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
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FOR CONSULTATION ONLY
A FOREIGNER LOOKS
AT INDIA

by

P. STAAL

*Consul-General for the Netherlands
at Sydney
Formerly Consul-General for the
Netherlands at Calcutta*



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PREFACE

I AM very grateful to Dr. T. G. B. Osborn, Professor of Botany at the University of Sydney, N.S.W., for reading through the manuscript and for advising me whenever I was conscious of the fact that English is not my mother-tongue.

P. S.

August, 1933



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In Memoriam

SIR ALEXANDER P. MUDDIMAN



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A FOREIGNER LOOKS AT INDIA

I

AREA—POPULATION— RELIGIONS

It has often been said, but it cannot too often be repeated: India is not a country, it is a continent. A glance at the map too readily conveys the wrong impression that India is formed by the triangle standing out from Asia into the Indian Ocean. This triangle, however, is only half of that part of the globe which is termed India. In reality India extends from 8° to 36° northern latitude and from 61° to 100° eastern longitude. Projecting this area on the map and taking London as a starting point, it would reach in easterly direction as far as Moscow and, in the south, nearly touch the tropic of Cancer.

Travelling by express train from Calcutta — and, by the way, Indian express trains are the most comfortable I struck during my travelling career on five continents — it takes twenty-eight hours to reach Delhi, forty hours to reach either Bombay on the west coast or Madras on the east coast, and fifty



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hours to reach Peshawar at the north-western extremity of the continent. The fast B.I. steamers require two and a half days to complete the sea journey from Calcutta to Rangoon. Again, leaving Rangoon by rail twenty-four hours are required to arrive at Katha, and from here another eighteen hours by river steamer to land at Bhamo, from where the caravans start for the interior of China.

This vast empire is inhabited by an agglomeration of various races, numbering 350 million souls, which are governed by 3500 British officials and protected and policed by 60,000 British and 150,000 Indian soldiers, the latter being trained and disciplined by British officers.

For the present, only these stand between order and chaos.

The apparent unity of the empire is due to the British and can be upheld by the British only. It may be too much to ask India, and more so the Indian politician, to realize this, but it is high time that Europe (and the whole of the white race) should no longer close their eyes against this fact. There may be other nations who have the faculties for governing a country of this size, one so full of complexities, and others, still, who have the power to do so, but one will search the world in vain to



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find another race possessing the happy blend of political genius and strength, which predestined the British to become the first colonial power in the world.

We only have to glance at the present situation in China to behold a picture of what India would be to-day without a British government to keep in check the ambitions that slumber in various parts and amongst the various races of India. The unbiased looker-on can have but admiration for the immense task the British completed, and will not be slow in recognizing that the outcome has proved a blessing not only to Europe, but primarily to India, and, above all, to the Indian himself. It is clear that Britain has two duties to fulfil — one towards the white race and one towards the Indian; both equally important.

Considering our side of the problem, Europe would do well to forget all national and political jealousies and remember that — at least during the last twenty centuries — he who mastered India, or the road to India, was master of the world, commercially or politically. We need not nourish any illusions about the possibility of Europe being able to maintain her present level in the world, her present standard of living, once the East were lost



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to her. Nor can the Dominions, nor even the United States, hope to continue the Western civilization once Europe falls back, for then the only true source of Western energy, Western ideals and Western conception of life would become obstructed and dried up. We should not forget that after the fall of Greece the Greek settlements around the Mediterranean were unable to carry on — let alone to conceive a new civilization. If Britain lost her hold on India the death-knell of the work of the white man out East would sound. It would mean disaster to Europe and to all those countries who sprang from her.

I have not at my disposal any figures that could illustrate the economic effect that the loss of India would have on Great Britain. But it was stated by the leader of the Dutch Socialist Party, who cannot be suspected of any imperialistic tendencies, that if Holland should loose her possessions in the East, the direct result would be that 150,000 workmen would be turned out into the street. Taking an average workman's family in Holland to consist of man, wife and three children, this would mean that 750,000, i.e. one-tenth of the population of the Netherlands would be destitute. It has not been calculated how this number being out of the buying-



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market would affect the home industry and trade. Nor can it be foreseen how further unemployment could be prevented, for the buying power of commercial circles in Holland would considerably drop, once the profits from plantations and trade in the East ceased to flow. Neither has it been pictured how the labour market in the East Indies would be affected and how starvation would stalk through the thickly populated island of Java, were Western capital and Western energy withdrawn from the East.

Turning our attention to the Indian side of the problem, we find a population of 350 millions, which, because of their numbers conveys an impression of power and danger. This impression is responsible for the feeling of fear which often takes possession of those in Europe, who never passed Suez and judge the situation in India by Western standards and occasional telegrams and leaders in their morning-paper. To these the danger seems imminent and a repetition of 1857 near. A handful of Britishers crushed by a mass of 350 million Indians, what awful picture to behold! But nothing is less to be feared, just because these millions are a mass and nothing but a mass, not an organized and well led unity, not a nation.



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This may seem inconceivable to the European mind, but we should not forget that the conception of the 'nation', the faculty of thinking 'nationally' is the outcome of a northern trait of character, probably bred into us by the demands of a harsh climate. To make life materially possible in more northern latitudes, man was forced to greater exertions in order to satisfy his daily wants of food, clothing, housing, heating and the like. In trying to lessen the strain of every day life he was soon led to form groups and clans, which eventually developed into nations.

In tropical countries, however, where life's demands for bare existence are more easily satisfied, it was only human that man should attach a lesser value to what was to be obtained with but little effort. Moreover living in a climate which does not incite to physical exertion, man became naturally inclined towards the spiritual side of life, towards meditation, philosophy and religion. Gradually, the importance he attached to the material satisfactions that life has to offer diminished. Finally, he arrived at a conclusion which denies to earthly life a value in itself and accepts it only as a preparation to something higher and more desirable in the life beyond. The latter conception

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crystallized and culminated in Hinduism, which can conceive life only as a link in a chain of lives, which in the end will lead to the most blessed state of Nirvana. It is evident that in a soil, nourished by this reasoning, the idea of the 'nation' could not take root. It is only in the wake of Western domination and as the outcome of modern Western education that in very recent days this idea was introduced into the tropical mind. Even to-day only the few who have been educated in the Western manner have a notion, and often but a vague one, of how deeply the 'nation-feeling' is rooted in the Western character.

Those who know the East from personal contact are, therefore, not surprised that — although India is inhabited by races of entirely different stock, scattered over the surface of this vast empire, separated by tradition and blocked from intellectual intercourse by a variety of more than two hundred languages — the division does not run along national lines, but that it is religion which is at the root of the ever recurring strife.

Leaving the smaller communities out of consideration we find in India some 230 millions of Hindus, 80 millions of Mohammedans and 11½ millions of Buddhists. Islam and Buddhism are



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easily comprehensible to the European, the latter bearing great resemblance to Christianity, the former, in many respects, leading our thoughts back to the old creed of Odin, which glorified battle and incited the warriors by picturing the Valkyries who would lead them straight to Paradise, should death be their part on the battlefield. Hinduism, on the contrary, created a philosophy which is entirely foreign to the Western mind.

Buddhism has practically disappeared from the Indian peninsula as 11 out of the 11½ millions of adherents are residing in Burma. Thus in India proper, two main religious powers remain, Hinduism and Islam, which are living in continuous discord. On one side is Hinduism, the ancient, instinctive religion of India, turned towards a life of self-denial and a Nirvana which seems to us, Europeans, self-annihilation. It is a religion complicating and regulating nearly every act of daily life, dividing the populations by their castes into numerous watertight compartments. It is a religion whose adherents consider the spiritual, the intellectual and the theoretical sides of life as the most important. On the other side is Islam, a creed which flowered amongst a race of warriors and which was carried throughout India in the trail of conquering hordes



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from the north-west. It is a creed of the conqueror, of the man of action who moves freely in the world and keeps in constant touch with the events of the outer-world on the yearly Haj to Mecca

Again, it is no surprise to the man who has lived in India, that a Hindu from Bengal feels more akin to a Hindu in Madras or in Gujerat than to his Mohammedan neighbour. Between the followers of the two religions there exists a feeling of bitterness and of mutual contempt which it seems impossible to relieve, caused as it is often by difference of race and difference of blood, by difference of religion and difference of law, as well as by an entirely different structure of social life, all accentuated by the memory of centuries of merciless strife, since Islam made its first appearance in India nearly a thousand years ago. Such is the foundation of Hindu-Moslem discord, which seems to form an insurmountable barrier against the realization of the ideal of a truly one and indivisible India, the only secure basis on which the structure of a free and independent country can be built.

The view is not infrequently put forward that the antagonism between the two communities has been and is encouraged and the hatred wilfully and systematically fanned by the British. Although it



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cannot be denied that the internal division of India rendered it a more easy task to establish and maintain British power, it is clear to those who know how deeply the hatred is rooted in the heart of both parties, that a policy of promoting religious strife in India would merely be 'carrying coals to Newcastle'. It is evident to those who read Indian history that it was not the British who inspired Taimur and Aurangzeb. It was not the British who sowed social intolerance in the heart of the Indian. It is not the fault of the British that the devout Hindu regards the cow as an object of great veneration, while the ceremonial sacrifice of cows and other animals is a feature of Moham-medan festivals. Nor did the British decree that Hindu music should be played through the streets on the occasion of the procession of an idol, whereas idols and music are taboo to Mohammedan religion.

These customs were in recent years almost always the immediate cause of violent outbreaks. If ever the British Government had tried to do more than prevent these outbreaks or limit them in their consequences and had interfered with the customs themselves it would have been accused, and justly accused, of hampering the freedom of religion.



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Such a policy immediately would have destroyed confidence in the Government's impartiality in religious affairs. It is only upon this rock of confidence that British authority could be built up and that internal peace maintained, which has contributed so largely towards the welfare of the peoples of India. It was only British authority, as a neutral, that could and did set up a canon of tolerance. The benevolent effect of this was clearly to be observed towards the end of the nineteenth and in the beginning of this century, when so much good feeling had gradually grown up between the two communities that violent outbreaks of religious feeling were at their lowest ebb and it could be hoped that Britain was well on the road towards establishing social and religious toleration in India.

Unfortunately one of the deplorable results of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms has been the perpetuation of the prevailing electoral system by which the Hindu and the Mohammedan voters are grouped in separate constituencies to elect their own representatives.

It should be remembered that this system is not the outcome of an entirely new principle, laid down in the Reforms of 1919. As early as 1892 regulations were made under the India Councils Act,

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providing for nomination to the councils of persons elected by important public bodies, such as municipalities, district boards, universities, associations of merchants and the like. The object was that each important class of the population should have the opportunity of making its views known in council by some member specially acquainted with them. Directions were given that representation should be provided for certain classes and interests, among which the Mohammedans were named.

In 1906, when the Morley-Minto Reforms were first discussed, a deputation of Mohammedans waited on the Viceroy and made a strong claim for communal representation, in the event of the principle of election being accepted. This claim was based on the numerical strength and the political importance of the Mohammedan population in India, but a point was also made of the fact, that with joint electoral bodies only Mohammedans sympathetic to Hindus would ever be elected. Lord Minto was favourably inclined towards the Mohammedan standpoint. The Committee of the Executive Council, when considering the question, decided that the Mohammedans hitherto had been insufficiently represented, both in quantity and quality, in the provincial councils, and proposed, in addition



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to seats which might be secured by Mohammedans in the course of competition with others as selected representatives of local bodies, the reservation of seats to be filled by representatives elected by separate Mohammedan electorates. In the Imperial Legislative Council, of forty-six seats the Committee proposed to allot four seats specially to Mohammedans, of which two were to be filled by nomination by the Viceroy and two by election from the provinces. The proposals were accepted by the Government of India, after the provincial governments had reported favourably on the general scheme, though some of them were doubtful as to the advisability of organizing separate Mohammedan electorates. Lord Morley, the Secretary of State, accepted the principle of Mohammedan representation, but expressed doubts as to the advisability of separate Mohammedan electorates, partly because of difficulties of organization in provinces where the community was thinly scattered and partly because the proposal would give Mohammedans a double vote, one in the selection of representatives from local bodies and another in a communal constituency.

He proposed, therefore, for the consideration of the Government of India, a system of reservation of



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seats to be operated as follows: In each electoral area an electoral college was to be established, the members of which were themselves to be elected in communal proportions (that is to say a fixed number of Hindus and Mohammedans corresponding to the numerical strength of these communities in the area concerned) by a joint electorate composed of substantial landowners, members of rural or sub-divisional boards, members of district boards and members of municipal corporations. These electoral colleges would, in their turn, elect their representatives of the provincial councils, the members being free to vote for any candidate, but the seats having been previously allotted on a communal basis.

Serious objection was raised against this proposal by the Mohammedan community and a deputation of the All India Moslem League interviewed the Secretary of State to protest against it. The members of the deputation insisted that joint electorates would not select Mohammedans who would satisfactorily represent their community, and also protested against Mohammedan representation being fixed on a population basis, urging that this did not give due weight to the political and military importance of their community.



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As a result of this opposition the proposal was dropped.

Accordingly the Act of 1909, and the regulations made thereunder, embodied in substance the Government of India's scheme — which was supported by Mr. Gokhale — of giving Mohammedans separate electorates, while retaining their right to vote also in the general electorates. This applied to all provinces possessing a legislative council, except the Punjab, where special protection was not considered necessary, and Burma, whose council at that time was almost entirely nominated. The non-communal general electorates were composed of certain big landholders, members of grouped municipalities and district boards, universities and chambers of commerce, so that election was almost entirely indirect. On the other hand, the separate Mohammedan electorates operated by way of direct election in territorial constituencies, with a franchise based in the main on certain property qualifications. This contrast — especially that of the double vote — aroused considerable resentment in India.

Thus the principle of separate communal representation became introduced into the political system of India. It should however be borne in mind that



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the reconstruction of the councils which took place in 1909, was not intended as a step towards parliamentary government in India.

Five years later the Great War broke out and, fed by the ideas which were then propagated by the Allies all over the world, the desire for political advance grew in India.

In October, 1916, nineteen members of the Imperial Legislative Council presented to the newly arrived Viceroy a memorandum on post-war reforms, in which an adjustment of representation between Hindus and Mohammedans was proposed. The nineteen members included representatives of both Hindu and Mohammedan opinion and their memorandum was accepted with some modifications alike by the Indian Congress and by the All India Moslem League, both of which held their annual conference at Lucknow in December of that year.

The scheme as a whole became known as the 'Congress League Scheme' and the agreement it embodied between the two communities as well as that part hereof which dealt with Mohammedan representation is usually referred to as the 'Lucknow Pact'. It provided for direct election to the provincial councils, as far as possible on a



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territorial basis, and for separate electorates for Mohammedans who would, however, cease to vote in general electorates as well. It laid down the proportion of Mohammedan seats in the provincial councils, including those of the Punjab and the Central Provinces, where separate representation had not previously existed.

These details of the proposals, which were agreed to by both Hindus and Mohammedans, formed the basis of the provisions for communal representation as they have been embodied in the Reforms Act of 1919.

From this short survey of the history of communal representation in India it clearly follows that there is no truth in the insinuation, not infrequently uttered nowadays, that the system of communal representation was in some diabolical way evolved by the British, whose object in so doing was the encouragement of Hindu-Moslem antagonism, with the ultimate aim of adding more weight to their arguments against the possibility of Indian independence.

In reality the system, as it is embodied in the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, was chosen because it was acceptable to both Hindus and Mohammedans, as is proved by the provisions of the



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Lucknow Pact and because it might be reasonably expected to reduce the actual chances of conflict between the two communities at the polling-box by preventing the two opposing groups from fighting each other for the same seats. It was the logical outcome of the principle that electors would choose exclusively between candidates of their own religion.

In practice the electoral system has led to the broadening of the existing gulf between the two communities and gives little hope to those who had expected that it would further the education of the Indian towards a wider sense of Indian citizenship.

The blame for this should not be laid on the system. It would be difficult, nay impossible, to evolve in India, as it is to-day, any other system which would not suffer from the deplorable effects of Hindu-Moslem discord. For the system is nothing but the outcome of a situation in which religious and social jealousies form the underlying basis. The immediate cause of the unfortunate results is the mentality which was created by the coming of the Reforms of 1919. Until then British authority had not been questioned in earnest and the idea of self-government had remained no more than a pleasant dream that did not enter into the sphere

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of practical politics. But the Government of India Act 1919, by professing in the preamble to aim at the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in British India, suddenly made both communities realize what the eventual withdrawal of British authority might mean to their respective interests.

So far Hindu-Moslem antagonism had been aroused by little more than local interests and had manifested itself in local outbreaks, which acted as a safety-valve to religious passion and could be easily kept under control by the authorities. When, however, with the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, there appeared within the range of possibilities the attaining of self-government in a not too far off future, it soon dawned upon both communities that it might depend upon their own power how the balance should be held in days to come. Neither was slow to realize the dangers that might threaten the members of one community from the political predominance of the other and it naturally followed that they should commence at once to consolidate their present positions and to manœuvre for the best strategical points with a view to the coming struggle for political power.

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In pleading his case the Hindu lays claim to the rights of a numerical majority and relies upon his qualifications of better education and greater wealth. The Mohammedan community naturally wants its members to be safeguarded against the effects of these initial advantages. No true follower of Mohammed forgets that his ancestors were the previous conquerors of the country. The Hindus maintain that justice must recognise the right of the majority, whereas the Mohammedans are as firmly convinced that no justice is possible without an adequate protection of minorities. According to the theories of the one there is no hope for democratic government if you start by making a distinction between one Indian and another. In the opinion of the other such a government cannot exist if you allow one important community to be crushed by the sheer weight of numerical superiority of the other.

Another grave danger which would be the outcome of communal rivalry, should the political power be placed into Indian hands, must be noted. Political responsibility does not stimulate the Indian, as it does the European in the east, to a higher sense of duty towards all classes of the community, but frequently it is in his eyes desirable



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in itself because of the opportunities that it offers for obtaining a full share, and often more than a full share, of the spoils of office.

It would be vain to hope that Hindu-Moslem antagonism can be soothed by any change in the electoral system. No change in policy, no change in government can bring about this result, which everybody must most earnestly desire. Nor can it be affected by the resolutions, expressing the firm resolve to establish Hindu-Moslem unity in a very near future, which are year in, year out, solemnly passed at numerous Indian meetings and conferences. What is required is a change of heart — if I did not fear to be thought too pessimistic I should even say a change of soul — in the Indian individual. There can be no hope of communal rivalry disappearing until the Indian politician not only professes by the mouth, but also proves by the heart, that he feels Indian first and Hindu or Mohammedan after and until the Indian masses follow his example.

II

CASTE

WHEN approaching the problem of caste we would do well to try and free our mind from all the standards that modern Western democracy attempts to force on life and to remember that these standards do not form the one and only solution of our human problems. As a matter of fact it was only during the last hundred years that modern democracy became the idol of the Western mind.

Caste in Hinduism having stood the test of life for a respectable number of centuries, cannot have been only the realization of some religious or economic theory sprung from human mind, but must have been the logical outcome of hard economic and social necessities.

It is not possible to trace with absolute certainty the causes which led to the establishment of the caste-system. It seems, however, not unreasonable to conjecture that at the bottom of it all lies racial antagonism, an instinct of self-preservation



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of the race, which we can still find spread all over the globe to-day.

From what we can perceive of the dawn of history it appears that at some far distant date India was invaded by the Aryan, a race of a much fairer complexion than the peoples who had until then inhabited the peninsula. They in time became the dominating race and then, as a means of protecting their typical racial characteristics against the influences of the darker-skinned races already settled in the country, imposed the system of caste.

It follows automatically, from the object, at which the system originally aimed, that at that time there should have been made but one single division, Aryan and non-Aryan. At the outset there was no necessity of making any further distinctions.

The subsequent complication of the system can be explained only by reasons of social order, which in their turn were determined by the exigencies of daily life.

Picturing life as it was in those ancient days, we find that none of our modern institutions, which in the West we have become to consider as essential necessities of life, would exist then. Obviously there was no railway, no telegraph or telephone, no printing-press and not even a common language



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to make intellectual intercourse possible. The only means of communication were by foot or by bullock-cart. People settled down in groups, which through lack of communication necessarily became isolated and therefore had to be self-contained.

The difficulties that had to be overcome in order to make life more than a bare existence would absorb all the energies of the race. The practical side of life dominated all other possibilities. Life was too hard to procure the leisure which could have permitted indulgence in theories. The school-master had not then appeared and there were no institutions where the workman could be formed. Thus the knowledge of crafts, which satisfied the practical wants of the community, and at a later period when the demand for products of art began to make itself felt the application of art could not be learnt out of doors, but was transmitted in the family only.

In this way each different occupation became, so to say, the property of one family. Then human jealousy and human egoism played their parts and it was natural that each family should do their utmost to guard their special occupation as their exclusive right. Subsequently the various occupations became incorporated into family-guilds, and

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as gradually these guilds increased in strength they finally became possessed of sufficient power to decree that the practising of each specific trade should be the hereditary right of one family-group.

Once the practical side of every day life had been settled and some form of stabilization reached, there was nothing more of immediate importance to do and people became concerned about the laying down of rules for social order. They could now indulge in the luxury of developing theories, they found time to codify these into a social system and finally, when all details had been worked out, ended by fossilizing the then existing state of affairs.

Thus various causes combined towards the evolution of caste, originally merely the outcome of racial necessity, into a system of social order.

In those days the population of India was still scattered over the continent in isolated communities of more or less importance; central political power, that could wield authority over them all, did not then exist. The only link between these scattered parts, the only authority that was generally recognized was that of the Vedas of the Aryan.

Therefore, when the problem arose as to how that social order, which had proved itself to be the most



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useful under the existing circumstances, could be stabilized and made acceptable to the numerous groups, it was soon discovered that it could be solved only by hanging the new social code in some way or other on to the Vedas. Once a connection had been brought about between religion and social order it was not surprising that in the mind of the Indian, who is so profoundly inclined towards religion, social order should become submerged in religion, and that caste should be transformed from the social problem which it had been hitherto into the religious problem which it appears to be to-day.

The arguments, which are in favour of the assumption that caste must have originated in the social order of primitive societies, gain in strength when we consider that from the original two-caste-system gradually developed the divisions of the Brahmin-caste of the priest, the Kshatrya-caste of the soldier, the Vaishya-caste of traders and farmers, and finally the numerous other castes. The main divisions correspond in a most striking manner with the classes, which succeeded each other to power in Europe.

Reviewing the history of the West we find that at the beginning there was the power of the Church,

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whose authority remained unchallenged at first. At a later phase nobility, originally the class formed from the military elements of society, claimed its share. In the course of events there followed the overthrow of these two powers by the middle classes and the rise to power of the princes of commerce and industry, who in their turn seem to be giving way to the demands of the organized working classes. It is not inconceivable that, when at some distant date, the active part of our civilization is played out, these four groups will tend to crystallize in some form or other and in their crystallized form remain the unalterable basis of our society.

Another proof of the statement that caste is originally a social and not a religious problem, can be found in the fact that even to-day no Hindu with any religious knowledge confuses caste with religion. It also is highly remarkable that caste is considered only as far as it affects laymen. Amongst Hindus no man, who takes the garb of the mystic, is ever questioned on this point.

That caste should be mainly concerned with marriage and food can also be explained from the social standpoint. At the beginning it was nothing but the outcome of the racial feeling by which at



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first the Aryan sought to keep his race pure. Later, when his racial feeling weakened, intermarriage came to be tolerated. It was only natural that then rules were laid down which were thought to offer the best chances of success and happiness and that the utmost importance should be attached to the rule that limited the right to contract marriage with people of the same culture, who had the same ideas of values in life or, in other words, to people belonging to the same caste. Add to this the fact that each occupation was the property of a family-guild — so that it was important to protect the profits accruing therefrom against outsiders — and we have not to go back far to find in Europe the same principles ruling about the undesirability of interclass-marriage.

In the beginning the food-problem was nothing but a consequence of natural exigencies of practical life, which demanded that people in various occupations should be differently fed. It is probable that then gradually snobbism had its say in the matter and it was only when rules had to be laid down that food became the all-important problem it is now.

In the caste system as we know it to-day, a fixed place in life is assigned to every one. Every Hindu necessarily belongs to the caste into which he is



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born and in that caste he inevitably remains. Neither wealth, nor education, not even genius can alter a man's caste. Inter-caste marriage is prohibited or at least most severely discouraged. Thus caste, which originally intended to bind together, finally served to split up the people into innumerable fractions which stand little chance of ever melting into one compact block.

At the outset, as we have seen, there was a two-caste system only. Then came the priest and carved out for himself a position of ascendancy and established the Brahmin-caste, which claimed the monopoly of the priestly office, to which the monopoly of learning was added. Since then every priest is a Brahmin. But not every Brahmin is a priest. The traditions of learning, the exercise of authority and the intellectual energy of the Brahmin-caste asserted themselves through the ages and secured for its members a share of power and influence which is out of all proportion to their numbers. The ability of the Brahmin Pundit is everywhere acknowledged and it is amazing to see how widely the members of the Brahmin-caste, though everywhere in a small minority, are represented in the public services, in the legislatures, at the Bar and in all the learned professions.

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Next to the Brahmins comes the Kshatriya or warrior-caste who formed the instrument by which the Brahmin could hope to uphold his power against aggression from outside, and next the Vaishya-caste of traders and agriculturists, who in their turn could supply the means by which the warriors had to be maintained.

These three are the Twice-born, living not only in this world, but sharing that higher existence which is betokened by the wearing of the Sacred Thread. The amazing thing is not that these three castes could be formed and assert and maintain their ascendancy over the lower castes, but that the Brahmin succeeded in keeping the other two in their places and was not supplanted by them as happened in Europe. This was feasible under the rigid system of caste, which not only reserved the monopoly of the priestly office and of learning to the Brahmin, but also strictly prevented the admission of individual members of one caste into the other. Maybe the Indian climate is also responsible for this. When the thermometer rises to 120° in the shade many will prefer enduring a bearable existence to gathering their energy and engaging in a hard struggle to obtain a better status in life.

Below the three higher castes we find the Sudras,



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consisting of the rest of the population, who are not entitled to the privileges of the Twice-born and are destined irrevocably to serve their superiors and to discharge menial occupations which it would be degrading for members of the higher castes to fulfil. Gradually the Sudras were more and more subdivided, new castes and sub-castes were evolved, each as rigid and impenetrable as the others, so that now a list of not less than 2300 different castes can be drawn up. At the bottom of the list we find what are now called the depressed classes, the outcasts, who however are recognized as being within the Hindu religious and social system. They number in British India, i.e. excluding the Indian States, over forty millions, that is some twenty per cent of the total population and some thirty per cent of the Hindu population. These lower groups seem to have been formed partly from those who followed unclean occupations and partly from the aboriginal tribes who were received into Hinduism, but only as impure castes.

The position of the outcast, to say the least of it, is not an enviable one. According to Hinduism he is untouchable, sometimes even unapproachable. This means that for all other Hindus he is the cause of pollution by touch and that he renders food



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and water impure. He may therefore not enter into the interior of an ordinary Hindu temple. In the south even the access to certain streets, inhabited by members of the higher castes, is denied to him.

Unapproachability which, however, is to be found in the far south only and even there is relatively rare, requires the outcast to remain at a certain distance from a high-caste Hindu, if necessary to leave the road and to give notice of his presence as in the old days lepers had to do in Europe. Even his shadow falling on a high-caste Hindu may cause pollution.

In the villages the untouchable is normally forced to live in a separate quarter. In many places he may not make use of the wells and watertanks, from which the other castes draw their supply. If the water is obtained from a river, he is obliged to get his water supply from a point lower down the stream. He will often eat food, which will not be consumed or even touched by other members of the community. His children in many places are either denied access to or required to sit apart at public schools. All this he accepts although he knows that it will not only last his lifetime, but also be the unalterable future of his descendants.



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It may seem unbelievable to the Western mind that any man can take such an existence for granted. We should, however, not forget that according to Christian religion earthly life commences at birth and ends with death, when we expect to be immediately either recompensed by admittance into Paradise or turned into another place to regret eternally the sins we committed on earth. Not so with the Hindu, to whom present life is only one of many earthly lives linked together, each life being the unalterable result of the former. He is firmly convinced that only the living through of the complete chain can ever make it possible for him to attain the state of Nirvana. To him, therefore, the life of to-day is no more than a passing phase and the material side thereof must necessarily appear of much lesser importance to him than it does to the Occidental.

One asks oneself, Can caste endure? Should it endure?

In recent times strong economic influences are noticeable which tend to weaken the rigidity of the system. It would be impossible to carry on work in the modern industries that sprung up in India or in the mines which came to be exploited during the last generations, had arrangements to be made to



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comply with the varying demands of the numerous castes to which the large numbers of Indian working men belong. Putting caste before efficiency would have prevented the working together of those who happen to belong to different castes. The working men would have to be detailed according to their caste and not selected according to their aptitude for a certain task. In many cases isolated accommodation would have to be provided for the workshops as well as for the private quarters, and this splitting up of forces and the entire lack of collaboration between the different castes would so seriously have prejudiced the earning capacity of the enterprises, that competition in the world's market would have been out of the question.

Practical difficulties also rendered it impossible to consider caste where transport by railways and tramways was concerned. An endless procession of cars would have been the result of supplying separate compartments for the use of the various castes. The railway authorities, therefore, wisely passed by the exigencies of caste and, in religious matters, limited themselves to providing separate sources of water supply at the stations, where the water-taps bear the inscription 'Water for Hindus' or 'Water for Mohammedans'. It is to be hoped



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that the Gods of various other creeds may not have mastered the use of the English language.

The modification of the strictness of caste which in this way became imperative, was accepted without difficulty by the Hindu population in these pacific innovations, but apart from this the rigidity of the system was fully maintained. It is difficult to foretell whether this process of modification will continue and gradually affect caste in the other walks of life or whether on the contrary, caste will regain the lost ground. In the latter event modern life would inevitably be brought to a standstill. But no Westerner can foresee whether in the long run it will be caste or modern life that will prove to be preferable to the Indian mind.

In very recent times political influences also have been at work to modify the severity of caste distinctions. Hindu politicians cannot be blind to the fact, that the existence of insurmountable social barriers is a powerful argument in the hands of those who hold that India is not ripe for government on the basis of Western democratic principles, and the educated classes, who clamour for a further advance to self-government, understand that there may be a political gain in attacking the caste-system.

But both of these have been influenced by Western



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education and Western ideals, which on the contrary do not stir the mind of the masses. The latter have not changed their deep respect for religion, for ancient tradition and the canons of orthodoxy. Britain would do well not to sail too closely by the compass of the anglicized Indian. Whatever may happen, whatever change may come in the interpretation of caste must come from the Hindu himself and from the Hindu only. The West cannot be told too emphatically to keep its hands off the problem of caste.

There is no reason to put ourselves on the high horse, to be shocked and horrified by the harshness of caste or by the deplorable position — deplorable in our Western eyes, of the outcast. We shall do well to remember that only a few centuries ago Europe indulged in the burning of witches and practised the horrors of the inquisition for the religious well-being of the people. But it was also in those days that Europe laid the foundation of our present civilization and possessed the strength and the energy to conquer the world, whereas nowadays when our social ideals are approaching realization and our intellect is proud of the conquests it has made in the realm of science, we are hard put to it to maintain our position in the world.



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These simple facts should make us ponder whether our Western intellect really is an infallible judge or trustworthy guide to be followed with full confidence in all the ways of life. It is quite possible that the deeper meaning and the real advantages of caste altogether escape our Occidental minds. We shall, therefore, do well to proceed with the utmost prudence in attacking a system that forms the steel frame which holds together the whole fabric of Hindu social life.

III

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CONCEIVING earthly life merely as a passing phase in the real existence of the individual it is only natural that the Hindu should not attach such value to time as the Occidental does. It is most striking that in the East there are no clock-towers, other than those built by the Europeans, and that one has to go as far as Japan to find an indigenous clock, based on an entirely different method of measuring time.

In the West we are all and always in a hurry. Every fraction of a second seems to be precious. We rush through breakfast, leave our house at the very last minute and have to race to the station, so as not just to lose our train.

Not so in the East. The Indian, who is not infected by our Western spirit, will take his time to decide whether he will go on a journey or not. He will quietly weigh the pros and cons, and when the decision to travel has been arrived at, collect

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his wife and family, his provisions and all that may be required on the journey. There will be no consulting of time-tables, but just when all is ready the caravan will start leisurely on its road to the station. Arrived there the head of the family will make inquiries and find out when a train will turn up to take them to their destination. May be the train has just departed and another twenty-four hours must elapse before the next will arrive. What of it? Of time there is plenty. And so there is of space. In the waiting-room or on the platform there is no difficulty in finding a corner where the family can eat and sleep. One of the most picturesque sights in India is the platform of a station where whole families peacefully take their meals or quietly install themselves for the night, perfectly content and perfectly sure that at some time or other the desired train will come and carry them along.

And it is not the humble Indian only who has this profound disdain of time. There goes a story that once upon a day an Indian prince decided to go on a voyage and ordered his private train to be put in readiness at once. As it should be when a prince commands, no time was lost in executing the order. Not till three days later one of the courtiers summed up his courage and dared to inquire after

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the desires of His Highness, for the train had been under steam continuously for seventy-two hours. The only reply that came forth, full of Oriental wisdom, was: 'Am I to please the train or is the train there to await my pleasure?'

Amongst a people, who take such a detached attitude towards the value of time, it is not surprising to find that history has not been the most favoured of sciences. The orthodox Hindu begins the political history of India more than three thousand years before Christ. His story, however, does not give what we understand by historical facts, but rests on mythology, tradition and folk-lore. Recent excavations in Sindh and in the Punjab by the Archaeological Department have proved that even earlier a high civilization must have existed there. But of actual facts we know little until 600 B.C. or thereabouts.

At that time the Aryan races had established in parts of India a form of civilization and had already founded the city of Benares. As far as the ascertained facts of history go, they were amongst the first of that long procession of invaders from the north, which characterizes the history of India. They were closely followed — or perhaps preceded — by another group, the Dravidians, who overran the

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Deccan and Southern India, crushed the aborigines and were, at a later period, subdued themselves by the Aryans. The first authentic record we possess of one of the Aryan kingdoms is that of Magadha, or Bihar, on the Ganges. It was in or near this kingdom that Jainism and Buddhism had their origin.

Of the fifth king of Magadha it is known that he was a friend and patron of Gautama Buddha, as well as a contemporary of Darius of Persia (521-485 B.C.) who invaded India and annexed the valley of the Indus.

There then follows a period of nearly two centuries during which India is hidden from our view, until Alexander the Great appears upon the scene. Alexander entered India in the year 326 B.C. and stayed for a period of nineteen months. He left behind him officers to carry on the government of the kingdoms he had conquered, but after his death (323 B.C.) these soon fell to pieces and two years later his successors had been obliged to leave the peninsula.

The leader of the revolt against the Greeks was a Hindu, Chandragupta by name, who became the first paramount sovereign of India, of whom we have certain knowledge (321 B.C.). His grandson

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was Asoka (269–231 B.C.), the great king who stands out in the ancient history of India. It was Asoka who, after his conversion to Buddhism, spread this religion, hitherto but a local sect in the Ganges valley, all over India. On his death, however, his kingdom collapsed.

Again there were new forces at work on the northern borderland of India, where the kingdoms of Bactria and Parthia had been formed and again there were Greek raids into the peninsula. The Greeks in Bactria, however, could not withstand the westward migration of the Yueh-chi horde, which in the first century A.D. also ousted the Indo-Parthian kings from Afghanistan and from North-Western India. Once more an invasion followed. This time it was Kadphises (85–125), one of the Yueh-chi kings, who crossed the Indus and established his power as far east as Benares.

Under his successors the power of the Yueh-chi waned towards the year 200, concurrently with the rise of the Andhra dynasty in Central India. Early in the fourth century the Gupta dynasty arose at Pataliputra. Its founder was a local chieftain, whose grandson Chandragupta is commemorated in an inscription on the famous iron pillar near Delhi and in the writings of the well-



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known Chinese pilgrim Fa-hien. But in the middle of the next century the dynasty weakened, the gateway of the Khyber was forced by the White Huns from Central Asia and by 480 the Gupta dynasty had disappeared.

Great confusion reigned in India for more than a hundred years, until Harsha arose, in the beginning of the seventh century, and succeeded in conquering Northern India and in extending his territory south to the Nerbudda. Emperor Harsha was the last native paramount sovereign of Northern India. After his death in the year 648 the country lapsed again into a state of internal strife, which lasted till the ninth century.

In the meantime in Southern India the Andhras had risen to power. They managed to create a stable form of government, so that commerce and industries could develop. It is known that in those days a considerable trade was carried on with Greece, Egypt, Rome and the East. But their domination was not to endure. In the fifth century they were overthrown and there then followed a number of dynasties, whose fortunes are so involved and in many cases so little known, that it would be impossible to describe them briefly. In the absence of any powerful rulers the ancient capitals fell into

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ruins, the jungle reconquered its domain, and the aborigines and various foreign races began to assert themselves so successfully, that before long the Aryan element was chiefly confined to the Doab and the Eastern Punjab.

A state of political chaos existed for some three hundred years from the middle of the seventh century. During this period the outstanding feature was the new orientation of Hinduism. There was the gradual transition from tribe to caste and the formation of the new division of pure and impure, which made it feasible to include in the Hindu religion the many barbarians and foreigners in the country, who until then had been kept outside.

The great political event was the rise of the warrior-caste of the Rajputs. Their origin is obscure, but they appeared in the eighth century and spread from Rajputana and Oudh into the Punjab, Kashmir and the Central Himalayas, assimilating a number of fighting clans and binding them together with a common code. With the ending of the period of anarchy the political history of India centres round the Rajputs, who succeeded in building up a new civilization. Several kingdoms were founded by different clans, which eventually became united, and by 1163 one of their rulers could



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boast that he had conquered all the country from the Vindhyas to the Himalayas. The son of this conqueror was the great Prithwi Raj, the champion of the Hindus against the Mohammedans. With his death in battle (1192) ends the golden age of the Rajput civilization, the greatness of which may still be admired in the temples and the palaces in Rajputana to-day. The two great philosophical systems of Sankaracharya and Ramanuja had been evolved and the triumph of Hinduism assured. Buddhism had practically disappeared from India and remained only in Magadha where, however, it was not able to make a stand against Islam, which, on the waves of Mohammedan conquest, carried all before it.

The first appearance of the faith of Mohammed in India was in Sind round about the year 700. But the first of the Mohammedan invasions into the peninsula did not take place till some three hundred years later. It was after a Turkish slave of a Persian ruler had succeeded in founding a kingdom of Ghazni, between Kabul and Kandahar, that one of his descendants, by the name of Mahmud (967-1030), made repeated raids into the heart of India and even occupied more or less permanently part of the Punjab.

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Enduring Mohammedan rule was not established until the end of the twelfth century, by which time, from the territory of Ghor, there had arisen one Mohammed Ghorī, who succeeded in founding a kingdom stretching from Peshawar to the Bay of Bengal. But at his death in the year 1206 this vast empire collapsed and was split up into numerous independent sovereignties, which were ruled by his satraps. Of these Qutb-ud-din, who was master in Delhi and Lahore, was the most famous. Amongst his successors stand out Ala-ud-din (1296–1313), who did much to weaken further the power of the Hindu kings in the South, and Firoz Shah of the house of Tughlaq. The imposing ruins of the fortress built by the latter near Delhi still convey an impression of his power.

But shortly after, during the reign of his successor Mahmud (1398–1413), the kingdom of Delhi went to pieces. Another invasion swept over the country and for seven months India was at the mercy of the terrible Turkish conqueror Taimur. It was not till towards the end of the fifteenth century that the kingdom began to recover under Sikandar Lodi. His son Ibrahim further extended his possessions, but then another torrent of invaders swept down through the Khyber Pass and near



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Delhi Ibrahim was defeated by Babar, King of Kabul, who became the founder of the Mogul dynasty in India (1526).

Stability, however, had not been reached even yet, and it took another two generations before a vast empire could be formed out of the numerous more or less important kingdoms that had been established by various Mohammedan dynasties outside the kingdom of Delhi. Babar himself had to pass through many a battle to maintain his possessions and his son, Humayun, though at first succeeding in greatly extending his kingdom, was eventually defeated and driven into exile (1540) by Sher Khan, another powerful Afghan, who reigned till 1545. The dynasty founded by the latter had not lasted for more than ten years, when Humayan in his turn succeeded in capturing Kabul and winning back part of his old kingdom.

At the time of his death, however, which occurred in the year 1556, the future looked far from bright for the Moguls. The emperor's son Akbar, only thirteen years of age, and supported by a mere handful of followers, was confronted by a host of rivals, all keen on carving out a kingdom for themselves. But Akbar's indomitable energy and military genius carried him from success to success. His

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career of conquest was almost uninterrupted and by 1594 the whole of India north of the Nerbudda was in his power. He subsequently entered the Deccan and captured Ahmednagar and succeeded in creating an empire, which held the whole of India in its fold.

Gifted with military genius, an indomitable will, untiring energy and never-failing courage, Akbar was moreover possessed of a clear political insight, which soon made him perceive that there could be no internal peace and therefore no unity in India, unless a broadminded policy of tolerance in religious affairs was practised. He put an end to the beloved custom of former Mohammedan rulers of converting the existing Hindu population by fire and sword. Not to share the monarch's religion was no longer considered a crime. Moslems, Hindus, Christians and adherents of various other creeds were all received at court on a footing of equality. One law applied to all. A strong central government ruled with a firm hand from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean and moulded India into one united empire. All over the peninsula the inhabitants — to whatever religion they might belong — enjoyed a measure of security of life and property as rarely had been the

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case, and, shielded against the ever-recurring menace from the north-west by Akbar's powerful armies, India entered upon an era of prosperity as never had been witnessed before. Akbar died in the year 1605, leaving the empire to his son Jehangir.

During the reign of the latter (1605-1627) India enjoyed a period of comparative peace. Jehangir in his turn was succeeded by Shahjehan, the emperor who dazzled the world by the magnificence of his court, the splendour of his palaces and the power of his forts and his armies. Nevertheless the first signs of a weakening of Mogul power could already be discerned by the shrewd observer during his reign. For many years Shahjehan had to wage war in the Deccan, while his strength of action was continuously undermined by intrigues at court. His children became an overgrowing menace to his power and finally he was forced to abdicate and imprisoned by his son Aurangzeb (1658).

The latter's rule was one of constant intrigue and fighting in every direction. His military strength was sapped by a twenty-five years' struggle in the Deccan, where the Marathas became a very powerful faction in Indian politics. His bigoted attitude towards Hinduism undermined the unity of the Empire and fanned religious antagonism, which

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had been eating into the heart of India from the days of the first Mohammedan invasions and was only temporarily appeased during the years of the wise reign of Akbar.

After Aurangzeb's death in the year 1707, his three sons fought each other for the possession of the throne, but none of them was able to establish his paramountcy. The proud structure of the Moguls fell to pieces, internal disorder and Maratha encroachments made themselves felt more and more severely, and in 1739 the old danger once more materialized. Nadir Shar, a Persian conqueror, swept down on India, captured Delhi and made off with valuable booty. After his withdrawal the Marathas made the most of the opportunity and all that was left of the Great Moguls were the puppet rulers at Delhi, who held out till the middle of the nineteenth century.

Surveying the general lines of the history of India up to the days when British power came to be established, one is struck by these two outstanding facts: India never crystallized into a united independent country and was always at the mercy of invaders from Central Asia.

The nearest approach to an independent Indian Empire was made under the rule of the Moguls,



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but even then unity was not the fruit of the energies of the native population, but was created by the genius of Akbar — a foreigner.

Standing at the heights of the Khyber Pass and looking backwards towards Peshawar, one realizes the irresistible temptation that the fertile plains of India must exercise on those who have to carve a miserable existence out of the barren rock of the surrounding mountains. It is only natural that the returning caravans, passing northward through the Khyber, should carry with them right into the heart of Asia, fabulous tales about the wonderland in the south, and that the imagination of vigorous warlike tribes, living in an inhospitable country, suffering from the effects of a severe climate, should be fed with dreams about a kinder and warmer country, where life would be easy, where brave deeds could be done and valuable booty obtained.

These tribes in all respects sharply contrasted with those living south of the Khyber in a country where the daily demands of life can be satisfied without great efforts and under a climate, which not only does not incite to great exertions, but which, on the contrary, saps people's strength in a few generations.

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Thus in the course of the centuries the same situation was bound to arise over and over again. In the north, a reservoir of vigour, stimulated by cold and hunger and the longing for a more comfortable life; in the south, a basin where energy was at its lowest ebb, and, as the unavoidable result of the difference of pressure between the two, a torrent rushes down through the Khyber to fill the vacuum in the south. By a merciless onslaught, by murder, plunder and rapine the native population would soon be crushed by the invading hordes and the conquerors could settle down as the masters in their newly-won kingdoms.

In the next phase the new owners would be mixing their blood with that of the original inhabitants, which as a natural result unavoidably brought about a strengthening of the native blood and a weakening of that of the conquerors, whose vigour would moreover be severely taxed by the enervating influences of the scorching climate, that was foreign to their race. This was the moment that sometimes a local Indian civilization could arise, but not last for more than a few generations.

Then again the old situation would develop and another wave sweep down from the north. And so from the Aryan until Nadir Shah history



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repeated itself at almost regular intervals. The vigorous tribes from the north, bred far inland, and therefore not having the love for the sea in their blood, never brought themselves to cross the water, but got crammed in the cul de sac, which forms India. Here their strength was sapped by the climate and they in turn became an easy prey to the following conquerors from central Asia. It looks almost as if Nature, who is never soft in her remedies, saw no other way of restoring the vitality which the population of India requires to continue the struggle for life in a merciless climate. To-day, travelling through the peninsula, the traces of this process can still easily be discerned. Proceeding northward from Tuticorin and westward from Calcutta one is struck by the fact, that the more one approaches the Khyber, the more virile and vigorous are the races whose blood must be younger and more often freshened by that of the invaders.

The last raid into India, by Nadir Shah, almost coincides with the foundation of British power in India. The British, contrary to the preceding conquerors, instinctively refused to mix their blood with that of the Indian and to settle permanently in the country. They soon developed the habit of



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returning home at regular intervals to recuperate their strength and constantly brought out fresh men from Europe. Thus they found a way of counteracting the deteriorating influence of the climate and were able to keep up the strength that is required to block the Khyber Pass and protect India against further invasions.

It is often argued that India paid too high a price for this protection by losing her independence, but history shows that an independent India was never able to endure for any length of time. If Britain must be blamed for what she did in India, the real wrong that can be laid at her door is this: by shielding India from further invasions from central Asia, she stemmed the flow of kindred blood, which through the ages has constituted the necessary stimulant to uphold the vitality of the population. Thus the British rule, which brought unknown security and numerous blessings to the individual, stands guilty of withholding the natural remedy which has strengthened the race in its struggle against an appalling climate. Should ever the Indian masses, not through the brain, but instinctively grasp this fact, it will be then, but only then, that a truly popular movement will develop and form a real menace to British supremacy.



I V

THE RISE OF BRITISH POWER

A CLEAR dividing line can be drawn between the first conquest of America and the European penetration in the east. Towards the west sailed the Spanish, animated by the pious hope of saving the souls of poor heathens by bringing them under the protection of the Roman Catholic Church and by the desire of finding new wealth to contribute towards the magnificence of the Spanish Court. Rounding the Cape of Good Hope and venturing east went the Portuguese and the people of the north, driven forth by that spirit of adventure, which has troubled the New Europe since its birth, when it broke out in the Crusades, and by the prospect of huge commercial profits to be obtained by legitimate trade.

The former carried the horrors of the Inquisition into the New World and their lust for gold engendered wholesale murder, slave traffic and piracy on the Main. The latter brought enduring



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wealth to Europe and, in order to safeguard their own interests, soon saw themselves obliged to create law and order out of the chaos, which threatened India after the fall of the Mogul Empire, and thereby re-established peace and security to the benefit of the teeming millions of the east.

It seems that these two currents of colonization are not sufficiently kept apart and many a politician to-day lays the blame, which the one deserves, at the door of the other. Too often we are told that we ought to feel ashamed of having conquered the East and suppressed the liberties of the Indian, as if we had been barbarians who destroyed a highly developed civilization out of pure lust for material gain.

But if we clear our brains of the modern ideas and read history in an unbiased spirit, we shall find that at the outset the Occidental came east to satisfy his want of adventure and to seek the best opportunities of trade. Pitting his commercial abilities against those of the Oriental—who was not a mere child in these matters—he tried to to make the best of it and succeeded. His trading instincts form a quality which is not to be despised, but should be given the high merits it possesses



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as a valuable asset to the building up of universal prosperity and the power of our own race.

It should be remembered that these trading instincts engendered the spirit of untiring energy that built up our present position in the east on which the entire structure of modern Europe rests. Without that spirit the capital could not have been made, which rendered it possible to evolve in Europe the higher standard of living we are enjoying now and to allow ourselves that necessary amount of leisure which is required to develop the intellectual side of our mind. In the Oriental countries this capital was actually created by enterprise and not wrenched from them, as was the case in South and Central America.

Without that spirit in Europe to-day we should have no sugar, no coffee, no tea and no tobacco, there would be no rubber and no petrol and consequently no motor cars. It was this same spirit which created New Amsterdam, and without it there would have been no Wall Street, no Edison and no Ford.

It saved India from chaos when the Mogul Empire broke up, it protected him against eastern despotism and gave him the benefit of fair justice. It brought him candles and oil, steampower and

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electricity, as well as modern irrigation and modern means of transport, which constitute his only effective safeguards against famine. It brought him the English language, which is the only one in which the different Indian races can converse and conspire, and gave the catchphrases of modern democracy with which the present agitation can be carried on.

Moreover we should not forget that the profits which accrued to the west were not obtained for nothing, but had to be paid for at an appalling price. We, who travel eastwards in the floating hotels of the P. & O. should try to picture what it must have meant to beat down the Channel in the teeth of a gale in a sailing-ship, of some few hundred tons, arriving at the Cape after a six weeks' journey, so trying that a week's rest or more was required to give those on board the necessary respite to recuperate their strength. And on again, for weeks and weeks on end to reach the east with its blazing sun and unknown perils. On the average out of three ships one was lost on the voyage. Those voyagers who did arrive found no comfortable blue-train awaiting them at Bombay to carry them to their destination, but had a long and tedious journey before them of which they often did not



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see the end. Try to imagine life in the Indian heat with no electric fans and no ice to cool one's drinks, without protection against tropical disease, no supply of pure water, none of our preventive inoculations, not even quinine to keep the fever down.

But the price was willingly paid. The new opportunities that opened up for Europe were soon recognized. Instinctively it was felt that great work was to be done, another *noblesse oblige* animated the pioneers and the new duties towards the old country were joyfully shouldered.

The Portuguese were the first in the field, and early in the sixteenth century had already laid the foundations of a great empire and cut out for themselves a monopoly for the trade between Europe and the East. It was not until the end of that century that the great wave from Northern Europe started, which in time absorbed practically all authority in the tropics and eventually spent its force against the rocks that are formed by China and Japan, two countries who, it will be noticed, are also from the north.

At the outset the relations between Europeans and Indians were almost entirely on a commercial basis, and armed conflicts between the two races of relatively rare occurrence. Both parties were



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desirous of opening up new sources, which could bring prosperity and wealth to all. No more was asked of the Indian rulers than permission to settle at certain points on the coast, which seemed convenient for oversea traffic, and the right to trade with the native population.

The wars that had to be fought at that period were almost exclusively between Europeans of different stock, with a view to protecting the trade monopoly or to wresting it from a more fortunate rival. First the Portuguese were attacked by the Dutch and the English, who did not rest until of the colonial empire founded by Almeida and Albuquerque nothing remained but the few remnants, which we know by the name of Portuguese India to-day. Next the struggle for supremacy broke out between the English and the Dutch, which lasted on till late in the seventeenth century, when finally the English had to relax their hold on the eastern archipelago, but became paramount in India proper. In the meantime England had taken the necessary steps to guarantee the peaceful development of her eastern trade by building factories first at Surat, then at Madras (1640) and Hughli (1651), while a valuable acquisition was made in the year 1661 when Bombay was ceded by



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the Portuguese as part of the dower of Catherine of Braganza.

Had the vitality of the Moguls not given out at that time and their power withered, the story of the East India Company would have been a different one. But, as fate would have it, just when the English had succeeded in driving their European competitors out of the peninsula, and could think of devoting their energies to the peaceful development of trade, the effects began to make themselves felt of the ill-omened reign of Aurangzeb, which began in the year 1658. This emperor's bigoted attitude towards Hinduism undermined the authority of his government and the unsuccessful war against the Marathas in the south was the prelude to the fall of the Mogul Empire. More and more local rulers revolted against the central government and it soon became evident that disorder would be prevalent all over India.

The East India Company were not slow in realizing that either they would have to give up all prospects of trade, or take the administration of the country into their own hands. As early as 1686, more than twenty years before the death of Aurangzeb, the Company announced its intention to establish such a policy of civil and military power and create and



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secure such a large revenue as might be required for the foundation of a large, well-grounded, sure English dominion for all time.

It took some six generations to complete the task, leaving us to wonder how it could have ever been done at all. We can only gauge the size of the problem by imagining that one of the gigantic business-enterprises in Europe or in America should be asked to restore order in China to-day. Although these would be in a position to rely on a modern army and a modern navy, on aircraft and mechanical transport, as well as on the resources of modern finance, and be backed by three centuries of colonial experience and all the intellectual training that our universities can supply, it is extremely doubtful whether the performance of our forefathers could be equalled and the solving of the Chinese problem accomplished.

At first but little success was obtained. In Bengal no stand could be made against Aurangzeb and it was not until after a humiliating peace had been concluded with the emperor, that in the year 1690 the foundations of Calcutta could be laid.

Internally the Company had to suffer in its trade from the competition of English rivals, who were keen on having their share in the profits, which



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accrued from commercial enterprise in the east. It was not until 1708, after the union of the old East India Company with the new one which had been established, that a united front could be formed against the dangers which threatened in India.

After the death of Aurangzeb central authority rapidly diminished and Indian chieftains emerged on all sides who endeavoured to carve out portions from the old Empire and found independent sovereignties for themselves. The mutual jealousies soon resulted in numerous local wars and increasing unrest, which threatened to develop into general chaos. It was then that the best qualities of the British race, tenacity and fairness, as well as the western standards of honesty, came to the aid of their trading instincts. The masses were not long in discovering that the protection of their interest was at least as safe in the hands of the English as in those of their native rulers. They realized that life and property were better guarded under the administration of a Company, whose chief object was trade and whose own interests were therefore served by the promotion of order and prosperity amongst the native population, than under the despotic rule of a prince of their own race, to whom in many cases authority in last instance meant but the satisfaction



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of personal ambition. It was then that the first foundation was laid for that wonderful confidence, which amongst the masses in India the individual gradually came to have in the British government as well as towards the British official personally, a confidence, which the agitation that has been going on in the peninsula since the end of the nineteenth century, has not been able to shake. Groups of Indians began to understand that their interests and those of the English went hand in hand, and when Bombay and Calcutta had to withstand the severe onslaughts of the Marathas and others, it was reassuring to know that there could always be found a nucleus of Indians on whose assistance the Company could rely.

From outside new attempts were made to encroach on the British monopoly of Indian trade. Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Russia all tried to secure their share, but were never in a position to become a serious menace. It was, however, to be different with the French, who founded Pondicherry and Chandernagore towards the closing of the seventeenth century and eventually acquired an important sphere of influence in Southern India, which had become independent of the Moguls and was chiefly divided into the three large states of



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Hyderabad, Tanjore and Mysore. It was then that the game started of playing off one Indian ruler against the other, as the Indian tried to play off the British against the French. During the wars between England and France in Europe, Dupleix and Clive were the outstanding personalities who faced each other in India. The struggle surged forwards and backwards around Madras, but finally, at the end of the Seven Years War (1763), French ambitions of empire in Southern India were definitely frustrated.

While the English were fighting the French in the south they became involved in grave difficulties in Bengal. At one moment they were even obliged to evacuate Calcutta, but the city was soon recaptured by Clive (1757). The Nawab Siraj-ud-Daula then joined the side of the French in Chandernagore, but he was crushed at the battle of Plassey in that same year. Mir Jafar was put on the throne by the English and made to cede the land around Calcutta to the East India Company. In his turn this ruler was threatened by an army from Oudh, which was repelled by Clive. This was the first indication that the Company could not remain satisfied with what it had acquired, but that in days to come it would be obliged to advance into north-western India.



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During Clive's absence in England the Company's Council deposed Mir Jafar and put Mir Kasim into his place. The latter began to intrigue with the Nawab of Oudh and soon found an opportunity of quarrelling with the English. A general rising in Bengal was the result and two hundred Englishmen were massacred. Mir Kasim's army was, however, soon defeated and the Nawab sought protection from the ruler of Oudh. Another combination was formed against the English, but in 1764 the joint armies of Shah Alam, then Mogul Emperor, and the Nawab of Oudh were defeated in the battle of Buxar.

Clive, who returned to India in the following year, again took the administration in his hands. He did not aim at founding an independent government, but contented himself by the substance of territorial power under the fiction of a grant from the Mogul Emperor. In Bengal he set up a system of government by which the English received the revenues and maintained the army, while the criminal jurisdiction was vested in the Nawab.

Another of the Company's difficulties was the lust for illicit gains of its servants, who endeavoured by private trading and other undesirable means to extort money from the population in order to be



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able to retire to England with a quickly accumulated fortune. Clive tried to purify the Company's service, but although he was not immediately successful he had another opportunity of showing how the interests of the Company and those of the native population could run parallel, and thereby contributed towards the growth of that unshakable trust which the Indian individual puts in the British character and proved to the Indian the value of British protection.

As is always bound to happen when a government is not firmly rooted in reality and is not the true expression of actual power it soon became evident, that the dual system of government set up by Clive was a failure. The Court of Directors of the Company had to outline another policy, and Warren Hastings, who was appointed Governor in the year 1772, was instructed to carry out the Directors' decisions, which were to give the Company the entire care and administration of the revenues. A most important step was thus taken towards changing the East India Company's position from that of a trading organization into that of a territorial power.

Hastings undertook the administrative organization of India. He reorganized the civil service, reformed the system of revenue collection and created



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courts of justice and some semblance of a police force.

The more the spheres, that were under the direct influence of the Company, progressed towards a new form of stable government, the more it became necessary to secure order in the bordering tracts. Thus the Company soon found itself involved in a nearly endless succession of wars, with the result that the Company's territory gradually extended into the interior. In western India the two Maratha wars (1775-1782) brought the conquest of Gujerat and the capture of Gwalior. In the south two Mysore wars led to a treaty with Tippoo in the year 1784. Towards the end of the eighteenth century and during the Napoleonic wars the French aspirations in India revived and their intrigues, notably in the south, for a few years again became a menace to the Company. Lord Wellesley, who in those days was Governor, then formed the plan of definitely stopping French scheming in India by placing himself at the head of a great Indian Confederacy. By the sword and by diplomacy he succeeded in extending British authority all over the Indian continent. The most outstanding features under his rule were the fourth Mysore war, which ended in the year 1799 with the death of Tippoo and



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the annexation of part of Mysore, the Carnatic and Tanjore, the third Maratha war which lasted from 1802 to 1804, and the cession of large tracts of territory by the Nawab of Oudh.

Under his successors relations were entered into with the Punjab and war was declared on Nepal. But it was not until the successful ending of the last Maratha war (1817-1818) under the governorship of Lord Hastings, that British interests could be considered as permanently secured on the Indian continent.



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WHEN the days of violent action are over, when final success has crowned his life, and, may be, his energy has spent itself during the years of battle, man often tends towards a less aggressive attitude in life and begins to contemplate the causes which led to his success. He develops a taste for theory, endeavours to frame some moral justification for the actions of his past and hopes to atone for these by trying to let his beaten opponents benefit by the maxims of his newly found morals.

As it is with individuals, so it often is with nations. When Europe had passed through the three most dynamic centuries, that are as far as we know unprecedented in history, and emerged, flushed by its success, as unchallenged master of the world — at least in the material field of life — it was only human that man should turn his mind towards the softer and more intellectual side of life and aim at realizing



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politically what appeared to his mind as a more human conception of practical morals.

In France, until the end of the eighteenth century, the upper classes had given the best of their energies to build up a strong united nation, safe from internal intrigues and from the dangers menacing from across the Rhine. They spent all their energies in this work, and as their strength waned they had to give way to the new intelligentsia which had by this time arisen. The French Revolution was the mighty symbol of this transfer of power. The slogans of liberty, equality and fraternity could not fail to charm all those who believed in the new morals, which decreed that intellect is superior to breeding. Europe was soon made to believe that it ought to abhor all that its ancestors had accomplished. The well-being of the individual became the professed aim of national politics and few troubled their minds about what was to become of the race. As a result we are confronted with the appalling dilemma that all that is pleasant to the individual is almost invariably disastrous to the race, and all that is good for the race is hard on the individual. No escape seems to be possible from this dilemma, so that one is tempted to ask whether he should consider the year 1789 as



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the starting point of a new era of progress in Western civilization, or as the beginning of the end of the power of the white race.

In England, where democracy had flowered as it were instinctively in the soul of the people — whereas France first had to feed its mind on English principles and then required nothing less than a revolution to discover that its people were democratic — the antithesis between the duties towards the race and the rights of the individual at first were less apparent. There had always been a tendency in English politics to consider the claims of individual freedom and individual happiness whenever the exigencies of national welfare had to be reckoned with.

In India that same tendency soon made itself felt. In the beginning, when a mere handful of Europeans were responsible for the success of the East India Company and it meant life or death to their enterprise that chaos should be prevented and law and order restored, it could not be expected that soft measures would prevail. Life in those days was different from what it is now. In India we waged war in the same cruel way in which it was then waged in Europe. It is well to remember that torture and mutilation formed part of the normal



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course of justice in the west and it is not surprising that Indians were treated in the same way as was customary to enforce respect for the law amongst Europeans at home as well as abroad. Excesses could not be prevented. Young men, often in their twenties, had to be given responsibilities that were undreamt of at home, and it was only human that, flushed with their power, they would exploit their authority for personal gain and commit actions which can only be deplored. It may be pleaded that they were not sustained by the principles of our twentieth century and that there was no resistance on the part of a population that was fatalistically inclined, one that through the countless ages had become accustomed to the despotic rule of native chieftains, to whom cruelty and covetousness appeared as natural attributes to authority.

But it did not take long before the Company aimed at suppressing the excesses of its servants. Parliament at home from the beginning had exercised control over the actions of the Company and severely judged and honestly aimed at preventing any abuse of power. That even the highest officials of the Company were not screened from the supervision of Parliament is proved by the trials of Clive and Warren Hastings.



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The natural instincts of the British had always been opposed to autocracy. As liberal ideas in Europe received a fresh impetus from the ideals propagated by the French Revolution, and, moreover, the era of war and conquest seemed to be over in India, it was only to be expected that voices should arise, clamouring for a more liberal course to be set in India, and that the stress should be laid more emphatically on the duties that Britain had to fulfil towards the masses in the east. As early as 1781 Warren Hastings had purchased a site for a Mohammedan college at Calcutta and assisted in the foundation of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, with a view to directing European attention towards Oriental philosophy and science. In the year 1792 the British Resident at Benares established a Sanskrit College at that city. In 1813 the British Parliament decided that the Governor-General should yearly set aside a certain sum for the encouragement of education in British India. More and more it was realized that Britain, having been forced by the course of events to assume authority in India, could not stand aloof now that the development of her trade was guaranteed, and refuse the further responsibilities that were laid upon her shoulders.



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The necessity of definitely separating the commercial interests, which had led to the growth of the East India Company, from the exigencies of a governing body into which it had gradually developed, could no longer be denied. The new Charter Act of 1833 brought the end of the commercial business of the Company and emphasized its position as the ruler of the empire that it had won in India, in trust for the Crown. The administration as well as the legislation were placed in the hands of the Governor-General, who, relieved from the burden of commercial duties, soon turned his mind towards the social problems which awaited solution. Bound up as these were with religion, progress could only be made with the utmost caution. A caste of professional hereditary assassins, the notorious Thugs, was suppressed and the prohibition enforced against the custom of widows mounting alive the funeral pyre of their deceased husbands.

Education was one of the subjects on which the attention of the Government became fixed and a long controversy between the advocates of the instruction in English or in the vernaculars was settled in favour of English education. More opportunity was given to Indians to enter the service of the

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Company. It seemed as if a long period of peaceful development might be looked forward to, in which it could be attempted to let India partake of some of the fruit which Europe was gathering as the result of six centuries of intellectual and political development. With full confidence Lord Auckland, who was appointed Governor-General in the year 1836, could announce before leaving England that he looked forward with exultation to the prospect of promoting education and knowledge and of extending the blessings of good government and happiness to the millions of India.

But again fate decreed otherwise. The old danger beyond the Khyber Pass loomed up in a new form, this time it was the Russian advance in central Asia. To counteract this the first Afghan war was embarked upon, but ended fatally. It then became necessary to devise other means of protecting India against the menace from the north-west. The annexation of Sindh followed and after the two Sikh wars the Punjab became a British province (1849). Moreover, with the progress of British Government in India, a surer foundation seemed desirable than the one that mere diplomatic understandings with native rulers would supply. During Lord Dalhousie's tenure of office the 'doctrine of lapse' was



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put into practice. By this doctrine British Government was substituted for Indian in states where misrule continued and where the change was made possible when a ruler died without leaving male heirs. Accordingly important territories were added to those already under British Government.

This spread the belief amongst Indian princes that the whole of India was to be subdued. The masses became restless as English civilization progressed and seemed to menace their century-old traditions. In the educated classes, whose brains were being fed by the intellectual fruit of Western civilization there awakened the ambition to take a greater part in the government of the country. The Indian troops became over-confident and attributed to themselves qualities which were chiefly due to British leadership. Thus the fuel piled up and the discontents grouped around the last remnant of Mogul glory, the deposed King of Delhi, Bahadur Shah.

The spark was supplied by the fact that new rifle cartridges were greased with fat, which rendered them unclean both for Hindus and Mohammedans. A year after Lord Dalhousie's departure the Mutiny broke out (1857). The rising was remorselessly suppressed and such an impression of British power was



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conveyed to the Indian mind that nearly half a century of unchallenged British authority ensued.

After the Mutiny was over a new era was inaugurated in India by the 'Act for the Better Government of India' of 1858, which brought to an end the existence of the East India Company and transferred the entire administration of the country to the Crown. Other most important changes were instituted by the provisions of the 'Indian Councils Act' of 1861.

The Regulating Act of 1773 had raised the Governor of Bengal to the position of Governor-General, who was to be assisted by a council of four members, one being the Commander-in-Chief and the others covenanted servants of the East India Company. The Governor-General in Council was given the power to make rules, ordinances and regulations for the good order and civil government of Bengal and to exercise control over the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, which control, however, was limited to transactions with Indian potentates and to questions affecting war and peace. The Government of Bengal had no power to interfere with the ordinary internal administration or with the making of laws to be applied in the two Presidencies.



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The opposition that the first Governor-General, Warren Hastings, had to suffer from a majority of the Executive Council soon proved the desirability of the Governor-General being granted a greater power over the Council. Consequently in the year 1786 the Governor-General was given the constitutional power to overrule his Council in matters which in his judgment vitally affected the safety or tranquillity of the British possessions in India.

By the Charter Act of 1833 rules were laid down for the further centralization of authority in India. The Governor-General of Bengal became the Governor-General of India. His authority was extended over the entire territory of British possessions in India and the independent legislative powers, which were until then enjoyed by the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay were abolished. The Government of India was born.

The number of members in the Governor-General's Council has varied from three to seven during the course of years. By the Act of 1833 it was raised from three to four by the addition of a Law Member, which fact, in itself, is hardly worth mentioning. But the novelty was that he was not to be one of the Company's servants; this is the first indication that Government in India would turn



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away from autocracy, the only form of government that India had hitherto known. The Law Member at first was not a full Executive Councillor, but was admitted in the Council only when legislative business was transacted. This arrangement lasted until 1853, when by the provisions of the Act renewing the Charter of the Company he was made a full Member.

The influence of modern conceptions of government in Europe, where the revolutions of 1848 had shown in which direction the wind was blowing, can already be discerned in this Act of 1853. Provision was made that the Governor-General's Executive Council, when dealing with law-making, should be enlarged into a 'Legislative Council' by bringing in six 'additional' members, viz., the Chief Justice and another Judge of the Bengal Supreme Court, and four officials appointed by the Provincial Governments of Madras, Bombay, Bengal and Agra. It was laid down that the proceedings of the legislative sessions should be held in public. This meant a further weakening of the autocratic power of the Governor-General, although he was given the right of veto over legislative proposals even as, in 1786, he obtained the constitutional right to overrule his Council in certain matters.



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A more momentous step was taken in the year 1861. So far legislation had been entirely in the hands of British officials, but after the shock of the Mutiny and the transfer of government from the East India Company to the Crown, it seemed advisable that a more liberal element should be introduced. Under the Indian Councils Act of 1861 the number of 'additional' members of the council was raised from six to twelve, and six of these were to be non-officials. Thus 'public opinion' was given a lever to influence government. The non-official members were to be nominated by Government and some of the new seats were given to Indians.

It was, therefore, in 1861 that an Indian element was given part in the making of laws for India and that a start was made with the fatal policy, which dreamt of satisfying the ambition of the Indian — educated on Western principles and who, therefore, thought himself capable of taking part in the Government — by giving him a minute share and retaining the real power in the hands of the British. It did not seem to dawn upon those who prided themselves on their broadminded policy that, for the Indian also, 'l'appetit vient en mangeant'. Once a start is made on the perilous road of giving away part of your authority of your own free will,



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it will be difficult to find arguments to stop the further claims of a people who, although not possessed of any power to enforce their demands, can become embarrassing in their agitation, because as they risk nothing, they stand to lose nothing. Unless it be frankly confessed that it is not the intention to translate the natural consequences of such policy into reality, the road can only lead to one of two endings. In the first place, Britain will be talked out of India, which will mean further unemployment and even hunger at home, whilst the destinies of the Indian masses will be handed over to a class of anglicized politicians, who in their turn will be soon driven from office by those possessed of the actual power, with the ultimate result that despotism, bloodshed, invasions and chaos will again fall to the lot of the peoples of India. Alternatively, it will be necessary to bring out the military and re-establish a sound foundation for British Government based on the true proportion of real power; to do so, will mean another phase of bloodshed added to the history of India.

The Legislative Councils, as constituted under the Act of 1861, possessed, however, but little of the power of a true Parliament. In fact they were nothing but committees, which supplied the Governments



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with advice and assistance in their legislation and ensured full publicity of the law-making. Their functions were strictly limited to legislation, which the Executive laid before them, and they were expressly forbidden to transact any business except the consideration and enactment of legislative measures or to entertain any motion except a motion to introduce a Bill or one having reference to a Bill actually introduced. They could not inquire into grievances, they could not call for information or examine the conduct of the Executive, they had no power over the army or over the finances of the Government.

In fact the authority of the Government was left unimpaired, but, in the spirit, the germs had been sown for the Indian unrest. In the mind of the Indians, who had been trained intellectually on Western lines, gradually grew the conviction that they were as capable of governing as the British. Their traditions, which are based on the Oriental conception of despotic government, led them to believe that the new course set by the British Government, could be nothing but a sign of weakness. In their hearts arose the hope that the day might be approaching when they could drive the foreigner out of their country and enjoy for them-

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selves the prosperity, which the British rule had brought about. Thus the first signs of Indian dissatisfaction became apparent, which Parliament, entirely misreading Oriental mentality, thought could be met by a further act of generosity.

In 1892 a new Indian Councils Act made provision for the introduction of a limited and indirect system of election for the filling of some of the non-official seats on the Provincial Councils as well as on the Indian Legislative Council. Strong resentment amongst the British in India was to be expected and, therefore, a true ostrich-policy was practised. The word 'election' appeared nowhere in the statute. The process was described as 'nomination' made on the recommendation of certain bodies.

In the case of the Central Legislature five more additional members were brought in, four nominated on their recommendation by the non-official members of each of the four provincial councils and one by the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce. In the provincial councils the majority of the non-official members were appointed on recommendation, principally by municipalities and district boards, thus ensuring a kind of indirect election.

Moreover, the power of the councils was increased.

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The members obtained the right of addressing questions to the Executive and were allowed to discuss, but not to vote upon, the annual statement of revenue and expenditure. There remained an official majority in the councils and it was still maintained that there was no approach to parliamentary government.

Lord Dufferin, in whose time the suggestions for the new act were first put forward, wrote:

‘Our scheme may be briefly described as a plan for the enlargement of our provincial councils, for the enhancement of their status, the multiplication of their functions, the partial introduction into them of the elective principle, and the liberalization of their general character as political institutions. From this it might be concluded that we were contemplating an approach, in all events, as far as the provinces are concerned, to English parliamentary government and an English constitutional system. Such a conclusion would be very wide of the mark; and it would be wrong to leave either the India Office or the Indian public under so erroneous an impression. India is an integral portion, and it may be said one of the most important portions, of the mighty British Empire. Its destinies have been confided to the guidance of an alien race, whose



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function it is to arbitrate between a multitude of conflicting or antagonistic interests, and its Government is conducted in the name of a monarch whose throne is in England. The executive that represents her imperium in India is an executive directly responsible not to any local authority, but to the Sovereign and to the British Parliament. Nor would its members divest themselves of the responsibility so long as Great Britain remains the paramount administrative power in India. But it is of the essence of constitutional government as Englishmen understand the term, that no administration should remain at the head of affairs which does not possess the necessary powers to carry out whatever measures or polity it may consider to be "for the public interest". The moment these powers are withheld, either by the Sovereign or Parliament, a constitutional executive resigns its functions and gives way to those whose superior influence with the constituencies has enabled them to overrule its decisions, and who consequently become answerable for whatever line of procedure may be adopted in lieu of that recommended by the predecessors. In India this shifting of responsibility from one set of persons to another is under existing circumstances impossible, for if any measure introduced into a legislative



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council is voted by an adverse majority, the Governor cannot call upon the dissentients to take the place of his own official advisers, who are nominated by the Queen-Empress on the advice of the Secretary of State. Consequently the vote of the opposition in an Indian Council would not be given under the heavy sense of responsibility which attaches to the vote of a dissenting majority in a constitutional country; while no responsible executive could be required to carry on the government unless free to inaugurate whatever measures it considers necessary for the good and safety of the State. It is, therefore, obvious, for this and many other reasons, that no matter to what degree the liberalization of the councils may now take place, it will be necessary to leave in the hands of each provincial government the ultimate decision upon all important questions, and the paramount control of its own policy. It is in this view that we have arranged that the nominated members in the council should outnumber the elected members, at the same time that the Governor has been empowered to overrule his council whenever he feels himself called upon by circumstances to do so.'

This reasoning may have sounded quite convincing to Members of Parliament. It may even have

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set at rest the misgivings of the British out in India. But the important point was what impression it would make on the Indian mind. Unfortunately it could not convey any meaning to the Indian, who cannot understand the essence of constitutional government as the Englishman does. To the educated Indian, who had mastered the intellectual part of our Western civilization only, the traditions and the instincts of the British race remained a closed book. He could translate the intellectual explanation of the provisions of the new Councils Act only through the vision of his Oriental mind, which cannot comprehend a delegation of power otherwise than as the weakening of those who have held that power so far.

It is, therefore, not surprising that this act of generosity had no effect towards the appeasing of Indian dissatisfaction, but, on the contrary, only encouraged the agitation which was gradually developing against British supremacy.

Unfortunately, the true cause of the difficulty was not recognized and in the year 1909 the Morley-Minto Reforms brought another step, and a very considerable one, in the same direction. It seemed almost as if British authority, once started on the downward path, was under the influence of the law



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of gravity and could but accelerate the pace. The official majority in the provincial councils was abandoned. The number of their additional members was brought up to fifty in the larger provinces and thirty in the smaller. The greater part of these were non-officials, elected by groups of local authorities, large landholders, trade associations or universities. In Bengal, the majority even of the whole council was elected. The Central Legislative Council was to contain the Governor-General, the seven Members of the Executive Council, and some sixty additional members, of whom not more than twenty-eight could be officials, while twenty-seven of the remainder were to be elected by a method which was partly indirect and partly direct. The seats were distributed in such a way, that the Government could always count upon an official majority. This was justified by Lord Morley on the contention that the Governor-General in Council in its legislative, as well as its executive character, should continue to be so constituted as to ensure its constant and uninterrupted power to fulfil the constitutional obligations that it owes, and always must owe, to His Majesty's Government and to the Imperial Parliament.

The control by the Executive over the Legislative



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was thus preserved, as it had to be. The only alternative would have been the control by the Legislative over the Executive, which in India would have meant nothing short of abdication of British authority.

The effect of the new reforms was to convey to the mind of the Indian extremist the conviction that he only had to continue his agitation to obtain this result and an increasing revolutionary spirit characterized the years which preceded the Great War.



CSL



V I

E D U C A T I O N

MODERN education is not the source of our Western civilization, and it is highly improbable that it can ever serve as the starting point for a new civilization. It is the handing on, in a condensed form, of the experiences amassed during ages of struggle and hardship, and is directed by well-defined ambitions and ideals of the Western race.

The hope that it can be of service to another race could only be realized if such race happened to be animated by the same ambitions and the same ideals as guided the West. But, in that event, it is to be expected that it would be discarded with disdain for such race would be firmly convinced that it could do better than we just as each new generation scoffs at the accumulated wisdom of its fathers and has no doubt as to its own abilities to solve all problems in a faster and a superior way.

Retracing our steps towards the commencement of our north-western civilization we shall find the



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line pointing towards the barbarians who invaded and destroyed the Roman Empire and not towards the intellectual centres at Alexandria and at Byzantium, which were only offshoots of Greek and Roman culture. Byzantium, at its best, was no more than a perverted pocket-edition of Rome.

It may be contended that our present civilization owes a great debt to the priests and monks, who guarded the intellectual fruit of the Graeco-Roman civilization during the dark ages, which followed the fall of the Roman Empire. It is, however, open to grave doubt whether they were capable of assimilating the true essence of the old culture and of understanding the true character of Roman or Greek. It seems more plausible that all they could do was to paste their own thoughts and their own feelings on to the words of the ancient, thus putting an entirely different meaning into them. The difference must be as great as would be the difference between the instinctive understanding that the man in the street in London to-day has of the British character, and the opinion that could be formed of it by the most learned Chinese professor who will be lecturing about British civilization in Canton towards the year 4000!

It is only human that our legitimate pride in the



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amazing victories of the intellect, as we witness them to-day, should lead us to exaggerate the part that it played in the building up of our civilization and that other important points should be lost sight of. Intellectualism is not synonymous with intelligence and the intellectual field is not life itself, but only a segment thereof. Our intellectual capacities have to be captured by each succeeding generation through years of laborious study, they are not inherited through the blood as is the case with character and instinct.

If we strip ourselves of intellectual vanity we are bound to recognize that, after all, intellect brought us little more than material comfort and individual security: the germ-carriers of degeneration. If we are out for the building up of a race, sufficiently strong to be victorious in the battle of life, we must trust to character; if we are out for happiness we must go to the heart. But we are too often inclined to attribute the success of our Western civilization to our conquests in the realm of the intellect, whereas in reality the development of our modern intellect is but one of the results of our civilization.

Studying history we find that, after the Great Invasion from central Asia and the fall of the Roman Empire, in the north-west of Europe various



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tribes crystallized into feudal states of a kind which remained stagnant for some four or five centuries. Then, in the course of the eleventh century, there suddenly flared up that typical Western mind, which was troubled by a desire to embrace life in all directions, to which desire no limits could apparently be set. Without preparation it inspired, as if it were instinctively, Gothic architecture, which found its expression in the admirable structure of our cathedrals, whose lines and towers seem to be animated by a longing for the infinite. All of a sudden enthusiasm flared up all over Europe and, in the Crusades, satisfaction was sought for a new and restless spirit of adventure.

The mystery of the sudden change which had come over Europe cannot be explained, but it does not seem unreasonable to conjecture that its conception took place with the mixture of the blood, which occurred in the preceding century as a consequence of the invasions by the Norsemen.

Basing ourselves on facts, we can only maintain that it could not have been brought about by those, who studied Graeco-Roman culture, for, in that event, the change would have come about more gradually. Moreover, those who interested themselves in these studies, were principally the monks,

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who shirked the harder problems of life and sought shelter behind the walls of the monastery. They did not take part in active life and the outcome of their studies and meditations did but to a small extent influence the men of action, who were truly responsible for the translation of the new spirit into deeds. It was those who had the courage to start on the perilous journeys and, with but little theoretical knowledge, succeeded not only in discovering new worlds, but in bringing them into the possession of Europe. Thus there opened an era of great prosperity and the intellectually-minded were stimulated to new conceptions of the universe and of the laws of nature. These eventually led to the advance of science and the mechanical inventions.

It is more reasonable to put the birth of modern Europe in this period than in the year chosen by the schoolmaster, 1543, the fall of Byzantium, when the new Europe was already advancing rapidly towards the years of full manhood. The era of the great conquests was at hand and Europe reaped the full benefit of its mature years, even as the man who succeeds in life does during the period that lies between his fortieth and sixtieth year. Thereafter, as the days of action drew to a close, the influence of the men of action waned and those who were more



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intellectually inclined found the opportunity of asserting themselves. The importance of theoretical knowledge was exaggerated and the value of action belittled. Beautiful theories were distilled out of actual life and then the unpardonable error was committed of trying to shape life according to still more theories derived from the former. This led to the falsification of the true and eternal character of life, which can only be maintained by action, by life itself, and cannot be reconstructed and remodelled by ever-increasing doses of paper and ink. The distance between theory and action can be measured by considering the difference that there exists between reading about the life of Clive and living through the days when Clive shaped the destinies of India.

Thus we rapidly approach the age at which a man prefers a comfortable chair near the fire, lights his pipe and talks. Having no longer the strength to join in the active battle of life, he can hardly do otherwise, and, being only human, he necessarily must try to find another foundation for life in order to justify his existence in his own eyes. All values are thrown in the melting pot; to him words, theories and ideals become the beauty, action and battle the inferior part of life. So, in public life, we



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prefer the modern Parliament, which is more and more doing justice to its name by becoming 'l'endroit ou l'on parle', to the old fashioned days when we were governed by a king, who, as the name denotes, was 'the man who can'. These thoughts may sound unpleasant to our human vanity, which, however, has no power to change the natural course of life, as it presents itself in birth, youth, manhood, old age and death to the race as well as to the individual. But, the fact that we must eventually die is no reason to prevent us from living and from straining all our energies in an endeavour to postpone death as long as possible.

In India, when the days of strenuous action were past and it seemed as if—thanks to Clive and Hastings—a form of stable government had been reached, the attention of the British was turned towards the more theoretical side of life and the problem of education came to the foreground. This lay in the natural order of things, but it must be deeply regretted that, when the choice between Oriental and Western education had to be made, a majority was in favour of the latter. Unfortunately at the critical moment, when the decision had to be taken, the new gospel of education began its victorious march all through Europe, whereas Oriental



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education in India, notwithstanding the traditions and achievements of ancient learning, was at an extremely low level. The temptation could not be resisted to make an entirely fresh start and let India profit by the fruit of the Western intellect, which just then, by its inventions in the mechanical field, brought the whole of Europe into a state of profound self-admiration.

Thus was neglected the only safe basis on which Indian society could rest and, unaware of the disastrous results it might lead to, an entirely foreign element was grafted on to the Indian soul. The Indian, accustomed as he was to accept anything that might be decreed by his rulers, soon adapted himself to the new course of instruction. At the outset both parties were not slow in recognizing the merits of the system. The East India Company appreciated the cheaper employees which modern education supplied to fill the lower ranks, while the Indian was pleased to find that an opportunity had opened to incorporate himself in the machinery of the ruling power. Thus three forces operated towards the extension of the new system — the apostles of Western education at home, the pecuniary interest of the East India Company, and the vanity of the Indian.



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Higher education was definitely linked with the English language and the British conception of modern education. By Sir Charles Wood's Education Dispatch of 1854 the whole course of Indian education was determined by imposing upon the Government of India the duty of creating a system which was to embrace the whole field of education from the primary school to the university. Evidently it did not dawn upon the apostles of education — British as well as Indian — that a foreign education is extremely limited in its results. It can develop the brain, but can have no effect on the character which is rooted in the instincts and the traditions of another race. Nor can it bring to life qualities which are not dormant in the racial character of the individual. It is too much to expect that our modern Western education, aiming as it is at knowledge, can give satisfaction to the heart of the Indian, because it fails to have any inner contact with the Oriental soul. Thus it remains floating and detached on the unfathomable depths of the Indian soul, which has been formed by an outlook on life that, through the experiences of thousands of years, has been entirely different from our own. It is vain to hope that Western education will ever take root and flower naturally in India as it did in our Western mind.



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The unpleasant results of the failure to assimilate the deeper meaning of education did not fail to make themselves apparent as the number of Indian students increased and the Universities, which rapidly sprang up all over the country, continued to pour forth a stream of B.A.s and M.A.s. The saturation point was soon reached, the professions became overfilled and neither Government nor commerce and industry could absorb the ever-increasing numbers of intellectuals. At the root of the trouble lay the fact that the Indian regarded Western education as an instrument for piling up knowledge and saw the piling up of knowledge as an aim in itself. He considered the obtaining of a degree as the end of his endeavours and did not seem to realize that it is the translating of theoretical knowledge into practical results which gives the true value to Western education.

The problem is complicated by the fact that until in very recent days, Western education appealed almost exclusively to the Hindu, while the Moham-medan stood aloof, and that amongst the Hindus it was especially the Brahmin who was attracted. The latter having always been averse to menial occupation, and his Indian mentality failing to comprehend the true essence of Western education, there were



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two causes working together towards the inevitable result that the Indian should concentrate his energy almost exclusively on the more theoretial branches of European science: Law and Medicine. The disproportion between those that are attracted by the study in chemistry, engineering, architecture and the like, and those that aspire to a position as a doctor or as a lawyer is most marked. Society, however, does not possess an endless capacity of absorption for unlimited numbers of lawyers and so in India there was formed a numerous group of unemployed lawyers, a class which has already proved dangerous to the internal peace of many a country in various parts of the world.

Another deplorable result of Western education in India has been its contribution towards the aggravation of Hindu-Moslem antagonism. Moham-medans looking askance at Western education, the natural outcome was that the overwhelming number of Hindu students should lead to the lion's share of government positions falling to Hindus. The existing proportion between the Hindu and the Moham-medan population in India found no expression in the number of government officials professing the two religions. This became a thorn in the flesh of the Mohammedan and the grievance widened the



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gulf between the two most important groups of the population. It is only in very recent days since it dawned upon the Mohammedan mind that the future of India may possibly not be determined by force alone that the followers of the Prophet have set themselves to retrieve the lost ground.

In Europe, where democracy and demagoguery seriously prejudice all sense of reality, another undesirable symptom appears in consequence of the entirely wrong impression that the exterior success of Western education conveys of the capacity of the Indian people in general to take their destinies into their own hands. It is only human that our vanity should have been flattered by the appetite the Indian showed for our European system of education and the facility he possessed for absorbing the maxims of our modern democratic ideals. We were thereby encouraged in our pride and strengthened in the faith we have in our modern institutions. Their acceptance by the Indian seemed to prove their superiority to anything the world had so far produced. We forgot that the Indian has mastered the intellectual side of our civilization, but the intellectual side only, and that he is unable to penetrate the outward shell and understand the true character and the instinctive dynamic forces, which



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form the real soul of Europe, and of which our intellectualism is but one manifestation. This mastery over the forms of Western intellect is but a thin layer over the Indian soul, but, at the Round Table Conference, the light of it (together with the light of apparent Indian unity) was flashed before the eyes of the British public, and so blinded the outlook of those, who had never been East, on the real state of Indian affairs. It should be impressed on the Western mind that in reality the anglicized Indian is only parading in borrowed feathers. Modern Western education can no more change his heart and his soul than the study of Hinduism can change the heart and the soul of the European. There is not any question of the one being higher or lower than the other, but there is a difference in conception of life which is so fundamental that it cannot be bridged by a few generations. Moreover, the Indian who is attracted by Western education is the one who, nationally speaking, is not possessed of a strong character. A true Indian will be anglicized no more than a true Briton germanized. It is as futile to hope that the East can be Westernized as to suppose that Europe could ever be Hinduized.

Modern education, including education that is

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carried on in the vernaculars, has not penetrated the masses. According to the latest census figures available, in British India 14.4 out of 100 boys over five years of age and 2.0 out of 100 girls over five years of age were literate, and only 160 males and 18 females out of 10,000 were able to read and write in the English language. It is not surprising that this should be so. Nearly three-fourths of the Indian population lives by agriculture and pasture and it is a feature all the world over that the ordinary farmer attaches little value to education: he prefers his children to assist in the fields or in the stables. Moreover, with the exceptions of the Brahmins, the people of India on the whole are not naturally inclined towards education. Whatever inclination they may have possessed was suppressed by Hinduism through numerous generations, and caste has formed an insurmountable barrier against their reaping the benefit of personal effort and ambition to rise in the social scale. It is only in recent times that political agitation has been a stimulant to them and it is remarkable how the number of pupils in primary schools has increased since the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. In 1917 the total number of the school-going population of British India attending primary classes numbered 6,404,200.



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In 1922 it had risen to 6,897,147 and the latest figure available is 9,247,617 for the year 1927.

But other figures prove that the influence of the Reforms has not been able to overcome the influence of tradition, as it has been formed through many centuries, and that the energy, which prompted the entrance into the schools, does not last long enough to make the pupils carry on for more than a few years. Against 3,453,046 boys who attended class I during the year 1922-23, there were left 1,218,758 in class II during the year 1923-34, 897,512 in class III during the year 1924-25, 655,101 in class IV during the year 1925-26 and 393,465 in class V during the year 1926-27. Considering, side by side with these figures, the fact that India can boast of sixteen universities, the university of Calcutta alone containing some 29,000 students — it is clear that the old-standing complaint, that the system of public education in India is top-heavy, still holds good.

The explanation of why no effective means could be devised to improve this situation, must be sought in the typical mentality of the Indian, formed gradually through the ages and not to be changed suddenly. A further explanation lies in the fact that modern Western education is not the logical out-



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come of the development of Indian society, but is a foreign element, suddenly brought into it, which cannot spread in the system, enclosed as it is between the barriers of caste and religion. Western education was not required to enable the people to meet the demands of the existing social and economic structure of the country, but became a means of rising from the ranks of the ruled into those of the ruling classes. It was not long before the impression was created in the Indian mind that, with the fountain-pen all those advantages could be obtained which so far had been the privilege of the European in India. Study thus did not mean a preparation for the battle of life, but the final object became the obtaining of a degree, which would automatically bring all the dreamt-of results to the successful candidate, and make him the equal of the members of the white race. His success would be a most pleasing stimulant to his vanity, and to that of his relations, and even when he did not succeed, a way was found to caress his vanity. It is no rare occurrence in India, that someone introduces himself into your office by presenting a visiting card, bearing below the name the words, 'failed B.A.' It is, therefore, not surprising that in many cases schools should become nothing more than factories of B.A.'s.



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The ideals of science were often lost sight of, the 'exam' became of preponderating importance and the course of studies just a channel for the mechanical conveyance of knowledge.

Undoubtedly more favourable results can be obtained by more effective control, direction and administration. But the root of the unsatisfactory state of affairs can thereby not be touched. The real cause of the difficulty lies in the unsympathetic attitude of orthodox Hinduism towards anything that comes from the West. This attitude is quite reasonable from the Hindu point of view since it safeguards the foundations upon which the entire social frame of the Hindu structure rests. Orthodox Hinduism is quite prepared to employ the Western educated classes in India as a phalanx directed against British supremacy, but, behind that phalanx, the barrier of caste remains hermetically closed.



VII

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PUBLIC opinion in Europe always seems to have overrated the dangers of the political agitation which has now been going on for more than one generation in India. It is doubtful whether anybody living to-day can recall a time when the newspapers did not bring some item of news about the unrest. Personally, I remember that during the South African war, when the old blood-tie made itself felt in Holland and all sympathies went out towards the Boers, many a Hollander nourished the hope that the salvation of the two Republics would be brought about by a revolt in India, an occurrence which, in the Dutch press, was frequently pictured as not being altogether outside the sphere of possibilities. This is just one example to show how public opinion in Europe always tended to put a wrong interpretation on the news about the situation in India. Another striking case is formed by the expectations of the German Government at the



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outbreak of the war in 1914. Notwithstanding that the Government must have had at their disposal adequate information about the actual state of affairs, German hope ran high that the revolutionary and nationalist tendency, which was discernible amongst the Hindu population in Bengal, might cause an actual outbreak. This, in combination with a Holy War to be started by the Moham-medans after Turkey's entrance into the war, would create a very grave danger to British supremacy in India and thus influence the course of the war.

These wrong impressions must probably be attributed to the fact, that there are but few in Europe, or in America, who realize that in India there are not less than three kinds of unrest, which are entirely different in cause and effect. Two of these are the outcome of natural causes, whereas the third one, influenced by political events and by currents of thought in various parts of the world, is to a very large extent the result of an agitation which is continuously fed by artificial means.

The most ancient of the three is the unrest along the north-western frontier. Retracing our steps through some thirty centuries we find, like a red thread woven all through the fabric of India's history, the story of numerous invasions from

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Central Asia. The true and natural causes of these invasions are found in the temptation which the fertile soil and the easier life in India exercise on the populations of the rougher countries of the north and by the imperative necessity of freshening the blood of the inhabitants of India, whose strength is continuously sapped by the weakening effects of the climate. As history shows these invasions could be temporarily checked whenever India enjoyed the blessings of a strong government, but no government will ever possess the power to eliminate the causes. We, therefore, must accept the inevitable fact that there will always be either invasions, or the milder form thereof as we know them to-day, in the unrest on the north-western frontier. This unrest is the manifestation of the menace of foreign aggression and has no relation whatever to any movement that finds its origin in Indian sentiment or in Indian aspirations.

The second type of unrest is the outcome of the antagonism which exists between Hindus and Mohammedans. The causes of this rivalry have been set out in Chapter I. The struggle between the two communities has been going on ever since the Mohammedans set foot in India. The British Government can prevent the violent outbreaks of



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the religious controversies or limit them in their consequences, but, as long as the mentality of the Indian does not change, there is no hope of elaborating any cure that can have a lasting effect. Those who do not know India are frequently led to conclude from the number killed and wounded which are the result of these outbreaks, that British authority in India is weakening. They should, however, keep in mind that the religious antagonism had already been the curse of India for many a century before the English set foot there, and that the problem is in no way connected with anti-British feeling.

Only the third kind of unrest is the result of a movement, which is directed against British supremacy. The dangers which may accrue from this movement are, however, grossly overrated in Europe and in America. Public opinion to-day, in the West, is too readily impressed by large numbers, and a figure of three hundred and fifty millions in itself frequently suffices to inspire a feeling of awe. It is, therefore, well to remember that these millions are not a unity, not a nation. They are divided by religion, by race, by language, by natural inclinations, and it should set the Western mind at ease to think that so far history cannot show one



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example of a man possessed of sufficient genius to weld a mass of three hundred and fifty millions into a weapon of attack.

Moreover, the present political agitation in India is not the flower of an indigenous plant rooted in Indian soil and nourished by the sap of Oriental wisdom. The seed of it was imported from the West, and its growth has been stimulated by the artificial manures of modern Western education and the political conceptions which form the ideals of Western democracy to-day. Deprived as it is of all natural nourishment (for that could be supplied only by what is grown in the Oriental soul as the essence of centuries of Oriental life) it cannot ever hope to be more than a hot-house plant, one that must wither as soon as it is exposed to the full force of the storms of life, and is no longer sheltered on the lee-side of the mighty structure of the British Empire.

Democracy is not an idea that comes naturally to the Indian mind. A man's rank and position in life are to the Indian of great importance and the divisions in social status descend into such minor details as seem, to the Western mind, to be bordering on the ridiculous. The sense of equality has always been discouraged by Hinduism, for the



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whole fabric of Hindu social life is built on the system of caste, which is diametrically opposed to the possibility of anybody ever gaining influence over affairs which are outside the sphere of his occupation.

Fatalism with the Mohammedan and the belief in Karma and reincarnation with the Hindu led the masses to accept things as they come. The fatiguing influences of the climate made them appreciate the fact that the burden of government rests on the shoulders of others. To the masses 'Government' has always been some mysterious power far away, a power which had in the good old days of despotism, moreover, most unpleasant ways of making its existence felt whenever its wishes were not complied with. In consequence it was reasoned that the less one came into contact with the ruling forces the better it was and that government was an affair which could best be left to the upper-classes.

Autocracy was the only form of government India ever knew, and its right of being had never been questioned until the effects of Western education began to make themselves felt. Young Indian brains soon were charmed by the liberal tendencies of English thought. But foreign as the ideas



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necessarily were to the Indian character, nourished through countless ages by the traditions of Hinduism, the youngsters soon drifted from the safe anchorage which the Indian conception of life had offered to innumerable generations.

No harm came of this as long as all who passed their matriculation or received their degree could find employment in Government service or be absorbed by commerce and industry. But, once the supply of westerly-educated Indians exceeded the demand, the difficulties appeared. Numerous educated youngsters then found themselves confronted by the problem of earning their living, and, when they found the European sources of employment obstructed by their colleagues, they soon discovered that their newly gained capacities were of no value to Indian society. Proud as they had been of their achievements in Western knowledge it was only natural that they should now feel the disappointment most bitterly and in their discontent put the blame for their ill-success on 'government', which had introduced the modern institution of Western education.

Averse as they felt towards more practical occupations, they soon filled the medical profession and the openings at the Bar. Then many



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turned their mind towards journalism, but, as the British papers were run by a British staff, their only hope lay in the foundation of an Indian press. The Indian journals, however, discovered that they could not compete with the British papers appearing in India and that the only chance of existence lay in opposing the Government, a position to which disappointment made them naturally inclined. This offered an opportunity of serving up an unconventional menu, which by its freshness might attract a sufficiently large circle of readers. The liberal ideas of English thought, wherewith they had become familiar at the University, were explained, and on them were based claims for the more equal treatment of the Indian and for a greater share in the affairs of Government which in turn would lead eventually to a larger number of Government posts becoming available for Indians.

The liberal classes in England were bound to sympathize with the movement. They recognized the same words, the same phrases which had always conveyed their thoughts of ideal government, but they could not realize that they were but words and phrases, the true meaning of which had not been grasped by the Indian. They did not



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realize, and, not knowing India, could not realize that thought in the East does not run on Western lines. They could not understand that most of the values of life are different in the East, or that much of the attitude towards life in the East is based on assumptions which are unacceptable to Europe and vice versa. They were the self-same words, and to the European they could only convey the meaning he had been in the habit of putting on them. Thus was created the source of an endless stream of mutual misunderstanding and trouble. The sources of information about Indian opinion open to the politician at home were too often limited only to the newspapers and books published in the English language by anglicized Indians and to the intercourse he could have with Indian students who visited England.

The fundamental cause of all the difficulties that were to come lies in the fact that those at home who followed the new aspirations that began to come to the surface in India, only saw (and, not knowing the East could only see) what was going on in the proportions of life as it had developed and grown at home. They failed to realize that all the intercourse they could have, whether by speech or by the printed word, was limited to those



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who belonged to a class which had been created artificially. The words were taken at their face-value and accepted as a true expression of Indian public opinion by Occidental minds. Their outlook on the situation in India was blurred by their assigning to the western-educated classes the same place in Indian society as the intellectuals occupied in the West. It did not sufficiently enter their minds that the latter form the fruit of a natural flowering of Western civilization and are firmly rooted in the soil of a native conception of life, whereas the former are the produce of a foreign system of education and have no spiritual connection either with the masses or with the body of the truly Indian intelligentsia.

The ideas propagated by the western-educated Indian were nothing but the parrot-like repetition of foreign principles, crammed into their brains at English-styled universities and not the voicing of the silent wishes of the masses living in the five hundred thousand villages of India. Even to-day over ninety per cent of the population is illiterate and less than two per cent can read and write in the English language. The colourless standardizing of life, which follows in the track of modern democratic ideals, does not appeal to their Oriental



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imagination. Politics, however palatably served, are no temptation to the soul of the Indian masses. Their admiration goes out to a strong Government, under whose rule they can always calculate what to expect. All they look for to Government is security of life, security of property and freedom to live according to their religion, and maybe they add the enjoyment of good roads and good health; and further they pray that the Gods may favour them with a good monsoon. They are only too grateful that the responsibility for all these blessings does not rest upon their shoulders and the idea that they ever may be asked to share these responsibilities is enough to fill their minds with awe.

The orthodox Brahmin was the first to perceive the possibilities that the new situation offered for the weakening of British power. The first seditious outbreaks were engineered by the orthodox Hindus in the Province of Bombay. Whatever hope this may have raised in the heart of the western-educated Indian proved to be futile, for he soon found himself confronted by the rock of Hinduism, firmly based on the traditions of the oldest religion of the world, the product of the true instincts of the Indian soul. Brahminism may temporarily encourage the new current because it can serve to



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weaken the rule of the foreigner, but it can never allow the new ideas to obtain a grip on the mind of the masses. To do so would irrevocably bring about the breaking up of the system of caste and automatically put an end to the privileged position that the Brahmin has managed to retain in Indian society all through the ages. The only hope for the westernized Indian of finding a following of some size, therefore, pointed towards the population of the few large cities which are to be found in India, a possibility which was soon explored.

The public in Europe and in America, however, remained on the whole ignorant of these facts and could only judge the situation by the picture as they saw it through the eyes of those who belonged to what in India were shortly termed 'the educated classes'. Their Western vanity was naturally flattered by the ready manner in which the Indian had accepted all that must appear to their mind as the logical solution of the political problems of life. Thus they could not help feeling sympathetically inclined towards the aspirations of New India, and the weight of public opinion and political influences soon made the British Parliament favourably disposed towards meeting the demands of what was thought to be Indian public opinion.



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As early as 1861 the Indian Legislative Councils were opened to Indians. The next step was made in the year 1892, when the principle of election, although thoroughly camouflaged, was admitted. These acts of generosity failed to appease Indian appetite for a larger share in the affairs of Government. It could hardly have been expected to be otherwise. To the Indian, as well as to the European, favours received leave a most unpleasant aftertaste. Ordinary human vanity made the Indian believe that the success that had been obtained was to be attributed to his own capacities and not to British generosity. He owed it to his self-respect to prove the truth of his reasoning in the only possible way — by continuing the agitation and thus obtaining further concessions. Which he promptly did and which he will be obliged to go on doing, unless the British radically change their attitude, until the final goal is reached and the British fully abdicate.

In the year 1885 the Indian National Congress had been established as a body of moderate opinion. It was not till shortly after the Indian Councils Act of 1892 came into force that the first indications of a revolutionary movement became apparent in the province of Bombay. After riots between



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Hindus and Mohammedans had broken out at Bombay in the year 1893, a movement was started amongst Hindus with a view to encouraging the celebration of two annual festivals, one in honour of the Hindu God Ganpati and one in honour of Sivaji, who had led the Marathas when they rose against their Mohammedan rulers. The movement, which at first was purely anti-Mohammedan, was soon directed against the British Government. In the course of the next year, on the approach of the Ganpati festival, agitators urged the Marathas to rebel as Sivaji did and insisted that a religious outbreak should be made the first step towards the overthrow of British power. The yearly festivals in celebration of the memory of Sivaji, which were started in the year 1895, offered opportunities of delivering stirring speeches recalling the courage of the man who conquered the foreign domination of the Mohammedans, and of instilling into the Marathas' mind the idea of a similar rising, now to be directed against British rule. A prominent part in the movement was soon to be played by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, whose memory is still held in great reverence by all Hindus who are interested in the political movement of to-day.



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In Bengal the first efforts directed towards a revolutionary movement date from the year 1902, but did not bear fruit till a favourable ground for sedition had been found in the agitation against the partition of Bengal a few years later. They then rapidly spread amongst the western-educated classes and gradually one current developed into a system of terrorism, which endeavoured to obtain its object by such violent means as the throwing of bombs, by murders and by dacoities. The Bengali has since remained the principal driving force in the movement and the most active in spreading the seditious agitation into the other provinces were emissaries from Bengal. It is highly remarkable that the leading part in the violent movement should have fallen to the population of Bengal, which for centuries had been one of the most peaceful and unwarlike races on the Indian continent. An explanation for this fact can only be found in the circumstance that the Bengali mind readily responded to Western learning and that, in consequence thereof, the modern Western ideals found a more fertile soil in Bengal than in the other provinces.

The provinces of Madras and Burma were, comparatively speaking, but slightly affected. More



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serious disturbances occurred in the United Provinces and in the Punjab.

At the beginning of this period, when the first hesitating steps were set on the road which is meant to lead to Indian independence, the movement received the formidable impetus from the amazing victories of Japan over Russia, which electrified the whole Asiatic world. No attention was paid to the facts that the Russian is not a truly European race and that the victory of Japan was in no small way attributable to the moral support she had received from Great Britain and from the United States of America. To the Asiatic mind stood out only the, to them all-important, fact that a white-skinned race had been defeated by a darker-coloured one. This was cleverly exploited by the leaders of the seditious movement in India and, as it easily impressed the imagination of the masses, it was constantly kept before the eyes of those they hoped to add to their following. Japan was pictured as the champion of all Asia and the outcome of the war as the turning point in the history of Europe.

Government hoped to stem the rising tide by widening the legitimate outlet for Indian opinion. In the year 1907 a Hindu and a Mohammedan



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were appointed to the Secretary of State's Council and in the year 1909 a Hindu was for the first time appointed to the Viceroy's Council. The Morley-Minto Reforms were a further expression of this policy. These reserved to the Indian a greater share in the number of seats in the legislative councils and conferred upon them wider powers of discussion. Such a policy cannot fail to remind one of the policy of Louis XVI. History can teach us that revolutions generally succeed when a government is weakening, but seldom stand a chance of success against a ruler who knows his mind. A policy of compromise cannot be crowned with lasting success. This is also proved by the fact that various governments in Europe, while endeavouring to prevent revolution by giving way to the rising demands of the people, have, since 1848, been constantly forced to retreat before the oncoming forces of socialism and communism.

In a country like India, where despotic and autocratic government had always been practised and accepted as the normal state of affairs, where the population looks up with admiration to the man who has the will to power and where only a ruler whose strength can be relied upon is respected, it was idle to expect that compromises would be

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effective in appeasing the growing discontent. To the moderate parties they could only act as an encouragement to continue their policy of trying to obtain something for nothing. As far as the extremists were concerned they had the effect of pouring oil on the fire. Terrorism and political crime in Bengal increased in a disquieting way, while violent outbreaks occurred in the United Provinces and in the Punjab, where they culminated in the attempt on the Viceroy's life, which was made at Delhi in the year 1912.

It was in this troubled atmosphere that the outbreak of the Great War found India.

So far the seditious movement had been almost entirely Hindu and but few Mohammedans had been involved in it to any degree. But with the outbreak of the war, and especially after Turkey joined the side of the Central Powers, apprehensions arose that the favourable situation would not endure. The sympathy of Indian Muslims with Turkey was of old standing and had already been apparent during the Crimean War. Gradually it had strengthened in consequence of improved communications and as the result of a wider interest in the world outside India. Pan-Islamic influences were favourable to the growth of this feeling. So



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were the events of the war between Italy and Turkey and the two Balkan wars. The British agreement with Russia regarding Persia produced a highly unfavourable impression and British inaction during the Balkan wars were commented upon in contrast with British championship of Turkey in former days. Under these circumstances Germany's hope rose high with regard to the possibility of provoking the outbreak of a Holy War to be directed against British supremacy in India. German influences were soon at work to foment trouble whenever and wherever there should be a chance to do so. At the outset they did not fail to come within reasonable distance of local successes and disturbances broke out in various parts of the country. The most serious ones were the Budge-Budge riot in Bengal, the Benares conspiracy in the United Provinces and the Lahore conspiracy in the Punjab, all of which were the outcome of the Ghadr plot, which had been hatched by German influences. German efforts to provoke an all-Indian rebellion were however frustrated. A frank declaration issued by the Indian Government about their objects in the war against Turkey and their intentions with regard to the Khalif and the sacred places of Islam soon set the apprehensions of the



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Mohammedan population at rest, and the provisions of the Defence of India Act put the necessary power into the hands of the Government to deal adequately with all disorder.

Thus the danger, which had seemed to be most threatening, did not materialize. But other undesirable consequences of the war were not slow in making themselves felt. These resulted from the ruthless campaign of propaganda against Germany that was carried on all over India. For the first time since Western supremacy had been established in the East, the solidarity of the white races with regard to the coloured ones was systematically undermined and openly broken. No efforts were spared to draw Oriental countries into the camp of the Allies. Everything was done to inflame the Indian with hatred against the German foe with a view to raising the number of Indian recruits for the army and to influencing Indian willingness to contribute towards the costs of the war. While a struggle of life and death was being waged sufficient attention was not paid to the eventual consequences that might be the outcome of such propaganda. But the fruit that it would bear could soon be discerned. Just as the average European at home cannot distinguish between the various races in



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India, the Indian masses are not capable of drawing a clear line of distinction between German, French, British and all the other white races that inhabit God's earth. The campaign of disparagement that was continuously kept up against the German could only lead to a lowering of the feelings of respect and confidence that the Indian in general had until then nourished towards all men of the white race. The British themselves could not escape herefrom. Moreover, too much stress has been laid upon the value of Indian assistance during the war, however valuable such assistance undoubtedly has been. But the repeated uttering of words of gratefulness for the part India played could not fail to imbue the Indian mind with the idea that British power evidently was not so secure as had always been believed. The conviction ripened in the mind of many an Indian, who so far had only dared to dream that a miracle might happen and cause a German victory which would put an end to British supremacy, that, whatever course the war would eventually take, profit might accrue to those who aspired to Indian liberty.

For the extremist parties there was no hope of success as the Defence of India Act had put the required power at the disposal of the authorities



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to quell all manifestations of violent disorder. The moderate parties, however, realized that the favourable moment for action had arrived. The impression that the strength of the British Raj was no longer invulnerable spread more and more. Catchphrases, such as 'the protection of small nations', 'the right of self-determination', 'a war to make the world safe for democracy' and various other slogans lent themselves admirably to be played off against the British Government in India. And so, in the month of October, 1916, nineteen members of the Imperial Legislative Council summed up their courage and presented the Viceroy with a memorandum on post-war reforms.

The Government continued its policy of following the line of least resistance and replied by the famous announcement which Mr. Montagu made to the British Parliament in August, 1917.



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THE old, old danger which has been hanging over India all through history, did not disappear with the coming of British rule. Though, since then, it never materialized into a catastrophe, constant watch had to be kept on the Khyber Pass and armed force repeatedly resorted to to keep in check the martial tribes on the north-western frontier, who always were and always will be keen on raiding the peaceful inhabitants of the Indian plain. From 1850 until 1922 not less than seventy-two expeditions had to be undertaken against those tribes.

In the course of the nineteenth century the gradual advance of Russia into central Asia gave a new aspect to the old problem. When Russia started intriguing in Afghanistan round about the year 1835 it became evident that she would not be content with extending her power up to the Khyber Pass, but that a new and formidable menace to

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British power in India was developing. To counter Russian influence the first Afghan war was undertaken, which, some thirty years later was followed by a second one. From then on, for a whole generation, the menace of a possible and even probable attack by Russia — the only Great Power who can move against the British Empire on land — darkened the foreign relations of India. This lasted until the year 1907, when an agreement was concluded between Great Britain and Russia on questions likely to disturb the friendly relations of the two powers in Asia generally and in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet in particular.

The Great War followed and the Russian Revolution. It seemed at first as if hereby the Russian menace had definitely disappeared. The new rulers, professing to open a new chapter in Russian history, renounced in vehement terms the imperialistic tendencies which had characterized the policy of the Tsars, and promised, by the realization of communist ideals, to bring peace to the world.

The pleasant dream soon was to be disturbed. The ideals of communism had charmed a small class of westernized leaders only, but the Russian masses had not been affected by them. The



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Russian Revolution, according to its original leaders, and to the fervent followers of communism is the final result of progress along the road of liberalism, radicalism, socialism and communism. But, to all appearances, it could only succeed because the semi-Asiatic population of Russia instinctively seized the opportunity to throw off the yoke of the foreign Western civilization which Peter the Great (1689-1725) had tried to lay on its shoulders. Seen in this light Bolshevik agitation in Europe is more than the desire to spread communism as a means of self-defence; it is an attack on the civilization of the West, which for two centuries threatened to suffocate the instinctive ideals of the Russian.

The foreign policy of a country is naturally, logically and mercilessly mapped out by the economic wants of its population. Such policy may be cloaked in the ideals of the party that happens to be in power, but these ideals can never constitute the substance of it. A government that would strive at the realization of its theoretic ideals to the detriment of the material interests of its own people would stand guilty of the crime of high-treason. This is one reason to disbelieve that the Bolshevik attack on capitalism is animated by the



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lofty desire of making the whole world partake of the blessings of communism.

But there is more. A Great Power of the size of Russia, with a population numbering some one hundred and fifty millions, must naturally aspire to world-domination. If Russia is inhabited by normal human beings, possessed of normal human character, it cannot be otherwise. Now, no country has, as far as history teaches us, been able to arrive at world-power, without having free access to the sea. It is therefore perfectly natural that, from the moment Peter the Great had succeeded in shaping Russia into a power that Europe had to reckon with, Russia's foreign policy should oscillate between expansion towards the west and expansion towards the east, both directed towards the ultimate aim of reaching the open sea. From Pultawa to Mukden the fundamental principle of Russian foreign policy never changed. It was determined by Russia's geographical position as well as by the economic necessities and the character of its inhabitants, three factors which even Bolshevism was powerless to alter.

Logically it had to follow that, some day or other, communist Russia, although vehemently protesting against all that was of the Tsars and denouncing

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imperialism as one of the most dangerous ulcers of capitalism, would have to take up the old imperialistic policy of its predecessors. As early as 1920 the first move was made. The line of least resistance was chosen and Poland attacked, but the waves of the Red Army broke at the walls of Warsaw.

After this defeat Bolshevik Russia decided to break with the piecemeal policy which had characterized the reign of the Tsars. She made up her mind to strike at the root of her troubles, which lies in British world power. Everywhere on her road to the open sea she finds Britain across her path. In the north-west the British Navy has no difficulty in blockading the outlet of the Baltic. In the south-west, should Russia succeed in conquering the long coveted Constantinople, she will find herself confronted by Britain at Malta and at Gibraltar in the west, at Port-Said and at Aden in the south. Due south again she will meet Britain on the Persian Gulf. Taking her course towards the south-east she would have to solve the tough problem of marching a modern army through the narrow gates of the Khyber Pass and then crush a British army waiting for her in the Indian plain. In the Far East, since the war of 1904-5, she finds the road blocked by Japan.

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Therefore, unless Russia be content to remain a continental power closed in on all sides, nothing remained for her but to take up the struggle with Great Britain. Knowing that her military and naval resources do not warrant any hope of success in open warfare, she realized that her chances of breaking Britain's back lie in the economic field and, therefore, decided to embark upon a ruthless economic campaign. Her communist theories lend themselves admirably to such a policy. By them her imperialistic aims can be veiled from the eyes of her followers and no opportunity need be lost to embarrass British trade. Each attack on capitalism, no matter in what part of the world, is sure to engender a setback of British commercial interests.

The chaotic situation in China offered a splendid occasion of undermining British prestige and British power. Under the pretence of assisting the Chinese in their struggle against the white race and against the rapacity of the West, the blessings of communism were preached in the East. Hitting at capitalism, translated into Russian foreign policy, means hitting at Britain, and the Russian move in China, stripped of its communist cloak, is merely the beginning of an encircling movement aiming at the British bulwark in India.



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In the same way the troubles that in recent years broke out in the Dutch East Indies and in French Indo-China were instigated by Russia, not to further the causes of communism or to weaken the power of capitalism, but as a truly Russian effort to open up the road towards Singapore.

Communism is but the mask in Russia's foreign policy, and Bolshevism not more than the present phase of the eternal Russian aspirations to world power.

I X

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IN former days, whenever political reforms were introduced in India, the fiction had been maintained that no responsible government was aimed at. Even when the Morley-Minto scheme was the subject of debate in the House of Lords towards the end of the year 1908, Lord Morley expressed his view in the following words: 'If it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or indirectly to the establishment of a parliamentary system in India, I, for one, would have nothing at all to do with it.'

In 1914 the war broke out, and, during the stormy years that followed, allied war propaganda inundated the world with a torrent of beautiful phrases, which gradually came to be accepted at their face-value and ended by blurring the people's clear vision on political events. It was only natural that, in the hearts of those who had suffered from



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the horrors of the period, a strong desire should arise to devise ways and means that would prevent for ever the repetition of such a catastrophe. From this natural feeling there developed the illusion that in future it would be possible to eliminate all elements that might lead to violence as a means of settling differences between nations, as well as between races and between opposing classes of the same society. Justice should reign supreme in all fields where hitherto the possession of real power had been the decisive factor. The growth of these illusions was favoured by a feeling of war-weariness and an indescribable longing for rest. Moreover, the wave of revolutions which swept over Europe deeply impressed the European mind and made it overrate the revolutionary dangers in Europe as well as in the East. In Europe, it was thought good policy to avert the threatening menace and to meet the claims of the working classes by granting universal suffrage, by introducing the eight-hours-day and by supporting the unemployed.

As far as India was concerned, the conviction grew that something had to be done to escape the risk of losing all. This conviction, coupled with the growing sentiment that justice should be the



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guiding spirit in all fields of life, led to what was justly claimed by the authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report to be 'the most momentous utterance ever made in India's chequered history'. This was the announcement which Mr. Montagu made to the House of Commons on August 20th, 1917, in the following terms:

'The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible, and that it is of the highest importance as a preliminary to considering what these steps should be that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at home and in India. His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided, with His Majesty's approval, that I should accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India to discuss these matters with the Viceroy and the



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Government of India, to consider with the Viceroy the views of local Governments, and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies and others.

‘I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility.’

Mr. Montagu visited India in the winter 1917-18 and in collaboration with the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, conducted an inquiry, the results of which were embodied in their Report on Indian Constitutional Reform, issued in the spring of 1918. The recommendations of the report were supplemented by those of the two committees which toured India in the winter of 1918-19. A third committee meeting in the United Kingdom in the course of the year 1919 reported on the modification



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of the system of administration of Indian affairs. In the same year the Government of India Bill was under examination by a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament, who, in their turn, issued an exhaustive report. Finally the Bill was passed by Parliament and received the Royal Assent on December 23rd, 1919.

The Preamble to the Government of India Act 1919 reaffirmed the new course, which had already been set out by Mr. Montagu in his announcement of 1917, by stating as follows:

‘Whereas it is the declared policy of Parliament to provide for the increasing association of Indians in every branch of Indian administration, and for the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in British India as an integral part of the Empire.

‘And whereas progress in giving affect to this policy can only be achieved by successive stages, and it is expedient that substantial steps in this direction should now be taken:

‘And whereas the time and measure of each advance can be determined only by Parliament, upon whom responsibility lies for



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the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples:

‘And whereas the action of Parliament in such matters must be guided by the co-operation received from those on whom new opportunities of service will be conferred, and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility:

‘And whereas concurrently with the gradual development of self-governing institutions in the Provinces of India it is expedient to give to those Provinces in provincial matters the largest measure of independence of the Government of India, which is compatible with the due discharge by the latter of its own responsibilities.’

The principal features of the Reforms of 1919 were the acceptance of the principle of direct franchise in the central and provincial legislatures, and the institution of the system of diarchy in the provinces.

The Reformed Central Legislature consists of the Governor-General and two Chambers, viz. the Council of State with a maximum size of sixty members, thirty-four of whom have to be elected,



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and the Legislative Assembly composed of not less than one hundred and forty-five members, one hundred and five of whom have to be elected. Special representation is retained for Mohammedans and other minorities.

The Central Legislature has power to make laws for all persons, courts, places and things within British India, for all subjects of His Majesty and servants of the Crown within other parts of India and for all Indian subjects of His Majesty without and beyond, as well as within British India. This power is subject to certain qualifications and to the limitation that the previous sanction of the Governor-General be obtained for the introduction of measures affecting certain matters, the most important of which are those relating to finance, religion, the military and naval forces and relations with foreign princes or states.

The Governor-General, in addition to his right of veto, is given special powers to secure the enactment of a Bill, whose passage in the form considered to be necessary may have been refused by the Legislature, by certifying that the Bill is essential for the safety, tranquillity, or interests of British India, or any part thereof. When the Governor-General decides to certify, the Act has to pass both



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Houses of Parliament at home and has no effect until it has received His Majesty's Assent. If a state of emergency exists the Governor-General may direct that the Act, certified by him, shall come into immediate operation. In that event, however, it is subject to subsequent disallowance by His Majesty in Council.

The Executive remains in the hands of the Governor-General in Council. There is no statutory limit to the number of members of this Council, which is now composed of seven members.

In the Provinces a unicameral system was inaugurated by the institution of the Legislative Councils. Of their members, at least seventy per cent (in the case of Burma sixty per cent) are elected by direct franchise. Special representation is reserved for Mohammedans and other minorities. The Council has power to legislate for the peace and good government of the province, subject to certain qualifications. But on a specified list of matters it cannot legislate without the previous sanction of the Governor-General.

In the Provincial Executive the system of diarchy was introduced. A division was made between 'reserved' and 'transferred' subjects.

The principal reserved subjects are the following:



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- 1 Irrigation and Canals, Drainage and Embankments, Water Storage and Water Power.
- 2 Land Revenue Administration, including assessment and collection of Land Revenue, Land Improvement and Agricultural Loans.
- 3 Famine Relief.
- 4 Administration of Justice.
- 5 Police.
- 6 Control of Newspapers, Books and Printing Presses.
- 7 Prisons and Reformatories.
- 8 Borrowing money on the credit of the province.
- 9 Forests, except in Bombay and Burma.
- 10 Factory inspection, Settlement of Labour Disputes, Industrial Insurance and Housing.

The most important of the transferred subjects are:

- 1 Local Self-Government, e.g. matters relating to the constitution and powers of municipal corporations and district boards.
- 2 Public Health, Sanitation and Medical Administration, including Hospitals and Asylums and provision for Medical Education.



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- 3 Education of Indians, excepting certain universities and similar institutions.
- 4 Public works, including Roads, Bridges and Municipal Tramways (not in Assam). 'Public Works,' in this connection, does not include Irrigation, for this forms a separate head in the List of Provincial Subjects. It is noteworthy, therefore, that while Public Works is a transferred subject, Irrigation is reserved. Railways and Inland Waterways are, generally speaking, Central Subjects.
- 5 Agriculture and Fisheries.
- 6 Co-operative Societies.
- 7 Excise so far as alcoholic liquor and intoxicating drugs are concerned, but excluding, in the case of opium, control of cultivation, manufacture and sale for export.
- 8 Forests, in Bombay and Burma only.
- 9 Development of Industries, including Industrial Research and Technical Education.

The transferred subjects were brought under the control of the Governor and his Ministers, who are chosen by him from the elected members of the provincial legislative council and hold the portfolios of the transferred subjects. Provision is made by



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rules for the temporary administration of a transferred subject, when, in case of emergency, owing to a vacancy there is no Minister in charge of the subject. This difficulty may be met by getting another Minister to add the subject to his charge, or, when this cannot be done, by the Governor himself taking temporary charge of the subject.

If ministerial government cannot be carried on, the Governor-General, with the previous sanction of the Secretary of State in Council may revoke or suspend the transfer of all or any subjects in the province and, thereupon, such subjects relapse for the time being into the position of reserved subjects.

The reserved subjects remain under purely official administration and are in charge of the Governor in Council. The Executive Council is in practice composed of an Indian non-official and a British official element. Its members are appointed by His Majesty the King-Emperor.

The Governor possesses the right of veto upon all Bills passed by the legislative council. He further possesses the right of 'certification', similar to the extraordinary powers vested in the Governor-General in the Central Government, and subject



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to the control of the Governor-General. But this power to certify can be exercised only when reserved subjects are concerned.

Now that most of the fevers caused by the War have calmed down, and the situation can again be judged with a cool brain, it is not difficult to point out why there can be but little hope that the bold policy for which Mr. Montagu struck out will be crowned with lasting success.

The fundamental error, on which the new plan seems to be based, is the wrong assumption that the parliamentary form of government, as the West knows it to-day, is the initial cause and the eternal safeguard of our present Western civilization, whereas in reality parliamentary government is no more than one of the many results of the latter. There is more truth in the old saying that every country gets the government it deserves than many a politician, in the East as well as in the West, would like to admit. The essential factor which decides whether a country shall enjoy a lasting independence is the possession of that measure of power required to keep others outside its borders. The kind of government which such a country will enjoy thereafter is the logical outcome of the inherent qualities of its inhabitants, of the



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balance of power between various classes of its population, of economic necessities, of the geographical situation and of the climate and similar factors. But one cannot buy a government ready-made, nor can one have it made to order. In vain will you search history to find an instance of a nation that owed a long-lived independence to the generosity of a foreign ruler. It is idle to hope for any country that it may obtain and keep its independence as the result of a course of instruction in self-government received from a foreign race. For instance, does anybody believe that Holland could have made a short cut towards independence and escaped the struggle for liberty which lasted eighty years had William of Orange and his followers received their education at Spanish universities or had Spain blessed the Dutch with an imitation of Spanish Government institutions?

In Europe, with the progressive realization of democratic ideals, we seem to get more and more estranged from the fundamental principles upon which any government which means to be the guiding and the leading power in the state must rest. The fatal consequences may be delayed for a considerable time in Europe itself, for there the masses have grown up together with the democratic



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ideals. Consequently in normal times, the common sense of an important majority can be relied upon, people who will instinctively feel where the line must be drawn between illusions and reality.

Not so in India, where our modern ideals were suddenly imported into a society that was not prepared for them and where the idea of sharing responsibility in public affairs had never entered into the heads of the overwhelming majority of the population. There our democratic ideals became the property of the minute minority that is formed by the westerly-educated classes. These ideals they have mastered with their brains, but with their brains only, they did not flower in their hearts, nor did they have any connection with the instinctive desires which animate the soul of the Indian people on the whole.

The belief has grown that to obtain self-government for India little more is required than to prove that from mere ideals there automatically follows the justice of an Indian claim for independence. The rock of facts, which must be the basis of every government that endures, was deserted and the Indian problem was lifted out of the sphere of reality and placed on the level of an academic



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debate. Unfortunately the Indian politicians succeeded in seducing the progressive minds in Europe to follow in their track, and, all too frequently, the Western of to-day is imbued with the idea that the ruling of a colonial empire is a question of convincing and not a question of power.

It may sound unpleasant to our ears, it may hurt the vanity of our Western mind (which has every right to be proud of many of the results it obtained), but, it is vain to hope that our human brain can evolve a system which will bring to India, along theoretical lines and within a few generations, all that which it took Europe centuries to conquer.

Those who believe that progress along the road which is marked by the stages of liberalism, radicalism, socialism and communism will lead to the Utopia where might will have been replaced by right: see Russia.

Those who believe that the Western education of a small minority in an Oriental population and the application of modern Western principles by these in their own country will lead to peace and happiness: see China.

Those who believe that democracy constitutes an effective remedy against racial feeling: see



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the negro-problem in the United States of America.

One cannot shake off the impression that the Indian problem is being approached from the wrong end.

Taking a bird's-eye view of the history of modern Europe we shall find that, at the beginning, only those groups that were sufficiently strong to beat off others who coveted their land could aspire to building a nation. Surpassing all other group-interests by its importance the imperative necessity of those days was the finding of a man, possessed of the required capacities to organize and lead the fighting forces of the clan. When such a man proved successful in overcoming all the dangers which threatened from outside, and the group could consequently settle down and devote its time to more peaceful occupations, it was not surprising that he should be definitely accepted as a leader. As the burden of ruling increased it was natural that, either of his own free will or as the result of the growing influence of other prominent personalities in the group, he should surround himself with others who could lighten his burden by giving advice. It was only human that these councillors could not be satisfied with the mere position of



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advisers and in course of time should demand a more effective share in the affairs of government. It is also human that the share of government on which attention was focused should be the pecuniary question, and so the first claim was to have a voice in the spending of the community's funds. The first wedge was thus driven into absolute power and the monarch had to accept the institution of a body whose power at first was limited to control in financial affairs. Gradually this body increased its rights, developed from a controlling power into a ruling force and eventually grew into the form of responsible government as we know it to-day. Each succeeding step, however, had been no more than the expression of the true proportion of power that existed between the executive and the legislative. It grew naturally and not as the realization of some theoretical conception.

In present day India on the contrary, the experiment, which was inaugurated by the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, is based on the assumption that it will be feasible to evolve a form of government based on theories extracted from the actual experiences of an entirely foreign race. The ease with which dominion-government was established



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in Canada, Australia and South Africa probably is in no small way responsible for this assumption. But attention has not been sufficiently paid to the all-important fact that the inhabitants of these dominions are derived from the same stock to which the population of the mother-country belongs. Clearly you can only have daughter-nations of the same blood.

It appears as if the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms are attempting to make India go through the course of development which Europe gradually worked out, but in the opposite direction. Thereby the anomalous situation is created that, whereas India is given facilities to obtain a share in the more complicated affairs of government, the responsibility for finance, for internal peace and for the army is entirely left to the British. Finance is the first field in which parliamentary experience in Europe was trained. Internal peace is the primary duty of every government. The army is the protection against foreign aggression, without which the mere idea of independence cannot be entertained.

Now no one, however favourably he may judge the Indian's capacity for self-government, will, after surveying the present state of affairs, admit that



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within a measurable distance of time the Indian can be expected to keep order in the interior and provide means of adequate defence against foreign invasion. Even Mr. Gandhi is graciously prepared to permit that the British Army should not be taken away before India shall have created an effective national shield of defence. Indian politicians are quick to maintain that this necessity of protection by foreigners is caused by the fact that through two centuries of British domination the Indian was emasculated. If the question of emasculation must be brought up for discussion it would seem to be nearer to the truth to suppose that the conquest of India by a mere handful of foreigners has been possible only because the population of India had already been emasculated by the influence of their climate.

In the 'Report of the Committee appointed by the All-Parties Conference, 1928, to determine the principles of the constitution of India' — the so-called 'Nehru Report' — it is stated that an Indian army already exists. This is merely playing with words. What is called the Indian Army consists of a number of Indian individuals who by British initiative, by British leadership and by British military science have been welded into a military force



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and are so being held together. Moreover, the Indian Army forms only a portion of the Army in India. The Indian Army is not Indian in the sense that it is a national army drawn from India as a whole. Far from it. Recruits for the Indian Army almost exclusively belong to the martial races, such as the Punjabi, the Pathan, the Sikh, the Maratha and the Gurkha. Leaving out of consideration the 19,000 Gurkhas who are recruited in Nepal — an independent country outside of India — out of the remaining 140,000 men of the Indian Army, 86,000 come from the Punjab and 16,500 from the United Provinces. It is worthy of note that these two provinces are the nearest to the North West Frontier, on the track that has been followed all through the ages by the invading hordes, and form in consequence thereof that part of India whose population profited most frequently and most recently by the infusion of fresh blood from Central Asia. In sharp contrast hereto stand the numbers of recruits supplied by the more sheltered provinces of Bombay, Madras and Bengal, where the inhabitants shine in the intellectual field and are most forward as far as theoretical politics are concerned. Of these provinces Bombay supplied 7000 recruits, Madras 4000, and Bengal none at all. The total population



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of each of the five provinces named, number as follows:

Bengal	47,592,462
United Provinces	46,510,668
Madras	42,794,155
Bombay	26,757,648
Punjab	24,187,750

It is often suggested that this contrast is not the result of natural causes, but the outcome of some Machiavellic policy, deliberately followed by the British authorities, with a view to maintaining their supremacy by playing off one part of India against the other. But what to think then of the figures of recruiting from India during the Great War, when the situation made it imperative that recruits should be accepted from whatever area they could be obtained? Out of 683,149 combatant recruits who enlisted during the war, 349,688 were drawn from the Punjab, and 163,578 from the United Provinces, against 7117 from Bengal. As a further proof of the differences in character and in military qualities it may be added that of the 414,493 non-combatant recruits 97,288 came from the Punjab, 117,565 from the United Provinces and 51,935 from Bengal. These figures show that whereas the proportion



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between the numbers of combatant and non-combatant units was approximately three and a half to one for the Punjab and one and a half to one for the United Provinces, Bengal on the contrary supplied more than seven non-combatants against one fighting man.

Now, it may be comparatively easy for the Indian Congress, or round table conference, to work out a solution which will neutralize the unpleasant effects of these plain facts. But history has proved over and over again that political arrangements, which are not based on the true proportion of actual power have no more value than the paper on which they are written. It is, therefore, logical that — whatever advantage there may be in making political coin out of the presence of the British army in India — the Indian politician from Bengal, from Bombay and from Madras should be favourably disposed towards maintaining, at least provisionally, British military forces in India, even if Dominion Status were obtained. A self-government shielded by the British would most admirably suit the interests of the Indian politician. He would be relieved of all anxieties as to the dangers which might threaten the stability of his position from beyond the Khyber Pass as well as from the Indian fighting races, who would, without



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the shadow of a doubt, refuse to follow the rules of the democratic game.

The role thus falling to the British soldier would be to execute obediently the orders of an Indian Government, for the safeguarding of the interests of a class of denaturalized Indian politicians. One important factor has, however, been left out of the calculation. It is the fact that the British are not a race of servants, but have always constituted a race of masters. It is idle to expect that a British officer or a British soldier would ever let himself be made to play a part that would not be of any service to his own country or to the masses of the Indian population. And, supposing for one moment that military discipline would be strong enough to overcome their objection, it would not be long before most unpleasant questions would be asked in British Parliament of a British Government who would allow the sacrifice of British blood for the protection of interests that would then be exclusively those of the Indian politician.

Picturing the probable results of the situation that would arise if ever self-government were realized in conformity with present day dreams of the Indian politician, and if the British army were then retired from India, one cannot suppress a feeling of awe.

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In India to-day, troops have to be employed many times a year to prevent or to quell internal disorder caused by religious rivalry. It is a well-known fact in India that, on such occasions, both communities implore the authorities to send British troops, because both are convinced that the neutrality of the British soldier can be relied upon and that there is no cause to suspect that he may favour either Hindus against Mohammedans or Mohammedans against Hindus. We are frequently told that, with the advent of self-government, Indians themselves will, by the sheer weight of responsibility, be obliged to work out a solution of the difficulties which have been constantly arising between the two religions ever since the Mohammedans appeared in India. But, unless self-government has the gift of blessing all Indians with an angelic disposition, it is difficult to understand how bitterness and hatred of such old standing as those animating the two communities, can ever be eliminated by any pact to which the political representatives of the two religions may arrive. On the contrary, it must be expected, as long as Hindus and Mohammedans are normal human beings, that, with the coming of self-government, their appetite for political power (and for the advantages which political power



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offers) will increase and form an evergrowing incitement to violent outbreaks. The Government will then be called upon to enforce the provisions of whatever Hindu-Moslem pact may then be in existence. For the enforcement, however, there will be no more neutral troops to rely upon, and the troops that would be called out cannot be expected to possess the superhuman quality of not sympathizing with their co-religionists. Their religious feeling would soon prove too strong for discipline and they would inevitably join either one side or the other; in which event, the results of the outbreaks would not be limited to a few broken heads and a few destroyed houses. It would not be long before a civil war blazed up all over India, a war that would not end before one of the two communities had succeeded in establishing absolute mastery over the other.

Another source of calamities lies in the fact that only a few of the many races that inhabit India have retained their fighting qualities, whereas the majority, populating the more sheltered provinces are averse to military occupations and put their faith in solving the problems of life along spiritual, intellectual and political lines. If the course set by the Reforms of 1919 is to be continued, it is the



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latter who stand the best chance of being the immediate successors to British power. But still greater is the chance that they will not be allowed to enjoy their position as rulers of India for any considerable length of time. For, unless self-government could change the fundamental qualities of the human character, it is not to be expected that sturdy races like the Punjabi, the Maratha, the Waziri and the like would for long submit to the rule of a group, that basing their right to govern on the theoretical principles of democracy and justice is bound to rely on the goodwill of those few military races for the enforcement of their rights. What can be more human but that these races, who possess the true capacity for power, would draw the sword, overthrow the government based on a foundation of theories, and immerse India in a stream of blood to reap for themselves the fruit which had ripened during the long period of internal peace that the country owes to British authority.

A third danger which will undoubtedly arise, will threaten from the quarter of the Indian Princes, the present rulers over five hundred and sixty-two states which, scattered all over India, cover between them an area equalling more than half of that which is under direct British administration in



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India. The combined population of these states number some eighty millions, or roughly one-quarter of the total population of India. They vary in size from petty states like Lawa, in Rajputana, with an area of nineteen square miles, to states like Hyderabad, as large as Italy, with a population of over thirteen millions. These Princes, all through the years of British paramountcy, have remained the true guardians of the ideals of Indian Independence and Indian Autocracy, which is the form of government that appeals to the instincts of the Indian masses. For them, it is one thing to arrive at an understanding with the groups of modern Indians who are now clamouring for self-government, and to enact some form of unity, which might induce the British Parliament to take further steps towards the abdication of British power in India, but it is quite another thing to uphold such unity, once this is no longer to their advantage and British authority is no longer there to keep them in check, whenever they feel like satisfying their appetite for extended power. Admitting that self-government will not eliminate normal human desires, there is nothing that can lead one to expect that, once British authority and the British army have vanished from India, the Indian Princes, who are autocratic



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by nature, will agree to sharing the power in India with a government based on modern Western democracy. A struggle of life and death is sure to ensue between the ancient forces, based on the firm rock of the Indian's instinctive conception of government and the modern ones, floating up on principles imported by a foreign race and without any real power of their own to rely upon. This would not be all. Without a strong central government, capable of restraining the natural ambitions for extension of territorial power, the few stronger ones among the Indian Princes would in all probability take advantage of the military weakness of the hundreds of smaller states and not hesitate to annex their neighbour's territories. After that, the struggle would continue amongst those who had been successful in maintaining or improving their position, and unless a man of the metal of Akbar appears amongst them, capable of seizing authority all over India, the country would have to suffer an endless series of wars, the end of which cannot be foreseen.

These three currents of rivalry — Hindu versus Moslems, martial races versus sheltered races, Princes versus modern government — would not remain clearly defined but would all become intermingled and re-create such a situation as India has



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known many a time before British supremacy became established.

To complicate and aggravate all this, the menace, which has threatened the peace of India all through history from around and beyond the Khyber Pass, will again materialize. Once the barrier at the southern slopes of the mountains is no longer held by the British army, the Indian plain will again be at the mercy of the sturdy races of the north, composed of men who are not softened by comfort and luxury or by the influences of Western democracy and modern education.

No words are required to picture how under such circumstances the welfare and the happiness of the peoples of India would be affected. Those at home who are favourably disposed towards the promotion of self-government in India would do well to ask themselves whether it could ever be justified before the tribunal of the ages, that Britain should thus shirk the responsibilities towards the Indian masses which history has laid on her shoulders.

And those who are impressed by the enormous figure of India's three hundred and fifty millions and advocate that, by the way of paying an insurance premium, political power should be handed over to the Indians in order to secure their goodwill



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to the advantage of Britain's commerce and industries, should consider the consequences such a policy must inevitably have on British economic interests. The very best that could be expected to happen is that a situation would arise, exactly corresponding to that by which the East India Company found themselves confronted in the course of the seventeenth century. A situation which, as has been proved by subsequent events is devoid of the necessary elements essential to the creation of such a form of stability as is required for the development of trade. It would soon be clear then that only two courses would remain open. Either all the work that has been accomplished in the course of more than two centuries would have to be done over again, or all the advantages accruing from Indian trade would have to be abandoned. By choosing the latter course Britain would shirk the duty she is called upon to fulfil not only towards the British, but towards the whole of the white race. Europe seen from the East is England. Once Britain throws up the game the days of the white man in the East will be over. No longer sheltered by the most frequently hidden power of the British navy, it will be out of the question for others to carry on. The amazing position which Europe her-



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self created in the world will soon be undermined and the standard of living which the white masses will then have to endure will soon descend to the level that was normal in the ages, that preceded the conquest of the East.

Were I asked to evolve a policy that can be reasonably expected to guarantee the security and the happiness of the Indian masses, to safeguard the British interests which are of imperative necessity to the welfare of the whole white race and to satisfy the aspirations of the modern Indian politician, I should have to confess that I do not know of one. Whatever you try you will find that you cannot build up a theory that is stronger than hard facts. Neither in India nor in other parts of the world can you expect a lasting success that is not the mathematical result of the true proportions of actual power. Many in the West will maintain that such a policy would be fraught with the gravest dangers. They think of three hundred and fifty millions and the will of the people! Our Western democrats need not fear. The masses — not the westernized politician — in India nourish no ambitions towards a share in the affairs of Government. The will to power for them is the most admirable quality that a government can possess, and a government that



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brings them security of life and property can always count upon their sympathies. But no government, which in their eyes shows signs of weakness, can hope for their support. Devoid as they are of all means of self-defence, it will always be to their interest to side with those whom they feel as the stronger or who, to their belief, will be the masters in the nearest future. Three hundred and fifty millions and the awakening of the East! No phrase is misused more than this one when the dangers which may threaten in Asia are discussed by the man at home. If ever the East should become a menace to the West, it must develop a force strong enough to throw off European domination. I do not hesitate to say that nowhere, from Japan to Bombay, have I discovered signs of such a force. Moreover, as far as India is concerned, history teaches us that, whenever a regenerating force appeared in India, it came from outside the borders.

The process which is now going on in the East is not the result of the strengthening of Asia, but of the weakening of Europe. To stem its course the remedy must be found in the West and not in the Orient. But often it appears as if in the West we are approaching a period corresponding to that which in



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the history of Rome was pictured in the following terms: 'When the heart of the country was no longer prepared to fight for the safeguarding of the outlying provinces, Rome was near to its fall.'



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THE reaction which Mr. Montagu's announcement produced on the mind of the British out in India varied from a feeling of great admiration for the man who so boldly struck out for a new solution of the Indian problem to a grave apprehension that the new policy would prove to be nothing less than an attempt at suicide.

The first impression created on the Indian mind was one of profound amazement for the tenor of the announcement surpassed all those expectations which even the most optimistic could have nourished in his inner heart. At first there was a general response of genuine gratefulness. But it was not long before it dawned upon the mind of many an Indian politician that a unique opportunity opened for the carrying off of a brilliant affair. What could be more simple than putting into operation the policy, frequently practised in the East, of the man who, having been paid more than his due, justly



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concludes that his value has been wrongly estimated and therefore, speculates on the further generosity of the giver by pretending to be outrageously treated. Taking into account the mood of war weariness and the longing for rest which weighed on Europe at that period, who knows what further amazing profits might be obtained by cleverly playing this part.

In the year following that in which Mr. Montagu's announcement had been made, the political atmosphere in India was extremely favourable for the carrying on of an agitation against Government. The consequences of the war and a failure of the monsoon had brought about a rise of prices, from which the masses were suffering. Grave concern was felt in Mohammedan circles all over the world as to the attitude of the Allied Powers towards Turkey at the end of the war. In those days the area of Islam, which stretches from Tangier as far as Australia, was like a chain charged with electricity, which could not be touched at one spot without producing effects all along its length. Mohammedans all over the world were unanimous in their opinion that the gravest dangers threatened their Khalif, the Holy Places of Islam and their Religion itself.



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The opportunity to weld into one the forces of political agitation of economic distress and of religious apprehensions offered itself when the Rowlatt Bill was introduced into the Indian Legislature. This aimed at perpetuating the extraordinary powers to combat revolutionary crime which the Defence of India Act had placed at the disposal of Government for the duration of the War. An organized agitation which was started all over the country against the Bill met with unexpected success. Mr. Gandhi appeared on the scene and placed himself at the head of what was to be his first campaign of passive resistance, which was planned on the principle of abstinence from all violence. Mohammedans, Hindus and Sikhs all believed that the moment had arrived to obtain redress for their real or supposed grievances. As the excitement grew the movement broke out into a widespread outburst of mob violence. In Gujerat, the province where Mr. Gandhi is born, and in the Punjab the movement showed its most violent aspect. In April, 1919, it culminated at Amritsar, where British property was destroyed and Britishers were assassinated. Nothing remained but to have the disorder quelled by military force. The immediate effect of General Dyer's action was most



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beneficial to the peace of India. As if touched by magic the storm which had been raging all over India suddenly quieted down. It was not until voices at home were raised against General Dyer, that protests in India became heard. And when the Government, in the hope of creating an atmosphere that would be favourable to the introduction of the Reforms which were then under discussion, appointed the Hunter Committee to investigate the tragedy of Jalianwala Bagh, one of the severest blows was struck at British prestige in India. Whatever success may be obtained by meeting the British voter with a winning smile on your face, it would be grossly misjudging Oriental mentality to expect that such a procedure could ever attract support from the Indian masses. In their opinion a government that at one moment violently hit out at these opponents, who aimed at its downfall and at the next moment seemed to regret its action and to make amend, must suffer from internal weakness. Such a government cannot hope to command respect or to retain the confidence of the Indian, because it has, by its zigzagging course, proved not to trust itself.

The difficulties by which the Government found itself confronted were aggravated by the action of



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the Amir of Afghanistan, who declared war and invaded British territory. Indian agitators explained to the Indian public that the action of the Amir was the outcome of the sympathies which animated the population of an independent Moslem country towards the anti-British movement in India. It would be nearer the truth to presume that exaggerated reports of the riots influenced the Amir to move and that in reality the Afghan, at what was thought to be the first indication of the weakening of British power, readily yielded to the temptations of the Indian plain, just as his ancestors had frequently done. Had not the British been there to close the gateway of the Khyber, India would have paid a terrific price for Afghan 'sympathy'. What happened should be a grave warning to the Indian as well as to those at home, of the ever-present menace and a sure indication of what will undoubtedly follow the withdrawal of the shield of British protection which now covers India.

In the latter days of 1919 the Reforms Act was passed by Parliament. The Moderates amongst the Indian politicians accepted the principles of the announcement of 1917 as governing the conditions of political advance, and though many of them were not fully satisfied with the scheme of the Reforms,



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they were, on the whole, prepared to do everything in their power to make the new constitution a success and so justify a further advance. Those of more advanced opinion, who formed the party of the Nationalists, on the contrary, denounced the Reforms as wholly inadequate and unacceptable.

Public attention, however, soon turned away from the doings of both parties and became centred upon a movement that arose in 1920, and came to be known as the non-co-operation movement. The soil for it had been prepared by the racial bitterness and the political disappointment of the previous year, as well as by the attitude of the Government which trusted to the common sense of the Indian people, and was inclined to postpone forcible intervention as long as possible lest the atmosphere of free opinion in which the Reforms should be received were disturbed.

The movement was conceived by Mr. Gandhi. Its adherents were to resign government titles and honorary offices, to withdraw from government service, to boycott schools, law courts and legislative bodies; to wear native cloth and to refuse to buy British goods. As reserves were kept the refusal to pay taxes and organized mass disobedience to the

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laws and to the orders of the Government. When the work of the Government had been paralysed by these methods, nothing would be left but for it to abdicate. There was to be no compulsion upon anyone to carry out any of these steps, and above all, there was to be no violence to person or property, either Indian or British. This project made a tremendous appeal to the mind of the Indian masses. However attractive the project must have seemed to the Indian, it was, nevertheless, doomed to failure because it left three important factors out of the calculation. Firstly, there should have been continuous unanimity for the working of the scheme amongst Hindus as well as Mohammedans. Secondly, the Government was not bound to limit itself to moral force and was possessed of sufficient material force to crush the movement, should this become a real danger to the peace of India or threaten its supremacy. Thirdly, the Government had proved to be capable of carrying on for a considerable length of time without the co-operation of the Indian.

Circumstances, however, were exceptionally favourable to the development of the movement. The ever-growing anxiety of Mohammedan Indians about the conference of Sevres, where the Turkish



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peace terms were under discussion, led to the Khilafat movement, an organized Moslem agitation which aimed at forcing the Imperial Government to restore the Sultan of Turkey to something like his pre-war position. Mr. Gandhi was not slow in perceiving the advantages which might accrue from adding the weight of his numerous followers to this movement and of coupling the energy of Moham-medan religious fanaticism to the forces of his own agitation. The two parties were, however, bound together by a negative aim only, namely the embarrassment of Government. The ultimate aim of the Khilafat movement was not the overthrow of British rule. It was based on a simple and actual fact, concern for the political and religious future of Islam. This fact, based as it was on the interests of Islam and not on those of India was, in the natural course of events, bound to become the cause of separation between the two allies.

The foundations on which Mr. Gandhi's movement rested are not so clearly to be defined. He stood for the ideals and the civilization of India as against those of Europe; for the cult of the spinning wheel and the simple economics of the village, as against the factories and the materialism of the West.



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But personally he was not averse to the use of the telegraph, the railway, the motor car, the electric light and various other facilities which the West had to offer. Nor were his followers, amongst whom there were many whose political and economic outlook, as well as their ways of life, were European. Therefore, Mr. Gandhi never gave a short and clear definition of what his 'Swaraj' would mean in practice. He limited himself to varying and nebulous accounts thereof. But the negative side of his doctrine appealed to the masses. British rule had impoverished India and destroyed its liberties. The ways of the West were all satanic and all that had to be done was to destroy Government.

Where Mr. Gandhi succeeded was in lifting the Indian problem out of the sphere of reality, into which it has not returned up to the present. Consequently, the sense for political realities was weakened and often destroyed in the Indian politician. Still graver was the result it had on the mind of many a European at home, who was tempted to follow Mr. Gandhi into a domain in which the chances of Western victory are greatly reduced. The Brahmin had already mastered the subtle art of words centuries before modern Europe emerged from the Middle Ages.



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At first it seemed as if Mr. Gandhi would carry all before him. Mr. Gandhi (who approaches more the type of a peaceful prophet of the Old Testament than that of the man who would be a successful leader in a struggle for liberty in Europe) by his character and by his doctrine of non-violence could not fail to become the ideal of all adherents of Hinduism, who in their enthusiasm bestowed upon him the holy title of Mahatma.

In the autumn of 1920 he succeeded in securing the support of the Indian National Congress. This body which since its foundation in 1885 had been preponderately Hindu had during the years of agitation received an important number of Moslem adherents who held extreme political views but again became almost exclusively Hindu after the failure of the non-co-operation movement. Congress placed at Mr. Gandhi's disposal its widespread organization and financial resources. Mr. Gandhi travelled all over the country, preaching his doctrines, inciting the masses against the Government and promising the advent of Swaraj before December 31st, 1921. 'Congress national volunteers' were enlisted and non-co-operation committees were set up in the villages to further the movement. But natural causes soon led to a disturbance of the



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atmosphere of non-violence. Mr. Gandhi, although possessing high moral qualities and an admirable self-control, did not have the required authority over the masses, who were systematically brought up to contempt for the law. The religious and militant character of the Khilafat movement became more and more difficult to control and the Hindu community became seriously disturbed by the ever-growing stress laid by the Mohammedans on their religious aims. From the beginning of 1921 onwards, disorder had been prevalent in many provinces. Open rebellion broke out in August, 1921, when the Moplahs, a sturdy Mohammedan race on the west coast of Madras, rose against the Government. They destroyed the machinery of government, killed or drove off all officials and then turned on the Hindu population. They soon put their heart into the work of converting Hindus to the religion of the Prophet and accentuated their religious arguments by murder, arson and outrage, thus copying the ancient methods, which had often been practised by their ancestors in the days of their conquest of India. Of course, it was left to the British to restore order. Mr. Gandhi, the Congress leaders and the Congress national volunteers were unable even to attempt an interference. They were



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occupied by working out their plans for organized civil disobedience in every province, and the intensity of anti-government feeling steadily grew all over India. Towards the close of the year 1921, on the day the Prince of Wales landed in India, a conflict occurred between the loyal and the non-co-operating elements at Bombay, as a result of which fifty-three persons were killed and four hundred and three wounded. It was only then that the Government resolved to move in earnest. A number of leading agitators were arrested, but Mr. Gandhi was not amongst them. Thus encouraged Mr. Gandhi demanded their release under a threat of putting his plans for mass civil disobedience into immediate effect. Nobody can say what might have been the further results of the Government's policy of sparing Mr. Gandhi and thereby strengthening the belief of the masses that the days of British rule were over, had not the tragedy of Chauri Chaura in which some twenty Indian policemen were cruelly murdered by the mob, intervened. Mr. Gandhi, in his horror at the incident, suspended his threat . . . and renewed it shortly afterwards. But at last the Government had learnt the truth of the saying that soft doctors make bad wounds. In March



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1922, Mr. Gandhi was arrested, tried and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of six years. Many had predicted a wholesale rising of the masses in the event of Mr. Gandhi's arrest. As a measure of precaution the police as well as the military had been kept in readiness from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, but not a hand was raised in his defence. The beneficial effect of the Government showing its firm determination to remain master of the situation soon became apparent all over the continent. By the way, it proved in a practical manner the untruth of many a superstition as to the supernatural powers of Mr. Gandhi and especially the one that ascribed to him the power of passing bodily through the thickest prison walls.

The arrest of Mr. Gandhi dealt a severe blow to the Hindu current of the non-co-operation movement. From this moment on the Government continued to rule with a firm hand, and the effects of a series of good monsoons made it more and more difficult to impress on the masses the necessity of a change of Government as the sole means of bettering their conditions.

The Khilafat movement came to an inglorious end towards the end of the year 1922, when



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Mustapha Kemal, who until then had been regarded as the saviour of Islam and as the protector of the Khalif, abolished the Khilafat and dethroned the Sultan of Turkey, who had to flee from Constantinople and seek protection on board of a British man-o'-war. To Indian Mohammedans, the news seemed so incredible that the Khilafat Committee announced its decision to approach its own correspondents in Europe with a view to learning the truth about recent events. When the news could only be confirmed, the leaders of the agitation tried hard to find an explanation of the facts which would be acceptable to the Mohammedan public. But the outstanding fact that Islam had nothing to fear from Britain was too clear and so all further efforts to stir up the Moslems against the Government were of no avail.

Since then no violent disorders or organized mass-agitation has been directed against British authority, until the appointment of the Indian Statutory Commission late in the year of 1927. This is not a case of mere coincidence, but the logical outcome of Oriental mentality. No Indian will revolt against a government that shows its firm determination to be respected. But the first sign by 'Government' of considering the possibility



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of meeting part of the demands of its opponents will always afford a welcome opportunity to the politician to impress upon the Indian public the growing weakness of 'Government'. New complaints are then invented or old ones grossly exaggerated. The minimum of political concessions which is declared acceptable rises from day to day. Whatever 'Government' may offer is disdainfully declined and proclaimed as wholly inadequate. Every concession granted by 'Government' is followed by further demands. In short the agitation adopts the only policy open to the man who is decided to make the best out of his claim, but which he has no power to enforce.

Moreover, in India's case it is always safe to gamble on the sympathies of modern democracy in the West and on the feelings that are often inspired there by a figure of three hundred and fifty millions. The dangers which may threaten from the political situation in India are, on the whole, grossly exaggerated in Europe. I remember, for instance, that in the early days of 1922, when I was returning to India, one of the last newspapers I saw in Holland had a leader on the Gandhi-movement ending with the words, 'the crisis is rapidly approaching now'. And at the station



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in Paris, one of my friends who had come to see me off, exclaimed: 'It is hardly worth while to say good-bye. You will be back before the summer. I just met Clemenceau, who has recently returned from a trip to India. Revolution is sure to break out within three months'.

In the meantime the Reforms had been put into practice. The first elections to the new legislatures took place at the beginning of the non-co-operation movement. The Nationalist Party had joined the movement, and, in accordance with Mr. Gandhi's programme, its members did not offer themselves as candidates. Thus the seats were practically uncontested and the Moderates entered in preponderating numbers both the central legislature and the provincial councils.

What most impresses the onlooker, when entering the House of the Central Legislature, is the atmosphere of unreality that hangs around. By its parliamentary setting the system tends to an inflation of the elected members with a feeling of importance, which does not correspond to their actual power. They can freely express their opinion, allow their criticism its full course and develop schemes which, if only the 'Government' would follow their advice, would, according to

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them, offer an immediate solution of the most complicated problems, whether political or economic, racial or religious. They are in the enviable position of never running the risk of being called upon to shoulder the responsibilities of government and to prove by deeds what they profess by the mouth. The statutory provisions of the Reforms Act exclude the possibility of a vote of the Legislative obliging the Government to resign and invest the Governor-General or the Governor-General-in-Council with sufficient power to prevent the opposition from bringing the administration to a standstill. But this shielded position of the elected member not infrequently leads him to exploit the floor of the legislature as a platform for political propaganda and to underestimate the qualities which are required for the governing of a country like India. He becomes strengthened in the belief that the art of governing is not more difficult to acquire than the capacities for parliamentary debate.

His attitude is, moreover, greatly influenced by the provisions of the Reforms Act, which laid down that after ten years a commission should be appointed to inquire into the working of the system and to report on the desirability of either



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enlarging or restricting the present degree of responsible government. Thereby his mind is fixed more on the future than is desirable. The Assembly to him offers an occasion to prove the inadequacy of what has already been conceded or becomes something like a dress-rehearsal at which he can show his abilities for playing the part that he desires to be assigned to him. In both cases his sense of political realities diminishes. Not infrequently he conveys the impression of being possessed of that particular mentality of the student who on the eve of his examination, can only see that examination as the ultimate aim and to whom all conception of what may lie beyond, fails. He focuses his energy on the realization of political ideals, which perhaps may bring happiness to the West, but which do not correspond to the aspirations of the Indian masses, to whom the blessings of Nirvana are of far greater importance than anything that may be obtained during one of the many earthly lives which, according to Hinduism, fall to the lot of human beings. Consequently, he loses touch more and more with the real wants and desires of the people of India, and it is to be feared that he will finally discover that his policy hangs in the air.

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As early as September, 1921, within eight months of their first meeting, the Assembly passed a resolution that the Government of India should convey to the Secretary of State for India the view of the Assembly that the progress made by India on the path of responsible self-government warranted a re-examination and revision of the constitution at an earlier date than 1929. As was only to be expected, the Secretary of State's reply was in the negative, but this did not prevent the same topic from making a regular appearance in each of the following years.

On the whole the Assembly, during the three years of the first term, loyally assisted the Government in the working out of various measures. But on two occasions the Governor-General was obliged to use the special powers of securing essential legislation entrusted to him by the Government of India Act. The first occurred in the summer of 1922, when the Government had promoted a Bill to prevent the dissemination of books and newspapers calculated to excite dissatisfaction against Rulers of Indian States. The Assembly refused the introduction of the Bill, whereupon it was certified by the Governor-General and subsequently passed by the Council of State.



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The second occasion on which the Viceroy had to bring into use his special powers was early in 1923. To prevent a deficit on the budget the Government had proposed an increase of the salt-tax. The Assembly rejected the clause in the Finance Bill concerning this increase and the only way left open was for the Governor-General to certify the Bill.

Long before the first term of the Legislative Assembly was completed, it became evident that the non-co-operation movement as a means of bringing the Government to its knees, had failed. During the first year of the movement Mr. Gandhi's appeal had met with an enthusiastic response, especially as far as the wearing of khaddar and the boycotting of schools and law courts were concerned. A number of prominent lawyers had resigned a lucrative position at the Bar; one case only is known of a decoration having been returned (by Sir Rabindranath Tagore); but khaddar had proved most popular with the masses. Within three months of Mr. Gandhi's arrest the tide began to turn. The number of students attending Government institutions increased regularly. Many a lawyer, who had given up his position at the Bar, resumed his practice. Although khaddar retained

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its popularity, the imports and sales of foreign cloth again showed a rising figure.

At the meeting of the All-India Congress, which was held at Lucknow in the month of June, 1922, the situation was reviewed and means discussed, that should lead to a more active policy against Government being pursued. No decisions were arrived at, at least, not published. A commission was appointed to travel all over India to collect data about the actual position, the results and the prospects of non-co-operation and mass civil disobedience, and report on the state of affairs to the next meeting of the Congress, which it was decided to convoke towards the middle of September. The commission did not complete its report until late in 1922. It concluded unanimously that the country was not ripe for mass civil disobedience, but advised that, if occasion offered and without engaging the responsibilities of Congress, a movement of disobedience to specific laws or ordinances should be started by certain groups of the population or in certain provinces. Three of the six members of the commission were in favour of ending the boycott of the councils and of allowing adherents of Congress to contest at the next elections. Those who should offer themselves for election were



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to pledge themselves, in the event of success, to obstruct the working of the Councils to their utmost ability, so as to wreck the councils from within.

The meeting of the All-India Congress, which in expectation of the commission's report had been repeatedly postponed, took place at Gaya in the last days of December and was presided over by Mr. C. R. Das. The three principal decisions arrived at concerned the Turkish situation, non-co-operation and civil disobedience, and the coming elections for the councils.

A resolution was passed on the first point embodied in the following terms:

In view of the serious situation in the Near East, which threatens the integrity of the Khilafat and the Turkish Government; and in view of the determination of the Hindus, Mussulmans and all other peoples of India to prevent any such injury, this Congress resolves that the Working Committee do take steps in consultation with the Khilafat Working Committee in order to secure united action by the Hindus, Mussulmans and others to prevent exploitation of India for any such unjust cause and to deal with the situation.

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The unity which was thus expressed on paper was, however, already far to seek in reality. The abolition of the Khilafat by Mustapha Kemal had cooled down the enthusiasm of Mohammedans in India, who were from then onward difficult to rouse against the Government. The movement of the previous years had, moreover, opened up new possibilities in the relations between Hindus and Mohammedans. Many of them realized the importance of consolidating and organizing their forces in preparation for the new situation that might arise, should political control pass out of the hands of the British. Appreciating the argument of numbers both Hindus and Mohammedans proceeded to the so-called reconversion of classes, who were said to have lapsed to the other faith. Suspicion and bitterness between the two communities was the inevitable result and during the latter half of 1922 communal riots broke out in various parts of the country. In the Hughli district the sacrifice by Mohammedans of a bull, holy to the Hindus, led to violent fighting, and the police had to interfere to restore order. At Allahabad riots between the two communities broke out at a religious festival; one killed and ten wounded. At Mooltan Mohammedans attacked Hindus; shops



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plundered, nine Hindu temples destroyed, seven killed and seventy-four wounded. In following years these outbursts became fiercer and fiercer and increased in number. So did the resolutions that were passed by Congress to establish Hindu-Moslem unity!

Introducing the debate on non-co-operation and civil disobedience at the meeting under review, Mr. Das admitted that it could not be denied that 'the petty is done' and 'the undone vast'. He stated that 'there is much which remains to be accomplished. Non-violence has to be more firmly established. The work of non-co-operation has to be established, and the field of non-co-operation has to be extended'. The sounds entirely differed from the confidence which Mr. Gandhi had expressed two years earlier as to the realization of Swaraj before the end of the year 1921. Nevertheless it was decided to continue the agitation for 'the speedy attainment of Swaraj', to immediately enlist 50,000 volunteers and to form a 'Tilak-Swaraj Fund' amounting to twenty-five lakhs of rupees for the furthering of civil disobedience and of the national cause. If these figures seem fairly modest in comparison to the size of India's population, the results that were

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eventually obtained were frankly disappointing, as is shown by the following figures, which illustrate the actual results for the period January 1st to March 18th, 1923. These figures are taken from *Young India*, the paper which was directed by Mr. Gandhi up to his arrest and again after his release. I have added the numbers of the population of each province at that time.

	Amount of contributions to the Tilak- Swaraj Fund in rupees.	Number of volunteers.	Number of members of Congress Party.	Total population.
Bengal ..	21,434	1249	32,065	47,592,462
Bombay ..	23,615	59	8,949	26,757,648
Punjab ..	3,058	53	4,222	24,187,750
Central Provinces	5,367	393	9,571	13,908,514
United Provinces	465	136	711	46,510,668
Sindh ..	10,205	85	3,159	3,278,493
Assam ..	104	0	87	7,598,861
Madras ..	11,125	450	3,836	42,794,155

To these figures must be added the amount of the contributions and the number who enlisted spontaneously at the meeting of Congress and immediately after. The totals thus reached on March 18th were 362,175 rupees, 3918 volunteers and 106,046 members of the Congress Party. It may be recalled that, when the non-co-operation

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movement was at its height, Mr. Gandhi confidently predicted that the members of the party would soon number 10,000,000.

When the policy to be adopted towards the coming elections came up for discussion, grave differences of opinion became apparent. Notwithstanding strong opposition from the President, Mr. C. R. Das, Congress finally resolved that the standpoint of 1920 should be maintained and all participation in the elections refused. It further expressed the desire that all members of Congress should abstain from offering themselves for election. Unity had been restored, but the fissures, which had already appeared in the report of the committee, set up by the Congress at Lucknow, could be repaired no more. A few days later, on December 31st, 1922, Mr. Das announced the foundation of a new party, the Congress-Khilafat-Swarajya Party, in a manifest which commenced as follows:

Whereas we are convinced that several important items in the programme of the work adopted by the Gaya session of the Indian National Congress are not conducive to the speedy attainment of Swaraj and we are further of opinion that several other important items



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have been rejected, we do hereby form and constitute ourselves into a party within the Congress.

Some hundred members of the All-India Congress Committee signed the manifest. Amongst them were two of the prominent leaders: Pundit Motilal Nehru and Mr. V. J. Patel.

The political aims of the new party were set out by Mr. Das in the following terms:

- 1 The goal of the party is the attainment of Swarajya.
- 2 The scheme of Swarajya prepared by Srijut Chitaranjan Das and Bhagwan Das be circulated and opinions be invited and a committee consisting of the two said gentlemen be appointed to collect opinions submitted to them or expressed in the country and the said committee do submit their scheme of Swarajya after full consideration of such opinions to this party within six months from now.
- 3 The immediate objective of the party is the speedy attainment of full dominion status, that is, securing of right to frame constitution by adopting such machinery and system as are most suited to the conditions

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of the country and to the genius of its people.

- 4 The party will formulate a definite programme of organizing and instructing electors in the country.
- 5 The party will set up nationalist candidates throughout the country to contest and secure seats in Legislative Councils and the Assembly at the forthcoming elections on the following basis:
 - (a) They will, when they are elected, present on behalf of the country its legitimate demands as formulated by the party as soon as the elections are over and ask for their acceptance and fulfilment within a reasonable time by the Government.
 - (b) If the demands are not granted to the satisfaction of the party, occasion will then arise for the elected members belonging to this party to adopt a policy of uniform, continuous and consistent obstruction within the councils with a view to make Government through Councils impossible, but before adopting such a policy



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representatives of the party in the Councils will, if necessary, strengthen by obtaining express mandate of the electorate in this behalf.

- (c) Detailed instructions in this behalf will be given by the party after elections are over.
 - (d) In no case will any member of the party accept office.
- 6 The party will contest elections to local and Municipal boards in several provinces with a view to secure control by nationalists over local and municipal affairs.
 - 7 The party will take steps to organize labour in the country, industrial as well as agricultural, including ryots and peasants with a view to protect and promote its interests and enable it to take its proper place in the country's struggle for Swarajya.
 - 8 The party will frame a plan for the boycott of selected British goods on advice of the sub-committee and will put it into operation as a political weapon in pursuit of its aim.



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- 9 The party will accord its full support in such manner as it thinks necessary to the carrying out of the constructive programme of the Congress in relation to swadeshi, khaddar, temperance, untouchability, inter-communal unity and promotion of national education and arbitration courts and will also endeavour to increase the number of members on the Congress rolls.
- 10 The party will take immediate steps, as a temporary measure and until greater national solidarity is achieved, to promote the formation of what may be called the Indian national pact in several provinces by means of which all reasonable communal claims may be guaranteed and disputes and differences may be settled in order that the attainment of the nation's freedom may be facilitated. The Lucknow compact will generally govern communal representation as between Hindus and Moslems and efforts will be made to bring about a similar understanding regarding the claims and interests of other communities like Sikhs, Parsees, Jews, Indian

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Christians (including domiciled Anglo-Indians), non-Brahmins and depressed classes in several provinces.

- 11 The party will take steps for India to participate in the formation of a federation of Asiatic countries and nationalities with a view to secure solidarity of Asiatic nations to promote Asiatic culture and mutual help in matters of trade and commerce.
- 12 The party will take steps to start, maintain, revive and reorganize the agencies of foreign propaganda for Indian affairs with special reference to dissemination of accurate information and securing of sympathy and support of foreign countries in this country's struggle for Swarajya.

Mr. Das and his followers thus broke away from the Congress policy of boycotting the Legislatures. As stated in articles 4, 5 and 6 they decided to stand as candidates at the forthcoming elections for the Assembly and the Provincial Councils on a pledge of uniform, continuous and sustained obstruction with a view to make Government through the Assembly and the Councils impossible. This policy, which was advertised as a policy of wrecking the legislatures from within, was based



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on the naive assumption that, once the working of the Reforms Act of 1919 was made impossible, nothing would be left for Government to do but to grant a further advance towards self-government.

Article 7 clearly illustrates the fact that the movement for liberty did not originate with the masses, but is an article imported from Europe by Anglicized Indians. It is not comparable to similar agitations led in the West by the intellectual classes, who themselves are the product of gradual development based on facts of history and on the instinctive, though often unvoiced, ideals of the masses. But in India, to use the words of Mr. Montagu, the masses should be roused from their pathetic contentment. One is tempted to ask: 'Why?' Is the lot of the masses in the West to be envied more than that of the Indian? When we see the continuous jealousy and discontent ruling between the various classes; when we see that seventy-nine per cent of the population of England have to live in the nightmare of our modern cities and industrial centres, where life oscillates between factory or office, where personal initiative is generally killed, and cinema and dancing are the standardized forms of amusement; when we see

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that we ourselves are the slaves of comfort and machinery, which drags into its trail the miseries of unemployment; when we see all this we should do well to ask ourselves whether motor cars, broadcasting and universal franchise are a sufficient compensation for all we lost by becoming isolated from the eternal currents of the universe. Can we honestly believe that our modern Western institutions will be a blessing to the Indian masses? Remember that seventy-one per cent of them live by agriculture or pasture, in daily contact with nature and accepting without murmur the sorrows of life, because they are strengthened by their belief in Karma, which rules their present as it will rule their future lives on earth, or else, if Mohammedans, submit to whatever the supreme will of Allah decrees in His eternal wisdom. May we take it upon our conscience to encourage a minute minority of intellectuals, cut off from their own culture and seduced by the modern doctrines of the West, to destroy this rock of contentment and spiritual security and replace it by the quicksands of modern democracy?

Article 10 is there to prove that national and religious solidarity in India is still chimerical.

The challenge of Mr. Das was not taken up by

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Congress. On the contrary, to restore unity the impossible was attempted. A meeting was arranged between Mr. Das, who continued to hold the position of Congress-President, and the members of the All-India Congress Committee at Allahabad on February 27th, 1923.

The following agreement was arrived at:

- 1 Suspension of Council propaganda on both sides till April 30th.
- 2 Both parties to be at liberty to work the remaining items of their respective programmes in the interval without interfering with each other.
- 3 The Majority Party will be at liberty to carry on their propaganda in accordance with the Gaya Programme about money and volunteers.
- 4 The Minority Party will co-operate with the Majority Party in appealing for and raising such funds and enlisting such workers as may be necessary for the constructive programme and also in working the constructive programme and other common matters.
- 5 Each party to adopt such course after April 30th as it may be advised.



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- 6 The above arrangement is subject to the condition that there is no dissolution of the existing councils before the expiry of the full term for which they have been constituted.

Practically both parties were thus at liberty to follow their own policy. Mr. Das, who changed the original name of his party into that of 'Swaraj Party', soon organized a vigorous election campaign, whereas the 'No Change Party', seriously handicapped by the evergrowing antagonism between Hindus and Mohammedans within its ranks, gradually saw its prestige wane and the confidence of its adherents diminish.

Another effort at restoring the unity of the Congress Party was made by the convocation of a meeting of the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay, where it was expected that the Gaya programme could be revised to the satisfaction of both parties. All that could be arrived at was a resolution, which embodied the temporary suspension of the boycott against the Councils, so as to give Mr. Das the opportunity of proving the practical value of his ideas, but at the same time maintained that part of the Gaya programme, which decreed that nobody should offer himself as

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candidate or cast his vote in the name of Congress. This resolution was accepted by the majority, but then the members of the Working Committee of Congress resigned upon considering that 'by adopting the compromise resolution suspending the council boycott propaganda the All-India Congress Committee has committed political suicide, and we refuse to fill the offices of the Congress executive in order to be a party to carry out that resolution which has considerably undermined the prestige of the Congress'.

Thereupon Mr. Das resigned as President of the Congress, holding that no members, belonging to the extreme wings of Congress, which are Constituted by the Swaraj and the No Change Parties, should form part of the Executive. A new Working Committee was then elected out of the members of what was styled the Central Party.

Congress thus practically split up in three parts, but to the eyes of the public the fiction of unity could be maintained. More opposition however arose. Mr. Rajagopalachariar, who had succeeded Mr. Gandhi as editor of *Young India*, refused to submit to the decision of the meeting at Bombay. He demanded the realization of the Gaya programme in full, and not content, as Mr. Das has

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been, with pursuing his own policy, started inciting the Provincial Congress Committees against the All-India Congress Committee. The last semblance of prestige of Congress was thus gravely threatened. Once more an endeavour was made to restore unity. A meeting followed at Nagpur, which sanctioned the Bombay resolution. But the trouble did not end there. The Committee resigned and amongst the members of the newly-elected committee was Mr. Rajagopalachariar, who had strongly opposed the resolution just passed by the meeting. To escape the consequences of this anomaly, several members desired another meeting to be convened, but when it was decided at the meeting to do so, the applicants declared that they would not appear. Finally, after endless discussions, the meeting arranged for an extraordinary session of the All-India Congress to be held at Delhi in the month of September.

This session brought an overwhelming victory to Mr. Das and his followers. Mohamed Ali, one of the prominent leaders of the Khilafat movement, at first strongly opposed the new policy and demanded that under no circumstances should Mr. Gandhi's programme be deviated from. Later he declared that, having received an occult message



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from Mr. Gandhi imploring him to maintain the unity of the party, he was now prepared to join Mr. Das. Thereupon Congress accepted a resolution, reading as follows:

While reaffirming its adherence to the principle of non-violent-non-co-operation this Congress declares that such Congressmen as have no religious or other conscientious objections against entering the legislatures are at liberty to stand as candidates and to exercise their right of voting at the forthcoming elections, and this Congress, therefore, suspends all propaganda against entering the Councils. The Congress at the same time calls upon all Congressmen to redouble their efforts to carry out the constructive programme of their great leader Mahatma Gandhi by united endeavour, to achieve Swaraj at the earliest possible moment.

To soothe the feelings of those who opposed, two more resolutions were passed. One expressing the firm resolve of Congress to prepare a vigorous campaign aiming at the promotion of Civil Disobedience, and one decreeing the boycott of all British goods.

Mr. Das had finally overcome the strong opposition in Congress against the policy he advocated.



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He could now proceed to shape his Swaraj-Party into a compact, disciplined and well-organized whole and could face the approaching elections, backed by the help of the Congress-machinery.

The Government was not intimidated by the coming onslaught. In sharp contrast to the hesitating policy that had been followed in the years 1919-1921, Lord Reading steered a determined course and thereby prevented a repetition of the deplorable events, which had marked the days when the movement of passive resistance reached its zenith. On several occasions he seized the opportunity of publicly expressing his views on the situation and impressing on the public's mind that, whatever might happen, the Government would not deviate from the road it had marked out on the lines set by the Reforms Act of 1919. At a banquet, offered to him by the members of the Chamber of Commerce at Calcutta in the early days of January, 1923, Lord Reading, when reviewing the political situation, frankly stated that the Government had at its disposal the necessary power to suppress all attempts at violent disorder and would not hesitate one moment to use that power, if required.

At the close of the session of the Legislative



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Assembly at Simla in the summer of 1923, the Viceroy, while explaining to the Assembly that there need be no fear of any change of Government leading to the restriction of the rights which had been obtained, found the occasion of pronouncing the following sentences, which might have served as a challenge to the wrecking policy of Mr. Das. 'The legislation has been passed with the assent of all political parties in England. Since then there has been no change and there will be no change in the announced policy.'

His Excellency expressed himself still more plainly at a banquet offered by the members of the Chelmsford Club at Simla in October of the same year. Criticizing the plans of the extremists to enter the legislatures with the object of wrecking them, Lord Reading, although considering the chances of success of such policy as non-existent, did not fail to draw the attention of Mr. Das and his party to the fact that, even if success should be with them, it would be useless to nourish any illusions as to the political consequences thereof. For it need not be doubted that even then 'the government of the country will be continued, the administration will be carried on as heretofore,

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save that the reformed constitution will be in abeyance'.

Between the Government which was holding the reins with a firm hand and the Swarajists offering a well-defined policy which appealed to all who hoped to profit by a weakening of British rule, the Moderates were in a far from enviable position. Their organization left much to be desired; the failure of their attempts in the Assembly to force the Government ahead on the road towards responsible government caused them to appear with empty hands before the electors, and the Swarajists saw to it that a good deal of the unpopularity of the Administration fell upon their shoulders. A third party was formed by the Independents, a group of candidates of various opinions, who were able to rely on local influences in the constituencies for support, rather than on acceptance of a party programme.

In the elections the Swarajists obtained a striking success by securing forty-five seats in the Assembly, which numbered one hundred and forty-five members. The price of their victory was mainly paid by the Moderates. In the provinces the Swarajist success was less pronounced. In the Council of the Central Provinces only, they obtained



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a clear majority. In that of Bengal, they became the largest party. In the other provinces they made no great headway, whereas they were weakly represented in Madras, the Punjab and Bihar and Orissa.

After the elections were over Congress decreed that members of the party in the legislatures should pursue a policy of pure obstruction. No member was to accept office or a seat on a select committee, or to take part, as an individual, in current business.

In the new Assembly Pundit Motilal Nehru became the leader of the Swaraj-Party. In accordance with the policy laid down in article 5 of the manifesto published by Mr. Das on the occasion of the foundation of the party in December, 1922, the Pundit soon moved a resolution for the convening of a Round Table Conference to recommend a scheme for establishing full responsible government in India. As was to be expected the Government opposed the resolution, but proposed an inquiry into the working of the Reforms. This proposal received little support and the resolution was carried against the Government by a large majority. This 'defeat' however, failed to deflect the Government from its course. The Assembly

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thereupon, as a 'constitutional protest', refused permission to introduce the Finance Bill of the year, the passage of which was then secured by the Viceroy's certification. The Assembly, however, had the question of constitutional advance on the brain and from then onwards brought it up for discussion on numerous occasions. All sense of reality was lost. The opposition worked up their imagination to the point of believing that it possessed the power of a strong party in a real parliament, and the fact that a successful debate in the Assembly had no power whatsoever to move the Government was drowned in a torrent of words.

The frontal attack having failed, the Swarajists now turned to the second point of their programme, 'the uniform, continuous and consistent obstruction', which, in practice, was not to last for more than a year. Numbering only forty-five out of one hundred and forty-five members, they soon had to look around for support and allied themselves with the Independents. These, however, failed to see the beauty of obstruction and compelled the Swarajists to compromise.

Towards the end of 1924 Mr. Gandhi was prematurely released from gaol in consequence of an operation for appendicitis. In the extremist camp

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hopes rose high. But here also it was soon proved that it is fatal to have two captains on one ship. Mr. Gandhi clung to his old policy of non-co-operation, civil disobedience and khaddar, whereas Mr. Das did not believe in the spinning-wheel as a weapon of attack and required something more substantial than soul-force to oppose to the power of the British Empire. The breach between the two leaders and their respective followings steadily widened, while a far greater danger threatened the unity of the party by the ever-growing antagonism between Hindus and Mohammedans. The political pact between the two communities was soon destroyed, each of them became bent upon their proper interests and violent outbreaks once more shattered the illusion of a United India. Serious riots between the two communities occurred in the North-West Frontier Provinces and Hyderabad during the latter half of the year 1924. Resolutions proclaiming the firm resolve of both parties to arrive at the speedy re-establishment of Hindu-Moslem unity were solemnly passed at numerous meetings all over the country. Mr. Gandhi, partly as an expiation for his share in the bad feeling and partly to draw the attention of the country to the urgency of the problem, decided

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on a complete fast during twenty-one days, under the sole restriction that he reserved unto himself the right to drink water with or without salt. The population, Hindu as well as Mohammedan, put their faith in the efficiency and neutrality of British troops, and the foretaste of Swaraj they had enjoyed did much to hasten the collapse of the extremist movement. A revival of revolutionary crime, resorted to in Bengal, was rapidly crushed by effective measures.

In the year 1925 the Swaraj-Party received a severe blow by the death of Mr. Das, who had been the great driving-power of the movement. The influence of Mr. Gandhi, who in the previous year, as a last effort at unity, had practically surrendered to Mr. Das, was rapidly waning. The religious discord had almost entirely driven the Mohammedans out of the party and the Hindu politicians, although their esteem for the character of Mr. Gandhi remained as high as ever, gradually lost confidence in his capacities as a practical leader. Neither Pundit Motilal Nehru, nor Mr. Patel could command sufficient authority. In the Assembly the compromise with the Independents caused them to fall away from the principles of ruthless and irreconcilable obstruction, which in the Central



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Provinces and in Bengal had succeeded in destroying diarchy — a 'victory' which, as its practical result, had restored the pre-Reforms powers of the Government. The temptation of government posts began to prove stronger than the attractions which boycott and obstruction had to offer. First Mr. Tambe, a Swarajist in the Central Provinces, accepted an Executive Councillorship, next Mr. Patel, the prominent Swarajist leader from Bombay, became President of the Assembly. Others followed and a new policy, styled as 'responsive co-operation', was adopted by a group led by Mr. Jayakar, Mr. Kelkar and Dr. Moonjee. This group split off from the main body and rapidly approached the standpoint of the Moderates, characterized by the words — 'oppose when we must, and support when we can'.

The proximity of the general elections to all the legislatures, which were to take place in the autumn of the year 1926, obliged the Swarajists to develop some new policy, which might cover up the failure of non-co-operation, civil disobedience, boycott and wrecking from within. The spectacular tactics of walking-out in a body, whenever the Government refused to listen to 'the voice of the people', came to be practised in the Assembly as

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well as in the Provincial Councils. The effect was futile and the comedy of the walking-out policy failed to make any impression on the electorate, which had a finer sense of realities than the politicians by whom it was represented. The elections were fought on the division between Hinduism and Islam, one of the true dividing lines which run through British India. The Swaraj-Party rapidly became entirely Hindu. Throughout the country Moslems stood as Mohammedans and Hindus as members of the Hindu Mahasabha. All other descriptions were of minor importance to the electors. It was rare that candidates appealed to the voters on broad grounds of public policy, nor did the great constitutional issue attract attention. Few felt Indian and could raise themselves above the religious issue. As a result of the electoral propaganda, communal tension, which had quieted down during the preceding year, again rose to fever heat and grave riots became frequent in Calcutta as well as in Upper India.

How deeply communal feeling had eaten into political life also became apparent in the grouping of the various parties in the newly-elected Assembly. The Swarajists commanded about one-third of the votes of the one hundred and five elected members.



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The Nationalists, a new party under an old name, included the Responsive Co-operators and the Hindu Mahasabhaites, the latter being the party of Hindu consolidation. These two groups were almost entirely Hindu. On the other side, most of the Mohammedans organized themselves as the Central Moslem Party under the leadership of Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan, while others joined the Independent Party, led by Mr. Jinnah, the Moham-medan leader from Bombay. To all appearances it looked as if the communal question would be paramount in all political movements throughout India, while the Government by their firm attitude had restored the confidence of the masses in the British Raj.

But the announcement of the appointment of the Statutory Commission in November, 1927, entirely changed the situation. The hope of politicians of all classes flared up. The Commission became a new object in the game of boycott, which by its passive character seems to exert an irresistible attraction to the Oriental mind. Mr. Gandhi, whose influence in Indian politics had gradually dwindled, reappeared upon the scene, and, by submitting to the claims of the extremists, succeeded in putting himself once more at the head of the

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movement. The beneficial effects of Lord Reading's virile rule became obscured and again Dame Phraze reigned supreme. The Report of the Simon Committee, re-affirming the pledge to progressive realization of responsible government in British India as an integral part of the British Empire and advising further important steps in the direction of self-government, did not allay the discontent. On the contrary, it only encouraged Mr. Gandhi and his followers to raise their demands. So did the announcement of the Government's decision to convoke the Round Table Conference, and various official declarations in India and at home. It could not have been otherwise. No extremist agitation can live unless its leaders continue to keep their demands well ahead of the concessions which the Government is prepared to grant.

The masses, rendered more susceptible to unrest by the facts of the economic depression which began to make themselves felt by 1929 were easily made to accept the decisions of the Government as signs of weakness. Circumstances were favourable to convey to public opinion at home an impression of the graveness of the situation. A façade of unity was beautifully dressed up on the occasion of the First Round Table Conference to screen the actual situa-

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tion in India from the public eye in Europe and in America. This was so cleverly done, that, at the opening session of the Conference, the impression could even be created that the Indian Government had entirely misread the mentality of the Indian Princes. Public opinion was successfully turned away from the fact that a natural opposition must exist between princely autocracy and Anglicized democracy, as well as from the violent outbreaks of Hindu-Moslem rivalry which continue in India, unaffected by the resolutions in favour of unity passed by the political leaders of both communities.

However, at the close of the Conference in January, 1931, a most surprising result had been achieved. Princes, Hindus, Moslems, Sikhs and all the minorities were favourably disposed towards the creation of an All-India Federation, and it appeared as if at last a path had been opened, which would lead to a united and independent India. In the atmosphere of enthusiasm and optimism but scanty attention was paid to the fact that little had been done towards solving the four major questions: Hindu-Moslem relations, the terms on which the Princes would consent to federate with British India, the nature of the safe-



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guards to be provided with regard to the army and finance, and the protection to be afforded to British trading interests.

Returned to India, it was not long before the delegates discovered that in spite of the favourable atmosphere which had been created in London, grim realities had to be faced. As a natural outcome of the prospect that an important step towards self-government was imminent, the various groups in India began to manœuvre to obtain the largest possible share in the powers that would be granted.

The Moslems were not slow to realize that their religious and civic rights would be put in jeopardy by the large numerical majority that the Hindu would hold in an All-India Federation. Moreover, they perceived that the inclusion of the Indian States would strengthen the Hindu position as the population of these States is mainly Hindu. Their claims for efficient safeguards, therefore, became more and more emphatic and as a result Hindu-Moslem relations were strained and soon reached breaking-point.

As the implications of federation became better understood the enthusiasm of the Princes waned. They feared that their sovereign rights would be



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curtailed and that undesirable democratic influences would make themselves felt amongst their people and undermine their authority in their states.

Congress members regarded the prospect of a federation with grave misgivings. They foresaw that they would be confronted by the Moham-medans and the Princes and they entertained grave doubts as to the chances of bringing an All-India federation under their political control. They were not blind to the fact that the autocratic influence of the Princes might menace their position and that the Indian Rulers, as the true defenders of the ancient Indian conception of governments, might erect an unsurpassable barrier to their Western democratic ideals.

Although the difficulties were towering up on all sides, the British and the British Indian Governments continued their preparations for a Second Round Table Conference in London. This Conference assembled in the autumn of 1932. Mr. Gandhi was present. But the glowing conception of an All-India federation had faded away. The Conference soon stranded on the rock of Hindu-Moslem antagonism. The minorities sub-committee came to no solution, asked for an adjournment, still reached no solution and asked for a further adjourn-

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ment. Finally Mr. Gandhi, who had been the principal mediator, had to announce that he had failed to negotiate an understanding between the two communities.

It was then clear that no progress could be hoped for at the Conference. In his closing speech Mr. MacDonald on the whole had to record a failure. He reaffirmed the determination of the British Government to do all it could to assist the creation of such a federation of All-India as he had foreshadowed when he closed the first conference in January, 1931. He also announced the decision of the Government to press on with whatever preparatory work could be done in the meantime. And he expressed the hope that the various communities might be able to reach agreement among themselves, adding, however, that if they did not, the British Government would have to put forward a scheme itself.

Practically the only advantage gained at the second Conference was that Mr. Gandhi, by his presence, had given those in Europe an opportunity of forming a personal opinion about his value as a leader and a statesman.

In the meantime the situation in India had gone from bad to worse.



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In Congress, the extremists had obtained the upper hand and were determined to force the issue and leave Mr. Gandhi on his return no choice but to resume civil disobedience. As their lieutenants Abdul Ghaffar Khan took action in the North-West Frontier Province and Jawahar Lal Nehru in the United Provinces. The former led the Red Shirt Movement around Peshawar, the latter the no-rent campaign in the United Provinces. At first the Government followed its old policy of staying its hand, so as not to precipitate more serious developments and hoped that the common sense of the people would soon reassert itself. When this hope was frustrated the Government issued ordinances to give the authorities the requisite special powers for dealing with the emergencies. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Jawahar Lal Nehru and other leaders were arrested. As a result of Government's firm action public confidence in their power to exercise authority was restored and the situation immediately improved.

Shortly after Mr. Gandhi's return from London, Congress called upon the country to resume civil non-violent disobedience. But this time Government lost no time. Mr. Gandhi and thousands of his followers were put in prison, and, although the

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movement was not arrested at once, it petered out before the end of the year 1932.

A greater menace is the terrorist movement in Bengal, which broke out in 1931 and has not yet been stamped out. Strong measures have been taken already and, although terrorism still goes on, it is difficult to believe that the Government will not find means to suppress the movement, as it suppressed terrorism in Bengal and in the United Provinces before the war, when the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, narrowly escaped being killed by a bomb thrown at his carriage at Delhi in 1912.

" It is not surprising that in this atmosphere the various communities in India did not succeed in finding a solution regarding their representation under the constitution to be. Therefore the British Government had to decide, and in August, 1932, announced its scheme for representation in the provincial legislatures. It found favour with no one. Vehement attacks against it were launched by Hindus, Moslems, Sikhs, Indian Christians, Untouchables and Women's Organizations alike — which after all is perhaps the best proof of its fairness.

The Government however was not deflected from its task of elaborating proposals for a reformed



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constitution, which proposals were published on March 17th, 1933.

By these proposals the provinces are given autonomy, and to the Federal Government is conceded responsible government over the whole field of administration allotted to the Federation, except in regard to certain reserved subjects.

For the franchise for the Lower Chamber of the Federal Legislature, the proposals lay down qualifications, the effects of which should be to enfranchise between two and three per cent of the population of British India, and similar, but lower qualifications, for the franchise for the Provincial Legislatures should produce a provincial electorate of about fourteen per cent of the total population of British India, or some twenty-seven per cent of the adult population.

Women can vote, and will have seats reserved for them in both the Federal Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures.

The Federation will consist of the autonomous provinces of British India and the Indian States. It will be brought about by the Princes surrendering a defined corpus of their present sovereign rights, but retaining internal autonomy in respect of rights

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not so surrendered and not affected by any other consideration than the existing suzerainty of the Crown. It is a condition of the setting-up of the Federation, first, that the rulers of the States, representing not less than half the aggregate population of the Indian States, and entitled to not less than half the State seats in the Upper House of the Legislature, shall have executed the necessary instruments of accession; and, second, that a reserve bank, free from political influence, will have been set up, and already be successfully operating.

The Governor-General and Viceroy will have a dual capacity — as Governor-General, being the head of the Federation, and, as Viceroy, conducting relations with the States outside the Federation sphere.

As Governor-General, he will be aided and advised by a Council of Ministers, responsible to the Legislature in all matters, save those concerned with three departments to be reserved to his personal administration, namely, defence, external affairs, and ecclesiastical affairs.

The Governor-General is also given special responsibility for certain purposes, including the following: (1) The prevention of any grave menace



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to peace or tranquillity; (2) the safeguarding of the financial stability and credit of the Federation; (3) the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of minorities; (4) the securing to members of the public services of any rights provided for them by the Constitution, and the safeguarding of their own legitimate interests; (5) the protection of the rights of any Indian State; and (6) the prevention of commercial discrimination in any matter which affects the administration of reserved departments.

In the event of a breakdown of the machinery of government the Governor-General is empowered to assume full control.

These special and wide powers are, however, to be exercised only in special circumstances, except in the case of the reserved departments.

The Federal Legislature resembles the existing Central Legislature in composition, and will consist of two chambers. The Upper Chamber or Council of State will be comprised of two hundred and sixty members, one hundred to be appointed by the Princes, one hundred and fifty to be elected by members of the principal Legislatures of British India, and ten to be nominated members.

The Lower Chamber, or House of Assembly, will



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consist of three hundred and seventy-five members, of whom one hundred and twenty-five will be appointed by the Princes, and the others elected directly according to the seats allocated to each province and to the several communities and interests in each province.

In the provinces certain subjects (reserved subjects) have hitherto been administered by the Governor-in-Council, and others (transferred subjects) by the Governor and his Ministers in the Legislative Council or local Parliament.

The reserved subjects, including law and order, are now to be transferred to the Ministers responsible to the Legislature. But the Provincial Government, like the Governor, is given special responsibilities, with corresponding powers to discharge these responsibilities, confined in scope, of course, to the province.

Provincial Legislatures are to be enlarged, and the allocation of seats and the method of election are in accordance with the provisions of the communal award of August 4th.

The present nominated members and the official bloc disappear in favour of wholly elected Legislatures, so far as the Lower Houses in the provinces are concerned. The Legislatures of Bengal, the



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United Provinces, and Bihar will be bicameral, with a small proportion of nominated members, not officials, in the Upper Chambers, and in the other eight provinces the Legislatures will be unicameral.

The proposals confirm the existing rights of the public services. The Secretary of State's Council for India is abolished, and its place is taken by not less than three, and not more than six, advisers. The Federal Court, with both original and appellate jurisdictions in cases raising constitutional issues, such as the spheres of the Federal, Provincial, and State's authorities, is set up, and power is given to establish a Supreme Court to act as a Court of Appeal in British India.

It remains to be seen whether these proposals will satisfy India and whether, once they pass into law, the dream of a peaceful India will be nearer realization than after the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms came into force. One may have his doubts, because the new proposals are based — as were the Reforms Act of 1919 — on the same three assumptions:

- 1 That modern Western democracy is the cause of our European civilization;



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- 2 That Western education and the Western conception of life can form the starting point for the regeneration of Indian political life; and
- 3 That you can have daughter-nations which are not of your own blood.

It looks as if the path which led from the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform to the Simon Commission, will have to be traversed all over again. It is to be feared that India will not be appeased and the agitation for complete self-government continue. Then there will be more civil disobedience, more Hindu-Moslem outbreaks and more murders in Bengal. Finally, another Royal Commission will have to be appointed to study the Indian problem. There will be more conferences and more committees. The Conservatives, the Liberals and the Labourites will talk at home. In India Mr. Gandhi will talk, and so will Congress, and the Mohammedans, and the Sikhs, and the Untouchables and all the majorities and the minorities. And amongst each and every group there will be eminent men and very clever talkers. But there are two things that even the cleverest talker amongst them all cannot do:



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He cannot talk India — populated as it is by groups which are divided by race and by blood, by religion and by law, as well as by an entirely different outlook on social life — into a united independent Empire;

Nor can he talk the British out of India.

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