



lives of respect to the laws, shipped their goods on the tonnage provided by the Government, while others disposed of their goods to the numerous foreign agents then employed in the port of Calcutta.

The quantity of private goods shipped for England in 1799-1800, affords, therefore, an incontrovertible proof of the eagerness and alacrity with which the British merchants resident in Bengal provided goods, with a view to embrace the expected opportunity of conveying their trade to London on terms of advantage; but no argument can justly be drawn from the same circumstance to prove that the continuance of the regulation adopted in 1799-1800 would afford adequate encouragement to the private trade between India and England.

The preceding considerations satisfied me that the plan of hiring ships, on the part of the Company, and of re-letting them to the proprietors of ships, leaving the proprietors of ships and the merchants at liberty to settle the terms of freight, is more advantageous both to the proprietors and freighters of ships, than the arrangement adopted under your orders of the 25th of May, 1798.

In your letter of the 25th of May, 1798, your Honourable Court appears to have intimated an opinion that persons uniting the capacities of proprietors and freighters of ships may trade from Bengal to the port of London, to greater advantage than merchants possessing no property in ships. It appears to me that the difference between the actual charge incurred by merchants being proprietors of ships, on account of the freight of their goods sent to England in their own ships, and the rate of freight paid by merchants not being proprietors of ships, cannot be deemed a profit derived by the proprietor of a ship on his goods. No person will employ any part of his capital in the purchase of property in ships without the prospect of deriving an adequate profit on the capital so invested. I am satisfied that it would not be practicable for the proprietors of ships in this port to maintain an effectual combination for the establishment of enhanced rates of freight; unless such a combination should be maintained, it is to be presumed that the profits of the proprietors of ships on their capitals invested in ships will never exceed, on an average, a reasonable advantage on the amount



of those capitals after defraying all the expenses of their ships. This profit must, therefore, be deemed entirely distinct from the profit which the proprietors of ships may derive on their goods conveyed to England in their own ships; and consequently the proprietors of ships cannot be supposed to possess in the general course and conduct of their trade, in the purchase, transportation or sale of their goods, any material advantage over merchants who are not proprietors of ships.

Various additional arguments, involving consequences of a more complicated and comprehensive description, appeared to me to demand, not only that I should recur without delay to the plan of the 5th of October, 1798, but that I should respectfully represent to your honourable Court, in the most distinct terms, my decided and conscientious conviction, that the permanent establishment of a systematic intercourse between the ports of India and that of London, regulated by principles similar to those adopted by this Government in October, 1798, is become indispensable to the united and inseparable interests of the Company and of the nation in India.

Under the beneficial influence of the British Government in India, combined with the increased demand both in Europe and in America for Indian commodities, the produce and manufactures of the British territories in India have increased to an extent far exceeding the amount which the capital applicable to the purchase of the Company's investment can embrace.

The wise policy, the just pretensions, and the increasing commercial resources and political power of Great Britain in India, claim for her subjects the largest attainable share in the valuable and extensive commerce of such articles of Indian produce and manufacture as are necessarily excluded from the Company's investments.

A large proportion of this valuable trade is already in the possession of foreign nations; and unless means be immediately adopted for depriving those nations of the undue share which they have obtained in that trade, the most serious consequences are to be apprehended to the combined interests of the English East India Company and of the British nation.

The British merchants at this Presidency not having ob-



tained the expected permission to freight their ships to the port of London in the last year, agreeably to the plan adopted in October, 1798; goods to a large amount, originally intended for the port of London, were sold to foreigners in the port of Calcutta, and thus diverted to the channel of the foreign trade.

The nature and extent of that trade have undergone a particular investigation. From the accompanying statements your honourable Court will observe, that the trade of America and Portugal with the port of Calcutta alone in 1799-1800, amounted,—

In Imports, 81,81,005 sicca rupees; in Exports, 71,30,372 sicca rupees.

Being an increase in 1799-1800 of the trade carried on in ships bearing American and Portuguese colours, compared with the average of that trade in the three preceding years,—

In Imports, 63,98,678 sicca rupees; in Exports, 43,92,768 sicca rupees.

On the other hand, the imports of the British subjects in the year 1799-1800 amounted only to 47,87,101 sicca rupees, and the exports to 67,66,649 sicca rupees.

Of the trade carried on in foreign bottoms with the other ports in India, from Europe and America, I possess no sufficiently accurate information. It is, however, known to be conducted on a very extensive scale.

In the present season, the trade conveyed in foreign bottoms, if left unrestrained, promises to increase beyond even the rapid progress of last year. From the accompanying statement, your honourable Court will observe, that the port of Calcutta at this early period of the season contains about 8,500 tons of shipping under American, Portuguese, and Danish colours.

I possess no means of forming an accurate estimate of that proportion of the foreign trade from India to Europe, and to America, which is supported by capital actually belonging to the nations, under whose flags the ships are navigated.

It appears, however, from the statements prepared by the reporter of external commerce, that less than one-fourth of the funds imported by the Americans in 1799-1800, for the purchase of their investments, was brought from America. Of the bullion £200,000 was imported from London, and the remainder from other parts of Europe and from the Island of



Madeira. I have not been able to ascertain the proportion of British capital employed in the trade between India and Portugal. Admitting the whole capital employed in the foreign trade with India to belong to the nations under whose flags the ships are navigated, the undue proportion which they have obtained of that trade, to the injury of the British merchants, demands the most serious attention.

The trade conveyed in the foreign ships is conducted with all the advantages of a comparatively low rate of freight; of strict economy in the management of the concern; and of voyages and returns of extraordinary expedition and celerity. The voyage from America to Calcutta is frequently performed in less than four months. In the last season several American ships disposed of their imports, purchased their cargo for exportation, and left the port within twenty-five, and some within twenty, days from the date of their arrival.

Under all the existing impediments, and under the uncertainty which has hitherto embarrassed the trade of the British merchant in India, it is impossible that his goods can reach the markets of the continent of Europe through the channel of the public sales in England, at so low a price as the goods conveyed directly from India to the same markets in foreign bottoms. The Company's sales in England must necessarily be affected by the quantity of Indian goods passing into the markets of the continent of Europe through the channel of the foreign trade, and the profits of the private British merchant, whose goods are disposed of at the Company's sales, must be proportionably diminished.

Although the voyage by which the produce of India is conveyed in foreign ships to Europe may occasionally be circuitous, the superior advantages, enumerated in the preceding paragraphs, enable the proprietors of the goods to dispose of them at a lower price than that for which the same descriptions of goods can be brought to the continental markets of Europe, if exported from India by British merchants under the heavy freight,* and other incumbrances to which their trade is at present subject.

* The Portuguese and Americans pay only one per cent. on Indian produce imported and re-exported. By the Warehousing Act lately passed in Great Britain, calicoes pay 2½, and muslins 7½, per cent. on the sales,

It must ever be impracticable, if it were justifiable or politic, by any restrictions or penalties on the trade of the British subjects, to prevent the increasing produce and manufactures of India from being conveyed to the markets in Europe, where a demand for such articles shall exist. Such restrictions tend to throw the trade into the hands of foreign nations, and to enable them to supply the markets of Europe on terms which must equally affect the Company's sales in England. If the same goods which now pass to the continent of Europe, through foreign hands, were brought to the Company's sales in England, the effect on the general price of articles exposed to sale at the Company's warehouses would be less prejudicial than that now experienced from the sale of those goods in the markets on the continent of Europe. The Company and the private British merchant would equally feel the advantage in the improvement of the general sales in England, and the private trade of India would become a fertile source of wealth and strength to the British nation, instead of contributing to the opulence and aggrandizement of foreign powers.

The interests of the Company, and of the British nation, are undivided and inseparable with relation to this important question. Every principle of justice and policy demands the extension of the utmost practicable facility to the British merchants in India, for the export from India to the port of London, of the largest possible proportion of the manufactures and produce of India, not required for the Company's investment. Such advantageous terms of freight and such other benefits should be opened to the British merchants in India as should not only remove every inducement to conduct the trade through foreign channels, but should enable the British merchants in India to enter into a competition in the markets of Europe with merchants trading in goods of similar produce or manufacture provided by foreign capital.

To foreigners the indulgence may safely be extended of

if sold for exportation. All other goods (excepting cotton, spices, bullion, &c., diamonds, precious stones, which pay no duties) pay two per cent. exclusive of the convoy duty, payable by the Importers. A reduction of those duties in England is absolutely necessary to complete the system of drawing the private trade of India to the port of London.



purchasing, with their own capital, such part of the manufactures or produce of India, calculated for the European or American markets, as may not be embraced by the capital employed in the purchase of the Company's investment and of the cargoes of the British merchants resident in India.

It is, however, doubtful whether* foreign nations would be able to retain any considerable proportion of the trade from India to Europe, were the British merchants in India permitted to avail themselves of their superior means of drawing the whole of the trade to England. Their local knowledge, added to all the advantages necessarily derived from a constant residence on the spot, must always enable them to command a supply of goods, of a better quality, and at a cheaper rate, than foreign merchants can obtain. In the conveyance of Indian goods to Europe rests the foreign merchant's sole advantage over the British. The superior facility which the foreign merchant enjoys in this respect gives him so decided a command over the trade, that he is enabled not only to outbid the British merchant in India, but also to undersell him in the markets of Europe.

Were the British merchants in India permitted to provide their own tonnage as occasion might require, every reason exists to justify a belief that they would soon possess themselves of nearly the whole of the private export trade from India to Europe, and would render London the universal mart for the manufactures and produce of Asia.

If the capital of the merchants in India, and the remittance of the fortunes of individuals, should not supply funds sufficient for the conduct of the whole private export trade from India to Europe, no dangerous consequences could result from applying to this branch of commerce capital drawn directly from the British empire in Europe.

* The Americans obtain Indian goods so much cheaper by a direct intercourse with India than they could through the circuitous route of Europe, that they will probably continue to deal largely even on their own capital with India. It is now the ordinary practice of the Americans, under the last treaty of commerce, to ship cargoes in India for America, to touch at some port in America, and without transshipping or unloading the goods in America to proceed directly to Europe, and to dispose of their Indian cargo in an European port. This practice is unquestionably contrary to the treaty of commerce with America.



Beneficial consequences of the utmost importance would certainly result to the British empire in India from any considerable increase of its active capital, which is known not to bear a just proportion to the productive powers of the country.

The necessary effect of such an increase of active capital in India would be to augment the produce and manufactures of your dominions to the full extent of any possible demand. The high rate of interest on money applied to mercantile purposes, and the charge of the public debt would consequently be diminished in India, while every source, both of public and private credit would be proportionably improved. No possibility appears of any injurious consequences resulting to the British Empire in Europe from an event so advantageous to India. It cannot be supposed that the private trade of India will ever absorb any portion of British capital which can find more advantageous employment at home. If any portion of British capital be now employed in the American, or Portuguese, or Danish trade with India, the general interests of Great Britain will unquestionably be promoted by inviting, under increased advantages, the application of the same funds to the trade of the private British merchants resident within the Company's dominions.

From whatever source the capital of the private British trade in India might be derived, the goods would be obtained in India under the same wise, humane, and salutary regulations now enforced with respect to the provision of every article of produce or manufacture in this country, either by the Company or by private merchants; Great Britain would enjoy all the advantages of that trade which is now a source of increasing wealth and strength to foreign nations, and which tends ultimately to introduce foreign influence, to establish foreign influence, and to aggrandize foreign power in India.

It would be equally unjust and impolitic to extend any facility to the trade of the British merchants in India, by sacrificing or hazarding the Company's rights and privileges; by injuring its commercial interests; by admitting an indiscriminate and unrestrained commercial intercourse between England and India; or by departing from any of the fundamental principles of policy, which now govern the British establishments in India.

It may be urged, that if a considerable proportion of the

goods now exported from India to the Continent of Europe by foreigners, were to be imported into England by the British merchants in India, under rates of freight more advantageous than those now paid by the Company, the demand for the Company's goods would be reduced, and the value of the Company's goods would be impaired.

It has already been observed that the public sales of East India goods in England must necessarily be affected by the aggregate quantity of those goods sold in the continental markets of Europe; and that the effect on the sales in England, would probably be less prejudicial and could not be more so, if a larger proportion of the goods provided in India for the European markets should be imported into England, and sold in the first instance at the Company's sales.

The long establishment of the Company's factories in India, the skill of its servants regularly educated for the conduct of those factories, the habitual confidence of the manufacturers in the good faith and integrity of the Company have secured to the Company so decided a superiority in the provision of the most valuable articles of piece-goods and raw silk, that no private merchant by any practicable reduction of freight can be enabled to rival the Company in these important articles of its investment.

In the first purchase of sugar and other gruff goods, the trade of the private British merchant has more nearly reached that of the Company; nor will the Company ever be able to trade advantageously in these articles, unless the Government in India shall resort to ships built in India, for the conveyance of such goods; the valuable branches of your investment will, it is supposed, be always conveyed with more advantage in your regular ships.

If the British merchants should be permitted to employ ships built in India under the plan of October, 1798, the Company's gruff goods may also be conveyed to England in ships of a similar description, at rates of freight equally advantageous with those paid by the private merchants. The Company will, therefore, derive a considerable benefit in this branch of trade, from encouraging the trade of the private British merchants in India;* at present neither the Company

* The probable saving to the Company in the present season by the



nor the private British merchants can rival foreigners in the markets of Europe in the less valuable articles of Indian produce and manufactures.

It is now evident that the extra tonnage engaged in England by the Company for the service of India can never be rendered a practicable channel through which the British private trade of India can contend with foreign adventure. This observation necessarily applies with more force to the regular ships of the Company, although experience has proved those ships to be admirably calculated for the conveyance of the Company's valuable investment.

The plan contained in the advertisement of the 5th of October, 1798, affords to the British merchants, every necessary facility for the conduct of the private trade from India to England, while the important principles of the trade and government of India are preserved from hazard, and sufficient precautions are provided against all the dangers justly apprehended from an unrestricted commercial intercourse between England and India.

The essential object of preventing the resort to India of persons unlicensed by the Company is not affected. The powers of the Government in India over unlicensed persons remain in full vigour and efficiency. No goods or passengers can be received in the private ships either in India or in England, without the sanction of the Company or of its government; the voyage to England and the return to India, are required to be performed under the instructions and control of the same authority; and as the proprietors of the ships, the commanders and officers; the seamen, (mostly natives of India) and all the persons concerned in the immediate conduct of the trade, are subject to the authority of the British Government in India, it is always in the power of the Company and of its government, to prevent the perversion of an intercourse thus regulated between India and England to any sinister purposes endangering the rights and privileges of the Company, or the interests of the British Empire.

Omitting the difference in the rate of freight, these considerations alone are sufficient to recommend the employment of ships built in India in the private trade between India and

conveyance of their guff goods in ships built in India may amount to £20,000.

Great Britain. Over private ships furnished from England the Company and their government in India, could not exercise an equally efficient control.

It is remarkable that the principle which has hitherto regulated the commercial intercourse between India and England has actually occasioned the very evils which it was intended to avert.

The operation of this erroneous principle has forced the trade between India and Europe from a channel, in which it could have been controlled and regulated without difficulty, into the hands of foreign nations, where it cannot, without considerable difficulty be subjected to any degree of controul, regulation, or restraint: the same mistaken policy has filled the Ports of India with the ships of foreign nations, has enabled those nations to rival the Company both in Europe and in India in many articles of its export and import trade, has invited from Europe and America adventurers of every description; and, by the number and activity of these foreign agents, has menaced the foundations of your commercial and political interests throughout every part of Asia, and even within your own dominions.

If the extension of additional indulgences to the British merchant necessarily involved the admission of numerous British adventurers into India, the wisdom of your honourable Court could not fail to remark that your Government can always with less difficulty control the operations of British, than those of foreign agents; while the danger to be apprehended from the views and designs of foreigners of every description must ever be greater than any which can probably arise from an increased resort of British subjects, under such limitations and restraints as your wisdom may frame, and the vigilance of your government in India may be enabled to enforce.

But it does not appear probable that any increase of the private British trade of India would necessarily produce a proportional augmentation in the number of British agents resorting to your dominions. The British merchants now resident in India being equal to the conduct of much more extensive concerns, and likely to be employed by persons engaged in commercial concerns at home, who might easily conduct their operations with India through those British subjects actually established within your dominions.

On the other hand foreigners generally deal directly with



the natives, or with foreign houses of agency, the number of these houses (in consequence of the war) is now inconsiderable; the increase of foreign adventurers will, therefore, be a necessary consequence of any considerable increase of the trade in foreign hands. Foreign ships also, being necessarily exempt from the control of the British Government in Europe, offer to every emissary of the enemy, and to every dangerous political adventurer, an easy entrance into India. In proportion to the increased resort of foreign ships to our ports in India, foreign intrigue will find a more ready channel of admission. It is a well known fact, that those to whom your permission and license to visit India have been refused usually resort to foreign ships, and thus evade your authority. The same channel is also always open to afford refuge and the means of escape to every public defaulter and delinquent from the authority of your government in India.

It is impossible to check the resort of the ships of foreign nations to India, by any other regulation than by rendering the trade unprofitable to foreign adventure. This effect cannot be accomplished otherwise than by enabling the British merchants in India to undersell foreigners in the markets of Europe. A system, which, under due regulation, shall afford to the British merchants in India, the greatest practicable facility of conveying their trade to England, instead of endangering the stability of the trade and power of the Company, and of the nation in India, will, therefore, constitute the most solid basis of security for the preservation of both.

The preceding observations may, I trust, satisfy your honourable Court, that the principles of the plan of the 5th of October, 1798, combine the requisite indulgence to the private trade, with the indispensable precautions necessary for securing your interests in India.

It is not my duty to enter into any detailed discussion of the objections urged by the ship-builders in England, against the admission of ships built in India, to a participation in the trade from India to the port of London; it may not however be useless to add some remarks on this part of the subject.

Experience having proved that tonnage cannot be furnished from England, on terms which would enable the British merchants in India to rival foreigners in the trade between India and Europe, the exclusion of ships built in India from



the port of London would not increase the number of British ships hitherto engaged in the Indian trade, in any proportion which could materially benefit the ship-builders in England. This measure, therefore, without any proportional benefit to the ship-builders in England, would perpetuate and aggravate the evils now experienced from the restraints imposed on the private trade between India and England; on the other hand, by admitting ships built in India to partake of the trade to England, the ship-builders and other artists, manufacturers, and traders in England will reap all the benefits arising from the large sums expended in the repair of the numerous ships annually resorting to England from the ports of India. Other interests connected with the building of ships in England will also derive the profit resulting from the great demand for the articles necessary in the construction and outfit of the ships built in the ports of India; the fact being established, that many of those articles must necessarily be brought from England.

On their return to India, these ships from the moderation of their rates of freight will afford a most advantageous mode of conveyance for such of the manufactures of the British empire in Europe, as may be demanded in India; consequently the facilities granted to the private trade, and to the ships built in India will serve to encourage the exportation of British manufactures to Asia, to whatever extent the demand may be enlarged.

I have thus carefully revised the plan contained in the advertisement of October, 1798, for the encouragement of the trade of the British merchants resident in India with England; I have compared that plan with the arrangement adopted under the orders of your honourable Court of the 25th of May, 1798; I have considered the probable effects of any future attempt to provide for the conveyance of the private trade of India to the port of London, either in the Company's regular ships, or in extra ships hired in England; and I have adverted to the comparative practical operation of the systems adopted by this government in the years 1798, 1799, and 1800, as it appears on the accounts of the exports and imports of the port of Calcutta in each of those years; I have also submitted to your examination a combined view of the motives which induce me to revert to the plan of



October, 1798, for the present season, and to form an anxious expectation, that my conduct in this proceeding may meet with your approbation and countenance, and may become the foundation of an improved and durable system of intercourse between India and England under the sanction of your authority.

The rapid growth of the foreign trade during the last season, urgently demanded the immediate interference of your government on the spot. The number of foreign ships actually in the port of Calcutta, the alacrity, enterprize and skill of the foreign agents now assiduously employed in providing cargoes, and the necessary inaction and languor of the British private trade, embarrassed by the restraints of the existing law, created a serious apprehension in my mind, that any further delay in the decision of this momentous question might occasion evils, of which the remedy might hereafter become considerably difficult, if not absolutely impracticable. The unrestrained progress of the foreign trade in the present season, added to its great increase during the last, might have established its predominance over the private trade of British subjects to an extent, which no future regulation might have proved sufficient to limit or restrain. The difficulty of diverting this lucrative commerce from the channel into which it had been forced, would naturally be aggravated in proportion to the length of time during which the trade should continue to flow in that course.

Under these serious impressions, and convinced that a prompt decision was demanded with a degree of exigency equal to the importance of the question at issue, I directed the accompanying notice* to be published at Fort William, on the 19th instant, and I ordered the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, to publish correspondent advertisements at those Presidencies with such modifications, as local circumstances may render indispensably necessary.

It will rest with your honourable Court to determine, whether this plan shall be rendered permanent. A temporary restraint is now applied to the progress of the foreign trade in India, during the present season; and a temporary encouragement is granted, for the same period of time to that of

* See Appendix.



British subjects resident within your dominions, ample time is thus afforded for the deliberate formation of your final judgment; the result of which I shall await with a respectful, but confident hope, that your wisdom may approve and perpetuate the policy which dictated my orders of the 5th of October, 1798, and of the 19th of September, 1800; and that your liberality may confirm to all the interests affected by this important measure, the lasting enjoyment of those commercial and political advantages, which it has been my constant endeavour, under your countenance and favor, to cultivate, to improve, and to extend.

I have the honor to be, honourable Sirs,

with the greatest respect,

Your most obedient and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. XCV.

The Marquess Wellesley to Hugh Inglis, Esq. Chairman of the Court of Directors.

DEAR SIR,

Fort William, October 6th, 1800.

I trust you will establish the monthly packet over land from London, and also monthly vessels of intelligence, which might carry small cargoes, passengers, and letters; the expense would be defrayed by the passage-money, postage, and sale of the cargoes, which might consist of such perishable articles, as are in daily demand in India; I have no doubt that individuals in England or in India would readily contract to furnish such packets, exonerating the Company from all expense, and taking the profits of the vessels and cargoes. The object is of the utmost importance; in the present year I was nearly *seven months* without receiving one line of authentic intelligence from England. My distress and anxiety of mind were scarcely supportable. Speedy, authentic, and regular intelligence from Europe is essential to the conduct of the trade and government of this empire. If the sources of information be obstructed, no conscientious man can undertake this weighty charge. The fundamental principles of policy on which rest our establishments in India, require frequent communication with England; the British subjects in India should never find any difficulty in maintaining that



intercourse with their native country, which tends to preserve their attachments, to keep alive their affections, and to bring the remembrance of *home* constantly to their minds. I could urge innumerable topics on this subject, which I feel to be of great importance. In India the regular establishment of the monthly post overland, and the return of the monthly packets by sea, would afford the government at home, as well as the parents and connections of all British subjects employed or resident in India, regular and quick intelligence of the state of public affairs, and of all private interests in the East. We might then hope to receive both in England and India respectively, constant advices of the date of three months and-a-half, or four months at the latest.

Believe me, dear Sir,

Your faithful and obedient Servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. XCVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to His Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier.

SIR,

Fort William, 13th October, 1800.

I am deeply concerned to inform your Excellency, that the Honourable Company's ship *Kent*, was captured on the 7th instant, off the Sand Heads, by the French privateer *La Confiance*, commanded by M. Surcouff, after an action which lasted about an hour and three-quarters; and in which the *Kent* had eleven killed, (including Captain Rivington the commander) and forty-four wounded.

M. Surcouff ultimately overcame the *Kent* by boarding that ship. He is stated to have sustained considerable damage during the action from the fire of the *Kent*, which mounted eighteen pounders.

The *Kent* was laden principally with marine stores.

It is the opinion of the second officer, and of the purser of the *Kent*, whom I have personally examined, that the *Kent* being very deep in the water, and a dull sailer, her progress to the Mauritius (to which place it is concluded she will immediately be despatched,) is likely to be extremely slow; and consequently that a strong probability exists, that any vessel would overtake her who should pursue her even at the



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distance of several days, subsequent to her departure from the Sand Heads.

It is uncertain whether the *Confiance* remains in company with the *Kent*, or whether the *Confiance* is still in a condition to persevere in her cruise. Her loss during the action is supposed to amount to about thirty men killed and wounded.

I have directed Captain Canning in the *Nonsuch*, to proceed in pursuit of the enemy; but as Captain Canning was on the point of sailing in charge of several ships, it is uncertain whether my orders will reach him in time.

I think it necessary to inform your Excellency, that the party of the enemy which boarded the *Kent*, (consisting, it is said, of 100 Europeans and 50 Caffres,) was guilty of the most savage acts of wanton and brutal cruelty; having cut down numbers of defenceless and unresisting persons, and after death disfigured the bodies of the slain in the most barbarous and shocking manner. Their treatment of the unfortunate survivors of the crew and passengers, who were put on board of an Arab vessel in the most destitute condition, (not excepting even the ladies) was equally inhuman, and contrary to every principle by which the evils of war have hitherto been mitigated among the civilized part of mankind.

The design of the present despatch is to suggest for your Excellency's consideration, whether it might not be proper, that your Excellency should detach one of the vessels under your command in such a direction, as may afford the best chance of falling into the track of the *Kent*, and of the *Confiance*, should she have proceeded with her prize towards the Mauritius.

Having no doubt that your Excellency will concur with me in opinion, that it is of the utmost importance to retake the *Kent*, I also beg leave to submit to your Excellency, whether it may not be expedient to detach one of his Majesty's vessels to the Isle of France, for the express purpose of intercepting her before she shall have entered that port.

It is supposed by the officers of the *Kent*, whom I have examined, that the *Confiance* with her prize, would be enabled to quit the Sand Heads on the 8th instant.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.



No. XCVII.

Minute by the Governor-General.

Fort William, 20th October, 1800.

The Governor-General acquaints the Board, that he directed the Town-Major to take such steps as might be necessary for furnishing the subaltern officers and cadets, who were captured on the Kent Indiaman with quarters, as also with a common table until such time as they might be otherwise provided.

The urgent distress and destitute condition of these unfortunate gentlemen demand the immediate interposition of government.

These gentlemen have lost whatever property of any kind they had brought with them from Europe. Many of them had already suffered considerable loss by the fire on board the Queen, which they had in some degree repaired at a greatly enhanced expense at St. Salvador, when by a second calamity at the mouth of this river, they were plundered of every article in their possession; many of them are destined for the establishment of Madras, and one for that of Bombay. They have arrived in the river all without property of any description, and many without a friend or connection in this settlement to relieve their distress. In addition to these calamities, some of them are severely wounded.

To offer a mere advance on account of pay, or allowances, to persons in such a situation, would be to propose an inadequate temporary alleviation of their present misery, at the certain sacrifice of their future comfort, and with the melancholy prospect of aggravated embarrassment. The stoppage of their future pay or allowances, with a view to the repayment of any such advance, (however gradual the operation of refunding might be,) would necessarily reduce them to borrow money from individuals, and would ultimately plunge them into inextricable ruin; the effect of such an arrangement on so large a proportion of the younger branch of the Company's military service, must be highly injurious to the interest of the public, as well as disgraceful to the honour and humanity of the British Government in the eyes of all its native subjects.



The Governor-General, therefore, deems it to be his duty to afford immediate relief to these sufferers, in such a manner as shall provide in some degree for their permanent comfort, and shall enable them to avoid the necessity of future embarrassment; with this view, his Lordship has referred to the practice established in his Majesty's service, the spirit of which appears to be justly applicable to the case now under consideration, since it is difficult to distinguish from losses incurred on actual service, the losses sustained by officers captured by the enemy in time of war, during the course of a voyage from Europe to India, undertaken for the purpose of joining their respective corps, or of being immediately posted at the different stations of the Company's army.

The Governor-General therefore proposes, that a gratuity or compensation for the loss of their baggage, and other property equal to 60*l.*, (the estimated value of the personal baggage of a subaltern officer, according to his Majesty's regulations) shall be granted to each of the subaltern officers of his Majesty's and the Company's regiments, to each of the cadets, to the medical gentlemen, and also to Mr. R. Davies, veterinary surgeon of his Majesty's 27th regiment of Dragoons.

This sum is certainly very unequal to the actual losses of each individual, and quite insufficient for the purpose of enabling them to renew many indispensable articles of equipment. The Governor-General however, has adopted the preceding principle of relief, as affording some degree of aid to the unfortunate sufferers, whose cases are now under his Lordship's consideration, and at the same time precluding the establishment of any precedent which might hereafter encourage unreasonable demands upon government. Circumstances of peculiar hardship may however occur, to warrant a deviation from the general rule, and to induce the Governor-General in council either to afford full and immediate relief, or to refer the case to the favourable consideration of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

As the gratuity alone, would not be sufficient in many of the cases of distress to afford the necessary relief, either with a view to the present or future situation of the objects of his Lordship's attention, the Governor-General proposes, that an advance of two months pay, and half batta shall be made



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to such of the subaltern officers and cadets, who were captured in the Kent, as may apply for advances to that amount. These advances will be deducted from their future pay and batta.

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No. XCVIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier.

SIR,

Fort William, October 22nd, 1800.

I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's information a copy of the advices which I received on the 15th instant from the Resident at Bussorah. The result of the late events in Europe has probably been an immediate peace between France and Austria. It is not, however, equally probable that peace will speedily be concluded between Great Britain and France. If the war on the continent has ceased, and if hostilities should have continued between Great Britain and France, it is reasonable to suppose, that the enemy has prepared to make, with the least practicable delay, a vigorous effort to relieve the French army in Egypt, and that this effort may either be accompanied or speedily followed by an attack upon our possessions in India.

The renewed spirit and enterprising genius of Buonaparte will naturally lead him to commence his operations with a view to either or both these objects at the earliest practicable period of time. Experience warrants an expectation that he will not lose a moment in availing himself of the actual advantages of his situation; and it is certain, that any naval armament which he might be enabled to despatch from France in the past months of July, August, and September, 1800, might reach the Red Sea, or the western coast of India, during the approaching season.

On the other hand, the probability increases every hour of a demand from his Majesty's Ministers upon the British Government in India, and upon your Excellency, to co-operate with a force, to be employed in the Mediterranean, for the expulsion of the French from Egypt. A considerable British force has been collected at Minorca, originally, perhaps, with



a view to an attempt on the southern coasts of France. That design, however, (if it was ever entertained,) has probably been relinquished in consequence of the late events on the continent of Europe. In the event of a separate peace between Austria and France, and of the continuance of hostilities between Great Britain and France, it is not improbable that the troops assembled at Minorca may be employed in concert with the Turkish army, against the French in Egypt. In such an event, an expedition from India might prove essentially useful by creating a diversion on the side of Upper Egypt; and the tenor of my private despatches from the Earl of Elgin tends to confirm the probability, that the unfavourable alteration which has taken place in the state of the war with France will induce his Majesty's Ministers to require an expedition from India to Egypt in the only manner in which such an operation could be undertaken with any prospect of advantage; namely, by combining it with a powerful attack from the side of the Mediterranean. It may be expected that any such requisition from his Majesty's Ministers may reach me in the first week in November, and that they will expect the fleets and armies of India to be ready to act against Egypt during the approaching season.

The preceding statement will have explained to your Excellency my reasons for apprehending that the naval and military strength of India is likely to be required, either for the purposes of defensive or offensive operations on the western side of the Peninsula between the ensuing months of December and March; and your Excellency's judgment and experience in the interests of the British empire in India will form a correct estimate of the magnitude of the danger which we may be called upon to repel, and of the urgent necessity of placing our force in such a condition, and in such a station, as shall enable us to act with promptitude and effect whenever the expected exigency shall arise.

After the fullest consideration of these circumstances, I am decidedly of opinion, that the British Government of India would not be justified in undertaking or prosecuting any expedition, the necessary effect of which must be to remove the strength of your Excellency's squadron to any considerable distance to the eastward for any long period of time. The same objection applies, in a certain degree, to the de-



tachment of any part of our military force in the present conjuncture for the purposes of any foreign conquest unconnected with an increase of our means of defence against the probable point of danger. This objection applies most powerfully to any detachment of our European force; the whole disposable amount of which throughout India does not at this time amount to ten thousand men.

If the expedition to Batavia should be prosecuted, even under the most favourable circumstances, your Excellency, with the strength of your squadron, could scarcely reach the western side of India sooner than the commencement of the month of February or the close of the month of January, 1801, and the troops employed in concert with his Majesty's ships would necessarily be detained at Batavia for a much longer period of time.

It is, therefore, with considerable reluctance, and under an irresistible conviction of the necessity of preparing to meet the emergencies which I have described, that I find myself compelled to suspend a second time the final execution of his Majesty's commands respecting Batavia; and to request your Excellency's assistance in carrying into effect a system of operations adapted to the new and alarming crisis of affairs. Your Excellency will not fail to observe the extreme difficulty of my situation: without any official or private information from his Majesty's Ministers, I am left to conjecture their intentions respecting Egypt from such imperfect advices as have been transmitted to me by the Earl of Elgin, and from my own view of the general state of political events. On the other hand, the declared anxiety of his Majesty's Ministers to obtain possession of Batavia, and the forward state of the expedition prepared for that purpose strongly inclined me to persevere in an undertaking which promised such advantage, and which had been so auspiciously commenced; but the pursuit of any foreign conquest, however easy or advantageous, must always yield to the necessity of self-defence. The further suspension of the measures commenced against Batavia will not render the prosecution of that expedition less practicable at a future period, while the absence of our fleet and of any part of our disposable European force in any of the probable cases which I have supposed might be fatal to our existence in India. I must, therefore, request your Ex-



cellency to consider the expedition to Batavia to be postponed to a more favourable opportunity.

Having decided this important point, it becomes my duty to submit to your Excellency's consideration a general view of the plan which appears to me most eligible for the purpose of enabling us to act offensively or defensively as the case may require, to frustrate any attempt of the French, either for the relief of their army in Egypt, or for the disturbance of our possessions in India, and to answer the expected demand of his Majesty's Ministers for our co-operation in Egypt during the approaching season.

With a view to meet all these cases as they may arise, it appears to me desirable to concentrate the strength of your Excellency's squadron, together with the largest disposable force of Europeans, which my limited means will enable me to spare, at some point from which they may be ready to issue with promptitude and facility either to the western coasts of the peninsula of India or to the Red Sea, or to any other quarter which the enemy may menace during the north-eastern monsoon. The general security of our possessions in India will be further promoted if the station chosen for your Excellency's fleet and for the proposed military force, should be central in its relation to the whole British empire in India, and should be a point at all times valuable and important to our interests, and necessary to be maintained against any assault of the enemy. After much attention to the subject, Trincomalé appears to me, under every aspect of the question, to be the most eligible station for the immediate rendezvous of the strength of your Excellency's squadron and of the force which I propose to assemble. It appears further necessary that the military force to be assembled should be provided with transports and camp equipage, and should be ready to move, under the convoy of your Excellency's squadron, wherever the service might require its presence. The force which I propose to collect at Trincomalé will consist of about 2,000* Europeans from his Majesty's infantry; to these I shall add a corps of native volunteer infantry from Bengal, and a suitable proportion of field ordnance.

I have reason to expect that I shall be enabled to assemble

* 10th regiment, 19th do. 80th do. infantry.



this force at Trincomalé on or before the middle of the month of December; and it is my intention that it should be commanded by Colonel Wellesley, and that Colonel Champagné should be the second in command. Colonel Wellesley has already received my orders to proceed to Trincomalé.

My earnest request to your Excellency is, that you will proceed to Trincomalé without delay, where Colonel Wellesley will, I trust, be prepared to meet you, to concert with you such plans of operation as may appear best suited to the purposes of the armament, and to aid you by every exertion within his power.

Your Excellency will either abandon the blockade of Batavia, or provide means for continuing it, according to your view of all the circumstances of our situation, and of the various objects stated in this despatch, and in that which accompanies it under the same date.

I expect that the troops and stores to be sent from hence will be ready to proceed to sea by the middle of November; and it is my intention to apprise Captain Malcolm, of his Majesty's ship *Suffolk*, of the change which circumstances have compelled me to make in my measures, and to request him to convoy the transports with the troops to Trincomalé instead of Prince of Wales' Island.

I request that your Excellency will give the necessary orders for the return of the two companies of his Majesty's 12th regiment (embarked on board of Captain Ball's squadron) to Madras by the earliest opportunity.

Although my opinion is, that a part of the European force to be employed in concert with your Excellency's squadron, will be most conveniently conveyed to the point of actual service on board his Majesty's ships, I have judged it to be expedient to engage transports sufficient for the conveyance of the whole European and native force to be assembled at Trincomalé, together with their necessary provisions and supplies. Your Excellency and Colonel Wellesley will determine on the spot what proportion of the European troops can be conveniently accommodated on board his Majesty's ships.

I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's information a copy of a letter which I despatched to Rear-Admiral Blankett on the 16th instant, in consequence of the recent



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accounts from Europe and Egypt. If your Excellency should agree in opinion with me regarding the expediency of Admiral Blankett's squadron being reinforced, with a view to the possibility of the French attempting to introduce a naval force into the Red Sea, I trust that you will adopt the necessary measures for reinforcing Admiral Blankett as early in the season as possible. I am aware that the state of your Excellency's squadron does not admit of your detaching any considerable force to the Red Sea consistently with providing for the general security of these extensive seas; but I am firmly persuaded that your Excellency's public zeal will prompt you to make every practicable exertion in the present conjuncture.

Your Excellency may be assured that I shall employ every possible effort to provide for the protection of the Sand Heads and of the northern part of the Bay of Bengal against the enemy's cruisers, and that I shall direct the Government of Bombay to adopt similar measures for the defence of the trade on that side of India, with a view to enable your Excellency to concentrate your force with more facility for the urgent and important purposes of offensive or defensive operations on an extended scale. I shall also direct the Governments of Bombay and Fort St. George to hold in readiness a considerable number of transports and a proportionable quantity of provisions and supplies for the purpose of moving towards any requisite point of attack or defence such a body of troops as it may be practicable to spare from the internal purposes of those respective Presidencies.

I think it necessary to inform your Excellency that I have apprized the Government of the Cape of Good Hope by the *Princess Mary* packet, now under despatch, of the state of affairs in India, and that I have requested his Excellency the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope to reinforce the King's army in India by the addition of two regiments of infantry to be landed at Goa or Bombay. I have also suggested to Sir Roger Curtis the expediency of reinforcing your Excellency's squadron by as many frigates as he can spare.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.



No. XCIX.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Sir George Yonge, K.B.
Governor of the Cape of Good Hope.*

SIR,

Fort William, October 24th, 1800.

I have received from Constantinople and Aleppo the most unfavourable accounts of the successes of the French on the continent of Europe, as well as of the progress of their establishment in Egypt.

In this state of affairs it is my duty to request your Excellency, in the most earnest manner, to despatch to India, with the least practicable delay, as considerable a reinforcement of European infantry as it shall be possible for you to spare from the defence of the colony under your Excellency's Government. If the view which I have formed of the probable intentions of France in the future progress of the war against Great Britain be correct, the colony of the Cape of Good Hope is not likely to be the point of attack; and consequently it will not be exposed to any immediate danger by a diminution of its present garrison. Under these circumstances, I flatter myself that your Excellency will be enabled to send two regiments of infantry to India without incurring any considerable hazard during the period which must elapse before those corps can be replaced from England.

The great utility of the Cape of Good Hope is to serve as an outpost to our Indian empire, and a dépôt, from which seasoned troops may suddenly be drawn for the defence of our possessions in the East in any emergency which may arise. This advantage was derived from the Cape in an eminent degree during the war with Tippoo Sultaun, and I am satisfied that, under your Excellency's administration, the military resources of the Cape of Good Hope will always be applied with the utmost alacrity and judgment to their true object—the preservation of our empire in the East.

It is my wish that the European force which your Excellency may furnish in consequence of the present application, should be embarked for the coast of Malabar: to touch in the first instance at Goa, and to be landed there or elsewhere on that coast, as the state of affairs, at the period of their



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arrival, shall require; with a view to this arrangement, the necessary orders will be transmitted to Goa. If, however, the transports with the troops from the Cape should not reach the coast of Malabar until the season shall have been too far advanced to admit of their landing either at Goa or at any other place on the coast of Malabar, it will be proper that they should, in that case, proceed directly to Bombay, unless the naval and military officers in charge of the reinforcements should previously receive instructions directing the troops to a different destination.

Your Excellency will necessarily feel the expediency of composing the reinforcements which you may despatch to India, in consequence of this letter, of the most seasoned regiments now at the Cape; the usual course of the service has been to season the King's troops in the climate of the Cape for eventual use in India. Under this system part of the force which I received from the Earl of Macartney was immediately employed in active service, and was distinguished in the siege and assault of Seringapatam.

Your Excellency will probably judge it expedient to despatch an express to Europe for the purpose of obtaining immediate reinforcements for your garrison; and I shall not fail to urge the necessity of affording you assistance, without delay, by despatching to his Majesty's Ministers an express overland, and by sea.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
with great regard and esteem,
Your Excellency's most obedient
and faithful Servant,
WELLESLEY.

No. C.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Curtis, commanding
His Majesty's Squadron at the Cape of Good Hope.*

SIR,

Fort William, Oct. 24th, 1800.

Although I have not had the honour to receive any intimation from your Excellency of your safe arrival at the Cape of Good Hope, I have had the satisfaction to learn that



event through other channels, and I accordingly beg leave to congratulate your Excellency on the occasion.

A constant and unreserved correspondence on every question affecting the mutual interests of India and the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, subsisted between the Earl of Macartney, the late Sir Hugh Christian and me. Sir Hugh Christian constantly advised me by every opportunity of the strength, condition, and distribution of the squadron under his command. This intercourse was productive of important benefits to the public service; and I am persuaded that your Excellency, adverting to the intimate connection of the relative interests of the British possessions in India, and of our establishments at the Cape of Good Hope will concur with me in cultivating a similar correspondence, and in employing every endeavour by mutual exertions to promote the prosperity of the general cause.

It has been my duty to request his Excellency the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope to despatch to India with the least practicable delay, the largest military force which he may be able to spare. I hope it will be in his Excellency's power to furnish two regiments of infantry; and that your Excellency will have no difficulty in affording the necessary convoy to the transports employed in conveying the troops in question to India. I have intimated to Sir George Yonge, that it is desirable, that the troops should proceed directly to Goa; but that, if the season should be too far advanced at the period of their arrival on the Coast of Malabar, it will be proper to land them at Bombay.

In addition to the necessary convoy for the military reinforcements, I trust it will be in your Excellency's power to reinforce Vice-Admiral Rainier's squadron, which I beg leave to state to you is particularly deficient in frigates; your Excellency will render a great service to the British Empire in India by contributing any aid to this deficient branch of the naval service in these seas.

In proceeding towards India, or to the Red Sea, a French Squadron must probably touch, either at the Spanish Settlements on the Eastern Coast of South America, or at the Mauritius. It is not impossible that such a squadron would find it necessary to touch at both places. I am satisfied that your Excellency's approved vigilance and judgment will be



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exercised in observing both these points, and in applying your force either to intercept the enemy on their voyage, or to reinforce Rear-Admiral Blankett (who proceeds up the Red Sea in the month of November next) or Vice-Admiral Rainier on the Coast of Malabar, or at Trincomalé, as the case may appear to require. I am also confident that your Excellency will give Vice-Admiral Rainier and me the earliest possible intimation of the movements of the enemy and of your own; and I flatter myself that you will from time to time apprise us of the general state and distribution of your squadron.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the signals now in use at the Isle of France, which I have lately procured, and believe to be correct; it may probably be found useful to your Excellency if you should happen not to possess the same information.

It appears highly probable, with a view to all her objects in Egypt and India that France may endeavour at an early season to throw a strong reinforcement into the Isle of France. Recent information leads me to believe that such a design is entertained by the enemy. Its success would certainly aggravate, in a great degree, the danger of our Indian Empire. I therefore feel it to be my duty, in the most earnest manner, to recommend to your Excellency to take immediate measures for establishing the most strict and effectual blockade of the Ports of the Isle of France, which your naval force will permit, until you shall receive further advices from me; and I request your Excellency to apprise Vice-Admiral Rainier and me by every favourable opportunity of the state of any such blockade, of its probable duration, and of its effect on the enemy's force and conduct, as well as of all such information as you may be enabled to collect respecting the internal strength and defences of the Isle of France. I have the honour to transmit a copy of a note which has been furnished to me relative to the most eligible plan for maintaining a blockade of the Ports of the Isle of France. The note was given to me by a very intelligent navigator, who has lately passed a month on the island. In the strictest confidence and with the fullest reliance on your Excellency's acknowledged discretion and secresy, I apprise you that my views are likely to be directed eventually to the



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reduction of the Isle of France. It is possible that I may make the attempt in the course of the month of January, 1801, or of the ensuing month of May. In the first case, I cannot hope for further assistance from your Excellency, than that you should send the most considerable force which you can spare to cruize off the Island or blockade its ports, at the earliest possible season; and if success should attend my enterprize in the month of January, the naval defence of the Island will be delivered over to your Excellency's squadron. Should the attempt from India be postponed until the month of May, your Excellency will hear from me again, and in either case, you will render a most essential service by blockading the Ports of the island according to the suggestion which I have recommended to your attention, and by despatching frequent advices to Vice-Admiral Rainier, and to me.

Your Excellency will probably observe, that my requisition for a reinforcement of troops from the Cape is connected with my eventual design against the Isle of France. But as I am satisfied that that design can be best executed directly from India, and that any attempt to obtain a co-operation of troops from the Cape would be subject to much difficulty, and would perhaps only serve to disclose a plan of which the success must principally depend on sudden and secret execution, I have resolved to make no communication whatever to the Government at the Cape of my intentions in the present stage of my design; nor is any person in India acquainted with them, excepting Vice-Admiral Rainier and my brother Colonel Wellesley, who will be employed, if I should determine to carry my plan into effect. The subordinate governments of India will not be apprized of my views, unless an armament should hereafter depart for the Mauritius from Trincomalé, where I am now assembling a large force, as a central position for the general naval and military defence of this empire. This force will eventually be applicable to various objects, according to the change of circumstances and events. One of these objects may be the reduction of the Isle of France, which I know to have been in a state absolutely defenceless in the month of August.

Your Excellency, I am persuaded, will not suffer this most secret and confidential communication to transpire beyond



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your own breast, and I am satisfied that you will contribute every effort of your talents, experience, and public zeal to aid my views, if it should appear to me expedient to prosecute the undertaking to which I have referred in this despatch.

Vague surmises and conjectures will always arise in the public mind, whenever any military or naval preparation shall appear to occupy the attention of Government, and possibly such may reach your Excellency with regard to the present armament in India; but you may be assured that its real objects are only known to those whom I have named, and are precisely such as I have intimated.

I have the honour to be,
with great respect and consideration,
Sir, your Excellency's most obedient
and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

Note—enclosed in the above letter, to his Excellency Sir Roger Curtis :

Two frigates, or a ship of the Line, to cruize off Port Bourbon between the latitude of 21° and $20^{\circ} 50'$.

Two frigates, or a ship of the Line and one frigate, to cruize off Port Louis, by no means to the westward of the Port.

No. CI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 25th October, 1800.

The despatches of the *Princess Mary* were finally closed on the 6th instant, and that vessel was on the point of sailing when the appearance of the enemy's privateers at the mouth of the river rendered it necessary to postpone her departure until a vessel could be armed to afford convoy to her and to the *Anna*.

The detention of the packet enables me to inform you that on the 15th instant I received the most alarming accounts from Bussorah and Constantinople of the progress of the French both in Egypt and on the Continent of Europe.



The impression made on mind by these accounts, and the measures which I have adopted in consequence of this unfavourable change in the state of affairs will appear in the enclosed copies of my despatches to Vice-Admiral Rainier, Rear-Admiral Blankett, Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Curtis, and Sir George Yonge.* It would occasion considerable detention of the packet were I to delay her departure until I could add to these documents copies of the instructions which I have despatched to the Governments of Fort St. George, Bombay, and Ceylon, in consequence of the plan of measures which I have framed with a view to meet the approaching exigency. The tenor of my letters to Vice-Admiral Rainier will afford you a sufficiently accurate knowledge of the general scope of of those instructions.

The most pressing object of the present despatch is to impress you with the urgent and indispensable necessity of augmenting, without an hour's delay, our European force in India to the extent demanded by the situation of this Empire.

In my letter of the 13th of July, 1800,† I represented to you, in the most urgent and anxious terms, the perilous weakness of the European force in India, and I earnestly entreated you to complete it with all practicable expedition, to the extent of twenty-five efficient regiments of infantry, and eight regiments of dragoons. If the war between Great Britain and France should continue, the late events in Europe and Egypt sufficiently indicate that the theatre of action will be transferred to India and Egypt; the necessity, therefore, of an early augmentation of the European army, in India to the extent proposed in my despatch of the 13th of July is not only become more urgent, but the increased probability of an active war in this quarter of the globe requires an augmentation beyond the amount proposed in that despatch.

My immediate wish is, that you should complete the corps in India to the strength proposed in my despatch of the 13th of July, without delay, and at the same time that you should

* The letters to Admiral Rainier and Curtis, and to Sir G. Yonge will convey the views detailed in the other letters mentioned by the Governor-General.—Ed.

† See p. 361.



embark for the Cape of Good Hope as large a reinforcement as possible, instructing the Government of the Cape to comply promptly with every requisition which I may at any time make for troops from that Colony.

You will recollect that in the event of my succeeding during the ensuing months of January or May, in my design against the Mauritius, a considerable body of Europeans will be required to garrison that island. Such a deduction from the European force necessary for the protection of our Indian Empire has not entered into any of the estimates which I have hitherto formed on this subject; and consequently the reinforcements to be sent to India should be calculated with a view to the probable additional demand of a strong garrison for the Isle of France, and of another for Batavia since the reduction of Batavia would necessarily follow that of Mauritius. The garrison of Mauritius ought not to be less than two thousand Europeans, nor that of Batavia than one thousand.

An early and extensive augmentation both of our naval and military force in India is further necessary with a view to the conquest of the Philippine Islands, which certainly ought to be undertaken with the least possible delay, especially if the theatre of the war should be likely to be transferred from Europe to this quarter of the globe. France is reported to have opened a negotiation with Spain a few years past, for the exchange of the Philippine Islands, and it may be reasonably supposed that she has not relinquished her views upon those valuable possessions, which, in the hands of the French, would prove the destruction of our trade with China. But even if this object should not be entertained, our naval force requires immediate augmentation, especially in the department of frigates. Without a considerable increase of the number of our frigates, the protection of the trade of India against privateers, or rather pirates, will become impracticable. The reduction of Mauritius would indeed destroy the present resort and haunt of the most formidable force of piracy in these seas; but other stations might possibly be substituted by the indefatigable activity and enterprize of French, American, Danish and Irish adventurers. The capture of the *Kent* will, I trust, induce Lord Spencer to condescend to pay some attention to my urgent entreaty, stated in a



letter written to him soon after my arrival in India. In that letter I declared my opinion, that an insult offered to the British flag at the mouth of the Ganges ought not to be felt with less indignation than an insult offered at the mouth of the Thames. In this sentiment I know you will concur with me, but unless you act upon it with resolution and system, the audacity of the enemy will increase in the Indian Seas, the confidence of our native subjects in our naval superiority will be extinguished, and the trade, both of individuals and of the Company, will be materially interrupted, if not seriously injured.

Believe me, my dear Sir,

your's, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 26th October, 1800.

I have the pleasure to congratulate you on the final conclusion of my treaty with the Nizam, of which the substance has already been communicated to you. A copy of the treaty is forwarded from Captain Kirkpatrick overland, by this despatch, to the Secret Committee. The treaty does not seem to require much explanation; but I shall soon transmit a full discussion of its principles and objects. The boundaries of our empire in the Peninsula are now, the Tumbuddra, the Kistna, and the Sea. I must repeat in the most earnest manner, my anxious recommendation of Captain Kirkpatrick for some distinguished mark of his Majesty's favour.

WELLESLEY.

No. CIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Fort William, November 5th, 1800.

The enclosed copies of my despatches to Vice-Admiral Rainier, and to Sir Roger Curtis* will afford you a general

* See pages 399, 406.



view of the nature of the command to which I have appointed you; as well as of the various objects to which the force to be assembled at Trincomalé may be applicable, according to the state of circumstances and events towards the close of the month of December.

In order to assist you in the consideration of these despatches, I will, in this place, shortly recapitulate the general purport of my orders and intentions.

First, In consequence of the state of the war in Europe, and of the strength of the French power in Egypt, I have determined to suspend the intended expedition against Batavia.

Secondly, I have ordered the force noted in the margin,* to assemble at Trincomalé, where I trust it will be collected by the middle of December, and I have desired the Admiral to repair to the same station with the strength of his squadron.

Thirdly, This force is to be applied to either of the following objects if required.

To proceed up the Red Sea, in order to co-operate with the British force, which may be employed in Egypt from the side of the Mediterranean.

To proceed to any point which the French may menace in India, especially on the western side of the Peninsula. The Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, are ordered to hold in readiness whatever troops they can spare, to act in concert with the force assembled at Trincomalé, either in Egypt or in any part of India, and the forces holden in readiness at each of those Presidencies respectively, will be subject to your command, and will repair to such position, as you may eventually point out with a view to either of the stated objects.

Fourthly, Intelligence which I have received has satisfied me, that a blow might now be struck with every prospect of success against the Isle of France. If the state of my accounts from Europe and Egypt should leave me at liberty to make such an attempt at the close of the month of December,

* The King's 10th, 19th, and 80th, regiments of foot. Bengal volunteers, 1 battalion consisting of 1000 firelocks. Artillery from Bengal 38 Europeans (exclusive of commanding officers) and 46 Golangauzes. The remaining proportion of artillery to be furnished from Ceylon.



my anxious wish is, that you should proceed on, or about the 25th of December, from Trincomalé directly to the Isle of France, and carry into execution the plan contained in the papers enclosed in my letter B of this date,* provided you and the Admiral, after full consideration, should judge the plan to be practicable, with the means which I can enable you to command, and within the period of the season stated in the plan.

The enclosure of this letter, and of my letter B of this date, contain such ample details as to require no farther explanation from me; you will meet the Admiral and Mr. Stokes at Trincomalé; in the meanwhile I shall furnish you with such information as I possess respecting the expedition formerly projected against the Isle of France, directing your attention to the various changes of circumstances which appear to me to favour the plan of Mr. Stokes; and also stating such observations as occur to me on the general principles of that plan. The particular details of the project involve many questions purely naval or military, on which the Admiral and you must be more competent to decide.

It is necessary to apprise you, that I have observed the strictest secrecy with regard to my views against the Isle of France. I have not communicated them even to Lord Clive. If I should judge it advisable to disclose them to him, I will give you timely notice.

Ever my dear Arthur,

Yours most affectionately,

WELLESLEY.

No. CIV.

From Lord Elgin to the Marquess Wellesley.

Constantinople, November 11th, 1800.

MY DEAR LORD,

[Received 20th February, 1801.]

At the moment of my Brother's setting out, a messenger from England has brought me the communication of government having ordered Sir R. Abercrombie, and Lord Keith, to undertake seriously the conquest of Egypt. I have ex-

* They are very voluminous, and as the expedition did not take place during Lord Wellesley's government, their insertion is not absolutely requisite.



THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY.

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tracted for you, the substance of the principal paper sent me. And most sincerely do I now trust you may have executed your plan of sending a force into the Red Sea, the co-operation of which will be so beneficial to the operations from the Mediterranean.

Believe me, ever, in great haste,

My dear Lord,

Yours most faithfully,

ELGIN.

Extracted from an Extract of a Letter from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Sir Ralph Abercrombie, October, 1800.

Sir Ralph Abercrombie is ordered (in concert with the commanding naval officer at Gibraltar) to complete all the troop ships, and coppered transports, for the purpose of conveying 15000 infantry to the Coast of Egypt.

He is to make the best of his way up the Mediterranean, and proceed to such port as shall be named the rendezvous, either on the Coast of Syria, Cyprus, Rhodes, or Candia, to procure refreshments, and to concert on the plans of operation with such officers as the Porte may appoint for that service.

The first material point appears to be the reduction of Alexandria, and the occupation of the other ports of Egypt on the Mediterranean.

Supposing these posts secured, it is thought expedient that he should move forward into the country, and open a passage for such forces as the Turks may wish to send that way, to co-operate with their main body in Syria. This is to be determined by Sir R. Abercrombie's more accurate knowledge of the country.

As the French soldiers are supposed to wish to return home, Alexandria is to be summoned, and an offer made to the garrison to return to France, on condition of not serving till exchanged. The same offer is to be made to the French Commander-in-Chief as soon as the Coast is secured; and in case he refuses, it is to be made as public as possible to the enemy's troops.

As it is known that the French Government has sent positive orders to the Commander-in-Chief to maintain himself in Egypt; in order to ensure the success of this British force, 5,000 men are ordered to co-operate from India, and to possess themselves of the French posts on the Red Sea.



(Enclosure to Lord Elgin's Letter, 11th November, 1800.)

Mr. Wickham to the Right Hon. Lord Grenville.

MY LORD,

Crems-Munster, 13th November, 1800.

I have received certain information from Paris, that an expedition is now preparing at Brest, and nearly ready to sail for the Islands of France and Bourbon.* It is to be composed of several ships of war and frigates, and is to be commanded by Admiral Villaret Joyeuse, and Mr. Magon is to sail with it, who is appointed Governor of these colonies, and Commissary-General for the affairs of India. Both are furnished with their commissions, and I am given to understand that they are detained only on account of the want of money, necessary for the carrying such an enterprize into effect, and the difficulty and danger of clearing the Bay of Biscay, in the present station of the British fleets.

I have not been able to learn the extent of the force to be sent out, but I am inclined to think, that it is intended to be considerable.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WILLIAM WICKHAM.

No. CV.

The Marquess Wellesley to The Hon. Frederick North.

MY DEAR NORTH,

Fort William, November 28th, 1800.

I have this moment received your official despatch of the 22nd October, and I lose not a moment in acknowledging it in this private form, for the purpose of urging you in the most earnest manner, to avoid by all possible means, any rupture with the Court of Candy. You will perceive by my late communication to you, the great importance, and indeed absolute necessity, of our guarding against every circumstance which may in any degree tend to embarrass the general measures of defence, which are of such indispensable urgency in the present exigency; I wish you, therefore, for the present, to suspend all your views at Candy, and to look to no other object than the speedy completion of the armament ordered to assemble at Trincomalé.

I am, &c.

WELLESLEY.

* The Marquess Wellesley had not of course received this intelligence when he stated to Admirals Rainier and Curtis [see p. 399.] his views respecting the intentions of the enemy.—Ed.



THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, TO

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No. CVI.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 1st December, 1800.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship, a copy of a letter from Sir Sidney Smith, to Mr. Manesty, dated the 12th of September, and extract of a letter from Mr. Tooke, the agent of the Company at Constantinople, to Mr. Harford Jones, dated the 18th of September, enclosing copy of a letter from Lord Minto to Mr. Tooke, dated the 2nd of September, 1800.

These advices were brought by an overland despatch, which reached Fort William this morning, and although they may have been forwarded to your Lordship from Bombay, I think it advisable to transmit copies of them by this despatch.

The intelligence contained in these advices, affords every ground of belief, that a renewal of hostilities between the Emperor of Germany, and the French Government has taken place; while on the other hand it appears probable, that during the continuance of the renewed war, the Emperor of Germany may have opened negotiations for a peace, on terms to which Great Britain cannot accede. These circumstances added to the state of the French power in Egypt, demand with additional urgency the execution of the measure communicated to your Lordship in my late despatches.

But the event to which I particularly desire to call your Lordship's attention, is the capture of the two Danish frigates as stated in Lord Minto's letter, which under all the circumstances of the case, appears to me to indicate a probability of an early rupture between England and Denmark. In the event of hostilities taking place, it will be of the greatest importance that we should be prepared to act with promptitude and effect against the Danish power in India.

With a view to this event, I request that your Lordship will be pleased to take with all practicable secrecy, such measures as may appear to you best calculated to enable you to possess yourself of the Danish settlement of Tranquebar, at the first moment after you shall have received authentic ad-



troubles from Europe of a rupture with Denmark, and in such a case, I request your Lordship to act instantaneously without waiting for any reference to me.

In the interval, it would be advisable as soon as possible, to carry into effect the measure which your Lordship knows to have been long in contemplation of establishing a resident at Tranquebar, for the purpose of observing the motions and intrigues of the French and Danes. I request your Lordship to select a proper person for that purpose, and to furnish him with credentials; referring to my authority, as well as to that of your Lordship's government, you will direct the resident at Tranquebar to correspond immediately with me, as well as with your Lordship; and you will fix his appointments on such a scale as may appear to your Lordship to be proper.

I also request that your Lordship will immediately transmit a copy of this letter with the papers which accompany it, to Vice-Admiral Rainier, and suggest to his Excellency the importance of directing a vigilant attention to the settlement of Tranquebar, and also of taking such measures as may appear best calculated for defeating any attempts which the numerous ships, and extensive commerce of the Danes in India, may eventually enable that nation to make against the British trade or settlements in the Indian, and the Chinese Seas.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CVII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lieut.-Colonel Close, Resident in Mysore.

SIR,

Fort William, December 24th, 1800.

Although I have not troubled you with any letter for some time past, you will easily believe that my attention has constantly been fixed on the affairs of Mysore, and on the prosperity of your administration of the important trust, which I confided to you, upon the conclusion of the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam. Nearly a year and-a-half has now elapsed since you took charge of your arduous office, and it is with



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the utmost degree of satisfaction that I declare every succeeding month to have furnished me with additional proof of the happiness of my choice in selecting you to fill a station, which affords the most ample field for the display of your various talents, and is equal in importance to any station in India, with the single exception of the governments.

The object of this letter is merely to convey to you, the cordial expressions of my approbation and gratitude; the state of affairs in Mysore does not appear to me to call for any particular instruction from me at present. The Dewan, under your direction, seems to pursue the wisest and most benevolent course for the promotion of industry and opulence, the protection of property, and the maintenance of internal tranquillity and order in Mysore. The external security of the northern and north western frontier, has been greatly strengthened by the successful termination of Colonel Wellesley's rapid and brilliant campaign, and by the great accession of territory which we have lately derived from the new and important treaty with the Nizam. Whenever an effectual plan can be pursued in Malabar for the settlement of that country, I trust that the empire subjected to the Government of Fort St. George, will become the rival of this, in revenue and resources of every description.

I sincerely hope that the state of your health (which I have been concerned to hear was lately deranged) may long enable you to assist in forwarding the great work of consolidating and improving our valuable interests in the Peninsula. You may always rely on my most zealous encouragement, and you shall learn the details of my sentiments on all occasions, which may appear to require my assistance and advice.

I have long entertained the hope of being able to visit Mysore, in the month of February, or March next, and to pass the hot season in that pleasant climate. I have not yet abandoned this plan, although my final determination has been delayed by the unaccountable delay in my brother Henry's return from Europe. If I should visit Mysore, my wish would be to pass the hot season between Bangalore and Seringapatam, principally at the former place.

Believe me, dear Sir,
with great regard and respect,

Your most faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

No. CVIII.

At a General Court of Proprietors, held on the 15th of January, 1801.

The Chairman acquainted the Court, that, the Court of Directors, having had under their consideration the important services rendered to the Company by their present Governor-General, the most noble the Marquess Wellesley, they have resolved, that his Lordship be requested to accept an annuity of £5,000; and which resolution, in conformity to the 19th Section of the 6th Chapter of the Bye Laws, he offers for the approbation of this Court.

The same was read as entered on the proceedings of the Court of Directors of the 10th ultimo, being as follows; viz.

“The Court, taking into consideration the important services rendered to the East India Company by their present Governor-General, the most noble the Marquess Wellesley; the political wisdom and foresight which distinguished his conduct in negotiating and concluding a Treaty with the Soubah of Deccan, whereby a body of 14,000 men, commanded by 124 French officers, was completely disbanded, and the officers made prisoners, thereby removing the cause of great political apprehension, and leaving the army of his Highness at full liberty to act in conjunction with his British allies in the subsequent conquest of Mysore; the zeal and alacrity shewn by his Lordship in proceeding to the coast of Coromandel to forward the equipment of the army, which afterwards effected that glorious achievement, which not only terminated in the destruction of a most implacable enemy, but by which the Company also acquired a very large addition of territorial revenue; the great ability, energy, firmness, and decision displayed by him during the whole of the negotiation with the late Tippoo Suldaun, and the able manner in which the Subsidiary Treaty with the Rajah of Mysore was concluded.

“Resolved, unanimously, that in reward for such eminent services, his Lordship be requested to accept an annuity of £5,000, to issue out of the territorial revenues in India, for the term of twenty years, provided the Company's exclusive

trade shall so long continue, and the territorial revenue shall so long remain in possession of the Company, to commence from the 1st of September, 1798, being the day on which the before mentioned Treaty with the Soubah of Deccan was concluded, and that the same be paid to his Lordship, his Executors, Administrators or Assigns, for the term aforesaid."

The Court taking into consideration the foregoing resolution of the Court of Directors,

It was moved, and on the question being put,

Resolved, that this Court entirely coincide with the sentiments of the Court of Directors as expressed in their resolution now under consideration, bearing date the 10th ultimo, and agree to the proposition therein contained, as a proper testimony of the high sense they entertain of the extraordinary merits and most eminent services rendered by the most noble the Marquess Wellesley to this Company.

No. CIX.

The Marquess Wellesley to Lt.-Col. William Scott, Resident at Lucknow.

SIR,

Fort William, January 22nd, 1801.

1. Having reviewed the series of your correspondence since the commencement of the reform of his Excellency the Vizier's military establishments, my attention has been particularly directed to the declaration made by his Excellency in his letter to you of the 29th of Jummad us Sani, relative to a probability of a failure on his Excellency's part, in providing the necessary funds for the regular payment of the additional troops furnished within the last year for the defence of his Excellency's dominions.

2. If the alarming crisis be now approaching in which his Excellency can no longer fulfil his public engagements to the Company, this calamity must be imputed principally to his Excellency's neglect of my repeated advice and earnest representations. The course of your correspondence manifests that the exertion of his Excellency in the reform of his



LIEUT.-COLONEL W. SCOTT.

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own useless, dangerous, and expensive military establishments, especially of his cavalry, has by no means kept pace with my efforts, to place the security of his Excellency's person and government beyond the reach of foreign and domestic danger. The augmented charges arising from the additional British force specified in the despatch to you from the Secretary in the Secret Department of the 5th of November, 1799, would have been amply provided for by the amount of the reductions which might have been effected in his Excellency's establishment, if his Excellency had vigorously and cordially co-operated with me in the salutary and economical measure of disbanding his own undisciplined, licentious, and disaffected troops.

3. I am perfectly satisfied that every exertion has been employed by you to accelerate the execution of my orders, and that his Excellency's systematic counteraction is the sole cause of the delays which have arisen; his Excellency having, to my knowledge, used every means within his power to frustrate the progress of a reform which he himself had invited, and which he had declared to be indispensable to the security of his person, and to the prosperity of his dominions.

4. The natural consequences of such a policy on the part of the Vizier are now necessarily felt by his Excellency; and it is now become the duty of the British Government to interpose effectually for the protection of his interests, as well as those of the Company, which are menaced with common and speedy destruction by the rapid decline of the general resources of his Excellency's dominions.

5. The Vizier is already apprized that I have long lamented the various defects of the system by which the affairs of his Excellency's Government are administered. Conscious of the same defects, his Excellency has repeatedly expressed a wish to correct them by the assistance of the British Government. I have never been indifferent to his Excellency's wishes on this subject, or insensible of the urgent necessity of an effectual change in the administration of the affairs of Oude; but circumstances, well known to you, have hitherto prevented me from executing all the dictates of my duty with respect to that distressed country, and have compelled me to limit my efforts to a partial reform of his Excellency's military



establishments; providing for the security of his Excellency's dominions and government to the extent of furnishing an efficient and respectable force for their defence and support, and of commencing a proportionate reduction in his Excellency's military establishments.

6. It was always evident that these precautions must prove fruitless if the defects in the civil administration of Oude should be suffered progressively to impair the fundamental resources of the state. The continuance of the present system for a much longer period of time will not only render his Excellency unable to discharge the subsidy on account of the additional troops, but will exhaust the resources of the country to such a degree as to preclude the possibility of realizing the former subsidy.

7. The causes of this increasing defalcation of revenue are manifest, and daily acquire new strength. Had the territories of Oude been subject to the frequent or occasional devastations of an enemy, had they been visited by unfavourable seasons, or by other calamities which impair the public prosperity, the rapid decline of the Vizier's revenues might be imputed to other causes than a defective administration; but no such calamitous visitations have afflicted the province of Oude, while, in consequence of the protection which it derives from the presence of the British forces, it has been maintained, together with all the Company's possessions on this side of India in the uninterrupted enjoyment of peace. A defective administration of the government is, therefore, the only cause which can have produced so marked a difference between the state of his Excellency's dominions and that of the contiguous territories of the Company. While the territories of the Company have been advancing progressively during the last ten years in prosperity, population, and opulence, the dominions of the Vizier, although enjoying equal advantages of tranquillity and security, have rapidly and progressively declined.

8. The operation of these evils has not commenced with the government of Saadut Ali; they necessarily flow from the system of administration which existed at the period of his Excellency's accession to the Musnud. But none of these evils have been diminished under his Excellency's govern-



ment; on the contrary, their daily increase and aggravation are notorious, and must be progressive, to the utter ruin of the resources of Oude, unless the vicious system of the native administration of the country be immediately abandoned. In place of inveterate and growing abuses must be substituted a wise and benevolent plan of government, calculated to inspire the people with confidence in the security of property and of life; to encourage industry; to protect the fruits of honest labour; and to establish order and submission to the just authority of the State, on the solid foundations of gratitude for benefits received, and expectation of continual security.

9. The Vizier must now be prepared for the active and decided interference of the British Government in the affairs of his country. His Excellency has repeatedly complained to me, and to the British Resident at his Court, of the ruinous condition of the internal government of Oude; he has repeatedly and earnestly solicited my direct interference, and has declared such interference to be indispensably necessary for the purpose of effecting a complete reform in his affairs. In the month of November, 1799, his Excellency was so convinced of the incurable defects of his government and of his own utter inability to administer it, that he signified to me, in the most formal manner, his deliberate determination to descend from the Musnud, and to return into private life. He solemnly avowed (not in a moment of temporary anxiety and vexation, but after the most deliberate reflection) "that his mind was utterly withdrawn from the government of a people who were neither pleased with him nor he with them, and with whose evil dispositions, enmity, disobedience, and negligence he was completely disgusted. This resolution, so deliberately adopted, was suddenly abandoned, but the cause of so sudden a change in his Excellency's resolution cannot, unfortunately, be traced to any improvement in the general administration of his affairs, to any augmentation of his means of conducting the Government, or to the consequent establishment of reciprocal confidence and attachment between his Excellency and his people. Could any other fact be alleged to favour such an inference it would be totally precluded by his Excellency's recent statement of the condition of his revenues, and by recent and aggravated symptoms

of the most alarming disaffection towards his person and government.

10. His Excellency's life has been lately attempted under circumstances of the most formidable description. Active and general support has been afforded by his subjects to the impostor who lately assumed the name of Vizier Ali; and the acknowledged temper of his Excellency's people, combined with the state of his government, exposes his situation every hour to increased anxiety, embarrassment, and hazard.

11. Having maturely considered these circumstances with the attention and deliberation which the importance of the subject requires, I am satisfied that no effectual security can be provided against the ruin of the province of Oude, until the exclusive management of the civil and military government of that country shall be transferred to the Company, under suitable provisions for the maintenance of his Excellency and of his family. No other remedy can effect any considerable improvement in the resources of the state, or can ultimately secure its external safety and internal peace.

12. Under this conviction, and with a view to the preservation of the common interests of the Company and of the Vizier, I have determined to propose to his Excellency a new treaty and arrangement similar to that concluded in November, 1799, between the Company and his Highness the Rajah of Tanjore; and also conformable to the plan of the treaty proposed to his Excellency by me, in my letter of the 9th of February, 1800, at the period of his Excellency's proposed abdication of the Government. A copy of the treaty with the Rajah of Tanjore is enclosed; I desire that you will frame from the articles of that treaty, and from the treaty submitted to the Vizier in the month of December, 1799, the plan of such an arrangement, as, while it shall effectually secure all the political benefits described in the eighth paragraph of this despatch, shall also consult, as far as may be compatible with that primary object, the inclinations and prejudices of the Vizier. Having framed such a treaty, you will submit it to his Excellency, and at the same time you will earnestly exhort him to consider the propositions contained in the new arrangement with calm and dispassionate deliberation.



13. If his Excellency should manifest a disposition to adopt the general frame of the proposed arrangement, but should appear desirous of introducing any particular modifications into the proposed treaty, you will receive whatever propositions his Excellency may offer for that purpose, and you will communicate them to me without delay, adding such observations as may occur to you for my further information.

14. On the other hand, if his Excellency should unfortunately be persuaded by the interested councils of evil advisers absolutely to reject the proposed treaty, you will then proceed to inform his Excellency in firm, but respectful language, that the funds for the regular payment of the subsidy to the full extent of the augmented force must be placed, without a moment of delay, beyond the hazard of failure.

15. For this purpose you will require his Excellency to make a cession to the Company in perpetual sovereignty of such a portion of his territories as shall be fully adequate, in their present impoverished condition, to defray those indispensable charges. This cession must be framed upon the same principle which has formed the basis of the late treaty between his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Company, by which his Highness has ceded to the Company in full sovereignty, a country rated at the annual revenue of sixty-two lacs of rupees in commutation for a subsidy of about forty lacs of rupees.

16. With respect to the countries to be ceded, it is sufficiently evident that no other portion of the Vizier's dominions possesses so many political advantages as would be derived to the Company from the possession of the Doab. The cession of that province, including the tribute from Furruckabad, must therefore be required in the first instance. In selecting the other districts which may be necessary (after deducting the charges of collection) to complete the amount of the augmented subsidy it will be advisable to regulate the demand in such a manner as shall place the Vizier beyond the reach of foreign connections and foreign dangers. For this purpose the new possessions of the Company should be so arranged as to surround whatever territory may remain to his Excellency. With this view, the country to be required, in addition to the Doab, must be Rohilcund. The cession of



these two provinces may be made with less violence to the pride and prejudices of the Vizier, inasmuch as they were actually added to the possessions of his family by the British arms. In this respect the arrangement proposed to the Vizier is similar to that concluded with the Nizam. The greater part of the countries ceded to the Company by the Nizam having been originally acquired from the power of Mysore by the assistance of the Company.

17. If the present produce of these two provinces, after deducting the charges of collection, should be deemed unequal to the amount of subsidy to be defrayed, the deficiency must be sought in the countries bordering on the district of Juanpoor; and for this purpose either Azimghur or Gorkuckpoor, or both, must be required.

18. Under such an arrangement, the territories which would remain to the Vizier would probably be sufficiently protected by the position which the Company's troops would necessarily occupy for the defence of the ceded countries; and no division of military force would be required for the express purpose of protecting the Vizier's territory. The continuance, however, of a regiment of native infantry at Lucknow might be expedient as a protection to the person of the Vizier, and a security for the peace of the City. If at any time the state of his Excellency's remaining territories should require the presence of any part of the British force, you would be empowered to issue the requisite orders for that purpose.

19. If the Vizier should manifest a disposition to accede to the first proposal, contained in the eleventh paragraph of this despatch, the transfer of the government will be considerably facilitated by the early adoption of effectual measures for the purpose of conciliating the minds of all persons whose interests or personal consideration may be affected by the dissolution of the existing government. With this view, it will be proper that suitable stipends or pensions should be settled on the principal nobles and officers at present dependent on the Court of Lucknow, as well as on all military officers of rank and particularly on those of the cavalry, who may lose their employments in consequence of the change of government, or of the reduction of the actual military establishments of



Oude. Accordingly you will state for my information and ultimate orders your sentiments with regard to the persons for whom it may be expedient and just to provide; and you will suggest the amount and mode of the provision to be made for the several classes or descriptions of claimants. In the meanwhile, if the state of the negotiation with the Vizier for the relinquishment of the civil and military administration of his dominions, according to the plan of the Treaty of Tanjore, should require your attention to the object of providing for individuals before you can receive any detailed instructions from me on the subject, you will promulgate, in the most distinct manner, such general and particular assurances, in the name of the British Government, as shall appear to you calculated to tranquillize the minds of those affected by the change of the administration.

20th. In considering the measures to be adopted with the views stated in the preceding paragraph, it will occur to you that no proceeding can be more calculated to conciliate all descriptions and classes of people, than a liberal attention to the religious establishments and charitable foundations of the country. I accordingly authorize you in the case supposed to take the necessary steps for affording to the people of Oude the most ample satisfaction on this subject; and I desire that you will furnish me with a statement of such public endowments, of both the Hindoo and Mahommedan religion as you may propose to confirm or to extend.

I am, &c.

WELLESLEY.

No. CX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Vizier of Oude.

Fort William, January 22nd, 1801.

Lieut.-Colonel Scott has furnished me with copies of the letters, and with a report of the different conferences which have lately passed between your Excellency and him on the subject of the subsidy payable by your Excellency, on account



of the additional British troops, of which you have recently received the aid, for the protection of your Excellency's dominions, in conformity to the Treaty of 1798, and to my letter addressed to your Excellency on the 5th of November, 1799.

Your Excellency has distinctly and repeatedly admitted the existence of those dangers, which I have endeavoured to remove by a seasonable augmentation of the efficient military strength of Oude; and I have already demonstrated the right and duty of the British Government to secure the external defence and internal tranquillity of your Excellency's dominions by such an augmentation.

I have also proved the obligation to which your Excellency is subject, by treaty, of providing the necessary funds for the punctual discharge of the expense incident to the augmented force; and your Excellency has not contested the justice or necessity of the motives and principles which have regulated my proceedings on this occasion.

But although your Excellency has not controverted any of the principles on which this important measure has been founded, I observe, with infinite concern, that you have suggested the probability of a failure on your part in providing the necessary funds for the regular payment of the additional troops furnished within the last year for the defence of your Excellency's dominions.

If the alarming crisis be now approaching, in which your Excellency can no longer fulfil your public engagements to the Company, it will be matter of additional regret to me that your Excellency's neglect of my repeated advice will prove the principal cause of your distress: your Excellency's exertion in the reform of your own useless, dangerous, and expensive military establishments, especially of your cavalry, unfortunately has not kept pace with my efforts to place the security of your Excellency's person and government beyond the reach of every danger, foreign and domestic. The augmented charges arising from the additional British force specified in my letter to your Excellency of the 5th of November, 1799, would have been in a great degree provided for by the amount of the reductions which might have been effected in your own establishment, if your Excellency had vigorously and cordially co-operated with me in the salutary and econo-



ineffectual measure of disbanding your own undisciplined, licentious, and disaffected troops.

Your Excellency, however, having pursued a course entirely opposite to your interests and to my advice, by counteracting, to the utmost of your power, the progress of a reform which you had declared to be indispensable, the natural consequences of such a policy are now necessarily felt by you, and it is now become my duty to interpose effectually for the protection of your interests as well as those of the Company. But in reviewing the actual state of your affairs your Excellency has now publicly admitted the existence of additional evils of the utmost magnitude and of the most alarming tendency.

It appears by your Excellency's statements, not only that you are embarrassed by the continuance of the charge of a large portion of your own troops, but that the general resources of your dominions actually decline with a rapidity menacing the joint interests of your Excellency and of the Company in the province of Oude with utter and speedy destruction.

Your Excellency is already apprised that I have lamented the various defects of the system by which the affairs of your Government are administered. Conscious of the same defects, your Excellency has repeatedly expressed a wish for the advice and assistance of the British Government in correcting them. I have never been indifferent to your Excellency's wishes on this subject; or insensible of the urgent necessity of an effectual change in the administration of the affairs of Oude. Circumstances, sufficiently known to your Excellency, have hitherto prevented me from executing all the dictates of my duty with respect to that distressed country; I have hitherto been compelled to limit my efforts to a partial reform of your Excellency's military establishments; providing for the security of your Excellency's dominions and government to the extent of furnishing an efficient and respectable military force for their defence and support, and of commencing a proportionate reduction in your Excellency's military establishments.

It was always evident that these precautions must prove fruitless if the defects of the civil administration of Oude should be suffered progressively to impair the fundamental



resources of the state. The continuance of the present system for a longer period will not only render your Excellency unable to discharge the subsidy on account of the additional troops; but the resources of your Excellency's country would be exhausted to such a degree as to preclude the possibility of your discharging the former subsidy.

Your Excellency has observed that the difficulty with which the collections are made is no secret. This alarming fact has never been a secret to me. I am equally well apprized that these difficulties are experienced not only with aumils* long established in the country, but that every settlement with a new aumil is concluded for a diminished jumma.† The causes of this increasing defalcation of revenue are equally notorious, and daily acquire new strength. Had your Excellency's territories been subject to the frequent or occasional devastations of an enemy—had they been visited by unfavourable seasons, or by other calamities which impair the public prosperity, the rapid decline of your revenues might be imputable to other causes than evil administration; but, under the favour of Providence, no such visitations have afflicted the province of Oude, while the powerful protection of the British forces has maintained your Excellency's dominions, together with all the Company's possessions in this quarter of India, secure from the ravages of war, in the enjoyment of undisturbed tranquillity and peace. What other cause, than evil administration, can have produced so marked a difference between the state of your Excellency's dominions and that of the contiguous territories of the Company? While the Company's territories have been advancing progressively during the last ten years in prosperity, population, and opulence; your Excellency's dominions, enjoying equal advantages of tranquillity and security, with the possessions of the Company, have rapidly and progressively declined. The operation of these evils did not indeed commence with your Excellency's Government. They necessarily flow from the system of administration which existed at the period of your Excellency's accession to the Musnud.‡ But none of these

* Superintendants and collectors of the revenue of districts or provinces.

† Assessment.

‡ Throne.



have diminished under your Excellency's Government; their daily increase and aggravation is evident to the whole world, acknowledged by yourself, and must be progressive to the utter ruin of the resources of Oude, unless the vicious system of Government be immediately abandoned.

In place of inveterate and growing abuses must be substituted a wise and benevolent plan of government, calculated to inspire your Excellency's subjects with confidence in the security of property and of life; to encourage industry, to protect the fruits of honest labour, and to establish order and submission to the just authority of the State on the solid foundations of gratitude for benefits received, and expectation of continual security. I must again remind your Excellency that you have repeatedly complained to me and to the Resident of the ruinous condition of your internal Government; you have repeatedly and earnestly solicited my direct interference, and you have declared it to be indispensably necessary for the purpose of effecting a complete reform in your affairs.

In August 1798, your Excellency informed me that the frame of your Government which had for a long "period of time been *very loose and confused*;" was become in the "last degree" ineffective and "irregular;" adding a request that I would instruct the Company's Resident at Lucknow to afford your Excellency his effectual aid in establishing your authority "on a new basis."

In June 1799 you repeated to me, by letter, the assurances of your anxiety "to establish a systematic settlement of the country, and of the military, for promoting the security and ease of the ryots, the prosperity of the country, and the tranquillity of the people." And you again required that the Resident might be ordered "to assist you in all matters, to the end that you might be thereby enabled to carry on the affairs of your government in a manner to produce ease and satisfaction to your mind."

In the month of November 1799 your Excellency was so convinced of the incurable defects of your Government, and of your own utter inability to administer the affairs of it any longer, that you signified to me in the most formal manner your deliberate determination to descend from the Musnud, and to return into private life. You solemnly avowed, not in



a moment of temporary anxiety and vexation, but after the most deliberate reflection "that your mind was utterly withdrawn from the government of a people who were neither pleased with you, nor you with them; and with whose evil disposition, enmity, disobedience, and negligence you were completely disgusted."

This resolution, adopted with so much deliberation, was suddenly abandoned. I should have rejoiced if the sudden change of your Highness's resolution could have been traced to any improvement in the general administration of your affairs, to any augmentation of your means of conducting the government, and to the consequent establishment of reciprocal confidence and attachment between your Excellency and your people. But this hope is precluded by your Excellency's own recent statement of the condition of your revenues, and by renewed and aggravated symptoms of the most alarming disaffection towards your Excellency's person and government. Your Excellency's life has been lately attempted under circumstances of the most formidable nature; active and general support has been afforded by your subjects to an impostor who recently assumed the name of Vizier Ali, and the acknowledged temper of your people combined with the state of your Government expose your situation every hour to increased hazard, anxiety, and embarrassment.

Having maturely considered the state and condition of Oude with all the attention and deliberation due to the importance of the subject, I am satisfied that no effectual security can be taken against the ruin of that country until your Excellency shall transfer to the exclusive management of the Company the civil and military government of your Excellency's dominions, under such conditions as may effectually secure the affluence and honour of your Excellency and of your illustrious family. I am convinced that no other remedy can materially or permanently improve the resources of the State, or ultimately secure its external safety and internal peace and order. Under the Company's management your subjects would enjoy the rights of property, the honest and vigorous administration of justice, and the security of life; the benefits of a provident and just government now diffused from Bengal to the frontier of Oude, might be extended over that declining country, and the resources of the State would



revive with the vigour of the government, and with the happiness of the people.

Under this conviction, I have communicated to Lieut.-Colonel Scott, in detail, my ideas relative to the measures necessary to be immediately adopted with a view to the preservation of the common interests of your Excellency and of the Company; and I earnestly exhort your Excellency, as you value the happiness and prosperity of your people, the permanent tranquillity of your mind, and your security from the disaffection of a suffering people, to consider the propositions which Lieut.-Colonel Scott will state to you, with calm deliberation.

If your Excellency should be unfortunately persuaded by the interested views of evil advisers to reject the proposals which will be made to you by Lieut.-Colonel Scott, it is my duty to inform your Excellency, that the funds for the regular payment of subsidy, to the full extent of the augmented force, must be placed, without a moment of delay, beyond the hazard of failure. I must, therefore, immediately represent to your Excellency the absolute necessity of making a perpetual cession to the Company of such portion of your Excellency's territories as shall be adequate to defray those indispensable charges.

His Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan has lately ceded to the Company in full sovereignty a country yielding an annual revenue of sixty-two lacs of rupees, in commutation for subsidy. A similar arrangement with your Excellency is absolutely unavoidable, unless you should prefer my first proposition, under any modification, which Lieut.-Colonel Scott may be authorized to make to you for the security, honour, and affluence of your family.

I have furnished Lieut.-Colonel Scott with my instructions relative to the line of territory which it will be desirable that your Excellency should relinquish to the Company in the event of your preferring such an arrangement.

I request your Excellency to be satisfied that the whole course of events in Oude, since your accession, has rendered it my indispensable duty to adhere with firmness to the tenor of this letter, as containing principles from which the British Government never can depart, nor can your Excellency receive, with surprize or concern, a resolution naturally re-

sulting from your own reiterated representations of the confusion of your affairs, and of your inability either to reduce them to order, or to conciliate the alienated affections of your discontented people.

WELLESLEY.

No. CXI.

The Right Hon. Henry Dundas to the Marquess Wellesley.

Downing Street, 6th October, 1800.

[Received 6th February, 1801.]

MY LORD,

By the private letter I received from your Lordship, No. 25, dated the 5th of March* last, and the communications I have since had with Major-General Stuart, I am apprized that the subject of annoying the French army in Egypt, from the Red Sea, has been under your consideration. For that reason, and because I concur in your Lordship's sentiments, as stated in the letter above-mentioned, I feel it the less necessary to enter into any details in this despatch, which cannot indeed be extended to any great length, as it is to be forwarded overland. I shall, therefore, confine myself to shortly stating to your Lordship, that Sir Ralph Abercromby has received his Majesty's orders to proceed up the Mediterranean, and by an attack on Alexandria, and the coast, to co-operate with the Turkish army, assembling in Syria, in whatever plan may be concerted with them for expelling the French from Egypt, and that it is thought expedient that a force should also be sent from India to act in such manner as may appear conducive to that essential object from the side of the Red Sea; with this view, Captain Sir Home Popham, with a proper squadron, will be immediately sent into that Sea, taking with him a regiment from the Cape. His first rendezvous, after leaving that settlement, will be the port of Bombay.

I enclose for your information, the letter I have written to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, on the subject of the expedition under his command, and I am to signify to your Lordship his Majesty's pleasure, that a force of about 1,000 European, and 2,000 native infantry is to be sent from India,



to the proposed place of rendezvous in the Red Sea, with as little delay as possible, to co-operate with Sir Home Popham, in the object of his instructions. The command of these troops should be given to some active and intelligent officer, and care should be taken that they be furnished with every necessary requisite for such a service. I have thought it right to send a copy of this despatch to the Governments of Madras and Bombay. To the latter it is necessary, because Bombay is the most proper place from whence to send the proposed force; but I have thought it likewise proper to send it to Madras, in case upon a full consideration of the places where the force upon the two coasts is at present stationed, it should appear to that Presidency, expedient to make any new arrangement of any part of the army under their Presidency, in order to enable the Bombay Government to detach the requisite force from their coast, without any real inconvenience to the territories under their own immediate charge.

I have directed those two Presidencies to proceed in making those preparations without delay, and even to carry these orders into execution without waiting for your Lordship's directions if they are ready in other respects.

If nothing unforeseen occurs to prevent or retard it, I hope that the armament under Sir Ralph Abercromby, will reach the coast of Egypt, in the month of December, and that Sir Home Popham may arrive in the Gulph of Arabia, in the month of February. It is, therefore, earnestly recommended, that the forces from India may join them, as soon after as possible; for this reason it will be desirable that you should not wait till the troops are all collected, if it will save time to forward them in two or three distinct detachments.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's
most obedient, humble servant,
HENRY DUNDAS.



THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS, TO

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(*Enclosure in the foregoing Letter.*)

To the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

MY LORDS,

Downing Street, 6th October, 1800.

It being judged expedient, that measures should forthwith be taken for dispossessing the French of Cosheir, Suez, and any other ports and places they may now occupy upon the coast of the Red Sea, and to encourage the inhabitants of the countries bordering on that part of Egypt, to assist in expelling them from the whole of that province. I am commanded to signify to your Lordships, his Majesty's pleasure that a ship of war, of not less than fifty guns, together with such armed troop-ships, as may be competent to the accommodation and conveyance of a regiment of not less than 800 men destined to assist in this service, are forthwith to be fitted for foreign service and sent to the Cape, where the said regiment is to be embarked.

It will also be necessary that the troop-ships in question, should in the first instance, convey another regiment, amounting to at least the same number of men from this country to the Cape; and it is, therefore, his Majesty's pleasure that your Lordships should give directions, and make the necessary arrangements accordingly,

Your Lordships will not fail to select for this service, an officer of acknowledged enterprize and ability. And with respect to the instructions with which he is to be furnished from your Lordships, it is his Majesty's pleasure, that after receiving on board the regiment, which the commanding officer at the Cape will be ordered to embark, he should be directed to make the best of his way into the Red Sea; and on his arrival there, to endeavour to procure intelligence respecting the number of the enemy at Coshier and Suez, and the state of defence of each of those places. Should the reports he may receive on these points be such as, in his judgment, and that of the officer commanding the land forces, to warrant an immediate landing and attack on one or both of these places, no time is to be lost in making the attempt, and should it prove successful, they are to make the best arrangements in their power for retaining possession of the same. As soon as in this, or in any other manner, a secure footing shall have been obtained in the country, or sooner if possible, every proper method is to be used to conciliate the inhabitants to our interests, and to induce them to make a common cause with us against the enemy. In order to enable them to do this with more effect, it will probably be necessary to supply them with arms and ammunition, and I shall, therefore, give orders, that a certain proportion of side-arms, muskets and cartridges, shall be sent on board the ships of the squadron with a view to this object.

Supposing the enemy to be driven from Suez, Coshier, and the whole coast, it will then remain for the respective commanding officers, of the land and sea forces, to take every method in their power for harrassing and annoying them in any other posts they may retain in Upper Egypt, and to prevail upon the Arabs, the Mamelukes and other troops, in that part of the country, to act against the French (wherever they may take post,) with union and vigour, until they can be finally expelled from Cairo, and



the remainder of the province; giving the Beys, or other officers, having command in those countries, such advice and assistance as may appear best adapted for this purpose. Upon this point, as well as upon every other which relates to the mode and detail of proceeding in the execution of the services I have pointed out as the objects of this expedition, much latitude must be left to the discretion and judgment of the commanding officers; and it is therefore impossible for me to do more than point out, as I have already done, the views for the attainment of which the plan has been formed, and to add that they are to be pursued with the utmost vigour, and by every means that may suggest themselves to the ingenuity of the commanding officers, provided only they are not inconsistent with those usages, which are deemed fair and honourable between nations in a state of war.

It is intended that the land forces to be sent from the Cape, should be reinforced as soon as possible, by another regiment of Europeans, and about 2,000 sepoys from India. It will be right, that the commanding naval officer should be apprized of this circumstance, in order that he may suspend until their arrival, the proposed attacks against Cosheir and Suez, unless the prospect of success with the regiment from the Cape, is so satisfactory as to warrant the attempt, without waiting for a further reinforcement.

Should this last division of troops on the other hand, find our forces in possession of Suez and Cosheir, they will be employed from thence in making diversions in Upper Egypt, and in annoying and harrassing the enemy, as much as possible in conformity to the suggestions already mentioned in these instructions.

In the event (not impossible) of the French having actually evacuated Egypt, before the arrival of the expedition in the Red Sea, the troops must be carried back to their former station, and the ships in that case, may be disposed of for such other services as your Lordships may think proper; but should Cosheir and Suez be retaken from the enemy, by his Majesty's forces, the one or the other, as may appear most commodious for the troops, and shipping, is for the present, and until further orders can be transmitted from this country, to be retained by a detachment of his Majesty's forces, the commanding officer, however, taking care in order to avoid all jealousies, to have it understood that he remains there, not from any intention of interfering with the right of sovereignty vested in the Ottoman Porte, or with the rights and privileges of the native princes, or their subjects; but that from considerations of military precaution, with a view to our Indian interests, which cannot appear extraordinary after what has happened, the British troops cannot be withdrawn without further authority from home.

Your Lordships will not fail to direct the commanding naval officer, and through him, all other officers serving under him, to maintain and cultivate the friendship and good understanding now existing with the native princes and powers of Asia, having ports or territories upon the coast of the Red Sea.

You will also direct the said officer to transmit a detailed report of his proceedings by every opportunity, for his Majesty's information, and to

correspond with the Company's Governor at Bombay, or with the Governor-General in council, who will give the necessary directions to furnish him with any supplies of which he may stand in need, and to pay every attention to such requisitions as he may make for the advancement of the service on which he is employed.

I am, my Lord,

Your Lordships most obedient
humble servant,

HENRY DUNDAS.

No. CXII.

Lieut.-General Lake, Commander-in-Chief, to the Marquess Wellesley.

Madras, January 29th, 1801.

MY LORD,

[Received 10th February, 1801.]

I have the honour to inform your Lordship of my arrival this day at Madras, and to assure your Lordship, I shall take the earliest opportunity of proceeding to Calcutta, unless I receive your orders to the contrary.

Permit me to acknowledge to your Lordship, how particularly gratified I feel by the very extreme flattering manner you have signified your approbation of my appointment to the high command in this country, and I beg you will believe that in every instance, you shall find me anxiously zealous to attend to your wishes, and carry into effect any service you may think proper to entrust to,

Your Lordship's
most faithful and obedient Servant,
G. LAKE.

No. CXIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to Major-General Baird.

SIR,

Fort William, February 10, 1801.

At the moment of closing my instructions of the 5th of February to you respecting the destination of the armament assembled at Trincomalé and Point de Galle, I received, overland, despatches from the right honourable Mr. Dundas, apprizing me that his Majesty had determined to adopt the most active measures for the expulsion of the French from Egypt. I enclose a copy of those despatches, which consist



of a letter addressed to me by Mr. Secretary Dundas, under date the 6th of October, 1800,* and of a letter from Mr. Dundas to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty of the same date.

You will observe, that a force, consisting of fifteen thousand men, under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby has been ordered to proceed up the Mediterranean Sea for the purpose of co-operating with the Turkish army assembled on the frontier of Syria, with a view of attacking the French in Egypt. The force under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby was expected to arrive on the coast of Egypt in the month of December last.

You will likewise observe, that his Majesty has been pleased to order that a force be immediately assembled in the Red Sea with the view of dispossessing the French of the ports and places which they occupy on the coasts of that Sea, and of creating a diversion in favour of the combined British and Turkish armies acting on the side of the Mediterranean.

The naval branch of the armament which his Majesty has been pleased to order to be assembled in the Red Sea has been entrusted to Captain Sir Home Popham, who was to be despatched from England in the command of one of his Majesty's ships, accompanied by transports, having on board one of his Majesty's regiments destined to replace one of the regiments at the Cape of Good Hope.

From Mr. Secretary Dundas's letter, it appears, that Sir Home Popham is instructed to proceed from the Cape of Good Hope with a regiment to be drawn from that garrison, directly to Mocha, at which port he was expected by Mr. Dundas to arrive in the course of the present month.

His Majesty has been pleased to signify his pleasure that the remainder of the military force required for the operations in the Red Sea be provided from India; and Mr. Secretary Dundas has desired that this force may consist of one thousand Europeans and two thousand native infantry.

I certainly expected that his Majesty's commands would have reached me at an earlier period of the season; in which

* See page 436.



event, the preparations made under my orders at Ceylon, Madras and Bombay, would have enabled me to execute his Majesty's intentions at the most favourable season for the navigation of the Red Sea.

The early preparations made at Ceylon, Madras and Bombay, will enable me even now to move a force towards Egypt within the present season; a movement which would have been utterly impracticable, if timely provision had not been made for the eventual execution of his Majesty's commands.

I have already observed, that Mr. Secretary Dundas appears to have calculated on the arrival of Sir Home Popham at Mocha in the course of the month of February; but it is scarcely possible for that officer to arrive at Mocha before the conclusion of the month of March, or the commencement of April. At that period the passage up the Red Sea, although practicable, is attended with delay and difficulty; and if the force ordered to be despatched from India should wait at Mocha for the arrival of Captain Popham, it is scarcely to be expected that any seasonable or effectual aid could be afforded from the operations of the proposed armament on the shores of the Red Sea, to the British and Turkish forces acting on the side of the Mediterranean.

These considerations, and my conviction that the expulsion of the French from Egypt, is indispensably necessary to the future security of the British empire in India, have determined me to relinquish for the present the projected expeditions against Batavia and the Isle of France; and to employ immediately on the shores of the Red Sea the whole force which I had collected at Trincomalé and Point de Galle, together with 1,600 native infantry, which have been holden in readiness for foreign service at Bombay under my orders of the 23rd of October, 1800. This service was the original destination of the armament at Ceylon, Madras and Bombay; but I always considered the previous assurance of an effectual concert and co-operation from the side of the Mediterranean to be indispensably requisite to justify the employment of any considerable force from India in the Red Sea.

Being now satisfied that a large British army will speedily act from the shores of the Mediterranean, I am resolved not to wait for the arrival of Sir Home Popham, but to apply whatever disposable force I can furnish in anticipating the



object of his Majesty's commands, by making an early and powerful diversion on the shores of the Red Sea.

It is my intention, that the forces destined for the Red Sea shall be commanded in chief by you, and that the Honourable Colonel Wellesley shall be the second in command on that important expedition.

It is proper to apprise you that Rear-Admiral Blankett sailed from Bombay for the Red Sea on the 28th of December last, in consequence of my secret advices.

The Rear-Admiral is accompanied by 240 European infantry (belonging to the 86th regiment,) 50 European artillery, 20 gun lascars, 1 engineer officer, and 100 marine sepoys; the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd. The period for which these troops were victualled has not been stated to me.

Besides the troops specified in the foregoing paragraph, Rear-Admiral Blankett was accompanied from Bombay by the armament noted in the margin.*

The armament under Rear-Admiral Blankett may be expected to produce all the effect of an advanced guard to that which is to proceed under you and Colonel Wellesley; and the early appearance of the Rear-Admiral in the Red Sea must influence the conduct of the French in Egypt.

The force, which is now placed under your command, is noted in the margin.†

You are already apprized, that the corps at Ceylon are in readiness to embark at the shortest notice. You will be able to command tonnage for the embarkation of 1,900 Europeans and 1,000 native sepoys; for the conveyance of the remainder

* One frigate (*Bombay* frigate), two bomb vessels (the *Drake* and *Strombolo*), three small cruisers (*Fly*, *Antelope*, and *Alert*), one armed vessel (*Bombay Merchant*, 450 tons), one store ship (*Adam Smith*), two brigs (*Fortune* and *Friendship*, from one to two hundred tons each,) capable of being converted into fire ships. One launch, fitted as a gun-boat, with a 24-lb. carronade, three ketches (of about 150 tons each), two armed boats (of about 80 tons each.)

† At Ceylon His Majesty's 10th regiment, 1,000 strong, 19th reg. 750 strong, 80th reg. 750 strong; 86 and 88th detachments, 500; total rank and file, 3,000; Bengal native volunteers, 1,000; European and native artillery, about two companies, with Lascars attached. At Bombay, 1,600 native infantry, European artillery, about one company, with draft and carriage bullocks attached.



I rely on his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier, although, after the junction of the *Candidate*, *Anstruther* and *Cecilia*, I conclude that you will possess ample means of accommodating all the troops, even without his Excellency's assistance, beyond the port of Mocha.

Orders have been despatched to the Government of Bombay to direct the corps of 1,600 native infantry, now in readiness at that Presidency for foreign service, to proceed, with all practicable expedition, from Bombay to Mocha, there to wait the arrival of the armament, from the Island of Ceylon.

You are apprized that the provisions for the European and native troops assembled at Ceylon, including the supplies, proceeding on the *Byramgore*, are sufficient for their subsistence to the end of June or middle of July. The native troops ordered to be embarked from Bombay will be victualled, in the first instance, for six months, which, supposing that division to sail from Bombay on the 1st of March, will subsist them to the end of August. Immediate measures will be taken to complete the supplies of provisions and of all necessary articles for all the troops under your command, to the end of the month of November, and also for the native troops directed to proceed from Bombay.

The first additional supply will proceed from hence in a few days to Trincomalé, in the ship *Candidate*, which will be laden with provisions of every kind for 500 Europeans, for a period of three months, and a proportion (to be hereafter stated) of provisions for the native troops. This ship will soon be followed by the ships *Anstruther* and *Cecilia*, on which will be embarked salt provisions for 3,000 Europeans, for a period of two months and ten days, and of all other articles for three months.

On these three ships are embarked a considerable quantity of the articles noted in the margin.*

The departure of the troops from Ceylon for Mocha, and from thence to the several points on the coasts of the Red Sea, where they may be required to act against the enemy, is not to be delayed for these additional supplies, which will follow you with all possible expedition.

Directions will be sent to the Company's Agent at Mocha

* Potatoes, cheese, and porter.



to furnish you with such supplies of money and provisions, as he may be able to command.

You will, of course, take with you the whole military chest consisting of the supply of treasure already transmitted to Colonel Wellesley, and of that actually on board the *Phoenix*.

I enclose a copy of my letter, of this date, to his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier, who, I am persuaded, will co-operate cordially with me, on the present occasion, to the fullest extent of his means.

His Excellency will determine on the number and description of his Majesty's ships, which it may be proper to employ on the present service.

In consequence of the deficiency of tonnage assembled at the Island of Ceylon, it will be desirable that his Excellency should receive a proportion of the troops on board of his Majesty's ships, and should convey them to the place of their destination in the Red Sea.

The *Candidate*, a country ship of 670 tons, will proceed from hence in a few days to Trincomalé, in aid of the tonnage, for the conveyance of the troops. The *Anstruther*, of 654 tons, and *Cecilia*, of 478 tons, laden with provisions, and also each capable of conveying about 220 Europeans, will proceed from hence about the middle of February. The period of the departure of these ships will be too late to admit of employing them in the transportation of any proportion of the troops from Ceylon. But if it should be found necessary, they may be applied to this purpose in the Red Sea. These ships, as well as all others which shall be sent in succession, with provisions for your army, whether from this presidency or from any of the other settlements in India, will be directed to repair directly to Mocha, and eventually to Judda, and at either port, to conform to such orders as they shall receive, either from you or from the naval commanding officer.

Immediately upon the receipt of these despatches, you will proceed directly to Ceylon, and from thence you will prosecute your voyage with the utmost practicable expedition to Mocha in the Red Sea, with the whole of the military forces and transports now assembled at Trincomalé and at Point de Galle.

The attainment of the important objects proposed by employing an armament to act on the coasts of the Red Sea will