

GL

NAMADHEYA.

Similarly, the names of various sacrifices are to be accepted as being based on the "Law of Nomenclature" specified in the Castras, wherein this law has been divided into four classes: (1) the "Tatprakhya," (2) the "Tadvyapadēça," (3) the "Yaugika," and (4) the "Vākyabhēda." To explain these-the passage "Agnihotranjuhoti" cannot be interpreted as enjoining a secondary factor in the form of the Deity Agni; because this has already been done by other passages-such as "Agnirjvotirjyotiragnih svaha, &c." The word "Agnihotra" here has to be broken up like the "Bahuvrihi" compound; and as such should be interpreted as being the name of the sacrifice in which the offerings are made to Agni, declared to be the Deity of the particular sacrifice, by such passages as "Agniriyotiriyotiragnih svaha, &c." It cannot be urged that the particle 'hotra' (in 'Agnihotra') denoting Homa, which is the instrument, the "Actual Bhavana" should bave the instrumental ending, like "Jvotishtomēna"; because the accusative ending in "Agnihotram" must be taken as being indicative of the instrumentality by implication, inasmuch as 'that an unaccomplished action cannot be an instrument' is an universally accepted maxim. Or, the accusative ending can be explained on the ground of its being supplementary to the Homa declared elsewhere. Thus it is that "Agnihotra" is regarded as the name of a sacrifice; and this by the "law of Tatprakhya."

In the same manner, in the passage "Cyënënabhicaran vajëta." the word "Cyena" is the name of a sacrifice, and does not constitute an injunction of the bird 'kite' as an auxilliary to the sacrifice. Or else, we could not explain the simile contained in the passage "Yatha ha vai eveno nipatyādattē ēvamēvāyan dvishautam bhrātrvyan nipatyādattē," which means that "as the kite darts upon and catches its prey, so does the performer of the Cyena sacrifice attack and catch hold of his harmful enemy." Because the simile can be so explained only if "Cyena" be accepted to be the name of the sacrifice. If, on the other hand, "Cyena" were explained as denoting the bird as an auxilliary to the sacrifice, and as such, the passage were taken to be only a declaration of secondary objects, then the "Cyena" (the bird) itself would constitute both members of the simile; and this would be far from right. Consequently, on account of the mention (Vyapadēça) of the similarity of the Cyēna, the word 'Cyona' cannot but be taken to be the name of the sacrifice ;- the meaning of the passage "Çyenenabhicaran yajeta" being that "one desirous of the death of his enemy, is to bring about his exorcisation by means of the 'Cyena' sacrifice."



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Similarly, in the passage "Udbhidā yājēta paçukāmah," the word "Udbhid" is the name of the particular sacrifice enjoined for the acquiring of cattle; and it cannot be taken to declare a material—trees—for the sacrifice mentioned elsewhere. Because we do not know of any such material, as the "Udbhid," in any way fitted for being used at a sacrifice, and the fact of "Udbhid" being the name of the sacrifice can be explained by interpreting the word as "one by which a certain result is produced" (Udbhidyatē phalam anēna).

Objection: "We might explain the word as 'something boring into the ground' (Udbhidyatë bhuman anëna); and as such take it to indicate the 'spade,' f.i.; and thus the passage could be explained as laying down the 'spade' as an auxilliary to the sacrifice."

We cannot assert such a passage to be a secondary declaration, on pain of landing on the absurdity of the entering of two mutually contradictory trios (in the same substratum). To explain this absurdity. The passage "udbhidā yajēta paçukāmah" cannot be said to be supplementary to the sacrifice declared somewhere else; consequently it can only be taken as enjoining the sacrifice as an instrument to the realisation of cattle. Thus then, the sacrifice comes to be an object of injunction, and becomes secondary, only inasmuch as it is found to be auxilliary to the result (acquiring of cattle). And the sacrifice also becomes acceptable (upādēya), inasmuch as the agent has recourse to it for the accomplishment of his desired ends. Thus then, we find that to the sacrifice belongs the threefold character (1) of "Vidheyatva" (of being the Predicate of the Injunction), (2) of "Gunatwa" (of being Secondary), and (3) of "Upadeyatva" (of being acceptable). And again, if "Udbhid" be taken to be a material for the sacrifice, then we shall have another threefold character with regard to the sacrifice-viz.: (1) "Prādhānya" (Primary Character-opposed to "Secondary Character" above) with regard to the material, (2) "Uddecyatva" (character of the "Subject" opposed to the character of the "Predicate" above), and (3) "Anuvādyatva" (Supplementary Character-opposed to "Upādeyatva" above). Thus we find ourselves faced by these two mutually contradictory trios with regard to the character of the sacrifice. Consequently the passage in question cannot be said to be declaratory of materials.

Similarly, in the passage "citrayā yajēta paçukāmah," the word "Citrā" is the name of the "Prājāpatya" Sacrifice. Because we meet with the passage "Dadhimadhughrtamāpodhānāstandulāh tatsansrshtam prājāpatyam," where we find the six materials, "curd," "honey," &c., mentioned together with "Prajāpati," and which connects them with that particular Deity; hence the object enjoined by the passage is the sacrifice



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"Prajapatya," inferred from this connection. And the question of result with regard to this sacrifice is answered by the passage "citraya yajēta paçukāmah,"-this repeated injunction coming in only for the purpose of mentioning the result. And this "Prajapatya" sacrifice (= a sacrifice whose presiding Deity is Prājāpati) comes to be named "Citrā" ("Variegated"), because it is performed with a variety of materials. Nor can it be urged that the passage lays down a subsidiary matterthe variegation of colour and the feminine character (as belonging to the animal)-with reference to the animal-sacrifice mentioned in the passage "agnishomiyam paçumālabhēta." Because this declaration, of many subsidiaries for a sacrifice declared elsewhere, would give rise to a manifest split of the sentence (Vākyabhēda); as is declared in the Tantra-vārtika: "More than one subsidiary cannot be enjoined for. any action mentioned elsewhere"; -- the accepted doctrine thus being that the injunction can be that of the sacrifice, inferred from the connection of the Deity and the material, qualified by many subsidiaries in the shape the Deity, the eightfold "Cake," "Amāvāsyā," "Paurnimā," &c.,only because it has not been declared anywhere else; as continues the Vārtika: "With reference by an action not declared elsewhere, however, more than one subsidiary can be enjoined at a single stroke."

Objection: "In the passage 'Paçuna yajēta,' with reference to a sacrifice declared elsewhere, we accept—as auxilliary to it—the injunction of the material 'animal,' its gender and number, &c., as being implied by the single word 'paçunā,' without any split of the sentence. In the same manner, in the passage at issue, we may accept the injunction of the 'animal,' as the material, with the qualifications of variegated colour and feminine gender, without leading to any split of the sentence. Thus it is that, (in the case of the passage 'Paçunā yajēta') the declared animal being the acceptable material, its singularity is taken to be a part of the sacrifice,-the meaning being that the sacrifice is to be performed with one animal only. To think that the singularity of the secondary factor-f. i., the 'pot' in 'Graham sammārshti'-is not significant is said to be the real doctrine. Why? Because the accusative ending in 'graham' leads to the conclusion that it is the most desired, and hence the primary factor, because of its having a purpose; and that the 'rinsing' is secondary to the 'pot.' In accordance with the maxim that 'with regard to each Primary, the Secondary is to be repeated,' we have as many 'rinsings' as there are 'pots'; consequently, there being no desire on the part of the agent with regard to the number of the pots to be rinsed, the singular number in 'graham' is not regarded as significant. In 'Paçunā yajēta,' 'paçu' is the predicate, and as such subsidiary to the sacrifice; and since there is the maxim of the 'non-repetition of the Primary for each



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Secondary,' to the question- with how many animals is the sacrifice to be performed?'-we have in answer, the singular number of the Predicate ('Pacuna'), for knowing which there is a desire on the part of the agent, and which, therefore, is significant. And further, because the Predicate is the material in the shape of the 'animal,' as qualified by the specific gender and number (all three indicated by the same word 'paçuna'),-therefore through this Predicate, the 'animal,' its singularity and its feminine gender, &c., -which are subsidiary to the sacrifice, -- come to be regarded as significant. Or again, the number and the gender being denoted by instrumental ending (in 'paguna'), they are included (by the force of the Instrumental Case), in the material, the 'animal,' which is the chief noun. But when this relation is neglected. and the number, &c., are connected directly with the Action, then the two (the gender, &c., and the material 'animal') become connected together, in accordance with the maxim of the 'one-year-old red cow':the construction then being 'the animal is mentioned as forming part of the sacrifice, and it is one only.' (To explain the application of the above-mentioned maxim:) As in the passage 'ēkahāryā pingākshyā gavā somankrnati,' the four qualifications 'one year old,' &c., though unconnected among themselves, become grouped together, as auxilliary to the purchase of Soma, by force of the instrumental endings. But these qualities being incorporeal are not capable of helping the sacrifice in any way; hence they connect themselves severally as characteristics of the 'cow,' which serves all necessary purposes of the sacrifice; and then, subsequently, they themselves become connected with one another, -the construction thus being 'the one-year-old cow, which is also brown-eyed and red, &c., &c.' Thus we find the qualifications of the Subject are insignificant, whereas those of the Predicate are significant. In the same manner, in the passage at issue, the 'animal,' endowed with the qualifications of variegated colour and feminine gender, would be quite capable of being declared to be subsidiary to the Agnīshomīya sacrifice, indicated by the word 'yajēta'; and as such wherefore should we make it the name of a sacrifice?"

The above position is not tenable; because if we do not regard 'Citrā' as a name, we land upon the absurdity of (1) abandoning the primary action; i.e., the "Prājāpatya," fully equipped with all materials and due results, and (2) the assumption of the secondary, i.e., the "Agnīshomīya." And inasmuch as both these contingencies are undesirable, "Citrā" must be taken to be the name of a sacrifice. In the same manner we can explain the names of all other sacrifices—such explanation being based on one of the four "laws of nomenclature" explained above.





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ARTHAVADA.

The "Arthavada" passages are not sufficient in themselves, because they serve no independent purpose; but it is necessary that they should lead to knowledge resulting in some end; therefore their acceptablity consists in their forming parts of the Injunctory passages, through the glorification of the objects of injunction.

These are of four kinds: (1) "Nindā (deprecation), (2) "Praçansā" (glorification) (3) "Parakrti" (the description of the doings of other persons), and (4) Purākalpa" (citing foregone examples). As an example of "Ninda" we have the passage deprecating the giving of silver at a sacrifice, on the ground of such gift leading to some calamity in the house of the performer within the year. "Praçansa:" "His face shines, who thus knows, &c." and "Vayu is the eftest Deity." The "Parakrti" Arthavada is the passage purporting that such and such an action was performed by some other great man, e.g., "Agni desired, &c." "Purakalpa" is the passage describing previous events, e.g., "He cursed &c." The Deprecatory Arthavada leads to the glorification of the action enjoined, by the deprecation of its opposite. In the example cited above, the fact of silver having been produced out of the tears shed by Prajapati sets aside that metal as useless, and by praising the non-giving of such silver, directly leads to the advisability of giving of other metals; and as such this instance is quite in keeping with the definition given. The Glorificatory Arthavada-e.g., the praising of Vayuleads to the fact that 'Vayu being the eftest Deity, he is the best suited to lead a sacrifice; hence the sacrifice having Vayu for its Deity, is the best of all'; and this praise connects itself, by the glorification of the Deity forming part of the Injunction, with the passage directly enjoining such sacrifices. The "Parakṛti" Arthavāda-e.g., "Agni desired, &c."points to the fact of the particular sacrifice having been performed by such a great personage as Agni; and hence the advisability of performing the action by other agents also; and this praise connects itself by the glorification of the enjoined action, with the passage enjoining such an action. The other forms of Arthavada are to be similarly explained. There are other purposes, too, of the Arthavada, e.g., we have an injunction to the effect that 'one is to put in wet pebbles.' Here the word 'wet' denotes simply some sort of liquid; and the doubt, as to what particular liquid material is to be used, is set aside by the glorification of clarified butter, in the passage "Tējo vai ghṛtam"; and thus this Arthavada has its purpose in the settling of a doubtful point.



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MANTRAS.

Mantras serve the purpose of recalling to mind certain things connected with the performance of the sacrifice; and the knowledge of the Mantras too is for the purpose of the useful knowledge of the whole Veda, and not for any unseen result, for in the presence of a seen result, the assumption of an unseen one is not allowable. As the performance of an action is impossible without an idea of the action performed, the Mantras serve the purpose of imparting the knowledge necessary for such performance. It cannot be arged that the performance of the action would be possible even on the remembrance of the exhortations of the adviser. Because it is a fact accepted by all that the proper results are attained only when the actions are performed with the appropriate Mantras, and not otherwise. This rule leads to the assumption of the production, by the Mantras, of certain intermediate unseen forces, without which the final end (of the sacrifice) could not be attained.

Objection: "From what you say it is clear that Mantras are employed in the actions implied by them severally. Such employment constitutes a relation of subserviency; and such supplementary character consists in the character of a subsidiary. Consequently the Mantra 'Imāmagrbhṇau raçanāmṛtasya' has the power (by its denotation) of applying to the 'holding of the stringing'; thus then, since the 'holding of the string' becomes possible through the 'Linga,' consisting in the denotability (by the Mantra) of the 'holding of the string'; therefore (we ask), what is the purpose of the further adage—'Ityaçvābhidhānīmādattē'?'

Reply: This adage serves the purpose of the "Parisankhyā" (see above): In the Cayana Section, we find the holding of the reins of the horse, as well as of those of the ass. And the aforesaid "Linga" would also apply equally to both; therefore the subsequent adage serves the purpose of setting aside the holding of the reins of the ass, and declaring the advisability of holding those of the horse alone. Thus the addage constitutes a "Parisankhyāvidhi," denying the application of the mantra to the hold-

ing of the reins of the ass.

This "Parisankhyā" is loaded with three faults: (1) the abandoning of its own purpose, (2) the acceptance of another's purpose, and (3) the setting aside of the declared action. The purpose of the above adage is the holding of the reins of the horse with the specified Mantra; and this has been abandoned, since it has been explained as merely negativing the holding of the reins of the ass. "Another's purpose" is the disconnecting of the Mantra from the holding of the ass' reins; and this has been accepted. And lastly, there is the settting aside of the holding of the ass' reins, declared elsewhere. Though loaded with these three faults,





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yet we accept this "Parisankhya," since there is no other way out of the difficulty.

In the same manner, we have in some cases accepted "Vikalpa" (option), though it has eight objections against it; because there is no other way for us. To explain—we have elsewhere accepted the "Āgnēya-ashta-kapāla Puroḍāça" (the eight-vesseled cake consecrated to Agnī) as subsidiary to the sacrifice. Then, for the production of a specified destiny, we are in the dark as to the substance of which the cake is to be made; and we have the specification of such objects, as the "Vrīhi" and the "Yava" in the passages "Vrīhibhiryajēta" and "Yavairyajēta." Between the two substances thus mentioned, both of which are for the same purpose of being offered, we have recourse to option. Similarly, we have the injunction "atirātrē shoḍaçinam grihṇāti;" and both of these being mutually contradictory, are not capable of application, at one and the same place; consequently, we again have recourse to Option—adopting one course at one place, and the other at others.

This Option has eight objections against it: (1) If Vrihi is used, then we have the abandoning of the meaning of the passage declaring "Yava" to be the substance for the cake; (2) the acceptance in the same passage, of weakness, consisting in the non-capability of performing its function; and (2) when "Yava" is used in the alternative case, then we have the the same faults reversed; (3) the acceptance of strength consisting in the capacity to perform its function, that had been abandoned at first; (4) the abandoning of the weakness that had been at first accepted—thus there are four objections in connection with the passage mentioning "Yava." The same four objections are similarly applicable in the case of the previous acceptance of "Yava" with reference to "Vrihi." Thus, both

together make up the eight objections against Option.

This Option is based sometimes on the fact of both alternatives performing the same function,—e.g., "Vrihi" and "Yava," both serving the purpose of making the cake. Sometimes Option is based merely on the strength of Vedic passages,—e.g., we have an injunction of the "Stotra" named "Vrihatpṛshtha" in the passage "Vrihatpṛshtham bhavati," and a like injunction of another "Pṛshsṭa Stotra" made up of "Sāma," in the passage "Rathantaram pṛshtham bhavati." The "Stotra," like the "Prayājas" leading to a particular destiny, is an "Artha-karma" (Primary Action); whereas "Sāma" being the purificatory agent, is a "Guṇa-karma"; inasmuch as "Sāmas" are accepted as the means to "Stotras," on the ground of their leading to their embellishment, consisting in the expression of the letters of the "Stotriya"; and "Stotra" consists in the recitation of the good qualities of individuals like Indra,



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Varuna, &c., by means of the Mantras sung at the sacrifice. The mention of the qualities of individuals by means of unsung Mantras constitutes the

"Castra." "Sama" is a particular form of singing.

The "Stotriya" consists in the Rchas constituting the Stotra. The mention of special numbers—such as 3, 15, &c.,—with regard to these, constitutes the "Stoma." These are the different forms of the Stotras. Though the "Brhatprsharatha" and the "Rathantarappshtha" are severally specified for different unseen results, yet the option with regard to the acceptance of the one or the other is based on such passages as "Brhadvā prshthankāryam," "Rathantaram vā prshthankāryam." Sometimes we have the "Vyavasthita-Vikalpa" (Decisive Option)—e.g., in the second "Prayāja," &c., we have the option between the Mantras "Nārā-çańsa" and "Tanūnapāt,"—both being specified for the same purpose. But we have another passage, specifying the "Nārāçańsa" for the Kshatriya, and the other Mantra for the others (Brāhmaṇas, &c.). Thus this affords an instance of "Decisive Option."

Thus we have shown that the strength of Declaratory passages, otherwise called "Codanā" (Impelling or urging), depends upon their denotation of the three-factored Bhāvanā. The strength of the udbhid passage, for instance, depends upon its mentioning the name of the sacrifice; and that of the Arthavada passages on their indication of the excellence of the prescribed action; and that of the Mantras on their capacity of reminding the agent of the action to be performed. And in this manner we have established the authoritative character of the whole of the Veda, with regard to such unseen entities as Dharma and Adharma.

The Smrtis, propounded by Manu and others, are based on the Veda, and as such, lend strength to such actions as the "Ashtakā-çrāddha," &c., — not mentioned directly in the Vedas. Smrtis, in direct contradiction to Çruti, cannot be accepted as trustworthy. For instance, the Smrtis that lay down the appropriation of a certain sacrificial cloth by the Adhvaryu cannot be accepted as trustworthy, because such appropriation is directly opposed to the Veda, and is based upon sheer avarice (on the part of the Adhvaryu).

"Custom," also, is an authority, being (indirectly) based on Çrutı, through the Smṛtis. Some customs, however,—e.g., the marrying of one's maternal cousin—is not Dharma, inasmuch as such marriage is distinctly prohibited in the Smṛtis. Thus has been explained the trustworthiness of Çruti, Smṛtii and Custom with regard to Dharma and Adharma.



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Dharma is of different kinds, as is borne out by the different passages declaring them. To explain-Sacrifice, Charity, and Homa are different from one another, inasmuch as they are each denoted by a separate verbal root. Out of these, Charity consists in the removing of one's own proprietory right over a certain object, and the producing of a similar right therein of another person. With regard to the five sentences-"Samidho Yajati" and the rest-there is no such rule as would make one of them declaratory of the Action, and the rest of materials. Consequently, every one of them must be accepted as being declaratory of the Action. But the repeated injunction of the same Action is unnecessary; and therefore the Action declared by one passage must be different from those declared by the others :- this difference being based on the repetition of the word "Yajati." In "tisra ähutih," though the Homa is only one, yet, for the sake of connecting the number "three" with the Homa. we have to accept the difference of the three Homas, -such difference being based on number.

To exemplify difference of Dharma based on naming:—In the case of the passage "Athaisha jyotih.....ētēna sahasradakshinēna juhoti;" though the three "Jyotiryāgas" are mentioned in the "Agnishtoma" Section, yet there is a difference between these and the "Jyotishtoma," inasmuch as they are named apart from the "Jyotishtoma." And again the three "Jyotiryāgas" themselves differ from one another on account of being mentioned severally.

In the case of "Vaiçvadēvyāmikshā-Vājibhyo Vājinam," &c., the former enjoins the Sacrifice of the material, Curdled Milk, for the Viçvēdēvas; and this is different from that declared by the latter; which has the "Horse" for the Deity and the "Scum of Curdled Milk" for the Material. And it cannot be said that the passage "Vājibhyo Vājinam" lays down the matarial "Vajina" for the "Vaicvadeva" Sacrifice. Because the "Vaiçvadēva" Sacrifice has already got the "Amikshā" (curdled milk) for its material; and consequently it cannot be connected with "Vajina." Nor can you have recourse to Option, as in the case of "Yava" and "Vrihi;" because the two are not enjoined in one and the same place; and there can be no option in the case of those mentioned in different places. And further, the "Curdled Milk" (Amiksha) is declared to be the material in the very sentence enjoining the "Vaiçvadava" Sacrifice itself. While, on the other hand, "Vājina" (scum of curdled milk) is mentioned in another passage. But of these two kinds of declaration of materials-the "Utpatticishta" and the "Utpannacishta"-the former is the stronger, inasmuch as it is mentioned as subsidiary to the sacrifice at the time of its origination; whereas the latter is recognised after the action (the Sacrifice) has been brought about; and as such, being the





weaker of the two, cannot be admitted to apply to the foregoing action; and further, being related to another Deity—the Vāji—it leads to the application of the passage mentioning it, to a different Action. Thus the above case affords an instance of the difference of Dharma, based upon the difference in Material—e.g., the 'Curdled milk' is "Āmikshā" and the water left behind is "Vājina."

In the "Kundapäyina" Chapter, we meet with the passage "Upasad-bhiçcaritvā māsamagnihotranjuhoti." Here we find that in the beginning there is no action mentioned in close proximity; hence the passage enjoins, by means of "Context" (Prakarana), consisting in non-proximity to any preceding action, an altogether different action, having the character of the well-known "Agnihotra" Sacrifice. The passage cannot be said to be declaratory of subsidiaries with reference to the "Agnihotra;" because, with reference to an action previously mentioned, if we make the passages declaratory of many subsidiaries in the shape of the

make the passages declaratory of many subsidiaries in the shape of the "Month," &c, we would have a split of the sentence. Therefore we must take our stand upon another kind of "Context" in explaining the difference in the actions,—the "Agnihotra," being one the daily performance of which is compulsory. Thus we have explained the various sorts of difference with regard to Dharma, as based upon difference of Passage,

Number, Mention (Sanjhā), Naming and Context.

We now proceed to consider the objects demonstratable by the Veda, &c. These are of three kinds: (1) "Kratvartha" (for the sake of the Sacrifice), (2) "Purushartha" (for the sake of the Agent), and (3) "Ubhayartha" (for the sake of both). To the first class belong the "Prayaja," &c. To the second belong the Means and the Result-"Jyotishtoma" and "Heaven" respectively. To the third belong "Curd," &c., -these being "for the Sacrifice" inasmuch as they are mentioned in the passage "Dadhuā juhoti," where the Result is not mentioned, and "fer the agent" because mentioned in the passage "Dadhnendriyākāmasya juhuyāt," which mentions the Result (acquiring of Senses). In the "Kratvartha" the impelling agent is the Sacrifice; and in the "purushartha" it is the Agent, - an impelling cause being that for whose sake the passage enjoins an action. The injunction of the "Darga," &c., leads to the performance of such sacrifices as the "Darça" and like for the purpose of attaining Heaven; consequently it is the attainment of Heaven that is the impelling cause in the "Darça," &c. Similarly the injunction of the "Prayājas" leads to the performance of the Prayājas for the purpose of accomplishing the "Darça;" therefore it is the "Darça" that becomes the impelling cause in this case. The injunction for the fetching of Curd





leads to such fetching for the purpose of the "Āmikshā," and not for the "Vājina" which would come of itself with the curd (because it is contained in it). Consequently it is the "Āmikshā," and not the "Vājina," that is the impelling cause in the case. Though the "Puroḍāça-kapāla" is enjoined as subsidiary to the removal of the Chaff, yet this removal cannot be said to be the impelling cause of the aforesaid "Kapāla;" because the "removal" is accomplished by the "Kapāla" brought in for (holding) the "Puroḍāça." Consequently it is the "Puroḍāça" that is the impelling cause in that case.

Question:—"An injunction lays down the performance of the Primary Action together with its subsidiaries; and there being many such subsidiaries, there must be some order in which they are to be performed. What are the grounds for accepting a definite order of succession?" Answer: All necessary ground for such order of succession are afforded by Smrti, &c., themselves, e.g., the passage "The Adhvaryu initiates the Brahmā" after initiating the master of the house distinctly lays down the order in which the initiation is to be performed—that of the master of the house preceding that of the Brahmā. This is an instance of "Çrautakrama."

The order based on the order of the Injunctions, e.g., in "Samidho yajati," "tanānapatan yajati"—is what is called the "Anushthānakrama."

In the case of "Agnihotranjuhoti," "Yavāgūmpacati," we have to abandon the apparent order, and accept a different one—viz., the Homa following the Cooking—on the ground that there can be no Homa before the "Yavāgū" has been cooked. This is an instance of "Arthakrama."

The passage "Saptadaçaprājāpatyān paçūnālabhate" denotes the performance of Seventeen Sacrifices having seventeen animals for the material, and Prajāpati for the Deity. Of these, the first object, the "Upākaraņa," may be begun and finished with any one animal out of the Seventeen; the "Niyojana," &c., however, are to follow the order of the "Upākaraṇa." In the performance of the primary "Agnīshomīya," there being only one animal, all the subsidiaries—"Niyojana," &c.,—are to follow close upon the "Upākaraṇa," there being no intervening agency. In the case in question (i.e., of the Seventeen Sacrifices) however, there are seventeen animals; consequently the "Niyojana," &c., of one animal is to follow 16 instants (units of time) after its "Upākaraṇa;" because the "Upākaraṇa" of all the animals has to be finished before any "Niyojana" can be done. And "Niyojana," &c., are to be performed in the same order as the "Upākaraṇa;"—i.e., the animal, whose "Upākaraṇa" has been done first, will also have its "Niyojana" done first of all, and



so on; otherwise we would be going against the spirit of the Çāstras. This is an instance of "Pravettikrāma."

In the "Sadyaskri Soma" Sacrifice, we find mentioned the Association of the three animals (the "Agnishomiya," the "Savaniya," and the "Anubandhya") to be killed in the "Agnishomiya" Sacrifice, beginning with the "Aupavasathya," in a definite order of succession (and not all together). And this association is applicable in the "place" of the "Savaniya." In this case, the former order is abandoned, and in the process of the injunction of Association by "Position," the order is—(1) the "Upākaraṇa" of the "Savaniya" Animal, (2) that of the "Agnishomiya, and (3) that of the "Anubandhya." This is an instance of "Sthānakrama;" viz., the "Aharanpavasathya" preceding the "Sutyādivasa."

In the "Darça," though the performance of the details of the "Sānnāyya" (the "cutting of twigs," &c.) appears to come first, and that of the properties of the "Agnēya" ("Nirvāpa," &c.) appears to follow later on, yet, between the two primary Sacrifices—Agnēya and Sānnāyya—the former is the first to be performed; consequently, following the order of the primary Sacrifices, the "pouring" ("Abhighāraṇa) to be performed first is that of the Puroḍāça, remnant of the "Prayājas." (subsidiary to the Agnēya); and then follows the "pouring" of the milk (used in the "Sānnāyya"). This is an instance of "Mukhya-Krama."

Thus we have explained the order, of the performance of actions, based upon "Cruti" "Artha," "Pātha," "Sthāna," "Pravṛtti" and "Mukhya." Any order, other than those warranted by these, would leave the action incomplete.

Like all other philosophical systems, the Mimansa also, in course of its dissertations, has treated of such subjects, as the Body, the Senses, the Mind, Soul, God, Brahma, the Origin of Creation, Heaven, Hell, Final Deliverance, Pleasure, Pain, &c., &c., and it will not be out of place to explain in brief what the Mimansaka has to say on these important topics.

Body, Senses, Mind.—The Body is made up of five elementary substances. The sense-organs are also the modifications of these substances; only the organ of Hearing partakes of the nature of Space. The Mind also is a modification of these.

Içvara and Brahma.—The Mīmānsaha does not admit of these as they are represented by the Vedānta or the Nyāya. There is no creator of the Universe; it is eternal.



Categories.—There are seven Categories: Substance, Quality, Action, Genus, Species, Inherent Relation and Negation. Of Substances, there are ten—and not nine as held by the Vaiçēshika; some hold even eleven, adding Darkness and Eternal Sound to the nine enumerated by the Vaiçéshikas.

Atmā or Self.—It is something different from the Material Body. There are many Selves, there being a self for each individual, each being imperishable indestructible. This is what experiences Pleasure and Pain, cognisable by the Mind alone, as the "I." It is all-pervading; but its cognition is energised only in the body. It is not identical with Knowledge, which is only a property or potency belonging to It.

Heaven and Hell.—The former is a particular kind of Pleasure, and the latter a particular kind of Pain. Heaven has been defined as 'that Pleasure which is nomixed with Pain, and is not interrupted by it, which

is the final goal of all longing.'

Final Deliverance.—This is a name given to the total negation of all Pleasure and Pain; it does not mean an annihilation of the phenomenal Universe, but only an annihilation of the connection of the Self with it. According to the Mimānsaka, the only bondage of the Soul consists in its connection with the Universe, which includes the Body, the Sense organs, and the material objects of enjoyment. And as soon as the Self is capable of disentangling itself from these, it becomes free, and it is this freedom that constitutes 'Deliverance.' When this is attained, there is no Body or Sense-organs, only the Mind subsists, and the Self retains only its Consciousness, Bliss, Eternality and Omnipresence.

When one ceases to perform all prohibited actions, as also those that are meant to bring about certain desirable ends, and confines himself only to those that are laid down as necessary, or when he remains self-satisfied in his knowledge of the Self, then there accruing no further Dharma or Adharma, there is a total destruction of the very seeds of rebirth; and so long as the Body remains, he spends up all his previous Karmic residue; and hence when the Body dies, there is no more birth, and the Soul is

free, has attained Final Deliverance.

True Knowledge of the Self is as necessary for the due performance of Sacrifices as for attaining Deliverance; as without it, there can be no cer-

tainty about the results to follow from the sacrifices.

Adrshta follows from Actions. This is of two kinds: Good and Bad, the former proceeding from actions that are laid down as to be performed, and the latter from those that are prohibited. This is what is meant by Virtue and Vice. The good Adrshta again is of two kinds—one bringing about Prosperity either in this world or in the next, and another leading to Deliverance; this latter proceeds from those actions that are performed without any desire for particular results.



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Pleasure and Pain.—The two are entirely distinct; they are not the negation of each other. They are of four kinds: Material, Imaginary, Mental and Egoistic. The eternal Bliss of the Self is different from these.

Means of Knowledge .- These are six. Sense-perception, Inference,

Analogy, Verba! Testimony, Apparent Inconsistency and Negation.

Oreation, Subsistence and Dissolution.—The Mimānsaka does not admit of any absolute annihilation of the Universe, which is ever-existent; but

there are partial or cyclic dissolutions.

Deity.—The form of the Deity has not been dealt with in the Sūtras of Jaimini. But the later authorities declare that the descriptions of gods and goddesses contained in the Purāṇas are mere Arthavāda; as there are no such deities actually in existence. All that these descriptions mean is that at the time of making the offering, one is to think of such and such forms. The Mīmānsaka admits of the Deity only as something to whom the offering is to be made; and this has no other form except the Mantras that are recited in connection with such offerings.

As for the time during which our author lived, the subject of these dates of the earlier authors is so shrouded in mystery, that there are no sufficient data leading to any definite conclusions; and as for conjectures, I am led to believe that it is mere waste of time to indulge in them; specially as what concerns us most is what the author has written for us, and it does not much matter whether he lived a few centuries this way or that. Still for those who may be interested, it may be stated that our author lived sometime between 57 B.C. (the time when Çavara Svāmi is reported to have lived) and 841 A.D. (the time of Vācaspati Miçra), and that he was a senior contemporary of the Great Çankarācārya.

All that remains for me now is the very agreeable duty of acknowledging, with thanks, the help that I have derived from the following

gentlemen :--

(1) Foremost among them is Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Citradhara Miçra, the Chief Pandit of the Darbhanga Raj, who taught me the work here translated, as also its continuation, the Tantravārtika (a translation of which is nearly complete), and but for whose help many passages would have remained wholly unintelligible. (2) My heart-felt thanks are also due to Dr. Thibaut of the Muir Central College and to Mr. Arthur Venis of the Queen's College, Benares, who always favoured with valuable advice and helped to encourage me in the work that I had undertaken. (3) To Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasad, Çastri, of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, without whose constant help my task could not have



been accomplished. (4) To Babu Bhagavān Dasa of the Central Hindu College, Benares, who rendered invaluable assistance, in the earlier portion of the work,—an assistance without which the translation would have remained more vague and unintelligible than what (I am still afraid) it is. (5) The last, but by no means the least, is Babu Govinda Dāsa of Benares, that indefatigable worker in the cause of Sanskrit literature.

who provided me with all necessary manuscripts and aids, and has all along continued to favour me with valuable hints and suggestions.

Notwithstanding all this help, however, there remains much room for improvement in the translation. This has been due mostly to my imperfect command of a foreign language, and partly to the fact of the text being extremely difficult—in fact some people speak of it as the most difficult book in the Sanskrit language. And I hope scholars will overlook the discrepancies that may have crept into the work and favour me with suggestions for corrections, and improvement which may be of use to me in my future work.

GANNGANATHA JHA.

ALLAHABAD:
Muir Central College, July 1905.



ÇLOKAVĀRTIKA.

APHORISM I.

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1. Reverence to Him who wears the crescent moon,—Him who is embodied in pure consciousness, Him whose three eyes are the three Vedas, and who is the source from which all prosperity flows.

2. And then obeisance unto my Teachers, they that are even as Suns for the lotus intellects of their disciples, after which I may hope through

their grace, to accomplish this work of the "Mimānsā-Çlokavārtika."

3. May the learned look upon this effort kindly! The good and the generous-hearted free of jealousy, accept graciously all that is offered to them in love and reverence.

- 4. And let not the mind be set over much on fault-finding alone: for they that set their hearts on discovering faults see them even where none exist.
- 5. How could learned people find any faults in the statements of people like me? They that endeavour to remove the misapprehensions of others allow none in their own works?
- 6. And where can one find, among men, any case of unanimity as to what is faultless? There are people who have something to say against Liberation and Heaven also.
- 7. Reverencing the Scripture as I do, let none reproach me, should I err (in my exposition). He that goes by the right path need not be censured, even if he slips (occasionally).
- I The notion of a God—and that too a bodied one—being foreign to the Mimān-saka, Pārthasārathi Miçra, iu his "Nyāyaratnākara," interprets the benedictory stanza thus: "Viçuddha-jnānādēha"—That whose body is the knowledge purified by the Mīmānsa-Çāstra. "Trivedidivyachakshushe" = That which is manifested by the three Vedas. "Somārdhadhariņē"—That which is equipped with vessels of Soma. All these epithets, in this case, are referred to "Yajna."
 - 8 "Accept &c." Literally-Listen with kind ears of the mind.
- 6 "To say nothing of other things, even such faultless things, as Heaven and Liberation, the highest aims of man, are denied by the Atheists," N. R.



8. Language (i.e. writing), commenced in any way as may be, even without polish or elegance, but following carefully the path of the three Vedas, is pleasing to him who has faith.

9. My greed is great for the gem of Vedic knowlege, when shining with additional lustre in the light of the Mīmānsā-Çastra,—(therefore I commence with an exposition of the Mimānsā, rather than of the Veda).

10. For the most part Mimānsā has, in this world, been made Atheisic; and this effort of mine is made to turn it to the theistic path.

11. "Henceforth (proceeds) enquiry into (the nature of) Dharma"—such is the first aphorism, propounded with a view to explain that the purpose of the Mimänsä-Çāstra is the (desire to know the nature of the) object called "Dharma."

12. For, who would begin (the study of) any science, or any action, while its purpose remained unexplained?

13. And especially is this science of the "Mīmānsā,"—depending upon (i.e requiring the previous knewledge of) many other sciences as it does, and (therefore very difficult to master),—unlikely to attract study unless its purpose has been explained beforehand.

14. This statement of the purpose may not be necessarily desirable in the case of other sciences; yet, there is no fear of evil resulting from them (by such omission).

15. But in the case of the Mīmānsā, if the purpose is not known, or ill-known for want of discrimination, great would be the defect (danger of going astray) in treading the path of the Law; hence the usefulness of effort (in explaining its purpose).

16. Therefore first of all, the purpose has been stated by the author of the aphorisms himself; (He did not leave this to be done by the commentators) for how could the commentators say so well and precisely what the author himself (could say and) has said?

17. "But the student proceeds to the study of only that science, which has a well-established purpose, and the relation of which (with its object) is also known. It is therefore necessary to state, at the commencement of a science, this relation (of the science) with its object, as well as the object itself."

18. The science and the purpose (object), are the two factors (substrata) in which the connection inheres: This (connection or

8 " In any way" With great difficulty.

Because in other sciences, if on account of the non-mention of the purpose people desist from them, there is not much evil there.

16 "Author" Jaimini.

"Commentators" Savarasvāmī, Haridāsa, Bhartrimitra, &c.

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18 "For Jaimini, the connection (or the cause of beginning his work) is not any question from among his disciples; but for him such cause is the relation of cause and





relation) is not mentioned separately because it is implied in the statement of the purpose.

19. "It is true that ordinarily, in all sciences, the relation (of the science with its object) is stated first; as it is only by such statement that the diligence of the student is secured.

20. "And so long as the relation of the science with the object is not explained, the talk of the teacher remains disconnected, and the result is incoherence (i.e. the student's inability to follow)."

21. In the present case, however, the connection is explained in the Bhāshya, by implication, by raising the question of the known or unknown character of Duty. Therefore any other is not mentioned.

22. In the present instance, this relation of the science (to the object) is not expressed by the word "Atha"; because this (word) denotes the relation between two actions; and these are different from the science.

23-24. This relation of the science is explained by some, out of the first word, (1) as a relation of either sequence to a preceding action (as the question of the student, or the propitiatory worship of some Deity), or (2) the relation of succession to past teachers of the science). But the presence or absence of such a relation does not affect in any particular whether the student should engage in the study of the science, or not do so, nor does it affect in anyway his knowledge of the science, or the scope of the science.

effect that subsists between the treatise and the aforesaid purpose (the knowledge of Duty). And without any questions from the disciples the revered Jaimini, intent upon public good, began the treatise which is the means to a knowledge of Duty. And this connection is implied by the mere mention of the objects related (the treatise and the knowledge of Duty); and hence it is not mentioned separately." N. R.

19 And therefore, if Jaimini has failed to show any connection, the commentators ought to explain it.

21 Towards the end of the Bhashya on Aph. I.

23 Some commentators hold that the word "atha" in the aphorism, denotes the connection required, i.e., that of subsequence to study. This view is set aside as not correct; because what is denoted by the word "atha" is the relation between the two actions—study and desire to know; and certainly Mimānsā (Deliberation) is something quite different from Jijnāsa (desire to know); though both are desiderative forms of verbs, yet the former is an action of the teacher, while the latter that of the learner. And lastly, it would not be true to fact to assert that Jaimini wrote the Sutras immediately after he had finished his study.

23.24 The relation is mentioned in order to attract the attention of the hearer. But this purpose is not served by any of the relations here mentioned; inasmuch as none of them either attract the hearer to, or repell him from, listening to the teachings. "Traditional order, &c."—which in the case of Mīmānsā is as follows—
(1) Brahmā, (2) Prajāpati, (3) Indra, (4) Aditya, (5) Vasishtha, (6) Parāśara, (7) Krishnadvaipāyana and (8) Jaimini; and this last after being instructed in the tenets of the system, composed the Satras.

CLOKAVĀRTIKA.

25. Therefore those who wish that the relation of the exposition of a science (to the factor or factors of that relationship) should form part of the explanation of the Sütra, should state only such a relation as is reasonable and useful (as against those rejected in 22 and 24), and no other useless (relations).

26. Of the Bhāshya passage, beginning with "Löka," six different interpretations are usually given,—all in keeping with the Bhāshya.

27. They are—(1) "Universal Explanation," (2) "Censure,"
(3) "Disavowal" say others, (4) "Specification," and (5) "Praise"—say

some; and (6) "Objections to the use of the word atha."

28. (1) "The interpretations of the Sutras are of two kinds—General and Special. The 'Special' is that which belongs to each Sutra, and the 'General' (which holds good in the case of all Sutras, and in fact, means "General Rules" of Interpretation) is this (which is here given).

29. "The 'affirmation' (i.e., the affirmative Rule) applies to words alone; and the 'negation' (i.e., the negative Rule) to the aphorism;—but only in cases not opposed to vedic assertions, and not in any and

every case.

30. "Supplying of ellipsis and inverting the order of words are possible only in sentences; therefore (the pronoun) 'these' (in the Bhāshya passage) refers to 'aphorisms,' even though it is the secondary (noun in the preceding sentence).

31. "The word 'Eva' signifies 'very little,' (and it does not mean that the vedic passages alone are to be explained). The repetition (of the

25 "With its reason"—i.e., with the grounds on which it rests. Such purpose can be none other than that of cause and effect, explained above.

26 "In the Sutras, the words are to be taken in the same sense as they are found to have in ordinary parlance. And they should not be interpreted indirectly either through ellipses, or special technicalities. Therefore it is vedic passages alone that are explained by the Sutras; or else, there would a double effort of explaining the Veda, and also the words of the Sutra."

27 Enumeration of the six explanations.

28 With this begins the detailed explanation of the (1) "Universal explanation."

29 The Bhāshya has declared that "in the aphorisms all words are to be taken in their ordinary acceptation"—hereby laying down an affirmative rule; and again it says—"Of these, new meanings are not to be created by unnecessarily importing words into the Text"—a negative rule. Here the pronoun "these" referring to the principal noun of the preceding sentence—which is "words,"—the negative rule would also come to be applied to the case of "words." And the present Karika serves to guard us against such—misinterpretation.

30 Because words are always complete in themselves, and have the same fixed unchangeable order of letters.

81 "Eva"-occurring after वेद्वाक्यानि in the Bhashya.

When the Vedic passages have been explained, little will be left that will require to be explained. "The repetition"—this gives the sense of the Bhashya-passage



explanation of the same words as occurring in the Sutra and in the Veda) would involve needless effort. If it be urged that 'anything being well-known does not require to be explained,' (we reply) this is no fault in human speech.

32. "He who requires the "supplying of ellipsis" and "technical uses"—thinking these to be part and parcel of interpretation,—for such a one this is declared as a command."

33. (2) "In the commentaries of some people we find the inversion of the ordinary meanings of words; and this (Bhāshya passage) is a censure (or refutation) of these:

34. "Athātah is not ordinarily used in the sense of sequence; as such interpretation thereof can only be possible as a technicality.

35. "The neglect of the accepted (uses of) words, and their assumed application to unknown ones—should not be had recourse to by the commentator, when the ordinary accepted use is possible.

36. "Because, for one who is thus perplexed in (the finding out) of the meaning of the aphorism, the ascertainment of the meaning of the Veda would be very distant (far more difficult); which would lead to (the necessity of) extreme heaviness of effort both on the part of the speaker and the hearer."

37. (3) "He will not explain the Sutras, being engaged in the interpretation of the 'Injunction,' (the Veda)." It is the refutation of this interpretation (of the opening sentence of the Bhāshya) that is declared by this 'Disavowal.'

38. "Efforts should be directed towards Vedic passages; what is the

beginning with "ITELT:" If the explanation once given in connection with the Vedic passage be repeated with regard to the Sutra, it would be useless. The objection noted in the karika is based on the opening sentence of the Bhāsnya. "If all the words are used in a sense well-known to the people, there should be no need of an explanation of the Sutra or sentence in which such word occur." The reply that is given means that the fact of words being used in their well-known sense is no fault—nay, it is an ornament—of human speech.

84 The Ehashya passage in question.

28 With this commences the treatment of the second interpretation-" Censure."

"Some people"-e. g., Bhavadāsa and others.

"This"—The Bhashya passage in question.

84 This karika explains the Bhāshya as implying the refutation referred to. Bhavadāsa has explained "Athātah" as signifying sequence.

With this begins the 3rd interpretation—"Disavowal." The Bhashya mentions the aphorism, and then takes a passage from the Veda, and begins to explain it. So with regard to this procedure, there may be three views—"That he omits the Sutra

(1) because they are meaningless, or (2) because he did not know their meaning, or (3) because they were unexplainable." And it is for setting aside such doubts that the Bhashya has the opening sentences in question.

"Injunction" = Veda.

18 Gives the reasons for such "Disavowal." The Vedic passages are useful inasmuch

good of any such towards the aphorisms?—on account of their fruitfulness and fruitlessness (respectively).

38-39. "By these—as the means—, the meaning of *Injunctions* is to be explained; not both, because of the extreme heaviness of effort.

39-40. "The meanings of words being well-known, nothing is left to be explained. The Bhāshya passage beginning with 'Evam' is rightly explained only in accordance with this view."

40-41. It is only on account of the absence of the breaking up of words, that there is an idea of "Disavowal." Because the Bhāshya does explain the meaning of the Sutra, and it even explains Redundancy, &c.—e.g. "This aphorism is not able to signify, &c.," and "The aphorism is quite proper," &c., &c.

42. And the Bhāshya also speaks of non-suggestiveness, &c., with regard to the aphorisms—all these become self-contradictory, if the "Disavowal" Theory is accepted.

42-43. Nor can one, not knowing the meaning of the means, be sure of the consequence,—from any other source; because even those versed in the Vedas require the aphorisms and their commentaries.

43-44. As the ground of 'Disavowal,' has been urged the well-known

as they are the means of the right notion of Duty; and as such any effort towards the interpretation of these is useful; while on the other hand, the aphorisms are useless, and as such any effort directed towards explaining these would be equally devoid of any results.

88.39 "These"—the Sutras.

"Not both "-i.e., not the meaning of the Injunctions and also of the Sutra.

39.40 All the words in the Sutra being used in their ordinary senses, there is nothing left therein to be explained by the commentator, and it is only when we take the Bhūshya passage to repudiate all attempt at the interpretation of the Sutra, that we can rightly construe the passage beginning with "Evam."

40.41 People have accepted the "Disavowal" theory only because they do not find, in the Bhāshya, any breaking up of the compound words, &c., of the Sutra; which leads them to think that the Bhāshya has entirely left off the explanation of the Sutra. With this begins the 4th interpretation—" Specification." Because, &c.—The Bhāshya does not only explain the meaning of the Sutras; it even goes farther: it explains redundancies and supplies whatever is wanting in them to enable them to give the proper sense. "This aphorism is not able, &c."—this occurs in the Bhāshya on p. 5 (I-i-2), where after having urged that something is wanting in the Sutra, the Bhāshya explains away the objection by interpreting the Sutra in such a way as to enable it, just as it stands, to afford the right sense.

"The aphorism is quite proper, &c." This occurs at the close of the Bhashya on II-i-47, where after having urged the redundancy of the second half of the Sutra, the Bhashya explains the necessity of it.

42 Refers to Bhashya on II-iii-16; where such an objection is brought against the Sutra and refuted.

42.48 The means of ascertaining the sense of the Veda, is the Sutra; and without a knowlege of the means, there can be none of the consequence; hence the Sutras must be explained;—specially as the meaning of the Veda can be got at from no other source.





character of the meanings of words; but this would apply equally to Vedic sentences, and as such, would preclude even these from explanation.

44-45. If it be urged that 'it is owing to doubts with regard to their meaning that we have recourse to the explanation of Vedic passages'—that too would apply equally in the case of the Sutra; and 'Disavowal' would be improper.

45-46. 'Disavowal' would be perfect only in the form "it is not to be explained." (But) since it is only faulty interpretation that is prohibited,

those free from them (faults) do not become precluded.

46-47. (4) This view (Disavowal) being opposed to all direct fact, and the former two ("Universal Explanation" and "Censure") being insignificant, and the middle view (Censure) also implying evil intentions,— "Specification" alone is appropriate.

47-49. Where Vedic sentences and those of Jaimini, contradict one another, in their direct signification, there this ('Specification') has its use: The Sutra has to be interpreted by means of "supplying the ellipsis," &c., whereas the Vedic sentence has to be taken in its direct signification.

49. When Vedic sentences contradict one another, then may second-

ary implications be applied to them also.

49-50. "Just as the Vedic sentence is the means of the right notion of Duty, so is also Jaimini's assertion our means of ascertaining the meaning of the Veda.

50-51. "On account of the similarity of the power of the sentence, as also of words and their meanings,—it is only the interpretation free from ellipsis, &c., that is everywhere proper."

51-52. Thus the unlawful assumptions, that would be necessary on account of impossibility consequent upon the contradiction of one or the other, would become optional.

45.46 The author of the Bhāshya, if he had any such Disavowal in view, would have clearly said: "The Sutras are not to be explained." But we find him clearly prohibiting only such explanations as have recourse to supplying the ellipsis, &c., &c.; and this distinctly shows that by the opening sentences he only wished to set aside such interpretations of the Sutras.

46.47 The theory of 'Disavowal' is opposed to facts as we actually find the Bhashya frequently explaining the Sutras.

"Is appropriate:" because it precludes all mistaken interpretation of the Vedic passages, and as such has grand results.

⁴⁹ In Sutra III-iii-2, we find the Bhishya having recourse to other methods of interpretation than the direct one, in explaining the Vedic sentences. And in order to meet such cases, it is here urged that the reason of so doing was not the contradiction of the Vedic passage with the Sutra, but that of two Vedic passages themselves; and as such, the secondary implication is not unlawful.

50.51 "Everywhere," i.e., both the Veda and the Sutra being equally important,

both are to be interpreted, without having recourse to ellipsis, &c., &c.

51.5% "Unlawful, &c."—interpretation other than the direct. "Optional"—There being no difference between the importance of the Vedic passage and the Sutra, the





52-53. On account of their prior functioning, as being the means (of the ascertainment of the meaning of the Veda), people might set aside the rightful Injunction, on the strength of the Sutra, taken in its direct denotation.

53-54. Hence, what is meant is "Whenever the non-contradiction of the Veda is possible." The rest is to be explained as it stands.

54. 'Of the remnants there should be disappearance'—here we have an instance of interpretation by supplying from without.

55. In the Sūtra "Viprakarshāt paçoçca" there is a modification of the affix. In "Lokā Sanniyamāt" there is intervention of a word.

secondary interpretation, that would be necessitated by their mutual contradiction might be applied in the case of either of the two—there being no reason for applying it exclusively to one or the other—both being equally important, on account of reasons just given.

the acceptance of the direct denotation, and the avoidance of ellipsis. &c., are to be had recourse to, only when such procedure does not contradict the "Veda" and Reason. The affirmative assertion—"Indirect interpretation is to be had recourse to, when it does not go against the Veda"—is to be construed into a negative one: "Such interpretation is not to be followed when it goes against the Veda"—and thus it becomes an instance of "Specification."

54 The author now cites instances where the Bhāshya has recourse to indirect interpretation, &c. In connection with the "Darça" and "Paurnamāsa," sacrifices, a question is raised as to what is to be done if the materials that are to be offered, become spoilt; and the Aphorism (VI-iv-12) answers it by laying down the necessity of preparing fresh materials. This with regard to the principal libations; with regard to the secondary ones, the aphorism says—"Api vā çēshabhājām syāt,"—in connection with which a doubt arises as to the nominative of the verb "Syāt;" and the Bhāshya supplies the work "Disappearance;" and supports this interpretation with arguments.

55 In the "Jyotishtoma" sacrifice on the day of the "Sutya" ceremony, the sacrificial animal, as well as the cakes, have to be purified. Hence with a view to apply the procedure, laid down with regard to the animal, to the case of the cakes, it is found desirable to have an Injunction to this effect; and with this view, we have the Aphorism "Pacocca viprakarshastantramadhyê vidhanat,"-in which the predicate is "Tantramadhyē vidhānam," and the reason "Viprakarshāt,"—the meaning being "on account of the remoteness of the mention of the animal, there should be a mention of the cakes in the procedure," the nominative case-ending of "Viprakarshah" being changed into the Causal Ablative, and the Ablative in "Vidhanat" into the Predicative Nominative. It may be urged that the Vedic sentence, like any ordinary sentence, is of human origin; and to meet this, we have the Aphorism-" Loke sanniyamat prayogah sannikarshah syāt" (I-i-26), where the connection is interrupted by the word "Sanniyamāt,"the meaning of the Apherism being "in the ordinary world, a word is used with regard to a certain object only, when there is some sort of intercourse between the object and one of the sense-organs; and thus all Speech functions under the restraint of sense-perception. On the other hand, there can be no such sense-contact, and the consequent restraint, with regard to Vedic objects, which are all, more or less, supersensuous. This Sutra can also be accepted as an instance of "Affix-modification," "Sannikarshah" being interpreted as "Sannikarshat."





56. There is intervention of the Sütra in the case of the vomiting of the Söma drunk (at the sacrifice). And in the case of the injunction referring to animal in general, the Sütra itself has been changed.

57. "Agnayaçca Svakālatwāt" and "Dēyadharmāvapātanam" have

been explained by a split of the sentence.

57-58. And the following are the instances of secondary signification:

66 A question is raised as to the "Acwapratigraha" sacrifice being necessary in the case of the acceptance of the gift of a horse in the world also, or only during the performance of a Vedic ceremony. The Aphorism (III-iv-28) lays down the wrong view, which is subsequently set aside by the Aphorism, III-iv-29. Then comes the question of offering the "Somaindra" cake, in the case of the sacrificer vemiting out the Soma-juice that he may have drank; and with regard to this a doubt arises as to whether such offering is to be made when one throws out the juice ordinarily, or only when it is thrown out at a sacrifice. This doubt is set aside by the Aphorism, III iv-32, where the word "tadvat" is made to refer to the case of "ordinary drinking," other than the sacrificial, which was mentioned in Aphorism III-iv-28, which is separated by no less than three Sutras, from the present Aphorism. Again, with regard to the Injunction of the qualifications of the animals to be sacrificed at the "Jyotishtoma," a question arises as to whether the Injunction refers to all the three animals, or to only one or two of them. And in reply, we have the Aphorism III-vi-18, which clearly applies the Injunction to all three equally. But finding this view to be inconsistent with III-vi-19, -which applies the Injunction to one animal only-in order to remove this inconsistency, the Bhashya holds the Injunction to apply to one -the "Savaniya" animal; and accordingly modifies the former Aphorism, interpreting it as-" The Injunction would have referred equally to all the three animals, had there been no difference of context; but in the present case, we have a difference of context; therefore the Injunction refers to the Savaniya animal only."

57 The former is part of III-vii-39; the latter refers to IX-iv-43.

57.58 (1) Though the word "Autpattika" means "belonging to the origin," yet, through Indication, it is explained as "Natural." (2) In the Aphorism "Gavyasya cha tadadishu," though the word "gavya" means either something that is produced from the cow, or the limbs of the cow, -yet, on account of the Arthavada passage "Gavo va ëtat. Satramasata "-which implies mere relation to the cow, the word "gavya" comes to be explained as the "path traversed by the cow." (3) Having raised the question whether all the Rik verses are to be introduced or not,—the reply is that only those are to be introduced in the middle, that are named the "Dhayya" Rik, while fresh ones presenting themselves are to be put in at the end; and the names of these latter are given as the "Ushnik" and "Kakubh." Then again, there is an Arthavada passage to the effect that the Ushnik and Kakubh 'are subsidiary to the Trishtup; hence,' in accordwith the Law of Indication, that the cause is mentioned by the effect, the word "Ushnikkakubhau" is made to indicate their parent, the Trishtup. (4) In this Sutra, the word "Abhyudaya" is made to indicate the "Dwadasaha" sacrifice, which is a means of "Abhyudaya" (prosperity). The meaning of the Sutra thus comes to be "Since in the Dwadashaha sacrifice we find particular names given to the different sacrificers-such as the Halfers, Quarterers, Thirders", -therefore the principal distribution of the gift is to be made in accordance with those names, and not equally to all sacrificers, or in accordance with the work done by each; that is to say, not considering the work that each may have done, the Halfer should get half, the Thirder the third part, and so on.



- (1) "Autpattikastu" (Aph. I-i-5), (2) "Gavyasya" (Aph. VIII-i-18),
- (3) "Ushnikkakubhah" (V-iii-6), (4) "Darçānācea viçeshasya tathābhyudayē" (See Note).
- 59. Or, the passage beginning with "loke" may be taken as signifying the praise of the author of the aphorisms: in explaining by means of well-known words, the disciples were not troubled by him.
- 60. "Bhavitavyantu tēna"—all before this taken as one sentence, or taking all before the passage containing the word "Vedādhyayanam"—we have the objections to the use of the word "Atha."
- 61. The ascertainment of the meaning of the Veda is only possible by means of the Sūtras consisting of words of known meanings; but the meaning of the word 'Atha' cannot be said to be well-known unless you postulate a certain foregone action.
- 62. It is only a word with well-known meanings that is proper to use; but such is not the case (with the word "Atha" as used here)—such is the objection. And again if the meaning of the words "Atha, &c.," be well-known, why should they be explained now?
- 63. 'It (such explanation) is simply for the purpose of showing (what the word means)'—say some.
- 63-64. Out of a composite of various signification—assumed by Bhavadāsa—, some people explain the meaning as belonging directly to only a portion thereof, as in the case of the beginning of the Eighth Adhyāya.
- 64. (Others again say): "Here we cannot have an explanation of the Veda, as such explanation has been censured as useless effort."
 - 65. Or again, it may only be an objection (against the use of the
 - 59 With this begins the 5th Interpretation-"Praise."
- 60 With this begins the 6th Interpretation—"objection to the use of the word
 - 61 This explains the meaning of the Bhashya, ending with "Bhavitavyantu tena."
- 62 With "and again" begins the consideration of the Bhashya beginning with "tatra loke, &c."
- 68-61 Bhavadāsa has taken "Athātah" as a composite word, and has explained it as denoting "sequence;" but the commentators on the Bhāshya explain the Bhāshya—where it dilates upon the meaning of the word "Atha"—as attributing the denotation of sequence to the word "Atha" alone, and not to "Atha" and "Atah" as forming a composite word. A similar explanation of the word "Atha" by itself, as signifying sequence, is given, in the first Aphorism of the Eighth Adhyāya.
- tion of both the Veda and the Sutra would be a useless effort; and in the present case we don't find an explanation of any Vedic passage; hence if the Sutra too were left unexplained, there would be no purpose served by the Bhāshya. Consequently we have here an explanation of each member of the Sutra.
- 65 The passage "Tatra loke, &c.," objects to the acceptance of the ordinary meaning of the word "Atha," on account of the impossibility of the sense of sequence, in the absence of any preceding event. And after such an objection has been raised, it is only proper that the signification of the word "Atha" should be fully dilated upon.



word 'Atha') as explained before (signifying sequence); because there is no event preceding it.

65-66. "If a word is always to be taken in its well-known sense, such cannot be said to be the case with the word 'atha'; and therefore—there must be a supplying of ellipsis (and other modes of secondary interpretation)."

66-67. "The accomplishment of the study of the Veda, and the mention of the high character of the 'Bath' are not recognised without a full comprehension of the meaning of the word 'Atha'; hence has this latter been explained."

67-68. If the word were without meaning, or if it had some other far-fetched meaning, the ordinarily known signification would certainly be set aside; therefore for the sake of the accomplishment of the direct meaning, a certain foregoing event has to be assumed;—the knowledge of the specified 'mark' (middle term) leading to the comprehension of the specified 'subject' (major term).

69. Others have thought it impossible to obtain such a meaning from the Sutra alone, and have therefore said "It is not so."

69-70. By the declaration of sequence, as also by the fact of its having

65-66 This gives the meaning of the objection as raised in the Bhashya.

66.67 Some annotators explain the Bhashva thus: This explanation of the word 'Atha' is not with a view to explain this word alone; but what is meant is that when there is an explanation of the word 'Atha,'—in the course of such an explanation, we would, by means of questions and answers, come to speak of the accomplishment of Vedic study, and the excellence of the concluding "Bath." If we left off the explanation of the word, the mention of these facts would appear irrelevent.

67.68 [In the first five methods of interpretting the opening sentence of the Bhāshya, the sentence up to "Prayatnagauravam prasajyēta" is taken as a single sentence; and the sentence "tatra loke, &c.," is taken as embodying the objection to the use of the word "Atha," The two limits of this latter sentence are to be taken as before (in Karika 60). We have explained the sentence beginning with "Bhavitavyam," as construed together with the foregoing sentence of the objection-passages. But if we accept the first limit,-taking all the sentences, from the beginning, down to "Bhavitavyam," as forming a single compound sentence-, then we have to take the sentence "Bhavitavyam, &c.," as supplying an answer to the objection raised. And it is this explanation that is given in the present Karika.] If the word "Atha" had any other meaning than that of sequence, then we would be going against its direct denotative signification. So, for the sake of this latter, we have to assume some preceding event; and such an event is the "study of the Veda." If "Bhavitavyam, &c.," be taken as forming part of the objection-passage, then the reply would consist of the sentence "tattu bodhyam, &c." The cognition of the "desire to know Duty" leads to the comprehension of Vedic study; the argument having the form-"Because there is a desire to know Duty, therefore there must have been a study of the Veda, preceding such desire."

69 This introduces the Bhashya-" Naitadevam, anyasyapi, &c."

69.70 The aphorism itself declares sequence; and it has a visible end, in the shape of the desire to know Duty; hence the "study of the Veda" must be taken as implied



a visible end, a study of the Vedas is implied; hence, why should there be the objection that it (study of the Veda) is not directly mentioned in the Sūtra?

70-71. That particular event without which the 'desire of knowing' is not possible, is the one, sequence to which is assumed to be the aforesaid visible end.

71-72. Any active "desire to know" would always follow upon something or other; and as such the declaration of such something in general (without any specification) is entirely useless.

72-73. Though it is true that without previous determination (Sankalpa) the desire is not accomplished,—yet this too being common (to all actions), does not need any special treatment.

73-74. Therefore it is an accomplished specific cause of the 'desire to know Duty,' which is meant by the author of the Sūtra; and this can be no other than Study.

74-75. "A study of the Veda having been precluded by the sentence 'Anyasyāpi, &c.' (in the Bhāshya), it is not proper to add 'Prāgapi, &c.,' as even there 'something else' is possible."

75. "The desired meaning having been got at, by means of the foregoing (sentences), what is the use of the passage 'Tadricintu, &c.'"?

76-78. It is only by over-looking what is to be described later on, that such an objection can be raised; for it is not yet proved that

by the aphorism itself; and it is not right to urge that such study is not mentioned in the aphorism.

71-72 The aphorism denotes sequence; but sequence in general need not have been declared; because, as a rule, anything that is done necessarily follows something else. So by declaring sequence the Aphorism must refer to sequence to something particular and this can be no nothing else but the "study of the Veda."

13-13 This Kārikā anticipates the following objection: "Determination is always found to have a visible effect; therefore why should we not accept sequence to such determination"? The sense of the reply is that determination is a common factor in all actions, and as such no special mention of this is necessary.

74.75 The Bhashya is thus: "It is not so; because the desire to know Duty may follow from other actions, even before the study of the Veda"; and the present Kārikā means that the first half of the sentence having already precladed Vedic study, there was no need of adding the words "even before, &c."; because even before such study, all that is possible as preceding the desire to know Duty, is something other than the study of the Veda; and this has already been pointed out in the first half of the sentence.

76 The sentence "tasmin hi sati sa'vakalpyatē" implies the necessity of Vedic study; as without this, no "desire to know Duty" is possible. And the passage in question too refers only to such Vedic study, as one without which the desire is not possible.

76-78 As Jaimini has only mentioned "Duty," it cannot yet be known that he is going to prove the Veda alone as the means of knowing Duty, or that he is going to explain only Vedic passages. Hence, so long as we have not learnt these facts, we can very reasonably urge that "bowing to Chaitya" is also a Duty; and as such, a desire



"Injunction" is the means of knowing Duty; (nor is it yet known) what sentences Jaimini will explain. As it is only "Duty" that has been mentioned up to this time, a desire to know it might follow also upon a study of the assertions of Buddha and others; -and this is what is referred to by the passage "Anyasyāpi, &c."

78-82. Or, the aphorism may be read as "Having studied the Vedas, the investigation should follow immediately." Then too the two intended implications would be: "not without having studied," and "not after doing something else"; but such implication cannot be got at (in a single sentence), because of the chance of syntactical split, consequent upon the duplicate construction, noticed hereafter. If the injunction simply said "after having studied," then the investigation of Duty might follow after the "Bath"; for in such a case, there would be no injunction of "immediate sequence." If however it be said to be an injunction of "immediate sequence," then the investigation following upon Vedic study might be made the subject, (and thus the immediate sequence being referred thereto), we land upon the possibility of an investigation even prior to Study.

82. The passage "Tādriçīn, &c.," specially serves to preclude the

study of the sayings of Buddha, &c.

83-84. The study of the Veda being arrived at, through the implication of the objection "Pragapi, &c.," the denotation of neither of the two aforesaid sentences can be the object of Injunction. This is what is meant by the Bhashya, beginning with "api ca."

84. What is enjoined is explained in the passage beginning with

"kintu"?

Some people construe the passage "Parastaccanantaryam" (by supplying into it words from without), -as "nor do we lay down its

to know Duty may also be taken as following after a study of the Scriptures of the Enddhists and other Atheistic sects; and that such desire is not preceded necessarily by a study of the Veda alone.

78_88 "Noticed hereafter"--in the Bhashya passage: "Vedanadhityetyekasyam

vidhīyatē anūdyāntaryam, viparītamanyasyām."

83.84 The investigation into the meaning of Vedic sentences is not possible for one who has not studied the Veda. Therefore the study of Veda being proved to be necessary, through the implication of the objection,-even if we have the Injunction in the form "only after Vedic study, &c.,"-the objections to this, arged above, cease to apply to the present case. "Bhāshya"-the passage referred to is: "api cha naiva vädädhyayanät pärvam.....arthaikatwäccaikaväkyatēm valeshyati."

84 Beginning with "Kintu" and ending with "upadēçāt,"—the sense of which passage is that the aphorism serves to preclude the "Bath" (enjoined in the Smritis),

which implies the end of one's residence with his Teacher.

84-86 In accordance with this view, the whole sentence has to be construed thus: We do not prohibit investigation into the nature of Duty prior to Vedic study; nor do we lay stress upon its immediate sequence to it.

"Because of the fact of the aphorism, &c.,"-because the aphorism refers to the preclusion of the cessation of one's residence with his Teacher. "Because of such being,



immediate sequence." They construe thus, because of the fact of the aphorism referring to another subject: (Investigation) is not prohibited before Study, nor is its immediate sequence enjoined, because this is accomplished by the power (of Study itself), and also on account of the necessity, in that case, of postulating an unseen effect. Therefore we cannot but have recourse to indirect signification (Indication).

86-87. (But) here (in the Bhāshya) the theory of immediate

sequence appears to have been accepted.

And it is without renouncing the direct meaning, that the indicated

meaning has to be accepted.

87-88. The investigation of Duty, being understood to follow closely upon Vedic study,—thus occupying a particular point of time—would imply the negation of "Bath" (at that time).

88-89. There being a contradiction in the simultaneity of both (Bath and Investigation occurring immediately after Study), there is a weakness in the claim of "Bath," on account of its occurrence at that time being

&c."—The form of the Injunction cannot be that "investigation should follow necessarily after study"; because this is implied in the very power of study itself, without which naturally, no investigation is possible. Again immediate sequence cannot be the object of the Injunction; because the investigation could be as well carried on, even after the lapse of a certain number of years after Vedic study; therefore no palpable end is served by enjoining immediate sequence. Therefore in this case we would have to postulate an invisible result, which is not allowable in a treatise based upon Reason; specially in a case where such assumption is easily avoidable. For these reasons, we must have recourse to an indirect method of interpretting the Sütra, through Indication; whereby we get at the meaning just noted.

87 Taking the aphorism to indicate the preclasion of the cessation of one's residence with his Teacher, we are to give up the direct meaning entirely; but, at the

same time, we should base the indicated meaning upon it.

87.83 "Bath" and "Investigation" are mutual contradictories; because by "Bath" here is meant the giving up of the habits of the religious student; consequently, after the Bath, there could be no longer residence with one's Teacher (which is also necessary for the religious student). But such departure from the Teacher's house would militate against a proper investigation into the nature of Duty, which needs the help of the Teacher. Hence when this investigation is understood as following immediately

after study, it naturally precludes its contradictory, "Bath."

88.89 "Opposed to the Veda"—The study of the Veda is for the purpose of knowing its meaning; so, if after mere repetition of the Veda the student were to go away from his Teacher after the ceremonial "Bath," then the whole Veda would become useless to him. Bays the Bhāshya: "Vedamarthavantam prayojanavantam santamanarthakamavakalpayēma." The immediate sequence of Investigation to Study has thus been proved by the opposition of "Bath" to the Veda. But the Bhāshya also makes an effort to reconcile the two Injunctions: "Nacādhītavēdasya, &c." The sense of the Bhāshya is that the Cruti merely enjoins the "Bath" as to be performed after Study—a mere ordinary sequence; and if nothing more important intervenes, it may be performed immediately after the Study. But such immediate sequence of the Bath is precluded by its opposition to the Veda; though still there is no contradiction of the Cruti injunction—which implies mere sequence.

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opposed to the Veda; and consequently this (Bath) would be superseded by 'Investigation' through its superior strength (support of the Veda).

89.90. The passage containing the expression "drishtarthatvat," and the one beginning with "lakshanayā tu" (occurring in the Bhāshya) are left off by some (Commentators), as they think them to be a mere repetition and hence meaningless. (Lit., on account of the fact of its meaning having been already arrived at by other sentences).

90-91. To these we reply: Though "immediate sequence" may doubtless be said to be expressed by the "Ktwā" affix yet, on account of non-contradiction, this affix, may be taken as indicating mere "precedence."

91-92. If one performed the "Bath" immediately after having got up the mere text of the Veda, it would be contrary (to the fact of the Study having a visible end). But if we explain the word "Adhyayana" as "Adhigama" (comprehension,—deriving it from the root 'ina,'--to go), then the contradiction ceases.

92-93. One who, having explained non-contradiction in this manner, would assert the necessity of the Bath, for the sake of a certain unseen result, or as a purificatory rite;—to him we make the following reply:


93-95. In this connection, the Injunction laying down the various restraints—"not-bathing" and the rest—for the religious student, not having laid down a limit to these,—these stand in need of an injunction laying down their end; and hence on account of this requirement, "Bath" must mean the cessation of "not-bathing and the rest"—which would thus come to be indicated by means of 'contradiction' and 'accompaniment,' for the sake of a visible purpose.

89.90 The two passages referred to are: (1) "Drishtārthatā cādhyayanasyānantaryē vyāhanyēta," (2) "Lakshanayā twēsho'rthah syāt." The sense of these commentators is that the former is a mere repitition of what has been asserted in the passage: "Drishto hi tasyārthah, &c.," and the latter is meaningless.

90.91 It has been declared in the preceding portion of the Bhashya that the affix 'Ktva' does not signify immediate sequence. Still we grant that it has such signification in the present instance; even then the fact of Study having a visible purpose, in the shape of the comprehension of the meaning of the Veda, would be contradicted. Hence, in order to avoid this contradiction, we ought to interpret the affix 'Ktva,' per Indication, as implying mere precedence.

92.93 Explaining "Bath," not as the ceremony closing the period of one's residence with the Teacher, but only as a particular religious rite, bringing about certain invisible results, like ordinary sacrifices.

93_95 What is wanted here is the end of restraints put upon the religious student, and not mere 'bathing.' Therefore the word "Bath" in the said Injunction must be taken to mean the cessation of its contradictory,—"non-bathing," as also the other restraints and duties imposed upon the religious student. Thus then the finishing of the Veda becomes the limit of these restraints; and consequently all other duties being only subsidiary to Study, the end of this latter would reasonably put an end to such duties also.





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95-96. Thus then of the words—signifying respectively 'Study,' Bath' and 'the order of sequence of the Investigation'—the above interpretations have to be accepted, for the sake of a visible purpose.

96-97. (Obj.): "If one were to carry on the investigation after the Bath, he would not be contradicting the Veda; and thus the contradiction (you have urged) ceases." To one who thus objects, we make the

following reply:

97-99. Just as the Smriti lays down the 'Bath' to follow immediately after 'Study,' so also (does it lay down) another action, to follow after that (bathing), and another one after this last, (and so on). Thus then as it would be absolutely necessary (for the sake of Investigation) to set aside something that has been enjoined by the Smriti, it is only reasonable that we should set aside 'Bath' as it is the first to come up at the time, and as such the fittest for being set aside.

99-100. Thus it is understood that the order of sequence based upon words, is set aside by the exigencies of the meaning. Or there being a contradiction between the primary and the secondary, it is the secondary

that is to be set aside.

96.96 (1) The word, signifying study, in the injunction: "The Veda should be studied," has been explained as implying the "Comprehending of the meaning. (2) In the Injunction "After study one should bathe," the word "Bathe" has been explained as implying the 'cessation of non-bathing and the other habits of the religious student.'
(3) The word "Atha" has been explained as implying the prohibition of one's removal from the Teacher's house. All these interpretations have been accepted simply on

the ground of their leading to visible ends.

97-99 In Smritis, we have such injunctions as—"one should take a wife, after having bathed," and "when one has thus become a Householder, he should perform the Agnihotra,"—and so on, one after the other, leaving no time unoccupied, which could serve for an Investigation into Duty, after the "Bath." Hence in order to carry on the Investigation, which is distinctly laid down in the Veda, it is absolutely necessary that we should set aside at least one action enjoined in the above Smritis. And as the fittest time for investigation is just after the Study, we naturally seek to set aside that which the Smriti has laid down as following immediately after the study; and this is no other than the "Bath." Again it is only the learned that are entitled to the performance of sacrifices; and as no one can be said to be learned unless he has fully mastered the nature of Duty, it becomes incumbent on us to have finished the investigation into Duty, as also all other branches of learning, before the taking up of the house-holder's life and its attendant duties.

99.100 The immediate sequence of "Bath" to Study—which is laid down in the sentence "having studied, one should bathe"—is set aside by the immediate sequence of the Investigation, which is implied by the fact of its arising directly out of the Study itself. That the order based upon words is set aside by that based upon the sense will

be explained in the 5th Adhyaya.

"Order" is the secondary factor in the meaning of words; hence if we accept the order based upon words, we set aside 'study' (which has been explained as the comprehension of the meaning of the Veda), and which being the direct signification, is the primary factor of the word. Hence we must reject the order based upon mere word, and consequently set aside the immediate sequence of "Bath."



100-101. By 'Bath' here is meant the 'return from the Teacher's house'; (and it is this latter which) would be set aside, as being opposed (to Study and Investigation), and not the tasting of Honey (or Wine), &c.

101-102. Thus then we understand the Injunction to mean that "Residing in the house of the Teacher, but not abstaining from 'honey, meat, &c.' (because these are not opposed to the desired Investigation), one is to investigate Duty."

102-103. And so long as the (final) return from the Teacher's House is not accomplished, there is no 'Bath;' because (the Bath) means (the cessation of) all (the habits of the religious student, including residence

at the Teacher's House).

103-104. And so long as one has not finally relinquished the Teacher's House, he is not called a 'Snātaka'; and so long too there can be no marriage; because marriage has been laid down only for the Snātaka.

104. The Smriti "one is to bathe (after study)" has been quoted

(in the Bhāshya) after having been explained.

105. And though the sentence "Mā samāvartishta" (do not go away from the Teacher's House) occurs (in the Bhāshya), immediately after the quotation of the above Smriti injunction,—yet as this is contrary to the Smriti, it is to be taken apart from that passage (Smriti).

106. The preclusion (of Bath), that has been explained to be due to (implied by) the word "Atha," is here (in the Bhāshya passage in question) shown to have a definite visible end (and it is not for an unseen

super-physical result).

107. The non-abstinence from meat, honey, &c., on this occasion (end of study) has been indicated by the Smriti; and as such it would not look well for the author of the aphorisms to be prohibiting these (meat, &c.),

for the sake of an unseen result only.

108. Though after having once returned from the Teacher's House (thus following the dictum of the Smriti directly), one could go there again, for the purpose of investigation;—yet, this too (the former Return) could be (only explained as being) for the sake of an unseen result. Hence this explanation has not been touched upon here (in the Bhāshya).

109. For one who has had his ends fulfilled, the Return from the Teacher's House is seen to have a perceptible result, and so has it been declared in the Smriti. And there could be no purpose in the Return of one who has not yet had his ends fulfilled (i.e., one who has not yet finished all that he had to do at the Teacher's House).

104 That is to say the meaning of the Bhashya is that such alone can be the meaning of the Smriti Injunction.

^{107 &}quot;Unseen result"—Because, not being opposed to the investigation of Duty, abstinence therefrom could not have any visible end,—the only good being the unseen result proceeding from such abstinence.



- 110. "The fact of Vedic study being the cause (of investigation) having been established by the word 'Atha,' which signifies 'immediate sequence,'—what is the use of the word 'Atah'?
- 111. Though the word "Atha" has signified appropriateness (of investigation after Vedic study), yet without the word "Atah," there could be no knowledge of the fact that "that (Vedic study) alone is the cause."
- 112. In that case (in the absence of "Atah"), it (Vedic study) would become a qualification of the person; and for the cause of investigation, (we would have to postulate) some such thing as his desire for certain things, &c.

113. "Study" (as the only cause of investigation) may be regarded as implied by the word "Atah." Because if such cause were not mentioned, the word "Atha" might be taken simply as a benedictory word.

114. Or again, the word 'Atah' may be interpreted only as precluding the "Bath": because for one who has fitted himself (for investigation) by a study of the Veda, there can be no idle staying (in the Teacher's House.)

(Here ends the discussion of the signification of the words 'Atha' and 'Atah).'

115-117. The desire, signified by the affix 'San,' has for its object the knowledge which is nearest related to it (as occurring in the same word); so it belongs to the knowledge alone; and no injunction (or anything of the sort) is implied thereby. Of the root 'Ishi' (in Icchā) the object is the extraneous (as occurring in another word) 'Duty,' or 'that' (Knowledge), or both. The affix "tumun" signifies co-subjectivity (i.e., the fact of 'desire' and 'knowledge' having the same nominative); and the 'lin' (in Icchēt)

110 If "Anantaryopadēcitvāt" is taken with "atahçabdēna," then the latter half would mean—"what is the good of the word 'Atāh' signifying mere immediate sequence (which has already been indicated by the word 'Atha')"?

112 If we had no 'Atah,' the meaning of the Sūtra would be—"a person who has studied the Veda is entitled to the Investigation of Duty"; and as a cause of Investigation, we would have to postulate a desire for certain things, which could belong to a Cūdra also, who would thus become entitled to the Investigation, and thence to Vedie study, which can never be allowable.

116-117 The Bhāshya referred to in these Karikās is—"Dharmanjijnāsītumicehēta." "It belonge, &c."—i.e., the part of the word ending in the affix 'San' signifies only the desire for knowledge, and not any sort of injunction, &c. The desiderative affix 'San' has for its object 'knowledge'; and the root 'ishi' has for its object either 'Duty' or 'knowledge,' or both. So there is no repetition or redundancy in "jijnāsitumichchhēta."

"The second desire, &c., &c.,"—as an instance of Desire for Desire, we have, in ordinary experience, a longing for the desire for food, in the case of one who is afflicted by a want of appetite.





signifies injunction. Thus there being various objects (signified by the several words of the Bhāshya), there is no repetition in it.

The second desire in (icchēt) has been employed for the sake of the

accomplishment of the 'desire' mentioned in the aphorism.

118. (obj.). "Because in the case of (the sense of the Dative being) for the sake or purpose of (tādarthya), it is the effect (the modification) with the Dative ending that is compounded with its material cause, as in the case of 'Yūpadāru,'—therefore there can be no such compound in the present instance (as 'Dharmāya jijnāsā')."

119. (Rep.). The clause "Sā hi tasya" (in the Bhāshya) signifies the breaking up of the compound into "Dharmasya jijnāsā" (changing the Dative into the Genitive). And the mention of "Dharmaya" is only with a view to show that the Genitive is in the sense of "for the sake or

purpose of."

120. (obj.). "If the particular relation (of for the sake of) be meant to be implied, then the Dative alone (and not the Genitive) would be correct; and if, on the other hand, only a general relation be meant to be implied, then why should there be any mention of 'Tadarthya' (being for the sake of)"?

121. (Rep.). Though it is relation in general alone that is signified by the Genitive, yet it is the relation existing in a particular form that is

here meant to be implied by the Bhashya.

(Here ends the exposition of 'Dharmajijnāsā).'

122. The "semblance of means" will be found herein in the arguments used by the Pürvapakshi (the questioner or objector).

122-123. The means of one thing applied to the case of another constitutes what is called the "Semblance of Means,"—e.g., the mention of the means of sacrifices as pertaining to the ends of man (e.g., non-hearing of evil spoken of himself), and those of the latter as pertaining

Its In "Yūpadārn" we have the compound consisting of "Yūpāya dāruh"—the wood for the purpose of the post,—because the scood is the material cause of the post. In the case of "Dharmāya jijnāsā," on the other hand, there is no such relation of cause and effect; therefore it is not proper to break up the compound "Dharma-jijnāsā" in this manner.

121 We do not mean that the Genitive implies "tadarthya"; we take it to signify mere relation in general; but as such a relation, without any specification, would be impossible, the Bhashya specifies the relation as that of "tadarthya," by means of the

insertion of the Dative affix in "Dharmaya."

122.23 "Qëshalakshana"—To the question—"what is the definition of Duty"?—the Bhāshya replies by declaring that the definition is given in the second aphorism; and whatever remains undefined there, is explained by "Çëshalakshana,"—a word that occurs in the first aphorism of the Third Adhyāya; but there we do not find the explanation of all that we have yet to know about Duty. For this reason, the Vartika takes the word "Çëshalakshana" to mean the complete body of the aphorisms.

to the former. The word "Çēshalakshaṇa" (the remaining definition) refers to the complete treatise.

CLOKAVĀRTIKA.

124. "It is only what is known (to some people) that is capable of being known (by others); while what is already known is not desired, (to be known). (On the other hand) what is not known (to the people) being incapable of being known, (it would not be desired) all the more ";—therefore (with a view to meet this difficulty) the Bhäshya has thus declared:

125. Duty is to be enquired into, on account of doubts (with regard to it), and also because of its leading to bliss. A thing with regard to which there were no doubts, or which did not lead to a (desirable) end,

could never be enquired into.

126. In the matter of the form, &c., of Duty there are two questions (with regard to its) 'Pramāna' (the means of knowing it) and 'Rūpa' (its proper form); and by means of these two, these preliminary questions

are settled in this (1st) quarter (of the 1st Adhyaya).

127-28. Even when the Veda has been proved to be the only means of knowing Duty,—with regard to the ascertainment of the meaning of Vedic passages, there is no agreement among learned people (lit. 'people knowing many things'), on account of various (kinds of) doubts. Some say "this is the meaning,"—some: "not that, but this";—and it is also for the settlement of these (differences of opinion with regard to the meaning of Vedic passages) that the treatise, subsequent to this (1st Pāda), has been composed.

Thus ends Aphorism I of Adhyaya I, Pāda i.





APHORISM II.

"Duty is a purpose having Injunction for its sole authority (means of conceivability)" (I-i-2).

1. Duty in general having been established, its authority "Injunction" is now explained; thence are its form, etc., known; and in this aphorism, it is the form that is described.

2. Both are signified by a single aphorism, through direct signification and implication; the form of Daty having been mentioned (directly),

its authority comes to be signified by implication.

The affix becomes capable of Enjoining, only when supplied with all its requirements, in the shape of 'what' and the rest. Hence in this system the sentence which urges (to action) is called "Codana" (Injunction).

1 "Its proof of Injunction &c."-The declaration of Veda as the basis of Duty is in this form: 'Duty has the Veda for its authority,-the Veda alone is its authority,and the Veda is solely authoritative, it cannot be otherwise.'

"Form &c."-i.e., the form and the special features of Duty. The form is explained in the following manner: The declaration of the authority points to the "Agnihotra" &c., as forming part of the authority-the Veda, as positively representing "Duty." The particular feature is explained thus: The specification that Veda alone is the authority implies that the character of Duty belongs to "Agnihotra," &c. as forming part of the Veda, and not to the worshipping of the Caitya, &c.

% "Both"-i.e., the Form and the Basis. The form of Duty having been declared to be that which occurs in the Veda, this very fact implies that the Veda is the Basis or Authority of Duty. This Karika refers to the passage in the Bhashya, wherein it is declared that the two questions-"what is Duty-and what is its Basis"?-are

answered by the present aphorism.

3 " Codanéti kriyayah pravartakam vacanamāhuh,"--Bhāshya. In connection with this, a question is raised whether the "urging expression" is the Affix (the Potential Imperative), or the Root itself, or the whole sentence? The karika accepts the last alternative. In all Injunctions, we require the following three factors—(1) What?-i.e., what is to be accomplished; (2) By what?-i.e., by what means it is to be accomplished; and (3) How?-i.e., by what process it is to be accomplished. It is only when the Potential Imperative Affix is accompanied by all three that it is able to arge a person to action; but it is only by means of the complete sentence that the three requirements can be fulfilled. Hence the sentence is the one arging agent; and as such, it is named "Codana"-Injunction.





- 4. "That Injunction alone is the authority" and "Injunction is only authoritative"—both these facts having been ascertained with regard to Duty, (the author of the Bhāshya) thinks it to be wanting in something, and hence he has slightly touched upon reasons, with regard to the aforesaid facts.
- 5. Inasmuch as authoritative character is possible only to the Word, he has also pointed out the incapacity, with regard to such objects (as the past, etc.), of Sense-Perception and the rest, which is to be described hereafter.
- 6. Even with regard to purely non-existing objects, the Word brings about some conception. And consequently, in the absence of any discrepancy, authoritative character must be accepted to belong to it by its very nature.
- 7. The Bhāshya has explained the word "Codanā" as signifying "Word" alone; for no "Injunction" ever treats of the past &c.
- 8. So long as "Word" (in general) is not established by means of the preclusion of the operation of the senses and the rest,—how can there be any opportunity of (speaking of) a particular form of it?
- 9-10. (The word) "Lakshana" may signify either cause in general, or the instrumental cause, (of right notion). And as the instrumental cause (i.e., if we accept this alternative) has been mentioned, either the word or the conception of the word, or the meaning of the word, or the comprehension
- 4 "Codanā hi bhūtam bhavishyantam &c.nānyat kincanēndriyam."—Bhāshya. That Injunction alone, and nothing else, is sufficient authority—such being the sense of the aphorism, the Bhāshya quoted brings out arguments in support of this view; because a mero declaration of a theory was considered weak. These arguments are to be brought out in full detail in the following aphorisms.

7 The passage "bhātam bhavishyantam &c.," means that Codanā can also treat of such objects; but, as a matter of fact, no Codanā is ever found to be treating of

the past; hence "Codana" must be taken here as signifying "word."

When the authority of Sense-Perception, &c., has been set aside, we are to prove the applicability of a particular form of authority (means of right notion)—in the shape of the "Word"—with regard to past and future objects, &c. But as yet we cannot assert this of Injunction, which is only a particular form of "Word." And further, the assertion of applicability to past and future objects &c., refers to "Word" in general, and not to any particular form thereof. Thus then, the sense of the Bhāshya comes to be this: Injunction is the authority for Duty; because authoritative character belongs to the 'Word,' as it has the capacity of producing conceptions even with regard to such objects as the past, future, &c., and Injunction too is only a particular form of the Word; therefore it is only reasonable that this should be the sole authority for Duty, which is super-sensions.

9.10 The Instrumental cause is optional, depending upon the speaker's wish; hence the various alternatives of option are pointed out.

"If the preceding ones &c."—When either the Word, or its Conception, or it, Meaning, is accepted as the Instrumental Cause, then the result attained is the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence; and when this last is taken to be the causes then the result is in the shape of Acceptance or Rejection.



of the meaning of the sentence. When the preceding ones are the means of right notion, then the character of the result belongs to the last.

11. If the word "Lakshana" be taken as used in the sense of "conception," &c., then the mention of "Codana" would indicate its effect,

and also the effect of that effect.

12. If however (the word "Lakshana") be taken as used in the sense of cause in general, or in that of "Word" itself as the means (of right notion), then, in that case, the word "Codana" and "Lakshana" would be co-extensive in their direct signification.

13. Later on we shall prove that the character of 'Duty,' belongs to the Material, Action and Accessory (of the Sacrifice, collectively). And though these are amenable to Sense-perception, yet it is not in their

ordinary form, that the character of Duty belongs to them.

14. Because, of these, the capacity of bringing about auspicious results is cognised always through the Veda; and it is in this form (of being the means of auspicious results) that the character of Duty is said to belong to them. And as such Duty cannot be said to be amenable to Sense-perception.

15. The mention (in the Bhashya) of "Senses" is only a hint, in

It "Its effect"—i.e., Conception, the effect of the Word; and the effect of the Conception, in the shape of the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence. This karika supplies an answer to the following question: "If the word 'lakshana' be used in the sense of something other than the Word—i.e., in the sense of the Conception of the Word &c.,—how, then can it be co-extensive with 'Codana,' which signifies 'Word'?" The sense of the reply is that, in that case, 'Codana' may be explained as indirectly indicating— not the Word, but—its effects &c. &c., the aforesaid co-extensiveness being explained per Indication.

12 This explanation is in accordance with the view that the Sentence constitutes the 'Codana'—as declared in the Bhashya. As a matter of fact however, in all cases, the co-extensiveness is through direct denotation. For "Codana" has been explained as 'that whereby anything is conceived of;' and, in the same manner, we can explain "Codana" as 'that whereby a person is urged'; and this would come directly to mean "Conception," &c.; as has been pointed out elsewhere: "Codana is that word, by means of which one has the wish 'may I exert'; or it may be the notion which leads

to such exertion."

18 "Material," &c., will be described, as "Duty," in the Bhashya, beginning with "ya eva Greyaskarah," and these are certainly visible to the senses; as such, it is not proper to restrict "Duty" to Injunctions alone. But the fact is that it is not in

their perceptible forms that these have been described as "Duty."

only precludes the applicability of the senses; and hence it cannot be taken as restricting Duty to Codanā alone; because apart from Sense-perception, we have still got the agencies of Inference &c." The first solution of this difficulty is that the mention of senses" is only a hint; it includes all other agencies of knowledge—Inference and the rest. The second solution is that "nānyat kinca" may be construed with the preceding sentence,—the meaning, in that case, being that "objects, past, future, &c., can be comprehended by means of Codanā, and by nothing else."



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the manner of the author of the aphorisms. Or we may disjoin "Nanyat-kinea" from what follows,—the meaning of the passage thereby becoming generalised.

16. And in order to establish the incapacity (of all other Means of Knowledge), there is a mention of "Senses." Or "Kinca" may be taken by itself—as signifying a question as to the reason (of the previous assertion).

17. Though Inference has its applicability to objects enunciated above (i.e., past, &c.), yet without the comprehension of relation, Inference itself is not possible.

18. In the case of Duty, however, there is no comprehension of the relation of any mark with either the generic or the specific (forms of

Duty),-by which it could have been amenable to Inference.

19. "But the 'Word' too cannot function, without a comprehension of relation." Yes, (that is the case with) the term; but 'Duty' is denoted, not by the Term, but by a sentence.

20. The non-expressive character of the sentence, as also the fact of the meaning of a sentence being based upon the meanings of words in-

dependently of any relation, will be established later on.

21. "Inasmuch as the eternality, &c., of the Veda have not yet been fully established, the Bhāshya admits it to be non-eternal, and thence brings forward the inauthentic character of the Veda, as being due to the preclusion, in its case, of the authority of a speaker."

16 The Bhashya being explained as "nothing else is capable; why is it so? Because of the incapability of the senses,"—the incapability of the "senses" implying also that of Inference and the rest; as these too are based upon Sense-perception.

17 Inference can treat of objects, past, future, unseen, &c.; but still it depends upon the comprehension of a certain relation expressed in the Major Premiss, which

stands in need of sense agency.

18 We know of no mark or characterestic, bearing any relation, either with the generic form of Duty, as such, or with its specific form, as "Agnihotra," &c. And a comprehension of such relation (of the mark or the Middle Term with the Major Term, which, in the present instance, is "Duty") is necessary in the Inferential process;

hence Duty cannot be said to be amenable to Inference.

20 This Kārikā anticipates the objection that "the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence also depends upon the cognition of certain relations; and hence 'Duty' also cannot be expressed by the Sentence." The sense of the reply as embedded in the Kārikā, is that such an objection would have been real, if we had attributed expressiveness to the 'Sentence;' but, as we shall show later on, no such expressive agency resides in the sentence,—all such agency residing in the meanings of words (making up the sentence), independently of any relations. All this will be explained in the "Tadbhūtādhikarana." (I-i-25 et seq.).

Il Now begins the consideration of the Bhāshya passage: "Nanvatathābhā-tamapyartham vrūyāt codanā, yathā yatkincana laukikam vacanam nadyāstīre panca phalāni santīti tathyamapi bhavati vitathyamapi bhavati." And against this it is urged that it was not proper for the Bhāshya to raise this question; inasmuch the ordinary assertion quoted as an instance can never reasonably be brought forward in condemnation of Chodanā, which is eternal and faultless. The explanation given by



- 22. "It is always an object perceived by other means of knowledge, that is got at by the Word; and like 'memory,' no authority can belong to it by itself."
- 23. "Even in the absence of the perception of an object by one's self, it is only proper that there should be an idea based upon trustworthy assertion, because it is an assertion of a person, who is believed to have perceived the object."
- 24. "Without some sort of Perception, &c.,—either of one's self or of another person,—a "word" has never been found to be true. So the same may be the case with "Injunction," also."
- 25. "Thus then, as even when producing a conception (i.e., mental representation), Fancy, &c., are no authorities by themselves, so we may apply the same rule to the case of Veda also."
- 26. "All Injunctions treating of Heaven, Sacrifices, &c., are false,—because their objects are not supported by Sense-Perception, &c., like such assertions of Buddha and others."
- 27. "Or again, because they are not composed by a trustworthy person,—like the assertions of children and intoxicated people. Or, the authoritativeness of the Veda may be set aside, by reason of its eternality, like that of Ākāsa."
- 28. "And again, all Injunctions depend for their authority upon some human being; or else, by themselves, these could not be authoritative,—because they are sentences,—like the assertions of ordinary people."

the Kārikā is that ordinary people, not knowing the eternal character of Chodanā, might relegate it to the position of common assertions of human origin, and as such would come to apply to it the rules and restrictions of ordinary speech. Under the circumstances, it was only proper to bring forward the objection in the Bhāshya; especially as the eternal character of the Veda has not yet been established. The Kārīkā also considers another alternative: granted that Chodanā is eternal; even then it would cease to be authoritative, because the authority of the speaker—whose veracity is the only ground for the authority of an assertion—is precluded from this case, which is held to be free from all human agency; with this view "more so" has been added.

24 Because Injunction is not said to be based upon Sense-perception.

26 By merely giving rise to some conception, the Veda cannot be said to be anthoritative; because Fancy also gives rise to certain conceptions; but it can never be said to have any authority; and is never believed to be true. "By themselves"—i.e., devoid of any support in Sense-perception, &c.

36 This Karikā brings forward a syllogsim in the formal style: "Such assertions,"—"such" is added in view of the fact that the declarations of Buddha also are found to be true in certain places. "Such"—not supported by Sense perception, &c.

27 The first half of the Karīkā is a syllogsim; but the conclusion is the same as that of the preceding argument. The second half presents the following syllogism: "Veda is unauthoritative, because it is eternal, like Ākāsa."

28 The sense of the first half is that all Injunctions owing their authority to the persons from whom they proceed,—and there being no such person in the case of the Veda—the Veda can have no authority.





29. "Or, the anthoritativeness of all Words should be accepted as depending upon 'man';—because of its being connected with Words, just as unauthoritativeness also (depends upon man)."

30. "If the speaker's character be no ground of the authoritativeness of Words,—then how can their unauthoritativeness (untrustworthiness) be

attributed to his faults"?

31. "Under these circumstances, whether there be a human agent or not, the authoritativeness of the Veda is hard to be got at; and it is with this in view that the Bhāshya has brought forward the objection beginning with 'Nanu.'"

32. "The contradiction, here, applies to the assertion of Buddha also; because from this latter also conceptions do arise. Hence the reply (to the

above objections given in the Bhashya) is a fallacious or futile one."

33. With regard to all conceptions, you must consider the following question: "Is the authoritativeness or unauthoritativeness (of any conception) due to itself or to something else"?

34. Because those that are by themselves false cannot by any means be proved to be true. Some people attribute both (authoritativeness and its contrary) to (the conception) itself. Others attribute them to the

proved excellences or discrepancies of its origin.

35. Both cannot be due to (the conception) itself, because the two are mutually contradictory,—nor can both be due to something else, because in this latter case, there would be no definiteness in the conception.

In reply to the above objections, the Bhashya has: "It is a mere contradiction that you are asserting—that it 'declares' and then 'falsely." The Karika objects to this reply, the sense of this objection being this: The meaning of the Bhashya is that anything that is uttered, and duly gives rise to a conception, can never be false. But, says the Karika, the assertions of Buddha also are found to give rise to certain conceptions; and as such, these would come to be authoritative; thus the Bhashya fails to establish the sole infallibility of the Veda alone,—the only fact that it sought to prove.

88 This Karikā serves as an introduction to the reply to the objection urged in the last Karikā. The questions in all these issues are in the following forms: (1). Is the authority or otherwise of the conception due to itself? (2) Are both of these due to the excellences and discrepancies of the source of the conception? (3) Is authority due to itself, and the contrary to extraneous causes? (4) Is unauthoritativeness due to

itself, and the contrary to extraneous causes ?

84 In the second view, the excellence of the source proves the authority of

the conception and the discrepancy in the source proves its unauthoritativeness.

The meaning of the first half of the Karika is that the faculties of authoritativeness and its contrary are mutually contradictory; and as such, cannot belong to one and the same object. The second half means that if both be held to be due to proved excellences and defects in the cause, then a conception having arisen, so long as such excellences or discrepancies have not been ascertained, the conception cannot be accepted as authoritative or otherwise,—thereby being without any definite character, which is an impossibility.





- 36. How can it be possible that any one thing, independently of all extraneous agency, should have contradictory characters? And when devoid of both these characters, of what form could the conception be?
- 37. If "non-contradictoriness" were possible with regard to different conceptions;—even then, if nothing else is taken into consideration, it cannot be ascertained which is which, and where.
- 38. "Therefore for those that hold the unanthoritativeness of conceptions to be natural (i.e., due to themselves), authoritativeness must depend upon something else."
- 38-39. "In this connection, the following rule is laid down: unauthoritativeness, being a negative factor, can never be due to the discrepancies of the cause; whereas authoritativeness, being a positive entity, is always based upon the excellences thereof (i.e., of the cause.)"
- 40. "If authoritativeness were inherent or natural (in conceptions) and its absence artificial (i.e., extraneous, to be determined by something else) then Dream-cognitions would be authoritative, self-supported; for what is there to refute this"?
- 41. "In my theory, however, there can be no authoritativeness, in the absence of a particular cause; and consequently there is no chance of the absurdity of a negative factor (unauthoritativeness) having a cause, in the shape of the said discrepancies."
- 42. "The excellences of the Sense-organ, &c., alone can be said to be the cause (of authoritativeness); but the authority of these is denied, for two reasons; (1) the occasional disorder of the organs of Perception, and (2) the occasional absence (as during dreams) either of the organs themselves, or of their capabilities."
 - 43. "It is on account of this fact that you have the mistaken idea
- 36 The first half of this is in reference to the view expressed in the first half of the last Karikā; and the second half refers to its second half.
- \$1 That is, though one and the same conception cannot be both, yet the double character can be explained as referring to different conceptions, whereby the contradiction ceases. This cannot be; because, even then, if no extraneous influence is accepted, how could it be ascertained which conception is authoritative and which not, and also in what place it is one or the other.
- ⁴⁰ Conceptions being by themselves authoritative, even dream-cognitions would become authoritative, as these are also conceptions; nor can their quanthoritativeness be said to be due to discrepancies; since, as a negative entity, it cannot but be natural, as shown above.
- 41 Authoritativeness being due to a particular cause, and unauthoritativeness being natural to a conception,—dream-cognitions would be unauthoritative by themselves, until there appears some extraneous cause which lends authority to them.
- 42 The sense-organs being the cause of the authoritativeness of conceptions, —these being inactive during dream, dream-consciousness can have no authority. "It"—i.e., such cause.
- 48 Because, as shown above, the falsity (or unauthoritativeness) of a conception is due to the absence of the excellences of the source of authority; and you mistake such





that 'the cognition of falsity is due to discrepancies (in the cause).' (As a matter of fact) the invariable concomitance of discrepancies leads to (a cognition of) the absence of excellences; and this absence establishes the unauthoritativeness of the conception."

44. "Therefore the purity of the cause must be admitted to be the means of the authoritativeness of a conception; while unauthoritativeness,

being natural, can only be indicated by the absence of such purity."

45. "Through Invariable 'Concomitance' and 'Logical Difference' also, unauthoritativeness cannot be said to result from any discrepancy (in the cause): inasmuch as this (discrepancy) is not found to exist in the case of a non-perception that is due to the absence of the cause (of perception)."

46. "Therefore, inasmuch as there is no human agency,—or even if there is any such, because of the impossibility of any purity belonging to it,—there can be no locus standi for the Injunction; and hence an

authoritative character cannot rightly be said to belong to it."

47. [Reply] You must understand that authoritativeness is inherent in all Means of Right Notion. For a faculty, by itself non-existing, cannot possibly be brought into existence by any other agency;

48. since it is only for the sake of its birth (origination) that a positive entity requires a cause. And when it has once been born (acquired an existence), its application to its various effects proceeds naturally out of itself.

49-51. If even on the birth (appearance) of conception, the object thereof be not comprehended, until the purity of its cause has been ascertained by other means; then in all cases we should have to wait for the production of another conception from a new source; for until its purity has been ascertained, the conception would be equal to nothing (i.e., false). And this second conception too, would be true only on the

absence to be the presence of discrepancies. The absence of excellence leads to the cognition of the negation of authority, which is natural.

44 Indicated by the absence of purity in the cause.

45 Unauthoritativeness is of three kinds: Doubt, Misconception and Non-conception. Some people construe the Karikā thus: Ajnānē doshavyatirēkē'pi aprāmānyānwa-yāt na dosha nimittam—"Because in the case of Non-conception, even in the 'absence' of any discrepancy, we find the 'presence' of unauthoritativeness,—therefore discrepancy cannot be said to be the cause of unauthoritativeness."

47 With this begins the refutation of the above arguments, and the establishment

of the standard Mimansaka theory.

49.51 If even a rightly-produced conception should be made to depend upon the ascertainment of the excellences of its cause, for the purpose of denoting its object,—then, for the ascertainment of such excellences too, we would need another conception, which would be due to something other than the aforesaid cause; and so on we would have to proceed ad infinitum. This Kārikā proves the propriety of the Bhāshya: "Vipratishiddamidamuchyatē bravitī vitathanchēti;" for a conception that denotes something is self-evident; and as such, cannot be false.



ascertainment of the purity of its cause; and so on and on, there would be no limit (to conceptions upon conceptions).

- 52. In case, however, authoritativeness be accepted to be due to (the conception) itself, nothing else is wanted (for its cognition). Because in the absence of any cognition of discrepancies, falsity (unauthoritativeness) becomes precluded by itself (i.e., without the help of any extraneous Means).
- 53. Therefore the authoritative character of a conception, cognised through the mere fact of its having the character of "cognition," can be set aside only by the contrary mature of its object, or by the recognition of discrepancies in its cause.
- 54. Unauthoritativeness is three-fold,—as being due to Falsity, Non-perception, and Doubt. From among these, two (Falsity and Doubt) being positive entities, are brought about by discrepancies in the cause.
- 55. In the case of Non-perception, however, we do not admit the action of such discrepancies. Because for us all non-perception is due to the absence of cause,—just as you have asserted.
- 56. The fact of mere Unauthoritativeness being due to discrepancies does not lead to any regressus ad infinitum, as is found to be the case with the theory of the cognition of excellences (being the cause of authoritativeness),—for us who hold the doctrine of "Self-evidence."
 - 57. Unauthoritativeness (falsity) is got at directly through the

⁵⁵ The truthful character of a conception is set aside, (1) when the object denoted thereby is subsequently found to be of a character contrary to that formerly conceived of,—e.g., in the typical case of mistaking the rope for a serpent, when it is found, on examination, that it is a rope, the previous conception of the serpent is set aside; and (2) by the recognition of a certain discrepancy in the cause—e.g., one suffering from Jaundice, thinks the conch-shell to be yellow; but as soon as he recognises the disorder in his eyes, he attributes the notion of yellowness to the disorder, and accepts the conch-shell as white, thereby setting aside his previous conception.

54 This is aimed against the argument orged above in Karika 38-39.

bb "Absence of the cause" (of cognition).

to depend upon another of the same kind, that we have a regressus ad infinitum. Consequently if we made unanthoritativeness depend upon another unauthoritative object, (as in the theory explained above, authority is made to depend upon another anthoritative tive thing), then alone could we land ourselves in the regressus ad infinitum. But, as a matter of fact, we explain unauthoritativeness as being due to discrepancies (the contrary character of the object of conception), which is authoritative, (as based upon Sense-perception); and as such this latter comes to be self-evident; and here the matter rests, and we are saved the necessity of assuming conceptions over conceptions ad infin.

bi Here is the conception of a snake with regard to the rope. Now this conception is set aside directly by another conception in the form, "this is a piece of rope" (which is contrary to the previous character of the conception). And undoubtedly one could never have the latter conception until the former had been set aside.





"Cognition (of its contradictory)." For, so long as the former is not set aside, the subsequent cognition (of its contradictory) cannot be produced.

- 58. Though the cognition of the discrepancy of the cause is known to refer to a different object (i.e., not the object which is the effect of the cause), yet we have co-objectivity (of the two cognitions) as being implied thereby; and hence we have the preclusion of the former,—as in the case of the "milking-pot."
- 59. But this rule applies only to those cases in which (with regard to the second conception) there is neither cognition of any discrepancy, nor any contradictory conception. In those cases, however, in which we have any of these two factors, the second conception becoming false, the first comes to be true.
- 60. But in that case too, the authoritativeness is due to the conception itself, in the absence of any cognition of discrepancies. And in a case where there is no such cognition of discrepancies, there is no reasonable ground for doubt.
- 61. Thus (in this manner) we do not stand in need of postulating more than three or four conceptions. And it is for this reason that we hold to the doctrine of "Self-evidence."
- 62-63. As a rule, the chance of discrepancies in an Assertion, depends upon the speaker; and in certain places the absence thereof (i.e., of discrepancies) is due to its having a faultless speaker; because the discrepancies, removed by his good qualities, cannot possibly attach to his word. Or
- 58 There is a general rule for performing a certain rite by means of a certain vessel; but in a particular case, there is a special rule, whereby, in that special case, the rite is performed by means of another vessel; and here both the rules are accepted as being coextensive in their scope, as having the common purpose of laying down a vessel for the same rite. In the same manner, in the case of the cognition of yellowness with reference to the conch-shell,-though the preceding cognition of such yellowness has for its object the yellowness of the conch, and the subsequent cognition of the bile in the eyes (the cause of perception having the discrepancy of being jaundice) has for its object, the bile in the eye, -yet, in this latter case also, we must admit of a coextensiveness of the scope of the two cognitions, as implied by their meanings. The cognition of yellowness leads to the cognition of the bile; and this bile, being the cause of the perception of yellowness in white, is found to exist in the eye, and thereby leads. to the conclusion that its effect -the perception of yellowness - is wrong; and this conclusion, of the idea of yellowness being a mistaken one, contradicts the former conception - of yellowness in the conch-shell; and hence this latter is set aside. The implied meaning of the second conception is that "there is bile in the eyes, and the presence of this bile has given rise to the mistaken notion of yellowness in the conchshell.
- 60 The second half guards against the following argument: "as the first conception is set aside by the second, and this by the third; so, on and on we might go, and find every conception set aside by the one following it." The sense of the Karika is that it is only the recognition of discrepancies in the means of the conception that sets aside the conception. Hence, when we do not come across any such discrepancy we cannot reasonably doubt the correctness of the conception.



again, in the absence of any speaker, there could be no discrepancies, as these would have no substratum (to inhere in).

64. In (truthful) human (speech) we find two (factors)—absence of discrepancies, and (presence of) excellence; and we have already explained that authoritativeness cannot be due to excellence.

65-66. Therefore excellences must be held to help only in the removal of discrepancies; and from the absence of these latter (discrepancies), proceeds the absence of the two kinds of unauthoritativeness; and thus the fact of (authoritativeness) being inherent in Words remains untouched. And inasmuch as the Word gives rise to a conception, its authoritativeness is secured.

66. "If the absence of discrepancies be held to result from excellences, then there is the same regressus ad infinitum (that you urged against us)."

67. (Not so): because at that time (i.e., at the time of the conception of the absence of discrepancies), we do not admit of any active functioning of the excellences, though they continue to be recognised all the same;—because in the conception of the absence of discrepancies they help by their mere presence.

68. Then too, in the case of the Veda, the assertion of freedom from reproach is very easy to put forward, because there is no speaker in this case; and for this reason the unauthoritativeness of the Veda can never even be imagined.


69. Thus then the authoritativeness of the Veda being independent of a speaker, your adoration of its Author is entirely out of place. For, such adoration could be possible only if you assume the Veda to be devoid of authority.

70. Hence the mere fact of the Veda not having been composed by an authoritative author, ceases to be a discrepancy. Of the syllogistic

65-85 "Two kinds"-i.e., "Contradictory Conception" and "Doubt,"-"Non-conception" being out of the question in a case of "Conception."

67 Of the cognition of excellence were the cause of the ascertainment of authoritativeness, then even this conception would stand in need of another, for its confirmation,—and so on ad. infin., but as a matter of fact, excellences help the ascertainment of the absence of discrepancies only by means of their presence, which serves to suppress the discrepancies; and these are not able to weaken the confirmed authoritativeness of the conception.

69 The latter half is read by some MSS. as "Kalpyēn-atmārthatā bhavēt" ("then the assumption of such would lead to the fault of self-dependence—Petitio Principii"); and the meaning of this is that it is only if the Naiyāyika hold the theory of the unauthoritativeness of the Veda itself that he would require a shelter in its infallible author, whom he assumes. But then, this Infallible Author too would depend upon the Veda, for a proof of His existence; and the infallibility of the Veda resting upon the infallibility of such an Author,—the reasoning would become a case of arguing in a cricle.





arguments urged against us, we shall lay down counter-arguments hereafter.

71. It is only human speech that depends for its authority upon another Means of Right Knowledge; and hence in the absence of the latter, the former becomes faulty; but the other (i.e., Vedic sentence) can never be so (on that ground).

72. Thus then, the very fact of the incompatibility of the Veda with other Means of Right Notion, constitutes its authoritativeness; for if it were not so incompatible, it would only be subsidiary (to such other means).

73. In the case of the authoritativeness of other Means of Right Notion also, the reason does not lie in their compatibility (with other Means of Knowledge); because more than one (Means of Knowledge), when treating of the same object, become optional alternatives; and hence the conception of that object can be due to only one of these (and the other ceases to be of any use).

74. The subsequent Means of Knowledge could only serve to specify the conception of an object, only in a case where the preceding Means has

failed to rightly ascertain its nature.

75. If the authoritativeness of the subsequent (Means of Knowledge) were to depend upon the preceding one, then we would require one such means for (the sake of the authoritativeness of) every Means of Knowledge; and as such we would never come to an end.

76-77. If you should admit of an inherent authoritativeness (self-evidence) in any one of these, then to what special cause is due your repugnance to (such inherent authoritativeness belonging to) the very first conception? And again, if mere non-support of other Means of Knowledge were the sole ground for unauthoritativeness, then a perception by the ear would have to be considered false on the ground of its not being supported by occular perception.

77-78. If it be urged that "one perception of the ear could be supported by another perception of the same sense,"—then in the Veda also, there would be conceptions, by the hundred, closely following upon its utterance (and these would support one another). In both of these (i.e., the

78 "Subsidiary"—to the conceptions otherwise obtained, and not, in themselves the means of any right notions.

78 Hence authoritativeness cannot be due to the compatibility of the means; it is

inherent in the conception itself.

76 When, even in your own theory, you find it necessary to postnlate the self-evidence of a certain conception in the end, in order to avoid a regressus ad infinitum,—why should you not postulate such inherent authoritativeness in the very first conception and thereby avoid the necessity of postulating many intermediate conceptions?

78 In the Veda, by frequent repetition, the conception got at in the first reading may be taken to be the basis of the authoritativeness of that obtained in the second reading, and so on, the Veda would finally come to rest upon itself, as its authority.



perception of the ear, as well as the conception derived from the Veda) there is no conception produced from any foreign means (of conception).

79. Just as (in the case of the ear-perception) the ground of support may be ascertained to be another perception by the same sense, so too we may postulate a similar support in the case of the Veda also.

80. Therefore the conception that has been firmly (and fully) brought about, and does not stand in need of any support of other conceptions,

must be accepted to be (truly) authoritative.

81. Nor is the authoritativeness of "Word," &c., capable of being proved by Inference; so that all conception is saved from any dependence upon other means of conception.

82. (Obj.): "But Sense-Perception and the rest are not comprehended as that 'these are authoritative'; nor is it possible to carry on any business by means of such perceptions, when they are not comprehended as such."

83. (Reply): Even prior to comprehension, the Means of Right Notion had an independent existence of their own; and they come to be comprehended subsequently (as such), through other cognitions.

84. Therefore the fact of its being comprehended as such, does not in any way help the authoritativeness (of the Means of Right Notion); because the idea of the object is got at through the former alone.

85. Even the unauthoritative Means would, by itself, lead to the conception of its object; and its function could not cease unless its falsity were ascertained by other means.

86. The falsity of an object is not, like its truthfulness, perceived by

81 If it were to be proved by Inference, then that Inference would require another Inference, in order to prove the instance cited therein, and so on ad infini.

83 All business with such means is performed by their mere existence, even before they have been recognised as such means.

84 The sense of the latter half is thus explained in the Nyāyaratnākara: "We do not mean to say that authoritativeness is perceived on account of its connection with the conception; all we mean is that the authoritativeness of a conception lies in its conformity with the real state of things; because upon such conformity depends the application of the words 'authoritative' and 'Idea' with regard to a conception. And this real state of things is perceived by itself, through the unknown conception; and there is no use of any other means of cognition."

85 Even the unauthoritative means do not, by themselves, advertise their false character; in fact, they also lead to the right conception of the object in their own way. The idea of silver really perceives the shell to be a piece of silver. Thus too, an unauthoritative means, by itself, signifies its own authoritative character and leads men to act accordingly—the man taking up the shell, as a piece of silver. It is for the detection of its unauthoritativeness and for preventing people from acting in accordance with it, that is need of another means; consequently the unauthoritativeness of a conception can never be inherent; as it is always arrived at by extraneous means; e.g., in the above instance, on close examination by the eye, the real character of the shell is detected, and the man throws it away.

36 This is levelled against the objection that the unauthoritativeness of the Veda



its very first conception. For the recognition of unauthoritativeness, the only cause is one's consciousness of the falsity of its subject itself, or of the faultiness of the cause thereof.

87. Thereby alone is falsity (of a conception) established; and by no other means. And the truthfulness (or authoritativeness of a conception) is proved to belong to the state of its birth (i.e., is natural or inherent in it).

88. Therefore even in cases where falsity is proved by other means, these two (causes of falsity) should be noted, and not only certain points of similarity (with another false idea).

89. For one who would prove the inauthenticity of the Veda by means of Inference, who could avoid the preclusion (of Inference) on the

strength of the conceptions derived from the Veda?

90. If it be urged that "Inference is not to be thus set aside, because of the inauthenticity of the Veda," then there results (the fault of) "Reciprocity" (or mutual dependence); because apart from Inference you have got no other means whereby to set aside the Veda.

91. And the mere non-perception of an object by other means of knowledge does not prove the negation of an object—e.g., taste, &c. Because with these, it is a rule that their perception is due to the tongue, &c.

92. If it be urged that "the perception of an object is due to the consciousness of one Sense, or means of conception," then the same may be said to be the case with Duty also.

92-93. Even when there are (correct) conceptions produced from the Veda, if you assert that "(the authenticity of the Veda) is not proved to me," such assertion can only be due to malignity,—and as such it is not proper for truthful people. And certainly there can be no inauthenticity

might also, in the same manner, be arrived at through extraneous means—e.g., the series of inferential arguments brought forward above, in Karikas 26 et. seq.

83 "Similarity with another, &c."—as has been done in the arguments brought forward against the authoritative character of the Veda.

90 You depend upon Inference for setting aside the Veda; and also for proving the falsity of the Veda; and it is only after this falsity has been proved that your Inference can have any force.

91 Because a certain conception is not supported by more than one means, that fact alone cannot prove its falsity. We do not mean to say that we do not accept Inference; and yet, in the absence of any other means of setting aside the authority of the Veda, we do not accept the preclusion of the Veda. All that we mean is that we can admit of no Inference that goes against the Veda.

The authority of the Veda has been proved to us; and hence we can never prove any fact that is distinctly denied in the Veda; and thus Inference comes to be set aside by the denial contained in the Veda." And the present Karika urges that it is not proper for the opponent to deny the authority of the Veda, when he can have certain unmistaken and correct ideas through it.



simply on account of (your) malignity, or on account of the fact of its not conforming (with your own views).

94. Nor can authenticity be proved merely by one's own wish or command. For no one asserts the non-perceptibility of the pain due to fire-burn (which is not desired).

95. Nor can any desirable conception be authentic (simply because it

is desirable).

95-96. Therefore like light, Veda being common to all persons, it is not proper to dispute its authenticity. The difference (of the Veda) from the assertions of Buddha, &c., will be pointed out hereafter. On account of the imperfections of human agency there is every chance of the latter being open to contradiction.

97. While in the case of the Veda, the fact of its not being due

to human agency, serves to establish its authenticity.

97-98. If the Veda were of human origin, then those that would declare it to be true, as also those that would declare it to be false, would have to postulate, without any grounds, its author, his excellences and defects, and its acceptance by great men, &c., &c.

98-99. By the Mimānsakas, on the other hand, now, as always, nothing is postulated, besides what is directly visible (i.e., the Veda alone by Itself).

99-101. Thus has the Bhāshya set aside (all chance of) misconception and doubt with regard to such a Veda, when it is found to be giving rise to (true) conceptions. And the assumption of a faulty origin of the Veda will also be set aside later on. Further, on account of the absence of human agency, there is not the least chance of the existence of these (Misconception and Doubt) being ever thought of (in connection with the Veda).

95.96 If the production of cognition be the sole ground for authority, then the scriptures of the Buddha would also come to be authoritative. But it is not so; the case of these is different from that of the Veda in many respects—e.g., in point of their origin. The Buddhistic scriptures have their source in human agency; and as no human agency is perfect, there is every chance of there being imperfections in those scriptures, which, for this reason, could be safely contradicted. It would require a deal of ingenuity and equivocal reasoning to establish the indisputable perfection of human agencies, and thence that of the Buddhistic scriptures.

97.98 "Acceptance by great men."—The supporters of the Veda would refer this to the Veda, in order to prove its authoritative character. Its opponent, on the other hand, would refer the same fact to the support of his own scriptures, and thereby establish the unauthoritative character of all other scriptures, the Veda included.

99_101 If the opponents of the Veda—which has been proved to be eternal and faultless—declare its unauthoritative character to be in the shape of Misconception or Doubt, then, we reply that all chance of Misconception and Doubt, with regard to the Veda, has been set aside by the Bhashya.

"Faulty origin"—any doubt as to the existence of discrepancies leads to doubts with regard to its authoritative character; and when the existence of such discre-