

2. Exoteric and Esoteric form of the Vedânta.

a) General Survey.

In accordance with what has been said, the metaphysics of the Vedânta also has two forms, a theological, exoteric, and a philosophical, esoteric form; both are present in the work which we have to analyse, running parallel, and being present in all the five provinces of the Vedânta teaching, namely, the theology, cosmology, psychology, the doctrine of transmigration, and that of liberation; they stand in a continuous contradiction which is necessitated by the nature of the matter. But the great difficulty for the philosophic understanding of the Brahmasûtras lies in the fact, that neither in the text nor in the commentary are the two conceptions clearly separated from each other, but rather meet us everywhere interwoven with each other, in such sort that the fundamental texture of the whole consists of a representation of the exoteric, or, as we may also call it (with an extension of the conception, whose justification will be given in what follows) the lower doctrine (*aparâ vidyâ*), which, however, is penetrated in every province by the esoteric or higher doctrine (*parâ vidyâ*), standing in contradiction to it, a relation which compels us to justify our general view here at the outset.

As is shown by the analysis of contents at the conclusion of our first chapter, the doctrine of the Vedânta consists properly in a richly coloured picture of the world on a mythological ground. The first part contains, in Adhyâya I, the theology, which on the basis of seven times four passages of the Upanishads, discusses the essence of the Brahman, its relation to the world as creator, ruler and destroyer, its relation to the soul, and its various names and attributes. This is followed, in Adhyâya II, by the cosmology which is concerned with the relation of the world to the Brahman as cause, its gradual evolution from and re-absorption in it, and, from II, 3, 15 on, the psychology, in which are thoroughly discussed the nature of the soul and its organs, its relation to God, to the body, and to its own deeds. In Adhyâya III



comes first the doctrine of transmigration, then a supplement to the psychology (III, 2, 1—10), another to the theology (III, 2, 11—41); the rest of the Adhyāya contains a miscellaneous assemblage of discussions, for the most part exegetic in character, as the chief content of which we can, in any case, with Gaṅkara (p. 1049, 3), consider the teaching of the means (*sādhana*) to attain the higher and lower doctrine, that is the knowledge and worship of the Brahman. For the most part these discussions deal with the strange question whether certain passages of the Veda are to be comprehended in one "Vidyā," or to be separated, a question which has a meaning only for the lower doctrine, with its aim of worship. Finally, the conclusion of the work, Adhyāya IV, contains the eschatology; it sketches in detail the departure of the soul after death, and how some souls follow the way of the Fathers (*pitriyāna*) to a new incarnation, while, on the contrary, others, the worshippers of the Brahman, are led along the way of the gods (*devayāna*) higher and higher upwards to the Brahman, "whence there is no return"—according to the Upanishads, but not without further conditions, according to the reasoning of our system: for this Brahman is only the "lower" Brahman, that is, as considered as possessing attributes (*guṇa*), it is the object of worship, and not of "perfect knowledge" (*samyaḡdarśanam*); only after this latter, that is, the esoteric doctrine, is imparted to the pious in the world of Brahman, is he also liberated; until then, although he is in the world of Brahman, and a partaker of Lordship (*aīśvaryam*), "his darkness is not yet driven away" (p. 1154, 9), "his ignorance not yet destroyed" (p. 1133, 15), that is, he possesses only the lower doctrine (*aparā vidyā*), whose content consists of all that has hitherto been mentioned, not the opposed higher doctrine, the *parā vidyā* or *samyaḡdarśanam*, that is, the pure philosophic, esoteric doctrine, which, in every part of this picture of the world with its empiric colouring, crops up in contradiction with it, and whose results, according to the metaphysical standpoint which we occupy, we may find strange, or admirable. In the department of Theology it teaches that the Brahman is not thus or thus, but altogether without attributes (*guṇa*), distinctions

(*viçesha*) and limitations (*upâdhi*), and therefore in no way capable of being defined or conceived. And this Brahman, devoid of all limitation, is the only being, outside which nothing is; therefore, in the department of Cosmology, there can be as little question of the origin of the world as of its existence, but only of there being neither anything different (*nânâ*) from the Brahman, nor any plurality of things (*prapañca*), and that the world extended in names and forms is non-existent (*avastu*), is only a glamour (*mâyâ*) which Brahman, as master-magician (*mâyâvin*), projects (*prasûrayati*), as the dreamer projects dream forms (p. 432, 8). In the same way all further Psychology falls away, after the saying "*tat tvam asi*" (that thou art), is comprehended according to which the soul of each human being is not an emanation, not a part of the Brahman, but fully and completely the Brahman. For him who knows this, there is no more migration of the soul, nor even liberation; for he is already liberated; the continued existence of the world and of his own body appears to him only as an illusion, the appearance of which he cannot remove, but which cannot further deceive him, till the time when, after the decease of the body, he wanders not forth, as the others, but remains where he is and what he is and eternally was,—the first principle of all things, "the originally eternal, pure, free Brahman."

This is the *Samyagdarçanam*, the *Vidyâ* in the stricter sense of the word, distinguished on the one side from empiric cosmology, and psychology, *Avidyâ*, and on the other from the doctrine of the *aparam, saguṇam brahma*, of its worship and the entering into it by the way of *devayâna*; this is the *aparâ vidyâ, saguṇâ vidyâ*, whose possessor can, however, also on occasion be called *vidvân* (p. 1095, 11. 1134, 11). Strictly viewed, this *aparâ vidyâ* is nothing but metaphysics in an empiric dress, that is *Vidyâ* as it appears, considered from the standpoint of *Avidyâ* (the realism innate in us). This definition is not, however, found in Çāṅkara, as in general the distinction of the esoteric and exoteric doctrine and the inner connection of the latter, as well as of the former, does not attain the clearness with which we express it and must express it here, unless we have to renounce a full comprehension



of the system. What prevented our author from connecting together—as he did in the case of the *parâ vidyâ*—the *aparâ vidyâ* also, with his doctrine of the creation of the world and Samsâra, in the unity of an exoteric system, was firstly the excessive attention which, in Indian fashion, he paid to theological and eschatological questions, and, on the other hand, the apprehension of injuring the letter of the Veda, in which esoteric and exoteric teaching are interwoven, by a recognition of the contradictions between them. For this reason, for instance, he takes endless pains to maintain the teaching of the creation of the world through the Brahman, and to unify it with his better insight into the identity of the two, by trying to show that cause and effect are identical, and then constantly (e.g., p. 374, 12. 391, 10. 484, 2. 491, 1) asserting that the doctrine of creation had only the aim of teaching this identity of the world with the Brahman, a view which cannot be brought into harmony with the ample and realistic treatment which he himself bestowed on it.

Naturally we shall do no violence to our author, and where, in the organism of his system, we note a false connection, we shall only indicate it, and not remedy it; but, on the other side, we have the right to exercise philosophic criticism and this will be the better, the more it is done entirely from within, that is, from the principles of the system itself. For in every philosophical system lies something more than its originator put into it; the genius reaches further than the individual, and it is the task of the historian to indicate where the thinker has lagged behind the full scope of his thoughts.

To this end we must be allowed here, at the outset of our exposition of the system, to bring together the passages which justify our general view of it; they will form the beacons to which we have to look for guidance on our laborious and dangerous journey, and from them we shall take the standard to test where our author has fallen short of the greatness of his own point of view.



b) Exoteric and Esoteric Theology.

Quite clearly and consciously, if not everywhere carried out in detail, do we find the contrast made between exoteric and esoteric doctrine in the province of Theology, under the names of the lower, attribute-possessing (*aparā, sagunā*), and the higher, attributeless doctrines (*parā, nirgunā vidyā*); the former is the doctrine of the lower, attribute-possessing Brahman, the latter of the higher, attribute-free Brahman (*aparam, sagunam, saviçesham*, also *kāryam, amukhyam brahma*, and *param, nirgunam, nirviçesham*, also *avikritam, mukhyam, çuddham brahma*); the former is the object of worship, the latter of knowledge; in the case of the former doctrine the fulfilment of duties is commanded; but not in the latter (p. 1077, 7); the former has many different rewards, the only fruit of the latter is deliverance.

The most important passages are as follows:

(p. 111, 3:) "The Brahman is known in two forms, [1.] as "qualified by limitations (*upādhi*) which are derived from the "multitude of his metamorphoses in respect of names and forms, "and [2.] on the contrary as free from all limitations."

(p. 803, 3:) "There are passages of twofold character (*līṅgam*) "referring to the Brahman; the one, as *e. g.* 'all-working, all-wish- "ing, all-smelling, all-tasting,' etc. [Chând. 3, 14, 2, cf. p. 50 above] "indicate that it is affected by difference (*viçeshā*); the others, "e. g., 'not coarse, not fine, not short, not long,' etc. (Brih. "3, 8, 8), indicate its freedom from all differences... But "it is not admissible to assume from the passages of twofold "character that the highest (*param*) Brahman has itself "(*svatas*) this double nature; for one and same thing cannot "in itself be affected by differences such as form, etc., and "not be affected by them, for this is a contradiction... And "by being connected with limitations (*upādhi*) a thing of a "one kind cannot assume another nature; for when rock crystal "is transparent, it does not become opaque by being connected "with limitations such as red colour and the like; on the con- "trary it is only an illusion (*bhrama*) that opaqueness per- "meates it; what adds the limitations to it is ignorance "(*avidyā*). Therefore, whichever character is assumed, the



"Brahman must be conceived as unchangeably free from all differences, and not the reverse. For everywhere in the scriptures where it is a question of teaching the proper nature of the Brahman, it is taught by such passages as 'not to be heard, not to be felt, without form, eternal' (Kâth. 3, 15), that the Brahman is completely above all change.⁵⁹

(p. 133, 7:) "For where in teaching the nature (*rûpam*) of the highest Lord all differences are excluded, the scriptures use such expressions as: 'not to be heard, not to be felt, 'without form, eternal' (Kâth. 3, 15). Because the highest Lord, however, is the cause of all, He is exhibited to us as distinguished by certain qualifications of the changeable world [of creation, which is a transformation of Him], when we read 'all-working, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting' (Chând. 3, 14, 2); and the case is the same when He is termed 'the [man in the sun] with the golden beard' (Chând. 1, 6, 6), etc."

(p. 1121, 1:) "As the lower (*aparam*) Brahman is closely connected with the higher (*param*) Brahman, it is no contradiction to apply the word Brahman to the former also. For the fact of the matter is this: the higher Brahman itself is the lower Brahman, so far as it [the former] is now and again for the purpose of worship described as possessing certain qualities of the changeable world, such as 'Manas is what it is formed of' (Chând. 3, 14, 2) etc., qualities which depend on the ascription to it of pure limitations (*viçuddha-upâdhi*)."

(p. 867, 12:) "These qualifications too [from Taitt. 2, 5: 'Love is his head' etc.] are only assumed in the highest Brahman as a means of turning the thoughts to it (*citta-avatâra-upâya-mâtratvena*), not with a view to knowledge... and this rule [that such qualifications have only local not general validity] is applied elsewhere, when it is a question

⁵⁹ Cf. p. 806, 9: "Therefore the Brahman must in these passages according to the Scriptures be regarded as quite without form (*nirākâram*); but the other passages which refer to the Brahman as possessing form (*ākâravat*) are not concerned with it but with the enjoining of worship (*upâsanâ*)."

"of certain qualities of the Brahman which are inculcated for the purpose of worship... For a 'More' and 'Less' of attributes in which continues the [empirical] action of the manifold (*sati bheda-vyavahāre*) exists in the attribute-possessing (*saguṇam*) Brahman, not in the attribute-less (*nirguṇam*) highest Brahman."

(p. 112, 2:) "In a thousand passages the scripture teaches the double nature of the Brahman, distinguishing between it when it is the object of knowledge and ignorance (*vidyā-avidyā-vishaya*). From the standpoint of ignorance (*avidyā-avasthâyām*) all occupation with Brahman has the distinguishing mark that it, as object of worship, and its worshipper are distinguished; and in this case certain ways of worshipping the Brahman have as their end an exaltation (*abhyudaya*); the end of others is gradual deliverance (*kramamukti*); others again have as their aim the success of the work of sacrifice;⁶⁰ and they vary according to the attributes (*guṇa*), differences (*viśeṣa*) and limitation (*upādhi*). Now though the God to be honoured, the highest Âtman, distinguished by this or that attribute and difference, is one, still the rewards [of worship] are different according to the attributes worshipped."

(p. 148, 2:) "For where the highest Brahman (*param brahma*), free from all connection with differences, is indicated as soul, there is, as is to be seen [from the scripture], only one single fruit, namely liberation; where, on the contrary, the Brahman is taught in its connection with different attributes (*guṇa-viśeṣa*), or in its connection with different symbols [*pratīka-viśeṣa*, on which 4, 1, 4. 4, 3, 15—16], there are produced high and low rewards only limited to Samsâra (*samsâra-gocarâṇi eva*)."⁶¹

⁶⁰ Cf. p. 815, 5: "The fruit of the same [the worship of the *saguṇam brahma*] varying with the instruction, is sometimes annihilation of sin, sometimes attainment of [heavenly] lordship (*aīṣvarya*), sometimes gradual deliverance; so it is to be understood. It is thus correct to assume that the words of the scripture about worship and the words about the Brahman [as object of knowledge] have not a single but different purposes."

⁶¹ Cf. p. 1047, 7: "Where no difference of teaching exists, there cannot



c) Exoteric and Esoteric Eschatology.

As already made clear by the passages quoted, this two-fold nature of the lower Brahman, as the object of worship, and of the higher, as the object of knowledge, corresponds exactly to the two-fold eschatological theory of our system. The names *parā* and *aparā vidyā* comprehend, for Ćaṅkara, not only the philosophical and theological theories of the Brahman, but also the doctrine of the destiny of those who adhere to the one or the other; the *parā vidyā* teaches how he who knows the *param brahma*, by this very knowledge, becomes identical with it, and accordingly stands in need of no departure of the soul and further advance towards it, in order to reach it; on the other hand the *aparā vidyā* comprehends the theory of the Brahman as object of worship, and at the same time the theory of the rewards which fall to the lot of the worshipper; these are, as we saw, partly temporal, partly celestial, partly even the gradual liberation of the *Devayāna*, but always limited to the *Saṃsāra* (p. 148, 5), from which it follows that, like the *Pitriyāna*, the *Devayāna* also belongs to the *Saṃsāra*, namely, as its termination. According to this, as we are expressively assured, the whole teaching of the *Devayāna* (the ascent of the pious to the Brahman) belongs to the *aparā vidyā* (p. 1087, 3); to the attribute-possessing worship (*saguṇā upāsānā*) of the Brahman, not to the *Samyagdarśanam* (p. 909, 8. 10); heaven and the like, with its lordship (*aicvāryam*) is the ripened fruit of the *saguṇā vidyā* (p. 1149, 13); for him who, on the contrary, knows the *param brahma*, as is developed in the episode

"be, as in the case of fruit of works, a difference of fruit either. For in
"the case of that doctrine [the *nirguṇā vidyā*], which is the means of
"liberation, there is no difference as in the case of works. On the con-
"trary, in the case of attribute-possessing doctrines (*saguṇāsu vidyāsu*),
"as, for example, 'Manas is his material, Prāṇa his body' (Chând. 3, 14, 2),
"and so on, there exists a difference, in consequence of the admixture or
"separation of attributes, and accordingly, as in the case of the fruit of
"works, a difference of fruit according to the given peculiarity. And a
"token of this is the scripture, when it is said: 'whatever he adores him
"as, that he becomes;' but it is not so in the case of the attributeless
"doctrine (*nirguṇāyām vidyāyām*), because [in it] no attributes exist."

concerning the *parā vidyā* 4, 2, 12—16 (*prāsaṅgikā paravidyā-gatā cintā* p. 1103, 12), there is no more departure from the body, nor any entering into the Brahman (p. 1102, 1).

d) Exoteric and Esoteric Cosmology and Psychology.

At first sight, the matter stands somewhat differently in the province of Cosmology and Psychology. The question is here no longer the contrast between *aparā* and *parā vidyā*, but another, the contrast between two standpoints, which, p. 456, 1, are distinguished as the standpoint of worldly action (*vyavahāra-avasthā*) and the standpoint of the highest reality (*paramārtha-avasthā*). The former is that of the *Avidyā* (p. 455, 6), the latter that of the *Vidyā*. The former teaches a creation of the world by the Brahman who is endowed with a plurality of powers (*śakti*), and the existence of a plurality of individual souls, for whose activities and enjoyments it is the stage from the latter standpoint, the possibility of a creation and a transmigration ceases along with plurality, and in place of both comes the doctrine of the identity of Brahman with nature and with the soul.

(p. 491, 1:) "This scripture-doctrine of the creation does not belong to the highest reality (*paramārtha*), for it lies in the province of worldly action (*vyavahāra*) in name and form admitted by *Avidyā*, and has, as its highest aim, to teach that the Brahman is the soul; this must not be forgotten!"

(p. 473, 13:) "When, through declarations of identity like '*tat tvam asi*' (that thou art), identity has become known, then the soul's existence as wanderer, and Brahman's existence as creator have vanished away.

That the *paramārtha-avasthā* of Cosmology and Psychology forms a whole with the *parā vidyā* of Theology and Eschatology, may be concluded from the explanations of Ṣaṅkara himself, in the single passage in which he lays down the esoteric teaching connectedly, and which is translated at the end of this chapter. Here we will prove only, what Ṣaṅkara was not so clearly conscious of, that, quite analogously, the *vyavahāra-avasthā* of the doctrines of creation and transmigration are to be connected with the *aparā vidyā* of an



attribute-possessing, that is, to speak in our language, of a personal God and a soul which departs to him after death, in the unity of an exoteric metaphysics, which treats of the Beyond from the standpoint of innate realism (*avidyā*), since the *aparā vidyā* cannot exist without the *vyavahāra-avasthā*, nor the *vyavahāra-avasthā* without the *aparā vidyā*.

1) The *aparā vidyā* cannot exist without the *vyavahāra-avasthā*; for the *devayāna* of the *aparā vidyā* demands, as its complement, the *pitriyāna*; but this is the path of *Samsāra*, and Ćaṅkara himself has told us (above p. 106), that the reality of *Samsāra* and the reality of the creation stand and fall together; therefore the *aparā vidyā* demands, as its complement, the realism of the doctrine of creation; as also, conversely, the *devayāna*, and, along with it, the *aparā vidyā*, disappear only for him who has recognised the unity of his *Ātman* with *Brahman*, and therewith the illusion of the manifold world and the wandering soul.

2) In exactly the same way the *vyavahāra-avasthā* of the teaching of creation cannot exist without the *aparā vidyā* of *sagunam brahma*; for, in order to create, Brahman requires a plurality of *śaktis*, or powers (p. 342, 6. 486, 10); but these stand in contradiction (p. 1126, 2) to a *nirviṣeṣam brahma*, from which it follows that only a *sagunam, saviṣeṣam*, not a *nirgunam, nirviṣeṣam brahma* can be a Creator.

The inner necessary connection between the *vyavahāra-avasthā* and the *aparā vidyā*, here demonstrated, often enough comes more or less clearly to Ćaṅkara's consciousness: thus, when he describes the *sagunam brahma* as *avidyā-vishaga* (p. 112, 2), for which the *bheda-vyavahāra* exists (p. 868, 7); when he views the *upādhis* attributed to it as resting on *avidyā* (p. 804, 1); when he explains the fruit of its worship as *samsāra-gocaram* (p. 148, 5), the *aicvaryam* of the *apara-brahmavid* as *samsāra-gocaram* (p. 1133, 14) and those who have entered into the lower Brahman as still subject to *Avidyā* (p. 1154, 9. 1133, 15), that is, with the same word with which he everywhere else describes the realism of the doctrine of creation and transmigration. And on occasion he expresses

it openly, that the cosmological distinction of *îçvara* and *prapañca* belongs to the *saguṇā upāsanā* (p. 456, 10), and, conversely, that the teaching of *saguṇam brahma* presupposes the *prapañca* (p. 820, 12).

From these facts we justify the weaving together of the teaching of the *saguṇam brahma*, of a world thereby created and of an individual soul which moves in this world, and finally enters into that *brahma*, into a whole of exoteric metaphysics. And Çaṅkara also, if we were to ask him—"Is, then, that *saguṇam brahma* and the *devayāna* leading thither real, although from the standpoint of the highest truth neither exists?" He would certainly answer: "They are precisely as real as this world; and only in the sense that the *prapañca* and *samsāra* are unreal, are the *saguṇam brahma* and the *devayāna* unreal; both are the *aparā vidyā*, that is *Vidyā* as it appears from the standpoint of *Avidyā*" (*avidyā-ava-sthâyām* p. 112, 3. 680, 12. 682, 3).⁶²

But it must still be borne in mind that Çaṅkara did not reach full clearness as to the necessary connection of the exoteric doctrines, and this will often become clear enough from his discussions, which we shall reproduce faithfully and unaltered; but, as regards the esoteric doctrine, on the contrary, there is found at the end of his work a passage from which his consciousness of its inner necessary connection comes out as clearly as possible, and which, as a compendium *in nuce* of Çaṅkara's Metaphysics, and, at the same time, as an example of the style and character of thought of the work with which we are occupied, we here translate word for word.

⁶² The thought that the exoteric doctrine aims at accommodating the truth to the comprehension of the masses, can also be pointed out in Çaṅkara; thus the spatial conception of the Brahman is formed *upalabdhi-artham*, p. 182, 8. 193, 4; the measurement of Brahman is *buddhi-artha'*, *upāsana-artha'*, 835, 4; *na hi avikāre 'nante brahmaṇi sarvair pumbhiḥ çakyā buddhiḥ sthāpayitum, manda-madhya-uttama-buddhitvāt puṁsām, iti*, 835, 6. The propædæutic character of the exoteric doctrine is very clearly laid down in the Commentary to Chând. 8, 1, p. 528, and this passage (which we shall translate in Chapter XI, 1, d) is before all to be considered, when the rightness of our comprehension of the Vedānta system comes in question.



3. Appendix: Çaṅkara's Esoteric Philosophy, translated from 4, 3, 14 (p. 1124, 10—1134, 3).

a) Do the liberated go to the Brahman?

"Some maintain that the passages of scripture as to going [to the Brahman] refer to the higher [not to the lower, attribute-possessing Brahman]. This cannot be, because a going to the Brahman is impossible. For to the all-present highest Brahman, inmost of all, who is the soul that is within all, of whom it is said: 'like the ether [p. 1125] 'omni-present, eternal' (cf. above p. 32, l. 9)—'the perceptible, not super-sensible Brahman, that as Self is the innermost being of all' (Brih. 3, 4, 1),—'Self only is this universe' (Chând. 7, 25, 2),—'The Brahman 'only is this universe, the most excellent' (Muṇḍ. 2, 2, 11),—to this Brahman whose character is determined by passages of scripture like these, there cannot now or ever be a going in. For we cannot go to a place where we already are; but on the contrary, according to common acceptance, only to another place. It is true experience shews, that we can also go to that, in which we are already, so far as we distinguish different places in it. Thus a man is on the earth, and yet goes to it, in so far as he goes to another place. So also the child is identical with itself, and yet reaches puberty, which is its own self, separated by time. In the same way, one might think, there may be a way of going to the Brahman, so far as it is endowed with all kinds of powers (*çakti*). But this is not so; on account of the negation of all differences (*viçesha*) in Brahman: 'Without parts, without action, restful, faultless, stainless' (Çvet. 6, 19),—'Nor gross nor fine, nor short nor long' (Brih. 3, 8, 8),—'For he, the unborn, is without and within' (Muṇḍ. 2, 1, 2),—'Verily this great unborn soul (*âtman*), that neither grows old nor fades nor dies, that is without fear, is the Brahman' (Brih. 4, 4, 25),—'He is not thus, not thus' (Brih. 3, 9, 26);—according to these rules of scripture and tradition no connection of the highest soul with spatial, temporal or other differences can be assumed, so that one could go to it as to a part of the earth or to an age of life; but a spatially and temporally [p. 1126] determined going to the earth and to the age is possible⁶³ because they are differentiated by locality and circumstances."

⁶³ It is in the highest degree attractive and instructive, to observe, how here and elsewhere the spirit of man in antiquity toils and struggles to reach the eternal fundamental truth of all metaphysics, which it was reserved for the genius of Kant to set forth in perfect clearness and to prove beyond contradiction: the truth that Being-in-itself must be spaceless and timeless, because space and time are nothing else but subjective forms of our intellect.—As here *space* and *time* are denied for the Brahman, so in the sequel will causality of creation be interpreted as identity.

b) Esoteric Cosmology.

"If you assert, that the Brahman must have manifold powers (*çakti*), "because, according to the scripture, it is the cause of the creation, sub-
"sistence and extinction of the world, we say no! for the passages of
"scripture which deny differences to it can have no other sense [but the
"literal one]. But the passages of scripture about the creation and so on
"can likewise have no other sense?—This is not so; for their aim is
"[only] to teach the identity [of the world with Brahman]. For when
"the scripture, by the examples of lumps of clay and the like,⁶⁴ teaches
"that 'the Existent', the Brahman, alone is true, but that [its] trans-
"formation [into the world] is untrue, it cannot have the aim of teach-
"ing a creation and the like.—But why should the passages of scripture
"about the creation and the like be subordinated to those about the
"negation of all differences, and not conversely the latter be subordinated
"to the former?—To this we answer: because the passages of scripture
"about the negation of all differences have a meaning which leaves nothing
"more to be wished for. For after the unity, eternity, purity, and the
"like, of the soul are recognised, nothing more remains to be desired,
"because thereby the knowledge, which is the aim of man, has been ob-
"tained: 'where can error or sorrow be, for him who beholds unity?'
"(Îçâ 7)—'Fearlessness, verily, o Janaka, hast thou attained' (Brih. 4, 2;
"4),—'The wise has no fear of any one at all' (Taitt. 2, 9),—'Him verily
"the question troubles not, what good he has not done [p. 1127], what
"evil he has done' (ibid.),—thus teaches the scripture. And while in
"this way it shews that the wise are conscious of satisfaction, it also for-
"bids the untrue assertion of a transformation [creation], since it says:
"From death to death he is ensnared who difference sees' (Kâth. 4, 10).
"Consequently it cannot be assumed that the passages of scripture which
"deny difference are to be subordinated to the others. Not so is it with
"the passages of scripture about creation and the like. For these are
"not able to teach a sense which leaves nothing more to be wished for.
"On the contrary, it is evident, that these have another aim [than that,
"immediately put forward, of teaching a creation]. For after it is first
"said (Chând. 6, 8, 3): 'Of this growth which has spring up, dear one;
"learn that it cannot be without a root,'—the scripture in the sequel
"teaches, how the one thing, which is to be known, is 'the Existent', as
"the root of the world. And thus it is also said: 'That, whence these
"beings come forth, whereby they, coming forth, live, wherein they,
"departing hence, enter again, that seek, for that is the Brahman' (Taitt.
"3, 1). Thus the passages of scripture about the creation &c., have the
"aim of teaching the unity of the Âtman, so that no connection of the

⁶⁴ Chând. 6, 1, 4: "Just as, dear one, by a lump of clay everything
"that consists of clay, is known; resting on words is the transformation,
"a mere name, in truth it is only clay," etc.



"Brahman with manifold powers [is to be assumed], and consequently a going to it is impossible. And also the passage: 'His vital spirit withdraws not, Brahman is he, and into Brahman he is resolved' (Brih. 4, 4, 6), forbids us to think of an end to the higher Brahman (*param brahma*). This we explained in discussing [Sûtram 4, 2, 13] 'clearly according to some' [passages, it is the body, not the individual soul, out of which he who has reached liberation withdraws]."

c) Esoteric Psychology.

"Further, when a going to the Brahman is assumed, the Jîva (the individual soul) which goes is either [1.] a part of the Brahman, or [2.] a modification, or [3.] different from the Brahman. For in the case of absolute identity with him, a going is impossible. If this be so, which of them is right?—We answer: if [according to 1.] that [Jîva] is a part [literally: a separate place] [in the Brahman], then he has already reached that [Brahman] consisting of the parts, and consequently even in this case a going to the Brahman is impossible. [p. 1128] But the assumption of parts and of that which is composed of them has no application to the Brahman, because, as everybody knows, the Brahman is without members. It is much the same if [according to 2.] we assume a modification. For the modification is also already in that from which it is modified. For a vessel of clay cannot exist, if it ceases to be clay; if this happened, it would cease to exist. If we could understand [the soul] as a modification or member [of the Brahman], the soul must remain inherent [in the Brahman], and a going of the wandering soul [reading *samsârîgamanam*] to the Brahman is absurd. But perhaps [according to 3.] the Jîva is different from the Brahman? Then it must be either [a.] the size of an atom, or [b.] all-pervading, or [c.] of middle size. If it is [according to b.] all-pervading, no going can be possible. If it is [according to c.] of middle size, it cannot [cf. above p. 68, note 43] be eternal [which was, however, proved 3, 3, 54]; if it is [according to a.] the size of an atom, then it is inexplicable that sensation exists throughout the whole body. We have moreover proved above [2, 3, 19—29] fully, that it can neither be of the size of an atom nor of middle size. But that the Jîva is different from the Highest is altogether contrary to the canonical words: '*tat tvam asi*' ('That thou art,' Chând. 6, 8, 7). The same error occurs, if we assume that it [the Jîva] is a modification or a part of it [the Brahman]. If you assert, that the error does not occur, because a modification or a part is not separate from that of which they are [modification or part], we contest this, because the unity in the main point would be wanting. And in the case of all these assumptions, you cannot get over it that either no cessation of transmigration is possible, or that in case it ceases, the soul, unless its Brahman-selfhood be assumed, must perish."

d) Esoteric Morality.

"But there are some who come and say: 'Suppose someone practised the regular and occasional [good] works, in order to escape the fall [into transmigration], and avoided at the same time those springing from the desire [for reward], as also the forbidden [works] in order to go neither to heaven nor hell, and exhausted the works [of his former existence] which are to be expiated in the present body [p. 1129] by the expiation itself, there would thus, after the dissolution of the present body, exist no further cause for incurring a new body; and thus the liberation of such a one, being only a continuation in his own essence, would be reached even without identification with Brahman.'—But this is not so; for there is no proof of it. Because by no canonical scripture is it taught, that he who seeks liberation should proceed in this wise. On the contrary, they have evolved it out from their own intellects, thinking thus: because Samsâra is caused by the works [of an earlier existence], therefore it cannot exist, where there is no cause. But the calculation falls to the ground, because the non-existence of the cause cannot well be known [cf. the detailed statements p. 673, 9ff.]. For of each single creature it must be admitted, that it has accumulated many works in an earlier existence, which ripen to desirable and undesirable fruits. As these bring contrary fruits, they cannot both be expiated at the same time; therefore some of them [the works] seize the opportunity and build up the present existence, others, on the contrary, sit idle and wait until space, time and cause come for them. As these which remain over cannot be exhausted by the present expiation, it cannot therefore be determined with certainty, that, for one who leads his life in the prescribed way, after the dissolution of his present body, no further cause should exist for another body; on the contrary the existence of a residuum of works is proved by passages of the Çruti and the Smṛiti like (Chând. 5, 10, 7): 'Those whose conduct here is fair,' and as it is further said ['for them there is the prospect that they enter a fair womb, a Brahman womb, or Kshatriya womb, or Vaiçya womb;—but those whose conduct here is foul, for them is the prospect of entering a foul womb, a dog's, or pig's, or Çandâla's womb'].—But if this be so, still [p. 1130] those [residual fruits of works] can be got rid of [*kshepakâni*; perhaps here and in the sequel *kshapakâni*, *kshapya*, etc. 'exhausted' would be better; cf. p. 909, 12] by regular and occasional good works?—That cannot be; because no contrast [between them] exists. For if they were contraries, then the one might be wiped out by the others; but between the good works heaped up in an earlier existence and the regular and occasional [ceremonies] there is no contrast, because the one and the other are of morally meritorious nature. In the case of evil works, since they are of immoral nature; the contrast exists indeed, and accordingly a wiping out might very well take place; but still it will not result in there being no cause for



"a new body. For in case of the good works, it still happens that they remain as cause, and for the evil works, it cannot be ascertained that they have been completely paid for [by pious ceremonies]. It can also not be proved that by performing the constant and occasional [ceremonies] only avoidance of the descent [into transmigration] and no other fruits besides are obtained; for it is quite possible, that yet other fruits result therefrom, in addition. At least *Āpastamba* [*dharma-sūtra* 1, 7, 20, 3] teaches: 'For, as in the case of the mango-tree, which is planted for the sake of the fruit, also shadow and sweet scent result as well, so also, when duties are performed, other beneficial ends also spring therefrom.' Moreover no man, who has not *Samyagdarśanam* (perfect knowledge), can be sure that, with his whole self, from birth to death, he has avoided all forbidden practices and those aiming at enjoyment for, even in the most perfect, small lapses can be perceived. But even if we could be in doubt about this, in any case it cannot be known that no cause [for a new birth] exists. And without the Brahman-hood of the soul having been brought to consciousness, by the way of knowledge, the soul, whose nature it is to act and enjoy, cannot reach liberation, for it cannot renounce its own nature, any more than fire can [cease to be] hot.—[p. 1131] This may be, it may be objected, but the evil lies only in the acting and enjoying as effect, not in its potentiality [in the deeds, not in the will, from which they proceed], so that, even while the potentiality remains in existence, liberation is possible through avoiding the effect. But this also cannot be the case. For if the potentiality remains in existence [reading: *śakti-sadbhāve*], it cannot possibly be prevented from producing its effect.—But it might still be, that the potentiality, without any further causal moment, [the will without an efficient motive] may not produce any effect; hence [the potentiality] by itself, even when it remains in existence, commits no transgression.—This also cannot be; for the causal moments are always connected [with the potentiality] by a connection referred to the potentiality.⁶⁵ So long, therefore, as the soul possesses the natural tendency to act and enjoy, and so long as the Brahman-hood of the soul, which is to be gained by knowledge, is not attained, there is not the faintest prospect of liberation. And the scripture also, when it says: 'There is no other

⁶⁵ *śakti-lakṣaṇena sambandhena nityasambaddha*; whether the sense of these rather obscure words has been caught above, or not, in any case it is clear that our author misses the main point of the matter, so far as he does not see that the real guilt lies only in the quality of the *śakti* (that is, the will), it being all the same, whether the will, instigated by the chance occurrence of *nimitta* (motive), unfolds its being in deeds, or whether this unfolding remains latent.—To have recognised this clearly and expressed it, is the service which Jesus has rendered to philosophy; compare Matthew v, 21 ff., xii, 33 ff.

"way to go' (Çvet. 3, 8), admits no other way of liberation but the way of knowledge.—But from the fact that the Jīva is identical with the Brahman, will not all worldly action be annihilated, since the means of knowledge, like perception etc., cannot be employed?—Not so; on the contrary, it goes on just as well as the action in dreams before awaking [cf. above p. 55, note 31]. And the canon also, when it says: 'For where there is a duality, as it were, one sees the other' and so on (Bṛih. 4, 5, 15), explains with these words the action of perception, and the like, for the unawakened, as valid, but on the other hand declares it as not valid for the awakened; for it is said further: 'But when for anyone all has become as his own self, how should he then see any other?' and so on. Therefore because for him who knows the highest Brahman, the idea of going and the like has ceased entirely, any going [to the Brahman after death] is quite impossible for him."

e) Esoteric Eschatology.

"But where do the passages of scripture belong which speak of a going [to the Brahman]?—[p. 1132] Answer: they belong to the region of the attribute-possessing doctrines (*saguṇâ vidyâh*). Accordingly a going is spoken of partly in the doctrine of the five fires (Chând. 5, 3—10. Bṛih. 6, 2), partly in the doctrine of the throne (Kaush. 1), partly in the Doctrine of the All-soul (Chând. 5, 11—24). But where in reference to the Brahman a going is spoken of, for example, in the passages: 'The Brahman is life, the Brahman is joy, the Brahman is amplitude' (Chând. 4, 10, 5; translated Chap. XI, 2, below p. 164) and 'Here in this city of the Brahman [the body] is a house, a small lotus blossom' (Chând. 8, 1, 1; translated Chap. XI, 1d, below p. 160)—there also, in consequence of the attribute 'bringing love' and so on (Chând. 4, 15, 3) and 'having true wishes' and so on (Chând. 8, 1, 5) it is only a question of worshipping the attribute possessing [Brahman], and therefore a going is in place; but nowhere is a going taught with reference to the highest Brahman (*parabrahman*). As therefore in the passage: 'His vital spirits withdraw not' (Bṛih. 4, 4, 6; translated Chap. XII, 4), a going is denied, as also in the case of the words: 'The knower of the Brahman reaches the Highest' (Taitt. 2, 1); for even if the word 'reaches' implies a going, yet it indicates here, where, as shewn, a reaching of another place cannot be understood, only the entering into one's own being, with regard to the annihilation of the extension of names and forms ascribed by Ignorance [that is, empirical reality]. 'Brahman is he, and into the Brahman is he resolved' (Bṛih. 4, 4, 6); this saying must be kept in sight. Further: if the going had reference to the highest [Brahman], it might be taught either for the purpose of attracting or for meditation. Now an attraction through the mention of the going [p. 1133] cannot happen in the case of those who know the Brahman; for he becomes this solely because, through knowledge, his



"unveiled original selfhood comes to consciousness; and a meditation on
"the going also has not the slightest reference to the knowledge which
"is conscious of an eternally perfected bliss, leaving no further goal to
"be reached. Consequently the going refers to the lower [Brahman];
"and only so far as the difference between the higher and lower Brahman
"is not kept steadily in view, will the passages of scripture concerning a
"going referring to the lower Brahman be falsely made to refer to the
"higher."

f) Esoteric Theology.

"Are there then two Brahman, a higher and a lower?—There are
"certainly two; as is seen from the words: 'In truth, o Satyakāma, this
"sound *Om* is the higher and the lower Brahman' (Praṇa 5, 2).—What
"then is the higher Brahman, and what the lower?—To this we answer:
"Where, by discarding the differences of name, form and the like, ascribed
"by Ignorance, Brahman is indicated by the [purely negative] expressions
"nor gross [nor fine, nor short, nor long]' and so on (Brih. 3, 8, 8) it is
"the higher. But where, on the contrary, exactly the same [reality], for
"the purpose of worship, is described as distinguished by some difference
"or other, for example, in words like: 'Spirit is his material, life his
"body, light his form' (Chând. 3, 14, 2), it is the lower.—But does that
"not contradict the word of the scripture, that it is 'without a second'
"(Chând. 6, 2, 1)?—Not at all! [The contradiction] disappears, because
"ascribed limitations like name and form spring from Ignorance. But
"the fruit of the worship of this lower Brahman is, according to the
"context 'If he desires the world of the fathers' and so on (Chând. 8,
"2, 1) a world-lordship (*jagad-aīvaryam*) belonging to Samsāra, since
"Ignorance is not [yet] destroyed. Now this [fruit] [p. 1134] is connected
"with a given place; therefore a going, in order to gain it, is no con-
"tradiction. It is true the soul is all-present; but as space [ether] enters
"into the vessel and the like, it also enters into connection with ascribed
"limitation (*upādhi*) like Buddhi and the rest, and so far a going is
"assumed for it, concerning which we have spoken, with reference to the
"Sūtra: 'because it [the soul in the condition of Samsāra] is the nucleus
"of its [Buddhi's] qualities [love, hate, desire, sorrow, etc.]' (2, 3, 29)."



THE FIRST PART OF THE VEDĀNTA SYSTEM:

THEOLOGY

OR

THE DOCTRINE OF BRAHMAN.



VII. Prefatory Remarks and Arrangement.

1. On the names of God.

THE doctrine, which we here undertake to set forth, is not seldom included under the general conception of Pantheism; this expression (like the corresponding: Theism, Atheism and the like) not only means very little, but also, seems actually inexact in its application to our system, as well in its exoteric and lower, as in its esoteric and higher form. For in the lower doctrine the Theology of the Vedânta should on the contrary be described as Theism, as is shown by the expressions for God, *Īvara*, the Lord, *Purusha*, the Man, the Spirit, *Prājña*, the wise, and the like; in the higher doctrine on the contrary, it is something that rises above all such catch words, and resists all attempts to include it in the accepted schemes, however, convenient such inclusion might be. In any case the name *Brāhman*, which, in the work which we are to analyse, is used only as a neuter,⁶⁶ indicates something impersonal, only in the sense, however, that its being is raised far above all personality. This word does not originally mean "the liberated," "the Absolute," from *barh*, *separate*, as the Vedântins derive it (p. 33, 2, and also perhaps already Kâth. 2, 13. 6, 17 *pravrihya*, *prahvrihet*) but rather from *barh*, *swelling*, that is (above pp. 17, 49) "prayer," conceived not as a wishing

⁶⁶ The *Brahmân* (m.) of Indian mythology appears quite exceptionally p. 913, 10 *Vasishṭhaḥ ca Brahmano mânasaḥ putraḥ* and in the formula p. 61, 11 *brahmâdi-sthâvarânta*, p. 604, 2 *brahmâdi-stambaparyanta*; also in the quotations p. 209, 1. 301, 4. 338, 12. 339, 1. 998, 2, where he is usually explained as *Hiranyagarbha* (p. 301, 1. 339, 3). In the Vedânta it is frequently the custom, which we shall occasionally follow, to connect a pronoun of masculine gender (he, his and the like) with Brahman in the neuter.



(εὐχῶσθαι) or wording (*orare, precari*) or demanding (*bidjan*) or softening (*молумбся*) or offering incense (ἱεῖν), but as the will of man striving upwards towards the holy, the divine; in accordance with this, the designation of God as *Brahman* would arise from a concept which finds and grasps the Divine where it is preeminently to be sought and found. The other designation of God as *Âtman*, that is, "the Self," or "the Soul" also points us to our inner life (cf. p. 100, 18: *âtâmâ hi nâma svarûpam*); but when this is distinguished from "the living Self," the individual soul (*Jîvâtman, Jîva*) as "the highest Self" (*Paramâtman, Mukhyâtman, Aupanishadâtman*), these expressions admonish us to distinguish two sides in our own selves, of which this whole empirical form of existence is only one, while the other, lying behind it, rests in the bosom of the deity, is even identical with it.

This is not the place to follow up further the designations of God as *Brahman, Âtman, Purusha, Îçvara* and the profound views which they open up; to this end the first steps of our knowledge must first be exhibited from the Veda more clearly than has hitherto been done. Here we must restrict ourselves to developing the Theology of Bâdarâyana and Çaṅkara, looking at the Upanishads only with their eyes; but even in this scholastic form, the ideas of the Godhead show a loftiness the like of which cannot easily be found elsewhere.

2. Arrangement of the Theology.

Apart from casual phrases scattered through the whole work, the doctrine of the Brahman is dealt with in two parts of the Brahmasûtras; that is, in the first Adhyâya, which lays down the Theology on the basis of a series of scripture texts, in a general way, and without developing the difference between Sagunâ and Nirgunâ Vidyâ,⁶⁷ and in an appendix to this, in

⁶⁷ Such a difference seems to be kept in view, judging from the introductory discussions p. 111—114; but in the development of the question whether *sagunam* or *nirgunam brahma* is to be understood, another question is generally substituted, that is, whether the text cited refers to the highest self or to the individual self. The threefold antithesis of *param brahma*, 1) to the forms as which it is presented



Adhyâya III, 2, 11—41, which contains the esoteric theology. We shall follow this twofold division; but within the first Adhyâya, in order to gain a clear idea of the matter, we cannot adhere to the order maintained in the Sûtras, since they bring together the most heterogeneous material in the strangest manner, and, on the other hand, widely separate passages naturally belonging to each other. To justify our transpositions it may be useful to explain as far as possible the principle of arrangement which governs the first Adhyâya of the Brahmasûtras.

To begin with, the first Adhyâya is divided as we have it (cf. table of contents at the end of the first chapter, above p. 39), into forty, that is, ten times *four* Adhikaraṇas (Chapters). *Four* of these chapters separate themselves naturally from the rest: the two last 1, 4, 23—27 and 1, 4, 28 which belong to the following cosmological section, and 1, 3, 26—33. 1, 3, 34—38, which contain an episode already treated in chap. III. Of the remaining Adhikaraṇas, the *four* first form the Introduction, *four* others (1, 1, 5—11. 1, 4, 1—7. 1, 4, 8—10. 1, 4, 11—13) combat the Sāṅkhya doctrine. After deducting these, we have seven times *four* Adhikaraṇas, which consist of an exegetical and dogmatic discussion of the same number of passages from the Upanishads. Of these, *four* are taken from Brihadâraṇyaka-Up., *four* from Kâṭhaka-Up., *four* from Atharvan Upanishads (three from Muṇḍaka, one from Praçṇa), *four*, that is two each, from Taittiriya and Kaushîtaki, and the remaining three times *four* from Chândogya-Upanishad.

The following scheme shews their order:

- | | | |
|----------------|-------------|------------------|
| 1) 1, 1, 12—19 | Taitt. 2, 5 | |
| 2) —, 20—21 | | Chând. 1, 6, 6. |
| 3) —, 22 | | Chând. 1, 9, 1. |
| 4) —, 23 | | Chând. 1, 11, 5. |
| 5) —, 24—27 | | Chând. 3, 13, 7. |
| 6) —, 28—31 | Kaush. 3, 2 | |
| 7) 1, 2, 1—8 | | Chând. 3, 14, 1. |
| 8) —, 9—10 | Kâṭh. 2, 25 | |
| 9) —, 11—12 | Kâṭh. 3, 1 | |

(*saguṇam brahma*), 2) to the forms in which it is manifested, that is, the world, 3) to the individual soul, is not sharply distinguished and preserved by Çaṅkara; we shall recur to this in Chapter XIV, 1.

10) —, 13—17	Chând. 4, 15, 1
11) —, 18—20	Brih. 3, 7, 3
12) —, 21—23	Mund. 1, 1, 6
13) —, 24—32	Chând. 5, 11—24
14) 1, 3, 1—7	Mund. 2, 2, 5
15) —, 8—9	Chând. 7, 23
16) —, 10—12	Brih. 3, 8, 8
17) —, 13	Praçna 5, 5
18) —, 14—18	Chând. 8, 1, 1
19) —, 19—21	Chând. 8, 12, 3
20) —, 22—23	Mund. 2, 2, 10
21) —, 24—25	Kâth. 4, 12
22) —, 39	Kâth. 6, 1
23) —, 40	Chând. 8, 12, 3
24) —, 41	Chând. 8, 14
25) —, 42—43	Brih. 4, 3, 7
26) 1, 4, 14—15 Taitt. 2, 6	
27) —, 16—18 Kaush. 4, 19	
28) —, 19—22	Brih. 4, 5, 6

As this survey shews, the order of the passages, as they occur in the different Upanishads, is rigidly preserved. But apart from this, these passages are interwoven in a way for which we only here and there seem to recognise a reason. Possibly this enigmatic relation points to preparatory exegetical works within the different Çâkhâs, which were then gradually united in a single whole.

However this may be, this much is clear, that this principle of arrangement is in fact an external one. Therefore, in our statement of the doctrine, we ignore it altogether, in order, after producing certain proofs of the existence of God (Chap. VIII), to treat of the Brahman on the basis of the material in question, first in itself (Chap. IX), then as a cosmic principle (Chap. X), again as a cosmic and at the same time psychic principle (Chap. XI), lastly as the soul (Chap. XII), and as the highest end (Chap. XIII). The investigation of the esoteric (*nirgunam*) Brahman will form the conclusion of the Theology (Chap. XIV).



VIII. Proofs of the Existence of God.

1. Prefatory Remark.

IN the course of the work, with which we are concerned, we several times come across discussions, which have a certain likeness to the proofs of the existence of God that figure in the modern pre-Kantian philosophy. We give them here under the names in use among us, as a comparison of the arguments on both sides is not without historical interest. There can be no question of mutual dependence, since proofs like the cosmological and physico-theological lie in the nature of man's processes of thought; as it appears, the Indians were never ensnared into an ontological proof; on the other hand, we find a new proof, which we may call the psychological, and in which the concept of God blends with the concept of the soul. We begin with a short and provisional definition of the Brahman, and then introduce the passages which occur under the titles mentioned, without meaning to maintain that their entire contents are suited to these titles chosen for the sake of comparison.

2. Definition of the Brahman.

(p. 38, 2:) "The cause, from which [proceeds] the origin or subsistence, and dissolution of this world which is extended in names and forms, which includes many agents and enjoyers, which contains the fruit of works specially determined according to space, time and cause, a world which is formed after an arrangement inconceivable even for the spirit, this omniscient and omnipotent cause is the Brahman."

(p. 90, 3:) "Brahman is the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the origin, persistence and passing away of the world."



3. Cosmological Proof.

Under this title we translate Sûtram 2, 3, 9 with Qaṅkara's explanation (p. 627—628).

Sûtram: "*But* [there is] *no origin of 'the Existent,' on account of the impossibility.*" Explanation: "After anyone has been taught from the scripture, that also ether [or: space] and air have originated, although we cannot conceive their coming into being, he might come to think that the Brahman also originated from something, for when he perceives how from the ether and the like, which are still only modifications, yet other modifications arise, he might conclude that the ether also sprang into being from the Brahman, as if from a mere modification. The present Sûtram "*But* [there is] *no-origin*" etc., serves to remove this doubt; its meaning is: but one must not think that the Brahman, whose essence is Being (*sad-âtma*), could have originated from anything else; why? '*owing to impossibility.*' For Brahman is pure Being. As such it can [*firstly*] not have sprung from pure Being, because [between the two] there is no superiority, so that they cannot be related [to each other] as original and modified;—but also [*secondly*] not from differentiated Being, because experience contradicts this; for we see that from homogeneity differences arise, for example, vessels from clay, but not that homogeneity arises from differences;—further [*thirdly*] also not from non-Being,⁶³ for this is essenceless (*nirâtma*); and because the scripture overthrows it, when it says (Chând. 6, 2, 2): 'How should the Existent come from the non-Existent?' and because it does not admit a producer of the Brahman, when it is said (Qvet. 6, 9):

"Cause is He, Master of the Sense's Lord,

"He has no Lord, and no Progenitor."

"For ether and wind on the contrary an origin is shewn, but there is none such for the Brahman, that is the difference. And because it is seen how, from modifications, other modifications arise, there is no necessity for the Brahman also

⁶³ The similarity of this demonstration with that in the Parmenides v. 62 ff., is conspicuous; Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen* I³, p. 471.



"to be a modification. For were this so, then we should come
"to no primordial nature (*mūlaprakṛiti*) but should have a
"*regressus in infinitum* (*anavasthā*). What is assumed as the
"primordial nature,—just that is our Brahman; there is thus
"perfect agreement."⁶⁹

4. Physico-theological Proof.

(p. 500, 3.) "When the matter is considered with the help
"of examples only, it is seen that in the world no non-intelligent
"object without being guided by an intelligence brings forth
"from itself the products which serve to further given aims
"of man. For, *e. g.*, houses, palaces, beds, seats, pleasure-
"gardens and the like are [only] contrived in life by intelligent
"artists in due time for the purpose of obtaining pleasure and
"averting pain. Exactly the same it is with this whole world.
"For when one sees, how, for example, the earth serves the end
"of the enjoyment of the fruit of the manifold works, and how,
"again, the body within and without by possessing a given
"arrangement of parts suitable to the different species and
"determined in detail that it may form the place of the en-
"joyment of the fruit of the manifold works,—so that even
"highly skilled artists full of insight are unable to comprehend
"it through their understanding,—how should this arrangement
"proceed from the non-intelligent original-matter [of the Sān-
"khyas]? For lumps of earth, stones and the like are in
"no wise capable of this? Clay also, for example, is formed,
"as experience teaches, to different shapes [only] so long as
"it is guided by the potter, and exactly in the same way must
"matter be guided by another intelligent power. He, there-
"fore, who relies on the material cause only as clay, etc.,
"cannot rightly maintain, that he possesses the primordial
"cause; but no objection meets him who, besides it [the clay],
"relies on the potter etc. as well. For when this is assumed

⁶⁹ In the last phrase, the relationship between the Indian and the western cosmological proof, as well as the inadequacy of both, comes out very clearly; since considered empirically nothing stands in the way of a *regressus* from the effect to the cause, from this again to its cause, etc. *in infinitum*.



"there is no contradiction, and at the same time the scripture, which teaches an intelligent power as cause, is thereby respected. So that, as the arrangement [of the Kosmos] would become impossible, we may not have recourse to a non-intelligent power as the cause of the world."

5. Psychological Proof.

(p. 32, 4:) "Is the Brahman which is to be investigated known or unknown? If it is known, we do not need to investigate it; if it is unknown, we cannot investigate it!—Answer: That Being which of its own nature is eternal, pure, wise, free, all-knowing, almighty is Brahman. For from the etymology of the word Brahman the meanings 'eternal, pure' etc. are reached, according to the meaning of the root *barh* ['to separate; see above, p. 119]. But the existence of the Brahman is demonstrated by the fact that it is the Self (Soul, *âtman*) of all. For everyone assumes the existence of himself, for he cannot say: "I am not." For if the existence of Self were not demonstrated, then all the world could say "I am not." And the Self is the Brahman.—But if the Brahman is universally demonstrated because it is the Self, then it is known, and the objection that it need not be investigated, recurs?—Not so! For with reference to its characteristics there is contradiction. For the common people and the materialists [*Lokâyatika*: 'those who follow the world'] assert: 'the Self is only the body invested with intelligence;'—others again; 'the Self is only the [naturally] intellectual organs of sense;'—others: 'it is the understanding (*manas*);'—yet others: 'it is only the perishable intellect;'—others: 'the Void;'—others again: 'it is the [individual soul] extending beyond the body, wandering, acting, and suffering;'—some: 'it is only the sufferer, not the agent;'—some: 'it is the all-knowing, almighty Lord, who extends beyond this [world];'—still others: 'it is the Self of him who suffers [or: enjoys] there.'—Thus many oppose each other, and rely on arguments and passages [of Scripture] or their appearance. He, therefore, who inconsiderately assumes the one or the other, may compromise his salvation and come to destruction. Therefore,



"because they set forth the investigation of the Brahman, the consideration of the Vedânta [Upanishad] texts, supported by non-contradictory reflexion, is recommended as a means of salvation."

(p. 78, 6:) "For the eternal Spirit (*purusha*) different from the agent [the individual soul], which is the object of the presentation of I, dwelling as witness (*sākshin*) in all being, uniform, one, the highest, is not apprehended by anyone from the Section of Works [of the Veda] or from any book based on reflexion; he, who is the soul of all. And therefore none can deny him, or make him an element of the Section of Works; for he is even the Self (soul) of him who denies him; and because he is the Self of all, it is therefore impossible either to flee from him or to seek him. For everything that passes away, came into existence and passes away through modification, because it finds its end in the spirit; but the spirit is imperishable, because there is no cause of perishableness in it, and because there is no cause of change in it, therefore is it raised [above change], and eternal, and for this very reason in its own nature eternal, pure and free [or: freed]."

Now in so far as God is the (metaphysical) I of man himself, his existence cannot be proved at all, but also it does not need to be proved, because he is that which is alone known directly, and thereby the basis of all certainty, as is developed in the following most remarkable passage.

6. *Cogito, ergo sum.*

(p. 619, 8:) "For if the Self [that is, Brahman] also [like ether, wind, fire, water, earth] were a modification, then, since the Scripture teaches nothing higher above it, every effect from ether downwards would be without Self (*nirāt-maka*, soulless, essenceless), since the Self [also] would be [only] an effect; and thus we should arrive at Nihilism (*çānya-vāda*). Just because it is the Self, it is not possible to doubt the Self. For one cannot establish the Self [by proof] in the case of anyone, because in itself it is already known. For the Self is not demonstrated by proof of itself.



“For it is that which brings into use all means of proof, such
“as perception and the like, in order to prove a thing which
“is not known. For the objects of the expressions ether etc.
“require a proof, because they are not assumed as known of
“themselves. But the Self is the basis (*âçraya*) of the action
“of proving, and consequently it is evident before the action
“of proving. And since it is of this character, it is therefore
“impossible to deny it. For we can call in question some-
“thing, which comes to us (*âgantuka*) [from outside], but not
“that which is our own being. For it is even the own being
“of him who calls it in question [cf. p. 79, l. 823, 2]; fire cannot
“call its own heat in question. And further, when it is said:
“‘It is I, who now know what at present exists, it is I, who
“knew the past, and what was before the past, it is I, who shall
“know the future and what is after the future,’ it is implied
“in these words that even when the object of knowledge alters,
“the knower does not alter, because he is in the past, future,
“and present; for his essence is eternally present (*sar-
“vadâ-vartamâna-svabhâvatvâd*); therefore, even when the body
“turns to ashes, there is no passing away of the Self, for its
“essence is the present, yea, it is not even for a moment
“thinkable, that its essence should be anything else than this.”

IX. The Brahman in itself.

1. Brahman as the non-Existent.

Sûtram 1, 4, 14—15.

It is asserted, Caṅkara says (*loc. cit.*), that the Vedânta texts referring to the derivation of the world from Brahman, as well as those referring to the nature of Brahman itself, are frequently contradictory; in the former case, sometimes the ether, sometimes fire, sometimes breath is named as the first created, while in the latter, Brahman is in some passages described as the "non-Existent," in others as the "Existent." With regard to the first point, he says, it will be discussed further on (cf. Chap. XVII, 1); here we have only to do with the latter. It is true that it is said (Taitt. 2, 7):

"Non-Existent was this in the beginning, thence the Existent arose" while on the other hand it is said (Chând. 6, 2, 1): "Existent only, dear one, was this in the beginning, alone and without a second. Some, verily, say: non-Existent was this in the beginning, alone and without a second; from this non-Existent arose the Existent. But how could this be, dear one? How could the Existent arise from the non-Existent."

Here, in the one passage, as in the other, the all-knowing, almighty, all-animating Being without a second is indicated as the cause of the world (p. 372, 7); and if the Taitt. Up. speaks of a non-Existent, it is not an essenceless non-Existent that is to be understood, as the preceding verse (Taitt. 2, 6) proves:

"He is but non-Existent⁷⁰ who knows Brahman as non-Existent;
"He who knows Brahman as Existent becomes himself by this Existent."

The word "Existent" is commonly used to indicate the

⁷⁰ Caṅkara always reads: *asann eva sa bhavati*, p. 375, 13. 124, 9. 128, 7. 823, 4.



world extended in names and forms; now in order to suggest, that this development did not exist before the creation, it is metaphorically said of Brahman which alone is: it was, as it were, a non-Existent (p. 376, 7).

2. Brahman as the primordial Light

Sûtram 1, 3, 22—23.

Mund. 2, 2, 10 (= Kâth. 5, 15 = Qvet. 6, 14) says:

“There shines not sun nor moon nor stars, nor shine these lightnings, far less earthly fire: after Him the shining One, all shines, from His light is lighted this whole world.”

In this passage, as Çaṅkara explains, it is not some kind of light-element that is to be understood, but the highest Âtman, of which Chând. 3, 14, 2 says: “Light is his form, truth his resolve” (p. 272, 9), and which is spoken of (p. 274, 2) in what goes before (Mund. 2, 2, 5. 9). A Light-element is not to be thought of, because from such an element the sun etc. [hence the moon also!] cannot borrow their light, since they are themselves just as much light-elements (p. 272, 11); but they can all very well borrow their light from the Brahman, for a borrowing can also take place in the case of things of different kinds, as a glowing ball of iron burns after the fire, and as the dust blows after the wind (p. 273, 2); moreover, besides the light-elements named, the sun etc., no other exists (p. 274, 8).—From the shining of the Âtman “all this” would borrow light, that is, either: the sun, etc., in the sense in which Brih. 4, 4, 16 says: “Him the Gods honour as immortal Life, as the light of lights,” or it means: this whole world-development, as it has arisen in names and forms as “the reward of works to the doer” (*kriyâ-kâraka-phala*, p. 273, 12; the same formula p. 291, 6. 447, 3. 987, 6), has as cause the light-nature of the Brahman, just as the revelation of all forms has as its cause the light-nature of the sun (p. 273, 13). All that is perceived, is perceived through the Brahman as light, but the Brahman is perceived through no other light, because its own being is to be Self-shining, so that the sun etc. shine in him (*tasmin*). For the Brahman reveals the other, but the Brahman is not revealed by the other (p. 275, 1).



3. Brahman as the last, unknowable origin of the Existent.

a) Sâtram 1, 2, 21—23.

In the Introduction of the Muṇḍaka-Upanishad two doctrines are distinguished (in another sense than above, p. 98 ff.), a lower, which, as Ćaṅkara remarks, has as its fruit ascent (*abhyudaya*, cf. p. 82), and a higher, which has as its fruit salvation (p. 203, 5). Under the lower the four Vedas besides the six Vedāṅgas (Phonetics, Grammar, Etymology, Metre, Ritual and Astronomy) are enumerated, and then it is said further, Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 5:

“But the higher is that through which that Imperishable “is known: the invisible, intangible, unoriginated, colourless, “without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, “all-pervading, all-present, very subtle, this is the Unchanging “which the wise know as the womb of beings. As the spider “puts forth [the threads] and draws them back again, as herbs “grow up upon the earth, as from a living man the hair on “head and body, so from this Imperishable arises all the “world.”

Here, as Ćaṅkara develops it, the highest God is to be understood, not primordial matter or the individual soul. For though the examples brought forward, the spider's body and the man's body, are only directed by an intelligent power, but are themselves non-intelligent (p. 200, 12), yet these are only comparisons, which must not be pressed too far (p. 204, 14); that an intelligent original Being is to be understood, is proved by what immediately follows, and is therefore to be applied here, “he who understands all, who knows all” (Muṇḍ. 1, 1, 9), which cannot be applied to a non-intelligent primordial matter (p. 201, 3).—One might also think of the individual soul, because it certainly according to its moral nature (p. 201, 9) conditions what arises as being, but what follows further on, shews clearly that only the highest Brahman can be meant. For it is said further, Muṇḍ. 2, 1, 1:

“This is the truth:—As, from a well lit fire, sparks, of “like nature to it, arise thousandfold, so, dear one, from the

"Imperishable go forth manifold beings, and return into it again. For divine is the spirit (*purusha*), the formless, who is within and without, unborn, breathless, wishless, pure, yet higher than the highest Imperishable. From him arises breath, the understanding with all the senses, from him arise ether, wind, and fire, the water, and earth the support of all. His head is fire, his eyes the moon and sun, the cardinal-points are his ears, his voice is the revelation of the Veda. Wind is his breath, his heart the world, from his feet the earth;—he is the inner Self in all beings."

From this passage, says Çaṅkara, it is clear, that neither the individual soul, to which such majesty of body does not belong, nor primordial matter is to be thought of, because it is not the inner Self in all beings (*sarva-bhûta-antarâtman*), (p. 207, 12). If at the same time an individualised form is attributed to the invisible womb of beings, this is not in order to ascribe to it a real individuality, but only to make it clear that it is the Self of the universe (*sarva-âtman*) (p. 208, 1).—A difficulty is caused by the fact that the Âtman, which (above p. 131) is called "the Imperishable," is here spoken of as "higher than the highest Imperishable." The way in which Çaṅkara tries to solve this difficulty, by here understanding the "Imperishable as the undeveloped subtle body [Chap. XXXI, 3], "forming the seed-power for names and forms, which serves as "the ground-work for the Lord, and is only a limitation (*upâdhi*) "ascribed to himself" (p. 206, 1), as well as the opinion of some, considered by Çaṅkara (p. 208), that in the concluding words of the text Prajâpati (a cosmogonic personification of Brahman) is to be understood, we may very well pass by.

b) Sûtram 1, 3, 10—12.

In the Brihadâraṇyaka-Upanishad (3, 8) Gârgî, the daughter of Vacaknu (not the wife of Yâjñavalkya, as Colebrooke, M. E.¹ p. 343 erroneously supposes) asks Yâjñavalkya in what is woven and interwoven that which exists above heaven, beneath the earth, and between heaven and earth, in what the past, the present, and the future, and receives as answer: in the ether (space) all this is woven and interwoven.—"But in what,"

she asks further, "is ether (space) then woven and interwoven?"
—To this Yājñavalkya:

"It is that, o Gârgî, which the Brahmans call the Imperishable (*aksharam*); it is neither gross nor fine, nor short nor long, nor red [like fire] nor adhering [like water], not shady nor dark, not wind nor ether, not sticky [like gum], without taste, without smell, without eye or ear, without voice, without understanding, without vital-force, and without breath, without mouth and without measure, without inner or outer; nothing whatsoever does it consume, nor is it consumed by any. At the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, sun and moon are kept asunder from each other; at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, heaven and earth are kept asunder from each other; at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, the minutes and the hours, the days and nights, the half-months, months, the seasons, and the years are kept asunder. At the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, the streams run downward from the snowy mountains some to the east, some to the west, and whithersoever each one goes; at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gârgî, men praise the generous man, gods strive for the sacrificer, the fathers for the offerings for the dead. Verily, o Gârgî, he who knows not this Imperishable, though in this world he offers and has offerings made, though he suffers penance many a thousand years, gains an unenduring [reward]; but he who knows not that Imperishable, o Gârgî, and departs from this world, he, indeed, is miserable; but he who, o Gârgî, knowing this Imperishable, departs from this world, he, indeed, is a Brâhmaṇa. Verily, o Gârgî, this Imperishable is seeing, not seen, hearing, not heard, understanding, not understood, knowing, not known. For outside him there is no seer, outside him there is no hearer, outside him there is none with understanding, outside him there is none with knowledge. In this Imperishable, verily, o Gârgî, is the ether woven and interwoven."

In this passage, as Ṣaṅkara explains, the Imperishable (*aksharam*) means not "the syllable," as usually is the case, generally the sacred syllable "om," of which it is said (Chând.



2, 23, 4) "the sound *om* is all this," but the highest divinity (p. 242, 10); for of it only is it true that in it the ether and thereby the universe is woven (p. 242, 14), as even in the passage mentioned (Chând. 2, 23, 4) the sound "*om*" signifies Brahman (p. 243, 3), whose properties of eternity and all-permeation are signified etymologically by *aksharam* (*na ksharati, açnute ca*, p. 243, 4). Primordial matter can also not be understood as the Imperishable, for it is said: "at the bidding of this Imperishable," and "this is seeing not seen" etc., which must refer to an intelligent power (p. 243, 12. 244, 8); but it cannot refer to the individual soul, because in the words: "without eye and without ear" etc., all limitations (*upâdhi*) are excluded, and without these the individual soul cannot exist (p. 244, 13).

All the properties of the Brahman, which we have dealt with hitherto, were (so far as they are not to be taken figuratively) purely negative; now we turn to the two positive determinations of the being of the Godhead, which show it as 1) pure intelligence, 2) pure bliss.

4. Brahman as pure Intelligence.

Sûtram 1, 1, 5—11.

Prefatory Remark. When we consider the weakness and frailty of man's intellect, we can only wonder at the unanimity with which, in Indian, Greek and modern philosophy, Intelligence is ascribed as an essential attribute to "the Thing-in-itself." It is well worth while to follow out the motives which have led the thinkers of ancient and modern times to declare so feeble a faculty, which works only intermittently, is bound up with organic life and perishes with it, to be the essence of the being of Beings. These motives are especially clearly seen in the deeply founded structure of the Vedânta philosophy. Metaphysics must above all seek a firm and immovable point of certainty, in order to attack the subject, and this can only be found in the consciousness of the philosophising subject; hence the Cartesian: *cogito, ergo sum*, and the corresponding statement of our work, which we have



given above p. 127ff. Here, within our own Self, we gain an infallible guide to the absolute Being which we are seeking: that which cannot be laid aside must also be the imperishable, the unchangeable must also be that which lies at the basis of every thing changeable, a conviction, which is most clearly expressed by calling the Principle of all Being the *Âtman*, that is, the Self. We reach it as, in the manner described above p. 58, and in note 29, we gradually separate from our "I" everything which is "not-I," hence not only the outer world, the body and its organs, but also the whole apparatus of *Buddhi* or intellect (the *indriyas* and the *manas*). What remains, should consequently be spoken of only as unconscious; but they could not go so far, without removing the whole phenomenon from the region of perceptibility. Consciousness, therefore, in which all this process of elimination proceeds, was left as the terminus, so that not only was the necessity avoided of abandoning, along with the organs of perception, their function also,—perception,—but also the very noteworthy objections of the adversary, which we shall presently detail, were set at defiance.

Many times, as Çaṅkara says in the passage, with which we are concerned, intellect is ascribed to the Principle of world-creation in the Veda. So when it is said: "He designed (*aikshata*): I will become many, I will procreate" (Chând. 6, 2, 3);—"He designed: I will create worlds" (Ait. 1, 1, 1);—"He formed the design, then he created Breath" (Prajña 6, 3, 4);—"He who knows all, understands all" etc. (Mund. 1, 1, 9).—From this it follows that we must ascribe to the Brahman omniscience, absolute, unlimited knowledge, that, as a later passage (3, 2, 16) explains, Brahman is pure spirituality (*caitanya*) and this alone.—Against these arguments the Sāṅkhyas raise the following objections:

First Objection: An eternal cognition in Brahman would take away the freedom of Brahman with reference to the action of cognition (p. 93, 1).—To this Çaṅkara replies: to begin with, it is to be held that only an eternal actual, and not a potential, cognition (such as the Sāṅkhyas ascribe to the *sattva-guna* of their primordial matter) satisfies the demands



of omniscience.⁷¹ A cognition of this kind does not take away the freedom of Brahman; for in the case of the sun also, although it continually gives forth heat and light, we say "it warms," "it shines" and thereby indicate that it does this of itself, of its own accord [p. 95, 16; that is to say: the following out of the law of its own nature does not take away the freedom of a being].

Second Objection: a cognition is only possible, if there is also an object of perception (*karman*, literally "a product," in contrast to *karanam*, organ), which was not the case before the creation (p. 96, 1).—Answer: as the sun also shines, when there is nothing for it to shine on, so Brahman might know without having an object of cognition (cf. p. 649, 10). Yet one existed, even before the creation. What is this pre-cosmic object?—It is (p. 96, 6) "the Names and Forms which are neither "to be defined as beings nor as the opposite, which are not "evolved, but striving towards evolution (*avyākṛite*, *vyācīkṛishite*), "the Names and Forms" of the world [which as the words of the Veda, as we saw above p. 71, hovered before the spirit of the Creator before the creation].

Third Objection: Cognition cannot proceed without organs of perception, body, senses, etc. (p. 93, 4. 96, 11).—Answer: because cognition inheres in Brahman, as shining in the sun, as an eternal law of its nature, it requires no organs to this end, like the individual soul (p. 97, 1), which, as is provisionally set forth on p. 98, is nothing but the Brahman itself, limited by the *Upādhis* like the body etc., and therefore only separate from the Brahman from the standpoint of Ignorance (cf. above p. 58 ff.). The individual soul (p. 100—101) is the Self of Brahman, and the Brahman is the Self of the individual soul; for of Brahman it is said: (Chând. 6, 3, 2) "this "divinity designed: good! I will enter into these three divinities "[Fire, Water, Earth] with this living self!" and again it is said (Chând. 6, 8, 7): "whose being is this universe, that is the

⁷¹ p. 95, 10. The passage seems corrupt; it would be a help if we might read: *katham nitya-jñāna-akriyātve asarvajñatva-hānir*, by which what follows becomes consistent.

"Real, that is the soul (the Self), that art thou, o Çveta-ketu!"—That Self means the own nature; a spiritual power, like the individual soul, cannot have an unspiritual as its own nature (p. 100, 18. 104, 9).—On this ground, which for our authors is unassailable, they take their stand further on, when, to prove the spirituality of the Existent or the Godhead, they refer to two phenomena, that of liberation, and that of dreamless sleep. Liberation is a return into Brahman (p. 102, 8); and from another point of view it is only a coming to consciousness of one's own Self (p. 103, 7), it follows, therefore, that Brahman is simply this Self, and therefore spiritual. As Liberation is an eternal union with the Existent, that is, with Brahman, the cause of the world, so deep, dreamless sleep according to the scripture (Chând. 6, 8, 1) is a temporary union with the Existent (p. 109, 2); the word "he sleeps" (*svapiti*) means, however, "he has entered into himself" (*svam apîta*); a spiritual power, like the individual soul, cannot enter into an unspiritual as into its own self (p. 108, 10).

5. Brahman as Bliss.

Sûtram 1, 1, 12—19; cf. 3, 3, 11—13.

Brahman is the inmost essence of man.—This thought is exhibited in the second part of the Taittirîya Upanishad by the theory (which plays a large part in the later Vedântasâra, but not yet in Bâdarâyana and Çaṅkara) of the different coverings (*koça*), by which our Self is surrounded, and through which we must break, in order to reach the inmost essence of our nature, and thereby the Brahman.

After Taitt. 2, 1 has briefly explained, how from the Âtman the ether proceeded, from this the wind, from this the fire, from this the waters, from these the earth, from this plants, from these food, from this seed, from this man, and further it is said: this man consists of food (*annarasamaya*), in this self of food indwells, another, filling it, the Self of breath (*prâṇamaya*), in this again the self of understanding (*mano-maya*), in this the self of intellect (*viññānamaya*), in this lastly, as inmost, the self of bliss (*ânandamaya*). For each of these five sheath-like selves, indwelling one in the other,



are distinguished and specified (perhaps while the form of a bird is present to the thought) the head, the right and left sides (wings), the body, and "the support (literally: the tail), the base." In the case of the self of food, these parts are formed by the parts of the body, in the case of the self of breath, by the vital spirits with the ether (in the heart) and the earth, for the self of understanding by the four Vedas and the Upanishads (*âdeça*), for the self of intellect by faith, truth, right, piety (*yoga*) and lordship; for the self of bliss it is said finally: "Love [literally: what is dear] is his head, joy "his right side, rejoicing his left side, bliss his body, Brahman "his support, his base" (Taitt. 2, 5).

In this passage, according to Bâdarâyana's Sûtras and the accompanying interpretation, by the "self of bliss" we are to understand Brahman; as is proved p. 116 from the connection of the passage, and from the frequent description of Brahman as bliss in the Taitt. Up. and elsewhere (Brih. 3, 9, 28), and finally, because it is spoken of as the innermost of all. The word "of bliss" do not here mean "made of bliss," but indicate only the fulness of the bliss of Brahman (1, 1, 13 p. 117), which is the source of all bliss (1, 1, 14 p. 118). Neither the individual soul (1, 1, 16—17 p. 119—120) nor the primordial matter of the Sâṅkhyas (1, 1, 18 p. 121) can be understood here, from the connection of the whole; moreover the union of the individual soul with the being "of bliss" is required (1, 1, 19, p. 121—122) in the words of Taitt. Up. 2, 7: "For "when one finds his resting-place and peace in this invisible, "bodiless, ineffable, unfathomable [literally: baseless], then he "has entered into peace; but if on the contrary, he assumes "a hollow in this [as in the four others]—[Commentary: if he "makes a difference between himself and this], then has he "unrest; it is the unrest of him, who thinks himself wise."

But in direct contradiction to this interpretation, (which is to be applied when the subject is resumed 3, 3, 11—13) another explanation of the Upanishad passage is introduced at the end of our extract by the words: "Here, however, the following is to be noted," (p. 122, 9) explaining that the interpretation of *-maya* as "consisting of" and then as "having



the fulness," is as inconsequent as if one had only half-digested his food,⁷² and then, entering into the discussion, declares that it is not by the "self of bliss" that Brahman is to be understood, but only by that which is indicated as "its support, its basis;" the self of bliss is not yet the kernel, but only the inmost shell, of which, therefore, we should have counted not four but five (p. 123, 10: *annamaya-ādaya' ānandamaya-paryantāḥ pañca koṣāḥ kalpyante*). In conclusion, the representative of this opinion gives an explanation—extremely forced—of the sūtras in his sense.

As both interpretations agree in recognising Bliss (*ānanda*) as the being of Brahman, this difference is of no particular consequence for our purpose. But it is interesting for the literary character of our work, as well as for the history of the Vedānta, that here in Ṣaṅkara's commentary two opinions stand side by side, of which, as it seems to us, the former alone corresponds to the text of the Upanishads and Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtras, while on the side of the latter are ranged the Commentary to the Taittirīya-Upanishad, which goes under Ṣaṅkara's name, as well as the Vedāntasāra, which likewise interprets the self of bliss as only a shell (Vedāntasāra, § 56, ed. Boehtl.) and thus counts five shells on which, in combination with the three Guṇas of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, the whole of its psychology is built up.

Either the latter interpretation is due to a later interpolator, not to Ṣaṅkara, in which case the Commentary to the Taittirīya-Upanishad also must not be attributed to him (cf. in it p. 25, 14 *sushumnā*, and above note 8);—or it is Ṣaṅkara's: in the latter case, we may suppose that he copied the first interpretation given to the separate Sūtras from an earlier commentator (a possibility, which would be of great importance for the character of his whole work, cf. notes 17. 45), or we can also suppose, that Ṣaṅkara disagrees with Bāda-

⁷² p. 122, 13: *arddha-jaratīya-nyāyena*; similarly p. 176, 11: *na tatra arddha-jaratīyam* (with this reading) *labhyam*. Differently and very naïvely Govinda explains the latter passage: *arddham, mukhamātram, jaratyā vṛddhāyāḥ kāmāyate, na āṅgāni, iti, so 'yam arddhajaratīya-nyāyāḥ*.

râyana here, that he therefore interprets the Sûtras first in Bâdarâyana's sense, and then rejects this interpretation, in order to give another in its place in the sense of which he finally interprets the Sûtras as the standard authority of the school, consciously changing their original meaning.

6. Brahman as Free from all Evil.

Sûtram 1, 1, 20—21.

As is well known, the hymns of the Sâmaveda, with but few exceptions (above p. 5) rest on those of the Rîgveda. The composer of the Chândogya-Upanishad (which belongs to the Sâmaveda) takes advantage of this circumstance, to show how, in the provinces of cosmology and psychology, certain phenomena rest on others, while on the contrary Brahman, which is symbolically represented as the man in the sun and the man in the eye, is raised above everything else, and free from all evil.

As the Sâman rests on the Rîc (so is explained Chând. 1, 6), so fire rests on earth, wind on atmosphere, the moon on the stars, on the clear light of the sun rests the black, very dark in it (which, according to the scholiast, is seen by looking very intently at the sun; possibly: the sun-spots are to be understood?). "But the golden man (*purusha*) who is "seen in the interior of the sun with golden beard and golden "hair, to the tips of his nails all golden,—his eyes are like "the flowers of the Kapyâsa-lotus, his name is "high" (*ud*), "for high above all evil is he; he raises himself high above "all evil, who thus knows;—his songs (? *geshnau*) are Rîc and "Sâman, therefore [it is said] the high-song (*ud-gîtha*), there- "fore also the high-singer (*ud-gâtara*), for he is his singer; the "worlds, which lie upwards from the [sun],—over these he "rules, and over the wishes of the gods."

What is here set forth in the province of cosmology (*adhidaivatam*), is then developed in that of psychology (*adhyâtmanam*). As the Sâman rests on the Rîc, so rests breath on speech, the image (*âtman*) on the eye, understanding on the ear, the black, very dark on the bright appearance in the eye. "But the man who is seen in the interior of the eye,



"he is this Ric, this Sâman, this praise, this sacrificial sentence, "this prayer (*brahman*). The form which the former has, this "also has the latter, the songs of the former are his songs, "the name of the former is his name; the worlds which lie "beneath him,—over these he rules, and over the wishes of "men. Therefore those who sing here to the lute, sing him, "therefore good is their lot."

Here, explains Çaṅkara, we must by no means understand by the man in the sun and in the eye, an individual soul raised through knowledge and works (p. 130, 3), but Brahman; for when form and position are attributed to him (p. 130, 6. 9), and the boundaries of his might are spoken of (p. 130, 13), all this happens only for the sake of worship (p. 133, 10. 13. 15), since we are dealing here with the attribute-possessing Brahman, not with the attribute-free (p. 133, 7). Of Brahman alone it can be said that he is "high above all evil" (p. 131, 10), and that he, the all-animating, is indicated as the subject of spiritual as well as of secular songs (p. 132, 1. 8). For of him it is said in the Bhagavadgītâ (10, 41):

"All that has might and beauty, vital force,
"Know thou that of my power 'tis a part."

We must distinguish between this sun-purusha and the individual soul embodied in the sun (p. 134, 2; cf. above p. 66); for thus says the scripture: (Brih. 3, 7, 9) "He who, dwelling "in the sun, is different from the sun, whom the sun knows "not, whose body is the sun, who rules the sun within,—he is "thy soul, thine inner ruler, the immortal."

7. Brahman as Free from Causality and Affliction.

Sûtram 3, 3, 35—36.

Just as *Kant* declares theoretical speculation insufficient, and turns the human soul with its demands away from speculation back to the practical way, so already did *Yājñavalkya*, in a highly remarkable passage in the Brihadâraṇyaka Upanishad 3, 4—5, the consideration of which we shall transfer from 3, 3, 35—36 into the present connection.

(Brih. 3, 4:) "Then asked him Ushasta, the descendant of "Cakra. 'Yājñavalkya,' said he, 'the immanent, non-transcen-

“dent Brahman, which as soul is innermost of all, that shalt
 “thou declare to me.’—‘It is thy soul, which is innermost of
 “all.’—‘Which, o Yâjñavalkya, is innermost of all?’—‘That
 “which inbreathes by inbreath that is thy soul, the inner-
 “most of all, that which outbreathes by outbreath that is
 “thy soul, the innermost of all, that which interbreathes by
 “interbreath that is thy soul, the innermost of all, that which
 “upbreathes by upbreath that is thy soul, the innermost of
 “all,—this is thy soul, which is innermost of all.’—Then said
 “Ushasta, the descendant of Cakra: ‘It is only indicated by
 “this, as when one says: that is a cow, that is a horse; but
 “the immanent, non-transcendent Brahman, the soul, which is
 “innermost of all, that shalt thou declare to me!’—‘It is thy
 “soul which is innermost of all.’—‘Which, o Yâjñavalkya, is
 “innermost of all?’—‘Thou canst not see the seer of seeing,
 “nor canst thou hear the hearer of hearing, nor canst thou
 “understand the understander of understanding, nor canst
 “thou know the knower of knowing. He is thy soul, which
 “is innermost of all.—What is different from him is afflicted.’
 “—Then Ushasta, the descendant of Cakra, was silent.”

(Bṛih. 3, 5:) “Then asked him Kahola, the descendant of
 “Kushitaka. ‘Yâjñavalkya,’ said he, ‘even that immanent,
 “non-transcendent Brahman, which as soul is innermost of
 “all, that shalt thou declare to me.’—‘It is thy soul which
 “is innermost of all.’—‘Which, o Yâjñavalkya, is innermost
 “of all.’—‘That which overcomes hunger and thirst, affliction
 “and madness, age and death.—Truly, after they have found
 “[Çaṅk.: recognised] this soul, the Brahmins cease from long-
 “ing after children, and longing after possession, and longing
 “after the world, and wander about as beggars. For the
 “longing after children is a longing after possessions, and
 “the longing after possessions is a longing after the world;
 “for both are mere longings.—Therefore after the Brahman
 “has put off his erudition, let him abide in childlike sim-
 “plicity; and after he has put off both his learned and his
 “childlike estate, then he becomes a silent one (*Muni*); after
 “he has put off keeping silence and not keeping silence, then
 “he becomes a Brâhmaṇa.—By what does this Brâhmaṇa



“live?—By whatever it may be, by that he lives.—Whatever
“‘is different from him is afflicted.’—Then Kahola, the descen-
“dant of Kushitaka, was silent.”

Çaṅkara's remarks on this passage are limited to showing that both extracts belong to the unity of the same Vidyâ (cf. above p. 99), which appears from the beginnings and endings containing the same words (p. 923, 14), from the use of the particle *eva* “even” (p. 923, 16) as introductory conjunction of the second piece, as also from the fact that in both cases the inner soul is treated of (p. 922, 7), as there are not two inner souls, but one (p. 922, 9). The repetition is due to the difference of the instruction (p. 923, 7): the first time the Âtman is depicted as lying beyond cause and effect (*kârya-kârana-vyatirikta*), the second time as overcoming hunger and the other qualities of Samsâra (*açanâyâ-âdi-sam-sâra-dharma-atîta*) (p. 924, 2. 3).

That the two extracts make up a harmonious whole is evident from their parallel construction; moreover a comparison of them may teach us whether, with our recollections of Kant, we have rightly hit the central thought. The Brahman, so teaches the first extract, is theoretically unknowable: for because, in all knowing, it is the knowing subject, it can never be an object of knowledge for us. To the mind which, not resting content with this, puts forward the same question anew, it is, in the second extract, pointed out that Brahman is to be grasped practically. This happens as one raises oneself step by step from the estate of erudition (*pândityam*) to that of childlike simplicity (*bâlyam*, cf. Matth. 18, 3), from this to the state of the *Muni*, from this to that of the *Brâhmana* [in its emphatic meaning, as Brih. 3, 8, 10. Chând. 4, 1, 7], who renounces family, possessions and worldly pleasure, because these are different from the Brahman, and therefore subject to affliction.

Touching the nature of the steps mentioned, and especially the meaning of *Bâlyam* one may compare the investigations in 3, 4, 47—50 (p. 1034—1041), from which we take only the following beautiful passage of Smṛiti (p. 1041, 8):



"Whom no one knows as high nor lowly born,
"No one as erudite nor yet not erudite,
"No one as of good deeds nor evil deeds,
"He is a Brâhmaṇa, in very truth!
"Given up to hidden duties well fulfilled,
"In secrecy let all his life be spent;
"As he were blind and deaf, of sense bereft,
"Thus let the truly wise pass through the world."



X. The Brahman as Cosmic Principle.

1. The Brahman as Creator of the World.

THE creative activity of the Brahman is one of the fundamental ideas concerning it, which recurs in most of the Vedic texts to be considered. We here discuss only a few passages, which cannot conveniently be introduced elsewhere and refer for further information to the texts as well as to our cosmological section (chaps. XVI, XVII). The passages in question teach us to know the Brahman from two sides: (a) as that which conditions the spatial extension of beings (Brahman as *Ākāṣa*, that is, "Ether" or "Space" of which later),—(b) as that which fills and animates the spatially extended (Brahman as *Prāṇa*, that is, "Breath" or "Life").

(a) The Brahman as *Ākāṣa*. Sūtram 1, 1, 22 and 1, 3, 41.

1. In the Chândogya-Up. 1, 8—9 there is a dialogue between three men, in which is investigated the point of departure (*gati*), of the Sâman (song). The Sâman, so it is said in the course of the dialogue, goes back to the Tone, the Tone to Breath, Breath to Food, Food to Water, Water to the celestial world, which has, however, as its basis the terrestrial world. But the terrestrial world also is finite, and goes back to the Ether (or space).

"Now it is the Ether from which all these beings arise, "and into which they return; the Ether is older than them "all, the Ether is the highest goal. This most excellent of "all is the Udgîtha [song of the Sâman], it is the endless."

Even though, Çaṅkara remarks on 1, 1, 22, it would be most natural in the case of the word Ether to think of the so-called element, yet what is said here of the Ether cannot apply to the element, but only to the Brahman (p. 136, 5).



For even if the other beings (elements) have arisen directly and immediately from the ether-element, yet it is said here that "all beings," therefore the ether also, arose from, and return to that which is here, as frequently in the scripture, symbolically called the Ether, that is the Brahman (p. 136, 9). Moreover this only could be meant by the oldest (p. 136, 11), according to the Scripture (Chând. 3, 14, 3) which calls it "older (greater) than the earth, older than the atmosphere, "older than heaven, older than all these worlds;" and only the Brahman can be the highest goal (p. 136, 14), according to the words (Brih. 3, 9, 28, where Qaṅkara, with the Mādhyandinas, reads *râter*):

"Brahman is bliss and knowledge, the highest aim of the sacrificer
"And of him who desists and knows."

2. Towards the end of the Chândogya-Up. (8, 14) there is found a remarkable saying (perhaps a blessing for the departing pupil), which runs thus: "The Ether it is, which extends "Names and Forms; that in which these two are [or: that "which is in these two], that is the Brahman, that is the immortal, that is the soul. I go forth to the hall of the lord "of creation, to his house [I enter the world]; I am the glory "of Brahman, the glory of warriors, the glory of cultivators; "to glory following after have I come; let me the glory of "glories not enter into the grey, the toothless, the toothless, "the gray, the slimy [into the womb for a re-birth; or: into "grey old age?]."

In this passage also, according to Qaṅkara on 1, 3, 41, by the Ether is to be understood the Brahman, chiefly because it is distinguished from Names and Forms,⁷³ which embrace everything created, everything that is not Brahman itself (p. 329, 7).

(b) The Brahman as *Prâṇa*. Sûtram 1, 1, 23.

Between the two great Upanishads, Brihadâraṇyaka, which serves as text-book for the students of the (white) Yajurveda,

⁷³ p. 329, 5 *antarâ* "different," as at p. 454, 12, where it is explained by *anya*, while the Commentator on Chând. and according to all appearances also Bâdarâyaṇa 1, 3, 41 understand it as "inside."



and Chândogya, which serves for the students of the Sâma-veda, are to be observed many, often verbal agreements, but, side by side with these, certain traces of a thorough-going polemic, which is shown, among other things, by the fact that teachers, who appear in the one Upanishad as the highest authorities, occupy only a subordinate position in the other. Thus, for example, *Ushasta*, the descendant of *Cakra*, whose doctrine in Brih. 3, 4 is subordinate to that of Yājñavalkya (cf. above p. 141), while, in Chând. 1, 10—11, under the name of *Ushasti*⁷⁴ it is true, he plays the leading rôle. In the legend, which is here recounted of him, he appears as completely destitute, and yet, notwithstanding his poverty, proud, since he begs food from a rich man, but refuses the drink offered with it, because he can get water to drink without begging. It is further related of him how he betakes himself to a sacrifice, and embarrasses the priests who have been engaged for it by his questions. The king, who is offering the sacrifice, notices him, and, after hearing his name, transfers to him the functions of the other priests. Now it is their turn to examine *Ushasti*, and the first question in this colloquy runs thus: "Which is the Godhead to which the *Prastâva* (the "introduction to the song of the Sâman) refers?"—To this *Ushasti* answers (Chând. 1, 11, 5):

"It is the Life (or the Breath, *prâna*); for all these beings "enter into Life, and to Life (*prânam*, probably better: *prânâd*, "from Life) do they arise."

Here, according to Çaṅkara, we must not, by Life, understand the vital force, into which, according to Çatap. 10, 3, 3, 6, the organs enter in sleep, and from which, on awaking, they are born again, but Brahman, because according to the words of the text not only the organs, but all beings arise from it and return to it again (p. 140, 10); and if it be objected that *Ushasti*'s other two answers, as which "the Sun" and "Food" follow, cannot apply to Brahman (p. 139, 13), it may be answered that this is not at all necessary (p. 141, 5).

⁷⁴ Çaṅkara calls him *Ushasti* also in quoting Brih. 3, 4 (p. 922, 3).



2. The Brahman as World-ruler.

(a) Sûtram 1, 3, 39.

In the Kâthaka-Upanishad (6, 1) the world is likened to an inverted *Açvattha* (*ficus religiosa*) whose one root is above (Brahman), and whose manifold branches are below (the beings of the world). Thus Brahman is indicated as the Essence of the Universe, on which all worlds rest, and which penetrates and rules them as the Breath of Life (*prâṇa*):

"The root above, the branch below,
 "This fig-tree stands from ancient days:—
 "This is the pure, the Brahman this,
 "And this is the Immortal called.
 "This is the resting-place of worlds,
 "By none can this be e'er surpassed.
 "This [world] is truly that [the Brahman]!

"This is the Life in which the world,
 "Which sprung from it, moves tremblingly,
 "Fearful is this, a threatening flash,
 "Who knows this, his is immortality.

"From fear of this burns the Fire, from fear of this the Sun,
 "From fear of this run Indra and Vâyu, and Death the fifth of them."

In this passage, says Çaṅkara, by Life (or Breath, *prâṇa*) we are to understand, not the fivefold Vital-breath (Chap. XXVII, 4) or the wind, but Brahman, as is clear from the context (p. 324, 7). To this alone can apply the passage about the trembling of the whole world (p. 325, 2) as also what is said of the lightning-flash; "for just as a man thinks: 'the threatening lightning-flash could strike my head if I did not fulfil his [Indra's?] bidding;' and impelled by this [and similar] fear performs the command of a king etc., so the whole world, fire, wind, sun etc., from fear⁷⁵ of Brahman, necessarily perform the duties which are assigned to them" (p. 325, 11). Moreover, proceeds Çaṅkara, it is only the knowledge of Brahman, through which immortality is ours (p. 326, 2), for thus says the Scripture (Çvet. 3, 8 = Vâj. S. 31, 18; cf. Taitt. Âr. 3, 13, 1):

⁷⁵ Cf. Psalm 104, 7 and Heraclitus': ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα, εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίχης ἐπίζουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν.



"Who knoweth him, hath triumphed over death,
 "And he who seeks this goal, this path must tread."

As the last words show, by immortality (*amṛitatvam*), in the case of the Indians, we are not so much to understand the western idea of an indestructibility by death, but rather a liberation from the necessity of dying again and again.

(b) Sūtram 1, 2, 18—20.

In the Brihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad *Yājñavalkya* is asked by *Uddālaka* the son of *Aruṇa* (the father and teacher of *Ṛṣetaketu* in Chând. VI, cf. Chap. XX, 2) concerning "the inner ruler (*antaryāmin*), which inwardly rules this world, "and the other world, and all beings," and thereupon answers (Brih. 3, 7, 3):

"He who, dwelling in the earth, is different from the earth, "whom the earth knows not, whose body is the earth, who "inwardly rules the earth, this is thy soul, thine inner ruler, "the immortal."

What is said here of the earth, is further, by a stereotyped repetition of the same formula, transferred to water, fire, the atmosphere, the wind, sky, the sun, the cardinal points, moon and stars, the ether, darkness, light; then to all beings; then to breath, speech, the eye, the ear, the mind, the skin, knowledge [according to the *Kāṇva*-, "the self" according to the *Mādhyandina*-Recension] and seed.—In conclusion it is said (3, 7, 23):

"He is seeing, not seen, hearing, not heard, understanding, "not understood, knowing, not known; outside him there is none "that sees, that hears, that understands, that knows; he is thy "soul, thy inner ruler, thy immortal;—what is different from "him, is afflicted."

Here, as *Caṅkara* shows, by the "inner ruler" the highest *Ātman* is to be understood; for it is his quality to rule all that exists from within; he has the power to do this, because he is the cause of all that exists (p. 195, 13); and in this he makes use of the organs of the beings in question (p. 196, 7). That he is different from beings, is evident from the fact that these beings do not know him; for the said beings know



themselves, as, for example the deity earth knows: "I am the earth" (p. 196, 4).—We must not think of the primordial matter of the Sāṅkhyas, because although it is true of this, that it is said to be "not seen" etc., it is not true that it is "seeing" etc. (p. 197, 5).—Just as little can the individual soul be meant, because this is enumerated among the things ruled by it, in the passage, where the *Kāṇvas* read "knowledge," and the *Mādhyandinas* "the self." Both mean the individual soul (p. 198, 7). Besides the difference between the Brahman and the individual soul is not, in the highest sense, real, but only the work of *Avidyā*, which perceives the highest soul by means of the ascribed limitation (*upādhi*) as individual soul (p. 199, 5), and on which the separation of subject and object, the empirical means of knowledge, Samsāra and the Vedic Canon rest (p. 199, 9). In truth there is only one inner soul, and not two (p. 199, 7).

3. Brahman as Destroyer of the World.

Sūtram 1, 2, 9—10.

In the Kāthaka-Upanishad it is said (2, 24—25):

"Not he who ceases not from deeds of violence,
"Nor he who has a restless, wandering mind,
"Nor he who has not peace within his heart,
"By knowledge can that highest Spirit gain.
"To whom the priest and warrior are bread
"Which he besprinkles with the sauce of death—
"Who that hath done these deeds can find him out."

Of the three objects, says Čaṅkara, of which the Kāthaka-Upanishad treats, fire, the individual and the highest soul, only the last can be understood here under that which consumes food. It is true that fire also consumes; it is also true that it is said of the individual soul (Munḍ. 3, 1, 1): "The one eats the sweet berry," and the following words "the other looks on, not eating," refer to the highest soul (cf. on this below p. 171); but this is to be understood of the enjoyment of the fruit of works, which comes only to the individual, not to the highest soul (p. 178, 13). In our passage,



on the contrary, it is a question of the devouring of all things movable [men and beasts] and immovable [plants], for which priest and warrior, as the noblest, are quoted as examples (p. 178, 11). This devouring of all that lives, after it has been sprinkled with the condiment of death, belongs only to the Brahman in its character of Destroyer of the World (p. 178, 7).



XI. The Brahman as Cosmic and at the same time Psychic Principle.

THE Brahman is identical with the soul;—the power which creates and supports all the worlds, the eternal principle of all Being lives whole and undivided in each one of us. This doctrine of the Vedānta, great and worthy of admiration as it is (cf. St. John 14, 20. Gal. 4, 19. 2, 20), is expressed in a further series of Vedic texts cited by Bâdarâyana, which we bring together in this chapter.

1. Brahman as the very Small and very Great.

(a) Sâtram 1, 2, 1—8.

The section Chând. 3, 14 (cf. Çatap. Br. 10, 6, 3) contains the much quoted "Doctrine of Qândilya" (*Qândilya-Vidyâ*), which runs as follows:

"Verily this universe is Brahman; as *Tajjalân* [in it be-coming, ceasing, breathing] it is to be worshipped in silence."

"Truly of Will (*kratu*) is man formed; according as his will is in this world, after its likeness is born the man, when he has departed hence; therefore should a man strive after "[good] Will."⁷⁶

"Spirit is its material, life is its body, light its form; its resolve is truth, its self is endlessness [literally: the ether];

⁷⁶ *Kratu* p. 168, 1 is explained by *saṃkalpa*, *dhyānam*, in the Commentary to Chând. 3, 14, 1 by *niścaya*, *adhyavasāya*, *avicala pratyaya*, to Bṛih. 4, 4, 5 by *adhyavasāya*, *niścayo yad-anantarā kriyā pravartate*; cf. Bṛih. 4, 4, 5: "Man is altogether formed of desire (*kāma*); according as his desire is, so is his will (*kratu*), according as his will is, so he does the work (*karman*), according as he does the work, so does it befall him."



"all-working is he, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting, comprehending the All, silent, ungrieved:—this is my soul (*âtman*) "in the innermost heart, smaller than a grain of rice, or of "barley, or of mustard-seed, or of millet, or a grain of millet's "kernel;—this is my soul in the innermost heart, greater than "the earth, greater than the atmosphere, greater than the "heaven, greater than these worlds.—The all-working, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting, embracing the all, silent, ungrieved, this is my soul in the innermost heart, this is Brahman, into Him shall I enter on departing hence.—He who "has gained this, he, verily, doubts no more."

"Thus spoke Qândilya, Qândilya."

In this passage, as Qaṅkara at great length explains, the highest Âtman is spoken of, as whose being the ether is mentioned, because, like the ether, He is omnipresent (p. 170, 12). Because He is the being of all, for this reason the qualities belonging to the individual soul, Spirit (*manas*), Life, etc. are ascribed to him (p. 171, 2), just as the Scripture says (Qvet. 4, 3 = A. V. 10, 8, 27):

"The woman thou art, and the man,
"The maiden and the boy,
"And born thou growest everywhere,
"As old man on a staff."

which refers to Brahman (p. 171, 3). For, so far as He is represented as possessing attributes (*sagunam*), such individual properties as wish, breath and the like can be ascribed to Him, while of the attributeless Brahman it is said (in the passage quoted above p. 132) "the breathless, wishless, pure" (p. 171, 7). Although in our passage it is said of Brahman that He is also in the body, yet the individual soul is not therefore to be understood, for it is distinguished from Brahman by being only in the body (p. 172, 6). A distinction is pointed out between them in our passage by the words: "Into Him shall I enter" (p. 172, 12), as also in the parallel passage Çatap. Br. 10, 6, 3, 2, where in the words "thus lives this golden spirit in the inner soul" the highest soul stands in the nominative, the individual in the locative (p. 173, 5); as also in the Smṛiti passage Bhag. G. 18, 61. Of course only the highest

soul really exists, and only the ignorant conceive it as limited by Upâdhis: body, senses, Manas, and Buddhi, that is, as the individual soul, just as space, in the vessels, limited through the Upâdhis [of the sides of the vessels] is apparently different from cosmic space. Yet the illusion only endures until identity with the highest soul is known by the sentence "*tat tvam asi*," whereby the whole standpoint of practical life with bondage and liberation [destroying bondage] comes to an end (p. 173, 16).—The objection that the human heart is too narrow a dwelling for the highest soul, is not valid; what is in one particular place cannot be everywhere, but what is everywhere can also be in one particular place (cf. p. 1060, 2: the soul is God, but God is not the soul); he who is lord of the whole earth, is lord also of the city of *Ayodhyâ* (p. 174, 12). Therefore, as space is also in the eye of a needle, so is Brahman also in the heart (p. 175, 2), and is specially there pointed out, in order to concentrate attention upon Him; as Vishnu is in a Çâlagrâma stone (p. 174, 16; the same comparison also p. 188, 12. 253, 12; cf. 860, 10. 1058, 13. 1065, 12. 1059, 6). If anyone should here object, that Brahman, if He dwells in the different hearts, as parrots in different cages, must Himself be either manifold or divided, he may be reminded that the relations here spoken of have no reality in the highest sense (p. 175, 5). In this also lies the answer to the objection, that the Brahman, if He dwells in the heart, must also take part in pleasure and pain: this is precisely the difference between the individual and the highest soul, that the former is the doer of right and wrong, the enjoyer of pleasure and pain, (p. 176, 2), while the latter, on the contrary, is free from all evil, and although present when one suffers, has as little share in the suffering as space has in the burning, when bodies filling it burn (p. 176, 5). Certainly the scripture teaches the identity of the individual soul with Brahman, but for him who has perfectly, and not only half, understood this teaching, with the entrance into full knowledge, the enjoyments and sufferings of the individual soul also cease (p. 176, 12), since both rest only on a vain illusion (p. 177, 3).