

I propose moving to-morrow morning a little to the northward of Rájmáchi pass in order, as effectually as possible, to keep my rear open and to collect the different detachments I now have out. I have ordered Captain Carpenter to join the army as soon as possible.

The enemy have not come down the Ghát in any force since I had the honor of addressing you last.

I have the honor to be,

With respect, &c.,

JAMES HARTLEY.

*Head-quarters Camp at Man, }
21st November 1780."*

Letter from the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL to Lieutenant-Colonel JAMES HARTLEY.

SIR,—Since our letter of the 11th instant we have received your letters of the 14th, 17th, 19th, and 21st instant.

The President has acquainted us that he has been advised by the Resident at Bellápur that you have ordered the detachment from that garrison now at Panvel to join the army under your command, but as it never was intended that the garrison at Bellápur should be considered as a part of the strength of your force, we cannot allow you to withdraw the detachment under Captain Lendrom, as it will immediately expose the district where they are stationed to the ravages of the enemy.

As we find by your last letter that you have thought it necessary to call in the different detachments now out in order to unite your whole force, we hope, notwithstanding, that you will be able to protect the inhabitants and those employed in gathering in the harvest.

We are, &c.,

WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 24th November 1780.

Letter from Colonel HARTLEY to the PRESIDENT and COUNCIL.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—I had the honor of addressing you last night acquainting you of my intentions of moving to the northward. I accordingly marched this morning at 6 o'clock, and at noon encamped about 4 miles to the northward of the ground I occupied at Deváli. A few straggling horse appeared in the rear, which was the only part of the enemy I have this day seen.

The officer in command of Kalyán informs me that the enemy's horse are in that neighbourhood, and that a body of a thousand men have marched from Mahuli and burnt Baindi (Bhivandi), Nangoli and Sanola villages on the borders of the Antgaon.

Conformably to your instructions I now consider the reduction of Bassein as the grand and primary object of our military operations, and flatter myself that by having drawn the principal force of the enemy so far to the southward I have contributed in a small degree to facilitate the success of the siege; by drawing near Kalyán where our magazines, both of provisions and



ammunition, are laid up, I think I effectually provide for the danger of the enemy availing themselves of their chief advantage against it, and distressing my detachment in respect to necessary supplies. This or any other disadvantage or difficulty is, as I conceive, what is now to be guarded against; and as long as I am sure of a sufficient supply for my troops and at hand to prevent the enemy from succeeding in any sudden attempt on Kalyán, I flatter myself still to keep them in check; or if they should choose to pass me in order to proceed to the relief of Bassein, I shall be ready to follow them or to take such steps under General Goddard's directions as may seem most necessary for the public service. By this plan of conduct I have little doubt of detaining any force the enemy may bring down the Gháts till Bassein falls, after which, if the enemy keep the field, they will have both General Goddard's army and this detachment on their hands at once.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
JAMES HARTLEY.

*Head-quarters Camp of Sawvee, }
22nd November 1780.*

Bombay Castle, 26th 1780.

Received the following letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley:—

“HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—I had the honor of acquainting you under the 22nd instant with my reasons for moving to the northward.

I marched again yesterday morning at 6 o'clock and for above ten miles the enemy made repeated attacks on the rear guard, but without making the smallest impression either on it, the line or the baggage, or once during the whole of that time obliging us to halt; when finding their efforts fruitless they drew off their force, and I marched 6 miles further on without the smallest opposition. We had one havaldár, one náik and twelve sepoys wounded—only three dangerously, the rest very slightly.

I cannot sufficiently commend to you the spirit which manifested itself all through the line during the march, and which has confirmed me in the high opinion I shall always have of the troops.

I am now encamped about two miles to the southward of Badlápúr and the different detachments I had out have already joined.

I have the honor to be,
With respect, &c.,
JAMES HARTLEY.

*Head-quarters Camp at Devláli, }
24th November 1780.”*



Bombay Castle, Tuesday, 5th December 1780.

Received the following letter from General Goddard:—

"GENTLEMEN,—I had the honor to address you the 16th October previous to my leaving Surat, and have from time to time written the Hon'ble President, informing him of the progress of march, the fatigues and hardships suffered by the troops from the extreme badness of the roads and the numerous nálas and rapid rivers in our route, which could not be passed without great difficulty. Besides, as I was compelled to march considerably inland in order to avoid the deep inlets of the sea, which could only be crossed in boats, the route lay through and over hills where the roads were exceedingly narrow and steep, and in some places stopped up with large stones and trees laid across.

The additional distance the circuit occasioned, and the time required to remove these obstructions rendered the march more tedious than I expected, and I did not reach the bridge of Gorwarra that joins the island of Bassein to the continent till the 12th ultimo. The preceding day the army having made a long and laborious march through a deep and narrow defile, where for above half a mile large trees and stones had been laid across, that entirely blocked up the passage and retarded the arrival of part of the troops at their ground till past 9 o'clock at night, I found it would be impossible for the whole to move next day; but as I understood from my harkáras that the bridge was then entire, knowing of what importance it would be to secure it before the enemy should have time to reflect upon the difficulties its destruction would necessarily occasion to us and the delay produced in our operations, I resolved to lose no time in seizing it, and accordingly marched myself in the morning of the 12th with the Grenadiers of the army.

A small guard only of the enemy was posted at it, which fled on our first appearance. On the 13th I marched and occupied the ground, where I am at present encamped near the sea-shore and within little more than two miles of the walls of Bassein, the situation of which has proved exceedingly useful and proper for every purpose of the service and for carrying on with convenience the operations of the siege. The troops from Sálsette crossed and joined me the night of my arrival; and the following day great part of the stores was landed and the remainder followed with every possible expedition. I am happy that I can with the strictest regard to justice declare my satisfaction with the alacrity and spirit shown by the troops since their leaving Surat, and the exertions made in every department since my arrival before this place to land and collect the stores provided for the siege, and I can venture to assure you that the operations have been and shall be prosecuted with all possible vigour.

I ought to apologize for troubling you at present with these particulars, most of which will no doubt have been already laid before you by the Hon'ble President, but having mentioned the subject, I have unintentionally run into a detail of circumstances, which I hope you will excuse.

The time requisite for landing and collecting the stores in the place fixed on for their reception giving me sufficient leisure to inform myself fully of the strength of the place previous to the commencement of the attack, I examined it most minutely and found it both from the natural situation of the ground and the construction of the works, the number of cannon planted on the walls, and the troops composing the garrison, which I have every reason to believe exceeds 8,000 men, much more strong and formidable than even from the description before given me I had been led to conceive. I accordingly determined to carry on my operations with every skilful and regular precaution, which, though it might be the means of protracting the fall



of the place, would not fail of securing its ultimate success, and prevent the disagreeable consequences of sacrificing the lives of the troops by proceeding more precipitately. Perceiving the works of the N.-E. face of the fort to be infinitely inferior to those on the N. side, where I now propose to erect my breaching battery it was my original wish and intention to have attacked it on that quarter, but having an opportunity of minutely examining the ground at the high spring tides, I found it was entirely overflowed, and that it would be impracticable to carry on my approaches on that side without the greatest difficulty and a certain hazard of disappointment. I therefore thought proper to lay aside my first design and to make the grand attack at a place, which though rendered exceedingly strong by art had not the same natural difficulties to oppose my operations.

On the 28th in the morning I had completed a battery of two 18 and four 12-pounders, with a battery for six 13-inch mortars, within 900 yards of the wall. It is impossible to ascertain the damage the enemy have received from the fire of this battery, but I have every reason to hope it has been considerable, as the artillery has been extremely well directed and the shells thrown into the fort have appeared most of them to take place, and do the desired execution. At all events, the effect it has produced has been very favourable to our operations, as it has enabled me to carry on my works under cover of its fire to the spot where I propose to erect the grand battery, which the necessary approaches and parallels being now completed, I intend to begin to-night, and hope soon to have the happiness of informing you of this work being also accomplished.

The enemy have not once ventured to sally from the walls or interrupt the operations otherwise than by a very hot fire of artillery, which, unfortunately, owing to the skill of the Engineer in constructing the works, though served remarkably well, has done us very little mischief. They have thrown some shells and rockets, but without effect. A third battery of four 18-pounders is now nearly completed within 800 yards of the wall, and more to the eastward, which will enfilade the face of the fort where I am carrying on the grand attack and greatly divert the attention of the besieged, as well as destroy the works which flank and command the entrance of the breach.

By advices received from Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley I understand that in consequence of a large body of the enemy having descended the Gháts he has thought it advisable to move towards Kalyán with his detachment in order to preserve the communication with that place, where his magazines of provision and ammunition are lodged. I have in consequence of this information sent him such instructions as appeared to me most effectual to defeat the success of the enemy's designs and guard against any attempt they may make to relieve this place. I do not, however, think they will venture to put themselves betwixt the two fires of this army and Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley's detachment, which seems to be the situation of all others in which we should wish to bring them; and indeed at all events it will not be possible for them to succeed if they should endeavour to throw succours into Bassein, because the place is so closely invested that they will not be able to approach it; and as I have destroyed two of the bridges upon the creek that forms the island of Bassein and have posted a very strong guard for the defence of the remaining one, I have not the smallest apprehension of their entering the island with any considerable force, or interrupting the operations of the siege in any material degree whatever.

A few horsemen have made their appearance within these two days on the outside of the creek and burnt some of the adjacent villages. My harkáras bring me intelligence that near 1,000 horse are encamped about 14 kos from the bridge and that parties are detached from them to destroy the country,



As I flatter myself it will soon be in my power to congratulate you upon the conquest of Bassein, and do not doubt you will take the earliest opportunity of communicating so pleasing an event to the Hon'ble Court of Directors, I beg leave to acquaint you with my wish of addressing them at the same time and informing them of such further particulars as they may be desirous of knowing. Permit me therefore to request you will give me previous notice of the exact time when the vessel you propose sending will sail, her immediate destination, and the route by which your packet is to be forwarded to Europe, that I may prepare my despatches accordingly.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp before Bassein, December 4th, 1780.

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Bombay Castle, 7th December 1780.

Received the following letter from Colonel Hartley:—

"HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—The enemy came down yesterday morning with two guns, from which they cannonaded us for about 4 hours; only two of their shot did any execution. By them we unluckily lost one Sergeant and one matross of the artillery and one sepoy Sergeant and one sepoy. We had also one sepoy wounded by their musketry. Both their horse and foot kept at a great distance during the attack.

I had intelligence the night before last that a party of their horse had marched from Dawmut and encamped about 8 miles to the northward of this on the Bassein road, and am now informed that that party was on the same evening reinforced by Senhor Noronha with three guns and one thousand foot, and that he and Rástia who command have received orders from Nana to proceed with that force towards Bassein. The party which remains encamped at Dawmut with two guns, I understand, meant to amuse us while the other party proceeds to the northward.

As the enemy's present division of their force may be only a feint to draw me from the strong situation I am encamped in, I shall not quit it till by another march towards Bassein they further confirm the intelligence I have received of their plan of operations. I propose then immediately to follow them.

I have the honor to be, with respect,

JAMES HARTLEY.

*Head-quarters Camp at
Devldli, 5th December 1780.* }

Bombay Castle, Sunday 10th, 1780.

Received the following letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley:—

"HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—I had the honor of addressing you under the 5th instant, acquainting you with the intelligence I had received of the enemy's intention of throwing succours into Bassein and my resolution in consequence thereof to follow them to the northward. I accordingly marched this morning and am now encamped at Titwala.

As the force, which remains in my rear, and is encamped at Dawmut and Bawa Mullen, may probably make some attempt on Kalyan in hopes of preventing my proceeding further to the northward, and as it is impossible for me to leave in that place a larger garrison than it now consists of, from the number of sick belonging to this army, which at present amount to near



THE FIRST MARATHA WAR.

six hundred men, I beg leave to recommend that a reinforcement may be sent and remain there while the service requires the continuance of this army to the northward.

Head-quarters Camp at
Titwála, 6th December 1780." }

I have the honor to be,
With respect, &c.,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Bombay Castle, 12th December 1780.

At a Select Committee, present :

The Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.

DANIEL DRAPER, and NATHANIEL STACKHOUSE.

Read and approved the proceedings of our last meeting on the 10th ultimo.

Read a letter from General Goddard, as entered hereafter, received early this morning by his Aid-de-Camp, Lieutenant Charles Brown, containing the agreeable intelligence of the surrender of Bassein, on which happy event a royal salute was immediately fired from the castle. We feel the highest satisfaction on this important conquest, and are impatient to hear the promised particulars from the General, when we shall consider what measures may be necessary to pursue with respect to this acquisition, and in the mean time we shall send our congratulations to the General by the return of his Aide-de-Camp.

The President lays before us the following plan of measures he would propose to be now pursued in consequence of the reduction of Bassein; and the same being deliberately considered, it is entirely approved and must be immediately transmitted to the General with strong recommendation from us immediately to pursue the measures therein proposed, which we flatter ourselves will coincide with his sentiments.

The surrender of Bassein makes it unnecessary to send the large supply of gunpowder requested by General Goddard in his letter of the 10th and which we can but ill afford to spare.

WILLIAM HORNBY,
DANIEL DRAPER,
NATHANIEL STACKHOUSE.

General GODDARD's letter regarding the surrender of Bassein.

GENTLEMEN,—I have the happiness to congratulate you upon the acquisition of Bassein, which surrendered to the Company's arms this day. I have written this express that no time may be lost in communicating to you so agreeable an event, and shall address you more particularly hereafter. In the meantime I beg leave to refer you to Lieutenant Brown my Aide-de-Camp, whom I have entrusted with this despatch, and who having been present at the siege, will be able to give you information on such points as you may be desirous of immediately knowing.

Bassein, December 11th, 1780.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD

Bombay Castle, 13th December 1780.

Received the following letter from General Goddard :—

"GENTLEMEN,—I had the happiness of acquainting you yesterday of the surrender of Bassein to the British arms and shall now inform you of such further particulars as you may be desirous of knowing.

During the 9th and 10th the grand battery fired without intermission and a practicable breach was nearly completed, which so much intimidated the garrison that at 10 o'clock yesterday morning they came with a message from the fort offering the surrender. I gave them till sunrise, dismissed the messenger, declaring if the terms I granted were not complied with by that time I would resume hostilities. At 7 in the morning no messenger appearing, I ordered the several batteries to play and kept up an exceeding hot fire both from the guns and mortars for about half an hour, which had the wished for effect, and the messenger came out once more, upon which I ordered the firing to cease about 9 o'clock. Nago Pant, one of the principal Sardárs, with the person who had brought the former messages, and another Brahman formally waited on me from Visáji Pant, the Subha of the place. The principal conditions upon which I agreed to accept the proposed surrender were, that the garrison should march out and lay down their arms in front of the fort, after which they should be permitted to go in safety to whatever place they desired; that they should be allowed to carry away their own private effects, but that all public property should be faithfully delivered up and appropriated to the use of the victors; that it was not my intention to hurt the unarmed inhabitants, and they might either remain in the place or depart with their property unmolested. As a preliminary article I insisted upon their immediately sending out to be punished at my mercy Jacob Johnson, a private man of the Madras Regiment of Europeans, who had deserted during the siege and whilst employed on duty in the trenches. With this final answer I dismissed the emissaries and allowed them till one o'clock, by which time should they not comply, I would hoist a flag in the battery as a signal for the renewal of hostilities. The flag was accordingly hoisted, and very soon after the people from the fort made their appearance from the western side coming out of the water gateway,—first the European, bound and escorted by a small guard, was delivered up, next followed the unarmed inhabitants, all of whom belonged to the towns of Babádarpur and Pápdí and the adjacent villages, and in the rear of the whole came Visáji Pant and the other Sardárs with the garrison, consisting of about 4,000 men, among whom were about 1,000 Arabs. They laid down their arms and delivered up their standards, about 30 in number, and were immediately escorted by a company of sepoys out of the island. Visáji Pant and the other Sardárs had the choice given them of being sent to Bombay or Surat and continuing under the English protection, but they all preferred going to Mussul (?), where a part of Visáji Pant's family at present reside.

I have not been able exactly to ascertain the number of the enemy killed and wounded during the siege, but from the effects of the shot and shells that appear in every part of the fort, and the number of wounded they carried out with them, as in general the wounds given them must have proved fatal, I believe their loss must have been very considerable.

The circumstance which I consider as most fortunate and which I cannot but most sincerely congratulate you upon, is the achieving the place with so little loss on our side, one officer only having been wounded, and about 12 men killed and wounded during the siege, including 4 Europeans and one Subhedár of sepoys.

I cannot help on this occasion doing justice to the merit of Captain Theobald, the Engineer, who had the constructing and carrying on of the works, to whose able management and skill in his profession must be in a great measure attributed the preservation of the lives of the troops, as well as the successful issue of the siege, during the whole of which he has acquitted himself to my satisfaction, and I hope so as to merit some testimony of your approbation.

The brisk and well directed fire of our guns and the effectual bursting of the shells, which, besides driving the enemy from their works and preventing them from annoying us fortunately destroyed two of their magazines, has proved of most essential consequence to the success of



our operations; and I am happy in an opportunity of declaring my approbation of the conduct and assiduous attention of Lieutenant-Colonel Bailie, Commandant of Artillery, in the direction of that department, in which he was well supported by Major Mackay and the other officers of the artillery corps.

Upon the whole, though the merits of the infantry and cavalry were not so immediately called forth in their particular line of service, I cannot sufficiently commend the alacrity and cheerfulness with which they performed the part required of them, being almost constantly employed in the trenches, the proper defence of which, from their extent scarcely admitted of two separate reliefs, and with the assistance they gave in conducting the works kept them almost constantly in duty. It is with particular pleasure I mention the behaviour of the Bengal sepoys who, with the regiment of cavalry, although before never accustomed to be employed on such occasions, offered themselves voluntarily to assist in working at the trenches and did accordingly assist in that service. In short, the behaviour of the troops, both officers and men, during the whole of the siege, in every department, has been so much to their own honor and the success of the service on which they were employed, that I cannot help expressing my warmest approbation of it to you.

I have examined the fortifications of the place very minutely, and find the idea I had formed of its being accessible on the face where I attacked it, to have been perfectly just, it being surrounded on every other side by water or low marshy ground which at spring tides is overflowed. The works here are therefore much weakened. Upon the whole the fort of Bassein, both from its natural situation and the strength of the works where it became necessary to have recourse to art for assistance, is exceedingly formidable, totally impregnable to the efforts of any country power, and cannot fail in your possession to be attended with every favourable consequence to the interests of the Company that has been expected from it, and to secure to us a permanent footing on the continent and possession of the Sarkár, of which it must always give us the command.

I have sent a summons to the Governor of Arnála to evacuate the place, and threatened to put every man in it to death, if he obstinately persists in refusing to submit, and put me to the necessity of sending a force to attack it; which he must be sensible can easily be effected, as from the fort being situated on an island, it will be impossible for the garrison to have any communication whatever with the continent.

I have taken every proper means to encourage the inhabitants who fled upon the commencement of hostilities against Bassein to return and settle in their deserted habitations; and many of them have already made their appearance, though from the destruction within the walls of the fort, as well as of the towns of Bahádarpur and Pápdí, together with most of the adjacent villages, they being at present only a heap of ruins, it will be long before the country can be restored to its former flourishing condition.

In consequence of intelligence brought in this morning by my harkárs that Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley is arrived in the neighbourhood of Vajrábái, and that a body of Maráthás has followed him from the southward, while Senhor Noronha with his detachment is on the road betwixt him and my camp, I shall march this evening with the Grenadiers of the army to intercept that body and facilitate Colonel Hartley's juncture with me.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Bassein, December 12th, 1780,



Bombay Castle, 16th December 1780.

Received the following letter from General Goddard and Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley:—

“GENTLEMEN,—In my letter of the 12th instant I acquainted you with my intention of proceeding that evening with a detachment composed of the Grenadiers of the army, with four 12 and four 6-pounders, the regiment of cavalry and Kandáhar horse to join Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley's detachment, who, from the intelligence brought me by my harkárás, had been attacked the preceding day by the whole of the Marátha troops that had descended the Gháts, as well as those including Senhor Noronha's body of infantry who had marched to the relief of Bassein, as the party which was advancing on Colonel Hartley's rear to impede the pursuit of the other, and that the Colonel had that day taken post within 4 or 5 miles of Vajrábái, in the neighbourhood of which the enemy also were encamped.

The idea which suggested itself to me from this information was the possibility that even the safety of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley's detachment might be in danger, having received no accounts from himself of a later date than the 9th instant, and that at all events from the severe attacks he had received it was probable he might be in want both of supplies of ammunition and provision, or of assistance in the care of his wounded men, which I also heard were numerous.

I therefore at once determined on the propriety of marching to his relief as a movement that could possibly be attended with no bad consequences, and besides its apparent necessity might ultimately prove of the most real advantage from the terror and alarm with which so sudden a step must impress the minds of the enemy. I was not either without hope of coming upon them unprepared, and by that means giving them a complete overthrow.

On the morning of the 13th I reached Mándavi, where I halted all day, and at 8 o'clock in the evening prosecuted my march to Vajrábái, where I arrived about an hour before daybreak this morning. When the van of the detachment had passed the village I could distinctly perceive the lights of the enemy's camp, and also heard the sound of their trumpets as if they were in motion at the distance of about 3 miles. By the intelligence of my spies I was soon convinced to my great disappointment that they were far beyond my reach, and that all attempts to pursue and overtake them would be ineffectual; for in the afternoon of yesterday, either alarmed by intelligence of the fall of Bassien or apprised of the motion I had made, they had sent off their bázárs, baggage, sick and wounded men towards Máhuli, and had followed with the whole of their force, except a party of horse whom they had kept as a guard at their former encampment, and which was the body I saw in motion upon my arrival at Vajrábái. I therefore halted at that village till sunrise, when I prosecuted my march to join Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley, whom I found strongly encamped in a post he had most judiciously chosen, and from whence the enemy must have found it a most difficult, if not impossible task to dislodge him, especially as in the attempts made by them to do so they had been repulsed with equal bravery and conduct on the part of our troops, and had themselves sustained most severe and considerable loss. The intelligence confirmed by the reports of different harkárás gives great room to believe that Rámchandra Ganesh, their principal leader, is killed, and that Senhor Noronha is wounded, whether dangerously or otherwise is uncertain.

The enemy are at present encamped within 5 or 6 miles of the fort of Máhuli, which I conceive to be near 21 miles distant. As the detachment that accompanied me is a good deal fatigued with their late harassing march to this place, I propose halting to-morrow and shall acquaint you with the measures I may find it necessary to take in consequence of the intelligence I shall receive of the enemy's motions and designs. During the march of last night your letter of the 12th instant enclosing the Hon'ble President's minute of the same date was brought me by my Aid-de-Camp Lieutenant Brown, to which I shall take the earliest opportunity of replying particularly hereafter.



The messenger I sent to Arnála summoning the garrison to surrender brought me a verbal answer from the Killedár last night with the letter I had written him, importing his resolution of holding out the place to the last extremity, though I had privately declared to him, if he compelled me to use force he must expect no mercy. I have yet taken no steps in consequence of this reply farther than requesting Commodore Nesbit to sail with the "Revenge" to the mouth of the Arnála river, which may have the effect of intimidating the garrison when they see fresh measures followed to cut off their escape, and desiring Lieutenant Hartley to have sufficient boats in readiness for the conveyance of such troops and stores as may be requisite to effect this necessary piece of service.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp Near Dugur, 14th December 1780."

Letters from Lieutenant-Colonel HARTLEY to the PRESIDENT and COUNCIL.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—I had the honor of informing you last night of an action I had during the whole day with the united force of the enemy, who, to the number of 20,000 men with five guns, attacked me in front and rear. My loss by the returns amounts to sixteen killed and eighty wounded, many of the latter dangerously.

Finding that during yesterday's action two parties I had posted on eminences on each flank of the line were frequently pressed by the enemy's infantry, I ordered the engineer during the night to establish two posts there, to each of which I got up a pounder. The enemy renewed their attack this morning. A thick fog prevented our seeing them till past 9 o'clock. We then discovered a large body of their horse close to the right of the line. Their infantry endeavoured to gain the height on the right flank, but both they and their horse were thrown into such confusion by the gun posted there and the artillery of the right of the line that they instantly retreated; and we saw from the eminence near 2,000 of their horse collected about one person whom they put into a palanquin and carried off. I have great reason to believe one of their principal officers is either killed or dangerously wounded. The party in the rear fired a few shot and then likewise retreated along the Máhuli road; the other body are now encamped about eight miles from this out of the Bassein road and on that to the Násik Ghát. Their guns have to-day done very little execution. We have a havaldár and one sepoy killed and one wounded. I have the happiness to inform you that both the officers and men have behaved with the greatest spirit, and many of the former have much distinguished themselves for their zeal and activity.

I am informed by the villagers who now flock into the camp in great numbers that the enemy were encamped three kos on the other side of Vajrábái; but on hearing of our approach marched to meet us, and judging I suppose they would find us fatigued after a long march, during a great part of which we were engaged with their army in the rear, were thereby urged to make the attack they did on the 10th. They will however, I believe, have but little reason to boast of the different attacks they have made since my leaving Devláli, as I am convinced their losses have been more than proportionably considerable.

I have the honor to be,
With respect, &c.,
JAMES HARTLEY.

*Head-quarters Camp near Dugur, }
12th December 1780. }*

Brigadier General Goddard arrived this morning.



HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—I had last the honor of despatching to you, under the 12th, at night, informing you of the retreat of the enemy and the reasons I had to believe they had lost one of their principal officers, and confirmed by the inhabitants, who say that Rámchandra Ganesh, the head Sardár of both their armies, has lost his life and that Noronha is dangerously wounded.

I am sorry to inform you that Lieutenant Cowan my Aid-de-Camp and Lieutenant Cooper are both dead of the wounds they received. The loss of the former I cannot help lamenting particularly as a very useful, active, and diligent officer.

I cannot avoid particularly recommending to your notice Lieutenant Pierson whose behaviour at the time he received his wound showed a spirit and zeal for the service deserving of every commendation in my power to bestow on it.

I have the honor to be, with respect,
Hon'ble Sir and Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
JAMES HARTLEY.

Camp at Vajrábái, }
15th December 1780. }

Letter from General GODDARD to the PRESIDENT and COUNCIL.

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GENTLEMEN,—I have the happiness to congratulate you on the capture of the fort of Arnála. A practicable breach having been made the measure for storming it had been fixed upon, the plan of assault laid, and the orders given for its being carried into execution this morning. It was however prevented by the Killedár's sending out a message yesterday evening offering to surrender the place. This I assented to receive, but would grant him no other terms than submitting entirely to mercy. After two or three messages, the intervals of which were filled up with a renewal of hostilities from our batteries which I assured them would be the case if they made any delay, the whole of the garrison consisting of about 500 men came over, having left their arms, &c., in the fort, and a party of sepoy crossed and took possession of it an hour before daybreak. I shall on a future opportunity acquaint you with the loss we have sustained, which has been very trifling, and with the number of guns and quantity of military stores found in the place. At present I shall conclude with observing that it is from its natural situation and the goodness as well as the excellent condition of its works, of very considerable strength, and may be defended by a handful of men against any force whatever.

I have, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Arnála, 18th January 1781.

Letter from General GODDARD to the PRESIDENT and COUNCIL.

GENTLEMEN,—I had the pleasure of addressing you the 31st ultimo. On the day following I marched to Badlapur, where I halted the 2nd and 3rd instant till the return of the escort from Kalyán, which joined me with the expected supplies during the night of the 2nd, and this morning I marched and encamped at Dawmut, about ten miles distant from the last ground.

Understanding from my harkárás that the enemy had collected all their force at Dawmut, where Hari Pant was himself in person, I conceived it very possible they might intend either to risk an action upon the arrival of the army there, or, what was more probable, that they would avail themselves of some favourable situation of the road through which we were to pass to make an attack upon the line and impede the progress of our march. That I might be fully prepared



to receive them I ordered the advanced guard of the army to be reinforced by the first battalion of Bengal sepoys. Nor was I deceived in my conjecture of their designs; for, after advancing about 7 miles, during which large bodies of the enemy had shown themselves and a great many rockets had been thrown by people concealed in hollows and jungly places, the former of which had been dispersed by our artillery and the latter driven away by the flanking parties, the route led through a narrow, though short, defile, and no sooner had the van of the advanced party appeared beyond it than a sudden fire commenced of small arms from behind a bank which was little more than 100 yards in front. The nature of the ground covered with thick jungle and full of deep hollows, but, above all, the extreme fogginess of the weather which had obstructed our view of the enemy the whole morning, made it impossible to ascertain their numbers; but from the extent of the front from which they fired, it was plain that they were considerable, and large bodies of horse appeared on the banks; besides which they had brought two guns to play upon us, but at the distance of more than a mile, nor did they venture to come any nearer. I immediately formed the advanced guard and pushed forward with it to dislodge the enemy from the post they had occupied, which they immediately abandoned and fled with great precipitation. Our artillery continued to fire upon them as we advanced and must have destroyed a considerable number, as the shot were well directed and fell amongst crowds of them. By the report of some prisoners who fell into our hands, as well as the intelligence brought me by my own harkárs this evening, they have sent off their bázárs and baggage of every kind to Kampoli, where they mean to follow themselves and proceed up the Gháts immediately. Other reports say that Hari Pant himself intends to take this route, but that some of the other Chiefs with a large body of horse are to remain below the Gháts. I have left Captain Carpenter's complete battalion in garrison at Kalyán, which will secure that place from all danger should they adopt this plan. However as I am now within 4 or 5 days' march of Kampoli, I shall soon be able to ascertain their intentions and give you information of them. I shall march to-morrow morning.

*Camp at Dawmut, }
4th February 1781. }*

I have, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

Letter from General GODDARD to the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL, Bombay.

GENTLEMEN,—Since my last letter from Dawmut nothing material occurred to communicate to you till this morning, which puts it in my power to congratulate you on the troops under my command having stormed and taken possession of Bor Ghát. After the ineffectual attempt made on the 4th instant which my last letter particularly described to you, the enemy thought proper to desist from the mode of opposition they had hitherto adopted, and a body of about five or six thousand horse under the command of Báji Pant Anna was detached to harass our rear and to endeavour to pick up any of the straggling bázár bullocks or baggage that might loiter behind out of the defence of our line. Here, however, they were equally unsuccessful. Nothing of any consequence and, indeed, scarce any thing falling into their hands; besides that many of them suffered from our artillery whenever they ventured to come within reach of them.

Yesterday morning the army reached Kampoli, which is at the foot of the Ghát, and finding upon my arrival that the enemy had posted themselves in it, where they had also brought a number of guns and a large body of infantry, consisting by the report of my spies of near 4,000 men, I resolved upon attacking it that very night before they could collect a more numerous force for its defence or improve the works which I could plainly perceive they were constructing; as I had also intelligence that Holkar with his army, consisting of 15,000 horse, besides



Pendhāris, and another principal Sardār with 7,000 horse had arrived upon the top of the Ghát. I thought it expedient to order a very strong party upon this service, which consisted of the Poona corps in front followed by two companies of Bombay and Madras European Grenadiers, four companies of Bengal sepoy Grenadiers, the 1st and 7th battalions of Bengal sepoys and the 8th battalion of Madras sepoys. The light 3-pounder pieces of Bombay Artillery carried by lascars preceded the European Grenadiers and two light 6-pounder field pieces marched in the rear of the 7th Bengal and in front of the 8th battalion of Madras sepoys.

The whole party were ready to march off and the van entered the bottom of the pass at midnight. In little more than an hour they reached the first post about half way up the pass, which the enemy after discharging their pieces immediately abandoned. The troops then pushed forward towards the Darwaja or second post, which is deemed the strongest part of the pass, and where the enemy had thrown up a breastwork, from the left of which, as our people advanced, they fired some guns and threw a considerable number of rockets, which, however, as our people were under cover, did no mischief whatever, and in the meantime the Pioneer corps with two companies of Bengal Grenadier sepoys having taken possession of some heights on the right of the road moved upon them towards the Darwaja, which the enemy instantly relinquished, but not without carrying off their guns, which, after a few discharges, they had moved to a hill in front of the Darwaja, and they continued firing from it as the troops formed. Our small field pieces were by this time mounted on the eminence and fired upon the enemy, who soon fled on all sides. The troops having got through the Darwaja and formed, then moved forward to a pagoda which is considered as the summit of the Ghát, and from thence to Khandaála, where they are at present strongly encamped upon the ground before occupied by the enemy, who abandoned it on their approach, and from the appearance of their camp as well as the number of horse who were seen moving off, I have reason to suppose Holkar himself must have been there, as the situation of the ground corresponds with the accounts given yesterday by the harkārás, and no further intelligence has yet been brought.

I cannot but congratulate you most sincerely upon the singular good fortune that has attended this enterprise, which has been achieved without the loss of one man killed or wounded; and this I must attribute in a great degree to the cool and steady conduct of Colonel Parker who commanded the morning party and the officers and troops under him, and also to the clear and exact information I received from a plan of the Ghát furnished me by Captain Jackson, which enabled me to form the previous plan of attack in a manner that would expose the troops to the least possible danger. I must also beg leave to mention with particular satisfaction the behaviour of Lieutenant Brown my Aide-de-Camp and Lientemants Christie and Richardson who accompanied the party up the Gháts, and by their activity and former knowledge of the situation of the ground greatly assisted in the success of several parts of the attack. A few only of the enemy's slain were immediately found, but I have not yet been able to ascertain exactly their number.

Having thus far successfully prosecuted the plan mutually agreed to for carrying on the war with vigour and driving the enemy out of the Konkan, it now remains to determine the measures most proper to be pursued the remainder of the campaign in order to bring the war to an honorable conclusion and effect, as far as lies in our power, the wishes of the Governor General and Council of Bengal on that head. It is necessary here to premise that notwithstanding the expectations they have given, no overture or proposal whatever has yet been made by the Poona Government, and I am myself at present incapable of making any previous advances on my part from a conviction not only of the inconsistency of such an act, but of the ill consequence that might attend it, since I have it not in my power to prescribe any terms whatever, and the



Minister, knowing the conditions on which he can put an immediate end to the war if he pleases should any further proposals be made him by me which could be construed into an anxiety for peace, might be encouraged to persist in hostilities and rather increase than relax in his demands and expectations of advantage. These being my sentiments with respect to any present idea of negotiation, I shall proceed to explain my opinion of the most eligible plan for prosecuting the war. The security of the Konkan and the requisite assertion of the superiority of our arms made it absolutely necessary to take possession of the Gháts which command it, and which at the same time open to us a passage into the Deccan and their capital at Poona at any time when we may find it expedient to march thither. The apprehension of this while it deters them from detaching any considerable force into the Konkan which might leave the capital exposed, will perhaps be the most probable means of inclining them to think seriously of peace. I am therefore of opinion that our first object ought to be to establish a strong post upon this Ghát, which from its situation as well as its vicinity to Poona, is the most convenient for the purpose, and which, if necessary, may be defended by one battalion of sepoy against any force whatever. The possession of this too, should the Konkan hereafter remain in our hands, will be most useful, as it will prove no less a check upon the Maráthas than a secure barrier to our own territories. The next point we ought to have in view is to collect a magazine of stores and provisions at this place sufficient to supply the army with enough of the latter for six weeks should it be deemed expedient to march forward to Poona, as that quantity would at least be requisite on such an occasion. With respect to this measure I must confess I do not at present see any sufficient or adequate object to authorize it, as I do not think it would be more conducive to the attainment of a peace than the mode I have before suggested. At any rate I am under the necessity of remaining here till I can receive a supply of provisions, which as the nearest and most convenient place I propose furnishing myself with from Bellápur, and have accordingly given directions to the Commissioners of the army to lay in their stock at that place, permit me therefore to request most earnestly as a point most essential to the good of the service and even necessary to the safety and existence of the army that you will give every encouragement to the conveyance of provisions to that place and in other respects give such assistance to the provision of grain for the use of the army as you may find most expedient and the nature of the case absolutely requires. I shall conclude this letter by entreating to be favoured with your sentiments on the several subjects it contains, in which I have fully delivered my opinion and shall impatiently wait to receive yours for my advice and further guidance.

I have, &c.,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Camp Bor Ghát, 9th February 1781.

Letter from the PRESIDENT and COUNCIL to General GODDARD.

SIR,—We received with particular pleasure your letter of the 9th instant and congratulate you most heartily on your having accomplished that important point of getting possession of the Gháts without any loss and in a manner so honorable to the officers and troops who executed that service.

Our despatch of yesterday will sufficiently explain our sentiments respecting future operations, which nearly correspond with those delivered in your letter before us, and we have only now to assure you that we shall assist you to the utmost of our power in establishing a magazine of provisions at the head of the Gháts, that you may have it in your power to



prosecute your future operations in such manner as may be judged most expedient. For this purpose we have given your Agent, Mr. David Scott, permission to make exports of grain and provisions from this island.

We entirely concur in your ideas respecting the impolicy and inefficacy of making any overtures towards an accommodation, as the Ministers are in possession of our terms, and the period limited for their determination approaches. The short time they have for deliberation, the advantageous position of the army and vigorous preparations for further measures may produce the crisis we hope for, which we do not think can be accelerated by any further advances on our part.

We are, &c.,

WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 12th February 1781.

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Bombay Castle, 7th March 1781.

Received the following letter from General Goddard with the enclosed paper:—

“GENTLEMEN,—Having received early this morning the Minister’s expected reply to my letter sent him the 1st instant, I lose no time in communicating it to you; and that you may be enabled to judge more fully of the real disposition and intention of the Marátha Government, I have enclosed an exact translation of his letter to me; together with a copy of mine, to which his is an answer.

His letter I cannot but consider as an absolute refusal of the offers of the Bengal Government, and proves beyond a doubt, what I have all along had reason to suspect, the existence of an alliance and connection with Hyder Alli, which has for its principal object a mutual league against the English nation; and that Hyder is expressly alluded to in that part of the Minister’s letter, where he says that, if I am fervent in my desire of friendship, it is requisite that I make a treaty, which shall include the proposals of such persons who are alluded to and connected with the Sarkár.

Having therefore no grounds to expect that the Minister will in the most distant degree be inclined to enter into our present views against Hyder by any further attempt to negotiate on my part, and indeed thoroughly persuaded that no terms could now in policy be proposed to the Marátha Government, that had not the mutual prosecution of the war against Hyder for its express and sole object, the present expediency and necessity of which could alone justify any further sacrifice on our side, I have determined to consider the Minister’s answer, as it is certainly intended by him, decisive with respect to the present negotiation, and to make no new proposals or advances, which would only increase his confident presumption, subject us to the mortification of a second refusal, and, besides, promise no reasonable prospect of success; since if Nána was really desirous of peace, he would have availed himself of the opening now given, and at least have communicated in writing or sent a person to declare what the terms are on which he is ready to conclude a treaty, and in some respect have explained the nature of the proposals he wishes should be included for the benefit of the persons who, he says, are allied and connected with the councils of the Sarkár.

I request to be favoured with your particular sentiments on this occasion, and your opinion of the propriety or good policy of prosecuting any further plan of negotiation under the discouraging circumstances that now present themselves; which, unless some unforeseen event occur, I shall not myself think of attempting till I receive your answer to this letter.



THE FIRST MARÁTHA WAR.

I have under my consideration your letter of the 12th ultimo, relative to the future operations of the war, in the conduct of which I shall be generally guided by the opinion you have therein expressed, and which concurs with the sentiments formerly delivered to you by myself.

I shall, however, be glad to receive any further communication of your particular ideas on this important point; and have the honor to be, &c.,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Khandála, 5th March 1781.

Draft of a letter from General GODDARD to NA'NA FADANAVIS, March 1st, 1781.

Notwithstanding you are already fully acquainted with the friendly sentiments of the English, and their earnest desire for peace with the Marátha State, which have been communicated to you, yet, in order to convince you still more of the sincerity of my intentions, and that you may not possibly urge in excuse for neglecting the interests of the Sarkár at this important and dangerous time, your ignorance of the favourable and very friendly disposition of the English towards you, I now enclose the proposals of the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council of Bengal, for concluding a treaty of perpetual alliance with the Marátha State, original of which has been transmitted by them to you through the mediation of Mudáji Bhonsla, the Rájá of Berár.

Should the original proposals not have been received by you through Mudáji Bhonsla, I think it proper to declare to you in the name of the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council of Bengal, that I am invested with full power in their name, and in behalf of the Hon'ble Company, to agree to the conditions proposed in the paper I now send you in the manner and within the time prescribed by the Hon'ble the Governor General and Council of Bengal.

You will perceive from the date of the proposals, that the five months limited will expire in nine days from the date of this letter, that is, on the 9th of March, corresponding to the 13th of Rubila-ul-divil, in the 1195 year of the Hijira.

I, therefore, think it necessary to declare to you, that if before that time you do not agree to the proposals, I am not authorized to grant or treat on these terms afterwards, and they will therefore become then and for everafter, void and of no effect.

If the proposals now made meet with your concurrence, it is necessary that a person be sent from you fully authorized by the Sarkár to negotiate, as with no other can I in future hold correspondence. What more?

(A True Translation.)

D. WATHERSTON,
Persian Translator.

Translation of a letter from NA'NA FADANAVIS to General GODDARD, received 5th March 1781.

Your agreeable letter having been received I am made acquainted with the contents.

You have written, that Mr. Hastings and the Government of Calcutta sent a treaty to the Minister of Peshwa, through the mediation of Mudáji Bhonsla, which perhaps may not have arrived, and on that account you have sent a copy, from a perusal of which every particular will be made known. You also add that Mr. Hastings and the Government of Calcutta have invested you with full powers to conclude and settle the business of these parts.

Before this, Mudáji Bhonsla wrote the Sarkár that Imad-ul-Dowla and the Chiefs of Calcutta had sent him a treaty, but as it did not meet with his approbation, it would answer no end to send it to the Sarkár; and that therefore he had returned it to Mr. Hastings.



At present the copy of that very treaty which you have sent me, has been read from beginning to end by your friend, and it is certain that the contents therein written are not proper or fit for the approbation of the Sarkár. If you are sincere in your desire of friendship, it is therefore incumbent upon you to make a treaty that shall include the proposals of those persons who are alluded to, and connected with the councils of that Sarkár.

It is not my desire that the violence of war should continue to rage on both sides, and the inhabitants be ruined. But betwixt the Government of the Peshwa Pandit Pradhán and the English Company a firm and constant intercourse of friendship long subsisted: on whose part this has been interrupted and destroyed that friend well knows. There is no necessity for me to point it out. What more shall I write?

(A True Translation.)

D. WATHERSTON,
Persian Translator.

Bombay Castle, 27th March 1781.

At a Select Committee, present:

The Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.

DANIAL DRAPER, and NATHANIEL STACKHOUSE.

Read and approved our proceedings of the 9th instant.

Read the letters received from General Goddard the 24th instant.

General Goddard's definition of the objects of the war and of our political views on this side of India is exactly the same as has been repeatedly expressed by us in all our proceedings and plans of conduct, and by which we have been invariably guided in all our operations.

We entirely concur with the General and, indeed, the proposition came first from us, as appears by our minutes of the 9th, that a system of defence is now a measure of necessity, and our only difficulty is in the choice of measures for pursuing that system. Various objections occur against keeping a large force at the head of the Gháts during the monsoon; the danger and difficulty of affording them supplies, the vast expense of stores and ammunition, and the danger of leaving so large a part of our force in a situation where perhaps we could not command their services, if there should be a necessity for them at Bombay, or be able to give them assistance if they should be hard pressed. After all, it does not appear that maintaining a post at the head of the Gháts will answer the purpose of keeping the enemy out of the Konkan, for it is evident by the General's letters on the table, that notwithstanding the present situation of the army, a very large body of the enemy is now in the country, by which a large convoy was exposed to imminent danger. If the General could have adopted our proposal of making himself master of Rájmáchi, the possession might have been maintained with a small body of men, and it would have afforded secure lodgment for the troops and stores without the expense attending the proposed scheme of raising works and fortifying a post, building magazines, casements, &c.

Upon the whole we think that if at any time hereafter it may be judged expedient to possess ourselves of the Gháts, they may be again secured or taken possession of with much less loss, difficulty and danger, than would attend maintaining a post there during the rainy season: and it is therefore resolved to recommend to the General to drop this idea, and to employ the army during the remainder of the season in protecting the Konkan, and if possible, to reduce Paeb or some other of the strongholds which might afford convenient and secure stations for part of the troops during the rains; and the securing of which in our hands will protect and encourage the inhabitants in their cultivation the ensuing season.



As it will be impossible for the Marátha horse to act in the Konkan during the rains, we apprehend there can be no danger, and it must accordingly be suggested to the General to canton the army in two or more divisions at the most convenient stations for covering the country, which we judge may be about Panvel, Kalyán or Vajrábái, from which places the troops may with ease be transported to Bombay in case of necessity; or form a junction against the opening of the season without danger from the enemy.

We shall, agreeably to the General's proposal, take immediate measures for returning the Madras detachment; and we are glad to have it in our power to assist that Presidency, though in the present reduced state of our establishment we wish circumstances would admit of our detaining the Europeans. The General must, in consequence, be desired to give immediate orders for returning the Madras detachment to Bombay in readiness to embark.

We also propose, previous to the setting in of the monsoon, to withdraw the Bombay troops into garrison, which will cause a further considerable reduction in the expenses of the army; and we conceive the Bengal detachment will be fully sufficient to secure the country and strong enough to resist any attempts that can possibly be made by the enemy at that season of the year.

We must now, with whatever reluctance, put in execution our former resolution of abandoning Tellicherry, which as already fully explained in our proceedings, it is absolutely out of our power to maintain any longer, since we have no longer any hopes of bringing the Marátha war to a conclusion. When the Madras detachment arrives from the army, which, as the season is late, the General must be desired to expedite, we shall consult with Colonel Brown about the plan to be observed in withdrawing the garrison, and the expediency of landing his forces in order to make an effort to dislodge the enemy, which we apprehend will be necessary before the place can be evacuated; and will also enable us to do it with less loss of credit and risk to the inhabitants.

Ordered,—That the Commander of the Royal Admiral be directed to get his ship in immediate readiness for sea, to assist in transporting the Madras detachment to Tellicherry and Anjengo.

Read the letter from Admiral Hughes, entered under the 19th instant.

Resolved,—That our resolution of this day respecting the return of the Madras detachment and the withdrawing of Tellicherry be communicated to the Admiral, and a request made to him to order one or more of his ships to assist on these services. Whatever ships he may think proper to order, may take on board the marines he left for the defence of Tellicherry.

The seamen will be returned on the arrival of the "Revenge," now daily expected, or, if the "Bombay Grab" should not have sent up her proportion, the ships the Admiral may send to Tellicherry may receive them there; and an apology must be made to the Admiral for their detention, which was neither foreseen nor ordered by us.

Adjourned.

W. HORNBY.

Letter from General GODDARD to the PRESIDENT and COUNCIL.

GENTLEMEN,—I have been favoured with your letter of the 28th ultimo, original and duplicate of which have arrived safe. I cannot help sincerely regretting the accident which happened to my letter of the 12th ultimo, because it has been the means of keeping me so long uninformed of your sentiments relative to the plan I had suggested of maintaining the top of the Bor Ghát; and though I must entirely concur with you in the superior expediency of the measures you have recommended, I am myself at this time unable to carry them into immediate execution from the particular state of the circumstances which I shall proceed to explain to you.

Upon the 28th of March an escort proceeded to Panvel to bring a supply of provisions to the army, which, as it consisted of three battalions of sepoys, the regiment of horse and the



Kandahar cavalry with ten pieces of ordnance, I considered sufficiently strong to oppose any force of the enemy then in the Konkan, and though some loss of cattle has happened through unlucky accidents which could not be foreseen or expected on the march to Panvel, I am confident the detachment would have been able to conduct the convoy in safety to camp notwithstanding every effort of Parashurám Bháú's force to obstruct and oppose their progress.

In this firm belief the detachment marched, and at the same time I was impressed with the idea that the Maráthás would not venture to detach any further considerable reinforcements into the Konkan. Contrary, however, to my expectation Holkar has himself descended the Gháts with the whole of his force, and as this addition of strength to the enemy renders the return of the escort if not impracticable at least too dangerous to be attempted without a reinforcement, I find myself necessitated to apply to you on this emergency and to request that you will immediately order a detachment from your Presidency to join Colonel Brown and proceed with him to camp, after which I propose instantly to relinquish the post on Bor Ghát, and as every previous preparation will be made for that purpose, I shall be able to put the whole army in motion, when the reinforcement you send may be returned to Bombay and the Madras troops proceed to your Presidency to be in readiness for embarking.

I beg to observe to you that no danger can possibly arise or inconvenience at all adequate to the pressing necessity of the service be occasioned by detaching a force at present from Bombay which cannot be absent above ten or twelve days, as there is no possibility of the enemy attempting anything on this side, and the presence of the fleet will provide perfect security from the sea.

I did intend upon the first intelligence of Holkar's design to have marched a detachment from this place to join the escort, but upon mature reflection and a full investigation of circumstances I find such a measure at this time impracticable. The difficulties which occur are these: The superiority of the enemy's force would too much endanger the safety of any detachment that could be at present spared; because if a body of men able to resist the efforts of their united strength were to move, a sufficient force could not be left to maintain this post, and though I were inclined to relinquish it immediately, which, I must confess, from the appearance of necessity it would carry, the discouragement it must give our own troops, and the proportionate spirits it would infuse into the enemy, do not think would be a proper or political step at this time. It would still be impossible to put the army in motion from the want of cattle to convey the stores and provisions now with me, and in particular the draught bullocks sent with the escort to Panvel to bring up the heavy artillery I had before applied for to your Government. If to these difficulties be further added the number of sick and wounded, it will be found an absolute impossibility to put the whole in motion until the return of the escort; and I assure myself that when, together with the several circumstances already mentioned, you also consider the weak and reduced state of the several corps of the army, a return of which accompanied the escort to Panvel, you will concur with me in the extreme danger and impropriety of detaching a part.

Having thus explained everything that the necessity of the circumstances prompted, and suggested the only plan that occurs to me as proper and practicable for the good of the service, I trust, gentlemen, that you will concur with me in the expediency of its being immediately and effectually adopted; and I beg to acquaint you that I must rely entirely upon your exertions on this occasion. It is impossible for me to point out what reinforcement is requisite which, after considering the necessity of the case, your own wisdom and judgment will best determine; but as its absence from Bombay can only be for a few days, I trust you will see the expediency of sending as many Europeans, sepoys and marines as can possibly be spared from the common duties of the garrison; and that no delay may be occasioned in victualling them, they may be supplied from the Company's stock of provisions immediately upon joining the escort.



I have acquainted the officer in command of the escort with my present application to you, and directed him not to prosecute his march until I joined by the reinforcements you may send, of which I have desired him to give me immediate notice, and also of the time he proposes to march, that I may be in readiness to co-operate with and facilitate his junction should circumstances render any movement on my part absolutely necessary.

Let me request to receive your immediate answer to this letter, for which I shall be exceedingly anxious; the parts of your letter which relate to the disposition of the troops I shall take an opportunity of replying to, hereafter. At present permit me generally to observe that no effort, excepting that of open force to which from its situation it is totally inaccessible, has been neglected by me to succeed in attempt upon Rájmachí, nor have I been inattentive to the object of securing the other strong fortress in the Konkan by every secret means in my power, and to which I shall bend my future endeavours.

I have the honor to be,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters, Kāandála, 4th April 1781.

P.S.—That you may clearly see the necessity of despatch on this occasion I think it necessary to mention that the stock of provisions at present with me will not last more than twelve days.

Bombay Castle, 8th April 1781.

At a Select Committee, present:

The Hon^{ble} WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.

W. DANIEL DRAPER, and NATHANIEL STACKHOUSE, indisposed.

Read and approved the minutes of our last meeting of the 27th ultimo.

Read the letter received last night from General Goddard.

In the critical situation to which we find the army is reduced, we cannot hesitate a moment in exerting every possible effort to extricate them, and it is therefore resolved immediately to send over to Panvel, to join Colonel Brown, as strong a detachment as could possibly be formed from this garrison, which by a sketch now made from the returns we find will amount to about 800 effective men, of which 80 will be European rank and file. This is a force nearly equal to two of the battalions now in the field, and is the utmost we can collect, as we have already, considering the vicinity of the army and the presence of the fleet, sent almost the whole of our troops into the field.

By the orders already given this detachment will proceed over to Panvel this night, of which immediate notice must be given to Colonel Brown and General Goddard, and the latter must be acquainted, that as we have entirely unfurnished the garrison, and the fleet will soon leave us, we must insist on his returning this detachment before the departure of the fleet; and he must also be desired to expedite the march of the Madras detachment that they may arrive in time to embark on the squadron.

Read the letter received from the Admiral the 5th instant.

The situation of the inhabitants at Tellicherry fills us with the most deep concern, and we shall not fail to take every step in our power for their preservation when we frame our instructions for the withdrawing of the place.

We are sorry for the disappointment in not returning the men lent to the "Bombay Grab", but their detention at Tellicherry was not foreseen or ordered by us.

W. HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Letter from Sir ERRE COOTE to General GODDARD.

SIR,—I have received your letters of the 18th and 28th December last.

I most heartily rejoice at the success which has attended your operations against Bassein and on the consequent fall of that important fortress. After begging that you will yourself accept of my sincere congratulations on the additional honor which you have acquired by this event, which is doubtless a severe blow to the interests of the Marátha State, I request that you will in my name express the highest sense I entertain of the bravery and good conduct of the officers and men under your command, and this I must entreat you to do not only by mentioning every officer and corps which you deem deserving of marks of my approbation, but that you will do it in such signal terms as will convince them of the entire satisfaction I received from the favourable accounts transmitted me of their valor and steady attachment to our interests. I shall also cheerfully acquiesce in any marks of distinction which you may think proper to confer on the Bengal troops, who, it must be allowed, highly merit every indulgence and favour in our power to grant them.

Having thus discharged the debt which I hold on every account due from me to yourself and the troops under your command, I shall beg your attention to what I have more immediately to offer on the subject of your letters of the 18th and 20th December.

When I wrote you in the terms I did, the most expressive I could dictate of the distressed situation of affairs here, wherein I enumerated the various difficulties I had to combat against, the smallness of my force, and the impossibility of attacking the enemy in the strongholds he was possessed of unless a diversion was created in his country to oblige him to divide the very formidable force he had in the Karnatak; I say, when I stated these circumstances, and added to them my firm opinion that nothing but our united efforts speedily exerted could possibly retrieve the misfortunes which had fallen upon our interests on this coast and the consequent ruin which threatened the whole of the English possessions in India, I did not mean to enhance any credit which might arise from my honest exertions in the cause of my country and my employers, but that you might be the better convinced of the real necessity there was for seeking an accommodation with the Maráthas on any terms rather than, by prosecuting a destructive war, delay should have happened in pursuing such measures as promised the accomplishment of the grand national object—giving an effectual check to the increasing power and influence of Hyder Alli Khán. I will not argue how far my orders as Commander-in-Chief ought to have weighed with you on the occasion; but I must say that when together with them I stated the imminent danger which I conceived to impend the British interests in India, and under the express authority delegated to me over the Bengal troops under your command pointed out the mode whereby that danger might be averted, I experienced a very heavy disappointment at your not having at least aimed at a cessation of hostilities with the Maráthas, for which the resolutions of the Governor General and Council, as well as the spirit of the proposed treaty itself, gave a clear latitude. With the authority you possess over the Bengal troops independent of the Bombay administration, and furnished with a just account of the situation of affairs of the most serious importance, and which stood in need of such speedy support, I am confident that had you made it, as it deserved, the first object in your deliberations with the Bombay Council, that they would have seen the propriety of countenancing it; and that had they and you in consequence been solicitous about it in your communications with the Minister at Poona, I have every reason to think, from the situation which the affairs of the Marátha State were then in, might easily have been effected. I will not be certain that no endeavours have been exerted to that end; but as you make no mention of anything to that effect in your letters, I



am justified in drawing the conclusion I have done, and in adding that I conceive my powers as Commander-in-Chief in India have not been treated with that attention which in a time of warfare they are entitled to, and more particularly at a juncture and on an occasion like the present, which called for their exercise and interposition. I wish nevertheless to rest the judgment to be formed of my own conduct, and the conduct of the other parties, who have had either an executive or deliberative share in the management of public affairs upon our own evident necessities, which, it must be confessed, were too alarming to justify any measures which could delay the much wanted cure for all our distresses—a Marátha peace. Although I ever consider the policy of warring against the Marátha State a most ruinous one to the interests both of the Company and the English nation; still on the eve of your late success, if we had no other power to combat against, I might have subscribed to the plan you advise me, as laid down for the operations of your campaign, as the most likely to procure us honorable terms of accommodation; but engaged as we are in a scene of contention, I may say with every power of any consideration in India, all steps, the event of which could not be clearly ascertained as an unfailing remedy must be exceptionable. By prosecuting the war our difficulties must be increased, and the prospect of obtaining peace become daily more distant. Our resources, anticipated by the current demands of our military establishment to which they are unequal, and burdened with a heavy debt, cannot long support the present system. I must therefore impose it upon you as a duty you owe your King, your country and your employers, to leave no means which may depend upon you, untried to effect a peace with the Maráthas, and which may enable you speedily to carry into execution my orders for entering and creating a powerful diversion in Hyder Alli's country on the Malabár side, without which I have already told you that it is impossible for me, with the very small army I command, to drive him from the Karnatak, possessing as he does a numerous and formidable force, and with every man of any consideration in this country in his interest, nay absolutely at this moment in his camp with considerable bodies of men.

In the operation of my yet infant campaign I have already put more to risk than can be reconciled with a proper regard to the public interest. I shall not attempt, occupied as my time and attention necessarily are in watching the motions of the enemy, who is strongly posted a few miles distant from ~~this~~ place, to state the grounds upon which the above opinion is founded, but just relate for your information the effects which my movements have produced: the retaking Carangoly in a manner which does honor to the bravery and resolution of the officer and men employed on that service, the raising the sieges of Permacoil(?), Vellore and Wandivash, and now keeping the enemy in check from attempting any thing effectual against these and other garrisons. I cannot, however, prevent his ravaging the country all around and obstructing all supplies from coming to my camp. What I now obtain is by sea. I ought also to have mentioned the distressing the French fleet in the Pondichery roads by destroying all the boats by the assistance of which they drew refreshments from the shore. They are now happily departed, being in number seven ships of the line and three frigates. Had they not gone when they did, my distresses for provisions, which were then great, might have increased to a degree that would have terminated in the most melancholy and fatal manner to this army. I thank God, however, that as the sea is now open to us these alarms are certainly subsided. Ill-equipped as the French squadron were for making resistance, it is much to be regretted that our fleet should have been absent from this coast, as I am confident they must have proved an easy conquest to them.

I trust that the intended relief for Major Cotgrave has been sent to Tellichery, as the bad effects which have been produced in his detachment by the frequent breach of promise to the sepoys of returning to this coast are both serious and alarming. On the strength of your informa-

tion that Major Cotgrave would certainly be relieved from Bombay, I have sent him orders to lose no time in joining me by the southern route or with the Admiral.

I shall conclude this letter with observing that as your letters contain assurances of your desire to co-operate with and to assist my measures, I will rely on your leaving no endeavours unexerted to accomplish the important objects above pointed out.

I am, &c.,
EYRE COOTE.

Camp New Town, 1st March 1781.

P.S.—I think it necessary to inform you I have received information that Hyder Alli Khán is using every means in his power to defeat our views of peace with the Maráthas, and has even carried his intrigues so far as to authorize Raghunáthráv to employ his credit in the expenditure of whatever sums he may find necessary to that end.

(A True Copy).
G. TYLER.

Letter from the GOVERNOR GENERAL and COUNCIL to the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL, Bombay.

HON'BLE SIR AND SIRS,—In our letter of the 9th October, which we have the pleasure to forward to you in transcript, we acknowledged our receipt of the letter which you had written to us under date the 17th August; we have since received those of the 11th and 23rd September.

We have read with attention your President's minute transmitted to us with your letter and highly approve of the sentiments therein delivered on a plan of operations for the ensuing campaign. It seems to us to be the best that could be adopted at the time when it was written; but since that period events have taken place which could not have been foreseen or provided for; the interests of the Company require that the operations of their troops should be directed against another enemy, and that their system of policy should of course be changed. It has now become necessary that the whole force which we were able to collect and to spare from the immediate defence of our Presidencies should be employed in curbing and, if possible, oversetting the increased power of our ambitious enemy in the Karnátak; and we hope that the orders which General Goddard had received from Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote, with whom it was left by us to send him such as he should deem expedient, will have followed by the immediate direction of his arms towards the territories of Hyder Alli Khán.

We wish at present to leave in suspense an ultimate resolution on that part of your letter wherein you communicate to us your observations on the desire we had expressed that the receipts from the acquisitions in Gujarát should be exclusively appropriated to the payment of General Goddard's army. Our abilities to continue supplies to it and to your Presidency is not increased since we made the requisition, but, on the contrary, considerably lessened, for we have been obliged to augment our military strength to supply the place of the detachments made from the force composing it; and the prosecution of the war in the Karnátak depends solely on remittances from our treasury.

We have sent to your Presidency on the ship "Duke of Portland" the sum of five lákhs of rupees, which we hope will prove to you a seasonable supply, and we authorize you to draw on us for what further sums as you may want at a reasonable exchange; but the exchange of the bills procured here payable at your Presidency is so extravagantly high, and the risk of conveyance of treasure to the other side of India so great, that we cannot promise you supplies in any other manner.

We have perused the translations which you have sent us of the intercepted papers from the Dutch Chief at Surat and the Marátha Vakils; but we deem them as unimportant, as defective in proof, and would recommend that the complaint be permitted to rest to a future day.



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We are not of opinion that the information contained in Mr. Henshaw's letter enclosed in yours to us of the 23rd September is of sufficient importance to require our serious attention; so far otherwise are we inclined to believe that the Portuguese are inclined to be hostile to the Company, that we have lately determined to make overtures to them for an union with us in distressing Hyder Alli by sending a body of force into his country.

The insults which have been offered to the Portuguese by this common enemy, the friendship and alliance which has long subsisted between their nation and ours, and independently of this last consideration the interest which they have in common with us in curbing an increase of power in that ambitious Chief have prevailed with us in making them the overtures above-mentioned; and we have deputed on this service Mr. James Peter Auriel, who has been instructed to advise you regularly of such part of his proceedings as may be necessary for your information.

*Fort William, }
7th January 1780. }*

We have, &c.,
WARREN HASTINGS.
EDWARD WHELER.

Letter from General GODDARD to the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL, Bombay.

GENTLEMEN,—I have the pleasure to acknowledge your letter of the 8th instant, and while I express my thanks for the ready and effectual aid you sent at my requisition to Colonel Brown, I feel at the same time the most sincere satisfaction in acquainting you with his safe arrival in camp yesterday at noon, and congratulate you upon the success he met with in conducting the escort to the army without any loss notwithstanding the repeated and powerful efforts of the enemy who attacked him every day during his march and in particular on the second day betwixt Burwa and Chauk, when the greatest part of their force at present below the Gháts, amounting to at least 20,000 men, among which some bodies of foot were mingled, showed themselves in front and rear, but more especially in the latter, and continued to molest and harass the detachment from before sunrise till about half-past two, when the troops arrived at their ground of encampment near two miles on this side of Chauk.

The military skill and conduct of Colonel Brown in protecting and preserving his convoy during so long and incessant an attack, and the order and perseverance of the officers and men under his command in bravely defeating the repeated and vigorous attacks of a numerous army, are circumstances that reflect the highest honor upon them, and in this point of view I beg leave to recommend their behaviour to your particular notice and approbation.

There is reason to believe the Maráthás must have suffered very considerably, though, as the detachment continued moving on, it was impossible to ascertain their loss with any certainty. The harkárá confirm this belief by accounts, however, which are too exaggerated to deserve entire credit, but yet prove the reality of the opinion I have been led to form of their suffering very severely. The total of our loss during the three days' march from Panvel to camp amounts to eighteen killed and eighty-eight wounded, including five officers wounded, *viz.*, Captain Bowles, Lieutenants Wheldon and Tindall of the Bombay, Ensign Gibbings of the Madras and Ensign Richardson of the Bengal establishment.

I am sorry to acquaint you that Lieutenant Tindall has since died of his wounds. By the intelligence of harkárá who came in from the enemy's camp this evening, Holkar has moved to the foot of the Eussore Ghát, on the top of which he has left his artillery and bázárs. Parashurám is still encamped beyond Dehoily, and as neither of them are encumbered with guns or heavy baggage (for they have not ventured to bring down any of the former into the Konkan), it will be easy for them to move up the Gháts with the whole or a part of their force without

my being able to intercept or prevent them. I hope to obtain certain information of their designs very soon and shall take my measures accordingly. In the meantime I am using every possible expedition to relinquish the post upon Bor Ghát, which on account of the number of stores of every kind collected at Khandála and the want of cattle I found it impossible to evacuate until the arrival of the escort, and shall put the army in motion towards Panvel as early as circumstances will admit conveniently or consistent with the nature of the service.

I shall not fail to give you previous intimation of the time of my intended march from Kampoli, and have the honor to be,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Khandála, 15th April 1781.

Bombay Castle, 19th April 1781.

At a Select Committee, present :

The Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.

W. DANIEL DRAPER, and NATHANIEL STACKHOUSE.

Read and approved our proceedings of the 8th instant, being our last meeting.

Read the letter received yesterday from the Governor General and Council and the one received this morning from General Goddard.

We cannot but sincerely regret that the letter from Bengal, which is of such infinite consequence to our deliberations, was not sooner received; and that transcripts were not forwarded by different conveyances, instead of giving us no other chance for its receipt than the safe arrival of a country grab ship which has already been some weeks on the coast and left Goa so long ago as the * * *; and we are now so much straitened for time by the near approach of the monsoon and the fleet being on the point of sailing, that it is hardly possible to retrieve the consequence of this omission; however after mature deliberation on the change of circumstances occasioned by the supplies of rice which we understand are provided for this presidency; and our wants for money being in some measure relieved by the consignment of specie expected on the "Duke of Portland"; and the permission we have received to make drafts on the Governor General and Council; as well as the importance of preserving the settlement of Tellicherry and the disgrace and bad consequences of abandoning it at this juncture, it is resolved to take measures with all possible expedition for sending a relief to that garrison; and for that purpose to draw immediately from the Konkan two batteries of sepoys and a detachment of artillery and to state our resolutions to the Admiral and request he will prolong his stay here for a few days in order to transport this force to Tellicherry; which being so important a service and as there will be now the less necessity for his remaining there any considerable time we flatter ourselves he will readily consent to.

A copy of General Goddard's last letter must be sent to the Admiral, who will observe therefrom that though we cannot fix any precise day for the arrival of the troops, yet we may hope as it has been so long upon the road that they may arrive very shortly, and he must be acquainted that we will expedite their embarkation as much as possible, and that boats were sent over last night to Panvel to transport them to Bombay.

It has not escaped our observation that it is possible the French fleet may appear on this coast the ensuing season; and that in such case they may make themselves masters of Tellicherry if they should join the present enemy before it; that we think the preservation of this fortress

* Illegible.



THE FIRST MARATHA WAR.

of so much consequence to the Company in the present situation of affairs that it is our duty so long as we have the means in our hands to make every possible effort to preserve it; and not to run the hazard of such a contingency; trusting that the Admiral will do the utmost in his power to protect all the Company's settlements, it is accordingly resolved to recommend to him to bring round the squadron to some part of this coast on the shifting of the monsoon and to take his station there till the season will admit of his returning to the coast of Koromandel; by which measure the Company's settlements on both coasts will be in perfect security from the attempts of an European enemy.

Resolved, also, that a boat be immediately despatched to Tellicherry advising of our intention to send this relief; and provided the Factors should not already have complied with the request of the Resident and Factors at Anjengo, they must at the same time be directed to send the "Royal Charlotte" country ship thither to receive a cargo of pepper, from whence she must return to this place.

A letter must be immediately sent off to General Goddard to advise him of this resolution and to repeat our requisition for the Bombay troops being sent over by the boats now waiting at Panvel.

Letter from the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL to Brigadier General GODDARD.

SIR,—We have just received your letter of the 15th instant.

Though we trust this letter will find you far advanced on your march from the Ghâts, we despatch express to acquaint you that we have, in consequence of advices from the Governor General and Council, come to a resolution to maintain the settlement at Tellicherry, and we have in consequence made application to the Admiral to postpone his departure for a few days in order to give time for a sufficient number of troops being sent from the Konkan to form a proper garrison for that fortress, and to be conveyed thither by the squadron.

We have therefore to desire that you will, upon receipt hereof, take measures for sending over with all possible expedition the whole of the detachment with which we reinforced Colonel Brown, both Europeans and sepoys, and all the officers and men under your command belonging to the 10th and 11th battalions of sepoys which are destined for Tellicherry. We have further to request that you will instantly relieve from the Bombay troops under your command the detachments from those two battalions now on duty at Persik, Bellápur and Karanja.

As the season is far advanced and the squadron remains here but a very few days, we commend and trust that you will use all possible despatch in complying with this requisition.

The necessary orders have been sent to Bellápur, Persik and Karanja, and the President will immediately send you advice of the numbers necessary for the relief of those garrisons.

We have received with much pleasure the testimony you gave of the gallant conduct of Colonel Brown and the troops under his command, and are,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

WILLIAM HORNBY AND COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, }
19th April 1781. }

Letter from General GODDARD to the PRESIDENT and COUNCIL.

GENTLEMEN,—I wrote you the 19th instant and acquainted you with my intention of putting the army in motion the day following. I accordingly marched from Kampoli and encamped the 20th at Kolhápur without meeting with any molestation from the enemy till the troops approached their ground, when a considerable party appeared in the rear, but after a few shot from our artillery retreated to a distance.

By the intelligence my harkarás brought me during the course of the day I learnt that Hari Pant with the force he formerly commanded in the Konkan had descended the Bor Ghát soon after my quitting Kampoli and has also brought down with him some light field pieces and a numerous body of infantry. In consequence of this information I conceived it was the enemy's object to attack and harass me as much as possible on the march and to attempt to carry off the baggage, &c.; and as the road through which we were to pass afforded them many opportunities for executing such a project with advantage, I took every precaution that circumstances could possibly allow of, to disappoint and defeat its success.

I accordingly marched at daybreak yesterday, and having sent all the baggage with a part of the army securely through a narrow pass that was close to the rear of our encampment and through which the road lay, prepared to follow with the rear division, when the enemy began an attack by the discharge of artillery and rockets, and a very smart firing of musketry, which they continued to do incessantly from very early in the morning till past 10 o'clock, when the troops reached their ground of encampment at Chauk.

Their principal efforts were directed against our rear; though from the nature of the country through which we passed and the thick jungles, deep hollows and broken ground which effectually covered them from our sight, they frequently found means to annoy the line on the flanks as it advanced; and could retire in safety as our parties moved out to dislodge them from their lurking places.

The first shot fired from the enemy from their field pieces unfortunately struck one of our 6 lbs. tumbrils, which instantly blew up. It luckily did us very little damage, wounded only one lascar and two bullock drivers, nor did it occasion any confusion or disorder in the line; but it is probable the enemy were encouraged by this accident to give us more trouble and annoyance than they would otherwise have ventured to do.

Their guns remained at a considerable distance in the rear, where their horse also kept aloof in large bodies, generally out of the reach of our shot, so that almost the whole of the action on their side was carried on by their infantry, which is evident from the small number of our killed in proportion to those who were wounded. Their foot, though above four thousand, did not attack in any regular manner or show themselves in large bodies, but were dispersed in small parties in the gullies and hollow ways which intersected the whole of the country and proved exceedingly favourable to their mode of attack; as behind these they lay concealed and took cool and certain aim by which means many men were picked off and a number of officers suffered; however unwilling to delay my march in any shape, the first object of which was to arrive at Panvel as soon as possible, or to expose the troops unnecessarily to the danger of the enemy's concealed attacks, I however found it requisite sometimes to form a part of the line and advance against them where they appeared to have collected in greatest numbers, when they always fled, and by these movements a confidence was given to our own troops and they were taught thoroughly to despise the dastardly efforts of so mean and cowardly a foe. The enemy had seven pieces of artillery in the field, two of which belonged to Holkar. A very brisk and constant fire was kept upon our side, both of artillery and musketry, and notwithstanding the disadvantages under which we had to labor in opposing an enemy that kept themselves so much under cover, could make choice of their ground, and only showed themselves when they pleased, I am convinced they must have suffered very considerably. The reports of different harkarás make their loss amount to 200 killed and about twice that number wounded. Our own loss, including European officers, was twenty-eight killed and 267 wounded, above 200 of which belonged to the Bengal troops. I shall send you a particular return of the whole upon my arrival at Panvel. Permit me in the meantime to testify my warmest sense of the courage and good conduct of the officers and men under my command who displayed on this occasion



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all that firmness and cool resolution which is no less the effect of discipline than a zealous attachment to the cause in which they are engaged and a determined intention of despising every difficulty and danger to promote its success.

I should be guilty of the highest injustice to their merits and services did I not take this opportunity of recommending them to your notice in the strongest terms of which I am capable, and expressing my sincere wish that they may be honored by marks of your favour and approbation.

I have found it necessary to halt at Chauk this day in order to provide conveyance for the wounded men who were with a great deal of difficulty brought up to the ground yesterday. All the officers' palanquins and a great number of horse belonging to the Mogal Regiment of cavalry being made use of for that purpose. I propose marching to-morrow and, if possible, pushing on to Panvel, though as the greatest part of the road betwixt this place and Burwa is very unfavorable from its being full of jungles and broken ground, I cannot promise with certainty that I shall be able to accomplish it.

I was this morning favoured with your letter of the 19th instant and shall immediately upon my arrival at Panvel comply with your requisition to relieve the garrisons of Bellápur and Persik, and shall send over the reinforcements from your Presidency, together with all the officers and men under my command belonging to the 10th and 11th battalions of sepoys, in order that they may be embarked for Tellicherry on His Majesty's squadron. That no delay may arise in conveying them to Bombay I hope to find the boats in readiness upon my arrival at Panvel which I suggested might be sent there in my letter of the 19th.

The enemy having now in consequence of our having relinquished the Gháts brought down all their force into the Konkan it will be necessary to form some plan of securing the country from their ravages in the most effectual manner possible; and for this purpose, after arriving at Panvel, should the lateness of the season not force them to retire, which, however, I think it is most probable will be the case, I shall consider upon the steps that appear to me most necessary to be taken, and acquaint you with the result.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
THOMAS GODDARD.

*Head-quarters Camp at Chauk, }
22nd April 1781.*

Bombay Castle, 25th April 1781.

Early this morning we learnt that the army arrived at Panvel the 23rd in the afternoon. Received the following letter from Brigadier General Goddard enclosing two returns of the killed and wounded of the army the 21st and 23rd instant:—

“GENTLEMEN,—I had the pleasure of addressing you the 22nd instant from Chauk and acquainting you with my intention of marching towards Panvel the following day. As I knew the road from Chauk to Burwa, more than half way to this place, lay through a country full of thick jungles, broken ground and narrow defiles, where the enemy would possess every advantage they could wish of concealing themselves and annoying our troops, I thought it expedient to send off all the heavy stores, baggage and every incumbrance, at 2 o'clock in the morning under the care of a strong escort and remained myself with the main body till daybreak. The success fully answered my expectations. The baggage, &c., moved off undiscovered by the enemy, who had not an opportunity during the whole of the march of attacking or giving them any disturbance whatever.

A little after sunrise the enemy made their appearance, at first in small parties, throwing rockets and discharging their musketry upon our rear, from the numerous thickets and hollows that favoured their approach. Their numbers continued to increase; and soon after their whole force, which I am confident from the full view I had of them at different times yesterday, the names of their leaders, and the repeated intelligence of my harkarás, would not be less than 50,000, of which there may be 6,000 infantry, showed themselves lining the tops of the hills on the right and left, and behind every bank or bush where there was a possibility of concealing themselves. Their horse kept behind their guns, and generally at too great a distance for our artillery to reach them, though sometimes considerable bodies came near enough to receive the fire of our guns, which were exceedingly well served and must have done very great execution.

Their most serious and determined attack was made when we came near Burwa, with their whole force, horse and foot; at which time the rear being very hardly pressed, I took possession of an eminence with the 6th battalion of Bengal and 13th of Bombay infantry, which effectually commanded the spot where the enemy had posted themselves, and drove them off, after they had sustained very considerable loss from the guns of these battalions.

The whole of the army reached Burwa, about 10 o'clock; when finding the enemy showed no inclination to advance, but on the contrary were retreating, seemingly tired of the warm reception they had met with and despairing of success in their attempts to make any impression upon our line, I thought it most expedient, notwithstanding the fatigue the troops had sustained, as the whole of the baggage, was secure in our front, to push on to Panvel, and accordingly having halted some time to refresh the people, prosecuted my march and arrived at Panvel about an hour before sunset.

It is with the greatest concern I have to acquaint you with the loss of Colonel Parker, who commanded in the rear, where exerting himself with that courage and military ardour that always distinguished him on every occasion of active service, he received a mortal wound in his belly, of which he expired on the march a few hours after.

Enclosed is a return of the killed and wounded in the action of yesterday; and I also take this opportunity of sending you a particular list of our loss upon the 21st instant.

The reinforcements for your Presidency will embark this day at noon; at which time also the relief for the garrisons of Bellápur and Persik will proceed.

I shall also send off with all possible expedition the five companies belonging to Captain Carpenter's battalion to strengthen the garrison at Kalyán, with one company of the 4th battalion of Bombay sepoys.

I expect you to receive particular accounts by my harkarás of the situation of the enemy and of their designs. By intelligence brought in early this morning, I learn that their main body is encamped at Chowke, and that they have a body of about 5,000 horse posted at Burwah. I shall do myself the pleasure of communicating any further information as soon as it arrives.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters Panvel, 24th April 1781.



THE FIRST MARATHA WAR.

Return of the killed and wounded of the Army under the Command of Brigadier General Goddard on the 1st April 1781.

First Regiment of Cavalry	1 Trooper wounded.
Artillery	Bengal	...	1 Lieutenant, 1 Matross, and 1 Gulendaz wounded.
	Madras	...	1 Lieutenant killed, 1 Lieutenant Sergeant, and 1 Matross wounded.
	Bombay	...	None.
Bengal Sepoy Infantry.	1st Battalion	...	2 Subhedárs, 2 Náiks, 7 Sepoys, and 1 Lascar killed; 2 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 3 Jumbledárs, 1 Drummer, 13 Havaldárs, 7 Náiks, 70 Sepoys, and 3 Lascars wounded.
	5th do.	...	1 Náik wounded.
	6th do.	...	3 Havaldárs, 2 Náiks, and 7 Sepoys killed; 2 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 2 Surgeons, 3 Subhedárs, 5 Jumbledárs, 1 Drummer, 8 Havaldárs, 4 Náiks, 2 Trumpeters, 63 Sepoys, and 2 Watermen wounded.
	7th do.	...	1 Sepoy wounded.
	Grenadiers of the 2nd and 4th Bengal Battalions.	...	1 Jumbledár, 1 Havaldár, and 7 Sepoys wounded.
Bombay Sepoy Infantry.	2nd Battalion	...	1 Sepoy wounded.
	4th	4 do do.
	8th	2 Lieutenants, 2 Sergeants, 1 Gunner, 5 Havaldárs, 5 Náiks, and 23 Sepoys wounded.
	Captain Samber's Battalion	...	1 Commandant, 1 Náik, and 4 Sepoys wounded.
Pioneer Corps	1 Náik and 2 Sepoys wounded.

	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Battalions.	Ensign and Sepoys.	Sergeants.	Gunners.	Matrosses.	Commandants.	Subhedárs.	Jumbledárs.	Drummers.	Havaldárs.	Náiks.	Trumpeters.	Gulendaz.	Sepoys.	Lascars.	Total.
Total killed	1	...	1	2	3	4	16	1	28
Total wounded	7	1	3	4	1	2	1	5	10	2	27	19	2	1	176	5	266

Names of the Officers killed and wounded.

Killed.	Wounded.
Lieutenant-Colonel Parker, Bengal Native Infantry.	Lieutenant William Rattray, Bengal Artillery.
Captain Sambers, Bombay Native Infantry.	Do. W. Rutledge, Madras Artillery.
Lieutenant Gibson, Madras Artillery, and Mr. Penny, Surgeon, do.	Do. Duncan, Madras Infantry.
	Do. Hall,
	Do. Taylor, } Bengal Infantry.
	Do. More, }
	Do. Coleridge, }
	Do. Smith, }
	Do. Taylor, } Bombay do.
	Do. Mills, }
	Do. Reynolds, }
	Mr. Flemming, Surgeon General.

THOMAS GODDARD,
Brigadier General.



THE FIRST MARÁTHA WAR.

Letter from the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL to Sir BYRE COOTE, K.B., Lieutenant-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in India.

Sir,—We have been favoured with your letter of the 2nd March.

In our letter of the 15th of February, by the "Indus", we fully explained our motives for recommending to General Goddard a vigorous prosecution of the war against the Maráthás; which we thought the most probable and rational method of bringing them to terms, neither had we in that case any room for deliberation, our line of conduct being distinctly marked out by the Governor General and Council, who, after acquainting us, that they had offered terms to the Marátha Government, directed us, on receipt of a certain requisition and notification from the Peshwa, immediately to suspend all hostilities and military operations; but in the mean time, and until the receipt of such requisition and notification, they earnestly recommended a vigorous prosecution of the war, so far as our troops were engaged in it, and acquainted us that a similar order had been sent to General Goddard.

We are convinced of the necessity, and sincerely desirous of bringing the Marátha War to a conclusion; but it is not because we are desirous of peace; or that peace is necessary to our affairs, that will prove arguments with the enemy for consenting to an accommodation; and until that happens, it would be as impracticable and as unsafe for us to employ the army against the possessions of Hyder Alli, as it would be for you to make a diversion in our favour against the Maráthás. In this situation we have done the utmost in our power for the common cause. We have reduced the war on our part as nearly as possible to a mere system of defence; and determined to send back all the Madras troops serving on this coast, in order to make the army under command more respectable and formidable, and thereby to distress Hyder to the utmost degree that lay within our power.

It is not to be doubted but that the Maráthás and Hyder are bound by mutual engagements, which we may conclude they will abide by so long as they may find it for their interest or safety. Provision must, therefore, be made to resist the attempts of both these powers until one or other can be detached from their engagements, or be effectually depressed; and it now appears to us that we can only expect this crisis from the event of your operations against Hyder, which we have sanguine hopes will be attended with the most decisive success, and that Hyder himself will be inclined to peace now he finds himself disappointed in his hopes of assistance from the French. We then might hope to bring the Maráthás to terms, which it has appeared the offers from Bengal have not been able to effect; though as we have already mentioned in our letter, dated the 6th of March, General Goddard, in consequence of our recommendation, sent a copy of the articles directly from himself to the Minister, who had affected ignorance of their contents.

We have enclosed a copy of the answer the General received from the Minister, wherein he evidently alludes to, and acknowledges engagements with Hyder Alli, and in direct terms refuses to accede to the offers.

We have further, with the assistance of supplies from Bengal, made provision for the defence of Tellicherry, and now send down a complete relief for the detachment under Major Cotgrave, which will be transported to the coast by the squadron under the command of Sir Edward Hughes and other ships we have appointed for that service. We expect to send round Colonel Brown's detachments by the "Ponsborne", "Contractor" and "Duke of Portland."

We have advices, which we believe very authentic, of Hyder having sustained a very material loss by the blowing up of his magazine and powder works at Bednur, on the 2nd or 3rd of last month.

Your packet was duly forwarded to General Goddard, who, we conclude, will give you the requisite information of his operations by this opportunity.

We beg leave to repeat our wishes for your success, and have the honor to be, &c.,

WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 26th April 1781.

Letter from the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL, Bombay, to Brigadier General GODDARD.

SIR,—We have received your letters of the 19th, 22nd and 24th instant.

The large drafts made from our force for Tellicherry make it absolutely necessary that the Bombay troops now serving with the army under your command should be immediately returned into garrison, as the fleet is on the point of departure and we have hardly a sentinel to post at our gates. The season is now so late that we imagine you can have little further occasion for their services in the field, but at any rate as our garrison is totally destitute of men, even for the most common and indispensable duties, we must desire that the whole of the Bombay detachment be forthwith sent over on the boats that will be provided for that purpose.

We are, &c.,

WILLIAM HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 26th April 1781.

Bombay Castle, 5th May 1781.

Received the following letter from Brigadier General Goddard:—

GENTLEMEN,—I am favoured with your letter of yesterday's date acknowledging the receipt of mine of the 30th April and 1st instant and enclosing a copy of the letter from the Hon'ble Governor General and Council, dated the 7th January. Mr. Bayard has also arrived with the treasure which you delivered to him.

In consequence of the small number of boats sent for the transportation of the troops to Bombay the 8th battalion of sepoys only could be embarked yesterday for the Presidency, and this day fifteen boats, and three small ones, having arrived, I have thought it most expedient to make use of these in transporting the sick and wounded of the Bombay detachment (for which purpose they are barely sufficient) to the Presidency. They will proceed this evening under the care of Mr. Spink, who is to deliver them over to the Surgeons of the Bombay Hospital, and as from the number of sick and wounded men now in camp, his assistance is very much wanted with the army, I shall be glad of your permitting him to return to it as soon as you possibly can.

The remainder of your detachment shall be embarked as soon as boats arrive to transport them, which I take the liberty of requesting may be done with the earliest opportunity, and also sufficient to convey the sick and stores to Kalyán, in order that the troops who now suffer great inconvenience from the violent heat of the weather, and especially the sick and wounded, may be commodiously lodged, and have time to shelter themselves from the inclemency of the season before the rains commence.

The greatest part of the enemy's force having retired beyond the Gháts and the remainder being now on their march, I propose setting out for Bombay early to-morrow morning and shall leave the necessary instructions with Colonel Brown, the officer commanding in camp.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

THOMAS GODDARD.

Head-quarters at Panvel, May 4th, 1781.

*Bombay Castle, 3rd September 1781.*

Received from General Goddard copy of a letter written to him by the Governor General and Council :—

"SIR,—We have to acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated the 24th March, received within these few days, in which you acquaint us that you had agreed with the President and Select Committee of Bombay in the propriety and expediency of confining your operations entirely to a plan of defence, and explain to us the motives that have operated with you in forming this determination.

Although our sentiments of the expediency of the measure at the time when it was agreed on, continue as they were expressed on the 10th ultimo, when we transmitted to you a copy of our letter to the President and Select Committee of Bombay in reply to theirs, in which they gave us information of it, yet the change of circumstances which has taken place by your retreat from the Gháts to Panvel has now made it absolutely necessary. Although we have not yet had any information from yourself of this movement, we received such advice of it as we deem authentic. This has totally changed the aspect of affairs, and as we cannot pretend even to conjecture what may be the state of them when this reaches you, we cannot under such uncertainty venture to restrict you by any instructions. But we feel not the smallest anxiety in placing the public welfare on this occasion in the unrestrained exercise of your zeal and abilities, a confidence in which we are justified by our experience of the spirit and judgment exerted in all your operations. We receive pleasure in the account which you relate to us of the success of the detachment under Captain Mackay; and desire that you will present our thanks to him for his spirited and skilful conduct, as well as to the officers and troops serving under him for their behaviour on this occasion.

We are, &c.,

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

(") EDWARD WHEELER.

(A True Copy)

T. GODDARD.

Fort William, 14th June 1781."

Bombay Castle, 24th November 1781.

At a Select Committee, present :

Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.

W. DANIEL DRAPER.

THOMAS GODDARD, Brigadier General.

JOHN HALSEY.

Read and approved our proceedings of the 6th instant, being our last meeting.

General Goddard begs to communicate to the President and Committee the purport of advices he has received from Colonel Muir, commanding the Bengal detachment to the northward of Málwa, dated the 23rd October, which inform him of the Colonel's having concluded a separate treaty with Mahádji Sindia on the 13th of the said month, and of his being then, in consequence of engagements made with that Chief, on his march back to the Doole, a province of the Vizir's on the north side of the river Jamna.



The only articles in the treaty which can affect our views and operations in this quarter, or which bear any relation to the general interests of the war with the Marátha State, are the 2nd and 3rd, by the former of which it is stipulated that "Colonel Muir with his army shall march into the country of the Vizier Assuph-ul-Dowla, and Sindia with his troops into his own within eight days after the conclusion of the treaty;" and by the latter article "Sindia agrees to endeavour on his part to negotiate a treaty of peace betwixt Hyder Alli and the English, and betwixt the Peshwa and the English, and if his endeavours fail of success, the English are then to be at liberty to act as they think proper. Sindia will neither oppose nor give assistance to any person whatever."

In order to make the Committee more fully acquainted with the views and interests of the Bengal Government in authorizing Colonel Muir to conclude this separate treaty with Mahádji Sindia, the General further lays before them a letter received from the Hon'ble Governor General, as entered hereafter, by which it is evident that he had derived from Sindia's alliance the expectation of laying the grounds of future peace and reconciliation with the Marátha State.

How far the terms of the agreement made by Colonel Muir may be calculated to answer this expectation is a point that deserves our most serious attention and consideration.

It is plain, however, that no express condition is made corresponding with that supposed in Mr. Hastings's letter to be intended by Sindia's proposition to him "of mediating a peace betwixt the English and Marátha State and requiring that a certain time may be allowed him for that purpose in which the result is to be awaited." Since, if Colonel Muir has agreed to Sindia's proposition of becoming mediator, he has done it in such general and indefinite terms as not even to imply that a truce shall take place betwixt us and the Peshwa during the time required for settling a final peace, or, indeed, to restrict us in our military operations in any degree. The sense in which Colonel Muir understood the nature of the agreement regarding this point is evident from the following extract of his letter to me and confirms the opinion I have given:—

"Herewith you will receive a letter from Mr. Hastings; in my next letter I will be more full and explicit. At present I am far from well, which I beg you will admit in excuse for the brevity of this. I shall now only add that I promised Sindia I would recommend a cessation of arms should take place as soon as possible between you and the Peshwa at Poona in order to give an opportunity for proposals for a general peace between our Government and them. Respecting this important point I will not presume to intrude my advice, as by the enclosed papers you have a full view of the Governor General's sentiments and wishes, and the terms he is willing to grant and accept. To them and to your own judgment I beg leave to refer you."

Since, therefore, no part of the treaty ties up our hands from acting in any manner we may find expedient, or forms any political engagement to restrain our conduct, and influence our counsels, we must be guided in the present choice of measures by the actual state of circumstances and the advantages which they offer; endeavouring at the same time to desire such benefit and use from Colonel Muir's treaty with Sindia as may be found practicable, and to make it (if possible) the foundation and leading step to a general peace and permanent alliance with the Peshwa and Marátha State.

The General will not take up more of the Committee's time at present. The subject is of the utmost importance and merits the most serious and attentive deliberation. It will not be, therefore, improper to postpone forming any decisive opinion or resolution regarding it till a future meeting, at which time he hopes to receive the Committee's full and explicit sentiments for his instruction and guidance. It is requisite generally to observe that the return of Colonel



Muir's detachment has totally overturned the basis on which the plan of operations formerly recommended to the consideration of the Hon'ble Governor General and Council was founded; and that since we are disappointed in our expectation of the means of effectually carrying on the war, we ought most earnestly to study how far the transactions with Sindia may be made to contribute to the attainment which we know to be so much the object of the wishes of the Hon'ble Governor General and Council.

The General also delivers in a copy at length of the treaty concluded with Mahádji Sindia, which is ordered to be entered on our records.

The General then acquaints us that he wishes to receive the sentiments and instructions of the Committee how far our measures and his conduct are liable to be affected by the treaty with Sindia, and what particular steps are necessary to be taken in consequence; but as this point requires more consideration, it is resolved to postpone our determination, and in the mean time the necessary papers must be sent round for the perusal of the members.

Read the advices received since our last meeting from Bassein, Thána and Bellápur.

Permission is given to repair the magazine at Bassein and to complete the works in the fort at Thána mentioned in the Engineer's letter; but the expense must not exceed the estimated sum.

A Surgeon has been already ordered to Tárápore.

It was not our intention by the power we gave to General Goddard over the troops in the Konkan to make any alteration in the internal management of the different settlements or to affect the relative powers of the Resident and Commanding Officer. The General will take what part of the troops from each station he may require to join the army under his command; and the remainder left for garrison will continue on the same footing as before.

Read a letter, as entered hereafter, from the Warehouse-keeper, by which we find we shall be at liberty to dispose of the copper whenever an opportunity may offer.

W. HORNBY, AND COMMITTEE.

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*Translation of an Agreement betwixt Colonel Muir on the part of the English Company
and MAHÁDJI SINDIA for himself, to this effect:*

That Mr. Hastings, Governor General of Bengal, &c., having been fully empowered by the Governor General and Council has authorized the above-mentioned Colonel Muir to negotiate a treaty betwixt the Company and the Mahárája, promising to agree to and confirm whatever engagements may be entered into by him in behalf of the Company. In consequence thereof the Mahárája and the Colonel mutually desirous of peace with each other have concluded a treaty of peace upon the following conditions:—

1st.—There shall be peace and friendship firmly established betwixt the parties and they shall always remain steadfast in their engagements.

2nd.—Within eight days from the final conclusion of the treaty, that is, after its being signed and sealed by both the contracting parties, the two armies are to march at the same time, Colonel Muir with his forces into the country of the Vazir, Assuph-ul-Dowla and Mahárája with his troops into his own country.

3rd.—If it should be approved of, the Mahárája agrees to endeavour on his part to negotiate a peace betwixt Hyder Alli and the English and betwixt the Peshwa and the English. If a peace should be concluded it is better, if not, the English will be then at



liberty to act as they think proper. The Maharája will neither oppose nor give assistance to any power whatever.

4th.—All the country belonging to Sindia on this side of the Jamna which has been conquered by the English the Colonel agrees to restore; and the Maharája promises on his part to give no molestation to Rána Chittersing in the possession of the country, together with the fortress of Gwalior now held by him, so long as he shall conduct himself properly, nor to Mahipat Rámsing in the possession of the country at present in his hands.

5th.—The Maharája having received Rámchandra Rája of Chanderi from the Colonel agrees to replace him in his kingdom and to make no demands whatever from him; and all his country (excepting such part of it as has been long in the possession of the Peshwa) after having expelled Rája Dher his Diván who ungratefully rebelled against his master, is to be given back to him.

This agreement was signed and sealed by Colonel Muir on the part of Hon'ble Company and Maharája Sindia for himself for the 13th day of October 1781, corresponding to the 24th of the month Showal and the 1195th year of the Hijira.

(A True Translation,)

D. WATHERSTONE,

Persian Translator.

Letter from the GOVERNOR GENERAL to General GODDARD, Commanding the Forces of the Bengal Establishment at Bombay.

SIR,—Mahádji Sindia having made overtures on terms nearly conformable to my wishes, I have sent instructions and full powers to Colonel Muir to settle and conclude with him a separate treaty of peace.

In the propositions, which have been received from Sindia, he offers his mediation for a peace with the Peshwa and requires that a certain time be allowed him for that purpose, in which the result is to be awaited, by which I understand a cessation of arms. I have authorized Colonel Muir to agree to this proposition; and in case it should be settled, that a truce shall take place between us and the Peshwa during the time required for settling a final peace.

I have directed Colonel Muir to transmit a copy of this article of his treaty to you. I have also desired him to communicate to you any other articles of the treaty which may affect your operations; and I direct that you be regulated by them and adhere strictly to the terms of Colonel Muir's agreement.

I think it necessary to inform you that I have directed Colonel Muir to provide that in case a treaty should already have taken place betwixt you and the Peshwa, the treaty now in agitation betwixt him and Sindia must become void so far as they may differ.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.

(A True Copy)

R. DUNKLEY, Secretary.

Chunar, 11th September 1781.

Bombay Castle, Monday, 26th November 1781.

Received per pattamars *vid* Massulipatam duplicate of a letter from the Right Hon'ble Lord Macartney, Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote, Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes and Mr. John McPherson, with a copy enclosed of a letter addressed by them to the Peshwa:—

"GENTLEMEN,—We have the honor to acquaint you that a few days since John McPherson, Esq., one of the Supreme Council of Bengal, arrived here from England and communicated to us the orders and instructions of the Court of Directors contained in their general letter, together with the concurrent system and intentions of the administration relative to the war in which we are engaged with the Marátha State.

Being thus fully possessed of the lines of our duty from the first authority, we have, without a moment's delay, taken the proper steps towards concluding a firm friendship and lasting peace with the Government of Poona. And for the perfect accomplishment of so desirable an object, we expect that you will give not only your most hearty concurrence but every possible assistance and co-operation. These, gentlemen, we are authorized and empowered to demand; and, from particular consideration for you, we think it necessary to add that should the least difficulty or delay arise from you in the prosecution of this measure, you alone must stand responsible for any failure to the public or ill consequence to yourselves.

It is our meaning that all hostilities should cease on the part of the Government of Bombay in the same manner as hostilities cease on the part of the Maráthas.

A copy of what we have written to them is enclosed in this letter, which will be forwarded to you through their channel. You will as soon as possible receive instructions from Bengal of a similar nature, for Mr. McPherson sails this evening.

We have the honor to be, 249

With great truth and regard,

Gentlemen,

MACARTNEY.

EYRE COOTE.

JOHN MCPHERSON,

For SIR EDWARD HUGHES,

signed by the above."

Copy of the letter to the PESHWA above referred to.

Mr. Hastings, the Governor General for the affairs of the English in India, has, no doubt, informed you of the wishes of the Company to establish a peace between them and your Government. The steps which he is pursuing to settle this desirable business cannot fail of being attended with success when supported by the orders just arrived, not only from the Company but from the King of Great Britain, our just and most illustrious sovereign.

These orders, issued at a time when the news had arrived in England of conquests by General Goddard, and when Vakils had brought letters to the King and to the Company from Raghunáthráv with great offers, speak most forcibly the justice, the wisdom and the unalterable determination of the Company, of the King, and of the whole English nation to adhere to the maxims they had long since adopted and declared in their instructions to their servants of remaining satisfied with their possessions in this part of the world without aiming at new conquest, but living in peace and amity with all the powers in India.

Such has been the indignation felt at the infraction of those wise and pacific maxims; and notwithstanding the accounts of successes gained by the English arms and before any knowledge of the invasion of the Karnatak, so peremptory have the late orders been for an immediate obedience to the former instructions, that we, Sir Eyre Coote, Commander-in-Chief of the King's and Company's Forces all over India, Sir Edward Hughes, Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Fleet, Lord Macartney, Governor of the Coast of Coromandel and one of His Majesty's Privy Council and representative of the Crown on divers occasions in Europe and America, and John McPherson, Esq., Member of the Supreme Council of Bengal, appointed under the authority of Parliament and just arrived in this country from England, charged expressly with the said orders, write to you this joint letter with a view to carry them into execution. And we have further requested the Naváb Walla Jah Bahádur, the ancient friend of our nation, to write to you his information.

The orders are to settle immediately a peace and establish a treaty of friendship with your Government, which will be ratified by the King and Parliament of Great Britain, and which cannot be altered or infringed by any Sardárs or servants of the Company.

As a proof of our respect for, and obedience to these orders, and in the fullest confidence of a suitable return on your part, we do not hesitate to send at once to General Goddard and to the Presidency of Bombay the Company's commands to cease immediately all hostilities against you, not doubting but that you will at the same time direct hostilities to cease against us.

We request that you will be pleased to write without delay to the Governor General and Council the particular stipulations of the treaty of peace and everlasting friendship which you may desire to have established between us under the authority of the King, the Parliament and the Company.

And as we know already in general what your wishes are, and as we are ordered and empowered to bring this affair to a happy conclusion, we hereby pledge to you in the most solemn manner our respective honors, not only upon our own parts but upon the part of the Governor General and Council, and in behalf of the Company and the King our master and the British nation, that every just satisfaction shall be given to you in a sincere and irrevocable treaty.

After these assurances you have before you the alternative of peace or war. The evil and fatal consequences of war, if you should be bent upon it, will hereafter rest upon you. If you join with us in preferring peace, you will at the same time enjoy all the advantages which our friendship will be willing and able to afford you. May God grant you to make a just and proper choice.

Fort St. George, September 11th, 1781.

MACARTNEY.
EYRE COOTE.
EDWARD HUGHES.
JOHN MCPHERSON.

Bombay Castle, 29th November 1781.

At a Select Committee, present:

The Hon'ble WILLIAM HORNBY, Esq., President and Governor.
W. DANIEL DRAPER.

THOMAS GODDARD,
Brigadier General.

JOHN HALSEY.

Read and approved our proceedings at our last meeting the 24th instant.

Read the duplicate letter from Lord Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes and

McPherson received the 26th instant, with the enclosed letter addressed to the Peshwa.