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**Selections from the Letter's
Dispatches and Other State
Papers Preserved in the Bombay
Secretariat Maratha Series**

Edited by
George W. Forest

Published by
Government Central Press
Bombay
1885



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The object of this volume is to trace by the Secretariat the history of the Maráthás from their rise into a great nation, to their defeat by the Maráthas. Assaye the story is told by the letters and has been printed exactly as they are entered in the Secretariat in the spelling of the Native words. Great difficulties in the names of places and persons. Thus the name of Severmook, and the name of Samsber Bahádúr, had Prahaunder. Some of the papers regarding the First Maráthá War in print in a large folio printed by order of the House of Commons printed again both for the sake of the continuity of the history because the folio is accessible to very few persons. It contains papers with the Records that they were full of errors owing to the way Native names were transcribed, unintelligible.

After the papers relating to the Second Maráthá War by the Marquess Wellesley when Earl of Mornington. The old letters in the Record Office. These letters have been called "Despatches, Minutes, and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley." "Selection from the Despatches, Treaties, and other papers." and those which have not been printed are now given. Some letters written to Colonel Palmer and the Peshwa. One letter, regarding the affairs, is included for the importance and interest of the Marquess Wellesley and his Council discuss the advantage to be gained at the port of Aden, and come to the conclusion that "On the whole that the proposed measure is in no respect eligible. We therefore of the Sultán of Aden be declined in as conciliating terms as possible under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Murray be withdrawn with the least possible delay. It appearing from concurrent accounts that Peria's discouragements of a very serious nature, does not, in point of the advantages which were originally expected from it, we do not think it again be occupied by British forces" (p. 640).

After the letters of the Marquess Wellesley follow a few letters of the Duke of Wellington when he was Colonel Wellesley and was in chief command of the Mysore territory. In the Bombay records there are a large number of letters of the Duke, but the majority of them have been printed in the despatches. Those given in this volume are now printed for the first time. The letters remain to be examined, and it is quite possible that some more will be written by the Duke of Wellington. The letter of the 1st of March 1800, and is addressed to the Marquess Wellesley that the troops in Kánara are under his command. "As I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant, Bombay, I am



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...atters in which I am desirous of being
wish me with such information as it may be in
the conciliatory tone which he always adopts
ed some troops to be moved from Malabár in
ntlemen of the Malabár Commission objected to
Bombay Government with the following remark.
nd of the troops, I have had an opportunity
f my duty, viz., to attend as much as possible to
it should be decided that I was wrong in drawing
gements were faulty, I hope that the error will
o an unworthy desire to do that which should be
also writes to the Commissioner of Malabár, "An
force in Malabár which I am concerned to observe
Commission: but it is the best thing I can devise in
e the credit with the Bombay Government and the
only as a measure of necessity. This I might like-
mission." At page 609 is printed a facsimile of
enington announcing to the Bombay Government the
ters of India.

...atters will be found an interesting historical account of
helped to increase the power and dominion of their
oraneous subjects of curiosity and interest are printed in
e found two letters written by Tipu and a detailed account
y before the war which proved fatal to him. The volume
n manuscript entitled "Memoranda and Recent Anecdotes
án by a Musalmán Observer in the year 1195-96 Hijri, that
value on account of its giving a Mahomedan view of the

...ections more intelligible to the general reader I have thought it
a short historical introduction. In the introduction will be found
ive which has never been printed before, an interesting memorial
bers of the Native community in the year 1739, offering to sub-
pees to repair the defences of the town of Bombay, and a quaint
en describing a gallant naval action.

asure to acknowledge the valuable assistance rendered me in the
by Mr. Purushottam Bákrishna Joshi, whose services were placed
ent.

G. W. FORREST.



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INTRODUCTION.

The first paper in these Selections is a translation of the Maráthá Empire. Mr. Waring in his History of the Maráthas gives information regarding Shiváji from four Maráthá historians, and he adds: "One is kept at Ráiri, the most authentic than the others." In the last paragraph of the first volume, will be found the following remark: "The village of Ráigad. Mánko Bhimráv, Kulkarni of Kadam, Pátíl of the village of Kámri, copied Mr. Waring in his appendix proves in the most convincing manner that Ráigad and Ráiri are the same place. He also shows that Ráigad is fifty miles north and by west from Poona. The Bombay Engineers, established on the spot, and that instead of being north-west from Poona, it is two miles south from Poona." Mr. Waring also shows that Ráiri is besides internally connected with the sea.

A Memoir of Shiváji, the founder of the Maráthá Empire, informs us that he derived his information of the life of Shiváji and his son from the capital of Shiváji's empire, and is more authentic than the others. The first time in the Memoir, published for the first time in the Maráthá language, account of Shiváji and Shiváji was in the village of Ráiri, by desire of Náikji from the Daftarkhána in that fort." In an elaborate manner that Ráiri and Ráigad are the same place. Orme was incorrect in placing Ráiri as a "poor ignorant Goodfellow," he writes, "of the name to this day is called Ráheri or Ráiri, and is situated thirty-eight miles west and forty miles from Poona. Every one also speaks of Ráigad as Ráiri. The life of Shiváji, which Mr. Waring gives, is so far from being the most authentic life of the founder of the Maráthá Empire, as one given in the present volume. The Memoir at Ráiri, says that he escaped to the fort of Ráiri, and continued there a month, and that he died there." In the present Memoir we are informed that he remained there a whole month and that he afterwards performed the usual ceremonies performed

is interesting on the life of a man who welded together the various tribes of the Deccan. The contrast between the life of the biographer and the life of the hero is most striking.



Rāvan and got possession of Ceylon, and will make your retrograde difficult." The life close a most remarkable prophesy; for like Aur or Barbarossa, Shivāji's reappearance in a supreme moment of his country's fortune has been confidently expected by the Marāthās foretold in all accounts of the national hero. "When Shivāji went to take his share of Chur Chunjāvar (Tanjore) in the year of Shālivā in 1595, the goddess Bhavāni came into his bod and remained there five hours, during which time she gave him a view of future events, viz. that all his dominions would fall into the hands of people with red faces; that Sambho would be taken prisoner by the Mogals; that Rāja Rām would succeed him on the masnad; that Shivāji would, in the course of time, extend his dominions to Delhi, and that me into the world again under a new form and dominion would remain in the Bhonsla family for twenty-seven generations."

On the death of Shivaji his son inherited his father's vast possessions, but none of his monarchies of Bijapur and Golconda, Aurangzeb the son of Shivaji fell a prisoner into his hands, Atara was captured, nearly all the Maratha strongholds were seized, but the Marathas neither crushed nor subdued. The very year before the death of the great Mogal Emperor his armies sustained a signal defeat at their hands and he himself narrowly escaped being a prisoner. On the death of Aurangzeb, Shahu Raja, the grandson of Shivaji, was sceptre. He allowed his state affairs to be but the young man was not fit to wield a literally means he who precedes. In 1714 chief minister or Peshwa, which inferior position in the state to the high of Shahu, raised himself from an confidence of Shahu and persuaded him to resign them to him. In course of time Shahu, the complete ensigns of authority. Every order was issued by the Raja Pandit Pradhan or Chief of the day of the last Peshwa. of government and

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with the *sirpāc* or robe of office. Bal
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Those of the people who wished to leave were allowed free egress with all their property for eight days, and those who desired to stay were permitted to worship God according to the forms of their own religion.

The capture of Bassein warned the English to guard themselves to meet a like peril. The President (10th May 1739) represented to the Board that in his opinion the boats now employed on the river may easily, by means of batteries, be compelled to retire and the enemy might, on being fully determined, get on the island. He also pointed out that the town wall was no more than eleven feet in height reckoning up to the cordon, and it seems unfit for the resistance of batteries, which is confirmed by the opinion of the Engineer. Two months afterwards "the President remarks to the Board that our present situation admits of no longer delay in coming to some resolution for or against the carrying on a ditch round the town wall. That the principal merchants of the place, convinced of the necessity of putting the town thereby in some state of defence, have subscribed the sum of thirty thousand rupees towards the expense of this work, as may appear by their hands set to an instrument now laid before the Board as entered at this consultation, and which is as much as can be expected from that body considering the too declined state of trade." The following is the instrument to which the President refers :—

"HON'BLE SIR AND SIRS,—The great happiness we enjoy under the English Government in a perfect security of our property and the free exercise of our respective ways of worship leads us to be very desirous of continuing the same advantages to our posterity; and as a formidable power of the Maráthas has subdued the neighbouring country and the invasion of this island is threatened, we cannot, on the present occasion, avoid being anxious that such a defence may be ordered as may tend to disappoint their evil designs; and as the town wall was, we apprehend, intended as a security to the merchants that were admitted to the protection of this Government, for the erecting of which we have long contributed, notwithstanding which we are apprised it is not yet in a condition to resist the neighbouring power; and seeing we have no other place of retreat to in case of an invasion, we humbly request that the said wall may be fortified with a ditch and such other additions made to it as may on an emergency secure our effects and families, and towards the defraying the expense of the same we, the merchants residing here and whose names are hereunto subscribed, beg leave to propose that a duty of one per cent. may be laid and collected until the amount of thirty thousand rupees be raised, which is as much as we can offer, considering the present decay of trade and the want of substantial merchants.—MOODY JEEJEE JAMSETJEE, AMBAIDAS FAKIRDA, RUPJEE DHANJEE, FRAMJEE RUSTOMJEE, KENPONDAS RAMDAS, DHANJEE GOPAL, LAKHMICHAND GOVINDAS, BOMANJEE JEDAH, MUNCHURJEE BOMONJEE FOR BOMONJEE RUSTOMJEE, BANAJEE LIMJEE, SOISSONGJEE BANAPORE BANSALL, RANCHANDRAJEE BANSALL, CRAPONDAS SAUDAS, NAGAIDAS LOLLJEE, ALLY BAYOOT MOORMAN, MAMUD BAYA MURGIVA MOORMAN, CLOWJEE HUSSON MOORMAN, SAIBOO PONDIA MOORMAN, SAIBOO TUCKEE HUSOR, ADOJEE PURVOE, RANEOJI PURVOE, GOVINDAJEE RAGHUNATH, RAMJEE PURVOE, SOUZ DABOY, SANURA SINAY, VISSU SINAY, BICKOO SINAY, BYBOO SINAY, MUCHANSETT PADAMSETT, SEWJEE DHARAMSETT, RAMAJEE GUNBARETT, MOROPANT VISSAJEE."

Besides strengthening the fortifications of the town it was considered prudent by the President to send a letter to the Sháhu Raja "as a proper step and introduction towards obtaining a friendly correspondence with that Court, which appears hitherto to have been entirely neglected." And the Board unanimously agreeing to this proposal, the President remarks that it will be necessary to accompany the letter with a few presents at a moderate expense, such as looking-glasses and other Europe curiosities as may be procured in the place. Captain Gordon was chosen to be the envoy as he knew the "manners and humours of the people." As it was feared that an attempt to negotiate directly with the descendant of Shiváji might give offence to the Peshwa it was agreed likewise "that as Bassein is reduced it will be highly proper to send a letter of compliment to Chinnáji with a small present in the Eastern manner, to consist of six yards of red velvet, six yards of green, and six yards of cloth." The presents were sent by the hands of a native, but Chinnáji desired by letter that Captain Inland



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should be sent to him to confer more particularly about the means of settling a good harmony and understanding with the Government. Captain Gordon in his letter of instruction was told to gain some information and insight into the Government interests and designs at Shahu Rájá's Court, and he was to discover who were Bájiráv's enemies at that Court and how much they were to be depended upon. "It will not be amiss," the Board writes, "if you see a proper occasion and opening to instill a jealousy of his ambition and growing power which must be much increased by the accession of these conquests from the Portuguese and consequently it must be high time to check or put a stop to them." The envoy however was to be "careful to guard against making him an enemy lest he might be excited to aim at doing us ill office." Mr. Gordon left Bombay on the 12th May and on the 13th arrived at Dunda Rájápur, being civilly received by the Siddhi. His letter gives a graphic description of the Deccan a century ago. "On the 20th" he writes "we entered the hills which were very difficult to ascend. The 22nd entered a fine country well peopled." On the 1st June he reached a small ruinous town, a mile from Myrah, which was then held by the Mogals and which Shahu Rájá was besieging. On the 3rd he had an interview with the Rájá, who asked him "how far Bombay lay from Bassein, how broad the river which parted us and if passable without boats, if we had quitted Bandora, if Bombay was walled and whether it had a ditch or river, and if we had any other fort within the town, to which we gave proper replies." Shahu also put the startling question whether "dread of the Maráthás had not occasioned the visit", to which answer was given that "friendship alone moved us." A few days afterwards the envoy had another audience with the Rájá "in a mean place he had erected with his own hands for his present convenience during the siege. He was very gracious to us, and seemed delighted with the birds that made a part of our present, expressing a willingness to do us good offices." Captain Gordon, however, soon discovered that the Rájá's good offices were not of much use, for "Bájiráv is so powerful that he makes small account of the Rájá." During their stay in camp news came from Delhi that Nádirsháh, who had plundered the Imperial City, "seemed disposed to march against the Maráthás." "On which the Rájá with much vehemence plucked off his turband (being a mark of great concern) saying, will Bassein and all our new acquisitions make amends for twenty-two thousand brave men lost there?" We are however afterwards informed that "the return of Nádirsháh is confirmed, and a report seems current that the Maráthás will proceed for seizing Delhi." On the 25th the Mission were allowed to take their leave, the Rájá "desiring his friend, the Governor of Bombay, would not omit to send him eight Guinea hens, a pair of Turkeys, some Bussora pigeons, a little mummy, and any kind of curious birds." The envoy returned by way of Poona, and he writes: "That place seems well built and abounds with people and is the chief residence of Bájiráv, who has a great extent of country, to appearance more fertile and valuable than any other I had passed through. I visited the foundery where I saw many cohorn and bomb shells, said to have been cast there, and a form of a thirteen-inch mortar—I was told they make such with great ease—and have learnt the art of running iron for making shot." The Mission arrived safe at Bombay after an absence of two months.

The mission of Inchbird proved a greater success even than that of Gordon. He visited the victorious Chinnáji at Bassein and records what took place in a letter, dated 27th June 1739. From the first question he suspected "they were bringing a demand of money upon the anvil." He however plainly told them that "the Company would sooner see the Island of Bombay sunk under water than they could or would comply with any such request." The Maráthás complained bitterly of the aid supplied from time to time to the Portuguese, which had cost them much trouble; but the envoy consoled them by saying that "as they now were



Governor of the North, wrote: "I am likewise, from a regard to our common interest, to tell you that the Maráthás have more at heart the conquest of your island than they had that of ours which now commands it and which they invaded under the colour of a peace equal to that you keep up with them now, both from the infidelity natural to that nation and from the certainty of the great riches and treasure they may get upon it." He further adds: "I hold it for indubitable that the gentlemen belonging to the Government of your island cannot but be sensible that you must be ruined with us if the Maráthás gain an establishment on the island of Sálsette, and that they only keep peace with you for a present conveniency, not to have at the same time two enemys on their back." The Portuguese commanders not only reproach the English for not making common cause against "the idolators and the common enemys to all European nations;" but for the assistance which they had lent them: "We knew for a certain," he writes, "that your island is continually furnishing the Maráthás with powder and ball; for in the winter season from the artillery with which the Maráthás fired against the town the balls were all hammered, but since the spring they are cast and with English marks. When our deceased General Pedro d'Mello went to attack the fort Dos Reys, I know that from your island there went three gunners to Thána, and perhaps their expertness was the rod that caused our smart, and afterwards under a pretence that they were deserters, they were turned, the Maráthás not yielding to send back others that were really deserters now in Thána, but only those who were sent over on purpose."

Neither the eloquence nor the taunt of the Portuguese Commander were of much avail. The President declared his intention of remaining neutral, but he sent fifty men with some ammunition to assist in the defence of Bándora. These were withdrawn when the Maráthá General declared his intention of attacking the place. The fortifications were on too great a scale for a small force to protect, and an order was issued to dismantle them and blow up all the buildings at Bándora. The superior of the Jesuit College resisted the order to the utmost. In the proceedings of the 20th February 1739 we read: "The President likewise communicates to the Board two letters from John de Souza Ferras, Commandant of Sálsette, remonstrating the obstruction he meets with from the superiors of Bándora in completing the works for the entire demolition of that place, threatening him with the worst of consequences if he goes on with them, the President himself having before received a sort of protest against the same from the superior aforesaid: upon which it is remarked that the power and influence of the Society is so great that this Commandant dare not execute the orders given him by the General of the North: and that to leave the College standing may be of great disservice to this island, affording the Maráthás a convenient protreat, or place of arms, whence they may greatly incommode us. That therefore since the evident benefit it is of to both nations to destroy the place entirely cannot procure their consent, an expedient be tried to bring the Padres to reason by refusing the protection of this Government for their persons and effects which they may keep at their College and defend against the Maráthás, or upon abandoning it, leave us at liberty to pursue our measures for the safety of our frontier without engaging us in a controversy with the Portuguese Government. And the Secretary is ordered to repair to Bándora to enforce and explain our sentiments of the Padres' conduct as well as to excite John de Souza Ferras to the performance of his orders in full."

The Maráthás had now begun the siege of Bassein and the Commander wrote frequent letters charged with dignity and pathos, asking for succour; the garrison were on the verge of starvation, could not some rice be sent to them? But none could be spared, as owing to the guard kept on the ports by the Maráthás the English were themselves threatened scarcity. Then came a letter from Caetan de Souza, dated the 1st March 1739, which acqui-

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The President with his succeeding to the command of the town by the death of John Xavier Pinto, killed by a musket shot in the throat ; " that the Maráthás have carried on mines, covered ways and other approaches to the very foundation of the wall, their batteries being very near the town ; that they throw large stones into the place from mortars. Notwithstanding all which he hopes to preserve the town from falling into the enemy's hands, having made all the necessary preparations and dispositions to disappoint the effects of their mines or sap ; that the continual fire they have been driven to has diminished their ammunition insomuch that without our assistance to that point the town would be in the greatest danger, and therefore he makes earnest suit for a supply of four hundred barrels of powder and five thousand shot of different sizes." At the request of the Captain of the North the opinion of " our Engineer Mr. John Brown and Bombardier Mr. Joseph Smith are taken with regard to the Maráthás' project of mining, but their reply was of no great professional value. They came to the conclusion that as the Maráthá works " must be superficial, the best way to annoy them is by sally or raining shells plentifully on them." It was also agreed to supply the Portuguese with two hundred barrels of powder and four thousand shots of the requisite size. The small aid was soon exhausted. The President is again implored to lend " this city in the name of all its inhabitants that have estates, or to the King my master on the mortgage of his royal domain one hundred thousand xeraphins for the payment of his troops. With the greatest security your Honour can desire even to have your payment secured in Portugal should there for our sins be no lands or revenue left in these parts to pay you out of." The Commander adds : " I have no resource left to apply to, having already a long time melted down the church plate to carry on the expense of the war." The President and Council express sympathy for the unfortunate state of the Portuguese ; but it is resolved that " in respect to the restrictions we are under we cannot hazard such a sum of money as it is requested and is agreed, therefore, that the President write a handsome excuse for the present, deferring a definitive answer till the arrival of a ship from Great Britain, which is daily expected." Soon afterwards we again find that the President communicates to the Board the pressing instances he has received in two letters from the Viceroy to assist Bassein and Chaul (at least the former) with money and munitions of war. The latter request is granted, but with regard to the former " it is unanimously agreed that we have not authority sufficient from our Hon'ble Masters to hazard any loan but at the risk of our own fortunes as may be evident from the strict tenor of their orders." However the danger now became so imminent that Bassein would be taken and " the troops of these Maráthás are so near our island" that " even at the hazard of our own private fortune in case of the same being disavowed by our employers," it was resolved " that a sum not exceeding fifteen thousand rupees be advanced the Portuguese, taking such security as may be got for repayment of the same on the Hon'ble Company's account." The Commander in answer offers as security not only a small parcel of plate belonging to the churches, but also " some pieces of brass ordnance of large calibre, either in payment or pawn for the debts. Having this consideration that it is most becoming my nation that it should be known to the world how, for the preservation of their King's city, it was stripped of its artillery, the principal instruments of its defence, whilst they put their trust more in their personal valour, in their constant fidelity and zeal than on the extraordinary force or hardness of metal ; so that if your Excellency will please to accept of this pledge, on advice from your Excellency I will send the pieces of ordnance that may be necessary to pay the debts incurred." Neither zeal nor personal valour could however save the doomed city ; the garrison worn out by want of food and constant fighting determined, after eight hundred of its officers and men had been slain, to capitulate. The terms were honourable both to victors and conquered. The garrison march out with all the honours of war.



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Tulaji A'ngria, terrified at the strength of the British fleet, left the fortress in charge of his brother and took refuge in the camp of his own countrymen. The Marátha General came on board the Admiral's ship and, Mr. Hugh in his diary informs us, he told the Admiral that "if we should have a little patience the fort would surrender without our firing a gun." He promised to bring Tulaji the next morning "to treat with us in regard to giving up the place, though at the same time he had the assurance to offer me any sum of money I could name on condition I could persuade the Admiral to desist commencing hostilities till they should deliver up the fort." Next morning the Marátha General did not appear according to promise and the Admiral determined "to run in and begin the attack as soon as the sea and wind would permit." The ships and bomb-ketches sailed straight into the harbour, anchored abreast of the fortress and opened a fire that in the course of a few hours silenced the enemy's guns. A shell set on fire one of A'ngria's ships and the whole of his fleet was burnt. Late in the evening Clive landed and occupied the ground between the Peshwa's army and the fort. Next afternoon, the morning having been spent in fruitless negotiations, "the ships warped in to within two hundred yards and opened fire on the walls with only the lower-deck guns." In a couple of hours the fort capitulated. One officer with sixty men marched into it and took possession and "at 36 minutes past 6 English colours were hoisted at the fort." Next morning Colonel Clive, with all the land forces, entered the citadel. This was a bitter disappointment to the Marátha General who, the diary informs us, "made use of all the methods he could think of for the place to be delivered up to him without any regard to us, and when he found he could not obtain his ends he even tempted our own officers, (who were lodged with a party of men within a hundred and fifty yards of the fort,) by offering them a lakh of rupees to let his people pass our centinels in order to get into the fort before us, which they rejected in a proper manner, and told him they would immediately fire upon him and his people if they did not retire, which they thought proper to do our people being ordered to present their firelocks."

On the 26th February the fleet returned to Bombay. The Government were anxious to keep Gheria and offered to give Bánkot in exchange, but the Peshwa objected to the exchange and wrote to the Governor on the subject. He informed him that friendship between him and the King of England "was duly cultivated because of all means the English are people of their honour" and as an example he quoted the behavior of the Governor of Durnápatam to Mahomed Ally Caun, and significantly added: "I reckon the honor an Englishman as well as him." Mr. Bouchier in reply expressed his regret the Peshwa should think him less an Englishman than these gentlemen, "or that I do not the honor of my King and country is much at heart," and informed the Peshwa "that I made a proposal of exchanging Bánkot for Gheria is true, but I never insisted on it as it had been agreeable to you." Mr. Spencer was sent as envoy to Poona and had an interview with Nána. The Peshwa asked that he should assist him with troops and artillery in his intended invasion of the Karnatak, but the request was declined by the envoy "from the uncertain state of affairs in Europe regarding the French." Not deterred by this refusal he also requested aid "in his expedition against the people about Delhi," but this, writes Mr. Spencer, "I evaded as gently as I could by representing our situation which would not admit of our parting with people, especially so far." The envoy seems to have conducted his difficult mission with considerable tact, and on the 12th October a treaty was signed which, besides securing certain commercial advantages, excluded the Dutch from the trade of the Marátha dominions and gave the English ten villages towards defraying the expenses of keeping up Bánkot.



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As there remained nothing more to do on the Western Coast, Clive wrote the following letter, requesting permission to be allowed to proceed to Fort David, of which he had been appointed Governor :—

"HON'BLE SIR AND SIRs,—As the men-of-war will sail in four days for the other coast I am very desirous of your approbation and consent to take my passage for Fort St. George on one of them. It will be needless to explain the Secret Committee's intentions in sending me first to Bombay. Your Honour and Council being sufficiently acquainted therewith, I would only represent that, as the truce on the other side hath at least suspended all thoughts of carrying into execution the proposed plan till further advices from England, my absence may be dispensed with without detriment to the Company.

If your Honor and Council think my undertaking the expedition against Golconda absolutely necessary, my going to the other coast I apprehend, can occasion no loss of time or be any impediment thereto. The same conveyance which brings round the detachment ordered from home may bring me likewise.

The approach of the rainy season, if I am not misinformed, will make it impossible to take the field before next October, by which time I may be returned to Bombay; and as the success of the undertaking will greatly depend upon the train of Artillery, Major Chalmers (whose particular province it is) is very well qualified to give directions relating thereto. The expedition against Gheria has put the train in great forwardness, and I make no doubt but what remains to be done will be accomplished long before the month of October.

The above reasons will, I hope, induce your Honor and Council to think that as I cannot be of immediate use in a military capacity, I may be allowed in the meantime to look after the Company's interest and my own at Fort St David.

By offering my service against Gheria at a time when success could not be insured or private advantages foreseen, will, I flatter myself, be deemed a proof of my zeal and attachment to the Hon'ble Company's and indeed my obligations are of such a nature that I can have no choice when their interest is at stake and though I much suspect both want of abilities and constitution to command so great an undertaking, called upon, I shall cheerfully exert myself in that service to which I owe every thing.

Hon'ble Sir and Sirs,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
ROBERT CLIVE.

Bay 21st April 1756."

Three days later we find in the records another letter from Colonel Robert Clive, in which he complains of the way in which he had been treated regarding a court-martial officer which had been lately held. "Neither do I complain against your Honor and Council," he writes, "for ordering the general court-martial, but against the Governor only, I never thought proper to ask my advice or opinion, or even to inform me himself or by any other person whatever with one syllable relating thereto; and considering the rank I hold of Lieutenant-Colonel in his Majesty's service, of Deputy Governor of St. David, and of a member of the committee of this place, I do not think I have been treated by the Hon'ble Mr. Bouchier, Esq., agreeably to the intentions of the Hon'ble the Court of Directors, or, I flatter myself, will do justice herein when they come to hear thereof." Mr. Daniel Draper, Secretary to Government, was instructed to reply that the Government do not pretend to instruct Colonel Clive in military duty "but judge it necessary to put him in mind of something so generally known that no body can be supposed ignorant of them except such as willfully shut their eyes." The fact generally known was that a particular rank commenced when it was conferred for a particular service and "expired of course when that service was no more needed." Mr. Draper was also further directed to acquaint Colonel Clive "that the Board had no intention to insult or affront you, and that they can likewise answer the same for the President, but that they do not think him in the least obliged to be accountable to any



officer of whatever rank, or the Governor of any other settlement, for what he shall think proper to lay before the Board, and that they as readily as you refer the whole of this affair to the determination of the Hon'ble Company." Clive and Watson, the diary records, left Bombay early in April for Fort St. George.

Three years after the capture of Gheria, the Bombay Government determined to send another embassy to the Maráthás, as "Nána the Peshwa had frequently desired the President to send a person to Poona with whom he might converse with freedom and confidence regarding our interests." The Peshwa was greatly offended at our not assisting him to take Janjira; and it was publicly reported that Nána had been treating with the French, and that he had offered to assist them in taking Bombay if they would assist him in taking Janjira. We had also just then captured the Castle of Surat, much to the disgust of the Maráthás, and the envoy was to soothe Nána by informing him, that, if the Naváb of Surat did not pay him what was justly his due, we should "always be ready to exert our interest and influence in obtaining him redress." Mr. William Andrew Price was chosen to be our envoy, and he left Bombay on the 24th August 1759. He reached the Sangam on the 4th. "This village is situated on the banks of the river Mula on one side as Poona is on the other. The river is fordable." He found the Bráhmans engaged in funeral ceremonies and so could not obtain an interview with the Peshwa. After some little delay he saw Nána at Parvati, but all political discussion seems to have been carefully avoided. The envoy, however, tells us, that "having had an opportunity of enquiring into the situation of affairs with respect to our nation," he finds that the success of the English troops was a very mortifying stroke to the Maráthás, and that he had some reason likewise to think that "they have made overtures to the French of joining them against Bombay, provided they will assist them in taking Janjira from the Siddi." Shortly afterwards the envoy had another interview with Nána, but he only entertained him with a sight of his horses and discoursed on indifferent matters. He, however, referred him to his Ministers, with whom he had a long conference. They told him if we would not engage to assist them against the Siddi they would not enter upon any other business. On the 30th Nána sent Mr. Price an invitation to a tent pitched without the town, "where he entertained me with the combats of elephants, which lasted about three hours; and although I had much discourse with him on the affairs of Europe in general, yet he never once mentioned his reasons for inviting me to Poona." More interviews followed and much parleying took place, but nothing definite was settled. Nána declared his intention of sending one of his Ministers to the President at Bombay, and the envoy left Poona after a sojourn of two months.

Two years after the embassy visited Poona, the terrible Afghan Abdali invaded India for the second time, and totally defeated the Maráthás on the fatal field of Pá niput 1761. Not only was their power in Northern India destroyed, but the hope of Hindu supremacy over the continent perished. Nána Sáheb survived the disaster only a few months. He was succeeded by his second son Mádhavráv Ballál, the eldest having perished at Pá niput. The Peshwa was only seventeen when he mounted the throne, and his uncle Rághoba made strenuous efforts to keep him in a state of pupillage; but he took the reins of government into his own hands, and with great wisdom and firmness guided the State. In 1769 an embassy was sent to him by the Bombay Government. In their letter of instructions to their envoy, Mr. Mostyn, they declared that the growing power of the Maráthás was a subject much to be lamented, "and has not failed to attract our attention as well as that of the Presidencies of Madras and Bengal, inasmuch that nothing either in their power or ours would be omitted to check the same as much as possible." But the dread of Hyder Allí "renders it highly



advantageous to pursue a different plan by endeavouring all in our power to cultivate an alliance with them." The envoy was to attempt to negotiate an alliance against Hyder. On the 29th November 1767 Mr. Mostyn reached "a pagoda called Ganesh Khind within one kos of Poona." He resided at the capital for three months, and had many interviews with the Peshwa. He was always treated with great courtesy by the Sovereign and Ministers, and many intricate negotiations were begun, but none were brought to any definite conclusion, because both parties were watching the tide of events. The Maráthás did not care to make any treaty if Hyder proved victorious, and we did not wish to make any treaty if we could crush him without their aid. While Mr. Mostyn was at Poona, the President and Council of Bombay took the first step in a policy which led to disaster and the loss of many lives shed in a fruitless war which raged during many years. Mr. Brome, Mr. Mostyn's assistant, was sent on a mission to Rághoba, who was then residing at Násik. Rághoba complained bitterly of the ingratitude of his nephew the Peshwa, and of the conduct of the Ministers at Poona, and announced his intention of punishing them as soon as the weather would permit of troops being moved. He expressed a hope that the English would engage on his side, and that he would receive help from them when he might take up arms. The envoy asked what his masters were to expect in return should they think proper to give him assistance. He replied, "he would with pleasure pay ready money for what he might receive from their hands." Mr. Brome remarked, that his masters did not make a practice of hiring out their troops, and he presumed that "they would expect some advantages exclusive of the bare pay of their troops, and the amount of such ammunition he might receive from their hands." Rághoba inquired what would content the Bombay Government, and the envoy replied that he had received no instructions regarding this matter, but he presumed "they would expect something adequate to the assistance." Rághoba on his part refused to make any proposals until he was assured of assistance, and Mr. Brome took leave of Rághoba, and his mission was barren of any immediate results. Five years after Mr. Mostyn visited Poona Mádhavráv died, and his early death was a national calamity. He was succeeded by his brother Naráyánráv, a lad of eighteen, who, after having enjoyed the throne for a few months, was murdered. Rághoba now assumed the dignity of Peshwa (1773), and in order to strengthen his position, entered into negotiations with Sindia, Holkar and the English.

When Bájiráv the first Peshwa usurped the supreme authority, Raghoji Bhonsla who was Commander-in-Chief of the forces, and held the province of Berár in jághír, proceeded to turn it into an independent Government. As the Mahomedan historian informs us, "this man was the first who assumed independence from being a tax-gatherer." The example set by the Peshwa was also followed by his own subordinates. Mulhárji Holkar, a cavalry soldier of the Sudra caste, Ránoji Sindia, slipper-bearer, and Piláji Gaikawár, the cowherd, from being menials became the founders of regal dynasties. They held commissions from the Peshwa to effect certain conquests which they received upon certain stipulations, the chief of which was to maintain a body of troops for the support of the empire. The distance of their sphere of action, however, removed them from the control of the Peshwa, and they began to make war and peace without his knowledge and approbation, and to use the troops not for the advantage of the empire but their own aggrandisement. In course of time each assumed independent authority, and, while they professed nominal obedience to the Peshwa, they stood in the same relation to him as the Peshwa stood in respect to the Rája of Sátára, the descendant of Shiváji. The year before the death of Mádhavráv, Mahádji Sindia, who had been wounded at Pániput, gained for the Maráthás an ascendancy in Upper India. He recovered Delhi from the Rohillas, and with great pomp resealed the Mogal Emperor on the Imperial throne.



To the great Mahálji, Rághoba applied for aid when the Ministers of State at Poona formed a party in favour of the widow of the late Peshwa.

Caste jealousies had now begun to sap the foundation of the Marátha Empire. The early Peshwas, who were called Pant Pradháns when the office was first instituted by Shiváji, belonged to a Bráhmanical caste called Deshasths, but Báláji Vishvanáth, who so greatly increased the power of the office of Peshwa, was of an inferior caste of Bráhmans called Chitpávans. Rája Rám, the second son of Shiváji, had, however, created the post of Pant Pratinidhi or Viceroy, which was given to a Bráhman of the Deshasth caste. Great jealousy naturally arose between the followers of the Pant Pratinidhi and the followers of the Peshwa. The former regarded the Peshwas as mere upstarts so far as social and religious status was concerned, and the Peshwas exercised the whole of their power to deprive the higher Bráhmans of any influence in the State. The Ministers were anxious to decrease the power of the Peshwa as the Peshwa had decreased the power of the descendants of Shiváji, and they were aided by all the higher castes who had been deprived of office. "The wise and just administration of Rághoba," writes Mr. Taylor, "would have totally defeated the views these men had formed of benefiting themselves by the minority of Madhávráv. They therefore exerted every artifice and intrigue to deprive Rághoba of power. It was industriously reported that the widow of the late Peshwa was pregnant, and she was taken to Purandhar and kept in close confinement. The better to secure, it is supposed, a male child somehow, five Bráhman women in the same state as the widow of Náráyanráv were said to have accompanied her, every person supposed to be in the interest of Rághoba was guarded, and the confederates immediately set about collecting troops to support this declared rebellion against the Peshwa." At first fortune smiled on Rághoba and he defeated the rival party and took their Commander-in-Chief prisoner. In this crisis it was announced that the widow of the Peshwa had given birth to a son, and when only forty days old the child was formally installed. Rághoba now sought the aid of Sindia and Holkar, but finding that they would give him no substantial assistance to regain his power, he began negotiations with the English. The Bombay Government promised to assist him with men if he would advance them money, and on his regaining power cede to the East India Company Salsette with Bassein and its dependencies.

While these negotiations were in progress news reached the Council that the Portuguese intended to take advantage of the discord which prevailed at Poona to seize these places. "Had this event taken place," the Bombay Government wrote to the Governor General and Council, "it would not only effectually have prevented us from ever acquiring Salsette for the Hon'ble Company, but the Portuguese would then again have had it in their power to obstruct our trade by being in possession of the principal passes to the inland country, and to lay whatever imposition they pleased upon it, which in former times on every occasion they were so prone to do, which of course would have been of infinite prejudice to the trade, revenues, and interests of the Company in these parts, insomuch that we should in a great measure have been subject to the caprice of the Portuguese." The very day the forces set out against Thána, the Portuguese fleet appeared off Bombay, and "the Commander of which so soon as he gained intelligence of our proceedings, delivered a formal protest, by direction, as he said, of the Captain General of Goa, which shows the necessity of the measure we have pursued." After a long and wearisome march, "the distance from Sion to this place" having "been much misrepresented," our troops got possession of the town of Thána. The siege of the fortress was a more difficult task than was anticipated. Mr. John Watson, Superintendent of the Bombay Marine, and General Gordon, who were sent "to co-operate with each other for the good of the service," differed, as to the method of reducing the fort. The former wished to take the small



forts, gain command of the water, and starve Thána into submission; but the latter did not consider his force to be sufficiently strong to bear being disunited. He writes "our detachments drive the enemy wherever they meet them, but even in beating them we lose men and harass the survivors. I am therefore resolved to carry on the siege with the utmost vigour and with all my force. The fort once taken the inferior posts will fall, and we may then with propriety make large detachments but not till then." In another letter he says—"I cannot make small ones to expose our arms to loss and disgrace." During the siege a cannon ball came through an old wall near which Mr. Watson was standing, driving the dust into his eyes while a stone struck him on the arm. The wound at first did not seem to be dangerous, but a few days after receiving it he had to leave Thána, and in the diary of the 26th December 1774 we read—"The body of the late John Watson, Esq., was interred this morning in the burying ground without the town, being attended by the principal inhabitants. Every public honor due on this occasion to his rank and merit was paid to his memory" (p. 201). It was also "unanimously resolved that a handsome monument be ordered to his memory in the church with a suitable inscription on it at the Hon'ble Company's expense." On the 27th December an attempt was made to fill up the ditch, and our troops "persisted in the work for nearly two hours with the utmost steadiness under a most galling and incessant fire from the breach." "But our loss in killed and wounded," the General writes, "was so great that I was obliged to order them to retreat before the passage across the ditch could be completed." "The grenadiers," we are told, "did every thing that men could do." The next day the fort was taken by assault, and "the slaughter was very great from the resentment of the soldiers from their former sufferings."

On the last day of the year 1774 Thána was captured and on the 7th March the long pending treaty between Rághoba and the Government of Bombay was signed at Surat. Troops under the command of Colonel Keating were now despatched from Bombay to conduct Rághoba to Poona and instal him as Peshwa. After a short stay at Surat they, accompanied by Rághoba, proceeded to Cambay, which port after a tedious and disagreeable voyage they reached on the 17th of March. Three days after landing they were joined by the army which Rághoba had deserted after his defeat by Holkar and Sindia. Before leaving Cambay Colonel Keating's detachment had been reinforced by two companies of European grenadiers and one battalion of sepoy from Madras. His force now consisted of 2,500 men, besides Rághoba's troops, the major portion of which was a mere rabble. The united army now marched towards the river Sábar-mati through a fertile country; but it being the end of the dry season, the wells and reservoirs were found to be dry, and the men suffered greatly from the lack of water. On reaching the village of Hasamli, the English Commander found the confederate army posted on the opposite side of the river. They immediately advanced to the attack, and a sharp engagement ensued. The enemy were compelled to retire after suffering considerable loss. In the English line eight men were wounded and none killed. Rághoba's army remained mere spectators of the fray. After the engagement the army crossed the river and proceeded to Kaira. On arriving there they found the confederate army had retired to some distance, and, leaving the town unmolested, they marched to the village of Hyderabad (p. 223), where their progress was barred by the confederate army who had taken up a commanding position. After an engagement, which lasted about a couple of hours, the enemy were repulsed. The loss on the English side was slight, but "Rághoba's loss was more considerable, near thirty killed and wounded, as the greatest part of the enemy's shot seemed directed to that quarter where the Peshwa was in person on his elephant." The victors marched to Nadiád and encamped under its walls. After Rághoba had levied a contribution of sixty lákhs from the inhabitants of the city the army proceeded towards the river Máhi. On the 18th May the two forces again con-



fronted each other. The battle is minutely described in Colonel Keating's frank letter (p. 226). It began by a cannonade on the rear, where Raghoba was seated on his state elephant. But the fire was quickly silenced. The guns were being withdrawn when the order was given for a party to make a dash to capture two which were behind the rest. But the assailants as they got near the guns were attacked by a large body of the enemy. They were driven back but again returned to the struggle. At this critical moment a large body of cavalry, with several war elephants, by declaring themselves to be Raghoba's, managed to penetrate between the advanced party and our main body. A sudden and unaccountable panic among the grenadiers nearly lost us the day; but after an engagement of four hours the enemy were routed. The victory was dearly purchased. An eye-witness tells us, "but of fifteen British officers in the advanced divisions seven were killed and four wounded, besides a great many native officers and two hundred sepoys; we also had to lament eighty Europeans killed and missing, mostly grenadiers. The officers at that unfortunate crisis, separated from the line, and deserted by their soldiers, bravely fell in the bed of honor. I had been conversing with most of them during the morning march, and in the evening was called to bury them in a large fort with their comrades." The loss of the vanquished was great; and among them were several officers of high rank. The eye-witness writes: "Many of the Maráthás fell in attempting to carry off the killed and wounded, an act of humanity to which they pay the greatest attention."¹

The hard fought battle of Arras was almost the only success gained to the cause of Raghoba, and it was short-lived. A few days after it was fought the Supreme Government pronounced "the war which you have entered into against the Marátha State impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized, and unjust" (p. 238). "You have imposed on yourselves," they wrote, "the charge of conquering the whole Marátha Empire for a man who appears incapable of affording you any effectual assistance in it". The Supreme Government peremptorily required that the Company's forces should be withdrawn "to your own garrison in whatsoever state your affairs may be, unless their safety may be endangered by an instant retreat." The letter bears the signature of Warren Hastings as the head of the Government, but it did not express accurately his sentiments regarding the policy of the Bombay Government. In a letter to Lawrence Sullivan, dated 21st March, he writes: "I have always considered the capture of Sálsette as an act of necessity and of good policy, not inconsistent with the most rigid principles of political justice. I never ~~approved~~ of the treaty with Raghoba, nor the precipitate measure of the war undertaken without a force of treasure to support it, without a plan of conduct, and with little necessity and less profit to requite it. But as it is almost impossible to withdraw from a war before the conclusion of it with honor and safety, had it rested with me I would have directed them to prosecute their original design by escorting Raghoba to Poóna, and to get clear of the war as soon as they could with honor and safety. But I was not in a position to dictate, and the language of the majority was to order the Presidency of Bombay to withdraw their forces immediately and without any reservation. All the good that I could do was by temporizing. I therefore advised that an order should be sent to withdraw the army, but I proposed to qualify the order with the following exceptions: 1stly, that the safety of the troops might be endangered by it; 2ndly, that any decisive advantage had been gained over the enemy; and, 3rdly, that a negotiation had taken place. In either of these cases I proposed that the order should not have effect. The majority adopted the first exception but rejected the other two." He also adds—"I have taken much pains to temper the severity of our Board in their

¹ Forbes' Oriental Memoirs, Vol. II.



letter to Bombay * * *. You long ago knew my wish to see a control given to this Government over the presidencies; but I never meant such a control as is now exercised; nor did the Parliament mean it. The Act gives us a mere negative power, and no more. It says the other presidencies shall not make war nor treaties without the sanction of this Government, but carefully guards against every expression which can imply a power to dictate what the other presidencies shall do; much less does it authorize the Governor General and Council to make cessions and exchange places for the other presidencies. Instead of uniting all the powers of India, all the use we have hitherto made of this Act of Parliament has been to tease and embarrass.”¹

The Bombay Government ordered Colonel Keating to return with his forces into British territory, and Mr. Hornby the President wrote a dignified protest against the action of the Supreme Government (p. 239). He declared that he and his colleagues considered that the welfare of the presidency entirely depended on their preventing the island of Salsette from again falling into the hands of the Portuguese, and “in this situation we are of opinion policy absolutely required that we should side with one of the contending parties in the Marátha State that it might be reconciled to our motives for that attack, and to our continuing in possession of that island. This necessity being allowed, justice doubtless required that we should take part with Rághoba the Peshwa, and in duty to our employers we made this decision as advantageous to them as possible, as we think is evident from the treaty.” They proceed to inform the Governor General that they have deputed Mr. William Taylor, “a member of our Board to visit Calcutta in order, more fully than can be done by letter at so great a distance, to represent to your Honor and Council the motives for all our proceedings, the present situation of affairs, with the danger and discredit that must allow our treaty being cancelled and Rághoba deserted.” Mr. Taylor on reaching Calcutta wrote a very full and able letter regarding Marátha affairs. The letter deserves to be closely studied by students of history, as it throws fresh light on the causes which led to the rapid decline of the Marátha Empire. But the arguments of Mr. Taylor had no effect on the Supreme Government. They inform him that “after duly considering the representations which you have been pleased to deliver to us, we are confirmed in our opinion of the expediency of the Company’s troops being immediately recalled from the service of Rághoba in their own garrison” (p. 269.) They also declared their intention of deputing an agent of their own, Colonel Upton, to negotiate with the ruling ministerial party at Poona. At first the pretensions of the Ministry at Poona were so great that it was impossible to make any settlement with them, and on the 7th March the Supreme Government, thinking that Colonel Upton’s negotiations had been entirely broken off, wrote to the Bombay Government to renew hostilities. They said: “We think it necessary to take the earliest opportunity to release you from the restrictions which we formerly laid upon your operations, and to provide every means in our power for carrying on the war in conjunction with Rághoba with vigour”. The Treaty of Purandhar, however, to the disappointment of the Governor-General and the Bombay Government had been signed before the letter was written. “The Treaty of Purandhar” writes Warren Hastings to a friend, “was executed the 1st of March 1776—I disapproved it.” The treaty established peace between the British Government and the ministerial party, and dissolved the alliance with Rághoba, who appealed to the King of England. He had entered into a solemn treaty with the Governor of Bombay, and in his letter (p. 282) he wrote: “The English custom is very well known everywhere like the sun, that is if any Governor has undertaken any

¹ Life of Warren Hastings.



business, the other unite to confirm the same, and join him to get it accomplished. I believe the said Governor Hastings may have done what he did, not understanding the business, all which your Majesty may have heard from the representations of the said Governor Hornby. Good fame, reputation, and uprightness of English nation is publicly known in this part of the world. It is therefore right that every one of them ought to get the just and solemn agreements which their Governor may have made with any man accomplished, not suffering any man to interrupt it."

The Treaty of Purandhar was only a temporary and hollow truce. The Bombay Government continued to give protection to Raghoba, and the Maráthás delayed and evaded the concessions they had made. It was impossible that any treaty which excepted Salsette would meet with the approval of the patriot party in the Capital of the Deccan. Two years passed in appeals from the Bombay and Poona authorities to the Governor-General and Council, and in ineffectual, though earnest, endeavours on their part to reconcile them. A new feature was added to the dispute by the arrival of Mons. Chevalier de St. Lubin at Poona. Nána Fadanavis, who had strenuously obstructed the fulfilment of the treaty, immediately attached himself to the Chevalier. The British envoy complained that "indeed in every respect they pay the greatest attention to the French." Mons. de St. Lubin was received with great pomp by the Peshwa when he delivered his credentials, "being letters from the King and Ministers of France." The letters from J. Madgett, and Mr. Farmer, of the Bombay Civil Service, (pp. 291 and 296) reveal in detail the exploits of Mons. St. Lubin. The main object of the Chevalier was to establish a factory, supported by a military force, at Poona, and to obtain a sea-port near Bombay. If he had succeeded, the French would have gained their former importance in India, and the English would have had to battle with them, supported by all the powers and resources of the Marátha Empire, for the supremacy of the East. If St. Lubin had accomplished his design of bringing into Poona an European force and European officers to drill the natives, he would have made the Government of the Peshwa united and powerful, and once more in all probability the Maráthás would have ravaged the plains of Hindustán. The Bombay Government in their resolution, dated 10th December 1777, very properly remark, that "if time is given to the French for the French Ministry to take their measure and to supply Nána with a body of forces, we can expect nothing but a repetition of the scene of wars and intrigues formerly acted on the coast of Coromandel, which will certainly be fatal to the influence of the English on this coast, and may end in our total subversion." At this critical time the rivalry between Sakárám Bápu created a division in the Council of the Poona Ministry, and the former made overtures for the assistance of the Company to bring Raghoba to Poona. The Bombay Government resolved "that if a formal application were made, it might certainly with the utmost justice be considered as an application from the Marátha State and treated accordingly, as Sakárám Bápu is the Diván, or first officer, in the Government, and the principal person with whom Colonel Upton concluded the late treaty on behalf of the State, he being the Minister first named in the treaty." It was also ordered that the "resolution be immediately forwarded to the Governor General and Council, who, we flatter ourselves, will do justice to our motives and afford their approbation and support to the step we have taken, and to the measures we may further pursue. The approbation and support of the Supreme Government was, after a stormy debate, gained only by the casting vote of Hastings. Francis and Wheler condemned the resolutions as illegal, unjust, and impolitic.¹ They argued

¹ Mr. Francis:—"I think the Presidency of Bombay should be directed to make some concessions to the ministerial party at Poona, and to endeavour to come to an accommodation with them as soon as possible. If we were to relinquish every one of the points which have been in dispute between us, since the conclusion of the treaty, we should neither give up anything that originally belonged to us, nor indeed anything that is worth keeping. Terri-



that it was taken without the sanction of the supreme authority, that it was contrary to the Treaty of Purandhar, and that it involved the British in the dangers and burdens of war. Hastings and Barwell argued that the emergency justified the illegality, that it was not contrary to the treaty, because the principal person with whom the treaty had been made had proposed it, and that it was not impolitic, because it would give the English permanent influence in the Marátha Empire. Warren Hastings wrote: "I instantly proposed that we should authorize the design and that we should promise them our assistance both in men and money to support the execution of it, and I at the same time sent Mr. Hornby a copy of the proposed resolutions, to prevent the effects of the delays which I expected in passing them. They were passed on the 2nd of February, Mr. Barwell supporting them, and Messrs. Francis and Wheler dissenting and protesting." The main resolutions of the Governor General and Council were (p. 309), that it is the opinion of the Board that the President and Council of Bombay are warranted by the Treaty of Purandhar to join in a plan for conducting Rághunáthráy to Poona on the application of the ruling part of the administration of the Marátha State: (7th) that a supply of money to the amount of ten lakhs of rupees be immediately granted to the President and Council of Bombay: (8th) that military assistance be sent to the Presidency. A force under Colonel Leslie was ordered to cross the continent and place themselves under the orders of the Government of Bombay.

On the 24th November 1778 a new treaty with Rághoba was signed. The terms were similar to those of the treaty of 1775, but the English instead of aiding him to gain the throne specially stipulated that he was to be invested with power merely as Regent for the young Peshwa during his minority. The day after the conclusion of the treaty the Bombay force crossed the harbour and landed at Panvel. It consisted of about five hundred Europeans, and two thousand native infantry. The troops were commanded by Colonel Egerton, but the conduct of the war was entrusted to a Committee consisting of John Carnac, Esq., Colonel Charles Egerton, and Thomas Mostyn. No better plan to insure failure could have been devised. Valuable time which ought to have been occupied in advancing was devoted to petty quarrels. Disputes arose as to the number of guns the civilian members were entitled to, and Colonel Egerton insisted on having the honour of a separate table. Twenty-five days passed before the army "proceeded up the Ghát to Khandála." Mr. Carnac wrote to the Government, "Colonel Egerton's military ideas seem wholly derived from the mode of practice he has seen and observed during the short time he was in Germany, and he proceeds with the same precaution as if he had an European enemy to deal with, whereas the only method of ensuring success in this country is to advance and be forward." On the 6th January Colonel Egerton owing to ill-health requested "permission to resign the command, and proceed immediately to Bombay", which was agreed to. The Colonel, however, found the road to Bombay impracticable, and he returned to Camp and continued to act on the Committee. It now began to dawn on all concerned that the task they had undertaken was more difficult than they had imagined. No single chief joined Rághoba's standard. The hopes which the Committee had formed of a general rising in favour of Rághoba were grievously disappointed. The scheme of pushing into the heart of the Marátha Empire with a small army, they discovered, was a difficult one to accomplish. As the British force advanced the enemy retreated, and burnt and laid waste the

terial acquisitions on that side of India are inconsistent with the Company's true interest, and no less contrary to their avowed fundamental policy. When we see that even their favourite acquisition of Salásette is attended with an annual outlay of Rs. 1,40,349, that is that the expenses of maintaining the different establishments there exceed the revenues of the island by so great a sum, we ought, I think, to be deterred by decisive experiment from wishing to gain more in that part of India, or even to keep a great part of what we have gained."—(Extract of Bengal Secret Consultation, 11th July 1778.)



whole country. When the English reached the village of Talegaon they found it reduced to ashes, and the deserters and prisoners informed them that the Maráthás "had determined to burn Chinchvad, a town still more large and populous than Talegaon, and that measures are also taken even for the destruction of Poona." The army halted two days at Talegaon. On the 11th the Committee wrote the following fatal letter to the officer commanding the forces :—

"To

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WILLIAM COCKBURN,

Commanding the English Forces now at Talegaon.

SIR,—Having maturely deliberated upon the necessity of the measure, you are hereby directed to march back the army under your command towards the pass at Khandála as expeditiously as possible,

J. CARNAC.

CHARLES EGERTON.

Talegaon, 11th January 1779."

At night the heavy guns were thrown into a pond, the stores were burnt, and the British force began to retreat. It was fondly imagined that the Maráthás would not gain intelligence of the movement. But the advanced guard had not proceeded far when they were attacked by the enemy. Before dawn the small force was surrounded and fiercely assaulted on rear and flank ; and it was sunset before they made good their retreat to the village of Wargaon. The only consoling circumstance was that "the troops during the whole time behaved with the greatest bravery." The hours of respite were few. At daybreak the enemy's guns began to play on the village, and they advanced to the attack. They were repulsed. But they came on again and again, and the battle raged the whole day. On the 13th instant we read, "a Committee was held to deliberate relative to overtures for the peaceable return of the army to Poona. No minutes taken, being in a severe cannonade and a number of persons standing round." The next morning Mr. Farmer was sent to the Marátha camp to negotiate terms with them. He was conducted to the top of a hill, where he was presented to Mahádji Sindia and Nána Fadanavis. Their answer to his overtures was curt : "If we wished to remain at peace with them Raghunáthráv must be delivered up, (p. 368) and then we might return quietly otherwise we might do as we please." There was no difficulty in complying with this request for Rághoba had previously made up his mind to surrender himself to Sindia. The Marátha Ministers, however, on hearing that we were willing to comply with their request, proceeded to demand more rigorous terms. "Nána Fadanavis said, as we had broken the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton, before our army moved we must agree to remain as we were by our treaty with the late Peshwa Nána" (p. 369). The envoy then appealed to Sindia. But the result was not more satisfactory. "He said that, as to the surrender of Rághoba it mattered little ; that we must settle a new treaty with the Marátha State, the one made by Colonel Upton being entirely broken by the present invasion of their country. In a few words, they seem to me to feel themselves in that situation with respect to us which the Turkish Vizier felt himself in with respect to Peter I. at the time the Empress Catharine sent in her jewels to the Vizier." The Committee on receipt of this intelligence called upon Colonel Cockburn to give his opinion relative to the practicability of marching back the army to Bombay. He declared that the troops could not sustain another attack from the Marátha army. He also added that being forty-five miles from Panvel it was not possible to reach that place in twenty days, and the small



army could not survive the daily attacks they were certain to encounter. "I therefore," he said, "cannot charge myself to conduct the army under these circumstances to Bombay, and humanity must prompt some other method than an attempt to retire in the face of the whole strength of the Marátha empire with such a handful of men, who must in such case be sacrificed." Colonel Egerton declared that his sentiments coincided with those expressed by Colonel Cockburn. The minutes of the Consultation held by the Poona Committee at Wargaon, the 15th January, prove that Mr. Carnac did not agree with his colleagues. He declared that the attempt ought to be made at all events rather than submit to the terms prescribed by the enemy, to which we have no authority to bind our employés. "And for his own part he would much sooner run his share of the risk than that they should be complied with." It was resolved "to advise Mr. Farmer that we have no powers to enter into or conclude any treaties, such power being solely lodged with the Governor General and Council of Bengal." The Committee, however, agreed to the contradictory resolution to send Mr. Holmes to Sindia, and to give him full powers to settle with the Darbár for the peaceable return of the army to Bombay, on such conditions as he may be able to obtain, since it is the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief that a retreat is impracticable. Sindia, on being told that the Bombay Government considered they had no power to make a treaty, naively demanded what authority they had to break a treaty. He did not care whether Rághoba surrendered or not, but till the English made a new treaty the army must remain where it was, whatever might be the consequence. The Maráthás' terms were accepted. The English agreed to restore Sálsette and all territory acquired since 1782, and to countermand the march of Colonel Goddard. Sindia was promised the English share of Broach, and £40,000 were distributed among his followers.

The Bombay Government on hearing the news of the miserable convention at once repudiated it, on the ground that their agents had no power to make a treaty. It was fortunate that at this critical time the Bengal detachment was commanded by a soldier of courage and capacity. "I have every reason," wrote Warren Hastings, "to be satisfied with Colonel Goddard. He is one of the best executive officers in the service, remarkably lively and enterprising." On hearing of the defeat of the Bombay troops, Goddard showed his bold and venturesome temper by marching from Bundelcund to Surat, a distance of three hundred miles, in twenty days. This was called in England "a frantic military exploit," but by such exploits our empire in India was won. The Supreme Government on hearing the news of the convention of Wargaon wrote to the Bombay Government that they "deemed it necessary to invest Colonel Goddard with full powers, as the public minister of this Government to treat with the Peshwa and the Ministers of the Marátha State for the renewal or confirmation of the Treaty of Purandhar, provided they will recede from the pretensions which they have acquired by the late engagements of Messrs. Carnac and Egerton, and will agree not to admit any French force to their dominions, nor allow that nation to form any establishment on the Marátha coast, empowering him to conclude a treaty with them on these conditions, the acceptance or refusal of which must determine the alternative of peace or war" (p. 386).

The Maráthás would not make peace on these terms, and on the 1st of January 1780 General Goddard marched from Surat to join the Bombay troops and to renew the war. On the 19th of January he appeared before Dubhoi, which was evacuated by the enemy after all preparations for attacking it had been made. Six days later a treaty was signed, by which the Company and Fattesing Gaikawár divided Gujarát. The former obtained the lands which belonged to the Poona Government, and "the English agreed to support and defend Fattesing in possession of his share of the Gujarát province." After the conclusion of the treaty General Goddard



marched against Ahmedabad, which the English had promised to restore to the Gaikawár. On arriving before the city he demanded its surrender. The Bráhman Governor expressed his own willingness to comply with the demand, but declared that he was only a prisoner in the hands of the Arab and Sindý mercenaries, who would not give up the place till the arrears of salary due to them had been paid (p. 396). Finding his efforts to gain the city by negotiations ineffectual, General Goddard began operations in earnest. Batteries were erected and their fire soon created a practicable breach. On the 15th the assault was made. The enemy stood their ground resolutely, and a bloody contest took place. Near three hundred of the enemy fell near the breach and gateway before they were driven in. Of the besiegers one hundred and six were killed and wounded, among which were several European officers. At Ahmedabad General Goddard heard that the united armies of Sindia and Holkar, amounting to 40,000 men, were advancing towards Surat; and he immediately retraced his steps to attack them. By forced marches he arrived at Baroda, where they were encamped. But Sindia, taken by surprise, had no inclination to try the chances of battle. To prevent himself from being attacked, he released from their confinement the English gentlemen who had been left as hostages with him after the convention of Wargaon, and a Vakil accompanied them to the English camp. He declared his master's friendship for the English and hatred towards Nána. He wished the General would "make such proposals to his master as might be consistent with the views and conducive to the interests of both parties." But Goddard refused to make the first overtures. After the lapse of three days the Vakil returned, and in the name of his sovereign proposed that Rághobha should relinquish all claims to any share in the administration of Poona; that Bájiráv his son should be appointed the Peshwa's Diván; but as he was too young to conduct the affairs of the state the whole administration should be in the hands of Sindia (405). General Goddard replied that the English "could not, consistent with their honor, ever agree to put any restraint upon Rághobha or compel him to leave their dominions." Goddard, suspecting that Sindia's sole object was to keep him inactive during the fair season, attempted to force a battle, but Sindia retreated as the English army advanced. On the 3rd of April, however, Goddard managed with a small detachment to surprise his army. "Seeing the inferiority of our force, and presuming upon their own numbers, they advanced with much appearance of courage and resolution, but were received by so warm and well directed a fire from our artillery that they were obliged to give way, and in the space of about an hour quitted the field entirely." The Bombay Government in acknowledging the receipt of General Goddard's letter describing the engagement, congratulated him on his success, but reminded him that the capture of Bassein ought to be the main object of the campaign. They wrote: "The danger of such a fortification, so contiguous to our possessions, remaining in the hands of the enemy at this time of an European war, and the advantage and security the acquisition of it would give to this Presidency makes us very earnest in our wishes not to leave the reduction of this place to the hazard of future accident or circumstances; nor can we think that any other object can claim a preference to your attention or bring this campaign to a more honorable and advantageous conclusion." But in case the General did not intend to move to the southward before the close of the season, "a due attention to the safety of this place, which you must be sensible, is now in a very destitute and unprovided situation with respect to troops, makes it absolutely and indispensably requisite that the Bombay detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley should be returned into garrison as soon as possible before the monsoon shuts up the communication by sea, as it would be the height of imprudence to suffer this place to remain with such a slender force for its defence at the season most favourable for a sudden attack, when no relief can be afforded in case of any attempts from the French." In accordance with this request the General sent back the Bombay detachment and



put his own troops into cantonments as the rainy season had begun. Holkar and Sindia returned to their own territories.

The Bombay detachment left Baroda on the 8th May, and it was on the evening of the 24th that the advanced guard came in sight of Kalyán. The town had been captured only a few weeks before by Captain Campbell with a handful of men. But the moment Nána Fadnavis heard of its fall, knowing the strategical importance of the place, he advanced with a large body of men and closely invested it. He had fixed on the morn of the 25th for making a desperate attempt to take it by assault; but to his surprise his troops were attacked by Colonel Hartley's force on their march to the town. A smart engagement ensued, in which large numbers of the enemy were killed. The Maráthás, after their defeat, retired from the Koukan and cantoned their troops during the rains.

It was during the monsoon that the evil tidings came to Bombay that Hyder Ali, with an army of sixty thousand men, had invaded the plains of the Karnatak. All the serene courage of Hastings and all the resources of the English were required for the struggle with Hyder—a struggle for life and death. "We have no resource", said Governor Hornby, "but such as we may find in our own efforts." Their chief resource was the skill of their General and the bravery of their troops. Goddard advanced against Bassein, and on the 13th of December he wrote and congratulated the Government on its surrender (p. 431). He immediately advanced to the help of Hartley, who had been engaged in preventing the enemy from throwing succour into the town. On the same day that Goddard captured Bassein the Maráthás endeavoured to destroy Hartley's small detachment. With a force of 20,000 men and 5 guns they attacked him in front and rear. After a severe struggle they were driven back, but the victor's loss amounted "to sixteen killed and eighty wounded." The next day the enemy renewed the attack on the outposts and were again repulsed. Hartley narrates one of the most gallant feats recorded in the annals of the conquest of India in a few modest lines. Two days after this severe affray with the enemy Hartley was joined by Goddard. At this time news came from the Supreme Council of their having offered terms to the Marátha Government. They also directed that on receipt of a certain requisition all military operations should be suspended, but until such notification they earnestly recommended a vigorous prosecution of the war. Goddard, thinking that a display of vigour would quickly bring the Poona Government to terms, on the 1st February 1781, advanced and stormed the Bor Ghát (p. 436). He then sent to Nána "the proposals of the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council of Bengal for concluding a treaty of perpetual alliance with the Maráthás." The Minister replied that the contents of the treaty were not proper or fit for the approbation of the Sarkár. He also added: "If you are sincere in your desire of friendship it is therefore incumbent upon you to make a treaty that shall include the proposals of those persons who are alluded to and connected with the councils of that Sarkár" (p. 440). By those persons Nána meant Hyder Ali, our inveterate foe. All hopes of concluding a treaty were now abandoned. Goddard was desirous of maintaining during the monsoon a strong position at the Bor Ghat, but the Bombay Government determined that the troops should return to Kalyán and Bombay for the rains. On the 15th of April Goddard began his march to Bombay; and very perilous was his state. His march lay through "thick jungles, deep hollows, and broken ground;" and the noise and flashing of their musketry, and the smoke bursting up through the foliage, was the first intimation the English General got of the presence of the enemy. Officers and men fell fast as they marched through a path of bullets. Now and then the troops were formed to attack the enemy where they appeared to have collected in greatest numbers. But they quickly dispersed, and took up another position by which they could harass our flanks. Goddard's position was indeed critical in the extreme; but with



unyielding resolution he continued the march until he reached the village of Panvel. His loss was heavy. Including European officers it amounted to twenty-eight killed and two hundred and sixty-seven wounded (p. 450).

In September 1781 Lord Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes, and Mr. McPherson wrote a letter to the Peshwa in which they informed him that they had orders "to settle immediately a peace and establish a treaty of friendship with your Government, which will be ratified by the King and Parliament of Great Britain, and which cannot be altered or infringed by any Sardars or servants of the Company." The Government of Fort George also requested that all hostilities should cease on the part of the Bombay Government. The Bombay Government replied that they were not apprised of what particular or special powers the Madras authorities might be collectively invested with, and that for some months a virtual cessation of arms had existed. Early in the year Captain Watherstone was sent to Poona to negotiate a treaty, but shortly afterwards a letter was received from Warren Hastings which led to his recall. The Governor General wrote: "I now inform you that a treaty of peace being concluded with Mahádji Sindia, who has offered to be the mediator between our Government and that of Poona, I have made choice of Mr. D. Anderson to be the Minister Plenipotentiary for the Company to negotiate and conclude a final peace and treaty of alliance with the Marátha Government" (p. 467). A few months afterwards Mr. Anderson concluded the Treaty of Sálbái with Sindia, but Nána delayed signing it till the 20th of December after he had received the intelligence of the death of Hyder. The chief provisions of the treaty were that the English were to abstain from the support and protection of Rághoba, who was to receive a pension from the Peshwa and reside where he liked; all territories conquered from the Peshwa subsequent to the conclusion of the Treaty of Purandhar were to be restored; the Nizám and Hyder Ali were also to restore the territories they had taken from the English; all Europeans, except the English and Portuguese, were to be excluded from the Marátha dominions. Broach was given to Sindia for his humanity to the English after the convention of Wargaoon, and he became guarantee for the due fulfilment of the treaty by the contracting parties. Rághoba, the cause of years of unprofitable war and the loss of many valuable lives, survived the death-blow of his ambitious hopes only a few months.

A short time after the final conclusion of the Treaty of Sálbái an event took place which for a time threatened to disturb the new peace which had been established, and which will be of interest to Englishmen so long as heroic courage is revered. The *Ranger*, a small brig of twelve guns, under the command of Lieutenant Pruett, was on its way to Calicut, when the Marátha fleet was seen approaching the vessel. Brigadier-General Norman Macleod was on board with his staff. They were officers of the King's service, and it is said they were fond of taunting Pruett as to the size of his vessel and its fighting capacity. He expressed a hope that the opportunity would occur for him to show the "soldiers' officers" how a Company's cruiser could fight. In such a temper he met the Marátha fleet and determined to stake life and fame to prove the valour of his crew. The fight was long and fierce. The shot fell thick. The assailants boarded by hundreds. The deck was strewn with dead and dying. Then Pruett turned to the King's officers and asked if the *Ranger* and her crew could fight. At last, when all had been either killed or wounded, he struck his colours, urged by the powerful motive of saving the lives of those that had nobly fought from an inevitable and sure destruction. The following letter written by the gallant Pruett to the Bombay Government gives a graphic account of the fight:—

"HON'BLE SIR,—You will not think it necessary I should inform you our late misfortune has afflicted and much concerned me, not only for the distress of individuals, but for the considerable loss the public is likely to sustain at this critical time.



INTRODUCTION.

CSL

The great superiority of the enemy in ships, guns, and men, after a close engagement of 4 hours and a half, made it indispensably necessary, situated as I was then, to strike to their superior power. It will, I hope, appear the honor of the British flag has not been impaired by the action, or the Company's vessel given away, before every effort in my power was exerted to protect and defend her, an account of which I shall endeavour to transmit to you, as well as so complicated an engagement, and the space of time that ensued before I had it in my power to minute a single transaction, will admit.

Tuesday, April the 8th.—At sun-rise two sails to the south-west and soon after several others; at 9 we could perceive they were Maráthás, consisting of 2 large grab ships, 1 ketch and 8 gallivats, steering for us with studding sails set; immediately every necessary precaution was taken and disposition made for defence; $\frac{1}{2}$ past the colours were hoisted, the courses hauled up, and directions given to the large battella to keep close under our stern, and the other three, small ones, upon our lee-quarter. At this time we were to the southward of Rajápur island, in 10 fathoms, upon a wind laying up S.W. with a light breeze at south. The gallivats, being the leading vessels, were the first that attacked us, firing the prow guns as they were coming down; and on their nearer approach the guns mounted on their side; these we paid no attention to, though several of their shot passed through our sails, &c.; our fire was reserved till the grape could reach them; the ketch and ships following the example of the gallivats in giving us their prow guns in coming down, which were pointed in a good direction, but too high.

At 10 the ketch, mounting 16 sixes and 2 twelves, brought to on our larboard bow and gave us her broadside. We did not think her near enough, therefore our fire was still reserved; but, as she kept edging down a few minutes, brought on the action with round and grape and small arms upon the fore-castle. Our fire would soon have silenced her had she not been supported by their Commodore, or Subhedár, Anandráv, in a ship of 22 twelves and 2 eighteens, who brought to on our larboard bow. Our attention was now taken up with him, and the engagement continued till $\frac{1}{2}$ past 1, as fast as we could load and fire. Once I observed they were both in one, which opportunity we did not neglect; but in general the ketch kept on the bow. A gun now and then with the musketry from the fore-castle plied her; those on the quarter deck, under Major Shaw, and Lieutenant Taylor, were employed against the Commodore's ship. As they kept to windward it was not in my power to be so near them as I could have wished; but, as their small shot flew over us imagine ours must reach them. In this situation they continued to return our fire, backing and filling their topsails as they shot ahead or dropt astern. About 1 the second in command, in a ship of 20 twelves and 2 eighteens, that had been at a great distance at the commencement, was now, very fortunate for them, entered into the action, as we could perceive the fire of the two first to have greatly slackened. During the whole of this time we were lucky in not having any of their shot to strike our hull, though they appeared to fly almost in all directions. From these we were opposed to and from the gallivats. Three of our guns were now in a disabled state by the axle-trees breaking, and required much labour and time to work them. I was therefore induced, before they perceived our distress, to wear, notwithstanding the danger we were exposed to of being raked fore and aft, their position putting it greatly in their power; however no bad consequences ensued, though they availed themselves of the opportunity. While in the act of wearing the small arms on the quarter deck did excellent service by driving them from the guns of one ship, whose broadside was fairly presented to our stern when we came to the wind on the other tack which had shifted to the westward. It brought them on our starboard quarter, and we received their case and bow guns, without being able to make any return that would be detrimental or prevent them cannonading us. In this situation I conceived it most prudent to hasten the action and bring it on a second time as soon as possible. The main topsail was therefore hove to the mast, which brought up in less than 10 minutes the last ship that entered into the action upon the starboard bow, who gave us her broadside within musket shot; this was briskly returned and repeated for about 15 minutes, which obliged her to fill and shoot upon the bow. In the meantime their Commodore had boarded us upon the quarter with his yards locked in with the after part of our rigging and was bravely repulsed, and their men prevented entering by the party on the quarter deck; the ketch shooting ahead of her boarded us at the chest tree; and the ship that had just past, veering round, boarded us nearly at the same time upon the bow. No use now could be made of great guns, two of the enemy being wedged close to us with their sails aback and their sterns end on upon the bow. The engagement was carried on by musketry on both sides; on ours from the main deck, quarter deck and fore-castle by the European servants; upon the main deck under Lieutenant Stuart. Lieutenant Taylor was, on the appearance of our being boarded, detached from the quarter deck to defend the fore-castle, which post he maintained against numbers, till he fell by a shot passing through his groin. Colonel Macleod



who had been with me on the quarter deck from the commencement of the action, and I had, though I was not then acquainted with it, received two shots in his left arm, yet this did not prevent him, when I pointed out to him the situation of the fore-castle, from running forward, where he was on the point of being carried by the enemy from the prow of the ship, who were ready to jump on board this place he nobly defended, supported by a few, with his sword in his right hand, till he received a third shot through his body.

The brave Major Shaw was now lying dead at my feet with 3 sepoy, the man at the helm with four sepoy and 2 lascars wounded, and one sepoy terribly burnt by the quarters being on fire; however it was soon put out, and no other accident attended it.

Colonel Humberston who had rendered me every service, first at the great guns, and latterly at the small arms, was now about this time, $\frac{1}{2}$ past 2, shot through the body as he was running along the booms to regain the fore-castle and fell upon the main deck. The loss of these gallant officers was an irreparable one to me. The enemy's force forward had drove our people to the main deck, where and from the quarter deck the firing was continued, and prevented them, notwithstanding their numbers, from entering.

About this time, 20 minutes after 2, I perceived the ship upon the quarter to be cut, and she went off a small distance; there was one still on board of us forward, and the ketch upon the bow, the effort of ours could clear us of them, had any been made. In this situation the firing was kept up some time longer; but from the number of killed, and wounded, and unserviceable firelocks ours was considerably reduced. This put new life and vigour into the enemy and made them crowd their prows during the interval of our firing; but they had not courage to put their threats into execution; but our situation was now become so critical that it was too evident we must be carried by another united attack, should those alongside not perceive the few we were opposed to previous to their being joined by their Commodore, who was within pistol shot. Our force consisted at this time of 5 muskets upon the quarter deck and two upon the main.

I was therefore induced to strike, urged by the powerful motive of saving the lives of those that had nobly fought and behaved themselves gallantly in this action, from an inevitable and sure destruction; but this had not at all the effect I conceived it would; for the instant the colours were down, they rushed on board like furies, and paid no regard to person or condition they were in. Lieutenant Stuart they cut in a most inhuman manner upon the main deck; and all whom they met a stroke with the sword was aimed at them; wounded gentlemen in the cabin, lying upon deck covered with blood were menaced; and with difficulty were they prevailed with not to cut them with their swords or thrust their lances into them; two Europeans were cruelly cut in the shoulder and arm with one lascar and a sepoy: these had been wounded before, except one. Most of the other Europeans, lascars, and sepoy jumped over board on their first entering to avoid immediate death.

On the quarter deck they were acting the same scene: one European they cut down the shoulder; Lieutenant Seton in endeavouring to ward off the blow received it on his left arm; a stroke was made at my head, but fortunately I only received a small cut upon my right shoulders.

When the fury and rage the opium or bháng had put them into was somewhat abated, their next business was plunder; in this as little mercy was shown as the treatment we had experienced of our persons; the wounded were stripped of every thing that was valuable, and to some they did not even leave a shirt.

Such cruelty and inhumanity to persons in their condition could hardly be equalled; their deplorable situation that night and the next day and following day cannot be described.

After they had cleared the ship and ketch that was on board of us, a rope was made fast to the vessel from the second in command and towed into Gheriah, where they anchored at 9 that night above the fort.

I despair doing justice to the gallant behaviour of Colonel Macleod and Colonel Humberston, whose presence and example greatly animated the whole crew; Lieutenant Seton was also indefatigable and did essential service in his department of the great guns; Lieutenant Taylor's defence of the fore-castle entitles him to be particularly mentioned; indeed great assistance I received from all the gentlemen as I did also from their European servants.

The *Ranger's* loss in the action was 5 killed and 25 wounded, most of whom are in a fair way of recovery. The damage she has sustained does not appear to me at present to be considerable, though I have not yet had it in my power to examine. The main top mast and gaff are shot through, most of the ports on the starboard side wrenched off, and the conversing plank in the gunnel loose up. The sails, those aloft as well as those in the netting, in a very ragged condition, with some of the standing and running rigging cut.



INTRODUCTION.

CSL

The enemy's loss I am informed is 16 killed and 43 wounded, 4 of the former were principal men.

I have had several conferences with the Subhedár, which shall be the subject of another letter, as I have great hopes of being able to despatch this away to you immediately; however the results of the whole of them are that we must have patience till answers can be received to his account of the transaction from Poona.

My situation and the manner I have been obliged to write will, I hope, excuse the disrespectful appearance of my letter. The enclosed is a return of the killed and wounded with a list of the Marátha fleet.

I am, with respect, &c.,
(Signed) ASHMEAD PRUEN.

"Ranger" in Gheria River, 11th April 1783.

Return of the killed and wounded on board the "Ranger" April 8th.

1 Major Shaw.

3 Sepoys.

1 Opas.

5 killed.

1 Colonel Macleod.

1 Colonel Humberston.

1 Lieutenant Stewart.

1 Lieutenant Taylor.

2 European seamen.

3 Do. servants.

7 Lascars.

1 Naique.

5 Sepoys.

1 Servant.

23 wounded.

(Signed) A. PRUEN.

A List of the Marátha Fleet.

Commanders.		Ships.	Guns.	
			17s.	18s.
Anandráv drew	...	"Narain Paul."	22	2
"	"	do.	do.	do.
"	"	"Madow Paul."	20	2
"	"	do.	69	do.
"	"	"Rampersut."	16	29

Eight gallivats, at 2 to 5 guns each.

(Signed) A. PRUEN."

Three years after the Treaty of Salbai had been signed, Mr. Charles Warre Malet was sent on a mission to Mahádji Sindia, who was at that time the most powerful sovereign in India. He had reseatd the Mogal Emperor on the imperial throne, and the whole of the imperial dominions were under his sway. It is true he held them as the Peshwa's deputy but these very conquests gave him full control over his nominal master. The aim of the mission acknowledged Sindia's supremacy. It was despatched to gain his consent to a permanent Resident being appointed at the Court of Poona. The embassy left Surat on the 15th March 1785. It proceeded by Baroda, "situated in a beautiful plain," and Champaner; and, nine miles from the stupendous mountain of Powaghur, "entered the dominions of Sindia." Mr. Malet describes the country as "well cultivated, beautiful, and picturesque: the soil light and neat, producing sugar-cane, bájri and rice, and even at this season of the year fresh and verdant, to be accounted for in the numerous little gullies and rivulets, and the benefit of the shade of the most beautiful trees." From Mullao the mission marched through the heart of Central India to Ujjein, "the capital of Mahádji Sindia's dominions." The envoy gives an interesting and minute account of the country through which he passed, and of the native princes he met; and from his diary we gain a glimpse of India as it was a century ago. Near Barria the road ran through a wild forest, much infested with banditti. The Raja, "though in a situation which would ensure impunity were he inclined to molest travellers, has fallen on the more eligible method of fixing regular imposts, whence arises a revenue, which he employs in curbing the Bhils and preserving



to the utmost of his power the peace of the road." He found Petlawad, "formerly a great mart for the goods of Málva and Gujarát," very much decayed, "as most of the whole country from the present state of its government; for the Maráthas have neither conciliated nor reduced the independent Zamíndárs, of which the whole country seems full since passing Barria, and who seem particularly disaffected to the Marátha Government." After a few weeks' journey the mission reached Ujjein, the capital of Mahádji Sindia's dominions. The envoy describes the town as containing "many good Buildings," and "the great street is very straight, broad, regularly built and well paved with stone." He was evidently much struck with the Ghore Shake Mehl. This, Mr. Malet writes, "is a most extraordinary place, a large gloomy edifice of peculiar strength, and still in very good repair, erected on an artificial island, formed for the purpose by a diversion of the stream of the Sipra, and connected with the western bank by a handsome flat bridge. In the western stream, which I conceive to be the artificial one, is a surprising multitude of various apartments situated on a level with the water, and in the midst thereof; the water being conveyed round them in various forms, into several reservoirs, constructed for its reception, whence again it is conveyed by proper outlets to the bed of the river, into which it discharges itself in falls, and little artificial cascades, that have a pleasing effect. The whole of these buildings, which must have been constructed before the bank was cut, must be overflowed in the rains, but are of such astonishing strength as to remain still in high preservation: they are most admirably calculated for coolness, the rings are still remaining in each apartment, to which were fixed curtains formed of a certain aromatic root, called kuss, which being wetted gives a most delicious coolness to the entering air. On the western side of the river two large spaces of ground are inclosed, the wall now in ruins; the innermost I conceive to have been a garden, the other, about three miles in extent, a park." On the 2nd of May the Mission reached the fortress of Gwalior, "esteemed one of the strongest in Hindustán." Malet found the city almost depopulated by "the terrible famine that prevailed for two years in those parts, the effects of which are visible in the vast quantities of human bones and skulls scattered over the country, but more particularly near towns and villages." The whole country between Gwalior and Agra he describes "as a dismal proof of the tremendous severity of the late famine." "The wretched remains of the inhabitants seem reduced to a state of stupid inactivity; and perching themselves on the roofless ruins of their habitations seem rather lost in the contemplation of their misery than inclined to remedy it by labour and exertion." At Agra, or Akberábád, as it was then called, Mr. Malet had quarters allotted to him by Sindia in the immortal Taj. He regarded it, both in point of design and execution, "one of the most perfect works that was ever undertaken and finished by one man", and generations of travellers since his diary have confirmed the verdict. "It has", he writes, "rather the appearance of an ivory model just delivered out of the artist's hands than an edifice that has withstood the inclemencies of one hundred and fifty-seven years." From Agra Mr. Malet proceeded to Muttra, where Mahádji Sindia was encamped. He had an interview with the Prince and found him extremely courteous. He also paid a visit to Sháh Állum the Moghal Emperor. Only forty years had elapsed since the day when the Marátha plunderers first descended from their mountains, and now the Mogal Emperor was a humble dependant in the camp of a Marátha chieftain. The great and victorious empire which Baber founded, and Aurangzeb raised to the zenith of greatness, had by bigotry and misgovernment been brought to ruin. The envoy found the Emperor seated on a silver throne placed in a common sized tent. "I made His Majesty a present consisting of gold mohars, cloths of various kinds, and some curiosities in agate, glass, and filigree, which he seemed to admire, though it is contrary to the system of Mógal dignity to show any lively marks of approbation; and in this systematic observance of rules, which are still kept up, consists the whole of His



Majesty's royalty; for that real dignity, that multitude of powerful Ameer, that abundance of wealth, that splendid and precise arrangement which characterized the courts of former princes, are now no more. His Majesty ordered me to be invested with a habit, which was accompanied with jewels for the turban, which he bound on himself round my hat; he then ordered a bridle and an *ankush*, the instrument for driving an elephant, to be presented to me, that being the method of conferring the honor of horse and elephant. Having made the usual observances for these marks of royal favour, His Majesty descended from his throne, and we, following him, took our leave." Not getting any definite instructions from Calcutta regarding the negotiations, Mr. Malet returned from Sindia's camp to Agra, and after residing in that city for a few weeks he proceeded to Cawnpore, "the most remote of the Company's fixed military stations." In August he reached Calcutta and had an interview with the Governor General, but could not get from him any decisive answer as to his appointment to the Court at Poona, though Sindia had given his consent to the arrangement. Three months passed before he got "the instructions and credentials of the Honorable the Governor General and Council to act as their Minister at the Peshwa's Darbâr."

Mr. Malet was for some years envoy at the Court of Poona, and proved himself a most expert diplomatist. When the aggression of Tipu forced Lord Cornwallis into a war Mr. Malet negotiated and concluded the offensive and defensive alliance formed with the Nizam and the Peshwa. The first campaign against the sovereign of Mysore was neither brilliant nor eminently successful, and Lord Cornwallis therefore determined to conduct the second himself. He proceeded to Madras and took command of the army. Mysore was invaded, Bangalore was captured, within sight of Seringapatam a battle was fought, and Tipu sustained a crushing defeat. But owing to the want of supplies Lord Cornwallis could make no use of his victory, and was obliged to return to Bangalore. He employed the remainder of the year in reducing the stupendous mountain fortresses of Mysore. The most famous of them was Savandroog. It commanded the communication between Bangalore and Seringapatam, and was deemed impregnable. Lord Cornwallis determined to take it at all hazard. Tipu rejoiced when he heard of his resolve. One-half of the English army he declared would perish by sickness, the other half by the sword. On the 10th of December 1791 our troops appeared before the fortress, and eleven days afterwards it was carried by assault. On the 10th January 1792 Mr. Malet forwarded to the Bombay Government an extract from a private letter describing the assault. The writer informs us "that Lord Cornwallis sitting in one of the batteries was a witness to the courage of his own troops" (p. 533). The packet which contained the extract describing the capture of Savandroog also contained Captain Little's account of his action with a large body of the enemy. No one by reading that modest letter would guess it describes one of the most brilliant battles of the whole campaign. The enemy's force numbered ten thousand: the Bombay detachment seven hundred and fifty bayonets and two guns. The position chosen by the enemy could not have been stronger. His right was protected by a river, his left by hills, covered with jungle, which approached within a mile of the river; his rear was secured by an impenetrable jungle, and a deep ravine protected his front. Lieutenant Moore, who was wounded in the action and wrote a graphic account of the campaign, informs us that, "The open space on which the enemy had pitched their camp, was not more than six hundred yards wide, and was upon the whole naturally the strongest place we ever saw; nor can we form an idea of one more disadvantageous to an assault. Had their situation been accurately known no one but an officer who had the most unlimited confidence in his troops could, in prudence, have hazarded an attack." At first the contest was doubtful. "The extreme thickness of the jungle, while it afforded the enemy the advantage of a deliberate aim at our European officers, broke our troops, and when they penetrated through it in small



numbers to the plain they were two or three times driven back." It was not till after a contest of two hours that an effectual impression was made on the enemy. "The English pursued them through the woods and captured six of their guns." A week afterwards Captain Little informs the Governor General of the surrender of Samago. In February 1792 Lord Cornwallis laid siege to Seringapatam. Tipu had strengthened the defence of his capital by a series of earthworks protected by three hundred cannon. These works were gallantly stormed, and Tipu, seeing further defence was hopeless, determined to throw himself upon the generosity and clemency of his conqueror. On the 19th of March a definite treaty of peace was concluded. One-third of the territories conquered were given to the Peshwa. A further grant of territory was also offered to him if he would make a similar treaty of offensive and defensive alliance as the Nizám had done, but owing to the influence of Sindia the proposal was rejected. Sindia had won the goodwill of the Peshwa, and he was on the point of overthrowing the influence of Nána Fadanavis when death put an end to his ambitious career. After Shivaji he ranks as the most popular and national of Marátha heroes. He took pride in the humble origin of his race, and had a deep veneration for the ancient institutions of his native land. It was said by his countrymen "that Mahádji Sindia made himself the sovereign of an empire by calling himself a Pátel" or headman of a village. His personal tastes were those rather of the mountain warriors of the Deccan than of a great prince. He cared not for the trappings of state, but he loved power. He was not only a successful conqueror, but a wise ruler of the countries he subdued. The chief object throughout his life was to make the Marátha federation supreme on the continent; and he did not love the English, because he naturally looked with serious alarm on their growing power.

The death of Mahádji Sindia made Nána Fadanavis supreme at the Court of Poona. The members of the Marátha Confederation now became jealous not only of the growing power of the English but of their ally the Nizám. An old demand for chauth was revived. The Nizám earnestly solicited the interference of the English, but Sir John Shore refused any aid. He did not think loss of prestige could be placed "in competition with the greater evils likely to attend a war with the Marátha and Tipu Sultan." It required the genius and courage of Wellesley to revive among the native princes a reliance in our faith and dread of our arms. And he had to fight both Tipu and the Maráthas. Nána Fadanavis, on hearing that the English would not interfere, pressed the claims of the Peshwa. The demands of the Marátha envoy were rejected with scorn. Both sides prepared for war. On the 12th March 1795 Mr. Malet announced (p. 538) to the Governor General the result of the battle of Kharda. The Nizám's army was routed. A few days afterwards he consented to the humiliating terms on which alone the Maráthas would make peace.

The victory of Kharda was followed by a sad tragedy. On the 27th October 1795 the Resident at Poona writes to the Bombay Government to inform them that the young Peshwa "in a temporary fit of delirium jumped, or fell, from an upper room or terrace into a fountain below." The envoy offered the unfortunate prince the aid of his own Surgeon, but "though these people are very frank in their acknowledgment of the skill and success of European medical men, yet, strange to say, between political and religious jealousy and distrust, the principal Bráhmans here are very averse to avail themselves of their services, though numbers of the lower class of people have every day, for near ten years past that this Residency has been established, benefited by the liberal assistance of our Surgeons Messrs. Cruso and Findlay." On the 29th October the Assistant to the Resident writes to inform the Governor General "that the Peshwa died on the 27th, and that the corpse was burnt in the course of the night at one of the places in town on the banks of the river, where the funeral obsequies of Bráhmans are usually performed." He also intimates to the Governor General that he is inclined



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to think that Nāna, if he could gain the consent of the other Marāṭha Chieftains, would "set aside Bājirāv." The Resident seems to have memorialised Nāna on this subject, and was told in reply "that whatever shall be resolved on by my counsels and the mighty Chieftains shall, with friendly cordiality, be communicated by this State." We are informed that on the 3rd of December the insignia of Peshwaship arrived from the Rāja of Sātara, "with which Bājirāv was invested at midnight."

In May 1798 Lord Mornington arrived in India as fourth Governor General. He informed the Peshwa in a letter, dated 21st May, of having taken over charge of the affairs of the Honorable Company, and added, "I am happy in the present opportunity of assuring you that it will always be my study to cultivate and improve the harmony subsisting between the two States, to establish the utmost degree of individual friendship and attachment with you, and to maintain the Company's reputation, and seek the confidence of all the princes and chiefs of Hindustān, by a strict attention to the principle of justice and good faith, and adherence to engagements" (p. 611). The native chiefs, however, had lost their old belief in our adherence to engagements, by Sir John Shore's refusal to aid the Nizām in the hour of need. After his defeat at Kharda that sovereign incensed by the absolute neutrality of the Governor General, disbanded the English which had been attached to him and increased the forces under the command of M. Raymond, a French soldier of fortune. At the time when Lord Mornington assumed office the very existence of the British Empire in India was threatened with grave danger. Tipu, the Nizām, and Sindia were all under French influence, and their armies chiefly officered by Frenchmen. The Nizām's forces under M. Raymond were 15,000 strong, with an efficient park of artillery: Sindia's forces under De Borgne were at least 40,000 men, in the highest state of discipline and efficiency, supported by more than four hundred guns. A Jacobin Club had been organized at Seringapatam. It was not beyond the bounds of probability that all the French commanders might unite to strike a deadly blow at the power of the English in the East. Lord Mornington therefore determined to destroy the chance of a federation. By a stroke of daring and genius he had the French force at Hyderabad disbanded, and a corps of British troops, paid by the Nizām and officered by Europeans, substituted for it. Lord Mornington was desirous of concluding a similar treaty with the Peshwa, and having a British detachment stationed at Poona. He wrote to the Governor of Bombay that he had authorized the Resident to apply to him for a military force to be marched directly to Poona. "We are fully aware of the objections even to a temporary diminution of the force on your establishment, but when we acquaint you that the permanent security of the British possessions in India is essentially concerned in the measures which we are now concerting with the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad, and that the success of those measures will become impracticable unless the force which may be required by Colonel Palmer shall reach Poona with all possible expedition, we are confident that you will not suffer so important an arrangement to be frustrated by any difficulty which is not absolutely insuperable" (p. 612). The Peshwa, however, at the instigation of Nāna, rejected the proffered treaty, but gave a solemn assurance of his fidelity to existing engagements. Lord Mornington felt that the time had come when some decisive action must be taken against Tipu, whose attitude towards the English grew more hostile every day. The Governor General was also aware of his intrigue with Bonaparte, who was at that time in Egypt, and he addressed him a letter pointing out that the French alliance was a menace to the English, which could not be permitted. Lord Mornington then proceeded to Madras, where Tipu's reply was to be brought to him. The day he landed at that town, 31st December 1798, he wrote to the Peshwa to inform him of the destruction of the French fleet at Alexandria (p. 616). Lord Mornington sent the same information to Tipu; but nothing could shake his belief in the value of the French



alliance, and he continued deaf to all appeals addressed to him. After a month spent in trying to bring him to reason, Lord Mornington wrote to the Resident at Poona to "apprise His Highness the Peshwa and Nána Fadanavis that the obstinate silence of the Sultán compels me to treat him as an enemy; and that, considering the Hon'ble Company to be in a state of war with him from this day, I shall accordingly direct our armies to enter his territories without further delay" (p. 620). He wrote to Davlatráv Sindia, "Influenced by no motives of ambition, anxious to maintain the relations of amity and concord with all the powers around them, and secure the internal peace and tranquillity of their own dominions, by a strict observance of the obligations of treaty and the rights of nations, the Company and their allies have strictly adhered to these principles throughout their intercourse with Tipu Sultán, and with the most patient forbearance have continued to adopt every conciliating means of accommodation under circumstances that would have justified an immediate appeal to arms. But these efforts have proved fruitless, and they are at length most unwillingly compelled to this issue as the only means now left to secure to them the future peaceable possession of their territory, their happiness, and their honor" (p. 623). Though the Peshwa had promised to help against Tipu, the envoys of that monarch were publicly received at Poona after hostilities commenced. The Marátha force which was to co-operate with the English was kept inactive. Lord Mornington wrote to the Resident at Poona, "You will signify to the Peshwa that the objects which I had in view in consenting to a detachment of Company's troops acting with his contingent cannot possibly be attained while he shall entertain Vakils from the common enemy." The Vakils were dismissed, but they retired only a few miles from Poona. The weak and treacherous Bájiráv wished to aid Tipu, but fear checked him. After much vacillation he settled a scheme with Sindia for attacking the Nizám. Tidings of their treacherous designs reached the Governor General, and he wrote to the Resident at Hyderabad, "You will immediately assure the Nizám, and Azim-ul-Omrah, at a private audience, of my determination not only to support His Highness, whenever circumstances shall admit, with the whole force of the Company against any power whatsoever, which shall desire to disturb His Highness's dominions, while he is engaged in the faithful and zealous discharge of his engagements to the British Government, but also to join with His Highness in inflicting the most signal chastisement on the aggressor" (p. 627).

Before the Peshwa and Sindia could put their treacherous scheme into execution they received a letter from Lord Mornington, in which he expressed "the utmost satisfaction in communicating the glorious intelligence of the capture of Seringapatam, which was taken by assault on the 4th of May with a very inconsiderable loss on the part of the allies." On the same day Lord Mornington wrote to the Resident at Poona, "It is necessary to apprise you that I do not intend to admit the Peshwa to an equal participation with the Company and the Nizám in the advantages resulting from our late success at Seringapatam. In strict justice he is entitled to no share whatever in these advantages. * * * Considerations of policy will, however, incline me to extend the benefit acquired by the joint efforts of the Company and of the Nizám even to this faithless ally" (p. 628). A share of the conquered territories was offered to the Peshwa, on condition that the grant should form the basis of a subsidiary treaty, like that concluded between the English and the Nizám. But, under the influence of Sindia, the offer was rejected. The presence of English troops at Poona, it was considered, would be the death-blow to Marátha independence. The death of Nána Fadanavis a few months afterwards, however, sealed the ruin of the Marátha Confederacy. The Marquess of Wellesley, for he had been raised to that title after the capture of Seringapatam, wrote to the Peshwa, "I have received with great concern the intelligence of the much lamented death of Báláji Pandit (Nána Fadanavis). The loss of persons distinguished for their talents, great



qualities, and abilities is at all times a subject of regret. The melancholy news, therefore, of the death of Báláji Pandit, the able Minister of your State, whose upright principles and honorable views, and whose zeal for the welfare and prosperity both of the dominions of his own immediate superiors and of other powers, were so justly celebrated, occasions extreme grief and concern."

After the death of Nána Fadazavis civil war raged throughout the country. Sindia and Holkar were engaged in hostilities, and the Peshwa espoused the cause of the former. Vithoji Holkar, brother of the Maráthá Chief, fell into Bájiráv's hands, and he caused him to be executed in his presence by being dragged along the ground, tied to the foot of an elephant. This cruel murder took place in the spring of 1801, and on the 26th October 1802 the Resident at Poona announces that "the action of yesterday, between Holkar's army and that under Sadáshiv Bháú, commenced with a warm cannonade about half-past nine, and lasted with great vigour till twelve, when the cavalry of the former chieftain, having made a general charge, repelled the cavalry of the enemy, and cutting in upon the line of the infantry obtained a complete victory" (p. 550). Four days afterwards the Governor of Bombay received a letter from Bájiráv stating that he had sought an "asylum" in British territory (p. 551). It was decided to consult Major Malcolm, Private Secretary to His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, who was at that time in Bombay, inquiring into the death of the Persian Ambassador, as to what measures it was advisable to pursue. Major Malcolm in reply sent a most clear and able letter reviewing the situation of affairs, which is now printed for the first time (p. 553). After full and mature consideration, the Honorable Mr. Jonathan Duncan wrote to the Peshwa to inform him that "it is well known to your Highness that all political arrangements are conducted by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General from Bengal, and that otherwise than under his instructions, or subject to his approbation, no conditions under my seal and signature would be binding on the British nation in India* * *. The Government of Bombay will, however, have a pleasure on all occasions in treating your Highness with the respect and attention due to a prince of the exalted rank of your Highness, who is also an ally of the British nation" (p. 557).

Holkar was desirous that his kinsman Amrutráv, the adopted son of Rághoba, should be raised to the throne. On the 5th November Amrutráv entered Poona, and "was received with great honors by Holkar." He was, however, not anxious to usurp the throne, and expressed the utmost desire that Bájiráv should be persuaded to return. Holkar, finding that all chance of seizing the Peshwa's person was hopeless, and fearing that Bájiráv would seek British aid to regain the sovereignty, professed to desire nothing more ardently than British mediation. Colonel Close informs Lord Wellesley, "at this interview Holkar treated us with peculiar attention. In a separate apartment, where Mr. Strachey was present, he spoke of his wish to accommodate with the Peshwa, who, he said, obstinately slighted him and countenanced Sindia, although his house was as old as Sindia's and at least of equal rank. He said repeatedly that he wished to have me as his friend, and consulted whether I could not be useful to him in bringing about an accommodation between him and the Peshwa. I told him that I thought it would be mutually for their interests to accommodate, but that unless both parties were to agree to refer their differences to me it would not be possible for me to be of any use to either. He then asked me whether, if the Peshwa was to agree that I should arbitrate between them, I would return to Poona for the purpose? I said I certainly could not return to Poona, but under your Lordship's instructions; but that, should such an occurrence arise, I should address your Lordship and take your sentiments on the subject. But should I fail (he said) to adjust with the Peshwa, what is to happen then? I replied smiling that I did not imagine he was at any time very solicitous about future events, which he apparently took as a compliment." Colonel Close, acting on instructions from Fort William, quitted the Residency



for Bombay. He was also informed by the Governor General "that with respect to the justice of supporting the cause of Bájiráv under the engagement which has already been contracted with him no question can arise. In such state of circumstances, therefore, His Excellency would not hesitate to employ every effort of the British power in the reinstatement of Bájiráv on the masnad of Poona." On the 10th of December Bájiráv arrived at Bombay, and, after a conference with the Governor, embarked for Bassein, where he was met by Colonel Close on landing. On the last day of the year the Treaty of Bassein was signed. The Peshwa was to be restored by the English to his throne. He was to receive a subsidiary force of six battalions under English officers, with a suitable complement of artillery, and for their maintenance he was to cede districts yielding twenty-six lakhs of rupees. He bound himself not to engage in hostilities, nor even to negotiate with other states, without the permission of the British Government. On the 11th May 1803 the following garrison order was issued by the Hon'ble the Governor, "A salute of 19 guns to be fired on the 13th instant on the happy occasion of the entry of His Highness the Peshwa into his capital of Poona, and of his restoration to the masnad."

Neither Sindia, nor Holkar, nor any of the great Marátha Chiefs could tolerate the Peshwa having signed away the Marátha independence. Bálájiráv they despised, and they were willing to usurp his power, but the reverence for the office had not departed. A strong love for the old hereditary office was the spirit which animated all the Maráthás. Mahádji Sindia when sovereign of Hindustán took pride in carrying the Peshwa's slippers. "This is my occupation," he said; it was that of my father". The restoration of the Peshwa by British bayonets wounded the national pride. But it was of vital importance to the English Empire that there should be a settled Government at Poona. We were now bound by treaty to protect the territories of Mysore and of the Nizám, and this could only be done by obtaining a commanding influence at the Capital of the Deccan. Sindia and Holkar had made the territories of the Peshwa their theatre of war, and laid them waste. Want alone might compel their troops to invade the more fertile lands of their neighbours. As long as Sindia kept an army in the Deccan we must have a strong force to watch him. The Duke of Wellington wrote: "The most expensive article in India is an army in the field; and the most useless is one destined to act upon the defensive."

The first result of the restoration of the Peshwa was the flight of Holkar from Poona. There was a momentary gleam of hope that order would be restored to the land without war. The southern chiefs paid their obeisance to the Peshwa. The Resident at the Court of Sindia read to Davlatráv the chief text of the Treaty of Bassein. He owned it contained nothing to which he could object; but both Davlatráv Sindia and the Rájá of Berár refused to acquiesce in the proposal "that the former should immediately recross the Narbada with his army and the latter return to Nágpur." General Wellesley was now invested by the Governor General with full powers to make peace or declare war. He wrote to the Resident at the Court of Poona to inform Sindia and the Rájá of Berár "that, consistently with the principles and uniform practice of the British Government, I am perfectly ready to attend to their interests and to enter into negotiation with them upon objects by which they may suppose their interests to be affected. But they must first withdraw their troops from the position which they have taken up on the Nizám's frontier and return to their usual stations in Hindustán and Berár respectively, and on my part I will withdraw the Company's troops to their usual stations. Sindia and Bhonsla replied "that the armies now assembled here, and those of the English Government and of the Nizám, shall commence their return upon the same date, and that each of the armies shall arrive at their usual stations on a date previously settled; that is, that the army of the English and of the Nizám now encamped near Aurangábád, the army of the English encamped near the Kistna, and you also with your army shall all march towards their stations on the same date that the armies move from this encampment; and on the same date that all those