



42-43. But the fact is that in the case of Fire and Smoke, the extension of these being limited, their concomitance is well-known, and even in the absence of any idea of concomitance between their negations, the existence of smoke is enough for the recognition of the existence of fire. In the case in question on the other hand, one of the concomitants (absence everywhere else) having an endless extension, even an idea of concomitance is not possible.

44. "But the recognition of another place without Caitra, is in this wise: 'Another place is such as Chaitra is absent from there,—because that place is other than the one where he is found to exist,—like another place before us (where he is found not to exist).'"

45. This argument is such as is also applicable to a contradictory conclusion,—the process of reasoning being 'another place is such as Caitra is present there,—because it is a place other than the place before us (where Caitra, does not exist),—like the place (before us) where Caitra is seen to exist.'

46-47. When the person, as a whole, is found to exist in one place,—this not being otherwise explicable, we naturally conclude that he cannot but be absent from everywhere else. Therefore even the recognition of your invariable concomitance can only be arrived at by means of "Apparent Inconsistency." So also in the case where a sight of the effect leads to the notion of a potency, in the cause, of bringing about the effect.

48-49. If it be urged that "the effect may be made the Middle Term (and thus the case may be proved to be one of Inference),"—(we reply), no; because (the arriving at the notion of the peculiar potency does not stand in need of any relation (of invariable concomitance). The Potency could be recognised (by means of Inference) only when the fact of its being related (by concomitance) had been ascertained, and not otherwise. But in the recognition of this Potency, any application of Sense-perception, (Inference, Word, Analogy and Negation) is impossible;

house with existence in the garden having been ascertained,—the mere fact of the non-recognition of any fact to the contrary would lead us to the invariable concomitance of presence in one place with absence from another; and thus the road of Inference would be clear.

42.43 "Extension being limited"—because the class "Fire" and the class "Smoke" inhere, in their entirety, in every individual fire and smoke, and thus their scope being limited, the recognition of their concomitance is easily arrived at; and hence it is well known not to stand in any urgent need of the idea of the concomitance of their negatives.

46.47 Thus then. Apparent Inconsistency has a distinct and independent object of its own. In the case of Cause and Effect the existence of the effect would not be otherwise explicable; hence it is by means of Apparent Inconsistency, that we are enabled to assume the existence of a peculiar potency in the cause of bringing about the particular effect.

43.49 "Potency" is not amenable to Sense-perception.



hence this can be cognised only by means of "Apparent Inconsistency," which is a correct means of knowledge (even) in the absence of the three factors of Inference.

50. In the case of the snake and the mongoose, the idea of their respective defeat and victory, based upon the fact of their standing to each other in the relation of the killed and the killer, is not cited (as an instance of "Apparent Inconsistency"), because it does not differ from Inference.

51. On the hearing of such assertions as that "being fat, a person does not eat during the day," we arrive at the idea of his eating in the night; and this is a case of Verbal "Apparent Inconsistency."

52-53. Some people refer this to the Meaning, and others to the Word; and they declare it to be identical with "Verbal Authority." Because, they assert, it is by means of this (Verbal "Apparent Inconsistency") that all Vedic rites are regulated; hence if this were different from "Verbal Authority" (and Scripture), such rites would become non-scriptural.

54. Others hold that the fact (of the person eating at night) forms the actual denotation of the statement heard (that 'being fat, he eats not in the day'). While there are others who hold it to be the denotation of another Sentence, intermixed with the denotation of the said statement.

55. The fact of his eating at night cannot be held to be the denotation of the statement heard; because a multifariousness of denotations is not proper (in words), and expressiveness does not belong to the Sentence.

56. The meaning of a Sentence is recognised, only in the form of a (syntactical) connection among the meanings of the words (constituting it); and the denotation of 'night,' &c., is not got at by means of the Sentence containing the word "Day" (i.e., "He eats not in the day").

57 Other commentators have cited this as an instance of Apparent Inconsistency; but the Bhāshya has not accepted it because it is only a process of Inference.

52-53 Some people hold that the result in this case is the fact of his *eating at night*. Others assert that the result is confined only to the *assertion*, "he eats at night."

"Vedic Actions, &c."—The "Apūrva" is assumed, because the Causal Efficiency of the Sacrifice itself towards the final result is not otherwise explicable.

54 Even among those who confine it merely to the word, there is a difference of opinion: Some hold that *he eats at night* forms part of the direct denotation of the assertion "being fat he eats not in the day." Others hold that the denotation of this assertion leads to another, viz: "He eats at night." And the result of Apparent Inconsistency is said to be the denotation of this latter assertion as mixed up with, and led to by, that of the former.

55 Therefore the fact of his eating at night cannot form part of the direct denotation of the Sentence "he eats not in the day."



57. "Eating at night" cannot constitute the syntactical connection of the Sentence containing the word "Day." Nor are "night, &c.," particular forms of "Day, &c.," whereby these latter would be expressive of the former.

58. And again, since the Sentence ("eats not in the day") has its full function in the denotation of another meaning (*the denial of eating in the day*), therefore no second meaning (in the form of *eating at night*) can be attributed to it. And for this reason, this meaning (that of *eating at night*) must be (held to be) denoted by another Sentence ("He eats at night") present in the mind of the person (who has heard the assertion, "Being fat, he eats not in the day").

59. Though this Sentence (in the mind of the person, viz., "He eats at night") partakes of the character of "Verbal testimony," yet, we have got to assert what, from among "Sense-perception" and the rest, is the means of getting at an idea of that Sentence.

60. Thus then, to a Sentence not uttered, "Sense-perception" cannot apply. Nor can Inference; because this (Sentence—"Eats at night") has never been seen to be concomitant with the other (Sentence—"Fat, he eats not in the day").

61. Even when any relation (with the Sentence "Eats not in the day") has not been recognised, if it be accepted to be the Middle Term (in the Inference of another Sentence, "Eats at night," which has not been found to be related to the other Sentence "Eats not in the day")—then the mere utterance of such a Sentence would bring about the idea of all Sentences.

62. Nor are all Sentences, that are amenable to "Apparent Inconsistency," found to be related to all Sentences; and therefore there can be no Inference with regard to them.

63. Neither mere existence, nor any specific entity, can be recognised by means of Inference; in the present case, what is inferred (according to you) is only the mere existence or a particular Sentence ("Eats at night").

64. And so, in the present case, the object of Inference is not (as it ought to have been) an object, whose independent existence has been previously ascertained, as specified by a property the independent existence of which also has been previously recognised.

61 "All the Sentences."—When there is no restriction as to the existence of the relation of concomitance between the Sentences "Eats at night" and "Eats not in the day," then, any and every Sentence could be taken to bring about the idea of all other Sentences in the world; which is an absurdity.

68 The object of Inference has been proved to be a "Sāmānyā"; and hence mere existence, or any specific entity can never form its object.

64 In the present case, it would only be the existence of a definite object that would form the subject matter of Inference.



65. "What we recognise (by means of Inference) is the Sentence that is heard ('Eats not in the day') as qualified by the other Sentence ('Eats at night')." But in that case you would have a Minor Term such as has an unknown qualification.

66. And again, if you hold this ("the Sentence heard") to be the Middle Term, because of the absence of any other characteristic Middle Term; then you will have the Middle Term (Minor Premiss) forming a part of the conclusion, as in the case of the Word.

67. In the same manner, we can disprove the fact of the Sentences having the character of objects and properties: If the Sentence "Eats at night" has not been ascertained, it cannot qualify the other Sentence; while if it has already been ascertained, it cannot be the object to be recognised by means of Inference.

68. In the absence of the particular relationship of *action and agent*, there can be no property; and since one Sentence is not the denotation of another, therefore it cannot be its qualification, in the form of its object.

69. If it be urged that "inasmuch as one Sentence leads to the recognition of another, it must be held to be expressive of it,"—then in that case, we have the absurdity of a multiplicity of denotations. And the character of property, derived from Inference, would be useless.

70. Nor is that Sentence ("Eats at night") cognised by means of the meanings of words (contained in the Sentence "Eats not in the day"); because it is not in any way connected with them. The character of words is such that they indicate the particular forms of their denotations, because of the inconsistency of their general forms of these (in connection with the Sentence in which they occur).

65 "Unknown qualification"—because the Sentence "Eats at night" can never be recognised as a qualification of the Sentence "He does not eat in the day."

66 That is to say, if the Middle Term be the same as the Minor Term,—viz., the Sentence that is heard. "In the case of the word"—i.e., as in the argument brought forward to prove the fact of words having distinct denotations (see above).

68 "Since one Sentence, &c."—The relation subsisting between the object and its substrate is not possible; because one Sentence is not the object of another. This relation would be possible only if one Sentence were the expressed denotation of another.

69 "Derived from Inference, &c."—This anticipates the following objection: "We grant that one Sentence is not the denotation of another; but one Sentence is clearly such as if inferred from another,—and hence the sentence *Eats not in the day*, being the object of Inference based upon the other sentence as its Middle Term, itself becomes the Middle Term; and as such could be laid down as the qualification of the other Sentence."

The sense of the reply is that the Inference having been got at before hand, the subsequent ascertainment of one Sentence being the qualification of another is entirely useless.

70 "The character of words, &c."—The word "jar" denotes the class; but inasmuch as this denotation is not consistent with the particular Sentence "bring the jar," it is accepted to indicate an individual jar. There is no such relation of Class and Individual between the two Sentences in question.

71. There is nothing in the words "Fat, eats not in the day" that could not be compatible without the other Sentence ("Eats at night"). Nor is there any other way in which the words "Eats not at day" can be related to that particular Sentence ("Eats at night").

72-73. If it be urged that "we can assume a different Sentence denotative of the Sentence, 'Eats at night'"—then (we reply) that the same objection (of want of connection, &c.), would apply to this assumption also; for any number of such assumptions cannot liberate it from the (objection of) want of connection. Hence it would be far better to accept its denotation by means of the first Sentence.

73. And further, in the case of your Inference, both negative and positive concomitance would be denied to exist, as in the case of the Word.

74. Nor is there any similarity between the Sentence heard ("Eats not in the day") and that which is not heard ("Eats at night"). Hence the case cannot be one of Analogy. Similarly with the meanings of the two Sentences.

75. Both similarity and the character of being the characteristic Middle Term, having been precluded from belonging to the Sentence, the same would be the case with the meaning (of the Sentence) also; hence the question cannot be included in either of the other Means of Right Notion ("Sense-perception," &c.).

76. The Sentence "Eats at night" is assumed, because without such a Sentence, the meaning denoted by the Sentence heard ("He is fat, and Eats not in the day") would be absolutely inconceivable.

77. "(1) Why should not the above case be explained as—'because

72-73 "Want of connection,"—between the words of the assumed Sentence and the Sentence "he eats at night." For the sake of that connection, you will have to assume another Sentence,—and so on Sentence after Sentence, *ad infinitum*; but not, withstanding all these endless assumptions, the want of connection will continue just the same; and in the end you will have to accept the fact of a Sentence being recognised by means of an unconnected Sentence; and then the assumption of a new Sentence becomes useless. And it has been already proved that there can be no denotative relation between the two Sentences themselves. Hence your theory falls to the ground.

73 There is neither a positive invariable concomitance between the two Sentences, nor any concomitance between the negatives of the two Sentences, &c., &c., &c., as was explained in course of the refutation of the theory that meanings belongs to Words.

74 "Similarity."—Since there is no similarity between the meanings of the two Sentences.

75 The Sentence heard is, on the very face of it, impossible, and its meaning could never be conceived of as being in any way possible, unless we recognised the fact of his eating at night, which alone can render the meaning of the Sentence possible, to a certain extent. And thus, inasmuch as the new Sentence is cognised simply with a view to avoid the inconsistency of the Sentence heard, it must be admitted to be a case of Apparent Inconsistency, pure and simple.

77 This objection emanates from one who holds that the object of Apparent Inconsistency is the *meaning* of the Sentence "he eats at night" and not the Sentence



the meaning of the Sentence heard is not possible without that of the other Sentence, therefore it is this latter meaning that is assumed' ? And (2) like the meaning of a Sentence, why should not this also be included in "Verbal testimony" ?

78. But all specially qualified cognitions are such that they presuppose the words (that give expression to such cognitions). When the Sentence has once fulfilled its purpose, anything other than that cannot be held to form the object of "Verbal testimony."

79. "If there be no connection (between the two Sentences 'Eats not in the day' and 'Eats at night'), or even when existing, if it be not recognised,—then (in that case), the Sentence ('Eats at night') being recognised would not be true, as it would not be based upon any Means of Right Notion."

80. Is there any heavenly ordinance declaring the fact of such connection being a Means of Right Notion ? In that case, how can the character of such Means of Right Notion belong to "Sense-perception," which is devoid of any such connection (or relation of concomitance) ?

81. If it be urged that "in the case of Sense-perception there is connection between the object and the Sense-organ," then (we reply that) at the time of the perception by the Sense, such connection (between the object and the Sense-organ) is not recognised by all persons.

82. Even one who recognises such connection does so only after he has had the Sense-perception; and hence this connection cannot form part of the means of right knowledge ("Sense-perception,") itself; since so far as the functioning of Sense-perception is concerned, the connection is as good as non-existent.

itself. (2) Just as, because the connection of the meanings of words is not possible, therefore even though it is not denoted by words, yet the meaning of the Sentence is assumed, and is accepted to be amenable to Verbal Testimony;—in the same manner, in the case in question, the meaning of the assumed Sentence "He eats at night" being recognised in order to avoid the inconsistency of the meaning of the other Sentence, could be accepted as an instance of Verbal Testimony.

78 The first half of this Kārikā meets the (1) and the second the (2) objection of the last Kārikā. The object of Apparent Inconsistency—the cognition of the new Sentence—is a specified cognition, and as such, presupposes the existence of words (constituting the assumed Sentence); and since the meaning will have been signified by these words, it could not be the object of Apparent Inconsistency. "When the Sentence, &c."—so long as the Sentence has not attained its object, whatever may be signified by it, must be accepted to be its denotation; and hence the meaning of a Sentence becomes the object of Verbal Testimony. So long as the words constituting it have not been construed with one another, the Sentence remains with its object unfulfilled. And as soon as the construction of the Sentence has been got at, it attains its object; and when this has been fulfilled, if anything else happens to be implied by that Sentence, such subsequent implication cannot be accepted as the object of the Verbal Authority of that Sentence.

82 "As good as, &c."—Because it does not in any way help the cognition of the object, coming, as it does, only after such cognition has been arrived at.

83. Some people (the Bauddhas) hold the "Eye" and the "Ear" to be such as to lead to the cognition of their various objects, without coming in contact with them; and just as these people hold the fact of the cognition by means of these (Eye and Ear) to be true (as being cases of Sense-perception), so we would also have in the case in question.

84. Therefore in the existence, or non-existence of connection, whatever cognition we have—provided that it be permanent (i.e., not contradicted by any subsequent correct cognition)—must be valid.

85. No one denies the fact of this ("Apparent Inconsistency") being a valid means of right knowledge. The only difference of opinion is on the point of its difference or non-difference (from other means of right knowledge, Inference, &c.) And on this point we have arrived at a correct conclusion (that "Apparent Inconsistency" is distinct from all the other five means of right knowledge; and as such must be accepted as a distinct and independent means of right knowledge).

86. In a place where, in the absence of connection, no cognition is produced, there is no help. But even in that case the connection does not constitute the ground (or cause) of validity.

87. In the "Mimāṃsā-Çastra" (1) Wherever a Çruti is assumed on the ground of another Çruti, (2) When a passage is assumed to apply to a definite sacrifice through "Power, &c.," and (3) Where the result, &c. (of a sacrifice) are assumed from outside,—in all these cases we have no conception of any (inferential) connection.

88 Eye—and Ear—cognition is held to be true even in the absence of any contact between these organs and the object (as held by the Bauddhas); and hence just as want of connection does not in any way affect the validity of these cognitions, so too, in every other case, we could not allow the validity of any cognition to be denied on the only ground of the absence of connection.

89 The existence or absence of connection does not in any way determine the validity of a cognition.

86 "There is no help"—i.e., we must admit the presence of connection to be a necessary concomitant of the validity of that particular cognition. "*Ground of validity.*"—The only such ground that we admit of is the absence of any cognition to the contrary.

87 All these are cases of the application of Apparent Inconsistency. (1) In the absence of a certain Çruti, a Smṛiti passage appears irrelevant or inconsistent; and with a view to this a Çruti is assumed by means of Apparent Inconsistency, e.g., in the case of the Smṛitis treating of the *Ashtakā*, whose basis in the Çruti is only assumed. (2) A certain sacrifice is enjoined; but its deity is not named there; and as without a Deity, the sacrifice itself would be impossible; and with a view to remove this inconsistency, we get at the name of the Deity through the force of a certain word in the *mantra* mentioned in connection with the sacrifice. (3) In the same manner, in the case of the *Viçvajit* sacrifice, the result is not mentioned, and as the injunction remains incomplete and inconsistent in the absence of a result, we assume a result, in the shape of the attainment to Heaven. And in all these three cases, the only way of getting at a satisfactory conclusion is by means of Apparent Inconsistency. And though in all these cases, no connection is recognised, yet no one can deny the validity and correctness of the assumptions.



88. All these and such like cases would be inexplicable, if "Apparent Inconsistency" were not different from "Inference." If, even when having such a distinct form and character, the name "Inference" be given to it, then you may have your wish.

Thus ends the Chapter on "Apparent Inconsistency."

(SECTION 9).

ON "NEGATION."

1-2. In the case of an object where the aforesaid five means of knowledge do not function towards the comprehension of the existence of that object, we have Negation as the sole means of cognition. The ascertainment of the non-contact (non-existence) of an object depends upon the validity of this (Negation) as a means of cognition.

2-4. The non-existence of curd in milk is called "Prior Negation" (Prāgabdhāva) (1); the non-existence of milk in the curd is called "Destruction" (Dhwaṁsa) (2); the negation of the horse, &c., in the cow, and *vice versa* is known as "Mutual Negation" (Anyonyābhāva) (3); the lower portions of the hare's head, being devoid of hardness and a supernumerary growth in the form of horns, is called "Absolute Negation" (Atyāntābhāva) (4).

5-6. If Negation were not accepted as a (distinct) means of cognition, then we would have the existence of curd in milk, of milk in curd, of the jar in a piece of cloth, of horns in the hare, of intelligence in the earth, &c., of shape in the Soul, of odour in water, of taste in fire, of form together with these two in the Air, and of tangibility and these three in the Ākāśa.

7-8. Nor again could we have any usage with regard to the differentiation of causes and effects, &c., if Negation were not classified into

89 All that we want to prove is that the form and character of Apparent Inconsistency are distinct from those of Inference. This having been satisfactorily proved, if even then, you persist in calling it "Inference," you may do so. The word may be explained as *that which is the means of something cognised after (or in the wake of) something else* (Anu=paścāt, mīyatē anēna); and when thus explained, the name "Anumāna" is applicable to all the means of right notion. And as such, we have no objection to the name being given to Apparent Inconsistency.

1.2 Says the Bhāṣya: "Negation too, being an absence of all other means of notion, gives rise to the notion *it exists not* with regard to a remote object." To this an objection is raised: "That which consists of the absence of the means of right notion cannot itself be the means of right notion"; and with a view to this objection, we explain the word "Pramāṇābhāva" (absence of the means of right notion) as the absence (or non-application) of the aforesaid five Pramānas. By means of these five objects as cognised *as existing*, while by means of Negation they are cognised *as non-existing*.

1.3 This Kārikā is levelled against those who hold that Negation being a non-entity can never be a means of right notion; the curd does not exist while the milk lasts, it



those of different kinds, such as Prior Negation, &c. Nor again is such classification possible with regard to a non-entity. Therefore Negation must be an entity. For what is the negation of an effect, other than the existence (continuance) of the cause?

9. Or again, Negation must be an entity, like the cow, &c., because it is capable of forming the object of the notions of collective affirmation and differentiation; and also, because it is an object of cognition.

10. Nor can it be asserted at will (without any grounds for so doing) that such a notion is only an (incorrect) imposition, or that it is a mistaken notion; therefore the fact of the character of general and particular belonging to Negation cannot be said to be false.

11. By means of the word "*Pramāṇābhāva*" (in the *Bhāṣya*) is meant the non-appearance of "*Sense-perception*" and the rest. And this is either a particular modification of the Soul, or the cognition of another object.

12. With regard to an object, which is ever both *extant* and non-

is only this prior negation of the curd wherein lies its character as an effect. No sooner does the curd come into the existence than the milk ceases to exist; and it is in this subsequent destruction of the milk that lies its character as the cause. The other examples of negation shown above would be impossible if we did not admit of the aforesaid classification of negation. And since no classification is possible for a non-entity, therefore we conclude Negation to be an entity; the more so, because the negation of an effect consists only in the existence of the cause, i.e., so long as the cause continues to exist there is a negation of the effect.

11 If Negation be accepted to be a particular modification of the Soul,—i.e. (in the present case), the negation of the particular modification of the Soul in the shape of the sensuous perception of the jar,—then, such negation cannot but be accepted as a means of right notion; inasmuch as it brings about the cognition of the non-existence of the jar; and the effect of this means is the knowledge that the jar *does not exist*. If however, this cognition of non-existence, arising with regard to a distinct object in the shape of the *absence of the jar*, be called "Negation," then the effect thereof would be the acceptance or abandoning of the object, &c., &c. The meaning of the aforesaid *Bhāṣya* passage would thus come to be this: "The absence of Sense-perception and the rest giving rise to the idea that it is *not*, constitutes 'Negation,' which is a distinct (the sixth) means of right cognition."

12 Every object has a double character: with regard to its own form, it exists (i.e., as *jar*, a jar exists); while with regard to the form of another object, it does not exist (i.e., and as *cloth* the jar does not exist). Both forms are equally entities; sometimes people cognise the one and sometimes the other. This is levelled against the objection that, inasmuch as there is no such independent entity as Negation, apart from the bare condition of the ground (i.e., as the non-existence of the jar in a particular place is none other than the *place devoid of the jar*), and this latter is amenable to Sense-perception, there is no room left for any other independent means of cognition in the shape of Negation. The sense of the reply is that the fact of the non-existence of the cloth in the jar simply means that the Cloth in its non-existent form inheres in another object, the jar, and as such, produces the cognition of its non-extant form in the jar. And certainly this non-existent form of the cloth could never be cognisable by means of Sense-perception, &c. Hence we obtain a distinct and independent object for Negation, as a distinct means of cognition.



extant with reference to its own form and that of another object respectively, some people cognise only certain forms at certain times.

13. We have the comprehension of the cognition of that form, which has come into existence, and with regard to which there is a desire (on the part of the agent) for comprehension, and it is by this that the cognition is named.

14. But during all this time the other form continues (latent) helping the cognition of its counter-entity. Because in the cognition of each of these we always have the touch of the other.

15. The ascertained definite notion of positive existence—such as “this is (the jar) and nothing else”—is not possible, without a tinge of the cognition of the absence of everything else.

16. Nor is the cognition “it (jar) does not exist” possible, without a notion of the object itself; for there can be no cognition without an objective substratum.

17. “Sense-perception” and the rest apply to such cases where there is a comprehension of the positive (*extant*) form of an object; where, however, the object of comprehension is the negative form, the only action of these (Sense-perception) consists in their non-appearance.

18. The idea that “this is not” is never brought about by means of the Sense organs; because the Sense-organs are capable of having contact with positive forms only.

19. “Well, you have asserted that ‘non-existence’ is non-different from ‘existence’; hence the Sense-organs could have contact even with non-existence.” Not so; because we do not admit of an absolute identity between the two (what we do admit of is only comparative non-difference); as in the case of *colour*, &c.

20. Even when there is an identity of the object (as in the case of a fruit, which is only one), we admit of a certain difference among its properties, *colour*, *taste*, *odour*, &c. And the comprehension of these exis-

13 When the jar has appeared in its *extant* form it becomes cognised, and the cognition is called the “cognition of the jar.” When, on the other hand, it is the non-existent form of the jar that has appeared in connection with a particular place, we have a cognition of this non-existent form; and this cognition is called the “cognition of the absence of the jar”; and this latter cognition is the object of Negation.

16 In the cognition of the jar, an idea of the absence of the jar ever continues latent, helping (by its negation) the cognition of the jar itself, and the cognition of the absence of the jar is admittedly accompanied by an idea of the jar itself.

19 Just as *Colour*, *Taste*, &c., are each different by themselves, but are considered non-different, as co-hering in the same substance.

20 Just as in the case of *Colour*, &c., there is difference in reality (though there is also a seeming identity), so also in the case of existence and non-existence; though they are really different, yet they seem to be identical inasmuch as both of them inhere in the same object. The difference between the two is also proved by the fact that one of them (*existence*) is comprehended when it has appeared and the other (*non-existence*) has disappeared, and *vice versa*.



tence non-existence depends upon (the) (appearance of the one) and disappearance (of the other).

21. The ground of difference, too, is found to be this : In the comprehension of *existence* we have contact of the senses as the means, while that of *non-existence* is independent of such contact.

22. Of *colour*, &c., too, some people explain in the difference to be based upon the difference in the means of their (respective) comprehension ;—just as in the case of one and the same person having the character of *Son* (with regard to his father) and *father* (with regard to his Son).

23. (According to us) the difference among *colour*, &c., is always based on mere cognition. They cannot be held to form a composite whole on the ground of the identity of their location.

24. *Colour*, *Taste*, &c., are held to be one, on the grounds of their being *entities* and *properties*,—and as being both identical with the *substance* and each of these again is held to be different from the other, when considered individually in its own specific character.

25. In the same manner, if, in the case in question, we had not the difference based upon a similar consideration of the individual specific character of each (*existence* and *non-existence*), then in other places we could not have any idea of the positive and negative characters of a cognition.

26. When there is a contact (of the Sense) with the object, then we have a cognition of its form and the notion that *it is*. On the other hand, the notion *it is not* is due to the absence of such contact.

22 Some people hold that colour is cognised by the eye and odour by the nose; and in this lies the difference of colour from odour. Just as the character of the *Son* is cognised with reference to the *Father*, and that of the *Father* with reference to the *Son*, so, in the same manner, we could have the difference between existence and non-existence (as correlative entities).

23 They are different simply because they are cognised to be different. "They cannot, &c."—This is levelled against the objection that "if such be the case, then we would have an eternal difference between colour and taste, and between existence and non-existence; and the idea of identity could be explained as being due to the fact of their existing in one and the same place; and thus forming a single composite whole, which is cognised as the object (fruit, f.i.)". The sense of the reply is that this is not correct, inasmuch as an independent object forming the substratum of properties has been proved to have an independent existence apart from its properties (*vide* Chapter on "Sense-perception").

25 If between *existence* and *non-existence* we do not accept both difference and non-difference, in accordance with the aforesaid considerations, then, with regard to one and the same object (*jar* f.i.), we could not have the cognitions of both its existence and non-existence, as based respectively upon its positive and negative forms.

26 The form of the place, being in contact with the sense, is at once comprehended; and the same place being (in the shape endowed with the presence of the jar) not in such contact, we have the notion that *the place is devoid of the jar*, and so on. The *Nyāya-ratnākara* enters into a lengthy discussion as to the various relationships of this non-existence.



27. After the object (*the place where the jar is not*) has been perceived (by the Eye), and the counter-entity (*the jar*) has been remembered, then follows the notion that *it (the jar) is not*, which is purely mental (and as such) independent of the Sense-organs.

28. Having (at first) *seen* the mere form (of a place), and latterly happening to *remember* a little of it, if one is asked as to the non-presence, in that place, of another object, he at once becomes cognisant of such non-presence (by means of "Negation" pure and simple).

29. Nor (in the case of Negation) do we find the character of Inference; because there is no Middle Term. If it be urged that "we have for such term, the positive form (of the object whose existence is denied)," then (we reply) this cannot be, because the positive form does not form an object of cognition at that time.

30. There is an appearance of the cognition of the negative form only when the positive form does not form an object of cognition. When,

27 This anticipates the following objection: "The Eye perceives the place, and Negation brings about the idea of the *non-existence of the jar*; how, then, could we have the notion of this *non-existence* as qualifying, or residing in, the particular place?" The sense of the reply is that the process may be thus explained: (1) The place is seen by the Eye; (2) the jar (which has been seen before, and which could have been seen if it had been present) is remembered; (3) then there follows a purely mental process which gives rise to the notion of the *non-existence of the jar*. The qualified notion of such non-existence in a place can be explained as having been brought about by the collective action of all the aforesaid three processes.

28 A person has passed the morning at a certain place; and all along he notices only the bare place, and nothing else enters into his mind. And in the afternoon he is asked if a tiger had been to that place in the morning. He calls up the place in his mind, and at once becomes cognisant of the fact that no tiger had been to the place; and he replies to the same effect. Here we find that the non-existence of the tiger had not been cognised while he was at the place; in fact, no idea of the tiger had entered his head, so he could not have *realised* its absence at that time. Nor is the place before his eyes, when the question is put to him. Therefore the idea of the non-existence of the tiger that he now has cannot be said to be due to the action of the senses; nor can it be said to be due solely to the non-perception of something that could have been perceived if it were present (it is specially against this alternative of the *Naiyāyika* that the present *Kārikā* is levelled); because this would be the cause of such notion of the tiger's absence as would appear at the time the person was at the place. As a matter of fact, however, in the above instance, we find that so long as he was there the idea of the tiger never entered his head; and so the non-perception of the perceptible cannot be the cause of his subsequent cognisance of the tiger's absence, which must, therefore, be admitted to have been the result of "Negation" pure and simple, as aided by the former perception of the place and the slight remembrance of it in the afternoon.

29 "At that time—i.e., when its non-existence was cognised. That which is not cognised cannot constitute the Middle Term.

30 At the time that the object is cognised to exist, it cannot be cognised to be non-existent.

on the other hand, the positive form has been cognised, then there can be no cognition of the negative form.

31. Nor can this (positive form) be the predicate of the Minor premiss, as in the case of the Word. And, again, no positivity is held to be concomitant with all negativity.

32. Even if we come across such a case as where the existence of one thing (place) is accompanied by that of another (jar), even then, we may also come across a case where in the same case (of the existence of the place) we find the non-existence of another (jar).

33. In a case where the non-existence of an object has never before been cognised, even in that case, we find that the comprehension of its non-existence is independent of any conception of invariable concomitance.

34. If there be a cognition of the relation of invariable concomitance of the existence of any object with the non-existence of another object, then we would have the comprehension of everything in the world by means of such invariable concomitance.

35. Even when the existence of one object has been comprehended all people do not necessarily have an idea of the non-existence of every other object; and thus, this being a case of non-concomitance, the cognition of existence cannot serve as the Middle Term.

36. When any relation is comprehended, it is necessary that the members related should be cognised. And by what means would you have the cognition of *non-existence* (which you assert to be related by invariable concomitance, to existence) ?

37. At that time (i.e., prior to the comprehension of the relation), the cognition of the member related could not be due to the Middle Term (because it has not yet been recognised as such). Hence the cognition of non-existence must be asserted to be due to some other means of knowledge (besides Sense-perception, Inference, &c.).

81 This is levelled against the view that the *existence of the place* (and not that of the jar) may be accepted to be the Middle Term. The sense of the reply is that it has been already shown (in the chapter on "Word") that the Word cannot be the property of its denotation; and the same process of reasoning may be employed to show that so long as the *non-existence of the jar* has not been cognised, the *existence of the place* cannot be cognised as qualifying it. Because in the absence of the substratum where would the qualification subsist ?

82 Though the presence of the place may be found in one case to be concomitant with the absence of the jar, yet at another time we could find the jar existing in the same place. No invariable concomitance between the two is possible.

83 If, without any restrictions, the concomitance of the existence of the cloth with the non-existence of the horse were to be accepted as a means of obtaining a notion of the non-existence of the jar, then such an uncontrolled premiss would be an universal solvent, bringing about the notion of everything in the world.

85 Whenever we perceive a place it is not necessary that we must directly become cognisant of the absence of everything else. Thus, then, we find that no case of existence is invariably concomitant with non-existence in general.



38-39. "The non-appearance of Sense-perception and the rest, would constitute the Middle Term." There can be no relation between this (non-appearance) and any *particular* case of non-existence. Then, there would be a distinct relation between this and non-existence *in general*. But *non-existence in general* is not capable of bringing about any cognition. And inasmuch as there is non-concomitance of this (non-appearance) with the particular cases, how could these be comprehended by means of that non-appearance)?

38.39 This objection emanates from the Bauddha, and his position is thus outlined in the *Nyāya-ratnākara*: "If that which is capable of being seen at a place happens to be not seen, then it cannot be existing in the place; and since I do not see a jar here (which I should have seen if it had existed), therefore it does not exist here at this time. This is only a natural inference. *Non-perception* is nothing more than the perception of one of the two objects of a relation; as, in the case of the *place* and the *jar*, we see the *place* alone; and this constitutes the absence of the *jar*. Thus then this non-perception being only a phase of perception, we cannot have the endless series of negations urged above; because the perception of one of the two members of a relation is cognisable by means of the Sense-organs; and this is held to be identical with the absence of the other member (the *jar*); for the sake of such usages as have been shown above. For these reasons, the non-appearance of Sense-perception can very well serve as the Middle Term, in the case of Negation. Or the inferential process may be otherwise explained. The existence of a visible object is always accompanied by its perception; consequently, the absence of perception must mean the denial of existence." The sense of the reply is thus explained: The absence of the *jar* cannot be rightly inferred from the mere negation of Sense-perception, &c. Because such a premiss could only lead to the inference of a *general* non-existence. While as a matter of fact, there never is any notion of such *non-existence in general* (which could be possible only at the time of the Universal Dissolution); the cognition of non-existence always rests in some particular case of non-existence; and this cannot be inferred from a general negation, &c., inasmuch as even when the *jar* exists, we have a general form of negation (in the *negation of the cloth*). Then the non-perception of the *jar* may be the Middle Term. But we ask—what is this *non-perception of the jar*? If it is, as you say, only the *perception of the bare place*, then this latter is a general assertion, and is possible during the existence as well as the non-existence of the *jar*; and as such cannot lead to the inference of the *absence of the jar*. Then, the perception of one of the two members cannot serve as the Middle Term; because we have such perception of one member, also when both the members are perceived. If the *non-existence of the jar* be explained as the *non-perception of the jar*,—then, at the time of the inference of such negation, and also at the time of the comprehension of the affirmative premiss, we would stand in need of a series of non-perceptions, one after the other, *ad infinitum*; and as in the cognition of the Middle Term, so also in that of the Minor Term, we would have the same endlessness; because you seek to prove the absence of the visible object by means of the absence of its perception; this absence of perception also, being an *absence*, could be cognised (according to you) only by means of another absence; and so on, *ad infinitum*. For these reasons, we must admit that the *non-appearance of Sense-perception*, &c., is the means of the cognition of Negation, by itself, and not by being made the Middle Term of an inferential argument; and when this has once been admitted, then upon this basis you can raise any amount of inferential fabric.

40-42. Anything that is not fully known cannot serve as the Middle Term. If it be urged that this (non-appearance) is well known,—then (we reply that) this too, being a negative entity, could have been cognised only by means of another negative entity (*i.e.*, another non-appearance), as the Middle Term; this latter Middle Term too would have been comprehended by means of another,—for nothing that is uncognised could ever be the Middle Term; and this cognition too could only be by means of another Middle Term;—*i.e.*, the Middle Term and so on, we would have an endless series (of Middle Terms). In the case of the Negation of the Minor Term too, we would have the same endless series. Therefore (in order to avoid this endlessness) you will be forced to admit of a resting-place where this (non-appearance, a negation) itself would be the means of cognition, even in the absence of a Middle Term.

43-44. An effect, in the shape of the notion 'it is not,' is seen to proceed directly from the non-appearance of Sense-perception, &c.; and it is for this reason that we accept the fact of this non-appearance being the means of the cognition, because of its immediate (and invariable) pre-existence. You (the Bauddha) hold that cognition to be inferential which is brought about by means of the threefold relation (the two causal, and one natural); and certainly a case of non-appearance (a negation) does not stand in need of a cause (and hence no causal relation is possible in the case in question).

45. If it be asked "how can negation be a means of cognition?" (we reply) of what form is the object thereof? Just as the object is negative, so would the means of cognising it be also negative.

46. Just as in the case of a positive entity, nothing negative can be the means of its cognition; so in the case of a negative object, nothing positive could be the means of its cognition.

47. There is no royal command to the effect that only a positive entity can be the means of cognition. The character of being the means of cognition would, in the case of both (positive and negative entities), rest upon the fact of their bringing about definite concrete cognitions of their respective objects.

48-49. If you deny the fact of negation being a means of cognition, simply on the ground of its being a negative entity, taking your stand on the belief that in all cases it is only a positive entity that has been seen to be the cause,—then, in that case, a negative entity (non-appearance) could not be either a Middle Term, or an object of any cognition. And under such circumstances, you could not explain the common usages shown above.

50. Neither the non-appearances of other means of cognition, nor a

43-44 "Threefold relation."—The Bauddhas hold that all Inference is based upon only three relations: (1) that of the cause with the effect, (2) that of the effect with the cause, and (3) that based upon the specific nature of the things concerned.

50 "The place, &c.," because the place is seen, and is amenable to visual perception.



negation, can be the property (or predicate of any thing). The place, where we have the negation (of the jar), is not related to this (non-appearance).

51. The non-appearance may be related to something else, that is not near (us at that time). But this *something else* cannot be the object of cognition,—because it is devoid of the character of predicate as well as that of the subject.

52. There would be a relation of this (non-appearance) with Negation, inasmuch as it has a negation for its object. But this fact of negation being an object depends upon a comprehension of the negation; and when this (negation) has been comprehended, nothing is left that could be the object of the Inference (having the 'non-appearance' as the Middle Term).

53. Between the two there is no other relation, such as conjunction or Inference. Thus we see that so long as Negation is not comprehended, the character of the predicate cannot belong (to 'non-appearance, &c. '); and when this has been comprehended, then your inference would become redundant (as proving what has already been comprehended, even before the comprehension of the premises).

54-55. (1) The *absence of the other five means of cognition* differs from these, "Sense-perception," &c.,—because it is denoted by the Word "Negation,"—just as among the objects of cognition (by the six means of cognition), the object of "Negation" is negative, while those of the other five are positive entities. (2) Negation (or non-existence) is cognised by a means similar to itself (*i.e.*, Negative),—because it is an object of cognition,—just as positive entities. Therefore "Negation" must be distinct from all things positive.

56. That all actions do not become related to all the results, that all sacrifices do not become related to all the subsidiaries, and that all these subsidiaries do not become related to one another,—all this is cognised by means of this (Negation).

57. Thus, by means of arguments, as well as by Verbal testimony, the six means of cognition have been differentiated and defined in the Bhāshya. Besides these (six) two other means of cognition are accepted by some people. But these are included in the aforesaid six. Hence the sixfoldness of the means of cognition is established.

58. The notion of "hundred" as existing in the "thousand"—explained as being due to "Probability"—is only brought about by the fact of the invariable concomitance (of a *hundred* with a *thousand*); and as

51 A positive entity cannot be a subject having a negative entity for its predicate nor can it be the predicate of a negative subject; because the two are mutually contradictory.

51 "Verbal testimony,"—*i.e.*, on the authority of Jaimini, who has enunciated only six means of right cognition.



such, it is identical with Inference. And much of what is known in the world as "Tradition" is not always true; and whatever happens to be true that does not differ from "Valid Testimony."

Thus ends the Chapter on Negation.

SECTION 10.

CITRĀKSHĒPA.

1. In the first instance, our opponents (the Bauddhas, &c.), had objected to the Vedic passages appertaining to supernatural results (as Heaven and the like); whereas in the present passage it is passages appertaining to worldly results (acquirement of cattle, &c.), that are objected to,—and this too by the author of the Sutra.

2-3. "(1) Passages, treating of the Citrā sacrifice, &c., as leading to such results as the acquirement of cattle, &c., are false,—because, though they treat of perceptible objects, yet no such objects are actually perceptible. And again, that which is so (treating of perceptible objects, and found to be devoid of any such objects) is always found to be false,—just as the assertion of a liar that 'there are fruits on the river bank,' when no such fruits are found to exist.

4-5. "(2) And again, the Citrā sacrifice cannot lead to the acquirement of cattle,—because it does not bring about such a result at the time of its performance, as do bath and feeding, &c. Or, (3) the acquirement of cattle cannot be the result of the Citrā sacrifice,—because it is not seen to exist at the time that the sacrifice is performed,—like Heaven, and the pleasures of satisfaction. As a negative instance for both these syllogisms we may have *pleasure attending upon shampooing*.

6. "If it be urged that immediate sequence is not mentioned (in the passage *Citrāyā yajēta pñcukāmah*),—we deny this, because such immediate consequence is clearly implied by the assertion; and it is also signified by implication, which also forms part of the Word.

¹ "At first,"—i.e., when the validity of the Veda was questioned. (*Vide supra*). This refers to the Bhāṣhya passage—"Sense-perception and the rest are the means of right cognition; but how is the Word, &c., &c." The former objection was aimed at the passages mentioning superphysical results, and emanated from opponents. The present objection however is aimed at the passages speaking of worldly results, and is made by the author of the Vritti to proceed from the aphorism itself.

2-3 "Absence, &c.,"—i.e., cattles are not seen to follow immediately after the sacrifice.

4-5 Bath and Feeding produce results at the time of their accomplishment. Heaven, &c., are not found to exist when the 'Citra' sacrifice is performed; and as such cannot be said to be its effects. The same may be said also of such results as the acquisition of cattle, &c. Pleasure is felt at the time that the shampooing is done. But such is not the case with the Citrā sacrifice and the acquisition of Cattle.

⁶ The sense of the objection to the objections is that the above arguments fall



7. "Because no other time is specified, and because such is the character of actions in general, therefore immediate sequence must belong to the case of such enjoined sacrifices as the Citrā and the like.

8. "In the above instance we have non-agreement with ordinary perception; in another case we have utter contradiction; because we see with our eyes, the body being burnt to ashes, which is contrary to a journey to Heaven.

9. "The passage mentioning '*yajñāyudhi*,' &c., is false,—because of its contradiction by Sense-perception. As an affirmative instance (of similarity in this syllogism) we have the stone-passage ("Stone is floating"); and as a negative instance (of dissimilarity) the assertion of a trustworthy person.

10. "If the sacrificer be said to be something apart from the body (that is burnt) then, in that case, that *something* could not hold the sacrificial implements (and hence could not be called '*Yajñāyudhi*'). Nor again, could the character of *yajamāna* belong to this *something*. In fact the very fact of the existence of any such thing (apart from the body) can hardly be believed.

11. "If this (passage of heaven-going) were a direct injunction (like the Citrā passage), then there would have been no difference between this and the instance of non-perception (instanced in the Citrā passage); and as such it would not have been mentioned separately.

12. "And again, if the passage were an injunction, then the contradiction could have been removed, by assuming the result to follow at some future time. As a matter of fact, however, the passage is only an assertion of an event affirmed to happen at the present time; and as such it does not admit of any such explanation of the contradiction.

to the ground, because the passage does not lay down that the acquisition of cattle is to follow immediately after the performance of the sacrifice. But the original objector replies that though such immediate sequence is not directly mentioned, yet it is distinctly implied by indication, which is only a particular form of verbal denotation.

⁸ Another case,"—i.e., the passage "*Esha yajñāyudhī yajamānah anjasā swargam lokamyāti*,"—referring to the sacrificer, who is dead, and is placed upon the funeral pyre with all the sacrificial implements in his hands,—lays down that such a sacrificer proceeds directly to Heaven. The sense of the objection is that inasmuch as the body which bears the implements, is seen to be burnt to ashes, the mention of its journey to Heaven is contradictory to direct Sense-perception.

⁹ The assertion of a trustworthy person is always in keeping with facts of Sense-perception; and it is only as such that it is true. The present case is not so; hence it must be false.

¹¹ This *Kārikā* refers to the Bhāṣhya passage "*na ca na yāti*, &c.," and is with reference to an objection that such an assertion of the Bhāṣhya is superfluous; because whether the passage is a *Vidhi* or not, it makes no difference in the above arguments. The sense of the *Kārikā* is that the Bhāṣhya adds this in order to differentiate the present passage from the Citrā passage.

13. "Though, as a matter of fact, the body being burnt, the asserted result could not belong to it, even if the passage were an injunction,—yet on the strength of (such) an injunction there could be an assumption (of something apart from the body, to which the result, Journey to Heaven, would appertain); and it is such an assumption that is set aside by the Sentence ('*Na ca na yātiti vidhiḥ*').

14. "Such (contradiction of facts of Sense-perception) is found to be the case with almost all *Arthavādas* and *Mantras*; hence all these may be made the subject of the above proposition (i.e., asserting the falsity of such vedic passages as those above cited '*Esha yajñāyudhī*, &c., &c.)

15. "Such being the case, falsity would also belong to the passages laying down the *Agnihotra*, &c.;—because they are parts of the Veda,—like the *Citra* passage, &c."

Thus ends the Chapter on Citrākshēpa.

SECTION 11.

SAMBANDHAKSHĒPA.

1-2. The argument proving the theory of the author is this: (1) Vedic assertions are not false,—because in regard to their own significations, they are independent of the speaker,—like the notions of the word and its denotation. (2) Or, Ideas originating in the Veda are true,—because they arise from sentences that are eternal,—like the signification of a Sentence. And in this case we also have the support of the arguments shown before (under Aph. 2).

3-4. Taking his stand upon the fact of the relation between word and its meaning being eternal, the author of the *Bhāṣhya* has set aside the invalidity of the Veda in order to establish its self-evidential character. And after this has been done, the objector declares its falsity on the ground of its originating in the absence of any relation (between word and its meaning).

4-5. That there is a relation, and that it is eternal have been declared, by the assertion "*Autpattikastu*, &c.," with a view to set aside the falsity (of the Veda). Both of these facts are denied by the objector; of these two, that there is no relation between Word and Meaning is here considered; and that it is non-eternal will be considered later on. (*Kārikas*, 45, 46).

¹⁴ That is to say, since the condition of contradiction is the same, such *Mantras* may also be held to be false, on the sole ground of their being contrary to Sense-perception.

¹⁵ In the *Bhāṣhya*, we have "*autpattikastu*, &c.," which proves the theory of the trustworthiness of the Veda, &c., and leaves for a while the objections urged in the "*Citrākshēpa*"; because when the authenticity of the Veda has been once established, on the strength of that, we would have all objections answered.

¹⁶ Says the *Bhāṣhya*: "The word has no relation with its meaning, whence could it be due to human origin?" The meaning of this is that when the relation



6-10. Since no other relation is possible, contact or connection alone remains behind. And it is in this relation alone that we have the sure cognizance of ordinary people. Consequently it is the presence of this relation (between word and the object denoted) that is denied (by the objector) in the following manner: "The word is not related to the object denoted,—because it is not found to exist simultaneously in the same place with the other,—like the Vindhya is not related with the Himālaya." In the same manner non-relation may be proved with regard to the object denoted, or with regard to both of them. In order to establish the minor Premiss of the above argument (that they are not found to exist in the same place), the instance of the 'razor,' &c., has been brought forward (by the objector in the Bhāshya). Men of the other party (that of the author himself), taking their stand upon the relation of denotativeness (expressiveness), say: If the objector seek to disprove the existence of the relation of contact, then your effort is superfluous (because we also deny this in the case of the word and its meaning); if, on the other hand, you seek to disprove the existence of all relation, then your argument is contradicted by such cases as those of the words "*Father*" and "*Son*," &c. Similarly (if all relation be denied) then the predicate (absence of all relation) of the conclusion fails, in the case of the instance of the Vindhya and the Himālaya, which bear to each other, the relation of existing on the same Earth.

11-12. If the relation of expressiveness be denied, then there is contradiction to ordinary usage; and contradiction also to the objector's own declaration,—because it is not possible, by means of words devoid of all relation (with their meanings), to explain one's theories to the other party.

between the Word and its meaning has been ascertained to be eternal, it would also imply the eternality of the members related; and being eternal, these could not have any discrepancies, in the shape of *falsity* and the like,—and these having been set aside, the self-sufficient authority of the Veda would become established. Consequently, in order to strike at the very root of this reasoning, the objector is made, in the Bhāshya, to deny all relationship between the Word and the Meaning.

6-10 Says the Bhāshya: "If there were any relation between the word and the meaning, the utterance of the words '*Razor*' and '*Sweet Cake*' would bring about a cut in the face and its filling with sweets respectively." It may be objected to this assertion on the part of the objector that there is no such rule as that the two members related should always co-exist in the same place. With a view to this it has been declared that no other relation save that of *Conjunction* or *Contact* is possible, between the Word and its meaning; and hence whenever one of them would exist, the other would surely exist. "*The other party, &c.*"—says the Bhāshya: "That relationship which can be here pointed out, &c."

6-10 "*Father and Son.*"—In the case of these words, there is certainly a relation between their denotations,—and as such a total denial of the relationship between the denotations of all words is not true.

11-12 "*Devoid, &c.*"—as declared by the objector.

12-13. Then, as a matter of fact, in the action of denotation (or expression) the objective character belongs to the object denoted, and that of instrumentality or agency to the Word;

13-14. Since both (word and meaning) are predicates in the comprehension (of assertions), and as such both are accepted to be concomitant; and the relation of the word and its meaning consists in the fact of both of them being restricted to one comprehension.

14-15. Though there can be no relation between the different cases, yet in the case of an action, we have the fact of one thing being the helper and another the helped, cognised through the connection of that action; and it is this (fact of the meaning being the *helped* and the word the *helper*) that constitutes the particular relation between Word and Meaning.

12.13 The action of denotation, belonging to the Word, has for its result, the comprehension of the meaning; and this is none other than a knowledge of the Word which, when considered in relation to its result in the shape of the comprehension of the object denoted, is known as the action of *denotation*. And in such a case, that which is the object of comprehension, is accepted to be the *object denoted* by that Word; and the Word is either the means of comprehension, or the agent that makes the meaning comprehended by the person; the consideration of these two alternatives is reserved for a future occasion.

13.14 This anticipates the following objection: "Even if the above facts be accepted, all that they can prove is that the Word and the Meaning belong to a single action of denotation, and not that they are in any way related to one another." The sense of the reply is that in the case of the predicates of propositions (as both the Word and the Meaning are in the present case), the fact is that by the force of the action in which they cohere, they are made concomitant; and therefrom results the relation of mutual restriction. Even between the Subject and the Predicate, there is this concomitance. The subject draws the action to itself, and the action reverts to it only after it has taken with itself the Predicate which forms a part of its own. In the case in question, the predominant factor is the object denoted; and this, with a view to the accomplishment of its comprehension, takes to the action of Denotation; this latter, in its turn, takes to the Word. And thus, between the Word and its Meaning, there is the relation of being restricted to the same action (of Denotation). This rule of restriction is thus explained: That action of Denotation which has the word "Cow" for its instrument has for its objective, the object *cow*; and conversely, that which has the object *cow* for its objective has the word "Cow" for its instrument. Though this restriction could not apply to the case of words with many meanings, or when the same object is denoted by many words,—yet as a rule, we do not admit of such words and synonyms; as this would make the signification of the words in a particular context doubtful. However in a case where we do come across such words, authorised by the scriptures, we are forced to accept the chance of *doubtfulness*. But the relation above explained remains intact, in the generality of cases, the other cases being only exceptions to it.

14.15 The Word being the *instrument* and the meaning the *objective*. The Word helps to make the meaning comprehended and thus capable of usage; and thus, there is between the Word and its Meaning, this relation of the *helper* and the *helped*, which is the same as that of the *expressor* and the *expressed*.



16. It has already been proved (above) that invariable concomitance is not the means (of signification).

16-18. "If by the Word 'Sanjñā' (*name*) be meant the fact of its being the means of comprehension, then it could not be the integral part of denotation. The name is postulated by usage according as the Word is found leading to the comprehension (of the meaning); and the name itself does not signify the meaning, so long as the relation (of the name with the meaning) has not been ascertained. Therefore the expressiveness of the name follows subsequently, as in the case of smoke (which leads to the inference of fire, after the invariable concomitance of the two has been ascertained). And hence, like the smoke, it (*name*) would not form the integral part of denotation."

18-21. This (Sanjñā) is not of the same character as smoke, &c. Because in the case of these latter, the inference (of fire from smoke) results after the invariable concomitance (of fire and smoke) has been ascertained, before which there is no idea of the smoke as being the means of comprehending (the existence of fire); whereas in the present case (of Verbal denotation) there is no idea of invariable concomitance before that of the denotativeness (of the Word). Whenever the relation (of the Word and the Object denoted) is recognised through the assertions of old (knowing) people, there—and in no other form—at once follows the idea that the Word is the means of the comprehension (of the said meaning).

21-24. In some places old people assert that 'such and such a meaning is to be understood by such and such a Word;' in other places they say 'this is the expressive (Word) and that the expressed (meaning);' while in other cases, younger people find that there is an action (of the middleaged person following the Verbal utterance (of an old person directing him to a certain course of action), and thereby they infer that the middleaged man must have comprehended the meaning (of the older man's utterance), and decides that 'because the middleaged man has understood the Word to denote such a meaning, therefore ordinary people know these to have the characters of being the expressive and the expressed respectively.'

18 The concomitance is recognised only after the denotation has been accomplished, and never before that.

18-21 In the case of smoke, the comprehension is preceded by the idea of invariable concomitance, whereas in the case in question, it is quite the reverse.

21-24 This anticipates the following objection: "Inasmuch as it is only a Sentence uttered by the old man that is found to express a meaning, denotativeness must belong to the Sentence, and not to the Word." The sense of the reply is that though at first there is such a mixed up comprehension, when the Sentence 'bring the cow' is pronounced,—yet when it is followed by another direction—'take away the horse,' and the other person acts accordingly,—then the boy looking upon the scene comes to comprehend the meanings of the words "cow" and "horse," apart from the Sentences.

24-25. Thus, though, in the beginning, the denotativeness (of a Word) is found to be mixed up (in the Sentence), yet, subsequently, by means of affirmative and negative concomitance, the meaning of the Word is ascertained apart from the Sentence.

25-26. On account of the presence of such multifarious denotations, partaking of such diverse factors as *class*, *property*, *substance*, *action*, and the manifold sub-divisions of these, quickly brought about both directly and indirectly (by indication),—ordinary people have no cause to enquire into a definite ascertainment of the one specific object of denotation.

27-29. People versed in Syntax (the *Mīmāṃsakas*) however only discriminate it in order to get at the comparative strength and weakness (among the diverse significations of a Word). (For instance) a word denotative of the *class* is weak when expressing a particular individual through indication, because such indication (of the particular individual by a word denotative of the *class*) is intervened by the *class* (intervening between the *word* and the *individual* indicated). Therefore it is necessary that some discrimination be made as to how much forms the (*direct*) *denotation* of a Word, and how much is *indicated* by means of the denotation, through an eternal relation.

29-31. Since when the general word ('cow') is used, and there is no mention of any particular kind (of cows), we find the former (general name) applying to the particular (kind of cow) also; and again since when a higher genus is named (f.i. 'living beings'), if the particular

When the word "cow" is uttered, the person brings a particular animal, which is not brought when that particular is not used. Such are the affirmative and negative processes by which the denotations of individual words come to be ascertained.

27.29 The *summum genus* is the class 'substance,' and as the species included therein, we have the classes, 'Earth,' 'living beings,' 'cow'—the one following being a species under the preceding class, "Earth" is a specific of the class 'substance,' and generic with regard to 'living beings.' Now, if the word 'Earth' be made to express the specific class of 'living beings,' it can do so only by directly denoting the class 'Earth,' and thereby *indicating* the class 'living beings' as included within itself; this indication being necessarily intervened by the denotation of the class 'Earth,' and thereby being a little weakened in the process. We have a Sentence in the Veda—"Āhavanīyē juhōti"; here the word 'juhōti' directly denotes the *homa* in general, and indicates, through that, the particular *Homa*, the "Patnīsanyāja," for instance. Another sentence is—"Gārhapatyē patnīsanyājān"; which directly denotes the particular *Homas* as to be performed in the *Gārhapatya* fire; and hence we find that the relation of the *Patnīsanyāja* to the *Gārhapatya* is much closer than that with the *Āhavanīyas*; and accordingly this latter is set aside in favour of the former. If the comparative strength of denotation, &c., were not determined, then we would have no standard by which to arrive at a definite conclusion in the case cited.

29.31 When the word "Cow" is uttered, even if the particular "red" kind of cow be not mentioned, the former generic name "Cow" is found to apply to all the different kinds of cows; and thus we see that wherever we have the class 'cow' we have the name "Cow." On the other hand, when a higher Genus—"Substance" or "Living beings"—is named, even if there is no mention of any other species than the



species of this ('cow') be not named, the former name ('living beings') does not give any idea of (the particular 'class cow'); therefore from such affirmative and negative concomitance, there arises the idea that the word 'cow' denotes only that object which has the *dewlap* &c.

31-32. Thus we find that at first we have (in the word 'cow') the character of signifying (the object *cow*); and based upon this is its denotativeness (or expressiveness): and this is the relation, of *the name and the named*, which is here spoken of as *a restricted particular relation*, 'invariable concomitance.'

33. "Inasmuch as, prior to the recognition of the relation (between the word and its meaning), the words 'cow,' &c., do not signify the object,—such words cannot have any denotative power,—like the words 'Devadatta' and the like."

34. Just as it is by usage alone that a word is cognised as signifying an object, so it is in the same manner that we have the cognition of its Denotative power, which is recognised to be the means of that signification.

35. Just as the cognition of the *form* of the word helps the final result (in the shape of the recognition of the meaning of the word), so also does recognition of the relation (between the word and meaning); and this does not take away the denotative power of the word.

cow, we do not have the word "cow" applying, in the absence of the definite class 'Cow.' Thus we find that when the *cow* exists, the name "Cow" applies to it; and when it does not exist, the name does not apply,—and accordingly we conclude that the object *cow*, as characterized by the presence of the *dewlap*, &c., is denoted by the word "Cow."

31-32 The particular means of signification are threefold: (1) the senses, which, by their mere presence, give rise to the idea of the object, as being in contact with themselves; (2) the Inferential Middle Term, which gives an idea of the conclusion through the premises; (3) the expressive power of Words, which gives an idea of the object, immediately after it has been ascertained that such a word signifies such an object. In the case cited, we find that as soon as the mere fact of the word "Cow" signifying the object *cow* has been ascertained,—even if no other relation between them is recognised,—we at once obtain an idea of the signification of the word "Cow," whenever it happens to be pronounced; and from this we conclude that such a signification, in the absence of any other relation, must be based upon a relation other than those of the Sense-organs and the Middle Term; and to this particular relation, we give the name "Denotative" or "Expressive"; and it is this relation that has been called "invariable concomitance" above; because in the case of the Word and its meaning, we cannot have the ordinary invariable concomitance based upon the identities of location or duration.

33 The objector has been made to urge, in the Bhāṣya, that "if the word is expressive of the object, wherefore does it not signify it the first time that it is heard by a person?" This argument is explained in the Kārikā: just as the word "Devadatta" can have no inherent denotativeness, &c., &c.

34 "Means"—i.e., the process whereby the object is signified by the word. This act does not strike at the denotative power of the word.

36. In fact, whatever is known to be the means of the accomplishment of anything, it always stands in need of auxilliary causes; but this does not destroy the power (or capability) of the former accepted cause.

37-38. There is no cause, either in the ordinary world or in the Veda, which does not stand in need of an accessory aid, afforded by a knowledge of the process (of the causal action), which latter is necessary for the accomplishment of a full idea of every causal relationship.

38-39. The *cause* is distinguished from the *process*, by means of a discrimination of the intimate (cognate) from the foreign (heterogenous); and sometimes the said distinguishing depends upon the option of the speaker; for when one is much troubled by darkness, he is found to exclaim 'what is the use of my eyes, when my seeing has to be brought about by the aid of the lamp'?

40. But as a general rule, we find that, since a blind man cannot see even by means of hundreds of lamps, therefore in the case of the perception of colour, &c., the only manifesting cause is the *eye* (and not the *lamp*).

41. The eye is accepted to be the cause, (1) because it is cognised to be stronger (in the case of the specific visual perception) than the connection of the body, soul and mind, on the ground of (these latter being common to all perception, and the eye itself) having a specific relation (to the perception in question), and (2) because it is found to be in closer proximity to the seat of visual perception (than the accessories, *lamp*, &c.)

42. In the same manner, in the case in question, the cognition of the relation (between word and meaning) is only an accessory. If you

86 It is not the Word alone that stands in need of an accessory in the shape of the cognition of the relation between the word and its meaning; such is the case with everything that is known to be a cause.

87 Even in the case of visual perception we have the need of light; but this does not in any way affect the fact of the eye having the faculty of vision. In fact, a knowledge of the process of the operation of the causes,—of the *Eye* for instance,—is necessary for the full recognition of its causal efficiency.

88-89 This anticipates the following objection: "When both the *cause* (the denotative power of the word) and the *process* (the cognition of the relation between the word and meaning) are expressed by the word, what standard have you got to differentiate the *cause* from the *procedures*"? The reply is that that which is more cognate is the *cause*, and that which is less so is the *process*.

91 This anticipates the following objection: "We do not see even when the eye is fully active, if there is no relation between the Soul and the Body, and the Soul and the Mind (i.e., if there is absent-mindedness), therefore it is this latter connection that must be accepted as the cause of perception." The sense of the reply is that the said connection is a factor common to all perceptions, and as such, cannot be accepted as the specific cause of a particular perception,—that of the eye for instance.

92 The real cause is the word, on account of its close proximity to the denotation. If even then you persist in holding the cognition of the relation to be the cause, you are welcome to it; and we will not try to persuade you any farther.

hold it to be the cause, on the ground of simplicity, then wherefore should anyone dissuade you from such a course?

43. The passage of the Bhāshya beginning with "just as the eye, &c.," points out the contradiction (involved in the argument brought forward by the objector, in Kārikā 33). And, as a matter of fact, even in the case of 'Devadatta' (cited as an instance, in the same Kārikā), people accept the presence of a latent (denotative power).

44. Inasmuch as even in the presence of external lights in the shape of lamps, colour, &c., are not perceived by the blind, and because of the immediate sequence of the final result (visual perception) (to the action of the eye), the Eye is accepted to be the cause (i.e., the means of visual perception).

45. "The relation of the name and the named (i.e., the denotative relation) has its recognition dependent upon human agency; and as such it does not exist prior to the existence of men. If such relation be desired, then it cannot but be caused (i.e., not eternal).

46. "Since the two are located in different places and time, therefore, there is no similarity between these two (Name and the Named),—just as between the jar and a piece of rope, and hence there cannot be any natural relationship between them."

Thus ends the chapter on "Sambandhākshepa."

SECTION 12.

ON "SPHŌTA."

1. When the substrate has been recognised, the comprehension of the object of which it is the substrate becomes an easy matter. And because the enquiry deals with the relation, therefore the Bhāshya has said "now, in the word 'cow,' &c."

43 "Latent," i.e.,—brought about in full force, as soon as the name is given to a particular individual—(Vide ch. on "Sense-perception").

46 "Human Agency"—the cognition of the meanings of words has been shown to be dependent upon the utterances of experienced persons, &c. This shows that, prior to the existence of these people, the relationship between the word and its meaning did not exist. And as such it cannot be eternal, as laid down in the Bhāshya.

45 It is a fact of ordinary experience that a relation is found to subsist between two objects that are in some way identical. The name and the named (i.e., the word and its meaning) however, are in no way identical, either in extension or in duration, as shown by the Bhāshya: "The word is in the mouth, &c., &c.,". Just as, there being no natural connection between the jar and the rope, their only connection is brought about by human agency,—so, in the same manner, in the case of the word and its meaning, there being no natural relationship, the denotativeness of words cannot but be accepted to be created by human agency; and as such, it cannot be said to be eternal.

¹ Says the Bhāshya "Now then in the case of 'Gauh,' which is the word"?



2. Who by himself would give any reply to such theorists as hold theories contrary to the facts of Sense-perception? Consequently the Bhāṣya cites the opinion of a revered person.

3. Those, who hold the cognition of the word to depend upon the comprehension of its meaning, may rest for the time being. At present we consider the cognition of the word as (it appears) through Sense-perception.

4. Our "Sense-perception" is not incapable (of giving rise to the cognition of the word); and when the object (the word) has been ascertained by means thereof, no other more capable means is possible, with reference to which (the cognition of word) could be considered.

5. Therefore when the word has been cognised by the Ear, whether it denotes its meaning or not, it has the character of the *Word*; and it is only thus that the fact of common experience is not contradicted.

6. If the capacity of the word 'Word' depend upon the comprehension of the meaning, then an entity, other than the Word, will have to be postulated,—because the word 'Word' is not ordinarily known to be so dependent (upon the comprehension of meaning).

7. Because *smoke*, &c., leading to the comprehension of the existence of *fire*, &c., cannot be said to be words; and again because they do not give any sense,—the name "Çabda" could not be denied to single letters.

8. Even prior to the comprehension of the meaning, if a word be duly cognised by the Ear, the name 'Word' cannot be denied to it. Conversely, even if a meaning be comprehended, the name 'Word' cannot apply to that which is not comprehended by the Ear.

The Kārikā anticipates the objection that the opponent has objected to the presence of any eternal relation between the word and its meaning; and hence what was necessary for the Bhāṣya to do was to prove the eternality of such relation. The sense of the Kārikā is that after the nature of the word itself has been ascertained, the consideration of its relations becomes an easy matter.

2 Says the Bhāṣya: "The word 'Gauh' is nothing more than the letters *ga*, *au* and the *Visarga*—as declared by the revered Upavarsha." The Kārikā means that the name of Upavarsha is given, not with a view to show that the opinion is not agreeable to the Author himself, but only to cite the authority of a revered person; as the Author dare not contradict, by himself, the pet theories of such clever people as the Vaiyākaranas, who hold the word to be something quite apart from the letters it is composed of,—a theory that is opposed to a directly perceptible fact.

3 The word "Word" is known in the world to be that which is perceived by the Ear; and the Ear only hears the letters; hence we conclude that word is nothing more than the component letters.

4 "Entity other than the Word,"—i.e., based upon the denotation of the meaning by the word, which could not be expressed by the word, "Word"; because that would contradict all accepted usage.

7 If the mere fact of bringing about the comprehension of something were the sole differentia of the class "Word," then *smoke* would also become included in that class; because it brings about the comprehension of the existence of Fire. And again,



9. As a matter of fact, we find that independently of one another, by means of auditory perception are comprehended, in their respective forms, the letters (constituting a word), and not either a preceding or a subsequent object.

10. Even when the letter is uttered with the least effort, it is either clearly recognised as a full letter, or it is not recognised at all.

11. Apart from the letter itself, its constituent parts are never cognised; nor are these (parts) ever found to be intermixed with the letter, as the threads are with the piece of cloth.

12. And since these parts are never cognised (by means of Sense-perception), they can have no cogniser in the shape of a Middle Term. Nor is there any scripture laying down such cognition with regard to it. And since it is not perceived (by the sense) Analogy cannot apply to it.

13. Nor would there be any inconsistency in the letter, if the existence of such parts be denied; just as there is no inconsistency in the case of such parts (of binary compounds, as atoms) not having any further parts (of themselves).

14. Why too, should not the letter, devoid of any constituent parts, be cognisable by Sense-perception? As in the case of the Ākāṣa, so in the case in question also, we would have for the Middle Term (in an inferential process leading to the cognition of such partless letters), an idea (of the letter) devoid of any notion of the parts.

15. Like Ākāṣa too, even when there is difference of locality, there can be no real difference among the letters themselves. "But then if they if that were the sole differentia, then a single letter, not capable of giving any sense, would cease to be included in the said class. Both these, the inclusion as well as the exclusion, are equally absurd.

9 The letters *ga*, &c., are those that are heard by the Ear; nothing besides these can be so heard. By the phrase 'preceding object' are meant the constituent parts of a letter, and by 'subsequent object' are meant the classes 'Gatwa' 'Autwa' and 'Goṣabdatwa,' the word '*Gauh*' considered as one component whole apart from the letters, and such other assumptions as the "*Sphota*" and the rest.

10 This *kārikā* proves that as a fact of Sense-perception, no constituent parts of letters are ever cognised. No intermediate course is possible. Even when the letter is only whispered, it is either fully recognised as the letter, or being not heard it is not cognised at all.

12 They are not cognised by means of Inference.

13 The atom which is a part of the binary compound, is accepted to be without any parts of its own; and if there is no inconsistency in this, there can be none in the denial of parts to letters. Therefore the cognition of any such parts of letters cannot be said to be due to Apparent Inconsistency.

14 "Middle Term"—The argument may be thus stated—"Letters are without parts—because we have a sensuous cognition of these as devoid of parts—just as we have one of Ākāṣa."

15 Though the letter *ga* may be found in different places, yet it is the same everywhere, just as the Ākāṣa is the same everywhere. With this *Kārikā* begins the denial of the "subsequent objects"—spoken of in K. 9. And the Author begins with the denial of the class "*Gatwa*." The meaning is that all '*ga*' is one and the same, the different

were all the same) there could be no idea of difference among them." (Reply). How then, have you the idea of singleness (of the class 'Gatwa')?

16. *Question*: "We have the idea of singleness with regard to the class ('Gatwa'), and that of diversity with regard to the individual *ga*'s. We do not hold to the diversity (of the individuals) alone; and therefore it is not impossible for us to have an idea of singleness (of the class)."

17. But in the case of letters, apart from the class "Word" ('*Ābdatwa*'), we have no other class applying to them as distinct from the individual (letters). And if there is no other class (applying to the individual letter), it can only be a *letter* (and not a *class*).

18. The idea that it is the same (letter) does not savour of similarity, because there is no similarity in the absence of a similarity of constituent parts, and there are no such parts in letters.

19. Because the letter *ga* is an object of Sense-perception, therefore the *preclusion of its contraries* can be of no use (in its cognition); nor, at the time (of the cognition of the letter *ga*), is any denotative word or any Middle Term, cognised (and as such the cognition cannot be either verbal or inferential).

20. *Question*: "Just as in the case of *ga*, &c., we postulate the class 'Word' ('*Ābdatwa*'), and as in the case of the different species of cows, we have the class 'Cow,'—so in the same manner, why could not we postulate the class 'Gatwa' (as applying to all *ga*'s)?"

21-23. *Answer*: When the different individual cows, and the different *ga*'s, have been recognised in the form of individuals, they become, as such, incomprehensible by any idea of *class*; and it is for this reason that we admit of (such) classes (as 'Gatwa' and '*Ābdatwa*' to admit of the com-

places where they occur not making them distinct individuals. Hence as there is no multiplicity of individuals, there can be no such class as "*Gatwa*." The objector urges that if there were no multiplicity of individuals, we could have no such notion as that 'this *ga* is long and that *ga* is short.' &c. The Author meets this by a counter-question.—"How can you have any idea of the singleness of the class '*Gatwa*,' when you hold the individuals to be entirely distinct?"

18 That the *ga* is the same as the one seen elsewhere.

19 The Bauddhas assert the *preclusion of the contrary* (*Apōha*) to be the means of cognising an object. The *Kārikā* means to say that the cognition of a letter cannot be amenable to this negative means, because it is found to be perceptible by the senses; nor do we know of any word that can denote the *letter*; therefore a cognition of this latter cannot be held to be Verbal; and as no proper Middle Term is possible, it cannot be inferential.

20 It is proper for the Bauddha, who denies all *class*, to deny the class "*Gatwa*" also. But the *Mīmāṃsaka* admits of such classes as "*Ābdatwa*" and "*Gotwa*"; why then should he deny the class "*Gatwa*" which is similar to these?

21-23 We deny the fact of "*Gatwa*" being a *class*, not without reasons; our chief reason for doing so is that we are not cognisant of any such class, apart from the class "*Ābdatwa*"; among the many "*ga*'s" we have an idea that 'this *ga* is a *Ābda*, and that *ga* is a *Ābda*,' just as in the case of different kinds of cows, we conceive



prehension of the individual cows and *ga*'s). Whereas in the case of the presence of such diversity as the long *ga*, the short *ga*, &c., the one individual *ga* is not recognised as distinct from another individual *ga*. Therefore the letter (*ga*) being one only there can be only one Idea (with regard to it). The presence of such diverse specific cognitions (as the 'long *ga*,' the 'short *ga*,' &c.), must be explained as being due to the diversity of the manifesting cause (the uttering of the letter with different degrees of effort, &c., &c.)

24. Just as your class '*Gatwa*,' even when cognised by means of such particular instances as the long, &c., is accepted to be one only,—so would also be our individual letter.

25. You accept the diversity (in the individual case of the long *ga*, the short *ga*, &c.), as caused by a diversity in the specific characters of the individuals constituting (*lit.* manifesting) the class; and we could also explain the diversity (in the case of the long *ga*, the short *ga*, &c.), to be caused by the diversity in the degrees of effort used in the utterance of each of these.

26. Therefore all that is necessary in cognition we can get from the letter alone; and whatever is perceived (to be distinct) in different individuals is well explained as being due to the different degrees of effort in utterance. Hence such notions, as those of the class '*Gatwa*' and the like must be rejected as useless.

27. Even if such a class as '*Gatwa*' were subsequently assumed, it would be extremely difficult to prove the facts of its being omnipresent, eternal, and inhering in every individual (*ga*).

28-29. The individual letter, on the other hand, is accepted by both of us; then, just as you attribute eternity, &c., to the assumed (class '*Gatwa*'), so you can attribute it to the individual, which is an established entity for both us. Thus too there would be no difficulty in accepting its inherence in the individuals (because all the individuals being identical, the character of the letter *ga* must inhere equally in all).

that 'this is a cow and that is a cow,' &c., &c. Such notions of every '*ga*' being a *Qabda* would not be possible, if there were no such class as '*Qabdatwa*,' which latter therefore we cannot deny. In the case of such notions as the 'long *ga*,' the short '*ga*' and the like, the diversity is due to the difference in the degrees of effort in the utterance of each letter; and the diversity being thus explained, it is not admissible to postulate a distinct class in the shape of '*Gatwa*.' The length, shortness, &c., are the properties of the same individual '*ga*,' just as 'bravery' 'cowardice,' &c., are those of the same individual Devadatta.

26 Even when you admit of the class '*Gatwa*,' you cannot deny such diversities as those of the long '*ga*,' the short '*ga*,' &c. You would explain this as being caused by the diversity in the specific characters of the individual long *ga*'s, short *ga*'s, &c. But in our case also, though we hold the letter to be one only, we could explain the diversity as being based upon the different degrees of effort in the utterance of the long and the short '*ga*,' &c.

29-30. In the case of the consonants, we have no such diversity (as the long, short, &c.),—which diversity is recognised only on account of the tinge of the vowel (accompanying each consonant); and with regard to this diversity, we discriminate the fact, that it is not found to apply to the pure consonants (by themselves, apart from the accompanying vowel).

31. Even in the case of the vowels, the notion of long, short, &c., would only be due to extraneous influences (of the different degrees of effort in utterance),—because it belongs to the letter,—just as the notions of the class 'letter' and the 'consonant' belong to the letter, and are due to extraneous influences.

32. The letter 'ga' is not recognised to be the substrate of the class 'Gatwa,' as abstracted (from the individual 'ga'),—because it is not comprehensible by any other idea save that of the individual 'ga'—like the class 'Gatwa' which is assumed by others (Vaiçeshikas).

33-34. Since our conclusion is a negative one, and since the two premises also are negative, the fact, of the instance being such as is not accepted by any one of the two parties concerned, does not in any way affect our argument. Or, for the above conclusion ("that the letter *ga* is not recognised to be the substrate of the class 'Gatwa'"), we can have another reason (Middle Term or minor premiss) based on the fact of its being a letter,—like the letter 'dha.' This conclusion is not contrary to Sense-perception, because a contradictory proposition is never cognisable.

35. In denying the class 'cow,' on the other hand, there would be a decided contradiction of a fact of Sense-perception; because (in the absence of such a class) there would be no such notion of the class ('cow') and the individual cow (as belonging to it), which is a fact ordinarily perceived by the Sense.

36-37. In this latter case (of the class 'cow'), if the object were one only (*i.e.*, if all individuals were identical, as in the case of the letter *ga*), then (in that case) we could not explain the diversity (of the 'black cow,'

35-36 This anticipates the objection that inasmuch as the Mimāṃsaka himself does not admit of the class "Gatwa," how could he cite it as an instance in his argument? The Sense of the reply is plain. "Contradictory proposition"—that there is a class "Gatwa" which inheres in each individual "ga." The meaning of the Kārikā is that no such class being perceptible, our conclusion cannot be said to be contrary to Sense-perception.

36-37 In the case of the letter 'ga,' we have proved that all the individuals are identical, because the letter "ga" is one only. In the case of the cow, on the other hand, we have many distinct individual cows, such as the red cow, the black cow, &c., all of which have the common character of the "cow," consequently, inasmuch as the character of the "cow" is found to inhere in many distinct individuals, we cannot but admit of the class "cow," in order to comprehend all the different kinds of cows, by a single word.



the 'red cow,' &c.), as being due to the diversity in any manifesting agency. Because (in the case of the class 'cow') there is no other manifesting agency save the individual cow; though in the other case (of the letter 'ga') we have the difference of degree in the tone of utterance. The class 'cow' is always found to be indicated by the individual cow; hence it is that among the different individuals we become cognisant of the single class 'cow.'

38. *Question*: "One, to whom both are objects of auditory perception, could have the dual conception; for you, however the tone of utterance being supersensuous, how could any specific cognition (of individuals) be brought about by means of these (tones of utterance)?"

39. In reply to this, some people assert that when a sound is cognised by the Ear, as affected by the difference in the degree of tone,—then it is that there is a comprehension of this degree of tone, brought about on account of its being mixed up with the letters.

40. Or, that there is no cognizance of these (*dhwanis*); it is the mere cognizance of *Ṣabda* that is brought about by means of *dhvani*. Even the *Vaiṣṇika* becomes cognisant of the intensity, &c., of the Sound only through affection (of the '*dhvani*').

38 The conceptions of the *individual* and the *class* are, in our opinion, both objects of auditory perception; and as such, it is quite possible for the objects of these conceptions themselves to be perceived by the same organ of perception. Your "*Nāda*," on the other hand, consisting as it does of differences in the intensity of the vibration of the air particles, cannot be amenable to such perception; and as such this could not bring about any conception of the letter "*ga*," which is an object of auditory perception.

39 The degree of tone is neither airy, nor consisting of the conjunction and disjunction of air-waves; it is only a property of the Air, a particular form of Sound known as '*Dhvani*' or '*Nāda*,' &c. Sound is of two kinds—one being in an entirely undifferentiated state, and the other consisting of the various letter sounds; both of these equally belong to the class "*Ṣabda*." Of the latter sort, are the letters '*ga*,' &c., while the sound of the drum is of the former kind. Thus then, *Ṣabda* in the form of *Dhvani* is a property of the Air; and it is this that is the manifesting agency of the letters '*ga*,' &c. Consequently, as soon as the air-waves, in the form of *Dhvani*, have struck the tympanum, the Ear becomes affected by them; and by means of the Ear thus affected, the *Dhvani* becomes perceived, and is comprehended, sometimes, as an undifferentiated sound, as in the case of the drum, while at other times, it is found to manifest a certain distinct letter—sound; and having thereby become mixed up with the utterance of the letters, it comes to be cognised as thus mixed up. Even in the utterance of letters, we are cognisant of the mere sound, as apart from the letters, specially when we differentiate the distance of sounds, through a difference in their intensity. Therefore in our case also, *Dhvani* is an object of Sense-perception, being perceptible by the Ear; and hence even for us, a dual conception is not an impossibility.

40 This *Kārikā* presents another solution of the difficulty raised in K. 38. Even the *Vaiṣṇika*, who admits of the class '*Gatva*,' accepts the presence of the different degrees of intensity—high, low, &c. But these he cannot represent as the properties of Sound, which according to him is itself a property (of *Ākāśa*) and as such

41-44. (1). Those who have their minds affected by the perversities of bile, perceive 'sweet' to be 'bitter,' and 'white' to be 'yellow'; (2) similarly those who are running fast, or moving in a boat, mistake the fixed mountains, &c., to be moving; (3) and again those who have applied the fat of the frog to their eyes, mistake a piece of bamboo to be a serpent. In the same manner people have an idea of the class ('*Gatwa*') as having the properties of *highness* and *lowness*, by means of the *highness* and *lowness* of individual letters '*ga*,' &c.; just as in the above cases, there is a mistaken cognition of the *manifested bitterness*, &c., even in the absence of any cognition of the element of mistake in the *manifesting agency* (perverted Sense of Taste, &c.), brought about by the recognition of their true causes (the perversities of bile, &c.).

45-46. Some people hold the short and long sounds of the same vowel (अ) to be distinct individual letters; because, like the high and low sounds (of consonants), the utterance (of the sound ā) is not necessarily concomitant (with that of ā). And thus they postulate a class '*Atwa*' as belonging to the three individuals (a, ā, and ā).

incapable of having any property of its own. [The *Mīmāṃsaka* holds Sound to be a distinct substance]. Consequently, the *Vaiśeṣika* holds that though *Highness* or *Lowness* cannot belong to the Sound, yet they are cognised by means of a conception which is affected by the differences of intensity of the tone of the utterance. In the same manner, in our case also, when the *Dhuvani* entered the Ear, and leaves it soon after, then, in that case, the affection of the Ear caused by this speedy striking and return continues for a very short time; and thereby the Sound too comes to be produced, at that very time, in accordance with the aforesaid affection of the Ear, and disappears soon after; and this speedy appearance and disappearance constitutes what is known as the *shortness* or *lowness* of the Sound, its *highness* consisting of a longer stay in the Ear of the air waves (*Dhuvani*), and hence also of the Sound itself. And thus, though the *shortness*, &c., really belongs to the manifesting agency of the *Dhuvani*, yet through extreme proximity, they come to be attributed to the manifested Sound; and the *Dhuvani* only becomes the means of rendering the Sound cognisable; and as such, it can be the means of differentiating the individual letters, as *short*, *long*, &c.

41-44 This anticipates the following objection: "When *Dhuvani*, the cause of the mistaken notions of *shortness*, &c., is itself uncognised, how can the *shortness*, &c., be cognised?" In reply, the Author proceeds to cite a number of well-known examples, where people have mistaken notions even in the absence of any recognition of the agency that brings about such misconceptions. People, with disordered bile, perceive the conchshell to be yellow, even before they are cognisant of their bilious disorder. So too, in the case at issue, we can have mistaken notions of the *shortness*, &c., of a letter, based upon the said characteristics of the *Dhuvani* (that precedes the particular letter—sound), even in the absence of any cognition of this *Dhuvani* itself.

45-46 Whether the consonant sound—of '*ga*' for instance—be high or low, it is always accompanied by the same *ga*—sound. In the case of the vowel however, we have the long vowel expressing something entirely different from that afforded by the short, —e.g., in the word "*Agamana*" (coming) and "*Agamana*" (not going); this difference cannot be denied; though both '*a*' and '*ā*' and the tripple '*ā*' belong to the same vowel-class '*atwa*.'



46-48. Others however assert, that the assumption of such a class is not proper; because the name '*Atwa*' could not apply to the long and the acute (which are pronounced *ā*, and *ā̃*); in the same manner, the name '*Ātwa*' would not belong to the short and the acute; nor could the acute belong to the other two; inasmuch as it cannot be recognised as belonging to each of the three,—as we have the name 'cow' applying to all the cows—be they black, or red.

49. The word "*avarṇa-kula*" may be explained as being based upon the identity of the location of the utterance in the body,—like the forest and the like. It is only an expression denoting a collection (of vowels), and it is not indicative of any such class (as '*Atwa*').

50. The distinction of the letter itself into *long* and *short*, would be contradictory to the theory of the eternal character of words: for, how can the letter, which is eternal, be said to be measured (in its utterance) by duration (of its pronunciation)?

51. Therefore it is the *utterance* of the vowel that depends upon the *duration* (*length* or *shortness*) of pronunciation, as lasting for two or three moments. The letter itself cannot be affected by such duration.

52. *Obj.* "But in that case the length, &c., of the vowels would (like *highness*, &c.), cease to form an integral part of the letters; inasmuch as (according to you) it will have nothing to do with the expressive (letters and words)." *Rep.* For us, the means of denotation are the *letters* recognised as such (*long*, *short*, &c., by the specialities of pronunciation).

53. A meaning is got out of only such letters (either long or short or acute) as have previously been found to be denotative of that particular meaning. If it be asked—"how can there be any (correct) comprehension of meaning by a mistaken means?" (We reply that) the mistake does not affect the comprehension of the meaning.

⁴⁹ This anticipates the following objection: "If there is no such class as '*Atwa*' how would you account for the presence (in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patanjali) of such an expression as '*Avarṇakula*,' as applied to all the vowels?" The sense of the reply is that the said expression only serves to indicate all the vowels taken collectively; exactly as the word "forest" indicates all the trees considered as one corporate whole; and the comprehension of all the vowels by means of the single expression "*Avarṇakula*" is due to the fact of all vowel-sounds proceeding from the throat.

⁵⁰ The meaning of the expression "a short vowel" is 'a vowel that lasts for a short time'; and this would be contrary to the theory of the eternity of Letters.

⁵¹ The '*Hraswa*' (short) is held to last for one moment, the "*Dirgha*" (Long) for two moments, and the "*Pluta*" (Extra Long) for three moments.

⁵³ The fruit, mango, is once found to be expressed by the word "*Amra*," as uttered by an experienced person. Latterly the young man will comprehend the fruit only as denoted by that particular combination of sounds which he has heard from the older man. Thus though the *length*, &c., are the properties of the pronunciation, yet they are so mixed up with the Letters themselves that they are mistaken to be the properties of these latter; and hence they come to be accepted as forming integral parts of these.

54. Just as the speed of the horse, though a property of another (the horse), may be indicative of the (dashing or urgent) business of the rider, so, for us, could the specialities of pronunciation be attributed to letters.

55. "But if *length*, &c., be not eternal, the expressive word would also become non-eternal." This objection is to be set aside in a manner similar to the treatment of the order of letters forming a word.

56. In the same manner the comprehension of the accents, *broad*, &c., depends entirely upon the speciality of pronunciation (and does not belong to the Letter). We never recognise any difference based upon accents, as we do in the case of the *length*, &c.

57-58. If we accept the accents to be forms of one and the same Letter, then we could explain their difference (as *broad*, &c.), in the same manner as we do the *highness*, &c. (of pronunciation). In this case (of the differently accentuated vowels) we do not stand in need of any other sound, as we do in the case of another Letter. And it is these *sounds* (and not the vowels themselves) that have to be accepted as endowed with the characters of *softness*, *acuteness*, &c.

58-59. Even when the Letter is one, the sound is of two kinds,—one serving the purpose of indicating the forms of Letters, and another

"Does not affect, &c."—The mistake lies only in the attribution of the properties of *length*, &c., to the Letters, and in nothing else beyond that. Hence though the means of comprehension is a mistaken one, yet that does not touch the truth of the comprehension itself. E.g., the notion of the redness of the crystal, which is a mistaken one, leads to the inference of the presence of a red object near it; from which we conclude that though the means may be a mistaken one, the effect may be quite true.

54 Therefore the vowel is only one; and the properties of *length*, &c., belong in reality to the duration of its utterance, and are only falsely attributed to itself.

55 "Become non-eternal"—because the word depends for its denotation upon the length or shortness of the vowels constituting it. Just as though the order, in which certain Letters appear in a word, is not everlasting, yet the word itself is eternal; so in the same manner, though the specialities of the pronunciation may be non-eternal, yet that does not affect the eternality of the word itself.

56 The length, &c., of a vowel are at times found to change the meaning of words; and in this they are found to produce—though only as a mistake—the notion of a difference between the long vowel and the short; but no such difference is found to exist in the case of accents. So the claims of these latter are even much weaker than those of the properties of *length*, &c.

57-58 "In this case, &c."—This anticipates the following objection: "In the case of the different accents, we cannot but postulate so many different sounds as belonging to the Letter; and hence, wherefore should we not accept a difference among the various phases of the same vowel, instead of assuming so many distinct sounds?" The sense of the reply is that, of any one Letter,—whatever its accent, &c., might be—the sounds are always of one and the same kind; and as such we have not got to postulate many sounds. It is only in the case of another Letter, that a distinct sound has to be admitted.

58-59 The sounds that conjointly and simultaneously define the word are those that bring about the comprehension of the Letters; and those that define it gradually are those that follow at the heels of the comprehension.



extending throughout the comprehension (of such forms);—these two being the means of bringing about the definition (of the Letters) immediately and gradually (respectively).

60. Thus then we have the comprehension of the *long*, &c., when there happens to be a cogglomeration of the sounds of the former sort. Since it is the Letter itself that is comprehended by means of these sounds, as lasting during the specified time.

61. And the recognition of the *Broad* and the rest is by means of these (sounds) aggregating simultaneously. On the aggregation of the others (i.e., those sounds that operate gradually) we would have the difference of pitch: viz: *low*, &c.

62. Though the character of the Letter has been recognised (at the first moment), yet the sounds gradually bring about a cognition of the same Letter, (during the subsequent moments); and it is not any other Letter that is cognised.

63. Even if among Letters, there be an absolute difference, based upon the existence of individuals and the class,—then too, Jaimini's theory (of the eternality of words) remains untouched.

64. Because, in that case, all the arguments, in favour of the eternality of the individual 'ga,' would be transferred to that of the class '*Gatwa*'; and the mention (in the *Bhāṣya*) of the Letters 'ga,' 'an,' &c.,

60 "*Specified time*"—one moment for the short vowel, two for the long, and three for the acute. The latter part of the *Kārikā* anticipates the following objection: "The long vowel is comprehended only when the sound is found to last for two moments. The sound would, in this case, extend all along the comprehension; and as such, the long and the rest must be admitted to be comprehensible by means of the sounds of the second sort." The sense of the reply is that though, as a matter of fact these sounds are those of the *gradual* sort, and as such, bring about the definition of the vowel sound only gradually, and extend all along the comprehension, yet even during the long time of 2 moments, it is only the letter that is comprehended. And as that alone which helps the denotation of the meaning is accepted to constitute the form of the Letter; it is only with regard to this denotation that its long form is comprehended; consequently, even though this form may have been comprehended at the first moment, yet it is recalled to the mind only subsequently. For these reasons the sound must be admitted to tend to indicate the form of the Letter; and hence it is quite correct to say that the Long, &c., are implied by means of the sounds that help in the recognition of the forms of Letters.

61 Though the text reads "*Drutādīkāḥ*" (*High and the rest*), yet inasmuch as in the case of the *High* the sound does not extend throughout the cognition, the *Nyāyarat-nākara* explains the compound as "those that are proceeded by the *Druta* (*High*), &c."—i.e., the *Medium* and the *Low*.

62 A vowel, either short or long, having been cognised, all that the subsequent sounds (in deeper accents) do, is to help in the expression of the same Letter; no other Letter is expressed.

63 Hence it should not be understood that we deny the class '*Gatwa*' with any ulterior motive of favouring the theory of the eternality of words. We deny it simply because we do not find any good reasons for accepting it.



would be explained as referring to the classes '*Gatwa*,' '*Autwa*,' &c.; and as such there would be no contradiction.

65. The Letters cannot be said to bring about an aggregate word, because each of the Letters is indicated by individually distinct efforts, and each of them is eternal and all-pervading.

66. And when the word '*go*' is not thus brought about, how could we have any such class as '*Goṣabdatwa*'? Nor is an assumption of any such class possible, just as a class of letter ('*Gatwa*') (is not possible, as shown above).

67. The notion of the sameness of a word (as uttered yesterday and to-day) is to be explained as being due to the identity of the Letters composing the Word. In the same manner is to be set aside the assumption of any aggregate whole, apart from the component Letters.

68. The assumption of an aggregate identical with the Letters however, does not militate against (our theory of) the character of Letters. Inasmuch the Letters have the power to signify the meaning (and as such they are capable of forming an aggregate word, which, however, can have no existence apart from these Letters).

69. Letters should be accepted as being denotative of a meaning only according as they are known (conventionally and traditionally) to have the capability of expressing such meaning.

70. With reference to these Letters, subsidiary as they are to the denotation of meanings, we have also to admit of the facts of their collocation, and of their being uttered by a single person, and that too in a certain definite order.

71. The fact of the speaker of all the Letters being one and the same, and that of their being uttered in a definite order, being the means of the signification,—what determines such signification is that order of the Letters, in which it has been previously found, by the present speaker, to have been used by experienced persons.

72. The simultaneity of the utterance of the Letters being impossible: it is not accepted (as in any way aiding the denotative process). In that

65 An aggregate whole can be said to be brought about only by such constituent parts as happen to exist simultaneously. But the Letters are not so perceived; as each of them is brought about by a distinct effort peculiar to itself. If the mere fact of all the Letters existing at the same time (even though not so perceived at the same time) were to be the cause of the complete word being accomplished, then, inasmuch as all the Letters are eternal and omnipresent, every Letter—a combination of Letters—could be said to be the cause of any and every word.

69 This anticipates the objection that each individual letter cannot signify the meaning of the word, and the whole word cannot be comprehended at any single moment,—how then can there be any signification of meanings? The sense of the reply is that the denotations of Words are based upon *Convention*.

72 Any number of letters could be uttered at one and the same time, only by different persons; but as a matter of fact, we find in ordinary life, that a word,—



case (*i.e.*, in the case of such simultaneity) the only possible course would be to have a multiplicity of speakers. But we do not find such multiplicity in the case of any denotation.

73. Those objects, that are capable of an action only when acting simultaneously, are not able to do the act when they are not united; just as those that are capable of acting separately, one after the other, in a certain order, are unable to act conjointly.

74-75. In the case of the sacrifices "Pūrnāmāsā" and the rest (six sacrifices constituting the "Darṣa-Pūrnāmāsā") we find that they have an order of action (three being performed on the Amāvāsyā and the remaining three on the Pūrnāmāsī),—though they act conjointly (in bringing about a common result, in the shape of *heaven*); and in the same manner, in the case of acquiring the Veda, we find that learning (consists of a gradual process of learning a letter, then a word, a Sentence, and so on, and yet all these processes have a common result, in the shape of an acquirement of the Veda). In fact everywhere we find that the Means, &c. (the three factors of a Bhavanā), though gradual in their function, yet lead up to an action at one and the same time. Therefore there can be no objection against the gradual (utterance of Letters constituting a Word).

76. All actions are recognised as complete in themselves, and any subtle differences among the actions themselves are never recognised.

77-78. When, however, the various parts of an action, though inhering in a single process (*lit.*: means to an end), are separately recognised distinctly,—then, in that case, the idea of simultaneity is a mistaken one. How then could there be any simultaneity in the case of many and distinct actions, inhering in separate processes, and occurring in a gradual order of sequence?

whose component letters are pronounced, not by one, but by many persons—is incapable of expressing any meaning.

73 The bearers carry a Palki conjointly, which they could not do if they went at it one after the other. In the same manner certain letters, combining in a definite way, are found to express a meaning, which they could not do, if all of them were uttered simultaneously (by different persons).

74-75 "Three factors," *viz.*: the Result, the Means, and the Process.

76 All actions end in their respective results; and when the result has been attained, then alone is the Action realised in its complete form, and as such an Action is always recognised as *complete*, *i.e.*, with its result duly accomplished. The joint action of letters is only through its result, in the shape of the full denotation of the meaning; and as for the subtle functioning of each individual letter (comprising the word) towards this result, it is never cognised separately.

77 Even in the case of the single action of *Homa*—where the different actions of *naming the Deity*, *pouring the libation*, &c., are each separately noticed—there is no real notion of simultaneity. Hence there can be no such simultaneity in the case of the Darṣa-Pūrnāmāsā sacrifices, which comprise many actions.



79. In a case where an action, from the commencement of its first functionings, to the final fulfilment, of its result, is recognised at one and the same time, as constituted by all the various functionings,—with reference to such an action we have the use of the Present Tense.

80. Therefore in the case in question (of the *Word*), we would have the present tense applicable to its action,—inasmuch as it is recognised in its entirety, as functioning from the very beginning in the shape of a desire to speak (on the part of the speaker), to the final result in the shape of the recognition of its meaning (by the listener).

81. The distinct actions of the individual letters (constituting the word) (though extant) could not be recognised in the absence of the fulfilment of the final result; but this fact (of non-recognition) does not prove the non-existence (of such individual functioning).

82. Thus then the action being inferable from the final result, the present tense becomes applicable to the action of the Means (*Words, &c.*), in accordance with its position with regard to the result.

83. In the aforesaid action (of signification) the close proximity of something is necessary. But the mere fact of the others being to a certain degree removed from the final result, does not lead to any notion of their not forming an integral part (of the *Word*).

84-85. With regard to the signification (of the object *cow*), due potency certainly belongs to both *ga* and *au*, though the former is removed

79 This Kārikā anticipates the following objection: "If there is no simultaneity, how do you explain the use of the Present Tense in connection with them?" The sense of the reply is that the Present Tense is used with regard to that action which is seen from its beginning to the end, and as such no simultaneity is necessary.

82 Though the action is to be inferred from the result, yet when we have once seen that a number of letters, in a certain definite order, leads to the signification of a certain meaning, and from this signification, when we have once inferred the action of the Letters,—then, at any future time, whenever we find the same Letters arranged in the same order, we come to apply to it the Present Tense. This anticipates the following objection: "At the time of the fulfilment of the result, in the shape of the signification, the functioning of the Letters will have ceased, and thus become *past*; how, then, could the Present be applicable to it?" The sense of the reply is that the final result has already been once seen before, and the functioning of the Letters has also been inferred from that result; hence latterly, whenever the *Word* is found, the functioning of the Letters is at once inferred and recognised as *Present*, as on the previous occasion.

83 This anticipates the following objection: "If all the Letters be accepted to be the means of expression, then, it becomes necessary that we should assume an impression produced by the *Word* taken as a whole, which would be the direct means of the cognition of the meaning; and this impression would, on account of its closer proximity, always belong to the last letter of the *Word*." The sense of the Kārikā is that, though it is so, yet the proximity of the other Letters is equally necessary, and hence these Letters should also be admitted to form integral parts of the *Word*.

84-85 In the case of all *Words*, it is necessary that certain Letters should come together in a certain definite order; otherwise they lose all their significance, and become absolutely useless.



by two steps (from the impression of the word as a whole), and the letter by only one; because, it is only when they are located in this order that they can (conjunctly) signify (the object). Just as the Visarga has a significance, only when it is at a distance from the other letters composing the word,—so, in the same manner, in the case of those (*g* and *au*) also, the significance does not depend upon the immediate proximity of the one or the other (to the final impression of the complete word).

86. And where one letter is incapable (of signifying an object), it does not follow that all (taken together) are also incapable. Because we see that the parts of the cart are incapable of carrying corn, &c. (and yet the cart as a whole is capable of carrying them).

87-88. "But in the case of the cart, each part of it has a certain capability of its own,—all these individual capacities conjoining towards the accomplishment of the carrying; whereas, in the case of Letters (composing a word) the only capability (of signifying an object) belongs to their aggregate, while no such capability is found to belong to the individual letters; inasmuch as the Letters individually—each one by one—do not signify even the least portion of the object (denoted by the complete word composed of those Letters)."

89. But the action of carrying paddy, &c., for instance, that is performed by the cart, is never found to be done by its constituent parts, as you would wish it.

90. If it be urged that the parts of the cart too are capable of carrying something (if not the whole cart load), then (we say) in the present case too, we have, among individual Letters, the capability of bringing about a notion of themselves (if not that of the object signified); and in some cases single Letters are actually found to signify even objects (as in the case of the letter *ka* = *Prajāpati*).

91. Even he, who holds that an impartite *Sphota* is implied by the ideas of the Letters, is not free from the above objection (urged against the *Mimamsaka*).

92. For, in that case too the *Sphota* of the word is not implied by

91 "Above objection"—against the theory that it is the Letters constituting a word that signify the object.

92 Even in the case of the sounds (of Letters) it is necessary to admit their proximity, the fact of their being uttered by the same person, and also the fact of their occurring in a particular order. And since those that occur in any order cannot be simultaneous, therefore we shall have to assume an impression produced by the whole word, over and above the assumption of the *Sphota*. And the objection against us,—*vis.*: that if the individuals have no power, then their aggregate can have none—applies to the *Sphota* theory also; because even in that the Letters individually are not held to signify the *Sphota*; for if anyone of the letters signified the complete *Sphota*, there would be no use for the other letters. Hence the *Sphota*—theory would also stand in need of the assumption that the *Sphota* is implied by all the Letters taken collectively, the *Sphota* itself signifying the impression that leads us to the

each individual Letter (composing it). Nor is the *Sphota* indicated in parts; and in its absence we cannot have any cognition of it.

93. And those that are individually incapable, are incapable, also when taken collectively. And the arguments that you (the upholder of *Sphota*) would bring forward to meet these objections, would serve our purpose.

94. The existence (of *Sphota*), its distinctness (from the Letters), and the denial of any parts (of the *Sphota*)—these three assumptions you would require over and above what is necessary for our theory. And it is for this reason (of avoiding unnecessary assumptions) that we seek (to prove the fact of the Letters themselves) signifying the meaning.

95. (Even if we do not admit of a residual effect *Saṅskāra*) there would be no inconsistency in the cognition of the meaning. Because for this cognition we will have, for the cause, that which immediately precedes it.

96. (The cognition of the meaning) always appears subsequent to the cognition of the last letter of the word, after the cognitions of the two (letters *ga* and *au*) have gone before. Therefore it is such (cognition of the last letter) that we hold to be the cause (of the cognition of the meaning).

97. Even without any residual effect (*Saṅskāra*), this last Letter would come to signify the meaning,—being helped to this capability by the letters that immediately precede it (and through this precedence help it on to full significance).

98. And it is this (help) which some people call “residual effect” (*Saṅskāra*). Because it is only this that is found to be free from the assumption of anything unseen (and transcendental, or merely ideal).

99. Or, it may be the Impression (produced by the letters) that is called the “residual effect.” Because all persons think that there is a “residual effect” in the case of all objects cognised by any definite cognition.

100. The only diversity of opinion lies in the fact of this (*Saṅskāra*) being the means of the cognition of the meaning (of words); and as a means of ascertaining this (causality) too, we have an invariable concomitance, as in other cases.

meaning. And certainly it is much simpler than this to assume a potency, in the Letters taken collectively, of signifying the impression that would denote the meaning of the word.

99 That there is such a thing as *Saṅskāra* is admitted by all men; the only difference of opinion lies on the point of its being the means of cognising the meaning of the word; and here too, we have to admit its causal potency, on the ground of (invariable) concomitance—as is explained in the following *Kārikā*.

100 We have the cognition of the meaning, only when there is an impression; and this invariable concomitance helps us to establish the fact that Impression is the means of the cognition of the meaning.



101. If the *Saṅskāra* be groundless, then the assumption of precedence (among letters) also becomes groundless; and hence there could be no *help* (as mentioned above in *Kārikā* 97).

102. Though it is an acknowledged fact that "*Saṅskāra*" is the cause of remembrance, yet that does not preclude its applicability to other purposes.

103. Therefore it is not that the *Bhāṣhya* has assumed the existence of a (useless supernumary in the shape of) *Saṅskāra*. The only imperceptible fact that it has laid down is that of its being the cause of the cognition of the meaning (of words).

104. And even the *Sphota*—theory is not free from an imperceptible factor; as the capacity of signifying the effect (the meaning) is equally applicable to Impression and *Sphota*.

105. And, inasmuch as the incompatibility (of *Saṅskāra* signifying the meaning) thus disappears, it cannot lead to the assumption of *Sphota*. And the assumption of a *Saṅskāra* too, preceding (the manifestation of *Sphota*) is very necessary for you.

106. We would not admit of anything besides *sound* (*Sphota*) with regard to the cognition of meaning,—only if such sounds were perceptible by the sense, or if the Letters themselves were not amenable to Sense-Perception.

107. If you are over-anxious to have a simultaneity of Letters, then we may allow that on the ground of their eternality and all-pervadingness (which makes all the Letters simultaneous); but this simultaneity cannot be said to constitute their capacity of expressing the meaning.

108. Thus then, in the case of Letters that are comprehended gra-

101 The Letter is destroyed as soon as it is uttered, and if we deny the fact of any Impression being left by it, then there would be nothing of it left to help the following letter; and when this help would be denied, then the precedence of the former would be useless; and it would be impossible to get at any correct theory with regard to the significance of words. Therefore we cannot totally deny the existence of *Saṅskāra* or Impression.

103 The *Saṅskāra* spoken of by the *Bhāṣhya* is none other than *Vāsanā*, which is the admitted cause of memory. The only thing that the *Bhāṣhya* has assumed and which is not amenable to direct Sense-Perception, is the capability of the *Vāsanā*, to bring about a cognition of the meaning of Words.

106 You too must necessarily postulate a certain unseen force that could imply the *Sphota*, which would signify the meaning. Thus then, our theory is simpler than yours, inasmuch as it does away with the intervening agency of the *Sphota*; and certainly, the *Saṅskāra* is as capable of denoting the meaning as the *Sphota*.

108 This anticipates the following objection: "You deny the *Sphota* on the ground of *Saṅskāra* which signifies the meaning; but why should you not deny the agency of the Letters also, and hold the signification to be due to the sound only?" The sense of the reply is that Letters are perceived by means of the senses, and as such are more reasonable to hold than any imaginary *Sphota*.

107 For in that case all words would signify all meanings.



dually in a definite order, their position—be it either simultaneous, or otherwise—is the only cause of the cognition of meaning.

109. Or (the fact may be that) when the Letters have been gradually comprehended in a definite order, there follows a recapitulated (or recalled) cognition of all the Letters (in the form of the complete Word); and it is this complete recapitulated cognition which is the means of the cognition of meaning.

110. And in this (recapitulated cognition) we have the simultaneity of Letters. But the cognition of the meaning does not necessarily depend upon the fact of this simultaneity being perceived by the senses.

111. Some people assert that this cognition (of the Word) is of a variegated character, consisting as it does of the existing (the last Letter) and the non-existing (the previous Letters that have come before); as in (the cognition of each word, the last Letter is always comprehended (at the time that the word is recalled as a whole).

112. Others however hold that when the last Letter has been comprehended, there is a simultaneous remembrance of all the other preceding Letters, brought about by the impressions left by each individual letter.

113. Thus then, though there are gradual cognitions (of the Letters in a definite order), yet, all theorists admit of a mental recognition of all the Letters as constituting a whole word.

114. For, if this be not admitted, then in the case of the perception of a certain number (one hundred, for instance) of the same object, each of which is perceived one by one,—there would not be any collective recognition of all of them as making up a hundred (such objects).

115. Thus, then, though the previous cognition, by the ear, of Letters, is one by one, yet subsequently there is a collective remembrance of the whole, which is purely mental (i.e., perceived by the mind).

116. And the Letters thus recalled are not, in any degree, removed from the cognition of meaning; and hence it is that ordinary people make the assertion that "the cognition of meaning is obtained from the Word."

109 This is the view favoured by the Author himself. According to this theory the pronunciation of the second letter is accompanied by the remembrance of the preceding letter.

111 When the last letter has been heard, all the rest are recalled; therefore the cognition of the last letter is direct *sensual perception*, and that of the others *remembrance*; and hence the variegated character of the word-cognition.

112 This alternative does away with the variegated character, because the final cognition of the whole word is made to follow *after* that of the last letter, and not simultaneously (as in the previous alternative). Thus then the final comprehension of the Word becomes a case of *Remembrance* pure and simple.

116 Because the cognition of the meaning follows immediately after the recognition of the complete word.



117. Being led astray by the aforesaid variegated cognition, some people hold that apart from the Letters composing it, there is a distinct cognition of the word "Gauh," and that this cognition is amenable to Sense-Perception.

118. We admit of the fact of this cognition (of the whole) being something different from the cognition of each of the Letters. But the cognition of the Word cannot be anything totally apart from that of the Letters composing it.

119. Even though the cognition of the whole word (*Gauh*) be something other (than that of the Letters), yet any cognition of the three (Letters ग औ and :) cannot belong to anything besides the three Letters themselves.

120. We do not deny the fact of the cognition of the word "*Gauh*," as a single component whole. This idea of the singleness of the Word is due to the fact of the word (as composed of the three Letters) being the object of a single cognition, and also to the fact of the whole (trio of Letters) having a single end (that of signifying the object *cow*).

121. In the case of the word "*Gauh*," the idea of one-ness may be due to the fact of the Letter औ following very soon after ग, and also to that of there being very little interrim between the two syllables. In the case of such words, however, as "*Devadatta*," and the like, the difference between the Letters is quite clear. (As a matter of fact the idea of one-ness is a mistake).

122. The construction of the Bhāshya passage ought to be "*the word is not subsidiary*,"—because the causal efficacy (of signification) belongs to the Letters (composing it); and it is on this view that we have the ordinary assertion ("the cognition of meaning is got from the word").

123. The Ablative in "*Çabdāt*" (in the sentence "*Çabdāt arthapratītiḥ*") signifies causal agency. In your theory too, there would be an intervening factor between the cognition of meaning (and the cognition of the Word,—the manifestation of *Sphota* being the intervening factor).

124. That is said to be subsidiary, which, being known in one shape, is used in another. And (in the case of the Word) we are not cognisant of any other form of causality (than the one we lay down).

117 The Grammarians hold this view of the perceptibility of the *Sphota*. They are led to this by a false analogy to the perceptibility of the last letter of the word. (See above). "*There is a cognition, &c.*" i.e., in the form of the *Sphota*.

123 This Kārikā refers to the following Bhāshya passage: "*Gauṇa ēsha çabda itī ēt na gauṇa 'ksharēshu nimittabhāvah.*" This is objected to on the ground that the reply portion seems to imply that the word '*gauṇa*' qualifies '*akshra*.' The Kārikā however, explains it thus: '*na gauṇah çabdah aksharēshu nimittabhāvah.*'

124 All causes have their own operation intervening between themselves and their effects; and in the case of Words also, we have only this much of interrim; and as such, this causality is none other than the one we are cognisant of in the case of all

125. The intervention of the operation of the cause itself is common to all causes ; and in the case of the Word, it is only this operation of itself (which is found to intervene between the Word and its signification) ; therefore this is no real intervention at all.

126. When, as a matter of fact, people do not give the name "Word" to anything besides the Letters, how could there be any such assertion as "meaning is got from the word," with regard to a meaning signified by them (*i.e.*, the letters composing the Word) (when you hold that it is the *Sphota* that signifies the meaning) (and hence the said assertion is not compatible with the *Sphota* theory).

127. If the cognition of the meaning be said to be brought about by the *Sphota*, manifested by the *Impression* produced by the cognition of the Letters,—then the causal agency of the Word becomes subsidiary to the greatest degree (inasmuch as between the Word and the cognition of the meaning, we would have two intervening factors : the *Impression* and the *Sphota*).

128. The utterance of the word is not for the purpose of bringing about the *Saṅskāra* ; this *Saṅskāra* appears gradually in connection with the word, used with a view to the signification of the meaning.

129. Therefore a Word is called (the cause of the signification of meaning) with a view to its effect,—being, as it is, used for the sake of that signification, and in the manifestation of the *whole Word* (by means of the Letters composing it), there is no intervention. (In our theory, the Letters are held to manifest the word directly, without any intervening processes).

130. Or, the previous residual effects (*Saṅskāras*) may be taken to be parts of the process of the signification of the Word ; and the last letter of the word would be the manifestor of that *Saṅskāra* ; and since this (last letter) is a word, therefore we would have the primary character (of the ordinary assertion—"the meaning is signified by the Word") [this is in accordance with the theory that the meaning is signified by the last letter of the word as helped by the impressions left by the preceding letters].

131-132. 'In words and sentences, either the Letters, or the Sounds (thereof) do not point to any such agent of signification, as the *Sphota*,—just as the lamplight (does not point to any intervening manifestor) ;—because the Letters have existence,—like the 'jar,' &c.' :—these and other arguments like these could be easily brought forward against the assumption of things not cognised by ordinary people.

133. And again, the *Sphota* cannot indicate the meaning,—because it is something altogether apart from the Letters (composing the

other causes. Hence the causality in this present case cannot be said to be of a secondary or subsidiary character.



Word),—like the jar, &c. Nor is there any contradiction (in this) of perceptible facts,—because the object (*Sphota*) itself, is not established (as an entity).

134. He who would deny the existence of Letters would be thereby contradicting the perceptible fact of the cognition of the meaning following immediately on the perception of the Letters (composing the Word),—just as the denial of the moon (contradicts a visible fact).

135. Or (we may cite another argument): 'The cognition of meaning proceeds from the Letters, because it follows immediately after the cognition of these;—because that which is so (*i.e.*, follows immediately after something,) necessarily proceeds from it,—as the notion of Fire from that of Smoke.' [That is to say, as the notion of Fire following immediately after the perception of Smoke, the former is accepted as proceeding from the latter].

136. Or like the lamp, the Letters *Ga* and the rest are the indicators of the objects 'cow,' &c., because these objects are always recognised on the utterance of the Letters; and because the Letters are always recognised prior (to the cognition of the object).

137. "The denial of the *Sphota* as apart from Letters, is of very little use in regard to Words." But we have made the above attempt (to refute *Sphota*) simply with a view to establish the truth of the effects brought about by the different members of the Sentence.

Thus ends the Sphota—VĀDA.

Section 13.

ON "ĀKRITI."

1. If the denotation (of a word) be something apart from the Ākriti (*class or form*), then we could not establish either the relationship (of meaning with the word) or the permanence of that relationship. Conscious of this (difficulty) we now proceed to establish the fact of the Class (Ākriti) being the object of denotation by a word.

131 The sense of the objection is this: "You deny the *Sphota* to be anything apart from the Letters; but in that case we can accept it as a part of the Word, and not of the Letters; and as such the *Sphota* theory would remain intact."

The position taken up by the reply is that in accordance with the *Sphota* theory, no parts of sentences are held to be operative,—the sentence alone, as a whole, being accepted as indicative of its meaning as a whole. Hence by the denial of *Sphota*, we establish the reality of the operative faculty of the parts of sentences.

1 If in every case, the Individual alone were the object of denotation, then, in as much as such Individuals could not be omnipresent, there could be no relation between the Word and its Meaning. The Class or Form on the other hand, is eternal; and as such, quite capable of relationship with the Eternal Word.



2. In course of this we shall also try to establish the existence of the Ākr̥ti, and in order to prove the strength or weakness (of its claims to denotability) in comparison to the Individual, we shall later on (in the Ākr̥tyadhikarana) lay down the grounds for accepting the fact of the Ākr̥ti matter being the object of denotation.

3. It is the *Class* itself that has been called "Ākr̥ti"—which signifies *that by which the Individual is specified (or characterised)*. It is that which is *common* to all the individual objects, and the means of a *collective idea* of all these (individuals) as forming *one* composite whole.

4. As the means of such collective idea, there is a *commonality*, which is signified by the word ('ākrti'),—this fact is admitted by all; and in this there is no difference among the several theorists.

5. With regard to all objects there is a double idea, in the shape of one consisting in its differentiation (as an individual apart from others), and another (a collective idea) consisting of its homogeneity (with others resembling it in certain respects, and thus, with it, forming a *Class*, a corporate whole). And this double idea is not possible without the double character of the object (as an individual, and as belonging to a class).

6. If the object were perceived merely as an individual, then there could be no idea of (its belonging to) a *Class*. And (*vice versâ*) if the *Class* alone were perceived, then there would be no occasion for any idea of the Individual.

7. Nor can any of the two ideas be said to be either mistaken, or of only secondary importance; because the conviction of the double idea is always so firm, that the mistake must lie on the part of those who assert that the double idea is a mistake—(therefore the double notion is absolutely necessary).

8. And further, since the two (the Individual and the Class) are nowhere perceived in their primary form, therefore there can be no assumption of the secondary character (of the idea of either the Individual or the

‡ The denotability of the *Class* is denied on the following grounds: (1) because it does not exist; and (2) because its acceptance is absolutely useless. Consequently we must begin with the proof of the existence of *Class*; and then we shall, in due course, come to take the second point, the reasons for accepting it, in preference to the Individual, by comparing the arguments in favour of each; for which the reader is referred to the latter half of the *Smṛitipāda*.

§ The words "Ākr̥ti" and "Jāti" are synonymous terms. The *Jāti* is accepted, because it is the only means of having a concrete collective idea of a number of individuals possessing certain properties in common among themselves.

§ It is only in the case of words signifying certain objects, that the idea of the Individual and the *Class* can be realised. If these be said to be secondary, where else could we have them as primary? An Idea can be accepted as secondary in one place, only if it can be found elsewhere in its primary character.



Class). (Nor can any of them be said to be false or mistaken, because) it has already been proved (in the "*Nirālambanavāda*") that all ideas have counterpart realities, as their objects, in the external world.

9. There is mutual dependence between the Individual and the Class: the Class belonging to the Individuals, and the Individuals to the Class.

10. A Class devoid of Individuals does not exist, (—because of the absence of Individuals)—like the horns of a hare. And in the same manner, because of the absence of Class there could be no Individuals (without a Class).

11. Or, these two premises may be mentioned in the forms "because one does not possess the character of the other." By this change, there ceases to exist the slightest difference between the Individual and the Class.

12-13. If one were to assert the capability of the Individuals to bring about ideas of commonality, without (admitting of) a separate entity (in the shape of "Class"),—for such a person, of what sort would be the capability of denotation? (1) Will this capability be cognisable, or non-cognisable? and (2) will it be different in each Individual, or one (and the same for all)? If it be *one* and *cognisable*, then it comes to be a *Class* only mentioned in other words.

14. If the capability be *non-cognisable*, then the Idea (of singleness or commonality) becomes devoid of any basis (and as such false). Because no object is accepted by mere existence (unless it is, in some form or other actually *cognised*).

9 If there were no Individuals, there could be no Class; and the only peculiarity of the Individual is that by its *individualistic character*, it specifies the *commonality* (of the Class); and hence without the Class, there could be no Individual.

10 The two arguments are: (1) The Class without Individuals (as assumed by others) does not exist: because it is without Individuals—like the hare's horns. (2) Individuals without the Class do not exist: because they are without the Class,—like the hare's horns.

11 The premiss—"because of the absence of Individuals"—implies that the Individual is something different from the Class; and in order to avoid this absurdity, the premises of the foregoing arguments are stated as follows: (1) 'because of the absence of the individualistic character'; and (2) 'because of the absence of commonality.' The argument thus changed becomes capable of proving the non-difference of the Class from the Individuals. Because the premiss signifies that *the difference of the Class from the Individuals* is concomitant with *unreality*; and it follows from this that their *non-difference* must be concomitant with *reality*—i.e. real.

12-13 This meets the following Banddha argument: "Even when you admit of a Class, you have to assume that it is capable of producing ideas of similarity; why should we not, then, attribute the same capability to the Individuals themselves?"

14 It is only the cognition of the common character that can be said to be capable of being implied by the Individual. If, however, the capability itself becomes non-cog-

15. Inasmuch as the Individuals themselves are different from one another, they can never be cognised by a single Idea; because (being *many* and *diverse*) they cannot have (any notion of *single commonality* for) their object. And as for the capability itself, it does not belong to these (Individuals).

16. If the capability be different (in each Individual and something wholly different from the Individual itself), then there cannot be *one* idea (embracing all the Individuals). And if the capability of each Individual were identical (with it), then too, we could only have ideas of the Individuals (and not of all of them collectively as one corporate whole).

17. For these reasons you must also admit of the *Class*, which is apart from the Individuals and their capabilities, and yet embraces all Individuals, and pervades through each of them.

18. Thus then, for us, there is a distinct object of the Idea of single commonality; and it is a natural property of the Individuals. And as such, it may be named either "*Sāmānya*," or "*Ākr̥ti*," or "*Jāti*," or "*Çakti*."

19. (*Obj.*): "Well, even in the case of such (*summum* genuses) as "*Sattā*" and the like, we have an idea of their forming a Class;—how could

nisable, how can it lead to the *cognition of something else*? If the capability is not cognised, how can that which is said to be the object of this capability be cognised? And hence all ideas of any *single commonality* must be rejected as utterly groundless.

15 This anticipates the following objection: "It is not the capability that is the basis of the idea of *single commonality*; the Individuals themselves constitute this basis." The sense of the reply is that the Individuals being *many* and *diverse*, they can never be the basis of any idea of *single commonality*, which must be the object of a notion of something which is *one* only. It is only a single form that can be the object of a single notion; but you do not admit of any single form embracing all Individuals (as that would be nothing more or less than admitting the *Class*); hence you cannot reasonably hold the Individuals to bring about any notion of *single commonality*. As for the *capability*, though you admit of its existence, yet, in as much as you deny its cognition, it cannot serve as the basis of any notion of *single commonality*: hence with regard to the case in question, it is as good as non-existent.

16 Is the capability different from the Individuals or not? It appears as *one*; but if it be different, it could not appear as *one*. And again if it be different, how could it denote any *single commonality*, by means of the Individuals, that are *many* and *diverse*? If however it be identical with the Individuals, we could have no other idea save that of Individuals. And these Individuals being *many* and *diverse*, they could not form the basis of any notion of *single commonality*.

17 "*Therefore*"—i.e. since neither the *Individuals* nor their *capability* are found to be fit to be the basis of the notion of *single commonality*; "*yet, &c.*"—The *Class* resides as a *whole* in each of the Individuals.

19 Though there can be no *Class of Classes*—such as "*gotwatwa*," (as this would lead to an endless series of classes), yet, even in the absence of such further classes, we have the idea of a *Class of Classes*, as one in which *many* diverse classes, such as



there be any such idea without the existence of another more extensive Class?"

20-21. (*Reply*). This argument that you bring forward is exactly met by the case of the *forest*. For even though the idea of the further Class is mistaken, that of the Minor Classes "*gotwa*," &c.—can not be so. Because prior to the utterance of the words ('*gotwa*, &c.,' in the case of the classes '*gotwa*,' '*aṇwatwa*,' &c.), we have no one notion of commonality with regard to all (such Classes), as we have with regard to the individual cows (in the case of the Class '*Cow*').

21-22. Some people assert than even in this case (of Class of Classes) there is a perceptible similarity consisting in the fact of their being "things" (and thus constituting the Class "*Vastutwa*"). But if such assumptions were admitted, then there would be an endless series of Classes; in as much even between the *summum genus* "*Vastutwa*" and the minor Classes "*gotwa*," &c., there may be assumed to be a similarity (consisting in the fact of both being Classes, and so on, *ad infinitum*).

23. And since the Individuals too are *things*, there would be an Idea of Class ("*Vastutwa*") with regard to these (Individuals) also, just as in the case of "*Sattā*," &c. Therefore, there can be no such class (of Classes) as "*Vastutwa*."

24. Therefore, in the case of "*Sattā*," &c., the application of the word "*gotwa*," "*aṇwatwa*," are found to be included. But in as much as there can be no Class of Classes, this idea cannot but be admitted to be a mistaken one. "And," urges the objector, "on the same grounds, why should we not reject the idea of the Class '*gotwa*' also, as being a mistaken one?"

20-21 "*Forest*."—The Forest is nothing apart from the trees in it. And hence though the idea of the "Forest" apart from the trees is clearly a mistaken one, yet the idea of the trees themselves cannot be so. Similarly, in the present case, though the idea of the Class of Classes may be mistaken, that of the Classes themselves cannot be so.

"Because prior to, &c."—In the case of the idea of the Class of Classes, the idea of singleness is merely verbal. When the similarity of the bovine characteristics is perceived to exist in a number of cows, without an expression of the idea of similarity in the word "*Gotwa*," we have not the remotest idea of any other class, as "*Aṇwatwa*." It is only when the word "*Gotwa*" has been uttered, even without the perception of any similarity, &c.—that we remember similar words, like "*Aṇwatwa*" and the like; and the idea of similarity among these various classes ("*Gotwa*," "*Aṇwatwa*," &c.), lies only in the verbal form; in as much as there is nothing common among them except their ending in the abstract affix "*twa*." And hence such an idea cannot but be a mistaken one.

23 Individuals are *things*, as much as the Classes; and hence, if the Ideas of Class be said to be based upon verbal expression only, the Individuals would be as entitled to the Idea, as the classes themselves.

24 How then, is a single word "*Sāmānya*" applicable in common to all classes? Inasmuch as it has been proved that this similarity is only verbal, and it does not