



HISTORY OF VEDIC LITERATURE.

IN taking a survey of the works which belong to the Vedic literature of India, our task would be greatly facilitated if general and characteristic features could be pointed out by which Vedic and non-Vedic works might at once be distinguished. Without entering into a minute analysis of the individual character of a work,—a mode of criticism which, with our present knowledge of the earliest Indian literature, must be very uncertain,—it will often happen that some external mark presents itself, determining at once the age or class of writing to which it belongs. It is true that there are certain grammatical forms and orthographical peculiarities which Indian grammarians restrict to the Veda, and which, therefore, might be used as distinguishing marks of works belonging to that era. But Manu, or rather the author of the *Mānava-dharma-śāstra*, has also employed several Vedic forms; because in transforming Vedic verses into epic Ślokas, he is sometimes obliged to retain words and forms which are not in strict accordance with the general character of his language; a fact which accounts in some degree for the strange appearance of many of his verses, which are stiff and artificial, and very inferior in fluency to the older strains which they paraphrase.

There is a strongly marked character in Vedic prose, and no attempt has been made to imitate it in later times. But in order to distinguish Vedic from



non-Vedic poetry, we must attend more closely to the metre. Several Vedic metres have been imitated by later poets, but there are metres which never occur in Vedic works, and which may be used as criteria for distinguishing ancient from more modern poetry.

That difference of metre should form a broad line of demarcation between two periods of literature, is not at all without an analogy in the literary history of other nations, particularly in older times. If once a new form of metre begins to grow popular by the influence of a poet who succeeds in collecting a school of other poets around him, this new mode of utterance is very apt to supersede the other more ancient forms altogether. People become accustomed to the new rhythm sometimes to such a degree, that they lose entirely the taste for their old poetry on account of its obsolete measure. No poet, therefore, who writes for the people, would think of employing those old-fashioned metres; and we find that early popular poems have had to be transfused into modern verse in order to make them generally readable once more.

Now it seems that the regular and continuous Anushtubh-śloka is a metre unknown during the Vedic age, and every work written in it may at once be put down as post-Vedic. It is no valid objection that this epic Śloka occurs also in Vedic hymns, that Anushtubh verses are frequently quoted in the Brāhmaṇas, and that in some of the Sūtras the Anushtubh-śloka occurs intermixed with Trishtubhs, and is used for the purpose of recapitulating¹ what had been explained before in prose. For it is only the *uniform*

¹ Sangraha-ślokas. Cf. Weber, *Indische Studien*, i. p. 47.



employment of that metre¹ which constitutes the characteristic mark of a new period of literature. Thus rhyme occasionally occurs in English poetry before the Norman period; yet, when we find whole poems written in rhyme and without the old Teutonic system of alliteration, we are sure that they cannot have been composed in an Ante-Norman period. The elegiac measure seems to have been used before Callinus; yet Callinus and Archilochus are always mentioned as the inventors of it:—that is, they were the first to sanction the uniform employment of this metre for entire poetical compositions. Hence no elegiac poem can be previous to the close of the 8th century B.C. The same applies to the iambus, the invention of which is commonly ascribed to Archilochus; although iambs occur interspersed in the *Margites*, a poem ascribed to Homer by no less an authority than Aristotle.² In the history of German literature we have several instances where

¹ It is remarkable that in Pāṇini also, the word *śloka* is always used in opposition to Vedic literature (Pāṇ. iv. 1. 66., iv. 3. 103. 1., iv. 3. 107.). *Ślokas*, even if ascribed by Indian tradition to the same author, who is considered as the Rishi of Vedic hymns or Brāhmaṇas, are quoted by a name different from that of his other works. The hymns or Brāhmaṇas ascribed to Kaṭha, for instance, are always to be quoted as “Kaṭhāḥ” (οἱ περὶ Κάρθορ); an expression which could never apply to poetical compositions ascribed to the same Kaṭha, if written in *Ślokas*. Verses written in this modern style of poetry must be quoted as “Kaṭhic Ślokas” (Kaṭhāḥ ślokāḥ). The Brāhmaṇa promulgated by Tittiri, and kept up in the tradition of the Taittirīyas, is quoted by the name of “the Taittirīyas,” but *Ślokas* composed by Tittiri are never included under this title. Pāṇ. ii. 4. 21. Vālmīki-*ślokas* are mentioned.

² See Mure's *Critical History*, vol. iii. ch. i.



poems of the 12th century ¹ had to be recast as early as the 13th, on account of their metre and language; which, during this period of rapid transition, had already become obsolete and unreadable.

Excluding, then, from the Vedic period the Ma-hābhārata, Rāmāyana, Manu, the Purāṇas, and all the Śāstras and Darśanas, we have now to see what remains of literary works belonging to the Vedic age.

There are in that age four distinct periods, which can be established with sufficient evidence. They may be called the *Chhandas period*, *Mantra period*, *Brāhmaṇa period*, and *Sūtra period*, according to the general form of the literary productions which give to each of them its peculiar historical character.

In order to prove that these four periods follow each other in historical order, it is necessary to show that the composition of Sūtra works presupposes the existence of a Brāhmaṇa literature; that the Brāhmaṇa literature again is only possible with the presupposition of a Mantra literature; and lastly, that the form in which we possess the Mantra literature presupposes a period of Vedic history preceding the collection and final arrangement of the ancient Mantras or hymns.

¹ For instance, "Reinhard the Fox," an old High-German poem of the 13th century, is a new edition of the same poem written in the 12th century, of which fragments have been found by Grimm. Other poems which are supposed to have been remodelled in the 13th century are "Crescentia," "Duke Ernst," and the "Roland Song." Lachmann supposed the same to have taken place with the "Nibelungen Klage."



CHAPTER I.

THE SŪTRA PERIOD.

THE *Sūtra period*, with which we have to begin, is of peculiar importance to the history of Indian literature, inasmuch as it forms the connecting link between the Vedic and the later Sanskrit. While on the one hand we must place several works written in *Sūtras* under the head of the post-Vedic or modern Sanskrit, we shall also find others which, although written in continuous *Anushtubh-ślokas*, or, more frequently, intermixed with *Trishtubh* and other verses (as, for instance, some of the *Prātisākhya*s and *Anukramanī*s, and the still more modern *Parīśiṣṭas*), must be considered as the last productions of the Vedic age, trespassing in a certain degree upon the frontier of the later Sanskrit./

It is difficult to explain the peculiarities of the style of the *Sūtra* literature to any one who has not worked his way through the *Sūtras* themselves. It is impossible to give anything like a literal translation of these works, written as they are in the most artificial, elaborate, and enigmatical form. *Sūtra* means string; and all the works written in this style, on subjects the most various, are nothing but one uninterrupted string of short sentences, twisted together into the most concise form. Shortness is the great object of this style of composition, and it is a proverbial saying (taken from the *Mahābhāṣya*)



amongst the Pandits¹, that "an author rejoiceth in the economising of half a short vowel as much as in the birth of a son." Every doctrine thus propounded, whether grammar, metre, law, or philosophy, is reduced to a mere skeleton. All the important points and joints of a system are laid open with the greatest precision and clearness, but there is nothing in these works like connection or development of ideas. "Even the apparent simplicity of the design vanishes," as Colebrooke remarks, "in the perplexity of the structure. The endless pursuit of exceptions and limitations so disjoins the general precepts, that the reader cannot keep in view their intended connection and mutual relation. He wanders in an intricate maze, and the clew of the labyrinth is continually slipping from his hands." There is no life and no spirit in these Sūtras, except what either a teacher or a running commentary, by which these works are usually accompanied, may impart to them. /

/ Many of these works go even further: they not only express their fundamental doctrines in this concise form of language, but they coin a new kind of language, if language it can be called, by which they succeed in reducing the whole system of their tenets to mere algebraic formulas. To understand these is quite impossible without finding first what each algebraic x , y , and z , is meant to represent, and without having the key to the whole system. This key is generally given in separate Sūtras, called *Paribhāṣā*, which a pupil must know by heart, or always have present before his eyes, if he is to advance one step in the reading of such works. But

¹ Benares Magazine, Oct. 1849.



even then it would be impossible to arrive at any real understanding of the subject, without being also in possession of the laws of the so-called *Anuvṛitti* and *Nirvṛitti*. To explain the meaning of these technical words, we must remember that the Sūtras generally begin by putting forward one proposition (*Adhikāra*), which is afterwards never repeated, but always to be understood, till a new subject of the same kind is introduced. After the statement of a subject, the author goes on by giving a first rule, which may extend its influence over the next following rules, whether these be restrictions or amplifications of it. These restrictive rules exercise again their influence to a certain extent over other rules, so that the whole becomes one continuous chain, each link held and modified by the others, and itself holding to and modifying the rest. The influence of one rule over the others is called *Anuvṛitti*, its cessation, *Nirvṛitti*. Without knowing the working of these two laws, which can only be learnt from commentaries, the Sūtras become very much confused. This is particularly the case in those works where the so-called *Mīmāṃsā* method of *Pūrva-paksha* (reasons contra), *Uttara-paksha* (reasons pro), and *Siddhānta* (conclusion), is adopted. Here the concatenation of pros and cons is often so complicated, and the reasons on both sides defended by the same author with such seriousness, that we sometimes remain doubtful to which side the author himself leans, till we arrive at the end of the whole chapter. It is indeed one of the most curious kinds of literary composition that the human mind ever conceived; and though altogether worthless in an artistic point of view, it is wonderful that the Indians should have invented and mastered

this difficult form, so as to have made it the vehicle of expression for every kind of learning. / To introduce and to maintain such a species of literature was only possible with the Indian system of education, which consisted in little else except implanting these Sūtras and other works into the tender memory of children, and afterwards explaining them by commentaries and glosses. An Indian pupil learns these Sūtras of grammar, philosophy, or theology by the same mechanical method which fixes in our minds the alphabet and the multiplication-table; and those who enter into a learned career spend half their life in acquiring and practising them, until their memory is strengthened to such an unnatural degree, that they know by heart not only these Sūtras, but also their commentaries, and commentaries upon commentaries. Instances of this are found among the learned in India up to the present day.

These numerous Sūtra works which we still possess, contain the quintessence of all the knowledge which the Brahmans had accumulated during many centuries of study and meditation. Though they are the work of individuals, they owe to their authors little more than their form; and even that form was, most likely, the result of a long-continued system of traditional teaching, and not the invention of a few individuals.

There is a great difference, according to the notions of the Hindus themselves, between a work composed previous to the Sūtra period, and a Sūtra composition. The difference of style between a Brāhmaṇa and a Sūtra work (with the exception of some Kalpa-Sūtras, to be mentioned hereafter) would strike every



body at first sight, although, as regards the grammatical forms, Vedic irregularities are, according to Sanskrit grammarians, allowed in Sūtras also.¹ But there is another, and more important difference. Literary works, belonging to the preceding periods, the Brāhmaṇas as well as the Mantras, are considered by Indian theologians as forming the Śruti, or divine revelation, in contra-distinction to the Sūtras and all the rest of their literature. In the dogmatical language of orthodox Hindus, the works, which contain the Śruti, have not been composed, but have only been seen or perceived by men, *i. e.*, they have been revealed to men. The Sūtras, on the contrary, although based upon the Śruti, and therefore in some instances also called Śrauta Sūtras, are yet avowedly composed by human authors. Whenever they appear to be in contradiction with the Śruti, their authority is at once overruled, and only in cases where anterior evidence

¹ Vedic forms occur in the Prātisākhya-Sūtras, and are pointed out as such by the commentators. For instance, I. Prātisākhya, iv. 33. ता वशंगमानि instead of तानि वशंगमानि। The Commentator says, तानिशब्दलोपो द्रष्टव्यः। कंदोवत्सूत्राणि भवन्ति। The same applies also to the Sāmāyācārīka-Sūtras, for instance, those of Āpastamba, i. 53., where we read अधासनशायी। The Commentator explains this irregular form by अधःशब्दस्य सवर्णदीर्घश्चांदसो ऽपपाठो वा। Again, i. 93. we find अग्लौस्तु explained by the Commentary as तत्रानुस्वारपाठश्चांदसः। अपपाठो वा। Gautama-Sūtras, p. 40. l. 20. we read सकारांतपाठ आर्षः सुमेधसो दुर्मधस इत्यादिषु दर्शनात्॥



is wanting from the Śruti, can they have any claim to independent authority.

Now, even if we had no other means of proving that the Sûtras could have been composed only after the composition of the Brâhmanas, there would be no reason to consider this distinction, drawn by the Indians themselves between their sacred and profane literature, as altogether artificial and devoid of historical meaning, particularly if it can be shown how great an influence that very distinction has exercised on the religious struggles of India.

It is clear that this distinction has ever been the stronghold of the hierarchical pretensions of the Brahmans. We can understand how a nation might be led to ascribe a superhuman origin to their ancient national poetry, particularly if that poetry consisted chiefly of prayers and hymns addressed to their gods. But it is different with the prose compositions of the Brâhmanas. The reason why the Brâhmanas, which are evidently so much more modern than the Mantras, were allowed to participate in the name of Śruti, could only have been because it was from these theological compositions, and not from the simple old poetry of the hymns, that a supposed divine authority could be derived for the greater number of the ambitious claims of the Brahmans. But, although we need not ascribe any weight to the arguments by which the Brahmans endeavoured to establish the contemporaneous origin of the Mantras and Brâhmanas, there seems to be no reason why we should reject as equally worthless the general opinion with regard to the more ancient date of both the Brâhmanas and Mantras, if contrasted with the Sûtras and the profane literature of India. It



may easily happen, where there is a canon of sacred books, that later compositions become incorporated together with more ancient works, as was the case with the Brâhmanas. But we can hardly imagine that old and genuine parts should ever have been excluded from a body of sacred writings, and a more modern date ascribed to them, unless it be in the interest of a party to deny the authority of certain doctrines contained in these rejected documents. There is nothing in the later literature of the Sûtras to warrant a supposition of this kind. We can find no reason why the Sûtras should not have been ranked as Śruti, except the lateness of their date, if compared with the Brâhmanas, and still more with the Mantras. Whether the Brahmins themselves were aware that ages must have elapsed between the period during which most of the poems of their Rishis were composed, and the times which gave rise to the Brâhmanas, is a question which we need hardly hesitate to answer in the affirmative. But the recklessness with which Indian theologians claim for these Brâhmanas the same title and the same age as for the Mantras, shows that the reasons must have been peculiarly strong which deterred them from claiming the same divine authority for the Sûtras.

✓To ascribe to literary compositions such as the Mantras and Brâhmanas a divine origin, and to claim for them a divine and absolute authority, is a step which can hardly pass unnoticed in the intellectual history of a nation, whether for the circumstances which led to it, or for the results which it produced. Now, in India the results of that fatal step are palpable. It may have been intended as a check on religious reforms, but it led to a religious revolution.



Buddhism would be unintelligible, unless as the overthrow of a system which had tried to maintain its position by an appeal to a divine revelation; and we may be certain that the distinction between Śruti and Smṛiti, between revealed and profane literature, was established by the Brahmans, previous to the schism of Buddha. /

If the belief was once established, that not only the simple effusions of the Rishis, but the pointed doctrines of the Brāhmaṇas also, emanated from a divine source, and could not therefore be attacked by human reasoning, it is clear that every opposition to the privileges which the Brahmans claimed for themselves, on the sacred authority of the Veda, became heresy; and where the doctrines of the Brahmans were the religion of the people, or rather of the king, such opposition was amenable to the hierarchical laws of the state. The Brahmans themselves cared much more to see the divine authority of the Śruti as such implicitly acknowledged, than to maintain the doctrines of the Rishis in their original simplicity and purity. In philosophical discussions, they allowed the greatest possible freedom; and, although at first three philosophical systems only were admitted as orthodox (the two Mīmāṃsās and the Nyāya), their number was soon raised to six, so as to include the Vaiśeshika, Sāṅkhya, and Yoga-schools.¹ The most conflicting views on points of vital importance were tolerated as

¹ Kumārila quotes Sāṅkhya and Yoga, together with other heretical systems. सांख्ययोगपांचरात्रपाशुपतशाक्यनिर्गय-

परिशुद्धीतधर्माधर्मनिबंधनानि॥ As to the Vaiśeshikas, see page 84.



long as their advocates succeeded, no matter by what means, in bringing their doctrines into harmony with passages of the Veda, strained and twisted in every possible sense. If it was only admitted that, besides the perception of the senses and the induction of reason, revelation also, as contained in the Veda, furnished a true basis for human knowledge, all other points seemed to be of minor importance. Philosophical minds were allowed to exhaust all possible views on the relation between the real and transcendental world, the Creator and the created, the divine and the human nature. It was not from such lucubrations that danger was likely to accrue to the caste of the Brahmans. Nor was the heresy of Buddha Śākya Muni found so much in his philosophical doctrines, many of which may be traced in the orthodox atheism of Kapila. His real crime lay in his opposition to the exclusive privileges and abuses of the Brāhmans. These abuses were sanctioned by the divine authority of the Veda¹, and particularly of the Brāhmaṇas. In attacking the abuses, Buddha attacked the divine authority on which they were founded, and the argument was short: he is a heretic; anathema esto.

/ Buddha was a Kshatriya.² He was of princely

¹ The Buddhists say that the three Vedas were propounded originally by Maha Brahma, at which time they were perfect truth; but they have since been corrupted by the Brahmans and now contain many errors. Cf. R. Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, p. 185.

² Kumārila always speaks of Buddha as a Kshatriya who tried to become a Brahman. For instance,

स्वधर्मातिरेकेण च चवियेण सता प्रवक्तृत्वप्रतिपद्यौ प्रतिपन्नौ।

And again, बुद्धादेः पुनरयमेवातिक्रमो ऽलंकारबुद्धौ स्थितः।

origin, and belonged to the nobility of the land. He was not the first of his caste who opposed the ambition of the Brahmans. Several centuries before Buddha, Viśvâmitra, who, like Buddha, was a member of the royal caste, had to struggle against the exclusiveness of the priests. At that early time, however, the position of the Brahmans was not yet impregnable ; and Viśvâmitra, although a Kshatriya, succeeded in gaining for himself and his family the rights for which he struggled, and which the Brahmans had previously withheld from all but their own caste. King Janaka of Videha again, whose story is given in the Brâhmanas, refused to submit to the hierarchical pretensions of the Brahmans, and asserted his right of performing sacrifices without the intercession of priests. However great the difference may have been between the personal character of these two men and of Buddha,

येनैवमाह कलिकलुषकृतानि यानि लोके मयि निपतंतु
विमुच्यतां तु लोक इति स किल लोकहितार्थं चत्रियधर्म-
मतिक्रम्य ब्राह्मणवृत्तिं प्रवक्तुं प्रतिपद्य प्रतिषेधातिक्रमसम-
र्थे ब्राह्मणैरननुशिष्टं धर्मं बाह्यजनानुशास्तिं धर्मपीडामप्या-
त्मनो ऽंगीकृत्य परानुग्रहं कृतवानित्येवंविधैरेव गुणैः स्तूयते॥

"And this very transgression of Buddha and his followers is represented as if it did him honour. For he is praised because he said, 'Let all the sins that have been committed in this world fall on me, that the world may be delivered.' It is said that if he thus transgressed the duty of a Kshatriya, and entered the life of a Brahman and preached, it was merely for the good of mankind; and that in adopting for the instruction of excluded people a law which had not been taught by the Brahmans, he took the sin upon himself and was benefiting others."



the first principle of their opposition was the same. All three were equally struggling against the overweening pretensions of a selfish priesthood. / But while Viśvâmitra contented himself with maintaining the rights of his tribe or family, and became reconciled as soon as he was allowed to share in the profits of the priestly power, — while King Janaka expressed himself satisfied with the homage paid to him by Yâjñavalkya and other Brahmans, — while, in short, successive reformers as they appeared were either defeated or gained over to the cause of the Brahmans, — the seeds of discontent were growing up in the minds of the people. There is a dark chapter in the history of India, the reported destruction of all the Kshatriyas by Paraśu-râma. It marks the beginning of the hierarchical supremacy of the Brahmans. Though the Brahmans seem never to have aspired to the royal power, their caste, as far as we know the history and traditions of India, has always been in reality the ruling caste. Their ministry was courted as the only means of winning divine favour, their doctrines were admitted as infallible, their gods were worshipped as the only true gods, and their voice was powerful enough to stamp the simple strains of the Rîṣhis, and the absurd lucubrations of the authors of the Brâhmaṇas, with a divine authority. After this last step, however, the triumph of Brahmanism was preparing its fall. In India, less than in any other country, would people submit to a monopoly of truth; and the same millions who were patiently bearing the yoke of a political despotism threw off the fetters of an intellectual tyranny. In order to overthrow one of the oldest religions of the world, it was sufficient

that one man should challenge the authority of the Brahmans, the gods of the earth, (bhûdeva), and preach among the scorned and degraded creatures of God the simple truth that salvation was possible without the mediation of priests, and without a belief in books to which these very priests had given the title of revelation. This man was *Buddha Śākya Muni.* /

Now if we inquire how Buddha's doctrines were met by the Brahmans, it is true that here and there in their philosophical works they have endeavoured to overthrow some of his metaphysical axioms by an appeal to reason. An attempt of this kind we have, for instance, in Vâchaspati Mîsra's commentary on the Vedânta Sûtras. In commenting on the tenet of Buddha, that "ideas like those of being, and not-being, &c., do not admit of discussion,"¹ Vâchaspati observes that the very fact of speaking of these ideas, includes the possibility of their conception; nay, that to affirm they do not admit of reasoning involves an actual reasoning on them, and proves that the mind can conceive the idea of being as different from that of not-being.

Such, however, were not the usual weapons with which Brahmanism fought against Buddhism. The principal objection has always been, that Buddha's teaching could not be true, because it did not derive its sanction from Śruti or revelation. The Brahmans, as a caste, would readily have allowed being and not-being, and the whole of Buddha's philosophy, as they did the Sāṅkhya philosophy, which

¹ सदादीनामन्यतमदिचारं न सहते॥



on the most important points is in open opposition to the Vedānta. But while Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya school, conformed to the Brahmanic test by openly proclaiming the authority of revelation as paramount to reasoning and experience, Buddha would not submit to this, either for his philosophical (abhidharma), or for his much more important moral and religious doctrines (vinaya). No doubt it would have been easy for him to show how some of his doctrines harmonised with passages of the Veda, as in the Veda all possible shades of the human mind have found their natural reflection. If he had done so only for some of his precepts, such, for instance, as, "Thou shalt not murder,"¹ "Thou shalt not drink,"² "Thou shalt eat standing,"³ the Brahmans would readily have passed over other doctrines, even such as came into practice after Buddha's death, like "Who longs for heaven, shall worship the holy sepulchre,"⁴ "He shall pull out his hair,"⁵ &c. As he refused to do so, the line of argument taken by the Brahmans was simply confined to an appeal to revelation, in disproof of the possibility of the truth of Buddha's doctrines. /

/ There must be something very tempting in this line of argument, for we see that in later times the

¹ न हन्यात् ।

² न पिबेत् । *i. e.* "thou shalt not drink intoxicating liquors."

³ तिष्ठन्भुञ्जीत ।

⁴ चैत्यं वंदेत स्वर्गकामः ।

⁵ केशान् लुचेत् ।

Buddhists also endeavoured to claim the same divine character for their sacred writings which the Brahmans had established for the Veda. A curious instance of this is given in the following discussion, from Kumânila's Tantra-vârttika. Here the opponent (pûrva-paksha) observes, that the same arguments which prove that the Veda is not the work of human authors, apply with equal force to Śākya's teaching. His authority, he says, cannot be questioned, because his precepts are clear and intelligible; and as Śākya is not the inventor, but only the teacher of these precepts, and no name of an author is given for Śākya's doctrines, the frailties inherent in human authors affect them as little as the Veda.¹ Everything, in fact, he concludes, which has been brought forward by the Mīmāṃsakas to prove the authority of the Veda, proves in the same way the authority of Buddha's doctrine. Upon this, the orthodox Kumânila grows very wroth, and says: "These Śākyas, Vaiśeshikas, and other heretics, who have been frightened out of their wits by the faithful Mīmāṃsakas, prattle away with our own words as if trying to lay hold of a shadow. They say that their sacred works are eternal; but they are of empty minds, and only out of hatred they wish to deny that the Veda is the most ancient book."

¹ अकर्तृकतया नापि कर्तृदोषेण दुष्यति।
वेदबुद्धवाक्यादि कर्तृस्वरणवर्जणात् ॥
बुद्धवाक्यसमाख्यापि प्रवक्तृलनिबंधना।
तद्वृष्टलनिमित्ता वा काठकांगिरसादिवत् ॥
यावदेवोदितं किञ्चिदेदप्रामाण्यमिद्धये।
तत्सर्वं बुद्धवाक्यानामतिदेशेन गम्यते ॥



And these would-be logicians declare even that some of their precepts (which they have stolen from us), like that of universal benevolence, are not derived from the Veda, because most of Buddha's other sayings are altogether against the Veda. Wishing, therefore, to keep true on this point also, and seeing that no merely human precept could have any authority on moral and supernatural subjects, they try to veil their difficulty by aping our own arguments for the eternal existence of the Veda. They know that the Mīmāṃsakas have proved that no sayings of men can have any authority on supernatural subjects; they know also that the authority of the Veda cannot be controverted, because they can bring forward nothing against the proofs adduced for its divine origin, by which all supposition of a human source has been removed. Therefore, their hearts being gnawed by their own words, which are like the smattering of children, and having themselves nothing to answer, because the deception of their illogical arguments has been destroyed, they begin to speak like a foolish suitor who came to ask for a bride, saying, 'My family is as good as your family.' In the same manner they now maintain the eternal existence of their books, aping the speeches of others. And if they are challenged and told that this is *our* argument, they brawl, and say that we, the Mīmāṃsakas, have heard and stolen it from them. For a man who has lost all shame, who can talk away without any sense, and tries to cheat his opponent, will never get tired, and will never be put down!" Towards the end of this harangue, Kumāṛila adds, what is more to the point, that the Bauddhas, who

ascribe to everything a merely temporary existence, have no business to talk of an eternal revelation.

/ Now, it ought not to be overlooked, that in all these discussions the distinction between Śruti (Mantras and Brāhmaṇas) and Smṛiti (Sūtras) is always taken for granted. / If, at the time of the first controversies between Bauddhas and Mīmāṃsakas, the authors of the Mantras or Brāhmaṇas, and particularly the founders of the so-called ancient Brāhmaṇas, had still been alive, or their names generally known, even a Brahman could not have ventured to stand up for the divine and eternal origin of this part of the Śruti. On the other hand, nothing could have prevented the Brahmins from ascribing the same supernatural origin to the Sūtras, if at the time of the rising power of Buddhism their authors also had been lost in oblivion. The distinction, therefore, between Śruti (revelation) and Smṛiti (tradition) which is a point of such vital importance for the whole Brahmanic system, will also be found significant in an historical point of view.

/ It must be observed, however, before we proceed farther, that what is called Smṛiti includes not only Sūtras, but also Śloka works, such as the laws of Manu, Yājñavalkya, and Parāśara (the Mānava, Yājñavalkya, and Parāśara-dharma-śāstras), which sometimes are called *the* Smṛitis, in the plural. Most of these, if not all, are founded on Sūtras; but the texts of the Sūtras have mostly been superseded by these later metrical paraphrases. /

/ How then did the Brahmins, after they had established the distinction between Śruti and Smṛiti, defend the authority of the Smṛiti, including Sūtras and the later Śloka works? /

That the Smṛiti has no claim to an independent authority, but derives its sanction from its intimate connection with the Śruti, is implied by its very name, which means recollection. For, as Kumārila remarks (in the pūrva-pakṣa), "Recollection is knowledge, the object of which is some previous knowledge; and if Manu and other authors of Smṛitis had not originally been in possession of an authoritative knowledge, it would be impossible to appeal to their recollection as an authority.¹ It would be as if a man, omitting his son or daughter, was to appeal to the son of a barren daughter. For the original knowledge of Manu might be compared to his son, but his recollection would only be like a grandson. Now as people, if they have reason to doubt the existence of a daughter, would disbelieve every mention of the son of a daughter, thus the recollection (smṛiti) of Manu would be futile, if he himself had not possessed some means of authoritative knowledge."

✓ The following extract from Sāyana's Commentary on Parāśara's Code² will show the use which the

१ पूर्वविज्ञानविषयं विज्ञानं स्मृतिरुच्यते। पूर्वज्ञानादिना तस्याः प्रामाण्यं नावधार्यते॥ And again, मन्वादीनामपि यदि प्रथमं किञ्चित्प्रमाणं संभाव्यते ततः स्मरणं भवेन्नान्यथा। कस्मात्पुनः पुत्रं दुहितरं चाधिकृत्य बंध्यादौहित्रोदाहरणं कृतं। स्थानतुल्यत्वात्पुत्रस्थानीयं हि मन्वादः पूर्वविज्ञानं। दौहित्रस्थानीयं स्मरणं। अतश्च यथा दुहितुरभावं परामृश्य दौहित्रस्मृतिं भातिं मन्यते तथा मन्वादिभिः प्रत्यक्षाद्यसंभवपरामर्शादष्टकादिस्मरणं मिथ्येति संतव्यं॥

² MS. Bodl. 172, 173.



Brahmans made of this argument, in order to substantiate the authority of their legal text-books.

“Does it not seem after all,” he says, “as if this Smṛiti (containing as it does the laws of men) hardly deserved a commentary of its own, inasmuch as it is difficult to make out on what grounds it claims any authority? For if we appeal to a Sūtra of Jaimini’s (the founder of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā) where he has proved that the Veda possesses an authority irrespective of anything else, these arguments can hardly apply to books which are evidently the work of men, and entirely dependent on the authority of their sources. These sources again, if they be considered as the life and strength of that authority, are often very indistinct. First, they could never fall under the cognizance of the senses, because the very nature of duty or law is transcendental. Nor can this ultimate reason or source be found in induction, inasmuch as induction is only possible after observation. Neither can it be looked for in the sayings of other men, because man is exposed to error, and cannot even express things as he has really perceived them. But even if man was free from error, there would always be room for doubt and opposition. And as to finding the authority for these laws in direct precepts of the Śruti (Mantras and Brāhmaṇas) this is out of the question, because such precepts are not to be found there. We have never seen a passage in the Veda where precepts like those of the Smṛiti, to keep the body clean, &c., are given. To admit the right of induction for laws of this kind would be most dangerous, for it would apply with equal force to the precepts of Buddha, to worship the holy sepulchre, &c.

“However, there is an answer to all these doubts./



A great difference exists between the Smṛitis of Manu and the Smṛitis of Buddha, because Manu's authority is asserted by the undeniable Veda itself. It is said in the Veda, 'Whatever Manu said, was medicine;' but there is no passage there in any way favourable to the Smṛiti of Buddha, and therefore the right of applying induction cannot be considered dangerous, because it never could be extended to Buddha's doctrines.

"Quod non," says the opponent. "This passage of the Veda, 'Whatever Manu said, was medicine,' is only an Arthavâda (an explanatory remark), and has no evidence by itself. It only serves to illustrate or recommend another precept, viz., that two verses of Manu's are to be used at a certain sacrifice.¹ Therefore, there is no passage in the Veda to warrant the authority of the Smṛiti; and if Śākya's, *i. e.* Buddha's, Smṛiti be exceptionable, the same applies to the Smṛiti of Manu. Thus it is said, 'As men speak often untruth and are exposed to error, as no divine precept is given, faith only can be authority.' But

¹ As dhayyâs at the Somâraudra Charu, in the middle of the Sâmidhêni, or fire-kindling hymns. The same argument occurs in Kumâra's Tantra-vârttika, i. 3.,

तथा च मनोर्द्ध्वः सामिधेन्यो भवन्तीत्यस्य विधेर्वाक्यशेषे
श्रूयते मनुर्वै यत्किञ्चिदेव वदेत्तद्भेषजं भेषजताया इति॥

Mahâdeva, in his Commentary on the Hiran'yakeśi-sûtras, says that the Śruti bears witness to the authority of the Smṛitis by declaring that whatever Manu said was medicine.

श्रूतिरपि स्यतीनां वेदमूलत्वमाह यैश्च किञ्च मनुर्वदत्तद्भेषजमिति भेषजं यथा हितमेवं मनुवचनमपि प्रमाणत्वेन
हितमित्यर्थः ॥



further, even admitting that there was a shadow of authority for Manu, what could be said in favour of Parāśara's Smṛiti, which is now to be explained? For, although the Veda may praise Manu, it never does the same for Parāśara, and thus Parāśara's authority at least can hardly be defended.

“Against all this our answer is: the Smṛitis are an authority, because that they should have authority is understood by itself; and there is no reason why they should not be considered as having authority. Three reasons are given why Manu and the rest could not claim any authority, viz. ‘that men speak untruth, that they are exposed to error, and that no divine precept is given.’ These objections, however, are entirely out of order, because nobody would ever think that Manu and Parāśara, who have been perfect from their very birth, could have spoken untruth, and could have erred. So much for the first two objections. And who ever denied that these sages were perfect from their very birth, as Mantras, Arthavādas, Itihāsas, and Purāṇas, prove distinctly not only the existence of Parāśara and others, but also their perfection? Nay, even if we had not the testimony of the Mantras, how could the perfection of Parāśara and others be denied, which is involved in their very existence? A difference of opinion is quite impossible. And has it not been proved in the chapter on the gods¹ in the Uttara-mīmāṃsā, that the Mantras do not require

¹ If this refers to the Sankarshanakāṇḍa, which is ascribed to Jaimini, and forms an appendix to the Karmamīmāṃsā-sūtras (cf. Prasthānabheda), we ought to read Pūrva-mīmāṃsā instead of Uttara-mīmāṃsā.

any further proof for what they say? It is true that in the chapter on the Arthavâdas it has been admitted that what the Arthavâdas contain is not always to be believed. But this is only on account of some impossible things which are occasionally mentioned therein. Therefore an Arthavâda like this, 'Whatever Manu says is medicine,' although it only serves to recommend another rule, must yet be considered as true in itself. With regard to Śākya, nothing similar can be brought forward; and thus it is well said elsewhere, 'May a man scorn all the erroneous doctrines of Arhat, Chârvâka, and Buddha.' / As regards Parâśara in particular, it is wrong to say that his fame is not equally founded on the Veda, for it is said in the Śruti, 'Thus spoke Vyâsa, the son of Parâśara.' If, therefore, the famous Veda-Vyâsa is praised as the son of Parâśara, how much more famous must not Parâśara, his father, have been! In the genealogical Brâhmaṇa of the Vâjasanêyi-śâkhâ, the son also and the grandson of Parâśara are mentioned in the succession of pupils and teachers who handed down the Veda¹ / 'Ghṛitakaṇṣika received from Pârâśaryâyaṇa, Pârâśaryâyaṇa from Pârâśarya, Pârâśarya from Jâtukarṇya, &c.' / Therefore Parâśara stands quite on a level with Manu; and the same applies to all the other Rishis, like Vasishṭha and Yâjñavalkya, who are authors of Smṛitis, and are mentioned in the Śruti. / Thus we read, 'The Rishis did not see Indra clearly, but Vasishṭha saw him clearly.'

¹ Brihadâraṇyaka, 5. 6. 3.

² Taittirîya-Saṁhitâ, 3. 5. 2.

अथवा वा इदं प्रत्यक्षं नापश्यन् तं वसिष्ठः प्रत्यक्षमपश्यत्

‘Atri gave his children to Aurva, who longed for a son.’¹ ‘Yājñavalkya had two wives.’² Therefore one must not think of attacking the Smṛitis of Manu and others by any means.

“The third reason also which was brought forward against the authority of the Smṛiti, viz. that the

सो ऽब्रवीत् ब्राह्मणं ते वक्ष्यामि यथा त्वपुरोहिताः प्रजाः
प्रजनियन्ते ऽयं मेतरेभ्य ऋषिभ्यो मा प्रवोच इति। तस्मा
एतान् सोमभागानब्रवीत् ततो वसिष्ठपुरोहिताः प्रजाः
प्राजायन्त तस्माद्वासिष्ठो ब्रह्मा कार्यः॥

“The Rishis did not see Indra clearly, but Vasishṭha saw him clearly. Indra said, ‘I shall tell you a Brāhmaṇa, so that all men that are born will have thee for Purohita; but do not tell of me to the other Rishis.’ Thus he told him these parts of the hymns; and ever since, men were born having Vasishṭha for their Purohita. Therefore a Vasishṭha is to be chosen as Brahman.”

Cf. Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa, xv. 5., where it is said of the Bharatas that they will always have a Vasishṭha as Purohita. The Commentator there observes, that Bharata may either mean the kings of that name, or men in general.

¹ Taittirīya-Saṁhitā, 7. 1. 8.

अत्रिरददादौर्वाय प्रजां पुत्रकामाय स रिरिचानो ऽमन्यत
निर्वीर्यः शिथिलो यातयामा स एतं चतुरात्रमपश्यत्तमा-
हरत्तेनायजत ततो वै तस्य चत्वारो वीरा अजारन्त
सुहोता सूहता सध्वर्युः सुसभेयः॥

“Atri gave his children to the son of Urva, who longed for a son. Then he felt lonely, and saw that he was without power, weak, and decrepit. He saw this Chatûrâtra; he took it and sacrificed with it. Four sons were born to him from it,—a good Hotṛi, a good Udgâṭri, a good Adhvaryu, and a good Brahman.”

² Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, xvii. 4. 5.



precepts given there are not based upon passages of the Śruti, does not hold good, because passages are met with which are the source of all the laws given in the Smṛiti. / Thus we read, 'These five great sacrifices are every day commenced and every day performed: the Devayajna (to the gods), the Pitṛiyajna (to the fathers, the manes), the Bhūtayajna (to all beings), the Manushyayajna (to men), the Brahmayajna (to Brahman, the divine Self).'¹ And although there is no distinct precept in the Veda for ablutions, &c., yet all this is implied. / Thus the Bhaṭṭāchāryās say, 'It is right to respect the Smṛitis, because they are delivered by Vedic authors, because their origin is well established; and because they derive their authority from the Veda, if but rightly understood.' The Munis see the Śruti, and they deliver the Smṛiti; therefore the authority of both is proved on earth by full evidence. A man who despises these two, and adopts fallacious doctrines, is to be avoided by good men as a heretic and Veda-blasphemer. /

/ " But one might object that if these precepts can be learnt from the Śruti, the Smṛiti would be unnecessary, because that only which cannot be learnt from other sources forms a fit object for a new work. Here then we say that these precepts, though they can be learnt from the Veda, are nevertheless put together in the Smṛitis for the purpose of making the order of their performance more easy, by leaving out the Arthavādas, and by taking from some Śākhās of the Veda particular facts omitted in others. Now it might again be objected that this

¹ Taittiriye-āraṇyaka, ii. 10.



is done in the *Kalpa-sūtras*, and that therefore there was no necessity for the *Smṛitis*. But this is wrong, because there are two different kinds of duties to be performed, called *Śrauta* (based on Śruti) and *Smārta* (based on Smṛiti). The *Śrauta* ceremonies consist in sacrifices like the Darśa-pūrṇamāsa, &c., which can only be performed after the sacred fire has been placed in the house, and they are clearly based upon the Veda, as we read it. The *Smārta* sacraments and traditional customs, on the contrary, consist in ablutions, rinsing the mouth, &c., and they are to be considered as based upon a Śākhā of the Veda which is hidden, but the existence of which must be inferred. Although, therefore, those precepts which regard the placing of the sacred fire, &c., are put together in the *Kalpa-sūtras*, yet as other duties, such as ablutions, rinsing, &c., are not included in them, the *Smṛitis* have still their legitimate object."/>

This discussion has been given here at full length because it is a genuine specimen of Indian orthodox dialectics. Whatever may be thought of this style of argument, we see at all events how great an importance has always been attached by the Brahmins to the distinction between Śruti and Smṛiti.

It may also have been observed in this extract, that it is not quite in accordance with the language of Sāyaṇa to speak of *Sūtra* works as *Smṛitis* in the plural. He applies this term to metrical codes only, like Manu, Yājñavalkya, and Parāśara, but not to *Sūtras* or *Vedāṅgas*.¹ This, however, does not affect

¹ Kumārila remarks that, although the six *Vedāṅgas* are not called by the name of *Smṛiti*, they are *Smṛiti* in the same sense



our present question, because even Sāyana, though he does not call the Sūtras by the name of Smṛitis, places them notwithstanding in the same category with the codes of law, and separates them from the Śruti, upon which they are founded, but with which they are not to be confounded. The Kalpa-sūtras are called by him śrauta, i. e. based on revelation, but not Śruti (revelation), because although they treat of the same subjects as the Śruti, they are themselves extracts only from the sacred writings. They are arranged by authors whose names are given, while, according to Indian notions, Mantras and Brāhmaṇas were only seen by the Rishis, but neither composed nor arranged by them.¹

That Sūtras, even where they contain Vedāṅga-doctrines, are distinctly excluded from the Śruti, may be seen from the following passage. In the Tantra-vārttika (1. 3.), Kumārila says, "There is a great

as the Dharma-sūtras, i. 3. 9. स्मृतित्वं त्वंगानां धर्मसूत्राणां चाविशिष्टं॥ यद्यपि स्मृतिशब्देन नांगानामभिधेयता। तथा-
येषां न शास्त्रत्वप्रमाणत्वनिराक्रिया॥ Mahādeva, in his Commentary on the Hiranyakeśi-sūtras, says distinctly, सूत्रेषु स्मृतित्वं स्मृत्यधिकरणे स्थितं। तत्सूत्रकारैरेवोक्तं न्यायवित्समय इति भीमांसासिद्धांतस्वीकारदर्शनेन॥

¹ "When we spoke of this (the authorship of Madhuchhandas) to a learned Hindu friend, he exhibited very marked dissatisfaction and distress, begging us to write and tell Professor Wilson that the hymn had no author; that it had existed from everlasting; and that Madhuchhandas was only the fortunate seer to whom, on the last occasion of its revelation, it had been revealed."—*Benares Magazine for June 1851*, "On Müller's Edition and Wilson's Version of the Rig-Veda."



difference between the Kalpa-sūtras, which teach the performance of sacrifices enjoined by the Vedas, such as we now possess them, and the Smṛitis, which derive their authority from parts of the Veda that have either disappeared or are dispersed, or the existence of which can be proved by induction only. It is easier, therefore, to establish the authority of the Kalpa-sūtras than that of the Smṛitis. The objections which have been raised against the authority of the Smṛitis, and which had to be removed by us before, cannot be thought of with regard to the Kalpa-sūtras, not even if it were only for argument's sake.¹ The question, therefore, is only this, whether the Kalpa-sūtras have the same authority as the Veda, or whether they merely derive their authority from it. As the Veda is called 'shadāṅga,' 'having six members,' these six members, and amongst them the Kalpa-sūtras, might seem to be implied by the common name of Veda. This, however, would be wrong²; for the Kalpa-sūtras, as is well-known, are composed by human authors like Maśaka, &c. They do not take their names, like the Kāthaka and other Śākhās of the Veda, from those by whom they were proclaimed, but from their real authors. It is true, no doubt, that the authors of the Kalpa-sūtras have the name of Rishis, and it might be said that as Śīśu

१ अप्रमाणं स्मृतीनां च यदशब्दतयोदितं।

पूर्वपक्षे न तद्वक्तुं कल्पसूत्रेषु शक्यते॥

प्रत्यक्षवेदशब्दत्वात्तदुक्ता नापशब्दता।

न ह्यत्यंतानृतं वक्तुं शक्यते पूर्वपक्षिणा॥

२ वेदत्वं कल्पसूत्राणां नो वक्तव्यं मनागपि।

Angirasa was not the author of the Śaiśava hymns in the Sāmaveda, the Kalpa-sūtras too were not composed, but only proclaimed, by those whose names they bear, particularly as there are even Brāhmaṇas, for instance those of the Aruṇa and Parāśara-śākhā, which have nearly the same form as the Kalpa-sūtras. Nevertheless, nothing can be more mistaken than the opinion of those who would put the Kalpa-sūtras on the same footing as the Veda, because people who teach and learn the Kalpa-sūtras know that there was a time when these works did not exist, and that they were composed by certain authors like Maśaka, Baudhāyana, Āpastamba, Āśvalāyana, Kātyāyana, and others.”¹ They are drawn, as he

¹ Kumārila expressly observes that these names signify certain individuals, and not Charaṇas (sects), like those of Kāṭha, by which certain Śākhās of the Veda were promulgated.

यथा च कठादिचरणैरनादिभिः प्रोच्यमानानामनादिवेद-
शाखानामनादिसमाख्यासंभवो नैवं नित्यावस्थितमशकादि-
गोत्रचरणप्रवचननिमित्तसमाख्योपपत्तिः। मशकवैधायना-
पस्तंबादिशब्दा ह्यादिमेकद्रव्योपदेशिन इति न तेभ्यः
प्रकृतिभूतेभ्यो ऽनादिग्रंथविषयसमाख्याव्युत्पादनसंभवः॥

“The branches of the Veda which were proclaimed by the sects of Kāṭha and others from all eternity, have a fair claim to be called eternal. But this does not apply to works handed down by the sects or families of Maśaka and others, however long they may have been established. For names like Maśaka, Baudhāyana, and Āpastamba, imply an individual being which had a beginning, and therefore it is impossible that a title derived from these names should ever belong to an eternal work.”

And again :

यथैव हि कल्पसूत्रग्रंथानितरांगस्यतिनिबंधनानि चाध्येत्र-

observes in another place, partly from the Veda, but partly also from other sources ; and the same applies, according to him, to all the Vedāṅgas and Smṛitis ; nay, even to later works, such as the epic and paurāṇic poems.¹

ध्यापयितारः स्मरन्ति तथाश्चलायनबौधायनापस्तम्बकात्या-
यनप्रभृतीन् ग्रन्थकारत्वेन॥

“For teachers and pupils do not only know by heart the Kalpa-sūtra books, and the other Vedāṅga and Smṛiti compositions, but they also remember Āśvalāyana, Baudhāyana, Āpastamba, Kātyāyana, and others, as the authors of these books.”

१ तत्र यावद्भर्ममोक्षसंबन्धि तद्देदप्रभवं। यत्तत्त्वसुखविषयं
तत्सोकथ्यवहारपूर्वकमिति विवेक्तव्यं। एषैवेतिहासपुराणयोर-
प्युपदेशवाक्यानां गतिः॥

“All that has reference to virtue and final beatitude is taken from the Veda, while other matters, the purpose of which consists in pleasure and gain, are according to the customs of men. This distinction applies not only to the Vedāṅgas, but also to authoritative passages in the Purāṇas and Itihāsas.”

Uvaṇa, in his commentary on the Śākala prātisākyā, takes the same view. He says, “that as the Veda was too difficult to be used by itself, learned men have extracted from it different doctrines on the ceremonial, the metre, and grammar, and brought them into a more intelligible form in the Sūtras.”

यस्मात्केवलर्वेदवाक्यैर्न शक्यते ऽनुष्ठातुं विचित्रत्वाद्दे-
वाक्यानां गूढार्थत्वाच्च अतः कविभिराचार्यैर्वेदार्थकुशलैर्वे-
दार्थेभ्यो निष्कृत्य कर्मार्थं सुखावबोधनानीमानि विद्यास्था-
नानि प्रवर्तितानि। शिष्टा कस्यो व्याकरणं निरुक्तं वृन्दो ज्यो-
तिषमिति धर्मशास्त्रं पुराणं न्यायविस्तरो मीमांसादीनि।

And again :

अत आचार्यो भगवान् शौनको वेदार्थवित् सुदृढत्वा



It might therefore be best to distinguish between Smṛiti or tradition in general, and the Smṛitis or law-books in particular. We might then speak of *śrauta*- and *smārta*-sūtras, comprehending by the former name all Sūtras, the source of which can be traced in the Śruti; by the latter those of which no such source exists, or at least, is known to exist.¹ The title of Smṛitis in the plural (or Smṛiti-prabandhās) might be left, for convenience sake, to such works as Śāyana is speaking of, which are composed not in Sūtras but in Ślokas. It ought to be remembered, however, that the same subjects which are treated in the metrical Smṛitis of Manu and others, had similarly been treated in Sūtras (*śrauta*, *grihya*, and *sāmāyāchārika*), and that the principal difference between the two lies, not in their matter, but in their age, and their style.

ब्राह्मणेभ्यो ऽर्थवादानुत्सृज्य विधिं समाहृत्य पुरुषहितार्थ-
मृग्वेदस्य शिचाशाखं कृतवानिति॥

¹ Thus, *smārtam karma* is well defined by Shadguruśishya in the Sarvānukramanibhāṣhya, as 'nishekādi śmaśānāntam smṛiti-grihyavivhitam karma.' In the Commentary on Āśvalāyana's Śrauta-sūtras, it is said, that, if observances, like rinsing the mouth, &c., are prescribed in the Śrauta-sūtras (as they are for instance Āśval. i. 1. 3.), this is only done in order to show that such observances are acknowledged and presupposed by the Śrauta-sūtras, though they belong to the province of the Grihya ceremonies.

स्मार्तानां स्नानाचमनयज्ञोपवीतादीनां श्रौतकर्माविरुद्धाना-
मस्मिन् शाखे प्राप्तिप्रदर्शनार्थमिदमाचमनं कर्मागं विधीयते।
शौचार्थस्य गृहप्रवेशाद्यागेव कृतत्वात्। तदुक्तं मनःप्रसा-
दाद्यत्योक्त्या तपसा स्नानकर्मणा। आचांत्या चात्मनः
शुद्धिं कृत्वा कर्म समारभेदिति॥

An objection against this division and terminology, not unknown to the Brahmans themselves, is that it is difficult to say whether certain Smārta-sūtras may not be based upon some lost Śākhā of the Veda. The Śrauta portions of the Kalpa-sūtras, there can be no doubt, are founded on Śruti, if by this name we understand not only the hymns, but also the Brāhmaṇas of the Veda. But there are only few allusions, even in the Brāhmaṇas, to the ceremonies described in the Grihya-sūtras; and the few passages which are quoted from the Śruti in their support, are chiefly taken from the Āraṇyakas and Upanishads, the latest branches of Vedic literature. As to the Āchāras, or the established rules of conduct with regard to particular temporal duties, even Indian writers admit that there are only very vague allusions to them in the Śruti, and they try to prove that these laws are based on parts of the Veda which no longer exist. This is a view which is taken for instance by Haradatta in his Commentary on Āpastamba's Sāmāyāchārika-sūtras, and it deserves to be examined more closely. On the first Sūtra¹, "*Therefore let us now explain the Sāmāyāchārika duties,*" he makes the following observations.

"The word '*therefore*' implies a reason, which is that as the śrauta (sacrificial) and gārhya (domestic) ceremonies have been explained, and as these ceremonies presuppose other observances, these other observances must now be explained too. For when it was said before (in the Śrauta and Grihya-sūtras), that such and such an act was to be performed by a man after

¹ अथातः सामयाचारिकान्धर्मोन्वाख्यास्वामः॥१॥



he had rinsed his mouth, by a man who is clean, who holds a pavitra in his hand, who is invested with the sacred thread, &c., an acquaintance with all these things, such as rinsing, &c., is presupposed. The twilight prayers, too, are referred to in the preceding Sûtras, when it is said, that a man who does not perform his twilight prayers is impure, and unworthy of every sacrifice. Several other instances occur; and it is therefore necessary to explain now immediately those other precepts called *sâmayâchârîka* (temporal). *Sâmayâchârîka* is derived from *samaya* (agreement) and *âchâra* (custom). *Samaya*, a human agreement, is of three kinds: *vidhi*, injunction; *niyama*, restriction; *pratiśheda*, prohibition. Rules founded upon *samaya* are called *samayâchâras*, from which the adjective *sâmayâchârîka*. *Dharma* (virtue) is the quality of the individual self, which arises from action, leads to happiness and final beatitude, and is called *apûrva*, supernatural. But, in our Sûtra, *dharma* means law, and has for its object *dharma* as well as *adharma*: things to be done and things to be avoided.

"It might be said, however," continues the Commentator Haradatta, alluding to the same controversy which we saw before treated of by Sâyaṇa, "that if *samaya* (human agreement) be the authority for the law, it would be difficult to deny the same authority to the Bauddhas and their laws, to worship the holy sepulchre, &c.; and therefore Âpastamba has added the next Sûtra: ¹

¹ धर्मज्ञसमयः प्रमाणं ॥२॥

“Those agreements are of authority which were made by men who knew the law.”

“We do not say,” Haradatta remarks, with regard to these words, “that every agreement becomes of authority, but those only made by men like Manu, &c., who knew the law. But then, it might be asked, how it can be found out that Manu knew the law, and Buddha did not? People answer, that Buddha could not have had a knowledge of the divine law. But the same might be said also of Manu; and if a knowledge of divine things be ascribed to Manu, on account of the excellence which he acquired by his virtue, then, again, it would be the same for Buddha. There is a known verse¹: ‘If Buddha know the law, and Kapila does not, what is truth? If they

सुगतो यदि धर्मज्ञः कपिलो नेति का प्रमा।
तावुमौ यदि सर्वज्ञौ मतिभेदः कथं तयोः॥

Dr. Weber, in his dissertation on the Upanishads, thinks it is not impossible that Kapila, the founder of the Sâṅkhya, and Buddha were in fact one and the same person. (Indische Studien, i. 436.) He afterwards qualifies this conjecture, and calls it not very probable. It is true that the Indians themselves observed a certain similarity between the doctrines of Kapila and Buddha. But this would rather show that the two were different persons. Nor would the legend that Buddha was born at Kapila-vastu, the town of Kapila, or rather of the Kâpilas, seem to prove the identity of Kapila and Buddha. By another conjecture, the same ingenious scholar makes the founder of the Sâṅkhya (Panchasikha Kâpileya) the same person with Kâpya Pâtanchala, who occurs in the Śatapatha-brâhmaṇa; while, in a former article (i. 84.), both Kapila and Patanchali together, the former as the founder of the Sâṅkhya, the latter as the author of the Yoga system, are merged into Kâpya Pâtanchala. Afterwards, however, this opinion also is retracted, because Dr. Weber thinks that the Yoga system might be a later development of the Sâṅkhya.



were both omniscient, how could there be difference of opinion between them?" If this be not so, a distinction must be made; and this has been done by Āpastamba in his next Sūtra: '*And the Vedas (are of authority).*'¹

This Sūtra is explained by Haradatta in the following manner: — "The Vedas are the highest authority for good and bad; and none of the objections made before could apply to the Vedas, which are faultless from all eternity, evident by themselves, and, as they were revealed, unaffected by the faults of human authors. Therefore, while to us those agreements are of authority which were made by men who knew the law, the Vedas, again, were the authority for those men themselves, like Manu, &c. And although we have not before our eyes a Veda, which is the source of these laws, we must still conclude that Manu and the rest had."²

¹ वेदाश्च॥३॥

² Someśvara, who calls himself a son of Mādhava, and of whose work "Tantra-vārttikaṭīkā" there is a manuscript at the E. I. H. (No. 1030.), dated Samvat, 1552, goes even a step farther, and says that, although rules of the Smṛitis may be against the sacred law, the Veda must notwithstanding be considered as their source, because the Smṛitis themselves maintain that the Veda is the highest authority, an admission which the followers of Buddha protest against. Cf. p. 80. ननु याज्ञवल्क्यादिभिरपि

यदुच्यते द्विजातीनां शूद्राद्वारोपसंग्रहः न तन्मम मतं
यस्मात्तत्रात्मा जायते स्वयं तेन पुनरित्यादिहेतुदर्शनपूर्वकं
धर्माधर्मोपदेशेनान्न तन्मात्रेण वेदमूलत्वनिराकरणं युक्तमि-
त्याशंक्य वेद एव द्विजातीनां निःश्रेयसकरः पर इत्या-

It is a matter of considerable interest to know whether this opinion of Haradatta's, as to the previous existence of a larger number of Vedic works, deserves credit or not. The opponent of the orthodox Kumā-tila in the Tantra-vārttika remarks very truly, that to invoke the testimony of lost parts of the Veda is like calling a dead person as a witness.¹ And if we had no better authority for this opinion than so late a commentator as Haradatta, we should hardly be justified in mentioning it as an argument. Anybody, however, who is acquainted with the character of Indian commentators, will admit that they seldom

दिना तैः प्राधान्येन वेदमूलत्वाभिधानात् &c. Cf. Yājñavalkya, ed. Stenzler, i. 56., i. 40.; Manu, iii. 12, 13., where the Commentator mentions Vāsishṭha as having spoken of the marriage of a Brahman with a Śūdrā, the ceremony not being accompanied by sacred hymns, as a kind of morganatic marriage, kāmato vivāhaḥ, वासिष्ठोऽपि शूद्रामथेके मन्त्रवर्जमिति मन्त्रवर्जितं शूद्राविवाहमाह॥

¹ मृतसाक्षिकव्यवहारवच्च प्रलीनशाखामूलत्वकल्पनायां यस्मै यद्गोचरे स तत्प्रमाणीकुर्यात्।

"If a man maintain a lost tradition to have been a source, he may prove what he pleases, for it is like appealing to a dead witness." And again :

येन यत्नेन मन्वाद्यैरात्मवाक्यं प्रपाठितं कस्मात्तेनैव तन्मूलं चोदना न समर्पिता॥ यस्मैव यदभिप्रेतं स एव तत्प्रलीनशाखामस्यके निश्चिष्य प्रमाणीकुर्यात्॥

"Why has a divine precept not been established by Manu and the others as the source of their teaching, which would not have cost them more labour than to proclaim their own doctrine? Anybody may throw whatever he likes into the skull of a lost tradition, and then invoke it as an authority."



commit themselves to novel theories, but almost always repeat what existed before in the tradition of their schools; a fact which at once increases and diminishes the usefulness of their works. Thus we find in the case before us, that Âpastamba himself, whose Sûtras Haradatta explains, entertained a similar opinion on this subject. In the twelfth section of his Sûtras, when speaking of some rules on the Svâdhyâya (praying), he says¹, "that certain rules must be considered as given in Brâhmanas of which the tradition or reading has been destroyed. Their former existence," he says, "must be inferred from

१ ब्राह्मणोक्ता विधयस्तेषामुत्सन्नाः पाठाः प्रयोगादनुमी-
यन्ते। यत्र तु प्रीत्युपलब्धितः प्रवृत्तिर्न तत्र शास्त्रमस्ति
तदनुवर्तमानो नरकाय राध्यति॥

The Commentator says: उत्सन्नाः पाठा अथेतदौर्बल्यात्॥

"The original passages were lost by the negligence of the students."

Kumârila observes: शाखानां विप्रकीर्णत्वात्पुरुषाणां प्रमा-
दतः। नानाप्रकरणस्थत्वात् स्मृतेर्भूलं न दृश्यते॥

"The original text from which the Smṛiti was derived cannot always be found, because the Sâkhâs are scattered about, students are negligent, and because these rules stand under different heads."

And again: दृश्यते ह्यद्यत्वे ऽप्यर्थ(वि)स्मरणं यंयनाशश्च॥

"As if we did not see in our own time that subjects are forgotten and works lost."

न च प्रलयो न संभाव्यते। दृश्यते हि प्रमादादस्त्रादिभिः
पुरुषचयाच्च।

"And it must not be said that their destruction is impossible, for we see it take place every day, whether by negligence, idleness, or by the death of men."

the simple fact, that these rules are still followed by men; the only exception being where customs can be proved to depend on selfish motives. In this case, a man who follows such unauthorised customs, shall go to hell."

With regard to the hymns, it is in itself very unlikely that no more should have existed than those which happen to be collected in the Rig-veda; and even in the Rig-veda we see that the number of hymns varied in different communities. The ancient poetry of India, however, would hardly have furnished authoritative passages for legal and ceremonial questions; and there is no doubt that the lost tradition which is appealed to by later writers, refers only to Brāhmaṇas. A number of these dogmatic works are still in existence; but others, which are always quoted along with them, are now lost, or known by extracts only. There existed a considerable number of ancient sages who embodied their doctrines, whether on philosophical or ceremonial, on metrical or grammatical questions, in independent works, which were handed down by tradition among their descendants. But, as Kumārila observes, through the carelessness and forgetfulness of men, and also by the extinction of families, these works were necessarily lost; and it is, indeed, less surprising that many of these Brāhmaṇas should have been lost, than that so many should still have been saved, if we remember for how long a time oral tradition was in India the only means of preserving them. Kumārila, however, was too keen-sighted not to perceive the danger of admitting lost Śākhās of the Veda as authorities, and he makes several reservations in order to guard against a promiscuous use of this argument. The Buddhists also might appeal to a lost

Śākha, and thus upset all the arguments of the orthodox philosophers. But in spite of the bug-bear of the Buddhists, the general fact that some Śākhas had perished was admitted by Kumārila, as well as by Āpastamba, both endeavouring to prop up the authority of the Smṛiti by the broken pillars of the Śruti.¹

The evidence which has been brought together is sufficient to establish the fact, that the distinction between Śruti and Smṛiti, revelation and tradition, had been established by the Brahmans previous to the rise of Buddhism, or, at all events, previous to the time when the Sūtra style began to be adopted in Indian literature. There existed, previous to the Sūtra period, a body of literary works propagated by oral tradition, which formed the basis of all later writings on sacred subjects, and which by the Brahmans was believed to be of divine origin. The idea expressed by the verb *śru*, to hear, *i. e.* to receive by inspiration, is known in the Brâhmanas. The name of Smṛiti seems to occur for the first time in the Taittiriya-āranyaka², though it is said to be used there in the

¹ यैश्च मन्वादिस्मृतीनामप्युत्सन्नवेदशाखामूलमभ्युपगतं तान्मन्त्रप्रति सुतरां शाक्यादिभिरपि शक्यं तन्मूलत्वमेव वक्तुं। को हि शकुयादुत्सन्नानां वाक्यविषयेयत्तानियमं कर्तुं। ततश्च यावत्किञ्चित्कियंतमपि कालं कैश्चिदाद्रियमाणं प्रसिद्धिं गतं तत्प्रत्यक्षशाखाविसंवादे ऽप्युत्सन्नशाखामूलत्वावस्थामनुभवन्तु-
स्त्यक्ततया प्रतिभायात्। अत एव विरोधे त्वनपेक्ष्यं स्या-
दिति॥

² Taitt. Ār. i. 1, 2.: स्मृतिः प्रत्यक्षमैतिह्यमनुमानश्चतुष्टयं॥
The Commentator explains Smṛiti by अनुमेयश्रुतिमूलं मन्वा-

sense of Śruti. In the Sûtras, however, the distinction between Śruti and Smṛiti is distinctly stated. We find it in the Anupada-sûtras¹, which we have reason to reckon amongst the earliest specimens of this class of literature. In the Nidâna-sûtras also, ancient tradition is mentioned by the name of Smṛiti²; and although in Pāṇini the technical distinction between Śruti and Smṛiti is not mentioned, it would be wrong to draw any conclusions from this, as there can be little doubt that Pāṇini is later than the Anupada-sûtras.

The Six Vedāngas.

We shall now proceed to an examination of those works which belong to the Sûtra-literature of India, as far as they have reference to the Veda.

दिशाच्छं। "the laws of Manu and others whose source is a revelation the existence of which must be inferred." Pratyaksha (sensuous impression) is, according to Sâyaṇa, सर्वपुरुषाणां श्रोत्रिये याद्वं वेदवाक्यं, "the word of the Veda which all men can perceive in their teacher." Aitihya (tradition) is explained by इतिहासपुराणमहाभारतब्राह्मणादिकं, "legends, Purāṇas, the Mahābhārata, and the Brāhmaṇas." Lastly Anumāna, if we believe Sâyaṇa, does not here mean inference, but customs of good men, by which or from which the existence of an authority, that is, of Śruti and Smṛiti, as the source of these customs, is inferred. अनुमानः शिष्टाचारः।

तेन हि मूलभूतं अतिस्मृतिलक्षणं प्रमाणमनुमीयते।

¹ Anupada-sûtra, ii. 4. अतिस्मृतिदृष्टसंपन्नैः। Cf. Indische Studien, i. p. 44.

² Nidâna-sûtra, ii. 1. आचार्यस्मृतीनां। याज्ञिकाः स्मृताः। Cf. Indische Studien, i. p. 45.



The Brahmans say that there are six members of the Veda, the six Vedângas. This name does not imply the existence of six distinct books or treatises intimately connected with their sacred writings, but merely the admission of six subjects the study of which was necessary either for the reading, the understanding, or the proper sacrificial employment of the Veda. (Manu calls the Vedângas by the name of Pravachanas¹, which is a title not unusually applied to the Brâhmaṇas.² And indeed, instead of

¹ Manu, iii. 184.: अग्न्याः सर्वेषु वेदेषु सर्वप्रवचनेषु च।

"Those priests must be considered as the purifiers of a company who are most learned in all the Vedas and all their Angas."—Sir W. Jones.

Kullûka: प्रकर्षणैवोच्यते वेदार्थ एभिरिति प्रवचनान्यंगानि॥

"Because the meaning of the Veda is proclaimed by them, therefore are the Angas called Pravachanas."

² कालवविनामपि प्रवचनविहितः स्वरः स्वाध्याये। Com.

प्रवचनशब्देन ब्राह्मणमुच्यते। प्रोच्यत इति प्रवचनं।

"Among the Kâlabavins also the accent exists in the perusal of the Veda enjoined by the Pravachanas. Com. By the word pravachana is meant the Brâhmaṇa, and it is called so because it is proclaimed."

There is a passage in the Prasthânaabhedā,

एवं प्रवचनभेदात्प्रतिवेदं भिन्ना भूयस्यः शाखाः।

"For each Veda there are several Śâkhâs the difference of which arises from different Pravachanas."

Here pravachana means Brâhmaṇa, because the difference of the Brâhmaṇa-śâkhâs does arise from Brâhmaṇas peculiar to each. It is possible, however, that Madhusûdana used pravachana in the sense of pronunciation, the difference of pronunciation being the chief cause of the Sanhitâ-śâkhâs. Pravachana is used in the Kathopanishad, ii. 23., in the sense of "reading."

looking for the Vedângas to those small and barren tracts which are now known by this name, it is in the Brâhmanas and Sûtras that we have to look for the Vedânga-doctrines in their original and authentic form. / The short Vedângas which are generally added to the manuscripts of the Veda, and which by several scholars were mistaken for the real Vedângas, represent only the last unsuccessful attempts to bring the complicated and unintelligible doctrines of former sages into an easy and popular form, and to preserve at the same time the names which had been sanctioned by antiquity.

/ A very clear and rational statement as to the character of the Vedângas in early times, is given in the Brihadâranyaka and its commentary. According to them the different doctrines of the Vedângas are to be considered as integral parts of the Brâhmanas, in the same manner as the Purânas and Itihâsas. These, as we saw before, were to be taken in the sense of epic or paurânic stories, incorporated in the Brâhmanas, as illustrations of ceremonial questions. By Itihâsa, as the commentator says, (Brih. Ârany. ii. 4.) we have to understand stories like those of Urvaśî and Purûravas in the Śatapatha-brâhmaṇa; by *Purâna*, passages on creation and the like, for instance, "in the beginning there was nothing," &c. He then proceeds to quote passages from the Brâhmanas which he calls Upanishads (mysteries), Ślokas (verses), Sûtras (rules), Anuvyâkhyas (explanations), and Vyâkhyas (comments). It is under these heads that the Vedângas had their original place. /

/ It is more difficult to determine where and when



the Vedāngas were first mentioned as six. In the *Mundaka-upanishad* the number of the Vedāngas is given as six, but in a line which is not unlikely to have been interpolated. Yāska (*Nir.* i. 20.) quotes only the Vedāngas, but not the six Vedāngas. The number of six occurs in the *Charanavyūha*, where we meet with the well-known versus memorialis, containing the titles of the six Vedāngas.¹ The same number occurs in *Manu* (iii. 185). There is a passage in the *Chhândogya-Upani-*

¹ शिक्षा कल्पो व्याकरणं निरुक्तं ह्रंदो ज्योतिषं॥ Āpastamba, who occasionally quotes Ślokas in his Sūtras, does not seem to have known this verse. His words are (ii. 4. 8.), षडंगो वेदः

ह्रंदः कल्पो व्याकरणं ज्योतिषं निरुक्तं शिक्षा। What follows, in the only MS. I know, is eaten away by worms; but then comes the word ह्रंदोविचिति, which was the title of a metrical treatise, and is quoted as such before Pingala, in the *Śabda-Kalpa-druma*, s. v. तस्य ग्रंथाः ह्रंदोविचितिपिंगलह्रंदोमंजरीश्रुतबोधदयः संति॥ One of the *Parīśiṣṭas* of the *Sāmaveda* begins with the

words अथातश्च ह्रंदसां विचयं व्याख्यास्यामः। The *Parīśiṣṭas*, however, are later than Āpastamba and Pingala; for the author of the *Parīśiṣṭa* declares that he made use of Pingala's work :

ब्राह्मणात्तंडिनश्चैव पिंगलाच्च महात्मनः। निदानादुक्त्यशाखाच्च ह्रंदसां ज्ञानमुद्धृतं॥ The title ह्रंदोविचिति refers, therefore, most likely to the *Nidāna-sūtra*, which also begins with अथातश्च ह्रंदसां विचयं व्याख्यास्यामः। Cf. MS. Berol.

95. In the *Commentary* on the *Śākala-prātiśākhya*, at the end of the 14th Book, the Vedāngas are enumerated as follows :

कल्पो व्याकरणं निरुक्तं शिक्षा ह्रंदोविचितिर्योतिषामयनं॥



should where a mention of the six Vedâṅgas might be expected, at the beginning of the ninth Prapâṭhaka. The number six, however, does not occur there, although Vedâṅga doctrines are clearly implied under somewhat unusual names.¹ The earliest mention of the number six in reference to the Vedâṅgas seems to be contained in one of the Brâhmaṇas of the Sâma-veda. But there again, though the number six is given, the titles of the several Vedâṅgas are not mentioned. / It is said there (Shadvîṁśa-Br. iv. 7.) of

¹ This passage has been pointed out and translated by Colebrooke (Miscellaneous Essays, i. 12.). "Nârada, having solicited instruction from Sanatkumâra, and being interrogated by him as to the extent of his previous knowledge, says, 'I have learnt the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sâma-veda, the Âtharvâṇa (which is) the fourth, the Itihâsa and Purâṇa (which are) a fifth, and (grammar, or) the Veda of Vedas, the obsequies of the manes (पितॄन्), the art of computation (राशिं), the knowledge of omens (दैवं), the revolution of periods (निधिं, com. महाकालादिनिधिशास्त्रं), the intention of speech (or art of reasoning) (वाकोवाक्यं), the maxims of ethics (एकाग्र्यं), the divine science (or construction of scriptures) (देवविद्यां, com. निरुक्तं), the sciences appendant on holy writ (or accentuation, prosody, and religious rites) (ब्रह्मविद्यां), the adjuration of spirits (भूतविद्यां, com. भूततन्त्रं), the art of the soldier (चक्रविद्यां, com. धनुर्वेदं), the science of astronomy (नक्षत्रविद्यां), the charming of serpents (सर्पविद्यां), the science of demigods (or music and mechanical arts, गारुडं see page 39.): all this I have studied; yet do I only know the text, and have no knowledge of the soul."



Svabhā, that her body consists of the four Vedas, and that her limbs are the six Āngas, or members of the Veda.¹ It is possible, however, that more ancient Brāhmanas allude to the number of six; at all events we see that it was sanctioned for the Vedāngas before the end of the Brāhmaṇa period.

The six doctrines commonly comprehended under the title of Vedāngas, are Śikshā (pronunciation), Chhandas (metre), Vyākaraṇa (grammar), Nirukta (explanation of words), Jyotiṣa (astronomy), and Kalpa (ceremonial). The first two are considered necessary for reading the Veda, the two next for understanding it, and the last two for employing it at sacrifices.

ŚIKSHĀ, OR PHONETICS.

/ Sāyana, in his Commentary on the Rīg-veda, defines Śikshā as the science of the pronunciation of letters, accents, &c.; and he quotes from a work of the Taittirīyas, who have devoted a chapter of their Āranyaka to this subject. Now in the seventh book of the Taittirīya-Āranyaka we still find the following headings: "Let us explain the Śikshā,"² "On Letters,"

१ चत्वारो ऽस्य वेदाः शरीरं षडंगान्यंगानि। श्रोतृधिवनस्य-
तयो लोमानि॥ "The four Vedas are her body; the six Āngas her limbs; herbs and trees her hair." See also the text frequently quoted from the Veda, ब्राह्मणेन षडंगो वेदो निष्कारणो ऽध्येयो ज्ञेयश्च॥ "The Veda, with its six members, ought to be known and understood by a Brahman without any further inducement."

२ शीचां व्याख्यानः The i in Śikshā is short (hrasva), though it is strong (guru). It is only in the Āranyaka that Śikshā

"On Accents," "On Quantity," "On the Organs of Pronunciation," "On Delivery," "On Euphonic Laws."

Unless we admit that the rules on Śikshā had formerly their place in this chapter of the Taittiriya-Āraṇyaka, it would be difficult to explain why all the principal subjects of the Śikshā should be mentioned here, why the whole chapter should be called the Śikshā chapter (ityuktaḥ śikshādhyāyah), and why it should begin with the words "Let us now explain the Śikshā." Sāyaṇa, who was certainly acquainted with the Vedic tradition, takes the same view in his Commentary on the Sānhitī-upanishad.¹ He states that the Taittiriya-upanishad consists of three parts², of the Sānhitī, Yājñikī, and Vāruṇī-upanishad. Of

occurs instead of Śikshā. Śikshā is derived from *śak*, to be able, and means originally a desire to know. From the same root we have *śakta*, a teacher (Rv. vii. 103. 5.); *śikshamaṇa*, a pupil (Rv. vii. 103. 5.). *Śishya*, a pupil, comes from a different root. Sāyaṇa says, शिष्यंते वेदनायोपदिश्यंते स्वरवर्णादयो यत्रासौ

शिचा। सैव शीचा॥ The other headings are, वर्णः। स्वरः।

मात्रा। बलं। साम। संतानः।

¹ I owe a copy of this Commentary of Sāyaṇa's to the kindness of Dr. Röer, at Calcutta. Seeing, in the catalogue of manuscripts published by the Asiatic Society of Calcutta, a work of Sāyaṇa's, called Śikshābhāṣya, and imagining this to be a commentary on the Śikshā-vedāṅga or one of the Prātisākhya's, I wrote to Dr. Röer for a copy of it. Though I was ultimately disappointed when I found that it had nothing to do with the Prātisākhya's, I still consider the Commentary of great interest, particularly Sāyaṇa's introduction to the Vedānta-system in it. Dr. Röer has since published the whole Taittiriya-upanishad, with the Commentaries of Śankara and Ānanda Giri, in No. 22. of the Bibliotheca Indica.

² मेवं तैत्तिरीयोपनिषत् त्रिविधा। संहिती चाज्ञिकी वारुणी चेति। तत्र प्रथमे प्रपाठके संहिताध्यानस्योक्तत्वात् जपोपनिषत्संहिती। द्वितीयतृतीययोः प्रपाठकयोर्या ब्रह्म-

these the last is the most important, because it teaches the knowledge of the Divine Self. The first serves as an introduction or preparation, in order to bring the mind of the pupil into a proper state for receiving the doctrines on the highest subjects. Now immediately after the first invocation, the Upanishad begins with the Śikshā chapter; and in order to explain this, Śāyana remarks that this doctrine is necessary here, in order to enable the pupil to read and pronounce the sacred texts correctly, and thus to understand their real meaning.¹ It might be objected, Śāyana remarks, that as a correct pronunciation is equally required for the earlier ceremonial portion of the Veda (Karma-kāṇḍa), the Śikshā ought to have been inserted there. But then, he says, this chapter in its present place stands between the ceremonial and the philosophical portion of the Veda, like a lamp on the threshold of a door giving light to both. He adds, that a right pronunciation and understanding is of greater importance for the philosophical part; because mistakes in the sacrifices and the ceremonial can be made good by penance, while there is no penance for a wrong understanding of philosophical principles.

If then there is reason to believe that the doctrine

विद्या विहिता तस्यां।&c. तासां तिसृणां मध्ये वारुणी मुख्या।

¹ तस्माद्विद्यायामवैकल्याय यथाशास्त्रं बोद्धुमुपनिषत्पाठे प्रयत्नातिशयं विधातुमत्रैव शिक्षाध्यायो ऽभिधीयते॥ तस्य च ग्रन्थस्यार्थज्ञानप्रधानत्वात्पाठे मा भूदौदासीन्यमित्येतदर्थे द्वितीयानुवाके शिक्षाध्यायो ऽभिधीयते।



of the Śikshâ was formerly embodied in the Âranyakas, perhaps even in the Brâhmaṇas¹, the question is, why it afterwards lost this place. This can only be accounted for by the appearance of more scientific treatises, which embraced the same subjects, but in a much more systematic style than anything which we could expect to meet with in the Brâhmaṇas and Âranyakas.

These were the Prâtisâkhyas, a branch of literature which will claim our particular attention for more than one reason. If we compare the Prâtisâkhyas with Brâhmaṇas and Âranyakas, they evidently indicate a considerable progress of the Indian mind. They were written for practical purposes; their style is free from cumbrous ornaments, and unnecessary subtleties. It is their object to teach and not to edify; to explain, not to discuss. Where the Brâhmaṇas or Âranyakas allude to grammatical, metrical, or etymological questions, they give nothing but theological and mystical dreams. So far from receiving elucidation, the points in question generally become involved in still greater darkness. It is not unlikely that teachers appealed to these passages of the Brâhmaṇas in order to derive from them the highest possible sanction for their doctrines. But these doctrines, if they were intended for use and instruction, must have been delivered in a more homely and more intelligible form. The origin of the Prâtisâkhyas may therefore be accounted for in the

¹ The passage from the Pushpa-sûtras (viii. 8.) which was quoted before, कालवविनामपि प्रवचनविहितः स्वरः स्वाध्याये, does not prove that the rules on the accent were laid down in the Brâhmaṇa of the Kâlāvavins, because it may also mean that the accented delivery of sacred texts was enjoined in the Brâhmaṇa.



following manner :—During the Brâhmana period the songs of the Veda were preserved by oral tradition only : and as the spoken language of India had advanced and left the idiom of the Veda behind as a kind of antique and sacred utterance, it was difficult to preserve the proper pronunciation of the sacred hymns without laying down a certain number of rules on metre, accent, and pronunciation in general. The necessity, however, of such a provision could hardly have been felt until certain differences had actually arisen in different seats of Brahmanic learning. Thus, when the attempt was made to prevent a further corruption, a certain number of local varieties in accent and pronunciation, and in the recital of the hymns, had actually crept in and become sanctioned by the tradition of different families or schools. These could not be given up, nor was there any means of determining which was the ancient and most correct way of reciting the sacred songs of the Veda. Discussions having arisen on this subject, we find in the Brâhmanas occasional mention of verses which, if improperly pronounced, become changed in their meaning. But even where the sense of the Veda was not affected, the respect paid by each teacher, by each family, and by each Brahmanic community to its own established oral tradition, was sufficient to give an imaginary value to the slightest peculiarities of pronunciation, accent, or metre.

A twofold advantage was gained when the rules and exceptions of the old sacred dialect were first reduced to a system. First, ancient dialectical differences, many of which are not so much attributable to corruptions as to the freedom of the old spoken language, were carefully preserved, and even apparent



irregularities and exceptions were handed down as such, instead of being eliminated and forgotten. Secondly, a start was made towards a scientific study of language; by the collection of a large number of similar passages, general laws were elicited which afterwards served as the phonetic basis of a grammar like that of Pāṇini;—a work which, although ascribed to one author, must have required ages of observation and collection before its plan could be conceived or carried out by one individual. Even the Prâtiśākhya, though they do not refer to grammar properly so called, but principally to the phonetic laws of language, presuppose a long-continued study of grammatical subjects previous to the time of their composition. The best proof of this lies in the great number of authors quoted in the Prâtiśākhya, whose opinions are frequently at variance with the precepts contained in the Prâtiśākhya themselves. Though we are not now in possession of the works of these earlier authors, yet we have a right to assume that their doctrines existed formerly in the shape of Prâtiśākhya. In the same way as one only of the different Śākhâs or recensions of the Rig-veda has been preserved to us in manuscript, the Śākala-śākhâ, which was followed by Śaunaka, we may understand how one only of the Prâtiśākhya of the Rig-veda has come down to us; particularly as its composition is ascribed to the same Śaunaka who is said to have united the Bāshkala and the Śākala-śākhâs, and who, as far as the Sanhitâ is concerned, was a follower of the Śaiśira-śākhâ. Śaunaka's Prâtiśākhya of the Śākalas, being one of the latest compositions of this kind, was probably also the most perfect and complete. As Śaunaka states the different opinions of Śākala grammarians on im-



portant points, where he himself differs from them, his work was the more likely to supersede previous Prâtisâkhyas, particularly at the time when the Vedic religion was on its decline, and Brâhmanic doctrines daily losing in influence. Though it is true that as yet only one Prâtisâkhya belonging to each Veda has been found in manuscript, yet they all belong not to one of the four Vedas in general, but to one Śâkhâ of each of them. Prâtisâkhya, therefore, does not mean, as has been supposed, a treatise on the phonetic peculiarities of each Veda, but a collection of phonetic rules peculiar to one of the different branches of the four Vedas, *i. e.* to one of those different texts in which each of the Vedas had been handed down for ages in different families and different parts of India. The differences between the Śâkhâs of the same Veda, as far as the words of the hymns are concerned, seem certainly not to have been very great, if we may judge from the few instances in which different Śâkhâs of the same Veda have been preserved in manuscripts. Most Śâkhâs do not differ in the general arrangement of the Sanhitâs, or collections of hymns, but merely in single words or verses. In a few cases only one Śâkhâ contains some hymns more than another. The Śâkhâs were not independent collections of the old hymns, but different editions of one and the same original collection, which in the course of a long continued oral tradition had become modified by slight degrees. The texts of the Veda as they existed and lived in the oral tradition of various sets of people became Śâkhâs differing from other Śâkhâs somewhat in the same way as the MSS. of the New Testament differ from each other. The Prâtisâkhyas, besides giving general



rules for the proper pronunciation of the Vedic language in general, were intended to record what was peculiar in the pronunciation of certain teachers and their schools. Even in cases where these schools had become extinct, we find the names of their founders, preserved as authorities on matters connected with the pronunciation of certain letters or words.

The real object of the Prâtiśākhya, as shown before, was not to teach the grammar of the old sacred language, to lay down the rules of declension and conjugation, or the principles of the formation of words. This is a doctrine which, though it could not have been unknown during the Vedic period, has not been embodied, as far as we know, in any ancient work. The Prâtiśākhya are never called Vyākaraṇas, grammars¹, and it is only incidentally that they allude to strictly grammatical questions. The perfect phonetic system on which Pāṇini's grammar is built, is no doubt taken from the Prâtiśākhya; but the sources of Pāṇini's strictly grammatical doctrines must be looked for elsewhere.

Although, then, there is no necessity to suppose that every one of the numerous Vedic Śākhās possessed full and complete Prâtiśākhya, like that belonging

¹ According to the first Prâtiśākhya, i. 58., पादवच्चैव प्रेषान् their rules would seem to affect passages of the Brāhmaṇas too, like होता यच्चत्, &c.: and the Commentator adds, च्चु यज्ञचणं तद्वेषेष्वपि। Most of these Praishas, however, are taken from the hymns; as, for instance, the words होता यच्चत्। Rv. i. 139. 10.

This is different for the Yajur-veda where the general rules of the Prâtiśākhya extend their influence to the sacrificial invocations.



to the Śākala-śākhā, which was finally collected by Saunaka, yet the great number of previous authorities quoted in our Prâtisâkhyas makes it likely that a large number of similar works did actually exist for the principal Śākhās that are mentioned in earlier writings. In the Pratiñāpariśiṣṭa¹ it is stated that there were fifteen codes of law for the fifteen Śākhās of the Vājasaneyins : and Kumārila says that the text of these Codes of law and of the Grihyas was peculiar in each Charaṇa, in the same manner as the formal rules of the Prâtisâkhyas.² Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's definition of Prâtisâkhyā is perfectly in accordance with this view of the subject. He says:—"The Veda³ consists of two parts: one teaching the sacrifice, the other teaching Brahman, or the Su-

¹ MS. Bodl. W. 510.:

तेषां पंचदश चयाखरं प्रतिष्ठाः प्रतिशाखं च कुलधर्माः।
The meaning of "Yathâsvaram pratishṭhâs" is doubtful. Should it mean "rules with reference to accents?" If so, they would be the rules of Prâtisâkhyas. That the Śākhās differed about the accents is seen in the case of the Māṇḍukeyas and Śākalas. Prâtisâkhyā I. 200. Kātyāyana, as the author of a Prâtisâkhyā, is called खरसंस्कारप्रतिष्ठापयिता॥

² Tantra V. I. 3. (MS. Bodl. W. 325. p. 15 b.)

धर्मशास्त्राणां गृह्ययन्त्राणां च प्रातिशाख्यलक्षणव्यतिचरणं
पाठव्यवस्थोपलभ्यते।

³ Veda is taken here in the general sense of sacred literature, as Uvāṭa says,

सर्वकालं सर्वदेशेषु प्रतिचरणमविभागेनैकैको मंत्रराशिर्वेद
इत्युच्यते।

"Every single collection of hymns which existed at any time, and in any place, without reference to the divisions in each Charaṇa (sect), is called Veda."

preme Being. As there are three different branches of the ceremonial, the Veda is, for the better performance of the sacrifices, divided into three: the Rig-Veda, Yajur-Veda, and Sâma-Veda. The ceremonial of the Hotri priests is performed with the Rig-Veda; that of the Adhvaryu priests with the Yajur-Veda; that of the Udgâtri priests with the Sâma-Veda. The duties of the Brahman priests, and of him for whom the sacrifice is offered, are also contained in these three Vedas. The Atharva-Veda is not used for solemn sacrifices, and is very different from the others, as it teaches only expiatory, preservative, or imprecatory rites. For each Veda there are several Śâkhâs, and their differences arise from various readings."¹ Afterwards he goes on to observe that "the rules of pronunciation (śikshâ), which apply to all the Vedas in general, have been explained by Pāṇini, but that the same rules, as they apply to the Śâkhâs of each Veda, have been taught by other sages under the title of Prâtiśâkhyas."² If

¹ According to Madhusûdana, the Brahman part of the Veda, by which he can only mean the Upanishads, is not affected by the peculiarities of the Śâkhâs. If this were true, it would only prove the late origin of the Upanishads. Some Upanishads, however, show traces of various readings, which must properly be attributed to various Śâkhâs. This is admitted, for instance, by Sâyana, in his Commentary on the Yâjniki or Narâyanaîyâ-upanishad. "Tadîyapâṭhasampradâyo deśaviśesheshu bahuvīdho dṛīṣyate; tatra yadyapi śâkhâbhedaḥ kâraṇam tathâpi Taittirîyâdhyâyakais tat-taddeśanivâsibhiḥ śiṣṭair âdṛitatvât, sarvo'pi pâṭha upâdeya eva." Ind. Stud. i. 76.

² See also Someśvara's Tantra-vârttikaṭīkā. (MS. E. I. H. 1030. p. 95.)

साधारणी विशेषविषया च द्विविधा शिक्षा। तत्र साधारण्या

We here take the word *śâkhâs* (branches) in the sense of different traditionary texts of the four Vedas, Madhusûdana's words do not require any alteration; they would become obscure if, as has been proposed, we took *śâkhâ* either in the sense of "a school" or of "a portion of the Veda."

The word *śâkhâ* is used, however, by some writers in so vague a manner that we need not wonder if its meaning has sometimes been misapprehended. "Traditional text (recension) of the Veda" is perhaps the nearest approach to its real meaning.

The word is sometimes applied to the three original Sanhitâs, the *Rig-veda-sanhitâ*, *Yajur-veda-sanhitâ*, and *Sâma-veda-sanhitâ*¹, in their relation to one another, and without any reference to subordinate *śâkhâs*

वेदांगत्वेन धर्मप्रामाण्ये ऽपि कात्यायनादिप्रणीताया विशेषवि-
षयायाः प्रतिवाक्यं प्रतिपदं चोच्चारणं नियच्छंत्या धर्मप्रमा-
णाभावाशंकानिराकरणार्थं पृथगुपादाने ऽपि शिक्षात्वेनैक्या-
न्नातिरेकापत्तिः।

"There are two kinds of *Śikshâ*, a general and one which has regard to particulars. It is true that the authority of the general *Śikshâ* is established, on account of its belonging to the *Vedângas*; but in order to remove all doubt as to the authority of the particular *Śikshâs*, published by *Kâtâyana* and others, which determine the pronunciation of each sentence and each word, it is clear that it is not different from the other, inasmuch as both are one by their common character of *Śikshâ*, although they are spoken of separately.

¹ It is said of *Sâyana* that he wrote commentaries on each of the *Śâkhâs* of the *Rîch*, *Yajush* and *Sâma*.

ऋग्यजुःसामशाखानामेकैका व्याहृता त्वया।

तावता तत्त्वमानार्था ज्ञातुं शक्यास्ततः पराः॥

Ekaika could hardly mean "one from among the *Śâkhâs* of each Veda."

belonging to each of them. They may be called the original branches or the three stems of the Veda-tree, each of them branching off again in a number of other śākhās. The "branches," as Kumārila says, have all the same root, revelation (śruti), and they bear all the same fruit, the sacrifice (karma). If otherwise, they would be different trees, not different branches.¹ In the same acceptation the word is used for instance by Āpastamba, where he is giving rules as to the time and place where the Veda ought not to be read. He says there (Sām. Sūtra, 3. 44, 45,) that it ought not to be rehearsed where music or Sāma-hymns are performed, and he adds, that Sāma-hymns ought not to be practised in the neighbourhood of another śākhā, that is, as the commentator observes, of another Veda.²

More frequently, however, śākhā is used to signify the various editions, or, more properly, the various traditions, that branched off from each of the three original branches of the Veda. In this latter sense śākhā seems sometimes synonymous with charaṇa. But there was originally an important difference in the meaning of these two terms.

¹ यदि प्रतिशाखं कर्मभेदः स्यात् तत एकमूलाभावादादित एवारभ्य भिद्यमानत्वात् समस्तकर्माख्यफलान्तरत्वात् वृत्तान्तरवेदेदान्तराण्येवोच्चेरन् न शाखांतराणि॥

² गीतिशब्दाश्च सामशब्दाश्च एते श्रूयमाणा अनध्याय-हेतवः॥ शाखांतरे च सामानमध्यायः॥ ४५॥ वेदान्तरस-काशे साम नाध्येयं॥ The first Sūtra is paraphrased by the Mānavas, iv. 123., सामध्वनावृष्यजुषी नाधीयीत कदाचन।



In order to appreciate the difference between śākhā and charaṇa, it need only be remembered that we find “śākhām adhīte,” “he reads a certain recension of the Veda,” but never “charaṇam adhīte,” still less “pa-riśhadam adhīte,” “he reads a Charaṇa or a Parishad.” Hence it is clear that śākhā means originally a literary work, and that Charaṇa does not. If śākhā is sometimes used in the sense of charaṇa or sect, this is because in India the śākhās existed in reality not as written books, but only in the tradition of the Charaṇas, each member of a Charaṇa representing what, in our modern times, we should call the copy of a book.

The Brahmans themselves were fully aware of this difference between śākhā and charaṇa. In a Vārttika to Pāṇini, iv. 1. 63., we find charaṇa explained by śākhādhyeṭri, &c., “the readers of a śākhā.” In a passage of Jagaddhara’s Commentary on Mālatīmādhava, Charaṇa is said to mean “a number of men who are pledged to the reading of a certain śākhā of the Veda, and who have in this manner become one body.”¹ Pāṇini² speaks of Charaṇas as constituting a multitude, that is to say, as comprising a number of followers. In Āpastamba’s Sāmayaçhârîka-sûtras, where rules are given as to the relative age of persons who ought to be saluted, the Châraṇas or members of the same Charaṇa are mentioned immediately after the Paurasâkhyam, or town acquaintances; and in

¹ चरणशब्दः शाखाविशेषाध्ययनपरैकतापन्नजनसंघवाची।

Cf. Zur Litteratur, p. 57

² Pân. iv. 2. 46. चरणेभ्यो धर्मवत् scil. समूहार्थे.

the third place stand the Śrottriya-Brahmans.¹ Pāṇini speaks of the Kāṭhaka and Kalāpaka as works belonging to the Charaṇas of the Kāṭhas and Kalāpas.² In a Vārttika to iv. 1. 63., women are mentioned as belonging to a Charaṇa; for Kāṭhî is the wife or daughter of a Brahman who belongs to the Charaṇa, or reads the Śākhâ, of the Kāṭhas. A śākhâ, which is always a portion of the Śruti, cannot properly include law books. But followers of certain Śākhâs might well, in the course of time, adopt a code of laws, which, as it was binding on their Charaṇa only, would naturally go by the name of their Charaṇa. That this actually took place may be seen from a Vārttika to Pāṇ. iv. 3. 120., where it is said that Kāṭhaka may be used not only for the sacred traditions, but also for the laws of the Kāṭhas. Thus the Prâtiśākhya also were called by the name of the Charaṇas, because they were the exclusive property of the readers of certain śākhâs, and even more so than the Kuladharmas or family-laws.

As a śākhâ consisted of a Sanhitâ as well as a Brâhmaṇa, at all events in later times, differences in the text of the hymns, as well as discrepancies in the Brâhmaṇas, might lead to the establishment of new Charaṇas, founded as they were on sacred texts peculiar to themselves.³ Śākhâs of this kind, which

¹ Āp. i. 4. 4. The Commentator says that चारणशब्दः शाखाध्यायिषु रूढः। Châraṇa, therefore, means a member of a Charaṇa. Lassen (Ind. Alterthumsk. i. 640.) takes Châraṇa in the sense of wandering poets, so named still in Western India.

² Pāṇ. iv. 3. 126. गोत्रचरणादुच्चार्यते इदमर्थे.

³ Mahâdeva's Hiranyakesibhâshya:

शाखायैकदेशो मन्त्रब्राह्मणात्मकः शाखेत्युच्यते। तयोर्मन्त्र-



differed through the various readings of the Śruti, were considered by the Brahmanas as eternal śâkhâs, and the Charaṇas, to which they belonged, were not supposed to have been founded by human authors.¹ It will be seen hereafter that the Brahmanas admitted another class of śâkhâs, which were founded on Sûtras² and derived their names from historical personages. They were confessedly of a later date.

But although, after a careful examination of these passages, we cannot doubt that there was an original difference between śâkhâ and charaṇa, it is not the less certain that these two words were frequently used synonymously³; in the same way as we may speak of the Jews when we mean the Old Testament, or of the Koran when we mean the Mohammedans.

ब्राह्मणधोरन्यतरभेदेन वेदे ऽवांतरशाखाभेदः स्यादिति चेत्
सत्यं॥

“Any portion of oral tradition consisting of Mantras and Brâhmaṇas is called a śâkhâ, and it is clear that differences of either the Mantras or Brâhmaṇas will necessarily lead, in the Veda, to a variety of subordinate śâkhâs.”

¹ अध्ययनभेदाच्चाखाभेदो ऽनादिः। “The various śâkhâs which arise from various readings are eternal.”

² शाखाभेदे ऽध्ययनभेदाद्वा सूत्रभेदाद्वा। आश्वला-
यनीयं कात्यायनीयं च सूत्रं हि भिन्नाध्ययनयोर्द्वयोः
शाखयोरेकैकमेव। तैत्तिरीयके समाज्ञाये समानाध्ययने
नाना सूत्राणि। Mahâdeva's Commentary on the Hiranyakeśi-
sûtra.

³ Cf. Nirukta, i. 17., where सर्वचरणानां is explained by
सर्वशाखांतराणां। and Pân. ii. 4. 3. चरणः शाखा। Pân. vi.
3. 86.

After having established the difference between śâkhâ and charaṇa, we have still to inquire how both differ from parishad, in order to determine the meaning of Pârshada, another title which is frequently applied to the Prâtiśâkhyas. Here it is important to observe that although every Prâtiśâkhyâ may be called a Pârshada¹, *i. e.* a work belonging to a Parishad, not every Pârshada can be called a Prâtiśâkhyâ, but those only which contain the rules of pronunciation for a particular śâkhâ or text of the Vedic hymns, studied and taught in certain Parishads.² Amara explains parishad by sabhâ or goshtî, an assembly; but the codes of law lay down more accurately the number, age, and qualifications of the Brahmans, necessary to form such an assembly as should be competent to give decisions on all points on which the people, or, if we may say so, the parishioners, might demand advice. That such Parishads or Brahmanic settlements existed in old times, we see in the Bṛihadâraṇyaka³, where it is said that Śvetaketu

¹ Pârshada, instead of Pârishada. Cf. Pân. iv. 3. 123.

² I doubt the existence of a word like माध्यंदिनपार्षदं, which Dr. Roth mentions (Zur Litteratur, p. 16.). One may speak of पंचालानां परिषद् or वत्सानां परिषद् &c., and a Prâtiśâkhyâ current in one of these Parishads may, perhaps, be called वत्सपार्षदं. But माध्यंदिन is not the name of a Parishad, but of a Śâkhâ; and therefore the Commentary on Gobhila speaks of a माध्यंदिनशाखीयप्रातिशाख्यं, but could not well have spoken of a वत्सशाखीयप्रातिशाख्यं॥

³ Bṛih. Âr. vi. 2. श्वेतकेतुर्ह वा आरुणेयः पंचालानां परिषदमाजगाम॥

went to the Parishad of the Panchālas, and many similar passages. The character of a Parishad is described in Manu's Code of Laws, xii. 110—113., and by Yājñavalkya, i. 9., where we have the contracted form Parshad instead of Parishad. According to the ideas of these modern writers a Parishad ought to consist of twenty-one Brāhmins well versed in philosophy, theology, and law.¹ This number, however, can be reduced according to circumstances, as will be seen from passages of Parāśara's Dharmasāstra. It must not be supposed that the rules laid down in these law-books have always been observed in the formation of a Parishad, particularly as regards the early times of India; yet we may be able to form some conception of their original character, by seeing what has become of them in later times. Parāśara says²: "Four, or even three able men from amongst the Brāhmins in a village, (grāmamadhye) who know the Veda, and keep the sacrificial fire, form a Parishad.

¹ एकविंशतिमंख्यैर्मीमांसान्यायपारगैः। वेदांगकुशलेष्वैव परिषत्त्वं प्रकल्पयेत् ॥

² चत्वारो वा त्रयो वापि वेदवंतो ऽग्निहोत्रिणः।
ब्रह्मणानां समर्था ये परिषत्त्वा विधीयते॥
अनाहिताग्नयो ये ऽन्ये वेदवेदांगपारगाः।
पंच त्रयो वा धर्मज्ञाः परिषत्त्वा प्रकीर्तिता॥
मुनीनामात्मविद्यानां द्विजानां यज्ञयाजिनां।
वेदव्रतेषु स्नातानामेको ऽपि परिषद्भवेत् ॥
पंच पूर्वे मया प्रोक्तास्तेषां वासंभवे त्रयः।
खट्वत्तिपरिपुष्टा ये परिषत्त्वा प्रकीर्तिता॥

“ Or, if they do not keep the sacrificial fire, five or three who have studied the Vedas and Vedāngas, and know the law, may well form a Parishad.

“ Of old sages who possess the highest knowledge of the Divine Self, who are twice-born, perform sacrifices, and have purified themselves in the duties of the Veda, one, also, may be considered as a Parishad.

“ Thus, five kinds of Parishads have been described by me; but if they all fail, three independent men may form a Parishad.”

Mādhava, in his Commentary on Parāśara, quotes a similar passage¹ from Bṛihaspati's Code:—“ Where seven, five, or three Brahmans, who know the customs of the world, the Vedāngas (or the Vedas and the Angas), and the law, have settled, that assembly is like a sacrifice.” The real difference, therefore, between a Charaṇa and a Parishad, seems to be that the former signifies an ideal succession of teachers and pupils who learn and teach a certain branch of the Veda; while the latter means a settlement of Brahmans, a community or college to which members of any Charaṇa might belong. Thus members of the same Charaṇa might be fellows of different Parishads, and fellows of the same Parishad might be members of different Charaṇas.²

¹ लोकोवेदांगधर्मज्ञाः सप्त पंच त्रयो वापि।

यत्रोपविष्टा विप्राः स्युः सा यज्ञसादृशी सभा॥

² See Gobhilabhāṣya, MS. W. 72. p. 71. a. आचार्यं सपरिषत्कं भोजयेत्सब्रह्मचारिणश्च॥ Com. सह परिषदा शिष्यगणेन वर्तत इति सपरिषत्कः तं। समानं तुल्यकालं ब्रह्मचारित्वं येषां त इमेऽन्यशाखिनोऽपि सब्रह्मचारिणः स्वयसो

Now as Pârshada may be used as the title of any work that belonged to a Parishad, or formed, so to say, the traditional library of the Pârishadyas, it is clear that this title could not be confined to the Prâ-tisâkhyas, though it would necessarily include them. If a follower of the Śâkala-charaṇa was a fellow of the Vatsa-parishad, the Śâkala-prâtiśâkhyas would necessarily be one of the Pârshada works of the Vatsas, and the Parishad of the Vatsas would through this fellow be connected with the Śâkala-charaṇa. This is what Durga means when in the Commentary on the Nirukta¹ he says "that those Pârshadas only are called Prâtiśâkhyas which are adopted in a Parishad of one's own Charaṇa for teaching certain grammatical doctrines connected with the reading of the Veda according to one or the other Śâkhâ." The Prâtiśâkhyas are in fact a subdivision of the Pârshada books, and

अभिधीयन्ते॥ The expression इत्येके, "thus say some," which occurs frequently in the Sûtras, is stated to refer to different Śâkhâs, उत्तरामित्येके॥ Com. इत्येवमेके शास्त्रिन आहुः। एक इति स्वमतव्युदासार्थं परशाखाप्रदर्शनार्थं च। एवमेके मन्यन्ते न गोभिल इत्यर्थः। Nârâyana's Commentary on Gobhila, MS. W. 72. page 23. b.

¹ Nir. i. 17. किं पार्षदानि। स्वचरणपर्यवेव यैः प्रतिशास्त्रं नियतमेव पदावय्वहप्रगृह्यक्रमसंहितास्वरलक्षणमुच्यते तानि-मानि पार्षदानि प्रातिशास्त्रानीत्यर्थः॥

"Those Pârshada books by which in a Parishad (parish or college) of one's own Charaṇa (sect), the peculiarities of accent, Sanhitâ and Krama-reading, of Pragrihya-vowels and separation of words, are laid down as enjoined for and restricted to certain Śâkhâs (branches or recensions of the Veda), are called Prâ-tisâkhyas."

in this sense it might well be said that Prātisākhyā is an adjective to Pārshada.¹

After the true meaning of Śākhā, Charaṇa, and Parishad, of Prātisākhyā and Pārshada, has thus been determined, we have still to inquire about those other works, which together with the Prātisākhyas were mentioned as the peculiar property of the Charaṇas. I mean the Kula-dharmas, or law books. They of course could not be called Prātisākhyas, but they might claim the title of Chāraṇas, (a name which has not been met with,) or Pārshadas. Now we saw before that Āpastamba actually refers to the Parishads in his Sāmāyāchārikā-sūtras (1. 11.), where, after having pointed out the days on which the Veda ought not to be repeated, he remarks, that farther particulars on this point are to be found in the Parishads.² What does this mean? All that Haradatta has to say in the commentary on this very passage, is that by Parishads must here be understood the Mānava, Vāsishṭha, and other Dharmaśāstras.³ These Dharmaśāstras, however, as we now possess them, betray their comparatively modern origin by their form and metre, and occasionally by their matter also. As many of them have been printed at Calcutta, it may be seen that the majority of these small Śloka works are utterly worthless. They were probably made up only

¹ See Dr. Roth, Zur Litteratur, p. 58.

² अन्यदतः परिषत्सु॥

³ अत एतस्मादनध्यायप्रकरणादन्यदनध्यायनिमित्तं परिषत्सु मानवादिषु धर्मशास्त्रेषु यद्योक्तं तथा द्रष्टव्यं। तत्र वासिष्ठः। &c.



in order to fill the gap which had been occasioned by the loss of ancient legal works. This loss was felt the more severely because the names of the old authors retained their celebrity, and were still quoted in common practice and courts of law. I have succeeded, however, in recovering in manuscript large portions of the Kula-dharmas, which are written in Sûtras, as might be expected in works contemporaneous with the Prâtisâkhyas. It has been thought that the sources of Manu and other Dharmasâstras must be looked for in the Grihya-sûtras. This is not quite correct. The Grihya-sûtras are concerned chiefly with the Sanskâras, or domestic sacraments, extending from the birth to the marriage of a man, and in so far only as these sacraments form a portion of the subjects treated in the Dharmasâstras, the Grihya-sûtras might be considered as their original sources. But then the same might be said of the Śrauta-sûtras, because the solemn sacrifices prescribed by them are likewise alluded to in the Codes of Law. By far the greater portion, however, of these codes is taken up with Âchâra, *i. e.* laws, manners, and customs. The difference between these observances and the ceremonies laid down in the other two branches of Sûtras is this: the domestic sacraments (grihya), as well as the solemn sacrifices (śrauta), are administered by parents or priests for the good of their children and pupils, while the Âchâra comprises all the duties which are to be performed by an individual on his own behalf.¹ These duties refer to the different castes,

¹ The threefold division of Dharma is pointed out by the Prayogavaijayanti (MS. Bodl. W. 68, p. 16. a.) तैः प्रत्येकं मितो धर्मस्त्रिविधः परिकीर्तितः॥४३॥ अनेनैवाभिप्रायेणाह बौधा-

and to the respective occupations of each. The rules of discipline for the young student, the occupations of the married man, the law of inheritance, the duties of the king, the administration of the law, are accurately detailed in these Sûtras. They are of great importance for forming a correct view of the old state of society in India, and the loss of the larger number of them is greatly to be regretted. Their general title is Sâmayâchârîka-sûtras, or Dharmasûtras, and they form the third part to the Śrauta and Grihya-sûtras. Thus we have, besides the Śrauta and Grihya-sûtras of Âpastamba, a collection of Sâmayâchârîka-sûtras belonging to the same Charaṇa of the Âpastambas, the members of which, as Kumârila tells us, followed one of the Śâkhâs of the Taittirîya-veda. Another collection of Dharmasûtras, which, however, is liable to critical doubts, belongs to the Gautamas, a Charaṇa of the Sâma-veda. It has been printed at Calcutta. A third one bears the name of Vishnu, and has been printed at Calcutta, enlarged by modern additions written in Ślokas. The Vâsishṭha-dharma-śâstra, printed at Calcutta, belongs likewise, at least in part, to this class of Dharmasûtras. Whether we shall succeed in finding still more of these Sûtra works is questionable, though prose quotations from other Dharmasâstras would justify this expectation. There can be no doubt, however, that all the genuine metrical Dharmasâstras

यनः। उपरिष्ठो धर्मः प्रतिवेदं तस्मान् व्याख्यास्यामः (sic)।
स्मार्तो द्वितीयः। शिष्टाचारस्तृतीय इति॥

“Baudhâyana says, the highest law is that contained in each Veda, which we shall follow in our explanation ; the second is the traditional law ; the third, the customs of eminent sages.”

which we possess now, are, without any exception, nothing but more modern texts of earlier Sûtra-works or Kula-dharmas belonging originally to certain Vedic Charanas.¹

To return to those works of the Pârshada literature which are known by the name of Prâtisâkhyas, I may refer for further particulars to Dr. Roth's valuable observations on this branch of literature. To him belongs the merit of having first pointed out in manuscript four of these works. The first is ascribed to Śaunaka, and belongs to the Śākala-śākhā of the Rig-veda. I call it the Śākala-prâtisâkhyā, not the Śaiśira-prâtisâkhyā, though it pretends to follow, like Śaunaka's Anukramaṇī, the Sanhitā of the Śaiśirīya-śākhā, which is itself a subordinate branch of the Śākala-śākhā.² Śiśira, however, is never mentioned in this or any other Prâtisâkhyā, as an authority on grammatical questions.

It is doubtful how far the rules given by Śaunaka

¹ See Prof. Stenzler's Introduction to his edition of Yājñavalkya, and his remarks on Indian Law-books in Indische Studien, i. 232.

² इदं शास्त्रं पार्षदाख्यमखिलं संपूर्णमुत्तरत्र वक्ष्ये वक्ष्याम इत्यर्थः। शैशिरिषे पारायणपाठ इति वाक्यशेषः। शैशिरि-यायां संहितायामित्यर्थः। शैशिरि संहिता शिशिरदृष्टत्वात्। तथा पुराण उक्तं। मुद्गलो गोकुलो वाक्स्यः शैशिरः शिशिरस्तथा। पंचैते शाकलाः शिष्याः शाखाभेदप्रवर्तका इति। तथा च ऋग्वेदे शैशिरिषायां संहितायामिति। यथा ऋग्वेदे पारायणाम्नाये शाकल्ये शैशिरिषकमिति वा। The verses to which the commentary refers are not in the MS. See also Vishṇu Purāṇa. p. 277. n. ऋग्वेदे शैशिरिषायां संहितायां



in his Prâtisâkhyâ, can be considered as representing the general opinion of the Śâkalas. Śaunaka, no doubt, wrote for the Śâkalas, to whom he likewise addresses his Anukramaṇi. But the author of the Prâtisâkhyâ occasionally quotes the opinions of the Śâkalas, as different from his own, and speaks of them in the same manner as he alludes to the opinions of other grammarians. He mentions (i. 65.) the Śâkalas as observing a certain peculiar pronunciation out of respect for their master, who seems to have sanctioned it in his own rules. Who this master was is difficult to say. But it is most likely the same who (i. 52.) is called the Master, Vedamitra (friend of the Veda), and who (i. 223.) is called Śākalyapitā, the father of Śākalya. His opinions, if we may judge by i. 232., differed from those of the younger Śākalya. In i. 185. we meet with him again under the name of Śākalya Sthavira, Śākalya the elder, and he is there represented as advocating a pronunciation from which Śaunaka, the author of the Prâtisâkhyâ, dissents. In i. 199. Śaunaka adopts the opinion of Śākalya, and in i. 208. he likewise mentions him with approbation. But all this would only tend to show that Śaunaka does not consider himself bound to follow either Śākalya or the father of Śākalya, implicitly.¹

There is not a single MS. at present existing of the Rig-veda in which the rules of our Prâtisâkhyâ are uniformly observed, and the same applies to the MSS.

यथाक्रमं प्रमाणमनुवाकानां सूक्तैः शृणुत शाकलाः॥ Com.

शैशिरीयायां शिशिरनाममहर्षिप्रोक्तायां॥

¹ In xiii. 12. Śākalya is mentioned as one of three Āchāryas, Vyāli, Śākalya, Gārgya.



of the other Vedas. The rules of the Prâtisâkhyas were not intended for written literature, they were only to serve as a guide in the instruction of pupils who had to learn the text of the Veda by heart, and to repeat it, as part of their daily devotions. As Śaunaka was himself a member of the Śâkalas, we may quote his Prâtisâkhyas as the Śâkala-prâtisâkhyas. But strictly speaking it could only be called one of the Śâkala-prâtisâkhyas, preserved by the pupils of Śaunaka, who, soon after, formed themselves into a new Charaṇa, under the name of Śaunakîyas.¹

The second Prâtisâkhyas belongs to the ancient text of the Yajur-veda. There is only one MS. of it at the Bodleian Library, together with a considerable portion of the Commentary, the Tribhâshyaratna. Professor Wilson, in his catalogue of the Mackenzie Collection (i. 7, No. xxxiii.) mentions another MS., "The Prâtisâkhyas of the Yajur-veda, with a Bhâshya or comment, entitled Tribhâshyaratna, from its being said to be the substance of the works of three celebrated sages, Atreya, Mahisha, and Vararuchi." To what particular Śâkhâ of the Black Yajur-veda this Prâtisâkhyas belonged it is difficult to determine. It quotes several of the Charaṇas, belonging to the Black Yajur-veda, such as Taittirîyakas, Âhvarakas, Ukhyas, the founder of the Aukhîyas, and Bhâradvâjas, the founder of the Bhâradvâjins. It also alludes to Mîmâṃsakas, a school of philosophers, mentioned in none of the other Prâtisâkhyas. Until we receive some more complete MSS. of this work we can only say that it belongs to some Śâkhâ of the Taittirîya or Black Yajur-veda. Its grammatical termi-

¹ This Prâtisâkhyas has lately been edited by M. A. Regnier, in the "Journal Asiatique."

nology, as might be expected, is less advanced and less artificial than that of the Prâtisâkhyas of the modern or White Yajur-veda.

The third Prâtisâkhyas is ascribed to the Śâkhâ of the Mâdhyandinas, one of the subdivisions of the Vâjasaneyins¹; though, perhaps, on the same grounds as those stated above with regard to the Śâkala-prâtisâkhyas, it might seem more correct to call it the Prâtisâkhyas of the Kâtyâyaniyas, a subdivision of the Mâdhyandinas. It was composed by Kâtyâyana, and shows a considerable advance in grammatical technicalities. There is nothing in its style that could be used as a tenable argument why Kâtyâyana, the author of the Prâtisâkhyas should not be the same as Kâtyâyana, the contemporary and critic of Pânini. It is true that Pânini's rules are intended for a language which was no longer the pure Sanskrit of the Vedas. The Vedic idiom is treated by him as an exception, whereas Kâtyâyana's Prâtisâkhyas seems to belong to a period when there existed but one recognised literature, that of the Rishis. This, however, is not quite the case. Kâtyâyana himself alludes to the fact that there were at least two languages. "There are two words," he says (i. 17.)², "*om* and *atha*, both used in the beginning of a chapter; but *om* is used in the Vedas, *atha* in the Bhâshyas." As Kâtyâyana himself writes in the Bhâshya or the common language, there is no reason why he should not have composed rules on the grammar of the profane Sanskrit, as well as on the pronunciation of the Vedic idiom.

Some of Kâtyâyana's Sûtras are now found re-

¹ It has been edited by Prof. Weber, Indische Studien, vol. iv.

² Indische Studien, iv. p. 103.

peated *ipsissimis verbis* in Pāṇini's grammar. This might seem strange; but we know that not all the Sūtras now incorporated in his grammar came from Pāṇini himself, and it is most likely that Kātyāyana, in writing his supplementary notes to Pāṇini, simply repeated some of his Prātiśākhya-sūtras, and that, at a later time, some of these so-called Vārttikas became part of the text of Pāṇini.

The fourth Prātiśākhya belongs to the Atharva-veda. It is called Śaunakīyā Chāturādhyāyikā, and was, therefore, no doubt the property of the Śaunakīyas, a Charaṇa of the Atharva-veda. The name of the author is unknown, and we possess as yet but one MS., and that a very imperfect one, in the Royal Library at Berlin. That it belongs to a Śākhā of the Ātharvaṇa, is indicated by its very beginning¹, and one of its first rules is quoted by the commentator on the Śākala-prātiśākhya as belonging to an Ātharvaṇa-prātiśākhya.² Besides, in the fourth chapter of the fourth and last book special reference is made to Ātharvaṇa sacrifices.³ We can hardly suppose that Śaunaka, the author of the Prātiśākhya of the Rīg-veda, was at the same time the author of this Śaunakīyā Chāturādhyāyikā. Śaunaka, whose name never occurs in the Śākala-prātiśākhya⁴, is quoted in

¹ नमो ब्रह्मवेदाय। अथांगिरसः॥

² तथा चाथर्वणप्रातिशाख्य इदमेव प्रयोजनमुक्तं। एवमिहेति च विभाषाप्राप्तं सामान्येन॥

³ आथर्वणेषु च कर्मसु यागवर्जितेषु मणिवंधनादिषु॥

⁴ I still doubt the genuineness of the first verse of the Śākala-prātiśākhya where Śaunaka's name has been foisted in at the end. The emendation which I proposed in my edition of the Śākala-prātiśākhya, requires the admission of a so-called iyāḍipūraṇa in tvādi.

the Châturâdhyâyikâ, i. 1. 8.¹ The grammatical terminology of this little tract is far in advance of the technical terms used by Śaunaka. Yet there is a certain connection between the two books, and it is most likely that the author of the Châturâdhyâyikâ was a member of the Śaunakiya-charaṇa, founded by the author of the Śākala-prâtisākhya. Nay it seems as if its author had retained something of the allegiance which Śaunaka owed to Śākalya and the Śākalas. In one instance, where Pāṇini quotes the opinions of Śākalya, the original is found in the Châturâdhyâyikâ, and not in the Śākala-prâtisākhya. We are told by Pāṇini, that Śākalya pronounced the *o* of the vocative to be unchangeable (pragrihya), if followed by the particle *iti*.² Exactly the same rule, and in the very same words, is given in the Âtharvaṇa-prâtisākhya³, whereas the Śākala-prâtisākhya teaches first, that the *o* of the vocative is pragrihya (i. 69)⁴; secondly, that it is liable to certain changes (i. 132, 135); and lastly, that all pragrihya vowels are unchangeable, if followed by *iti* (i. 155). In none of these Sūtras do we find the exact words which Pāṇini quotes, and which are found in the Âtharvaṇa-prâtisākhya. Again, Pāṇini (viii. 3, 19.) ascribes the dropping of *y* and *v* in *vishṇa iha* instead of *vishṇav iha*, in *hara ehi* instead of *haray ehi*, to Śākalya. Now it is true that this process is not unknown in the Śākala-prâtisākhya, but it there assumes quite a dif-

¹ The quotation refers to Śākala-pr. i. 114.

² 1. 1. 16. संवुद्धौ शक्यस्येतावनार्थे॥

³ 1. 3. 19. आमन्त्रितमितावनार्थे॥

⁴ 1. 69. ओकार आमन्त्रितजः प्रयुज्यः।



ferent aspect (i. 129. 132. 135); whereas, in the Châturâdhyâyikâ the explanation is very much the same as in Pāṇini.¹ Pāṇini quotes in the same place (viii. 3. 18.) the spelling adopted in these cases by Śākāṭyana.² This is mentioned likewise in immediate connection with the rules which precede it in the Âtharvāna-prâtisâkhyā; it is not mentioned at all in the Śākala-prâtisâkhyā. It has been supposed³ that a rule, which in Kātyāyana's Prâtisâkhyā is ascribed to Śaunaka, was taken from the Châturâdhyâyikâ, and that therefore Kātyāyana's Prâtisâkhyā was later than that of the Atharva-veda. But the rule ascribed to Śaunaka by Kātyāyana is, that a final tenuis, if followed by a sibilant of a different class, is changed into the aspirate, whereas according to the Châturâdhyâyikâ (II. 1. 6.) a tenuis, followed by a sibilant of its own class, would have to be aspirated.⁴ It must be admitted, however, that no such rule as that ascribed by Kātyāyana to Śaunaka is found in the Śākala-prâtisâkhyā, and, in other respects, the Prâtisâkhyā of Kātyāyana shows traces of more modern origin than the Châturâdhyâyikâ.

¹ ii. 1. 21. स्वरान्वयोः पदान्तयोः॥ ता इमा आपः॥

ii. 1. 22. नाकाराद्वकारस्य॥ उभाविदं॥ ii. 1. 23. गविष्टौ

गवेषण इति च॥ Forms like ubhâ u, instead of ubhâv u, sanctioned by the Śākala-pr. i. 129, would offend against the rule of the Âtharvāna-prâtisâkhyā.

² लेशवृत्तिरधिसर्गं शाकटायनस्य॥

³ Indische Studien, iv. 249.

⁴ Kātyāyana would write दृषत् साये, विराट् षंडे। the Châturâdhyâyikâ, दृषत् साये, विराट् षंडे॥

The following list gives the names of the principal authorities quoted in the Śākala-prātiśākhya, the Taittirīya-prātiśākhya, the Kātyāyanīya-prātiśākhya, the Chāturādhyāyikā, the Nirukta, and Pāṇini. I have availed myself of the lists given by Roth, Weber, and Böhrtlingk; and though I do not pretend that my own list is complete, it will be sufficient to show the active interest which was taken in grammatical subjects at that early period:—

- | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Āgniveśya. T. | 25. Gautama. T. |
| 2. Āgniveśyāyana. T. | 26. Charmaśiras. N. |
| 3. Āgrāyana. N. | 27. Chākравarmaṇa. P. |
| 4. Ātreya. T. | 28. Jātukarṇya. K. |
| 5. Ānyatareya. Ś. Ch. | 29. Taitiki. N. |
| 6. Āpiśali. P. | 30. Taittirīyakas. T. |
| 7. Āhvarakas. T. | 31. Dalbhya. K. |
| 8. Ukhya. T. | 32. Panchālas. Ś. |
| 9. Uttamottariyas.(?)T. | 33. Paushkarasādi. T. P. |
| 10. Udichyas. P. | (vārt.) |
| 11. Audumbarāyana. N. | 34. Prāchyas. Ś. P. |
| 12. Aupamanyava. N. | 35. Plākshi. T. |
| 13. Aupaśivi. K. | 36. Plākshāyana. T. |
| 14. Aurnavābha. N. | 37. Bābhṛavya (Krama- |
| 15. Kāṇḍamāyana. T. | kṛit). Ś. |
| 16. Kāṇva. K. | 38. Bhāradvāja. T. P. |
| 17. Kātthakya. N. | 39. Māṇḍūkeya. Ś. |
| 18. Kāśyapa. K. P. | 40. Māsakiyā. T. |
| 19. Kaundinya. T. | 41. Mimānsakas. T. |
| 20. Kautsa. N. | 42. Yāska. Ś. |
| 21. Kauhalīputra. T. | 43. Vāṭabhīkāra. T. |
| 22. Kraushtuki. N. | 44. Vātsapra. T. |
| 23. Gārgya. Ś. K. N. P. | 45. Vātsya. Ch. (?) |
| 24. Gālava. N. P. | 46. Vārshyāyani. N. |



- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| 47. Vâlmîki. T. | 56. Śākalya-pitṛi (stha- |
| 48. Vedamitra. Ś. | vira). Ś. |
| 49. Vyâli. Ś. | 57. Śāṅkhāyana. T. |
| 50. Śatabalāksha Maud- | 58. Śaityāyana. T. |
| galya. N. | 59. Śaunaka. Ś (?). K. |
| 51. Śākatāyana. Ś. K. Ch. | Ch. |
| N. P. | 60. Sāṅkrītya. T. |
| 52. Śākapūni. N. | 61. Senaka. P. |
| 53. Śākala (pāḍakṛit). Ś. | 62. Sthaulashṭhīvi. N. |
| 54. Śākalas. Ś. | 63. Sphoṭāyana. P. |
| 55. Śākalya. Ś. K. P. | 64. Hārīta. T. |

For the Sāma-veda no Prâtiśākhyā has as yet been discovered. There is a small treatise which I found in the same manuscript of the Bodleian Library which contains the Taittirīya-prâtiśākhyā, and which might be called a Prâtiśākhyā of the Sāma-veda. But it is so badly written, and so unintelligible without a commentary, that little use can be made of it at present. It is called Sāma-tantra¹, and evidently treats of the same subjects which usually occur in the Prâti-

¹ It begins (MS. Bodl. W. 505.) श्रीगणेशाय नमः॥ खरोऽनं-
त्यः। नीचानां। उपांत्यं। उपांत्ये। त्रिषु। आदिः। उपांत्यं च।
द्वितीयं। अंतस्य। उपांत्ये॥१॥ आद्ये। अंत्ये। मध्यं। विपरीत-
स्वराणां। जारा। माहङ्। शश्वु। जता। पारिव्वु। दि॥२॥
वि। पिबा। दधिविदपूर्वा। जरा परा च। सूखा। ईयाङ्।
अंत्ये। शता। तिपौगु॥ &c. From my notes taken in the Royal
Library of Berlin, I see that the same work exists there with a
commentary (?) in 13 Prapâṭhakas. समाप्तमिदं वृंदोगसंबधिकं
सामतंत्राभिधानं व्याकरणं। The same work I find mentioned



sâkhyas. Its authenticity is supported by the Charaṇa-vyūha, where a Sâma-tantra is mentioned, but without any further particulars.

If it be asked now why all these works, so different in appearance, are to be ascribed to one period of literature, the Sûtra-period, the reasons for it are as follows: first, that the style of the majority of these works is the old Sûtra style, for instance, in the Taittirîya-prâtisâkhyâ, the Kâtyâyanîya-prâtisâkhyâ, and the Châturâdhyâyikâ¹; secondly, that the manuscripts call these works Sûtras; thirdly, that even works, written in mixed Ślokas, like those of Śaunaka, are quoted as Sûtras², a title which would never be given to works like the Mânava-dharma-sâstra, &c.; and fourthly, that the same men to whom these works are ascribed are known to have composed other works, generally written in the style of

in Dr. Weber's interesting article on the Sâma-veda. (Indische Studien, i. 48.) It is curious that this Sâmatantra is called Vyākaraṇa, grammar. The same name is also given to the Rik-tantra, a small Śikshâ treatise, MS. Bodl. W. 375. This MS. contains several small treatises on Śikshâ matters connected with the Sâma-veda, but more in the form of Parîśiṣṭas: one on Avagraha, or division of words; another called Sâmasankhyâ; and a third called Stobhânusanhâra, beginning with the words

अथातो ह्रस्वदीर्घनुतमात्राण्यचराणि व्याख्यास्यामः।

¹ The title put at the end of the chapters of the Taittirîya-prâtisâkhyâ is "iti prâtisâkhyâ-sûtre prathamah praśnaḥ samâptah, &c."

² Shadguruśishya, in his Commentary on the Anukramanî, says that Śaunaka first composed a Kalpa-sûtra, consisting of 1000 parts and resembling a Brâhmaṇa. सहस्रखंडं स्वकृतं सूत्रं ब्राह्मणमनिभं. This was afterwards destroyed by himself; but his few remaining works, which are written in verse, are equally called Sûtras, सूत्रदशकं।



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Sûtras. That the Prâtisâkhyas of the Śâkalas should be written in Ślokas and yet be ascribed to Śaunaka, the teacher of Kâtyâyana, is no objection. It would have to be excluded from the Sûtra period, if written in regular Anushtubh-ślokas like those of Manu. But the mixture of the Śloka with other ancient metres indicates better than anything else the transition from one period to another, and is quite in accordance with that position which, as will be seen, Śaunaka occupies in the literary history of India.

By comparing Śaunaka's chapters on Śikshâ in his first Prâtisâkhyas with the small Śloka compilation which is generally quoted as *the* Vedânga, the difference of old and modern Ślokas will at once be perceived. This modern tract which has been printed in India, contains scarcely more than the matter of the Śiva or Śamkara-sûtras brought into Ślokas. It mentions the Prâkrit dialects, and represents itself as written after Pânini, but not, as Madhusûdana Sarasvati pretends, by Pânini.¹ Yet it is curious to see how great a reputation this small work must have gained, because Sâyaṇa, who knows the Prâtisâkhyas and quotes both from the Śâkala and Taittirîya-prâtisâkhyas, regards this small tract as the real Vedânga. In a Mimâṃsâ work, which has been mentioned before, Someśvara's Tantra-

१ अथ शिक्षां प्रवक्ष्यामि, पाणिनीयं मतं यथा।

and again :

शंकरः शंकरो प्रादाद्वाचीपुत्राय धीमते।

वाङ्मयेभ्यः समाहृत्य देवी वाचमिति स्थितिः॥

येनाक्षरसमाधायमधिगम्य महेश्वरात्।

वृत्तं व्याकरणं प्रोक्तं तस्मै पाणिनये नमः॥

parttika-tikâ, it seems even as if greater authority had been attributed to this short Śikshâ tract than to the more developed and evidently older works of Śaunaka, Kâtyâyana, and others.

Besides these works on Śikshâ which have been enumerated, from the Taittirîyâranyaka down to the so-called Vedânga, we possess another tract on Śikshâ, called the Māṇḍûki-śikshâ.¹ But this also is probably a production later than the Sûtra period, and it is important only in so far as it bears the name of another Charaṇa of the Rîg-veda, the Māṇḍûkâyanas², and thus confirms what was pointed out before, that each of the old Śâkhâs had originally its own Prâtisâkhyâ, although the greater number of them, as well as

¹ Another work on Śikshâ is mentioned by Raja Râdhakânta in the article which he has dedicated to the Vedângas in his Śabda-kalpa-druma, and for which Amara and Bharata are quoted as authorities. तत्र अकरादिवर्णानां स्थानकरणप्रथमबो-

धिका अ कु ए ह विसर्जनीयाः कथा इत्यादिका शिक्षा

The Commentary on the Śâkala-prâtisâkhyâ also seems to speak of two Śikshâs. यथा तावच्छिक्षायां सुमूर्द्धन्या चतुरषाः

सामान्येन सर्वशाखासु रेफो मूर्द्धन्य इत्युक्तः। तथान्यस्यां

शिक्षायां दंतमूलीय इति रेफो दंतमूलीय उक्तः। एवं सर्वा

शिक्षा वर्णेषु स्थानकरणानुप्रदानादि सर्वासु शाखासु विद-

धाति। न तु निश्चितः कस्यां शाखायां रेफो मूर्द्धन्यः कस्यां

दंतमूलीय इति। अत एव व्यवस्थापकमारभ्यते। दंतमूलीयसु

तकारवर्गः सकाररेफलकाराश्च रेफं वर्त्यमेके। शा० प्रा० १

४५। ४६। ४७। एवमस्यां शाखायां दंतमूलीयो वा वर्त्यो

वा रेफ इत्येतदवधारितं॥

² Māṇḍukeya is quoted in the Śâkala-prâtisâkhyâ, I. 200.



their Mantra texts, are now lost or preserved only under a more modern form, as may be seen in the case of this Mâṇḍūkî-śikshâ.

CHHANDAS, OR METRE.

The second Vedânga doctrine, *Chhandas* or *metre*, stands very much in the same position as the Śikshâ. Some names which have been afterwards adopted as the technical designations of metres, occur in some of the Mantras of the Rig-veda, and there are frequent allusions to metres in the Brâhmanas. What is said, however, in the Brâhmanas with reference to metres, is generally so full of dogmatic and mystical ingredients as to be of scarcely any practical use. In the Âranyakas and Upanishads whole chapters are devoted to this subject. Yet it is again in the Sûtras only that a real attempt has been made to arrange these archaic metres systematically. We have some chapters on metres at the end of the Śākala-prâtisākhya, written in Śaunaka's usual style of mixed Ślokas. This treatise is anterior to that of Kâtyâyana which we find in the introduction to his Sarvânuḥkrama, because Kâtyâyana is the pupil of Śaunaka, as we shall see hereafter. For the metres of the Sâma-veda we have the Ni-dâna-sûtra in ten prapâthakas, which, after explaining the nature and different names of all the Vedic metres, gives a kind of index (anukramanî) to the metres as they occur in the hymns employed at the Ekâha, Ahîna, and Sattrâ sacrifices. As to Pingalanâga's work on Chhandas, which is most frequently quoted under the title of Vedânga, it does not pretend to be of greater antiquity than

the Mahābhāshya, supposing it were admitted that Patanjali, the author of this famous commentary on Pāṇini, was the same as Pingala.¹ There would be nothing extraordinary in the fact that Pingala treats of Prākṛit as well as Sanskrit metres. For we have the instance of Kātyāyana-Vararuchi, who wrote the Vārttikas on Pāṇini and lived before Patanjali, and is said to be the same who wrote a grammar of the Prākṛit dialects. It must be admitted, however, that Pingalanāga's Metric is one of the last works that could possibly be included in the Sūtra period; though there is no sufficient ground for excluding it from this period altogether, merely because those rules which refer to metres not yet employed in the Veda are ascribed to the same Pingala. Besides, Pingala is quoted as an authority on metres in the Paṛiśiṣṭas², a class of literature which does not seem to be separated from the Sūtra period by a long interval.

To the same class of Chhandas works to which Pingala's treatise belongs, and which are not restricted to certain Śākhās, but are intended for the Veda in general, two other works are added by the commentator on the Śākala-prātiśākhya, the one ascribed to Yāska, the other to Saitava.³ Both these works, however, seem to be lost at present.

¹ Colebrooke, Miscellaneous Essays, ii. 63.

² MS. Bodl. W. 466. सामगानां कंदः। ब्राह्मणान्जिनश्चैव
पिंगलाच्च महात्मनः। निदानादुक्त्यशास्त्राच्च कंदसां ज्ञानमुद्धृतं॥

³ तथा सर्वैश्चंदसित्यादिभिः पिंगलयास्त्वसैतवप्रभृतिभिर्यत्सामान्येनोक्तं लक्षणं। See Dr. Roth's preface to the Nirukta,

The difference between a Chhandas work belonging to one of the Śākhās, and those treatises which are occupied with metre in general, may be seen from the following instance.

According to Pingala's Sūtras, a metre of seventy-six syllables is called Atidhṛiti, a metre of sixty-eight syllables Atyasṭi. Now Rv. i. 127, 6. a verse occurs of sixty-eight syllables which ought therefore to be called an Atyasṭi. According to Pingala himself, however, some syllables may be pronounced as two¹, and if we follow his rules on this point, the same verse consists of seventy-six instead of sixty-eight syllables. In order, therefore, to remove the uncertainty attached to the metre of this verse, the Chhandas chapter in the Śākala-prātiśākhya (towards the end of the 16th Paṭala) declares that according to the tradition of the Śākala or Śaiśira-śākhā, this verse is to be pronounced as an Atidhṛiti, i. e. with seventy-six syllables. The same direction is given in Kātyāyana's index to the Śākala-sanhitā.

p. 10.; and quære whether in the Śākala-prātiś. xvii. 25. one might read इति वै यास्कः instead of इति वैयास्कः as the commentator proposes. Saitava is the pupil of Pārāśarya and divided by thirteen teachers from Yāska. Cf. Bṛih. Āraṇy. Kāṇva. ii. 6. 2, 3.; Indische Studien, i. p. 156. n.

¹ Pingala, 3. 1. पाद इयादिपूरणः॥ इयादिः पूरणो यस्य (पादस्य) अमाविद्यादिपूरणः। आदिग्रहणे तु उवादयो गृह्यन्ते। तत्रायमर्थः। यत्र गायत्र्यादौ वृन्दसि पादस्याक्षरसंख्या न पूर्यते तत्रेयादिभिः पूरयितव्या। यथा तत्सवितुर्वरेण्यमिति दिव्यं गच्छ सुवः पत इत्येवमादयः॥

VYÂKARANA, OR GRAMMAR.

The third Vedânga is *Vyâkarana* or *Grammar*. According to the account which Indian authors give of their literature, this branch of Vedic learning would be represented by the Grammar of Pāṇini. Here the contradiction becomes even more glaring. In Pingala's Sûtras the Vedic metres were at least treated in the same way as the non-Vedic. But in Pāṇini, the rules which refer to Vedic grammar in particular, form only the exceptions to all the other rules which treat of the regular or classical language. Instead, therefore, of considering the third Vedânga doctrine as represented by the grammarians beginning with Pāṇini (Pāṇinyâdayah), as Indian authors do, it would be more correct to say that it is represented by the grammarians ending with Pāṇini (Pāṇinyantâh). It unfortunately happened that Pāṇini's work acquired by its great merits such a celebrity as to supersede almost all that had been written on grammar before him, so that, except the names and some particular rules of former grammarians, we have little left of this branch of literature, except what occurs occasionally in the Prâtiśâkhyas. That Pāṇini knew the Prâtiśâkhyas had been indicated long ago by Professor Bôhtlingk; and it can be proved now by a comparison of Pāṇini's Sûtras with those of the Prâtiśâkhyas, that Pāṇini largely availed himself of the works of his predecessors, frequently adopting their very expressions, though he quotes their names only in cases where they have to serve as authorities for certain rules.

There are two separate treatises on grammatical



subjects, which belong to a period anterior to Pāṇini : the Sūtras on the Unādi affixes, and the Sūtras of Śāntanâchârya on accents. The Unādi affixes are those by which nouns are formed from roots, the nouns being used in a conventional sense, and not in strict accordance with their radical meaning. They are called Unādi, because, in the Sūtras as we now possess them, *un* is the first-mentioned affix. That Pāṇini was acquainted with the same arrangement of these formative affixes cannot be doubted, because he uses the same technical name (unādi) for them. We do not know by whom these Unādi affixes were first collected, nor by whom the Unādi-sūtras, as we now possess them, were first composed. All we can say is, that, as Pāṇini mentions them, and gives several general rules with regard to them, they must have existed before his time. But how many of the Sūtras existed before the time of Pāṇini, and how many were added afterwards, is a question that can hardly be solved. In their present form the Sūtras seem to treat the Vedic words as exceptions, at least they give now and then a hint that a certain derivation applies to the Chhandas only. Nevertheless it is curious to observe that the greater number of words, explained by the genuine Unādi-sūtras, are Vedic, some of them exclusively so. If the author of the Sūtras had intended his rules for the Bhâshâ, there would have been no reason why he should have paid such prominent regard to words of a purely Vedic character. In fact, I believe, that originally the Unādi-sūtras were intended for the Veda only, and that they were afterwards enlarged by adding rules on the formation of non-Vedic words. At last the non-Vedic or *laukika* words assumed such a prepon-