

23-25. If there ever was an absolute destruction of the Soul, then we could have the disappearance of the actions performed, and the appearance of those not performed by it. These, however, do not apply; if there be only a change in its condition, as from childhood to youth, &c., we find people performing or avoiding actions in this life according as they think them to be productive, respectively, of either good or evil, at some other stage of his life. In fact in the case of no action do we find the result following at the same stage of the person's life as at which it was performed. And since the Soul is not utterly destroyed, therefore people do not take the *enjoyer* (of results) to be other than the *doer* (of actions) (even though there is necessarily a change in his condition).

26. According to my theory the Person (*i.e.*, the Soul), while passing through the different conditions of pleasure, pain, &c., never, for once, relinquishes his character of an Intelligent substantial Entity.

27. If modification (change of condition) were identical with total destruction, then, when a man in trouble would regain happiness, he would either lose all those (character of Intelligence, &c.), or continue in a state of trouble (simultaneously with that of pleasure).

28. Therefore an entire continuance or an entire cessation of all the traits of the Person (with the change in condition) being both impossible

of
What we object to, in the case of the Soul, is the assertion of its destruction. For certainly, the fluctuations in the surface of the sea do not bring about its destruction; and like the sea, the Soul can never be destroyed, notwithstanding the endless momentary transformations that it undergoes.

23-25 If the Soul were destroyed at death, the effects, accruing to one in the next birth, of actions performed in the previous birth, would be accruing to one who has not performed the actions; as the performing Soul will have been dead along with the performing body. But we hold that Death means only a change in the state of the Soul; just like the changes from childhood to youth, from youth to old age. And certainly there is no gainsaying the fact that the person that performed the action (say of learning the alphabet) in his childhood is the same that is utilising it in his youth. In fact all effects of one's deeds affect him at a period of life other than that at which precisely the deeds are done; as the state of the person is undergoing momentary changes.

26 During the various stages that the Soul passes through, it all along remains an intelligent and substantial entity. That is to say, its inherent character remains the same. And mere changes in extraneous condition cannot mean *destruction*.

27 "*Or continue, &c.*"—That is to say, in order to keep up the character of the *Intelligent, &c.*, it would be necessary for it to keep to the same condition of pain; as change of condition would, for you, mean total *destruction*.

28 When a serpent has been lying coiled up in a circular form, and then resumes its natural form by uncoiling itself,—we have the character of 'Snake' pervading all along, in both conditions; though the position has been changed. In the same manner, in the case of a person who has been experiencing troublous times, if his state changes and he becomes happy and contented, the character of the Person—



we must hold that there is both partial continuance (as of the permanent characters of Intelligence, &c.), and partial cessation (as of the ephemeral state of pleasure or pain), like the serpent in the different positions of a circle, &c.

29. And the character of the *doer* and that of the *enjoyer* do not belong to the conditions (of the Person's life), but to the Person who is the substrate of all the different states; hence it is always the *doer* that enjoys the result of the action.

30. And as a matter of fact, on the appearance of a new condition (of life), the former condition does not become totally destroyed; but being in keeping with the new condition, it merges into the common character of the Self (Intelligence, &c.)

31. It is only the Individual conditions that are contradictory to one another. Over all of them, however, equally pervades the common character of the Soul (Intelligence, &c.)

32-33. In the theory of the non-existence (*i.e.*, non-eternality) of the Soul, however, the person performing an action, would know beforehand that "I myself (*i.e.*, my Soul, that performs the action at this moment) having been destroyed (the next moment), either its result would not appear at all, or, if it appears at all, it would affect some other soul than mine;" and hence he could never be tempted to perform any action; and as such the Veda would lose all its efficient trustworthiness.

33-34. Even if the upholders of pure Idea alone (the Bauddha Idealists) were to admit of another birth (for the same personality), they could not but have the enjoyer (of the results of action) different from the performer (of the action itself),—because they hold the Ideas to be momentary (*i.e.*, one idea does not exist for more than one moment); and further, because, being devoid of action and omnipresence, one and the same Idea could not reside in any other body (than the present one; and hence the "Idea" that would perform the action in this life, could not exist in another body, in the next birth, at the time of the enjoyment of the results of that action).

35. *Obj.*: "We hold that the 'Series' (of Ideas) that performs the actions would also be the enjoyer (of the results); and we could explain the

Intelligence, &c.—would remain the same throughout the two states, even though the states will have been changed.

²⁹ If the said characters belonged to the state of life, then inasmuch as the person's condition at the time of the performance of the action would not continue till the time of the enjoyment of its result, the *enjoyer* could not be held to be the same as the *doer*. According to our view, however, the common character of the Person, Intelligence, persists throughout his life; and as such, the Person remaining the same, the *enjoyer* would always be the same as the *doer*.

³⁵ This series is eternal, as well as omnipresent.

difference among the moments of Ideas in the same way as you have explained the difference of conditions (of the Soul)."

36. *Reply*: In fact it is extremely hard for you to prove the fact of (momentarily changing) Ideas being the doer of actions extending over a long time;—specially when there are thousands of Ideas (in your series), the performance of a single action by all these, would be like the "*Kula-kalpa*" (in which an action extending over a long time being incapable of being finished by a single person, is finished by a large number of persons, one coming after the other).

37. Then again, if the Series be not held to be different (from the individual Ideas constituting it), then the individual ideas (forming the Series) being non-eternal, you could get at no doer (of any action).

38. And (even if a doer were possible) he would be totally different from the enjoyer (which for you would be an altogether different idea, existing at the time of the enjoyment of the result of the action); and as such, you would have the fault of the result appearing in favour of an agent who never performed the action. And we do not urge against you the fault of the disappearance of the result for one who has performed the action; because (in accordance with your theory) there is none who can perform the action (and as such this latter fault does not apply to you).

39. On the other hand, if the Series be held to be identical (with the individual Ideas), then the mention of the word "Series" would come to be only another expression for the same individual Ideas; and the objections against such a course have already been stated above. And further, the Series being itself a nonentity, could never get at the position of the performer of actions.

40. If the Series be momentary, then you have the same objections. If it be regarded as not momentary, then that would be an abandonment of your theory (of everything being momentary), and you would have quite a new Substance (other than *Ideas*, which are the only entities you admit of).

57 Because it is necessary for the Doer to exist all along, from the commencement of the action to its end. No such continuance would be possible for *momentary ideas*.

58 "There is none who can perform," &c.—As shown in *Kārikā* 37.

59 "Nonentity."—Inasmuch as all individual ideas are being momentarily destroyed, the series comprising these cannot but be a negative entity.

40 "Same objection."—I.e., the impossibility of any one doer for an action lasting for any length of time.

"A new substance."—And thus, too, it would be an abandonment of your theory that Ideas are the only entities, which you hold to be momentary. Then, if the series were to be non-momentary, it will have to be accepted as something other than the Ideas themselves.



41. If the Series be one, and yet non-different from the individual Ideas, then we would have their identity as well as difference, as in the case of the cogniser and the cognised.

42. Therefore the Series must differ, either entirely or partially, (from the Individual Ideas); and thus this series would come to be the same thing as the Soul (held by the *Vaiçeshikas* and the *Sāṅkhyas*).

43-44. We could not have the notion that the "Series" (that enjoys the result) is the same (that performed the action), unless there be an identity (between the two). As for instance, in the case of the Series of Air, Lamp, &c., the genuine character of the Air, &c., continues the same. And a notion of identity, as (between the "Series") based on the fact of both of them having the genuine character of "Cognition," has been set aside in the chapter on "*Ānyavāda*." (Thus then, in accordance with your theory, the *enjoyer* cannot be the same as the *performer*). And we have also set aside (in the chapter on *Nirālambanavāda*) your theory of "Impressions," which you hold to be left upon the mind by the actions we perform, for the purpose of bringing about their results.

45. And no mind (or Idea) can, in accordance with your theory of Universal Momentariness, continue for any such time as you hold the Impressions to subsist. And further, since your "Series" is a nonentity, it can in no way be "impressed" upon by Actions.

46. Even if you were to hold the result of the action to be enjoyed by the "Idea" produced gradually by a Series of Impressions (appearing

41 "*Case of the Cogniser and the Cognised*."—It has been shown above, under *Ānyavāda*, that if the Cogniser and the Cognised were both identical with *Idea*, then we would have differences in the Idea itself; inasmuch as, in that case, it would be identical with two different things; and along with this we would have an identity of the Cogniser with the Cognised. In the same manner, the Series being identical with the Individual Ideas, all these Ideas would become identical; and at the same time we would have a difference in the series itself, as this would be identical with different individuals.

42 The *Vaiçeshika* holds that the Soul is an intelligent entity, different from the Cognitions.

43-44 You cannot explain how the series is identical; and hence you cannot prove that the *Enjoyer* of the Result is the same as the *Performer* of the Action.

Having in the above manner proved the enjoyments of Results, the Buddha has recourse to the "Impression" theory. He holds that Actions, being momentarily fleeting, can never keep on till the day of its final fruition. The sense of the *Kārikā* is that this loophole also is barred against you; as it has already been shown to be untenable, under "*Nirālambanavāda*."

45 You hold that the Impression continues from the time that the Action is performed to that of its fruition. But inasmuch as no mind could continue for such time, wherein could the Impression exist?

46 This refers to the following theory: "Though no single Impression can last more than one moment, yet, the Impression produced by the Action in one Idea, will



one after the other),—then too, there being no identity between the *enjoying* Idea (and the performing Idea), you would be clearly open to the faults of the disappearance of the result for one who has performed the action, and an appearance of it for one who has not performed it.

47. And further, it will be extremely difficult for you to prove any difference (of this enjoying Idea) from those brought about by other Series, on the ground of cause and effect. Nor would that remove the objections of these (disappearance of the result for one who has performed the action, &c., &c.)

48. If, even in the absence of any such causal relation, you were to prove (the identity between the enjoying Idea and the performing Idea) in some other manner;—then, all other grounds (of identity) that you can bring forward—such as the facts of their residing in the *same* Earth, having the *common* character of "Idea," and so forth—would belong equally to all Ideas (and as such would establish an identity, not only between these two Ideas, but among all Ideas).

49. In fact, even an idea of *sameness* (as in the sameness of the earth, &c.), is not possible, without the continuance of one entity for some time (and as such it is not possible for you, who hold all entities to last only one moment). Therefore it is wrong to assert that the "Series" (that enjoys) belongs to the same "Person" (Idea) that performed the action.

produce another like itself in the next Idea, and so on and on, till the time of the final fruition; and it is the last of this series of Ideas, which is to be accepted as the *Enjoyer of the Result*." The sense of the objection to this is that, even then, the Idea enjoying the Result would not be the *same* that performed the action.

47 If an Idea be held to be the Enjoyer, even in the absence of any identity between this Idea and that which performed the action leading to that Result,—then, any and every Idea could be held to be such an enjoyer. If you assert that, "the capability of an Idea to *enjoy* is regulated by the relation of cause and effect, and as such no stray Idea could be the Enjoyer,"—then, in that case, in accordance with your theory of *Momentary existence*, no such causal relationship would be possible,—as we have already shown under the section on '*Nirālambanavāda*.' Even if such a relationship were possible, it could not save you from the objection of "disappearance, &c."

48 Any other reasons that you will bring forward will be found to apply to *all* Ideas; and as such they could not prove the identity of the *performing* with the *enjoying* Idea alone.

49 In order to avoid the objection of "the Disappearance of the Result for one who has performed the Action, &c., &c.," the Bauddha has asserted that what enjoys the Result of the Action is the "Series" continuous with the Idea that performed the Action, and as such the enjoyer would be the same as the Performer. But the *Enjoyer* cannot be the same as the Performer, unless both of them had a common substrate, which would continue from the time of performance to that of the appearance of its Result. As a matter of fact, however, no such continuance is possible for the Bauddha who holds all things to have only a momentary existence; and hence he cannot reasonably hold the enjoyer to be the same as the Performer, and as such he can never escape from the objection in question.



50. Because the words "that"—"which" (when used together) cannot apply to different objects, therefore even the upholder of the theory of the "Series" of Ideas, must admit of a single permanent positive entity (like our "Soul," that could pervade over, and be the substrate of, the Idea performing the action, and the Idea enjoying the result).

51-52. *Obj.*: "Just as the father is tempted to perform actions for the accomplishment of certain results for his son, though he knows the son to be other than himself,—so, in the same manner would the individual Ideas (be led to the performance of actions, even though the results would be enjoyed by other Ideas). And just as the children of our people, though being as different from the performing person as the son of this latter, yet do not obtain the results of that action,—so, in the same manner, the Ideas appearing in one Series (would not enjoy the results of the action performed by an Idea appearing in another 'Series')."

53. *Reply*: But we are not cognisant of any such (disinterested performance of an action by one Idea, for the sake of another Idea obtaining the results). As for the father, he is led to support (and improve) his son in the hope of fulfilling a certain end of his own (support in old age). There can be no such motive in your case (because the performing Idea is destroyed in a moment, and as such cannot hope to be in any way benefited by the results accruing to another Idea).

54. People do not support their sons, &c., with any other end in view. And certainly, that (*person or idea*) which is destroyed cannot obtain any benefit from supporting its own line or series.

55-56. One,—who, in accordance with the same instance of the father, &c., asserts the existence of another result (to distinguish the perform-

50 There is no other means of getting rid of the aforesaid objections. And if such a single pervading entity be admitted, it would be none other than what we call "Soul."

51.52 "Series"=Family; "Idea performing the Action"=the Father; "Idea experiencing the Result"=the Son; and "Ideas appearing in other series"=children of other families.

55.56 Says the Baddha: "Apart from the final result of the Action, which may not appertain to the Performing Idea, there is another result in the shape of the enjoyment by one member of the series of the result brought about by benefiting another. If a father benefits a son, in order that the son may impart a benefit on the other son (*i.e.* when the father exhorts the one not to beat the other), he has a certain end in view, though the Result may not accrue to himself. In the same manner, the only end in view of the Performing Idea may be the benefiting of another Idea which would bring about the fulfilment of some purpose of another Idea; though the result may not accrue to the Performing Idea itself." This theory, however, is not quite tenable; because what could be the motive of the second Idea in benefiting the third? If you make its end consist in the mutual benefit accorded to one another, then, such an assumption would go on without end; and the only possible resting-ground would be the

ing Idea), brought about by the benefit of one member (i.e., Idea of the same Series as the performing Idea), and enjoyed by another member (Idea, of the same series),—could have no resting ground, apart from the enjoyment of the result by the first (performing) Idea itself. Nor do you accept any subsequent individual Idea to be exactly like the performing Idea (and as such thinking the result to be one following from its own action).

57. The greater the distance of the appearance of the result, the greater its liability to destruction, on account of the greater interval (between the performance of the action and the appearance of the result).

58. The bringing up of children that we come across among animals, may be held to be due to their ignorance, but the action of knowing intelligent men cannot possibly be so.

59. It is not possible for the Ideas to transfer themselves into another body (at re-birth; cf. K. 34); inasmuch as we are not cognisant of their exit from the present body.

60-61. The flame &c., move from one place to another, only when they are blown upon by the wind; whereas there is nothing that could move an Idea from the body in which it has appeared (which is its cause). Being immaterial (formless), the Idea could not by itself move from one place to another. And for the same reason (of immateriality) it is not possible for the Idea to move about even while the Body is living.

enjoyment of the Result by the Performing Idea itself. This, however, will not be possible for you; as you cannot, consistently with your own theory, admit the continuance of the Performing Idea from the time of the performance of the Action to that of its Fruition; nor can you accept the existence of any other subsequent idea that could consider itself identical with the Performing Idea, and thereby consider the result to have followed from its own Action; as all subsequent Ideas are equally different from the original performing Idea; and the only entity that could point to any such identity would be the *positive* one of the class 'Idea,' which would not be very acceptable to you.

67 The Performer can think the result to be his own, only if it follow contiguously with himself. If, however, the Result be removed from him, then, the greater the degree of the removal, the more will be the chance of his ceasing to think it his own; and as such there would be all the less connection between the Performer and the Result.

68 Intelligent persons are led to action, only by the idea of the Action being capable of leading to a desirable end; and this has been shown to be impossible for the Bauddha.

59 This is not possible because of the immateriality of Ideas. It is only a material entity that can either transfer itself, or be transferred, from one body to another.

60-61 Even when the body is living, any motion of Ideas is not possible. Because if the Idea were material and moveable, then, it would very often lose connection with the Body; as both are moveable, and both would not be always moving together. And this severance of connection might occasionally make the body non-intelligent.



62. An intermediate (subtle) Body has been rejected by Vindhyāvasin. We too find no proofs of its existence.

63. That the subtle body, endowed with all sorts of subtle forms, &c., is suddenly brought into existence (at death), and as suddenly disappears (at re-birth), is only an imaginary assertion.

64. Even if such a body existed, there are no grounds for believing in the movement (i.e., entrance) of Ideas into it. And consequently the assumption of the Ideas being thrown into the next body is also groundless.

65. To assert that the Ideas exist in the embryo is a sheer piece of recklessness. Since no sense-organs have been produced in the embryo, no objects can be cognised (by It).

66. And of an Idea (or Cognition), we do not know of any other form than that of a cognition of objects. It is for this reason that no cognition is possible in a coma (even though the senses continue to exist).

⁶¹ Some people hold that the Ideas acquired by man during the present life are transferred to him at his future birth; and in the interval, the Ideas continue to exist in a subtle *Linga Garīra*, which lies encased in the Body during life, and becomes disengaged from it at death, to occupy the next physical body of the Person. And inasmuch as this subtle Body is the seat of Ideas, these latter can be easily transmitted from one body to another. The *Kārikā* says that it has been shown by Vindhyāvasin that such a subtle Body has no existence at all.

⁶² Inasmuch as there is no cause for its sudden appearance, and as sudden disappearance, the statement must be regarded as a figurative exaggeration and not a statement of facts. Because there is no Body apart from the five elements; and any Body composed of these cannot be subtle.

⁶³ The Ideas being immaterial cannot enter into the subtle Body; and for this reason they cannot be transmitted to any other Body.

⁶⁴ If the Ideas of one Body were to be transmitted to another, then, the embryo would be already possessed of the Ideas of the previous life; as a matter of fact, however, the embryo cognises no objects; and in the absence of the objects of cognition, there can be no reason for asserting the presence of the Cognition or the Idea itself. It might be asked—"How is it that your eternally intelligent Soul does not cognise objects in the embryonic state?" The reply to this is that, though our Soul is eternally intelligent, yet for actual cognitions, it stands in need of such accessories as the organs of sense, &c., and inasmuch as these do not appear in the embryonic state, the Soul is unable to cognise any objects. Then, as for mental cognition, the mind too is under the influence of his former *Karma*; and as such its functioning is hampered in the embryonic state; but as soon as the sinister Karmic influence is set aside, consciousness is regained.

⁶⁵ Inasmuch as, in a state of coma, there is no cognition of objects, we conclude that there is no cognition at all in that state; though the regaining of consciousness would indicate that certain cognitions existed in that state, yet, inasmuch as we find the man not recognising any objects, we conclude that there are no cognitions or Ideas in his mind; and this cessation of cognition must be due to the cessation of the functioning of the sense-organs.



67. Nor can it be held that at that time (in the embryonic state) the Idea continues in a state of latent potentiality. Because, in the absence of any substratum for such potentialities, their existence cannot be admitted.

68. If the potentiality of Ideas resided in the material sense-organs, then these latter would have intelligence; and there would be no re-birth (inasmuch as the Intelligence and the Ideas would all die away with the death of the sense-organs, which being material, would be bound to die with the Body).

69. And further, (if the potentiality of Ideas resided in the sense-organs) then, all Ideas would be brought about by the sense-organs themselves,—these helping the manifestation of the potentialities by modification, discrimination, &c. And hence the Idea could not be held to be preceded (and brought about) by another Idea (as held by the Idealist Bauddha).

70. In the same manner, you could have no instance to prove the assertion that the first Idea (of a person) after the embryonic state (*i.e.*, at birth) has its origin in another foregoing Idea.

71. If in the embryonic state, the potentiality (of Ideas) be held to exist, without any substrate, for the sake of the accomplishment of subsequent Ideas,—then, these would be nothing but (our) "Soul" under the name of "Potentiality."

67 In fact, this potentiality cannot be anything other than the idea itself, according to the Idealist.

69 We find that whenever intelligence is joined to the elements (*e.g.*, with the clay in the making of the jar), the object, jar, being developed out of the elements, we come to realise that the intelligence that took part in its making is something other than, and to be duly discriminated from, the material form of the object. And in the same manner, if the potentiality were to reside in the material sense-organs, then we could get at the Ideas (of which these were the potentialities) only by discriminating the immaterial factor from the material effects brought about by the senses themselves; and the appearance of the Idea could not, for this reason, be said to be due to any previous Idea.

70 The Bauddha asserts that inasmuch as during life we find all ideas to be due to some previous Idea, we can from this deduce the fact that the very first Idea that a person has at birth must be due to a previous idea; and as this latter idea must have existed in the embryonic state, we cannot but admit of the persistence of Ideas in that state. The sense of the *Kārika* is that the Bauddha bases his argument upon the instance of the second and subsequent Ideas appearing at the birth; but as a matter of fact, these ideas are due, not to any previous Ideas, but to the sense-organs; and as such the argument becomes baseless.

71 It has been proved that the potentialities of Ideas have no substrates; hence the *Kārika* takes up the other alternative for consideration. "Soul"—because we also hold the Soul to be *without any substrate*, and *capable of moving from one body to the other*. And as the Bauddha holds his "Potentiality" to have these two characteristics, we admit the same entity, but with different names—we call it "Soul" while you name it "Potentiality."



72. If we were to assume any substrate for the potentiality, such substrate could be none other than the Soul. And as a matter of fact, the existence of Ideas, like that of flame, bubbles, &c., is not possible without a substrate.

73. Therefore you must admit that there is a Person (Soul), bearing the potentialities of Ideas, and being eternal, omnipresent, and capable of (migrating into) another body. And as such, even though not actually moving, it would become connected with another body.

74. On account of its active character, the Soul comes to be the performer of sacrifices. We do not hold "motion" to be the only form of action, as held by the *Vaiçēshikas*.

75. It is not always only such an action as inheres in (*i.e.*, belongs to the body of) the performer himself, that can be performed by him. All that is expressed by a verbal root would be an *action* (and hence *motion* cannot be held to be the only form of action); and we find that the character of being the performer of an action belongs to a person, even when the action properly belongs to (is performed by) another person, (and therefore it cannot be held that an action must always inhere in the performer himself).

76. Of the different forms of pure *being* and *Idea*, &c. (the immaterial factor) the Person (*i.e.*, the Soul) himself is the direct doer; and as for the motion of the material factors (*i.e.*, the body), these too are brought about only by his superintendence (or guidance).

77. As whatever actions are performed by the body, the sense-organs

78 The proof of its eternality consists in the fact of its being recognised as the same at different points of time, and also of distinct Vedic declarations to that effect. And as it is not material, it must be all-pervading, like the *Ākāśa*; and as such it could become easily connected with another body; which could not be possible if it were material and as such limited. It is only a material object that requires movement in order to become connected with new bodies. The soul, on the other hand, being immaterial and all-pervading, does not stand in need of any movement.

79 This refers to the following objection: "Being omnipresent, the soul could have no action; and as such it could not be considered as the performer of sacrifices." The sense of the *Lārīkā* is that it is only action in the shape of movement that is not possible for an omnipresent entity; other kinds of action are quite compatible with omnipresence. And, like the *Naiyāyika*, we do not reduce all action to the terms of 'motion.'

80 There is no such rule as that all the actions that a person performs, must necessarily appertain to his own body. For, we actually find that even when an action is performed by one person, another person is also accepted to be its performer, by reason of his having either urged the former to action or helped him in it.

81 Without the guiding Soul, there could be no movement of the hands, &c. And hence of these movements also the Soul must be regarded as the Performer.

82 "With regard to him"—*i.e.*, because he enjoys the results of all actions.



&c., are all said to be done by the Person himself; because they are done with regard to him.

78. Since these—the body, sense-organs, &c.,—could have no action without their belonging to the Person, therefore even with regard to the motion (of hands, &c.), they cannot be said to be the doers, inasmuch as they are not independent (of the intelligence of the soul, even in this form of action).

79. Since it is only such body and sense-organs, &c., as are earned by the Person for himself by means of previous deeds, that can perform the actions,—the character of being the performer of the actions must belong to the person; just as the actions performed by the "*Ritwik*" (sacrificial priest) and the "axe" (have their real performers, in the first case, in the Person who engages the priest and pays him for it, and, in the second, the person who uses the axe).

80. Just as, in the case of the sacrifice, the action is held to be performed by the mere instrumentality of the priest, on the ground of the Veda declaring the "buying" (of the priest); so, in the same manner, on account of the Veda enjoining "going" and other such actions (which are not possible for the Soul itself directly), we accept them to be brought about through (the instrumentality of) the Body, &c.

81. For, just as the "buying" cannot apply to the Soul, so too "going" cannot apply to it. Therefore the fact of the Soul being the performer of such actions, as declared in the Veda, must be accepted as being possible only through (the instrumentality of) something else (in one case, the priest, and in another, the Body, &c.)

82. And again, just as in the case of *cutting*, which resides in the wood, Devadatta is accepted to be the doer; so too, in the case of *going*, which resides in the Body, we could hold the Person himself to be the doer.

83. If it be urged that, "in the case of cutting, the idea of the Person

78 Deprived of the intelligence of the Soul, these can have no action.

79 The meaning is that the Body, &c., are only the agents and instruments of action; and as such these cannot be held to be the 'doers'; as the 'Doer' is that person who obtains these instruments, through his former deeds, and then uses them in his present actions.

80 "*Buying*"—engaging him and paying him for his services. And as he is paid for the work, he cannot be the real 'performer' of the sacrifice. And inasmuch as the "buying" that is enjoined cannot apply to the master of the sacrifice, he cannot but accomplish the sacrifice by engaging certain priests to perform the details for him. Similarly in the ordinary actions of *moving*, &c., enjoined for the person, not being found applicable to the Soul itself, we must admit of the instrumentality of the Body, &c., in the accomplishment of these actions, which would not be possible without this instrumentality.

83 Determination and existence cannot belong to the Body; just as the manipulation of the axe cannot belong to the wood that is cut by it.



being the doer is based upon other actions (that of manipulating the axe f.i.), which belongs to the Person himself,"—then (we reply that) in the case in question too (that of *going*, &c.), the idea of the Person being the mover is based upon *determination and existence* (which belong to the Soul itself).

84. By the mere fact of its *existence*, the Soul becomes the *doer* of all actions in general; and it comes to be held to be the *doer* of particular individual actions, on account of the determination (of the Person) which affects each action separately.

85-86. And the action of all the agents, performing a certain action, is not identical; e.g., the fighting soldier moves—the sword to cutting, by his movements; the commander of the regiment (moves it) only by his word (of command); and the King, who employs the servants, moves it at times by his mere presence.

87. Therefore even though the Soul may not itself move, yet it may be held to be the *performer* (of motion); just as even though Devadatta is not cut (or pierced) (by the sword), yet he is held to be the *performer* (of the cutting).

88-89. The taking of the present body, &c., by means of the bodily actions (performed in his previous life) may be considered to be the actions of the Person with regard to his agency of the actions of his present body, &c. And the actions of the previous life too may be held to be

84 By its mere existence, the Soul is the doer of all actions. And it is held to be the performer of a particular action, when it is found that the action has been brought about by a special determination on the part of the Person.

85.86 And yet all of them are accepted to be the performers of the action of cutting the enemies.

87 In both cases, the idea of the Person being the doer is based upon the fact of his superintending and guiding the action.

88.89 Even if it be absolutely necessary to hold that all action is in the form of *motion*, then too, we could hold that the actions done by means of the hand, &c., by the Ego, in his last life, are his actions with regard to the actions of his body in the present life, &c., &c. The connection between the two sets of actions lies in the fact of present bodily conditions &c., being the effects of the Ego's actions in the previous life. Just as we can trace no beginning in the use of the *seed* and the *tree*,—so too none can be traced for the Creation; and the process must be regarded as going on, eternally without beginning, and without end. "And on the disappearance, &c." This refers to the following objection: "The body of other Egos is as different from the one Ego as his own body. Consequently, if his actions were to be affected by those of his body,—then, even when all his own actions will have been exhausted by fruition, he would still continue under the bondage imposed by the actions of the bodies of other Egos; and as such no Deliverance would be possible." The sense of the reply as embodied in the *Karikā* is, that the Ego is affected by the action of his own body, only because he imparts the guiding force to these actions, and as such, is himself, in a way, the performer of them. As for the actions of the body of the Egos,—as one Ego has no guiding force over the action of other Egos,—they could not affect him.

brought about by the Body, &c., of the birth previous to it; and these too by other Bodies, and so on. And thus there is no beginning of these (and hence endlessness cannot be any fault). And, on the disappearance of all his own actions, the Ego cannot be affected by the actions of those bodies that are not his own.

90. In the case of the measure prescribed for the *Udumbara* Post, which is to serve as the connecting link (between the Master and the Priest),—the application of the form of the Sacrificing Ego is not possible; and hence his agency with reference to this must be through the Body.

91. Therefore just as the Scripture, though literally laying down the "Class" ("*Vṛhi*" f.i.), is made to refer to the individual (*Vṛhi*) (on account of the impossibility of the use of the "Class"),—so the injunction (of the measure of the stick) though really referring to the Ego, must be taken to apply to the Body, &c.

92. First of all (before giving its own reasons) the (*Bhāṣhya* mentions and) refutes the arguments brought forward by others (*Vaiṣeṣhikas*), to prove the existence of the Soul. 'Na' (in the *Bhāṣhya*) has to be separated from the following sentence (meaning that 'breathing, &c., are not properties of the Body'), because these (breathing, &c.), are unlike other properties (of the Body).

93. Says the *Vaiṣeṣhika*: "(If Breathing be denied to be a property of the Body, on the sole ground that it does not last as long as the Body lasts, then) the fact of not lasting as long as the Body lasts would also apply to leanness, &c. And if it be held that 'leanness' is only a particular condition (of the Body), then we can hold 'Death' also to be the same."

90 It is prescribed that the Sacrificial Post is of the same size as the Master. The Ego, however, is illimitable; and hence as no post of this illimitable size would be possible, we are forced to have it of the size of his body.

92 This refers to the *Bhāṣhya*: 'We infer the existence of the Soul from breathing, &c.' The second half refers to the sentence '*na prāṇādayah śarīraguṇavidharmānah*.' This latter sentence would mean that the breathing, &c. are properties similar to those of the body. This not being quite admissible, the *Kārikā* undertakes to explain it differently. The 'na' is taken as denying the foregoing objection (that the breathing belongs to the Body); and then, as a reason for this denial, it is added 'because the breathing, &c., are not similar to the properties of the Body, they cannot belong to the Body.' These arguments, up to *Kārikā* 101, are expounded by the *Vaiṣeṣhika*. And then up to K. 106 we have the refutation of the *Vaiṣeṣhika* arguments from the *Bauddha* standpoint; and lastly, from 107 the *Mīmāṃsaka*'s own arguments are put forward.

93 Leanness, &c., appear and disappear, and as such cannot be accepted as concomitant and coeval with the Body. "Death, &c."—just as the Leanness of the Body, being only one of its varying conditions, reverts to it after the disappearance of the opposing condition of Fatness;—so Death also, being a varying condition of the Body, might disappear; and with this disappearance, the breathing, etc., might return.



94. "There is only this much of difference between the two cases; that even while the Body continues in a perfectly healthy state, the breathing, &c., cease (as in cases of sudden death); and (of this cessation) there can be no other reason (than that the breathing belonged to the Soul which has left the body).

95-96. "Because (1) a property is destroyed when the substance itself is destroyed, and (2) when there is production of a contradictory property, then the former property is removed from the substance, and forthwith destroyed. In the case of Death none of these two (causes for the destruction of Breathing) is, by any person, found to apply; and yet we find that even while the Body is not destroyed (and remains intact), the Breathing, &c., cease altogether.

97. "Therefore we conclude that Breathing, &c., are not the properties of the Body,—because these cease to exist, while the Body is yet seen to exist,—just like the odour of flower-garlands and sandal-paintings.

98. "Breathing, &c., having an existence external (to the Body), are perceived by other people's senses (and as such may be said to be the properties of some exterior object); but Pleasure, &c., having only an internal existence, are not so perceived (and as such, they can point to the existence of the Soul).

99. "These (Pleasure, &c.,) are always cognisable by such inferential marks as a happy countenance and the like. If it be urged that—' (the Pleasure really belongs to the Body, but) is not perceived on account of its internal existence,'—(we reply that) even on tearing open the Body (at Death) we do not find the Pleasure, &c., there.

100. "On tearing open the Body, we can see the colour, &c., of the

95-96 All causes of the disappearance of properties are enumerated here; and as none of these is found applicable to the case of the cessation of *Breathing* in a healthy Body, we must admit that *Breathing* is a property, not of the Body, but of the Intelligent Ego, that leaves the Body at death.

97 The *Odour* ceases even while the Body continues; hence it is accepted to be a property, not of the Body, but of the garland.

98 This refers to the following objection: "Breathing is found to consist of certain movements in the Air; and as such, though it cannot be the property of the Body, yet it can belong to the Air; and hence it could not prove the existence of the Soul." The sense of the *Kārikā* is that the explanation might hold good for the *Breathing*, which, as having an existence outside the Body, is perceptible by other people's senses. But the Pleasure, &c., of the person, which are only inferable from his countenance, cannot be so perceived; and hence these could not be attributed to any objects outside the Body.

99 If Pleasure belonged to the Body, occupying a position inside this latter, then at death, when the Body is torn open, we could see this Pleasure encased there. Inasmuch as such is not the case, we conclude that it belongs to the Soul, and as such disappears with the Soul, at death.



interior of the Body, but not Pleasure, &c. Therefore, like the Mind, and the Will, these (Pleasure, &c.), too cannot be regarded as properties of the Body.

101. "Pleasure, &c., being properties, must have a substrate, like taste, &c., and that which is the substrate of these (Pleasure, &c.) is the Soul."

101-102. The *Bauddha* replies: "One who argues thus (as shown in *Kārikās* 92-101) must be answered thus: It is only when a certain entity is established to be a property, that from the fact of its depending upon some other (substrate) we infer the existence of the object (or person) having that property. But for us *Pleasure*, &c., are not established to be properties (and as such these, cannot prove the existence of the Soul).

103. "How is it that the case of Remembrance (Memory), exactly resembling the case of Desire, is brought forward (in the *Bhāshya*) as something different?—Both (are equal, since both) equally do not apply to unperceived objects, and both can be explained as being due to 'Impression' (*Vāsanā*).

101 It cannot be urged that "Pleasure has no substrate, and as such could not prove the existence of the Soul."

101-102. Beginning with this, down to K. 106, we have the refutation of the above *Vaiçēshika* arguments, from the standpoint of the *Bauddha*. As the *Bauddha* does not admit of Pleasure being a Property, the argument based upon this supposition can have no force for him.

103. The *Bhāshya*, having established the incapability of *Pleasure* proving the existence of the Soul, puts forward *Desire* as the property that would establish its existence. This is thus explained in the *Kārikā*: "Desire refers only to such an object as has been perceived before, and found to be agreeable. Thus this Desire cannot but belong to the same entity to whom this previous cognition belonged. As a matter of fact, we do find a person desiring something to-day which he had perceived yesterday; and hence we must admit of the existence of an eternal entity, other than the Perceptions, which perceives the thing one day, and desires it on the next." To this argument, the Idealist is represented (in the *Bhāshya*), as making the following reply: "There is nothing that cannot be cognised by the means of Right Notion, and as such we cannot admit of any other entity save the *Idea*; so *Desire* also, as apart from Perception, cannot be proved to us; and hence the mere existence of Desire could not convince us of the existence of the Soul. Then, as for the fact of the desiring entity being the same as the perceiving entity, we could explain that on the ground of both—Desire and Perception—belonging to the same *Series of Ideas*, the *Desire* being brought about by the *Impressions* left by the *Perception*." Having thus found *Desire* also unable to convince the opponent of the Soul's existence, the *Bhāshya* puts forward *Memory*, as affording the reason for the Soul's existence, the process of reasoning being the same as in the case of *Desire*. And this also the Idealist is represented as rejecting on the same grounds as before. It is with a view to this that the *Kārikā* asks—"When the grounds in support, as well as the arguments against *Memory* are exactly the same as those in the case of *Desire*, why should the *Bhāshya* have put forward *Memory*, after *Desire* had been rejected?"



104-105. "A *Desire* is produced by a mere *remembrance* (of the object) independently of any direct idea of the *perception* itself; and hence it is not necessary that the nominative of this (*Desire*) should always be the same as that of *Perception*. While, on the other hand, *Remembrance* is always in accordance with *perception*; and hence its nominative is always the same (as that of *Perception*); and it is for this reason that the case of *Remembrance* is brought forward (in the *Bhāṣya*) again (i.e., even after the refutation of the capability of *Desire*).

106. "In this case (of *Remembrance*) too, since the *Impression* (that causes *Remembrance*) is in the same 'Series' (of Ideas),—therefore we can explain *Remembrance* (as being due to the same *Impression*), even though it be different (from *Desire*)."

107. The arguments of other theorists (for proving the existence of the Soul) being thus rejected, the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to show that the Soul is itself directly cognisable by the notion of "I."

108-109. Though, in the assertion "I go," the word "I" refers to the Body, inasmuch as it is the Body that goes, going being impossible for

104-105 These *Kārikās* point out the difference between the cases of *Desire* and *Memory*. It often happens that one man perceives an object and finds it agreeable; and then he describes it to another person, who comes to have a *Desire* for that object; and thus it is not always the case that the desiring entity is the same as the perceiving entity. In the case of *Memory*, however, the person remembering an object could not but be the same that had previously perceived it.

106 This *Kārikā* points out the grounds on which the Idealist rejects the capability of *Memory* establishing the Soul's existence. The *Impression* that causes the remembrance, (and which is the basis of *Memory*) always occurs in the same 'Series of Ideas' as that which causes the *Desire*. Consequently, even though the case of *Remembrance* might differ from that of *Desire*, in the point shown in the previous *Kārikā*, yet, inasmuch as the fact of being brought about by *Impressions* is common to both, the ground of refutation too would be exactly the same in both. Just as the case of the desiring entity being the same as the perceiving entity has been explained on the ground of the *Desire* being brought about by an *Impression* occurring in the same 'Series' as the *Perception*,—so, in the same manner, we could also explain the fact of the remembering person being the same as the perceiving one, on the ground of the *Remembrance* being due to the *Impression* occurring in the same 'Series' as the original *Perception*.

107 With this *Kārikā* begins the explanation of the *Mīmāṃsaka's* own arguments for proving the existence of the Soul. In accordance with this theory, the Soul is the object of the notion of 'I' which is directly perceptible by the Senses, and does not rest upon mere Inferences.

108-109 Though the 'I' in 'I go' may be taken to refer to the Body,—and similarly the fact of our remembering a thing to-day as it was perceived some days ago, as also the fact of our recognising a certain thing as being the same that was perceived by us a few days ago, &c., &c.—all these may be explained, somehow or other, as being due to 'Impressions' appearing in the 'Series of Ideas,' &c., &c.—yet the recognition of one's own self as being the same to-day as it was yesterday, cannot be explained except by postulating an eternal



the Soul,—and though *Remembrance* and *Recognition*, with regard to other objects, may be due to "Impressions";—yet the *recognition* of the *Cognising Self* (by itself as being the same to-day as it was yesterday) is hard to be got at (by "Impression," &c.)

110. It cannot but be admitted that in the assertion "I know," the "I" cannot but refer to the *Knower*;—this *Knower* may be either the "Idea" (as held by the *Bauddha*) or the *substrate of the Idea*, the "Ego" (or "Person.")

111-112. The applicability of Intelligence to the material elements making up the Body and the Senses, &c.—considered either as one complete whole or severally (each element by itself), or as having been modified into a particular shaped Body to be discriminated from other material objects, Body, &c.,)—has been rejected by the *Sāṅkhyas* and others, on the grounds of the Body (1) being impure, (2) being a partite whole, (3) having a shape, (4) being material, and (5) being a Body,—like *material elements*

Soul. Thus then, it is the *recognition of the Self* that is brought forward by the *Bhāṣhya* as a fact proving the existence of the Soul. It cannot be denied that the object of the previous cognition, and that of the subsequent recognition are one and the same. Consequently, even if you have recourse to 'Impressions,' these must be held to be brought about by the previous cognition of the Soul.

110 In the case of 'I go' we admit of the fact of the 'I' referring to the Body, only because 'going' is not possible for the Soul. But in the case of 'I know' the case is quite the reverse, the 'I' referring directly to the Soul; as it is the Soul alone to which 'Knowing' could apply, as it could not apply either to the Body or to the Sense-organs. The word 'I' therefore must be taken as referring to the *Knower*; and we shall prove later on—in K. 115 *et seq.*—that the Idea cannot be the *Knower*; and hence 'I' cannot but refer to the Soul.

111-112 "Considered either as one complete, &c."—The question is—Does Intelligence belong to each of the elements composing the Body, or to all of them, considered as one composite whole? As a matter of fact, it is not found to exist in the elements, earth and the rest, when these exist separately by themselves. Nor can it exist in all of them taken collectively; because that which does not belong to the parts cannot belong to the whole. For the same reason the Intelligence cannot be regarded as belonging to these modified into a particular corporeal shape, for the purpose of being discriminated from other Bodies. Because even then, the constituents of that shape remain the same earth or the rest, which have been found to be devoid of Intelligence. Thus then, inasmuch as Intelligence cannot belong either to the Body or to the Sense-organs, these cannot be regarded as the *Knower* referred to by the 'I' in the sentence 'I know.' The 'impurity' of the Body consists in its being made up of the three attributes—*Satva*, &c. Just as the elements, having the aforesaid four properties—*being a partite whole*, &c.—are devoid of Intelligence, so must the Body also be; as this also has the said four properties. And just as the dead Body, having all the characteristics of the Body, is found to be devoid of Intelligence, so also must the living Body be regarded to be; because there is no difference between the material constituents of the dead Body, and those of the living one.

(which is an instance applying to the first four premises), and like the *dead Body* (which is an instance applying to the last premiss).

113. If all (the material elements constituting the Body) had Intelligence, then all being equal (in importance) could not be related to one another. And if only one of them had intelligence, then the fact of the other (elements) being its auxiliary would become incompatible.

114. An embodied whole and a shape could never exist, except for the purpose of some other entity. If we have a distinct enjoying (experiencing) Agent (in the shape of the Soul apart from the body), endowed with Intelligence, then the incompatibility ceases.

115-116. If the *knower* were only an *Idea*, then your knower would be a momentary entity; and then there could be no recognition of any previous cogniser (being the same as the one at the present moment): as that "I knew this before, and I know it also now."

117-119. Because of this (recognition), which "Idea-moment" would be the object? With regard to the previous event (cognition in the past) we would have the notion "I knew"; and then the assertion "I know it also at the present moment" could not be true (with reference to the same cogniser), because the "Moment-idea" (that cognised the previous idea) does not cognise the present Idea (since the past idea must have disappeared instantly, and as such could not cognise any idea at the present time). And a cogniser at the present time is known from the assertion "*I know*"; and in this case, the assertion "*I knew it*" would not be true (with regard to the present cogniser). Because the present cognising Idea could not (have been present at any past time, and as such could not) have cognised (the object) in the past. If both (the present and the past cognising Ideas) were to be the objects of (recognition) then both would be false, inasmuch

118 "*Could not be related, &c.*"—Those that are equally important cannot bear any relationship to one another,—as declared by Jaimini in the Sūtra:—"Subsidiaries, all being equal, in that they are subservient to others, cannot bear any relationship to one another." (VI—iv—13). If one element were intelligent, then, it would not require the aid of the others, and the Body would be constituted by that one element only.

114 Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 17.

115 With this begins the refutation of the *Bauddha* theory that the "Idea" is the *knower*.

116-119 "*Both would be false.*"—The past and the present cognising Ideas being (in your opinion) different from one another, could not be the object of the subsequent recognition. Because this could be possible, only if both the cognising Ideas had jointly cognised the object, both on the former occasion and on the present one. This, however is by no means possible; because the *present* Idea had no existence on the former occasion; nor could the *past* Idea exist at the *present* moment. According to us, the Soul that cognised on the former occasion is the same that cognises at the present moment; and as such *Recognition* is only natural.



as both of them did not cognise it in the past; nor do they both cognise it at the present moment.

120. The "series" (of ideas) cannot be said to be the object of Recognition; because none of the two forms (past and present) can possibly belong to it. As the series did not cognise it in the past (as it did not exist at the time of the first cognition), nor does it cognise it at the present moment, because of its non-objective (unreal) character.

121-122. Nor is there any common element in the past and present cognising Ideas (as the *Bauddha* does not admit of any *class* notion). If it be urged that Recognition is due to *similarity*,—then, we could not have any recognition in the case of *dissimilar* ideas; as in the case "I knew the *cow* before, and (the same) I know the *horse* now."

122-123. If it be urged that both have the common character of being the *cogniser*—then, that would also belong to other persons, and, then, in the case of the cognition of all men, we would come to recognise the "I."

123-124. Even if both these (cognising ideas had the similarity of) appearing in the same "series" (of ideas),—then, too, all the recognition we could have would be in the form of "That,"—just as we have with regard to the cognitions of other persons, or with regard to external objects like the jar, &c. (when seen twice).

124-125. "Impressions" are able to bring about the recognition of

120 "Non-objective character."—Because, according to the *Bauddha*, the "Series" cannot be permanent; nor can it be momentary; as it is held to consist of many momentary Ideas. And as such this "Series" cannot be regarded as *non-objective*, or unreal.

121.22 The *Bauddha* does not admit of any such *class* as "Idea." "Dissimilar"—in the case cited, the *previous* cognition is that of the *cow*, and the *present* one is that of the *horse*; consequently there can be no similarity between the two cognisers, on the ground of the *cognitions*, which are not similar to one another; and hence the recognition of the cogniser of the *present* cognition as being the same as that of the *previous* one cannot be said to be due to *similarity*.

122.23 If the mere fact of both being *cognisers* were sufficient ground for the recognition of one as being the same as the other, then, inasmuch as one person would be as much a *cogniser* as another person, we would come to recognise the two persons as identical; and this would be an absurdity; as it would mean that, whoever the cogniser may be, he would always be recognised as 'I'!!

123.24 Granting that the two cognising Ideas have the similarity of appearing in the same "Series," and that as such one could be recognised as being the same as the other,—even then, we could recognise the *present*, as being the *past*, only in the form 'this is that;' and we could not have any notion of 'I' in it. Because the Cognition is as much different from the 'I,' as another person's Cognition, or as any external object. Consequently, the *recognition* laid down by you cannot explain the recognition of the "I" in the assertion—'I who see the *cow* to-day am the same that saw the *horse* yesterday.'

124.25 We admit the ability of the Impressions to bring about the recognition of

the *cogniser*; but they cannot bring about, with regard to an object, the idea of something that it is not; for "Impressions" are not a cause of mistaken notions (and the notion with regard to an object as being something that it is not, cannot but be a mistaken one).

125-126. And the notion of "I" is not a mistaken one; as it is not set aside by any subsequent cognition; and naturally, this notion of "I" cannot refer to any other object than the *cogniser*, as we always find the *cogniser* to be known by the notion of "I."

127. The notions of "I,"—as in "I am heavy, or fat, or lean, &c.," when taken as referring to the Body,—must be held to be mistaken ones. Because the fact of the Body being different from the "I" is proved by such assertions as that "*my Body* is heavy," &c.

128. With regard to the sense-organs too, we find that they are always spoken as being different from the "I"—e.g., in the assertions "this *my eye* is so and so," "*my mind* is wandering," and the like.

129. Thus then, the fact of the body not being the *cogniser* having been established, if there be any notion of identity (between the cognising "I" and the Body), even when the one is different from the other, then this cannot but be a mistake due to extreme proximity (of the *cogniser* with the Body).

130. The idea of "*my Soul*," indicating difference (between the *soul* and the "I"), must be explained as being due to the difference (from the soul) of "cognition," which is a state of the *soul* (and hence often spoken of as such).

131. Of the word "My" (i.e., "I") the direct denotation can be none

the *present* cogniser as identical with the *past*. But such recognition could be possible only when the two cognisers would be identical. On the other hand, when there is a distinct difference between the two (and the *Bauddha* has failed to prove their identity), then, in no case could the one be recognised as the other,—even by means of Impressions; specially as such a recognition could only be a misconception.

125.26 We always have an idea of our own *self* whenever we cognise an object to be the object of the notion of 'I.' Hence the notion cannot refer to the *Body*.

127 "I am heavy" always means that "my body is heavy." Consequently the notion of 'I' in this expression, when made to refer to the *Body* alone, apart from all notion of one's *self*, cannot but be false. If there were no difference between the "I" and the *Body*, then we could have no such notion as '*my*' *body*, and the like.

129 "Any notion of identity" as in 'I am heavy.'

130 This refers to the following objection: "Just as we speak of *my body*, so we do also of *my soul*; and this would prove that the *Soul* is something other than the *I*." The sense of the reply is that '*my-Soul*,' = *my cognition*,—*cognition* being a condition of the *Soul* is spoken of as the '*Soul*'; and certainly the cognition is something other than the '*I*'.

131 "Aforesaid cause," i.e., the fact of the cognition being different from the '*I*,' and yet being spoken of as '*Soul*,' on account of the Cognition being a particular condition of the *Soul*.

other than the "Soul"; therefore the notion of difference (expressed in "My soul") must be due to the aforesaid cause, and the difference is due to the difference of "Cognition," (and therefore the expression "My soul" cannot be taken to point to any other *soul* than the one expressed by the "I" in the word "My").

132. Those alone, who have no knowledge of the difference (of the soul from the Body), can have a notion of "I" with regard to the Body. But even in this case (they have this notion with regard to the Body, only because) they *think the body to be the Soul*. Hence the notion of "I" must always (be accepted to) refer to the *Soul*.

133. Those, however, who have a knowledge of the difference (between the Soul and the Body), have no notion of "I" with regard to the Body. And as for the notion of "I" expressed in "I know," this is never set aside.

134. For, if this notion were absent in the *Yogis*, how could they have any ideas, while instructing their disciples? And we do find them thus engaged (in instructing); therefore we must admit that they are cognisant of the "Soul."

135. In a case where only a half of a certain scripture, &c., has been learnt, if one were not to have any idea that "I have learnt this much," then (when taking up the study of the work after some time), he would have to learn from the beginning again.

136. Thus then, we would have a rejection of the theory of the non-existence of the *Soul*, by means of the aforesaid *Recognitions* (of the Soul), experienced by all persons. And the following are the counter-arguments (against the arguments, brought forward by the other side, to deny the existence of the Soul).

137. Though they think the Body as 'I,' yet, inasmuch as the Body is also thought of as the *Cogniser*, and as eternal, &c., &c.,—they make no difference between the Body and the Soul; and thus for them, the Body being identical with the Soul, it is only natural that the notion of 'I' should refer to the Body; and in this case, this would not be adverse to the notion that 'I' refers to the *Soul*.

138. "As for the notion, &c." This refers to the following objection: "People who have reached the highest grades of knowledge, cease to have any notion of 'I' with regard to the Soul also; consequently the Soul too cannot be rightly regarded as the objective substrate of the notion of 'I.'" The sense of the reply is that, though the notion of 'I,' as expressed in 'I go,' 'I run,' &c., is set aside by a true knowledge of the Soul, yet such notions of 'I' as are expressed in 'I know,' are never found to be rejected.

139. We find even the great master of *Yogis* imparting instructions to Arjuna, and talking of himself as—"I am the origin of this Universe, &c., &c."

140. We find that one who had learnt the first half at some previous time, takes up the other half at a future time. This would not be possible if there were no *one Soul* occupying the Body of the person, during the time extending over the complete period of his study.



137-139. (1) The cogniser, known as the "I" yesterday, is the same that continues to-day, because—the cogniser of yesterday is known as the "I," like the cogniser of the present time. (2) The present cogniser must have been the cogniser yesterday,—because it is a cogniser, or because of the aforesaid reason (i.e., because it is known as the "I"),—like the cogniser of yesterday. (3) Or, we may have the arguments based upon the "cognitions" themselves as the minor term: all cognitions of the "I" happening to-day or yesterday have one and the same object (Soul),—because they are all the cogniser's cognitions of the "I" connected with one and the same "series" (of Ideas),—like any ordinary single cognition of the "I."

140. One who would seek to know the Soul by the help of the Veda alone would find himself contradicted by certain contradictory texts; hence the citation of the *Brāhmaṇas* (with a view to explain away the contradictory passages).

141. The Injunctions (of Sacrifices) themselves, standing in need of a permanent Soul, indicate its existence on account of the inexplicability of the Injunctions in case of the non-existence of the Soul; and the texts cited only serve to strengthen the idea of the Soul, indirectly indicated (by the Injunctions).

142. It being asked—" (if the existence of the Soul be indicated solely by Vedic Injunctions and texts), when the Word ceases to indicate the Soul, by what is it manifested? "—the reply is given by the text—*It is self-luminous*, meaning that *The Soul is manifested by Itself*.

143. By saying that it is "incognisable," in general,—the meaning would seem to be that it is so (incognisable) by *all* persons (including even the Ego himself). But the assertion of "self-luminosity" distinctly indicates its incognisability *by others*.

144. When an *object* (the 'gavaya') is cognised by means of another *object* (the 'Cow'), we have a case of *pure Analogy* (or *Simile*). Where,

137-139 The *Kārikā* puts forward another argument based upon the "Cognitions":—"Yesterday's cognitions were those of the Cogniser known to-day,—because they are cognitions like the series of to-day's cognitions."

140 Having established the existence of the Soul, by means of reasonings, the *Bhāṣya* has brought forward certain Vedic texts in support of the same, and the *Kārikā* shows the use of this citation of authorities. "Contradictory texts"—such as 'na prētya, &c.' ('There is no consciousness after death').

141 As shown above, the attainment of Heaven would not be possible if there were no Soul. Hence it is absolutely necessary to accept the existence of the Soul, for the sake of the Injunctions of actions leading to Heaven, &c., &c.

142 "Word ceases"—i.e., when the texts are not being pronounced.

143 This refers to the *Bhāṣya* quoting the sentence—'I cognise the Soul to be as you cognise it to be.' This is objected to on the ground that there can be no Analogy in



on the other hand, the similarity is indicated by Words alone, there we have a case of "Analogy" and "Verbal testimony" (combined).

145. We become cognisant of other people's Souls, by observing their methods and actions, such as are not possible without the Soul;—and also of such cognition of other people's Souls as has been shown by Inferences (in K. 135 f.i.)

146. The text ("there is no consciousness after death") embodies an objection urged by Maitrēyi, who had become confused by various passages in the Upanishads, declaring the Soul to be *existing* and *non-existing*, *perishable* and *imperishable*; and (the text "This Soul is imperishable" embodies) the statement (by Yājñavalkya) of the final well-ascertained fact.

147. The Soul, by Itself, is imperishable. And perishability belongs to (its connection with) the senses, &c., together with the capabilities (of *Dharma* and *Adharma*). And the "absence of consciousness" (mentioned in the passage "there is no consciousness after death") refers to the Material Senses, &c. (the meaning being that after death, the Soul ceases to have any cognition through the material sense-organs and body, &c.)

148. Thus has the author of the *Bhāṣya*, with a view to refute Atheism, established, by means of reasonings, the existence of the Soul. And this idea of the existence of the Soul (thus obtained) comes to be strengthened by studying the *Vedānta* (i.e., the Upanishads).

Thus ends the Section on Ātma-vāda.

Thus ends the 5th Aphorism.

a case of Verbal Assertion. The *Kārikā* admits that this is not a case of pure Analogy; it is one of Analogy and Verbal Authority combined.

145 The passage just quoted speaks of one's own Soul as cognised through its similarity to other men's Souls; and the *Kārikā* shows how we become cognisant of the Souls of other people.



APHORISMS VI to XXIII.

On the Eternality of Words.

1. *Question* : "When, even in accordance with the theory of non-eternality of Words, meanings are comprehended from Words, and the usage too is without beginning, why should you insist upon the eternality of words?"

2. *Answer* : True : the theorists (holding non-eternality) do desire such comprehension of meaning ; still, we have to examine their reasonings ; because the mere fact of acceptance by others cannot be regarded as sufficient ground for validity.

3. When the Word is momentary (as held by the *Bauddha*), then it is incapable of giving any sense. Consequently, if the comprehension of meanings from momentary words be sought to be established, by means of arguments, then the comprehension of the Veda would become groundless.

4. In the face of the groundlessness of these comprehensions (of meanings of Words), we could have some refuge in the case of perceptible objects (which are amenable to sense-organs, and as such, are not totally dependent upon verbal expression). As for *Dharma*, however, depending as it does solely upon the Veda, it would lose its ground altogether.

5. And we should also reject the theory of an eternal usage being based upon objects having a beginning (and as such necessarily perishable). In the case of the use of the jar, the idea of the (perishable) *indi-*

3 A momentary word can have no relationship with anything ; and as such, cannot afford any meaning. If, in the face of such incapability, the Vedic sentences were to give a sense, it could only be in accordance with a human convention. But any such convention is held to be inapplicable to the Veda. Hence the Veda would become meaningless.

5 Words being momentary cannot be the objects of eternal usage. Though we find an eternal usage—in the shape of the *fetching of water*—in the case of the jar ; yet such eternality is based only upon the idea of the class 'jar,' which is eternal. The notion of the *individual jar* being an object of eternal usage is a mistaken one, for certainly any single jar could never be the object of eternal usage.

vidual jar is a mistaken one, as it really pertains to the class "jar" (which is eternal).

6. We can have eternality of only such a usage as is based upon an unchangeable eternal entity. In the absence of one such unchangeable eternal entity (in the shape of the *Class*), there is nothing that could be the substratum of such eternality.

7. And further, we can admit of no usage other than what is generally recognised. Therefore it is for the sake of the validity of the Veda, that we seek to prove the eternality of Words.

Objections against the eternality of Words (embodied in Sūtras 6-11).

8. "Since there is mutual invariable concomitance between *non-eternality* and *being caused*, the *Sūtras* lay down arguments in support of one of these.

9. "Words are *caused*,—because many of us recognise it, simultaneously, in diverse places, in one and the same form;—like the tracing of letters in writing.

10. "Or (the *Sūtra* may be taken to mean that) there is a difference (in the same word as pronounced by different persons), because they are simultaneously recognised; and because there is this diversity (or difference), the Word must be *caused*. Because a single object cannot be

⁶ It is only an *eternal entity* that can be the substrate of eternality; anything else does not exist long enough to serve as such a substrate.

⁷ We find all usage to be based upon notions of *Class*—and not on those of *Individuals* (*vide supra*).

⁸ From this *Kārikā* down to K. 18, we have the explanation of *Sūtras* 6 to 11, embodying the arguments against the eternality of words. These *Sūtras* are: (1) "Some say that the Word is *caused*, because it is perceptible only after an effort" (1—i—6); (2) "Because it does not persist" (7); (3) "Because of the application of the word 'make' with regard to it" (8); (4) "Because it is found to be pronounced by many persons at one and the same time" (9); (5) "Because it undergoes change" (10); (6) "Because it is intensified by a multiplicity of speakers" (11). *Kārikā* 8 refers to an objection urged against *Sūtra* 7. This *Sūtra* seeks to prove the *non-eternality* of words; while what the preceding *Sūtra* 6 lays down as the conclusion to be proved is that *the word is caused*. The sense of the *Kārikā* is that it is a well-known fact that whatever is *caused* is also *non-eternal*, and *vice versa*; and as such the argument that proves the one also proves the other.

⁹ This explains *Sūtra* (9).

¹⁰ One and the same word—"Cow" f.i.—is recognised, at one and the same time, by many persons; and unless it be all-pervading, like *Ākāśa*, this would not be possible,—specially if the words recognised by different persons be non-different from one another; but as a matter of fact, we do find them to be different; and as such the word cannot but be regarded as *caused* by the effort put forth by each person,



cognised simultaneously in different places, unless it be an all-pervading entity (like *Ākāśa*).

11. "And that the Word is not an all-pervading entity is proved by the fact that in a single place it is perceived *in its entirety*, like the *jar*, &c. Therefore the word ('Cow' f.i.) uttered by one person must be (held to be) different (from the same word as uttered by another person).

12. "If the word ('Cow' f.i.) were *one* only, and as such necessarily existing in one place,—then, when it would be used by one person, it could not possibly exist in the mouth of another speaker; just as the mouth of one person (cannot belong to another person).

13. "As, on the other hand, if the word be held to be a *caused* entity, then, since the actions (efforts of individual speakers) are different, it is only natural that the effects of these actions should be different from one another. And the notion of all these being *one*, must be held to be due to their extreme similarity (of form),—when the fact of their being different from one another is so clear.

14. "Then again, if the Word were eternal, there would be no ground for the mistaken notion with regard to it (in the shape of *sameness*, &c.) And the unity of the Word,—sought to be proved in the passage "verily it is the positions (of the word) that are different, and not

11 An all-pervading entity, like the *Ākāśa*, is never capable of being perceived *in its entirety*. And if such difference as shown above is admitted in the case of one and the same word, you cannot deny the fact of its being *caused* by the effort put forth by each individual speaker; and as such, it cannot be *eternal*.

12 "Effects"—in the shape of the word "Cow" pronounced by different persons. This word uttered by one person cannot but be different from that uttered by another; the ordinary notion of *sameness* is due to extreme *similarity*.

13 When it is proved that a word uttered by one person is different from the same word uttered by another person, then we can explain the notion of *sameness* as being due to *similarity*. If, however, the word be held to be eternal, then there can be no ground for any mistaken notions with regard to that. Because if there were any such grounds, then the word would lose its eternal character, as shown later on. Thus if the word were eternal, the said notion of *sameness* would be quite real, and not mistaken; but inasmuch as the *sameness* is shown to be false, the *eternality* cannot but be rejected as false also. Hence if the word be held to be eternal,—in reality it has been shown to be otherwise—we could have no grounds for explaining the said notion of *sameness*. "And the unity," &c., &c. It cannot be argued that the identity or unity cognised by means of sense-perception cannot be rejected by inferential arguments. Because it is only correct sense—perception that is incontrovertible; while that which is distinctly found to be incorrect,—e.g., the perception of the *sameness* of the flame which is undergoing changes every moment is always set aside by means of well-established inferences. The fact is that the word "Cow" is diverse, because it is perceived in several places; and hence the notion of *sameness* or *unity* with regard to that word cannot but be a mistaken one; and from this it must follow that the word is *not eternal*.

the word itself" (in the *Bhāṣhya* on *Sūtra* 15),—would be contradicted (and rejected, by the arguments brought forward in *Kārikās* 9, 10, &c.)

15. "Nor can it be urged that the appearance (of the same Word) in different places (as uttered by different persons) is due to the difference in their manifesting causes (in the shape of the utterances of different speakers). Because a single *jar* does not appear diverse, as shown by lamps located in different places.

16. "And further, since the impartite *Akāṣa* is the sole substrate of all the manifesting utterances (of different speakers) together with the manifested (Word),—therefore, for you, the manifestation too (of the Words) would be in one and the same place.

17. "The letters 'i,' &c., are non-eternal,—because they undergo modifications into other letters ('ya,' &c.), as laid down and regulated by the *Smṛti* and similarity, just as *curd*, *milk*, and *sugar*, &c. (being modifications of *milk*, *grass*, and *sugar-cane* respectively, are recognised as non-eternal).

18. "And again, since (the utterance of) the Word is intensified in accordance with the intensity of its origin, it must be non-eternal, like the *jar*. (The notion of intensity cannot be said to be a false one, caused by the intensity of the manifesting cause; because) even though we may have a thousand lamps illuminating a *jar*, the *jar* will not, on that account, become any larger."

Reply to the above (embodied in Sūtras 12-23).

19-20. In this (12th) *Sūtra*, and in those that follow, the *Bhāṣhya* shows the inconclusive character of the above arguments. The fact of

15 A diversity in the manifesting agency cannot cause diversity in the manifested entity.

16 Hence you cannot explain the diversity of the word "Cow" as being due to the difference of the positions of its manifesting causes, in the shape of the utterances of several persons.

17 This *Kārikā* explains *Sūtra* 10. The letter 'i' when followed by the letter 'a' is changed into 'ya' (vide *Panini* VI—i—77); and out of the modifications laid down in the *Sūtra*—*ya*, *va*, *ra*, *la*,—it is into 'ya' only that the 'i' is changed, simply because of a certain similarity between these two letters; and certainly that which undergoes changes can never be eternal.

18 This explains *Sūtra* 11. No amount of intensity in the manifesting cause can bring about an intensity in the effect. It is only an increase in the material cause (*Clay*) that leads to the enlargement of the effect (*jar*). In the same manner, the intensity perceived in the word, when uttered by many persons simultaneously, must be held to be due to a certain increase in its material cause, and not to any in its manifesting causes. And thus, inasmuch as the word undergoes modifications in accordance with the modifications of its material cause, and as such it resembles the *jar*,—it cannot but be regarded as non-eternal, transitory.

19.20 With this begins the reply to the above arguments,—this reply being em-



"being perceived after a certain effort" does not militate against the theory of eternity either. Therefore (since the fact of being perceived after an effort does not negative the fact of its existence elsewhere), as the Word is perceived only after an effort, we recognise its existence through *perception* as qualified by *recognition*, at other times also, even though it is not then perceived directly by the senses.

20-22. If by your argument ("because it is perceived only after effort") you mean the fact of its *non-perception* before and after the effort,—then the argument becomes doubtful—(1) for the *Vaiçēshika*, with regard to "class," (2) for the *Sāṅkhya*, with regard to intelligence as residing in the Soul, and (3) for the *Bauddha*, with regard to the three entities held by him to be other than momentary: *viz.*, "Intelligent Destruction," "Non-intelligent Destruction," and "*Ākāṣa*."

22-24. When the destruction is preceded by an intelligent process (*e.g.*, the breaking of a vessel by means of the stroke of the stick), we have an idea of "Intelligent Destruction." And when the destruction is not so preceded by any intelligent process (as in the case of the tumbling down of a wall), we have "Non-intelligent Destruction." Both these (Destructions), being *imperishable* are held to be *uncaused* also. The *Bauddhas* have asserted that Destructions are accomplished by themselves, and are (*not caused*).

24-25. Because that which is found to have a cause, is invariably found to perish,—as for instance, the sprouts, &c. And since there is no destruction of Destruction, it must be *uncaused*.

25-27. From the fuel as connected with fire, *proceeds* a series of bodied in *Sūtras* 12-23. *Sūtra* 12 is thus: *The fact of being perceived after effort is equal* (to the theory of eternity as well as to that of non-eternity).

20.22 The *Vaiçēshika* holds the *Class* to be eternal; and yet the *Class* is not perceptible, before and after an effort on the part of the Perceiver. In the same manner, with the Intelligence of the *Sāṅkhya*, as also with the three *eternal entities* accepted by the *Bauddha*,—none of these being perceptible before and after an effort.

22.24 That which is *caused* cannot but be *perishable*. Therefore, in order to be *imperishable*, the *Destruction* must be *uncaused*.

25.27 What are popularly known as cases of Destruction brought about by some cause are only cases of positive Production; *f.i.* the case of the burning of the wood is one of the production of ashes.

"*Not perceived, &c.*"—Destruction is natural to all entities; but it exists in two forms, the *subtle* and the *gross*. So long as an object continues to be acted upon by homogenous causes, its changes are all homogenous and positive; and during all this process, the Destruction continues in its *subtle* form; and in this condition it is not perceived. It, however, comes to be perceived when the object happens to be acted upon by an external heterogenous agency,—such, *f.i.*, as the *stick* in the case of the breaking of the jar; and it is then that the Destruction appears in its *gross* form, and as such becomes perceptible.



fiery embers. And from the jar, as struck by a stick, proceed certain earthenware fragments. Destruction, being natural, and having an existence in itself (without any agency from without), is extremely subtle,—and hence it is not perceived (to appear),—being, as it is, lost in a series of homogenous positive entities.

27-28. When, however, an external heterogenous cause happens to fall (*i.e.*, operate) upon the homogenous series, then, by means of an heterogenous effect (thereby brought about), the Destruction appears in its gross form, and (thereby) becomes manifested (and perceptible).

28-29. Thus, then, it is an heterogenous effect that is brought about by the cause,—by which cause the Destruction is distinctly manifested, though it is not brought about by it.

29-30. Thus then, inasmuch as Destruction,—even though *not appearing apart from an effort* (in the shape of the *striking with the stick*, for instance)—is found to be *uncaused*, your reasoning (embodied in *Sūtra* 6) becomes contradictory.

30-32. The *Ākāṣa* too, being eternal,—when it happens to be covered up under the Earth or Water,—is rendered visible only by the removal of these (Earth and Water) by means of *digging* and *pumping*. And thus we see that here we have perception (of *Ākāṣa*) only after an effort. Consequently your reasoning—“since it (word) is perceived only after an effort”—becomes doubtful.

32-33. If it be urged that—“in the case cited, we infer that the *Ākāṣa* exists all along, though it is hidden under Earth and Water,”—then (we reply that, in the case of the Word too, from *recognition*, we infer that it exists all along even prior to (and after) the effort put forth by the speaker.

33-34. When the *Ākāṣa* is made to *disappear* by an effort in the shape of filling up the well, then we find that the argument—“Because the Word does not continue to exist”—becomes doubtful.

34-35. In the well thus filled up, there is no cognition of the *Ākāṣa*,

28.29 And this manifestation leads people to think that the Destruction has been brought about by the cause.

29.30 Your argument is that, since the Word is found to appear after an effort, therefore, it must be caused. But as a matter of fact, all that is so found to appear, is *not caused*, as we have shown, with regard to *Destruction*.

30.32 We now proceed to show that the argument fails with regard to *Ākāṣa* also.

33.34 This refers to *Sūtra* 13, which refutes the argument put forward in *Sūtra* 7. Since an uncaused and eternal entity, like *Ākāṣa*, is found not to have a continued existence, therefore the argument cannot be valid.

34.36 Just as we have no cognition of the Word, which has not yet been rendered perceptible by an effort on the part of man, so also, in the case of *Ākāṣa*, we have no cognition of it until it is rendered perceptible by an effort in the shape of the removing of the earth from the well.



—because that which has been hidden is not perceptible,—just as the cognition of the Word.

35-36. If the argument be brought forward in the form—"because of the non-continuance of the Word" (thus saving the cases of the *Ākāṣa*, &c.),—then it must be held, by the person holding the theory of the *manifestation* (and not *production*) (of the Word), to be an unaccomplished (incomplete) one.

36-37. If (by "caused") you mean the fact of its depending (for manifestation) upon an action of the (manifesting) causes,—then (the argument becomes doubtful) with reference to the cases of the root (of trees) and Water under the ground. Because, though these (the root and Water) are *caused* (in the above sense of *appearing after an action of the cause*) yet they are not *produced* by the actions of *digging*, &c. (which only serve to render them perceptible).

37-38. In the case of the Word, there is no other action productive of it, save its utterance (by a person). Even if the argument be qualified by the specification "in the absence of impediments,"—then too, it becomes doubtful, with reference to the same facts (of the roots and water underground).

38-39. Because, even in the absence of any impediments (to the

35.36 "*Unaccomplished*"—because the Word is *not* accepted by the *Mīmāṃsaka* to have a non-continuous existence. Consequently, an argument based upon a fact not accepted by him can never convince him.

36.37 What do you mean by the assertion—"The Word is a caused entity?" (1) Does it mean that it is *produced* by some cause, (2) Or, that it is perceived after a certain action of that which is held to be the cause? In the former case, the argument—"because it is perceived after an effort"—becomes useless; as it does not prove your conclusion. And in the latter case, in view of the case of the roots of trees, and the water under the ground, the said argument becomes very doubtful. Because, these are perceived after a certain action—of *digging*, f.i.—and as much, may be said to be 'caused,' though they can never be said to be 'produced' (brought into existence) by the *digging*; as they already existed under the ground. In the same manner, even if the Word be proved to be a *caused* entity (in the above sense), it could not, on that account, be said to be 'produced.' Consequently, your argument fails to prove that Words are 'produced' and 'non-eternal.'

37.38 If the argument be stated in the form—"because in the absence of any impediments of its perception, the Word is not perceived before and after an effort"—then, too, it becomes doubtful, with regard to such things as the water underground. Because these too, in the absence of any impediments to their perception, are not perceptible either before or after the presence of a lamp, or of other causes of their appearance. (*Vide* next K.)

38.39 The deaf does not cognise the sound of a Word; but that is owing to the absence of the manifesting cause, and not to the non-existence of the Word. And as such these facts of non-perception, before and after the effort, cannot prove the *causedness*, and the consequent non-eternality, of the Word.



perception of these), they are not perceived, on account of the absence of causes (favouring their perception). In the same manner, in the case of the Word also, we would have no cognition of it, on account of the absence of its manifesting agency (the ear, f.i.),—as we find in the case of the deaf. If the non-existence of the manifesting cause be said to form the impediment (meant in the argument), then too the argument would be incomplete.

40. If it be urged that—"our reason is *non-existence* (of the Word) before and after (the effort),"—then too, the reasoning is non-conclusive, and *unaccomplished* (non-convincing). Because, as a matter of fact, the Word exists all along; but is not perceived, on account of the absence of causes (favouring its perception, by helping its manifestation).

41. And the cognition of the Word depends upon a cause which is momentary; just as during a dark and cloudy night, our vision depends upon a flash of lightning (which is momentary).

42. Just as a lamp is held to be the manifestor of the jar, &c., through the aid that it affords to the eye,—so (in the case of the Word) utterance (by the Speaker) would be (the manifestor of the Word), through the impression it makes upon the ear (of the hearer).

43. This is not affected by the question—"In what form is the *impression*?" Because, just as in this case of *production* (of the Word in the ear), so equally in this case (of manifestation) also, the power (of manifestation) is beyond Sense-perception.

44. How can any objection apply to a *power*, which is even inferable

"*Incomplete*"—Because the absence of such an impediment would mean the negation of the absence of the manifesting cause—which would be equivalent to the existence of the cause; and during such existence there can be no non-perception of the Word (which is always perceived whenever the manifesting cause is present).

40 The objection means that it is not the *non-perception*, but the non-existence, of the Word before and after the effort, that we lay down as an argument against its eternity. But this argument is unconvincing to the *Mīmāṃsaka*, who does not admit such non-existence.

41 Since the cause regarding the already existing word lasts only a moment, therefore the word is not perceptible before and after the effort. Hence this latter fact cannot prove the *non-existence* of the Word before and after the effort. As an example of the manifesting cause being momentary we have the flash of lightning illuminating things in a dark and cloudy night.

43 The agency producing the sound in the ear is not perceptible to the senses. So the agency manifesting it too would as reasonably be imperceptible. Hence the non-ascertainment of the form of impression cannot affect our position.

44 So long as the Power succeeds in bringing about its effect—in the present case, manifestation of the Word,—its existence and efficiency can never be questioned. And specially as such efficiency is proved by concomitance: the cognition of the Word existing only when there is the manifesting agency of the utterance and not otherwise.



from the effects (it brings about). The only ground for believing (the utterance to have the power of manifesting the Word) lies in the fact of the cognition (of the Word) appearing only when there is utterance.

45. Thus then, it is by means of supersensuous power alone, that these (utterances) impart a supersensuous facility (power) to the Sense-organ (the ear), and thereby, become the causes of the manifestation of Words.

46-48. If it be urged that "the manifesting cause cannot be heterogeneous (to the manifested entity)",—then (we ask), how can you hold the ear to be the manifestor of sound? And, how could the fiery lamp be the manifesters of the earthy jar? And, lastly, what homogeneity could there be between the Conjunction of the Soul (with the Mind, which conjunction is held by the *Vaiṣeṣikas* to be the manifestor of all perceptions) and the objects (perceived)? If you take your stand upon some such genus (as the *summum genus* "entity," to which everything belongs, and through which all things may be said to be homogeneous),—then, that would serve us also (as both the Utterance and the Word would equally belong to the genus "entity"). Barring the means of cognition or perception (of the Word), nothing else can be rightly regarded as the manifestor.

48-49. Therefore just as an homogenous entity is accepted to be a manifestor, simply on the ground of its being the means of perception,—so too would also an heterogeneous entity (be held to be a manifestor), on the same ground of perception being concomitant with (i.e., existing on the existence of) that manifesting cause.

49-50. Not knowing the fact of the Utterance belonging to the Air, and thinking it to belong exclusively to the palate and other (places of Utterance in the mouth), the objector (in the *Bhāṣya*) has urged the objection—"even on the cessation of the (Utterance) the sound is heard, &c., &c."—in order to prove the non-manifesting power (of Utterance).

48-49. If utterances, being heterogeneous to Words, cannot be the chief manifesters, then the Ear could not be the manifestor of sound and so forth. "Barring, &c." This is added in anticipation of the objection that the lamp being known to be a manifestor of the jar, &c., it was right to bring it forward as an instance; when, as in the case of the Conjunction of Soul, people do not ordinarily know this as a manifestor, it is not right to bring it forward. The sense of the *Kārikā* is that everything that brings about the perception of an object is its manifestor, and the Conjunction of the Soul is the means of such perception; therefore this too is as good a manifestor as anything else.

48-49. We have the same grounds for accepting an heterogeneous entity to be a manifestor, as we have for accepting an homogenous one.

49-50. The sound is heard even after the utterance, because it resides in the air. But the objector, who is made to speak in the *Bhāṣya*, is ignorant of the fact, and knows the sound too to reside in the palate, &c., which ceases as soon as the speech has ceased.

50-51. And it is with regard to the fact of its belonging to the Air (and hence continuing even after the speaking has ceased), that the reply is given (in the *Bhāṣya*) that *in fact, the Utterances do not cease*. Till the assertion (in the *Bhāṣya*) of the fact of (the sound) "striking" (the Air), &c., &c., the above objection as well as its reply remain with their connections (and significations) obscure.

51-52. In the *Bhāṣya* passage beginning with "If, &c.," the "manifestation," that is spoken of, is possible in three ways: It is possible (1) through a change (*saṅskāra*) in the word itself, or (2) through that of the sense-organ (the Ear), or (3) through that of both.

52-53. *Objections*: "If the change were in the Word, then all men would cognise it. Because of an entity, which is impartite and all-pervading (as the Word is held, by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, to be), there could be no change in any one portion.

53-54. "Nor is it possible for the process of change to be regulated in accordance with the diversity of its substrates (*i.e.*, the Ear of men hearing it). Because, being like the *Ākāśa* and the Soul, the Word (as held by the *Mīmāṃsaka*) can have no substrate.

54-56. "If the *Ākāśa* be held to be the substrate (of the Word),—even then, the change cannot belong to a portion of the Word, inasmuch as it is itself impartite; and also because people always cognise the Word, in its entirety. If the Word had undergone a change, only in a portion of it, it could never be cognised in its entirety, pervading, as it does, over the whole extent of the *Ākāśa*.

56-58. "If the *Ear* be held to be the *Ākāśa* itself, it being all-pervading, the conjunction (with the Word uttered) would be equal (in the Ears of all men). And thus we would have the possibility of hearing words even from a great distance. And in this way (*i.e.*, if the *Ear* were to be *Ākāśa*), the Ears of all men would become one (since *Ākāśa* is one); and consequently when one person hears something all men would hear it (an absurdity).

50-51 The utterances do not cease with the speech. They continue in the Air for some time. The fact of the utterance belonging to the Air is known only when the *Bhāṣya* has asserted the sentence "*Abhigāta*, &c."

51-52 The passage referred to is the *Purvapakṣa* passage: "If the connection and disjunction (of the palate, &c.,) were to manifest the Word, &c."

52-53 Now begins the setting forth of the objection raised in the *Bhāṣya* referred to. The Word being the change produced in it by utterance, must belong to the whole of it. And as it is all-pervading all men would hear it.

53-54 It cannot be held that the change is produced in the Word, only in so much as is in conjunction with the Ear of men near the speaking man.

56-58 The Ear of all men being all-pervading, the sound made in America would be as well heard by us as by those near the speaker.



58-59. "Inasmuch as the *Ākāṣa* is impartite, it cannot be held—for the double purpose of regulating (the change produced by utterance, and the limitation of hearing)—that the Ear is that part of the *Ākāṣa*, which has been modified by the Virtue and Vice (of the person having the Ear).

59-60. "These objections also apply to the theory of the *Vaiṣeṣhikas* (who hold the Ear to be *Ākāṣa*); and to the doctrine of Kapila (*Sāṅkhya*) also, as the Ear, &c., being all-pervading (inasmuch as all sense-organs are modifications of Self-consciousness, which is held to be all-pervading),—the same process of reasoning would apply.

60-61. "(If the change belonged to the Ear, then) the Ear, being once changed (which, in the case of Ear, means *being made* capable of cognising sounds), would comprehend all the Words. Just as the eye opened (and rendered capable of vision) for seeing a jar, does not fail to see the cloth also (if it be before the eye).

61-62. "The same objections would apply, if the change belonged to the object (*i.e.*, the Word). Since the Word exists in the same place (as the ear), the change of the one is not different from that of the other.

62-63. "There would be a change in the ear, by the removal of the air filling up (the cavity of) the Ear. But we always see that when a covering is removed we perceive everything that may have lain in the place (covered).

63-64. "The Word being held to be one only, it is not possible for it to be changed (for one person) and not changed (for another person) at one and the same time. And if only one of these conditions (changed or not changed) be held to apply to it at a time,—then it would be either

58.59 Such modification by the deeds of persons possessing the Ear, could explain the limitations in hearing. Because the deeds of each person being different the capacities of their Ears would also be different.

60.61 And the objection, is that, if the change produced by utterance were to belong to the Ear. All Words being external and all-pervading, the Ear is always in proximity to all Words; hence, if it were to be modified and rendered capable of comprehending Words, it would comprehend all the Words—which is an absurdity.

61 Since the Word heard is co-extensive with the Ear, the change of the Word is open to the same objections as the change of the Ear.

62.63 The only change that is possible in the Ear and the Word is that which is brought about by the removal of the Air filling up the cavity of the Ear. But in that case the covering of Air, the only impediment of the Ear, having been removed, it would comprehend all Words, because they also are in the Ear, which is all-pervading like *Ākāṣa*, and hence all the Words exist in it; consequently if the covering be removed, all the Words would equally be open to comprehension.

63.64 If the Word were to be changed once only, it would be so for all people; and hence all people would hear it. In the same way, if it were to be not-changed only, no person would hear it.

cognised (heard), or not cognised, by all persons (at one and the same time).

64-65. "If the change be held to belong to both (the Ear and the Word),—then this theory would be open to all the objections that have been shown above, to apply severally to each (*i.e.*, to the change of Word and to that of the Ear). Therefore a partial cognition of the Word (*i.e.*, the cognition of the Word by some people and not the rest) would not be possible, unless the Word be held to be a *caused* entity."

65-66. The *Bhāṣya* has given a reply to the above, based upon (the theory of) the change belonging to the Ear. The hearing by different individual hearers is regulated by a diversity among their Ears.

66-67. Nor do we admit the Ear to be necessarily (identical with) *Ākāṣa*. Nor, again, is the *Ākāṣa* itself impartite; inasmuch as this (impartite character) has been denied (with reasons) by the *Jainas* and the *Sāṅkhyas*.

67-68. Therefore the Ear could either be a part of *Ākāṣa* itself, or a distinct entity by itself (without being open to the aforesaid objections). And thus, in accordance with our theory, for each person, verily, there is a separate Ear—this being inferred from the (otherwise) inexplicability of effects (in the shape of the hearing, of different persons, being different from one another).

68-69. (Granting the theory of Ear being *Ākāṣa*), even though it (Ear) were one and all-pervading, yet, the change produced by utterance could belong only to the substrate of the auditory *Ākāṣa* only. Therefore the Word would be cognised only by that Ear (auditory *Ākāṣa*) which is affected by that change (and thus there would be no chance for the Word being heard, or not heard, by all persons simultaneously) (as urged in K. 63-64).

69-70. If the change be attributed to the organ of Sense (the Ear),—even then, the change could (be held to) apply to the organ, through its substrate (*viz.*, the tympanum in the body of the hearer). And thus the Word would not be heard by that Ear, of which the tympanum has not been affected by the change (produced by the utterance).

65-66 This refers to the *Bhāṣya*: "One who holds the manifestation of words is not open to the said objections; because the disjunctions and conjunctions of the palate, &c., of the speaker, do not affect the Ear that is at a distance, &c., &c."

67-68 If the Ear of each person were not distinct, we could not explain the fact of a Word being heard by one person, and not by others.

68-69 Substrate of the auditory *Ākāṣa* is the Ear in the body.

69-70 And consequently we would not have the absurdity urged in K. 63-64. That is to say, there could be no chance of the Word being either heard, or not heard, by all persons simultaneously.



70-71. An utterance does not effect any change in the auditory organ, if it fails to reach the Ear (in the body). Therefore the applicability of the change (produced by utterance) is regulated by the diversity of the corporeal Ear (which is different for each person) (and consequently there is no chance of the absurdity of a Word being heard by all persons simultaneously, or that of a very distant sound being heard with as much distinctness as one near at hand).

71-72. *Obj.*: "But then, the auditory organ, having been affected by the change in one corporeal substrate, would become the means of cognising (that Word) in all persons,—for those who hold all auditory sense to be one only (on the ground of its being identical with *Ākāṣa*, which is one)."

72-73. The cognition (audition of the Word) is held to be produced in the bodily organ of persons. Consequently the change (appearing in the organ of one body), appearing in a place other than the principal element (audition of the Word by other persons), fails in an essential factor (necessary for audition by others).

73-74. Even one soul, though impartite, and as such cognising (a Word) by its whole self, has the cognition in the body it occupies (and which it has acquired in accordance with its past deeds). And after this explanation, our theory no longer remains faulty (objectionable).

74-75. Just as the *Ākāṣa*, though one (and impartite), comes to be diversely connected with several partite objects severally,—so in the same manner, would it also be open to change and non-change (in accordance with its substrates in the bodies of men) (and hence the change in one auditory *Ākāṣa* could not lead to the cognition of another person, and so forth as urged in *Kārikās* 56-57 *et seq.*)

75-76. Even though *Ākāṣa* is impartite and all-pervading, yet the "connection" (of *Ākāṣa* with the partite objects, jar, &c.,) having a dual substrate (in the shape of *Ākāṣa* and the partite object), depends upon the (partite objects) jar, &c., lying on the earth only (and as such, the connection cannot be said to be all-pervading).

71-72 The sense in one person being the same as in other persons: if it happens to be affected in the Ear of one person, and lead to his cognition of the Word, it would remain affected even in the Ear of other persons. Therefore when one person hears a sound, all others would hear it.

72-73 Change is a secondary element in cognition which is the principal element. And the secondary element, in order to be effective, must be in the same place as the primary. The cognition is to be produced in the bodies of men and nowhere else. Therefore the change affecting the sense in Rama's body cannot bring about a cognition in the body of Krishna. Because the change in Rama is not co-extensive with the cognition in Krishna.

75-76 This is in anticipation of the objection that the connection of *Ākāṣa* would also be all-pervading.

76-77. Deafness, &c., are also regulated by the same cause (*i.e.*, by the effects produced in the bodily organ). And this (deafness) is not experienced by another (*i.e.*, any Soul other than the one to which the particular body, with the deranged ear, belongs),—inasmuch as it is influenced by the virtue and vice (of that particular Soul).

77-78. Just as in the case of a village lord, when removed from the mastery over the village,—though he continues to reside in the village, yet he does not enjoy (the possession of) the village,—so, in the same manner, though the Soul of a deaf person continues to reside in the body, yet, being deprived of its mastery (over the organ of audition), it does not hear any sounds, even when others (near him) hear it.

78-80. Even if (it be granted that), like the auditory sense, the Word and its substrate too are without any parts (*i.e.*, impartite) and incapable of occupying any one place (*i.e.*, all-pervading,—even then, the theory is not open to the (aforesaid) objections. Because the air-vibrations, which are held to be the manifesters (of the Word), are both endowed with parts and capable of occupying different places (*i.e.*, are neither impartite nor all-pervading). And (of these manifesting air-vibrations) there are different classes also,—on which (classes) are based the changes (produced in the auditory sense).

80-81. Just as, in your theory, the air-vibration (utterance) put forth for one Word, does not produce another Word,—so, in our theory too, the vibration, capable of producing changes, in the Ear, enabling it to cognise one Word, will not be able to make a change for the sake of another Word.

81-82. Just as any *one* of the contacts of the palate, &c. (by the speaker), (put forth for the pronunciation of one Word) cannot, in your theory, produce another Word,—so, in the same manner, any one of these

76-77 Deafness results when the bodily organ, Ear, which is the substrate of auditory sense, becomes deranged. Hence both the ability and inability of the auditory sense must depend upon the effects produced (or changes brought about) in the bodily organ.

78-80 "Manifester"—that which renders cognizable. "Different classes"—For one class of Letters there is one class of Air-vibrations; and so on with each letter that is pronounced. And the change produced in the auditory sense is none other than the contact with these Vibrations. The Ear coming in contact with a vibration, cognises only that letter (or Sound) which belongs to the same class as (*i.e.*, is homogeneous (to that vibration. This *Kārikā* meets the objection urged in *Kārikās* 60-61.

80-81 Even one who holds the theory of words being caused finds it necessary to assert that Words can be produced only by such air-vibrations as are homogeneous to them.

This meets the objection urged in *Kārikās* 62-63 and shows how "तद्देशान्योप-लक्षणम्" is not possible.



contacts of the palate, &c., which is capable of putting forth such sounds as bring about changes in the auditory sense favourable for the cognition of any one particular Letter, is not able to indicate sounds of other Letters.

82-83. Therefore, both in the theory laying down the production of Words, and that holding their manifestation, the diversity of all capabilities (for producing changes in the Auditory Sense, &c., &c.), is equally inferable from the (otherwise) inexplicability of certain well-known effects (every-day facts of ordinary life). And (from the same inexplicability) could also be inferred the diversity of *effort* and *desire to speak* (which inference too is equally possible in both theories).

83-84. If the change be held to belong to the object (Word), then too the change would apply to one Word only (and not to all, as urged in *Kārikās* 61-62). And even this one would not be heard by *all* men (simultaneously), on account of a difference in their capabilities.

84-86. Just as (in your theory) though the Word is produced equally with regard to all men, yet it is not cognised by all (simultaneously), on account (as you explain) of the fact of (its cognition depending upon) the divisions of *direction*, *place*, &c.,—so, in the same manner (in our theory also) when a Word is affected by changes brought about by sounds produced in proximity to some men, the Word is heard by these men alone, and not by those that are at a distance (from those sounds).

86-87. Even if it be held that the changes belong to both (the Ear and the Word), the assertion (in *Kārikās* 64-65) of this being open to both objections (urged against the change of "Word" and change of "Ear") is untrue. Because on account of discrepancies in either (of these two changes of Word and Ear), all (Words) are not heard by all (Ears of all men).

87. A method (of the cognition of Word) must necessarily be laid down by such inquirers as strictly follow the universally accepted fact of the hearing (of Words) obeying the desire to speak (on the part of the speaker).

88-90. In this matter, some people (the *Vaiçṣhikas*) hold that the Word (sound) is primarily produced by Conjunction and Disjunction; that

88.84 "Difference in capabilities."—One who is at a distance is not as able to hear as one who is near. The latter half meets the objection urged in *Kārikās* 63-64.

61.62 Just as your cognition of the Word is governed by Direction, &c., so are also our changes of Words, &c.

88.87 A discrepancy in the Ear of people (caused by distance, &c.), makes it impossible for all men to hear a sound simultaneously. And a discrepancy of the Word (caused by the fact of one sound manifesting only one Word), makes it impossible for all the Words to be heard at one and the same time.

88.89 By Conjunction, as in the case of the drum struck by the stick, and by Disjunction, as in that of the flute.

from this (sound) is produced another sound similar to it; and that in a place next to this is produced another sound also similar to it, then follows another, and so on, in the manner of waves and ripples; and it is the last sound (of the series) that is caught by the Ear.

90-91. But, in this theory, there are many assumptions of imperceptible facts. In the case of a sound, we are never cognisant of any multiplicity of sounds (as held by the *Vaiṣeṣika*).

91-92. Even the fact of one sound producing another is groundless, inasmuch as sound has no action. Nor can an immaterial entity (like sound),—being, as it is, incapable of striking (against anything)—produce an effect in a place removed from itself.

92-93. Nor is there any means of regulating the production of sounds, with regard to the limit of their reach. Nor is there any cause that could account for the restriction of the direction (of sounds), and for the fact of (sounds) following the current of winds.

93-94. It is hard to prove that a sound produces another which is either similar or homogeneous to it. Nor are we cognisant of any grounds for believing the production (of sounds) to extend on all sides (specially as waves and ripples, which you cite as an instance of the method, proceed in a single direction).

94-95. And again, it is not possible for foregoing sounds, that are entirely destroyed (without leaving any trace), to produce the subsequent sounds, which had absolutely no existence before. And just as the possibility of a series of cognitions (has been rejected under *Nirālambanavāda*), so too is the possibility of a series of sounds (inadmissible).

95-96. In the case of the Waves,—since they have a certain velo-

90.92 We do not cognise the sound heard to be different from the sound uttered.

91.92 If an immaterial entity were to have such an effect, then such effects (sounds) would be possible, even beneath the ground (*i.e.*, the sound produced above the ground would be heard in the nether world): because an immaterial object would never be retarded in its progress by any such interceptions as those presented by material objects, like the Earth, &c.

92.93 Sound being immaterial, what would be the means whereby we could accept the theory that the series of these sounds stops short at a certain point, beyond which it does not go. And since no such cause can be found there would be an endless series of a sound, which would thus come to be heard simultaneously by the whole world.

If sound be immaterial, how could we explain the fact of its being produced in one direction, or the fact of its being caused in the wake of word-currents—both of which are possible only with material objects?

93 Since a sound cannot be a material cause, it cannot produce another sound.

94.95 A sound on being produced is instantly destroyed and no trace of it is left behind. How then can this be the cause of the next sound in the Series, which, till then, has had no sort of existence?

95.96 A ripple has a certain velocity for a long time after its first appearance, and



city (motion) and action, it is possible for them to produce effects in places other than that of the cause (*i.e.*, the first ripple, having motion, can produce another ripple, even at a distance from it). Because the action of such (mobile) causes lasts so long as the velocity (or motion) lasts.

96-97. (Granting such a production of sounds) this production could not be impeded by the intervention of walls, &c., because the existence of an immaterial substance (like sound) in the midst of a material substance (like the wall) is not impossible.

97-98. And further, Walls, &c., do not serve either to destroy or remove the *Ākāṣa* (and hence, sound being a property of *Ākāṣa* cannot be destroyed or in any way intercepted by the Wall). Therefore, even inside the Wall, *Ākāṣa* cannot be rendered imperceptible.

98-99. If *Ākāṣa* did not formerly exist in the place, then the very existence of the Wall,—as also of all its inner parts,—would be a contradiction (because all things exist in space, which is the same as *Ākāṣa*). Because these cannot have any existence in a material substance.

99-100. If it be held that "the *Ākāṣa* bears only the production of such sounds, which are free from any contact with a substance having the character of an interceptor,"—such a statement has no reasons in its favour.

100-101. This statement cannot be said to be proved by Apparent Inconsistency; inasmuch as the fact (of sound being intercepted) is capable of being otherwise explained. And, as a matter of fact, this (Apparent Inconsistency) is not held to be a means of right notion by those who admit of only two such means (Sense-perception and Inference).

so long as this velocity lasts, it will go on producing other ripples. This is not possible in the case of sound, which has neither velocity nor motion.

97-98 Because, being immaterial and all-pervading, the *Ākāṣa* must have existed in the place, prior to the erection of the wall; and since it could not be in any way intercepted by the presence of the wall, it must be admitted to continue in the place even after the wall has been built.

98-99 "Because, &c."—Since it is so, they must be held to have their existence in an immaterial entity like *Ākāṣa*.

99-100 This qualification is a saving clause against the argument based on the intervention of the wall. The objection means to imply that, since the sound, in the case of the presence of a wall, is in contact with an intercepting substance in the shape of the wall, therefore it cannot be said to be produced when its progress has been stopped by the wall. Hence, behind the wall, the sound is not heard.

100-101 It is only when a fact is not cognisable, and cannot be explained without the admission of a certain other fact, that this latter is accepted on the (otherwise) apparent inconsistency of the former fact. In the case of sound, however, all the facts are applicable in accordance with the *Mīmāṃsaka's* theory. Therefore, there is no Inconsistency that would lend support to any new theory.



101-102. Nor can the assumption be said to be due to Inference; inasmuch as no relation (of concomitance) is perceived (to exist between production and any invisible entity, as the intermediate sounds propounded by the *Vaiṣeṣhika*). If it be urged that "we could have the Inference from a general affirmative premise,—" then, in that case, your reasoning would be contradictory.

102-103. Thus, (if it be argued that)—"a sound is productive of homogeneous sounds,—because it is a property,—like the Sense-organs (of Taste, &c.),"—(this would be met by the counter-argument based upon the same premise): *viz*: A sound is not productive of other sounds,—for the same reason (*i.e.*, because it is a property, and properties are not productive of other properties). (And if the production of other sounds were like the productions of the Sense-organs, then, as these latter appear in the same point of space as is occupied by the Sense-organ, so in the same manner, the intermediate sounds) would appear in the same place as that occupied by the primary sound (and thus there could be no transmission of sounds).

103-105. Because (it is a matter of common experience that) the place, which is occupied by the parts of the piece of cloth, is also the place where all its properties exist, and it is the same place where the whole (piece of cloth) made up of the parts also exists; and the properties of the whole, too, occupy the same place (as is held by the Whole itself). Thus, we have co-extensiveness (of the properties of the Cause and those of the Caused). In the same manner (we could infer that), all the (subsequent intervening) sounds have no place other than that held by the primary (first) sound.

105-106. A sound does not produce another sound,—because it is a sound,—like the final sound (where the series of the *Vaiṣeṣhika* ends). Similarly, Conjunction and Disjunction (held by the *Vaiṣeṣhika* to be productive of sounds) (do not produce sounds)—because they are so (*i.e.*, because they are Conjunction and Disjunction),—like any other ordinary Conjunction and Disjunction.

106-107. In fact, the theories of the movement of the sound, and that of the auditory sense,—as held by the *Jaina* and the *Sāṅkhya* respectively,—are more reasonable than the above (*Vaiṣeṣhika*) theory. But these, too, become untenable, on account of the following reasons.

101-102 The Inference from general affirmation is shown in the first half of the *Kārikā*. "Contradictory"—also proving a proposition aimed at.

105-106 A syllogism proving the fact of sounds not producing sounds.

106-107 The *Jaina* theory is that the sound having been uttered travels bodily to the ear of the hearer. And the *Sāṅkhya* theory is that the sense being all-pervading travels to the region where the sound is produced.



107-108. The travelling of sound, as proposed by the *Jaina*, is an imperceptible fact, as are also the materiality and tangibility (of sounds) the suppression of existing sounds, non-cognisability by the tactile sense (even in presence of its tangibility), and the existence of many subtile factors (technically called, by the *Jainas*, "*Pudgala*").

109. How can there be any production (of the final perceptible sound) by means of these (subtile factors), which are imperceptible (and as such incapable of producing perceptible entities)? And, from what sort of diversity in the process of production would proceed the diversity of the Letters (appearing in the sound)?

110-111. In the absence of *fluidity* in these (subtile factors), how can they be said to be mixed up (into a complete whole, in the shape of the sound)? And (even if such mixing up be admitted, as in the case of a lump of flour), how is it that in the travelling (from the region where the sound is produced to that where it is heard), the sound is not dissipated (and blown away) by the air-currents?—specially as these parts (*i.e.*, the subtile factors making up the sound) are extremely light (being subtile) and are not bound together (into a composite whole) by any thing. And just as a lump of clay is shattered (into fragments) by striking against trees, so would the sound also (be shattered into its imperceptible component fragments by its striking against trees, &c., intervening in its path, from the place of production to that of its cognition).

112-113. (If the sound be held to be a component whole, made up of parts, then) having entered into the Ear of one man, it could not be heard by others. Nor is there any cause for the multiplicity of intervening sounds. Nor, lastly, is it possible, for one and the same (component sound) to travel on all sides (in order to be heard by different persons).

113. Even in accordance with the theory that it is the Auditory Sense that moves (to the region where the sound is produced),—such (motion of the Auditory Sense) is not possible. And if (it be held that) it is the function (or action of the Ear) that travels, then (in that case) it would mean the assumption of two imperceptible factors (since neither the function of the Ear nor the travelling of the function is perceptible). And further,

107.108 This *Kārikā* enumerates the various imperceptible facts assumed (without any reason) by the *Jaina*.

110.111 No mixing up is possible unless the factors mixing up have a certain degree of fluidity and consequent viscosity.

The air-currents blow away the flour; so would they blow away the sound into fragments; hence it would be impossible for any sound to be heard.

112.113 A material component object having entered one ear, will remain there in its entirety, as it is not possible for such an object to remain in more than one place at one and the same time. And we have no grounds for holding that when a sound is produced, many sounds follow in its wake and spread all round.



(in this theory) you would have a modification (of the Auditory Sense) by a distant object (*viz.*, the sound, which is always produced at a certain distance from the Ear).

114-115. If it be held that (the Auditory Sense) gets (at the distant sound), on account of its all-pervading character,—then, this fact would apply equally well to the case of very distant sounds (and hence all sounds would be heard equally well); and, as such, the modification or non-modification (of the Auditory Sense) would be brought about by all sounds equally, and not differently (the difference, in our theory, being based upon the distance or the proximity of the sound produced).

115-116. If it be held that the Auditory Sense is modified by those (sounds) that have no (particular) relation with it; then, as shown above, non-relation being equal (in the case of sounds near and distant), there would be no speciality in the near sound (whereby such sound would be heard, and not the one at a distance).

116-117. And further, the function of the Auditory Sense, being immaterial, could not be intercepted by any material obstacles; and hence, wherefore should an intercepted sound not be heard?

117-119. If the modification were to belong to the Auditory Sense (which the *Sāṅkhya* holds to be all-pervading), then there would be no reason for any limit (as to the reach of its cognition,—*i.e.*, it would cognise all sounds); nor would it be possible for the function of the Auditory Sense to be urged mostly in the same direction as the wind (and as such the greater reach of the sound in that direction would not be explicable); and it would be as possible for it to be intercepted in that direction and to move, with greater facility, against the wind (which facts militate, against the fact of the greater audibility of sounds in the said direction); because, in that case, the help of the wind, belonging to the Auditory Sense, would not belong to the sound.

119-120. Those who hold that the sound is cognised by the Auditory Sense, without coming in contact with it,—will have this non-contact applicable equally to the case of distant and near sounds (and hence there could be no difference in the hearing of these).

120-121. And in that case, both in the case of distant and near sounds,

115.116 Now begins the refutation of the *Sāṅkhya* theory.

116.117 "Intercepted" by obstacles, like a wall, &c.

119.120 This *Kārikā* and the next meet the *Bauddha* theory that the Auditory Sense cognises the sound without coming in any sort of contact with it.

120.121 Since all sounds would be equal in having no contact, and as such equally cognisable.



cognition or non-cognition would be equally possible. And there would be no sequence, or intensity or lowness, &c., of sounds.

121-122. Therefore, we must now enquire into the process of hearing, from the standpoint of the *Āśrīya* (the *Mīmāṃsaka*). It is an undoubted fact (of perception) that (in speaking) the internal Air, being struck by the mental effort (of the speaker) moves (out of the mouth).

122-123. And this (Air) requires (for going out of the throat) the conjunction and disjunction of the (tongue with the) palate, &c. And since the Air has a certain force (with which it moves), it moves along so long as this initiatory force lasts.

123-124. And it is also certain that, in moving along, the Air and its constituent particles come in contact with, and are disjoined from, the still (calm) Air (through which it passes).

124-125. Having reached the *Ākāśa* (Space) in the Ear, the Air imparts a certain faculty, or potency, to the Auditory Sense; and since the sound is heard only when this (faculty) appears, therefore, we admit of its existence in the shape of a change (*Sanskāra*, produced in the Sense),—and this is the only imperceptible factor that we assume.

125-126. And this "faculty" that we assume, is like the faculty of producing (the sound, held by the other party); and it is nothing more than that. And similarly (i.e., as in the case of the opposite theory) we would assume particular faculties from the fact of the cognition of particular sounds.

126-127. The production of Words (and sounds) having been rejected,

121-122 With this begins the expounding of the proper *Mīmāṃsaka* theory—Cf. the following *Kārikās* of Pāṇini—"The soul having cognised the objects produces in the mind a desire to speak; it strikes the fire in the body; and this fire moves the air inside; this air moving up strikes the head (brain?) and returns to the mouth, and there brings forth the Word." Such is the production of the sound of the word; this sound strikes the outer air with a certain force; and so far as this force lasts in the outer air, up to that place, and till that time, the word is heard. It is shown in the *Kārikā* that every item of this theory is amenable to perception, the only supersensuous element being that of the change produced in the Ear by the sound. Whenever the ordinary Air is struck by anything it moves; and so it must be with the Air in the body.

123-124 And since it comes in contact with the calm Air all round, therefore it is quite possible for the sound to be disseminated, and spread along, on all sides of its source.

125-126 They too assume the appearance of a faculty in the ear, like us. They make the faculty productive of the sound, while we only hold it to be capable of making the ear cognise the sound. So the fact of assuming an imperceptible faculty is common to both of us.

126-127 The production of sounds is rejected under the Sūtra "*Darśanasya parārthatvāt*." (I-i-18).



—since the process of hearing them is not otherwise explicable,—we assume the (imperceptible) fact of specific changes being produced (in the Auditory Sense) by the sounds.

127-128. That which proves the existence of such a faculty of sounds (producing the changes) is the fact of (the change) appearing only when that faculty exists;—just as in the case of the faculty of the Auditory Sense (which is proved by the fact of *hearing* appearing only when the faculty exists). And the intellect (that was engaged in the assumption, or explanation, of the production of the change) is taken up by the same (*i.e.*, by the assumption of the faculty of sounds to bring about the changes).

128-130. The interception caused by a Wall, &c., is quite possible, in the case of the Air. And the striking against the tympanum (of which we are at times cognisant) is due to the great force of the Air-current. And since the Air has its own intensity, as well as that of its velocity, perishable,—and since it moves along in a certain order of sequence,—therefore, it comes to be the sole cause of the change (in the Auditory Sense) of the order of sequence (in the hearing of the sound), as also of the intensity and lowness, &c. (of the sound).

130-132. It is this “modification” (of the Auditory Sense) as the means of the comprehension of sounds, that some people, (Bhartṛmitra, &c.), thinking themselves to be learned, hold to be the “Auditory Sense” itself. But this is only a changing of (or play upon) names; and yet they feel elated in their own minds (at having discovered a new theory); whereas this pride is only false, inasmuch as they have not discovered anything new.

132-133. The *Bhāṣhya* too, has not mentioned the “Auditory Sense” to be anything other than a change produced by the sounds. Beyond this, what else have they found to be indicated by the word “Auditory Sense” (that they seek to improve upon the *Bhāṣhya*)?

133-135. People always use the word “*Sanskāra*” (“modification”)

137-138 “Intellect, &c.,” when we enquire into the production of this change, we are satisfied by the assumption of such a faculty in the sounds uttered.

139-140 By “Etc.,” are meant the facts of the sound being heard near and not at a distance, the fact of its greater reach in the same direction as the wind, its diffusion on all sides (caused by the current of Air passing on all sides).

140-142 They hold the Modification to be the Sense. They admit of the Modification and the Sense both; but change their names.

142-143 The only difference between our statement of the fact and theirs is, that they call the “faculty” itself the “Auditory Sense;” while we apply this name to an Entity (a sense-organ) endowed with this faculty. And that the latter fact is true is proved by our every-day experience.



as a generic name applicable (in common) to all entities belonging to the same class (of "supersensuous entities," to which the aforesaid *faculty* of the Auditory Sense belongs),—the existence of which entities is inferred from their effects. But the word "*Śrotra*" (Auditory Sense) is not known (by people) to have any connection with the denotation of the word "*Sanskāra*"; and as such, the word "Auditory-Sense" cannot renounce its own *specific* denotation (known to every person), and denote the "*Sanskāra*" (which is always known to be only a *generic* entity).

(135-136).—The author of the *Bhāṣya* has laid down, in the beginning, the "non-optionality" of the denotations of words. And this (rule) would be surely violated by those (who optionally, without any grounds) attribute the word "*Śrotra*" to the *Sanskāra*.

136-137. The word "*Śrotra*" is known, by all men, to apply to something other than the *Sanskāra*. And hence (by asserting it to mean *Sanskāra*) we would separate the word "*Śrotra*" from its well-known signification, without any reason.

137-138. It is established, on the ground of Scriptures, that the Sense-organs accrue to the man, while he is yet in the womb; and this shows that they exist even prior to the appearance of their effects (cognitions). And this (Scriptural Assertion) is violated (by the theory that the Auditory Sense is identical with *Sanskāra*).

138-139. And further, the relation of the word with the meaning, cannot, in any way, be created (anew) by us. If the Auditory Sense be held to be momentary (as it necessarily must be, if it be held to be identical with *Sanskāra*, which is only momentary),—then the relation of this (word "*Śrotra*") with its meaning (*Sanskāra*, which is produced by sounds, and as such a *caused* entity), could not but be such as is created by us (and as such non-eternal). (And this would go against the theory of the eternity of the relation of Words with their meanings, as held by all the *Mīmāṃsakas*.)

139-140. If it be urged that "the same would be the case with the word '*Sanskāra*' (which is admitted by the *Mīmāṃsaka* to denote *Sanskāras*, that are momentary and non-eternal),"—then (we reply that) other *Sanskāras* remain (even when one *Sanskāra* has been destroyed; and we hold the denotation of the word "*Sanskāra*" to apply to the class "*Sanskāra*," which is eternal). (Apart from the class) however, there are some individual *Sanskāras* (as those of the *Yogi*) that continue for hundreds of years. Hence, the relation of the word "*Sanskāra*" with the *Sanskāra* (considered either as a class, or as an individual) can never be destroyed.

137.138 "Violated"—because the *Sanskāra* is concomitant with the cognition of the word; but there is no such cognition in the womb; while the *Gruti* declares that the senses accrue to the child in the 5th month after conception.

140-141. Then again, the word "*Ārotra*,"—prior to the (production of the) *Sanskāra*, as also after it,—is always known to apply to an object located in a certain place (part of the body, viz., the Ear).

142. And we can hold the continuance (permanence) of the "Auditory Sense" on the ground of its being a sense, like the "Tactile Sense," &c. And hence it cannot be said to be momentarily created (and as such cannot be identical with a "*Sanskāra*," that is created and destroyed at every moment).

143. If by contact with sound, the "Auditory" Sense were to be produced (as held by those who hold the sense to be identical with *Sanskāra*, which is produced by the sound),—then how is it that it is not found (to be produced) in the case of the deaf person?

144. Because that which does not exist in a person, is naturally capable of being produced,—therefore, the "Auditory Sense," which is wanted (for the cognition of sounds), would be produced, even for the deaf (which is impossible).

145-146. If it be urged that "the same contingency would apply to the theory of *Sanskāra* (being produced by the sound),"—(then we reply that), the *Sanskāra* cannot be produced in the Sense which has been destroyed (or deranged, as it is in the deaf). Sounds are unable to produce any changes (*Sanskāra*) in the "Auditory Sense" (of the deaf) which is covered over by derangements. But if it be held that it is the Sense (of audition) itself, which (being identical with *Sanskāra*) is produced (by sounds), then, in that case, there could be no obstruction (to the production of the Auditory Sense, even in deaf persons).

146-147. Those (*Vaiśeṣikas*) who hold the Senses to be material

140.141 This anticipates the following argument : The line of argument that the *Mīmāṃsaka* follows with regard to the signification of *Sanskāra* by the word "*Sanskāra*," would also apply to the case of the signification of *Sanskāra* by the word "*Ārotra*." The sense of the *Kārikā* is that this is not possible, inasmuch as *Sanskāra* is held to be signified by the word "*Sanskāra*," simply because, apart from the *Sanskāra* this word is found to have no meaning. In the case of the word "*Ārotra*," on the other hand, even prior to, and after the *Sanskāra* has appeared and disappeared, it is found to denote the Ear in the body ; therefore the word "*Ārotra*" cannot be accepted to denote *Sanskāras*.

143 The Ear of the deaf comes in contact with the sound ; and this contact, producing his Auditory Sense, would wake the sound heard by him.

144 It cannot be urged that the deaf does not have the Sense, because he has not got it. Because it is only that which one has not got which can be produced by adequate causes.

145.146 The sense of this objection is that if the cognition of sound be due to *Sanskāra*, it would be produced for the deaf also, and he would also hear sounds.

146.147 The word "*Sanskāras*," as applied to the case of the Auditory Sense (a well-known object), means the capability of the Sense to bring about an effect in the shape of



(each Sense belonging to a particular material substance) hold a certain part of *Ākāṣa* to be the Sense of Audition. And how would you (who hold that the Sense is produced by the sound) reject the fact of the existence of this (part of *Ākāṣa*, as the Auditory Sense), even prior to the (production of the) sound?

147-148. The capability, of a certain well-known object, to bring about a certain effect,—which (capability) is brought about by other agencies,—is what is known to be denoted by the word "*Sanskāra*"; and on what grounds would you reject the fact of this denotation?

148-149. The mere denial (without any reasons) of facts ordinarily well-known, and supported by the Scriptures, is a profitless waste of labour (*lit.*, useless shedding of perspiration),—like the (dog's) chewing of the cows' horns (which does not give it any food, and is mere waste of labour).

149-150. If it be absolutely necessary to deny the assertion of the *Naiyāyika* (as to a certain part of *Ākāṣa* being the Auditory Sense),—then you must seek to establish the fact of *space* ("*Dik*") being the Sense of Audition, on the ground of its being laid down in the Veda.

150-152. "The Auditory Sense returns to the Quarters (*i.e.*, to Space)" —such is the assertion of the Veda, in the chapter on "Dissolutions" (where it is asserted that the various Senses return to the various material substances). And this assertion implies that the Sense returns to its primary condition (Space). Just as, with regard to the "Sense of Vision," we have the passage "the Sense of Vision returns to the Sun," which means that the primary condition of the Sense of Vision is *Fire (or Light)*,—so, exactly in the same manner (the passage declaring the return of the Sense of Audition to Space means that) the Sense of Audition is constituted by Space (which is its primary condition).

152-153. Space is all-pervading and one, and extends as far as the *Ākāṣa*; and when this (Space) is limited within the region of the ear (in the body), it becomes the "Auditory Sense,"—just as *Ākāṣa* is held to be (by the *Vaiṣeṣikas*).

153-154. And the arguments,—that the *Vaiṣeṣika* can urge in favour of the theory that the Auditory Sense is a part of *Ākāṣa*,—will all apply equally well to our theory that the Auditory Sense is a part of Space. The only difference is that our theory is supported by the Veda (while the *Vaiṣeṣika* theory is opposed to it).

154-155. Therefore the "Auditory Sense" must be held to be that the cognition of sounds; and this capability is due to the sound-waves in the air striking them. This is known to all men. And on what grounds do you seek to deny the fact of such signification of the word "*Sanskāra*"?

153-154 The character of Space is much the same as that of *Ākāṣa*.

154-155 "Changed," *i.e.*, the *Sanskāra* produced by the sound belongs to the part of

part of the substance "Space," which is influenced by the virtuous and vicious deeds (of the person to whom the Sense belongs), and which (under this influence) comes to be limited within the hole of the Ear (in the man's body). And it is this (part of Space, as constituting the Auditory Sense) that is changed (by the sounds striking it).

155-156. Thus, then, the fact of the Sound (Word) not persisting (continuing to exist) is due to (the absence of) other things; and thus the argument (in *Sūtra* 7) is inconclusive. If it be taken to declare the fact of the non-continuance of the cognition of the Word, then we have such non-continuance (of cognition) even in the case of the *Ākāṣa* (contained in the Well which has) disappeared (i.e., been covered up by the filling up of the well) (and hence the argument becomes doubtful).

157-158. Nor can destructibility belong to a substance (like *Ākāṣa*) which does not consist of (is not caused by) another substance. If it be urged that "in the case of *Ākāṣa* we have an inferential argument which proves its continued existence (even in the case of the filling up of the Well),"—then (we reply that), in the case of the Word too, we have an Inference (based upon the fact of its being recognised to be the same as the one heard before, which proves that the same Word continued to exist all along).

158-159. On account of the use of the word "*Karoti*" ("does," with regard to Words), it has been asserted (in *Sūtra* 9)—that the word is a *caused* from which one infers the fact of words being caused,—then (we reply that) the mere Space as constituting the Sense of Audition, and renders it capable of cognising the sound.

156 This recapitulates the arguments that have been urged against the *Sūtra* "*Asthānāt*" (I-i-7).

The non-continuance of the Word is due to the fact of the non-continuance of the object signified by the Word, and not to the destruction of the Word. And as for the non-continuance of the cognition of the Word, this cannot be any ground for asserting the Word to be caused, and non-eternal. Because if this be accepted to be sufficient ground for such conclusion,—then that would apply also to *Ākāṣa*, which is known to be caused and eternal. And hence, the argument becomes doubtful.

157.158 With this begins the consideration of the fourteenth *Sūtra*, which meets the argument urged in the *Sūtra* "*Karotiḥabdāt*" (I-i-8).

The word "*Karoti*" properly signifies the production of something that did not exist before. But this is not applicable to words; because even when we have the assertion "*Qabḍāṅkuru*" the word has existed, before the assertion, and the utterance of the word by the person directed; and as the word existed already, the person cannot be said to produce something that did not exist beforehand. And hence your argument fails.

If it be urged that it is not on the basis of such production that we assert the fact of words being caused; but it is on the fact of people making such assertion as "*Qabḍāṅkuru*,"



entity. But the proper meaning of the word ("Karoti") is not applicable (to the case of Words). If the mere assertion ("Çabdam kuru") be said to be (the ground for holding words to be caused), then the argument becomes contradictory (not proving the desired conclusion),—for those who hold (the Word) to be caused (produced) by the action of that person (who is directed as "Çabdam kuru"). Because we meet with such assertions (or directions) even in the case of "coudung," &c., which are not produced by the person directed.

159-160. If it be urged that, "the coudung is certainly a caused entity anyway,"—(we reply that) we also come across with such assertions as "ākāçam kuru" ("produce emptiness").

160-162. If it be urged that "the Ākāça,—being only a removal (Negation) of covering (and this being brought about by the action of the removal),—is also a caused entity," then (we reply that) even to the *Bauddha* (who holds all things to be momentary and non-eternal), a negation, being self-sufficient, is never produced. The effect of the action (of digging a well, in accordance with the direction "produce emptiness (ākāça) here," is the removal of the Earth (filling up the space) to some other place (and not the production of Ākāça). And the Ākāça, being a negation of covering (granting this theory for once) continues ever permanent.

162-163. If it be urged that, "since there can be no production of an eternal thing (like Ākāça), therefore this assertion ("produce Ākāça") is either wrong or figurative,"—then, we could have the same explanation with regard to the assertion ("produce words") with regard to the Word also.

163-165. That which is the East of the people of Saurāshtra, is the South of the Mālavas; and the East of these (Mālavas) is the North of those (Saurāsh-

fact of such assertion cannot prove your theory, because this assertion cannot prove that the person (directed) produces the Word; because we meet with such directions as "Gomayānkuru" (=collect coudung); though the coudung is not produced by the person addressed.

159, 160 "Somehow or other"—i.e., whether it be produced by the cow or by something else.

If the instance of the coudung will not do, we have such assertions even with regard to such an eternal and uncaused entity as the Ākāça.

160, 162 If Ākāça be only a negative entity (removal of covering),—it is all the more eternal. Because even the *Bauddha* does not hold negations to be non-eternal.

The direction "produce Ākāça here" = dig out the Earth from this place.

162, 163 The sense of the objection is that Ākāça is eternal. Therefore such assertions cannot apply to it; the sense of the reply is that the word is also known to be eternal from the fact of its being recognised (to be the same at different times); and as such this too being eternal, the assertion of production with regard to it must also be either wrong or figurative.

163, 165 With this begins the explanation of Sūtra 15: "The simultaneity (of the