



of the inapplicability of an element which is even subordinate to its subordinate. Because (in so rejecting the Class on the ground of the said inapplicability) you would be rejecting a fact of Sense-perception on the ground of Inference (an absurdity).

42. Therefore it is proper to reject only that element which is found to be wholly incompatible. But this cannot lead to the rejection of something else which is quite compatible with actual facts.

43. Thus then (the cognition of *Class* being due to Sense-perception), the Class, all-pervading as it is described to be by the Vaiçeshikas, is recognised only in that place where it happens to be manifested by the individual; just as a letter (though omnipresent, is cognised only when manifested by particular utterances).

44. Therefore (it must be admitted that) the idea of 'cow,' with regard to the individual cows, is based upon the *single class* "Cow,"—because in the idea of all of these there is a tinge of the *cow*; and because the idea of all these (individuals) is of one and the same form,—just as the idea of a single individual cow.

45. The idea of the 'cow' is not due to the "black cow,"—nor is it based upon any other (particular cow);—because that idea of *cow* is particular, which, in its turn, is subordinate to the Class. Hence the fact of the inapplicability of the two methods of relationship (accepted by you) cannot lead to the rejection of the Class. "*Because, &c.*"—The Class and its methods of relationship are all matters of Sense-perception; whereas the fact of the absence of any relationship on the ground of the inapplicability of the two methods, is got at by means of Inference.

46 What is impossible is only the applicability of the two methods of relationship to the case of the Class. Therefore we must reject this applicability. But this does not necessitate a rejection of the Class itself.

47 Though omnipresent, the Class—'Cow' f.i.—is not perceived everywhere; because that which manifests it—the Individual Cow—exists only in certain places.

48 Having proved the existence of the Class, as based upon Sense-perception, the author proceeds to cite certain syllogistic arguments. The minor term of the syllogism is the fact of the idea of one Individual being like those of other Individuals; the Major term is the fact of this Idea being due to a *single class* ("Cow"). And the reasons are :—(1) Because the ideas of all these are tinged by the form of the "Cow"; and (2) because the ideas of all individual Cows are of one and the same form. *Example*:—That Idea which is tinged by the shape of the Cow, is always of one and the same form, and as such, must be based upon a single entity—e.g., the Idea of an individual Cow.

49 The Idea of Cow is not brought about by a particular Cow—the black one f.i.; because the said Idea is present where the *blackness* is absent,—e.g., in the case of other kinds of cows. Just as the notion of "Earth" cannot be said to be due to the notion of the Jar. The Kārikā mentions two conclusions that follow from the same premises; The first is what has been explained and the second is expressed in the sentence—"*Nor is it based, &c.*"



sible also in a place where there is absence of that particular cow,—just as the idea of “earth” with regard to the jar.

46. The idea of ‘cow’ has for its object something (*i.e.*, the *class* “cow”) that inheres in every one of the individuals,—because with regard to every individual (cow) there is an idea of the “cow,” which is complete in itself,—just as the idea of every single individual cow (taken one by one).

47. Though inhering in each one of the individuals, the *Class* is *one*,—because (with regard to it, there is a single idea of the *class* “Cow”),—just as in the case of negative expressions (like “non-Brāhmaṇa,” &c.), there is negation of the Brāhmaṇa, &c.

48. The idea of the “cow” is not based upon similarity (among the individual cows),—because, being valid (*i.e.*, correct) it is brought about by identity,—just as the recognition of a certain individual object (as being the *same* that was seen before).

49. And certainly, it cannot be argued that with regard to the *class* “Cow” any such *single idea* (as serves to embrace all the individuals in a single notion) is false. Because in this (recognition of a single idea) there is no discrepancy in the means (by which we recognise the single

46 The idea of the Individual Cow resides in its entirety in that Individual; and as such is held to have for its object, the objective ‘Cow.’ In the same manner, the notion of “Cow” has for its object something that is commonly inherent among all individual cows; and this can only be the *Class* “Cow.”

47 That with regard to which there is a single idea must be one; even if inhering in many individuals. For instance, the negative word “Non-Brāhmaṇa” applies in its entirety to many individuals—*viz.* : the Kshatriya, the Vaiçya, &c.; and yet the *negation of Brāhmaṇhood* must be accepted to be one only; and this because, with regard to all cases of the *absence of Brāhmaṇhood* we have a single Idea,—that of *non-Brāhmaṇhood*. Consequently, even the multiplicity of substrates does not lead to any multiplicity of the Idea itself. So also in the case of *Class*; though it inheres in every one of the Individuals constituting it, it must be accepted to be one, and *one only*.

48 The idea of the Cow is based upon a recognition of the fact of the *Class* “cow” inhering in one Individual being identically the same as that which is found to inhere in another Individual Cow. And such an Idea could not be based upon similarity, which differs with every two Individuals. In fact, just as a certain Individual—Rāma, *f.i.*,—having been once seen, comes to be recognised again, as being the same person; so in the same manner, in the case of the *Class* “cow,” when we have once recognised it as inhering in the *Black Cow*, if we happen to see subsequently a *Red Cow*, we at once conclude that the *Class* inhering in this latter is exactly the same as that which inhered in the *Black Cow*. And so on, we come to have a general Idea of the *Class* “Cow,” *apart from the Individual Cows*.

49 An Idea that has once been cognised can be rejected as false, only—(1) if at some future time we come across a certain flaw in the means by which we got at the Idea; or (2) if subsequently stronger convictions to the contrary present themselves, so strongly as to contradict, and, by its superior validity, set aside, the former Idea. In the

idea); nor is there any stronger conviction, to the contrary, that would reject it.

50. *Obj.*: "In a place, where the fact of the Class being something other (than the Individual) has been proved on the ground of the cognisability of the Class apart from the Individual,—the instances of the 'forest,' &c., are brought forward, in order to show the non-absolute (i.e., doubtful) character of the argument;—and as such how can irrelevancy be urged against this (citing of 'forest,' &c.)?"

51. If we were to bring forward the fact (of the perception of Class apart from the individuals) as an argument to prove (our position), then it would be quite proper to urge the non-universality (of our premises). But as a matter of fact, we bring forward (the aforesaid fact of Sense-perception) only as an objection (against those who deny the existence of the Class altogether); and (it is with regard to the citing of 'forest,' &c., against this objection, which is not an argument, that) "irrelevancy" has been mentioned (in the *Bhāṣya*).

case of the idea of the Class "Cow" however, we have none of these two contingencies; and hence the idea cannot be rejected as false.

50 Says the *Bhāṣya*: "*asatyapyarthāntarā evanjātiyakā bhavati pratyayah, pañktirñ-
tham vanāmīti yathā iti cēt asambaddham vacanam, &c., &c.*" And the objector in the *Kārikā* shows that the citing of the instance of the Forest, &c., is not "asambaddha," inasmuch as it strikes at the very universality of the premiss brought forward by the *Bhāṣya* to prove the fact of Class being something different from the Individual. Because the Forest is also recognised as something different from each Individual Tree in it, and yet as a matter of fact the Forest is nothing apart from these trees; therefore the mere fact of the Class being recognised apart from the Individuals constituting it is not enough reason for holding the Class to be something different from the Individuals.

51 The fact of the Class being something different from the Individual is perceived by the senses; and as such, for proving this we stand in need of no arguments. The fact is that the adversary having denied the existence of the Class apart from the Individuals, we present before him the fact of the Class being actually perceived by the senses to be something different from its constituent Individuals. And as this is no inferential reasoning that we bring forward, it is not right that you should seek to set it aside by citing an argument, based upon the instance of the forest. Specially as Sense-perception depends, for its validity, only upon a correct functioning of the senses, and not upon any non-contradiction, &c. Consequently to bring forward a solitary instance of the Forest—even granting the validity of your reasoning with regard to this,—would never serve to invalidate a fact of direct Sense-perception. All that your instance can do is to show that such is not the fact in every case. But any such exceptional instance cannot affect any particular case of the Class which is directly perceived by the senses, and as such, can never be set aside, except when we cognise, by means of the senses, the fact that the class is not perceived apart from the Individuals. And so long as this is not cognised, no amount of instances can shake the validity of a fact founded upon direct Sense-perception.



52. By this (mention of the fact of the Class being perceived to be apart from the individuals) we only meant to show that the arguments, brought forward to prove the non-existence (of *Class* apart from the Individuals), is contradicted by a fact of direct Sense-perception. The argument brought forward by the adversary (with a view to prove the said non-existence of the *Class*, &c.), has already been shown above (in Kārikā 11).

53. Nor can the falsity of the above fact of Sense-perception be urged on the mere ground of the falsity of a like perception with regard to the forest. Because the falsity of one (Sense-perception) cannot lead to the falsity of all (facts of Sense-perception). And hence the citing of 'forest,' &c., cannot but be declared irrelevant.

54. Just as by the falsity of the cognition of the *forest*, &c. (as something apart from the trees), the cognitions of *taste*, &c., do not become false *taste*, &c.,—so would the cognition of *Class* too (as something apart from the individuals) (not be rendered false, by the falsity of the cognition of the *forest*). Or else, you must mention some peculiarity (with regard to the cognition of *Class*) (that would differentiate it from the case of *taste*, &c., and thereby save your position).

55. The idea of singleness, with regard to a *forest* as cognised apart from the trees, may be a mistaken one, because of a discrepancy in the shape of remoteness (of the *forest*, from the person perceiving it from a distance). In the case of the *Class*, however, there is no such discrepancy (and hence it cannot be false).

56. (In the case of the cognition of the *forest* as one), when one gets

¹³ This refers to the following objection: "Even if such be the case, the instance of *forest*, &c., may be accepted as invalidating the fact of Sense-perception, urged by the Mīmāṃsaka, and as such there would be no irrelevancy in the matter." The sense of the reply is that because the perception of the forest, as *something apart from the trees*, is false—that cannot be any reason for denying the truth of other facts of Sense-perception, so even thus the irrelevancy remains just as before.

¹⁴ "Peculiarity"—no such is possible.

¹⁵ A cognition can be accepted to be a mistaken one, only when there happens to be some discrepancy in the means of that cognition. In the case of the person who (himself at a remote distance from the forest) makes the assertion that the *forest* is *something apart from trees* in it,—we may consider this to be a mistaken notion, because of the remoteness of the forest, which is a great discrepancy in the process of Sense-perception; and there is every chance of such sensuous perception being mistaken. In the case of the cognition of the *Class* however, we have no such discrepancy, and as such it cannot but be accepted as correct.

¹⁶ Another reason for rejecting a fact of Sense-perception as false lies in the fact of its being such as is subsequently set aside by another conviction got by a more authoritative means. The said *Idea of the Forest* may be so rejectable; but that of the *Class* is never found to be rejected.



near the trees, the singleness, of the idea (of the *forest*) with regard to them, ceases; whereas, by no means whatever, is the idea of *Class* (being an entity apart from the Individuals) ever found to be set aside.

57-58. The idea of the singleness (of the forest as apart from the trees),—(based only upon perception), as considered independently of (the denotation of) the word ("Vana"),—has been rejected (on the ground of the remoteness of the observer, who could not be expected to see things rightly from a distance). And as for the Idea of singleness (of the forest) based upon (the fact of the *forest* being the only object denoted by) the word "Forest,"—this (Idea) may also occur to one who is in the middle of the forest (and not at a distance). But even this Idea may be taken to be false, because of the impossibility of its being amenable to (any means of right notion) Sense-perception and the rest. As for the *Class*, it is always in the same character (of singleness, apart from the Individuals) that it is cognised by all the means of right notion (and as such, the idea of its singleness, &c., can never be set aside).

59. As a rule, a word is always used with reference to an object which has been cognised by other means of right notion. Consequently whenever it happens to be used, with regard to an object not (otherwise) perceived,—as in the case of the "forest,"—it must lead to mistaken (notion).

60. (I.) Some people hold that the singleness of the *forest* is always cognisable by the word alone; and, as such, it would always be true, even though there were no support from other (means of right notion); just as the (cognition of) *taste* is true, though it is not supported by the ear, or any other means of right notion, save the tongue.

61. Falsity, caused by the non-support (non-cooperation of other means of right notion), could apply (to the case of the Idea of the singleness of the *forest* as signified by the word) only if it were not cognised. When however, it has once been duly cognised, the mere absence of extraneous corroboration cannot in any way affect its validity.

62. That the word can apply only to such objects as are amenable to other means of right notion, is not accepted as a rule applying to all words.

⁵⁹ If the notion of singleness were only based upon the word "*Vana*," then alone, being purely verbal, it could not but be false.

⁶⁰ The author now proceeds to explain the various views taken of the above question. Some people hold that the idea of the singleness of the forest is got at by means of the word, and is true; and as such the case of this cannot serve to invalidate the notion of the singleness of *Class*. It is only the word that is the means of cognising the singleness of the Forest; and as such this idea of singleness would be false, only so long as the word has not duly signified it. When however the idea has been once signified, it stands in need of no other support.

⁶¹ This rule cannot affect all words; because there are certain things—*Dharma* above all the rest—that are cognisable by word, and word alone.



63. (11.) In fact, however (in the case of the Idea of the singleness of the *forest*) we have the support (of other means of right notion), inasmuch as the *forest* is only the many trees (considered together); and these trees surely are cognised by other means of right notion (Sense-perception, f.i.); and as for the number (singularity in "*Vanam*"), this too is found to be cognised (by other means of right notion) in other objects (the jar, f.i.)

64. If it be urged that the many (trees) cannot be denoted by a single word "(Forest)",—(we reply that) we could have such denotation, as in the case of the *ekaçēsha* compound. And if it be said that in the case of the *ekaçēsha* the number is changed (into the plural),—then (we reply that) we may leave off this factor (of the change of number) (and yet the fact of the denotation of the many by a single word remains common both to the *ekaçēsha* in '*ghatāk*' and the word "*Vanam*" as signifying the many trees).

65. Thus then we find that the compatibility of *singularity* (with the many trees) can be established by means of a universal affirmative premiss. And thereby we could have the number (singularity, applying to the trees as constituting the *forest*), even though it is not cognised by any other means of right notion;—just as we do admit of the movement of the sun (which is not cognisable by any other means of right notion, but is established only by means of Inference).

66. Some people explain the word "*Vanam*" as denoting the *commonality or class of "many"* (i.e., *Bahutwa* = multitudinousness) *as located in* (i.e., belonging to) *the tree*. And certainly the class "*multitudinous-*

⁶⁴ In the *ekaçēsha* compound, many jars are signified by the single word "*ghatāk*." The second objection means that the *ekaçēsha* in '*ghatāk*' is Plural, whereas '*Vanam*' is Singular, and as such could not denote many trees. The sense of the reply is that though the word "*Vanam*" will differ from the *ekaçēsha* in the point of its number, yet the fact of one word signifying many individuals remains the same in both cases; and it is this alone that we seek to establish.

⁶⁵ As a matter of fact, *singularity* belongs to the trees themselves. Since the name '*Vanam*' applies to many trees, and the relation of *singularity* (in '*Vanam*') with the many cannot be cognised by any other means of right notion,—therefore we must have recourse to a universal affirmative premiss, whereby we could establish the compatibility of the denotation of the noun ("*Vana*" denoting the many trees) with the denotation of the affix (the Accusative Singular). This premiss is that "the affix that is found joined to a noun connects its own denotation with the object denoted by the noun." From this premiss, we conclude that there is a relation between the objects denoted by the word "*Vana*" (i.e., the many trees) and the *singularity* denoted by the singular Accusative affix in "*Vanam*."

⁶⁶ Finding that no amount of Inference can lead to the compatibility of *singularity* with many trees,—because this would mean the accepting of Inference in the face of its opposition to a fact of Sense-perception,—the Kārikā throws out another suggestion.



ness" is only one (and as such the singular number in "*Vanam*" becomes quite compatible with the denotation of *many* trees). Or (we may accept the view that) the class "*Forest*" resides in the trees (and thus too the singular in "*Vanam*" becomes compatible, as the class "*Forest*" is only one).

67. Even in the absence of any such single object that could be the substrate (of the denotation of the word "*Vana*"), (such denotation is possible);—just as (though) the *whole* (has no one substrate apart from the parts constituting it, yet it is accepted) to be *one*, and so forth. And as, for the fact of the manifestation (of the *single* forest) by means of the *many* trees, not in contact with one another (like the parts of a *whole*);—since such manifestation is perceived by the eyes (as really existing in the case of the *single* forest and the *many* trees), therefore it cannot be said to be incongruous.

68-69. The word "*Vana*" may be the common (generic) name of denotation residing elsewhere (i.e., in the individuals): Just as we find the name "wandering about" applying to the momentarily changing particular movements,—so in the same manner, is distinctly cognised the Class "*Forest*," even though its substrates are many and diverse.

69-70. (III.) Or again, the "*Forest*" may be accepted as one, on the ground of (all the trees conjointly) bringing about a single effect (in the shape of the denotation of the forest);—just as the word "*Gauh*," though made up of *several* letters, *Ga* and the rest, is yet accepted as being (in

67 Just as the *whole* has no substratum apart from its parts, so the word "forest" has no substrate apart from the trees contained in it. The two cases being identical, we cannot rightly deny the one while admitting the other. "*Incongruous*."—Though the manifestation of the *single* forest by the *many* trees, or *vice versa*, is a fact self-contradictory in itself,—yet inasmuch as such manifestation is cognised by Sense-experience to have a real existence, it cannot but be admitted to be true.

68-69 The movements that are always disappearing are also included in a generic term; and as for "forest," though the individual trees, the substrates of the generic notion of the *Forest*, are many and various, yet, we cannot deny the correctness of the generic notion.

69-70 Though the letters, making up the word "*Gauh*," are many, yet, inasmuch as all these letters conjointly bring about the only effect, in the shape of the signification of the object *Cow*, the word is admitted to be *one* only. Similarly, in the case of the *Forest*, though it consists of *many* trees, yet inasmuch as all these trees conjointly bring about the single effect, in the shape of the manifestation of the *Forest*, the collection of these trees is accepted as *one* composite whole. Those trees that are always found to exist singly by themselves cannot have any single joint action; in fact, they are the causes of so many diverse ideas (of various trees); and consequently these cannot be held to be included in the denotation of the single word "*Forest*." And as a matter of fact, when trees are at great distances from one another, they are never called "*Forest*."



the form made up of these letters taken conjointly) *one* word (denoting the *cows*). And as for those trees that are always known to exist singly by themselves (apart from other trees), the word "Forest" is not meant to apply to these.

70-71. (IV.) Or, in the case of such terms as "Series," "Group," "Forest," &c.,—even in the absence of the *singleness* of the objects (denoted by these),—we may explain the notion of singleness as being indirectly indicated, through the peculiarities of place, time and action, &c.

71-73. We have the idea of "Forest" with reference to a *collection* of *trees*;—but we could not hold the idea of the *class* "Cow" to belong to a *collection* of *cows*. Because the idea of the *class* "Cow" is similar to that of the "tree" (inasmuch as just as to each of the individual trees belongs the character of "tree," so to each individual cow belongs the idea of the *class* "Cow"). Nor can we assume (the idea of the *Class* "Cow" to belong to) a collection (of individual cows); because that idea of the *class* "Cow" does not resemble that of the 'forest' in the point of the non-cognition of this latter apart (from the trees constituting it).

73-74. Nor can a conglomeration of the dewlap, &c., be the substrate of the idea of the *Class* ("Cow"); because the operation of these (dewlap, &c.), ceases with the bringing about of the cognition of the *individual* (cow); whereas the idea of the *class* "Cow" rests in the commonality of (*i.e.*, the entity common to) these (individuals). Then, even if you deny a *corporate whole* (apart from the constituent particles,—as held by the Bauddha), the *Class* still remains (untouched).

75-76. By means of the arguments explained before (in support of the existence of *Class* apart from the *Individuals*), we could also prove

70.11 Inasmuch as the trees conjointly exist in one place, or at the same time, or have the same joint action,—these special features indirectly point to the notion of *singularity* with regard to the "Forest," even though the objects denoted by the word—*viz.*, the trees—are many and diverse.

71.13 "Does not resemble, &c."—The forest is not perceptible, apart from the *trees*, whereas we are cognisant of the *Class* "Cow," even apart from any *individual* cow that may come into our view.

73.74 The conglomeration of the *Dewlap*, &c., is only capable of bringing about a cognition of the *individual* cow; whereas the idea of the *Class* 'Cow' extends over *all* *individual* cows, which are, on this very account, considered as belonging to one and the same class. "Therefore even, &c."—The Bauddha holds that the *Whole* is nothing apart from the constituent particles; *i.e.*, the *Jar* is nothing more than a conglomeration of atoms. But we have shown above that the *Class* is something quite different from a conglomeration of parts. Therefore the denial of the *whole* does not affect the existence of the *Class*.

75.76 We admit of the *Class*, simply on account of the fact of the cognition of a certain *single commonality* extending over many *Individuals*. In the same manner,

the existence of the *whole* also. But between this (Whole) and its constituent parts, there could be no absolute difference; inasmuch as, like the Class from the Individuals, this *Whole* also is never cognised as wholly apart (from its constituent parts).

76-77. Both difference and non-difference (of the *Whole* from the Parts) have been affirmed and denied by some people. But between the two sets of arguments it has never been ascertained which is the stronger and which the weaker; therefore it is best to take the middle course (*i.e.*, admit of both difference and non-difference, partially).

78. Thus then, both difference and non-difference being affirmed as well as denied (with equally strong arguments), it must be admitted that (both these characters apply to the *Whole*, which thus becomes of a variegated character), like a multi-coloured object; and as such it is incorrect to assert that it has only one character (*f.i.* colour, in the case of the object).

79-80. This fact of the non-absolute character of an object, does not render our cognition of it doubtful (or invalid). Because it is only where the cognition itself is doubtful, that we can have its invalidity. In the present case however, our cognition is perfectly certain, *viz.*, that the object is of non-absolute (or doubtful) character (and as such, the validity of this cognition cannot be doubted).

80-81. The fact of the non-cognition of the *Whole*, when the parts have been mentally abstracted, is also possible for the *Aulukya* (who holds the difference-theory), on account of the destruction (of the *Whole*) also being in the mind (of the person who abstracts the parts).

inasmuch as we have notions of *singleness*—with regard to a *jar*, *f.i.*, even though it is made up of many constituent atoms,—we must admit of the existence of one corporate *whole*, as something different (though not absolutely) from the constituent parts.

76-77 “But between, &c.”—The arguments on both sides are equally weak and equally strong.

79-80 The doubtful character of the object does not in any way invalidate our cognition of it. It is only where the cognition itself is doubtful—as in the case of the doubt as to whether a certain object before us is a man or a post—that, there being no fixed cognition, there can be no validity to it. In the case in question however, we have a definite cognition, not doubtful in the least, of the duplicate character of the object; and hence the cognition cannot be said to be doubtful or invalid.

80-81 The upholders of the “non-difference” theory urge as follows: “When we mentally abstract the constituent atoms, one by one, from any object, we find that eventually nothing is left behind; and hence we cannot think of any *whole* apart from the *parts*.” The sense of the *Kārikā* is that this argument is not by any means exclusive; because even one who holds the *whole* to be distinct from the *parts*, admits the *whole* to be only an entity, due to an agglomeration of parts; and consequently, when the parts have been mentally abstracted, the agglomeration of these also ceases (mentally); and thus there being a mental destruction of the object itself, it could not be cognised (after

81-82. The relation that the whole bears to the parts is recognised to be such as simultaneously extends over (all the parts); and hence the questions—whether the *whole is related to each part in its entirety, &c., &c.*—with regard to this, are to be rejected, just as they have been with regard to the *Class*.

82-83. If the idea of the *Class* "Cow" were due to (that of) the conglomeration of the various parts, dewlap and the rest,—then we could not have the notion of the *Class* "Cow" (which we may have cognised with regard to one cow) with regard to an individual cow (other than the one with reference to which the bovine character has been cognised); because the dewlap, &c., belonging to one individual cow are entirely different from those belonging to the other (and as such the idea of one could not apply to the other).

83-84. Nor is any commonality of the parts acceptable to the adversary (the Bauddha, who denies all positive commonality). Therefore it must be admitted that the idea of the *class* "Cow" is brought about by something other than the dewlap, &c.

84-85. The idea of "forest" that we have—with reference to a forest other (than the one that has been once perceived to be a collection of trees and so forth),—is said to have for its object the *class* "tree" with many substrates (in the shape of the many trees making up the forest).

85-86. Just as, even though the *Class* by itself is *one*, yet it has multiplicity, in view of the individuals (included therein),—so too, though the individuals are many, yet they may be considered as *one*, in view of the *Class* (to which they belong).

the parts have been taken away). In the absence of the parts themselves, we cannot be cognisant of any conglomeration of them.

81.82 "Rejected"—because there is no occasion for such questions. (See above: "na hi bhēdavinirmuktē kārtsnyabhāga-vikalpanam).

82.83 Any idea—of the bovine character, f.i.—brought about by the Dewlap seen in one cow, cannot be the same as that which is brought about by the same thing seen in another cow. And thus we would have to postulate as many bovine characters as there are individual cows.

83.84 This strikes at the theory that the notion of the *Class* "Cow" could pertain to all the cows, only if we had a *class* in the shape of the parts of the cow;—i.e., the *class* "dewlap" would include the dewlaps of all cows, and so on. But inasmuch as the Bauddha denies all positive *Class*, even this refuge is barred against him.

84.85 The idea of the Forest has been analysed above into that of the *Class* "Tree" with many substrates; and the sense of the *Kārikā* is that this idea may be accepted as the commonality inhering in all forests.

85.86 The *Class* by itself is *one*; but in the shape of Individuals, it is many. So too, conversely, the Individuals by themselves are many; though one only, in the shape of the *Class*.

86-89. In the matter of denoting either one or many (objects), words have their power (of denotation) irrevocably fixed by convention. Some (words), like "Ambara" (sky), and the like, denote the individual with its own number (*i.e.*, singular). In the assertion "one corn is ripe" (said with reference to the sheaves of corn in a field), the word ("Vṛhih") denotes the class ("Vṛhi") with its own number (singular). In the case of the "sannahanana (preparation) of the wife" ("in accordance to the Injunction *Patnīm sannahyāt*") the word ("Patnīm") denotes the individual (wife) as qualified by the number (singularity of the Class). (In the Injunction "*Vasantāya kapinjalān ālabhet*") the word "*Kapinjalān*" signifies the class "*Kapinjala*".

91-92. The word "*Dārāh*," whether used with regard to an individual (wife) or to the Class, is always used in accordance with the number of the constituent parts (*i.e.*, always in the Plural).

92-93. The word "*Vana*" (used always in the Singular) on the other hand, signifies many individual (trees) as qualified by the number (singularity) of the Class; or it may be taken to signify the (single) Class "Tree" as located in many individuals.

93-94. Similarly in the case of all such words as "Series" ("Crowd") &c., we always have some (singular) qualification or other, in the shape of conjunction, &c. (which serve to justify the Singular number). Therefore the notion of singularity (in these) is not groundless.

94-95. If the idea (of single commonality), that is common between the Forest and the directly perceptible Class, be said to be non-existing (*i.e.*, false, with regard to the Class, simply because it is found to be false in the case of Forest),—then (even such known objects as) the trees, &c., being equal to the Class (on the ground of sense-perceptibility), (would

86.89 The Sky is one; the Corns are many; hence the Singular is based upon the Class. The word '*patnī*' refers to the wives of all persons performing the *Darṣa-Pūrnamasā* sacrifice; hence the Singular number, in the word "*pātnīm*" as appearing in the sentence must be accepted as referring to the singleness of the Class "*Patnī*." The class "*Kapinjala*" is only one; therefore the Plural number must be explained as pertaining to the plurality of the Individuals.

91.92 This lays down the conventional rules.

93.94 The singularity of the word "Series" is based upon the fact of many individuals being joined to one another in a certain fixed order; and thus this is based upon Conjunction.

94.95 The idea of commonality belongs to the Forest, and also to the Class. And being found to be false in the case of the Forest, if it be said to be false in the case of the Class also,—then the well-recognised perceptibility of the Class must also be rejected as false. Following the same course of reasoning, sense-perceptibility being common to the trees, to the jars, in the same way as to the Class,—inasmuch as it has been found to be false in the case of this last, it cannot but be rejected as false, with regard to the others also. And this would mean that no sensuous perception is true!!



have to be rejected as false); and we would finally come to Nihilism (the theory of *Ġūnyarāda*).

95-96. In fact the idea of "Forest" apart from the trees (contained therein) is only an object of what is a mere semblance of Sense-perception (*i.e.*, mistaken Sense-perception); and as such, it cannot vie with (*i.e.*, cannot be held to be similar to) the (idea of) "Class," which is an object of direct (and correct) Sense-perception.

96-97. If you urge that "if there be equality between the Class and the Forest, then the Forest also becomes an entity (apart from the trees),"—then by this assertion, you would be renouncing the (refutation of the) Class-theory, and pointing out objections against an altogether different theory (with regard to the nature of the conception of Forest, &c.)

98. Thus have we explained things in accordance with the nature of Words and their Meanings as accepted by all people. In fact, in philosophical treatises, we cannot use words in an arbitrary sense assumed by ourselves. As a matter of fact (as shown above), in accordance with ordinary usage, there is a difference between the (ideas of) *Class* and those of "Series," "Forest," &c. If however, such difference be not found to be reasonable (in accordance with general popular usage)—even then that would mean no rejection (of our theory).

Thus ends the Vanavāda.

(SECTION 16).

SAMBANDHĀKSHEPA-PARĪHĀRA.

1. The Word and its denotation may be as you have described them to be. But you ought to explain the Relation (between them), for the sake of which you have taken all this trouble upon yourself.

2-3. "This relation having already been explained (before), why should the question be again asked? And the reply too (that the *Bhāshya*

95.96 Therefore the instance of the "Forest" cannot in any way affect the validity of the idea of *Class*.

96.97 If the case of the "Class" is exactly similar to that of "Forest,"—then, just as the Class has an existence apart from the Individuals, so also would the Forest come to have an existence apart from the trees.

98 "No rejection"—because, even in that case, we have already proved that the idea of "Forest" is not false; and so even if the case of the Forest were similar to that of the Class, none of the two could be false.

1 This refers to the *Bhāshya*! "atha kaḥ Sambandhaḥ, &c., &c." The sense of the *Kārikā* is that even if it be granted that the word is made up of letters, and that its denotation consists in the class,—we have yet to explain what relationship the denotation bears to the word.

2.3 "Reply"—the *Bhāshya* says that the relationship between the word and its meaning lies in the fact that the meaning is cognised on the cognition of the word.

gives to the question) cannot be the correct reply, because it does not mention the form of the relation. If, on being asked 'what is the medicine for fever?'—if one were to reply 'that by which it is destroyed,'—what information will have been afforded by this reply ?

4. In view of this objection, some people declare, that the author of the Bhāshya, not being satisfied with the explanation (of the relation described) above (in a previous chapter), has again raised the question (of the relation between Word and its Meaning), with a view to laying down (and explaining) another relation.

5. Since the relation of "*the name and the named*," (which is the relation that has been explained above as subsisting between the Word and its Denotation) follows after the comprehension (of the Word), and the comprehension must have been preceded by some other relation (because without some relation no comprehension is possible); therefore that relation of the "name and the named" cannot be a (causal) factor in the comprehension (of the word).

6. Even before one has come to know the fact of (such and such a word) being the *name* (of a certain thing), he comprehends its meaning through the cognition of some other relation; and it is later on that he comes to think of the word being the *name*; (therefore the relation of the "name and the named" cannot be the means of comprehension).

7. Others hold the relation (between Word and Meaning) to be one of invariable concomitance; inasmuch it is only this (relation) without (a cognition of) which, the comprehension of the word could not bring about the comprehension of the denotation.

8. This, however, is not right; because in the Bhāshya there is no mention of such a relation (as that of invariable concomitance). If the reply given in the Bhāshya alone be taken to imply this relation (even though it does not mention it), then why should the sentence in the Bhāshya not be taken to imply the contrary (that even without the relation of invariable concomitance, comprehension is possible) ?

The sense of the objection is that this alone cannot be sufficient; as this does not make quite clear the specific relationship borne; specially because the reply is a mere begging of the question. As the meaning of the Question is—"what is the relation by which the meaning is cognised on the cognition of the word?"—and the Reply that is given is only a paraphrase of this, just as in the counter-instance, "that whereby fever is destroyed" is only a paraphrase of the term "fever-medicine."

* This supplies one answer to the first question in K. 2.

† The latter half of the *Kārikā* sets the relationship into the Reply given in the Bhāshya.

‡ "Why should, &c."—When the sentence denotes neither the necessity of the relation nor its contrary,—then it is as reasonable to infer one thing as the other. There is no restrictive rule.

9. And then again, the (application) of the relation of invariable concomitance (to the case of the comprehension of words) has already been set aside. And as for the Name, the fact of its (application to the case of the Word and its Meaning) comes to be recognised, through the usage of ordinary people; and even when the Word is not definitely recognised to be the 'name,' we are still cognisant of its denotativeness (of the meaning).

10. Therefore it must be admitted that the (treatment of) "Relation" having been interrupted by a consideration of the nature of the denotation of words (in the chapters on *Sphota*, &c.), it is again brought forward simply with a view to the consideration of the question of its eternality or non-eternality.

11. The expression—"on the comprehension of the Word, the meaning is comprehended"—also points to the *power* or *denotativeness* (of the Word),—which (power) consists in the fact of the Word being either the agent or the instrument (or means) of the denotation (or signification, of the Meaning).

12. *Obj*: "The relation of denotability does not belong to the Denoter (Word) and the Denoted (Meaning) by themselves. And as for comprehension, this is based upon certain conventional rules laid down by men (in Dictionaries) just as (we comprehend certain meanings from) certain gestures of the eye."

13. *Reply*: Is this "conventional rule" made in accordance with the requirements of each individual mortal being, or of each utterance (of the

9 As a matter of fact, there is no such invariable concomitance as is mentioned above (under "*Sphota*"). Even before the word is cognised as the *name*, it is known to be the denotation of a certain meaning; and this is due to the fact of our finding experienced old persons using it in a certain definite sense; and it is only when an old person says that such and such a word is the name of such and such a thing, that we become cognisant of the fact of the word being a *Name*. The *Nyāyaratnākara* adds "Though the word is not definitely pointed out as being a *name* (at least not in so many words),—yet the *Denotability*, that we are cognisant of, and which is quite different from the sense-organs and the other means of right notion, is nothing more or less than what is meant by "Name" ('Name' = *that which denotes*). For this reason, it is certain that it is the relationship of the 'Name and Named' that is the chief factor in the comprehension of meaning. Consequently, the fresh raising of the question cannot be attributed to any aversion to this theory (explained above), and to a desire for pointing out some other relationship in the shape of invariable concomitance, &c. &c."

11 "Power," 'Denotability,' 'Name,' &c., are all synonymous—all signifying the fact of the word being either the agent or the means of signifying the meaning.

12 With a view to the refutation of the objections, urged in the chapter on "*Sambandhākshēpa*," against the Relationship, the Author first of all recapitulates the objections. The sense of the objection is that the Relationship not being natural, it cannot be held to be eternal.



word) ? Or is it made once for all, at the beginning of creation, by some one person (Brahmā f.i.) ?

14. And, does the relation differ with each (different person and utterance), or is it one only ? If it be one only, then (being common to all individuals, of the past, the present and the future) it cannot be said to be *caused* (and hence non-eternal) ; and if it differ (with different individuals), then people would surely be cognisant of some such differences.

15. If the rule be different (with each different individual), then it would be necessary to assume a power (or denotativeness) with each of these different relations (fixed by convention). And then too, a person, who has recognised the denotability in accordance with (the rule laid down by) one person, could never understand the word when used by another person.

16. If it be urged that each word will be comprehended in accordance with the rule laid down (with regard to it) by some one person,—then, how could a word, with regard to which different conventional rules (of denotability) are laid down by different people, be at all comprehended (to have a definite meaning) ?

17. If it be held that there is an option among the many significations of a single word,—this cannot be ; inasmuch as the one (conventional denotability) necessarily rejects the other (and there can be no ground for option). Nor, in ordinary usage, are we cognisant of the (simultaneous) co-existence of these (different conventional denotabilities).

18. For, we find that all usage is based upon only one (out of the many diverse conventional denotabilities). Whereas, if the relation were to be governed by different rules laid down by different persons, no one (relation) could be the means of the comprehension (of the word).

19. Even where there is no difference in the (form of the) Word or in that of the Meaning (i.e., in a case where the same word is applied to

¹⁵ Because the Rule, and hence the denotability, differs with each person.

¹⁶ With regard to a word of which the convention is laid down by a single person, there will not be much difficulty in comprehending its meaning. But with regard to a word where there is a difference of such conventional denotability (as in the case of the word "*pilu*" which is made by us to denote a *tree*, whereas the *Mlecchas* make it denote an *elephant*),—how could there be any comprehension ?

¹⁸ It is only when there is a single relationship between the Word and its Meaning,—that we can say that such and such a person is trustworthy and the other is not. If, however, the meanings of words were to be regulated by different persons, in accordance with stray rules laid down by themselves, then, all persons would be equally trustworthy,—a palpable absurdity.

¹⁹ We always comprehend the Word as bearing one and the same relation to its meaning. Hence there can be no option with regard to this relation: it must be accepted to be one only.



the same meaning),—if there be a multiplicity of persons (i.e., if the relation subsisting between that word and its meaning be said to be different, in accordance with the rules laid down by different people);—then no option would be possible; inasmuch as the person comprehending the word) is not found to doubt whether this or that is the relation (between the Word and its Meaning).

20. And again, on the word "cow" being pronounced *once*,—the persons present, willing to comprehend it, being many,—if the relation were optional, then some people would comprehend the word, and others would not.

21-22. If it be urged that "we could have a simultaneous co-existence (of different relations) with regard to the difference among the persons (holding the different relations)",—this cannot be; as such (co-existence) is impossible, on account of the speaker being one only (who must have used the word with regard to only one relation in his mind). And if there were a difference between the ideas of the speaker and the hearer (with regard to the relation borne by the Word to its Meaning), then all ordinary parlance would become faulty; inasmuch as the relation in the mind of the hearer would be quite different from that in the mind of the speaker (and which latter he desires to be conveyed by the word he uses).

22-23. In order to point out a relation (for the sake of) the hearer what relation could the speaker have recourse to? If it be the one which he has already known, then the speaker cannot be said to point it out to him (because he already knows it); and if he points out an altogether new relation, then this latter not having ever been known by the hearer to lead to the comprehension of any meaning, (he could never comprehend the word used).

24. If it be urged that "in any case (whether the relation be one

²⁰ It would be comprehended only by that person who had accepted the relation in which the word had been used.

²¹⁻²² "Co-existence"—One and the same word may be accepted to bear the different relations, at one and the same time, in accordance with the opinions of different persons. "Speaker being one only"—Since he can have only one relation in his mind therefore only those among his listeners will comprehend him who would have that relation tallying with that which they themselves hold. Other people would not comprehend him, at least in the particular sense that he wished to be conveyed.

"Parlance, &c."—Because the hearer not comprehending the meaning desired to be conveyed by the speaker, there would be an inextricable confusion, and all intelligent conversation would cease altogether.

²²⁻²³ This is the reason why Convention cannot be held to be different with different persons.

²⁴ It may be all very well with the hearer; but the speaker himself cannot use a word in a certain sense, unless he knows for certain that the word would convey that

known before, or not) the end of the hearer (*viz.*, the comprehension of the word) would be accomplished all the same";—(then, we reply), that the other person (*i.e.*, the speaker) could not use the word with regard to a relation which he himself does not know to be the well-established (means of getting at the comprehension of the word). If it be urged that the objection urged in k. 22-23 applies also to the case of the *jar*, &c.,—(we reply) it is not so: because in the case of these it is the *class* ("jar") which is held to constitute the meaning (of the word).

25-26. Though (even in the case of the *jar*) it is not reasonable to point out (to the hearer) an individual which he already knows to be denoted (by the word), and the denotability that may be newly pointed out is not known (by the speaker himself) to have the power of bringing about the effect (comprehension),—yet the denotability (of the individual *jar*),—in the matter of fetching it *f.i.*,—is based upon the (fact of the) *class* ("jar" being the object denoted by the word, which fact is known both to the speaker and to the hearer). And this ("Class") has no beginning in time; whereas your relation has a beginning (depending as it does upon conventions made by persons).

27. If you admit of an eternal commonality (Class) (covering all the Relations), then our position is established (since you also revert to that). But still (even though you have modified your theory with mine, yet, it cannot be the correct theory, because) it is not possible (for the denotation of a Word) to have a double form.

28. Because the Relation is only a particular kind of potency (or Denotability); and of this (Potency) there can be no different individuals. And further, the Potency being only inferable from its effect (which is one only), it cannot be many.

meaning. "*It is the Class, &c.*"—And hence, even to a person who is already cognisant of this denotation, we could point out that "this," a certain individual before us, belongs to the Class "*Jar*;" and this will be conveying a new information to him; and yet in due accordance with a word whose denotability the speaker is cognisant of. Consequently the objection urged in K. 22-23 cannot apply to the case of the individual *jar*.

25-26 "*And this has no beginning, &c.*"—Inasmuch as the Class has no beginning our theory is unaffected by the question—"Before the Class existed where did the denotability exist?" This can only affect the other party who hold the relation to be a caused one, and hence not everlasting.

27 "*Double form*"—that of the Class and the Individual—is not possible: and hence your theory cannot be correct; inasmuch as you attribute this double character to the denotation of a Word.

28 The Potency being one and one only, it cannot be divided into individuals; specially as the existence of the Potency can be inferred only from its effects; consequently it could be many only if its effects were many. As a matter of fact, however,



29. In fact the existence of the Potency is assumed only because, without it, certain facts are inexplicable; and these facts being explained through *one* entity (Class) alone, it is not right to assume *many* individuals.

30-31. At the time of the mention of the Relation (as fixed by the speaker himself), on the word "cow" (f.i.) being uttered, some people would understand the word by means of their comprehension of the (new) relation; whereas others would not do so (being non-cognisant of the new relation fixed upon). Thus then, we see that if the relation did not exist (from time immemorial, and were only coined by different speakers) then, all persons could not understand the word. If it be argued that, "if the relation were ever existent, then all people would comprehend it (which also is not possible),"—we say it is not so; because the relation, though eternal, is not cognised by certain people at a particular time (and so the difference with regard to each person governs, not the relation itself, but the cognition thereof by different people).

32. The word, being the means of the comprehension of its meaning, stands in need of its own cognition (by the hearer). Hence even though ever-extant, the relation could not express (its meaning), so long as it itself were not duly recognised.

33-34. With regard to an object that exists, we often find that (in some cases, and by certain people) it is not perceived; whereas that which is absolutely non-existent, is never, by any person, known to be extant; because the two properties of *existence* and *non-existence*, being mutually contradictory, can never belong (simultaneously) to the same object.

34-35. *Obj.*: "In the same manner, there is a contradiction between the *known* and the *unknown*." *Reply*: The *Cognition* resides in the *person*; and since there are *many persons*, this (*cognition* of the relation simultaneously with its non-cognition) cannot be incompatible. Because the cognition does not contradict the non-cognition residing in another person.

we find the effect, in the shape of the denotation, to be one only, in the form of the Class; therefore the Potency cannot be many.

39 "Fact"—of the denotation of a word; and this is quite reasonably explained, as referring to the one entity, Class; and as such it is not right to apply the denotation to the individuals, which are many.

32 The meaning of a word can never be comprehended until we cognise the relation subsisting between them.

33-34 It is a fact of common experience that an object, though existing, may not be perceived; and it is quite possible that the relation, though existing, may not be perceived. If, however, it were wholly non-existent, it could never be perceived to exist.

34-35 The sense of the objection is that the properties of existence and non-existence can never belong to the Relation; and similarly the characters of being *known* and *not known* could not belong to it at one and the same time. The sense of the reply is that

36. On the other hand, between *existence* and *non-existence* there is a distinct contradiction, on account of both residing in (a single substrate) the Relation itself. And since a multiplicity (*i.e.*, number greater than one) of this (Relation) has been denied (in *Kārikās* 28, 29), therefore we cannot base the compatibility (of existence with a simultaneous non-existence) on that ground (of multiplicity) (as we have done in the case of *persons*).

37. The white colour, placed before the blind and the not-blind, is not perceived by the blind, while it is perceived by the other. But this fact (of its cognition by one person and non-cognition by another) does not prove that it is both non-existent and existent.

38. There is no contradiction in the former case, because there is a diversity, among the persons, based upon the fact of one (person with eyes) being capable (of perceiving colour) and the other (the blind person) being incapable (of perceiving it). And of perception (of the colour) too, there is no other reason, save the fact of its existence.

39. Thus then, the cognition of usage being equal (on account of its efficiency to prove the existence of the Relation between Word and its Meaning) to the organs of sense-perception (which also infallibly proves the existence of the object perceived),—only those, that are endowed with

the Cognition of the relation belongs to several persons; and hence it is quite possible that at one and the same time, it may be *known* to one person and *unknown* to another. Existence, on the other hand, belongs to the Relation itself; and as this is one only, it cannot have both Existence and Non-existence at one and the same time.

41. The substrates of Perception and Non-perception are distinct; whereas that of Existence and Non-existence is one only: *viz.*, Colour. Consequently, though it is quite possible for one person to perceive it, while the other does not do so,—yet it cannot be said that the colour is both extant and non-existing.

38. "And of perception, &c."—This anticipates the following argument: "Granted that there can be both Existence and Non-existence of the Relation; even then, we could hold that, inasmuch as some people do not perceive it, it does not exist at all." The sense of the reply as embodied in the second half of the *Kārikā* is, that the mere fact of a certain thing not being perceived by some people can never establish its Non-existence; because the non-perception might be due to some defect in the perceptive faculty of the man; and while the thing is not perceived by one person, it may be perceived by other persons. As a matter of fact, it is the fact of a certain thing being perceived that can conclusively establish its existence; for the simple reason that if the thing did not exist it could never have been perceived by any person. Consequently even if the thing happens to be perceived by a single person, this fact of its perception at once goes to establish, beyond doubt, the fact that the thing exists.

39. The means of visual perception is the Eye; hence one who is without the Eye can never see an object. In the same manner, the cognition of the usage of the word is the means of comprehending its meaning; and hence one who has not that cognition,—*i.e.*, who does not know the sense in which the word is used by ordinary people—can never comprehend the meaning of that word.



the former (*i.e.*, those that are cognisant of the usage of the word), will be able to comprehend its meaning; while others (being devoid of the cognition, and thereby) resembling the blind (in the matter of visual perception), cannot (comprehend it).

40. And though this (usage) is one only, yet it will, by "*tantra*,"—*i.e.*, tacit supposition—help (all future comprehension),—like the "laying of the fire" (at *Agnihotra*). The remembrances of it will, of course, differ,—like the fetching of the "*Agnihotra*" Fire.

41. To all persons ignorant (of the Relation of a Word with a certain meaning), the Relation comes in a well-established form, through previous traditions (*i.e.*, from people who have known it before them, and so on *ad infinitum*); and therefore there can be no beginning of the (application of the) Relation (to the Word); and (as such it must be held to be eternal).

42. The theory, of the accomplishment (of the Relation) based upon (conventional rules made with) each utterance (of the word), has been rejected in the *Bhāṣya*. And as for the fixing (of the relation) at the beginning of Creation,—(this cannot be; since) we do not admit of any such time (the world being eternal and as such having no beginning in time).

43-44. *Obj.*: "But, if there be such a Person as would create the world, and then set going the processes of *Dharma* and *Adharma*, and the uses and relations of words, for the sake of the world,—then, such a fact would not in any way vitiate the Veda." *Reply*: Yet this theory is as difficult to prove, as an omniscient person; hence we have not admitted it (in the *Mīmāṃsā* system).

40 One who performs the daily *Agnihotra* has not got to prepare the fire for the performance of any other sacrifice; as the once consecrated fire is used by him in all actions. In the same manner, when we have once cognised the usage of a word, this one cognition helps us to comprehend it in every case. And as in the case of fire, the *Agnihotra* fire has to be fetched from one place to another,—and this fetching differs in each case,—so in the case of the usage of words also, in every future case, we will have to remember the usage, and this recalling to mind will always differ with different persons.

42 Up to K. 41, we have refuted the theory that the relation is governed by conventional rules laid down with each different individual speaker and hearer. We now proceed to consider the other two alternatives. The theory referred to in the first half is refuted in the *Bhāṣya*, in the section on Words, where it has been declared that "a single utterance cannot accomplish the relationship of the word with its denotation, nor can it bring about its usage, &c., &c." We need not repeat that refutation on the present occasion. Then there remains the theory that the meaning of each word is fixed by the Creator at the very beginning of creation, and this theory is refuted in the next *Kārikā* by a total denial of any such creator or beginning of creation, &c.

43-44 The opponent means that such a theory is not contradictory to the Veda. For a refutation of the "omniscient" person, see above, *Sūtra* 2.

45. At a time when all this (earth, water, &c.), did not exist, what could have been the condition of the universe? As for Prajāpati himself, what could be his position? and what his form?

46. And at that time (when no men existed) who would know Him and explain His character to the later created persons? (If it be held that He cannot be perceived by any man, then) without perception (or cognition of some sort, by some person), how can we determine this (fact of His existence)?

47. Then again, in what manner do you believe the world to have had a beginning in time? (If it be held that it is brought about by a desire on the part of Prajāpati, then) since Prajāpati is (held to be) without a material body, &c., how could He have any desire towards creation?

48-49. And if He has a body, assuredly this body could not have been created by Himself; thus then we would have to postulate another creator (for his body) (and so on, *ad infinitum*). If Prajāpati's body be held to be eternal, then (we ask)—so long as earth (water, &c.), have not been produced, of what material would that body be composed?

49-50. Then again, in the first place, how is it that He should have a desire to create a world which is to be fraught with all sorts of troubles to living beings? For at that time (of the beginning of creation) he has not got any guiding agencies, in the shape of the virtue (or sin), &c., of the living beings themselves. Nor can any creator create any thing, in the absence of means and instruments.

51. Even the production of the spider's net is not held to be without some sort of a (material) basis; as (the net is spun out of) the saliva, which

45 All place exists in one of the substances. Hence if these did not exist, where could Prajāpati stand? And of what materials could his body be composed?

47 If Prajāpati has a body, it must be held to be eternal; and when one body would be eternal, how could we deny the eternality of other bodies—our own, for instance? The only ground of the belief in the transient character of our own body consists in the fact of its being corporeal or material; and when one material body is transient, there is no reason why Prajāpati's body should be held to be eternal. For if his body is eternal, ours also must be eternal.

49-50 People hold that all the trouble in the world is due to the vicious deeds of living beings in the previous birth. This may be quite true; but at the very beginning of creation, there being no previous birth, no such guiding principle would be available; and the blame of creating a troublesome world would rest with the creating God.

51 Even granting the agency of Virtue and Vice, that alone could never suffice for the creation of worlds. Because it is always out of some such material as clay and the like, that a certain thing—f.i., the Jar—is made; while Prajāpati has got no such material at hand; and as such there being no material basis on which He could proceed, all that you supply Him with are the unseen agencies of Virtue and Vice; and this could be of no initial help to Him.



is produced out of the body of the animals (flies, &c.), eaten (by the spider).

52. (If it be held that Prajāpati creates the world, out of pity, then, we say) in the absence of objects of compassion (in the shape of living persons), no Pity (or Compassion) could be possible for Him. And if He were urged to creations by pure compassion, then He would create only happy beings.

53. If it be urged that "without some pain, neither the creation nor the continuation of the world would be possible,"—then (we reply that) when everything depends upon the mere will of the Creator Himself, what could be impossible for Him?

54. And if He were to depend upon Laws and Agencies, then this fact would deprive Him of His (boasted) independence. (You say He desires to create the world,—will you let me know) what is that end which He desires, and which could not be gained without creating the world?

55. For without some end in view, even a fool does not act. Then if He were to act so (without any end in view), then what would be the good of his intelligence?

56. If the activity of the Creator were due to a desire for mere amusement, then that would go against his ever-contentedness. And (instead of affording any amusement), the great amount of work (required for creation) would be a source of infinite trouble to Him.

57. And His desire to destroy the world (at *Pralaya*) too would be hardly explicable. And (above all) such a Creator could never be known by anybody.

58. Even if He were known in form, the fact of His being the *Creator* could never be known. Because, at that time (*i.e.*, in the infancy of creation) what could the living beings, appearing at the beginning of creation, understand?

59. They could not understand wherefrom they have been born; nor

53 It is we who recognise and bow down to the law that without Pain the world could not exist. Your Creator, however, being all-powerful, could annul the said law,—if He were really moved to creation by sheer compassion—and create a world eternally happy.

55 "What would, &c."—For in that case, the action being without any motive, your Creator would resemble the *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhyas*. This *Pradhāna* is held to be non-intelligent, and as such it could not have any motive for its activity. Thus then, inasmuch as your Creator too would act without a motive He also would have to be admitted to be non-intelligent; and certainly this could not be a very palatable morsel for you.

56 One has recourse to an amusement with a view to please himself. Hence if the Creator wants amusement, He cannot be said to be eternally happy and contented.

58 Because they have appeared after Prajāpati has finished his operations.

could they know the state of the world prior to creation, or the fact of Prajāpati being the Creator.

60. Nor could the idea that they would derive from His own assertion (with regard to His being the Creator), be altogether trustworthy; because even though He may not have created the world, He might speak of having done so, in order to show off His great power.

61. In the same manner the Veda that would proceed from him would only be doubtful, and hence could not be admitted as a sure proof of His existence (and creative power). And as for that (Veda) which is eternal, how could it make a mention (of facts and processes with reference to the creation of living beings, &c.) ?

62. For, if the Veda existed before the objects (created), then there can be no connection between this (Veda) and the objects created. Therefore the passages (occurring in the Veda) (which appear to describe the process of creation) must be interpreted as praising up something else (*i.e.*, some injunctions of sacrifices, &c.)

63. The idea common among ordinary people (that the Veda mentions of the creation as proceeding from Prajāpati) is a mistaken one, caused by certain valedictory passages (praising up certain injunctions). Because whenever a passage is not duly considered and interpreted together with the passages that precede and follow it, it is bound to give rise to a misconception.

64. The use of the Mahabhārata, &c., too to the matter of Dharma, &c., is in the form of telling stories (exemplifying and praising up certain duties and sacrifices), just like that of the Vedic passages (which seem to mention certain processes, while they only praise up certain sacrifices). Therefore the notion (of the creation proceeding from Prajāpati) got from these (*i.e.*, passages occurring in the Purāṇas, &c.), would also be only a mistaken one.

65. Because mere story-telling cannot have any use, therefore in all these (stories making up the Purāṇas) we must admit of something that could be the object of praise or dispraise (embodied in the stories);—and this *something* may be that which is enjoined either in the Veda, or in the Purāṇas themselves.

66. If there were any such thing as the *first activity* of the Veda

61 Since there is a mention of creation, it must have been composed after the event.

62 "No connection"—*i.e.*, the Veda that existed before the creation came about, could not speak of the event.

64 The story of the creation mentioned in the Purāṇas must also be taken only as praising certain sacrifices; it cannot be taken as literally true.

66 The second half of the *Kārikā* refers to the theory that during *Pralaya* the Veda lies latent in the bosom of Prajāpati; and at the beginning of creation it is



(towards injunction, &c.), (this would mean that the Veda has had a beginning, and) then we could never have an idea of the fact of its not being composed by anybody (but being eternal in itself). The theory too, that during universal dissolution the Veda resides in (the person of) Prajāpati, could, at best, only be considered doubtful.

67. If, however, you assume the eternity of the Creator and the processes of creation and dissolution,—then too, we could only admit of a gradual process of creation, such as we see in the case of present living beings (creating the Jar, &c.)

68. And as for a "*Pralaya*" in the form of universal destruction, we find no proofs for admitting it. Nor could such an action (of destruction) on the part of Prajāpati serve any useful purpose.

69-70. And for such souls as have (the load of) actions (*Dharma* and brought forth by Him into its full activity; and this fact of being brought into activity does not necessarily imply its non-eternality. The meaning of the *Kārikā* is that the theory referred to is extremely improbable, and has already been refuted under *Sūtra* (2).

67 With this *Kārikā* begins the consideration of the *Vaiṣeṣhika* theory, which is thus summed up in the *Nyāya-ratnākara*: "The processes of creation and dissolution are eternal. After a hundred years of Brahmā have elapsed during the existence of the world, there arises in the mind of God a desire to destroy the world; and in obedience to this desire, there comes about a universal disjunction of atoms, and in the end all that is left behind, is only a number of disjointed atoms of Earth, Water, Fire, Air, *Ākāśa*, (i.e., Space) and Soul; during this time all the *Dharma* and *Adharma* of individual men are kept in abeyance by Divine Will; these *Dharma* and *Adharma* lie latent in the soul of each individual. When the period of dissolution passes, the same God seeing the souls of men lying idle, without obtaining the results of their deeds and misdeeds, takes pity on them; and this pity gives rise to a desire on His part for creation, and directly all homogenous atoms become combined,—these combinations bringing into existence all the various objects of the world; and then the *Dharma* and *Adharma* of the men are let loose; and this going forth into activity comes to affect the destiny of each individual soul, throwing some of them down into animal life, while raising others to lives in nobler families. And then the same God creates the Veda, with a view to explain *Dharma* and *Adharma* to the world. Thus it is that the Veda comes to differ with each cycle of creation. But inasmuch as this process itself is eternal, the Veda, the Creation and the Dissolution, should all be considered eternal, and so also the Creator." The sense of the second half of the *Kārikā* is that any such simultaneous creation as the *Vaiṣeṣhika* speaks of, we never come across in ordinary life, where every process is distinctly gradual. Hence we cannot admit of any such simultaneous creation.

68 And no intelligent creator could have recourse to such a suicidal process, unless it served some very important purpose of his; and since we cannot think of any such purpose we cannot believe in a Universal Dissolution.

69.70 The *Vaiṣeṣhika* holds that during *Pralaya* the souls of men continue to exist with all their *Dharma* and *Adharma* lying latent, without bringing about any results; this the *Kārikā* denies.



Adharma) upon them, there can be no existence, during which there is no enjoyment of their results. Nor can the results of one action be restrained by any other action (in the shape of the Creator's desire, as held by the *Vaiṣeṣhika*); and it is not possible for all actions to continue to remain devoid of their results. Nor is there any single action, the result of which could be the non-fruition of all other actions (and which single action would thereby keep the other actions in check).

71. Then again, if all the actions (of persons) were to be destroyed (at the dissolution), then no future creation would be possible; for, under the circumstances (*i.e.*, if actions were destroyed), what could be the means of bringing out these actions (out of their latent state) ?

72. If the desire of God be held to be such a means, then that (desire) in itself could be an efficient cause of the creation of souls. And if creation were dependent upon God's wish, it would be useless to assume the (agency of) actions (*Dharma* and *Adharma*).

73. And it is not possible for the God's desire too to be produced without any cause. If there be any such cause (of the production of the God's desire), then that could also be the cause of the (production of the worldly) elements also.

74. If one were to argue that 'the production of the bodies of living beings is controlled by an intelligent agency (in the form of God's desire),—because they are made up of certain constituent parts,—like a house, &c.,—then, he should be answered thus:

75-76. If by "control" it is meant only the fact of some intelligent

71 The *Vaiṣeṣhika* holds that when the God desires to create again, then the *Dharma* and *Adharma* of men come out; and it is in accordance with these that he regulates the next creation. But when all actions are destroyed at *Pralaya* they would cease to exist and there would be no means of bringing them into activity.

72 It would be a needless complication to assume that it is God's wish that manifests the destroyed actions which regulate the creation. God being omnipresent and omnipotent, if His wish had anything to do with the creation, there would be no need for any other agency.

73 God's desire too cannot be eternal; as that would lead to eternal creation or eternal dissolution. If, on the other hand, the desire be non-eternal, there must be some cause that gives rise to it in the mind of the Creator. And then for the activity of this cause also, we would require another cause, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Even granting the possibility of a cause for the God's desire, if there be such a cause, that alone could suffice for the creation of the world, and there would be no need of postulating an intermediate agency, in the shape of the God's desire.

75-76 "Redundant"—because it only proves that the world is affected by intelligent agencies; and as the actions of even individual living beings are such intelligent agencies, your argument does not necessarily establish the superintendence of a supra-mundane intelligent cause, in the shape of an omniscient God.



agency being the cause of creation,—then, inasmuch as all creation could be accomplished by the actions of all living beings (which are intelligent agents), your argument would become redundant (proving a fact already proved; for no one denies the fact that the diversity of the world is regulated by the actions of living persons). (And you have the same redundancy) even if by “control” you mean that the creation of bodies is preceded by the desire of an intelligent agent; because the actions (of living beings) too are preceded by it (*i.e.*, a desire, to act, on the part of the acting persons).

If, however, you mean that the creation follows immediately after the desire, then (we say that) there is no such immediate sequence even in the case of your own instance (the making of a *house* not following immediately after the desire of the builder).

77. Your premises too are inconclusive (*i.e.*, deficient and doubtful), with regard to the body of God Himself. For His body too must have had a beginning, inasmuch as it is also a body, like ours (made up of constituent parts).

78. If it be argued that “the production of the God’s body too is controlled by His own intelligence, and as such this (case of the God’s body) does not go against the conclusion (of the argument mentioned in K. 74),”—then (we reply that) the bodiless God, being like an emancipated soul, could not exercise any control.

79. And if in the case of the jar, &c. (that you cite as an instance) you refer to the superintendence of the potter, &c., then the control of the God would not apply to these (and as such the instance could not prove the fact of the creation of the body being controlled by God); if, on the other hand, you mean that the making of the jar is controlled by God, then you would have the deficiency of the major term (that is to say, the fact of the jar, &c., being controlled by God is not recognised by us, and hence these could not serve as instances to prove the same with regard to the body, &c.)

80. And if you take the instance (of jar, &c.), as it is commonly

77 And thus the body of the God also would have to be controlled by an intelligent agent, in accordance with your argument. But you deny any such control over the divine body, and thereby you weaken your own argument.

78 “Bodiless God”—If God were to control the production of his own body, then he could do so only in a bodiless state; inasmuch as so long this controlling force has not been exerted, his body could not have been produced. And just as a soul that has been emancipated from the world and has become bodiless cannot exert any controlling force over anything, so too a bodiless God could not exert any control.

79 The jar is found to be made by the potter, who is not a god, and who is perishable. Hence in accordance with this instance, the argument would stand thus: “The body is not created by a God,—because it is controlled by intelligence—as for instance,

recognised, then the premiss would contradict (the conclusion); inasmuch as in that case (the instance would lead to the conclusion that) the body, &c., are produced by one who is not a God, and who is himself perishable.

81-82. If it be held that God does not Himself carry on any operations, as the potter does (towards making the jar),—then, how could an insentient entity (in the shape of the atoms) follow His desire? Therefore the creation of the atoms, &c., could never be brought about by a mere desire of His.

82-83. Of a Person who is Himself extremely pure, the modifications (in the shape of this universe) could not be impure (as the world is found to be). *Dharma*, &c., too being absolutely under His power, it is not right (and reasonable) that there should be pain (in this world). And if the activity (of the world) were to be dependent upon (*i.e.*, regulated by) these (*Dharma*, &c.), then that would be accepting something else (*i.e.*, an agency other than God's desire).

84. The God himself being absolutely pure, and there being no other object (at the time of creation), what could bring about the activity of Nescience, which (in falsity) resembles a dream?

85. If the mobility (to activity) were held to be due to something other (than Brahma), then you would have duality (since you would be admitting the existence of Brahma and something else to stimulate the

the jar, &c.; and thus the premiss that you brought forward to prove the creation to have been brought about by a God comes to prove something quite to the contrary.

81-82 The *Kārikā* combats the theory that God does not actually work out the creation Himself, as all that he does is to express a desire, that is instantly obeyed by the eternal atoms of matter, which proceed to combine homogeneously and thus form the endless substances. Against this theory the question is put—how could the insentient atoms be cognisant of, and obey, the wish of the God?

82-83 Now begins the refutation of the *Sāṅkhya-Vedānta* theory that the world is only the modification of a single Person, who is extremely pure, &c., &c. If then, it be held that the evils in the world are due to the past *Adharma* of the men,—then, inasmuch as this *Adharma* also would be under His guidance, He might, on account of His extreme purity, remove the impurities of the world, which would be left absolutely pure and happy. Further, if you grant the fact of the creation of the world having its character regulated by *Dharma*, &c., then that would amount to an acceptance of agencies other than that of Divine Will, operating towards the creation of the world.

84 Even the *Vedānta* theory is not tenable by itself. Because when nothing but Brahma exists, what is it that causes the Nescience to operate towards creation? It could not be Brahma Itself; as That can have nothing to do with Nescience, which is a false entity and whose functioning is as unreal as a dream.

85 If Nescience were natural, then to whom would it belong? Certainly not to Brahma; as that consists of Absolute Knowledge, and as such could not have any connection with Nescience. Then the existence of Nescience apart from Brahma would bring about Duality. And above all, if Nescience, like Brahma, were natural, it could never be set aside, and hence no Deliverance would be possible.



activity of Nescience). And if Nescience itself were only natural (and as such not requiring any stimulation from without), then none could strike it off (and we could not have any Deliverance).

86. A natural existence (like that of Nescience) could be destroyed only by the influence of something unique (*i.e.*, some such agencies as those of meditation, &c.) But for those who have their only means (of deliverance from Nescience) in the Self, there cannot be any unique agency.

87. Even for those (the *Sāṅkhyas*) who hold the Person (soul) to be inactive, how could there be any functioning of the Attributes, at the beginning (of creation)? Because till then there would be no *karma* (of the souls).

88. Nor at that time could there be any false cognition; nor could there be any attachments and aversions (that would disturb the equilibrium of the Attributes); because all these are functions of the Mind; and this Mind will not yet have been produced (at the beginning of creation).

89. Some people hold that the cause, of the bondage of souls, lies in their actions existing in a state of latent potentiality. But this is not correct; inasmuch as the effect is not produced from a cause which is only latent (and does not function towards its production).

90. The potentiality of the curd,—so long as it is only lying latent in the milk (and has not come out in the curd itself)—is not able to bring about the *Dādhika* (a special substance prepared out of the curd). This potentiality of the curd in the milk is the cause of the curd only (which is prepared directly from the milk); and as for the *Dādhika*, its cause is something else (*i.e.*, the potentiality of the *Dādhika* itself, in the curd).

91. If the effect were to be produced from the cause *still in a state*

86 The Advaiti holds that the only means of destroying Nescience is the knowledge of self; but since this is not possible, and no other adequate means is admitted, therefore Nescience, if held to be a natural entity, could never be destroyed.

87 Now begins the refutation of the *Sāṅkhya* theory. That theory is that the soul does not operate towards the creation of the world, which is brought by a disturbance in the three Attributes of Primordial matter, that function along, and bring about the various objects of creation; and the agency that disturbs the equilibrium is that of the *karma* of persons to take their births in the forthcoming creation. The sense of the *Kārikā* is the first creation could not have been due to any such Karma; because till then none existed.

90 The *Dādhika* is made of the curd; and in milk we have the potentiality of the curd; consequently, if latent potentialities were to bring about effects, the *Dādhika* could be prepared directly from the milk. Similarly the child could perform the feats of the grown-up man; as it has all the strength and energy of the man lying latent in it.

91 Because even when the effects of the action have been brought about, and experienced, the action is not destroyed (as an entity can never be destroyed), but continues latent; and if latent causes were to bring about their effects, what would be

of latent potentiality,—then there would be bondage (to the soul) (by *karma*), even when this latter will have already produced its results.

92. Because it is held (by the *Sāṅkhyas*) that even on its destruction (by fruition) *karma* continues to exist in a state of latent potentiality. In fact even the performance of an action would be useless, as even before (it has been performed) its potentiality must exist (and this would bring about the result for the sake of which the action is sought to be performed.)

93. And then, why is it that you do not postulate Attachment (aversion), &c.,—in their latency (at the time of creation),—to be the cause of bondage (of the soul)? If you say that you accept *karmā* (to be the cause of bondage) because it has not yet produced its results,—this cannot be; because there could not be even a manifestation (or appearance) of that *karma*.

94. Then again, Knowledge could not be the cause of Deliverance; since it is not a counter-entity (contrary) to the potentiality of *karma* (and it is this latter that you hold to be the only cause of bondage); for, assuredly, Knowledge is not in any way contrary to the potentiality of *karma*.

95. Though it is understood that actions are, like attachment, &c.,

there to prevent this action from producing its own, in the shape of the bondage of the soul; and thus no deliverance would be possible.

96. "Must exist, &c.,—because the *Sāṅkhya* holds that everything that is done or produced in this world already exists in a latent state,—finally in the *Prakṛiti*.

98. Because at the time of creation also, the attachment, &c., of the soul must be continuing in their latent state,—why cannot you attribute the soul's bondage directly to these? And why should you seek for its cause in the actions only? The sense of the intermediate objector is that certain actions, before they had produced their results, had been restrained in their activity, at the time of Dissolution, by the desire of God; consequently inasmuch as these have to bring about their effects, it is these that we hold to be the cause of bondage. The latter part of the *Kārikā* rejects this explanation on the ground that, if a latent cause were to produce its effect, an action, endowed with all its potentialities, would at once bring about its results, even before the action has had time to manifest itself. The purport of all this is that, as shown in the foregoing *Kārikā*, an action would (in accordance with the activity of the latent cause) bring about its effects, even before it is performed (and thereby manifested); and as such it could not exist, for any length of time, without bringing about its effects, in order to burst forth, at the time of creation. And it is equally impossible, in accordance with your theory, for the action not to produce its result at the time, as it should appear at the time of creation. Because, according to you, an action must produce its effects straight off, as also that the action cannot manifest itself.

96. Actions being brought about by ignorance, as soon as knowledge would appear, the actions would cease to be performed. But they would still continue to exist in their latent forms; and inasmuch as these potentialities of actions would not be the effects of ignorance, no amount of knowledge could remove them. And, according to you, latent causes also bring about their effects; consequently, these latent potentialities of actions would be sure of bringing about their effects in the shape of the soul's



brought about by ignorance, yet Knowledge cannot set aside these (actions as existing in a state of latent potentiality).

96. That there is destruction of actions by means of Knowledge is not proved; as is also the theory that (through the force of knowledge) the Action exhausts itself by producing its result in the smallest degree (in order to free the knowing soul from bondage),—just like some crime committed by a royal prince (which is let go after only a nominal punishment has been inflicted upon him).

97. If, even now-a-days, an action in a state of latent potentiality were to be the cause (of its effects), then it would be quite reasonable to speak of its causal efficiency even at the time (of Dissolution) when the only entity held (by you) to remain would be the *Prakṛti*.

98-99. In ordinary life, we find that it is the function (or active state) of the mind (of a person), that is the cause of (his) actions. But this (activity of the mind) does not exist at the time (of Dissolution). And (even if such activity of the minds were possible at the time of Dissolution), since (at that time) all minds would be mixed up (in the *Prakṛti*), there would be an admixture (of their functions, and consequently also) of the actions. Therefore that which is called "*Adhikāra*" (i.e., the actions in a state of latent potentiality) cannot be held to be the cause of bondage.

99-100. Even if "*Adhikāra*" be taken to mean *capability*, no separation (of it from the *Prakṛti* and the Soul) would be possible: as the capability of the soul to enjoy consists in his intelligence, and that of *Prakṛti*, to be enjoyed, in its non-intelligence. And these (capabilities) are never absent in them (Soul and *Prakṛti*).

bondage, and no Deliverance would be possible. Therefore knowledge cannot be held to be the means of Deliverance.

96 There is no cause for believing in a destruction of actions by knowledge.

97 Because you hold that at the Dissolution, all things become dissolved into, and continue to lie latent in, the *Prakṛti*-(Primordial matter),—to burst forth again into creation at a suitable time,—you must admit that the actions have their potentialities lying latent in the same *Prakṛti*; as, according to you, nothing can be totally annihilated. And thus, even at the Dissolution, there would be nothing to prevent the actions from bringing about their effects.

98-99 "*Admixture*"—all the minds and the actions due to them being mixed up in the *Prakṛti*, the actions of a soul in bondage might belong to a soul that has been delivered, and *vice versa*.

99-100 Some people hold that in the assertion that "the cause of bondage is the *Adhikāra*," what is meant by the word '*adhikāra*' is not the *potentiality of actions (to be performed)*, but the *capability of the Prakṛti to be enjoyed and that of the Soul to enjoy*. The *Kārikā* rejects this explanation, on the ground that neither the *Prakṛti* nor the Soul could ever be severed from this *capability*; and as such, the cause of bondage continuing for ever, there could be no Deliverance; just as intelligence never leaves the Soul, so, in the same manner, non-intelligence never leaves the *Prakṛti*.

101. If Ignorance be held to be the cause of the production of actions,—then from the destruction of Ignorance could result only the non-production of (fresh actions), and not the cessation of the results (of previous actions).

102. It is not by means of Sense-perception (Inference), &c., that Knowledge is cognised to be the cause of Deliverance. Nor does the Veda declare that deliverance results from Knowledge, such as it is held to be by the *Sāṅkhyas* and others.

103. That "Self is to be known" has not been enjoined with a view to the attainment of Deliverance. All that it indicates is the fact that the knowledge of self is a cause of activity towards certain sacrifices.

104. And when this (knowledge of self) has been recognised to be (enjoined) for the sake of something else (*i.e.*, engagement in sacrifices), the mention of results ("He doth not return," &c.), that we find (in connection with the passage—"The soul ought to be known"), must be taken to be merely as a valedictory declaration (meant to praise up the knowledge and its results in the shape of activity in sacrifices); and as for real results, there can be none other than Heaven, &c. (mentioned as the results of various sacrifices).

105. If Deliverance be held to be merely the enjoyment of pleasures, then it would be synonymous with "Heaven;" and this is perishable (and not eternal as you hold Deliverance to be).

106. Because nothing that has a cause (*i.e.*, that which is *caused*)

101 The destruction of the cause could only result in the non-production of its further effects. Consequently, even when ignorance would be destroyed by knowledge, all that we could expect would be that no more actions would be brought about. But the destruction will, in no way, be able to affect the fruition of the seeds sown by the actions of the past; for the simple reason that this fruition is not the effect of ignorance, whose destruction, therefore, could not affect the former.

102 The Veda, even seemingly, lends its support only to such knowledge as is held by the *Vēdānti* to be the means of Deliverance.

103 The knowledge discriminating the Soul from *Prakṛti* is of use in the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices that lead to results beyond the physical world; inasmuch as, unless the Soul is learnt to be discriminated from the Body, how can people believe that such results as are not obtainable in this physical world could be attained by men? And unless one believes in the possibility of such results being obtained, he can never engage himself in the performance of those sacrifices of which the results are said to accrue to the performer in a superphysical world. Consequently, it is with a view to making people take to the performance of such sacrifices, that the Soul is enjoined to be distinguished from *Prakṛti*. And having this perceptible result, the said knowledge cannot be said to have any other, in the shape of Deliverance, &c.

104 Bondage consists of attachment to the Body; and it is the negation of this that constitutes Deliverance. Therefore Deliverance must be held to be the destruction of



is ever known to be imperishable (eternal), therefore one could be delivered (i.e., Deliverance would be possible) only through the absence of the cause (of bondage)—(an absence) due to exhaustion (by fruition) of all *karma* (*karma* being the sole cause of bondage).

107. Barring its negative character, there is no other ground for the eternality of Deliverance. And no negation can ever be the effect of any action (therefore Deliverance cannot be held to be the effect of *Knowledge*).

108. The fact (as to the manner of Deliverance) is that for those that have come to know of the real character of Self,—all their past actions having been exhausted by fruition, and there being no subsequent residue (of actions),—the body is never again produced (and this is what is meant by Deliverance).

109. It is only for the purpose of enjoying the results of our past actions that our body is produced; consequently, when there are no actions (left to bring about their results), there is no cause left for such productions (of the body).

110. One desiring Deliverance, therefore, would not engage in (i.e., perform) such actions as are either prohibited or are enjoined with a view to the attainment of certain (material) results. But he would continue to perform those that are enjoined as necessary (and to be performed daily); and those that are enjoined as to be performed on certain specific occasions (such as eclipses and the like),—in order to avoid the sin (accruing from the non-performance of such actions).

111. The effects (of the necessary sacrifices f.i.) are known to result

the present body and the non-production of any future body for the particular Soul. Bondage again is due to *Karma*; so when *Karma* is destroyed by fruition, the consequent Bondage ceases by itself on the cessation of its instigating cause (*Karma*); and thus Deliverance being of a negative character, would be eternal; in fact all total destructions are eternal; and Deliverance too has been shown to be only the *total destruction* of the present body, &c., &c.

107 The result of knowledge is what has been explained above, in K. 103.

108 "*Body is never produced.*"—Because it is only *Karma* that brings about the confinement of the Soul in a body. Says the *Kārikā*: "Since all persons so delivered are also found to be knowing the character of the self, therefore we must admit that such knowledge is only an indirect auxiliary aid to Deliverance; but it cannot be held to be the real direct final cause of deliverance" (see above).

110 This refers to the following objection: "If such be the case, then one who desires Deliverance would cease to perform the actions enjoined in the Veda; because if he were to perform such actions he would be sowing seeds for the reaping whereof he should have to take another birth in the physical world." The sense of the *Kārikā* is clear.

"*To avoid sin, &c.*"—If he does not avoid sin, he will have to be born again, in order to reap the harvest of that sin.

111 This refers to the following objection: "Even of necessary actions—the *Agniotra* and the like,—certain results, in the shape of Heaven, &c., are mentioned in the

only when they are desired by the agent; and as such they could not accrue to one who does not desire them. And as this (aversion to results) exists in one who knows one's real self, it is in this that such knowledge comes to be of *indirect use* (to the attainment of Deliverance).

112. It is not at all necessary for people who are conscious of their bodies (as being the only impediment to Deliverance), to have an idea of Creation and Dissolution, beyond (their own bodies), with regard to the whole universe.

113. Therefore the theory of Creation and Dissolution must be admitted to resemble the present every-day processes (of production and destruction); and any particular idea of these with regard to the production and destruction of the whole universe cannot be established, for want of proofs.

114-116. Even the existence of a Creator is to be rejected in the same manner as an omniscient person. Any such Creator cannot differ from ordinary people, except through (an excess of) *Dharma*; nor is *Dharma* possible without performance (of actions); and performance is not possible without an idea (of the action to be performed); this idea is not possible except from the Veda; nor is (a knowledge of) the Veda possible without (a comprehension of) words, &c. Therefore it must be admitted that all these (Words, &c.,) existed before the Creator. And again, such a creator may be proved to have been preceded by the Veda, on account of His being an intelligent being, like ourselves (who are preceded by the Veda).

117. It is impossible to give an adequate reply to the people who assert (the fact of the Creator being preceded by the Veda) on the ground of these reasonings (explained in K. 114-116). Therefore the followers of

Veda; consequently, even if one were to perform these necessary actions, he would have to be born again for the enjoyment of these results." The sense of the reply is that the person desiring Deliverance performs these necessary actions, not with a view to their results, but simply with a view to avoid the sin accruing from the neglect of the necessary actions; consequently, the results of these actions can never accrue to him. "*Indirect use, &c.*"—If there were no knowledge of Self, the person would not have an aversion to results; and as such, he would perform actions with a view to their results, which would thus accrue to him, and he would have to be born again for the enjoying of these results. Thus we find that the knowledge of Self is of indirect use, in that it indirectly saves the person from falling into the meshes of actions and their results.

118 In order to establish the possibility of Bondage and Deliverance, it is only necessary to have distinct ideas of Creation and Dissolution with regard to the Body. Therefore the mention of "Creation" and "Dissolution" with regard to the whole universe must be taken to be meant only to enlogise Destiny, and hence to induce man to perform such sacrifices as would turn the tide of that Destiny.

114-116 Prajāpati cannot be accepted as the Creator, unless he be something greater than other persons. And as no such greatness is possible without a knowledge of the Veda, the Veda must be accepted as having existed before Prajāpati.



the Veda must explain the usage (of Words) as being without a beginning (i.e., eternal).

118-119. Those persons—who, finding Sense-perception inapplicable to the case, seek to prove, by Inference, the existence of an Ordainer of the (meaning of the words) “cow,” &c., on the ground of these being related (to the objects denoted), like the words “*Dittha*,” &c. (proper names fixed by ourselves),—are to be met by this counter-argument: ‘all people come to know the relation of the words “cow” (to their denotations) from other people,—because they use the words,—like myself.’

120. *Obj.*: “If such be the case, then even the relations of (proper names) ‘Devadatta,’ &c. (with the individuals they signify) would come to be eternal (which is absurd, because the persons themselves are not eternal).” *Reply*: (Though the inferential argument just brought forward would justify such eternality of proper names, yet) this idea of eternality would cease on account of its contradiction (and consequent rejection) by a fact of Sense-perception (the perishableness of the persons named),—specially as this (Sense-perception) is more authoritative (than Inference).

121. Or, as a matter of fact, in the case of proper names too, the denotability may be regarded as eternal, even though its application (to a particular individual) may be non-eternal. And it is the non-eternality appertaining to this (application) that leads us to mistake the denotability (to be non-eternal also).

122-123. In the case of (common names) “Cow,” &c., however, there is no such mistake; because, in this case, the application too is eternal. For, as a matter of fact, the Relation (between the word and its denotation) must be admitted to exist before all the people that are found to use it. The relation being thus established (to have existed before all persons using it, from times immemorial), there could be no beginning for that relation.

123-124. If a word be taken to signify its meaning on the ground of its being used by a trustworthy person,—and not through its own

118-119 “*All people, &c.*”—We find in our own case, that whatever word we use, we use it only in that sense which we have learnt from other people. So from this fact, we can conclude that all persons must use words only with such meanings as they may have learnt from other people.

122-123 We find that the relationship must exist before it can be made use of by anyone. Thus then, inasmuch as the word had been found to have been used, since time out of mind, to express a certain meaning, we must admit that the peculiar relationship between the word and that meaning must have existed, even before that time. Consequently the relationship cannot be conceived of as having a beginning in time, i.e., we must admit it to be eternal.

123-124 The *Bhāṣya* says that we are not cognisant of any originator of the relationship; and that therefore, there can be no such originator; and the significance of words must rest wholly upon themselves, and not upon any personal agency.



inherent denotability—, then, how is it that we have no cognisance (either direct or recalled to memory) of the trustworthiness (of that person) ?

124-125. For example, the Banddhas, so long as they do not recognise an assertion to emanate from Buddha, &c. (their trustworthy source), they do not accept it as true, even though there may be an idea brought about by the sentence.

125-126. *Obj.*: “But when a certain conventional rule is laid down by someone (as that ‘ā and āi’ should be known as ‘vrddhi’), people accept ā and ai to be styled ‘vrddhi,’ even when, subsequently, they cease to remember Pānini (the originator of the rule). Therefore the remembrance of the originator cannot be regarded as necessary.” *Reply*: But the aphorism itself, carrying with it the name of Panini, would lead to an idea of Pānini (being the trustworthy originator of the rule).

127. Then again (in the case of the word “cow”), we have no assertion (of the rule) in the form that “the word *cow* is to apply to the object with the dewlap, &c.” In fact it is impossible to make any such (assertion), because the words (“*dewlap, &c.*”), (of which the assertion consists) could not have got their own relations (with their individual denotations) known at that time.

128-129. For these reasons we could in no way have any comprehension, without (an idea of) the originator (of the meaning of the word).

124-126 Those who take their stand upon the trustworthiness of the source of the assertion, do not accept the truthfulness of any assertion until they have found that it has emanated from one of these trustworthy sources. So, if we held to the view that a word can denote a meaning, only on account of the veracity of the originator of its connection with that meaning, then, in the case of every word, we would stand in need of an idea of the originator of the significance of that word, in order to be sure of the meaning applied being authorised by a trustworthy origin.

125-126 This refers to Pānini's *Sūtra*—‘*Vrddhirādaic*’ (I—i—1). The sense of the reply is that as soon as the *Sūtra* is cognised, it is directly known as one of Pānini's *Sūtras*; consequently the *Sūtra* must be held to carry, within itself, the authority of Pānini's name. Therefore every idea of the *Sūtra* and its meaning is necessarily accompanied by an idea of the originator of the *Sūtra*. This is found to be the case with all words whose trustworthiness depends upon the character of their originator.

127 Unless the meanings of the words, ‘*dewlap,*’ ‘*animal,*’ &c., are all known generally and distinctly, how could they be used in laying down any rules, &c. If one rule were held to be based upon another set of rules, pertaining to each word of the assertion, then these latter rules would stand in need of another set of rules, and so on and on, *ad infinitum*.

128-129 In the case of visible things, such comprehension is quite possible; only because such things are capable of being verified by other means of right notion. In another case,—where f.i. Pānini lays down the rule that “one should use the Sanskrit word ‘*Gauh,*’ and not the vernacular word ‘*Gāvi,*’ because in using the former we acquire a certain Virtue,”—where the *Virtue* is not capable of being verified by any other means of knowledge, if we use the word ‘*Gauh*’ in preference to the others, we would



Though in the case of the words referring to ordinary perceptible facts—such as the case of “*Vṛddhi*” noticed above—such comprehension may be possible,—yet in a case where the rule is based upon *Dharma* only (an imperceptible thing), we could have no sure comprehension, without (an idea of the rule emanating from an authoritative source) Pāṇini.

129-130. And again, the comprehension of the letter *Ā* in “*Āṣwalāyana*,” brought about by the change of the simple *Ā* (in *Āṣwalāyana*) into the broad *Ā* (in *Āṣwalāyana*=relating to *Āṣwalāyana*)—(in accordance with a rule of Pāṇini’s that if the nominal affix *kit* be added to a noun, the first vowel is broadened),—is never recognised to be correct until it is known that the change is in accordance with a rule laid down by Pāṇini.

130-131. In the case of visible objects, there may or may not be an idea of the originator (of the word); but as for the use (of words) in the Veda (where for the most part only invisible transcendental things are spoken of), such (use) would not be possible without a remembrance of the originator (of the meanings of words).

131-132. How do you apply the word “Cow” to the cows existing in inaccessible places? If it be said that certain persons (who have managed to get to the place) have seen them (and found them to agree with the denotation of the word “Cow,”)—then (we may ask) why could not the (all-powerful) originator (of the meanings of words, as accepted by our oppo-

be sure of having what is right, only if we remembered the fact of the restriction having been laid down by a trustworthy person.

129.130 The word ‘*Āṣwalāyana*,’ when pronounced with a broad ‘*ā*’ (in the beginning), could never be believed to signify ‘*relating to Āṣwalāyana*,’ unless we knew that the word ‘*Āṣwalāyana*’ had undergone a change on account of the addition of the *kit* affix,—a change authorised by a trustworthy lawgiver, Pāṇini.

130.131 Inasmuch as we have no idea of such an originator as that spoken of in K. 128, the denotation of a word cannot be based upon the fact of its emanating from a trustworthy source; and consequently the Word must be accepted to denote its meaning, by its own inherent denotative potency, which is uncaused and eternal.

131.132 In *Sūtra* 5, we have the word ‘*Avyatirēka*’; and this word is explained as *absence of any incompatibility, either (1) in time, or (2) in place, between the Word and its Denotation*. In connection with this, the *Bhāṣya* explains that, just as we find the word ‘Cow’ in one place, denoting the animal with the *devlap*, &c.,—so would we also find in all other places, be they howsoever inaccessible. And consequently, inasmuch as no human originator could reach these inaccessible places, how could the signification of the word ‘Cow’ (embracing as it does also inaccessible cows) be based upon the authority of any such personal agency? For this reason, the Denotation must be accepted as being due to the inherent denotative potency of the word itself.

With the present *Kārikā* begins a series of objections against this interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*; and the sense of these is that the *Mīmāṃsaka* could not be sure of the word ‘Cow’ being *not incompatible* with the inaccessible cows. “*Could never be restrained, &c.*”—and as such the word could very well have its signification based upon the trustworthiness of a personal agency.

ment) go there? Certainly being all-supreme (God) His accession to any place could never be restrained.

133-134. As for the meeting together of the many (originators of word-meanings), who could deny a meeting convened for a special (important) purpose? While, as a matter of fact, a rule laid down in one place (by one person) is used by people in every other place—e.g., the rule with regard to "*Vṛddhi*" (laid down by Pāṇini). Therefore it is only the second interpretation (absence of incompatibility *in time*) that can be accepted as correct.

134-135. If someone were to assert that the origination of the relations (of words and meanings) is based upon certain other relations that are accepted to be already existing,—then, it would be hard to say which (words and relations) are the self-established ones (not requiring human agency).

135-136. Because it is not right to assert that words, other than those known now-a-days, are those that existed before (and on which the origination of the meanings of the present words is based). Nor do we perceive any difference among the words that are in use at the present time; (and hence we cannot assert some of these to have existed before the origination).

133-134 This refers to the objection raised in the *Bhāṣya* against the theory of the significance of words being based upon the trustworthiness of personal agencies. The objection is that, inasmuch as there must be many such trustworthy persons, we could not know that all of them agree on the point of the rules regarding the signification of words. The sense of the *Kārikā* is that such important issues depending upon a committee of the trustworthy persons, it is just possible that there may be such a meeting; but as a matter of fact, we find that no such committee is necessary. "*Second interpretation*."—It has been shown that the interpretation of the word '*avyatirēka*'—as 'absence of incompatibility in place'—will not do; as that will effect our own theory as much as—if not more than—that of our opponent. Therefore we must take it in the sense of 'absence of incompatibility *in time*'; that is to say, there is no point of time at which the word 'Cow' does not signify the *animal with the dewlap*, &c. As for the aforesaid *personal agencies*, these could not exist at the time of Dissolution; and hence this interpretation will completely demolish the position of our opponent. In our own case we could explain the significance of words as being based upon their own denotative potency, which continues at all times,—a fact proved by their use in the *Veda*. Thus then, there can be no *incompatibility in time* between the Word and its denotation.

134-135 This refers to the *Bhāṣya*: *If no denotations were admitted to be self authoritative, then no new significations could be attributed to words, &c., &c.* (cf. *Kārikā* 127). Some people desire to escape from this dilemma by declaring that they admit of the self-sufficiency of certain words (in affording their denotation). The sense of the *Kārikā* is that this is not possible; because it cannot be rightly defined which are the few words that are self-sufficient in their denotativeness.

135-136 "*Not right*"—because nobody knows of any such words as existed before and have ceased to exist now.



136-137. Barring the eternality of the Word and its Meaning, there could be no other reason for (holding the eternality of the Relation (between these). Therefore (since the eternality of Words and Meanings has been proved above) in the Veda, there can be no beginning for the relation (between them).

137-138. The inference of the origination of the relations (between Words and Meanings) is negated by the fact of the absence of any means (of asserting or laying down that relation); and as for the inference of the non-assertibility (of a pre-established relation by us), it is set aside by a fact of direct perception.

138-139. The only means of comprehending the meaning of words lies in perceiving (and noting) the repeated comprehensions by experienced people (of words uttered by other experienced persons). And certainly this means is found to fail with regard to (*i.e.*, can be of no avail to) people, who do not comprehend the relation (between words and meanings, prior to the laying down of the rule).

136-137 We have proved, in the section on 'Words,' that the Word is eternal; and also, in the section on 'Akṛti' that, its denotation is eternal. And then, inasmuch as no Word can be used without a meaning, we cannot but accept (even on the sole ground of the eternality of Words and their Denotations), the eternality of the relationship between them.

137-138 One who would give birth to the denotative relationship of words, could never utter any sentences himself; inasmuch as he would not recognise any pre-established meanings of words. And as he could not utter any sentences, how could he lay down any rules with regard to the meanings of words (cf. K. 127 and 134-35)? On the other hand, those who, like us, accept the pre-established eternal relationship of words and denotations, can very well lay down and explain to others, in well-chosen words and sentences, the fact of such and such a word having such and such a meaning; consequently, the argument of the opponent—that 'a young boy could not understand any sentences, because he would not know the meanings of the words used'—becomes refuted by the perceptible fact that when certain words and their denotations have been explained to a young boy, he readily comprehends the meaning of the sentences composed of those words. And no amount of Inference can shake the truthfulness of this perceptible fact.

139-139 It cannot be asserted that the *Mīmāṃsaka* cannot make any assertions with regard to the relations of words. Because, in the first place, according to the *Mīmāṃsaka*, no such assertion is necessary; as young boys come to comprehend the meanings of words by picking up a word here and a word there, out of the conversations of older people. And then this knowledge comes to be supplemented by the explanations that he is favoured with from these old people, who are cognisant with previously established relationships, and are capable of making any number of assertions with regard to these. For our opponent, on the other hand, none of this would be possible; because before the meanings will have been laid down for him by his trustworthy persons, they did not exist for him, and as such, in what words could the 'trustworthy person' express the relationships, that he meant a certain word to bear a definite meaning? Nor could the trustworthy guide carry on any conversations, from which you could pick your knowledge of the words.

139-140. Even such means, as gestures of the hand, &c., could not exist at the first actions (at the beginning of creation). Because the meaning of these (gestures) could not be known unless there were other persons (using them).

140-142. (According to us) the young inexperienced observer (1) perceives the word, the experienced persons, and the object (talked of—the cow f.i.), by his *senses* (the Ear and the Eye),—(2) cognises, the fact of the hearer (the directed experienced person) having understood (the meaning of the word uttered by the older experienced person directing him to 'fetch the cow' f.i.), by (a process of) *Inference* based upon the action (of the ordered person,—*going and fetching the cow*),—and (3) lastly, he comes to recognise, the fact of denotability resting upon both (the denoting Word and the denoted Meaning), through *Apparent Inconsistency* based upon the fact of the inexplicability [of the action of the directed person, except on the ground of the denotability of the Meaning (the object *cow*) by the word "Cow"; and the consequent resting of the denotability in both Word and Meaning]. Hence we find that the relation (between Word and its Meaning) is comprehended by (the joint action of) three means of right notion (Sense-perception, Inference and Apparent Inconsistency).

Thus ends the Chapter on *Sambandhākshēpaparihāra*.

139-140 It cannot be urged that—"Sentences are not the only means of explaining the meanings of words; as Gestures could be easily used for that purpose." Because even Gestures could explain only such meanings as would be known to have been established beforehand as expressible by such Gestures. And hence Gestures could not help you any further than the Words whose meanings are laid down for you by trustworthy persons. Further, it is only when we find one person performing a certain act in accordance with the Gestures of some other person, that we realise that Gesture to be significant of that act; there can be no other means of comprehending the meanings of Gestures. But at the beginning of Creation, there could not have been any person to understand, and act according to, the Gestures of the Creator. Consequently, even the help of Gestures does not carry you a step further than your former theory with regards to Words having their relationships laid down by trustworthy persons.

140-42 The *Nyāyaratnākara* interprets the last line in a different way: It takes it to mean that, though Sense-perception and Inference help in the cognition of the relationship, yet it is only Apparent Inconsistency which is the direct and immediate means of its cognition. The translation, however, follows the interpretation of the *Kaṣikā*, by preference,—inasmuch as the *Vārtika* itself, calling the cognition of the Relationship '*tripramāṇaka*,' does not appear to have made any difference in the degree of help accorded by each of the three means of cognition. The difference in the two interpretations however is not of much consequence,—as it comes to the same thing, after all.

(SECTION 17.)

CITRĀKSHĒPA-PARIHĀRA.

1. The two arguments,—that have been advanced above (in the chapter on "*Citrākshēpa*") to prove the fact of the "*Citrā*," &c., not having any results (in the shape of cattle, &c.),—have their premises unproved (i.e., false); because the immediateness (of the result after the action) is not laid down (in the Veda).

2. The immediateness (of the appearance of the result after the action) cannot be held even to be indirectly implied (by the passage enjoining the performance of the *Citrā* for the sake of acquiring cattle); because, as a matter of fact, it is not impossible for the results of actions to appear without some specification (with regard to time or place, &c.)

3-4. Since actions become mixed up with one another with regard

¹ This refers to the reply given by the *Bhāṣhya* to the arguments on '*Citrākshēpa*.' The passage referred to is the following: '*nahi grīyatē kṛtē karmani tāvatyēva phalam.*' The *Citrākshēpa* argument is mentioned in the *Bhāṣhya* thus: "*Karmakālē karma-phalēna bhavitavyam, Yatkālam hi mardanam tatkālam mardanasukham na kālāntaram.*" And this latter has been resolved by the *Vārtika* into two distinct arguments: (1) "The *Citrā* sacrifice cannot have the acquisition of cattle for its result,—because it does not bring the cattle in its time,—like the Bath, &c."; (2) "Cattle cannot be acquired by means of the *Citrā* sacrifice,—because at the time of the obtaining of cattle, the *Citrā* does not exist,—like the attainment of Heaven." Both these arguments are to be refuted in the present section; and the present *Kārikā* strikes at the premises. The sense of the *Kārikā* is that the premises—"because the *Citrā* does not bring the cattle in its own time"—is false; because the action's 'own time' is not the time immediately following its completion; because the relationship between the Action and its Result can be cognised only from the Veda; and the Veda does not declare that the Result is to follow immediately after the Action. Consequently by the expression 'action's own time' (*Karmakāla*) we must understand that particular time at which, all impediments having disappeared, the fruition of the latent potency generated by the Action in the past manifests itself; and as this would be the exact time for the appearance of the Result, there would be nothing incongruous in the non-appearance of the cattle immediately after the completion of the *Citrā* sacrifice.

² "Because, &c."—If we found that the Action could not bring about the Result, unless some specification of time and place is made, then, through Apparent Inconsistency, we could have made the passage enjoining the *Citrā* sacrifice to imply a specification of time,—viz.: that the result of the sacrifice would follow immediately after the completion of the sacrifice. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the result of the *Citrā* sacrifice can as reasonably appear during this life, as during the next; and hence we have no Inconsistency of either time or place, on which we could fall back, for the implication of your "immediateness of sequence." The peculiar potency of sacrifices is such that, once performed, it persists for any length of time, till the Result has been fully accomplished.

³⁻⁴ This meets the following argument: "We infer such immediateness of the



to space, time, &c., and it often happens that the result of one action has been only half-realised, therefore the fruition of one action is often found to be deferred (to appear at some future time). Therefore the idea of immediateness must be regarded as groundless.

4-5. The fact of Sense-perception, &c., not agreeing with (supporting the declaration in question), it does not in any way vitiate the (validity of) its Verbal Authority. Because the disagreement (of Sense-perception) with regard to *immediateness* cannot in any way set aside the injunction whose application is free from any specification (of either time or place); inasmuch as the defects of the two (the Sense-perception and Injunction) are totally different.

6. (On the contrary) it is the inference of immediateness, which you deduce from the similar instance of the "rubbing,"—that would be re-

Result from the nature of actions in general." The sense of the *Kārikā* is that when once a certain action has begun to bring about its results, even if actions be performed, their fruition will be postponed till all the results of the former action have been acquired. Such being the case, and we finding, in every-day life, one Action following so closely on the heel of another as to become mixed up, it is not possible for the results of all actions to follow immediately after the completion of the Actions. Says the *Nyāyaratnākara*: "In ordinary experience we find that certain actions, by their very nature, have their results removed from them; e.g., the operations of agriculture; some have their results removed on account of certain specialities of time, place, &c.; while in the case of others, it may happen that the results of some other Action may not have been completed. For these reasons the idea of the immediateness of the sequence of the Result cannot but be false."

4.5 This refers to the objections brought forward in *Kārikās* 2-3 of '*Āitrākshēpa*.' The sense of the reply embodied in the present *Kārikā* is that the fact of the cattle not being seen to appear immediately after the completion of the *Āitrā* sacrifice cannot in any way adversely affect the Injunction of this sacrifice; inasmuch as the Injunction does not specify the time for the appearance of the Cattle as being that which follows immediately after the sacrifice. "The objects of the two are different."—The non-perception of the Cattle is restricted to the time immediately following the sacrifice; whereas the Injunction lays down merely the acquisition of the Cattle, without any restriction of time. Consequently the fact of the non-perception of the Cattle immediately after the sacrifice does not contradict the fact of the appearance (and perception) of the Result at some other time; and as such appearance of the Result would be quite in keeping with the Injunction,—and it has been shown to be not incompatible with the fact of the non-appearance of the Cattle immediately after the sacrifice,—therefore we do not see how the Injunction can be in any way set aside by such limited non-perception of the Cattle. In fact, if the Cattle were to appear at some other time than that at which the sacrifice is finished,—that alone would be compatible, both with the Injunction (which specifies no time), and the said non-perception.

8 The opponent has argued that the Result of the Action must always follow immediately after it,—as we find in the case of *massage*. The meaning of the *Kārikā* is that what is proved by the Inference based upon this Instance is the immediate



jected by the "non-perception" (of the cattle immediately after the sacrifice); inasmuch as both refer to the same object.

7. (In ordinary life) we find that even in the case of actions—as the attendance on one's master—the ends of which are quite visible, even though the result (the satisfaction of the Master) has been accomplished, yet, through some impediment or other (either seen or unseen), it takes a long time in manifesting itself (in the shape of rewards, &c.)

8-9. The final result (in the shape of the harvest) does not follow as soon as the corn is sown. If it be said that in the case of the corn we have an immediate effect in the shape of the sprout (growing out of the corn sown),—then (in the case of the Sacrifices whose result is the attainment of Heaven) we may hold that the Heaven results immediately after the Sacrifice (in a subtle and etherial form) and it takes time to materialise into a condition of being enjoyed. For, in the case of every effect being produced (from a cause), there is a certain marked sequence in the process (of its production), which is natural to each and every one of them.

10. Even if (by the instance of *rubbing*) you seek to prove the fact of the *Citrā*, &c., having immediate results, then too, your argument

sequence of the Result to the Action; and as it is the immediate sequence that is negated by the fact of the non-appearance of the Cattle immediately after the sacrifice, and as this *Inference* would be opposed to a fact of *Perception* (negative), it is the former that should be rejected, and not the latter.

7 Another instance is that of the effects produced by medicines, which appear sometimes very long after the medicines have been administered.

8.9 If it be argued, that in the case of the Corn, there is an immediate result in the shape of the minute form, which takes some time to develop into the final result of the Harvest, on account of the natural impediments in the way of its attainment,—then, we can say the same thing with regard to the case of Heaven, &c., also, that are brought about by means of sacrifices. We might argue that after each sacrifice there is immediately produced its result, in a subtle form, which takes some time to become sufficiently materialised for actual delectation, because of certain natural impediments in the way of such accomplishment. And in both these cases, the orderly process, beginning with the appearance of the result in its subtle form and ending with its ultimate realisation, would be only natural; the interruption, in both cases being due to natural impediments in the way of immediate accomplishment. Thus then, from the fact of our non-perception of the attainment of Heaven, or of Cattle, immediately after the completion of the *Darṣa-Pūrnamasā*, or the *Citrā*, sacrifice, cannot lead us to the inference that the sacrifices can have no such results.

10 The translation follows the reading '*anantarōphalatvam*,' which has been accepted by the *Kāṇikā*. The *Nyāyaratnakara* however reads '*anantarphalatvam*'; and explains it thus: "If by the non-perception of the immediate result of the *Citrā* sacrifice, you seek to prove the fact of there being no such immediate results,—then, inasmuch as we also accept the fact of the results not being immediate, all your effort would be useless, as you would be proving what we also accept as true." But this



becomes redundant, proving only what we also admit; for (we also admit of such immediate production of the result in a subtle etherial form); or else, how could we have the fully-developed results at any other time (if we had no sprout-like germination in the beginning)?

11-12. Finding a discrepancy in the case of service and other perceptible means (*i.e.*, finding that service, &c., do not *always* bring about the results in the shape of cattle, wealth, &c.),—we must admit that for the acquirement of cattle (in this life) there is some unseen cause, other than those that we can perceive (to-day). And then, too, the application of the causes, other than what we accept, is groundless; inasmuch as such agencies as those of “God’s wish” (held by the *Vaiṣṇvikas*), “Potency” (of Matter and Soul, held by the *Sāṅkhyas*) and the like, have been shown to have neither Verbal Authority nor Reasonable Premises, &c., in support of them. Therefore we must accept, on the strength of Verbal Authority, the *Āitrā* sacrifice performed at some time (either during this or in some previous life) as being the cause of the obtaining of cattle.

13. The bringing about (of cattle) cannot be said to be without any cause. Because (the necessity of every effect having a cause having been proved by all the means of right notion) all the means of right notion cannot be invalid. In fact, in the present case, the Word (*i.e.*, the Veda) indicating an adequate cause (of the acquirement of cattle: in the shape of the *Āitrā* sacrifice) cannot be said to be invalid (untrustworthy).

14. And those, who hold that the results of the *Āitrā*, &c., must appear in this very life, will not be able to show any cause for the appearance of their results (cattle, &c.), in favour of those who have never performed those sacrifices during their present lives.

reading and its explanation do not quite clear up the last foot of the *Kārikā*. Hence the preference given to the reading adopted in the *Kāṣikā*.

11-12 Unless we admit of an Unseen Cause, we cannot explain the acquirement of cattle by one man, and not by the other,—when their visible efforts are exactly the same. Then the question is as to what this Unseen Cause is. All other causal agencies, postulated by the various philosophical systems, have already been proved to be inapplicable (under the section on ‘*Sambandhāṅkshēpa*’). It has been shown that no such agencies—as that of Divine wish and the like—are proved either by Verbal Testimony, or by any process of Inference, or by any other means of right notion. Therefore, we cannot but admit that the person acquiring the cattle must have, at some time or other, performed the *Āitrā* sacrifice; and the ground for this belief is supplied by the Vedic injunction—‘one desiring cattle should perform the *Āitrā* sacrifice.’

13 It cannot be urged that the appearance of the cattle is without any cause; so long as we have verbal authority distinctly pointing to the fact of the *Āitrā* sacrifice being an adequate means to its attainment.

14 We find that persons who have not performed the *Āitrā* in this life have obtained cattle; and as we have shown that there is no other means of acquiring it, we must admit that it is due to the man having performed the *Āitrā* in his previous life.



15. Because (according to these theorists) the effects of the *Citrā*, &c. (performed during some previous life) must have been exhausted in the course of that life; and portions of the (previous) enjoyment of Heaven cannot follow one to a new life.

16. Because actions, which have one definite result attributed to them (by the Veda) cannot accomplish other results for us. In the ascertainment of Gautama too, the "residue" must be interpreted with reference to the *Citrā* sacrifice (in the present case, where the effect under consideration is the acquiring of cattle).

17. If the effects were held to be merely natural (i.e., brought about by chance, and not by any adequate cause), then even such results, as follow immediately after the Action (e.g., the rains brought on by the *Kārikā* sacrifice), would not be believed to have their cause in that Action.

18. And then (if this Chance Theory were true) people could obtain the results (Heaven, &c.), even if they were, like the *Mlēcchhas*, not to perform the actions enjoined by the Veda (as bringing about those

15 The latter half rejects the theory that the cattle may be a portion of the joys of Heaven that the person may have been lately enjoying before his birth into his present life.

16 This meets the following theory: "The cattle might be the remains of the joys of Heaven accomplished by means of the *Jyotishtoma* performed in a previous life; as declared by *Gautama* (in the *Nyāya-sūtras*): 'The person having experienced all the effects of his deeds, comes to be born in a station in life, which is fixed by the residue left of his past deeds.'" The *Kārikā* declares this to be impossible; because the *Jyotishtoma* has been laid down as having the joys of Heaven for its result; and as such could never bring about any such result as the obtaining of cattle. As for *Gautama's* assertion, it must be taken to mean that whenever we perceive a man possessing, in the present life, something for his acquisition of which we do not find any cause in his present actions,—we must conclude that this acquisition must be the remnant of a like possession of his in his previous life, brought about, at that time, by his previous performance of a sacrifice whereof that acquisition is mentioned in the Veda as the specific result. That is to say, even if the obtaining of cattle during the present life be held to be a remnant, it must be the remnant of the cattle, to which the person must have been entitled by the previous performance of the *Citrā* sacrifice, in some past life of his, and which he must have been unable to obtain, in full, during all his intervening lives. And thus the obtaining of cattle could be the result of the *Citrā* sacrifice only.

17 Because it is always easier to explain an effect as natural, than search for its cause, &c., and thus all effects would come to be looked upon as due to mere chance.

18 The authority of the Veda lies in the Injunction of certain sacrifices, with a view to the fulfilment of certain definite ends. If these ends were held to be fulfilled by mere chance, and not by those elaborate sacrifices, then no sane person would be willing to undergo all the trouble of performing these latter. And as a necessary consequence of this, people would cease to have any faith in, and regulate their conduct by, the Veda.



results). And consequently all the authority of the Veda would fall to the ground.

19. And again, if the cattle were *always*, as if by command, to follow immediately (after the sacrifice), then the sacrifice would come to have a purely perceptible result, and in this it would come to resemble the case of a purgative bringing about the movement of the bowels.

20. And in that case (*i.e.*, if all results were to appear during this life) we could not explain the declaration of the *Bhāṣhya*—"facts experienced in previous births are not remembered"; nor that of the *Sūtra*—"the Scripture has its purpose in pointing out facts not got at (by any other means of right notion)."

21. Therefore just as the Injunction is found to be without any specification of time (as to the appearance of the result),—so must it always be accepted to be; as anything (idea) beyond that (which is directly signified by the Injunction) is groundless, and as such cannot (reasonably) be comprehended (in connection with that Injunction).

22. Even those (*Naiyāyikas*), who hold to the theory of immediate sequence (of the result), and explain the cases of non-appearance of

19 "Come to have a purely perceptible result."—If the result of the *Citrā* were always to follow immediately after the performance of the sacrifice, or even at any time during the present life, invariably,—then, the fact of the *Citrā* leading to that result would become an object of pure Sense-perception and Invariable Concomitance (Inference); and as such there would be nothing left for the Veda to enjoin, on the score of that sacrifice; and consequently, the Vedic sentence enjoining the *Citrā* would come to be taken as merely descriptive of a fact of Sense-perception; and thus it would resemble an *Ārthavāda*, thereby losing all its injunctive authority. In the case of the *Kāriṇī* sacrifice, the result of which appears in this very life, the result does not always come about as expected, being interrupted by impediments; and hence we could not have any idea of invariable concomitance (of the *Kāriṇī* with its result, rainfall). And hence the removal of this uncertainty would be a fit object for the Vedic passage enjoining the *Kāriṇī*. In order to distinguish the case cited in the *Kārikā*, from that of the *Kāriṇī*, we have the word '*niyogēna*' (=always, necessarily, as if by the command of a superior authority, and not by reason only).

20 In the *Smṛtyadhikarana* (Adhyāya I, Pāda iii) the *Bhāṣhya* says: 'We do not recognise any causal relationship between the Action and its result necessarily in the present life.... Facts experienced, &c., &c.' And the theory, that the results of sacrifices must appear in the present life, would go against this assertion of the *Bhāṣhya*, as also against that of the *Sūtra* (in Adhyāya VI) which declares that the Vedic Injunction has its purpose in the pointing out of something not yet cognised by any other means of knowledge. For if, as shown above, the result of the *Citrā* were to appear in the present life, it would become an object of Sense-perception; and hence the sentence laying down the *Citrā* would fail in its only purpose of pointing out something not cognised by any other means of knowledge.

22 The *Naiyāyika* holds that the result of the *Citrā* must appear during the present life,—holding as he does the theory of the immediate sequence of Cause and Effect;



results as being due to some discrepancy in the Action itself, are also in the same position as the upholders of the "Chance" theory.

23. The fact of (the attainment of) Heaven belonging to a future life will be proved in the first part of Adhyāya VI; and the absence of any fixity of time (*i.e.*, whether belonging to this life or the next) with regard to the acquirement of cattle, &c. (will be proved) in the *adhikarana* (section) on "*Yogasiddhi*." (iv—iii—27, 28).

24. Results, in the shape of the acquirement of cattle, &c., are held to occur at any time possible (either in this life or in the next), and not belonging *exclusively* to the next life. Therefore even for one, who would be in an extreme hurry (to obtain the result), the means enjoined (*i.e.*, the *Citrā* sacrifice) would be the same (that is enjoined for the sake of the result to happen either in this or in the next life).

25. That (result) which is common to many persons—such as the obtaining of rains and the like—must naturally be accepted as such (common); and since by all persons it is only *immediate* (or approximate) rain that is desired, therefore it can be rightly regarded as belonging to this life exclusively.

26. Though in this case (of the '*Kāriri*' sacrifice bringing about rains) the root "*Kamī* (to desire)" is not qualified (by a specification of time; and as such it is similar to the case of the *Citrā*) yet we indirectly get at the specification of the result (as belonging to this life), as otherwise it could not be desired. If, in some case, the *Kāriri*, be found to be non-productive of its result (in this life), we must conclude that, in that case, there undoubtedly exists (the force of) some other (contrary) action (performed by the person at some previous time) whose result is declared in the Veda (to be contrary to the obtaining of rains), and which has not been *all* enjoyed by this time.

Thus ends the Chapter on "*Citrākshēpa-parihāra*."

and as such he is open to the objection against the "Chance" theory (Vide *Kārikā* 14); and he will not be able to explain the acquisition of cattle by one who is not found to have performed the *Citrā* during the present life.

23 This meets the objection that if there be no specification of time, then Heaven also may, sometimes, be attained during the present life.

24 Whether the person be in a hurry or not, the means is the same, *viz.*, the performance of the *Citrā* sacrifice.

26 "*Indirectly*,"—*i.e.*, through Apparent Inconsistency. If the results did not belong to this world, they would not be desired. If the *Kāriri* is found, sometimes, not to bring about rainfall, we must conclude that the performer has had some residues left of some action done by him in the previous life, whose result must have been contrary to that of the *Kāriri*, which latter result has had no time to be spent up in realisation, and still persists in counter-acting the effects of the *Kāriri*.

(SECTION 18.)

ĀTMA-VĀDA.

1. Though it is true that the Soul can have no direct connection with the sacrificial implements, yet it is possible for it to have an *indirect* relation, through the body.

2. The perceptibility (signified by "*Īśha*," in the sentence '*ēśha yajñāyudhī yajamānah anjasā swargam lokam yāti*'), though really pertaining to the Body, is indirectly referred to the Soul also (on account of its connection with the body). Conversely, the approach to Heaven, though really (primarily) belonging to the Soul, is indirectly (and secondarily) referred to the body.

3. By the denial of the Soul in connection with this particular passage, all the Veda is rendered open to objection. Because (if there be no Soul, then) the relations of the means and consequences laid down therein, become incapable of being established.

4. The Vedas have declared that the results of sacrifices appertain to the performer, in some birth or other; and if the Soul were nothing more than mere *Idea*, then it could not have the character of the performer (of actions) and enjoyer (of results).

5. If, after the perishing of the body, nothing is held to exist, then many sacrifices failing to bring about their results (in this life), the Vedic passages, mentioning these (sacrifices as leading to supernatural results), become false.

6. Therefore, it is with a view to establish the authority of the Veda, that the existence of the Soul is sought to be proved here; even though the single passage in question ("*Īśha-yajñāyudhī*, &c."), may be explained away as being an *Arthavāda* (because the mere explanation of this one passage does not free us from the aforesaid difficulties with regard to the authority of the Veda).

¹ It has been argued under '*Ūtrākshēpa*,' that the Vedic sentence—'*ēśha yajñāyudhī*, &c.' is not true; &c., &c., &c. (Vide *supra*). And to this the *Bhāshya* replies—'*Ārīrasambandhād yat tasya Ārīram so'pi tairyajñāyudhī bhavati*'; and it is this passage that the *Kārikā* is meant to explain. "*Indirect*,"—i.e., the implements are related to the body, and the body to the Soul.

² This meets the objection that the sentence in question may be taken as a mere *Arthavāda*, which obviates the necessity of having recourse to the above farfetched interpretations. The sense of the *Kārikā* is that the explanation of the particular passage is not what we are driving at; what we mean is that if the existence of the Soul be denied, then the Veda loses all its authority. "*Means and Consequences*."—That a certain sacrifice leads to Heaven could not be true, if there were no Soul to experience the joys of Heaven; as the body is always left behind.



7. We hold that the Soul is something different from the body, the sense-organs and ideas, and that it is eternal; while all the rest, the body, &c., are perishable.

8-9. *Obj.*: "If it be eternal, even when it has the character of the *doer* and the *enjoyer*, then,—as at the time of the enjoyment of the result, it is not cognisant of the relation between this result and the action (that it may have performed to bring it about),—having no such idea as that 'these results that I am enjoying are the effects of such and such virtuous or vicious deeds that I had done (in my last life),'—how could it have any liking (for a virtuous action as being the cause of good results, &c., &c.)?"

10. "And when one does not recognise a result to have been brought about by any action of his own, then there can be no difference between the enjoyment experienced by one's own Soul, and that by other's.

11. "And even while doing a vicious deed, one might think that at the time of the enjoyment (of the result of this action) he would not remember it (to have been brought about by that particular action of his),—and thereby he would not avoid that vicious deed.

12. "Thus then, even in accordance with the theory of the eternality (of the Soul), you have, with reference to the result, the disappearance of

3.9 In the first place, it is not possible for an eternal entity to be either the *doer*, or the *experiencer*, as an eternal entity cannot but be free from all activity. But even if we admit such characters, for the sake of argument, then too, inasmuch as at the time that the result is experienced, no person is found to have any idea of the action leading to that result, that he may have performed in his past lives, he cannot have an idea of any action bringing about any particular results either good or bad. Hence, he could not be attracted to the performance of any actions with transcendental results; and that would mean a total cessation of all sacrifices.

10 That is to say, we cannot be sure whether the results we are experiencing in the present life are the effects of actions performed by other Souls, or of those done by our own Soul. And thus there being an inextricable confusion, one would be tempted to give up all sacrifices, hoping to obtain the results of those performed by others; specially as there would be nothing to convince him after the fact that the results he would experience in his future lives must be only those of his own actions; because during his present life, he is never able to fix upon any relationship between the results he is experiencing now and the actions that he may have performed in his past lives.

11 The person would not avoid an evil deed; because he would be unable to establish any connection between the evil effects he may be experiencing and any past deeds of his own. And thus he cannot be convinced that evil deeds bring about evil consequences. And as he would not avoid evil deeds, when tempted to them by the promise of temporary pleasures, of which he is quite sure,—he would be unwilling to forego these pleasures in consideration of future evil consequences, the chances whereof he finds to be, at best, extremely doubtful.

12 As shown above, it may happen that, even if the Soul be eternal, the person may not experience the result of his own deed, whereas he may experience those of



what has been done (by the Soul), and appearance of what has not been done, exactly similar to what you have urged against the theory of non-eternality; and consequently (since you cannot avoid the objection) it is needless to prove the eternality (of Souls)."

13. *Reply:* This does not affect our theory: because, for us, a remembrance (of the action) is of no consequence in the enjoyment (of its result); as neither engagement in, nor avoidance of, an action is due to any remembrance (of it) at the time of the enjoyment (of its results).

14. An idea (of a certain action leading to a desirable end),—the existence of which, as the means to engagement in that action, is sought after,—is already distinctly cognised, through the Veda, by the learned, before his engagement (in that action).

15. Even subsequently to the performance of the action (at the time of the appearance of the result), people versed in the Scriptures do have an idea of the result being due to a particular action in some previous life. And it is only such persons that are entitled (to perform sacrifices). And as for unlearned fools, it does not matter if they have no such idea (because such fools are not in any case entitled to the performance of sacrifices).

16. Such ideas (or remembrances) need not, in every case, be amenable to all means of right notion; therefore the idea got at by one means of right notion cannot be rejected on account of the fact of its not being got at by the other means.

other people's actions. And inasmuch as this seems to be the only important objection that you have urged against the non-eternality of Souls,—it is no use trying to prove their eternality,—as this too has been found to be open to the same objection.

12 "As neither, &c."—The process is as follows: (1) the operation of the Performer, (2) the Action itself, (3) the experiencing of the Result; and we find that the experience comes three degrees later than the original operation; and hence this latter cannot be said to be due to that.

14 Even though one cannot have any idea, at the time, of the experiencing of a Result, or that of the Result being due to any particular action of his,—yet, the idea of a certain action leading to a certain desirable result is obtained by us, from the Veda (where such causal sequence is distinctly laid down); and this idea would be enough to lead us to the performance of that action, for which we would not stand in need of any remembrance of the result having been actually brought about by that action (in a previous life).

16 As a matter of fact, even at the time of experiencing the Result, learned people do recognise its relationship to a previously-performed action. And thus there would be no hindrance to these people becoming engaged in sacrifices; and as for ignorant people, it does not matter whether they do, or do not, perform any sacrifices.

18 It is true that such an idea is amenable to the Verbal Authority of the Veda; and this is enough to establish its correctness; notwithstanding the facts of its not being amenable to Sense-perception, Inference, &c.



17. One who does not understand that from such an action such a result will accrue to him, must be an ignorant fool; and as such naturally he has no chance of performing the action (and hence even if he has not the idea necessary to lead him to a certain Vedic action, it does not matter).

18. As a matter of fact, even though at the time of the enjoyment of profound sleep, we have no idea of the enjoyment being due to the softness of the bed we had prepared,—yet we are led to prepare our soft beds beforehand.

19. And further, if one were to realise, at the time of enjoyment, the fact of its being the result (of a certain well-defined action),—then, as in the case of roads, &c., so in the matter of sacrifices also, the Veda would lose all its authority.

20. *Obj.*: “If your Souls be inactive (without any action), on account of their eternality and all-pervading character,—and unmodifiable by pleasure and pain,—what sort of the character of *doer* and *enjoyer* can they have?”

21. “If it be held that at the time of the performance of an action, and at the time of the appearance of pleasure, &c., the character of the Soul is transformed, then its eternality disappears.”

22. *Reply*: We do not deny the applicability of the epithet “non-eternal” to the Soul; if “non-eternality” mean only “liability to modification”; as such liability does not necessarily imply destruction.

17 “No chance”—because it is only the learned that are entitled to the performance of Vedic actions. (*Vide Adh.*, III.)

18 As a matter of fact, no such idea is necessary, at the time of the experience of the result, for the taking up of an action.

19 If such an idea were possible, then it would be a case of connection between the Result and the Sacrifice being amenable to Sense-perception and Invariable Concomitance. Consequently, just as in the case of the Road, the fact of its connection with the convenient passing of the people is amenable to Sense-perception; and hence the Vedic passage speaking of it comes to be taken as a Valedictory sentence describing a perceptible result,—so really in the same manner, in the case of Sacrifices also, the relation between these and their results being held to be amenable to Sense-perception, the Vedic passages declaratory of the Sacrifices would have to be taken as Valedictory sentences describing a well-established fact; and as such, the Veda would cease to be the sole authority for such sacrifices.

20 “When he has no action, how can he be the *doer*? And when he is unaffected by pleasure and pain, how can he be the *enjoyer*? As the only objects to be enjoyed are pleasure and pain.”

21 “If the principal character of the Soul can undergo a transformation, it cannot be eternal.”

22 We do not deny the Soul's liability to modifications; and if this is all that you mean by ‘non-eternality,’ then in that case, we could call the Soul ‘non-eternal.’