



THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, TO

CSL
JUL 12

You are already apprized that my principal object is to effect a reform of the Nabob Vizier's army; and it would be a happy circumstance if any steps towards that most desirable end could be made during the present season before the alarm of Zemaun Shah's return to the frontier of Hindostan can be renewed. I have, therefore, thought it advisable to relax my injunction to you, not to take any step towards the accomplishment of the proposed military arrangements before you shall have received further instructions from me: I leave it to your discretion to act in this matter as you shall deem most expedient.

I entirely approve your suggestion of the advantages to be derived from availing ourselves of any instances of mutiny, treachery, or criminal neglect in any branches of the Vizier's army to reduce such divisions of the army as shall be convicted of these crimes.

The extreme unpopularity of the Nabob Vizier has been an object of serious regret to me: I understand that it arises principally from his excessive parsimony and his ungracious conduct towards the principal personages of his Court. It will be a matter of considerable delicacy to attempt to correct these defects; however, I request that you will direct your constant attention to them; and if any favourable opportunity should occur, that you will apprise the Nabob, in an amicable manner, of the concern with which I have learnt, that he does not pursue a course likely to conciliate the affection of his subjects; and you will signify to him, that the deep interest which I take in the stability, ease, and honour of his Government, renders me particularly anxious to hear that his Excellency has found means of removing the unfavourable impressions which have been conceived of his disposition.

At the same time you will express to his Excellency, in the strongest terms, my cordial approbation of the regularity which has marked his payment of the military subsidy ever since my arrival in Bengal. It is scarcely necessary to point out to you the importance of taking every step to encourage and improve the Nabob's disposition to the punctual discharge of his pecuniary engagements to the Company, forming, as they now do, the source of so considerable a branch of our revenue.

You are already informed of my views in the event of the



death of Almas Ali Khan, they are entirely conformable to your own ideas upon that subject. I request that you will apply to Mr. Lumsden for a copy of a private letter which I addressed to him a short time previous to my departure from Calcutta.* It contains a general outline of my sentiments with regard to the state of Oude.

I wish to call your particular attention to an evil which I consider to be of the first magnitude. I mean the number of real or pretended emissaries of Zemaun Shah who have spread themselves over the provinces of Oude and Benares for the last two or three years, exciting general alarm, and weakening the respect due to the British Government by inculcating exaggerated reports of the force of the Shah.

The imperious tone which the Shah has adopted in his communication with the Nabob Vizier and with the British Government must be abated. Our tacit admission of his presumptuous claims of sovereignty upon our provinces and their dependencies serves only to inflame his pride and ambition, and to degrade us in the eyes of our own subjects. From the papers discovered in the palace at Seringapatam, after the conquest of that place, it appears evident that Tippoo Sultaun had formed a connection with Zemaun Shah. Under all these circumstances, I desire that you will establish, in concert with Mr. Vanderheyden, a most vigilant control over any emissaries who may arrive from the Shah; and that you will, without hesitation, either send them beyond the frontier of Oude, or imprison them, as the case may require. I wish you to understand and to declare that I shall hereafter consider every person as a traitor who shall assert the royal authority of Zemaun Shah over any part of the dominions, either of the Nabob Vizier, or of the Company.

Your attention will necessarily be alive to the intrigues of Ambajee and of the French; with respect to the latter, my principle is very simple: wherever I find a Frenchman in India, within my power, I will send him back to Europe, and I desire that you will adopt this principle as the general rule of your conduct, from which you are never to depart, excepting in cases of a very special nature, which you will always report to me for my determination.

* See Vol. I. p. 386.



SIR JOHN ANSTRUTHER, TO

CSL
June

I am naturally anxious to visit Oude, but as I see no prospect of being able to return to Bengal before the month of September, it will be impossible for me to move from Calcutta before the month of December; indeed, after so long an absence from Calcutta, I should be desirous of remaining there until the commencement of the rains in the ensuing year, 1800, unless you see any necessity for my visiting Oude at an earlier period. On this question I wish for your unreserved opinion, by which my motions shall be regulated.

Believe me, dear Sir,

Yours, most sincerely,

MORNINGTON.

No. XXI.

Chief Justice Sir John Anstruther to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

June 25th, 1799.

I had your very kind letter some days ago, and yesterday brought me Tippoo's private correspondence with the French Government, you were so good as to send me. It affords convincing proofs of the good sense and judgment which dictated the commencement of the war, and of the danger which would have attended any delay, or any less exertion of vigour and activity than actually took place.

I am much flattered with the favourable place you gave me in your esteem, and sincerely assure you that I feel nearly as much satisfaction upon private as upon public grounds at the wonderful success of the war, but knowing what I do I cannot help wondering at the slight grounds upon which the fate of empires depend. The slightest delay in your passage, the slightest accident to the ship, an accidental sickness at the Cape, nay, had you yielded to the desires of many of your friends, and come to India without the Government being in you the instant of your arrival, all your exertions would have been in vain, and our empire in India might have been tottering at this day, instead of being fixed upon foundations I trust the most stable.

I am extremely happy to hear your determination upon the question of Seringapatam, which I have not disclosed to a



soul. Its central position, its local strength, joined to the river, being in a great measure a frontier almost all the way across the peninsula, and the facility with which an army may move from it to any point of attack, point it out as a material station for our army, and indeed, a line drawn by Colar Bangalore to Periapatam, affords a shorter line of defence to the Carnatic than we had before, and seems to point out that and Mangalore as a desirable acquisition for us. Gooty and Gurrumcoonda naturally are the places from whence the Nizam will secure his share of the conquest, and in the present circumstances an addition to his power is rather desirable than dangerous, adds to our strength, and not to our alarm, an additional effect of the wise measures of your Government. Were I in your place I should be more puzzled with Bednore than any other part of the country. It is distant from us. The Mahrattas will claim it. They deserve little, and in their present state, although not very formidable, yet might become so; and it is a rich province. I dare say your determination will be the best and the wisest.

The correspondence you sent me I think, in some degree, proves what I have long suspected, that the principles upon which the treaty of Seringapatam was founded were but fallacious, and more suited to defend the treaty in an English House of Commons than to assist its operations in this country. To Tippoo the triple alliance appeared the effect of weakness rather than ability, and moderation was by him, and I suspect by our allies too, supposed the effect of our inability. Besides the remote good arising from the balance of power wisely held to any Indian mind cannot come in competition with any immediate advantage whatever. Our successes have been too rapid for any Indian to give us credit for our moderation, and their false and fickle conduct will, I am afraid, prevent us from practising it long. I have no doubt but had the Frenchman's advice in the last letter in the collection*

* This was conveyed in a letter from M. Dubuc to Tippoo Sultaun, dated 16th of December, 1798, urging Tippoo to make overtures to the Mahrattas for their cooperation against the English, and entreating Tippoo so to stimulate the Mahrattas that they might take alarm and attack the East India Company's territories. See p. 134 of Mr. Edmonstone's translation of the discovered documents.



CAPTAIN MUNRO, TO

CSL
June

been taken with vigour, that you would not have had the Mahrattas so quiet, and possibly their delay may be in some degree owing to its having been attempted to be carried into execution. Adieu! may every good attend you, and every success follow your measures.

Yours, ever sincerely,

J. ANSTRUTHER.

No. XXII.

Captain (afterwards Sir Thomas) Munro to the Earl of Mornington.

My Lord,

Seringapatam, 29th June, 1799.

I should hardly have ventured to trouble your Lordship with a letter on the subject of my appointment as a joint Secretary to the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore had not their instructions, directing me to communicate with you on the civil administration of Canara, opened the way for me to make my acknowledgments to your Lordship for having twice pointed me out as a person that might be usefully employed. As it is probable that your Lordship may hear that I hesitated for some time in accepting this appointment to Canara, I shall, without reserve, explain the motives by which I was guided on this occasion. I felt a reluctance to quit the coast, where I had served near twenty years. After having been the greatest part of the last nine years in tents, I dreaded that my constitution would not support the fatigue of leading the same kind of life for two or three years longer in investigating the revenues of a new country. I thought it possible that I might be ordered to take charge of a part of Coimbatore, and as I know perfectly, from my long residence in the neighbourhood of that province, that it yielded more than double the estimate of Tippoo Sultaun; I flattered myself with the hope of gaining some credit by augmenting the public revenue. On the contrary, I saw that, by going to Canara, I should only disappoint the expectations which your Lordship might have formed; for I never had any doubts of



the truth of the report which prevailed in 1792, that the Sultaun had overrated the whole of the Malabar coast in order to secure to himself a part of it for keeping up his French connection. This report seems to be confirmed by experience in Malabar, where, after a trial of seven years, the revenue is still lower than the schedule. I could scarcely hope to bring the country up to its estimated value in a short time; to do in one year what had not in the adjoining province been done in seven; and I therefore foresaw a certain unavoidable loss of reputation. But I considered that it was my duty to go, and the more especially as I was conscious that though I should never be able to realize any sanguine ideas that might be entertained on the subject of the revenue of Canara I should yet, from possessing the advantages of long experience, be enabled to render it as productive as it could have been in any other hands.

I understand that two gentlemen have been proposed as my assistants, but I am not sure whether or not they have been actually confirmed. It is hardly necessary to mention to your Lordship that no person can be of the smallest use in this revenue who does not understand some one or other of the country languages; besides this indispensable qualification, an assistant ought also to possess great perseverance and great temper with the natives. I am as yet ignorant how far the gentlemen in question are endowed with these requisites; but if I find them deficient, I shall not fail to report to your Lordship, in full confidence that I shall be furnished with abler assistance.

I shall trust to your Lordship's candour for excusing the freedom with which I have expressed myself in this first address.

I have the honour to be,
your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

TH. MUNRO.



THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, TO

CSL
June

No. XXIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 30th June, 1799.

I now proceed to furnish you with such observations as occur to me to be necessary for your guidance in discussing the several articles of the treaty of Mysore with the Court of Hyderabad, if contrary to my hope any such discussion should arise. In the first place, I wish to state distinctly the fundamental principles on which I have framed the new settlement. I have always been disposed to pay not only every attention to the just pretensions of his Highness the Nizam, but even to exceed the limits of his strict rights in allotting the measure of his participation in the advantages of our late conquests, but I cannot admit the claim of his Highness to an equal partition of all or any of those advantages to be founded on any principles of justice or reason. His Highness cannot avail himself of the treaty of Paungul to maintain this claim because the article of that treaty relating to an equal partition of conquests could not be construed to apply to the late war. No other written or verbal engagement existing to support such a claim on the part of his Highness, I have endeavoured to estimate his rights under the alliance by an entirely different, and in my opinion, more equitable standard. My view has been to distribute the recent acquisitions of revenue between the two States in a due proportion to the efficient share, which each has borne in the expense and hazard of the war, as well as to the security which each is likely to derive from the assistance of the other in maintaining their common interests, and in consolidating the basis of the peace.

Although I have assumed this principle as the general foundation of the whole settlement, I am persuaded that a fair review of the details of the treaty of Mysore will convince any impartial mind that I have made concessions to the Nizam far exceeding the limits of the rule which I had thus



prescribed to myself as the just measure of his Highness's rights. It is unnecessary to enter more minutely into this part of the subject; you will find no difficulty in applying these observations to the articles of the treaty.

The preamble of the treaty requires no remark.

The 1st and 2nd articles leave to the Nizam and to the Company shares of territory, as nearly as is practicable, of equal value, after deducting from each the charges for which they have reciprocally engaged to provide on account of the maintenance of the families of Hyder Ali Khan, and Tippoo Sultaun, and although on account of the Jaghire of Meer Cummur ud Deen, it may be observed, on the part of the Nizam, that, under the power reserved to the Company in the 6th article, the Company may derive a greater benefit from its share of territory than that which now appears upon the face of the treaty, because the Company having reserved the power in certain contingencies of diminishing the allowances of the deposed family is not to be accountable to the Nizam for any such contingent advantage. On the other hand, it is apparent that the Nizam will be entitled to similar advantages with regard to the Jaghire of Cummur ud Deen, which his Highness, under his rights of sovereignty over Cummur ud Deen, will at any time possess the power of limiting or suspending, although no such power be expressly reserved in the treaty. His Highness also is exempt from the charge of any contingent increase in the expense of maintaining the deposed family, a contingency by no means improbable.

Meer Allum having objected to the operation of the 6th article, I offered, on the part of the Company, to render annually to the Nizam an account of the expense of maintaining the deposed family, and to divide equally with his Highness any contingent saving within the sum stipulated by the treaty for their annual maintenance, provided his Highness would consent to pay one-half of any eventual excess beyond the stipulated sum. Meer Allum declined this equitable proposal, and agreed to the articles in their present form.

It appears that the Nizam is desirous of retaining a part of Tippoo Sultaun's family within his Highness's territory,



the objections to such a plan must be obvious to every friend, not only of the British interests, but of the alliance between his Highness and the Company, the residence of the deposed family in the territory of the Company can never be an object of jealousy to the Nizam. Within his Highness's dominions it might become an object not only of jealousy to the Company, but of serious danger to the stability of the new settlement of Mysore. In addition to this observation, I must also remark, that the separation of the different members of the family of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun would be heavily felt by them as an unnecessary act of severity. It has been my duty to mitigate the rigour of this sudden change of their fortunes, and having been apprized that any separation of the several branches of the families would greatly aggravate the unavoidable pressure of their actual condition, principles of humanity, as well as of policy, forbid me to adopt the plan suggested by Azim-ul-Omra.

The whole of the deposed family will therefore be settled at Vellore, under the care of Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton, and no reasonable expense will be refused by me which can contribute to their comfort or accommodation on a munificent scale, suited to the rank in which they were born.

Before I quit the 1st and 2nd articles, I think it proper to repeat that a mistake has arisen in enumerating the districts of Coimbatore retained by the Company, the district of Kanjam having been omitted in the schedule A.

The necessity of the third article is evident, as without that article Seringapatam would never become an efficient military post in the hands of the allies. I am persuaded that the Nizam will soon feel and acknowledge the security which he is likely to derive from the establishment of a large British force at Seringapatam.

The fourth article contains the basis of an arrangement founded on the strongest principles of justice, humanity, and policy. It does not appear to me necessary to state any thing farther on this; or the fifth article; you will naturally observe that, if the Nizam's claim to an equal partition of territory had been founded in right, and consequently admitted by me, this adjustment so honourable to the moderation, generosity, and wisdom of the British character, would not have taken place.



I have already remarked the operation of the 6th article on the interests of the Nizam, its necessity with a view to those of the Company is obvious. The policy of the 7th and 8th articles, I should trust, would not be disputed even by the illiberal, rapacious, and vindictive spirit of which I have perceived so many disgusting symptoms at Hyderabad, even since the fall of Seringapatam.

That the new settlement of Mysore should be rendered as acceptable as possible to all the powers contiguous to the respective boundaries of the allies, is a principle founded on the soundest maxims of prudence, as well as of generosity. The conditions which I have annexed to the provisional cession of territory to the Mahrattas will, I trust, satisfy the Court of Hyderabad of my sincere disposition to promote the interests of the Nizam by every effort compatible with the laws of my country, and the rules of public faith and justice.

You have already been apprized through my correspondence with Colonel Palmer, of the general outline of the conditions which I propose to require from the Peishwa, as well as of those which the Peishwa has proposed to me, I trust I shall be able, in the course of to-morrow, to forward to Colonel Palmer the draft of a treaty founded on his late communications. The despatch prepared for Colonel Palmer will pass through your hands, and you will communicate its contents to the Nizam, conformably to the stipulations of the treaty of Hyderabad. I desire that you will furnish me and Colonel Palmer, by the speediest conveyance, with such observations as may occur to you relative to the adjustment of affairs between the Peishwa and the Nizam.

The Ninth Article of the treaty of Mysore is intended to form the foundation of a connection of the most intimate nature between the Company and the Rajah of Mysore; you will inform me whether this arrangement is likely to excite any degree of jealousy in the mind of the Nizam. It is my decided determination not to admit of any relation between the Rajah of Mysore and any other power otherwise than through the Company's Government. I am persuaded that in this determination I have made the best practicable arrangement for the interests of the Rajah, the Nizam, and the Company. The Nizam will not be a party to the subsidiary



treaty with the Rajah. I have not yet determined, however, whether a treaty of general guarantee between the three states to which the Peishwa hereafter may be invited to accede, would not be an advisable measure.

With regard to the two separate articles of the treaty of Mysore, the nature of the first has already been explained in my observations on the 6th article of the treaty. The 2nd requires some further remarks; it was proposed by Meer Allum as a mode of removing all jealousy from the mind of the Nizam, and of reconciling the Court of Hyderabad to Meer Allum's conduct in signing the treaty without having received powers from his Court.

The article appears to me to be perfectly nugatory, unless it be supposed that the Court of Hyderabad possesses sufficient influence with that of Poonah to prevent the Peishwa's consent to conditions which might otherwise prove acceptable to him, or unless it be intended insidiously to favour some unreasonable pretensions of the Nizam against the Peishwa. I shall, however, pursue through the whole of the negotiation the course which shall appear to my judgment to lead to the ends of reason and justice, and I will not suffer myself to be diverted from those ends by any intrigues at either court.

It is difficult to express to you the degree of disgust which has been occasioned in my mind by some of the late official documents from Hyderabad. It is evident that Meer Allum, notwithstanding his obligations to the British Government, and personally to myself, has employed every art to create discontent against both, by the tenor of his unfounded complaints, addressed to Azim ul Omra, from Seringapatam. I am credibly informed that the cause of Meer Allum's conduct is no other than his disappointment at not having personally shared in the distribution of the spoils of Seringapatam; and I understand that he has the imprudence to proceed so far as to hint his right to a share in the prize, equal to that allotted to Lieutenant-General Harris. The rejection of this unreasonable claim was immediately followed by the most marked symptoms of a discontent, which has never since been removed. This is a proceeding unworthy of his character, inconsistent with his professions, and incompatible with his obligations to the British Government; from this moment he



will ever be, in my opinion, an object both of suspicion and contempt. The conduct of the Nizam, and of Azim ul Omra, is of a similar character. Nor can I conceive any attempt more despicable in principle, or indiscreet in policy, than that which they have made, to deprive our army and the Nizam's of the just and customary rewards of their gallantry and honourable labours.

I will transmit to you by an early opportunity copies of the orders of Lord Cornwallis, during the last war, respecting the right of the army to property found in places taken by assault.* I will add copies of my late orders on the same subject. You will remark that Lord Cornwallis' opinion proceeds far beyond mine on this subject, although practically our determination has been the same. The plain truth is, that the claims of the army under such circumstances have never been resisted in His Majesty's service, nor do I think they could have been resisted at Seringapatam on any grounds of justice or policy, unless the amount of the captured property had been so enormous, as that its distribution must have affected the discipline of the army. The Nizam's force formed so small a proportion, either in point of number or efficiency, of the whole army, that it would have been the height of injustice to have admitted his Highness' claim to an equal participation of the whole prize, an admission which would have deprived our army of its reasonable advantages, without serving that employed by his Highness. No other principle, therefore, could be adopted but that of allowing his troops to share rateably with ours; excepting always his cavalry, the irregular construction of which rendered such an arrangement impracticable. For his cavalry, therefore, a compromise was made with Meer Allum. Whether Meer Allum defrauded his Highness' infantry of their share of the prize money, and reserved it for his Highness' private use, to the prejudice of those who had so well earned it in the field, is a question which I confess freely it never occurred to me to ask; nor will I degrade the character of the British Government by mixing in such a transaction, although the consequence of my refusal should be the total loss of his Highness' alliance.

* See Appendix.



THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, TO

CSL
June,

When Lieutenant-General Harris communicated to me Meer Allum's requisition to be admitted on the part of the Nizam, to make a valuation of the treasure, I immediately gave my assent to Meer Allum's proposition with some expressions of surprise, that the Commander-in-Chief should have thought any reference to me necessary. Subsequent information, however, has convinced me that the Commander-in-Chief not only acted with propriety in declining Meer Allum's original proposal, but that he has also been completely justified in suspending the execution of my orders; for it now appears that the Court of Hyderabad, as well as the whole army, would have construed the concession into a formal recognition of the personal right of the Nizam to one-half of the captured property.

I shall close this letter with some general reflections arising out of the recent conduct and language of the Nizam, Azim ul Omrah, and Mustakeem oo Dowlah.

It is with infinite regret that I perceive throughout the whole tenor of the reports of their recent conversations a spirit extremely dangerous to the stability of our connection with the Court of Hyderabad. The language of Mustakeem oo Dowlah is particularly offensive, and as he is nearly connected with Meer Allum, it is not difficult to trace the source of his insolence and boldness in the disappointed avarice of his patron and kinsman; it appears, however, that the language which he used had been previously concerted with Azim ul Omra, a circumstance which renders it the more deserving of animadversion. I desire that you will take an early opportunity of bringing Mustakeem oo Dowlah to a distinct explanation of his statement of the powers which the Nizam had vested in me. That statement is, if possible, as false and absurd as it is disrespectful to the supreme power of the British Government vested in my hands. His Highness the Nizam, since the fall of Seringapatam, on two distinct occasions declared, in the most positive terms, that he would not in any degree interfere to restrain those plenary powers which he had requested me to exercise with respect to all his interests in the conquest of Mysore. I desire that you will take an early opportunity of reprimanding Mustakeem oo Dowlah, in the most public and pointed manner, for the disrespectful terms in which he has spoken of the British

Government, and that you will deprive him of his pension if you should deem it necessary to proceed to such an act of severity; at the same time, you will take an opportunity of signifying to the minister the extreme concern with which I have learnt that he has suffered any of his servants to utter with impunity expressions so unwarrantable. It may not be useless to embrace this occasion of awakening Azim ul Omra to a just sense of the extensive advantages which have been acquired by the Nizam's Government, within the last year, by means of his connection with the British power. Within that short space of time the Nizam has been delivered from the violence and arrogance of an armed party in the centre of his dominions, which menaced the independence, if not the existence of his throne. His enemies have been deterred by the intervention of the British power from prosecuting against his Highness' kingdom designs which he possessed no means of resisting, and which probably would have terminated in his destruction. His most formidable enemy has been utterly destroyed, with scarcely any expense to his Highness' treasury; and in place of that enemy has been substituted a power, connected with him by all the ties of interest and public faith, and affording perfect security to his dominions in that quarter, formerly the most vulnerable. He has acquired a large accession of territory and revenue, as well as of reputation and glory, by the conduct of his troops under the direction of British officers during the war.

Finally, from a weak, decaying, and despised state, he has recovered substantial strength, secured the means of cultivating and extending his resources, with power and honour at home and abroad, and resumed a respectable posture among the princes of India. These have been the consequences of his connection with the British power, acquired without effort or hazard on his part.

It is for his Highness and Azim ul Omra to determine whether these benefits are all counterbalanced by our adherence to the invariable practice of our military service, and by our justice to the merits of that army which has secured his tranquillity as well as ours. Perhaps it may occur as a prudential consideration, whether his Highness' disappointment at not being permitted to lay hands on rewards, appropriated by the custom of the British Government to encourage the



zeal of those who risk their lives in the public cause, should be so far indulged, as to hazard any interruption of that friendship from which he has derived advantages so solid, substantial, and honourable.

The treaty of Mysore appears to me to be highly favourable to his Highness' interests.* If, however, he should object to the basis and fundamental principles of it, he will not excite an emotion of alarm or uneasiness in my mind. I am perfectly prepared to carry the new settlement into effect by the aid of British arms alone; and his Highness must be aware of the advantages which he will open to the Court of Poonah, if he should compel me to resort to such extreme measures. But if his Highness should object merely to partial details, or particular stipulations of the treaty, I trust he will not hesitate to ratify it, relying on me to remove all such objectionable parts, unless they should appear upon examination either to be necessarily connected with the whole arrangement, or counterbalanced by advantages, which had escaped his Highness's observation.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 4th July, 1799.

I have already stated to you the grounds of my decided opinion, that the Peishwa has forfeited all right to claim any share in the advantages of the late war with Tippoo Sultaun. In this place therefore, I shall only observe, that the plea of inability to fulfil its engagements stated by the Durbar of Poonah, in the 5th article of the Peishwa's proposition, is a direct admission that the Mahratta State is not entitled to any share of the partition of Mysore, for whatever might be their inclination, nothing less than an effective co-operation in the field could have been deemed to amount to such a performance of their engagements, as could constitute the foundation of a right to participate in the division of our recent

* See p. 26.



conquests; but even their inclination has been at least equivocal, and by their continued intercourse with the enemy, they have precluded themselves from the benefit of your declaration made in my name, under the express condition of their renouncing all such intercourse during the war—their conduct in the former war cannot serve as a plea to justify a totally different behaviour in the present; it might as well be contended that the Nizam should be now punished for his want of zeal in the former war, as that the Mahrattas should be now rewarded for their alacrity at that period.

You must, therefore, understand and explain distinctly to the Peishwa, that I cannot consent to negotiate with him under any admission of his right to an equal, or any, share of the dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun. Whatever cessions may be made to the Peishwa from those territories, must be deemed gratuitous on the part of the Company, and of the Nizam, excepting in as far as they shall be compensated by correspondent concessions on the part of the Peishwa.

It may be necessary to observe, that it is my intention to exclude both the Nizam and the Mahrattas, especially the latter, from any interference in the affairs of the Rajah of Mysore, who is to be considered as a dependant of the Company. You will judge whether any specific engagement, on this subject, will be necessary to restrain the Court of Poonah from intriguing in Mysore.

The whole system of my policy, is a sufficient earnest of my anxiety to expel the French from the service of Scindiah; but it might be dangerous to proceed to any steps which tend to fix Scindiah in the interests of France. I desire you will keep this object constantly in view, nothing would be more satisfactory to me, than to find means of conciliating Scindiah's interests in the present pacification; perhaps it might be possible to arrange this most desirable object, by some equitable adjustment of his pecuniary claims on the Nizam and on the Peishwa; on this subject you will concert your measures with the Resident at Hyderabad.

I am, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.



SIR SIDNEY SMITH, TO

CSL
July

No. XXV.

From Sir Sidney Smith, to His Excellency the Right Hon. the Governor-General of the British Possessions in India.

MY LORD,

Tigre, off Cyprus, 9th July, 1799.
[Received at Fort William 15th Oct. 1799.]

I feel I cannot do better towards meeting the natural impatience, and relieving the anxiety of our friends and coadjutors in India, than to transmit copies of my late despatches to Rear Admiral Lord Nelson, containing the detail of the seige of Acre, which Bonaparte was forced to raise precipitately, after sixty-three days labour, and eleven fruitless attempts to carry the place by assault. He returned towards Cairo with the remnant of his exhausted army, which was originally twelve thousand men on the Syrian expedition, and is reduced at least one third. Egypt will afford him a reinforcement of about twelve thousand men, left there under General Kleber, so that his *utmost* force is now twenty thousand men, but by no means so formidable as they were before they met with a check, and felt their situation as it really is, cut off from all resource, and in a country by no means congenial to their habits, or furnishing the means of supplying their wants, still, however it is my duty to state that we have experienced desperation to be a strong principle of action both in Bonaparte and a portion of his followers, consequently as they find themselves hard pressed on this side by the Ottoman armies, they may push across the Isthmus, and carry terror among those who don't know them; it is necessary, therefore, that his Majesty's and the Right Honourable Company's servants in India, should continue to be on their guard, notwithstanding the recent defeat of that portion of the French army which entered Syria, and if the British forces should have it in their power to attack the first of the enemy's troops, which make their appearance to the southward of the Isthmus, the success of his Majesty's arms, which (after what I have witnessed) I look on as certain, cannot fail to have the same good effect on the opinion of the natives, that our early successes had in this country, in which case the most formidable part of the evil is



THE RIGHT HON. THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

CSL
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done away, and the rest must be subject to the ordinary course of events in war, where a succession of fresh troops have to deal with a fatigued, diminished and dispirited enemy. If this is the case with them in Egypt, I am happy likewise, from recent official information to be able to say, it is equally so in every other quarter where the French arms have hitherto carried all before them. The Russian and Austrian combined armies under the command of General Suvarof, have beaten them out of Italy. The Austrians on the Rhine have been equally successful, the enemy having been driven back across the river. In Switzerland, the Austrians have everywhere been received as liberators, and the French expelled. We have no direct news from the interior of France, but these events according to the spirit which I know to prevail, both in Paris and the provinces bid fair to overturn the monstrous system, which has nearly reduced all the surrounding nations to the same pitiable state which France is in herself, and consequently to restore tranquillity to Europe.

Sir Charles Whitworth writes me word, that he has exchanged the ratification of a subsidiary treaty with Russia, by which she engages to furnish us 45,000 men, which will no doubt, enable Government to support your Lordship in the laudable exertions you are making to secure our Empire in India. You may be apprehensive on hearing, that the French fleet sailed from Brest, in the latter end of April, and had not been heard of when the last letters left London; they have however, made their appearance on the coast of Italy, having entered the Mediterranean on the 5th of May; they are followed by our superior fleet.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

With perfect respect and regard,

W. SIDNEY SMITH.



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No. XXVI.

From the Earl of Mornington to the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort St. George, 3d August, 1799.

My last separate letter to your Honourable Court, was dated on the 6th of June,* at which period I informed you, that I was occupied in framing a general settlement of the conquered territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun. In this despatch, I shall submit to your Honourable Court, a summary abstract of the principles by which my conduct has been governed in framing this settlement, and of the means which I have employed for carrying it into effect.

From the justice and success of the late war with Tippoo Sultaun, the Company and the Nizam derived an undoubted right to the disposal of the dominions conquered by their united arms. This right of conquest entitled the Company and the Nizam, to retain the whole territory in their own hands; the cession of any portion of it to any other party, might be a consideration of policy or humanity, but could not be claimed on any ground of justice or right.

The Mahrattas, whatever might have been their disposition, having taken no share in the war, had forfeited every pretension to participate in the advantages of the peace. The numerous progeny of Tippoo Sultaun, (even if it had been possible to adjust their several pretensions to the succession,) could plead no title which had not been superseded by the conquest of the kingdom; nor was it possible in estimating their claims, to forget the usurpation of Hyder Alli, and the sufferings of the unfortunate family, expelled by his crimes from the throne of Mysore. A lineal descendant of the ancient house of the Rajahs of Mysore, still remained at Seringapatam; but, whatever might be the hopes of his family, from the moderation and humanity of the conquerors, this young Prince could assert no right to any share of the conquered territory.

To the free and uncontrouled exercise of the right of conquest thus vested in the Company and the Nizam, no

* See Vol. I. p. 593.



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tion of the conquered territory, and any considerable extension of their empire was objectionable, especially when accompanied by the possession of strong fortresses bordering on the line of our frontier. It was, however, desirable to conciliate their goodwill, and to offer to them such a portion of territory as might give them an interest in the new settlement without offence or injury to the Nizam, and without danger to the frontier of the Company's possessions. On the other hand, it was prudent to limit the territory retained in the hands of the Company and of the Nizam within such bounds of moderation as should bear a due proportion to their respective expences in the contest, and to the necessary means of securing the public safety of their respective dominions.

For the information of your Honourable Court, I have annexed to this despatch a comparative statement of several plans for the partition of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions, drawn up under my instructions with a view to the relative interests and power of the Nizam, the Mahrattas, and the Company; to the nature, produce, and geographical boundaries of the country, and to the position and strength of the several fortresses and passes; an attentive investigation of every comparative view of these important questions terminated in my decision that the establishment of a central and separate government in Mysore, under the protection of the Company, and the admission of the Mahrattas to a certain participation in the division of the conquered territory, were the expedients best calculated to reconcile the interests of all parties, to secure to the Company, a less invidious, and more efficient share of revenue, resource, commercial advantage, and military strength, than could be obtained under any other distribution of territory or power, and to afford the most favourable prospect of general and permanent tranquillity in India.

Having decided these leading principles of the new settlement, I proceeded to determine the rule of distribution for the respective shares of the Company, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas, to fix the most eligible position for the cessions to be made to each party, and to define the limits of the new government of Mysore.

To the Company's share naturally fell the Province of Ca-



nara, the Districts of Coimbatore and Daraporam, with all the territory lying below the Ghauts between your possessions in the Carnatic, and those in Malabar. These acquisitions appeared the most eligible, not only on account of their intrinsic value in point of produce, but as securing an uninterrupted tract of territory from the coast of Coromandel to that of Malabar, together with the entire sea-coast of the Kingdom of Mysore, and the base of all the eastern, western and southern Ghauts. To these I thought it necessary to add the forts and posts forming the heads of all the passes above the Ghauts on the Table Land. The possession of the base of the Ghauts alone formed no effectual barrier for the inhabitants of the Low Lands against an enemy possessing the summits of those mountains; and I, therefore, considered the acquisition of all the entrances of the Passes situated above the Ghauts, to be an essential object of security, against every possible approach of danger from the Table Land. This acquisition derived a further importance in my opinion, from the means which it appeared to afford of curbing the refractory spirit of the Polygars, and of all other turbulent and disaffected subjects in the Carnatic, and on the coast of Malabar; I also considered the district of Wynaad to be an useful possession with a view to the tranquillity of your territories on the latter coast. The last addition which I deemed it necessary to make to your share of the conquered dominions, consisted of the fortress, city and island of Seringapatam, the possession of which would effectually secure the communication between your territories on both coasts, and consolidate all your lines of defence in every direction.

To the Nizam, it appeared most expedient to allot the districts of Gooty and Gurrumcondah, bordering on the cessions which he acquired by the peace of 1792, together with a tract of country, the frontier of which should be drawn nearly along the line of Chitteldroog, Sera, Nundydroog, and Colar, leaving, however, these fortresses to the southward to form the frontier of the new Government of Mysore. The Nizam certainly could not assert any just claim to an equal participation with the Company in the advantages of the peace. The operation of the 6th Article of the Treaty of Paungul, respecting an equal division of conquests, was



limited to the war which terminated in 1792. Since the peace of Seringapatam, the 10th is the only Article of the Treaty of Paungul which can be considered to continue in force; and no subsequent engagements had been contracted with the Nizam which could entitle him to any advantages in the present peace exceeding his relative proportion in the expences and exertions of the allied force during the late war. It was, however, desirable that the territorial revenue retained in sovereignty by the Company (after deducting whatever charges might be annexed to the tenure) should not exceed the Nizam's portion, and accordingly I determined that this principle should be observed in the partition; reserving, however, to the Company, as a just indemnification for their superior share in the expences and exertions of the war, the principal benefit of whatever advantages might flow from any engagements to be contracted with the new Government of Mysore.

For the Mahrattas, I resolved to reserve a portion of territory, the revenues of which should not exceed two-thirds, nor fall short of one half, of the portions retained in sovereignty by the Nizam and the Company respectively, after deducting their respective charges; considering that any cession to the Peishwa must be viewed as a matter of mere favour, it appeared to me that the share to be allotted to him was amply sufficient, it would contain Harponelly, Soonda above the Ghauts, Annagoondy, part of the district of Chitteldroog, part of Bednore above the Ghauts, and other districts, but the frontier fortresses of Chitteldroog and Bednore would remain for the protection of the new Government of Mysore. I also determined that no portion of territory should be ceded to the Peishwa unconditionally, and that the cession should form the basis of a new treaty with the Mahratta empire.

The territory remaining unoccupied by this partition could be bounded to the northward by a strong line of hill forts and posts, forming a powerful barrier towards the southern frontiers of the Nizam and of the Mahrattas, from Punganoor on the line of the eastern, to Bednore on that of the western Ghauts, and would be entirely surrounded to the east, west and south, by the territories of the Company

above and below the Ghauts, the Company also holding the Fort of Seringapatam in the centre of the Table Land.

The necessity now occurred of determining in what hands the new Government of Mysore should be placed, and although no positive right or title to the throne existed in any party, it seemed expedient, that my choice should be made between the pretensions of the family of Tippoo Sultaun, and those of the ancient house of the Rajahs of Mysore.

The claims of humanity on both sides rendered the decision a painful and ungracious task. No alternative remained, but to depose the dynasty which I found upon the throne, or to confirm the Mahommedan usurpation, and with it the perpetual exclusion and degradation of the legitimate Hindoo sovereigns of the country. The usurpation, although not sanctioned by remote antiquity, had subsisted for such a length of time as to have nearly extinguished the hopes of the Hindoo family, and to have accustomed them to the humility of their actual fortunes, while the sons of Tippoo Sultaun, born in the state of royalty, and educated with the proudest and most exalted expectations of sovereignty and power, would be proportionably sensible to the sudden change of their condition, and to the unexpected disappointment of their splendid prospects. In this view of the subject it would have been more grateful to my mind (securing a munificent provision for the ancient family of Mysore) to have restored that of Tippoo Sultaun to the throne; if such a restoration could have been accomplished without exposing Mysore to the perpetual hazard of internal commotion and foreign war, and without endangering the stability of the intended settlement of your interests and those of your Allies in this quarter of India.

Since the peace of Seringapatam, and more especially since the year 1796, the destruction of the British power in India has formed the favourite and unremitting object of Tippoo Sultaun's hopes and exertions. His haughty mind never could be reconciled to the sacrifices which he was compelled to make for the purchase of peace in 1792; and his increasing eagerness to recover the extensive portion of his dominions, then ceded to the allies, urged him to pursue a systematic course of intrigue against the British power among all



the native states, and to revert to his ancient and hereditary connection with France, as the only effectual means of gratifying either his ambition or revenge.

The proofs which I had obtained, previous to the war, of the nature and objects of his machinations, were sufficient to satisfy my judgment; they have since been corroborated by the voluminous records discovered in the Palace of Seringapatam; it is now incontestable that Tippoo Sultaun's thoughts were perpetually intent upon the ruin of the British power, that he trusted to have accomplished our expulsion by instigating the French to invade India; and that he prosecuted this unalterable purpose with all the zeal and ardour of passionate resentment and vindictive hate, as well as with the steadiness of a deliberate maxim of state.

Perhaps the most wise policy which Tippoo Sultaun could have pursued would have been to have rested satisfied with the dominions remaining in his hands after the peace of 1792. But a policy of so moderate and pacific a spirit being utterly incompatible with the impetuosity of his temper, with the principles of his religious faith, and with the military character of his government, it might be at least a matter of rational speculation, whether a close alliance with France (however dangerous in its remote consequences) was not his true interest, in the actual state of his immediate views and pursuits. The possession of his lost dignity, wealth, and power could not be recovered without the conquest of a great part of the Company's territory, nor effectually secured without the total subversion of the British interests in India;—a French army was the only instrument by which such an enterprize could be attempted;—an alliance with France was, therefore, the necessary consequence of Tippoo Sultaun's restless, but natural desire to restore his empire to its former splendour and strength. In addition to his correspondence with the French at Tranquebar, with those at the Isle of France, and with the executive Directory at Paris, his embassy to Zemaun Shah, his intrigues at Poonah and Hyderabad, and his correspondence with Mons. Raymond, (all which transactions appear distinctly in the records discovered at Seringapatam) furnish abundant evidence that his antipathy to the English was the ruling passion of his heart, the



main-spring of his policy, the fixed and fundamental principle of his councils and government.

The heir of Tippoo Sultaun must have been educated in the same principles, and encouraged to indulge in the same prejudices and passions, and instructed to form the same views of the interests and honour of the throne of Mysore. These sentiments would necessarily acquire additional force in his mind from the issue of the late war. Our unexampled success had subverted the foundations of his father's empire, and transferred to our possession every source of the civil or military power of Mysore. Placed on the throne by our favour, and limited by our controul, he would have felt himself degraded to a state of humiliation and weakness so abject as no Prince of spirit would brook. Under such an arrangement our safety would have required us to retain at least all the territory which we now hold by the partition Treaty of Mysore. Whatever we retained must have been considered by the prince as a new usurpation upon his royal inheritance, and an additional pledge of his degradation and disgrace. In proportion to the reduction of his territory and resources he would have less to lose and more to regain in any struggle for the recovery of his father's empire; nor does it seem unreasonable to suppose that the heir of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, animated by the implacable spirit and bold example of his parents, and accustomed to the commanding prospect of independent sovereignty, and to the splendour of military glory, might deliberately hazard the remnant of his hereditary possessions in pursuit of so proud an object, as the recovery of that vast and powerful empire, which for many years had rendered his ancestors the scourge of the Carnatic, and the terror of this quarter of India.

In the most narrow view of the subject, it must be admitted that the son of Tippoo Sultaun must have felt a perpetual interest in the subversion of any settlement of Mysore, founded on a partition of his father's dominions, and on a limitation of his own independence. If, therefore, a prince of this race had been placed on the throne of Mysore, the foundations of the new settlement would have been laid in the very principles of its own dissolution. With such a prince no sincere alliance, no concord of sentiments, or union of



views could ever have been established; the appearances of amity or attachment must have been delusive, even his submission must have been reluctant, if not treacherous; while all his interests, his habits, prejudices, and passions, his vices, and even his virtues must have concurred to cherish an irreconcilable aversion to our name and power, and an eager desire to abet the cause, to exasperate the animosity, and to receive the aid of every enemy of the British nation. Whatever degree of influence or strength might have been left to the native Government of Mysore in such hands, would always have been thrown into the scale opposed to your interests. The hostile power of Mysore would have been weakened, but not destroyed; an enemy would still have remained in the centre of your possessions, watching every occasion to repair the misfortunes of his family at your expense, and forming a point of union for the machinations of every discontented faction in India, and for the intrigues of every emissary of France.

Under these circumstances, the same anxiety for the security and repose of your possessions, which originally compelled me to reduce the power of Tippoo Sultaun, now appeared to require that I should provide effectually against the revival of any degree of a similar danger, in the person of his son.

On the other hand, the restoration of the descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore was recommended by the same course of reasoning which excluded the heir of the Mahomedan usurpation.

The indignities which the deposed family of Mysore had suffered, especially during the cruel and tyrannical reign of Tippoo Sultaun, and the state of degradation and misery to which they had been reduced, would most naturally excite a sentiment of gratitude and attachment in their minds towards that power, which had not only delivered them from oppression, but had raised them to a state of considerable affluence and distinction. Between the British Government and this family, an intercourse of friendship and kindness had subsisted in the most desperate crisis of their adverse fortune. They had formed no connection with your enemies. Their elevation would be the spontaneous act of your generosity, and from your support alone could they ever hope to be maintained upon the throne, either against the family of Tippoo Sultaun,



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or against any other claimant. They must naturally view with an eye of jealousy, all the friends of the usurping family, and consequently be adverse to the French, or to any state connected with that family, in its hereditary hatred of the British Government. The heir of the Rajahs of Mysore, if placed on the throne, must feel that his continuance in that state depended on the stability of the new settlement in all its parts. His interest must therefore be to unite with cordiality and zeal in every effort necessary to its harmony, efficiency, and vigour. The effect of such an arrangement of the affairs of Mysore would not be limited to the mere destruction of the hostile power which menaced our safety. In the place of that power, would be substituted one, whose interests and resources might be absolutely identified with our own, and the kingdom of Mysore, so long the source of calamity and alarm to the Carnatic, might become a new barrier of our defence, and might supply fresh means of wealth and strength to the Company, their subjects, and allies.

In addition to these motives of policy, moral considerations, and sentiments of generosity and humanity, favoured the restoration of the ancient family of Mysore. Their high birth, the antiquity of their legitimate title, and their long and unmerited sufferings, rendered them peculiar objects of compassion and respect; nor could it be doubted that their government would be both more acceptable and more indulgent than that of the Mahomedan usurpers, to the mass of the inhabitants of the country, composed almost entirely of Hindoos.

These considerations induced me to adopt the resolution of preferring the descendants of the Rajahs of Mysore to the heir of Tippoo Sultaun.

I determined at the same time to grant to the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun a more magnificent maintenance than either had enjoyed during the late reign, and to provide with the same liberality for the principal Mahomedan officers and chiefs of the state, who had survived the Sultaun, and for the families of all those who had fallen in the course of the war.

For the accomplishment of a settlement founded on the principles which I have had the honour to detail to your



Honourable Court in the preceding paragraphs, I issued a special commission on the 4th of June,* appointing Lieutenant-General Harris, The Honourable Colonel Wellesley, The Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, commissioners for the affairs of Mysore, with the ample powers specified in the commission; and I named Captains Malcolm and Munro to be secretaries, and Mr. Edward Golding and Lieutenant Charles Pasley assistant secretaries to the commission. As the favourable state of the country has rendered my presence at Seringapatam unnecessary, I accompanied the commission with instructions directing the commissioners to proceed without delay to lay the foundations of the new arrangement, and for the purpose of precluding the intrigues of the natives, and of all the great interests which were in suspense; I enjoined the commissioners and their secretaries to take an oath of secrecy, in order that no part of my plan might transpire until the arrangements for the whole had been completed.

The commissioners assembled at Seringapatam on the 8th of June, and under my instructions, their first act was to make provision for the principal surviving officers and chiefs of the late Sultaun, and for the families of those slain during the campaign. I am happy to inform your Honourable Court, that this measure produced the most salutary effect in tranquillizing the minds of the principal Mahomedans remaining in Mysore, and in placing the clemency and generosity of the British Government in the most conspicuous and honourable light. It was determined, that Meer Kummur ud Deen should be settled at Gurrumcondah, with a jaghire from the Nizam, and another from the Company. This arrangement having been concluded, Kummur ud Deen departed from Seringapatam on the 19th of June, with many expressions of gratitude towards the Company's Government. The Brahmin Poorneah, who had been the principal financial minister of the late Sultaun, having given satisfactory proof of his readiness to serve the new Government in the same capacity, it was determined that he should be appointed Dewan to the young Rajah of Mysore.

* See p. 23.



The next proceeding of the commissioners, in pursuance of my directions, was to undertake the painful, but necessary task of removing the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sul-taun from Seringapatam to the Carnatic.

I had previously given orders that the fortress of Vellore should be prepared for the reception of the families, and I had appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton to the command of that fortress, and had also entrusted him with the payment of the stipends allotted to both families, directing him to spare no reasonable expense in providing for their accom-modation, on a scale suitable to their former rank and ex-pectations. The four princes, Futtch Hyder, Abdul Khaulik, Moyez oo Deen, and Moyee oo Deen, with their families, arrived at Vellore on the 13th of July; they expressed their satisfaction in the accommodations provided for them. The remainder of the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sul-taun will be removed as soon as may be practicable.

Previously to the departure of the princes from Seringa-patam, the commissioners had cautiously abstained from all intercourse with the family of the Rajah of Mysore; but as soon as the four elder sons of the late Sul-taun had left the capital, the commissioners paid a visit to the young Rajah, whom they found with others of this persecuted family, in a condition of poverty and humiliation, which excited the strongest emotions of compassion; it was determined to fix the residence of the Rajah in the ancient town of Mysore, as being the most eligible situation for the seat of his government.

On the 5th of June I had furnished the commissioners with the first draft of a treaty between the Company and his Highness, the Nizam, for the partition of Mysore, and having received the fullest communication of their sentiments and of those of Meer Allum, on the subject, I made such alterations as appeared to be advisable. On the 22nd of June this treaty was executed by the commissioners and Meer Allum, at Seringapatam, and ratified by me in council at Fort St. George, on the 26th of the same month, and by his Highness the Nizam, at Hyderabad, on the 13th of July. A copy of this treaty is annexed to this despatch under the title of the Partition Treaty of Mysore.*

* See p. 26.



On the 30th of June the Rajah of Mysore was formally placed on the musnud, by the commissioners, assisted by Meer Allum.

On the 8th of June I had forwarded to the commissioners the first draft of the subsidiary treaty, to be concluded between the Company and the Rajah of Mysore. After an ample discussion with the commissioners who had communicated the whole arrangement to the Brahmin Poorneah, and conciliated his co-operation; and after the adoption of several alterations, this treaty was executed in the fortress of Nuzzerbah, near Seringapatam, by the commissioners, and certain proxies on the part of the young Rajah, on the 8th of July, and ratified by me in council on the 23rd of July, under the title of the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam*.

In framing this engagement, it was my determination to establish the most unqualified community of interests between the Government of Mysore and the Company, and to render the Rajah's northern frontier in effect, a powerful line of our defence. With this view, I have engaged to undertake the protection of this country, in consideration of an annual subsidy of seven lacs of star pagodas; but recollecting the inconveniences and embarrassments which have arisen to all parties concerned under the double Governments and conflicting authorities unfortunately established in Oude, the Carnatic, and Tanjore, I resolved to reserve to the Company the most extensive and indisputable powers of interposition in the internal affairs of Mysore, as well as an unlimited right of assuming the direct management of the country (whenever such a step might appear necessary for the security of the funds destined to the subsidy), and of requiring extraordinary aid beyond the amount of the fixed subsidy, either in time of war, or of preparations for hostility.

Under this arrangement I trust that I shall be enabled to command the whole resources of the Rajah's territory, to improve its cultivation, to extend its commerce, and to secure the welfare of its inhabitants. It appeared to me a more candid and liberal, as well as a more wise policy, to apprise the Rajah distinctly, at the moment of his accession, of the exact nature of his dependance on the Company, than to

* See p. 43.



have any matter for future doubt or discussion. The right of the Company to establish such an arrangement, either as affecting the Rajah or the allies, has already been stated in this despatch.

I entertain a sanguine expectation that the Rajah and his ministers being fully apprized of the extensive powers reserved to the Company, will cheerfully adopt such regulations as shall render the actual exercise of those powers unnecessary. Much indulgence will be required at the commencement of the new Government, and it is my intention to abstain from any pressure upon the Rajah's finances, which by embarrassing them, might tend to the impoverishment of the country, and to the distress of the people.

Soon after the enthronement of the Rajah, the Brahmin Poorneah was appointed by the commissioners to be his Highness' Dewan.

The eminent talents and integrity of Lieutenant-Colonel Close, added to his extraordinary skill in the country language, and his experience in the manners, customs, and habits of the natives of India, induced me to select him for the important charge of resident with the Rajah of Mysore. He was accordingly appointed to that office immediately after the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam had been signed; and the commission was then dissolved on the 3rd of July.

Although your Honourable Court will perceive in the commission the names of two persons, of whose merits it may be difficult for me to form an impartial judgment, I feel it to be my duty to recommend the conduct of the commissioners to your most public and distinguished approbation.

The conclusion within one month of two treaties, so extensive in their consequences, and complicated in their details, together with all the subordinate arrangements connected with this important settlement, will appear the most extraordinary effort of diligence and ability, when it is remarked, that reference was necessarily made to me at Fort St. George, in every stage of the business. It will also be satisfactory to your Honourable Court to observe, that the whole arrangement has been conducted at Seringapatam, with a spirit of humanity and liberality, which cannot fail to conciliate the good will of the inhabitants of Mysore.

The command of Seringapatam will remain in the hands of



Cobonel Wellesley; it is a trust of great delicacy and importance, which it is my duty to repose in a person of approved military talents and integrity, and to superintend with peculiar vigilance and care.

Although I shall deem it prudent to detain the army in the field for a short period of time, I have the satisfaction to assure your Honourable Court, that far the greater part of the dominions of Tippoo Sultaun is now in a state of perfect tranquillity.

A detachment from the army of Bombay took possession of Mangalore on the 4th of June, and the province of Canara, with the exception of the fortress of Jemaulabad, appeared disposed to submit cheerfully to our authority. I have little doubt that the commanding officer of Jemaulabad will soon be induced to surrender to the Company's arms; in any event, however, the fort will be reduced without difficulty. In this confidence, a collector has been appointed for the province of Canara.

The remainder of the territory allotted to the Company in Coimbatore, has passed into our hands without any difficulty, and collectors have been appointed for the administration of the revenue. The fort of Gurrumcondah is in the possession of his Highness the Nizam, and those of Sera and Chitteldroog are now garrisoned by the British troops. Some disturbances have taken place in Bidnoor, in which province an adventurer had assembled a banditti, which had distressed the inhabitants of the country; a division of the army being now on its progress towards Bidnoor, I have every reason to expect that the commotions in that quarter will speedily be quelled.

Since the fall of Seringapatam, the conduct of the Mahrattas has been of the most conciliatory nature; it would be premature at present to enter into any detail on the subject of the negotiations depending at Poonah; but I have the satisfaction to assure your Honourable Court that no interruption to the settlement of Mysore is likely to proceed from the Mahrattas. Whatever may be the secret inclination either of the Peishwa or of Scindiah, their mutual weakness and reciprocal jealousy are sufficient securities against any danger from that quarter.

The advantages resulting to your interests from the recent



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Settlement of Mysore, are sufficiently obvious, as they appear in the preceding parts of this despatch, and in the papers which accompany it. It may not, however, be useless to submit to your Honourable Court, in a connected form, a general view of the whole of this important question, together with the reflections which have arisen in my mind from an anxious and assiduous attention to every branch of the subject.

Since the first war with Hyder Ali, the tranquillity of your possessions has been continually menaced by the power of Mysore. Even in the intervals of peace, which have succeeded to the several wars in which the company has been engaged with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, your security in the Carnatic has ever been precarious. During the cessation of actual hostilities, the designs of the Sovereign of Mysore have still continued uniformly hostile, and his means of executing them have always remained considerable, while the degrees of your safety have fluctuated with the state of your military establishments and preparations, and with the distribution of your force.

The baneful effects of this perpetual state of uncertainty and solicitude, have been felt not only in the decay of agriculture, and of the arts of peaceful industry on the coast of Coromandel, and in the rebellious spirit of certain descriptions of your subjects on that coast, and on the coast of Malabar, but occasionally throughout all India, in the diminution of the British Influence and consideration at foreign courts, in the rising hopes of the turbulent and disaffected, and in the decline of public and private credit, shaken by repeated rumours of war, and by the constant necessity of guarding against a surprise from the sudden aggression of an enemy, whom no clemency or moderation could conciliate, and no faith could bind.

The reduction of Tippoo Sultaun's power and resources effected by the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, had weakened, but not extinguished the cause of these complicated evils. Soon after the conclusion of peace, this cause and its effects appear to have recovered a considerable degree of activity and vigour, until in the year 1796, the intrigues and military movements of Tippoo Sultaun compelled the Government General to assemble the army on the coast of Coromandel,

and in the Autumn of 1797, such apprehensions were justly entertained of his designs and power, as induced the Government of Fort St. George to abandon the prosecution of an expedition ably planned, intimately connected with your interests, and which had already brought a heavy charge on your finances.

Judicious indeed, and provident was the policy which dictated the relinquishment of that enterprise, since subsequent discoveries and events have manifested the great probability, if not the absolute certainty, that the departure of the large force destined for Manilla would have proved a signal to the watchful vengeance of Tippoo Sultaun to invade the Carnatic, or to attack the dominions of the Nizam, even without waiting for succours from France, the assistance of which might not, perhaps, have appeared to him necessary during the absence of so considerable a portion of our army.

But the apprehension of the designs and movements of the power of Mysore had never, perhaps, been more anxiously or more justly entertained, than between the months of June and September, 1798. It cannot be denied that during that period, your interests were menaced by a combination of the most serious dangers. The anxiety and fears hitherto entertained with regard to the designs of Tippoo Sultaun, were now confirmed by a certain knowledge of his having actually proposed to the French projects of the most extensive hostility against your possessions in India. The alarm, as well as the danger, was considerably aggravated by the formidable preparations of the French in the Mediterranean, by the apparently desperate state of our alliances in the Deccan: by the peculiar situation of the Court of Hyderabad, subjected to the will of a powerful French army and French faction; by the menacing declarations and probable views of Zemaun Shah; by the dispersed and defective condition of the army of Fort St. George; and above all, by the general persuasion, that an early attempt to assemble or to move that army, would serve only as a provocation to the enemy to invade and desolate the Carnatic, without furnishing the means of repelling the invader.

The situation of our allies at this period of general dependency, is now well known to your Honourable Court.



It will therefore be sufficient in this place to observe, that the degree of danger with which the Nizam and the Peishwa were threatened by the impending storm, exceeded that which menaced our possessions in the same proportion, as the distractions and weakness of the Governments of Poonah and Hyderabad rendered them less able than the Company to counteract the machinations or to repel the assault of the enemy. It is true, that Tippoo Sultaun's views against the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, were ostensibly limited to the recovery of the cessions made by him to those powers in 1792. But it cannot be doubted, that his ambition and rapacity would have augmented with the progress of his victories, and his revenge was not of a temper to be mitigated by success.

Your Honourable Court is apprised of the changes which successively and rapidly took place in the condition of our alliances and of our army, substituting at Hyderabad in place of a French faction and a French army, British influence and a considerable British force, and producing ultimately the happy restoration of confidence and energy among your servants at Fort St. George. It is therefore unnecessary to dwell on that part of the subject; but it may be expedient to advert to the state of the general expectations at different periods of time previous to the war, and to compare our actual situation with those expectations, as well as with our position in the month of June, 1798.

At that time, even the most sanguine dispositions, and those least affected by the prevalent panic, would probably have been content to have detached Tippoo Sultaun from his alliance with the French nation; in the hope that, without the aid of a French force, he would not attempt to disturb the tranquillity of the Carnatic.

Even at a later period, when the subversion of the French party at Hyderabad, the restoration of the Nizam to the condition of an efficient ally, and the advanced state of our military preparations had inspired a general spirit of confidence and zeal, the most confident and zealous would have deemed the issue of the approaching contest prosperous as well as honourable, if it had effected a considerable reduction of the power and resources of Tippoo Sultaun, and had obtained a reasonable indemnity for the expenses of the allies.

The entire destruction of Tippoo Sultaun's power, or the absolute transfer of his resources to any hand, less inimical or less violent, would have been deemed a glorious termination even of a long and expensive contest.

But the success of your arms in the short period of the late campaign has not merely excluded the French from Mysore, provided an ample indemnity to you and your ally for the charges of the war, destroyed the hostile power of Tippoo Sultaun, and effectually precluded its revival, but has transferred the sword of your implacable enemy into your own hands, and turned to your use the main springs of his wealth and strength.

By the partition treaty of Mysore you have acquired an augmentation of direct territorial revenue to the annual amount of about star pagodas 6,47,641,10, (£259,056 sterling).^{*} By the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam, you have secured an annual subsidy of star pagodas 7,00,000, (£280,000 sterling), making together, with your new territorial revenue, the sum of star pagodas 13,47,641,10, (£539,056 sterling), and leaving (after deducting the provision allotted for the families of Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultaun) an annual increase of your funds in this quarter of India, equal to star pagodas 11,47,641,10, (£459,056 sterling). But a reasonable expectation is entertained, that the territory acquired by the Company, under the treaty of Mysore, will yield, in the course of a few years, a sum not less than, star pagodas 14,78,698, (£591,479 sterling). If such an advance in the nominal revenue of the acquired districts should actually be realized, the positive augmentation of your available annual resources, in consequence of the late settlement of Mysore, will amount nearly to 20 lacs of star pagodas, (£800,000 sterling). But in estimating the increase of your annual available resources since the month of June 1798, the augmentation which took place in the subsidy payable by the Nizam, is not to be omitted. By the treaty of Hyderabad, concluded on the first of September 1798, the annual subsidy was augmented from Arcot rupees 6,44,556, to Arcot rupees 24,17,100, making an increase annually of Arcot rupees 17,72,544, or star pagodas 5,64,982, (£225,992 sterling). Thus, the total augmentation of your available annual resources since June 1798, in this quarter of your possessions,

^{*} Calculating the star pagoda at 8s.



amounts actually to, star pagodas 17,12,623, (£685,048 sterling), and, if the increased revenue of the newly acquired territory should be realized, (according to just expectation), it will amount to star pagodas 25,43,680 (£1,017,472 sterling).

Against these acquisitions must be placed the expense of whatever additions it may be found necessary to make to your military force, either in consequence of the extension of your territory, or of the subsidiary engagements which have been contracted with the Nizam and with the Rajah of Mysore.

The subsidiary force at Hyderabad must be considered as a part of your efficient strength prepared for your service on any emergency, and ready to aid you in any future war, as it has aided you in the last. It does not appear to me probable that it will be necessary to make any considerable addition to the military establishment of Fort St. George, in consequence of the treaty of Hyderabad, nor do I apprehend that the requisite increase of that establishment, and of the army of Bombay, in consequence of the two treaties annexed to this despatch, will bear any proportion to the increase of your revenue and resources. For it must never be forgotten that, while your territory has been extended, your frontier has been contracted and strengthened, your principal enemy utterly destroyed, and an ally, and dependant of the Company, substituted on his throne.

I do not yet possess the means of stating with sufficient accuracy to your honourable Court, either the amount of the charges incurred in consequence of the various measures of preparation and precaution, which became necessary on the discovery of Tippoo Sultaun's hostile designs in June 1798, or the amount of the expense which is to be placed to the account of the operations of the late war. The accumulated charges both of our preparations and of the war must be considerable; but whenever a statement of the expenses of the late war can be submitted to your honourable Court, your wisdom and justice will necessarily distinguish the charges incurred for the purpose of assembling an effective army in the field, from those actually belonging to the operations of your armies in Mysore, and to the siege of Seringapatam.

From the moment that Tippoo's negotiations had transpired, it became an indispensable duty to place the Carnatic in a posture of complete defence. The experience of former wars with Mysore, the nature of the frontier of the Carnatic,

exposed in various points by its almost innumerable passes to the incursion of the enemy, the actual state of affairs in India and in Europe, all concurred to convince me, that the only rational system of defence against Tippoo Sultaun was to assemble your armies on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, in such force, in such a state of equipment, and in such a position, as should excite in the mind of the Sultaun a just alarm for the safety of his capital; no other plan was calculated to secure the Carnatic against the ravages of his numerous cavalry; because no other plan would have compelled him to concentrate his forces within his own territories, for the defence of the vital point of his empire. His capital was not only the object of his pride, but the centre of his power; it was his strongest fortification, the principal granary of his army, his only arsenal, the repository of his treasure, and the prison of the legitimate claimant of his throne, as well as of the families of all his great chieftains; whose obedience he secured, by retaining the objects of their reverence and affection within the walls of the fortress of Seringapatam. On the preservation of that fortress, therefore, depended the fate of his kingdom, and (although I did not neglect any practicable precaution against a contrary course of events) my judgment was always decided, that he would never abandon the defence of Seringapatam, but with his life.

The success of the plan (founded on this opinion) fully answered its primary purpose; since no part of the Sultaun's force ventured to enter the Company's possessions in the Carnatic during the late hostilities. It also fully answered the secondary purpose of enabling your armies (when our pacific negotiations had failed) to act offensively with promptitude, vigour, and effect.

Neither the expense of the magazines of grain and other stores on either coast, nor of the battering train, with its equipment of cattle, ought therefore to be charged to the account of the war; for every expense incurred previous to the 3rd of February 1799 (the day on which Lieutenant-General Harris received orders to march) must, and would have been incurred, if no war had taken place; and ought to be charged to the account of the indispensable defence of your possessions, according to the only plan, which could provide effectually for that object.



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The expenses of moving the battering train to Seringapatam, as well as of maintaining the army in Mysore, cannot have much exceeded the charges which must have been continued if the whole had remained within your frontier; and when it is considered that, if the army, with the battering train, had not moved to Seringapatam, the expensive, but necessary, system of defence already explained, must have been protracted until all dangers from Tippoo Sultaun's connection with the French should have been averted;* your honourable Court will probably sanction my decided opinion, that the rapid movement of the British forces towards the scene of their certain triumph, was not only the most effectual, but the most economical measure which could have been adopted, to frustrate the views of the enemy, and to secure the tranquillity of your possessions.

For, on the one hand, no prospect appeared of any practicable reduction in the expense of a defensive system, during the continuance of the war between Great Britain and France; while every hour of delay in the movement of our army afforded to Tippoo Sultaun the means of increasing his strength, of receiving succours from the French, and consequently of aggravating to the Company, both the expense and hazard of the impending contest.

On the other hand, the state of our army, the arrangements which had been made for its equipment and supply in every department, and the period of the season, left no doubt that the great object of the war would be attained in one short campaign. Nor did this calculation prove to have been in any degree sanguine; for although an alarm of a deficiency of grain prevailed in the army before Seringapatam on the 16th of April, it appeared soon after, upon an accurate examination, that at that time (exclusive of the immense depôt established in the district of Coorga) a quantity of grain remained in camp sufficient to maintain the whole of the fighting men of the army, at half allowance, until the 20th of May; and on the 13th of that month, Major-General Floyd returned to Seringapatam with the large supplies, which had been forwarded from the Carnatic, under the care of Lieutenant-

* The war between England and France lasted for fifteen years, after the fall of Seringapatam.—*Ed.*

Colonels Read and Brown. It may also be useful to remark in this place, that if any accident had protracted the operations of the siege beyond the 4th of May, ample time would still have remained for the reduction of the place previous to the rising of the Cauveri; since the four eldest sons of Tippoo Sultaun, with an escort of 1500 men, and a considerable train of attendants, crossed that river on the 18th of June, on which day the water was nearly as low as on the day of the assault.

Reviewing all these circumstances, your honourable Court will hereafter compare the expense incurred by the movement of the army to Seringapatam, with the probable charges of any other practicable plan of policy, or of military operation; in any view of the subject it will probably appear, that the increase of your revenue and pecuniary resources obtained by the issue of the war, far overbalances the combined expense of the preparations for your defence, and of the operations of the late campaign.

But in addition to this positive indemnification for your expenses, your honourable Court will also consider the augmentation of your commercial and military resources arising from the conquest of Mysore.

Hitherto, all traffic between your subjects or dependants, and those of the late Sultaun has been nearly prohibited, by the restraints to which his hatred of the British Nation, or his ignorance and prejudice had subjected the communication with your possessions. These restraints being removed, and every proper encouragement to commercial intercourse being substituted in their place, it may reasonably be expected that the neighbouring, and now united countries of the Carnatic and Mysore, will mutually consume a considerable portion of their respective productions and manufactures; and that even a proportion of British commodities will soon find a market in Mysore. My information with regard to the articles produced, manufactured, or consumed, in the countries acquired by the Company, and by the Rajah of Mysore, is at present too imperfect to enable me to form any accurate calculation of the imports from the coast of Malabar to Europe; but it appears probable, that your investment in the article of pepper, may soon be augmented to any extent, which you may deem advisable.



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Your military resources may be considered to have received a great augmentation, not only from the additional supplies of grain, provisions and cattle, which your connection with Mysore places at your disposal, but from the new channels, which it opens for recruiting the native force, both of the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay; under this head may also be considered the superiority of the climate of Mysore, to any in this quarter of India, and the means which it affords of preserving the health and consequent efficiency of European troops.

Highly as I estimate these immediate and direct advantages of revenue, and of commercial and military resources, I consider the recent settlement of Mysore to be equally important to your interests, in its tendency to increase your political consideration and influence among the native powers of India, together with your means of maintaining internal tranquillity and order among your subjects and dependants, and of defending your possessions against any enemy, either Asiatic, or European.

These are principles of substantial and durable security, the operation of which must be felt throughout every part of your possessions, and in every branch of your affairs both in India and Europe.

The balance which it was the policy of the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, to establish between the native powers of India, was soon deranged by the course of events; our influence in the general scale proved insufficient, not only to maintain peace between our allies, but to check either the rapid decline of their respective resources and strength, or the growing ascendancy of the French faction at Hyderabad, or the systematic machinations of Tippoo Sultaun. Experience has manifested that the power preserved to that infatuated and restless Prince, must always have been thrown into the scale opposed to our interests, and that in no possible combination or conflict of the views of the courts of Poonah, and Hyderabad, could the interposition or neutrality of Tippoo Sultaun become favourable to our security. If he menaced war, or sought alliance with either, or with both those states, his uniform object was our disturbance. If he remained neuter either in their dissensions or union, it was in order to preserve his own strength unimpaired and unembarrassed for that con-



rest with ours, which formed the favourite scope of all his views. In no case, has his power been brought into action, or remained at rest, without a hostile design, and an injurious effect upon our influence and consideration. The balance is now in our own hands, we now possess the irresistible power either of concentrating the most efficient part of the resources of Mysore in one mass, for our single defence against any possible combination; or of throwing the same weight into that scale, which shall appear to require such an aid for the preservation of the general tranquillity, on the solid basis of moderation and justice.

If the Nizam or the Mahrattas, notwithstanding their real interest in maintaining the new order of things, should harbour a disposition to disturb it, our means of defence, as well as of offence with regard to both those states, are become so powerful, as well from the advancement and strength of our frontier, as from the other relative considerations already stated in this despatch, that the internal union of all the divided feudatory chiefs of the Mahratta Empire, or even a confederacy between the Peishwa and the Nizam, could no longer be formidable to your possessions; and your honourable Court is apprized, that the first of these events is highly improbable, and the latter nearly impossible—on the other hand, it is evident that, having annihilated the power of Tippoo, no injury can result to us from the interminable feuds of the Mahratta Empire, or from the mutual jealousy of the Peishwa and the Nizam.

The connexion between the Nizam and the French is entirely dissolved, under circumstances which, I trust, will render its renewal impracticable, at least, for many years.

It is certainly true, that an alliance between the Mahrattas and the French, might prove highly injurious to the British power in India; but it is well known, that whatever may be the disposition of the Mahrattas towards us, it would require a most violent exercise of injustice and oppression, on our part to dispose the suspicious and cautious councils of the Court of Poonah, to favour the progress of a French force in India.

But, although we have nothing to apprehend from the Nizam, or from the Mahrattas, danger may still perhaps be apprehended from an invasion of Oude by Zemaun Shah. I



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am not disposed to undervalue this danger, but I am satisfied that it is less formidable now, than it has been at any former time. The loss of such an ally as Tippoo Sultaun, must materially affect the hopes of Zemaun Shah; and it is obvious, that although he should persist in his threatened invasion, our means of repelling it are greatly increased; since the army of Fort St. George, in a case of exigency, might now co-operate against Zemaun Shah with that of Bengal. Even during the late alarm of invasion from Zemaun Shah, (although war with Tippoo Sultaun was apprehended, and 3,000 native volunteers with a considerable force of artillery, had been detached to the coast of Coromandel) we still were able to maintain an army of at least 20,000 men, on the frontier of Oude.

The intrigues of Tippoo Sultaun among the Rajahs inhabiting the coast of Malabar, among the Poligars in the Carnatic, and among every other description of your disaffected or refractory subjects, were the sources of continual commotion within your territories, while the vicinity of the hostile frontier of Mysore, offered refuge and impunity to every offender against your authority, and to every disturber of the public peace. It may reasonably be expected, that the establishment of your influence in Mysore, will operate as a powerful check on the spirit of disorder in your own possessions, and by removing the causes of internal weakness, will enable you to oppose every foreign attack with greater confidence and vigor.

With regard to any danger from the designs of France, it is evident that the probability of her making any effort to disturb the tranquillity of India, will be greatly diminished from the moment that the intelligence of Tippoo Sultaun's fate shall reach Europe. Perhaps it is not too sanguine a view of our situation, to consider the annihilation of the only native ally of France in India; as the final ruin of all her ambitious and vindictive projects against this great source of the wealth and power of Great Britain. The aid and co-operation of some native State must always be indispensably necessary to any European force, in attempting a serious impression on your possessions in India; without such aid, it seems impossible that any European army should be able to advance from the sea-coast, or even to maintain itself wherever it might



land. If however, contrary to every reasonable expectation, France should still persist in her projects against the peace of India, she will have to contend unsupported by the arms, and (what is of more importance) by the resources of any Indian ally, with a British army, animated by recent success, unembarrassed either by any native enemy in Mysore, or by any French faction at Hyderabad, and free to act on any point which France might venture to assail.

Such appear to me to be the consequences of the late settlement, as they relate more immediately to the interests of the Honourable Company; but it will be proper to consider them also as they affect our allies.

Although the advantages offered to the Peishwa by the treaty of Mysore, may not be calculated to satisfy the rapacious character of the Mahratta State, it is reasonable to suppose, that under all the circumstances of the case, they will be received as a distinguished testimony of our amicable disposition towards the Court of Poonah; and that they will tend to appease its characteristic jealousy, if not to conciliate its cordial attachment.

The establishment of an Hindoo State in Mysore, with the restoration of the temples and endowments of that religion, must be grateful to the Government of Poonah, independently of the advantages arising from the substitution of a power of the same religion, and of pacific views, in the place of an odious Mahommedan usurpation, scarcely less hostile to the Mahratta than to the British nation.

With regard to the Nizam, his ambition would also have been more gratified with an arrangement, which should have thrown into his hands a larger share of territory and power; and the distribution of the property captured at Seringapatam, among the British troops and those of his Highness, disappointed his private expectations of appropriating a large portion of that property to his own use. The solid and permanent benefits however, which have resulted to his Highness from the recent improvement of his connection with the Company, and particularly from the new settlement of Mysore, are so obvious and considerable, that they may reasonably be expected to overbalance any temporary disappointment of his avarice or ambition. The existence of his throne was saved by the destruction of the French party at Hyderabad, in October, 1798.



The formidable power of Tippoo Sultaun, which perpetually menaced his Highness's possessions, and filled his Court and dominions with intrigues and treason, has been annihilated, and a friendly and allied state established in Mysore. His Highness has received a large increase of territory, revenue, and power; together with several important fortresses tending greatly to secure the tranquillity of his dominions. His expenses in the war have been inconsiderable; and if a comparison were to be instituted of the advantages accruing to him, and to the Company from the whole arrangement, those obtained by his Highness would probably be found to preponderate; for, the danger from which he has been delivered was even more imminent than that which menaced the Company's possessions; and while his expenses have borne no proportion to ours, he has attained equal benefits both of indemnification and security. The collateral benefits derivable by the Company from its connexion with the Rajah of Mysore, will necessarily extend to the Nizam, and be scarcely less felt by him than by us, while he shall remain faithful to his alliance with the Company; and the advantages which his Highness would receive from the proposed mediation of the Company between him and the Mahratta empire, are highly estimated by all those who understand the interests of the Court of Hyderabad. If that mediation should fail, his Highness will receive an increase of territory beyond the amount of the proportion acquired by the Company, in the general partition; I have the satisfaction to know, that although his Highness's extravagant expectations have not been gratified to the full extent, his most able and experienced counsellors are fully sensible of the extensive and solid benefits acquired by his Highness, under the general operation of the late treaties. I am, therefore, persuaded, that his Highness's just sense of the permanent interests of his state, will command his cordial co-operation in the maintenance of the new settlement.

The interests of the Rajah of Mysore, being identified with those of the Company, and the safety, prosperity, and honor of the Peishwa, and of the Nizam, being amply secured by the treaties of Hyderabad and Mysore, and by the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam; I entertain a confident expectation, that the recent settlement of the dominions of



Tippoo Sultaun will prove not less durable, than I trust, it will be found equitable in its fundamental principles, beneficial in its general operation, and conformable in every point of view, to the liberal character of the English East India Company, and to the just and moderate policy prescribed by parliament, for the Government of the British empire in the East.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXVII.

The Right Hon. Henry Dundas to the Earl of Mornington.

Wimbledon, 18th March, 1799.

MY DEAR LORD,

Received at Fort William, 5th August, 1799.

The financial state of our affairs in India, and the arrangement of them in future, will be the subject of official correspondence from the Court of Directors, by some early conveyance; but the present situation of the finances and commerce of India have suggested to my mind many important considerations, which I would think it wrong to withhold from you in the form of a private communication, as the opinions I shall lay before you may probably operate upon your conduct previous to the period when the same opinions may reach you in the more tedious form of despatches through the medium of the Court of Directors. This mode of earlier communication with you is the more necessary, as I am aware some of the opinions which I hold will be the cause of a difference of opinion among the Directors, and must ultimately be settled by the authority of the Board of Control, a form of proceeding necessarily productive of delay.

If there had been the prospect of the war coming to any speedy conclusion, I should not have been uneasy by the circumstance of a very considerable addition of the debt in India, for the purpose of continuing a large investment from an Indian capital, because from the experience I have already had in extricating their affairs under very unpromising circumstances, I should have felt perfectly satisfied that a few years after the return of peace, would have sufficed, speedily,



to wipe off the debt which the mixt exigencies of war and commerce had created. This, however, has its bounds, for if the debt in India is allowed to increase so much as to become unwieldy and unmanageable, we are cut off from the means of extricating our affairs when peace shall have returned. The loans, from being made in times of difficulty, are accomplished at an exorbitant rate of interest, and thereby exhaust the whole of the surplus revenues, which is to operate as the sinking fund for the redemption of the debt after the return of peace. It is the more necessary I should give a particular attention to these considerations, because it is very natural for the Court of Directors to turn their eyes chiefly to the state of their affairs in Leadenhall-street, and both they and the Proprietors are flattered, by the view of sales at home, uncommonly large, and a swelling balance in their coffers at home; while, at the same time, it is obvious to every person who will take a comprehensive view of their affairs, that this flattering delusion, permitted to go on for a very few years, would bring irretrievable ruin upon the finances of India, and totally disable us from maintaining there that pre-eminence of wealth and power which has proved so important to the general interests of the British Empire.

Viewing this subject in all its bearings, I am well aware of the importance of keeping up the means of a large investment from India. This principle is important, not only from the encouragement it affords to the navigation and shipping of the kingdom; from the addition it makes annually to the wealth and capital of the country, and from its being a fruitful source of revenue; but in addition to all these and similar considerations, I must add the necessity of such an investment, as immediately connected with the prosperity of our Indian provinces. *It is to the increased exports from India to Europe, that we are to attribute the increase of Indian prosperity, industry, population, and revenue;* and the manufacturers of that country would be reduced to very deplorable circumstances if any severe check was to be given to the usual investment and exports from India. These considerations necessarily lead to the conclusion of bringing home as large an investment as our means will enable us to do. I see no difficulty in accomplishing this, but it must be done by means of resources which do not lead to the ruin of our



finances in India. The same circumstances which have led to put the whole commerce of the world into the hands of this country, do operate in a proportionable degree to extend beyond the example of all former times, the trade of the East India Company, and the produce of their sales in Leadenhall-street. This ought to be encouraged by every means; but the overflowing balance from thence arising after defraying their necessary burdens at home, ought to be employed in the purchase of bullion, to be consigned to India and China, for the purchase of a large and profitable investment. The times, from the influx of wealth into this country, are highly favourable to such an operation, the beneficial effects of which are obvious in a variety of ways. Your Lordship states, and all the other settlements concur in the same statement, that our Indian possessions are greatly distressed from the want of specie. The measure I have mentioned effectually removes that distress, and is likewise productive of another essential benefit. It is stated that the increase of the loans at so high a rate of interest, checks all private credit, and obstructs all other pecuniary transactions; but this inconvenience would not be found, if the system I have alluded to, was carried into execution.

It is with much satisfaction I observe in some of your Lordship's recent despatches, that you find yourself warranted by the opinions of some of the most intelligent persons upon the spot, that the export of manufactures from this country may be considerably increased. This is certainly the most desirable of all resources for the supply of a commercial investment from India, and it ought to have no limits, except what are prescribed by the power of selling them in India or China.

Another commercial resource, is what can be got in India upon the foundation of the remittance plan. This, I understand, has likewise received a check, in consequence of the high rate of interest paid for the government loans in India; but if these loans are stopped, and the capital of the debt itself considerably diminished each year by the remittance plan, an effectual cure is administered to this inconvenience, and the commercial resources of the Company materially aided, without the necessity of extravagant loans for that purpose.

These are the outlines of the system which, in my opinion, ought to be pursued during the remainder of the war, and as



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during its continuance our commerce will remain unbounded, and the wealth of the world continue to be collected here, no inconvenience whatever can arise from the export of bullion to India and China; on the contrary, I understand it would rather be in this point of view, materially convenient. The result, therefore, of what I have stated, is that the investment ought not to be diminished, but kept up at its present standard, and the resources for doing so are,—1st, The surplus revenues in India, after defraying the expense of establishment and the interest of debt. This fund will increase in proportion as the debt is diminished by the plan of remittance. 2ndly, By bills upon the East India Company to the amount of what can be got there, applicable to the reduction of the capital of the debt in India. 3rdly, An increased amount of the export of manufactures from this country, which generally upon an average, has been reckoned for some years past for India, exclusive of China, to amount to about five hundred thousand pounds. And lastly, a remittance of bullion to whatever amount may be necessary, joined to the above mentioned resources, to keep up the usual investments from India.

If this system is adopted, and invariably adhered to, we will be enabled, without any material inconvenience, to continue the war so long as our inveterate enemy shall be disposed, or in a condition to carry on the contest. The many other collateral advantages resulting from such a system, and connected with the prosperity and safety of India, are so obvious, it is unnecessary to trouble your Lordship with detailing them.

Having stated all that appears to be necessary, so far as concerns the finances of India, and the commercial resources of the East India Company, as connected with their finances, I wish now to direct your Lordship's attention to the trade of India, in a more extended point of view.

It is notorious that at no period the capital or commercial powers of the East India Company have been able to embrace the whole, or near the whole of the wealth of India, exported from thence by trade to Europe. This is placed beyond a doubt by a great share of the Indian trade now in the possession of neutral nations, a great part of which rests upon the capital and fortune of the servants of the East India



Company. Your Lordship will recollect that at the time I introduced the proposition for renewing the Charter of the East India Company, I endeavoured to remedy this obvious absurdity by obliging the East India Company to allot a certain proportion of tonnage to the purposes of private trade. They agreed to it with reluctance, and it is so managed as to render the provision almost illusory. I need not enumerate to your Lordship the causes which have rendered it of no avail. They appear in the applications made to the Government of India by the resident traders in India, and are recorded in the correspondence between the Board of Trade and Supreme Council in India, so that they must be perfectly familiar to your Lordship. In truth, there is no remedy for this evil but two—1st, Alluring the trade of India to resort to the port of London, by diminishing the expenses of doing so. The 2nd is, By authorising the Government of India to license the *appropriation of India-built shipping to the purpose of bringing home that Indian trade, which the means and capital of the East India Company is unable to bring home.* The first of those ways will, I trust, be effectuated by the Bill which Mr. Pitt has agreed to introduce for the reduction of the duties upon imports from India, and the second must be accomplished by giving to the Government in India that authority to license India-built shipping, to which I have already alluded.

This last measure will, I take it for granted, undergo much discussion before it can be carried into execution, but it must be carried. The whole weight of the shipping interest will be opposed to such a proposition, under a most false and erroneous idea that it is prejudicial to their interests. Nothing but ignorance of the subject could lead them to entertain such an idea. They made an attempt to accomplish it by inflaming the interests of the ship carpenters in the river Thames, at the time of the general mutiny in the navy. It was an unhandsome proceeding upon their part, and was resisted by me in a letter I then addressed to the principal ship builders in the river. I do not know whether they did not choose to answer it, or whether they found it to be unanswerable; but I never received any reply to it. I have often thought upon the subject since, and the more I have thought upon it, the more I am convinced of the truth of every propo-



THE HON. HENRY DUNDAS, TO

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sition which that letter contains; I send you a copy of it,* and you may rest assured, that no exertion shall be wanting on my part speedily to introduce into practice the system detailed in that letter.

It has not reached me in any authentic form, but I am credibly informed that your Lordship, upon the application of the resident traders in India, has authorized a number of India-built ships to be taken up, for the purpose of bringing home the surplus trade of India. I hope the information is true, both because it is a measure of much wisdom, and because it will bring the point directly to issue, and you need not be under any apprehension as to the result of it.

Although, from the influence I have stated, there may be a contest in the Court of Directors with regard to the subject last mentioned, I do not believe there will be any material objection offered against any of the other measures I have had occasion to treat of in this letter; indeed, one leading principle has already been acted upon to a considerable extent, for the Court of Directors have already sent out to India, bullion to the amount of £759,226, and they have it in contemplation to send more. In short, I make no doubt of their being induced to send out what is requisite for the accomplishment of the commercial plan, I have detailed in the course of this letter.

I have nothing further to trouble you with at present. It is only necessary for me to remind you, that although the opinions I have laid before you, rest for the present merely upon the footing of a private unofficial communication, I trust they, or the substance of them, will speedily be conveyed to you in due official form.

I remain, my dear Lord,

Your's very faithfully,

HENRY DUNDAS.

* See Appendix.



No. XXVIII.

The Right Hon. Henry Dundas, to the Earl of Mornington.

Whitehall, 21st March, 1799.
MY DEAR LORD, [Received at Fort William, 5th August, 1799.]

By this conveyance I have troubled your Lordship with a despatch* on the general system of alliance, which we ought to pursue with a view to the security of our Indian possessions, and likewise with a despatch on the subject of our Indian finance and commerce.† In the present letter, I wish to bring under your view a few observations on the interior administration of our different settlements.

On the subject of Bengal, I have much satisfaction in feeling that I have occasion to say very little. The wise system adopted during Lord Cornwallis's administration, and to which I make no doubt you will adhere, leaves me no reason to apprehend any real danger to the wealth and resources of the valuable provinces under your immediate administration. I think, for the last two years I have observed, that the arrears of land revenue were somewhat larger than they used to be; I trust this has been owing to some accident, and not to any defect in the system of permanent security given to the landowners of India. Among the many other important benefits expected to arise from that beneficent plan, a prominent one was the regularity in payment of the stipulated jumma, and nothing has ever occurred to me, or been stated to me which had a tendency to lessen the prospect of that benefit resulting from it. I could not however, refrain from bringing the circumstance to which I have referred, immediately under your view.

As we have limited the extent of land revenue in India, by the measure of a permanent settlement, it has sometimes occurred to me to reflect, that the principles which led to the adoption of that system, naturally opened a prospect of other sources of revenue, in so far as it entitled us to expect an increase of the wealth, industry and population of the country. Every circumstance which has since happened, has led to the conviction that these effects have been produced by it. The encreasing produce of the revenue on salt, opium and spirit-

* See Vol. I. p. 608.

† See p. 301.



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ous liquors, all tend to corroborate this observation. I wish therefore to direct your attention to consider, and report to me, how far in your opinion, there is, either in the articles I have mentioned, or in any others of a similar nature, any prospect of raising more revenue on articles of general consumption among the natives of India. This can never be attempted but with a perfect consideration to their happiness and content; and I am likewise aware that a people whose wants are very limited and simple, do not present to their Government the same various objects of taxation, which exist in other countries differently circumstanced. It appears however, to be a point worthy your consideration, if possible, at all times to insure a revenue in India, equal to all the exigencies, not only of our expensive establishments, but for the payment of a tribute to this country, through the medium of a beneficial and encreasing commerce.

The circumstance connected with the Government of Bengal, to which one can look with the least confidence is the situation of Oude. I trust the late arrangements made by Lord Teignmouth, may enable your Lordship to give further improvement to this essential part of our system. I have nothing very minute to suggest; all I have to say, is comprehended under two general heads. The first is, a just and pure administration by the Vizier of his own country, in which is comprehended an accurate collection of his real revenues, and an economical expenditure of them. The second is, that he could be induced to keep up an efficient military establishment for the security of his own, and our frontier. This object never can be accomplished, but by dispersing his useless rabble, and forming an army to be kept up and disciplined under our immediate superintendence.

Respecting the affairs of the Coromandel coast, I had so full a communication with you before your departure, it is not necessary to add much more at present. I think for some time past the interior administration of affairs there, have considerably improved. Their revenues are encreasing, their estimates are made with more accuracy, and their accounts are kept much more regularly than they used to be; and I have a perfect reliance on the assiduity, talents and integrity of Lord Clive, that the improvement will be progressive. Our chief difficulties in the administration of the Carnatic,



are, first—the anomalous connection in which we stand with the Nabob of Arcot. Secondly, a similar inconvenience attending the Government of Tanjore. Thirdly, the insubordination and distractions so frequently prevalent in the northern Circars.

The double Government existing in the Carnatic has long been felt as a serious calamity to that country. It enfeebles the natural resources of the country, and above all, tends to continue that system of intrigue and consequent corruption which has been imputed to the Madras Government so much more than to our other settlements. It is singular to remark, that the country of Oude is the other part of India, where the purity of the Company's servants has been most suspected, and that the same circumstance of a double government has always been assigned as the cause. Consistently with our treaties with the Nabob of Arcot, we cannot at present materially meliorate his government, but must wait favourable opportunities, and embrace such means of conciliation and attention to him, as are most likely to accomplish this desirable object. We must lay our account with being at all times obstructed in our views, by that corruption and intrigue to which I have referred. Nothing will counteract it but a pure and steady government, acting instantaneously against any of the Company's servants, who may be detected in those practices. Lord Hobart's administration was characterized by a very laudable spirit in this respect, and you cannot doubt, that the same purity and spirit will actuate the conduct of Lord Clive, who will have the additional advantage of the newly-established judicature to aid him in the punishment of those offenders. I have always thought however much it has been the fashion to clamour against it, that the Supreme Judicature at Calcutta, has had very beneficial effects in preserving the purity of the servants under that presidency.

The affairs of Tanjore are more simple in their nature, and less complicated in their administration. It is exposed in a certain degree, to the same inconveniences which have been injurious to the government of the Carnatic; but from the recent transactions which have taken place there, and from the feelings of gratitude which appear to operate on the mind of the Rajah, I flatter myself he will be inclined more and more, to listen to the admonitions of our government, to whose



power and justice he is indebted for his situation. If those sentiments regulate his conduct, our part is simple and easy; we have nothing to ask of him, but a pure and virtuous administration of the affairs of his country, the effects of which will be equally felt by him and us, in the respective interests we have in the prosperity of Tanjore.

The northern Circars have certainly never produced to us those advantages which the extent of the country, and the fertility of the soil in many parts, entitle us to expect. I know not to what cause to attribute it, but the inhabitants of some of its higher parts seem to be in a state of very uncivilized society, and this can only be gradually removed by a steady, just and vigorous government. We must not too rapidly apply to that part of our possessions the same principles of government, which have been wisely applied to the more civilized Provinces of Bengal. I believe the same observations may to a considerable degree be made, with regard to some parts of the Circars, that I shall immediately bring under your view, with regard to the Malabar Provinces.

From the situation of the countries in our possession, on the Coast of Malabar, they are calculated to be either a great security, or a great annoyance to our power in India; and whether they shall be one or the other, depends much on the manner in which they are managed.

I remain, my dear Lord,

Your's most faithfully,

HENRY DUNDAS.

No. XXIX.

The Earl of Mornington, to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 5th August, 1799.

The annual menace of Zemaun Shah's invasion of Hindostan having recently been renewed, I think it necessary to take immediate measures, with a view to impose an effectual check upon the designs of that Prince. Although the zeal and ability which Mehdi Alli Khan has shewn in conducting the negotiations committed to his charge merit commendation, yet he has manifested so much indiscretion throughout his conduct, that I cannot think him a proper person to be entrusted with the sole management of measures of so important



and delicate a nature, as those which I have it in contemplation to adopt at present at the Court of Persia, or eventually at that of Cabul. At the same time, I am far from wishing to subject Mehdi Alli Khan to any disgrace, or even to withhold from him a suitable reward for the services he has rendered; but I think it necessary to apprise you, that with a view to the object before adverted to, I have determined to send a gentleman on an embassy to Baba Khan, and eventually to Zemaun Shah. Mehdi Alli Khan's local knowledge and address may render him useful, and, therefore, I think it advisable that he should be directed to consider himself under the orders of the gentleman who may be deputed. The gentleman whom I have selected for this duty, is Captain John Malcolm, Assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad, in whose abilities, knowledge, activity and integrity I repose the utmost confidence. He will be directed to receive a considerable part of his instructions from you, and will make all his equipments at Bombay, whither he will proceed in the course of a few days.

As I expect the best effects from the mere promulgation of this measure, I have resolved to make the embassy quite public. Upon the whole of this subject, it is my intention to write to you more particularly hereafter.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXX.

Spencer Smith, Esq. to the Earl of Mornington.

My Lord,

Constantinople, 24th August, 1799.

I am too much flattered by your Lordship's reception of my past correspondence, and assurances of reciprocity, not to endeavour to cultivate a commerce, of which the balance must be so vastly to my advantage. It is not, however, easy for me to find a moment free from interruption for private scribbling, in a climate which has rendered me a valetudinarian, and at a post where I have more than enough to do was I in health; your Lordship will therefore appreciate the goodness of my intentions accordingly.

What I have done in point of political cooperation, is suffi-



MR. SPENCER SMITH, TO

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ciently stated in my correspondence with the Presidency of Bombay for me to pass that topic over here; as indeed I may such articles of public intelligence as enter into my letters to Mr. Manesty, which of course reach you by *ricochet*.

I have just received most interesting letters of about a month old from Sir William Hamilton and Lord Nelson, who, with the King of the *two* Sicilies (as he is become again) and Mr. Acton, were all together on board the *Foudroyant* in the Bay of Naples, settling the new government.

The Admiral arrived there most fortunately in time to annul a disgraceful treaty on foot between the enemy and Cardinal Ruffo, and to save the King's honour by rejecting with disdain any terms but unconditional submission within a very limited number of hours on the part of rebels. So that while the French in the castle of St. Elmo were enticed by a decent capitulation (which I forward to Bussora) the rebels in the castles *Nuovo* and *dell' Uovo* came out without any honours; the principals were seized, and conducted on board the ships of the squadron, and their accomplices confined in fourteen transports under our guns. And thus *John Bull* fights almost alone on one element for the common cause, and recovers kingdoms for sovereigns, who by following half measures have been kicked out of them by a set of thieves.

An express was just arrived (on 25th past) at Naples from Tuscany, Mr. Wyndham was returned to Florence, and that once happy country was again free from French tyranny, as well as Lucca. F. M. Sowvarof, after beating Messieurs Macdonald, Moreau, and Co., on the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th, was advancing to Genoa. Mantua surrendered on or about the 25th. The Arch Duke Charles was at Zurich, with his *left* communicating with the Field Marshal's *right* over the Alps, whose summit between *Bernard* and *Gothard* was occupied by a central army under General Bellegarde, aiming at turning Massena by the *Valais*, and Mont Blanc.

So much for *terrafirma*. In the Mediterranean, Lord St. Vincent, laying with a single ship of the line at Gibraltar, has had the mortification of seeing the combined fleets, 61 sail of the line, pass him to the westward on the 9th past, and only able to precede them by a privateer 24 hours to Portugal, and by another privateer who met Lord Keith with 35 sail off Ivica on the 14th, who immediately set out after them.



My brother, after the siege of Acre, and revictualling at Cyprus, returned to the coast of Egypt on the 18th of July, just in time to throw himself into the castle of *Aboukir*, which the Turks had stormed on the 16th, where he was preparing for a second edition (but rather more offensive) of his herculean labours in Syria.

The siege of Acre forms such an epocha in the annals of these times, that I regret my want of leisure to keep pace with events, and give that heroic achievement a more distinct place in my historical correspondence, far independent of my fraternal feelings upon that point. No one as a minister and a man can better judge of its salutary influence in the common cause. Had Acre fallen, Constantinople would have tottered; Vienna felt the shock, and Europe, as Buonaparte himself elegantly expresses it, "*prix par les reins.*"

I have the honour to be,

My dear Lord,

your faithful Servant,

SPENCER SMITH.

No. XXXI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort St. George, Sept. 3d, 1799.

Since the date of my last separate letter to your Honourable Court of the 3d of August,* few occurrences have happened of sufficient importance to be communicated by the present despatch. But as a considerable part of the army still remains in Mysore, and as some detachments of it have been actively employed, notwithstanding the happy termination of the war, it may not be unacceptable to you that I should review the cause and nature of the operations in which the army has been engaged since the date of my last letter.

It might have been expected that, in the complete settlement of Mysore, some difficulties would arise from the attempts of the various Poligars and others who had been

* See p. 72.



dispossessed by Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultaun. The early settlement of the country, however, has not been materially delayed by any resistance of this nature. It has, however, been somewhat impeded by the endeavours of a few of the commandants of the principal fortresses to obtain an unreasonable price for their submission, and of others to favour (by a demonstration of an intention to resist) their retreat with the plunder which they had found means to collect. It is to be imputed to one of these causes that the Fort of Gururumcondah did not surrender to the British detachment by which it was surrounded on behalf of the Nizam, until it had been seriously threatened; and that Lieut.-Colonel Bowser was actually obliged to breach one of the lower walls of the fortress of Gooty before his Highness' garrison was admitted. The refusal of the Kelladar of Jemaulabad (the only place of considerable strength in Canara) to submit to the British Government is to be imputed to a similar cause; but that place will certainly be reduced as soon as the state of the season in Canara will admit of the march of a sufficient force against it; an event which may be expected to have taken place within the course of the month of August.

The only impediment of any importance to the speedy and quiet settlement of the whole of the country assigned to the Rajah of Mysore by the partition treaty, has proceeded from some disturbances which have arisen in the province of Bednore, but which are now happily quelled.

A partizan of the name of Dhoondia, originally in the service of the Patan State of Savanore (or Shanoor) having committed various depredations on the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, had incurred the resentment of that Prince. Tippoo Sultaun having contrived to secure the person of Dhoondia, compelled him to conform to the Mahommedan faith, and afterwards employed him in military service; but, either detecting him in some treacherous projects, or suspecting his fidelity, the Sultaun confined him in irons at Seringapatam some time previous to the commencement of the late war. From this situation he was released, together with several other prisoners, by the inconsiderate humanity of the British troops on the 4th of May. He immediately fled from Seringapatam, and being joined by a few of the Sillahdar cavalry of Tippoo Sultaun's disbanded army, took the direction of Bed-



nore, in his way to which province his force received some augmentation, some of the principal Asophs and Killadars in Bednore betrayed their trusts to him; and in this manner many of the principal places of the district had fallen into his hands before it was in the power of Lieut.-General Harris to detach from the army a sufficient force to act against him. In the mean while Dhoondia, had laid the rich country of Bednore under severe contributions, which he exacted with the most unrelenting cruelty, perpetrating throughout the province the most atrocious acts of rapine and murder.

At length a light corps of cavalry and native infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel James Dalrymple of the Madras establishment, moved against Dhoondia from Chitteldroog on the 21st of July, and overtook a party of his banditti, consisting of about 250 horse and 400 infantry. The shocking cruelties which these plunderers had recently committed rendered it necessary to make a severe example; it was, therefore, determined to refuse them quarter, for the purpose of deterring others from similar enormities.

Dhoondia having crossed the Tungbuddra, Hurryhur, a fort on the eastern bank of that river, was taken on the 30th of July by a division of Colonel Dalrymple's detachment.

While Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple attacked this banditti on one side, Colonel Stevenson was advancing into Bednore in another direction, at the head of a light force, composed also of native cavalry and infantry. On the 31st of July Colonel Stevenson crossed the Tungbuddra, and advancing against Simoga, took that place by assault on the 8th of August. On the same day the fort of Hoornelly, situated on the western bank of the Tungbuddra, was taken in the same manner by the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Dalrymple.

Both detachments having now effected the passage of the Tungbuddra, it was determined to make a combined attack on the camp of Dhoondia, which occupied a strong position near the town and fort of Shikarpoor. Accordingly Lieut.-Colonel Dalrymple, on the 17th of August, charged Dhoondia's cavalry, and drove them with considerable loss into a river situated in their rear. Our infantry at the same time attacked the fort of Shikarpoor, and carried it by assault;



THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, TO

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Dhoondia escaped by means of a boat prepared for the occasion.

Colonel Stevenson (the progress of whose detachment had been impeded by difficult roads) now arrived and assumed, as senior officer, the command of the united detachments, and immediately pursued Dhoondia so closely as to compel him to take refuge in the Mahratta territory, within the limits of which Colonel Stevenson, on the 20th of August, saw him encamp with the remnant of his banditti, which it would have been easy for Colonel Stevenson to have taken or destroyed had he been at liberty to pass beyond the boundary of the Mahratta dominion. But my particular orders having strictly prohibited any violation of the frontier of the Mahratta empire, Colonel Stevenson, with great judgment and discretion, halted his army on the line of the boundary, and signified to the Mahratta officer of the adjoining district that the respect of the British Government for the rights of the Mahratta State precluded the further progress of their army.

As Dhoondia had, on several occasions, by acts of robbery and murder, rendered himself extremely obnoxious to the Mahrattas, there is no danger of their affording him an asylum in opposition to the remonstrances of the British Government; and I have received accounts from Colonel Stevenson that Dhoondia Punt Ghoklah, a chief commanding a division of the Peishwa's army, had plundered Dhoondia's camp within a few hours after it had been pitched within the territory of the Mahrattas, had carried away all his elephants, camels, bullocks, and guns, and entirely deprived him of the means of future depredation. The province of Bednore will be completely delivered from the banditti which had acted under Dhoondia's command, for, although they continued to retain some posts in the country at the period of his flight, those posts will certainly be evacuated on the approach of the British troops.

I think it my duty to request the particular attention of your Honourable Court to the judicious and spirited conduct displayed during the late operations against Dhoondia, as well by Colonel Stevenson as by Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple; and I am persuaded it will be satisfactory to your Honourable



Court to observe the great activity and energy which has marked this movement of the troops within so short a period after their late brilliant successes, and in the midst of a season of the year which has hitherto been supposed to render military operations impracticable.

Lieutenant-General Harris, with the main body of the army, had advanced to the eastern bank of the Tungbuddra to the support of the detachments under Colonel Stevenson and Colonel Dalrymple. Judging, however, that it was no longer necessary after the dispersion of Dhoondia's followers, and after the flight of their leader, to detain the army in Mysore he immediately determined to form the subsidiary detachment for the permanent protection of Mysore, and to recal the remainder of the forces into the Carnatic. Having made his arrangements for this purpose, and left the honourable Colonel Wellesley in command of the troops which are to remain in Mysore, General Harris quitted the army on the 25th of August at Hoonelly, and arrived here on the 30th following. I am now occupied with him in making the necessary arrangements for the general distribution of the troops into garrison and cantonments.

I have availed myself of the opportunity of my residence at this Presidency to enter into the consideration of various branches of its internal Government, and it is my intention, with the assistance of Lord Clive, to take early measures for the improvement of the administration of your affairs in this quarter.

As I was on the point of closing this despatch, accounts reached me from the army in Mysore, purporting that the fortress of Bednore, and every other place of any consequence in that province, were in the possession of the Company's troops, and that tranquillity was every where established.

I have the honour to be, honourable Sirs,
with the greatest respect,
your most obedient and faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.



THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, TO

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No. XXXII.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort William, Sept. 16th, 1799.

I received your letter of the 28th of August on my arrival yesterday at this Presidency.

It would be useless to speculate on the probable motives which have governed the conduct of the Peishwa in the course of the late negotiation. I shall content myself for the present with observing, that I have from the commencement of it entertained considerable doubts of his sincerity.

I desire you will immediately inform the Peishwa and Nana Furnavese that I consider all negotiation on the basis of the treaty of Mysore to be concluded; but that, although I deeply regret his Highness's rejection of an arrangement, which had no other object than the improvement of the friendship and alliance subsisting between the three States, and which was at least as much calculated to promote the interests of the Peishwa as those of the Company and the Nizam, I do not feel any diminution of my amicable disposition towards his Highness.

You will further apprise the Court of Poonah that, conformably to the stipulations of the treaty of Mysore, the Company's Government will proceed immediately, in concert with his Highness the Nizam, to a division of the reserved territory, I rely with confidence that his Highness will take effectual means to prevent any of the officers of his Government from attempting to interrupt, in any degree, the execution of this measure; and that he will compel them to respect the rights of the Company and the Nizam in their recent acquisitions on the side of the Mahratta frontier, with the same solicitude which the Company's Government invariably manifests to respect the rights of all its neighbours.

You will also inform the Peishwa that, although he has not thought proper to accede to the treaty of Mysore, I am not on that account less confident that he will perceive the necessity and propriety of causing all his subjects, of every description, to abstain, with the utmost care, from trespassing in any manner on the territories of the Rajah of Mysore. The



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Peishwa is already generally apprized of the union of interests subsisting between the Company and that Rajah: but it may be proper to inform him further, that the Company are bound to defend the Rajah's territories against all powers without exception.

While I wish you to continue to cultivate the best possible understanding with the Court of Poonah, I must desire you to refrain carefully from any interference in the disputes which are now likely to be revived between Bajee Rao and Dowlut Rao Scindiah. You are never either to invite or encourage any renewal of the late negotiation; but to reply to every attempt of that nature, that your instructions permit you merely to transmit to me any propositions of that tendency which may be made to you.

I am, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXIII.

General Order—Public Department.

Fort William, 17th September, 1799.

The Governor-General has great satisfaction in resuming his seat in Council at this presidency in recording his sense of the zealous co-operation which he experienced during his absence, from his Excellency the Honourable the Vice-president in council, in the prosecution of the late war against Tippoo Sultaun, and particularly in the prompt despatch of the extensive and important supplies of money, grain, and other Articles which were required from Bengal for the use of the army destined to act against Mysore.

No. XXXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 22nd September, 1799.

I embarked from Fort St. George on the 5th instant, and arrived here on the 14th following, after a pleasant and favourable passage.

At the time of my departure from Fort St. George the



state of affairs in Mysore was perfectly satisfactory. General Harris had arrived at the Presidency from the army to the charge of which Colonel Wellesley had succeeded.

Soon after my arrival at this place I learned from Poonah the failure of the negotiation which I had directed to be opened with the Peishwa on the basis of the partition Treaty of Mysore. It was broken off ostensibly upon the article respecting the exclusion of foreigners from the service and dominions of the Peishwa; to this article the Peishwa would not assent, excepting under limitations, which would have defeated my object in the stipulation. I am not satisfied that the ostensible was the real cause of the failure of the treaty; I suspect either that the Peishwa has been insincere throughout the negotiation, or that Scindiah has contrived to influence the Peishwa against the measure. In consequence of this event I have adopted immediate measures for dividing the reserved territory between the Company and the Nizam conformably to the stipulations of the 2nd separate article of the treaty of Mysore.

Although this issue of the late negotiation is unfavourable to my design of acquiring such an influence at the Court of Poonah as should enable me effectually to hold the balance between the Peishwa and the Nizam, I apprehend no other serious disadvantage from it. The Peishwa will probably regret the loss of a considerable territory which he might have acquired on terms, not only moderate and just, but highly beneficial to him; and he will view with jealousy the transfer of that territory to the hands of the Company and of the Nizam. But however his perverse temper may incline him to overlook the reason or justice of the question between us, the consciousness of his own weakness, and of our strength, affords us ample security against any rupture with the State of Poonah on this occasion. I consider the same argument to be equally applicable to the probable conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Before my departure for Fort St. George I had placed the affairs of Tanjore in such a train as will lead, I trust, to a speedy and favourable settlement. I left in Lord Clive's hands my plan of a new arrangement in the form of a treaty,* which was to be immediately proposed to the

* See Appendix.