



BOOK III. was intersected by numerous rivers, which, rising in the
CHAP. III. Yuma mountains, ran westwards to the sea, and as they
1825. approached the latter widened into vast estuaries, which
could be traversed only after much labour and delay. The
line of coast was, however, selected for the march of the
troops, as presenting fewer impediments than the thickets
of the interior, and in the expectation, that the flotilla
would provide transport for the stores, and facilitate the
passage of the troops across the mouths of the rivers.
General Morrison, accordingly moved from Chittagong
early in January, and, on the 1st of February, arrived on
the northern bank of the estuary of the Naf. A detach-
ment was sent across to occupy the port of Mangdu, from
which the Burmas had retired; and no opposition was
offered to the passage of the army. It was not effected
before the 12th; and even then, most of the baggage was
left behind, and great part of the cattle destined for its
conveyance had not arrived. A division was halted at
Mangdu, to bring on the cattle and stores; and the main
body moved on to Tek Myoo, another great arm of the
sea, about five marches south from that of the Naf, and
of still more ample extent, being above three miles broad,
and running above fifty-four miles inland. A part of the
force which had been sent by sea, encountered a squall,
by which the flotilla was dispersed, and several of the
boats were driven on shore with the loss of baggage and
ammunition, but fortunately without loss of life. This
occurrence added to the delay, which the passage of Tek
Myoo occasioned; and a whole month elapsed before the
army was encamped on the east of the estuary at Chank-
rain, situated on a branch of the Koladyne river, a chief
river of Arakan, leading to the capital, being navigable with-
in a few miles of the city for boats of burthen. A sufficient
force for movements in advance was assembled at Chank-
rain, on the 20th of March;¹ and the right wing of the
army was pushed forward to cover the working parties,
employed in rendering the different canals and water-
courses passable, while the left threatened some stockades
at Kiung-pala, higher up the stream, which had been the

¹ His Majesty's 54th, 10th Madras N. I., and left wing of 16th, sent by sea. The field battery, His Majesty's 44th, 1st L. I. Battalion, four companies of the 42nd Bengal N. I., five of the 62nd, Bengal N. I., right wing of the 16th Madras N. I., and two troops of Local Horse.



REPULSE AT KIUNG-PALA.

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scene of a temporary check before the arrival of the army. Commodore Hayes with a division of the flotilla, having on board a company of His Majesty's 54th, and detachments of the 10th and 16th Madras Infantry, had entered the Arakan river towards the end of February, for the purpose of exploring its course and ascertaining how far it was navigable. Having received information which induced him to believe that a stockade at Kiung-pala might be captured by the force under his command, he brought his vessels abreast of the works, and opened a cannonade upon them. They proved to be stronger than he expected; and he was obliged to retreat after sustaining some loss.¹ Before the advance of the army towards the capital the stockade was abandoned.

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The route to Arakan, following the direction of the river, was intersected by numerous channels leading into it, and occasionally by low ranges of hills between the gorges of which it flowed. The channels, all within the influence of the tide, were generally fordable at the ebb; and, although they retarded, they did not essentially obstruct the march. No attempt was made by the enemy to defend the passage of any of them. But on the 26th, they made a stand on the Padho hills, where they had constructed entrenchments: they were soon driven from their defences. On the following morning they were found stockaded at Mahati, a post of considerable strength; but after exchanging a cannonade, in which their guns did little execution, they abandoned their works, and fell back upon Arakan, where their final effort for the maintenance of their power in the province was to be made.

The approach to Arakan on the southern and eastern sides, lay across a narrow valley, bounded by a range of hills about four hundred feet high, the summit of which was crowned by a series of stockades, and garrisoned by the whole Burma force, estimated at nine thousand men. A belt of jungle ran along the skirt of the hills; but beyond it, the acclivity was steep and open, and commanded by the enemy's fire. At the northern extremity, a pass led over the hills; but this was defended by a battery of

¹ Six persons were killed, and thirty-two wounded. Among the former, were Mr. Rogers, second officer of the gun-brig Research, and Major Schaleh, of the Engineers, an officer of distinguished merit, who was on board the Research.



BOOK III several pieces of artillery and a strong body of troops.
CHAP. III. The British force was formed for the attack on the morn-
1825. ing of the 29th March, in the valley at the foot of the hills.

The first operations were directed to force the pass. The assault was led by the Light Infantry Company of His Majesty's 54th, four Companies of the 2nd Light Infantry Battalion, the Light Companies of the 10th and 16th Madras Infantry, with the Rifle Company of the Mug levy, and was supported by six Companies of the 16th Madras Light Infantry. The troops moved to the attack with perfect steadiness; but they were unable to make way against the steepness of the ascent, the fire to which they were exposed, and the shower of heavy stones rolled down upon them from above. After a fruitless struggle, in which every officer was disabled, and many of the men had fallen, it was judged expedient to desist; and the assailants were recalled.¹ The failure of the attempt rendered a change of plan advisable; and while the attention of the enemy was kept on the alert in front, it was determined to turn the position by a movement on their right. The guns were accordingly brought into position on the 30th; and on that and the following day a brisk fire was maintained upon the Burma defences. On the evening of the 31st, Brigadier Richards with a detachment,² ascended the range by a circuitous route, and had established himself on the summit, before his movement was detected by the enemy. On the following morning, the division attacked the Burmas in flank, while the main body again assailed them in front. They offered but a feeble resistance; and abandoned Arakan to the British arms, retreating across the low lands between the city and the mountains, and crossing the latter by the passes of Talak and Aeng.

The town of Arakan, situated on the banks of a branch of the Koladyne river, on an irregular square plan, enclosed by hills, presented few traces of its former greatness. A stone fort defended its north-west angle, and works of considerable strength in the shape of walls, and

¹ Captain Trant, of the 16th Madras N. I., was killed.

² Six Companies of His Majesty's 44th, three of the 26th, and three of the 49th, thirty seamen, and as many dismounted troopers of Gardner's Horse.



embankments of masonry crowned the hills, and filled up whatever gaps were left by their inferiority of height — forming a line of circumvallation of nine miles in extent. The different elevations adjacent to the town were surmounted by Buddhist temples; but the town itself presented no buildings of any consideration, being a mere collection of mud and mat or bamboo hovels. The greater portion of the population had abandoned the place; but they speedily returned, and submitted readily to a change of masters. As soon as the necessary arrangements could be effected, the main body of the army was quartered in the vicinity of the town, and detachments were sent out to complete the reduction of the other divisions of the province. A force,¹ under Brigadier General Macbean, marched in April against Sandoway and the island of Ramri. A descent had been made upon the latter, early in February, by Lieut.-Colonel Hampton, commanding at Cheduba, with a few men of His Majesty's 54th, and European Artillery, five hundred of the 10th N.I., and seamen and marines from the Hastings frigate. But the ignorance or treachery of the guides misled the division away from the point it was intended to assail; and, after exposing them at disadvantage to the fire of the enemy in a tract overspread with thicket, compelled their re-embarkation. The success of the Burmas on this occasion failed to inspire them with confidence: and upon the arrival of General Macbean, it was found that they had abandoned their works, and passed over to the main land. A detachment of Artillery, and eight Companies of the 10th, were left to garrison Ramri; and the rest proceeded to Sandoway, a town situated at the head of a tide inlet, about twelve miles from the sea. This was also deserted by the enemy. It was not thought necessary to leave any part of the force for its defence at the time; but Sandoway, as the islands of Ramri and Cheduba, proved to be so much less unhealthy as stations for the troops than the interior of Arakan, that they were all afterwards permanently occupied.

The final subjugation of Arakan accomplished one object of the equipment of General Morrison's force, and

¹ Four Companies of His Majesty's 44th, eight of the 40th Bengal N. I., 16th Madras N. I., and eight guns.



BOOK III. rescued a valuable territory from Burma oppression. The
CHAP. III. next principal object, co-operation with the force of General Campbell on the line of the Irawadi, was frustrated
1825. in the first instance by an imperfect knowledge of the country, and finally defeated by the insalubrity of the climate. The Burmas, in retreating from Arakan, had separated into small parties, whose track could not be pursued through the intricate jungle and labyrinth of water-courses, by which the land between Arakan and the mountains was overspread. That passes through the mountains existed was self-evident; but of their number, their direction, and their practicability, the accounts were vague and unprecise; and little reliance was placed even upon such as were entitled to some credit. Thus the Aeng pass,¹ which eventually proved to be practicable for cattle and artillery was wholly disregarded, while with singular infelicity, the only effort that was made followed a direction beset with almost insurmountable difficulties. A detachment placed under the orders of Major Bucke was sent by water across a tract of low jungly land, intersected by numerous rivulets, extending about eighty miles to Talak, at the foot of the mountains. From Talak, the division made four marches up the ascent, in which they encountered extreme fatigue, from the rugged and precipitous nature of the road and the deficiency of water. When within one stage of Thantabain on the Burma frontier, it was ascertained that the enemy was posted there in force; and the exhausted state of the detachment, with the impracticability of the route, compelled Major Bucke to retrace his steps, and return to Arakan, where disease had now begun its ravages, and very soon incapacitated the army from any further activity. The setting in of the monsoon early in May, in a country inundated by numerous muddy streams, and thickly overspread with close and pestiferous jungle, could not fail to produce its usual

¹ It is mentioned by Captain Pemberton, that an accurate account of the pass was furnished to Government by Mr. Robertson, the Political Agent at Chittagong, in July, 1824, and that the same officer also mentioned its existence to General Morrison. No attempt was made to ascertain the real nature of this line of communication; and it was not until the end of the war, that its practicability was experimentally proved, by the march of a detachment with elephants across it, from Sembegwen on the Irawadi, to Aeng in Arakan, in eleven days.—Pemberton's Report on the Eastern Frontier, p. 101. Lieut. Trant, who accompanied the party, has described it in detail.—Two Years in Ava, p. 416.



UNHEALTHINESS OF ARAKAN.

deleterious effects on the health of soldiers necessarily exposed to the malignant influence of the atmosphere. The situation of the town of Arakan was found to be peculiarly insalubrious, being traversed by branches of the Koladyne river, surrounded by thickets and shut in by hills. There was no want of supplies as at Rangoon; but the sickness and mortality, attributable evidently to climate, needed no aggravating causes. No rank was exempt; and a very large proportion of the officers experienced the fatal effects of the climate. Their only chance of escape was timely removal to a more healthy locality; but this did not always avail. Brigadier General Morrison himself, after struggling through the campaign, was obliged to quit the country, and died on his way to Europe. By the end of the rainy season, a fourth of the men had died, and more than half the survivors were in hospital.¹ The place was, however, reluctantly relinquished; and it was not until the end of the year, that the measure of abandoning

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¹ In the course of August, the deaths were eight officers, seventy Europeans, four hundred and twenty Sipahis, and two hundred camp followers, above seven hundred men. Between May and September, two hundred and fifty-nine Europeans out of one thousand five hundred died; and of the rest, nearly four hundred were in hospital. Of eight thousand native troops, eight hundred and ninety-two had died, and three thousand six hundred and forty-eight of the survivors were in hospital. The peculiarities of the locality, combined with the effects of the climate, sufficiently accounted for the mortality. "The town of Arakan lies on the banks of a muddy river, and is buried among hills, and invested on every side with jungle and morass. The tide overflows the flat borders of the river to a considerable extent. Its reflux converts them into a noisome swamp; and in this swamp, strange to say, the town of Arakan is built, the water flowing under the houses which are raised on posts"—Grierson, *Endemic Fever and Medical Topography of Arakan*. Trans. Med. and Phys. Soc. of Calcutta, ii. 201. "The causes of the sickness were too obvious to be overlooked. The locality was sufficient to satisfy every medical observer, that troops could not inhabit it with impunity; and a reference to the meteorological register will shew a severity of season, to which the men were quite unaccustomed, and which no covering could resist. In July, August, and September, the fall of rain was one hundred and twenty-three inches, of which one hundred and three fell in the first two months. The climate was as deadly to animals, as to man. Elephants, horses, and bullocks died in vast numbers; and of the camels, not one returned to Hindustan."—Burnard, *Medical Topography of Asam*.—*Ibid.* vol. iii. p. 25. "In a country like Arakan, and in cantonments such as have been described, it seems not difficult to trace the causes of disease; and after what has been advanced, regarding the influence of a raw, variable and impure atmosphere, little remains to be said, either of the causes of the sickness or the mortality which followed it."—Stevenson on the Sickness prevailing in Arakan.—*Ibid.* iii. 35. "The deadly unhealthiness of Arakan was well known to the people of the country, and to the Burmas, who, before, during and since the war, have uniformly asserted that the city of Arakan, is the most unhealthy spot in their country during the rains. This extreme insalubrity is confined to the capital, as neither of the other stations, Sandoway, Kyuk-Phoo, Cheduba, or Akyab, have proved much more inimical to the health of the native troops, than the other military stations on the eastern frontier of Bengal."—Pemberton. 158.



BOOK III. Arakau received the sanction of the new Commander-in-CHAP. III. Chief, Lord Combermere. It could then no longer be doubted that all precautions, all remedial skill, were unavailing to combat with the inclement climate and deadly atmosphere of Arakan. And the scanty remnants of this once powerful armament, instead of carrying victory to the banks of the Irawadi, were scattered among the stations on the coast which had proved comparatively healthy, or were recalled to the Presidencies from which they had been despatched. An immense expenditure of treasure and loss of life had been incurred to little purpose; and the humiliation of the presumptuous Court of Ava, was still left to be achieved by the army of Rangoon.

CHAPTER IV.

Rangoon. — Friendly Disposition of the People of Pegu, — invited to elect a Prince. — Communications with Chiefs. Military Co-operation offered, — not received. — Determination of Sir A. Campbell to advance, — in two Columns, — one by Land, — one by Water. — Detachment sent against Bassein. — Burmas retreat to Donabew, and Detachment returns to Rangoon. — March of the Land Column to Tharawadi. — found deserted, — thence to Yuadit, — whence it returns to Donabew. — Proceedings of Water Column, — Arrival below Donabew. — Attack of Stockades, — Insufficiency of Force, — Junction of the Land Column, — Batteries opened, — Sally of Burmas with Elephants, — Repulsed, — Death of Bandoola. — Donabew evacuated, — Arrival at Prome, — Force cantoned for the Rains, — Negotiations for Peace. — Aggression of Siamese on the Tenasserim Coast, — Repulsed. — Mission to the Burma Camp at Miaday. — Armistice agreed to. — Conference with the Kyi Wungyi. — Terms of Peace, — objected to by the Burmas, — Renewal of Hostilities. — Repulse of British at Watigaon. — Advance of Burma Army, — Attacked, — Defeat of their Left, — of their Right and Centre, — Retreat to Melloon. — Advance to Patanagoh. — Treaty with Ministers not ratified. — Entrenchments at Melloon carried. — Ad-



PEGU CLEARED OF THE BURMAS.

vance to Pagahm. — Final Defeat of the Burma Army. — Affairs in Pegu. — Advance of Main Army to Yandabo, — Negotiations for Peace. — Treaty concluded, — Conditions, — Return of the Troops. — Reflections on the War, — its Inevitableness, — the Mode of its Prosecution, — Value of Acquisitions.

THE situation of the British forces at Rangoon had undergone a rapid improvement after the dispersion of the Burma army and the capture of the stockades at Kokien. With the altered condition of the atmosphere, the progress of disease was arrested, and the efficiency of the force was re-established. Re-inforcements were also received, and the political state of the country became more propitious. The inhabitants, who were mostly of the Talien or Pegu race, began now to look with confidence to the ability of the British to effect their emancipation from their Burma masters, and hastened to place themselves under the new administration. A proclamation addressed to them by Sir Archibald Campbell confirmed them in their favourable sentiments, and invited them to choose a chief of their own nation whom the English General engaged to acknowledge.¹ The extinction of the ancient ruling dynasty deterred the Peguers from complying with the invitation, although three Talien chiefs, in the service of Siam, who were at the head of a considerable body of troops in the neighbourhood of Martaban, opened a friendly communication with the British Commander in the beginning of the year, requesting that an amicable intercourse with Siam should be maintained, and offering if required, to advance and join the English with five thousand men. It did not appear, however, that they acted under any orders from the Court of Bankok, or that they were authorised to furnish military aid; and the offer was therefore declined, although general assurances were expressed of a friendly disposition.² Neither was it thought advisable to prosecute the project of encouraging the people to recover their independence, as, however attended it might be with present benefit, it might lead to eventual inconvenience.³ No steps were taken, therefore, to

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¹ Appendix II.² Documents, Burmese War, p. 119, 120.³ Letter from Lord Amherst to Sir Thomas Munro, Life, 2, 124.



HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK III. give effect to Sir A. Campbell's proclamation; but the
CHAP. IV. favourable effects which it had produced, and the mani-
1825. fest good-will of the Talien chiefs and people, obviated all
anxiety respecting the internal tranquillity of the province
after the last remains of the Burma armament should
have been expelled. This was speedily accomplished.
One division which had re-occupied the Pagoda at Syriam,
was driven out by Lieut.-Colonel Ebrington, without diffi-
culty. A stronger force, stockaded at Thantabain on the
Lyne river, was dislodged by Colonel Godwin early in
February; and the route to the north was open for the
advance of the army.

The serious difficulties by which the British army at
Rangoon was encompassed, through the absence of means
of conveyance, and the deficiency of supplies, early sug-
gested doubts of the possibility of penetrating into the in-
terior of the kingdom of Ava by the line of the Irawadi,¹ and
induced Sir A. Campbell deliberately to contemplate the
adoption of a different plan of operations; either to direct
his route to the south, and march on the capital by way
of Martaban, through Old Pegu, or to re-embark his
troops, after leaving a strong garrison in Rangoon, for the
coast of Arakan, and thence endeavouring to cross the
mountains into Ava. Fortunately for the British arms,
the hesitation of the Bengal Government to approve of
either project,¹ and the improved knowledge of the country
acquired during the latter months of the year, prevented
the Commander of the army from having recourse to
either of these alternatives, and satisfied him of the
greater practicability as well as the superior advantage of
adhering to the original design, and advancing towards the
capital partly by land, partly by water, as soon as the state

¹ The Governor of Madras, Sir Thomas Munro, with his characteristic discernment, strongly objected to both plans, and urged the advance by the Irawadi. "I have already," he remarks, "given my opinion on the main point, namely, that the plan of advancing by the Irawadi was preferable to that of marching south, or re-embarking, and landing at Arakan. I can see no object in his going to Martaban, because it would not facilitate his advance to the capital, as, according to his own account, even if the Siamese and Peguers were to take a part in the war, he would still require draught and carriage equipments from Bengal. With regard to the plan of re-embarking the Rangoon force, and landing it at Arakan, nothing could justify such a measure but the certainty of being furnished there with an equipment of draught and carriage-cattle. If they could not obtain it, they would be still more helpless than where they are now, and we should have lost reputation, and given confidence to the enemy."—Letter to Lord Amherst, 23rd Aug., 1824.—*Life*, 2, 131.



of the country should admit of such a combined movement. BOOK III.

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After surmounting the embarrassment and delays inseparable from a deficient supply of conveyance, Sir A. Campbell completed his arrangements. Leaving a garrison in Rangoon consisting chiefly of native troops, with such Europeans as were yet unfit for field duty, he formed the remainder of his force into three divisions: one of the strength of two thousand four hundred under his own command;¹ one of half that strength under Brigadier-General Cotton;² and one something less than six hundred strong under Major Sale.³ The latter was directed to move against Bassein; and, after clearing the province, to cross the country, and join the main body at Henzada on the Irawadi. The division under General Cotton was to proceed by water, with a flotilla of sixty-two gun-boats, and all the boats of the men-of-war, under the command of Captain Alexander of the Royal Navy, and on its way was to carry the enemy's entrenchments at Panlang and Donabew. The column under Sir Arch. Campbell was to proceed by land to Prome on the Irawadi, where it was to be joined by the other divisions.

The detachment under Major Sale proceeded by sea to Cape Negrais, where the Burmas had erected batteries; but they were quickly driven from them by the fire of the ships; and the troops landed and destroyed the works. The squadron then ascended the Bassein river to the town of that name; but they found that the Burmas had abandoned it, having first set it on fire. From Bassein the enemy had retreated to Lamina, sixty miles distant, and were followed thither by the division in boats, as the depth of water was insufficient for the ships. The Burmas had again retreated, and fallen back upon their main position at Donabew, above forty miles distant inland. An attempt was made to pursue them; but the want of carriage rendered it impossible for the division to advance.

¹ The land column was formed of His Majesty's 38th, 41st, and 47th, three Native Battalions, the Body-Guard, a troop of Bengal Horse Artillery, and part of the Rocket Troop, with which the army had been latterly reinforced.

² His Majesty's 89th, 1st Madras European Regiment, two hundred and fifty of the 18th N. I., Foot Artillery, and part of the Rocket Troop.

³ His Majesty's 13th and 12th Madras Native Infantry, with details of Artillery.



BOOK III. Major Sale accordingly returned to Bassein, and thence
CHAP. IV. sailed back to Rangoon, whence he joined the reserve
column on its march to Prome. This expedition against
1825. Bassein was attended with no political or military benefit,
and was planned eviſently upon imperfect information re-
garding the nature of the country to be traversed, and a
miscalculation of the benefits to be expected from ſuch a
diverſion.

The column commanded by Sir Archibald Campbell marched on the 13th of February, following the courſe of the Lyne river at ſome ſhort diſtance from its left bank. On the 17th it arrived at Mophi, where, from information received from the Karens, or hill-people, who diſplayed a favourable feeling towards the Britiſh, it was aſcertained that Maha Thilwa, with a conſiderable force was poſted. Upon arriving on the ground, the enemy had diſappeared, except a ſmall party, which had taken ſhelter in the remains of an old Pegu fort; but which, as the diſviſion approached, fled, after firing a few ſhots, into the adjacent jungle. The column halted at Mophi until the morning of the 19th, when it moved onwards to Lyne, the capital of the province, where it arrived on the 23rd. The town was ſituated on the river ſide. The force was here in communication with the boats, bearing its ſtores; and halted to lighten their burthen, the river becoming too ſhallow for deeply laden veſſels. Some ſupplies were alſo obtained from the Karen villages, which were found thinly ſcattered along the route. On the 1ſt of March, the column forded the Lyne river, and on the following day, after a march of fourteen miles in a north-westerly direction, reached Tharawa, on the main ſtream of the Irawadi. Much to the mortification of the force, the whole population of Tharawa was deſcied on the oppoſite bank of the river; and, ſoon after, was loſt in the ſhades of an extenſive foreſt. No means of croſſing the river, here eight hundred yards broad, were found. At Tharawa, the column halted, in expectation of hearing news of General Cotton's brigade, until the 7th, when, from a cannonade heard in the direction of Donabew and information ſubſequenty received, it was rather haſtily concluded that the poſition had been taken. Theſe accounts were confirmed on the following day; and the column moved on two marches in



advance to Yuadit, when a despatch from General Cotton announced the failure of his attack, and the necessity of the employment of a more powerful force against it than that which was under his command.

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The column that was destined to advance by water, moved on the 16th of February, and on the 19th, the van arrived at Panlang on the Rangoon river, where both banks were defended by stockades, while a third in front guarded a point where the channel divided. The shells and rockets from the flotilla cleared the entrenchments; and the troops, when landed, found them deserted. A division of the 18th Madras N. I. was left in one of the stockades, to keep open the communication with Rangoon. The others were destroyed, and the flotilla advanced to Yangan-cheno, where the Rangoon branch separates from the Irawadi. The force entered the latter river on the 27th, and on the 28th the advance came in sight of Donabew, where Maha Bandoola had entrenched himself. Some delay occurred in passing the more heavily laden boats across the shallows into the Irawadi; but the whole were in the main stream by the 4th of March, and on the morning of the 6th took up a position on the right bank of the river, two miles below Donabew. The Burma General had been summoned to surrender, and had returned a courteous but resolute refusal.

The works at Donabew were of considerable strength and extent, lying along the right bank of the river, and commanding its whole breadth. The chief work, a parallelogram of one thousand by seven hundred yards, stood on a bank withdrawn from the bed of the river in the dry season, and rising above it. Two others, one of which was a square of two hundred yards, with a pagoda in the centre, and the other, an irregular work, four hundred yards from it, stood lower down on the river; forming outworks to the principal stockade, and commanded and supported by its batteries. All three were constructed of squared beams of timber, provided with platforms, and pierced for cannon; and each had an exterior fosse, the outer edge of which was guarded with sharp-pointed bamboos, and a thick abattis of felled trees and brushwood. One hundred and forty guns of various calibre, besides a still greater number of ginjals, were mounted on the parapets, and the



BOOK III. garrison consisted of twelve thousand men, commanded
CHAP. IV. by the most celebrated general in the service of Ava.

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The assailants bore no proportion to the defenders; for General Cotton had left his native regiment at Panlang, and part of his Europeans, to guard the boats with stores. His whole available force did not, therefore, exceed six hundred bayonets, a force manifestly inadequate to the storming of Donabew, even with the assistance of the guns of the flotilla. The orders of the Commander-in-Chief, however, leaving, in General Cotton's opinion, no alternative, he made arrangements for the attack. At sunrise, on the 7th, two columns composing together five hundred men, advanced against the smaller stockade, supported by the fire of two field-pieces, and of a rocket battery. They were encountered by a fire kept up with more steadiness than the Burmas had lately displayed; but the troops disregarded it, and rushed impetuously on the work into which they forced their way. The garrison, after suffering severely, fled over their defences, but many were intercepted by such of the troops, as, unable to penetrate into the interior, spread round the parapet, and cut off the fugitives. The stockade was soon in the possession of of the assailants.

The second of the entrenchments was next attempted, A battery was erected in advance of the captured stockade, and when it was thought that a sufficient impression had been produced, a column of two hundred men was sent forward to storm the work. The Burmas remained quiet until the assailants had advanced to within a few yards, when a heavy fire was poured upon them, by which the leading men were struck down, and the column turned from the point of attack. The men endeavoured to shelter themselves in a ditch, which was, however, exposed to the fire of the enemy. Captain Rose, who had led the party, was shot while endeavouring to rally his men, and Captain Cannon of the 89th was mortally wounded. The loss of men was also severe, and it became necessary to recall them. It was now evident, that Donabew was too strong to be reduced by General Cotton's division, and he desisted from a further unprofitable expenditure of life. The guns and stores were re-embarked, and the flotilla dropped down to the position at Yung-yung, which it had occupied



on the 6th, and there awaited the instructions of the Commander-in-chief.

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However anxious to accelerate his onward march, Sir A. Campbell could not avoid feeling the necessity of a retrograde movement against Donabew, not merely to redeem the reputation of the British arms, but to free his rear from a force which cut off his communication with Rangoon, and by commanding the river-navigation rendered it impossible for supplies to reach him by water. As soon as positive information of the check which had been sustained was received, he retraced his steps, and, leaving Yuadit on the 11th, returned to Tharawa on the 13th. Here it was necessary to cross the Irawadi; for which purpose no other means existed than a few canoes capable of conveying but a small number of men at a time, and utterly unfit for the carriage of guns and stores, By great exertion, however, and the construction of rafts for the reception of the heavier articles, the passage was effected in the course of five days, and the army was assembled on the right bank of the Irawadi, by the 18th of March. The head-quarters were at Henzada, a town of some extent: the vicinity of which was ornamented by a number of handsome Buddhist temples and monasteries, sheltered by groves of mangoes and tamarinds. Neither priests nor people were, however, visible: the whole population of the town and neighbourhood having abandoned their habitations. No hostile force had opposed the occupation of the town; but information was received, that the Kyi Wungyi was posted at a distance of fifteen or twenty miles from Henzada; and it was thought possible to surprise him. Lieut.-Colonel Godwin, with His Majesty's 41st, the Body-Guard, and a brigade of guns, made a night march with this object. They came upon a party of Burmas at daybreak, who immediately dispersed and fled, but the main body had previously effected their retreat, leaving the country open for the advance of the army. This was made with as much expedition as was practicable, in the absence of all regular roads, and the delay caused by having to cut a pathway through the intricate jungle of brushwood and tall reeds, by which the surface was overspread. On the 25th, the force came before Donabew, and preparations were immediately com-

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menced for the attack of the main entrenchments, against which it was necessary to proceed in form. The Burma General was equally active; and, on the same night, before the troops had well taken up their position, directed a well-judged sortie against the right of the line. It was repulsed without much loss on either side, but was a favourable indication of the spirit with which the enemy were animated, and of the military talents of the commander.

The army having been encamped above the works, while the water column was some way below them, a short delay occurred in establishing a communication; but, on the 27th, the flotilla weighed with a fair breeze, and sailed past the stockades under the fire all the guns the Burmas could bring to bear upon it. At the same time, a sally took place on the west side, headed by a line of seventeen elephants, each carrying five or six men, armed with musquets and ginjals, and supported by a body of Casay horse, and a dense mass of foot. The army was drawn up to receive them. They advanced steadily to within a short distance, when, being staggered by a well-maintained fire of musquetry and artillery, their discomfiture was completed by a charge of the Body-Guard. The elephants losing their drivers, and becoming unmanageable, broke away and fled into the thicket; the Horse followed their example, and the Foot retreated precipitately into the stockade. Upon the junction of the flotilla with the battering-train and stores on board, the heavy guns and mortars were immediately landed, and placed in battery; during which operation, shells and rockets were diligently thrown into the entrenchments. Some attempts to interrupt the progress of the battery were made by the enemy, but without effect, and the guns opened on the morning of the 3rd of April. They were unanswered by the stockade, and shortly after they commenced firing, the Burmas were discovered in full retreat, through the adjoining brushwood. It was soon ascertained, that the death of their general had paralysed the energies of the garrison. Maha Bandoola had been killed on the previous night by the bursting of a shell, and with him expired the courage of his followers. Despairing of success, they refused to prolong the resistance, and evacuated the en-



trenchments, carrying with them the ashes of their chief whose body had been burned. The death of Bandoola spared him the mortification of beholding the disastrous termination of that war which he had been mainly instrumental in exciting, and which he alone had the ability and courage to maintain, if not with hope, at least with reputation.¹

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The capture of Donabew removed the only remaining obstruction to the prosecution of the main object of the campaign, and as soon as the post was taken possession of, Sir A. Campbell resumed his march. He was at Tharawa with his advance on his way to Prome on the 7th of April, and on the 8th was there joined by reinforcements from Rangoon, under Brigadier M'Creagh, consisting of His Majesty's Royal Regiment, and the 28th N. I., with elephants, and carriage-cattle sent round from Bengal. The main body, after crossing the river in the boats of the flotilla, was concentrated at Tharawa on the 10th, and immediately moved forward. The Burmas had been rallied by the Prince of Tharawadi, whose head quarters were at Yagain, but he retreated as the British army advanced; and the force arrived at Prome on the 25th, without encountering an enemy. The town had been but recently evacuated by the Burmas, after setting fire to the stockades. Part of the town was found on fire; but the exertions of the troops prevented the conflagration from spreading. At first, no signs of population appeared; but, in the course of a few hours, a number of the inhabitants showed themselves, and having been assured of protection for their families and property, re-established themselves in their residences: guards were placed over the religious edifices for their preservation, and every precaution was taken for the maintenance of tranquillity and order. After a brief interval, Prome again became the seat of industry and traffic. A regiment of Native Infantry was quartered in the town: the rest were stationed outside; and, as the rainy season was approaching, cantonments were constructed for the shelter of the troops during the monsoon. The weather had been hot during the whole of the campaign, the thermometer rising to

¹ The loss of the British in the affairs at Donabew was, thirty killed, and one hundred and thirty-four wounded.



BOOK III. 110° in the shade ; but the nights were cool, and the
CHAP. IV. climate proved not unhealthy. The character of the country had greatly improved. The banks of the Irawadi were now of some elevation above the level of the sea, while a range of low heights skirted the town on the south ; and on the right bank, well-wooded spurs from the boundary mountains of Arakan came down to the water's edge. To the west of the town lay the river, here two miles broad. On the north and east, stretched a cultivated plain several miles in extent, studded with villages. The consequences of the favourable change of topographical position were highly propitious to the health and spirits of the troops ; and although the state of the weather prevented their being actively employed during the months of June, July, and August, and although they did not wholly escape from the visitations of sickness incident to the season, and to irregular and indifferent supplies, yet the efficiency of the main body was unimpaired, disease was comparatively limited, and casualties were rare. The period was not without its excitement, and parties were occasionally detached to explore the country, conciliate the people, and ascertain the purposes of the enemy. Attempts at negotiation were also set on foot with both Ava and Siam.

On the march to Prome, when within thirty miles of the city, a letter was brought into camp by a British soldier of the 38th, who had been taken prisoner by the Burmas and been liberated for this mission, addressed to Sir A. Campbell, by two of the Atwen-wuns, or Royal Councillors, It stated, that the two Governments had always been on terms of friendship until the breaking out of the present war, which had arisen out of the conduct of a certain paltry chief, and that it was very desirable that a communication should be opened, by which the blessings of peace might be restored. A reply was sent, to intimate that the commander of the British army purposed to advance to Prome ; but that, on his arrival there, he would willingly hold a conference with the Burma officers for the re-establishment of peace between the two nations : to which an answer was received, expressing the satisfaction of the Atwen-wuns, but intimating their hope that the British army would halt on the spot where the



letter was received, and not proceed to Prome—a request which inspired Sir Archibald Campbell with a distrust of the sincerity of the parties—a distrust confirmed by the cessation of further communication. In truth, the Court, notwithstanding the shock inflicted by the fate of Bandoolla, was not yet weaned from its belief in its ability to expel the invaders; and a strong faction, at the head of which were the Queen and her brother, influenced the King to persist in his hostility. The Prince of Tharawadi, the King's brother, under whose sanction the two Atwenwuns had addressed the British General, appears, however, to have been sincerely desirous of entering into the proposed negotiation: and, although his army had been reinforced by a body of six thousand men, he quitted his camp, and repaired to Ava to urge pacific counsels, which, as subsequent events proved, he advocated in vain.

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Although the states of Ava and Siam were not declaredly at war and had no armies in the field, yet a feeling of enmity had for a long time past divided the two Courts, and had displayed itself in an unavowed course of mutual aggressions and reprisals on the frontiers, having for their object the burning of villages and the seizure of the inhabitants as slaves. In this reciprocity of petty outrage, the Siamese had especially harassed the southern provinces of the Tenasserim coast; and, in the beginning of 1825, either in real or pretended ignorance that the districts of Tavoy and Mergui had changed masters, the Raja of Chomphan, a dependency of Siam, appeared on the coast with a flotilla of war-boats, and, landing his men, laid waste the country and carried off the people. These excesses were speedily checked by the activity of the British authorities; and the Siamese flotilla was attacked, and dispersed. Negotiations were presently afterwards opened with the Court of Bangkok, which had the effect of putting an end to the incursions of the Siamese, and of recovering a considerable number of the people who had at various times been carried into captivity. Deputies were also despatched to Martaban to Colonel Smith, the officer in command, on the part of the Ron-a-ron, a chief of Talien origin, who had advanced towards the frontier at the head of a considerable force, and who expressed his earnest desire to co-operate with the British in liberating his



BOOK III. native kingdom from the domination of the Burmas. Due
CHAP. IV. encouragement was given to this demonstration, and means
1825. for facilitating the passage of the Sanluen river by the
Siamese force were in course of preparation, when letters
from the Prime Minister of Siam announced the recall of
the Ron-a-ron and that of his troops to the capital. The
death of the King, which took place in April, 1825, and
the requisite presence of the chiefs at his funeral, and
the installation of his successor, were the reasons assigned
by the Prime Minister, in a letter to Colonel Smith; but
a promise was added, that after the Monsoon the Siamese
army should again take the field. This promise was not
performed. The new King probably adopted a different
policy from that of his predecessor, and contemplated the
triumph of the British, and the projected independence
of Pegu, with equal aversion. Nothing further was heard
of the Siamese auxiliaries; but a friendly understanding
subsisted, and many Talien and Burma captives and fugi-
tives were allowed to return to their native country, to
enjoy the security afforded by the protection of the British
Government.

Upon receiving the intelligence of the fall of Donabew
and the death of Bandoola, the first feeling of the Court
of Ava was that of despair. It was, however, but of short
duration; and the King was persuaded that the contest
was not yet hopeless, and that the English might still be
humbled. Great exertions were made to recruit the army.
In place of the usual conscription, large bounties were
given to the Burmas to induce them to enlist, and the
tributary tribes of Shans, north of Ava, were summoned
to support the general cause. They obeyed the summons,
and joined the Burma army in large numbers, confiding
in the fortunes of the kingdom, and unacquainted with
the enemy they were eager to encounter. The principal
force was assembled at Miaday, about sixty miles from
Prome, under the command of Mimiabo, a half-brother of
the King; while other divisions were stationed at Pagahm,
Melloon, and Patanagoh, amounting in all to about forty
thousand men, of which one-half was posted at Miaday.
Another body, stated to be twelve thousand strong, was
stationed at Tongho, the capital of the province of Thara-
wadi, to the north-east of Prome. To encounter these



forces, Sir A. Campbell had under his command about five thousand men, of whom two thousand three hundred were Europeans. Detachments left at Rangoon, to the extent of about one thousand five hundred more, were under orders to join him. The state of his force, and the advanced position he had attained, rendered it highly improbable that the renewal of hostilities by the Court of Ava would be attended by a more favourable result than the past.

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While both parties were thus prepared to resume active operations, they were not averse to the discontinuance of the contest; and, in compliance with the tenor of the injunctions which he repeatedly received from Bengal, to avail himself of every favourable opportunity of bringing the war to a close, Sir Archibald Campbell addressed a letter to the ministers of the King of Ava, from his headquarters at Prome, stating his being authorised to negotiate and conclude a peace, and inviting them to avert the misfortunes which impended over their country from the prosecution of the war, by a timely assent to equitable terms of pacification. The overture was promptly met; and a deputation arrived from the Burma camp, to propose that a mission should be sent to the Prince Mimiabo, who held the chief command and was fully empowered by the King to treat, in order to specify the terms, on which a pacific negotiation should be based, and to make arrangements for a suspension of hostilities during the interval requisite for communicating with the Court. In conformity to the invitation, two officers, Lieut.-Col. Tidy, the Deputy Adjutant-General, and Lieut. Smith, of His Majesty's ship *Alligator*, accompanied the Burma deputies to Miaday, where they found the Kyi Wungyi, at the head of the force. The Prince was at Melloon; and as it was necessary to refer to him for final orders, the British officers were delayed ten days in the Burma entrenchments, during which they were treated with perfect confidence and cordiality, and received from all persons of note with whom they were permitted to carry on unmolested intercourse, assurances that the sense of the nation was

¹ According to General Campbell's own account, his letter was immediately acknowledged. He observes, "The time had scarcely elapsed for the reception of an answer, when such did actually arrive."—Document 144, A.



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BOOK III. strongly opposed to the prolongation of the war. Favour-
CHAP. IV. able replies having arrived from Mimiabo, it was agreed that
1825. an armistice should be at once concluded from the 17th of
September to the 17th of October, during which neither
force should cross a line extending from Komma, on the
west bank of the Irawadi, through Naibenzik to Tongho.
The Kyi Wungyi engaged to meet the British General at
Naibenzik, on the 2nd October, to determine the definitive
conditions of peace. The meeting took place accordingly.
Sir A. Campbell was accompanied by Sir James Brisbane,
who had lately taken the command of the British Navy in
the Indian seas, and had joined the army towards the end
of September, and was attended by his personal staff, and
a thousand picked men, both Europeans and Natives. A
like number of Burmas formed the escort of the Kyi
Wungyi, agreeably to his own request, as it was contrary
to etiquette for the Burma minister to come with a
smaller train. The parties met at Naibenzik, on a plain
which had been cleared for the occasion, and in the centre
of which, a building on the model of the Lotoo, or Hall of
Audience, at Ava, had been constructed for the accommo-
dation of the negociators. The Kyi Wungyi, was assisted
by the Lamain Wun, and attended by other officers of
rank. In the discussions that followed, perfect good-will
and mutual courtesy prevailed. The chief of the Burma
mission, the Kyi Wungyi, was an elderly man of pleasing
deportment, mild disposition, and cheerful temper; and
he and his colleagues readily responded to the cordiality of
the British officers, and, as far as it was possible for habits
so opposed, willingly conformed to the habits of the con-
querors. It very soon appeared, however, that they were
entirely unprepared for the demands made upon their
Government by the British Commanders. The Court of
Ava was expected to desist from all interference with
Asam and Kachar, and to recognise the independence of
Manipur. Arakan, with its dependencies, was to be given
up to the British, and an indemnity of two crores of
rupees was to be paid for the expenses of the war; until
the discharge of which sum, Rangoon, Martaban, and the
Tenasserim provinces were to be held in pledge. A resi-
dent was to be received at Ava, and a commercial treaty
to be concluded, by which the trade with Rangoon should



be relieved from the exactions by which it had hitherto been repressed. These proposals were received by the Burma negociators with manifest surprise, and were strenuously resisted. The war, they maintained, had been occasioned by the protection given by the British to fugitives from the dominions of their sovereign; and had already inflicted upon the country an amount of expense and injury which might well appease the resentment of a great nation. The Chinese had formerly invaded and conquered part of Ava, but when peace was re-established, had given back the subjugated territory, and had exacted no pecuniary compensation: this example was worthy of imitation by the British. At any rate, they were unauthorised to accede to such conditions, and must refer them to the royal pleasure, for the ascertainment of which, a further delay was unavoidable; and they proposed, therefore, to extend the armistice to the beginning of November. This was readily granted, as military movements could not be conveniently commenced at an earlier period, and the interval enabled the British Commander-in-Chief to perfect his plans for the opening of the campaign. Little doubt was entertained, that recourse must be again had to arms; and the expectation became a certainty by the receipt of a letter from the Burma chief, at the end of October, in which it was announced, that if peace was sincerely wished for by the English, they must empty their hands of what they held, and then solicit terms; but that if they made any demands for money for their expenses, or for any territory, friendship was at an end. Such was the custom of the Burmas. This announcement precluded all further negociations; and preparations were forthwith set on foot for the vigorous prosecution of the war. They were anticipated by the advance of the enemy.

As soon as the nature of the British requisitions was known at Court, the indignation of the Monarch was sensibly excited, and the representations of the party that deprecated any concession, re-obtained their former influence. It was still maintained to be possible to exterminate the British; and the army was ordered to move without delay upon Prome, the command being given to a veteran chief, who had formerly enjoyed a high military reputation for his services in Arakan, and who, at a very

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BOOK III. advanced age obeyed the call of his prince, and relinquished the retirement into which he had withdrawn, to lead the forces of his country, as he fully confided, once

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more to victory. Under his command, the Burma army drew towards the British lines at Prome, with a view to circumscribe their limits, and harass, and intercept their communications. A considerable body was accordingly thrown forward to Watigaon, twenty miles from Prome, where they entrenched themselves in a position which gave them the command over the country, on the right flank of the British army, and from which it was, therefore, necessary to dislodge them.

On the evening of the 15th November, Brigadier McDowall was despatched against Watigaon, with four Regiments of the Madras N. I., disposed in three columns: the first, under Colonel McDowall himself, consisting of the 28th and 43rd Regiments, was intended to attack the position on the left; the second, formed of the 22nd Regiment, led by Major R. Lacy Evans, was to assail it in front, supported by the 18th, which was moved forward for that purpose. The 38th Regiment formed the third column, and moved to the eastward. The ground did not admit of the employment of artillery. The columns marched separately across a plain much broken by swamp and thicket, which prevented their mutual communication; and on their way, they were opposed by parties of the enemy, who shewed themselves in great strength; and who, although repulsed, retarded the progress of the columns. It thus became impossible to operate in concert; and when the principal body under Colonel McDowall approached the works, there was no appearance of the other divisions. As the brigade was unprovided with battering guns, the entrenchments could not be breached; and in the attempt to push forward and force an entrance, a heavy fire was poured upon the troops, by which their commander being killed and many of their officers disabled, Lieut.-Colonel Brooke, who succeeded to the command, was compelled to order a retreat. The Burmas pursued the retiring detachment to within nine miles of Prome, and had thrown it into great disorder, when the movements of the other divisions also in retreat, effected a diversion in its favour.



The column under Major Evans fell in with the enemy's picquets early in the morning, and drove them in upon a strong stockade, from which so heavy a fire was encountered, that the advance was almost annihilated. The firing from the main column was heard, but, as there appeared to be no prospect of its co-operation, the regiment retired, pursued for about three miles by the Burmas, and obliged to abandon the wounded; but otherwise retreating in good order. The 38th Regiment, under Colonel Smith, was unable to reach Watigaon before noon, by which time the other columns were in full retreat. A body of the Burmas was encountered and dispersed; but as no traces of the main division could be discovered, and the firing had ceased, it was concluded that the attack had failed, and the column returned, after a fatiguing march, to Prome, having met with no other opposition. The loss of the detachment was severe.¹ A principal cause of the failure appears to have been misinformation as to the strength of the Burma force, which had been reported not to exceed two or three thousand.² It was estimated by the officers engaged, at five times that number. The separation of the attacking columns was also ill-judged; as the nature of the ground to be traversed, rendered it impossible for the different detached divisions to arrive simultaneously at their destination.

The success of the Burmas on this occasion confirmed them in their expectation of compelling the British army to retire from Prome and encouraged them to advance within a few miles of the town. Their left, under Maha Nemyo, which had lately triumphed at Watigaon, took post at Tsembike, on the Nawain river, a stream running past Prome, and falling into the Irawadi. The centre, commanded by the Kyi Wungyi, moved down to the heights of Napadi, within a distant view of the cantonments, and thence spread round to Watigaon. The Burma right, under the Tsada Wun, followed the right bank of the Irawadi to Padong, and thence detached a body to Shwe-

¹ Besides the death of the Commanding Officer, ten officers were wounded, of whom, Lieut. Ranken, 43rd Madras N. I., died. Of the Native troops, fifty-three were killed, one hundred and ten were wounded, and forty-two were missing. A total loss of above two hundred.

² Despatch of Sir A. Campbell. Documents 150. — According to Lieut. Trant, it consisted of eight thousand Shans, two thousand Burmas, and six hundred horse, under the command of Maha Nemyo.



BOOK III. dong in the rear. The former was occupied by a detach-
CHAP. IV. ment of the Royals, who had thrown up an entrenchment,
1825. and repulsed every attempt of the Burmas to expel them. Colonel Godwin was despatched to drive the enemy from Shwe-dong; but he was anticipated by the 87th, which, on its way to join the main body, had been fired upon from the post, and had in consequence landed and dispersed their assailants, leaving the communication again open. The Tsada Wun fell back, so as to communicate with the Kyi Wungyi, occupying the rocks on the right bank of the river. The several divisions of the Burma army were all strongly entrenched. On their side, the British were diligently engaged in strengthening themselves with field-works and entrenchments, as if in apprehension of an attack, and in the hope of inviting it. This defensive attitude, however, failed in its object. The Burma generals adhered to the national tactics of a gradual and guarded approach; and it was evident, that the British front could be cleared of the enemy, only by assuming the initiative, and making an attack upon the Burma lines.

In pursuance of this determination, Sir Archibald Campbell, leaving four regiments of Native Infantry for the defence of Prome, marched, on the 1st of December, with the remainder of his force. Directing the flotilla, with a regiment of Native Infantry, to make a demonstration against the enemy's right, so as to engross their attention, he directed his principal attack against their left. The army was formed into two divisions; one, under the Commander-in-Chief, consisted of the 13th, 38th, 47th, and 87th Regiments of His Majesty's troops, and the 38th Madras, N. I.: the other, under General Cotton, was composed of His Majesty's 41st and 89th Regiments, and the 18th and 28th Regiments of N. I. The second division, following the left bank of the Nawain river, came first upon the enemy's works about noon. They were immediately stormed and carried by Lieut.-Colonel Godwin, with the advance. The Burmas left three hundred dead in the entrenchments: their veteran general, Maha Nemyo, was among the slain. The division commanded by Sir A. Campbell was delayed by the difficulty of the route; but it arrived on the opposite bank of the Nawain as the fugi-



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tives were escaping from the stockades which the second division had carried, and completed their defeat. The first division then countermarched to Ziuk, at the ford over the Nawain, where it halted for the night: the second division bivouacked at Tsembike: both ready to follow up the advantage which had been gained by an attack on the right of the enemy's centre at Napadi.

On the morning of the 2nd the force advanced, and when arrived at the foot of the hill, divided into two columns: one of which, under Brigadier Cotton, took a circuitous direction to the right, so as to fall upon the enemy's flank; while the other, following the bank of the river, ascended the hills by narrow pathways obstructed by underwood. The flotilla at the same time pulled up the river, and throwing shells and rockets into the stockades on either bank, kept down the fire from the guns which defended the Burma position. As soon as this was effected, the troops moved to storm the entrenchments, the 13th and 38th Regiments under Colonel Sale proceeded along the river, supported on their right by six Companies of the 87th. They were encountered by a heavy fire, but pursued their way steadily without firing a shot, until they had gained the summit, when they drove the Burmas from the entrenchments, and followed them from hill to hill, until the whole position, two miles in extent, was in their possession. General Cotton was unable to penetrate through the thicket; but this was immaterial, as the works were gained, and the enemy had disappeared everywhere, except on the right bank of the river, where the Tsada Wun still remained in force. On the 5th of December, Brigadier-General Cotton, with a part of his division, crossed the Irawadi, and drove the Burmas from the works on the river, and from a strong stockade in the interior.¹ The whole of the Burma force was thus, once more, broken up, and was further weakened by the almost entire desertion of the Shans, who returned to their own country. Thus reduced, the Burma commanders were unable to man the defences which they had constructed along the river,

¹ In these operations, the loss was twenty-five killed, and one hundred and twenty-one wounded. Three officers, Lieuts. Sutherland and Gossip, of His Majesty's 41st, and Lieut. Proctor, of His Majesty's 38th, were killed. Ensign Campbell, of the 1st, and Lieut. Baylee, of the 87th were mortally wounded.



BOOK III. and abandoned their stockades at Miaday and Palha, which
CHAP. IV. could not have been forced without loss. The reliques of
1825 the Burma army having fallen back to Melloon, they were
followed thither by the British army, the march of which
was delayed by the badness of the road, and by a temporary
attack of cholera, which was fortunately of short continuance,
and of which the ravages were most extensive among the
retreating masses of the enemy, as was evidenced by the dead
and dying, by which their route was marked. The force
reached Miaday on the 19th, and after a short halt for
supplies, resumed its advance, accompanied by the
flotilla. The latter was met on the 26th by a flag of truce,
bearing a message from the Burma Commander, stating
that full powers had been received from the Court to
conclude a treaty, and suggesting that deputies should be
sent to discuss the conditions. The same officers who were
formerly employed on a similar mission, Lieut.-Colonel Tidy
and Lieut. Smith, R. N., were again sent on this duty.
The army continued its march, and arrived at Patanagoh,
opposite to Melloon, on the 29th, where it encamped. The
flotilla also ascended the river, and was suffered to pass
Melloon without molestation. The bank of the river occupied
by the British being loftier than that on the opposite side,
the whole of the interior of the Burma entrenchment could
be distinguished from the camp. It was a quadrangular
stockade, extending along the bank of the river, having in
the centre a conical hill, surrounded by a Pagoda, and
fortified by a brick *revêtement*, which formed the key of
the position. On the day before the arrival of the army at
Patanagoh, a message was received from the Burma chief,
proposing a meeting with the British Commissioners on the
24th of January, and repeating a proposal made to the
deputies, that a suspension of arms should in the mean
time take place. As the object of the proposition was
obviously to gain time, it was at once declined, and the
Wungyis were informed that no delay would be granted.
As soon as the army was encamped, however, it was
conceded to another messenger from the Chiefs to
abstain from hostile operations on the ensuing morning,
and to hold a conference with the Burma Chiefs on board
a boat, which they undertook to fit up for the meeting,
and anchor in the middle of the river. Ac-



cordingly, on the 30th, Sir Archibald Campbell, accompanied by Mr. Robertson, who had been appointed from Bengal as Civil Commissioner conjointly with the Commander-in-Chief, and by Sir James Brisbane, repaired on board, and were met by four of the principal members of the Burma Government, Kolein Mengyi, who had been sent down from Ava, with powers to treat, the Kyi Wungyi, the Atwen-wun Mung Kyne, and Maha Thilwa. The stipulations were the same as those formerly proposed, and were encountered with the same objections. Those relating to territorial concession were not persisted in; but the unwillingness to pay a money indemnification was so insuperable, and the plea of inability so tenaciously urged, that the British Commissioners were induced to lower their demand to one crore of rupees. With this alternation, the Burma Commissioners professed themselves contented, and a definitive treaty was executed by them on the 3rd of January. An armistice was agreed upon until the 18th, by which period it was expected that the treaty would be returned from Ava with the royal ratification, the prisoners at Ava would be sent down, and the payment of the first instalment would be commenced. These expectations were disappointed.

On the 17th of January, the day before the armistice expired, a deputation was sent by the Burma Commander to apologise for the non-arrival of the ratified treaty, and request a few days' prolongation of the time, offering to pay an instalment of five lakhs of rupees immediately, and to give hostages for the liberation of the prisoners. Compliance with the request was declined; and, on the 18th, a deputation proceeded to Melloon from the British camp, to apprise the Wungyis, that, unless the ratified treaty should arrive, or, unless they engaged to evacuate Melloon by sunrise on the 20th, the post would be attacked. For the former alternative they were unable to pledge themselves; and they refused to accede to the latter. Recourse to arms became consequently unavoidable.

The Burmas had not been idle during the interval which had elapsed since the first appearance of the British forces at Patanagoh; but had added extensively, although covertly, to the strength of their defences, and they had been joined by considerable reinforcements, making their



BOOK III. numbers from sixteen to twenty thousand. Their confidence, however, was too violently shaken, to enable them to avail themselves courageously of their resources ; and the

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The British batteries were opened upon the works before noon on the 19th of January, with great effect ; and under cover of their fire, a brigade of the 13th and 38th Regiments, conjointly less than five hundred strong, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sale, crossed the river below the entrenchments, to assault the south-east angle, while the main force under General Cotton crossed higher up, in order to attack the northern front. The boats of the first division were carried rapidly down the current past the works of Melloon, from which a heavy fire was opened upon them ; by which Colonel Sale and several of the men were wounded. The troops effected a landing, and after a short interval, escalated the entrenchments. The Burmas made no further resistance, but retreated with such celerity, that they eluded the pursuit of General Cotton's division, which had landed, and attempted to intercept their retreat. A great number of guns of various descriptions were found in Melloon, with abundant stores of ammunition and grain. The capture was attended with but trifling loss. The works were set on fire, and the army resumed its advance, anticipating, from the apparent resolution of the Court of Ava, the necessity of occupying the capital. One more effort was made by the war party to avert such a catastrophe.

Anxious as were the sovereign and his ministers to put an end to a contest which had inflicted so much injury and disgrace, and menaced consequences still more fatal ; the conditions of peace, particularly the payment of an indemnification which was regarded with peculiar aversion, not only from the avaricious disposition of the king but as a confession of inferiority, and an unequivocal sign of degradation, were felt to be so intolerable, that any chance of escaping from them, however desperate, was eagerly grasped at ; and the empty boast of a military chief that he would be answerable for the discomfiture of the invaders was listened to with credulity. Zay-yah-thuyan, the name of this individual, who was dignified with the title of Nuring Phuring, prince of Sun-set, was entrusted with



the greatest force that could be collected, amounting to about sixteen thousand men; and with these he engaged to cover the capital against the nearer approach of the British army. At the same time, it was thought prudent to keep open the negotiation, and deputies were despatched to the British camp to ascertain the ultimatum of the Commissioners. Either from a distrust of its own officers, or in the belief that the choice would be acceptable to the British, the deputies of the Court on this occasion were Mr. Price, an American Missionary, settled at Ava, and Mr. Sandford, the Surgeon of the Royals, who had been taken prisoner: four other prisoners were set at liberty, and sent down with the deputies. The latter reached the head-quarters of the force, on the 31st of January, and after a conference with the Commissioners, returned to Ava: the stipulations previously proposed were insisted upon without modification.

In the mean time, the march of the army continued, and on the 8th of February, approached within five miles of the ancient city of Pagahm, the capital of the Burma empire at the season of its greatest power and prosperity. The city was enclosed by a ruinous brick wall, which had been partially repaired, but behind which the Burmas evinced no disposition to take shelter. Their new General had adopted a novel system of tactics; and discarding the national practice of combating behind entrenchments, arrayed his army in the open field among the remains of numerous pagodas, and amidst a thicket of prickly jungle traversed by a narrow pathway, on either side of which he had arranged the chief body of his troops. The force with Sir A. Campbell, did not exceed thirteen hundred men, of whom nine hundred were Europeans; two regiments of the latter, the 47th and 87th detached to Tondwyne, to collect cattle and grain, as well as disperse a body of Burmas reported to be stationed there to harass the British flanks, not having rejoined. With the limited force under his command, General Campbell moved to attack the superior numbers of the enemy on the morning of the 9th, advancing in two divisions. The first, commanded by himself, was formed of His Majesty's 13th and 89th Regiments, four guns of the Horse Artillery, and a detachment of the Body Guard. The 38th and 41st Regiments formed



BOOK III. the second division, commanded by Brigadier Cotton ; and
CHAP. IV. the left was covered by the 43rd Madras N. I., following
1825. the line of the river. The European divisions were directed severally against the left and right wings, while the advance led by Sir A. Campbell, and consisting of two companies of the 13th, with the Horse Artillery and the Body Guard, occupied the centre. The several attacks were crowned with success ; although for a short time the safety of the advance was compromised. Pushing forward with their usual impetuosity, and driving the enemy before them, they had left behind them the supporting columns, which were more slowly disengaging themselves from the narrow route by which they had to pass. Observing this, the Burma General ordered large detachments including a body of six hundred Casay horse, to close in from his centre and left, and cut off the most forward of his assailants from their main body. The necessity of a retreat was obvious ; but it was made with a coolness and deliberation which deterred the Burmas from following up their advantage, the troopers of the Body-Guard forming in the rear, while the guns of the Horse Artillery were loaded, and opening to the left and right to allow of their being fired. In this manner, alternately forming and retreating, this small body checked the audacity of their pursuers ; and the progress of the flank divisions speedily put an end to the danger. The Burmas were driven from the field ; a stockade which covered their right flank was carried at the point of the bayonet ; and the last army which the Court of Ava could hope to raise was destroyed. Its presumptuous commander returned to Ava, to carry the tidings of his defeat, and solicit the command of another army with which to retrieve his credit. He was ordered from the presence with contumely, and on the night of his arrival put to death. That the contest had become hopeless, and that the British arms had nothing more to apprehend from the exhausted energies of Ava became manifest to the people ; and their conviction was evidenced by their return to their homes which they had been forced by the Burma authorities to abandon. They flocked into Pagahm from every quarter ; and numerous boats crowded with men, women, and children passed hourly down the river to the villages on the banks. The army halted a few days at



Pagahm to recover from the fatigue which it had undergone, from the nature of the road and the increasing heat of the weather.

While these transactions were taking place on the upper course of the Irawadi, the province of Pegu had been the scene of some military movements of a chequered character, but ending in success. Upon the advance to Prome it was not thought necessary at once to dislodge the Burmas from the line of the Sitang river on the right flank of the army; but the duty was assigned to a division under Colonel Pepper, consisting of the flank companies of the Madras European Regiment, and three regiments of N. I., which marched from Pegu, in order to occupy Tongho, about eighty miles east of Prome. As the detachment advanced the Burmas abandoned their posts, and the detachment entered Shoegyun on the Sitang river, without opposition, on the 4th of January. It was here ascertained, that the former governor of Martaban with a considerable body was stockaded at Sitang, in the rear of the advance, and intercepted the communication with the lower provinces. The 3rd Regiment of Madras N. I. under Lieut.-Colonel Conry, was sent back to dislodge the Burmas from the position; but this attack was repulsed with heavy loss, including the commander.¹ The disaster was immediately repaired by the activity of Colonel Pepper who falling down the river with his whole disposable force, attacked and carried the stockade by storm, on the afternoon of the 11th January. The works were strong and well situated, and were defended with spirit. The loss was proportionately severe;² that of the enemy was much greater. Colonel Pepper was reinforced after the capture of Sitang, in such a manner as to ensure the command of the country against any efforts yet in the power of the enemy to make.

After halting five days at Pagahm, Sir Archibald Campbell, on the 16th February, continued his march towards the capital, and had reached Yandabo, within sixty miles

¹ Besides Col. Conry, Lieut Adams of the 3rd Regiment was killed; two officers, Lieuts. Harvey and Potter, were wounded; ten natives were killed, and nineteen wounded.

² Two officers, Capts. Cursham and Stedman, were killed. Major Home, Lieut. Fullerton, and Lieut. Power, were severely wounded. The loss in rank and file, was fourteen killed, and fifty-three wounded.



BOOK III. of Ava, when he was again met by the only negotiators in
CHAP. IV. whom the king had confidence, the American missionaries,
Messrs. Price and Judson, accompanied by two Burma
1825. ministers of rank, and by a number of prisoners who were
liberated as a proof of the sincerity of the Court. A more
convincing testimony was afforded by the first instalment
of the contribution (twenty-five lakhs of rupees), which
was brought by the Atwenwuns; and by the authority
vested in the American deputies to accede to whatever
terms the British Commissioners should impose. No
other conditions were stipulated for than those already
insisted upon; and a treaty was finally concluded upon
the basis already described. The King of Ava renounced
all claim to, and right of interference with the country of
Asam, and the principalities of Jyntia and Kachar, and
recognised the independence of Manipur. He consented
to cede in perpetuity the four divisions of Arakan, or
Arakan Proper, Ramri, Cheduba, and Sandoway, and the
three districts of Tenasserim, Ye, Tavoy, and Mergui, or
the whole of the coast, belonging to Ava, south of the
Sanluen river; to receive a Resident at his capital, and
sanction the conclusion of a commercial treaty; and,
finally, he agreed to pay a crore of rupees, or about a
million sterling, in four instalments, the first immediately,
the second within one hundred days from the date of the
treaty, and the other two in the course of the two follow-
ing years. On their part, the British engaged to retire at
once to Rangoon, and to quit the Burma territory, upon
the payment of the second instalment. The treaty was
concluded on the 24th of February. Its conditions were
ultimately fulfilled, although the discharge of the pro-
mised indemnity was tardily and reluctantly completed.

As soon as the ratification of the treaty was received,
the army broke up from Yandabo. A brigade, formed of
His Majesty's 87th, and the Native Corps at head-quarters,
under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Hunter Blair,
followed the route to Rangoon by land, while, as has been
noticed, the 18th Madras Infantry, with the elephants,
under the command of Captain David Ross, marched first
to Pakang-yeh on the Irawadi, eight marches from
Yandabo; and thence, after crossing the river to Sem-
bewghwen, quitted the low country in three days; and, in



TREATY OF PEACE CONCLUDED.

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eight more, crossed the mountains by a practicable route to Aeng in Arakan.¹ The remaining troops, with the Commander-in-Chief and Civil Commissioner, embarked in boats provided by the Burma Government, and proceeded down the river to Rangoon, whence such of the troops, as were not required for the protection of the cautionary towns and conquered provinces, were despatched to their several presidencies. Sir Archibald Campbell, after visiting Calcutta, returned to Rangoon, of which he held possession agreeably to the terms of the treaty, until the payment of the second instalment at the end of the year. He then removed the troops to Moalmain, an inconsiderable village opposite to Martaban on the British side of the Sanlue river, but which offered a convenient military frontier station. At the same time, a sea-port was formed at the mouth of the river, about twenty-seven miles below Moalmain, to which the name of Amherst was assigned. The Tenasserim provinces were placed under the authority of a Commissioner appointed from Bengal. The subject of a commercial treaty, which had been generally indicated in that of Yandabo, was more especially determined at the end of the year, when Mr. Crawford, who had been previously appointed Civil Commissioner at Rangoon, was directed to proceed as envoy to Ava, to conclude the arrangement, as well as to clear up doubts which had arisen with respect to the eastern frontier. The former object of the mission was accomplished: but the question of the boundary,² especially on the side of Manipur,³ was left undetermined, when Mr. Crawford left Ava,

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¹ Captain Trant observes: "We met with but little arduous difficulty, yet performed a march of one hundred and twenty-four miles, which had been supposed impracticable, in eleven days, and clearly pointed out, that, had this road been examined, it would have been found that there was nothing to have prevented a portion of General Morrison's army from wintering in Ava, instead of perishing in the marshes of Arakan."—*Two Years in Ava*, p. 447.

² Of this treaty, Mr. Bayfield observes, "the Court never considered it as a treaty, but as a royal license; and that it left to the King the right of prohibiting the free exportation of the precious metals, as well as levying royal and all customary duties on the British vessels and trade."—*Hist. Sketches*. The conditions were little regarded by the Governors of Rangoon, and their own interests continued to be, as heretofore, the measure of their exactions.

³ The Raja of Manipur, Gambhir Sing, claimed the Kobo Valley, a fertile strip of land between the foot of the hills on the eastern confines of Manipur and the Ningti river, the right to which was denied by the Burmas. The question was diligently examined, and afforded an opportunity, of which advantage was taken, to depute at different times British officers to visit the localities between Manipur and Ava, by which valuable knowledge was obtained of the interjacent countries. In 1833, the Resident was authorised to apprise



BOOK III in the beginning of December, and returned to Bengal
CHAP. IV. early in the following year. The stipulation of the treaty
of Yandabo providing for the permanent residence of a
1825. representative of the British Government, at the capital
of Ava, was little less unpalatable to the Sovereign than
the demand upon his treasury; and it was not until the
beginning of 1829, that the presence of a resident was
felt to be essential for the adjustment of various subjects
of discussion, and Major Burney was in consequence ap-
pointed. However acceptable to the Ministers, and to the
King personally, and although discharging the duties of
his appointment in a spirit of conciliation and impar-
tiality, the Resident failed to reconcile the Court to an
arrangement which they looked upon as a public and per-
petual record of their humiliation.

The enormous expense, and the vast loss of life which
the war with Ava had occasioned, and the uncertainty of
reaping any adequate advantage from the acquisitions with
which it had closed, excited in the authorities at home a
strong feeling in opposition to the inevitability of the war,
and in condemnation of the system on which it had been
conducted. The occupation of Shahpuri, a mere sand-bank,
it was argued, was wholly unworthy of serious dispute;
and its relinquishment involved no loss, either of revenue
or reputation. The interposition exercised in the affairs
of the petty states of Kachar and Manipur was treated as
unseasonable and impolitic; and the facilities which the
fugitives from Asam and Arakan were permitted to find in
the Company's territories for maintaining a civil war in
the countries from which they had been expelled, with the
refusal of the British Government to apprehend and give
up those disturbers of the public peace, afforded, it was
affirmed, reasonable ground of offence to the Court of Ava,
and evinced a spirit which could not fail to irritate an
ambitious and semi-barbarous power. A more concilia-
tory policy would, in all probability, have prevented the
collision; and, if it had not succeeded, the only alternative

the King, that the supreme Government adhered to the opinion that the Ningit
formed the proper boundary between Ava and Manipur; but that, in con-
sideration for His Majesty's feelings and wishes, and in the spirit of amity and
good-will subsisting between the two countries, it consented to the restora-
tion of the Kubo Valley to Ava, and to the establishment of the boundary line
at the foot of the Yumadong Hills.—Pemberton, p. 119.



necessary was, the maintenance of a sufficiently strong defensive attitude on the frontier, to have protected it from violation. War with Ava was particularly to have been avoided, not from any fear of its military power, or doubt of the result, but from the difficulty of reaching the enemy through the natural defences by which he was guarded, the absence of all resources in his country, the scantiness and misery of the population, and the insalubrity of the climate. No conquests that might be made could compensate for the evils that were unavoidable, as the greater part of the dominions of Ava were not only incapable of contributing to the public revenue, but of defraying the cost of the establishments requisite for their government. They could be alone retained by a further waste of money and of men, and must be sources of weakness, not of strength, to the Indian empire.

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The observations that have been suggested by the occurrence of hostilities with Nepal, apply* with equal force to the war with Ava. A continued course of forbearance and conciliation, involving loss of credit to the State, and positive injury to its subjects, might possibly have delayed, but could not have prevented a rupture. Incapable of appreciating a generous and civilised policy, ignorant of the resources of the Government whose resentment they defied, reckless of international rights, inflated with an overweening confidence in their own prowess, and emboldened by a career of victory, the King and the Ministers of Ava were, as we have already explained, eager for a contest, the results of which they did not for a moment question, would be the confirmation of their supremacy over the countries from which they had expelled the legitimate princes, and the re-annexation to the dominion of the Burmas, of those portions of Bengal which had become their right, as constituting provinces of the conquered kingdom of Arakan. These notions were fostered by forbearance. The obvious and avowed anxiety of the Government of Bengal to preserve amicable relations uninterrupted was misinterpreted; and its reluctance was ascribed, not to moderation, but to fear. To have persisted in the same policy must have led to the same result, as it would have tended only to confirm the Burmas in their schemes of aggrandisement. Nothing



BOOK III. but experience of the immense superiority of such an
CHAP. IV. antagonist as they encountered, could have convinced
1825. them of the reality of that superiority. It may be
doubted, if they are, even now, fully sensible of its truth :
and it is certain that they have abated but little of their
arrogance in their dealings with the British settle-
ments.

The expedition to Rangoon was unpropitiously timed ;
but it was clearly directed against a quarter which, as far
as was then known, was the most vulnerable of the
territories of Ava. The plan of conveying a large army
with all its stores, ammunition, baggage, and followers,
five hundred miles, in open boats, against the current of
a large and rapid river, was evidently ill-considered ; and
the consequent despatch of the armament, so as to avail
itself of the Monsoon, was unfortunate ; but the most
disastrous results of the expedition were the effect of
circumstances which could scarcely have been anticipated,
the disappearance, voluntary or enforced, of the whole of
the population. Hence the want of necessary supplies,
and the fatal mortality that prevailed during the first
months of the campaign. With the cessation of the rainy
season, the advance of the army by land met with no
serious impediments, and, although retarded by the in-
sufficiency of the local resources, was victoriously prose-
cuted to within a few miles of the capital : establishing
the superior advantages of the route by which the invaders
had marched, over those which were attempted through
Kachar and Arakan. The former of these originated in a
strange want of information respecting the country to be
traversed, and the utter impossibility of moving through
it in masses embarrassed with the cumbrous equipments
of European warfare. In that case also, as well as with
respect to Arakan, a most exaggerated opinion seems to
have been entertained of the strength of the Burmas ;
and large and heavily-armed bodies were consequently
sent to perform what two or three regiments, lightly
equipped, would have easily accomplished. Hence arose
a main portion of the expenditure, as the supplies of the
large army of Arakan had to be sent by sea, and to be
conveyed across the mouths of wide creeks, after being
brought at a great charge, and to but little purpose, from



a considerable distance;¹ and hence originated that disastrous decimation of the troops, which was inflicted by the pestilential vapours of the climate. These were the radical errors of the military arrangements, and might have been prevented, had the plan, first laid down, of confining the operations on the frontier to simple demonstrations while the main effort on the side of Rangoon was urged with vigour, been adhered to. The Burmas were expelled from Asam by the Company's native troops alone. They were driven out of Kachar and Manipur by a handful of Manipuris under their Raja, and a British officer; and a force efficient, but not unwieldy, would, in all likelihood, have been equally successful in Arakan. The expedition to Rangoon, in fact, paralysed the efforts of the Court of Ava in other quarters; and the whole of their attention after their first ill-sustained success at Ramoo, was concentrated upon the imminent danger which threatened them at home.

BOOK III.
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The territorial acquisitions which it was deemed advisable to exact from Ava were, at the time of their cession, of little value to either state. Long the prey of intestine discord and of foreign oppression, the population had been almost exterminated; and tracts, which were once the seats of busy industry, were overrun with impenetrable wilderness. They have not even yet recovered from the wide and wasting decay into which they had been plunged by internal anarchy and Burma misrule; but they have benefited by the continuance of tranquillity and good government, and abundance is spreading over their fields and their villages; and an augmenting population is industriously driving back the encroachments of the thicket. In Asam and in Kachar, agricultural cultivation has spread extensively; and new articles of culture, especially that of the Tea Plant, are likely to become important accessions to the resources of the former. The Tenasserim provinces present a valuable line of sea-coast, contributing to the British command of the Bay of Bengal, and offering a channel to commercial enterprise, as the means of communication with Siam and the Shan tribes, as far as the western confines of

¹ Several thousand head of cattle, sent at a great expense from the Upper Provinces of Hindustan to Chittagong, never crossed the Myoo.



BOOK III. China: they are also rich in vegetable and mineral products.¹ Of these conquests, however, Arakan has made the most decided advance. Favourably circumstanced, both as to climate and soil, for the growth of rice, it has become the granary of the countries on either shore of the bay; and hundreds of vessels now annually sail from its harbours, which at the time of the conquest rarely sent even a fishing boat to sea.² In an economical point of view, therefore, these territories have already exceeded expectation, and are in a state of progress to still greater improvement; while they have a real political value in constituting a difficult and well defined frontier, presenting a ready access to Ava and Siam, and promising at some future period convenient intercourse by land with the opulent empire of China. The civilisation of the barbarous tribes which occupy the intervening space, may also be contemplated as a certain although distant result; and although some temporary embarrassment and distress may have been occasioned by the war with Ava, the interests of British India and of Oriental civilisation will be gainers by the contest,

CHAPTER V.

State of Feeling in Hindustan in 1824. — Extensive Dissatisfaction. — Protected Sikh States. — Raja set up at Kunjawa. — Fort stormed. — Religious Impostor put down. — Outrages in Hariana. — Attack on Kalpee —

¹ Particularly Teak Timber and Tin. Moalmain, which, as noticed in the text, was an inconsiderable cluster of miserable huts in 1826, is now a large town containing, with the adjacent district, a population of 60,000, and carrying on an active trade. The average value of the Exports for the three years ending in 1839, was about £70,000, and of the Imports £140,000. The population of the Tenasserim provinces, although much increased, is still not much above 100,000, or little more than three to the square mile.—Reports on the Tenasserim Provinces by Dr. Helfer, Calcutta. Printed also in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1838-1840. Also Bengal and Agra Gazetteer, 1841, vol. 2.

² In 1839-40, nearly twelve hundred square-rigged vessels sailed from Akyab, besides country coasting vessels. The value of the rice exported exceeded twelve lacs of rupees (£120,000); the rice was sent to the opposite coast of the Peninsula, to the Isle of France, to the Peninsula of Malacca, Siam, and China. The land in cultivation had been more than doubled; but it still did not exceed more than one twenty-fifth of the whole capable of being cultivated. The population had increased from about 100,000 in 1823 to 250,000 in 1839. The net revenue, at the latter date, was about £60,000, and was fully equal to the charges.



Mischievous Reports current in Malwa. — Predatory Incursions of Sheikh Dalla. — Rising of the Bhils in Baglana, — of the Coolies in Guzerat. — British Officers killed at Kittur, — Fort surrendered. — Capture of Omraiz. — Troublesome Conduct of the Raja of Kolapur, — Force sent against him, — Treaty concluded, — violated and renewed, — Military Control maintained until his Death. — Disturbances in Cutch. — Incursions from Sindh. — Feelings of the People towards the British Government in the British Provinces. — Sentiments of the Native Princes. — Relaxation of Control. — Transactions with Alwar. — Claimants for the Raj. — Attempted Assassination of Ahmed Baksh Khan. — Investigation demanded, — refused by the Raja. — Transactions with Bhurtpore. — Recognised Right of Succession of the Infant Raja. — Death of the Father, Baldeo Sing. — Guardian of the Minor murdered. — Durjan Sal seizes the chief Power, — his Right disallowed by the Resident of Delhi, — professes to act as Regent, — Professions not credited. — Sir D. Ochterlony assembles a Force against Bhurtpore, — Measures disapproved of by the Government, — Employment of Troops countermanded, — Resignation and Death of Sir D. Ochterlony, — his Popularity, — Prudence of the Decision of the Government, — Final Determination. — Large Force assembled under the Commander-in-Chief, — Siege of Bhurtpore. — Walls breached. — Mines sprung, — carried by Storm, — Durjan Sal taken, — Regency appointed. — Advance against Alwar, — Raja submits. — Visit of the Governor-General to the Upper Provinces. — Intercourse with the King of Oude. — Loans by the Court of Lucknow. — Death of the King. — Missions from Holkar, — and from Sindhia. — Death of Daulat Rao. — Regency of Baiza Bai. — Adoption of a Successor. — Visit to Delhi. — Residence at Simla. — Friendly Communications with Runjit Sing. — Insurrection of Afghans, — incited by Syed Ahmed, his Death. — War between Persia and Russia, — Successes of the Russians. — Territory ceded and Indemnification paid by Persia. — Abrogation of British Subsidy. — Death of Abbas Mirza. — Return of the Governor-General to Calcutta. — Discussion of Judicial Arrangements. — Progress at the different Presidencies. — Death of Sir T.



HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

Munro. — State of Finances. — Domestic Affairs. — Succession of Bishops. — Advance of Education. — Expedition in Search of Traces of La Perouse. — Close of Earl Amherst's Government and Departure for England.

BOOK III. THE condition of the territory subject to British
CHAP. V. dominion on the continent of India, about the period
1824. of the commencement of hostilities with the Burmas, although in the main satisfactory, was not exempt from sources of uneasiness. The impression produced by the splendid triumphs of the Pindari war had already lost much of its freshness, and the inhabitants of the West and the South, no longer exposed to the ravages of predatory bands, no longer permitted to recruit their ranks, and share in the spoil, began to grow impatient of an authority which, while it protected them from the lawlessness of their neighbours, also restricted them from the perpetration of violence. In several of the newly acquired districts, the financial exactions of the Government were undesignedly oppressive. The lands had been assessed when the prices of grain had been raised to an unnatural height, by the presence of large bodies of military, as well as by the extensive discontinuance of cultivation, and no allowance had been made for the inability of the people to pay the same amount of revenue, when, in consequence of the disappearance of the military bazars, and the great extension of agriculture that followed the re-establishment of peace and security, the produce of the soil had increased in a much more rapid ratio than the population, and the demand had proportionately declined. Some time elapsed before these altered circumstances were fully appreciated; and in the meanwhile the people and their rulers were mutually dissatisfied. The state of things was not much better in the old provinces. The tranquillisation of Hindustan had thrown back upon the Company's territories a multitude of military adventurers, who were natives of British India, and whose turbulence no longer found a safety-valve in the mercenary bands of Mahratta or Pathan. The defects in the administration of civil justice were still to be remedied. The police was still ineffective; and the settlement of the revenue for a period sufficiently pro-



tracted to ensure to the occupant the fruits of any improvement he might attempt, was still deferred. These causes produced a general sentiment of discontent; and in the course of 1824, there was scarcely a district, in the Upper Provinces in particular, in which a spirit of disaffection was not more or less manifested.¹ The feeling was fostered by the dissemination of vague and exaggerated rumours of the checks which had been suffered on the western frontier, and by a current belief that the resources of the state were wholly absorbed by the war; a belief confirmed by the march of the troops from the interior to the Presidencies, for service in Ava, and the consequent reduction of the military force on duty in Hindustan. The expression of the public sentiment was restricted, however, to partial and desultory manifestations, and to acts of petty and predatory violence, which the means at the command of the Government, and the activity of its officers, were fully able to suppress and punish.

In the protected Sikh provinces on the north-west, where in consequence of the drafts made upon the regular troops, the peace of the country had been entrusted almost to the unassisted guardianship of the native chiefs, a predatory leader, who had for some time past baffled the pursuit of justice, emboldened by the weakness of the local troops, collected a formidable band of followers, and established himself in the mud fort of Kunjawa, not many miles from the station of Saharanpur, where he assumed the title of Raja, and levied contributions on the surrounding districts. He was joined by adventurers from all parts of the country, and was rapidly organising a formidable insurrection, when the fort was attacked by a detachment of the Gorkha Battalion, and a small body of horse, under Captain Young and the Civil Commissioner, Mr. Shore. The banditti were dislodged after a fierce combat, in which one hundred and fifty of their number were killed. At a somewhat earlier date, a religious mendicant at Badawar announced his advent on an appointed day as Kali, the last of the Hindu Avatars, for the purpose of overturning the reign of the foreigners. He was apprehended: but on the day appointed, a lawless

¹ Notes on Indian Affairs, by the Hon. F. J. Shore, i. 159.



BOOK III. multitude headed by a body of Akalis, collected to effect
CHAP. V. his rescue. They were encountered by a party of horse,
1824. in the service of the Patiala Raja, by whom they were
discomfited and dispersed; and, as there was no further
sign of the promised Avatar, the agitation subsided.

It was not to be expected, that the turbulent tribes of Haryana, and the borderers of Bhatner and Bhikaner, the Mewatis and Bhattis, would remain tranquil under the temptation offered by the reduction of the military force in their neighbourhood, and the reported decline of the power of the Government. It happened also, unfortunately, that the autumnal harvest proved defective, and a scarcity of food contributed to impel the villagers to recur to their predatory practices. A band of plunderers from different villages in the district of Rotak, near Delhi, took the opportunity of a large Mela, or fair, at Beree, to carry off many hundred head of cattle, including a number purchased for the Government, proclaiming that its authority was at an end. A party of horse escorting public camels destined for the army, was attacked by the inhabitants of Bhawani, and other villages; and repulsed the assailants, only after suffering loss of life. Arms and ammunition were everywhere collected. The communication with Delhi was intercepted. A movement was threatened upon Hissar. Suraj Mal, an exiled marauder, returned from his exile, and at the head of four hundred matchlocks, and a party of horse, stormed and took the fort of Behut, defended only by a few Irregular Horse. Similar proceedings took place in the district of Rewari; and the spirit of turbulence was spreading to a dangerous extent, when measures were taken for its extinction. Two additional regiments of Irregular Horse were immediately raised for service in the Delhi districts; and the Gorkha Local Battalions were augmented. The increase of military strength, and the judicious arrangements of the chief Civil authorities, succeeded in restoring order.

In the province of Bundelkhand, heretofore an equally prolific source of turbulence, order was successfully preserved, with one wild but unimportant exception, in which an attempt was made by a refractory Jagirdar of the Jhaloun Raja, to carry off the public treasure from the fort of Kalpee, and plunder the town. The whole garrison con-



sisted of but one weak company of Sipahis, commanded by Captain Ramsay, while the assailants were in considerable strength, both horse and foot. The insurgents were repulsed from the fort, although it was not possible to defend the town, which was plundered and partly set on fire : the arrival of reinforcements soon put the marauders to flight. Their leader, Nana Pundit, was shortly afterwards taken prisoner and confined for life.

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In Malwa, similarly mischievous reports unsettled the minds of the people ; and a rumour was extensively circulated, that the British were about to retire from Central India, in consequence of the difficulties of the Burma war. No serious consequences, however, ensued. In Sondwana, an attempt was made to organise a rising ; but it was frustrated by the timely movement of a military detachment. More troublesome transactions occurred on the Nerbudda, in the vicinity of Burhanpur, in consequence of the reappearance of Shaikh Dalla, a notorious Pindari, and long the terror of the Nizam's territory. Through the collusion of the Mahratta manager of Burhanpur on behalf of Sindhia, and in league with the Eastern Bhils, the free-booter succeeded in reviving a system of outrage and plunder ; lurking in the jungle between Asirgerh and Elichpur, and suddenly sallying forth at the head of a strong party of horse and foot, and sweeping off the cattle and property of the villagers, and robbing and murdering travellers and merchants. Associated with him, was an impostor, pretending to be Chimnaji Appa, the brother of the Ex-Peshwa, who, at the head of a body of armed men, attempted to penetrate into Berar. Troops were despatched against Shaikh Dalla in different directions ; and the party of Chimnaji was surprised and dispersed by a division of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force under Major Seyer. The main body of his marauding confederates who were encamped in the vicinity hastily retired ; but their retreat brought them in contact with a party of the Mandaleswar Local Corps, under Lieut. Dermot, by which they were put to flight. The Pindari took to the thickets ; but the little success which had attended his career and the activity displayed in his pursuit so disheartened his followers, that he was unable again to make head in any force.