



XXVII. The Organs of the Soul.

1. Preliminary Survey.

REGARDED from the standpoint of knowledge the soul is Brahman Himself and completely identical (*ananya*) with Him. The plurality of souls is illusory; each one of us is the whole, undivided Brahman; as such each is infinite, omnipresent, all-pervading, eternal and changeless, omnipotent and omniscient; without differences and without organs, neither agent nor enjoyer, neither sinning nor suffering, in his essence pure intelligence (*caitanya*), an organless, objectless, painless, pure cognition. As such the soul is in us merely an onlooker (*sākshin*) who in all cognition, present as its innermost nucleus looks on idly at worldly action and at its illusions without being in the least mixed up in it: *sa, yat tatra kiñcit paçyati, an-anvâgatas tena bhavati; asaṅgo hi ayaṁ puruṣaḥ* (Brih. 4, 3, 16).

This is not so from the standpoint of Ignorance. For just as a man whose eyes are affected sees two moons where there is in reality only one—or as the sun is reflected in the water in a thousand images, each of which is not a part but the whole of the sun, though in truth a mere phantom without real existence,—so the Ignorant sees instead of one Brahman without a second (which is his own Self) a plurality consisting of 1) a God (*īçvara*) whose office is that of dispensing retribution, 2) a world which is the scene of this retribution, and 3) a given number of souls subject to the limitations of individuality; they wander from eternity and in each new existence suffer retribution for the works of the previous life; for this purpose after each death a new body, corresponding



exactly to the merits and faults of the previous life, arises out of the seed of the body with which the soul is inseparably connected; and this happens again and again without cessation during all eternity.—It is true these souls are in reality neither individual nor wandering; each one of them is on the contrary the *Âtman* (besides which nothing else exists), *i.e.*, the omniscient and omnipotent *Brahman* itself in his completeness. But the soul does not know that this is so, because it has not the proper knowledge of its own Self, in that its own nature is hidden from it. What prevents this self-knowledge, in which the soul is at once the perceiving subject and perceived object, is *Avidyâ*; *Avidyâ* puts itself between the soul as subject and the soul as object; and is sometimes characterised subjectively as defective intellectual force, sometimes objectively as defective perceptibility. The soul is from the subjective point of view compared to a blind man (above p. 87), whose lost sight can only be restored by the remedy of grace; objectively it is the *Upâdhis* by which the divine nature of the soul is disguised and as it were rendered latent like fire which slumbers hidden in the wood:

(p. 787, 9:) “The omniscience and omnipotence of the soul “is hidden *by its connection with the body, i.e., by the connection with body, senses, Manas, Buddhi, external objects* “and sensation. On this subject we have this simile: just as “fire has as properties burning and illuminating; but the heat “and light are hidden when the fire has entered into wood or “is covered with ashes, in the same way through the connection “of the soul with the *Upâdhis* such as body etc. which are “created of Ignorance and formed of name and shape, arises “the error of not distinguishing ourself from them [the *Upâdhis*] “and this produces the concealment of the omniscience and “omnipotence of the soul.”

These *Upâdhis* which condition the individualisation of the soul, are, taking these all in all, the following:

- I) The coarse body (*deha, sthûla-çarîram*) consisting of the elements; the soul casts it off at death.
- II) Among what accompanies the soul on its migration we distinguish:

- A) a changing part: *viz.* moral determination (*karma-âçraya*) which accompanies the soul into each life as a new moment, not previously (*apûrvam*) existent, and
- B) an unchanging part with which the soul was invested from eternity and remains invested until liberation; this includes:
- 1) the subtle body (*sûkshma-çarîram, bhûta-âçraya*) consisting of the "subtle portions of the elements which compose the seed of the body" (*deha-vijâni-bhûta-sûkshmanî*);
 - 2) the life-organs, termed *Prâṇas* (in the more extended sense), *i.e.* vital breaths, spirits. These fall into two classes, the first includes the principles of the conscious, the second those of the unconscious life.
 - a) The system of the conscious life is formed by
 - α) five organs of sense (*buddhi-indriyâni*): sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch;
 - β) five organs of action (*karma-indriyâni*), including the functions of speech, of the hands, the feet, the organs of generation and evacuation;
 - γ) the *Manas*, the central organ of conscious life, directing the organs of perception and action.
 - b) The system of the unconscious life consists of the *Prâṇa* in the limited sense, more properly termed *Mukhya prâṇa*, *i.e.*, chief breath of life. This again is divided into five single *Prâṇas*, *viz.*, *prâṇa* (in the strictest sense), *apâna*, *vyâna*, *udâna* and *samâna*, on which depend the functions of respiration and nutrition as well as the act of dying.

We shall deal with the subtle body (*bhûta-âçraya*) and moral determination (*karma-âçraya*) when we consider transmigration; here we have more especially to consider according to the section 2, 4, 1—19 the psychic apparatus,



consisting of the systems of the conscious and unconscious life, which the soul (like a snail with its horns) puts out during life and at death withdraws into itself; the special enquiry is preceded by the question as to the origin and nature of the *Prâṇas*, i.e., of the whole psychic organism.

2. Origin and Nature of the Organs of Life (*prâṇa*).

By organs of life (*Prâṇas* in the more extended sense) are to be understood in the present case: the five organs of action, the five senses, the *Manas* and the *Mukhya Prâṇa* with its five branches.

Though this apparatus appears in strict and (except in liberation) inseparable connection with the soul, it does not belong to it all the same but to another non-spiritual part of nature. In the drama of world-development it does not belong to the player but the scenery; it is therefore in a similar position to the elements (earth, water, fire, air, ether) and appears in close connection with them; and if the metaphor is carried further one might say: the elements form the scenery (stage and wings) and the organs of life the costumes which the actors put on. For the rest, the idea of the *Prâṇas* is not clearly worked out; on the one hand they are the inseparable companions of the soul on its wanderings and therefore parcelled out individuals, on the other hand, as in what follows, they appear as a complex mass from which the soul draws its organs as it takes its body from the corresponding mass of the elements.

The question as to the nature and origin of the *Prâṇas* is twice treated, 2, 3, 15 and 2, 4, 1—4 without our arriving at settled ideas in the matter; in the first passage (as we saw above chap. XVII, 3 p. 236) *Çaṅkara* is undecided whether the *Prâṇas* are to be regarded as of the same nature as, or as different from the elements; in the former case, he thinks, they must have originated (in the creation at the beginning of each *Kalpa*) at the same time as the elements, in the latter before and after them; at any rate it is certain, he says, that they, like the elements, have arisen from Brahman.—The



verbose treatment which he deals out to our question in the others passage, 2, 4, 1—4, does not bring us much further, for the essential content of his explanation is limited to the following: the question is whether the Prâṇas had an origin or not (p. 701, 6), for passages can be cited in support of both assumptions (p. 701, 7. 702, 1); one may not however therefore take the origin of the Prâṇas in a figurative (*gauna*) sense (p. 702, 7); on the contrary they are sprung from Brahman just as much as the rest of the world (p. 703, 11), for the Scripture teaches this expressly (p. 704, 7). If on the other hand the Scripture (Çatapathabr. 6, 1, 1, 1) makes them exist before the origin [of the world], they are for all that not absolutely primordial in their nature (*mūla-prakṛiti*) but only relatively so (*avāntara-prakṛiti*) viz. with respect to what has originated in its turn from them (p. 706, 6). Whether their origin from the elements as taught Chând. 6, 6, 5 (above p. 263) is to be taken literally or figuratively (p. 708, 5), it follows in any case from it that they like all else have arisen from Brahman (p. 708, 9).

But this is in no way a satisfactory settlement of the question. For the Prâṇas exist, like the subtle body which carries them, as long as Samsâra endures (p. 1096, 11), and they accompany the soul inseparably even if it should enter a plant (p. 1096, 14), in which case Manas and Indriyas naturally cannot unfold themselves; now Samsâra exists, as we have seen many times already, from eternity; therefore the soul must have been equipped with the psychic organism of the Prâṇas from eternity too. Our author is everywhere only concerned to reconcile this eternal existence of the individual soul and its psychic apparatus with the entering into and origin from Brahman, taught by the Scripture of all that exists; this he does by making the soul continue in Brahman in the form of seed (*vîja-âtmanâ*) or potentially (*çakti-âtmanâ*) which makes its destruction and origin merely apparent;—but these Vedic apologetics have far less interest for us than the question as to the relation between the eyes and ears, hands and feet, etc., which wander forth with the soul and exist for ever, and the material parts of the body which bear these



names and originate and perish with the body.—Çaṅkara gives a hint to guide us in solving the question when he, as we shall see, declares repeatedly that the function (*vritti*), not the organ wanders forth with the soul; that therefore even when the organs of sight, hearing, moving and grasping perish at death, the capability (we might say the will) to see, hear, move and grasp, etc. persists with the soul (cf. the passage from Chând. above p. 185ff.). We find no further information, but a solution of the question in conformity with the system is not lacking. In this matter we must regard as fundamental the view that the body is related to the psychic complex as the developed plant to its seed. Since everything originates only from its seed, the wandering soul must necessarily, besides the Prâṇas, take with it the seed of the gross body in the form of the "subtle body" which we shall examine more closely in the section on transmigration. As the material body is the bearer of the material sense-organs, so this subtle body is the bearer (*âgraya*) of the psychic organs. They must like the body be conceived as germs which, on entering into material existence, by drawing homogeneous corpuscles from the whole mass of Prâṇa-materials, develop into material organs, just as the seed of the subtle body absorbs the materials of the elements and ripens into the gross body.

3. The System of the conscious Life: Organs of Relation.

In accordance with the anatomical theory which makes the brain, as the central organ of conscious life, branch out on the one hand as sensory nerves into the organs of sense and on the other hand as motor nerves into the muscles of voluntary movement, we find the Indians conceive the existence of a central function, *Manas*, and two systems dependent on it; viz. the five organs of perception (*buddhi-indriyas*) and the five organs of action (*karma-indriyas*). In these eleven organs according to Çaṅkara the whole complex of conscious life is included.—How many Prâṇas, he asks (p. 709, 1), must we assume if we leave out of account the *Mukhya Prâṇa* (the

principle of unconscious life)? Their number is variously stated and passages may be cited which make them seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve and thirteen in number (p. 709, 3—9). The right number is however eleven.

For there are in the first place five classes of perception (*buddhi-bheda*), according as their object is sound, the object touched, form, taste or smell [as to the order cf. note 97, above p. 237]; to these correspond the five organs of perception (p. 711, 7). There are further five classes of action (*karma-bheda*), speaking, grasping, going, evacuating, and procreating; these purposes are served by the five organs of action (p. 711, 9).

These external organs [which are limited to the present] have as correlative the inner organ (*antahkaraṇam*) or *Manas* (the two expressions are for *Caṅkara* completely interchangeable cf. 711, 4. 21, 4. 666, 5) which extends (p. 711, 10) to past, present and future (p. 723, 9); “by division of the functions some “distinguish *Manas, Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra, Cittam*” (p. 711, 11); —“this inner organ which serves the soul as Upādhi is here “and there variously termed *Manas, Buddhi, Vijñānam, Cittam*; “others even distinguish separate functions and term the “faculty of reflection (*saṁśaya*, p. 340, 6 *vikalpa*) *Manas*, that “of decision (*niścaya*, p. 340, 7 *adhyavasāya*) *Buddhi*” (p. 666, 7). *Caṅkara* mentions these different views without refuting them but also without making use of them; for him there is only one inner organ, the *Manas*; and even the *Buddhi* is for him not a distinct faculty but sometimes the activity of perception, sometimes the mind in general (though it occasionally in connection with *Kāth.* 3, 3 appears coordinate with the *Manas*, p. 638, 11; cf. 263, 8. 389, 2. 265, 6. 787, 10. 1056, 1).—So too *Ahaṁkāra* is in our system not a distinct organ but means in the first place “the word I” (p. 157, 5), then as a synonym of *Ahaṁpratyaya* “the idea of the Ego” “self-consciousness” (pp. 672, 1. 2. 680, 5. 6) whose object (*ahaṁpratyaya-vishaya*) is the individual soul (pp. 73, 5. 78, 6. 672, 1, while on the other hand p. 15, 2 *asmat-pratyaya-vishaya* refers to the highest soul); as subject of presentation of the Ego sometimes the individual soul (*ahaṁkartar* p. 73, 5) is mentioned, sometimes the *Manas*



(*ahampratyaṃ* p. 21, 5); the highest soul on the other hand is not subject of the *Ahaṃkāra*, for that involves activity; on the contrary, like all else, the *Ahaṃkāra* (with its perceiving subject and perceived object) is for the Upādhi-less Soul simply an object of perception (p. 680, 6). Cf. above p. 321.

As we have already seen (above p. 314) the necessity of the assumption of the *Manas* is deduced by Ṣaṅkara from the fact that while the soul is essentially an eternal cognition, there is no reason discoverable in the organs of sense for their different behaviour at different times; from this would result that we [in a waking state which alone comes in question here] should either not perceive at all or should perceive continuously, unless there were between the soul and the organs of sense the *Manas*, "by whose attention (*avadhānam*) and "non-attention apperception (*upalabdhi*) and non-apperception "[of the soul] results" (p. 667, 6).

As the central organ of the organs of perception and action *Manas* is on the one hand what we term understanding, on the other hand conscious volition. The ideas on these objects are not however further developed. Ṣaṅkara contents himself instead (p. 667, 7, cf. p. 21, 4) with a reference to the unsystematic information in Bṛh. 1, 5, 3: "My mind "was elsewhere (*anyatra-manas*), I did not see, my mind was "elsewhere, I did not hear, so we say; for only with the mind "does one see, only with the mind does one hear;¹¹⁵ *kāma*, "saṃkalpa, *vicikitsā*, *śraddhā*, *aśraddhā*, *dhṛiti*, *adṛiti*, *hrī*, "dhī, bhī,—all these are *Manas*; therefore when we are touched "from behind, we recognise the fact by the *Manas*."—The faculties mentioned are explained by Ṣaṅkara on Bṛh. *loc. cit.* as follows: "*kāma*, desire, the longing for sexual enjoyment, etc.; "saṃkalpa, decision, the determination of the character of a "presented object by differences such as white, black, etc.; "vicikitsā, doubt; *śraddhā*, belief, the perception of the existence "of invisible objects, e.g. the gods, by their effects; *aśraddhā*, "disbelief, the contrary; *dhṛiti*, steadiness, keeping oneself up-

¹¹⁵ Cf. Epicharmos in Plut. Mor. p. 961 A:

Νοῦς ὁρᾷ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τὰλλα κατὰ καὶ τυφλά.



"right when the body is tired; *adhr̥iti*, the opposite; *hr̥i*, "shame; *dh̥i*, cognition; *bh̥i*, fear."

The *Prāṇas* mentioned (*Manas*, *Buddhi-indriyas*, and *Karma-indriyas*) are minute (*anu*) which means that they are 1) subtle (*sūkshma*), 2) limited (*paricchinna*), but not that they are of atomic size (*paramānu-tulya*), "because in this case the pervading of the whole body would be impossible."¹¹⁶ Their subtlety is deducible from the fact that otherwise (if they were *sthūla*, coarse, material) they would necessarily be seen at the time of death, when the soul passes from the body, by the bystanders, just as a snake is seen which glides from its hole (p. 715, 6); and they must be limited and not (like the soul free from *Upādhis*) infinitely great, because for the infinitely great no passing, going and return would be possible (p. 715, 7). "If you maintain that the infinitely great can by reason of "its function (*vr̥itti*) be at a given spot in the body, we must "remark that the organs [of the soul] are altogether mere "functions; for the function or whatever it is, that brings about "perception we call an organ; the dispute is therefore only "about names and the assumption of omnipresence a purposeless one" [the *Prāṇas* enter into the question only in respect of what they are in the body, even if we call them here organs or functions, and assume as their bearers infinitely great organs]. Therefore the *Prāṇas* are to be regarded as the functions or faculties of seeing, hearing, feeling, grasping, going, etc. which, as they cleave to the soul, are not annihilated at death with the corresponding parts of the body but produce them again and again from themselves as seed produces plants.

¹¹⁶ p. 715, 4; above (p. 310 ff.) on the other hand the possibility of action throughout the body is disputed, not for the soul of atomic size, but for the minute soul (which in the state of *Samsāra* has the same size as the *Buddhi*, i.e., the *Manas*). If we disregard this and ask what in the strict logic of our system is the nature of the reciprocal action of the minute soul, "large as the point of an awl," and the body, we have as answer that it is doubtless brought about by the *Prāṇas* which stand in the middle between soul and body; the nature of this connection however e.g. of the function or faculty of sight with *Manas* and soul on the one hand, and with the Ego on the other, is not cleared up.



4. The System of the unconscious Life: Organs of Nutrition.

The principle of the unconscious, vegetative life is the *Mukhya Prâna*, an expression which originally meant "Breath in the mouth" (thus Chând. 1, 2, 7 where Brih. in the parallel passage 1, 3, 7 reads *âsanyah prânah*; cf. Brih. 1, 3, 8); in our system however where respiration is only a part of its task it has taken the meaning of "chief breath of life." Its primacy over the other organs of life is a favourite theme of the Upanishads; e.g., in the parable of the contest of the organs (Brih. 6, 1. Chând. 5, 1; cf. Kaush. 3, 3. Prajna-Up. 2) according to which the organs: speech, eye, ear, Manas, etc. go forth in order, and, when it is the turn of the (*Mukhya*) Prâna, become conscious of its indispensability and their own dependence on it. A variation of the same theme is the story of the quarrel of the gods (*i.e.*, the organs: smell, eye, ear, Manas, and Mukhya Prâna) with the demons, who visit evil on the other organs, but fly to dust on the Prâna like clods of earth on a stone (Brih. 1, 3. Chând. 1, 2).

With many references to these stories Çaṅkara sets forth (2, 4, 8—13) that though the *Mukhya Prâna* is also a creation of Brahman, it is still the oldest and noblest among all organs. It is true, he says, the *Nâsad-âsîya* song says (Rigv. X, 129, 2):

"Death was not known nor immortality,

"Night was not born, and day was not yet seen,

"Airless, he breathed in primevality

"The one beyond whom nought hath ever been;"

but that which "breathed" is not the Prâna in this case; on the contrary as the words "without air" proves, it is the highest cause (p. 716). Therefore the Prâna too [in the same sense as the other organs, *i.e.*, from its seed which has from eternity been connected with the soul] has originated, but is the oldest among the organs because its function begins from the moment the sperm is introduced, if it actually germinates in the Yoni (p. 717, 3), while the activity of the others is only possible after the auditory passage etc. have originated (p. 717, 5); so too the Prâna is the best, because the other organs in the



parable of the quarrel of the organs confess to him: "of a truth without thee we cannot live" (p. 717, 7).

What is then the constitution of this Prâna? It is in the first place not air alone, though one passage of Scripture (p. 717, 10) seems to assert this; for it is, Chând. 3, 18, 4, expressly distinguished from air (*Vâyu*); it seems rather to be a psychic analogue of the (cosmic) divinity of the air (*vâyur eva, adhyâtman āpannah*, p. 719, 8). Further, it is also not to be regarded simply as a combined function of the organs (*Manas* and *Indriyas*) as the *Tantrântarîyas* (p. 717, 12, i.e., the *Sânkhya*s) maintain when they say:

"The working of the organs when combined

"Are the five airs with Prâna at their head;"¹¹⁷

for if it were no more than this it would not be specially mentioned Mund. 2, 1, 3 in addition to *Manas* and *Indriyas*. But could it not be the result of the united action of these eleven organs, which produce the life of the body in something the same way as eleven birds shut up in a cage raise it in the air, when they fly upwards?¹¹⁸ To this is to be replied, that the organs cannot possibly produce the phenomenon of life, because it is absolutely heterogeneous from hearing, etc. (p. 719, 4). It is rather included in the primacy of the Prâna as taught by the Scripture, that the other organs are subordinated to it as qualities (*guṇa*) [p. 719, 6, 12; without prejudice to their original essential difference from it; of this below].

But the Prâna cannot therefore, like the individual soul, be termed the sovereign of the body (p. 719, 12); for even if it alone remains awake, while the organs sleep (Bṛih. 4, 3, 12, above p. 190) and does not fall into the grip of death (weariness)

¹¹⁷ This verse, cited by Çaṅkara (p. 718, 2) is found in the *Sânkhya-Kârikâ* v. 29 and in the *Sânkhya-sûtras* 2, 31, where it has manifestly been taken over from the *Kârikâ* as the artificial metrical form (it is a complete *Āryâ*-half-verse) sufficiently proves. Further examples in Hall, *Sânkhya-Sâra*, p. 12.

¹¹⁸ p. 718, 13; this image too seems to belong to the *Sânkhya*s, at any rate it is found in a distorted form in *Gaudapâda* on *Sânkhya-Kâr.* 29, ed. Wilson p. 26, 5.



like them (Bṛih. 1, 5, 21), even if it is called the "absorber" because in sleep it absorbs them into itself (Chând. 4, 3, 3, above p. 61) and guards them as a mother guards her children (Prajña 2, 13) still it is only the prime minister of the soul, just as eye, ear, etc. are its servants (p. 720, 7). For the rest, it is on the same level as the organs (p. 720, 9), is like them an aggregate [*saṃhata*, i. e., produced from its seed by the depositing of corpuscles from the Prâna-material] and non-spiritual (p. 720, 11); it has not, however, as they have, an object (p. 721, 1) and cannot be reckoned with them as a twelfth organ; it rather supports, nourishes, and animates the whole body, as is further proved on p. 722 from the parable of the contest of the organs.—With this agrees the fact that the Mukhya Prâna is termed p. 161, 9 *prajñâ-sâdhana-prâna-antara-âçraya* "the support of the other Prânas which sub-serve the purpose of perception" and that as its task *saṃsaranam* is mentioned p. 471, 2, and *parispanda* pp. 378, 6. 380, 12. 732, 6. 1090, 10, both of which seem to mean stimulation, animation.

As animating and supporting principle of life the *Mukhya Prâna* has five branches: *Prâna*, *Apâna*, *Vyâna*, *Udâna*, and *Samâna*, which are frequently enumerated (e. g., Bṛih. 1, 5, 3. 3, 9, 26. Chând. 3, 13. 5, 18. Prajña 3; the three first only: Bṛih. 3, 1, 10. 5, 14, 3. Chând. 1, 3, 8; four: Bṛih. 3, 4, 1) and are sometimes very differently explained. According to Çaṅkara (p. 723, 1—4) *Prâna* is exhaling (*ucchvâsa*), *Apâna* inhaling (*niçvâsa*); *Vyâna* is a sort of combination of both, viz. what supports life when the breath is held for a great effort ¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ This explanation of Çaṅkara of *Prâna*, *Apâna*, *Vyâna* rests on Chând. 1, 3, 3—5 and agrees with Çaṅkara's Commentary on this passage in which he expressly defines *Prâna* as exhaling (*vâyum vahir nihsârayati*), and *Apâna* as inhaling (*antar âkarshati vâyum*). On the other hand contradicting himself he explains *Apâna* in the Commentary on Chând. 3, 13, 3 and again on Prajña 3, 5 as *mûtra-purîsha-âdi-apanayan*, i. e. Secretion. The former view agrees with his explanation of Bṛih. 3, 2, 2, that smell is associated with *Apâna*; the latter, as it seems, with his Commentary on Bṛih. 3, 9, 26 as well as with the theory of the Vedântasâra § 95.—A reconciliation is perhaps attainable from the fact



[in Indian medicine *Vyāna* is the principle of the circulation of the juices and the blood, cf. the St. Petersburg. Dict. s. v. as well as *Prāṇa* 3, 6]; *Samāna* is the principle of digestion; and finally *Udāna* is the faculty which at death brings about the passing of the soul from the body.—We see therefore that the Indians are not so far from our triple division of the regulative system into respiration, circulation, and digestion.

Quantitatively the *Mukhya Prāṇa* is of minute size (*anu*); here too this means, not that it is of atomic size; for by means of its five functions it pervades the whole body (p. 724, 3); but that it is 1) not coarse, for it is not perceived at the passing of the soul (p. 724, 4), and 2) not infinitely great, for otherwise passing, going, and return would not be possible (p. 724, 5); and when (Bṛih. 1, 3, 22) it is termed “as large as a termite, as a midge, as an elephant, as these three worlds, “as this universe” this is to be understood in a cosmological sense of *Hiranyagarbha* (a mythological personification of Brahman, cf. note 41) and not in the psychological sense; for in this sense his dimensions are, as the words “as large as a termite” show, limited according to the size of each individual being (p. 724, 10; from the expression: the *prāṇa* is *pratiprāṇivartin* may be concluded that with its five branches it completely fills the body it happens to be in).

5. Mutual Relation of the Systems of the conscious and unconscious Life.

Sūtras 2, 4, 17—19.

There is a doubt whether the remaining *Prāṇas* (the *Manas* and the ten *Indriyas*) are mere functions of the *Mukhya Prāṇa* or are separate entities (p. 729, 3). The former opinion might be maintained, because we read (Bṛih. 1, 5, 21) “they all became part of its nature” and because they too bear the name *Prāṇa* (p. 729, 5). But this is not so; they are separate entities, as follows from their having the special name *Indriyam*;

that inhaling is of importance for the promotion of the movement of the contents of the intestines.



it is true the *Ṛuti* (Mund. 2, 1, 3) mentions the *Manas* as well as the *Indriyas*, but the *Smṛiti* (Manu 2, 89) enumerates eleven *Indriyas*, and includes the *Manas* among them, which is never done with the *Prâṇa* (p. 730). The difference is also exhibited in the fact that in the quarrel of the gods and demons (Brih. 1, 3. Chând. 1, 2) all except the *Prâṇa* are overcome (p. 730, 12).

The difference of the two consists in the following: 1) even if all others sleep, *Prâṇa* remains awake; 2) all except it are subject to death, Brih. 1, 5, 21, by which here weariness is to be understood (p. 732, 2); 3) the *Prâṇa*, not the *Indriyas*, conditions by its remaining the continuance, and by its removal the destruction of the body; 4) the activity of all *Indriyas* is directed to objects [they are organs of relation] but not that of the *Prâṇa*; 5) that "they became part of its nature" (Brih. 1, 5, 21) means that the *Indriyas* are dependent on the *Prâṇa*, so far as it brings about their stimulation (*parispanda*); and for this reason also bear its name (*prâṇa*) in a metaphorical sense (p. 731, 8—732, 11).

6. The Cooperation of the Gods.

Sûtras 2, 4, 14—16.

The general tendency of the Indians to draw parallels between cosmic and psychic potencies is also displayed in the relation in which the single organs of life are brought to the corresponding elements conceived as gods. Thus in Brih. 1, 3, 11 after the *Prâṇa* in the fight with the demons has warded off evil and death from the organs, the latter are "led beyond death;" speech becomes fire and illuminates, breath becomes wind and purifies, the eye becomes the sun and burns, the ear becomes the poles, and the *Manas* the moon and shines.—On the other hand Ait. 1, 2, 4 says of the gods who arose from the primitive man and, desiring a fixed abode, enter into human beings: "Fire entered as speech into the mouth, wind "as breath into the nose, the sun as sight into the eye, the "cardinal points as hearing into the ear, herbs and trees as "hair into the skin, the moon as *Manas* into the heart, death



“as Apâna into the navel, and water as seed into the organs of generation.”—In agreement with this according to Brih. 3, 2, 13 at the death of man speech becomes fire, breath wind, the eye becomes the sun, the Manas the moon, the ear the cardinal points, the body the earth, the soul ether [in the heart], the hair on the body becomes herbs, the hair of the head trees, and blood and seed turn to water.

On these passages is based the Vedânta theory of the directorship (*adhiṣṭhâtṛitvam*) of the gods over the organs. The organs of life, so Çaṅkara sets forth p. 725—726 on the basis of the texts cited, can only act, so far as they are guided by the corresponding gods; of their own force they cannot do it though they are equipped with the strength requisite for their action (p. 726, 14); just as a waggon though it is strong (*çakta*) needs the oxen to move it (p. 727, 1). This last comparison points to the fact that the organs surrounding the soul are conceived as a mechanism in itself lifeless, which needs in addition a special principle of motion. The soul cannot be employed as such, because it is not an agent and only becomes an agent (*kartar*) through the Upâdhis (*i. e.*, the organs); therefore the activity of the organs is referred partly to the “inner ruler” (above p. 149), *i. e.*, the exoteric Brahman; and partly as here to the gods who are in other respects superannuated. Still their rôle is a purely subsidiary one; they do not share in enjoyment and suffering; this is wholly reserved for the individual soul affected by good and evil, pleasure and pain (p. 728, 3). At death the gods withdraw their assistance; this is all that is meant by the above mentioned return of speech into the fire, etc. (p. 745, 8); nevertheless the organs themselves, the *Prâṇa* as well as the *Manas* and *Indriyas* withdraw with the soul and accompany it on its wanderings (p. 728, 7).

7. Retrospect.

After the Indians had early attained the knowledge that the key to the enigma of the world is to be sought nowhere else than in the Self (*Âtman*), they asked themselves further



which part of our Ego is to be regarded as the clearest expression of the thing-in-itself—unconscious life which in waking and sleeping goes tireless on its way, or conscious life in whose preponderance consists the advantage of man over other beings?—As it seems to us, both these paths were taken; in earlier times principally the first by the identification of the *Prâna* (breath, life) with *Brahman* and the corresponding theory of an entrance into Brahman in deep sleep (where according to *Qatapathabr.* 10, 3, 3, 6 all organs are absorbed into the life); later there was manifested an inclination to the *Âtman* rather in the subject of cognition within us, and to characterise it therefore as *drashtar* (*Brih.* 3, 7, 23. 3, 8, 11), *prajñâ-âtman* (*Kaush.* 3), *prâjñâ âtman* (*Brih.* 4, 3, 21. 35), *prajñâna-ghana* (*Brih.* 4, 5, 13) etc., and to regard the entrance into Brahman in deep sleep rather as an unconscious because objectless Cognition (*Brih.* 4, 3, 23) or even as a fancifully elaborated ascent to the highest light (*Chând.* 8, 12, 3); *Chând.* 7 would there be a polemic of the younger school against the older and *Kaush.* 3 an attempt to reconcile the two; until finally the extreme intellectualism of the system of the *Vedânta* was reached, for which Brahman is pure intelligence (*caitanyam*), while the *Prâna* in the shape of the *Mukhya Prâna* sinks to a mere *Upâdhi* of the soul.

This view which can for the present only be presented as a hypothesis, would among other things explain the singular position of the *Mukhya Prâna* in the system, which on the one hand gives it the primacy over all other *Upâdhis*, and on the other hand connects the soul not so much with it as with the *Manas* (dependent on the *Mukhya Prâna*). For while the *Mukhya Prâna*, suiting itself to the size of the body whatever it is (above p. 336) pervades all parts of the body with its five branches, the soul in the state of *Samsâra* is “the nucleus (quintessence) of the qualities of the *Buddhi*” (above p. 311), i.e., of the *Manas*; it is like the *Manas* “large as the point of an awl” and dwells with it in the heart in quasi-identity; from there the *Manas* sends out the *Indriyas* as its feelers (organs of perception) and performers of its commands (organs of action) throughout the body. In deep sleep, as we shall



see, the *Indriyas* creep into the veins, and these enter into the *Mukhya Prâṇa*, and, like the *Manas*, attain repose in it, while the soul, united with Brahman, sojourns in the ether of the heart. This liberation of the soul from the *Upâdhis* (*upâdhi-upaṣama*) is conditioned by the cessation of the activity of the *Indriyas* and the *Manas*, but not of the *Mukhya Prâṇa*, whose activity continues in sleep as it does in the waking state; this makes clear how loose the connection between it and the soul is; its repose is not necessary for the repose of the soul, and its activity is without influence on the state of the soul. It appears rather as the antipodes of the soul in the life of the organism, as the gathering-place of the *Upâdhis* and therefore as the central point of all that individualises the soul and obscures its original divinity. True the *Mukhya Prâṇa* is not, like the *Manas* and *Indriyas*, servant of the soul but its prime minister (*mantrin* p. 720, 7); it is however a minister with whom the sovereign is not on the best of terms; the weal of the land is committed to his care, but his Highness prefers to reside in the castle of a favourite (the *Manas*) whom he prefers, but who is subject to the minister;—this is a position which may be reached in the course of political evolution, but it is certainly nowhere the original state of things.

The matter is somewhat different with regard to death; here, as we shall see, the *Indriyas* first of all enter into the *Manas*, and then in succession the *Manas* into the *Mukhya Prâṇa* [in which it already is, spatially considered], the *Mukhya Prâṇa* into the *Jîva* (individual soul), and therefore into the heart; finally the *Jîva* enters into the “subtle parts of the “elements which form the seed of the body,” *i.e.*, into the subtle body, which is their bearer during the migration.

As this subtle body is related to the coarse body, so are the organs which pass out with it related to the material organs which perish with the body; they are their continuations *vîja-âtmanâ* or *çakti-âtmanâ* as seed or power; *i.e.*, while eye and ear, hand and foot perish at death, their function (*vritti*), the power of seeing, hearing, going, grasping, etc. connected with the soul, wanders out with it (in a latent state) and serves



for a new incarnation as the seed from which the material organs proceed just as the coarse body arises from the subtle body. [A combination of the material of the subtle body from the three original elements, and of the material of the coarse body from their triply or quintuply mixed derivatives is not yet discoverable in Çaṅkara's commentary].

According to this the interaction of body and soul must be conceived as follows: the *Indriyas* are simply the powers or functions of the *Karāṇas*, i.e., of the material organs; these they produce out of themselves and remain in the closest and most intimate connection with them; these *Indriyas* have their common centre in the *Manas*; the *Manas* is homogeneous with them and itself an *Indriyam*; it dwells, large as the point of an awl, in the heart; in the *Manas*, filling it completely and (except by liberation and temporarily in deep sleep) inseparably connected with it, is the Soul, which, by the mediation of the *Manas* and *Indriyas*, governs the movements of the *Karāṇas* and receives their impressions; while the *Mukhya Prāṇa* with its five branches pervades the whole body and provides for its nutrition on behalf of the soul; it is subject to the soul, but, leaving death out of the question, a connection between the two is not discoverable.

XXVIII. Special States of the Soul.

THERE are three states of the individual soul which sojourns in the body; they are: Waking, dream-sleep, and deep sleep (p. 799, 14), and these three are also to be understood when the highest soul is spoken of as "changeless onlooker "at the three changing states" (as *e.g.* 432, 12, above p. 276). A fourth state is dying consisting in a passing out of the body (p. 799, 15); we have further swooning, which is however not to be reckoned as a fifth state because it is only an occasional and exceptional phenomenon, which is in the sphere of the healing art (p. 802, 13).

We shall now consider these three states on the basis of the material afforded by the appendix 3, 2, 1—10 supplementary to the Psychology, prefixing a brief definition of them from p. 107, 12ff.: "the soul is awake, when, in consequence of its "connection with the various *Upâdhis* [the ten *Indriyas*] which "proceed from the *Manas*, it apprehends sensuous objects and "examines their differences;—when, modified by the impress- "ions¹²⁰ of these, it sees dream-pictures, it is [occasionally, "*viz.* Chând. 6, 8, 2, above p. 263) described by the word *Manas* "[in the dream-state the senses repose, while the *Manas* remains "active, above p. 320]; in the state of deep sleep in which the "two kinds of *Upâdhis* [*Indriyas* and *Manas*, or, as Govinda "maintains: the coarse and fine] are in repose, and the differ- "ences conditioned by the *Upâdhis* cease to exist, the soul is "as it were dissolved (*pralîna*) in its own self and therefore

¹²⁰ The dream-pictures have as cause the impressions (*vâsanâ*) of the waking state; cf. p. 788, 11: *jâgarita-prabhava-vâsanâ-nimittatvât tu swap-nasya*; p. 270, 8: *tad-vâsanâ-nimittânç ca swapnân nâdî-carô 'nubhûya*.



"it is said: it has entered into itself (Chând. 6, 8, 1, above p. 263)."

1. Dream-Sleep.

Sûtras 3, 2, 1—6.

In the principal passage, Brih. 4, 3 (a knowledge of which from Chap. XII, 4, above p. 189 we shall in what follows assume in the reader) it is said: "there are no chariots, no teams, no roads, but he creates for himself chariots, teams, and roads." The question is (p. 778, 7) whether a real creation is here to be understood or one depending on illusion (*mâyâ*).

The first view might be taken, for it is said: "he creates;" and further: "for he is the creator" (p. 779, 6). Moreover another passage (Kâth. 5, 8) says of dream-sleep:

"The spirit that in the sleeper never tires
"And gives the form he will to his desires,
"He is the Brahman, he the stainless one,
"Immortal is his name.
"And all the spheres
"Repose in him; beyond him there is none."

It might be imagined that by wishes here as before (Kâth. 1, 23—24) real objects are to be understood, and that by the creating spirit (Kâth. 2, 14) the world-creating highest Soul (*prâjña*) is meant (p. 780, 1. 5), so that the dream-creation is to be conceived as real just as much as the actual creation (p. 780, 10).

To this is to be replied: the dream-creation is a mere illusion, and not a reality (p. 780, 17) because it is not consistent with time, space, and causality and is refuted by them (p. 781, 3). 1) Not with space: for there is no room for chariots, etc. in the limited confines of the body (p. 781, 5). It might be imagined that the soul leaves the body in sleep because it is said (Brih. *loc. cit.*) "it soars from the nest and hovers where it will" and because in dreaming, going and standing still are only possible on this supposition (p. 781, 6). But that is not so; for it is not possible to pass over the space of a hundred miles in a moment; besides a man who goes to sleep in the country of the *Kurus* and reaches in his



dream the country of the *Pañcālas*, ought to be able to wake up there too; but in reality he always wakes in the country of the *Kurus* (p. 781, 10, 14). Moreover objects in foreign countries are in reality not at all the same as they were in the dream (p. 782, 1). The above mentioned passage is therefore to be taken figuratively, and the going and standing still in dreams are an illusion (p. 782, 5, 7). The dream is just as unreconcilable with 2) the conditions of time; for one sleeps at night and believes it to be day, and often a dream that lasts an hour seems like a number of years (p. 782, 8); and the dream is in conflict 3) with causality; for one grasps chariots without hands, sees them without eyes, builds them without wood; besides their existence is refuted by the awakening (cf. above p. 247), and not by this alone but also by the course of the dream itself, for the chariot suddenly turns into a man, and a man into a tree (p. 782, 11).

True the dream is not completely illusory, for it is prophetic of good or ill luck. For thus says the Scripture (Chând. 5, 2, 9):

"For him who dreams of happiness in love,
"Good fortune when he wakes is near at hand;"

while (according to Ait. âr. 3, 2, 4, 17) a black man with black teeth indicates a speedy death (p. 783, 7). Again those skilled in dream-books (*svapna-adhyâya* p. 783, 10) explain the dream, when they for example teach that riding on an elephant is a foretoken of riches, and on a donkey of poverty. Here what is presaged is true, but what presages, the dream namely, is not true (p. 783, 14; cf. above p. 270).—Besides it is the purpose of dream-pictures to excite joy and fear, and that as a result of the good and evil that one has done (p. 784, 7).

Therefore the passage as to the creation of the chariot is to be understood figuratively (p. 784, 2) and serves to elucidate how far the spirit is its own light (p. 784, 9). The individual soul is in the first place to be regarded as the creator of dream-pictures (p. 785, 3); and if the context of the *Kâthaka*-passage we have cited indicates the highest soul, this depends on the two being properly speaking identical (p. 785, 6) in the sense of the words *tat tvam asi* [it would have been more



appropriate to recall the words *etad vai tat* which we find not far from these cited]. God directs all things and therefore dreams too; but the dream-creation is not a real one in the same sense that nature is. "Further the creation of nature "is not an absolute reality (*âtyantikam satyatvam*); for on the "basis of the words of scripture referring to its depending on "words (above p. 262) we have proved its identity with Brah- "man (chap. XX), as well as that the whole extension of the "world is a mere illusion (*mâyâ*);¹²¹ its difference from the "illusion of a dream consists only in the continuance of the "extension of the world until the soul is recognised as Brah- "man, while the extension of the dream is refuted daily" (p. 785, 10).

"But are not God and the soul related as fire and sparks; "and does not the soul therefore of necessity share in God's "omniscience and omnipotence, as sparks have their share of "light and heat; and cannot it therefore at will (*samkalpa*) "create in a dream?"

—Reply: the homogeneity of the soul and God is a fact, but is concealed by Ignorance, and only becomes manifest to him whose eyes are opened by the grace of God.

"But how does it come about that this homogeneity is "hidden from us?"

—It is, like fire under the ashes, hidden in consequence of the connection with the *Upâdhis*, to wit the body etc. which are produced by the world of names and forms dependent on Ignorance.

"But if the soul does not possess the omniscience and "omnipotence of God, it is essentially heterogeneous from "Him, and does not need to become so by the connection "with the body?"

¹²¹ The theory of the extension of the world as *mâyâ*, the occurrence of which in *Çaṅkara* is doubted by Colebrooke, and in *Bâdarâyana* by Cowell (Colebrooke, M. E.³, p. 400) is quite clearly expressed in *Çvetâç-vatara*-Up. 4, 9—10 which is accepted by both of them; from *Çaṅkara's* Commentary the following passages are applicable: pp. 120, 16. 269, 2. 342, 12. 406, 6. 432, 8—13. 472, 9. 484, 11. 785, 12; cf. above pp. 100, 187, 228, 254, 276, 277, 299.



—By the connection with the body it comes about, that the soul's (own) omniscience and omnipotence are concealed from it, and that is why it cannot create at will in a dream. If it could do so, no one would have an unpleasant dream, for no one creates what is not pleasing to himself (pp. 786 to 788).

2. Deep Sleep.

Sûtras 3, 2, 7—9.

In deep, *i.e.* dreamless sleep, the soul becomes temporarily one with Brahman. In course of time this doctrine, which, in our opinion, only expressed the extinction of conscious in unconscious life, that is perceived in sleep by simple observation, assumed an essentially different meaning. According as the soul came to be regarded as an essentially intellectual potency a separation of it from the *Mukhya Prâna* as principle of the unconscious life and a closer connection with the organs of conscious life, *viz.* *Manas* and *Indriyas*, became necessary. In deep sleep this connection is temporarily dissolved in such a way that *Manas* and *Indriyas* enter into the *Prâna*, and the soul on the other hand is submerged in the Brahman who sojourns in the ether of the heart. Çaṅkara's statements on this point are concerned with special questions and rest on assumptions which are nowhere clearly developed; we must therefore by putting things together attempt to lay down what these were.

In the waking state the soul, connected with the *Manas*, has its seat in the heart and from here by means of the *Indriyas* exercises its influence throughout the body.—In dream-sleep the functions of the *Indriyas* are extinguished, for (*Praṇa* 4, 2) they are absorbed into the *Manas*; and the soul surrounded by the still active *Manas* and the reposing *Indriyas* (above p. 320) passes through the whole body, as a prince surrounded by his vassals makes a progress through his kingdom. This view based on *Bṛih.* 2, 1, 18 seems to hover before Çaṅkara's mind when he says p. 270, 8, the soul enjoys the dream-pictures which are dependent on waking impressions



nâdicara, "as it passes through the veins."—In deep sleep, as is said in the same passage (p. 270, 9), the two illusions of waking and dreaming are destroyed, and the soul, freed from all *Upâdhis* enters into Brahman in the ether of the heart. What becomes of *Manas* and *Indriyas* in this case? According to Chând. 4, 3, 3 the *Prâṇa* absorbs them and this view is adopted by Çaṅkara p. 720, 1. On the other hand it is said in the statement to be given below, the *Upâdhis* (*i.e.*, here *Manas* and *Indriyas*) sojourned in deep sleep in "the pericardium (*purîtat*) or the veins," which, 72 000 in number (according to Brih. 2, 1, 19) starting from the heart surround the *Purîtat* and thence (Çaṅkara on Brih. p. 367, 8) pass to all parts of the body, 101 of them subserving the withdrawal of the dying soul from the body. This information leads us to believe that the veins were taken to be the main seat of the *Mukhya Prâṇa*; with this agrees the statement that the *Vyâṇa* acts in them (Praçna 3, 6) and that the *Udâna* leads the soul from the body at death by the 101 principal veins.

After these preliminary remarks we turn to the statements of Çaṅkara, which we shall give in some detail on account of certain special difficulties.

On the question of the state of the soul in deep sleep (*sushuptam*, *supti*, *sushupti*), as we read in the Commentary on 3, 2, 7, the scripture seems to contradict itself; for there are passages according to which the soul in deep sleep "has crept into the veins" (Chând. 8, 6, 3), "lies in the pericardium" (Brih. 2, 1, 19), "has attained unity in the *Prâṇa*" (Kaush. 4, 19), "sojourns in the ether of the heart" (Brih. 4, 4, 22), "has entered into the Existent" (Chând. 6, 8, 1), "is embraced by the Self of knowledge" (Brih. 4, 3, 21).—One might think that different places are to be here understood, because they all subserve the same end and therefore cannot be dependent on each other (p. 789, 12). That is also the reason why they are mostly in the locative, and where this is not the case, as in the passage about "the Existent" (p. 790, 3) the locative meaning is made certain by the connection and context (p. 790, 8). As the essence of deep sleep consists in the suspension of individual cognition (*viçesha-vijñâna-upaçama*), and



all the spots mentioned subserve this purpose, it seems that the soul in deep sleep can enter one or the other at choice (p. 790, 10).—To this is to be replied: not at choice (*vikalpena*) into one or the other, but at the same time (*samuccayena*) into all the places mentioned does the soul enter in deep sleep (p. 791, 1), because otherwise we should have a partial denial (*pakshe bādhaḥ*) of the evidence of scripture. From the uniformity of case it does not follow that all (each for itself) fulfil the same purpose; they may fulfil different ends which require to be combined (p. 791, 7) and as a man can be at home and in bed at the same time, the soul too can be simultaneously in the veins, the pericardium, and the Brahman (p. 791, 8). Where (as in Chând. 8, 6, 3) the veins alone are mentioned, without excluding Brahman who dwells, as we know, in another spot [in the ether of the heart], an entrance into Brahman by means of the veins (*nāḍi-dvāreṇa*) is to be understood (p. 791, 16); this is not in contradiction with the locative; for he who by means of the Ganges (*Gaṅgayā*) journeys to the ocean, has journeyed on the Ganges (*Gaṅgâyām*) (p. 792, 1). Moreover the passage in question is concerned with another matter, *viz.* the way through the veins and sunbeams into the Brahman-world [in heaven]; and in treating of this it is, to exalt the veins, mentioned that no evil touches him who has entered by them [into the heart], and that because, as Chând. 6, 8, 3 says, “he has thus become one with heat” (p. 792, 5). By heat (*tejas*) is here to be understood either the juice (*pittam*) in the veins that surrounds the organs of cognition (p. 792, 6) or Brahman; for (p. 792, 11) that it cannot be touched by evil agrees with the facts of the Brahman-world [in the heart, cf. above p. 164] while the complex of veins issues (*anugata*) in Brahman, as the place of deep sleep. So too the pericardium is in close relationship (*anugūṇa* p. 793, 4) with the place of deep sleep. For the envelope of the heart is termed pericardium, *puritat*; what is in the heart is also in the *puritat*, just as what is in a town is surrounded by the walls of the town (p. 793, 8). Of the three places of deep sleep, veins, pericardium and Brahman, the two first are therefore only to be regarded as entrances (p. 793, 13). “The



"veins too, or the *Puritat* are only the receptacle of the *Upâdhis* "of the soul; in them its organs sojourn [probably only the "*Indriyas*, and if a removal from its natural position be "assumed, the *Manas*]. For apart from the connection with "the *Upâdhis*, the soul in itself (*svatas*) needs no receptacle "but in its non-difference from Brahman reposes in its own "majesty" (Chând. 7, 24, 1), and thus identity (*tādātmyam*), not a relation of receptacle and contents, exists, between it and Brahman (p. 794, 2); "true the entrance of the soul into Brahman is never unrealised; it cannot give up its own nature; "but in dream and waking by virtue of its mingling with the "*Upâdhis* it is as though the soul had passed into a different "nature; therefore the release from the *Upâdhis* in deep sleep "is regarded as an entrance of the soul into its own nature" (p. 794, 7). The aim of deep sleep, the suspension of individual cognition, would not be attained by a mere entrance into veins and *Puritat*, for (p. 794, 14) they involve plurality (*bheda-vishaya*); and "where a plurality as it were exists, one sees "the other," as the scripture (Brih. 4, 5, 15) says. True suspension of cognition can be effected by the great distance of the objects but only where the subject is limited, which is not the case with the soul, if the *Upâdhis* are left out of account (p. 795, 2); if however a removal of the *Upâdhis* is meant it is just this release from them of which we are speaking (p. 795, 5). We do not maintain either that veins, pericardium and Brahman are to be regarded as possessed of equal rights; for the two first do not come in question at all (p. 795, 8); the important thing is that Brahman is unchangeably the place of deep sleep, and that the Brahmanhood of the soul is adhered to, and a release in deep sleep from the activity of the waking and dream states (p. 795, 12).

Just as deep sleep is an entrance into Brahman, so awaking out of it is a withdrawal from him (p. 795, 15).

But how is it possible, if deep sleep is a complete union with Brahman, that each soul on awaking finds its way back to its individuality? If a drop of water is poured into a body of water and a drop taken from it again, it can hardly be



assumed that you get the same drop again!¹²² Just so, as it seems, must we assume that after its union with God in deep sleep the same soul cannot return to its individuality; that on the contrary it is another soul or even God himself who awakes in its place (p. 796, 8—797, 1).

But this is not so, as Çāṅkara shows p. 797, 2ff.; he who awakes can neither be another soul nor God but must be the same who went to sleep and that for the following reasons which the words of the Sūtram also set forth:

1) *On account of works*; it cannot be assumed that a [religious] work begun in the evening and completed in the morning is divided between two different souls; and that *atiprasaṅgāt* "because too much would follow from it;" to wit that then to every one could be apportioned the works of another and be imputed to him at the retribution.

2) *On account of remembrance*; for one remembers when one wakes: "I saw this and this yesterday" and "I am so and so." This continuity of the consciousness of external objects and the Self proves that the same soul awakes as went to sleep.

3) *On account of the text of scripture*; "then it hurries back according to the entrance, according to the place, into the waking state" (Bṛih. 4, 3, 34);—"all these creatures go day by day into the Brahman-world and yet do not discover it" (Chând. 8, 3, 2);—"therefore of a truth, dear one, when all these

¹²² The question raised above is explicable from the view that the soul as such is a completely indifferent principle, i.e. like God himself (chap. XIV, 3) *nirviṣeṣha* without any difference, and that therefore all its individuality is to be sought in its empirical existential form. But wherein is this individuality to be found?—Not in the *Upâdhis* for they are only a mechanical apparatus, in themselves dead, which are alike an attribute of all. Therefore if the individual character can neither be found in the soul as such, nor in its *Upâdhis*, it must be discoverable in some *tertium quid*, and this is moral determination, which we here characterise by three expressions from Bṛih. 4, 4, 2: *vidyâ*, *karman*, *pūrvaprajñâ* (or as we preferred to say above p. 193 *apūrvaprajñâ*), knowledge, works, and previous (or newly acquired) experience. We return later (p. 374ff.) to this question; here we had to anticipate it to make what follows intelligible.



"creatures proceed out of the Existent again, do they not know that they proceed out of the Existent again; whether they are tigers here, or lions, or wolves, or boars, or worms, or birds, or midges, or gnats, whatever they may be, that they become again" (Chând. 6, 10, 2).

4) *On account of the precepts* as to knowledge and works, which in the absence of personal identity would become invalid; for otherwise deep sleep would mean complete liberation, and what would become then of the works that still remain and have to be atoned for, and of the (lower) knowledge? So too in the case of the other in whose person the soul would have to wake, the continuity of his actions would be destroyed. How can one even assume that any one goes to sleep in the person of A and wakes up in the person of B?—Finally the really liberated might also awake again in that case [for nothing distinguishes him from the others] and liberation would not be definitive. But this is, after Ignorance has once been destroyed, impossible; and from this it follows that God (*îçvara*), for whom Ignorance is eternally annihilated, cannot awake in the place of the soul.—That is; for the reason that otherwise man would suffer for what he has not committed, and not atone for what he has committed (p. 798, 12), it is impossible to assume that a different person from him who went to sleep wakes up. The comparison with the drop, which cannot be recovered from the body of water, does not agree with the facts; for the distinguishing cause is wanting in this case, but in the case of the soul it is present, namely in the shape of works and knowledge [in which therefore consists the individuality of the individual]. Moreover things which are hard to distinguish for such as we are, are still distinguishable; thus the goose (*haṇsa*, for a domestic animal must be meant here) is able to distinguish water and milk when they are mixed (p. 799, 3). "There does not exist an individual soul different from Brahman, distinguishable from the Existent like a drop of water from a body of water; but the Existent itself is, in consequence of the connection with the *Upâdhis*, termed individual soul in a metaphorical sense, as we have often set forth; and therefore the matter stands thus: the



“action of a given individual soul extends so far as the connection with a given *Upâdhi*[complex] exists, and where another *Upâdhi* is present, we have the action of another individual soul; but one and the same *Upâdhi* is in deep sleep and the waking state in the position of the seed and the plant; therefore it is the same soul which wakes up again.”

—If in the course of these discussions it appears occasionally as if the exoteric theory could not be maintained throughout in the doctrine of deep sleep, the last remark shows that it is not so. The union with Brahman in deep sleep and death and at the destruction of the world is in every case merely apparent, for the individualities continue to exist potentially and arise again from their seed unchanged; and this is at the bottom synonymous with a real continued existence of the soul.

3. Swooning.

Sûtram 3, 2, 10.

Besides the states of waking, dreaming, deep sleep, and death there is a special state, which is different from all, an intermediate condition between several of them, namely swooning (p. 799, 12). It is in the first place not the waking state; for in it the senses no longer perceive the objects. True the arrow maker perceives nothing beyond his work when he is buried in it; but he has all the same consciousness and control over his body, both of which are absent in the fainting person (p. 800, 7. 11). Further swooning is not dream-sleep on account of the accompanying unconsciousness, and not death because it is distinguished from it by bodily warmth and breath. That is why people look for warmth in the region of the heart, and breath in the nostrils to find out whether anyone is dead or only fainting; if both are absent people say he is dead and fetch wood to burn the body; if on the other hand warmth and breath are still present, he is cared for in order to restore him to consciousness (p. 800, 13). By his coming to himself again we see that he was not dead: for from *Yama's* realm



no return is possible [though *Naciketas* in the *Kāthaka-Upanishad*, like *Er*, the Armenian, in *Plato Rep.* 10, 13 p. 614B, gains information as to the Beyond by sojourning in the kingdom of the dead]. Finally swooning is not deep sleep either; for while fainting is characterised by interrupted breathing, trembling of the body, a frightful expression on his face, and widely opened eyes, a person in deep sleep has a peaceful expression; he draws his breath regularly, and has his eyes closed, and his body does not tremble; moreover he is waked by merely stroking him with the hand, while not even blows with a hammer can rouse a fainting person. [Perhaps from observations during torture]. The causes of the two phenomena are different also; in the one case the blows of a club and the like produce it, in the other simple weariness (p. 801, 10). Therefore swooning is half deep sleep, not in the sense that it is a half union with Brahman, but in so far as it is intermediate between deep sleep and death. It is a gate of death (p. 802, 9): "if there remain works [that still have to be atoned for] speech and consciousness return; if nothing remains "breath and warmth depart."

4. Metaphysical Significance of Death.

This last assertion is of importance because it shows how the strict predestination that governs life also controls its termination. The whole empirical reality is, as we know, nothing more than *kriyā-kāraṇa-phalam* "the requital of works on the doer," and the whole bodily existence is *kārya-karāṇa-saṅghāta* "a complex of the organs of work" intended to produce that requital in the form of action and suffering. True the possibility is not excluded, that the works of a single existence have to be atoned for in several succeeding existences (cf. p. 1129, 11 translated above p. 112); and in souls born as plants such an assumption is unavoidable; for the rest however the view is that life both in quality and quantity is in respect of the works of the previous existence an atonement exactly measured and completely fulfilling its aim. The atonement is brought about by *bhoktrivam* and *kartrivam* (the states of



enjoyer and agent); the latter condition has as its unavoidable result works which have to be atoned for again in a following existence, so that the clockwork of atonement in running down always winds itself up again; and this goes on for ever,—unless perfect knowledge is gained which, as will be seen, does not depend on merit; it makes its appearance independently to dissolve the existence in its innermost essence, to consume the seed of works and thus for all time make a continuation of transmigration impossible. On the other hand, knowledge cannot put an end to the present existence because this is conditioned by the works of an earlier birth, whose seed has already germinated and cannot therefore be consumed but demands its full retribution. So long as a balance of works remains from a previous existence, death cannot occur; if they are however exhausted, life must go out, like a lamp when the oil is burnt up,—and lead the Ignorant on fancifully elaborated ways to a retribution in the Beyond, and then back to new forms of existence; while the sages who possess the higher knowledge are immediately swallowed up in identity with Brahman, and those who possess the lower knowledge indirectly by the Devayâna or way of the Gods.

It only remains for us to examine the Eschatology of our system, to follow the soul on its wanderings after death and to consider the two possible ways of its entrance into Brahman.



THE FOURTH PART OF THE VEDÂNTA SYSTEM:

SAMSÂRA

OR

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRANSMIGRATION
OF THE SOUL.



XXIX. The Eschatology of the Vedânta.

1. The main Phases of Indian Eschatology.

IN general we can distinguish three stages of development in the views of the Indians as to the condition of the Soul after death.

1. The oldest view, that which prevails in the hymns of the *Rigveda*, knows as yet of no transmigration of the soul. The souls of the good pass after death into Yama's heaven of light where they lead a blissful life in the company of the Fathers (*pitarah*);¹²³ the wicked are shut out from it and pass (according to a less definite and perhaps already secondary view) into the "nether darkness."¹²⁴ A return either of the former or of the latter to a new earth-life does not occur.

2. According to the doctrine of transmigration in the *Upanishads*, as we shall become more closely acquainted with it in the next chapter, there are three Paths. The Wise, after death, will be carried ever higher and higher upon the *Devayâna* (sc. *panthâ*) that is the "Path of the Gods," on-

¹²³ *Rigv.* 10, 14, 10: *athâ pitrînt suvidatrân upehi,*

Yamena ye sadhamâdam madanti.

compare St. Matthew's Gospel viii, 11: πολλοὶ ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν ἔξουσιν καὶ ἀνακλιθήσονται μετὰ Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαάκ καὶ Ἰακώβ ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν.—26, 29: οὐ μὴ πίνω ἀπάρτι ἐκ τοῦτου τοῦ γενήματος τῆς ἀμπέλου, ἕως τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης, ὅταν αὐτὸ πίνω μεθ' ὁμῶν καινόν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς μου.

¹²⁴ *Rigv.* 10, 152, 4: *yo asmân abhidâsati, adharam gamayâ tamah.*

Atharvav. 9, 2, 4: *nudasva Kâma, prapudasva Kâma;*

avartim (the downward way) *yantu, mama ye sapatnâh;*

teshâm nuttânâm adhamâ tamânsi

Agne vâstûni [anu-]nirdaha tvam!



wards into Brahman, whence there is no return. The doers of works go upwards by the *Pitriyâna*, the "Path of the Fathers," into the luminous realm on the moon, enjoy there the fruit of their works and then descend once more into a new incarnation, differing according to the moral character of the previous life. Finally, those who possess neither knowledge nor works come to the "third place," that is, they are reborn as lower animals or [Kâth. 5, 7] plants, without having tasted bliss on the moon.

3. According to the esoteric Vedânta doctrine, which already finds expression in the Upanishads, the soul is identical with Brahman and the entire existence of the manifold world is an illusion. For him who sees through this illusion, there is neither a migration of the soul nor an entering into Brahman, but "Brahman is he, and into Brahman he is resolved," as is said in Brih. 4, 4, 6 (translated above p. 194); compare with this, as also with what follows, the section of Çaṅkara's Commentary, p. 1132—1133, translated under the title of "Esoteric Eschatology" above p. 114 ff.

2. Exoteric and Esoteric Eschatology.

Our system is a combination of all the three views just stated. It retains, from the first stage of development, the doctrine of reward and punishment in the Beyond and unites this with the second theory in such a way as to assume a double retribution for the good and the evil: the one after death in the Beyond, the other through a descent to new incarnation following thereon and through the particular form of that incarnation. Opposed to the transmigration of the *Pitriyâna* is the liberation of the *Devayâna*; but both, the Path of the Fathers and the Path of the Gods, are valid only in the exoteric, lower knowledge. Only for him, to whom this whole world still appears as real, can the two Paths into the Beyond be real too: the *Pitriyâna*, which leads back again to earth-life, and the *Devayâna*, which, as reward for the lower exoteric knowledge and the accompanying worship (*upâsanâ*) of the lower (*aparam, saguṇam*) Brahman, leads the soul



to him. In contradiction with the chief passage in the Upanishads on transmigration, the system regards this liberation attained through the *Devayāna* as being not yet complete. It becomes so only when those, who through the lower knowledge have entered into the *sagunam brahma*, there obtain perfect knowledge, the *samyagdarśanam*. For only the latter, that is the knowledge of the identity of one's own Soul with Brahman, brings about absolute liberation, or rather is in itself already that liberation: hence, as soon as that knowledge dawns, even here on earth, liberation is accomplished and the persistence of corporeality till death is only an illusion of the senses, which when once true knowledge is attained, can no longer deceive us, even though we are unable to remove its appearance.—Thus a man suffering from a disease of the eyes sees the moon double and cannot prevent himself from doing so; but he knows that there is really only one moon there.

3. No Transmigration from the Esoteric Standpoint.

From what has been said it is clear that, in the Theory of Liberation to which our last part will be devoted, we shall again meet with the twofold doctrine that we have followed out in detail as the lower and higher knowledge in Theology, and as the empirical and metaphysical standpoint in Cosmology and Psychology; while in the present part, on the contrary, which deals with transmigration we shall encounter only the lower, exoteric, not the higher, esoteric doctrine which puts precisely in the place of this pilgrimage of the soul, the knowledge of the soul's identity with Brahman, through which liberation is gained at once, so that from the standpoint of the higher knowledge there can be no question of anything like transmigration. Accordingly the reality of the *Samsāra* stands or falls with the empirical reality of the world: as the latter is a mere illusion, so also are the ideas as to the former not so much, as with Plato, εἰκότας μῦθοι, but rather a continuation of that illusion into the domain of transcendent; the question remains open however how far our author's mind, deeply imbued as it was with belief in transmigration accord-



ing to the general views of his people, reached a clear, scientific consciousness of the mythical character of this doctrine of transmigration. It is true that he declares often enough, that neither the world, nor the individual wandering soul in truth exists; but this did not prevent him, as we have seen, from putting forward a detailed theory of world-creation; and with the same earnestness he treats of the doctrine of *Samsāra*, according to the Vedic revelation and in close connection with those passages of the Upanishads which treat of transmigration; amongst which we must specially single out the *Pañcāgni-vidyā* from Brih. 6, 2 and Chând. 5, 3—10; then the *Paryāṅkavidyā* in Kaush. 1; together with the *Upakosalavidyā*, Chând. 4, 10—15 (translated above p. 164 ff.), the *Daharavidyā*, Chând. 8, 1—6 (above p. 158 ff.); further Kāth. 5, 7, Praçna 5 (above p. 198 ff.), and other passages.

These and other passages we shall make use of according to the requirements of our present task; one only among them need be placed before the reader *in extenso*, because not only is it the most extensive monument from Vedic times of the doctrine which more than any other has dominated the entire thought of the Indians, but also because it underlies in general as well as in particular all the explanations of Bâdarâyana and Çaṅkara in this and our last part: this is the *Pañca-agni-vidyā*, that is "the Doctrine of the Five Fires," which is found in Brih. 6, 2 and Chând. 5, 3—10 in two recensions, which generally agree verbally, and yet again diverge materially from each other. Moreover, Brih. is simpler, more beautiful, more ancient, Chând. smoother, more modern, more detailed towards the end, so that the two stand to each other very much in the same relation as the many parallel passages in the Gospels according to *St. Matthew* and *St. Luke*. The additions in Chând. are such that, as we shall see, a further development of the doctrine is recognizable in them. For this reason and because our Vedânta authors take their stand chiefly on Chând., we shall take that version as our basis and make use of Brih. only when the latter is of special interest.



XXX. The Vedic Doctrine of the Five Fires.

Chândogya-Up. 5, 3—10 (Bṛihadâraṇyaka-Up. 6, 2).

1. Introduction.

Çvetaketu, the son of *Âruni* (cf. above p. 262), comes to the assembly of the *Pañcâlas*. There king *Pravâhana*, son of *Jîbala*, asks him five questions:

1. "Knowest thou whither the creatures go from hence?"
2. "Knowest thou how they return hither again?"
3. "Knowest thou the parting of the two ways, the Path of the Gods and the Path of the Fathers?"
4. "Knowest thou why that world does not become full?"
5. "Knowest thou how at the fifth offering the waters speak with human voice?"

To all these questions *Çvetaketu* knows no answer. Downcast, he comes to his father and complains that he has been inadequately taught by him. The latter declares that he himself is unable to answer the questions asked. Both then set out and come to the king who grants *Âruni* a boon. As this boon *Âruni* chooses the solution of the questions asked, and after some resistance the king consents to impart the following instructions to him and says he is the first Brahman who had received them (cf. above p. 18).

2. The Five Sacrificial Offerings.

As in the sacrifice the offerings are thrown into the fire to come forth from it again in a spiritualised form, so too the fire, wherein the corpse is burnt, is a sacrificial fire, through which man passes to come forth out of it again "in a luminous form" (Bṛih.). This conception of the rising from



the body as an offering, is also applied by the section under discussion to the descent of the soul into the body from the Beyond: this descent is a passing through five transformations, which are spoken of as five successive sacrificial acts and are described in detail.

The first sacrificial fire, through which man passes, is the other world; its elements (fuel, smoke, flame, coals, sparks) are the sun, its rays, the day, the moon, and the stars. In this fire the Gods offer Faith, and from this offering goes forth King Soma.

The second sacrificial fire, consisting of wind, vapour, thunderbolt, and hail, is Parjanya, that is, here: the storm cloud; in this fire the Gods offer king Soma, and from this offering goes forth Rain.

The third sacrificial fire, consisting of the year (that is time), space, night, and the cardinal points is the Earth (Brih.: this world); in this fire the Gods offer rain, and from this offering goes forth Food.

The fourth sacrificial fire, consisting of speech, breath, tongue, eye, ear, is Man; in this fire the Gods offer Food, and from this offering goes forth the Seed.

The fifth sacrificial fire, consisting of the generative organs and functions of woman, is Woman; in this fire the Gods offer the seed, and from this offering goes forth the Embryo.

"Thus it happens that at the fifth offering the waters [one "may understand by this either the subtle body or the "moral character; of this, later] speak with human voice. "Then when this embryo, surrounded by its chorion, has lain "for ten months or however long it may be, in the womb, it "is born. After it is born, it lives as long as may be. Then "when it dies, it is borne away to its destination in the fire, "even thither whence it came, whence it arose."

3. The Path of the God (*devayâna*).

"Those now who know this, and those others who practise "faith and penance (Brih.: Truth) in the forest, enter into the "flame, [of the funeral pyre] from the flame into the day, from "the day into the light half of the month, from the light half



"of the month into the summer months [literally: into the six months in which the sun journeys northwards], from the months into the year, from the year into the sun (Brih.: the world of the Gods), from the sun into the moon, from the moon into the lightning—there indeed is a man, who is not as a human being, he leads them to Brahman." (Addition in Brih.: "there in the world of Brahman they dwell far, far away. For such there is no return.")

"This is the Path of the Gods."

4. The Path of the Fathers (*pitriyāna*).

"On the other hand, those who [only] practise sacrifices, pious deeds, and alms-giving in the village (Brih.: who through offerings, alms, and penance gain heaven), these enter into the smoke [of the funeral pyre], from the smoke into the night, from the night into the other [dark] half of the month, from the other half of the month into the six winter months [literally: the six months, in which the sun journeys southwards]; these do not reach the year, but pass from the months into the world of the Fathers, from the world of the Fathers into the *Ākāśa*, from the *Ākāśa* into the moon, who is King Soma, therefore he is the sustenance of the Gods, him the Gods enjoy." (Otherwise Brih.: "When they have attained to the moon, they become food; in that place, just as one enjoys King Soma with the words: 'swell up and shrink,'¹²⁵ so also are they enjoyed by the Gods.")

¹²⁵ 1. The Soma-plant is placed in water which makes it swell; then it is pressed, which makes it shrink and the Soma-drink trickles out.—2. To this earthly Soma corresponds as a heavenly Soma the moon, which decreases when the Gods drink it, and then increases again; R̥g̥v. 10, 85, 5: *yat tvā, deva, prapibanti, tata' āpyāyase punah*.—3. The increase and decrease of the moon is however on the other side conditioned by the rising of the dead to the moon, where they enjoy the fruit of their works, and their subsequent re-descent to a new life upon earth.—4. A combination of these ideas gives us the concept, that the dead, in virtue of their works, rise to the moon, where they, that is, their works, are enjoyed by the Gods (according to Atharva-V. 3, 29, 1, the Gods take only $\frac{1}{16}$ of the works as tribute), until they are consumed. The being-enjoyed by the Gods is on the other hand an enjoying of the fruit of



"—After they have dwelt there, so long as any residuum is left, they return by the way they came, back again into the Âkâça, from the Âkâça into the wind; after they have become wind, they become smoke, after becoming smoke, vapour, after becoming vapour, cloud, after becoming cloud, they descend as rain; these same are born here below as rice and barley, as herbs and trees, as sesame and beans. Thence truly it is more difficult to escape; for only the man who eats him as food, who emits him as seed, only his increase (descendant) does he become.—(The following down to the end only in Chând.) Now those whose conduct here was fair, for them there is the prospect that they will come into a fair womb, the womb of a Brahman, or a Kshatriya or a Vaïçya;—those, however, whose conduct here was foul, for them there is the prospect that they will come into a foul womb, a dog's womb, a swine's womb, or (even) into the womb of a Caṇḍâla."

5. The third Place.

(Chândogya-Up.)

"But upon neither of these two ways are to be found those minute, ever-returning beings, who originate and pass away, as quickly as one says it bites. This is the third place.—

"Therefore that world grows not full."

(Bṛihadâraṇyaka-Up.)

"But those who know not these two paths, those are the worms, birds, and whatsoever bites."

6. Epilogue (only in Chândogya-Up.).

"Therefore should one beware!—On this there is this verse:

works on the part of the dead; just as, when a man enjoys a woman, so the woman on her side enjoys the man (Çaṅk. on Chând. p. 343, 10). The person and his works melt into one another in these fancies; more of this, later.



"The thief of gold and drinker of strong drinks,
"The slayer of a Brahman, and he who defiles his teacher's bed,
"These four perish and fifthly he who goes with them."

"But on the other hand, he who thus knows these five fires,
"he verily consorts not with them and is not stained with their
"evil, but remains pure and unspotted in the world of the
"pure, he who knows this, who knows this."—

7. On the two Recensions of the Doctrine of the Five Fires.

The difference between these two passages cited from Brih. and Chând. is, in spite of all verbal agreement, very considerable. Penance (*tapas*) according to Brih. does not liberate but according to Chând. it does liberate; further the whole system of the three paths after death is essentially modified and much confused by the additions in Chând.;—their confusion is increased in the Vedânta-sûtras since they go back generally to Chând., but also to Brih., so that it is hardly possible to obtain a uniform and consistent view.

The conception in Brih. is perfectly clear: the wise by the *Devayâna* enter into liberation, the performers of pious works rise on the *Pitriyâna* to the moon, and thence descend, as it seems, only into human bodies. Those who possess neither knowledge nor works are shut out from both paths and enter as punishment into the bodies of animals.

It is otherwise in Chând.; here too the Path of the Fathers according to the opening words, is destined for those who have practised pious works. But this determination is quite lost sight of in the addition at the end, which distinguishes, among those who return upon the *Pitriyâna*, between those of fair conduct and those of foul conduct and accordingly destines the former to life in one of the three higher castes and the latter either to animal life or to existence in a lower caste. Through this "the third place" properly becomes superfluous and is left to low and short lived animals, which accordingly, as it seems, remain entirely shut out from ascent and descent in the transformation of the soul, quite contrary to the drift of the Vedânta system.—It is a further inconsistency, that Chând. recognises both reward and punishment



for those who go by the *Pitriyâna* on their return to earth-life, but in the Beyond on the contrary reward only; this inconsistency our system removes by inserting, as contrast to the reward on the moon, the pains of hell in the Beyond also. How it further finds a way through the contradictions of its Vedic sources, we shall see further on.

We turn now to an examination of the single phases of transmigration; and in this we shall give the remaining Vedic texts in their proper places, assuming on the other hand that the main passage translated in the present chapter is always present in the reader's mind.



XXXI. The Passing of the Soul from the Body.

Sûtras 4, 2, 1—11. 17. 3, 1, 1—7.

1. The Vedic Basis.

THE doctrine of the passing of the soul, which is the same for all, except those who possess the *Samyagdarśanam*, (that is, for the ignorant and for the worshippers of Brahman possessed of attributes, who follow the lower knowledge), bases itself partly on the conceptions contained in the previous chapter of the Waters, which speak with human voice in the fifth offering, and of Faith, which the Gods offer in the first sacrificial fire, partly on the following passage from Chând. 6, 8, 6 (translated with the context above p. 264):

“When now, O dear one, man departs hence, speech enters into Manas, Manas into life, life into heat, heat into the highest God-head.”

2. The Involution of the Organs.

Sûtras 4, 2, 1—5.

1. At death, according to the passage just quoted, speech first of all enters into *Manas* (p. 1087, 6); under speech here the remaining nine *Indriyas* (above p. 329) are included, for another passage says (Praçna 3, 9): “therefore, when his splendour is extinguished, he passes to rebirth together with his senses, which have entered into Manas” (p. 1089, 5). Are we now to understand by the senses, for example, speech, the sense itself or only its function (*vṛitti*) (p. 1087, 8)?—This question appears strange, after our author, as we saw above p. 332, has already stated p. 715, 10 that the organs (*karanam*)



are only functions (*vritti*), as indeed we can understand under the *Indriyas*, which depart hence with the soul, naturally not the material organs, but only functions conceived as independently existent potencies. In this sense it is a matter of course that only the function (*vritti*) of the *Indriyas* enters (*sampadyate*) into *Manas*, while the bodily organ perishes with the body. The question here raised on the other hand, as is apparent from the way it is answered, must be understood in the sense that by *vritti* are not to be understood these functions themselves, but only their activity, and by their *sampatti* not their entering into *Manas*, but their complete dissolution (*pravilaya* p. 1088, 1, *upaçama* p. 1088, 4). Accordingly we must interpret the question under discussion to be: whether at death the sense organ (the *vritti*, according to p. 715, 10) attached to the soul, when it enters (*sampadyate*) into *Manas*, is, on this entering in, dissolved (*sampadyate*) only in its functional activity (*vritti*) or in its very essence? The answer is that only the functional activity, not the *Indriyam* perishes (*vâg-vrittir manasi sampadyate* p. 1088, 1), in the first place, because otherwise complete non-separateness (*avibhâga*) would ensue, and the condition of non-separateness, according to 4, 2, 16, belongs only to the liberated and not to others (p. 1088, 5); again, because the perception which shows how the activity of the senses dies out at death, while that of *Manas* (consciousness) persists for some time longer, only gives us the right to speak of an extinction of the functional activity, not of that of the agent (p. 1088, 10); finally, because a thing, according to its essence, can only enter into that from which it arose, as a pot into clay, but according to its functional activity, it can enter into something else, as for instance the functional activity of fire springs from fuel and is extinguished in water, although both are different from it (p. 1088, 14). If, notwithstanding, the passage says that speech enters into *Manas*, this depends on usage (*upacâra*), which does not distinguish between the action and the agent (p. 1089, 3).—The ambiguity displayed by the author in the use of these expressions *vritti* and *sampadyate* is to us unintelligible.



2. The second act at death, according to Chând. 6, 8, 6, is that *Manas* enters into *Prâna* (as the principle of unconscious life, above p. 333 ff.). Here the same question repeats itself. One might think that *Manas* as an organ enters into *Prâna*, because it is said, in Chând. 6, 6, 5 (above p. 263), that *Manas* is formed from food, and *Prâna* from water, while again it is said (above p. 235) that food, that is, the earth, arose from water (p. 1090, 4). But here too it seems rather to be the fact that only the function (functional activity) of *Manas* is to be understood as entering (dissolving into) *Prâna*; for it is only the function of *Manas* that we can observe coming to rest (p. 1090, 9) in *Prâna* in one who falls asleep and in one desirous of liberation (cf. Kâth. 3, 13); and again we cannot conclude from the mediate (*pranâlîka*, found only here as *adj.*) arising of *Manas* from *Prâna* that the former must re-enter into the latter, since otherwise it would also follow that *Manas* must dissolve itself in food, food in water, and *Prâna* in water (p. 1090, 13). Here too therefore we must understand by *Manas* only its functional activity, not the agent, since usage does not distinguish between them (p. 1091, 1).

3. When further it is said in Chând. 6, 8, 6 that *Prâna* merges into heat (*tejas*), we must note that, in the first place, it enters not into heat but into the overseer (*adhyaksha*) by which is to be understood "the overseer of the cage of the "body and the organs," that is, the individual soul (*jîva*) (p. 1091, 6); the latter (*jîva*) is defined on this occasion as "self of knowledge endowed with the limitations (*upâdhi*) of "knowledge, works and previous experience" (p. 1091, 9), by which, as we shall show immediately, the moral character is to be understood. With the latter the soul seems to be more closely united than with its organs; for while these must first enter into it, the moral character clings to the soul of itself.— Even though in the successive stages of the entering in the fundamental passage Chând. 6, 8, 6, does not mention the individual soul, yet its insertion between *Prâna* and *Tejas* is justified by another scriptural passage (Brih. 4, 3, 38, translated above p. 192) in which it is said that at death all the *Prânas* enter into the soul, and that, when the latter

departs, life and with it all the organs of life,¹²⁶ depart with it (p. 1091, 12).

4. Only after the Prâṇas have entered into the soul which is accompanied by the moral character, does the soul enter with them into heat, by which here, as will shortly be further shown, are to be understood the other elements also, as well as heat (*tejas*), in that sublimated form, in which they constitute the seed of the body (p. 1092, 2). This absorption of the Prâṇas into the soul, of the soul into heat, does not contradict the words of the fundamental passage, according to which the Prâṇas enter into heat; for if a man goes from *Çrughna* to *Mathurâ* and from *Mathurâ* to *Pâtāliputram*, he has thereby gone from *Çrughna* to *Pâtāliputram* (p. 1093, 2).

3. The subtle Body.

Sûtras 4, 2, 6—11. 3, 1, 1—6; cf. 1, 4, 1—7.

The soul with the organs of conscious and unconscious life (*Indriyas*, *Manas*, *Prâṇa*) which have entered into it, further needs in order to be able to withdraw from the body a vehicle (*âçraya*) of material nature, since without such, without a material basis, as experience shows, nothing living can move or stand (p. 744, 9). This basis is the subtle body, *sûkshmaṃ çarîram* (p. 341, 3. 1097, 14), or, as Çaṅkara usually paraphrases it: *deha-vijâni bhûta-sûkshmanî* (p. 740, 8. 741, 3. 744, 2; cf. 1095, 10. 1092, 10), that is, "the fine parts of the elements which form the seed of the body."¹²⁷ In order hereafter

¹²⁶ That the soul takes the Prâṇas with it depends on the fact that without them the soul can neither move nor enjoy in the life after death (p. 745, 5); therefore when it is said (Brih. 3, 2, 13) that the Prâṇas at death go to the Gods, the eye to the sun, the breath to the wind, etc., this is only a metaphorical (*bhâkta*, *gauṇa*) expression (p. 745, 1), which means that at death the Gods withdraw (p. 745, 8) their assistance from the organs (above p. 337 ff.).

¹²⁷ Cf. *bhûta-sûkshmam* 206, 1. 207, 1. 341, 6. (plur.) 743, 1; and *bhûta-mâtrâḥ* 740, 13. 14; the expression *tanmâtrâṇi* is, so far as we know, not yet to be found in Çaṅkara's Commentary.—These fine parts of the elements, which form the seed of the body, are of like nature with the seed from which the world after its destruction comes forth anew each



to attain a body consisting of the different elements, the soul must take with it the seed of this body, and this seed, not of heat alone, but of all the elements, is to be understood, when in the fundamental passage, Chând. 6, 8, 6, it is said: Life enters into heat. For the scripture says (Brih. 4, 4, 5): "(this 'soul is) of the nature of earth, water, air, ether, heat" (p. 1093, 12), and the Smṛiti (Manu 1, 27) declares:

"The infinitely minute parts of the Five,
"From which arises all in order."

Now these elementary germs of the future body, embraced by which the soul leaves the body (p. 741, 3), are also to be understood in the explanations in 3, 1, 1—6 by the term waters, which according to the doctrine of the Five Fires speak with human voice at the fifth offering, after having been offered five times in succession,—as Faith, Soma, Rain, Food, and Seed,—by the Gods in the Fires of Heaven, the Atmosphere, the Earth, Man, and Woman (p. 741, 6). True, only water is there spoken of (p. 742, 11), but under that name the germs of all the elements are to be understood (p. 744, 2) and these are called water, first, because according to p. 240 above water contains in itself (p. 743, 4) all elements (of which here, following Chând. 6, 2, three only are named; on this see p. 231 above), then because in the body, which likewise consists of them all (above p. 240ff.), water preponderates (p. 743, 9).

These waters then, representing the totality of the elementary germs, are thus what forms the bridge from one human existence to another by being offered successively as Faith, Soma, Rain, Food, and Seed. The description of the last four as water is readily explained from the preponderance of the water element in these materials (p. 746, 1); but by faith,

time (above p. 70. 228); they are both regarded as being alluded to by the *avyaktam* of Kâth. 3, 11 and the *aksharam* of Muṇḍ. 2, 1, 2; p. 341, 12 *jagad idam anabhivyakta-nâmarûpam, vîja-âtmakam, prâg-avastham avyakta-çabda-arham—tad-âtmanâ ca çarîrasya* (that is, of the subtle body) *api avyakta-çabda-arhatvam*; and p. 206, 1: the *aksharam* is *avy-âkritam, nâmarûpa-vîjaçakti-rûpam bhûtasûkshmam, îçvara-âçrayam* (the material substratum in the creation of the world), *tasya eva upâdhi-bhûtam* (only an Upâdhi of the Îçvara, not a *pradhânam* independent of him).



which appears as the sacrificial element in the first offering the same waters are equally to be understood (p. 746, 6), first, because only in that way can question and answer harmonise with each other (p. 746, 10), then, because the first offering, being the cause of the subsequent ones as its effects, cannot be essentially different in nature from them (p. 746, 13). "Further "it is not possible, in so far as Faith, being an idea (*pratyaya*), "is a quality of Manas or the soul, to tear it away from the "substance in which it inheres, like the heart, etc. of a sacrificial victim, to use it as an offering. By the word 'Faith' "therefore the waters are to be understood" (p. 747, 1—3). This designation corresponds to the usage of the Veda (Taitt. samh. 1, 6, 8, 1: *çraddhâ vâ' âpah*), and is explained by the fact, that the waters as seeds of the body assume a subtlety like that of faith (p. 747, 5), somewhat as one might call a hero of lion-like courage, a lion (p. 747, 6).—We shall see shortly, how our author brings himself into palpable contradiction with this express explanation of "faith" as the elementary seed of the body.

This "subtle body," forming the seed of the body,—subtle, because it departs through the veins (p. 1097, 7)—has, according to its essential nature, on one hand extension (*tanutvam*) and so the capacity of locomotion (p. 1097, 8), on the other, however, transparency (*svacchatvam*), in virtue of which it meets with no obstacle in departing and also is not seen by those standing round (p. 1097, 8). The bodily warmth proceeds from it (p. 1097, 14; otherwise Chând. 3, 13, 8, translated above p. 169); hence during life the body feels warm to the touch, after death on the contrary cold, while in other respects the body is yet unchanged (p. 1098, 1). Finally, it is owing to the subtle nature of this body, that it is not also injured when the (gross) body is injured: for example (p. 1097, 11) by burning (by which we must naturally not think of the burning of the corpse).

Sûtram 4, 2, 8: "*Until the entrance, because of the declaration as to Samsâra.*"—Commentary: "When further on in "the text (Chând. 6, 8, 6, above p. 367) it is said: 'the heat "enters into the highest Godhead,' this means that the



"above-mentioned heat [meaning the subtle body] accompanied
"by the Onlooker, by Prâṇa, and the host of the organs and
"united with the other elements, enters at death into the
"highest Godhead. But of what kind is this entrance? this
"is to be considered. One might think it to be a final dis-
"solution of the own being in the highest Godhead, from
"which it came forth; for the origin of all existence, of all
"that has become bodily is, as we have established, the highest
"Godhead; and thus also this entering into non-separateness
"would be final.—To this we reply: *this* subtle body formed
"out of heat, etc., as it is the bearer of the organs, ear, etc.,
"continues to exist *until the entrance*, until liberation from
"Samsâra, as that liberation follows upon the perfect know-
"ledge; *because of the declaration as to Samsâra*, as it is given
"in the words (Kâth. 5, 7):

"The one attains a mother's womb and takes a human form,
"Another animates a plant, as deeds and knowledge fate."

"For otherwise mere dying would be for everyone a dissolution
"of the Upâdhis and a final entrance into Brahman; but then
"the Canon of Law would be purposeless, and equally so the
"Canon of Knowledge. But bondage has its ground in false
"knowledge and can therefore be loosed in no other way than
"by perfect knowledge. Hence, in spite of its origin from it,
"this entrance of the soul there into the Existent, like that in
"deep sleep and at the dissolution of the world, is such that
"a seed remains over and persists" (p. 1096, 3—1097, 3).

—In reality this entrance into Brahman, retained for the
sake of the Vedic texts, is a mere passing through Brahman,
and not even that: for the system, as such, knows nothing of
it, but makes the souls pass immediately after death either
by the *Pitriyâna* to the moon, or into hell, or finally by the
Devayâna into the (lower) Brahman.

Upon all these Paths the soul is accompanied by the subtle
body: for the latter, as we saw, continues to exist as long as
Samsâra, but *Samsâra* has existed from Eternity (above
p. 280) and endures until liberation, whence it follows that
as the soul is clothed from all eternity with the organs (above
p. 312) so also it is clothed with the subtle body and so it



remains until it gains perfect knowledge, that is, esoteric knowledge. On the other hand, the exoteric knowledge, as it leads upwards into the lower Brahman by the *Devayâna*, does not free the soul from the subtle body. True, as this subtle body is a support of the soul by the elements, this support is for the purpose of rebirth, but rebirth no longer takes place in one who has (exoteric) knowledge, since according to the scripture he attains immortality (which means that he is no longer subject to death, above pp. 149. 287), for these reasons one might think that only the Ignorance (p. 1094, 12) departs (clothed with the subtle body); but this is not so: rather it is exactly the same in the case of the ignorant and of the possessor of (exoteric) knowledge except the difference of the Paths which they respectively take; the ignorant passes with the subtle body to new embodiment, the (exoteric) knower passes on his own special path to immortality (p. 1095, 10); true, immortality in the full sense of the word is not the sojourn in a given place and thus requires no going thither and therefore no material substratum (p. 1095, 13); but the immortality of the (exoteric) knower, with which we are here concerned, is only relative (*âpekshika*), since he has not yet burned up all Ignorance; hence for it a going, and, in order that this may be possible, a subtle body as material vehicle, are required, as without it no going can occur (p. 1096, 1).

4. Moral Determination of the transmigrating Soul.

(a) Prefatory Remark.

All the Upâdhis hitherto discussed, clothed with which the soul departs (namely, *indriyâni*, *manas*, *mukhya prâna*, *sûkshmaṃ çarîram*), are purely neutral, not individually determined principles, and the soul itself is the same, as, according to its nature, it is identical with Brahman and is only apparently different from him through its being clothed with the said Upâdhis. Thus the soul with all its organs is entirely neutral, bearing in itself no moral distinction,—quite consistently with the Indian and, indeed, with every other standpoint, which, like it, places the essential nature of the soul in Knowing not in Willing.

But whence then the moral determinations, which condition the differences of character, the differences of Paths in the Beyond, the contrast of reward and punishment in the other world, and the form of the subsequent rebirth in this world?—

We must assume for the departing soul, besides the just described elementary substratum (*bhûta-âçraya*) a second, viz. a moral substratum (*karma-âçraya*), and these two are expressly distinguished by Qaṅkara (p. 1094, 5) under these names.

Now in what does this moral substratum consist, which conditions all differences of character and of destiny?

Like all moral points, this important question is very inadequately dealt with by Qaṅkara (for reasons indicated above p. 59), and all that we find about it consists in occasional references to certain passages of scripture, which therefore we are to follow, according to the intentions of our author.

(b) The *Karma-âçraya*.

Sûtram 4, 2, 6, p. 1094.

In Brih. 3, 2, 13, the son of *Ritabhâga* questions *Yājñavalkya*:

“‘*Yājñavalkya*,’ he said: ‘when after a man dies his speech
“‘enters into fire, his breath into the wind, his eye into the
“‘sun, his Manas into the moon, his ear into the cardinal
“‘points, his body into the earth, his Âtman into the Âkâça,
“‘the hair on his body into plants, the hair on his head into
“‘trees, his blood and seed into water,—where then does the
“‘man remain?’—Then spake *Yājñavalkya*: ‘Take me, *Ârta-*
“‘*bhâga*, dear one, by the hand; upon this we two must speak
“‘alone together, not here in the assembly.’—Then the two
“‘went out and conversed together; and what they spoke of,
“‘that was work, and what they praised, that was work.—
“‘Verily, through good work one becomes good, through evil
“‘work, evil.’”

“Then the son of *Ritabhâga* was silent.”

Upon this remarkable passage, in which we seem to have the very birth of the doctrine of transmigration before our eyes, Qaṅkara merely remarks (p. 1094, 6), that it only lays

stress upon works and does not thereby exclude the other, material-substratum of the soul, the *bhûta-âçraya*, that is, the subtle body, which is spoken of *loc. cit.* The contradiction that the organs, according to this passage, enter into the forces of nature, while in our system the soul withdraws them into itself, he puts aside in the manner indicated in note 126, above p. 370.—In another respect the circumstance that besides the *çarîram* the *âtman* also (according to Çaṅkara, it would be indeed the *âtma-adhishtânam hridaya-âkâçam*) dissolves, while the *karman* persists, is very remarkable, in its bearing on Buddhism.

(c) *Vidyâ-karma-pûrvaprajñâ*.

Sûtram 3, 4, 11.

Of the soul after death it is said in Brih. 4, 4, 2 (translated above p. 193): "then their knowledge and their works "and their newly gained experience take them by the hand,"—the last, as we read *apûrvaprajñâ* and find here already the conception of the *apûrvam*, which will be further spoken of shortly. Çaṅkara, indeed, reads (p. 740, 4. 1091, 9) *pûrvaprajñâ*, "previous experience" (which in the Com. on Brih. p. 843, he understands as *pûrva-anubhûta-vishayâ prajñâ*, "the "consciousness of what has been experienced before"). The contrast between knowledge and works he explains 3, 4, 11 at first following the Sûtram to mean that the former (those who go by the *Devayâna*) are taken by the hand by knowledge, the latter (those for whom the soul's transmigration continues by the *Pitriyâna*), are taken by the hand by works (p. 984, 4); but then he remembers that here it is not yet a question of liberation (to which the *Devayâna* also leads), but only of Samsâra, and explains, in harmony with his commentary on Brih. 4, 4, 2 that the question is only one of knowledge concerning *Samsâra*, that therefore by *Vidyâ* is to be understood here "ordained and forbidden knowledge" (Govinda cites as an example of the former the *Udgîtha*, of the latter *nagna-strî-darçanam*), as by *karman* the doing what is ordained and what is forbidden (p. 984, 9). By *Pûrvaprajñâ* in Brih. l. c. he understands, as already observed, "previous experience"



and explains it as impressions (*vâsanâ*) which things leave behind in the soul, and upon which depend inborn gifts for artistic work (he gives as an example talent for painting) and perhaps also for moral conduct,¹²⁸—the last if we may thus understand *vishaya-upabhogeshu* and *karmani* (on Brih. p. 844, 5. 7) where however this idea, so important for us, of an inborn determination of the moral character is only touched on casually, not distinctly developed.

(d) The *Apûrvam*.

Sûtras 3, 2, 38—41. 3, 1, 6.

In the endless chain of transmigration, every new life is conditioned in its doing and suffering by the works of the preceding life; these therefore bring about the changes in the soul's destiny, and these changes interpose as a new moment, as "something which was not there before" (*apûrvam*), (although they too, consistently with the system, cf. above p. 322, are necessitated by the life preceding them). This conception of the *Apûrvam*¹²⁹ belongs to the *Karmamâmânsâ* school and is for it the metaphysical link between work and its retribution, that which persists when work has passed away and its fruit has not yet appeared. The opinion of *Jaimini* is thus summarised on p. 841, 6 of our work: "It is not possible that "previous work should bear within it the fruit as yet hidden "in the future, unless it causes a given *Apûrvam* to proceed "from itself. Therefore certain subtle persisting elements of "the work, or preparatory elements of its fruit, are termed "*Apûrvam*." Now this conception of the *Apûrvam* is disputed

¹²⁸ On Brih. p. 844, 2—8: *Drigya te ca keshâncit kâsucit kriyâsu citra-karma-âdi-lakshanâsu vinâ eva iha-abhyâsena janmata' eva kauçalam; kâsucit atyanta-saukarya-yuktâsu api akauçalam keshâncit; tathâ vishaya-upabhogeshu svabhâvata' eva keshâncit kauçala-akauçale drigya te; tac ca etat sarvam pûrvaprajñâ-udbhava-anudbhava-nimittam. Tena pûrvaprajñayâ vinâ karmani vâ phala-upabhoge vâ na kasyacit pravrittir upapadyate.*

¹²⁹ Besides the passages cited above we find the *Apûrvam* only on p. 1139, 5 (on p. 1020, 6 it occurs in its etymological meaning). On the nearly allied conception of the *Adrishtam* compare pp. 697, 4. 9. 697, 12. 15. 698, 7. 699, 3. 7. 8. 703, 1. 2. 754, 10. 819, 10. 521, 2. 968, 8. 1074, 2.



by Caṅkara in the passage cited, in so far as the Vedānta places retribution in the hand of God (cf. on this point above pp. 279, 323); the *Apūrvam* is something non-spiritual and cannot therefore act without being moved by something spiritual (p. 840, 2); hence the fruit cannot be explained by the mere *Apūrvam* (p. 842, 1); "whether therein God has regard to the action, or to the *Apūrvam*, in either case the fruit comes "from Him" (p. 842, 2).

We must not see in this passage an unconditional rejection of the *Apūrvam*, if we do not wish to place ourselves in contradiction with 3, 1, 6, where the *Apūrvam* makes its appearance directly as a well known and admitted conception, in order to explain the Faith which, according to the doctrine of the Five Fires, is offered in the first fire, and this indeed in quite another way than that which we have considered in Chapter XXXI, 3, above p. 371.

(e) The *Ṣraddhā*.

Sūtras 3, 1, 2. 5. 6.

The explanation of Faith (*ṣraddhā*) given above p. 372 as "the waters, as these represent the subtle parts of the elements "which form the seed of the body," appears indeed very forced; first, because, so far as we can see, the conception of the subtle body accompanying the soul, has as yet no existence whatever in Brih., Chānd. or any of the older Upanishads; then because the Indian *ṣraddhā* (just as, though wrongly most probably, by Lactant. inst. 4, 28 the Latin *religio*) is etymologically traced back to the conception of knitting together and means the link between man and the Beyond, thus appearing to require a moral explanation. Such an explanation is offered without forcing the meaning: for it is quite natural to understand by *ṣraddhā* (which Caṅkara, on Praṇa, p. 250, 6 defines as *ṣubha-karma-pravṛtti-hetu*) in Brih. and Chānd. *loc. cit.*, the works of man produced by faith, as they condition his weal and woe in the Beyond; and this very explanation is also offered by Caṅkara, whereby he brings himself into irreconcilable contradiction with himself. For after he has, on p. 747, given the explanation of Faith, quoted above on p. 372,



as the Waters, meaning the subtle body, he then immediately on p. 747, 7ff. explains Faith as the Waters, rising upwards in the sacrifice, they are the bearers of the works conditioned by Faith;—thus in the one case they were the garment of the dead, here they are the moral treasure, which the still living performers of the sacrifice lay up for themselves in heaven: “thus the Waters consisting of the sacrificial libations wherein “inheres the work conditioned by faith, these waters in the “form of the *Apūrvam* clothe the souls which bring the sacrifice and lead them, to receive their reward, into the other “world” (p. 748, 10); in the same manner Ṣaṅkara explains *graddhā*, p. 743, 16 as the *karma-samavāyīnyā’ āpas* and again two lines afterwards as the *deha-vijāni bhūta-sūkṣhmāni*. By this all the explanations in 3, 1, 1—6 are rendered very far from clear and the impression is produced not so much that they originated from two different hands, as rather that a single hand had endeavoured to preserve two mutually irreconcilable interpretations and work them up into an apparent whole.

5. The Path into the Beyond.

Sūtram 4, 2, 7.

After the soul has drawn back into itself its perceptive powers, the organs, in the way just described, it then (according to Brih. 4, 4, 1) enters into the heart (in which, however, according to p. 311 above it already is); “thereupon the point of “the heart becomes luminous; from this, after it has become “luminous, the soul departs, either through the eye, or through “the skull, or through other parts of the body” (Brih. 4, 4, 2, above p. 192f.); up to the moment when the point of the heart becomes luminous and thereby lights up the way (p. 1104, 9), everything is the same for the ignorant and for the (exoteric) knower; here, however, the way divides, in that the knowers depart through the head, the ignorant through other parts of the body (p. 1104, 10), for thus says the Scripture (Chând. 8, 6, 6 = Kâth. 6, 16):