

*Letter from the GOVERNOR-GENERAL and COUNCIL of Bengal, to the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL, Bombay.*

GENTLEMEN,—We have received your letters of the 31st December, containing as well the general state we required of the political situation of affairs of your Presidency as the particular accounts of your late operations at Sálsette and Bassein. The first will be taken into consideration as soon as the hurry of other business will permit us, and directions in consequence will be transmitted to you. As to the last, the lateness of your advices almost precludes us from saying anything at present on the subject. Our sentiments of this inattention will be sufficiently known to you by our letter of the 3rd February, triplicate of which accompanies this. We must however add that we cannot admit the plea of your being unacquainted with the new Government having taken place here, because we conceive that the operations in which you were going to engage were too interesting to the Company's affairs at large, and too likely in their consequences to affect this settlement not to have become matter of the most early intelligence to the Presidency under the late Administration.

We have received advices from Fort St. George of the steps they had taken in consequence of your application to them for assistance. For the reason we have already given we suspend our opinion on your late measures and the consequence of it, but can assure you, we shall be ready to afford you such support in your present circumstances as may be necessary for preventing, as far as may be in our power, any injury to the Company's affairs.

We are alarmed at the declaration of your intentions of joining Rághoba. We must disapprove this as inconsistent with your negotiation with the ruling powers at Poona, and with the authority of this Government. Your own report of his decline and of the power of his opponents prove it to be a measure dangerous; and may force us into a rupture with Sabáji Bhonsla, his declared enemy and our neighbour, with whom we are on terms of friendship. We cannot ratify your engagements with Rághoba without such reason as we cannot now foresee, and we therefore positively bid you to suspend your negotiations with him until you receive our further instructions.

We were disappointed in not receiving an account of the forces on your establishment, with the general state of your political affairs which you sent us, more especially as you informed us of your having found it necessary to require a reinforcement from Madras. We therefore desire that you transmit us such a statement by the first opportunity.

We also desire that you will prepare and transmit to us an accurate statement of the whole revenues of your Presidency, specifying the gross amount charges and net produce of each branch.

We are, &c.,  
WARREN HASTINGS.  
JOHN CLAVERING.  
GEORGE MONSON.  
PHILIP FRANCIS.

*Fort William, 8th March 1775.*



To

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, Esquire,

Governor General, and Council,

at Fort William.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN.—Our letter of the 1st instant (which has been already forwarded in duplicate) acknowledged the receipt of your favour dated the 8th of March.

In that letter we communicated to you the progress of our army under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Keating; we have not since received any farther advices from him, nor have we received any letters from you since our last; this therefore is chiefly to reply to your letter of the 8th of March, agreeable to what we promised in our address of the 1st instant.

We trust that the reasons which have been assigned in our letter of the 30th of April, for not sending more early intelligence of our designs and operations against Sálsette, will prove sufficiently satisfactory, more especially when you consider that it was, as we well knew from the distracted state the Marátha Government, totally out of its power to disturb the tranquillity of the Company's possessions in Bengal or those of their allies, on account of our proceedings on this side of India, and so the event has fully proved; and provided our present operations in support of Rághoba are crowned with that success which we hope they will, the treaty we have entered into fully binds Rághoba and his successors from ever taking part against the Company, and indeed we doubt not but that the gratitude will induce him always to be ready to act in their behalf.

Your Honour and Council observe "that you are alarmed at the declaration of our intentions of joining Rághoba, which, you add, you must disapprove as inconsistent with our negotiations with the ruling powers at Poona, and that it is a measure which may force you into a rupture with Sábáji Bhonsla, his declared enemy and your neighbour, with whom you are on terms of friendship."

We never had any negotiations with the Ministerial party, who we suppose you mean by the ruling powers. We only acquainted you on this head, long before we concluded the treaty with Rághoba, and at a time that there was little probability that it ever could be concluded, that in case they gained the advantage in the present contest, that we should endeavor to reconcile them by explaining our motives for attacking Sálsette. The conclusion of the treaty, and the part we in consequence took against them, rendered any explanation or negotiation on this account quite unnecessary, and therefore all thoughts of a negotiation with them independent of Rághoba have been long dropped; and though Rághoba's affairs have an unfavorable aspect, yet we make no doubt but that a steady perseverance and proper conduct will enable him with our assistance to overcome his enemies, or also to accommodate matters favourably with them.

When your Honour and Council take this subject into your consideration, we request that you will particularly attend to the following circumstances; first, that the part we have taken is in support of the rightful supreme Governor of the Maráthás, and who had been in possession of that dignity; and that the Ministerial party are his subjects who have rebelled against him, and most unjustly are endeavouring to dispossess him of his seat. Secondly, that by acting in the manner we have done, we have secured to the Company by the most effectual grants (and which Rághoba was the only person who had any right to give) the right of possessing those places, such as Sálsette and Bassein, which they have repeatedly and earnestly enjoined us to procure for them, and even more. What is still further for their benefit, the expenses that will be incurred in this war are to be amply repaid to them, and in the end we doubt not





such a currency will be given to the affairs of the Company in these parts, and to trade in general, as will be attended with singular benefit to them and to individuals trading under their protection. In this light we flatter ourselves you will view our proceedings when the whole comes before you.

We were and are convinced that your Honour and Council may be perfectly free from any apprehensions of being forced into a rupture with the Bhonslas on account of our proceedings, even had Sábaji been yet alive; for from the death of Jánoji Bhonsla, which happened about 3 years ago, till Sábaji was killed (as he was lately by Mudáji) that Government which was commonly known to us by the name of the Berar Government was torn in pieces by the civil dissensions between Sábaji and Mudáji; but since the death of the former it has been restored to quiet, and as Mudáji (who now governs for his son that was adopted by the late Jánoji) is a known friend to Rághoba, he will consequently be rejoiced at the part we have taken, instead of being disgusted with it.

Thus we hope that we have removed your Honour and Council's objections to our entering into the treaty with Rághoba, and that you will concur with us in opinion that we were and are pursuing the true interest of our employers, for had we not laid hold of the present opportunity, which was so very favourable to procure grants of the places that we wished to possess, it is more than probable that another such would never again have offered.

We beg leave here to remark that as your Honour and Council are situated so very distant from this Presidency, it would be totally impossible for us to benefit by circumstances as they fall out, provided we always wait for your directions. We need produce no other instance than the letter before us, which is dated the 8th of March, not being received here till the 21st ultimo, and is an answer to our advices of the 31st December last; had we waited for your reply to these advices, Rághoba would have been entirely lost, and the advantages the Company gain by treaty gone most probably for ever; the Legislature has indeed provided against this great inconvenience in the late Act of Parliament which we make no doubt but that you will always consider, and we assure you that we shall take no material step in any political matter, without your concurrence, unless when it may be dangerous to postpone for so long a time coming to a determination thereon.

In the preceding part of this letter we acquainted you that we had no advices from Lieutenant-Colonel Keating since the date of those noticed in our last address, but private letters from Surat mention that the army is arrived in the neighbourhood of Broach in its march towards Poona, that our forces have had another engagement with the Ministerial army in which the latter were again worsted, and that the affairs of the confederacy owing to their want of money and to dissensions amongst themselves are in a very declining way.

The Maráthas lately made an attempt on Salsette by landing about 3,500 men from Bassein, but they were quickly driven off by a detachment only from the Madras battalion of sepoys, with very considerable loss on their side, while on ours we had only one sepoy killed and two or three wounded.

We are, &c.,

WILLIAM HORNBY,

AND MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE.

Bombay Castle, 24th June 1775.

*Letter from the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL, Calcutta, to the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL, Bombay.*

GENTLEMEN,—We have not been favoured with any letters from you or your Select Committee respecting the political affairs of your Presidency since your letter dated the 31st of





December, nor have we received any authentic advices of the late occurrences in your parts, but from private letters and other intelligence all concurring in the same points; we understand you have entered in an offensive treaty with Rághoba, and have sent a considerable force to his assistance which has actually taken the field; this last is confirmed by letters received by the Commander-in-Chief with returns of the force actually sent. Embarrassed and perplexed with these reports, the truth of which we cannot doubt, and ignorant of the force of your enemies, and of the immediate plan of your operations, we are obliged to remain inactive in circumstances which may possibly require our utmost exertion for your support and relief.

In this situation your silence becomes truly astonishing, but under the want of precise and authentic information from yourselves, we are obliged to suspend our final judgment of your proceedings, and in the meantime protest against all the consequences of any hostile measures taken, or offensive engagements entered into by you without our consent. We consider them as directly contradictory to the provisions made in the Act of Parliament for uniting the several Presidencies under the political superintendence of this Government, and equally contrary to the common principles of prudence and policy; since the partial resolutions and operations of a single Presidency may eventually involve all the Company's settlements in a general war, without any previous concert, or a general plan for conducting it.

Our letter of the 3rd February last contained very explicit orders on these heads and we expect you will be full and circumstantial in your answer to it, and in explaining the motives for your late conduct.

*Fort William, 25th May 1775.*

We are, &c.,

WARREN HASTINGS.

J. CLAVERING.

G. MONSON.

R. BARWELL.

P. FRANCIS.

GENTLEMEN,—We have received your letter of the 31st of March with the copy of your treaty with Rághoba enclosed and the advice of your subsequent operations.

Our duty imposes upon us the painful necessity of declaring that we totally condemn the measure which you have adopted, that we hold the treaty which you have entered into with Rághoba invalid, and the war which you have entered into against the Marátha State impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized and unjust; both are expressly contrary to the late Act of Parliament. You have imposed on yourselves the charge of conquering the whole Marátha empire for a man who appears incapable of affording you any effectual assistance in it; the plan which you have formed, instead of aiming at a decisive conquest, portends an indefinite scene of troubles without an adequate force, without money or certain resources to extricate you from him, nor have you the plea either of injury sustained from the party which you have made your enemy, or of any prior obligation to defend the man whose cause you have espoused.

We solemnly protest against you for all the consequences, and peremptorily require you to withdraw the Company's forces to your own garrison in whatsoever state your affairs may be, unless their safety may be endangered by an instant retreat. We leave the means of effecting this to you, but shall expect your punctual compliance with our commands. You have neither





informed us for what purpose the detachment was sent to a distance so remote from the obvious scenes of its operations as Cambay, nor what plan you have concerted for their subsequent progress. You have not informed us of the situation of the places assigned you for paying the subsidy, in whose possession they were, from whom they were to be either peaceably surrendered, or taken by force, nor of the amount of the revenue of the ceded island; all which points we consider to be necessary for our information.

In the dangerous consequences which we apprehend from the state in which you have placed the Company's affairs in your quarter, we do not advert to any part of your conduct which respects merely the formal line of your conduct. Yet as this Government has been charged by a solemn Act of Legislature itself with the general interest of the Company in India, and armed with controlling powers over the other Presidencies, we cannot pass by without noticing the entire disregard which you appear to have shown to our authority. For the past we content ourselves with leaving to you the consequences of your own act, but for the future in cases of like inattention on your part, after the peremptory injunctions we have found it necessary to prescribe for your conduct, we shall deem ourselves accountable, if we neglect to exercise the authority vested in us by Act of Parliament for supporting the authority committed to us.

In order that nothing may be omitted on our parts to extricate you from any difficulty to which your immediately relinquishing your engagement with Rághoba may expose you, it is our intention to open a negotiation with the ruling party of the Marátha State at Poona as soon as possible. We shall advise you of the measures we take for this purpose; in the meantime we direct you to receive and encourage any pacific overtures that may be proposed to you, making the instant cessation of your arms and a continuance of your possession of the island of Sálsette and Bassein, your first object, but you are not to aim at more extensive acquisitions, nor conclude any definitive treaty without our approbation.

*Fort William, }  
31st May 1775. }*

We are, &c.,

WARREN HASTINGS.  
JOHN CLAVERING.  
GEORGE MONSON.  
RICHARD BARWELL.  
PHILIP FRANCIS.

To

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE.

Governor General, and Council,  
at Fort William.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—We addressed you in duplicate under the 6th instant, and have since received the duplicate of your letter of the 31st May, the contents whereof give us great concern, not only because the interest of our hon'ble employers we apprehend must be very materially affected by the measures you have thought proper to adopt for bringing about a general pacification, and the due right of this Government affected in a manner we fear scarcely to be retrieved by the letter to Sakharam Bápu at Poona, but also because your Honour and Council seem to think we had been guilty of a premeditated and intentional disrespect to the power entrusted by the Legislature to





your Government, which we take this early opportunity to assure you was by no means the case ; but the negotiation for the treaty with Rághoba began before your administration commenced, and as we thereby secured to the Company the possession of Sálsette, and the right to Bassein and the parganas near to Surat, all of which our hon'ble employers have repeatedly enjoined us to procure for them ; and as the revenues of these parganas can be collected without much trouble or expense, and is so considerable as to amount, including Sálsette and Bassein, near 20 lákhs of rupees per annum, which will be the means of enabling this Presidency to support itself, without being longer a burthen to yours, of which the late administration frequently complained ; and as it was moreover absolutely requisite for us to determine finally whether we would conclude the treaty or whether we would reject it ; for any delay in the then situation of Rághoba's affairs would, we judge, have been the same as if we had determined to remain inactive. We say, for all these cogent reasons, we thought that we were not precluded by the late Act of Parliament from pursuing the measures we did.

Another weighty consideration also impelled us to this measure. We had been induced from the motives we fully stated to your Honour and Council in our address of the 31st December last, to attack and reduce Sálsette, and we think that the welfare of this Presidency entirely depended on our preventing that island from again falling into the hands of Portuguese ; in this situation, we are of opinion, policy absolutely required that we should side with one of the contending parties in the Marátha State, that it might be reconciled to our motives for that attack, and to our continuing in possession of that island. This necessity being allowed, justice doubtless required that we should take part with Rághoba, the Peshwa, and in duty to our employers we made this decision as advantageous to them as possible, as we think is evident from the treaty.

We are induced to hope from these reasons that your Honour and Council will not continue to consider our treaty as invalid, nor the war, which was a consequence of it, either unauthorized, impolitic or unjust ; that it was not dangerous the event of it hitherto has shown ; but even had it been so in some degree, we flatter ourselves your Honour and Council will admit that something might have been risked for the great probability we had of acquiring a revenue of nearly £250,000 sterling per annum for the future necessary support of this Presidency, and this by a means that equity, as we conceive, allowing for circumstances cannot censure ; for though we have not the plea of injury sustained from the Poona party, yet it must be observed that their party is composed of the traitorous and rebellious subject of Rághoba who by his large offers for our assistance, his just pretensions, and the necessity for our taking a part for the reasons above assigned, induced us to espouse his cause and to hope for your Honour and Council's concurrence.

We are convinced that were you fully acquainted with the equitable and undeniable pretensions of Rághoba to the dignity of Peshwa, of which he has been near two years in possession (as you please to observe on reference to a letter from Mr. Mostyn, Resident to the Darbár, to the late Select Committee at your Presidency under date 29th November 1773) ; and that a large party of the Marátha Empire at present acknowledge him such was the fair prospect we had of shortly fixing him therein ; and also of the distracted state of the affairs of the rebellious confederacy, without an adequate army or effectual means to procure one ; together with the detriment that must accrue to the Company and the disgrace to this Presidency by the orders you have given for annulling our treaty and in consequence deserting Rághoba ; we say that had your Honour and Council been fully apprised respecting all these points, we cannot but flatter ourselves, that your orders would have been very different, or at least that you would have left to us to have carried into execution your resolution for a general pacification, which we are satisfied might have been done with honor and credit, had you not, at the same time that you preemp-





torily required us to withdraw our forces, acquainted the Ministerial party so expressly of your having done so and of your condemnation of our conduct.

This intelligence we received from Poona in a letter to the President as per copy enclosed, and at the same time we received a copy of one from Governor Hastings to Sakháram Bápu. Both were delivered by an Agent from that party which had been here some time to solicit peace, but the indisposition of this Agent, and of our President afterwards, prevented his proposals being received till after he had got this letter; and he will now make no other overtures than that on condition of delivering up Rághoba and the island of Sálsette, and of relinquishing our pretensions to Bassein and all other places ceded by treaty, our expenses may be defrayed; though we are satisfied that those he came with were widely different indeed. He also assures us, as well as the letter from Poona, that orders are gone to their army to cease all hostilities, which orders the Agent declares he understands extend to Rághoba, his officers and adherents. In obedience to your positive injunctions we have also sent directions to our Commanding Officer to cease from all acts of hostility, and as soon as the season will possibly admit, our forces will be withdrawn into our own garrisons.

But in order, more fully than can be done by letter at so great a distance, to represent to your Honour and Council the motives for all our proceedings, the present situation of affairs, with the danger and discredit that must attend our treaty being cancelled and Rághoba deserted, as well as to represent to you at large the particular interest of this Presidency, we have deputed to your Honour and Council Mr. William Taylor, who from being long a member of our Board and of the Select Committee, is sufficiently qualified to give your Honour and Council every requisite information; and we earnestly request that you will attend to the representations that he may make you on the subject in question, and on all others dependent on it; when we hope that on further consideration you may be induced to revoke your present orders, to confirm our treaty and to permit us to carry Rághoba to Poona in the manner first proposed; for we can assure your Honour and Council that with your countenance and support we are firmly of opinion, no ill consequences can result therefrom, but on the contrary that great and permanent advantages must be secured to the Company thereby. We hope also that you will do us the justice to believe that it is our wish and intention at all times to pay the most implicit obedience to your authority; we would willingly take upon ourselves the consequences of the war for which your Honour and Council by your protest declare we are responsible, provided we have your support and are allowed to conduct it to its issue.

For any other requisite information as well with regard to the places ceded by treaty, as for those granted for the subsidy, also for the situation of the parganas that have been since made over to the Company by Rághoba and by Fattesing, for mediating the reconciliation of the latter with the former, likewise for the Company's general interest at this Presidency in its present situation, permit us to refer your Honour and Council to Mr. Taylor. Assuring that we remain,

Your, &c.,  
WILLIAM HORNBY.

*Bombay Castle, 23rd August 1775.*

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—We are favoured with your despatch of the 1st of last month, which contained amongst others some advices of the operations of the army of Rághoba and of yours with them.

We find these accounts so incomplete and unsatisfactory that we are still at a loss to form a true idea of these affairs from them. The only part of Colonel Keating's correspondence



which you have communicated to us is a broken extract from a letter containing a relation of his transaction beginning in the middle of an engagement, from which we are unable to judge of his intention before the battle, or of the operations he proposed in consequence of it. We only know that he has arrived near the river Máhi, and had persuaded Rághoba to cross it before the rains, which appears to us rather contrary to your information of his being in full march towards Poona. It should rather seem he meant to cross the river with an intent to put his army in quarters during the rains.

We therefore think it necessary to require copy of your correspondence with Colonel Keating from the beginning of the campaign, and that you continue to furnish us with copy of what may pass between you in future.

We cannot avoid observing that notwithstanding our instructions of the 8th of March last and the peremptory style in which we found it necessary to convey them, you have still thought it proper to send Mr. Mostyn as Public Minister to Rághoba's camp, without informing us of the design or object of his mission, or the measures which you have taken for a compliance with those instructions, although it appears that ten days had elapsed from the receipt of them till the date of your letter now before us. Neither have you informed us what supply you have received or expect from Rághoba for maintaining the burthen of the war you have entered into in his behalf. In a word we are still as much in the dark as we were on the first intelligence of your projected campaign, notwithstanding our earnest entreaties to be furnished with every information to enable us to judge what aid our duty might make it incumbent upon us to render you. We now desire, in addition to the other lights we have required from you, that you send us a copy of your instructions to Mr. Mostyn, and that you give orders to him to transmit to us by every opportunity successive intelligence of the state of affairs in Rághoba's army while he continues there, and of all other affairs relating to his mission and the state of the present war with the Maráthás as may fall under his notice.

From what we have said you will perceive that we can in no shape approve of your late transactions. It is painful to us to repeat remonstrances; we shall leave you to answer for this conduct to the Court of Directors; in the meantime while we lie in the uncertainty of which we complain, we cannot think ourselves justified in sending you the supplies you require; we remain in hopes that the letter you promise us in answer to ours of the 8th March will be more explicit, and both enable us to afford you our aid and point out the objects which are to be obtained by it.

We have already advised you of our intention to open a negotiation with the ruling party at Poona for the re-establishment of peace with the Maráthás. We also have written to Sakháram Bápu at the same time on that subject, acquainting him of our desire to send a person to treat with him there. We have since appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Upton to this charge, who is now ready to set out and will wait at Kálpi on the river Jamna for passports from Sakháram Bápu.

We enclose a copy of such part of his instructions as we think materially necessary for your information.

We are, Gentlemen,  
Your, &c.,

WARREN HASTINGS.  
JOHN CLAVERING.  
GEORGE MONSON.  
RICHARD BARWELL.  
PHILIP FRANCIS.

*Fort William, 10th July 1775.*



*Letter from the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL to Colonel Upton.*

SIR,—In a letter from the Governor General and Council of Bengal, dated the 10th of July, they acquainted us of their having appointed you to proceed to Poona and of the object of your mission; at the same time they transmitted an extract of such part of their instructions to you as they said was necessary for our information.

The Governor General and Council in their letter to us mention that they are much misinformed as to the then situation of affairs, and it appears by their instructions that in most points they have been able to give you discretionary orders only. In this case we think it becomes a duty we owe to our hon'ble employers to offer you every information that you can possibly want, to enable you to discharge the high commission with which you are entrusted, and as we learn by some of the Ministerial Agents here of your arrival at Kálpi on the river Jamna from whence they shortly expected you at Poona, and as we are fully satisfied that you will receive very partial accounts from the Ministerial Confederacy of the real state and present situation of the affairs of Raghunáthráv and of the Company, so far as they are connected, we will therefore most readily give you, on your signifying your desire for it, every information that you can wish for relative to both, either by letter, or by deputing a gentleman to you from hence to Poona, properly instructed and fully acquainted with the whole, should you prefer. We request that you will procure the necessary passports for him, and on your sending them hither he shall proceed immediately. At any rate we wish you would take no material step in the present business entrusted to you relative to this Presidency till after we may receive your reply to this letter.

In case you should prefer our only writing to you on the subject above-mentioned, it will be then necessary that you should acquaint us whether you are in possession of the Company's large or small cypher for your correspondence.

We transmit this letter in quadruplicate by different routes in hopes that it may safely reach you.

We are, &c.,  
WILLIAM HORNBY.

*Bombay Castle, 11th September 1775.*

*Letter from the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL, Bombay, to the GOVERNOR GENERAL and COUNCIL, Fort William.*

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—We had the honor to address you the 4th instant, and agreeable to what we then mentioned we shall now proceed to reply more fully to your letter dated the 10th July.

We are much concerned that you should still continue to think you have reasons to complain of our not being sufficiently full and explicit in our advices respecting our proceedings in consequence of the treaty with Raghoba, which we cannot but in a great measure attribute to your not having then received our letter of the 30th of April of which you have not acknowledged the receipt, and we flatter ourselves that all cause of complaint on this head will be entirely removed by our succeeding letters, and the information Mr. Taylor will personally give you.

In compliance with your requisitions, we now transmit a complete series of our correspondence with Lieutenant-Colonel Keating, beginning with the instructions given him on his





first proceeding with our troops to join Rághoba, and we shall not fail regularly to transmit copies of all letters that may in future pass between us. We also enclose a copy of the instructions we had prepared for Mr. Mostyn, by which your Honour and Council will perceive that the objects of his intended mission were only to press Rághoba to march with all possible expedition towards Poona, to hasten the accomplishment of some points of the treaty, and to relieve the Commanding Officer from all charge of business with the Darbár and negotiation with the country powers. The treaty with Rághoba had been executed long before our determination for sending Mr. Mostyn to the army, and we did not conceive this measure to be in the least repugnant to the directions contained in your letter of the 8th of March, being solely intended to hasten the conclusion of the war which had been already begun. Mr. Mostyn, however, was prevented from proceeding to join the army by the unusual severity of the monsoon, and this design was afterwards entirely dropped upon the receipt of your letter dated the 31st of May.

We most sincerely regret the resolution your Honour and Council have taken to send Lieutenant-Colonel Upton to treat with Sakháram Bápu at Poona without waiting for further advices from us. We did entertain hopes, that we should have convinced your Honour of the justice of Rághoba's pretensions to the Peshwáship, and that we should have met with your support and assistance in the prosecution of the war, when we did not doubt, but in the course of next campaign, we should have conducted Rághoba to Poona and fulfilled our engagements with him. These hopes, we now fear, are not only defeated by this measure, but the dignity and consequence of this Presidency amongst the neighbouring powers very sensibly injured. We cannot think we were unreasonable in our expectations, that a negotiation in which the interests of this Presidency were so materially concerned, should have been carried on in concert with us, and which indeed we concluded to be your intention from the tenor of the Governor General's letter to Sakháram Bápu; but when we advert to the extract you have favoured us with from Colonel Upton's instructions, we find him vested with the most extensive powers, and not the least reference to be made to us even for advice or information, the want of which is avowed in these very instructions, and which from the vicinity of Bombay to Poona we could convey to him in two days. Notwithstanding this we thought it our duty to afford Colonel Upton every information we could give to assist him in the execution of his important Commission, being satisfied that he would only receive very partial accounts at Poona both of Rághoba and affairs in general, and we at first proposed to send a gentleman fully instructed to meet him there to confer with him respecting the interests of this Presidency so far as you have committed them to his charge; but not knowing whether this step might be agreeable to your Honour and Council we despatched a letter to him by different routes, a copy of which is enclosed, wherein we made him this proposal, or that if he preferred information by letter, we offered to give him, the most full and satisfactory advice on every point he might wish to be informed of. We have not yet received an answer to this letter, or any advice of the Colonel's arrival at Poona, though we heard so long ago as the 9th ultimo that he arrived at Kálpi on the river Jamna.

The letter from Colonel Keating, dated the 30th August, will show you in what manner Rághoba received the news of your Honour and Council's determination to open a negotiation with the Ministry, and of your positive orders for withdrawing our forces from the army, and a cessation of hostilities taking place. His subsequent letter, dated the 2nd of September, will apprise you of the negotiation; but in the meantime he demands very pertinently from what source he is to supply his exigencies for money until the conclusion of this important adjustment, which must necessarily take up some months, and then makes the following proposals which we intend to communicate to Colonel Upton when we hear of his





## THE FIRST MARÁTHA WAR.

arrival at Poona. And we beg leave strongly to recommend to your Honour and Council to obtain them for him, as being in our opinion extremely moderate and strictly consistent with justice.

Rághoba first proposes that half of the country, the produce of which is reserved for the maintenance of the reigning Peshwa, should be put into his immediate possession, or lest this proposal should take up too much time in the discussion, that a monthly stipend be paid him from the Sarkár of Poona for the support of himself and his adherents until some agreement may be concluded. This stipend, his Agent here proposes, should be seven lákhs of rupees per month.

He next proposes and entreats, that before you come to any decision respecting his pretensions to the Peshwáship, you will attend to every evidence that can be produced by either party, when if it should be proved to your satisfaction that a son of the late Náráyanráv does exist, let such son be appointed Peshwa; but he then as next of blood claims the office of Diván for himself until the minority of this supposed son expires, at which period he will rest satisfied with a provision independent of any employment. If on the contrary he should prove to your Honour and Council that this child, said to be the son of Náráyanráv, is a fictitious one, and which he doubts not to make evident, he in such case pleads that as the son of Bájiráv he is justly entitled to the Peshwáship of the Marátha Empire, with which if he is invested he promises instantly to fulfil the whole of his engagements with the Hon'ble Company.

We have sent directions to Colonel Keating to retire with the troops into our parganas contiguous to Surat or Broach so soon as the weather and roads will permit, and as by the agreement for the cessation of arms everything was to remain in the same state until a general pacification might be concluded, we have ordered him to give effectual protection to these parganas and to repel any hostile attempts that may be made upon them. Mr. Tayler will have acquainted your Honour and Council that we had taken possession of most of the parganas ceded to us so long ago as the month of April last.

In the course of Colonel Keating's correspondence you will observe that he has at different times obtained grants from Fattesing and Rághoba, of some other small districts contiguous to Surat and Broach. He lately obtained from the former a grant of a pargana called Sinor, producing a revenue of upwards of a lách of rupees a year, but as it lay out of the line of territory we wished to possess, and your Honour and Council had forbidden us to aim at further acquisitions, we immediately gave directions for its being restored.

We beg leave to observe in reply to a remark in your letter, dated the 10th of July, that we acquainted your Honour and Council in our letter of the 31st of March of Rághoba's having made a deposit in jewels valued at six lákhs of rupees as a security for the expenses of the war, and by the treaty appears that several districts were made over to the Company, the revenues of which were to be particularly assigned for the payment of the monthly stipend of 1,50,000 rupees; Rághoba has since paid a farther sum of two lákhs of rupees, as mentioned in Colonel Keating's letter of the 30th of August, and we had every reason to expect a most considerable sum would have been received from him in consequence of the treaty with Fattesing, who has already paid about ten of the stipulated twenty-six lákhs, and we are persuaded would have paid the whole, and that Rághoba would have found no difficulty in raising money as he advanced, had we continued to support him.

Whatever may be your determination with respect to the matters at present in agitation, we assure you we will most strictly conform to it, and we request, in the most earnest manner, that you will not continue to withhold the necessary supply of money for our expenses from an





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apprehension that we shall apply to any purpose inconsistent with your directions, and likewise that you will if possible assist us in paying off our bond debt, which unless we are confirmed in possession of the places ceded to us by the treaty we see no prospect of being able to effect ourselves.

We should have been more particular in explaining the pretensions of Rághoba to the Peshwáship had not Mr. Tayler been commissioned to give you full information on that head. He will also be able to acquaint you with any particulars you may want to know respecting Fattesing and Govindráv, the sons of Dámáji, or as they are commonly termed the Gáikawárs, the mention of whom so frequently occurs in the letters from Lieutenant-Colonel Keating. We shall only here observe that this family till lately collected a share of six-tenths of the Broach revenues in participation with us, and that it was their share we wished to obtain, and not the Mogals', as mentioned in your instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Upton. The Mogals' share devolved upon us when we reduced the town, and Fattesing having lately given us a Phirmaund for the Gáikawár's share, we are now entitled to the whole revenue of that district.

*Bombay Castle, 14th October 1775.*

We have, &c.,  
WILLIAM HORNBY.

*Letter from SAKHÁRÁM BÁPU to the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL, Bombay.*

The Hon'ble Company of England having sent two or three gentlemen of Council to Bengal, who having consulted with the Governor there, he has written two letters to this Sarkár (Sakháram Bápu). This it is necessary the Governor of Bombay should be acquainted with. Therefore in the Sarkár's letter are enclosed copies of those two letters which you will present to him, and let his answer be sent to me with the news.

*Translation of a copy of a letter from the Hon'ble WARREN HASTINGS, Esq., of Bengal, to SAKHÁRÁM PANDIT.*

I am sure you have a full power over the Marátha Government. It is therefore right that I should write you about a dispute that arose between the English Company and your Sarkár. I heard by the Governor in Council of Bombay that they have joined with Raghunáthráv and sent a large army to get him placed in the Government of Peshwa. This conduct is against the Company's order, because they have ordered all officers in India not to make any war nor enter into any dispute. My employer, the King of England, has directed that all the Company's Governors in India should obtain mine and my Council's permission as King's Governor and Council of Bengal either to make a war or peace; we have therefore sent an order to the Governor and Council of Bombay to recall the army that they have sent to the assistance of the said Raghunáthráv, and not to meddle with any Marátha officer unless they be obliged to do it for their self-preservation. I have an intention to send a trusty, wise and deserving man to Poona, that place being the capital city of the Peshwa's Government and is near to Bombay, to settle the dispute that arose between the Government of Bombay and the Maráthás and to conclude a lasting friendship; but I will defer sending the aforesaid man till such time as I may receive your answer and know what you want, but you will in the meantime order all your officers positively to suspend a war with the English, in doing which no hindrance will come between the settlement of peace. The Company having recommended me the care of their affairs, and in order to strengthen and renew a friendship with the Maráthás I write you this. I have heard of your wisdom and capacity from everywhere, therefore trust in your person that you will not fail to get the business done through your interest. If the business is not done agreeable to mine as well as your intentions, we shall both be blamed for the same.





## THE FIRST MARÁTHA WAR.

*Letter from the PRESIDENT and COUNCIL to Lieutenant-Colonel KEATING.*

SIR,—We direct that as soon as the weather and road will permit, you return with the forces under your command and with all the guns and stores into either the Broach or Surat parganas dependant on the Company, as may be most convenient. Acquaint Rághoba it is our advice that he and such a large part of his army as he may be able to keep together and to provide for should continue with you till the embarkation of the troops or till we may be acquainted with the final Resolution of the Governor General and Council respecting the matter at present depending.

Your letters of the 30th July and 6th ultimo have been duly received.

We can by no means comply with your desire, and that of the officers of the army at present under your command, by consenting to an allowance of double batta, as it would not only be a most expensive and dangerous precedent for the future, but the orders of our hon'ble employers are express against.

Captain Farre's request to be allowed batta as Major is very unreasonable. The answer you gave him was a very proper one.

We are, &c.,  
WILLIAM HORNBY.

*Bombay Castle, 5th September 1775.*

FROM

WILLIAM TAYLOR;

TO

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, AND COUNCIL,

FORT WILLIAM.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—By the "Good will" I acquainted you with my arrival here the 30th ultimo. On the 6th instant I received notice from the Secretary to attend the Governor General and Council on Monday the 9th for taking into consideration the business on which I had been deputed from you.

Deeming it necessary to give them the fullest and most perfect information of every circumstance in the least relative to the primary objects of my deputation, I had previously stated at large the nature of the office of Peshwa, the origin of their independant power, the rise and progress of the late divisions in the Poona Government to the time of Rághoba's application to us, the state of the Marátha Empire and the different powers connected with it to that period, the political and commercial views of the Company, the progress of the war, the offers of the Nizám evinced on one hand how much the honor and good faith of the nation, the interests of the Company, the dignity of your Government, were concerned in the strict adherence to our engagements with the Peshwa, and on the other the disadvantage, danger and disgrace, that would attend the abandoning of them: earnestly conjuring them to warrant and assist you to prosecute your original plan; and as a previous measure instantly to revoke their orders for withdrawing our army from Rághoba.

These representations I delivered in the form of an address, which was duly perused, and sundry questions put to me; but it is with infinite concern I must acquaint you, that there appears not the least hope of persuading this Government to alter their former resolutions, for notwithstanding all I had to urge, they wrote me in answer, that after duly considering the re-





presentations I had been pleased to make to them, as well as the several informations which I had communicated respecting the nature, motives and objects of your engagements with Rághoba, and the present state of the Marátha Government at Poona, they had for the present to acquaint me that they were confirmed in their opinion of the expediency of the Company's troops being recalled from the service of Rághoba into their own garrisons. Their orders for this purpose would therefore remain in force. But as I seemed to understand their directions implied the recall of the troops to Bombay, they thought it necessary to explain their meaning to have been, that it should remain at your option to withdraw them to such of your garrisons, and distribute them as you might see fit, of the protection of the Company's possessions including Sálsette.

The words Company's possessions appearing to me indefinite I requested it might be explained, whether they meant to include by them such of the several districts ceded to us by the Peshwa and by Fattesing Gáikawár as are in our possession, or whether they meant to confine them only to Sálsette and the territories belonging to the Company previous to the commencement of our engagements with the Peshwa, to which they returned me for answer that their meaning by the Company's possessions was the territories possessed by the Company previous to the date of the treaty with Rághoba, and that they added including Sálsette, because you had taken possession of it before that period.

You have been advised of Colonel Upton's being deputed from this Government to the Poona Darbár, in order to settle a treaty with the Maráthás. I yesterday received a copy of his instructions, and instantly remonstrated in the strongest manner against this measure desiring his recall, but have not yet received an answer. By the "Terrible," which I have spared at the request of this Government, to convey five lákhs of rupees for Bombay to Sir Edward Hughes at Trinconomali, I will transmit copies of every paper that has passed. In the interim I remain with respect.

Hon'ble Sir, &c.,  
WILLIAM TAYLOR.

*Calcutta, 13th October 1775.*

To

THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS, ESQUIRE,

Governor General, and Council,

Calcutta.

HON'BLE SIR AND GENTLEMEN,—The Hon'ble the President and Council of Bombay having deputed me to represent to your Honour and Council the motives of their proceedings in their engagements with the Peshwa Raghunáthráv Báláji, the situation of the affairs there, the danger and discredit that must attend their treaty with him being utterly cancelled, the general interests of the Company at that Presidency, with other matters as mentioned in their address of the 22nd ultimo, I shall now proceed to enter as fully and clearly as I am able on the several subjects.

The better to explain them it will be necessary to advert to a period antecedent to that in which these engagements commenced; for this reason though it may at first appear foreign to my present purpose, yet I trust your Honour and Council will not deem this recapitulation an unnecessary one.





## THE FIRST MARÁTHA WAR.

In the ancient constitution of the Marátha Empire, the affairs of it were conducted under the supreme authority of the Rájá, by a Council consisting of eight persons, being the eight principal officers of the State. By the last account I have seen of this Council, it consisted of Bráhmans who were generally employed in all civil departments of the State: the command of armies and other military matters was confided to the Marátha or Rajput Caste.

The principal of these Ministers in power was the Peshwa, which literally means he who precedes the rest. The nature of his office resembles that of the Mahomedan Vazírs.

Báláji Vishvanáth, a Brahman, born in the district of Rájápur, from an inferior state in the reign of Sháhu Rájá rose by his abilities to the high office of Peshwa. By degrees he so far gained on the confidence of the Rájá as to persuade him to divest himself of all the cares of Government and resign them to him. The Sháhu Rájá accordingly invested him with all the insigns of authority and power incident to the Rájáship. All orders and every detail of Government issued immediately from the Peshwa, who was further styled by the Rájá, Pandit Pradhán or chief and elect of the Pandits. This form of Government subsists to this day. On the death of a Peshwa his successor goes to Sátára in order to be formally invested with the *sirpáv* of office by the Rájá. There is in the Poona Darbár a person nominally esteemed in some degree superior even to the Peshwa. It is the Pratinidhi, who is the delegate and immediate representative of the Rájá, and formerly his fiat was necessary to give a proper validity to all acts of Government; besides the Sháhu Rájá had also reserved to himself a considerable degree of actual force, the revenues of a large district were collected by him, with which he maintained a considerable body of troops under his own immediate command.

The Peshwa Báláji Vishvanáth had well availed himself of the indulgence of the Rájá, by creating a number of adherents, for we find his son and successor Bájiráv Ballál possessed in fact the supreme power in the Marátha Empire, as he paid little or no regard to his prince. The Rájá indeed at first possessed entire liberty of person, but whether it was that the Peshwa did it more effectually to secure his power, or that the intrigues carried on against him rendered it necessary for his own safety the Rájá was soon confined to Sátára. At his death he was succeeded by the present Rájá Rám, his adopted son, who continuing under the same restriction as his father, the Rájá, has ever since been in mere name, an image of authority in the Marátha Empire.

The conquests of Chinnáji Appa, brother to Bájiráv, first engaged the attention of the President and Council of Bombay towards the Maráthás.<sup>1</sup> By the acquisition of Sálsette and Bassein they became our neighbours; and as the Peshwa family also early turned their thoughts towards the establishment of a marine, it was foreseen that sooner or later some points of discussion must arise which might lead to disputes. It was therefore thought prudent to prevent them by stating our several rights in a treaty, as the Rájá had formerly ceded to Bájiráv in his own right all the countries conquered from the Europeans. It was feared the attempts of his brother Chinnáji Appa might not stop at the Portuguese settlements; the President and Council seemed to think they might effectually secure themselves by an application to the Rájá, and a gentleman was therefore sent to him; but judging from the state of matters at that Court, it was justly to be feared an offer to treat immediately with the Rájá might bring down on us the resentment of the Peshwa; sundry articles of agreement were concluded with Chinnáji in behalf of his brother Bájiráv. Since that time the Rájá has never been thought of, but finding the Peshwas in absolute possession of all power we have constantly in all transactions with the Maráthás applied to and treated with them, as though they were the lawful Princes of the Empire.

<sup>1</sup> Vide the English Embassy to the Maráthás in 1739, page 67.



## THE FIRST MARÁTHA WAR.

The wisdom and policy of Bájiráv firmly established in his family the power they had usurped, and accordingly on his demise he was peaceably succeeded in the Peshwáship by his eldest son Báláji Bájiráv, more generally known by the appellation of Nána, who, in the year 1761 was also regularly succeeded by his son Mádhavráv Báláji, then a minor of fourteen.

On the death of Nána, his brother Raghunáth conducted the affairs of the Marátha Government as Regent during the minority of his nephew, the young Peshwa. There is a treaty subsisting between the English and Mádhavráv formed under the administration of Rághoba. He had conducted matters during the critical situation in which the invasion of the Nizám had plunged the Maráthás, and there is no act to prove that ever he sought to embrace the opportunity of the possession of power to secure it to himself in prejudice to the rights of his nephew.

In all the civil departments of Government the Peshwas continued to employ the caste of Bráhmans. By the influence this gave them they raised immense fortunes, in order to give the security to their power which a large fortune in this country always endangers; their next steps were to create to themselves a consequence. This they sought to effect by dividing the family of the Peshwa, and occasionally siding with the party which policy directed. Hence early began those scenes of intrigues from whence spring the different factions and divisions which first disclosed themselves in the minority of Mádhavráv, and have nearly brought the power of the Peshwa to a total decline, on the ruins of which has arisen the high influence of these persons now known in the Poona Government by the appellation of the Ministers.

The wise and just administration of Rághoba would have totally defeated the views those men had formed of benefiting themselves by the minority of Mádhavráv. They therefore exerted every artifice and intrigue to deprive Rághoba of power. Gopikábái, the widow of Nána, was a woman deeply given to intrigues of every kind and her scandalous licentiousness justly attracted the reproach of one so nearly concerned in the honour of the family as her husband's brother. Hence first arose the bitter hatred of Gopikábái to Rághoba. The ministers availed themselves of this circumstance and of her influence with her young son, to breed a coldness between the uncle and nephew, which ended in a declared breach, the total deprivation of power, and at length in some degree in the confinement of Rághoba.

Their ends thus compassed in this point, they industriously adverted to the primary object to which this was only intended to lead: all favours of Government now flowed from the Ministers, and as none are granted in this country without a valuable consideration, by means of presents and peculations, these men increased their fortunes and influence to an immense degree, whilst from the withholding of the tribute by the Northern Jághirdárs, and by such other of the Pandits on various pretences, as purchased friends to protect them, the treasury of the Peshwa became almost exhausted, and as money alone commands troops, his consequence would have declined with it. But Mádhavráv as he advanced in years showed a firmness and abilities which made him dreaded and respected by every one: in the short time he governed, his wise conduct and great abilities procured him the respect of every power around him, and as he well knew the designs of the Ministers, there is no doubt had his life been longer he would have effectually restored the influence of the Peshwa, but unfortunately for it he died in November 1772 at the age of 25, leaving no children.

The gradual progress of his disorder giving him time to reflect on the consequence of his death, Mádhavráv on perceiving his end approach revolved seriously in his mind the fate and situation of his family. His brother Náráyanráv who was to succeed him he knew to be a weak hasty young man, easily swayed by any counsel and particularly under the influence of his mother Gopikábái whose deadly hatred to Rághoba he was also well apprised of. He was sensible





of the ambitious and independent views of several of the leading Ministers which if not well counteracted must in time wrest from his family the power, and perhaps the office of Peshwa. In this dilemma nothing better presented itself than to repose a confidence in Rághoba. It was true that Rághoba had lately made some secret steps towards liberty and an accession of power, but reflecting on the appearance of his own approaching end, and knowing the influence that would guide his brother's actions Rághoba's attempt appeared to Mádhavráv only a prudent act of self-preservation. He therefore called them to him, explained his views, remembered them of their ancestors, and joining their hands conjured Rághoba to protect the young man, advised Náráyanráv to confide in their uncle, and never to listen to the insinuations of their mother Gopikábái, whose deadly hatred and revenge he himself had experienced would stop at nothing to be gratified.

For a short time after the decease of his brother, Náráyanráv carried it fair to his uncle. It was settled that all business should be conducted by Rághoba as Náib, subject to the control of Náráyanráv, and accordingly when the latter was invested by the Rája with the *Sirpáv* of Peshwáship, he confirmed on the former that of Náib. This harmony was however soon interrupted by the intrigues of the Ministers, but especially by the ascendancy of Gopikábái over her son.

Mádhavráv had advised his brother chiefly to regard the counsels of Sakhárám Bápu, the Diván, but it seems his inclinations rather led him to attach himself to Nána Fadnavis whose age and disposition was better suited to his own. Hence arose two parties in the Ministry. His confidants in the interest of Gopikábái had instilled into him jealousies of his uncle. The hatred of this singular and enterprising woman had received an additional force from his adoption of Amrutráv, a young lad in a measure connected with Mudáji; this adoption she represented as contrary to the custom of their caste while he had nephews of his own, as singularly unjust by depriving his family of the riches he might die possessed of, and impolitic as it might in time tend to deprive their race of the Peshwáship. His connection also with so powerful a chief as Mudáji Bhonsla was likewise hinted as a circumstance to prove his own ambitious designs. By these arts and insinuations the good counsels of his late brother were entirely effaced from the mind of the young Peshwa. He deprived his uncle of all powers, then made him a sort of prisoner at large, and on the pretence of Rághoba's concerting a plan with a Náik of Hyder Alli for his escape, he on the 11th April 1773 closely confined him to a chamber in the Darbár debarring him as well as he could of all access.

Had Náráyanráv possessed the least degree of prudence, he might have remained secure in the Peshwáship, for though by the instigation of his mother and the choice he had made of confidants he had created to himself a deadly enemy in the Diván Sakhárám Bápu, yet the influence and abilities of the Fadanavis, Nána and Moroba, and their adherents, were more than a counterpois to him. But without the least share of judgment and wholly devoted to low vices and pleasures, Náráyanráv paid not the least regard to any one; on the contrary he behaved in so senseless, imperious and disregarding a manner even to the Ministers in his own party, that they became lukewarm in his interest and in time suffered him to fall a sacrifice to the machinations of his enemies.

It is said by means of Mudáji Bhonsla the Diván Sakhárám received information of an intention to assassinate him and Rághoba, at the instigation of Gopikábái. Certain it is that this woman was well known to have been constantly advising her son to deprive him of the Divánship which was the first step to the loss of riches and perhaps of life. From this instant Sakhárám and his party set about concerting the means of deposing Náráyanráv, releasing Rághoba, and placing him in the Peshwáship.



Chiefly by means of the intervention of the Diván, Mahomed Essuf and Sumersing, two Subhedárs, were won over to execute the deed. On the 18th August 1773 at two in the afternoon they led their party of 500 men to the Darbár under pretence of being mustered; they forced the gates and put the guards to the sword. Náráyanráv apprehensive of their design ran to his uncle Rághoba begging him to take the Government but spare his life. Rághoba it seems wished to save him, as nothing more than his imprisonment was ever meant, but owing to the resentment of a slave of the family whom Náráyanráv had caused to be publicly whipped his death was determined upon. The assassins threatened instantly to destroy both if he did not loose his nephew; he then thrust him from him, and the young man soon expired at his feet.

On the death of his nephew Rághoba was instantly complimented by the Diván and other Ministers at Poona as Peshwa; and he proceeded to the discharge of that office. Nána and Moroba Fadanavis with some of their party on hearing of the late event had instantly quitted Poona, fearing they might become a sacrifice to their enemies, but Rághoba equally cognisant of the design of all the Ministers, had no particular attachment, or aversion to any of them, and therefore found means to calm the apprehensions of the Fadanavis, who returned and resumed their former offices. Every day for a time seemed to wear the appearance of peace, and Rághoba sent his son Amrutráv to Sátára to obtain from the Rája in his name the investiture of the Peshwáship, which was accordingly granted with every requisite form and solemnity. Every officer in the Marátha army then at Poona paid Rághoba the usual compliments on the occasion, and he was publicly and solemnly acknowledged by us as Peshwa in a visit especially paid him by Mr. Mostyn, a Member of the Bombay Board, appointed by the Hon'ble Company to be their Resident at Poona. Accompanied by the usual presents and the same proofs of our friendship, as had ever been usual on the accession of a new Peshwa, he made him an engagement to maintain the articles of peace and alliance entered into with his ancestor Bájiráv.

The appearance of tranquillity between Rághoba and the Ministers was of no great duration. Sensible of all their designs he could place no confidence in any of them. He had appointed no Diván, but transacted most affairs himself; it seems that in imitation of his brother the Nána's policy, he wished to form a body of troops solely dependent on himself; to effect this money was principally necessary, and as Mádhavráv just before his death had disbursed eighty lákhs of rupees in discharge of the Sarkár's debt, and the troubles during the short reign of Náráyanráv had prevented the regular receipt of the revenues, the treasury of the Peshwa was found very bare. To replenish it Rághoba seems early to have turned his thoughts towards the Karnátak, but being diffident of the troops with him, he wrote to Mudáji Bhonsla to come down and assist him, and having joined his army proceeded against the combined forces of the Nizám, commanded by Rucun-ud-Dowla and Sábáji Bhonsla.

Even those Ministers who had been most forward in establishing him in the Peshwáship never meant he should acquire the least degree of independent influence, well knowing that the first effect would be an invasion of their treasures; seeing him therefore at the head of an army leagued with Mudáji Bhonsla in a way to acquire money and of course troops of his own their apprehensions led them to confederate against him. On different pretences they left the camp, and those who remained betrayed Rághoba to the Mogals. In an action he was not only defeated, but narrowly escaped being cut off, as a party of the enemy had been allowed to advance to his tent without opposition, and dangerously wounded him before he could retreat.

Notwithstanding the late advantage over the Marátha army, the Nizám thought proper to treat with Rághoba and a peace was concluded between Rucun-ud-Dowla promising in behalf





of the Nizám to comply with Rághobá's demand of twenty lákhs of Jághír and the cession of two or three forts, but the Nizám at an interview he afterwards had with Rághoba, pleading poverty and inability to comply with what his Vazir had promised, Rághoba agreed to waive the whole demand on his engaging to assist him with a body of forces on any particular emergency. From hence Rághoba directed his steps towards Hyder, from whom he demanded the arrears of Chauth, and as a pretence to the same demand meditated on him, Rághoba wrote to Mahomed Alli, Nabáb of Arcot, for assistance, knowing he should meet with a refusal. Hyder compromised matters by paying down twenty six lákhs, for which he obtained the cession of the three provinces of Madgewang, Hansutak and Chivdinrug.

Having thus settled with Hyder, Rághoba then declared his intention of marching into the Karnátak in hopes to get from Mahomed Alli a sum of money as arrears of Chauth. The prospect of plunder attracting every desperado who could muster a horse and sword, his army was soon increased to a very considerable number, and he was in full march towards the Karnátak when his attention was diverted to another quarter.

Justly apprehensive of Rághobá's acquiring sufficient force to be wholly independent of them, the Ministers, while they had it in their power, were determined to prevent him; accordingly the two parties united, and a confederacy was formed under the name of the Panch Bhái or five brothers, five principal persons being the leaders of it. Their intention was to have seized Rághoba and confined him, to have carried on the Government in the name of Gangábái, Náráyanráv's widow, till the birth of the child. She was then industriously reported to be pregnant, whose issue, if a boy, was to be proclaimed Peshwa. In the month of February 1774 a party of them seized Gangábái and Párvatibái, the wife of Sadoba, and carried them to the fort of Purandhar. The better to secure, it is supposed, a male child somehow, five Bráhma women in the same state as the widow of Náráyanráv were said to have accompanied her, every person suspected to be in the interest of Rághoba was guarded, and the confederates immediately set about collecting troops to support this declared rebellion against the Peshwa.

Fortunately for Rághoba, he received the news of this confederacy a few hours before the ministerialists had advised the partisans in his camp of their design, and he retired to Gutti, a fort under the command of Morárráv Gopálráv, a Marátha Chief of high influence. The Ministers now imagined his ruin certain, as Morárráv had always inclined to their party, but they were mistaken by his declaring for, and openly joining Rághoba. As the impolitic avarice of the Bráhmans had clearly evinced their intentions to avail themselves of their present possession of power to call on the Marátha Chiefs for their arrears, whenever a fortunate event gave them hopes of success, many Marátha Chiefs quitted their party and joined Rághoba, which enabled him to face the ministerial army, and by stratagem in the month of March he gained a complete victory, taking prisoner Trimbakráv Máma, the Commander-in-Chief, and one of their most respectable partisans.

This unlooked for event threw the confederates at Purandhar into the utmost consternation; they hourly expected to be surrounded by the victorious army of Rághoba. In this dilemma they had once thought of releasing the Rája at Sátára and restoring the ancient Government in order to gain over the Marátha Chiefs; but justly dreading the evils they might bring on themselves, in revenge for the usurpations of their caste, they dropped all thoughts of this expedient, and had recourse to that of publishing the birth of a son to Gangábái, the widow of Náráyanráv. This child they immediately acknowledged as lawful Peshwa. The partisans of Rághoba declared it to be a fraud, and indeed the general report at this time, the certain circumstances of the pregnant women who accompanied Gangábái to Purandhar, the utility of it to the ministerial cause, inclined many then to doubt the reality of this child, and



the information since obtained by the Resident at Poona, the caution of the Ministers to conceal Gangābāi by surrounding her house with a strong wooden fence, together with the manner in which the Nizām treats this reputed child in his late proposals for pacific measures, give much room to doubt the authenticity of the birth of Mádhavráv Náráyan.

The causes of the subsequent retreat of Rághoba to the country of Holkar, his junction with Holkar and Sindia, together with all his transactions and those of the different parties concerned in the confederacy against him till the period of his crossing the Tápti and his march towards Poona, I find, are fully explained in the letters from Mr. Mostyn, the Resident there, to the late Government at Calcutta from April to November 1774, and to them I therefore beg leave to refer you for every necessary information during that time.

From the divided state of the Ministerial party, the doubtful mien of those they deemed their allies, and the respectable force of Rághoba, his success almost seemed infallible. The better to secure it, he, however, in the month of August, made overtures through his Vakil to the Government of Bombay for a body of troops to assist him; his offers were then such as could not be accepted consistently with the plan laid down to them by the Hon'ble Company as the grand object of every military and political engagement, which they were unremittingly to pursue, and constantly to watch every opening afforded by the political state of affairs to obtain. He could not be brought to cede either Sálsette or Bassein; exclusive that the Bráhmans have ever shown singular attention to depress every growing power in the west of their dominions, and have always beheld with particular jealousy the advancement of the English there, a point of honour is concerned in the preservation of these territories; it is the family property of the Peshwá acquired by their famous ancestor Chinnáji Appá, and the only forts and countries that were conquered by natives of Hindústán from the Europeans.

It is not well known whether he had any just cause to suspect them or whether it was only an artifice of the Ministers, very usual in this country, but it is said Rághoba intercepted letters to Holkar and Sindia, wherein they appeared to be bargaining for his destruction. Alarmed at this he found means to quit their army, gave out that he was flying to Delhi but turned off at Indur and joined Govindráv Gaikawár, then before Baroda, who agreed to assist him with all his force. Their combined army was then said to consist of forty thousand men.

Holkar and Sindia deeming Rághobá's affairs desperate by his late desertion, thought best to enter seriously into terms with the Ministers. A new confederacy was then formed consisting of twelve persons, partly Bráhman Ministers and Marátha Chiefs, under the denomination of the Bára Bhái or twelve brothers. The acknowledgment of Mádhavráv Náráyan, for whom they had obtained from the Rája the *Sirpáv* of Peshwa, and the total exclusion of Rághoba from all share in the Government was the basis of their agreements; their private stipulations were not known.

To form the better judgment of the force and expectations of the two parties, it may not be amiss to take a slight view of the state of affairs in the Marátha Empire at this period, and of the States around so far as they have any relation with them.

The Bhonsla is by far the most formidable of the Marátha Chiefs, both by the extent of his dominions and the goodness and number of his troops. The late Jánoji Bhonsla having no children, had adopted his nephew Rághoji, the son of his younger brother Mudáji Bhonsla. This occasioned a warm dispute between the surviving brothers Sábáji and Mudáji; the former claimed the right of Government as the elder brother, and the latter as father and guardian to the adopted child. The Ministers had embraced the party of Sábáji; and Rághoba, while in power, that of Mudáji, who partly for this reason and on account of Rághobá's adoption of





Amrutráv was strongly in his interest. They at first each afforded assistance to the different causes they espoused, but at this period their own affairs, it was thought, would fully engage their attention and compel them to remain neutral.

The Gáikawár, a Marátha family, possessed the whole of the Gujarát country down to Daman. It was reduced from the Mogals by Piláji, grandfather of the present Gáikawár, and was held for some time independent of the Poona Darbár, but in the Government of Nána they compelled Dámáji, the son of Piláji, to yield them several places, part of the revenues, and to furnish a certain quota of troopers when wanted. The whole of the revenue is estimated at about 80 lákhs of rupees, and the Gáikawárs generally maintain a force of between twenty and thirty thousand horse. During the late disturbances at Poona this family had been prevented from taking any active part by their own intestine divisions. On the one hand Fattesing was in possession of the Government by orders from Poona, in the time of Mádhavráv having obtained it by high bribes to the Ministers. On the other hand, Rághoba, on his accession, had granted this Government to Govindráv, the brother of Fattesing, who after various successes in the field, was then besieging his brother in his capital city of Baroda.

The two northern Jágírdárs, Tukoji Holkar and Mahádji Sindia, had indeed entered into the confederacy and were the great hopes and support of it; but as they had till now studiously avoided interfering with either party, from the political motive of profiting by the divisions among the Bráhmans, the longer to withhold their tribute, it was imagined they would never heartily endeavour at the total suppression of Rághoba.

Muráráv Gopáráv, an old and experienced Marátha, who possessed the Fort of Gutti with a considerable district bordering on the Nizám's country, seemed only attentive to secure himself in his Jágír, without siding with either party.

The Nizám, whose interest it especially is to keep the Poona Government divided and depressed, had essentially profited by the present feuds. He had obtained cession of forts and countries from both parties (with considerable sums of money from the Ministers) without showing the least intention effectually to assist either.

Hyder, whose interests are in respect to the Poona Government the same as those of the Nizám, was also pleased to see the division among the Bráhmans. He was employed in reducing the forts for which he had the Sanáds from Rághoba, to whom, if we may judge from his behaviour, he seemed rather to incline.

The reduction of the Rohilla had left the Company fully at peace in every part, nor was there the least appearance of any occasion for the employment of their troops in the east of Hindustán.

Such was the situation of affairs when the Peshwa Raghunáthráv applied to the President and Council of Bombay for the assistance of a body of troops to join his army, then generally allowed to consist of about 40,000 horse, in order to reduce to obedience certain of his subjects leagued in a rebellious confederacy not only to deprive him of the Peshwáship, which was his acknowledged right, but of every share of the Government of the Marátha Empire.

To form a proper judgment of the motives which guided the Government of Bombay at this juncture it will be necessary to be acquainted with the views of the Hon'ble Company in that settlement.

The safety and accessibleness of the harbour of Bombay at all seasons of the year, together with its vicinity to the Maráthás, and particularly to one of the passes through which the whole of the country above the Gháts might be supplied with the articles of England, seem chiefly to





have engaged the attention of the Company in the acquisition of this island. Their speculations were perfectly just, as woollen and the other staples of England are disposed of at Bombay and the markets which it supplies to the amount of 14 lákhs annually.

Besides this, the convenience of the harbour has secured to the English, and to those who trade under their protection, almost the exclusive trade in Indian commodities with the country of the Maráthás, as well as in the cotton with which Bengal and China is supplied, the whole bringing in an annual profit of lákhs of rupees in customs to the Company.

The influence which the Company have in the Government of Surat not only enables them in a great measure to give a considerable check to the commerce of the European nations already established there, but if well exerted, to prevent any others from interfering, a power the more valuable, as Surat is next to Bombay, the chief mart for the vend of staples, the entire monopoly of which is their great and leading commercial view on the west side of India.

For a considerable time commerce alone engaged the attention of the Company of Bombay; but the construction of the docks and the excellent timber with the number of artificers readily procurable there, gave it a consequence in a military light. Nothing more need be said of this than that the testimony of the Commanders of his Majesty's squadrons, and indeed the utter impossibility of proper repairs elsewhere, serve to evince that to the docks at Bombay and the ready assistance found there was chiefly owing our superiority at sea in this quarter of the globe last war.

Sensible of the importance of these objects and of the defenceless state in which Bombay was, the Hon'ble the Court of Directors in the year 1768 sent out Colonel Campbell to inspect the state of the fortifications, with positive orders implicitly to follow his plan, and knowing also the inadequacy of our garrisons to the defence of the place they very considerably enlarged our military establishment.

Previous to this the expense of Bombay exceeded its revenues, but this great increase they were sensible must distress the Government; therefore they meant to defray them, and furnish their investments for Europe and China. Knowing also that a territorial acquisition alone would furnish a revenue equal to the necessities of that settlement, they laid down a system for the attainment of one. This was the acquisition of Sálsette and Bassein with the Marátha share of the revenues of Surat, which they imagined would complete their views; and this, I must again repeat, they urgently and especially enjoin us to embrace every opportunity to attain, and to this alone to direct all our political and military operations, declaring it at the same time to be the utmost extent of their wishes on the west of India.

In the cessions stipulated for by the treaty with the Peshwa, the views of the Company have been completed beyond their hopes, as exclusive of the chief consideration—a revenue equal to its expenses and occasions—the commercial and military advantages of Bombay are most permanently secured to it.

On Sálsette, Karanja and Bassein, Bombay may safely depend for provisions of all kinds, and possessing Bassein and its districts we ensure to ourselves a part of the timber necessary to our marine yard, the want of which would greatly distress our works there; that were this place to fall into an enemy's hand, or any dispute with the Maráthás to subsist in the time of a war with France, the docks which are now so material would be rendered almost useless for want of this indispensable article.





In the districts ceded in the Gujarát country grows the cotton for the Bengal market, which secures to the English and those under their protection, the entire trade in this article, and of course to the Company the whole customs on it.

Exclusive of these actual advantages, we shall entirely preclude the Dutch, who have long been soliciting a settlement at Bassein, from all rivalry with the Company in the trade to the Marátha dominions; besides preventing the dangerous consequences that might attend the neighbourhood of so active and enterprising a nation, who have never been known to let slip an opportunity of extending themselves, and should they at any time embrace an opportunity to get possession of Bassein with the means they would have to distress ours, and carry on their own trade, it seems very probable that but litt<sup>l</sup> would be left to the English at Bombay. This acquisition also defeats the known and declared designs of the Portuguese and the probable views of the French, who, from former steps and their now sending so many ships to the west of India, seem to incline also to participate with us in the commerce there.

The striking advantage of these possessions will I trust be deemed worthy of the most serious regard, when it is considered that the maintenance of Bombay is necessary in the general system of the Company's affairs. From an annual loss of above £150,000 sterling, a burthen upon your Presidency, troublesome at best, but perhaps dangerous in the end by having to remit specie, and all chiefly for a local advantage till then uncertain, Bombay would become a winning settlement of near eight lákhs, which will be a difference to the Company of £250,000 annually; it would be in a state to afford certain assistance of all kinds to a squadron in time of war, secure the commerce of the west of India in the English hands, and above all frustrate the great rivals of the Company in their views of participating in our trade with the Marátha donimions, an object alone of great importance, as on this trade depends their chief vend of woollen and other staples of our native country.

Such were the great and leading motives which induced the Government of Bombay to engage with the Peshwa Raghunáthráv. It seemed the very crisis wished for by the Company, an opportunity of accomplishing the objects they had so strenuously enjoined them ever to keep in view, with honour, with justice and without the hazard of a general war with the whole Marátha Empire. With their special and repeated orders on this head before them unrepealed by the very letter which accompanied the new Act, so far from meaning a disregard to that Act, or to the power with which it vests your Honour and Council, the Government of Bombay would have deemed themselves wanting in their conception of it, to the spirit of the Legislature expressed in the words "except in such cases as when the said President and Council respectfully shall have received special orders from the said United Company" and most highly neglectful to their employers, had they so slumbered over their interests, as to let pass by, unregarded this opportunity, perhaps the only one that may ever offer again of establishing their affairs on the west of India on the footing they have so long sought to place them. To have hesitated closing with the Peshwa, would in effect have been the same as a plain refusal, for in the situation he then was, he must certainly have had recourse to other assistance; and from the respectable footing in which the late increase of their military and total change of Government has placed them, would most probably have been to the Portuguese, who would gladly have cherished a stroke of fortune, so unexpectedly co-operating in the very views to which all their late expenses and arrangements have solely tended, *viz.*, the recovery of the provinces of the North—the grand object of their interest and honour ever since the capture of them in 1739 by Chimnájí Appa; and which they would certainly have now obtained had it not been for an interference equally timely and fortunate for the Hon'ble Company.





Besides these, other strong inducements were not wanting to take the part they did; the reduction of Sálsette without the consent of either party rendered it necessary to side with one, in order to procure a degree of title to the possession, and to prevent the disagreeable alternative of either endangering the safety of the settlement by relinquishing this conquest, or sustaining at some period a general war with the combined forces of the Maráthás to maintain it.

A due attention to the safety and tranquillity of the Company's possessions in the east of Hindustán was also no small motive in these engagements. It was judged that should the success of the confederates at Poona end in the total depression of Rághoba, and once give them leisure to advert to other objects, the very first that would strike their attention would be to enrich themselves by the collection of the Chauth in the name of their Sarkár; in this all parties among the Maráthás never fail to concur. I cannot pretend to say how far the Bengal provinces might be endangered, but from the vicinity of the Karnátak there seems no doubt to their paying it a visit. They never want a pretence, and the reduction of Tanjore had given great jealousy at Poona, particularly to the Marátha Chiefs, as the Rája of Tanjore is related to their Rája. The safety and tranquillity of the Company's territories in the east would for these reasons be insured for a longer time by not suffering the ministerial confederacy to predominate. By the treaty with the Peshwa this great object is for ever accomplished as far as solemn engagements can bind, and could circumstances admit of a general assertion at this period our success in this point might be still more perfect.

Induced by these several motives the Government of Bombay concluded a treaty with the wakil of Rághoba. It was much to be wished that their resources in men and money had been more adequate to this undertaking, but trusting that the same sentiment would generally prevail of the policy and utility of their engagements, the aid of the other Presidencies was not doubted. Accordingly such troops as could possibly be spared embarked for Surat, from whence they were to proceed to form a junction with the army of Rághoba, in the manner that circumstances on their arrival might point out to be most expedient. The capture of the capital of the Gáikawár would put the officers of Govindráv in possession of the country, and direct the march towards Poona which could then be done in greater safety, as we should leave a country in alliance with us in our rear.

Haripant Fadkia, a Bráhman, one of the confederates, and Commander-in-Chief of the army, hearing of Rághoba's intention to secure our aid, judged no time was to be lost, and therefore determined if possible to attack him, while they had yet the superiority. He accordingly directed his march towards Baroda, which obliged Rághoba to raise the siege of it, and retire to the northward of the Máhi, a river near Cambay. Fattasing Gáikawár joined the confederates, and being well acquainted with the country, led their army by short routes through passes and defiles, crossed the Máhi, came unexpectedly on the army of Rághoba, and attacked the centre of it where he was. A smart action ensued, but a party of Arabs whom Rághoba had got from Govindráv declining to engage, he thought himself betrayed, quitted the field and narrowly escaped to Cambay with about 1,000 horse. His General Mankoji Phaneria retreated with the best of his troops and valuable effects to the Fort of Kapadvanj, about 50 kos from Cambay, as did Govindráv and Khanderáv.

From Cambay the Peshwa made the best of his way to Surat, where our army found him. The treaty agreed on by his Wakil was here ratified by him, and having received advice from his General and allies of their safe retreat to Kapadvanj, from whence they acquainted him that they doubted not of effecting a junction with the English troops, could they advance to Cambay, it was therefore determined our army should proceed there, as we could transport it by sea,





and were well assured of its perfect security; it accordingly arrived there the 18th March, and though the ministerial army was at first between us and our allies, yet by a concerted motion the Commander-in-Chief having brought himself in a secure post, between the enemy and the Peshwá's troops, a junction was happily formed with them the 19th April.

The combined army then consisted of 35,000 horse and foot belonging to Rághoba and Govindráv, and 2,500 English troops: the army of the confederates had suffered a very material reduction of their best troops by the desertion of Mahádji Sindia, the Jágírdár of Ujjain, owing to the impolitic avarice of the Bráhmans, who deeming Rághoba's ruin certain on his late defeat, paid no further attention to their northern friends, but sent orders to Haripant Fadkia to seize Mahádji Sindia and send him to Poona to settle his accounts. The Marátha got intelligence of this and knowing the true meaning was to fleece him, he decamped with about 12,000 of the best horse in the army under pretence that troubles in his own Jágírh called him there.

As soon as possible after the junction, Colonel Keating the Commander-in-Chief of our forces, advanced towards the enemy in order to bring them to an engagement, but though something superior, they studiously avoided it, and fled before us at different times. At the request of the Peshwa for some particular reasons, our army moved towards the North, but Poona being our final object, as the Peshwa's arrival there would bring matters to a conclusion, Colonel Keating was ordered not to be diverted from it by any object so remote from his destination but with all expedition possible to direct his march southwards.

Discouraged by the defection of so considerable a partisan as Sindia, by the doubts they were in regarding their other northern ally Holkar, by the duplicity of the Nizám's conduct, who notwithstanding their cessions had still declined advancing any troops to their assistance, by the loss of their ally Sábáji Bhonsla cut off by his brother Mudáji, by their fears of several leading men who not only refused to join the confederacy but they judged would declare openly for Rághoba as he advanced to Poona, and knowing the utter impossibility they were in to resist should the engagements of the English become general, from these several motives the Junto, at Poona, it is said, directed Haripant Fadkia at all events to risk an engagement with us, at any rate their prospects could not be worse, and a fortunate success might give a favourable turn to a negotiation which Sakhárám Bápu and Nána Fadanavis were then meditating with the President and Council at Bombay.

When the Peshwa was compelled to fly, on the unfortunate surprisal of his army, he had only brought off with him about six lákhs of rupees in jewels, the rest of his valuable effects were secured in the Fort of Dhár with his family. These six lákhs were insisted on as a pledge for his engagements with the Company; he wanted to make a loan at Surat, but owing to the uncertain state of his affairs, the shroffs did not choose to trust him, merely on his own security, and the President and Council could not in prudence engage the credit of the Company. From this want of money infinite distress succeeded; and advantages were lost by it as it is well known the hired troops of India can never be brought to engage without some prospect of immediate satisfaction. The Ministers knew this, and were therefore more desirous to come to action, before a turn to his affairs might relieve him from this distress, which they were sensible would in fact deprive him of any great benefit from his own troops, whatever their number might be.

Accordingly on the 18th of May they made dispositions to engage; accounts have already been transmitted of this action in which the confederates were defeated; and though by some unfortunate accident on our side, and the inaction of the Peshwa's troops, it was not so complete





a victory as might have been hoped for, yet it sufficed to throw their troops into utter discouragement, and they never could be brought to face us again, but suffered us quietly to pursue them through defensible passes and defiles without opposition, till on the 7th of June we came up with their rear in crossing the Narbada, killed several people, obliged them to sink their cannon in the river, and many horses, camels, &c., were afterwards found floating down with them, Haripant Fadkia having fled with the remains of the army entirely out of the Gujárať Province.

The approach of the monsoon when it would be impossible for our troops to march, forbade all thoughts of advancing further southward before the rains; not to loose any time however it was determined by the Colonel to avail himself of the remaining part of the fair season to reduce Dubhoi, a fortified place situated between Broach and Baroda, where our army could winter, and on the opening of the season be easily joined from Broach by such reinforcements and supplies as might be sent from Bombay and from thence march to reduce Baroda, should the negotiation then on foot between Fattesing and the Peshwa fail to secure us a friendly country in our rear. On the march of the army towards Poona, the reduction of Dubhoi was effected without loss, and with it concluded all our military operations in that campaign.

The engagements of Fattesing Gaikawár with the confederates seem to have been solely with the views of preventing the ravage and destruction of his country, for even at the time he joined their army he made distant overtures to Rághoba. He knew that the interest which the late cessions gave the English in the welfare of Gujárať would protect it on their side, and his junction with the ministerial army secured it on the other. As soon therefore as the retreat of Haripant Fadkia confirmed his safety in that quarter, he began to make serious overtures of accommodation to Rághoba, who from the general face of things he judged must prevail, and in that case his Government must be for ever lost to him, as the former appointment of Govindráv and his firm attachment to Rághoba left no doubt of his rival being established in the Gaikwár possessions. The better to ensure success he applied for the mediation of the English, to whom he not only gave a confirmation of the grants engaged by the Peshwa to be obtained from the Gaikawár, but further convenient cessions in perpetuity to the amount of about Rs. 1,78,000 per annum. With Rághoba he stipulated for the usual Chauth and aids due to the Poona Darbár, and what was most convenient in his present circumstances 26 lákhs to be paid in 60 days; the Peshwa having previously ratified with Govindráv, a treaty of peace and alliance was finally concluded in the month of July last.

At sea the Maráthás made at first a formidable appearance, induced by the hopes of making some rich captures. The officer at Gheria equipped a squadron consisting of—

1 Ship	...	... 46 guns	
1 do.	...	... 38 do.	2 gallivats of 9 guns.
1 do.	...	... 32 do.	8 do. from 2 to 4 besides.
2 do.	...	... 26 do.	swivels.

This formidable fleet in appearance was met on the 2nd by the "Revenge" and "Bombay Grab," under the command of Commodore John Moore. The Commodore immediately stood towards them, when their whole fleet bore away. He however singled out the Admiral's ship called the "Samsher Jang" of 46 guns, and directed the "Grab," being the best sailor, to chase. The ship stood in for the shore with a design to run her aground, but the "Grab" came up with her, and began engaging, which giving time to the Commodore to come up also, he kept up a smart fire for about two hours when she blew up, and was entirely destroyed with her Commander and most of her people.



Proper convoys being given to the trade going up and down the Malabar Coast we met with no loss whatever at sea, except a small pilot sloop which was surprised by two gallivats under the colours of the Siddhi of Rájápur, our ally, not knowing, at the time, of our being at war with the Maráthás.

As your Honour and Council have desired particular information regarding the several places ceded to us, I will conclude with the account of them at this period.

Ceded for ever by the treaty with the Peshwa :—

Sálsette with Karanja, Hog Island and Canary...	3,50,000
Bassein and its dependencies ...	4,00,000
Olpád ...	3,50,000
Jambusar ...	4,00,000
Broach, the Gáikawár share ...	3,50,000
To be paid annually from Ankleshvar ...	75,000
	<hr/> 19,25,000

Presented to the Company since, by Rághoba and Fattasing on the conclusion of the treaty between them, viz. Corial near Broach ...	50,000
Chikhli (Surat) ...	1,00,000
Variav (Surat) ...	28,000
A'mod adjoining to Broach ...	1,50,000
	<hr/> 3,28,000

Ceded for ever to the Company ...	22,53,000
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Made over by the Peshwa for the payment of the subsidy, A'mod (since entirely given up) and therefore the others remain as a pledge for the payment of the subsidy.

A'mod ...	1,50,000
A'nkleshvar, the pargana of, its Revenue ...	1,10,000
Hánsot ...	1,27,000
Nersaul ...	1,00,000
	<hr/> 4,87,000

From the southward port of Bassein to the point of Chaul, the land forms a deep bay, in which are situated the Islands of Sálsette, Bombay, Karanja, Hog Island, Elephanta and Káni. Bombay is situated about 8 miles from the continent, and forms the harbour to which it gives its name.

Sálsette lies north of Bombay, from which it is divided by a narrow channel of about half a mile in breadth; it is about 20 miles long and the same breadth on a medium. Its chief produce is rice, it is capable of much improvement, not being above two-thirds cultivated and great part of it is also breached by the sea. The fort of Thána commanding a fordable channel dividing Sálsette from the main, is about the middle of the eastern side of the island.

Karanja is a small island on the east of Bombay forming part of the eastern side of the harbour; its chief produce is also rice; it is at present worth about Rs. 6,000 per annum and is capable of improvements. Elephanta is a small island valued at about Rs. 800 per annum. Hog Island and Káni are little more than barren rocks; the latter is in the mouth of the harbour. Of all these (except Káni which was not worth reducing) we have possession and the regular sanads for them from the Peshwa.



Bassein is a peninsula formed by a large river on the north, by the sea on the west and by a large river which divides it from Sálsette and to which it gives its name, on the south a rivulet which when filled makes it an island in the time of the rains. It produces rice, many fruits and particularly fine sugarcane; and an extensive fort on the south commands the river. The district of Bassein extends to Baldapaldi northward within 8 kos of Daman including Tárápur, Máhim, Arnála and some other towns situated on small rivers flowing from the Gháts. We have the sanads for Bassein and its districts, but as we had not sufficient force to reduce them, after the departure of our troops to the northward, and as conducting the Peshwa to Poona was the great object, which was to ensure us the peaceable attainment of these places, it was not thought prudent to delay that, or diminish our force by the previous reduction of them; they are not therefore in our possession as you imagined, but still in the hands of the ministerial party.

These are all our acquisitions to the southward of Surat, forming a continued chain with Bombay of about 86 miles from north to south; two additional battalions of sepoys will I imagine be sufficient to maintain the necessary posts, which being called in, on any apprehensions from the French, will be a considerable reinforcement to the standing army of Bombay.

From Bassein to Danse and the rivers comes great part of the timber indispensably necessary for the ships. Sálsette, &c., with Bassein and its districts are only estimated at 7·2 lákhs, but under our Government they will I doubt not in a few years produce ten at least.

For all the cessions to the north stipulated by the treaty with the Peshwa we have not only the sanads, but absolute possession. The sanads for Corial, Chikhli and Variav were just received by the very last accounts, and no doubt we had possession, soon after we were in possession of Amod, of all the places assigned for payment of the subsidy.

Olpád, Variav and Chikhli, lying contiguous to Surat, I see no increase of expense will be requisite on their account, except the necessary one for collection.

The cession of the Gáikawár share of the Broach revenue is only what is called the Chauth, collected from the same towns we did, so that this is all clear profit. Jambusar is a large commercial town near a river to which it gives its name; from its vicinity to Broach very few charges will be requisite, as the same garrison which defends the territory of the one will serve for the other. Amod is a large town; its districts and that of Corial are all contiguous to Broach. From Ankleshvar when the subsidy is paid, we have only to send a person to collect annually Rs. 75,000.

Ankleshvar, the first of the parganas from which we are to reimburse ourselves for the stipulated subsidy, is between Surat and Broach. Hansot adjoins to our pargana of Olpád. Nersaul is about 40 miles to the southward of Surat, situated on a river from which a great quantity of timber is exported. As it is from the net produce of these assignments that the Company are to be paid, the necessary charges of collection will be on account of the Peshwa.

Although these cessions are not literally the Marátha share of the Surat revenues, by which is to be understood those collected by the Peshwa, yet as they generally answer the views of the Company, it was preferred accepting them for many reasons; different persons collect in many of the districts. Broach being reduced since the date of their orders, they could have no views nor interest in the districts ceded adjoining to it. But another still more forcible reason is, that in order to have completed the sum we had in view, the Peshwa must have taken from the Gáikawár dominions, and at that period it was very material to conciliate





the affections of that family, who may also be made useful allies to the Company, should you deem this a fit junction to form a system for counteracting any future designs of the Poona Darbár.

At the conclusion of the Treaty with Fattesing, the general aspect of affairs was very flattering to the hopes of Rághoba; he had already experienced that with the greatest force they could ever hope to collect, the confederates had never dared to make a bold and determined stand against our army as it then was, although for want of pay his own troops had never been brought to act with any degree of efficacy. This army would have been increased after the rains by Captain Kelly's battalion of sepoy's from Madras, which from the experience and the activity of the Commander, the attention of his officers and the excellent discipline the men were in was judged by the military gentlemen to be but little inferior in the field to Europeans. Add to this the junction of Fattesing's troops, and the effectual service that might now be expected from the Peshwá's troops, when they found him enabled to satisfy their demands for arrears, it was natural to imagine the confederate army would not dare to face us. The Gaikawár's country, extending far on the road to Poona, secured our rear and provisions to the army. With this force alone, it might not be very rash to pronounce that we should have reached our destination during the course of the ensuing campaign, had we received the requested reinforcement from Madras. It seems to me there would not have been the least doubt of it.

To increase his hopes, by the latest accounts Mudáji who by the death of his brother Sábaji now enjoyed undisturbed possession of the Bhonsla dominions, was advancing with a very respectable force to his assistance, as was also Ismaél Khán at the head of about 4,000 good horse. Appaji Ganesh then in charge of Ahmedabad, was in treaty for the surrender of it to the Peshwa, part of whose troops were gone to take possession of it, which when effected would have left him free from any enemy to the northward of the Narbada.

But above all the conduct of the Nizám at this juncture, most fortunately co-operated with other events, to give us a most perfect assurance of conducting our engagements with the Peshwa to a happy issue. It was perfectly of a piece with that policy which had attentively watched every turn in the Marátha affairs, to return what the Government had usurped from him in its prosperity, on the defeat of their army, and the bad aspect of their affairs. When the Peshwa crossed the Narbada, the confederates who would advance nothing of their own, thought to bribe the Nizám to action by the cession of the strong and important fortress of Davlatabad with Brahimpur, Assay, and some other districts formerly conquered by the Maráthás. He accordingly entered into a solemn engagement with them. They had actually evacuated Davlatabad, and were withdrawing their troops from the other cessions; in point of territory it seems he had now got all he wanted, but judging that if the English entered generally and heartily into the re-establishment of Rághoba his retaining it might be very doubtful, in order to secure himself more thoroughly, he applied to the north of Surat, to sound whether he could not compass his admission into the party of Rághoba. His terms were the confirmation of all that the Ministers had ceded to him, for which the English were to become guarantees, for this he offered to act against the Ministers with all his force consisting of 5,000 sepoy's and a train of artillery, which were to be further joined by 8,000 good horse of Mudáji Bhonsla, should the terms be accepted. Should the Nizám once be determined to act against them the confederates must lose all hopes, and there seems no reason to doubt that he would, with the guarantee of the English to secure him in the stipulated cession, as without it he would have little hopes of peaceably retaining them any longer than just during the continuance of the present divisions.

Exclusive of this application to the English, the Nizám had also sent Vakils to Rághoba with proposals of a general accommodation between all parties on the following plan. That





Rághoba was to enjoy all the honors and sufficient revenues to support the dignity of the Peshwa, but the government to be carried on in the name of his son Amrutráv, and the administration of affairs to be with Moroba Fadanavis, all places stipulated to be ceded by the Ministerial party to be confirmed to him by Rághoba, and the confederates fully pardoned and secured in the possession of their fortunes and effects; exclusive of the policy of it, which suffices to account for the conduct of the Nizám, it is imagined the death of Ruckun-ud-Dowla, who was said to be deeply bribed by the Ministers, was partly the occasion of these overtures.

Far different from this flattering situation was the state of the confederacy; they had been deserted by Mahádji Sindia and Tukoji Holkar, on whom rested their chief dependence. Narso Appa, the Governor of Poona, a man well respected, was dead, Moroba Fadanavis, a Minister of the first consideration, with several others, could not be brought to join the confederacy, and his influence was so high that they dared not molest him even in Poona. Already some of their party by no means inconsiderable had quitted it; such were Appáji Ganesh, the Governor of Ahmedabad, and Fattasing Gaikawár, to whose knowledge and influence in the Gujarát country, they are solely indebted to the success they met with previous to our junction with Rághoba. Sábáji Bhonsla, who had formerly been of great service to them, was dead. Always doubtful of the Nizám, the death of Ruckun-ud-Dowla now defeated all their hopes in that quarter. They knew the utter impossibility of resisting the united efforts of the English; add to this the jealousy entertained of the views and ambition of the confederacy made several dread their success almost as much as that of Rághoba. Such was the state of politics at Poona.

Their dependence on their army was nothing better. The Marátha Chiefs who had been brought to engage in the confederacy were given to hope for supply of cost from the Ministers, but here again the Bráhman avarice combated the general interest, for though they have large sums of their own, yet no one being perfectly assured that any particular benefit would especially accrue to himself by parting with it, constantly refused every application and referred to the treasures of the Sarkár, which being only the temporary collections were soon exhausted in subsidies to the Nizám. Haripant Fadkia foreseeing the confusion this want of money would make, absolutely made pacific overtures to the Peshwa at the head of his army when it was in its most flourishing condition; however fit the Marátha troops may be for predatory incursions, strong reasons may be assigned why they will never willingly be brought to act against an army with a well served artillery; from these reasons, and from the little prospect they had of plunder, the army of Haripant Fadkia very soon showed strong disinclination to serve, and having lost numbers of horse in the different attacks we had made on them, the men now became clamorous on their leaders for arrears of pay, who again importuned Haripant Fadkia. By the account of persons sent for intelligence and to watch his motions the Minister had sent bills of fifteen lákhs of rupees, but the shroffs had refused to answer them, from whence may justly be inferred they had not even in this situation advanced the amount. Haripant Fadkia had designed to winter to the northward in order to be at hand to watch our motions on the opening of the campaign, but his troops had absolutely refused. By the last accounts he was at Indore in full march towards Poona with between twenty and thirty thousand men, horse and foot: in his way through Tukoji Holkar's country they had violent disputes regarding some money which Fadkia demanded, but Holkar could not be induced to furnish; and under pretence that the death of Suja-ud-Dowla, and his third son being in arms, might render his presence absolutely necessary in his own Jághír, he drew off his troops from the confederacy.

Sakháram Bápu and Nána Fadanavis had sent two Vakils to treat of an accommodation, but from the indisposition of one of them, and afterwards of the Resident, they had not mentioned their offers; and though it was rather wished to secure to the Company the late cession by way of peace than of war, yet the precipitancy of dispensing with the President's negotiation,





it was thought, might have bespoken too great an eagerness on our parts, and an impolitic doubt of success in the undertaking we were then engaged.

Such, gentlemen, was the situation of the Peshwa on the receipt of your letter of the 31st May last. I leave you to judge how different from that desperate, friendless and forlorn state, you seemed to apprehend him in. Had you but been pleased to signify to the Government of Bombay alone, your pacific determinations, there is no doubt but a general accommodation might soon have been effected with honor and credit to the Company, and all the cessions and advantages secured to them, which are stipulated for in the treaty with the Peshwa, as the terms of that treaty were never understood by either party to extend further than our assistance to defeat the Ministerial Confederacy, and by conducting him to Poona to reinstate him in the Peshwáship, whether this was effected by force or negotiation the Company were equally entitled to the several benefits which induced them to form these engagements.

But much do I fear, that whatever your future resolution may be in consequence of these my representations, the letter from the Hon'ble the Governor General to Sakháram Bápu, and your positive orders to withdraw our troops from the Peshwa, will utterly destroy all the fair hopes of success, which from circumstances we had a right to conceive. Nothing can give a stronger idea of the unfavourable consequences which may probably ensue than the triumphant insolence of the confederates, as expressed in their offers subsequent to the receipt of Governor Hastings' letter. Instead of permitting us to retain Sálsette and Bassein (the last of which I have observed is not in our possession), they demand Rághoba to be delivered up to them, Sálsette and other acquisitions to be restored, for which they will deign to reimburse our charges. But a few days before I may venture safely to assert they would have been glad to have compounded for the guarantee of the English to the safety of their persons and property. It is not in their nature to conceive that a spirit of justice dictated this apparent concession; they attribute it to fear or a conscious inability of performing our engagements.

As the Ministers will take every advantage of this circumstance, and no doubt highly exaggerate it, I must confess myself at a loss to judge with precision what consequences may ensue.

The first that strikes me is that Fattesing will fly off from all his engagements, retain such part of his 26 lákhs as are not paid, and refuse the Company quiet possession of the several districts he had ceded to them; by this means the Peshwa will lose all the dependence he had in Gujarát; for having been obliged in some measure to disappoint Govindráv in his expectations on that province, in order more effectually to secure so important an object as having the whole Gáikawár family at his devotion, it is not to be doubted but that Govindráv, when he finds the Peshwa incapable of performing his late promise, will accommodate matters with his brother Fattesing and both decline any further interference.

By our desertion and that of the Gáikawár's, and probably most of his troops for want of money, the Peshwa will really find himself for a time that forlorn and abandoned man which you, gentlemen, imagined him to be. Whatever part he may then take must be detrimental to the interests of the Company in the west of India, and perhaps dangerous to their possessions in the east.

If he embraces the offers of the Nizám, and is reinstated by his means, the Company must not only forego all hopes and title to further possessions, but relinquishing Sálsette, encounter all the difficulties and inconveniences of a Marátha war, which are by no means counterbalanced by the revenues of that island. Exclusive of this, we shall lose about 12 lákhs which will become due for arrears of subsidy; and as we shall have everything to expect from the just





resentment of Rághoba, the commerce of the Company, and the English in general, will be impeded if not totally interrupted by the discouragement which will be in his power to give without coming to an open rupture.

The same consequences will ensue should he throw himself on the protection of Hyder Alli, with the additional disadvantage of increasing the power of a man who has so mortal and declared an aversion to the Company and their allies; and his open partiality to and encouragement of their declared rivals render every accession of country or connection the just object of our jealousy. Hyder has already assisted him of late with money, and no doubt would willingly undertake his cause for much smaller concessions than have been made to us: with 30,000 horse, a body of well disciplined infantry, a good artillery served by about 600 Europeans, he is lately said to have agreed for those with the Dutch; this force, joined to the allies of Rághoba, would be irresistible by the confederates, and then it rests with you, gentlemen, to determine, with the combined armies of Hyder and the Peshwa, in what safety would be our possession in the Karnátak.

His other resources are in his ancient ally Mudáji Bhonsla, in Holkar and Sindia always inclined to his party and now utterly discontented with the confederates, in Moroba Fadanavis and his party and even in Haripant Fadkia whose treatment by the Poona Junta has led him to make frequent overtures to Rághoba; all which equally deprive us of the advantage of the stipulated cessions, and are pregnant with dangers to the Hon'ble Company's settlements.

But there is another object, gentlemen, on which I would wish to fix your serious attention: it is the sacred honor of the English nation and the Company, and that firm reliance which their hitherto unviolated faith has given all the powers around on our word and engagements. It is well known that among the princes of Hindustán the violation of the most solemn compacts enters into the common course of business, therefore they are lightly formed and little relied on. Far different with the English; they have beheld them backward to engage, and making no treaties but with the most deliberate consideration; but then they have ever found them steadfast to their word, and of faith inviolable. The Maráthás have beheld us in the very zenith of their formidable power, with not half our present force, bid defiance to all their threats and boldly oppose ourselves in aid of an inconsiderable ally. After a two years' siege, we hoisted our colours on Janjira which they were on the point of reducing; they admired our good faith and respected our resolution by withdrawing their troops though not without murmurs and strong discontent.

In what light then will they regard our desertion of Rághoba, after the solemn treaty so publicly entered into with him; for whatever errors there may be in the conduct of the Government of Bombay, the application of the Nizám, of the Gaikawár, and the behaviour of all the neighbouring powers strongly bespeak their idea of the force and solemnity of the engagements of the English. They can hardly ever be brought to comprehend the nature of that limited and discretionary power, the exact explanation of which can alone clear the President and Council of Bombay in their minds of an unworthy and intended fraud in forming engagements they must know were invalid; by this, and by the public manner in which you have proclaimed their dependence, I am afraid that the requisite respect and opinion of their authority, which are necessary in the common conduct of their affairs, will be totally destroyed; and should they lose this opportunity of accomplishing the views of the Company in the west of India, we may for ever bid adieu to all hopes of it, howmuchsoever the Directors may recommend a continuance of our attention to them; for it is only by availing ourselves of such circumstances as must be embraced the moment they present themselves, that I foresee any probability of bringing matters to the



happy train they were previous to the receipt of your orders of the 31st of May. The intention of the Legislature in the clause of exception before quoted, will, I apprehend, be utterly frustrated. Who again will ever apply to us? They must be sensible the whole face of things may be changed before your consent can be obtained.

Exclusive of our breach of faith with the Peshwa, which would be rendered doubly glaring by espousing the man who was the notorious contriver and conductor of the plot against Nārāyanráv, with which the confederates now affect to stigmatize the character of Rághoba; exclusive of this there appears to me many strong objections against acknowledging the administration of Sakhárám Bápu and the Poona Junto. Sakhárám has always shown himself the determined enemy of the Company. Besides that dread and jealousy of their advancement in the west of India, common to every Marátha who has a just sense of the interests of their Government, another good reason may be assigned for it; whether it was from the poverty of his parents, or that the duties of the menial employ he was brought up in, prevented him from giving the necessary application, but unfortunately he does not possess the requisite advantages of education, scarcely being able to read or write; this necessarily, when he came to the charge of affairs, compelled him to repose a confidence in some person who could read and write. His confidant is one Visájipant Lele, a Bráhman, who having long been Supreme Governor of Konkan, in which are Sálsette and Bassein and its districts, and knowing the views of the Company, has ever opposed with all his influence, the least favourable inclination in the Darbár at Poona to comply with them. He has ever fomented disturbances and jealousies between us. Being a man of intrigue and ability he is said to have great weight with Sakhárám, and as he is from interest deeply concerned in preventing our acquisition of these places, I imagine that should we utterly abandon Rághoba, and the confederates perceive his other resources likely to fail him, whatever they may promise us at first should they at length have no fears from him, they will never acquiesce in any of the cessions made by the Peshwa. Indeed their offers before mentioned sufficiently bespeak their intentions. I leave you, gentlemen, to judge what will be the sentiment of our hon'ble employers on this occasion, after such a sacrifice of men, money honour and national faith, to become the contempt and ridicule of the power in the west of India.

Bad and disgraceful as this may be, it appears to me yet trifling to the serious consequence that may ensue to their territories in the east, on the undisturbed possession of which the very existence of the Company depends. I hold it as a political maxim that all the powers in India are interested in the continuance of the Bráhman Government: the jealousy which from various causes ever subsists between the Marátha Chiefs and the Bráhmans will prevent that union of the whole empire, which must be most formidable to the rest of India. The surprising rapidity with which they overran almost the whole dominions of the Mogal, the numerous armies they sent forth to all quarters, and the bravery of the Rajputs, under their own Rája, and led forth by Chiefs of their own caste, are sufficient circumstances to make us deprecate their reunion. Should the administration continue in the hands of the confederated Bráhmans, what with their own dominion and other circumstances, it seems to me very probable that some of the Marátha Chiefs will expel them from the Government, and either re-establish the Rája or reign themselves. Mudáji Bhonsla whose bravery, policy, and daring character are well known and dreaded, was suspected of this design. Disencumbered from his brother Sábáji, he may perhaps turn his thoughts to effecting it. Should such an event take place and the whole power of the empire be collected in one hand, what prospect of a lasting tranquillity can there be to the other States of India? The Government of a Peshwa, under proper checks and limitations of power, seems to me the only certain way to avert this evil. And should this object be deemed worthy your attention, I apprehend the present crisis to be fittest that may ever again offer for effecting it.





I have thus, gentlemen, as fully and as clearly as in my power explained to you, the rise, progress and present state of undertaking with the Peshwa Rághunáthráv. On one hand you will perceive the interests of the Company and the honor of the English nation deeply concerned in fulfilling our engagements; on the other hand you may judge of the detriment, danger and dishonour attending the utter abandoning of them. I am happy to perceive that the general manner in which the letter from the Hon'ble the Governor General to Sakhárám Bápu is worded, by implying you unacquainted with the nature of our previous acknowledgment of Rághoba as Peshwa, on which is founded the equity of our late treaty, reserves as yet unviolated the honor and good faith of the Company, and leaves you free in the choice of measures. I do therefore most solemnly entreat you in the name of the Government of Bombay to warrant and assist them to fulfil their engagements with the Peshwa, as in their opinions and in mine on the most mature consideration, this appears to be the only safe and honorable expedient at this juncture, and is perhaps the only opportunity that may ever offer again of accomplishing the several important objects before explained to you, and establishing the affairs of the Company on that system in the west of India which they have so frequently and strenuously recommended.

But whatever may be your intentions I must earnestly recommend to you, gentlemen, instantly to revoke your orders for withdrawing our army from Rághoba. This may prevent the effects to which they are immediately liable, by keeping all parties in suspense till your final determination is known; and whether you may be led to terminate this affair by arms or negotiation it is equally important to your success, and pardon me if I add, to your national reputation not to utterly abandon him. The desertion of all his allies would be the infallible consequence of ours, and his death most probably, of both, which the world judging only by appearances would lay to our charge. In a word, gentlemen, whatever judgment you may entertain of the original measures this seems to me to be no longer the proper object of your consideration. If we have unnecessarily engaged in a war, to which we had no just provocation, yet its continuance is now become necessary to our safety, for the recall of our army will not only throw us at the mercy of a perfidious enemy who will not fail to take the basest advantage of our weakness, but it will cut off all our hopes of future resources by so dreadful an example held out to those whose alliance we may hereafter find it necessary to solicit. If you suppose that we have violated former treaties, and any neutrality which the Company may have recommended to be maintained with the Marátha State by the treaty lately formed with Rághoba, permit me to say that we have the plea of those very engagements to justify us in the part we have taken with the only legal or known representative of the Marátha nation, and that having executed a new treaty with him in all its forms, we have pledged the nation's faith and honour to the performance of it. The Government of Bombay alone is responsible, and willingly takes upon itself the responsibility for the past and for the future. It is our duty to set before you the alternative which we know depends on your resolutions. On the one hand we are convinced that conquest and honor, the acquisition of revenues and an influence in the first state of India, will be the issue of the enterprise which we have happily prosecuted to this time, if we are allowed to carry it to a conclusion: on the other hand weakness, disgrace and ruin will inevitably follow the retreat of our forces, unless an accommodation shall have first taken place, by which the interests of each party shall have been secured and their safety effectually guarded against all future claims and hostilities.

I have, &c.,  
W. TAYLOR.

*Calcutta, 9th October 1775.*





THE FIRST MARÁTHA WAR.

*Letter from the GOVERNOR GENERAL and COUNCIL to W. TAYLOR.*

§ 4.—After duly considering the representations which you have been pleased to deliver to us, well as the several informations which you have communicated, respecting the nature, motives, and objects of the engagements of the Bombay Presidency with Rághoba and the present state of the Marátha Government at Poona, we have for the present to acquaint you that we are confirmed in our opinion of the expediency of the Company's troops being immediately recalled from the service of Rághoba into their own garrison. Our orders for this purpose will therefore remain in force.

But as you seemed to understand, by the proposition which you urged at taking leave of the Board, that our directions implied the recall of the Company's troops to Bombay, we think it necessary to explain our meaning to have been that it should remain at the option of the President and Council of Bombay to withdraw them into such of their garrisons, and distribute them as they might see fit for the protection of the Company's possessions including Sálsette.

We are, &c.,  
WARREN HASTINGS.  
J. CLAVERING.  
G. MONSON.  
R. BARWELL.  
P. FRANCIS.

*Fort William, 9th October 1775.*

To

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL UPTON.

SIR,—Having thought it necessary to depute you to Poona, the Capital of the Marátha State, with powers to act on behalf of this Government in settling with the Peshwa or Acting Minister of that nation, the terms for a restoration of peace with the Government of Bombay, we direct that you proceed thither with all despatch and attend to the following instructions:—

1st.—On your arrival at Poona you will deliver the credentials herewith given you unto Sakhárám Bápu, or the Peshwa, or Acting Minister for the time being, and take the first opportunity of expressing to him the regret of this Government for the hostile measures which have been adopted by the President and Council of Bombay in concurrence with Rághoba; you will inform him that we entirely disapprove of the treaty they have entered into with him, which was done without any authority from us, that our only desire is now to re-establish that peace which has been infringed by the Presidency of Bombay, and to live in amity and union with the Marátha nation.

2nd.—You will use your endeavours to obtain a cession of the Islands of Sálsette and Bassein to the Company with the other conquered islands, that is Karanja, Kaneri, Elephanta and Hog Islands. You will represent the intentions of the Portuguese to have seized these Islands, and that a naval force had actually arrived at Goa for this purpose; that the Government of Bombay possessed themselves of them as soon as they were informed of this intention without the least degree of enmity to the Marátha Government, but merely to frustrate the designs of the Portuguese which have since proved evident in this respect, they having formally protested against our proceedings and asserted an old claim to the possession of the above places. It might be further urged that the Portuguese will continue to keep a watchful eye upon them, but their Court being at peace with the English nation they would not pretend to set on foot any expedi-





tion against them while they continue in our hands, and if they should be given up again to the Maráthás, the Portuguese would not fail to take the first occasion of making an attack upon them, and either overpower the garrisons usually stationed for their defence or make it necessary to maintain in them such a force in constant pay as the revenues could by no means afford to support.

3rd.—If there is any foundation for the intelligence which we have lately received, and which we believe to be authentic, of some signal advantages which have been gained by Rághoba over the ministerial army, we apprehend you may be able to obtain the cessions of Sálsette and Bassein with the other conquered islands without much difficulty, and in this case you may also have it in your power to gain more substantial advantages to be yielded to the Company; your next object must therefore be to obtain a formal surrender of the moiety held by the Maráthás of the revenue of the town and pargana of Broach, but we must leave these and other points which you may be able to secure for the interests of the Company to your discretion, and you will propose them or not, as you see occasion from the Court, the event of the operations of Rághoba and the inclination of the Ministers to a pacification; if any offers shall have been made before your arrival by the Ministerial party to the Government of Bombay it is unnecessary to recommend to you to invest on them if they should be to the advantage of the Company.

4th.—Although we do not mean to insist absolutely upon all these concessions if manifest advantage should have been gained against the Company's arms, yet we are determined on no account to relinquish the possession of Sálsette and Bassein, therefore should the Peshwa hold out against yielding them to the Company, you are at no rate to agree to restore them, declaring to them if necessary, that the matter having been referred to the Hon'ble the Court of Directors it is impossible to relinquish these places without their express permission, and you are to advise us immediately of what has passed.

Although we have thought it necessary to disapprove of the measures of the President and Council of Bombay in entering into the treaty with Rághoba, and have ordered them to withdraw their assistance from him, yet we think it consistent with the honor of the nation and this Government, to endeavour to stipulate some conditions for him with his adversaries. What these should be must depend on the circumstances in which you may find him on your arrival. We must therefore leave this chiefly to your discretion, and only direct in general, that in whatever treaty you may negotiate with the Maráthás you will endeavour to include Rághoba, and make such terms for him as in his actual situation it may appear to you reasonable to expect, and which may not frustrate the immediate objects of your negotiations.

We enclose the translation of a letter which the Governor General has lately written to Sakhárám Bápu, on the subject of our intentions to depute a person to the Marátha Court, also a copy of the treaty entered into by the Presidency of Bombay with Rághoba, as they may serve as a guide to you in your negotiations.

We are, &c.,

WARREN HASTINGS.  
J. CLAVERING.  
G. MONSON.  
R. BARWELL.  
P. FRANCIS.

*Fort William, 21st June 1775.*





*Additional Instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Urton.*

SIR.—We think it proper to give you the following instructions in addition to your former, and require you to pay all due attention to them in entering upon your negotiation at Poona.

As the Nabab of Arcot is a particular friend and ally of the English, and as his intentions may be affected by any treaty that you conclude with the Marátha Government, we direct that you make the Marátha Chief acquainted with the union that subsists between him and the Company, and insist on including him in the treaty in an express article to the following effect: that the Nabab Wallah Jah Bahádur, Nabab of the Karnatak, having been for a considerable course of years united to the English Company by the strongest ties of friendship and alliance, and the Company having ever considered his enemies as their enemies, and his friends as their friends, it is agreed that the Marátha Chiefs likewise shall hereafter regard him as their friend, and his enemies as their enemies.

At the same time we are to acquaint you that we have desired the Nabab of Arcot if there are any particular articles which he wishes to have stipulated for him, to state these articles to us, assuring him that we would take them into consideration, and give you such further orders respecting them as shall be compatible with the other objects which we have in view, in concluding the treaty of peace with the Maráthas.

We have further to direct that whatever treaty you enter into with the Marátha State, you require that it be signed by all the Chiefs collectively and individually, and that you insist on this as a point from which you cannot depart.

A duplicate of this letter will be delivered to you by the Nabab of Arcot's Vakil at Poona, with whom you will consult upon anything which he may have to propose for his master's interest, and attend to his representations, as far as may be consistent with the general tenor of your instructions.

We enclose for your information copy of a treaty which was executed between the Presidency of Bombay and the Marátha Government on the 12th October 1756.

*Fort William, 16th August 1775.*

We are, &c.,  
WARREN HASTINGS.

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*Letter from the GOVERNOR GENERAL and COUNCIL, Fort William, to the GOVERNOR and COUNCIL, Bombay.*

GENTLEMEN,—We have just received your letters of the 13th July and 6th August; that of the 24th June had before reached us.

The last advices which you acknowledge the receipt of from us being dated the 8th March, we take this opportunity of transmitting you copies of all our letters since that date, to your Presidency.

The sense we entertain of your engagements with Raghoba and the whole of your conduct in respect to your transactions with him cannot more fully appear than from the tenor of those letters.





We are very sorry to find the truth of our conjectures as to the consequence of this engagement, that the whole burden of the expensive war undertaken by you in support of Rághobá's claim to the Peshwáship has fallen upon yourselves, and that a dependence can be placed on the assistance of his troops.

We have been so particularly enjoined by the Court of Directors to attend to the preservation of peace in general with the country powers throughout India, that we thought it necessary in our letter of the 31st May to give you positive orders to recall your army from Rághoba to your own garrisons, in whatever state your affairs might be, unless their safety might be endangered by an instant retreat. We hope you have acted in conformity thereto; if not we now repeat those directions, judging it more particularly requisite at this period, as it appears that Rághoba is not able to fulfil his part of the treaty, and we require you to confine your views to the protection of the Company's possessions including Sálsette and the share in the revenue of Broach given up by Fattesing, in the best manner you are able. This last we have also instructed our Minister at Poona to secure if possible by the treaty with that State.

We cannot consequently grant our consent to any further reinforcement of troops being sent to join you from this side of India, and have therefore forbade the Council at Fort St. George to comply with your request for 300 Europeans and 2 battalions of sepoys. Another reason which has weight with us against supplying you with troops is that having appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Upton to proceed to Poona to negotiate a treaty of peace with the Ministerial party there, he will most probably arrive and open the business of his mission to that Court before any reinforcement of troops could be brought to operate with your army, even supposing they should still remain in their quarters at Dubhoi. The junction of fresh troops might be alarming to the Maráthás, and appear contrary to good faith at a time we are treating for peace. We have the greatest reason to hope that Colonel Upton will find the Ministry inclined to listen to his proposals for an accommodation, especially if they reflect on the justice and moderation of this Government in the part it has taken, and discover by this that it is our wish and intention to promote a general pacification. Colonel Upton will no doubt under these circumstances effect an honorable peace for the British nation, and upon terms of security to the Company's possessions in India.

We have agreed to furnish you to the amount of 20 lákhs of rupees in the course of the present year commencing the first of May last, in which we include the drafts accepted from your Presidency and Surat since that date, and we authorize you to continue drawing upon us for such sums as you may be able to obtain at the most reasonable exchange in your power to that extent.

We are, &c.,  
WARREN HASTINGS.  
J. CLAVERING.  
G. MONSON.  
R. BARWELL.  
P. FRANCIS.

*Fort William, 7th February 1775.*