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ḌLOKA VĀRTIKA

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSKRIT WITH EXTRACTS FROM THE
COMMENTARIES OF SUKARITA MIŚRA (THE KĀŚIKĀ) AND
PĀRTHASĀRATHI MIŚRA (THE NYĀYARATNĀKARA).



BY
GANGANĀTHA JHĀ, M.A.,
PROFESSOR OF SANSKRIT, MUIR CENTRAL COLLEGE, ALLAHABAD.

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ĀLOKAVARTIKA.

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INTRODUCTION.

The word 'Mīmāṃsā'—more properly 'Pūrva Mīmāṃsā'—is applied to the system originally propounded by Jaimini. The other names given to this system are—'Pūrvakāṇḍa,' 'Karma-Mīmāṃsā,' 'Karmakāṇḍa,' 'Yajñavidyā,' 'Adhvaramīmāṃsā,' 'Dharmamīmāṃsā,' and so forth—some people even speak of it as the 'Dvādaśalākṣhṇī.'

Inasmuch as the avowed object of this system is a consideration of *Dharma* it is commonly spoken of as 'Dharmamīmāṃsā.' Of the Veda, there are three sections or *Kāṇḍas*: The *Karmakāṇḍa*, the *Upāsanākāṇḍa*, and the 'Jñānakāṇḍa.' And it is only that portion of the Veda which is contained in the first of these that is dealt with in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*; and for this reason it is spoken of as 'Pūrvakāṇḍa,' *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, or 'Karmamīmāṃsā.' Though the *Karmakāṇḍa* of the Veda treats of many such actions as 'Sacrifice,' 'Giving,' 'Offering,' and the like, yet it is of the sacrifice that this system treats mostly, and it is full of discussions about sacrifices only. And for this reason people speak of this as 'yajñamīmāṃsā' or 'Adhvaramīmāṃsā.'

This consideration of *Dharma* is found to consist of twelve parts; and these parts have been put by Jaimini in the form of twelve *Adhyāyas*; and hence the system has come to be known by the name of 'Dvādaśalākṣhṇī.'

For a detailed explanation of the subject-matter of each *Adhyāya* and *adhīkarana*, the reader is referred to the Appendix.

While chiefly dealing with these subjects, Jaimini has in many places dealt with other things in connection with these. It is clear that all that is treated of by Jaimini is chiefly Vedic. In the work known as the 'Veda'—beginningless and authorless,—were found mentioned here and there, at random, many sacrifices, offerings, &c. And hence it was very difficult to understand and grasp the methods and procedure of the various sacrifices, (&c.); consequently, at the time of the performance of a sacrifice, at each step the performers would meet with serious doubts and difficulties. And all this difficulty has, once for all, been set aside by Jaimini, by means of the *Sūtras* dealt with here. And it was only after the *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy had been duly propounded that the path of *Karmakāṇḍa* became easy.

At the very outset, Jaimini divided the Vedic sentences into two kinds: The *Mantra* and the *Brāhmaṇa*. The former is now known as the 'Saṁhitā'—f.i. *R̥gvedā saṁhitā*, &c. There are many *Brāhmaṇas* that are known as 'Upanishat,' f.i. the *Brhadāranyaka* and

the *Chāndogya*. Then again he proceeds to sub-divide these two kinds into other sorts—the *Rk*, the *Sāma*, and the *Yaju*.

The definitions that he lays down for the differentiation of the *Mantra* and the *Brāhmaṇa* are embodied in the *Sūtras* II—i—32 and 33; wherein it is said that, that which, at the time of the performance of a sacrifice, points out certain details in connection with it is called '*Mantra*;' and the rest are called '*Brāhmaṇa*.' But the earlier authors have distinctly declared that this definition of '*Mantra*' is only a tentative one; as there are many *Mantras* that do not fulfil the conditions herein laid down; and are yet called '*Mantras*.' The '*Mantras*,' in reality, take the place of *Aphorisms* dealing with sacrificial details, and the *Brāhmaṇas* are commentaries on them; in fact, they are frequently spoken of as such by *Çankarācārya*.

Rk, *Yajush* and *Sāma* are the three sub-divisions of the said two divisions of the *Veda*. Among *Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas*, that sentence wherein we have distinct divisions into 'feet,' is called a '*Rk*' (*Sūtra* II—i—35);—the other names of which are '*Rçā*,' '*Çloka*,' '*Mantra*.' The sentences that are capable of being sung are known as '*Sāma*' (II—i—36). The rest are called '*Yajush*' (II—i—37).

The text of the *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy is the most extensive of all; the *Sūtras* have twelve *Adhyāyas*, divided into sixty *Pādas*, containing about 1,000 *Sūtrās*, dealing with 1,000 sections or *Adhikaraṇas*.

The word '*Ādhikārāṇā*' really means 'Discussion,' 'Consideration,' 'Inquiry,' 'Investigation.' In the *Mīmāṃsā* we find that each Discussion is made up of five parts: viz.: (1) *Vishaya*—the subject-matter under consideration (2) *Viçaya*, or *Sançaya*—the doubt arising in connection with that matter, (3) *Purvāpaksha*—the standpoint of the opponent, and the arguments in support thereof, (4) *Uttara* or *Siddhānta*—the demonstrated conclusion, (5) *Sançati*—Relevancy of the discussion with the particular context. Some authors explain '*uttara*' as the arguments against the view of the opponent, and instead of '*Sançati*' they have '*Nirṇaya*' which they explain as '*Siddhānta*.' This system of discussion is adopted, more or less, in all the Sanskrit philosophical systems.

The *Sūtras* are all arranged in the above order of discussion. But a mere reading of the *Sūtras* does not afford us any idea as to where a discussion ends, and another begins. For all these, as also for a proper understanding of the *Sūtras* themselves, we have to fall back upon certain commentaries upon the *Sūtras*.

Of these commentaries, and commentaries on commentaries we have an almost endless series. The oldest commentary on the *Sūtras* that

is available now, is the *Bhāṣhya* by Ṣavara Svāmi (published in the *Bibliotheca Indica*); though we find this *Bhāṣhya* referring to other commentaries, chief among which is the *Vṛtti* of the "revered Upavarsha." On the *Bhāṣhya*, we have the commentary of Kamārila Bhatta, generally spoken of as "Bhatta." This work is divided into three parts, known under three different names: (1) The *Ḡlokavārtika*, treating of the first, the *Tarka*, (Polemical) *Pāda* of the First *Adhyāya* (published in the 'Caukhambhā Sanskrit Series,' Benares); (2) The *Tantravārtika*, dealing with the last three *Pādas* of *Adhyāya* I, and the whole of *Adhyāyas* II and III (published in the 'Benares Sanskrit Series,' and being translated into English by the present translator);—and (3) The *Tuṭṭikā*—dealing with *Adhyāyas* IV—XII (published in the 'Benares Sanskrit Series'). On the first of these, we know of two commentaries: (1) The *Kācīkā* by Sucarita Miṣra, and (2) the *Nyāyaratnāṅkara* of Pārthasārāthi Miṣra (published in the 'Caukhambhā Sanskrit Series,' Benares); extracts from these two commentaries have been put in as notes in the present work; and (3) the *Nyāyasudhā* of Somēṣvara Bhatta. On the second, the only commentary we know of is the *Nyāyasudhā*, generally known as '*Bāṇaka*,' by Somēṣvara Bhatta (in course of publication in the 'Caukhambhā Sanskrit Series,' Benares). And on the third, we have only one proper commentary, the *Vārtikābharana* by Vēṅkaṭa Dikshita; the other, the *Tantrarātna* cannot be spoken of as a 'commentary' in the proper sense of the word; as it is a semi-independent commentary on the *Sūtras* themselves, though here and there, taking up and explaining certain passages from the *Bhāṣhya* and the *Vārtika*. This closes the list of works, indirectly dealing with the present work.

The first *Sūtra* of *Pāda* i, *Adhyāya* I, deals with the usefulness of an investigation into *Dharma*. In the remaining part of the *Pāda*, we have a treatment of the questions—What is *Dharma*? What is its definition? By what means of knowledge is *Dharma* cognisable? and so forth. From the beginning of the second *Pāda* to the end of the *Adhyāya*, we have a consideration of the means of *Dharma*, and its Result, as also the authoritative character of the *Veda*, as the sole means of knowing *Dharma*.

[SŪTRA (1).]

The meaning of the *Sūtra* is that inasmuch as *Dharma* is a purpose that is conceivable by means of the *Veda* alone, and the *Veda* is the only authority for it, after the student has finished the study of the *Veda*, he should continue with his teacher a little longer, with a view to learn the details of *Dharma*.

This *Sūtra* contains two *Adhikaraṇas*, i.e., it treats of two subjects :

- (1) Is a study of the Veda necessary for all the three higher castes ?
- (2) Is *Dharma* a subject for consideration ? It is only the latter aspect of the *Sūtra* that has been dealt with by the commentators; and the obvious reason for this is that with regard to the former, there can be no doubt in the mind of any person who is not an avowed Atheist, and as such not to be admitted into a philosophical discussion.

The *Adhikaraṇa* dealing with the latter question is thus explained in detail:—

(a) The *subject* of discussion—the passages that form the subject-matter of the discussion—are the following two: 'One should study the Veda,' and then 'one should perform the Conclusive Bath after having studied the Veda.'

(b) The *doubt* arising with regard to these sentences is this: 'Should one perform the Conclusive Bath, immediately after he has finished the reading of the *text* of the Veda, or should he postpone it, and continue his stay with the teacher, a little longer, in order to learn something about the nature of *Dharma* ?'

(c) The *opposite view* (the *Pūrvapakṣa*) is that the Bath should be performed immediately after the study of the Vedic text has been finished.

(d) The *Reply* to the opposite view is as follows: The sentence 'one should study the Veda' does not mean a mere getting up of the verbal text, it also means a due understanding of the sense of the scriptures. And unless one ponders over the passages, he cannot arrive at a due understanding of their sense. Consequently a mere reading of the text does not afford us a due knowledge of *Dharma*, without which the study cannot be said to have borne its true fruit; and hence we cannot admit that the Conclusive Bath is to be performed immediately after the text has been got up.

(e) The *Siddhānta* or final conclusion arrived at is that after the student has got up the verbal text of the Veda, he should continue his stay with the teacher a little longer, for the purpose of learning all about *Dharma*.

The above shows the way in which the writers on *Mīmāṃsā* put forward the various *Adhikaraṇas*.

The commentators have pointed out that the *Sūtra* in question also implies the necessity of learning the character of *Adharma*; as without such knowledge, one could not exactly know what he should avoid. But none of them have gone into the details of *Adharma*, simply because a knowledge of *Dharma* would naturally give us an idea of its being contrary; and as such no separate treatment of this was necessary.

[SŪTRA (2).]

The questions dealt with in this *Sūtra* are: What is *Dharma*? What is the authority—means of knowing—*Dharma*?

The meaning of the *Sūtra* is that '*Dharma*' is the name that is given to those actions resulting in good, that have been laid down by Vedic injunctions. The commentators have gone into very elaborate details in connection with this *Sūtra*; the upshot of which is this: When an action is performed, there arises in the soul of the performer a certain potential energy, in the shape of a particular property or character, that, at some future time, brings about an eminently satisfactory result; and it is this potential energy that is called '*Dharma*' '*Punya*,' '*Ābhyaśrita*' and so forth.

The *Adhikaraṇa* contained in the *Sūtra* may be expressed as follows:—

(a) The *subject-matter* is *Dharma*.

(b) The *doubt* is as to whether or not there is a means of knowing *Dharma*. Is this means contained in Sense-perception and the other ordinary means of knowledge? Or, is *Dharma* knowable only by means of Vedic Injunctions? Is the action of these injunctions in any way helped by Sense-perception and the rest?

(c) The *opposite view* is this: Vedic injunctions are not the means of knowing *Dharma*. All sentences serve only to describe things that have been known by means of Sense-perception, &c., and as such they cannot be accepted as independent means of knowledge. The conclusion led to by this view is either that (1) there is no means of knowing *Dharma*, or (2) that *Dharma* is cognisable by means of Sense-perception or Inference; or (3) that *Dharma* is perceptible by the senses, for the *Yogis*, while for us it is to be known either by means of Inference, or by that of Vedic injunctions; or (4) that it is known by means of Vedic Injunctions as aided by Apparent Inconsistency. The sense of this last theory is that unless we admit of a super-physical cause, we are unable to explain the gradations and differences that we meet with in the universe; and it is the Apparent Inconsistency of these differences that points to the existence of such a cause in the shape of *Dharma*; and then it is the *Dharma* whose particular character is known by means of Vedic Injunctions. In any case *Dharma* is not cognisable by means of Vedic Injunctions alone.

(d) The *reply* to the *opposite view* is as follows: When we find that the idea given rise to by the Injunction is not contradicted by any produced by other means of knowledge, we cannot but admit the undisputed authority of that sentence. And hence, so long as we have distinct words affording us the due knowledge of *Dharma*, we

cannot very reasonably declare that there is no means of knowing it. In the case of the words of ordinary persons, there are various causes of mistake—as for instance, carelessness, deliberate desire to cheat, and so forth; and as such the authority of such words might very well be doubted. The case of Vedic sentences, however, is quite different, as it has not been composed by human agency; and as such there being no chance of any of the aforesaid causes of mistake, the words of the Veda cannot but be admitted to have a self-sufficient authority in all matters wherewith they may deal. As for Sense-perception and the rest, they are found always to point to things that exist in the present, and have nothing to say with regard to things in the future. As for the perception of *Yogis* also, this is based upon *memory*; and as this always pertains to pre-conceived things, even Yogic perception cannot apply to *Dharma*, which has never been perceived or thought of, and is yet to come.

(e) The *Siddhānta*, or conclusion, arrived at is that Vedic Injunctions are the only means of knowing *Dharma*.

We have given above the sample as to how each *Adhikarana* is worked up. The *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* deals with a thousand of such *Adhikaranas*, each of which has been very tersely put in the form of one or more *Sūtras*.

Inasmuch as the Second *Sūtra* lays down the two fundamental propositions—that (1) Vedic Injunctions are the only means of knowing *Dharma*, and (2) that Vedic Injunctions are wholly authoritative as as such means——, that form the keystone of the whole system, people have come to speak of this *Sūtra* as the 'Prātijñā' *Sūtra*. It is with a detailed working out and supporting of these propositions that the rest of the First *Pāda* is taken up.

[SŪTRAS 3—5.]

Proceeding to examine the means of acquiring the due knowledge of *Dharma*, Jaimini comes to the following conclusions: (1) Inasmuch as Sense-perception consists of the cognition brought about by the contact of the sense-organ with the material object,—and as such it can only pertain to things existing at the present time,—it cannot serve as the rightful means of knowing *Dharma*; because *Dharma* is not a material object, and it does not exist at the present time. (2) The relationship between the Word and its signification is natural and eternal; it is not created by Convention; consequently, the cognition brought about by a Vedic Injunction is absolutely and unconditionally

true; it is a permanent authoritative means of knowledge; its authority is self-sufficient and self-manifest. (3) When we have found with regard to any two things that they are related in such a way that wherever the one is, there the other also is present,—then whenever on some future occasion, we actually see any one of these, we at once conclude that the other also must exist; and this cognition is what is called 'Inference;' but this Inference is of no use in obtaining a knowledge of *Dharma*.

As the whole fabric of Jaimini's philosophy is based upon the second of these conclusions—the Self-sufficiency of Verbal Cognition—he devotes a special *Adhikarana* to a full discussion of the question.

[SŪTRĀS 6—11.]

The objections against this self-sufficient authority, embodied in *Sūtras* 6—11, are based upon those against the eternity of all words in general, and of the Veda in particular. These may be thus summed up: (1) It is a fact of ordinary perception that all verbal utterance is an action brought about by human effort; and as such, having had no existence, prior to this effort, it cannot be believed to be eternal. (2) It is found, at best, to enjoy a very brief existence; and actually found to be destroyed as soon as uttered. (3) We find people speaking of 'making' an utterance, which would not be possible if the word were eternal; as then it would be ever-present, and would require no 'making.' (4) The same word is found to be uttered, at one and the same time, by various persons, at various places. This would not be possible, if the word were an eternal omnipresent entity. (5) Then again we find in grammar that words undergo several modifications,—*f. i.*, the letter (*i*) changes into (*ya*); and certainly that which is eternal can have no modification. (6) We find the volume of the word decreasing or increasing, according as it is uttered by one or more men; and certainly that which increases and decreases can never be eternal.

[SŪTRĀS 12—17.]

These are the six objections against the eternal character of the Word. Jaimini meets every one of these in *Sūtras* 12—17. The arguments contained in these *Sūtras* may be thus summed up: (1) The mere fact of the word not being heard before it is uttered, does not prove that it did not exist before, or that it has been *created* by the utterance; all that it shows is that it was not manifest to our perception, and the utterance serves to make it perceptible. (2) Similarly, the word is not destroyed after being uttered; the fact is that the effect of the manifestive agency of the utterance having passed off, the word reverts to

its original unmanifested state; there are many things in the world that exist, though they are not perceptible. (3) People speak of the *making* of the word; but that refers to the *sound* that manifests the word; and this manifesting agency is certainly due to human effort. (4) As for the simultaneous utterance of the same word by many persons,—this is analogous to the case of the single sun being simultaneously perceived by many persons. That is to say, just as many people, at different places, simultaneously perceive the single sun, so do they utter and hear the same word also. (5) What the grammatical rules lay down is not a *modification* of the letters; it is not that the 'i' is *changed* into 'ya'; but that the latter takes the place of the former. (6) The volume of the Word never undergoes increase or decrease; it is only the sound proceeding from the throats of men that increases or decreases.

[SŪTRAS 18—23.]

Having thus met the opponent's objections, Jaimini proceeds to bring forward his own arguments in favour of his theory. These arguments are contained in *Sūtras* 18—23. (1) The word is ever present; because the utterance of it is only for the purpose of manifesting it to others; and it is only when the word exists that such effort at manifesting it could be justified. (2) When the word 'cow' is uttered, it is always recognised to be the same word; and this recognition could not be said to be mistaken; it is universally cognisable. (3) People speak also of uttering the word 'cow' *three or four times*, and not of uttering three or four such words. This common usage also points to the oneness and the eternity of the word. (4) We do not perceive any productive or destructive cause of the word, as we do of all transitory things; and hence we cannot admit of its production or destruction. (5) Some people have held that Word is *produced* from Air. But what they really mean to be produced from the Air, is the *sound*, not the word itself; because as a matter of fact, we know that the vibrations produced in the air give rise to various degrees of *sound*; and when these vibratory waves reach the tympanum, they are sensed and perceived by the ear. And there can be no doubt that Word is something wholly distinct from *sound*, which latter only serves to manifest it. (6) We have many Vedic texts distinctly laying down the eternity of words.

[SŪTRAS 24—32.]

In this connection, the commentators have shown that though the *word* is eternal, and so is its signification, yet in all human utterances, there is always a chance of the man having mistaken notions of both; and as such there is no independent authority attaching to human

utterances. But as for the *Veda*, it is not found to have any author. It is self-existent, self-sufficient in its authority and eternal. As for the names of persons and places met with in the *Veda*, they are mere sound coincidences; the words having quite a different sense.

That *Dharma* exists and that it consists of the *Sacrifices*, *Charities* and the *Libations*, &c., enjoined in the *Veda*,—are the two propositions with regard to which there is a unanimity among *Mīmāṃsakas*. We proceed to show the points on which there is a diversity of opinion.

Sacrifices, Charities and Libations, duly performed, bring about definite results; hence *Dharma* consists of these actions. The true function of these actions lies in the bringing about of a certain potency in the soul of the performer. And it is through this potency that the performer takes his future births, for the experiencing of such results as the pleasures of Heaven and the like. To this Potency is given the technical name of '*Apūrva*,' in *Mīmāṃsā*; while in other systems it is known by such names as '*Adṛṣṭa*,' '*Puṇya*,' '*Dharma*,' and so forth. In accordance with this theory then, *Dharma* consists of the actions of sacrifice, &c., which latter consist of elaborate preparations of materials, &c.; thereby the actual form of *Dharma* is perceptible, though its function proper, in the shape of *Apūrva* is invisible, and can only be inferred.

According to other people, it is along with the Sacrifices, &c., themselves that there appears an *Apūrva*, which is the name given to the potency that leads to Heaven and other desirable results. And consequently according to these *Dharma* consists of this potency of *Apūrva*; and it is only indirectly that the name '*Dharma*' is applied to the sacrifices, &c. Just as people speak of the life-prolonging Butter, as '*longevity*,' so also do they speak of the *Dharma*-producing Sacrifice as '*Dharma*.'

Dharma and *Adharma*, the effect of bodily, verbal and mental actions; and they form the seed of all future happiness and misery. It is because the results of *Dharma* accrue to the Individual in his future life, that it is held to be imperceptible either by ordinary or yogic perception. Hence the final position arrived at is that it is cognisable by Vedic Injunction alone.

In the fact of bringing about a definite cognition, consists the authority of a Verbal expression; and its authority is independent and self-sufficient; it is unquestionable. Though it is true that even a false assertion gives rise to a cognition, yet inasmuch as in all cases of false assertion, we always either find some deficiency in the means of cognition itself, or find it to be denied subsequently by a more authoritative means of cognition,—we do not accept it as authoritatively true. But the only deficiency in Verbal Assertion, as a means of cognition, lies in the untrustworthy character of the person making that assertion; consequently

inasmuch as there is no person concerned in the Vedic assertions, we never question the authority of these, specially as none of them is found to be set aside by any subsequent means of cognition; because inherent deficiency in the means itself and the subsequent denial of the idea given rise to by it are the only two grounds for questioning the authority of a Verbal Assertion.

On this occasion, it will be necessary to consider in what way a man's idea of the authoritativeness of any means of cognition arises. That is to say, the question to be considered is—People have an idea as to this being authoritative, and that unauthoritative,—does this idea proceed naturally from the cognition itself? or, is it brought about by another cognition? or does it come about, after one has looked into the excellences and defects of its means, or after one has examined the real state of the objects cognised? or, is it that authoritativeness is ever inherent in the cognition, always appearing with itself, and it is rejected only either when one finds the actual state of things to be otherwise, or when some deficiency has been discovered in the means of the cognition? For, as a matter of fact, it is found that the idea of the true authoritativeness of a certain cognition appears and remains permanent, only when it is found that the object really exists in the form in which it is cognised, that there is no more authoritative cognition to the contrary, and when no deficiency is found in the means of that cognition. For instance, that what we see is actually a serpent is believed to be perfectly true, only when it is found on due inspection, by finding it moving, *f.i.*, that it is a serpent; secondly, when it is not found to be denied by the idea obtained by further examination of it; and, lastly, when it is ascertained that there has been no flaw in the powers of vision concerned.

In connection with this, some *Mīmāṃsakas* hold that the potency of the Cause, to bring about its effect, is inherent in it; and hence it is Cognition itself that establishes its own authority or otherwise, with regard to its nature and powers. While others hold that the Cognition is not capable at one and the same time, of establishing the truth and falsity of its object; because *truth* and *falsity* are two mutually contradictory properties and as such they could never co-exist, either in any object, or in any Cognition. Consequently it must be admitted that the truth or falsity of a cognition is ascertainable only by the presence or absence of discrepancies in its source.

Another class of *Mīmāṃsakas* declare that if, until the excellences and defects of the source have been found out, the truthfulness or otherwise of the assertion emanating therefrom remain doubtful, then it would be necessary to admit the Cognition to be devoid of any characteristics or potentialities. But this could not be very acceptable; consequently it must be

admitted that, in the first instance, the cognition is untrustworthy; but when subsequently, corroborative cognitions appearing, the untrustworthiness is set aside, its trustworthiness becomes accepted. Thus then, in the case of the Veda, so long as we do not recognise it as the work of a trustworthy author, we cannot accept it as true. On the other hand, we actually come across, in the Veda, such apparently absurd assertions as 'the trees performed the sacrifice,' which distinctly point it out as being the work of an extremely untrustworthy person.

To this, the orthodox *Mīmāṃsaka* makes the following reply: The authority or the evidential character of the Veda—or of any means of knowledge—cannot be dependent upon anything outside itself; because if a cognition did not contain within itself, its own evidence, but depended upon another cognition, then in that case, this latter cognition also would have to be justified by another cognition, and so on *ad infinitum*: and it would be absolutely impossible to accept any cognition to be true. Consequently we must admit that all cognitions are self-sufficient in their authority. But this does not mean that all cognitions or ideas are true. In the case of many we subsequently find that they are not in keeping with the real state of things, or that they had originated from a mistaken notion; and in such cases the formerly-conceived truth is set aside in view of these subsequent facts. But in cases where we have no such subsequent contradictions, we naturally admit the idea to be true. Thus then in all assertions of ordinary men, they are always open to the probability of being false, on account of the character of the persons making the assertions; and hence these are not accepted to be unconditionally true. The case of the Veda, however, is different. There is no human element in it; and consequently there is no probability of any untruthfulness vitiating its inherent self-evidential character. Nor have we, at our command, any means of knowledge that could show the Vedic assertions to be false; because the subject treated of in the Veda is not amenable to any of the recognised means of right knowledge. Then again, it has already been shown that all words are eternal; consequently the words of the Veda need not necessarily be attributed to a human author. And we find that the knowledge derived from Vedic words fulfil all the conditions of "right knowledge," viz: it is incontrovertible, it refers to things not known before, and is quite consistent with facts. The only chance of faultiness of such knowledge lies in the character of the speaker; and as there is no speaker in the case of the Veda, it is above all such faults.

This assertion of the *Mīmāṃsakas* is based upon the theory that Sound is as impartite and eternal an entity, as Time, Space, etc., and, it is not a mere property of *Akāśa*; it is beginningless and indestructible; all that

the speaker does is to help in the manifestation of certain sounds that he has conventionally fixed upon as being expressive of certain things. Then again, what is heard is not the Word, but only the Sound that serves to manifest it as it already exists eternally.

The *Mīmāṃsaka* does not hold the word alone to be eternal; but also its meaning, and its relationship to that meaning. That there is such a relationship is directly cognisable by Sense-perception; and the reason why it is not recognised by one who hears a word uttered for the first time is that the necessary accessories are not present; but that does not make the relationship non-existing; for because the eye cannot see without light, that does not mean that the eye is incapable of seeing altogether. This accessory in the case in question is in the shape of the knowledge that such and such a word denotes such and such a thing. This knowledge is obtained by the child from experience, by marking the words and the actions of his elders.

Nor have we any grounds for believing that the Veda was composed by Brahmā and handed to his sons, by whom it has been propagated in the world. The *Mīmāṃsaka* finds a greater difficulty in believing this than the eternal character of words and their meanings.

It is on such a Veda that Jaimini bases his enquiry into the nature of *Dharma* and *Adharma*. Of these *Dharma* is said to consist in the course of conduct, tending to the attainment of the four desirable ends of life, as laid down in the Veda; such, *f.i.*, as the performance of sacrifices and the like. And *Adharma* consists of such conduct as is conducive to the advent of objects of aversion, laid down as such in the Veda,—*e.g.*, the eating of games killed by poisoned arrows, etc. In the matter of these two, all requisite proof is afforded by the *Veda*, *Smṛti* and the practical code of morality obtaining among good men. Of these the first is as already shown above, self-independent in its authority, while the other two owe their authority to the fact of their being based on the Veda.

The *Veda* consists of two parts: the *Mantra* and the *Brāhmaṇa*. The *Mantra* serves the purpose, at sacrifices, of recalling to the mind of the performer, the substances, the Deity, and other things connected with them; and the *Brāhmaṇa* consists of sentences mainly declaratory; one important portion of this latter is made up of the *Arthavāda* (*Sūtra* I-ii-7), which is made up of the *Praising* and *Blaming* of certain actions and things; this is accepted as an authority on *Dharma*, chiefly because it tends to the recognition of the excellence of the enjoined Duty, but only so far as it is capable of being taken along with the Declaratory Passages dealing with that Duty.

Such declaratory passages are of various kinds: (1) "*Karmotpatti-Vākya*" — (passages declaring a duty); (2) "*Guṇa-Vākya*" — (passages

laying down the materials, &c. ; (3) "*Phala-Vākya*" — (passages declaring the result); (4) "*Guṇa-Vākya*, for a particular purpose; (5) "*Saṅgana-Karmot-patti-Vākya*" — (passages declaring a duty together with the necessary materials), and so on.

(1) A "*Karmotpatti-Vākya*" is that which simply points out that "such an action is to be performed"—e.g., "Offers the Agnihotra sacrifice;" this sentence merely signifies the fact that the Agnihotra Sacrifice is laid down as one to be performed.

(2) A "*Guṇa-Vākya*" is one which lays down the Deity and the Materials, &c., necessary for the performance of the sacrifice—e.g., "Sacrifice with the Curd." The very fact of the "Curd" being mentioned as part of the action constitutes its "*guṇatva*" (secondary character). In the above proposition the character of the *Homa* as the *subject*, lies in the fact of its having been known from other sources of information, and being herein mentioned only as related to the Predicate; and if such a *Subject* were repeated in order to show its relation to the *Predicate*, this would constitute its "*Anuvādyatva*" (another character of the *Subject*). And the primary character of such a term is due to its connection with the Materials, such as the "Curd" in the above proposition. The character of "Curd" as the *Predicate* consists in the fact of its not being known from any other source (save the proposition in question); and its secondary (or subservient) character, in comparison with the *Homa* itself, is due to its being the material for (and as such subservient to) the *Homa*. And further, the acceptability of both by the agent is due to the action itself being such as is to be performed by him.

The action having been mentioned, the question naturally arises in the mind of the agent—'what will be the result of this action?' And the sentence that serves to lay down the connection of the Action with a definite result is called the—

(3) "*Phalavidhi*,"—e.g., "One desiring heaven should perform the Agnihotra Sacrifice." The full connotation of this sentence is—'He who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra Sacrifice, as the means thereto'; and as such, this sentence lays down the result of the action (Agnihotra), which, in the previous passage, has only been pointed out as a sacrifice to be performed.

(4) A "*Guṇavākya for a specific purpose*" is that in which a certain material is mentioned, in connection with a known action, as leading to a particular result;—e.g., "One ought to offer the libation of curds for the sake of one who is desirous of acquiring efficient sense-organs." Here, for the specific purpose of "acquiring the senses," a particular material (curd) is mentioned in connection with *Homa*, an idea of which has already been derived from the passage enjoining the Agnihotra. The formal meaning

of the above injunction is—"One is to realise the accomplishment of the Senses by means of curds, in connection with (i.e., as forming the materials for) the *Homa*." Another name for "*Guṇaphalavidhi*" is "*guṇakarmavidhi*."

(5) A "*Saṅṅakarmotpattivākya*" is a passage enjoining an action together with its accessories—such as the Materials, Deity, &c. As an example of this we have—"One ought to sacrifice with the Soma." This passage enjoins the *sacrifice* together with the *Soma-plant*, since the injunction of a qualified action (here, the *Soma-Sacrifice*) necessarily implies that of the qualification (here, *Soma*).

In certain cases, an "originative passage" (*Karmotpattivākya*) also mentions the result of the action,—e.g. "One desiring cattle is to sacrifice with the Udbhid." The "*Udbhid Sacrifice*" is not mentioned in any other passage; and in the passage cited it is enjoined, as leading to the acquiring of cattle. Thus it is a single sentence enjoining *the sacrifice as leading to a certain result*,—thus serving the double purpose of laying down a sacrifice, and also pointing out the Material with which it is to be performed.

The Primary Injunction (i.e., the passage simply mentioning the action) is often such as to be construed together with its subsidiary injunctions (i.e., those mentioning the accessories to the action mentioned in the foregoing primary injunction); and thus both conjointly come to form a single sentence and make up the one complete injunction of *the main action together with all its accessories*; and such an injunction is called a "*Prayogavidhi*." As an example of this, we have—"One desirous of heaven ought to perform the Agnihotra Sacrifice"; this passage means that "the Agent is to conceive of the acquiring of heaven by means of the Agnihotra Sacrifice." But there instantly arises the question of method: 'How is this sacrifice to be performed?' And this is answered, in regard to the Agnihotra, &c., by such passages as "set up the fire, put in the fuel, &c., &c.," which come forward as laying down the necessity of *fire, fuel* and such other things, in the performance of the Agnihotra Sacrifice. And passages like these ("set up the fire, &c."), forming with the primary injunction ("one desiring heaven should perform the Agnihotra") one single "*Grand Injunction*" go to point out *the Agnihotra Sacrifice with all its accessories, designed for the attainment of heaven*,—the whole thus meaning that "one is to attain heaven by means of the Agnihotra Sacrifice, performed with the help of its accessories, such as the *setting up of fire*, the *putting in of fuel*, the *purification of the house* and the like." Such is the "*Prayogavidhi*." Other names for the accessories taken collectively are "*Itthambhāva*" and "*Itikartavyatā*." In the above instance, *Agnihotra* is the primary action, and the *setting up of fire, &c.*, are all auxiliary to it.

THE APŪRVA.

It does not appear quite reasonable that momentarily-disappearing actions should bring about any such future effects, as the *attainment of Heaven* and the like. But the fact is that, from certain Vedic passages, we come to know of the capability of the enjoined and prohibited actions to bring about certain results; and in order to render reasonable the production of future effects by means of momentarily-disappearing actions we assume certain intervening transcendental Agencies in the shape of "Punya" (virtue) and "Pāpa" (vice). Thus then, the causing of the attainment of Heaven by Sacrifices is not *immediate*, but *indirect* through the unseen agency of *virtue*. This is what is called the *Unseen Force* (*Adṛṣṭa*) leading to a particular effect; and the cause of this Unseen Force is the primary action, fitted up with all its various subsidiaries preceding and following it, and not the primary action alone by itself. For, in that case, the effects (attainment of Heaven, &c.) too might be said to be brought about by the primary alone; and such a theory would lead to the inevitable conclusion—the uselessness of the subsidiaries.

An *objection* is here raised: "It is not right to assert the production of the Unseen Agency by the Primary Action together with all its subsidiaries. For the Primary Action is no sooner performed than destroyed, and as such cannot profit by the aid of its subsidiaries."

To this, the *Mimāṃsaka* replies that though no help of the subsidiaries is possible to the Primary by itself, yet such aid would be quite possible through an (intermediate) Unseen Force, brought about by the mere origination of the primary action (such Force having the conventional name of "*Utpattyapūrva*"). Because for the fulfilment, to the Primary, of the full aid of all its subsidiaries, we conventionally assume the production by the Primary alone, of such an Apūrva intervening between the Primary and the *final* Apūrva directly leading to the (*final* result). In the same manner, the subsidiaries too, being only conjointly capable of helping the Primary, cannot help one another directly by themselves; and, as such, for the fulfilment of this mutual aid among the subsidiaries also, we assume the production of intermediate Unseen Forces—*Utpattyapūrvas*—at each step (*i.e.*, together with every subsidiary,—the one subsidiary helping the one following through the *Utpattyapūrva* produced by itself).

The help of the subsidiaries towards the Primary, as a rule, consists in turning the Primary towards the production of the "Great" Apūrva leading to the *Final* Result. With the *Darṣa* and *Pūrṇamāsa*, however, the case is different: that is to say, in these the subsidiaries together with the Primary go collectively to form a single Primary. First as to the *Pūrṇamāsa*.

The sentence “Yadāgnēyo ‘*śiṭākāpālo*’ *māvāsyāyāñca* paurṇamāsyāñcācyuto bhavati” enjoins the Āgnēya Sacrifice; and the sentence “*tābhyāmētamagnīshomīyamēkādaçakapālampurṇamāsyām prāyacchat*” lays down the Agnīshomīya. In the Paurṇamāsi again, the Upāṇçu-Sacrifice is laid down by the sentence “*Tāvabrūta, &c.*” All these three Injunctions together lay down the “Primary” in the Paurṇamāsi. In connection with these three—the Āgnēya, the Agnīshomīya, and the Upāṇçu—we have the sentence “*Ya ēvam, &c.*” where the word “Paurṇamāsi” is in the singular, and, as such, denotes the fact of all three together forming a single group. Hence, in the Veda, the word “Paurṇamāsi” is to be understood as denoting all these three—Āgnēya, &c.—taken collectively.

Here some people raise the following objection: “In the sentence *yadāgnēya, &c., &c.*, there is no word denoting ‘sacrifice’; and as such, how can the sentence be said to enjoin a sacrifice?” And the reply that is given is, that the word ‘Āgneya’ = *that (Purodāça) which is consecrated to Fire as its Deity*; and this word being co-ordinate with (i.e., qualifying) *Purodāça*, connotes the relation of the material (*Purodāça*) with the Deity (Fire). But such relation is not possible in the absence of some sort of a sacrifice; and the word “Sacrifice” too signifies nothing more than ‘the offering of certain materials to a certain Deity.’ Therefore the relation of Material and Deity expressly laid down in the passage (by the word ‘Āgnēya’) must lead to the inference of the passage being the injunction of a Sacrifice;—the significance of the passage thus being “one is to conceive of his aim by means of a Sacrifice to be performed on the *māvāsyā* day, having for its Material the *Purodāça* consecrated to the deity Fire.” Similarly, whenever any passage declares the relation of Material and Deity—e.g., “*Sauryancarunnirvapēt,*”—we have to infer the injunction of a Sacrifice, by means of the relation of the Deity (Sun, in the example cited).

Another objection is here raised to the effect that the passage enjoining the Upāṇçu-sacrifice is devoid of any injunctive ending, and as such, it cannot be taken as a real Injunction. But the present tense in “*Yajati*” must be taken as standing for the injunctive: because wherever there is no injunctive ending we have to assume a like change. Others, however, explain “*Yajati*” as belonging to the *लेट्* class, and thus having an independent injunctive signification of its own.

In the Darça-sacrifice too, we have three primaries—(1) & (2) the two *Sānnāyya* Sacrifices mentioned in the passages “*Aindrādadhī, &c.*” and “*Aindrampayah, &c.*”; and (3) the Āgnēya Sacrifice mentioned in the passage “*Yadāgnēya, &c.*” And all these three form collectively a single

group, expressed by the word "Amāvāsyām" in the accusative singular, occurring in the passage "Ya ēvamvidvānamāvāsyām, &c." Hence, in the Veda, wherever we meet with the word "Darṇa," we have to interpret it as denoting all the above three taken collectively. Another reason for making the words "Darṇa" and "Paurṇamāsa" each denote each of the two trios mentioned above is the explanation of the dual ending in "Darṇapaurṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajēta,"—which (dual ending) could not be explained if each were to denote severally each member of the trio individually, in which case, the plural ending would be necessary.

Thus then, the *Prayāja* and the rest, mentioned in proximity to the fruitful *Āgnēya*, are subsidiaries to the six sacrifices beginning with the *Āgnēya*; and the meaning of the passage "*Darṇapaurṇamāsābhyām yajēta*" would be this: "One is to produce the Unseen Force leading to Heaven by means of all the sacrifices that go collectively to form the two groups of 'Darṇa' and 'Paurṇamāsa,' taken together."

Question : 'How can the two sets, occurring at different times, be said to act together ?'

Answer : Though they cannot act together by themselves, yet the three constituent factors of each would each produce a distinct Unseen Force; and it is through these several Unseen Forces, that the two sets would act conjointly.

Question : 'How can the three parts of one produce a single Unseen Force ?'

Answer : Each of the three, when taken together with the subsidiaries *Prayāja*, &c., are said to produce one Unseen Force for the complete set; and because each of the three cannot, by itself, be accompanied by the whole host of subsidiaries, therefore the three sacrifices are said to produce three *original* Unseen Forces (*Utpattiyapūrvas*); and it is through these that each of the three becomes connected with all the subsidiaries. And because the subsidiaries, *Prayāja*, &c., cannot by themselves be taken with the Primary, therefore this conjunction too is to be accepted as accomplished through the several original Unseen Forces. Further, there is a conjunction of the original Unseen Force produced by the Primary and those produced by the subsidiaries, *Prayāja*, &c.; and it is this conjunction that constitutes the fact of the Primary being equipped with all its subsidiaries. Similarly, in the *Paurṇamāsa*, the three Unseen Forces, produced by the three subsidiaries *Āgnēya*, &c., in company with those produced by the *Prayāja*, &c., bring about the one Unseen Force, that belongs to the complete three-fold set. In the same manner, in the *Darṇa*, the three Unseen Forces, produced by the *Āgnēya* and the *Aindra*, together with those produced by the subsidiaries, bring about a single Unseen Force, which belongs to the whole three-fold set. These two Unseen

Forces of the two trios, brought about as they are by the three original Unseen Forces of the Āgnēya and the rest, produce the final *Phalāpūrva*—the force from which proceeds the final result. Thus the meaning of the passage is that 'One is to bring about Heaven to himself by means of the *Darṣa*—and—*Paurṇamāsa*, through Unseen Forces.' Thus then, the fulfilment of the effectual Unseen Force necessitates the performance of the Primary, together with all its subsidiaries; and the injunction that lays down this fact is the "*Prayogavidhi*."

The Veda is again divided into 4 parts—the *Vidhi*, the *Arthavāda*, the *Mantra* and the *Nāmadhēya*; and we proceed to explain each of these in detail.

VIDHI.

"*Vidhi*" (Injunction) is of three kinds: (1) "*Apūrvavidhi*," (2) "*Niyamavidhi*," and (3) "*Parisaṅkhyāvidhi*."

(1) Of these the passage that enjoins an action that has not been laid down elsewhere is called an "*Apūrvavidhi*" (*lit.* the Injunction of something new); e.g., "*Vrīhīn prokshati*," a passage occurring in connection with the *Darṣa-paurṇamāsa*—without this passage, we could in no way have any idea of the *washing* of the *corn* to be employed in the sacrifice.

(2) The passage that restricts the procedure of a certain action laid down in another passage is called "*Niyamavidhi* (Restrictive Injunction)"; e.g., "*Vrīhīnavahanti*," a passage also occurring in connection with the *Darṣa-paurṇamāsa*. If we had not this passage, then, with reference to the *Darṣa-paurṇamāsa*, as *threshing* does for the removal of the chaff from the grain for the purpose of making the "Cake" mentioned in the original injunction,—so, in the same manner, we could also have recourse to the process of removing the chaff by tearing each grain by the nails; and hence in the latter case, as the work could be done by other means, *threshing* would not be necessarily required; and as such it could only have a partial application (optional with the *tearing by the nails*). In the face, however, of the aforesaid injunction,—*Vrīhīnavahanti*—we have it distinctly laid down that the chaff is to be removed by *threshing* alone; and the *nail-process* is set aside once for all. *Objection*: "Since the *nail-process* serves our purpose as well as *threshing*, the restricting of the process to the latter alone is not reasonable." *Reply*: Not so; because it is admitted that the removal of the chaff by the process of *threshing* produces a certain Unseen Force (not attainable by the other process) in addition to the visible

effect in the shape of the speedier removal of the chaff. This Unseen Force is added to the final effective Unseen Force, through the *original Apūrva* of the Sacrifice itself. Thus then, as without the Unseen Force brought about by the Restriction, no final *Apūrva* would be possible, the Restriction cannot be said to be purposeless.

(3) When two objects happen to be mentioned as equally applicable in a certain case, the passage that serves to preclude one of them is called "*Parisankhyāvidhi*"; e.g., in connection with the *Oṡyana*, we read: "*Im-āmagr̥bh̥ṇanrasanāmṛtasyētyaḡvābh̥dhānimādattē*,"—whereby the Mantra herein mentioned is found to appertain to the holding of the *horse's reins*. In the absence of this passage the Mantra merely mentioning the "holding of the reins" would find itself appertaining to the holding of the reins of the *ass*, by means of the "*linga*" consisting of the capacity of the Mantra expressing merely the "*holding of the reins*." When, however, we have the aforesaid injunction, we have it clearly laid down that the said Mantra is to be employed in holding the reins of the *horse*, and not those of the *ass*,—which latter is to be held *silently* (without any Mantra). Thus we find that the passage quoted sets aside the application of the Mantra with regard to the reins of the *ass*, which, together with the reins of the *horse*, would, otherwise, be equally related to the Mantra in question.

We have said above that the *Prayāja*, &c., are subsidiaries to the "*Darṡa-Paurṇamāsa*." Now then, the "authority" for accepting such subordinate character is sixfold—(1) "*Ṣṛuti*" (Direct Assertion), (2) "*Linga*" (Indirect Implication), (3) "*Vākya*" (Syntactical Connection), (4) "*Prakaraṇa*" (Context), (5) "*Sthāna*" (Position), and (6) "*Samā-khyā*" (Name).

In the *Agnihotra*-passage—"Dadhṇā juhuyāt"—the 'offering' is expressed by the word "*Juhuyāt*;" and with reference to this 'offering' we find mentioned the "*Dadhi*," which we at once make out, on account of its instrumental ending, to be the *Material* that is to be offered. Thus then, in the present instance we find that the fact of the *Dadhi* being subsidiary to the offering is directly mentioned by the passage above quoted.

"*Linga*" is "*Sāmarthya*," Power. It is twofold—belonging to the Meaning and to the Word. As an instance of the former, we have the following: The passage "*Sruvṇa avadyati*" asserts the general fact of '*Avadāna*' (*cutting*) being accomplished by means of the *Sruva*; but the Power (or capacity) of the *Sruva* is such that any '*cutting*' by it can refer only to fluid materials, like butter, &c., and not to solid ones, as *Puroḡaḡa* and the like; and as such the *Sruva* comes to be a subsidiary only to the

cutting of the fluid materials. The Power of a word lies in its denoting a certain meaning, e.g., the mantra "Agnayē nirvapāmi" forms part of the 'Nirvāpa,' simply owing to the denotation of the word 'Nirvapami' (occurring in the body of the mantra).

"Vākya" (Sentence, or Syntactical Connection) consists in the mention of a certain word together with other words; e.g., the mantra "Ishē tvā, &c.," is interpreted as being subsidiary to the 'chopping of the reed' on account of the *syntactical connection* of the mantra with the verb "Chinatti" (*cuts or chops*, occurring close after the mantra). Or again, in the passage "Agnayē jushṭam," &c., the words are syntactically connected with the verb "Nirvapāmi" (following close upon the mantra); and as such the mantra is accepted as being subsidiary to the 'Nirvāpa.'

"Prakarāṇa" (Context) consists in "mutual want." As for example, in the passage "Darṇapaurṇamāsābhyam svargakāmo yajēta"—which means that 'one is to bring about an unseen agency leading him to Heaven by means of the Darṇa and Paurṇamāsa sacrifices'—the first question that arises is—"How, by what process, is the unseen agency to be brought about by means of the two sacrifices?" Again, in close proximity to the passage enjoining the sacrifices 'Āgnēya' and the rest (which are parts of the Darṇa and Paurṇamāsa), with their results, we meet with such passages as "Tanūnapātam yajati, &c.," without the mention of any results. Then with reference to these latter, there arises another kind of question—"what is to be the result of all these sacrifices?" Thus then, there being a want of *result* with regard to the "Prayāja," "Āgnēya," &c., and that of the *procedure* with regard to the "Darṇa and Paurṇamāsa," we find a *mutual want* between the two sets of passages—which *want* constitutes "Prakarāṇa,"—and thereby arrive at the conclusion that the "Prayāja," "Āgnēya," &c., are subsidiary to "Darṇa and Paurṇamāsa."

"Sthāna" (Position) is proximity; e.g., coming across with the mantra "Sundhadhivam, &c.," in close proximity to the "Sānnāya" vessels (vessels for holding butter and curd) we infer that the mantra is subservient to (and has its application in) the rinsing of these vessels.

"Samākhyā" is naming. As for example, certain actions having been mentioned in the Adhvaryu Chapter, the fact of "Ādhvaryava" being the *name* (of the actions) leads to the conclusion that the Adhvaryus are the performers of these actions, and as such, are subsidiary to (i.e., form of part of) them. Again, in connection with the passage "Aindrāgnamēkādaṇḍa-kapalannirvapēt prajākāmah," the "Aindragni" sacrifices are called by the name "Kāmyēshti"; hence the *naming* of the mantras "Ubhā vāmindrāgni, &c., &c.," as the "Kāmyēshtiyājya-nuyākākaṇḍa" leads to the conclusion that these latter (mantras)



are to be used as *yājñanuvākya* (to the *Aindrāgni* sacrifices, called "*Kāmyeshti*");—that is to say, these mantras are subsidiary to the *Aindrāgni* sacrifices.

When "Direct Assertion" and the rest happen to have a common object of application, their respective authority depends upon the order in which they are mentioned above—i.e., "Position" is stronger than "Name," "Context" than "Position" and so on, "Direct Assertion" being the strongest of all. As for example, in the Agnihotra section we meet with the passage "*Kadā ca nastarirasityaindyā gārhapatyamupatishthatē*"; and here from the "Power" of the word "*Aindryā*," the mantra "*Kadā ca na, &c.*," would form part of the adoration of Indra; whereas the *direct* instrumental ending in "*Aindryā*," and the accusative ending in "*gārhapatyam*" connects the mantra directly with the *Gārhapatya* sacrifice; and therefore, the former connection of the mantra with Indra, based on "Power," is set aside in favour of the latter, based upon "Direct Assertion." This theory of comparative strength is based upon the fact that "Direct Assertion" lays down directly whatever it has to assert; whereas "Power" stands in need of the assumption of an intervening "Direct Assertion; and the reason for this is that nothing can be regarded as authoritatively valid unless it is laid down in the Veda directly. Thus, in the given example, finding the "Power" of the word "*Aindryā*" referring to Indra, we stand in need of a "Direct Assertion" in the form "*Aindryā Indramupatishthatē*," before we can assert the application of the mantra to the adoration of Indra. But such an assumption is not warrantable because of another relation (of the mantra, with *Gārhapatya*) being laid down by "Direct Assertion." In case, however, where there is no "Direct Assertion"—as in the case of "*Agnayē jushtan nirvapāmi*"—the "Power" of the word "*Nirvapāmi*" at once connects the mantra with "*Nirvāpa*," through the assumption of an intermediate "Direct Assertion" in the form—"By means of this mantra, one should perform the *Nirvāpa*." Because in this case, there is no objection to such an assumption (since in this case we have no "Direct Assertion" bearing testimony to any other interpretation).

Similarly, in the passage "*syonantē sadanam kṛpomi ... tasmin sīda*," the word "*tasmin*," from its very nature, connects the latter sentence ("*tasmin sīda*") with the former ("*syonantē, &c.*"); and this syntactical connection would make only one mantra of the two sentences; whereas "Power" would make two different mantras of them, owing to the fact that the "Power" of the former sentence indicates "*Sādana*" (Home, Seat), and that the latter indicates "*Sādana*" (making to sit). And

because "Power" is stronger than "Syntactical Connection," and as such sets it aside, therefore we conclude that the mantra "syonantē, &c." is related to *Sādāna*, and "tasmin sīda" to *Sādāna*. The reason for "Power" being stronger than "Syntactical Connection" is that, as in the above instance, "Syntactical Connection" will reduce the two sentences into one, and then will necessitate the assumption of the "Power" of "*Sādāna*," and then, lastly, it will also stand in need of the assumption of a "Direct Assertion" to the effect that "one is to perform *Sādāna* by means of the two sentences taken collectively as one mantra." On the other hand, in the case of the application of "Power" which directly indicates *Sādāna*, all that is necessary is the assumption of a "Direct Assertion" to the effect that "one is to perform *Sādāna* by means of the mantra syonantē, &c." And thus we find that the latter interpretation is a step shorter than the former. And the signification being thus complete, nothing more is required; and as such it precludes the necessity of assuming another "Direct Assertion" through the assumption of another "Power," on the strength of mere "Syntactical Connection." It is for this reason that "Power" is said to be stronger than "Syntactical Connection," which is a step farther, and more complicated than the former, and is therefore set aside by it.

In the same manner, "Context" is set aside by "Syntactical Connection," "Position" by "Context," and "Name" by "Position;" and "Direct Assertion" sets aside all.

The subsidiary character of a certain action consists in its being mentioned for the sake of another (action); and this latter fact consists in its forming a helpful part in the performance of an action by the agent. This definition would apply to the *Prayājas* as forming parts of the "*Darṣa* and *Paurṇamāsa*," inasmuch as with regard to these latter, the former form part of the performance of these by the agent.

Subsidiaries are of two kinds: (1) The "*Sannipatyopakāraka*" and (2) the "*Ārādupakāraka*."

The Subsidiaries—which directly or indirectly make up the primary Sacrifice, and then, though this latter, bring about its "Original *Apūrva*"—are the "*Sannipatyopakārakas*;" e.g., the various corns, *Vrihi* and the rest, and the "threshing," &c., of these, as also the Deities (*Agni*, &c.) and the sacrificial mantras related thereto. The "sprinkling of water" (over the corn) helps towards the "cake" through a certain sanctity, produced thereby in the corns; the "threshing" helps through the visible effect in the shape of the removal of the chaff; and lastly, the corn helps towards it by means of the flour. And by means of this

"cake," the above three bring about the Sacrifice and its "Original Apūrva." The form of the sacrifice itself is accomplished by the Deities directly, and by the sacrificial mantras indirectly, through the sanctification of the Deities. And it is by means of the form of the sacrifice that the "Original Apūrva" is brought about. Because a sacrifice consists only in the offering of certain materials to certain Deities; and further, because the material and the Deity are recognised as conjointly constituting the form of the sacrifice.

Those that bring about an "Apūrva" inherent in themselves are called the "Āradupakāraḥ," e.g., the "Prayāja" the "Ājyabhāga," "Anuyāja" and the like. These do not produce any sanctification, either of the Deity or of the material. They simply bring about the "Apūrva" in themselves.

Actions in general are of two kinds: "Arthakarma" (Primary) and "Guṇakarma" (Secondary). The former are those that produce an "Apūrva" in themselves,—e.g., the "Agnihotra," "Darṣa-Paurṇamāsa," the "Prayājas," and the like. Of the latter kind are those that are simply purificatory in their character; i.e., which only serve to purify, and thus render fit for use, certain materials.

These latter (the Guṇakarma) again are twofold: (1) Those sanctifying the materials being used, and (2) those sanctifying the materials to be used hereafter. Of these the former are called "Pratipattikarma"—the word "pratipatti" meaning the laying aside in its proper place of materials occupying the hands of the Agent, e.g., the "eating of Idā," the "Caturavatta Homa" and the like.

An objection is raised in this connection: "The eating of the Idā consists in the laying out of the 'Cake' which occupies the agent's hand in a Primary Sacrifice; and as such it could reasonably be classed as 'pratipatti.' But a Homa, on the other hand, does not tend to sanctify a material being used in the sacrifice; and as such how can that be called a 'Pratipatti?' Because a Homa occurring simultaneously with the sacrifice, the materials purified by the Homa—such as the "Caturavatta" and the like—cannot be said to be *in the course of being used*. The reply is: A Pratipatti consists only in the sanctification of what is *in course of use* (in general), and not merely in what is in course of use *in the Primary Sacrifice*. For, if the latter were the case, then the "removal of the blood" simultaneously with that of the "fat, heart, &c.," following the slaughter of the animal, would not be a "Pratipatti"; because this would not be the removal of material *being used in a sacrifice*. And further, the "casting away of the black horn" would

not be a "Pratipatti"; for though the black horn is used in scratching the body (of the Yajamāna), yet it is not used in the sacrifice directly. Therefore all that is necessary to constitute a "Pratipatti" is the fact of the materials *being in any way used in a sacrifice*. And hence, as the fat, &c., of the animal are also used in one way or the other, they come to be classed as "Pratipatti." And thus the definition would apply to "Homa" also; because there too, the "Caturavatta," &c., are used in some way or other, at sacrifices.

The "Pratipatti" is of three kinds: (1) One following the Primary Action; (2) one occurring simultaneously with it; and (3) one preceding it. To the first order belong the "eating of Īdā" and the like; and to the second "Homa" and the rest. In the "Darṣa-Paurṇamāsa Section we read—"Sakṛdupastrṅgāti," "Dvirhaviṣho' vadyati," "Sakṛdabhi-ghārayati," "Caturavattam juhoti." From among these, in the last, it cannot be said that the Caturavatta passage being supplementary to Homa, enjoins the Caturavatta as a material for it. Because the Homa has not yet been anywhere mentioned by itself, and as such there cannot be a supplement to it. Nor can it be urged that Homa is mentioned in the passage "Yadāgnīya, &c." Because this last passage is declaratory of the sacrifice (and not of Homa); and it cannot be said that Homa is identical with the sacrifice. Because a sacrifice consists in the offering of a certain material to a certain Deity, whereas Homa consists of the throwing of the materials into the fire. Therefore, though the passage "Yadāgnīya, &c." is declaratory of the sacrifice, yet being unable to indicate the "throwing in" of the materials (and as such, not being declaratory of the Homa), the Caturavatta passage cannot be said to be supplementary to it. The fact is that the passages laying down the "spreading of the grass" (*upastaraṇa*), "twice cutting" (*deviravadāna*) and the "pouring out of butter" (*abhiḥhāraṇa*) indicate the "Caturavatta," fourfold cutting; and the word "juhoti" lays down the "throwing in" thereof (in its proper place) as purificatory of it; and this "purification" is of the form of "pratipatti" pure and simple. For of the two alternatives—(1) the *pratipatti-ship* of the 'Cake' prepared for the deities Agni, &c., forming part of the primary sacrifice, in accordance with such passages as "Agnayē juṣṭamabhiḥhārayāmi" and the like, and being as such, only *indirectly* used in the sacrifice, and (2) the *pratipatti-ship* of the "throwing in" of the "avadāna" (cut portions) of the "Cake" (which are used in the sacrifice *directly*),—the latter is decidedly the more reasonable. And this "purification" is simultaneous with the Primary Action. For the Homa is enjoined as following the "Vashatkāra" (the uttering of the syllable 'Vashat'), and the sacrifice by the Adhvaryu is also enjoined as occurring at the same time, and he is

reminded of this by the mention of "Vashatkāra"; and hence the simultaneity of the Homa and the sacrifice. All this has been explained in the "Vārtika" on the "Pradhanādhikaraṇa." As an example of Pratipatti preceding the Primary, we have—the "removal of the blood, &c.," which naturally precede the offering of the *flesh*. This is explained in the Vārtika, under the sūtra "Paçāvanālamhāt, &c."

The second kind of *Guṇakarma* the "Upayokshyamāṇasaṅskāra" is also of various kinds: (1) The one directly sanctifying the material used, (2) the one sanctifying a material helping another which directly conduces to the action, and (3) one preparing a material to be presented later on, and so forth. Of the former class is the "threshing of the corn" which signifies the preparation of the corn already prescribed in a preceding passage,—*"One ought to sacrifice with corns."* To the second class belong such actions as the "fetching of the calf." To the directly used material, the cow, calf is of service, as being necessary for the milking of it, and the "fetching" is purificatory of the calf, which is thus only indirectly an aid to the sacrifice. As an example of (3), we have the passage "Put curd into hot milk—this is the Vaiçvadēvi Āmikshā." Here the pronoun "this" lays down the future employment of "milk" in the Vaiçvadēva sacrifice, and the "curd" to be put therein is thus the means of the preparation of the special form of milk required in the Vaiçvadēva sacrifice. The "Paçu" and the "Puroḍāça" sacrifices, on the other hand, are for the preparation of the Deities *directly employed*, as well as of those *going to be employed*, and also for the production of a particular Unseen Force, with regard to the *offering* (of the materials to the Deities). Because the Deity *Agnīshoma* is the object of embellishment by the "Paçu," the "Puroḍāça," &c.; and this Deity is *already employed* in the "Vapā-Yāga" and is also laid down as one *to be employed* in the sacrifice with the heart and other parts of the animal's body. The "Svishtakṛt" Sacrifice is for the preparation of the *directly employed* with regard to the material and the Deity, and also for the sake of the production of an Unseen Force, with regard to the *offering*. In the same manner, the "Sūktavākasāadhanapramāṇa" is preparatory of the Deity *to be employed* in the first Prayāja, and as such belongs to the third class; and with reference to the materials, it is for the sake of an Unseen Force. The "Fat-offering" (Vasā-Homa), preceding the "sacrifice of the heart, &c.," is a "pratipatti" with regard to the calf; but otherwise it is for the sake of an Unseen Force.

Some people, however, define "Pratipatti-karma" as an action consisting in an embellishment or preparation, other than that of the materials *to be employed*. The material "Caturavatta" having been burnt by the Homa, it cannot be said to be a *material to be used* in the

Homa; and as such it cannot but be other than the Homa,—which thus becomes included in the above definition. The following is the only peculiarity in the above definition:—In an “Arthakarma” the Action is more important than the material which is subservient to the Action, *e.g.*, in the Agnihotra “Dadhi” is the Material (and as such of secondary importance, being subservient to the sacrifice itself); while in a “Gṇakarma,” it is the Material that is the essential factor, and the Action is subordinate to the material, *e.g.*, in the passage “Vrihin prokshati,” since the accusative ending in “Vrihin,” connotes the fact of the “corn” being the substratum of the Action “Prokshana,” therefore we come to the conclusion that the Action is subordinate to the Material, which thus occupies the essential position.

Another division of “Gṇakarma” is into—(1) The “Utpatti” (Productive), (2) The “Āpti” (Acquisitive), (3) The “Vikṛti” (Modificatory), and (4) the “Sanskṛti” (Purificatory). As an example of (1), we have the following:—The different kinds of Fires—Ābhavaniya, Gārhapatya and Laukika—though already placed in the *Kunda*, are yet said to be consecrated by such mantras as “Agninādadhita” and the like; and as such, are brought into existence in their new consecrated form. Consequently, the “Consecration,” bringing about an embellishment leading to the *production* of the Fires, is called the “Utpattisāṅskāra” (productive embellishment). (2) As an example of the “Āpti,” we have the *acquiring* of the *Veda* by study, indicated by such passages as “Svādhyāyo dhyātavyah” and the like. (3) As an example of “Vikṛti” we have “Vrihinavahanti,” where the “threshing” is called the “modifying embellishment,” because it removes the chaff from the corn, and thus produces a change in it. (4) As an example of “Sanskṛti” we have “Vrihin prokshati,” where the “sprinkling of water” over the corns is called “Sanskṛti” because it produces a particular kind of sanctity in the corns. In the above, the “consecration” (of the Fires) and “Study” are independent “Gṇakarmas” by themselves, and not as subsidiaries to sacrifices; whereas the “sprinkling of water, &c.,” and “threshing” are secondary “Gṇakarmas,” being subservient to the sacrifices.

Primary Actions (Arthakarma) are of three kinds: (1) “Necessary” or “Obligatory” (Nitya), (2) “Periodical” or “Occasional” (Naimittika), and (3) “Optional” or “Performed for some particular object” (Kāmya). As an example of (1), we have the injunction of the obligatory performance of Agnihotra both morning and evening, to the end of one’s life. As an example of the “Naimittika” we have the performance of the “Pathikṛt” and “Ishti,” &c., for the removal of the impediments to the proper performance of the “Darṣa” and “Paurṇamāsa.” The

non-performance of these two kinds of actions constitutes a sin. But other people assert that the only peculiarity with these is that their performance does not bring about any definite result. A third class of people again lay down the "removal of sin" as the effect of these; and in support of this latter view, we have the following Smṛti passage: "The performers of the Nitya and Naimittika actions have their sins destroyed." Against this it cannot be urged that in that case, these two would become "Kāmya," inasmuch as they have a definite result. Because the performance of these is not preceded by any desire on the part of the agent for any specific end; and again because such actions are not enjoined as leading to the accomplishment of any definite object; and as such, they cannot be called "Kāmya."

The "Kāmya" again is of three sorts: (1) the effects whereof are confined to this world, (2) whose effects belong to the other world alone, and (3) whose effects extend to both (this life and the life to come). As an example of (1), we have the sacrifices "Kāriri," which is performed by one desiring rain for the enlivening of the crops withering for want of timely rain,—and not by anyone desiring rain at some other time or in his future birth. As an instance of (2), we have the "Darṣa" and "Panṛnamāsa" performed for the attainment of Heaven; inasmuch as the pleasures of Heaven cannot be enjoyed in this world. As an example of (3), we have the sacrifice "Vāyavya," performed for the attainment of prosperity (attainable in this world as well as in the world to come).

It is necessary to explain the process of injunction by means of the declaratory passages (Vidhivākya). In the sentence "svargakāmo yajēta," there are two properties of the root "yaji" (=to sacrifice), due to the affix "ta": (1) "Ākhyātatva" (the character of the verb itself independently of affixes and terminations); and (2) "Līntva" (the *liñ* affix). The character of the verb as such is common to all moods and tenses; and the affix *liñ* characterising the verb "yajēta" connotes the "Ārthi (actual) Bhāvanā," which consists of the active energy of the agent.

This "Bhāvanā" (Realisation or Bringing about) consists of three factors: (1) "What?" (2) "By what?" and (3) "How?" To explain—on the utterance of the word "yajēta," the first connotation of the affix is that "one is to realise"; because, as a rule, the object denoted by the declensional affixes are construed with those connoted by the conjugational ones, and as such the latter are the more important of the two; and then again, as the connotation of the affix is more important than the denotation of

the root, it is only proper that we should, before all, have a conception of the connotation of the affix. Then the verb "to realise" being transitive,—inasmuch as it belongs to the same class of verbs as "kr" ("to do"),—the next question that arises is—"What is the object of this *realisation*?" In reply to this, we have "Heaven," as the object of realisation, though expressed by another word. Though the "sacrifice" (yāga) is expressed by the same word as the "realisation" (i.e., yajēta), yet it cannot be construed as the object of realisation, because it is in itself extremely troublesome and is thus incapable of constituting the end most desirable by the agent. "Heaven," on the contrary, consists in bliss, and as such can be the desired end; and hence it is that it is construed as the object of *realisation*. Thus the final notion arrived at is—"One is to realise Heaven." Then comes the question of the *means*—"by what (means) is Heaven to be realised?" And in reply to this, we have the "Sacrifice," expressed by the same word as the Bhāvanā (i.e., "yajēta"), presenting itself as the instrument (or means) of realisation,—the meaning being, "one is to realise Heaven by means of sacrifices." Then, lastly, comes the question of *process*—"How, by what process, is Heaven to be realised, by means of sacrifices?" In reply to this, we have a series of passages, laying down the fact that Heaven is to be realised by means of sacrifices, by the perceptible help of the *consecration of fire*, the *threshing of the corn*, &c., and the imperceptible help of the "Prayājas" and other minor subsidiary sacrifices. Thus the "consecration of fire" and the "Prayājas," &c., come to be construed as constituting the *procedure* ("Itikartavyatā") which supplies the answer to the question—"How to realise?" As an example of this method of interpretation, in ordinary parlance, we have the sentence "Desiring rice, one is to cook,"—where the *optative affix* (in "Pacēt") connotes *realisation*, *rice* is the *object* (of realisation), *cooking* is the *means*, and the *blowing of the fire*, &c., constitute the *process*;—the meaning of the whole sentence being, "one is to obtain rice by means of cooking, by the help of fire, &c." The same process of interpretation applies to the Vēda also.

This same optative affix also denotes the *ṣābdī* (verbal) Bhāvanā, which consists in *urging* or *impelling* (towards action); just as, in ordinary parlance, on hearing the order of the preceptor—"fetch the cow,"—the disciple becomes engaged in its *fetching* only when he perceives that "this preceptor of mine urges me to fetch the cow." We thus find that on account of this natural concomitance, the recognition of some impelling agent is always the cause of an action. And, on a like concomitance, is based the idea that the knowledge of an impelling agency is brought about on the hearing of the *verb* together with the *optative affix*. This

denotability of "*impelling*" by the optative is accepted by ordinary people; and consequently we postulate a like denotation in the case of the Vēda also. The difference in the two cases, however, is this: The *impulsion* towards the "fetching of the cow" consists in the recognition of a particular intention on the part of the directing individual; in the case of the Vēda, however, there being no directing personal agency, the impelling force resides solely in the optative affix, &c. It is for this reason that the "Bhāvanā" is characterised by the impelling agency residing *in the word*; and this is called "*pravartanā*" or "*Prēṇa*" (*Impelling*), inasmuch as it urges people to the performance of Sacrifices, Homa, &c.

The "Verbal Bhāvanā" is also made up of three constituent elements. In this case, the factor entering as the *result* is the *Ārthi Bhāvanā*, consisting in the action of the agent. The *instrumental factor* is made up of the optative, &c., comprehended by a study (of the Vēda); and the factor of *procedure* is supplied by the comprehension of the excellence of the action as delineated in the eulogistic passages (*Arthavāda*). The form of the cognition of the "Verbal Bhāvanā" may be thus briefly summed up: "Having acquired a certain amount of comprehending faculty by means of a systematic study of the Vēda and its various appendages, the agents are to perform sacrifices, after having recognised the desirability of such performance, through the optative affixes, &c., met with in the Vēda, together with a knowledge of the excellence of the Actions delineated in the *Arthavāda* passages." This *performance* constitutes "Action," and hence the action of the agent is quite rightly said to be the result of the "Verbal Bhāvanā."

The aforesaid "Verbal Bhāvanā" is not recognised as one to be performed in the "*Jyotishtoma*" and the "*Prāṭisvika*"; though in both of these it appears in its proper form;—the reason for this being that it is the "Actual Bhāvanā" itself that is therein recognised as one to be accomplished. The "Verbal Bhāvanā," however, is recognised as one to be accomplished, in the passage "*Svādhyāyo 'dhyētavyah*." It cannot be urged that this latter passage also is declaratory of the "Actual Bhāvanā"; because in this passage the "Actual Bhāvanā" itself appears in the form of the "Verbal Bhāvanā," residing in all the declaratory passages. The word "*Adhyētavyah*" is made up of *adhi*+root "*īn*" (to study)+*tavya* (accusative affix); and the object thereof is the "*Svādhyāya*" which consequently is the primary factor; and the "*Adhyayana*" being an embellishment of this, comes to be recognised as a "*Guṇakarma*"—like the "sprinkling of water" on the corn. Next we have the question—'what is the purpose of the *Svādhyāya*, as accompanied by an embellishment in the shape of a *retentive memory* brought about by study?' In reply to this, we assert that the purpose (or aim) is the cognition of the

meaning of the forms of sacrifice, &c., necessary for the performance thereof, obtainable from the denotations of sentences with optative verbs, &c., appearing in the Vēda (Svādhyāya); because it is the only perceptible effect; and because by leading to the performance of sacrifice it indirectly leads to the attainment of hyper-terrestrial ends, in the shape of Heaven, &c.; and certainly no action can be performed, unless its full form and character have been comprehended (which is impossible without proper study). No Unseen Force can be said to be the aim, because in the presence of seen results, the assumption of an unseen one is not allowable. Thus all "Verbal Bhāvanās," endowed with the three constituent parts, denoted by the optative verbs, &c., appearing in the Vēda, are laid down as being objects of performance;—the full significance of such "Verbal Bhāvanā" being that—"the agents having acquired a full knowledge of the meaning of the optative, &c., appearing in the Vēda, aided by the recognition of excellence delineated in the Arthavada passages, should thereby come to know of the necessity of the performance of the sacrifice, &c., with particular results, and should then become engaged in their performance." Thus then, like the "Actual Bhāvana," the three factors of the "Verbal Bhāvanā" are: (1) the action of the agent, as the *result*, (2) the optative, &c., appearing in the Vēda, as the *instrument*, and (3) the knowledge of excellency as the *procedure*. And it is solely owing to the peculiar character of the Injunction that even in this (Verbal Bhāvanā) there is an appearance of such desirable ends as Heaven, &c., being the result thereof. If the sacrifice, &c., did not lead to the fulfilment of the agent's purpose, then no Injunctions could urge him to activity; and therefore such Injunctions lead to the fact of the sacrifice—which is the object of activity of the agent addressed by the Injunction—being the means to the attainment of ends desired by the agent, such as Heaven and the like. Otherwise the Injunction would lose all its impelling force; inasmuch as the impelling consists only in the means of leading the agent to activity. In the case of the verbal affixes—such as those belonging to the First Preterite and the rest—there is no Injunction consisting of *impelling*; and as such there is no necessary rule as to the "Actual Bhāvanā" pointing to the agent's purpose, as the object of realisation.

"Bhāvanā" consists in the action of urging to the coming (result). This definition applies to the "Actual Bhāvanā," because it consists in the action of urging to the coming result in the shape of Heaven, &c. It also applies to the "Verbal Bhāvanā," inasmuch as this too consists of the action of urging to a coming result, in the shape of the activity of the agent.