab.* 4, 2, 21.



“new creation] to be guided according to the process in the “former world-period, therefore at every creation the differences “of the same names and forms are present in the mind of the “creators (*īṣvarāḥ* cf. n. 41), and in consequence of the likeness “of names and forms it happens that, even if a return of the “world by means of a collective evolution and a collective “disappearance is maintained, yet the authority and so forth “of the word of the Veda suffers no injury.”

Thus the word of the Veda, with its whole complex of ideas of the world and its relations, forms an eternal rule of guidance for the Creator, outlasting every disappearance of the world. The Creator “remembers,” while he shapes the world, the words of the Veda (p. 297, 10), and thus the world originates with its constant forms (*niyata-ākṛiti*) as the gods and the rest, from the word of the Veda (p. 298, 2). Naturally this coming forth of the gods etc. from the Veda is not, like the evolution from the Brahman, to be taken in the sense of a *causa materialis* (*upādāna-kāranam*), but it means only “a coming forth of the individuals of things in conformity with the use of the words of the scriptures” (*śabda-vyavahāra-yogya-artha-vyakti-nishpattiḥ*, p. 287, 9), which were there before the world, not only according to the witness of scripture and tradition (p. 288), but also because they are the necessary pre-supposition of creation. For if one wishes to make anything, one must first call to mind the word that indicates it (p. 289, 3), and thus also before the creation the Vedic words were present in the spirit of the Creator, and, according to them, he shaped all things (p. 289, 5).

But what are we to understand by “word” in this world-creating sense (p. 289, 9)?—Perhaps we might answer: the concepts corresponding to the words. But this answer the Indian cannot give, because he never reached a conscious separation of concept and perception. He answers in the first place: By word he understands⁴⁵ here the *Sphoṭa* (the burst-

⁴⁵ Who? is not said. It is the opponent, but not Čaṅkara, as Cowell assumes in Colebr. M. E.³ p. 373 n. 1; what Cowell quotes is only the *Pūrvapakṣa*, not the *Siddhānta*, which *Upavarsha* afterwards maintains; probably Čaṅkara took the whole discussion from his commentary (cf. n. 17).

ing forth, the sudden coming to consciousness of the idea on hearing the letters of the word); and this conception leads to a discussion which is not without interest, and which, as a contribution to the Philosophy of Language, we here translate as accurately as possible in the form of an episode.

4. Episode: on the vedântic philosophy of language (translated from p. 289, 10—297, 7).

[The Opponent, who defends the *Sphoṭa*, says:] “An origination of individuals, such as gods etc., from the eternal words [of the Veda] is not possible, on the assumption that the letters [of the word] are the bearers of its meaning], for they as soon as they appear, pass away. Not only so but the letters which pass away as soon as they have appeared are continually apprehended differently according to their pronunciation. Thus it is possible, for example, to recognise a man with certainty, even without seeing him, when we hear him read aloud, by his voice, and to say ‘Devadatta is reading,’ or ‘Yajñadatta is reading.’ And this diversity of apprehension of the [same] letters is, however, not based on error, because there is no apprehension which could refute it.—It cannot, therefore, be assumed at all that the meaning of a word is recognised [merely] from the letters. For [*firstly*] it cannot be assumed that each single letter in itself makes known the sense, because they are different from each other; [*secondly*] [the sense of the word] is also not [merely] a conception of the sense of the letters, because they succeed each other [so that the earlier have already passed away when the latter are pronounced]. It is perhaps [*thirdly*] that the last letter, assisted by the impression [*samskāra*], which the perception of the preceding letters has produced, makes the sense known? —This also is impossible. For [only] the word itself, presupposing the apprehension of the connection [of the letters], makes the meaning known, as in the case of smoke [whose vanishing and continually reproduced particles alone are not able to give the conception of smoke]. Further, an apprehension of the ‘last letter, assisted by the impression, which the perception of the preceding letters has produced,’ is not possible, because the impressions are not [any longer] perceptible.—Is it then perhaps [*fourthly*] the last letter, assisted by the impressions [of the preceding] perceived in their after effect, which makes the sense known?—Not this, either; for the recalling also, as it is the after effect of the impressions, is again a series [of presentations in time,—which has already been discussed above, under the second head].—Therefore it only remains possible that the word [as a whole, that is, its sense] is a *Sphoṭa* [an outbursting], which, after the percipient has received the seed of the impression through the apprehension of the single letters,



"and has brought it to ripeness by means of the apprehension of the last letter, flashes before him suddenly in its unity as a single conception. And this single conception is no reminiscence, referring back to the letters; for the letters are several, and cannot, therefore, be the object of the single conception. This [*Sphoṭa*, the soul of the word, as we might say,] is [only] recognised again, [not produced], on the occasion of its pronunciation, and is therefore eternal [as well as a unity,] because the conception of the manifold refers only to the letters. Thus the word, [that is, its sense] in the form of the *Sphoṭa* is eternal, and from it, as that which names, goes forth as that which is to be named, the world, consisting of deed, doer and fruits."

"In reply, the venerable Upavarsha" [an old Mīmāṃsā and Vedânta teacher, cf. above, Note 17, and Colebrooke Misc. Ess.³ I, 332] "maintains that only the letters are the word."

[Opponent:] "But I have said, however, that the letters, as soon they appear, pass away."

[Upavarsha:] "This it not so, because they are again recognised as the same."

[Opponent:] "That they are recognised again, depends in their case on the fact that they resemble [the former], somewhat as in the case of hairs (cf. on Brih. 743, 2)."

[Upavarsha:] "O no! For that it is a recognition [of the same, not merely of like], is not refuted by any other recognition."

[Opponent:] "Recognition is grounded on species (*ākṛiti*). [When I say *a* repeatedly, it is not the individual *a*, but the species *a*, which recurs in different individuals.]

[Upavarsha:] "No; it is a recognition of individuals. Yes, if in speech other letters were continually apprehended, as in the case of other individuals, for example, cows, then recognition would be grounded on species; but this is not so; for only the individual letters are recognised again in speaking, and [if the same word, for example, 'cow,' is repeated,] then it is assumed that the word 'cow' has been spoken, twice, not two words 'cow' [once].

[Opponent:] "But the letters are still [as argued above] apprehended as different, according to the difference of pronunciation; for when the reading aloud of Devadatta and Yajñadatta can be recognised by the tone, merely by hearing them, it results from the fact that a difference is apprehended." [Therefore the recognition of a letter must be that of the species, not of the individual differing according to pronunciation.]

[Upavarsha:] "Without detriment to the exactness of the recognition in the case of the letters, letters may be pronounced [more] joined or [more] separated; hence the different apprehension of the letters is

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"grounded on the difference of pronunciation, not in the nature of the letters. Further: he also, who transfers the difference to the individual letters [instead of the manner of pronunciation], must, if a recognition is to be possible, [first] settle species for the letters, and then assume, that these [species] are differently apprehended owing to foreign influences; and here it is preferable to assume, as simpler, that, in the case of the individual letters, the apprehension of the difference is conditioned by foreign influences, while, on the other hand, their recognition is conditioned by their own nature. For the assumption that there is a difference in the letters, is refuted precisely by the fact that a recognition of them takes place."

[Opponent:] "But how can it happen that the sound *ga* which is one, is at the same time different, when several pronounce it at the same time, and [likewise] when it is pronounced with the acute, grave, or circumflex accent, or without the nasal?"

[Upavarsha:] "But this difference of apprehension is not caused by the letters, but by the tone (*dhvani*)."

[Opponent:] "What is tone?"

[Upavarsha:] "That which reaches the ear, when one hears sounds from a distance, and does not perceive the difference of the syllables, and which prompts one sitting near to attribute his own differences of stupidity and sagacity to the letters [which he hears]. And from this [the tone] depend attached the differences of accentuation with the acute etc., and not the nature of the letters. But the letters are recognised just as they are pronounced [independently of the tone]. If this be assumed, then the perceptions of accentuation have a basis, otherwise not; for, as regards the letters, they are only recognised again, and do not differ [in themselves]; therefore we should have to assume that the differences of accentuation lie in their connection and separation; but connection and separation are not perceptible, and we cannot take our stand on them, in order to arrive at an explanation of the difference of the letters; consequently the perception of accentuation etc. would have no basis [without the assumption of tone].—We must not fall into that error either that, because the accentuation is different, the letters to be recognised are also different. For because one thing shews differences, another, which is not different does not need to shew them also; as, for example, one does not conclude that the species is different, because individuals differ among themselves. And as it is thus possible to recognise the sense from the letters, the hypothesis of the *Sphoṭa* is unnecessary."

[Opponent:] "But the *Sphoṭa* is no hypothesis, but an object of perception. For in the understanding (*buddhi*), after it has received [different] impressions through apprehension of the single letters, [the sense of the word] flashes out suddenly."



[Upavarsha:] "This is not so: for this understanding [of the sense of the word] also refers to the letters. For after the apprehension of the separate letters [of the word 'cow,' for example,] has preceded in time, there follows this single concept (*buddhi*)—'cow,' whose object is the totality of the letters and nothing else."

[Opponent:] "How do you prove this?"

[Upavarsha:] "By the fact that with the concept which thus comes into being [cow], the letters *C* etc., and not the letters *T* etc., are connected; for if the object of this concept were a *Sphoṭa*, something different from the letters *C* etc., then the letters *C* etc., would have just as little to do with it as the letters *T* etc.; but this is not so; and therefore this simple concept [of the idea] is [not a *Sphoṭa*, but] *only a reminiscence connected with the letters.*"

[Opponent:] "But how is it possible, that the different letters are the object of the simple concept?"

[Upavarsha:] "To this we answer: a thing which is not simple can also be the object of a simple concept, as is seen in examples like: series, forest, army, ten, hundred, thousand, and the like. For the understanding of the word 'cow' as a unity, since it is conditioned by the extracting of one sense from many letters, is a metaphorical one (*aupacārikī*), just as is the understanding of forest, army, and the like."

[Opponent:] "But if the mere letters, by entering, in their totality, into the sphere of a simple concept, formed the word, then no difference would be made between words like *jā-rā* (paramours) and *rā-jā* (king), *ka-pi* (ape), and *pi-ka* (cuckoo), for the letters are the same, yet in a different connection they give a different sense."

[Upavarsha:] "To this we answer: even when all the letters are perceived, just as ants can only form our idea of a row, when they are in a row, so the letters can only form the concept of a word, when they keep their sequence [this is only an evasion of the opponent's objection] and there is no contradiction in the fact that, even when there is no difference in the letters, a difference in the words may be perceived in consequence of a different order of letters. Therefore since certain letters perceived in their order etc. are, according to the traditional usage of language, connected with a given meaning, apprehended [through them], though they are perceived in their own proper function as single letters, our unifying understanding becomes conscious of them simply as this or that, and they thereby convey this or that given sense. —Therefore the assumption that the letters [are the bearers of the sense] is the simpler, while the assumption of a *Sphoṭa* leaves the sensible and hypostatizes the supersensible, by which it is assumed that these given letters, perceived in order, reveal the *Sphoṭa* and this *Sphoṭa* reveals the sense; which is certainly complicated enough. Admitting



"therefore that the letters, according as they are pronounced, are different
"in each case, it must yet undeniably be assumed, that as that on which
"recognition rests is an identity existing in the letters, and that in the
"case of the letters the deliberate design of communicating the sense is
"transmitted in this identity."

Author's note. The truth in this controversy probably lies between the two extremes. The Opponent is right, in so far as philosophy cannot dispense with the acceptance of ideas (for ideas are reasonably to be understood by the *Sphoṭa*), and Upavarsha is right, in so far as ideas exist only so far as words exist (retained by memory). Moreover, the relation between idea and word is certainly no mere external, conventional one, but originally inner and organic; but why just these sounds express just this idea, is a problem which philosophy, comparative philology and physiology have hitherto worked at in vain, yet the solution of which can and will never be abandoned by science.

IV. Qualifications of those called to the study of the Vedânta.

1. The Study of the Veda.

AN indispensable condition of our science, the impossibility of fulfilling which in the case of the Qâdra, as we saw, (p. 58ff.) excluded him from the saving doctrine, is the study of the Veda, and this requirement, or at least the appearance of it, seems to have been continually more exaggerated in course of time. Thus it is said in *Sadânanda's Vedântasâra*, a later compendium of the Vedânta, § 5: "He who is called to the study must have regularly studied the Veda and the Vedângas (that is, the six subsidiary sciences of the Veda: phonetics, grammar, etymology, metre, ritual and astronomy, as they are already enumerated Mund. 1, 1, 5) so, that he may be able to understand the full sense of the Veda *ex tempore* (*âpâtatah*),"—a requirement which, considering the extent of the Veda⁴⁶ and the great difficulty of many Vedic texts, in the strict sense of the word no one except Brahman can have fulfilled, while men must have satisfied themselves, in the case of each hymn for instance, with imprinting accurately on their memories the metre, poet, deity and ritual purpose, and at the same time, perhaps, also understanding something of the sense.⁴⁷ Of such exaggerations we find no trace in Qaṇ-

⁴⁶ There is no question of a limitation to one's own *çâkhâ* (cf. p. 979, 4: *samasta-veda-artha-vijnânavatah*), and such a limitation would also not include all the Upanishad texts presupposed by the Vedânta.

⁴⁷ Cf. Colebrooke, Misc. Ess. i p. 20, and in Qaṇkara's work (p. 301, 8) the quotation from the *Ârsheya-brâhmanam* p. 3: "For whoever employs a hymn for sacrifice or study without knowing the Rishi, Metre, God-head, and ritual use of it, knocks against the trunk of a tree, or falls into a pit."



kara: he contents himself with simply indicating the study of the Veda and a knowledge of its contents as an indispensable condition (p. 24, 4. 316, 9); what he actually presupposes, apart from the occasional quotations of other Vedic texts (cf. p. 32), is hardly more than an accurate knowledge of the eleven older, or, as we might almost say, of the genuine Upanishad's (*Aitareya* and *Kaushâtaki*; *Chândogya* and *Kena*; *Taittirîya*, *Kâthaka*, *Çvetâçvatara* and *Brihadâraṇyaka* with *Îçâ*; *Mundaka* and *Prâçna*), with quotations from which he everywhere deals very liberally; generally quoting only the opening words with the "etc." which is unfortunately so common in Indian texts, and which sometimes slips from him even where there is nothing more to follow (cf. p. 269, 4), and greatly injures the precision of treatment. As we cannot in general assume in our readers such an acquaintance with the Upanishad texts as the Indian could in his, we shall interweave in our presentation an anthology embracing a series of the most beautiful and important passages of the Upanishad's, even if we do not select them according to a standard of our own, but in accordance with the texts of the scriptures employed by Bâdarâyana and Çaṅkara.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ The most important part of what has already been done for the Upanishad's, excepting editions of texts (by Roer, Weber, Cowell, Poley and others) is as follows: Anquetil Duperron, *Oupnek'hat*, Argentorati 1801-1802, a Latin translation of 50 Upanishad's from the Persian into which Sultan Daraschakoh, 1656 A.D., had had them translated, contains: Vol. I, p. 15 *Tschehandouk*, 98 *Brehdarang*, 294 *Mitri*, 375 *Mandek*, 395 *Eischavasieh*, 400 *Sarb*; Vol. II, p. 1 *Naraîn*, 5 *Tadiu*, 12 *Athrbsar*, 27 *Hensnad*, 35 *Sarbsar*, 68 *Kok'henk*, 94 *Sataster*, 128 *Porsch*, 152 *Dehian band*, 157 *Maha oupnek'hat*, 162 *Atma pra boudeh*, 165 *Kioul*, 171 *Schat roudri*, 197 *Djog sank'ha*, 200 *Djogtat*, 204 *Schiw Sanklap*, 207 *Abrat (athrb) sak'ha*, 213 *Atma*, 217 *Brahm badia*, 221 *Anbrat bandeh*, 229 *Tidj bandeh*, 232 *Karbheh*, 241 *Djabal*, 249 *Maha naraîn*, 266 *Mandouk*, 271 *Pankl*, 274 *Tschehourka*, 279 *Pram hens*, 286 *Arank*, 291 *Kin*, 299 *Kiouni*, 328 *Anandbli*, 338 *Bharkbli*, 346 *Bark'heh soukt*, 351 *Djounka*, 355 *Mrat lankoul*, 358 *Anbratnad*, 366 *Baschkl*, 372 *Tschhakli*, 378 *Tark*, 380 *Ark'hi*, 387 *Pranou*, 403 *Schavank*, 412 *Nersing'heh atma*; for the corresponding Sanskrit names see below. A German translation of this translation of a translation has appeared Dresden 1882.—Ram Mohun Roy, Translation of several principal books, passages and texts of the Veds, ed. II, London 1832 (contains *Mundaka*, *Kena*, *Kâthaka*,



2. The four Requirements.

As further conditions for the study of the Vedānta, Çaikara mentions (p. 28, 3), in conformity with the Vedāntasāra, the four requirements which we shall now consider more closely.

Îçâ.—Colebrooke, Misc. Ess.¹ I, p. 47-54. 62-71. 76-79. 83-88. 91-98. 110-113.—F. W. Windischmann, Sancara, Bonnæ 1833, p. 49-186.—The same in his father's "Philosophie im Fortgange der Weltgeschichte," Bonn, 1832-34, p. 1388-90. 1448-49. 1540. 1585-91. 1595-98. 1613-23. 1655-60. 1673-76. 1689-1719. 1737-40.—Poley, *Kâthaka*-Upanichat (with *Mundaka*) translated into French, Paris 1837.—Roer, the *Taittirîya*, *Aitareya*, *Çvetâçvatara*, *Kena*, *Îçâ*, *Kâtha*, *Praçna*, *Mundaka* and *Mândûkya* Upanishads, translated, Bibl. Ind., Calcutta 1853.—The same, the *Brihadâranyaka* Up. transl. Calc. 1856.—Râjendralâla Mitra, the *Chândogya*-Up., transl. Calc. 1862.—Cowell, the *Kaushîtaki*-brâhmaṇa-upanishad, ed. with an Engl. Transl., Calc. 1861.—The same, the *Maitri* Up., Calc. 1870.—A. Weber, Analyse der in Anquetil Duperron's Übersetzung enthaltenen Upanishad, Ind. Stud. I, p. 247-302. 380-456. II, 1-111. 170-236 IX, 1-173, Berl. 1849. 1853. Leipz. 1865; the only thorough treatment of the material existing up to the present (1863). An index (wanting in the Ind. Stud.) is added here for more convenient reference: Vol. I: p. 254 *Chândogya*, 273 *Brihadâranyaka*, 273 *Maitrîyaṇî*, 279 *Mundaka*, 298 *Îçâ*, 301 *Sarvopanishatsâra*, 380 *Nârâyana*, 381 *Tadeva*, 382 *Atharvagirâs*, 385 *Hansanâdu*, 387 *Sarvasâra* (*Aitareya*-Up.), 392 *Kaushîtaki*, 420 *Çvetâçvatara*, 439 *Praçna*; Vol. II, p. 1 *Dhyânavinidu*, 5 *Mahâ*, 8 *Âtmaprabodha*, 9 *Kaivalya*, 14 *Çatarudriyam*, 47 *Yogaçikshâ*, 49 *Yogatattva*, 51 *Çivasamkalpa*, 53 *Atharvachikshâ*, 56 *Âtma*, 57 *Brahmavidyâ*, 59 *Amritavinidu*, 62 *Tejovinidu*, 65 *Garbha*, 71 *Jâbâla*, 78 *Mahânârâyana*, 100 *Mândûkya*, 170 *Çâkalya* (?), 170 *Kshurikâ*, 173 *Paramahansa*, 176 *Ârunika*, 181 *Kena*, 195 *Kâthaka*, 207 *Ânandavallî* (= *Taitt.* 2), 230 *Bhṛîguvallî* (= *Taitt.* 3); Vol. IX, p. 1 *Purushasûkta*, 10 *Châtikâ*, 21 *Mṛityulângûla* (?), 23 *Amritanâda*, 38 *Vâshkala*, 42 *Châgaleya* (?), 46 *Târaka*, 48 *Ârskeya* (?), 49 *Praṇava*, 52 *Çaunaka* (?), 53 *Nṛisinha*.—The same, *Die Vajrasûci* des Açvaghosha, Berl. 1860.—The same, *Die Râmatâpanîya* Up., Berl. 1864.—The same, Ind. Lit.², p. 54-57. 77-81. 103. 106-109. 139-154. 170-190.—A. E. Gough, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, Calcutta Review, CXXXI, 1878-1880.—P. Regnaud, Matériaux pour servir à la l'histoire de la philosophie de l'Inde, Paris 1876-78; cf. Weber's Critique of the first part, Jenaer Liter.-Z. 1878 Nr. 6, p. 81 ff.—F. Max Müller, The Upanishads, translated, part. I, Oxford 1879 (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 1); the first volume includes the Introduction and *Chândogya*, *Kena*, *Aitareya*, *Kaushîtaki*, *Îçâ*; the second (Vol. XV, 1884) contains *Kâthaka*, *Mundaka*, *Taittirîya*, *Brihadâranyaka*, *Çvetâçvatara*, *Praçna*, *Maitrîyaṇa*. For

1) The first is "discerning between eternal and non-eternal substance" (*nitya-anitya-vastu-viveka*); by eternal substance Brahman is meant, and by non-eternal, every thing else. As this discernment in the full sense of the word is really the last result of our science, we are to understand by it here, where it appears as condition precedent, only the general metaphysical disposition in virtue of which one has a consciousness of an unchanging being, in contrast with the changeableness of all worldly things and relations; in this sense the said condition of the Vedānta agrees exactly with the question with which Plato begins his exposition of metaphysics, and which also pre-supposes the consciousness of the same difference: "τί τὸ ὄν αἰεί, γένησιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν αἰεί, ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε" (Tim. p. 27 D).

2) The requirement which Ćaṅkara, and (better, because without *artha*) Sadānanda, mention in the second place, gives us a high conception of the earnestness of Indian thought: it is "Renunciation of the enjoyment of reward here and in the other world" (*iha-amutra-[artha-]phala-bhoga-virāga*). Only as far as we pursue philosophy without the consciousness of following material aims at the same time, do we pursue it worthily and rightly,—and he only can hope to find an explanation of the highest questions of being who has learned to raise himself above all hopes and longings of the heart to pure objectivity of spirit.

3) There is more misgiving about the third requirement, as which Ćaṅkara gives "the attainment of the [six] means, peace, restraint, etc." (*śama-dama-ādi-sādhana-sampad*). This is based on a passage in the Bṛih. Up., where, at the end of a wonderful description of the *Akāmaya-māna*, that is, the man who already in this life, through the power of knowledge, has reached freedom from all desires, it is said in conclusion (Bṛih. 4, 4, 23): "Therefore he who knows this is "peaceful, restrained, resigned, patient and collected; only in "the Self he sees the Self, he beholds all as the Self (the Soul,



"*âtman*); evil vanquishes him not, he vanquishes evil; evil burns him not, he burns evil; free from passion and free from doubt, he becomes a Brâhmaṇa, he whose world is the Brahman." Fitting as all this is, when said of the saint who has overcome the world, it is strange when the Vedântists, relying on the passage, enumerate the possession of the following six means as conditions precedent to knowledge:—

1. *Çama* Tranquillity,
2. *Dama* Restraint,
3. *Uparati* Renunciation,
4. *Titikshâ* Resignation,
5. *Samâdhi* Concentration,
6. *Çraddhâ* Belief.

The explanation of these conceptions by Çaṅkara (on Bṛih. loc. cit.), Govindânanda and Sadânanda, with numerous divergencies in detail, amounts to this, that, under No. 4, they all understand an apathy towards contraries like heat, cold, and the rest, in the sense of the Stoics; under Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, on the other hand, an inner concentration along with a full withdrawal of the senses from the objects of the outer world. Neither of these will fit the picture that we form of the true philosopher to-day. In contrast to the Stoic sages (whose model was certainly not Heraclitus, the real father of the Stoic doctrine), we imagine the philosophic genius rather as a profoundly excitable, nay, even passionate nature; and, in spite of all concentration and meditation, we demand from him, as from the empiric investigator, a full interest in the visible world and its wonderful phenomena, only that he must see them with other eyes than the empiric, in a word, to use an expression of Plato's (Scholia in Ar. ed. Brand., p. 66 B 48), not only with the eye which sees the ἵππος, but also with that which sees the ἱππότης. And just as little will the requirement demanded from the pupil under No. 6 commend itself to us, since we have learnt from Descartes, that the beginning of wisdom consists in this, *de omnibus dubitare*.

4) As fourth and last requirement for the study of the Vedânta, Çaṅkara and Sadânanda name *Mumukshutvam*, "the



longing for liberation." And rightly so. For he who enjoys the day of life with childlike, Hellenic, cheerfulness, however high a flight his genius may take in other respects, will only touch in passing the last and highest problems of being, as did the Greeks; to seize them fully and clearly requires a deep feeling of the vanity and nothingness of all this life, and a corresponding longing to pass "*from the non-existent to the existent, from darkness to light, from death to immortality*" (Bṛih. 1, 3, 28), a longing by which, as the passage quoted leads us to believe, the Indians were inspired even in ancient times, and which remained the true motive principle of their philosophy; so that, exceptions apart, the question of liberation forms the corner-stone of all the philosophic systems of India.

3. Relation of the System to that of Justification by Works.

The already enumerated requirements in the elect are, according to Ṣaṅkara, the only ones which are indispensable. As soon as (*anantaram*) they are fulfilled, the "investigation of the Brahman" can begin (p. 29, 4); and it is not necessary that the "investigation of duty," that is, the study of the *Mimāṃsā* of Jaimini (cf. above p. 20), should precede it (p. 28, 4); on the contrary it may just as well follow as go before (p. 25, 1), since the contents and aim of the two systems are independent; the investigation of duty demands observance, as Ṣaṅkara (p. 27) remarks; and refers to a future, dependent on the action of men, and has, as its fruit, *abhyudaya* (going upward, happiness, both transitory in heaven, and also earthly in a future birth), but the investigation of the Brahman, on the contrary, has as its fruit *niḥcreyasam* (literally: *quo nihil melius, summum bonum*), that is, liberation; it refers to a something which has always existed, not dependent on the action of men; it does not command, like the other, but only teaches, "as if, in teaching concerning any thing, it is brought before the eyes" (p. 28, 1, cf. 818, 7); therefore all imperatives, even if they are taken from the scriptures, are, when directed to the knowledge of Brahman, as blunt as a knife with which one would cut a stone (p. 76, 3); therefore also all the



commands of the scripture, that we should investigate the Brahman, have only the meaning that they turn the thoughts from their natural tendency towards outward things (p. 76, 6) and the egoistic aims bound up with them (p. 76, 7), through which the eternal goal of mankind is not reached (p. 76, 8), and give them a direction towards the inner soul, in order then to teach them about the existence of the soul (p. 77); as also further, for him who knows the Brahman, all commands and prohibitions cease to be in force: "for this is our ornament and pride (*alamkāra*), that after the knowledge of the soul as the Brahman all obligation of action ceases, and all past actions are annihilated" (p. 77, 7).

However freely, as is visible in these quotations, our science raises itself above the whole legal system with which the Brahmans had succeeded in fettering the spirit of the Indian peoples, yet it hardly ventures at all to carry this into practice. Only for him who has won the knowledge of the Brahman, as we shall see further on more in detail, do all laws cease⁴⁹; but, as long as this point is not reached, the four *Āśramas*, or stages of practice in which, according to Brahmanical law, the life of each twice-born has to traverse the steps of Brahman pupil, householder, hermit and beggar (above p. 15ff.), along with the works prescribed in them, remain in force (p. 1008, 5): "For [only] full-grown knowledge requires "nothing else for the perfecting of its fruit [liberation]; yet it "certainly requires other things, in order that it may first "grow. Why? Because of the passage of scripture which "speaks of sacrifice and so forth. For thus says the scripture "(Bṛih. 4, 4, 22): 'The Brahmans seek to know this [the "highest spirit], by reading the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, "by penances, by fasts'; and this passage shows that sacrifice "&c. are a means of knowledge; and, as it is therein said, "they seek to know,' therefore this limits them to being a

⁴⁹ p. 1007, 1: "For knowledge [alone] is the cause through which the goal of man is reached; therefore, after this goal has been gained through knowledge, the works of the *Āśramas*, such as kindling the fires &c., are not [further] to be observed."

"means for the growth [of knowledge]." In the same way, by the passages Chând. 8, 5, 1, Kâth. 2, 15 and others it is "shown that the works of the *Âçramas* are a means of knowledge" (p. 1009, 4). Their difference from the means, tranquillity &c., enumerated above, consists only in this, that the latter continue even for those who have gained knowledge, and thereby form the more immediate (*pratyâsanna*) means, while sacrifice &c. are to be considered as the external (*vâhya*) means, since they exist only for those who are striving after knowledge (p. 1012, 4). These external means, sacrifices, gifts, penances, fastings, are to be followed by every one with the exception of those who have reached knowledge, whether desiring liberation or not (p. 1017, 9); in the latter case the obligation to fulfil them lasts the whole life, in the former, for a time only (p. 1019, 2), since they are only helpful in gaining knowledge, but, this once gained, become superfluous. For thus teaches scripture (p. 1008, 9. 1019, 4), it also shows, how he who possesses the means of Brahma-scholarship &c., will not be overcome by affections (*kleça*), such as love [and hate] (p. 1021, 3). In what their collaboration towards knowledge further consists, is not more definitely determined; according to p. 1044, 4, they are to collaborate towards the knowledge which arises from the hearing of the scriptures, by destroying the hindrances which may exist; these hindrances consist in this, that other works of a former birth may come to ripeness, whose fruit may be a hindrance to knowledge; if the power of the stated means be the stronger, it overcomes the other fruits of works, and knowledge is gained (p. 1043, 4); but if, on the other hand, the hindrances are stronger, the pious practices, in virtue of the metaphysical power (*atîndriyâ çaktiḥ*) which dwells in them, as in all works (p. 1044, 1), bring forth knowledge in the next birth, in which, as was the case, for instance, with *Vâmadeva* (Ait. Up. 2, 5. Brih. 1, 4, 10), it may occasionally exist even from the mother's womb (p. 1044, 10).

But how stands it with those who, on account of wretched circumstances, lack of means and the like, cannot fulfil the religious duties of the *Âçramas*, and thus stand, as it were,



in the middle,⁵⁰ between the twice-born and the Çûdras (p. 1021, 8)? They also, thus declares the answer, as is seen, for instance, in the case of *Raikva* (cf. n. 37), are called to knowledge (p. 1022, 1), although it is better to live in the *Âçramas* (p. 1024, 2). For those whose condition is wretched, we must admit that, either on the ground of ordinary human actions, such as repetition of prayers, fasts, worship of the gods (p. 1023, 1), or also in consequence of the works of the *Âçramas* performed by them in a former birth, the grace (*anugraha*) of knowledge is bestowed on them (p. 1023, 6). And here we touch a very remarkable conception, concerning which we shall try further on to reach perfect clearness, but the material for which we shall introduce here, in order to direct the reader's whole attention to it.

4. Liberation through "the Grace" of Knowledge.

How is the knowledge that leads to liberation, that is, the recognition of the Brahman, produced in men? To begin with, we must remember that it is not a question of gaining something which we did not possess; to gain it is impossible, since the Brahman is actually nothing else than our own self (p. 71, 7). But what have we to do, in order to become conscious of this? This is briefly answered by the passage, p. 69, 7: "The knowledge of the Brahman is not dependent "on the action of man, but on the contrary, just like the "knowledge of a thing which is an object of perception and "other means of knowledge this also depends only on the "object [that is, on the Brahman]." One must also not think that the recognition of the Brahman is an effect of the action of investigating (p. 69, 10), or of worshipping (p. 70, 3); and even the scriptures are its source only so far as they destroy Ignorance concerning the Brahman (p. 70, 7), just as they have no further significance for the state of awakening (*prabodha*) (p. 1060, 11); nay (p. 70, 10), all investigation and

⁵⁰ *Antarâ* 3, 4, 36, explained by Çaṅkara as *antarâle*; if we understand the expression rightly, it means, what we were before (n. 13) not able to conclude with certainty from Manu, that the *Âçramas* were obligatory on all three *Dvija* castes.



knowledge, so far as subject and object are thereby separated, is a direct hindrance to the recognition of the Brahman, as says the scripture (Kena-Up. 2, 11, recalling the Gospel according to Matthew, XI, 25):

“Who doth not know, he knoweth it
“And he who knoweth it, doth not;
“Unknown it is to him who knoweth
“And known to him who doth not know.”

Under these circumstances, according to the mode of expression of the exoteric, theological teaching, in which the philosophy of our system is framed,⁵¹ the birth of knowledge and the liberation connected with it, appears as a grace of God (literally: of the Lord *îçvara*), as becomes clear from the two passages which we here quote:

P. 682, 3: “For the individual soul, which is impotent, in “the condition of Ignorance, to distinguish [from the soul] “the aggregate of the organs of activity [appearing as the “body], and is blind through the darkness of Ignorance, from “the highest soul, the overseer of [the work, the onlooker “dwelling in all being, the Lord who is the cause of spirit, “from him, by his permission, comes the Samsâra, consisting “in the states of doing and enjoying (suffering), and through “his grace, is caused knowledge, and, through this, “liberation.”

P. 786, 7: “Granted, that the soul and God are related “as the part and the whole, yet it is evident that the soul “and God are of different character. How stands it, then, “with the identity of God and the soul? Does it exist, or “does it not?—In truth it exists, but it is hidden; for Ignorance “hides it. But, although it is hidden, yet, when a creature

⁵¹ That in the conception of grace (as in general in the whole apprehension of *Brahman* as *Îçvara*) we have to do only with an exoteric personification, which is not to be taken strictly, becomes also clear from the fact that p. 1023, 9 the *Samskârâh* (moral purifications) are likewise spoken of personified, as *anugrahîtâro vidyâyâh*. Cf. on the teaching of grace, besides the two above quoted chief passages, also p. 662, 1, where the *para âtman* is spoken of as *cakshur-âdi-anavagâhya* and *jñâna-prasâda-avagamyâ*; to the teaching of creation refers the *paramesvara-anugraha* p. 300, 3. 301, 2. There are no further passages as far as we know, in which the conception of grace occurs.



"thinks on and strives towards the highest God, just as the
"faculty of sight in one who has become blind, after the
"darkness is shaken off by the power of remedies, in him, in
"whom the grace of God perfects it, does it become mani-
"fest, but not naturally in any being whatsoever. Why?
"Because through him, through God as cause, the binding
"and loosing of the soul are accomplished, binding when it
"does not recognise the essence of God, and loosing, when it
"does. For thus says the scripture (Qvet. 1, 11):

"When God is known, all fetters fall away,

"All torments cease; birth is no more nor death;

"And he who knows him, when his body dies,

"Has for his lot blest freedom and release."

V. Source of the Vedânta.

1. General Remarks on the Indian Pramânas or Canons of Knowledge.

WHAT are the sources from which we draw our knowledge? This question, of which every philosophy has to give an account, meets us in the Indian systems largely in the form of a consideration of the *Pramânas*, literally, "measures" or "canons," of our knowledge; in which, therefore, not the concept of a source from which we draw is the basis, but on the contrary that of a means of control, by which we are to measure the knowledge already existing in us, and test its correctness, a concept which is explained by the fact that Indian philosophy did not start, as far the most part the Grecian did, from an investigation, free of assumptions, into "the existent," but rather, like modern philosophy, from the critical analysis and testing of a complex of knowledge handed down (through the Veda)⁵². As such *Pramânas*, or canons of knowledge, the systems, as a rule, enumerate: 1) *Pratyaksham*, also called *drishtam*, the sensuously perceptible, as it is known to us by direct perception; 2) *Anumānam* "the measuring after something," inference, by which that part of "the existent" which does not fall within direct perception,⁵³ becomes acces-

⁵² An essential difference consists in modern philosophy in its fundamental character, even up to to-day, being a toilsome struggle and gradual shaking off of the fetters of mediæval scholasticism,—while the Indian philosophy through all time has been the better, the more closely it has adhered to the basis laid down in the Vedic Upanishads. But in truth this basis is also of an eminently philosophical character.

⁵³ By this is explained the fundamental proposition of the theory of knowledge, that where *Pratyaksham* exists, there is no *Anumānam* p. 657, 9: *pratyakshatvād anumāna-apravṛtteh*.



sible; we know of it only because the perceptible points to something else, not perceptible, with which it is connected. This connection can be threefold, according as the element to be inferred is either the cause of the element perceived, or its effect, or as, thirdly, the two stand in a relation which does not fall under the conception of causality, for example, in that of analogy.

These two spheres of knowledge, the perceived and the inferred, embrace naturally the whole complex of "the existent." The position of the Cārvākas (materialists) who will only allow validity to the first is crude but correspondingly little objection can be raised, when the Vaiṣeṣhikas and Bauddhas (Buddhists) will not go further than these two *pramāṇas*. For it is very strange that the Sāṅkhyas and others add to these also 3) *Āptavacanam*, that is "right communication," which then, again, according as it is understood, means secular or religious tradition. For the former goes back again to *Pratyakṣam* and *Anumānam* and the latter is, in philosophy, no legal component, and is one of the means by which the Sāṅkhyas and others, with all their heresy, were yet able to keep up an appearance of orthodoxy. Through further splitting up of *Anumānam*, not to the advantage of clearness, the adherents of the Nyāya reached four, the Mīmāṃsakas of the school of Jaimini six, and others even nine *Pramāṇas* (cf. Colebr. *Misc. Ess.*¹ p. 240, 266, 303-304, 330, 403).

2. Insufficiency of the secular Canons of Knowledge.

Like the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*, the *Vedānta* also accepts six canons of knowledge, according to Colebrooke (*loc. cit.* p. 330), who appeals for support to the (modern) *Vedāntaparibhāṣhā*. As far as our *Vedānta-sūtras* are concerned, there is, neither in the text nor in the Commentary, any discussion of the *Pramāṇas* at all; on the contrary they are everywhere presupposed as well known, and set aside as inadmissible for the metaphysics of the *Vedānta*,⁵⁴—and in reality a fundamental ac-

⁵⁴ p. 49, 2: "Only from the canon of scripture as means of knowledge "is the Brahman known as the cause of the coming into being and "[existence and passing away] of the world;" p. 488, 1: "only through

count of the fact that metaphysics attains its contents only through a right use of the natural means of knowledge, is very difficult, and presupposes a greater ripeness of thought than we find in the Vedânta, which helps itself out of the difficulty by the short cut of substituting a theological for the philosophical means of knowledge, as we shall now further show.

As for Bâdarâyana, he expresses his rejection of the secular means of knowledge, *Pratyaksham* and *Anumânam* with the drastic brevity which characterises him, in this, as we have already remarked (above p. 23), that he uses the two words to indicate something altogether different, namely the *Ṛuti* and *Smṛiti*; thus in the Sûtras 1, 3, 28. 3, 2, 24. 4, 4, 20 (supposing, naturally, that Çaṅkara has explained them correctly). The *Ṛuti*, therefore, the holy scriptures, in the narrower sense the Brâhmaṇas and Upanishads, but also the Mantras presupposed by them, that is, hymns and formulas,⁵⁵ are for Bâdarâyana the *Pratyaksham*; the revealed is for him self-evident, needing no further authority. It is otherwise with the *Smṛiti*,⁵⁶ under which name Çaṅkara quotes testimonies from the Sâṅkhya and Yoga systems, from the law-book of Manu, from the Mahâbhârata and Purâṇas, as also from the Vedic Sûtra literature. For while the *Veda*, like the sun, which has its own light, possesses unconditional authority (*nirapeksham prâmânyam* p. 414, 6), the *Smṛiti* is called *Anumânam* because, as Çaṅkara, p. 287, 11, explains, for its support another basis of authority (*prâmânyam*) is necessary. As, namely, the secular

"the scripture can one plunge into this deepest, highest Brahman; one cannot plunge into Him by reflection." Of passages where the *Pramâṇas* are mentioned, we have noted, besides these the following: the *pramâṇâni*, *pratyaksha-âdini* are *avidyâvad-vishayâni* (p. 17, 13); they are frail (p. 448, 1); are common to us and animals (p. 19, 6); *pratyaksham* is *rûpa-âdi*, *anumânam* &c. is *lînga-âdi* (p. 426, 8. 438, 1); of different character is *anubhava*, permissible, according to 42, 4, in the investigation of Brahman, cf. 419, 2 *anubhava-avasânam brahma-vijñânam*; the monstrosity of an absolute perception (subject without object) occurs on p. 671, 2; cf. 96, 5.

⁵⁵ Thus, for example, passages of the Rîgveda-Saṃhitâ are quoted as *Ṛuti* p. 208, 13. 212, 1. 304, 4; on the contrary the *mantra* is opposed to the *ṛuti*, p. 308, 4.

⁵⁶ As also with the *Âcâra* (above p. 24); cf. p. 990, 1: *smṛiti-âcârâbhyâm, na ṛuteh*.



Anumānam rests on the *Pratyaksham*, and only has the force of proof so long as it is rightly inferred therefrom, the *Smṛiti* also is only so far valid as an authority, as it confirms the *Ṛuti* by its testimony, and completes it by right inference. Therefore it is frequently quoted in confirmation, but not seldom also rejected; as for instance 4, 2, 21, in reference to the departure of the soul, the ideas of the *Smṛiti* (Bhagavadgītā 8, 23) are only so far rejected as they are in contradiction to the *Ṛuti* (p. 1109, 5). For the rest Bādarāyaṇa declares himself, 2, 1, 11, as opposed in principle to any possibility of basing the metaphysical verities on reflection (*tarka*), which is commented on by Ṣaṅkara as follows (p. 435, 11):—"And, therefore, mere reflection (*kevalas tarkah*) must not be quoted in opposition in a matter which is to be known by [sacred] tradition (*āgama*); for reflections which, without [sacred] tradition, rest only on the speculation (*utprekshā*) of men, are untenable, since this speculation is unbridled. For instance the reflections thought out by some experts after great trouble are recognized by others, still more expert, as [merely] apparent, and those of the latter in the same way by others. Therefore one cannot rely on it, that reflections have stability, because the opinions of men vary. But [it may be objected], when there is a man of recognised greatness, a *Kapila* or another, who has made a reflection, one could at least rely on it as well-founded. Even here a sound foundation is lacking, since even the recognised pioneers (*tīrthakara*) such as *Kapila*, *Kaṇāda* and the like, openly contradict each other." To this the opponent objects: "Yet one can, perhaps, come to a well-founded reflection, in reflecting in a different way, for that there can be no well-founded reflection at all is in itself a law based on reflection alone (p. 436, 7); and because one reflection is false, the other need not also be false; the opinion that all reflection is unreliable, would make an end of all worldly action resting thereon (p. 436, 10)." Reflection, he says, might have in view the consideration of the words of scripture, in order to reach in this way the full truth (p. 437, 1); even *Manu* (12, 105) recommends, besides the tradition of scripture, perception and inference; and the

excellence of reflection is precisely this, that, unbound by previous reflections, in case they are untenable, other reflections may be made (p. 437, 7). To this Çāṅkara replies (p. 437, 10): "Even though it appear that in many provinces reflection is well-founded, yet, in the province here spoken of, reflection cannot be freed from the reproach of baselessness; for it is impossible to know at all this extremely profound essence of being (*bhāva-yāthātmyam*), without the [sacred] tradition, connected with liberation; for this subject does not fall within the province of perception (*pratyakṣham*), because it is without form and the like, and therefore also not within the province of inference (*anumānam*) and the other [Pramāṇas], because it has no characteristics [*liṅgam*] and the like." Here, as our author further develops the question, where the full truth and the liberation which results from it—as all admit—are being considered, the subject of knowledge must be identical, and the knowledge of it uncontradictable. But reflections do not fulfil these conditions, because they contradict each other, and what the one maintains, another overthrows, and what the latter puts in its place, yet another overthrows (p. 438, 9). Besides, the Sāṅkhya system is not in any way recognised by everyone as the highest, and in any case it is impossible to bring together all the thinkers of all lands and times, to establish firmly the final truth of reflection among them. But, on the other hand, the Veda, as a source of knowledge, is eternal; its subject stands fast; the full knowledge of it formed therefrom cannot be turned aside by all the reflecters of the past, present and future (p. 439, 5). By this the full validity of the Upanishad teaching is proved, and by this it is established, "in virtue of the [sacred] tradition and the reflection which follows it" that (which was to be proved) the spiritual Brahman is at once the *causa efficiens* and the *causa materialis* of the world (p. 439, 7).

Çāṅkara expresses himself even more strongly in discussing the same point in another place. To the objection that the Brahman can only be *causa efficiens* and not also *materialis*, because experience (*loka*) shows that only a *causa efficiens*, as for instance, the potter, can be endowed with knowledge, he

answers (p. 403, 7): "It is not necessary that it should be here the same as in experience; for this subject [Brahman] is not known by inference (*anumānam*), but only by revelation (*śabda*), and it is therefore [only] necessary here that [which is to be proved] it should be in accordance with revelation, and this shows that the knowing *Īvara* (Lord) is the *causa materialis* [of the world]" (cf. p. 1144, 13).

In these circumstances it is possible occasionally to make such statements about the Brahman as would be, according to worldly standards, absolutely contradictory; for example, that the Brahman does not wholly enter into the phenomenal world, and yet is without parts: (p. 481, 13) "in the scripture the Brahman is rooted; in the scripture it has its ground of knowledge, not in sense-perception and the like; therefore it must be taken as scripture gives it; and scripture teaches of the Brahman both that it is not wholly [used up in forming the world of appearances], and that it is yet without parts. Nay, even in the case of worldly things, such as amulets, spells, drugs and the like, it happens that, in virtue of difference of place, time, and cause, they manifest powers with various contradictory effects, and even these cannot be known by mere reflection without instruction, nor can it be determined, what powers, with what accompaniments, referring to what, for what available, a given thing may have,—how can it then be possible to know the nature of the Brahman, with its unthinkable perfections of might, without the scripture?"

This advantage, however, of being allowed occasionally to ignore experience, holds good only in the case of the Vedânta teacher, but not of his opponent (p. 595, 8): "The follower of the Brahman investigates the being of the cause [of the world] and the like, relying on the [sacred] tradition, and it is not unconditionally necessary for him to accept every thing in accordance with perception (*na avacyam tasya yathā-dṛṣṭam eva sarvam abhyupagantavyam*); but the opponent, who investigates the being of the cause [of the world] and the like, relying on the examples of experience (*dṛṣṭānta*), must accept everything according to experience,—that is the difference."

3. The Revelation of the Veda.

To mitigate the severity of these declarations, we must call to mind the details given in Chap. II, 2 (reading especially the passage in n. 32, above p. 56), according to which all empirical means of knowledge, and all the world produced by them, belong to the realm of *Avidyâ*, as also, on the other hand, that in the Veda, especially in the Upanishads, there are philosophic conceptions which have their like neither in India, nor, perhaps, anywhere else in the world. Therefore we can well understand our author's view that the Veda is of superhuman origin (*apaurusheya* p. 170, 2); that it is infallible (p. 618, 1); that, as we saw above p. 69ff., the Gods are created, but the Veda, on the contrary, is ever-present in the spirit of the creator of the world, as the timeless rule of being; that it was "out-breathed" by him⁵⁷, concerning which the two chief passages are (p. 47, 2): "The great canon of scripture beginning with the *Rigveda*, which, enforced by many branches of knowledge, lights all things like a lamp, and in a certain measure is omniscient, has the Brahman as its origin and cause. For such a canon as the *Rigveda* and the rest, which is endowed with the quality of omniscience, can come from none but an omniscient source." And further (p. 48, 4): "The great being which, according to the scripture [*Bṛh. 2, 4, 10*] brought forth unwearying in sport, like the outbreathing of a man, the *Rigveda* and the rest, as a mine of all knowledge, which is the basis of the division into Gods, animals, men, castes, *Âçramas* and the like, this being must possess an unsurpassable omniscience and omnipotence."

As the Brahman itself is free from all differences, so also is the knowledge of the Brahman, as we gain it from the

⁵⁷ We have thus in India, as analogy of our Inspiration, an Expiration, through which the Vedic texts were revealed to their composers, who are therefore called *Rishis*; the Mantras and *Brâhmaṇas* "appear" (*pratibhânti*) to them, are "seen" (*drishta*) by them; cf. p. 301, 6: "Çaunaka and the other [composers of *Prâtichâkyas*] teach, that the Decades [of the *Rigveda*] were seen by *Madhucchandâs* [the composer of the opening hymns of the *Rigveda*] and the other *Rishis*." In the same way, according to p. 314, 13, the *Brâhmaṇas* were also seen by the *Rishis*: *rishînâm mantra-brâhmaṇa-darçinâm*; cf. p. 119, 8: *mantra-brâhmaṇayoç ca ekârthatvaṃ yuktam, avirodhât*.



Upanishads, uniform throughout and without contradiction (p. 834, 4): "Has it not been established that the Brahman, the object of knowledge, is free from all differences, as before, behind, and the like, uniform, and, like the lump of salt [Bṛih. 4, 5, 13], of one taste? How, then, can the thought arise of a difference or non-difference of knowledge? For that, like the variety of [pious] works, a variety with reference to the Brahman could be taught by the Vedānta, can by no means be affirmed, since the Brahman is one and uniform. And if the Brahman is uniform, then the knowledge of the Brahman cannot be manifold; for the assumption that the subject can be one thing and the knowledge of it another, is necessarily erroneous. And if, on the other hand, there were to be taught different doctrines of the one Brahman in the Vedānta, of which some were true and others false, we should have the case of disbelief in the Vedānta [that is, the Upanishads] [cf. p. 104, 1],—therefore one cannot assume that there are in the Vedānta differences in the knowledge of Brahman." In conformity with this principle, the numerous contradictions in the Upanishads are explained away (1, 1, 27 may serve as an example), or hidden under the broad mantle of exoteric doctrine, of which we shall speak in the next Chapter. However, occasionally minor contradictions in the parallel texts of the Upanishads are admitted with the remark, that they are not important.⁵³ Where the sense of the scripture is doubtful, the rule of experience (*laukiko nyāyah*) decides, p. 1064, 5: "But still it is unseemly to check the view of the scriptures "by a rule of experience? To this we answer: this is so, where "the sense of the scripture is certain; but where it is doubtful, it is permissible to have recourse to a rule of experience, "for the sake of clearing up the question;"—as generally the worldly means of knowledge are helpful to the investigation of the sense of the scriptures (p. 40, 6): "The knowledge of "the Brahman is gained by the sense of the word of the Veda

⁵³ For example p. 222, 2. 849, 11. 855, 6: *nā hi etāvatā viśeṣeṇa vidyā-ekatvam apagacchati*.—418, 12 *grutānām paraspara-virodhe sati, eka-vaṣeṇa itarā nīyante*. This especially holds good in the case of contradictions in things where the aim of man (*puruṣa-artha*) does not come into question, p. 374, 7.



"being considered and determined; it is not gained by other means of knowledge, such as inference (*anumānam*) &c. But although it is the Vedānta texts which inform us of the cause of the world's coming into existence &c., yet, to make sure that we have grasped their sense [correctly], an inference which does not contradict the words of the Vedānta is not excluded as a means of knowledge. For by the scripture itself [Brih. 2, 4, 5. Chând. 6, 14, 2] reflection is called in as a help."—(p. 42, 3): "For in the investigation of the Brahman, the scripture is not, as in the investigation of duty [the *Pârva-mîmāṃsā*], the exclusive authority, but the authorities here are, according to circumstances, the scripture and the [inner] perception (*anubhava*) and the like. For the knowledge of the Brahman reaches its final point in perception, as far as it refers to a really existing subject."—(p. 44, 6): "But does not the Brahman, so far as it is something really existing, alone belong to the province of other means of knowledge, and is not the consideration of the words of the Vedānta consequently aimless? By no means the Brahman, for, as it is not an object of sense, the [causal] connection with the world would not be grasped [with certainty]. That is to say, the senses, according to their nature, have as their object external things, and not the Brahman. If the Brahman were an object of sense, then the world might be grasped as an effect connected with Brahman. Now, we only perceive the effect, so that [without revelation], it cannot be decided whether the world is connected with Brahman [as cause], or with something else [for the same effect can have different causes]."

Of the possibility here suggested, of bringing in reflection as an aid, our author makes a far more extensive use than might appear from these expressions. Since this side of Qaṇkara's work has for us the chief interest, we will, as far as possible, pass over his endless quotations from the Veda, but, on the other hand, bend our whole attention to the philosophic reflection. The perfection of the latter, as it meets us in Qaṇkara's Commentary, may itself speak for the fact that we have to do here with a monument of Indian antiquity not merely theological, but also in the highest degree philosophical.



VI. Exoteric and Esoteric Vedânta Doctrine.

1. Justification of Exoteric Metaphysics.

ALL metaphysics has to battle with the great difficulty, unique in the whole province of science, that it must think in conceptions and express in words what is properly contrary to their nature, since all words and conceptions at last spring from that very base of empiric reality which metaphysics undertakes to transcend, in order to lay hold on the "Self" (*âtman*) of the world, the "ὄντως ὄν" the "thing in itself," which finds its expression and manifestation in all empiric reality, yet without being identical with it.

So far, then, as metaphysics adapts itself to the form of empirical knowledge, in order thereby to express its own content, it necessarily assumes an allegorical, more or less mythical character; and, as this is the only form in which it can be grasped by the people, standing in need of it (*ἐκείνοις δὲ τοῖς ἔξω ἐν παραβολαῖς τὰ πάντα γίνεται*, St. Mark, IV, 11), is called exoteric metaphysics. So far as, on the other hand, it adheres to the path of exact science, in order to attain to a Whole, thoroughly demonstrable in all its parts, and equal to any opposition, metaphysics must often choose difficult by-paths, turning conceptions through many shades of meaning, with all kinds of reservations, and in many cases entirely renounce results that can be clearly represented.—And all this demands a great power and habit of abstraction, attainable only by few; therefore for this form of our science the name of esoteric metaphysics is to be taken.