

"*Sāmānya*" (*commonality*) is due either to the fact of the one (name) applying to many and diverse classes (as '*gotwa*,' '*aṇwatwa*,' &c.), or to that of bringing about a single Idea (with regard to the various classes).

25. The Class resides in the Individuals, because the Class is not perceived in the interval between the perception of two Individuals. And we do not admit of any (omnipresent) Class like "*Ākāṣa*."

26. Or, even if it be admitted to be omnipresent, its manifestation would depend upon certain capabilities (in the Individuals composing it). And such capability would be inferred from its effect in the shape of the manifestation (of the Class).

27. Therefore that (Individual) alone would be considered to be *capable*, the presence of which would bring about the manifestation (of the Class). It is for this reason that the Class ('*gotwa*') is not perceived in the presence of any and every individual.

28. Though (all Individuals, cows, horses, &c., are) different (from all Classes "*gotwa*," "*aṇwatwa*," &c.), yet the capability (of manifesting one Class) belongs only to certain (Individuals); while some (Individuals) are wholly without such capability. And certainly no exception can be taken to the natural capabilities of things.

29-30. For instance, to such facts, as the burning of fire and not of *Ākāṣa*, who could take exception? It is merely accepted as a perceptible fact, and no other reason for it is looked for. And the mere absence of any other reason, does not make the cognition of the fact (of fire burning) groundless (*i.e.*, false).

30-31. In the mere fact of pointing out (or manifesting of the Class

constitute a real Class in the shape of "*Sāmānya*," this application of the name to all classes must be explained as being due to extraneous influences; and as such influences, we have the facts that the name "*Sāmānya*," though only one, belongs to all the various *classes*, and brings about a single idea embracing all classes.

25 "And we do not &c."—The Class can have no existence apart from the Individuals; and hence it cannot be said to be omnipresent, like "*Ākāṣa*," which has an independent existence of its own.

26 It is not perceived in the intervals; because at that time there is no individual endowed with the requisite capability.

27 Only that Individual can be said to be "*capable*," which manifests the Class. The class "*Gotwa*" is manifested by the individual cows alone; and hence no other individuals—as horses or elephants—can be said to manifest that Class.

28 Though the individual cows and horses are equally different from the classes '*Gotwa*' and '*Aṇwatwa*,' yet the individual *cow* is capable of manifesting the former class and not the latter.

29 That which is perceived by the Sense does not require any other proof to substantiate it.

30.31 If the Idea of the Class were produced by Inference, we would stand in need



by the Individual) no concomitant property need be looked for; because such manifestation is not inferential; and in the case of sense-perception, what would be the use of any further definitions, &c. (of marks and characteristics, &c.)?

31-32. Then again, the relationship between the Individual and the Class is purely natural, and not based upon any reasoning. Consequently we do not require any other Class, for the establishment of such relationship. And like the aforesaid capability, the natural (character of the relation) cannot be questioned.

33. Or, even if the relationship were based upon some reasons,—since it is only a reason or ground, in some form or the other, that is required,—therefore when certain Individuals have been perceived, (they themselves would supply the necessary grounds for the relation), and nothing else (in the shape of a fresh Class) would be needed.

34. *Question*: "Wherefore do other Individuals not signify the Class?"
Answer: Simply because such manifestation is not seen to follow from them. And since such non-application of one set of individuals to another Class is only natural, no other grounds for non-manifestation, need be sought after.

35-36. *Question*: "Since you do not admit of any further 'Sāmānya' (a higher Class) for the controlling of the application (i.e., the relation between certain Individuals and Classes), therefore, why should not the notion of the individual *cow* be independent of any such controlling agency as that of the Class 'Cow'? And just as, even though (all individuals are) equally different (from the Class) yet the capability of relationship belongs only to some of them, (independently of any other causes), so too we would have the cognition of the individual 'cow' (naturally by itself), without any other causes."

of a concomitant property. But as a matter of fact, it is only a case of Sense-perception. This anticipates the following question: "By what mark do we know that such an individual will manifest such a Class?" The sense of the reply is that it is only Inference that stands in need of such a mark; Sense-perception does not require it.

31-32 This anticipates the following objection: "The individuals being many, they cannot be the cause of any *one* relationship,—and as such we shall require another Class for the establishing of the said relationship." The reply is that the relationship is natural, and not based upon any extraneous grounds.

34 How is it that the individual *cow* does not indicate the class 'Horse'?

35-36 If many and diverse individuals be the grounds of the existence of a single Class, we may have the same Individuals as the causes of the single notion of the individual *cow*; and we need not have any such thing as the class 'cow.' And just as among certain individuals, equally different from the Class, only a few have the natural capability of being related to the Class; so also we could have a natural cognition of the class 'Cow' without any other cause.

37 *Answer* : Inasmuch as we do not admit of the appearance of any cognitions, in the absence of objects,—we necessarily require a Class, apart from the Individual.

38. All Ideas, appearing without corresponding objects, must, in the absence of such objects, be rejected as false. And the existence of the *class* ("cow") here cannot be said to be faulty, on the ground of the absence of another (Class).

39. If the Class were not admitted, then there could be no functioning of Verbal Testimony and Inference (as means of true cognition). Because there could be no relationship among individuals, on account of the endless number (of these).

40. And further, this (relation) is of use to the person (in arriving at Inferences and Verbal Testimony), simply because of its being so perceived. Whereas in the case of the relation between the Individual and the Class, there is no need of perception.

41-42. When the object, in the shape of the *Class* 'cow,' has been cognised by means of the Senses, Apparent Inconsistency leads to the ac-

37 With regard to the different kinds of cows, we have an idea of a single commonality consisting of a character that is common to all cows. And since there can be no ideas without their counterpart realities, therefore we must admit of a single *class* "Cow," independently of the specific characteristics of the individual cows.

38 It is a fact of common experience, in the case of different kinds of medicine effecting a cure of the same disease, that even many and diverse agents conspire to bring about a single end. Therefore even in the absence of any further assumed Classes, it is only reasonable that the diverse *Individuals* should directly point to a single *Class*.

39 Verbal Testimony is based upon the relation of Word and Meaning; and Inference is based upon the relation subsisting among the various terms of the syllogism. If we had no Classes, all relationships would have to be based upon Individuals; and as all Individuals (innumerable) could not be perceptible at any one time, no relationship would ever be perceived.

40 In the case of Inference, a relationship is of use in the argument, only when it has been duly ascertained, as existing among the terms concerned. Of the *Class*, however, the relationship with the *Individual* is based upon the very nature of the two; and as such it does not stand in need of being actually realised in perception.

41-42 Even though the capability (of producing a single idea of commonality possessed by certain Individuals) exists, yet, in as much as no Idea can exist without its counterpart reality, we cannot but admit of the reality of the *Class*, as the real object of the single notion of commonality produced by the aforesaid capability; and hence if the Class be denied, the capability itself becomes untenable.

"The capability, &c."—This is in anticipation of the argument that the *capability* itself might be accepted to be the object of the notion of commonality—thereby doing away with the necessity of postulating the *Class*. The sense of the reply is that the existence of the *Class* is realised by Sense-perception; and as such it is far more



ceptance of a single capability as the controlling agent (of such relation between the Individuals and the Class); and this (capability) being now established, cannot set aside its own cause (the idea of the *Class*). The capability itself cannot be the object of this (single) notion (of commonality); because it is not perceptible by the Senses.

43. The *regressus ad infinitum*, that you urge on the ground of (the necessity of having further and further) other Classes, could only tend to the rejection of (all ideas of) *Class*. But such rejection is opposed to facts perceived by the Sense.

44. Either the relation (between the Individual and the Class), or the basis thereof, is not the means of cognising the Class. It is only when the individual object has been perceived (by the Sense) in its true form, that the Class is subsequently definitely ascertained.

45. Since the dewlap, &c., and the class 'cow' are both connected with the same object (cow), therefore the existence of the dewlap, &c., tends simply to point (to the *Class* as related to the same individual objects of which it itself is the qualification). And it is not necessary that anything that serves to point to something else must be an integral part of it.

46-47. And when there is no absolute difference between the dewlap, &c., and the individual cow, and again between the class 'cow' and the individuals (composing it), then the reply to the question—"how is it that the class 'cow' applies only to the objects endowed with the dewlap, &c.?"—would be that it does so simply because the Class consists of (is identical with) it (the individual endowed with the dewlap, &c.). Then as for the question—"Whence this identity?"—you must understand that it lies in the very nature (of the Class and the Individuals composing it).

reasonable to admit the *Class* as the real object of the notion of commonality, than the *Capability*, which, at best, can only be *inferred*.

44 Thus the ascertainment of the Class is independent of the relation, &c.; and as such cannot be rejected.

45 This is in anticipation of an objection to the Bhāshya passage, where it is declared that the Class ('cow') is qualified by the *dewlap*, &c.; this theory makes the cognition of the Class 'cow' dependent upon that of another Class 'dewlap'; and this goes against the standard theory of the independent cognisability of the Class 'cow.' The sense of the reply is that when the Bhāshya raised the question—what is the meaning of the word 'Cow'?—the reply given was that the signification of the word consisted of the *class endowed with the dewlap, &c.*, meaning thereby the *object* endowed with these. The peculiar wording may be explained on the ground of both the *dewlap* and the *Class 'cow'* being related to one and the same object, the *individual cow*; and in no case can we admit the *dewlap* as qualifying the *Class*. "And it is not necessary, &c."—i.e., because the dewlap is not an integral part of the *Class 'cow'*, that is no reason why it should not be accepted as defining (or specifying) it.

47-48 This supplies, from the Author's own standpoint, an answer to the question—

48-49. Thus the fixity (of relation) is established in accordance with ordinary sense-perception. And the difference among the various classes 'Cow,' ('Horse'), &c., are based on the very nature of things, and are not due to any difference in their respective manifesting agencies; for if it were so, then like the shortness, &c., (of letters), the difference among classes would become false. Then again, we ask—On what depends the difference between the manifesting agency (the *summum genus* "*Vastutva*") and the individual objects, elephants, &c.? If it be said that the difference is natural,—we can say the same (with regard to the difference of the Minor classes themselves,—thus doing away with the intervention of a *summum genus*).

50. If it be urged that the difference is due to the peculiarity of the manifested class;—then there would be mutual dependence. Therefore the difference between the classes ('cow' and 'elephant') and the individuals (cow and elephant) must be held to be based upon the very nature of things.

51 *Objection*: "Since the Class extends over many (individuals) and the Individual over nothing but itself, therefore they (the Class and the Individual) cannot properly be held to be identical; and hence (in the cognition of the Class) there must be some secondary imposition.

what is the ground of the peculiar relationship between the Class and the Individual? This ground is held to be mere identity.

48-49 "*The difference, &c.*"—This is levelled against those that hold that all classes are identical in the *summum genus* '*Vastutva*,' and that their differentiation into the minor classes is due to certain manifesting agencies in the shape of the words '*Gotva*' '*aṣwatva*,' and the like; just as in the case of Letters, the only difference lies in the Intonations—short or long, high or low, &c.

"*We can say the same, &c.*"—In the case of individual cows also, there is a natural difference among them. Thus, then, though '*Vastutva*,' is one, yet, owing to the differences among the individual cows and elephants, if it be held to appear manifold, in the shape of the minor classes, "Cow" and "Elephant,"—then, in the same manner, in as much as there are natural differences among the individual cows themselves, these individuals could be taken as forming so many minor classes; especially as the only ground for '*Vastutva*' appearing in the forms of the minor classes "Cow," "Elephant," &c., is the fact of its difference from the individual cows and elephants. This is a palpable absurdity; consequently, we cannot but admit of a class "Cow," which is distinct from the elephant, &c., and yet embraces, within itself, all individual cows. And in this manner, the necessity of the minor class 'cow' is established, apart from any manifesting agency in the shape of a *summum genus*.

50 "*Mutual dependence.*"—The cognition of the manifested depending upon the manifesting agency, and the difference of this latter from the individuals, necessary for the said manifestation, depending upon the peculiarity of the manifested class.

51 In as much as they cannot be identical, the idea of the Class must be either mistaken, or only a secondary characteristic imposed upon the Individual.



52. "We must admit the difference (of the Class as extending over each different individual),—because the Class is identical with those that are different (among themselves)—like the specific character, (of the individuals). And again, we must admit the singleness of individuals,—because they are all identical with the one (Class).

53. Then again, "how can one and the same thing, (the Class and the Individual being identical, and thus one and the same), be both *one* (in the form of the Class) and *many* (in the form of the Individuals), and then too, extend over others (as a Class) and be restricted within itself (as an Individual)? How too, can the same be both the Class and the Individual? These among others are the inevitable contradictions involved in your theory."

54-55. *Reply*: It is not proper to urge these contradictions (as they do not apply to our theory); because it is only when the Individual is cognised as being identical with the Class, that it can extend over many things; and the class too is known to extend to nothing beyond itself, only when it is perceived to have become identical with the character of the Individual. (Thus there ceases to be any contradiction).

55-56. In the same manner is to be set aside the (contradiction based upon the) fact of (one and the same thing) being both diverse and one because in one shape (that of Class) we may have singleness, and in another (that of Individual), diversity.

56-57. He who urges the diverse character of the Class is to be shown that (the Class has that character) when it is in the shape of the Individuals; and hence we accept this character, as also the single character of the Individuals, only as appearing in the shape of the Class.

52. The sense of the objection is this: "The Class is identical with all Individuals the Individuals differ from one another; hence the Class as affecting one Individual must be different from that which affects another. Secondly all Individuals being identical with the one Class, they must all be *one* and *one* alone. Thus then, the theory of the identity of the Class with the Individuals militates against two of your most cherished notions. The first syllogism, brought forward in the Kārikā does away with the very character of the Class—viz that of being one and embracing many Individuals; and the second syllogism strikes at the character of the Individuals, which are held to be many and diverse.

54-55. It is only when the Individual has acquired the character of the Class that it can extend over many Individuals; and the Class too is restricted within itself only when it has acquired the character of the Individual.

55-56. The Class 'Cow,' in the shape of the red cow, differs from the black cow; whereas in its own generic shape—of the Class 'Cow'—it cannot but be identical with the black cow also. And this does not constitute any self-contradiction, as it is always possible for one and the same thing to bear one relation to one thing, and the opposite relation to another thing.

56-57. The contradictory character is admitted, as explained in the foregoing Kārikā; hence your syllogisms become entirely superfluous.

57-58. As in the case of the variegated colour, we can optionally fix upon any one of the various colours (without any contradiction), simply because the object (colour) is of a variegated character,—so, in the same manner, we could fix upon the diversity or unity (of the Class or the Individual, without any contradiction, because in different shapes both are capable of having the two characters).

58-59. He who would seek (by the above arguments) to prove the diversity (of the Class), after having separated the Class-character (from the Individuals), will have his premiss failing. And if the premiss were to be fulfilled, then it would simply be proving the proved (i.e., redundant).

59-61. When the Class is cognised as identical in form with the divers Individuals, then the object appears only in its individual form; and when this (individual character) has appeared (to consciousness), the (character of) Class continues to lie latent in it, helping its existence; and though a real entity, this (character of the Class) appears to us to be non-existing, because it is (at that time) not perceptible (by itself, apart from the Individual).

61-62. When we are cognisant of the Individuals themselves as non-different from the Class, then it is the Class itself that is perceived (and the Individuals continue to lie latent).

62-63. When, however, an object of variegated character is cognised at once (without any concrete cognition of details), then difference, non-difference, diversity and all things else become latent.

63-64. But no word can express such an object (in the abstract); (in as much as) all words apply to the generic forms (of things).

58.59 The premiss is in the form—"because it is identical with diverse Individuals." But when the Class-character is removed, then the identity ceases to exist; because it is only the Class that is *one* and *identical*, embracing all Individuals. Thus then if the Identity is accepted, the Class-character of the Individual cannot but be admitted.

61.62 Thus then, the Individual and the class are cognised, equally, in the same manner, according as occasion presents itself. Therefore none of the two can be denied. These two cases are of concrete cognition; while the next Kārikā cites a case of unqualified abstract cognition.

63.64 The first half of the Kārikā anticipates the following objection: "If the form of the object be as described in the foregoing Kārikā, then, how can you explain the assertion of the Bhāṣya that 'the class is the denotation of the word'? For it is the real form of the object (which has been shown to be abstract) that a word ought to denote, or else, it becomes entirely disconnected from the object sought to be signified." The sense of the reply is that no word can have any significance with regard to the variegated character of an object taken in the abstract; since words apply to certain portions of the object, and this portion is the generic form of the object,—that is to say, the idea of the Class as contained in the idea of the Individual is what forms the object of verbal signification.



64-65. In view of the object as a complete whole (not signified by the word), some people assert the separation of certain parts of the denotation of the word to be false. But the fact of the generic idea (of Class) being a part (of the denotation of words) cannot be denied.

65-66. He, who explains "Class" as being merely the similarity among individual objects (should explain), what he understands by the word "similarity." If it be the fact of the various individuals having one and the same form (and character), then this is exactly what we mean by the word "Class."

67-68. If however, by "Similarity" you mean the *Similarity of form*, then you must explain whose, and with whom, is this similarity. For, in their particular forms, the cow that is red is not *similar* to that which is black. If (it be urged that) the former are *similar* to the latter, in that they have similar limbs &c.,—then (we say that) the idea of similarity that we would have would be in the form "like the black cow"; and this could not give rise to the notion of (both sorts of cows belonging to) a common *Class* 'Cow.'

69. Even by mistake we could only have the notion that "this (red cow) is the black one"; and not that "it belongs to the Class 'Cow'." For the form of the *red cow* is not the form of *cow in general*.

70. There would be no idea of "Cow" with reference to any other

64.65 Since words do not touch the complete forms of objects, as they exist; therefore, on this sole ground, some people assert that the separation of the *generic* from the other elements of the object is a mistake. The sense of the last sentence added to the reply given to this view is that, though this separation may be considered a mistake, yet no one can deny the existence of various elements in the idea of an object; nor can any one deny the fact of the generic idea (of the Class) being one of these elements. Therefore Words, according to their capabilities, must be taken to touch only *certain* elements of the object (and not all of them); and this fact cannot be rightly construed into a disconnection of the Word with the real character of the object.

67.68 If the similarity were to rest in the Individuals, then, we could not perceive any similarity between the red cow and the black. Even if there be certain similarities of bodily shape, limbs, &c., all the idea we could have would be that—'the red Cow is similar to the black Cow,' and this could never be the source of an idea of the comprehensive *Class* 'Cow'—in the form that 'both the red cow and the black equally belong to the Class Cow.'

69 If it be urged that the idea of Class is a mistaken one, based on similarity,—even then, in the case of the two cows, red and black, the idea would be that 'the red cow is the black cow.' For any idea—either correct or mistaken—of the Class 'Cow,' in this case, there is no cause. "*The form of the red Cow &c.*" For if it were so, then the black or the white cow would cease to be called a 'Cow.'

70 The generic idea of the "Cow" is found to belong to all cows—black, red, &c., and yet you seem to restrict the name to only red ones. Therefore your theory distinctly militates against the well-established fact of the generic idea of *Cow in general*.

cows besides the black one, even if they were very much similar to it. But such an idea (of "Cow") is actually found to exist. And yet you do not admit the existence anywhere of such a generic form as the "Cow" *in general*.

71. Nor is any other "Cow" known to exist, on which you could base the notion of similarity (extending over all cows). And again, with regard to two objects that are similar, no idea that "it is that" (i.e., no idea of absolute identity) can exist for ever.

72. Since the idea (of *Class*) belongs to all men (at all times), it cannot be a mistaken notion; specially as it is never found to be (contradicted and) set aside (by any perceptible fact). And if (even in the absence of any such contradicting fact) we accept an assumption (of its unreality), then all ideas could be rejected as false.

73-74. As a matter of fact, we do not perceive any particular virtue in any particular individual cow; what, then, is that *one individual*, which would be called a "Cow" (and on a similarity with which we would apply the name 'Cow' to other individuals)? If some pristine individual (the first cow created by God, f.i., were said to be such an Individual),—then, inasmuch as we have never seen this pristine individual, and hence can never have any idea of similarity (with it), we could never have any generic idea of 'Cow' *in general* (through that individual Cow).

71 "Nor, &c."—This is in anticipation of the following argument: "The *class* cow is not the similarity of the black cow, but a similarity with a cow which is similar to all cows in existence." The sense of the reply is that you do not admit of any such generic entity as the 'Cow'; and yet you cannot reasonably deny its existence, cognised by all persons.

"And further, &c."—In every case of mistaken notions—as in the case of silver and shell—one is for a moment deceived by similarity, and takes the one for the other; but soon after he perceives a difference, he is undeceived, and ceases to have any idea of the identity of the two objects. Such is the case with all mistaken notions: they always disappear in due course of time. In the case of the idea of the *Class* 'Cow' however, we find, as a matter of fact, that all along eternity, all men have had the idea that all the various kinds of Cows belong to the *Single Class* 'Cow'; and certainly such a long-continued universally recognised idea cannot be disregarded as a figment.

74.75 *Similarity of body* means that all cows have bodies that belong to one and the same *Class*. But one who denies all *Class* cannot admit of this explanation; and hence it is yet to be explained what is meant by 'Similarity.' "For an idea, &c."—This refers to the following argument: "Even in the absence of *Classes* of body, the *Individuals* themselves, aided by certain everlasting *Vāsānās*, would bring about ideas of the commonality of the bodies, and thereby also the idea of the said *Similarity*." The sense of the reply is that in the absence of an all-embracing *Class* (of Bodies), the many and diverse *Individuals* themselves cannot, in any way, bring about any idea of single commonality—as we have already shown above.



74-75. And further, there can be no idea of similarity, in the absence of Classes, of the limbs (of the cow); for an idea of a *Class* is not produced by the individuals alone.

75-76. Then, as to the question, whether this similarity is different, or not different, from the individuals,—(it must be admitted that) similarity must consist either in the *Class* (i.e., if it be said to be different from the Individual) or in the Individual itself.

76-77. It is for this reason that in his own work Vindhyāvasin has explained that "sameness of form" (*Sārūpya*) is not an object absolutely different (from the Individuals). And it is only by mistake that "similarity" has been asserted by (Vaiṣeṣikas, on the basis of Vindhyāvasin's assertion) to constitute what we call a *Class*.

Thus ends the Chapter on ĀKṚTI.

SECTION 14.

"APOHA."

1. Those, who have assumed the *Class* ('Cow') to be a *negation of the absence of Cow*,—even these people have clearly, by the assertion of the negation of the absence of *Cow*, admitted of an entity in the shape of "*gotwa*" (the *Class* 'Cow').

2. It has been proved before (by the Baddhas) that a *negation* is only another form of positive entity; and hence, please tell me what is that positive entity, which consists in the negation of "Horse" &c.

3. The specific (abstract) form cannot be held to be such an object, because it is undefined (abstract and unqualified). Nor could it apply to

75.76 This is in reply to the following theory: "*Similarity* does not mean the *Similarity of bodies*, but an entity altogether different from Individuals and Classes." The sense of the reply is that we have never come across any similarity, which is distinct from the *Class*, and yet different from the Individuals (*vide* Chapter on *Analogy*).

76.77 Vindhyāvasin has said—'*Sārūpyam Sāmānyam*'; and this only means that the *Class* (*Sāmānyā*) consists in *Sārūpya*,—that is in the *one single form which is common to all the Individuals* (composing that *Class*); and yet people have mistaken his '*Sārūpya*' for '*Sādṛśya*' (Similarity), and have gone about asserting that it is something distinct from Individuals, &c., &c.

¹ The Baddhas assert that the *Class* 'Cow' is only the negation of all that is not cow. This is what they mean by 'Apoḥa.'

² Besides the class 'Cow,' there can be no other positive entity that could be the substratum of the negation of 'not-cow.'

³ To that which is undefined cannot be attributed any positive character—to say nothing of a negative character.

the individual black cow, &c., because that would not be *common* (to all cows).

4. The forms of the black, red, &c., are not common to one another, and for you (Baudddhas), there is no one entity which could be common to the rest, for, in that case, there would be an endlessness of the meanings (of that one entity).

5. All non-cows (horse, &c.), cannot be negatived directly by any individual (cow); because it is not the idea of the *black* cow which is brought about by the negation of *non-cow*.

6. The idea of the *black cow* is brought about by the negation of cows that are red, &c. (i.e., the negation of all cows that are *not black*). If on the contrary, this idea of the black cow were to negative the absence of *cow in general*, (and thus be tantamount to the idea of *cow in general*), then,—just as it does not negative itself (since it itself is a cow),—so it could not negative the other kinds of cows (red, &c.,—because these too would be as much *Cows*, as the black one), (and thus the well-established fact of the *black cow* negating the other kinds of cows would be contradicted).

7. Thus then, if you were to assume that there is partial non-negating, while there is general real negating,—then this simultaneous affirmation and negation would involve a self-contradiction.

8-9. For these reasons, there can be no negation of the 'non-cow' by such individuals (cows) (as have their forms confined within themselves) Nor is a conglomeration of these (individual cows) the means of negating

* "And for you, &c."—For us, there is a class 'cow' which is common to all individual cows, and which we could have as the substratum of the negation of 'not-cow.' As for the Baudddhas, they do not admit of any such Class. Hence if they were to admit of any such single entity as 'cow,' then, in that case, in as much as there are many kinds of cows, the one word (signifying the single entity) would come to have so many distinct denotations, separately, with regard to each separate individual. And such endlessness of denotations would be far from desirable. Specially as we can conceive of no relationship of a word with endless denotations. Hence such a word could never be used. That is to say, if particular kinds of cows were to be the substrate of the negation of 'not-cow,'—and thus form the denotation of the word 'cow'—then, inasmuch as there are endless kinds of cows, the word 'Cow' would come to have innumerable denotations.

⁵ The negation of 'not-cow' would be *the cow in general*, and not any particular cow.

⁷ If the theory above criticised were to be accepted, then the individual black cow—in accordance with a perceived fact, would negative the existence of all other kinds of cows; and yet the same black cow—being the substratum of the negation of all 'non-cows,' and as such having the same character as the 'cow' in general—would also include all other kinds of cows, which it has previously negated. Such would be the contradiction.



"non-cows." Because, in that case, we could have an idea of 'cow' *in general*, only at a time when all the individual cows would be simultaneously perceived (which is an impossibility); and then too, the idea of the cow *in general* would be only such as would rest in all the individual cows taken together as one composite whole; and we could not have the name 'cow' apply to each individual cow taken separately by itself; and as for applying to a conglomeration of all individuals, this is impossible (because all individuals, past, present and future can never be perceived at one and the same time).

10. Therefore that one form alone, which resides in its entirety in each and every one of the individuals, can be the means of having an idea of cow (*in general*). And this (form) is none other than 'cowness' (*i.e.*, the character or property of belonging to the Class 'Cow,' which is common to all individual cows).

11. *Obj*: "But in the case of the different sorts of Negation, you do not admit of any Class in the form of a positive entity." *Reply*: Even in the case of these (we hold that) the Class (is a positive entity, in the shape of) *existence* itself qualified (or limited) by *non-appearance*, &c.

12-13. When that (existence) is qualified by *appearance* (continuance), &c., then it is known as a *positive entity*; and when that (very existence) is qualified by a negation due to the presence of other entities (like the curd, &c., in the case of milk), then it is known as a *negative entity* (*negation of milk* *f.i.*) Non-eternality (or Destructibility=*Pradhvaṃsābhāva*) belongs to a positive class (consisting) of the *action of being destroyed*.

13-15. "What would *non-Brahmanahood* be with respect to Kshatriyas, &c.? *Manhood* belongs to all the four, and as such cannot be said to be synonymous with 'non-Brahmanahood'; and the idea produced by the word 'non-Brahmana' does not refer to any one individual caste; because it equally signifies all the three, Kshatriya, &c. Nor can it be held to signify the three *conjointly*, because this notion of 'non-Brahmanahood'

11 'Prāgabhāva' signifies an *existence that has not yet appeared*, and so on, the various phases of negation may be explained in terms of positive entities.

12-13 This explains how, in accordance with the above theory, we could differentiate between entity and non-entity.

13-15 In this case, the idea of non-Brahmanahood belongs equally to the Kshatriya the Vaiçya and the Qūdra; and yet non-Brahmanhood cannot be held to be a positive class; specially because we do not know of any such class as would include all the three castes; the one that is possible is the class 'manhood' but it includes the Brahmanas also. Hence in this case, you cannot but admit a negative class; why, then, can you not find your way to accepting a general *Apoha*? "*Each of the three, &c.*"—*i.e.*, A Qūdra is as much a *non-Brahmana* as a Kshatriya.

belongs to each of the three separately. Therefore, the only class that we could have in the present case would be 'non-Brahmanahood' (negation of Brahmana); and this is a negative entity. And just as we have the notion of *Class* with reference to a negative entity like "non-Brahmana," so, in the same manner, we could also have such a notion of *Class* with reference to the 'Class' (when we explain it as the 'negation of non-cows')."

16-17. (In reply to the above objection) some people hold that 'non-Brahmana' is only one word, like the word "*aksha*," applying to (signifying) each of the three castes (Kshatriya, Vaiçya and Çādra). But this explanation could not apply to the case of "non-jar." Because in this case (of *non-jar*) there being endless individuals that are not jar, we are cognisant of the fact of this word "non-jar" being common to (*i.e.*, denoting) all of them. For this reason (some people hold that) the reason for the denotation of the word "non-Brahmana" applying to Kshatriyas, &c., lies in the fact of certain actions and properties belonging to these latter, and not to the Brahmanas.

18. The true explanation however, is that the Class "Manhood," common to all the four castes, is precluded, by means of the negative particle (in the word "non-Brāhmana"), from all Brāhmanas,—and as such, the class "non-Brāhmanahood" (signifying *manhood precluded from Brāhmanas*) is cognised as a positive entity;—just as in the case of the mention of (special) purposes, &c.

16-17 "Like the word *Apoha*, &c.,"—that is to say 'non-Brahmana' is not a *class* consisting of Kshatriyas, Vaiçyas and Çudras. It is only a word that has three denotations, pointing to the Kshatriya, the Vaiçya and the Çādra; being in this like a word that has several meanings. The word 'non-jar' cannot be said to have different significations. For, in that case, this one word would have endless meanings, in as much as it can refer to all things in the world, only excepting the *Jar*.

"Some people, &c."—But the explanation is scarcely correct; because it will not apply to the case of the word 'non-jar.' Because in the case of the word 'non-Brahmana' we are fully cognisant of such *properties*, as Valour, &c., and *Actions*, as fighting, &c., that belong to the Kshatriya, and not to the Brahmana; while we know of no such properties as, not belonging to the jar, belong to all other things in the world.

18 "As in the case of the mention of special purposes &c."—When it is said—"bring a man for carrying a flask of wine,"—the special purpose for which the man is wanted—*viz.* the carrying of the wine—being incompatible with any other caste but the Çādra the word, 'man,' in this case, is taken as signifying *a person belonging to the Çādra class only*. In the same manner, in the case in question, the force of the *negative* in 'non-Brahmana' which takes the place of the special purpose (in the instance cited) serves to disconnect *manhood* from the Brahmanas, and as such signifies *all men that are not Brahmanas*, which refers to all the other three castes equally; and as such can be taken as a positive entity.

19. Though there is no caste in—between (“manhood,” and “Brāhmanahood,” “Kshatriyahood,” &c.), which resides in the three castes (Kshatriya, Vaiçya and Çūdra), yet, through the force of the negative (in “non-Brāhmana”), the class “manhood” is cognised as inhering in the castes (Kshatriya, &c.)

20. Through the diversity of the denotative power of words, we have a diversity in the cognitions with regard to the Castes,—as when in its natural form, the class “manhood” is cognised as residing in four substrates (the Brāhmana, the Kshatriya, the Vaiçya and the Çūdra), and yet, through the preclusion (of Brāhmanas, by means of the negative in non-Brāhmana) it is cognised as residing in only three substrates (Kshatriya, Vaiçya and Çūdra).

21. Just as to the eyes of the eagle and the crow belong the faculties of seeing a thing at a distance and in close proximity respectively; so too, to a single class “manhood” would belong the capability of denoting (a general object) “man,” as also (the more specific object) “non-Brāhmana.”

22. In a case where we have to use a sentence in the form “*manhood*” residing in objects other than Brāhmanas, there we use the word “*abrāhmana*”; and such actually is our cognition also.

23. In the case of “non-jar,” on the other hand, all the cognition we have is that of the class “*earthy substances*” other than the jar.

24. A word (“Brāhmana” f. i.).—being precluded, by means of the negative, from its singular (individual) character (of Brāhmanahood),—comes to reside in only its generic form (“manhood”) devoid only of that (aforesaid individual character).

²¹ This meets the following objection: “The single class ‘manhood’ cannot reside in four and three substrates.” The sense of the reply is that though the organ of perception—the eye,—is the same, and the object—dead body—is the same, yet the eagle sees it from a great distance, while the crow only when it is very close to it.

²² We know of many instances where compounds are used in the place of sentences. In the same manner, the word ‘*abrāhmana*’ could stand for ‘*men other than Brāhmanas*,’ the explanation of this fact being that the negative in ‘*abrāhmana*,’ while denoting directly the preclusion of Brāhmanas, indicates indirectly the class ‘*man*,’ as related to Brāhmanahood. Consequently, to mention the word ‘*abrāhmana*’ is as much as to say ‘*men qualified by the absence of Brāhmanas*.’

²⁴ The word ‘Brāhmana’ directly denotes the single class Brāhmana, and indirectly indicates the classes *Man*, *Living being*, &c. When the negative particle is attached to this word,—in the form ‘*abrāhmana*’—it serves to preclude the individual character of Brāhmanahood alone. And as such, the word cannot but fall back, for its denotation, upon the nearest generic character of *manhood* (which is not negated), which, however, must be free from the singular character of Brāhmanahood, which has been precluded by the negative.

25. When the particular form (Brāhmanahood) has been thus precluded, the word ("non-Brahmana"), standing in need of a Class (which it could denote), is restricted, by the next higher Class, within itself (i.e., within such a Class).

26. Because there is no ground for setting aside the first (Class "manhood" that comes next to the one precluded), therefore what is left behind (as the denotation of the word "non-Brāhmana") is "*manhood*" as apart from "*Brāhmanahood*."

27. The negative having once precluded (the singular character of) "Brāhmanahood," and thus having once become the qualifying adjunct (to the specific character), if some one were to assume the preclusion, by the same negative, of "manhood,"—then it could be so only in an indirect way.

28. Therefore whenever any specific form (Brāhmanahood f.i.) of a Class ("manhood") are negatived, it is this same Class that is naturally cognised, as located in other specific forms (Kshatriya, Vaiçya and Çūdra). And such is the experience of ordinary people.

29. Though the idea (of "manhood") is common (to all the four castes, including Brāhmanas), yet the negation (of Brāhmanas) is accepted as a matter of course. And the meaning thus being accepted as being (that Class) devoid of that (negatived element) alone, we have an idea of the others (Kshatriyas, &c.) also through similarity.

30. Or, in the case of such words as "non-Brāhmana," &c., we may accept *similarity* alone as being the object of denotation. And this is

²⁵ Brāhmanahood being precluded, the denotation rests upon the next higher class 'Man,' and cannot go beyond that, to 'Living being' for instance. For so long as the needs of denotation are supplied by a lower class, it is not right to go beyond it.

²⁷ This anticipates the following objection: "The negative in 'abrāhmana,' while precluding the directly expressed Brāhmanahood, might also preclude the indirectly indicated *manhood*." The sense of the reply is that Brāhmanahood being directly expressed, the negative cannot but qualify it; and when the negative has once served the purpose of qualifying it, it cannot be taken to apply to another entity, which is only indirectly indicated by the word in question.

²⁸ Inasmuch as a Class cannot continue without the Individuals composing it, when one set of Individuals is negatived, the Class must fall back upon other sets of Individuals.

²⁹ Though it is common, yet, inasmuch as the negative particle serves to preclude (and negative) Brāhmanahood, the class 'manhood' must be accepted to reside in the remaining three castes—Kshatriya, Vaiçya and Çūdra. "*Similarity*"—The denotations is that of the Class devoid of Brahmanas; and instead of accepting, by this, an altogether foreign positive entity, it is far more reasonable to accept the Kshatriya, &c., which are similar in character to the caste precluded by the negative; and the cognition of these is far easier than that of any thing else.

³⁰ Inasmuch as people recognise the Kshatriya, &c., by the word 'abrāhmana,' we may accept *similarity* to be signified by the negative particle, the word 'abrāhmana'



based upon a similarity of parts. In fact, it is also in the absence of any such (similarity of parts) that the similarity is perceived.

31. In some cases, even without any similarity, we can have a signification by means of a word accompanied by a negative,—this being due to such causes as proximity, &c.,—as will be explained later on, in connection with the case of the “non-seeing” (of the rising sun).

32. In this case (of ‘non-seeing,’) we require an action other than *seeing*; and we do not recognise any such action other than the formal determination (*Saṅkalpa*), because of the proximity (of this latter, to the injunction “one should not look at the rising sun”).

33. The negative particle, occurring in conjunction with a noun or a verbal root, does not possess the actual negating faculty. For the words “non-Brāhmaṇa” and “non-Virtue” only signify such other *positive* entities as are contrary to these.

34. Even where, in connection with a verb, the negative brings about the cognition of a negation,—there too, the listener recognises only a positive entity, *as indifferent* (or apathetic to the action signified by the Verb).

35. Thus then, all negations (*Apoha*) would rest in positive entities.

being = a caste similar to the *Brāhmaṇa*. This similarity too consists in the similarity of the Individuals composing the *Brāhmaṇa* class with those composing the class *Kṣatriya*, &c. Though there can be no similarity of parts among the various objects that are *not-jar*, yet *similarity* does not always consist solely in that of the *parts*; it often consists of a similarity of *relationship*, *as* has been already shown above, under ‘Analogy.’ And among all the objects that are *not-jar*, we find a common relationship,—in that they are all of the *earth*.

31 This refers to the objection that if similarity were expressed by the negative, then, how could a negative have any meaning in a place where there is no similarity?

32 The negative accompanying the verb ‘to see’ (in the sentence in question) signifies only the negation of *seeing*, and indicates the determination—‘I will not see,’ &c., &c., because this is mentioned in close proximity to the Injunction. And the Injunction too is not a negative, but a positive one, being, as it is, mentioned among the observances laid down for the Religious Student. The meaning of the Injunction thus comes to be this—‘one is to make a formal determination that he will observe the rule of not looking at the rising sun.’

33 This refers to the objection that the negative particle, having the sense of *negating*, how can it have an affirmative meaning? “*Abrāhmaṇa*” = castes other than the *Brāhmaṇa*; and ‘*Adharma*’ = Vice.

34 Even in such instances as ‘*na pibēt*,’ the meaning is that the ‘person addressed is to be free from the action of drinking;’ thus the object signified by ‘*na pibēt*’ is the person himself *as free from the specific action of drinking*—which is distinctly a positive entity.

35 The substrates of all negative ideas having been proved to be positive entities, as qualified by certain limitations,—inasmuch as the Individual, the black or the red

And again, if (all generic ideas) be assumed to rest in negative entities, then, until we reach the final individuals (atoms), we could not get at any positive entity.

36. And as a matter of fact, none of our usage is based upon such final individuals (atoms which are imperceptible); nor is any definite cognition of these (atoms) possible. Consequently, the word "*Apoha*" is only (a subterfuge) to express a void (*Ānyatā*=negation of all existences), in other words.

37. And in accordance with that theory (of *Ānyavāda*), all the ideas of *Horse*, &c., would have to rest in their own specific (sensational) forms. And in that case it would be an useless assumption to state that those ideas signify the negation of (objects) other than themselves (i.e., the *Apoha*).

38. And (the ideas signifying themselves), you would have a *Class*, in the form of a positive entity, in the shape of the *Idea*. And therefore it was an useless effort on your part to have assumed an *Apoha*, as forming the denotation of objects, and yet independent of any external (real and positive) objects.

39. And this *Idea* appears, in the shape of a real entity, with reference to the signification of words. Therefore we must admit of a positive entity—not in the form of the negation of other ideas (*Apoha*)—to form the object signified (by a word, "*Cow*" f.i.)

40. Just, as even in the absence of any external objects, we have a cognition (in a positive form, and not in the form of an *Apoha*) of the meaning of a sentence,—so, in the same manner, we could also have with regard to the word; and why should we assume an *Apoha*?

cow, could not be the substrate of an idea of all cows,—you must admit of a positive entity in the shape of the *class* 'cow.' If all generic notions be held to rest upon negative entities, then, for an idea of positive entities, we would have to go down to individual atoms, which alone are wholly free from a generic character. But as a matter of fact we do not fall back upon atoms in our ordinary usages. Therefore all generic ideas cannot be held to rest upon negatives.

88 It is only for an explanation of the gross forms of things that we postulate the existence of atoms; hence when the gross forms themselves would be negatives—i.e., non-existences—then the atoms could never be cognised. Thus then, it would come to a negation of all existences. The *Apoha* theory thus comes to be only a round-about way of putting forward the *Ānyavāda*, which has already been met before.

87 The *Ānyavādi* holds that inasmuch as there are no entities in the world, all ideas have their own specific forms for their objects.

88 The object of the *Idea* of a *Horse* would be that *Idea* itself—a positive entity; and thus the *Idea* itself would constitute a *class* including all *Horses*.

89 This meets the theory that the above idea is only a negative entity, an *Apoha*. The sense of the reply is that the idea that we have is in the form of a *cow*, which is distinctly a positive entity.



41. In the case of all ideas, we are not cognisant of any rejection of other ideas (*Apoha*). Since the idea ends only in bringing about its own form, therefore it does not bear the burden of any other (ideas).

42. Words signifying different Classes, as also the words signifying different individuals, would all come to be synonymous, if the signification of words were to consist in *Apoha*.

43. *Obj* : " But, since the *Apohas* (of different words) are different, therefore this objection cannot apply. If however, you base your objection upon all *Apohas* considered as constituting a single class '*Apoha*,' then, the same may be said even with regard to your positive entities."

44-45. *Reply* : As for us, our Classes, being positive entities, differ from one another; and, not being mixed up with one another, they never attain to unity. Whereas, for you, how could there be any difference among *Apohas*, being, as they are, devoid of any specifications in the shape of commixture or unity or multiplicity, &c.

46. Or (if you admit of differences as belonging to *Apohas*, then) inasmuch as it would be different (in different individuals), it must be a positive entity—like the specific (idealistic) forms (of Ideas). And if the character of a positive entity be denied to it, then it cannot be many; and as such you are not freed from (the absurdity of) making all words synonymous.

47-48. *Obj* : " Well, we could have a difference among *Apohas* on the ground of difference among the objects negatived by such *Apohas*." *Reply* :

41 We might speak of an *Apoha* as being the denotation of a word, if we were actually cognisant of any such signification in ordinary parlance. As a matter of fact, however, whenever the word 'cow' is uttered, we have no such notion as the rejection of all that is not cow. Hence we cannot admit of any such signification in the form of *Apoha*, which is contrary to all experience.

42 All words signifying *Apoha*, they would be all synonymous.

43 The sense of the objector is that "'cow' is = *Apoha* of non-cow; 'horse' is = *Apoha* of non-horse; and thus the various *Apohas* being different, the words cannot be said to be synonymous. If however, &c.—If even in the face of different individual *Apohas*, you base your objection upon the unity of *Apoha* as a class composed of the various *Apohas*,—then in the case of your positive entities also the significations of all words may be said to rest in a single class '*Vastu*' (Thing); because there can be no doubt as to all objects belonging to that class. And on this ground, we could urge against you, the fact that such being the case, all words would become synonymous."

44-45 Difference is a property that can only belong to positive entities, and not to the negative, which is devoid of all specification.

46 Specific forms of ideas differ from one another, and are, on that very ground accepted to be positive entities (vide '*Gūnyavāda*')

47-48 The objects negatived by the *Apoha* of 'cow' are the horse and other animals, and those negatived by that of 'horse' are the cow, &c. Thus there is a difference among the objects negatived in each case. Any secondary imposition

But there is no natural difference among *Apohas*; and if their difference be sought to be based upon something else (the object negated, *i.e.*), then such difference can only be secondary (imposed upon them from outside, and not belonging by nature to themselves). And for the same reason it is not right to assume a difference (among *Apohas*) on the ground of the diversity of the substrates (of negation).

48-49. Nor on the mere ground of the diversity of relationships, can any difference be accepted even among positive entities;—how then could it be declared with regard to a negative entity (*Apoha*), which is neither definitely cognised, nor related (to anything), nor differentiated (from other things), nor endowed with any definite specific form?

50. For these reasons, just as even when there is a difference among the individuals (cows) no difference is held to belong to their *Apoha*,—so, in the same manner, the *Apoha* cannot be many, even if there be a difference among the objects negated.

51. Then again, if such difference (among *Apohas*) be accepted, then the rejection of non-cow (*i.e.*, the *Apoha* of 'non-cow') would reside in each individual (cow); and such being the case, you could not have an *Apoha* which you wish to be common to all individual cows—the black, red, &c.

52. When even their substrates, that are connected with those *Apohas*, are not able to differentiate them (into distinct *Apohas*), then, to assume that they would be differentiated by the objects negated by them that are altogether extraneous to them! (what a stretch of philosophic insight!)

53-54. In (the signification of) "non-cow" the only element in excess (of the signification of "non-horse") is the *horse*; and again in (the signification of) "non-horse" the only element in excess (of the signification of "non-cow") is the *cow*; and again in (the signification of) "non-cow" the only element in excess (of the signification of "non-horse") is the *horse*; and again in (the signification of) "non-horse" the only element in excess (of the signification of "non-cow") is the *cow*.

cannot affect our arguments. "Substrates of negation." The individual cow, horse, &c.

49 One and the same Devadatta may be in one place one day, and in another place on the next day; and though his relationships will be changing, yet it cannot be held that the Devadatta in the two places is not one and the same. "What then, &c."—How can such an indefinite thing be cognised as different on the mere ground of the difference of relationships? For certainly no relationships with it can be cognised.

50 Though the individual cows differ among themselves, yet you accept a single *Apoha* as embracing them all. Why, then should you hold the *Apoha* of 'Horse' to be different from that of 'cow,' on the mere ground of there being a difference among the sets of objects rejected by the two *Apohas*?

51 Thereby your *Apoha* would lose its generic character; and as such it could not be a substratum of our *Class*. This would be the case if the difference of *Apohas* were based upon the difference among their substrates, and not upon that of the objects rejected.

53-54 "Non-cow" = all that is not cow; *i.e.*, the horse + other animals. In the same manner "non-horse" = all that is not horse; *i.e.*, the cow + all other animals.



tion of "non-horse," the only element in excess (of the signification of 'non-cow') is the *cow*; the rest of the objects negated—the *elephant*, &c., are common to both ("non-cow" and "non-horse"). Thus then there may be a difference (between the significations of "non-cow" and "non-horse") on account of a single point of difference; while on account of many points of non-difference there will be non-difference; and thus inasmuch as the property of an object is based upon that element which exists in the greatest quantity, we must admit of non-difference (among *Apohas*); specially as in the signification of two *Apohas* just mentioned, the element of non-difference is much more than that of difference.

55. The "*cow*," consisting in the negation of the *elephant*, &c., cannot be differentiated from the "*horse*" (which also consists in the negation of the *elephant*, &c.) And hence if the "*cow*" were to negative the "*horse*," then the identity (proved above) would be contradicted.

56. *Obj*: "In all words it is only one object negated (by each) that exceeds (those negated by the others). Hence on the ground of this one uncommon element we would accept the fact of that word negating that one object alone."

57. *Reply*: In that case, the lion and all other animals, being the objects negated by the word "*horse*," and also bearing the negation of '*non-cow*'—which is the ground of the negation by "*horse*"—would come to be named "*cows*."

58-60. If anyone hold that all (animals other than the *cow*) constitute the *Apoha* (of the word "*cow*") then (we ask) in

55 The non-difference among the individual *cows* is based upon the identity of objects rejected by their *Apoha*. Thus, inasmuch as the *elephant*, &c., are rejected by the *Apohas* of '*cow*' and '*horse*,' these latter would belong to the same class; exactly like the individual *cows*. And so the rejection of the *cow* by '*horse*' would be exactly like the rejection of the *one cow* by the *other cow*.

56 In the case of '*horse*' and '*cow*,' the element in the signification of '*non-cow*,' which is different from that of *non-horse*, is the *horse*; exactly as the *cow* is, in that of '*non-horse*,' different from that of '*non cow*'? Thus then, on this ground of difference, the object rejected by "*cow*" must be the *horse* only, and *vice versa*. And thus is established a difference between the objects rejected by '*cow*' and by '*horse*.'

57 If "*non-cow*" = *horse* only, then the *animals* that are rejected by "*horse*" (which is identical with *non-cow*) would bear within themselves the rejection of *non-cow* which is the ground for the rejection by "*horse*"; and thus, being the rejections of "*non-cow*," they would be identical with the *cow*; and in this way, the lion and other animals would come to be called '*cows*'!

58-60 "*And in one, &c.*"—Because in any individual *cow*—a black one, f.i.—we would have *Apohas* of all other *cows* and other animals—an endless number. Specially no *one Apoha* would be possible, such as would embrace all individual *cows*. "*And hence, &c.*"—not content with having an endless number of classes, embracing the individual *cows*, we would come to think that, just as the *horse* belongs to at



what manner can this (*Apoha*) be asserted? If it be held to apply to each individual animal other than the (*cow*), this cannot be; because (1) in that way there would be an endless number of the objects negated, (2) on account of the diversity of the objects negated we would have a diversity of *Apohas* (and not a single *Apoha*) embracing (*all cows*), and (3) in one and a single individual we would have the inherence of many classes. For these reasons you could not have a *single* generic denotation of the cow that would be held to be signified by the word "cow." And hence we would have an idea that these (individual cows) belong to a class other (than the "cow"), just as we have with regard to other classes "Horse," "elephant," &c.

61-62. Nor can the character of being negated belong to the animals (other than the *cow*), taken as one corporate whole; because they cannot be considered as a corporate whole in the absence of any one property (that would be common to them all); nor, as a matter of fact, do they co-exist either in time or place.

62-63. Then again, there is no *whole* apart from (the individuals) themselves. And if it be non-different from (each individual) then we have the same endlessness.

63-64. If it be asserted that "the individual animals are negated (by the word 'cow') in a generic form (of 'non-cow'),"—then they cease to be positive entities. And how could a negative entity be, in that case, negated? Then again, that which is negative can never be positive. And further when a negative is negated, the resultant is always positive.

class other than the *cow*, so also do all the individual cows; because if these latter be held to belong to the class *cow*, we cannot but admit an endless series of classes—one class for each separate individual.

61-62 The character of *being an animal* belongs to all other animals, as well as to the *cow*; consequently that could not be held to be the "property of objects to be rejected by the word 'cow'"; because that property belongs to the *cow* also.

62-63 The number of individuals is endless; and if the *whole* is identical with each individual, then there must be as many *wholes* as there are individuals; because one individual is totally different from the other.

63-64 *Objection*: "All individuals are included in the generic term 'non-cow'; and it is in this form that they are rejected by the word 'cow.'" The sense of the reply is that a negative entity cannot be either the *rejector* or the *rejected*. In a place where we have the rejection of a negative—e.g. "That the jar is not here is *not*"—the result is always an affirmative one—viz., "the jar *is*." In the same manner, the idea of the *cow* also,—if it be held to be only the *Apoha* of a negative entity (viz., 'non-cow' including all the animals other than the *cow*),—would be in the form of 'non-cow,' which is the 'cow,' a positive entity. Thus then you finally have to accept our view of the case.



65-66. (In your theory) there could be no definite cognition of any difference among the individual animals negated,—because there is no diversity of character in a negative entity. If it be asserted that 'their difference would be due to the difference among the *Apoahas* themselves,'—then, you have mutual inter-dependence; the diversity of "non-cow" depending upon the diversity of the *Apoahas* signified by the generic term "cow" (as just asserted), and the diversity of *Apoahas* signified by the generic term "cow" depending upon the diversity of the "non-cow" (which has been said to include all the animals negated by the word "cow,"—see *Kārikā* 47).

67-69. If the horse, &c., were all "non-cows," then they would all become distinct negative entities, with reference to (individual horses) the "Karka," &c., and these (the "Karka," &c.) too would have the same character of negativity, based upon the fact of these too being generic

65-66 All other animals being 'non-cow,' how do you differentiate each individual among them? For, certainly, the negative, *non-cow*, cannot be said to be endowed with diverse forms; and inasmuch as no diversity among the objects rejected can be recognised, your assertion in K. 47 falls to the ground. "If it be asserted," &c. The sense of the objection is that in order to avoid the fact of such words as 'horse,' 'elephant,' &c.—the ideas whereof are rejected by the word 'cow'—being synonymous, we have been obliged to hold (*vide* K. 43) that there are distinct *Apoahas*, for each distinct individual animal, rejected by that word. This leads to mutual inter-dependence, as shown in the text.

67-69 This anticipates the following objection: "Non-cow is not only a negation of cows, but also other animals, the horse, &c.; and as such, there ceases to be any mutual inter-dependence." The sense of the reply embodied in the *Kārikā* is that the term, "Horse" is a generic term, as compared to "Karka," &c. (the names of individual horses); and a generic idea, according to you, is only an *Apoha*, a negative entity. The same is the case with the "elephant," "lion," &c. Consequently, the "horse" too being a generic term, and hence (according to you) a negative entity,—and in the same manner, the elephant, the lion, &c., all being negative entities,—on account of this common negative character, there could not be any difference among the various animals (see K. 65). It might be urged that the difference among the horse, the elephant, &c., could be based upon the difference between individual animals. But then, even the individual Horse, or the Elephant, is a generic entity, with reference to its particular limbs, &c.; and thus being a generic entity, it cannot (in accordance with your theory) escape the negative character. Hence, there could be no difference based upon individuals. This reason could be extended so far down as the atoms. And thus all these having been shown to be generic entities, and hence negative, what would be the object to be rejected by the word "cow." The individual cow also cannot escape the negative character; and it is only the individual cow that has been held to be the substrate of the *Apoha*, which however it cannot be, on account of its negative character. "In ordinary, &c."—all verbal usage is based upon a cognisance of relationships perceived by the senses. The atoms being imperceptible, we can never be cognisant of any relationship of these; and hence no verbal usage could be based on them.

entities in comparison with their specific limbs, &c. Such being the case, what would be the object rejected? And where too, would be the *Apoha*? Because in the case of the individual cows we would (in the same manner) have the same (character of generality and negativity). Therefore, both these characters (of being the object rejected, and that of being the substrate of the *Apoha*) could only belong to the final atoms; but as a matter of fact, in ordinary parlance these (two characters) are not cognised as belonging to these (atoms).

69-70. Between the atoms of the *cow* and those of the *horse*, there is no such difference based upon the difference of *form* or of *class*, or of *position*, or of *modification*. And hence, even in the case of atoms, it cannot be differentiated as to which (atom) is the object rejected, and which the substrate of the *Apoha*.

71-72. No person is able to cognise all individual cows (or horses, &c.), as all equally being the substrates of *Apoha*, so long as any positive similarity among them is not recognised. Nor is any person able to ascertain the objects rejected—horse, elephant, &c.,—unless one single property be cognised as belonging to (all or everyone of) them. And therefore no *Apoha* can be possible.

73-74. Either Inference or Verbal Testimony cannot apply in a case that is devoid of a positive relationship. And without these (Inference and

69.70 The atoms composing all animal bodies are only those of the earth; and these do not differ among themselves. The objects rejected are those of a different class; and the substrates of *Apoha* are all of the same class. As no difference of *class* is cognised among atoms, no differentiation of such character is possible.

71.72 Leaving atoms aside, even in the case of gross individual cows, there can be no differentiation of objects rejected and the substrates of the *Apoha*, so long as a positive generic term is not admitted. For so long as no positive ground of similarity is recognised as belonging to all the individual cows, they cannot be cognised as belonging to the same class; and hence they cannot be regarded as the substrates of the *Apoha* (signified by the word 'cow'). In the same manner, unless a ground of similarity is cognised as belonging to *all cows*, nothing can be recognised as being dissimilar to them. Hence, the horse, the elephant, &c., can never be cognised as being the objects rejected. "And therefore, &c."—because unless there is some ground of similarity among these various objects—a ground not applying to the cow—they can all be regarded as commonly being the objects rejected. And consequently the *Apoha* theory would fall to the ground.

73.74 This anticipates the following objection: "Among the individual cows, we have a common element, in the shape of *Apoha*; and this would form a sufficient ground of similarity." The sense of the reply is that a Class is perceptible by the senses; and hence all the objects, in which we perceive this existence of this class, are cognised as belonging to that class; and those in which this class is not found to exist are cognised as belonging to a different class. Your *Apoha*, on the other hand, is not perceptible by the senses; and as such it could only be cognisable by Inference or Verbal Testimony. Both of these however depend upon the affirmation of a *definite*



Verbal Testimony), the existence of the *Apoha* can not be established; nor can there be (cognised) any positive relationship with the unspecified abstract specific forms (of objects). And since the *Apoha* itself has not yet been established, where could we have perceived any positive relationship (with the *Apoha*)? And further, no positive relationship being recognised, there can be no validity to any Inference or Verbal Testimony that could be brought forward in support of the *Apoha*.

75. Nor, on the mere ground of non-perception (of the contradictory), could there be any conclusion arrived at by means of these two (Inference and Verbal Testimony). Because, since nothing is perceived nothing is left that could be indicated (by Inference and Verbal Testimony).

76. If, then, even in the absence of any grounds of similarity (among individual cows),—there be an assumption of *Apoha*,—why should not the rejection of non-cow apply both to the cow and the horse.

positive relationship. But as a matter of fact, no cognition of any such relation is possible, with regard to the *undefined* specific forms of objects; because these latter are not amenable to any of the recognised means of cognition. And inasmuch as this specific form is the only entity, besides *Apoha*, that you admit of,—when no relationship with such forms is cognised, how can there be any Inference with regard to the *Apoha*? The relationship, necessary for the establishment of the premiss cannot be based upon the *Apoha* itself; because prior to the cognition of the relationship and the subsequent Inference based thereupon, the *Apoha* has no existence. And inasmuch as no positive relationship is cognised, how can there be any validity to the Inference or the Verbal Testimony, that would apply to the *Apoha*? Thus then, the *Apoha* itself, not being established, there can be no notions of homogeneity or heterogeneity, based upon it.

75 This anticipates the following objection: "Inference and Verbal Testimony would establish the fact of negation by means of the *Apoha* (of entities other than that of which the *Apoha* is cognised, *fi.* of the cow), on the sole ground of the non-perception of any premiss contrary to the conclusion, which is also a recognised ground of Inference." The sense of the reply is that when a positive relationship is not perceived, and (according to you) its contrary too is not perceived,—then, in that case, nothing of the relationship being perceived (either in the positive or in the negative form) how could Inference or Verbal Testimony, in such a case, lead to any conclusion? For instance, just as the word 'cow,' not perceived in connection with non-cows (horse, &c.,) signifies a negation of these latter; so in the same manner the same word, having never before been perceived in connection with the cow itself (according to the alleged basis of the Inference of your *Apoha*) could also signify the negation of this also. And thus, signifying the negation of both, the cow and the non-cow, the Word, as well as the Inference based upon a non-perception, would lead to the cognition of nothing!

76 If there is no similarity, the distribution of the characters of the *Apoha* (the object rejected by the *Apoha*) and the *Apoha* must be at random, without any controlling agency. And in that case, both the horse and the cow could be asserted to be the objects rejected by 'non-cow'—a palpable absurdity!



77. Difference from the *black cow* is common both to the *red cow* and the *horse*. And if no generic term (as the class "cow") is accepted, then whereto could the *Apoha* of the cow apply?

78. The *rejection* of *non-cow* is not recognised by means of the senses; and the function of the Word too does not apply to cases other than those (that are perceived by the senses); for on (the basis of) the perception of what could the Word function?

79. For reasons detailed before (in the Chapter on "Negation"), Inference cannot apply to the present case. And for this reason, there can be no cognition of any relationship (of the *Apoha* with any Word).

80. Those people that do not know the meaning of the negative word ("not") can never be cognisant of (any such negative entity as)

77 Though according to our theories, *Apoha* could be the object of *Negation*, which we hold to be a distinct means of right notion—yet in the absence of a positive generic entity, on what grounds could similarity or dissimilarity be ascertained? For, *Apoha* means *mutual negation*; and this would apply to the case of the Red and the Black Cow, just as much as to the case of the Red Cow and the Karka Horse. That is to say, just as the Red Cow differs from the Black Cow, so also does the Karka Horse differ from the Red Cow, specially as you do not admit of any such generic property as belongs in common to the different kinds of cows, and not to the horse. Therefore, just as the rejection of the Karka Horse is common to the Red and the Black Cows, so also is the rejection of the Red Cow common to the horse and the Black Cow. Thus then the Red Cow would be as homogenous to the Black Cow, as it is to the Karka Horse. Consequently, there is no ground for specifying the grounds of any *Apoha* (of the "Cow" &c.) If the mere fact of *rejection* by any one entity be the sole ground of homogeneity, then, inasmuch as this could belong to the most dissimilar and heterogenous substances,—like the Tree, the Lion, &c.,—being, as all these objects are, capable of being rejected by a single word "horse", the Tree, the Lion, &c., would all be regarded to be homogenous!

78 It is only those objects that have been perceived before by the senses that can be mentioned by words; the *Apoha* however is not so perceived; and the only other entity that you admit of is the specific forms (of ideas); but these too are not perceptible by the senses. Under the circumstances on what could you base the use of your words? In fact the upholder of the *Apoha* cannot explain the use of words at all.

79 The only ground of inferring the existence of something that is not perceptible by the senses is the fact that, though it is not perceived now, yet it is present elsewhere, and if it were present it would certainly be perceived. And in this case, the ground of Inference would be *the non-perception of something otherwise perceptible*; and inasmuch as this too is only a negative factor, we would require another Inference for its establishment; and this again would have to be based upon another negation; this negation too upon another Inference; and so on and on, we would have an endless series of negations and Inferences, which would be very far from desirable. "For this reason, &c." Since the *Apoha* is not amenable either to sense-perception or to Inference.

80 The horse, &c., must be regarded to be the objects rejected, only in the form of the "non-cow"; this is a negation; and a negation is not perceptible by the senses.



the "non-cow;" (and yet they may be found to have an idea of the *cow*) hence there can be no (reasonable) denial of a Class (in the form of a positive entity).

81-82. And further how would you get at the fact of any object being denotable by the word "non-cow"? (If it be urged that) "we would understand *that* to be so denotable, in connection with which we would not find the word 'cow' applying, at the time that any relationship with the object so denoted is asserted,"—then (we reply that) if you were (in the above manner) to have, from a single individual (whose relation will have been asserted, on which basis you would get at the denotation of the word "non-cow"), a cognition of all that is different (from that Individual),—then all these latter would be the objects negatived (by the *Apoha* of "cow"); and thereby no denotability would belong to any generic idea.

83-84. It is an established entity, the *cow*, which is negatived (by the *Apoha*; and this *Apoha* is only the negation of the *cow*. Hence (in order to explain this *Apoha* the *cow* should be explained. And if this (*cow*) be said to be the *negation of the non-cow*, then there would be mutual inter-dependence.

84-85. And if you admit of the *cow* as an (independently) established entity, for the sake of having an object for your negation *Apoha*, then the assumption of the *Apoha* would become useless (inasmuch as the idea of *cow* is admitted to be established independently of it). And in the absence of an idea of the *cow* as an established entity, there can be no idea of *non-cow*; and as such how could you explain the idea of the *cow* to be based upon the idea of the *non-cow*?

85-86. Between two negative entities there is no such relationship as that between the container and the contained, &c. Nor is any specific (abstract) positive entity ever cognised as related to *Apoha*.

86-87. How, too, could any relation be assumed to subsist between a negative *Apoha* and a positive entity (the specific forms of ideas)?

and hence it could not but be cognized by means of the word. Then those that do not understand the meaning of the word "non"—f.i., small boys—cannot understand the word "non-cow", and yet they do have a cognition of the meaning of the word "cow." Hence we conclude that the word "cow" must signify a *positive* entity, in the shape of the class "cow."

85-88 The upholders of the Class-theory can assert the denotability of the *individual as qualified by the class* (though this is not what is admitted by us). As for you, on the other hand, you can never be cognisant of the denotability of anything qualified by the *Apoha*. Because one *Apoha* cannot be qualified by another, as both of them being negative, between them, there can be no such relationship as that of the container and the contained, and the like. Nor can it be asserted that the specific forms of ideas may be qualified by the *Apoha*; as no such specific forms are signified by words

86-87 "That which colours, &c."—Since the specific forms of ideas are not cognised,



There can be no qualification to anything (like the specific forms of ideas) which merely exists (and is not signified by the word). Because it is only that which colours the qualified object by its own idea, that can be called a "qualification."

88-89. In fact, no cognition of *Apoha* is produced from the words "horse," &c.; and the cognition of the qualified object cannot be such as is without any idea of the qualification. Nor can a qualification of a certain character bring about an idea of a different character. Hence, when the object has been cognised to be of a certain character, how can a qualification, which is of an opposite character, be said to belong to it?

90-91. If even in face of the opposite character of the object, a qualification (of the opposite character) be asserted to belong to it,—then any qualification would belong to any object (without any restriction). Hence, when the qualification *Apoha* is of a negative character, no positive character can belong to the qualified (specific forms of ideas). Therefore you cannot have, as the denotation of the word, any positive entity qualified by *Apoha*.

92-94. Though Verbal Testimony and Inferential premises cannot properly function towards an idea (or object) which is devoid of (not qualified by) the *Apoha*, yet the cognition of the cogniser (*brought about by a word*) rests upon a positive entity alone. And since no entity in the shape of the specific forms (of objects) appears in our cognition (of the they cannot be affected (coloured) by the *idea* of anything; and as such, they cannot have any qualifications.

88-89 The cognition produced by the word "horse" is of the form of a positive entity, in the shape of a horse; and never in the negative form of an *Apoha*. Consequently apart from any peculiarities of the qualified (specific forms), the *Apoha* itself can never have the properties of a qualification. Inasmuch as the *Apoha* is not cognised as the qualification, there can be no idea of anything qualified by it.

"Non-cow, &c."—Your qualification, *Apoha*, being of a negative character, it can never be cognised as belonging to the idea of a positive entity.

92-94 This anticipates the following Banddha argument: "The only positive entities that we admit of are the undefined specific forms of *ideas*; and these, being amenable to Sense-perception, cannot be treated either by Verbal Testimony or by Inference; hence, as an object denoted by a word, you must accept the aforesaid specific form (which is a positive entity) as qualified by the *Apoha*." The sense of the reply is that, though a word cannot, in accordance with your theory, signify an object unqualified by the *Apoha*, yet, inasmuch as ordinary experience supports the fact of a word signifying a positive entity (without any negative qualifications),—we cannot but accept the truth of such denotation of a positive entity, even without a qualification in the shape of an *Apoha*; because we cannot very rightly deny a fact of common experience. Thus then, it being established that the denotation of a word must be a positive entity, and for the aforesaid reasons, the specific forms of ideas not being capable of being the objects denoted by a word,—we cannot but admit of a generic positive entity—in the form of a positive class—as being the object denoted by a word.



denotation of words),—and again since this (specific form) cannot be the qualified, because it is an unqualified abstract entity,—and, lastly, since it is sheer recklessness to assert something not signified by the word to be the qualified entity;—therefore, we must accept a positive generic entity to be the object cognised and denoted by the word.

95-96. When the character of being the negated object cannot belong to individuals,—because these are not denoted by the Word,—then it is only the generic form (class) that could be the object negated (*Apoha*); and because of the fact of its being negated, it must be admitted to be a positive entity. Because no negative entity can be the object negated, on account of the impossibility of the negation of a negative entity (as such continued negation would give rise to an endless series of negations, as shown in the chapter on Negation).

96-97. In the case of (the cognition of) one *Apoha*, we have a clear perception of another *Apoha*, in the shape of the rejection of some generic positive entity. If the negation of a negative entity were different from the negative entity itself, then it could only be a positive entity; and if it were non-different from it, then we would have (the absurdity of) the cow being the non-cow.

98-99. Though in the case of other words (like “cow,” &c.), we could somehow or other, have positive entities as the objects negated,—yet, in the case of the word “entity” (*sat*), the object negated by it cannot be other than “non-entity” itself; and then (if you were to hold that objects negated must be positive entities), to non-entity would belong a positive character—an absurd contingency surely! And further, without the ascertainment of the non-entity, we could not have any idea of entity; and the non-entity (being only a negation of entity) cannot be cognised (without the cognition of entity) (and this would involve a most undesirable mutual interdependence).

100. Nor can either the difference or the positive character of the

95-96 Individuals cannot be the objects of denotation by Words; because that would give rise to an endlessness of denotations, the number of individuals being endless.

96-97 In the case of the *Apoha*—in the form of the negation of non-cow—we have the rejection of a positive generic entity—in the shape of the class ‘horse,’ or ‘elephant,’ &c.; and thus all the objects rejected by an *Apoha* would come to be positive generic entities. If, however, the object rejected be asserted to be of a negative character, then its contradictory—i.e., the class ‘cow’ as rejecting the ‘non-cow’—could only be a positive generic entity; otherwise, if the negation of a negative entity be said to be non-different from it, then we would have ‘cow’ = ‘non-cow,’—a palpable absurdity.

100 The Bauddhas declare that though the denotation of a Word is always cognised in a positive form, yet inasmuch as learned men are incapable of recognising any positive ground of similarity among objects, different from one another, the

objects negatived be explained on the ground of the diversity of *Vāsanās*. Because there can be no *Vāsanā* with regard to a negative entity.

101. And further, excepting remembrance, to no other action can the function (or force) of *Vāsanā* apply. Therefore the *Vāsanā* cannot, with regard to an object endowed with a certain definite character (negative or positive), produce a cognition of another sort (or character).

102. And for you, the difference of Words (from the objects denoted by them) cannot be based upon the *Vāsanā*; because the specific (abstract) forms of Words cannot have any denotability, inasmuch as these (specific forms) are never actually cognised.

103. And on account of the *diversity* of these (momentarily changing specific abstract forms of Words), these forms cannot bring about the idea of a *single Vāsanā* (which could be the means of getting at an idea of any generic entity). Nor do you accept any such single positive generic entity, as "Word," that could bring about the said (*single*) *Vāsanā*.

104. Thus then a generic entity, in the form of the *Apoha* of another word (i.e., the *Apoha* of 'non-cow'), being accepted (as the denotation of the Word "cow"),—inasmuch as this too is in the form of a negative entity (the *rejection or negation* of "non-cow")—we cannot admit of any difference among the objects denoted (by the Word "cow").

105. And just as there would be no difference between two expressive Words, so, in the same manner, there would be none between the expressive (word) and the expressed (meaning). And it has already been proved above that there can be no such difference based upon the difference among the objects negatived.

denotations of words cannot but be admitted to rest in the negatives of their contradictions; and that though this is of a negative character, yet it is cognised as positive, on account of eternal *Vāsanās* that help to bring about such cognition. This is denied in the *Kārikā* on the ground that a *Vāsanā* is produced only by perceptions; and as Perceptions belong to positive entities alone, no *Vāsanā* can belong to a negative entity.

101 The only use of the *Vāsanā* lies in its being the means of *remembering* or *recalling* the objects perceived in the past. "It cannot, &c."—with regard to a positive entity, it can never produce a notion that it is negative, as held by the *Bauddha*.

102 *Difference* is a property of positive entities; and inasmuch as the only positive entity that you admit of is the undefined specific forms of words (as you admit of no other specific forms save those of the ideas of objects)—and as these undefined forms can never be cognised as bearing any relationship (because no relationship can be cognised in connection with undefined entities),—the Word cannot but cease to have any denotability; and hence you cannot base the difference between Words and the objects denoted by them, upon *Vāsanās*.

103 Just as no difference is possible among the *denoting* Words, so too there would be none among the *denoted* objects.



106-107. The *Apoha* of a Word, so long as it is not comprehended, cannot in any way signify anything. As a matter of fact, it is not perceived, to be so capable, by the sense-organs; nor are there any inferential premises or authoritative assertions (asserting any such capability), that could lead to the comprehension of that *Apoha*. If we were to assume any such inferential premises, &c., then we should urge that, in that case, we would have no resting ground, in the absence of any foundation based upon sense-perception.

108. The characters of being the *expressed* and the *expressive* cannot belong to the two *Apohas* (of the Meaning and the Word respectively),—because according to your theory these (*Apohas*) are non-entities,—just as (no such character can belong) to “hare’s horns” and “sky-flowers.”

109. If you were to urge that—the aforesaid premiss (“because they are non-entities”) is faulty, inasmuch as we have the inference of the *absence* of rain from the *absence* of clouds (when both these absences are non-entities),—then (we reply that) according to us negations too are only positive entities, (see above); in fact, the task of explaining the validity of this inference also rests upon you (who hold *negation* to be a non-entity).

110. One, who does not admit an object in the shape of a word to have a positive character, cannot possibly admit of any negation thereof; inasmuch as negation is always preceded by affirmation (that is to say, it is only the positive character of an object that is negated by its negation).

111. As a matter of fact, even the negation of a negative entity, which is expressed by a double negative, can pertain only to a positive entity,—and not to a negative entity, because there can be no conception of this latter (which is devoid of any substratum).

112-113. “Well, then, by the same argument (we conclude that), the *Apoha* does not differ from a positive entity; and thus the aforesaid

106-107 “No resting place”—because for the accomplishment of this premiss, we would require another premiss; and so on and on, *ad infinitum*.

110 Thus then, Negation depending upon the positive character of things,—and this latter, according to you, being only the denial of the negation,—you strike yourself against the immutable rock of mutual interdependence.

111 Like the *Apoha* of an object, the *Apoha* of the Word too, being devoid of a real substratum, can never be conceived of; and the specific forms of these, being only in the abstract, can never be realised in conception. Consequently we cannot but admit of a positive generic entity. As for example, even the use of a double negative—‘This is *not non-cow*’—can pertain only to a positive entity, the *cow*. c.f. above: ‘*apohyamānē cābhāvē bhāva ēvāvaśishyatē*.’

112-113 The sense of the *objection* is this: “One *Apoha* does not differ from another, because both are non-entities; in the same manner, no *Apoha* would differ from a

objections cannot affect it." True, but that would only lead you to my position. And, as a matter of fact, you can have no loophole for escape (except accepting my position).

113-114. (Then the question is) have we an idea of positivity with regard to an object which is in reality negative,—or that we have negative notions belonging to an object which is in reality positive? But in the case of an object of negative character, any idea of positivity would be totally groundless; whereas in the case of a positive entity, even negative conceptions are quite possible, in view of another entity.

115-117. Again, if to all objects we attribute the character of being denoted by the *Apoha*,—then, in the case of such expressions, as "the blue lotus," which have mixed denotations, we could not have the relationship of the qualification (*blue*) and the qualified (*lotus*), and also that of co-extensiveness (of the property *blue* with the object *lotus*). Because the *negation of non-blue* is not always followed by the *absence of non-lotus*, nor *vice-versâ*; therefore they could not be cognised as the qualification and the qualified.

117-118. Nor could these relationships belong to the words ('blue' and 'lotus') themselves, independently of their denotations; because there can be no co-extensiveness between the two *Apohas* (of the words), inasmuch as these (*Apohas*) are entirely different from each other.

positive entity; because this latter too is in reality, only a non-entity. The positive entities however differ among themselves, through their abstract specific properties, and upon this difference, we could base the difference among the various *Apohas*: and thus we sail clear of the absurdity of making all words synonymous (as urged above)." The sense of the reply is that if you once admit that Negation being a property of the entity, cannot absolutely differ from it,—you come to accept a positive generic entity. Because barring this acceptance, you can have no means of asserting any difference among the various *Apohas*; as the specific properties, that you speak of, cannot afford the requisite means; inasmuch as they can never, by themselves, be conceived of. Then the only point at dispute, between you and me, is what we show below.

118-119. The only point of difference between the upholders of *Apoha* and ourselves now, is, that, while, admitting, like ourselves, the final conception to be of a positive character, they hold the real character of the object to be negative; while we hold this also to be positive; and even the negative conceptions that we have, we refer back to the primary positive character of the objects. The sense of the latter half of the *Karika* is that the notion of positivity with regard to a negative entity cannot but be regarded as a mistake; but a mistake we can never have unless there is some ground for it. And as we have shown that there is no such ground, this alternative cannot be tenable. On the other hand, in the case of a positive entity—the cow f.i.—we can always have a negative conception, that of its *not being something else*,—the horse f.i., For these reasons, we cannot but admit of a positive generic entity in the shape of the class 'cow,' &c., &c.

117-118 "Entirely different, &c."—The *Apoha* of 'Blue' is different from that of 'lotus'; and as such they can never co-exist.



118-119. If such co-extensiveness be held to belong to the denotations of the words ('Blue' and 'Lotus'),—then, we ask—in what manner can they be *contained* in any one substratum (in order to be co-extensive)? We know that an abstract specific entity is never cognised; and any entity besides this you do not admit of. Then, as for the uncognised co-extensiveness of the words (as based upon the abstract specific character of their denotations),—of what use can this (uncognised fact) be?

120. If it be held that what is denoted by one word (f.i., "cow") is *an object qualified by the negation (Apoha) of other objects*,—then too, the pervasion (i.e., denotation) by the word becomes weak (or impossible), on account of the dependence of this (denotation, upon something else).

121-122. Just as in a piece of sugar, the *sweetness* not denoting the *whiteness*—on account of the difference in the negations of these—, there is no notion (produced by the expression 'sweet-white'), and (hence) there is no relation of qualification and the qualified (between the two); so, in the same manner (in the expression 'San-ghatah') the meaning (of 'San' according to you) being the *negation of non-existence (non-San)*, the word ('San') would not touch that part of the denotation which consists in the *negation of non-ghata*.

123. If it be urged that there could be such relation (between the

118-119 A negative entity can never be the *contained*. Co-retentiveness can belong to two words, only when both of them signify the same object, either directly or indirectly. This is not possible, in your case; while in my case, as we hold the Class ('Lotus') to be identical with the *property* ('Blue'),—though the word 'Blue' signifies the property 'Blue' and the word 'Lotus' signifies the Class of Lotuses,—yet, inasmuch as both of these co-exist in the individual Lotus before us, there can be no discrepancy in our theory.

120 If the word by itself were to denote an object, then, in the case of the expression 'San-ghatah' the object signified by the word 'San' would be precisely the same as that signified by the word 'Ghatah'; and in this case, it is only right that there should be a co-extensiveness. On the other hand, if, as you hold, the denotation of a word consisted in the negation of other objects—upon which negation the denotation would be totally dependent,—then, the word 'San' would signify an object *qualified by the negation of non-San*; and this would certainly be totally distinct from the *negation of non-Ghata*. Similarly, the word 'Ghata' would signify the *negation of non-Ghata*, which would be totally distinct from the *negation of non-San*. And thus, the denotations of the words being totally distinct, there could be no co-extensiveness between them.

121-122 In the case of the expression 'tikto madhurah,' even when it has some meaning, this can only be in reference to the sugar-piece itself; and the only reason of this non-signification lies in the fact that the one word 'tikta,' according to you, denotes only the *negation of non-bitter*, and the word 'madhura' the *negation of non-sweet*; and these two denotations being totally distinct from each other, there could be no co-extensiveness between them. So also, in the case of the expression 'San-ghatah.'

123 If it be urged that the denotation of the word 'San' lies in the *object qualified*



denotations of 'San' and 'ghatah'), in the form of objects (signified by each of these),—then (we say, that) such relation could only be based on the class "entity" (*sattā*); and certainly no one denies that the objects belonging to the class "Jar" are included in this class ("entity").

124. Such an implication, of the word by the class ("entity"), cannot be denied on the ground of that class being a positive entity. Because with regard to the recognition (of the meaning) the action (of the word, in signifying that meaning) is the same, whether the class 'entity' be a positive or a negative entity.

125-126. The form of positive objects (in the case of 'San ghatah', though impartite, is yet expressed by words, only in parts. Because the cognition of the word 'San' alone does not lead to the cognition of the jar. Therefore (in your case also) you have the fault of "non-signification" (of the San by the word 'San') and you have also (equally with us, the fault of "secondariness.")

126-127. Since it is the qualifying adjunct, therefore the *Apoha*, like the class, must be the primary element (of the denotation); and hence (just as you have urged against the Class theory) there can be no denotation of an object as qualified by that *Apoha*,—because such an object would be only secondary (and as such cannot form an object of denotation). If you urge

by the negation of non-San, and that as such, this would also touch the negation of non-ghata,—then, we would reply that this assertion would be a tacit admission of the Class theory; because an object qualified, &c. &c., must be a positive entity; and in that case the necessary co-extensiveness becomes quite possible.

124. That the class 'entity' is a positive entity cannot be a ground for denying its signification of objects qualified by *existence*; because whether the object denoted by the word 'San' be positive or negative, so long as it denotes an object, an implication by it, of the *ghata*, cannot be denied.

125, 126. This *Kārikā* anticipates the following objection: "In the Class theory, the object denoted (by 'San' f.i.) being always positive and concrete, cannot but be partite; and hence even if one part of it is cognised, the other parts remain uncognised; whereas on the *Apoha* theory, the object denoted being negative and abstract, the mere negation of non-San would lead to the cognition of the impartite whole, all at once; and hence the functioning of words, according to the two theories, cannot be held to be similar." The sense of the reply is that even if you hold the object denoted by 'San-ghatah' to be impartite, you must admit the word 'San' to denote one part while the word 'ghata' denotes another part; and it is only subsequently that the two join together and produce a joint effect, in the shape of the denotation of a single object. And even in this case, you are open, like ourselves, to the fault of 'San' not signifying the *ghata*. Then again, you have urged against us the objection that the class being the primary denotation, that of the individual becomes only secondary. But both of us are equally open to this objection, as shown below.

126, 127. We hold the object to be qualified by (belonging to) the class; and you hold it to be qualified by *Apoha*; the result is the same.

that *Apoha*, being a negative entity, cannot be the primary element,—then (we say that), in that case, it could not be a qualified adjunct either (and hence the object denoted by '*San*' could not be one that is *qualified* by the *Apoha* of '*non-San*;' and this would mean the total giving up of your ground).

128. The object qualified by your *Apoha* could only consist of different individuals; and you have yourself explained that these (individuals) cannot be the objects of denotation, because of endlessness and contradiction. And certainly, you do not admit of any *single object qualified by Apoha* (that could embrace the individuals in one corporate whole, like our "*Olass*."')

129-130. There can be no such thing as "*Apohavattwa*" intervening between the *Apoha* and the individuals (contained in it). Even if you were to assume some such intervening entity, we would ask,—Is this a positive or a negative entity? If it be positive, then it is the same as "*class*"; and if it is negative, then all the aforesaid objections (urged against the denotation of the *Apoha* alone) would apply to it.

130-131. Or again, if this (intervening entity) be assumed to consist of the relation (subsisting between the *Apoha* and its substrate); then (we reply that) the denotability of such a relation cannot be desirable to you (since you have urged many arguments against such denotability.) Nor is there any such single object, as would serve as the substrate of *Apoha*, and as such, exist in another object. And for this reason too, no generic entity is the object of denotation; nor lastly, can it be the qualification.

129 The Apohists have urged against the Class-theory the objection that individuals can never be the objects of denotation, because that would give rise to endless denotations on the one hand, and many overlapping and self-contradictory denotations on the other. The same objection is shown to apply to the *Apoha* theory also. In fact, the upholders of the Class theory escape the anomalies by postulating the *Class*, which forms for them the true denotation of the word, and which, as occasion presents itself, is cognised as qualifying distinct individuals. This loophole for escape is not available for the *Apohist*; because if he admits of such a corporate whole, embracing all individuals, he would only admit the Class theory.

130.131 "*You have urged, &c.*"—The Bauddha has argued that if the denotation of a word consisted in the relationship between the *Class* and the *Individual*, then there would be no co-extensiveness. This same argument may be applied to the denotability of the relationship between the *Apoha* and its substrate. "*Nor is there any such single object, &c.*"—If you accept any such single object as the *jar* to be the substrate of *Apoha*,—then, this object could not exist in any other object; and hence such a word could not denote a generic entity.

"*Too*"—i.e., it is not only on account of the want of the co-extensiveness of such a single object with any other object, that the said generic character is impossible, but it is also impossible for the following reason: Even if you hold to the theory of the denotability of the substrate of *Apoha*,—inasmuch as, in that case, there is no single word that would include all such substrates,—no generic character could belong to it. It

132. The *Apoha* of 'Asan' does not indicate the particular *Apohas* (of the non-jar, &c.), while these latter do not inhere in the former; consequently, the *Apoha* of 'Asan' cannot be qualified by those (*Apohas*), in the same manner as "Blue" is (qualified) by the successive higher degrees of its shades.

133. On account of its doubtfulness we cannot have even an indirect implication (of the *Apohas* of non-jar, &c.), as we have that of the object (fire) by means of its characteristic (smoke). Because the *Apoha* (of *Asan*) in its general form is not such as cannot be accomplished without those (*Apohas* of non-jar, &c.)

134. In the same manner, there could be no implication of the object (the substrate of *Apoha*) by means of the *Apoha*. Because the *Apoha* (that the Baudha holds) would apply also to the "hare's horns" (and certainly in this case, the *Apoha* could not be said to indicate a real object; inasmuch as there is no such thing as *aḡaḡavishānavyāvṛtta*).

135. And further, no gender or number, &c., could possibly belong to an *Apoha* (a pure negation). Nor could there be any relationship through the individuals (said to constitute the *Apoha*),—because these (individuals) are not (according to you) denoted by the word (which you restrict to the denotation of the *Apoha*).

136. Nor can the individual be said to be implied by the *Apoha*, because (you hold) the individual to be a specific abstract entity. And that which is not understood as thus implied (or indicated) cannot be the object of any such specification (as that by gender, &c.)

is for this reason that when any one object is spoken of as qualified by 'existence,' the same word cannot be applied to any other object; and hence even such a word as 'Sattā' can not serve as the qualification.

137 Just as the class 'sat' does not indicate the class 'jar,' which latter does not exist in it, and hence the former is not qualified or specified it,—so the same would be the case with the *Apoha* of 'Asat.'

138 "Is not such, &c."—Without fire there could be no smoke. There is no such relationship between the *Apoha* of *Asat* and the *Apohas* of non-jar, &c. The *Apoha* of *Asat* could belong to the *Apoha* of the jar also. So all that we can say is that the *Apoha* of *Asat* would raise a doubt with regard to the *Apoha* of non-jar, &c.

139 If the word be held to denote the substrate of *Apoha*, then we would have the absurdity of the indication of another *Apoha*, as shown above. If on the other hand, it will be held to denote the *Apoha* only, then, there can be no indication of the real objective substrate of the *Apoha*. Because the *Apoha* being a negative quantity,—and as such being applicable to such absurdities as the 'hare's horns,'—cannot be taken to be necessarily indicative of a real object.

140 In the Class theory, though the word denotes the Class, yet this latter implies the individuals, to which apply all such specifications as those of Number, &c. But this is possible only when we accept the individual to be a definite concrete entity; but you hold to be an undefined specific abstract entity; and as such, according to you no specification can belong to it.



137. Then again, the *Apohas* of gender, number, &c., cannot by themselves be the objects of specification; and as for the objects themselves, how can they be cognised, by means of words, to be the objects to be specified (inasmuch as you hold the objects to be indefinite and abstract and as such not denotable by words)?

138. And further, as a matter of fact, without (the particular means of right notion which we have termed) "Negation," there can be no notion of any negativity. And as for the objects "cow," &c., we do not find them to be in any way amenable to the said means of Negation.

139. And again, in the case of verbs, we are not cognisant of the *negation of something else* (the necessary factor in an *Apoha*); because in this case there is no object of negation in the shape of any *exception* (or prohibition), &c.

140. Even the double negative 'na-na' (that he cooks *not* is *not*) only serves to deny the negation (of the action of cooking); the verb 'cooks,' on the other hand, by itself stands on its own unnegated (positive) form.

141-142. And further, the specification of verbs as *unfinished* ('present') and 'past,' &c., would become groundless; inasmuch as the *Apoha* (a negation) is always a finite and complete entity (and as such, can never be either *unfinished* (i.e., present) or *past*, &c. And in the case of an injunction and other similar cases (invitation, &c.), we are not cognisant of any *negation of other things*.

142-145. And again (1) of what form would be the negation (*Apoha*) of a negative connected by another negative (*na-na*)? (2) And then too, in the case of (conjunctions like) 'and' (*cha*), &c., where there is no negative element, there can be no negation (*Apoha*). (3) The meaning of a sentence cannot be said to consist in the *negation* (*Apoha*) of *something else*. (4) In the case of such words as '*ananyāpoha*' (the negation of something that is not different), we cannot conceive of any meaning. (5) And, lastly, where could we find the objects to be negated by such words as "nameable," "knowable," &c. (which are universal, and as such do not leave anything untouched that could be negated by themselves)? If you were to assume a new object to serve as the object of negation by these words ('nameable,' &c.),—(we say) it would be far more reasonable to accept a positive (generic) entity (which would form the denotation of such and other words).

145-146. Since it has been proved (in the chapter on *Çūnyavāda*)

139 The expression '*na pacati*' simply means the *absence of the action of cooking*, and not the *prohibition* of the action.

140 The latter '*na*' serves to negative the former '*na*' and the *verb* by itself in its own pristine positive form remains free from negation.

141 It is only an external object that can be either denoted or negated.

that the denotation of a word does not consist of a mere *Idea* (or cognition),—therefore denotability cannot belong to any factor within (the mind of man); nor can (such an internal factor) be the object of negation. Therefore *Apoha* cannot apply to these internal factors (Ideas, &c.) And again of such words as 'ēvam,' 'iti' and the like we can conceive of no *Apohya* (object to be negated).

147. If you were to assume the *Apohas* of particular individuals, on the ground of one particular being the contradictory of another,—then you would have the notion of such contradiction based upon *Apohas*, and that of *Apohas* upon the contradiction (mutual interdependence).

148. Even the specifying specification of the same Class is not in a positive form. The fact is that the word "*Çiṇṇapā*" (a kind of tree) particularises the generic term "Tree," only after it has negated the "*Palāpa*," &c. (as being *not-Çiṇṇapā*).

149-150. Even the non-negation (*Anapoha*) of the Class, &c., cannot be postulated, on the ground of their non-contradictory character. Because

Hence it cannot be urged that the object negated by the verb 'cooks' is the *idea* of *non-cooking*. Since this idea is not an external object, the argument must fall a victim to the reasonings brought forward in the chapters on *Çūnyavāda* and *Nirālambanavāda*.

147 The particular tree of the mango will have such trees as the *Banyan*, &c., for the object of its *Apoha*; and so on. "*Mutual*, &c.,—because there can be no notion of difference, unless we have a notion of the thing itself; and this latter notion cannot but be based, according to you, upon *Apoha*; and this *Apoha* you now base upon a difference among the particular individuals.

148 This refers to the objection that the contradiction among individuals is due, not to the *Apoha*, but to the fact of each of the individuals belonging to the same class. The sense of the reply is that inasmuch as the *Apohists* do not admit of a positive class, they cannot base the contradiction of the individuals upon any such Class. "*Their specification*, &c."—It is true that the contradiction lies in the fact of their belonging to the same class; but this specification too is always preceded by the *Apoha*. Because the word '*Çiṇṇapā*' has no positive signification, in the shape of any particular tree, therefore it is not in this positive form that it can be said to specify the tree. As a matter of fact, the word '*Çiṇṇapā*' in the first instance, according to you, negatives all *that is not Çiṇṇapā*, and then withdraws the name 'tree' from the '*Palāpa*,' &c., and restricts it within itself; and thus at last, it is the *Apoha* that is the sole basis of the contradiction. Such a negative signification also gives rise to another absurdity: '*Çiṇṇapā*' being taken to negative all *that is not Çiṇṇapā*, may be accepted as negating the 'tree' also; because the tree also is *not-Çiṇṇapā*.

149-150 This refers to the view that, a particular term '*Çiṇṇapā*' does not negative the general term 'tree'; because there is no contradiction between these. The sense of the reply is that the *Apohists* have no means of ascertaining such a non-contradiction, so long as they do not admit of a positive class to which the different kinds of individuals could belong. Because so far as the words themselves are concerned, apart from the objects that they might denote, we cannot be cognisant of either the contradiction or the non-contradiction of these. And secondly, as for the objects that the words may signify, the *Apohist* cannot base his idea of the contradiction on these; because he does



the contradictory or the non-contradictory character does not belong to the verbal forms of words (independently of their significations); nor can this (contradiction, &c.), depend upon the forms of objects (to be denoted by the word); because (according to the Apohist) the objects have no relation with words. And as for the *Apohas* themselves, we can never recognise the contradictory character, &c., of these, before the word has already functioned (to its fullest extent).

151. As for the Word itself, it functions only with regard to such an object as is not amenable to another (means of right notion); and as such, in what form can it be said to belong to any generic class?

152. If it be said that the cognition of the *negation of the contradictory* (*anyāpoha*) could be based upon the specific forms of the words themselves,—then, there being a difference between the words “*Vrksha*” and “*taru*” (in form, though both denote a tree), how could you deny the negation of the one by the other?

153. As a matter of fact, without a touch of (the action of) words, the *Apoha* cannot be cognised, even by means of inferential premises.

not admit of any definite concrete object being denoted by a word. The only alternative then left to him is that of the Contradiction, &c., being referred to the *Apohas* signified by the words. But even this will not hold. Because inasmuch as these *Apohas* are not recognized before the word has already functioned, we can never have any notion of the contradiction, &c., of these *Apohas*. And it is for the comprehension of the full signification of the word that the Apohist has had recourse to the determination of the contradictory character, &c. And thus there is an inevitable mutual interdependence.

151 The sense of the *Kārikā* is that we have no means of ascertaining the fact that the particular term ‘*Ḡiṇṇapā*’ is not contradictory to the general term ‘Tree. Because no such cognition is possible, until we have become cognisant of the relation borne by the word in question to a certain *Apoha*. That is to say, it is only when the *Apoha*, i.e., the denotation of the word—has been comprehended, that we can attribute any character to it. And so long as the form of the *Apoha* is not cognised,—how can it be known that this *Apoha* is generic and that specified. Nor have we any other means at our command, save the word, for acquiring any idea of the *Apoha*. Hence in this also, the Apohist cannot be free from the aforesaid mutual interdependence.

153 This anticipates the theory that—“prior to the functioning of the word, we could ascertain the form of its *Apoha*, its generic or specific character, and the contradiction, &c., of these,—by means of Inference; and then we could have ideas of the co-extensiveness, &c., of the word and its signification, &c.” The sense of the *Kārikā* is that an inferential premises can have for its subject only such a thing as has been already cognised to have certain relations with certain other things; and consequently, so long as the *Apoha* has not been ascertained, we cannot be cognisant of any relationships borne by it; and as such how could there be any inferential premises dealing with such an uncognised *Apoha*? That is to say, until we have understood what the word and its *Apoha* mean, how can we make any inferences with regard to them?

Nor can these premises ascertain the contradictory or the non-contradictory character of these *Apohas*.

154-155. We have already refuted the theory that the negation (or contradiction) of one (i.e., *Palāṇa*) by the other (the word "*Çinçapā*") is based upon the fact of the former being never seen to be expressed by the latter. And (if negation were based upon the mere fact of one word not being used to express a certain object) then, since the generic term ("tree") is not held to be expressive of the individuals (*Palāṇa*, *Çinçapā*, &c.), therefore a negation in this case (of the individual trees by the generic term "tree"—an absurdity) would be inevitable. And as for a word being applied to an object, somehow or other,—we have the application of the word "*kshatriya*" with reference to a *Brāhmaṇa* (endowed with warlike propensities); and in that case we would have no negation (of the *Brāhmaṇa* by the word "*kshatriya*").

156. Non-negation, based on the fact of the one being in need of another, is equally applicable to the case of the verb and the noun; and thus there would assuredly be non-negation of the verb "stands," by the noun "the tree" (an absurdity).

157. And again (in the case of "*Rājnah puruṣah*") if "*Rājnah*"

154-155 "We have already refuted"—under the *Kārikā* '*sarvatraiva hyaḍṣhtatwāt pratyayo nāvaçishyate*.' The sense of the refutation is that so long as the word is not fully comprehended in all its bearings and relations, and then used,—it is never found to express anything; and as such the word '*Çinçapā*' would negative not only the '*Palāṇa*' but everything else, even the *Çinçapā* tree itself.

155 "Somehow or other."—Though we find the general term applied to particular individuals, yet such application can be based only upon indirect indication, and not upon direct denotation. For the word 'tree' cannot be said to directly denote the *Çinçapā*. And if we were to attach much importance to such indirect indications, we would have a difficulty in the case of the word '*Kshatriya*' when figuratively applied to a *Brahmāṇa*, who is endowed with the qualities of the warrior. For this single instance of the figurative use of the word would annul the sole condition of negation (by a word)—the only such condition, according to you, being '*aḍṣhtatwa*,' the fact of the word never being used with reference to the object; and so the word '*Kshatriya*' would never negative or preclude the *Brahmāṇa*. And as for direct denotation even the general term does not directly denote the individual.

156 This refers to the theory that inasmuch as the general term 'tree' stands in need of every one of the individual trees, it must be taken to be related to every one of them, none of which could be negated by it. The sense of the *Kārikā* is that if the mere fact of being in need be sufficient ground for non-negation, then we would be met by the absurdity pointed out in the second half of the *Kārikā*, where it is shown that the verb 'to stand' needs a *place*, and the *place* 'tree' requires a verb; and hence on account of this mutual need, the word 'tree' would not negative the verb 'stands,' and the two words would become synonymous.

157 In both cases you are faced by an absurdity.



were to negative "*purushah*," then, this latter could not be qualified by the former. On the other hand, if it were not to negative it, then there would be an identity, as in the case of "blue lotus."

158-159. It is asserted (by the Apohists) that in the case of the series of words—"tree," "earth," "substance," "entity," and "knowable" (where the one following is more extensive than the preceding), taken first in one, and then in the reverse order,—if we were to accept a positive denotation, we would have the (absurdity of) every word denoting all the above five objects. But this assertion is not correct; because as a matter of fact, all words are not found to be applicable to all cases.

159-160. (If a word be held to denote all the various parts or shades of an object simply because of) the location (of all these parts) in a single substrate, then, we would also have the functioning of the eye towards taste, &c., also (simply because these reside in the same substrate, a fruit, as the colour). And just as the cognisability of the different objects (colour, &c.), is restricted to each separate sense organ, the eye, &c., so, in the case of words too, we have the applicability of each word restricted to definite classes of objects; and so there can be no such admixture (of denotations as urged above).

161. When the word (f.i. "tree") has ceased to function (after having denoted its specific object *tree*),—the denotability of "entity," &c., is possible, but only through concomitance and non-concomitance, as leading respectively to deficiency and excessiveness.

153-159 The sense of the objection is this: "If we were to accept the positive denotation of words, then, inasmuch as all objects are complete wholes, the words must denote the whole objects; and in the case of the five words cited, a *tree* has got the character denoted by each of the four following words; and hence it is that the tree is always recognised as having a five-fold character; and consequently all the five will have to be accepted to be constituent parts of the tree. And then inasmuch as the object *tree* is an indivisible whole, and it is as such that it is denoted by the word 'tree,' all the aforesaid parts of the tree must be held to be identical. The word 'knowable' too, while denoting *knowability* would denote the tree and the other four of the aforesaid, but in the reverse order. But as a matter of fact, we find that this latter process is not so sure as the former, and hence is not equally probable; and in order to avoid this absurdity, we must deny the fact of words denoting positive objects." The sense of the reply is that all objects are not necessarily indivisible; and hence it is quite possible for a word to denote one portion of it, while other parts are denoted by other words. And thus, there can be no identity among the denotations of the words cited. That the object is not indivisible has been shown above.

161 The word 'tree' cannot properly be taken to signify the *earth*, &c., directly. The functioning of a word ceases as soon as it has served to denote the *tree* alone. After that it may indirectly indicate the higher genus of the *earth*, on account of the class 'tree' being included in the class 'Earth.' But in this case, the indication of *Earth* will be deficient in one point, having been dragged from the higher to the lower

162. In fact, the objection you have urged would apply only to you, who hold general words to apply to specific objects. Specially as (in your theory) there is no difference between the objects (the specific entities) and the factor denoted by words.

163. And again one—who (like the Apohist) would attribute to negative entities, like the *Apoha*, such properties as *singleness*, *eternality* and *pervasion over each separate individual*,—could also admit of a piece of cloth without any yarns.

164. For these reasons, it must be admitted that we can have the *negation of something else* only in the case of such words as have a negative particle attached to them. In the case of words other than these, it is only the positive form of the object that can be denoted.

165. Some people (the *Naiyāyikas*) argue that the denotation (of a word) has not the character of *negating things other than itself*,—because it is a means of right notion,—like the senses of touch, &c. But this argument is rendered doubtful with regard to those words to which negative particles are attached.

genus. So too, the same word 'tree' may be taken to indicate a particular tree—the *Palāca*, f.i.—, on account of this latter being included in the class 'tree'; and this indication will be a step higher, as in this case the lower is raised to the place of the higher. For these reasons, the word must, strictly speaking, be taken as having its denotation confined to a particular object only.

166 The *Apohist* holds that the general term 'tree' denotes only an abstract specific entity, which cannot but be held to be indivisible; and as such there could be no distinct factors in the object denoted; and hence it is only the Apohist that can be a victim to the objections urged in the *Kārikā Vṛkshatvapārthivadravya*, &c. "Because, &c." This meets the following objections: "The Bauddha does not hold the words to rest with the specific entities, because this would land him in *endlessness*, &c.; what he actually holds to be the objects of words are the *negations* that have their distinct forms definitely individualised, either by the individualities of the objects negated, or by those of their attendant *Vāsanās*; and as these are different from one another, the above objection cannot apply to the Bauddha theory." The sense of the reply is that according to the *Apohist*, there is no difference between the objects (*specific entities*) and the factors denoted by the word (*viz. Negations*). For if he were to admit of a Negation that would include various specific entities, then that would amount to an admission of the *Class*; and we have already refuted the theory that there can be any difference among the objects negated based upon the difference of *Vāsanā*, &c.

168 The *Apohist* is constrained to attribute the said properties (that belong to a positive class) to his *Apoha*; otherwise he falls into the ditch of *endlessness*, &c. And it is simply absurd to attribute positive properties to negative entities.

164 "Non-cow" = negation of the cow; and not that "Cow" = *negation of non-cow*

165 Up to the last *Kārikā*, the refutation of the *Apoha*-theory has been based upon ordinary experience. The *Naiyāyika* seeks to refute it by means of an inferential argument—propounded in the present *Kārikā*. This argument however is fallacious; because negative words are means of right cognition, and yet they have negative denotations.

166. And if all (words—positive and negative) are made the subjects of the conclusion, then the argument becomes doubtful (not universal and hence uncertain) with a view to negative arguments; and it also becomes opposed to certain facts accepted by all persons.

167. If your conclusion,—that “the word does not negative, &c.,” refer to the agency of the word (in negating),—or, if it refer to the fact of words denoting negation alone,—then it would only be proving what is already an accepted fact (and as such becomes redundant).

168. If the conclusion mean that ‘a word does not in any way apply to an object which is the negation of its contradictory,’—then that would go against a formerly accepted view: for certainly, in the cow we have a negation of the horse, &c. (which are contradictory to, i.e., something other than, the cow).

169. The instance (that you have cited in your syllogism, that of the sense-organs) is such as is entirely at variance the conclusion. Because the eye, &c. (the sense-organs) do, as a matter of fact, apply to objects that are the negation of something else, though they do not comprehend this (negative aspect of the thing).

170. If, again, the conclusion be taken to mean that ‘the idea (or cognition that we have from a word) is not coloured by any taint of the negation of other things,’—then too, the argument becomes redundant; because though the denotation of a word is actually in the form of a negation, yet it is ordinarily known (by means of *Vāsanā*) as being a positive object.

171-172. Again, if the conclusion be taken to deny the fact of the *Apoha* being the means of the application of the word (to its denotation),—

168 If the conclusion also included negative words,—i.e., if it be asserted that even negative words have no negative denotations,—then the argument becomes doubtful; because as a matter of fact, even the *Naiyāyika* admits of negative premises and arguments, which prove the conclusion only by negating the contrary of the conclusion; and certainly, this goes against the universality of the assertion that no negative words have negative denotations. And further, all ordinary people are cognisant of the negative denotations of negative words; and hence the argument in question also goes against a popularly-accepted notion.

167 What does your conclusion mean? Does it mean that the word is never a means of negating? If so then, it is redundant; because the *Banddha* does not hold the word to be such a means; all that he holds is that the word is expressive of negation. Secondly, if your conclusion mean that words cannot denote negation only,—then too it becomes redundant; because the *Apohist* does not hold words to have for their denotation negation pure and simple, by itself; though it is true that he resolves the denotations of all words into the negative form of the *Apoha*,—yet he always bases this upon a palpable entity.

171-172 “Removal of a doubt”—with regard to a pole, there is a doubt—‘is this a

then, this too would go against a formerly accepted theory : inasmuch as you do admit of negation (*Vyatirēka*) being a means (of denotation). In the case of Inference too, you have the same thing (inasmuch as the negation of the contrary of the major term is also accepted as a means of getting at the middle term and the premises); and so the very basis of your argument (*i.e.*, the middle term) becomes doubtful. And lastly, your argument is doubtful and inaccurate, when viewed as against a perceptible idea that we obtain on the removal of a doubt.

173. And further, your argument would also be contradictory; inasmuch as a word resembling in action the sense-organs, Ear, &c.,—such words as “Self,” “Mind,” “Ākāṣa,”—would cease to signify their meanings (because none of these objects are perceptible to the sense-organs).

174. Then again, “the application of a word to a positive object cannot but be through Negation,—because the word is the means of inferential reasoning,—like negative premises.”

175. And again;—“the word cannot denote the *Class*, or an Individual as qualified by the Class,—because it is a means of right notion,—like the senses of touch, hearing, &c.”

176. It was in view of such counter-arguments being available for the Apohist, and on finding that by means of (inferential) arguments we cannot arrive at any definite determination of what does, and what does not, constitute the denotation (of words),—that we have treated of the question above wholly in accordance with Usage.

Thus ends the Apohavāda.

post or a human body standing’? When we go near it, the doubt disappears, and we have the idea—‘this is a pole, *not a man*’—which is thus found to partake fully of a negative element.

173 If in the matter of the denotations of words, we were to depend wholly upon inferential arguments, without having anything to do with *usage*,—then inasmuch as the self, &c., are not amenable to the senses, or to inference either, the very same argument that you have urged above may be utilised in proving that the word “self” does not signify what it is accepted to signify—*i.e.*, it does not signify *Ātmā*,—because it is a means of right notion,—like the ear, eye, &c. You cannot bring forward any argument in support of the fact of the word “self” signifying *Ātmā*, unless you have recourse to *usage*. For this reason, you must base all your arguments against *Apoha*, upon usage, and not upon any inferential reasonings.

174 Against the Naiyāyika’s inferential argument, the *Apohist* pits another inferential reasoning. And without having a recourse to usage, there is no escape from the dilemma.

175 This embodies another counter-argument.

176 Therefore the *Naiyāyika* was wrong in calling in the aid of Inference, for demolishing the structure of *Apoha*.



SECTION 15.

THE VANA-VĀDA.

1. *Objection*: "How is it that it is asserted (in the *Bhāṣhya*) that the *Ākṛti* (Class) is qualified by the *dewlap*, &c., when, as a matter of fact, "gotwa" (an *Ākṛti*), which is related to that (individual cow) which is endowed with the parts (*dewlap*, &c.), does not reside in these parts themselves?"

2-3. *Reply*: These parts are related to the class 'Cow,' only through their relationship with a certain individual (cow) endowed with these parts. Hence, inasmuch as these are peculiar to that particular Class "Cow," they may be taken as specifying that class.

In the individual (cow) there is an inherence of many classes, such as "entity," &c.; and the "dewlap," &c., assuredly serve to specify (or distinguish) the class 'cow' from those other classes.

4. The *dewlap*, &c., are not the manifesters of the class 'cow'; nor are they qualifications (of it), like properties (*gunas*). For if it were so, then there would be no cognition of the class 'cow,' until these (*dewlap*, &c.), had been recognised.

5. (If the manifestation of one class 'cow' were to depend upon other classes "dewlap, &c.," then) we would have to assume the cognition (manifestation) of these latter themselves by means of other manifesters; thus there could be no resting place from such assumptions; and consequently there would be no definite cognition of the class 'cow.'

1 This refers to the following *Bhāṣhya* passage '*atha gaurityasya kō'rthah? sāś-nādiviṣṭā ākṛitiriti*.' The sense of the objection in the *Kārikā* is that it is the individual cow that is endowed with the *dewlap*, &c., and hence the class 'cow' should never be spoken of as qualified by these.

2-3 By the declaration that the *dewlap*, &c., qualify the class 'cow,' it is not meant that the relationship between these and the class is that of qualification proper, as in the case of *blue* and *lotus*; but that the parts mentioned—the *dewlap*, &c.—serve to specify the class "cow" and differentiate it from other classes. And this specification is based upon mere relationship in general. And inasmuch as the *dewlap*, &c., are related to the class 'cow,' through their direct connection with the individual cows—even in the absence of an inherent relation (as in the case of *blue* and *lotus*),—it would not be unreasonable to accept them as specifying or characterising the class "cow"; just as the ear-ring, though not bearing an inherent relationship to the wearer, serves to distinguish her from other persons, not wearing it. And though many other properties—such as 'existence' and the like—inhere in the individual, yet inasmuch as these properties are common to individuals of many other classes, they cannot be accepted as specifying the cow; which can be specified only by the *dewlap*, &c., which exist in no other animals.

4 They are not the manifesters of the "cow"—as the smoke is of the Fire. Because even before the existence of these has been duly ascertained, with regard to a particular individual, this is recognised as a cow, i.e., belonging to the class "cow."

6. And further, if the dewlap, &c., were the manifesters of the class 'cow' then) we could have an idea of 'cow' only when we would have cognised all of those (*viz.*, dewlap, hoofs, horns, &c.) But, as a matter of fact, a simultaneous cognition of all of these is never possible.

7. Therefore it must be admitted that just as the parts (making up the individual cow), by the mere fact of their existence, bring about the idea of *extension* in regard to that individual,—so would they also (bring about the ideas) of the *class* (to which the individual may belong) and the properties attaching to it, &c., &c.

8. *Question*: "If so, then how is it that we have no idea of the *class* (cow) in a place where these (constituent parts the dewlap, &c.), are not at all cognised (*i.e.*, where these do not exist)" ? *Answer*: The very simple reason for this (non-recognition of the Class) lies in the fact that the cognisable object (Class or Individual) does not exist in any other place than the one occupied by its constituent parts.

9-10. The truth is that when the Class "Cow" has been recognised, there appears a cognition, of the dewlap, &c., as occupying the same point in space (as the "Cow"),—this latter cognition being due to the inseparability (of the cognition of the 'Cow' from that of the dewlap, &c.) Or, on account of the absence of any absolute difference (between the dewlap, &c., and the individual cow, and also between the individual cow and the *class* "Cow"), the Class may be said to be qualified by the dewlap, &c.

10-11. It is with a view to reject an inferential reasoning of the adversary that it is added (in the *Bhāṣya*) "being perceptible to the

6 "Never possible"—and hence no cognition of the cow would be possible!

7 Our idea of the *extension* of an object is due to the fact of the mere existence of its parts. That is to say, we believe it to be *extended*, simply because of the existence of its parts; and it is not necessary for us to have a distinct cognition of each individual part, before having an idea of extension. For if it were so, we could find no resting ground, until we reached the Atom; *i.e.*, in the case of every object, we would have to be cognisant of its Atom,—a palpable absurdity! In the same manner, the mere fact of the existence of the dewlap, &c., is sufficient to give us an idea of the *class* "cow"; and it is not necessary for us to have a distinct recognition of every one of its distinguishing features, in the shape of the dewlap, the horns, the hoofs, and the like.

8 The sense of the reply is that our *Class* is not omnipresent, like that of the *Naiyāyika*; and we do not admit of its existence in any place, save the one where the individuals as characterised by the Dewlap, &c., exist. Therefore the non-cognition of the class is due to mere Negation,—in the shape of the *absence* of the said constituent features, and not to the non-cognition of these features.

9-10 As a matter of fact, it has been shown that it cannot be the qualification; but it can be accepted to be so, on the ground that there is no very great difference among the three.

10-11 Having put the question—"Is the *Ākṛti* capable of being the subject of a syllogism" ?—the *Bhāṣya* replies—*na pratyakṣā sati sādhyā bhavitumarhati*. (Being



senses, it cannot, &c." And the argument employed by the adversary is this: "The Class is nothing apart from the Individual,—because in the absence of the cognition of these (individuals) there is no idea of that (i.e., Class),—just as is the case with a *series*, a *crowd*, a *forest*, &c. (where no idea is possible without an idea of individuals constituting these)."

12. We ourselves do not stand in need of the statement of any arguments (supporting our theory); because it is known, and accepted by, all men. And against our opponents trying to negative our theory, we can bring forward the fact of their theory contradicting universally-accepted ideas.

13. *Objection*: "But in case the Class were perceptible by the senses, there could be no difference of opinion (with regard to its existence)."

Reply: The very fact of there being such a difference with regard to the means of right notion themselves, whence could argumentative people (like you) agree as to these (fundamental bases of all cognition)?

14. And even with regard to "colour, &c."—objects that are accepted to be perceptible to the senses—these (worthies) have an objection! And, as a matter of fact, no sane person objects to the existence of the *Class*.

15. We find various usages based upon class—notions,—e.g., the case of offering *curd*, *takra*, &c., to the *Brāhmanas* and the *Kaundinyas* (respectively).

16. By the word "*Ākṛti*" here (in the *Bhāṣhya*) is meant *Class*, and not the *shape*. Because in the case of Air, Fire, Sound, &c., we are not perceptible to the senses it cannot be the subject of a syllogism). The sense of this is that our adversaries seek to prove, by inferences, that there is no such thing as *Class*; but all such reasonings are set aside once for all, by the fact of the *Class* being perceived, by the senses, to be something distinct from the Individuals; and as such no amount of inferential arguments can shake our theory.

12 We do not require any inferential arguments, either for strengthening our own position, or for assailing that of the opponent. In both cases we take our stand wholly upon Popular Usage.

13 The objection is clear. The sense of the reply is that even with regard to such things as the means of right cognition, we have an endless divergence of opinions,—specially with regard to the forms and the source of such means. Consequently, if the mere fact of there being difference of opinions were considered sufficient ground for denying the existence of an object, how could the Bauddha establish his own two means of cognition—viz., Sense-perception and Inference.

14 Colour, &c., are perceptible by the senses; and yet the Bauddha denies their existence, and resolves the whole external world into mere *Idea*; and hence he cannot reasonably deny the perceptibility of an object, on the sole ground of there being a difference of opinion with regard to it.

15 The injunction is in the form—"give curd to the *Brāhmanas*, but *Takra* to the *Kaundinya*." Here, unless we accept the word "*Brāhmana*" to denote the general class *Brāhmana* (which includes the *Kaundinya*)—we could not justify the exception, with regard to *Kaundinya*.

cognisant of any *shape* (though we are cognisant of the *class* 'Air,' 'Fire,' &c.)

17. And further, with each individual, we are cognisant of a distinct *shape* (and thus we would have an *endless* series of shapes, and no idea of *commonality*). And if the commonality were to consist in the conjunction of the constituent parties, then it would be destroyed on a disruption of these (particles).

18. If it be urged that we could have "*shape*" itself as (a *class*) common (to all shapes, thus avoiding endlessness and explaining the idea of commonality),—then (we reply that) this (*class* "*shape*") would be equally common to the Horse, the Cow, &c. And, as a matter of fact, we are not cognisant of any such *class* as the "*shape*," apart from what is popularly known as the *class* "*Cow*."

19. And further, though we recognise a sameness of *shape* in all similar objects (f.i. the *gavaya*), yet we never have any idea of the *class* "*Cow*" with regard to these. Therefore it must be admitted that the *Class* is something entirely different from the *Shape*.

20. In the mention of the *Rucaka*, &c., the Bhāshya has exemplified the *classes* "*Rucaka*," and the rest. (But this is done with a view to show that) in all these different (*shapes* of gold) we recognise a common *class* "*Gold*."

21-23. When the *Vardhamānaka* being broken up, a *Rucaka* is made (out of the same gold), then the person who desires to have the former

17 "And if, &c."—*Shape* is nothing more than a conglomeration of certain particles; and conglomeration as a whole is bound to disappear, whenever there is the slightest disjunction of the particles. Consequently any commonality based upon this conglomeration could never be anything permanent.

18 The Cow, as well as the Horse, has *shape*; and hence if all the notion of commonality that we have, with regard to all individual cows (taken together), were to consist in the mere fact of their *having shape*; then inasmuch as this *commonality* would belong to the Horse also, it would also come to be called "*Cow*." As a matter of fact, even the notion of the commonality "*shapedness*" (covering all individual cows) is not possible without an idea of the *class* "*Cow*."

20 This refers to the Bhāshya: "*Rucakāḥ swastiko vardhamānaka iti hi pratyakṣam ārcyate*." This passage is explained with a view to prove the fact of *Class* being perceptible by the senses. ['*Rucaka*,' &c., being the names of different kinds of golden ornaments]. If the *Class* were not something different from the *shape*, then, how could we have any such common name as "*Gold*," applying to objects of such diverse shapes as the *Rucaka*, &c.

21-23 In this process of the breaking up of one ornament, and the making of another out of the same gold, the indifference evinced by one who wants mere *gold*, would be possible only if he could perceive a certain character persisting in the gold, independently of its three states—of destruction of one *shape*, the continuance as a mass, and the remaking of it into another *shape*. And the only common character that can be



becomes sorry, while one desiring the latter ornament likes the process, while a third person who only desires gold remains indifferent, unaffected. Therefore the object (gold) must be admitted to have a threefold character. Because unless the object partook of *production*, *continuance* and *destruction*, there could not be (with regard to it) the three notions (of like, dislike and indifference). There can be no sorrow (or dislike) without destruction (of the object desired); and there can be no pleasure without production (or appearance of the object desired); and lastly, there can be no indifference without continuance or permanence (of the desired object). For these reasons there must be a permanence of the *Class*.

24. In the case of a heap of *Mudga*, *Seasamum*, &c., too, where we are not cognisant of any difference in shape among the individual grains, we have an idea of a single commonality (belonging to all the grains, of *Seasamum*, f.i.), which is distinctly amenable to Sense-perception, &c.

25. In the case of a person seen at a distance, we have (in our minds) a doubt as to his belonging to the *Brahmana*-class, &c.; and this would not be possible if the *Class* were not perceptible to the senses.

26-29. The specification of the *Class* is brought about by certain agencies, in the shape of the peculiarities of colour, &c., and those of Time, Place, &c. (For instance) *Gold* is assuredly distinguished from *Copper* by its *colour*; *Boiled butter* is distinguished from *Oil* by its *odour* and *taste*; *Fire* covered over by *ash* is distinguished by its *touch*; the *Horse* at a distance is distinguished (from other animals) by its

found to persist thus is the *commonality* "*Gold*," and as such we cannot but admit the class "*gold*" to be eternal. "*Therefore the object must be admitted*," &c. Because we come across these three feelings, therefore we must accept the object *gold* to have a threefold character. "*Permanence of the Class*"—It is only because we have an object in the form of the *gold*, that we perceive it to continue during all the three states, through which the mass of metal has passed during the above process. And because it continues thus, in all the three states, therefore the *Class* must be admitted to be something permanent and everlasting.

25 This fact shows—(1) that the *Class* ("*Brāhmana*," f.i.) is something other than the individual, because even though the individual person is perceived *definitely*, yet there is a doubt as to the *class* to which he belongs; (2) and also that the class is amenable to Sense-perception; inasmuch as we find that when the person has come near us, we have a definite idea of the *Class* to which he belongs.

26-29 This anticipates the following objection: "If the *Class* is perceptible by the senses, how is it that we do not recognise *Brāhmanahood* by means of the eye, as quickly as we do the fact of the object before us being an *individual man*?" The sense of the reply is that the *Class* depends, for its due specification, upon certain agencies, in the shape of certain peculiarities of *Colour*, *Time*, *Place*, &c. "*And sometimes, &c.*"—In a place where man's conduct is rightly regulated, there are certain actions that are performed by the *Brāhmana* alone. This would serve to distinguish the *Brāhmana* from the other castes.



neighing; the Jar, &c., are distinguished (from one another) by their *shape*; the (castes) 'Brahmana,' &c., are distinguished by their *origin* (birth and parentage of the individual), and sometimes also by actions (where they happen to be) properly regulated by the King (of the realm).

30-31. The fact of the *Class* inhering in each individual being thus perceived (by the senses), it cannot be said to be contradictory (*i.e.*, unreasonable). And even though such is the case (*i.e.*, though it inheres in every individual), it cannot be held to be many, because (with regard to the *Class*) the idea we have is that of *single* (commonality). Nor can the singleness of the form (of *Class*) be set aside by a difference among the individuals to which the *Class* happens to be related (by inherence). And the absence of *omnipresence*, as also that of *parts*, is to be proved in the same manner as (they are proved) with regard to sound.

32. Just as a single individual, even when met with at different times (and in different places), is recognised to be the same,—so, in the same manner, would also the *Class*, though inhering in different (individual) substrates (be yet recognised to be *one*).

33. The question—whether the *Class* belongs to the individual *in its entirety*, or *in parts*,—is not proper with reference to the *Class*. Because apart from the individuals themselves, there can be no idea either of *entirety* or of *parts* (with regard to the *Class*, which, by itself, is impartite).

34. Therefore (it must be admitted that) we are cognisant of the mere fact that the *Class* inheres in the individuals. And there being no occasion for any further questions, the above fact (of the *Class* inhering in the individuals) rests within itself (*i.e.*, we take our stand upon this well-ascertained fact).

35-36. The *contact in parts*, which we perceive in the case of the gar-

30-31 This refers to the following objection: "Does the *Class* belong to each of the individuals, in its entirety,—or does it pervade through all of them, like a thread passing through all the beads of a necklace? The former alternative cannot hold; because a single object cannot reside *in its entirety*, in more than one place; and as for the second alternative, how can there be a recognition of anything pervading over all individuals, of the past, the present, and the future? Consequently no idea of the class is possible." The sense of the reply is that the *Class* inheres in its entirety in every individual; and as for the possibility of such inherence, in as much as we actually perceive it to be so, its reality cannot be gainsaid. Nor is it altogether unreasonable; as it is quite possible for a single object to be similarly related to a number of objects; "*Omnipresence, &c.*"—A *Class* is such as is not limited in space; and not that it exists everywhere. The fact of Sound being without parts has been proved under 'Sphota'; and that of its being not omnipresent will be explained in the chapter on 'Qubda' later on.

35-36 The thread, through its parts, is in contact with every one of the beads,—one



land and the thread (on which the garland is strung), and the *contact in entirety*, which we perceive between animals and their properties, and between the voice and its properties,—all these are due to the partite character (of the thread) and the non-extensive (limited) character of the properties respectively. And inasmuch as both these characters are wanting in the *Class*, we can have none of the aforesaid contacts with reference to it.

37. There is no hard and fast rule restricting the methods of relation to two only. Because the three methods (explained in K. 20 *et seq*), just as the two just mentioned, are also possible, on account of their being perceived by the senses (as described above).

38. If it be urged that “the threefold relation perceived with regard to the Class is not perceived anywhere else (and hence no such relation can exist),”—(we reply that) in that case, the same would be the case with the garland, &c.; because there is no equality (or similarity) between those two (the relation of the string with the beads and that of the property with the animal), nor is there any (equality) of these with the relation borne by the Class to the individuals.

39. For, the heat of fire does not cease to exist, on the mere ground of its not being perceived elsewhere. Nor is the relation borne by the Class to the individual got at by means of Inference, so as to stand in need of a corroborative instance.

40. Thus then, a relation (the one borne by the *Class*), which, in its proper form, is perceived by the sense, cannot possibly be rejected on the ground of the form of other relations,—specially when we are not cognisant of any (such) peculiarity in the former (as would place it in a position of weakness in comparison to the latter).

41. And again, it is not proper to reject a principal element (in the shape of the Class and its methods of relationship), on the mere ground

part of the thread being in contact with one bead, and so on. And the properties of *whiteness*, &c., of the animal, reside in it, in their entirety. The reason for the former fact lies in the fact of the thread having so many parts; and that of the latter lies in the fact of the properties not being omnipresent. The *Class* on the other hand, is omnipresent; inasmuch as it belongs to *all* individuals of the past, the present and the future; and as it is so perceived, it cannot be said to inhere *in its entirety* in each individual.

39 Because a certain property is not perceived anywhere, save in a single substrate,—that cannot be a reason for denying its existence altogether. For instance, *Warmth* is found in fire only; and certainly its existence cannot be denied. “*Inference*.”—It has been shown above that the relation borne by the Class is perceived by the Senses.

41 By laying stress upon the twofoldness of relationships you seek to prove the absence of the Class. But as a matter of fact, this method is subservient to the Indi-