CHAPTER XI

EXTENSION OF NATIVE AGENCY IN CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

Civil administration carried on mainly by native agency.

THE foregoing account will have brought clearly to view that the civil administration of India is in fact carried on by native agency, supervised by a small body of Englishmen. During the last twenty-five years, notwithstanding the additions of territory made, the covenanted civil service has been reduced by 22 per cent., and, excluding Burma, the condition of which is for the time exceptional, there are now altogether only about 750 English officials,[1] including military men in civil employ and a few others, engaged in the civil administration, or about one to every quarter of a million of people. Besides these the higher judicial and executive service comprises about 2,600 officials, of whom, according to the latest returns, only thirty-five were Englishmen not domiciled in India. Four-fifths of these are Hindus, one half of them being Brahmans; the remainder, save a few Sikhs, Parsis, and unspecified classes, are Mahomedans. Under this class comes the subordinate civil service, including about 110,000 persons on salaries of 100 rupees and upwards, of whom 97 per cent. are natives of India.

Recent development of this.

The development of the native civil service to its present position has taken place in comparatively recent times. The great increase in the cost of the civil administration which has occurred during this

[1] This does not include the English officers in the police.

period is due mainly to this cause—to the creation of new offices required by the needs of improved administration, to be held by Indians only; and to an advance in the rates of salary paid to the Indian members of the service, which are now sensibly higher than the rates obtaining in the indigenous civil services of France, Germany, and other European countries. But when the earlier editions of this work were published, our administrative policy was open to the charge that it took no account of the increasing aptitude and claims of the people of the country for advancement to a larger share in its administration, and that the system established by the Company and Lord Cornwallis, of a monopoly of all the higher posts for well-paid Englishmen, was adhered to long after the conditions which led to its establishment had passed away. This charge can no longer be sustained, and a brief account will be offered of what has been done to remove the stigma, and what there still remains to do in the same direction.

Introduction of competitive system

The monopoly, not of the civil service, but of Englishmen to appointments in that service, was put an end to by the introduction in 1854 of the competitive test for admission. That test, however, was imposed wholly in view of its substitution for nomination as the means of maintaining the supply of Englishmen. That Indians would come to England in large numbers to take part in the competition appears not to have been contemplated by the authors of the scheme. At any rate the opening has in fact been taken advantage of to only a very limited extent, and so far as it has occurred the result has been to substitute for those whom it was designed to secure, young Englishmen of superior ability and education, a class of Indians having these qualifications also, but drawn mainly from one country of India, and from one class of that country, and in no proper sense representative of the people of India generally. A Bengali civilian appointed to office in Punjab would be

the Civil Service while retaining its character as a close body with a monopoly of all the higher appointments. An Act of Parliament[1] passed in 1870 provided that duly selected natives of India under regulations to be laid down, should be eligible for any of the offices heretofore reserved for the Civil Service. The regulations drawn up in accordance with the Act for the creation of a Statutory Civil Service, as it was called, were the subject of prolonged correspondence, conducted without any marked alacrity between the Home and Indian Governments, and were not carried into effect until 1879. They provided in effect for the nomination of the candidate being made by the Government of the province of which he was an inhabitant, and for the nomination being subject to the approval of the Government of India and Secretary of State. They contemplated that the statutory civilian thus selected should ordinarily be employed only in his native province—Bengalis in Bengal, Madrassis in Madras, Punjabis in Punjab; also that this branch of the Civil Service should eventually—at any rate as the first point of departure—amount to one-sixth of the whole body, and recruitment of the service at the examination in England was correspondingly reduced in this view.

Creation of Statutory Civil Service.

This new system was allowed only a short trial. In all about sixty persons were appointed to this Statutory Civil Service in the seven years following its introduction; but although the different provincial governments undoubtedly exercised their power of selection with great care, and sought so far as they could to make the service, in respect of the standing and character of the candidates chosen, representative of the classes in their respective provinces best fitted for high office—fitted to administer with talent and integrity, and to command respect, nevertheless the system was found to

Partial trial of it.

[1] 33 Vict., C. 3.

Defects of the system.

come short of realising the desired aim. The higher classes did not come forward, and many of the candidates chosen were young men, who, but for this opportunity, would have been satisfied to enter the subordinate service.

New departure made.

In 1886 the whole subject of the constitution of the Civil Service, outside the covenanted service, was referred to a strong commission presided over by a distinguished public servant, Sir Charles Aitchison, then Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, and composed of fifteen members, English and Indian, representing many phases of opinion and much diversity of interests. The Commission, after visiting various parts of India and taking a great quantity of evidence, submitted their report in the spring of 1888, which was referred to the Secretary of State with the opinions and recommendations on it of Lord Dufferin's Government in the autumn of that year. The final conclusions and orders of the Secretary of State in Council on the whole case were embodied in a despatch to the Government of Lord Lansdowne, of September 1889, to the following effect.

Indian civil service to be partially recruited from provincial services.

Heretofore, as has been explained, the administrative and judicial staff of the public service (omitting the special and technical branches, public works, telegraph, education, &c.), had been divided into two parts: one the small covenanted civil service, the other the whole body of public servants who, down to the humblest clerk, were dealt with under the general title of the uncovenanted service. The salaries of these, who outnumber the covenanted service in the proportion of some hundreds to one, were determined by the office held in each case, but they were all placed under the same conditions as to leave, length of service for pension, and other general regulations. This organisation, if such it could be called, was altogether anomalous and out of date, and is to be replaced by a new system. In every province the civil employees are to be divided into two bodies:

a Subordinate Civil Service, comprising the holders of clerical and minor offices; and a Provincial Civil Service to embrace the class engaged on executive and administrative duties. To these last, to be styled the Bengal Civil Service, Madras Civil Service, and so on, admission will be obtained under tests to be laid down by the Government of the Province (subject to confirmation by the higher authorities) and also by promotions of deserving members of the Subordinate Civil Service. Further, which is the important point in this connection, the members of these Provincial Services are to be eligible for any of the offices heretofore reserved for the covenanted service. The advancement will be gradual; the Secretary of State anticipates, and the opinion will be shared by everyone acquainted with India, that while men fit for promotion to the higher judicial posts will soon be forthcoming to the extent required, the development in any considerable number of Indian officials qualified to take the executive charge of districts can be looked for only by degrees. Meanwhile the recruitment of the civil service in England is to be so regulated that it may suffice eventually to fill only five-sixths of the posts now held by it. Some years must elapse before the change can be carried even so far, and speculation as to any further development the system may be found capable of taking when that point is reached would, in the light of the limited experience now available, be premature and unprofitable. When time shall have shown that Indian magistrates can carry on the charge of districts with firmness and judgment in circumstances of stress and difficulty—and such occasions will surely arise as the years go by—it will be soon enough to frame rules for their advancement to still more responsible posts. We may be sure that the desire to maintain the pledge in the Queen's proclamation will increase rather than diminish as time goes on, and that no limit will be placed on the em-

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ployment of Indians in all civil offices save that determined by their own fitness and the necessity for securing the efficient government of the country, which must always be the first condition to keep in view.

Abolition of title 'covenanted' for civil service.

With these changes in the organisation of the other branches of the civil service, the title of 'covenanted' for the portion appointed from England is very properly to be abolished. It arose out of a great reform introduced by Lord Cornwallis, who found the civil servants of the Company miserably paid, but allowed to make their livelihood by trading. He succeeded in abolishing this vicious practice and procuring for the service a scale of emoluments liberal at the time, and which, although gradually reduced, would still be adequate but for the great fall in value of the rupee. From this date the civil servant on appointment was required to enter into a covenant with the company, whereby he undertook among other conditions, not to engage in trade; and thus a term, which in reality implied a precaution against a pernicious privilege, became in its survival a title of dignity. The designation of the body which bore it has now been changed to the 'Indian Civil Service.' The term Uncovenanted Service, which had even less appropriate meaning, has also been discontinued.

No special legislation has been entered on in order to carry out these changes, the Home Government being advised that the Act of 1870 contains the needful authority for giving effect to them. The same Act will continue to empower the Government of India as before to select any fit person outside the provincial services for the superior offices. So that the idea of engaging the natural leaders of the people in the government of them which for the present has been dropped, may at some future time be revived.

With this change it may be said that the road is now fully open to the Indian which leads to the highest offices of the state, and that the pledge conveyed in the

Queen's proclamation has been at last redeemed; while those who are acquainted with the present state of India will probably unite in feeling hopeful that the native civil service will soon prove itself equal to the opportunity. And all friends of India will watch the development of the new system with sympathy and interest. One further change appears to be distinctly called for. The competitive examination held in London should now be limited to British-born candidates. It is perhaps the smallest objection to leaving it to be still open to Indians, that to the extent to which the opening is availed of, must the channel of admission in India to higher offices through the new system be contracted. No one who has a claim to be heard would contend that a competitive examination is the best, or even a proper mode for the selection of Indians for posts needing other qualities than the power of assimilating knowledge. The new system which aims at selecting men for advancement from an already carefully selected service, on the ground of proved ability in the discharge of public duties, gives a full guarantee for their efficiency, while the promotion being provincial instead of through all India, the system ensures that the ruler set over the people shall be a fellow-countryman and not a stranger from some other part of India. But the essential consideration is that a certain number of Englishmen are required for the business. The present strength of the Civil Service gives quite as small a proportion as is sufficient if India is to be governed in a safe and rational way—at any rate for the present. Some people profess to look forward to the time when the English element in the Government will be represented by the Viceroy and a few Governors, presumably with a British army still maintained to keep the peace. When we get to that point the change assuredly will not stop there. We are, however, a long way off from such a state of things, and if the Home Government

Competitive system should be limited to English candidates.

will have the courage to declare that the selection of civil servants made in England is to be for the English portion only of that service—a portion steadily decreasing, but the strength of which cannot be left to chance, and must be maintained at the numbers considered to be necessary; such an announcement will be approved by all whose judgment is based on reason and experience.

CHAPTER XII

RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN ARMY

THE first establishment of the Company's Indian army may be considered to date from the year 1748, when a small body of Sepoys was raised at Madras, after the example set by the French, for the defence of that settlement in the war which had broken out four years previously between France and England. At the same time a small European force was raised, formed of such sailors as could be spared from the ships on the coast, and of men smuggled on board the Company's vessels in England by the crimps. An officer, Major Lawrence, was appointed by a commission from the Company to command their forces in India.

Company's forces raised in Madras.

Hostilities between the English and French were terminated in the following year (1749), on the receipt of news of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; but about the same time the settlements of both nations began to take an active part in the politics of the peninsula, and the engagements into which the English entered with the parties whose cause they supported led to a rapid increase of the Madras native army, stimulated further by the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756.

During this time Calcutta remained a purely commercial settlement, and the military force with which Clive retook that place in 1757 from the Nawab of Bengal, and won the Battle of Plassey, was principally composed of troops, native and European, belonging to

Rise of Bengal Army.

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the Madras establishment, with part of a royal regiment of foot. On the English becoming virtual masters of Bengal, Clive proceeded to raise a Sepoy force after the Madras pattern, commanded by English officers, and supplemented by a local force of European infantry and artillery. The complications which soon followed in Bengal politics, arising out of the deposition of successive Nawabs by their new masters, and the efforts of the party of the emperor to recover that country, led to a rapid augmentation of the Bengal army, which, in 1772, consisted of 21 native battalions, 3 battalions of Europeans, and 4 companies of artillery. The native battalions were about 800 strong, and were commanded each by a captain, with a few subalterns attached; the European battalions and the artillery companies were more fully officered, but were usually very weak in men. In all, there was a nominal strength of about 3,500 Europeans and 24,000 natives, with more than 600 officers. The army was divided into seven brigades, the battalions of which were attached to them permanently. Each brigade was commanded by a field-officer, the whole army by a general officer commissioned by the Company, a charter of 1753 vesting them with authority to raise troops and appoint officers. It was with an army so constituted that the campaigns were fought which terminated in the final subjugation of Behar, and placed the Emperor and Nawab-Wazir of Oudh at the mercy of Clive, on his second return to India in 1765. The Bengal army had previously supplied a considerable detachment to the Madras coast, which afforded material aid in the struggle between the French and English in the South of India, ending in the final overthrow of the former, and the capture of Pondicherry, in 1761.

With the grant to the English of the diwani or treasurership of Bengal, and the fall of the French power in India, all contests for the possession of that province

ceased; but the English almost immediately afterwards entered into more extensive engagements. In 1773 their troops occupied Allahabad, in view to hold that place on behalf of the emperor against the Marathas; in 1774 they undertook the defence of the Nawab of Oudh's dominions, and their garrisons were moved up to Cawnpur and Fateghar; in 1778 the Bengal Government joined in the operations then being undertaken from Bombay against the Marathas, and a Bengal column was despatched across India to aid the western presidency. These measures involved a considerable augmentation to the Bengal army, which in 1786, at the time when Lord Cornwallis assumed charge of the government, consisted of 36 battalions of Sepoys, which had been formed into 18 regiments of 2 battalions each, and 6 weak battalions of Europeans; the whole organised in 6 brigades. The European battalions were fully officered; the native battalions were commanded by a captain, with a subaltern to each company. Under the organisation followed up to this time the promotion of the officers had been regulated in one list for the whole army, from which they were posted to the various battalions. In all matters connected with pay, equipment, and the audit of accounts, the army administration partook of the general laxity and disorder which had pervaded every branch of the Company's Government in India, the greater part of the officers' emoluments being derived from irregular perquisites; while, as to the quality and discipline of the early Company's army, the history of those days records a succession of mutinies, in which the black and white troops were alternately employed to coerce each other. The latter were composed of the scouring of almost every European nation, kidnapped or wheedled on board ship by crimps, for the Company's recruiting depot was not established until 1781. The class from which the Sepoys were obtained was familiar with the scenes of

turbulent violence which at that time were being enacted at every court in India. These conditions were quite incompatible with the formation of a well-disciplined or well-organised army, such as has been sometimes represented to have existed at this time. Discipline and sound organisation were the products of a later date. The redeeming feature of the troops of all classes was the gallantry and endurance exhibited in the numerous campaigns and protracted expeditions on which they were engaged.

Increase of Madras Army.

While the Bengal army was thus in course of gradual development, the Madras army also underwent a rapid augmentation. The overthrow of the French power, in 1761, left it indeed for a time without a rival; but the Madras Government had now undertaken the defence of the Carnatic on behalf of its ruler, whom it was rapidly supplanting from all but the nominal sovereignty, and the engagement involved the maintenance of a considerable force. In the year 1772 the Madras army contained about 3,000 European infantry and 16,000 Sepoys, with an establishment of more than 600 officers, the greater part of the cost being defrayed by the Nawab of the Carnatic. This force was shortly afterwards further augmented in consequence of the war with the Marathas and with Haidar Ali. The first contest with the latter, as is well known, involved a struggle for the very existence of the English settlement, Haidar extorting a peace (1769) from the Madras Government under the walls of Fort St. George; in the second war with him and his son Tipu, which terminated in 1784, neither side manifested any decided superiority.

Bombay Army.

The Bombay Presidency during this period, and for many years afterwards, comprised no territory on the mainland of India. But a military force was maintained for its protection, which was increased during the Maratha wars. In 1772 it consisted of about 2,500

Europeans and 3,500 Sepoys, with nearly 200 officers. The expense of this army, as of the Bombay civil establishments, then and afterwards was defrayed from the revenues of Bengal, or by the produce of loans.

In 1773, when the first Governor General was appointed under the Act passed in that year, and the Crown interposed to nominate the members of the Government, the Company's army consisted nominally of about 9,000 Europeans and 45,000 natives.

Royal troops in India.

The first regiment of the British army sent to India was the 39th Foot, which arrived at Madras in the year 1754. This regiment formed part of the force which went with Clive to the relief of Calcutta in 1756, and it was present at the Battle of Plassey in the following year. In 1758 it was nominally sent home, but in effect was broken up, the men being invited to volunteer into the local force, and the officers offered commissions in the Company's army. The English garrison in Bengal then consisted for a time wholly of the Company's forces. Madras remained without royal troops until 1758, when in pursuance of the elder Pitt's vigorous plans for pressing the war against the French in every quarter of the globe, a newly raised regiment of the line, the 79th, was sent out, followed by the 84th, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre Coote, and the 96th. In 1759 Coote's regiment was transferred to Bengal, and he was appointed by the Company Commander-in-Chief of their forces in that presidency. On the peace of 1763 the British line was again reduced to 70 regiments, and India remained without any royal troops until 1779, when the 71st [then numbered 73rd] Foot was raised and despatched to Madras. Four other new regiments followed, to aid in the war against Haidar Ali.

Lord Cornwallis, who was appointed the first Governor General in India after the passing of the Act of 1784, which gave that personage authority over the

three presidencies, was appointed also Commander-in-Chief, and was thus vested with supreme authority over both civil and military affairs throughout India. Up to this time it had been usual to confer a step of local brevet rank on all lieutenant colonels of the royal service, an arrangement which naturally caused dissatisfaction among the Company's officers, whose own commissions were moreover often not recognised by the former as giving valid rank. The high authority conferred by the rank and military reputation of Lord Cornwallis, enabled him to procure the repeal of a regulation which was repugnant to his sense of justice. Through his representations the local brevet promotions were withdrawn in 1788, and brevet commissions in the royal service were granted by him as Commander-in-Chief to all the Company's officers, with corresponding dates to those of their substantive ones. This arrangement was continued until the abolition of the Company's government in 1858.

Gradual augmentation of native armies.

From 1772 until 1796 the strength of the Indian army underwent a gradual increase, occasioned by the Maratha war of 1778, and that in the Carnatic with Haidar Ali and Tipu. These wars were, however, undertaken rather for defensive than aggressive purposes; and until the accession of Lord Mornington to the government, the policy of the English, although at times marked by great oscillation of purpose, was on the whole based on the principle of recognising the political equality with themselves of the principal native states, and maintaining the balance of power throughout India. Lord Cornwallis, indeed, when forced into hostilities with the ruler of Mysore, displayed a degree of decision and vigour at that time quite unusual in the conduct of the English military operations. The burden of that war, which ended in the complete humiliation of Tipu and the confiscation of a large part of his territory, was borne principally

by the Madras and Bombay armies, which received the largest share of the augmentation rendered necessary of the aggregate military establishment.

At the commencement of Lord Cornwallis's government, the establishment of royal troops consisted of one regiment of dragoons and five battalions of foot. In 1788 four regiments of the line were raised for service in India, and thus brought up the complement to nine battalions, which remained unaltered until 1797. Of these nine battalions only one was stationed in Bengal; two belonged to the Bombay Presidency, the remaining six, with the regiment of dragoons, to Madras. In the year 1794 the total strength of the Indian armies, including royal troops, was 70,000, of which 13,500 were British. The Madras and Bengal establishments of native troops were each about 24,000 strong, the Bombay establishment about 9,000.

Reorganisation of 1796.

In 1796 the organisation of the Indian Army was entirely recast. Heretofore the officers belonging to the establishment of each presidency had been borne on one seniority list, from which they had been distributed among the different regiments; and the proportion of junior to senior grades was exceedingly unfavourable for promotion, there being about eight subalterns to every captain. They were now divided into separate cadres, one for each native regiment of two battalions, to which henceforward the respective officers were permanently attached, their promotion up to the rank of major running in the order of regimental seniority. The lieutenant colonels and colonels remained on separate lists for each branch of the service, to which the regimental majors were promoted in order of army seniority, on succession to vacancies. The establishment of each regiment was fixed at 1 colonel (non-effective), 2 lieutenant colonels, 2 majors, 8 captains, 22 lieutenants, and 10 ensigns, with the result of a great advancement in rank throughout the army.

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This system of promotion was maintained until the reorganisation of 1861. The regiments of artillery and engineers were at the same time organised on a similar footing to that of the infantry. An establishment of generals was also formed for the Company's army, the officers of which, owing to the power previously conferred on the Company to grant generals' commissions having been withdrawn, were not at this time eligible for promotion byond the rank of colonel. It was also provided that a specified number of the divisional commands should be held by major generals of the royal army. These were fixed at two for Bengal, and one each for Madras and Bombay; until after the Mutiny these, with a limited number of brigade commands, were the only appointments on the staff of the Indian army which could be held by officers of the British service.

The year 1796 was further marked by the introduction of furlough regulations, which entitled officers to visit England without resigning the army, and also to quit India on sick leave, retaining their Indian allowances and appointments during absence. The privileges conferred by these regulations were, however, partly withdrawn in 1854, and they were still further curtailed, virtually, by the operation of the amalgamation measure of 1861. They were restored with more favourable conditions by the furlough rules of 1868, which have in turn been superseded by later regulations, more in keeping with the conditions of the times and the increased facilities for communication between India and Europe.

Subsequent increase of forces.

Lord Mornington (Marquis Wellesley) arrived in India in 1798, and immediately entered on a new line of policy, the object of which was to sweep away the appearance of equality of power between the English and the principal native states, and to establish the undisputed supremacy of the former throughout the country.

The era of war and conquest which marked his tenure of office, and resulted in the advance of the British cantonments to beyond Delhi in the north, and over the whole of the Dekhan and the Maratha territories, involved of necessity a large increase to the army. The Bengal infantry was raised from twenty-eight[1] to fifty-four battalions, that of Madras from thirty to fifty battalions, and that of Bombay from twelve to eighteen battalions. A considerable augmentation was also made to the native cavalry and the Company's artillery of all kinds. The British troops in India were also largely increased; but the Company's European infantry, which had always been far below its nominal strength in rank and file, was reduced to one regiment per presidency.

Indian Army in 1808.

In 1808, after the great Maratha war had been finally brought to an end, and the military forces reduced to a permanent peace-footing, the Indian establishment was constituted as follows:—

	Royal Army		Company's Army			
	Regiments Cavalry	Battalions, Infantry	Battalions, European Infantry	Battalions, Artillery	Regiments, Native Cavalry	Battalions, Native Infantry
Bengal . .	2	5	1	3	8	54
Madras . .	2	8	1	2	8	46
Bombay .	—	7	1	1	—	18
Total . .	4	20	3	6	16	118

The strength of the three armies being, in round numbers—

	British	Natives	Total
Bengal . . .	7,000	57,000	64,000
Madras . . .	11,000	53,000	64,000
Bombay . . .	6,500	20,000	26,500
Total . .	24,500	130,000	154,500

At this period, it will be noticed, the Bengal and Madras native armies were nearly of equal strength,

[1] The number of battalions had been reduced in 1796 from 36 to 24, and again raised in 1797 to 28 battalions.

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but the latter had a larger proportion of British troops serving with it. The cavalry and artillery were on a small scale in proportion to the rest of the army; but this was in accordance with the organisation in force at that time for the British army at home.

In 1823 the two-battalion regiments of native infantry were separated into regiments of one battalion each. The officers of a regiment under the new organisation consisted of—

	1 Colonel (non-effective)
	1 Lieutenant Colonel
	1 Major
	5 Captains
	10 Lieutenants
	5 Ensigns
Total	23

Further development.

The period from 1805 to 1827 was marked by several important wars, and considerable annexations of territory. The war of 1817–18, conducted by the Marquis of Hastings—which led to the dethronement of the Peshwa and further contraction of the other Maratha states, and the expansion of the Bombay Presidency into one of the great provinces of India—as well as the first Burmese war of 1825, involved some considerable additions being made to the army, principally to the Bengal and Bombay establishments. In 1843 a second European regiment was added to the Company's army at each presidency; a third was added in 1854. The artillery also underwent considerable augmentation. The number of British regiments remained almost unchanged, but, in consequence of the large additions made to the territories occupied by the Bengal army, a gradual transfer took place of line battalions from the Madras and Bombay establishments to that of Bengal.

Establishment in 1856.

In 1856, the year preceding the Mutiny, the establishment of regular forces in India was as follows:—

	Bengal	Madras	Bombay	Total
Regiments, British Cavalry . .	2	1	1	4
Battalions, British Infantry . .	15	3	4	22
„ Company's European Infantry	3	3	3	9
Battalions, Artillery (European and Native)	12	7	5	24
Battalions, Native Infantry . .	74	52	29	155
Regiments, Native Cavalry . .	10	8	3	21

with three battalions of sappers and miners.

The native battalions were 1,100 strong in Bengal, and 900 in Madras and Bombay. The British line battalions had a nominal strength of 1,000 rank and file. The cavalry regiment had in the British service 730, in the native 500 sabres.

Additional native infantry regiments.

There were also in Bengal, besides the 74 battalions of native infantry, a few additional battalions which had been raised at different times, and which, although not numbered, took their place as a part of the regular army. These had three officers each, detached from the regular regiments.

Irregular cavalry.

The cavalry of the line bore a very small proportion to the infantry, and the disproportion was the more remarkable, when it is remembered that the plains of India are particularly adapted for the use of that arm. But a force of eighteen regiments of what was termed 'irregular' cavalry, was attached to the Bengal army, in addition to the ten regular regiments. The force thus styled was drilled and trained on the same method as the cavalry of the line, and was subject to the same discipline and to the Articles of War. The points of contrast were, that their officers (three per regiment) were taken from the regular regiments, and that the men, recruited from a superior class, yeomen for the most part, possessed of independent means, were engaged under different conditions (as to clothing, arms, and the supply of horses) from those which governed the rest of the army. The Bombay establishment also comprised some regiments of the same kind.

In addition to the regular army, various local regi-

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Local troops.

ments had been raised from time to time in Assam, Arracan, and other places which were exceptionally unhealthy for unacclimatised troops; while on the annexation of Punjab, a strong local force of fifteen regiments—five cavalry, ten infantry, was organised for the defence of the frontier, recruited principally from the mountain races of the border, and placed under the orders of the provincial government. The formation of these local forces, as the empire was increased, was deemed preferable to an expansion of the regular army, which in course of time had lost something of the mobility which distinguished the native troops first raised by the English; it was recommended also on grounds of state policy. It was felt that the regular army of, at any rate, the Bengal Presidency, was already too large a body, raised as it was almost entirely from one recruiting field, Oudh and the North West Provinces, and composed mainly of one class, high caste Hindus, united by the strongest bonds of common prejudices and interests. Accordingly, in 1854, on the annexation of Nagpur, a local force was raised on the Punjab plan; and again, on the annexation of Oudh, in 1856, another considerable body was formed, to aid the regular army in garrisoning those provinces. The Oudh local force, which was composed of almost precisely the same material as that which supplied the regular army, was the last addition made to the Indian armies before the outbreak of 1857. At that time the total military force in the pay of the Company was about 280,000 men, of whom about 45,000 were British soldiers. Of the latter, rather more than one half belonged to the royal army.

Contingents.

Further, besides the Company's troops of all kinds, regular, irregular, and local, a considerable supplementary native force had gradually arisen which was practically at the disposal of the British Government, in the various 'contingents' of native states. The first, as well

as the largest and most important of the kind, was the Hyderabad or Nizam's Contingent, consisting of two strong brigades of infantry and cavalry, with a proportion of artillery. This force was originally established in order to strengthen the position of our ally the Nizam in his own dominions, and with respect to his neighbours, and also in order to give the British Government the aid which would be available from the alliance, were a portion of his army rendered efficient by discipline. The contingent was commanded by European officers taken from the regular regiments of the Indian army, and was paid for by the Nizam, the payment eventually taking the form of an assignment of territory in perpetuity. This example was in course of time followed in other places, and in 1857 almost every native state had its contingent based on the same plan, and paid for in the same or a similar way. These troops were not under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, but were under the direction of the Foreign (or diplomatic) Department of the Government of India, the officer in command receiving his instructions through the Resident at the native court in question. The aggregate strength of these contingents was about 35,000 men, largely recruited from the countries (North West Provinces and Oudh) which furnished the greater part of the regular army, certainly the best fighting material we had found in India until we came across the people of Punjab, and which had carried the British flag over every part of the country.

Officering of irregular troops.

All the battalions and regiments additional to the regular army—extra regiments of the line, irregular cavalry, local troops, and contingents—had each a complement of three European officers, selected and specially appointed to them from the regular regiments. To supply these officers, the effective strength of the latter, which was nominally two officers per troop and company, was thus correspondingly reduced; and as appointment to the irregular service in every branch carried with it an

increase of pay and higher relative position, it was eagerly sought after. Thus, from an early date, the system of officering the irregular service tended to lower the efficiency and credit of the regular army. But this was a small part of the evil. The whole of the extensive army staff and the military departments—commissariat, pay, stud, &c.—were all supplied in the same way by officers borne on the effective strength of their regiments; and the drain on the latter was still further increased by the formation of the mixed commissions of civil and military officers, for the administration of the different non-regulation provinces as they came under British rule. The employment of military officers in diplomatic duties, and as judges and magistrates (under the titles of commissioner, deputy-commissioner, &c.), dates from the earliest period of British rule; but the great drain of this kind was caused by the annexations made by Lord Dalhousie of Punjab, Nagpur, and Oudh, when, simultaneously with the formation of large new local forces, a great number of officers were appointed to the civil administration of those provinces. The Court of Directors authorised a slight addition to the army to meet this demand, a sixth captain being added to each regiment of cavalry and infantry in 1843, and a seventh captain and eleventh lieutenant in 1854; but these augmentations were but a slight alleviation of the evil, and at the outbreak of the Mutiny, out of the nominal strength of twenty-five officers there was scarcely a regiment in the country with a dozen officers attached to it. The greater number of the Bengal regiments had much less, and the majority of these officers were ensigns and junior lieutenants, who had not yet qualified for staff employ.

Withdrawal of officers for civil duties.

Its ill effects.

But the paucity of officers was the smallest part of the evil, for a dozen officers under a good system should have been an ample complement for a native battalion. The mischief lay in the unhealthy feeling of dissatisfac-

tion with which regimental duty came to be regarded, as the last course, only to be undergone by the minority who could get nothing better. If it had been a question in each case of making a definitive choice between the irregular and regular service, or between a civil and a military career, no doubt many aspiring and able soldiers would have elected to remain with their proper regiments, foregoing present advantages for the chances of future distinction. But, as matters were arranged, a man sacrificed nothing of his regimental position by accepting staff or civil employ. He rejoined his battalion in his proper standing if it were ordered on active service, and in most cases he reverted to it on promotion to field officer, when as a matter of course he took the command, no amount of absence on civil duty being deemed to make him ineligible for that position. Under these circumstances, when every consideration tended to attract an officer from his regiment, it must have been almost impossible that any man should voluntarily elect to remain permanently on regimental duty with the regular army; and in fact almost all the abler officers escaped from that employment, which had come to be regarded as what must needs be accepted either in default of good-luck, or as a mere rest-house on the way to preferment in some other direction. The effect of this prevailing sentiment on the tone of the native army was only too apparent during its latter days. It was impossible but that this degeneracy of feeling should be reflected by the men; and the paucity of officers, from the manner in which it came about, was unquestionably one of the many causes which led up to the great Mutiny.

Other defects of system.

Other causes combined especially to impair the tone and discipline of the army. Two field-officers were nominally attached to each regiment, a major and a lieutenant colonel, but there was not, on the average, more than one available for duty. Now the majors, as

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has already been explained, belonged to their respective regiments, from which they could not be removed, while the lieutenant colonels were borne on one general list for each branch of the service, infantry and cavalry. In order therefore that the field officers should be distributed equally, it followed that the lieutenant colonels had to be posted to those regiments of which the majors were absent on leave or staff employ; and they were always liable to transfer, on the return of the major, or the promotion of an effective captain to that rank, to some other regiment in want of a field officer. A system which thus made a convenience of the commanding officers, was subversive of all sense of individuality and responsibility on their part, in fact the lieutenant colonel's position was thoroughly humiliating. To which evil must be added the excessive centralisation of the army administration, which deprived commanding officers of all authority; this, combined with the system of promotion maintained, under which all the non-commissioned and native commissioned grades were filled up solely by seniority—the senior private in the regiment succeeding as of right to the first vacancy among the corporals, and so on through all the senior ranks, and the permission accorded to the soldiery to petition the Commander-in-Chief privately touching any supposed regimental supersession or other grievance, rendered the commanding officer a perfect cypher in his regiment.

Seniority system.

The same vicious practice of seniority extended to the higher commands, every officer being held to be entitled to succeed to the charge of a brigade and afterwards of a division when it came to his turn, although this might involve his waiting unemployed for many years, possibly in England. The duties of command when he succeeded to it were little more than formal, mostly of superficial regimental inspections, and passing on references to army head-quarters.

The army staff and departments were officered in the same way. Once on the staff always on the staff; the man who succeeded in getting appointed to the adjutant general's or quartermaster general's department, perhaps as a subaltern, remained in it till he rose to the top after twenty or thirty years' service therein, during which he saw little of the army save through the medium of reports and returns.

The system was little better as regards the staff and generals appointed from the British service. These were mostly selected from the old army which had fought in Spain and Waterloo, men young and vigorous in the earlier part of the century, old and usually inefficient as the years passed by, when officers succeeded to the command of divisions, and of the Indian armies, after long periods passed on half-pay, and came to India for the first time worn out in health, and utterly ignorant of the country and the troops at the head of which they were placed.

Ill discipline.

Drill and military training were of a simple stereotyped kind. The long periods of rest were alternated by campaigns, latterly bloody and desperate, but of short duration; in peace time the troops had little to do. Discipline in the proper sense of the term had long ceased to govern them. They would obey a customary order, and when nothing occurred to interfere with their prejudices or recognised claims, the sepoys were singularly docile and well conducted; military crime, as commonly understood in armies, was almost unknown; but the history of the army was a record of repeated mutinies treated usually with culpable weakness, and so far as could be hushed up; while the want of conduct often shown before the enemy was glossed over, from a natural but mistaken feeling of regimental pride on the part of those who witnessed it.

The Bengal army with its attached contingents and local forces was over one hundred and fifty thousand

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Bengal Army over-grown.

strong, men, both the Hindus and Mahomedans, raised mainly from one particular part of the country; the former imbued with overweening pride of caste; all united by the strongest bonds of class feelings and common interests. Flattered, petted, feared, and conscious of its strength, this army was a magazine of explosive matter which a spark would kindle. The great augmentations made from time to time as one new acquisition after another was added to the Empire, had been accompanied by no corresponding increase of British troops, which had been withdrawn from many of their old stations to occupy the new frontier. The guard of almost all the forts and magazines had been entrusted to sepoy garrisons. Many among the officers saw dimly the dangers of the situation, but public opinion took its tone from army headquarters, whence the word was passed to make things pleasant and show the confidence felt there in the aspect of affairs. In this state of things a catastrophe of some sort was inevitable, for the army of 1857 was rotten to the core. The motive action was supplied by the greased cartridges.

Mutiny of 1857.

In the Mutiny only a remnant of the Bengal army remained faithful. All the contingents connected with it joined, sooner or later, in the rebellion. The Punjab Frontier Force—which formed a separate army, recruited from a different country, and which had never been brought into contact with the regular army—came eagerly to the aid of the small British force in the Punjab, and took a highly prominent and distinguished share in the suppression of the rebellion. The Bombay army, although recruited to some extent from Upper India, generally escaped the contamination. Of the Madras army, which was recruited entirely in Southern India, one regiment only of cavalry showed a mutinous spirit, and was disbanded.

During the Mutiny large reinforcements of British troops were sent to India. On the pacification of the

country these were again reduced, but the establishment retained was much more considerable than that kept up previously. This establishment underwent gradual reduction from time to time, till in 1882 it had been brought down to 60,000 men—or about 15,000 more than the nominal establishment of the pre-Mutiny days. The events on the frontier in 1885 with the new military responsibilities then brought to light indicated that the reduction had been carried too far, and the British portion of the army in India was increased by 10,000 men, partly by the addition of some batteries of artillery and three battalions of infantry, partly by strengthening the rank and file of both cavalry and infantry. The establishment now stands at nine regiments of cavalry and fifty-two battalions of infantry, against four of cavalry and thirty-one[1] of infantry in 1857. But as three additional battalions of infantry are now detached for the occupation of Upper Burma, annexed in 1886, the number of additional battalions in India itself is only eighteen.

Subsequent increase of British troops.

The end of the Mutiny found the Bengal native army again almost as large as that which had disbanded itself. A very few of the old regiments had remained faithful, but a great number of new regiments had been raised, the greater number in Punjab of excellent troops, the others in the North West Provinces, levies hastily raised of inferior material. A natural reaction had set in against the high caste Hindustani Sepoy, but the low caste soldiers who were in favour for a time wanted the needful fighting quality. On the pacification of the country being accomplished, all the three Indian armies were largely reduced; a number of regiments were disbanded and the strength of the remainder in rank and file was cut down. At the same time the nine battalions of local European infantry, with three regiments of European light cavalry which

Reorganisation after the Mutiny. Reductions made.

[1] Nine of these belonged to the Company's service.

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had been raised during the Mutiny and officered from the unemployed officers of the mutinous Bengal cavalry —a force in which the Court of Directors had a special interest—were transferred to the British army. The three presidential regiments of artillery also were absorbed into the Royal Regiment. The reduced Indian armies now consisted of native cavalry and infantry only, distributed as follows:—

	Battalions Infantry	Regiments Cavalry
Bengal	49	19
Madras	40	4
Bombay	30	7
Punjab	12	6
Total	131	36

with three sapper battalions.

Of this force, the Punjab army, which had five batteries of native artillery attached to it, continued to be under the orders of the Punjab Government. The Hyderabad Contingent of four cavalry and six infantry regiments was retained. This force is commanded by a general officer under the orders of the Resident at Hyderabad. The various contingents and local regiments which had mutinied were not restored, but two regiments of local horse and five of local foot were maintained in Central India, under the Foreign (Political) Department of the Supreme Government. The strength of cavalry regiments was fixed at 500 sabres or lances, that of the infantry at about 700 of all ranks. The total strength of the reorganised native army was therefore 120,000, or about one half the strength of 1857, and less than it has been at any date since the time of Lord Cornwallis.

This great reduction became possible only by the general disarmament of the people of the country carried out after the Mutiny, and by the transfer to a newly organised police of a large part of the duties formerly undertaken by the army, especially the escort of

treasure from place to place, and the guard of the district treasuries; and there is no country in the eastern hemisphere where the military force bears so small a proportion to the population, and where, apart from the liability always present that the army may be called on to take the field, even the large cities are so slightly guarded in peace time. City for city, the military garrisons of India are now smaller than even those of England.[1] The Indian army, in fact, has been placed on the footing of a very limited peace establishment, and without any capacity for rapid augmentation.

The mode of officering adopted for the reorganised army will be described in the following chapter. It will be sufficient to say here that as regards the native officers and non-commissioned officers, the vicious system of promotion by seniority throughout all ranks, in itself sufficient to destroy the discipline of any army, was abolished, and by the new Articles of War commanding officers were vested with considerable powers, both for reward and punishment.

Subsequent changes.

For the next twenty years the native army underwent little change in strength and composition, although the British troops were gradually reduced. The Afghan war brought out prominently the insufficiency of the then existing organisation for service. A battalion 700 strong, when recruits, depot and sick were left behind, took the field at starting a very weak body, and under the stress of campaigning soon dwindled away to a handful of men little stronger than the company of a continental army, and this although the enemy was formidable rather from the advantage of

[1] Delhi, for example, the imperial city with a population of 200,000 abounding in dangerous elements, is occupied by four weak companies of British infantry, a garrison battery, a detachment of native cavalry and a battalion of native infantry. The province of Bengal, with 70 millions, has three British and five native battalions to guard it. All the obligatory points are held by such small garrisons that it is no exaggeration to say that, in order to furnish a division for foreign service, a strain has to be put on the army which is felt from one end of the country to the other.

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occupying strong positions and a difficult country, than from fighting quality. It was not, however, in view of reforming the tactical unit but under financial pressure that the change was carried out in 1882, of a large reduction in the number of regiments maintained throughout the Indian armies, accompanied by an increase to the rank and file of those retained. The strength of the native infantry battalion was raised from 712 to 832 of all ranks, and a fourth squadron was added to the Bengal and Bombay cavalry regiments, the general result being—with a considerable saving in cost—to leave the strength of the army practically the same as before, but with its organisation certainly improved even for a peace establishment. In 1885, however, the advance of Russia up to the frontier of Afghanistan, and the liability involved—then imminent and henceforward to be kept in view—of being called on to aid in the defence of that country, involved the necessity for an immediate increase to the army, which was carried out to the extent of 30,000 men, the 10,000 British troops already referred to, and 20,000 native troops. The augmentation in the latter case took the form, partly of an increase to the strength of regiments, the infantry cadre being raised from 832 to 912 of all ranks in the Bengal army and Punjab Frontier force,[1] and the cavalry cadre of these and the Bombay army to 625; partly by raising new regiments from the more warlike classes. In particular several new battalions were raised of Gurkhas, the dominant race in Nepal, soldiers of the highest quality. This increase was, however, to a great extent absorbed by the annexation of Upper Burma in the following year, the occupation of which was effected without any addition to the army. But as no cavalry is stationed in Burma, and the infantry garrison of that country is furnished mainly from the Madras army

Augmentation of 1885.

[1] Two (Baluch) regiments of Bombay infantry also were put on the higher establishment.

INDIA
IN 1894.

English Miles
0 100 200 300

Area and Population British India, 1891.

Provinces	Districts	Area in square miles	Population
British Provinces Under Government of India:—			
Ajmir	2	3,000	540,000
Berar	6	18,000	2,900,000
Coorg	1	2,000	170,000
Andaman Islands	1	2,000	20,000
		25,000	3,630,000
Madras	21	141,000	35,630,000
Bombay	23	123,000	18,930,000
Bengal	47	152,000	71,330,000
N. W. Provinces and Oudh	49	106,000	46,900,000
Punjab	31	111,000	20,870,000
Central Provinces	18	87,000	10,780,000
Assam	13	42,000	5,480,000
Burma	25	166,000	7,610,000
Beluchistan		38,000	260,000
Total British Provinces		1,015,000	221,400,000
Native States Under Government of India:—			
Rajputana States	—	130,000	12,020,000
States in Central India	—	78,000	10,320,000
Baroda	—	8,000	2,420,000
Hyderabad	—	83,000	11,540,000
Mysore	—	28,000	4,940,000
Kashmir	—	81,000	2,540,000
Total	—	408,000	43,780,000
Under Provincial Governments:—			
Madras	—	11,000	3,700,000
Bombay	—	64,000	8,060,000
Bengal	—	38,000	3,300,000
N. W. Provinces	—	5,000	790,000
Punjab	—	33,000	4,280,000
Central Provinces	—	29,000	2,160,000
Burma	—	116,000	unknown
Beluchistan	—	109,000	500,000
Total Native States	—	806,000	86,350,000
Total all India	—	1,820,000	287,750,000

British Territory
Native Territory under British protection
Independent
Frontier boundaries
Boundaries of the principal divisions of India
" " lesser States, Districts &c.
Railways open to 94
" constructing

Longitude East from Greenwich

Longmans, Green & Co., London & New York.

F. S. Weller.

which it would not be proposed to employ on the North West Frontier, the increase made in 1885 so far as effective strength goes is all to the good. With respect to the augmentation of British troops, the three infantry battalions added to the Indian establishment have indeed been absorbed by Burma, but those remaining in India have been raised from about 900 to about 1000 rank and file, and the considerable increase of artillery is all available in India.

Present strength of army.

The augmentation of 1885 brought up the Indian army to 70,000 British and 130,000 native troops in round numbers, or 200,000 men in all, at which strength it has practically remained. But during the last eight years some important changes have been made by the substitution of new for the old material in several regiments, the men serving in them at the time of conversion being discharged altogether, and an entirely fresh class enlisted, obtained mainly from Punjab or the warlike races on the frontier. Some of these regiments have been localised in the territories in which they have been raised.

CHAPTER XIII

BRITISH OFFICERS OF THE INDIAN ARMY

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Pre-mutiny system of officering regiments. Degradation of the regimental system.

Reorganisation of 1861. Reform of regimental system.

It has been explained that, up to 1857, all the British officers of the Native Army were borne on the rolls of the different regiments composing it. Each infantry regiment had an establishment of twenty-five, and each cavalry regiment of twenty-two officers, of whom rather more than one half were permanently absent from it, serving with so-called irregular regiments, or on the staff, or in some civil employment. To rescue regimental employment from the state of degradation to which it had thus been reduced, was among the reforms most urgently needed, and it was wisely declared almost as the first act of positive reconstruction of the native army, that henceforward employment with a native regiment should be in the nature of staff employment, for which officers would be specially selected. Whereas heretofore the number of officers with an irregular regiment had been three (a commandant, second-in-command, and adjutant), and with a regular regiment usually from ten to twelve, according to the demands of other departments, a fixed regimental establishment was now laid down, at first of six officers, subsequently increased to eight for the infantry and nine for the cavalry;[1] to each situation in the regiment a specific

[1] In the infantry a commandant, two wing commanders (the senior being also second in command), adjutant, quarter-master, and three available to take the place of the others when absent and learning their work. The companies are commanded by native officers. In the cavalry—the commandant, four squadron commanders, adjutant, and three others spare.

staff salary was attached, in addition to the officer's pay of his substantive rank, and appointment to the regiment and to each particular post in it was to be made by selection at the pleasure of the Commander-in-Chief. Officers detached for appointments on the staff, the tenure of which is for five years, are borne as supernumerary in their regiment during absence, and substantive appointments are made to it in their room.

Creation of the Staff Corps.

For the purpose of regulating substantive promotion, all the officers of the Indian army were to be borne on a Staff Corps, of which one was established for each of the three presidencies, and in which promotion was to be regulated by length of service, eleven years to captain,[1] twenty to major, twenty-six to lieutenant colonel; so that the service continued to be one of pure seniority (largely tempered however by the effect of brevets, officers of the staff corps taking rank among each other according to dates of army commissions), but in which office and employment were independent of rank and wholly by selection.

Merits of the system.

As a means of supplying the wants of India for officers, a system such as that of this Staff Corps is very suitable. Its merit lies in that it has no fixed establishment, but consists simply of the number of officers required to fill the various posts, regimental and others, maintained at any time, and so expands and contracts automatically with the varying wants of the day; the regulation of promotion by length of service prevents the block in or too rapid promotion which might arise with a fixed establishment. The improvement wrought by the new regimental system simultaneously introduced cannot be too highly appraised. But the manner of carrying out this great reform was not so happy as its conception. The old Bengal army having disappeared, it was a simple matter to post the unemployed officers to the new regiments which replaced it. But the Ma-

Blunders made in introducing it.

[1] Twelve years in the first instance.

dras army, and the greater part of the Bombay army, had remained unaffected; the result, therefore, of applying the new system at once to these bodies was that a part of the officers were placed in a new and much more satisfactory position with increased salaries in every case, while the remainder found themselves put out of employment. It would not have been difficult to arrange for the gradual introduction of the new system, or to defer it altogether as regards these two armies until a reduction in the number of officers should have enabled the change to be made without doing the injury which, thus carried out, it inflicted on the existing interests of the less fortunate officers.

The introduction of the staff corps system was also a measure which would with propriety have been made applicable prospectively, to the young officers entering the service after its introduction; its application to the army as it then stood involved obvious difficulties and complications, only to be successfully overcome by careful forethought and consideration to adjust the new system to the varying circumstances to be dealt with. These precautions were wholly absent from the handling of it. The scheme as sent out cut and dried from the India Office to the Government of India, prescribed that all officers then serving in any staff or extra regimental employment, including in that term service with regiments under the new conditions, that is practically all the officers employed in any capacity, should have the option of joining the staff corps; but that the names of the officers so transferred should still be borne on the lists of their old regiments, to regulate the promotion of their juniors. Since even the moderate rate of promotion guaranteed under staff corps rules was much quicker than that obtaining in the old army, this option was largely availed of, so that the unemployed officers found themselves largely superseded by their more fortunate brother officers. They naturally protested, and claimed

the right of succession to the vacancies caused by transfer of the latter to the staff corps. It fell to a succeeding Secretary of State to compose the differences which arose on this and various other points—notably in regard to the claims advanced to compensation for the abolition of the old retirement purchase funds, which had been maintained in almost every regiment, as to which it might and should have been foreseen that a difficulty would certainly arise. It was finally decided on the first point, with which alone we are now concerned, that the staff corps should be thrown open to the whole army, and that while the names of officers electing for transfer to that corps should continue to be borne on their old cadres up to the grade of lieutenant colonel, on reaching that grade the officer's name was to be removed from the regimental list and substantive promotion to that rank made in his room. It might seem at first sight that such a rule would have provided at most only a very moderate rate of promotion for the men who elected to remain in their old lists; but inasmuch as the offer of transfer to the staff corps was very generally availed of, the result was that in several regiments one officer after another rose in rapid succession to the lieutenant colonelcy, and was struck off the regimental list to make way in turn for his junior. If the officer so removed had joined the staff corps, the promotion being nominal only did not benefit him; his pay and rank were determined by his standing in the staff corps; but if the officer had declined the offer of transfer to that service his promotion was substantive; several officers in this way were advanced to the rank and pay of lieutenant colonel in even so short a time as eleven or twelve years, the average rate for promotion to that rank having previously been over thirty years, and having been fixed for the staff corps at twenty-six years. Army promotion was thus made subject to unforeseen and unexpected

chance, and the lucky lieutenant colonels thus prematurely advanced to that rank being for the most part unemployed, a large and unnecessary charge was imposed on the finances. Another mistake was made with far-reaching consequences. The introduction of the new system of a smaller but fixed establishment of officers for each native regiment, simultaneously with the sweeping reductions made in the number of regiments to be maintained, necessarily threw a large number of officers out of employment. The fixed establishment of officers with the native army had been about 4,300; the actual requirements under the reorganisation came short of this by about one thousand, after making provision for all the extra regimental appointments, military and civil, filled by military men. And every consideration of sound administration indicated the expediency of at once reducing the establishment to this extent, and that a supply should be maintained of young officers brought in at the bottom of the list in succession to vacancies, so as to secure a due proportion of strength in the various grades throughout the list. This was fully recognised when the great reduction was carried out in the strength of the Royal Navy in 1871. In that year a large number of officers in all ranks, down to the sub-lieutenants, were induced to retire by the offer of special pensions; but the establishment having been thus brought down at once to the reduced scale, the supply of young officers proportionate to the requirements of the new establishment was maintained without any intermission. In the case of the Indian army, on the other hand, the unfortunate decision was made to work off the superfluous officers, who were to be brought back to active employment in succession to vacancies, after a longer or shorter period of inaction, during which they had necessarily become less fit for duty with every succeeding year of enforced idleness. This process of reduction took about thirty

years to carry out, and many officers were never brought back to duty at all. Special retirements were indeed offered to a small portion of the redundant officers, but on terms not sufficiently attractive to achieve even the limited scope of the measure. And simultaneously, but most unwisely, special inducements were created to retain officers in the service. Heretofore the prizes held out to the old officers had been the 'colonel's allowance' attached to the nominal colonelcy of a regiment, which was usually reached after about twelve years' service as lieutenant colonel. As the latter rank was seldom reached till an officer had served considerably over thirty years, the colonel's allowance was virtually a retirement in old age. But a large number of regiments had disappeared, and to meet the case it was provided that the colonel's allowance, instead of being attached to succession to the colonelcy of a particular regiment, should be acquired after twelve years in the rank of lieutenant colonel. Thus the fortunate men just referred to, after twelve years spent in doing nothing, retired in middle age on a pension much larger than any pay they had ever drawn when in so-called active employ. Certainly the reconstruction of the Indian army was carried out with scrupulous regard to the interests of officers, but so carried out it involved a heavy public charge of which the burden is by no means yet extinguished.

Costly remedies applied.

The cost of the measure was, however, not the greatest evil caused by the ill-considered way in which it was carried out. The Madras army, which had sustained few casualties in the Mutiny, has been especially a sufferer from the unfortunate decision to work off the superfluous officers by degrees. For nearly a quarter of a century virtually no fresh appointments of young officers were made to that army, and the men who were at the bottom of the list in 1861 occupied the same position in 1876. Their rank had advanced, but

Bad effects of mistakes made, especially on Madras army.

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they were still performing a subaltern's duties.[1] It is unnecessary to comment on the disastrous effect of such a state of things upon the spirit of the whole body; in fact, it gave the final blow to the efficiency of the Madras army. Officers so situated could not have any heart in their work; regiments thus officered with men grown grey in the performance of subordinate duties, and without prospects of advancement, formed a most unsatisfactory school for the young officers eventually posted to them.

The officers of the Madras army thus growing old all together reached the age for retirement together, seniors and juniors, making sudden gaps in the list, which, the establishment having now been brought down by effluxion of time to the required strength, were filled up by the appointment of young officers in numbers far exceeding the proper average yearly supply. The first comers of this accession have had exceedingly rapid promotion, and the Madras regiments are now for the most part commanded by captains. But those who come below these lucky seniors will in their turn be very unlucky. The Madras officers are all very much of the same age again, all young men, just as the men they succeeded were all old men, and another block in promotion is impending. And some special measures will be needed to prevent a recurrence of the disastrous circumstances of the past. The needful degree of prevision to deal with this is perhaps hardly to be expected from the Government of India, the members of which hold office for only brief terms, and are very fully employed on the business to be dealt with from day to day. And a

And further evils to come.

[1] In a certain Madras regiment, not long ago, the eight British officers comprised seven colonels and lieutenant colonels and one lieutenant. From 1861 the two junior officers of a regiment were officially styled 'wing subalterns:' it occurred to the authorities, after some years, that this title was hardly appropriate for field officers, and it was altered to that of 'wing officer.'

Secretary of State, who comes to his office absolutely ignorant of India and its affairs, seldom holds it long enough to master administrative problems much more important than even the organisation of the army. But the Council of India, whose members have no executive business, whose functions are limited to offering advice, and who have abundant leisure, should be just the body from whom an exhibition might be looked for of the needful foresight to draw attention to evils to come. Past experience however does not encourage the expectation that this form of statesmanship will be exhibited by that body.

Amalgamation of the three Staff Corps.

It remains to mention about the Staff Corps that it was originally constituted in three separate bodies: the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Staff Corps respectively. Inasmuch as the officers comprising them are serving under identical conditions as to pay and promotion regulated by length of service, and that they are all equally eligible for employment extra-regimentally in any part of India, this separation into three corps was obviously unnecessary. Their amalgamation into one 'Indian Staff Corps,' repeatedly proposed by the Government of India, has at last been carried out. The title is obviously inappropriate for a body only a small fraction of which is employed on the staff. But a difficulty in the way of making the desired change in this respect has existed so far, that the title 'Indian Army' has been given to the minority of the officers of the old army who elected not to join the staff corps. These, however, are a rapidly decreasing body, consisting now of seniors only, and on their disappearance, when the Indian army and the Staff Corps will mean the same thing, it may be hoped that the latter unmeaning title will be discontinued.[1]

Title should be changed.

[1] There is also a body of officers, appointed in the years 1859–1861, termed the 'General List.' Their case is too technical to be dealt with here; it is sufficient to say that no difficulty would arise in dealing with them in the same way as with the staff corps.

CHAPTER XIV

ARMY ORGANISATION

CHAP. XIV.

Causes which brought about the presidential system of organisation.

THE circumstances under which the Indian army was originally created and has gradually attained its present form, have already been described briefly in earlier parts of this work. In the first instance the three armies which arose out of the requirements of the times were separate and independent organisations. The Government of Bengal had indeed from an early period a general authority over the Governments of the other Presidencies, but this was not exerted in matters of detail, and the three armies had only the degree of uniformity due to the respective Governments they served being under the orders of their common master, the Court of Directors of the East India Company. Each army recruited its native soldiers locally, and received its European reinforcements direct from England; it served only in its own Presidency, and was separated from the other armies by wide tracts of country under independent native rule. From an early date indeed the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal was recognised as being also Commander-in-Chief in India, but the authority thus conveyed applied only to control over the military operations in the field and to a certain limited extent over the discipline of the King's troops serving in that country. The native troops and the Company's European troops in Madras and Bombay continued to be

wholly under the local Commander-in-Chief and Government. Gradually the three armies came in contact as they spread over the whole country, and gradually also the Supreme Government came to exercise a more direct control over the administration of the Madras and Bombay armies. From the first, indeed, the financial responsibility for finding ways and means for defraying all military expenditure had rested with the Government of Bengal, as the supreme authority was then called. For long after it maintained an army, the Bombay Presidency had no revenues to speak of, and the Madras Government was never able to meet its military charges; but this responsibility was not clearly recognised until a system of annual estimates and appropriations was introduced, when by degrees a definite financial control was established and the authority of the two minor Governments to sanction military expenditure gradually came to an end. The military system continued however to be organised on the presidential basis; three separate departments of account were maintained; three departments of commissariat, ordnance, and so forth, all engaged in disbursing money supplied directly by the Supreme Government, and all acting under regulations laid down by that authority. The two local governments came into the business only in personal matters. Appointments to and promotions in the departments at Madras and Bombay were still made by those Governments, a striking case of patronage divested of responsibility; but this patronage, and the assumed loss of dignity which would be suffered by change have been largely instrumental in creating the opposition long maintained to the introduction of a more rational system.

This gradually became unworkable.

In the progress of events the Madras and Bombay armies, as has already been explained, were gradually pushed forward beyond the limits of those Presidencies to occupy the different territories added from time to time to British India. From the beginning of the

century the Madras army has occupied Mysore and Hyderabad, states with the affairs and administration of which the Madras Government has no concern; more recently it has been called on to furnish garrisons for the Central Provinces, the maritime districts of Burma, and even portions of Bengal and Bombay. Similarly, on the occupation of Central India and Rajputana after the last Maratha War, in 1817, a portion of the garrisons of these countries was allotted to the Bombay army, which latterly has also detached some of its regiments to remote Baluchistan. The complications involved in carrying on the military business of the Indian Government in this disjointed fashion have long been extraordinarily troublesome and inconvenient; the state of things arising in war was in the last degree embarrassing. The Government of India which was alone responsible for the conduct of military operations, had not even the advantage of choosing the generals and staff to be employed, the nomination of which for the contingents supplied from the Madras and Bombay armies rested, according to the etiquette obtaining, with their respective Governments. If we suppose that in a case of an expeditionary force sent abroad from the United Kingdom, the selection of the troops to go from Ireland and the Channel Islands with their generals and staff, were to be vested in the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland and the Governor of Guernsey respectively, we should have a reproduction of the practice which has hitherto obtained in India. The Indian Government in effect took the field with an army of allied troops, under all the disadvantages attending such a condition and with none of the countervailing benefits; the whole responsiblity for results and the burden of meeting the charges remained with that Government.

The serious evils and the flagrant absurdities involved in this state of things were first brought under public notice in the earlier editions of this work, more

than a quarter of a century ago, in which also was proposed a definitive plan for carrying out a comprehensive reform, to bring the organisation of the Indian armies into accord with the requirements of the day, based on the principle that the entire control over them should pass to the authority on which already rested the whole responsibility, financial and administrative. Recognising the extreme importance of maintaining the segregation of the different armies and their difference of composition, and pressing indeed that this should be carried out more rigidly than had been customary of late, the author pointed out that the nominal interposition of the Madras and Bombay Governments in the administration of their now scattered armies, which were serving under regulations in the framing of which they had practically no part, and stationed for the most part in countries with which they had no concern, so far as it was not directly mischievous was simply productive of needless expense and delay in the disposal of business. The remedy proposed was obvious and simple. Those armies should be maintained intact, but they should be removed from the control of the local governments, the various disbursing departments and the offices of account and audit being brought directly under the Government of India and the local Commanders-in-Chief placed directly under the Commander-in-Chief in India.

Evils of maintaining system brought to notice in previous editions.

And reforms proposed.

On the other hand the Bengal army called for disintegration. The old army had become dangerous because an overgrown homogeneous force, all recruited from one part of India and from one class. This error, which mainly was the cause of the transient success of the great Mutiny, had indeed been avoided in the reconstruction of that army, and it now consisted of two distinct and nearly equal elements, Hindustani and Punjabi. But the principle of segregation had been lost sight of; the two classes of regiments had been mixed up together, all over northern India, Hindustanis serving

on the Peshawur frontier, and Punjabis at Calcutta. Moreover, the Bengal army was spread over a country far too extensive for a single command, and every consideration pointed to the need for dividing it into two separate armies, to be kept entirely apart from each other in peace time, for the eastern and western parts of the north of India, which from their position and composition would accurately be called the armies of Hindustan and Punjab, the name Bengal being dropped altogether. Always a misnomer, since there has never been a Bengali serving in it, it had become more than ever inappropriate, and indeed absurd, now that only a very small fraction of that army was serving in Bengal. The commanders of these two armies would be placed on the same footing as the Commanders-in-Chief at Madras and Bombay; the Commander-in-Chief in India, dissociated from his present immediate connection with the Bengal army, would occupy the same position towards each of the four armies, and would be responsible in the same degree for the discipline and general efficiency of all.

This proposal to substitute for a condition which had been suffered to grow up unchecked without any attempt at progressive reform, to adapt it to the altered circumstances of the times—for a system, if such it can be called, full of anomalies, violating all sound financial principles, which worked only with infinite friction in peace time, creaking at every joint, and must infallibly break down in war: the proposal to substitute for this ill-ordered state of things an organisation symmetrical, simple in form, and based on the principle universally recognised everywhere else, that administrative power must go with the authority that is responsible, met with general approval except at the India Office and Horse Guards. At the one it encountered opposition natural from men wedded to a system in which they had been brought up; at the other the nature of the proposal

was not understood. The years passed by, but the authorities at home showed no disposition to take any action in this direction, when the Afghan war of 1878–80 and the revelations of presidential mismanagement which followed made plain the impossibility of maintaining any longer the existing state of things. And the Government of Lord Lytton appointed a Commission to enquire into the organisation of the Indian army. The ostensible cause for action was the desire to reduce military expenditure at a time of financial embarrassment. But cost and organisation were bound up together; the war had been illustrated by instances of grievous mal-administration and improper appointments to responsible posts, and the instructions to the Commission—a very strong one with the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, the most important civil official in India after the Governor General, at the head, were wide and general. Their copious and exhaustive report, in addition to proposals for reduction of expenditure, recommended a complete re-organisation of army administration corresponding in all essential respects with that proposed in this work—the unification of army administration under the Supreme Government, the detachment of the Bengal army from the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, and its division into two armies for Hindustan and Punjab respectively. Lord Lytton left India shortly after the presentation of the report, which fell to be taken up by the Government of Lord Ripon, and the adoption of the leading proposals contained in it was strongly pressed by them on the authorities in England. The latter, however, received it but coldly. To some members of the Indian Council any change upon the state of things obtaining in their day was repugnant, others were indifferent, those who approved of the reform were lukewarm in supporting it. At the Horse Guards the scope of the proposals seems to have been misapprehended; that office is not

which after protracted opposition and controversy

familiar with the organisation of the Indian army, and its criticisms on the case, so far as they are known, were hardly relevant to it.[1] They were mainly directed to the danger of overcentralisation in military affairs which was assumed to be contemplated. The fact that the Madras and Bombay armies had remained faithful when the Bengal army mutinied was ascribed to the fact that they were serving under separate governments, and it was argued that their loyalty would be strained by the transfer of their services to a distant authority. Further, that in the event of a recurrence of rebellion, a great advantage would be lost if the local governments were not in a position to command the services of the local armies at a time when perhaps communication with the Supreme Government might be cut off.

To this the Government of India replied that while overcentralisation, in the sense of concentrating all power in a central authority, dealing with matters which might with propriety and advantage be disposed of by the local officials, was undoubtedly to be deprecated, their proposals did not involve anything of the kind. Segregation of the armies would be maintained as before, while the division of the Bengal army into two carried the principle of segregation much further. So far from the existing arrangements securing the desired result, as a matter of fact great practical difficulty had been found in restraining the authorities in Bombay from persistently recruiting in Northern India from among the classes which supplied the Bengal army, in violation of the regulations prohibiting the practice. As to the supposed attachment

[1] The Commission, in their report, rather unfortunately used the term 'army corps' to denote what would, in fact, have been four separate armies, kept as distinct from each other as they were before the change; possibly it may have been apprehended that there would be a loss of patronage because the local commanders-in-chief were to be abolished. They were, however, to be retained under another name, and the number of them was to be raised from two to four.

of the local armies to their government, inasmuch as they were serving for the most part in territories beyond the jurisdiction of that government, with which they seldom if ever came in contact, and as the military code under which the troops were serving was not that of the local government, which equally was not responsible for the pay or clothing or equipment of the troops, the connection between them must necessarily be of but a shadowy kind. As to the supposed safeguard, in the event of internal troubles hereafter, of maintaining the nominal connection of two out of the eight provincial governments of India with military affairs, the degree of energy and skill which might be displayed by the civil authorities of any province cut off from outer communication, and forced to act for itself, would depend on the character of the Government. The Governor who showed the highest example in this respect during the Mutiny was one who had nominally no control over the army serving in his province. On the other hand, if centralisation in the bad sense was to be condemned, unity of command and control was an essential condition of proper army administration. The existing system, with the nominal interposition of the authority of the two local governments in the concerns of armies dispersed for the most part in territories beyond the limits of their own administration, was productive of nothing but embarrassment and delay, and must sooner or later be recognised on all sides as a mischievous survival of a state of things which had long passed away. Meanwhile, the liability was always present that the outbreak of war might find the administration of the Indian Government still encumbered by this defective military organisation. The correspondence was pursued for some years on these lines, the Indian Government continuing to press its demands for the reform, the India Office repeating its objections in a half-hearted way as if growing ashamed of its obstruc-

tion; but while refusing to accord definite sanction to the proposal, the Secretary of State gave the case away bit and bit. One by one, he sanctioned the transfer of the different army departments in Madras and Bombay from the nominal control of the local governments. In 1876, the three departments of military account and audit were consolidated into one with an Accountant-General attached to the Government of India at the head of it, and on this change being made, what control over army administration had still nominally remained with those governments practically came to an end. The three presidential Stud Departments were amalgamated in 1881. The unification of the Ordnance Departments followed in 1884; and later on of the Army Transport and Commissariat and the Clothing Agencies. The Madras and Bombay Governments had never been concerned with the charge of the barracks and other military buildings occupied by their armies outside the limits of those presidencies, the provision and custody of these having been entrusted to the governments of the different provinces in which the troops were stationed, while the harbour defences and other fortifications throughout the country were carried out by the Government of India through the agency of the Military Works Department, which had also the charge of the military buildings occupied by the Bengal army. In 1888, this department, reorganised in four branches, each under an Inspector General, with a Director General at the head, took over the charge of all military buildings throughout the country. Lastly, the three separate presidential staff corps were amalgamated into one Indian Staff Corps.

Meanwhile the military operations which followed upon the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886 brought into prominent relief again the evils of what still remained of the presidential system. The troops employed were furnished from the three presidencies, and nearly

one half of the Madras army was diverted to that country —although the Bengal and Bombay troops took the leading part in the operations, and the general commanding, acting of course in immediate communication with the newly appointed governor of the province, took his orders from the Commander-in-Chief in India, who was responsible to the Supreme Government for the conduct of the war, and indeed went himself to Burma for a time to superintend affairs from the spot. Nevertheless, Burma being a command nominally attached to the Madras army, the fiction was maintained that the Madras Government, in some sort of way which no one could pretend to define, was responsible for the business, and for a time the general commanding submitted formal reports to that government of operations about which they had otherwise no other information than was to be derived from the newspapers. This absurdity was eventually dropped, but the Commander-in-Chief at Madras continued to be the medium of communication between the general officer on the spot and army headquarters in India.

At last, in 1888, the authorities at home could no longer withstand the irresistible reasons for putting an end to a state of things repugnant to common sense and amounting to an administrative scandal, and the Indian Government were authorised to prepare the necessary orders for finally giving effect to this long withstood reform. These, which were to be framed in detail, were to provide for the assumption by the Supreme Government of the direct administration of all the Indian armies. So far the change would be little more than formal, the transfer of this administration having in fact been already gradually taken over, but the further important change was now to be carried out, an essential part of the reform originally proposed, of dividing the Bengal army into two armies, each under a general officer having the same status and authority

are at last in course of being carried out.

as the commander-in-chiefs of the Madras and Bombay armies. The immediate connection of the Commander-in-Chief in India and headquarters staff with the Bengal army would thus be severed, and the great patronage heretofore exercised by him of all the appointments and promotions connected with that army would be transferred, with the command, to the heads of those two armies to be created. On the other hand the Commander-in-Chief in India was now to undertake fully the functions indicated by his title, occupying the same degree of supervision and control over all four armies, while as a necessary condition of the responsibility attaching to that position he would naturally have a potential voice in selection for the higher posts throughout all those armies. The measure, while thus establishing unification of command and administration, was aimed at providing also in a large degree for decentralisation, by devolution of authority to the four army commanders and the local departmental heads. Everything was thus made ready for carrying out the change in 1890, but delay arose in obtaining the statutory authority considered necessary for severing the connection between the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Madras and Bombay armies and the governments of those provinces. This was obtained by a short Act of Parliament passed in 1893, and there only remains for the Secretary of State to signify approval to the proposals of the Government of India for giving effect to the measure in its various details in order that this most important and long delayed reform should at last be carried out.

Reforms proposed in 1870 no longer suitable to circumstances of case.

But meanwhile the march of events has already outstepped the slow and reluctant movement of the Home Government, and the arrangements first proposed so many years ago and now approaching accomplishment, have already ceased to be appropriate to the state of things with which we have to deal. The original scheme of four armies, the Bengal army being formally

decomposed into its two distinct elements, the Hindustani and Punjabi, necessarily presented a considerable inequality; the Punjab army to be created would be much the strongest numerically of the four, besides being the superior in fighting quality; the Hindustan army also was considerably larger than the other two. This inequality was accepted as a necessary condition of taking things as they were, and altering as little as possible the existing organisation. But since 1881 the Madras army has been largely and the Bombay army considerably reduced, while additions have been made to the troops on the North West Frontier; and the inequality in strength of the four divisions has now become so great that the new system will be found impracticable to work as soon as it comes into operation. Recent changes made in the composition of the armies increase the inequality still more. Of the thirty-two infantry regiments of the Madras army remaining after the reductions of 1882, seven have been converted into local Burma regiments recruited from Northern India, a change made partly in order to relieve the Madras Sepoy from unpopular service in that country, and partly because of his insufficiency for the work there. These seven regiments, although they continue to bear their old numbers as well as their new ones, are practically severed from the Madras army. Moreover, sooner or later, it will be found necessary to constitute Burma a separate command, the general holding it to report direct to army headquarters. With this change, which should have been carried out from the first occupation of Upper Burma, the last shadow of reason will disappear for maintaining even a nominal connection between these Burma battalions and the Madras army. Besides these local battalions, seven battalions of the regular Madras infantry are stationed in Burma, so that the Madras command will be limited, as regards native

troops, to eighteen regiments of infantry,[1] three of cavalry, and a battalion of sappers, and including British troops will comprise only about twenty-seven thousand men, or less than one-seventh of the Indian army. It will not be justifiable to keep up the apparatus of a commander-in-chief and staff sufficient for an army on account of this body. The native portion is smaller than the Punjab Frontier Force, the command for thirty years of a brigadier-general with a single staff officer.

A similar disintegration has taken place in the Bombay army, which must inevitably be carried further. The portion of that army serving in Sind has always been a local force of two so-called Baluchi infantry regiments and three regiments of Sind Horse, consisting of men raised on the frontier and in Punjab. A portion of the garrison occupying the more advanced position lately taken up at Quetta and other points beyond Sind and Punjab has however been furnished from the regular regiments of the Bombay army, coming and going in the periodical reliefs, a service unpopular with men raised in the tropical districts of India, and for which they are physically unfitted. Of these battalions, five in number, three have lately been broken up, and the men in them replaced by a new enlistment from the border tribes for local service; so that, although the old numbers have been retained for the present, these regiments have practically severed their connection with the Bombay army. The Quetta district has always been directly under the Commander-in-Chief in India. The Bombay army, even before the conversion above mentioned, furnished only a smaller portion of the whole force there, and now is represented by only two battalions of infantry. In any redistribution of commands, the small force in Sind, which can be approached from

[1] These regiments have a considerably less strength in rank and file than the regiments in Northern India.

Bombay only by sea, would naturally be attached to the frontier command of which it forms a base. If this be done, as on military grounds is much to be desired, and would certainly be done if war were imminent, then the Bombay command would be reduced to about thirty thousand men, also little more than one-seventh of the whole Indian army.

On the other hand, the Western or Punjab army will have become very much more than an army of Punjabis only, and will be brought up to a strength of about seventy thousand men, a larger and incomparably stronger military force than the Madras and Bombay armies put together.[1] The fact is that during the last few years the military centre of gravity has moved further towards the west. The necessity has arisen of strengthening the frontier position, while in pursuance of the policy which has always been acted on of inviting into our ranks the best material available, there has been a large substitution for other classes of the hardy races on the frontier which have come under our rule and influence. The result is a state of things obviously incompatible with the fulfilment of the original scheme of four commands with equal staffs and establishments for dealing with armies of nearly equal strength. The inequality resulting, if that scheme is persisted in, would be nearly as great as it is under the system to be replaced; an early modification of that scheme is inevitable.

It is certainly necessary that unity of military purpose should be secured on the frontier. But the extent

[1] The composition of the four armies would be as follows:—

	British Troops	Native Troops	Total
Madras army .	9,000	18,000	27,000
Bombay army .	12,000	18,000	30,000
Punjab army .	23,000	33,000	56,000
Hindustan army	23,000	47,000	70,000
	67,000	116,000	183,000

In addition there would be about 4,000 British and 10,000 native troops in Burma.

of this is too great for the personal supervision of a single commander. To attach any part of this frontier, with its garrisons of local troops, different from the Bombay troops in race and language, to the Bombay command, would be highly impolitic. It would be equally so to attach these local troops—Baluchis and others—to the Punjab army. The principle of segregation should, above everything, be scrupulously maintained under the new organisation. These considerations all point to the necessity for dividing the frontier into two commands: that is, the present Quetta district, with Sind added for its base, should continue to be a separate command directly under the Commander-in-Chief in India. This would reduce the overgrown Punjab army by about fifteen thousand men.

Another equally appropriate reduction would be to maintain the separate autonomy of the Punjab Frontier Force. This distinguished force, with a splendid record dating from its first formation, nearly fifty years ago, which comprises twelve battalions of infantry and five of cavalry, with five native batteries, was transferred from under the orders of the Punjab Government to those of the Commander-in-Chief in 1888. It guarded the border from Kashmir to Sind, except the Peshawur district, which has always been garrisoned by the Bengal army, and interrupted its continuous line of border-posts held by the former. Towards the south this condition no longer holds, some of the posts lately established in the extensive territory of Baluchistan overlapping those of the Punjab Frontier Force behind them and below the mountain passes; but it should not be difficult to redistribute the different posts, and to concentrate the Punjab Frontier Force on one portion of the frontier. The original proposal of the Commission of 1880, adopted in this respect by the Government of India, contemplated the maintenance of this force as a separate body from the four regular

armies, and every consideration seems to press for adhering to this purpose. Unity of administration should be insisted on, no doubt; no conflict or co-ordination of authority is permissible in any reasonable military system; but this has now been secured, and it is equally important to secure decentralisation, and above all, to avoid a repetition of the blunder of building up one overgrown native army overshadowing the others.

Modifications desirable.

Under this view the Indian army would be organised in seven commands, the native portion of each being a separate and distinct army, the strength of which would be susceptible of modification from time to time, to accord with the changes in the military situation inevitable in the future. It may be pleaded as an objection to such an arrangement that all the army departments —ordnance, commissariat, transport, account, &c., have recently been organised in four branches, so that the commander of each of the four armies originally contemplated might have the aid of a local departmental head in each department. But it should not require a great exercise of administrative skill to adapt the original scheme in this respect to the more flexible system here advocated. Sooner or later, it must be recognised that the plan of four equal armies, or four armies of any sort, has ceased to be appropriate to the actual military position, and it appears highly desirable when carrying out the impending reform, to do so in a way calculated to be lasting and stable.

Patronage how to be regulated.

One matter, of detail comparatively, but of great importance, needs to be carefully provided for. The four-army scheme provided that the selection for all appointments—regimental as well as staff—in the Madras and Bombay armies would remain as at present with the generals respectively commanding them, and that similar powers would be vested in the commanders of the two bodies into which the Bengal army is to be

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divided. Thus the Commander-in-Chief and army headquarters in India were to part with the whole of the great patronage of the Bengal army now vested in them. If the larger subdivision of the Indian army here suggested is carried out, the temptation to retain this patronage may not unnaturally assert itself, on the plea that it cannot be transferred with propriety to officers, the generals commanding in Burma and Baluchistan and the Punjab Frontier Force, of less standing and authority than was contemplated when the original plan was proposed. The importance of decentralisation in these matters however can hardly be rated too highly, and it should not be difficult to deal with it in a satisfactory way, whatever be the units of organisation determined on, which should be flexible enough for adaptation to the variations in the composition and strength of the different armies which will certainly be found necessary as time goes on. Patronage in the Indian army is of two kinds. There is the first appointment of the young officer on his arrival to a particular army, and to the cavalry or infantry branch of it, and also his posting to a particular regiment in that branch. Heretofore candidates for the Indian army have been obtained from British regiments, mainly from the regiments serving in India, and the distribution of them was made by the Government of India, the young officer being usually appointed to the particular army with which his regiment happened to be serving.

Of first appointments.

This mode of supply has lately been abandoned, and candidates for the Indian army are now appointed direct from Sandhurst to the Indian Staff Corps into which the three separate staff corps have happily been amalgamated. The distribution of the candidates among the different Indian armies is made by the Indian government. And the question is, how this distribution should be regulated. Appointment to the army or armies on the frontier will naturally be most in request,

but as the candidates are unknown to those with whom rests the distribution, the latter have nothing to guide them but the solicitation of friends. Patronage exercised under such conditions is indefensible, and the only satisfactory way of regulating the business is to give the candidates their choice, in order of their standing on passing out of Sandhurst, of succession to the available vacancies in the different armies. This, however, does not dispose of the difficulty, because there is keen competition for appointment to the cavalry and to particular regiments—as of the Gurkhas—in the infantry. This part of the business has been dealt with by the respective commanders-in-chief, and the patronage has no doubt been valued as a means of obliging friends; but it is an unsatisfactory form of patronage, because from the nature of the case its disposition cannot be determined by the merits of candidates whose qualifications have still to be tested. And under patronage pure and simple, however conscientiously exercised, bad riders have found their way into the cavalry, while undersized officers are clearly as much out of place in Sikh regiments as in the Guards; equally are officers six feet high out of place in regiments of Gurkhas who run to about five feet in height. Subject to this last condition the most satisfactory way of settling the matter would be to give the young officers their choice of regiments, as of army, according to their standing on leaving Sandhurst, while first appointments to the cavalry should be provisional, to be confirmed only after the candidate has undergone a searching test of fitness for that branch; a bad rider with Indian cavalry (and there are many such now in the service) may do incalculable mischief.

Of regimental posts.

Patronage, however, only begins with first appointments. Every one of the eight posts which make up the complement of a native regiment (nine posts in the cavalry) is a staff appointment to which any officer may be appointed, either of that regiment or from

another regiment.[1] It is this freedom of selection, and the right which the Commander-in-Chief possesses of transferring officers from one regiment to another which perhaps more than anything else has conduced to the efficient officering of the Indian army. The right is limited by the condition always acted upon, although not prescribed by any regulation, that the regimental standing of officers shall correspond with their length of service. Inter-regimental transfers seldom occur except to adjust special instances of inequality in the rate of regimental promotion, while if an officer is superseded in the command of his regiment, it is generally understood that he shall be removed also from active employment.

To the staff.

There is, further, the selection for the staff proper. An officer appointed to the staff—except to some of the higher posts—continues to be borne as a supernumerary, on the strength of his regiment, to which he reverts on the completion of five years' service on the staff. The practice in this respect is similar to that which obtains in the British service, at home and in India, although in both armies it occurs that the services of some officers are deemed to be so indispensable that their tours of staff service are almost constantly renewed either in the same or a fresh capacity. Now in regard to both classes of appointment, the regimental and staff, the selection is made with a full knowledge of the qualifications of the men to be dealt with and under a due sense of the responsibility involved in making the selection. Patronage of this sort, which is the only kind that should be exercised by any authority, should be interfered with as little as possible. It only remains to determine with whom lies the best means of forming a right judgment, and the most complete responsibility. As regards regimental appoint-

[1] An adjutant or quartermaster cannot however be of field rank.

ments and the junior posts on the staff, it may be said that, be the army large or small, the army commander is clearly indicated as the proper authority in whom to vest the patronage. The Commander-in-Chief being responsible for the efficiency of the Indian army as a whole should certainly have a potential voice in the selection of commandants of regiments as well as for all the higher staff appointments, and this should be made by him, for all the armies, on the nomination of the local commander.

CHAPTER XV

INDIAN ARMY PROMOTION

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Promotion to colonel.

PROMOTION in the Indian staff corps, which will soon embrace the whole Indian army, as has been explained, is regulated by length of service ; eleven years to captain, twenty to major, twenty-six years to lieutenant-colonel, and onwards according to the peculiar system now obtaining in the British service. Until lately promotion to the rank of brevet colonel, when not gained by distinguished service in the field, could be obtained by a specified term of service as lieutenant colonel in command of a regiment or other qualifying appointment, originally fixed at three, but subsequently extended to five years. The list of qualifying appointments was enlarged from time to time till it embraced practically every situation, regimental and departmental, in the active list, so that promotion to colonel became in effect like that to the grades below it, a matter of simple seniority attained in thirty-one years, except when given earlier for war services. A few years ago this system was superseded by a new one according to which appointment to certain specified staff situations was to carry with it substantive promotion to colonel, the condition being added that only lieutenant colonels of three years' seniority and upwards should in future be eligible to hold these offices. The warrant embodying these changes for the British army having been promulgated, the Indian Government were instructed to apply its

provisions to their army. Two very notable conditions were involved in the change. In place of the long-established principle that promotion to colonel should be earned by approved service in an office, appointment to the office was to carry promotion with it; the selected officer was to get the appointment (and promotion) first, and to prove his fitness for it afterwards. And regimental command ceased to be a qualification for promotion. Now, whatever may be thought as to the importance of regimental command in the British army, in regard to the Indian army, at any rate, it has always been recognised that its efficiency must depend before everything on the discipline and good leading of the regiments; the command of a regiment has therefore always been held to be a higher and more important charge than any of the ordinary staff appointments, a distinction accentuated by the higher emoluments attaching to the former. Except in the case of a few men employed at head-quarters, the duties of a staff officer are of a routine kind, needing business habits and physical activity, but carrying with them no personal responsibility, and are best fulfilled by comparatively junior officers. To require that none but lieutenant colonels of three years' standing should be appointed to these situations would involve that the assistant adjutant general at the end of his tour of office should be a man of nearly thirty-five service, much too old for efficiency on the staff in India. Moreover, while in the British service the tenure of regimental command is limited to four years, and the lieutenant-colonel is therefore eager to pass on at the end of it to a staff appointment which carries promotion, instead of being placed on half-pay, the command of a native regiment is held for seven years; the commandant will naturally be unwilling to descend from this to the less responsible office of a district staff officer; yet as the warrant stands this is the only way of securing the coveted promotion. As a matter of

fact the provisions of the warrant in this respect have not yet been applied to India, and the district and other staff appointments continue to be held in part by junior officers. The loss resulting to the Indian army of promotions to the rank of colonel is to be made up by the selection of a certain number of lieutenant-colonels for promotion without reference to the appointments held by them. The case of this warrant, thrust upon the Indian Government without previous consultation with them, is one of many indications how little knowledge appears to be possessed by the Horse Guards of the organisation and needs of the Indian army, about which nevertheless it has often a potential voice.

Promotion to general officer.

The mode of dealing with the promotion of general officers is in its way as curious as that of the colonels. According to the wording of the present regulations promotion to major-general and upwards is to be determined by selection. For this in peace time no better way of ascertaining an officer's fitness for promotion could be found than that afforded by the discharge of the actual duties of command. The opportunity for making selections after these trials is constantly afforded. Second-class Districts as they are called—brigade commands—are held by selected colonels with the temporary rank of brigadier-general, and not unfrequently colonels are appointed to the command of first-class districts with the acting rank of major-general. So also promotion to the head of the great administrative departments of the army—ordnance, commissariat and transport, and military works, or to the army staff as adjutant or quartermaster-general or as inspector-general of cavalry or artillery, carries with it acting promotion to major-general.[1] Here then the amplest

[1] Some of these appointments are held by officers of the British service, with which we are here not concerned, but the principle involved is obviously applicable to all branches of the army.

opportunity is given for testing the officer's qualifications; and if appointment to a specified post is to carry with it promotion at once, still more the efficient discharge for five years of the duties of an office might surely be accepted as the most satisfactory possible test. But this obviously fitting test of selection is disregarded, and the officer after completing his term of duty in one or other of these high and responsible offices, involving perhaps the command of from ten to twenty thousand men, reverts to the rank of colonel, to take his turn of promotion to major-general with others who have in the meantime been holding subordinate posts or altogether unemployed.

For this state of things the India Office is responsible, so far as the Indian army is concerned. When absolute seniority for promotion to general officer was given up in the British army, it should have been recognised that the public interests demanded its abolition in the Indian army also; that the appointments to be held by general officers being few, the list of generals, now reduced, should be maintained only for those who should establish a claim to it by actual service in that rank. Unfortunately a too scrupulous adherence to the supposed claims of officers to promotion by seniority prevailed, not only of those on the so-called active list, but the still larger class who have been virtually retired; and it was decided that these should be moved up through the different grades of general officer *pari passu* with their former contemporaries, the most copious of the many measures for degrading military rank taken of late years, the like of which has never been applied to the army of any other country.

A defect of present system.

It has been mentioned that admission to the Indian army is now obtained direct from Sandhurst. Heretofore, when the channel was through a short preliminary term of service with a British regiment, the possibility of obtaining a transfer practically depended on the

young officer being posted to a regiment stationed in India, and if the applications for admission exceeded the vacancies there were no satisfactory means of deciding between the conflicting claims. It is perhaps to be regretted that the opening should be closed to candidates from Woolwich; but the choice of a career must be made sooner or later under any rules, and that the candidate should be allowed to make his choice between the two services if sufficiently high in the class list is as satisfactory a plan as could be devised. The material thus obtained is as good as could be wished for; the outcome of public school life and the pursuit of athletics tempered by competitive examinations gives to the army a body of young officers with which the country they represent may well be satisfied. The subsequent training has perhaps this defect that the numerous courses of instruction to be undergone,—in musketry, signalling, surveying, and what not, take the young officer away from his regiment just at the time when the mind is quickest to acquire a new language. In former times the old Court of Directors used to give their cadets when they came up to present themselves before sailing for India a piece of advice—the only thing they gave them, for his passage money was defrayed by the friends of the cadet—to study the language, advice usually followed in the absence of other occupation. In those days the course of military training was short and simple, life was monotonous and distractions few, and the officer at starting was thrown very much among his men, and soon became proficient in their language. Nowadays, the young officer spends a large part of his first years away from his regiment, and sees little of his men except in the drill season, and so loses the first and best opportunity of becoming an expert linguist. The same difficulty occurs in the civil service, in the great increase of English correspondence thrown on civil officers of all ranks, and of special

and centralised departments at the headquarters of Government, attractive to the ablest men of the service as are staff appointments at army headquarters to military officers. Both classes while so withdrawn from direct contact with the people of the country, except their domestic servants, make no progress in their knowledge of the vernacular languages even if they do not lose ground in them, and equally make no progress towards a real knowledge of the people of the country and the native soldiery. The evil is a very real one, although it is not easy to find a remedy.

Comparative emoluments in India and elsewhere.

To these remarks regarding the British officers of the Indian army, it may be not inappropriate to add that the notion popularly held as to the comparative superiority of Indian pay over English and colonial pay is no longer supported by the facts. A comparison between the two rates would be fallacious; the English rate is supplemented by various allowances, and the officer is provided with free quarters, and one or more soldier servants. In India no perquisites of any sort are recognised; the officer receives a fixed rate of pay, and has to find his own house and servants, and on the march to supply his own tent and the means of carrying it. This system is invariable for all ranks from the general downwards; only when travelling on duty by railway is his fare paid. With the fall in silver the rupee pay has undergone a depreciation which puts the officers of British regiments in India very nearly on an equality with those serving at home; in this respect the officers of the Medical Staff in India are distinctly at a disadvantage. The officers of the Indian army are not much better off, if their comparatively slow promotion be taken into account, and that they have usually to find their own passage when going on and returning from leave to England. On the other hand the Indian army has the advantage of a much more liberal rate of retiring pensions.

The same thing holds good of the prizes of the service, the district commands held by general officers. The real equality between home and Indian rates is disguised by the allowances and free quarters attaching to the commands at home and abroad, whereas the Indian general receives a consolidated salary in lieu of all demands. And there are only as many hundred men in the ordinary colonial command as there are thousands in the Indian one. The pay of the Indian first class district is on a higher scale, but there are no posts of corresponding importance out of India, except Aldershot and Ireland.

CHAPTER XVI

NATIVE OFFICERS

The old regimental system.

THE regimental organisation of the native army of India has already been briefly described. The unit of organisation is the battalion in the infantry and the regiment in the cavalry.[1] The seniority system obtaining for the British officers was equally applied to the native soldiery, and in a still more rigid way, extending throughout the regiment. The sepoy, usually drawn from the agricultural class, enlisted as a private and rose to the non-commissioned grade by length of service in his regiment. A knowledge of reading and writing in the vernacular was required for promotion, but subject to this small qualification the senior private, if of good character, was entitled by custom to become a corporal (naik) and then sergeant (havildar) in order of seniority in succession to vacancies. Advancement to the commissioned ranks of native officer, and promotion from the lower to the higher grade in that rank was regulated in the same way, by pure seniority, the senior sergeant of the regiment having a recognised claim to succeed to a vacancy among the jemadars and the senior jemadar becoming in turn subahdar. The subahdar-major (the senior native officer) was consequently, as a rule, the oldest man in the regiment and always an old man. The native officer held a very subordinate position; the troops and companies were

[1] The Gurkha regiments are organised in two battalions, which however are practically separate regiments, the officers attached to them rising in their respective lists.

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commanded by British officers, generally lieutenants and ensigns. The same system obtained in the regular cavalry; the various ranks differed from those of the infantry only in name. Pensions regulated by the rank of the soldier were claimable after twenty-one years' service, and higher rates for still longer service. It was thought that this system, with the certainty held out of pension for long service, was a guarantee for loyalty, especially among the seniors who had so much to lose by misconduct—an expectation entirely falsified by the event. In the Mutiny the regiment either revolted in a body, or stood firm together with a very few exceptions, and its old native officers continued to command it throughout the war. The Bengal army was recruited mainly from the high-caste Hindu peasantry in Oudh and the adjacent British districts; but a fourth of the men in each regiment might be Mahomedans. This mixed composition, which was no doubt adopted in the first instance as a protection against combination, proved quite ineffectual. Class feeling proved stronger than race and religious antipathy; the two classes might possibly have clashed afterwards, had the rising been successful, but while the struggle lasted they held together. Shortly before the Mutiny, admission to the army was accorded to Sikhs from the lately conquered Punjab to the extent of ten per cent. per regiment. But this further attempt at establishing diversity of interests proved equally inoperative. The people of the Punjab indeed, when the Mutiny broke out, showed themselves eager to pay off old scores against the Indians, their hereditary foes and recent conquerors when led by British officers. The regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force, raised in 1849, formed a very distinguished part of the army which put down the rebellion, and the new regiments hastily raised by Sir John Lawrence in that country were filled up at once, and many of them were organised in time

to take an active and most useful part in the war. But the Punjabi elements in the old army were altogether too small and too scattered to withstand the professional influences to which they were subjected. These young soldiers, for the most part, threw in their lot with their regiments.

The so-called irregular cavalry, which formed the larger part of this branch of the Bengal army,[1] was organised on a different footing. It was recruited from a higher class, mostly yeoman or landholder, each man bringing his horse with him and depositing a substantial sum in the regimental chest. Against this he was debited with the cost of his uniform and equipment, and credited in turn with their value on leaving the regiment, when the balance of his deposit was repaid to him. The rate of pay included the cost of maintaining the soldier's horse which was provided by himself. Originally a native gentleman or a man of substance on enlisting might bring a certain number of relatives or retainers with him, and he drew pay for them, the portion distributed in turn to them being a matter of private arrangement. Later on this individual footing was gradually altered to a regimental system, under which the horse as well as the forage was found by the regiment, which was self-contained and self-managed, both as to the supply and up-keep of horses and equipment, the Government merely issuing gross pay per head and leaving all arrangements for maintenance and equipment to be managed regimentally, exceptional charges on the regimental funds from loss and wear and tear of equipment on service being met by special grants in aid. Promotions in this branch of the service were made by selection on the nomination of the commanding officer; the commissioned ranks were filled partly by direct appointment of native gentlemen from the military class, and partly

[1] Ten regiments of Regular Cavalry; eighteen Irregular.

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by promotions from the non-commissioned grade, in which were generally serving many men of good family. The irregular cavalry (a perfectly inappropriate title, because its regulations, although special to the service, were as regular as simple) was in fact in the nature of a yeomanry force permanently embodied; and, although less well mounted than the regular cavalry, which as well as the British cavalry and artillery was horsed from the government studs, was composed of a class very superior socially to the ordinary Sepoy. There being only three native officers per regiment, the commandant, second in command, and adjutant, the squadrons were commanded by native officers. The cavalry in Madras and Bombay was organised on the regular footing, the three local regiments of the Bombay army serving in Sind being however on the irregular footing. Thus the irregular cavalry was the only service for a respectable career open to Indian gentlemen. The rest of the army was composed of peasants, but peasants, like the Roman legionaries of the early republic, who were yet thoroughly aristocratic by caste, regarding all other people except Brahmins and Rajputs as their social inferiors, separated from them by an impassable gulf of caste distinction. The irregular cavalry occupied a still higher social position, and it might have been expected that this branch of the service so differently constituted from the bulk of the army would withstand the influences which acted fatally on the other. But the character of the whole army had been sapped by the laxity of discipline and incompetent administration so long prevailing, while the horror excited by the greased cartridges (the actual cause of the Mutiny) affected the Mahomedans who formed a large proportion of the cavalry equally with the Hindus; and the greater number of the irregular cavalry regiments joined in the general outbreak, some taking a specially conspicuous part in it.

In reconstructing the Bengal army the old irregular

The new system.

system was adopted for all the cavalry and extended to the whole of that branch of the Bombay army. As regards the infantry, a reaction had set in against the high caste sepoy, and several regiments of low caste troops were raised, but on trial some of these proved insufficient in fighting quality, and a better material was eventually substituted. The place of other disbanded regiments was taken by Punjabi troops of high quality, and the number of battalions of Gurkhas, the ruling race in the mountains of Nepal, men whose gallantry and soldier-like qualities are the admiration of all who have served with them, has been increased from two to thirteen.[1] The Gurkhas, to whom the summer heat of the Indian plains is little more bearable than it is to the British soldier, are distributed at various points in the Himalaya Mountains, and, with the British infantry stationed in the same region, form practically the only reserve available. The old Hindustani sepoy of Oudh and the North West Provinces, of whom there were formerly 120,000 in the service, and with them we conquered India, is now represented by only fifteen regiments, for the most part organised in separate castes or classes. The latest change of organisation, the substitution of local regiments on the North West frontier, recruited from the warlike and formerly hostile inhabitants of those regions, for regiments sent up for relief from tropical India, has already been referred to. One Bengal and three Bombay regiments have already been so converted, and the process must undoubtedly be carried still further in the future. The vicious seniority system of promotion has been put an end to. Selection by fitness is now the only recognised mode of promotion; commanding officers have been vested with large authority; discipline is strict, although with a soldiery sober and well

[1] Five regiments of two battalions, and three single-battalion regiments stationed in Assam.

conducted in a remarkable degree, punishments are few; and as a fighting machine the Indian army now ranks very high. But in one important respect the organisation remains unchanged and defective. While the judicial service has long been mainly filled by natives, who are represented also on the bench of the highest courts, and while under the most recent changes every branch of the service, judicial and executive, has now been thrown open to them, the army, save with a few very exceptional cases, continues to be what it always has been—an army of peasants, or a class little removed above them; an army of native soldiers commanded by English officers. So far, indeed, it may be said to be organised like the British army, in which the men and the officers form two separate classes; but then that is a British army led by British officers, and this makes all the difference.

Its defect, in not offering a career for the Indian higher classes.

In the cavalry the position of the native officer has even gone back, for whereas formerly he could rise to the command of a squadron, the squadrons are now commanded by British officers, the most junior of whom takes precedence over the oldest native officer. So far then as the army is concerned, the Queen's proclamation on assuming the direct government of India is a dead letter. This proclamation declares that 'Our subjects, of whatever race or creed, shall be freely and impartially admitted to office in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge.' To a very large number of a most important class of Indian gentlemen, descended in many cases from ancestors who held high military office under former rulers, the only palatable, and indeed the only form of public service practicable and possible for them is the military, and that is closed to them. While this is the case it cannot be said that the promise held out in the proclamation is fully acted upon. It may be replied,

indeed, that the class in question is excluded from service by the condition of fitness laid down, by reason that is of their defective education. And certainly in regard to a service the routine business of which is conducted in the English language, this contention may be held to be good, if the proclamation is read in a literal sense, without regard to the spirit which animates it. Some very gallant and distinguished native officers, among them hereditary chiefs who have brought their clansmen by the hundred to join our standards—men who closely resemble in many respects the chiefs of the Highland clans a hundred and fifty years ago—have been unable to read or write in any language; yet men labouring under the same deficiency have carved out kingdoms for themselves. A man of this sort, a thorough gentleman in manner and feeling, if illiterate, with all the pride and bearing of birth and high family tradition, leading his own kinsmen like the Highland chief of old, will by his chivalrous example show his men the way to victory, and that, after all, is what has to be aimed at in choosing officers. Moreover this state of things is fast passing away, if it has not disappeared already. Education is making great strides among all classes in India, and if the desired goal can be reached by that course, the needful standard in this respect would soon be attained. To make education the only test, indeed, or to introduce competitive examinations for admission to the army would be an absurd misapplication of what is perfectly suitable for Englishmen. The military class in India, whether prince or peasant, is distinguished from all others in a degree which it is difficult for anyone unacquainted with that country to appreciate, there being nothing analogous to the difference in any section of European society. Men and women are hardly marked off more distinctly from each other than the military and non-military class in India; to throw open the army to competition would

produce a result absolutely grotesque, if it would not involve the destruction of the army as a fighting machine. The selection of officers must be determined by other qualifications than that of education, which is by no means a necessary one. The first thing needed for a good officer is that he shall be a man who can lead and whom his men will be ready to follow. The military instinct is something apart from and far more valuable in stress of battle than any product of education. It would however be quite practicable, in deference to common prejudice on this head, to require a certain educational standard in addition to other qualifications. Such institutions as the Mayo College at Ajmir, established a few years ago for the princes and gentlemen of Rajputana, may easily be adapted to the purpose, and similar facilities, if required, could and would be afforded elsewhere.

It may be, indeed has been, said that the change of policy here advocated would be dangerous; that men of rank and influence raised to high military position might take advantage of the position; that the Mutiny might have had a very different ending if there had been men of rank and ability in the army to take advantage of the opportunity. Plain speaking is here the best. Nothing will be concealed by silence, for this defect in our military system is so prominent as to be the subject of constant comment. The studious exclusion of Indians from all but the humblest places in our army is so conspicuous, that only one inference can be placed upon it—that we are afraid to trust them. And the danger from one point of view may be freely admitted. The Indian people are not held to us by any feelings of attachment. When in almost every country of Europe men are found plotting against their fellow-countrymen; with the experience of Ireland before us, it would be absurd to expect that loyalty in India should take a higher form than expediency—the recog-

nition that our rule is the best available at present, and that it is too firmly established to be attacked without risk. But apart from any question of justice or good faith, it is surely safer as a matter of policy to have men of talent and ambition with you, their interests enlisted in our system as offering possibilities of high advancement, than that their only chance of escape from a life of obscurity and inaction should be felt to lie in subversion of our rule and the anarchy attendant on such a revolution. There can be little room for doubt on which side the choice should be taken. Too much time has already been lost before entering on the course indicated by policy as well as good faith. Meanwhile contrasts, not to our advantage, are publicly made between the Russian system, its ready assimilation of the races brought under its influence, the utilisation of ability which might otherwise be dangerous, and our hard and fast repressive system. And when the step forward is taken in the right direction, it will be satisfactory to consider that while the army necessarily contains the elements of danger inherent in every body formed under such conditions, it has been rendered of late years a much safer as well as a more efficient weapon. No one class has been disproportionately increased in strength, while for the indiscriminate fusion of class and caste, the separate class and caste regiment has been largely substituted. For precaution, the army must be held to its duty by liberal terms and strict discipline; a still more effectual precaution would be that indicated by considerations of justice and policy —that the military classes equally with all other classes should feel that to them a career suitable to their tastes and aspirations is open, bounded only by their capacity to take advantage of it; that service under the Queen may offer more than can be hoped for by any other way.

The practical difficulties of carrying out such a reform, especially at the outset, may no doubt be recog-

nised. The Indian Mahomedan from long contact with the Hindus, has imbibed caste ideas as to food and other matters unknown to those of his religion elsewhere, such as to make it no easy matter to bring him into the practical working of the military system in the upper grades. Between the English officer and the native officer who will not sit at table with him, and to whom it would be an offence even to refer to the existence of his wife or female relations, there cannot readily be that intimate fellowship which is found among the officers of the British army in all grades. There may, however, be mutual respect. A more difficult point would arise when the native officer became senior to the British officer entering the service after him. This however might be avoided as regards the regiment at least, if the native officers, instead of being distributed among different regiments, were attached to certain regiments only, the first one appointed as junior of all, then as second junior on the occurrence of a vacancy, and so on until the regiment so selected for the purpose was officered wholly by native gentlemen. Later on would come the fresh difficulty of the two races coming together in mixed bodies, and of the native officers as senior taking the command of a force containing British troops. This difficulty however would not arise for some years to come; the change must be gradually and cautiously made if it is to have a fair chance—it has taken fifty years to build up an efficient judicial service; meanwhile, the British soldier would become familiar with the idea of the native as a commissioned officer, and if the latter showed himself to be thoroughly efficient this would cease to be unpalatable. If, on the other hand, the prediction of those who contend that the native will never become an efficient officer should be verified: if he does not come up to the proper standard, then the experiment will have failed and be abandoned; but at any rate justice will not be satisfied till the experiment has been fairly made.

CHAPTER XVII

PUBLIC WORKS: ORGANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT

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Technical meaning of term Public Works in India.

In India the term 'public works' was in former years applied to every kind of building operations undertaken by the Government, and included therefore the construction and repairs of all State buildings, civil and military, as well as the prosecution of roads, irrigation works, and eventually railways. Until the middle of this century, indeed, the operations of the Indian Government were confined almost wholly to works of the former category, which were public works only in the sense of not being private ones; while the greater part of the State expenditure under this head was incurred in the maintenance of the barracks and subsidiary buildings required for the European garrison of the country. The native troops built their own dwelling huts from an allowance made for the purpose, and the only State buildings required for native regiments were the hospitals and magazines. The civil buildings of the country were mainly the various district court-houses, and the maintenance of these unpretending edifices formed but a trifling item in the whole expenditure. In the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, the tanks which from time immemorial have supplied irrigation to the cultivators of the soil, were repaired and superintended by the State; and the maintenance of the extensive system of dykes or embankments which protect the Gangetic delta from the sea and from the

floods of the great rivers discharging into the head of the Bay of Bengal, was also undertaken by the Government, the landholders interested defraying a portion of the expense. But the bulk of the charges incurred under the head 'public works' was, as above stated, for repairs to military buildings, and the department charged with the duty was not unnaturally deemed to be a department of the army, and was placed under the superintendence of the Military Board at each of the three presidencies, a body composed of the heads of the different civil departments of that branch of the service.

Want of roads in India formerly. Traffic how far affected by it.

India was at this time destitute of roads, and journeys could be made only on horseback or in a palanquin. The facilities for travelling were not however altogether so small as might be inferred from the analogy of European countries. In a climate where the rainfall is limited almost entirely to one season of the year, and in a country the greater part of which is a level plain, the absence of well-made roads, or of roads of any kind, does not produce the extreme inconvenience that it would occasion in temperate regions. For three months of the year all travelling was suspended, but during the remainder it could go on uninterruptedly. The large rivers were crossed by ferries or boat bridges; the small ones could be easily forded. Any track served for a road, and the worst inconvenience occasioned was the tediousness of the journey to the traveller and the costliness of transporting merchandise on an unmetalled (unmacadamised) track.

Its effect on Indian military system.

From a military point of view this state of things had even its advantages. The want of roads taught Indian armies how to do without them. The whole system of military transport and supply being necessarily adapted to a roadless country, the ordinary requirements under this head during peace differed in no material degree from the requirements of a time of war.

All the subsidiary military establishments were framed on a scale and plan to admit of the troops moving readily across country in any direction; and when regiments were transferred from one station to another in ordinary course of relief, they took the field just as completely as if they were about to enter on a campaign. Thus to pass from a state of peace to that of war involved no change of system; the ordinary business of peace time constituted in fact a regular training for campaigning; on the breaking out of war nothing had to be improvised, and the troops took the field without difficulty or confusion. Succeeding, as did English rule, to the state of constant warfare which had obtained throughout the country, this preparedness for action was a necessary condition. It explains the extraordinary promptitude with which the wars of the Indian army have been so frequently entered on. The remarkable efficiency of the Indian commissariat and transport service is, no doubt, to be ascribed in great measure to the same cause.[1]

First progress in road-making.

These conditions serve in some measure to explain the complacency with which the older school of Indian statesmen—of whom Lord Metcalfe was a notable example—regarded the absence of any progress towards the material improvement of the country. The first beginning in this way may be referred to the administration of Mr. Thomason, Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces from 1843 to 1853. That country is peculiarly adapted for the construction of roads, from the dryness of the climate, its flatness, and

[1] Not the least important part of the training which this rough-and-ready system afforded, was the practice in marching which the troops obtained in the course of the annual reliefs. A regiment often spent three or four months, moving at the rate of twelve or fifteen miles a day, in passing from one station to another, and at the end of the march the men were in the highest possible condition for entering on a campaign. With the introduction of railways, these long marches became of course unnecessary, but with their discontinuance a good deal of that familiarity with camp life must be lost, which Indian troops, native and European, have hitherto exhibited.

the excellence and cheapness of the material for a road surface available throughout its extent, a nodular limestone (kunkur) found in thin horizontal layers at a short depth below the surface alluvial soil; and, through the influence and exertions of Mr. Thomason, practically the first governor appointed for the purely civil administration of a province, considerable progress was made towards the construction of metalled roads to connect the different large cities throughout his jurisdiction. About the same time a trunk road was undertaken to connect Calcutta with the Upper Provinces, and carried on with energy. The bridging somewhat lagged behind, and the road was not available for horsed carriages until 1850, when mail-carts began to run between Calcutta and Delhi. But the first great impetus was given to road-making in India, and public works generally, on the annexation of Punjab. The development of this province occupied the particular attention of Lord Dalhousie, who, both on military grounds, and in view to its general improvement, at once prescribed a course of vigorous action. A special engineer department for undertaking road and irrigation works was established for this province, unconnected with the Bengal Military Board, and, a fortunate selection being made for the head of it,[1] the progress made soon placed Punjab in this respect on a level with all, and in advance of most other parts of the country.

Lord Dalhousie's reform in organisation of Public Works Department.

Up to this time the presidential system had full sway in the arrangements of the Public Works Department, which was divided into three branches, to correspond with the three Indian armies; and except in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, where the limits of the civil and military administration were coextensive, the various civil governments had no share in the control of the

[1] The first Chief Engineer of the Punjab, from 1848 to 1856, was Lieutenant Colonel Robert Napier, afterwards Field Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala.

departmental operations carried out in their respective provinces, which were conducted directly by the Government of India, through the agency of the Bengal Military Board.

In 1854 an important reform was effected, under Lord Dalhousie's administration, by the removal of the management of public works from the Military Board, and the formation of a separate department (or secretariat) of the Supreme Government for conducting the business. Simultaneously with this change, the immediate executive control of the public works was transferred from the supreme to the provincial administrations, and a Public Works Department was formed for each province. This example was shortly followed in Madras[1] and Bombay, where also public works affairs were removed from the control of the local Military Boards, and constituted a part of the business of the civil administration. From this time great and steady progress was made in the prosecution of works throughout the country, and largely increased grants of public money were provided on this account. In 1849–50 the State expenditure in India on public works of all kinds, including military buildings, was about 600,000 Rx., of which 122,000 Rx. was for roads; the grant provided for 1870–71 amounted to nearly seven and a half millions (Rx).

Executive agency.

Under the departmental organisation introduced by Lord Dalhousie a Chief Engineer was placed at the head of the Public Works Department in each province, who is now also secretary to the provincial government. Under him are the Superintending Engineers of Circles, while the actual execution of work is conducted by the next grade of officers, styled Executive Engineers, aided by Assistant Engineers, with a staff of subordi-

[1] The management of irrigation works in Madras had been for some years vested in the Board of Revenue. A separate department was now organised for all public works.

nates. As a rule the same engineer carries out all the works, whether roads or civil buildings, within his district or division; the more important lines of road are made special charges, divided into sections of convenient length. But in course of time, with the development of irrigation in various provinces, that branch of public works was separated from the rest and organised as an Irrigation Department, with its special staff of a chief engineer [and Joint Secretary to the Provincial government], superintending, executive, and assistant engineers.[1] The Public Works Department continued for some time longer to carry out all other works, military (including the work of the barrack master's department and other services connected with the accommodation of the troops) as well as civil. But upon the transfer of the administration to the provincial governments, which had no concern with, or responsibility for, any other branch of army business, the arrangement was soon found to be very unsatisfactory. The care of military buildings received insufficient attention, with the result of some discreditable constructive failures, which led to the removal of this duty from the cognisance of the provincial governments, and the formation of a military works department under the administration of the Indian War Department, which provides for the expenditure in the military estimates. The operations of this Department, which is officered from the Royal Engineers, has more recently been extended to the whole of India. Railways have from the first been dealt with as a separate branch of the service.

Department divided into four branches.

The staff of the Public Works Department, while organised in one body as regards rules of service, pay, pension, and so forth, is thus divided into four branches: roads and buildings, and irrigation, both organised provincially; railways; and military works.

[1] In the North West Provinces the administration of the great canal works was from the first kept separate from that of other public works.

The members of it are interchangeable between the different branches (the members of the military work department being, however, all military officers and held to be on military duty), but practically such transfers are rare, and with few exceptions an officer serves in the branch, and (except in the military branch) in the province to which he is first appointed, the position of the engineer being in this respect similar to that of the civilian. In the two provincial branches promotion runs in separate lists for each province, and each branch within the province, and is made by selection of the provincial government; but in regard to the higher appointments, the Government of India intervenes to a certain extent to secure that the claims of the seniors in the different provinces shall be fairly considered.

Composition of staff.

The staff of the Public Works Department consisted in the first instance of the officers of the Indian Engineers Corps, only a small part of whom were employed in peace time with the sapper battalions, supplemented by officers drawn from other branches of the service. Cautley, the designer and constructor of the Ganges Canal, the greatest work of the kind, was an officer of the Bengal Artillery; to which regiment also belonged Captain (now General) C. H. Dickens, the engineer of the Sone Canal. With the development of public works the staff of engineers available from these sources soon became insufficient, and large additions were made of civil engineers, some of those appointed in the first instance being men of professional standing and experience, but generally young officers selected in England and sent out by the Secretary of State to join the service in the junior grades. In 1871 the Royal Indian College at Coopers Hill was established, from which, since 1874, all first appointments in the country have been made. The service is also recruited to a certain extent in India, where various institutions have been

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established for the education of engineers. The Thomason College of Engineering was established at Roorkee in the North-West Provinces near the head of the Ganges Canal about fifty years ago, primarily to supply a native subordinate staff for the canal department. The instruction of the classes formed for this purpose is conveyed in the vernacular, but a class of European soldiers was soon added, for training as overseers in the Public Works Department, and also a small class for the education of civil engineers. This last has supplied some engineers who, under the practical experience gained in the service, have proved very valuable officers, but the educational staff and appliances have never advanced beyond the very rudimentary stage on which they were first instituted, and are utterly insufficient for the purpose in view. There are also engineering schools or departments of schools at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, which give an elementary education in engineering, and which furnish the subordinate departmental staff for these and the adjacent provinces. The education at these institutions is practically gratuitous, and although they are starved in teaching staff and appliances, the cost of each pupil turned out from them is out of all proportion to the result. Indigenous engineering schools are very necessary, but those now in existence need to be thoroughly reformed and placed on a more efficient and business-like footing.

Expenditure how provided.

Up to the year 1867–8, the public works expenditure, which, as has been explained, comprised all outlay for public buildings, civil and military, as well as that incurred for the material improvement of the country, was provided for out of revenue; the amount allotted to this purpose necessarily varied from year to year according to the state of the budget. In the years of deficit, the loans raised to cover it were dealt with as supplementing the finances generally, and no part was allocated specifically as debt incurred for public works,

although the deficit would in many cases not have occurred if this public works expenditure had not been undertaken. But in the year 1868–69 it was determined to provide specifically by loans for the capital expenditure on remunerative works, leaving the charge for other works only to be met from the ordinary revenues of the year. Under this arrangement the construction and repair of roads, the maintenance of existing irrigation works and the construction of such new ones as although necessary were not likely to be directly remunerative, together with the State outlay on guaranteed railways, arising chiefly for the land taken up by them and for the government controlling establishments, were to be provided for out of revenue. The construction of such new irrigation works as were expected to prove directly remunerative to the extent of defraying the interest on the public debt incurred on their behalf, and the capital expenditure on railways undertaken directly by Government agency, were defrayed from loans. This arrangement was so far modified about ten years later, that one and a half millions was set apart annually as a provision against famine, on the understanding that so much of this sum as was not required for the actual relief of famine should be applied to the construction of railways and irrigation works, the increase of capital debt for these works being to that extent prevented. This is the so-called Famine Fund, to which further reference will be made in a later chapter.

The cost of maintenance necessarily goes on increasing with the extension of roads, and forms a heavy charge on the revenues. The amount devoted to new roads for some time past has been about one million (Rx) a year, sufficient for the construction of about 1,000 miles. With the extension of railways, the importance of road-making has fallen into the background in popular estimation, but it continues to be

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as necessary as ever; in fact every new railway creates a fresh requirement for road feeders, and the day is far distant when India will be adequately equipped in this respect. The cost of bridging the great rivers as part of the road system is prohibitive; these works are practicable only in connection with railways; the main lines of road are for the most part supplied with excellent boat bridges which can be maintained for the greater part of the year, while during the rainy season there is little traffic.

India generally is well provided with material for road making, but ordinarily and in most parts of the country, and where trunk lines have already been made, an extension of first-class roads is not what is most wanted. The goods traffic of the country, which consists mainly of agricultural produce, takes place after the harvest, at a season when the smaller rivers are almost dried up, while for the great majority of the travellers, extended facilities for slow travelling in every direction are more needed in the present state of things than a few perfect lines; to meet these requirements most beneficially, the outlay will be directed in the first instance to making fair-weather roads. Bridges will be regarded as supplementary works to be provided subsequently and by degrees, the smaller streams being bridged first, and the larger rivers left to be crossed by fords or ferries, till the expansion of traffic and the progress of the country justify a large outlay on specific localities.

Comparative advantages of roads and railroads.

In some parts of the country the great cost of road-making indicates the propriety of constructing railways in the first instance on all lines of importance, instead of beginning with roads and following up with railways. This is especially the case in Bengal, from the magnitude of its rivers, the need for high embankments, and the want of proper materials for a road surface. Persons whose experience is confined to

Europe may find it difficult to realise the idea of a perfectly flat country, extending for several hundred miles in every direction, and where there is not so much as a pebble to be found throughout its whole extent. Such is Bengal. Stone if used must be brought from enormous distances, and the only possible substitute for it as a road surface is the expensive and imperfect one of broken bricks.[1] The difference in cost between a railroad and what at best will be a very imperfect road would therefore merely arise from the addition of sleepers and rails. There is no question of tunnels, cuttings, or gradients in this country, and the embankment which serves for the road would do equally for the railway. It is indeed often forgotten, when comparing the cost of the two things, how much of the expenditure for a railway is due to provision for carrying the travellers, whereas the travellers on a road find their own conveyances, and that while the maintenance of a road is a permanent charge, a railway will at least pay its working expenses. Bengal, however, if a difficult country to make roads in, has been bountifully furnished with natural means of communication in its numerous perennial rivers and tidal channels, through which the great trade of that country has been called into existence; and money would probably be much more effectively spent in improving these natural highways than in attempting to surmount the difficulties which they present to the construction of roads. On the line from Calcutta to Madras, no amount of expenditure in reason would suffice to make a first-class road accessible in all weathers, for the line crosses the whole drainage of the country and several great rivers, and the large sums involved in such a project would produce little or no useful effect. A line of communication in

[1] Until railways brought stone from the interior within reach, the roads at Calcutta were macadamised with stones brought as ballast by ships visiting the port.

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this direction is only possible if undertaken on the scale suitable for a railway, and a railway is now in course of slow construction between these two points. But the rivers that are crossed, and which are too large to admit of being bridged for a road, serve as most useful feeders for a canal between the two places, while the features of the country are in all other respects most favourable for the construction of that class of works. And a canal also connecting the two places has long been in course of being gradually carried out.

Canal navigation in Northern India.

The extensive irrigation canals of Northern India, running as they do through a highly populated country, are very favourably situated for the development of an extensive navigation, but the use made of them for this purpose has proved to be quite insignificant. The rapid current of these artificial rivers renders haulage against the stream expensive and slow, while in the desire to keep down the first cost of the undertaking the works connected with the navigation were constructed on an insufficient scale. The locks are too small to admit steamers of any power, and the bridges are not high enough to admit the passage of large or heavily laden boats. These defects of construction are being gradually remedied, but it seems improbable that the traffic will ever be much more than a traffic one way, mainly of timber floated down the stream.

Road-making transferred to provincial governments.

The construction of roads to keep pace with the extension of railways, involving not only the first cost, but an annually increasing charge for maintenance, must always continue to form an important obligation on the State and a great and increasing liability on the finances of India. The business has long been too large and scattered for the central authorities to deal with properly, and the finance and administration of it has been entirely localised, and made over to the different provincial governments, with whom it now rests to find the necessary ways and means for the prosecution of the work.

CHAPTER XVIII

IRRIGATION WORKS.

Importance of Indian irrigation works.

THE liability of India to drought and its attendant famine; the remarkable benefits resulting from irrigation in all seasons, good as well as bad; and the magnitude of the undertakings carried out by the Indian Government in this connection, make the subject of Indian Irrigation one of special interest and importance.

Different systems of irrigation.

Various modes of irrigating the soil artificially are practised in India. Leaving out the use of wells, in which case the earth itself acts as the reservoir, the most simple, as well as one of the most effective kinds of irrigation is derived from tanks.

Tanks.

The ordinary Indian irrigating tank is formed by intercepting the drainage of the country by an embankment. If a gorge between two hills be selected for the place of construction, a single embankment across the lower part of the valley is sufficient for the purpose; but where, as is most commonly the case, the scene of operations is a gently sloping plain, the embankment must be constructed on three sides. In these tanks the depth of water is of course greatest against the lower embankment, and gradually becomes shallower towards the opposite end, till the bed rises above the level of the water. Sluices are constructed at the lower end of the tank, in the embankment, whence the water is led off and distributed among the fields below it.

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For the construction of these tanks, a moderate and equable slope of the country is required. If the fall of the land be great, an excessive height of embankment becomes necessary; if it be slight, the shallowness of the tank, and consequently the extent of surface in proportion to its contents, causes great waste from evaporation, while the area of land occupied by the tank is disproportionately large.

The configuration of the coast of the Carnatic, or eastern portion of the Madras Presidency, is peculiarly favourable for tank irrigation, and the whole of this part of the peninsula is studded with these reservoirs, some of them enormous works many miles in circumference. These were almost all constructed before the occupation of the country by the English, whose connection with them has been limited to their maintenance and in some cases restoration. Tank irrigation is also largely practised in Bombay and Central India, as well as in Behar. But this last country has too small a surface inclination to admit of the full development of the system, and the water from the tanks has there to be lifted into the irrigating channel, usually by manual labour.

Irrigation from rivers. Madras system.

The other system of irrigation practised is by the diversion of river-waters. This is differently carried out in Upper and Southern India. What is generally known as the Madras system of irrigation, consists in the construction of a dam across the bed of a river to raise the level of the water, which is then diverted into side-channels, and thence distributed over the surface of the country. The irrigation system of Northern India is also based on the damming-up of the rivers, but the conditions of the two cases are very different. In Madras the most fertile lands are those adjacent to the coast, which form the deltas of the different rivers, and the use of the water commences in the immediate vicinity of the dam. The fall of the country is here

extremely small, the regime of the river channel has been thoroughly established, and the management of the water is easily under control. Moreover, the difference of level between the river and the country through which it flows is so slight that a very moderate height of dam suffices to lift the water into the irrigating channels. Similar physical conditions would be met with in the delta of the Ganges, and on a much larger scale; but this part of the country is comparatively independent of artificial irrigation, by reason of its abundant rainfall; it is in the upper course of the Ganges and its feeders that the use of their waters is wanted, where they flow through the comparatively dry country of the North West Provinces. And here too the agricultural conditions are very dissimilar from those in Southern India. On the Coromandel coast only one crop is raised in a year, and this is irrigated in the rainy season; so that the system of irrigation deals mainly with the rivers when they are in flood, and comparatively simple works effect the desired object. In Upper India, on the other hand, there are two harvests in the year, and the corn, cotton, and other crops which most require irrigation are grown during the cold season, when the rivers are at their lowest. The Ganges, after it issues from the Himalaya, runs in a valley which it has excavated for itself in the course of ages—five or six miles wide, and from eighty to one hundred feet below the level of the great plain which forms this part of India. The general slope of the country from the Himalaya to the sea is from a foot to eighteen inches in the mile; this, which would be an excessive slope in a great river, is counteracted by the tortuous course of the Ganges, which meanders from one side to the other of the valley within which it runs. To dam up the river at any part of this course, would therefore involve the construction of a weir across the whole width of this valley, as well as very extensive

Canal system of Northern India.

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cuttings to convey the water into the adjacent country; and the level at which the water would strike the surface of the country could only be reached at a considerable distance lower down the course of the river than the site of the weir, so that the country adjacent to the upper part of the river's course would be unprovided with irrigation. These considerations led to a different plan of operations being undertaken. The waters of the Ganges are intercepted at the point where the river issues from the Lower Himalaya in a firm well-defined channel, whence they are carried to the centre or watershed line of the Doab,[1] down which the canal is conducted nearly to the point of junction of the Ganges and Jumna. The watershed line once reached, the canals in that situation afford highly favourable conditions for effective irrigation. Distributive channels are constructed on each side at intervals of a few miles, whence the water is led to the surface of the country, and from these again smaller channels convey it for distribution over the fields. The excess in the slope of the country, beyond what is required for a moderately swift current—and for this a few inches per mile suffices—has to be overcome by numerous weirs, over which the waters of the canal are discharged. Although the work is spoken of as one canal, it consists in fact of a network of branches, which convey the water, right and left, over the surface of the Doab, the whole system, with its main lines, branch lines and distributory channels, resembling the reticulations at the back of a mulberry leaf. Unlike a river, the canal becomes smaller instead of larger in its course;[2] and

[1] *Do*, two; *âb*, water—a country lying between two rivers. The great plain between the Ganges and Jumna, which forms the greater part of the North West provinces, is known *par excellence* as *The* Doab.

[2] This is, however, not true of all Indian rivers. The Cuggur and Sarsatti, which rise in the Lower Himalaya between the Ganges and Jumna, and at certain seasons are considerable streams, both disappear before the Indian desert is reached; partly taken up in irrigation, and partly absorbed by the sandy soil through which they run.

only sufficient water for the purpose of navigation is retained in the main channel, which finally, an attenuated stream, rejoins its parent river at Cawnpur. Unlike a river, also, the canal flows along the highest instead of the lowest line of the country.

The foregoing account is generally applicable to the principles of construction adopted for all the canals of Northern India—those taken off from the Ganges and the left bank of the Jumna in the North West Provinces; from the right bank of the Jumna, the Sutlej, the Ravi, and the Chenab in Punjab. The problem in each case is to divert the course of the river from the valley of its natural line to the crest of high land running parallel with it, and to make the force of gravitation take the place of mechanical agents for distribution of the water. Such a mode of irrigation is clearly only adapted for a flat country, where the high crest spoken of is in fact a very gentle undulation, only perceptible to the test of the surveyor's level.

Irrigation works on the large scale (other than the large tanks scattered over the country), and which involve the application of hydraulic engineering in the proper sense, are confined and have attained the greatest development in the three provinces above mentioned (Madras, North West Provinces, and Punjab), as well as in Bengal, where some large canals have been constructed within the last twenty-five years, and in Bombay. Of these it may be said that the works in Madras are of the most critical importance, in the sense that they are absolutely necessary for securing a harvest in all years. This is explained by the physical character of the country. The rainfall of India, generally, takes place during the prevalence of the south-west monsoon, a local trade-wind, which blows with great force from May till September, and is occasioned by the sun's progress to the north in summer, combined with the rotatory motion of the earth. But the supply of

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moisture deposited upon the peninsula generally by this wind, is intercepted from the Coromandel coast by the mountain ranges to the west, and the time of the rainy season in every other part of India is a dry season there. For their supply of rain the districts on that coast are dependent on the north-east monsoon, also a periodical wind occasioned by the return of the sun to the south, which blows from October till the beginning of the succeeding year; but this wind, which rises in the Bay of Bengal, is much less powerful and distinctly marked than the other Indian trade wind, which comes from the Southern Ocean, and it brings only a precarious supply of rain. This coast is therefore almost wholly dependent on artificial irrigation for good harvests. In Northern India, on the other hand—although there is seldom a season in which artificial irrigation, when available, is not made use of, and the demand becomes more extended and sustained as habit teaches the cultivators to insure themselves against the chances of the seasons—artificial irrigation is yet merely an auxiliary to the ordinary course of farming, and a palliative of occasional drought. In favourable seasons good crops can be raised without its aid.

Canals in Madras.

The irrigation system in Madras, in addition to the maintenance and development of the great tanks scattered over the country wherever the surface has admitted of their formation, comprises the works of damming up the great rivers which fall into the sea on the east coast by masonry weirs, at the points where their deltas begin, and distributing the waters over the surface of the country by canals. The principal tracts thus dealt with are the deltas of the Godavari at Rajamundri, the Kistna at Bezvada, the Penner at Nellore and Sangam, and the Cauveri at Trichinopoli. There is also a canal system in the interior of the province from the Tungbhadra river with head works near Kurnul, where the river issues from the hilly country to

the westward. These last-named canals were originally constructed by a joint stock company formed under a guarantee of five per cent. on a capital of one million sterling. This sum proved quite insufficient for the purpose, and after making large further advances the Government eventually took over the works which cost altogether over two millions (of ten rupees). They have not as yet paid their working expenses and are the only unprofitable undertaking in the province. A large project is also in course of being carried out for irrigation from the Vaigai river near Madura, on which about half a million has been spent. The total capital outlay on all these undertakings amounts to about five and a half millions (Rx.), and the present revenue from irrigation is about forty lakhs, giving a return from the completed works of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; this although the account is loaded with the commercially unprofitable expenditure on the Kurnul Canal system. Altogether about six millions of acres are under irrigation in Madras, of which rather more than half are watered from tanks, old and new, and the rest from the new canal systems.

In Bengal.

Artificial irrigation in Bengal is of comparatively modern date. Bengal proper, which is under the full influence of the summer monsoon, receives ordinarily a plentiful supply of rain, but in the south-western province of Orissa which forms part of the administrative province of Bengal, a complete failure of the annual rains occurred about thirty years ago, which in the absence of any sufficient means of communication by land or sea caused a grievous famine. Consequent on this a Joint Stock Company was formed, without a guarantee, for undertaking irrigation works from the river Mahanadi. The capital raised of one million sterling sufficed only to complete a part of the project. No more could be obtained, and the affair was on the point of collapse when the Government came to the rescue of the shareholders and purchased the under-

taking from them. Joint stock enterprise is altogether inapplicable to irrigation works. The best sites economically have already been taken up, and each new project is likely to be less directly profitable than those undertaken before. The canal system in Madras, although very economically constructed, gives a much smaller return on first outlay than the primitive tanks previously constructed. Moreover, the construction of the works is only the beginning of the business. The distribution of the water from day to day—the ultimate duty of those concerned, is by far too delicate a matter to be entrusted to an agency interested only in getting the largest possible return on its capital; it can be properly conducted only by the department of government directly responsible for the welfare of the people, or by a body of public servants in immediate communication with, and subordinate for revenue business to that department. Anyone familiar with the extortion sometimes attempted to be practised by the subordinates attached to the government irrigation works, although carefully watched, and although the water-rate is fixed intentionally at a very low figure, will readily understand how great an engine of oppression might be framed out of the management of such a concern. It was accordingly provided in the case of the Orissa Company, that on the construction of the works being completed, the duties of the company's officers should be confined to the maintenance of the works, and that the distribution of the water should be undertaken by the Government. The company, in fact, was to sell the water to the Government, and the Government to sell it to the cultivators. All this complication, with the laborious negotiations that arose with the company, extending from first to last over several years, involving great delay in the commencement of work, and ending in an arrangement by which the Government accepted an expenditure over which it had no effective

control: all this had for its object to save the Government from the responsibility of raising and spending directly one million sterling. Eventually the works were completed at a cost of two and a half millions, but they have not yet paid their working expenses. Orissa, except in very exceptional years, happily few and far between, gets as much rain as it needs, and no demand arises for water from the canals. Nevertheless, an undertaking which would be disastrous as a commercial enterprise, may be both proper and profitable for the Government to carry out. The direct return in the form of a water-rate is in fact an altogether secondary consideration. A failure of the crops involves the loss of the land revenue for the season, and the further liability for an enormous outlay to convey food to the famine-stricken districts. These are the direct obligations, apart from the loss involved to the people in addition to their inability to pay revenue, which it must always be the duty of the Government to endeavour to avert. That irrigation works, unlike roads, should in most cases yield a good return on their outlay, is a very satisfactory condition, but their primary object is to be an insurance, primarily against the horrors and losses of famine, and, further, against the resulting loss of land revenue.

The canals in Orissa, therefore, apart from their value as a means of assurance, are mainly useful for purposes of navigation, and in some parts the traffic on them is considerable. But the great province of Behar, very fertile and generally well supplied with rain, is yet liable to occasional drought, and a large canal system has been carried out there by which the waters of the River Sone, an affluent of the Ganges rising in the mountains to the south, are distributed over the country, irrigating about half a million of acres. The works have cost about two and a half millions and give a direct return in tolls and water

rent of nearly three per cent. Altogether about seven and a half millions (Rx.) has been spent in Bengal on works of this class, in addition to a considerable outlay from year to year, provided from revenue. About one thousand square miles are under irrigation annually. But the actual extent of irrigation, here as elsewhere, in ordinary years is a very imperfect index of the amount of benefit that accrues in seasons of drought.

In North West Provinces.

The Irrigation works carried out in the great plains of the North West Provinces are among the most satisfactory records of British government in India. The first work of the kind was carried out about seventy years ago, a canal taken off the east or left bank of the Jumna, where it issues from the Lower Himalayas, which distributes a part of the waters of that river, till only a small stream remains at the tail or terminus of the canal to fall into the parent stream at Delhi. A second canal of larger size, taken off the right or western bank of the river, runs through a country—the greater part known as the Delhi Territory—which since the Mutiny has been transferred to Punjab. This was at first only the restoration of an older canal constructed under Mahomedan rule, which had fallen into disuse, a rude and imperfect work which has been realigned and practically reconstructed. The Ganges Canal, designed and constructed by Cautley and opened in 1854, is the most striking and original work of the kind yet constructed, from the great capacity of its channel and the magnitude and boldness of the head works, by which the canal has to be carried across the drainage of the sub-Himalayas for twenty miles, through, over, and under various affluents of the main river which in rainy weather are raging torrents of great volume. The Ganges Canal, with its branches, has a length of more than 4,000 miles, and conveys the waters of the Ganges to Cawnpur. The dam across the Ganges, at Hurdwar, which diverts the water into the canal is

in great part a temporary work carried away every year when the river rises in flood, and renewed in the succeeding dry season. This is deemed to be cheaper than the construction of a permanent dam in a position of exceptional difficulty. Although in the times of lowest discharge the whole body of the river appears to be intercepted, a considerable stream issues from its shingle-bed a short distance below the dam, which, increased by the various affluents, soon becomes a large stream, and when a hundred and fifty miles of its course are accomplished, it rolls along a broad river as if it had not parted with any portion of its volume. At about this distance from the head another and permanent dam has within recent years been constructed across the bed, and a second, the 'Lower Ganges' canal, taken off from it, acting as a feeder to the first, and with its branches and subsidiary channels nearly 3,500 miles in length. These two works have together cost about six millions; with the East Jumna canal they form a network of water-channels spreading over the whole Doab, from the Himalayas to the junction of the Ganges and Jumna at Allahabad, driving away famine and insuring plenty. This is especially a country to protect, for the Ganges acts as a great drain to intercept the flow of waters from the Himalaya to the south, and having only a moderate rainfall in ordinary seasons, it is specially liable to drought. One of these great canals, a deep and rapid river, full in the driest season, its banks shaded by thick groves of trees in unbroken lines for hundreds of miles through a country in many parts bare of timber; such a phenomenon in a hot and thirsty land conveys a feeling of charm and refreshment, mental and bodily, which only those who have seen it can fully appreciate.

A second canal, called the Agra canal, of considerable size, finished twenty years ago at a cost of about one million, has been taken off the Jumna at Delhi, to irrigate the country on the right bank or south of the

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river as far as Agra. The country north of the Ganges, Oudh and Rohilkhand, is not as yet protected by irrigation works on any extensive scale, but the rainfall over these regions is usually abundant. A considerable part of it comes under the influence of Himalayan moisture.

Altogether about $8\frac{1}{4}$ millions (of which the Ganges canal accounts for 6 millions) have been spent on capital account for irrigation works in the North West Provinces, which provide for about 3,000 square miles being irrigated every season. The net revenue from the sale of the water is over five per cent. on the capital outlay, but the irrigation on the more recently constructed Lower Ganges canal has not yet become fully developed, and a still higher return may be looked for; it needs hardly be added after what has gone before that this direct revenue is only the smallest part of the resulting benefit. The works would have been directly remunerative to the Government, even did they only cover their working expenses. The advantage to the country and people from them can hardly be overestimated.

In Punjab.

The conditions of irrigation in Punjab differ from those obtaining in the North-West Provinces, so far that while here also the fertile districts towards the north, bounded by the Himalayas, need protection from occasional drought, and in all seasons are largely benefited by a plentiful supply of water, as the country extends to the south the average rainfall becomes more and more scanty, till at last the line of cultivation disappears in the Indian desert, where the wells, when found at all, are of a depth too great for use in irrigation, and husbandry is only practicable if water can be brought from a distance. Here then, also, irrigation canals are of inestimable value. Happily the great rivers of Punjab which, rising like the Ganges and Jumna in the perennial snow of the Himalayas, traverse the country from north to south, and flowing into

the Indus make up the great volume of that river, offer the needful means for a great system of irrigation which has been in course of execution ever since the annexation of that country. The canal taken off from the right bank of the Jumna, transferred to Punjab after the Mutiny with the territory through which it flows, was indeed in full operation for some years before; it has been extended and improved, and pays about nine per cent. on the cost of construction; the accumulated profits on the work, after deducting interest and cost, amount to three millions. The first new work undertaken was the canal from the Ravi, opened in 1859 and completed at a cost of about one and a half millions. It now pays about 7½ per cent., and irrigates the great plain between the Ravi and Beas, known as the Bari Doab. The next great work undertaken was the canal from the Sutlej, which, at a cost of nearly five millions, irrigates the country between that river and the Jumna, including several Sikh States, which have contributed to the outlay, and is gradually extending agriculture into the thirsty districts to the south. The returns from this canal, as from all other works of the same class, have gone on increasing with the gradual development of irrigation, a process of time in every case. Opened in 1882, the return on the capital five years later was about 1½ per cent.; at the end of another five years it had risen to 7¼ per cent.

Another of the great rivers of Punjab has lately been utilised in the same way. A canal from the Chenab, a river with greater volume than the other three already dealt with, was opened for use in 1892. Over a million has been spent on this canal, which is still incomplete, but already 350,000 acres of waste lands to be irrigated from it have been allotted to colonists, whose migration from the more congested districts of the province will afford a very sensible relief to the agricultural community. The Jhelum and Indus rivers

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still remain to be attacked, if it should be found that they admit of being dealt with in the same way. A canal from the Swat river, which falls into the Indus near Attock, in the extreme north of the province, recently constructed at a cost of 350,000 Rx., completes the list of the great hydraulic works in Punjab. Altogether about seven and a quarter millions have been spent on these, besides the contribution of more than one million to the Sutlej Canal from the native states interested, which already give a return of $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and with which 8,000 miles of main and distributory branches have been constructed. These are all canals taken off from the rivers as they issue from the gorges of the Himalaya. It would be impossible to give here any account of the various headworks by which the stream of waters are controlled and diverted; but their magnitude and solidity, and the boldness, ingenuity, and perseverance which have been applied to the task in each case, here as well as to the east and south, must command the admiration of all who have had the opportunity of seeing these great and original undertakings. Yet but few of their countrymen and practically none of their countrywomen take the trouble to visit them—among the most creditable records of what has been accomplished by Englishmen in India.

Inundation Canals.

In addition to the canals constructed from the upper waters of the Punjab rivers, an extensive system of irrigation has been developed in the southern districts of the province by what are known as the 'Inundation Canals.' These are diversions of the waters in the flood season by cuts made through the high banks. The inundation canals are available therefore during only one season, and give only a single crop, and their operation is necessarily limited to the low country in the vicinity of the river; but the works are of a very simple and inexpensive character, and are extraordinarily beneficial and remunerative. The country round

the city of Multan, where the average annual rainfall is only three inches, is a garden of cultivation carried out in this way.

In Sind.

The province of Sind, the basin of the Lower Indus, a practically rainless country, is cultivated entirely by artificial irrigation, mainly 'inundation' canals of the kind just mentioned. The conditions of this country closely resemble those of Lower Egypt, as do its products, but the Indus does not overflow its banks in the same way as the Nile, and artificial irrigation is necessary to produce any sort of crops. About one and a quarter millions has been spent on canals in Sind, which give a net revenue on that sum of nearly 12 per cent.

In Bombay.

In the province of Bombay the contour of the country, in great part irregular and uneven, and where the rivers are generally found running in valleys, is not favourable for the construction of canals, and the irrigation works generally take the form of tanks, or more properly lakes, to be filled in the rainy season and discharged by irrigating channels in the dry. A system based on the storage of water must necessarily be more expensive than the diversion of streams which give a constant supply; but in no part of India is artificial irrigation more valuable than in the Dekhan with its moderate rainfall, a slight deficiency in which at once creates a drought. The capital expenditure on irrigation works in Bombay has been about two and a half millions, one-third of this being on works still incomplete, and which have not begun to pay anything; the present return on the whole sum is about 5 per cent.[1]

[1] To those who desire further information on this subject may be recommended *Irrigated India*, by the Hon. Alfred Deakin, formerly Chief Secretary to the Government of Victoria, a book containing a detailed and very interesting account of these great and beneficent works.

CHAPTER XIX

RAILWAYS

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Early history of Indian railways.

THE first beginning of railways in India was made in the year 1851 during the administration of Lord Dalhousie, under what is known as the guarantee system. The original scheme provided for the construction of three railways along what were considered the most important lines of communication for commercial, political, and military purposes :—1. The East Indian Railway, from Calcutta northward to the Ganges, thence along the course of that river to Allahabad, crossing the Jumna just above its junction with the Ganges, and so passing along through the Doab to Delhi, about 1,200 miles in length, to which was shortly added a branch of 250 miles from Allahabad to Jabalpur. 2. The Great Indian Peninsula Railway, from Bombay to join the East India Railway at Jabalpur, completing the communication between Bombay to Calcutta, with a branch to Nagpur opening out Central India and the cotton districts; and a southern line from Poona towards Madras, also traversing an important agricultural country. The total length of the whole concession was nearly 1,300 miles. 3. The Madras Railway, from Madras across the south of the Peninsula to the West Coast, to which was subsequently added (1858) a line from Madras to communicate with Bombay and the southern branch of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway. This third line was much less important than the other two,

in fact, as experience has since shown, it had no claim to be selected as one of the initial undertakings; but the distribution was governed by the principle always assumed to be involved in the presidential system, that whatever was done for one Presidency must be done for the other two.

The first completed section of Indian railway—twenty miles of the Great Indian Peninsula—was opened for traffic in 1853; in the following year a section of thirty-seven miles was opened from Calcutta on the East India Railway. Further extension on the former line was at first slow, a difficult ascent having to be accomplished from the sea level of the table land of the Dekhan. On the East Indian, operations were carried on simultaneously in the North West Provinces and in Bengal, materials being transported up the Ganges to the former. Unfortunately no portion of this upper section was ready when the Mutiny broke out, but the line from Allahabad to Cawnpur was opened in the following year. The Ganges was reached from Calcutta in 1860; through communication was established between Calcutta and the North West Provinces in 1864, save for the large bridge over the Jumna; the whole line to Delhi was opened in the same year. The branch to Jabalpur was completed in 1867. Communication between Bombay and Calcutta was established by the connection of the two railways at Jabalpur in 1870. The third of the lines projected at the outset, the line from Madras to the west coast, of over 400 miles, was finished in 1862, and a branch therefrom to the table land of Mysore in 1864. The more important section from Raichur, completing communication with Bombay, about 300 miles, was finished in 1871.

The guage of all these lines was five feet six inches, which was thus established as the standard guage for India. The capital was raised in each case through the agency of a joint stock company, to which a guarantee

The Guarantee system.

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was given of 5 per cent. on the capital outlay, and half of the surplus profits, no repayment being required of this guaranteed interest for the periods during which it might be in excess of the net receipts. To the company was entrusted the appointment of the engineering and other staff to be engaged, and the execution of the works. The Government, in consideration of this guaranteed interest, were to have complete control over the operations of the company, both as to design and expenditure in all branches. Power was taken to purchase the line at certain specified periods of time.

Further progress.

Following on these three railways four additional lines were soon afterwards undertaken on similar guarantees: the Eastern Bengal, 160 miles, from Calcutta to the Ganges; the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India, 460 miles; the Oudh and Rohilcund, 700 miles (further extensions were added later on); the Sind, Punjab, and Delhi Railway, from Karachi along the right bank of the Indus to Sukkur; onward by the left bank of the river and its tributaries to Multan; thence to Lahore and Delhi, a total length of 1,150 miles; also a small line in the south of India, begun in 1859, from Negapatam on the east coast to Erode on the Madras Railway.

Merits and defects of guarantee system.

The guarantee system as originally introduced was subject to the great defect that, under the terms of the contracts made, the Government covenanted to pay the guaranteed interest, not only upon all expenditure incurred, but on all the capital called up,[1] thus relieving the railway company from all responsibility for the cost of construction, and all incentive to economy, save that supplied by the prospect of an eventual share of

[1] Both conditions are prescribed in the contract, which was very carelessly drafted; in one clause it is specified that the interest shall be paid on the expenditure incurred, while in another clause the payment is extended to all capital called up with the sanction of government. The wider condition of course governed the adjustment of all the transactions arising.

surplus profits in excess of the guaranteed interest; but this prospect in the first instance and during construction was remote and contingent. The company had, therefore, a high incentive to make as large an investment as possible. The Government undertook to control the expenditure, but its efforts in this direction were at first very ineffectual. The controlling officers were inexperienced in the business and unacquainted with the proper method of conducting an audit, and their well meant efforts to secure economy were often applied in a way to create a good deal of friction, especially in dealing with the engineers engaged on the work—a body whose training and antecedents rendered somewhat impatient of control and economy, and who also began the undertaking without experience of Indian engineering. The result was that the first cost of these railways largely exceeded what would have been found necessary under a better system. But it is easy to be wise after the event. The guarantee system had these overruling advantages, that it attracted British capital to India, which so far has not been found forthcoming in any other way, save when the State itself is the borrower; and further, that after the contract was once made with the company, the work went on uninterruptedly to completion, free from all the delays and interruptions due to the vacillation of policy, which so far has appeared to be inseparable from the course of railway construction undertaken by the State, when the grants fluctuate from year to year according to the state of the financial balance-sheet. Under State construction these earlier lines would assuredly have taken a very much longer time to construct than was actually spent, and the enormous addition they have given to the administrative strength of the Government and to the prosperity of the country, would have been to that extent deferred. The advantages of the system have, on the whole,

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greatly outweighed the disadvantages. Dear railways are far better than none; but in fact the extravagance of early days gave way in time to a better ordered system, and latterly the guarantee system has not been open to any reproach on this head.

Construction of railways by State.

It was, however, in view to the cheaper construction of railways that the Government of India undertook the construction of them by its own agency. The first State enterprise was the Rajputana-Malwa Railway, the first section of which, from Delhi and Agra through Rajputana to a junction with the Bombay-Baroda Railway at Ahmadabad, a length of over 700 miles, was begun in 1873 and completed in 1879. To this was added the Malwa branch, from Ajmir on the main line through Indore in Central India, descending into the Narbada valley to join the G. I. Peninsular at Kundwa, about 400 miles, making about 1,100 miles in all. Other extensions have been added, and the whole system now comprises nearly 1,700 miles. The Rajputana-Malwa Railway was the first constructed on the narrow or metre guage.

Introduction of narrow guage.

Railway construction continued for some years to make fair progress, partly by State agency, partly by guaranteed companies, some of the lines being on the standard guage and some on the metre guage. The lines constructed in Punjab (after the completion of the Sind, Punjab, and Delhi line), west of the Sutlej, have been made by State agency on the broad or standard guage. A beginning was made westward of Lahore on the metre guage, but the break was found so extraordinarily inconvenient during the Afghan war of 1878, that the line, so far as it had been completed, was converted to the standard guage, and no metre guage has been carried permanently beyond the Sutlej. The Punjab railways, of which the portions on the frontier are military lines made for strategic purposes, and from which no appreciable revenue is to be ex-

pected for a long time to come, have lately been extended through the passes of the Suleiman Mountains to Baluchistan and the table lands of Central Asia, under great engineering difficulties.

The great plain north of the Ganges, from the borders of Assam to the Jumna, has been occupied mainly by the narrow guage; the different lines have been made, partly by the Government, partly by companies.

The Dekhan and the part of India to the south of it have also been occupied by narrow guage lines—the Madras Railway excepted—constructed by the two agencies. The Southern of India Railway referred to above as one of the earlier undertakings, has been converted to the narrow guage.

Recent additions.

Two considerable systems, the Indian Midland and the Bengal-Nagpur with its branches, have lately been constructed by companies under a guarantee, both happily on the standard guage. The line from Delhi to Kalka, at the foot of the Himalaya, where the road to Simla begins, was made by a company under guarantee. A new line of 750 miles from Chittagong to Assam, inappropriately called the Assam-Bengal Railway since no part of it lies in Bengal proper, is now in course of construction by a company, the capital being supplied partly by the company on a guarantee, partly by the Government; this is on the metre guage. On the east coast of the Bay of Bengal, a line of 450 miles is in the course of construction from the Kistna to Kuttack, which was originally undertaken as a famine work; this is on the standard guage. It will eventually, if completed, give direct communication between Bengal and the east coast, but some large rivers have to be crossed involving great outlay for bridging.

Railways in Burma.

The railways in Burma are all State lines, and all on the metre guage; they comprise at present, the main line from Rangoon to Mandalay; a line from Rangoon to Prome at the head of the delta of the Irawadi river;

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and an extension of the main line from opposite Mandalay, along the right or west bank of the Irawadi to the frontier of Burma at Mogaung; about 750 miles have been opened; 150 more are in progress.

The foregoing comprise all the principal Indian lines. Altogether up to the spring of 1893, about 18,000 miles of railway have been completed, of which there are—

On the standard guage .	. 10,346 miles.
On the metre guage .	. 7,451 „
On special guages . .	. 245 „

Almost the whole of these are single lines only. Portions of line only, mainly on the East Indian and the G. I. Peninsula, to an extent in all of about 1,050 miles, have as yet been doubled.

Evils of break of guage.

Two of the most obviously noticeable points brought out by any view of Indian railways, are the break of guage, and the diversity of agency employed in the construction of the different lines, both plain indications of the vacillation and want of definite principles of action which have marked the railway policy of the Indian Government. The metre guage was introduced with excellent intentions, to promote economy in construction, to make a given sum produce a greater mileage by laying light rails and permanent way to carry light rolling stock at a low speed. The same end might have been reached while yet maintaining the standard guage. The saving of cost in the narrow guage line, due to a narrower permanent way, is a quite inconsiderable item in the whole saving. In a flat country, and where the cost of land is trifling, the saving does not arise from placing the lines of rail closer to each other, but in using a light permanent way and a light rolling stock; these could have been provided equally in one case as in the other, while on the broad guage the stock is much easier to handle than on the narrow one, because it covers less ground for a given load,

admitting of shorter platforms and goods yards. It may be objected, and probably was argued at the time, that if these lighter lines had been laid down on the wider guage, it would have been practically impossible to prevent heavy stock from being run over them; or that if the two kinds of stock had been kept separate, the stock of each part, heavy or light, being reserved for itself, there would have been equally in effect a break of traffic with all its inconveniences, just as much as if there had been a break of guage. Admitting this, still a great deal of the traffic might have been continuous and carried over the lighter road, the condition involved being a mere question of reducing speed, which surely could have been kept under regulation. With a uniform guage and permanent way, the lighter stock and permanent way could have been gradually replaced by stronger materials with the development of traffic. In Burma, indeed, where the railways are completely isolated from those of all other countries, the objection to the narrow guage does not hold good in this respect. The same thing may be said of the new Assam-Bengal railway, but as to both cases it may be asserted that in a level country there is no virtue in the metre guage, and that a wider guage (even if less than the standard) would have been as cheap and more convenient. In India itself, the Ganges, except in its upper parts, cannot be bridged within any measurable space of time; here then, also, the objection to a break of guage did not present itself at the outset, and the lines north of that river might have been laid down on the narrow guage, as a system separate from that established on the south of the river. But the ruling principle to be observed was violated by the construction of the Oudh and Rohilcund Railway on the broad guage. Moreover, the lines in upper Bengal are now in course of being connected with those to the westward, when there will be an extensive metre guage sys-

tem north of the Ganges, joining the extension of the Rajputana line, so that the metre and standard guage lines will be crossing each other at numerous points in North Western India, and all the evils of a break of guage will be manifested in an extreme form. The same intersection of broad and narrow guage lines already obtains in Southern India, but the broken surface of the Dekhan is especially suitable for the metre guage if it can be justified anywhere. It is remarkable that the mistake of first introducing that guage should have been perpetrated on the Rajputana Railway, one of the main lines of communication between Upper India and the seaboard, and over a section terminated at each end by a broad guage line. It is indeed a singular instance of mistaken judgment that India should be committed to all the irreparable evils of a break of guage by a government which had a perfectly free hand and a new country to deal with.

Vacillation of railway policy of Indian Government.

To appreciate fully the vacillation of policy which has marked the course of Indian railway administration, the various subsequent arrangements must be understood which have been made for working the different lines upon their completion. All the contracts with the guaranteed companies provided for the Government having the option of purchase at stated periods. This option was not availed of in the case of the G. I. Peninsula and Madras Railways, which on the expiry of the first period of twenty-five years, obtained a renewal of their contracts. In thus losing the opportunity of reducing the high and now unnecessary rate of guaranteed interest, 5 per cent., an opportunity which will not recur until 1899 and 1907 respectively, a fault of omission was committed which it is difficult to extenuate.

Extension of contracts granted in some cases,

railways purchased in other cases.

While extensions of their contracts were given to these two lines, the contracts with several others were determined. The Eastern Bengal Railway was acquired

in 1884, and added as a working system to the narrow guage state line of that name, north of the Ganges. The Government has also undertaken the working of the Bengal Central Railway (125 miles), one of the few lines undertaken without a guarantee, but on which a guarantee was eventually granted; this line now forms part of the same system. The Sind, Punjab, and Delhi Railway was purchased in 1886, and incorporated with the Government North West system under the title of the North Western Railway, now comprising over 2,400 miles owned and worked directly by the Government, the most extensive system in India. The Oudh and Rohilcund Railway was purchased in 1889, and its management assumed by the Government.

To the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India Company, on the other hand, an extension of its contract was given on the old guarantee of 5 per cent. until 1905, and it has further been given a lease of the working of the Rajputana-Malwa State line, which had been worked as well as constructed by State agency. The combined system, broad and narrow guage, comprises about 2,350 miles, extending from Bombay to Cawnpur.

The East Indian Railway was purchased in 1880, and made over to a company to be worked under special arrangements which will be presently referred to. This company has also been given a lease of the new Delhi-Kalka line.

Amalgamations of different systems.

The Great Southern of India has been amalgamated with another company, the whole forming a concern called the South Indian Railway Limited, with a guarantee of 3 per cent. on the new capital, and 4½ on the stock of the old company, and a share of surplus profits when realised. The whole system covers about 1,100 miles, a considerable part of which consists of line, originally built on the standard guage, since converted to the narrow.

The Southern Maratha Railway, of 1,550 miles, is a

system made up of various lines constructed by the company of that name, and various State-constructed lines made over to it for working, with a guarantee on the capital of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and a charge on surplus profits.

The Bengal and North Western Railway, about 750 miles, similarly consists partly of lines constructed by the company of that name and partly of lines constructed by the Government, made over to the former for working. In Northern India also a comparatively small concern, the Rohilkhand and Kumaon Railway, of less than 60 miles, works a system of 300 miles of narrow guage lines, the greater part of which were originally made by the State.

The Bengal-Nagpur Railway, about 850 miles, is the property of the Government, in consideration of a contribution of nearly half of the capital, and a guarantee of 4 per cent. on the remainder. This is worked by the company by whose agency it was constructed. The Indian Midland, 750 miles, is on the same footing as the Bengal-Nagpur.

Diversity of system now obtaining.

Thus it will be seen that while the Government has bought several of the lines built by guaranteed companies, under the terms of the contracts, it has failed to take advantage of this option in the case of others; no reasonable explanation is forthcoming for this difference of treatment. Further, while the Government on the one hand has assumed the direct management of several lines originally constructed by companies, on the other hand it has made over to companies for working a considerable number of lines constructed by its own agency, the result being an extraordinarily complicated variety of agencies and conditions. The Indian railway system now comprises :—

1. Lines constructed and worked by the State.
2. Lines constructed by companies and worked by companies.

3. Lines constructed by companies but purchased and worked by the Government.
4. Lines constructed by the Government but made over to be worked by companies.
5. Lines constructed with State funds through the agency of companies and worked by them.
6. Lines constructed by one company but worked by another.
7. Lines constructed by native States and worked by those States.
8. Lines constructed by native States and worked by companies.

To sell a railway one day and buy another the next; to build a railway and then lease it to a company, and at the same time to take over another line on lease; these inconsequential proceedings are sufficient indication of the total want of systematic policy and good judgment which has characterised the railway administration of the Indian Government. But even more serious and harmful than past mistakes, is the lamentable want of progress exhibited at present in railway making. Less than 500 miles of new line were opened in 1892–3, and the additional work sanctioned for construction covers only 136 miles. This is as if railway making in India was regarded as having come to an end. It would be perhaps too much to say that railway construction is just beginning, but the total of only 18,000 miles completed in that great country is a figure which speaks for itself; there are still large tracts, highly cultivated and thickly populated, for which railways are practically non-existent, and which without railways can find no market for their produce. But everybody is agreed about the necessity of largely extending railway construction, and the Government professes itself to be most eager on the point; the difficulty is that it cannot make up its mind to a definitive policy which will

Stoppage in railway progress.

ensure a steady yet rapid progress without needless extravagance or foolish bargains. Not indeed that the bargains in the past can be so characterised. The guarantee of five per cent. was a not unreasonably high attraction to offer to the investor nearly fifty years ago, when the conditions of India and its trade were little known or understood. And if the rupee had maintained its gold value, the bargain would have proved to be a very good one for the Government, to which most of the earlier lines would now be returning handsome profits. As it is the present financial situation of the Government, as affected by its railway operations, is one of the most striking illustrations of the dislocation wrought in trade by the fluctuations in the value of gold and silver. The rupee being now worth only a little more than one half its value at the time when the capital raised was sent to India to make the railways, a return of nearly ten per cent. is now required to cover the guaranteed gold interest of five per cent. The loss thus incurred, as on every bargain struck before the depreciation of silver set in, is irrecoverable, unless the value of silver should be restored. But the same cause of loss cannot arise upon further transactions of the kind except in the improbable contingency of a still further fall of silver, which there is reason to hope has now touched nearly its lowest point, while of course there is no longer any question of a five per cent. guarantee; the latest contracts have been made at three per cent. on the capital outlay.

Effect of fall of silver on guarantee system.

The financial aspect of the Indian railways is highly satisfactory and encouraging. The annual account of receipt and expenditure for 1893–4 shows indeed a balance of a million and a half on the debtor side,[1] still further increased in the present year by the greater loss on exchange in payment of guaranteed interest. But

Satisfactory position of railway finance.

[1] A small part of this is due to substitution of terminable annuities for permanent interest, and is therefore in the nature of an investment.

the account is in the initial stage, burdened with charges on new lines which have not had time to pay. The frontier railways apart, which must always be worked at a loss, the average return on the capital outlay already exceeds $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., although on several lines lately opened the traffic is still in a quite undeveloped state. The heaviest charge on the account, however, arises from the high rate of interest still paid to the Great Indian Peninsula, the Bombay-Baroda, and the Madras Railways, which will eventually be susceptible of large reduction. The burden arising out of the guarantee on the older lines from the depreciation of the rupee is one which it would be irrational to suppose will recur on any new engagements made, and in the development of railways is to be found the best prospect of strengthening the financial position of the government. In no other way can the exchange difficulty be so effectually met as by the stimulus thus given to the export trade. The benefit to India itself from railway extension will be incalculable. Every consideration therefore points to the urgency for replacing the present condition of hesitation and inaction by a policy of sustained and vigorous progress. The first condition required for securing this result is that the government should arrive at a speedy decision as to the machinery to be employed for carrying out the business in this way. At present, halting between a half-hearted desire to execute the work by its own agency and a disinclination to continue the guarantee system, it has brought the business almost to a standstill, for the annual grant made to State railways, besides that it cannot be certainly counted on, is utterly inadequate for the wants of the case.

State construction.

At first sight there might appear much to be said in favour of railway construction being carried out in future by Government agency. The Government can certainly borrow more cheaply direct than through the agency of a company under guarantee; it commands

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the services of a staff of very able engineers, whose work is as economical as it is good. But while India and its people are highly prosperous, the Government itself is in a state of great financial embarrassment; the inevitable tendency to regulate railway expenditure with reference to the ways and means of the year would be fatal to the prospect of carrying out construction in this way with vigour and regularity. Every change in the state of the Treasury will be reflected in its railway policy; hesitation and vacillation—fits of energy succeeded by suspension of work, variation in the grants of work varying from year to year, almost from month to month; this has been the condition exhibited in the past and will certainly be maintained in the future. Nor is it desirable that a Government already overworked, should load itself with the burden of undertaking directly a laborious business of this kind. There is further great objection to the creation and maintenance of any more public establishments than are absolutely necessary. In most self-governing countries, indeed, the growth of these establishments is becoming a serious political danger. In India the danger assumes another phase of the same kind—that in a country where there is little public opinion and where amongst the English community the official element largely preponderates over the unofficial, the services should become too strong for the Government. But the first objection is the greatest of all, and it is conclusive.

Compared with joint stock agency.

The best and only satisfactory method for ensuring regular and sustained railway progress is by the employment of a separate agency, that is, to entrust the business to joint stock companies.

Terms to be given.

If this decision is arrived at, there remains to act upon it by fixing terms which shall be sufficient, but not more than sufficient, to attract English capital to the business. The Government have lately after much delay announced the terms on which they are pre-

pared to entertain proposals for the construction of new lines. These terms, formulated as being those which must in future take the place of a guarantee, are: that the preliminary survey for a railway shall be undertaken at the cost of the State; that the land to be taken up shall be acquired by the Government, and given free of cost to the company; and that a rebate or discount shall be allowed to the new line for all traffic receipts brought by it on to, or received by it from the old line; this assumes that the new line will be an extension of an old one, as in fact almost every new railway must be. This rebate is obviously another form of guarantee. But it is one thing to lay down conditions, and another that they shall serve the desired purpose of stimulating railway progress, and it seems doubtful whether a guarantee simple in form and readily understood, would not be more attractive to the investor, while not involving any greater liability to the State than these somewhat complicated terms. The present state of the silver market is distinctly favourable to a guarantee, even in gold, because the fall which has occurred cannot in reasonable probability go further. If, however, the needful capital can be obtained without a guarantee other than the disguised one now proposed, by all means let the guarantee be dropped. How far the proposal will serve its purpose has yet to be seen. But in any case, if English capital is to be freely obtained for Indian railways, two conditions at least must be satisfied. The curious notion seems to pervade the official mind that the inducement which leads to the formation of companies is the prospect of a dividend on the part of the shareholders. Even if this were the cause, it is certain that the ordinary investor cannot afford to wait while the process of return is in course of development. This difficulty has been got over by an Act lately passed,[1]

[1] 57 & 58 Vict., Cap. xii.

under which it becomes lawful to pay dividends out of capital during the process of construction, which is in fact equivalent to loading the enterprise with a certain extra dead weight of expenditure, unproductive, but necessary under the circumstances. But investors alone do not get up railway schemes. The authorities in India and at the India Office have not apparently got to the points of understanding that, for this class of business as for any other, a special agency is needed, which must be paid for its services—the promoters who have to be responsible for raising the capital, and who, in order that subscriptions shall be forthcoming, have to underwrite or procure underwriters for the amount; and that they will not undertake this, with the risk or discredit of failure, without adequate return. There must in short be a lump sum provided at the outset for commission, under whatever name it be called, in addition to the actual cost of constructing the line. This consideration explains how it is that while in every mushroom South American Republic foreign capital is forthcoming for its railways, India fails to get any without a guarantee. But surely there is a mean between the state of things where every one from the Prime Minister or President downwards has to be squared—where the interests of the promoters are made the first, and those of the shareholders the last consideration, and the condition which those who conduct affairs in India appear to think reasonable and sufficient, that railway projects should be got up by the investing public themselves, simply with the prospect of ultimately getting a moderate interest for their money. The present state of Indian traffic returns shows that any well planned line, with the economical modes of construction now in force, can bear this loading of a reasonable profit to the promoters and underwriters who raise the loan, and of interest during construction to the shareholders, and yet return a good profit.

Railways should be constructed by companies.

But while new companies may be usefully established for raising capital and constructing new lines in various localities, the agency of existing companies may be employed to still greater advantage for carrying out the extensions required to the lines under their management. Hitherto the procedure in this respect has been in the last degree cumbrous and unnecessary. In the case of the Delhi-Kalka line, for example, which is obviously an extension of the East Indian, a company was got up to raise the capital and construct the line, which on completion was made over to the latter company on lease to work, the staff which had been got together for making the line being thereon dismissed, while the London board of the new Company is retained solely for the purpose of distributing the dividend to shareholders. Obviously this extension could have been carried out with greater economy and without this roundabout process by the existing company. A very pressing requirement at the present time is that the contracts between all the old companies and the Secretary of State should be so modified as to admit of his giving them borrowing powers for such extensions and the other approved works necessarily arising out of the development of their traffic.

Government acquiring ownership.

But while railway construction should be entrusted to companies, the advantage to the Government from the possession of the railways is so great that the condition of the right of eventual purchase will no doubt be provided in all future, as it has been in all past contracts. If to the condition of purchase be added a firm adherence to the wise policy now being pursued of paying off the purchase-money by terminable annuities, the State will eventually become the owner of this great and lucrative property free of encumbrance, a source of financial strength such as is presented by no possible mode of taxation.

On the other hand, if while State ownership of the

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but not working the lines directly.

railways should be a cardinal point of policy, the first construction of the railways should not be undertaken by the State, still more desirable is it that the Government should divest itself of the working of completed lines. Over and above the disadvantages already stated as regards the first case, are those involved in the great and increasing burden of conducting a great railway traffic. Government management of a railway is shrouded in mystery. In the case of a private company the responsibility rests with the visible head; in the working of State lines it can never be known how far the blame for mismanagement and omission to make improvements is shared between the ostensible management and an obstructive controlling department at headquarters; the Government of India should not place itself in a position to appear responsible for bad administration in any branch. Moreover, an incurable defect attaches to government management in the constant movement of the executive officials from post to post, a condition incompatible with good administration.

All future contracts, then, should provide for the line being leased to the company which makes it, and the government may with great advantage also divest itself of the working of the lines which it still retains. The case of the East Indian Railway offers a valuable precedent on this head. The company, as reconstituted in 1880, has a working lease of the line with a capital of about one-fifth that of the original company, to cover the value of the stock taken over.[1] The profits on the working of the line are charged with the payments of the annuities due to the shareholders on the old stock, and with 4 per cent. guaranteed to the shareholders on

[1] The reconstitution of the East Indian Railway Company on its present basis, was practically the act of General Strachey, then a Member of the Indian Council and now Chairman of the Company; one of the many remarkable and beneficial measures due to the labours and genius of this distinguished man.

the new—or to be more accurate, with a rate of annuity equivalent to that interest; of the surplus, four-fifths goes to the government and one-fifth to the company. The working of this line is remarkable both for the large increase of traffic which takes place from year to year, and the extraordinary economy with which it is administered—the working expenses being less than 30 per cent. of the gross receipts, a result, it is believed, not attained by any other railway company anywhere. What that company now needs is the power to make the extensions which could be profitably carried out in various directions, and which are urgently required in the interests of the country. But the company has no borrowing powers; it is dependent on the government for the supply of increased capital for this purpose, being in this respect on the footing of a government line, and suffering equally with the government railways both in limitation of the supply of funds, and in the vacillation and uncertainty which attend the allotment of them. This allotment of late has been insufficient even for the purchase of the necessary additional rolling stock required to carry the increased traffic, while the work of extension is practically standing still. Great is the need that, as has been proposed, borrowing powers should be given both to this company and to all other guaranteed lines to enable them to carry out their needful developments when these are approved by the government, in the methodical and systematic way which alone is compatible with economy in construction, instead of with petty instalments of additional capital, doled out in varying sums and at uncertain intervals.

Reform necessary in railway administration. At India Office

Whatever reforms of system be introduced, and however much the government may divest itself of the burden of direct construction and management, the operations of the railways are so intimately connected with the financial interests of the State, that the government must continue to maintain an effective control

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over them. An administrative agency of some kind will always be necessary; and in this respect also reform is urgently demanded. The existing procedure for dealing with this branch of public affairs sufficiently accounts for the blunders and vacillations of the past, and offers a conspicuous warning for the future.

The railway business of the Indian Government is naturally of a kind to be largely dealt with at home as well as in India itself, and the machinery of the India Office is singularly ill adapted for the purpose. The Secretary of State, coming with everything to learn to the charge of a department which is concerned with every branch of affairs, and unable to give more than a mere fragment of his time to the task, especially in these days of the interminable sittings of Parliament, can deal with the business in any one department only in the most perfunctory manner. The effective conduct of the business must perforce be left to the permanent staff, the head of which, as regards each department, is a Committee of the Council. Such a body, if suitable for reviewing the proceedings of others, is a bad form of agency for almost any kind of executive business; and especially inappropriate for the prosecution of railway business is a committee of old soldiers and civilians who come to it late in life, without any previous experience of the conditions with which they have to deal, and whose responsibility is nullified by the circumstance that their action ends with a recommendation to take action which is liable to be set aside by the collective Council. In a later part of this work a reorganisation of the India Office is suggested, which would furnish one responsible permanent head for this, as well as for the other departments into which it is divided, and with such a change there might be a reform in the mode of transacting business at the India Office, which now drives everyone who comes in contact with it to despair. But after all, Indian railway affairs

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in all their details must be transacted in India, and there the defect of procedure is even more glaring. Thirty years ago, when the departmental or cabinet system of Government was first introduced into the Governor General's Council, the Governor General himself took charge of the Public Works Department. With the rapid increase of business in all its details which took place after the Mutiny, the head of the Government soon found it impossible to superintend directly the Public Works as well as the Foreign Office, and the former was made over to one of the two civilian Members of the Council to hold in addition to one of the civil departments. In every other branch of the Government, law, army, revenue, finance, the Member of Council in charge was an expert in that particular line. In this case he was practically entirely ignorant of the business he was called on to administer, and grievously have public works interests suffered in consequence. It may be said that the same condition obtains in England, where all the ministers of departments are frequently changed, and always come and often remain from first to last quite ignorant of the business which they are nominally supposed to transact. But then in England the minister works in the light of day and under the constant criticism of Parliament; at any rate he has to assume a knowledge if he has it not, and in most cases to come to a decision; and he is aided by a permanent staff who spend their lifetime in the office. But in India, where it is the custom for business to be dealt with directly by the members of the government, singly or collectively, in a much more minute degree than obtains in England; that a minister should be entirely unversed in the business he is called on to deal with, is a condition unknown in any other branch of affairs. The head of the War Department is always a soldier; of the Finance Department a trained financier; of the Legislative Department a lawyer;

and in India.

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the revenue business of the Government is transacted by a civilian thoroughly trained and of long experience in that branch of affairs. It would be thought a monstrous thing to shift these ministers about among the different departments, but it is not more absurd to place an entirely untrained man at the head of so complex and extensive a Department as that of Public Works, which requires special knowledge and training just as much as any other. Moreover, under the traditionary rule always acted upon, that one of the two Civilian Members of the Council should be taken alternately from Madras and Bombay, the charge of the Public Works Department has usually fallen to the Councillor chosen from these provinces, apparently by seniority, who has possibly passed his life in the blameless discharge of duties connected with the law or revenue courts, who knows nothing of Indian affairs outside his own province, to whom the great problems of railway construction and administration have never presented themselves in any form, and who is unacquainted with the qualifications of the members of the large service at the head of which he is placed, and from which he has to make the selections for all the higher posts. The Indian Government have been fortunate in securing a succession of very able and experienced men for the post of Secretary to the department,[1] but ability and experience do not get full play in a subordinate position, and the Indian system suffers under the further defect that these officials are constantly changed. In England, the permanent under-secretary of a department will often hold that position for a great number of years, and so become the depository of great knowledge and experience; in India the secretary and other superior officers succeed each other every few months, the rule which superannuates them at the age of 55 years carrying a man off into

[1] It may be again mentioned that the secretary to a department in India holds a position corresponding with the permanent under secretary of a department at home.

retirement just as he has worked his way to the top of the service.[1] The present mode of administrating the Indian Public Works is indefensible. It is at the root of almost all the mistakes, blunders, and objectless changes of purpose, and especially the lamentable delays which have occurred to discredit the Indian Government.

A public works minister required,

An Act of Parliament passed in 1876 provided for the appointment of an additional member of the Governor General's Council for Public Works purposes; but the sanction given by this Act was only once made use of; the appointment first made under the Act was not renewed, and save during the exceptional period when a distinguished civilian, Sir Theodore Hope, had charge of the Public Works Department, the Public Works administration has been the least satisfactory feature of the Indian Government; with the increasing complexity and magnitude of the business to be dealt with, the need for reform becomes every year more urgent. The first condition for securing this is that a minister with the needful special knowledge and experience should be placed in charge of it. The objection to increasing the number of the Governor General's Council may be admitted. Even seven members are almost too many for prompt executive government. But if it be deemed inexpedient to prevent this increase by discontinuing to fill up one of the two seats reserved for members of the Civil Service, the same end might be secured by declaring the public works member eligible to sit and vote only when public works business was under discussion.[2] This would be

[1] It is a curious inconsistency in the Indian system, that the civilian in every branch is superannuated at a much earlier age than the military officer. If a major-general is considered to be physically fit for his post up to the age of sixty-two, it might be thought that a civilian could be kept to his work till at least the same age. A still greater age is not thought excessive for a Viceroy, the hardest worked man in the country.

[2] The addition of one word to the Act of 1876 would apparently effect what is desired; creating, instead of a member of the Governor General's Council 'for Public Works purposes,' a member 'for Public Works purposes *only*.'

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in harmony with the English system, under which all the ministers have not equal rank as members of the Cabinet, and it would be appropriate to the requirements of the case, the qualifications to be sought for in a public works minister being not necessarily of a kind to make his opinions of value on the other matters with which the Government of India has to deal.' The essential point, however, is that there should be a minister qualified by his antecedents for the post, specifically responsible for the conduct of public works, able to speak and act with authority, and not compelled, as the virtual head of the department—the secretary, has hitherto been, to work through a more or less ignorant and incompetent superior, who signs the papers put before him and has no opinions, or only worthless ones, of his own.

and a public works board.

But this reform alone would not be sufficient. To secure the continuity of policy and progress which hitherto has been lacking in such a lamentable degree, some more durable governing body than a single man is necessary. In a general way, no doubt, and especially for vigorous executive action, government by one man is better than government by a Board; but in this case, where the interests to be dealt with are so various and complex, and in India especially where men come and go so quickly, the continuity of policy which above everything has to be aimed at can only be got by such an agency. Moreover, it is very desirable that the higher officers of the department should all be able to speak and act with authority. A Board, therefore, of which the minister should be chairman, and the three principal officers of the department, the Secretary to Government, the Director-General of Railways, and the head of the Irrigation Service, members, may be suggested as the machinery which should satisfy the needful conditions.

With the creation of a body of this sort, it would be

Railway accounts to be separated from general financial accounts.

possible to deal with the finance of railways and irrigation in a more satisfactory way than is possible at present. The railway transactions are now all brought into the general accounts of the country, and in a very unsystematic and confusing fashion. The fact is that the Indian Finance Department is attempting to combine two incompatible things—the English system of accounts and finance based upon annual grants and appropriation; and the accounts and finance involved in the working of a great property like the Indian railways and irrigation works. The system of yearly grants has been found highly inconvenient and impolitic applied to even the comparatively small expenditure involved in the naval defences of this country. To deal in this way with progressive expenditure already amounting to hundreds of millions is impracticable: the attempt must sooner or later be given up, and the sooner the better. Railway accounts and finance, at any rate, if not those of irrigation also, should be entirely separated from the general accounts of the country and dealt with, as they only can be properly, on commercial principles; and for this purpose alone a Railway Trust appears indispensable. The proposed Board would serve this purpose. Under this reform the net revenue receipts or expenditure, as the case may be, of the railways would be shown by one final entry in the general finance accounts of the year, as so much revenue or outlay. The capital raised for railway purposes should also be kept separate from the other loans of the Government, and grants made therefrom should not as at present be revocable. Only by separating railway finance in this way, from that of the general treasury, conjoined with the other reforms indicated, can fixity of purpose and methodical and economical progress be secured.

CHAPTER XX

FINANCE

[The unit used here, ten rupees (Rx), is that which is now adopted in the public accounts of India; a unit which twenty years ago was nearly equal in value to the pound sterling, and used to be treated in those accounts as actually representing that sum.]

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Finance accounts inflated by entry of gross receipts and charges.

THE gross revenue of India, as shown in the public accounts, is about 90 millions; the gross expenditure for the last two years has been still larger. Thirty years ago, when financial equilibrium had been restored after the losses and special outlay caused by the Mutiny, the revenue and expenditure were about 40 millions; twenty years ago they were about 57 millions. It would thus appear on a superficial view as if the public expenditure and revenue of India had increased during the last twenty years by more than 30 millions, and this has been assumed to be the case by some writers whose knowledge of the subject is not always on a level with the confident tone of the opinions they express upon it. This increase in the figures is in fact due to a large extent to the exhibition in a greater degree than formerly of all receipts in the gross on one side of the account as revenue, and all charges for collection and so forth as expenditure. But it is still more largely due to the inclusion, on both sides, of the State transactions connected with the Indian railways, which are practically a new item in the public accounts. The inflation of the financial accounts due to this cause will go on increasing largely from year to year with the

development of these railways to such an extent as ultimately to render the other entries apparently insignificant—a distortion dearly purchased by the result. For even as a statement of the transactions which the figures profess to represent, they are misleading. In the accounts of 1893–4, the entry on the revenue side—about 20 millions in all—is made up of two items, $16\frac{2}{3}$rd millions of gross traffic receipts on the railways worked directly by State agency, the working expenses of these, $8\frac{1}{4}$ millions, being shown on the other side as expenditure; and $3\frac{1}{3}$ millions, the net traffic receipts of the railways worked by companies. The propriety of showing even the net traffic receipts as revenue is questionable, because at present there is a loss on the whole account, the guaranteed interest being in excess of the receipts. But at any rate the circumstance that the receipts of one railway are collected directly by the Government, and those of another through the agency of a company, is no reason for dealing with the items in a different way, the less so that the management of the railways is frequently changing hands. One year the Government buys a line and undertakes the working of it; another year it makes over one of its lines to be worked by a company. Clearly either the gross traffic receipts should be shown in all cases, or only the net traffic receipts. From the figures given nothing definite can be predicated until adjustments of the kind thus indicated as necessary are first made. As has just been pointed out, a new method is required for dealing with the financial transactions of the Government in regard to railways, in combination with the system of annual budgets. Apart from the financial distortion produced by the present mode of exhibiting the railway transactions, it seems misleading also to show miscellaneous receipts of the army and other public departments as revenue; they are merely recoveries of over payments made, and not revenue in the proper sense.

This inflation of the finance accounts—the outcome of official purism—does not even satisfy the canon of accuracy, as representing the whole transactions of the Government, and is hardly more appropriate than would be the insertion in the accounts of a bank of all the cheques handed over the counter.

Net revenues and receipts compared.

In order to appreciate the relative improvement which has taken place in the finances, the net and not the gross revenue and expenditure for successive years must be compared. The following figures furnish this comparison for 1873–4 and 1893–4. It is not quite exact, because in the figures available for the earlier year, the loss by exchange (to be presently referred to) is shown in the lump sum, whereas in the later account it is distributed over the different heads under which the loss occurs. The comparison is, however, sufficiently complete for the purpose in view. It will be seen that the net revenue has increased from 39¼ millions in 1873–74 to 50¼ millions in 1893–94. This increase of 12½ millions has accrued at a fairly uniform rate of rather more than half a million a year. The land revenue has furnished a proportionate share of the total increase, while generally the increase in the different branches of revenue indicates a gradual and steady, but moderate, advance from year to year in the general prosperity of the country, a condition entirely borne out by the expansion of railway traffic and the statistics of the Indian trade. The increase in the salt revenue is accounted for partly by an increase in the duty, partly by increased consumption. It is practically the only obligatory tax in India, while from the facility of collection as an excise duty levied at the localities where the article is produced, or at the ports of entry, it is probably the least irksome form of taxation that could be devised. The most satisfactory item of revenue, however, as regards the people of India, is that derived from opium, it being not an impost upon them but an

Increase of revenue.

Net Revenue	1873–4	1893–4
	Rx.	Rx.
Land	18,138,300	21,381,500
Opium	6,323,400	4,809,500
Salt	5,647,000	7,840,600
Stamps	2,575,600	4,337,700
Excise	2,187,400	5,124,900
Provincial Rates	1,765,200	3,424,600
Customs	2,378,600	1,467,800
Assessed Taxes	28,500	1,677,500
Forest	231,300	752,600
Registration	60,100	203,700
Tributes Native States	768,500	792,000
	40,103,900	51,812,400
Assignments and Compensations	870,800	1,559,300
Total	39,233,100	50,253,100

Net Expenditure	1873–4	1893–4
	Rx.	Rx.
Interest	4,914,500	3,557,600
Post, Telegraph, and Mint	367,100	180,400
Civil Departments	8,463,500	12,923,500
Miscellaneous Civil charges	2,322,400	4,658,200
Famine Relief and Insurance	3,864,700	1,138,300
Construction of Railways charged against Revenue	32,800	77,100
Railway Revenue Account	1,414,700	1,597,000
Irrigation	610,600	536,700
Buildings and Roads	4,409,100	5,286,300
Army and Marine	14,217,400	22,588,400
Special Defence Works	—	342,000
Exchange	879,400	—
	41,506,200	52,524,700
Provincial and Local Deficits	465,300	478,800
	41,040,800	52,045,900
Deficit	1,807,700	1,792,800
Total	39,233,100	50,253,100

article of export paid for in cash. Unfortunately, from a merely fiscal point of view, the opium revenue shows great falling off; recovery is more than doubtful, and the loss accruing under this head will necessarily have to be made good by other imposts, direct or indirect.

Next to opium comes the revenue from stamps, $4\frac{1}{8}$ millions. The considerable 'provincial rates,' nearly $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions, are made up of various local cesses, among them a small percentage on the land revenue appropriated locally, tolls on roads and ferries, and other receipts realised locally and for the most part applied in the same way, but which are brought in the first instance to the credit of the imperial revenues. Provincial taxation must not be confounded with provincial finance, which will be referred to later on.

A long way behind the foregoing in amount come the assessed taxes, little more, and the customs a little less, than $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions. The falling off in the latter as compared with the receipts of 1873–74 is due to the abolition in 1883 of the cotton and other duties. The forests, under the care and good management bestowed upon them in past years, have begun to furnish a substantial and increasing addition to the general revenue, now amounting to $\frac{3}{4}$ of a million. The tributes from Native States, about as much, furnished under treaties made with them at different times, vary little from year to year. The fees derived from the registration of deeds, less than a quarter of a million, completes the list of revenue.

The 'assignments and compensations,' $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions, to be deducted from the total revenue, represent among other items the drawback allowed to certain native states for their share of duties levied, mainly salt, but principally assignments made in lieu of land revenue received.

These figures of the revenue of India tell their own story, and if we did not know the facts from other

sources, would furnish an immediate indication of some of the most marked conditions of that country. Just as from the English Budget may be inferred some of the primary characteristics of the English as a people largely given to strong drink, great consumers and great producers of various commodities themselves, comprising also a very large wealthy class, so the Indian Budget is unmistakably concerned with the circumstances of a frugal people of simple habits, of whom very few are otherwise than poor and almost all are engaged in agriculture. The assessed taxes—the unfailing and almost boundless resource of the English financier—yield only about 1½ millions from 220 millions of people, indicating the almost entire absence of a middle class. The stamp duties tell the same tale, while generally the increase in the different branches of the revenue indicate a gradual and steady, but moderate advance from year to year in the general prosperity of the country.

The land revenue, the mainstay of Indian finance, is revenue only in a special and technical sense; it is really the rent of land, paid in most cases direct by the cultivator to the landlord, and the only rent paid by the former. Succeeding to the system under which, from time immemorial, the ruler of the country has been recognised as the owner of the soil, and the occupier as his tenant, the East India Company gradually substituted a money rent for the payment in kind obtaining under native rule, and rents fixed for a term of years in lieu of a certain proportion of each harvest from year to year. Unfortunately, through ignorance of the conditions subsisting on their first succeeding to the government, they went still further in the direction of fixity, and in the wrong direction. On the assumption of the government of Bengal by English officials, the mistake was made of taking the zemindars or farmers of the land revenue, whom they found in that

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position, to be the proprietors of the soil. Going to India with the aristocratic notions derived from English tenures, that the land must be held everywhere by the squire or great proprietor, the first English rulers of India took it for granted that the officials of the Mohamedan rulers whom they succeeded, to whom the land revenues had been farmed out, were the owners of the estates of which, at that time, they had charge, and these zemindars were declared to be the landlords of these estates in perpetuity, subject to the payment of the rents for which they were at the time responsible. This is what is known as the Perpetual Settlement of Bengal. Moreover while conferring these rights upon the zemindars, no action was taken to secure the rights of their under tenants; the profits from the rise in rents which took place with the advance in prosperity resulting from the establishment of peace, and its consequent increase of cultivation, were left to the zemindars, free to enrich themselves by rack-renting the peasantry; and it is only within recent years that the claims of the latter to a similar fixity of tenure have been recognised, and a system of tenant right established in the province of Bengal. In that part of India, therefore, which from the long period of settled government enjoyed by it, accompanied by the consequent influx of British capital, has attained to a greater advance in prosperity than any other part, the land revenue yields practically no increase; the land owners, with enormously increased incomes, contribute nothing of that increase to the finances. The advance in the land revenue during the last twenty years from seventeen millions to twenty millions[1] has accrued in other provinces. Fortunately, by the time fresh accessions of territory were acquired, a more accurate knowledge of the actual conditions of

[1] After deducting from 21¼ millions shown in the table, page 329, the proportion of the assignments and compensations entered at foot thereof.

land tenure throughout the land had been arrived at. It had been discovered that the state was the owner of the soil, and the zemindar only the publican or rent collector; and the settlement of the land revenue was henceforth made directly with the cultivator—either collectively with the village for the land held by it, or with the individual peasant proprietor. The increase of revenue during the twenty years under review, is due mainly to the greater breadth of land brought under cultivation in the older provinces, and partly to accessions of fresh territory. But on the whole the assessment has actually become lighter, the proportion of the produce of the soil claimed as revenue or rent having been reduced from time to time. It should be added that the annual rate of increase hitherto accruing has for the present come almost to an end, the settlement over the great part of Northern India having lately been revised and fixed for a further term of thirty years.

Increase of expenditure.

Turning now to the expenditure side of the account, the first item, interest, shows the satisfactory result that, wars and famines notwithstanding, the annual charge for the public debt has been reduced during the twenty years under review by nearly 2,000,000*l.*; partly by the reduction of debt, partly by reduction in the rate of interest as the financial credit of the Government has rendered the conversion practicable. On the other hand, the account tells the same tale which is repeated in every country, of the greatly increased cost from year to year of both the civil administration and the army. But it should be explained that a large part of the increase is here apparent only, and is due to the ever growing burden of the loss by exchange. When the rupee was worth ten shillings, the Indian accounts were exhibited for financial purposes in sterling, the expenditure in India being taken at ten rupees to the pound. But when silver began to fall in value

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with respect to gold—about twenty-three years ago—this mode of dealing with the accounts ceased to be practicable; the sovereign now represented more than ten rupees, and it became necessary to introduce a definite charge to provide for the loss by exchange in the remittance to England of the silver required for the sterling payments to be made in that country. With the continued fall of the rupee the loss by exchange has gone on at an ever increasing rate. Twenty years ago it amounted to less than a million of tens of rupees. In 1893-4 it had reached to over 10 millions, and in the present year will be very much more. But, exchange allowed for, still there has been a very large increase of the charges both for the civil administration and army. What has happened in this respect in every country in Europe has happened also in India. The large increase in civil charges is due to the development of the civil administration in all branches, in pursuance of demands which every government finds irresistible and which grow in strength with every advance towards what is called civilisation. The increase is caused also in great measure by the rise in salaries of all branches of the Native Civil Service which has been taking place from year to year. The salaries of the English civil servants have meanwhile undergone no change, and the strength of the service has been largely reduced, although the boundaries of British India have been pushed forward to include large tracts of country on both the east and west. The cost of the home establishment also has somewhat decreased of late years—a fact which probably cannot be recorded of any other public department in London. And it is a remarkable and in one sense very satisfactory feature of Indian finance that, this loss from exchange apart, the total public expenditure during the last twenty years should have increased by only two millions—so that, if the rupee had remained at the old par of exchange, then other things

Loss by exchange.

Civil charges.

being the same, there would be at the present time, that is on the budget of 1893–4, instead of a deficit, a surplus of eight millions. The comparison is useful as indicating both the good management of the Indian finances and the tremendous liability placed on them by the fall of silver, a liability the further incidence of which in the future it is impossible to estimate, and which mocks all efforts at financial care and foresight.

Military charges.

The military charges present the other great item of increase, from 14¼ millions to 22½ millions; the exchange enters into this to the extent of 3 millions. It is partly due to the high pension rates arising out of the bad bargains made with the British officers of the old Indian army on its abolition, the full effects of which are now beginning to be felt; to an increase of strength in 1885 when 30,000 men (10,000 British and 20,000 native) were added to the army; and largely to the increased cost of military stores, ammunition, and equipment of all kinds. The modern cartridge costs almost as much as did the obsolete gun of twenty years ago. The greater care now taken of the British soldier, both of his health and comfort, also involves expenditure at all points, while increased allowances of all kinds have been granted to the native army to keep pace with the attractions of civil life, as the class which supplies the soldier becomes more prosperous. There is no prospect of any reduction under these heads, but rather a certainty of further increase. The pay of the British soldiers and non-commissioned officers serving in India is converted into silver at the current rate of exchange —they being the only class of the British in India who do not lose from the fall of the rupee, and the charge on this head will go on increasing with any further fall in that coin. Military operations and military precautions of all kinds tend to become continually more expensive, while it must be remembered that the army

in India is now maintained at a very low strength with regard to the work it has to do even in peace time. It is moreover organised on a peace establishment only, and no machinery has as yet been provided for securing its expansion in case of necessity. A beginning has been made of forming a reserve, but only a beginning, and so far the measure can hardly be deemed successful; but effective measures for this purpose cannot be much longer delayed; the native army is now maintained with difficulty on its peace establishment, and at the outbreak of war recruiting might stop altogether if measures be not taken betimes to render the service more attractive.

Liability impending for exchange compensation.

On all sides, therefore, there are continual liabilities for increased expenditure; and one pressing liability in particular must soon be met. Owing to the fall of the rupee the position of the English public servant in India, civil and military, has for the last three or four years been becoming more acutely embarrassing. The status of what used to be known as the Covenanted Civil Service, the highest and most highly paid branch of the public service, has become thoroughly depreciated, and a remarkable exodus is now going on from it; men are retiring into private life just as the prizes of the profession are coming within their reach, because they find by the simplest calculation that the sterling[1] pension gives a better return than a nominal rise of salary in the depreciated rupee. To this class one great attraction, apart from the interest of the work and the sense of power it confers, has been that if the duties of the service were hard, and performed often in solitude and always in a bad climate, the life at least was one of ease and freedom from care about money matters. A man might live in comfort and yet lay by for his family. This attraction has disappeared, and the present members of the service are hurrying away from it to such

[1] A pension largely contributed to by deduction from their salaries.

an extent that there is already difficulty in securing men sufficiently experienced for the higher posts. But if this is the condition of the Civil Service *par excellence*, the class which fills all the higher posts in that country, that of the much larger class of public servants in other branches, Education, Post Office, Telegraph, Public Works, and others corresponding to the regular civil service at home, is still more serious. The pay of these has always been on a moderate scale, with only a small margin left after providing for the absolute necessaries of life in the East, which margin has altogether now disappeared. The officers of the army are in the same position. The public servant in India is placed at this disadvantage—that his official life there does not advance his interests to secure employment for his sons. The old system of patronage pure and simple was no doubt defective, even vicious in some respects, but at any rate it often enabled the public servant to put his sons in the way of gaining a similar livelihood, for the appointments given away were bestowed for the most part on the sons of public servants. The open competition system has put an end to this; but the public service is still practically the only career available for the sons of Indian officials, and to gain a place in this involves an education always expensive, and expensive in a special degree for those whose parents are living abroad. In any case the children must be sent home and educated there; the expense of sending a sick wife home, the loss of income caused by the breadwinner's own sickness, are more than mere contingencies. It was the means of meeting these expenses which it may be said alone made life in India bearable. Only if a man lived on rice and dressed in calico could he have met the fall in the rupee without loss; but his needs for the necessaries of life remain unaltered, while the price of everything has practically doubled. The result is that the life of the junior officers

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in India, military and civil, has become one of real poverty and hardship.

Nor have the necessities of the public servant himself only to be considered. The gravity of the present state of things, if unremedied, lies in its inevitable effect on the character of the administration. Indian officials are exposed to special temptations; it is not only unjust but dangerous that these should be increased. The present scale of salaries was established one hundred years ago to put a stop, not to corruption, but the irregular mode of emolument then in force. The Company was a trading body first, a governing body afterwards, and, under the lax views then held on the subject, their servants likewise were allowed to trade and derived almost all their emoluments from that source. This was put a stop to, and salaries were established on a scale, generous at the time and liberal for many years afterwards, with the result that the character of the Indian public servant became and remained absolutely pure. Reviled and slandered as are our Indian officials from week to week by an unbridled vernacular press, no suggestion of their corruptibility has ever been ventured upon; the charge would be too absurd to have any effect. But it is impossible to believe that this immunity can be maintained unless some remedy be applied to the hardship to which the Indian official is now subjected; when with his income practically reduced by one half, he finds it difficult to pay his way from day to day, and impossible to make any provision for his family or for old age. On all grounds, therefore, of justice to the present body of officials who were invited to enter the public service by expectations which have proved illusory, and to maintain the character and efficiency of the service in the present and future, a complete revision of the scale of pay with reference to the depreciation of the rupee is necessary. Something has been done in this direction after a not unnatural delay,

but a far more complete and comprehensive measure of remedy will have to be carried out, and quickly; this involves a heavy additional charge.

Effect of fall in silver.

But while the government with its gold obligations is thus embarrassed by the fall of silver, and is in face of a position of financial difficulty which threatens to become still more acute, and in which it has only the consolation of being in no way responsible for the situation, nevertheless the fall of silver has not been without its compensations. It has not injured the tax-payer directly, and by stimulating exports has added to the trade of the country. Tested by every criterion for determining the condition of a country, the increase in internal traffic and foreign trade, and of the railway receipts, the capacity to buy and the capacity to produce, never were the people of India so prosperous as they are now. And if that country and its government were self-contained and without any liabilities to make gold payments, they might accept the present state of things with equanimity. It is not the silver-using countries which suffer directly by the fall in the value of silver. Indirectly indeed India does suffer through the discouragement given to the investment of English capital and especially in the check given to railway extension, the greatest present requirement of that country.

Stability of Indian finance.

Turning from the present to the past, one point comes out clearly from any enquiry into the subject—the remarkable stability of Indian finance. Wars have succeeded wars, and famine has followed upon famine, but the loans incurred for these account for only a small part of the expenditure involved. This was mainly defrayed from the revenue, year by year, and the debt incurred in the bad years was more than paid off in the good. The other special charges which have accrued of late years, as for the great works of harbour and frontier defence, have also been paid for, without borrowing, out of revenue from year to year. Few

countries can show so good a record in this respect. Further, the financial condition has been even more satisfactory than appears on this view of it, in two important respects. First, as regards the so-called famine fund. The nature of this is frequently misapprehended. The liability of India to a recurrence of famine in some part or other of the country is only too well attested by the numerous visitations of that calamity during the historic period. A terrible famine occurred in Bengal in the latter end of the last century when many millions of persons perished; in 1833, the failure of the crops through the greater part of the North West Provinces created an enormous degree of distress and a great loss of revenue. In 1868–9 occurred the great famine in Orissa; the calamity falling on a roadless country, importing relief in the way of food became almost impossible. In later times the duty of conveying a food supply to the country affected by drought has been systematically undertaken by the Government, with a great mitigation of suffering, as in the famine of 1877 which extended over the part of Bengal north of the Ganges, but at an enormous cost. In 1877 a Commission was appointed, with Sir John Strachey—afterwards successively Lieutenant Governor of the North West Provinces, and financial member of the Government of India—at the head of it, to enquire into the whole subject of famine relief and to propose a definite system for coping with famines in future. Their report deals with the subject in a complete and comprehensive way. First, in place of a gratuitous distribution of food, they recommend the establishment of systematic relief works for the employment of the people whose crops have failed; and that only where the ordinary operations of private trade are insufficient to bring the supply of food to the famine-stricken districts, the agencies for this should be undertaken by the Government itself. But even still more important than an effective system

Famine relief fund.

of administering famine relief is the adoption of measures for preventing famine. Failure of the crops, indeed, can be averted only in those parts of the country where the configuration of the soil admits of the construction of irrigation works, but what would otherwise be famine may be reduced to the less terrible scarcity of food by improving the communications throughout the country, so as to furnish cheap transport. During the ten years ending in 1877, fifteen millions had been spent directly or indirectly upon famine relief. The Commission represented, therefore, that an average expenditure to this extent might be anticipated in the future, and that this indicated the necessity for providing a yearly surplus of at least one and a half millions in the prosperous years, in order that the revenue might suffice to meet the charge without a further increase of debt whenever famine should occur. This is the origin of the so-called Famine Relief Fund established in 1877, an action which embodied the intention of the Government to set aside one and a half millions yearly out of revenue to be applied to: 1. Relief works during the actual occurrence of famine. 2. The construction of railways and irrigation works in districts liable to famine. 3. Paying off debt in anticipation of the need for incurring fresh loans on the occurrence of famine. This sum was to be applied yearly out of revenue to one or other, or all, or any part of these objects; and the balance or surplus of the year was to be declared only after this sum of $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions had been entered in the accounts as an item of the ordinary expenditure of the year. Thus supposing the sum to be wholly applied to paying off debt, then in ten years 15 millions would be paid off, and on the recurrence of famine involving an expenditure of that amount, and the contraction of a corresponding new loan, the net result would be to leave the public debt at the same figure as at the beginning of the operation: the

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15 millions borrowed would have been provided for out of revenue. So also if the $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions were devoted to railway making or irrigation works; the capital debt which otherwise would have been incurred for the purpose, would be *pro tanto* diminished, so that if eventually within the course of the ten years 15 millions had to be borrowed for famine expenditure, the sum total of debt obligations would not be increased, because 15 millions of railway capital which otherwise would have been borrowed had been provided out of revenue.

This is the operation of the so-called Famine Relief Fund. There was no fund in the proper sense of the term, as in the case of a bank setting aside a reserve; the operation merely expressed the determination to provide $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions a year before a surplus was declared as a charge of the year for one or other of purposes which properly are in the nature of capital expenses. But it is obvious that in order that the operation should be a real one there must be a surplus, or at any rate a financial equilibrium remaining after it has been carried out. If the result of entering the charge for this fund in the accounts is a deficit, the operation ceases to have any meaning. Expenditure on railways, for instance, cannot be provided out of revenue, when there is no surplus revenue from which to meet it; while if, as has happened in the present year, a loan has to be raised in order to provide for the ways and means of the year, it would obviously be a purposeless proceeding to go through the form of paying off debt on the one hand, and incurring a corresponding amount of new debt on the other. This explanation it may be hoped sufficiently disposes of the complaint which has been made by those who evidently did not understand the subject, that the Famine Fund has been abandoned. The fund, in the proper sense of the term, has never had any existence;

the action contemplated could from the nature of the case take effect only for so long as there was an available surplus, and must necessarily be suspended in a year of deficit. The allegation made in certain quarters, that inasmuch as extra taxation was imposed for the purpose of creating this fund, it is a breach of faith to apply the proceeds of that taxation to any other purpose, hardly needs a serious reply. Had the total expenditure of the country remained at the same amount from year to year, then when the necessity for obtaining this surplus no longer existed, the taxation imposed to produce it might have been remitted. But in lieu of a surplus there is now a deficit which more than absorbs these proceeds. The contention that in this or any system of finance the proceeds of any particular impost are ear-marked, and applicable to meet only one particular item of expenditure, would be raised only by persons unacquainted with the elementary principles of the subject. It would be as rational to contend that when a man takes a ride, so much of the distance covered is to be credited to the rider, and so much to the horse.

It was never contemplated that this annual provision for famine relief should be made perpetual. The Famine Commissioners reported that 20,000 miles of railway would suffice to ensure the means of cheap and speedy transport of food into every part of India liable to be affected with drought, of which 10,000 miles were already completed, but that even 5,000 more would go far to remove all further risk of serious difficulty in the supply of food to any part of any district in the whole country. Since that report was written 8,000 more miles of railway have been opened, and although this addition includes some lines on the frontier carried out for other objects, still the particular 5,000 miles which were most pressing from a famine point of view have been constructed. It may be said, therefore, that India

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has now been made safe in that respect; in proof of this, the failure of rain in Behar which occurred in 1888 and again in 1891, which was nearly equal in extent to that which occurred in 1877, and in consequence of which full preparations were again made for meeting a famine by a scheme of relief works, nevertheless produced only a severe scarcity, and the whole outlay of public money found necessary for purposes of relief was only between three and four lakhs. During the last thirteen years, since the report of the Commission and the establishment of this so-called Famine Fund, only about a third of a million has been spent on actual famine relief; the rest of the surplus set aside under this head has been appropriated—5½ millions to new railways, 1¾ millions to irrigation works, and 5½ millions to paying off debt. The total operations of the fund, therefore, have amounted to about 13 millions, and with that expenditure it may be said that the necessity for further outlay of the kind has come to an end. The scheme of famine protection has been carried out to the contemplated extent; the liability of the Government to incur a great expenditure on the direct relief of famine, in the supply of food or relief works, no longer exists.

Net surplus in recent years.

The Indian revenue during the eleven years ending in 1891–2 shows a balance of surplus of 8 millions; if to this be added 12¾ millions spent on Famine Relief operations,[1] an outlay which any other government would have paid for by raising loans for the purpose, the virtual surplus during this period has been nearly 21 millions. This is not a bad record. A period of deficits has now been entered on, due to the fall of silver, but as regards the finance of the future, a new and very satisfactory element of Indian finance arising

[1] Three millions more have been charged to the same account in succeeding years, but as there have been deficits in these years of nearly the same amount, the money was not provided from revenue and is therefore omitted from this statement.

Financial bearing of the railways.

out of the State railway operations has to be considered. This has already been referred to in some detail in the preceding chapter. The Indian Government possesses in the railways it owns already, and others of which it may become the owner, a highly valuable and rapidly improving property. The general result of the railway accounts shows at present a deficit, or net charge over receipts, of one and a half millions a year; but, as has been explained, this is mainly due to temporary causes which should soon disappear. The military frontier lines, indeed, which account for a small part of the loss, are not, and probably never will be, directly remunerative. But of the commercial lines owned by the Government, or of which the interest on the capital is guaranteed, some have been lately opened, and are not in full working order; all of them promise to be remunerative in the early future. The most important of the older lines are paying good dividends, although the cost of converting these into the gold guaranteed interest still imposes a charge on the revenue, but this rate of interest should be largely reduced when the Government purchase the lines on the expiry of the contracts now running. But further, the Government is not paying only the yearly interest on its railway capital account, it is, in effect, buying up these railways by the substitution of terminable annuities for the fixed annual interest. The increased charge constitutes therefore an investment, by means of which the Government will eventually become the owner of this great and valuable property. To this extent the finance accounts are actually better than they look, so far as that the future is being provided for in the present, and the nominal deficit of the year to that extent disappears. Whether the tax-payer in the present should be called upon to this extent for the relief of obligations in the future must be a matter of opinion which does not admit of being definitely determined one way or the

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other; but considering the liability under which the Government of India is placed to meet possible calls in the future for military and political purposes, calls to be met from a revenue which, if steadily improving, is still inelastic, and not readily susceptible of large or rapid augmentation—the form of insurance exhibited by this gradual discharge of existing liabilities will probably be deemed not to err on the side of excessive prudence. At any rate, the financial conditions which admit of even a limited outlay on railway construction, and the process of extinguishing the railway debt being regularly carried on, cannot be otherwise than intrinsically sound. There is indeed just now a dark shadow thrown over the situation by the loss in exchange, which threatens to become ever larger, and the consequences of which it is impossible to foresee, or for the Indian Government of itself to provide against, and which may baffle all the efforts dictated by prudence and foresight. Yet, on the other hand, the danger may pass away again. Another great discovery of gold, and it might be dissipated as quickly as it arose. Not that the matter need be left to chance. There is of course a definite remedy. This is not the place for an essay on bimetallism, but so much at least may be said, that it is not the silver-using countries which suffer alone, or suffer most from the fall in value of that metal, a fact slowly but surely forcing itself on the comprehension of even the most prejudiced and hard of understanding. As soon as the conversion of the English treasury to sound economic principles is accomplished, a currency reform to relieve both England and India of present difficulties will come within measurable distance of accomplishment.[1]

Loss by exchange.

[1] When Sir William Harcourt complacently announces that he pins his faith upon a gold standard for England and a silver standard for India as the only sound currency basis, and spurns the bimetallic 'nostrum,' one is reminded of the address of M. Diafoirus, senior, in *Le Malade Imaginaire*, when in recommendation of his son, Dr. Thomas Diafoirus, he says: 'Above everything, what I admire in him—in which he follows my example—is that he is blindly attached to

Fiscal resources available.

No one familiar with India would lightly entertain the idea of additional taxation to meet the difficulty, although that country is more lightly taxed at present than it has been at almost any previous time. But one source of revenue, free from the objections apparent to every other form of impost, is to be found in the restoration of the cotton duties. The history of this case is still so fresh in recollection that it is not necessary to recapitulate it. That the tax has not yet been imposed is due, not to any consideration for the people of India, but simply to the supposed exigencies of party government at home. The principle involved, however, goes far beyond one of pure finance. It opens up the larger question, whether the government of India is to be conducted in sympathy with the interests and feelings of the people of that country, or in accordance with the small and shifting policy of party needs; as to which it may be said that, unless the steps lately taken are retraced, an injury will be done to the good faith and character of the British Government of India, which may and probably will lead to far reaching consequences.

Provincial Finance.

Provincial finance, how far practicable.

We have so far been dealing with the revenue and expenditure of India as a whole. The different provincial governments have also certain financial responsibilities, involving a system of provincial or local finance, as it is termed, of which some account may here be given. First it should be explained that this is something quite different from what might be inferred from the published records. For example, to the general account showing the revenue and expenditure of all India, a supplementary account is attached, professing to show the distribution of the different heads of re-

the opinions of our forefathers, and that he altogether objects to listen to the reasons and experiences of the pretended discoveries of the age, touching the circulation of the blood and stuff of that kind.'

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Misleading form of provincial accounts published by India Office.

ceipts and expenditure among the various provinces into which British India is divided; and at first sight it might appear as if the Indian system of finance were primarily provincial, and that the imperial finances were built up simply by collecting together the several financial operations of these provinces, and so arriving at a general account for the whole country; that is, as if the general surplus of the year was the sum of surpluses contributed by the various provinces after deducting the deficits of those provinces which do not pay their way. Such a view, although thus favoured by a superficial aspect of the accounts as presented,[1] would be however wholly erroneous. It may be observed that this distributed account contains, besides columns for the different provinces, a column with the heading 'India, General,' in which are entered the operations of the departments—post office, telegraph, &c., directly under the Government of India, with which the Provincial Governments are not concerned. This heading, 'India, General,' also comprises the operations of various smaller provinces which are not provided with separate columns of their own; and several items of revenue, of which salt, two millions, is the highest, are placed in that column, because the collection was effected in one or other of those smaller provinces. The railway receipts, also, shown in this column, are the receipts of the railways which are administered directly by the Government of India. On the other hand, the different provinces are not charged with military expenditure. The mode of showing this is indeed especially misleading, it is not all placed in the column 'India, General,' but is distributed between that and the columns for Madras and Bombay. As a matter of fact, the expenditure is all incurred by the Government of India and accounted for in one central office, and

[1] See, for example, the tables from p. 98 of the *Statistical Abstract of British India* for 1892–3.

afterwards distributed under these heads. This mode of exhibiting the military expenditure, which is one of the last surviving relics of the old Presidency system, is thus absolutely inaccurate. The military expenditure shown under 'Madras' is not merely the military expenditure incurred in that province, but includes that incurred in Burma, Mysore, and several other provinces; the amount of military expenditure shown under 'Bombay' is equally inaccurate.

This account therefore gives no indication of the financial position of any one of the provinces. In order to arrive at an estimate of this, it would be necessary that all the general charges—as for the post office, &c., should be distributed among them. Many other adjustments would need to be made. The sea customs are collected at the seaports, but obviously the provinces in which these seaports are situated are not entitled to the whole of these duties. So also Bengal is credited with the revenue derived from all the opium manufactured in the north and east of India, because the administration charges of all the opium agencies of those parts are entered in the Bengal column. Bombay again is credited with the profits of the excise duty levied on the opium exported from the port of Bombay, none of which however is grown in the province of Bombay. The railway accounts are equally misleading as any indication of the conditions of provincial finance. The railway transactions, *e.g.*, shown under 'Punjab,' do not refer to the railways within that province alone, but to the transactions of the great system of frontier railways known as the North Western Railway, which extends throughout Sind and far into Baluchistan beyond the limits of the Punjab province.

Even if it were practicable to make this general adjustment of revenues and charges over the different provinces on a rational basis, no equitable distribution could be arrived at of the military charges. The troops

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massed in Punjab are a protection to the whole of India, and admit of Bengal being denuded of troops; but how much of the cost of the Punjab garrison should be charged to the defence of Bengal it is obviously impossible to determine. Even if this and all the other adjustments could be effected, there remains the interest on the public debt, for which no sort of provincial allocation is practicable. It is quite impossible to predicate of any particular loan that it was contracted on behalf of any particular province or provinces.

Decentralisation of Indian Finances impracticable.

The practicability, therefore, of establishing any system of provincial finance based on total revenues and charges, such as has been proposed at different times by politicians and writers with the view of decentralising the labours of the Indian Government, disappears at once when the matter is looked into. The interests and obligations of the different parts of the country cannot be separated or distinguished from each other. And this being so, nothing useful is indicated in this direction by the so-called provincial accounts now published. The figures given in the different columns in which the items are distributed do not represent the respective claims and responsibilities of the different provinces; the columns to which these names are given merely represent the geographical distribution of the different agencies through which the financial business of the Government of India is conducted, and through which the revenues are collected and the expenditure defrayed. Even so there is in most cases nothing provincial about them. The revenue and expenditure, for instance, shown under 'Bombay' represent the revenue and expenditure which pass through the books of the Accountant General at Bombay, and so with the other provinces. But the different Accountants General of provinces are imperial officers belonging to one of the departments acting directly under the Indian Finance Minister. Even where the

fiscal officer concerned belongs to the local service, as the collector of excise or opium, his proceedings are regulated entirely by the financial department of the supreme government, and the intervention of the local government in the business is purely formal. In short, the figures exhibited, although they may be serviceable to the Finance Department itself, fulfil no useful purpose as regards the public; they are simply calculated to mislead the inquirer, and might advantageously be omitted from all future returns.

But provincial governments should have financial powers and responsibilities.

But although a system of provincial finance in the sense indicated is from the nature of the case impracticable, that the different provincial governments should be without any financial responsibility has always been a grave defect of the Indian administrative system. As was pointed out in the former editions of this work, these governments, with all the high-sounding apparatus of governors and councils provided for some of them, were really nothing more in fact than the administrative agents of the supreme Government. But while they had no interest in financial economy, they had a strong interest in obtaining the largest possible share of the public money each for their own province. This condition of things was thoroughly unsound and provocative of extravagance, and a practical reform of it was urged in the earlier editions of this work, the following extract from which explains the case as it then stood, and indicated the sort of form by which the needful object could be effected :—

'Thus, in effect, the general finance department is dependent rather on the forbearance and loyalty of the different provincial administrations for securing adherence to its estimates, than on the action of its own officers. The law invests the Supreme Government with the most complete authority in regard to every kind of expenditure, but there is practically no means of enforcing it, for the only effectual check against an

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abuse of their opportunities by the local authorities must necessarily be reserved for serious cases of financial insubordination. Small breaches of rule cannot be treated with this gravity, and they will always be condoned by public opinion. That a body, which in all its outward forms appears little removed in dignity and importance from the Supreme Government of India, should in reality have none of the attributes of a government, but be merely the executive agent of the central authority, is a relation hard to be distinctly apprehended by the public either in England or India, while it is one which the subordinate authority continually chafes under, and struggles to escape from. Unfortunately, the efforts at liberty are made only in one direction. The Supreme Government is perpetually embarrassed by the occurrence of expenditure which it has not authorised, or which it would fain avoid, while no spontaneous efforts are made to assist it with additional revenue. The provincial governments have a direct and very lively interest in obtaining for their share the largest possible amount of the public expenditure. Their dignity and importance, and their popularity both with the public and with the services, will be enhanced by a liberal expenditure, as will also indeed their administrative efficiency and the prosperity of the country, while the local press will always be ready to applaud any instances of outlay incurred for local purposes against the wishes of the supreme authority. On the other hand, the provincial government has no immediate interest in increasing the revenue, for any addition made will not appear in any tangible form to the credit of the contributing province, but will be merged in the general revenues. Nor is it only, or even mainly, in matters of new expenditure that this embarrassment is created. No doubt the sentiment of obedience is usually sufficient to restrain the local authorities, even although there may not be the distinct

means of enforcing it. But it is, perhaps, rather in cases where reduction in existing expenditure is desired that the Government of India feels most distinctly its financial isolation. In such cases retrenchment has usually to be carried out, not only with the co-operation of the provincial governments, but often against their vigorous opposition. On these occasions the Government of India finds itself on one side, and all the local authorities arrayed on the other; while the latter, regarding the effect of expenditure merely as it increases their administrative efficiency, and being in no way concerned with the financial result, are always armed each with abundant reasons why reduction is impossible, or why, at any rate, it should not be applicable to their own province in particular. These ill-regulated financial conditions sufficiently explain the unsatisfactory relations so often obtaining between the supreme and subordinate governments, particularly those of Madras and Bombay, where the panoply of councils and ministerial officers with which they are surrounded renders their legal financial status especially incongruous, and because the privilege which they possess of corresponding directly with the home authorities often commits the Indian Government to expenditure against its own wishes. The same thing occurs more or less in every other quarter. There is everywhere manifested the same desire to secure administrative efficiency with the same indifference about the provision of the needful means. Thus India, in its financial aspect, is a federation of a most defective kind, in which there is no proper distribution of responsibility, and where, from the nature of the case, the interests of the central and local authorities are liable to be constantly opposed. The remedy for this state of things is to be found in that re-adjustment of the financial system already advocated, under which the contribution to be paid by each province to imperial pur-

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poses should be limited to a fixed sum, and the balance of its revenues should be available for its own expenditure. Another practicable arrangement would be, while retaining certain sources of revenue as imperial, to place others at the entire disposal of the local government, with the proviso that certain branches of expenditure which are now defrayed from the imperial exchequer should henceforth be met from these local revenues. Under either method the provincial government would be invested with a distinct financial responsibility and interest in financial success; and while such a redistribution would not only lead the way to new methods of taxing, it presents the only effective plan for putting a stop to the administrative extravagance which is the cause of the present financial embarrassments. None but a very strong government could resist the continued pressure put on it from all parts of the country for increased expenditure in every branch of the service, and the Indian Government has often been in its financial administration exceedingly weak. But let the provincial governments be thrown on their own resources, and they will soon learn to limit their wants by their available surplus; and that zeal for material progress which is now so often found in company with a lofty disregard for the ways and means of effecting it, will no doubt be succeeded by a more business-like and sober temperament.'[1]

System adopted for securing this.

The method of provincial finance which has been actually adopted carries out the principle thus advocated. Any attempt at decentralisation, in the sense of creating a system of provincial finance complete and self-contained, the budgets and accounts of which, when brought together, would make up a general budget and account for the whole of India, is impracticable for the reasons already given. What has been done is this.

[1] *Indian Polity*, 2nd edition, p. 439.

To each province there has been credited a fixed part of certain items of the revenue collected within the province, against which is charged all the purely civil expenditure of the province; the surplus, if any, arising on this account, is held to be at the disposal of the local government. The apportionment of revenue so made is purely arbitrary, and varies for the different provinces according to their relative prosperity. But generally these hypothecations comprise about one-fourth of the land revenue and the excise, three-fourths of that from stamps, seven-ninths of the assessed taxes, three-fifths of the forest revenue, and certain differing shares of the other items. Irrigation revenue, also, is brought into the account; for example, in the North West Provinces the provincial account is charged with interest on the capital cost of the works at 4 per cent., and credited with the net revenue derived from them.[1]

Provincial contracts.

The arrangement thus set up between the supreme and each provincial government in no way affects the mode of conducting or exhibiting the public accounts. These are still wholly imperial, and the revenues received and payments made on whatever account are still recorded as such. There is no setting aside any part of the monies, either in the way of establishing separate stocks of coin, or even of an account. Nor are the provincial governments absolved from the rules requiring the sanction of superior authority—the Government of India or the Secretary of State, as the case may be—for all new establishments, or for increasing the salaries of members of existing establishments when those are in excess of a certain specified amount. Nor does this apparent hypothecation of the

[1] This debit of interest on capital is a purely paper entry; the cost of these works has been long ago defrayed, partly out of revenue from year to year; what remained as capital debt created has been merged in the general debt accounts of the empire.

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revenue appear in the public accounts; the transactions in question are recorded in a supplementary account, such as that which a landowner might keep with his agent in respect of a particular estate, on the understanding that the surplus income from this, after all expenses were paid, should be available at the discretion of the latter for the improvement of the estate; or the account which a man might keep with his wife, if while himself paying all the family bills he agreed that any surplus arising on a certain fixed part of his income set aside for housekeeping, should be at her disposal to spend as she might wish. The practical effect of the arrangement is, that whereas formerly all proposals of a provincial government for increased expenditure of any sort were simply made on their merits, unaccompanied by any suggestions for finding ways and means, the burden of which fell wholly on the central authority, the provincial government is now bound to show that means are available from the balances accruing on the provincial accounts. Or, in cases where the expenditure is of a kind not involving the necessity for reference to higher authority, the provincial government can employ the available surplus arising in the province at its own discretion. This is especially the case in regard to public works, including such railways as are now placed virtually under provincial management.

These provincial contracts, as they are called, which are made for a term of years, thus give to the provincial governments a strong interest in keeping down unnecessary expenditure, because the larger the balance accruing on the contract, the more they have available for provincial purposes to spend at their discretion. It should be added that the Government of India necessarily claims the right, in case of urgent necessity, to levy contributions on the provincial balances in aid of the imperial exchequer, a claim obviously just and

reasonable. The provincial governments must take their share in bearing the financial strain caused by the fall in the rupee, or any similar difficulty. Such an emergency has twice arisen since the system was introduced.

This explanation indicates the need of the entries shown in the Budget to record these provincial agreements. In the account of 1893–94, for example (p. 329), a deduction of Rx478,800 is made from the total imperial expenditure, in order to arrive at the net charge of the year. The reason for making the entry will be readily understood from what has gone before. The expenditure of a provincial government is part of the imperial expenditure, and is shown under the respective heads of the services concerned—civil administration, public works, and so forth. But a debtor and creditor account is kept with each province, the proportion of revenue allotted to it being shown on the one side and the provincial expenditure on the other; and upon this account a balance has, in the course of time, arisen to the credit of each province. If a provincial government were to spend in a year exactly the amount credited to it in that year, this balance would be unaltered, but such a precise identity between receipts and expenditure can never happen in practice. If, then, the provincial expenditure in a year is more than the proportion of revenue it is entitled to take credit for, the excess must involve a reduction to that extent of the balance at credit of the province. But the liability of the imperial government being to that extent reduced, the total of the imperial expenditure should be correspondingly reduced. Similarly, if the provincial balance increases during the year by an excess of receipts over expenditure, although only that expenditure which has been actually incurred can be detailed in the public accounts, yet this increase to the provincial balance forms a new liability which must be

Adjusting entries in finance accounts.

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added to the total expenditure of the year, although as it has not been actually disbursed it cannot be distributed over any particular heads of service.[1]

The introduction of these provincial contracts, by making the different subordinate governments shareholders with the Supreme Government in financial profits and interested in maintaining economy, has constituted a valuable administrative reform. They can still have no concern with army expenditure, nor with the public debt, the operations connected with which are for the most part conducted in England; and many other general charges can be dealt with only by a central authority; further, the portion of the revenues to be allotted to a province, must, as has been explained, necessarily be determined in an arbitrary way. But with their powers even thus limited, the different provincial governments are for the first time invested with the attributes attaching to the name. What is now required is to carry the change still further in the direction of giving them greater and independent authority to deal with matters of expenditure, especially in regard to charges for establishments. It may be added that a similar delegation of authority to the Supreme Government in this respect is greatly to be desired. At present the Governor General in Council cannot sanction a pension of five rupees a month, but must refer the case to the India Office. Great is the waste of time and money involved in such references, but the love of centralisation is to be found in every bureaucratic body, and the practice of requiring them will perhaps not be readily abandoned.

Further powers should be given to provincial governments, and supreme government.

[1] The case may be illustrated by the analogous case of a landed proprietor who we may suppose agrees to allow his Scotch and Irish stewards each 1,000*l.* a year for the up keep of his estates in those countries respectively. The one spends 1,300*l.* in the year, anticipating his allowance by 300*l.*: the other spends only 900*l.*, carrying forward 100*l.* to next year. The landlord's actual cash outlay is thus 2,200*l.*, but in making up his accounts for the year he would deduct 200*l.* in order to arrive at his virtual expenditure as compared with his income. So with the Government of India *vis-à-vis* to the Provincial Governments.

CHAPTER XXI

THE HOME GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

Earliest jurisdiction by Court of Directors.

THE body of merchants styled the East India Company derived their authority from charters given by the Crown, the first of which was granted by Queen Elizabeth in 1601. These were renewed with modifications at various times, the last of them being a charter granted in 1752 by King George II. Under these charters the Company had in course of time undergone various changes from its original form, and was invested with authority to raise troops, to carry on war, and to occupy territories in India and the Eastern Seas. The first statutory recognition of British India is contained in the Act of 1773,[1] by which the administration of India was vested in a Governor General and a Council at Fort William, in Bengal. This Act however did not touch the home administration of the Company, which remained under its ruling body, the Court of Directors, until the passing of Pitt's bill of 1784,[2] known as the Regulating Bill, which created the Board of Control over Indian affairs, an organisation which lasted until the abolition of the rule of the East India Company in 1858. This body was to consist of not more than six Privy Councillors, three of them being the two principal Secretaries of State—the whole number then existing—and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Three of the members constituted a board, the senior of them, in

Board of Control.

[1] 13 Geo. III, C. 63. [2] 24 Geo. III, C. 25.

the absence of a Secretary of State or the Chancellor, was to preside. All the commissioners might sit in Parliament. The Board was vested with full power and authority to direct and control all operations and concerns which in any wise related to or concerned the civil and military governments and revenues of India. The inclusion of the Secretaries of State and the Chancellor of the Exchequer provided for the business of the Board being brought when necessary under the view and within the control of the Cabinet. But the active and practically the sole control of affairs rested with the nominated commissioners, whose salaries were chargeable to the revenues of India.

The provisions of the Act of 1784 regarding the Board of Control were slightly modified by the Act of 1793,[1] in which the first Commissioner named in the Letters Patent constituting it was declared to be the President of the Board. It was also provided that two Commissioners might be appointed from outside the Privy Council, and that the Secretary might be a Member of Parliament, so that his office became a party appointment. Under this change the collective action of the Board appears to have become little more than a fiction, and it consisted virtually of the President alone, who was always a member of the Cabinet, with the parliamentary secretary as his mouthpiece in the House of Commons, if he was a peer. In the India Act of 1833[2] no specific number of Commissioners was laid down, and the qualification of belonging to the Privy Council was omitted: they might be 'such persons as His Majesty shall think fit to be and who shall accordingly be styled Commissioners for the affairs of India.' Accordingly, after the passing of that Act the number of Commissioners was reduced first to four and later to two, including the President; and in 1841 and afterwards only a single Commissioner (the President of the

[1] 33 Geo. III, C. 52. [2] 3-4 William IV, C. 85.

Board) was appointed, the first to hold the office under these conditions being Lord Ellenborough, who filled it for a few months until appointed Governor-General of India.[1]

From 1841 therefore the Board as a matter of fact had ceased to exist, although the officer who exercised its functions was still styled President of the Board, this being one of the numerous legal fictions which abound in our administrative system.

Procedure for exercising control over Company.

Means of exercising the control contemplated by the Act of 1784 and succeeding Acts were very fully provided therein. Not only was the Board given full access to all the records and correspondence of the Company; the Court of Directors were also required to supply copies of all orders and despatches sent to India within eight days of sending them, and all despatches from India immediately on the receipt of them. No order could be sent to India without being first submitted to the Board for approval; full power was given to the Board to make any alterations in the despatch, which the Court were bound to send in its altered form after, if they so desired, an exchange of opinions thereon; and if the Court failed to frame despatches within fourteen days, the Board might itself frame the despatches which the Court was bound to send on. Further a 'Secret Committee' of the Court, limited to three members (in practice to two, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman) was constituted and sworn to secrecy, through which Committee the Board might send secret orders to the Government of India, which the Secret Committee was bound to transmit as from themselves. Similarly, any despatches from India marked 'Secret' were to be recorded at the India House in the Secret Committee, and delivered to the Board without being seen by the other Directors.

Secret Committee.

[1] He had held the office also on two previous occasions under the old conditions.

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It is a remarkable illustration of the illusive effect of form in constitutional affairs, that although these provisions which transferred all real power and authority from the Company to the Crown were clearly set forth in an Act of Parliament and repeated in succeeding ones, the circumstance that the Court of Directors was still maintained as the ostensible ruling authority and the actual channel of communication between the Governments in India and at home, nevertheless sufficed entirely to disguise from public attention the actual state of things. For the period of three-quarters of a century during which this system remained in force, it was popularly supposed that the Court of Directors were alone conducting and controlling all the affairs of India. Sir Charles Napier and his brother biographer denounced the Court and some of the Directors by name in virulent terms for withholding prize money claimed to be due to the former for the conquest of Sind, a proceeding for which a single member of the Cabinet was immediately responsible, and with which the majority of the Court had nothing to do, and no official knowledge of. Similar ignorance obtained generally among the English public. Much public astonishment was expressed when Sir John Hobhouse stated before a Select Committee of the House of Commons that the invasion of Afghanistan in 1838 had been carried out wholly by his orders as President of the Board. Great is the force of official shams.

Patronage reserved to Court of Directors.

But while the minister whose individuality was concealed by the apparatus of a board was thus generally omnipotent in the direction of Indian affairs, his powers were limited in one important respect. The Board of Control could not increase salaries or grant allowances or gratuities, except on the proposal of the Court first made and after reporting the matter to Parliament—a condition which placed a salutary check on jobbery in appointments. And the Company were left for a time

their monopoly of trade to the East; the monopoly was restricted by the Act of 1813 to trade with India, while in 1833 their trading powers were abolished. And to the Court was left all patronage of appointments to India; the nomination, subject to the approval of the Board, of the Governor General, the Governors of Presidencies and Commanders-in-Chief, and all first appointments to the civil and military services. This patronage was the great object of a seat on the Court, a position gained, not by meritorious services or personal distinction, but through election by the proprietors of East India Stock, the canvass for which, always long pursued, often through many defeats in order to obtain eventual success, was as degrading as such a pursuit must be. The goal once reached, the Director received his share out of the general fund of nominations to the Indian services, which was equally distributed among the collective body, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court (offices filled in rotation) getting however a double share. This was patronage pure and simple, bestowed without any divided responsibility, and for the most part entirely on private grounds. A Director might sometimes give his nomination to the son of a distinguished officer, but no instance is on record of the Court collectively awarding a single nomination to the relative of a public servant in recognition of his merits. And the bestowal of nominations naturally followed the order of value; sons and nephews were appointed to the Civil Service, or if they were not clever enough to pass even the very limited test of qualification laid down for that service, then to the well paid Cavalry. Next in value came direct appointments to the Infantry, and, lastly, for those who had the least personal claims, nominations to the Company's Military College at Addiscombe, the cadets from which supplied the Artillery and Engineers—services in which promotion was excep-

Addiscombe and Haileybury.

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tionally slow; while the cadets who failed to come up to the standard for those services were appointed to the Infantry. The educational arrangements of the Court were in strict keeping with the relative directorial interests; Haileybury College, where the young civilian was educated, was maintained on a reasonable scale of comfort, and equipped with a very able staff of professors, while a shower of prizes descended on the students. At Addiscombe the cadets were badly lodged and insufficiently fed, while the place was altogether lacking in the appliances for military training as for recreation; there was no riding school or gymnasium; not even a fives court. A high standard of work was maintained at the top of each class, owing to the competition among the cadets to gain places in the Engineers or Artillery; but although the hours of study were inordinately long, leaving to the industrious cadet absolutely no time for exercise, save a little perfunctory drill, the standard of qualification for the Infantry was of the lowest, and might be reached after two years of continuous idleness. No medical examination was imposed on candidates for the Army, and it was an illustration of the Company's system that the Military Secretary at the India Office was a senior clerk on the establishment who had passed his life peaceably in London. But indeed there was nothing in the composition of the Court of Directors to qualify them for the government of India in any part of its affairs, and all the arrangements connected with it indicated the inadequacy of such a body to the duty. That the result was not unsuccessful on the whole for many years was because they interfered so little with the actual administration of India, and because the conditions of that country developed a body of statesmen and soldiers equal to the task. But although the action of the Court and the Board of Control was generally that of a drag on

progress, this obstruction was not necessarily exercised on the side of real caution. There is no evidence to show that any warning was ever given by these bodies, or any sense exhibited of the danger of denuding the older provinces of British troops with the extension of their territories, or of the continual expansion of the great overgrown homogeneous Bengal army; and it was the rule of seniority strictly maintained by the Court, not only in regimental promotion, but in succession to commands, which as much as anything contributed to the decadence of the Indian military system and the catastrophe of the Mutiny.

Abolition of Court of Directors and Board of Control, and appointment of Secretary of State and Council of India.

In 1858 the Government of India passed from the East India Company to the Crown, and the administration of the Court of Directors came to an end. The Act of Parliament passed in that year[1] after many and long debates abolished the Board of Control, and invested the home government of India in a Secretary of State with a Council. The constitution of this Council was especially the subject of protracted discussion in the House of Commons, in which the leading members of both sides took a prominent part. It was ultimately decided that the Council should consist of fifteen persons, of whom eight were to be appointed by the Court from their own body, the other seven by the Crown. Vacancies arising in the first class were to be filled up by election of the Council, vacancies in the second class by the Crown. The major part of the Councillors were to be persons who had resided ten years at least in India, and who should not have left India more than ten years before appointment. The appointment of a Councillor, who was ineligible to sit in Parliament, was to be held during good behaviour, but he was to be removable on an address by both Houses of Parliament. Business was to be transacted by the Council collectively; all

[1] 21 & 22 Vict., C. 106.

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despatches to India were to be signed by the Secretary of State, to whom also all correspondence from India was to be addressed. Power was given to the Secretary of State to override the decision of a majority of his Council, his reason for so doing being formally recorded, when any members of the Council present might also record their opinions. The machinery of the Secret Committee was maintained, but its powers were concentrated in the person of the Secretary of State, who was authorised to send out secret despatches to the Governor of India which would not be seen by any of his councillors; similarly, despatches from the Government of India marked 'secret' were to be seen only by him, and were not to be communicated to the Council. The Act further provided that no grant of any part of the Indian revenues could be made without the concurrence of a majority of votes at a meeting of Council.

Changes made in Council.

These provisions are still in force, but some modifications have been made in the constitution of the Council. In 1869 an amending Act was passed[1] putting an end to the election of a portion of the Councillors, and providing that all appointments to that body should be made by the Secretary of State instead of by the Crown. The Members of Council were to be appointed for ten years and to be ineligible for reappointment, save for special reasons to be set forth in a minute by the Secretary of State to be laid before both Houses of Parliament. Members of Council appointed before the passing of the Act were to be eligible for pensions on retirement after ten years' service therein. It was explained in the debates on the measure that this provision was introduced to encourage retirement, and so to admit of fresh appointments being made of men of recent Indian experience.

In 1876 another amending Act was passed,[2] under which the Secretary of State may appoint not more

[1] 32-33 Vict., C. 97.

[2] 39 Vict., C. 7.

than three members to the Council for life, with pension after specified length of service, such members not being subject to the condition of ten years' previous service in India, the reasons for such appointments to be set forth in a minute laid before Parliament. The object of this change was explained by the introducers of the Bill in both Houses to be to admit of the appointment of lawyers to the Council; the provision has been applied also to admit men of English financial and banking experience and unconnected with India. By an Act passed in 1889[1] the number of councillors was reduced prospectively from fifteen to ten.

Reduction in numbers.

It might appear at first sight that the change of government introduced in 1858 was merely one in name. The Crown—that is the British Government for the time being—had possessed for three-quarters of a century the means of exercising complete control over the affairs of India. All, therefore, that was apparently effected by the change was to bring the member of the Cabinet who had charge of Indian affairs into more direct communication with the permanent body which shared the administration with him, and as regards this body to substitute for the old and vicious system of election by the holders of India stock, direct appointment by the Government, a change calculated to secure in a much higher degree the appointment of distinguished and experienced men to the Council. But, as has been pointed out more than once in this work, in order to appreciate the full effect of the administrative changes effected by a change in the law we must go behind the verbal provisions and examine its effect on the actual course of procedure. The law gave the President of the Board of Control (a body which latterly had no existence) power to override completely the Court of Directors if he chose to exert it. But the law also prescribed that the initiation of business

Effect of the change.

[1] 52 & 53 Vict. C. 65.

should ordinarily rest with the Court; and in public affairs it is the man who initiates who has the real power. The Court received the despatches from India in the first instance, discussed them and submitted to the Board the drafts of the despatches which they proposed to send in reply. The President of the Board might alter these drafts or substitute others in the place of them. But to do this constantly or even frequently involved a power of work as well as a power of will seldom, if ever, to be found combined in a man working single-handed, a busy Cabinet Minister, who, even if zealous and industrious, could not give the whole of his time to the business of his department, but who was often indolent, and always came to it profoundly ignorant of the matters to be dealt with. Add that while the Court had a large office and an able permanent staff, the President of the Board had only a small office; further, that the responsibility of overriding the Court was exercised only in secret, and that he would receive no credit for any proceedings taken, and it will be readily understood what course the business under such circumstances would naturally follow. The President indeed sometimes intervened with great effect by placing business in the Secret Department and so removing it from cognisance of the Court—sometimes with disastrous effect, as in the case of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1838. But generally the conduct of business rested with the Court. Their proceedings however being subject to the cognisance and approval of the Government, they were divested of all legal responsibility for the consequences.

Necessity for a Council.

The change in the law, therefore, by entirely altering the course of procedure, has necessarily brought about a fundamental change of system. The Secretary of State is now publicly responsible for everything; he is addressed in name by the Indian Government, and signs all the despatches issued from the India Office.

The rapid communication now established between the two countries, the greater public interest taken in Indian affairs, and the larger quantity of business to be transacted in this country in connection with the finances, the prosecution of railways, and indeed with every department of affairs, involve the constant interposition of the home authorities; the proper organisation of the Home Government becomes, therefore, a subject of extreme importance. The less the Government in India is interfered with the better; but interference of some sort is unavoidable at every point. Apart from the large amount of business connected with India which has to be transacted in this country, the constant disposition evinced by sections of political parties to interfere with the Indian administration involves the necessity for a strong and efficient representative agency in this country; not merely a responsible official with access to information, but an instructed and experienced department to deal with it. For the conduct of the Colonial Office little more is needed than the power of mind capable of dealing with the matters set forth in official papers containing little that is special or technical in character, or that cannot readily be understood by any well educated person. And the business of the Colonial Office is comparatively unimportant, for the colonies in regard to which any direct action can be taken by the British Government are few and small. But as to the competency of any man suddenly appointed to the duty, however able and well educated he be, to deal adequately with the questions arising out of the Indian administration; if we consider how those who have passed a lifetime in that country and taken the largest share in its administration are yet sensible of the imperfection and incompleteness of their knowledge of it, we may understand the absolute insufficiency of any man who, perhaps when past middle age, finds himself

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charged with the administration of affairs strange, complex, and multifarious as are those of the Indian Government, to which he comes not only ignorant, but about which he has probably never before given a serious thought. The impossibility of entrusting the control of Indian affairs to a single party official will therefore be at once apparent. The power which some statesmen so placed have exhibited by exceptional industry and ability, of mastering at any rate the elementary subject matter of the business of the Indian department is indeed as remarkable as creditable to themselves; but the ordinary politician transferred to that office from the respectable discharge of routine duties of some department requiring little more than nominal control, who perhaps owes his elevation to talent in debate, a talent which, while it necessarily carries with it great weight in this country, may yet be unaccompanied by business habits or industry; such a man going to the India Office, often late in life, will not unnaturally shrink from the great and distasteful labour involved in the attempt to overcome his absolute ignorance of the very elements of the subject he has to deal with. Still more will he be likely to evade the task when party exigencies leave him only a shred of his time for the purpose. This ignorance may be concealed from the public to a certain extent by the written answers prepared for him which he reads out in reply to questions put in Parliament; and if in the unavoidable personal communications he has to hold with officials from India and others, he keeps to vague generalities, he may hide it to a certain extent from those with whom he has to do business, and so may not only enter upon but give up charge of his department, utterly ignorant of India, its people, and affairs. And not only does party government involve vacation of office just as perhaps the minister is beginning to get a glimmering of the business of his department; it often happens that the Indian Minister

is changed even during the short life of a Government, by promotion, as it is called, to some higher office, or at least to some post which brings him more prominently before the public, and enables him to take a more active share in the business of his party. It would be thought an absurd thing if any member of a government were eligible to be made Lord Chancellor, although without any knowledge of the law, but the mode of selection adopted for the India Office is really not more absurd. It is, however, a necessary condition of our system of parliamentary and party government; but except among a certain class of politicians, in the view of whom ignorance is a positive qualification for high office, and who would wish to have nobody with knowledge and experience interposed between India and their desire to make experiments upon it, the necessity for maintaining a permanent Council or body of some sort unconnected with the ebb and flow of party politics, will be universally recognised, and the constitution of this body will equally be considered a matter of importance. The number of councillors was fixed at fifteen in the first instance, in order to admit of its being fairly representative of knowledge and experience gained in the different parts of India and of the different interests to be dealt with; and making allowance for the proportion of dull men who will always find their way into such a body, it is certainly not too large for the purpose. Whether the Council, as established, is turned to the best account will depend on the procedure laid down for its working. One of the most important points to be provided for is the protection of the people of India, the tax payers, from the infliction of improper and unfair charges. This was, no doubt, the object aimed at in the provision of the Act of 1858, that 'no charge should be placed upon the revenues of India without the sanction of the majority of the Council.' But this check is practically

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rendered nugatory by the power given to the Secretary of State to deal with business alone in the Secret Department. In the days of the East India Company the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of the Court of Directors were associated with the President of the Board of Control on this Committee; but now the Secret Department of the India Office is removed entirely from the view of the whole Council. And thus while the sanction of the majority of that body is required to the granting of a gratuity or a pension of a few shillings a year recommended by the Government of India on behalf of some humble applicant, a Secretary of State may order, and has ordered, military operations to be undertaken by the Government of India, involving an expenditure of millions of money, not only without the sanction, but without even the cognisance of his Council. This is a flagrant defect of the system which was certainly not contemplated by the framers of it, and which calls urgently for remedy. The Secretary of State should undoubtedly have power to override his Council. It could not be allowed that the policy of the British Government should be liable to obstruction by any other body than the Parliament which places it in power; but the interests of India demand that the Cabinet should at least be placed in possession of the opinions of those who are best qualified to judge of the effect of any measures proposed which will involve a financial burden on India; and while it should be recognised that in dealing with measures involving military operations, secrecy is a necessary condition, and that the maintenance of secrecy is not compatible with deliberation of a large body; yet, on the ground of justice to India, and to prevent rash and ill-considered action, the reconstitution of at least a part of the Council as a Secret Committee is undoubtedly required. At present such of the clerks as deal with the secret business of the India Office are placed in a more re-

sponsible and important position in the Council; they can at least make representations regarding the measures dealt with in these despatches, while the Council itself may be in absolute ignorance about them.

Existing procedure should be reformed.

Further, the practical efficiency of such a Council depends largely on the mode in which it is employed. The assumed purpose of a Council is to advise, but its effective action for this purpose depends on the point at which, in the course of deliberation, its advice is recorded. The Council of India is divided for working purposes (under statutory provision) into Committees for dealing with the particular subjects coming before them, judicial, financial, military, revenue, political,[1] and public works. The members as a rule serve each on two committees, and are occasionally transferred from one committee to another. In the case of orders to be sent to the Government of India, the most important class of business, the procedure followed is that the Secretary of the Department concerned first takes the orders of the Secretary of State on the case, often in the way of preparing a draft reply and submitting it for approval. The draft after being seen and perhaps amended by the Secretary of State is then referred to the Committee for opinion. Here their criticism comes in; they may suggest alterations, or even prepare and submit alternative draft despatches of their own. But the Secretary of the Department is not the Secretary of the Committee, although he attends their meetings. If they do not like his way of putting a case they must put it themselves; but four or five men sitting round a table cannot write a letter. To set a case in motion therefore under such circumstances, in the way of proposing a new line of action, involves a degree of volition which few men so placed are likely

[1] The political department of the office also deals with the secret despatches, but without the cognisance of the political committee, its immediate superior.

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to exercise, and in fact the result fully illustrates the fact that in administrative business the outcome is determined by the procedure, and that the man who initiates practically governs the situation. The Committee therefore may object or obstruct, but they cannot direct. The subsequent stages of business are of the same tenor, but the power of criticism is even less distinctly present. The papers, after passing through Committee, and if approved by the Secretary of State, are made available for inspection by the rest of the Council, and then brought up before a meeting of that body and formally passed, with usually little or no amendment. And regard being had to the innate indolence of most men, especially of old men, and to the natural disinclination (in itself a creditable feeling) of men experienced in business to appear obstructive, it will be understood that the experience and judgment of the Councillors are to say the least not turned to the best account. A strong man may assert himself and make his influence felt—a strong man will always do this in any circumstance—but he must go out of his way to do it. Add that of individual responsibility there is none, opinions being expressed collectively both in Committee and in Council, and it will be recognised that the Indian Council as actually constituted is not as efficient a body as it should be, and that its procedure at any rate needs to be reformed.

Anomalous position of Councillors and Secretaries.

Further, the India Office has lately undergone an important change. Formerly, except in the military branch, the Secretary of which since the Mutiny has been an officer of the Indian army, the Secretaries of Department have been simply senior clerks of the establishment promoted to the higher position—in most cases men of great ability, but whose knowledge of India was gained in London. Of late years, however, retired Indian officials of distinction have been appointed to some of these posts. It is illustrative of the change

which has come over the course of an Indian career, that whereas formerly the successful civilian on returning to his native land after holding high office in India would buy an estate and set up as a country gentleman, and possibly get also a seat in Parliament, he is now satisfied to supplement his small savings and modest pension (a great part of which he has provided himself by contributions from his salary) by accepting a subordinate appointment in the India Office. The result is, that the departmental secretary is often a man of higher official standing as well as of more recent experience than the Councillors to whom he is is subordinate. One secretary of a department came to the post from being Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, the most important office in India after that of Governor General. Another was for five years a member of the Governor General's Council; a third conducted the great administration of Burma during and after the critical time of annexation. These gentlemen have not only a wider record than any of the Councillors, they have had greater experience than most of them, and having the initiation of business and direct access to the Secretary of State, they must naturally have greater influence than the Councillors. Yet, while the latter are so far responsible that they are the statutory advisers of the Secretary of State, and have the power of recording opinions which may be, and sometimes are, made public, the secretary is not responsible for his advice; technically he is only a civil service clerk.

Councillors should be placed in responsible charge of departments.

Clearly there is not room for both councillors and departmental secretaries of the new stamp, and an organic improvement indicated by these considerations would be to give the members of the Council specific administrative duties and responsibilities by placing them severally in direct executive charge of the different departments—in fact, to reconstitute that body on a footing similar to that of the Governor General's

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Council in India. That Council, as has been explained in a previous chapter, was in the first instance merely a consultative body, and in that capacity very inefficient. Its advice when given came too late in most cases, and the burden of initiation imposed on the Governor General became at last so heavy with the increasing amount of business from year to year, that his Council had to be reconstituted on new lines dictated by experience. The members of that Council are indeed still spoken of as the advisers of the Governor General, and so they are in the same sense in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer may be said to be the adviser of the First Lord of the Treasury. But they, with the Governor General, form the Government of India, and each member has responsible charge of one of the departments of the State. By reorganising the duties of the Council of India in the same way, the experience and ability of its members would be utilised much more fully than at present, and much better effect would be given to the intentions of the Act of 1858 as indicated in the debates on the subject.[1] The Secretary of State, while bound generally to abide by the decision of the collective body, and having the benefit of their advice in that collective capacity, would still retain his full responsibility and his power of over-ruling their decisions when necessary.

A change facilitated by recent reduction of Council.

The recent reduction of the number of the Council from fifteen to ten members favours the change. The reasons alleged for proposing the reduction were indeed audaciously insufficient. The Bill was brought up for second reading in the House of Commons after midnight, and pressed forward on the ground of the relief that it would give to Indian finance. The sum to be saved was 5,000*l.* a year; if, as the Under Secretary in

[1] This was the system proposed by Lord Palmerston, who when introducing the first of the two Bills brought in, explained that his provision of a Council of eight members only would admit of each member having charge of a department.

charge of the Bill implied, the prospect of effecting that saving furnished an unanswerable case, a still stronger case lay for abolishing the whole Council. The only reason Lord Cross vouchsafed in the Lords was that he thought he should do better with a smaller council, and that the members of that body themselves were favourable to a reduction; but in what way that opinion was recorded he did not explain, or whether it was the opinion of the more active and able minority, who found little benefit from the presence of venerable colleagues who had long ceased to take any active interest in Indian affairs. The indecent haste in which the Bill was hurried through both Houses on such a flimsy pretext was in painful contrast with the care and consideration with which the constitution of the Council was discussed in both Houses during the session of 1858. For a consultative body which should bring a reasonable amount of varied experiences gained in various parts of the country and in different branches of affairs, fifteen is certainly not too large a number; while among the objections to the reduction must be noted the loss of any new accessions to the Council while it is in course of being carried out. For an administrative body, however, a smaller number would be sufficient; although this view of the case does not seem to have occurred to the Secretary of State when proposing the reduction. Six or seven councillors at least would be required under the proposed system, for the charge of the different departments, and some others might usefully be employed on purely consultative business. On the change being made, the position of departmental secretary would revert to its former status, and these posts would in future be filled as before by promotion of the senior clerks of the office. There is nothing in the reform here suggested which could not be carried out under the statutory provisions of the Act of 1858; but the tenure of office of a councillor might advantageously

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Caution against undue interference with Government in India.

be reduced to less than ten years, a change which would involve the passing of an amending Act to that effect.

The Council of India thus reorganised would undoubtedly be a much more efficient body than the present. An objection might perhaps be raised to the change that it would be too strong; that able and experienced men coming to it after holding high positions in India and placed in charge of the different departments of the India Office might be tempted to try to direct the administration of that country from their new position; to press their own views against those of their successors in India. This is certainly a possible danger. Hitherto the India Office, recognising that its proper function is that of a court of review, and that India can be properly governed only by the Government in that country, has as a rule laudably abstained from direct interference in administrative details. This statement may perhaps create surprise in India, where undoubtedly there is often a feeling of soreness at the supposed tendency of the India Office to interfere in matters which should be left to be dealt with on the spot; but everyone who has watched affairs dispassionately with a knowledge of what has passed on both sides of the water, must recognise that the Secretary of State for the time being has usually been scrupulous in maintaining this dividing line of the respective functions of the two authorities. There have indeed been exceptions to the rule, as in the case of the reorganisation of the army after the Mutiny, when a quite impracticable scheme was sent forth from the India Office cut and dried to be carried out in India. These and similar attempts to transfer the initiation of affairs from India to England, have served to bring the more clearly to light the soundness of the policy of abstention; and as the procedure of the Council would continue to be of its present corporate character, and the proposals of the different departments in every case would come

under the review of the whole body before the proceedings reached the stage of final orders, it may be trusted that a sufficient check would be exerted over any tendency of the departmental officials to interfere unduly with the executive functions of the responsible authorities in India.

The maintenance of this principle, that India must be administered by the Government in India—with the development lately set in motion of local institutions, the advancement of the people of that country to a larger share in its administration through the expansion of the legislative councils, and their extended employment in all branches of the public service—becomes now more than ever of vital necessity, and makes it superfluous to discuss the proposals put forward from time to time for the replacement of the existing Council of India by a larger body. Anything in the shape of an assembly debating in public is from the nature of the case out of the range of serious consideration. Indians could not be brought to this country to serve on it, at any rate in sufficient numbers to be representative of the people of India; and the idea that persons so placed, whether Englishmen or Indians, should be in a position to advance opinions, still more to carry resolutions for the result of which they would not be wholly responsible, will not be entertained by anyone who has the most elementary acquaintance with the conditions of that country, or of representative institutions. If, in the dim and distant future, the time should ever arrive when a parliament of any sort is possible for India, it must be set up in that country and not in this.

CHAPTER XXII

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

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Political aspect of India.

THE salient features of Indian administration have now been passed in review, and various points have been brought to notice in regard to which the present system calls for amendment and reform. One question especially of great interest and importance is naturally suggested by the enquiry, how far that system, with the development which may be indicated as necessary from time to time, will be suited to, and sufficient for, the wants and circumstances of India in the future, and what modifications of it are likely to be required or brought about in the course of events. Over and above the special circumstances arising out of its connection with England, India now presents this singular political aspect, that its people have been put in possession of a degree of personal liberty as great as is enjoyed by any nation in the world, but liberty not associated with the usual accompaniments of self-government or of representative institutions, save only to the limited extent to which these have been introduced for municipal purposes. The government of a country so circumstanced must necessarily be delicate and difficult; and among the special elements of difficulty at the present time is the appearance on the surface of Indian society of a new class—a class which has no affinity with the landed aristocracy or the natural rulers of India, or the mercantile, or the agricultural communities; which has never before occupied a position of any importance; a

Full personal liberty without free institutions.

Difficulties resulting.

Agitation set on foot.

class which is the product of our system of free education, and which, while constituting a numerically insignificant minority of the whole population, lays claim to be accepted as the people of India, and, with the assistance it is endeavouring to secure from an uninstructed section of English politicians, is entering on a course of political agitation, vague, unreal, and impracticable in its aims, but which, unless directed into a rational course, may bring about trouble and danger to India. The vast majority of the people of India, on the other hand, although the agitation now being got up among a section of the small English-speaking class necessarily excites among them a vague feeling of unrest and expectation, are still politically in an elementary condition to which no part of Europe furnishes anything analogous. The questions which we are told exercise the minds of the people of India, such as the expansion of the legislative councils, the constitution of the Civil Service, and so forth, are at present absolutely beyond their apprehension. Their notions of the nature of the Government they are ruled by are of the vaguest. To them the Government is represented by the three or four district officials with whom they come in contact; these they see to be acting under higher authority, but as to the nature of this they have only the vaguest notions, while of the government in England, with its parliament and political parties, they have no more conception than of the composition of the solar system. Representative institutions, franchises, voting, elections, the simpler political questions which are coming to be understood by all classes in Europe do not enter even in the most remote way into their thoughts. This is a class of whose wants and feelings little or nothing is heard in the so-called political discussions now going on in India; yet it outnumbers the other class by thousands to one, and it is mainly in their interests that the government has to be conducted.

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Encouragement received from certain classes of English politicians.

Simultaneously with this movement in India a greater degree of interest has become awakened here in the affairs in that country than was formerly felt about it—an interest however not necessarily based on knowledge. The class of persons who profess to take India under their patronage is made up for the most part of minor politicians whose reputation is associated with eccentricities or fads—persons who are not taken seriously at home and are of little account in English politics, except so far as they are weighed by their voting power, and whose defective judgment and unfitness for the position they would endeavour to assume are sufficiently shown by the attitude which they have taken up. They have thrown themselves into the hands of the small party of agitators, taking them at their own valuation as what they profess to be, the representatives of the people of India. These gentlemen have not made the elementary discovery that the class with whom they have associated themselves not only have no sort of claim to be so accepted, but that the interests of those who compose it are to a great extent antagonistic to those of the general community. The movement in question derives its impulse from a section of the educated class of one nationality, the Bengali, whose domination if established would be in the highest degree obnoxious to the other nations of India. The aims of those who have set this agitation in motion find expression in the proceedings of the so-called National Congress, and form the continued subject matter of the vernacular press.

The vernacular press.

The character of this press is not generally understood even by Englishmen in India, and to the English public it is probably absolutely unknown. It is unlike the press of any other country in that it is not divided by party lines to represent various sections of the community; with a few honourable exceptions it is all cast in the same mould, and animated by the same spirit—the desire to disparage and discredit the

Indian Government and render it odious in the eyes of the people. Not only are the actions of that Government continually misrepresented, and its officers denounced and reviled, the most insidious attempts are made to arouse the feelings of the masses by appealing to the prejudices which have been affected by previous legislation. Even the abolition of *sati* by the Government of Lord William Bentinck in the early part of the century is not too far-fetched a topic in time or reason to be continually dragged in; while the legislation of the Government of Lord Lansdowne restraining the premature consummation of child marriages is denounced week after week as being an unjustifiable interference with caste and religious observances. The press in its present form originated in Bengal, and although it has now spread over the whole country its impulse is still given from that province. The unanimity with which any topic calculated to disparage the Government is taken up and made the subject of accusation and abuse week after week until it gives place to some new topic, shows the power of combination with which the business is conducted. In face of this persistent misrepresentation and abuse, often taking the form of rank sedition, the inaction of the Government, although superficially magnanimous, is to say the least imprudent. A Government by a handful of foreigners, which is possible only while it has the respect and confidence, if not the regard of the people of the country, runs a great risk when it is thus from week to week persistently held up to obloquy and hatred, while the English public servants are denounced as being selfish, unjust, and tyrannical, and hating the people over whom they are placed. These papers are contemptible as literary productions and the circulation of many of them is extremely small, but the number of copies sold would be a very incorrect index of the number of readers; and although the mass of the people of India

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are still quite uneducated, the subject matter of these newspapers, which is the only thing read at all, undoubtedly filters down to the classes below the readers and cannot but in the long run tend to produce serious mischief. Of this the Government of India is well aware, for it has received many warnings on the subject from various quarters; that it abstains from moving in the matter is not because of any doubt as to the action which should be taken, but from the uncertainty felt whether this would be supported by the authorities at home. The remedy would be really of the simplest kind but for what has gone before. The Government of Lord Lytton passed an act to restrain the press, which had then for the first time become markedly seditious in its tone; the Act provided that a paper after being warned would be liable to suspension, and the legal sanction thus obtained for action was found amply sufficient to prevent the necessity for any action being taken—not a single case of proceeding under the Act took place. Nor was any harm done to anyone. These truculent writers do not in the least mean what they say; they have sense enough to know that if the British Government were overthrown, their class would not be gainers; politically they are but as mischievous children, quite unfit to be left without control. And if the matter had been allowed to rest nothing more would have been heard of the matter in India. Unfortunately the Act was repealed, in deference to a party cry raised in this country. The repeal was perfectly unnecessary, even as a means for giving practical effect to the object in view, because under the provisions of the Act it might be suspended by notification of the Government in any part of India; and this suspension might have been extended by degrees to the whole country. Such however being the past history of the case, the Government of India is unable to take any action unless it can first be secure of the sanction of the Government at home.

The remedy therefore must wait for the appearance of a Secretary of State with the courage to act in opposition to the small section of politicians who are unable to see that the platitudes about the inherent right of every people to a free press are not applicable to the case of India, and that the poisonous literature now being circulated without let or hindrance threatens to create a great political danger. The people of India, generally docile and tractable, are credulous to a remarkable degree and liable to unreasoning outbursts of excitement, and if they were brought to believe that their rulers are really what the native press declares them to be, passions might be aroused and a movement set up fraught with tremendous consequences. Not only is repression of this uncontrolled seditious writing necessary for the safety of the country, it would be hailed with satisfaction by all the more respectable and sober-minded classes, many of whom are at present the victims of the systematic terrorism and blackmailing pursued by the vernacular press. For the Indian, the official equally with the private gentleman, is politically timid; he will not assert himself to resist this tyranny; he looks only to the Government for relief from the nuisance, and wonders that this scandalous press should be so long tolerated.

The National Congress

The so-called National Congress, which comes more under notice in this country than the writings of the vernacular press, although also thoroughly disloyal, is less mischievous, because of the absurd character of its proceedings. They always set out indeed with a profession of loyalty to the British Government, but the resolutions they embody are distinctly aimed at rendering that government impossible. The self-elected delegates who make up that body are in great part pleaders in the Law Courts, and ex-students from the Government College in want of employment, a class yearly increasing under our system of free education, the

class, in fact, which works the native press, with which the Congress is in close alliance. For chairman some foolish politician is chosen, or, when one can be found to come forward, a native of position who has a grievance against the government. The proceedings do not include discussion or debate, but a number of resolutions, prepared beforehand by a self-constituted committee, are passed by acclamation, and are usually carried forward with additions from year to year. Among the most favoured resolutions are those for the repeal of the Arms Act which forbids the carrying of arms without a licence, an amusing one to emanate from a class peaceful and unwarlike beyond the people of any other country, and which has never furnished a soldier to the army under either native or British rule. Of a piece with this resolution is that in favour of a 'widespread system of volunteering such as obtains in Great Britain.' No reason is advanced why volunteering, which is unknown to any country in this continent but England, and is not allowed in Ireland, should be applied to India, a country where the people are votaries of one or other of two great religious faiths, each of which evokes the most passionate prejudices and excitement causing of late dangerous riots, repressed without great bloodshed only because the rioters were unarmed; where the agitation against such an innocent practice as the killing of kine has recently been made the subject of widespread feuds. That in India, of all countries in the world, volunteering should be seriously proposed, sufficiently indicates the political sense of the persons who compose this annual gathering. As for practical politics, the resolutions declare for a great reduction in the salt tax, a doubling of the minimum income exempt from payment of income tax, increased public expenditure on all branches of public education, and reduction of the fees in the schools and colleges. In fact, taxation is to be reduced, public expenditure is to be increased, and legislation generally

is to be in the interest of the class which practically contributes no taxation whatever. This, with the proposal that the small body of English public servants should be replaced by natives, embodies the political aspirations of the members of the Congress. And yet there are to be found politicians in this country who not only accept these crude and foolish utterances as the voice of the people of India, but have not made the discovery that they do not represent the aspirations of any considerable portion of the educated classes as a whole, or the upper ranks of native society. For it would be an entire mistake to suppose that while there is this apparent unanimity among the party who run the press and the Congress, and while their schemes are framed entirely in view of their own interests, these make up the whole or even a large portion of the more respectable classes in India. Happily there are plenty of educated native gentlemen, even in Bengal, who regard the proceedings of the Congress with disapproval; but political courage and independence of character are virtues which have not yet taken root in India. In their dread of being singled out for obloquy by the vernacular press, the more respectable classes of the community abstain from any combination or counter agitation. The other section on the other hand have grown bold with impunity, and the class of Bengalis who lead the movement are adepts in the art of agitation. The funds are supplied by one or two rich native gentlemen, the wire-pullers provide all the accessories, down to the telegrams sent from time to time to a certain class of London newspapers to give the movement a factitious strength and importance. At the last meeting held the president in opening the proceedings assured the meeting that 'every one of Ireland's Home Rule members was at their back in the cause of the Indian people.' That the section of Indians whose agitation takes this form should be

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secure of the hearty support of the Irish Nationalist party is only what might be expected; unfortunately this sympathy is shared by other members of the House of Commons who do not necessarily desire to embarrass the Government, or to encourage the growth of difficulties in any part of the British Empire, but whose knowledge of India is of the elementary kind which leads them, as has been said, to take the small party of agitators at their own valuation, and to suppose that they represent, as they profess to do, the wishes and aspirations of the people of India at large.[1] While public opinion is of this ill-instructed sort, there is danger of parliamentary interference in the affairs of that country of a very mischievous kind. The House of Commons as a whole being unprepared, and for the most part indifferent about debates on Indian questions, a small section of the House may and does succeed in carrying resolutions, striking at the root of the Indian administrative and financial system. This would not be very mischievous if such resolutions were regarded as the mere expression of opinion on the part of those who support them; but the claim is made that they should be acted upon as if they had the force of law. We have only to compare the effect of such action with the elaborate procedure enforced in regard to English finance, the debates in committee, the formal resolutions which follow in the whole House, and the incorporation of these in a Bill carried through its successive stages before they can take effect, to appreciate the monstrous assumption made in such a claim The

Intervention of parliament in Indian affairs.

Resolutions of House of Commons.

[1] In a recent debate, a highly respectable member assured the House of Commons that the rejection by the Government of the Resolution of the House in favour of simultaneous examinations for the Civil Service, had disappointed the 'expectations of countless millions of our fellow subjects.' It would be a far less absurd exaggeration to say that the one desire of the millions of the working classes in this country was the abolition of the duty on the higher brands of champagne; and yet men who make foolish remarks of this sort claim to be taken as advisers regarding the government of India.

humblest local taxpayer even, would have greater protection than the government of India. An English town council cannot add an additional furlong to its street tramways without a Bill formally carried through both Houses, but yet forsooth the vote of a scratch majority in a thin and tired House of Commons is to be accepted as sufficient authority for tampering with the whole administrative and fiscal system of India, and possibly throwing them into utter confusion.

And their ill effects

For the lamentable results which have ensued, and may yet follow if this contention is to be accepted, the blame rests with successive Governments of both parties, from their weakness in suffering such resolutions to be taken seriously. No doubt in the ordinary course of legislation, when votes are taken from time to time at various stages of debate, the action to follow must be governed by the decision of the majority, whether small or large. In such cases there can be no counting of heads; a vote is a vote, whether carried by a large or a small number. But the time has come for recognising that the Indian administration must not be placed at the mercy of the erratic dictates of a chance majority. There might be occasions when a Resolution of the House of Commons would be the most solemn and unmistakeable expression of the voice of the English nation, but it is the duty of a Government before taking extreme action, to make sure that it really has this high authority. To treat all such utterances as having equal force is either political pedantry or political cowardice. It may be said indeed that although a Resolution of the House of Commons may be foolish and ill considered, still that a Resolution of the House can turn out a Government. No doubt it can, if directed to that end; but on all recent occasions when India has been made the sport and playground of the faddists, there has been no question of making these divisions a test of confidence in the Government. The men who carry one or other

through timidity of ministers.

When authoritative.

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and when not.

of these snap votes would be quite powerless to carry a vote of that kind; and if on a late occasion the Government, instead of taking the feeble course of throwing on the Government of India the burden of deciding against the simultaneous examinations, had at once announced their intention of ignoring the Resolution, sensible men and reasonable politicians on both sides of the House would have rallied to their support in sufficient numbers to bring out the numerical insignificance of those who would make India the vehicle for introducing rash experiments which they would be quite impotent to force upon their fellow countrymen at home.

Still more important is it to recognise that India should not and must not be subjected to treatment which the House of Commons would not venture to adopt towards the smallest self-governing colony, and that while that country is not and will not for an indefinite time be fit for representative institutions, it must nevertheless be governed in accordance with the wishes of its people so far as they can be ascertained, and are compatible with the maintenance of British rule. If this principle had been kept in view we should not have had Opium Commissions forced on India to ascertain at great expense to that country what all those whose judgment is worth considering knew already, that the objects which the faddists were aiming at would not only result in throwing the Indian finances into confusion, but would involve an unwarrantable and tyrannical interference with the habits and customs of the people of that country, especially of the class which forms its most powerful bulwark of defence, and which, if it were alienated from our rule, would soon render that rule impossible. Nor should we have seen the Indian tariff played fast and loose with in the interests of certain classes in this country; the discreditable episode of the cotton duties would not have occurred—an episode which by causing a widespread belief that Indian policy

is dictated in the interests of political party rather than in the interests of the people of India, has inflicted a grievous blow on our character for good faith.

Danger of undue interference with Government of India.

Another point lately brought into prominence is the difficult and anomalous position which, under recent action taken in this country, the Indian Government is coming to occupy. In the view of the people of India, that Government appears vested with the highest power and authority in its executive capacity, and all the other attributes of a great government; while for legislative purposes it presides over a body in which the people of India are now largely represented. This is the outward appearance of things, actually of course the condition is quite different. According to the law the Government of India is merely a delegated agency for carrying out the policy and instructions of the Government at home, and the legislation entered upon by the former is subjected to the full control of the same authority. So far the law has made no change in either respect from the state of things always in force. The legal position of the Government of India still remains what it was in 1784, and although a numerous council has taken the place of the single English lawyer who from 1833 to 1854 represented the legislative element in that Government, its legislative proceedings equally with its executive action remain, as they have always been, subject to the control and approval of the Government at home. This is of course a necessary condition of the case. The Home Government and the British Parliament have the same full rights over every portion of the Queen's dominions; but wherever representative institutions have been granted, these authorities abstain from exercising almost all of the rights they by law or precedent possess. Their powers and rights remain dormant. But in India, where no such institutions exist, the ultimate power must reside somewhere, available for exercise in an active form. And unfortunately, while

everywhere else their exercise of authority by the imperial government has greatly lessened, if it has not altogether ceased to be employed, in regard to India the control has become more stringent and minute. The change which has come about is not in the form of law, but in the strain put upon the application of the law. Until quite recently the initiation of all legislative measures has rested with the Government of India, although it has had to submit its proposals for legislation to Her Majesty's Government as represented first by the Board of Control and afterwards by the Secretary of State. These proposals sometimes met with opposition and may not always have been accepted, but it is only now that the Home Government has for the first time begun to employ the power given it by the letter of the law, not only to initiate legislative action itself, but, in deference to the outcry of a small fanatical, ill-instructed section of its supporters, to force on the Government of India the obligation to carry out legislation to which the latter is distinctly opposed.[1]

False position occupied by that government in consequence.

This change in the policy so long wisely pursued, a policy by which alone India can be safely governed, has placed the Government of India in a false position. Not only must that government carry out measures to which it is opposed, it must in loyalty to Her Majesty's Government profess to approve of those measures. It has not even practically the means of recording a protest in the form of resignation. The members of the government at any time are all serving under different tenures; some may be just entering upon their term of office, others on the point of closing it, so that the sacrifice involved in resignation would be very unequal. Moreover, there is no analogy between the conditions of Indian and English political life. Here, if a party or individual minister resign, they pass over

[1] We may refer especially to the proceedings taken in connection with the Indian Cantonments Act.

to the other side of the House, but still exercise a potent influence over the course of affairs, to the direct management of which they will in all probability eventually return. Members of the Indian Government, if they resign, would retire into obscurity and uselessness. Occasions indeed might arise when it would be their duty to refuse to obey orders from home, accepting their recall if ordered. It is impossible to lay down a precise line at which disobedience to improper orders, given at the dictates of a rash and unscrupulous political party at home, might become a duty to India; but generally they will best consult the interest of the people of India by remaining at their posts, and putting a drag in the last resort on such unwise and high-handed proceedings.

Interference especially inopportune at present time.

This objectionable departure from the policy hitherto maintained, has been especially inopportune at the present moment, just when the expansion has taken place of the Indian Legislative Councils. The false position into which the Indian Government has thus been thrown in being called upon to carry a measure through the enlarged council to which they are obviously opposed, might under a persistence in such a course soon make their position untenable. Nor must the fact be lost sight of, that the Secretary of State has lately taken the unusual course of over-riding the unanimous opinions and advice of his own council, a course which the spirit of the law only justifies in cases of imperial importance. That India should be kept altogether outside party politics is perhaps a counsel of perfection, but it is the obvious duty of ministers to minimise, so far as possible, the effect of party government, and when they quote parliamentary authority for interference in the ordinary course of Indian administration, to be sure that it is the real voice of Parliament which they are obeying. They must, in fact, exercise more political courage; there must be no repetition of

such scandals as that of a minister forcing legislation on India, against the wishes of the local government, at the bidding of a small section of political faddists, or of his prohibiting the introduction of fiscal measures desired by all the people of India who are capable of forming an opinion on the matter, on the plea that these are opposed to sound economic principles—fishing for parliamentary votes on the hypocritical profession of inculcating sound economics. India is held by the right of conquest, and the form of its government is absolute; but these conditions should at least not be offensively obtruded.

Summary of case.

To recall what has been said, the present condition of India politically is, that the fullest measure of personal liberty has already been given, and so far as can be foreseen, the grant of political power will follow as fast as it can be safely conceded. The administration is mainly Indian already, and is rapidly becoming still more completely so. Hitherto the expansion of native agency has proceeded most largely in the judicial line; the employment of Indians in high executive posts is only just beginning, and is still in the experimental stage, but the experiment must be pursued *pari passu* on both lines, if the great change is to be safely carried out. With an executive staff consisting of British officials, a purely native judiciary, if animated by the spirit shown by the vernacular press, might bring Indian administration to a deadlock. Indian native officials are politically timid, and peculiarly susceptible to the influence of press criticism, and if not actually siding with the party of sedition might yet be a feeble instrument with which to make head against it.

Material prosperity of India.

In material respects, India, as compared with any previous state, is now extraordinarily prosperous. Weighed by every practicable test, internal and external trade, the increased production and consumption of commodities, the accumulation of the precious metals,

above everything the growing railway traffic, the India of the present day, although still according to English standards a very poor country, is by comparison vastly more wealthy than it has ever been before. But two elements of danger and difficulty in the social condition of the country are coming into prominence, to qualify the satisfaction with which the situation might otherwise be viewed. As the ruthless wars which were the chronic condition of India in past times have been succeeded by the present era of internal peace, while famine no longer sweeps away the population over widespread tracts of country, and while simultaneously the elements of sanitation have been introduced, almost everywhere the population tends to increase faster than the increase of cultivation and the improvement of the soil, and to press with growing force upon the means of subsistence. It is easier to point out the evil than to apply a remedy. The religious customs of the country favour early marriages, and emigration on a scale sufficient to be effective is practically out of the question; but the case has to be stated to show that even a peaceful and beneficent rule is not without its concomitant drawbacks.

Qualifications to be made.

Excessive growth of population.

Next, apart from the pressure of population on the means of subsistence, in many parts of the country a social revolution is taking place, not the less momentous because in silent operation, arising out of the increasing indebtedness of the agriculturist, and involving the transfer of the land from the simple peasantry which have held it from time immemorial to the professional money lender, in redemption of loans borrowed at exorbitant interest. The process is favoured by the procedure of our law courts, which with their rigid enforcement of bonds entered into, even by those ignorant of their purport, the highly technical system of pleading allowed and the facilities afforded for costly appeals from the one court to another, are utterly

Cultivators in course of being displaced from the lands.

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unsuited to the understanding and circumstances of the agricultural classes.

It is a curious inconsistency in our policy that while in Ireland so much attention and labour should have been directed towards attaching the cultivator to the soil and creating unalienable tenant right, and while philanthropists and economists should be aiming to introduce the same conditions for the agricultural classes of Great Britain, we should have admitted, indeed encouraged, this social revolution to set in silently on India and work the havoc which it has already created. Some special remedial legislation has been applied, as for example, the Dekhan Raiyat Act, to check this evil. But a larger and more general process seems necessary, nothing less in fact than complete abolition of the sale of land for debt. It would be also a great advantage to the unfortunate peasantry affected, if in all suits arising out of loans made on their land or crops, the agency of professional pleaders were disallowed, and the parties to the suit alone were heard in person. The importance of dealing with this great matter in a thorough and comprehensive way cannot be too strongly insisted on; the class concerned make up the great mass of the people of India, and apart from the claims of justice, the foundations of our rule rest upon their contentment.

Remedial action required.

It is notable that the vernacular press are generally silent upon this social revolution. The agitators, the money lenders and the pleaders whom they employ, are closely allied; they belong to the 'white-clothed' class whose interests, in many respects, are directly antagonistic to those of the people of India.[1]

[1] The Congress does indeed pass an annual resolution, 'that fully fifty millions of the population, a number yearly increasing, are dragging out a miserable existence on the verge of starvation, and that in every decade several millions actually perish by starvation; and humbly urge once more that immediate steps be taken to remedy this calamitous state of affairs.' This resolution—dovetailed among others proposing the establishment of volunteers, the creation of a medical profession, the abolition of taxes, and increased expenditure on education and other things—does

Assumed drain of wealth from India.

The complaint is often made that our foreign domination drains India of its wealth. The wealth at any rate is the creation of our rule; we found India poverty stricken as it always had been before, and as doubtless it would still be if we had not appeared on the scene. The drain of wealth which consists in the large payments which have to be made to England, is of course a fact, but we must distinguish between the two sources of this drain. By far the larger part consists in the payment of interest on the English capital invested in India. In this respect India is in the same position as almost every other country in the world, and has all the advantages derived from a borrower under such circumstances. Borrowed money is the source of her wealth. The greater part of this capital has gone to make the railways which have enriched India more than anything else, and brought about her present prosperous condition; among other things the great tea and jute industries in particular have been established entirely by British capital. The interest India pays on this represents but a very small portion of the benefit which she derives from it. There is, however, a drain of another kind, but smaller in amount, for the pensions paid to English officials, the savings taken away by Europeans of all classes, and that part of the cost of the army which is defrayed in this country. This last item is obviously a necessary condition of the maintenance of a stable government of any sort in India; the most truculent of the agitators who are for replacing the English civil service straightway by natives, have not yet advanced to the point of suggesting that the British army should be withdrawn. The other items

touch the matter, but can hardly be said to deal with it in a very practical or useful way. A town council would not be held to gain credit for good sense or philanthropic spirit by placing a minute on its proceedings to the effect that a large number of the English people were suffering from poverty, which Her Majesty's Government should take immediate steps for putting an end to.

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are no doubt a drain in the actual sense of the words, but that this should be cause of complaint involves the absurd assumption that without English rule exercised by English officials, India would have attained of itself to a state of internal peace and prosperity. Those people must have a very slender acquaintance with Indian history or with the Indian people who can suppose that there is the smallest foundation for such a belief; or that if the *pax Britannica* had not been established in India, that country would not either still be the prey of intestine feuds, such as desolated it before our rule, or have again become the spoil of some warlike invader from the north. All that can be said is that a good government by foreigners is more costly than would be an equally good government by the people of the country. So it would be cheaper for a man to cure himself when sick, if he knew how to do so, than to call in a physician. And the fact needs to be plainly stated that the capacity of the Indians to govern themselves has yet to be established. We must not mistake what may be merely a facility for adaptation, and imitation, and proficiency as agents working under supervision, for original capacity. The assumption that all the races of the earth possess the same natural power, and that the backward ones may by training and propinquity be readily brought up to the level of a higher civilisation, has yet to be established.

Political instability of India if left to itself.

Even now the internal conditions of the country present no elements of political stability. India is still a congeries of nations which although mixed up together in a bewildering degree, and undergoing a rapid fusion in their superficial aspects under British rule, are yet so widely different from each other that generalisations are apt to be delusive and misleading. The difference between the various peoples, between, for example, the martial frontier races and the Bengalis or the people of Madras, is far greater than that which

is found between any two races or classes of Europe. But this at least is clear, that the ascendency of the class, now so disloyal and so noisy, which is claiming to succeed us, and which puts forward the impudent claim that every English official constitutes a wrong done to themselves by keeping one of their class out of office: that the ascendency of this class would be utterly abhorrent to the greater part of the people of India, and that as they are simply the artificial creation of British rule, so they would be the first to disappear from the surface if that rule were withdrawn.

English rule not necessarily popular.

Attractive character of Indian people.

That this rule should be popular is hardly to be expected, nor probably are the English themselves individually popular; but if the people of India do not like us, it is impossible to help liking them. They differ, as has been said, from each other so widely, that generalisations are apt to be delusive and misleading; yet there are some characteristics which the English in India will recognise as common to all, especially their good temper, sobriety, industry, patience, and power of self-denial, their kindness to children, their loyalty to family ties. We must all too admire the gallantry of the warlike races, and few can leave the country without carrying away memories of disinterested gratitude shown for good offices done, ties formed of mutual affection with those who have nothing more to look for from our friendship; feeling a degree of interest in India and its people which only long acquaintance with it and them could give; and hopeful that if wisely governed a prosperous future is before them.

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