



dispossess him of his government. He returned to Patna for that purpose, and was on the point of attacking the town when he received a counter-order. A reconciliation took place with the government, and Rám Náráin remained in his office, but without any confidence between him and the nabob. Coote returned to Murshidábáb, and on the day after his arrival Clive set out for Calcutta. He left the detachment under Coote at Casimbázár, but removed the rest of the army to Chandernagór.

August 22.

Septem-
ber 14.

After so violent a revolution, it was natural to expect temporary disorders, but before Clive left Murshidábád, there were already signs of permanent weakness in the new government. The great claims of the English had left Mír Jáfir no means of gratifying his old adherents or rewarding those chiefs who had taken part with him in the late conspiracy; the transfer of so much money to a foreign territory was of itself unpopular, and the ascendancy of Europeans, hitherto only known as humble merchants, was odious to all classes, especially to the Mahometans. Mír Jáfir's own character was little qualified to remove these bad impressions. He was feeble and irresolute, indolent and insincere; he wasted his time in frivolous amusements, and embittered the disappointment of his unrewarded friends by lavish expenditure on his own pomp and pleasures. His son Míran, though so young, had, from his reckless energy, an ascendancy over him. This young man was rather popular with the soldiery, from a notion that he was unfavourable to the English; but his treachery and cruelty, his licentious and profligate character, made him detested by all other classes of the people. Neither father nor son understood the English, the most corrupt of whom despised habitual fraud and falsehood. If those

CHAP.
VIII.

around were discontented with the nabob, he was not better pleased with them. He had expected to step at once into the situation of Ali Verdi, and he found himself not only controlled by his allies, but tied up by engagements to his own subjects which he was not allowed to break. The first object of his jealousy was Rái Dúlab, who till the moment when he mounted the masnad had been his equal, and who from the agreement sworn to by himself and Clive, was still beyond the reach of his power. To deprive Rái Dúlab of this protection Jáfir brought forward all the accusations to which he gave credit, and others which he invented or did not believe. Rám Náráin having formerly been a dependent of Rái Dúlab, was supposed to be under his influence; insurrections broke out in different places which were attributed to him; a body of Marattas, who threatened Bengal from Cattac, were thought to have been invited by Rái Dúlab, and the troops more than once mutinied for pay, which was supposed to be at his instigation. How far Rái Dúlab was concerned in any of these machinations is doubtful, but he did the nabob as serious an injury, by endeavouring to impress on the English that he had formed a regular design for freeing himself by force from their control. He himself was alarmed for his life, and several times shut himself up in his house, suspending all the financial business of the state and depriving it of the services of the large body of troops which was under his personal command. This state of things kept the city in continual agitation and alarm. On one occasion during the nabob's absence a cry was raised of an extensive conspiracy headed by Rái Dúlab to put the infant nephew of Suráj-u-Doula on the masnad, on which Míran ordered the unfortunate child to be murdered, and imprisoned the ladies of Ali



Verdi's family. Temporary reconciliations were mediated by the English, but did not last, until Clive, judiciously availing himself of a period of embarrassment, convinced the nabob of the injury he was doing to his own affairs, and brought about an agreement which was effective for a considerable time.

The first of the insurrections alluded to was at Midnapúr, where the farmer of the revenue resisted the new government, but was brought to obedience by the interposition of Clive. The next was a plot at Dacca, to set up one of the family of Sarafiáz Khán, but that was quelled by the local officers. The most serious was that of Achal Sing, the farmer of Purniá, who set up a connection of Ali Verdi's family and raised a great body of troops. The nabob went in person against this insurgent, accompanied by Clive and the British troops. Their approach broke up the rebellion, and an officer of the nabob's, named Khádim Husén, who was sent in advance, took possession of the district and made Achal Sing prisoner. The nabob, thus freed from his other enemies, was eager to dispossess Rám Náráin, while Clive, who knew that he had collected an army, and feared that if driven to despair he would call in the Nabob of Oude and throw the whole country into confusion, was very averse to proceeding to extremities. He complied with the nabob's wish that he should march towards Patna, but he obtained his leave to attempt by fair means to obtain the submission of Rám Náráin, and wrote to that officer undertaking to guarantee the terms proposed by the nabob. On receiving this letter Rám Náráin set out from Patna, and came without hesitation to the camp, when he was presented to the nabob and was confirmed in his government. Rám Náráin on this occasion was quite sincere, and was effectually protected

CHAP.
VIII.

as long as Clive remained in India, but the nabob gave such proofs of sinister intentions during the transaction as to create a great degree of alienation between him and Clive, and even to excite some suspicions of hostile designs against the latter. When all was at last adjusted, the army returned to Murshidábád, Mír Jáfir following by a circuitous route. When the army reached the capital, Míran affected alarm at the power of Rái Dúláb and fled to a country house, an act of folly which though in some degree repaired by his early return, revived the old estrangement of Rái Dúláb, and even implied distrust of Clive.

A considerable portion of the first payment to the English, which it had been agreed should be made in ready money, was still outstanding, and the expense of the present expedition increased the debt. Before the march of the army, Clive required that districts should be set aside from which the amount might be collected on account of the English, and the nabob at this time conferred a further favour on the Company by allowing it to farm the saltpetre monopoly in his province, though at the highest rate ever paid on any former occasion.²

After a short stay at Murshidábád, Clive proceeded to Calcutta. Despatches soon after arrived from England setting aside Clive, who had first been nominated as head of a committee for the settlement of Bengal, and appointing a council of ten, the four senior members of which were to preside for four months each in turn. This absurd arrangement was the result of a compromise between conflicting interests in the Court of Directors. It had taken eight months to reach Bengal, and had been

² The districts were subsequently restored before the whole debt had been liquidated, and a deposit of jewels was accepted as security for the remainder, which amounted to 200,000*l*.



drawn up before the news of the battle of Plassy had been heard of in England. Had that victory not taken place, the plan must have occasioned the immediate destruction of the British power in Bengal. Even in the actual state of affairs it was so pregnant with danger, that the members who would have formed the rotation government, to the great honour of their disinterestedness and patriotism, at once determined to waive the appointment, and with the consent of the rest of the council, offered the government to Clive.

Clive, though greatly offended at the treatment he had received, did not withhold his services, but accepted the charge without hesitation. This was the first instance of open disobedience to the orders of the Court of Directors, which was afterwards so often the theme of invective against their servants. The extreme importance of subordination, and the unnecessary breaches of it which sometimes occurred in India, make the general clamour on this subject natural and commendable, but in fact the distance of the Court of Directors, their ignorance of India, then only gradually becoming known to persons on the spot, their liability to local influence, and the necessary inapplicability of orders arriving at least a year after the exigency to which they related, made it often impossible to carry their instructions into effect. In the present case disobedience saved the province, and on many subsequent occasions the most useful and necessary measures were carried through in India, in direct opposition to the Court of Directors. In this instance a revolution of parties in the court led to a speedy correction of their error and confirmed Clive's appointment.

The nabob paid a complimentary visit to Calcutta soon after Clive's accession, and, in his absence, the long

CHAP.
VIII.

disputes with Rái Dúlab were brought to a crisis. That minister was desired to exhibit his accounts to be examined by Míran's díwán, and seeing the snare prepared for him, he requested to be allowed to retire to Calcutta. Míran refused, and at the same time instigated a body of troops to raise a mutiny and threaten the life of the minister. Rái Dúlab stood on the defensive until he was relieved by Mr. Watts, who returned from the nabob with a permission which he had obtained for the minister's departure. The removal of so powerful a subject was a great triumph to the nabob, but he did not feel safe while his enemy was at the ear of the British Governor. He had recourse therefore to new devices. Soon after his return to his capital he gave out that as he was going to perform his public devotions he observed a commotion among the troops whom he passed, and on reaching the mosque found that Khoja Hádi, who was posted there with his personal guard, was engaged in a plot to murder him, and to join in an extensive mutiny for which his death was to be the signal. No attempt on his life was made, and the threatened disturbance was quelled with unaccountable ease; but Khoja Hádi was dismissed from the service, and soon after the nabob pretended to have gained possession of a letter to him from Rái Dúlab. In this letter that veteran conspirator was made to avow his own share in the plot without reserve, and to say that he had obtained Clive's consent to it; and this was addressed to a man who, as the letter shows, required no such encouragement to induce him to go through with the plot. The intention of the letter was to irritate Clive against Rái Dúlab, but the forgery was too palpable to deceive anybody, and Clive contented himself with remonstrating against the nabob's giving ear to a story in which his



name was so dishonourably introduced. How much of the whole plot was real and how much invented by the nabob was never fully ascertained, for Khoja Hádi was allowed to depart with a small escort, and was murdered by a party of the nabob's troops in a defile through which he had to pass.

Before this, the French had sent such a force to Coromandel as obliged the English to stand on the defensive, and about this time intelligence arrived that they had taken Fort St. David and were threatening Madras. Earnest and repeated entreaties and injunctions had from time to time been received from the Madras Government for the return of Clive and his detachment to that Presidency. The course of the narrative has already shown the utter impossibility of compliance up to this period, and even now it was not competent for Clive to abandon his government, if he could otherwise have been spared. Even to weaken his force for a time was dangerous, and to do so permanently would have been ruinous. He, however, discovered a plan by which one part of the evil was avoided, and resolved to send an expedition into the French districts nearest Bengal, by which, if he did not effect a diversion, he would at least strike at the most important of the enemy's resources.

This resolution was opposed by the whole council without exception. Besides the perilous state of the interior, they still looked to the possibility of a descent by the French, and they thought, not without plausible reasons, that it would be an act of unpardonable rashness to weaken a province where their power was so precarious, and which was of so much more value than all the Company's old possessions. The expedition, however, sailed on Clive's sole responsibility. It was

CHAP.
VIII.

commanded by Colonel Forde, and consisted of a full half of the troops.

End of
Sep-
tember,
A.D. 1758.

The successes of the French opened new views to the nabob, and he was heard to say that if that nation were to come to Bengal, he would assist them, unless the British would agree to renounce all their pecuniary and territorial claims. But although the reduced numbers of the English was favourable to any design against them, none seems to have been formed. Jáfir was greatly irritated by the restraints imposed on him, and felt the increasing pressure of the Company's claims, and he was at first disappointed to find that the munificence of his presents to Clive produced no disposition to relax on public questions; but he perceived how insecure his power would be without the English, and he still felt reverence and perhaps regard for their chief. Clive owed these sentiments as much to his steady conduct as to his services and station. He treated the nabob with frankness and temper, as well as with firmness; trusting in general to reason and sometimes to time and patience for attaining his objects, seldom peremptory and never arrogant.

January,
A.D. 1759.

Not long after the departure of the expedition, intelligence was received which showed in a strong light the danger of leaving Bengal so ill defended. Prince Ali Góhar, after his escape from Delhi,^s remained for several months in dependence on Najib-u-Doula, but hearing of the distracted state of Bengal, he thought he might have some chance of supplanting the present occupant of that province. Shujá-u-Doula, to whom he next repaired, had a secret motive for encouraging him to make the attempt, and for inducing his own

^s ii. 668.



cousin Mohammed Kúli, Viceroy of Allahábád, to embark with the greatest zeal in his cause.

If the Empire had still been in existence, Ali Góhar was a rebel, for such he had been proclaimed by his father at Delhi; his claim to Bengal was a fresh offence against his sovereign, for the king's patent for that province had not long before been sold to Mír Jáfir. But the Emperor was known to be a tool in the hands of Gházi-u-dín, and as the right of the house of Teimur had become a mere matter of feeling, it would have been idle to scrutinise the legal pretensions of any of its members. Ali Góhar's name, supported by the power and resources of Mohammed Kúli, drew together a force which was at one time estimated at 40,000 men. He wrote to Clive, promising whatever he chose to ask within the compass of the Empire; but Clive plainly stated his relation to the nabob, whom he had recognised as master of the country, and, though in general very respectful, he on one occasion, when dismissing the prince's agents, told them that if they should return with similar proposals, he would put them to death as disturbers of the public peace. This conduct did much to quiet the mind of the nabob, but his knowledge of his own unpopularity, his fears of treachery from Rám Náráin, and his doubts of the fidelity of all his troops and officers, kept him still in great alarm. He even thought of buying off the prince with a sum of money, but Clive convinced him of the danger as well as disgrace of such a course, and, in compliance with the earnest entreaties of the nabob, he agreed to take the field along with Míran to oppose the invader. Though his force consisted of no more than 500 Europeans and 2,500 sepoys, he left Calcutta nearly stripped of troops. While he was preparing, and the nabob providing pay

CHAP.
VIII.

March 23

for his army, the prince and Mohammed Kúli had advanced into Behár, and Shujá-u-Doula, the Nawab Vizier of Oude, was making open preparations to follow. Rám Náráin wrote urgent letters for assistance, and Clive gave him the strongest assurances of support ; but the enemy at last reached Patna, and Rám Náráin had no expedient left but to temporise. He waited on the prince and made the fullest submission, and so far won on Mohammed Kúli, that he promised to make him Diwán of Allahábád. But he allowed nobody to enter the city, and when at length the patience of the confederates was completely worn out, he shut his gates and stood on the defensive. It was never doubted at Murshidábád that he was sincere in his defection. The nabob was filled with fresh alarms ; even Clive was misled and wrote to reproach him. But Rám Náráin was quite in earnest in his defence, and held out steadily against repeated attempts to breach and storm the walls. At the end of a fortnight the British army drew near, and he was still looking to their arrival for deliverance, when his difficulties were at once removed by an act of unparalleled treachery committed by Shujá-u-Doula. Having embarked his cousin in the invasion of Behár, he made a show of joining him, and obtained leave to deposit his family in the fort of Allahábád ; when admitted he made himself master of the place, and, in the absence of their chief and his army, the whole country speedily submitted. Their recent repulse, followed by this calamity, disheartened Mohammed Kúli's men, who were afraid to face a force of Shujá's sent to attack him, and in the end he threw himself on his cousin's mercy and was immediately put to death. When he left Patná, the prince, who depended on him for his daily bread, was obliged to retire with him.

April 5.



At the time of this retreat, Clive's advanced guard was within a march of Patna, and he himself, with the young nabob, made his entry into the town five days after it. The prince repeatedly applied to Clive for an asylum, but Clive, though he replied in terms of sympathy, warned him that it would be his duty to make him prisoner if ever he came into his power. The end of their intercourse was a present of 1,000*l.* from Clive to relieve the prince's urgent necessities. After reducing some zemindars in the hilly part of Behár, who had declared for the prince, Clive returned to Murshidábád, where he was received with joy and gratitude by the nabob. As an unequivocal proof of those sentiments, he conferred on him as a *jágír* the rent reserved from the districts held by the Company, the value of which was 30,000*l.* a year. The magnitude of this gift, and the dependent condition of the nabob, naturally suggest a suspicion that such a sacrifice must have been extorted by the receiver, or must have been made with the expectation of obtaining some advantage in return. But on a close inquiry it appears that the only application made by Clive was an expression of disappointment, in a letter to the Sét, that the nabob, when he procured him a high title from Delhi, had not assigned him a *jágír* for the support of his dignity; he begged the Sét to apply to the nabob on this subject, as he had no intention of bringing it forward himself. The nabob returned an evasive answer, after which six or seven months elapsed, and Clive by his own account thought the affair forgotten. It is certain that he took no further steps relating to it, for the Sét, when they report their ultimate success, and take credit for having kept the nabob in mind, still refer to Clive's first letter as the only communication they have had

CHAP.
VIII.

on the subject from him. Mr. Sykes, the Resident at Murshidábád, states in his evidence that he had received no application directly or indirectly from Clive, and had never heard of the intended grant till it was notified to him by the nabob. No urgency had been shown under apparent neglect, and the amount to be given was left entirely to the donor.⁴ The nabob no doubt expected some advantage from conciliating Clive, but he knew from former experience how little effect presents had in mollifying his strictness in public matters, and that he required no extraneous motive to induce him to show his gratitude to Clive is apparent from the circumstance of his leaving him a large legacy in his will. The transaction therefore was as free from corruption as from extortion; whether it was equally free from indelicacy on Clive's part is a very different question.

Not long after Clive's return to Calcutta, he had to encounter a new enemy. A strong expedition was fitted out by the Dutch at Batavia, professedly for the purpose of reinforcing their settlements on the coast of Coromandel, but really destined for Bengal. It sailed in the middle of June, touched at Negapatam on the coast, where it left no troops, and arrived in the Ganges in October. Its arrival placed the British Government in imminent danger. The absence of the force under Colonel Forde, the chance of renewed disturbances in the interior, even the uncertainty of the nabob's disposition, made its situation critical, and threw those at the head of it into great embarrassment. To allow the Dutch to establish themselves was to give up Bengal, and to oppose them during peace with their

⁴ Letters from the Sêts, First Report of 1772, 224; evidence of Clive, *ibid.* 153; evidence of Sykes, *ibid.* 153; Clive's *Letter to the Proprietors*, 35.



nation was a violent step for a subordinate authority. War with Holland was indeed expected, but it had not been proclaimed and in fact never took place. A prodigious responsibility was thus thrown upon Clive, and, to add to his perplexity, a great part of his private fortune was in the hands of the Dutch. He, however, gave no signs of hesitation, but acted with firmness and consistency from first to last.⁵

The nabob sent repeated prohibitions against the force landing, which were answered by promises of compliance by the Dutch. Hostilities were commenced by the invaders, but the English had previously determined to oppose them by force of arms.

The British troops took the field, to the number of 320 Europeans and 1,200 sepoy, leaving Calcutta in charge of 250 militia. They were commanded by Colonel Forde, who had returned after the conquest of the French districts on the coast, suffering severe ill-health, and just superseded in his command by the Court of Directors. His zeal and spirit were not the least abated; he took the Dutch post of Barnagor, dispersed an ambuscade which lay in wait for him in the ruins of Chandernagór, and took up his station near Chinsura to await the arrival of the Dutch force. He soon after learned that it had landed on the preceding day and was at no great distance.⁶ It consisted of 700 Europeans

⁵ He said to a friend who remonstrated against his incurring so great a responsibility, 'A public man must sometimes act with a halter round his neck.'

⁶ It is said with every appearance of truth, that he applied to Clive for final orders, which might be required for his justification in so questionable a case. Clive was playing at cards when the note was delivered to him, and without rising from the table he wrote with a pencil, 'Dear Forde,—Fight them immediately. You shall have the order of council to-morrow.'

CHAP.
VIII.

and 700 Malays, with some Indian foot soldiers. The Europeans were mostly Germans, and the commanding officer was a Frenchman. From their composition they were very superior to Forde's force. The action was short, bloody, and decisive; the Dutch had 300 killed and 150 wounded. A body of the nabob's cavalry which had joined Forde took an active part in the affair, especially in the pursuit. On the same day the seven Dutch ships which had brought the troops were taken by three English Indiamen after an action of two hours. The Government of Chinsura immediately came to terms. They engaged to pay for the damage done to the British merchant vessels and villages, and to restrict their military establishment for the future to 125 European soldiers. The Dutch well knew when they began that they would have to fight the British. Their expedition was an aggression against the nabob if he were a substantive power; if he were not so, it was an aggression against the English, whose ascendancy in Bengal had, from circumstances beyond their control, become necessary to their existence in that province.

The nabob was supposed by the English to have invited the Dutch, but to have changed his mind after the war with Ali Góhar. It is probable that though he would have been glad to see a counterpoise to the power of the English, he never went beyond some underhand assurances of favour in an early stage of the affair.⁷

February
5, A.D.
1760.

This was the last transaction of Clive's government. He sailed for England early in the next year.

⁷ See the letters of the Dutch Governor; First Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, 162.



CHAPTER IX.

Prince Ali Góhar assumes the title of Sháh Álam—Is routed by the English under Caillaud—Operations of Caillaud—Death of Míran—Crisis in the affairs of Murshidábád—Arrival of Vansittart—Decides on supporting Cásim Ali—Terms of the treaty—Jáfir Ali deposed—Remarks on the revolution—Presents to members of the Government—Defeat of Sháh Álam by Carnac, and his surrender to the English—Disputes with Cásim Ali—Private trade of the Company's servants—Its abuses—The Nabob abolishes all inland duties—Violent resolutions of the Council—The Nabob seizes boats with supply of arms for Patna—Capture of an English detachment—Murder of Mr. Amyatt—Treaty with Mír Jáfir and advance of the English army—Defeat of Cásim Ali—Massacre of the English at Patna—Cásim Ali takes refuge in Oude—Insubordination in the British force—Defeat of Shujá-u-Doula by Carnac—Another mutiny in the British army—Battle of Buxar—Sháh Álam joins the British camp—Capture of Allahábád and occupation of Lucknow—Shujá-u-Doula seeks assistance from the Marattas—Surrenders to Carnac.

BEFORE Clive's departure news had been received of the reappearance of the Prince Ali Góhar on the north-western frontier. He was not now supported by any of the great chiefs of Hindostan, but was invited by some zemindars and some military officers who thought themselves aggrieved by Mír Jáfir. In his present state of want and despondency, however, any adventure was worth the trial.¹ The chief of the malcontents was Cámgár Khán, a zemindar of Behár, and to him the prince entrusted the duties of prime minister and commander-in-chief during the whole of the expedition. Before he reached the frontier he heard of the murder

CHAP.
IX.

A.D. 1759.

¹ 'The forlorn prince who had no house nor home of his own, wanted no better.' (*Seir ul Mutakherín*, ii. 92.)

CHAP.
IX.November
A.D. 1759.

of his father at Delhi, and immediately assumed the title of Emperor² and the name of Sháh Álam. His right was incontestible, and was generally recognised, and although it added little or nothing to his power and influence in the Empire, it made some impression in his immediate vicinity. Single adventurers joined him in greater numbers, and the neighbouring zemindars began to think better than they had done of his chance of success. He before long obtained a more solid advantage by the indiscretion of Rám Náráin, who was still governor of Patna, and who quitted the city for the purpose of meeting him in the field.

Rám Náráin had a native force estimated at 15,000 men,³ with twenty guns, but his own part of it was discontented for want of pay, and he had reason to doubt the fidelity of the zemindars who composed the other portion

² [The sovereigns of Delhi are usually described as kings in the English versions of the grants to the East India Company. The title, which is rendered Emperor in the text, is probably that of Padshah, which was uniformly borne by the members of the Mogul dynasties and by Sháh Álam himself at the lowest point of the fortunes of the family. (See the Essay on 'Imperial and other Titles,' *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. ix. N.S.). Eastern titles are very various, as Malik, Sultan, Sháh, or Khán, differing in linguistic origin and in the importance attached to each at different times. The title Khán was brought by the Mogul conquerors of Asia from the north, but on the decline of their power it drops out of history as a royal appellation. The title of Sultan was commonly borne by the early Mahometan conquerors of India. Baber was the first to take the title of Padshah. He says in his memoirs that he assumed it after his conquest of India. 'Till this time the family of Timur Beg, even though on the throne, had never assumed any other title than that of Mirza. At this period I ordered that they should style me Padshah.' The Imperial title now borne by our sovereign is that of Kaiser-i-Hind. The new designation steers clear of all controversy as to the employment of a title of Aryan or Semitic origin, and it is said to be one still recognised as Imperial in the East.—ED.]

³ MS. letter of Mr. Amyatt, dated Patna, January 17, 1760, 'the narrative of what happened in Bengal in 1760,' reckons Rám Náráin's force at 40,000 men, and Sháh Álam's, at a later period, when at its highest, 60,000.



of his army. He was accompanied by seventy Europeans, a battalion of sepoy, and two field-pieces, which Clive had left as a garrison in the town.⁴ The prince's army was probably not so numerous, and had no guns. Rám Náráin drew up his troops at too great a distance to allow of his receiving support from the English. Two disaffected zemindars changed sides in the beginning of the action, and fell on Rám Náráin's rear; he was himself severely wounded, and his remaining troops dispersed. He owed his own retreat to the protection of a body of 400 English sepoy who moved to his assistance, and who after effecting that service were cut to pieces with their officers, only twenty-five men surviving. The remains of the British troops made their way to the city through the midst of their victorious enemies.

Patna was thrown into consternation by this defeat, but the prince made no serious attack on it. He spent a few days in plundering the country, and probably in increasing his force, but his attention was chiefly directed to the approach of Míran and the British. Colonel Caillaud (who had been summoned from Madras to command the army in Bengal) marched from Murshidábád on January 18 with 400 Europeans, a battalion of sepoy, and six field-pieces, accompanied by Míran at the head of 15,000 men, and twenty-five pieces of cannon. On the 19th they were within twenty-eight miles of Sháh Álam, who immediately moved against them. On the 22nd, in the evening, as the British were pitching their tents, they were attacked with vigour by the Emperor. Míran's troops showed no want of courage, but were huddled up in a mass by the

February
9, A.D.
1760.

⁴ We learn from Vansittart (*Letter to the Proprietors*, 98) that the strength of a battalion was at that time 700 men.

CHAP.
IX.

ignorance of their leader, and were on the point of giving way, when Caillaud wheeled up part of his sepoy, and took the enemy in flank. Their success was now turned into a complete rout; seventeen pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the English. But as Míran refused to pursue, the enemy's whole force was collected again within two days at Behár, ten miles from the field of battle and thirty-five from Patna. Míran himself was slightly wounded in the action, and made that a pretence for going into Patna and remaining there for a week.

February
29.

At length he was prevailed on to move, but before he reached Behár he found that Sháh Álam had left his opponents behind and boldly pushed for Murshidábád. Míran and his horse immediately pursued by forced marches, while Caillaud moved with equal speed in boats down the current of the Ganges. At the end of three days Sháh Álam found he could no longer escape along the river, and struck into the mountainous tract which covers the south of Bengal. Though he had only light horse, without guns or baggage, he was so much delayed by the thick woods and narrow passes in those hills, that it was not till the end of March that he presented himself within thirty miles to the west of Murshidábád. He was there joined by four or five thousand Berár Marattas, who had come on a plundering expedition from Orissa and had made their way so far towards the north. The nabob had had time in the interval to draw together some of his troops, with whom, and with 200 Europeans, he moved out to cover the city, where the greatest alarm nevertheless prevailed. Up to this time Sháh Álam had conducted his march with skill and energy, but he threw away the effects of it by hesitating to attack the nabob and push

March 8.



on to Murshidábád before any sufficient force could be assembled to oppose him. In a few days it was out of his power to do so, for Míran and Caillaud joined the nabob on April 4, and the Emperor had no resource left but to retreat. He was followed for two or three marches, and on this occasion, as well as on the march from Behár, several opportunities of destroying him were lost through the jealousy, sloth, or caprice of the nabob and his son. Sháh Álam seems now to have recovered his judgment, which had deserted him in the decisive moment. He recollected the defenceless state of Patna, and determined to march with all speed to that city in the hope of obtaining possession of it before any succours could arrive.

Till April
7.

He reached the neighbourhood of Patna about April 22, and was there most opportunely joined by M. Law, who had hitherto found shelter in Bundelcand, with the remnant of the French sepoys and some guns. With this accession to his means for a siege, he attempted both to breach and escalate the walls of Patna.

The garrison repulsed two attacks, but on the second the enemy had for a time got into the town through the breach, and they despaired of being able to hold out for another day, when their drooping spirits were revived by the most unlooked for appearance of a British detachment. It was under Captain Knox, who had left Caillaud's camp on April 16 with 200 Europeans, a battalion of sepoys, and two guns, had marched 300 miles in thirteen days, a distance almost incredible at that scorching season, and now threw himself into Patna soon after the second assault had failed.

Next day he surprised Sháh Álam's camp about noon, the hour for dinner and repose, and caused so

April 28.

CHAP.
IX.

much loss, confusion, and terror, that the enemy withdrew fifty miles to the southward of the city, and remained there for a long time inactive.

From the beginning of Sháh Álam's invasion, Khádim Husén, governor of the district of Purniá, though a creature of Mír Jáfir's own, had, on some offence or alarm, carried on a correspondence with the Emperor, whom he promised to join. Had he done so at an earlier period, the fate of Patna would have been sealed. Even now it was of importance to prevent his forming a junction with Sháh Álam, and when he marched from Purniá along the left bank of the Ganges, Caillaud and Míran set out from Ráj Mahal in pursuit of him. They themselves kept on the right bank, but wrote to Knox, as soon as Khádim Husén got near Patna, to cross and intercept him. Knox accordingly crossed when he was nearly opposite to Patna, and found himself with 200 Europeans, a battalion of sepoy, five guns, and 300 irregular horse, opposed to an army which the lowest account transmitted to us reckons at 12,000 men, with thirty guns. He was therefore obliged to act on the defensive; but so effectually did he repulse the repeated attacks of the enemy, that in the end he drove them from the field and captured eight of their guns. Khádim Husén now retired to the northward towards Batiá and the neighbouring forests. Míran and Caillaud followed in pursuit, but the monsoon now set in with its usual violence, and, while the army was encamped on the River Gandac, it was overtaken by a storm such as is common at that season; during the height of the tempest a flash of lightning struck Míran's tent and killed him with two of his attendants. The news was speedily and secretly conveyed to Caillaud, who concealed it from all but the

May 23.

June 16.



principal chiefs until the necessary arrangements had been made and the army was on its return towards Patna, at which place it took up its quarters for the rains.⁵

The death of Míran brought on a crisis in the affairs of Bengal.

The mutual irritation between the nabob and the Company's Government had increased rapidly within the last few months. On Clive's departure the nabob lost all remains of his confidence in the English, and all the reverence which he had hitherto felt for their chief. Mr. Vansittart, Governor of Madras, had at Clive's recommendation been appointed to the government of Bengal. He had not yet reached Calcutta, and his place was filled for the present by Mr. Holwell, the senior member of council. The temporary nature of

⁵ The campaign against Sháh Álam is taken from Caillaud's evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, First Report, 158 *et seq.*, and from an anonymous *Narrative of what happened in Bengal in 1760*, published in England in the same year, and reprinted in the *Asiatic Annual Register* for 1800, as communicated by Colonel Ironside, who was probably the author. Further information is derived from the *Scir ul Mutakherín*. Two points were the subject of minute inquiry in consequence of charges brought against Caillaud in England. He was alleged to have engaged in a plot for dethroning Mír Jáfir, and, as preparatory steps, to have favoured the murder of Míran and promised a great reward to an assassin who was to take off Sháh Álam. We are astonished to find the name of Mr. Burke connected with this wild accusation. It appeared that there was not the slightest ground for suspicion in regard to this plot, or to the murder of Míran, but Caillaud did not escape so well from the charge respecting Sháh Álam. He had really countersigned a promise of Mír Jáfir and Míran to a person who had offered to murder Sháh Álam; but this he did at a time when the nabob and the English strongly suspected each other of negotiating with that prince, and under an impression that the whole overture was a trick of the nabob's for the purpose of putting Caillaud's sincerity to trial. It is certain that he had no design on the life of Sháh Álam, but he showed little regard to his own honour or that of his country in willingly connecting his name with so disgraceful a fabrication. The whole particulars of the inquiry are given in the Appendix No. 10 to the First Report, 238 to 249.

CHAP.
IX.

this gentleman's authority lessened his weight with the nabob, who scarcely concealed his distrust in every transaction with the English. Mr. Holwell in his turn was provoked at the disregard of his just demands, gave ear to every report unfavourable to the nabob, and put the worst construction on all that prince's actions. But the embarrassment occasioned to the Government by its relation to the nabob was in itself of the most serious nature. As long as the treasures gained by the revolution lasted, the Company found no difficulty in defraying the heaviest and most unexpected charges; but when that fund was exhausted they began to discover that the provision made for the future by the treaty was quite inadequate to the demands of their new situation. The sum of a lac of rupees (10,000*l.*) a month, which the nabob was to pay while their troops were employed on his requisition, was scarcely sufficient to meet their actual field expenses for the time, while that of maintaining the troops when not on service, and supplying them with recruits and stores from Europe was totally unprovided for. The annual revenue of 70,000*l.* from lands ceded to them on other grounds would not, even if devoted to this object, have been nearly sufficient.

So far from being able to make up these deficiencies, the nabob had not the means of discharging his existing debt to the Company. The enormous sums which he had to pay at his accession had exhausted all the wealth at his command, and he was now without sufficient resources to support either the Company's government or his own. The monthly subsidy to the troops on service was two or three months in arrear;⁶ assignments for it had been given on the revenues of particular districts, but those districts happened to be the scene of the

⁶ Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 34.



ravages of Sháh Álam and the Marattas, and the wants of the nabob's own officers also sometimes led them to encroach on the assigned revenue. This source of income was therefore unproductive, and the Company was reduced to extremities, obliged to suspend its trade, and yet unable to pay its troops, who in consequence showed a disposition to desertion.⁷

The nabob's own troops were much more in arrears, often mutinied against his authority, and sometimes threatened his life. Add to this that the revenue collected from his country was wasted by frauds and embezzlement before it reached his treasury,⁸ and that more than one of the principal zemindars became refractory, withheld their tribute, and threatened further disturbance.⁹ Even within his own territory the nabob was despised for his irresolution and hated for his exactions, and for several executions and assassinations, which his fears and suspicions had prompted him to order himself, or to acquiesce in when they originated in the violence of his son. The only remedy for all these evils appeared to Mr. Holwell to be to depose the nabob. It was to be done by obtaining from Sháh Álam the transfer of his office to the Company, on its engaging to pay to him the full tribute of Bengal and to assist him with all its means in recovering the throne of his ancestors.¹ The seizure of the province by the Company might perhaps have been accomplished, but the part of the project connected with Sháh Álam was not within the verge of possibility. By setting up the infant son of Miran or some equally helpless representative of the family of Ali Verdi, by adhering strictly to old forms,

⁷ Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 34 and 36.

⁸ *Ibid.* i. 35.

⁹ *Narrative of what happened in Bengal* above referred to.

¹ Holwell's *Address to the Proprietors*, 59 and 60. See also 63.

CHAP.
IX.

and keeping up the native mode of government, so as to afford the usual employment to all classes of its subjects, the English might perhaps have possessed themselves of all real power as easily as they did ten years later. Such a measure, if practicable, would have been attended with several obvious advantages, and would have been free from many of the objections to merely changing the nabob.

But the attempt to revive the Mogul government would have been an obstruction rather than an aid to the plan. The titular Emperor did not at that moment possess a foot of land, nor had he the means of influencing the transfer of an acre in any part of his so-called dominions.² We were to restore him to power by affording our assistance to the Mussulman chiefs and the Abdáli Sháh, but only a few months had elapsed since those powers had routed the Marattas at Pánipat and had nothing to obstruct any designs they might have entertained in favour of the Emperor. Yet except for a dutiful recognition of his title at the recommendation of the Sháh, the chiefs never mentioned Sháh Álam or gave a thought to his pretensions. The reason was obvious; their territories were formed out of the last possessions of the house of Teimur, and the first step towards restoring that family must have been to give up their own sovereignty. Even such disinterestedness would have made the Emperor but a petty prince at best. The Empire had died a natural death after a long decay commencing with Aurangzib, and the name was allowed to remain solely because it had no reality, and

² It may appear that an exception ought to be made of the city of Delhi, where Sháh Álam's son bore the name of Emperor, but the real possessor was Najib-u-Doula, the Rohilla chief of Seháranpúr, who alone exercised any authority in the city. (Dow's *Hindustan*, ii. 350.)



interfered with nobody. The English, even the most intelligent and best informed, entertained and continued for some years to entertain an exaggerated idea of the importance of the Emperor,³ but there was not a native chief in Hindostan or the Deckan who thought it worth while to make use of him even as a pageant.

CHAP.
IX.

When the council of Calcutta were on the point of opening a negotiation with Sháh Álam, accounts of Míran's death were received, and this event suggested a combination by which a new model of the nabob's government might be more easily effected.

Almost immediately afterwards, Mr. Vansittart arrived. The new Governor seems to have been endowed with judgment and integrity sufficient to guide him rightly in ordinary circumstances, but to have been unfit for any situation in which self-reliance or firmness of any kind was required. The strong opinions and ready arguments of Mr. Holwell seem to have overpowered him from the first, and in three or four days he announced his adoption of the last of that gentleman's plans.

End of
July A.D.
1760.

This was to confer on Cásim Ali, the nabob's son-in-law, the titles and offices formerly held by Míran, to invest him at once with all the powers of the state, and to secure his succession to the title also on the nabob's death. Cásim Ali was one of the ablest and most ambitious men about the court. He had been entrusted with important employments and commands, and from the moment of Míran's death seems to have fixed his

³ Holwell's *Address to the Proprietors*, 60, 61, 62; Minute of Colonel Coote and other opposition Members of Council, dated March 11, 1762, 17-19; Vansittart's *Narrative*, 254-9. Clive, in denying that Sháh Álam still rules over the Empire, admits that he may possess a twentieth part of it [*Letter to the Proprietors*, published 1764, 22]. It has been shown in the text that he did not possess any fraction of it.

CHAP.
IX.July 18,
A.D. 1760.

eye on the succession. In a desperate mutiny of the troops at the capital which followed that event, and in which the nabob's life was exposed to imminent danger, Cásim Ali stepped forth to pacify the tumult, became security for all the arrears due to the troops, and paid three lacs of rupees out of his own funds to appease the most pressing demands.⁴

September
20, A.D.
1760.Septem-
ber 25,
A.D. 1760.

This conduct gained him universal popularity, and led everyone to regard him as the only person fitted to retrieve the desperate affairs of the government. Soon after Míran's death he wrote to Mr. Holwell with the strongest professions in favour of the Company if they would procure his appointment to the station held by Míran.⁵ After Mr. Vansittart's arrival he was invited to Calcutta, and the nabob's consent was obtained on some pretext to his visit. After one or two ceremonial interviews with the Governor, he had a confidential meeting with Mr. Holwell. He commenced by insisting on the murder of Mír Jáfir as a necessary preliminary to his undertaking the government. Mr. Holwell explaining the horror in which such actions were held by the British nation, and the necessity for his renouncing all thoughts of them if he expected its support, he at length gave way, but with an appearance of dissatisfaction, and an observation that Mr. Holwell was not so much his friend as he had thought him.⁶ Ten articles were then agreed to after much discussion, by the principal of which it was settled that the government should be carried on in the name of the nabob, who should have a personal allowance of 120,000*l.* a year; that all the powers of the state should be vested in Cásim Ali, to whom the succession on the nabob's

⁴ Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 71.⁵ Holwell's *Address to the Proprietors*, 67.⁶ *Ibid.* 69.



death should be secured; that there should be an offensive and defensive alliance between him and the Company, and that the Company should always be ready to support him with their army, which they engaged was to consist of 8,000 sepoy, 2,000 Europeans, 2,000 irregular cavalry, and 500 European horse. In return for this he was to pay up all the moneys due, and cede the districts of Bardwán, Midnapúr, and Chittagong to the Company. The immediate recognition of the title of the nominal Emperor was pressed by Mr. Holwell, but objected to by Cásim Ali, and was at length allowed to lie over for further consideration.⁷

These articles, with the omission of the amount of Mír Jáfir's allowance and the number of the troops to be kept up, were signed on the next day but one by Mr. Vansittart and the select committee of the council, to whom the conduct of all business requiring secrecy was entrusted.⁸ Up to this time not a hint had been given to Mír Jáfir of an intention of deposing him. But when all was settled the Governor and Colonel Caillaud repaired to Murshidábád accompanied by a body of troops. At the two first interviews between these gentlemen and the nabob, the complaints of the Company and the necessity of redress were stated in vague and general terms. At the third, Mr. Vansittart, still in a circuitous and indistinct manner, intimated to the nabob that he must make a territorial cession to the Company, and must transfer the conduct of his government to some one of his relations, so that he might himself enjoy ease and tranquillity undisturbed by public affairs. The fitness of several relations was discussed,

September 27,
A.D. 1760.

October 15, A.D.
1760.

October 18, A.D.
1760.

⁷ Holwell's *Address to the Proprietors*, 70.

⁸ Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 101-4.

CHAP.
IX.

and amongst others that of Cásim Ali, to whom Mr. Vansittart showed a strong inclination and the nabob a still stronger repugnance. This transfer, when once disclosed, was pressed with indecent haste ; the nabob was refused time for consideration or even for returning to his palace at his dinner hour ; he was obliged to send for his meal to the garden where the meeting was held, and was not allowed to go till he was so much exhausted with fatigue and anxiety as to be unable to attend to business. Nothing was settled when he went away, no hint was given of the treaty with Cásim Ali, and all seemed to be left for discussion at another meeting. Next day he was left undisturbed, but Cásim Ali exclaimed against the suspense, during which he said he was in hourly fear of assassination ; and Mr. Vansittart learning that the nabob had spent the day with some of the most worthless of his advisers, concluded that no good would come of the consultation, and determined to resort to force.

Accordingly, at three in the morning, Colonel Caillaud with the British troops, and Cásim Ali with his own, marched secretly to the nabob's palace, which they surprised and surrounded. They seized the ministers, and told the nabob that he must make over the conduct of affairs without delay to Cásim Ali. At first the nabob gave way to his surprise and indignation ; he reproached the English with their breach of faith, and threatened to defend himself to the last extremity ; but reflecting that, while in the palace, he was every moment exposed to the practices of Cásim Ali, he sent for Caillaud, and although he still rejected the proposed arrangement, which he said would place his life in the hands of his substitute, he expressed himself ready to abdicate, provided his life and an allowance for



his maintenance were secured. His offer was acceded to ; Cásim Ali was installed and proclaimed ; Mír Jáfir, who was afraid to remain a single night in Murshidábád, set off on his journey to Calcutta ; and the day passed with as much quiet and composure as if nothing extraordinary had happened.⁹ Never was a revolution effected on more slender grounds, nor a greater scandal than the deposal of a prince by the same body which had so lately raised itself to power by a solemn engagement to support his title. The reasons alleged were Mír Jáfir's plots to undermine the British authority, and the cruelty and oppression of his internal administration ; but few of those charges would have justified the subversion of his government, and fewer still could be substantiated by evidence.¹

CHAP.
IX.October
20, A.D.
1760.

⁹ Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 109-136. Caillaud's *Narrative*.

¹ The following are the reasons assigned (Holwell's *Address to the Proprietors*, 14, and Vansittart's *Narrative*, i.) :—

1st. That Mír Jáfir from his accession formed a design to reduce the power of the English.

2nd. That for this purpose he cut off or drove out of the provinces every person whom he suspected of being attached to us.

3rd. That he conspired with the Dutch to counteract and destroy our power and influence.

4th. That he and his son, on three different occasions of actual service, treacherously deserted our commander-in-chief.

5th. That he meditated a treaty with Sháh Álam and offered to sacrifice us.

6th. That he negotiated with the Marattas to introduce 25,000 or 30,000 of their troops into Bengal. (Letter to Mr. Amyatt ; p. 65 of Mr Holwell's *Address to the Proprietors*.)

7th. That his government was a continued chain of cruelty and oppression.

But most of these charges may be refuted or explained.

1st. Mír Jáfir, or whoever was nabob, would naturally desire to keep down the power of the English, and prevent its encroaching on his own ; but it does not follow that he had any wish to break the treaty or to shake a connection on which his own existence depended.

2nd. Mír Jáfir was very jealous of the English, and would not look with favour on any of his subjects who devoted themselves to that

CHAP.
IX.

The only real apology for setting him aside would have been the absolute impossibility of carrying on the established system in conjunction with him; and such an impossibility is alleged to have arisen from the weakness and unpopularity of his government, and his inability to furnish the funds indispensably necessary to enable the British to keep their footing in the country. The first of these disqualifications is declared to have been so manifest that withholding the English protection would have put an end to the government if

interest, but there is no proof of a systematic persecution, or indeed of any persecution carried on against them.

The instances mentioned (Holwell, *Address*, &c. 8, and Vansittart, i. 49) of persons driven from the country are two, Rái Dúláb and Ómar Bég. The story of Rái Dúláb has been given (see *ante*, p. 335); it was more from jealousy of the man himself than of the English that he was attacked. Ómar Bég, by Mr. Vansittart's own account, embezzled the nabob's money entrusted to him, and fled the country in consequence (Vansittart's *Letter to the Proprietors*, 63). Of ten persons said to have been made away with (Vansittart's *Narrative*, 151), five were women and children of Ali Verdi's family; some of the remaining five were individuals whom the nabob thought dangerous to his person or government, but none appear to have been connected with the English. It is more than doubtful whether some of these murders were ever committed at all, and those which are certain were all the work of Míran.

3rd. The extent of his intercourse with the Dutch has been stated; the utmost it indicates is a wish to see them re-established in their factory as a counterpoise to the English.

4th. There are abundant proofs of inactivity and perhaps of cowardice in the repeated neglect of the nabob and Míran to support Caillaud, but no sign and scarcely a possibility of treachery.

5th. The plot with Sháh Álam is founded on a copy of an alleged letter from the nabob to that prince received through a most suspicious channel, and bearing obvious marks of forgery. The supposed combination is absurd in itself; Sháh Álam had no quarrel with the English but for preventing his taking possession of Bengal, a point on which the nabob and he were not likely to come to an agreement (see Mr. Holwell's correspondence on the subject with Colonel Caillaud and Mr. Hastings, *Address to the Proprietors*, 31-40).

6th. Of the negotiations with the Marattas, no proof whatever is offered. It is in itself highly improbable.

7th. His cruelties have been enumerated, and his oppressive government may be admitted, but our treaty gave us no right to punish either.



not the life of Mír Jáfir.² But if this statement proves the evil, it no less points out the remedy. Such a state of things must have compelled the nabob to accede to any reasonable proposals, or must have produced his removal without the interference of the English. The financial difficulty might have been removed by the same territorial cessions which were made by Cásim Ali, and if it were true (as is asserted) that Mír Jáfir would never have come to terms without force, it would have been better to have used force for the attainment of moderate concessions than for the total destruction of an ally. The terms offered were worse than deposal; Mír Jáfir might have accepted a minister named by the British, but the transfer of all his powers to Cásim Ali would have been the signal for his own execution.

But the best reply to the alleged impossibility of maintaining their relations with Mír Jáfir is that it was to him the English Government was obliged to recur after an unsuccessful attempt to support his rival.

In return for the good service received from them, Cásim Ali presented the Governor and the members of the select committee with 200,000*l*. It does not appear that they were influenced by the prospect of this reward, which was not stipulated for, which they declined at the moment, and which was paid to them at different periods after a long interval.³ Still it was a disgraceful proceeding. The committee had no pretext of losses suffered or risks run, and the money was to be drawn from a government the impoverished state of which was one of the strongest grounds for the revolu-

² Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 160.

³ First Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, 1772, 161, 163, and 164; also Third Report, 310-11, and Appendix, 402-4.

CHAP.
IX.

tion. Mr. Vansittart received 50,000*l.*; he had at the time an allowance from the Company of 18,000*l.* or 19,000*l.* a year, and carried on trade on his own account besides.⁴

The whole of the transactions connected with the change of government had been conducted by the select committee. When they came before the whole Council, Mr. Verelst, Mr. Smyth, Mr. Amyatt, and Mr. Ellis recorded their disapprobation of the measure, partly as objectionable in itself and partly because it had been concluded without consulting them. This was the commencement of an opposition which led to serious results. The Madras service, civil as well as military, having now been long accustomed to wars and negotiations, seemed more likely to furnish men capable of political duties than the factories and commercial agencies of Bengal. For this reason Lord Clive had exerted his influence to procure the nomination of Mr. Vansittart to succeed him, superseding Mr. Amyatt, the senior civil servant of Bengal. The arrangement was regarded as an injury, not by Mr. Amyatt alone, but by the whole of the Bengal service. The opening of Mr. Vansittart's government was therefore looked on with no favourable eyes. His first act, which was so questionable in itself, was the worse received as coming from him, and as the knowledge of this feeling made Cásim Ali unite himself more closely with the Governor, they came to be regarded as forming one party, and the Company's servants were equally ill-disposed to Mr. Vansittart and his nabob. These gentlemen, under the influence of such prejudices, were ill prepared to control them by enlarged notions of their duty. Accustomed to buy and sell according to orders from England, they

⁴ Vansittart's *Letter to the Proprietors*, 138-40. See also 82-4.



saw nothing even of trade beyond its details. Their views of the Company's interests were, therefore, contracted, and the sudden change in their own situation, the acquisition of power, and the examples of rapid fortunes gained among their fellows, sometimes made them lose sight of those interests altogether. The means they took to gratify their impatience to enrich themselves often brought them into collision with the native functionaries, and though now elated with the pride of conquerors, they retained a lively impression of their former dependence, and thought it an act of spirit to repel what they still called the insolence of their fallen rulers.

Wicked and unprincipled as the new nabob had shown himself, he was in many respects well suited to his situation in reference to the Company. He was fond of business, attentive to order and economy, vigilant, active, and acute. He soon brought about a reform in his finances, and cleared off all the numerous encumbrances that had been left to him by Mír Jáfir. He reduced his army from 90,000 men to 16,000, and yet increased its efficiency more than he diminished it in numbers. He made great advances towards bringing his zemindars into obedience, and would have done it effectually if he had remained long enough undisturbed. Such qualities and such accessions to his power, if not balanced by equal defects, might have made him formidable to the English, but his constitutional timidity restrained him from any bold enterprise, and the disaffection produced by the severity of his exactions and his suspicious temper must ever have retained him in dependence on the support of his allies. It is probable that he would have been at all times jealous of his authority, and that, when opportunities offered, he would have endeavoured

CHAP.
IX.

to encroach on the English Government ; but he would not have pushed his intrigues so far as to endanger his safety, and on the whole there was every reason to calculate on the stability of the alliance. But the feelings which have been described on the part of the English led to a series of provocations which would have driven the most feeble and the most prudent of mankind into resistance.

On his flight from Patna, Sháh Álam had withdrawn to a position about fifty miles south of that city, and not far from the country of the hill zemindars. Here he remained inactive and undisturbed during the troubled period between the death of Míran and the deposition of Mír Jáfir, his troops were reduced to a miserable condition, but after the rainy season he rapidly increased his numbers ;⁵ and soon after Cásim Ali's accession he received an invitation from the zemindars of Bardwán and Birbúm, who had revolted, to pass through the mountains as before, and join them in their own country. This plan would have brought him into the immediate neighbourhood of Murshidábád, but it was frustrated by the promptitude of his antagonists. Cásim Ali moved in person against the two new insurgents, and, although his own troops were unsuccessful, the rebellion was almost immediately put down by a British detachment which had accompanied him in his march.⁶ Orders had previously been despatched from the Government to the officer commanding at Patna to attack Sháh Álam without delay,⁷ and they were carried into

⁵ Mr. Amyatt, in a MS. letter dated Patna, November 5, 1760, describes his force as a set of half-starved, water-soaked banditti, grown from neglect into a formidable army.

⁶ Vansittart's *Narrative* ; *Seir ul Mutakherín*.

⁷ Holwell, *Refutation of a Letter &c.*, 22 ; Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 142.



effect with great spirit by Major Carnac within a fortnight after he took the command. The nabob's troops having demurred as usual, he marched without them, leaving them to follow as they chose. He found Sháh Álam posted on a considerable river, which he crossed unopposed, drove the enemy from position to position with his cannon, and at length dispersed his army without the loss of a man killed or wounded on his own side, and without one of his men having occasion to take a musket from his shoulder during the whole action.⁸

M. Law, with thirteen French officers and fifty privates, were taken prisoners, being the only part of the army that did not fly with precipitation. Owing to the slackness of the nabob's cavalry, who had joined him to little purpose, Major Carnac could not prevent the enemy from partially reassembling, but he allowed them no time to recover their courage, and, after refusing to negotiate for some days, Sháh Álam gave himself up to the English, and the zemindars retired to their fortresses.⁹

Major Carnac received the Emperor with the utmost ceremony and escorted him to Patna, where an allowance of 100*l.* a day (afterwards increased to 130*l.*), was fixed for him at the nabob's expense.¹ The news of these

CHAP.
IX.January 1,
A.D. 1761.January
15, A.D.
1761.February
6, A.D.
1761.

⁸ Colonel Ironside's Narrative, *Asiatic Annual Register* for 1800, 24, 25.

⁹ Colonel Ironside's narrative; *Seir ul Mutakherin*. The Indian historian is struck with the spirit shown by Law in his resistance, the generosity and courtesy of Carnac in his treatment of him, and the cordiality between him and his captors from the moment of his surrender. Major Carnac's report of his victory to the Government is characteristic of the writer and of the times. It commences thus: 'Gentlemen,—The measure of my wishes is filled, and I have had the good fortune to answer the expectations of some of you and to disappoint the diffidence of others.' The allusion is to the Governor, with whom he was offended (MS. letter dated January 15, 1761).

¹ Colonel Ironside; *Seir ul Mutakherin*, ii. 169.

CHAP.
IX.

events soon brought Cásim Ali to Patna ; he was dissatisfied with the expense thrown on him for maintaining the Emperor, and was distrustful of the use the English might make of that prince's name in case of any disagreement with himself. These feelings were not alleviated by the channel of his intercourse with the Emperor and the British Government. Major Carnac was a devoted adherent of Clive (whose private secretary he had been, and with whom he was a favourite). He was naturally opposed to the reversal of his patron's measures in the case of Mír Jáfir, and was strongly prejudiced against the present nabob. He had been hurt by some disparaging expression of Vansittart's which came to his knowledge, and was now elated by his success against the Emperor, to whom he determined to show himself a generous conqueror. From these motives he treated the nabob with marked slight, while he behaved with the utmost deference and humility towards Sháh Álam. The nabob's resentment as well as his policy led him to do his best to disgust this favoured guest with his present residence. He refused to meet him except at the Company's factory, which might be regarded as neutral ground, and he is accused of having excited a serious mutiny among the troops that still adhered to Sháh Álam.²

Things were on this footing when Major Carnac was removed from Patna. That officer on his assuming the command had informed the Government, in reply to an order to support the nabob in a particular case, that he should do so in that instance, but that the British troops, while he commanded them, should never be made the

² Colonel Ironside's *Narrative*, 27 ; *Seir ul Mutakerin* ; letter from certain Gentlemen of the Council (including Major Carnac), Appendix to First Report, 255.



instruments of violence or oppression ; and by an equally uncalled for declaration in public darbár at their first meeting, he gave great offence to the nabob, who felt the insinuation conveyed no less than the open disrespect, and perceived the effect which such an announcement must have on all who were inclined to resist his authority. Other disputes arising with Major Carnac, the Government took the first opportunity of superseding him in his command.³ It was afforded by the arrival of Colonel (afterwards Sir Eyre) Coote from Madras as commander-in-chief in Bengal. This distinguished officer disapproved of the removal of Mír Jáfir, but came to Bengal determined to avoid political discussions and to endeavour to reconcile his colleagues, with all of whom he was on terms of friendship.⁴ But his employment at Patna forced him to take a decided line. He found the nabob highly irritated, jealous of the British commander, and alarmed at the intrigues which he supposed to be carrying on between that officer and Sháh Álam. His distrust was so apparent in his neglect or rejection of Coote's advice, and in other matters, that Coote, naturally of a fretful temper, became provoked in his turn, and being surrounded by malcontents and in some sort at the head of a formed opposition, he was led to put the worst construction on all the nabob's actions, and to allow things to run into a state of greater exasperation than that left by Carnac.⁵

CHAP.
IX.

March 6.

They began, however, with mutual civility. The first point they had to settle was that about Rám Náráin. This man, it may be recollected, was governor

³ Major Carnac's letters in Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 182 and 186. See also the same volume, 189-91 and 198.

⁴ His evidence, First Report, 165.

⁵ Vansittart's *Narrative* and letters from Colonel Coote and the Nabob, i. 195-250.

CHAP.
IX.

of Behár at the time of Suráj-u-Doula's fall, and only acknowledged the new nabob on condition of being guaranteed by Clive against any change for the worse in his condition under his former master.⁶ He had been steadily protected by Clive, and was so at first by the present Government,⁷ but the question how far protection should be carried was not without difficulties. On the one hand Rám Náráin asserted that he was persecuted merely on account of his attachment to the English, and on the other the nabob declared that he withheld the whole revenue of his province, and made use of the British protection to render himself in essentials an independent prince.⁸

April 21,
A.D. 1761.

These complaints were at their height when Coote went to Patna, and the Government requested him to investigate and report on the real state of claims, and in the meantime to prevent any oppression of Rám Náráin and to maintain him in his government.⁹ Mr. McGwire, the chief civil officer at Patna, was associated in the inquiry. Though disposed to put the best construction on the conduct of Rám Náráin, Coote began the investigation with every intention to do justice, but between the affected delays of Rám Náráin and the impatience of the nabob, he was not able to make much progress.¹ The Government would now have been justified in dictating some terms of compromise to both parties, but

⁶ See *ante*, p. 333.

⁷ Letter to Major Carnac of February 9; Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 180.

⁸ Major Carnac's letter, Appendix to First Report, 257; letter from certain Gentlemen of the Council, Appendix to the same Report, 256. The Nabob's in vol. i. of Vansittart's *Narrative*; Mr. McGwire's letter, Appendix to First Report, 328.

⁹ Letter to Colonel Coote; Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 191-2.

¹ Letter from Colonel Coote, Appendix to the First Report, 259; Nabob's letters in Vansittart's *Narrative*.



instead of doing so they gave way to the clamours of the nabob, directed Coote to remove Rám Náráin from his government, and afterwards left him to settle with his own superior, only stipulating for his exemption from personal ill-usage. Before these orders arrived Mr. McGwire had been dismissed and Rám Náráin entertained hopes of greater support from his temporary successor Mr. Hay ; but the orders from Calcutta were peremptory, a guard of sepoy which had been detained at his house was withdrawn, and he was left at the mercy of the nabob only for the stipulation above mentioned. He had before offered 50,000*l.* in lieu of his arrears as the utmost sum he could possibly raise, but finding himself deserted and threatened by the nabob he agreed to pay 500,000*l.*, on which he was released and received a dress of honour from the nabob as a mark of his being restored to favour.² Up to this time no violence was used towards him,³ but how the engagement broke off or what subsequently became of Rám Náráin does not appear until two years afterwards, when he perished in the general massacre of the prisoners during Cásim Ali's flight.⁴

If Carnac and Coote favoured the alleged defaulter they did so from no sordid motives. Coote refused a

CHAP
IX.June 18,
A.D. 1761.

² Correspondence in Appendix No. 1 to the Third Report, 327-331.

³ Letter from Mr. Hay, dated September 7, 1761, in the same Appendix, 330.

⁴ Major Grant's evidence, Third Report, 305 ; *Seir ul Mutakherín*, i. 267. Several persons who had held employment under Rám Náráin's government, especially those employed in revenue departments, were imprisoned and had their property seized ; some were flogged to force them to disclose where their money was deposited. Rám Náráin probably escaped similar treatment in consequence of the stipulation with the British Government. Cásim Ali was capable of any injustice or cruelty, but in this instance his offences could not have remained concealed.

CHAP.
IX.

bribe of 55,000*l.* to give up Rám Náráin, and Carnac, besides indefinite offers from the nabob, rejected 5,000*l.* from Rám Náráin's intended successor;⁵ but Mr. McGwire, who was still more zealous on the side of the nabob, was not so fortunate in the evidence of his disinterestedness. He had received 20,000*l.* (as a member of the select committee) on the nabob's accession, and he now accepted of 7,000*l.* or 8,000*l.* on pretext of some public occasion.⁶ It would not be just to pronounce that these presents, or those of a similar nature made to others, were given as bribes or immediately influenced the resolutions of the receivers, but they hung like a millstone round their necks ever after, and if they did not impede the freedom of their action, always led to a suspicion that the weight was not unfelt; Clive alone felt no embarrassment from benefits conferred on him, which his services entitled him to regard as rewards for the past, not retainers for the future.

Another source of contention arose from the continuance of the nabob's suspicions of Sháh Álam. That prince had at last agreed to remove to Oude, and Cásim Ali had engaged to pay to him 260,000*l.* a year on account of the revenue of Bengal; one half of the first year's payment was to be issued on his quitting the province, at which time also he was to be formally acknowledged as Emperor. He set out accordingly for Shujá-u-Doula's country, where he was received with every show of respect and then consigned to neglect and insignificance. But the credit afforded by the English to his pretensions gave him an importance in the places under their influence which he did not

January
21, A.D.
1761.

⁵ Coote's letter, Appendix to the First Report, 259. Carnac's evidence, Third Report, 300.

⁶ Mr. McGwire's evidence, Third Report, 300.



possess elsewhere, and for this reason he continued to be an object of jealousy and apprehension to Cásim Ali. Major Carnac had accompanied him to the frontier, and on taking leave begged as a personal favour a confirmation of all the Company's privileges throughout the Empire. Sháh Álam promised compliance on condition of a pecuniary consideration, and (perhaps insidiously) offered of his own accord to add the Dîwání of Bengal on similar terms. This office in strictness conferred only the superintendence of the revenue, but in hands so strong as the Company's it involved the control of the administration in all its branches. The offer was therefore likely to alarm the nabob, and was on that ground rejected by the Government of Calcutta, and the whole application was censured as unauthorised and officious.⁷ But other measures of the Government itself did away the effect of this moderation. They had again taken up the scheme of restoring Sháh Álam to his throne; Coote was ordered to be ready to march to his support, and some correspondence to which this led came to the nabob's knowledge. Cásim Ali probably thought that the project of the British Government was only a cloak for some more rational negotiation, and he ascribed the communications which took place in connection with it to a plot for the transfer of his office of viceroy from himself to a descendant of one of the former nabobs, and in this he supposed Coote to be a principal actor.⁸ Sháh Álam having passed the frontier, the nabob agreed to proclaim him king as had been promised, and the principal people about Patna had been assembled

⁷ See the correspondence in Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 255-64.

⁸ First Report, Appendix, 258; see also paragraphs 32 and 33 of the letter in p. 256.

CHAP.
IX.January
17, A.D.
1761.

for that purpose, but when the day drew near the nabob, either from timidity or some secret motive, refused to enter the town unless the British guards were removed from the gates. This seeming caprice provoked the English commander, some angry messages were exchanged, and at night information was brought to Coote that the nabob was about to attack the town. Coote kept his small force on the alert during the night, and about daybreak he rode to the nabob's camp, attended by his usual escort of a company of sepoys and some European dragoons. He alighted at the head-quarters, and as the nabob had not yet left the tents appropriated to his women, people were sent to call him, and Coote entered the reception tent with his pistols in his hand, after surrounding it with his troops to guard against treachery. As the nabob did not appear Coote mounted his horse, and after riding round the camp, where he found all quiet, he returned to the town.⁹ This act of haste and indiscretion made it impossible to keep Coote with the nabob. He was recalled to Calcutta along with Carnac, who would otherwise have succeeded him, and the command devolved on a captain subordinate to the civil chief.

The rough treatment which the nabob received from the military commanders was respect and courtesy compared to what he subsequently met with from the civil servants.

One of the last acts of Clive's government had been to sign a letter to the Court of Directors, pointing out the bad consequences of the harsh language in which they were accustomed to address their servants, and of the influence of private favour and enmity which ap-

⁹ Coote's letters in Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 238 and 243, and his evidence, First Report, 166. Nabob's letter, *Narrative*, i. 216.



peared in their dispensations of censures and rewards. This remonstrance was not itself a model of the urbanity which it inculcated, and it gave such displeasure to the Court of Directors that they dismissed all the members of the council who still remained in India, and positively ordered them to be sent home by the first ships.

This measure, together with the previous retirement of some of the councillors, threw out those who had concurred with Mr. Vansittart, and introduced others vehemently opposed to him. Mr. Hastings, who was one of the new councillors, alone supported the Governor in the subsequent transactions. Above all, the removal of Mr. McGwire necessarily conferred the chiefship of Patna on Mr. Ellis, a man of strong prejudices and ungovernable temper.

He had scarcely taken charge of his office when he gave signs of his disposition towards the nabob, but his first act of open violence was about two months later. An Armenian named Antoon, who held the office of collector of a district, either purchased or took by force a small quantity of saltpetre, for the use of the nabob, from one of the people whose business it was to make it. This was seized on as an infringement of the Company's monopoly, and Antoon was apprehended and sent down to Calcutta in irons. He was cousin to Gregore, another Armenian, who was in high favour with the nabob, and was supposed to be hostile to the English. His offence was therefore treated at Calcutta as a most serious affront to the nation. Some of the council thought he should be publicly whipped, and one (Mr. Johnstone) strongly urged cutting off his ears;¹ but common sense at last in some degree prevailed; he

November, A.D. 1761.

January, A.D. 1762.

¹ Vansittart's *Narrative*, ii. 11.

CHAP.
IX.February
4, A.D.
1762.April 27,
A.D. 1762.

was sent back to the nabob to be punished, and was made over to him and dismissed from his service, after a confinement of three months and a journey of 900 miles.² About the same time, Mr. Ellis having received information (which proved to be unfounded) that two European deserters had taken refuge in Monghir, the nabob's principal fortress and the place he had fixed on for his usual residence, sent a company of sepoy to demand the deserters and to search the fort if they were not given up. The commandant refusing to admit an armed body into his fort, Mr. Ellis exclaimed against his insolence and declared that he would not withdraw the sepoy until a search had been allowed. The nabob remonstrated in terms of the highest indignation, but the British Government took no step for about three months, when it interposed a sort of mediation between its own servant and the nabob, and the dispute was with difficulty compromised.³ Mr. Ellis withdrew his sepoy, but from this time the nabob refused to have any further communication with him. It is obvious that Mr. Ellis ought now to have been removed to some other station, but he was supported by the majority of the council, and the representative of the British Government remained in open hostility with the ruler of the country. Alarm was added to the nabob's disgust by the unguarded language of Mr. Ellis and other members of council, who foretold his early deposition as a consequence of orders from England. Their threats were in some measure supported by the vacillating despatches of the Court of Directors, which

² Correspondence in Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 300-305 and 323.

³ Vansittart's *Narrative*, and correspondence inserted, i. 305-14; also 326 to the end, and ii. 1-11.



were privately circulated among the natives and necessarily reached the nabob.⁴

These altercations made an impression throughout the country. A conspiracy against the nabob was discovered, the principal actors in which were put to death; and among the letters intercepted on that occasion was one encouraging a powerful zemindar to engage in it, on the ground of the approaching hostilities with the English, in which the nabob was sure to be driven out of the country.⁵ All these evils were magnified by the nabob's fears, and perceiving, as he thought, an intention to force a quarrel on him, he became apprehensive of an open and immediate attack.

Aware of the dangerous consequences of a continuance of such divisions, Mr. Vansittart prevailed on the board to depute Mr. Hastings to Patna, for the purpose of attempting a reconciliation between Mr. Ellis and the nabob. He failed, as might have been expected, but his mission brought to a crisis a question which had long been rising, which affected the interest as well as the pride of the parties, and which soon ran to a height that almost precluded reconciliation.

The Mogul's grant to the Company exempting their goods from customs was couched in general terms and accompanied by no limitation, but its obvious meaning was to confine the exemption to exports and imports. It was given, like Queen Elizabeth's grant to the same effect, for the purpose of encouraging foreign commerce, and not for that of conferring on an alien Company a monopoly of all the internal trade of the

⁴ Correspondence in Vansittart's *Narrative*, ii. 61-70, with his own remarks.

⁵ Vansittart's *Narrative*, ii. 13-16.

Empire. In this sense it had been understood by both parties, and had been acted on up to the deposition of Suráj-u-Doula.⁶ After the ascendancy of the British was established, Lord Clive used to obtain from the nabob exemptions from internal duties in favour of particular persons, but those were always conferred by special passes from the nabob, and were never (unless secretly) assumed as a matter of right, or claimed under the Company's passport. In the weaker Government which succeeded, the Company's servants and other Europeans began to claim exemption without the nabob's passes; their agents did not always produce even the Company's pass, but hoisted a British flag which, from the awe inspired by it, was a sufficient protection to any cargo, even when used without authority, and by natives unconnected with the English. This abuse was often complained of by Mír Jáfir, but it had now risen to such a pitch as to eat up all that part of the nabob's revenue that was derived from customs and transit duties, and to throw out of employment all of his subjects who had been accustomed to live by the internal commerce. The privilege had only existed (even under the nabob's passes) since 1756, and in 1762 every attempt to question it was received with as much surprise and indignation by the council as if it had grown venerable under the sanction of ages.⁷

⁶ An attempt was made almost at the outset to apply it to internal trade, but this pretension was at once put down by the viceroy of the day, and was never after renewed. (Orme, ii. 25.)

⁷ For the recent origin of the trade, see Orme, ii. 25 and 26; Mr. Hastings' correspondence in Lord Clive's time, and other papers in the first section of Vansittart's *Narrative*; Scrafton's observations on Vansittart's *Narrative*, the minutes of Vansittart and Hastings, and the nabob's letters in the above *Narrative*. On the other side I know nothing but the minutes of the councillors given in Vansittart's *Narrative* and in the Appendix to the Third Report. Their argument generally is that the



A still worse consequence of the interference of Europeans with the internal trade was that it filled the country with commercial agents (gomáshtas) of private persons. Each of these was as proud and as rapacious as his master; he sold custom-free passes to people unconnected with the Company, he took the goods of the manufacturers and other dealers at his own price, and beat or imprisoned anyone who attempted to resist him; he interfered in all affairs in the village where he was stationed, and, being sure of support from the British authorities, he set the greatest of the nabob's officers at defiance. If any of those functionaries had spirit enough to maintain his authority, a detachment of sepoy from the nearest factory soon put a stop to his interference and often carried him off as a prisoner to answer for his insolence. In addition to these licensed harpies, another swarm carried on the same oppressions under their name. They pretended to be gomáshtas of English gentlemen, and dressed up people like the sepoy and the badged messengers of the Company to enforce their orders. The consequence was that the whole country became a scene of confusion and alarm, as if it had been suffering from the occupation of a hostile army.⁸ Mr. Vansittart had before this received many complaints of these disorders and had entered on a plan for restraining them, but he does not seem to have laid

king's grant gave the Company the privilege of the inland trade custom free; and that they were wrongfully kept from the enjoyment of it by the nabobs until they became strong enough to do themselves justice.

⁸ For the proceedings of the gomáshtas and of the European agents, see the statements of the nabob and his officers in Vansittart's *Narrative*; the letters of Serjeant Brego, *ibid.* ii. 111, and those of Mr. Gray and Mr. Senior, *ibid.* iii. 412-13; Lord Clive's letter to the Court of Directors, par. 12, Third Report, 394; Scrafton's *Observations on Vansittart*, 38; and many other authorities. On the opposite side the accusations are only met by a flat denial.

CHAP.
IX.

anything before council. Mr. Hastings had warmly opposed them from the very beginning in the time of Mir Jâfir and Lord Clive, and had always maintained that the Company's passport should only be given to exports and imports, and that the nabob should be allowed to do himself justice in all cases where goods were not protected by that passport, and where agents in the country belonged to anyone except the Company.⁹ On his present journey, or rather voyage to Patna, he was surprised to see British flags in many villages and on almost all the boats that he met on the Ganges. He consulted Mr. Vansittart on the subject, and by the time he had to encounter the nabob's complaints, he was prepared to lay a paper before him in which were specified the points on which he might direct his own officers to check abuses without interfering with the rights of the Company. The nabob approved of the terms, but said it would be impossible to carry them into effect as long as every chief of a factory had the power to employ force to resist his authority. He therefore required that articles should be drawn up in a proper form under the seal of the Company and the Governor, and if necessary those of the council.¹

A long and dangerous illness of Mr. Vansittart prevented the preparation of such a document, and as the degree of control which he had hitherto been able to keep up over the abuses it was to remedy was removed by his absence from council, they multiplied with astonishing rapidity, and complaints poured in from every part of the country. The number of agents and of private European adventurers increased; they extorted presents, decided causes, interfered in public business;

⁹ See his letters written in 1758-9 in Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 26-30.

¹ Mr. Hastings' letters, Vansittart's *Narrative*, ii. 78-96.



in short were going on to usurp the whole administration of the province. Some of them also, who held offices or farms from the nabob, refused to obey orders, or to pay what was due from them to the treasury. At the same time as loud complaints came in from the chiefs of the Company's factories. They said the insolence and outrages of the nabob's officers had increased to such a degree as to put a total stop to their business ; Mr. Ellis threatened to oppose force to force, and others applied for reinforcements and called for supplies of ammunition, as if they were on the very brink of a war.²

These indications of a rupture alarmed even the council at Calcutta. They sent orders on all sides to forbid the use of force ; they agreed that Mr. Vansittart, accompanied by Mr. Hastings, should repair to the nabob and endeavour to bring about an adjustment ; and even after those gentlemen were gone they continued for a time to conduct themselves with a laudable moderation. In fact the council was as yet composed of comparatively reasonable members ; four only were present, the rest being employed, according to the custom of the day, as chiefs of the different factories.

Mr. Vansittart therefore set out with strong hopes of effecting an arrangement, and with an impression on his mind that he had full powers to enter on the requisite engagements with the nabob.

October
20, A.D.
1762.

The meeting took place at Monghír, when the nabob renewed all his complaints and produced some letters from Company's servants expressed in disrespectful and menacing language towards his government. To give weight to his demand for redress, he announced that if it was not speedily granted he would abolish all internal

² Vansittart's *Narrative*, ii. 109-191.

CHAP.
IX.

customs throughout his dominions, since at present they scarcely yielded any revenue and only served as protecting duties in favour of the English monopoly. It appeared also, by reports received by Mr. Vansittart, that the nabob's officers and the people of the country showed a marked spirit of resistance and hostility to the Europeans and their agents, and that three or four sepoy's had been killed in one place and a gomáshta in another.

The times seemed therefore to admit of no delay, and after frequent consultations with the nabob, Mr. Vansittart agreed to terms which were comprised in nine articles, and which he forthwith reported to the council.

The substance was that the Company's passport should only be granted to goods imported or intended for exportation ; that all other goods should take passports from the nabob's custom-houses, paying the duty beforehand, and being liable to no detention afterwards ; that boats furnished with the Company's passport should in no case be detained, but if it was suspected that the goods on board exceeded the amount specified in the passport, a complaint should be made to the nearest English officer ; that all boats without passports should be confiscated, even if sailing along with those provided with the Company's passports, and that the same rule should apply to boats carrying articles of internal traffic under the Company's passport clandestinely procured ; that the gomáshtas should trade like other merchants, and should be fully protected by the native government, but that all acts of oppression or other offences which they might commit should be punishable by the nabob's magistrates. Regulations were also included for the protection of the gomáshtas from