



The many unforeseen dangers and sudden irruptions, to which the Company's possessions in Bengal were continually exposed, induced the Council to press for the completion of the military establishment proposed by Lord Clive.* "That being maintained, the Company's revenues and possessions would be defended against the most considerable powers of the country."

1767.
BENGAL.

The Mahratta leaders, Ragonaut Rao and Janojee, the chief of Nagpore, having reconciled their differences, the expectation of acquiring Cuttack was rendered hopeless, and led to a suspicion that a junction would take place between the Soubah, Hyder, and the Mahrattas, against Bengal; but as affairs were in a state of tranquillity, the Council resolved to give every possible aid to the Madras Presidency, in the hope that the power of Hyder might be reduced.

Mahrattas.

The King and Shuja Dowla were represented to be "more united to us, both by inclination and interest." Sensible that the security of their possessions, as well as the degree of consideration they held in the empire, depended upon our friendship, they were desirous to govern their conduct by principles the most likely to promote an amicable understanding with the Company. The third brigade was stationed with them, at their request, and a detachment from the second brigade had

Sentiments of
the King and
Vizier towards
the Company.

* Letter to Court, 10th April, 1767.



1767.

BENGAL.

had crossed the Caramnassa, with the view of supporting what the Council felt to be the basis of the Company's alliance with the King and the Nabob, they agreeing to defray all extra charges : so that the Company incurred no extraordinary expense by the motion of these troops beyond the limits of the provinces. Chunagurwas garrisoned by the Company's forces. The Council added : "it is nevertheless our intention to recall all your forces, and punctually to observe your directions, whenever the disturbances which now prevail among the neighbouring powers will not endanger our own safety."

The Jauts.

Jewaher Sing, the chief of the Jauts, was at the head of an army, endeavouring to recover the territory of which he had been dispossessed by the Mahrattas. He entered the Rohilla country, and advanced within a few miles of the King's dominions. Colonel Smith was directed to remain with the third brigade until his intentions were more fully developed.

The Council received, in the month of April, a pressing invitation from the Rajah of Nepaul, for aid against the Rajah of Goorcullah, * by whom he had been deprived of his country, and shut up in his capital. Although they felt that such a military enterprize was foreign to the system of politics by which they proposed to regulate their conduct,

* Now known as the *Goorkah Rajah*.



conduct, they determined, after much deliberation, to send an expedition to Nepaul in support of the Rajah, between whose country and that of Bahar an advantageous trade had been carried on, and a considerable quantity of gold imported into Bengal. It was observed, that the vicinity of Nepaul to the Bettea country, which was in quiet possession of the Vizier, would bring additional commercial advantages; so that the Council entertained very flattering prospects of the issue of an expedition, of which "they hoped to send home a good account at the close of the season."*

1768.

BENGAL.

Expedition to
Nepaul.

Their anticipations were not realized. Captain Kinloch, who had been entrusted with the command, found it necessary to apply for reinforcements, without which he did not expect to succeed. This requisition occurring at the moment when the aid was required in support of the operations against Hyder, the expedition was recalled. Part of the lands belonging to the Goorcullah Rajah, bordering on the Bettea country, both rich and fertile, were kept to indemnify the charge already incurred.

Failure of ex-
pedition.

The Mahratta chief, Janojee, in demanding the *chout*, which had been regularly paid during the latter part of Aliverdy Khan's government, manifested a desire to treat for the cession of Cuttack to the Company. The President had several conferences

Proposed ces-
sion of Cut-
tack.

* Letter, 25th September, 1767.



1768.

BENGAL.

Chain of Com-
pany's influ-
ence.Revenues in
Bahar.Court's views
as to policy
abroad.To promote
happiness of
the natives.

ferences with Janojee's vakeel, in conjunction with Mahomed Reza Khan, who had arrived at the Presidency. The annual payment, for the cession and the *chout*, it was proposed to fix at sixteen lacs, to be accounted for from the time the Company took charge of the Dewanny. An arrangement was prepared, but never finally acted upon. The object of the Council was to form a complete chain of the Company's influence and dominion, from the banks of the Caramnassa to the extremity of the Coast of Coromandel.

In noticing the state of the revenues in Bahar, the Council remarked upon the small balance which was irrecoverable; and pointed out the great advantages anticipated from the tour of inspection and examination by the Company's servants selected for that duty "in Bahar, and in the Dinagepore and Purnea countries." The Zemindars were stated to have been guilty of frauds, embezzlements, and even crimes of an atrocious character.

The Court of Directors communicated to the Council at Calcutta their sentiments on the leading points in the advices from Bengal. They enjoined the Council:—

"Not to increase the revenues by any way which may oppress the inhabitants, whose happiness and prosperity we are desirous of cultivating upon every occasion, as it is upon their affections and confidence the permanency of our possessions will greatly depend.

"Never



“Never to extend your possessions beyond their present bounds.

1768.

BENGAL.

Keep within present bounds.

“Never to engage in a march to Delhi, nor enter into an offensive war, unless urged to it in pursuance of our treaty with the King and Shuja Dowla for the preservation of their dominions; and whenever called upon to march any troops for that purpose, to have Allahabad, Chunar, or some fortification, put in our possession.

“If these rules are strictly adhered to, we shall flatter ourselves our power and advantages in Bengal will obtain that permanency we have so long laboured at.

“We have paid much attention to your negotiations with Janojee for settling the *chout* on the terms agreed between the Mahrattas and Aliverdy Khan. We think it both equity and sound policy to pay them their *chout*, and shall much approve it, if it can be done on the terms you mention, of their ceding to us their possessions in Orissa, which would join our Bengal possessions to the Circars, and would afford us the means of preventing any hostile attempts of an European enemy who might land in that part of Orissa.

As to obtaining Orissa from the Mahrattas.

“From what appears in your proceedings, we think we discern too great an aptness to confederacies or alliances with the Indian powers: on which occasion, we must give it you as a general sentiment, that perfidy is too much the characteristic of Indian princes, for us to rely on any security with

Caution as to alliances with Indian powers



1768.

BENGAL.

Troops at Alla-
habad.

with them. But should you enter into a treaty to act in concert with them in the field, one of our principal officers is to command the whole : a pre-eminence our own security and our superior military skill will entitle us to.

“ As all our views and expectations are confined within the Caramnassa, we are impatient to hear our troops are recalled from Allahabad.

“ As it seems not impossible that Shuja Dowla may undertake to escort the King to Delhi, it becomes necessary we should give you our idea of the proper conduct to be held on that occasion, which entirely coincides with Lord Clive's opinion in his letter to the Select Committee, that to march any part of our army on such an expedition might bring on the total ruin of our affairs ; and we add, that, should you be persuaded into so rash and dangerous a measure, we shall deem you responsible for all the consequences ; and as such a measure would be attended with the greatest danger to our affairs, be assured we shall be extremely jealous of every one high in our service, civil or military, who shews a tendency to such an expedition.

“ The only precautions we would recommend against Shuja Dowla's military progress, are, to prevent Europeans as much as possible from engaging in his service, and to be very watchful that no cannon, fire-arms, or artillery stores, find their way by the Ganges into his dominions.

“ Every



“ Every method must be tried to get Monsieur Gentil, and every European, from his country, observing to use therein such means as shall not hurt the dignity or independency of Shuja Dowla, or leave room for the French to construe them as violations of the friendship between the two crowns.”*

1768.
BENGAL.

“ As we look with a favourable eye on every attempt for the extension of commerce, we do not disapprove the expedition to Nepaul, and are sorry it failed of success. You did right not to renew the expedition till the state of your forces would better admit of it, and to hold in your possession lands taken from the Goorkah Rajah, as an indemnification for the expenses we had been put to; and they may be of use, should it hereafter be thought proper to renew the attempt, and we hope their amount has answered your expectations.” †

The extent of the French forces in the Indian seas was brought to the notice of the Court by the Council, who stated that ten ships were expected from France, seven of which, the French alleged, were either to be sold or to remain in India. Four thousand of his most Christian Majesty's troops were at the islands, and more were anticipated. “ So alarming a force, at a place from whence

French influence.

* Letter to Bengal, 16th March, 1768.

† Letter to Bengal, 11th November, 1768.



1768.
BENGAL.

whence it is very difficult to procure the least information of their designs has induced us to have a very vigilant eye over our fortifications. It requires no great depth of judgment to foresee, that the assembling such a number of forces at the French islands can bode no good to your settlements in India. Nor are we without apprehensions, that, whenever the French are in a condition to cope with our nation in Europe, they will make some attempt on India; and even this may happen previous to a declaration of war, as, from the situation of the islands, they are masters of their own time and operations." A similar impression was entertained by the Council at Madras.

The following outline gives the position of the Company, towards the different powers of Hindostan, by whom the public tranquillity might have been essentially disturbed at that period.

Review of the
powers of Hin-
dostan.

The first great cause of British security was attributed to the general indigence of the Mogul empire, produced in a great measure by the invasion of Nadir Shah,* which gave a mortal blow to the overgrown wealth and arrogance of the Omrahs; but its effects were not immediately felt beyond the capital. The irruption of the Mahrattas ensued. Their undistinguishing rapine plunged cities and countries on the south side of the Ganges, from
near

* In 1739.



near the frontier of Bahar on the east, to Sirhind on the north and west, into misery and distress, The expedition of Shah Abdallah followed: his operations were principally confined to the Punjab, yet the vast sums he levied were felt severely throughout the country. The decrease of specie produced a decay of trade and a diminution of cultivation. Although that cause was somewhat mitigated in the Company's provinces by the importation of bullion, yet in Benares and Mirzapore, the fact appeared to be beyond dispute. The financial means of the several powers being very limited, new levies were made by each, when hostilities against any were contemplated, the die being cast on a single campaign; their resources not admitting of their maintaining a second. The circumstance which tended to the security of the Company, was the discordancy of the principles, views, and interests of those neighbouring powers.

The majority of the princes of Hindostan had no natural right in the countries which they possessed. In the general wreck of the monarchy, every man seized what fortune threw in his way, and was rather studious to maintain it than to grasp at more. Hence the principal disturbanees were to be traced to the Mahrattas, the Seiks, and Shah Abdallah, whose views were extended more to plunder than territorial acquisitions. Thus situated, it was in the power of the Company, with a watchful and active administration,

1768.
BENGAL.

The Native
princes.

to



1768.

BENGAL.

to hold the general balance of Hindostan, and crush any combination. Allahabad was pointed out as the key of the surrounding territories. Its vicinity to the several countries of Shuja Dowla, the Rohillas, Jauts, and Mahrattas, accordingly determined the Council to retain a brigade out of the Company's provinces.

The King of
Delhi.

The King, Shah Alum, retained little of the authority or dominions of his ancestors, but what he derived from the Company.

Shuja Dowla.

Shuja Dowla was the next ally of the Company; and, if gratitude could bind any man, the Company had the strongest hold upon him. His dominions, excepting the zemindarry of Bulwunt Sing, were on the north of the Ganges, and extended to the hills. He was considered well fitted to accomplish the Company's main point, of maintaining themselves as the umpires of Hindostan, rather than an enemy who, from his strength or situation, could occasion them any uneasiness or trouble.

Rohillas.

The Rohilla chiefs held districts immediately contiguous to those of the King and Shuja Dowla. The principal ones were Ahmed Khan Bungish, Hafez Rahmet Khan, and Nijib-ul-Dowla, besides several of less importance, such as Dunedy Khan, Surdar Khan, &c. Though all were independent of each other, yet they derived their power from one stock, being of one tribe, that of Ally Mahomed Khan. Their joint forces were estimated at eighty thousand effective horse and foot. Their
native



native hardiness, their dexterity with the sword, their skill in the use of war-rockets, ranked them in higher estimation than the ordinary Hindostan troops, and they were looked upon as a rising power.

1768.
BENGAL.

The territories of Ahmed Khan Bungish immediately bordered on the Corah country, Furruckabad being the capital. The possessions of Hafez Rahmet Khan joined the western limits of Shuja Dowla's dominions; they laid entirely on the north side of the Ganges, except Etawah and one or two other straggling pergunnahs. Those of Nijib-ul-Dowla were bounded by Sirhind on the west, and, beginning on the Jumna, seven coss east of Delhi, swept across the peninsula, to the northward of the Ganges, so as to join Hafez Khan's and Dunedy Khan's western frontiers.

The dominions of Jewaher Sing, or the country Jauts. of the Jauts, extended in the peninsula from Agra, to within a few coss of Delhi on the west, and near to Etawah on the east. They possessed three forts, then deemed impregnable, and were in the receipt of a revenue of nearly two crores.

Jewaher Sing was at war with Maharaja Madhu Sing, who possessed a large tract of country south-west of Delhi, and a revenue of a crore of rupees. Few could compare with Madhu Sing for the antiquity of his family, or the fame of his ancestors. His subjects were chiefly Rajpoots, born to war; the cultivators of his lands in time of peace,



1768.

BENGAL.

peace, and their undaunted defenders in the field. Proud of their ancient glory, they disdained to fly, and rushed with intrepidity to certain death or victory. It was stated, that, in a late engagement with the Jauts, their horse rode up through the fire of ninety pieces of cannon and all the musketry of the sepoy, till they came to swords, and, though thrice repulsed, renewed the attack, and were ultimately successful.

Seiks.

The Seiks' country commenced as far west as Sirhind. Their distance was thought to render it almost needless to mention them. Their rise was most extraordinary, from the lowest ebb of national weakness to a respectable power: their tribe, originally not more than ten thousand, amounting to eighty thousand fit for arms, possessing all the fertile country between Sirhind and Attok. Their power to repel or even to ruin an invader, was evinced in Shah Abdallah's expedition.

Such is the outline of the powers, exclusive of the Mahrattas, with which the Company had to deal at that period. In Bengal, a maintenance of a good understanding with the whole, was considered to be the wisest course of policy; and the Company's united force and means, the best preservative of peace.

Conduct of the
Vizier suspi-
cious.

Suspensions had been excited, at the commencement of this year, regarding the views and intentions of the Vizier. In the months of July and August, reports reached the Council that he had made



made great progress in the new levies of troops; that he had invited auxiliaries into his service when tranquillity seemed to reign throughout the empire; that he was forming connexions with foreign powers, and had established a foundry, which already supplied him with a great quantity of cannon for field service; and his "amazing improvement in making small arms," by no means inferior to the best imported into India, combined to impress the Council with the necessity of arriving at some degree of certainty as to his future designs.

1768.
BENGAL.

The line of policy to be observed towards Shuja Dowla was brought under the consideration of the Select Committee at the close of July.

No difference of opinion existed as to the necessity of some decided measures being taken to curb the ambitious spirit of the Vizier. His object was to obtain possession of the provinces of Corah and Allahabad. In order to gain over Colonel Smith, in promoting its attainment, he visited that officer in the early part of the year at Allahabad, and "proffered him four lacs of rupees in ready money, and to swear secrecy on the Alcoran, if he would aid in its accomplishment."*

At an interview which Colonel Smith had subsequently with the King, his Majesty stated with emotion,

* Secret Consultations, 3d August, 1768.



1768.

BENGAL.

emotion, that the Vizier had applied to him for the same purpose, but without success; adding, "it should seem Shuja Dowla did not wish him to have an habitation of his own on the face of the earth."

Colonel Smith animadverted upon the delay which had occurred in adopting measures against Shuja Dowla. The President considered that no material inconvenience had arisen from delay, and on the 3d August recorded a minute, in which he proposed that the Vizier should be required, in the presence of the King, to reduce his forces within a given number, and that his Majesty's injunctions should be previously ensured to the same effect.

Colonel Smith was opposed to the President's plan. From the knowledge which he had, both of the King and the Vizier, he apprehended that a war would prove the unavoidable consequence; for, if the King should require of Shuja Dowla to disband any part of his forces, his haughty disposition would induce him to treat such orders with contempt, or he might answer, as Jewaher Sing had lately answered to an order of the King, "that when his Majesty shall regulate the twenty-two Soubahs of this empire, he will not be among the latest to shew obedience." Colonel Smith suggested, that a letter might be so framed as to press upon the Vizier, in friendly but forcible terms, the views and opinions of the Council, and that an embassy should accompany it, which he
had



had no doubt would effectually accomplish their desire: he likewise proposed, that the second brigade should move to the Caramnassa.

1769.

BENGAL.

After much discussion, and also differences of opinion as to the powers assumed by Colonel Smith in his military capacity, the Select Committee resolved, on the 17th August, to address two letters to the Vizier, and appointed a deputation, consisting of Mr. Cartier and Colonel Smith, members of the Select Committee, and Mr. Claude Russell, member of council, to proceed to the Vizier at Allahabad.

Deputation to
the Vizier.

The first letter stated that the Council urged a reduction of his forces, in order that all apprehensions as to the maintenance of a good understanding between him and the Company might be removed. The second letter was to be presented in the event of the first failing to gain the Vizier's consent to the proposed reduction, after the King's commands had been issued to him for that purpose.

To alleviate the odium he might incur from a diminution of his forces, it was proposed that the supernumeraries should be tendered as recruits to the Company's brigades. Nothing was to be omitted which might lead to an amicable adjustment. They were likewise instructed to represent to the King and Shuja Dowla, the necessity of providing a fund for the payment of the troops at Allahabad, and to suggest, that two or



1768.

BENGAL.

Deputation to
Vizier.

three circars belonging to the Soubah of Allaha-
bad, of which the Hindooput Rajah had possessed
himself, should be obtained for that purpose.

The deputation reached Benares on the 17th
November. The Vizier arrived there the follow-
ing day, having declined the meeting at Allaha-
bad. At the first conference, Shuja Dowla mani-
fested every disposition to fall in with the views
of the deputation; but at the next and subsequent
interviews he evinced a totally different feeling.
He enlarged on the state of his troops in former
times; he insisted that he was not restricted to
any particular number; that he had in no shape
infringed the last treaty, and that it was surprising
it should now be thought necessary to limit his
forces. The same demand he observed might, with
equal justice, be made on the Rohillas. The de-
putation, finding all expostulation vain, delivered
the Committee's letter to the Vizier. After much
discussion, he declared, with firmness, that he
never would willingly reduce his force below
35,000 men, of which 8,000 should be horse.
The low state of the Company's treasury, the
arrears due to the troops, the situation of affairs
on the coast, where success depended on supplies
from Bengal, and the tenour of the Court's orders,
made the Council most anxious to avoid all risk
of a war, which might be hazarded by impos-
ing conditions "too mortifying for his haughty
spirit." They therefore consented to the 35,000
men



men being retained ; but stipulated the various bodies of which that force should consist. To this the Vizier would not accede. The sepoys were fixed at 7,000 only ; he insisted upon 10,000. Having arranged for the regular troops, he proposed that the irregulars, together with the mode of discipline, should be left to his option, and intimated his intention to go down to Calcutta, unless the point was conceded.

1768.

BENGAL.

The tone assumed by the Vizier induced the deputation to break off the negotiation, and to announce their intention to proceed to the royal presence on the ensuing morning. This intimation had the desired effect. Shuja Dowla sent a message the following day to the deputation, when departing for Allahabad, stating that he was afraid they "had not rightly understood him." The deputation replied through Captain Harper, who came from the Vizier, that unless he acquiesced in what they had proposed, a further meeting was needless, and that they should persevere in their resolution to proceed to Allahabad. This communication produced a concession on the part of the Vizier to the modified terms. An agreement was drawn out and signed on the 19th November, confirming the former treaty, and stipulating that he should not entertain a greater number than 35,000 men, of which 10,000 were to be cavalry ; ten battalions of sepoys ; the Nujib regiment, 5,000, with matchlocks, to remain always

Negotiation
with Vizier.



1768.

BENGAL.

at its then establishment; five hundred for the artillery, and that number never to be exceeded; the remaining 9,500 were to be irregulars, neither to be clothed, armed, or disciplined, "after the manner of English sepoys." So long as the Vizier adhered to these articles, no matter was to be introduced in addition to what had been now agreed to. The arrangement was fully approved by the Council at Calcutta, who passed a resolution of thanks, on the 25th January, to the deputation for their services. The Nabob accompanied the deputies to Allahabad, and was received in the royal presence in quality of Vizier.

The views of the Directors on the proceedings of the Council were despatched to Bengal in the following year.

Court's views
on the proceed-
ings as to Shuja
Dowla.

"We have constantly enjoined you to avoid every measure that might lead you into further connexions, and have recommended you to use your utmost endeavour to keep peace in Bengal and with the neighbouring powers; and you, on your part, have not been wanting in assurances of your resolution to conform to these our wishes.

"Yet, in the very instructions which you have given to the deputies sent up to Shuja Dowla with professions of friendship, you have inserted an article, which will not only give fresh cause of jealousy to Shuja Dowla, but engages you likewise in disputes with other powers still more distant.

"We



“ We mean the article whereby they are directed to apply to the King for a grant of two or three circars, which belonged, you say, originally to the Eliabad province, but were unlawfully possessed, some time since, by the Hindooput Rajah.

“ Is it our business to inquire into the rights of the Hindooput Rajah, and the usurpations he may have made upon others? And, supposing the fact to be proved, does such an injustice on his part give us any claim to the disputed districts?

“ If the districts in question belong to the Eliabad province, they are a part of Shuja Dowla's undoubted inheritance; and supposing him to waive his right, you cannot send a man nor a gun for defence of these new acquisitions without passing through his country, which will be a perpetual source of dispute and complaint.

“ Nor does the mischief stop here. The Hindooput Rajah, who, by all accounts, is rich, will naturally endeavour to form alliances, to defend himself against this unexpected attack of the English. Then you will say your honour is engaged, and the army is to be led against other powers still more distant.

“ You say nothing in your letters of this very essential article of your instructions to the deputies.”*

“ In several of our letters, since we have been engaged

* Letter to Bengal, 11th May, 1769.



1768.

BENGAL.

engaged as principals in the politics of India, and particularly during the last two or three years, we have given it as our opinion, that the most prudent system we could pursue, and the most likely to be attended with a permanent security to our possessions, would be to incline to those few chiefs of Hindoostan, who yet preserve an independence of the Mahratta power, and are in a condition to struggle with them; for so long as they are able to keep up that struggle, the acquisitions of the Company will run the less risk of disturbance.

“The Rohillas, the Jauts, the Nabob of the Deccan, the Nabob of Oude, and the Mysore chief, have each in their turn kept the Mahrattas in action, and we wish them still to be able to do it; it is, therefore, with great concern we see the war continuing with Hyder Naigue, and a probability of a rupture with Shuja Dowla and Nizam Ally. In such wars, we have everything to lose, and nothing to gain: for, supposing our operations be attended with the utmost success, and our enemies reduced to our mercy, we can only wish to see them restored to the condition from which they set out; that is, to such a degree of force and independence as may enable them still to keep up the contest with the Mahrattas and with each other. It would give us therefore, the greatest satisfaction to hear that matters are accommodated, both at Bengal and on the coast: and in case such a happy event shall have taken place,



place, you will do your utmost to preserve the tranquillity.”*

1769.

BENGAL.

In July, 1769, the proceedings of the French led to a belief that they meditated some movement against the Company's settlements. Under the plea of repairing a drain round the town of Chandernagore, to prevent the effects of inundations, which it was represented had proved fatal to the inhabitants, they carried the works to such an extent as to create strong suspicions. A field-officer was accordingly deputed from Calcutta, in a public capacity, for the purpose of examining and reporting upon the state of the works. The result satisfied the Council that their suspicions were too well founded. The proceeding was an infraction of the eleventh article of the Treaty of Paris; and having remonstrated ineffectually, they required that the works should be destroyed. The French not only refused compliance with the requisition, but carried them on with more vigour; in consequence of which, the Council gave peremptory orders for their demolition. This, and subsequent acts regarding the French in Bengal, gave rise to representations from the French Court to that of St. James's. The arrangements projected for adjusting the difference,† will be found to have involved the Company's representatives in

Differences
with the French
at Chanderna-
gore.

serious

* Letter to Bengal, 30th June, 1769.

† Letter to Bengal from the Court of Directors, 27th June

1770:



1769.

BENGAL.

Mogul determines to proceed to Delhi.

Council resolve to aid his views.

serious discussions, with the accredited agent on the part of the Crown.

The President, when at Bauleah, in the month of May, received a letter from the Mogul, announcing his determination to proceed forthwith to Delhi, with the troops of his Vizier, in order to take possession of the throne and dominions of his ancestors, and applying for the aid of two battalions of sepoys and some field-pieces, agreeably to an alleged promise of Lord Clive, whenever he should march towards his capital. The Council considered the intended requisition favourable to the recall of the forces from Allahabad. Having, therefore, deliberated on the orders of the Court, they determined to grant the King the aid which he requested. At the moment when the enterprise was to be commenced, the King's minister, Munerah-ud-Dowlah, on returning from the royal durbar, was accosted within the precincts of the palace by his majesty's guards, who, in a tumultuous manner, demanded an increase of pay and the arrears then due. The reply of the Nabob being

1770:—"His Majesty has constituted Sir John Lindsay his plenipotentiary for examining into the supposed infractions of the late treaty of peace, you will afford him the necessary information and assistance, whereby he may be enabled to answer the complaints of the French plenipotentiary, to justify your conduct, and to defend those rights of the British Crown which were obtained by express stipulation in the Treaty of Paris, and which appear to have been invaded by the proceedings of the French at Chandernagore."



being unsatisfactory, one of the inferior officers drew his sword, with an intent to destroy him, and would have effected his purpose, but for a faithful Coffrey, who exposed his own life to save that of the Nabob ; the latter escaped, but six of his followers fell a sacrifice. The King sent for General Smith : on enquiry, it did not appear that any arrears were due, and there was strong reason to believe it to be a design formed by some people of rank to destroy the Nabob. Munerah-ud-Dowla shortly after retired from the Court, with the permission of the King, and resided at Patna.

At the same time, three of the best battalions in Shuja Dowla's service took up arms against him. They were repelled, and a severe example was made by the Vizier, who conducted himself with great energy. The event lessened his confidence in his troops, and tended to reconcile him to the reduction to which he had been constrained to submit. Upon being urged to dismiss from his presence M. Gentil, in accordance with the promise which he had made to the Council, he stated, " that if it was insisted upon, he should comply ; but that, at a time when the hand of adversity was upon him, when all those whom he had clothed and fed forsook him, when he was abandoned by his own countrymen and by those of the same religion, this man, who was a stranger, of a different nation and different religion, forgot him not, but partook of his misfortunes.

1769.

BENGAL.

Vizier's troops
revolt.Vizier's appeal
in favour of
M. Gentil.



1769.

BENGAL.

tunes. What a reflection will it then be upon me, if I am obliged to chase this man from my dominions! Assure the English chiefs, that I will be responsible that he shall never do any thing to their prejudice ; the moment I discover such intention, he loses my friendship : at the same time, I will consider it as a mark of theirs, if they will not urge the performance of my promise concerning him." The Council abstained from urging the performance of the promise. Circumstances arose which cast a doubt upon the sincerity of the Vizier's declaration, but the result proved that it was made in good faith. The Vizier subsequently declared to the Company's officer commanding their troops, that should hostilities commence between the French and English, he should feel it unbecoming in him to entertain any man who was the enemy of our nation. He desired that this resolution might not be communicated to the Council, as he was determined to take such a course without any requisition on their part, in order that he might have the merit of it.

Mogul defers
proceeding to
Delhi.

These occurrences led the King to postpone his movement towards Delhi. The Company's troops were withdrawn, by the month of September, from Allahabad. The Council stated : " Nothing but the obligations to support our national faith, or to provide for the actual supply of these provinces, shall induce us to march your troops beyond the Caramnassa."

Brigadier



Brigadier General Smith resigned in November, being succeeded in the command of the forces by Brigadier General Sir Robert Barker. In December, Mr. Verelst relinquished the President's chair to Mr. Cartier.

1769.

BENGAL.

Mr. Cartier
succeeds to
Mr. Verelst.

The Vizier, notwithstanding his former hatred of Munerah-ud-Dowla, now earnestly entreated the King to reinstate him in his councils. His motives for so doing were not very apparent. It was surmised that, by removing all suspicion, he thought that he should the better secure his own supremacy: if such was the fact his dissimulation attained his object. The King was inexorable in his determination not to recall the Nabob; upon which Shuja Dowla repaired to the presence, embraced the lucky moment, and was invested with every honour and authority, both nominal and real. This unexpected reconciliation between the King and the Vizier, received additional strength from the marriage which was shortly to be celebrated between one of the royal princes and his Excellency's daughter. Munerah-ud-Dowla had invariably opposed the expedition to Delhi. The King, by the confidence which he now reposed in Shuja Dowla, placed himself entirely in his hands.

Shuja Dowla
reinstated in
the Mogul's
confidence.

At this period, Cossim Ally Khan* emerged from the obscurity in which he had so long remained, and

Cossim Ally
Khan.

* *Vide* page 92.



1769.

BENGAL.

and became once more an actor on the political stage of Hindostan. It was stated, that the Ranee of Gohud had invited him to reside at Gwalior, as a place better fitted for his schemes than the country of the Rohillas. A Mahratta army was hovering between the country of the Rajpoots and Jauts, and a large body of Seiks was in the neighbourhood of Paniput; Nujib-ud-Dowla was in the field, and the divisions amongst the Jauts grew more inveterate. This state of things necessarily obliged the Council to keep a watchful eye on the course of events. Although the movements of Cossim terminated without any important result, it appeared that the King, who was the mere puppet of the Vizier, had been in correspondence with him, and that his Majesty's regard towards the Company had evidently diminished.

The Nabob of Bengal, Syoof-ud-Dowla, died in March, of the small-pox, which raged with great violence at Moorshedabad. He was succeeded by his younger brother, Maborek-ud-Dowla, about ten years of age. Rajah Bulwunt Sing died at Benares on the 23d August, and was succeeded by his son Cheyt Sing.

1770.

Mahrattas' hostile demonstration.

The Mahrattas were at this time the cause of serious apprehension to the Council. From their forces having continued so long a period on the borders of the country of the Rajpoots, it was supposed that they were satiated with plunder, and would have retreated, as usual, on the commencement



mencement of the hot weather, and repass the Ner-budda. Instead of such a course, they pursued their conquests. The whole of the territories of the Jauts to the south of the Jumna, and between that river and the Ganges, submitted to their arms, excepting the forts of Deeg and Agra, which, it was stated, they never could hope to possess, but by voluntary submission or treachery: a circumstance that would, at all events, present a check to their progress. The treasure deposited in these forts was supposed to amount to many crores, and all that was wanted to apply it with effect was a more able and more resolute leader of the Jauts than Null Sing. Amidst the whole of the movements, the Mahrattas did not manifest any hostile designs against the Company's provinces: but a project was formed for the purpose of raising up a new king, in opposition to Shah Alum, who was considered a prisoner in the hands of the Company: but to this project even two of the Mahratta generals refused their concurrence. The King evinced apprehensions of the Mahrattas, whilst the conduct of the Vizier was not free from suspicion; as at the moment that the Mahrattas were threatening his frontier, and when he ought to have been prepared to oppose their progress, he was amusing himself in hunting in a distant part of his dominions.

The conduct of the French, notwithstanding the anxious desire evinced by the Council to avoid disputes,

1770.
BENGAL.



1770.

BENGAL.

Calcutta militia.

disputes, continued to give rise to frequent alterations; the former magnifying matters of little moment into affairs of consequence, for the foundation of disputes between the two courts in Europe. As a preparation against any attempts, a militia was formed at Calcutta, composed of the Company's civil servants and the European inhabitants. A naval force was likewise sent from England, to protect the British interests, the whole expense of such aid being borne by the Company.

Mission to Nepal.

The Directors having expressed a desire to learn, whether a trade could be opened with Nepaul; and, if cloth and other commodities might not find their way to Thibet, Lhassa, and the western parts of China: the Council deputed Mr. Logan, of the medical service (who had, on a former occasion, accompanied Captain Kinloch,* and was perfect master of the language), to prosecute the inquiry, and furnished him with the necessary credentials to assist him in what they termed a "hazardous enterprize."

The affairs of Bengal having been brought down from Lord Clive's appointment in 1765, to the period when the Special commission of supervision was determined upon by the Company, the proceedings of the two Presidencies of Madras and Bombay will be given for the same term, and will comprise the measures in which his Lordship and his successors took part regarding those two settlements.

* *Vide* page 181.



CHAPTER V.

THE Councils, of Calcutta and Madras, had pressed upon the attention of the Home authorities, the importance of establishing a permanent influence in the Northern Circars. The resumption by the French of their possessions in India, under the treaty of peace, led the President of Fort St. George to suggest to Lord Clive the expediency of obtaining from the Mogul sunnuds for the circars of Rajahmundry, Ellore, Mustaphanagur, Chicacole, and Condavir or Guntoor.

1765.

MADRAS.

Northern
Circars.

The circars formed an appendage to the Soubah of the Deccan. Salabat Jung, in 1752, gave Condavir, on the south side of the Kistna, to the French East-India Company, as a perpetual jaghire; and soon after ceded to them the other town north of that river, for the maintenance of the troops in the immediate service of M. Bussy. When Colonel Forde took Masulipatam, and put an end to the authority of the French in the Deccan, all the five circars were restored to the Soubah, who consented, at the same time, that the family of Vizeramrauze should continue in the management



1765.

MADRAS.

management of the Chicacole circar, as a reward for fidelity and attachment to the Company.

The Circar of Condavir, or Guntoor, was also conferred as a jaghire on Bazalet Jung, third brother of Salabat Jung, from which he still received an annual tribute. The other circars had been put under the management of different persons. In 1762, they were offered as a jaghire to the Company, on the same terms as they had been formerly held by the French; but as those terms involved the sending assistance into the Deccan, it was considered too onerous an obligation, and the offer was declined. Hussain Ally acted as the ambassador from the Nizam. From the failure of his mission, he fell into disgrace: but, through the aid of the Nabob of the Carnatic, and the advance of a considerable sum of money, he effected terms, and procured for himself the management of those countries, and at the request of the Nizam was joined* by a detachment of the Company's troops, in expectation of re-establishing a proper government. The zemindar never accounted with any of his managers unless compelled by force, and the country had been generally plundered by the strongest of the contending parties. Hussain Ally, supported by the Company, though with a very small force, got possession of the circars of Rajahmundry, and

* *Vide* page 107.



Ellore, and Mustaphanagur: having engaged to put the Company in possession of them, whenever required, a reasonable maintenance being secured to him should that event take place.

1765.

MADRAS.

On the 14th October, the Council at Madras advised the Directors, that Lord Clive had, at the instance of Mr. Palk, the President at Fort St. George, obtained sunnuds from the Mogul for the five Northern Circars, and a confirmation of the jaghire granted by the Nabob to the Company. It was judged prudent to defer taking immediate possession of them, as the Council were not aware how far they might be required to send aid in troops to Bengal. The revenues of the Circars, for the next year, had been anticipated by Hussain Ally, to enable him to make good his payments to the Soubah, and support his troops; but the possession of the sunnuds was important, the French being thereby prevented from getting a footing in them.

Sunnuds for
the Circars ob-
tained from the
Mogul.

The Nizam having marched to Berar, General Caillaud was appointed to command the troops: he proceeded in January, and took possession of the Bessoara Pass. The sunnuds, or grants, were published at Masulipatam the 3d of March, and received there with general satisfaction. The fort of Condapilly, which in a great measure secured the pass into the Circars, was carried by assault, on the 7th March. The Council determined to take the countries immediately into their own hands,



1765.

MADRAS.

hands, to receive from the zemindars the outstanding balances, and to use every means for discharging Hussain Ally's troops.

In April, the Directors were advised of the measures adopted for establishing the Company's authority in the Circars, and of the difficulty of prevailing on the Nabob of the Carnatic to remain on terms with Hyder, who had made such extensive conquests on the Malabar coast. "As an instance of the Mysorean's sincerity," the Council stated, "Hyder has consented to surrender to the Nabob the fort of Milpaddy, which guards a pass to the westward of Tinnevely, and was given into the Mysore hands by Moorteis Ally, about the time of the surrender of Vellore."

The proceedings of the Madras government created considerable alarm in the mind of the Nizam, who looked upon the Nabob as the cause. To remove this impression, the Council suggested that the Nabob should despatch a proper person, to satisfy the Nizam that he had not the least concern in the transaction. The party deputed was instructed to assure him, that the Council desired to remain on the most friendly terms, that their views extended no further than the possession of the Circars, and in order to settle the treaty more readily, they contemplated negotiating it through the Nabob. Before the party had set out, the Nabob received a letter from the Nizam, and one also

Differences
between the
Nizam and the
Nabob.



also from his Dewan, upbraiding him for not having endeavoured to prevent the Council taking possession of the Circars, and recommending him to prevail on them to withdraw their troops.

1766.
MADRAS.

It appeared that the Soubah* was in great want of funds, and that his principal dependence was on Hyder Ally, to whom he had made overtures for assistance. The Council felt that he could not give them much trouble as Hyder's vakeel was at the same moment soliciting the alliance of the Company. Under these circumstances, they judged it best that the Nabob's messenger should proceed, as originally intended, to the Nizam. The latter was deaf to every proposition which wore the least appearance of coming through or from the Nabob. The Council, alive to the importance of securing the Nizam, not only with reference to the growing power of Hyder and his great wealth, but also the Mahrattas and the preservation of a communication with Bengal, resolved to instruct General Caillaud and Mr. Smith to proceed to Hyderabad, to put the Nizam in complete possession of their motives and intentions regarding the Circars, and their proposition for a treaty with him. At this period, the Council received a communication from the Select Committee in Bengal, and the President another from Lord

* The *Soubah* and *Nizam* is the same party, although the two designations may be used indiscriminately.



1766.

MADRAS.

Council in
Bengal pro-
pose an alli-
ance with the
Nizam.

Lord Clive, containing a plan for an alliance with the Nizam, and offering to join the Madras force with one entire brigade, in assisting him to settle his government, and to carry into effect a plan which Lord Clive had contemplated on his arrival in India, of regaining possession of Cuttack, situated between Ganjam and Balasore, in order to make the junction of the two presidencies complete.

The proposition appeared well calculated to preserve the Company's possessions and the whole country in peace, and at the same time to form a barrier against the invasions of the Mahrattas, both as regarded Bengal and the Carnatic. The aid which Lord Clive suggested should be proffered to the Nizam, as an inducement for his falling into the views of the Council, consisted of two hundred infantry, one hundred artillery, and three battalions of sepoys. The Council apprized the Bombay Presidency of the measures in contemplation, and remarked, "it is in your power to oblige both the Mahrattas and Mysoreans to attend to their own concerns."

Treaty with
the Nizam.

The treaty, which consisted of fourteen articles, was signed at Hyderabad on the 12th November. It was termed one of alliance and friendship between the Company and the Nizam. The Company, in consideration of the grant of the Circars, engaged to have a body of troops ready to settle the affairs of his Highness's government in every thing



thing that was right and proper, but with liberty to withdraw them, should the state of affairs, or those of the Carnatic, render it necessary. Whenever the troops were not supplied by the Company, or required by the Nizam, the latter was to receive from the Company nine lacs per annum. The Chicacole circar was to be reduced as soon as possible: that of Mustaphanagur having been given by the Nizam to his brother, Bazalet Jung, as a jaghire, the Company were not to take possession of it until his death; but should he occasion disturbance in the circar, then the Company were to have it in their power to assume it. The diamond mines were to remain in the possession of the Nizam. The fort of Condapilly was to be garrisoned by the Company's troops, a killedar being maintained therein on the part of the Nizam.

The most material clause of the treaty was that which provided for an indefinite support in troops to the Nizam. Upon this point the Council stated that, in the course of the negotiation, General Cail-laud had discovered that the Soubah was absolutely determined, in the event of his concluding a treaty, to proceed against Hyder, for which purpose he had engaged the service of the Mahrattas, and stipulated that the Council should co-operate with him in the undertaking.

The view of the Directors on this transaction was communicated to Bengal the 25th March, 1768.

Observations
of Court of
Directors on
the treaty.

“ We have taken the negotiations and treaty
with



1766.

MADRAS.

with the Soubah of the Deccan into our most serious consideration, and are much alarmed at the state of your affairs by your last advices. The examination into your proceedings has led to a review of all that has passed on the business of the Circars, from your first entertaining the idea of obtaining possession of them.

“ The exclusion of the French from the Circars has been our principal view in obtaining them, but we have ever shewn a repugnance to the holding them on the terms of assisting the Soubah with our troops, and such, too, have been your constant sentiments, until 1766.

“ In your letter of the 2d of October, 1761, paragraph 18, your system was, to suffer the contending parties in the Deccan to weaken themselves, and not to grasp at more than you could hold.

“ In the following year, the Soubah, distressed by his war with the Mahrattas, consents to your holding the Circars, on your agreeing to pay him half the revenues of them; but he revokes the grant the moment his danger from the Mahrattas ceases. In 1764, he is disposed to grant them, on condition of your keeping up a body of troops in the manner the French did; but when you found it would require so great a force as seven hundred infantry, a company of artillery, and three thousand sepoy, besides a proper force in the Circars, you reject the terms, as inadequate to the expense and danger that may be incurred by them.

“ The

1766.
MADRAS.

“The growing greatness of Hyder Ally was but a weak pretence for a junction with the Soubah. We do not conceive you really thought his army, or any country troops in Hindostan, could endanger the Carnatic in a defensive war; but had you entertained such an apprehension, the whole of our experience in the country wars shows how much danger, difficulty, and expense, and how little assistance, is to be derived from any country alliance in a general action, more especially with the Soubah’s army, the most undisciplined rabble of all.

“Upon the same principle, we disapprove Lord Clive’s ideas of a general alliance against the Mahratta powers, and look for safety and success in our own force only, and their divisions.

“We perceive Lord Clive’s opinion has had great weight; but had that been your guide, you would never have concluded the treaty on the terms you have; for in his Lordship’s letter to Mr. Palk, of the 11th August, he says, he thinks two hundred infantry, a company of artillery, and three battalions of sepoy, sufficient to answer the purpose of supporting the Soubah.

“In your conduct in the negotiations with the Soubah, there is a yielding temper throughout the whole negotiation, which implies a want of firmness in your negociator.

“The general alliance with the Soubah and Mahrattas produced the effect we always shall expect



1766.

MADRAS.

expect from alliances among powers uncontrolled by the law of nations, or any principle to establish good faith among them.

“The Mahrattas, instead of being reduced, are like to be aggrandized, by their conquest of the Mysore dominions, which brings them so much nearer to the Carnatic. The Soubah’s weakness and indigence seem beyond all relief; and Hyder Ally, if less formidable to the Soubah and the Mahrattas, is more likely to be an enemy to us, and to embrace every opportunity of disturbing the Carnatic.

“Should the Circars continue in our possession, it must be observed as a general rule, that no European is to interfere in the collection of the revenues, further than to receive the rents from Hussain Ally, or the rajahs who held the districts, and are to account to the chiefs of Masulipatam or Vizagapatam, as you shall direct: neither are they to interfere in the management or the government of the country, farther than to check the renter if guilty of any grievous oppression.

“Before we leave the subject, we must observe to you, that we think it very extraordinary the whole negotiation with the Soubah should have been conducted by a military officer, unaccompanied by a civil servant. When Mr. Pybus’s illness was known, another should have been immediately appointed, for it is highly displeasing to

us,



us, and contrary to our orders, that a military officer should be alone employed in negotiations of our commercial or political interest."

1765.
MADRAS.

It has already been seen that the conduct of Hyder, on the Malabar coast, led the Council at Bombay to apprehend a rupture between him and the Company.

At Madras, nothing more was heard of him until the month of July, when he informed the Council that he had sent for his vakeel. This circumstance created suspicion, it being at the same time confidently reported, that he had solicited and received from the Nizam a sunnud for the Carnatic. This was in a degree confirmed by his having suddenly quitted his conquests on the Malabar coast, and proceeded to Seringapatam, where, it was stated, he had placed a child upon the throne, and then posted his army at Coimbatore, near the confines of Caroor.* Notwithstanding these movements, the Council were assured by a vakeel from Hyder, that he desired nothing more than to live in perfect friendship with the Company, and for this purpose he requested an English gentleman might be sent to him to settle terms. Mr. Bouchier, a member of the Council, was deputed for the purpose, and set out with the vakeel. When he reached Arcot, he was desired to

Proceedings
of Hyder.

* This is explained by the report which had reached the Bombay Council, of his having adopted the son of Chunda Saib.



1766.

MADRAS.

Council determines on hostilities with Hyder.

to wait for answers from Hyder regarding the place of their interview. He was afterwards informed that Hyder had ordered the vakeel to go to him alone. Mr. Bouchier returned to Madras, and reported to the Council that the vakeel, on quitting him, had stated that he had received a letter from his master disapproving of an English gentleman coming to him.

The Council considered the whole conduct of Hyder to be very questionable. When they reflected upon his immense conquests, his great riches, and the power which he had established, added to his pride and ambition, they felt that no opportunity should be lost to reduce that power within its ancient and proper bounds, and to check the intentions of a man, who, by his violence and oppression, had rendered himself obnoxious to all the country governments, and dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of the Carnatic. They therefore, viewed the resolution taken by the Nizam to be a very important circumstance,* and resolved to assist him with such a force as would insure success, and at the same time satisfy the Nizam of the sincerity of their intentions. Information of the bearing of the Nizam towards Hyder was despatched to Bombay, that the President and the Council there might take the necessary measures for securing the

* *Vide* page 213.



the Company's possessions on that side, and be prepared to make use of their forces in the event of a rupture, in which case they concluded that many of the powers of the Malabar coast would be ready to embrace the opportunity of recovering their ancient possessions.

1766.

MADRAS.

Having reason to believe that the treaty with the Nizam had been concluded, the Council, in November, required Sitteramrauze, who had been backward with his kists, to state whether he would submit to the Company's government by keeping up his agreement. The situation of Vizagapatam, in the midst of the Chicacole circar, being well calculated to preserve the country in obedience, the Council contemplated placing it in a state of security against any country enemy. They originally intended to have taken the other circars into their own management, but, under the advice of General Caillaud, they judged it better to conclude an agreement with Hussain Ally, to rent them for a term of years. The Pittapore Rajah, one of the zemindars of the Rajahmundry district, "being unwilling to submit to the reasonable demands of Hussain Ally," the Council determined to send a force beyond that stipulated to be paid for, in order to reduce the zemindar to obedience.

Circars.

They advised the Court of Directors of the whole of the foregoing measures, in their despatch of the 22d January. On the 20th of that month, Colonel Smith had an audience of the Nizam, in camp near

1767.

Hyderabad,



1767.

MADRAS.

Vacillating
conduct of the
Soubah.

Hyderabad, when he proposed moving to the banks of the Kistna, where he expected the Company's troops. The whole joined the Nizam on the 19th. In the month of March, the Council, believing that Hyder had been using means to induce the Soubah "to make up matters," and that the latter had been in communication with the Mahrattas, attempted, but without success, to discover whether such was the fact. In order to strengthen the hands of Colonel Smith, Mr. Burchier was sent to join in the endeavour to bring the Nizam to a determination. They were at the same time obliged to march a force into the Madura and Tinnevely districts, to subdue some refractory Polygars, who not only defied the Nabob's managers, but had defeated a small body of military sent against them. After much negotiation, the Nabob consented to discharge the whole of the "useless rabble," of which his troops consisted, and to depend entirely upon the Company's forces for the defence and security of his possessions.

Soubah dis-
posed to join
Hyder.

The Nizam continued not only to act with indecision, but even treated the Company's commanders and troops with disregard. In the interim, the Mahrattas settled their affairs with Hyder, and it soon became apparent that a negotiation was in progress between Hyder and the Nizam, the latter wavering only as to the amount which he was to receive for breaking with the Company.

These events present a true picture of eastern intrigue



intrigue and deception. A few weeks had scarcely elapsed since the Soubah had been resolute in adopting measures to reduce Hyder's power, and now he is found forming an alliance with that ambitious chief, and abusing his connexion with the Company.

The greater portion of the Company's force was accordingly withdrawn, with the consent of the Nizam, who engaged to remit the two lacs on account of the Chicacole circar, and likewise to give to the Company and their troops one-fifth of the money collected from Hyder. The negotiation with Hyder was continued from May to the close of June, when the Nizam's Dewan gave a sunnud to the Company for the remission on account of the Chicacole circar, and bills for a fifth of what Hyder was to pay. These proceedings were but just concluded, when reports reached the Council, that the Nizam with hostile intentions was entering the Carnatic. In July, all doubts were removed upon this point. His army, instead of marching northward, advanced towards Bangalore, and from thence to Oapatavady. At the close of the month, Hyder crossed the river near Seringapatam and proceeded to Bangalore, where, on the 16th August, his main body was joined by the Nizam.

The Council caused all their troops to be forthwith collected and placed under Colonel Smith. Aid was requested from Bengal to secure the Cir-

cars,

1767.

MADRAS.

Enters the
Carnatic hos-
tily.

Measures
against Hyder.



1767.

MADRAS.

cars, and the Council at Bombay were called upon to use their best exertions in assisting the designs against Hyder, whose power it was felt, sooner or later, must be reduced, as the only means of giving peace to the Carnatic and securing the Company's possessions. The Council observed : "It is not only his troublesome disposition and ambitious views now that we have to apprehend, but that he may at a favourable opportunity, or in some future war, take the French by the hand, to re-establish their affairs,—which cannot fail to be of the worst consequence to your possessions on the coast. He has money to pay them, and they can spare and assemble troops at the islands, and it is reported that he has already made proposals by despatches to the French king or Company in Europe."*

The Soubah
and Hyder de-
feated.

On the 26th September, the joint forces of the Soubah and Hyder were defeated by Colonel Smith, who pursued them till within eight miles of the road from Trinomallee to Changama. Sixty pieces of cannon were taken. The want of cavalry prevented his more effectually following up the victory. During the operations, a body of Hyder's horse found means to advance to Choultry Plain. They plundered St. Thomé and the whole of the adjacent villages, carrying off several of the inhabitants, without the Council being able to afford them

Hyder's horse
approach Ma-
dras.

* Letter to Court, 21st September, 1767.



them succour. The Council represented: "The continual reinforcements we had sent to camp had reduced our garrison so low, we were obliged to confine our attention entirely to the preservation of the Fort and the Black Town, for which purpose it was necessary to arm all the Company's civil servants, the European inhabitants, Armenians, and Portuguese." The detachments of the enemy consisted of three or four thousand cavalry, and continued in the bounds until the 29th September, when they moved off. The Council added: "As it is uncertain when the troubles we are engaged in will end, and as we must in the course of the war expect to have many Europeans sick, we must earnestly request you to send out as large reinforcements as possible." This despatch reached the Court by the *Hector* on the 22d April, 1768. It was acknowledged in the following terms:—

"The alarming state of our affairs under your conduct, regarding the military operations against the Soubah of the Deccan, joined with Hyder Ally, and the measures in agitation with the Mah-rattas in consequence thereof, requiring our most immediate consideration, we have therefore determined on this overland conveyance by the way of Bussorah, as the most expeditious way of giving our sentiments to you on those important subjects.

"In our separate letter of the 25th March, we gave

1767.
MADRAS.

Court's views
on the opera-
tions against
Hyder.



1767.

MADRAS.

gave you our sentiments very fully on your treaty with the Soubah of the Deccan.

“After having for successive years given it as your opinion, confirmed by our approbation, that maintaining an army for the support of the Soubah of the Deccan was endangering the Carnatic, and would tend to involve us in wars, and distant and expensive operations, and the grant of the Circars was not to be accepted on such terms, you at once engage in that support, and send an army superior to that which, in the year 1764, you declared would endanger your own safety.

“The quick succession of important events in Indian wars puts it out of our power to direct your measures. We can only give you the outlines of that system which we judge most conducive to give permanency and tranquillity to our possessions.

“We should have hoped that the experience of what has passed in Bengal would have suggested the proper conduct to you: we mean, when our servants, after the battle of Buxar, projected the extirpation of Shuja Dowla from his dominions, and the giving them up to the King. Lord Clive soon discerned, the King would have been unable to maintain them, and that it would have broken down the strongest barriers against the Mahrattas and the northern powers, and therefore wisely restored Shuja Dowla to his dominions.* Such, too, should be your conduct with respect to the Nizam and

* *Vide* page 143.



and Hyder Ally, neither of whom it is our interest should be totally crushed.

“The Dewanny of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, with the possessions we hold in those provinces, are the utmost limits of our views on that side of India. On the coast, the protection of the Carnatic and the possession of the Circars, free from all engagements to support the Soubah of the Deccan, or even without the Circars, preserving only influence enough over any country power who may hold them, to keep the French from settling in them; and, on the Bombay side, the dependencies thereon, the possessions of Salsette, Bassein, and the castle of Surat. The protection of these is easily within the reach of our power, and may mutually support each other, without any country alliance whatever. If we pass these bounds, we shall be led on from one acquisition to another, till we shall find no security but in the subjection of the whole, which, by dividing your force, would lose us the whole, and end in our extirpation from Hindostan.

“Much has been wrote from you and from our servants at Bengal, on the necessity of checking the Mahrattas, which may in some degree be proper; but it is not for the Company to take the part of umpires of Hindostan. If it had not been for the imprudent measures you have taken, the country powers would have formed a balance of power among themselves, and their divisions would have

1767.

MADRAS.

Extent of the
Court's views
as to territorial
possessions.



1767.

MADRAS.

Offensive wars
and further ac-
quisition to be
avoided.

left you in peace; but if at any time the thirst for plunder should urge the Mahrattas to invade our possessions, they can be checked only by carrying the war into their own country. It is with this view that we last year sent out field-officers to our presidency at Bombay, and put their military force on a respectable footing; and when once the Mahrattas understand that to be our plan, we have reason to think they will not wantonly attack us.

“You will observe by the whole tenour of these despatches, that our views are not to enter into offensive wars in India, or to make further acquisitions beyond our present possessions. We do not wish to enter into any engagements which may be productive of enormous expenses, and which are seldom calculated to promote the Company’s essential interests. On the contrary, we wish to see the present Indian powers remain as a check one upon another, without our interfering; therefore, we recommend to you, so soon as possible, to bring about a peace upon terms of the most perfect moderation on the part of the Company, and when made, to adhere to it upon all future occasions, except when the Company’s possessions are actually attacked; and not to be provoked by fresh disturbances of the country powers to enter into new wars.”*

The troops were ordered into cantonments during

* Court’s Letter, dated the 13th May, 1768.



ing the rainy season ; preparations being made for resuming the field as soon as the weather would permit. The enemy took advantage of this step, and invested Veniambaddy, of which they got possession on the 8th November, and then laid siege to Amboor. The Council ordered the troops to assemble immediately at Vellore, to preserve the important fortress of Amboor, and to prevent the enemy from again penetrating into the Carnatic. Colonel Smith obliged them to withdraw from Amboor in December, and shortly after defeated them ; Hyder proceeding to Covrapatam, where he fortified his camp. Colonel Smith followed, but abstained, in consequence of Hyder's strong position and the want of provisions, from again attacking him. Hyder, in order to cut off an expected convoy, put himself at the head of a select body of troops, and on the 20th December marched to Singarapettah, in the hope of intercepting it. Colonel Smith immediately detached Major Fitzgerald with some black cavalry and two companies of grenadiers. He fell in with and defeated Hyder, who retired to Tingra Cottah, and ultimately to Bangalore, leaving garrisons in all the forts in the valley. Tingra Cottah surrendered on the 12th February to Colonel Wood, who advanced against Daraporam, into which place Hyder had thrown six hundred of his best sepoys. The garrison stood a storm, in which they suffered greatly. Covrapatam surrendered to Colonel Smith on the

1767.

MADRAS.

Operations
against Hyder.



1768.

MADRAS.

Nizam desires
terms of ac-
commodation.Treaty with
Soubah.

23d February. The troops under Colonel Wood proceeded to reduce Salem and Ashtour, the possession of which it was felt would greatly tend to the security of the Carnatic to the southward. Various other operations followed, which opened the road to Hyderabad. This circumstance, together with the success of the troops in other parts, induced the Nizam to desire terms of accommodation; and that the Council would send a person to him for the purpose. This was declined, on the ground that he was the aggressor; and it was insisted, as a preliminary, that he should withdraw entirely from Hyder, and send his Dewan with proposals to Madras. After some hesitation, he sent Ruccum-ud-Dowla to the Presidency on the 9th February. The negotiation terminated in a treaty of peace between the Company, the Nizam, and the Nabob, on the 1st March. The Circars were ceded to the Company, the Nizam acknowledging the validity of the phirmaund from the Mogul. The Company agreed to pay him annually the sum stipulated by the former treaty, excepting the two lacs on account of the Chicacole circar, which the Nizam gave up. The sum to be paid him yearly was five lacs of rupees, out of which he agreed that the expenses of the war, about twenty-five lacs, should be deducted, at the rate of three lacs per annum. Care was taken so to word the treaty, that the payment of this sum should not appear to be by virtue of the Company's holding



holding the Circars from the Nizam, but only in consideration of the friendship existing between them. The Guntoor circar was left in the hands of Bazalet Jung, as in the treaty of Hyderabad. Entire possession of the fort of Condapilly, with the jaghire dependent on it, was given up to the Company. Hyder was publicly denounced by the Nizam as a rebel and an usurper, with whom no correspondence was to be maintained. The Nizam promised to assign and make over to the Company all his right and title to the dewanny of the Mysore country. The Nabob of the Carnatic was included in the treaty, "as well with the view of preventing the Soubah from molesting the Carnatic, as to hinder the Nabob from having any hopes towards the Deccan."*

1768.
MADRAS.

Operations were carried on against Hyder. On the 20th March, Salem surrendered to Colonel Wood.

Operations carried on against Hyder.

Intelligence having reached Madras of the expedition fitted out at Bombay† to attack Hyder's settlements on the coast, Colonel Wood was ordered to proceed towards Sattiamungulum, to gain possession of a fort which had been lately built by Hyder, and secure an entrance into the Coimbatore country, and at the same time open a communication with the Malabar coast, to afford aid

Proceedings at Bombay against Hyder.

* Letter to Court, 1st March, 1768.

† *Vide* page 264.



1768.

MADRAS.

aid to the expedition from Bombay, against which the Council apprehended Hyder would direct his attention.

The fort of Kistnagherry, which had been invested by Colonel Smith in the month of February, did not capitulate till the 2d May, the enemy having a few days previously made a vigorous but unsuccessful effort, with a body of two thousand horse, one thousand sepoy, and six hundred peons, to throw in provisions.

Hyder evinces
a disposition to
come to terms.

Hyder had shewn himself a very formidable enemy, and convinced the Council of Madras that, from his increase of power, he would prove a dangerous neighbour. They had reason to believe that he was in treaty with the French, who had been collecting a force at the islands, of thirty companies of one hundred men each, amongst which were many artificers of all kinds. He had intimated a desire that his vakeel might be received at Madras. The Council declined, unless the vakeel was furnished with the conditions proposed as the basis for a negotiation. They felt that the country powers would be apprehensive of joining the Company's interests, if they were liable to be cast off, without a clear understanding as to the position in which they would be placed towards those against whom they might have acted. They also considered it essential to lessen the power of Hyder; but had little reason to believe that he would sacrifice either power or ambition to allay
any



any apprehensions. They observed, that they had a barrier to obtain to the Carnatic, their expenses to recover, and an extension of privileges and possessions to acquire for Bombay. With these views, they determined to pursue vigorous measures, in order to obtain a footing in Mysore before the rainy season obliged them to suspend operations.

1768.

MADRAS.

To promote these ends, two members of the Board were nominated, in the character of field-deputies, to proceed to camp, who, with Colonel Smith, were to act as a Committee, and to determine such measures with the Nabob as might be essential, without awaiting the decision of the Council at Madras, if the delay was likely to be detrimental to the public service. They were also to assist the Nabob in settling the country that might be acquired, to superintend all the measures, and to keep the charges within all possible bounds. The state of their finances was at this time most embarrassing. As very limited aid could be expected from Bengal, part of the money intended for the China investment was withheld.*

Field-deputies appointed.

In the course of the operations, cavalry was indispensable, to enable the troops to follow up the advantages, as well as to oppose with effect that arm of the enemy. The want of such force

Financial embarrassment.

was

* Letter to Court, 11th May 1768.



1768.

MADRAS.

Success against
Hyder.

was severely felt. Vencatagherry surrendered to Colonel Campbell on the 16th June, and Muliava-keel on the 28th; from thence he proceeded to Ossour, where he was joined by the remainder of the army. That place surrendered on the 11th, and Amicalle on the 13th July. These forts formed a complete chain from Vellore to Bangalore, and their possession secured an uninterrupted communication. These successful operations led the Council to resolve on an attempt against Bangalore, which they deemed of the greater moment, from a report that the Nizam had a design of breaking with the Company, and that a negociation was actually on foot between him and the Mahrattas. Hyder also had a vakeel with the Nizam, and Ruccum-ud-Dowla, who had the principal share in concluding the treaty between the Company and the Nizam, was in disgrace, and it was reported that the latter and Mhaderao proposed, as soon as the rains was over, to attack the Nabob's and the Company's possessions.

The views entertained by the Court of Directors, and the course of policy which it appeared to them the Council should have followed, were communicated to Madras, and a Select Committee was nominated to carry into effect their instructions regarding the affairs under that presidency.

Court of Directors condemn the treaty with the Soubah.

“ In whatever light we view the 10th article of your treaty with the Soubah, we see nothing but weakness

1768
MADRAS.

weakness, danger, and instability to our affairs. The Nabob Mahomed Ally, though highly esteemed by us for the sincerity of his attachment, and the long and faithful union of interest that has subsisted between him and the Company, is universally known to be a man of no resources in himself, and, consequently, the whole burthen of defending and supporting him in the Mysore country must fall upon us; with this disadvantage, that by deviating from the original purpose of restoring to every one his right, you lose all the natural interest of the country, there remaining no inducement for any one to join you: thus we should have a barrier to maintain at an immense distance from Fort St. George, and the Mahrattas for our neighbours.

“The situation you were in, when the *Egmont* sailed, was precisely that in which a peace seemed attainable on eligible terms. You were then in possession of all the chain of hills and forts, to form a strong barrier for the Carnatic, and we make no doubt but that Hyder Ally’s repeated defeats would have induced him to pay a large sum of money for the expense of the war; and there it might have been closed with propriety.

“Instead of pursuing pacific measures with Hyder Ally, as we think you ought to have done, knowing, as you did, our sentiments with respect to extending our territories, you have brought us into such a labyrinth of difficulties,
that



1768.

MADRAS.

that we do not see how we shall be extricated from them.

“ But if it should have happened, when these advices reach you, that Hyder Ally should be extirpated, and it should not be inconsistent with any engagements you may have entered into, our wish would be, to have restored to the ancient Rajahs, and powers to whom they belonged, the several districts and countries taken from Hyder Ally, after reserving to us the passes and forts which serve as a barrier between Mysore and the Carnatic. Such a step must demonstrate to all the Indian powers with whom we are connected, that we mean to distribute to every man his own, and by a just, mild, and prudent conduct towards them, to evince that conquests and plunder are not the objects of our pursuit; but that we mean to confine ourselves to the branches of our commercial interest, and the benefit of such revenues as have been granted to us by Mahomed Ally.

“ When we reflect on the vast length of country, from the northern parts of Chicacole, to the southern districts of Madura and Tinnevely; the number of garrisons to be maintained, and the wild independence of most of the Rajahs and Poligars, from whom nothing can be collected but by a standing force, we regret our having ever passed the boundaries of the Carnatic, even for the possession of the Circars; for we have great doubts whether the charges will not always exceed the



the collections, and apprehend many ill consequences from so great a division of our forces. The preservation of the advantages we hold in the Bengal provinces, is the great object of our attention.”*

1769.
MADRAS.

“ Upon principles of policy, we wish for a peace with Hyder Naigue, whenever it can be obtained upon the most moderate terms ; for our policy is to avoid every thing that tends to the increase of the Mahratta power, which is evidently the misfortune of this war; for you are reduced to the necessity of being yourselves the proposers of new provinces to be added to the dominion of the Mahrattas, already possessed of half the Mogul empire.

“ Whether the Mahrattas have accepted or not of your offer, certain it is, they will make the most use they can of the embroils of others. It is by this conduct they have arrived to their present degree of power ; and our best policy is to check their growth by every opportunity, or at least to avoid lending our own force to their aggrandizement, which we certainly do, as often as we engage in wars with the few remaining chiefs of India, who are yet capable of coping with them.

“ Nizam Ally and Hyder Naigue are two of those chiefs, and it is our true interest to preserve a good understanding with them. We do not mean

* Letter to Madras, 17th March, 1769.



1768.

MADRAS.

mean by this, that, after the long and expensive war which you have been most unfortunately engaged in, you should yield to Hyder Naigue, and accept of dishonourable terms ; but, whenever he shews a disposition to peace, we would have you meet him half-way ; and if a reasonable compensation can be obtained for our expenses, we desire no increase of territory, nor fresh grants and privileges of any kind.

“ We have possessions enough in Bengal and the Carnatic to yield all the advantages the Company expect. What we want is, attention in our servants to their improvement and good management, and a time of peace and leisure to establish plans of economy and frugality, both in our own affairs and those of the Nabob of Arcot, whose debts and embarrassments will have no end, till he confines his views to the Carnatic.”* Subsequent events will prove how truly the Court's prognostications were fulfilled.

The difficulty of obtaining monthly supplies to carry on the war, induced the Council to recommend to the Committee to make a vigorous effort at once against Bangalore. This measure was defeated by intelligence from Bombay. The Council at that presidency had promptly answered the call made upon them from Madras, for the purpose

* Letter to Madras, 30th June, 1769.



pose of attacking Hyder's possessions.* Mangalore was taken on the 1st March, and Onore surrendered on the 25th; but their operations against the Ally Rajah were ineffectual, owing to their being disappointed in the promised aid from the "Malabars." Their attempt to induce the Mahrattas to take part against Hyder, also failed; and an agent from Mhaderao laid claim to the Bednore and Soondah countries, and to such part of Mysore as might be taken. This was peremptorily refused by the President of Bombay; but he was empowered by the Council to stipulate, that if the islands of Salsette and Bassein,† with the several districts and revenues dependent upon each respectively; also Caranjah and the Mahrattas' share of the revenue of Surat were relinquished to the Company, the Mahrattas should be secured in their usual *chout* from the various governments and countries of the former rajahs on the coast,

1768.

MADRAS.
Proceedings
against Banga-
lore.

Claims of the
Mahrattas.

* *Vide* page 222.

† The Court of Directors, in a despatch to the Bombay Government in 1768, expressed their desire to obtain grants of both places:—

"The intimation you gave to our President and Council of Fort St. George, to use their endeavours with the Mahrattas to obtain a grant of Salsette and Bassein to us, we highly approve of; and we now recommend to you, in the strongest manner, to use your endeavours, upon every occasion that may offer, to obtain these places, which we should esteem a valuable acquisition. We cannot directly point out the mode of doing it, but rather wish they could be obtained by purchase than war."



1768.

MADRAS.

coast, who were to be reinstated in their possessions.*

Operations
against Hyder.

Hyder retali-
ates.

The discussions terminated without any satisfactory result. The Council were advised that the enemy had appeared on the coast, and that Mangalore and Onore had been evacuated by the Company's forces with great precipitation, a party of the sick and some field-pieces falling into the hands of Hyder, who returned immediately to Bangalore. The views of the Council of Madras, notwithstanding these reverses, were still directed to the reduction of that fortress. The troops under Colonels Smith and Wood were ordered to unite and encamp near Onscotah, until the necessary supplies were collected for carrying on the siege. Before the junction of Colonel Wood, and the arrival of the heavy guns and stores, Hyder formed a design of surprising the camp of Morarirow, about half-a-mile on the right of ours, on the 23d August. He attacked it at night, with six thousand horse and a battalion of sepoys. Morarirow, with great presence of mind, ordered his men not to mount, by which they had greatly the advantage of the enemy among the tents, and soon obliged them to retire with considerable loss. Colonel Wood, having joined Colonel Smith at Boodicotah, on the 6th September, endeavoured to bring Hyder, who was encamped eight miles north

* Letter, April, 1768.



north of that place, to action: he retreated too rapidly for their force to come up with him. Perceiving that he was followed by only one body of troops, he surprised and took Malavagal. Colonel Wood immediately went to its relief, and attempted to recover the fort on the hill by escalade, but without success. Hyder's attempt to throw in a fresh body of troops, on the 28th September, brought on a general action, which lasted from eleven in the morning till sunset, when he retreated, leaving Colonel Wood master of the field. He retired to Chicamogloor, and, on his way, made an effort to take the fort of Murgomallee, which he abandoned on the approach of our troops. The Council, having ascertained from Bombay that he had made overtures for a negociation through the president there, despatched a communication to Mr. Hornby, the President, suggesting that he should inform Hyder, that the Council at Madras were not averse to peace, and that proposals would be received. Colonel Smith, who had advanced with his division of the army in pursuit of Hyder, near Punganoor, received a message from him, desiring to know whether he would grant him a peace. He was informed in reply, that, if he had anything to propose, he should freely open his mind; Hyder desired some person might be sent to him. Colonel Smith despatched his Dubash, the only person he had with him, to whom Hyder said,

1768.

MADRAS.

Fruitless negotiations with Hyder.



1768.

MADRAS.

said, "he was sensible he could not oppose us in the field, neither would he attempt it, but that he could give us much trouble; and as he was forced to quit his own country, he was determined to enter the Carnatic, and do all the mischief he could, and, if reasonable terms were refused him, he would come to the gates of Madras to make peace." The Dubash felt that he could make no answer. To another party sent by Colonel Smith, on the return of the Dubash, Hyder stated, "he was determined not to return to Bangalore; that he had left it well provided to the chance of war; that it was possible we might take it in a month, but he should have Seringapatam and Biddenore remaining, and that, rather than lose all, he would call in the Mahrattas." He also deputed a person of consequence to the field deputies, by whom such moderate terms were proposed, that, had he been sincerely desirous of peace, he would have acceded to them; but he abruptly broke off the negotiation. The Council were satisfied his object had been to gain time, and to give him an opportunity of drawing off the several powers, by publicly announcing that peace had been concluded.

Apprehensions being entertained that Mhaderao would advance beyond the Kistna and join Hyder, the Bombay Council despatched a Resident to Poonah, to draw off his attention. The sincerity of the Soubah was again doubted, as he had



had also sent an agent to Mhaderao. Every attempt was accordingly resolved upon by the Madras Council to distress Hyder, both on the Malabar coast and in the Coimbatore country. The Council at Bombay, from a desire expressed by the Directors for peace, had abstained from further operations.

1768.
MADRAS.

Such were the difficulties and embarrassments with which the Madras Council were surrounded, and so great were their apprehensions as to the Mahrattas, that Mr. Brome, who had been appointed Resident at Poonah, was authorized to propose a junction with Mhaderao, to enable him to conquer the Bednore country, although the Council were quite alive to the great increase of power that the Mahrattas would derive from that conquest.*

Mr. Brome
sent to Poo-
nah.

The mission of Mr. Brome was of no avail. The unfortunate situation of the Company on the Malabar coast, arising from their conquests having been abandoned, and the weak state of the garrison at Bombay, of which Mhaderao was fully informed, left that chieftain free from any apprehension as to the Company's power being exerted to his prejudice. These circumstances, together with a large sum of money paid him by Hyder, and the pressing entreaty of the Nizam (notwithstanding the solemn engagements of

* Letter to the Court, 16th November 1768.



1768.
MADRAS.

of the latter to the Company), that he would join Hyder, led to the conclusion of a treaty between Mhaderao and the Nizam; by which, the latter, in lieu of the forts of Autoor, Nagore, and Dowlatabad, made over to him by Ragobah, was to receive the forts of Ausem and Bodamy, with a jaghire of twelve lacs of rupees, to be paid out of the country of Darood, to make up the difference of the revenues arising from the forts which he ceded: he agreeing to join the Mahrattas in assisting Hyder against the Company and the Nabob. At the date of this transaction (2d December 1768), the following letter was received by the Council of Madras from Mhaderao:

“As the firmness and strength of your friendship is known to every one to be superior in those respects *even to the wall of Alexander*, it is needless to pretend to enter into any discussions of it. In consideration thereof, I have sent my Vakeel, who will advise you of some matters which I have entrusted to him.”

On the 28th November, Hyder's troops forced the Guzelhetty pass: Captain Andrews, who commanded, was killed in the defence. A few days afterwards, the garrison of Coimbatore mutinied; they put to death both the commanding officer and paymaster, and then delivered up the fort to the enemy. This event created so great a panic in the other garrisons, that some were immediately abandoned, and the rest surrendered without

Mutiny at
Coimbatore.



without opposition. On the 5th December, Colonel Lang took the command of the army, relieving Colonel Wood, who had been ordered to the Presidency, to explain the course he had pursued after Hyder's movement towards Ossour, the result of which had produced great despondency both in the troops and their commander.

1768.

MADRAS.

Hyder repossessed himself of the several forts south of the valley, excepting Kistnagherry. He detached parties of his horse, plundering, burning, and laying waste the province of Trichinopoly and the southern countries. The fort of Trichinopoly was only saved by the arrival of Major Fitzgerald in the neighbourhood. The ravages committed by Hyder's horse were great, the want of cavalry rendering it utterly impossible to check them. In fact, the country as far north as Gingee was destroyed, some of the straggling parties advancing to Chingleput. During the whole of January, the forces under Major Fitzgerald were marching and countermarching, in order to watch, and if possible to stop, the progress of the enemy.

Hyder's success.

On the 12th February, a correspondence was renewed with Hyder, on the subject of peace. In reply to a letter from Major Fitzgerald, he expressed a desire to terminate the war, and that an officer might be sent, to whom he could open his mind, promising at the same time to put an end to the ravages committed by his horse. Major

1769.



1769.

MADRAS.

Hyder corres-
ponds with
M. Law.

Fitzgerald deputed Captain Brooke, who, by Hyder's permission, took down in writing the conversation that passed, which led the Council to believe that he was really inclined to come to terms.* A proposition was made, on the part of the Council, for a truce of forty days; Hyder would only consent to twelve days. The terms he prescribed being inadmissible, preparations were made to watch his motions. He was at this time in communication with M. Law, at Pondicherry, which the French were busy in fortifying, under pretence of security against the Native powers. The following copy of a letter from Hyder to M. Law was discovered:—"It is a long time since I had the pleasure of receiving any letters from you advising of your health, the news of these parts, and that of the French in Europe. Considering the friendship and regard which the French Company and the sirdars of their king in Europe bear to me, I am very glad to hear of the increase of their happiness and power, also of your health. You have, doubtless, heard from others the repeated victories which, by the blessing of God, have attended the Circar's troops; also the defeat of the English, and my laying waste the Trichinopoly, Arcot, &c. countries. My victorious armies are now gone towards Madras, near to which place they will proceed; when you will certainly

* Madras Consultations, January 1769.



certainly send to me a person of distinction, to inform me as well of certain affairs of your country of Europe as these parts; and till then, be constant in writing me very particular letters, advising of the above matters, the situation of affairs in Europe, the English sea-ports and their sirdars; all which will be the means of increasing our friendship and regard. From Shah Mahomed, a servant of my court, whom I now send, you will be informed of my friendship. What can I say more?"*

1769.

MADRAS.

Experience having shewn, that it was impossible to obtain any decisive advantage without a body of horse, a communication took place with the Nabob of the Carnatic as to the best means of procuring that species of force. The distress of the Council was so great for want of money, that a stop was put to the investment on the coast, all further advances being interdicted: notwithstanding these extreme measures for relief, they stated that, they "knew not where to find resources for carrying on the war for more than four months longer." They applied to the King of Tanjore for a body of cavalry; but Hyder had already despatched part of his force to the frontiers of Tanjore, and obliged the king to pay a sum of money, and to furnish a quantity of provisions, to save his country from being laid waste. It being

Want of
cavalry and
money.

out

* Country Correspondence, 1769.



1769.

MADRAS.

Causes of protracted war.

out cavalry, Morarirow engaged to complete his horse to three thousand; the Nabob was to furnish four thousand more, which, with the fifteen hundred he already possessed, and about five hundred the Polygars could supply, would form on the whole a respectable body.

The Council ascribed the protraction of the war to the three following causes: a divided power—the want of cavalry—and the want of money. They remarked, that the forces in the field were under the Company's servants, but the means of maintaining them were principally obtained from the Nabob, who was very jealous of control, especially since our attainment of the Dewanny in Bengal, which led him to infer that the same result would follow at Madras. They did not hesitate to declare their opinion, that either the whole management of the Carnatic must remain in his hands or that of the Company; and that if the revenues of the Carnatic were free and unencumbered, they might well afford to maintain a respectable body of cavalry, besides one of infantry; but under the existing embarrassments of the Nabob, it appeared to be impracticable. As to money, they had never been able to calculate a reasonable dependence on more than could meet three or four months of ordinary charges. The Nabob, at length perceiving his danger, and the indispensable necessity of a body of cavalry, engaged to procure both the cavalry and the means.



means.* Great doubts were entertained as to his fulfilling his engagement; had not large supplies been furnished from Bengal, the affairs at Madras must long before have sunk under the burthen. These considerations led the Council to urge the expediency of a sum being always reserved at each of the presidencies to meet the extraordinary charges of war, in case the ordinary revenues should fail.† The incursions of Hyder determined the Council to fortify the Black Town, for which purpose a contract was entered into with Mr. Paul Benfield, in March.

Hyder, finding himself much pressed by the force under Colonel Smith, near Chingleput, returned suddenly to the southward, and on the 18th March, encamped on the Red Hills, near Pondicherry. Colonel Smith marched to Wandewash, where he was obliged to wait some days, to put his army in a condition to pursue the enemy.

On the 28th, the Council received intelligence from Chingleput, that Hyder's horse had appeared near that place, and at twelve at night, the signal agreed upon was made at the Mount. On the 29th, in the morning, several parties of horse appeared within the bounds of Madras, and it was ascertained from a spy, that Hyder, with more of his horse, but without guns or infantry,

was

* This measure was the foundation of that portion of the Carnatic debt commonly called the "Cavalry Loan."

† Letter, 8th March 1769.

1769.
MADRAS.

Hyder advances to Madras.



1769.
MADRAS.

Letter from
Hyder.

was on the other side of St. Thomé. About six o'clock in the evening, Hyder addressed a letter to the President on the subject of a peace :

“ After the arrival of Mr. Andrews, and the commencement of the negociation of peace, in person as well as by letter, a means of establishing a friendship between us took place. I therefore addressed a letter to you, by a camel-hircarrah, on the 13th March, in answer to one you sent me, and lay encamped near Balepore ; when, Colonel Smith arriving near my army, by continual marches, with a design to attack me, I was under a necessity to move. Just at which time, I received your letter of the 17th, by the said camel-hircarrah, advising of your intention to send Mr. Andrews again to me, in a day or two ; for which reason, I encamped within three or four coss of Cuddalore, in expectation of his arrival. The laying waste of that place would not have been so difficult a task ; but still I declined it, out of regard to the friendship between us, as it would prejudice the trust that is usually put in sea-ports. Mr. Andrews, however, delaying his coming for some time, and Colonel Smith, notwithstanding the negociation of peace being on foot, again arriving within two or three coss of my army, with the same design as before, I immediately decamped ; and with a view to settle a lasting peace, the soonest possible, am arrived at the Mount. My regard to our friendship, and the intercourse of
letters

1769.
MADRAS.

letters which has passed between us, made me decline coming to blows with the Colonel; and the same consideration has made me entirely forbid the burning the villages, and seizing the cattle: on which heads, I have given proper orders throughout my army. I now write this, therefore, to desire you will send to me Mr. Dupré, who is a wise sirdar and one of the councillors, and with whom, moreover, I have maintained a correspondence since the first arrival of Mr. Andrews. To him I shall impart my thoughts respecting the establishing a peace and sincere friendship between us, which, having fully understood, he may return and acquaint you with; in which case, that foundation of a lasting peace, which we are both desirous of, will be established. In case of any delay therein, I am not to be blamed: let me hope, therefore, that you will send the said gentleman with all possible expedition. Entertain no apprehensions whatever, but be pleased to send him with a contented heart. For further particulars relative to my friendship, I refer you to the said Nizamuddeen. May your happiness always increase!"*

The President replied to Hyder Ally Khan:—
“By Nizamuddeen Ahamed, I have just now received your letter from the Mount, the friendly contents of which give me great pleasure, as you still express your good inclination to restore peace,
and

* Country Correspondence, 1769.



1769.
MADRAS.

and desire that I will send Mr. Dupré to you for that purpose. That gentleman will set out from hence to-morrow morning early, to visit you ; and I hope all our differences will soon be adjusted to our mutual satisfaction. I therefore desire, as an earnest of your good intentions, that you will order your people not to plunder the Company's villages, nor molest the people. If you will consent to this, I will empower Mr. Dupré to send a letter to Colonel Smith to halt at a proper distance."

Treaty signed.

On the following morning, Mr. Dupré set out to join Hyder, with whom he continued the whole day, returning to the Presidency in the evening. The conference led to the conclusion of terms, and of a treaty, which was signed by Hyder on the 3d April. He announced his signing it in the following terms :—" I have the pleasure of your letter. Agreeably to your desire, I have put my seal to the treaty you sent. You will receive it by Mr. Stracy, to whom I beg leave to refer you for further particulars, as well as to the circumstances of Colonel Smith's movements to-day. May your happiness and joy ever last!"

It consisted of three articles. The contracting parties included the Rajah of Tanjore, the Malavar Ram Rajah, and Morarirow, who were described as friends and allies to the Carnatic Payan Gaut ; also all other friends and allies of the contracting parties, provided they did not become aggressors against either of them ; but if they be-

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1769.

MADRAS.

the delivery of the stores in the fort of Colar. The Council, anticipating some further demands, consulted Colonel Smith as to the means of carrying on a war, should hostilities recommence. That officer declared that, considering the reduced condition of the troops, the distressed state of the country, and the inability of the Council to procure any certain pecuniary resources, there was no probability of their being able to prosecute a war with any prospect of success; that they were not in a position to insist upon more favourable terms, and that even a temporary respite was of great moment to the troops.

In consideration of these circumstances, and of the success of the enemy in the Tinnevely country, owing to the combination of the Polygars in his favour, and the miserable defection of the Nabob's sepoys, who fled from every part on the appearance of the enemy, the demands of Hyder were acceded to.

Hyder shortly afterwards solicited the Council for a small body of troops, merely as a proof of the Company's connexion with him, to assist him with Janojee against Mhaderao. The Council referred him to the treaty, under which they declined acceding to his request, feeling that it would be unwarrantable to take part against Mhaderao.

On the termination of peace with Hyder, the Council brought before the Court the relation in which