

deshmookhs in the neighbourhood of Kopaul and Bellary, who had for some time refused all payments to the government of Beejapoor, were compelled to submit to the troops of Sivajee. The reduced state of Beejapoor, its want of cavalry, and the swelling of the rivers from the rains, prevented Musood Khan from making an effort to recover these valuable districts.

During Sivajee's absence, Moro Trimmul, the Peishwa, provided for the security of the territory with his usual activity and ability. The war with the Seedees, who were reinforced every season by the Moghul fleet from Surat, continued to be waged with rancorous enmity. Descents upon the Mahratta coast, actions with vessels on both sides, attempts to burn the Seedee's fleet, and a slow but lasting cannonade on Jinjeera, was the manner in which the warfare was maintained. The only events which it seems requisite to particularize, was the supersession of Seedee Sumbhole by Seedee Kassim, in consequence of an order from the emperor. The title conferred on the new chief, who is admitted by the Mahrattas to have been an excellent officer, was Yakoot Khan—the same as that of his predecessor.

It was probably in consequence of the truce between the Moghuls and Beejapoor that Moro Punt was induced to entertain numbers of the discharged cavalry of Beejapoor, being apprehensive that Dilere Khan meditated hostilities on his return to Pairgaom; but Aurungzebe was displeased with the adjustment which Dilere Khan had made, and informed him that he ought to have effected a more complete arrangement by providing for the nobility, paying the arrears of the troops, and taking the government under the imperial protection; he, therefore, commanded him to endeavour to amend his error whilst it was yet reparable, to pay the arrears of the cavalry, and to draw over as many of the officers as he could. Sultan Mauzum was again appointed to the government of the Deccan, but the command of the army in the field remained with Dilere Khan. The Afghan party in Beejapoor were easily detached; but many of those who were violently factious, although averse to the existing authority, had still a greater dislike to the Moghuls. The envoy formally demanded Padshah Beebee as the only means of averting an immediate siege. Musood Khan refused compliance. One of the factions, headed by Syud



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Mukhtoom, and instigated by Mullik Berkhordar, assembled in arms to enforce the request at a time when the regent was unprepared; but a battle in the midst of the city was prevented by the king's sister, who herself repaired to the spot, and declared her intention of proceeding to the Moghul camp, vainly but generously imagining that, by this sacrifice, her brother and his kingdom might be saved. The Mahomedan inhabitants of Beejapoor, who yet remain, revert with fond garrulity to this anecdote, and to many traditionary legends of their last and favourite princess.

Padshah Beebee reached Dilere Khan's camp when the Moghuls were advancing to invest the city, a fit escort was furnished to conduct her to Aurungabad, but the imperial army prosecuted its march. Musaoood

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Khan in this dilemma sought assistance from Sivajee, who agreed to attack Dilere Khan, or effect a diversion in favour of the besieged. For this purpose Sivajee assembled a large body of cavalry at Panalla, and marched towards Beejapoor; but, finding the besiegers strong, and not choosing to encounter the Patans, of whom a large portion of Dilere Khan's army was composed, he only made a show of attacking, advanced slowly until within 24 miles of the camp, when he turned off to the northward, rapidly crossed the Beema, and attacked the Moghul possessions, literally with fire and sword, leaving the inhabitants houseless and the villages in ashes. Dilere Khan did not relinquish the siege, and Sivajee continued his depredations from the Beema to the Godavery. He crossed the latter river, attacked Jaulna, and, although Sultan Mauzum was at Aurungabad, plundered the town leisurely for three days, pointing out, as was his custom on such occasions, the particular houses and spots where money and valuables were secreted. Nothing escaped him, and no place was a sanctuary; the residence of the *peers*, or Mahomedan saints, which Sivajee had hitherto held sacred, were on this occasion pillaged. The laden booty was a certain signal that Sivajee would take some route towards Raigurh, and a body of 10,000 horse having been collected by the prince's orders, from various parts under Runmust Khan, pursued, overtook, and attacked Sivajee near Sungumnere on his route to Putta. A part of his troops were



thrown into confusion, owing principally to the impetuosity of Suntajee Ghorepuray; Seedojee Nimbalkur, an officer of distinction, was killed; but Sivajee led a desperate charge, and by great personal exertion retrieved the day. The Moghul troops were broken, and he continued his route; but he had not proceeded far when he was again attacked by the Moghuls, who had been joined by a large reinforcement under Kishen Sing, one of the grandsons of Mirza Raja Jey Sing. This division cut him off from the pass to which he was marching, and Sivajee's army was unable to contend with such an accumulated force. But the superior intelligence of one of his Jasooses, or guides, saved Sivajee in this emergency. He conducted him across the hills by a pass unknown to the Moghuls, by which he gained several hours' march in advance, and safely reached Putta. The Moghul troops returned to Aurungabad, and Sivajee judged the opportunity favourable for possessing himself of the whole of the forts near Putta, 27 in number; for which purpose he ordered a body of infantry to join Moro Punt from the Concan, in order to reduce as many of them as possible; and a large detachment of cavalry was likewise placed at the Peishwa's disposal.

Sivajee remained at Putta until he received an express from Musaoood Khan, entreating him to return southward, and make an effort to relieve the city: "that Dilere Khan had run his approaches close to the walls, and that nothing but prompt exertion could save them." Sivajee again set off for Beejapoor, when news reached him that his son Sumbhajee had fled and joined Dilere Khan. He directed his army to pursue their route under Humbeer Rao, whilst he himself retired to Panalla to devise means of bringing back Sumbhajee.

The conduct of his eldest son had for some time been a source of grief and vexation to Sivajee; and in consequence of Sumbhajee's attempting to violate the person of the wife of a Bramin, his father for a time confined him in Panalla, and placed a strict watch over him after he was released. Sumbhajee, impatient under this control, took advantage of his father's absence, and deserted to Dilere Khan, by whom he was received with great distinction.

Dilere Khan sent accounts of this event to the emperor, and proposed, as the Mahrattas were becoming so very powerful, to



set up Sumbhajee at the head of a party, in opposition to his father, in order to divide their interests, and facilitate the capture of the forts. But this scheme, although it appeared to Dilere Khan similar to what was then carried on against Beejapoor and Golcondah, was disapproved by the emperor, as it would ultimately conduce to strengthen predatory power; and it is remarkable that this reason, than which none could be more just at that period, should be recorded by a Mahratta biographer of Sivajee. Although it rests on no other authority, we cannot but remark that, had such an opinion guided Aurungzebe's measures at an earlier period, and the view been a little more extended, so as to have preserved the other Mahomedan states from becoming first a prey, and then an accession of strength, to the Mahrattas, the policy of this emperor might have met its meed of praise, with far more justice than we can discover in those eulogies which have been frequently bestowed upon it.

But before sufficient time had elapsed to obtain a reply from court, Dilere Khan, intent on his own scheme, took measures for carrying it into effect. He sent a detachment of his army from before Beejapoor, accompanied by Sumbhajee, as raja of the Mahrattas, to lay siege to Bhopaulgurh, the extreme outpost of Sivajee's possessions to the eastward, which was taken.

Humbeer Rao, detached by Sivajee towards Beejapoor, fell in with 8,000 or 9,000 cavalry under Runmust Khan, the same officer lately sent by Sultan Mauzum against Sivajee; and he again sustained a severe defeat.

Moro Punt took Ahoont and Nahawagurh, both forts of great strength, and dispersed his army all over Candeish, which was plundered and laid waste. Humbeer Rao hovered about the camp of Dilere Khan, whilst the besieged, encouraged by Musaood Khan, continued a most resolute defence. Dilere Khan pressed the siege, but personal exertion could not avail when all supplies were cut off. He at last was compelled to abandon all hope of reducing the place; and, at the end of the rains, attacked the open country, plundered Hutnee, crossed the Kistna as soon as fordable, divided the troops, and was laying waste the Carnatic, when Jenardin Punt, with 6,000 horse, attacked the party commanded by Dilere Khan in person, completely defeated him, intercepted his parties, cut several of them to pieces, and compelled him to retreat.



By this time orders had arrived from the emperor recalling Sultan Mauzum, disapproving of Dilere Khan's measures, and reinstating Khan Jehan in command of the army, and in the government of the Deccan. Sumbhajee was ordered to be sent prisoner to Delhi; but Dilere Khan, who had permitted Sivajee's emissaries to have access to him now connived at his escape; and, although Sivajee was reconciled to him, he confined him in the fort of Panalla until he should give proofs of amendment.

Sivajee, as the price of his alliance with Beejapoor, required the cession of the tract around Kopaul and Bellary, also the cession of all claims to sovereignty on the conquered territory in Drawed, the principality of Tanjore, and the jagheer districts of Shahjee.

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These conditions being complied with, Sivajee went to the neighbourhood of the city of Beejapoor, where he had an interview and a secret consultation with Musaood Khan.

The supremacy granted to Sivajee was considered by Venkajee as a death-blow to his independence; he was already not only subjected to the interference of Rugonath Punt, but Sivajee, on pretence of assisting him with fit agents, took a large share of the management into his own hands. Venkajee, impatient of control, appears to have been so greatly mortified, that he resigned himself to melancholy, neglected his affairs, and omitted even the usual care of his person, and the observances enjoined by his religion; he became careless and abstracted from all worldly affairs, and assumed the conduct rather of a devotee than of an active chief, such as he had hitherto shown himself. On this occasion Sivajee addressed a letter to him, full of energy and good sense. This letter was amongst the last that Sivajee ever dictated; he was taken ill at Raigurh, occasioned by painful swelling in his knee-joint, which became gradually worse, and at last threw him into a high fever, which, on the seventh day from its commencement, terminated his existence on the 5th day of April 1680, in the 53rd year of his age.

Such was the end of Sivajee. We have passed over some details in his warfare with the Seedees, which may require retrospective notice, and have been drawn forward by a chain of more important events, until we have reached that point where we naturally pause to look back on the life of any human being who



has just ceased to be. Sivajee was certainly a most extraordinary person; and, however justly many of his acts may be censured, his claim to high rank in the page of history must be admitted. To form an estimate of his character, let us consider him assembling and conducting a band of half-naked Mawulees through the wild tracts where he first established himself, unmindful of obstruction from the elements, turning the most inclement seasons to advantage, and inspiring the minds of such followers with undaunted enthusiasm. Let us also observe the singular plans of policy he commenced, and which we must admit to have been altogether novel, and most fit for acquiring power at such a period. Let us examine his internal regulations, the great progress he made in arranging every department in the midst of almost perpetual warfare and his successful stratagems for escaping or extricating himself from difficulty; and whether planning the capture of a fort, or the conquest of a distant country; heading an attack or conducting a retreat; regulating the discipline to be observed amongst a hundred horse, or laying down arrangements for governing a country; we view his talents with admiration, and his genius with wonder. For a popular leader, his frugality was a remarkable feature in his character; and the richest plunder never made him deviate from the rules he had laid down for its appropriation.

Sivajee was patient and deliberate in his plans, ardent, resolute, and persevering in their execution; but even in viewing the favourable side, duplicity and meanness are so much intermixed with his schemes, and so conspicuous in his actions, that the offensive parts of a worse character might be passed over with less disgust. Superstition, cruelty, and treachery are not only justly alleged against him, but he always preferred deceit to open force when both were in his power. But to sum up all let us contrast his craft, pliancy, and humility with his boldness, firmness, and ambition; his power of inspiring enthusiasm while he showed the coolest attention to his own interests; the dash of a partizan adventurer, with the order and economy of a statesman; and, lastly, the wisdom of his plans which raised the despised Hindoos to sovereignty, and brought about their own accomplishment when the hand that had framed them was low in the dust.



Sivajee's admirers among his own nations speak of him as an incarnation of a deity, setting an example of wisdom, fortitude, and piety. Mahrattas, in general, consider that necessity justifies a murder, and that political assassination is often wise and proper. They admit that Sivajee authorised the death of Chunder Rao, the raja of Jowlee; but few of them acknowledge that Afzool Khan was murdered. The vulgar opinion is that the Khan was the aggressor; and the event is spoken of rather as a commendable exploit than a detestable and treacherous assassination.

From what can be learned of Sivajee in domestic life, his manners were remarkably pleasing, and his address winning; he was apparently frank, but seldom familiar; passionate in his disposition, but kind to his dependants and relations. He was a man of small stature, and of an active rather than strong make; his countenance was handsome and intelligent; he had very long arms in proportion to his size, which is reckoned a beauty among Mahrattas. The sword which he constantly used, and which he named after the goddess Bhowanee, is still preserved by the raja of Satara with the utmost veneration, and has all the honors of an idol paid to it.

Sivajee, at the time of his death, was in possession of the whole of that part of the Concan extending from Gundavee to Ponda; with the exceptions of Goa, lower Choule, Salsette, and Bassein, belonging to the Portuguese; Jinjeera, in possession of the Abyssinians; and the English settlement on the island of Bombay. He had thannas in Carwar, Ankola, and several places on the coast, where he shared the districts with the deshmoorkhs. The chief of Soonda acknowledged his authority, and the rana of Bednore paid him an annual tribute. Exclusive of his possessions around Bellary and Kopaul, his conquest in Drawed, his supremacy as well as share in Tanjore, and the jagheer districts of his father in the Carnatic, Sivajee occupied that tract of Maharashtra from the Hurnkassée river on the south, to the Indooranee river on the north, between Poona and Joonere. The districts of Sopa, Baramuttee, and Indapoor were occasionally held, and always claimed by him as his paternal jagheer; and the line of forts, built from Tattora to Panalla, distinctly mark the boundary of his consolidated territory to the eastward. He, however, had a



number of detached places. Singnapoor, at the temple of Mahdeo, was his hereditary enam village; the fort of Parneira, near Damaun, was rebuilt by Moro Trimmul; and his garrisons and thannas occupied a great part of Buglana, and several strong places in Candeish and Sungumnere. His personal wealth was immense; and making large allowance for exaggeration in the Mahratta manuscripts, he had, without doubt, several millions in specie at Raigurh.

The territory and treasures, however, which Sivajee acquired were not so formidable to the Mahomedans as the example he had set, the system and habits he introduced, and the spirit he had infused into a large proportion of the Mahratta people.

None of his successors inherited his genius, but the rise and fall of empires depend on such an infinite variety of circumstances, that those instruments which of ten appear to human foresight the least likely to produce a particular end, are the very means by which it is accomplished.

Sivajee had four wives—Suhjee Bye, of the family of Nimbalkur; Soyera Bye, of the Sirkay family; Pootla Bye, of the family of Mohitey; and a fourth wife, whose name and family are unknown. Of these, two survived him, Soyera Bye and Pootla Bye; the latter immolated herself, but was burnt some weeks after her husband's corpse, owing to the secrecy which was observed respecting his death.

Suhjee Bye, the mother of Sumbhajee, died in 1659, two years after his birth; Soyera Bye was the mother of Raja Ram, and, being an artful woman, not only had great influence with her husband, but a considerable ascendancy over several of the principal ministers, especially Annajee Dutto, the Punt Suchew. Sivajee, during the last days of his life, had expressed to Moro Punt, Annajee Dutto, and others, that, in the event of his death, much evil was to be apprehended from the misconduct of Sumbhajee; and these words were interpreted by Soyera Bye and her faction as a will in favour of Raja Ram, then a boy of ten years old. Moro Trimmul Peishwa, although Annajee Dutto had always been his rival, was at first drawn into a plan of administering the government under a regency in the name of Raja Ram. The other Purdhans likewise acquiesced in the arrangement, and measures were immediately taken to carry it into effect.



Sivajee's death was to be kept a profound secret until Sumbhajee's confinement should be rendered perfectly secure. The funeral obsequies were performed privately by Shahjee Bhonslay, a relation of the family. A force under Jenardin Punt Somunt, whom we have seen so active in the Carnatic, was directed to march to Panalla; the garrison of Raigurh was strengthened; 10,000 horse were stationed at the neighbouring village of Panchwur; and Humbeer Rao, the Senaputtee, was ordered with a large army to take up a position at Kurar. As some time was necessary for any of these movements, letters were despatched to Heerajee Furzund, in charge of Sumbhajee at Panalla, to apprize him of what was going forward. But Sumbhajee had either been informed of the event, or suspected his father's death, for, on the appearance of the messenger with the letters, he seized and threatened him with instant death if he did not give up the packet. Its delivery discovered the whole. Heerajee Furzund fled into the Concan; Sumbhajee took command of the fort, and was obeyed by the garrison; but he immediately put two of the principal officers to death. Not knowing whom to trust beyond the walls of the fort, he made preparations for defending it, and resolved to await events. Jenardin Punt, finding the place in Sumbhajee's possession, sat down to blockade it, and after some weeks was content to leave his guards at their posts, whilst he took up his abode in the town of Kolapoor.

Raja Ram was placed on the throne in May, and the ministers began the conduct of affairs in his name; but as latent rivalry is easily excited, the Peishwa and the Suchew soon became jealous of each other.

Sumbhajee, in the meantime, having gained over a part of Jenardin Punt's troops, took a chosen band of his Mawulee garrison, proceeded through the Punt's lines in the night, seized him in the town of Kolapoor, and carried him back to Panalla, a prisoner. Humbeer Rao Mohitey, delighted by this exploit, so worthy of the son of Sivajee, became immediately inclined to Sumbhajee's cause; and Moro Punt, who had set out from Raigurh on the news of Jenardin Punt's disaster, instead of exerting himself for the cabal, offered his services to Sumbhajee, by whom he was confirmed as Peishwa, but never succeeded





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in gaining his confidence. Humbeer Rao advanced and paid his respects, when Sumbhajeer immediately quitted Panalla, and proceeded towards Raigurh. Before his arrival the garrison had risen in his favour, and confined such as would have opposed his authority. The army at Panchwur came over to him in a body, and Sumbhajeer entered Raigurh in the end of June 1680.



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## *From A.D. 1680 to A.D. 1689*

SUMBHAJEE'S CONDUCT, from the time of his father's death until he entered his capital, discovered a vigour and method the more satisfactory from being unexpected; and had he taken advantage of the general submission, and published a declaration of amnesty, the address and energy he had shown would have suppressed all recollection of his early faults; but the barbarity of his disposition was displayed from the moment he passed the gate of Raigurh. Annajee Dutto was put in irons, thrown into prison, and his property confiscated. Raja Ram was also confined; Soyera Bye was seized, and, when brought before Sumbhaje, he insulted her in the grossest manner, accused her of having poisoned Sivajee, loaded her with every epithet of abuse, and ordered her to be put to a cruel and lingering death. The Mahratta officers attached to her cause were beheaded; and one, particularly obnoxious, was precipitated from the top of the rock of Raigurh. This severity, justly deemed unnecessary and cruel, besides causing an inveterate enmity in the minds of Soyera Bye's relations, was considered a most inauspicious commencement; and on the occasion of his being seated on the throne, in the early part of August, many unfavourable auguries were reported in the country.

The armistice which Sivajee effected with the Moghul viceroy, Khan Jehan Buhadur, when quitting his own territory on the Carnatic expedition, produced no compromise with the Abyssinians of Jinjeera; a petty warfare was constantly maintained in the Concan between the Seedee and the Mahrattas; but hostilities became more rancorous after the accession of Sumbhaje.

The island or rock of Henery, near the entrance of the harbour of Bombay was fortified by Sivajee in 1679, which being resented by the English, an attempt by them, in conjunction



with the Seedee, was unsuccessfully made to dispossess him of it; but Kenery, another island of the same description, which stands by the side of Henery, having been in the same surreptitious manner occupied by the Seedee during the ensuing season, Sumbhajee's first efforts were spent in endeavouring to drive out the Seedee, and with no better success than had attended the attempt on Kenery. The English as little relished the occupation by the one party as by the other.

Sumbhajee, whilst his fleet and troops were thus employed, proceeded to Panalla, for what purpose is not clearly ascertained, though perhaps it may have been to conduct some negotiations with the Beejapoor government. He remained there until recalled to

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Raigurh by the appearance of an illustrious fugitive who sought an asylum in his territory. This personage was Sultan Mohummud Akber, the fourth son of the emperor Aurungzebe, who, having been won over by the Rajpoots, consented to head a rebellion against his father, but the scheme was frustrated by the emperor's address, and the prince fled towards Sumbhajee's country, which he was fortunate enough to reach, though he was hotly pursued, and the strictest orders issued, to all the imperial officers of the districts in his route, to intercept him.

Sumbhajee sent an officer to welcome his arrival, appointed the village of Dodsay for his residence, the name of which, in compliment to his guest, was changed to Padshapoor; but some affair, of which Mahratta manuscripts take no notice, detained him at Panalla, and prevented his visiting the prince on his first arrival. In the meantime the restless faction of Annajee Dutto, in order to forward their own views, and procure his enlargement, took advantage of Sumbhajee's absence to propose some overtures to Sultan Mohummud Akber in favour of Raja Ram. The news of this fresh conspiracy was first communicated to Sumbhajee by Dadajee Rugonath, Deshpandya of Mhar, and excited suspicions towards his guest, until the prince himself communicated the circumstances, which entirely dispelled his doubts, and Sumbhajee visited and welcomed him with much cordiality.

The intrigue on the part of the friends of Annajee Dutto was said to have been supported by the whole Sirkay family in the



Concan, whose motive was revenge for the death of Soyera Bye. Ballajee Aujee Chitnees, a man of the Purbhoo caste, who had stood high in Sivajee's favour, and had been employed by Sumbhajee himself on a confidential mission to Bombay, was accused of being a principal instigator in the meditated treachery. This person, together with his eldest son, one of his relations named Samjee Aujee, Heerajee Furzund, such of the Sirkays as could be apprehended, and, lastly, Annajee Dutto himself, were at once led out to execution, tied to the feet of elephants, and trampled to death. The principal members of the Sirkay family fled in consternation, and several of them entered the Moghul service. Sumbhajee's severity, even if just towards Ballajee Aujee, which is doubtful, was extremely impolitic in regard to Annajee Dutto. To put a Bramin to death is always looked upon with horror, and the fate of the gallant Punt Suchew, who had performed such important services during the rise of Sivajee, was viewed, by every one capable of appreciating his worth, as a violent and harsh measure, calculated rather to create fear and dissension than to insure obedience and unanimity.

Of this number was Moro Punt Pingley, Peishwa, who, as his jealousy was extinct in his rival's death, did not fail to inveigh with honest boldness against the impiety and impolicy of his execution. A Kanoja Bramin from Hindostan, named Kuloosha, who had by some means insinuated himself into Sumbhajee's favour, and who was the secret adviser of his action, recommended the imprisonment of Moro Punt. The Peishwa was accordingly thrown into confinement, and Sumbhajee, with the aid of this inexperienced man, equally presumptuous with himself, undertook the conduct of all state affairs.

Ramdas Swamy, the friend and spiritual director of Sivajee, whose life and conduct seem to have merited the universal encomiums of his countrymen, a few days previous to his death, wrote Sumbhajee an excellent and judicious letter, advising him for the future rather than upbraiding him for the past, and pointing out the example of his father, yet carefully abstaining from personal comparison.

About the same time Rugonath Narain Hunwuntay undertook a journey from the Carnatic, having left Hurjee Raja Mahareek in charge of the government during his absence. On





his arrival at Raigurh, as he brought with him a considerable treasure, the balance saved from the revenue of the districts, he was well received, and as was due to one of the Purdhans, and so distinguished an officer, a full durbar was assembled on the occasion. Rugonath Narain took this unusual opportunity of entering on public affairs, and represented all the evils likely to result from the disregard shown to experienced servants, and to the forms of government instituted by Sivajee; he pointed out what ought to be done, and, whilst maintaining his arguments boldly censured Sumbhajee's proceedings, and predicted his fall.

It would seem difficult to account for the temerity of Rugonath Narain, especially as his brother, Jenardin Punt, was still in confinement; but Sumbhajee was probably sensible that any violence towards Rugonath Narain might at once place the Carnatic at his uncle's disposal; and it is remarkable that decided language from a man whom he respects generally overawes the most ungovernable Mahratta. Sumbhajee promised to release Moro Punt and Jenardin Punt, and Rugonath Punt himself was civilly dismissed to his government. He died, however, before he reached Ginjee, and Sumbhajee not only fulfilled his promise of releasing Moro Punt and Jenardin Punt, but advanced the latter to the rank of Amat, vacant by his brother's death, confirmed Hurjee Raja in the government of the Carnatic, and Neeloo Punt Moreishwur, the son of Moro Punt, Peishwa, was appointed under him as mootaliq, or chief agent of affairs. But this amendment was but temporary, and the favourite Kuloosha obtained a complete ascendancy over his mind.

On the occasion of Sumbhajee's meeting with Prince Akber, it was rumoured abroad that the Mahrattas and Rajpoots were about to unite for the purpose of dethroning Aurungzebe, and placing Sultan Akber on the throne. But vanity and anger are more active stimulants to common minds than ambition or glory; no speculation of that kind diverted Sumbhajee from the more humble design of reducing Jinjeera; to possess himself of a place which his father had failed in taking, to avenge the pillage of several of his villages, and the daily insults experienced from the Seedee, were the causes which combined to make this an object of paramount interest.

He, in the first place, directed Khundoojee Furzund, one of his creatures, to desert to Jinjeera, and endeavour, by corrupting



some of the Seedee's people, to blow up the magazine when the attack was about to commence. A large body of troops were assembled, and the command of the expedition given to Dadajee Rugonath Deshpandya with the promise, in case of success, of being made one of the eight Purdhans.

The plot of Khundoojee Furzund was discovered by means of a female slave, before the attack commenced, and he, with many of his accomplices, were put to death.

Sumbhajee, accompanied by Sultan Akber, proceeded to Dhunda Rajepoor, for the purpose of stimulating the exertions of his troops. He proposed filling up the channel by an immense mound of earth and stones, and thus advancing to the assault. The work

*A.D. 1682* was actually in progress, when he was suddenly called upon to oppose a body of Moghul horse under the command of Hoossein Ali Khan, which advanced from Ahmednugur, by the route of Joonere, descended the Ghauts, and ravaged the Kallian district north of Panwell. Sumbhajee attacked them in front, prevented their penetrating to the southward, and, having stopped their supplies on all sides, the Moghul general retired before the rains.

The siege of Jinjeera was continued by Dadajee Rugonath, and in the month of August, the defences having been battered down, an assault was attempted by means of boats, but the slippery rock and beating of the surf prevented the assailants from keeping their footing. They were repulsed with the loss of 200 men, and the attempt on the island was abandoned.

After the siege was raised, and the besieging army withdrawn, the Seedees made constant inroads, destroying cows, carrying off the women, and burning the villages. They even penetrated to Mhar, and seized the wife of Dadajee Rugonath, the officer so lately employed against them.

These insults greatly enraged Sumbhajee; he threatened to punish the English and Portuguese for maintaining a neutrality towards Jinjeera, and during the remainder of the monsoon he made preparations for an attack on the Seedee's fleet. In the month of October, the principal commanders of his armed vessels sailed out of the Nagotna river in quest of the Seedee, whose fleet was at anchor off Mazagon, in Bombay harbour. On perceiving the approach of the Mahrattas, the Seedee imme-



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diately got under weigh, and stood up towards the Tannah river, when, having chosen his position, he lay-to, and waited for the Mahrattas. Seedee Missree, the relation of Seedee Sumbhole, who had deserted to Sumbhaje, led the attack, and was well supported by the other officers. But Yakoot Khan in person commanded the Jinjeera fleet; and, although he had only 15 vessels to twice that number of Sumbhaje's which attacked him, he gained a complete victory. Seedee Missree was mortally wounded, and taken prisoner in his own vessel, which, with three others, was captured by the Seedee. Some of the Mahratta fleet were sunk, defending themselves to the last.

Sumbhaje, exasperated by this defeat, began to carry his threats against the Europeans into effect; he commenced with the Portuguese, by plundering some of their villages, and was preparing to fortify the island of Elephanta in Bombay harbour, for the purpose of annoying the English, and preventing the Seedee's vessels from anchoring at Mazagon during the monsoon; but he was diverted from this latter scheme, and suddenly resolved on endeavouring to form an alliance with the English against the Moghuls and the Seedee. His inducement to this plan was intelligence of great preparations on the part of Aurungzebe, and the arrival at Aurungabad of Sultan Mauzum, whom the emperor had sent forward, appointed for the fourth time to the government of the four Soobehs of the Deccan. According to his projected change of politics, Sumbhaje sent an ambassador to Bombay, who pretended to inform the council of a scheme which the Moghuls had laid for reducing the island, and proposed an alliance against them and the Seedees. The council listened to these overtures, with a view of procuring an exemption from certain duties which were levied by Sumbhaje's officers, on the trade of the factories on the Coromandel coast; but, although the negotiation was protracted to some length, neither party at this time obtained their desire.

Sumbhaje was again called to repel an inroad into the Concan by a detachment under Runmust Khan, supported by another Moghul officer, named Roh Oolla Khan, whom the prince had detached against him. These troops advanced to Kallian Bheemree, ravaged the country, as had been done the preceding

A.D. 1683



season, but returned to Ahmednugur before the rains, without having effected anything worthy of notice.

In prosecution of the war against the Portuguese, Sumbhajee attacked Choule in the month of June, but he could make no impression on a regular European fortification. The viceroy of Goa did not confine his operations to defensive warfare. He took the field in the month of October, and invaded Sumbhajee's territory with a considerable army, 1,200 of whom were Europeans. The Portuguese in their warfare exhibited greater barbarity than Mahratta freebooters. They not only carried fire and sword into the defenceless villages, but destroyed the temples, and attempted to convert their prisoners by force.

The viceroy neglected no means of hostility; he had anticipated Sumbhajee's intention of fortifying the island of Aujee Dewa, and now gave orders to some armed vessels stationed there to cruize against Sumbhajee's fleet, and distress the trade of Carwar. The viceroy advanced in person with the army, and laid siege to Ponda. Sumbhajee, who possessed all the ardent bravery of his father, though without his prudence or his talents, immediately marched at the head of an inconsiderable force to raise the siege, and on coming in sight of Ponda, although his numbers were inferior to the Portuguese, he commenced an attack on their rear.

The fort was at this time breached, and might have been stormed, but the viceroy, with the ideas of a European, unused to Indian warfare, alarmed lest his retreat should be cut off, and Goa exposed to danger, immediately resolved on retiring. He effected his retreat; but at the expense of the whole of his camp equipage, stores, guns, and equipments: 1,200 of his men were slain, of whom 200 were Europeans.

On arriving at the back water which separates the island of Goa or Pangin from the main land, Sumbhajae, who had headed repeated charges, again led on the horse, intending to have dashed across with the fugitives; but the Portuguese, from a better knowledge of the ford, and from having stationed boats, and lined the opposite banks with troops, repulsed the attempt. Sumbhajee rallied his men, and again tried to ford, but although he headed the troops himself, and persevered until his horse was swimming, he was at last obliged to desist, owing to the flood-tide.





Sumbhajee on this occasion particularly signalized himself, and Bhowanee, the sword of his father, which he used, could not have been better wielded; but, with his usual obstinacy, he persisted in his rash design of crossing over into the island, and ordered boats to be brought for the purpose. Two hundred of his men were embarked and transported, when the Portuguese boats coming round, intercepted the return of the Mahrattas, and the enraged and defeated troops of the viceroy fell upon the 200 men thus exposed to their fury, and destroyed most of them.

The siege of Choule was continued without success; but Caranja was taken possession of, and retained for nearly a year. Several places belonging to the Portuguese between Bassein and Damaun were attacked and destroyed, and the viceroy made overtures for peace, but as Sumbhajee demanded five crores of pagodas as a preliminary, they were at once broken off.

The Mahratta horse, a part only of which were required on these services in the Concan, were, as usual, let loose to plunder, and subsist in the upper country during the fair season, and this year they were fruitlessly pursued by a force from Aurungabad.

To follow them in all cases, or to trace their incursions with precision from about the period at which we have arrived, is scarcely possible. Nor is it necessary. If we can account for the growth of their predatory power amidst the general warfare and confusion throughout the Deccan, and connect the principal incidents by which their empire was extended, it is all that can prove interesting or instructive in their history.

From the time of Moro Punt's confinement, Kuloosha was entrusted with the entire management of public affairs; nor did the partial enlargement of the Peishwa, for the short time he afterwards lived, produce in this respect any change. Sumbhajee, when not actually employed in the field, gave himself up to idleness or to vice; none could have access but Kuloosha; and if any one ventured to approach without the favourite's permission, Sumbhajee flew into a passion, and punished the intruder. Kuloosha, as possessing a religious character, could not consistently be admitted to any other rank among the Purohiths than that of Pundit Rao; in addition to that honor, he was dignified with the title of Chundagau-Matya Kuvée-Kulus. Although in





the Mahratta manuscripts Kuloosha is loaded with many epithets of abuse, he is seldom accused of having been the pander of Sumbhaje's vices; it is even admitted that he was a learned and courtly man, and that he excelled in poetry, but his total incapacity for his high station, and the ruinous consequences, both of his neglect and his measures, may be very clearly gleaned from the Mahratta writings: in these the ascendancy gained over the mind of Sumbhaje is ascribed to magic, in which Kuloosha is believed to have been a perfect adept.

The system which Sivajee introduced soon fell into decay, wherever the efficiency of the establishments depended upon the vigilance or care of the executive authority. This was first perceivable in the army, where the discipline and strict orders of Sivajee were neglected. When the horse took the field, stragglers were allowed to join, plunder was secreted, women followers, who had been prohibited on pain of death, were not only permitted, but women were brought off from the enemy's country as an established article of plunder, and either retained as concubines or sold as slaves.

The small returns brought back by the commanders of the horse were insufficient for the pay of the troops; they took the field in arrears, and permission to keep a portion of their plunder was an ample and desirable compensation for the regular pay allowed by Sivajee.

Sumbhaje was prodigal in his expenses, and as he considered his father's treasure inexhaustible, even he favourite minister was unwilling to rouse his dangerous temper by touching on that theme. No revenue was received from the Carnatic after the death of Rugonath Punt; the districts in that quarter maintained themselves; but as loss rather than advantage was now the result of most of the expeditions by which, in the time of Sivajee, so much was amassed, Kuloosha conceived he had discovered an easy mode of replenishing the treasury, by raising the land-rent, through the addition of various assessments; but when he came to collect the revenue, he found that the receipts were as much diminished from what they had been in the time of Sivajee, as the assessments were nominally increased.

The managers of districts were in consequence removed for, what appeared to him, evident peculation. The revenue was



farmed, many of the ryots fled from their villages, and speedy ruin threatened the territory of Sumbhaje, without the approach of Aurungzebe, who this year advanced to Burhanpoor with a vast army, for the purpose of carrying his designs on the Deccan into execution.

The ostensible impediments to the emperor's plans were, in comparison to his apparent means, very inconsiderable. The state of Hyderabad was the most formidable as to men and money, and the king, Abou Hoossein, was possessed of great private riches in jewels. His administration, conducted principally under Mahdhuna Punt, was popular amongst a large proportion of his Hindoo subjects, but many of the principal Mahomedan officers were disgusted at the sway exercised by a Bramin over both their prince and country. Their jealousy was fomented by the secret emissaries of Aurungzebe; but Abou Hoossein, sensible of the minister's value, did not withdraw his confidence or support.

Mullik Berkhordar, the envoy of Aurungzebe, residing at the capital of Beejapoor, not only succeeded in drawing over many of the principal officers who were pensioned or employed by the emperor, but to his influence may be ascribed the decay of Musaood Khan's power. The faction opposed to the regent was headed by Syud Mukhtoom, an Oomrah of no distinction, but he was supported by Shirzee Khan, the best officer then left in the Beejapoor army. Shirzee Khan's enmity towards Musaood Khan originated in the preference shown the latter for infantry, which was contrary both to the interest and judgment of the former: many of the best horse under Shirzee Khan had been discharged, and Musaood Khan had been obliged to call in the aid of Sivajee, at the expense of ceding some of the finest districts in the kingdom. This faction forced Musaood Khan to quit Beejapoor and retire to Adonee, probably about a year after Sivajee's death. By whom the new administration was conducted is uncertain; but as the envoy of Aurungzebe had always represented the treaty with the Mahrattas as a great source of displeasure to the emperor, one of its first acts, after the removal of Musaood Khan, was an injudicious attempt to recover some of the fertile territory near the banks of Kistna, of which Sivajee had acquired possession. Merich was retaken, and the breach which this



occasioned between Sumbhaje and the Beejapoor government seems to have been irreparable. It was the interest of Sumbhaje to unite with the Mahomedan states on this occasion, and Mahdhuna Punt made some endeavours to effect a confederacy, but there were so many parties and interests, such jealousy and imbecility, that no state could call forth its own resources, still less could all combine in one grand effort. For whilst Aurungzebe's emissaries pretended, at each of the courts of Beejapoor and Hyderabad, that the emperor meant to extend to it particular favour and protection, some of the members of the state were weak enough to be lulled by such palpable illusions, and many of the nobles were traitors; so that the ostensible authorities in each government, distrusting all around them, were careful not to suggest proceedings which might ensure their own assassination or precipitate the hostility of the emperor. When Musaood Khan was obliged to reduce the army, he maintained but a small number of cavalry in addition to the Mahratta munsubdars, who, in fear of losing their jagheers, enams, and hereditary rights, still acknowledged themselves the servants of the Beejapoor state. Some of the members of the different families had, however, enrolled themselves with Sivajee, and continued under the standard of Sumbhaje.

The Mahratta munsubdars, formerly under the Nizam Shahee state, in like manner paid obedience to the Moghuls, whilst many of their relations were in the army of Sumbhaje. Wherever there were disputes regarding hereditary rights, which is generally the case amongst village and district officers, as well as enamdars, jagheerdars, and all old Hindoo families, the party not in possession, as the country became more and more unsettled, always went over to the invading enemy, prompted by motives of self-interest, but more by feelings of spite and personal enmity, in hopes of finding some occasion for wreaking vengeance on the opponent. If the invader prevailed, the occupant was frequently ejected, and he took the same mode of being reinstated; or if fortunate enough to make his peace by timely submission, the other party awaited another opportunity.

Aurungzebe understood and took advantage of these feuds. The reader, at all acquainted with the Hindoo character, can conceive the bitter rancour with which they pursued these





quarrels, when there are several instances of one party becoming a Mahomedan, in order to ruin his adversary and gratify revenge. The services of the Hindoo munsudars, under the Mahomedan states, became exactly in proportion to the measure of punishment or reward which the government they acknowledged could inflict or bestow.

This brief survey of the state of the Deccan must be understood to apply to that period which followed the first year of Sumbhaje's accession, up to the fall of Beejapoor and Golcondah, when additional causes of disturbance and confusion will appear. But previously to entering upon the war which was directed by Aurungzebe in person, it is fit to notice an extraordinary event which occurred amongst our own countrymen, in their then small establishment on the west of India, of which Surat was, at that time, the residence of the governor, or president of the council, under whom the East India Company's factories on the coast were managed.

In December 1683, the garrison of Bombay at the head of which was Captain Keigwin, confined the deputy of the governor of Surat, declared they held the island for the king, and that they would submit to no other authority. This act of rebellion being limited to a small insulated space, and Keigwin its instigator, a firm, resolute man, who maintained order amongst his inferiors, notwithstanding the pernicious example he had set, the ruinous consequences so much to be dreaded were happily obviated, and an amnesty having been promised by Sir Thomas Grantham, whom the president in council at Surat had named to act under a general commission obtained from the king, the whole island was surrendered and restored to the lawful authorities, 11th November 1684.

The state of parties in England had probably as great an effect in occasioning this proceeding as its immediate cause. The interests of commercial adventurers, and the rival East India Company, which sprang up about this time, created a variety of reports, and spread opinions in India prejudicial to the existing company. This, no doubt, tended to diminish that respect for them in the eyes of their own servants, which was of so much importance to the preservation of their authority.

The directors injudiciously chose this period for reducing their expenses by decreasing the allowances of their military.



The president in council at Surat carried the orders into effect in that ungracious and arbitrary manner which appears to have marked the government of Sir John Child, and, in the state of feeling which these various causes were likely to produce in high-spirited rash men, the revolt which ensued, however inexcusable, is not surprising.

It was fortunate that the president had not the means of attempting to enforce immediate obedience, otherwise it is possible the rebels might have been driven to the infamous alternative of making over the island to the Moghuls or the Mahrattas. Keigwin's management, however, in several respects, merited commendation, particularly in having obtained from Sumbhajee not only a confirmation of the articles agreed to by Sivajee, but a grant for the establishment of factories at Cuddalore and Thevenapatam, an exemption from duties in the Carnatic, and the balance of compensation for losses sustained by the English at different places formerly plundered by the Mahrattas.

We now return to affairs of greater magnitude than those of the infant establishments of the East India Company, connected, however, not only with our subject, but intimately linked with the causes by which the British nation has obtained such vast power in that distant portion of the globe.

*A.D. 1684* Aurungzebe, whom we have mentioned as marching to Burhanpoor, remained there for some months regulating several departments in finance, and settling plans for the approaching grand arrangements he had in contemplation. He first ordered Sultan Mauzum, now dignified with the title of Shah Alum, to proceed in advance from Ahmednugur with his whole army, and reduce Sumbhajee's southern territory, whilst Sultan Azim was directed to reduce his northern forts about Candeish, Buglana, and Sungumnere, and to commence by besieging the important fortress of Salheir, the acquisition of which by Moro Punt had afforded such facility for Mahratta inroads through Candeish. Accordingly, Sultan Mauzum descended into the Concan by the Ambadurray Ghaut, near Nassuck, and passing the Kallian district, already devastated, advanced to the southward, where he plundered and burnt the country from Raigurh





to Vingorla. Sultan Azim marched towards Salheir, where much resistance was expected, but Neknam Khan, the Moghul killidar of Molheir, who joined the prince on his advance, had obtained a previous promise from his neighbour, the Mahratta havildar, to surrender Salheir as soon as the army came before it. Such negotiations being always doubtful in their issue, Neknam Khan had prudently communicated the agreement to the emperor only; the place, however, was evacuated, and the prince, with the feeling of a very young commander, disappointed in the expected fame of the conquest, expressed great displeasure at being sent on such a service. He was shortly after recalled, the emperor promising to employ him in the war against Beejapoor. Shahabodeen Khan was, therefore, ordered to reduce the remainder of the forts, but met with an unexpected resistance from the havildar of Ramseje, by whom his troops being repeatedly repulsed, Khan Jehan Buhadur was sent to repair the failure, but after many vaunting attempts, equally unsuccessful as those of his predecessor, he was compelled to retire with disgrace.

Sultan Mauzum's army, although they had overrun the greater part of the Concan, do not appear to have come prepared for sieges; the forts and places of strength still remained in the hands of Sumbhajee, who during this inroad sent his cavalry to subsist in the upper country, whilst he himself retired with Sultan Akber to Vishalgurh. The distresses occasioned by the ravages of the invading army soon recoiled upon themselves, and scarcity prevailed in their camp. Sumbhajee, taking advantage of the improvident waste they had made, ordered down his horse, and directed them, assisted by the different garrisons of the forts, to stop the roads, cut off supplies, harass them by desultory attacks, and destroy the foragers and stragglers. The Mahratta horse found subsistence from the grass and grain stored under the protection of the forts, but the Moghuls were soon in great distress, and thousands of followers, horses, and cattle perished.

The emperor, apprized of their situation, but unwilling to sanction what might seem a defeat, directed the force under Shahbodeen Khan to proceed for the purpose of opening the communication; and orders were sent to the Moghul governor at Surat



to embark supplies for Dhunda Rajepoor and Vingorla. The demand being urgent, the vessels were sent off, as laden, without waiting for convoy, and Sumbhajee's cruizers, apprized of their approach, took the greater part. Such a scanty supply arrived that it became impossible to exist in that situation, and Sultan Mauzum was obliged to retire towards the Ambah Ghaut, which he ascended, and afterwards cantoned his army, during the monsoon, near Wulwa on the banks of the Kistna.

Shahabodeen Khan, when directed to march for the relief of the prince, advanced as far as Nizampoor near Raigurh, when he was opposed by Sumbhajee, whom he defeated, probably in a very partial action; but small advantages are always over-estimated in unsuccessful campaigns. Shahabodeen, being a personal favourite with the emperor and at the head of a body of Tooranee Moghuls, his countrymen, whom it was the emperor's desire to conciliate, was honored with the title of Ghazee-ud-deen, and the recollection of his failure at Ramseje purposely obliterated. Such, we may here observe, is the earliest account we have, in the history of the Deccan, of the ancestor of the family of Nizam-ool-Moolk, afterwards so conspicuous in the annals of that country.

The emperor, in the meantime, had quitted Burhanpoor, and arrived at Aurungabad. During his stay at the former city, amongst other arrangements, he issued orders for the collection of the jizeea, a poll-tax levied on all his subjects not Mahomedans, which was to be as strictly exacted in the Deccan as in the northern part of the empire.

To reconcile such a measure with that character for wisdom which has been assigned to Aurungzebe is impossible; it would even be inexplicable in a person of ordinary capacity; but the workings of fanaticism always warp the understanding, and Aurungzebe may have supposed that his undertaking merited divine favour, by giving the people about to be conquered the alternative of conversion or taxation. There could be no political reason for such an edict, although his apologists may point out the mean one of gratifying the Mahomedan vulgar, and affording an earnest of what his emissaries professed at Beejapoor and Golcondah, that he was coming to the Deccan for the purpose of suppressing idolatry, and placing Mahomedan power



FROM A.D. 1680 TO A.D. 1689

on such a footing as would, in future, uphold the dignity of the faith of Islam.

The imperial service sustained considerable loss this year by the death of Dilere Khan. He had great experience in Deccan warfare, had seen more service than most officers of his time, and had signalized himself on many occasions. He was always suspected, and in his old age neglected, by the emperor, after having fought his battles for 26 years—a just retribution when we know that, in joining the crafty Aurungzebe, he became a traitor to the cause of the generous, confiding, and unfortunate Dara.

Sumbhajee was still at war with the Portuguese, and the latter had instigated the chief of Soonda and the Dessayes of Karwar to throw off their allegiance. Sumbhajee, about the end of the rains, sent some of his troops into northern Concan, and again plundered the exposed ports of the Portuguese possessions in that quarter; he himself came to Panalla to watch the motion of Sultan Mauzum's army.

The emperor, at the opening of the fair season, leaving Khan Jehan at Aurungabad, moved with the grand camp, in more than ordinary magnificence, towards Ahmednugur.

The number of his forces is not specified by any Moghul historian, and the estimate formed by the Mahrattas is quite incredible. The display of power, however presented by Aurungzebe's march into the Deccan, was grand and imposing to a degree which has seldom been surpassed. Besides foreigners, his cavalry, assembled from Cabul, Candahar, Mooltan, Lahore, Rajpootana, and the extended provinces of his vast empire, was the flower of his army, and presented an array of gigantic men and horses completely armed and accoutred, whom, it might be imagined, the more slender and lighter-armed natives of the Deccan could hardly venture to oppose. His infantry was also numerous, and was composed of musketeers, matchlockmen, and archers, well equipped; besides bodies of hardy Bundelas and Mewattees accustomed to predatory contests among the mountains, and the better able to cope with the Mahratta Mawulees. To these were afterwards added many thousands of infantry, raised in the Carnatic. Besides a number of field-pieces, which accompanied the royal tents, there were several hundred pieces



of cannon manned by natives of Hindostan, and directed by European gunners, and a great number of miners were attached to the park of artillery, with artizans of every description. A long train of war-elephants was followed by a number of the same animals on the emperor's private establishment, employed to carry the ladies of his seraglio, or to convey such of his tents as were too large to be borne on camels. Numerous led horses, magnificently caparisoned, formed a stud for the emperor's riding; a menagerie accompanied the camp, from which the rarest animals in the world were frequently brought forth, and exhibited by their keepers before the emperor and his court; whilst hawks, hounds, hunting tigers, trained elephants, and every accompaniment used for field sport, swelled the pomp of this prodigious retinue. The canvas walls, which encompassed the royal tents, formed a circumference of 1,200 yards, and contained every description of apartment to be found in the most specious palace. Halls of audience for public assemblies and privy councils, with all the courts and cabinets attached to them, each hall magnificently adorned, and having within it a raised seat or throne for the emperor, surrounded by gilded pillars with canopies of velvet, richly fringed and superbly embroidered; separate tents as mosques and oratories; baths and galleries for archery and gymnastic exercises; a seraglio as remarkable for luxury and privacy as that of Delhi; Persian carpets, damasks, and tapestries; European velvets, satins, and broad-cloths; Chinese silks of every description, and Indian muslins and cloth of gold, were employed in all the tents with the utmost profusion and effect. Gilded balls and cupolas surmounted the tops of the royal tents; the outside of which, and the canvas walls, were of a variety of lively colours, disposed in a manner which heightened the general splendour. The entrance into the royal enclosure was through a spacious portal, flanked by two elegant pavilions, from which extended, on each side, rows of cannon, forming an avenue, at the extremity of which was an immense tent containing the great state drums and imperial band;—a little farther in front was the post of the grand guard on duty, commanded by a nobleman, who mounted with it daily. On the other sides, surrounding the great enclosure just mentioned, were separate tents for the emperor's armoury, harness, &c.; a tent for water, kept





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cool with salpetre; another for fruit, a third for sweetmeats, a fourth for betel, and so on, with numerous kitchens, stables, &c., &c. Such luxury in a camp is scarcely to be conceived; but, besides what has been described, every tent had its exact duplicate, which was sent on in advance to be prepared against the emperor's arrival. His march was a procession, and, when he entered his pavilions, a salvo from 50 or 60 pieces of ordnance announced the event; and he assumed and maintained every form and ceremony observed at the established residences of the imperial court.

The magnificence of such a spectacle, which formed a remarkable contrast with the plain, and even austere, personal habits of the emperor, was intended to strengthen his power by the awe with which it impressed his subjects; but as his state was imitated by his nobles, it proved a serious encumbrance to the movements of his army, while the devouring expense of such establishments pressed hard on his finances, and soon crippled even the most necessary of his military and political arrangements.

We may easily suppose that the inconveniences of this style of magnificence, of which all the Moghul camps in some degree partook, must have been already experienced by Sultan Mauzum during his campaign in the Concan. Whilst he lay at Walwa above the Ghauts, he took possession in the emperor's name of such parts of the country as he could cover, and deeds are yet extant confirming in his own name grants of lands originally given by the Beejapoor government. In the month of October a pestilence broke out in his camp, which swept off many of his men, and greatly diminished his force; but, on receiving the emperor's orders to reduce the south-west districts above the Ghauts, formerly taken by Sivajee from Beejapoor, he advanced without hesitation for that purpose, and Azim Shah, who had commenced the war against Beejapoor with indifferent success, opened the campaign to the northward by laying siege to Sholapoor.

Sumbhajee's troops in the Concan under the command of Humbeer Rao, apprized of the exposed state of  
*A.D. 1685* Candeish, were secretly reinforced by several detachments, and moved off to the northward. They suddenly appeared at Burhanpoor, plundered it of much



property and riches for several days, and retired as rapidly as their heavy loads would permit, leaving the whole country, in their route from Burhanpoor to Nassuck, in a blaze.

Khan Jehan, on hearing of this inroad, moved from Aurungabad in pursuit; but, in place of marching to Chandore or Unkye Tunkye to cut off their retreat, which he might have done, he crossed the range of hills at the Ajunta pass, and wheeled round to the left, but he never came within five marches of the Mahrattas. After having followed them to a considerable distance to the southward, he received orders to place thannas in the country between Joonere and Singurh, whilst the young prince, Kaum Bukhsh, was sent to cover Burhanpoor.

Khan Jehan took possession of Poona and the adjacent country, where he left Khakur Khan as foudjar, and was proceeding, by the emperor's order, to support Azim Shah, who had taken Sholapoor, and was advancing towards Beejapoor: but the prince, finding that he could not contend with Shirzee Khan, had re-crossed the Beema, which made the junction of Khan Jehan unnecessary.

Sultan Mauzum, meanwhile, had successively captured Gokauk, Hooblee, and Dharwar, in which he had met with little resistance; but famine, pestilence, and the drafts from his force required to garrison the new acquisitions, had so greatly reduced the numbers and efficiency of his troops, that when attacked by a small detachment, sent against him from Beejapoor, he was scarcely able to defend himself. Roh Oolla Khan was immediately sent forward with a party to his assistance, and Khan Jehan was ordered to cover Roh Oolla Khan. Until this succour arrived, the prince's army was constantly harassed; most of the horses being dead, nobles and troopers were reduced to the necessity of marching and fighting on foot, which even the common horsemen considered a degrading hardship. The wreck of this fine army returned to Ahmednugur, more effectually reduced than if they had been vanquished in many battles.

After assisting Sultan Mauzum's shattered army, and escorting the prince to the frontiers, Khan Jehan and Roh Oolla Khan returned, and cantoned at Hulmullee, in the Beejapoor territory, during the monsoon. At the opening of the season these two officers were ordered to invest Beejapoor.





Mahdhuna Punt's endeavours to effect union in opposing Aurungzebe were ineffectual, even when the intentions of the latter in regard to Beejapoor were avowed. Sumbhajee made no effort to aid that state, but he engaged to assist Golcondah, and received a subsidy of one lakh of pagodas from Abou Hoossein. This alliance was communicated to the emperor, and the conditions came to his knowledge at a subsequent period. He immediately ordered Khan Jehan to advance into the Hyderabad territories, under pretence of receiving the arrears of tribute. Sadut Khan accompanied the army as envoy, with secret instructions, not merely to demand satisfaction for this alliance with Sumbhajee, but to provoke any fit cause of widening the breach, and producing a rupture with Hyderabad.

The emperor marched from Ahmednugur towards Sholapoor, and directed a body of troops stationed at Joonere, under Ghazee-ud-deen, to move towards Ahmednugur. The Mahrattas, again seizing this opportunity, made a rapid march to the northward, crossed the Naptée and Nerbuddah, and assaulted and took the city of Baroach within a few hours after their approach was known. It is probable that Sultan Akber was the instigator, if not the leader, of this enterprize; he was actively employed against his brother during the campaign in the Concan, and on this occasion the party proclaimed him emperor, plundered and exacted all they could, and did not retire until the approach of the soobehdar of Guzerat who had assembled the troops of the province, and marched against them.

The sack both of Burhanpoor and Baroach are principally to be ascribed to Aurungzebe's want of military arrangement. Intent on his own schemes against the Mahomedan states, he neither covered his own country, nor took time to study the genius of the people, whom his early ambition and his present negligence alike fostered, and for whom he still entertained a contempt, fatal to the security of his empire.

The operations against Beejapoor were renewed. Sultan Azim moved forward about the end of the year, and approached the capital with a large army. The officers of Beejapoor, although they had before opposed him on the frontier successfully, now retired before him. This was judicious. Very little rain had fallen this year, a scarcity prevailed, and the little grain which



had been produced in the neighbourhood of Beejapoor was, as usual, secured within the fort. To the northward, in the province of Aurungabad, the harvest had been more plentiful, but grain was exceedingly dear in the grand camp at Sholapoor, which drew its supplies from the northward. To have attacked Azim Shah, therefore, in the neighbourhood of the emperor's camp, would comparatively have been of little advantage. They allowed him to approach the city, when they cut off the communication between him and the camp at Sholapoor, interrupted his supplies, destroyed foragers, harassed the army by false attacks and skirmishes, and in a very short time Azim Shah

*A.D. 1686* was in great distress. The scarcity in his own camp prevented the emperor from forwarding supplies from Sholapoor. Ghazee-ud-deen Khan was therefore ordered to bring 20,000 bullock-loads of grain from Ahmednugur, and carry it on to Azim Shah's force, reinforced by a strong detachment under Dulput Rao from the grand army. This service was well performed by Ghazee-ud-deen. The Beejapoor troops saw the necessity of cutting off his convoy, and made a desperate attempt to effect their purpose, but they were defeated; and, after a well-contested action, the prince's troops were rescued from the disgrace and destruction which the loss of delay of the convoy had rendered unavoidable. On this occasion the princess Janee Begum, wife of Azim Shah, proceeding with the convoy to join her husband, mounted her elephant, and advanced into the battle encouraging the troops. Aurungzebe expressed himself more gratefully to Ghazee-ud-deen for thus relieving his son, than for any service ever performed by his officers.

Khan Jehan, according to the orders which were given, had advanced towards Hyderabad, but Mahdhuna Punt's preparations were in a more forward state than was expected, and Ibrahim Khan, the supposed friend of the minister, met the Moghuls at Mulkair, with an army of 70,000 men. Khan Jehan's force being quite unequal to contend with this host, and a retreat being exceedingly dangerous under such circumstances, he threw up intrenchments, and sent intelligence of his situation to the emperor. Sultan Mauzum was immediately despatched with a body of troops to his relief. In the meantime Ibrahim Khan, who had a fine army, and had Khan Jehan completely



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in his power, made no vigorous attacks, and, on the advance of Sultan Mauzum, his conduct was so treacherous, or his exertions so feeble, that the Moghuls marched on to Hyderabad with little opposition. The king retired into the fortress of Golcondah, notwithstanding Mahdhuna Punt's remonstrances; but at this time Ibrahim Khan treacherously deserted to the Moghuls, the city of Hyderabad was taken possession of, and, contrary to Sultan Mauzum's orders, plundered by the troops. The wisest minister is obnoxious in times of public misfortune; the enemies of Mahdhuna Punt, at the instigation of the king's mother-in-law, or some of the treacherous factions in league with the Moghuls, took advantage of the general outcry amongst the populace, and assassinated him. Abou Hoossein, although he had many amiable qualities, was destitute of the firmness and decision in which only his safety could be found, and, being thus left without an adviser, sued for peace. Aurungzebe, perceiving that the troops, the wealth, and the preparations at Hyderabad were more formidable than he had contemplated, and that Beejapoor seemed likely to make considerable resistance, agreed to a peace, on being promised two crores of rupees in treasure and effects, which Sultan Mauzum was left to collect. The prince and Khan Jehan fell under the emperor's displeasure for not securing the plunder of Hyderabad, and Aurungzebe, recollecting the vast treasure he had obtained there in 1655, became jealous of the wealth they were supposed to have secreted, for purposes similar perhaps to what his own had been. Khan Jehan was therefore ordered to Lahore, and, although he rejoined the emperor some years afterwards, he was never again actively employed.

The emperor now moved to Beejapoor. The walls of the city were of immense extent, and the fort, which communicates with it, is six miles in circumference. To invest the latter closely, therefore, required the presence of the grand army. There were different breaching batteries erected, but the principal one, under the immediate superintendence of Turbeeut Khan, was on the south face.

Shirzee Khan, Abdool Raoof, and Seedeas Zalim and Jumshed were the officers who defended the fort, under the young prince Sikunder. The garrison was not numerous, but, although ill-



paid and short of provisions, they still showed some remains of Patan valour, and fought with obstinacy. The emperor as he saw they must surrender, and as the occasion was not pressing, prudently deferred the assault after the breach was practicable, choosing rather to trust a little to the effects likely to be produced in them by reflection on their hopeless situation, embittered by privation, than to assault men, who, under such circumstances, would have fought with desperation, and exulted in an opportunity of dying with their swords in their hands.

Aurungzebe was not disappointed; for, although they had still an inner fort much stronger than the outward works, the garrison were so much in want of provisions that they were compelled to surrender on or about 15th October 1686. Shirzee Khan concluded the terms through Ghazee-ud-deen, to whom the emperor, agreeably to custom, when he received such proposals through any of his officers, was pleased to assign the nominal honor of the conquest.

The principal officers were admitted into the imperial service, and a munsub of 7,000 horse, with the title of Roostum Khan, was conferred on Shirzee Khan. The young prince Sikunder Adil Shah was kept a close prisoner in the Moghul camp for three years, when he died suddenly, not without suspicion of having been poisoned by Aurungzebe.

Beejapoor henceforth ceased to be a capital, and was soon after deserted. The walls, which are of hewn stone and very lofty, are to this day entire, and, being surmounted by the cupolas and minarets of the public buildings, still present to a spectator from without the appearance of a flourishing city; but, within, all is solitude, silence, and desolation. The deep moat, the double rampart, and the ruins of the splendid palaces in the citadel, attest the former magnificence of the court. The great mosque is a grand edifice, and the tomb of Ibrahim Adil Shah, already mentioned, is remarkable for its elegant and graceful architecture, but the chief feature in the scene is the mausoleum of Mohummud Adil Shah, the dome of which fills the eye from every point of view, and, though in itself entirely devoid of ornament, its enormous dimensions and austere simplicity invest it with an air of melancholy grandeur, which harmonizes with the wreck and desolation that surround it. In the climate where





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Beejapoor is situated, the progress of decay is extremely rapid, and, until lately, nothing whatever was done to arrest its effects; but, when viewed as mere ruins, the remains of that city, as they at present exist, are exceedingly grand, and, as a vast whole, far exceed anything of the kind in Europe.

After the reduction of Beejapoor, immediate preparations were made by Aurungzebe for attacking Golcondah; but previously to violating the treaty so lately concluded by Sultan Mauzum, Aurungzebe added meanness to his want of faith, by directing Sadut Khan to procure as much treasure, and as many of Abou Hoossein's jewels, as could be extorted, by working on the hopes or the fears of that weak prince.

A Moghul foudjar or military governor of a district was appointed to command in Beejapoor; and another, named Kasim Khan, was sent with a detachment across the Kistna, to occupy as much of the country as possible, and induce the Dessayes, or zumeendars as they were commonly styled by the Moghuls, to acknowledge the imperial authority. Shirzee Khan, of Beejapoor, was sent to invade Sumbhajee's districts, and marched in the direction of Satara.

Whilst the emperor advanced towards Kulburga, on pretence of paying his devotions at the tomb of a celebrated saint, Ghazee-ud-deen was directed to move in a direction east and somewhat

*A.D. 1687* south of Beejapoor, intended, probably, to intercept any reinforcements that might be sent from Suggest, Adonee, or any part of the

Carnatic to the assistance of Golcondah. The emissaries of Aurungzebe were busily employed corrupting the troops of Hyderabad by bribes and promises; many of the officers were drawn over, and the envoy, Sadut Khan, by the lowest artifice, obtained possession of the jewels, even to the ornaments of the women, which the king stripped off, vainly hoping that this degrading compliance would satisfy the emperor or excite his commiseration. But feelings of pity never swayed the conduct of Aurungzebe; he declared war against Abou Hoossein by a manifesto, in which the principal articles of accusation, after a general charge of profligacy, were the employment of a Bramin minister, and an alliance with the idolator Sumbhajee. Roused at length to indignation against the merciless tyrant by whom



he was thus persecuted, but deserted by many whose services he had a right to expect, Abou Hoossein retired to the fort of Golcondah, supported by a few brave troops and officers who still remained faithful. The gallant defence of the fort, the heroic devotion of some of his followers, and the dignified self-possession he maintained to the last, have preserved his memory in Deccan tradition as the brave and good *Tannah Shah*, a title of doubtful meaning by which he is known in Maharashtra, but said to have been the name of a fugueer with whom the king was in habits of intimacy previous to his elevation.

The fort of Golcondah, after a siege of seven months, fell by treachery in the end of September 1687. Hyderabad is still a populous city, and forms, as our progress will explain, the capital of the soobehdar of the Deccan. Though much inferior to Beejapoor, it retains traces of a royal residence. The great mosque in particular is a fine edifice, and the tombs of the Kootub Shahee kings, with their glittering cupolas, overlooked by the fort of Golcondah, forms one of the most striking prospects in India.

It was during the memorable siege of Golcondah that Sultan Mauzum, falling under the unjust suspicion of the emperor was placed in confinement; and he remained in that situation, in his father's camp, for six years, when he was released and sent as governor to Cabul. His only fault seems to have been a remonstrance in behalf of the persecuted object of the emperor's unjust enmity, more honorable and generous than judicious, as it was attended with such effects to himself and to the unfortunate Abou Hoossein, who was sent to the fortress of Doulutabad, where he ended his days.

To secure the new conquests, and reduce the whole of the territories subject to Beejapoor and Golcondah, was now the first consideration. Reinforcements were sent to Kasim Khan in the Carnatic, to whose proceedings, as connected with the detail of Mahratta progress, we shall presently revert.

Khanzad Khan was sent to reduce the fort of Suggar, between Kulburga and Beejapoor, in possession of a chief of the Berud tribe, a caste of people in the Carnatic precisely similar to the Ramoosees of Maharashtra. This chief was a polygar, and could command 12,000 infantry, principally of his own tribe. His fort



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was situated amongst hills and jungles, extremely difficult of access; but, in dread of the Moghul name, he surrendered. As it was an invariable rule of Aurungzebe to bestow great honors on all who unresistingly acknowledged his authority, this Ramoosee Naik, greatly to the amusement of the courtiers, was raised to the rank of a commander of 5,000 in the Moghul empire. He survived his honors but a few days; and his son Pemnaik, finding himself uncomfortable in the splendour of his new situation, withdrew to the woods, and, collecting a band of his tribe, took up his abode in Wakinkerah, a walled village near Suggest, where, by plunder and robbery, he gradually added to his numbers, and in less than 20 years we shall find the last personal effort of the mighty Aurungzebe directed to reduce the Berud Naik of Wakinkerah.

Azim Shah and Ghazee-ud-deen, at the same time that the other detachments were sent off, marched against Adonee, still in possession of Musaood Khan, formerly regent of Beejapoor. Considering resistance as altogether hopeless, Musaood Khan resigned his possessions, but declined entering the imperial service, and died in respectable obscurity.

The eastern quarter of Golcondah was not overlooked. Rajamundree, and the seaports of Mausulipatam and Ganjam, were taken possession of; the detachments were successful in all quarters, and the governors of Kuddapah, Conjevaram, and Poonamalee submitted.

Those tracts of Carnatic and Drawed, which had been subject to the subverted kingdoms of Beejapoor and Golcondah, were indiscriminately termed Carnatic by the Moghuls; but the districts which had belonged to the former state were known as Beejapoor Carnatic, and those which had appertained to the latter as Hyderabad Carnatic. The former lay in the upper country, or Carnatic proper; the latter extended from Guntoor along the Coromandel coast, and included portions of territory intermixed with the Mahratta possessions, as far south as the Coleroon. No part of the Payeen Ghaut belonged to Beejapoor, as all its possessions in that quarter were conquered by Sivajee; but several places in the Bala Ghaut, or Carnatic proper, were still comprehended in the Hyderabad Carnatic, amongst which may be enumerated Gootee, near Adonee, and the districts of Gurumcondah, Gandicotta, and Sidhout.



After the fall of Golcondah, the grand camp moved towards Beejapoor, whilst the detachments, whose destination we have briefly noticed, were occupying and settling the country on every side; and before we revert to the share which the Mahrattas had in the events of this period, it is fit to explain, without a superfluous enumeration of all the establishment, the mode in which the Moghuls took possession of a district.

Two officers were appointed to it, the foudar and the khalsa dewan. The foudar was a military officer, in command of a body of troops, charged with the care of the police, and the protection of his division. He held, or according to circumstances, assumed, a greater or less degree of power. The regular amount allowed him for the maintenance of the district establishment was about 25 per cent of the government collections. The duties of the dewan were entirely of a civil nature, and he was intrusted with the collection of the revenue, whether of the exchequer or on account of a jagheerdar. The Moghul commanders, who received what were called jagheers from the newly-acquired territories of Hyderabad and Beejapoor, seldom had lands permanently made over similar to the tenure by which the Mahratta mun subdars held their possessions; the usual practice was to grant assignments for a term of years, on specified districts, for the support of their troops. Thus the foudars were more on the footing of feudatories than the jagheerdars. The foudars, in conjunction with the dewan, farmed out the districts to the deshmooks or dessayes, and the dewan realized the amount from them. There were commonly several foudars in each soobeh. The Moghul conquests in the Deccan, which had formerly consisted of four soobehs, now, with the addition of Beejapoor and Golcondah, were formed into six.

During the rapid progress of Aurungzebe's conquests, the personal inactivity of Sumbhajee is ascribed, by the Mahratta writers, to the effects of the incantations of the magician Kuloosha. The fact appears to have been that Sumbhajee's habits had become abandoned, and he was generally lost in the stupor or derangement occasioned by a brutal excitement of the senses. He still might be roused to temporary activity; but although many of his father's officers, besides the few who were employed, were well qualified to assist at this crisis, they were



deterred from acting by the jealousy of Kuloosha or the violence of his master.

The Mahratta munsibdars, who had been in the service of Beejapoor after the fall of the capital, sent professions of duty to the emperor, but they showed no readiness to join his standard. Shirzee Khan was, as we have seen, detached for the purpose of attacking Sumbhaje's possessions, and the munsibdars alluded to were ordered to co-operate, but it is not ascertained that they joined him. Shirzee Khan, after penetrating as far as Waee was attacked and defeated by Humbeer Rao, the Senaputtee, a victory dearly purchased by the loss of Humbeer Rao, who was mortally wounded on the occasion. The advantage which the Mahrattas had gained was not neglected in consequence of this misfortune; several of their detachments pushed forward and occupied a great part of the open country towards Beejapoor. Parties of Mahratta horse made their appearance at Golcondah during the siege of that place, but they acted with no vigour, and scarcely caused any interruption to the operations. The most important diversion which Sumbhaje attempted, was by sending off a detachment to the Carnatic under the orders of Kessoo Punt Pingley, the late Peishwa's brother, with Suntajee Ghorepuray as his second-in-command.

The preconcerted plan was to unite with Hurjee Raja Mahareek, and their ultimate design, the occupation of the districts in the upper Carnatic, which had been the jagheer of Shahjee, and were still held by Venkajee, from whom Sumbhaje had received neither share nor tribute since his accession. But, on the arrival of the army at Ginjee, disputes and jealousies arose between Kessoo Punt and his nephew Neloo Punt; and it was supposed, or perhaps given out by the latter, that Kessoo Punt had some secret orders to dispossess Hurjee Raja of the government.

Venkajee, whether aware of this expedition, or foreseeing that it would not be in his power to defend the paternal jagheer, was at this time in treaty with Chick Deo Raj, raja of Mysore, for the sale of Bangalore; but the negotiation having become a matter of notoriety, the Mahrattas at Ginjee were intent on possessing themselves of it before the transfer should take place, and the Moghuls became equally desirous of anticipating them. The dissensions which prevailed at Ginjee, which, as in all other



situations, are the bane of active service, delayed the Mahrattas. Kasim Khan arrived first, took Bangalore without resistance, and sold it a few days afterwards to Chick Deo Raj for three lakhs of rupees—the same sum as the raja had agreed to pay to Venkajee.

Kessoo Punt and Suntajee Ghorepuray, frustrated in their design upon Bangalore, entered the country of Mysore, where they levied contributions and remained several months, but made no permanent conquests, and, after hearing of the fall of Golcondah and the rapid progress of the Moghuls, they returned in the end of the year to Ginjee.

Hurjee Raja, alarmed at the approach of the Moghuls, and the submission of the neighbouring officers, at last united with

*A.D. 1688* Kessoo Punt, and they succeeded in possessing themselves of several places; but a large body

of the Moghul troops arriving in the neighbourhood, and no cordial union existing among the Mahrattas, they were compelled to relinquish these new acquisitions, and retire to the protection of their forts on each side of the Paliar.

Ouscotta, another of the oldest Mahratta possessions in the Carnatic, was this year wrested from Venkajee by the raja of Mysore, which might have easily been prevented by the aid of Sumbhajee's troops; but where Mahrattas have hereditary disputes, they can seldom be induced to set them aside, even in behalf of their common interests.

Their power in the Carnatic was rapidly declining; and, if their strength in Maharashtra had not depended on causes altogether different from anything consolidated or regular, Aurungzebe's plans of conquest would not have proved visionary, and the Mahratta name must have speedily sunk into his former obscurity.

Sumbhajee had become completely careless of all general business; he spent his time between Panalla and Vishalgurh, or at a favourite house and garden in Sungumeshwur. The only plan on which he seems to have been particularly intent, in his present state of imbecility, was connected with his early success, and during his lucid intervals he was planning the capture of Goa, but failure attended all his intrigues. The whole power was in the hands of Kuloosha, and the time of the minister



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seems to have been more occupied in managing his master's humours, than in attending to the important business of the state. Prince Mohummud Akber, whose advice and intelligence had been of service to Sumbhaje, became disgusted with his situation, and after the fall of Beejapoor, finding he had nothing to hope and much to fear by remaining longer in India, obtained Sumbhaje's permission, hired a vessel at Rajapoor, commanded by an Englishman, withdrew to the court of Persia, where he resided for 20 years, and died at Ispahan in 1706.

The laxity, to which we have already adverted as having taken place in the discipline of the Mahratta army soon after Sivajee's death, greatly increased in a few years; and, although extremely detrimental to Sumbhaje's resources as head of an organized state, it had a wonderful effect in extending predatory power; for every lawless man, and every disbanded soldier, whether Mahomedan or Mahratta, who could command a horse and a spear, joined the Mahratta parties, and such adventurers were often enriched by the plunder of a day. The spirit which, independent of every other cause, was thus excited amongst a people fond of money, and disposed to predatory habits, can easily be imagined. The multitude of horsemen nurtured by former wars were already found too heavy a burden on a regular state, and no resources could support them. The proportion of the best troops which was retained in the imperial service would probably have soon enabled Aurungzebe to suppress the disorders commonly attendant on Indian conquest, had there been no spirit kindled amongst the Mahratta people. But a pride in the conquests of Sivajee, their confidence in the strength of the forts, the skill and bravery of several of the Mahratta leaders, the ability and influence of many of the Bramins, and, lastly, the minds of the Hindoo population aroused by reports of the odious poll-tax, to jealous watchfulness on the tenderest point, had, in addition to what we have already enumerated, excited a ferment which required not only vast means, but an entire change of measures, before it could possibly be allayed.

Aurungzebe possessed great military strength and pecuniary resource; he also had considerable local knowledge, and, in the first instance, the same power of confirming or withholding hereditary rights, as his predecessors in conquest. Titles,



munsubs, and jagheers were frequently bestowed, and still more frequently promised, with a liberality greater than any former conqueror had shown; but presumption, jealousy, and bigotry soon deprived him of many of those advantages. He was not fully aware of the strength or the nature of predatory power, and instead of crushing it by the aid of the established governments, he pulled down those constituted authorities without replacing them; he involved himself with enemies on every side; he discharged the soldiery, whom, in addition to his own troops, he could not maintain, and thus sent armies into the field against himself. He supposed that he was not only acquainted with the details of arrangements necessary in a newly-conquered country, but capable of superintending them; he placed little confidence in his agents, whilst he, at the same time, employed Mahomedans in all situations to fill which, in many instances, policy and humanity, alike dictated the selection of Hindoos. The confusion and disorder which ensued could not be tranquillized by the emperor's fancied wisdom, or the flattery and praises of his court and countrymen. The Mahrattas, more especially the Bramins, are not a people so easily dazzled as the Mahomedans, and, in the course of a very short time, they began to discover the weakness of the Moghuls.

The powerful Mankurees, Duflay, Ghatgay, Manay, Nimbalkur, &c., during the siege of Beejapoor, hovered about the imperial camp until the fall of the capital, when they withdrew to their jagheers, sending their wukeels with humble professions of duty, and sometimes attending themselves; but from this time they joined plundering parties of their own countrymen, or submitted to the Moghuls, as circumstances invited or compelled them. There were few plunderers independent of Sumbhajee's parties or some Mankurees, because the foudar's troops were always too powerful for common depredators. A few *Pindharees*, as all not belonging to Mahratta parties were termed, appeared about Beder, but they were soon suppressed, or driven to join the Mahratta standard. No irregulars of that description received pay, but were frequently taken under the protection of some Mahratta chief, and allowed to encamp near him, on condition of presenting frequent *nuzurs*, or, in other words, giving up a part of their plunder.



The Mankurees, whilst their envoys were in the imperial camp professing "perpetual obedience and fidelity to Aurungzebe, the king of the world," frequently sent their parties to plunder the Moghul districts; and, in case of discovery, the Bramin wukeel, who had secured the patronage of some great man at court by bribery, was ready to answer for, or excuse, the irregular conduct of his master's followers. The Moghul foudjars were instructed to conciliate the Mahratta chiefs on condition of their agreeing to serve with fidelity. The chiefs were negotiating with the foudjar; their wukeels were intriguing at court; their own villages were secure; and their followers, under the general name of Mahrattas, were ravaging some other part of the country.

The Moghul officers, who had jagheer assignment in the Deccan, soon found that they could raise very little revenue; their corruption was increased by poverty, and the offenders, who had, in the first instance, plundered their districts by purchasing the connivance of the foudjars, bribed the jagheerdars at court with a part of the pillage.

The hereditary rights and the family feuds which had been before usefully applied as an instrument of government, now became, in the general confusion of this period, a great cause of increasing disorder. The intricate nature of some of the hereditary claims in dispute, and the ingenuity of Bramins, who were always the managers; made every case so plausible, that the officers of government found little difficulty in excusing, or at least palliating, many acts of gross injustice, to which they scandalously lent themselves. Thus the rightful owners had often good reason for complaint; they absented themselves with their troops, joined the plunderers, and, when induced or compelled to come in, they boldly justified their behaviour by the injustice they had suffered.

When an hereditary office was forfeited, or became vacant in any way, the Moghul government selected a candidate on whom it was conferred: but the established premium of the exchequer was upwards of six and a half years' purchase, or precisely 651 per cent on one year's emoluments, one-fourth of which was made payable at the time of delivering the deeds, and the remainder by instalments; but, besides this tax, an infinite number



of fees and perquisites were exacted by the clerks, all which lent encouragement to confiscations and new appointments. The emperor increasing in years was soon overwhelmed in more important cares than the mere details of business; his ministers and their underlings were alike negligent and corrupt, and even after deeds and papers were prepared, years elapsed before the orders they contained were put in execution. In these remarks we have both recurred to events, and, in some degree, anticipated the consequences of those that are to follow; but such is a correct picture of the times for upwards of 12 years after the fall of Beejapoor and Golcondah. At the end of that period, the effects and continued growth of the causes enumerated completely undermined the Moghuls, and their power crumbled like the aged and still splendid fabric, which it is impossible to repair, but which a few revolving seasons must level with the ground.

Upwards of a year was spent by the emperor at Beejapoor, during which success attended his arms in every quarter, and

*A.D. 1689* nothing in Sumbhaje's upper country, except the strong forts, remained unsubdued. The

Moghul troops had possessed themselves of Tattora, and of the range of forts built by Sivajee between that place and Panalla; and Aurungzebe was now preparing to enter on a regular plan for reducing the whole of the forts, being, in his opinion, all that remained to complete the conquest he had so long meditated. His design, however, was soon partially obstructed by the breaking out of a disease in his camp, which swept off numbers of his troops; but on moving to Auklooj, on the banks of the Neera, it subsided.

About this period the attention of the emperor was attracted to the English, and, in consequence of piracies which began to be committed by individuals, several of the factories belonging to the East India Company were seized. This was no uncommon measure for Aurungzebe to adopt when any of the Moghul ships were taken, and he more than once threw the president at Surat into confinement. On the present occasion the Seedee was ordered to drive them from Bombay. Yakoot Khan made a descent upon the island, and possessed himself of Mazagon, Sion, and Mahim, but could make no impression on the fort. The attack, however, continued, until the English



appeared Aurungzebe, by the usual expedients of bribes to the courtiers, and the humblest submission. The Seedee quitted the island after he had remained upon it nearly a year.

After the emperor's arrival at Auklooj, plundering parties of Mahrattas were frequently heard of, but intelligence was received that one very large body had appeared near Nassuck, where the Moghul troops in the neighbourhood were not sufficient to oppose them. The Prince Azim Shah was detached with an army to that quarter; a considerable force under Yeatikad Khan, the son of Aurungzebe's prime minister, Assud Khan, was ordered to prepare for the invasion of the Concan; and Tukurrib Khan, an active partizan, who had been a distinguished officer under the unfortunate Abou Hoossein, was sent with a detachment into the district of Kolapoor, of which he was also appointed foudar. The Moghul troops were in possession of the open country in that quarter, but the Mahrattas still occupied Panalla with a strong garrison. Tukurrib Khan, having on his arrival taken pains to inform himself of everything in his neighbourhood, hearing that Sumbhajee spent his time at Sungumeshwur, entirely off his guard, conceived the bold project of seizing his person.

Having procured correct intelligence, and guides well acquainted with the Ghauts and the intricate windings of the route, he chose a few active infantry, and a small party of horse, with which, accompanied by his son, Ikhlass Khan, he set off from Kolapoor in prosecution of his enterprize. He was close upon Sungumeshwur before he was discovered, and when at last Sumbhajee's Jasooses ran to him with the intelligence, he was found intoxicated, and told them he would cut their noses off if they dared to bring such insulting stories about the approach of Mussulmans to him.

Ikhlass Khan had given little time for warning; he dashed on at the head of a small party, entered the gate of the Gurhee before the Mahrattas could close it, cut down all who opposed him, and thus secured an entrance to his father.

Most of Sumbhajee's followers saved themselves by a precipitate flight; the few that remained, at the head of whom was Kuloosha, endeavoured to defend their master, but Kuloosha being wounded by an arrow, they were speedily overpowered,



and Sumbhajee, although he attempted disguise, was discovered by some valuable ornaments on his person, of which he had not time or presence of mind to divest himself. Besides Kuloosha there were 24 persons taken with him.

Tukurrib Khan brought his prisoners in safety to Kolapoor, and, on reporting his success, was directed to bring them under a strong escort to the imperial camp, which, prevails to the arrival of Tukurrib Khan, had moved up the Beema, and cantoned at Tolapoor, at the junction of the Indooranee river, 16 miles north-east of Poona.

No effort was made to rescue Sumbhajee; the measures of his favourite, added to his own misconduct, had rendered them both deservedly odious to the generality of his subjects; and even had his army been disposed to undertake any enterprize in his favour, its loose and disordered state would probably have prevented the attempt.

On the arrival of the prisoners in the neighbourhood of the imperial camp, they were bound and exalted upon camels; Sumbhajee was deprived of his turban; drums, and all sorts of noisy music, sounded before him, and countless thousands flocked on all sides to see his entry into the camp. The prisoners were exhibited before Aurungzebe, and afterwards ordered into confinement, previous to their final sentence.

Some of the Moghul nobility suggested the propriety of sparing the life of Sumbhajee, as a means of inducing his troops to surrender the forts; and Aurungzebe also, with this view, perhaps did intend to spare him conditionally. But Sumbhajee, roused to a sense of his situation, stung with shame and remorse, expected and wished for nothing but death, and made use of every epithet of abuse to induce some rash soldier to kill him. When in this frame of mind, Aurungzebe sent a message offering him life on condition of his becoming a Mussulman. "Tell the emperor," said Sumbhajee, "that if he will give me his daughter I will become a Mussulman," and concluded his reply by an invective on the prophet.

No words more insulting than that speech could be used to a Mahomedan. The emperor, enraged, determined to make a terrible example of him; he ordered a red-hot iron to be drawn across his eyes, his tongue to be cut out, and his head to be severed from his body.





FROM A.D. 1680 TO A.D. 1689

Sumbhaje, in exact conformity with this mandate, was publicly executed in the camp bazar at Tolapoor, about the beginning of August 1689, together with his favourite Kuloosha. The Bramin minister, however unworthy in many respects, has, by a story characteristic of the invention of Mahomedans, and by the hatred of some of the Mahrattas, been unjustly accused of forming a scheme for betraying his master.

Sumbhaje's character has been sufficiently depicted, and scarcely requires a summary. He inherited some military virtue, and was far from deficient in ordinary ability; but dissipation, vice, rashness, and cruelty completely obscured his few good qualities, and a longer life would, in all probability, have greatly increased the catalogue of his crimes. But the Mahratta people, though for the last three years much estranged from him, heard of the murder of the son of Sivajee with indignation, and this cruel execution, meant to strike the leaders with terror aroused their vengeance without alarming their fears.



11

## *From A.D. 1689 to A.D. 1707*

FROM THE TIME of the execution of Soyera Bye, the widow of Sivajee, her son Raja Ram had been confined by his half-brother Sumbhajee in the fort of Raigurh. This confinement does not appear to have been more rigid than Sumbhajee found consistent with his own security. Raja Ram had the free use of the fort, and upon the death of his first wife, Sumbhajee married him to two others—the one named Tara Bye, the other Rajis Bye; the former of the family of Mohitey, the latter a daughter of Ghatgay of Cagul. Raja Ram lived on terms of friendship with Yessoo Bye, the legitimate wife of Sumbhajee, who, with her son Sivajee, resided in Raigurh.

On the news of Sumbhajee's death, the principal Mahratta leaders repaired to Raigurh, when it was determined, in consultation with Yessoo Bye, that Raja Ram should be declared regent during the minority of Sivajee, afterwards known by the name of Shao, and who was then entering his sixth year. At this council the principal people, besides the parties mentioned, were Jenardin Punt Hunwuntay, Prillhad Neerajee, the son of the late Nyadeish Purdhan, Ramchundur Punt Bowreekur, Khundoo Bullal Chitnees, Mahadajee Naik Pansumbul, Suntajee Ghorepuray, Dhunnajee Jadow, and Khundee Rao Dhabaray.

Prillhad Neerajee, with that ascendancy which superior minds acquire in times of real difficulty, took the lead in the consultations of this important assembly. They planned their measures with wisdom, unanimity, and firmness. They took a full view of the power and the preparations of Aurungzebe. They calculated their means of resistance, and saw, without dismay, a public treasury exhausted, the laxity of all discipline, the unprovided state of the forts, and even the probability of their being reduced. Their first endeavours, therefore, were directed to lay in provisions in the forts, and to keep the garrisons as complete as possible.



The regulation of Sivajee, which gave the troops composing the garrisons a perpetual and hereditary subsistence from lands dependent on the forts, was of infinite importance at this period. Orders were immediately issued to preserve these institutions carefully; and the commanders of the forts, in addition to being warned to lay in as much grain as possible, were particularly enjoined to observe the orders for cutting and stacking the grass of the pasture lands under the protection of the forts, so as to preserve subsistence for the horse, when forage in more accessible parts might not be procurable—a wise precaution of Sivajee, which had already proved useful during the time of Sumbhajee.

It was resolved that Raja Ram should move about from place to place along the line of forts from Raigurh to Vishalgurh; but, in order to distract the attention of the Moghuls, to make none of them his fixed residence; and should it be found unsafe for him to remain in Maharashtra, it was settled that he should quit the country, and repair to Ginjee, on the coast of Coromandel.

Yessoo Bye and her son remained in Raigurh, and the family of Raja Ram retired to Vishalgurh. The Mahratta chiefs were to act according to circumstances, but to keep most of their horse for the present at no great distance from the person of Raja Ram.

The Moghul besieging force, under Yeatikad Khan, destined for the Concan, could not enter that country before the fair season. The first place attack was Raigurh; but the Moghuls, though assisted by the Seedee, made little progress for several months, till a discontented Mahratta, named Sooryajee Peesal, who had served in the army of Sivajee, joined Yeatikad Khan, and engaged to bring a body of choice Mawulees provided he should be intrusted with the command of them, and obtain the Khan's assistance in getting possession of the hereditary rights of the Deshmookh of Waee, to which he pre-

*A.D. 1690*

tended a claim. These conditions being accepted, Peesal performed his part of the agreement, and the early surrender of the fort was principally ascribed to his exertions. Peesal accompanied Yeatikad Khan, and the Seedee had several of his ancient possessions restored to him.

The widow of Sumbhajee and her son Sivajee fell into the hands of Yeatikad Khan; they were conveyed to camp, where





the Khan was received with particular distinction, and honored with the title of Zoolfikar Khan. Yessoo Bye and her son found a friend in Begum Sahib, the daughter of Aurungzebe, and the emperor himself became partial to the boy, whom he named Sahoo, an appellation which pronouncing it Shao, he ever after chose to retain.

After the capture of Raigurh, detachments from the grand army advanced to Merich and Panalla, which were surrendered to the Moghuls, and Raja Ram was now advised to make good his way to Ginjee as soon as possible, before his plan of retiring there should be suspected. As preliminary arrangements, he had, by the advice of Prillhad Neerajee, adopted the precaution of appointing Neeloo Punt Moreishwur to his father's situation of Peishwa—a measure which secured Ginjee in his interests. The command of Vishalgurh, Rangna, and all the forts, with full and complete powers of government in the old provinces, was confided to Ramchunder Punt Bowreekur, with the title of Hookmut-punah. Under him was placed Pureshrum Trimluck, a Bramin, who, from the humble situation of hereditary Koolkurnee of Khinneye, had brought himself into notice, and had given proofs of intelligence and spirit. Seedojee Goojur, dignified with the title of Surkheil, was intrusted with the general command of the fleet, the superintendence of the maritime ports, and the defence of the coast. His second-in-command was a Mahratta, named Kanhojee Angria, whose father, Tookajee Angria, had early distinguished himself in Sivajee's fleet. The foresight of Prillhad Neerajee had also been the means of opening a correspondence with all the principal Mankurees, which, although it did not immediately induce them to make common cause against the Moghuls, directed their inclinations to that end.

Mahadajee Naik Pansumbul, an old man who had great weight with the sillidars of the country, was appointed Senaputtee, and left in Maharashtra. At his recommendation, the different leaders dispersed their horse amongst the villages, with directions to assemble at such place, and by such signal as might afterwards be made to them by the Senaputtee, and that all their friends, brethren, and connections should join the Bhugwa Jenda wherever it might appear.





After showing himself in his different forts, Raja Ram joined his confidential friends at Rangna, ready to prepare for flight. Having disguised themselves as Lingait Banians, they proceeded to Soonda, and thence across the country, towards the opposite coast. The party of Raja Ram on this occasion consisted of 25 persons, and amongst them are found the names of Prillhad Neerajee, Suntajee Ghorepuray, Dhunnajee Jadow, and Khundee Rao Dhabaray. Although the plan was well concerted, Aurungzebe got intelligence of the Raja's flight, and immediate orders were sent to Kasim Khan, foudar in the Beejapoor Carnatic, to intercept him. Similar orders were transmitted by Kasim Khan to his friends, and Raja Ram was in great jeopardy in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, where the slight circumstance of having his feet washed by a servant first attracted attention. The wary observation of Khundoo Bullal discovered that there was a plan for arresting the whole party, and, to disappoint the scheme, Khundoo Bullal, with the majority of the party, remained cooking their victuals, whilst Raja Ram, Suntajee Ghorepuray, and Dhunnajee Jadow went off by one route, and Prillhad Neerajee with Khundee Rao Dhabaray travelled by another.

Khundoo Bullal and his companions were taken, as had been foreseen: they were examined, confined, and beaten to extort confession; but on their firmly persisting in a preconcerted story, and denying all knowledge of any fugitives from Maharashtra, they were released, and finally joined Raja Ram, who, with the others, had reached Ginjee in safety.

The first news they heard from Maharashtra was the death of Mahadajee Naik, the Senaputtee; this event, although it disconcerted their measures for the time, was fortunate for the Mahratta cause, as it brought Suntajee Ghorepuray into immediate power—an officer of much greater ability and enterprise.

The primary care of Raja Ram was to establish a court on the plan of his father, which, though at first little more than nominal, was of much importance in giving consequence to his party.

The Purdhans now appointed were as follow:—1st, Neeloo Punt Moreishwur, Peishwa; 2nd, Jenardin Punt Hunwuntay, Amat; 3rd, Shunkrajee Mulhar, Suchew; 4th, Ramchundur Trimbeck Poonday, Muntree; 5th, Suntajee Ghorepuray, Sena-





puttee; 6th, Mahadajee Gudadhur, Somunt; 7th, Neerajee Rowjee, Nyadeish; 8th, Sreekuracharya, Pundit Rao.

The appointment of Peishwa having been previously filled, and Prillhad Neerajee continuing the soul of their cause, a new rank was instituted which raised him above the Purdhans, by the title of *Pritee Needhee* literally meaning the likeness or representative of the raja himself. Although Prillhad Neerajee was fond of titles and show—a taste which he probably acquired when envoy on the part of Sivajee at the court of Golcondah—the dignity conferred upon him was entirely unsolicited. Suntajee Ghorepuray, now the oldest representative of the Kapsee family, besides the rank of Senaputtee, was further dignified with some additions to his hereditary titles, and styled Hindoo Rao Mumlukut-Mudar. He was also intrusted with a new standard called the *Juree Putka*, or Golden Pennon; and in imitation of the imperial officers of the highest rank, he was authorized to beat the *nobut*, or large drum, and assume various other insignia. Dhunnajee Jadow got the title of Jeysing Rao, and, in consequence of the demise of Mahadajee Naik, both Suntajee and Dhunnajee were sent back to Maharashtra “to collect men and plunder the Moghuls”.

Raja Ram was formally seated on the throne, and the new court began to exercise all the forms of government. Gold bangles, clothes, shawls, and letters announcing the event, were secretly forwarded, and pompously presented to all the principal Hindoos throughout Maharashtra, and what is very remarkable, enams, jagheers, &c., in the Mahratta country, then in actual possession of the Moghuls, and places which never had belonged to his predecessors, were profusely bestowed, but few of them were confirmed, by Raja Ram, or Shao, after they had obtained control over the territory which the raja thus pretended to alienate. Unsubstantial, however, as such gifts were, they had the effect of strengthening his cause, of keeping alive an interest in it, and of drawing numbers of persons to Ginjee.

Aurungzebe, as soon as he heard of these proceedings, detached Zoolfikar Khan with a large army into the Carnatic, vainly hoping that he would be able to strike off this last head of the Mahratta power; hydra but the had lost none of its vigour; parties under the

A.D. 1691



FROM A.D. 1689 TO A.D. 1707

name of Mahrattas, though they may have been discharged horsemen from Beejapoor and Golcondah, were this season plundering at Nassuck, Bheer, and Beder at the same time; whilst hundreds of horse, that had shared in the campaigns of Sivajee, were flocking to Suntajee Ghorepuray and Dhunnajee Jadow, the oldest and most popular leaders among them. The want of funds was greatly felt by Suntajee in his attempts to organize a force on the old system, which he never was able fully to effect, but Ramchundur Punt gave him every aid in his power.

In the exposed state of the Payeen Ghaut, as Prillhad Neerajee considered that Suntajee and Dhunnajee could give more effectual aid to Ginjee by remaining in Maharashtra, he engaged a Mahomedan officer, formerly in the service of Beejapoor, to attempt some opposition on the approach of the Moghuls. The attempt was made, although unsuccessfully, and the officer in question afterwards joined the Moghuls.

In Zoolfikar Khan's army there were a number of Mahrattas, both in the cavalry and infantry. In the latter were the same body of Mawulees that had assisted in the capture of Raigurh, and among the former there were two of the relations of Raja Ram, Gunnajee and Ranoojee Sirkay, who, having deserted to the Moghuls when Annajee Dutto was executed, had attained commands, and were esteemed good officers. The second-in-command to Zoolfikar Khan in this army was Daood Khan Punnee, a Deccan officer of some repute, but notoriously addicted to drinking. The fort of Ginjee consists of several contiguous hills, strongly fortified, and is many miles in circumference. The Moghuls never considered an army capable to undertake a regular siege, unless sufficiently large to surround the place invested, and completely obstruct communication. Zoolfikar Khan, finding his force inadequate for this purpose, after he had commenced some works, represented that a reinforcement was necessary, and, until it should arrive, he left a detachment at Ginjee, and undertook an expedition to the southward, where he levied contributions both from the rajas of Tanjore and Trichinopoly.

But this requisition for troops was not immediately complied with; the Deccan was far from being in that state which made it easy for Aurungzebe to spare large reinforcements, without



running great risk of having the whole country in a state of insurrection. The depredations of the Naik of Wakinkerah had become so troublesome, that an army, under the Prince Kaum Bukhsh and Roh Oolla Khan, was ordered to destroy his town; but they were obliged to besiege it, and came ill-prepared to overcome the defence which was maintained against them.

Ramchundur Punt was as useful in Maharashtra as the Pritee Needhee at Ginjee; he had an excellent second in Pureshram

*A.D. 1692* Trimbuck, who used great exertions in restoring the arrangements of the forts, and giving spirit and zeal to the garrisons. Ramchundur

moved from place to place, but fixed his principal residence at Satara, where, by the aid of his head carcoon, Shunkrajee Narain Gaudekur, he not only attended to every military disposition, but regulated the revenue, and established some order in the country. He had raised troops of his own, and had cut off several straggling parties of the Moghuls, before Suntajee and Dhunnajee returned; but when they joined him, Ramchundur proposed a plan for surprising the foudjar at Waee, to which Suntajee, greatly pleased, immediately consented, took the foudjar with all his troops prisoners, and established a Mahratta thanna in the place. The mere presence of Suntajee and Dhunnajee animated Ramchundur's followers, and he incited his commanders to follow their example. He sent them out to make their established collections, as the chouth and surdeshmookhee were termed, from the Moghul territory; and as they became encouraged by success, his officers added a third contribution for themselves, under the head of *ghas-dana*, or forage-money. In this manner a distinct army was raised, of which the principal leaders were Powar, Thorat, and Atowlay. The commanders received honorary presents and rewards from court; the title of Wiswas Rao was conferred on Powar, Dinker Rao on Thorat, and Shumsher Buhadur on Atowlay. Ramchundur was particularly partial to the Mahratta *dhungurs*, or shepherds, a great number of whom served among his troops; and any of the ancestors of those who afterwards became great chiefs in the empire; began their career under Ramchundur Punt.

Shunkrajee Narain, hitherto known as an able carcoon, had received charge of the Waee district, and had retaken Rajgurh,



which, after the fall of Raigurh, had been surrendered to the Moghuls. A still more important service was performed by Pureshram Trimbuck, who surprised and retook Panalla.

Suntajee headed another attack on the Moghul officer stationed near Merich, against whom he was as successful as at Waee; and Ramchundur, in consequence, by virtue of the powers vested in him, gave him a grant of the Deshmookhee of Merich. As soon as Suntajee and Dhunnajee had collected a sufficient body of troops, mindful of their object of effecting a diversion in favour of Ginjee, they made their appearance on the banks of the Godavery, which was the only part of the country where scarcity, from one cause or other, did not prevail. They there plundered and destroyed everything, and cut off several of the Moghul convoys coming from Hindostan. Parties were soon sent against them; but Aurungzebe found that he had not ordinary freebooters to suppress; instead of fleeing from his detachment, they defeated three of them successively, took the commander each time prisoner, and, according to a rule invariably observed by Suntajee, exacted a large ransom before they would grant their release. This system was according to Sivajee's general rule, but contrary to his practice; for he took a pride in releasing great men, although he always made what he could by the middling class of prisoners. Suntajee conformed to Sivajee's discipline as far as was practicable, and was particular in obtaining security for the good conduct of his followers, always preferring Mahratta wutundars to any other class of men. Dhannajee Jadow was not so strict nor so good an officer as Suntajee, but he was a more popular leader.

Whilst they were thus spreading their ravages to the northward, Aurungzebe shifted his encampment on the banks of the Beema, apparently undecided with respect to his future operations.

He at last resolved to support Zoolfikar Khan, and, at all events, reduce Ginjee. The

*A.D. 1693*

Prince Kaum Bukhsh, under the guidance of the prime minister Assud Khan, was destined for the service. He was directed to leave Roh Oolla Khan at Wakinkerah, the siege of which was afterwards abandoned, and move on the route to Ginjee, where he was soon joined by Assud Khan with a large army. On approaching the Payeen Ghaut, parties of horse





made their appearance, and by skirmishing delayed their advance but they finally sat down before the place and invested it.

Zoolfikar Khan, on being deprived of the command by the arrival of the prince, was exceedingly mortified; and even Assud

*A.D. 1694* Khan, after the late success of his son at Raigurh, considered the supersession unjust on the part of the emperor, particularly as it was well known that it had been brought about by Joudpooree, the prince's mother, and the favourite wife of Aurungzebe.

The Mahratta ministers, who, like all Bramins, are ever on the watch for such opportunities, speedily turned this jealousy, which they foresaw would prove reciprocal, to their own advantage. They courted both, but they first gained Zoolfikar Khan, who entered into a secret compact with Raja Ram for the purpose of obstructing the prince's measures, which he did, either by thwarting his plans, where the execution depended on himself, or by preparing the besieged to counteract every intended operation.

The emperor, probably conceiving that his army must draw the Mahrattas southward, moved to Gulgulla; but Ghorepuray still continued to the northward, and Ramchundur's parties levied contributions as far east as Sholapoor. Aurungzebe, finding his feint unsuccessful, brought back his unwieldy host to Brimhapooree, on the Beema, below Punderpoor, where he established his principal depot, and built a cantonment, in which he held his court; and from that point the operations of his armies and the affairs of his empire were directed for several years.

The Portuguese about this time had fallen under his displeasure, and war was waged against them in every part where they had settlements in India. Great cruelties

*A.D. 1695* were exercised on the defenceless inhabitants subject to that nation in the northern Concan, but numbers found an asylum in their forts of Damaun and Bassein; at last the Moghul courtiers, bribed by the viceroy at Goa, represented the advantage of making peace with the Portuguese, for the purpose of procuring cannon in order to reduce the Mahratta forts—a sure way to carry their point, as the emperor's age and imbecility had become apparent, and to



flatter his favourite scheme rendered even the wily Aurungzebe the dupe of that despicable deceit and artifice which he had all his life practised on others. A like means was used to pacify him with regard to the English. The ravages of the pirates continued; and, as the Moghuls always concluded that one or both the English East India Companies were engaged in these depredations, the emperor, although a considerable revenue was derived from the customs on their trade, would have driven them from the coast, had they not been protected by the fort of Bombay,

which, defended by their artillery, was considered impregnable. One capture, that of the

A.D. 1696

*Gunj-Suwae*, the largest of the Moghul ships,

proceeding from Surat to Mocha with many pilgrims as passengers, gave particular offence, and occasioned the seizure of the chief at Surat, with several other Englishmen, who were imprisoned for a considerable period until the affair was adjusted.

In the meantime, years had been already wasted before Ginjee. Suntajee Ghorepuray, after committing great havoc, and defeating or eluding all that were opposed to him in Maharashtra, left two active officers, Pursojee Bhonslay and Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, both of whom had served under Sivajee, to give spirit to the Mahrattas in Gunthuree and Berar. With an army of upwards of 20,000 horse, Suntajee passed to the west of the grand camp by the Satara road, pushed on towards the Carnatic, and as soon as he got within a certain distance of Ginjee, detached about one-third of his troops under Dhunnajee Jadow, who, making rapid marches, brought the first news of his approach by attacking some of the Moghul post in the neighbourhood of the fort. Orders were immediately issued to the different small divisions to concentrate and form larger bodies to the right and left; but the Moghuls, always slow to obey, were not aware of the activity of the horse that now attacked them, whilst Dhunnajee, assisted both by troops and signals from the fort, cut in upon them, and did great execution before the manoeuvre ordered could be executed.

Suntajee Ghorepuray, with less haste, brought on the main body of Mahrattas. Upon his arrival at Covrepauk, he was opposed by the foudjar, Ali Murdan Khan, with a considerable army; but the foudjar was speedily routed, the whole of his



baggage and camp-equipage plundered, and he himself, on his flight towards the camp at Ginjee, was overtaken, made prisoner, and released for a high ransom.

The victorious Mahrattas, with their usual activity when successful, beat in the Moghul outposts in every direction, destroyed their foragers, and so completely cut off their communications that neither supplies nor intelligence could reach them. Reports of the emperor's illness and death were industriously circulated by the Mahrattas, who then made overtures to Kaum Bukhsh, and proposed to make him emperor. The prince either listened to their proposals, or at all events Assud Khan and his son affected to believe that he did, and they determined on placing him under restraint. The Mahrattas, apprized of what was going forward, taking advantage of the bustle and dissension which the circumstance naturally created in the Moghul camp, attacked and harassed them with additional vigour. The personal troops of Kaum Bukhsh refused to fight; all became alarm and uproar; at last the Moghuls burst their cannon, abandoned their batteries, and were in turn besieged in their lines.

Whilst in this situation, and in great distress for supplies, a truce was proposed; from which party it originated seems uncertain, but the probability is that it came from the Moghuls; an agreement, however, was concluded between Assud Khan and Suntajee. The Moghuls were to be permitted to retire to Wandewash unmolested, and to remain until Assud Khan should receive a reply from the emperor, according to which it was stipulated that he should abide.

Aurungzebe, foreseeing all the consequences of this ill-advised proceeding, immediately ordered Assud Khan and the prince to the presence, moved with the grand camp to Beejapoor, and directed Zoolfikar Khan to prosecute the war.

But the siege of Ginjee was not immediately renewed. The Mahrattas were accused of not having observed the truce, because they attempted to cut off a convoy of provisions which the foudjar of Carnatic Beejapoor was escorting to camp, and which he saved by throwing himself into Covrepauk. Their having retaken Permacoïl and several other forts was still less justifiable; and Zoolfikar Khan, in order to recover these places and



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punish the violation of the agreement, marched to the southward, and re-possessed himself of the forts. Continuing his march, he entered into an alliance with the raja of Trichinopoly, and obliged the raja of Tanjore, one of the sons of Venkajee, to restore several places wrested from the latter, and to pay a considerable contribution to himself; after this arrangement, Zoolfikar Khan re-crossed the Coleroon, and again sat down before Ginjee.

The clandestine intercourse was still carried on with Raja Ram; and it is not improbable, from his desire to protract the siege, that Zoolfikar Khan, upon the demise of the emperor, may have had designs of ultimately establishing an independent government in the Carnatic for himself.

During Zoolfikar Khan's absence in Tanjore, Suntajee Ghorepuray laid waste the Beejapoor Carnatic. To punish his depredations, a considerable force was sent off from Beejapoor under different leaders, and, being joined by Kasim Khan, foudjar of the province, the whole were about to march in quest of Suntajee; but their advanced tents had scarcely been pitched when his troops attacked and destroyed the guard, and the Mahrattas were flying about the main body on all sides, before the great men had time to caparison and mount their elephants.

Kasim Khan's authority did not extend beyond his own troops; the other leaders, as rash as they were destitute of resource, followed their own plans, and each body fought or defended itself as it best could; while the Mahrattas, profiting by their distraction, never ceased harassing them, charging and firing upon them by day, and rocketing them by night. At last the Moghuls on the third day sought shelter under the walls of the gurhee of Dodairee. There was a small quantity of provisions in the place, which, though sold by the Banians from the top of the walls at an enormous price, was soon exhausted. This state of privation became intolerable; but they were beaten troops badly commanded, and could not try by a brave effort, to save themselves. An attempt was made to rescue them, but Suntajee attacked and defeated the party coming to their relief, whilst it was still at a distance, so that the despairing men heard nothing of the effort. In this situation the Moghul officers surrendered. Kasim Khan had served with reputation: he did not survive the disgrace, but took poison and died. The other officers, be-



sides being stripped, had to pay a large ransom for their release, and, on their return to the imperial camp, they were divested of their honors, and appointed to distant and inferior commands.

Himmud Khan, the officer who had made the unsuccessful attempt to relieve Dodairee and the son of Khan Jehan Buhadur, being, at his own request, reinforced from the grand camp by an army sufficient to cope with the Mahrattas, proceeded in search of Suntajee. He was soon found. The Mahrattas, on being vigorously charged on the plain, fled, and Himmud Khan pursued the fugitives, until they had, according to Mahratta custom, drawn him into difficult and broken ground, when they turned round, attacked in their usual desultory manner, killed Himmud Khan, totally defeated his army, and plundered his baggage.

Suntajee, retiring towards Ginjee, was attacked by Zoolfikar Khan, and pursued to a considerable distance. When the latter turned to resume the siege, Suntajee attended him a march in the rear. This manoeuvre is not unusual with Mahrattas; in the instance alluded to, however, the pursuit was probably a mere feint, as an intimacy subsisted between Zoolfikar Khan and Suntajee, which there is some reason for suspecting that the rivals of the latter afterwards misrepresented to his prejudice.

At Ginjee the same languid operations continued, and the siege at this time would probably have been bloodless, but for the inebriety of Daood Khan, Zoolfikar Khan's lieutenant, who, when intoxicated, always turned out his men to storm the fort and exterminate the infidels; these fits only produced frequent skirmishes; but the conduct of Zoolfikar Khan having at last aroused the suspicion of the emperor, the Khan was privately warned by his friends that, unless he speedily effected the reduction of Ginjee, and the capture of all the principal people, no influence could save him from disgrace and ruin. This information the Moghul general communicated to Raja Ram, and as he was now obliged to press the siege, he connived at a plan for the Raja's escape, through his relations the Sirkays, who agreed to convey him safe to Vishalgurh, to take charge of his family, and to join him themselves on the first opportunity, provided they received certain hereditary rights, and the town of Dabul in the Concan in enam.

A.D. 1697



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All these conditions being settled, Raja Ram, by the assistance of the Sirkays, escaped through the Moghul lines, and reached Vellore, where he was received by Mannajee Moray, the commandant.

After remaining there a short time, he set off with his conductors for Vishalgurh, where he safely arrived in December.

Ginjee was taken early in January. It was carried by escalade, and the wives and family

*A.D. 1698* of Raja Ram, who had joined him from Rajapoor by sea, were, as preconcerted, made over to the Sirkays as their relations, which Zoofikar Khan permitted, on the Sirkays making a public representation of the loss of honor they should sustain, in case of their female relations being exposed unveiled, or given in charge to persons of another caste. They were shortly after conveyed to Maharashtra.

Zoofikar Khan ordered many of Raja Ram's people into perpetual confinement; and although he had acted this deceitful part to screen his treachery from the emperor, many were executed as plunderers and insurgents; amongst others, Naroo Prillhad, the son of Prillhad Neerajee, suffered as a rebel. The Pritee Needhee had died previous to the fall of Ginjee.

During the preceding year, the main body of the Mahrattas did little against the common enemy. Dissensions had for some time prevailed between Suntajee and Dhunnajee; but by the judicious counsel of the late Pritee Needhee, the raja had long remained neutral in their quarrel, and thus prevented an open rupture. But after the death of Prillhad Neerajee, Raja Ram had no such prudent monitor. He had for some time smothered his jealousy of Suntajee Ghorepuray, which now uncontrolled, and worked upon by others, gave Ghorepuray an enemy where he had the best right to expect a protector, and Dhunnajee Jadow, encouraged by the raja, raised a strong faction against him. Nor did Aurungzebe neglect so favourable an opportunity of practising his favourite policy of creating division among his enemies; he had emissaries among the Mahrattas, who fomented their jealousies, and kept him informed of all that passed.

Suntajee's army was corrupted, and he had but just time to escape with a few followers from a combined attack made upon him by a part of his own and Dhunnajee Jadow's troops. This



sedition happened in the neighbourhood of Beejapoor; parties were sent in pursuit of Suntajee, whilst the main body of the Mahrattas separated. One-half accompanied Dhunnajee Jadow into the Carnatic, where Zoolfikar Khan had lately been exerting himself with great success against the smaller detachments of the Mahrattas, and was very anxious to possess Vellore, which he thought would effectually suppress their power in that quarter. The other half of the Mahratta army marched to join the raja at Satara, which, at the recommendation of Ramchundur Punt, became the seat of government.

Jenardin Punt having died, the office of Amat was restored to Ramchundur Punt, from which he had been removed by Sivajee, in 1676, to make room for Rugonath Punt Hunwuntay: his late services eminently entitled him to high honor and reward, and his principal carcoon, Shunkrajee Narain Gaudekur, was raised to the rank of Suchew, which office had become vacant by the retirement of Shunkrajee Mulhar to Benares during the siege of Ginjee. The appointment of the new Suchew displeased Pureshram Trimbuck, who conceived his claims to that honor greater than those of Shunkrajee Narain.

Timmojee Rugonath Hunwuntay, the son of the late Jenardin Punt, having effected his escape from prison at Ginjee in a very dexterous manner, rejoined Raja Ram, by whom, in consequence of his family pretensions and supposed talents, he was raised to the rank of Pritee Needhee.

Seedoojee Goojur, who died about this period, had been engaged in constant warfare with the Seedee, and with various success; but by the activity of Kanhojee Angria, the Mahratta fleet had made many valuable prizes. Vessels of all nations were attacked; repeated descents were made along the coast, and few of the defenceless mercantile towns, from Travancore to Bombay, escaped a visit from these depredators. The Mahrattas continued in possession of most of their forts on the coast; they had maritime depots at Severndroog and Viziadroog, but the principal rendezvous of their fleet continued, as in the time of Sivajee, at Kolabah. The Sawunts, Deshmookhs of Waree, when their districts were not overrun by the Moghuls, adhered to Raja Ram; but the Dessaye of Carwar continued independent, and, as usual under such circumstances, assumed the title of raja.



Suntajee Ghorepuray, whom we left pursued by parties of his enemies, was hunted from place to place, and had hitherto foiled them all; but Nagojee Manay, Deshmookh Muswar, stimulated by private revenge, continued the pursuit with unrelenting perseverance; until, having overtaken Suntajee in the act of bathing in a small rivulet to refresh himself, at a moment when he thought his enemies far behind, though alone, tired, and defenceless, the assassin rushed down and slew him on the spot. Having severed the head from the body, he brought it to the skirts of the imperial camp, and sent it to Aurungzebe. Nagojee shortly after sent a petition for re-admission into the imperial service, which he had entered and quitted in the same manner as all the hereditary officers and Mankurees were in the habit of doing at this period. A free pardon, high encomium, and additional honors were readily bestowed, which proves the acceptable service he had rendered by this murder. Suntajee Ghorepuray was one of the best officers of whom the Mahratta annals can boast, and his eulogy is best recorded when we say he was the terror of the Moghul detachments for seven years.

The death of Suntajee and the atrocity of the deed brought back many of his followers to a sense of their own ingratitude. His sons Ranoojee and Peerajee, and his nephew Seodojee, who had fled from the army in dread of Dhunnajee, were soon rejoined by a number of Suntajee's followers, on which they erected their family standard, and began to plunder the Moghul territory on their own account.

Raja Ram, after he had remained a short time at Satara, proceeded with his army to the northward, where he was joined by Pursajee Bhonslay, Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, Neemajee Sindia, Atowlay Shumsher Buhadur, and other commanders who had for some time

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been plundering in Candeish, Gungthuree, and Berar. The combined armies, which now formed a greater force than Sivajee had ever commanded, proceeded under Raja Ram, who entered Gungthuree claiming as his established right the chouth and surdeshmookhee. All who submitted to the payment of these demands were protected, and the Moghul garrisons that remained passive spectators were not molested, but such as made unsuccessful opposition were put to the sword. On this occasion



The Mahrattas were more systematic in their exactions than they before had been; where they could not obtain ready money they took promissory notes from the Patells, according to the practice first introduced by Sivajee, and in this manner went on through Nandere, Berar, and Candeish.

When he had nearly completed his tour, Raja Ram left Khundee Rao Dhabaray in Buglana, Neemajee Sindia in Candeish, Pursajee Bhonslay in Berar, and Hybut Rao Nimbalkur in Gungthuree, to collect, what they termed, the outstanding balances due to the Raja.

Pursajee Bhonslay, when appointed to this duty in Berar, got the title of Sena Sahib Soobeh, and Hybut Rao Nimbalkur was styled Sur Lushkur; both these officers received the Juree Putka, or Golden Pennon, on this occasion. Raja Ram, on his return, attacked Jaulna, which he was plundering, when the Moghul army came suddenly upon him; they attacked and pursued his troops with a vigour and perseverance to which they had of late seldom been unaccustomed; but to account for their activity on this occasion, we must revert to the proceedings of Zoolfikar Khan and Aurungzebe.

In the Carnatic affairs under Dhunnajee Jadow had not been prosperous. Zoolfikar Khan, although a corrupt, ambitious man, was an active commander, and now the only Moghul officer of whom the Mahrattas stood in any awe. He had repeatedly defeated Dhunnajee, when the emperor, hearing of the march of Raja Ram, sent express orders for Zoolfikar Khan to repair to the cantonment at Brimhapooree. It was then determined, in consultation with Assud Khan, and several of the principal officers, to adopt a new plan of operations, by which, whilst one army attacked the Mahrattas in the field, another was destined for the reduction of their forts. This last the emperor reserved for himself, giving the command of the pursuing army to the Prince Bedar Bukht, the son of Azim Shah, with Zoolfikar Khan as his lieutenant, whose first effort was the attack and pursuit of Raja Ram's army, to which we have just alluded.

The emperor's preparations being completed, the cantonment at Brimhapooree was evacuated, much to the regret of the indolent Moghul officers, many of whom had built excellent houses at that station. A depot was formed under the protection of the



Gurhee of Machnoor, which was within the line of the cantonment, and a strong guard was left for its protection. Aurungzebe's march was nearly due west, and he encamped under the fort of Wussuntgurrh, on the twentieth day after quitting the Beema. Batteries were erected, and in three days the garrison surrendered. The emperor named the fort *Kuleed-i-fulih*, or "the key of victory," and was much pleased by the event. As Pannalla had been unsuccessfully attacked by Moiz-ud-deen, the son of Sultan Mauzum, some years before, the Mahrattas were impressed with an idea of its being about to be besieged, and directed all their preparations towards its defence. But Aurungzebe marched for Satara—a movement wholly unexpected, as the fort was not provisioned for above two months. This neglect was considered a great misfortune, and gave rise to a suspicion that Ramchundur had purposely left it unprovided; of this suspicion Aurungzebe afterwards took advantage; and when Ramchundur, during the siege, was called away to Singurrh in consequence of the illness of Raja Ram, Aurungzebe wrote a letter which fell into the hands of Pureshrām Trimbuck, and widened a breach that had for some time existed between him and Ramchundur Punt.

Aurungzebe, on his arrival before Satara, pitched his own tents on the north side of the fort, on the site of the present village of Kurinja. Azim Shah was stationed at a village on the west side, which has since retained the name of Shapoor. Shirzee Khan invested the south side, and Turbeeut Khan occupied the eastern quarter; chains of posts between the different camps effectually secured the blockade. The fort of Satara occupies the summit of a hill of moderate height, but very steep; its defences consist of a scrap of upwards of 40 feet in perpendicular black rock, on the top of which there is a stone wall. It was defended by Pryagjee Purvoo, havildar, who had been reared in the service of Sivajee. He vigorously opposed the Moghuls, and disputed every foot of ground as they pushed forward their advanced posts. As soon as they began to gain any part of the hill, he withdrew his troops into the fort, and rolled down huge stones from the rock above, which did great execution, and, until they could throw up cover, were as destructive as artillery. The blockade, however, was complete; no communication could be held with the country; and as the small stock of grain in the garrison was soon exhaust-



ed, the besieged must have been compelled to surrender; but Pureshram Trimbuck, who had thrown himself into the fort of Purlee, purchased the connivance of Azim Shah, and conveyed provisions to the besieged.

The divisions on the west and south faces erected batteries, but the grand attack was directed against the north-east angle, which assumes nearly the shape of a tower, and is one of the strongest points; the rock being 42 feet high, and the bastion, now on the top of it, consists of 25 feet of masonry, making a total height of 67 feet.

Turbeeut Khan undertook to mine this angle, and, at the end of four months and a half, had completed two mines. So

*A.D. 1700* confident were the Moghuls of success, that the storming party was readily formed, but

concealed, as much as possible, under the brow of the hill, from the view of the garrison. Aurungzebe was invited to view the spectacle, and a stratagem was formed to draw all the garrison towards the bastion, by the emperor's moving off from that side in grand procession, so that when the match was ready to be applied, hundreds of the Mahrattas, attracted by his splendid retinue, crowded to the rampart, and, amongst others, Pryagjee, the commandant. The first mine was fired; it burst several fissures in the rock, and occasioned so violent a concussion, that a great part of the masonry was thrown inwards, and crushed many of the garrison in its ruins. The storming party, in their eagerness, advanced nearer; the match was applied to the train of the second and larger mine, but, being improperly constructed, it burst outwards with a dreadful explosion, and upwards of 2,000 of the Moghuls are said to have been destroyed on the spot. Pryagjee, the Mahratta commandant, was buried in the ruins by the first explosion, close to a temple dedicated to the goddess Bhowanee, but was afterwards dug out alive. His escape was considered a happy omen, and, under other circumstances, might have been of much consequence in animating the Hindoo garrison to prolong the defence; but Azim Shah could no longer be induced to connive at the transport of the grain; proposals for surrendering were therefore made through him, and the honor of the capture, which he so ill-merited, was not only assigned to him, but the place received his name, and was called by the emperor Azim Tara.



Satara surrendered about the middle of April, and Purlee was immediately invested; the siege lasted till the beginning of June, when, after a good defence, the garrison evacuated it. The south-west monsoon having set in with all its usual violence, the Moghul army, from a total want of arrangement, was exposed to considerable distress and hardship before the camp could be moved to a distance from the hills. After much loss, both of baggage and of lives, the army reached Kowauspoor, on the banks of the Maun, where the rains are comparatively light.

In the meantime a great change had taken place in the Mahratta government. Raja Ram, when the Punt Amat was called to see him, had just returned from Jaulna, having experienced a long and fatiguing pursuit from Zoolfikar Khan. He was suffering from a spitting of blood and inflammation of the lungs, brought on by violent exertion during this retreat. After lingering about 30 days, his illness proved mortal: he expired in the fort of Singurh, about the middle of March, a month before the fall of Satara.

The ruin of Suntajee Ghorepuray is the only crime which stains the memory of Raja Ram. But that alone is of magnitude; and if we admit as an excuse that he was worked upon by the enemies of Suntajee, the weakness of the man but detracts from the virtues of the prince. He possessed some share of the military enterprize of his father, but he had no genius for civil government; his measures were ably directed by Prillhad Neerajee, who appears to have been a very uncommon person, and, in his total disregard of self-interest, is almost a singular instance amongst Bramin statesmen. Raja Ram was naturally mild in his disposition, addicted to no vices, and was distinguished by uncommon liberality to his followers.

The death of Raja Ram, although the news was received in the emperor's camp at Satara with great rejoicing, produced no event favourable to the subjugation of the Mahrattas. The Raja left two sons: the elder, named Sivajee, by Tara Bye Mohitey, was ten years old at the time of his father's death; and the younger, named Sumbhajee, by Rajis Bye Ghatgay, was in his third year.

Tara Bye, with the assistance of Ramchundur Punt Amat, Shunkrajee Narain, and Dhunnajee Jadow Senaputtee, immediat-



ely assumed the reins of government, and her son Sivajee having been seated on the gadee or cushion of state, Rajis Bye, with the general consent, was placed in confinement.

Timmojee Rugonath being found unfit for his high station, Pureshram Trimluck was raised by Tara Bye to the rank of Pritee Needhee, and received general charge of all the forts. This preferment excited much jealousy on the part of Ramchundur Punt, who does not appear to have been aware that there were suspicions of his fidelity; but the decided tone and conduct of Tara Bye obliged him to appear reconciled to the measure. Tara Bye did not fix her residence in any fort, but moved about according to circumstances. Dhunnajee Jadow took to the open field: confining his operations to no particular part of the country, he spread his horse in every quarter, and performed many signal exploits. Nimbalkur, Bhonslay, and Dhabaray likewise distinguished themselves in the same manner; whilst Thorat, Chowan, Sindia, Powar, Atowlay, and various other chiefs, headed large bodies of troops in different direction, and levied tribute under the various heads of chouth, surdeshmookhee, and ghas-dana: the last-mentioned item of ghas-dana was generally considered the personal perquisite of the chief.

Contrasted with the splendour of the Moghul camp already described, we may view the horde accompanying one of these free-booters. Different from the organized bands of Sivajee, but still more destructive to a country, an irregular assembly of several thousand horsemen, united by preconcerted agreement in some unfrequented part of the country. They set off with little provision, no baggage except the blanket on their saddles, and no animals but led horses, with bags prepared for the reception of their plunder. If they halted during a part of the night, like the Pindharees of modern times, they slept with their bridles in their hands; if in the day, whilst the horses were fed and refreshed, the men reposed with little or no shelter from the scorching heat, excepting such as might be occasionally found under a bush or a tree; and during that time their swords were laid by their sides, and their spears were generally at their horses' heads stuck in the ground; when halted on a plain, groups of four or five might be seen stretched on the bare earth sound asleep, their bodies exposed to the noon-day sun, and their heads in a cluster, under





the precarious shade of a black blanket or tattered horse-cloth extended on the point of their spears. The great object of this class was plunder; and the leaders and their troops, though they generally rendered a partial account to the head of the state, dissipated or embezzled the greater part of their collections.

The Mankurees began to profess obedience to the descendant of Sivajee, and sometimes joined his standard; but they always plundered on their own account when an opportunity offered. The Ghorepurays committed great devastations along the eastern confines of Maharashtra, from the Godavery to the Kistna. The revenues raised by the emperor in the Deccan had become very inconsiderable, and, to support his army and the splendour of his court, he drew vast treasures from Hindostan; caravans after caravans were poured into the Deccan,—the Mahrattas frequently intercepted them, and the imperial troops on many occasions behaved in the most dastardly manner.

The victories and marches of Zoolfikar Khan, as detailed in Persian manuscripts, are scarcely credible; but, on the testimony of his enemies, he is justly entitled to very great merit for his indefatigable exertions, at a time when so few of the Moghul officers discovered the smallest talent or energy. Public virtue was unknown amongst them, and they were corrupt, slothful, and indifferent. One cause of this general debasement was the great age and increasing infirmities of the emperor, and the character of his sons. The prospect was full of trouble. Men paused at the threshold of a period which must open with great commotion, and seemed rather inclined to reserve energy for the coming struggle, than to exert themselves in the tiresome endless warfare in which they were engaged.

The reign of Aurungzebe, however, was prolonged beyond all expectation, and the old man persevered to the last in his fruitless endeavours to stifle Mahratta independence. During the ensuing four years he was almost entirely occupied in the siege of the forts, and in that period he successively reduced Panalla, Vishalgurh, Singurh, Poorundhur, Rajgurh, and Torna.

*A.D. 1702* Chundun, Wundun, and Pandoogurh were also surrendered to his officers. But in the meantime the Mahrattas multiplied. In 1702 they levied contributions



from Surat and Burhanpoor, and extended their operations every year. Wherever the demands of chouth and surdeshmookhee were promptly acknowledged, they carefully refrained from plundering. In 1705 the emperor received accounts, almost

at the same time, of their having crossed the Nerbuddah in great force, and extended their ravages to the heart of Malwa; that the whole of

Candeish and Berar were overrun; and that 15,000 Mahrattas had broken into Guzerat, defeated the troops of the assembled foudjars, and that nothing appeared but slaughtered soldiers, houseless ryots, and the ripened fields in devastation or flames.

On this intelligence great preparations were made; Zoolfikar Khan was sent after the body in Malwa, Ghazee-ud-deen was appointed soobehdar of Berar, and Azim Shah despatched to Ahmedabad to take charge of the government of Guzerat. Each had a considerable army, and it was hoped, from the character of the generals, that these countries would soon be cleared.

But these apparently vigorous efforts of the government were unsubstantial; there was motion and bustle, without zeal or efficacy: the empire was unwieldy, its system relaxed, and its officers were corrupt beyond all example. It was inwardly decayed, and ready to fall to pieces as much by its own irrecoverable weakness, as by the corroding power of the Mahrattas, whom the Mahomedan wars had trained, and their imbecility now allured to that predatory life to which the natives of Maharashtra are prone; as yet, however, their plundering hordes did not comprehend that they were conquerors. A general sentiment pervaded the whole body of Hindoo population in the Mahratta country, but it was not so actively excited as to create a general union, for a purpose so exalted as that of throwing off a foreign yoke, and vindicating their civil and religious liberties. There was a common sympathy, but there was no common effort; their military spirit was not so much excited by patriotism as by plunder; and those who enjoyed greater advantages under the Moghuls, in consequence of the struggle, than they were likely to do by the establishment of the independence of their country, eagerly desired a continuation of the war.

Many of the Moghul officers in charge of districts were in the pay of both parties, and likewise wished that the existing con-



fusion might continue. Parties of Mahrattas in the service of the Moghuls met, rioted, and feasted with their countrymen, and at parting, or when passing within hearing of each other, they used to mock the Mahomedans by uttering an *Ulhumdulillah*, and praying for long life to the glorious Alungeer.

Upon the reduction of Rajgurrh and Torna, the emperor, after halting some months near Joonere, finally quitted the neighbourhood of Poona, of which place he had also changed the name to Moyabad, and marched towards Beejapoor.

Some of the Moghul officers were anxious to negotiate a peace; and the favourite son of the emperor, Kaum Bukhsh, whose plans were early directed to the establishment of an independent kingdom at Beejapoor, and who in his views seems always to have had some injudicious scheme of conciliating the Mahrattas by admitting a part of their claim, now contrived to obtain the emperor's consent for opening a negotiation with Dhunnajee Jadow.

Overtures was first begun, by proposals for releasing Shao, the son of Sumbhajee. The negotiation proceeded, and Aurungzebe had, for a few days, been brought to consent to the payment of ten per cent of the whole revenue of the six soobehs of the Deccan as surdeshmookhee, for which the Mahrattas were to engage to maintain order with a body of horse. On the news of this concession, the Mahrattas, who, notwithstanding their predatory character, are at all times exceedingly eager to have any right formally recognised, flocked to Dhunnajee's camp. Their expectations rose with their assembled numbers: but their increasing insolence, their tone changed from supplication to demand, their near approach to the camp, and their stipulating for honorary dresses to 70 principal officers among them, entitled to that distinction from the emperor, led Aurungzebe to suspect treachery as well as insult. He therefore broke off the negotiation, and recalled his ambassador, who was attacked soon after he left the Mahratta camp—a circumstance which confirmed the emperor in his opinion. Aurungzebe seems to have returned to the eastward, from an apprehension that the disorders prevalent in Maharashtra were likely to spread over Telingana and the Carnatic; but although there were partial disorders occasioned by Beruds in the one, and Pindharees in the other, the inhabitants



of those countries are a very different race, and were less prone to those habits of predatory enterprize which had long distinguished the natives of Maharashtra. The people of the Carnatic are not unwarlike: in bodily frame they are at least as robust as the Mahrattas, and at this period a great part of the emperor's infantry were men raised in that country. Banditti, however, started up in various parts, and so daring had their chiefs become, that some of them carried on an open traffic for the goods plundered by their gangs. The independent Mahratta chiefs, particularly the Ghorepurays, had of late years committed constant ravages about Beejapoor, Kulbarga, and Beder. Pemnaik, the Naik of Wakinkerah, although repeatedly compelled by the imperial generals to pay large fines, no sooner saw the Moghul troops retire to a distance, than he recommenced every species of rapine. The Mahrattas maintained a good understanding with this chief, and Dhunnajee Jadow, whilst the emperor was besieging the forts in the Syhadree mountains, lodged his family in Wakinkerah, as affording greater security than any other place. The power of the Naik had become so formidable, that the emperor, after his arrival at Beejapoor, judged it necessary to proceed against him in person.

Wakinkerah was merely a fortified town, but the siege lasted many months. Pemnaik defended himself with resolution, drove back the Moghul advanced posts, whilst Dhunnajee Jadow perpetually harassed their camp. The imperial officers had become so dastardly, and the troops so shameless, that the mere appearance of Dhunnajee's cavalry made them turn to flight.

The best officers were at a distance. Zoolfikar Khan was directed to join, and a like order was sent to Daood Khan in the Carnatic. The former had returned to Aurungabad, after driving Neemajee Sindia from Malwa; and as the Mahrattas had been principally employed to the northward, the Carnatic had not been infested by large bodies of them for several years. The important fortress of Vellore was surrendered in 1704 by Mannajee Moray to Daood Khan, for which Moray was promised a munsub by the emperor, but he never came to demand it, having, on his return to Maharashtra, gone off to join his countrymen. Daood Khan left Sadut Oolla Khan as his Naik or deputy in both Carnatics, and arrived in the emperor's camp shortly



after Zoolfikar Khan. They were both officers of courage and experience; they attacked the place with resolution, and the town of Wakinkerah was evacuated, after the environs had been stormed and taken, with heavy loss on both sides.

The Mahrattas, in the meantime, were plundering the open country in every direction. Ramchundur Punt Amat had particularly distinguished himself by retaking Panalla and Pawungurh by escalade. Tara Bye, on this event, determined to reside at Panalla, and admitted Ramchundur Punt to a very large share of power. Pureshram Trimbeck, the Pritee Needhee, had retaken Wussuntgurh and Satara. The latter was surprised by the artifice of a Bramin named Annajee Punt. This man had escaped from prison at Ginjee, and assumed the character of a mendicant devotee. Having fallen in with a party of Moghul infantry marching to relieve the garrison of Satara, he amused them with stories and songs, obtained alms from them, and so ingratiated himself with all, that they brought him with them, admitted him into the fort, and, on account of the amusement he afforded, allowed him to live there. Annajee Punt had formerly been a carcoon of Mawulee infantry, and soon saw the practicability of surprising the place, if assisted by a few of his old acquaintances. He patiently watched his opportunity, informed Pureshram Trimbeck of his design, and having introduced a body of Mawulees into the fort, the enterprizing but remorseless Bramin put every man of the garrison to the sword.

Shunkrajee Narain Suchew did not remain inactive; as soon as the Moghul troops withdrew from that part of the country of which he was the chief manager, he retook Singurh, Rajgurh Rohira, and some other places. The Moghul garrisons were composed of a large proportion of Carnatic infantry; and these men, latterly, could not be brought to stand the onset of the Mawulees.

The loss of these forts, particularly Singurh and Panalla, gave Aurungzebe great vexation, and augmented an illness under which he laboured, and from which he recovered very slowly.

Zoolfikar Khan was sent to retake Singurh, and, previous to his departure, the emperor committed Shao to his charge. Zoolfikar Khan, partly from hatred to Kaum Bukhsh, bitterly inveighed against the overtures that had been made for peace,



and Aurungzebe was equally conscious of the error; yet, with some design of releasing Shao, he had now recourse to the half-measure of causing letters to be written to the Mahrattas from Shao as their lawful prince, inviting them to submit. Had he released him at once, a division would probably have taken place amongst the Mahrattas. Under any circumstances, the other expedient was unwise, but particularly inconsistent in Aurungzebe, as it was, in effect, acknowledging the legitimacy of Sivajee's government, and consequently admitting the injustice of Sumbhajee's execution. The result was, as might have been expected, of no avail.

Zoolfikar Khan was successful in obtaining possession of Singurh, owing to the want of supplies; but as soon as he retired, it was as speedily retaken by Shunkrajee Narain, from the same cause. The grand army, moving towards Ahmednugur, was attacked by the Mahrattas on the march, a great part of it was defeated, and had the Mahrattas improved an advantage which they gained, the emperor of the Moghuls, their inveterate foe for Aurungzebe, would have been a prisoner in their hands. It is curious to observe how the Moghul writers undesignedly record their own humiliation on this occasion, by dwelling upon this fortunate escape with abundant self-congratulation. The character of the imperial army was in some degree retrieved by the gallant charge of Khan Alum, a brave officer, whom, under the name of Ikhlass Khan, we have seen so active at the capture of Sumbhajee.

Aurungzebe arrived at Ahmednugur, and, on pitching his camp on the same spot which it had occupied in such splendour

21 years before, he predicted that his end was  
*A.D. 1707* near, by observing that he had this day finished

his campaigns, and that his last earthly journey was completed. The contrast between his former and his present circumstances is remarkable; but when we also reflect on the intervening events, we have not merely a striking picture, but a curious history of the growth of predatory power, and of the means by which it was nurtured. Aurungzebe had only three surviving sons—Sultan Mauzum, or Shah Alum, governor of Cabul; Azim Shah; and Kaum Bukhsh. Azim Shah joined his father at this period, and was appointed to the government of



FROM A.D. 1689 TO A.D. 1707

Malwa; Kaum Bukhsh was appointed to Beejapoor, and was immediately sent to take charge of his new government.

In the meantime Zoolfikar Khan, who continued pursuing and attacking the Mahrattas, had gone off across the Kistna to aid the son and nephew of his old opponent, Suntajee Ghorepuray, who had been attacked by Dhunnajee Jadow, in consequence of their having plundered in some of Tara Bye's districts; Zoolfikar Khan had assisted the Ghorepuray, and driven off Dhunnajee, when news reached him that the emperor had died at Ahmednugur on the 28th Zeekaad A.H. 1118 (or

21st February 1707). He therefore immediately

*February 21* suspended operations, and marched with all expedition to join the Deccan army, which fell under the command of Azim Shah, the prince nearest to the grand camp.

In regard to the character of Aurungzebe, the facts connected with the rise of the Mahrattas are sufficient to prove that, from the time he usurped the throne, there is nothing in his conduct which deserves the high encomium which has in general been bestowed on his talents and government. Previous to his elevation, he displayed very considerable ability, together with an iniquity almost unparalleled. His boundless ambition was concealed by deep dissimulation, and his boldness was equal to his hypocrisy. His success in placing the diadem of Hindostan on his own head, after overcoming his powerful rivals; his literary acquirements; his attention to business; and the simplicity of his personal habits, amidst a court so remarkable for splendour and magnificence, gave a tone to general opinion amongst his contemporaries, which his subsequent misconduct and misrule could not entirely efface. He was ambitious of a character for wisdom; and his low craft and mean policy are partly ascribed to this weakness. His greatest political error was the overthrow of Beejapoor and Golcondah, instead of applying their resources to the suppression of predatory power. His suspicion and bigotry, his presumption and obstinacy, alike tended to prevent the tranquillization of that tumult of which his own measures were a principal cause; whilst his pomp weakened the efficiency of his armies, and exhausted the finances which should have maintained his wars.



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## *From A.D. 1707 to A.D. 1720*

IT HAS BEEN already mentioned that, upon the fall of Raigurh, the widow and son of Sumbhajee were carried prisoners to the imperial camp. They were received within the enclosure of the royal tents, and at the request of Begum Sahib, the emperor's daughter, a place was assigned to them near herself, and she continued to show them unremitting kindness during many years of captivity. The boy was at first constantly with her, and Aurungzebe, during his visits to his daughter, took much notice of him. Shao's original name was Sivajee, but that by which he afterwards became known was a familiar name given him by Aurungzebe; and his choosing to retain it in preference to that of his renowned grandfather, is as remarkable as that our English appellation of "*the Shao Raja*," meaning the sovereign of the Mahratta nation, applied from his long reign to Shao's successors as well as to himself, should have had its origin in an unbecoming pun of the emperor Aurungzebe. The attendants who followed the family into captivity were allowed to communicate with the Mahrattas in the Moghul army—an indulgence which did not extend to Shao, his mother, or to Muddon Sing, the illegitimate son of Sumbhajee, also made captive at Raigurh. Every kind of intercourse with the Mahrattas in rebellion was, to all the family and their followers, most strictly forbidden.

Yessoo Bye was a woman of much prudence, and carefully avoided intrigues. When Aurungzebe began to revolve the scheme of releasing Shao, he proposed to marry him to the daughters of two of the most distinguished Mahrattas in the imperial service, and to secure them in his interests by additional favours; these were, Jadow of Sindkheir, to whom the emperor had given the title of Roostum Rao; and Sindia, Patell of



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Kunneirkheir, whose illegitimate offspring, as heads of a Mahratta principality, are well known in the modern transactions of India. Shao was connected with Jadow by the mother's side, and the proposal being agreeable to all parties, the nuptials were celebrated in a respectable manner, but without pomp; and the emperor, besides conferring favours on Jadow and Sindia, bestowed on Shao the districts of Akulkote, Indapoor, Sopa, and Neywassa in jagheer. On this occasion Aurungzebe, amongst other presents to Shao, gave him a sword he had himself frequently worn, and restored two swords, which Shao's attendants had always urged him, if possible, to recover; the one was the famous Bhowanee of Sivajee, and the other the sword of Afzool Khan, the murdered general of Beejapoor, both taken at Raigurh.

But Aurungzebe, as we have seen, could not resolve on giving effect to this plan, and after his death Shao continued in the camp of Azim Shah, and was, by that prince, carried to a considerable distance beyond the Nerbuddah, when on his march, at the head of the army lately employed in the Deccan, to contend for the throne with his brother, Sultan Mauzum, who was advancing from Lahore.

Tara Bye and her ministers improved the opportunity which the absence of the main body of the Moghul army afforded. Dhunnajee Jadow defeated Lodi Khan, the foudar of Poona, re-took Chakun, and the Mahrattas were rapidly occupying, as well as plundering, the country, when Azim Shah, by the advice of Zoolfikar Khan, determined to release Shao, but to retain his mother, brother, and family as hostages for his good conduct; promising, however, that, in case he should succeed in establishing his authority, and continue steadfast in attachment and allegiance, he should receive the tract conquered by his grandfather from Beejapoor, with an additional territory between the Beema and Godavery.

Shao sent forward one of his attendants, personally known to Pursojee Bhonslay and Chimnajee Damoodhur, then at the head of some Mahratta troops in Berar and Candeish, for the purpose of announcing his approach, and soliciting their assistance. They immediately joined him, and their example was soon followed by Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, Neemajee Sindia, and



other chiefs. Letters, intimating his approach, were despatched by Shao to Tara Bye; but, as she did not choose to relinquish a power she had so long held, or renounce her son's pretensions to the sovereignty, she affected to believe him an impostor, assembled the whole of her ministers, declared her intention of opposing this pretender, and called upon all the principal officers to attest their fidelity to the cause of her son by the most solemn oaths. On their compliance she appointed Ramchundur Punt and Neeloo Punt to assist her with their counsel; Dhunnajee Jadow and Pureshram Trimbuck to command in the field; Shunkrajee Narain to defend the Ghaut-Mahta; and Kanhojee Angria, Surkheil, who had been appointed by Raja Ram to the command of the fleet, upon the death of Seodojee Goojur, was placed in charge of the coast. Poond Sawunt, of Waree, also sent assurances of fidelity to Tara Bye.

Shao, on hearing of these proceedings, halted at the Godavery, in hopes of being able to dispel any opinion there might really exist of his being an impostor; but his army having increased to 15,000 men, he determined, by the advice of Pursojee Bhonslay, to move forward without further delay. Dhunnajee Jadow and the Pritee Needhee advanced to oppose him. The people of the country seemed inclined to the cause of Tara Bye, and one village had the audacity to fire on his troops. Several of his men being killed, the place was assaulted, and a severe example made of the offenders. During the attack, a woman, bearing a boy in her arms, rushed towards Shao, and threw down the child, calling out that she devoted him to the raja's service. Shao took charge of him, and, in commemoration of his first success, called him Futih Sing to which he afterwards added his own surname of Bhonslay, and always treated him like his own son. Such was the extraordinary origin of the rajas of Akulkote.

As the armies drew near to each other, means were successfully employed to detach Dhunnajee Jadow from the cause of Tara Bye; and the Pritee Needhee, finding he was not supported in an action which took place at the village of Kheyr, 22 miles north of Poona, withdrew from Dhunnajee's troops, and fled to Satara. Shao, joined by Dhunnajee, advanced to Chundun Wundun, of which he obtained possession. He seized the families of all



persons acting against him; sent a summons to Shunkrajee Narain, Punt Suchew, to deliver up Poorundhur, which he had taken a short time before, and an order to Pureshrum Trimbuck to surrender Satara; neither of them obeyed; but Shaik Meerah, a Mahomedan officer who commanded under the latter, confined him and gave up the fort.

Shao, on obtaining possession of Satara, formally seated himself on the throne, in the month of March 1708. Gudadhur

*A.D. 1708* Prillhad was appointed Pritee Needhee, and Byhroo Punt Pingley was made Peishwa. The

brother of Byhroo Punt, Neeloo Punt Moreishwur, who still adhered to Tara Bye, died shortly after at Rangna. Dhunnajee Jadow was confirmed in his rank of Senaputtee, and the right of making collections in several districts was delegated to him. At this period of confusion the revenue was realized on no fixed principle, but levied, as opportunity presented itself, in the manner of contribution. The principal carcoons employed by Dhunnajee in revenue affairs were Abbajee Poorundhuree, Koolkurnee of Sassoor (Sasswur), near Poona, and another Bramin, Koolkurnee of Sreewurdun, in the district of Choule, a village then claimed by the Seedee, from which, in consequence of some intrigue connected with the Seedee's enemy Angria, he had fled to Sassoor, and had been recommended to Dhunnajee Jadow by Abbajee Poorundhuree and Pureshrum Trimbuck. The name of this Koolkurnee, afterwards so celebrated as the founder of the Peishwa's power, was Ballajee Wishwanath Bhutt.

Meanwhile the two eldest sons of Aurungzebe, Sultan Mauzum and Azim Shah, had fought a bloody battle near Agra, in which Sultan Mauzum was victorious. The army from the Deccan, commanded by Azim Shah, engaged under great disadvantages, owing to the pertinacity of that headstrong prince, who, at least, accelerated discomfiture by his want of preparation, and by his neglect of arrangement among his troops. He paid the forfeit of his obstinacy with his life. There fell with him his two sons, together with Turbeeut Khan, Dulput Rao Boondelay, Ram Sing Harra, the gallant Khan Alum, and a great proportion of the officers experienced or distinguished in Mahratta warfare.

Kaum Bukhsh, who was sent to Beejapoor by Aurungzebe a few days before his death, assumed the ensigns of royalty, and



declared himself emperor upon the demise of his father; his authority was at first acknowledged, but having no stability of character, he was soon deserted by most of his troops; he first endeavoured to conciliate the Mahratta Mankurees, who showed some disposition to listen to his overtures, but they were soon disgusted with his petulance and folly. Sultan Mauzum who had used his victory with moderation, and was now on his march to the Deccan, generously offered him the kingdoms of Hyderabad and Beejapoor: but Kaum Bukhsh preferred the desperate chance of encountering the whole army of Hindostan, and was killed near Hyderabad, in an attack made upon him by his old and inveterate enemy, Zoolfikar Khan, who was joined on the occasion by a body of Mahrattas sent by Shao, under the command of Neemajee Sindia.

The affairs of Kaum Bukhsh were considered so desperate that, after he had refused the offer made by Sultan Mauzum, it was conjectured that he intended to follow the example of his uncle, Sultan Mohummud Akber, and retire to Persia; orders were sent to all the seaports to intercept him, and two lakhs of rupees, with an extension of the company's privileges, were promised by Zoolfikar Khan to Mr. Pitt, governor of Madras, if he would apprehend the fugitive. To this Mr. Pitt agreed, but refused the present.

Zoolfikar Khan, who was in the army of Azim Shah in the battle of Agra, after supporting his reputation as an officer, escaped from the field, and Sultan Mauzum, by the advice of his excellent minister, Monaim Khan, not only pardoned, but promoted him to high rank, conferring on him the viceroyalty of the Deccan, and the title of Umeer-ool-Oomrah. By Zoolfikar Khan's representations, Sultan Mauzum at first lent his countenance to Shao's party, which tended to increase the raja's consequence amongst his countrymen, and would have been followed by more substantial advantages in a formal grant of the surdeshmookhee, but Monaim Khan, unused to Bramin artifice, having been visited by the wukeels of Tara Bye, was persuaded by them that Tara Bye's son, Sivajee, was the lawful raja of the Mahrattas. Zoolfikar Khan, impatient at his listening to these pretensions, betrayed an irritation which the minister resented; and Sultan Mauzum, unwilling to disoblige Monaim Khan, and



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at the same time not displeased to find an excuse for deferring such a concession, seemed to comply with the minister's proposal in favour of Sivajee, and desired that the deeds for the surdeshmookhee should be made out in his name; he, however, postponed their delivery until the claim to the Mahratta supremacy should be decided by the issue of the contest which was then in progress between the candidates.

Shao's army was cantoned at Chundun Wundun, in the neighbourhood of Satara, during the monsoon, and he neglected no preparation to enable him to reduce his rival. Amongst other expedients he made an unsuccessful application to Sir Nicholas Waite the Governor of Bombay, for a supply of guns, ammunition, European soldiers, and money. At the opening of the fair season, after celebrating the Dussera, preparations were made to renew the war against Tara Bye. Panalla was invested, the siege pressed with vigour, and the havildar who commanded offered to surrender on condition of being confirmed in his station. This proposal was readily acceded to; and Vishalgurh

*A.D. 1709* was surrendered by the agent of Pureshram Trimbuck on the same terms. Shao next marched towards Rangna, where Tara Bye then was; but, hearing of the approach of the army, she quitted Rangna and fled to Malwan. The havildar of Rangna refused to surrender, and opposed the besiegers with resolution; an assault was made and repulsed, and Shao, on the approach of the monsoon, abandoning the siege, retired to Kolapoor, where he cantoned the troops.

At the opening of the fair season it was intended to prosecute the war, but about that time an agreement was entered into with the Moghuls, which waived the grand question of hereditary claim, and rendered the reduction of Tara Bye a point of less pressing personal interest to Shao. Zoolfikar Khan, who attended the court of Sultan Mauzum on his return to Hindostan, left Daood Khan Punee as his deputy in the six Soobehs of the Deccan, and obtain for him the government of Burhanpoor, in addition to his other appointment. Daood Khan settled, with such Mahratta chiefs as acknowledged Shao's authority, to allow them, with certain reservations, one-fourth of the revenue, but reserved the right of collecting and paying it through his own agents. Daood Khan's intimacy with most of the Mahratta



chiefs, his connection with Zoolfikar Khan, and the terms of friendship between the latter and Shao, not only preserved Shao's ascendancy, but, except in instances where independent plundering bands occasionally appeared, procured a tolerably correct observance of the terms mentioned.

In the end of the year Shao returned to Satara, and married two wives, one of the Mohitey, and another of the Sirkay, family. His other two wives were still with his mother at Delhi, where one of them, the daughter of Sindia, shortly afterwards died. Dhunnajee Jadow, after a long illness caused by the breaking out of an old wound in his leg, died on his way from Kolapoor, on the banks of the Warna. His carcoon, Ballajee Wishwanath, had accompanied him on that service, and during his sickness had the management of all his affairs, which created an unconquerable jealousy on the part of Chunder Seyn Jadow, Dhunnajee's son, and several Bramins in his service.

The army had scarcely returned to Satara when Tara Bye, encouraged by the havildar at Panalla, marched towards that place, reinforced by the troops of Poond Sawunt, and it was immediately restored to her. It was now resolved, in order to give her party credit, and the appearance of a rising cause, to make that fort and the neighbouring town of Kolapoor the future residence of her court. Ramchundur Punt continued steadfast in the interest of her party, and Shunkrajee Narain likewise maintained her cause.

As the territory of the latter was reckoned the foundation-stone of the empire, from Sivajee's having first established himself there, Shao determined to reduce the Suchew, instead of renewing the attack on Panalla. About this time he entertained the design of removing his capital to Ahmednugur, but as it gave offence to Zoolfikar Khan, Shao, at his desire, relinquished the intention.

An army proceeded towards Poona, and succeeded in obtaining possession of Rajgurh; but most of the Suchew's forts being well stored with provisions, and garrisoned by veteran Mawulees, were reckoned impregnable. It was, therefore, with no small satisfaction that Shao heard of his having put a period to his existence,—an act which, it is said, he committed from remorse, in consequence of having taken a solemn oath to maintain the cause of Tara Bye against his lawful prince.



Just at the time, in the month of January, Sivajee, the son of Tara Bye, died of the small-pox. This prince was an idiot, but his death occasioned a considerable change at Kolapoor. Ramchundur Punt seized the opportunity to remove Tara Bye from the administration, and to place Sumbhajee, the son of Rajis Bye, the younger widow of Raja Ram, in her stead—a measure which had the sanction of Hindoo usage, and was therefore supported by common consent. Tara Bye, and Bhowanee Bye, her son's widow, said to have been pregnant at the time of her husband's death, were put into confinement, and Ramchundur Punt, unfettered by Tara Bye, began to exert himself with renovated vigour.

But Shao, whilst Daood Khan's government continued, was secured in the ascendancy; he was also surrounded by most of the experienced ministers, and was totally exempt from that cruelty and excess which his enemies gave out that he inherited, with many other vices, from his father Sumbhajee. The loss of Shunkrajee Narain was a severe blow to the cause of the opposite party, and Shao, in that temper of conciliation for which he is deservedly applauded, seized the advantage which the sanction of lawful authority always bears, and immediately despatched clothes of investiture to Narroe Shunker, son of the late Suchew, then a child of two years old, at the same time confirming, as a matter of course, his mootaliq, or principal agent, in that situation. This measure immediately secured to him the services of that party, and the Suchew never afterwards departed from his allegiance. Shao was not equally successful in binding all the members of the Pritee Needhee's family to his interest.

He released Pureshram Trimbeck, restored his honors by the removal of Gudadhur Prillhad, and confirmed in his formal charge of Vishalgurh and its dependencies. The Pritee Needhee sent his eldest son, Kistnajee Bhaskur, to assume the management of the fort and district: but he had no sooner obtained possession, than he revolted, tendered his services to Sumbhajee, and was made Pritee Needhee at Kolapoor. On this defection Pureshram Trimbeck was again thrown into confinement, and Shao, under

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a belief that the revolt had been encouraged by him, intended to have put him to death, but he was dissuaded from this design, which, even if just, would have made him odious in the country.

In consequence of changes at the imperial court, Daood Khan was removed to the government of Guzerat, which dissolved the agreement between the Moghuls and the Mahrattas.

Chunder Seyn Jadow, who had been appointed Senaputtee on the demise of his father, was sent off from Satara with a considerable army, and directed to levy the chouth, surdesh-mookhee, and ghas-dana from the Moghul districts. He was attended on this occasion by his father's carcoon, Ballajee Wishwanath, who was now charged with collecting and appropriating a share of the revenue for the raja—a situation of control which, under no circumstances, was likely to be favourably viewed by the Senaputtee. The jealousy formerly entertained was increased tenfold, and on a very slight cause, arising from a dispute about a deer run down by one of Ballajee's horsemen, the suppressed enmity burst out in attempted violence; and Ballajee was obliged to flee for his life, first to Sassoor, where the Suchew's agent in Poorundhur did not think it prudent to protect him, although he begged hard to be permitted to enter that fort. The horsemen, his pursuers, were in sight; but the commander of the fort was obdurate. With a few followers, amongst whom were his sons Bajee Rao and Chinnajee; Ballajee Wishwanath attempted to cross over to Pandoogurh, a fort in the opposite valley; but Jadow's horsemen were already in his route, and searching for him in every quarter. In this dangerous extremity he contrived to conceal himself for a few days, until two Mahrattas, the one named Peelajee Jadow, and the other surnamed Dhoomal, then common sillidars in his service, collected, by their influence with their relations, a small troop of horse, and promised to sacrifice their lives, or carry him and his sons that night to the Machee of Pandoogurh.

Ballajee Wishwanath, as the manuscripts state, "did not particularly excel in the accomplishment of sitting upon a horse," but the sillidars, although they had a skirmish, performed their promise, and the commander of the fort protected him by Shao's orders. Chunder Seyn Jadow peremptorily demanded his being delivered up to him, and threatened, in case



of refusal, to renounce his allegiance for ever. Shao was not prepared to punish this insolent demand, but he refused to give up Ballajee, and sent orders to Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, Sur Lushkur, then near Ahmednugur, to march for Satara immediately. In the meantime Ballajee Wishwanath was cooped up in Pandoogurh, which was surrounded by the Senaputtee's troops. Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, already jealous at not being made Senaputtee, and greatly incensed at Jadow's behaviour, obeyed the order with all speed; the latter, hearing of his arrival at Phultun, quitted Pandoogurh, and marched to Dewoor. The armies fought, and the troops of Jadow being defeated, he retired to Kolapoor, accompanied by Ghatgay Shirzee Rao. The latter was confirmed by Sumbhajee in his hereditary possessions at Kagul, but both went off to meet Cheyn Koolich Khan (Nizam-ool-Moolk), who had just been appointed, for the first time, to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, and from whom Jadow received a large tract of territory in the neighbourhood of Palkee, 25 miles east of Beder, as a jagheer for the support of his troops.

After the death of Sultan Mauzum in 1712, the distractions which prevailed by the usual contentions of the Moghul emperor's sons, the subsequent revolution effected for his grandson Ferokhsere, and the barbarous execution of Zoolfikar Khan, were followed by important changes in the government of the Deccan. Of these changes, the first to be mentioned was of much importance, both as it removed Daood Khan from the government, and as it brought a person to the temporary charge of the viceroyalty, who subsequently bore a leading part in Deccan affairs. This was the appointment of Cheyn Koolich Khan, the son of Ghazee-ud-deen. His original name was Meer Kummur-ud-deen; the title of Cheyn Koolich Khan, with a munsub of 5,000 horse, was conferred on him, when a very young man, by Aurungzebe, under whom, in the latter years of that emperor's reign, he held the important post of soobehdar in the province of Beejapoor. Cheyn Koolich Khan had materially contributed to the success of the two Syuds, Abdoollah Khan and Hoossein Ally Khan, to whose bravery, skill, and exertions Ferokhsere owed his throne. Amongst courtiers as well as states, friendship is as often the result of common enmity as of common interest; Cheyn Koolich Khan, who was known to have been the enemy



of Zoolfikar Khan, was immediately appointed to succeed to the viceroyalty of the deceased minister, and dignified with the title of Nizam-ool-Moolk, whilst Daood Khan was removed to the government of Guzerat.

It was at this period that the disaffected Senaputtee went over to Nizam-ool-Moolk, by whom he was well received, and rewarded in the manner already mentioned. He was accompanied by Ghatgay Shirzee Rao, of Kagul, and an officer named Rumbhajee Nimbalkur; the latter became distinguished in the Moghul service, and got the title of Rao Rumbha, which descended to his posterity. Nizam-ool-Moolk, on arriving at Aurungabad, seemed disposed to favour the cause of Sumbhajee, which, without enquiring into the private motives that may have inclined him to that party, was now the wisest policy the Moghuls could have adopted. Jadow, eager for revenge, and Nizam-ool-Moolk, desirous of suppressing the ravages of Shao's officers, sent an army against the Sur Lushkur, who retired from the Godavery to the Beema. Shao, in order to support him, sent forward a body of troops under Ballajee Wishwanath, whom he now dignified with the title of *Sena Kurt*, or agent in charge of the army. Ballajee effected a junction with Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, who fell back to the neighbourhood of Poorundhur, where they proposed to stand an engagement. A battle was fought, in which the advantage claimed by the Mahrattas is contradicted by their subsequent retreat to Salpee Ghaut. A detachment of Mahrattas from the Moghul army, under Rumbhajee Nimbalkur, took possession of the Poona district, and Rumbhajee obtained a jagheer in the neighbourhood. At length an accommodation took place, the terms of which are not ascertained, but hostilities ceased, and the Moghuls returned to Aurungabad. Nizam ool-Moolk kept his troops in motion during the fair season; but after he went into cantonments for the rains—a plan he invariably adopted—the Mahrattas, acting under different leaders, resumed their depredations.

All the deshmoookhs and deshpanyas in the Moghul districts of Maharashtra fortified the villages where they resided, on pretence of defending themselves, but they frequently joined or assisted their countrymen, of whatever party, in escape, defence, or concealment. One very rich caravan of treasure, escorted by a large detachment under Mohummud Ibrahim



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Tebreezee, was attacked on the route from Surat to Aurungabad, the troops were entirely destroyed, and the property carried off. This robbery was probably committed by Khundee Rao Dhabaray. For many years that officer had subsisted his followers in Guzerat and Kattywar, and exacted a tribute in those provinces. He acknowledged Shao as his chief; and when Daood Khan was appointed to Guzerat, he withdrew from the neighbourhood of Ahmedabad, and established himself in the strong country about Naundode and Rajpeeplee, whence, it is likely, from the nature of the attack, this was his first sally.

As Nizam-ool-Moolk favoured the Kolapoor party, Sumbhajee's influence was increased as that of Shao was diminished. Seedojee Ghorepuray, the son of Byherjee, nephew of the famous Suntajee, and youngest brother of the first Moorar Rao of Gootee, was induced to declare for Sumbhajee, by whom he was dignified with the title of Senaputtee, and several of the Ghorepurays, both of Kapsee and Moodhole, joined the Kolapoor party: but Seedojee and his ally, the Patan Nabob of Savanoor, were too intent on their own schemes of conquest and plunder to quit the Carnatic. It was about this period that Seedojee made a great acquisition by obtaining possession of Sondoor, a fort situated in a valley of singular strength, within 25 miles of Bellary.

Kishen Rao Kuttaokur, a Bramin, raised by the Moghuls, took post in the country about the Mahdeo hills, and without joining either party, plundered the districts on his own account. Dummajee Thorat, an officer long under Ramchundur Punt, strengthened a gurhee in the village of Hinghee or Hingungaom, near Patus, about 40 miles east of Poona, and levied contributions for 30 miles round. He was of the Kolapoor party, and acknowledged no chief except his old patron Ramchundur Punt, under whom he had first established himself, and from whom he received Sopa and Patus as a jagheer, during the siege of Ginjee. Even in Mahratta estimation he was a lawless ruffian. Oodajee Chowan, another of Ramchundur's officers and a native of Hutnee, took the gurhee of Buttees Serala, and in a short time became so formidable, that Shao was glad to enter into a compromise, by conceding the chouth of Serala and Kurar, which Chowan long continued to receive as a personal allowance. There were several other petty depredators who declared them-



selves Sumbhaje's adherents, but the most formidable of all was Kanhojee Angria, then in possession of the coast from Sawuntwaree to Bombay, who was extending his sway over the province of Kallianee in the Concan.

Such was the state of anarchy which now prevailed that, without a sudden change of fortune, and a greater efficiency in Shao's government, his authority over the Mahrattas must soon have become nugatory. Ballajee Wishwanath instilled some vigour into his councils, and began to take a lead in public affairs. He proposed to reduce Dummajee Thorat, and set out for that purpose; but he was seduced to a conference, treacherously seized, and thrown into confinement, together with his friend Abbajee Poorundhuree, his two sons Bajee Rao and Chimnaje, and several of their immediate retainers.

Thorat threatened them with the torture of fastening horses' feeding-bags, filled with ashes, on their mouths, and with ultimate death, unless he received a large ransom for their release. After enduring many indignities, the amount of their ransom was at last agreed upon and paid by Shao, who now applied to the Suchew to stop the progress of Thorat. The Suchew accordingly prepared to attack him; but his troops were defeated, and both the Suchew and his mootaliq were taken and thrown into confinement at Hingungaom.

At the same time that the Punt Suchew undertook this service, two expeditions were prepared at Satara—the one, under the Peishwa, Byhroo Punt Pingley, went to protect the Concan and repel Angria; and the other, commanded by Ballajee Wishwanath, was ordered to suppress Kishen Rao Kuttaokur. This Bramin had become so bold and confident, that he marched to Ound to meet Shao's troops, but he was totally defeated, principally by the bravery of Sreeput Rao, the second son of Pureshrum Trimbuck, the Pritee Needhee, who had urged his son to perform some action which might wipe away the misconduct of his elder brother and procure his father's release. Shao, accordingly, once more restored the Pritee Needhee to his liberty and rank. Kishen Rao, after perfect submission, was pardoned, and received the village of Kuttao in enam, a part of which is still enjoyed by his posterity.

This success was of considerable importance, but a like good fortune did not attend the Peishwa's expedition. Byhroo Punt



was defeated and made prisoner by Angria. The fort of Logurh was taken; Rajmachee surrendered; and it was reported that Angria was about to march for Satara. All the force that could be spared was collected to oppose him, under Ballajee Wishwanath, who undertook the command, with hopes of being enabled, from his former connection with Angria, to effect an accommodation more desirable than any that might result from a protracted contest with a powerful neighbour. Ballajee knew Angria to be a leader of considerable ability as well as enterprize, and that his resources were not bounded by the extent of the districts in his possession, but were chiefly obtained by daring and extensive piracies. Ballajee was successful in his endeavours; and Angria, on condition of receiving 10 forts, and 16 fortified places of less strength, with their dependent villages, on being confirmed in command of the fleet and his title of Surkheil, agreed to renounce Sumbhajee, to release the Peishwa, to restore all his conquests, except Rajmachee, and to maintain the cause of Shao.

By this agreement the Seedee found himself deprived of some places of which he had enjoyed the revenue for 20 years. The consequence was an immediate rupture between that chief and Angria, in which Ballajee Wishwanath, co-operating against the Seedee, invaded his territory, and soon compelled him to submit.

Ballajee having performed this service in a manner so entirely to Shao's wishes, was received, on his return to Satara, with the greatest distinction; and, in consequence of the

A.D. 1714 failure of Byhroo Punt Pingley, that minister was removed from the dignity of Mookh Purdhan, and Ballajee Wishwanath was appointed Peishwa in his stead. His friend Abbajee Poorundhuree was confirmed as his mootalik, and Ramjee Punt Bhanoo as his Furnaweese.

Manajee Moray, after the desertion of Chunder Seyn Jadow, had received clothes of investiture as Senaputtee, but had not performed the services that were expected of him; he was now ordered, with Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, to accompany Ballajee into the Poona district, for the purpose of reducing Dummajee Thorat. As Ballajee was apprehensive that the Suchew, who was still a prisoner in Hingungaom, might be killed if the place were attacked, he was prevailed upon by Yessoo Bye, the Punt Suchew's mother, to endeavour to obtain his release before



hostilities commenced. This was accordingly effected, and Yessoo Bye, in gratitude to the Peishwa for saving her son, made over to him the Suchew's rights in the Poona district, and gave him up the fort of Poorundhur, as a place of refuge for his family, then residing in Sassoor. On the same pretence Ballajee obtained a grant of it from Shao, by which concession that prince forged the first link in the chain which afterwards fettered his own power, and reduced his successors to empty pageants of Bramin policy.

The force assembled in the Poona district was too powerful for Thorat. He was soon forced into the gurhee of Hingungaom, which was breached and stormed. Dummajee Thorat was made prisoner, and the gurhee was destroyed.

The Sur Lushkur returned to the Godavery, after quarrelling with the raja for not appointing him Senaputtee, and they were never reconciled. The Peishwa induced the Moghul agent, in charge of the Poona district, to make over the superior authority to him, on promising that Rumbhajee Nimbalkur's jagheer should be respected. He immediately suppressed a banditti which infested it; gave his attention to restoring order in the villages; discontinued all farming of revenue; and encouraged cultivation, by the usual means of very low and gradually increasing assessments.

The affairs of the Mahrattas began to wear a more favourable aspect in all quarters; but after the confusion, weakness, and total anarchy which have just been described, the rapid expansion of their power from about this period, under the authority of Shao, is on any view very remarkable, and at first, until the cause be investigated, might seem quite incredible. The circumstances, however, which preserved that prince's ascendancy will be satisfactorily explained; and, as to the domestic confusion among the Mahrattas, it may be considered the reaction of their predatory power; their present state was like a flood with its channel completely obstructed, which rises on its natural barriers, till, surmounting or bursting through them, it inundates the plains.

The influence of Ballajee Wishwanath continued to increase, and no affair of importance was undertaken without his advice. A conciliatory policy was agreeable to Shao, and dictated all Ballajee's measures. The system of Sivajee was the groundwork



FROM A.D. 1707 TO A.D. 1720

of their arrangements; but, since the time of Sumbhaje, the necessity of preserving the raja's supremacy, by profusely issuing deeds, confirming to the successful Mahratta leader the possession of all the territory in which he could establish himself, was ruinous both to their union and resources as a nation. The nature, however, of the tribute which Sivajee's genius had instituted, suggested a remedy for the endless divisibility which every additional acquisition of territory was likely to create. The expedient adopted, which must have been long contemplated, will be shown in its proper place; and although it but temporarily insured its end, is the most ingenious, as well as the deepest, scheme of Bramin policy which is to be found unconnected with their religious system. The ministry, as far as practicable, was composed of the old retainers, and the situations of those who adhered to the Kolapoor party were conferred on their near relations.

The following is a list of the ministry at this period:—  
Pritee Needhee—Pureshram Trimluck.

*The Eight Purdhans*

1. Peishwa, or Mookh Purdhan—Ballajee Wishwanath.
2. Amat—Amba Rao Bapoo Rao Hunwuntay.
3. Suchew—Naroo Shunker.
4. Muntree—Naroo Ram Shenwee.
5. Senaputtee—Maun Sing Moray.
6. Somunt—Anund Rao.
7. Nyadeish—Honajee Anunt.
8. Pundit Rao—Moodghul Bhutt Oopadheea.

Pursojee Bhonslay and Hybut Rao Nimbalkur both died about this time. The son of the former, Kanhojee Bhonslay, was confirmed by Shao in all his father's possessions, and succeeded to his title of Sena Sahib Soobeh; but the rank of Sur Lushkur was conferred on Dowulshee Somwoushee, together with all the rights and honors of the situation. The son of Hybut Rao, whose succession was set aside, quitted Shao's standard, joined Chunder Seyn Jadow, and afterwards received Barsee and other districts as a jagheer from Nizam-ool-Moolk.

Shao was not destitute of ordinary ability; he was naturally generous, liberal to all religious establishments, observant of forms enjoined by the Hindoo faith, and particularly charitable



to Bramins. The Ghaut-Mahta and the rugged Concan were his birthright, but, unused to climb Ghauts, or wander and live in the wilds of the mountain-forest like his hardy grandfather, Shao's childhood was spent within the enclosure of the imperial seraglio, and it is not surprising that, seduced by the pomp and luxury of which he partook, his habits should have continued those of a Mahomedan. He occasionally showed all the violence of the Mahratta character, and for the time anger overcame his indolence; but in general he was satisfied with the respect and homage paid to his person, and the professions of obedience invariably shown by the ministers to his commands; he was pleased at being freed from the drudgery of business, and in following his favourite amusements of hawking, hunting, and fishing; he did not foresee that he was delegating a power which might supersede his own. As legitimate head of the Mahrattas, the importance of that nation was increased by the manner in which he was courted by the Moghuls; and the dignities and rights conferred upon him, in consequence of his situation, gave an influence and respect to the name of Shao, which, under other circumstances, he could never have attained. Both the sons of Sivajee followed the example of their father, from the period when he mounted the throne, and always declared their independence; but Shao acknowledged himself a vassal of the throne of Delhi, and whilst styling himself king of the Hindoos, he affected, in his transactions with the Moghuls, to consider himself merely as a zumeendar, or head deshmookh of the empire.

The Emperor Ferokhsere, soon after his accession, upon the cessation of hostilities at the Salpee Ghaut, appointed Shao to the rank of 10,000 horse; and for 17 months, or during the first government of Nizam-ool-Moolk, the policy and vigour of that viceroy had greatly tended to control the Mahrattas.

Ferokhsere, at a very early period, began to entertain a jealousy of the Syuds, to whom he owed his elevation, and mutual distrust soon followed. He consented to appoint the younger Syud, Hoossein Ally Khan, to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, in hopes that, by separating the brothers, he should weaken their power and compass their destruction. In applying for this appointment, Hoossein Ally Khan intended to follow the example of Zoolfikar Khan, and govern by deputy; but, relying on the



FROM A.D. 1707 TO A.D. 1720

emperor's assurances, he was prevailed upon to depart for the Deccan, openly declaring, however, that if anything should be meditated against his brother, he would be in the capital in 20 days. Ferokehser, under whose authority Daood Khan was removed to Guzerat, now despatched secret instructions to that officer to oppose the new viceroy, promising that, if successful, he should be appointed to the six Soobehs of the Deccan in his stead. Daood Khan, from his known influence with the Mahrattas, and other circumstances, was considered a person peculiarly fit for this commission, which, at the command of the emperor, he readily undertook. The only Mahratta, however, that had come forward, or had time to join him, was Neemajee Sindia, who, content with a jagheer he received from Zoolfikar Khan, in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, attached himself, during the dissensions of his countrymen, to the Moghul viceroy for the time being. On the present occasion, in observance of

the same temporizing rule, when Hoossein Ally Khan and Daood Khan came to a battle, Neemajee Sindia galloped about at a distance, awaiting the result, and seeing victory declare in favour of Hoossein Ally, after the death of Daood Khan, the Mahratta congratulated the victor, and joined his standard.

Ferokehser, disappointed in his treacherous scheme, but still intent on the destruction of the brothers, with the greatest professions of cordiality, secretly encouraged resistance to the viceroy's authority, both amongst the servants of his government and the Mahrattas—a base and silly policy which, in the end, could hardly fail to meet with its deserts.

The first expedition, directed by Hoossein Ally Khan against the Mahrattas, was for the purpose of opening the communication between Surat and Burhanpoor, and suppressing the depredations of Khundee Rao Dhabaray, who had established a line of posts along that route, and exacted one-fourth of the effects of all travellers who did not purchase his passport. Eight thousand men were sent off, under Zoolfikar Beg, to destroy this freebooter; but Dhabaray, hearing of their march, threw himself in the way, suffered himself to be pursued in the usual manner, until the Moghuls were broken, when, wheeling round, the experienced Mahratta completely defeated them, killed the commander, and plundered his troops even of their clothes.



Maakoob Sing, the dewan of Hoossein Ally Khan, set out, accompanied by Chunder Seyn Jadow, to avenge this disgraceful defeat. Khundee Rao effected a junction with the troops of the Sur Lushkur, and gave the Moghuls battle near Ahmednugur. A severe conflict took place, in which both parties claim the advantage, but the Moghuls returned to Aurangabad. Khundee Rao Dhabaray, who had been long absent from court, went to Satara after these successes, paid his respects to Shao, and was raised to the rank of Senaputtee of the empire, Manajee Moray having been removed for inability and misconduct.

The Mahratta officers, encouraged by their success, and by the secret overtures of Ferokhsere, now extended their encroachments; and, in addition to the chouth, which they had agreed to receive from Daood Khan in lieu of all claims, they everywhere levied the surdeshmookhee.

It was under these circumstances that Hoossein Ally Khan, distracted by Mahratta depredations on one side, and court intrigues on the other, had recourse to negotiations with Shao. Shunkrajee Mulhar, originally a carcoon under Sivajee, and appointed Suchew by Raja Ram, at Ginjee, retired, as has been mentioned, during the siege of that place, to Benares. Having become tired of a life so little in unison with his former habits, he engaged, although then a very old man, in the service of Hoossein Ally Khan when appointed to the Deccan. He soon gained the confidence of his master, and at an early period entered into a correspondence with his old friends at Satara. He represented to the viceroy that, if the Mahratta claims were recognised, they would have an interest in the prosperity of the country; that this was the only way to restore tranquillity, and a certain means to obtain powerful allies, by whose aid he might rest secure from present intrigues, and eventually defy the avowed hostility of the emperor.

In these opinions he was supported by Mohummud Anwar Khan, the governor of Burhanpoor, a person high in the confidence of Hoossein Ally Khan. Shunkrajee Mulhar was therefore despatched to Satara, for the purpose of effecting an arrangement and alliance between the Moghuls and his countrymen.

This mission laid open a grand prospect to the aspiring mind of Ballajee Wishwanath. Besides the chouth and surdeshmookhee of



the six Soobehs of the Deccan, including the Beejapoor and Hyderabad Carnatic, with the tributary states of Mysore, Trichinopoly, and Tanjore, Shao demanded the whole of the territory in Maharashtra which had belonged to Sivajee, with the exception of his possessions in Candeish; but in lieu of which, territory adjoining the old districts, as far east as Punderpoor, was to be substituted. The fort of Sewneree was required to be given up, and the fort of Trimbuck restored. The old districts in the Carnatic were also demanded, and a confirmation of some conquests lately made by Kanhojee Bhonslay, the Sena Sahib Soobeh, in Gondwaneh and Berar; and lastly, the mother and family of Shao were to be sent from Delhi as soon as practicable.

On these conditions Shao promised to pay to the imperial treasury,—for the old territory, a peshkush, or tribute, of ten lakhs of rupees; for the surdeshmookhee, or ten per cent of the whole revenue, he bound himself to protect the country, to suppress every species of depredation, to bring thieves to punishment, or restore the amount stolen, and to pay the usual fee of 651 per cent on the annual income, for the hereditary right of surdeshmookh: for the grant of the chouth he agreed to maintain a body of 15,000 horse in the emperor's service, to be placed at the disposal of the soobehdars, foudjars, and officers in the different districts; but upon the grant of the chouth no fee was to be paid. The Carnatic, and the soobehs of Beejapoor and Hyderabad, which were then overrun by the partizans of Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapoor, Shao promised to clear of plunderers, and to make good every loss sustained by the inhabitants of those provinces from the date of the final settlement of the treaty.

Shunkrajee Mulhar had already sufficiently proved his desire to forward the interests of his countrymen, and Shao appointed him to conclude the terms, which, according to the above proposals, were, with some exceptions, conceded by Hoossein Ally Khan.

A.D. 1717

The territory and forts not under the viceroy's control were to be recovered at some season of leisure, or in any manner which Shao might think fit; in the meantime, a body of 10,000 horse were sent to join the viceroy. Suntajee and Pursojee Bhonslay, relations of the Sena Sahib Soobeh, Oodajee Powar, Wiswas Rao, and several other commanders were detached in



charge of the Mahratta troops for this duty. Agents were at the same time sent to inquire into the state of the districts, and collect the extensive shares of revenue now assigned to them, whilst the Bramin ministers were devising a system for realizing their intricate claims, which it was by no means their object or their interest to simplify.

The emperor, however, refused to ratify the treaty which had been exchanged; and an unworthy favourite having given him great encouragement in his intrigues for the destruction of the Syuds, he became less guarded in his measures, and an open rupture seemed

*A.D. 1718*

inevitable. Hoossein Ally Khan, therefore, prepared to march for the capital, and solicited aid from Shao. Such an opportunity was not neglected. Ballajee Wishwanath and Khundee Rao Dhabaray proceeded to join the viceroy with a large body of troops, for which he agreed to pay them a certain sum daily, from the date of their crossing the Nerbuddah until their return; and Hoossein Ally Khan further promised that the treaty should be ratified, and the family of Shao released and delivered to his officers. Ballajee Wishwanath was instructed by Shao, on his departure, to endeavour, if possible, to obtain the cession of the forts of Doulutabad and Chandah, and an authority for levying the tribute, which had been for some time imposed by the Mahrattas, in Guzerat and Malwa. The plea on which these extraordinary pretensions to tribute were made was, that the chiefs who had already levied contributions in those provinces would break in and plunder, unless Shao could receive such an authority as must oblige the chiefs in question to look to him only for, what they termed, their established contributions, and that he would, under these circumstances, be responsible for the protection and improvement of the territories.

The combined army marched to Delhi, where the wretched Ferochsere, as irresolute in his actions as he was bold in his intrigues, could not be prevailed upon to act any consistent part: he was alike submissive and deceitful; the friends, who would have acted for him, were suffered to be removed; and, finally, after some tumult, he was confined by the Syuds, and subsequently put to death. Two princes of the royal household succeeded each other on the throne, and died within seven months.



FROM A.D. 1707 TO A.D. 1720

Roshun Ikhtiar, the son of Jehandar Shah, and grandson of Sultan Mauzum, was then raised to the imperial dignity by the title of Mohummud Shah; but the two Syuds, *A.D. 1719* by whom all these changes were effected, conducted the affairs of the empire with absolute sway, and with the usual watchful jealousy of usurpers. They held the reins with a strong hand, but they were naturally desirous of retaining the services of such nobles of experience and ability as were not supposed hostile to their party. Of this number was Nizam-ool-Moolk, but that officer was secretly inimical to their power; he had been removed from his government in the Deccan to make room for Hoossein Ally Khan, and appointed to Mooradabad, where he had distinguished himself by his activity in reducing to order some rebellious zumeendars of the provinces, who had sheltered themselves in the Sewalik mountains. He was recalled to court by the emperor, and remained at Delhi for some time unemployed, but was at last despatched as governor of the province of Malwa, at the recommendation of the elder Syud. Although daring and ambitious, he inherited the temporizing policy of his father, and he was induced, on the confinement of Ferokhsere, to profess his allegiance to the pageant emperor whom the Syuds had set up. He continued in his government of Malwa; but observing the troubles and disorders likely to arise, he waited in expectation of some favourable opportunity to aggrandize himself, during the revolutionary period of which he foresaw the approach.

Ballajee Wishwanath and his Mahrattas remained at Delhi until the accession of Mohummud Shah; and during the tumult which preceded the confinement of Ferokhsere, *A.D. 1720* Suntajee Bhonslay and 1,500 of his men were killed by the populace in the streets of Delhi.

The army was paid by the Syuds, according to the agreement, and Shao's mother and family given over to Ballajee Wishwanath. Both the Peishwa and Senaputtee being anxious to return to the Deccan, they were permitted to depart; and, according to the treaty with Hoossein Ally Khan, they received three imperial grants for the chouth, surdeshmookhee, and swuraje. The chouth, or one-fourth of the whole revenue of the six Soobehs of the Deccan, including the Hyderabad and Beejapoor Carnatic, and



the tributary states of Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Mysore; the surdeshmookhee, or ten per cent over and above the chouth; and the swuraje, literally meaning *our own sovereignty*, or the districts possessed by Sivajee at the time of his death, which were granted to Shao, excepting the detached possessions in Candeish, the fort of Trimbuck, with the adjoining district, and the conquests south of the Wurdah and Toongbuddra rivers, which were not ceded. In lieu of such of these claims as lay to the north of the Beerna, districts beyond the line of forts from Tattora to Muchindergurh, as far east as Punderpoor, were wholly ceded to Shao, and also those districts which Aurangzebe had promised to him at the time of his marriage in that emperor's camp. The country watered by the Yairla, Maun, and Neera, celebrated for good horses and hardy soldiers, and the residence of the most ancient families in Maharashtra, who had not hitherto formally acknowledged the descendant of Sivajee, were by this cession placed under his authority.

The Mahrattas pretend that the conquests in Berar by Pursojee and Kanhojee Bhonslay, and their right to tribute in Guzerat and Malwa, were confirmed at the same time; but although some very indefinite verbal promise may have been given, and Ballajee Wishwanath left a wukeel, named Deo Rao Hingunee, for the purpose, as is alleged, of receiving the sunnuds, yet subsequent events prove the falsity of the assertion. No such confirmation appears in the imperial deeds; the usual fees levied on an hereditary assignment are specified on the back of the grant for the surdeshmookhee, but none of the three were given as perpetual alienations.

When Ballajee Wishwanath departed for Delhi, he left his dewan, Abbjee Poorundhuree, as his mootaliq, or deputy, in charge of his seal of office, and the duties of Peishwa continued to be carried on at the Mahratta court in Ballajee's name. On his return to Satara with the imperial deeds, the scheme for collecting and distributing the revenues, which all admit to have been projected by Ballajee, was examined, and the system before alluded to, which had already been partially introduced, was now generally promulgated. A brief analysis of their plans for collecting and appropriating the revenues will afford more insight into the character of the people, and the nature of



Bramin power, than the subject promises. It furnishes not only some explanation of the mode adopted for preserving a common interest among the Mahrattas, and affording pretexts for encroaching on the Moghuls, but it exposes the laboured artifice by which the illiterate Mahratta chief becomes wholly dependent on his Bramin accountant.

The surdeshmookhee, or ten per cent on the revenues of the six Soobehs of the Deccan, was first set aside, and termed by the ministers the *raja's wutun*—a gratifying sound to the ears of a Mahratta, whether prince or peasant.

The imposition of the surdeshmookhee, of course, reduced in a proportionate degree, the actual collections from a country, the resources of which were already drained to the utmost; but the nominal revenue continued the same. To have collected even one-fourth of the standard assessment would probably, at this period, have been impossible; but the Mahrattas, in all situations, endeavoured to secure, in lieu of their chouth, at least 25 per cent of the real balance. But, although they seldom could collect it, they always stated the chouth as due upon the tunkha, or standard assessment; because, even should a day of retribution arrive, no claim of peshkush could be made by the Moghuls on that head, as none was specified on the deed.

In regard to the surdeshmookhee, it suited both their foreign and domestic policy to keep that claim undefined; but one system in practice, that of exacting as much as they could, was as simple as it was invariable.

Of the 75 per cent which remained to the Moghuls, one-third, or 25 per cent was received, according to established usage, by the foudar, and the balance was collected sometimes for the imperial exchequer, but generally on account of some jagheerदार, to whom, as I have already mentioned in a former chapter, the Moghul conquests in the Deccan were assigned for the support of troops. This general mode of appropriating the revenue accounts for the seizures, resumptions, and cessions of territory, under the name of jagheer, which was taken, re-taken, and interchanged, during the later wars in the Deccan, between the Nizam and the Peishwa. It likewise explains the practice which prevailed in many villages, even up to the period of the late conquests in Maharashtra by the British government, of bring-



ing 50 per cent of the net revenue to account under the head of jagheer, for which the Koolkurnees, in less than a century, could assign no reason except the custom of their forefathers.

The swuraje, applied in the first instance to that part of the territory north of the Toongbuddra possessed by Sivajee at his death, was, upon the return of Ballajee Wishwanath, extended in its signification to the whole of the Mahratta claims, exclusive of the surdeshmookhee. Of these claims, one-fourth, or 25 per cent, was appropriated to the head of the state, in addition to the surdeshmookhee; and this fourth was known by the name of the *raja's babtee*: the balance was termed mokassa. Upon the mokassa there were two shares left at the disposal of the raja—the one was Sahotra, or six per cent, and the other Nargounda, or three per cent, both calculated on the whole swuraje. The balance of the mokassa was 66 per cent of the whole of the Mahratta claims, exclusive of the surdeshmookhee.

The Sahotra was bestowed by Shao on the Punt Suchew, as an hereditary assignment; but it was only collected by the Suchew's own agents within the territory wholly possessed by the Mahrattas: separate collectors were sent by the raja to realize it in distant districts. The Nargounda was granted to different persons, at the raja's pleasure.

The Purdhans, independent of salaries from the treasury, had many enam villages conferred upon them. Ballajee Wishwanath received several districts adjoining Poona in personal jagheer, including the fort of Logurh. The Pritee Needhee, the Peishwa, and the Punt Suchew were charged with the collection of the Babtee on the raja's account. Thus there were distinct agents for realizing the babtee and surdeshmookhee, for the Sahotra of the Punt Suchew, for the Nargounda of the assignee to whom it belonged, and for mokassa to different officers for maintaining troops.

The mokassa was distributed amongst a great number of chiefs, as military jagheer, burdened, according to circumstances, with dues to the head of the state, both money and of troops. The districts of old Mahratta jagheerdars were exempted from the chouth, but they generally were liable to the payment of surdeshmookhee, besides furnishing their quota of horse. Such jagheers, in a grant of mokassa for a large tract, were always



stated as deductions, and long before districts were conquered, former grants and assignments of their revenue were distributed. Numberless personal jagheers and enams of lands and of whole villages were alienated by Shao: the former commonly required the performance of some service, but the latter were entirely freehold. The raja's authority was considered necessary to collect the revenues thus conceded; but authority, for which they were constantly petitioning, was a mere mockery. The Bramins soon proved, at least to their own satisfaction, that the raja's sunnud was sufficient for levying tribute in districts not specified in the imperial deeds. A district once overrun was said to be under tribute from usage, whilst the others were plundered by *virtue of letters patent*.

There were particular quarters of the country assigned to the principal officers, which as far as they can now be ascertained, were as follow: The Peishwa and Senaputtee, charged with the command of a great proportion of the raja's personal troops, were ordered to direct their attention to the general protection and defence of the territory. The former had authority to levy the government dues in Candeish, and part of the Bala Ghaut; the latter was vested with similar authority in Buglana, and a right to realize the dues established by usage from Guzerat. Kanhojee Bhonslay, the Sena Sahib Soobeh, had charge of Berar Payeen Ghaut, and was privileged to make conquests and exact tribute from Gondwaneh to the eastward. The Sur Lushkur had Gungthuree, including part of Aurungabad; Futih Sing Bhonslay was appointed to the Carnatic; whilst the general charge of the old territory from the Neera to the Warna, and the collections from Hyderabad and Bedar, were left to the Pritee Needhee and the immediate agents of the raja. The Chitnees had particular charge of several districts in the Concan. The Punt Suchew enjoyed the revenue of the whole Sahotra, besides his old possessions in jagheer. The agents for collecting the raja's zumeendaree dues were styled Naib Surdeshmookh.

Kanhojee Angria, retaining his districts in the Concan, levied his chouth, as he termed it, by continuing to plunder the ships of all nations that appeared on the coast. For a time Angria refrained from molesting the English; but in consequence of his taking the ship *Success*, under British colours, war was renewed



in 1717, and the settlement of Bombay was endangered by his intrigues with a Bramin, known by the name of Rama Kamatty, who was employed in a confidential manner, and in command of the sepoys, by the governor, Mr. Charles Boone. On the accession of Mr. Phipps as president in council, the war was vigorously prosecuted; but Kanhojee Angria continued to deride the efforts both of the English and Portuguese, who united to suppress his piracies. Angria used to pay a tribute to the raja in guns, muskets, military stores, and ammunition. He also presented frequent nuzurs, in articles from Europe and China; and he was sometimes charged with a very extraordinary duty, that of executing state criminals.

All the principal Mahratta officers had, as a further means of preserving intercourse and union, particular claims assigned to them on portions of revenue, or on whole villages in the districts of each other. The greatest Mahratta commanders, or their principal Bramin agents, were eager to possess their native village; but, although vested with the control, they were proud to acknowledge themselves of the family of the patell or koolkurnee; and if heirs to a miras field, they would sooner have lost wealth and rank than been dispossessed of such *wulun*, or inheritance. Yet, on obtaining the absolute sovereignty, they never assumed an authority in the interior village concerns, beyond the rights and privileges acquired by birth or purchase, according to the invariable rules of the country.

Such is a brief outline of the system and arrangements settled by the Mahratta ministry on the return of Ballajee Wishwanath; and such was the mode by which a common interest was created, and for a time preserved, among the Mahratta chiefs; whilst the character of Shao, the influence and power of Ballajee Wishwanath, the abilities of his sons Bajee Rao and Chimnaje, and the preponderance of Bramin opinion and authority, paved the way, though by gradual steps, for the supremacy and usurpation of the Peishwas.





13

*From A.D. 1720 to A.D. 1726*

THE MEASURES which the Syuds adopted were the reverse of conciliatory; they were respected by the people, but they neither gained the goodwill of the nobility, nor of the pageant emperor whom they had raised. Nizam-ool-Moolk, governor of Malwa, who always meditated the means of aggrandizing himself, encouraged by these appearances of discontent, and secretly incited by persons in the confidence of Mohummud Shah, formed the resolution of throwing off his dependence on the Syuds, and of resisting their authority by possessing himself of the resources of the Deccan. He was aided in his projected scheme by Murhummut Khan, a disaffected officer of considerable talent, whom he had gained, and the awakened suspicions of the Syuds determined his purpose.

Assuming the title of Asif-ja, Nizam-ool-Moolk crossed the Nerbuddah at the head of 12,000 men. The fort of Asseergurh was given up to him by Talib Khan for a sum of money; Burhanpoor was surrendered by Mohummud Anwar Khan, and the whole of Candeish, in a very short time, submitted. Chunder Seyn Jadov, Nimbalkur, the son of Hybut Rao, the late Sur Lushkur, Rao Rumbha Nimbalkur, several other Mahrattas discontented with Shao, and some troops belonging to Sumbhajee from Kolapoor, attached themselves to his standard.

At this juncture there were two armies in the interests of Syuds, at no great distance from each other; the one, under Diawlur Ally Khan, was on the frontiers of Malwa, and the other was the army of the Deccan, stationed at Aurungabad, with the deputy viceroy, Alum Ally Khan, a nephew of the Syuds, left in charge of the government, when his uncle Hoosein Ally Khan departed for Delhi to depose Ferokhsere. As the rains were at hand, Nizam-ool-Moolk probably contemplated that the advance of



the former might be obstructed by the swelling of the Nerbuddah and Taptee, and that he should be able to decide the fate of the Deccan, and become master of its resources, before the deputy viceroy could be reinforced from Hindustan. Dilawur Ally Khan, however, marched with such rapidity, that he crossed the rivers whilst still fordable, but either incapable of perceiving, or disdaining the advantage which would have been insured by forming a junction with the troops at Aurangabad, and intent only on attacking his enemy, he marched straight for Burhanpoor. Nizam-ool-Moolk prepared to receive him, and, being aware of the impetuous character of his adversary, adopted an order of battle suggested by his experience of Deccan warfare: he sent forward and displayed a part of his army, to stimulate the ardour of Dilawur Ally Khan, who rushed upon them, pushed forward in imagined victory, was drawn into an ambuscade, defeated, and slain.

Alum Ally Khan, the deputy viceroy, had not assembled the whole of his army, when news of this disaster reached Aurangabad; the troops of Shao, under Kanhojee Bhonslay, the Sena Sahib Soobeh, and Hybut Rao Nimbalkur speedily joined Shunkrajee Mulhar, who, since the departure of Hoossein Ally Khan, had resided with the deputy viceroy, as the envoy of Shao. Khundee Rao Dhabaray, who had just returned from Delhi, was likewise despatched from Satara with a body of horse. Alum Ally Khan advanced towards Burhanpoor, and sent forward the Mahrattas to harass his opponent. Nizam-ool-Moolk, who had been busily employed in preparing his own troops, and sowing sedition among those of his adversary, likewise advanced; but the Poorna river being greatly swollen, his march was for a time interrupted, until a ford was discovered. The Mahratta horse on each side had frequent skirmishes as the Moghul armies approached each other; but Nizam-ool-Moolk, previous to engaging, stationed his Mahrattas at a village some distance in the rear. Choosing an arrangement nearly similar to that by which his late success had been achieved, Nizam-ool-Moolk attacked his adversary at Balapoor in Berar Payeen Ghaut, drew him into an ambuscade, where, after great efforts of personal valour, and after many of his troops had fled, or deserted to his enemy, Alum Ally Khan at length fell, surrounded by Mahrattas slain in his



defence. On these occasions the Mahrattas behaved as faithful auxiliaries, and fought with bravery, they lost no person of note, except Shunkrajee Mulhar, who was mortally wounded, and made prisoner.

The news of this second victory, which was gained by Nizam-ool-Moolk about the end of July, was received at Delhi with consternation by the Syuds, but with secret satisfaction by the emperor. Various were the plans proposed by the two brothers, but it was at last determined, instead of yielding the government of the Deccan to Nizam-ool-Moolk—a measure strongly advised by their Hindoo agent, Ruttun Chund—that the younger Syud, Hoossein Ally Khan, should march for the Deccan, taking with him the emperor, and a well-appointed army sufficient to crush this formidable rebel.

Accordingly Hoossein Ally Khan, accompanied by the emperor, having made every preparation, took leave of his brother, and commenced his march southward. The Tooranee Moghuls, friends and countrymen of Nizam-ool-Moolk, dreaded the event of a war in the Deccan; but, stimulated by the success of Nizam-ool-Moolk, whom they considered a chief of their tribe, and encouraged by the connivance of the emperor, a conspiracy was formed against the life of Hoossein Ally Khan by three daring individuals, on one of whom fell the lot of striking the blow. The assassin effected his deadly purpose at the expense of his life. The surviving conspirators, Mohummud Amin Khan and Sadut Khan, joined by Hyder Koolee Khan, immediately placed the emperor at the head of such troops as they could command, proclaimed their resolution of freeing him from the tyranny of the Syuds, and, after considerable bloodshed, obtained the ascendancy in camp. An Indian army readily changes masters, and even under circumstances of national hostility, where the commander of the vanquished has been slain, and his followers accept of service from the victor, the new chief, to use their own expression, "whose salt they eat," frequently advances at their head with as much confidence as if they had never been his enemies; on the present occasion, although the army had previously looked on Hoossein Ally Khan as their master, they were employed under the name and authority of Mohummud Shah. The chiefs of the conspiracy, therefore, after they had prevailed



over the immediate dependents of the Syuds, found no difficulty in securing the fidelity of the army, and the imperial standard were advanced towards the capital. Syud Abdoolah Khan, on hearing of this revolution, by means of the treasure at his command, assembled a large army in a few days, and placing on the throne a rival to Mohummud Shah, marched forth to punish the murderers of his brother. The armies met at Shahpoor, where a bloody contest, long dubious, at length ended in the defeat of Abdoolah Khan, who was wounded and made prisoner.

Mohummud Shah, on thus becoming entire master of the empire, in gratitude for the services he had experienced, appointed Mohummud Amin Khan his vizier, Khan Dowran received the title of Umeer-ool-Oomrah, Kummur-ud-deen Khan, the son of Mohummud Amin, was raised to high dignity, Hyder Koolee Khan and Sadut Khan were also promoted, and all those who had distinguished themselves in the battle of Shahpoor were rewarded and honored.

The emperor entered his capital in splendid procession, and for many days nothing was heard but rejoicing and festivity. Letters of submission and professions of loyalty poured in from every quarter; Nizam-ool-Moolk offered his congratulations; Shao's envoy was equally prompt in paying homage; and the chiefs of the European factories, through the different soobehdars and foudjars, sent humble offers of congratulation and best wishes for his majesty's long and happy reign.

The reign of Mohummud Shah was indeed long, but ages of ordinary decay were crowded in that period. The rapid ruin of the empire, and the terrible fate overhanging the venerable Delhi, form a melancholy contrast with the gaiety and splendour which now gladdened its inhabitants, and for which the Moghul capital was still celebrated. Suitable answers and returns were made to all the messages, letters, and presents which crowded in upon the young emperor. Nizam-ool-Moolk, whose successful revolt had been the primary cause of the present happy revolution, was particularly honored, and shortly afterwards, in consequence of the sudden death of Mohummud Amin Khan, he was not only permitted to retain his viceroyalty, in addition to his government of Malwa, but raised to the office of vizier of the empire; arrangements, however, in the Deccan and Carnatic,



to which we shall presently revert, prevented his appearing at court until the month of January 1722.

Amongst the appointments of this period, it is proper to mention those of Hyder Koolee Khan to Guzerat, which he at first governed by deputy; and of Sadut Khan, first to Agra and afterwards to Oudh; during the short time the latter held both governments, he also entrusted Agra to a deputy. Sadut Khan has been already mentioned as an active conspirator against his former patrons the Syuds, and he afterwards bore a large share in the events of his time, but he is best known in British India as the ancestor of the present king of Oudh.

The first event which attracted the attention of the new administration at Delhi, and on the issue of which that of all India was probably fixed, arose from the rebellion of the Rajpoot prince of Joudpoor, Ajeet Sing, who, originally in the interest of the Syuds, had possessed himself of Ajimere. Hyder Koolee Khan and Sadut Khan proposed marching to reduce him to obedience, but Khan Dowran, the principal minister, in the absence of Nizam-ool-Moolk, unwilling to relinquish the command of the expedition, was at the same time afraid of losing his influence when at a distance from the young emperor; he was also averse to quit the pleasures of the capital, and at last assented to the appointment of Kummur-ud-deen Khan for this service. The latter, however, required some preliminary concessions in regard to his powers of command, which could not be complied with; in short, the expedition was abandoned, and the imperial authority compromised, by admitting excuses and professions of submission from Ajeet Sing, which were tendered to the emperor through Khan Dowran. Nor did a mere pardon suffice; by the influence of Khan Dowran, Ajeet Sing was appointed to the government of Agra, in consequence of the assassination of the deputy of Sadut Khan, and thus, as the Khan was not consulted, the emperor's enemy was conciliated at the expense of his friend.

In the meantime several important changes had also taken place at the Mahratta court, chiefly owing to the death of three of the principal ministers—Pureshram Trimbuck, Ballajee Wishwanath, and Khundee Rao Dhabaray. Sreeput Rao, second son of the Pritee Needhee, had succeeded his father Pureshram Trimbuck, previously to the return of Ballajee Wishwanath from Delhi.



The Peishwa's health had suffered considerably from the fatigue of the journey, and the labour he had bestowed on different arrangements after his return: he therefore obtained permission from the raja to retire for a short time to Sassoor, where his family resided, but his constitution being completely exhausted, he only survived a few days. He left two sons, Bajee Rao and Chimnajee, and two daughters—Bhow Bye, married to Abbajee

*October*

Naik, the brother of Bappoojee Naik, a rich banker of Barramuttee; and Annoo Bye, the wife of Narain Rao Ghorepuray, of Eettul

Kurinjee—connections which have reference to future circumstances. Ballajee's eldest son, Bajee Rao, was not formally invested with the dignity of Peishwa for nearly seven months after his father's death; the reason for this delay is nowhere explained, but it may be attributed to the absence to the principal officers, or Bajee Rao may have joined the army, which did not return beyond the Godavery for some time after the battle of Balapoor.

The troops of Khundee Rao Dhabaray behaved with great bravery on that occasion; and one of his officers, Dummajee Gaekwar, who with several of his sons had long stood high in Khundee Rao's estimation, had so particularly distinguished himself, that on his return he recommended him to Shao in the warmest manner. The raja, in consequence, appointed him second-in-command under Khundee Rao, with the title of Shumsher Buhadur. Such was the origin of the ancestor of the reigning family at Baroda. Neither Dummajee nor Khundee Rao Dhabaray survived their return above a few months: the son of Khundee

*A.D. 1721* Rao, Trimbuck Rao Dhabaray, was honored with the dress of Senaputtee in May—the same month in which Bajee Rao received his clothes of investiture as Peishwa. Peelajee Gaekwar, an active partizan, the son of Junkojee Gaekwar, succeeded to the situation of his uncle Dummajee; and Chimnajee, the second son of the late Peishwa, was appointed to a similar command under his brother. Chimnajee likewise received the district of Sopa in jagheer. Abbajee Punt Poorundhuree, their father's mootaliq, according to the rule of appointment by the raja, was re-invested by Shao with scrupulous ceremony. During the interval between the



death of Ballajee Wishwanath and the appointment of Bajee Rao, Abbajee Punt Poorundhuree transacted ordinary affairs with the seal of the late Peishwa; but a great part of the business fell into the hands of Khundoo Bullal Chitnees, and Sreeput Rao, Pritee Needhee. The former gave his attention principally to Angria, the Seedee, and affairs in the Concan; whilst the Pritee Needhee, aided by Anund Rao, Somunt Purdhan, conducted the important negotiations which were pending with Nizam-ool-Moolk.

The son of Anund Rao, named Mahtajee, was employed as Shao's wukeel, and the temporizing policy and character of Nizam-ool-Moolk are strongly marked in his conduct during the year which followed the victory at Balapoor. At first, whilst he apprehended an attack from Hoossein Ally Khan, he cemented his friendship with Sumbhajee, of Kolapoor, and conciliated Shao by promising to give up all that the royal grants conceded. No sooner was he apprized of the ascendancy acquired by his party at Delhi, and of the loss the Mahrattas had sustained in the death of Ballajee Wishwanath, than he began to start objections to the establishment of Shao's collectors, founded on some pretensions set up by Sumbhajee and Chunder Seyn Jadow. But the wise precautions of Ballajee Wishwanath, and the communion of interest which the distribution of the ceded revenues had produced, placed the Raja of the Mahrattas in a far more commanding situation than that in which he had stood during the first period of the government of Nizam-ool-Moolk in the Deccan. The wukeel remained at Aurungabad, where his arguments would probably have been of little avail, but a vast army of Mahrattas was assembling in Gungthuree, under the Sur Lushkur, and their appearance no doubt had considerable effect in expediting the delivery of orders to permit the Raja Shao to establish his collectors. A fresh firman, obtained by the Mahratta wukeel at Delhi from Mohummud Shah, opportunely arrived to remove from Nizam-ool-Moolk the appearance of having yielded to menace, and afforded an opportunity of evincing the promptitude with which he obeyed the imperial commands.

Nizam-ool-Moolk, in raising objections, had not contemplated the train which had been laid under the administration of Ballajee Wishwanath; he wished to procrastinate, and to involve the Mahrattas in war with each other, but he was, for various reas-



ons, desirous not to precipitate hostilities between the Mahrattas and himself. He dreaded the increase of their power, only as far as it affected his own views; the prospect of aggrandizement at the imperial court, which opened to him upon the death of the vizier, Mohummud Amin Khan, seemed incompatible with his plan of independent sovereignty, but he was unwilling to relinquish the one or the other.

His prompt obedience to the royal commands may have been favourably viewed by a young monarch, just emancipated, although it confirmed the alienation of half the revenues of the Deccan; but Nizam-ool-Moolk, in whatever light his conduct might have been regarded at court, on this occasion had the address to gain the good opinion of Shao, to flatter and conciliate the Pritee Needhee, and to gain the Somunt by bribery.

On a general view, his plans were calculated to preserve his rank at court, and his power in the Deccan; to keep alive the old, and to create new, dissensions among the Mahrattas: to preserve a connection with that nation, in case it should ultimately be useful to direct their attacks from his own to the imperial territories; and, however inconsistent some of those designs may seem, in this system of political artifice, through the remainder of a long life, Nizam-ool-Moolk not only persevered, but generally prospered.

His first object was to ascertain, by personal observation, the character of the new Moghul government, and what he might expect or apprehend from the emperor's present friendship or future enmity. He was on his way to court, when he was recalled for a short time in consequence of disturbances in the Beejapoor Carnatic; to which, after concluding some arrangements, he appointed a new soobehdar, and resumed his march for the capital, where, as already related, he arrived in January 1722.

Nizam-ool-Moolk, on assuming the post of vizier, endeavoured to effect some reform at court; but the emperor was not only fond of that mirth and festivity natural to his years, but weak in mind, and, as is generally the case with persons of that disposition, dissolute in his behaviour. The manners of Nizam-ool-Moolk were austere, and disagreeable both to the emperor and his courtiers.

A.D. 1722



Prompt at every base intrigue, they soon devised a scheme of freeing themselves from the society of Nizam-ool-Moolk. Hyder Koolee Khan had departed for his government at Ahmedabad before the return of Nizam-ool-Moolk from the Deccan, and having committed some irregularities, the courtiers, by threatening him with punishment from the vizier, Nizam-ool-Moolk, and working on the passions of both parties, soon inflamed them to the utmost, and drove Hyder Koolee Khan to further acts of disrespect and disobedience. Nizam-ool-Moolk had censured the manner in which the rebellion of Ajeet Sing had been passed over; and being now offered the post of soobehdar of Guzerat, with the commission of reducing Hyder Koolee Khan, he readily accepted it. On this service it was hoped the Nizam might be long employed, or fall a victim to the chances of war.

Hyder Koolee Khan had a well-appointed army, and his qualities as a soldier were unquestionable. Nizam-ool-Moolk, however, having sent emissaries amongst his troops, the greater part of those on whom Hyder Koolee Khan had reliance deserted, which made such an impression upon him, that he feigned insanity, and fled in dismay to court, leaving his adversary in the undisturbed occupation of the province. Nizam-ool-Moolk, on obtaining this intelligence, halted at Oojein, whither most of the principal officers in Guzerat repaired to pay their respects to him. All his appointments and arrangements were made without proceeding to Ahmedabad; and as he took every opportunity of increasing his own resources, and of informing himself of what was passing in the country, he set aside five of the most productive districts in different parts of the province as his personal jagheer; these were—Dholka, Baroach, Jumbooseer, Mukboolabad, and Bulsar. The usual establishment of civil and military officers were confirmed or appointed to the imperial districts. The jagheerdars in that province were on a different footing from those appointed by Aurungzebe in his late conquest of the Deccan, and agents, generally of their own nomination, superintended the revenue and police within their respective boundaries.

Nizam-ool-Moolk sent his uncle, Hamed Khan, as his deputy to Ahmedabad, and leaving his cousin, Azim Oolla Khan, deputy governor of Malwa, he returned to Delhi. But his



presence was so disagreeable to the emperor, and mutual disgust was with so much difficulty suppressed, that  
A.D. 1723 Nizam-ool-Moolk gladly entered into a compromise, accepted the honor of wukeel-i-mootluq, or supreme deputy in the empire, and resigned his post of vizier. Soon after, in the month of October 1723, he took an opportunity, on pretence of going on a hunting excursion, to depart for his viceroyalty in the Deccan; and from that time, although he always professed obedience to the emperor, even when waging war against him, Nizam-ool-Moolk became wholly independent; and the countries south of the Nerbuddah, the conquest of which had engaged the Moghul princes in much more than a century of war, were torn for ever from the throne of Delhi.

Whilst these events were passing in Hindostan, Bajee Rao, soon after his appointment as Peishwa, set out with an army for Candeish, where he levied his mokassa, although not without opposition. From the period of his accession he gave a considerable portion of his attention to extending Mahratta conquests to the northward, and his views were early directed to Malwa. Circumstances generally obliged him to return annually to Satara and Poona; and during three expeditions, before the rains of 1724, although he had sent detachments  
A.D. 1724 into Malwa, it is not ascertained that he crossed the Nerbuddah in person until the end of that year; nor did he remain in Malwa for any length of time, until upwards of eleven years after his accession as Peishwa; various affairs in the Deccan required his presence, which, with the intrigues of Nizam-ool-Moolk, and domestic opposition, restrained both his ambition and his enterprize.

Before the year 1724, Bajee Rao had, at different times, defeated the soobehdar of Burhanpoor, and an officer, named Daood Khan, sent against him by Azim Oolla Khan, from Malwa. In one of these battles, two of Bajee Rao's officers, who afterwards attained high rank, were first brought into notice: the one, Mulharjee Holkar, was a sillidar who commanded a party of horse of his own; he was a Mahratta Dhungur, a class of Shooders already mentioned, and a native of the village of Hohi, on the Neera, of which his father was Chougula; he had served under Kantajee Kuddum Bhanday, one of the raja's





officers, and had collected a small body of horse. The other officer was Ranoojee Sindia, descended from a younger branch of the family of Kunneirkheir, a village 15 miles east of Satara. The Sindias, according to the legends of the country, have been distinguished sillidars since the time of the Bahminee dynasty; there are two Mahratta families, or rather tribes, of this name: the one is distinguished by their hereditary Patell village of Kunneirkheir, and the other by the appellation of Ruwee Rao. Both families claim a Rajpoot descent; those of Kunneirkheir had a munsub under Aurungzebe; and Sindia's daughter, who was given by that emperor in marriage to Shao, died in captivity at Delhi. Sindia remained faithful to the Moghuls; and as his fate was never known, it is conjectured that he was killed in some distant country, possibly with Azim Shah in the battle of Agra in 1707. The family, however, had fallen into decay, and Ranoojee, who revived its fame with additional celebrity, was reduced to a state of abject poverty, serving as a Bargeer, first in the Pagah of Ballajee Wishwanath, and afterwards in that of his son. To contrast his original with his subsequent condition, he is said to have carried the Peishwa's slippers, and to have been marked by Bajee Rao as fitted for a place of trust by the care he took of the humble charge committed to him.

Another officer, who attained additional distinction about this period, was Oodajee Powar Wiswas Rao. His father was first raised by Ramchundur Punt Amat, when he governed the country during the siege of Ginjee, and the young man, having joined Shao, obtained the command of a considerable body of the Paga horse. He was employed on various services, and appears to have been an active partizan: like most contemporary Mahratta leaders of experience, such as Kantajee Kuddum, Peelajee Gaekwar, and Kanhojee Bhonslay, he calculated on the surest advantage in the more distant ventures, where his appearance was least expected. He made incursions into Guzerat and Malwa; plundered the former as far as Lunawara, and found the latter province so much drained of troops, that he was enabled to remain some time in the country, intimating to the raja that, if supported, he might collect the chouth and surdeshmookhee in every direction. How long he maintained his station in the country, on his first inroads, is uncertain; but



it is probable that he was obliged to retire from Dhar, where he first established himself, upon the appointment of Geerdhur Buhadur, whose exertion in the defence of Malwa was one principal cause of preventing the Mahrattas from getting a firm footing in that province for more than ten years after the accession of Bajee Rao.

The progress of Oodajee Powar, the news of successes by Kantajee Kuddum Bhanday and Peelajee Gaekwar in Guzerat, and the dissensions between Nizam-ool-Moolk and the imperial court, opportunely occurred to favour the Peishwa in his views of extending the Mahratta conquests in Hindostan, which were at first disapproved by Shao, and from prudential motives, as well as party feelings, strongly opposed by Sreeput Rao, the Pritee Needhee; but here some explanatory digression is required.

The reader has already obtained considerable insight into the character of Nizam-ool-Moolk. That of his great rival, though occasional ally, Bajee Rao, might have been allowed to develop itself; but the history of the period is intricate, owing to the varying plans, or the domestic affairs of the different powers, the vast space to which attention must be directed, and the numerous actors that will start up every year to consequence or to sovereignty; but the leading personages are the Nizam and the Peishwa.

Bajee Rao was early trained to habits of business by his father; he had accompanied him to Delhi, and was present at one or more interviews which took place between Ballajee and the Raja Jey Sing of Jeypoor—a circumstance which promoted a future connection with that celebrated chief. Bred a soldier as well as a statesman, Bajee Rao united the enterprize, vigour, and hardihood of a Mahratta chief with the polished manners, the sagacity, and address which frequently distinguish the Bramins of the Concan. Fully acquainted with the financial schemes of his father, he selected that part of the plan calculated to direct the predatory hordes of Maharashtra in a common effort. In this respect the genius of Bajee Rao enlarged the schemes which his father devised; and, unlike most Bramins, of him it may be truly said he had both the head to plan and the hand to execute. To the assiduous industry and minute observation that seem inherent in his caste, he superadded a power of discrimination that taught him to direct his mind to those lead-



ing points of political importance which tended so materially to extend Mahratta sway during the period of his administration.

Besides his foreign enemies, Bajee Rao had a domestic rival of some abilities in the Pritee Needhee. Jealousy, in public situations, is a passion which the most subtle Bramins can rarely command or conceal; it prevails in a remarkable degree amongst all of them, but it is most conspicuous between Bramins of different tribes. The rivalry of Sreeput Rao tended to preserve the raja's ascendancy, as head of the state, for a longer period than it might otherwise have existed; but whilst it usefully controlled the conduct of Bajee Rao and Chimnajee Appa, both of whom are said to have been naturally domineering, it also, for some years, cramped the efforts of the Peishwa, obliged him to return to Satara more frequently than was conducive to the success of distant expeditions, and aided Nizam-ool-Moolk in his endeavours to excite internal dissensions amongst the Mahrattas.

The Peishwa's first proposal for exacting, what he called, the established tribute from Malwa, and extending Mahratta conquests into Hindostan, was violently, and, as already noticed, for a time successfully, opposed by the Pritee Needhee. The latter represented it as "rash and imprudent; that the head of the state might not be called upon to account for casual inroads, but that to grant such an authority to the Mookh Purdhan must draw upon them the whole power of the empire, and precipitate hostilities with Nizam-ool-Moolk, whose victorious army was still at their gates; that, so far from being prepared for resistance, there was a total want of regularity even in the arrangements laid down, that they could scarcely quell a common insurrection, and that entering on a war, when they had not yet secured what had been ceded, was the extreme of folly and of rashness." The Pritee Needhee added that "he was a soldier as well as the Peishwa, and as ready as Bajee Rao could be to head any expedition, when it might become expedient; that after they had established their collectors, and arranged other parts of the country, it would be advisable, before pursuing their reconquests in the north, to reduce the Carnatic, and recover the territories conquered by Sivajee; that, although Futih Sing Bhonslay held sunnuds for collecting the mokassa of the Carnatic, his troops, from the power of Sumbhajee at Kolapoor, and his abettors,





Chowan, Ghorepuray, and the nabab of Savanoor, could scarcely venture to cross the Kistna, and that the first effort should therefore be made in that quarter."

Such were probably the real opinions of Sreeput Rao, but the wisdom of Bajee Rao was of a much higher order. He comprehended the nature of predatory power; he perceived its growth in the turbulence and anarchy, for which the system of distributing the revenue was the first remedy; he foresaw that confusion abroad would tend to order at home; and that, as commander of distant expeditions, he should acquire the direction of a larger force than any other chief of the empire: that the resources of the Deccan would not only improve by withdrawing the hordes of horse which unprofitably consumed them, but must fall under the control of that person who could most readily procure employment and subsistence for the troops; and who, at the same time, could conciliate, as well as overawe, the insubordinate and predatory bands, of all castes and descriptions, composing the Deccan soldiery.

Whilst he suppressed his latent designs, and partly admitted the justice of Sreeput Rao's observations, he endeavoured by his commanding eloquence, to arouse enthusiasm or ambition in the raja, by recapitulating the conquests of his illustrious grandfather, and reminding him of the powerful kings, the mighty emperor, with whom he had successfully contended: he painted the present condition of India,—the weakness, indolence and imbecility of the Moghuls,—the activity, energy, and enterprize of the Mahrattas; he observed that, "if the great Sivajee had been of the same opinion as the Pritee Needhee, he would have thought it necessary, before venturing into the Carnatic, to reduce Beejapoor and Golcondah. As to their domestic quarrels beyond the Kistna, it would be time to think of them hereafter; and that, by the influence of the raja's good fortune, every desire would be accomplished." After a speech on one occasion of considerable length, which seemed to have a great effect on Shao and all present: "Now is our time," said this gallant Peishwa, "to drive strangers from the land of Hindoos, and to acquire immortal renown. By directing our efforts to Hindostan, the Mahratta flag in your reign shall fly from the Kistna to the Attock." "You shall plant it on the Himmalaya," exclaimed the raja; "you are indeed a noble son of a worthy father."



Bajee Rao improved the opportunity by urging Shao not to think of minor objects, and, alluding to the Moghul empire, "let us strike," said he, "at the trunk of the withering tree; the branches must fall of themselves."

At what time this consent was obtained or in what year the original commission was issued, was not ascertained. The form of obtaining the raja's authority on all such occasions was rigidly observed by the Peishwas, at a stage when their supremacy was very far advanced; because, by virtue of that authority, and their station as Mookh (or chief) Purdhan, even when their usurpation became complete, it suited the Bramin character, of acting as nominal servants and real masters, to rule the Mahratta chiefs as the delegate of their prince.

But as both the remote and immediate causes of the Mahratta power are only to be explained by fixing our attention as much on the general state of the country as on their domestic policy, the affairs of the Moghuls are now, more than ever, interwoven with this history.

The departure of Nizam-ool-Moolk for his government in the Deccan, in a manner which bespoke distrust, aggravated by contempt, excited anger and revenge in the mind of the emperor. Secret orders were sent to Mubariz Khan, soobehdar of Hyderabad, to raise an army, and oppose Nizam-ool-Moolk. The viceroyalty of the Deccan, for which he received a firman, was to be the reward of his success.

Nizam-ool-Moolk endeavoured, by his usual artifice of creating sedition, to break the power of his rival, and remained some months negotiating before he advanced against him. He at last arrived at Aurungabad in July 1724, and after protracted discussion, when his plans had partly succeeded, he took the field and a decisive battle was fought at Shukurkhera, about the 1st October, in which Mubariz Khan, after great efforts of personal valour, was surrounded and slain. He was gallantly supported by four of his sons, two of whom fell with him, and two were desperately wounded. Nizam-ool-Moolk sent the Khan's head to court, with a congratulatory letter on the victory attained by the emperor's arms.

When Mubariz Khan began to make head in the Deccan, he threw a strong garrison into Golcondah, under Khwajeh Ahud,



another of his sons, supported by Sundool Khan, who had long been governor of that place; many other forts were commanded by officers in his interest, and as his cause was popular, Nizamool-Moolk saw the necessity of gaining or reducing Khwajeh Ahud, and of obtaining possession of the forts as soon as possible. He, therefore, marched towards Hyderabad, where, after some time, he effected his design by conciliation. The emperor, in order to reduce the power of Nizamool-Moolk as much as possible, had issued a firman, depriving him of his governments in Guzerat and Malwa; Sur Boolund Khan was appointed to the former, and Raja Geerdhur Buhadur to the latter; as the troops in the interest of the Nizam had been withdrawn from Malwa to support his pretensions in the Deccan, the Raja Geerdhur occupied the province without opposition.

Shujaet Khan was appointed deputy governor of Guzerat by Sur Boolund Khan; but although Hamed Khan, who had been left in charge of the province, on the part of his nephew Nizamool-Moolk, could not prevent his occupying the capital, he determined not to relinquish his government without a struggle. Having repaired to Dohud, he invited Kantajee Kuddum Bhanday, one of Shao's officers, to join him—an invitation which Kantajee, on promise of getting the chouth, readily embraced. They first came to Kuppurwunj, where Hamed Khan having established a correspondence with his friends at Ahmedabad, procured correct intelligence of Shujaet Khan's movements, watched his opportunity, and attacked, defeated, and slew him within a few miles of Ahmedabad, where Hamed Khan's authority was again acknowledged. On this event, Roostum Ally Khan, the brother of Shujaet Khan, foudar of Surat, who had just gained some advantages over Peelajee Gaekwar in the neighbourhood of that city, made a truce with Peelajee, and invited him to join in an attack on Hamed Khan. Peelajee had been previously engaged by the emissaries of Nizamool-Moolk to assist his uncle Hamed Khan, but accepted the overtures of Roostum Ally, until he could ascertain precisely which side was the most advantageous. He accompanied Roostum Ally towards Ahmedabad, crossed the Myhie at Fazilpoor, and had a skirmish with Hamed Khan at Arass, where Roostum Ally drove back his opponents by the fire of his artillery. By this time Peelajee had



made his bargain with Hamed Khan, and recommended Roostum Ally to charge the fugitives, leaving his guns to the care of a party in the rear—a fatal advice, which Roostum Ally had no sooner followed than Peelajee overturned the gun-carriages, and joined in attacking his late ally. Roostum Ally defended himself with bravery, until his reduced numbers showed him the impossibility of escape, when he stabbed himself to the heart, in order to avoid the ignominious treatment he expected in case of being made prisoner.

Peelajee's treachery was rewarded by an equal share of the chouth with Kantajee, and both in conjunction  
 A.D. 1725 proceeded to levy their assignments. But the division of the money led to perpetual disputes;

Peelajee, as the agent of Dhabaray Senaputtee, considered himself the superior authority in Guzerat, and Kantajee, as an officer of the raja's, despised his pretensions. For some time these differences only produced heavier impositions on the towns and villages, until, on their approach to Cambay, where they began, as usual, to burn the suburbs for the purpose of intimidation, the inhabitants, aware of their dissensions, affecting to consider Kantajee the superior, sent a messenger to Peelajee hinting this circumstance, and offering him 20,000 rupees to leave the place. Peelajee, exasperated by the insult, confined the messenger; Kantajee insisted on his being released, and both flew to arms to assert their prerogative. After a severe conflict, within sight of the walls, Peelajee was discomfited, and retired to Mahtur, a village near Kaira. The contribution from Cambay was levied by the victor, and 5,000 rupees demanded from the English factory, where the agents pleaded exemption, in consequence of privilege of trade from the "Shao Raja," but at which "the armed villains," as Mr. Innes, the chief of the factory, in bitterness of heart, terms them, "only laughed."

Hamed Khan, foreseeing the desertion of one or other of his allies, made them sign an agreement, by which the chouth east of the Myhie was assigned to Peelajee, and that to the west to Kantajee. The Mahrattas still preserve their original custom of retiring to quarters, during the monsoon; and soon after the battle at Cambay, Peelajee retired to Sonegurh, near Surat, and Kantajee to a jagheer district he held in Candeish.



Sur Boolund Khan, who had been unjustly removed from Cabul, was, at this season of difficulty, courted by the emperor, and earnestly solicited to repair to his government in Guzerat, for the purpose of suppressing the formidable insurrection of Hamed Khan. The emperor was the more urgent, as he had been disappointed in a scheme he had meditated of controlling the Tooranee Moghuls, by the release of Abdoollah Khan, the elder of the Syuds, who dethroned Ferokhsere: but the unprincipled courtiers sacrificed him to their envy and fear, and removed him by poison. Sur Boolund Khan consented to assume the government; and every facility being afforded, as he was an excellent and popular officer, a large army was soon assembled under his command, and, though delayed for a time by the emperor's professing his intention of accompanying him, at last proceeded on his route to Ahmedabad. Nizam-ool-Moolk, aware of the abilities of his uncle's opponent, wrote to him to resign the province with a good grace; but Hamed Khan, not choosing to follow this suggestion, prepared to defend himself. He had almost despaired of being joined by the Mahrattas, and was obliged to leave Ahmedabad defended by a weak garrison, and retire before the advanced division of Sur Boolund Khan's army. He had only reached Mahmoodabad when he heard that the Mahrattas had crossed the Myhie, and as soon as they joined him, he returned to Ahmedabad. But a party in the city, in order to pay court to the new governor, had overpowered his troops and forced them out. Hamed Khan encamped at the Shah-i-Bagh, a royal garden still in existence, on the day that Sur Boolund Khan's advanced troops arrived at Udaledje; but as some of the gun-carriages belonging to the main body had broken down, this advanced force discovered that they were farther from support than they had contemplated, and hearing of the proximity of Hamed Khan, immediately took the alarm and began to entrench themselves. This precaution encouraged the Mahrattas; and Hamed Khan, watching their humour, led them on to attack the entrenched camp, where he gained a complete victory. But the advantage was purchased with great loss, and the Mahrattas would not risk another battle. Hamed Khan, therefore, became, like them, a mere plunderer, and commenced a warfare on the Mahratta plan. Foujdars were



OM A.D. 1720 TO A.D. 1726

appointed, and the usual arrangements made with more than ordinary vigour by the new governor; but Kantajee and Peelajee continued to plunder during the remainder of the season, until the approach of the rains, when they took their annual flight. A deceitful calm succeeded;—the fall of the rain brought back the cheering green, and the beautiful province of Guzerat, which, for hundreds of miles, may vie with the finest parks of the nobles of England, was clothed in all its natural beauties, by rapid verdure and luxuriant vegetation. Tranquillity seemed to reign, where a short time before nothing was to be seen but perpetual skirmishing, murder and robbery in open day, caravans pillaged even when strongly escorted, and villages burning or deserted.

Bajee Rao, in the meantime, took advantage of the confusion caused by Moghul dissensions, to carry his arms into Malwa, where, although opposed by Raja Geerdhur, he was successful for two seasons in obtaining plunder and contribution. It is probable that Nizam-ool-Moolk may at least have connived at his incursions, but there is no proof of any direct communication with the Peishwa. Bajee Rao, by virtue of the authority vested in him by Shao, granted deeds to Powar, Holkar, and Sindia to levy chouth and surdeshmookhee, and to retain half the mokassa in payment of their troops.

In 1726 the Peishwa was with a very large army under Futih Sing Bhonslay, which proceeded into the Carnatic, plundered the districts, and levied a contribution from  
 A.D. 1726 Seringapatam. No particulars of this campaign have been discovered; but it appears, by a letter written 12 or 13 years afterwards by Bajee Rao to his brother, that they lost a number of men without gaining advantages which had been anticipated. From his former sentiments, and these symptoms of disapprobation, expressed in the letter alluded to, it may be inferred that Bajee Rao had objected to the expedition; but upon his return to Satara, he found more serious reasons of dissatisfaction in the measures pursued by the Pritee Needhee. The cause of his displeasure originated in the artful schemes of Nizam-ool-Moolk, which but for the penetration and vigour of Bajee Rao, would probably have unlinked the connecting chain by which Ballajee Wishwanath had joined the interests, as well as the inclinations, of most of the Hindoo chieftains of the Deccan.



# 14

## *From A.D. 1727 to A.D. 1734*

THE DECLINING EMPIRE of the Moghuls having been thrown into a state of great anarchy by Nizam-ool-Moolk and his countrymen, the Tooranee Moghuls, *A.D. 1727* the Nizam, relieved from immediate apprehensions from Mohummud Shah, became alarmed at the spreading power of the Mahrattas, and beheld, in their systematic and persevering encroachments on the divided revenue of the Deccan and Carnatic, the extinction of his own resources as well as those of the empire. To avert these evils, by endeavouring to consolidate his own power, and to create divisions among the Mahrattas, the measures which he adopted seem to have been planned with considerable skill; but in forming designs, founded on the character of the people, he overlooked the abilities of his opponent, nor contemplated that he should, in pursuit of his own schemes, only strengthen the power of the Peishwa.

Since the battle of Shukurkhera, Nizam-ool-Moolk had fixed his eye on Hyderabad, the ancient capital of the Kootub Shahee kings, as fittest for the seat of government of the independent sovereignty which he himself had founded; and it was very desirable to remove the Mahratta collectors from that quarter on any terms. Although Nizam-ool-Moolk had confirmed the imperial grants in Shao's favour, a great deal of what was yielded was not actually given up; numerous points remained unadjusted. Shao's part of the agreement to prevent plundering was not fulfilled, and constant discussions were the consequence. A new authority, for a part of the old Mahratta territory, was granted by Nizam-ool-Moolk, which particularly specified the fixed personal jagheers that Shao agreed to exempt from sequestration. Jagheer assignments in the old territory about Poona, which the Nizam had given to Rumbhajee Nimbalkur, one of the disaffect-



FROM A.D. 1727 TO A.D. 1734

ed officers who had joined him, were exchanged for new grants to the eastward, about Kurmulla—a measure on the part of Nizam-ool-Moolk particularly conciliatory to Shao. After this, a settlement was concluded, through the Pritee Needhee, by which Shao agreed to relinquish the chouth and surdeshmookhee in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad; an equivalent in money was to be paid for the former, and for the latter Shao received some jagheer territory near Indapoor, of which district he was an hereditary deshmookh; a jagheer in Berar was conferred on the Pritee Needhee. Nizam-ool-Moolk had thus effected his first object by negotiation, but the exchange met with the decided disapprobation of Bajee Rao, who was ever an enemy to consolidation of the nature in question; and disputes ran so high between him and the Pritee Needhee, that Nizam-ool-Moolk, encouraged by appearances, and the support and alliance of Chunder Seyn Jadow, Rao Rumbha Nimbalkur, Jagheerदार of Barsee, and Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapoor, resolved to complete the design he had formed. With this view he proposed to espouse the cause of Sumbhajee, and to endeavour to create a complete division in Shao's government, by reviving the former feuds between Shao and Sumbhajee. His connection with Dhabaray and Peelajee Gaekwar; his hopes of finding, through the Raja Geerdhur, employment for the Peishwa's officers in Malwa; and the boasted superiority of his own troops, were strong inducements for making the attempt.

Nizam-ool-Moolk commenced by a formal hearing of the claims of Sumbhajee in a demand made for an equal division of the revenue; and, according to a prevalent custom in the Deccan, he sequestered the property in dispute by removing the collectors of the surdeshmookhee, and displacing the mokassadars of Shao, until their respective rights should be equitably adjusted. Assuming this privilege as viceroy, he pretended to become the friend and arbiter of both parties; but Bajee Rao was not to be duped by the old artifice of engaging the Mahratta cousins in an hereditary dispute, and quickly turned the Nizam's weapons to his own advantage; for Shao, true to the inherent feeling of a Mahratta, of whom, even amongst the peasantry, the mildest men often became the most violent of human beings when the possession of wutun is concerned, and who, for some time, had



been reconciled to Nizam-ool-Moolk, was at once, on hearing of this interference, aroused to implacable resentment against him, and for the time against all who had formerly vindicated or now dared to justify his conduct. He looked to Bajee Rao for counsel and for vengeance; for these he would have bartered life, and for these he now virtually sold the supremacy of his empire. He, at first, was determined to march in person, but it was represented that such a procedure would place him on an equality with Sumbhajee, of Kolapoor; whereas none but the emperor was worthy of contending with the king of the Hindoos. Full powers were therefore delegated to Bajee Rao; and the great influence which the Peishwa had acquired, may be observed in the promptitude with which many of the most unruly and factious of the sillidar families willingly gathered round the standard of the nation.

Nizam-ool-Moolk perceived his mistake, and sought to amend it by writing to Shao and the Pritee Needhee that he was solely actuated by a wish to benefit the raja, in order to prevent the usurpation of the Concanee Bramins, by whose creatures every situation was filled; that the mokassadars and collectors of the surdeshmookhee had been replaced by others belonging to the raja's relation, Sumbhajee, whom he had appointed the raja's deputy, as surdeshmookh of the six Soobehs of the Deccan; and that the raja, when freed from the control of the Bramins alluded to, might afterwards appoint agents entirely of his own selection. But the animosity of Shao, worked up to the highest pitch by the Peishwa's representations, was not to be appeased by offers, which, under the colouring given to them by Bajee Rao, only added insult to injury. Both parties, therefore, prepared to attack each other, as soon as the rains should subside and enable their horse to cross the rivers.

Nizam-ool-Moolk awaited the junction of his allies. Bajee Rao was first in the field, and laid waste the district of Jaulna before the Moghul army was prepared to oppose him. Early in the month of November the Mahrattas were attacked by Ewuz Khan, at the head of the Nizam's advanced force; Bajee Rao partially engaged him, but retired, first towards Mahoor, then returned rapidly towards Aurangabad; without stopping to plunder, he gave out that Burhanpoor should be reduced to ashes,



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and marched on to Candeish, laying waste the country in his route. Ewuz Khan, followed by Nizam-ool-Moolk, pursued him, in order to save Burhanpoor. Bajee Rao, as soon as the pursuing army, with all their equipments, had passed the Ajunta Ghaut, sent a party towards Burhanpoor, wheeled off with the main body to his left, and proceeded with great speed to Guzerat, where he not only plundered, but, taking advantage of Nizam-ool-Moolk's notorious duplicity, and the enmity subsisting between him and Sur Boolund Khan, he caused it to be believed by the latter that the Nizam was the supporter of his invasion—a rumour which gained strength by accounts of the approach of the latter towards Surat. Nizam-ool-Moolk, after being misled, losing some time at Burhanpoor, and fruitlessly following the Peishwa, at last perceived his error, retraced his steps to the Deccan, and determined to destroy Poona. But he had not reached Ahmednugur, when Bajee Rao, having passed the Karsarbharee Ghaut, totally destroyed the districts of Gandapoor and Byzapoer, which, from former tenure, or the late exchanges, were wholly jagheer. Nizam-ool-Moolk recrossed the Godavery,

A.D. 1728

when the Peishwa, after some days' skirmishing, drew him into a situation favourable to his purpose, set fire to the grass, destroyed the forage, and effectually straitened his supplies. The Mahrattas suffered severely by the fire of the artillery, but they cut off such detached parties as they could overpower, and drove off the draught cattle. At last, in some broken ground, around which, for several miles, there was no water, the Mahrattas completely surrounded the Nizam's army, and so effectually impeded his march, that night closed before he could extricate himself from his embarrassing situation. Nizam-ool-Moolk had foreseen that this species of warfare would be practised, and, in entering upon the campaign, expected that the part of light troops should be performed by his associates. He had reproached them with their want of vigour, and recommended their adopting the same system against their countrymen as Bajee Rao was practising. But Chunder Seyn Jadow represented that most of his troops were Moghuls; and Sumbhaje acknowledged, not only that his numbers were inadequate, but that he suspected his carcoons were in league with the enemy. There is something



explanatory of the nature of the alliance, and characteristic of the Mahratta, in Sumbhaje's requesting, at the conclusion of an interview, to say a word in private to Nizam-ool-Moolk, and then begging of him "not to give the money, on account of the subsidy, to his carcoons, as they would defraud the troops;" whilst the Bramins, by another representation equally private, represent "that Sumbhaje would spend the whole on dancing-girls, dissipate it in drinking and debauchery, and leave them to starvation, and the troops to revolt."

Nizam-ool-Moolk had never been so dependent on Mahratta allies; the attacks he had experienced, and the privation his army endured, obliged him to accede to a negotiation with the Peishwa, which was begun by Bajee Rao, through Ewuz Khan. The Nizam, however, first forced his way to a situation where water was procurable; Bajee Rao demanded that Sumbhaje should be sent to his camp; that security should be afforded for the future collection of the Mahratta shares of revenue, by giving up several fortified places; and that all arrears, not yet realized, should be made good. Nizam-ool-Moolk agreed to all the articles, except that of delivering up his ally. Bajee Rao represented that he was a near relation of the raja's, and that he should be treated with equal respect; but it was at last settled that Nizam-ool-Moolk should guarantee his safe arrival in Panalla, when Shao should be at liberty to take what steps he might think proper for the settlement of their family dispute.

After an interchange of presents, when Bajee Rao and Nizam-ool-Moolk met for the first time, the armies retired upon the conclusion of the treaty. Its final ratification was of consequence to both parties, but especially to Bajee Rao, who was then negotiating with Sur Boolund Khan, in hopes of obtaining the cession of the chouth and surdeshmookhee of Guzerat. Sur Boolund Khan, who had at first exerted himself to check Mahratta incursions, was induced to listen to the terms proposed by Bajee Rao, in order to save the country from total ruin. He had repeatedly applied to court for a supply of money, as it was at first impossible to raise any revenue of consequence from the districts in their exhausted state; but his demands were entirely neglected. He had endeavoured to conciliate Peelajee and Kantajee by grants of chouth, but they collected all the revenue,



and afforded no protection to the country. Chimnajee Appa arrived with a large army, exacted a heavy contribution from Pitlaud, and plundered Dholka; but he promised, on the part of his brother, that if the chouth and surdeshmookhee were yielded, the districts should be effectually secured from the depredations of all other freebooters. Sur Boolund Khan at length agreed to the Peishwa's proposals, and granted deeds, in the year 1729,

to Sham Rao, the wukeel of Bajee Rao, the minister of the Raja Shao, ceding the surdeshmookhee, or ten per cent of the whole revenue, both on the land and customs, with the exception of the port of Surat and the district around it; together with the chouth, or one-fourth of the whole collections on the land and customs, excepting Surat, and five per cent on the revenues of the city of Ahmedabad.

Sur Boolund Khan mentions in the deeds that these cessions in Guzerat are granted in consequence of the progress of improvement, the increasing population, and the general tranquillity in the Deccan. The conditions affixed to the deed for the surdeshmookhee are nearly similar to those mentioned in the same grant for the Deccan provinces; but the deed for the chouth is more specific; 2,500 horse are constantly to be kept up, the fourth part of the actual collections only to be paid, no more than two or three persons to be placed in each district as collectors on the part of the Mahrattas, no extra demands whatever to be made on the ryots, and every assistance to be afforded in maintaining the imperial authority. One condition attached to the deed is, that Bajee Rao, on the part of Shao, agrees to prevent Mahratta subjects from taking part with, or in any way supporting, disaffected zumeendars, and other disturbers of the public peace—a clause which is fully explained by the opposing interests of Bajee Rao, Kantajee Kuddum, and Trimbuck Rao Dhabaray. Peelajee Gaekwar, the agent of Dhabaray, was, it appears, leagued with the Bheels and Koolees of the country, and on that account especially was considered particularly formidable by the Mahomedans. After these deeds were obtained, the mokassa and the collection of a part of the surdeshmookhee were assigned to Dhabaray; but jealousy of Bajee Rao's interference in the affairs of the province occasioned an implacable enmity on the part of that chief.



Whilst Bajee Rao's presence was necessary to the northward in order to support Chinnajee in Guzerat, Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapoor, instigated by Oodajee Chowan, refused to listen to overtures made by Shao, and encamped in bravado, on the north side of the Warna, with all his baggage, women, and equipments, and began to plunder the country. An opportunity thus presented itself for the Pritee Needhee to recover his lost influence with Shao, which he partly effected by surprising the camp of Sumbhajee and Oodajee Chowan, and driving them to Panalla, with the loss of the whole of their baggage. Many prisoners were taken by the Pritee Needhee; amongst others, Tara Bye, and her daughter-in-law, Rajis Bye, the widow of Sivajee of Kolapoor; both these persons were placed in confinement in the fort of Satara. This defeat brought on an immediate accommodation. The Mahratta districts and claims, with the exception of some forts, in the tract of which the rivers Warna and Kistna to the north, and the Toongbuddra to the south, were the boundaries, were wholly ceded. Kopaul, near the Toongbuddra, was relinquished by Shao in exchange for Rutnaguiry; and the territory of the Concan, extending from Salsee to Ankolah, was comprehended in the sovereignty of Kolapoor.

*A.D. 1730* The Gurhee of Wurgaom, occupied by Oodajee Chowan, on the south bank of the Warna, which in the border warfare had cost many lives, was destroyed by mutual consent, but the claims of Chowan were left undetermined. Merich, Tasgoam, Hutnee, several villages along the northern bank of the Kistna, and some fortified places in Beejapoor district, were given up to Shao. This treaty was offensive, and defensive and provided for the division of further conquests to the south of the Toongbuddra, which, on co-operation, were to be equally shared. Grants of enam land or hereditary rights conferred by either party, within their respective boundaries, were confirmed.

Although enemies were not wanting to detract from the reputation of the Peishwa, and to extol that of his rivals, the success of the Pritee Needhee did not materially affect the ascendancy which Bajee Rao had attained; but Nizam-ool-Moolk was still bent on opposing him, and found a fit instrument for his purpose in

*A.D. 1731*



Trimbuck Rao Dhabaray. Ever since the Peishwa had obtained the deeds from Sur Boolund Khan, Dhabaray had been negotiating with the other Mahratta chiefs, and assembling troops in Guzerat. At length, finding himself at the head of 35,000 men, he had resolved to march for the Deccan in the ensuing season. Bajee Rao was well aware of the Senaputtee's enmity, but was not alarmed by his preparations until he discovered that Nizam-ool-Moolk was to support him in the Deccan. Immediately on being apprized of their intention, he determined to anticipate them, although, when joined by all his adherents, his whole army did not amount to above half that of Dhabaray. The latter gave out that he was proceeding to protect the raja's authority, and was supported by Peelajee Gaekwar, Kantajee, and Rughojee Kuddum Bhanday, Oodajee, and Anund Rao Powar, Chimnajee Pundit, Koor Buhadur, with many others. Bajee Rao proved that Dhabaray Senaputtee was in alliance with Nizam-ool-Moolk, and declared that he was leagued for the purpose of dividing the Mahratta sovereignty with the raja of Kolapoor—a measure inconsistent with sound policy, and contrary to the divine ordinances of the Shasters.

The preparations of Nizam-ool-Moolk hastened the march of Bajee Rao; and as his army, though so inferior in numerical strength, was composed of the old Pagah horse, and some of the best of the Mahratta Mankurees, he moved rapidly towards Guzerat, but he commenced negotiating from the day of his quitting Poona, and continued it until the hour of attack. His advanced troops, however, under Awjee Kowray, having fallen in with a party of the enemy under Dummajee, one of the sons of Peelajee Gaekwar, soon after crossing the Nerbuddah they were attacked and completely defeated. Bajee Rao, not discouraged by this unfortunate commencement, determined, when about to engage his countrymen, contrary to his usual plan, to close with them immediately. The new levies did not await the shock, but fled on the first charge; Kantajee Kuddum went off with the fugitives, leaving the old troops of Khundee Rao Dhabaray to defend his son. Trimbuck Rao was mounted on an elephant, and seeing the flight of his troops, chained the animal's legs. Bajee Rao was on horseback, and exerted himself with all the energy so great an occasion demanded; but the field was still disputed with obstinacy, and the issue doubtful, when Trimbuck Rao, in the act of



drawing his bow, was shot by a random ball from a matchlock; his death left complete victory to Bajee Rao, with all but nominal control of the Mahratta sovereignty.

In this battle, which took place between Baroda and Dubhoy, in Guzerat, about the 1st of April, Jowjee Dhabaray, Mullojee Powar, and one of the sons of Peelajee Gaekwar, were slain with their commander. Oodajee

*April 1*

Powar and Chimnajee Pundit were taken prisoners. Anund Rao Powar, Peelajee Gaekwar, and Koor Buhadur were wounded, but escaped. Both Dubhoy and Baroda were at this time in the hands of Peelajee; the latter was afterwards taken from him by the Moghuls, but Bajee Rao, at the suggestion of Sur Boolund Khan, then intended to reduce it for himself. A treaty was, however, concluded in the month of August, and the Peishwa, at the close of the monsoon, returned to Satara. He would have punished the treachery of Nizam-ool-Moolk, but that crafty politician, whose schemes had recoiled on himself, warded a blow which he could with difficulty have withstood, by directing its aim against the head of the empire.

Bajee Rao readily acceded to the Nizam's views; it suited his favourite policy, and it gave employment to persons likely to disturb the domestic arrangements he aimed at establishing. Troops were immediately despatched towards Malwa under his brother Chimnajee, whilst he himself remained, for a time, engaged in the interior arrangements of government, at Poona and Satara. Such appear to have been the rise and progress of the events and intrigues, which ended in a secret compact between Bajee Rao and Nizam-ool-Moolk, securing to the former supremacy as Peishwa, and to the latter a kingdom in the Deccan.

The victory over Dhabaray, like the issue of every civil war, left impressions on the minds of many, not easily effaced; but the Peishwa adopted every means of conciliation in his power. It had been a custom to feed some thousand Bramins for several days every year at Tullygaom, near Poona, the enam village of Dhabaray; this charitable practice Bajee Rao continued at Poona, and gave sums of money, at the same time, to the assembled Shastrees and Waeedeeks. This festival, continued by his successors, was known by the name of Dukshina.

Yeswunt Rao, the son of the deceased, was raised to the rank of Senaputtee; but being too young to take the management upon





himself, his mother, Ooma Bye, became his guardian; and Peelajee Gaekwar, their former mootaliq, was confirmed in that situation, with the title of Sena Khas Kheyl, in addition to his hereditary one of Shumsher Buhadur.

In order to prevent disputes, an agreement was drawn up under the authority of Shao, and subscribed by the Peishwa and Senaputtee, stipulating that neither party should enter the boundary of the other in Guzerat and Malwa. Within the limits of the former province the Senaputtee was to have entire management; but he bound himself to pay one-half of the revenue to government through the Peishwa. All contributions, levied from countries not specified in the deeds given under the authority of Sur Boolund Khan, were to be made over to the raja after deducting expenses.

The cession of chouth and surdeshmookhee from the province of Guzerat was highly disapproved at the imperial court, although no attempt had been made to assist Sur Boolund Khan, or to avert the calamity and disgrace, which that officer foretold must be the consequence of neglecting his applications for assistance. Sur Boolund Khan was superseded by Abhee Sing, raja of Joudpoor, who proceeded with the army to take possession of his new government. Sur Boolund Khan opposed him for a considerable time, but at last an accommodation took place, and the latter went off towards Delhi, where he was afterwards extremely ill-used and unworthily disgraced. Although an enemy of Nizam-ool-Moolk, the disrespect and indignity with which Sur Boolund Khan was treated, is given as the reason for the intimate connection which was now cemented between the former and Bajee Rao. The Mahomedan historian is partly right; but selfish, not generous, motives furnish the real interpretation of Nizam-ool-Moolk's consideration for Sur Boolund Khan. Perceiving Bajee Rao's complete ascendancy, the appointment of the Hindoo prince Abhee Sing to supersede Sur Boolund Khan, the imbecility of the emperor, and the treachery as well as depraved venality of his courtiers; knowing also that he had rendered himself in the highest degree obnoxious, Nizam-ool-Moolk had good grounds for apprehending that the Peishwa might be able to obtain the viceroyalty of the Deccan. The plan, however, which he adopted, under these circumstances, belongs to the





higher order of politics, and seems to have been framed for the purpose of diverting the Mahrattas from the destruction of the resources of his own country, and of making his own power a balance between that of the emperor and the Peishwa.

Previously to invading Malwa in person, Bajee Rao had an interview with Nizam-ool-Moolk, and endeavoured to induce him to advance a subsidy for the assistance he was affording; but the Nizam considered the inducement sufficiently strong without paying his auxiliaries. The districts in Candeish, by the present agreement, were to be protected by the Peishwa in his passage to and from Malwa, and nothing more than the usual tribute was to be levied in the six Soobehs of the Deccan,—a proposal to which Bajee Rao readily acceded.

Various parts of the province of Malwa had been already laid under contribution by Powar, Holkar, and Sindia. The Raja Geerdhur on every occasion had exerted himself with great fortitude and energy, but was at length killed in an action with Oodajee Powar and Chimnaje Pundit in 1729; but his relation, Dia Buhadur, having been appointed soobehdar in his room, continued to repel the Mahratta inroads with bravery, and frequently with success; till at last, attacked by Chimnaje Appa, the Peishwa's brother, Peelajee Jadow, and Mulhar Rao Holkar, at Talah near Dhar, he was also slain, and his troops were defeated. Bajee Rao, on crossing the Nerbuddah, assumed command of the army in Malwa, and sent his brother and Peelajee Jadow back to Satara, to maintain his influence at court, and to concert measures for settling the Concan, which was in a very disturbed state; the Peishwa having been obliged to withdraw a force, at first intended for the entire settlement of that country, including the reduction of Jinjeera.

In the meantime, after the Peishwa left Guzerat, the foudjar of Abhee Sing recovered the fort of Baroda; but the cause of Peelajee Gaekwar was popular, he had gained several victories, and occupied many of the principal thannas, when Abhee Sing, on pretence of entering upon a final agreement with him, sent some emissaries, apparently for the purpose of settling the preliminaries. These emissaries had frequent interviews with Peelajee, till at last, one evening, after having sat until it was



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dusk, they took leave and went outside the tent, when one of their number, on pretence of having forgot something of consequence, returned to the tent, and, whilst affecting to whisper in Peelajee's ear, drew a dagger and stabbed him to the heart. The assassin was instantly killed, but the rest of the emissaries escaped. This murder was perpetrated at Dhakoor, a well-known village in the district of Tausrah.

The murder of Peelajee Gaekwar was not attended by the advantages expected from it by Abhee Sing; Dilla, Dessaye of Padra, near Baroda, who had lived in friendship with Peelajee, instigated the Koolees and Bheels to rise all over the country, and watching an opportunity, afforded by the march of troops to quell the insurgents, sent intelligence to Mahadajee Gaekwar, the brother of Peelajee, who then occupied Jumbooseer, and advised him to attack Baroda. He accordingly followed this recommendation and obtained possession of it about the same time that Dia Buhadur was killed in Malwa, in 1732, since which time it has always belonged to the family of Gaekwar. But besides this success on the part of the Mahrattas, Dummajee, the eldest surviving son of Peelajee, advanced from Sonegurh with a great force, occupied many of the principal districts in the east of Guzerat, and made incursions as far as Joudpoor, till Abhee Sing, resigning Ahmedabad to a deputy, was forced to return to protect his paternal dominions.

Mohummud Khan Bungush, governor of Allahabad, was the new soobehdar appointed to Malwa. Shortly after the period of obtaining the government, he entered Bundelcund,  
 A.D. 1733 and established himself in the territory of the Raja Chitoor Sal. On this proceeding the Rajpoot prince solicited aid from Bajee Rao, which was readily afforded. The Peishwa moved expeditiously into Bundelcund, surrounded Bungush, and forced him to seek refuge in a fort, where he was reduced to the greatest distress, till rescued by a band of Afghans of his own tribe, headed by his son. The province, however, was completely evacuated by his troops, and Chitoor Sal was so entirely satisfied with the aid afforded by his new ally, that he conferred on him a fort and district in the neighbourhood of Jhansee worth two and a quarter lakhs of rupees of annual revenue, adopted him as his son, and at his





death, which happened very soon after, bestowed on him one-third of his possessions, or an equal share with his sons Juggut Raj-jee Deo and Hurdesa, the former styled raja of Kalpee, and the latter of Bundelcund; but it would appear that, although they may have managed separately, they shared in common.

After the defeat of Mohummud Khan Bungush, Raja Jey Sing was appointed by the emperor to the government of the provinces of Agra and Malwa. Nothing could be more

*A.D. 1734*

favourable to the views of Bajee Rao; but as Jey Sing was now situated, the honor of the

Rajpoot was at variance with the subsisting understanding between him and the Mahrattas. This circumstance may account for his hesitating to comply with their demands; but he at last came to an agreement with Bajee Rao, yielded him the government of Malwa in the following year, and for the time, the emperor, by Jey Sing's persuasions, tacitly acquiesced in the arrangement.



15

*From A.D. 1734 to A.D. 1739*

I HAVE THUS endeavoured to show the steps by which the Mahrattas spread themselves in Guzerat, and established a footing in Malwa; their domestic policy, their affairs in regard to Berar and the Concan, now claim our attention, before we return to their operations in Malwa or enter on the more important proceedings, which the present chapter will record.

A.D. 1734 During the Peishwa's absence, Kanhojee Bhonslay, the Sena Sahib Soobeh, had been accused of disobedience, and confined at Satara; and Rughoojee, the son of Kanhojee's cousin, Bembajee, had been appointed to the situation of Sena Sahib Soobeh in his stead. Rughoojee had served with a small party of horse, both under his relation Kanhojee, and with one of the petty Mahomedan princes in Gondwaneh; his station was too humble to bring him into general notice, but he had, in a confined sphere, distinguished himself by superior intelligence, activity, and spirit. The particulars of the intrigue by which Kanhojee Bhonslay was deprived of his title and jagheer are not known, but from the selection of Rughoojee as his successor, agreeably to the choice of the raja, it is probable that Bajee Rao had no share in it. Rughoojee had accompanied Shao in his excursions, and from being a very bold and expert hunter, had ingratiated himself with the raja, and obtained a great ascendancy over him. Shao married him to the sister of one of his own wives, of the Sirkay family, which, except their having the same surname, and that they may possibly have been originally relations and rivals for the hereditary right of Patell of their village, is the only connection which can be traced between the families of Satara and Nagpoor.

On receiving the sunnuds for Berar, Rughoojee gave a bond to maintain a body of 5,000 horse for the service of the state; to



pay an annual sum of nine lakhs of rupees; and exclusive of ghas-dana—a tribute which the Sena Sahib Soobeh since the time of Raja Ram had been allowed to reserve—the half only of all other tribute, prize property, and contributions was to be accounted for to the head of the government. He also bound himself to raise 10,000 horse when required, and to accompany the Peishwa, or to proceed to any quarter where he might be ordered.

This arrangement was effected during the absence of Sreeput Rao Pritee Needhee, who had been sent into the Concan by the Raja. The Pritee Needhee, being the friend of Kanhojee Bhonslay, endeavoured to obtain some mitigation of his sentence, and proposed that Akola and Balapoor, in Berar Payeen Ghaut, should be restored, on condition of his maintaining 200 horse; but it does not appear that this arrangement was carried into effect. Kanhojee was an officer of great enterprize; he had made some partial conquests in Gondwaneh, and headed one incursion into Kuttack. He died at Satara, after having lived there many years, a prisoner at large.

Whether Nizam-ool-Moolk had made any preparations in consequence of these dissensions, is uncertain; but Chimnaje Appa conceived, or affected to believe, that he meditated an attack. He, therefore, pitched his camp about 40 miles east of Satara, leaving Peelajee Jadow with an inconsiderable body of horse, being the only troops at Satara in the immediate interest of the Peishwa.

When Bajee Rao advanced into Malwa, it was his design to engage the Raja's mind with petty affairs in the Concan. Divisions of authority. contending factions, and the turbulent disposition of some of its inhabitants afforded ample field, within the small tract from Goa to Bombay for engaging and fatiguing attention; but as these authorities had also a large share in the transactions of the Bombay government during the last century, they demand, as a record of our own history, particular enumeration. Sawunt, the principal Deshmookh of Waree, occupied his hereditary territory in that quarter, but having suffered from Kanhojee Angria's attacks, prior to the late peace between the rajas of Satara and Kolapoor, he bore an enmity to Angria's family ever after.



Kanhojee Angria's death happened about the end of the year 1728. During his life all attempts at reducing his power proved fruitless. The Bombay government, incensed at his piracies and contumelious conduct, joined with the Portuguese in an expedition against Kolabah. The land forces furnished by that nation, and three English ships of the line, under Commodore Matthews, cooperated; but the attempt failed, owing to the cowardice of the Portuguese. The expedition took place in 1722, and, two years afterwards, the Dutch, with seven ships, two bomb vessels, and a body of troops, made an attempt on Viziadroog, at that time better known by its Moghul name of Gheriah; but this attack also failed. Angria seized many English vessels, and, about a year before his death, took the *Darby*, a ship richly laden, belonging to the East India Company. The crews of his vessels, like all Mahrattas when successful, became very daring, and his forts on the coast were considered impregnable.

Kanhojee Angria left two legitimate and three illegitimate sons. The two former succeeded to his possessions; the elder, named Sukkajee, remained at Kolabah, and the young, Sumbhajee, resided at Severndroog. The elder died a short time after his father, and Sumbhajee, keeping with him the eldest of his half-brothers, appointed the other two to the charge of Kolabah. The eldest of these, Yessajee, had charge of the interior management, whilst Mannajee commanded the naval and military establishment. The latter, some time after, having quarrelled with his family, sought protection and assistance from the Portuguese; and having obtained the aid of some troops, he esaladed Kolabah, and carried it sword in hand. He cruelly put out the eyes of his brother Yessajee, and confined him, for which Sumbhajee, as soon as the Portuguese retired, attacked him. Mannajee, however, having obtained aid from Bajee Rao, compelled Sumbhajee to raise the siege, and, in consequence of the assistance afforded, ceded the forts of Kootla and Rajmachee to the Peishwa.

The Seedee, who at this time was chief of Jinjeera, had held that situation for several years, with the old Moghul title of Yakoot Khan. The districts which had been placed under the Seedee's charge by Aurungzebe, including Mhar, Raigurh, Dabul, and Anjenweel, had been defended against every effort of the Mahrattas, and frequently, in consequence of their



inroads, the Seedee levied contributions from Shao's districts. As force was not likely to prevail, the Pritee Needhee, Jewajee Khundee Rao Chitnees, and others of the raja's ministers, formed schemes for ruining the Seedee by intrigue. A person named Yacoob Khan, well known in those times as one of the most daring pirates on the coast, and distinguished by his familiar appellation of Shaikjee, possessed the entire confidence of the Seedee. This man was a descendant of the Koolee rajas of the Concan, and hereditary Patell of Goagurh. In one of the incursions of the Seedees he was, when a child, taken prisoner, and bred a Mussulman. At a very early period he distinguished himself, and, on getting command of a ship, became as celebrated for his stratagem as his bravery. The Pritee Needhee gained this Shaik Yacoob, and entered into a secret treaty with him, by which he was to receive the command of the fleet, the whole of the Seedee's possessions, with the exception of some forts, several villages in enam, and the surgounda, or two per cent of the whole revenue of the lower Concan, from the river Penn to the boundary of the Kolapoor territory. His brother was to be appointed second-in-command at Raigurh, and one lakh of rupees was to be distributed as a largess amongst the troops and crews of the vessels, in case of success in effecting a revolution.

To aid this scheme, a force was sent into the Concan, in 1733, under the Pritee Needhee, his mootaliq, Yemmajee Sewdeo, and Oodajee Chowan; the intrigues, for reasons which are not explained, were unsuccessful, but a war ensued, the effects of which fell principally upon the helpless peasantry. Little impression could be made on the Seedee's garrisons; the Pritee Needhee, after many months, was finally worsted, and when encamped at Chiploon, the fort of Goelkot, although strongly garrisoned, was disgracefully surprised and taken. Chimnajee Appa incurred the raja's displeasure for not sending assistance to Sreeput Rao after repeated orders, and Shao at last told him—"If you do not, I must go myself." Peelajee Jadow was at length despatched, but none of the other officers at Satara would undertake to support the Pritee Needhee except on condition of receiving the conquered districts in jagheer; he was, therefore, compelled to return to Satara with great loss of reputation. About



this time the chief at Jinjeera died, leaving several sons, the eldest of whom, Seedee Abdoollah, was murdered by his brothers, supported by other conspirators, with the view of usurping the government in prejudice to Seedee Rehman, one of the brothers not in Jinjeera at the time of the murder, and who bore no part in the conspiracy.

Yacoob Khan immediately embraced the cause of Seedee Rehman, and called on Shao for support; but nothing could be done until the return of Bajee Rao, who, after leaving Holkar and Sindia with a large body of cavalry in Malwa, returned to the Deccan, and, on crossing the Godavery, intimated to the raja that he should march straight to Dhunda Rajepoor. All the disposable infantry were directed to join the Peishwa, and Peelajee Jadow was sent off, reinforced with a body of the Pagah horse, to support Mulhar Rao Holkar in Malwa.

Seedee Rehman and Yacoob Khan joined Bajee Rao, who commenced operations by attacking some of the forts. Futih Sing Bhonslay and the Pritee Needhee proceeded to co-operate; but the only assistance which they rendered was the recovery of Sivajee's capital, Raigurh, the killidar of which had been previously corrupted by Shaik Yacoob. The Peishwa reduced the forts of Tala and Gossala; but his further progress was interrupted by the advance of Seedee Rehman, one of the brothers, at the head of a body of troops from Jinjeera. They attacked the Peishwa vigorously, but could not prevail over the numerous forces of the Mahrattas. Seedee Rehman was killed, and his troops were pursued to Dhunda Rajepoor. Batteries were erected against Jinjeera, whilst Mannajee Angria assailed it from the sea.

The operation of cannonading Jinjeera had been repeated from the time of Sumbhajee every year the Mahrattas were in possession of Dhunda Rajepoor. Bajee Rao perceived the impracticability of reducing it, at least for many months; and as he foresaw many bad consequences from remaining in the Concan, he listened to overtures made by the besieged, entered into a treaty, by which they recognised the pretensions of Seedee Rehman, gave up half the revenues of eleven mahls to him, and ceded the forts of Raigurh, Tala, Gossala, Oochitgurh, and Beerwaree to the Mahrattas.



Upon this successful termination of hostilities, Bajee Rao, with additional power and influence, returned to Satara, and was appointed soobehdar of the late acquisitions.

After Bajee Rao's return to the Deccan, the troops of Mulhar Rao Holkar made incursions beyond Agra. Khan Dowran, the vizier of Mohummud Shah, attempted to check the progress of the Mahrattas rather by the pen than the sword, forgetting that all negotiations with a predatory state, without previously punishing its aggressions, only tend to excite further depredations. He laid plans for obtaining the aid of Nizam-ool-Moolk without appearing to solicit it—a conduct little less inconsistent than that of the fickle emperor, who now earnestly courted him; but the Nizam was nursing his resources, and the period had not yet arrived when he could perceive that his presence at Delhi would be hailed as that of the saviour of the empire.

Khan Dowran's attempts were feeble, but his preparations were always splendid; all Delhi was in bustle when his expeditions set out; but they commenced in bombast and ended in ridicule. His brother, Muzuffir Khan, moved forth to drive the plunderers and robbers across the Nerbuddah. Holkar sent a few of his light troops to molest his march during the day, and to throw rockets into his camp during the night; but he never allowed himself to be interrupted in the collection of contributions, in which he was employed, for the purpose of endeavouring to satisfy the importunate demands of his master, the Peishwa, whose pecuniary distress had become very great. Muzuffir Khan advanced as far as Seronje, whence he returned, and was received at Delhi as if he had performed signal services, acquiring fame among his friends by the contempt of his enemies. The province of Malwa, and the country south of the Chumbul, although some of the forts remained in possession of the imperial officers, were completely overrun, and the Rohillas, as well as the Mahrattas, took possession of several places. Kantajee Kuddum Bhanday, who the year before had been constrained by the power of Dummajee Gaekwar to quit Guzerat, persuaded Holkar to make an incursion into that province, where they appeared unexpectedly; levied contributions as far as the Bunass; plundered several towns to the north of Ahmedabad, amongst which were Eder and Pulhanpoor, and departed as suddenly as they had come.



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Abhee Sing was shortly after removed from the government of Guzerat, and Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, Momin Khan, was appointed to officiate; but the deputy of Abhee Sing would not evacuate the city of Ahmedabad, and Momin Khan was at last obliged to court an alliance with Dummajee, in order to expel him.

Bajee Rao, owing to the vast army he had kept up, both to secure his conquests and to overcome his rivals, *A.D. 1736* had become greatly involved in debts. His troops were in arrears; the Soucars (or bankers), to whom he already owed a personal debt of many lakhs of rupees, refused to make any further advances, and he complained bitterly of the constant mutinies and clamours in his camp, which occasioned him much vexation and distress. He levied the chouth and surdeshmookhee in Malwa, and applied, through Raja Jey Sing, for their formal cession in that province; and likewise for a confirmation of the deeds granted by Sur Boolund Khan for Guzerat. The Tooranee Moghuls, who formed a considerable party in the ministry, were decidedly against a compromise so disgraceful; Khan Dowran and the emperor, by whom it had been already tacitly yielded, were disposed, by the advice of Jey Sing, to acknowledge the title in due form; but, in the course of the negotiation, which ensued between the imperial minister and the Peishwa, both parties went beyond their original intentions, and hastened the advancing reconciliation between Mohummud Shah and Nizam-ool-Moolk.

The emperor, in the first instance, agreed to relinquish, in the form of an assignment, 13 lakhs of rupees of the revenue of the districts south of the Chumbul for the ensuing season, payable by three instalments at stated periods; and to grant an authority to the Peishwa to levy a tribute from the Rajpoot states, from Boondee and Kotah on the west, to Budawur on the east, fixing the annual amount at 10,60,000 rupees. The latter concession, Khan Dowran probably expected, was more likely to create enmity than to establish friendship between the Mahrattas and the Rajpoots. This minister imagined himself superior to a Mahratta Bramin in political artifice, and continued to negotiate when he should have had no thought but to chastise. The Raja Jey Sing was the medium through whom Khan Dowran sent an envoy of his own, named Yadgar Khan, to treat with Bajee



Rao. The sunnuds for the chouth and surdeshmookhee were secretly prepared, and given to the agent, with instructions to reserve them; but Dhondoo Punt Poorundhuree, the Peishwa's wukeel residing with Khan Dowran, discovered this preliminary admission, and apprized Bajee Rao of the circumstance. Mahrattas, in every negotiation, invariably begin by requiring much more than they expect. If they find their proposal acceded to, they rise in their pretensions, and very often, from a tone of the most obsequious complaisance, assume an overbearing insolence of manner, and a style of pointed threat and menace, which, to those who have only seen them submissive, is scarcely conceivable.

Bajee Rao's demands now exceeded all bounds; at different stages, during the discussions, he required the whole provinces of Malwa in jagheer; the Rohillas, who had established themselves, to be dispossessed; the forts of Mandoo, Dhar, and Raiseen; the jagheer and foudaree of the whole tract south of the Chumbul; 50 lakhs of rupees from the royal treasury, or an equivalent assignment on Bengal; Allahabad, Benares, Gya, and Muttra in jagheer; and a hereditary right as surdeshpandya of the six Soobehs of the Deccan.

All these concessions were evaded by the emperor, excepting the last; to that he acceded, on Bajee Rao's agreeing to pay a fee of six lakhs of rupees. This grant was precisely similar to that of the surdeshmookhee, but coinciding with the proportion of the emoluments of deshmoorkh and deshbandya: those of the surdeshmookhee being ten, the surdeshbandeegereee was five per cent. This grant, however, fell upon the Deccan; it was a stroke levelled at Nizam-ool-Moolk by Khan Dowran, and had the immediate effect of rousing the Nizam's jealousy, whilst encouragement from the Moghul faction and pressing invitations from Mohummud Shah to repair to Delhi and save the empire, at length induced Nizam-ool-Moolk to think of turning the scale against his predatory allies. In the meantime negotiations produced no cessation of activity on the part of Bajee Rao, and his demands were so exorbitant, that it was determined, after protracted consultations, to assemble a vast army, by the mere display of which, it seemed as if they expected to annihilate the Mahrattas. The plains in the neighbourhood of the capital were



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accordingly covered with tents, and the preparations were as splendid as the operations proved feeble. The Peishwa, on hearing that Khan Dowran and Kummur-ud-deen Khan, each at the head of a great army, had advanced towards Muttra, deposited his heavy baggage with his ally, Juggut Raj, in Bundelcund, and advanced to a position on the banks of the Jumna, 40 miles south of Agra. He had attacked the raja of Budawur for refusing to settle his claims, and levied contributions in every direction. Mulhar Rao Holkar, Peelajee Jadow, and Wittoojee Bolay committed great depredations in the Dooab, until driven across the Jumna by Sadut Khan, who marched from Oudh, and unexpectedly assailed the Mahrattas. He wrote an exaggerated account of his success to court, stating that he had wounded Mulhar Rao Holkar, killed Wittoojee Bolay, and driven the whole Mahratta army across the Chumbul; that 2,000 were killed, and 2,000 were drowned in the Jumna. On Sadut Khan's arrival at Agra, Bajee Rao quitted his ground on the banks of the Jumna, and moved to a more open country in a north-east direction, his former position being confined by the Chumbul on his left flank, and his camp intersected by deep ravines—very unfavourable to his mode of fighting.

Sadut Khan's account of his success, as written by himself to the emperor, was communicated to Bajee Rao by his wukeel, who remained with Khan Dowran, until the latter, accompanied by Mohummud Khan Bungush, joined Sadut Khan at Agra, when, by the advice of the latter, the wukeel was dismissed. Nothing was talked of in Delhi, but the hero Sadut Khan, who had driven the Mahrattas back to the Deccan. "I was resolved," says Bajee Rao, "to tell the emperor truth, to prove that I was still in Hindostan, and to show him flames and Mahrattas at the gates of his capital."

Six days before Khan Dowran joined Sadut Khan, Bajee Rao, foreseeing that they would unite, was on his march to Delhi. Quitting the great road and skirting the hills of Mehwat, where they formed the boundary of the territory of Chooramun Jath, and keeping 14 miles to the left of Oorlass, where Kummur-ud-deen Khan was encamped, he advanced at the rate of 40 miles daily, and pitched his camp close to the suburbs. Some elephants and camels coming out of the city were seized, and a party of



Hindoos, when going to a temple for the performance of a religious ceremony, were stripped; but the Peishwa prudently abandoned his first intention of plundering and burning, as he conceived the booty might retard his retreat, and that burning the suburbs would but show a disrespect and contempt, which would impede his negotiations with the emperor and Khan Dowran, both of whom, he well knew, were disposed to grant a large share of his demands. He therefore next day wrote two letters—one to the emperor, and the other to Raja Bukht Mull. Their purport is not mentioned, but the emperor requested that a wukeel might be sent, which Bajee Rao refused, unless a guard came out for his protection. He, however, returned a polite message, stating, "that as he apprehended mischief to the city from the contiguity of his troops, he was about to retire to the Jheel Tank." This moderation encouraged a party of 8,000 men from the city, under Muzuffir Khan, Meer Hoossein Khan Kokah, Raja Sew Sing, and other nobles of the court, to venture forth and attack the Mahrattas. Bajee Rao despatched Suttojee Jadow with a few skirmishers to reconnoitre them; and, upon Suttojee's sending notice that they were coming out to attack him, Mulharjee Holkar, followed by Ranoojee Sindia, immediately wheeled about, fell upon them, killed and wounded upwards of 600, drove them back into the city, and took 2,000 of their horses, and one elephant. Raja Sew Sing was amongst the slain, and Meer Hoossein Khan Kokah was mortally wounded.

The Mahrattas lost very few men, and had only one officer wounded. This action was soon over, and Bajee Rao was about to refresh his men, when the army of Kummur-ud-deen Khan came in sight. Bajee Rao had a skirmish with him; but as night was approaching, and as he perceived that the enemy was supported by troops from the city as well as by Khan Dowran and Sadut Khan, who were close at hand, he determined to retreat, and before morning moved eight miles to the westward of the late field of battle. In the skirmish with Kummur-ud-deen Khan, the Peishwa lost 30 men. Khan Dowran and Sadut Khan effected a junction with Kummur-ud-deen Khan on the following morning; and Bajee Rao retreated towards Gwalior, by the route of Rewaree and Mundawar, both of which he plundered, and was neither interrupted nor pursued. It was Bajee Rao's intention to



cross the Jumna, and plunder the Dooab before the rains; but being apprehensive that Nizam-gol-Moolk might interrupt him before he could collect the revenue in Malwa, he ordered his brother to watch the Nizam's preparations; and, "if he attempt," says the Peishwa's letter, "to cross the Rewa (Nerbuddah), fall instantly on his rear, and put heel-ropes upon him."

No opportunity presented itself of crossing the Jumna, and as his presence became requisite in the Deccan, Bajee Rao, upon a promise of obtaining the government of Malwa and 13 lakhs of rupees, again sent his wukeel to Khan Dowran, and set out on his return to Satara; where he paid his respects to the raja, and immediately proceeded into the Concan.

The Portuguese, who had assisted in taking Kolabah, not having received some districts promised to them in the neighbourhood of Rewadunda, now appeared, as the allies of Sumbhajee Angria, against Mannajec, in another attack upon Kolabah. The Peishwa

*A.D. 1737* was sent to repel this attempt, in which he succeeded, took Mannajec under his protection, on condition of his paying the yearly sum of 7,000 rupees, and presenting annually to the raja foreign articles from Europe or China, to the value of 3,000 rupees more. The war with the Portuguese led to the invasion of Salsette. Visajee Punt Leiley, a carcoon in the service of the Peishwa, corrupted some natives in the Portuguese service. The Mahrattas first possessed themselves of a small fort on the opposite side of the river from Bassein, on the night of the 6th April, put the commandant, with his garrison, to the sword, and occupied the river, so as to prevent all succour from Bassein to the other forts on the island; number of their troops crossed on the 7th, and the fortifications of Tannah being then unfinished, and a whole curtain wanting, the Portuguese governor of Salsette, Don Lewis Botelho, who was there, without attempting to defend it himself, called a council of war, and decided on retiring to Caranja, leaving Captain John de Souza Pereira to defend the fort, and Captain John de Souza Ferraz to command the garrison of Bandora, opposite to Mahim. Pereira behaved with spirit, and gallantly repulsed two assaults, in the last of which he was severely wounded; but the officer who succeeded him, having been seized with a panic, when there was no enemy in sight,



shamefully took to flight. The English at Bombay, interested in the defence of Bandora, sent both men and ammunition to that post; but, on other occasions, declared their neutrality. The Peishwa, to secure these conquests, and to maintain the war against the Portuguese, entertained some Arabs, and a very large body of infantry, principally Mawulees and Hetkurees. But news from Delhi obliged him to withdraw a part of his forces from the Concan.

The emperor, having at last prevailed on Nizam-ool-Moolk to repair to court, the government of Malwa and Guzerat were restored to him, but in the name of his eldest son, Ghazee-ud-deen; the conditions were, that he should drive the Mahrattas from those provinces; and every inducement that could flatter his ambition, or stimulate his avarice, was held out to prevail upon him to undertake this service in person.

The fullest powers were granted by emperor for assembling all the tributary rajas under his standard, whose forces, added to his own troops, enabled him to take the field with 34,000 men under his personal command, and a train of artillery accounted the best in India. Abdool Munsoor Khan Sufdur Jung, nephew of Sadut Khan, and the raja of Kotha, covered his rear. The Nizam began operations with abundant caution, crossed over into the Doab, and kept the Jumna on his right flank, recrossed the river at Kalpee, obliged the rajas of Bundelcund to join him, and advanced into Malwa.

Bajee Rao assembled all the troops he could collect, and, by the time he reached the Nerbuddah, found himself at the head of an army estimated at 80,000 men. Neither Yeswunt Rao Dhabaray, nor any of the Senaputtee's officers, joined him; and Rughoojee Bhonslay evaded the order, under pretence that he apprehended an invasion of Berar.

When Bajee Rao crossed the Nerbuddah, Nizam-ool-Moolk was at Seronje. The two armies met near Bhopaul in the month of January, when the Nizam, instead of advancing at once on his adversary, took up a strong position in the neighbourhood of the fort of Bhopaul, with a tank in his rear, and a rivulet in his front. This extreme caution may be said to have decided the fate of the war; the Mahrattas, who had approached under some alarm, no

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sooner fancied themselves superior, than they in fact became so. They insulted the Nizam in his lines; and, when a part of his army chose their own position for battle, the Mahrattas attacked them with vigour. The action was principally maintained, on the part of Nizam-ool-Moolk, by the Rajpoots, under the son of Raja Jey Sing, supported by the troops from Bundelcund, and the neighbouring rajas, all of whom, except the raja of Boondee, had united with Nizam-ool-Moolk. The Rajpoots lost about 500 men and 700 horses, the Mahratta loss was principally from the fire of the artillery, and estimated by the Peishwa himself at 100 killed and 300 wounded. Ranoojee Sindia, Peelajee Jadow, and Syajee Goozur were the officers who led the Mahratta troops into action. The Peishwa, during the engagement, was within two rockets flight of the Nizam, anxiously watching an opportunity, in hopes that he would quit the strong ground on which he stood, when it was Bajee Rao's intention to have made an effort to cut him off; but in this he was disappointed. No decisive advantage was gained by the Mahrattas during the attack; but the Nizam recalled his troops, and allowed himself to be hemmed in on all sides; provisions and forage soon became exceedingly scarce; a detachment from the army, under Sufdur Jung and the raja of Kotah, was intercepted and defeated, with the loss of 1,500 men, by Mulhar Rao Holkar and Yeswunt Rao Powar. Sufdur Jung retreated, and the Mahrattas, exulting, straitened the army at Bhopual, cut off their supplies, and kept them on the alert day and night. Dispirited by privation, and harassed by tiresome watching, many of the troops, especially the Rajpoots, would have deserted, but Bajee Rao would admit of no overtures; he now had an opportunity of showing his superiority to all India, and well knew that, as long as the blockade could be secured, the greater the numbers the greater their straits. It seemed unaccountable to Bajee Rao how Nizam-ool-Moolk should have thus put himself into his power. "The nabob," says the Peishwa in a letter to his brother, "is both an old man and a man of experience; how he has got himself into this difficulty I cannot comprehend; it will ruin him in the opinion of all at Delhi."

Preparations were made both in Hindostan and in the Deccan to effect his relief. Khan Dowran, perhaps, saw the distress of his rival with secret pleasure; and the emperor's command, not



to advance until he should march in person, was an intimation to Bajee Rao that he had nothing to apprehend from the northward. The Nizam's principal hopes of succour were from the Deccan; troops were assembled, both at Hyderabad and Aurungabad, by his second-son, Nasir Jung, whom he had left as his deputy; and messengers were secretly despatched from the camp at Bhopaul to hasten their march. Bajee Rao, on the other hand, exerted himself with the utmost earnestness to prevent their approach; he wrote, beseeched, and threatened Rughojee Bhonslay, without effect; he entreated the raja to compel the Senaputtee, then at Sonegurh, near Surat, to join him; and Shao, to that end, wrote a peremptory mandate with his own hand. Chimnaje Appa took post on the Taptee, and the intended relief for the Nizam assembled at Phoolmurry, north of Aurungabad. The Peishwa urged his brother in the strongest manner to collect every man he could: "bring up Futih Sing Bhonslay, Sumbhoo Sing Jadow, and the Sur Lushkur from the southward; if Dhabaray Gaekwar and Bhanday are not on their march to join me, let them take post with you on the Taptee; let every Mahratta join, and one grand and united effort may make us masters of the Deccan."

The Nizam made an attempt to move, but, owing to the encumbrance of heavy baggage and stores, he was compelled to return; his troops, in retiring to their former ground, were driven under the walls, or crowded within the fortifications of Bhopaul. Bajee Rao, from the want of artillery, could not effect a breach, but he poured in such a shower of rockets, and so galled the Moghuls with matchlocks, that Nizam-ool-Moolk determined on making a last effort to extricate himself. He deposited his baggage in Bhopaul and Islamgurh, and began his retreat under cover of a powerful artillery, and a number of swivels mounted on camels. The Mahrattas charged the guns, but failed in taking them. The retreat, however, was only at the rate of three miles a day. The Mahrattas acted vigorously, but began to be discouraged by the execution from the guns; at last the Nizam, on the twenty-fourth day from the commencement of the attack, about the 11th February, was compelled to sign a convention at Doorae Suraee, near Seronje, promising in his own handwriting, to grant to



Bajee Rao the whole of Malwa, and the complete sovereignty of the territory between the Nerbuddah and the Chumbul; to obtain a confirmation of it from the emperor, and to use every endeavour to procure the payment of a subsidy of 50 lakhs of rupees, to defray the Peishwa's expenses. "I tried hard," says Bajee Rao, "to get something from the nabob himself, but this I scarcely expected. I recollected his unwillingness to part with money when I entered on an agreement to assist him"—alluding to their compact six years before.

The Peishwa remained for a time levying contributions south of the Chumbul, and carrying on negotiations at court, where the threatening invasion of Nadir Shah, at that time besieging Candahar, although mentioned by Mahomedan writers as an apology for the Nizam's failure against the Mahrattas, had as yet excited little alarm at court, and the inhabitants of Delhi, like all enervated and selfish people, were as careless of danger at a distance as terrified and helpless on its approach.

In the meantime the war in the Concan was maintained against the Portuguese; to keep them in check, a body of horse had been sent down towards Goa, under Wenkut Rao Narain Ghorepuray; and Khundoojee Mankur, in the northern Concan, laid siege to the fort of Asseeree, near Tarrapoor; but Don Antonio Cardin Frois, an officer of reputation, had superseded the late governor of Bassein and Salsette, and exerted himself with some success in recovery of their possessions. Colonel Pedro de Mello, with about 500 Europeans and 4,000 Portuguese, natives of India, attacked Khundoojee Mankur, stormed and destroyed the batteries at Asseeree, and was preparing to make a great effort for the recovery of Tannah. The governor of Bombay apprized the Mahrattas of the intended expedition, and advised them to make peace with the Portuguese; at the same time the English sold them both powder and shot; but Khundoojee Mankur was reinforced, and Mulhar Rao Holkar was sent with all speed to Tannah, where he arrived in time to repulse an attack on the fort, led by Don Antonio Frois in person, who bravely fell in the attempt.

Although Bombay was then insignificant, it afterwards became a great English settlement, and the subtle part which its chief acted on that occasion, leaves room to regret that political ani-



mosity, and the spirit of commercial rivalry, should have tended to a conduct which certainly, in some degree, detracts from our national reputation. Like everything of the kind, it was exaggerated by the exasperated feelings of the other party; and although it must be admitted that the Portuguese had great reason to complain, their assertion that the English assisted the Mahrattas in the defence of Tannah, and that an English gunner pointed the cannon which killed their commander, appears from all contemporary authority to be totally unfounded. We are also bound in justice to add, in regard to such part of the conduct of the English as deserves censure, that it was principally to be ascribed to the treatment they had experienced from the Portuguese. Bombay, with its dependencies, was ceded by the crown of Portugal to Charles II, in 1661, as the dowry of his queen. In the year following, when the English appeared and demanded possession, the Portuguese refused to give up Salsette, which they, contrary to what had always been understood, declared was not a dependency of Bombay. The English at first declined receiving any part of the cession, and the troops they had brought, 500 in number, were landed on the island of Aujeedeva. But 381 of them having fallen a sacrifice to the climate of the unhealthy spot, Ensign Humphray Cooke, who became the surviving commander, was glad to accept of Bombay on any terms. When the Portuguese, therefore, were dispossessed of Salsette by the Mahrattas, it was natural for the English, in a public point of view, to regard their misfortunes without regret, especially as it afforded a better chance of one day obtaining or conquering from the Mahrattas what they could not recover as their just rights from the Portuguese.

After the rains, the body of horse under Wenkut Rao Narain Ghorepuray, the Peishwa's brother-in-law, returned to the neighbourhood of Goa, whilst Chimnaje Appa was sent down with Sindia and Holkar into the Concan, attended by a very large army, a number of guns, and a vast body of infantry. Ranoojee Sindia, detached from the main army, took Kuttulwaree and Dannoo early in January; and before the month of February, Seergaom was surrendered, and Kelwa and Tarrapoor were



carried by storm. At the last-mentioned place the defence and assault were desperate: there were four mines constructed by the Mahrattas, two of which succeeded, and effected large breaches in a bastion and curtain; the different leaders vied with each other in the attack. Bajee Bew Rao, Ramchundur Hurry, Yeswunt Rao Powar, and Tookajee Powar (the last an officer of Angria's) rushed forward with their respective colours; but the Portuguese gallantly opposed them, and for a time success was doubtful. At length Ranoojee Bhonslay, having crossed the ditch at a place where there was no breach, applied scaling ladders to the wall, and entered sword in hand; "but the garrison," says Chimnajee Appa in his account of the attack, "still fought with the bravery of Europeans," and defended themselves till completely overpowered. The few that remained alive, amongst whom was their commander, Don Francis de Alarcao, demanded and received quarter.

Whilst the war was thus vigorously prosecuted against the Portuguese, and Ranoojee Bhonslay of Oomrautee, the uncle of Rughoojee, the Sena Sahib Soobeh, had, as related, distinguished himself at Tarrapoor, his nephew had seized the opportunity of extending his possessions to the eastward; he had plundered Kuttack, and during the period when the Nizam was surrounded at Bhopaul, Rughoojee made an incursion to the northward, as far as Allahabad, defeated and slew the soobehdar, Shujah Khan, and returned loaded with booty. These expeditions, undertaken without regular sanction, were highly resented by Bajee Rao. He marched from Poona for the purpose of punishing his misconduct, and sent forward Awjee Kowray to plunder in Berar. But that unfortunate officer was attacked and defeated by Rughoojee in the end of February. Bajee Rao was preparing to avenge his loss, when news reached him of the arrival of Nadir Shah, the defeat of the Moghuls, the death of Khan Dowran, the capture of Sadut Khan, and, finally, that the victorious Persian was dictating the terms of ransom at the gates of Delhi. These accounts exceedingly alarmed Bajee Rao; but the subsequent intelligence which he received at Nusseerabad informed him of the imprisonment of the emperor, the plunder of Delhi, the dreadful massacre of many of its inhabitants, and seemed for a time to overwhelm him. "Our domestic quarrel



with Rughoojee Bhonslay is now insignificant," says the Peishwa, "the war with the Portuguese is as naught; there is now but one enemy in Hindostan." He appears to have conceived that Nadir Shah would establish himself as emperor, but he was not dismayed when he heard reports that a hundred thousand Persians were advancing to the southward. "Hindoos and Mussulmans", says Bajee Rao, "the whole power of the Deccan must assemble, and I shall spread our Mahrattas from the Nerbuddah to the Chumbul." He called on Nasir Jung to arm against the common foe, and Chimnajee Appa was ordered to desist from the Concan warfare, and join him with all speed. Before Chimnajee received this command, a detachment from his army, under Khendoojee Mankur, had reduced the forts of Versovah and Darawee; he was in possession of the whole of Salsette, and had begun the siege of Bassein. It was invested by an advanced force under Shunkrajee Narain on the 17th of February. The commandant represented with humility that he was willing to pay the Mahratta tribute, and that the Portuguese asked no more than the terms granted to the Seedee of Jinjeera. But he was mistaken in supposing that such a tone would avert the attack of a victorious Bramin. Chimnajee was unwilling to relinquish the capture of an important fortress which would secure his conquests, and without which the Portuguese had a key which opened a passage to the recovery, not only of what they had lost, but to the whole Concan from the Ghauts to the sea, and from Damaun to Bombay; therefore, although the mandate from his brother was urgent, he determined to secure Bassein. Aware of the risk to which he exposed himself by the chance of discomfiture, during the whole of March and April he pressed the siege by every possible exertion. Numbers were daily killed in his batteries and trenches, where shells and huge stones, thrown from mortars, did terrible execution. The numerous guns of the besieged were at last silenced, and a breach had been effected in one of the curtains, but it was not yet practicable. The mines of the besiegers were repeatedly counteracted; at length five were prepared, but so unskilfully, that the first only partially exploded, and of three mines close together, intended to be fired at once, two only went off. These, however, made a very large breach, which the Mahratta troops resolutely, and promptly mounted, when the remaining mine



FROM A.D. 1734 TO A.D. 1739

having caught fire, blew hundreds of the assailants in the air. The Portuguese flung a quantity of hand-grenades amongst the crowds in the rear, whilst they plied those who had ascended with musketry, and drove them back with much slaughter. The defences were repaired with alacrity, the besiegers returned to the attack; but, before attempting an assault at the former breach, the remaining mine under the tower of St. Sebastian, which had been constructed under the superintendence of Mulhar Rao Holkar, was fired: half the bastion was brought to the ground, and the assailants, after losing two of their colours, at last effected a lodgment. The besieged, however, although 40 of their number were killed, and upwards of 130 wounded at the breach of St. Sebastian, disputed every inch of ground, threw up a retrenchment of gabions, and mounted fresh guns, from which they kept up an incessant fire. At last, worn out by fatigue, and distressed for want of provisions, the sea face being blockaded by Mannajee Angria, they sent offers of capitulation, which were accepted on the 16th of May, and eight days were allowed to embark their private property and families. The Portuguese lost, in killed and wounded, according to the Mahratta account, 800 men, whilst Chimnajee Appa acknowledges his own loss at upwards of 5,000 from the commencement to the end of this remarkable siege, the most vigorous ever prosecuted by Mahrattas. The Portuguese only enumerate their loss at the last breach. The capitulation was made by Captain de Souza Pereira, the same officer who before defended Tannah, Silveira De Menezes, the commanding officer, having been killed during one of the assaults.

Holkar and Sindia, as soon as Bassein fell, were sent to join Bajee Rao with all speed, but by that time news had arrived of the retreat of the Persians. Nadir Shah restored the throne to its degraded owner, and wrote letters to all the princes in India, announcing the event; amongst others, he addressed a letter to Shao, and one to Bajee Rao. He informs the latter that he has reinstated Mohummud Shah, and now considered him as a brother; that although Bajee Rao was an ancient servant possessing a large army, he had not afforded the emperor assistance; but that all must now attend to Mohummud Shah's commands, for if they did not, he would return with his army and inflict punishment upon the disobedient.



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# *From A.D. 1739 to A.D. 1740*

SHORTLY AFTER THE departure of Nadir Shah, Bajee Rao sent a letter to the emperor expressive of his submission and obedience, and a nuzur of 101 goldmohurs, which was acknowledged in suitable terms, and a splendid khillut sent in return. He is assured by the emperor that the rank, jagheers, districts, and inheritance, already conferred on him, shall be confirmed, and that he may depend on finding his interests best promoted by continuing steadfast in his duty to the imperial government.

Although no new soobehdar, nor any Deputy of Nizam-ool-Moolk, was appointed to Malwa, yet no sunnud was sent conferring the government on Bajee Rao. This omission the Peishwa considered a breach of faith on the part of Nizam-ool-Moolk; but the Nizam's army being still in Hindostan, and some of Bajee Rao's best officers and troops advancing from the Concan, he deferred enforcing his claims until a fitter opportunity. In the meantime he was busied in arranging the affairs of the province of Malwa, and strengthening his connection with the Rajput princes in the western quarter, along the banks of the Chumbul from Kotah to Allahabad, but especially with Juggut Deo and his brother Hurdesa, rajas of Bundelcund. With these two princes he entered into a very particular and secret alliance for the purpose of mutual protection and support against the Mahomedans. The contracting parties became bound by the most solemn oaths. The rajas of Bundelcund agreed to accompany Bajee Rao in all his incursions across the Jumna and Chumbul, and with the exception of the territory of Budawur, to share in all prize and conquest in a proportion corresponding to the numerical strength of their respective forces; they promised, "in case of Bajee Rao's being engaged in a war in the Deccan to defend Bundelcund for at least two months, and if,



at the end of that time, the Mahrattas should not be advancing to their assistance, they will make the best terms they can as a means of temporary safety, but break them the moment they are joined by their Hindoo allies." Bajee Rao's share of the territories of the former raja, Chittoor Sal, exclusive of Jhansee, was now fixed at five lakhs of rupees.

These arrangements to secure the northern frontier were preparatory to a war with Nizam-ool-Moolk, or an expedition into the Carnatic. The late success against Nizam-ool-Moolk, his departure from the terms of agreement, his great age, the probability of contentions among his sons, encouraged or stimulated the Peishwa to attempt the subjugation of the Deccan; but the deficiency of his resources for so great a design was the chief obstacle which deterred him from this undertaking. On the other hand, the prospect of contributions and plunder, by which he might liquidate his debts, and perhaps some secret encouragement from Arcot, were strong allurements for venturing into the Carnatic. But Bajee Rao was critically situated, and circumstances impelled him to choose the Deccan as the theatre of his operations. The party of Dhabaray, or rather of Dummajee Gaekwar, the agent of Ooma Bye (as her son Yeswunt Rao, even when he grew up, was incompetent to his situation), possessed very considerable resources, and, from causes already detailed, was always inimical to the Peishwa.

Rughoojee Bhonslay was jealous of the Bramin ascendancy; he meditated a revolution by getting the raja into his own power; and as Shao had no prospect of an heir, Rughoojee may have contemplated the possession of the Mahratta supremacy by being adopted as his son. Futih Sing Bhonslay, the only Mahratta likely to supersede him in the raja's choice, possessed neither ability nor enterprize, and had failed to create power by acquiring popularity among the soldiery. Rughoojee had many difficulties to overcome in prosecuting a scheme of the kind. Although a party existed inimical to the Peishwa, Bajee Rao's friends and dependents surrounded the raja, and possessed his ear, if not his entire confidence; nor could Rughoojee Bhonslay nor Dummajee Gaekwar concert a plan or transact the slightest business without Bramin agency; should Bajee Rao, however, quit the position which he occupied between the territories of



those two, there would be no obstacle to their uniting against him.

The subsisting difference between Rughoojee and Bajee Rao arose from Rughoojee's having plundered the province of Allahabad, and not having joined when he was ordered, according to the terms on which he held his lands and title. The Peishwa affirmed that he had no authority for levying contributions north of the Nerbuddah, and declared his determination, at the time of his marching from Poona in the end of 1738, to enforce restitution—not to the owners but to the Mahratta state—and to punish the aggression. A temporary compromise took place on the arrival of the Persians at Delhi; but the dispute was unsettled, and nothing but a sense of injury to their mutual interests prevented an open war.

This state of affairs laid the foundation of schemes which had a great effect in extending the spreading but unstable power of the Mahrattas. Unfortunately there are few direct proofs to illustrate this part of their history. It is however certain that Bajee Rao and Rughoojee had a meeting, and that they were reconciled.

From all that has been stated, as well as from subsequent events, there is reason to suppose that Bajee Rao unfolded as much of his schemes to Rughoojee as were necessary to engage his co-operation; and the plunder of the Carnatic, an eventual addition to his own territories in the Deccan, and a future partition of Bengal and Hindustan, may have been urged by the Peishwa to excite his ambition and cupidity. In this conference may also be seen the real spring from which a host of Mahrattas were poured into the Carnatic.

In prosecution of his plans of conquest in the Deccan, Bajee Rao, seizing the opportunity afforded by the absence of Nizam-ool-Moolk at Delhi, commenced his operations about the end of the year, by surrounding Nasir Jung, the second son of the Nizam, who was encamped in the neighbourhood of Aurangabad with 10,000 men; but a very large body of horse and foot, with a numerous artillery, advanced to his relief, and, having effected a junction, Nasir Jung, thus reinforced, attacked Bajee Rao, crossed the Godavery in defiance of the Mahratta army, and moved in the direction of Ahmednugur, plundering the villages in his route. The Peishwa, being joined by Chimnajee Appa,



with a body of fresh troops, principally Concan infantry, repeatedly attacked the Moghuls, and Nasir Jung was at length compelled to retire towards the Godavery; but after several months the Mahrattas, tired of the unprofitable war, gladly entered on terms of accommodation, and a treaty was concluded at Moongy Pyetun, by which both parties pledged themselves to maintain peace, and mutually to refrain from plundering in the Deccan. Hindia and Kirkoun, districts on the banks of the Nerbuddah, were conferred on Bajee Rao in jagheer, and the Peishwa, without visiting Poona or Satara, in great vexation, amounting almost to despair, set off with his army towards Hindustan. Chimnajee Appa was called to support Ballajee Bajee Rao, the Peishwa's son, engaged in hostilities in the Concan.

Sumbhajee Angria, still intent on recovering Kolabah from his half-brother Mannajee, taking advantage of the absence of so large a body of troops, had again attacked Mannajee's districts, and having rapidly taken Choule, Alibagh, Thull, and Sagurgurh, laid siege to Kolabah, and cut off the garrison from fresh water. Mannajee applied to Ballajee Bajee Rao, who was with the raja in the neighbourhood of Satara. Five hundred men were accordingly sent to support the garrison, and an express despatched to Chimnajee Appa for instructions. Chimnajee had ordered his nephew to repair to Kolabah in person, and applied to the governor in council at Bombay (with whom he had concluded a treaty, and maintained a friendly intercourse since his late campaign in the Concan) to support the garrison at Kolabah, and assist them with water, which was immediately done. Ballajee, or, as he was then invariably designated, Nana Sahib, arrived at Kolabah on the fifth day's march, and distinguished himself on his first service, by an attack on a party stationed under the protection of Heerakot, which he drove into Sumbhajee's camp, killed 25 or 30 men, and took Toolajee, half-brother of Sumbhajee, prisoner. The English had arrived before Nana Sahib; they forced the fleet of Sumbhajee to run down to Severndroog, and compelled him to move his camp from the seaside, where it was pitched on their arrival, and to throw up an intrenchment to protect his people from a heavy cannonade which they opened from their ships. Sumbhajee applied to the



English for permission to retire to Severndroog, but they refused to listen to his request. He, however, effected his escape by some means of which the Mahratta letters and manuscripts afford no particulars. Chimnaje Appa having joined Nana Sahib, they were concerting the reduction of Rewadunda, when accounts reached them of the death of Bajee Rao, which happened on the banks of the Nerbuddah on the 28th day of April 1740. On receiving this intelligence, Shunkrajee Narain was appointed soobehdar of the Concan, Khundoojee Mankur was left in command of a body of troops, whilst Chimnaje Appa and his nephew, after the usual ceremonies of mourning, which occupy ten or twelve days, returned to Poona, and shortly afterwards repaired to Satara.

The death of Bajee Rao is an event in Mahratta annals, which, on his account alone, deserves a pause. In the history of this nation, whose very existence was the confusion of other states, an occasional survey, however brief, of those powers with whom they have transactions, is absolutely necessary. The reader may now, indeed, be less at a loss to comprehend who the Mahrattas were, than European contemporaries of Bajee Rao, who heard of a people unknown a century before, that had overturned ancient monarchies, who were plundering and burning on the east and on the west, from the Hooghly to the Bunass, and from Madras to Delhi; yet from the diffusive nature of their conquests, one may be apt, without some survey of the kind, combined with a retrospective view of their past history, to lose sight of the rise and progress of their power, and of their relative importance in India. The Mahomedan wars, from the commencement of the seventeenth century, the plans and conquests of Sivajee, the state of the Deccan after his death, the increase of habitual rapine by the absence of controlling authority, the immense predatory power which was thus prepared, and the means of directing it, placed by the Moghuls in the hands of Shao, had all their share in accumulating the mighty mass of Mahratta force; and when we consider the skill with which Ballajee Wishwanath and his successor combined and guided the whole weight of such a tremendous engine of destruction, we cease to feel surprise at the havoc which it spread. Other causes besides Mahratta progress had concurred to complete the humiliation of the Timoorian dynasty, and, at the period



of Bajee Rao's death, the vast fabric of the Moghul empire was disjointed or in ruins.

Mohummud Shah had received his liberty and his crown, after both had been subjected to the will of a despot. Delhi had been plundered of upwards of 30 millions of pounds sterling; thousands of its inhabitants had been cruelly massacred; and Cabul, Tatta, and Mooltan were added by Nadir Shah to his kingdom of Persia.

Khan Dowran, who was killed in a precipitate attack on the Persian army, had been succeeded as vizier by Kummur-ud-deen Khan, the friend of Nizam-ool-Moolk, so that the faction of the Tooranee Moghuls remained in power, though contrary to the secret wishes of the emperor. Nizam-ool-Moolk, dignified with the title of Umeer-ool-Oomrah, remained for some time at Delhi; but, having heard that his son, Nasir Jung, meditated rebellion, he obtained the emperor's sanction for transferring his title of Umeer-ool-Oomrah to his eldest son, Ghazee-ud-deen, and commenced his march for the Deccan.

Sadut Khan, the nabob of Oude, died before Nadir Shah left Delhi, and his nephew and son-in-law, Abdool Munsoor Khan Sufdur Jung, was appointed his successor.

The principal Rajpoots, still tributary to the emperor, were those of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Oudepoor. Both the last mentioned states had been subjected to partial devastation from the Mahrattas; but the intimate connection subsisting between Jey Sing and Bajee Rao prevented such aggressions in the districts of Jeypoor.

The Jhats, originally a tribe of Shooders from the banks of the Indus, had, a short time before the death of Aurungzebe, established themselves in the territory between Agra and Jeypoor. Their chief, Chooramun, attained power during the confusion of the times, and the plunder of the baggage of Aurungzebe's army is said to have furnished the means of beginning the fortifications of Bhurtpoor. Though situated at such a distance from each other, the Mahratta progress was the cause of the rise of the Jhats; and being afterwards, from the time the Mahrattas crossed the Chumbul, drawn together by mutual interest, a friendly intercourse has, for the most part, subsisted between them.





About this period, the usurper, Aliverdy Khan, established his authority over the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. From a humble situation in the service of Shujah-ud-deen Khan, nabob of Bengal, Aliverdy had been appointed the nabob's deputy in Behar. Surfuraz Khan, the heir apparent to the nabobship, was stationed at Dacca, and Moorshed Koolee Khan, the son-in-law of Shujah-ud-deen, was the deputy governor of Orissa, having for his dewan a native of Arabia named Meer Hubeeb. On the death of Shujah-ud-deen, Surfuraz Khan was appointed nabob. Aliverdy Khan rebelled, and slew him in battle. He also attacked and drove Moorshed Koolee from Orissa. Meer Hubeeb, the dewan, a person afterwards so instrumental in Mahratta progress, also fled, but subsequently submitted, and entered the service of the successful insurgent. Aliverdy Khan was acknowledged by the emperor as nabob of Bengal, in consequence of sending a part of the property and jewels of Surfuraz Khan to court.

New states sprung up even in the environs of Delhi; the founder of the principality, afterwards known by the name of Rohillah, had been for some time rising into notice. The person who first established himself was the son of a Hindostanee. Ahee, a class of shepherds nearly similar to the Dhungurs of Maharashtra. An Afghan adopted him, when a boy, as his son, and gave him the name of Ali Mohummud Rohillah, which procured for him and all his followers the appellation of Rohillas. He began his career under the deputy governors of Mooradabad, as commander of a small party of Afghan cavalry. He afterwards got possession of lands on pretence of paying a higher rent for them; and at last, on an attempt to suppress his encroachments, he raised an insurrection, and defeated the deputy of the vizier Kummur-ud-deen Khan, in whose jagheer, situated in the Dooab, little more than a hundred miles to the southward of the capital, all these circumstances happened.

In the Deccan and Carnatic, Nizam-ool-Moolk divided the revenue with the Mahrattas, except in the Śwuraje, and where territory had been wholly ceded in jagheer; the Nizam, in other situations, claiming sovereignty, as the Mahrattas did tribute, over all those states and principalities to the southward of the Toongbuddra, which had submitted to Aurungzebe.



Dost Ally, the nephew of that Sadut Oolla Khan, who, in the year 1706, was left by Daood Khan as his deputy in the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut, had, in 1732, succeeded his uncle as nabob, but without obtaining the sanction of Nizam-ool-Moolk or the authority of the emperor.

The country was breaking into many small states; the nabobs of Kurnoul, Kurpa, and Savanoor, the descendants of governors under the dynasties of Beejapoor and Golcondah, were closely connected with some of the Mahrattas, and had been, for some time, nearly independent. The son-in-law of the nabob of Arcot, the well-known Chunda Sahib, had obtained possession of Trichinopoly, on pretence of affording protection to the widow of its late raja.

The nominal raja of Tanjore was the grandson of Sivajee's brother Venkajee. Tookajee, the youngest of Venkajee's three sons, was the only one who had issue; and at this period two sons of Tookajee's remained alive; the one Syajee, was legitimate, the other, Pertaub Sing, was the son of a concubine. The government was administered under the name of the former, but the power was held by a Mahomedan officer, who, since the time of Tookajee, had been vested with the command of the fort of Tanjore. Syajee, who some years afterwards placed himself under the protection of the English at Madras, was dispossessed by this officer, who raised Pertaub Sing to the head of the government in 1741; but the new raja would not submit to the control of his minister, and freed himself from a state of tutelage by assassination.

The English and French, who were so soon to take a part in the contentions and usurpations of the times, still remained on the defensive, unconscious of their own strength, or unwilling to exert it; and although the former, when driven to arms, had manfully asserted their rights on all occasions, yet the merchants of those two great nations, in common with those of other European factories, sought only to increase their trade and privileges by humble submission, and frequent bribes or presents to the petty courts surrounding them.

The Portuguese had been severely humbled by the Mahrattas. The English at Bombay courted the Peishwa, through his brother Chimnajee Appa, for the purpose of obtaining an extension of



commercial privileges, and a treaty had been settled with Chimnajee Appa at Bassein in July 1739.

The Raja of Soonda and the dessaye of Carwar had assisted the Portuguese in their war against the Mahrattas; but the rana of Bednore, whose territory adjoined that of Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapur, appears to have remained neutral.

The Mysore state, though a declared tributary of the Moghuls, and of the raja Shao, had for 12 or 15 years, by the commotions of its neighbours, and the vigour of some of its officers, been exempted from the scene of plunder and exaction which devastated the greater part of India.

Such was the disjointed state of the Moghul empire at this important period. The detail of events has unfolded the parties, the feuds, and the domestic policy of the Mahrattas; but something remains to be said of the administration and character of Bajee Rao.

Having already dwelt upon the artificial divisions of revenue, adopted as a means of cementing union among the Mahrattas, it is fit to enquire how far it tended to that end, and how long the detail of the system was preserved. That it did create union, and give an immediate direction to predatory power of the Deccan, is unquestionable; and it is probable the Mahrattas would never have spread their conquests so far, had not this means been devised for conciliating and controlling the chiefs. It was founded on a principle of self-interest, which, fitly directed to the views of a community, is unerring in its results; but it must always be remembered that this principle, when misapplied or misunderstood, may tend as much to stir up sedition, and to create hostility, as to preserve union and ensure combination. Bajee Rao had not leisure to attend to detail or arrangement; the minute divisions, which were made of the revenues ceded by the Moghuls, served to provide hundreds of Bramin carcoons with bread; and everyone interpreted the amount of his own, or his master's claims to surdeshmookhee, babtee, mokassa, &c., rather according to his power to enforce his demands, than his ability to prove their justice.

The more solid institutions of Sivajee are yet found amongst his native mountains, but the origin of the distribution of revenue in the year 1720 was, in less than 50 years, understood by few



people in the Mahratta country, and is now useful chiefly as an historical record.

With regard to Bajee Rao, when we look to the perplexities, both foreign and domestic, in which he was involved, the confusion which continued to prevail in every branch of the administration is far from surprising. He manifested little disposition towards regular government: many of his countrymen accuse him of avarice, of some regard to the observances of his faith, and of being so entirely a soldier as to neglect every branch of finance and jurisprudence. Their opinions are entitled to full consideration, but will not greatly detract from the superior character of Bajee Rao. If he inherited some of the defects of his caste, he was free from their bigotry, and but slightly tainted with the meaner vices, which render the general character of Bramins, when in power, despicable. The strictures of his countrymen are best answered by his embarrassments and his career. It is true he was inordinately ambitious, and in his last scheme of subjugating the Deccan he completely miscalculated his means; yet he made the best amends for his want of foresight, by receding from the attempt in a creditable manner. Bajee Rao's plans, like those of most men when formed amidst a choice of difficulties, surrounded by faction, intrigues, and danger, did not extend to remote futurity. As a politician, however, in suppressing much domestic opposition, in quickly discerning and promptly counteracting, the designs of Nizam-ool-Moolk, he evinced penetration, talent, and vigour. His enlarged views, in fitly directing the only power at his disposal, might lead us to suppose him capable of the greatest undertaking, but a summary of character must reject speculation. As a predatory leader, his qualities were great; he was brave and eloquent, enterprising and skilful. The period at which he lived, and the circumstances under which he acted, are so very different from those of Sivajee, that a comparison cannot be succinctly drawn. Yet the distinctions are sufficiently obvious, and Bajee Rao, though a better man, must remain a much less distinguished character in history.

Bajee Rao was handsome in his person, and his manner was more that of a frank soldier than of a smooth courtier; when in the field with his troops, he kept up no state, and shared in all





the privations of the meanest horseman. An anecdote illustrative of his character is preserved from the following circumstance. Before Nizam-ool-Moolk had seen Bajee Rao, during the first campaign in which they were opposed to each other, the former desired a famous painter in his service to repair to the army of Bajee Rao, and bring his likeness, taken in whatever attitude he might first see him. The painter executed his task, and, on his return, exhibited the Peishwa mounted, with the head and heel ropes of his horse in his feeding-bag, like that of a common Mahratta, his spear resting on his shoulder, whilst he was rubbing with both his hands some ears of ripened Joowaree, which he was eating as he rode.

Bajee Rao left three sons. Ballajee Bajee Rao, the eldest, succeeded him as Peishwa; his second son was Rugonath Rao, afterwards so well-known to the English; and his third was Jenardin Bawa, who died in early youth. He also left one illegitimate son by a Mahomedan mother, whom he bred a Mussulman, and named Shumsher Buhadur.



# 17

## *From A.D. 1740 to A.D. 1749*

THE ARMY WHICH entered the Carnatic, under the command of Rughoojee Bhonslay, was composed of troops belonging to the raja, the Peishwa, the Pritee Needhee, A.D. 1740 Futih Sing Bhonslay, and various chiefs of less note. The Ghorepurays of Sondoor and Gooty were invited to join, by letters from Shao and the Peishwa; and Moorar Rao, the grand nephew of the famous Suntajee Ghorepuray, and adopted son and heir of Moorar Rao of Gooty, appeared under the national standard for the first time, since the death of his distinguished and ill-requited relation. He demanded his rank as Senaputtee, or commander-in-chief of the Mahratta army, but consented to waive it on obtaining a promise of three districts near the Toongbuddra. According to Mahratta manuscripts, the whole force which entered the Carnatic amounted to 50,000 men. They descended by an unfrequented road, appeared in the rear of Dost Ally, in the neighbourhood of the Damulcherry pass, attacked and slew him, defeated his troops, and took his dewan, Meer Assud, prisoner. They commenced levying contributions all over the province, until bought off by Sufdur Ali, the son and heir of the late nabob, with whom, before retiring, they entered into a secret compact, to return and crush Chunda Sahib, then in possession of Trichinopoly, whose popularity and power had for some time excited the jealousy and apprehension of Sufdur Ali and Meer Assud. No bait could be more alluring to the Mahrattas than Trichinopoly, and the troops only retired 250 miles towards Maharashtra, to prepare for the promised conquest, and lull suspicion of an attack.

Whilst the main body of his army remained encamped on the Sew Gunga, Rughoojee Bhonslay returned to Satara, and endeavoured to prevent Ballajee Bajee Rao's succession as Peishwa,



by proposing Bappoojee Naik of Baramutee, a connection, but an enemy, of the late Peishwa, for the vacant office. Bappoojee Naik was possessed of great wealth, and his enmity to Bajee Rao arose from a very common cause, that of having lent money, which his debtor could not repay. Rughoojee's party used the irritated creditor as their tool, and very large sums were offered to Shao on condition of Bappoojee's being raised to the vacant Peishwaship.

The Pritee Needhee, although adverse to the supremacy of the Peishwa, was yet more inimical to the pretensions of Rughoojee, and as he did not engage in the intrigue, Ballajee Bajee Rao, assisted by his uncle Chimnaje, was at last invested in August 1740. A more serious cause of uneasiness to Ballajee Bajee Rao arose from his being answerable for his father's debts, and Bappoojee Naik enforced his demand with all the importunity and harassing pertinacity which is often exercised by the Mahratta creditor. From this persecution Ballajee was relieved by the influence and credit of his dewan, Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, a service of which the Peishwa ever after retained a grateful recollection.

Rughoojee, on finding his schemes abortive, carried Bappoojee Naik with him towards the Carnatic, and returned to reap the expected harvest at Trichinopoly, accompanied by Sreeput Rao, the Pritee Needhee, and Futih Sing Bhonslay. In regard to the subsequent operations of the Mahrattas in the Carnatic, very little illustrative of what has already been so ably recorded, has fallen within my observation in the Mahratta country. It appears, however, that the Tanjore state, though then agitated by factions, entered into a friendly correspondence with their countrymen, but whether to avert attack, or to afford assistance, is not mentioned. Trichinopoly surrendered 26th March, 1741, and Chunda Sahib was brought a prisoner to Satara, where he remained in custody of an agent of Rughoojee Bhonslay for about seven years, his complete enlargement having been effected in the year 1748. Moorar Rao Ghorepuray was left in command of the fort of Trichinopoly, and a part of his garrison was composed of infantry belonging to the Peishwa. Their expenses were defrayed by Shao; besides which, it was settled that 20,000 rupees of the share of tribute from the province of Arcot should be annually paid to Ballajee Bajee Rao.



On the death of Bajee Rao, the government of Malwa, being considered disposable, was conferred on Azim Oolla Khan; but this appointment proved merely nominal. One of the first acts of the new Peishwa was to forward petitions to Delhi respecting various promises made to his predecessor. These applications were transmitted through Jey Sing and Nizam-ool-Moolk. A supply of ready money was what Ballajee most earnestly craved, and 15 lakhs of rupees, as a free gift, were granted by the emperor. Proposals for an agreement were then drawn up, in the joint names of the Peishwa and Chimnajee Appa, wherein they request that they may receive the government of Malwa; after which they promise to pay their respects personally to the emperor; to prevent every other Mahratta officer from crossing the Nerbuddah; to send a body of 500 horse, under an officer of rank, to remain in attendance on the emperor's person; and to ask no more than the gift of money already bestowed. They agree to send 4,000 horse for service, who will punish refractory zumeendars, as far as their numbers may enable them; and they faithfully promise not to sequester the rent-free lands or jagheers, assigned for charitable or religious purposes. It does not appear that any notice was taken of the application; but

A.D. 1741

Ballajee, whose disposition was naturally conciliatory, was anxious to have the government of Malwa conferred as a right, according to treaty with his father; and with this view, when Nizam-ool-Moolk was marching to the Deccan in order to suppress Nasir Jung's disobedience (a subject to which we shall presently advert), Ballajee paid him a respectful visit near the Nerbuddah, and sent a body of his troops to join him. At this period he sustained a great loss in the death of his uncle, Chimnajee Appa, which happened in the end of January 1741. Eleven days previous to the event, Khundoojee Mankur, under Chimnajee's direction, had reduced Rewadunda, the last place remaining to the Portuguese between Goa and Damaun. Chimnajee Appa, from his successes against a European nation, has a greater reputation amongst the Mahrattas, as an officer, than he perhaps deserved. Impressed, from obvious circumstances, with an idea, which, however true in most instances, it was dangerous for his countrymen to entertain, he believed that the strength of an army lay



in its infantry and guns. To this opinion of the father may probably be traced a prepossession on the part of the son, Sewdasheo Chimnajee Bhow, then a boy ten years old, which, strengthened by other circumstances, may have led to the injudicious conduct of that campaign, which 20 years afterwards terminated so fatally on the plains of Panniput.

On the demise of his uncle, the Peishwa returned from the northern districts, and spent nearly a year in civil arrangements at Poona and Satara. Continuing to manifest the greatest apparent respect for the raja, he obtained from Shao a grant by which the whole of the territory conquered from the Portuguese was conferred on him, and also, with the exception of Guzerat, the exclusive right of collecting the revenues, and of levying contributions north of the Nerbuddah.

At the present conjuncture the authority thus obtained was of considerable importance. We have briefly noticed in the preceding

chapter the rise and progress of Aliverdy Khan in Bengal: the defeat of Moorsheed

Koolee Khan, and the conduct of his dewan, Meer Hubeeb. It appears that, immediately after his master's defeat, Meer Hubeeb had invited Bhaskur Punt, the dewan of Rughoojee Bhonslay, who was left in charge of the government of Berar during his master's absence in the Carnatic, to advance into the province of Kuttack; but Bhaskur Punt, having found it necessary to apply for his master's permission, before an answer could be received, and the troops prepared, Aliverdy Khan had conquered the province, and Meer Hubeeb had submitted to his authority. Another opportunity, however, soon presented itself to Bhaskur Punt of carrying his arms to the eastward; and no sooner had he set out on his expedition, than the Peishwa, eager to establish his power over those territories, for which the authority obtained from the raja was, as usual, assumed as a right, marched, though late in the season, towards Hindostan, and made himself master of Gurrah and Mundelah before the monsoon. He was obliged to encamp on the banks of the Nerbuddah during the rainy season, and probably meditated an expedition into Allahabad, when he was called upon to defend his rights in Malwa, invaded by Dummajee Gaekwar and Baboo Rao Sewdasheo.





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This inroad seems to have been instigated by Rughoojee, merely to obstruct the Peishwa's progress to the eastward; and on Ballajee's arrival in Malwa, the army of Guzerat retired. On this occasion Anund Rao Powar, to whom Bajee Rao never became reconciled after his uniting with Trimbuck Rao Dhabaray, was permitted to pay his respects to Ballajee, and was by him confirmed in possession of Dhar and the surrounding districts—a politic measure, which not only secured Powar in his interests, but opposed a barrier on the western side of Malwa to incursions from Guzerat. Since the Peishwa's arrival at Mundelah, a negotiation had been going on between him and the emperor, through the mediation of the Raja Jey Sing, supported by Nizam-ool-Moolk. The chouth of the imperial territory was promised, and a khillut, more splendid than had ever been conferred on his father, was transmitted to Ballajee. It does not, as may be here remarked, appear that any deed for collecting this general chouth was ever granted by Mohummud Shah; sums of money and convenient assignments were the mode of payment. The object in the pending treaty was, on the part of the Peishwa, to obtain sunnuds for the promised government of Malwa; on that of the court of Delhi, to procrastinate, and to widen the breach between the Peishwa and Rughoojee Bhonslay.

In the meantime Bhaskur Punt had invaded Behar: he was induced to make that province the theatre of his first operations, in the expectation of finding the country drained of troops, owing to an insurrection in Kuttack, which had burst forth in consequence of the tyranny and misconduct of the grand-nephew of Aliverdy Khan, whom he had left as governor of the province. Aliverdy Khan, as Bhaskur Punt had anticipated, returned to Kuttack for the purpose of quelling the disturbance, which, however, he speedily effected; and in the month of April was already on his return march to Moorshedabad, when news was suddenly brought to him that the Mahrattas had entered Behar, emerged from the hills and woods near Ramgurh, turned to the right, and had fallen upon the district of Pacheat, in their usual manner of plundering and extorting.

The Mahratta army consisted of 10,000 or 12,000 horse, and report had swelled their numbers to nearly four times that amount. Aliverdy Khan, although only at the head of 3,000 or



4,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, resolved to oppose them; but the Mahrattas attacked him with great success, surrounded his army, carried off most of his baggage, and reduced him to great distress. Many of his men deserted or were killed; the whole of what remained amounted only to 3,000, but with these he determined rather to die than submit to the severe demands which the Mahrattas would have exacted. Although sorely harassed for several days, he fought his way, and made good his retreat to Cutwa. In one of the first attacks, Meer Hubeeb, who was in the army of Aliverdy Khan, having been made prisoner, joined the Mahrattas, and exerted himself so much as to gain the confidence of Bhaskur Punt. That officer proposed retiring for the rains, which Meer Hubeeb opposed; but as Bhaskur Punt could not at first be persuaded to remain, Meer Hubeeb requested command of a detachment, with which he marched to Moorshedabad, rescued his brother, who resided in the city, plundered the banking-house of Juggut Sett Alumchund of the enormous sum of two millions and a half sterling, overtook Bhaskur Punt, and at length succeeded in convincing him that it was better to remain in Bengal, and that it would be preposterous to quit so rich a harvest as he might expect to reap. Accordingly he wheeled about, and, through the aid of Meer Hubeeb, obtained possession of the town of Hooghly by stratagem. Most of the places from Cutwa to the neighbourhood of Midnapoor fell into his hands, and the swelling of the Hooghly alone prevented the Mahrattas from entering the district of Moorshedabad. Whilst affairs were in this state, an officer from the imperial court arrived on the frontiers of the province of Bengal to demand the arrears of tribute due by the nabob. Aliverdy Khan represented his situation and the impossibility of satisfying these just demands, until he could expel the Mahrattas; he at the same time earnestly solicited a reinforcement. Aliverdy Khan likewise applied to the Peishwa, and with a view of inducing him to invade Rughoojee Bhonslay's districts in Berar, despatched a considerable sum as a subsidy for that purpose: the convoy, however, was cut off by the order or connivance of Sufdur Jung, the governor of Oude.

But whilst thus negotiating for every succour he could devise, Aliverdy Khan wisely placed his chief dependence on his own



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exertions; he assembled every man he could command, and made vigorous preparations for attacking Bhaskur Punt's camp at Cutwa, as soon as the season should permit. Before the rivers had fallen, he prepared a bridge of boats, which, in the night, he threw first across the Hooghly, and then over the Adjee, which enabled him to gain the opposite bank; although, in consequence of a break in the fastening which had laced the boats together, 1,500 men were plunged into the Adjee, and totally lost before the accident was discovered. The Mahrattas, by whom this attempt was quite unexpected, did not oppose the nabob, but fled eastward, until they had misled their pursuers in the hills and jungles of Behar, when they again re-entered the district of Midnapoor. But Aliverdy Khan soon recovered their track, and, with the most active of his troops, continued to pursue them. They seldom turned except to skirmish, and having lost all confidence, in consequence of an indecisive action which took place at Ballasore, they fled from Bengal, and returned through the province of Orissa to Berar. Rughoojee Bhonslay had arrived with his army from the Carnatic some time before his fugitive dewan appeared, and, having resolved to support his pretensions in Bengal, advanced towards the province by the same route as that by which Bhaskur Punt had entered.

In the meantime, the emperor, on being apprized of the irruption into Bengal, ordered Sufdur Jung, nabob of Oude, to drive out Bhaskur Punt; and, at the same time, applied to Ballajee Bajee Rao to afford his aid. As inducements to the Peishwa, an assignment on Aliverdy Khan, for the arrears of chouth due from Azimabad, was sent to him by the emperor, and an assurance of confirming him in the government of Malwa.

The reward was prized too highly, and the service was too desirable to be refused. Having quitted Malwa, the Peishwa proceeded through the province of Allahabad, and marched straight on Boglipoor. In order to prevent injury to the country, he avoided high roads in the neighbourhood of cultivation, but, to the great alarm of the timid inhabitants, who were in terror of an army even of Mahratta friends, he arrived  
 A.D. 1743 at Moorshedabad. Rughoojee Bhonslay, with a powerful army, was advancing as an enemy from the eastward, and as Ballajee well knew that princes are



most liberal at such seasons, he pressed the settlement of accounts with Aliverdy Khan before he would take the field. Payment being promised, Rughoojee, who had by that time arrived between Cutwa and Burdwan, decamped as soon as he heard that a settlement had taken place, and retreated towards the hills. Aliverdy Khan instantly marched in pursuit; but Ballajee, who intended to act according to his agreement, seemed to have a poor opinion of the nabob's ability to pursue Mahrattas. He therefore took another road, soon passed the Bengal troops, and in a few days overtook, attacked and defeated Rughoojee's army. Bhaskur Punt, who was at the head of a party in reserve, immediately retreated through Orissa; but Ballajee Rao, after his victory, returned to Malwa, in order to secure the long-promised government.

The conduct of the Peishwa in the late campaign left no reasonable excuse on the part of Mohummud Shah for refusing to perform the engagement; but to save the credit of the imperial name, the feeble palliative of conferring the appointment on the Peishwa, as the deputy of Prince Ahmud, the emperor's son, was adopted at the suggestion of Jey Sing and Nizam-ool-Moolk, through whom the transaction was concluded.

The rest of the treaty differs little from the former proposition, made in the joint names of Ballajee and his uncle Chinnajee, as already detailed; but instead of 4,000, Ballajee promised to furnish 12,000 horse, the expense of the additional 8,000 being payable by the emperor.

From the period of Ballajee Rao's accession, the most friendly intercourse subsisted between him and Jey Sing; several written agreements are preserved, containing mutual assurances of alliance and support. Jey Sing was guarantee for the observance of the treaty with Mohummud Shah, and there is another remarkable reservation for the imperial dignity affixed to the treaty in question, by bringing forward Mulhar Rao Holkar, Ranoojee Sindia, and Peelajee Jadow as the securities, who in due form declare that, should the Peishwa recede from his duties, they will quit his service. An absurd pledge for the fulfilment of an agreement from those whose interest lay in dissolving it, and which does not so much prove the consequence to which those commanders had attained, as the state of humiliation to which



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the emperor was reduced. There might be political design mixed with this plan of security, for feeble governments are full of far-fetched artifice; but the imperial court, if it thus projected its own salvation by dissensions among its enemies, did not reflect on their relative situations, nor perceive that Mahratta combination was likely to be ensured, until the Moghul empire was totally subverted.

The Peishwa returned to Satara to pay his respects, and go through the form of producing his accounts of the revenue. These accounts were made out by the Peishwa, as a general in command of a body of the raja's troops; the receipts, disbursements, and balance were set forth; and it is a remarkable fact that, after the rajas of Satara had become perfect ciphers in the Mahratta government, the Peishwa's accounts continued to the last to be made out in the manner described.

But other reasons of great importance required Ballajee's presence at this juncture. Rughoojee Bhonslay, after his defeat,

had sent wukeels to the Peishwa, assuring him  
 A.D. 1744 of his sincere desire of reconciliation, and of  
 his being now fully convinced that the plans of

Bajee Rao were those best suited to his own, and the real interests of the Mahratta nation. He continued the same professions with apparent sincerity, but as he was on full march towards Satara, the Peishwa thought it necessary to be on his guard, particularly as Dummajee Gaekwar was also approaching. The Pritee Needhee had become infirm by sickness, but his mootalik, Yemmajee Sewdeo, was an active, able man, adverse to the Peishwa's supremacy, and, although not leagued with Rughoojee, was intimately connected with the faction of Dhabaray. Under these circumstances, Ballajee Bajee Rao had to make his election between a war with the Mahratta chiefs, or the resignation of Bengal to Rughoojee Bhonslay. The question did not admit of hesitation; he chose the latter; but it being understood that the country north of the Mahanuddee as well as the Nerbuddah was comprehended in his agreement with the emperor, he made a merit of conceding his right of levying tribute to Rughoojee, and a secret compact, in which the raja was used as mediator, was finally concluded.

The object of the contracting parties seemed avowedly to have been not so much an alliance as an agreement to avoid inter-



ference with each other. The raja's authority was in this instance convenient to both. A sunnud was given to the Peishwa, conferring on him his original mokassa; all the jagheers bestowed on himself, or acquired by his father and grandfather; the governments of the Concan and Malwa; and the shares of revenue or tribute from Allahabad, Agra, and Ajimere; three talooks in the district of Patna, 20,000 rupees from the province of Arcot, and a few detached villages in Rughoojee's districts. On the other hand, it was settled that the revenues and contributions from Lucknow, Patna, and Lower Bengal, including Behar, should be collected by Rughoojee Bhonslay. The latter was also vested with the sole authority of levying tribute from the whole territory from Berar to Kuttack.

It was agreed that Dummajee Gaekwar should be obliged to account to the Peishwa for the amount of the contributions he had levied in Malwa, but nothing was urged at this time respecting the large arrears due by Dhabaray to the head of the government. It does not appear that any settlement was concluded, but Dummajee seems to have remained some time in the Deccan, although his presence was much required in Guzerat. The Peishwa's southern and eastern boundaries in Hindostan were well defined by the Nerbuddah, the Soane, and the Ganges; but the sunnud delivered on this occasion authorised him to push his conquests to the northward as far as practicable.

With these domestic arrangements of the Mahrattas, Nizam-ool-Moolk had no interference. We have already mentioned that he quitted Delhi in consequence of the meditated rebellion of his son Nasir Jung. On returning to the Deccan, in the beginning of 1741, Nizam-ool-Moolk used every endeavour to induce his son to submit without coming to hostilities. At last Nasir Jung sent messengers to treat, which so alarmed his partizans, that most of them endeavoured to make the best terms they could. Nizam-ool-Moolk gradually drew them over, continued to use fair words towards his son, until, in an emotion of generosity, Nasir Jung hastily sent back the whole of the park of artillery. This concession might have obtained an unreserved pardon, but as soon as Nizam-ool-Moolk had him in his power, he wished to humble him completely. Nasir Jung, assuming the garb of a fukeer, retired in penitence to Rozu, near Doulutabad, but his



father continued to manifest the same stern behaviour; till at last the young man was so much piqued, that he listened to the suggestions of Futih Yab Khan, one of his companions, by whom he was persuaded that he might still compel his father to submit to any terms.

Nizam-ool-Moolk, according to his custom, had cantoned his troops for the rains, a part at Aurungabad, and the rest at different towns in the neighbourhood. Futih Yab Khan suggested to Nasir Jung that they must first seize some strong fort; and undertook to surprise Molheir, of which Mutuwussil Khan, Nasir Jung's brother-in-law, was governor. Futih Yab Khan succeeded in the enterprize, and Nasir Jung immediately joined him. Nizam-ool-Moolk did not expect this attempt, but made no preparation in consequence. Apprized of his supineness, Futih Yab Khan proposed to surprise him in Aurungabad. Nasir Jung advanced from Molheir with 7,000 horse, reached Doulutabad before intelligence of his march had been received, and had he pushed on, would probably have succeeded in taking his father prisoner. He seems, however, to have been seized with some compunction for the part he was acting, and passed the day in prayer at the shrine of a celebrated saint; whilst Nizam-ool-Moolk, apparently serene, but much alarmed, was calling in his detachments; his gun bullocks were all at a distance grazing, and very few men were in readiness; but he immediately pitched his tents, and moved out from the city. Before next morning, which was the 23rd July, he had a respectable force drawn up, with which he coolly awaited the approach of his son, who advanced at the head of his followers, and was repulsed. Finding his troops giving way, Nasir Jung impetuously charged his father's standard, pushed on towards his elephant, and slew three of his bravest attendants, one after the other. The driver of his own elephant being killed, Nasir Jung sprang into his place; when his brother-in-law, Mutuwussil Khan, approaching him, drew an arrow to the head, which must have transfixed him, had not his son, Heedayet Moideen Khan, who sat on the same elephant, stayed his hand, and saved his uncle's life: at that moment, Syud Lushkur Khan, an officer of experience, who knew Nasir Jung, and the pride as well as the generosity of his disposition, pushed his elephant close by the side of his, saluted him, and respectfully made room on the



seat of his elephant; when, overcome by this act of courtesy, Nasir Jung took the place, and was thus carried prisoner to Aurangabad. Shah Nuwaz Khan, who, as well as Syud Lushkur Khan, was destined to act a conspicuous part in Deccan affairs, had embarked with his friend Nasir Jung in this desperate enterprize, stood by him to the last, and must have been cut down, but one of his friends in the army of Nizam-ool-Moolk, after Nasir Jung was taken, opening a way by which he might escape, called to him to desist and save himself. He followed this advice, and to the concealment and obscurity in which he was for seven years obliged to live, Indian history is indebted for his valuable biography, the Muasir-ool-Oomrah.

Nizam-ool-Moolk was exceedingly gratified by his son's preservation, but he threw many of his adherents into confinement, and to mark his sense of Nasir Jung's rebellion, imprisoned him for a short time in the fort of Kandhar, near Nandere, but relieved him before proceeding on an expedition to the southward: his motives for that undertaking we shall now explain.

Whilst the affairs of Bengal occupied the Mahrattas, the attention of Nizam-ool-Moolk was directed to the Carnatic, and in his protracted absence from the Deccan may be perceived the reason of his conciliatory conduct to Ballajee Rao, in aiding his pretensions to the government of Malwa. The murder of Sufdur Ali, nabob of Arcot, by his brother-in-law, Mortiza Khan, in 1742; and the general confusion existing in the Moghul territories south of the Kistna, presented a favourable opportunity for Nizam-ool-Moolk's interference, to establish his power, and to restore tranquillity to the country. He accordingly marched from Hyderabad at the head of an immense army in January 1743, and upwards of a year was spent in concluding the arrangements he had contemplated. To obtain possession Trichinopoly was an object of importance, but as matters stood with the Mahrattas, as the acquisition was much prized by them, it must have been an affair of some political management. The family of Ghorepuray, however, was never firmly united with their countrymen after the murder of Suntajee; it is true they would rather have joined the Mahrattas, but superior advantages, and the chance of plunder, would induce them to fight on the side of Moghuls or Europeans. Moorar Rao was recognized as chief of Gooty by



FROM A.D. 1740 TO A.D. 1749

Nizam-ool-Moolk, and evacuated the Carnatic with all his troops in August 1743.

The Mahratta armies which assembled at Satara in the beginning of 1744 were probably contemplated with some anxiety by Nizam-ool-Moolk, whose march was soon directed towards Hyderabad, having left Anwar-ud-deen Khan, at his own request, in charge of the government of the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut, and appointed his own grandson, Heedayet Moideen Khan, better known by his title of Muzuffir Jung, to the Carnatic Bala Ghaut (or Carnatic proper), conferring on him the district of Adonee in jagheer, and fixing his head station at Beejapoor, whilst that of Anwar-ud-deen continued, as in the time of Daood Khan and the Newayetch Nabobs, at the long-established capital of Arcot. Nizam-ool-Moolk, finding he had nothing to apprehend from the Mahrattas, directed his attention to affairs of internal government, and reduced several forts, the killidars of which were in rebellion.

The Mahrattas were too much occupied in their own schemes to think of taking advantage of the Nizam's absence. Rughoojee Bhonslay was intent on recovering his lost footing in Bengal, and the Peishwa, in order to excuse himself to the emperor for not acting against Rughoojee, remained in the Deccan. Rughoojee had returned to Berar in the rains, but as soon as the season opened, Bhaskur Punt, Alee Kurawul, and several officers of note, supported by 20,000 horse, were sent into Bengal by the route of Orissa. Aliverdy Khan prepared his troops, but, on pretence of coming to an agreement, opened a negotiation with Bhaskur Punt, invited him to a *ziafut*, or entertainment, with 20 of his principal officers, and most treacherously murdered them. One Surdar, named Rughoojee Gaekwar, who remained in charge of the camp, was the only one out of 22 principal officers who escaped this perfidious massacre: he conducted the retreat of the army to Berar by the same route they had come, but many of the Mahratta stragglers were cut off by the exasperated peasantry.

An opportunity, however, soon occurred of renewing the incursions. An insurrection against Aliverdy Khan's government by the Afghans in his service obliged him to leave Orissa, in some degree, exposed, and in charge of a Hindoo governor.



Rughoojee Bhonslay, apprized of the state of the province by certain Gosaeens whom he entertained as spies, invaded Orissa, obtained possession of several districts and demanded 30 millions of rupees as the price at which he would spare the remainder, and quit the country. Aliverdy Khan contrived to amuse him until he had suppressed the rebellion, when he sent a vaunting message to Rughoojee, which put an end to all negotiation. After the rains hostilities commenced, but ceased for a time, after a partial defeat of the Mahrattas at Cutwa, Rughoojee being obliged to return to his own territories, in consequence of a disputed succession to the principality of Deogurh, in Gondwaneh, where the sons of a raja named Bukht Boolund, converted by Aurungzebe to Mahomedanism, had quarrelled, and one of them, named Wullee Shah, not only confined his two brothers, Akbar Shah and Boorhan Shah, but, on being assisted by Neelkunt Shah, another Hindoo renegade, raja of Chandah, Wullee Shah refused to pay either chouth or surdeshmookhee to the Mahrattas. Akbar Shah was desirous of obtaining assistance from the Nizam, but Boorhan Shah courted the Mahrattas.

The insurrection of Wullee Shah and Neelkunt Shah ended in the subjugation of their territory. Deogurh and Chandah were both annexed to the possessions of Rughoojee, but Ruttunpoor was assigned to Boorhan Shah, the brother of Wullee Shah, with an income for his support, and his posterity still reside at the Court of Nagpoor in the enjoyment of a part of it. Akbar Shah died a pensioner of the Nizam's government.

Shortly after Rughoojee had entered Bengal, during the Afghan insurrection, Ballajee Bajee Rao arrived at Belsha, in Malwa, from which place he addressed letters to the emperor, full of assurances of perpetual fidelity, but excusing himself from paying his respects in the royal presence. He expressed surprise at Aliverdy Khan's inactivity in not repulsing Rughoojee, which the emperor in his reply accounts for by charging Ballajee with not having stopped the ghauts in Rughoojee's rear as preconcerted. But the agreement which had taken place with Rughoojee precluded all interference; the Peishwa evaded the discussion, and on pretence of business in the Deccan, after making his annual collections, speedily returned to Poona.

A.D. 1745



FROM A.D. 1740 TO A.D. 1749

In the following year he sent his cousin, Sewdasheo Chimnajee Bhow, accompanied by Sukaram Bappoo, the carcoon of Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, on an expedition into the Carnatic, to punish some of the deshmookhs, who had driven out the thannas of the Peishwa's old creditor, Bappoojee Naik Barramutteekur. That person, by the interest of Rughoojee Bhonslay, had obtained the chouth and surdeshmookhee between the Kistna and Toongbuddra, in farm, from the raja, for the annual sum of seven lakhs of rupees; but the opposition he experienced, and the heavy charges for maintaining the troops, totally ruined him in a few years. The expense of the present expedition, which he was compelled to defray, added to his embarrassments, but he would not consent to relinquish the contract in favour of the Bhow, as was proposed to him. Sewdasheo Chimnajee levied contributions as far as Toongbuddra, and reduced the fort of Bhadur Benda, to which the Mahrattas had a claim of long standing. On Sewdasheo Chimnajee's return from this expedition, he was invested by the raja with the same rank as had been enjoyed by his father, and being ambitious, and bolder than his cousin the Peishwa, he began to assume considerable power. He chose as his carcoons Wasdeo Joshee and Rughoonath Huree, two able men who had been brought up under Kanhojee Angria. The

A.D. 1747 Peishwa himself concluded a new and more specific agreement with the rajas of Bundelcund, by which, after deducting the district of Ryhlee, which had been wholly ceded to the late Peishwa, one-third of the territory, estimated at 16½ lakhs of rupees, was made over to Ballajee Rao, besides a like share from the profits of the diamond mines of Pannah.

The Peishwa, during this period of comparative tranquillity in the Deccan, gave encouragement to agriculture, protected the villagers and grain merchants, and improvement was everywhere visible. But events occurred about this time in Hindostan, the Deccan, and Carnatic which were the forerunners of fresh troubles, and great revolutions in every part of India.

The season of 1747-48 is memorable in Hindostan by its being the period of the first invasion of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, king of the Afghans, who are distinguished in India by the various



appellations of Dooranee, Abdallee, and Giljya. Ahmed Abdallee, the person who was now their acknowledged sovereign, was son of a chief of a tribe of Afghans, named Abdallee, settled in the province of Herat, when it was conquered by Nadir Shah. Ahmed, from being the prisoner, became a military follower of Nadir, and was gradually promoted to considerable rank. On the assassination of Nadir Shah, Ahmed left the Persian army with the whole of his tribe, who were in camp, and, retiring to Herat, which he occupied, was soon acknowledged as king by the whole Afghan nation, and now possessed the eastern half of the dominions of Nadir Shah.

One of the nephews of Kummur-ud-deen Khan, the vizier, who had taken charge of the governments of Mooltan and Lahore, in prejudice to his elder brother, was advised by a treacherous Moghul, named Adina Beg Khan, to unite his fortunes with the rising Ahmed Shah Abdallee—an advice which he had no sooner begun to put in practice, than Adina Beg informed his uncle of the circumstance, and the nephew, ashamed of his conduct, returned to his allegiance; but the traitor, Adina Beg, had already gone so far in the negotiation with Ahmed Shah, that the latter was not to be interrupted in his progress; his troops advanced, and he obtained possession of Mooltan and Lahore, almost without resistance, and proceeded

towards Delhi. He was, however, at this time  
*A.D. 1748* successfully opposed by the Moghul army, sent forward by the emperor, under his son, Prince Ahmed, and the Afghan army retreated towards Cabul. On this service, Kummur-ud-deen Khan, the vizier, having been killed, his son, Meer Munnoo, received the governments of Mooltan and Lahore, and set out to take charge of those provinces. Prince Ahmed returned towards Delhi, but, before he reached the capital, the emperor had breathed his last. On the prince's accession to the throne, by the title of Ahmed Shah, in the end of April, he bestowed the office of vizier on Sufdur Jung, nabob of Oude. He had offered the viziiership to Nizam-ool-Moolk, but he excused himself on account of his great age, and only survived Mohummud Shah a very short time, having died at Burhanpoor in his 104th year, on the 19th June 1748.

Nizam-ool-Moolk left six sons, namely, Ghazee-ud-deen, Nasir Jung, Sulabut Jung, Nizam Ally, Mohummud Shureef, and Meer



FROM A.D. 1740 TO A.D. 1749

Moghul. The two first were of the same mother, all the others were of different mothers. Ghazee-ud-deen being at Delhi, where he held the rank of Umeer-ool-Oomrah at the time of his father's death, Nasir Jung assumed the government.

A few months after the death of Nizam-ool-Moolk, the emperor wrote a letter with his own hand, inviting Nasir Jung in a very pressing manner to come to court, and the latter had arrived at the Nerbuddah, when the invitation, for some reason not satisfactorily explained, was withdrawn. The circumstance appeared at the time fortunate to

A.D. 1749

Nasir Jung, as news of an alarming nature had just reached him of a rebellion, headed by his nephew Muzuffir Jung, and aided by Chunda Sahib, with a body of French troops. Very shortly afterwards intelligence was received of the defeat and death of Anwar-ud-deen, governor of the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut, at the battle of Ambour, on which Nasir Jung applied to Rughoojee Bhonslay for a body of his troops, promising to grant some cessions of territory as the reward of their service. He also summoned the whole of the Moghul dependents and tributaries in the Carnatic to be prepared to join his army, as he advanced to the southward. Moorar Rao Ghorepuray, as jagheerdar of Gooty, the raja of Mysore, the nabobs of Kurpa, Kurnoul, and Savanoor, and Mohummud Ally, second son of the late Anwar-ud-deen, with his supporters, the president and council of the English settlement at Madras, were the principal authorities who joined, or sent their troops to accompany Nasir Jung.

The Deccan, thus completely drained of troops, presented an inviting field to the Peishwa, but domestic arrangements of the utmost importance demanded his presence at Satara. The raja Shao had, for some years, been in a state of mental imbecility, brought on, it is said, in consequence of the death of his youngest wife, Sagoona Bye Mohitey; but as his health declined, he recovered the use of his intellect, and the dependents of the Peishwa about his person urged him to adopt a son. The raja, on the loss of his only child, some time before derangement, had declared, contrary to all his former invectives against him, that he would adopt Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapoor, provided he had issue; but as this was not the case, it was now proposed that



he should institute an inquiry for some of the lineal descendants of Wittoojee, the brother of Mallojee, and uncle of Shahjee. Search was accordingly made, but none were discovered; and it was then suggested to receive the son of some respectable sillidar of that Patell family, of which there were a great number. This proposal, however, Shao said he had a strong reason for declining, and at last told Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree and Govind Rao Chitnees that Tara Bye, who was still alive, and residing in Satara, had somewhere concealed her grandson Rama, the son of the second Sivajee, who was born in 1712, after the death of his father. It is not known by what means Shao became possessed of this secret; and the subject, intricate in itself, has been so studiously involved in mystery as to excite a suspicion that the Peishwa was convinced of the legitimacy of Ram Raja, and found it necessary, for the purpose of rendering him insignificant, to invent, or at least to connive at, the insinuation that the whole was a trick of state. Tara Bye, on hearing of the intended adoption of Sumbhajee of Kolapoor, was heard to say—"I will prevent that;" and, on being now closely questioned and encouraged, declared the existence of her grandson. The eldest surviving wife of Shao, Suckwar Bye Sirkay, true to the inherent violence and ambition of her family, on becoming acquainted with this declaration on the part of Tara Bye, which deprived her of all chance of the power she expected, by seeing a minor placed on the throne under her own care, immediately opened a communication with Sumbhajee, inciting him to oppose the pretensions of the alleged grandson of Tara Bye, whom she declared an impostor. She promised to aid Sumbhajee with her utmost means; she engaged Yemmajee Sewdeo in her cause; and Jagjeewun, the younger brother of Sreeput Rao, who had been appointed Pritee Needhee on the death of the latter in 1747, also promised her all the support in his power. Dummajee Gaekwar gave his assent to the proposal, and emissaries were despatched into the Ghaut-Mahta and Concan, a tract ever prone to insurrection, to raise men and be prepared for her purpose. Ballajee Bajee Rao repaired to Satara, with an army of 35,000 men; but so cautious was he of committing any act which might outrage the Mahratta feeling, already jealous of Bramin power, that he did not attempt to separate Suckwar Bye from her



husband, or to impose any restraint likely to arouse the active enmity of her relations. But although he knew the extent of her plots, and was also aware that Suckwar Bye had a plan to assassinate him, he was at the same time suspicious of Tara Bye; and the known enmity of the latter to Ballajee Bajee Rao is indeed the principal evidence of the truth of her extraordinary story. The pregnancy of Bhowanee Bye, the wife of the second Sivajee, was strongly suspected by Rajis Bye, the younger wife of Raja Ram, at the time of Sivajee's death, and it required all the care and circumspection of Tara Bye to preserve the infant from destruction. She, however, found means to convey the child from the fort of Panalla, and having given him in charge to the sister of Bhowanee Bye, he was carried to Tooljapoor, and thence to Barsee, where he was reared in obscurity.

The Peishwa was at a loss what to do, and during three months spent at Satara before the raja's death, he was alternately swayed by ambition and apprehension: he sometimes thought of at once asserting his supremacy, by setting aside the raja entirely, but on the whole he considered it most expedient to support the assertion of Tara Bye; yet, although he was scrupulous in every outward form of respect towards the prince whom he acknowledged, he was not afterwards desirous of suppressing a current report at Poona, already alluded to, of the whole being fictitious. When the power of the Peishwa was complete, and the end answered, such a pageant as the raja was, in some respects, inconvenient to the usurper, and to countenance a belief of the imposture was the first step to his being wholly set aside; but the voice of the country was too strong, and an heir of the house of Sivajee would have been joined by thousands in the tract where that chieftain first established himself.

Suckwar Bye, in order to conceal her plot, always gave out that, in the event of Shao's death, she would burn with the corpse; this declaration proved her ruin, for the wily Bramin affected to believe it; and took care to circulate the report, until it became so general that its non-fulfilment would, in the eyes of the whole country, have become a reflection on the honor of her family.

Although Suckwar Bye seldom quitted the raja, and kept him constantly surrounded by persons in her interest, Ballajee found



means to obtain a private interview, at which he induced the raja to give him a deed, empowering the Peishwa to manage the whole government of the Mahratta empire, on condition of his perpetuating the raja's name, and keeping up the dignity of the house of Sivajee, through the grandson of Tara Bye, and his descendants. This paper also directed that the Kolapoor state should always be considered an independent sovereignty; that the jagheers, as now existing, were to be confirmed to the holders leaving power with the Peishwa to conclude such arrangements with the jagheerdars as might be beneficial for extending Hindoo power: for protecting the temples of the gods, the cultivators of the fields, and whatsoever was sacred or useful.

The raja had scarcely ceased to breathe when a body of horse galloped into the town of Satara, surrounded and seized the Pritee Needhee, and his mootaliq, Yemmajee Sewdeo; placed them in irons on the instant, and sent them off, strongly escorted, to distant hill forts. Every avenue about the town was occupied by troops, and a garrison of the Peishwa's was placed in the fort, whilst a party was detached to reinforce the escort of Ram Raja, who had not arrived when Shao died.

Suckwar Bye had not recovered from the first emotions of consternation and rage, at finding her whole plans unmasked and defeated, when the Peishwa sent her an insidious message, "begging that she would not think of burning with the corpse of her husband, for that he and all her servants were ready to obey her commands;" and not content with working on the mind of an angry woman to incite her to self-destruction, he sent for her brother, Koarjee Sirkay, represented the dishonor that threatened to attach to his house, and promised him a jagheer in the Concan, on condition of persuading his sister to immolate herself, "not only for the honor of the family of Sirkay, but for that of all India under the sway of the late raja." By such arts Ballajee Bajee Rao secured his victim. But let not the reader suppose that those of his own countrymen, who know the secret history of this base transaction, and whose minds have not been perverted by the calm villainy of a Bramin court, attempt to palliate it, as a sacrifice in conformity with their faith; on the contrary, they mention it with much detestation, and say that even the ordinary mode of execution would have been far more manly and far less objectionable.



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## From A.D. 1750 to A.D. 1754

PREVIOUSLY TO SHAO'S demise, orders in his name had been sent to Yeswunt Rao Dhabaray and Rughoojee Bhonslay, requiring their presence at Satara. The former had become totally imbecile from habits of debauchery, and, as had probably been foreseen, neither Dhabaray, nor A.D. 1750 Dummajee Gaekwar, the commander of his army, attended. Most of the other jagheerdars, were present, but if any were disposed to resist the Peishwa's authority, they remained passive, until they should see what part Rughoojee Bhonslay would assume. But Rughoojee's ambition was now controlled by the caution of age, and the admonition of experience. He was not only intent on directing annual incursions into Bengal, but, owing to the absence of his son Janojee, who accompanied Nasir Jung into the Carnatic with 10,000 horse, and to the number of troops which he was compelled to leave in his own territories, he arrived at Satara, in the month of January 1750, with a force only estimated at 12,000 men. His disposition was pacific towards the Peishwa, but he made some demur in acknowledging Ram Raja. He required, in testimony of his being a Bhonslay, and the grandson of Raja Ram, that Tara Bye should first eat with him in presence of the caste, deposing on the food they ate together that Ram Raja was her grandson. On this being complied with in the most solemn manner, Rughoojee declared himself satisfied; and, after a long conference with the Peishwa, he gave his assent to the propriety of the plans submitted for his consideration. As a proof of the good understanding which subsisted between them, Ballajee took occasion to proceed in advance to Poona, leaving the raja in Rughoojee's charge, and requesting that he would accompany him to Pooná, with the whole of the jagheerdars, for the purpose of concluding the arrangements made by the will of



the late raja. From this period Poona may be considered the capital of the Mahrattas. Ballajee, in the success of his schemes, almost overlooked Tara Bye; but, although upwards of 70 years of age, she soon convinced him that it was dangerous to slight a woman of her spirit. On pretence of paying her devotions at the tomb erected over her husband's ashes, in the fort of Singurh, she went there, and endeavoured to persuade the Punt Suchew to declare for her as head of the Mahratta empire. Ballajee, after much persuasion, induced her to come to Poona, and having flattered her ambition with the hope of having a large share in the administration, at last obtained her influence with Ram Raja in confirming the many schemes he had now to carry into effect.

Rughoojee Bhonslay received new sunnuds for Berar, Gondwanah, and Bengal; and some jagheer lands which had belonged to the Pritee Needhee, adjoining Berar, were transferred to him. The sunnuds for half of Guzerat were sent to Yeswunt Rao Dhabaray, which, as he had never yet accounted for a share of the revenue to the state, gave Dummajee Gaekwar to understand what he might expect from the increasing power of the Peishwa. Ranoojee Sindia died about this period, and his eldest son, Jyapa, was confirmed in his jagheer. The whole of Malwa, estimated at about 150 lakhs of rupees of annual revenue, was, with the exception of about 10 lakhs, divided between Holkar and Sindia—that is, 74½ lakhs were conferred on the former, and 65½ lakhs on the latter. The remaining 10 lakhs were held by various jagheerdars, of whom Anund Rao Powar was the most considerable: all of them were subservient to the views of the Peishwa, and from them he had to apprehend no opposition.

Ballajee Rao, without intending to employ them, confirmed the eight Purdhans, and for a short time nominated Gungadhur Sree Newass as Pritee Needhee; but, on the application of Rughoojee Bhonslay and of some other jagheerdars, when about to return to their respective districts, he made them a promise to release Jugjeewun Pureshram, and did accordingly restore him to his rank and liberty. But as the raja's establishment was to be much reduced, and it was necessary to secure in his interests such of his officers as he could not employ, the Peishwa reserved a great part of the Pritee Needhee's lands as jagheers and assignments to the persons in question, particularly the tract west



of Kurar, between the Oormooree and the Wana, where he apprehended an insurrection supported by the raja of Kolapoor.

Futih Sing Bhonslay, the adopted son of Shao, was confirmed in the possession of his jagheer in various minor claims on shares of revenue, and in the title of raja of Akulkote, which, except the detached claims alluded to, are still enjoyed by his descendants. An appointment created by Shao for a relation of the Muntree, and which was termed *Ajahut Surdeshmookh*, or general agent for collecting the surdeshmookhee, was nominally preserved; but jagheer lands were assigned in lieu of the right of interference, in the collections of the ten per cent, on the six Soobehs of the Deccan.

The appointment of Sur Lushkur was taken from the family of Somwoushee, and given to Nimbajee Naik Nimbalkur. All these changes and appointments were made in the name of the raja, but it was now well understood that the Peishwa's authority was supreme in the state, and generally admitted without dissatisfaction.

But Yemmajee Sewdeo, who recovered his liberty at the same time with the Pritee Needhee, threw himself into the fort of Sangola, near Punderpoor, where he raised an insurrection, and made head against the Peishwa, until suppressed by Sewdasheo Chimnajee Bhow.

The Peishwa, in the measures which have been detailed, owed much of his success to his dewan, Mahadajee Punt, who, next to his cousin Sewdasheo Rao, possessed greater influence over Ballajee Bajee Rao than any other person. Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, on his expedition to Sangola, was accompanied by Ram Raja, for the purpose of giving Yemmajee Sewdeo no excuse for resistance; and, during their stay at that place, the raja agreed to renounce the entire power, and to lend his sanction to whatever measures the Peishwa might pursue, provided a small tract around Satara was assigned to his own management—conditions to which Ballajee Rao subscribed, but they were never fulfilled. The raja, under a strong escort, returned from Sangola to Satara, when an extraordinary difference arose between the Peishwa and his cousin Sewdasheo Rao, which had well-nigh overturned the whole of the plan which Ballajee Rao had been labouring to establish.



Sewdasheo Rao had at this time connected himself with Ramchundur Baba Shenwee, a person to whom, although his conduct was extremely exceptionable, especially in the manner by which he obtained power, the Mahratta country is much indebted. This person, originally known by the name of Ramchundur Mulhar, was koolkurnee of the village of Aroolee subject to the Sawunts of Waree, from whose power he was obliged to flee as a defaulter in the revenues of his village. He came to Satara, where he was taken into the service of Kucheswur Baba Uteekur, and by him recommended to Bajee Rao, under whom he distinguished himself, both as a soldier and a man of business. Bajee Rao appointed him dewan to Ranoojee Sindia, and it partly accounts for Ranoojee's proverbial poverty that Ramchundur made a large fortune. At Ranoojee's death he bribed Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, in hopes of being continued, by his interest, as the dewan of Jyapa; but as Jyapa disliked him, and Mulhar Rao Holkar opposed the arrangement, the Peishwa removed him from the situation. This circumstance, trifling as it appears, was the seed from which sprung much mischief. It was the foundation of enmity between Holkar and the Bhow, and between Ramchundur and the Peishwa. Sewdasheo Rao appointed Ramchundur his own dewan, and at his suggestion applied to the Peishwa for the same share of authority as had been held by his father, Chimnaje Appa. Ballajee refused, as it must occasion the supersession of Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, to whom he owed innumerable obligations; on which Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, after his expedition to Sangola, made overtures to the Kolapoor raja, was appointed his Peishwa, and obtained the cession of three forts—Pargurh, Kullandhee, and Chundgurhee—together with a jagheer of 5,000 rupees a year. A war was prevented by the admirable conduct of Mahadajee Punt, who voluntarily resigned his situation, and Sewdasheo Rao, quitting his Peishwaship at Kolapoor, returned as prime minister to Poona.

The arrangements before and consequent to the raja's death had, as already adverted to, prevented the Mahrattas, from seizing an opportunity of enlarging their conquests in the Deccan, afforded by the absence of so great an army in the Carnatic. A negotiation with Ballajee Rao had been opened by Ghazee-ud-



deen, the eldest son of Nizam-ool-Moolk, through Mulhar Rao Holkar. The Peishwa agreed to support his pretensions, and wrote to the emperor, Ahmed Shah, requesting that Ghazee-ud-deen might be appointed viceroys, assigning as a reason that the whole Deccan, from the absence of the army and the disorders in the Carnatic, would soon be overrun by independent plunderers. In the meantime the Peishwa, having prepared his troops, moved towards Aurangabad; but, before quitting Poona, he prevailed on the Punt Suchew to give him the fort of Singurh in exchange for Toong and Tikona; and in order to soothe the Tara Bye, whose great age had not rendered her less active and intriguing, he incautiously removed his own troops from the fort of Satara, and, having placed in it the Gurhkurees and old retainers, who had great respect for the widow of Raja Ram, gave up the entire management to her. The raja was kept with a separate establishment in the town of Satara, but perfectly at large, and a splendid provision was assigned to him and his officers, the expense of which amounted to the annual sum of 65 lakhs of rupees.

About the time that Ballajee Bajee Rao was summoned to Satara on account of Shao's illness, Nasir Jung proceeded on the well-known Carnatic expedition, which ended so disastrously for that prince. Moorar Rao Ghorepuray and some other Mahrattas continued in the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut; but Janojee Bhonslay, Rughoojee's son, left the army, either upon the defeat of Muzuffir Khan, in March 1750, or with Shah Nuwaz Khan, who quitted Sulabut Jung, and repaired to Aurangabad during the siege of Kurnoul, in March 1751. The fall of Nasir Jung was wrought by the intrigues of M. Dupleix. He gained a Bramin, named Ramdass, a native of Sicacole, in the confidence of Nasir Jung, and through him raised seditions in the army, which Dupleix called into operation by an attack on the camp. Nasir Jung was treacherously shot, on the 5th December 1750, by Mohummud Khan, the Patan nabob of Kurpa, one of the conspirators. Nasir Jung was totally destitute of his father's prudence, and, if successful in his fortunes, would probably have sunk into a Mahomedan sensualist; but he was, in some respects, a superior person, and with a better education in a European country, he had many of the qualities to form the gallant knight



and the accomplished gentleman. He possessed bravery and generosity, a taste for poetry and literature, and as he came to an untimely end, his memory is cherished by the Deccan Moghuls, to whom he is known partly by his own writings, but principally from the works of his friend, Meer Gholam Ally of Belgram.

Muzuffir Jung assumed the viceroyalty of the six Soobehs of the Deccan by aid of his allies, the French. The traitor Ramdass, a fit instrument for the unprincipled ambition of Dupleix, was raised to the situation of prime minister, by the title of Raja Rugonath Dass. Nor must we omit to mention Abdool Rehman, the dewan of Monsieur Bussy, better known by his title of Hyder Jung. The father of this man, a defaulter of revenue under the Nizam's government at Mausulipatam, had, on several occasions, when in power, been friendly to the French, and in his distress fled to Pondicherry, where he was protected and treated with much kindness by Dupleix. His son Abdool Rehman, then a boy, soon acquired the French language, was useful to Dupleix in carrying on his intrigues with Ramdass; and, upon the success of them, accompanied Bussy when he marched with Muzuffir Jung: he was soon styled the French dewan, and re-

ceived from the new-made nabob the title of  
A.D. 1751 Hyder Jung. But the Patan nabobs, dissatisfied at not receiving all they had expected by the death of his predecessor, conspired against Muzuffir Jung, who, although victorious, fell in action in the end of January 1751. Sulabut Jung, the third son of Nizam-ool-Moolk, was chosen to succeed him.

Ballajee Bajee Rao, on the plea of requiring money to assist his ally, Ghazee-ud-deen, demanded a contribution from Syud Lushkur, then governor of Aurungabad, the secret friend of Ghazee-ud-deen, which, on pretence of coercion, Syud Lushkur Khan levied to the amount of 15 lakhs of rupees. On obtaining this supply, the Peishwa proceeded to the banks of the Kistna, in order to oppose Sulabut Jung, who, attended by the French corps under Monsieur Bussy, was advancing towards Hyderabad. The armies had scarcely come in sight of each other, when news from Satara, of an alarming nature, was received by the Peishwa, in consequence of which he closed with the first overtures made by Sulabut Jung, and returned to the westward with the utmost expedition.



Tara Bye, when the Peishwa departed to Aurungabad, sound-  
ed Ram Raja, in regard to his assuming the control usurped by  
his servant Ballajee Rao; but not finding him fit for her purpose,  
she pretended to have had no serious intentions in the proposal,  
but despatched messengers to Dummajee Gaekwar, representing  
the unprotected state of the country, and recommending his  
immediate march to Satara, to rescue the raja and the Mahratta  
state from the power of the Bramins. This request was imme-  
diately acceded to; and Tara Bye, as soon as certain accounts  
were received of Gaekwar's approach, invited the raja into the  
fort of Satara, and made him prisoner. She then reproached him  
with his want of spirit; regretted that "she had ever rescued  
him from a life of obscurity, for which only he could have been  
destined; declared that he could not be her grandson, or the  
descendant of the great Sivajee; that he was neither a Bhonslay  
nor a Mohitey, but a base-born Gonedulee, changed in the  
house where he had been first conveyed; that she would make  
atonement on the banks of the holy Kistna for ever having  
acknowledged him." She ordered the havildar to fire upon his  
attendants, most of whom, unconscious of what had happened,  
remained near the gate of the fort; and she directed the guns to  
be pointed at the houses in the town below, belonging to the  
partizans of the Concanee Bramins. Trimbuck Punt, commonly  
called Nana Poorundhuree, Govind Rao Chitnees, and the  
officers in the Peishwa's interests at Satara, were at first disposed  
to ridicule this attempt as that of a mad old woman; but on  
hearing of the approach of Dummajee Gaekwar from Sonegurh,  
they quitted the town, and assembled troops at the village of  
Arla, on the banks of the Kistna. On the advance of Gaekwar by  
the Salpee Ghaut, although they had 20,000, and their opponent  
only 15,000 men, they made an irresolute attack, and retired to  
Neemb, where they were next day followed up, attacked, and  
defeated by the Guzerat troops. Dummajee Gaekwar immediately  
went to pay his respects to Tara Bye; and several forts in the  
neighbourhood were given up to her. Satara was well stored  
with provisions, and the Pritee Needhee promised to aid her  
cause. It was the intelligence of these proceedings which recalled  
the Peishwa; but before he returned, Nana Poorundhuree had  
redeemed his lost credit, by attacking and compelling the army



of Dummajee Gaekwar to retire to Jore Khora, where they expected to be joined by the Pritee Needhee from Kurar, and by troops from Guzerat. In this hope, however, they were disappointed; and as Shunkrajee Punt, soobehdar of the Concan, was assembling troops in their rear, whilst the Peishwa's army, which had marched nearly 400 miles in 13 days, was close upon them, Dummajee sent a messenger to treat with Ballajee, who solemnly agreed to abide by the terms proposed, and enticed him to encamp in his neighbourhood, where, as soon as he got him into his power, he demanded the payment of all the arrears due from Guzerat, and the cession of a large portion of his territory. Dummajee represented that he was but the mootaliq of Dhabaray, the Senaputtee, and had no authority for complying with what was required. On this reply the Peishwa sent private orders to seize some of the family of Gaekwar and of Dhabaray residing at Tullygaom, and imprison them in the hill fort of Logurh; whilst, at a set time, he treacherously surrounded, attacked, and plundered the camp of Dummajee Gaekwar, and sent him into confinement in the city of Poona. The Peishwa next tried to induce Tara Bye to give up the fort and the raja; but, having assembled her garrison, she required an oath from every man that he would stand by her to the last; such of them, however, as chose, were allowed the option of quitting the fort or joining in the solemn asseveration. Some of the Peishwa's troops became impressed with an idea that she was a Deo (or good spirit), and others that she was a Dyt (or evil spirit), but all the Mahrattas were so strongly of opinion that Tara Bye was the rightful regent, that Ballajee found there was more to be apprehended from proceeding to extremities than leaving her unmolested; although her party, to become formidable, only required a leader of reputation. Perplexing as the affair was in the meantime, the conduct of Tara Bye proved in the end advantageous to the Peishwa, as it took from him the odium of being the first to confine the raja to the fort of Satara. Tara Bye did not merely confine him to the fort; his prison, which still exists, was a damp stone dungeon, and his food was of the coarsest grain.

Dummajee Gaekwar was the only person whom the Peishwa dreaded; but as he was a close prisoner at Poona, Ballajee now



proceeded towards Aurangabad, in prosecution of his engagements with Ghazee-ud-deen; and wherever Sulabut Jung's authority was acknowledged, he carried on the usual Mahratta plan of contribution or plunder. Monsieur Bussy, who was the principal adviser in directing the movements of the Moghul army, was himself at the head of a battalion of 500 Europeans, and a body of 5,000 disciplined sepoys, and, as the best means of repelling these aggressions, recommended that the war should be carried into the Mahratta country. Sulabut Jung advanced accordingly to Ahmednugur, where he deposited his heavy stores and baggage, whilst Raja Rugonath Dass, his prime minister, opened a communication with Tara Bye, and also with Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapoor. The Peishwa and his officers were not prepared for this unexpected plan of operations, and were proportionally disconcerted on finding their own schemes anticipated. They had intended, by supporting Ghazee-ud-deen or Sulabut Jung, according to circumstances, to weaken both; to conquer the whole Deccan; or to obtain large cessions, which, they foresaw, must at all events be granted to them by the one party or the other. To repel Sulabut Jung they had recourse to the Mahratta system, and with 40,000 horse surrounded and attacked the Moghul army in their usual-desultory manner; but the French artillery, consisting of eight or ten field-pieces, galled them severely, and the Moghuls, supported by this powerful auxiliary, advanced towards Poona, totally destroying every village in their route. The Peishwa, alarmed at their progress, endeavoured to negotiate; and, at the same time, to augment dissension and jealousy, which had already become considerable among Sulabut Jung's officers, in regard to the views of the French. Monsieur Bussy, as the best means of counteracting such schemes, and securing his influence, exerted himself with judgment and energy. On one occasion he planned an attack on the Mahratta camp, and chose the night of the 22nd November, at the moment of an eclipse of the moon, when the Hindoos are employed in devotional exercises. The whole Mahratta army fled before him, and some valuable booty was taken, particularly some gold utensils belonging to the Peishwa. This exploit, although the Mahrattas sustained very little loss, made a great impression, and had, perhaps, more effect in raising the reputa-



tion of Bussy amongst the natives of India, than affairs of moment, where he displayed much ability and decision.

The Mahrattas, although surprised, appeared in the course of the ensuing day as active as ever, but the Moghuls continued to advance, plundered Ranjangaom, and totally destroyed Tullygaom (Dumdairay). At last, on the 27th November, they were attacked by the Mahrattas in the most determined manner, and nothing but the French artillery prevented a total defeat. The Mahrattas on this occasion were led by Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, the late dewan, supported by two of the sons of Ranoojee Sindia, Duttajee and Mahadajee, and Koneir Trimbuck Yekbootee. The last-mentioned person performed feats of valour, obtained the distinguishing appellation of Phakray, or the heroic, and from that day bore a silver bangle on his horse's leg, which, among Mahrattas, implies that the rider is always to conquer or die. This success did not prevent the advance of the Moghuls; but on their arrival at Korygaom, on the Beema, a spot which was afterwards to become so famous to the British arms, Raja Rugonath Dass, in consequence of overtures from the Peishwa, had an interview with Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, and an armistice would have taken place, but news arrived that one of the Mahratta officers had surprised the fort of Trimbuck, which the Peishwa refused to restore, and Sulabut Jung insisted on immediately proceeding to retake it. The Moghul army returned to Ahmednugur to replenish their ammunition, and take on their battering guns. They moved towards Joonere, but the Mahrattas constantly harassed them: accounts of difficulties of the road for transporting their guns, and intelligence of Rughoojee Bhonslay's progress to the eastward, conspired, with other circumstances, to damp the hasty and short-lived ardour of Sulabut Jung. His troops were in arrears, and clamorous for their pay, and the more their services were required, the more urgent they became: many of the principal officers were discontented, and it was at last determined, by Bussy's advice, to close with the Peishwa's overtures. An armistice was concluded, and the army of Sulabut Jung returned towards Hyderabad. But the symptoms of disaffection did not cease. Rugonath Dass, the dewan, was assassinated at Balkee, on the 7th April, in a tumult, apparently created by the soldiery on account of their arrears.

A.D. 1752



FROM A.D. 1750 TO A.D. 1754

But whilst these events were passing in the west, the experi-  
enced Rughoojee, whose operations have been alluded to, was  
 engaged in making those acquisitions which closed his long and  
 active life, with great reputation among his countrymen. His  
 anxiety to return from Poona towards Berar in 1750 was owing to  
 apprehended commotions in his own territory, and to his desire  
 of seizing what he deemed a favourable conjuncture for prosecut-  
 ing his views. His son Janojee, having returned from the army of  
 Nasir Jung, was sent into Kuttack, to support Meer Hubeeb,  
 and invade Bengal. That province had been freed from Mahratta  
 ravages for a whole year, but they now returned with a keener  
 desire to possess themselves of its resources; and Aliverdy Khan,  
 seeing no other relief, ceded the whole of the province of  
 Kuttack, as far north as Ballasore, which was granted in the name  
 of Meer Hubeeb, as the nominal deputy of the nabob of Bengal,  
 but as the real servant of Rughoojee Bhonslay. Meer Hubeeb  
 did not long enjoy the situation thus acquired. Owing to the  
 jealousy of his coadjutor, Janojee, he was, on pretence of having  
 withheld balances of revenue, confined until he should render an  
 account, but unable to brook the disgrace, he rushed out with a  
 few followers upon the guards placed over him, and was cut to  
 pieces. Twelve lakhs of rupees in lieu of further claims was the  
 amount which was settled for the chouth of Bengal and Behar;  
 but the reason of Rughoojee's accepting a sum so inadequate is  
 found in the events which were passing in the Deccan. As soon  
 as the Peishwa and Sulabut Jung went to war, Rughoojee sur-  
 prised and took Gawelgurh and Nurnallah, made himself master  
 of Manikdroog, occupied the districts dependent on these forts,  
 and whilst Sulabut Jung, by Bussy's advice, advanced towards  
Poona, Rughoojee not only laid the whole country between the  
Payeen Gunga and Godavery under contribution, but drove out  
 the Moghul thannas, and established his own.

Before the succeeding events in the Deccan can be explain-  
 ed, it becomes necessary to revert to the eldest son of Nizam-  
ool-Moolk, and to those affairs of the imperial court in which  
 the Mahrattas were engaged. Ghazee-ud-deen Khan, although  
 desirous of proceeding to the Deccan, had been detained at  
Delhi since the death of his father, and it seems probable, from  
 his commencing the negotiation with the Mahrattas, that bribes



may have been employed by his brothers to insure his being kept there. The imperial court, soon after the accession of Ahmed Shah, was subjected to a fresh alarm, by intelligence of the return of Ahmed Shah Abdallee towards Lahore, of which, as well as of the province of Mooltan, Meer Munnoo, son of the late vizier, Kummurud-deen Khan, was governor. Meer Munnoo purchased the forbearance of the Abdallee, by the cession of the revenues of four districts; and this expedient left the vizier, Sufdur Jung, at liberty to follow up certain schemes which he had in progress against the Rohillaes. The growing power and encroachments of these adventurers excited the vizier's particular jealousy, as they threatened to extend themselves over his own territories in the province of Oude. The death of Ali Mohummud Rohillah, which happened a short time before Sufdur Jung's appointment as vizier, had afforded him an opportunity of raising dissensions amongst those who pretended to the succession, and, during the period when Ahmed Shah Abdallee threatened Lahore, civil war raged amongst the Rohillaes. At last, Sadoollah Khan, the third son of Ali Mohummud, by the abilities of Hafiz Rehmut, his guardian, became the successful competitor, and although his two elder brothers, who during the struggle were prisoners amongst the Abdallee, afterwards returned to claim their inheritance, Sadoollah Khan, whilst supported by Hafiz Rehmut, maintained the ascendancy he had gained. But Sufdur Jung, as soon as apprehensions from the Abdallee were tranquillized, marched into Rohilcund, reduced the territory to temporary obedience, and appointed one of his dependents, a Kaeeth, named Newul Raee, to be governor of his new conquests; the Rohillaes, however, soon rose upon Newul Raee, whom they defeated and slew. Sufdur Jung, proceeding to punish their rebellion; was also totally defeated, and therefore called to his aid Mulhar Rao Holkar, Jyapa Sindia, and the Jath prince Sooruj Mulli. With these auxiliaries he soon overran the country of the Rohillaes, forced most of them to seek refuge in the Kumaon hills, and gave up the greater part of their territory as assignments, in lieu of subsidy, to Holkar and Sindia. Whilst Mahratta affairs were in this prosperous state in Hindostan, their capital in the Deccan was, as we have seen, endangered by the advance of Sulabut



FROM A.D. 1750 TO A.D. 1754

Jung, Rughoonath Rao, who had proceeded on an expedition to Surat, was recalled; and Mulhar Rao Holkar received the most pressing letters from the Peishwa to repair to the Deccan, with or without Ghazee-ud-deen. Holkar, then near the Kumaoon hills, immediately on receipt of these letters, moved to the southward, and had crossed the Ganges, when he was informed by the vizier, and by news from Delhi, that peace had been concluded in the Deccan. Upon this intelligence Holkar wrote to the Peishwa, stating his readiness to advance to his aid, but that, in consequence of these reports, he should await further orders. In the meantime, the vizier, Sufdur Jung, was summoned to Delhi, in consequence of another invasion of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, who, on this occasion, made himself master of Mooltan and Lahore, the entire cession of which was conferred upon him by the emperor before Sufdur Jung could reach the capital. Had it not been for this precipitate measure, the vizier would have used every endeavour to expel the Abdallee, and had engaged Holkar and Sindia as auxiliaries by promise of great rewards, the more necessary as they were obliged to withdraw their troops from the lately assigned districts.

On this occasion the Mahrattas, before they evacuated the districts, consistent with their usual policy of making the best bargain they can on both sides, are said to have exacted a bond for 50 lakhs of rupees from the subjugated Rohillahs.

When Sufdur Jung arrived in the neighbourhood of the capital, he heard of the irrevocable concession that had been made to the Abdallee, and was therefore at a loss how to employ or compensate his Mahratta auxiliaries; but the Peishwa, who had only concluded an armistice until a favourable opportunity of breaking it should offer, continued to urge the advance of Holkar and Sindia to his support, and carried on a close intercourse with Ghazee-ud-deen, both through Holkar and his own wukeels at Delhi. It was therefore easy to satisfy all parties, by permitting Ghazee-ud-deen to proceed, accompanied by his Mahratta allies, to try his fortune on that field of adventure, the Deccan.

On the assassination of Raja Rugonath Dass, Sulabut Jung, who was at Hyderabad, sent for Syud Lushkur Khan and Shah Nuwaz Khan, the ablest and most popular men under his



government, who were then residing at Aurungabad. Both were inimical to the French—the former secretly, the latter openly; both, however, had latterly endeavoured to obtain the good opinion of Bussy, whose influence over Sulabut Jung was already paramount. By Bussy's advice Syud Lushkur Khan was raised to the office of dewan, and Shah Nuwaz Khan was made soobehdar of the province of Hyderabad. Syud Lushkur Khan was intimately connected with the Mahrattas, and secretly favoured the cause of Ghazee-ud-deen. When positive accounts reached Sultan Jung that Ghazee-ud-deen was on his route to the Deccan, Syud Lushkur Khan had the address to persuade Sulabut Jung and Bussy, that, by his resigning his situation as dewan, and pretending to go over to the Mahrattas, he should be able, from his influence with many of their chiefs, to induce a great number of them, either to join Sulabut Jung as allies, or to remain neutral in the quarrel. Shah Nuwaz Khan was accordingly appointed to act as vizier, whilst Syud Lushkur Khan proceeded to the residence of Janojee Nimbalkur at Kurmulla. On the approach of Ghazee-ud-deen, the Peishwa moved towards Burhanpoor. Syud Lushkur Khan and Janojee Nimbalkur had an interview with him, at which Syud Lushkur Khan, as if the envoy of Sulabut Jung, began by stating that his master had received letters from the emperor, from which it appeared that Ghazee-ud-deen was merely to proceed to Aurungabad, settle the government in his own name, appoint his brother deputy, and return to Delhi. The Peishwa, however, perfectly understood that he intended to join Ghazee-ud-deen, and wished to obtain his support; but, however desirable it might be to have a fit minister at Hyderabad in his own interest, he was sensible of the abilities of Syud Lushkur Khan, and doubtful of what might be his conduct when he obtained power. He, nevertheless, wrote to Ghazee-ud-deen respecting these overtures. The letter was referred to his minister, Syud Ashkar Khan and Mohummud Anwar Khan, who dreading Syud Lushkar Khan, more as a rival than an enemy, desired the Peishwa to detain both him and Nimbalkur, and bring them on to camp. When the whole army, joined by the Peishwa, and the Moghul troops from Burhanpoor, who declared for Ghazee-ud-deen, arrived in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, it amounted to 150,000 men. Whilst both sides were preparing for





the campaign, as soon as the rains subsided, negotiations began on the part of Sulabut Jung: and circumstances appeared which render it as impossible to deny the validity of the elder brother's title from Delhi, as his undoubted claim by priority of birth. In the meantime the Peishwa required, and obtained, from Ghazee-ud-deen, in behalf of himself and his officers, the entire cession of territory west of Berar, from the Taptee to the Godavery. There seemed to be a prospect of settling the claims of all parties, when Ghazee-ud-deen, in an evil hour, accepted an invitation to an entertainment provided in the city, partook of a poisoned dish prepared by the hands of the mother of Nizam Ally, and expired the same night.

Sulabut Jung was thus left without a rival, and became desirous of withholding the cessions yielded by his brother to the Mahrattas; but having once admitted the validity of Ghazee-ud-deen's appointment, the whole Mahratta power being now collected, supported by Mohummud Anwar Khan, and the Burhanpoor chiefs, whose safety for the time lay in making common cause with Ballajee Rao, Bussy saw that it was both consistent and necessary to avoid war, and the alienation of the provinces in question was confirmed by Sulabut Jung, on condition that Rughoojee Bhonslay withdrew his garrisons beyond the Payeen Gunga, with which he immediately complied.

After peace was thus restored, the Mahratta armies proceeded to their respective territories—Holkar and Jyapa Sindia to Hindostan, and the Peishwa to Poona. Syud Lushkur Khan was

*A.D. 1753* reinstated as prime minister, and Sulabut Jung departed for Hyderabad. On the route to that place, M. Bussy was taken ill, and was obliged

to proceed to Mausulipatam, on the sea coast, for the recovery of his health. Syud Lushkur Khan took that opportunity of weaning Sulabut Jung from Bussy's influence, and in the course of a few months artfully detached the French corps, and contrived to carry Sulabut Jung to Aurungabad, preparatory to the entire removal of Europeans from his territory. Bussy's illness was long and severe, but as soon as he could travel, he collected his troops and repaired to Aurungabad, where he procured the dismissal of Syud Lushkur Khan, and the appointment of Shah Nuwaz Khan as minister.



The excuse made for detaching his corps was the difficulty of raising funds, which was obviated for the future by territorial cessions on the east coast, consisting of Sicacole, Rajamundree, and Ellore. M. Bussy placed a body of 150 Europeans and 2,500 sepoys to protect his new acquisitions, the gross revenue of which was afterwards extravagantly estimated by the French at upwards of 30 millions of rupees. Bussy farmed the revenues to Vijyaram Raje, a principal deshmoorkh, who had recommended himself by his ability. The rent was moderate, enforced without rigour, accurate accounts were prepared, and most of the hereditary officers, if not those possessing rent-free lands, were confirmed in their property—facts which do Bussy and his nation great honor.

The Peishwa had no sooner made the arrangements immediately necessary for the occupation of the districts ceded to him, and their appropriation amongst the chiefs, than he prepared a large force for an expedition into the Carnatic. The troops of Mysore were engaged as allies of the French in the well-known war of Coromandel, and the period was so favourable for recovering arrears of tribute, that he, on that account, deferred other plans which he had projected on the side of Guzerat. But before he took his departure in person, Ballajee endeavoured to pave the way for effecting a compromise with Tara Bye. During his absence at Aurungabad she had occupied the districts of Wae and Satara, aided by 5,000 or 6,000 Mahrattas and Ramoosees, whom she had entertained in her service. A large force was therefore sent to invest Satara, and starve her into submission. Anund Rao Jadow, the havildar of the fort, convinced of the folly of resistance, had formed a design of carrying the raja out of her power; but the circumstances coming to her knowledge, she ordered him to be beheaded—a sentence which the garrison executed on their own commander, as well as on several others subsequently implicated in a like scheme. Baboo Rao Jadow, a person unconnected with the late havildar, and a relation of the Jadows of Sindkheir, was appointed to the command of the fort. The Peishwa, on his way to the Carnatic, sent to assure Tara Bye that, if she would submit, the control of the raja's person and establishment should remain at her disposal; but to this proposal Tara Bye would not listen, unless Ballajee Bajee Rao would come to Satara, acknowledge





her authority, and give such personal assurances as should satisfy her on the subject.

The expedition into the Carnatic was the most profitable, in regard to the recovery of tribute, of any in which Ballajee Rao had been engaged. When the Mahrattas proceeded  
A.D. 1754 beyond their boundary, to collect revenue

and to make war were synonymous; whenever a village resisted, its officers were seized and compelled by threats, and sometimes by torture, more or less severe, to come to a settlement; ready money was seldom obtained, but securities from bankers, with whom all the villages had dealings, were preferable, as they were exchanged by the holders for bills payable in any part of India. When the garrisons of fortified places made an unsuccessful resistance, they were put to the sword. On the present Moolkgeeree (such was the name given to these expeditions) Hooly Onore was taken by storm, and the Peishwa was bought off from attacking Seringapatam by a sum of money; whilst professions of attachment and submission, and promises of greater regularity in the future payment of the Mahratta claims, were also tendered on the occasion. Ballajee Rao, content with this success, returned with his cousin Sewdasheo Chimnajee to Poona, in the month of June; and his brother Rugonath Rao, as soon as the rains abated, set off, accompanied by Duttajee Sindia and Sukaram Bappoo, on an expedition to Guzerat.

In regard to the history of that province, it has been already mentioned that Nujeem-ud-Dowlah, Momin Khan, was appointed, by an order from the imperial court, to the charge of its government, on the removal of Abhee Sing in 1735. Nizam-ool-Moolk was re-appointed soobehdar of Guzerat in 1737, when he returned to Delhi; it proved, however, but an empty honor, as the confusion of the period left nothing but nominal authority to the emperor in Guzerat. Baroach, which Nizam-ool-Moolk had assigned to himself as one of the districts of his personal jagheer, when he superseded Hyder Koolee Khan, was held by an officer named Abdoollah Beg, as foujdar, under the government of Sur Boolund Khan; but when the latter was superseded by Abhee Sing, Abdoollah Beg placed himself under the authority of Nizam-ool-Moolk, from whom he received the title of Nek



Alum Khan, and neither acknowledged Abhee Sing, nor admitted the pretensions of the Mahrattas.

In the meantime Momin Khan had been endeavouring to establish his authority; but the deputy of Abhee Sing, a native of Marwar, named Ruttun Sing Bhandaree, continued to dispute the possession of Ahmedabad, until at last Dummajee, after making a treaty, and exchanging turbans with Momin Khan, sent a force along with him, under an agent named Rungajee, to expel Ruttun Sing. They were repulsed in an assault, but Ruttun Sing at last capitulated. Rungajee and Momin Khan obtained possession of Ahmedabad about the 20th of May 1737, and an equal share of the authority and the revenue was assigned to the Moghuls and the Mahrattas, which, as might have been expected, occasioned constant disputes.

Dummajee continued to levy all the usual Mahratta dues in Guzerat undisputed, and an annual tribute from Kattywar, until the death of Momin Khan, in February 1743. Abdool Uzeez Khan, then at Aurungabad in the Deccan, was appointed his successor by an imperial firman, and immediately began to raise troops. After he had got together a few thousand men, he departed to assume the charge of his new government, passed Surat, and arrived near Baroach; but he was suddenly attacked at Oklaseer by Dummajee, or one of his relations, and his party totally destroyed. Abdool Uzeez Khan was never after heard of, and Futih Yab Khan, the supporter of Nasir Jung's rebellion, was among the killed. Fukhir-ud-Dowlah was then sent from Delhi to take charge of Ahmedabad in 1744. At that period Dummajee was obliged to repair to Satara, until the dispute with Rughoojee Bhonslay and the Peishwa was settled; but a detachment of his troops, under his agent Rungajee, opposed Fukhir-ud-Dowlah, and prevented him from obtaining possession. Khundee Rao Gaekwar, taking advantage of his brother Dummajee's absence, made several important changes, removed Rungajee from Ahmedabad, and appointed an agent of his own in his stead. He also gave some support to Fukhir-ud-Dowlah; but Dummajee, speedily returning, dissolved their connection before it proved injurious to the Mahratta cause, by giving up to Khundee Rao the fort of Boorsut, the valuable district of Neriad, and appointing him his deputy at Baroda. Dummajee,





by this judicious management, preserved an ascendancy over the numerous members of his own family, which was probably more difficult than other obstacles in maintaining his power in the province. He would not acknowledge Fukhir-ud-Dowlah, but supported Fidaee-ud-deen Khan, the brother, and Mohtuffir Khan, the son, of his old friend Momin Khan, in the government.

The precise period when Dummajee Gaekwar obtained a share of the revenue and customs of the town and port of Baroach has not been ascertained; but in 1747, Kedarjee, the cousin of Dummajee, was invited to take a share in disputes among several competitors for authority in Surat, and was by one party promised three lakhs of rupees as the reward of his assistance. He accepted this offer; but the object having been effected without his interference, and the stipulated payment refused, he began to plunder the country in the vicinity. Syud Acheen, the person who had entered on the agreement, having no other means of satisfying him, offered one-third of the revenue of Surat until the amount should be liquidated—a proposal which Kedarjee, at Dummajee's desire, accepted. Great disturbances continued to prevail in Surat when Dummajee was a prisoner at Poona, and this was one of many reasons which made Dummajee so anxious to procure his liberty. The Peishwa was desirous of effecting a general arrangement in Guzerat; but before he would listen to Dummajee's overtures, he bound him down by the strongest securities. He fixed a sum of 15 lakhs of rupees as an acquittance for the amount then due, which was far from immoderate; but the lenity of the Poona government is accounted for by a bribe of one lakh of rupees, which was paid by Dummajee to Ramchundur Baba Shenwee for himself and his master, Sewdasheo Rao Bhow. The Peishwa also exacted a bond for an equal partition both of the districts then held by the Gaekwar family in Guzerat, and of all future conquests. Dummajee agreed to give up half the territory, and, after deducting his expenses, to render a fair account of half the surplus, in all situations where tribute, shares of revenue, contributions, or prize property were realized. Dummajee also engaged to maintain 10,000 horse, and to assist the Peishwa when necessary; to pay, as the mootaliq of Dhabaray, Senaputtee, an annual tribute of 5,25,000 rupees for his share of the Guzerat province;





to contribute annually a certain sum for the support of the raja's establishment; to aid the Peishwa in establishing garrisons in the districts ceded by this agreement; and, finally, to join in enforcing their mutual claims to tribute over the whole peninsula of Guzerat. But, until a convenient period of fulfilling these conditions, Dummajee, though no longer closely confined, was kept a prisoner at large, attended by a guard of Ballajee's confidential troops.

Of the port of Surat, which was still accounted the chief emporium on the west of India, the Peishwa was very desirous of obtaining complete possession, and, at the time of the above agreement with Dummajee, was, as will be hereafter noticed, engaged for that purpose in negotiations with the English, who had views in the same quarter.

In 1751, in hopes of obtaining possession of it without the intervention of allies, Rugonath Rao was sent to Surat, but he was, as has been mentioned, recalled to the Deccan before his object could be effected. His second expedition, which brings us to the period at which we had arrived, was undertaken with the more extensive view of completing those general arrangements comprehended in the settlement with Dummajee, whose release appears to have taken place a short time previous to the march of Rugonath Rao, as he joined him with his army soon after he entered the province, and they proceeded together, levying tribute, and reducing the country. Their progress was not interrupted until their arrival before the city of Ahmedabad. During Dummajee's confinement, Juwan Murd Khan Babey, an officer originally appointed to the charge of the Moghul quarter by the brother of the deceased Momin Khan, had usurped the whole power of the city, but he permitted Dummajee's collector to realize his master's dues. When the Mahrattas arrived at Ahmedabad, Juwan Murd Khan Babey happened to be absent at Pulhanpoor, but, hastening back, he was just in time to save the city from being carried by escalade. A new spirit was communicated to the garrison by his presence, and both the siege and defence were maintained with great resolution. Wittul Sewdeo, the ancestor of the great jagheerdars of Vinchoor, here greatly distinguished himself; and Naroo Shunkur, the person

*A.D. 1755*



FROM A.D. 1750 TO A.D. 1754

who built the strong fort of Malygaom in Candeish, was one of the most active of the assailants, having under his command a large body of Arab infantry. The conduct of Juwan Murd Khan Babey procured him an honorable capitulation, and, on condition of his giving up the city, Puttun Burnugur, Radunpoor, Beejapoor, and several other districts north of Ahmedabad, situated between the Saburmuttee and the Bunass, were conferred upon him in jagheer; but about ten years afterwards Dummajee took the greater part of these districts from him.

Ahmedabad, the capital of Guzerat, was finally taken possession of by the Mahrattas in April 1755. The revenue was to be equally divided between the Peishwa and Gaekwar, but the whole garrison was furnished by the Peishwa, except one gateway, which was occupied by the troops of Dummajee; the latter, however, paid 6,000 rupees annually to assist in defraying the expenses. An officer, named Sreeput Rao, was left as the Peishwa's agent in Ahmedabad; when Rugonath Rao, having taken leave of Dummajee at Baroda, proceeded with Duttajee Sindia to Hindostan, where he was joined by Khundee Rao, the only son of Mulhar Rao Holkar. They overran Ajimere, levied the chouth and surdeshmookhee in the imperial territory, and insisted on receiving tribute from friend and foe. The Rajpoot states were compelled to pay a contribution, and the Jaths also yielded an acknowledgment, although they resisted the demand, and repulsed an attack on the fort of Kombhere, in which Khundee Rao Holkar was killed. Rugonath Rao did not return to the Deccan till 1756.

Whilst the Peishwa's arms were thus successful to the northward in November 1754, another expedition from Poona proceeded to the Carnatic, and levied contributions as far as Bednore. The Peishwa accompanied the army to Eroor on the Kistna, where he gave over the command to Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, and returned on a pilgrimage to the source of the Godavery, where the waters of the Ganges are supposed to emerge every thirteenth year, and where many thousands of Hindoo devotees repair for the purpose of bathing in the sacred stream.

Ballajee Bajee Rao was naturally of an inactive disposition; and as he had agents on whom he placed dependence, habitual indolence was a natural consequence. The principal military



arrangements were entrusted to his brother Rugonath Rao, whilst the whole weight of the civil administration devolved on his cousin Sewdasheo Chimnaje. The system of village government had always preserved the country from total anarchy, and some protection was now afforded from that general system of plunder and violence, which had been universal for a period exceeding the life of man. The commencement of a system of order is ascribed to Ramchundur Baba Shenwee, and after his death Sewdasheo Rao Bhow improved on his suggestions.

In regard to events in the eastern part of the Mahratta dominions in the Deccan, the most important was the demise of Rughoojee Bhonslay, which, after his great success in the war against Sulabut Jung, happened in the month of March 1753. He divided his territory amongst his four sons—Janojee, Sabajee, Moodajee, and Bimbajee; the two elder sons, Janojee and Sabajee, were born of the younger wife, and the two younger sons, Moodajee and Bimbajee, born of the elder wife, were nephews of the late ranee of Satara, Suckwar Bye Sirkay. Rughoojee, however, left the supremacy to Janojee, with the certain prospect of being confirmed as Sena Sahib Soobeh by the Peishwa. Rughoojee with his last breath recommended to his sons the advantage of preserving union in the Mahratta empire, and amongst each other; but precept, however solemn, carries no such weight as the most common experience. In the course of one month Janojee was compelled to reduce his brother Moodajee to obedience by force of arms, and, owing to the time lost in operations, he was prevented from receiving his title and investiture, until the Peishwa's return from the Carnatic.

Encouraged by Janojee's approach to Poona, and on assurances of safety and protection from the Peishwa, Tara Bye, leaving the garrison of Satara, and the custody of the raja's person to Baboo Rao Jadow, repaired to the Peishwa's capital, accompanied by Bimbajee Bhonslay, the youngest brother of Janojee, who had attached himself to her party, and married one of her relations of the Mohitey family. At Poona, Tara Bye was received with so much attention and consideration, that she agreed to the Peishwa's proposals, as formerly made, provided he would promise to accompany her to the temple of Jejoory, and there solemnly swear to abide by his present declarations. The





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Peishwa acquiesced, on condition that Baboo Rao Jadow should be dismissed, to which Tara Bye reluctantly consented. Taking advantage of her obstinate temper, he gained his end of keeping the raja a prisoner, by pretending a great desire to see him released.

Ram Raja was a prince deficient in ordinary ability, and the miserable thralldom he underwent, during a long confinement under the circumstances we have described, entirely broke his spirit and ruined his health.

Janojee Bhonslay, having agreed to the terms before subscribed by his father, of furnishing 10,000 horse when called upon for the service of the state, and of paying nine lakhs of rupees annually to defray the expenses of the raja's establishment, obtained formal investiture as Sena Sahib Soobeh, and the concurrence of the Peishwa to those articles concluded with Aliverdy Khan in regard to Orissa in 1751. He then took his departure for Berar, carrying with him Bimbajee, whose relationship to the Sirkays, and his new connection with the Mohitey family, excited jealous apprehensions at the court of Poona. Janojee, on his route to the eastward, levied the tribute of ghasdana both from the Mahratta and Moghul territory. This exaction excited the resentment of Sulabut Jung, on which Janojee began to plunder his districts; but being attacked by a very inferior force under a Moghul officer, who took his dewan prisoner, he was compelled to restore a great part of his plunder, and to retire to Nagpoor.

It was probably when smarting under this disappointment and disgrace that he accepted an invitation from Jaffair Ali Khan, the dispossessed soobehdar of Sicacole and Rajamundree, to invade those districts, which he laid waste, and for a short time plundered with impunity, until troops were assembled to repel him. He then sent off an escort with his plunder; and, to insure its safe retreat, maintained a partial engagement with the troops of Vijyaram Raje, the zumeendar who rented Sicacole and Rajamundree from M. Bussy. The zumeendar was supported by a body of French troops, but Janojee secured the object for which he fought, and the booty reached his own territories in safety.

Affairs at Delhi were not long exempted from Mahratta interference, owing to the dissensions of the court, which arose to a



height greater than ever. Meer Shahabodeen, the son of the late Ghazee-ud-deen, bore a conspicuous part in the troubles and crimes of the period. This youth, on the news of his father's death, pretending to be absorbed in grief—a garb which wickedness frequently assumes—interested the vizier so much in his apparently melancholy situation, that he obtained for him all his father's honors, the title of Ghazee-ud-deen, and the post of Umeer-ool-Oomrah. But no sooner were his ends attained, than he perfidiously conspired to ruin his benefactor, assisted to obtain the office of vizier for Intizam-ud-Dowlah, the husband of his aunt, and finally brought on a civil war between the late vizier and the emperor. This war continued in and about the capital for six months. Sufdur Jung, at the end of that time, relinquished the contest, and retired to his own territory at Lucknow.

During these troubles Meer Shahabodeen, who audaciously took the lead, had called to his aid Mulhar Rao Holkar and Jyapa Sindia, but they arriving after the departure of Sufdur Jung, Meer Shahabodeen carried them with him to act against Sooruj Mull, whom he wished to punish for joining the late vizier. The Jath prince retired within his forts, but Meer Shahabodeen persevered in his plan, and applied to the emperor for a train of artillery. Intizam-ud-Dowlah, however; being aware of the unprincipled disposition of his relation, as well as of his talents and ambition, notwithstanding the services capriciously rendered to himself, dissuaded the emperor from sending the guns—an advice which was supported by strong political remonstrances from Sooruj Mull. To counteract these representations, Meer Shahabodeen sent an agent to Delhi; but he, finding the emperor disposed to follow the advice of the vizier, enticed away a number of the soldiers belonging to the artillery, and began to plunder the environs of the capital. The emperor, intending to succour Sooruj Mull, moved out from the city against Meer Shahabodeen and the Mahrattas. Mulhar Rao Holkar, who regarded Jyapa and Shahabodeen as young men whom he was not bound to consult on such occasions, without intimating his design, set off by himself, came upon the imperial camp when totally unprepared, threw a few rockets, which created such confusion that the whole army fled in terror, and Holkar gained all the



advantages of a victory by the plunder of their baggage. Meer Shahabodeen, on this success, joined Holkar at Delhi, and obtained from the emperor the office of vizier for himself, to the exclusion of Intizam-ud-Dowlah. He next deposed the emperor, raised a grandson of Jehandar Shah to the imperial dignity, by the title of Alumgeer II, in the end of May 1754, when the unfortunate Ahmed Shah was confined and deprived of sight. This revolution was soon after followed by the death of the former vizier, Sufdur Jung, who was succeeded by his son, Shujah-ud-Dowlah, in his government at Oude. Violence, rapine, and anarchy continued to increase in Hindostan; but affairs of greater interest carry us back, for a series of years, to the detail of Deccan affairs, directly connected with the history of Maharashtra.



# 19

## *A.D. 1755 and A.D. 1756*

THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION at the Mahratta capital continued under the management of Sewdasheo Chimnaje. The Peishwa remained at Poona *A.D. 1755* for nearly a year, and during that time, by the assistance of the English, in the manner hereafter explained, his troops had reduced a part of Angria's country, including the important fortress of Severndroog. After the monsoon the Mahratta army in the Concan was strengthened in expectation of further aid from the presidency of Bombay, but whilst the preparations were going forward, the Peishwa's presence was again required in the Carnatic. Muzuffir Khan, an officer who had commanded M. Bussy's sepoys, and had gone over to the Peishwa in 1752, accompanied the army sent by the Peishwa in the preceding year into the Carnatic under Mahadajee Punt. Having taken offence at some interference in the muster of his corps, he quitted the Peishwa's service, and proceeded to Seringapatam, but afterwards joined the nabob of Savanoor. As the nabob refused to give him up, and was supported by his old allies, the Ghorepurays of Gooty and Sondoor, the Peishwa assembled a great army, which was augmented by the junction of Janojee Bhonslay, with his contingent of 10,000 horse; the whole force crossed the Kistna, took Bagulkote, and then proceeded to attack Savanoor. The prime minister of Hyderabad, Shah Nuwaz Khan, who was at this time, for a special purpose, in secret league with the Peishwa, observing this formidable assembly of troops on the part of the Mahrattas, with well-dissembled alarm collected troops for the avowed purpose of forming an army of observation on the Kistna. Wukeels were in due form sent by the Peishwa to declare his pacific intentions, and to solicit aid against the nabob of Savanoor, the subject of Sulabut Jung, whose conduct he represented as hostile to both states, and his



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power, if not instantly crushed, of a nature to threaten the subjugation of the Carnatic. Sulabut Jung and Monsieur Bussy having been brought to accede to an alliance, the Moghul army marched to assist the Mahrattas, then besieging Savanoor.

Leaving the combined army engaged in these operations, it is fit to revert to the affairs of the Concan, and the expeditions against

Angria; for, although to the Mahrattas the transactions on the west coast appeared, and comparatively were, insignificant, they acquire an importance, because they explain the first continental acquisitions of the English in Maharashtra, of which the whole population are now subjects of Great Britain, or politically under its control.

Mr. Richard Bouchier, on the 24th November 1750, announced to the Peishwa that he had succeeded to the government of Bombay, and its dependencies on the 17th of

A.D. 1750 the same month; and from that period a more intimate intercourse commenced between the Mahrattas and the English. They had for some years been mutually desirous of settling Surat, and suppressing the depredations of Toolajee Angria. Ballajee Bajee Rao, on the first service he had seen, in the year 1740, was impressed with a high idea of the English from their conduct when they relieved Mannajee Angria at Kolabah. The warfare in the Carnatic had greatly contributed to raise their military reputation, and their fidelity to their master (as Mohummud Ally was termed), whose cause they had once embraced, had much effect in raising their national character in the minds of the natives of India.

Ballajee had early promised to assist Mr. Bouchier in restoring order in Surat, where, from the weakness of the Moghul government, there were three or four authorities besides the agents of Dummajee Gaekwar and the English factory. Seedee Musaood, an officer of the Seedee of Jinjeera, who had command of that part of the Seedee's squadron whose proper duty was to protect the trade of Surat, having part of the revenue assigned for that sole purpose, was a principal cause of the many broils which took place in that city. The English at Bombay had always maintained a friendly intercourse with the Seedees of Jinjeera, because theirs was the only territory in the vicinity from which they could procure beef for supplying their ships. In



other parts of the Mahratta coast, cows and bullocks were sacred; for to prey on human flesh would not be more revolting to the feelings of a European than eating beef to the prejudices of a Hindoo. Seedee Musaood had taken advantage of the distrac-  
tions in Surat, and the confusion in the government at Jinjeera, virtually to throw off his dependence on all authority, and, like most of the African race who have attained power in India, he was overbearing in his deportment and tyrannical in his behaviour.

The depredations of the pirates on the coast were still continued; for although Sumbhajee Angria was dead, and Mannajee remained in nominal obedience to the Peishwa, and generally pacific towards the English, Toolajee, who had succeeded to the territories of his half-brother Sumbhajee, situated between Bancoote and Sawuntwaree, disavowed the Peishwa's authority, and seized and plundered all ships, not bearing his own passport, which he could overpower. The raja of Kolapoor and the Sawunts of Waree followed a like system, and by the English were indiscriminately termed Malwans—a name given to them from the fort of Malwan, or Sindeedroog, which commanded the principal fort on their coast, and belonged to the raja of Kolapoor.

The war which took place between the Mahrattas and the Moghuls, subsequent to the murder of Nasir Jung, prevented the Peishwa from effecting the settlement in Surat. An agreement was made with the English for their co-operation against that place through Ramajee Punt, sur-soobehdar of the Concan, at the time when Rugonath Rao was recalled, to assist in the war against Sulabut Jung. This derangement of their plan was a great disappointment to the Bombay govern-

*A.D. 1751* ment, after the expectations they had formed; and therefore, that their expensive preparations might not be abandoned without some effort, they entered into an agreement, independent of the Mahrattas, with Nek Alum Khan, Nabob of Baroach; but the scheme proved unsuccessful.

The occupation of Guzerat, the siege of Ahmedabad, and the Carnatic expeditions, prevented the Peishwa from joining to reduce Surat, or from co-operating in attacking Toolajee Angria, until the beginning of the year 1755. The

*A.D. 1755* Mahrattas had then a short interval of leisure, and the presidency of Bombay, when unexpectedly called on, in the month of March, although such an



expedition was to them in the highest degree desirable, began to start difficulties respecting the lateness of the season, though these objections may have been purposely raised, as they certainly made the Mahrattas more urgent in their application. Ramajee Mahdeo Furnuwees, the sur-soobehdar of the Concan, was deputed by Ballajee to settle a plan of operations, and conclude the agreement. The council, although they had no king's ship at Bombay, resolved to make the attempt, and Commodore James, of the Company's marine, was selected for the command of the expedition, which consisted of a 44-gun ship, a ketch of 16 guns, and two bomb vessels. Six or seven articles were subscribed by the contracting parties, by which the English were to have the command of the marine, but mutual approbation was necessary in the conduct of all operations. The vessels that might be taken from Angria were to be divided by the captors, but the guns and stores were to belong entirely to the Peishwa. Bancoote, with the fort of Himmutgurh, and the sovereignty of the river on which it stands, with five villages, were to be ceded in perpetuity to the English. But the president and council seem to have considered these stipulations as pledging them too far, and therefore one of the articles guardedly states that the English only engage to keep the sea, and prevent Angria's fleet from throwing succours into the northern forts of Severndroog, Anjenweel, and Jyegurh.

The strongest forts which Toolajee Angria possessed were Severndroog and Viziadroog. The latter, as already mentioned, was better known in those days by its Moghul name of Gheriah. On account of the approaching monsoon it was deemed inexpedient to reduce Gheriah, or any of the forts south of those three specified in the articles. The small squadron under Commodore James sailed from Bombay harbour on the evening of the 22nd March. A wanton delay on the part of the Mahratta fleet enabled Angria's vessels at Severndroog to avoid the English ships. Commodore James, after a fruitless chase as far as Jyegurh, returned to Severndroog, where he commenced operations on the 2nd April; stood close under the fortifications, and by noon of the fourth day from the commencement of the attack, was in possession of the four distinct forts of which Severndroog consists, without the loss of a man—an achievement



which, from the previous idea entertained of the pirate Angria, and the strength of the fortifications, was matter of surprise even to those who accomplished it. The whole success was justly attributed to the vigour and judgment of Commodore James, and the resolution of his handful of troops and sailors. The Peishwa's fleet never ventured within gun-shot; and Naroo Punt, a carcoon of Sebundeas, who commanded, being unaccustomed to the sea, although he had headed several assaults on land, behaved in the most dastardly manner. Shumsher Buhadoor, the Peishwa's half-brother, was sent down from Poona with a body of troops to reinforce Ramajee Mahadeo, and several of the forts in the neighbourhood of Severndroog surrendered to him. Elated by this success, the Mahrattas pushed on to Rutnaguiry; but the stay of the ships was limited to the end of April, and although subsequently directed, at the Peishwa's earnest solicitation, to continue till the 15th of May, the season was too far advanced to permit of their acting with effect, owing to the heavy swell which is caused by the setting in of the southerly winds, about a fortnight before the rains. Commodore James finally returned to Bombay on the 18th May. Severndroog was punctually made over to the Mahrattas; but Bancoote, by the wish of the English, was not given over till after the ensuing October, when they got possession. The reason of requiring this cession was to obviate that dependence on the Seedee which has been explained. The Peishwa was assured by Mr. Bouchier that the assistance he desired should be granted at the opening of the season, when the expected arrival of the king's ships from the opposite coast, under Admiral Watson, would place more powerful means at his disposal.

Before that time, however, the presidency obtained aid on which they had not calculated, by the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Clive, with a large detachment of soldiers from Europe. The French establishments in the Deccan had created a jealous alarm in England, and it was there projected to send a force to Bombay, with the view of entering into an alliance with the Mahrattas, which had for its object the expulsion of the French from their districts in the Deccan, and from the service of Sulabut Jung. The articles of the truce agreed to by Mr. Saunders and Monsieur Godeheu, in the preceding year, on the



coast of Coromandel, precluded, in the opinion of the Bombay government, the employment, of this force on its original destination, until accounts should be received from Europe, approving or annulling the articles in question. The Madras presidency were of a contrary opinion, but on this subject their arguments and their whole design certainly more resemble the sophistry and artifice of a Dupleix, than the strong straightforward sense which distinguished the general conduct and deliberations of that government.

The governor of Bombay, in consultation with Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, resolved to seize the opportunity, afforded by the presence of so large an armament, to reduce Toolajee Angria. A commission, consisting of Mr. Hough, one of the members of council, Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, was invested, by the governor in council, with powers to conclude all necessary arrangements and agreements according to instructions, with which they were furnished. Three ships of the line, one ship of 50, and another of 44 guns, with several armed vessels belonging to the Bombay marine, amounting in all to 14 sail, proceeded, in the month of February, on this expedition, having on board 800 European soldiers and 1,000 native infantry.

Since the month of November a body of the Peishwa's troops, under Khundoojee Mankur, had been successfully employed against Toolajee Angria, and had, with the exception of Gheriah, reduced the whole of his forts along the coast to the northward of that place. No loss of any importance was sustained by them in the attacks, but at Rajapoor, one of the places which they took, after they had got possession, 300 men were killed by an accidental explosion, owing to the careless manner in which the

Mahrattas expose their gunpowder. When the

A.D. 1756 English armament appeared off Gheriah, Toolajee repaired to the Mahratta camp for the purpose of making the best terms he could: Ramajee Punt and Khundoojee Mankur were negotiating for the surrender, which was deemed by the British authorities a violation of the agreement concluded in the preceding year; and therefore, in order to prevent their obtaining possession, Admiral Watson attacked the sea face on the 12th February, whilst Colonel Clive, landing with the troops the same night, invested it on the land



side, so as to prevent the Mahrattas from having any communication with the garrison. If the Mahratta authorities intended to possess themselves of Gheriah, in the manner alleged, which, from several circumstances, as well as their known chicane, is more than probable, the British authorities might be deemed justifiable in anticipating them; but, on this point, and their subsequent attempt to keep the fort, the evidence is not so satisfactory as to allow our countrymen the merit of a decision entirely correct, or a disinterestedness wholly unimpeachable. Ramajee Punt had intimated, on the arrival of Admiral Watson, that he was in treaty, and promised to come on board for the purpose of obtaining the sanction of the commissioners. He did not come at the time appointed, and his carcoon had the assurance to offer Mr. Hough a bribe of any sum, on condition that he could get the admiral to suspend operations. The admiral, therefore, was certainly justified in commencing the attack; but it appears that the property contained in Gheriah was well known, and a committee of ten officers, of which Admirals Watson and Pocoke, Mr. Hough, and Colonel Clive were members, had, before they left Bombay harbour, agreed to share the whole prize property without reference to their allies. If the Mahrattas had intelligence of this proceeding, they had an equal right to anticipate the English. Ramajee Punt, when he found Colonel Clive had occupied a position between him and the fort, perceived what was intended, and endeavoured to get in a few of his men by any means. With this view he made secret overtures to Captain Andrew Buchanan, the officer on picket, offering him a bill on Bombay for 80,000 rupees, if he would permit him and a few of his people to pass into the fort—an offer which was rejected as became a British officer; but it is a circumstance worthy of notice, as elucidating the character of the times, that the Bombay government thought common honesty so rare, as to present Captain Buchanan with a gold medal in consideration of his extraordinary good behaviour.

Gheriah surrendered to Admiral Watson on the evening of the 13th February. During the bombardment, a shell thrown amongst Angria's fleet, which lay at some distance up the river, burst in the *Restoration*, a vessel Angria had taken from the Bombay government, set her on fire, and, the flames rapidly



communicating, his whole fleet in the course of an hour was totally destroyed. The captors of Gheriah declared that the Mahrattas had no right to share in the prize property, and divided about ten lakhs of rupees according to the plan agreed upon before they weighed anchor. Toolajee Angria's family were taken in the fort. Toolajee was also taken, put in irons, and thrown into one of the Peishwa's hill forts near Raigurh.

The president and council, on obtaining possession of Gheriah, were unwilling to relinquish it. They wished to give back Bancoote in exchange for Gheriah; but this offer the Mahrattas peremptorily refused, and urged their right in the clearest manner to its unreserved surrender according to the articles of agreement. The Peishwa in the course of his representations made repeated applications to Madras, and complaints to the king of England; but to all these remonstrances Mr. Bouchier declared that the articles had been infringed by the Mahrattas, that they had not fixed the limits of the Bancoote cession, that Toolajee Angria had not been delivered up to them, and, worse than all, that the Peishwa had contracted for a supply of goods from the Dutch. This last objection alluded not to the agreement made by Ramajee Punt, but to that settled with the Raja Shao, through the agency of Chimnajee Appa in 1739; the two first were evasive, the last did not relate to the point in question. Mr. Bouchier even condescended to present 5,000 rupees to the carcoon of Ramajee Punt, in order to induce him to persuade his master to accede to the exchange, and he agreed to waive the question of Toolajee Angria, on the simple assertion of the Mahrattas that he should be well treated, and never receive any territory within 40 miles of the sea. In one respect they kept their word: Toolajee Angria, after long endurance of rigid captivity in the fort of Wundun near Satara, was removed to the fort of Sholapoor, where he died. Two of his sons made their escape 12 or 14 years after their capture, and were protected at Bombay during the government of Mr. Crommelin.

In the early part of these discussions the Peishwa was employed at Savanoor. When he was urging Sulabut Jung to enter on that expedition, in order to excite the jealousy of Bussy, and blind his usual penetration with regard to the design which was in progress, Ballajee Rao wrote to the presidency of Madras for a