



APHORISMS XXIV to XXVI.

ON SENTENCE.

Objections against the eternality of the Veda :—

1. "Even though you have proved the Eternality of Words, of the objects (in the form of Class) signified by words, and of the relations of these,—yet that does not prove the validity (and eternality) of the Veda with regard to the meanings of sentences.

2-4. "Would the meaning of a sentence be expressed by the Words, individually, or collectively? or, by a Word (in the shape of a syntactical Sphota) altogether different (from the Sentence and the words composing it)? or, by the meanings of words as before (individually or collectively)? or, by the means of cognising these (Meanings of Words)? or, either by the Remembrance (of these) or by the Relation (of Words and Meanings) or by an Idea of this (Relation)—and by these too, individually or collectively? None of these can be the means (of getting at the meanings of Sentences), because none of these is known to have any connection (with the meaning of the Sentence).

4-5. "One thing (the Word, &c.) being totally different from another (the sentence and its meaning), and being altogether unconnected with it, cannot bring about its comprehension. Because a relation (or connection) which is not cognised, is as good as non-existing. In fact, the existence too of that which is not cognised by the ordinarily accepted means of right notion, cannot be believed to be true.

6. "And again, the reality of the sentence and its meaning, as distinct entities, is not possible;—inasmuch as they 'cannot be explained to be either different or non-different from Words and their meanings.

7. "Because they (Sentence and its Meaning) are never cognised

¹ Now begins the consideration of Sūtra 24 which embodies an objection against the validity of the Veda. "Even if (words and their relations) were eternal, these would be incapable of expressing (the meaning of Vedic Sentences), because the (cognition of the) meaning (of Sentences) is not due to these (words, &c.)" (I—i—24).

4.5 "Because, &c."—Even if there be a relation between the words and the meaning of the Sentence composed by them; since we are never cognisant of any such relation (at the time of uttering a sentence) we may accept it to be as good as non-existing, since being unknown, it is of no use.

⁷ If all the words were heard all at once, then alone could the Sentence be said



apart from them (Words and Meanings). Nor can they be held to be aggregates of these (*i.e.*, the sentence cannot be said to be the aggregate of Words, and the Meaning of the Sentence cannot be said to be the aggregate of the meaning of Words),—inasmuch as there is no simultaneity in their comprehension (*i.e.*, the words are heard and understood one after the other, and not all at once).

8. Mere simultaneity in existence (that is, the mere fact of the Words having the common character of *existing*) can be of no help in the usage (of Sentences). Otherwise, all (Words) being eternally existent, (we would always have a cognition of all words together, and) there would be no comprehension of any particular Words.

9. "And again, even though there is simultaneity of existence, yet, since the cognitions (of the Words) are gradual (appearing one after the other), therefore there is no possibility of a collective cognition. And it is for this reason that the meaning of the Sentence is not cognised to be an aggregate of these (meanings of Words).

10-11. "It is an established fact that the Sentence and its Meaning are (necessarily) preceded by (a cognition of) the relation (subsisting among the Words composing the sentence, and between the complete sentence and the meaning sought to be conveyed by it). And mutually independent (unconnected) Words (such as 'House, Elephant, Cow, Grass, Man') are never known as a *Sentence*. And no Relation is possible where there is no dependence.

11-12. "Either Words or Letters do not, by themselves (*i.e.*, independently of their meanings), stand in need of one another,—as we find in the case of meaningless Words and Letters (which are never found to be in need of one another).

12-13. "And again, so long as a Word has not been uttered, it cannot stand in need of another. And as for simultaneity (of utterance of two words one of which would require another), it is not possible. And when the Word has been uttered, it instantly disappears (since its utterance does not continue for any length of time) (and as such even after being uttered, the Word does not continue long enough to stand in need of another Word).

to be an aggregate of these. Because in the absence of such simultaneity the words cannot be recognised as forming a single component whole.

10-11 "No relation, &c."—*i.e.*, unless, among the words forming a Sentence, it be shown that one word requires another, there can be no relation between them. And unless there be some relation among the Words, they cannot form a Sentence. As a matter of fact, the Word in itself cannot have any need of another word, and as such independently in themselves, the words cannot be said to have any relation among themselves; hence they cannot be said to form a Sentence. (See next Kārikā).

13-14. "Even if there be a dependence, there can be no Relation in any of the generally known forms of *Cause and Effect or Conjunction or Inherence*.

14-15. "If it be urged that among the Words there is the relation of *inherence in a single object* (*viz*: the Sentence),—then, all words equally inhering in the Ākāṣa (and thus having a common relation among themselves, we could have a Sentence made up of all the words in existence); and consequently there could be no difference in the connection (of any Sentence) with Words,—whether they be uttered or not uttered, and whether they be capable or incapable (of such connection).

15-17. "And as for the (common) relation of being engaged in one and the same action (of bringing about a comprehension of the Sentence),—such action could only be with regard to that which is *manifested*, or to that which is produced (by the Words). As for the objects *manifested* by the Words, these are different (in each Word), on account of the difference of the Words themselves. Consequently these (words) cannot bring about any one *collective* Idea (with regard to all the objects, denoted by the various words composing a sentence, considered as forming a single conglomerated whole). And as for the idea of the objects taken individually, they differ with each individual Word.

17-19. "Nor is it possible for any single Idea to be *produced* by these (Words), differing, as they do, among themselves, and appearing one after the other. And if (in the manner explained by you) the cognition of the sentence were only in parts (according as we perceive the words one after the other), we could never have an idea of the Sentence and its meaning, as a single whole in itself. And, in the absence of any contradictory fact rejecting it, we cannot assert the partial cognition (of the component parts of a Sentence) to be a mistake. For, how could there be any truth in the mistaken notion of the singleness and impartite character (of the Sentence)?

19-20. "Either mutual intimate relation (*Saṁsarga*) or mutual

18.14 None of these relations could make all the words into a single corporate whole.

17.19 "For how could, &c."—The only notion that could contradict and reject the cognition of the parts of a Sentence is the idea of the sentence as a single impartite whole. But inasmuch as the cognition of the parts of a sentence is directly perceptible, and that of the sentence as a whole, at best, only inferable; therefore there can be no doubt as to which of the two is to be accepted as correct. Therefore the idea of the sentence as one and impartite being contradicted by the perceptible fact of the cognition of the parts of the Sentence severally, must be held to be wrong, and it can never be the other way.

19.20 It has been shown that in the absence of any relation the words cannot be held to form a Sentence. It is now shown that for the same reason of want of relation the



exclusion is not possible for Ideas,—because each of these has only a momentary existence; therefore either Intimate Relation or Mutual Exclusion (of the meaning of Words composing a Sentence) cannot be accepted to constitute the meaning (of the Sentence).

20-21. "If the notion of the word 'Cow' continued to exist at the moment of the appearance of the notion of 'White,'—then only could the notion of the 'Cow' be excluded, by the notion of 'White,' from others (black cows, &c.), or be associated (in intimate relation) with it.

21-23. "And of notions there can be no association,—because it is impossible for them to have any such relation as Conjunction, &c. And as for the fact of their inhering in the same Soul (that of the speaker or hearer) (which you may urge as a ground of the association or intimate relation of the notion of the 'Cow' and 'White'),—this (relation) is common to the notions of the 'Horse,' the 'Elephant,' &c. (and as such you would have to admit such utterances as 'Horse, Elephant, Camel, Grass, &c.' to be properly expressive, which is an absurdity). The same may be said with regard to *contiguous appearance* (or entrance) (which too you may urge as the ground of intimate relation between 'White' and 'Cow,' but this too is equally applicable to the Sentence 'Horse Elephant'). Nor is there any mutual dependence (or requirement, between the notions of 'White' and 'Cow'), just as (it has been shown that there is no mutual dependence) among Words; because the notions being all only momentary, there is no simultaneity in their existence; and as such, what *notion* could depend upon (stand in need of) another notion?

23-24. "And it is for this reason that the notions of the words 'White' and 'Cow' cannot bring about a single collective notion of meaning of the Words cannot make up the meaning of the Sentence. The Mīmāṃsaka holds the meaning of the Sentence to consist of the mutual intimate relation among the meanings of Words. According to them the word "cow" denotes only the *class cow*, and is indifferent with regard to the individual *cow*. And when the word "White" comes to be added, this only serves to express a relation of the class *cows* with a particular property *whiteness*. And when this relation has been duly comprehended there follows the implication of the exclusion of all cows other than those that are white. Thus then, according to these people, the meaning of the Sentence "White Cow" consists of the relation between the class *Cow* and the property *whiteness*. Those who hold the denotation of the word to be in individuals explain the meaning of a sentence in the same manner. This theory is objected to on the following grounds: Do these Intimate Relation and Exclusion belong to the Words or to the notions of Words, or to the meanings of Words, or to the notion of these meanings? None of these is possible. Because they cannot belong to the Words; nor can they belong to the notions of Words; because the notion of the word cannot continue long enough to become related to that of the word "White." This is what is shown in the following Kārikā.

20.21 But, as a matter of fact, each of these notions is only momentary and cannot continue for any length of time.

the 'White Cow'),—which (collective notion) alone could justify, for its own sake, the assumption of the mutual intimate relation among all the notions (of the individual words 'Cow' and 'White' severally).

24-25. "Inasmuch as such mutual intimate relation and exclusion appear internally (in the mind of the hearer),—if they were to appear *externally* in the shape of an object (the white cow, sought to be denoted by the Sentence)—they could only be similar to a dream, in authenticity.

25-26. "As a matter of fact, no cognition is possible, in the absence of any external object (for its substrate) existing at any of the three points of time (past, present or future). And, in the present instance (of the cognition of Mutual Association and Exclusion of the notions of words) there is no possibility of any external object (such as Association or Exclusion, that could be asserted to be the substrate of the said cognition).

26-27. "Thus then, the fact is that, even in the absence of the appearance of any cognition (of the Association), you have an assumption of such appearance. Or, the assumption of the Association (of Cognition) may be due to the Association of external objects (*i.e.*, the Association really belonging to external objects is wrongly attributed to Cognitions).

27-28. "Thus then, the relation of the qualification and the qualified (*i.e.*, Association) cannot belong to the Notions (of the Word and its meaning). Similarly, with the Word and the notion thereof, since there is no difference produced (in the Word either by Association or Exclusion, by any other Word) therefore even the Word and the notion thereof could not be held to constitute the Sentence.

28-29. "For even after the addition of the word 'White,' the word 'Cow' remains just the same (as it was before). Even if the word 'White' be uttered before the word 'Cow,' this latter remains the same; similarly with the notions of the Word also (the notion of the word 'Cow' is not changed by the addition of the word 'White').

29-30. "Nor could there be any qualification between *Whiteness* and the *class* 'Cow' (forming the meanings of the word 'White' and 'Cow')

24.25 This meets the argument that the mutual intimate relation of the words "White" and "Cow" actually appear in the mind of the hearer. The sense of the *Kārikā* is that, even if this do appear, it can only resemble a dream in authenticity.

27.28 "No specification"—The Word "Cow" remains the same even after the word "White" is added; the word "White" produces no change in the word "Cow."

29.30 It has been proved that the notion of the meanings of words cannot have any Association or Exclusion, and as such the notion of the meaning of the word "Cow" cannot undergo any difference by the notion of the meaning of the word "White." It is now shown that even the meanings of the words themselves cannot have any qualifying effect upon another—and as such these cannot constitute the sentence.



respectively); because between these there cannot be either Association or Exclusion.

30-31. "Because neither the *class Whiteness* is affected (associated) by the *class 'Cow,'* nor is the *class 'Cow'* affected by the *class Whiteness.* Because these *classes* do not belong to (inhere in) one another; inasmuch as each of them inheres in the individuals (contained in it).

31-32. "Even if Individual were affected by them (*i.e.*, even if the individual *Cow* were affected by the individual *Whiteness*), this fact could not constitute any relation between the words ('White' and 'Cow') inasmuch as these (words) do not refer to Individuals (but to *Classes*).

32-33. "And when the Individuals (*Whiteness* and *Cow*) are not denoted by the Words,—even though they happen to consist in a single substrate (the *white Cow*), yet this fact alone cannot authorise any relation between the Words themselves;—just as in the case of the *Cow* and the *Horse*, both of which co-exist on the same earth (yet there is no relation between them). And even in a case where colour (smell) &c., co-exist in a single substrate (the *jar*, *f.i.*), there is no relation among these (*Colour*, &c.) themselves.

34-35. "And (as a matter of fact) there are no grounds even for asserting the fact of the *Class 'Cow'* and the property '*Whiteness*' inhering in a single individual (the *white cow*); because this fact of the singleness of the individual (in which these would inhere) could only be based on the ground of an inherent relation (between the denotations of the two

30.81 The *Class "Whiteness"* inheres in the individual "*White*," and cannot inhere in the class "*Cow*."

32.88 This meets the objection that, "even though the Individual *Cow* is not denoted by the word, yet there is such a single individual *Cow* as in which the class "*Cow*" and the property "*Whiteness*" both co-exist. And thus this fact of a single individual being the *Cow* and having the property of *whiteness* leads to the conclusion that the Sentence "*White Cow*" is one and has a single denotation (in the shape of the *white Cow*).

"And even, &c."—This meets the objection that we do not hold mere singleness of substrate (as in the case of the *Cow* and the *Horse*) to constitute the meaning of a sentence; what we mean is that the meaning of a sentence is that object wherein inhere the denotations of the words forming the sentence; and in the case of the '*White Cow*' we have such an object in the shape of the *white Cow*. The sense of the *Kārikā* is that even the fact of inhering in a single substrate does not constitute a ground of any relation between the inhering factors; because we find that in a single object, *jar*, smell and colour inhere, while there is no relation between these. Therefore even though the denotations of the words "*White*" and "*Cow*" happen to inhere in a single individual *cow*, yet this fact alone cannot authorise any relation among the two words, on the ground of which relation we could hold the two words to form a single sentence, and the denotations of these words to form the single denotation of the sentence as a whole.



words, if such relation exist at all); and this inherent relation too has been shown to be based on the singleness of the individual (in which they would inhere); and as such you have mutual interdependence.

35-36. "Nor is there any such (third) Word as would bring about the notion of the singleness of the individual. (Even if there did exist such a Word) nor is the singleness of the individual capable of being expressed by the word. Even if the individual were so expressible, its singleness could not be (denoted).

36-37. "If you assume the relation (between the denotations of the two words 'White' and 'Cow') on the ground of the singleness of the object as conceived by us, then why could not we have the relation between the *Jar* and the *Tree*, in both of which we have a conception of the single indential class 'Earthy' (i.e., both are equally made of the Earth) ?

37-38. "The mention of 'White' does not serve to exclude the Class 'Cow' from the black Cow, &c. And hence the denotation of these (latter) (by the word 'Cow') being natural, is never set aside by the mere mention of 'White.'

38-39. "Even if the negation of the *black*, &c., be the denotation of the word 'White,'—still the only ground for the inherence of this Whiteness in the *Cow* is mere *proximity* (of the word 'White' with the word 'Cow' in the sentence),—and this is not a sufficiently strong proof (of the relation).

39-40. "And so long as it has not been distinctly expressed by the word that it denotes such and such an object,—if one were to determine its denotation of his own accord, all that he would fix upon as being the denotation of the Word would be such as is not at all connected with the Word.

40-42. "And if such a denotation (as that 'white' means the *white cow*) were to be inferred from the proximity of the words 'White' and 'Cow,'—even then (since this inferred relation could only refer to *whiteness* and *cow in general*) the fact of the word ('white') referring to *this particular object* (before the speaker) could only be inferred from *proximity* (of the speaker and the hearer to the particular cow before them); and thus then, if we were to assume the denotation of the word ('white') to extend so far (as the particular cow),—then there would be

38.39 Because syntactical connection is very much weaker than direct assertion.

40.42 "Being apart from *siz*, &c."—The direct assertion of the Word refers only to the class *cow*; hence by making the word refer to the particular cow Proximity goes against Direct Assertion, and as such cannot be included in verbal Testimony; nor can it be included in any other means of Right Notion. Therefore it becomes groundless and invalid, and as such cannot serve as a proof of any relation of *whiteness* with the *particular cow*.



no end (to these assumed denotations). Hence, being apart from the six Means of Right Notion, Proximity remains without any footing (of validity) (as a ground of the relation of *whiteness* with the particular cow).

42-43. "Nor do we perceive, in the word 'cow' (in the expression 'white cow'), the genitive affix, which could point to a relation (of the cow with *whiteness*.) And, as a matter of fact, even if there were such a genitive affix, the relation (between *whiteness* and the *particular cow*) could not be directly denoted; because the fact (of such relation being directly denoted by the Words) has been rejected above (on the ground that the direct denotation of the word 'Cow' refers to the *class*, and not to any *particular individual Cow*).

43-44. "(The word 'white' cannot be held to qualify the *particular cow*, which is indicated, though not directly denoted, by the word 'Cow'; because) An object (the *particular cow*) which is indicated (and not directly denoted) (by something, f.i., by the word, 'cow') is never found to be qualified by another word (such as 'white'), or by affixes (attached to the word 'Cow'),—as for instance, in '*Dhūmo'yam jvalati*' (*Fire* is indicated, through inference, by the smoke, and it cannot be held to be qualified, in the aforesaid Sentence, by the action of *burning*, or by the affix in '*dhūmah*').

44-45. "Even if (mutual) *connection* or *exclusion* (of others) be assumed to be the meaning of the sentence,—then too, inasmuch as this (Connection or Exclusion) extends only so far as the object denoted by the Words, the connection, &c., of the different words can never constitute a Sentence (as a complete whole in itself).

45-46. "Because the Connection and Exclusion are nothing apart from the Meanings of the Words. Nor can the words be said to produce a new entity (in the shape of the Sentence), by the help of these (Connection and Exclusion).

46-47. "For the *Class* and *Property* (as denoted by the words 'cow' and 'white' respectively) do not produce any new object in the external World. And in the absence of any such object, if there be a notion of it, it can only be false, like a dream.

47-48. "One,—who holds that the object denoted by the sentence consists of the already existing particular objects (the *particular cow* as qualified by *whiteness*), manifested (or implied, by the Words, 'cow' and 'white,' which directly express the *class* and the *property*) through *proximity* (of the Words, as appearing in the Sentence),—even for him, this (denotation of the Sentence) cannot be one (because each word of the Sentence has a distinct connection with the rest, and as such in a single Sentence, the connections of Words would be many and not one).

48-49. "And further, there is no ground for believing in the previous existence (of the particular objects), in the absence of any recognition of these; for the actual objective reality of these (particular objects) are not the cause of the Existence of the Words (inasmuch as the Words denote *classes* and not particular individuals).

49-50. "In the same manner, if it be assumed that there is a final conglomeration of all the Words from the first to the last (word of the Sentence),—even then the Words cannot be said to form the Sentence, inasmuch as there is no mutual help among the Words.

50-52. "For, if the first Word of the Sentence were specially affected (qualified or specified), by the other Words (of the Sentence), then this (first) Word alone would constitute the Sentence, the other words being only secondary qualifications (only serving to elucidate the object denoted by the first Word). The same would be the case with all other Words, taken severally. And (this is an impossibility, because) we never recognise any single Word independently (of other Words) as a Sentence.

52-53. "And the fact of the existence of such a *class* as the 'Sphota' (of a Sentence as a whole) is to be rejected like (*i.e.*, on the same grounds as) the Sphota of the Word; and the fact of the sequence of Words constituting the Sentence on the same grounds as the fact of the Sequence of Letters constituting the Word.

53-54. "The sequence cannot be comprehended apart (from the Words) (as explained with regard to the Sequence of Letters in Words); inasmuch as it is always the Words themselves that are cognised as having that order of sequence,—like an auditory cognition (which is always cognised as endowed with a certain order of sequence).

54-55. "We find that the Words remaining the same, the order of the words is now one, and then another; and hence we would have a difference in the meaning of the Sentence, according to the order of the words (if a Sentence were only the order of sequence of Words).

55-57. "On the ground of one Word being for the sake of another, some people hold that it is the Verbal affix that, being the primary element, constitutes the Sentence; and the meaning of the Verb constitutes the meaning of the Sentence. But if this were the case, (in certain cases) there could be no relation between the Verb and the Nouns—as they really exist in the external World. And as a matter of fact, we are not cognisant of any relation among the actions themselves, or the Nouns themselves.

54-56. If the order of words constituted the Sentence then the meaning of "*gauh çuklah*" would be different from that of "*çuklo gauh*," which is not the case.

55-57. Now begins the attack on the theory that the meaning of the Sentence lies in the meaning of the Verb. This theory is that the principal meaning of the Sentence

57-60. "In such an utterance as 'in a vessel rice by means of fuels Devadatta may cook,' there is no mutual connection among the objects (expressed by the Words); inasmuch as, *firstly*, they are totally different from one another; *secondly*, every one of them is an accomplished object in itself (there being no causal relation between any two objects denoted); and, *thirdly*, there is no genitive (indicating any relation among them);—and as such they are independent of one another (and hence cannot form a Sentence, which consists only of such Words as have their denotations dependent upon and related to one another). And the presence of the Instrumental case (in 'kūshthaiḥ') removes all possibility of (the relation of) *proximity* (between the objects denoted). And as for the objects—Fuel, etc.,—themselves, they can be related (to the action of cooking) only by means of their action (of burning, and) not by their mere existence;—inasmuch as we find that when the fuel is wet (and cannot burn), it does not accomplish the cooking.

60-61. "If the capability (of objects) be held to be the cause (of their mutual relations),—then inasmuch as these (capabilities) are, by themselves, immaterial (incorporeal), they cannot, themselves, have any actions; and (in the inactive state, they can be of no use, because) even though they have the capability (of burning and thereby accomplishing the *cooking*), yet, they cannot accomplish the *cooking*, while they are *inactive* (i.e., until the fuel becomes active, and burns, it cannot accomplish the cooking).

is the *Bhāvanā*; and this *Bhāvanā* is expressed by the Verbal affix; and hence inasmuch as the primary element of the meaning of the Sentence is expressed by the Verb, it is this latter that constitutes the Sentence; the other words serving only as qualifications to the verbal affix, and as such being only *secondary* elements in the Sentence. This theory is rejected on the ground that even though Words may serve to give us an idea of the relation between the action and agents (denoted by the verb and the nouns in the Sentence) yet they do not point out any relation between such action and agents as really exist in the outer world. For in certain cases we only have linked together in a Sentence, a certain verb, and some nouns, which may quite reasonably have a *Verbal* relation; but which can have no relation in the actual existing state of things as exemplified in the following *Kārikā*.

57.60 "*Proximity*"—Proximity consists of Sequence, and as such is weaker than Direct Assertion. In the present case the Direct Assertion of the Instrumental rejects the *proximity*.

"As for the objects themselves, &c."—The sense is thus explained in the *Kārikā*:—The mere fact of the words being heard together does not establish any relation among the objects denoted by them, because such utterances as, "wet with fire, &c.," cannot establish any relation between fire and wetness. And so in the instance in question *fuel* by itself is not capable of having any relation with the *cooking*; consequently the relation between the action and objects accomplishing the object cannot be based upon the passive forms of the objects themselves but upon the active capacities of these objects.

61-62. "Even if there be a connection of these (fuel, &c.) with the cooking, through their (action of) burning, &c.—then too, inasmuch as an action (*cooking* f.i.) is not capable of being accomplished by another action (of *burning*, f.i.), it (the connection, that of being the material cause between the *fuel* and *cooking*) remains as inaccessible as ever.

62-63. "Nor is any relation (such as that of an immaterial cause with its effect) possible, inasmuch as they (the *cooking*, and the *burning*) inhere in different substrates (the *cooking* inhering in the *rice*, and the *burning* in the *fuel*). (Nor can *burning* or the *fuel* being the Instrumental Cause of *cooking*, because) that (*cooking*) which is produced by another cause or means (the action of *Devadatta*, &c.) cannot be said to have another cause (in the shape of *burning*, &c.).

63-64. Those (Fuel, Vessel, &c.), that perform the actions of *burning*, &c. (and as such have independent effects of their own), could never be the means (Cause proper) of the *cooking*; and hence, how could there be any connection between *cooking* and such objects (Fuel, &c.) as are not the cause of it? (*Lit.*—How could they form any single sentence?).

64-65. "If it be held that the capabilities contained in the *burning* &c., are indirectly (or secondarily) applied to the *cooking* (and this would constitute a relation between the two),—then (since the *fuel*, &c., are the agents of the *burning*, &c., and it is the capability of the *burning* that is applied to the *cooking*), the *Fuel*, &c., would come to be the agents of the action of *cooking*, and it would be impossible for them to be *instruments* (as they really are, the real agents being *Dēvadatta*).

65-66. "Because in the *burning*, we are never cognisant of various primary capabilities; and as such, how could any such capability be found to be applying secondarily at the time of *cooking*?

66-67. "Because with the reference to their own actions (of which they are nominative agents), the *Fuel*, &c., cannot be instruments. And

61.62 The sense of the latter half is that the fuel could be the cause of the cooking, through burning—only if the burning were the cause of the cooking. But as a matter of fact the cooking not inhering in the burning this latter is not its cause.

63.64 "How could, &c."—Since there is no direct relation between them how can they form a Sentence? Because words that denote unconnected objects cannot compose a sentence, the necessary element whereof is that each word must bear some direct relation with another word in the sentence.

65.66 All secondary application is based upon some primary capability. And as a matter of fact, we know that the Fuel, &c., are not possessed of such diverse capabilities primarily, as those of the Nominative, the Locative and the Instrumental. And as they are already cognised in their Instrumental capacity, they can have no other in the shape of Nominative agency; and hence no such capability could be secondarily applied to the cooking.

we find the actions of *softening*, *burning*, *holding* (belonging respectively to the rice, fuel, and vessel) (and hence these cannot be the agents of *cooking*).

67-68. "Nor can these (collectively) have any other action (than those enumerated), at the time of the cooking—just as singly each of them has only one action (and no other). Hence (if they be held to have any action towards cooking) it must be as Nominative agents (which has been shown to be impossible).

68-69. "And further, inasmuch as *burning*, &c., are not expressed by the root '*paci*' (=to cook), there can be no relation (through *burning*, &c., between the Fuel, &c., and Cooking). Because the mere fact of the existence of these (*burning*, &c.) cannot make them the means of any relation (between Fuel, &c., and Cooking).

69-70. "Nor are these (*burning* &c.) expressed by any other Words (such as *fuel*, in the Sentence). Consequently the root '*paci*' must be admitted to be denotative of Dēvadatta's action, and as such, could not have any connection with the Fuel, &c.

70-71. "If the root '*paci*' itself be held to denote all the actions (of *cooking* as well as those of *burning*, &c.) then, like Devadatta, the Fuel, &c., would also come to be agents (of the *cooking*).

71-72. "Because that case is held to be the Nominative, whose action is denoted by the root. (In the present case the root *paci* denoting the actions of *burning*, &c., belonging to Fuel and the rest, these latter could not but be accepted to be Nominatives). And since the relation with '*Bhāvanā*' (the conception denoted by the verbal affixes) too is equally applicable to all (Fuel, &c.), there can be no other definition of the Nominative (that would not apply to Fuel, &c.).

72-73. "At times we do come across such assertions as 'the fuels cook' (where, in the presence of various obstacles, the excellent character of the fuel only helps the accomplishment of the cooking); —and this would not be possible, if we had a definition of Nominative other than the one given above (*viz.*, that whose action is denoted by the Verb).

87.63 Just as for fuel, &c., singly, there is no other action than the one of *burning*, &c., so collectively too they can have no other action than those mentioned in the last Kārikā. And hence if their actions are secondarily applied to the cooking, they can only be nominatives and instruments (as they really are).

88.69 Even if there be such a relation, it could not be through *burning*, &c.; since these are not even indicated by any of the words in the sentence, which therefore cannot express any relation based upon *burning*, &c.

71.72 The latter half anticipates the objection that we will define the Nominative as being that which is related to the *Bhāvanā*. The sense of the Kārikā is that even this definition will not meet the difference urged in the former half of the Kārikā.

73-74. "Among the actions expressed by a single root (as *cooking, burning, &c.*, held to be denoted by the root *pacī*), there can be no difference of predominance and subordination (all actions being equally denoted); and consequently we cannot define the Nominative as that whose action is more predominantly denoted.

74-75. "Thus then, either denotation or non-denotation of all these actions being equally predominant, it is not proper for the agents of these actions (Fuel, &c.) to have, at one time, different case-terminations (as in "*Sthālyām, kāshṭhāih, Dēvadattah pacati*"), and, at others, one and the same case-termination (*viz.*, the Nominative, as in "*Kāshṭhāni pacanti*").

75-76. "Nor can *burning, &c.*, be held to be denoted by the affix (the *tip* in *pacati*); because this (affix) can only denote either the Nominative agent (as held by the Vaiyākaraṇas), or the action of the agent (as held by the Mīmāṃsaka). Consequently the Verb '*pacati*' cannot have any connection with the 'fuel,' &c.

77-79. "The denotation of the root (*pacī*) too is not always connected with the denotation of the affix. Because that which is denoted by the affix is the *Bhāvanā* (conception); and with regard to this, the root cannot have any such denotation as will serve for either the object or the means (of the *Bhāvanā*),—inasmuch as objectivity is denoted (by the Accusative as) in '*Pākam,*' and instrumentality (by the Instrumental) in '*Pākēna,*' and none of these is denoted by the simple root-form '*pac.*'

79-81. "Inasmuch as the Injunction and the *Bhāvanā*, are both denoted by the affix, the former becomes connected with the *Bhāvanā*, before it comes to be connected with the denotation of the root. And thus, when the Injunction has found its haven in the shape of the *Bhāvanā*, even when the denotation of the root comes to be connected with the Sentence, it does not become the object of the Injunction.

81-82. "Though the denotation of the root is directly asserted (by the root), yet it could never be (cognised as) an object of performance;

74.75 If all actions are equally denotable by the root *pacī*, then all Fuel, &c., must have always one and the same case-termination, the Nominative.

77.79 Having shown the impossibility of any relation between the Verb and the other members of the Sentence, it is now shown that there can be no relation between the meaning of the root and that of the affix.

The *Bhāvanā* requires only three factors—the object, the means, and the process; and none of these being capable of being denoted by the root '*pacī*,' this latter (the root) cannot have any relation with the *Bhāvanā* which is denoted by the affix.

79.81 It is now shown that the Injunction can have no connection with Vedic sentences. The Injunction being more closely related to the *Bhāvanā*, naturally becomes connected with it and not with the subsequently appearing denotation of the root.

81.82 It is only that which is enjoined that can be performed; and as the meaning of the root *yajī* has been shown to be unable of being the object enjoined, the *yāga*



since activity (or performance) depends upon the Injunction which has been shown not to have the denotation of the root for its object). In the same manner we could show the impossibility of other objects (named in a Sentence), the auxiliaries *viz* : or subordinate Sacrifices being the objects of Injunction.

82-83. "Consequently, we should reject the fact of the *Prayājas*, &c. being auxiliaries to the Injunction (of the *Jyotishṭoma*); because they have no connection with it (the Injunction). And this want of connection between these may be shown as between 'White' and 'Cow' (shown above).

83-84. "In that case (of the 'Cow' and 'White') however, there may be a connection, in the shape of the object (the *white cow*); but (in the case of the *Prayājas*) there can be no relation between these (and the Injunction), inasmuch as these are cognisable only by means of the various Vedic sentences, which have no connection with one another.

84-85. "Thus then, since none of the two (neither connection among the objects denoted by the Words, nor that among the words themselves) are found to have any other grounds, we would have mutual interdependence (if we held that the connection between the various objects denoted by the words occurring in any enjoining passage is based upon and authorised by the Word alone). And thus, inasmuch as the Injunction is devoid of the three factors (necessary in the *Bhāvanā*), it becomes devoid of any object (since the *Bhāvanā* too cannot, under the circumstances, be the object of the Injunction which is devoid of the three factors, and as such incapable of any connection with the *Bhāvanā*).

could not be performed. And when the *yāga*, which is denoted by a part of the same word "*yajēta*," of which the latter particle denotes the Injunction, cannot be the object of the Injunction, nothing else that is foreign to it—such as the *soma*, or the auxiliary sacrifices, which are expressed by other words—can never be the object of Injunction. And as such Injunction ceases to have any relation with Vedic Sentences; and Sacrifices, &c., can never be recognised as being enjoined by the Veda.

83-84 In the case of the "White Cow," when one hears this uttered by an old man and sees a cow brought by another man, one can come to recognise a connection between *whiteness* and the *cow*; but in this case, the cognition of the connection is based not only upon the Word but upon this as aided by Sense-perception, Inference, &c. In the case of the *Prayājas*, however, these are not amenable to any other means of knowledge, but the Word; and the Word, by itself, has been shown to be incapable of denoting any relation of these with the Injunction, therefore there can be no means of cognising any relation of the *Prayājas* with the Injunction. Specially as the Sentences mentioning the *Prayājas* with themselves are various and have no connection among themselves.

84-85 "Mutual interdependence." Because so long as the relation among the objects is not cognised, the meaning of the sentence cannot be cognised. And until the meaning of the sentence is cognised, the connection among the objects cannot be cognised; since this connection has no other proof than the Vedic Sentence itself.

85-86. "And this (Injunction) cannot be connected directly (without the intervention of *Bhāvanā*) with the denotation of the root and the objects named (in the sentence); because the Injunction being interrupted by the *Bhāvanā* (on the ground of both being denoted by the affix), the agent cannot engage in (the performance of) those (*viz.*, the denotation of the root, &c.).

86-87. "Thus then, since all verbal connections are based upon the connection between actions and agents, &c. (and these have been proved to be impossible),—therefore all other kinds of relation must be rejected. And this rejection would lead to the rejection of all such relationships as those of master and servant, father and son, a man and his friends, &c.

87-88. "Of Verbal prefixes and *Nipātas* there cannot be any connection with any (factor of the sentence). And as for a relation among themselves, this is never accomplished, as also is the relation of these with nouns, independently (of the verbs to which they are attached).

88-89. "Because, unless the particles (known as Verbal affixes) qualify the verb, they do not acquire the character of the 'Verbal affix.' And as for the meaning of the Sentence, they (the Verbal affixes) cannot qualify it,—simply because the meaning of the Sentence does not exist (*i.e.*, until the relation of the various words composing the Sentence have been ascertained, the meaning of the Sentence is not cognised), and as such, for all intents and purposes, is *non est*).

89-90. "If the relation of Verbal affixes, &c., be held to be through the Verb,—then (we reply) such relation with the Verb is not possible for that which is not a *Kāraka* (that is, a noun having one of the six case-terminations). And (Verbal affixes are not *Kāraḥ*, because) a Noun (or *Kāraka*) cannot signify (or define) an object (which has no existence) (and Verbal affixes do not signify any objects at all).

90-91. "As a matter of fact, these (Verbal affixes, &c.) cannot have a qualifying capacity, inasmuch as they do not, and cannot, produce any positive effect upon the objects denoted by other words; because all that the Verbal affix, &c., are capable of doing is either to be meaningless, or change the original meaning (of the word to which they happen to be prefixed), or establish a meaning contrary to the original meaning.

91-92. "In '*pralambatē*,' &c., the prefix (*pra*) is meaningless (the meaning of *pralambatē* being the same as that of *lambatē*). In '*prasāda*,' the original meaning (of the root *sad*—to *sit*) is changed (into *Favour*,

85-86 The object engaged in must be the object enjoined; and the root-denotation cannot be such an object, on account of the Injunction having been interrupted and located within itself by the *Bhāvanā*, which has the strongest claim to it, on the ground of both being denoted by the Verbal affix.



Kindness, &c.). And the meaning of '*pratishthate*' (*starts*) is contrary (to the meaning of '*tishthati*'—*sits*).

92-93. "That alone, which adds something to the original meaning (of a word) without, in any way, affecting it to the contrary,—can be held to be a qualification; and not that which destroys (and completely alters) the original meaning (as the Verbal affixes do).

93-94. "Even in the case of such prefixes as signify such non-contradictory qualifications as 'direction towards' and the like (as in the case of *udgacchati*, &c.), these specifications belong to the agent (because it is the agent who is qualified by the *Ābhimukhya*, and not the Verb); and as such, they cannot be held to form part of (or belong to) the denotation of the Verb.

94-95. "And with the agent, the Verbal affix can have no relation. And inasmuch as it (the Verbal affix) is distinct from the three factors (of the end, the means and the procedure), it cannot have any relation with the *Bhāvanā*.

95-96. "And further, in the case of negative and alternative Verbal prefixes and *nipātas*, any relation would only be a contradiction,—because for those who hold the reality of external objects, such prefixes, &c., signify objects contrary (to those originally signified by the simple word without the prefix, &c.).

96-97. "Because by its own significant word, an object is denoted in its positive form; and as such, how can it be relegated to negativity by means of the negative prefixes, &c.?

97-98. "Because between the two direct assertions ('*jar*' and '*non-jar*') there is a contradiction, as between '*is*' and '*is not*.' And in the case of the alternative *nipāta* ('*or*,' &c.) there is contradiction in a single word (a single word '*or*,' signifying two contradictory objects).

98-99. "Of these (verbal prefixes) there are no independent

95-98 Negative prefixes, &c., signify an object contrary to the one signified by the original word without such prefix; and as such these prefixes cannot be said to be related to the originally signified objects—for such would be a mere contradiction, the prefix '*not*' signifying the non-going and yet being related to *going*.

98-97 If it be not held to be related to the *jar*, then the very nature of this latter would be perverted; and this perversion of character cannot be held to be a case either of qualification or relation.

97-98 In the Assertion "*Jar or Cloth*," the "*or*" belongs equally to both; and as such simultaneously signifying two contrary objects, it is a contradiction in itself.

98-99 Prefixes have no meaning of their own. The meaning of a Sentence is held to be made up of the meanings of the words composing it. Hence in the sentence "*White Cow*," the meaning of the sentence is that which is made up of the meaning and of the two words. And inasmuch as both these words have meanings of their own, each of them comes to have a certain relation with the Sentence as a whole through their

significations, as we have of the words 'cow' and the like; and hence the meaning of the Sentence could not contain any such denotation (of the prefixes independently), through which they (the prefixes, &c.) would be connected in the Sentence.

99-100. "Since, later on, the Bhāṣhya denies the fact of all the words of a Sentence *collectively* being the means (of cognising the meaning of the Sentence),—therefore the assertion of the Bhāṣhya that *the meaning of the sentence is cognised when all the words have been uttered*—must be taken as showing (or indicating) the incapability of *each individual word* (to denote the meaning of the sentence).

100-101. "On the ground of the non-relation of the denotations of Words, as shown above, the collective denotability of Words is asserted to be non-existing, even though it seems to exist—because (on being duly considered) such collective denotability is not cognised.

101-102. "If each word individually were to constitute the meaning of the sentence, then the ground (on which the meaning of the sentence is sought to be based) becomes inconclusive (doubtful) (because any individual word may be common to any number of sentences, and as such it could not invariably point to the meaning of any one particular Sentence). And if the meaning of the Sentence be held to be based upon the meaning of the Words taken collectively, then, since any particular combination of Words (forming a Sentence) is not perceived anywhere else, (such collective denotation cannot be sufficient ground (for the meaning of the Sentence), inasmuch as, being unique, it cannot serve as the basis of any

specific denotations. The prefixes, however, have no independent significations of their own; and as such there is no means by which they could become related to the Sentence or its meaning.

99-100 In order to show the groundlessness of the cognition of the meaning of the Sentence, the Bhāṣhya has asserted that in the sentence, "*Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmah*," none of the words signify that Heaven follows from Agnihotra; and then again it follows with the assertion that "this meaning is got at when all the words of the Sentence have been uttered." These two assertions appear mutually contradictory. Because the latter assertion shows that all the words are the ground for the idea of the meaning of the Sentence, which the former assertion seeks to prove to be groundless. It is this contradiction that the Kārikā refers to and explains. The explanation is that the latter is not a final assertion, because such collective denotability is rejected later on; what it means is simply that the words *individually* are incapable of denoting the meaning of the Sentence.

100-101 The Bhāṣhya denies the collective function of words. But in face of individual recognition of such collective denotability, this denial seems to be unreasonable. The Kārikā explains this seeming contradiction. It means that though the mutual relation among the meanings of words appears to exist, yet on careful enquiry, it is found that there is no such relation, and hence no collective denotativeness of words in a sentence.



argument (just as the smell of the earth being unique in the earth alone, cannot prove anything with regard to any other thing).

102-103. "One who holds that the meaning of the sentence is the meaning of the component words taken collectively, will also have some syntactical meaning out of such a sentence as 'Cow, Horse, Elephant, &c.'

103-104. "The meaning that the Word has when alone is not abandoned when it appears with other words. For if a word were to abandon its original meaning, then we could never have any trust in any Word and meaning.

104-105. "And (inasmuch as words only denote *classes*, when two or three words are uttered together) all that we could get from them would be the idea of two or three *classes*; because even when many words are uttered, they cannot denote particular individuals.

105-107. "If it be held that the Sentence denotes its meaning directly, independently of the meanings of the component Words,—then there would be no perceptible use for any cognition of the meaning of the Words. And hence even such people as have not understood the meaning of the Words would directly cognise the meaning of the Sentence (which is an impossibility). And if (in order to avoid this you hold that) one stands in need of a cognition of these (meanings of words) then these would come to be the means (of the meaning of the Sentence). And this has already been explained (to be impossible on the ground of the absence of any connected relation among the Words). Thus then, we find that there is no possibility of any ground for the cognition of the meaning of a Sentence.

108-109. "Thus then, it must be admitted that the cognition of the meanings of human utterances could be brought about by a cognition of the relation of objects denoted (by the component words)—(which relation of external objects is cognised by means of right notion, sense-perception, &c., than the Words); and the meaning of Vedic sentences cannot but be groundless (inasmuch as the objects talked of in the Veda are not amenable to the other means of right notion, and it has been shown above that any cognition of the meanings of the component words alone cannot bring about a cognition of the meaning of the Sentence). Or, the denotation of the Vedic sentences may be based upon connections laid down by men, like the (conventional) denotations of such words as '*Gunā*, '*Vṛddhi*,' &c., (laid down by Panini as signifying certain accents, &c.). Or, lastly, it may be that the Vedic sentences have no meaning at all—what they are made to signify is really non-existing,—being kept up by the sacrificial priests (for the sake of emoluments accruing to themselves, from the performance of sacrifices, said to be enjoined by the Veda)."

109-110. "And with reference to this (explanation of the meaning

of Vedic sentences being based upon Convention), it has been asserted (by Inference) that, in that case, being a conglomeration (of facts), like any common story, the Veda (as based upon Convention) must be a human production. And (under the circumstances), since we do not know of any trustworthy person as being its author (*i.e.*, of the Veda), (as we find in the case of ordinary human assertions made by persons known to be trustworthy), the Veda must be admitted to be invalid (groundless and false.)”

Reply to the above :—

110-111. Though we have no other ground (for the cognition of the meaning of the Sentence), yet we perceive that the meanings of the words (composing the Sentence) are such grounds,—inasmuch as the cognition of the meaning of a Sentence appears only when there is a cognition of the meanings of the words.

111-112. It is true that it is not possible for the Sentence (as a whole, independently of the Words) to express any meaning ; because, inasmuch as the cognition of its meaning is otherwise explained (as being based upon the meanings of Words), it is altogether unwarrantable to assume an independent denotative capacity in the Sentence (as a whole, apart from the words composing it).

112-113. It is extremely difficult even to assume the denotativeness of the Word to lie in its component Letters (though even this has been proved to be impossible). And as for the denotativeness of the Sentence lying in the Sentence, it would be much more difficult to assume this inasmuch as one word disappears (as soon as it is uttered, and does not continue till the whole Sentence has been uttered); and if we assume the denotativeness of the Sentence to lie in the Letters composing the Words making up the Sentence, we would have to recall the innumerable Letters long disappeared (*i.e.*, in recalling the past Words of the sentence we would have to recall the Letters composing these Words).

114-115. And further (in thus assuming), we would have to assume a further function (than the denotation of the meanings of words) of those (Letters) that have already had their use in (denoting) the meanings of words (composed by them). And by this we would also be rejecting

110.111 With this begins the explanation of *Sūtra* I—i—25 with which the *Sūtra* begins its reply to the above objections, detailed in *Kārikās* I—110.

114.115 While there is this immediate sequence between the denotation of words and that of the sentence, the cognition of Letters composing the Word is followed first by the cognition of Words, which is then followed by that of the Sentence-meaning. And as such it is quite unreasonable to assume the causality of the cognition of Letters which is one step removed, neglecting that of the words, which is followed immediately by the cognition of the meaning of the Sentence.



the recognised capability of Words (to denote the meaning of the Sentence) and, as a matter of fact, the meaning of the Sentence cannot forego the causality of the Words, inasmuch as there is a denotation of the Words and also that of the Sentence (the cognition of the meaning of the Sentence following immediately after that of the Word meanings).

115-116. (If it be held that the denotation of the Sentence is cognised by means of the impressions left by the Letters composing the Words, then) How could a single impression (left by the Letters) bring about two effects (the cognition of the meaning of the Words, and that of the meaning of the Sentence)? Nor are we cognisant of any other impression (left by the Letters) than the previous one, which gives us the idea of the (Words and their meanings).

116-118. Nor is a review of the past Letters possible at the time of the utterance of the last Letter (of the Sentence); inasmuch as such a review is rendered impossible by the intervention of the cognitions of the Words and their connection with the Sentence. Therefore the cognition of the Sentence, (and its meaning) as a single corporate whole cannot be of the form of the remembrance of the Letters (composing the Words of the Sentence) as previously heard (at the utterance of the Words). And for the same reason it cannot be held (as it is by the Vaiyākaraṇas) that the Sentence really is of the form of the Sentence itself (considered as a whole in itself, irrespective of the Words or Letters composing it).

118-119. By the idea of a "Sentence" we do not comprehend the specific form of the Sentence (irrespective of the meaning); nor can the idea of the meaning of the Sentence bring about the cognition of its specific form (irrespective of objects as actually existing in the external world);—both these facts having been shown to be impossible, under "Çaṇyavāda."

119-120. Those theorists, who hold the Sentence and its denotation to consist in single wholes (in the shape of *sphota*)—some of them holding such *sphota* to have an external existence, and others confining it to the mental idea of these alone—, will have to assert, without any grounds, the falsity of the separate cognitions (that all men have) of the several component parts (of the Sentence and its denotation). For, even if one were to assume the falsity (of certain well-known facts and objects, such as the idea of the parts of the Sentence, &c.), this (mere assumption

116.118 The Kārikā admits the statement made in the objection, that the Sentence as a whole is not denotative of the meaning of the Sentence, and also that it cannot be held that there is a *Sphota* of the Sentence which is denotative of its meaning, this *Sphota* being irrespective of the Words and Letters and their mutual relations, &c.

without any reasons) could not reject the (actual) cognition (that people have) of the object itself.

121-122. The Words themselves, cognised as having only a slight capability (of denoting their own specific meanings), are capable of making up an endless number of Sentences, through the inclusion (of some) and exclusion (of others), and through the various combinations (of the words). And when the matter (of Sentences and their denotations) can be explained on the ground of these slight capabilities (of the words), it is quite unreasonable to assume greater (and further) capabilities (of the Sentences) (as would be necessitated by those holding the signification of a Sentence to belong to the Sentence as a whole, irrespective of the Words). And (since the denotation of the Sentence can be explained on the ground of the denotations of the Words) therefore no Apparent Inconsistency could authorise an endless number of Sentences and their denotations.

123-124. It cannot be urged (as it is done by the Vaiyākaraṇas) that the idea of parts (in a Sentence) is a mistaken one, due to similarity (of the sounds manifesting the Sentences). Because, you do not recognise the primary parts of any Sentence, either apart from itself or in any other Sentence, inasmuch as you hold all Sentences to be impartite wholes. And it is among such *parts* as have a reality of existence, that there could be similarity or dissimilarity. (And as you deny such reality you cannot base any ideas upon similarity of these).

125-126. In the case of Narasiṅha, (which is the instance cited by the Vaiyākaraṇa) there is a partial similarity (with the man and the lion) because there are two such classes (of animals, as *Man* and *Lion*). And hence in this case, the parts perceived in the body of Narasiṅha have a previous and separate existence in the two classes,—some parts of each appearing (in the body of Narasiṅha) and others being absent (therefrom). The hands, &c., are found to separately resemble those of the

131.22 "Greater capabilities, &c."—because such theorists will have to assume a distinct capability for each separate Sentence over and above the capability of the Words. A certain number of words can constitute many sentences; and one who holds the capability of words alone will base all denotations of the words as could be made up by the various combinations of the words, on the capability of words alone. Whereas one who admits the Sphota will have to assume a separate capability for each separate sentence; because, for him, the denotability of the Sentence is irrespective of the Words.

123.24 The Vaiyākaraṇas hold that the sound manifesting each sentence is distinct. But in two sentences where certain words are common, the sounds are much similar; and as such there arises a notion of the Sentences having certain parts similar to those of the other sentences, and certain dissimilar parts. This gives rise to the idea of a Sentence having parts.



human body; and we have a separate cognition of all these (parts, hands &c.), in the various human bodies we have seen.

127. Hence the idea of the sameness of these (as appearing in the body of Narasiṅha, and in any ordinary human body) may be explained as being due either to similarity or to the sameness of the class to which these, hands, &c., belong. And hence there is a likelihood of the recognition (of the hands, &c., of Narasiṅha as being those seen in a human body).

128. And then, if you hold the recognition of the similarity of the parts of Sentences to be like this (similarity of the limbs of Narasiṅha),—then the reality of the existence of parts being thereby established, the assumption of Sentences being without parts becomes false.

129. The similarity, that one would assume, of a non-existent object with another non-existent object, would be exactly like the similarity of the horns of the Hare with those of the Ass!!!

130. If you hold that here too (in the case of non-existent things), there is a similarity of *non-existence* (which is common to all non-existent things), then such similarity would exist among all Sentences; inasmuch as, according to you, the parts of all Sentences are equally *non-existent* and as such, no two Sentences would ever be dissimilar.

131. In the case of an object of variegated colour, we see its various parts, as black, &c., severally; and in the case of wine, (having the sweet as well as the bitter taste) we cognise one part (the *bitter*) to be similar to other objects (which are altogether bitter).

132. In the case of a mixed cognition, we are not cognisant of its parts. It is the object of that cognition which is variegated, and the object has parts also (therefore the case of the mixed cognition will not serve as an instance for you).

133. Therefore the notion of similarity with regard to Words and Letters cannot be based upon non-existence. Nor can there be, for you, any such similarity (based upon parts) in a Sentence, inasmuch as you do not admit of any parts (of Sentences, which in your opinion, form complete wholes in themselves, in the shape of *Sphota*).

134. Even if the Sentences were similar to one another (even in the absence of any parts of these), there could not be a detaching of Letters

132 The other side has urged as an instance that in the case of a mixed cognition, we have an idea of parts, even though really it has no parts; in the same manner though the Sentence has no parts in reality, yet it is cognised as having parts; and as such this cannot serve as an instance for the case of the sentence.

134 As a matter of fact we know of such instances as the detaching of one Word from a sentence and the insertion of another in its place. All this could not be if the

and Words (from Sentences). Hence there could not be an inclusion and exclusion (of Words), (as laid down by the Vaiyakāraṇas themselves), inasmuch as there would be no substrates of these (since for you, there are no such things as parts of Sentences, in the shape of Words, &c.)

135. Nor, in the absence of Words and Letters as making up the Sentence, can you have any diversity of the manifesting (sounds of Sentences), on which diversity you could base the apparent notions of diversity in Sentences. Because Sounds (manifesting the *Sphota* of the Sentence according to you) are held to be subtile (and hence imperceptible in themselves, and hence incapable of having their diversity perceptible).

136. (Being atomic themselves) the Sounds cannot produce any perceptible effects other than the atomic. Consequently, we could have cognitions only of the atomic factor of the Words (and we could never have any perception of Words as they are ordinarily known).

137. Even though there be diversity and sequence among the sounds, yet these sounds could not bring about any such (diverse and sequential) manifestation,—on account of the absence (according to you) of these (diversity and sequence) in the objects to be manifested (in the Sentences, which you hold to be impartite wholes).

138. (According to your theory) you could have either the simultaneous cognition of the whole Sentence (as a whole) or no cognition at all. Because before the whole Sentence has been uttered, there is nothing for you to cognise (inasmuch as you do not hold words to form parts of the Sentences).

139. And (another difficulty that you will have is that) a single Sentence ("the cloth is") may be a complete sentence (at one time, by itself); and the same, when standing in need of something else (such as the assertion of the redness of the cloth), would be deficient (as wanting the asser-

sentence were one impartite whole. Because in your opinion the parts of sentences are non-existing; and there can be no insertion or exclusion of non-existent entities.

140 The Vaiyakāraṇas hold that the Sounds manifestive of the Sentences are diverse and are endowed with a certain order of sequence; and it is these that bring about the notion of partiteness and sequence with regard to sentences which in reality have no parts and no sequence: The Kārikā shows that this cannot be; inasmuch as the sounds held to be manifestive of the *Sphota* of sentences are subtile; and as such cannot have any diversity perceptible. Hence the apparent diversity in the sentence cannot be due to the diversity of the sounds.

141 Though as a matter of fact, even when a certain sense is left incomplete, we do not comprehend the words that may have been uttered till then.

142 The opponent cannot assert that the Word expressing redness may be added to the Sentence—because one who does not admit of parts of the Sentence cannot have these additions and subtractions, as shown above.



tion of *redness*); and this would be a contradiction; inasmuch as the same Sentence cannot be both complete and incomplete (deficient).

140. If it be assumed that the Sentence of three words, known to have a separate existence by itself, does not exist in the Sentence of four Words,—then the *tree* could be said not to exist in the *forest*.

141. If it be held that, “the Sentence (of three Words—‘Bring white cow’) is other (than the Sentence of four words, “Devadatta, bring white cow”), because it is known to have a separate existence, and because it has a reality (by itself apart from the other Sentence,”—then Words and Letters too would come to be other than the Sentence (composed of these) (inasmuch as the words making up one Sentence are known to have an existence elsewhere also, and have a reality apart from the individual Sentence).

142. Therefore, just as the existence of smaller Sentences cannot be denied in a large Sentence (made up of these smaller Sentences),—so, in the same manner, the notions of Words and Letters cannot be said to be non-existent, in the cognition of Sentences (made up of these Words and Letters).

143. If it be urged that, “since these (Words and Letters) are never used alone by themselves (but only in Sentences; and hence they may be taken to be as good as *non est*),”—then the smaller Sentence too is used only in the bigger Sentence (and as such the former may also be *non est*). If it be urged in reply that the smaller Sentence is used to denote its own small meaning,—then, (we reply,) the Words too are used to denote their own meanings.

144. Though Words and Letters by themselves are never found to form part of ordinary usage (*i.e.*, though they are never used as such by themselves) yet they have an existence of their own (apart from any Sentence), when the speaker wishes to use a single word.

145. When, on having cognised a certain specific fact, one wishes to express only the meaning of a word, he uses either the Word singly or a single Letter with some meaning.

146. At the time of studying (getting up) a certain book, one has re-

140 One who denies the fact of Words and Letters making up Sentences, must hold that the Sentence “Bring white cow” being a complete Sentence in itself, does not exist in the Sentence “Devadatta, bring white cow.” And if this were true, then, inasmuch as the tree in the forest is complete in itself, it could not be said to exist in the forest. This is as absurd as the other.

145 On being asked ‘Who is coming?’ the reply is simply ‘the King;’ or on being asked ‘Who is the husband of Lakshmi?’ the reply is ‘A,’ *i.e.* Vishnu.

146 What the student fixes in his memory, first of all, are the Words and Letters by themselves. The getting up of the Sentences comes next.



course chiefly to the ascertainment (and remembrance) of Words and Letters, apart (from the Sentences composed of them).

147. And when, in such cases, these (Words and Letters) have been known to have an (independent) existence of their own,—such existence can never subsequently be denied; because the cognition of the denotation of the Sentence does not in any way contradict (*i.e.*, is inconsistent with) the independent forms of these (Words and Letters, as having an independent existence of their own).

148. Though these (Words and Letters) singly have not the power to bring about the cognition of the denotation of the Sentence, yet their existence remains uncontroverted,—just as the existence of the wheel even when (apart from the chariot and the horse) is by itself incapable of action (motion).

149. Thus then the fact of not being used by itself (which you urge as a premiss to prove the non-existence of the Word) becomes inconclusive. The fact of those (wheel, &c.) being seen to exist even in the absence of the action (motion), has been shown to apply to the case of Words also (since these also are seen to exist apart from the Sentence). (So on this ground too, the cases of the Wheel and the Word are not dissimilar).

150. The counterblast (by the adversary) that,—“if there be an existence of Words and Letters (as parts of the Sentence), then there

147 When the Words have been known to have an independent existence apart from the Sentence, the denotation of the Sentence cannot in any way reject their existence.

148 Though the wheel cannot move, yet it exists all the same. In the same manner, though the Words, by themselves, are incapable of giving the meaning of the Sentences, yet their independent existence continues all the same.

149 The argument advanced by the opponent is—“Words have no existence, because they cannot be used by themselves,” and this argument is rendered doubtful and inconclusive—incapable of giving the desired conclusion—with a view to the well-known fact of certain well-known objects—as the wheel &c., which are known to be incapable of action by themselves and yet have an independent existence of their own.

150 The adversary's argument herein referred to is that, just as Words have an independent existence as parts of the Sentence, so too will the Letters, as parts of the Word, have an independent existence of their own. And so with the parts of the Letters as well; so on and on, *ad infinitum*. And in order to avoid this endlessness, you will have to rest upon some impartite entity; then when it does become necessary to admit of an impartite entity in the end, why not admit of it in the beginning, admitting the Sentence to be such an entity, thus doing away with the necessity of parts, Words, &c.?

“As in the case of atoms.”—That is, in the case of the jar, people go on assuming partite entities up to the atom where they rest; and those that oppose this theory of atoms assert that when you have to admit an impartite entity, why not admit the jar itself to be such an entity, thus doing away with all the series of parts over parts?



would also be an independent existence of the parts of these (Words and Letters) also; and thus (going on *ad infinitum*) we would have to accept the non-existence of all of these as in the case of atoms,"—can only serve to frighten children.

151. Because, just as even when there are (such) ultimate (parts as) atoms (of the cloth), the threads, &c. (as intermediate parts of the cloth, to the downward series of its parts up to atoms) have an established existence,—so, in the same manner, even if there be parts (over parts of the Letters, &c.), this fact does not militate against the existence of the Letters (as intermediate parts of Words and Sentences).

152. And further, because a certain object is found to be partite, it does not necessarily follow that all its parts must also have parts; because though the jar is a partite object, yet the atom (of the jar) has no parts.

153. Thus then, the diversity of Words and Letters (in a Sentence) having been held to be amenable to *Sense-perception*, the "Apparent Inconsistency" (Impossibility) of the parts of Letters cannot reject it.

154. The adversary has cited the case of "Root-Forms" (original forms of Words) and "affixes" as instances proving the non-existence (of Words and Letters independently of the Sentence). And these instances are not sound, inasmuch as people are cognisant of the independent existence of these (Roots and Affixes).

155. It cannot be said that grammatical words mention (Root-forms and Affixes by themselves only as showing) certain grammatical processes (and not as expressing the forms of these independently by themselves). Because the independent forms of these (Root-forms, Affixes, &c.) are directly perceptible (by the Senses); and so (perceptible) is also the denotation of these, just like any other denotations (of Words or Sentences).

156. Because in a Word ("*vrkshēna*," f.i.) the root-form ("*vrksha*") and the affix (the instrumental "*tā*") are recognised distinctly one

154 The adversary's syllogism is—"Words and Letters have no existence,—because they can never be used by themselves,—just as Roots, Affixes, &c." And the *Kārikā* means that since we are cognisant of the independent existence of Roots, &c., the existence of these cannot prove the independent non-existence of Words and Letters. In fact, in rules of grammar Roots and Affixes are very often mentioned by themselves.

155 When "*Vrkshēna*" is uttered we have first of all a cognition of the original simple word "*Vrksha*" as denoting the tree; and then follows the cognition of the case—ending *tā* signifying singularity and instrumentality. Thus, as the two are perceived distinctly one after the other, and their denotations too are cognised distinctly one after the other, they cannot but be admitted to have distinct independent existences of their own.

after the other (since at first we have an idea of the simple noun "*vrksha*," and then of the instrumental and singular affix). And the denotations of these too, appearing on their own appearance, are also cognised distinctly, one after the other.

157-159. The denotations of these (basic nouns and affixes) are cognised distinctly also through affirmative and negative concomitance; inasmuch as we find that while the affixes—*am* and the rest—appear and disappear (i.e., even when the affixes are being changed) the denotation of the basic noun ("*vrksha*" f.i.) continues the same. As for instance, in the two words "*vrksham*" and "*vrkshēṇa*," the class "*vrksha*" (being the denotation of the simple basic noun "*vrksha*") remains the same, while the *accusative character* (denoted by the *am* in the former word) disappears (in the latter), and in its place appears the *instrumentality* (denoted by the *tū* in "*vrkshēṇa*"). (So much for the distinct cognition of the denotation of the Affixes apart from the basic noun; now as regards that of the denotation of the basic noun, apart from that of the Affixes). In the same manner, in the two words "*vrksham*" and "*ghatam*," the *accusative character* (denoted by the *am* present in both words) continues the same, while the denotation of the Word "*vrksha*" disappears (in the latter), and that of the word "*ghata*" appears in its place.

160. Hence (it must be admitted that) the denotation (of a word or affix, or a sentence) is that which always accompanies (is invariably concomitant with) these (Word, &c.). And in order to explain this otherwise inexplicable fact, we conclude the existence of such potentiality (of denotation) in them (i.e., Word, &c.).

161. Though in the case of such Words as "*yūpa*," "*kūpa*," &c., the particle "*ūpa*" is common, yet there is no distinct denotation (of this common particle) which would be common to both words (as the "*vrksha*" is in the words "*vrksham*" and "*vrkshēṇa*"); and that this is so does not militate against Words (and as such the above fact cannot militate against the partite character of words).

157, 159 This shows that we are cognisant of the denotations of affixes apart from those of the basic nouns, and *vice versa*.

161 The objection answered in this Kārikā is this:—"If the Word '*Vrksha*' being common to the two words "*Vrksham*," and "*Vrkshēṇa*," has a distinct denotation of its own—the particle *ūpa* being common to the two words would also have a distinct signification of its own; and inasmuch as this is not the case, the distinct signification of the word '*Vrksha*' should also be rejected; and hence also the fact of Words and Sentences being partite." The sense of the reply is that the mere fact of any common particle not giving a distinct meaning cannot strike against the denotativeness and partite character of all words.



162. Because mere concomitance—either affirmative or negative—cannot bring about the cognition of any altogether new denotation (never known before). All that is done by these (affirmative and negative concomitances) is that, when a certain number of denotations appear to be connected (with a Word), they serve to restrict the (denotative) potentiality (of the Word) to one of them.

163. Thus then, a Word ("*vrkshēna*," f.i.) being of a variegated form (containing the basic noun "*vrksha*" and the instrumental case-ending "*tā*"), and as such, signifying a variegated meaning (the *tree* and *instrumentality*) that meaning which is cognised at the appearance of a certain factor of such a word, is ascertained to be the specific denotation of that factor (f.i., *instrumentality* being cognised only on the appearance of the affix *tā*, this affix is ascertained to have *instrumentality* for its specific denotation).

164. Though the dust, really appearing and disappearing on the appearance and disappearance of herds of cows and horses, &c., may, for once, be found to be accompanied by (concomitant with) a line of ants (which may be passing by at that time),—yet it (the dust) is not the denotation thereof (of the line of ants); inasmuch as this has not the potentiality (of such denotation).

165. Among all big animals, such as elephants, horses, &c., we find a common cause of (throwing) dust, in the shape of their being hard-bodied animals,—characterised by combination and distribution (producing an increase and decrease respectively in the quantity of dust thrown out).

166. If the meanings of words were to be produced by such concomitance, then the presence of *upā* in *yūpā* and *kūpa* would lead to the conclusion that it has a meaning. But as a matter of fact concomitance is incapable of producing meanings. The only use of concomitance lies in this that, as for instance, on hearing the word "*Vrkshēna*," we find that the Word "*Vrksha*" may denote the *tree* or *instrumentality*; and then subsequently finding the word "*Vrksha*" to be present in "*Vrksham*," and knowing that this word is the accusative form of "*Vrksha*," and the former is the instrumental form—and again finding that in "*Ghatēna*," though the instrumental affix is the same, the noun "*Vrksha*" is absent,—we conclude that *instrumentality* must be the denotation of the affix *tā*; and the *tree* only the denotation of the word "*Vrksha*."

167. Concomitance only serves to regulate the potentiality of words, &c., among already existing meanings.

168. If mere concomitance were the ground of denotation, then in a case where dust has been thrown by the movement of cows, &c., if a line of ants happen to pass by, we could have the line of ants denotative of the dust, which is absurd.

169. It cannot be objected that, since dust is seen to be thrown out by elephants also, cows, &c., cannot be the cause of the dust. Because it is not only certain animals that are its cause; but all hard-bodied animals—cows, horses, elephants all—are the cause of dust-storms, inasmuch as they are all hard-bodied; and another ground for asserting these animals to be the cause of dust is that an increase in the number of animals moving about brings about an increase in the quantity of dust thrown



166. And further, as a matter of fact, we find the 'line of ants even without any dust;—hence even though it (the line of ants) may exist together with the elephants, &c., (causes of the dust), yet it cannot be the cause of it (the dust).

167. Basic Nouns and Affixes never being used separately by themselves (apart from one another),—just as their (separate) denotations are never seen, so also their non-denotability (separately, each by itself) can never be seen (hence it is as reasonable to assert their denotability as non-denotability).

168. *Objection* :—"In the case of Nouns and Verbs, we find, in certain cases (exemplified below in K. 169—178), that when they are taken in their complete forms they do not invariably and necessarily give the desired meaning only, and when taken in their deficient forms (or even when these Words themselves are absent) (then too the desired meaning is expressed all the same); (and hence), it is found that their denotability of an invariable definite meaning is impossible,—this impossibility being based upon the fact of the (denotations really belonging to) other Words and Sentences (i.e., the impartite Words and Sentences, in the shape of the *Sphota* of these).

169. "As instances of the incapability of words to express any definite meaning, when they are taken in their complete forms, we have

ant, and so with decrease also. And it is a commonly acknowledged fact that a decrease or increase in any effect, is brought about only by decrease or increase in its cause. And as the quantity of dust thrown about is seen to increase and decrease, according as the number of animals increases and decreases (as combining together or becoming dispersed),—therefore these animals must be admitted to be the cause of the dust. [It is to be noted that the ant is not a hard-bodied animal].

166 It is only an invariable and necessary antecedent that is a cause; and since the ant is seen even without the dust, and the dust is seen without the ants, these latter can never be the cause of the dust.

167 We see the ants in the absence of the dust. But we never see either the basic noun used without the affix, or the affix used without the basic noun; hence it is as reasonable to assert that they have separate meanings, as to hold that they have no such meaning. But we find that they have distinct denotations, as shown in Kārikās 157 *et. seq.* Therefore there can be no ground for asserting their separate non-denotativeness,—while for asserting their separate denotativeness, there are many grounds, as detailed in Kārikā 157, &c. Hence it must be admitted that even basic nouns and affixes have distinct denotations of their own.

168 From here up to K. 181 the *Sphotavādi* seeks to prove on the ground of the absence of concomitance—affirmative and negative—that words and their parts have no expressiveness. The word "*Bhīmasēna*" denotes Arjuna's brother, who is also denoted by the word "*Bhīma*" alone.

169 "Vipra," &c., are explained in Kārikās 170-177; and "Rājā," &c., in Kārikā 178



the words '*Viprah*,' '*Aṇvah*,' '*pacatē*,' '*yātam*,' '*Rājahastinyagāt*.' And (as instances of the meanings of words being expressed even when the Words themselves are either deficient or altogether absent, we have) "*Rājñā Dadhyatra Gām*," where the Word (expressing the meaning)—appears in an entirely different form, and as such, (sounding) like another Word altogether.

170-175. "The word '*Vipra*' may be taken as consisting of '*vi*' and '*pra*,' two verbal prefixes expressing their meanings as such; and it may also be taken as forming a single word '*Vipra*' denoting the class '*Brāhmaṇa*.' (Therefore there can be no invariable concomitance between the word '*Vipra*,' and the expression of any one of these two meanings). Similarly, the word '*aṇvah*' may be a noun (denoting the horse) as well as a verbal form of the First Preterite (Second Person Singular, of the root '*ṇvas*' to breathe). The word '*pacatē*' may be a verbal form (Present Tense, Third Person Singular); or it may be taken as two words, '*paca*' and '*tē*,' in which latter case too '*tē*' may be taken as the dual form of the Feminine Pronoun, or the Plural form of the Masculine Pronoun, or the Singular Dative or Genitive of the latter; or the complete word '*pacatē*' may be the form in the Dative Singular of '*Pacan*' (the root *Paca*), ending in the affix *ṣatr* (the Present Participle). Again '*yātam*' may be the verbal form (of the root '*ya*') in the Imperative Mood Second Person Dual,—or it may be read as '*ayatam*' (when preceded by '*pacatē*'), in which case, it would be a form of the same root in the First Preterite, (Second Person Singular); or the word '*yātam*' may be taken as a Past Participle (ending in *kta*, and qualifying a noun), in which case, it may be taken as Accusative Singular in the Masculine, or Nominative Singular (in the Neuter). And '*Rājahasti*' may be taken as a compound (meaning the King's elephant), or the word '*Rāja*' may be taken as (a separate word) a form of the root *Rāja* in the Imperative Second Person. And in '*Hastinyagāt*,' '*Hastinī*' may be taken as the form (of the noun '*Hasti*') in the Locative Singular (when taken as ending in the short *i*), or (when taken as ending in the long *i*) it may be taken as a Feminine form (in the Nominative Singular). And, lastly, '*agāt*' may be taken as a form of the root '*gam*' in the Third Preterite (Third Person Singular), or as a form of the noun '*aga*' (mountain) in the Ablative (Singular); or again '*agāt*' may be taken as a compound, ending in the *kṛp* affix, and signifying *one who eats* ('*atti*') *mountains* ('*agān*').

176. "Thus then, there being a doubt as to the real meaning (of words,) no definite ascertainment of the meaning of particular words is possible. On the other hand, if an impartite sentence, in the shape of *Sphota* be held to be expressive of meanings (independently of the Words)

then there is a definite ascertainment of the meaning, through the sentence as a complete whole in itself (in the shape of Sphota.)

177. "Then the meaning that is once found to accompany (be expressed by) a word, cannot be said to always constitute the only denotation of the word; inasmuch as the same form (of the word, 'Vipra,' f.i.) when taken as a different word (i.e., when interpreted as the two verbal prefixes *vi* and *pra*.) is seen to be without any meaning at all.

178. "In the same manner, what is known to be significant (of the King) is the word 'Rājā,' and this word is not found in the word 'Rājnā' (which too signifies the King). Similarly, the forms of the words 'Dadhī' and 'Gāh' (originally known to be significant of the curd and the cow) do not exist in the expression 'Dadhyatra' and in 'Gām' (though in both these we have the signification of the same objects).

179. "And when the relation of a certain meaning (the King, f.i.) has been recognised, with a certain particular word ('Rājā,' f.i.), no other words ('Rājnā' or 'Rājnah,' &c.) can be held to be expressive (of that meaning). Nor is it possible for us to be cognisant of the relation (of the meaning) with all the modifications (of the original word known to be significant of the meaning),—inasmuch as these modifications are endless.

180-181. "Therefore (the fact of the sentence being impartite having been proved) it must be admitted that the complete qualified meaning (of the sentence) is signified by the Sentence, independently by itself—which is devoid of any meanings (of Words or Letters) on account of the non-signification (by it) of any relations between *classes* and *generic properties* (which form the denotations of Words, the denotations of sentences referring to *individuals*),—and which is also devoid (independent) of Words and its parts, in the shape of the basic nouns, and affixes, &c., &c.;—such independent signification by the Sentence being through the supposed agency of its supposed parts, assumed and laid down as such in grammatical works, for the purpose of explaining the signification of the sentence to weak-minded persons

178 This explains the instances "Rājnā" &c. (urged in the second half of Karika 169) which are meant to show that even negative concomitance cannot explain the expressiveness of words, inasmuch as in the cases cited, the meaning continues to be expressed even when the word known to be expressive of it has ceased to exist, e.g., the word "Rājā" is known to signify the King; and the King continues to be signified even if the word "Rājā" has been replaced by "Rājnā."

179 "Modifications—such as "Rājnā" "Rājnah," "Rājñī" "Rājakiya," &c.,—of the word "Rājā."

180-181 The sentence is independent of the words, &c., and the meaning of the sentence is independent of the meanings of the words; inasmuch as words signify *classes*, while sentences refer to *individuals*.



incapable of comprehending the meaning of the sentence as a complete impartite whole in itself."

182. To all this, we make the following reply: In all the above-cited instances (of '*Vipra*,' '*Agva*,' &c.) the real word is different in each case (the word "*Vipra*" as signifying the Brāhmaṇa being different from the same word as made up of the verbal prefixes *vi* and *pra*),—this difference being based upon the difference of some property (characteristic) or other,—e.g., in the case of the words "*Jarū*" and "*Rāja*" the difference is based upon the difference in the order of the Letters (which are exactly the same in the two words.)

183. And as for the purpose of ascertaining the real forms of words, learned people have recourse to many means,—such as *Order*, *Deficiency*, *Excess*, *Accent*, *Sentence*, *Remembrance*, and *Direct Assertion*, &c.

184-185. The meanings of certain parts of the sentence having been definitely cognised in their true forms, the others are ascertained as denoting meanings in keeping with the former. As for instance, in the case of a word which can be taken both as a noun and a verb,—those, who have already got at the noun by means of other words in the sentence, stand in need of a verb, and hence conclude the doubtful word to be a verb; while those who have got the verb elsewhere conclude it to be a noun.

186-187. And again, the human shape being the same in any two persons, the fact of their being a Brāhmaṇa, &c., is ascertained by the *Remembrance* of their parentage (*lit.* Father and Mother). In the same manner, the ascertainment of the fact of words being a noun or a verb is due to the *Remembrance* (*smṛti*) of the rules (laid down by Pāṇini) mentioning the basic nouns and their affixes (as also verbs and their affixes).

188. *Objection*: "But those who are not acquainted with these

184-185 In the case of the word "*pacatē*"—which can be both a verb and a noun (the Dative Singular of "*pacan*"),—when it is found in the sentence "*Bhoktūkāmah pacatē*" there is a doubt as to whether it is to be taken as a noun or a verb; then comes the cognition of the preceding word as a noun, and then in order to complete the sentence the other word is ascertained to be a verb. While in the sentence "*pacatē dakṣhiṇām dēhi*" the verb being recognised in '*dēhi*,' the '*pacatē*' is ascertained to be a noun (properly as qualifying a noun). This is an instance of the ascertainment of the meaning of words through *Sentence*.

186-187 This is an instance of the ascertainment of the meanings of words through *Remembrance* or *Smṛti*. Whether the word *pacatē* is a noun or a verb can also be ascertained by knowing whether it is made up of the root *pac* + *tē* (which are called verbal root and verbal affix respectively by Pāṇini), or by the basic noun *pacan* + the dative termination (called noun and case affix, by Pāṇini).

188 The fact of the non-discrimination of Brāhmaṇahood by those not knowing the person's parentage, cannot prove that Brāhmaṇahood is not based upon parentage.

(grammatical) rules could never thus distinguish (between nouns and verbs)." *Reply*: True: but this objection applies equally to the discrimination of the Brāhmaṇa, &c., by those who are not acquainted with the parentage of the person concerned.

189. Similarly, sometimes a doubtful word is ascertained (in its application) by means of Direct Assertion by those persons to whom the fact of certain words being nouns and others being verbs is already well-known;—this ascertainment being due to co-ordination.

190. *Obj*: "But there could be no such discrimination (of verbs and nouns, specially when the form is the same, as in 'pacatē'), according to one who does not admit of *classes* of words (such as the class 'noun' &c.' And (hence) the same word ('pacatē,' f.i.) could never be cognised as both a noun and verb."

191. *Reply*: True: but who is such as does not admit of such (distinct) classes, as the four kinds of words ("Noun," "Verb," "Verbal Affixes" and "Irregular Forms")? In fact (even among parts of words) we have the *classes* "Declensional Affix," "Conjugational Affix," "Nominal Affix," and "Taddhita Affix," as also the classes "Verbal Root," &c. ("Basic Noun" and the like).

192. Even if the word be a single (impartite whole) (in the shape of the class "verb," &c.),—even then, this fact does not militate against the

In the same manner the fact of the non-discrimination of nouns and verbs by those not acquainted with grammatical rules, cannot prove that the grammatical rules do not regulate the discrimination of nouns and verbs.

189 "Co-ordination"—People who are learned have never any doubts as to whether a word is a verb or a noun. All the doubt that such people have is with regard to the exact meaning of words—e.g., in the passage "*udbhidā yajēta*" people have doubts as to whether "*Udbhid*," is that which sprouts up, or it is the name of a certain sacrifice. And then they perceive that the word "*udbhidā*" qualifies—and as such is co-ordinate with—the sacrifice which is comprehended in the said passage as being the means of the conception (Bhāvanā) of cattle—which is directly asserted by the above passage, to be attainable by means of the "*udbhid*" sacrifice. Thus through Direct Assertion it comes to be ascertained that "*udbhid*" is the name of a certain sacrifice which brings about the acquirement of cattle.

190 The sense of the objection is that, "in the case of Brāhmaṇas we are cognisant of such different classes; whereas we are not cognisant of any such classes as 'Noun' and 'Verb,' &c., hence how could the same word be said to be both noun and verb; since all that we are cognisant of is the form of the word, which remains the same; how could it be both noun and verb of which, as *classes*, we are never cognisant?"

192 The objection that this Kārikā has in view is this: "The *Mīmāṃsaka* holds the word to be a partite object made up of the Letters; while in postulating such a class as 'Verb,' for instance, he admits the singularity of these since the class Verb is one only; and since words too, as being individuals of these classes, would be cognised as being identical with the class, these would be one only; and as

class "Word," which does not entirely differ (from the Letters composing the word). What is meant by the Bhāshya—"Letters themselves are the word"—is the denial of any absolute difference (of the word from the constituent Letters).

193. And like the class "walking," this (class "noun,") too is manifested (made perceptible) by means of its various parts appearing in a certain order of sequence. Or, the manifestation thereof may be due to the last Letter only, as helped by the impressions left by the preceding Letters.

194. Or, Letters would be capable of bringing about the cognition of the verb and noun, &c.,)—even if the form of the word were the same as in the case of *pācatē*,—by means of that property of theirs, whereby they are capable of manifesting another class (i.e., "Word").

such this would be nothing more than the Vyākaraṇa theory of Sphota." The sense of the reply as embodied in the Kārikā is that even though the word be identical with the classes "Verb," &c., yet this cannot reject the class "Word;" and this does not contradict our own previous assertions, inasmuch as what we have denied under Sphota is that form of a Word from which all distinction of Letters, &c., has been removed; and hence if the word be held to be a class not absolutely differing from, and based upon, the real Letters (composing the words), then too the passage "Letters themselves are words," would only mean that a word is the Letters belonging to (having the shape and character of) the class "word." This passage denies the fact of words being different totally from Letters; hence if the word be held to be a class, not excluding (or totally differing from) the Letters, then the above passage is not contradicted.

Such is the interpretation of the Kācīkā which is also followed in the translation. The N. R. however explains thus: The Kārikā anticipates the objection that if the word be held to be one with the component Letters, as laid down in the Bhāshya—"Letters are words"—then this means a denial of everything else besides Letters; and hence how could there be any such classes as "Verb," &c. consistently with the assertion of the Bhāshyā. The sense of the Kārikā in reply is, that what the Bhāshyā means is only the denial of such a thing as Sphota which is held by Vaiyākaraṇas to be something totally different from the Letters (and this is what is meant by the Bhāshyā asserting that word is the Letters themselves and *not a sphota*). But the classes "Verb," "Noun," &c., are such as are not totally different from the Letters, just like the class "Sound;" and as such these cannot be said to be denied by the passage which only denies an entity—like the Sphota—totally different from, and having no connection with Letters, inasmuch as the class Verb, &c., as held by us is based upon Letters; and as such is not absolutely different from and unconnected with them.

198 Just as "Walking" is manifested by the various motions of the body appearing one after the other, so the class "Noun" is manifested by the various Letters composing it appearing one after the other in a certain order of sequence. In this view all the Letters are held to be the manifesters. In the view propounded in the second half of the Kārikā it is the last Letter of the word which is the manifesters, the preceding ones only acting as its auxiliaries.

199 Having shown the possibility of such classes as "Verb," &c., the author now gives up this position, on account of the uselessness of such an assumption; inasmuch

195. Though of these (verb, noun, &c.) there are no well-defined groups, like a *Forest* or a *Line*, yet it is possible to have distinct usages of the verb, &c., as classes.

196. The same explanation holds good with the idea of the Verbal Roots, Affixes, and their Denotations, as forming so many classes. And these cannot be said to be conventional and as such non-eternal; because the forms of Taddhitas, verbs, and words ending in nominal and verbal affixes, are all recognised (remembered) by learned people to be eternal (inasmuch as we come across such words and expressions in the Veda also).

197. Nor can it be held that, like the affix "çap" (which is a conjugational sign assumed by Pānini to lie between the root and the termination for the purpose of the pronunciation of the vowel 'a'),—this division into nouns, verbs, &c., is merely optionally assumed, for the purpose of giving an optional name to words by which we could mention certain words together. (This cannot be held) because that (word), of which a distinct form (in the shape of individual nouns and verbs, &c.) is used (by persons, as well

as the cognition of these, "Noun," "Verb," &c., is explained even without postulating any such classes as "Noun," &c., as being brought about by the Letters themselves, and the property whereby Letters are held to manifest the class "Word" is only the *capability of expressing some meaning*; and as this is applicable also to the case of verbs and nouns, &c., we can quite reasonably hold that the idea of these—Noun and Verb, &c.—is due to the Letters as expressive of a certain meaning, helped by the impressions left by grammatical rules, regulating the application of these names (Noun, &c.) to certain definite words. Thus then, it is proved that (Noun, &c.) are real entities, and the idea of these is not devoid of a real substrate.

198 In the case of a forest we find that it is a group of trees, and a *Line* to be group of *living beings*—elephants, f.i.; and this leads us to discriminate between the Forest and the Line. In the case of Nouns, Verbs, &c., on the other hand, there are no well-defined groups of these wherein they are separately enunciated—as that these words are Verbs, and these Nouns. Even though there is no such distinct enunciation and grouping of these, yet we can always definitely ascertain—whether a word is a Verb or a Noun—by means of their significations, with the help of the rules and nomenclatures laid down in grammatical works. And we can regulate the usage of these accordingly. The grammatical rules lay down distinct characteristics common to all Verbs, f.i., by which we could even use the name "Verb," as a class including all words having those characteristics.

199 The notion of Verb as a class including all Verbs is based upon the fact of all words known as Verbs denoting certain actions of some objects, which are hereby included in the common name "Noun," because such is the character laid down in grammatical words as being common to all Verbs. In the same manner, in the case of the common name "Root" the commonality is based upon the fact of all that are known as "roots" denoting *actions*.

The second half means that though the common names "Root," "Verb," &c., are based on grammatical rules, yet the individual Verb, &c., cannot be said to be non-eternal, as being based upon these human conventions; since the fact is that the individual



as in the Veda, as related to certain actions and objects) cannot be a mere means (optionally) assumed, only for the purpose of fulfilling some secondary object, as the pronunciation of the 'a' in the middle of words, (as in the case of the affixes "çap," &c.).

198. And our theory is not affected by the uncertainty of the limits (of Bases and Affixes) due to the difference (of opinion) among those laying down these (Bases and Affixes.)

199. Because (this discrepancy can be set aside on the ground that) that form (and limit) is correct which is authorised by trustworthy persons (like Pāṇini, &c.). Or, where there is an equal authority (for both forms), we must admit both to be correct, the acceptance of one or the other being optional.

200. In fact, (even though there be a difference of opinion, yet it is only in the details of the form of the Base or the Affix, as to whether it is to end in *ti* or *a*; and) there is no difference of opinion as to a certain part of a word being the Base and the other the Affix. And as for the remaining, optional 'çap' or conjugational sign 'a' inserted between the Root and its termination for the sake of pronunciation, these may be optionally regarded to be subsidiary (either to the Base or the Affix) (and since these

words are always recognised to be eternal; and all that the rules do is to lay down certain properties that are common to all words signifying action (for instance) which on this ground, come to be included in the common name "Verb."

199 This anticipates the following objection: "If the division of words into Nouns, Verbs, Affixes, &c., be real and eternal, then there could be no difference of opinion as to the limits of these, while as a matter of fact, we find that there is such difference—e.g., some people call the same affix "ati," while others call it "ti"; some people name the root (=cook), as "paca," while others name it "pacati." Thus, since there is this discrepancy, the division into Verb, Noun, &c., must be admitted to be merely conventional, based upon the assertions of different persons."

Why this discrepancy does not effect our theory is shown in the following Kārikā.

199 The difference of opinion among authorities—admitted in the second Kārikā—refers only to accents, &c., (with regard to which certain acknowledged authorities differ) and not with regard to well-ascertained definite entities—like Nouns, Verbs, &c., with regard to which there is, or can be, no difference among recognised authorities.

200 Since the Base has a distinct signification of its own, apart from that of the affix—there can be no difference of opinion as to a certain part of the word being a Base, and the rest an Affix. The only difference possible referring to minor details cannot affect our position.

"Optional Affixes."—In certain instances it happens that when a certain affix is added to a certain Base, the resultant word becomes unpronounceable—and then, for the sake of pronunciation, people assume the presence of certain supernumary affixes which bring about the addition of certain vowels enabling us to pronounce the word:—
"çap" is one such affix.



are optional, any difference of opinion with regard to these cannot affect our position).

201. Just as in the case of *smoke*, it is only a certain part of it (the fact of its belonging to the class "smoke") which leads to the Inference of Fire; while its other parts (the fact of the smoke being *dusty, vapoury, &c.*) are common to many other objects, (and as such do not help to bring about the inference of Fire);—so, the same may be said to be the case in the present instance (of optional Affixes).

202. And just as in that case (of smoke), (even though the factor of its colour is of no use in the Inference, yet) that factor (of colour, &c.) belonging to the smoke eternally, is not rejected (or removed from the smoke),—so, too, in the present instance, even though a part of the word (in the Optional Affix) is not expressive (being added only for the sake of the facility of pronunciation, and as such having no meaning), yet it continues to exist as eternal.

203-204. In cases when the Affix being eliminated, the Base alone remains—as in the case of words ending in the affix *kvip*,—or, when the Base itself being eliminated, the Affix, pure and simple, remains,—as in the case of the word "adhunā" (=now),—we must admit that the single factor remaining has the potentialities of both (Base and Affix), through the natural capability of words (which is diverse); as for instance, in a sentence the capabilities of words ending in nominal affixes are various and diverse.

205. Some people assert that in the above instances the simple Base or Affix expresses the double meaning (of both), because the presence of the one part (Base or Affix) leads to the inference of another (Affix or Base respectively). Others declare that the one part of the meaning (of both) (denoted by one factor) indirectly indicates that of the other (factor).

206. But, this latter explanation is incorrect; because in the cognition (of the double meaning expressed by the single factor) there is not

201 In the case of a word within which an optional affix has been inserted, we could as reasonably explain that in the case of such a word it is only certain parts of it (such as the real Base and the real Affix) that bring about the cognition of the denotation while the other part (consisting of the optional affix) is of no use in that cognition—just as the colour of the smoke is of no use in the inference of Fire.

203.204 The word "Agnicit" is made up of "agni" + "ci" + "kvip"; but the resultant form is "agnicit" only, there being no trace of the affix. Similarly "adhunā" = "Idam" + "adhunā," where there is no trace of the Base, "Idam." Words ending in nominal affixes, &c.—as f.i., the simple word "Aupagava," which merely looks like the word "Upagu" slightly transferred, denotes so much as "the son of Upagu from his own lawful wife."



the slightest tinge of indirectness or Indication; inasmuch as in the case of words ending in *kvip* f.i., the meaning that we cognise is wholly in its primary and direct form.

207. And further (there can be no indirect Indication in the above cases, because) the science of grammar does not treat of such indirect functions of words, as *Indication*, etc.; inasmuch as what the science does is to ascertain the direct denotation of the directly expressive word, when, in any word, there happens to be a commixture of the Indirect functions (of Indication, etc., with those of Direct Denotation).

208. [Nor can the double meaning be due to Inference as asserted in Kārikā 205; because] we are never cognisant of any concomitance between the denotation of the Base and that of the Affix (and without such concomitance the presence of one cannot lead to the Inference of another). [Nor can it be urged that at the time that the compound, "*agnicit*" is being expounded—as "*agninā cinoti*"—there is a concomitance between the meaning of the Base, the root "*cit*," and that of the affix *kvip* in the shape of the 'nominativity' to the *present action* denoted by the *tip* in '*cinoti*;' and this concomitance of meanings would lead to the Inference of the meaning of one factor from the presence of that of another factor, because] the only means that there is of comprehending the meaning of a sentence, lies in the meaning of the words (composing the sentence), as they are used by persons, (and in the case in question, people always use the word "*agnicit*"; and as such for the comprehension of the word we cannot reasonably have recourse to such words as have not been used).

209. And further, inasmuch as the root "*cit*" is also found to be accompanied (at times) by verbal affixes (Imperative) (just as it is found to be accompanied by *kvip* in "*agnicit*"),—the presence of the simple root ("*cit*" in "*agnicit*") would also be free to lead to the cognition, by Inference, of the denotations of those (verbal affixes); (and there would)

207 The sole purpose of the science of grammar is to show what words are directly denotative of what meanings: in order to distinguish these from the meanings indirectly indicated or suggested. Hence a word—such as the one ending in *kvip*—which grammatically is always in the form of the Base alone, can never be said to partake of any indirect expressiveness; because in that case such a word would never have a pure direct denotation, and hence we would have, in grammar, an affix which can give sense only when recourse is had to the indirect functions of words.

208 Another reason why such concomitance cannot lead to Inference is that the meaning of the affix "*kvip*" is not always accompanied by that of the root "*cit*;" nor is the latter always accompanied by the former, inasmuch as the affix *kvip* may be added to any root; and any other affixes may be added to the root "*cit*;" therefore there being no invariable concomitance between the two, the most necessary element of Inference fails; and consequently no Inference is ever possible. This is shown in the following Kārikā.

be no ground for explaining "*agnicit*" as "*agninā cinoti*," since it would be as reasonable to explain it as "*agnincinoti*," etc.

210. Nor is it proper to assume the presence of both the Base and the Affix in the single factor (Base or Affix left after the elimination of the other factor); because, (rather than have recourse to such a complex and unreasonable assumption) it would be very much better (and simpler) to assume the presence of the dual potentiality (in the single factor).

211. Because knowing the exact extent of the word (be it either in the form of the Base alone, or in that of the Affix alone)—how, in the first place, could we, in the absence of any such directions laid down in grammatical works, assume its multiplicity (i.e., the fact of its containing both the Base and the Affix)? and then the potentiality (of the two factors thus assumed to exist in a single factor, which latter assumption is still more difficult to make, as shown in the last Kārikā).

212-213. There remains the case of "*Dadhyatra*," where the word (denotative of the Dadhi) is not like the one originally known (to be denotative of it). In this some people hold that the word (denotative of Dadhi, in "*Dadhyatra*") is the same word (as originally known to be denotative of it), only affected by the immediate sequence of a vowel (the *a* in "*atra*"); and inasmuch as the same word ("*Dadhi*") is recognised (in "*Dadhyatra*"), the meaning too as cognised (by "*Dadhi*" in "*Dadhyatra*") is the same (as that cognised in "*Dadhi*"); the only difference that there is, is the cognition of the "i" (of "*Dadhi*") as "ya" (in "*Dadhyatra*"), which is due to the immediate sequence of the "a" (in "*atra*").

214. Or, the explanation of this, according to our own theory, is that even though (in "*Dadhyatra*") we have "ya,"—yet its potentiality

²¹⁰ Because it is always simpler and more reasonable to assume new potentialities which are imperceptible forces, than to assume new objects, which are always perceptible, and as such, any assumptions of such as are not to be perceived, look absurd on their very face.

²¹¹ We know exactly how far the root "*Cit*" extends; and then it is altogether unreasonable to assume that it contains both the root *cit* and the affix *kṛip*; and thus it becomes far more unreasonable to make the further assumption of these assumed factors having potentialities of their own. It is much more reasonable to assume a multiplicity of potentialities; because as a matter of ordinary experience, many words actually have various meanings based upon various potentialities; and as such it is not unreasonable to assume a multiplicity of potentialities in the root and "*cit*."

^{212, 213} For the difficulty with regard to this, see Kārikā 178.

²¹⁴ The word in "*Dadhyatra*" is actually different from "*Dadhi*," still the meaning denoted by the one is the same as that denoted by the other; because the Sūtra "*Iko yañaci*" lays down that when 'i' is followed by 'a' &c., one ought to pronounce 'ya' in its place; and this means that the meaning of such a word ending in 'ya'

of denoting the denotation of the word "*Dadhi*," is recognised, in accordance with the specific definition (of 'ya' as laid down by Pāṇini in the sūtra "*Iko yaṇaci*").

215. And further, we find that one who has never heard the word "*Dadhyatra*," and who has never realised the definition (laid down in the sūtra "*Iko yaṇaci*") does not comprehend the expression. "*Dadhyatra*," even though he knows the meaning of the word "*Dadhi*" (and this shows that the word contained in "*Dadhyatra*" is not identical with "*Dadhi*").

216. And the fact of the impossibility,—of the cognition of the relation (of all the transformations of a word, "*Dadhi*" *f.i.*, with the single denotation of the original word "*Dadhi*") on account of the endlessness (of the number of transformations) (as urged in K. 179),—can be explained on the ground that it would not be very difficult to cognise such a relation, in accordance with the specific definitions (of the various transformations, as laid down in Pāṇini's sūtras), or with the explanations (of the relations) supplied by (learned) people knowing it (the relation) fully (*i.e.*, in all its bearings).

217. *Obj.*—"But, (in the case of '*Dadhyatra*') we have no definite cognition as to the extent of the word (signifying the curd)—as to whether it ends in a vowel ('i') or in a consonant ('ya'); and in the absence of such cognition (of the word) we cannot have any definite idea of its significations."

218. To this we reply that if we were to analyse the expression ("*Dadhyatra*," separating the word signifying the curd), the word (as ending in 'ya') would become incorrect (inasmuch as there is no such word as "*Dadhya*"); while, so long as its form ("*Dadhya*") remains in close contact (*i.e.*, not separated from the following word), it is correct in accordance with the dictum (of Pāṇini—*viz.*: "*Iko yaṇaci*.")

219. And hence in this condition (of contact) we comprehend the meaning of the word (signifying the curd), even though its limit is not ascertained. And hence, even when the words are not separated, they are cognised to be two different words, on account of the difference in their significations (distinctly recognised, one apart from that of the other).

220. Or, as a matter of fact, in this case, we do recognise the limit of

(as "*Dadhya*") is the same as that of the word ending in 'i' (when the 'ya' is such as is pronounced in the place of 'i' followed by 'a').

217 The sense of this objection is that if the word (signifying the curd) as contained in "*Dadhyatra*" be held to be other than the original word "*Dadhi*," then it would be impossible to realise the form of such a word; and hence it could not have any meaning; because unless the exact form of the word is cognised, its meaning cannot be comprehended.

220 In "*Dadhyatra*" it is always cognised that the former word ends in a

the word, knowing it to end in the consonant ("ya"); but we are unable to mention it (separately) (because in that case it would become incorrect). (It is so) since it is that (word ending in "ya") alone which is always comprehensible (in analysis) only as the word "*Dadhi*,"—as in the case of a "*Nityasamāsa*."

221. The above (explanation of the case of "*Dadhyatra*") supplies the answer to the] (objections with regard to the) words "*Rājā*" and "*Rājñā*" &c., (as urged in K. 169). Because (in "*Rājñā*," as in "*Dadhyatra*") a certain part (that part which signifies the King apart from instrumentality) is similar to, and synonymous with, the other word ("*Rājā*"), though the two are different words altogether (like "*Dadhi*" and "*Dadhya*").

222-223. The fact of the non-cognition of the meaning of the word "*Brāhmaṇa*," in the word "*Brāhmaṇa-vastra*" (which is the technical name of a certain kind of cloth), is explained on the ground of the latter word being an altogether new word, and as such, having a limit altogether different (from that of the word "*Brāhmaṇa*"). For, who is there that does not admit the fact of the *general* being set aside by the *particular*? And hence, the word "*Brāhmaṇa*" being the general word, is neglected when appearing in a word which has another limit (i.e., in the word "*Brāhmaṇa-vastra*" which ends in '*Vastra*,' and restricts the meaning of the word "*Brāhmaṇa*," signifying as it does, a particular kind of cloth).

224. When, however, the word "*Brāhmaṇa*" is pronounced as a consonant; and thus as we have a cognition of such a word distinct from the other word, the cognition of the different significations of the two words follows. The fact of one being unable to separate the words in so many words cannot bar our cognition of their different significations. As for instance in a "*Nityasamāsa*" ("*Kumbhakāra*" f.) the fact of our being unable to mention the two words ("*Kumbha*" and "*Kāra*") separately, does not stop the distinct comprehension of the meanings of the two words. And again, just as the word "*Kumbhakāra*" is always analysed as "*Kumbham Karoti*," when the *Karoti* in the analysis is another word than the *Kāra* in the compound, though the two are synonymous and in analysis, the "*Kāra*" must always be comprehensible as "*Karoti*"),—so exactly in the same manner "*Dadhyatra*" is always analysable into "*Dadhi*" and "*atra*" where "*Dadhi*" is a word other than "*Dadhya*," though the two are synonymous, and the word "*Dadhya*" must be comprehended, in analysis as "*Dadhi*."

225-23. The sense of this is that the word "*Brāhmaṇa-vastra*" has no connection with the word "*Brāhmaṇa*;" and as such it is only proper that the meaning of the latter should not be cognised in connection with the former; and hence this want of cognition cannot affect the partite character of words, &c. Because the word "*Brāhmaṇa-vastra*" is an altogether different word having an altogether different signification.

224. When the word '*Dēvdatta*' is pronounced as a whole, as a name, people do not



distinct word, apart (from the word "*Brahmaṇa-vastra*"), then, who can deny (or neglect) its own specific meaning,—as in the case of the words "*Dēvadatta*" and the like?

225. Similarly, in the case of the word "*aṇvakarṇa*," since the whole is known to be an independent word, having an independent signification of its own, in the shape of a particular plant,—the meanings of its parts ("*aṇva*" and "*karṇa*") are completely neglected.

226. Though the parts (of the word "*aṇvakarṇa*") have their significations sometimes neglected, on account of the compound appearing in a context which allows only of the distinct signification of the whole (as one independent word),—yet at times, even as members of a compound, as well as separate words, their own specific meanings are distinctly comprehended.

227. As for the words "*gō*" (cow), "*śukla*" (white) and the like, we never find their specific significations neglected,—whether they appear in compounds or singly by themselves; and as such, where could they be said to be meaningless?

228. And inasmuch as the meaning of a sentence is always comprehended in accordance with the meaning of the words (composing the Sentence),—the fact of the sentence having a qualified (particular) signification cannot point to the fact of the sentence being independent (of the words).

229. For us, even in the signification of the sentence, the words (composing it) do not lose their significance (potentiality); and it is only

mind the significations of the words "*Dēva*" and "*Datta*." When, however, the word "*Dēva*" is pronounced apart, one cognises its own particular signification. What leads to the neglect of the meaning of the word—"Brāhmaṇa" in "*Brāhmaṇa-vastra*" is only the presence of another limit (*Vastra*)—when this presence is removed, the cognition of the meaning of the word "*Brāhmaṇa*" is clear and unavoidable.

230 When the word "*Aṇvakarṇa*" occurs in a context where plants are enumerated, there can be no cognition of the meanings of "*Aṇva*" and "*Karṇa*." But when a rider says "Bring the *Aṇva*" we comprehend the meaning of '*Aṇva*' as a horse; similarly when one says "pierce the *Karṇa*," this word is comprehended as denoting the ear; and also in a compound such as in the chapter on '*Aṇvamēdha*'—it is said "*aṇvakarṇam sammārshti*" where we cannot but comprehend the sentence as signifying "washes the ear of the horse."

231 Thus all words must be admitted to have distinct significations of their own.

232 Since the sentence only signifies the connection of the meanings signified by the words composing it; therefore it can have no significance apart from the words; and as such it cannot be an entity apart from, and independent of, the component words. (Note that the author of the *Vārtika* is an "*Abhihitānvayavādi*" as contrasted with *Prabhākara* who is an "*Anvitābhīdhānavādi*.")

233 This anticipates the objection that if the meaning of the sentence be derived from the meaning of the sentence, then this latter loses all direct significance. The sense of the reply is that the signification of the sentence is not entirely devoid of the potentiality of the words. And though the expression of the individual meanings of words

because the direct function of the words ends in the signification of their own individual denotations, that we hold the meaning of the sentence to be deduced from the *meanings of the words* (and not from the words directly).

230. Even if the signification of the sentence be not directly Verbal, yet the significations of the words cannot but be directly Verbal. Because in the case of these (latter) there is no possibility of any intervening agency between the word itself and its meaning,—as there is in the case of the signification of the sentence (between which and the words, the agency of the meanings of the words intervenes).

231. And these (words through their meanings) (as composing a sentence) signify a connected meaning, (which comes to be recognised as the meaning of the sentence) and which is necessarily concomitant with them; inasmuch as the existence of a generic entity (the meaning of the word, which denotes only a generic 'class') is not possible without particular entities (the generic denotations of the individual words, as qualified and specified by the connection of one another).

232. Nor can the mere presence of such concomitance make the cognition (of the meaning of the sentence from that of the words) an *inferential* one. Because inasmuch as the meanings of the words would form part of the conclusion, they could never constitute the inferential indicative.

233. The meaning of the sentence is always cognised as colored by

happens to intervene between the word and the meaning of the sentence,—yet this is only because the words themselves can improperly express their own meanings; and since the expression of these alone (unconnected among themselves) cannot serve any purpose in the sentence, we deduce from these the meaning of the sentence, which is thus due to words alone; and as such is as directly Verbal as anything can be.

231 This is in reply to the objection urged above (in K. 4.) that the words cannot signify the meaning of the sentence, because the words signify something different from the meaning of the sentence. The sense of the reply is that the meaning of the sentence is nothing more than the relation subsisting between the meanings of the words composing it. And as the generic denotation of each word is only specified by its relation with another word, the meaning of the sentence is nothing more than the specified forms of the denotations of the words. And as the specified form is necessarily concomitant with the generic forms, the common fact of invariable concomitance points to the agency of the words in the signification of sentences.

232 The conclusion sought to be proved is that the meaning of the sentence is the meaning of the words specified by their mutual connection (which connection constitutes the meaning of the sentence). And in order to prove this, by Inference, if the premiss be 'because this connection is concomitant with the meaning of words,'—then the premiss becomes a part of the conclusion. And since this is so, the cognition cannot be said to be an inferential one.

233 This means that in an Inference the major term ("Fiery") is something entirely



(i.e., in the shape of) the meaning of the words (connected together); and these latter (meanings of words) *do not* signify the former (the meaning of the sentence) independently of themselves;—as the *smoke* signifies the *presence of fire* (which is totally different from the *smoke* itself).

234-235. Nor is it possible for these (the meanings of words) to qualify the meaning of the sentence (as the Fire qualifies the particular place, mountain); because, the latter is not cognised previously to the cognition of the former, as the place (mountain,) f.i. is (previously to, and apart from the Fire). Because, as a matter of fact, we obtain the cognition of the meaning of the Sentence, which is in itself non-existent (as an independent entity by itself), from (the meanings of words only); or else, how could it (the meaning of the sentence),—consisting, as it does, of the relations of nouns and verbs, &c.,—be cognised previously (to the cognition of the meanings of the component words)?

236. So long as the object (the meaning of the sentence) itself is not cognised, it is not possible to have any idea of its qualification; and previously (to the cognition of the meanings of the words) there is no means of comprehending the meaning of the sentence. (Therefore the meaning of the words can never be cognised to be the qualification of the meaning of the sentence).

237. And if (the meaning of the words be at all cognised to be the qualifications (of the meaning of the sentence), after this meaning of the sentence has been duly comprehended,—then, the meaning (of the sentence) having already been known, what would be left (unknown) to be known (by Inference)?

238. Even invariable concomitance of the meaning of words, the meanings of sentences do not stand in need of. (That is to say, in bringing about a cognition of the meaning of the sentence, the meaning of words do not require invariable concomitance). Nor is this (invariable concomitance) easily cognisable, with regard to all the words at one and the same

distinct from the middle term (smoke); while in the present case the meaning of the sentence is not so different from the meanings of the words. This shows that the minor premiss of the syllogism would not be possible.

234-235 The mountain is known previously, and apart from, the Fire: hence the latter is latterly cognised as existing in, and as such qualifying the mountain. In the case in question, however, the meaning of the sentence is never known, either previously to, or apart from, the meanings of the words composing it; hence it can never be qualified by them.

237 The Inference is sought to bring about the meaning of the sentence; but no premisses are possible until the meaning of the sentence has been duly cognised; consequently the meaning of the sentence can never be said to be cognised by Inference.

238 The words are not heard simultaneously; hence there can never be the cognition and the concomitance of all these: simply because they are never concomitant.

time, inasmuch as (at any time during the utterance of the sentence) some words have already gone before, some are yet to come, and some are yet hidden.

239. Nor is it possible to infer the meaning of one sentence from the relation (concomitance) of the meanings of the words (composing that sentence) with the meaning of another sentence,—because the meanings of words are different (in the two sentences). Or, if these (meanings of words) were exactly the same, the sentences could never be cognised as different (*i.e.*, the words and their meanings being the same, the sentences would be identical; and the difficulty of a proper and timely cognition of invariable concomitance would remain the same).

240. If it be held that we are cognisant of the relation (concomitance) of *words in general* with *sentences in general* (and this concomitance would lead to the inference of the meaning of the sentence),— then (we reply that), in that case there would be no cognition of the meaning of any *particular sentence*; and all the cognition that we have, of the meanings of sentences, refers to particulars (and not to generalities) (and as such it could never be brought about by any Inference based upon the relation of generalities, as held above).

241. It has been proved above that, even in the absence of any cognition of relations, we have the validity of the means of cognition (as in the case of Apparent Inconsistency, &c., where we have no cognition of any relations). And, as for a comprehension (of the meaning of the sentence), it is explicitly known to all men.

242. For, even when the meanings of the words (*i.e.*, the objects denoted by them) have been cognised elsewhere, (*i.e.*, in places other than the one talked of),—as in the case of the description of events in remote countries,—if the assertion comes from a trustworthy source, our comprehension (of the meaning of the sentence) is not in any way retarded.

243. If it be urged that, “this would be a case of inference from the fact of *non-contradiction of trustworthy assertion* (as the premiss)” —(we reply that) such a premiss would only establish the certainty (of the truthfulness

239 This is in reply to the objection that concomitance may be recognised by the sentence, and may serve as the ground of inference of the meaning of another sentence.

241 The sense of the second half is that, even in the case of Inference the validity of the conclusion is not based upon any cognition of relations; since a conclusion is valid only as not denied by any contradictory fact known to be true; and this non-contradiction of a well-recognised fact is also common to the case of the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence, when too we have a comprehension which is not opposed to any well-established fact; and hence the comprehension of the meanings of sentences, as cognised by all people, cannot but be valid,—even in the absence of any cognition of the relation of concomitance among the words or their meanings (as held by us).



of the assertion) and, as for the appearance of the comprehension itself, it could never be brought about by the aforesaid premiss.

244. And the *truthfulness* of the assertion, as ascertained by the fact of its coming from a trustworthy source, is one thing; while the *meaning of the sentence* is quite another thing, comprehended long before the former (*i.e.*, truthfulness, which is ascertained long *after* the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence, when a doubt has arisen as to the truthfulness or otherwise of the assertion contained in the sentence).

245. And, as such, even if you have an inference of *truthfulness* from the fact of the assertion coming from a trustworthy source,—how could the Inference apply to the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence (which has been shown to be a totally different thing)?

246. The appearance (or production) of the comprehension (of the meaning of the sentence), on the hearing (of the sentence), is equal,—whether the assertion come from a trustworthy source or otherwise. And the three factors of Inference cannot be of any use with regard to anything further than the appearance (of cognition; inasmuch as all the Inference, we have, is in the shape of a *cognition* produced by the premiss).

247. Now we proceed to explain how, for the purpose of the ascertainment of the validity of “Verbal Testimony,”—we obtain a comprehension of the previously-unperceived meaning of the sentence, from the meaning of the words (composing the sentence).

248-250. (In a sentence, “*svargakāmo 'yajēta*,” *i.e.*) the word signifying the Bhāvanā reminds us (gives us an idea) of the Bhāvanā, just as in ordinary parlance. And, through positive and negative concomitance, some people hold that this (Bhāvanā is the denotation of the affix) in “*yajēta*”; others hold it to be the denotation of the verbal root (“*yaji*”) as aided by the proximity of the affix; others again hold it to be the denotation of both (root and affix) together, inasmuch as it is by means of both together that we comprehend the Bhāvanā; and because, just as we have no comprehension of the Bhāvanā by means of the words “*Pāka*,” etc., so

244 Since the two are totally different the Inference of truthfulness cannot mean the Inference of the meaning of the sentence.

246 And as such, inasmuch as the appearance of the cognition of the meaning of the sentence has been shown to be brought about by means other than Inference—*i.e.*, by the meanings of words, this cognition cannot in any way be benefitted by Inference.

248, 250 “Very little use”—all that we want is the signification of the Bhāvanā, without which the meaning of the sentence cannot be complete. And it does not matter whether this Bhāvanā be signified by one factor of the word or by both; so long as we have the signification of the Bhāvanā it does not matter whence we get at it.

too, we have none by the verbal affix in "*pacati*," etc. But, as a matter of fact, since it is very little use to differentiate (as to which special factor signifies the *Bhāvanā*), we may hold whatever we like with regard to the (signification of the *Bhāvanā* by the) words "*pacati*," etc., (be it either by the root alone or by the affix alone, or by the two together).

251-252. And inasmuch as this (*Bhāvanā*) only signifies the End, the Means and the Process, *in general*,—it stands in need of a particularisation (of these generic entities), which can be got at by means of other words ("*svarga*," f.i.). And, on the other hand, the *svarga* (Heaven), having been cognised (by means of the word "*kāmah*" = desiring) as the object (of desire) stands in need of the *Bhāvanā* (for its accomplishment). Hence, on the ground of proximity of the affix in "*yajēta*" as signifying the *Bhāvanā*, and the word "*svarga*" as signifying the end or object and capability (based upon mutual requirement, as shown above), we conclude that there is a certain relation between the two.

253. Having its relation (with the end) thus ascertained, the *Bhāvanā* further requires the means (by which to attain that end). And, as a matter of fact, there can be no such action (or performance) as has not its means such as is denoted by the Verbal root.

254. And the denotation of the root, in the shape of the "*yāga*" or *sacrifice*—even though not ending in the Instrumental affix, yet, being in contact with the *Bhāvanā*—stands in need of an *end* (for which it would be the means).

255. And on the ground of extreme proximity between the root *yaji*, in "*yajēta*" as signifying the *sacrifice* as the means, and the word "*svarga*" as signifying the Heaven as the end, we conclude that there is a connection between these two. And in order to show this clearly the aforesaid sentence is explained as "*yāgēna svargam bhāvayēt*" (clearly pointing out the fact of the "*yāga*" being the means, by means of the Instrumental ending).

256. (This explanation is not improper, since) just as the word "*aupagava*" is explained as "*the child of Upagu*" (*Upagoh apatyam*) where the genitive is not present in connection with the word "*Upagu*" in the original word (but is added in order to clearly point out the relation between *Upagu* and the child), (so in the present case also).

257. As a matter of fact, the character of *being the means* is not imparted by the instrumental alone; inasmuch as even if such character be denoted by other means, such denotation cannot be, in any way, contradicted (and set aside) by it (the Instrumental).

258. Even though the Root is recognised as signifying the *means*, yet

259 There can be no *Bhāvanā* whose means is not denoted by the Root.



it cannot have the Instrumental ending, because it is not a noun, as the word "*yāga*" is.

259. Therefore the instrumentality of the root "*yajī*," which is comprehended through the (expressive) potentiality of words, is explained by means of the word "*yāgēna*," inasmuch as the root could not be used alone by itself (to show its instrumental character).

260-261. Similarly, standing in need of the *manner* (of its fulfilment) the *Bhāvanā* refers only to the *Process*. And the *Process* too, standing in need of something to be fulfilled, is restricted (related to the particular *Bhāvanā*), through capability and proximity, on the ground of the impossibility of any other explanation (of the character of the *Process* and the *Bhāvanā*, and the relation between these). And the *Process* is such as may be obtained from the same sentence (as in which the *Bhāvanā* appears) or from other sentences.

262. (And there is no incongruity in this, because) just as the *Base* and the *affix* stand in need of one another, and just as one word stands in need of another word,—so, in the same manner, would a sentence stand in need of another sentence.

263. Without a process, the means do not accomplish any results. Otherwise (*i.e.*, if the *Bhāvanā* of the *Jyotishtoma* and the means, in the shape of the particular sacrifice did not require a statement of the process, then) the declaration of the minor sacrifices the '*Prayāja*' and the rest (which make up the *Jyotishtoma* sacrifice) would be fruitless.

264. Because, rather than make these minor sacrifices have any other use, it is far better to make their use lie in the help that they impart to the means of the *Bhāvanā* of a certain definite result,—inasmuch as the means stand in need of such help, and the proximity (of the declaration of the *Prayājas* to the *Jyotishtoma*) leads to the same conclusion (that the *Prayājas* constitute the process whereby the '*Jyotishtoma*' is to be performed).

265. The three factors (*Means*, *Process*, and *Result*) mentioned in connection with the same *Bhāvanā*, subsequently, come to stand, with regard to one another, in the relation of mutual auxiliaries (the one fulfilling the requirements of the other and so on, amongst all the three).

266. The *Bhāvanā* requires (to know) the *means* that would bring about its result, and also what (*process*) would help the *Means*,—thus requiring all the three factors intertwined with one another.

260-261. For the *Process* it is not absolutely necessary to be mentioned in the same sentence with the *Bhāvanā*, &c.

262. It cannot be said that the *Bhāvanā* appearing in one sentence could not stand in need of the *Process* mentioned in another sentence.

267. Similarly in the case of such sentences as "bring the white cow," there is mutual requirement based upon inseparability. And the mutual relation (between the class "cow" and the property "white") is due to the fact of their being connected with the same action (of *bringing*).

268. And the fact of the *property* qualifying the *class* is based upon the individual object (*white cow*); as the one (class) inheres in the object which is qualified by another (the property of *whiteness*), with reference to the same action (of *bringing*).

269. And the fact of both inhering in the same object as their substrate, is due to the fact of their being taken up by an action, which does not stand in need of any other object. And, as such, there is no mutual interdependence (between the fact of both having the same substrate and that of one being the qualification of another).

270. And the mutual effect produced by one upon the other (on account of their inhering in the same substrate) is naturally of help (in ascertaining their relation). And as for the exclusion of the cows of other colours, this indirectly follows (from the relation ascertained, for the time being, as subsisting between *whiteness* and *cow*). And hence (it must be admitted that) there is no discrepancy in the relation (among Nouns and Verbs, &c., as appearing in a sentence).

271. Though the noun "cow" and the adjective 'white' by themselves separately, having unlimited general applications, render many sentences possible, yet on account of their mutual exclusions (when appearing in the same sentence) we have the idea of that single sentence.

287 "Inseparability"—i.e., the class "Cow" denoted by the word "Cow" stands in need of a specification, inasmuch as the action of "*bringing*" is inseparable from individual cows (on account of the impossibility of its belonging to the *class*); and the property "white" supplies this need. Similarly, the property "white" stands in need of something to which it would belong, inasmuch as the property could have no existence separately from a certain class of individuals; and this need is supplied by the word "cow." Thus, just as in Vedic sentences, so in ordinary sentences, the connection among the various words (composing the sentence) is due to mutual requirement, the class wanting the property and the property wanting the class for its substrate.

269 This refers to the objection that the relation of the qualifier and qualified may be due to their inhering in the same substrate. But whence this inherence? If it be said to be due to the aforesaid relation then there is mutual interdependence.

270 "Exclusion"—This is in reply to the objection urged in K. 37.

271 In the sentence "bring the white cow," the word "bring" denotes the class "bringing," and indicates individual bringings, belonging commonly to all cows—black red, &c. The word "cow" too (ending in the accusative, denotes accusatives in general and as such indicates any action in general of which it would be the object). So also the word "white" in the accusative. But when all these words are taken together, and

272. Therefore even though this (cognition of a single sentence) is not a case of Inference based upon positive and negative concomitance,—yet the fact of the sentence having only one meaning exclusively (which would have been the sole result of the Inference) is got at by other means (*i.e.*, by the close proximity of the words).

273. Injunctions as well as Prohibitions function properly when they have got at the fully-equipped Bhāvanā (*i.e.*, a Bhāvanā endowed with all its three factors), as signified by a conglomeration of words (composing the sentence) and of sentences (such as serve to lay down the processes helping its means).

274. Though the Injunction refers properly to the Bhāvanā untouched by anything else, yet, on account of sheer incapability (of pointing to a Bhāvanā entirely by itself, without any of its factors), it does not end in that (Bhāvanā) alone (but also points to its other factors, inasmuch as there can be no idea of the Bhāvanā without that of its factors also cropping up at the same time).

275. The Injunctions serve to urge persons towards certain actions to be performed; and people do not perform the Bhāvanā, alone, apart from its factors.

276. Therefore, even though the Injunction has its function and form well started, yet it continues to stand in need of something until the Bhāvanā reaches its full capacity and has no requirements (*i.e.*, when it has been fully equipped with all its factors, and as such has no requirements unfulfilled).

forming one sentence, the action of bringing signified by the root comes to be cognised as the same which is signified by the accusative "cow," as also the word "white." Thus all words come to indicate a single particular case; and the action becomes excluded from classes and properties other than the "cow" and "white;" and the class "cow" too comes to be excluded from other actions and properties; and the property "whiteness" becomes excluded from other classes and actions; and this brings us to the cognition of the one sentence, "Bring the white cow."

277. The previous K. having set aside the objection urged in K. 101-102, the present Kārikā meets the objection urged in the first half of K. 4.

278. And since an Injunction stands in need of all the factors of the Bhāvanā, it cannot be said that the Injunction refers to the Bhāvanā alone, and not to its means—the sacrifice, &c.

279. This explains the "incapability." It is only when the Bhāvanā is realised in all its parts—*i.e.*, when people come to know that such and such a *result* will be attained by such and such *means* as aided by such and such a *process*,—that we come to know all its factors.

280. Though the Injunction begins with referring to the Bhāvanā pure and simple, yet it has not its function fully complete, until the Bhāvanā has appeared with all its factors.