

and its contrary have not been differentiated, what could be the use of the mere vague idea that "there is *something* (the cause of diversity)?"

106-107. Would pain result from Sacrifice, &c., or pleasure from Slaughter and the like? And from what sorts of Action, what sort of effects—Heaven, children, &c.—would result?

Until one has a definite idea as to these facts, he is never led to take up any action. What is here sought after is the root (cause) of such knowledge as forms part of such activity.

108. Therefore though the Means in general may have been ascertained, no specification (of the Means) is possible, except through the Veda; and it is an enquiry into this special Means (of knowing Duty), that has been declared by the author of the aphorisms.

109. And when the special Means has been recognised, even the cognition of the Means in general, which is included in the former, would be got at through the Veda; and hence (Arthāpatti) cannot be the means (of knowing even the generic form of the Means).

110. And as with Arthāpatti, so too there could be no similarity (of the Veda) with Inference. If it be urged that Inference is based upon the

and the same man could not be both rich and poor, even at different periods of his life; for his *nature* would remain the same all along. For this reason, he offers another reply, the sense of which is that "Apparent Inconsistency" would only prove that there must be some unseen cause for the diversity; but unless the character of the unseen cause—either as Duty or otherwise—is ascertained, the mere knowledge of the fact of there being such a cause of diversity could not serve any purpose; and certainly, "Apparent Inconsistency" could give us no clue as to the nature of the cause; and as such, it could never be the means of knowing Duty.

107 The knowledge which forms an integral part of activity is based upon the Veda; and hence "Apparent Inconsistency" cannot have any application in this case.

108 "Apparent Inconsistency" only serves to prove that the aforesaid diversity has an unseen cause.

109 This Kārikā anticipates the following objection: "Inasmuch as 'Apparent Inconsistency' brings about the idea of the *cause in general*, and the Veda that of the *specific cause*,—we should say that the means of knowing Duty consists in 'Apparent Inconsistency and the Veda,' combined; and not in the Veda alone." The sense of the reply is that "Apparent Inconsistency" proving the *general*, is unable to give any idea of the *particular*; whereas the Veda proving the *particular* would apply to the *general* also; because an idea of the former includes that of the latter.

110 Some people urge that the argument contained in the above objection is not an instance of "Apparent Inconsistency," but one of ordinary Inference, *per modum pollens*, based upon the invariable concomitance of the cause in general, with the effect in general; and thus the Veda too comes to be nothing but a part of Inference. The Kārikā means that these people have also been refuted by the above refutation of "Apparent Inconsistency."

Some commentators construe "*nānumānopamēshyatē*" as "*na anumānam ishyatē, na upamānam ishyatē*;" but this construction is not right; in as much as the opponent also denies the applicability of "Analogy;" and as such it would be a useless effort to deny what the opponent also denies, as pointed out in the Kārikā.

Scripture;—then (we reply that) in that case, the character of *Pramāṇa* would belong to this (latter) (and not to the Inference).

111. The assertion,—that the 'Linga' (and other factors of Inference) are not perceptible by the organs of Sense, because of the undefined character (of Sense-perception)" —is not correct; because we hold Sense-perception to be applicable to well-defined (concrete) cognitions also, as helping the comprehension of the form of the object.

112. First of all, there is a cognition in the shape of mere *observation* in the abstract, which is undefined,—similar to the cognition of the infant or the dumb, arising purely out of the object by itself (without any qualifications).

113. And at that time neither any specification nor a generalisation is recognised; what is cognised is only the object, the substratum of these (generalisation and specification).

114-116. Others (the Vedāntists) lay down a "Summum Genus" in the shape of "Being" (*Sat*), which they call "Substance"; and through this, they hold "generalisation" to be the object of perception

The meaning of the second half is that if "Inference" be made to depend upon the Veda, for the sake of the cognition of special causes, then we would have the Veda itself, as the independent cause of the cognition of the general as well as the particular.

111 It has been urged that there can be no perception of the *Linga*, &c.; because "Perception" consists of undefined (abstract) cognition, which cannot give rise to any premises, as these latter consist of definite concrete ideas. It is this theory that is controverted here; It is not an absolute rule that all "Sense-perception" must always consist of undefined abstract cognition; as we shall prove later on that we apply the name "Sense-perception" also to the cognition of the *form* of the object, which is well-defined and concrete, and is brought about by the action of the Sense-organs, following closely upon the undefined abstract cognition, in connection with the same object; and it is quite reasonable to assert the precedence of such concrete cognition, to "Inference" and the rest.

112 Some people deny abstract cognition, altogether. Their reasoning is this: "All cognition is concrete, because it is always accompanied by expression in words. In ordinary experience, we do not come across any cognition, which is not accompanied by verbal expression. We enquire into the various means of cognition, only for the sake of ordinary experience, and we do not find any experience based upon any purely abstract cognition; in as much as all experience is concrete and definite. The cognitions of the infant also are accompanied by verbal expression, in its subtlest form, &c. &c."

114 These theorists hold that there is only one *generality*, in the shape of "Being,"—all others being only specifications of this; what is known as a "generality" is that which is common to many individuals; and what is known as "specific" is that which is restricted to a single individual; and it is the great *generality* that forms the object of Abstract Cognition, the rest being amenable to concrete perception. Because, if such specific characters were not recognised, as being common to certain objects, and as not existing in others,—by what means could there be any discrimination between the perceptions of different objects?

(i.e., the undefined abstract cognition); the "specifications" being cognised by means of well-defined concrete cognitions. Some of these specific characters again are peculiar to each individual, while some are common to many. And without such recognition of these (specific characters), through specification and generalisation, there would be no difference between the perception of the *cow* and that of the *horse*.

117. This is not correct; because (even in the case of abstract cognition) we find each individual object to be distinct from others; and because the difference cannot be expressed, that is no reason why its existence should be totally denied.

118. Even in the case of an undefined abstract cognition, there is a perception of the object, in its two fold aspect (general and specific).

118-119. And this cognition (of the double aspect of an object) only serves to point out its real character; by the cogniser, however, it is perceived in its pure (unqualified) form only. It is not cognised as anything *special*, because there is no exclusion of others (objects); nor is it cognised as *general*, because there is no definite idea as to the inclusion of other special objects.

120. And it is only after some time that the object comes to be characterised by such specifications as the "class" and the rest; and the

117 If the *great genus* "Being" alone were the object of Abstract Cognition, then we would have exactly the same cognition (so long as it remains undefined), with regard to all objects. But, as a matter of fact, such is not the case; since we find that the abstract cognition with regard to one object differs from that with regard to another. Though this difference cannot verywell be expressed in words, yet this non-expressibility cannot prove its non-existence.

118 That is to say, it is not only the general aspect of an action that is cognised by Abstract Perception.

118-119 To this view, of Abstract cognition relating to the double aspect of an object, it is objected, that, in the course of such abstract cognition, there is no idea of either the *generic* or the *specific* aspect of the object; and as such, the above view sounds much like a contradiction of facts. The reply is that we do not mean that in the course of abstract cognition, there is any comprehension of either the *inclusion* or the *exclusion* of different objects, in or from the object cognised; all that we mean by mentioning the "twofold aspect of the object" is, to state the character of the object: that the object of Abstract Cognition is such as has a twofold aspect. What is comprehended by the cogniser is the object, pure and simple, without any qualifications, &c.; and, in abstract cognition, this object is not cognised as anything *particular*; because Abstract Cognition does not serve to *exclude* other objects; nor is it perceived as anything *general*; because Abstract cognition does not *include* other objects. Therefore what is comprehended by means of Abstract Cognition is only the object, pure and simple; and this object is such as has the twofold character of the *general* and the *particular*; and this is all that we mean.

120 Abstract Cognition is followed by a cognition which serves to specify the object, with reference to "class" "action" and "property" and this definite cognition is also held by us to be included in "Sense-perception" and this name thus comes to apply both to Abstract and Concrete cognitions.



cognition, by means of which such specifications are arrived at, is also included in Sense-perception.

121. And the reason for this is that the means of this latter cognition is the sense-organ; though the cognition is not actually located in it; For this reason, the fact of the sense-organ being incapable of remembrance can not preclude well-defined (concrete) cognition (from Sense-perception).

122. Because the cognition is located in the soul; and it is this (the soul) that is found to be the cogniser; and this (soul) has also the power of Remembering, as also of Recognising (the facts of past experience).

123. Therefore when the contact of the object with the sense-organ is present, the person,—though specifying the object, through Memory, by means of its own characteristics,—comes to have the sensuous perception of that object.

124. And this (perception) being dependent upon the Senses, is rightly attributed to them (i.e., called 'Sense-perception'); and that which is produced without the contact of the senses is not called 'Sense-perception.'

125. All cognition, that follows from frequent specifications of this sort, is said to be "Sense-perception," in accordance with their connection contact or with the organs of Sense.

126. Because the objects in a lying-in room (which is closed on all sides) are not visible to those who have just entered it, from outside; that does not lead to the conclusion that such objects are not perceptible by the Senses.

127 It is urged that "it has already been declared that *sense-perception* is the cognition brought about by the action of the sense-organs; the specifications however are arrived at through the *remembrance* of the class and action, &c., of the object; but the sense-organs have no capacity of *remembering*; hence a concrete cognition can never be *sensuous*." In reply to this, it is said that this objection would apply to us if we held that the sense-organs serve to *specify* the objects, after having *remembered* the class, &c. As a matter of fact, however, we do not hold any such view; in fact, the sense-organs are only the *means* of cognition; and the *cognition* and its *memory* inhere in the *Soul*. Therefore our theory is not open to the objection based upon the *incapability*, of the senses, to *remember*.

128 A man happens to see a certain object belonging to one class; and after some time when he happens to see another object of the same kind, he remembers the fact of his having previously seen the former object; and then he comes to recognise the two objects as belonging to the same class. And the latter object being still before his eyes, he comes to have a well-defined and specified "*Sense-perception*" of the object; in as much as the operation of the sense-organ continues all along.

129 That is to say, even though it is aided by Remembrance, the causal efficiency belongs to the senses themselves.

130 Though there may be many such specifications, yet, so long as they are brought about in accordance with Sense-contact, they cannot but be included in the name "*Sense-perception*."

131 That is to say, the name "*Sense-perception*" is not restricted to such perceptions alone as are produced *immediately* after the operation of the Sense-organs.

127. And just as in this case, the persons, at first, apprehending only a semblance of the objects, subsequently come to have a clear and definite perception of their real form; so, in the same manner (would one come to have a definite cognition) of the specific properties (class, &c.), of the object (after having had an undefined idea of these).

128. If, after having observed an object (in the abstract), one were to close his eyes and then determine the object (in the concrete),—this would not be Sense-perception, because of its not following from a contact of the Sense-organ.

129. The Soul and the rest could be the cause also of such concrete cognitions, as are not connected with the Sense-organs; therefore the only reason, why concrete cognitions are attributed to the Senses, lies in the fact that the Sense-organ alone is a means that brings about *only* such cognition as is connected with the senses.

130. In the undefined abstract cognition also, the Sense is not the

127 In the instance cited, though, at first, the person perceives only the semblance of the two objects, yet, subsequently, he comes to have a definite perception of the objects themselves; but this too is brought about by means of the eyes alone. In the same manner, in the case of definite concrete cognition, though the first contact of the sense would only give rise to an undefined abstract cognition, yet, subsequently—the contact of the Sense-organ continuing all the time—the person would come to have a well-defined perception of the various specific properties—*genus, property, &c.*—of the objects; and it is this that constitutes *concrete cognition*. And as the Sense-contact has all along continued to operate, such cognition cannot but be called “Sense-perception.”

128 Because the closing of the eye has cut off the Sense-contact.

129 This Kārikā anticipates the following objection: “The Means of Concrete Cognition are manifold,—such as the *Soul* and the rest; in that case, why should such cognition be specifically attributed to the organs of Sense, and be called *sensuous*?” The sense of the reply is that names are given to objects, in accordance with such an aspect of it, as belongs exclusively to the object in question. In the present instance the agency of the senses alone is such as belongs exclusively to Concrete Cognition, the agency of the Soul, &c., belonging also to other kinds of cognition—such as the Inferential, Verbal, &c., and as such it is only right that it should be called *sensuous*.

130 The first half of this Kārikā implies that the objection pointed out in the last note does not hold. If it be urged that “the Concrete Cognition, following, upon Abstract Cognition, must be held to have this latter for its cause, and cannot be attributed to the senses,”—then, we reply that even then, inasmuch as it is brought about, through the intervention of Abstract Cognition, by means of the senses alone, it can be called “Sensuous.” This would be quite compatible with ordinary usages;—e.g., the name “*pankaja*” (*clay-born*) that is given to the *lotus*, cannot belong to it *literally*; since the *lotus* is produced directly, not from the *mud*, but from the *bulbous root*; yet all the same, the name does apply to the *lotus*, simply on the ground of its being produced from the *mud*, through the intervention of the *bulbous root*. The assertion that—“we would conventionally restrict the name *Sense-perception* to Concrete Cognition”—implies that if we did not call in the aid of *conventional usage*, the argument, based upon the fact of its being *intermediately* produced by the senses, would apply to *Inference* also, which too would come to be called *Sense-perception*, as being produced



only cause. Or, the name 'Sense-perception' might be said to apply, by conventional usage, to that which is produced intermediately thereby (*i.e.*, by sensuous perception),—as in the case of the word "Pañkaja."

131. Or, this conventional usage too may not apply to the case of such concrete cognition as is of itself (naturally) known to be *sensuous*, which is not the case with abstract cognition.

132. For us all meanings of words, are comprehended, through the usage of old (experienced) people. And the sense in which a word has been used by these (old people), cannot be separated from it.

133. It is only the observation (and classification) of established facts, that ought to be done by enquirers; and a certain fact which is known to all men as established, cannot be set aside by (newly-devised) definitions.

134. Again, how can *dependence on Sense-organ* be said to apply to the Self-recognition of the cognition? If it be urged that "the mind would serve as the requisite Sense-organ, in that case,"—then the same would also apply to the case of (such specifications of 'class,' &c., as) the class "cow" and the like.

135. If it be urged that it is only meant to be applicable to "Self-recognition,"—(we reply that) people do not mean it so. Therefore we must have recourse either to usage, or to conventional technicality.

136. And again, as the sensuous character of pleasure pain, &c., is due to the fact of the mind being a Sense-organ, so, in the same manner,

by the senses *intermediately*. What the author means is that the word "Sense-perception" is "*yogarūḍha*."

133 This anticipates the objection that we find people using the name "Sense-perception" with regard to Concrete Cognition, and yet we find that the correct definition of the name does not apply to such Cognition.

134 If Concrete Cognition is not accepted to be *sensuous*,—how can the Buddhist say that the *cognition of the cognition*, by itself, is due to the action of the senses? For such Self-recognition cannot proceed *directly*, from any Sense-organ.

135 "Only meant to be, &c."—because the mind, being an *internal* organ, could not apply to *external* objects; but the Self-recognition of Cognition is a purely *internal* process, and as such, could be effected by the *internal* organ of the mind. The sense of the reply is that people accept the applicability of the mind even to the perception of *external* objects—like the class "cow" and the like.

"We must have recourse, &c."—The sensuous character of Self-recognition being thus denied, it is only Concrete Cognition that can be *sensuous*. And if it be urged that—"inasmuch as the mind is an *internal* organ, and Concrete Cognition does not follow directly from Sense-contact, such Cognition cannot be *sensuous*,"—we reply that since we have already proved the sensuous character of Concrete Cognition, if you do not find it to be directly amenable to the function of any of the eleven organs of sense, you must have recourse to *technicality*, or *conventional usage*, on which would be based the fact of Concrete Cognition being included in "Sense-perception;" since the *sensuous* character of such Cognition cannot, in any case, be denied.

136 The opponent also accepts Pleasure and Pain to be *sensuous*.

would the sensuous character of the specification of *class*, &c., also be due to the same cause.

137. And, as in your case, even when the fact of depending upon the mind is the same (in the case of all cognitions), you specify it as "undefined abstract cognition," and thus accept only certain parts thereof to be sensuous,—so, the same could be done in our case also.

138. On account of the absence of the 'Linga' (middle term), this (concrete cognition) cannot be said to be Inferential, &c. And on account of there being no notion of any contradiction, it cannot be said to be unauthoritative.

139. And again, on account of its not having been perceived before, it cannot be "Remembrance." Therefore it must be 'Sensuous'; such is also the common usage and belief.

140. "*Class*, &c., being objects foreign to the object perceived, the notion thereof in connection with the object, which is not identical with them (*Class*, &c.), can only be a case of false attribution; and as such it is similar to the ordinary misconceptions of the mirage and the like."

141. It is not so; because it is not possible that the cognitions of a horse and other objects, should always be cases of false attribution; specially

151 Like Abstract Cognition, Concrete Cognition is brought about by the mind; and yet the Buddhist defines *sensuous* perception, as *undefined* and *abstract*; and thereby confines *sensuousness* to the *self-recognition* of Cognitions, and denies it in the case of such cognitions as that of the *class* "cow." In the same manner, even when the fact of *being produced by the mind* is common to Sense-perception, Inference, Analogy, &c., we could restrict the name to the cognition of such objects as are *not removed from the Sense-organs*. That is to say, as the other party restricts the name to one class of Cognition, dogmatically, without any reasonable grounds for so doing,—we could also do the same. The Kārikā refers to the objection that—"if the mere fact of *being produced by the sense of mind* be the sole criterion of Sense-perception, then Inference, &c., would also become included in it." The sense of the reply is that as the Buddhist dogmatically excludes all other cognitions, except the Abstract, from "Sense-perception," we would also dogmatically exclude Inference, &c.

153 As Concrete Cognition cannot be either Inferential, or Verbal, or based upon Analogy; nor can it be said to be altogether untrustworthy; it must be accepted as "Sense-perception" there being no ground for our denying such acceptance.

150 This Kārikā embodies the Vedantic objection: "We grant that Concrete Cognition cannot be Inferential, &c.; but we cannot agree to its being always authoritative. Because Concrete Cognition consists in the attribution of *Class*, *Action*, &c., to an altogether different object (viz., the individual object of perception); and as such, it cannot but be false."

151 Says the Nyāyaratnakara: "*Class*, &c., are not altogether different from the Individual. It is a fact of common experience that the individual 'cow' is recognised as such, only when it is found to be identical with the *Class* 'cow' (without which it could never be known as 'cow'). This could not be, if the Individual were totally different from the *Class*. Such recognition of the identity of the Individual with the *Class* is the only means of knowing the *Class*; hence there must be an identity between the Individual and the *Class*."



as we hold that the *Class* (*Action* and *Property*) are not totally different from the *Individual* (object of perception).

142. If the qualification were entirely different from the qualified, then, how could the qualification *always* produce, in the qualified (object), a cognition precisely similar to itself?

143. The perception, of the colour of shellac in a piece of rock-crystal, belongs only to the ignorant, and is false (mistaken),—for the wise, there is a recognition of difference (between the real form of the crystal, and the reflected one of shellac).

144. Whereas the individual object has never been seen as separated from *Class*, &c.; nor have these latter been ever seen apart from the individual,—as is the case with the rock-crystal and the shellac.

145. In the case of the crystal and shellac too, if the difference were never perceived by anybody,—whereby could the apparent correctness of the perception of the red colour (in the rock-crystal) be ever set aside?

146. Nor can there be any assumption of an extraneous relation subsisting among objects proved to be inseparable. Because there can be no such relation between unaccomplished objects. And if a member of the relation be said to be accomplished (before the relation is established) then there is no inseparability.

147. Such being the case, there is no ground for postulating a

142 "Qualification"—*Class*, *Action* and *Property*. "*Qualified*"—the *Individual* object. If the *Class* were something other than the *Individual*, then the idea of the latter could not be invariably concomitant with that of the former.

143 The Vedānti urges that if "*Sense-perception*" were always authoritative, then the notion of *redness* in the crystal would also be true. The sense of the reply is clear.

144 The crystal and the lac are not always found to be concomitant; while the *Individual* is invariably found to be concomitant with the *Class*, and *vice versa*. Therefore the instance of the crystal and lac cannot apply to the present case.

145 If the crystal were always accompanied by the lac, and if it were inseparably connected with it, then the perception of *redness* in the crystal could not but be accepted as true.

146 The Vaiçēshikas hold that *Class*, *Action*, &c., are entirely different from the *Individual*; and they are found to be invariably concomitant with the latter, simply because they are inseparably related to it, by the permanent relation of '*Samavāya*' (Inherence). The Sense of the objection to this theory is that no relation can subsist between any two objects, that are not already known to be established entities; and thus, if either member of the relation be accepted as being an established entity, prior to the assertion of the relation, then the inseparability ceases. Hence no relation between inseparable objects being possible, there can be no such thing as "*Samavāya*."

147 "*Such being the case, &c.*"—There being no inseparability, there is no reason to assert any such relation as the "*Samavāya*." And thus no relation being perceptible, we could not recognise either the *Individual* or the *Class*. And there being no ground for relation, there could be no relation among the categories—among which the only relation held by the Vaiçēshika to subsist is that of "*Samavāya*," which has been proved to be *non est*.

relation (between the *Class* and the *Individual*); nor could we recognise any relation to subsist among the six categories themselves.

148. The separation from *Samavāya* would lead to mutual separation (among objects said to be related by *Samavāya*); and if the existence of these were certain, then there would be no limit; because of its being accompanied by another, and so on, *ad infinitum*.

149. If it is urged that the "*Samavāya* being identical with the form (of the objects themselves), no assumption of any other relation is necessary,"—then on account of this identity, the *Samavāya* may be only a particular form of the qualification and the qualified (*Class* and *Individual*).

150. Because if it (*Samavāya*) is different from them (the objects *Class* and *Individual*), then it cannot subsist as a relation (between these two); if, on the other hand, it be identical with these two, then they cannot be different (from one another).

151. "But the object—such as the 'cow' f. i.—not being perceived apart from its properties, it would be only an aggregate of these properties (and have no independent existence of its own,—like the *forest* and other like things)."

152. The Object is that which permeates through such (properties) as have the character of appearance and disappearance, prior to the comprehension of the properties themselves.

153. Therefore the object—that is perceived, by people, in the form

148 The question is—"Is the *Samavāya* itself related to the objects among whom it is said to subsist, or is it not?" If it is not, then there can be no *Samavāya* with regard to the objects. And if it is, then this relation of *Samavāya* with the objects would stand in need of another relation, and so on, there being no end of *Samavāyas*.

149 The objection is that *Samavāya* is nothing more or less than the forms of the objects themselves. The reply is that in that case, the *Vaiśeṣika* drifts towards our theory; inasmuch as we also assert that the objects—the qualification 'Class' and the qualified 'Individual,' between which you assert the relation of *Samavāya*—are identical; and you also hold that the relation between them is that of identity, which comes to the same thing.

151 The meaning of the objection is that the object is not found to differ from its properties; it is only an agglomeration of the properties; just as the forest is only the collection of trees in it; and further, we have only five senses; and all these have their purpose only in apprehending five sets of properties. Consequently, as there is no sixth sense, we can never perceive anything besides these properties.

153 The sense of the reply to the last *Kārikā* is that the properties—colour, f. i.—have the character of appearing and disappearing—e.g., the greenness of the fruit disappears, and yellowness appears; therefore it is that which conforms with both these properties (the one going and the other coming), which is the object, the fruit; and this must be different from both greenness and yellowness; inasmuch as while the former has disappeared, and the latter has appeared, the fruit itself has all along continued the same; and it is possible to have a cognition, (though only undefined and in the abstract) of the fruit, as apart from its properties.

153 This sums up the authoritative character of Concrete Cognition. "Does not become, &c."—this refers to the Vedantic objection brought forward in *Kārikā* 140.

of *Class*, &c. (i.e., as specified by these)—does not, by this fact, become of another form; and hence it cannot be untrustworthy.

154. That object, whose difference from its properties is clearly defined,—even of this, the identity (with the properties) being permanent, there can be no falsity (or untrustworthiness) of its concrete cognition.

155. It is only that which, while having one cognisable form, is cognised in another, that is false; and not that which is *always* cognised in its own permanent form.

156. That which is cognised by more senses than one does not (only on that account) come to be of diverse forms; for if it were so, then any and every object would come to have diverse forms, on the ground of its being cognised by the (same) sense, as located in the bodies of different persons.

157. If it be urged that “in this case the senses of all person would be of the same *class*, and as such in a way identical,”—then we could have (the same in the other case also—the non-difference being based upon) the sameness of the class “Sense-organ.” The class “Being” too, is not diverse, because of its cognition being always the same (even though it is cognisable by all the five Sense-organs).

158. Colour, Taste, Odour, &c., do not become identical with one another; because of the difference in their cognitions. The *Singleness* and

159 This anticipates the following objection of the Buddhists: “An object cognised by the senses of touch and sight would come to have diverse forms. For if even on the diversity of the comprehending organ, there were no diversity in the forms of the object comprehended, then there would be no difference between smell and colour, &c. If it be urged that the *class* ‘Being’ is perceived by means of all the five senses,—we deny this; because no such class can be perceived by the five senses. And if you assert a commixture of the Sense-organs, then it would be superfluous to postulate more than one Sense-organ—that of Touch, for instance; and the functions of all the other senses might be accepted as congregating in this alone.” The sense of the reply is that the mere fact of being cognised by more senses than one does not constitute sufficient ground for postulating a diversity in its forms. For if that fact were the sole ground for diversity, then even the object perceived by means of a single sense, would have to be taken as diverse; inasmuch as the object is cognised by many persons, and as such there is a diversity in the comprehending sense—this diversity being that of the senses as belonging to various persons.

160 The objector says that though the one sense—of Touch, f.i.,—may belong to different persons, yet everyone of these is the “Sense of Touch”; and as such there is no real diversity in the comprehending organ. The meaning of the reply is that though the Sense of Touch may differ from the Sense of Sight, yet both equally are “Sense;” and as such, in our case too, there is no real diversity. Though the *class* ‘Being’ is cognisable by all the senses, yet its cognition being of the same form, in all cases, it cannot be said to have many forms.

161 In the same manner, colour, taste, &c., cannot be said to be identical; because all of them are cognised to be of the same character. We can however call these “single,” taking them as forming parts of the *class* “Being,” and “many” or “diverse,” when they are taken in their respective individual forms of colour, taste, &c.



manifoldness of these may be explained as being due respectively, to their being considered collectively as "Being," or individually, as "Colour," "Taste," "Odour," &c.

159. In some cases, there being a commixture of various Sense-functions, we conclude that the Sense-organ functioning is not one; because in certain cases we have a definite idea as to the respective importance of the various Sense-functions, based upon the comparative strength and weakness of the Sense-organs.

160-161. As for instance, in the case of the Mind, we find that with regard to Colour, &c., it functions in conjunction with the eye, and the other Sense-organs; while with regard to pleasure, pain, &c., we find it functioning independently by itself. The absence of commixture in one case does not necessitate its absence in every case; nor does the perception of commixture in one case necessitate its presence in another case.

162. Because we find that there is a remembrance of sound, even on the destruction of the ear; and also because we find that on such destruction, there is no perception of any present sound;—we conclude that there is a definite standard (regulating the relative importance of the senses).

159 This Kārikā refutes the objection of the superfluonsness of postulating more than one sense. The meaning is that, because two functions of two senses become mixed up in the cognition of a single object, it does not follow that there is only one Sense-organ; since as a matter of fact, we find that one, whose sense of vision is strong, and that of audition weak, sees distant objects, but does not hear distant sounds, and *vice versâ*. Such adjustment of the Sense-functions could not be possible, if the Sense-organ were one only. Therefore, even though any two Sense-functions may become mixed up in the cognition of an object, yet the two Sense-organs remain distinct.

160-61 These Kārikās have in view the objection that "Coming across a commixture of Sense-functions, in the case of the cognition of *Substance*, we might also infer the commixture to belong to the cases of Colour-perception and the rest." The sense of the reply is that, that which has been seen to exist in one case, cannot necessarily be said to exist in every other case. As for instance, we find that, in the case of the cognition of colour, &c., we find the *mind* functioning with the help of the external organs, the eye and the rest, whereas in the cases of *Remembrance*, *Pleasure*, and the like, the mind is found to function by itself alone. In the same manner, of the external organs, the eye, &c., also, there would be a commixture in the case of the cognition of *substance*, while in the cases of the perception of colour, sound, &c., each of these organs would be functioning, each by itself.

162 This Kārikā explains how we come to infer the fixity of the application of the mind, functioning as stated in the last Kārikā. Inasmuch as we find that one, who is totally deaf, *remembers* sounds, and *feels* pleasure, &c.,—we infer that, for *remembering* and *feeling pleasure*, &c., the mind functions independently of the external Sense-organs. On the other hand, we find that the deaf are incapable of perceiving any sounds at the present time; and thence we conclude that in the *perception* of such sounds, &c., the mind stands in need of the external Sense-organs.



163. If the Sense-organ were only one, in all cases, then either everything or nothing would be perceived. If it be urged that we postulate different capacities (or functions) of the same Sense-organ,—then, these capacities themselves could be said to be so many distinct organs of sense.

164. A deaf person would also hear sounds, if (in the perception of sound) there were a commixture with the eye, &c.; and also if the mind were independent (of the external organs) with regard to the cognition of present objects.

165. The deaf person could not remember any sound, if the ear were the sole cause of memory; or (if you assert his remembrance to be spontaneous, and not due to any cause, then), like remembrance, he would also have a cognition of the present sound (which is not possible).

166. And on the other hand, there could not be any subsequent remembrance of the sound, if the mind had no share in its comprehension, at the time of its cognition by the ear; nor could there be the non-remembrance of all other things (at the time of the perception of sound).

167. If the person were not dependent upon the Sense-organs, then he would have a simultaneous cognition of all things at once; because by himself, he consists of pure consciousness.

168. Therefore in some places, we must accept exclusive fixity, as well

163 The postulating of five different functions for any one Sense-organ, is the same as postulating five distinct Sense-organs.

164 If there were *commixture* alone, there could be no restriction. "If the mind, &c."—Because though the deaf have no ears, yet they have their minds intact.

165 This Kārikā anticipates the following objection: "The cognition of sound could be explained as being due solely to the ear; why call in the aid of the mind?" The sense of the reply is that, there could not be a *remembrance* of any particular sound, if the mind had nothing to do with its previous perception. And farther, we find that an absent-minded person, though with his eyes all right and quite open, is unable to see anything. And again, after a certain object—*sound*, f.i.—has been perceived, one does not, by that means, *remember* all other objects, colour, and the rest. Therefore we conclude that the mind, the organ of remembrance, has got something to do with the perception of objects. Because if we were to accept the agency of the mind with regard to *memory*, without admitting the fact of its having something to do with the object at the time of its being *perceived* by the Sense-organ, then we would be landing ourselves on an absurdity,—that of the *perception* of one object bringing about the *remembrance* of all other objects; since, in that case, there would be nothing to restrict the agency of the mind to any particular object.

167 A scion of the Vedānti asserts that the Self itself consists of pure consciousness; and as such, all cognition is only natural to it; whence there is no necessity of having either external or internal organs of perception. The Kārikā means to say that if such were the case, then all sorts of cognitions, of all things in the world, would be crowding upon the person, all at once.

168 Through the character of their effect; in the shape of cognition, we infer the capabilities of the *cogniser* and the *cognised*; and from these, we infer that, in certain cases,—as in that of *colour*—there is no *commixture*; while in others—as in that of *substance*—we have a *commixture*.

as commixture, in accordance with the character of the cognition,—these two being assumed, from the capabilities of the cognisable (object) and the cognising (organ), in accordance with the effects of these, in the shape of the resultant cognition.

169. The divisions, of the eye, &c., as well as colour, &c., are limited to five only. Therefore though there are many such subdivisions as the *Blue*, *Red*, &c., yet there is no necessity of postulating innumerable organs (for the perception of each of these).

170. For this reason, we conclude that it is by means of all the *five* organs of sense that we have the cognition of the class "Being" and the class "Quality"; of the "Substance" and the "Shape" (of objects), the cognition is caused by *two* (Sight and Touch); and of *Colour* and the rest, by only *one* (the eye, &c. one by one).

171. (Obj.). "Though identical with the Class, &c., yet the idea (of an object) would be false, on account of its being brought about, through identification with the word;—as is the case with the idea of *Colour* and the rest."

172. (Rep.). The cognitions of objects, as produced, are not in the form of identification with words. Because the ideas produced by words are exactly similar to those that have been brought about before the use of the words.

173. (Obj.). "But the idea of the form of the *cow*, in the shape of the class *cow*, &c., never appears, until there has been a recognition of the relation subsisting between the word 'cow' and the object (it denotes)."

169 As we have the restricted applications of the Sense-organs, to such objects as *Taste*, *Colour*, &c.,—i.e., the cognition of colour is restricted to the eye and so on; therefore we accept these as five distinct organs; but in the case of *Blue*, *Red*, &c., there is no such restriction,—all *colour* being equally perceptible by the *eye* alone,—therefore these are not accepted as separate subdivisions.

170 This sums up the conclusions arrived at.

171 The sense of the objection embodied in the *Kārikā* is this: "The object being identical with *Class*, *Action* and *Property*, we grant the trustworthiness of the cognition of such identity; but the *word*, in which this idea is expressed, is something quite different (from the *object*, and the *Class*, &c.); therefore the *idea*, as identified with (i.e., expressed in) the *words*, cannot but be false. Such words as 'Cow' and the like denote the *Class*, *Action* and *Property*; and as such, specify such *class* as being specific forms of themselves; and then subsequently, they determine the particular individual object, as specified by such *Class*, &c. Thus then though there is no falsity attaching to the object as identified with the *Class*, &c., yet the identification of the *Class*, &c., with the *Words* cannot be true. The proper name of different objects too serve to represent such objects as identical with the names; and this identification of objects with words cannot but be false."

"The idea of colour, &c.—i.e., just as the identification of the *colour blue*, with the word "blue" is false.

172 That is to say, the idea that we have of objects is not in the form of words; i.e. our cognition of an object is not always accompanied by a verbal expression of the same.

174. "And if that (which appears in the particular 'cow') were the form of the *Class*, &c., then even one who does not know the word 'cow' would recognise the animal (as belonging to such and such a class, which is an absurdity). Thus then, both by Affirmative and Negative premises we conclude that the object is identical with the Word."

175. (Rep.). Just as *Colour*, *Taste*, &c., are recognised, in their own form, as different from one another, even before their expression in words,—so would it also be in the case in question. The fact of these having different names (expression in words) is something quite different (from the objects themselves).

176. Nor can an object be said to be not cognised, simply because it has not been specified by words. Therefore even he, who does not know the word, can recognise the class 'Cow,' &c.

177. Even in the case of a cognition produced by contact with the sense of hearing, there is no attribution of identity with words; because there is a difference between the object and the word, based upon the fact of these being cognised by the Eye and the Ear (respectively).

178. It is only in the ascertainment of one property of an object with innumerable properties, that the *word* serves as the means; and it could in no case, be the cause of the imposition of its own identity (upon the object).

179. Nor is it possible for the form of the *means* to be imposed upon

174 The affirmative Premiss is: "The idea of the *class* ('cow') is brought about only when the relation between the *word* ('cow') and the *object* (the *Class*) has been duly ascertained"; and the Negative Premiss is: "One who does not know the word can have no idea of the object, as belonging to any particular *class*."

175 Just as we have the cognition of *Colour*, *Taste*, &c., in the abstract, even before the cognition of any relation between the *word* and the object,—so, in the same manner, we could also have the cognition of *Class*, &c., even before they come to be expressed in words, in their own specific forms, and not in the form of the words (subsequently recognised as denoting them). One who knows the words is able to remember the names of the *class*, &c., as something over and above the specific forms of the words; and thereby he comes to give expression to them in words.

176 It has been argued in the "Vākyapadiya" that "one who does not know the word cannot have any idea of the *class*, because no expression in words is possible for him; and there can be no such idea, in the absence of a corresponding verbal expression." It has also been declared that "In the world there is no idea which is not expressed in words; all idea is cognised only as expressed in words." The Kārikā objects to this theory.

177 Even in the case of a cognition accompanied by Words, there is no notion of an identity between the Word and the Object; because the object is perceived by the Eye, while the Word is cognised by the Ear; and as such, the cognitions of these being radically different, they can never be identical.

178 Words have their use only in defining or singling out one out of the many properties of an object; in no case do they lead to any notion of their identity with the object.

its *object*; for it cannot in any way be held that the form of the lamp or of the Sense (of sight), is imposed upon the Colour perceived.

180. If the class 'Cow' be always cognised in the form of the word,—then, inasmuch as no other form is cognised, how could there be any difference between them, or any attribution of the form of the one to the other?

181. And again, if there be non-difference, in reality, there can be no falsity (in the identity); and if there be any difference in their forms, then there could be no chance of the said imposition; and the assumption of such imposition would only be erroneous.

182. It is only by means of *words* that there can be any description (or mention) of the object that has been cognised. And for one who would describe either the *object* or the *word*, or the *Idea*, the only expression that he could use is "the cow."

183. And on account of this identity of expression (or description), the hearer comes to conceive the identity, of the *word*, the *idea* and the *object*, with the expression (used by the speaker).

184. Though the cause of error is the same (in both cases) it is the *cognition* and *audition* that are known as imposed upon the *object*, and not the *object* upon those.

185. As a matter of fact however, the idea of the *cow* (the object) is in the form of 'an animal with dewlaps, &c.'; of the 'word' (Gō) is in the form of the letters 'Ga,' &c.; and that of the '*idea*' of these two is without any (external) shape.

186. If the *object* were always cognised to be identical, in form, with

180 If the Individual and the Class were both cognised in the form of the Word alone, then the Class and the Word, both being eternal, there would be an absolute non-difference between the two; and thereby there could be no attribution of the form of the Word on the *Object* or *Class*. That is to say, the Class being cognised in the form of the Word, and in no other form, it would become non-different from it.

181 "Imposition"—which has been noted and denied in 179.

182 That is to say, the *Object*, the *Word*, and the *Idea* of the object, can all be described by the expression "the cow"; the *Word* only serves as the means of describing to others what one has seen. And it is from this fact that arises the erroneous notion that *the word is identical with the object*.

183 The hearer reasons thus: "Because the speaker uses the same expression in the case of all the three, therefore he must also, necessarily, have the same *idea* with regard to them, &c., &c."

185 That is to say, the aforesaid imposition is only an error; as a matter of fact, the form of the idea is different in each case.

186 Some people hold that the Word only serves to denote its own form; and they declare that there is an imposition of this form upon the individual Object. The Kārikā objects to this view, on the ground that, if the *object* denoted by the Word were identical with the Word, then we would have the absurdity of there being no difference between such objects as the *playing dice*, the tree *Terminalia bellerica* and other objects, that are all expressed by the same word "Aksha"; for the *word* remaining

the word,—then in the case of such words as “Aksha” (and others with several meanings), the (different objects), *dice* and the rest, would also come to be identical.

187. If it be urged that “there may be such an identity,”—(we reply) that such identity is never recognised before the use of the word. If it be urged that “the same may be the case with the class *cow*, &c.,” we deny this; because in this latter case we always see only one form.

188. In the case of the plant *terminalia belerica* and the other two (denotations of the word *Aksha*), there is no conformity of any one property; the only common factor being the denotability by the word ‘Aksha’; and thus it is different from words denoting a *class* (in which there is conformity of properties among the various *individuals* constituting the *Class*).

189. In the case of the word ‘Aksha’ however, we find three forms entirely different from one another. This could not be possible if there were any imposition of the form of the word; as there is no difference in the form of the word “Aksha,” (which continues to be the same, whatever meaning it may be taken to denote).

190. If it be urged that “the word ‘Aksha’ may be different (in each case)” —we deny this; because as a matter of fact whenever this word is used, there is always a doubt as to its present signification, which would not be possible, unless the word remained the *same* (in the case of all its significations); and secondly, we also actually find that the form of the word is precisely the same (in all cases).

191. In the case of such words as “bhavati” and the like,—where the same, the forms of the objects, being identical with it, could not be different from one another.

187 The objection in the first half belongs to the Banddha theory that the function of a Word lies only in the *exclusion* of everything other than the object denoted by it; and as such the meaning of the word “Aksha” would only be the “negation of all that is *not-Aksha*”; and in this form, there cannot but be non-difference among the objects denoted by the Word. The Author replies that we do not recognise any such identity, prior to the use of the Word; and without the recognition of such a relation (which according to the Buddhist is necessary in the denotation of the Word), the Word cannot have any meaning. The objection raised in the second half of the *Kārikā* means that “the Mimansaka also holds the *Class* ‘Cow’ to be one only; and as such, he will also have to face the absurdity of the non-difference among thousands of *individual cows*.” The reply to this is that, for the Mimansaka, there is no such absurdity, inasmuch as all the individual cows are actually found to be identical (similar) to one another, in their main shape, (the only difference being in the minor details).

190 Whenever a word with several meanings is used, there is always a doubt as to its true signification, which would not be possible, if the word did not remain the same in all cases. The theory here refuted is that the Word does not really consist of the *letters*, but of the “*sphota*,” which is held to be peculiar to each word, and on which depends the signification of the word.

191 “*Bhavati*”—(1) the Locative of ‘*Bhavan*’ (you), and also (2) the form in the Present Tense, Third Person, Singular of the root “*bhū*” (to be).

there is a difference based upon (the word in one case being) a Pronoun, and (in another case) a Verb,—the form remains the same; and as such, if there were any imposition (of the form of the word upon the object), we would have non-difference in the two meanings (of the word taken as a Pronoun, and as a Verb).

192. The *formation* of the word being precisely the same in both cases (*bhavati*, as a Pronoun, and as a Verb), how can the verbal expression be said to have the character of something *to be accomplished*? Or again, how could the shapeless (immaterial) word have a shaped (corporeal or material) signification?

193. If the words 'cow,' 'horse' and 'white' were independent of the form of the objects denoted, how could there be any restriction as to the denotations of these, as resting in 'class' 'quality,' &c.?

194. The difference between the words "Tree" and "The Fig-tree" being exactly the same as (that) between (these and) the words "Jar," &c.,—how could there be in the case of the former couple, any relation of the *general* and the *particular*, if we did not take into consideration the forms of the *objects* (independently of the words)?

195. Nor could there be any co-substrateness (of the *object* denoted and the *Idea* produced by the word), as (there is none) in the case of the

192 As in the case of the pronoun, so also in that of the Verb, the Word is equally complete and accomplished. And then if the form of the Word were imposed upon (and identical with) that of the Meaning, how could the meaning of the Verb be said to be *in the course of completion*? For the verb '*packati*' does not signify the *completion* of the action of *cooking*; it only signifies that the '*action of cooking is in progress*.' Some people, again, hold the object to be a particular modification of the Word; and this is refuted by the latter sentence of the Text. The meaning of the *Kārikā* is that a *material* modification can belong only to a *material* primary. In the case in question, however, the word being *immaterial*, cannot have *material* modifications in the shape of the *jar*, &c.

193 If it was the mere *form* of the Word that was imposed upon the object denoted,—without any idea of the *class*, &c.,—how could we say that "such and such a word denotes the *class*, and another denotes the *property*."

194 You say that the form of the *object* signified by the Word is identical with the form of the Word itself. But you see that the difference between the words "Tree" and "Fig" would, in that case, be exactly the same as that between the words "Jar" and "Tree"; and then what does this lead to? It cannot but lead to the conclusion that the relation that subsists between the two objects *Tree* and *Fig* is exactly the same as that which subsists between the *Tree* and the *jar*; which would mean that there is no relation between the generic term "Tree" and the particular term "Fig."

195 In such instances as the "blue lotus" (where there is a co-substrateness between the property *blueness* and the class *lotus*), as there is no co-substrateness between the Word and the Idea, there would be none between the *Idea* and the *Object* denoted; because, according to you, it is the Word itself that is denoted; and as there are two words in the compound "blue lotus," the *object* denoted by it cannot be one; and as the objects are two, there can be no co-substrateness between the *concept* "blue lotus" and the objects denoted by the two words. If it be urged that "as in the case

word and the *Idea*. Nor can two distinct *Ideas* cohere in one undefined (abstract) cognition.

196. If it be urged that 'the coherence is in the Substance (in general)'—then, all such words, as 'cow,' 'horse,' &c., would come to have one and the same meaning; because all these words signify a *substance*.

197. The expression 'blue lotus' too is not used with reference to a particular case of non-difference (between *blueness* and *lotus*); for if it were so, then the expression could not be used elsewhere (*i.e.*, in the case of another blue lotus); whereas we see that such use is desirable.

198. Nor do you accept the object "blue lotus" to be one only, (and reasonably so),—because (in the compound 'blue lotus') we recognise a

of the theory of the denotation of *Class*, &c., by the Word, the words 'blue lotus' give rise to only one *conception* in the abstract, (*i.e.*, the abstract *Idea* of the Blue Lotus), so, in our case too, we could assert that there is co-substrateness between the concept 'blue lotus,' and the aforesaid abstract *Idea*,—to this we reply that in your case, there is nothing to regulate the abstract signification of the words 'blue' and 'lotus.' In our case, we assert the word "blue" to denote a *property* and 'lotus' to denote an individual of the *class* "lotus;" and hence we find the relation of the *qualification* and the *qualified* subsisting between the two; and thereby we make "lotus" the chief member of the compound, which fact serves to restrict the abstract *Idea* to the *lotus* and not to the *blueness*. While according to you, both words signifying their abstract *Ideas*, there would be nothing to restrict the abstract denotation of the compound to anyone of the two objects. Says the *Kāṇikā*: "Two ideas are said to be co-substrate only when they are found to inhere in the same substrate. In accordance with the *Imposition Theory*, where can they cohere? For they cannot do so in the specific Abstract Property ("*Swalakshana*"); because this is not definable. In our theory however, there can be such co-inherence, inasmuch as we assert that a portion of the denoted object enters into the Abstract *Idea* produced by the Word."

199 It has been shown above that there can be no co-inherence in the '*swalakshana*' of the signification of the compound "blue-lotus." Under the circumstances, if the co-inherence be held to be in the *substance in general*—*i.e.*, if the co-substrateness of 'lotus' and 'blue' be held to be located in their generic character of 'Substance'—then inasmuch as this latter is the same in the case of all significant words, all objects denoted by words would become co-substrates with one another.

197 If the expression "blue lotus" were held to be restricted to one such lotus in particular, then there would be no use of the expression in the case of any other such lotus; and this is not desirable.

198 You do not admit of any such *class* as "blue lotus"—which would include many individual blue lotuses; and as such, you cannot base the use of the compound upon any such *class*, which is the only way of applying one name to many objects. And farther, you do not even admit any single object, as *blue lotus*; which you could very reasonably accept, in accordance with your theory that the objects are identical with the words denoting them. Though such acceptance would not be right, inasmuch as "blue" and "lotus" are two distinct words, and as such they form the two members of a compound, and accordingly they have two distinct forms, whence they must be taken to signify two distinct objects; for the simple reason that the imposition of the forms of two distinct words cannot result in the denotation of a single object.

difference, of words and meanings, based upon the (two) members (of the compound).

199. We also come across cases of the imposition of two words (upon the same object); e.g., in the case of synonyms; and in such cases, these too would become co-substrate, like the expression "blue lotus."

200. A word is never used with reference to any object that has not been perceived before; and then, at the time of the comprehension of the relation (between the *word* and the *object*), what sort of object would be cognised?

201. Because at that time it is not possible for the form of the *word* to be imposed upon that of the *object*; nor is the relation (of the word), comprehended in reference to the particular object spoken of.

202. And if the power of imposing its own form belonged to the *word*, independently of the comprehension of the *relation*,—then, we would have such imposition of forms, even in the case of a word that is heard for the first time.

199 If in the case of "blue-lotus," you assert the co-substrateness to consist in the fact of the two words being used in close proximity, then in cases where two synonyms are pronounced together, when the meaning of a certain word is being explained to others—e.g., "Utpalam Kamalam"—you would have to admit a co-substrateness of these words also, which is an absurdity.

200 Says the *Kārikā*: "A word is not able to signify an object, unless its relation to it has been ascertained; and, no such relation can be ascertained, unless the object has been perceived. Therefore it would be a hard nut to crack, for the upholder of the Imposition Theory, to explain what sort of object is perceived at the time of the comprehension of the said relation." The question implies that the object cannot be cognised in any way—in accordance with the Imposition Theory. The next *Kārikā* explains why there can be no such cognition of the object.

201 "Because, &c."—i.e., because it is only after the relation has been ascertained that there is a conception of the identity of the word with the object. The *Kārikā* adds: "The object being, according to you, of the same form as the word, it cannot bring about any idea of such form, unless it has itself been fully comprehended beforehand. Thus then the comprehension of the *relation* would depend upon the *imposition*, and this *imposition* too would depend upon a full comprehension of the relation; and we would have the fault of mutual Inter-dependence."

"Nor is the comprehension, &c."—The relation of the word with its denotation is not comprehended with reference to any one particular object—f.i., the *individual* cow; for if it were so, then the word (the name "cow") could not be used with reference to any other individual of the same class ("cow"); inasmuch as the relation is, as held by you, restricted to the former individual. And thus we would have to postulate endless relations—in fact, as many as there may be individuals that we come across.

202 That is to say, this would give rise to the absurdity that the meaning of a word would be fully comprehended, even by one who hears it for the first time, just as well as any other person, who may have known it for ever so long. If the imposition of the form of the word on the object were independent of any comprehension of the relation subsisting between the word and the object, then one who hears the word "cow" pronounced for the first time would also understand that it signifies a certain animal with dewlaps, &c.,—which is an absurdity.



203. For us, however, no remembrance of the object denoted results on the first utterance of the word, because the person does not yet know the object (it denotes). Whereas according to you the form of the object would be perceived in that of the words.

204. Just as with regard to objects, that form the denotations of unknown words, there is no idea of these (words as denoting such objects); so similarly, in the case of words whose denotations are not known, (there is no idea of the object as denoted by such words), even when the word has been heard.

205. Thus then, the denotations (*i.e.*, the objects) do not depend entirely upon words; on the other hand, since *words* have the function of recalling the (pre-cognised) object, therefore we come to recognise the dependence of these (*words* upon *objects*, and not that of *objects* upon *words*).

206. For these reasons, we conclude that it is only the form of the object, cognised at the time of the comprehension of the relation (between words and their denotations), that is cognised through the word also; and the (original) form of the object is in no case totally suppressed.

207. We do not in any way cognise the identity of the *word*, in the *idea*, that is produced by the *word*, either in the case of activity, or in that of cessation from activity.

208. If we accepted the theory of the imposition (of the form of *words* upon the *objects* they denote), then we would comprehend different meanings from the (synonymous) words—"kara," "*hasta*," etc.; because there is a difference in the forms of these words.

209-210. The imposition of the identity of anything is found to be due either to *similarity* or to *reflection*. In the present case, however, we

203 The above objection does not apply to our theory; because we hold that the comprehension of the meaning of a word depends upon a certain relation that subsists between the word and the object it denotes; and in the case of the hearing of a word for the first time, as the hearer is unable to recognise the relation that subsists between that word and its denoted object, he can derive no conception from this word. This argument however does not serve the Imposition Theory; because according to this, the form of the object is identical with that of the word; and hence as soon as the word is heard (even though it be for the first time), there must follow the conception of the object, which is absurd.

206 "*Suppressed*"=changed; that is to say, when the word is used, the form of the object does not become changed into that of the word, as held by the Imposition Theory.

207 And hence there can be no "*imposition*" of the form of the word upon the object.

209-210 We find that there is an "*imposition*" of the identity of *silver* in the *shell*, on the ground of their similarity. There is also an imposition (or attribution) of identity in the case of the *redness* of the rose and the *crystal*, on the ground of the *redness* being reflected in the *crystal*. But in the case of the alleged identity of the forms of the word and the object, we find none of the aforesaid grounds for imposition. Therefore we conclude that there is no such identity in this last case.

do not find in the *word*, any similarity with the *object*; nor can there be any reflection of the word (on the object) which is at a distance from it; nor could any reflection from a distance be possible in the case of an object which has no (bodily) shape.

211. And if the proximity (of the word) to the object were said to be due to the all-pervading character of words,—then every object would come to be reflected upon by every word.

212. And again, anything that is perceptible by a different Sense-organ cannot be the reflector of an object; for the perception of the rock crystal, even when having the reflection of shellac, is not brought about by the Senses of Touch, etc.

213. If we accepted "Imposition," then Inference and Verbal Testimony would both become false; and because of the falsity of all specification, there would also follow a negation of all things (through falsity).

214. If the opponent were to say "let it be so,"—then his own words also becoming untrustworthy (for the same reason), how could he make any true declaration? For certainly, no truth is cognised through false (untrustworthy) assertions.

215. Also from the arguments (we shall bring forward later on) against the Ṣūnyavāda, we infer the functions of the *Cognition* and *Word* to be true; but the form of the object can never be dependent upon the word.

216. Therefore, even before the use of the *word*, those objects that are cognised by the ideas of *distinctness*, *oneness*, etc.,—of such objects, the existence is ever real.

217. Even in the case of such objects (Virtue, etc.), as are known only by *words*, though there can be no idea of the object, in the absence of the *word*,—yet the form of the object is not totally destroyed (i.e., cannot be denied).

218. (As for instance) in the absence of the eye, the form of *colour* is not perceived; but from this we do not conclude that the form of colour has been destroyed (and does not exist).

219. The relation (between the *word* and the *object*) being eternal, it

212 The reflected and that which is reflected upon must both be perceived by the same Sense-organ.

213 If all concrete cognition be said to be false,—as it must be in accordance with the Imposition Theory,—then all the Means of Right Notion, Inference and the rest, would become false; since every one of these is based upon well-defined (concrete) cognitions. "Everything"—i.e., all worldly affairs.

216 After the use of the word, the conception of the object is always in keeping with some foregoing perception. Even in the case of objects, whose names are not known to us, we have such notions, as that of its *being different from other objects*, *being only one in number*, and so forth; consequently the existence of such objects can never be denied.

219 This Kārikā has the following objection in view: "We grant that the form of the object is different from that of the word; then the case will be this, that in the com-



cannot be said that the object is *never* perceived in the form of the word (which is held to be imposed upon it); because all men do not, at one and the same time, perceive the object in another form (*i.e.*, in a form different from that of the word).

220. If it be urged that "the same (argument) would apply to the case of (the cognition of the object as) being of the same form (as the word),"—then (we reply that) when both of these cases are true, just consider whether the object itself is incapable of being denoted by that word, or the cogniser himself is incapable of comprehending the signification of the word?

221-22. The negation and affirmation (of the denotability by the word) in the object, cannot both be possible; because of the two being mutually contradictory; whereas it is quite reasonable to lay down denotativeness and non-denotativeness (of the word), in accordance with the difference (in the capabilities) of the cognising persons;—as in the case of the blind and the non-blind, with regard to the (perception of) colour (presented) before them. For these reasons the cognition, in the object, of the form of the word (*i.e.*, the denotability of the object by that word),

prehension of the relation of the word and the object, the object would not be perceived in the form of the word; and it would be only after such comprehension of the relation, that the object would be cognised in the form of the word; and this would ultimately mean that the object, *which has not the form of the word*, would come to be cognised *as having the form of the word*; and this idea cannot but be wrong." The sense of the reply is that the relation between the word and its denotation being eternal, this relation, even before its comprehension, subsists all the same; and the object all along has the capability of being denoted by that word; and it is only this capability that becomes manifested, after the due comprehension of the aforesaid relation; and again it is this capability that is meant, when we say that "the object has *the form of the word*,"—which statement does not mean that the forms of the word and the object are identical. "But how do you know that this *capability* is eternal?" For the simple reason that, from the mere fact of one man not knowing the relation subsisting between the word and the object, we cannot conclude that the relation is not known to any person in the world; and hence we cannot assert that all men, at one and the same time, are ignorant of the denotability of the object by the word. That is to say, though one may not know the object *cow* by the name "Cow," yet there are sure to be others who will know it by that name; and thus we find that the denotability of the object by the word cannot be entirely denied at any time.

220 The sense of the objection is that, as has been said in the case of the denotability of the object,—that all men do not all at once recognise the object by a particular name,—so may it also be asserted that 'all men do not, all at once, come to recognise the denotability of an object by a particular Word.' It is said in reply that the reasoning might truly apply to both cases; but if a little consideration is given to the point as to which of the two alternatives is the more reasonable,—(1) either that the object itself is not denotable by the word, because one man does not know it by that name, or (2) that such individual non-recognition only implies a certain incapacity in the man himself,—it would appear which is more acceptable and compatible with well-ascertained facts.

belongs only to one who knows the word (as denoting that special object), and to none else.

223. (Obj.). "In such words (proper names) as 'Dēvadatta' and the like, we find a beginning of the assertion of the relation (subsisting between the name and the person); and therefore the object being (in this case) non-eternal, its conformity to the word (denotability) would also be non-eternal."

224. (Rep.). In such cases also (i.e., in proper names) we accept the eternal character of the power of producing a cognition of the form of the word (with regard to the object), as belonging to the signified object and the signifying word; it is only the application of the name to a particular object that can be non-eternal (having a beginning in time).

225. Prior to such conventional application, no one ever cognises the denotability (by the word, of the particular individual); and hence some people accept the falsity of (these), in accordance with the theory of Imposition.

226. The denotativeness of the word is held to be true, whenever the word serves as the means of bringing about the idea of an individual object, exactly as it had been perceived before the word had been heard.

227. Or, granted that it is only after such conventional application,

223 In the case of proper names, the object and (hence) the relation being both transient, the denotability of the object by the name would also be transient; and hence it cannot be denied that the form of the word (which is not that of the object) is *falsely* attributed to the object. That is to say, the denotability of the object by its name is not always eternal; and as such, the argument based upon the eternality of such relations falls to the ground.

224 The word "Dēvadatta," by its natural denotative power, signifies the *benediction*: *may the gods give him to us*; and in this sense, the name "Devadatta" too, like the word "cow," would have an eternal relation with its denotation, the aforesaid benediction; and hence even in this case there would be no false attribution of the denotability of the object by any particular word. It is only the *application* of these proper names to particular persons or things, which has a beginning in time, and is, consequently, transient.

225 The denotability of the individual by the name does not really exist; it only comes to be cognised by conventional application,—prior to which, such denotability does not exist; and for the matter of that, it cannot exist, in reality, after the convention either; and as such, all proper names are cases of *false attribution*.

226 The last Kārikā states the reply to the objection, according to a certain section of those theorists who hold the Imposition theory. The present Kārikā offers a reply from the author's own standpoint. As a matter of fact, there is no imposition; all that the word does is to remind the hearer, of a particular individual, exactly as this had been perceived at the time of the comprehension of the relation of the word and the object. In no case does the word impose its own form upon the object.

227 This Kārikā anticipates the following objection: "Such names as *Dittha* and the like have never been used, before they were conventionally attached to certain objects; and as such, these words cannot be said to *remind* one of an object." The sense of the reply is that the capability of an object, of being remembered by means of a certain

that the *word* comes to indicate the denotability of the object thereby; even then, this could not establish an identity of the *object* with the *word*.

228. Conventional restriction is put upon the case of the *object* which is denotable by all forms (of words), as also upon the case of the *word* which is capable of denoting all forms of objects.

229-30. In the case of the cogniser, who remembers (at the time of comprehending an object by means of a word) the relation between the *word* and the *object*,—the Idea that is produced, by the remembrance of a formerly perceived object, with reference to the object before his eyes, cannot but be accepted as Sense-perception.

230-31. (Even in this case) the objects, severally amenable to Memory and Sense-perception, are distinctly discriminated: what are *remembered* are the *word* and the *relation* (of this word with the object seen before), and the character of Sense-perception may not belong to (the cognition of) these; but the mere fact of the non-sensuous character of these does not preclude Sense-perception from applying to the cognition of the object (before the eye).

232-33. Though the perception of the Cow at the present time is tainted by memory, yet it is perceived as clearly distinct from the previous conception, both in individuality and in the *time* (of perception); and herein lies the occasion for the right notion (to be got at exclusively through the Senses).

name, is permanent, and as such, must be accepted as belonging to the object, even before the name has been fixed by convention; and all that convention helps in doing is to manifest this ever-existing denotability; and in no case can it serve to *identify* the object with the word.

233 Says the *Kāçikā*: "To the object itself belongs the capability of being denoted by all words; and hence whichever word may happen to be applied to it by convention, it comes to be accepted as being specially expressive of that object. Conversely, a word is also naturally capable of expressing all objects; and it comes to be restricted to a particular object, by mere convention. Thus far the author has set aside all chance of an identity of the object with the word.

229-30 With this begins the refutation of the theory that "verbal cognition is not trustworthy, because it is mixed up with memory." When a person sees a particular cow, he at once remembers the cow he had seen before, and then remembers the relation which that particular cow at that time had with the word "cow," and then, lastly, comes to recognise the object before him to be a "cow." Though memory enters into the element of such verbal cognition, yet as the cognition is that of an object before the person's eyes, the fact of its being a *perception* (and as such authoritative) cannot be denied.

230-31 "The mere fact, &c."—Because these conceptions are not "Perception," it does not necessarily follow that the cognition of the object too is not "Perception."

232-33 That is, the cow, that is seen at present, is perceived, not as being the same that was perceived in childhood (at which time it was pointed out to the person, for the first time),—but as something quite distinct from it *individually* (though belonging to the same class); and it is this *individuality* of the object that forms the subject of Sense-perception, which thus comes to be true.

233-34. That portion of Sense-perception, which had been perceived before, (i.e., the notions of the *word* and its *relation*), cannot be said to be perceived (exclusively by means of the Senses); but the *present* existence (of the individual object) is not got at by any previous conception.

234-35. That "it is only such cognition as is prior to remembrance that is called *Sense-perception*"—there is no such command either of a king, or of the Veda.

235-36. Nor is the function of Sense-organs, after remembrance, precluded by any valid reason; and therefore this (fact of its following after remembrance) alone cannot make it (the function of the Sense-organs) faulty.

236-37. For these reasons we must accept, as "*Sense-perception*," every conception that is produced by the contact of the Sense-organs with the objects (of perception),—whether it appears before or after remembrance (it does not affect the fact of Sense-born conceptions being "*Sense-perception*").

237-239. Just as those that are absent-minded do not recognise objects even in contact with their Senses, so also those that are deluded by similarity, &c. But this does not imply the falsity (or untrustworthiness) of the perception of the object, by another person who can distinctly recognise it (rightly), even if it be of an extremely subtle character, by rightly discriminating it from other objects that may be similar to it.

239-41. Just as one who has been well instructed in music, is able to discriminate between its different notes, both ordinary and Vedic, such as the *Shadja*, *Rshabha*, &c.; and those who have not been so instructed know all notes merely as *music*; but the non-recognition by these latter cannot lead to the conclusion that the recognition of discriminating persons is false.

241-42. For these (discriminating persons) correctly recognise the differences (between the different notes of music), even when the names (*Shadja*), &c., are not mentioned.

233.34 This Kārikā seems to distinguish the part amenable to Memory from that amenable to present Sense-perception.

234.35 That is to say, we could accept such an apparently absurd assertion, only if either a king commanded its acceptance, or if it was directly laid down in the Veda.

237.39 If one man, either through absent-mindedness, or being deceived by the similarity of objects, should fail to recognise an object correctly,—this alone cannot be sufficient ground for concluding that the conceptions of such men as are attentive, and capable of detecting the minutest differences among objects, would also be wrong.

241.42 Even when the singer does not name the different notes of the music, people knowing music and having trained ears, can easily detect the subtlest differences among them.

242-43. So in the case of such objects as the *class* "cow" and the like,—those that are not practised in the uses of words recognise the object only indistinctly; whereas those that are well posted up in (meanings of) words cognise it distinctly.

243-44. Just as in the case of objects endowed with Colour, Taste, &c., a man cognises only those factors (from among colour and the rest), whereof he is endowed with the corresponding Sense-organ; he can cognise nothing else, because he is without the requisite means (in the shape of the Sense).

244-45. Similarly among the means of discrimination (words), whichever he comprehends,—of the denotation of such (a word) alone has he any cognition, through the help thereof.

245-46. Therefore so long as the person has not found the means of discrimination (words), his cognition remains undefined.

246-47. For this reason, too, it is only when an object is recognised in the character of some other object, that there can be any falsity of the means of cognition; and not when the object is recognised in its own character.

247-48. Thus it is proved that the character of sensuousness (perceptibility by Sense-organs) belongs to *Class*, (i.e., the different factors of Inference in general) as also to the *Relation* (asserted in the premisses); and hence it is only when preceded by Sense-perception, that Inference, &c., can be rightly accomplished.

248-49. If Sense-perception were always accepted to be undefined (abstract), then we could not have Inference, &c.,—this we shall prove in the section on Inference.

249-50. (Obj.). "If such be the case, then, like the cognitions of the class *Cow* and the like (properties, actions, &c.), we would have to assert the character of Perception to belong to such cases as the idea of the *warmth* of fire when seen at a distance."

242-43 "Recognise indistinctly"—i.e., have only a confused idea of it. "Distinctly"—i.e., as belonging to a particular *class*, and having definite *properties, actions, name, &c., &c.*

243-44 In the case of such an object as has both *taste* and *colour*—f.i., the mango—the blind can perceive only the *taste*, because he is devoid of the organ of Colour-perception.

245-46 So long as one does not remember the word, related to the object before him, his cognition can only be undefined and indistinct.

246-47 That is, when an object is recognised as something else,—f.i., the piece of shell known as silver.

249-50 The sense of the objection is this: "If you declare the character of Sense-perception to belong to all the conceptions that one may have, during the time of Sense-contact,—then, in that case, when we see fire at a distance, and have simultaneously an idea of its heat, this latter idea of heat would also come under the category of Sense-perception, as the object remains all along in contact with the Sense of Sight."

250-51. (Rep.). In the case of the (cognition of the) *class* 'Cow,' we do not accept, as Perception, any other cognition which could be in closer contact (with the Sense-organ, the mind, and the Soul, than the Cow itself) ; therefore we cannot accept any other idea as perception, except that of the Cow.

251-52. There too, when the cognition belongs to one who is not conscious of the contact (of the object with the organs of sense,) we do not accept it as "Sense-perception."

252-53. It is only when there is contact with the Sense of Touch, that the cognition of warmth can be said to have the character of "Sense-perception;" and hence it can only be *non-sensuous*, when the fire is perceived (at a distance) by the eye alone.

253-54. Therefore the Sense-organ having been ascertained to apprehend a certain object, — it is only when there is contact with this Sense-organ, that the cognition (of that particular object) can be accepted as "Sense-perception"; in no other way could "Sensuousness" belong to the cognition of that object.

255. Though the method of specification is similar (in the cases of the *class* 'Cow' and the *heat of fire*), yet the character of sensuousness can belong only to that case where the cognition follows from actual Sense-contact. And such is "Sense-perception" known to be, in the world (*i.e.*, among ordinary people), independently of any elaborate definitions thereof.

Thus ends the *Vārtikā* on the 4th Aphorism

Treating of Sense-perception.

250.51 The Sense of the reply is that in the case of the idea of the heat of the fire at a distance, we have a preceding cognition of the fire itself, which we accept as *sensuous*; and from the existence of fire—cognised by the eye—we come to *infer* its heat; and thus the foregoing notion is in closer contact with the soul, &c., than the subsequent one of *heat*. On the other hand, in the case of the perception of the *class* "Cow," we do not find any other preceding cognition with regard to it, which could be in closer contact with the soul, and from which the idea of the Cow could be *inferred*. And it is on account of this closest possible proximity that we accept the cognition of the *class* "Cow" to be "Sense-perception."

252.53 "*Non-sensuous*"—(in the present case) Inferential.

255 That is, even those people, that are ignorant of the elaborate definitions of "Sense-perception," know that the name can belong only to such cognitions as follow directly from Sense-contact.

APHORISM V.

"Constant is the relation between the Word and its Denotation; and the means of knowing it is the "Upadēṣa" (Injunction), (which is) incapable of contradiction; it is authoritative with regard to the object not perceived (before), because it is independent,—so says Bādarāyaṇa." I-i-5.

SECTION (1).

1-3 (Obj.). "Though Sense-perception and the rest have been set aside, yet Duty and non-Duty (Virtue and Vice) could be rightly discerned, through ordinary usage,—like the distinction of the Brāhmaṇa and the like. (1) As those that give pleasure (to others) are known as 'Dhārmika' (Virtuous), and those that give pain (to others) are known as 'Adhārmika' (Vicious). So says the son of Parāśara (Vyāsa) with regard to this subject: 'That *this is Virtue* and *that is Vice*—these two expressions are well known among men—down to the lowermost Cāṇḍāla; and hence there is not much use of the Scripture (on this point).'

4. (Rep.). On account of the impossibility of this Usage being without a foundation, it is examined here, by means of proofs with regard to such source or foundation.

1.3 After having set aside the applicability of Sense-perception, Inference, &c., to the case of Duty, the Bhāṣya, in introducing the present Aphorism, says—"abhāvo 'pi nāsti"—"Even Negation is not"; and these three Kārikās embody the objections against this introductory sentence of the Bhāṣya. The sense of the objection is that there could be a doubt of the applicability of Abhāva, only after all sources of positive cognition had been exhausted. As a matter of fact, however, we have yet one resource left, in the shape of "ordinary usage"—to which we can rightly attribute the character of the source of all notions with regard to Duty and its contrary.

* The sense of the reply is that Usage must have some basis; and it is this basis which is enquired into: Is the use of the word 'Duty' baseless? Or is it based upon Sense-perception? Or is it based upon the Veda? Now then Sense-perception, Inference, Analogy and Apparent Inconsistency having been discarded, only two are left to be considered: Ābda (Veda) and Abhāva (Negation). Hence it is only proper that the acceptance of the applicability of Ābda should be introduced by the denial of Abhāva.

4-5. Sense-perception and the rest, have been set aside (as not applicable to the case of Duty); and people do not accept any proofs, apart from these.

5-6. For the Atheists (*lit. those that hold 'slaughter' to be 'deliverance from the shackles of the world'*) Slaughter is accepted as *Virtue*; and they hold 'Penance' to be a *Vice*. And inasmuch as there is this diversity (of opinion) among the Mlecchas and the Āryas, Duty cannot be said to be ordinarily known (and based upon usage).

7. Nor can there be any special point (in favour) of the Āryas, until the Scripture has been resorted to; and the Usage (or well known character) of an object can be said to be based upon the Scripture, only after the authority of the Scripture itself has been established.

8. Therefore if "Injunction" were not able to rescue "Virtue" (or Duty) and "Vice" from the mouth of Negation, then in our very sight, would these become swallowed up by it.

9. '*The Jñāna thereof becomes the Upadēṣa*'—such is the construction (of the Bhāṣhya). "Jñāna" here is *that by which it is known*, because it is spoken of as being co-extensive (syonymous) with 'Upadēṣa.'

10. The mention of the word "Constant" removes all discrepancies of the Means ("Word"=Veda); "Avyatīkēka" implies its undeniability; and thence follows its Self-authoritative character.

11. All (Means of Right Notion) apply, with effect, to only such objects as have not been already perceived (by any other means);

5.6 As there is no consensus of opinion among different people, the notion of Duty cannot be said to be based upon Usage.

7 When there is a diversity of opinion, we cannot accept either the one or the other, without sufficient grounds. The view of the Āryas—that slaughter is sinful—cannot be accepted until we have recourse to the Scripture.

8 The meaning of the Kārikā is that if the notion of Duty be not based upon the Veda, then no notion thereof is in any way possible, and it would altogether cease to exist.

9 The passage of the Bhāṣhya here referred to is "*Autpattikastu Çabdasyārthēna Sambandhah tasyāgnihotrādīlakṣhaṇasya dharmasya nimittam katham? Upadēṣo hi sa bhavati.*" And a question is raised as to the construction of the latter sentence, which is explained in the Kārikā. It implies that untrustworthiness based upon the fact of its being unknown cannot apply to the present case. In 'Jñāna' we have the nominal affix *lyut*.

10 The first half implies that untrustworthiness based upon discrepancy in the means cannot belong to the notion of Duty. And the second half means that it is incontrovertible.

11 The idea of an object that has already been, at some past period of time, perceived by other means, can only be due to Memory. Therefore the authority of all Means of Right Notion is restricted to objects never perceived before, *i.e.*, perceived for the first time by the Means in question. The second half is added in anticipation of the objection that what the author sought to establish was the authoritativeness of *Codanā*, while what he is here driving at is that of *Upadēṣa*.

otherwise it is only a case of Memory. "Codanā" 'Upadēṣa' and 'Vidhi' are all synonymous terms.

12-13. (Obj.). "When any ordinary sentence could serve our purpose, why should we have recourse to Injunction? Specially as the relation of cause and effect is signified equally by all verbs; and since every sentence has a verb, all the requirements of the student would be fulfilled (by any ordinary sentence). And as for activity, it is due to desire, while cessation from activity is due to direct prohibition."

14. If Injunction is not resorted to, then the 'end of man' would not come to be the object to be accomplished; and then, Heaven and the rest, that are directly mentioned in the Veda (as desirable objects), would be set aside; and any ordinary denotation of the verb (as occurring in an ordinary sentence) would come to be the object to be accomplished.

15. If, on the other hand, Injunction is resorted to, then this (meaning

12.13 The meaning of the objection is that when an ordinary sentence—'He sacrifices'—would be able to signify the performability of sacrifices, why should we restrict the notion of the Veda only to 'Injunctions'—such as 'One ought to sacrifice'? Duty is the means of prosperity; such means of prosperity is got at through the Bhāvanā; and this Bhāvanā is present in every verb; and a verb exists in every sentence. Thus then all requirements of the investigator into Duty having been fulfilled by the ordinary sentence—'He sacrifices'—, he would naturally conclude that the performance of sacrifices brings about the desired result; and hence that this is Duty; and he would thus come to recognise the causal relation between Sacrifice and Heaven. Under the circumstances it would be needless to have recourse to a direct Injunction. As for the activity of people towards the performance of Sacrifices, it can be due to a desire for certain desirable ends—Heaven for instance—on the part of the agent. An Injunction too only serves to point out that the performance of Sacrifices leads to Heaven; whence the agent desires to 'Reach Heaven by means of Sacrifices.' This is exactly what is done by the ordinary sentence—'He Sacrifices and goes to Heaven.' Why then should the notion of Duty be restricted to Injunctions exclusively?

14 If there were no Injunction, then it would be the meaning of the verb that would fall in with the Bhāvanā; because both of these—the Bhāvanā (*Bhāvayati*) and the meaning of the verb would form part of the denotation of the same word—'Sacrifices'; and the sentence 'He Sacrifices' would signify that *one should seek to attain Sacrifice by the Sacrifice*; and this Bhāvanā could have no connection with Heaven which is at a distance from it. And the sentence could not convey the notion that the performance of the Sacrifice leads to a desirable end in the shape of Heaven. In the case of Injunction, on the other hand the Injunctive affix (in *Yajēta*) which denotes the Bhāvanā, is also accepted as *urging* the person towards activity; and thus the Bhāvanā falls in completely with this *urging* (which is more nearly related to the Bhāvanā than the denotation of the verb which is something other than the affix); and hence this *urging* of the person makes Heaven, etc., (i.e., ends desired by the agent towards which alone he could be urged) the objects of the Bhāvanā; consequently the *Sacrifice* also comes to be recognised as being the means of attaining such desirable ends, as Heaven and the like.

15 This Kārikā explains the word 'Anapēkshatvāt' in the Aphorism; the meaning being that inasmuch as Injunction does not stand in need of corroborations, either from one's own cognition or from that of others, it cannot but be authoritative.

of the verb) is passed over, and Heaven, &c., come to be recognised as the objects to be accomplished. And it is only when such is the case, that the means of reaching Heaven, &c., come to have the character of Duty.

16. In the case of the assertions of untrustworthy persons, one needs (the corroboration of) another cognition of his own. In the case of the assertions of trustworthy persons too, (such as the Smritis), one needs (the corroboration of) another (i.e., the Veda). In the case of "Injunction" however, no exterior corroboration is needed.

[Thus ends the Vārtikā (proper) on Sūtra V.]

SECTION (2).

THE VIEW OF THE VRITTI.

17. The word 'Ādi' has 'M' at its end; for if there were a deletion thereof (of 'M'), the connection (of the word 'Ādi' with the rest of the sentence) would be too strained. The negative ('na') is supplied in the Aphorism, from without.

17-18. It is on account of the commixture (of right and wrong) that the objection is raised: "(There must be) investigation (into the means of Knowing Duty), because of misconceptions arising from an ignorance of the means of knowing it, and their correct definitions."

18. With the expression "that is not Sense-perception," the theory of the unnecessary character of the investigation has been summed up.

19-20. Falsity attaches to something else, while *Sense-perception*

17 Kārikās 17 to 26 expound the view of the author of the Vritti (Bhavadāsa).

This refers to the Bhāṣhya passage: "*Vrittikāraṣṭwanyathēnam grantham varṇayāncakāra tasya nimittaparīkṣitirityēvamādīm.*"

"The negative, &c."—The Vritti explains Aph. 3, as '*na nimittam parīkṣitavyam*' and this is only possible, if an additional 'na' is supplied from without.

17-18 This refers to the Bhāṣhya passage: "*Nanu Vyabhicārāt parīkṣitavyam nimittam, &c., &c.*" The sense of this objection is that in the absence of a well-defined and accurate definition of Sense-perception, people would have mistaken notions with regard to it: for example, they would accept the cognition of silver in the shell as correct Sense-perception. Therefore inasmuch as correct ideas of these Means of Right Notion are mixed up with incorrect ones, it is necessary that we should investigate the means of knowing Duty, and hence the Sūtra as interpreted in the Vritti, becomes objectionable.

18 To the above objection the Bhāṣhya replies thus: "That which is *Sense-perception* is never mistaken, and that which is mistaken is *not Sense-perception*." And it is to this that the Kārikā refers.

19-20 When one object (the shell) is cognised as another (silver), then it is the cognition of this latter that is false; but no falsity attaches to the perception of an object that happens to be before one's eyes. And it is only such cognition that is denoted by the word '*Sense-perception*,'—the full definition of which is that it is a

itself remains intact and true. Because Sense-perception is held to follow only when there is contact (of the sense) with the object *that is perceived*. This is the full definition (of Sense-perception), wherein the words *tat* and *sat* (of Aph. 4) have to be transposed.

20. The word 'Sat' would (in this case) mean 'right.' Or we may take the Aphorism to be elliptical.

21. Through "Arthāpatti" also, we come to attribute the character of the "False Semblance of Sense-perception" to all cognitions other than those mentioned (in the last Kārikā).

21-22. The idea of negation cannot be got at without the denial of

cognition that results from the contact of the Sense-organs with the object as conceived by the perceiver. This definition is arrived at by construing the fourth Aphorism as—'*Tatsamprayogē puruṣasyēndriyānām buddhijanma sat pratyakṣam.*' And when the cognition tallies exactly with the object before the eyes—i.e., when the rope is cognised as the rope—it can never be said to be wrong. It has already been explained that the fourth Aphorism as it stands cannot be taken as a definition of Sense-perception; because as it stands the Aphorism would apply equally to correct as well as incorrect perception; for the Aphorism only signifies that "Sense-perception" is that cognition which is produced by the contact of the sense with some object existing in the present; and this would also include the case of the cognition of *silver* in the *shell*; because this latter too would be a cognition produced by the contact of the eye with an object. But if we transpose the words *Tat* and *Sat* then the meaning of the Aphorism would be this: 'The idea produced by the contact of the sense with *that* (i.e., with the object as conceived), is *correct Sense-perception*,' and this would exclude all incorrect perceptions.

²⁰ 'Elliptical'—that is to say, supplying the word 'Grāhya' (=that which is perceived) between the words *Sat* and *Pratyakṣam*,—thereby getting at the same meaning that is obtained by the aforesaid transposition.

²¹ 'Arthāpatti'—when correct Sense-perception is defined as that which is produced by the contact of the Sense-organ with the object as conceived, then all others—those cognitions that are not produced by such contact—naturally come to be known as 'false (semblances of) Sense-perception'?

²¹⁻²² 'How do you know that a certain cognition is not produced by such contact?' The Bhāṣhya replies: We come to know of this by finding that the cognition is negated by a subsequent cognition. On this point the question is raised: 'What special grounds have we for accepting the denial of the preceding cognition by the subsequent one, and *vice versa*?' The reply to this is that it is not possible for us to have any subsequent cognition to the contrary until the preceding cognition has been negated; and since in the present case of the *shell* and the *silver* we do have a subsequent contrary cognition, therefore we conclude that it is the preceding cognition that must be negated by the subsequent one. 'But in that case, you would have a Reciprocity,—the negating of the preceding cognition being due to its falsity, and the falsity being due to the fact of its being so negated.' The answer to this is that the subsequent cognition only serves to indicate the falsity of the preceding one; it does not create any such falsity. And as such there can be no reciprocity; specially as the falsity of the preceding cognition is due to certain discrepancies in the means that gave rise to it. 'But why should we not accept the preceding cognition as negating the subsequent one?' The reason is obvious: at the time that the preceding cognition is produced the

the preceding (cognition); and we have this (in the present case, where the preceding cognition is set aside by the following cognition). And there being only an indication (of *falsity*), there can be no "Reciprocity." While, on the other hand, the true form of the preceding cognition is got at without any denial of the (subsequent) cognition, which has not yet appeared.

23. Even where there is no rejection (by means of any subsequent notion of the cogniser himself to the contrary), the recognition of some discrepancy in the cause (of the cognition, would establish the falsity thereof). Nay, even in such a case, we have the contrary notions of other persons (that would lead us to reject the cognition).

24. That cognition,—whereof all persons, at all times, have the same idea,—can never be rejected. Because in that case, the conviction of any discrepancy in the cause is not strong enough.

25. In a case where the idea of "class, etc.," has been produced, and subsequently, on accounts of its impossibility, comes to be rejected by means of arguments,—in such a case 'Reciprocity' is patent.

26. And in this case (of the notion of 'class'), there is a definite (true) cognition based upon the self-authoritative character (of the idea), through

subsequent one does not yet exist, to be negated; and as soon as the subsequent cognition appears, in its very appearance it negates the preceding one. And thus this latter being at once rejected could not negative the former.

25 If it is absolutely necessary to have some contrary idea, for the purpose of rejecting a certain misconception, then the correct cognitions of one person would be set aside by the contrary cognitions of other persons. But as a matter of fact, this is only an assumption; the real cause of falsity lying in the discrepancies in the means bringing about the conception.

24 This is in anticipation of the objection that—even in the absence of any direct cognition to the contrary if any notion could be rejected, then the notion of 'class' would also come to be rejected. The sense of the reply is that only that notion is rejected which is found to be contradicted by well-ascertained facts. The notion of 'class' however is never found to be so contradicted, hence it cannot be rejected. Because any idea of the discrepancy in its cause, even if existant, cannot be strong enough to reject it.

25 'Reciprocity'—the appearance of the idea of rejection being due to the falsity of the notion of 'class, and this falsity being due to the idea of rejection.'

26 The Kārikā anticipates the following objection: "Even if the notion of 'class' be not false there is the same Reciprocity: the non-falsity being based upon the absence of contrary notions, and this absence being based upon the non-falsity." The sense of the reply is that in the case of the 'class,' a certain idea is rightly brought about; and inasmuch as this idea is self-authoritative, its non-falsity is based upon reasoning, and as such, does not stand in need of any absence of contrary notions; and when this non-falsity has been definitely ascertained, there is no chance of the appearance of any contrary notions; specially as in the case in question, the idea of the existence of the 'class' is not controverted; because even those that deny the existence of the 'class' admit the fact of everyone having an *idea of such class*; and thus then there is no reciprocity spoken of.

the indication of its existence; because even those that deny the existence of a 'class,' admit an *idea* of it, all the same.

[Thus ends the expounding of the view of the *Vritti*.]

SECTION (3).

THE NĪRĀLAMBANA-VĀDA.

(Idealism.)

1-3. Authoritativeness and Non-authoritativeness,—Virtue and Vice and the effects thereof,—the assumptions of the objects of Injunctions, Eulogistic passages, Mantras, and Names,—in short, the very existence of the various Chapters (of the Sutra) based upon the various proofs,—the differentiation of the Question from the Reply, by means of distinctions in the style of expression,—the relation between actions and their results in this world, as well as beyond this world, &c.,—all these would be groundless (unreasonable), if Ideas (or cognitions) were devoid of (corresponding) objects (in the External World).

4. Therefore those who wish (to know) Duty, should examine the question of the existence or non-existence of (external) objects, by means of proofs accepted (as such) by people,—for the sake of the (accomplishment of) Actions.

5. "Even if only the 'Idea' (or sensation) is accepted (to be a real entity), all this (that is ordinarily known as the 'External World') may be explained as '*Samvriti* Reality'; and as such it is useless for you to persist in holding the reality of the (external) object."

6. But there can be no reality in "*Samvriti*" (Falsity); and as

1.5 The Bhāṣhya: "*Nanu sarva ēva nīrālambanah swapnavat pratyayah, &c.*" An objection is raised in the Kārikā to the necessity of the discussion raised in the Bhāṣhya. The Kārikās are meant to show that if all cognitions were without corresponding objects in the external world (as held by the Banddha-Idealist), then all the doctrines and subjects treated of in the Mīmāṃsā would be baseless, and a treatment of these altogether unreasonable; since there would be no realities corresponding to such words and phrases as: "authority of the Veda," "Incapability of the Sense-perception, &c., to give any idea of Duty," "Duty in the form of the Agnihotra," "Vice in the shape of slaughter," "Duty leading to prosperity," "Vice leading to Hell," "Urging as the object of Injunctions," "Attracting the object of the eulogistic passages," "Manifestation of Action the object of the Mantras," "Signification of materials, &c., the object of Names," "the differentiation of Actions into the Primary and the Subsidiary, in accordance with, Direct Revelation, Power, Sentence, Context, Position and Name," &c., &c., and so forth.

5 The Banddhas hold that there are two kinds of Reality: False and the True; and they attribute only a false reality to the External World.

such how can it be a form of reality? If it is a reality, how can it be 'Samvriti'? If it is false, how can it be real?

7. Nor can 'reality' belong, in common, to objects, false as well as real; because the two are contradictory; for certainly the character of the "tree" cannot belong in common to a *tree* as well as to a *lion*.

8-9. Thus then the words "Samvriti" and "Mithyā" (false) being synonymous, the assumption (of "Samvriti Reality") is only meant to hood-wink ordinary men, just like the word "Vaktrāsava" (mouth-wine) as used with reference to the saliva;—with a view to remove the stain of *atheism* (from the Bauddha doctrine). And so is also their theory of the *assumed* reality (of external objects); because there can be no assumption of the indivisible ('consciousness which alone is real, for the Bauddha) in the void (*i.e.*, the external world, whose existence is denied by the Bauddha).

10. Therefore it must be admitted that that which does not exist, does not exist; and that which really exists is real, while all else is unreal; and therefore there can be no assumption of two kinds of reality.

11. There is a theory current (among the Bauddhas) that the experiences (of Heaven, &c.), are similar to the experiences of a dream; and it is for the refutation of this theory that we seek to prove the *reality* of external objects.

12-13. It cannot be for the mere pleasures of a dream that people engage in the performance of Duty. Dream coming to a man spontaneously, during sleep, the learned would only lie down quietly, instead of performing sacrifices, &c., when desirous of obtaining real results. For these reasons, we must try our best, by arguments, to establish (the truth of) the conception of external objects (as realities).

14-16. (Among the Bauddhas) the Yogacāras hold that 'Ideas' are without corresponding realities (in the external world); and those that hold the Mādhyamika doctrine deny the reality of the Idea also. In both of these theories however the denial of the external object is common. Because it is only after setting aside the reality of the object that they lay down the "Samvriti" (falsity) of the 'Idea.' Therefore on account of this (denial of the reality of external objects) being common (to both), and on account of (the denial of the reality of the 'Idea') being based upon the aforesaid denial of the external object,—the author of the Bhāṣhya has undertaken to examine the reality or unreality of the external object.

8.9 They hold that the external objects have an assumed reality. But this too is only meant to deceive people.

12.13 If the pleasures of Heaven were only like dreams, then these would come to people, spontaneously, and would need no efforts of the person; and people would not stand in need of the performance of elaborate sacrifices, &c.

14.16 The Mādhyamikas hold that, inasmuch as the external object is unreal, no cognition based upon it can be real.



17-18. The denial of the external object is of two kinds: one is based upon an examination of the object itself, and another is based upon reasoning. Of these, that which is based upon a consideration of the object may be laid aside for the present; that which is based upon reasoning, and as such is the root (of the theory), is what is here examined.

18-19. Here too the denial has been introduced in two ways: at first through Inference, and then, after an examination of the applicability of Sense-perception, through its inapplicability (to external objects). And it is the Inferential argument that is urged (in the Bhāshya): "*Nanu &c.*" And this has a connection (with what has gone before, in the Bhāshya).

20-22. *Obj*: "(1). It has been declared that 'Sense-perception' is only that which is produced by a contact (of the sense) with the particular object; but there is no relation between the objects and the Sense-organ, in reality; while, as for an *assumed* contact, this is present in a dream also; therefore it is not possible to have any such differentiation (in reality) as that into (cognitions) *produced by such contact*, and (those) *not so produced*. (2) And again, it has been said that falsity is only of two kinds, and not more; but here it is added that all (cognition) is false; why then should there be any such specification?"

23. "The cognition of a pole is false, because it is a *cognition*; because whatever is a cognition has always been found to be false,—*f.i.* the cognitions in a dream."

17-18 "*Based upon an examination of the object itself*"—Say the Bauddhas: "Neither atoms, nor an conglomeration of atoms, are amenable to the senses, as the aggregate too can have no existence apart from the atoms themselves. Nor can the embodied substance be sensed; because this has no existence apart from the constituent atoms which are beyond the reach of the senses. For these reasons, we conclude that there is nothing in the External World that could be perceived by means of the senses." The Bhāshya does not take up this aspect of the question; because this is only a deduction from the cardinal doctrine of the Bauddhas; and hence it is only this latter that is examined. Kārikās 17-19 may be taken as an introduction to the Pūrvapakṣa passage of the Bhāshya: "*Nanu, &c.*"

18-19 "Connection" as explained below, in two ways—*vide* Kārikās 20-27.

20-22 Kārikās 20-27 explain the Pūrvapakṣa passage of the Bhāshya, which runs thus: "*Nanu sarva ēva nirālambanah svapnavat pratyayah pratyayasyāpi Nirālambanatā-rabhāva upalakshitah svapnē; Jāgrato'pi stambha iti vā Kudya iti vā pratyaya ēva bhavati; tasmāt so'pi Nirālambanah.*" The first connection of this Pūrvapakṣa is that it objects to the definition of Sense-perception, as embodied in the Aphorism. The second connection is this: The Vritti has said that there are only two kinds of false notion—*viz*: (1) That of which the origin is faulty, and (2) That which is contradicted by a subsequent stronger cognition; it is to the latter that the Pūrvapakṣa objects, on the ground of all cognitions being equally false.

²³ This Kārikā formulates the inferential argument contained in the Pūrvapakṣa.

24-25. "In order to avoid partial 'Redundancy' (Proving of the proved), 'the absence of the instance,' and 'the uselessness of the word *eva*'—(which would be irremediable) if the argument were urged with a view to prove the falsity of all cognitions—'Sarva *eva*' must be taken to signify only *waking* consciousness.

And further, because of the acceptance (by the Bauddhas) of the reality of the idea of the cognition itself, what is here denied is only the reality of the external objects of perception."

26. "*Pratyayasya*, &c., serves to point out the instance of the *Hēta* (Middle term—*Pratyayatvāt*) as concomitant with a portion of the Major Term; the sentence *Jāgrato'pi*, &c., serving to point out the *Hētu*, by means of an 'Upanaya'."

27. "Since there is no case of the negation of the Major term (*the fact of being without a corresponding object*), therefore the negative argument

24.25 If 'all cognitions' were declared to be without corresponding objective realities, then 'dream-cognition' would also be included in the same category. And then, inasmuch as the Mīmāṃsaka also admits the absence of a corresponding reality, in the case of this latter, the argument would become partially redundant. Secondly, "Dream-cognition" having become included in the Major Term, there would be no cognition left which could serve as the instance, in the aforesaid argument. Thirdly, the word "*eva*" would become redundant; because this word only serves to differentiate the object in question from its counter-relative or contradictory; and as such the meaning of the sentence would be that—"it is not only waking cognition that is so, but all cognition, &c."—which is not the meaning desired to be conveyed: because "all cognition" would also include the cognition of the cognition itself, which is held by the Bauddhas to be real, as having a corresponding reality.

26 This Kārikā anticipates the objection that the argument as laid down in the Bhāṣya has no Middle Term; and as such, no Instance is necessary. "Upanaya" means the application of the *Hētu* (Middle Term), as qualified in the Major Premiss or in the Instance, to the case in question (i.e., to the Major Term); hence the Kārikā must be taken to mean this: "In the sentence, *pratyayasya* *svapnē*,—which is meant to serve as the Instance in the syllogism—the character of being a cognition has been shown to be invariably concomitant with the character of being without a corresponding reality in the objective world, and then the sentence *jāgrato'pi*, &c., ... *bhavati*,—which is meant to serve as the Minor Premiss of the syllogism—serves the purpose of applying the Middle Term, Character of being a cognition, to waking cognition, the Minor Term." The syllogism, then, should be stated thus: "All cognitions are without corresponding realities—e.g., Dream-cognition; Waking-cognition is cognition; therefore, Waking cognition is without a corresponding reality.

27 'Negative argument.'—"That which is without a corresponding reality is not a cognition." The second half of the Kārikā anticipates the objection that in the argument—"waking cognition is without a corresponding reality because it is a cognition"—the middle term (cognition) would form a part of the conclusion. The sense of the reply is that the Idealist accepts no cognition to be free from the character of being without a corresponding reality; and as such, the middle term (character of cognition) could not exist apart from the Major term; hence the statement of the negative argument would be superfluous.

is not stated. The Hātu being a Universal one, it would not be open to the fault of forming a part of the Minor term."

[Here ends the explanation of the Bhāshya Pūrvapaksha.]

28-29. In waking cognition there is (you say) a distinctive feature—that it is certain and well-defined. But the connection with the external object (whereby you seek to prove the well-defined character of waking cognition) is not accepted by your opponent (the Bauddha). And hence, the reply that is given by the author of the Bhāshya comes to be either 'Vikalpasama' (doubtful) or 'Vaidharmyasama' (contradictory)."

30. Some people admit the Reply to be a faulty one, on the ground that the Pūrvapaksha itself is faulty; others however explain it as pointing out the fact of the Pūrvapaksha conclusion being contrary to well-ascertained directly visible facts.

31. When we shall be able to clearly reject the self-cognisability (of cognitions), then your theory would simply come to be a pure denial of everything that is cognisable.

32. The object of Sense-perception, &c. then, cannot but have an existence in the external world; and hence one who would deny this (external object) would have his theory contradicted by these (Sense-perception, &c.).

28-29 With this Kārikā begins the explanation of the Siddhānta Bhāshya, which runs thus:—'*Stāmbha iti Jāgrato buddhiḥ superniścītā katham viparyēshyati*' and Kārikās 28-29 raise objections to this passage. 'Vikalpasama'—among cognitions some would be well-defined and have corresponding realities while others would not be so, on account of there being cognitions, like dream-cognition; thence the reply given, which is based upon the fact of waking-cognition being well-defined, would become doubtful. 'Vaidharmyasama'—the fact of waking-cognition being a cognition, like dream-cognition, would prove it to be without a corresponding reality, while the fact of its being well-defined would prove it to have a corresponding reality, thence the reply would be contradictory. For technical definitions of Vikalpasama and Vaidharmyasama, *vide* Nyāyasutrā V—2-4.

30 The second half expresses the Author's view.

31 That is to say when it shall be proved, (and you will not be able to deny it) that the cognition cannot be cognised by itself, then in that case your denial of the reality of the external objects of perception would come to be a pure denial of all things cognisable; and as such your theory would be open to contradiction by the direct perception of cognisable objects. The contradiction of direct perception may also be explained thus:—when self-cognisability has been rejected, it is only an external object that could be the object of direct perception, hence the denial of such an object would be contradicting direct perception itself.

32 'Then'—That is when Sense-cognisability has been rejected.



33. The expression "well-defined" serves to point out the greater strength of these (Sense-perception, &c.), based upon the fact that in the absence of any cognitions to the contrary, they cannot but have real authority or trustworthiness.

34. It is only the denial of an object, comprehended by means of a faulty cognition, that can be correct. If there be a denial of every conception, then your own theory too cannot be established.

35. The Predicate and the Subject (the Major and Minor terms of your Syllogism) being (according to you) incapable of being cognised (*i.e.*, being no real objects of comprehension),—you would be open to the charge of having both the Subject and the Predicate, or only one of them, such as has never been known.

36. If the cognition, of the Subject and Predicate, as belonging to the speaker and the hearer, were without corresponding realities, then both of them would stand self-contradicted.

37. Nor would any differentiation be possible, between the Subject and the Predicate. For these reasons the declaration of your conclusion, cannot be right.

38. "But we do not admit of any such entity, as the *Character of having no real corresponding object*; therefore it is not right to raise any questions as to the absence or otherwise of such entities."

39. If the cognition is not a real entity, then in what way do you wish to explain it to us? Or, how do you yourself comprehend it?

39-40. If it be urged that "we assume its existence and then seek to prove it,"—then (we reply), how can there be an assumption of something that does not exist? And even if it is assumed, it comes (by the mere fact of this assumption) to be an entity. If it be asked—"How do you (Mīmāṃsakas) apply cognisability to Negation (which is a non-entity)?"—(we reply), that we hold Negation to be a real entity.

53 The superiority of Sense-perception over the inferential argument brought forward by the Pūrvaśakṣa, lies in the fact that the former must always continue to be a trustworthy means of right notion, so long as there are no cognitions, equally strong, that contradict them.

31 If every conception is denied, then the objector's theory too being a conception would be denied.

35 When nothing can be known, the subject and the predicate of the Pūrvaśakṣa could never have been known; and an inferential argument with an unknown Subject and Predicate can never be expected to be valid.

36 One who would deny the reality of his own Subject and Predicate would be courting Self-contradiction.

37 Since no such explanation is possible, until the Subject and Predicate have been actually recognised as distinct from one another.

38 The sense of the objection is that the foregoing Kārikās only serve to point to this objection:—'Does the character of having no real corresponding object belong to such and such a cognition, or does it not?' But in as much as such character is not an entity, it is not right to question its absence or presence.



41. Then again, is the word "Pratyaya" (made up of) an accusative affix, or a nominal one? If the latter, then there would be self-contradiction; and if the former, then the syllogism would not serve any useful purpose.

42. Because we also accept the fact of the cognisable objects—Colour and the rest—being without substrates in the external world; inasmuch as (according to us) these objects are not mere *Ideas*; and as such they do not stand in need of any external substratum.

43. If either the nominative or the instrumental affix (be accepted), then the words ('Pratyayah' and 'Nirālambanah') too would themselves become (included in) the Minor term (of your syllogism). And when these become devoid of a substratum, your Minor term itself ceases to exist.

44. Without a distinct object of cognition, no nominative (or instrumental) is possible; hence if you mean the word "Pratyaya" to signify these, there is a contradiction of your own assertion (*Vide* note 41).

45. If however, you hold the word "Pratyaya" to have a conventional signification (and not one based upon the meaning of the root and affix constituting the word),—then, in that case, we would say that by usage (or convention) the word 'Pratyaya' is proved to be a real entity comprehending another *real object*—exactly as held by us.

⁴¹ Kārikās 41-48 embody the objections against the validity of the Subject of the syllogism contained in the Pūrvapakṣa. The word 'Pratyaya' with an Accusative affix signifies *that which is cognised, i.e., the object*; with a Nominal affix, it would mean *cognition*; with a Nominative affix it would mean *that which cognises*; and with an Instrumental affix, it would mean *that by which anything is cognised, that is, the Sense-organ*. 'Contradiction'—if the word Pratyaya be held to end in the Nominal affix, then the very name 'Pratyaya' (cognition) would indicate an *object* which would be comprehended by the cognition; and hence to assert that such cognition has no corresponding reality in the external world would be a self-contradiction. If on the other hand the word be held to end in the Accusative affix, then your conclusion would simply mean that the *object of cognition*, the Jar and the like, is without a substratum in the external world; and this we do not deny; hence your reasoning becomes superfluous. And as for the *cogniser* (signified by the Nominative affix) or the *means of cognition* (signified by the Instrumental affix), none of them is possible in the absence of a cognisable object.

⁴³ Because words are not only the instruments, but also the nominatives, of cognitions; e.g., in the assertion, "The word *cow* produces the cognition of the cow;" and hence a denial of the substratum of these would mean the denial of the substratum of the two terms of your syllogism. And again the fact of these words having no substratum would mean that they have no significance; and as such, cannot be used in any sentence, which means that your syllogism ceases to exist.

⁴⁵ The usage of the word lends no support to your theory. By usage, the *cognition* and the corresponding external *object*, are proved to be relative to one another. "Another object"—i.e., the cognition does not cognise *itself*, as held by the Bauddha.

46. And if you seek to argue (as you do) after having accepted this (usage), then your own accepted (usage) becomes contradicted (by your argument). And your argument becomes one that has an unrecognised Subject (Pratyaya). While this fault would apply to us, only when you have for your Minor term (a "cognition") which is not such (as comprehends a real external object).

47. Whether (you have, for your minor term, "cognition") as a property of the soul, or independently by itself,—in any case, your argument has the same fault (of having the Subject unknown). Nor is there any such thing as simple "cognition" (without objects, &c.), because such cannot be recognised or specified.

48. Though there is for others (Mīmāṃsakas) a specification in the shape of the mere signification of a word,—yet such can not be the case with you; for you do not accept any difference between the word and its signification.

49. If you seek to prove *the fact of being devoid of a substratum*, as Universal,—then you are open to the faults of having your *predicate unrecognised*, and that of *the absence of an instance*.

50. If (on the other hand) you assert the fact of being devoid of substratum, only *partially*, we also admit the cognition of *taste* to be devoid of *colour*, and your argument becomes superfluous.

47 If the "cognition" of your syllogism means a *property of the soul*, as you hold it to be, then, inasmuch as such a cognition is never recognised by you, the very subject of your syllogism—becomes such as is not recognised; and this renders your argument fallacious. If, on the other hand, you hold that "cognition" means *cognition by itself* (i.e., without the notion of the cogniser and the cognised); then, we add, that such a cognition is not recognised by us; and this also makes your argument fallacious; inasmuch as the minor term of a syllogism must be such as is accepted by both parties.

48 This Kārikā anticipates the following objection: "The sort of fallaciousness urged above would apply to all arguments. For example, the Mīmāṃsaka argues that sound is eternal. The Bauddha might retort: Is *sound* a property of the Akāṣa, or that of Air? If the former, we do not accept it as such; if the latter, the Mīmāṃsaka does not admit it. The Mīmāṃsaka might say that by *sound*, he means only that which is signified by the word *sound*; but the Bauddha would add that the word *Pratyaya* only means that which is signified by the word *Pratyaya*." The sense of the reply as embodied in the Kārikā is that the Bauddha does not accept anything denoted, apart from the word itself; and hence, he has not the same facilities, as the Mīmāṃsaka, for sailing clear of the above fallacies.

49 Because the Predicate—"Nirālambanah"—would also come to be devoid of a substratum; and as such, incapable of being recognised. Nor could you have any corroborating instance; as, even in a dream, there is not a total absence of all substratum; since during dreams, there are distinct notions of *place, time, &c.*, which are all real,—the only unreality in the dream lying in the particular connections in which the time and place, &c., are cognised.

50 Because we do not hold any cognition to have for its substratum, *everything* in the world.



51. And again, if you seek to reject only such substratum as the form in which the cognition appears; then (we say that) inasmuch as you accept the cognition of the cognition itself, such denial (of the form of the cognition) would be a self-contradiction.

52. If by the absence of external substratum you mean the absence of such ideas as "this (object) is external (to the cognition,)"—then in that case, there being no such feeling with regard to the *pole*, &c., your argument becomes superfluous.

53. And if you mean that the cognition has no such substratum (in the external world), as the *pole* and the like,—then this would contradict a visible fact.

54. If you urge that "the same would be the case with the perception of the duplicate moon,"—we say—no; because in this latter case, we deny the reality of the substratum (duplicate moon), on the ground of its being beyond the reach of the Senses, and not on account of the absence of the cognition of the object.

55. For us, on the other hand, the reality or the unreality of a cognition is based upon the contact of the Sense with the object;—and it is on the strength of this that we accept the cognised object, as real or unreal.

56. For you, however, there being no Sense-organs, there can be no other ground for holding the fact of the cognition having a real substratum, than the cognition itself; and as such a denial thereof is not reasonable.

57. Since you recognise no externality, how do you seek to prove thereby (i.e., on the ground of externality) the theory of the absence of any real substratum (for the cognition)? For under such circumstances (i.e., if you deny the externality of objects), which is the adjunct of your minor term, the minor term itself cannot be recognised.

58 The sense of the objection is that on pressing the eye with a finger, you perceive the moon to be duplicate; and then if you say that the moon is one only, this assertion of yours contradicts a fact ascertained by means of your own eyes. The meaning of the reply is that we deny the duality of the moon, because such duality is beyond the reach of the senses; and it is for this reason that we declare the idea of the duplicate moon to be without a real objective substratum;—this idea being due to an extraneous discrepancy temporarily imposed upon the eye. We do not base our denial of the duality upon the denial of all objective substratum for the cognition itself.

59 Where the sense is in contact with the object, just as it is cognised, the cognition and the object are both real; where it is not so, they are both unreal.

60 Because such denial would mean the denial of the cognition itself. (The Buddhists deny the reality of the sense-organs).

61 If you mean to assert that you only deny the fact of any external object being the substratum of cognition,—then we would say that, since you do not recognise the reality of any external object, how could you have such a minor term as "a cognition which appears to be external."

58. Just as when there is no recognition of the qualification (or adjunct), the minor term (or the conclusion) is not ascertained, on account of the incapability (of such a term) of rightly expressing an idea; so for the same reason, would there be a non-ascertainment of the conclusion, if the adjunct of the adjunct too were not recognised.

59. For, so long as the meaning of the word has not been fully recognised, the meaning of the sentence cannot be ascertained. And we shall prove later on that the minor term really consists of the signification of the sentence, because it follows from such recognition (of the meaning of the sentence).

60. (By saying that "cognition is devoid of any substratum apart from itself" you may mean) either the exclusion or the negation of all extraneous objects; any way, the whole world being (according to us also) non-different, through *predicability*, your argument becomes superfluous.

61. And again, if you assert "the absence of substratum" with reference to (a substratum) totally different (from the cognition) (then too, your argument becomes superfluous). If, on the other hand (you assert it) with reference to (a substratum) only partially different (from the cognition), then your conclusion would contradict your previously postulated (difference).

62 This anticipates the following objection: "It is only the non-recognition of the adjunct of the minor term that vitiates an inferential argument. In the present case, however, what is not recognised is only the *externality* of the objects qualifying the minor term; and this is only the non-recognition of the qualification of the adjunct; and as such it does not vitiate the argument." The sense of the reply is that, in both cases, the faulty character of the Inferential argument is based upon the fact of the term being incapable of giving any sense, in the case of its necessary adjuncts not being recognised.

63 Your minor term is necessarily mixed up with the signification of such words as "external," &c.; and again, it is by the significations of such sentences—as "the cognitions have no external substratum"—that the minor term is constituted. And as such, the minor term can not be recognised, until the significations of the constituent words have been fully ascertained.

64 If you mean to *exclude* extraneous objects, your conclusion would be of some such form as: "Cognition has for its substratum, something that is not extraneous to it." While if you mean to deny it, the conclusion would be in the form: "Cognition has no extraneous substratum." Any way your conclusion would not go against our theory; inasmuch as we also hold all things to be identical, on the ground of all things having the common character of *predicability*; and hence, according to us also, nothing being extraneous to anything, the substratum of the cognition cannot be said to be extraneous to the cognition. Thus then your argument loses its force, and becomes superfluous.

65 "*Becomes superfluous*"—because we also hold that the cognised object is not totally extraneous to the cognition. "If on the other hand, &c., &c."—If your conclusion mean that "Cognition is devoid of any substratum that even partially differs from it,"—then you also admit a slight difference, though only assumed, between the object of cognition and the cognition.

62. And on account of its appearing in the form of the objective, it is held (by us) to be devoid of any substratum (and hence your argument becomes superfluous). While if you assert the non-difference (of the cognised object) from the Cognition, then that would go against the (theory of) distinct faculties (of the cognised Object and Cognition).

63. If you seek to prove the fact of the absence of any substratum for the cognition, at the moment of its being produced,—then, this being an apparent fact, we also accept (the cognition at the moment of production) to be devoid of any external object of perception.

64. You, however, do not accept its correctness or reality at any time; as this too has its end in itself, like the ideas of the mirage and the like.

65-66. If such cognitions as that of Caitra and the like were to have the fact of being devoid of any real substratum as their necessary character, &c., then they could never be comprehended by cognitions arising out of inferential arguments. And hence, on account of there being a multifariousness of objects, and also on account of the form (of such cognitions as those of Caitra, &c.)—how could the correct notion of cognitions having real substrata be dispensed with,—when it is not actually set aside by any contradictory of itself?

67. If you take the word '*pratyaya*' to be the *cognition*, (thus forming

62 It is in the generic character of "Cognition," that an Idea has an external object for its substratum. When, however, this happens to be in the form of an inanimate object—the jar, *f.i.* :—, then it is accepted by us also to have no substratum as such.

63 We hold that in every perception, there is a threefold process: (1) at the first moment, there is a production of the cognition; (2) at the second, the referring of the cognition to a concrete fact; and (3) at the third, the full comprehension of the cognition. And as such we also hold the cognition to be devoid of an external substratum, at the first moment. And hence your argument becomes superfluous.

64 "Correctness"—i.e., the fact of its having a corresponding object in the external world. We hold the cognition to be without a corresponding reality, only at the moment of its production; but what we assert is that subsequently, at the second moment, this cognition comes to be referred to a concrete object. Thus then, it is only after the moment of production that we part company with you, who assert that *at no time* is the Cognition able to have any such corresponding reality; and that at all times it has an end in itself, and is, like mirage perceptions, always false.

65 You hold all Cognition to end in itself, without referring to any corresponding object extraneous to it. But then, the Cognition or Idea, arising out of the argument you urged against us, could never rightly comprehend one fact of the absence of any real substratum as belonging to cognitions in general; and hence there being multifarious objects of Cognition,—when the existence of the substratum is not directly denied by any counter-notion of the absence of such substratum,—how could one totally deny the existence of the substratum, specially when we are examining the form and character of such cognitions as those of Caitra and the like?

67 If the opponent were to interpret the word "Pratyaya" as the *means of knowledge*, then it would come to signify the word '*Pratyaya*': and in accordance with

the minor term of your syllogism),—and thence if you seek to set aside the fact of the cognition (of this word) having any substratum (in the *post* and other external objects);—then your argument becomes superfluous.

68. If again, (by your argument) you seek to set aside the capability (of the word *cognition*) to bring about a conception (or *Idea*), then your major term becomes incapable of being ascertained; because the argument itself could not be brought forward in the absence of such capability of producing conceptions.

69-71. There is no *denotation* without *connection*; and this (connection) is not possible without some *difference* (between the word and its denotation). Nor is this *difference* possible in the absence of an *idea* expressing such difference; and this *idea* too is not possible unless the questioner distinctly comprehends the sentence and also the several members of the syllogism, such as the minor term, the middle term, the Instance, and the two members of the discussion. If you bring forward your argument after accepting all this (*i.e.*, the fact of the above-mentioned cognitions having real substrata), then this conclusion would militate against your previous assertion.

72-73. Without the difference between Virtue and Vice, and that between the Disciple and the Teacher himself, being ascertained in its reality, there could be no instructions with regard to Duty, &c., specially as we come across the actual *performance of duty*, (we conclude that) the difference of the *idea* (of Duty from Duty itself) is accepted (even by your Teacher Buddha) (and as such in denying the reality of external objects of perception, you contradict your own Teacher).

73. And since we find that the Buddha has accepted (such differences) in other Sūtras (the “Saddharma” *f.i.*); there would be a contradiction of your own scriptures too (if you were to totally deny the reality of the external world).

74. And your conclusion on this point is also contradicted (and hence rejected) by facts known to all persons (who always recognise objects apart from their cognitions).

74-75. If you hold the idea of all arguments to be false (as having

this, if he were to interpret his argument as proving that “such object as the *post* and the like cannot be the substratum of the word ‘*Pratyaya*’,”—then we would reply that we do not deny this conclusion; and as such your argument loses all its force.

68 If by the proposition “*Pratyaya* is *nirālambana*,” you mean that the word ‘*Pratyaya*’ is incapable of having any denotation, then your minor term (the denotation of this word ‘*Pratyaya*’) being unrecognised, your conclusion cannot be proved.

69-71 The argument cannot be brought forward unless there is a distinct idea of the words employed in the argument, and their significations, &c., and until such ideas have been duly recognised to have corresponding realities. And if you accept these, you contradict your own assertion of all cognitions being devoid of corresponding realities. Thus then you are placed upon the two horns of a dilemma.

74-75 You hold all cognition to be false. And in accordance with this, the

no real substratum), then there would be a universal negation; and the deficiency of the minor term, &c., could also be urged (against your argument). And, if (in order to avoid these) you were to hold these (cognitions of your minor term, &c.), to have real substrata, then on the ground of such cognitions themselves, the middle term (of your syllogism and hence the major premiss also) would become non-conclusive or doubtful.

76-77. If you urge that your conclusion has for its subject "*cognitions other than those of the factors of the syllogism*"—then (we say that) the idea of this distinctness (i.e., the notion that such and such cognitions are *other than* such other cognitions) would be false. And when this happens to be false, all that has gone before becomes incapable of being ascertained. Nor would, then, there be any difference between the cognition of the *post* (you employ as an instance) and that of the argument (you urge against us).

77-78. As your conclusion goes on signifying (the falsity) of cognitions *other than those of your argument*,—there would be falsity of all the rest; and hence whatever goes before, becomes set aside; and thus either your middle term becomes concomitant with its own contradictory, or your conclusion itself comes to be rejected by (your own) inferential argument.

79-80. (Because) in opposition to all the alternatives (open to you) we would bring forward this counter-argument:—"*Cognitions have real substrata in the external world*; and this notion (of cognition having a real substratum) is correct; because it is a notion free from contradiction;—like the notion of the falsity of dream-cognition."

significations of all argumentative assertions would be false; and hence your argument comes to be a denial of the truth of all arguments. Or again, any and every fault—in the shape of the deficiency of the various factors of your syllogism (the idea of all of which you declare to be false)—could be urged against your argument. "*Non-conclusive*": The middle term of the syllogism is "*Pratyakṣ*" ("Because it is a cognition, therefore they have no real substratum.") But if you admit a single cognition to have a real substratum, the said middle Term becomes doubtful, and as such vitiates the argument.

76-77. Because you accept only the reality of the cognitions of the various members of your syllogism. "*Ceases to be ascertained*"—because the idea of such distinctness being false, the conclusion of your syllogism becomes faulty in its subject: and hence the whole argument falls to the ground. "*Nor would then &c.*"—Because when all notion of distinctness is false, there can be no difference between two such cognitions, as those of the *post* and *your argument*,—a palpable absurdity.

77-78. If in order to avoid the difficulties urged above, you have 'for the subject of your conclusion, *such cognitions as are other than that of such distinctness*,—then all other cognitions would come to be false; whence all that has gone before—even your own previous argument becomes false. Thus you will have to bring forward arguments *ad infinitum*; and then too you will never come to an end; because each argument will negative all that may have gone before it. Thus then either your own argument will have to be admitted to be fallacious, or (if you avoid this) your conclusion will be contrary to the Premises.

80-81. And if you urge that this notion (of the falsity of dream-cognition) is also false; then dream-cognition would never be (contradicted and hence) false; and consequently it could not supply the instance (of falsity) in the argument you have brought forward against us.

81-82. And in the same manner, if you were to accept the correctness of the notions of the momentary character, distinctness and existence of cognitions, then your argument (i.e., the middle term) would become non-conclusive or doubtful; while if you accept the falsity of such notions, you contradict your own theory.

83. And again, there could be no such distinction as that into the "bound" and "liberated,"; and hence you would have the absurdity of the futility of any attempt towards Liberation.

84-85. If you urge that you accept as false, only such notions of the existence, &c., of cognition, as appear in concrete (well-defined) forms:—then (we say that) in this case, we do not find the application of any other means of right notion; and thus, there being no such means, the existence, &c., of cognition can be scarcely ascertainable.

85-87. Thus then all our cognitions would come to be false, on account of their being (concretely) well-defined; and it would be scarcely possible to get at (the ideas of) *proximity* and *remoteness*, *reality* and *unreality*, &c. And (thus) the falsity of cognitions being common to all systems of philosophy, it is not proper to reject the Sāṅkhya, &c., and be partial to the Bauddha philosophy alone.

80-81 This Kārikā puts the opponent in a fix: If he accept the falsity of dream-cognition, he can have nothing to say against the counter-argument urged in K. 79-80; and he completely loses his ground. If, in order to avoid this, he do not admit the falsity of dream-cognition; then he contradicts himself; in as much as he has brought forward "dream-cognition" as an instance (of false cognition), in the inferential argument he has urged against the Mīmāṃsaka. This argument, in the absence of a corroborating instance, would fall to the ground.

83 If you deny the distinctness of cognitions, you land yourself upon the Vedantic theory of the "unity of knowledge"; and in that case, the notion of Bondage would be identical with that of Deliverance.

84-85 It may be argued that you accept only the falsity of concrete cognitions; and that, cognitions can have their existence, &c., in their abstract forms. But this is not right; because such notions, as—"the world is only an idea," "all cognitions are momentary entities" and the like—are not comprehended by any person, in their abstract forms. As a matter of fact, it is only by means of Inference, &c., that such notions are ascertained; and as such, they cannot but be *concrete*, and hence (according to you) false. Consequently, the notions of the existence of cognitions, and their momentary character, &c., cannot be got at.

The Kārikā adds that if the Bauddha admits the reality of abstract cognitions, such reality would belong also to the abstract notions of the *past*, &c., and this would establish the reality of the external world.

85-87 If all cognitions were false, there could be no idea of the comparative *reality* or *unreality* of objects, as due to the *proximity* or *remoteness* of objects, in regard to the Sense-organ concerned.



87-88. If a cognition be false, would it not be liable to rejection? If it were to be false even without being rejected, then there would be no restriction (as to the reality or unreality of a cognition).

88-89. For us, dream-cognition would certainly be falsified by the perception of a waking cognition contradicting it; while for you, what would constitute the difference (between the reality of waking-cognition and that of dream-consciousness, both of which are held by you to be equally false)?

89-90. Of waking cognition as such, there is no proper (correct) contradictory cognition,—the perception whereof would establish the falsity of such (waking) cognitions as those of the *past* and the like.

90-91. The fact of waking cognitions being the contradictory of dream-cognition is known to all persons, and, as such they differ from dream-cognition (which is known only to particular individuals), just like the cognition, which serves to reject (a particular dream-cognition).

91-93. Obj.: "Of such waking cognitions as those of the *past*, &c., invalidating cognitions do arise in the shape of those of the true Yogis (who know all things worldly to be false); and this would certainly make these waking cognitions equal to dream-cognitions (in point of falsity). And such invalidating cognitions too (as those of Yogis) would belong to all living creatures when they reach the Yogic stage; and hence the fact of waking cognitions having invalidating counter-cognitions becomes established."

93-94. But, such Yogic cognition is not found to belong to any person in this life; and as for those who have reached the Yogic state, we know not what happens to them.

94-95. Our Yogis too could have only such invalidating cognitions as would be either subversive of or contrary to your assertion.

87-88. The sense of the Kārikā is that if even waking cognitions were false, they too, like dream cognitions, would be liable to rejection by subsequent cognitions; but such is not the case.

90-91. Waking cognition, as distinguished from Dream-cognition, is known equally to all men; while Dream-cognition is confined to only particular individuals, under the influence of sleep. Therefore, just as, in the case of a cognition rejecting a certain foregoing dream-cognition, the former is recognised as contradictory of the dream-cognition,—so, in the same manner, the character of being the contradictory of dream-cognition would belong to all such waking cognitions, as those of the *past* and the like; and it is in comparison with such waking cognitions that dream-cognitions are said to be false.

91-93. The sense of the objection is that, though Waking cognitions are not invalidated by ordinary cognitions, yet they do become invalidated by the contrary cognitions of Yogis.

94-95. As you urge the cognition of your Bauddha Yogi against our theory, so could we also bring forward the cognitions of our own Yogis, as invalidating your theory. "Subversive"—such as the recognition of the true character of the shell, after it has been mistaken for silver. "Contrary"—e.g., the idea that 'this is not silver', as distinguished from the idea that 'this is a shell.'

95-96. And further, you can have no instance to prove that the cognition of the Yogi is such as you assert it to be. As a corroborative instance of our assertion we have the cognition, as ordinarily perceived.

96-97. If you were to argue that "such cognitions as that of the *post* and the like, have got counter-cognitions which invalidate them, simply because they are cognitions,—like the cognitions of the *mirage*, &c.;"—

97-98. (We reply) we do not deny the fact of waking cognitions having counter-cognitions, in the shape of the cognitions of the *mirage* and the like; and in that form, they also become capable of being invalidated, as also through their cognisable object; and your reasoning is also incompatible, with (the cognitions of Yogis, which you hold to be correct, and as such) the invalidating agent; and if you qualify the premiss by the phrase "other than that", then as before, (there would be several discrepancies in your argument).

99-100. For according to you, to dream-cognitions would belong the character of being the counter-cognitions of false cognitions (in the shape of such waking cognitions as those of the *post*, &c.); and (in the case of Yogic cognitions) such peculiarities as you may attribute—*f.i.*, the fact of its being comprehended through the suppression of passion and

95.96 You are not to understand that your case is exactly similar to ours; because your argument has no corroborative instance; while our assertion, of Yogic cognitions having real substrata in the external world, is based upon an Inference supported by the case of any ordinary cognition: Even at the present day, we find that the cognitions of all men are based upon external realities; and this would rightly lead to the conclusion that the cognition of the Yogi should also have a real substratum.

97.98 It is true that waking cognitions have counter-cognitions in the shape of wrong conceptions. And just as false cognitions and their objects are invalidated by the fact of there being counter-cognitions, so, in the same manner, correct cognitions too, having (like false cognitions) the character of *cognition*—, and their objects too having (like the objects of false cognitions) the character of *object*—, and having too, in common with false cognitions, their counter-cognitions,—would be capable of being invalidated. We do not deny this fact; and so your argument becomes superfluous. But, inasmuch as right cognitions are capable of being invalidated, the cognitions of Yogis too could not be free from this capability; and as it is these Yogic cognitions that you hold to be the invalidators of ordinary cognitions, your reasoning becomes inconclusive and doubtful. If you argue that all cognitions, *save those of the Yogi*, are capable of being invalidated, then too, you would be open to all the objections urged in *Kārikās 76 et-seq.*

99-100 You find that Dream-cognition has for its counter-cognition, the waking cognition; and the cognitions of Yogis, which are both false; consequently the waking cognitions too would be invalidated only by such Yogic cognitions as are false. Thus then the Yogic cognition invalidating the waking cognitions having become false, you will have to reject all such exceptional characteristics of Yogic cognition, as the fact of its proceeding from the suppression of passions, &c., from which you conclude such cognitions to be correct. And in this way your reasoning becomes self-contradictory.

meditation, &c.,—would also become rejected; and thence your argument would become self-contradictory.

100-101. There being no rejection (of waking cognitions), by great men, these would be like the Yogic cognition which you accept as invalidating present cognitions; and thence we would either urge the rejection of your inferential argument, or bring forward a counter-argument, and recall the discrepancies in your previous argument.

101-102. And your previous argument is also open to the fault of having the middle term unrecognised by both parties, because it is non-different from the major term (or conclusion), and is (hence) unmentionable (as the middle term).

102-203. As for the 'class cognition' in general, you do not accept it as being both different and non-different (from the individual cognitions); and as for its being totally different (from the individuals), there is no such 'class' accepted by us.

103-104. That there is neither *similarity* nor the *exclusion of others*,

100.101 We can bring forward the following counter-argument: "Waking cognitions are correct, because at present they are not rejected by able men,—like your Yogic cognition." Then if this argument of ours is equal in strength to that whereby you seek to invalidate all waking cognitions, then ours is only a counter-argument. If, on the other hand, our argument is stronger than yours, then your argument falls through. Any way, our argument closes the way of your argument. "*Previous argument*:" i.e., the argument whereby you seek to prove the absence of any real substratum in the external world, for cognitions.

101.102 Over and above the discrepancies in your argument, pointed out above, there is yet another point against it: your middle term "Pratyaya" is not one that is recognised by both parties; inasmuch as the "fact of being a cognition" cannot be made the middle term; because it forms part of your conclusion, and as such, is not accepted by your opponent. Your conclusion is that "all cognitions are devoid of substratum"; and for your middle term, too, you have "cognition"; by which you presuppose the fact of cognitions being devoid of substratum—thus incurring the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*. Thus then your argument becomes devoid of a proper middle term, which must always be such as is already accepted by both parties.

102.103 You may urge that you will have, for your middle term, "Cognition" in general, what forms part of the conclusion being only a *particular* kind of cognition, thereby sailing clear of the objectionable identity of the conclusion with the Minor term. But in reply to this, it is added, that the conception of such a generic entity too is not common to both of us. If you deny the identity of the *Class* with the *Individual*, then you have only two alternatives left: (1) either that it be both different and non-different, (2) or that it be entirely different, from it. Apparently, you do not accept the first alternative; because you do not admit the *Class* to be identical with the *Individual*; and as for the second, we do not accept it. So even now your middle term remains such as is not accepted by both parties.

103.104 It may be urged that "by *class* we do not mean a category including many individuals; but by *Sāmānya* (class) we only mean *similarity* (so cognition in general meaning cognitions that are similar) and *exclusion of others* (cognition in general then meaning everything that is not non-cognition); and it is this latter that is technically called *Apoha*, the upholders of which declare that the word *cow* denotes neither the