



depend, in a great degree, on the timely arrival of the troops, at their several destinations, on those coasts. In order, therefore, to ensure to the armament a safe and expeditious passage up the Red Sea, the advanced period of the season requires that you should exert every effort to expedite the departure of the armament from Ceylon to Mocha, and from thence to the places of its ulterior destination.

I entertain no doubt that his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier will afford the aid of the requisite number of his Majesty's ships; but if his Excellency, contrary to my expectation, should either decline to furnish the requisite aid, or should be unable to furnish it instantly on your arrival at Trincomalé, it is my positive order that your departure be not delayed an hour on that account.

To preclude all misunderstanding on this subject, I hereby direct you and Colonel Wellesley, instantly after your arrival at Trincomalé, to proceed to Mocha with such troops as you may be able to accommodate in the ships now engaged or attainable at Ceylon.

If, under these orders, you should be compelled to leave at Ceylon any portion of the troops, hereby placed under your command, you will appoint a proper officer to conduct those troops, after you, to Mocha, with all practicable despatch; but I further order and direct that the officer so appointed do not wait for convoy or other aid from his Excellency the Vice-Admiral, but do proceed to join you at Mocha, without delay, as soon as the transports shall be ready for the conveyance of troops.

If on your arrival at Mocha you should find Sir Home Popham at that port, you will concert with him the operations to be undertaken by your united forces. If Sir Home Popham should not have arrived at Mocha, you will, as soon as possible, proceed to join the squadron of Rear-Admiral Blankett; and having joined the Rear-Admiral, you will concert the measures proper to be adopted, with a view to the annoyance of the enemy in Egypt, and to the most beneficial co-operation with the forces acting from the Mediterranean.

On your arrival in the Red Sea, you will endeavour to procure intelligence respecting the state of the enemy's force at Suez and at Cosseir; and also respecting the condition of the defences of each of those places; should the reports which you





may receive be such as to warrant (in your judgment, and in that of the officer commanding the sea forces, with which you shall have effected a junction) an immediate landing and attack on one or both of these places, you will immediately make the attempt; and if it should prove successful, you will proceed, in concert with his Majesty's naval officer, to form an arrangement for retaining possession of either or both places, as circumstances may admit.

At the earliest possible period of time you will employ every proper method to conciliate the inhabitants of the coasts of the Red Sea or of Egypt to our interests, and to induce them to make a common cause with us against the enemy. In order to facilitate and strengthen their means of acting with us, it may be necessary to distribute arms and ammunition. His Majesty's Ministers have, therefore, directed a supply of muskets, side arms, and musket ammunition, to be sent on board the ships of Sir Home Popham's squadron, with a view to this object.

With respect, however, to the expediency of arming any considerable number of the natives, you and the officer commanding the naval force will exercise your joint discretion.

If the enemy should be driven from Suez, Cosseir, and the whole coast of the Red Sea, it will then remain for the commanding officers of the land forces to employ every method in their power for the annoyance of the enemy in any other posts which they may retain in Upper Egypt; and to engage the Arabs, the Mamelukes, and other troops in that quarter to act against the French, with union and vigour, until the final expulsion of the French army from Cairo, and from the remainder of the province can be effected, giving the Beys or other officers holding command in those countries, such advice and assistance as may appear best adapted for this purpose.

Although considerable difficulty may at first be experienced in moving your forces into the interior parts of the country, I trust that the strength of the force will effectually secure its safety against any attempts of the enemy. You must draw your supplies of provisions, and even of water, in some positions from the ships, but the whole coast will be under your command. Such part of the force as may be able to move in the country will derive additional security from the support





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of the remainder, stationed on the coast; and while the magnitude of the armament must contribute to alarm and distract the enemy, its strength will afford additional confidence to the chiefs and inhabitants of the country, and will render them more desirous to break the French yoke, and to join the British cause.

On these points, as well as on every circumstance relating to the mode and detail of proceeding in the execution of the present service, much latitude must necessarily be left to the discretion of the commanding officers of the sea and land forces. It is impossible for me, at this distance, and in this stage of the plan, to enter into more minute detail. The views of his Majesty's Ministers, in the present expedition, are plainly stated in Mr. Secretary Dundas's despatches. I can only add my confidence that his Majesty's views will be pursued with the utmost vigour, and by every means consistent with the received usages of war.

You will employ the earliest exertions for the purpose of opening a safe and speedy communication with the commanders of his Majesty's naval and military forces intended to be employed against the enemy in Egypt from the side of the Mediterranean. On this subject you will receive information from Rear-Admiral Blankett.

It is possible that, before the arrival of the armament from India in the Red Sea, the French may have been compelled to evacuate Egypt. In this case, or if you should find that the troops from India cannot possibly act with effect on the side of the Red Sea, I desire that your whole force, or such part as you may judge necessary, should be employed with all practicable expedition in the reduction of the Isles of France and Bourbon, or of Batavia; or successively of both places, according as the condition of the armament, at the period of withdrawing from the Red Sea, shall appear to recommend in the judgment of the naval and military officers acting with you on this expedition.

In any of these cases, I direct you to act as Commander-in-Chief, and Colonel Wellesley as second in command. If you should reduce the French Islands, Colonel Wellesley will remain in the government and command of those colonies, and you will either proceed to Batavia, or return with the troops to the most accessible port of India or Ceylon, according to





the season. You will receive from me constant advices of the state and strength both of the French Islands and of Batavia.

Previous to your departure from the Red Sea, in the cases supposed, you will leave sufficient garrisons to retain Suez and Cosseir, or any other port or place in Egypt, or on the coast of the Red Sea, which you and the commander of the naval forces acting with you, may judge it advisable to retain in conformity to the tenor of Mr. Secretary Dundas's despatches herewith enclosed.

Notwithstanding every exertion which can be made by this Government, and by the other Presidencies of India, it may not be practicable to supply you amply and seasonably on the coasts of the Red Sea, with the provisions necessary for the troops under your command. In this case it will be proper that you should exercise your discretion, and if you should find any danger of a deficiency of your supplies, and should receive no certain accounts from India of additional supplies, being in progress to the Red Sea, you will relinquish your situation in that quarter, and you will return to such port of India, as may be most accessible, at the period of your return; leaving, if you should judge proper, on a consultation with the naval commanding officer, such military detachment in the Red Sea as may be sufficient to occupy the ports of Suez, Cosseir, or any other of the ports in that Sea.

I am fully aware of the difficulties which must be encountered in furnishing your army with the necessary supplies, and with the means of ready movement, in the event of your effecting a landing at Suez or Cosseir.

To establish a systematic plan of supplying your army, when landed on the coasts of the Red Sea, I have made the following additional arrangements.

I have appointed Mr. Charles Stokes Agent for the care and despatch of supplies for the use of your armament, to reside either at Mocha, or at such place as you may direct, on the coast of the Red Sea, for the purpose of conducting the whole detail of the supplies of your army. I shall forward from this port, and I shall order the governments of Fort St. George, Bombay and Ceylon, to forward, respectively, in armed ships to Mocha, and from thence to any other appointed depôt, such provisions and other articles as may





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be requisite for your use, consigned to the charge of Mr. Stokes, who will take the charge of forwarding them to your order.

You will not only apprise all the respective governments of India of any actual defect of your present stores, but you will state your probable future wants, and the nature of the particular articles, of which you are likely to require a constant and regular supply.

With respect to the means of your eventual movements in Egypt, I have it in contemplation to despatch to you a large supply of horses from the western coasts of India; to which I propose to add a proportion of horse artillery; a certain number of draft and carriage bullocks will accompany the detachment proceeding from Bombay; and I shall endeavour to add a proportion of camels. You will receive further details from me on this branch of the subject, upon your arrival at Mocha. As Colonel Wellesley is particularly conversant with the means which can be afforded from the peninsula of India for the movement of your army, I direct him to report his opinion on this subject to you and to me, and to transmit, by land and sea, without delay, the report by express to Fort William.

To this report I direct that all such observations may be added as may occur to you, to Colonel Wellesley, or to any intelligent officer in the departments of the army, connected with its movement. You will also advert to those means of aiding the movement of your army which can be furnished from Bengal. On this branch of the subject, I also authorize you to make such immediate applications as may appear to be requisite, to me, and to all or any of the subordinate governments; they will be directed to comply with your applications as soon as may be possible.

I have the honour to enclose the necessary powers from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, for enabling you to assemble general courts martial.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

WELLESLEY.

P. S. I expect to be enabled to despatch to you, by the *Anstruther*, the following horse artillery, completely provided





with horses, &c.; one twelve-pounder, three six-pounders, two three-pounders, twenty European gunners and matrosses, and twenty-four golundauz, with the necessary proportion of gun lascars.

## No. CXIV.

*The Marquess Wellesley to Major-General Baird.*

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Fort William, 10th February, 1801.

You will find by your instructions of this date,\* that your present destination is to the Red Sea and Egypt, for the purpose of co-operating in the great object of expelling the French from that most important position. A more worthy sequel to the storm of Seringapatam could not be presented to your genius and valour. I have chosen my brother to second you in this glorious enterprize, and I rely on your giving the public the full benefit of his talents, by admitting him to your most cordial confidence, and by uniting harmoniously and zealously with him in the prosecution of my wishes. I have manifested an honourable confidence in you by selecting you for this service, which if successful, will attract the applause and admiration of the whole world. In return I claim from you the full benefit for myself and my country, not only of your services, but of those of my brother, and of all the gallant and able officers whom he has brought with him to the army. I desire that you will arrange some mode of confirming in active and honourable stations the whole of his staff, and of those who have accompanied him. I recommend it to you also to employ Lieut-Colonel Murray of the 84th, whom I shall send to Mocha; he has been active, and has manifested ability at Suez and Aden; I also recommend Captain Wilson, Aid-du-Camp to Mr. Duncan, on the same grounds of experience in the affairs of Arabia and Egypt. May the same providential protection which accompanied you to the gates of Tippoo Sultaun's palace,

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\* See preceding letter.





conduct you to Cairo; and may you be the happy instrument of completing the exclusion of the French from India; a work so nobly commenced in Mysore. Remember that the harmony and cordial union of our counsels in the field, were the main sources of all our triumphs in that glorious war, which has rendered your name memorable in the annals of your country; for the rest, I have no apprehension; and I trust you will preserve my favourable opinion, by preserving unanimity in your army.

Believe me, my dear General,

Your obliged friend, and faithful servant,  
WELLESLEY.

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No. CXV.

*Minute by the Governor-General.\**

Fort William, February 12th, 1801.

The communications, now recorded by Sir Alured Clarke, afford me the opportunity of requesting his Excellency, to accept my grateful acknowledgment of the assistance which I have received from him in the discharge of the various duties of this extensive government, under all the extraordinary occurrences of the three last years 1798, 1799, 1800.

In the course of those years, I have frequently resorted to his Excellency's assistance on many important questions, not immediately connected with the military department; and in the most arduous crisis of the affairs of the British empire in India; during the late memorable war, the principal charge of the affairs of this Presidency was administered by his Excellency to my entire satisfaction, and to the considerable advancement of the public service. I cannot more fully explain my sense of Sir Alured Clarke's zealous and beneficial co-operation during that critical period of time, than by annexing to this minute,

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\* The Governor-General's Minutes of the 12th of February are inserted a little out of their date in order to preserve the continuity of the instructions relative to the Red Sea Expeditions.—ED.





a copy of my separate letter addressed to the honourable the Court of Directors, under date the 27th of January, 1800.\*

I shall always retain a just estimation of my personal obligations to his Excellency, for the aid which he has contributed towards the promotion of the objects of my administration; and my sincere good wishes will ever accompany him. The despatch from his royal Highness the Duke of York, recorded on the proceedings of this day, furnishes an ample testimony of the consideration with which Sir Alured Clarke's services in India are regarded by his Majesty; I entertain a confident expectation, and a sincere desire, that his Excellency's return to England, from his long and honourable career of foreign service, may be attended by every circumstance, which can enhance to him the satisfactory reflection of having merited the approbation of the East India Company, of his king, and of his country.

WELLESLEY.

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No. CXVI.

*Minute by the Governor-General.*

Fort William, February 12th, 1801.

I cannot receive the notification of Mr. Cowper's intended departure from India, without offering to him a public tribute of my sense of the zealous and honourable support which I have received from him in all the arduous trials of difficulty, and danger, to which the British empire in India has been exposed during the period of my administration. On every occasion of public emergency, I have found in Mr. Cowper the most earnest desire to co-operate in the important measures, and exertions which the crisis required, and to strengthen the hands of the government, by an uniform and unabated continuance of honourable confidence, of firmness, and of public spirit. I cannot forget that the nature of the legal powers of the Government of Bengal, during my absence on the Coast

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\* See p. 200.





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of Coromandel, was such, as to entitle Mr. Cowper to a just proportion of the gratitude due from myself, and from the public to that government.

I trust that my sincere thanks will be acceptable to Mr. Cowper; and that he will receive with satisfaction the expression of my wish, that the honourable the Court of Directors, should consider Mr. Cowper's assistance and cordial support to have contributed in a great degree, to the ease of my Government, and the success of that system of measures, which has been distinguished by the honour of their approbation.

WELLESLEY.

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No. CXVII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Jonathan Duncan.*

SIR,

Fort William, February 16th, 1801.

It is of the utmost importance that measures should be immediately adopted for supplying the army under the command of Major-General Baird, with the means of moving with promptitude and facility, in carrying on military operations by land.

Those means, unless procurable in the country in which the troops may be acting, must be principally supplied from Bombay; and I, therefore, request you will immediately turn your attention to the important object of collecting draft and carriage bullocks, camels, horses, and every article necessary for the above-mentioned purpose, and of providing tonnage for their transportation. You will be pleased to ascertain, and report to me, as speedily as possible, what supplies of this description you think it practicable to collect at Bombay, or on the western side of India; but it is desirable that you should immediately employ your utmost exertions towards the attainment of this important object, and that you should forward any supplies procured, to Mocha without waiting for further instructions from me.





I also request that you will consider of the means of opening a safe and speedy communication with Sir Ralph Abercromby, and that you will contribute, as far as lies in your power, to the speedy and regular transmission of advices from the Red Sea.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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No. CXVIII.

*Major-General Baird, to the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY LORD,

On board the Phoenix, 22nd February, 1801

Your Lordship's instruction to me of the 10th instant, I have perused with much attention, as well as the letters to which they refer, pointing out many and serious difficulties. I beg to assure your Lordship, that every possible exertion will be used on my part to surmount them; as yet, I have never met with any that were not to be got the better of by a steady perseverance, and I hope I shall not on this occasion. The greatest difficulties we shall have to encounter are a regular supply of provisions, and the means of moving with celerity, but as these depend on your Lordship's foresight, and from the arrangements you have already made, I have no doubt we shall be enabled to surmount them. It is unnecessary to say more at present, than that the most vigorous measures shall be adopted to endeavour to carry into full effect the grand object of the expedition; and to assure your Lordship, that the talents of your brother, as well as of every other officer shall have full scope; trust me my Lord, I harbour no little jealousy. All in my breast is zeal for my king and country.

I will endeavour to make such an arrangement for the employment of those officers intended for the staff by Colonel Wellesley, as I hope will meet with your Lordship's approbation.

I have now to request your Lordship's acceptance of my warmest acknowledgements, for the very handsome and





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friendly manner you have been pleased to express yourself towards me, and particularly on this occasion in your private letter of the 10th instant.\*

I have the honour to be,

with most sincere regard and respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful friend,  
and obedient servant,

D. BAIRD.

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No. CXIX.

*Lord Clive to the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort St. George, 25th Feb. 1801.

It was my original intention to have addressed your Lordship, in council, upon the subject of the present despatch; but, reflecting that so formal a communication might convey an appearance of gloom that may not be necessary, I judge it expedient to make application to your Lordship for an increase of native troops, through the channel of my private correspondence, being convinced that when your Lordship is fully apprized of the extent and urgency of our wants, they will receive your utmost consideration; and that provided the Bengal Government shall enable your Lordship to furnish the means, we shall not remain long without the requisite assistance. It has been no small mortification to me to have seen the attainment of internal tranquillity almost within our grasp, and to have been unavoidably baffled in the accomplishment of that object by the want of a sufficient body of troops. It is probable that two thousand effective troops, which I hope Colonel Stevenson's successes will, ere long, enable him to detach, would terminate the confusions in Dindigul: and that the addition of two thousand men for which I anxiously look to your Lordship, would produce effects equally beneficial in the circars.

Captain James Bryant has marched to the southward with ninety of my body-guard, including the men attached to the

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\* See p. 451.





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two gallopers, in a state of high order and efficiency; and I am sanguine that when they and the other troops ordered to reinforce Major Macaulay shall have reached their destination, a good account will soon be given of the rebellious Polygars in Tinnivelly.

I remain, with the greatest esteem,

My dear Lord,

most faithfully your's,

CLIVE.

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No. CXX.

*The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Lieut.-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, K.B., Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's Forces in Egypt.*

SIR,

Fort William, February 28, 1801.

By an over-land despatch which reached me on the 6th instant,\* I have been apprized of the important expedition destined, under your command, to effect the expulsion of the French from Egypt. By the same despatch I have had the honour to receive his Majesty's commands, signified to me by the right honourable Henry Dundas, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, directing me to furnish a force from India for the purpose of co-operating on the coast of the Red Sea with an armament under Captain Sir Home Popham, and of attempting a diversion in favour of the forces acting from Syria and from the coasts of the Mediterranean.

I have the honour to enclose, for your information, extracts of my instructions to Major-General Baird under date the 10th instant, which will apprise you of the measures adopted under my orders for the execution of his Majesty's commands.†

My views of the proposed expedition, and the foundation and objects of my instructions to Major-General Baird, and of their enclosures, may be more fully explained by the following remarks:

It appears improbable that the armament under Sir Home Popham will reach Mocha before the commencement of the

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\* See p. 436.

† See p. 440.





month of April, or in any event, before the conclusion of the month of March, 1801.

The navigation up the Red Sea is difficult in April, and extremely precarious from May until August, when the southerly winds re-commence; but it is not absolutely impracticable to a good ship at any period of the season.

Sir Home Popham's squadron may, therefore, possibly reach the northern coasts of the Red Sea early in the month of May, but probably will not arrive before the month of June, 1801.

The difficulties of supplying an army proceeding from the Indian Seas to the coast of the Red Sea are considerable. Supplies of every kind must accompany any force acting in that direction, and in some positions (particularly at Cosseir) the troops on shore must depend on the ships, even for the ordinary supply of water.

The necessity of furnishing such supplies leads to consequences which require the most particular and minute attention. Whatever may be the disposable force in India, it would be impracticable at any season to move any considerable division of that force towards the Red Sea without preparations of a nature which would require long previous notice, and which must occupy a great space of time. This difficulty arises, in a great degree, from the scarcity of salt provisions in India; no depôt of salt provisions exists in any part of our possessions equal to the supply of any large body of Europeans, even for the period of six months; the means of procuring a larger quantity of this necessary article are always precarious, and are limited by the nature of the climate, which precludes the possibility of salting provisions at any port in India from the month of February to that of November.

The tedious and precarious navigation up the Red Sea from April to August (during the prevalence of the northerly winds), and the equal difficulty of returning down the Red Sea (during the prevalence of the southerly winds), from August to April, render it an indispensable precaution to furnish any army destined for the coasts of the Red Sea with at least six months provisions of every kind.

The difficulties of procuring tonnage for the transport of a large force in India on any sudden emergency are also de-



serving of particular notice ; the available tonnage of the port of Bombay is not considerable, that of Madras is extremely limited, that of Calcutta, however, at certain periods of the season, is of great extent.

No large armament can be provided with transports in India without aid from the port of Calcutta. Bombay, or Madras in the most favourable season of the year cannot furnish transports, properly equipped, to convey even a small body of troops on a long voyage without a notice of several weeks ; at certain seasons of the year, the state of the weather renders the resources of the ports of Calcutta and Madras unavailable for the purposes of a naval and military armament. No ship can leave the port of Calcutta, without difficulty, from the middle of March to the commencement of November, and the port of Madras cannot be approached or quitted with safety from the commencement of October to the close of December. In addition to these circumstances the tonnage ordinarily available at the port of Calcutta is usually pre-occupied, and has actually departed for the purposes of commerce previously to the middle of March ; a large proportion of it usually departs before the end of January.

Adverting, therefore, to the nature and extent of the requisite supplies of provisions, to the available resources of the several ports in India, and to the course of the seasons in these climates, it is manifest that a demand upon all or upon any of these ports to send a large body of troops to the Red Sea, could in no case be effectually answered without a considerable degree of delay.

To supply the means of movement to an army acting on the coast of the Red Sea is a matter of still greater difficulty, and requires a longer period of preparation. It would be desirable that cattle of every description should be provided and transported from India, because it is, at least, uncertain whether our troops could procure the requisite cattle in the country. But the length and difficulty of the voyage from India must render the transport of cattle by sea tedious and precarious at all seasons, and at certain times absolutely impracticable. Without the command of some means of movement it would be difficult for an army even to retain possession of Suez and Cosseir with any advantageous effect upon the operations of the force under your command.





In your present important situation, it is necessary that you should be seasonably and accurately apprized of these facts, and of my opinions resulting from them, in order that you may be enabled to form a correct view of the measures already adopted in India in obedience to his Majesty's commands, and also that you may estimate our future means of co-operating with you, if the war in Egypt should be protracted.

The embarrassments enumerated in the preceding paragraphs would be infinitely aggravated if the main body, or any considerable division of the enemy should be at liberty to act against the force landed on the coasts of the Red Sea. A sense of this danger induced me to determine never to attempt the establishment of a body of troops on the coasts of the Red Sea, until I could be absolutely certain of support from a body of British troops acting on the side of the Mediterranean. No reliance, in my judgment, could prudently be reposed in the single assistance of the Turkish army. The existing state of affairs in India, until the month of October, 1800, also precluded the possibility of an attempt to send troops from India to the Red Sea; the amount of our disposable force (until that period of time) being limited by disturbances, which had prevailed on the frontier of Mysore, and by various important political considerations intimately connected with the tranquillity and security of our recent conquests in the Peninsula.

Concurring, therefore, most cordially in the spirit of intimations repeatedly conveyed to me by the Earl of Elgin, respecting the advantage of an early and vigorous effort for the expulsion of the French from Egypt, the considerations already stated induced me to confine the movements from India towards the Red Sea to desultory operations on a limited scale, until I received his Majesty's commands for the adoption of a more extensive plan in concert with a British force acting from the Mediterranean.

My opinions with regard to a material branch of this important question were confirmed by the judgment of that active, able, and experienced officer Rear-Admiral Blankett; in pursuance of our combined views, I, therefore, concerted with him the expedition, of which the particulars are stated in my instructions to Major-General Baird. I flatter myself that the active operations of this force, which proceeded up





the Red Sea under Rear-Admiral Blankett's command on the 28th of December from Bombay, will serve to create an impression in Egypt favourable to your progress, and will materially interrupt the enemy's supplies.

The state of affairs in Europe precluded the possibility of any early intimation of the designs of his Majesty's ministers against the French in Egypt, and accordingly no intimation from his Majesty's ministers of any intention to employ a force from the Mediterranean in Egypt reached me until the 6th instant.

In the month of October, however, being relieved from the pressure of any demand in India, and having adverted to the state of affairs in Europe and Egypt, I thought it advisable to use the precaution of assembling in the ports of the Island of Ceylon, at Madras, and Bombay, the largest disposable force which could be spared.

The force thus assembled in the month of December 1800, under my orders of the preceding month of October, was intended to wait his Majesty's eventual commands, which I supposed might have reached me in the month of November, or at the latest period in December 1800. I directed that this force should be equipped and furnished with the necessary provisions and supplies; and by commencing these arrangements at the opening of the season for salting provisions, I was enabled to command such a supply of the article of salt provisions, as, if now ordered, would not be procurable before the month of December 1801, or of January 1802. A similar advantage enabled me to secure the necessary transports at the proper season; and for this purpose I was compelled to employ the whole available tonnage of the port of Calcutta.

To provide effectually from India cattle and the means of movement even for 3,000 men on the coasts of the Red Sea, a greater quantity of tonnage would be requisite, than the ports of India could furnish, unless most of the Indiamen in addition to the country shipping, were applied to the purpose. In such a case the commercial investment of the Company could not proceed. The inconvenience and expense attending such an armament could be justifiable only by the positive certainty that the Government in India would be required to send a powerful armament into the Red Sea, but the intentions of his Majesty's ministers being unavoidably



unknown to me in the month of October 1800, I could not proceed so far on my conjectural opinion as to incur such a degree of positive inconvenience and expense with a view of meeting a contingent demand.

If his Majesty's commands could have reached India within the months of November or December 1800, the Government of India might certainly have afforded you a more seasonable and effectual aid. On the other hand, if any seasonable and effectual diversion can now be made from India on the coasts of the Red Sea, it is evident, that the possibility of making such an effort with any prospect of success must result from the preparations commenced in India in the month of October previously to the receipt in India of any intimation of his Majesty's commands.

In my instructions to Major-General Baird you will find a statement of the amount of the force which I have ordered to proceed up the Red Sea, in addition to that already acting there under Rear-Admiral Blankett, and to that expected under Sir Home Popham.

This force considerably exceeds the amount required by his Majesty's commands; I am convinced that the limitation of the force, stated in his Majesty's commands, was dictated exclusively by an estimate of the disposable force of India, and of the difficulty of supplying for the purpose of operations on the coast of the Red Sea any larger force than that required by his Majesty's commands.

The advantage of creating in that quarter the most powerful diversion which may be practicable from India, is evident; and as the measures taken previously to the arrival of his Majesty's commands will, I trust, enable me to secure a sufficient supply of provisions for the force which I now employ, I hope I shall meet your wishes, and shall fulfil the spirit of his Majesty's commands by this considerable augmentation of the army destined to co-operate with your movements.

Major-General Baird sailed from Calcutta on the 14th instant; he will probably reach Trincomalé by the 24th instant; and as Colonel Wellesley has been at that port ever since the close of December, 1800, for the purpose of regulating all the necessary preparations, I trust that the forces may leave Ceylon towards the close of this month; and may reach Mocha before the end of March.





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According to those calculations, which appear to be most correct, it is scarcely possible that Sir Home Popham can arrive at Mocha at as early a period of time as the armament from Ceylon. The division from Bombay will probably arrive at Mocha nearly at the same period of time with the armament from Ceylon.

I am apprehensive that no part of the armament either from England or from India, will reach Suez or Cosseir early enough to afford any essential aid to the operations of your army, unless the commencement of your campaign should have been postponed beyond the period indicated in Mr. Secretary Dundas's despatches (by which it appears that your arrival on the coast of Syria was expected in December, 1800,) or unless your operations should be protracted to the month of June or July.

I trust, however, that the expedition under Rear-Admiral Blankett may produce a salutary impression; and I am persuaded that you will be convinced that every practicable effort has been made by the Government of India, not only to execute his Majesty's commands with promptitude and alacrity, but even to anticipate their object, and to extend their spirit. You may rely with the fullest confidence on the activity, enterprize and intelligence of the officers to whom I have entrusted the command of the forces from India. Major-General Baird led the memorable assault of Seringapatam on the 4th of May, 1799; that gallant officer will omit no possible effort to second your exertions. Colonel Wellesley held an important command and was much distinguished in the war against Tippoo Sultaun. Since the conclusion of that war, he has acquired additional reputation by his able and spirited conduct in the chief command of the forces employed in the late campaign against the insurgent Dhoondiah.

It will be extremely desirable that you should endeavour, as soon as possible, to open a correspondence with Rear-Admiral Blankett, and Major-General Baird, or with the officers commanding the land and sea forces, in the Red Sea.

The plan of operations must necessarily be to seize Suez and Cosseir, to endeavour to effect a junction with your army, and to occupy Upper Egypt, while our naval force shall intercept the supplies of the enemy from the Red Sea.





THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, TO

CSL  
Feb.

The great difficulty will be the means of movement; I fear that it will be impracticable to remove this difficulty by any effectual assistance from India, before the commencement of the next season. In the meanwhile, I shall exert every possible endeavour to transport to the Red Sea, such cattle as may be most useful; and I trust that the magnitude of the force from India will secure whatever means of movement may be found in the country. By the possession of the sea-coast, any body of troops which Major-General Baird may find it practicable to move, will be enabled to act with more confidence and effect in the interior of the country; the consideration of this advantage was a primary motive for augmenting the force to the greatest practicable extent; since it is to be rationally presumed, that the amount of the force which may be able to act in such a situation, must always increase, in proportion to the magnitude of the whole army, from which it must derive support.

I have given directions to the commanding officers to employ their earliest exertions for the purpose of opening a safe and speedy communication with your army.

Every exertion will be made under my orders at the several Presidencies in India, to furnish a constant and regular supply of provisions, and of all necessary articles for the troops composing the armament in the Red Sea. I have directed the proper agents to be appointed for this express duty. Although the prevailing winds in the Red Sea from the middle of April to the conclusion of August, are unfavourable to the passage of ships up that Sea, yet the voyage not being impracticable to ships of a good construction and well equipped, it is my intention, that ships shall be despatched in succession with supplies of provisions and stores from the three Presidencies, and from Ceylon; and directions have been given accordingly to hire ships for this purpose, and to despatch them successively, (as speedily as they can be laden with provisions) to Mocha, or to such other place as may be appointed for a general dépôt. The principal difficulty will be, that of procuring salt provisions for the European troops; as the season for salting is elapsed, and will not re-commence in any part of India until the month of November. I expect, however, that a considerable supply of this article may be procurable from the American and Danish ships, which frequent the ports of





India, and which usually import salt provisions as an article of trade.

It appears to me to be possible, that the war in Egypt may be protracted to another campaign; for that event I shall make the earliest preparations; and if the troops now sent into the Red Sea should secure an establishment, I hope in the next season to be able to reinforce the native infantry to a considerable extent, and possibly to add a body of European and native cavalry, with a further augmentation of horse artillery.

I shall hope to receive early and constant intelligence from you; it may be proper to apprise you, that a letter from Brigadier-General Koehler, dated Jaffa, the 9th of July, 1800,\* did not reach me until the 21st instant.

The channels of correspondence now open to India are, Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad, Bussorah, Mocha, and Muscat. The despatches should be addressed through the persons named in the margin.†

I am apprehensive that this despatch may not reach you in time to admit of your deriving any advantage from the communication, I shall forward copies of it by Aleppo and Mocha, and a copy under a flying seal for the perusal of the Earl of Elgin, and of Mr. Duncan, the Governor of Bombay.

I request you always to use a flying seal to such of your despatches as shall be addressed to me through Constantinople or Bombay, for the perusal of the Earl of Elgin, and of the Governor of Bombay. I shall always communicate your despatches to the Governor of Fort St. George. His Lordship, and the Governor of Bombay will receive my orders to attend to any applications which you may transmit directly to them.

If his Majesty's commands had reached me at an earlier period of the season, I should have endeavoured to proceed to the western side of India, for the purpose of accelerating the supplies towards the Red Sea, and of super-

\* See page 309.

† Constantinople,—his Majesty's minister at the porte, or the Company's agent, Mr. Tooke. Aleppo, Mr. Barker, or the British consul. Bagdad,—Mr. Harford Jones. Bussorah,—Mr. Manesty. Mocha,—Mr. Stokes, or the Company's broker. Muscat,—The Company's resident, Captain Seton.





THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, TO

CSL  
March,

intending more immediately the details of the expedition; at present I fear it will not be practicable for me to quit this Presidency, before the month of December, 1801.

I have the honour to be,  
with the greatest respect, Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient  
and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

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No. CXXI.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.*

SIR,

Fort William, March 7th, 1801.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 24th of June, 1800, accompanying his Majesty's commission under date the 7th of August, 1800.\*

I request you to lay before his Majesty my respectful sense of the honour which he has been graciously pleased to confer on me by vesting in my hands the powers and authorities specified in that commission.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient and humble servant,  
WELLESLEY.

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\* The Commission appointing the Marquess Wellesley Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of all the Land Forces serving in the East Indies was as follows:—

*George the Third, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, and so forth, to all to whom these presents shall come, greeting:*

Whereas the united Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies, by their commission under the seal of the said Company, bearing date the sixth day of October, One thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven, have appointed our right trusty and entirely beloved cousin and counsellor Richard Wellesley, Marquess Wellesley (then Earl of Mornington), of our kingdom of Ireland, and Baron Wellesley, of Wellesley, in our county of Somerset, in our Kingdom of Great Britain, and Knight of the most illustrious order of Saint Patrick, to be, during the pleasure of the said Company, Governor-General of the said Presidency of Fort William in the Bay of Bengal, and of all the towns and territories thereunto belonging, and of all and singular the forts, factories, settlements,





lands, territories, countries and jurisdictions within the soubahship of Bengal, and of and for all the affairs whatsoever of the said Company in the Bay of Bengal, and other the places and provinces thereto belonging in the East Indies, together with all and every the powers and authorities committed and given to the Governor-General of Bengal for the time being, by any act or acts of parliament then in force; and by another commission under the seal of the said Company bearing date the same sixth day of October, One thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven, have appointed the said Richard Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Fort and Garrison of Fort William in Bengal, of the town of Calcutta, and of all the forces which then were, or thereafter should be employed in the service of the said united Company, within the said fort, garrison and town, and the said Company have also from time to time appointed officers to be Commanders-in-Chief of their forces at the said presidency of Fort William in Bengal, and their presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay respectively, and also have occasionally appointed persons to be Commanders-in-Chief of all the said Company's forces in the East Indies; And whereas we have from time to time caused detachments of our land forces to be employed in the East Indies for the protection of the British territories there, and the annoyance of our enemies in those parts; And whereas difficulties have arisen and may arise in the direction and employment of our said forces, inasmuch as the same are under the immediate command of officers commissioned by Us, and not by the said Company, and We are desirous of preventing such difficulties by giving authority to the said Richard Marquess Wellesley to act as Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief, of all our forces in the East Indies, and thereby to put under his orders and directions all our land forces, as well as the military force in the service of the said united Company which may be employed in those parts: Now know ye, that We reposing especial trust and confidence in the prudence, courage, and loyalty of the said Richard Marquess Wellesley, have made, constituted, and appointed, and do by these presents make, constitute, and appoint the said Richard Marquess Wellesley our Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief, of all and singular our land forces employed or to be employed in our service within any of the British territories in India, and in all parts within the limits of the exclusive trade of the said united Company during our pleasure, to order, do, and perform all things whatsoever, which do or ought to belong to the office of our Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief of our land forces, within the parts aforesaid; and generally to order, do, and perform all and whatsoever for us, and in our name, ought to be done in the command, order, and direction of our said forces, and also of all military forces whatsoever in the parts aforesaid which the said Richard Marquess Wellesley is not authorized and empowered to order, do, and perform, by virtue of the said commissions from the said united Company; it being our gracious will and intention by this our commission, to give to the said Richard Marquess Wellesley full power and authority to order, direct, and controul all military forces employed or to be employed, in the territories and parts aforesaid, in all





cases to which the commissions so granted by the said united Company to the said Richard Marquess Wellesley, cannot extend for want of powers in the said Company for that purpose; and we do hereby command all our officers and soldiers who are or shall be employed in our land service within any of the territories and parts aforesaid, to acknowledge and obey the said Richard Marquess Wellesley as their Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief; but nevertheless we do strictly enjoin and command the said Richard Marquess Wellesley, in the exercise of the powers and authorities given to him by these presents, to observe and obey all such instructions, orders and directions from time to time, as the said Richard Marquess Wellesley, shall receive from the first Commissioner for the affairs of India, or from any of our principal secretaries of state; Provided always, and our Will and Pleasure is, that if the said Richard Marquess Wellesley shall cease to be Governor-General of the presidency of the British territories in Bengal as aforesaid, then and from thenceforth all and every the powers and authorities hereby given to the said Richard Marquess Wellesley shall cease, determine, and become void, any thing herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding. In witness whereof we have caused these our letters to be made patent. Witness Ourselves at Westminster, the seventh day of August, in the fortieth year of our reign.

By Writ of Privy Seal, YORKE.

*General Orders by his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council, under date the 26th of February, 1801.*

The General Officer holding the commission of Commander-in-Chief for the time being of his Majesty's forces in the East Indies, will fill, according to former usage, all appointments and commissions which may become vacant in his Majesty's army serving in the East Indies, subject as heretofore to his Majesty's pleasure.

All returns of his Majesty's land forces serving in the East Indies, all applications for leave of absence, and all correspondence respecting the internal regulation of his Majesty's said forces, are to be transmitted as heretofore to the General Officer holding the commission of Commander-in-Chief for the time being of his Majesty's said forces serving in the East Indies, who will report the same, together with all other details respecting the said forces, to his Excellency the Governor-General in Council.

By command of his Excellency the most noble the Governor-General in Council.

G. H. BARLOW,  
Chief Secretary to the Government.





## No. CXXII.

*The Earl of Elgin to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Constantinople, December 16th, 1800.

[Received 10th March, 1801.]

MY DEAR LORD,

The present opportunity for writing to India, finds me in the midst of a very particular deal of pressing business; and I must therefore request your indulgence while I put down in this form, and very hastily, the communications which I am desirous of making to you to-day.

The intelligence from Vienna, contained in the extracts of my correspondence from thence requires no comments.

The conduct of Russia is, the most extraordinary; I fear that not only an embargo is laid upon our shipping in the Russian ports; but, that upon some quarrel happening on board of one of our vessels, several have been burnt. Such at least, is a report believed at the Porte. The cause of this embargo is differently stated. I doubt, if any answer can have been received from England on the application from Petersburg, to know the determination of the King relative to Malta; and I rather presume that the only provocation, if so it may be called, that the Emperor has received, arises from Lord Carysfort, who, it seems, was requested to convey the demand of Russia to England, and declined taking upon himself such a commission. The demand in itself appears to have been, not only whether the king would cede to Russia, a part of the fortress, and receive in it a Russian Government, (an arrangement which had been in agitation when the blockade was to have been carried on by Russians, as well as us,) but also, the demand of an explanation why no mention of the Russians was made in the capitulation; and the place taken, exclusively in the name of Great Britain.

The Emperor is, no doubt, very much hurt with this success of ours, by which the favourite object of his ambition and anxiety, is wholly in our hands. He is also highly offended with our conduct in regard to neutral navigation, and particularly from our sending a fleet into the Sound, in aid of Lord Whitworth's negotiation at Copenhagen.





THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, TO

CSL  
March,

He now dreads, that we may effectuate the rescue of Egypt; and I have reason to believe, that he intends attempting to obtain from Buonaparte, the ratification of the convention of El-Arish; although at the time, that convention was a source of the most violent animadversion, and indeed made one cause of the Emperor's breaking with us. I mention this, not that I know it positively, but because the mode in which the notice came to me, is a very strong indication, that, whether that step be, or not, adopted, the Emperor means to thwart, as far as possible, our present expedition against Egypt; unless he has time to take a share in it, and secure to himself the advantages of the success.

Whether one considers the Emperor's feelings and temper, or the strong inducements Prussia, Sweden and Denmark, have to carry Russia along with them, in what is denominated the Confederacy of the North; or the encouragement, which France will find means of applying, for the maintenance of that system, and occupying the Emperor's mind with it; at all events, we must for the present expect, I conceive, every unfriendly proceeding on the part of Russia.

Hitherto, the Porte continues very steady; its exertions at this moment, in aid of the expedition against Egypt, however trifling in comparison with the exertions of other European Governments, do certainly far exceed whatever before has been seen here; and although much pressed by Russia, and even by Prussia, to slacken in its reliance on us, the Sultan promises fair, to do whatever he can to assist us in the present moment.

Believe me, ever, my dear Lord,

with sincere respect,

Your faithful humble servant,

ELGIN.





## No. CXXIII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan.*

SIR,

Fort William, March 19th, 1801.

I have judged it proper to address letters to the principal Arabian chieftains, occupying the territory on the coasts of the Red Sea, inviting them to make a common cause against the enemy. The letters in question are transmitted under cover to Major-General Baird, by the present despatch.\* In those letters, I have signified to the Arab chieftains respectively, that Major-General Baird will make proper presents to them on my part. I therefore request that you will immediately provide, and transmit to Major-General Baird such presents as may appear to you proper for that purpose. A list of the persons to whom I have thought proper to address letters is enclosed.

It would be advisable to furnish Major-General Baird with a sufficient number of articles not only to provide the presents above-mentioned, but to make occasional donations to others, when good offices may be engaged by similar gratuities.

The Honourable Company's broker at Mocha, may perhaps have the means of providing a considerable portion of the articles necessary for the purposes above-mentioned; in that event, you will be pleased to issue orders to him accordingly.

I have the honour to be, &amp;c.

WELLESLEY.

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*(Enclosure.)**\*To the Shereef of Mecca, the Imaum of Senna, and the Sultaun of Aden.*

Fort William, 19th March, 1801.

The friendship and harmony which during a long course of years has firmly subsisted between the sublime Porte and his Britannic Majesty, is well known to you; that friendship has been still more closely cemented by the faithless conduct of the French towards the Ottoman Porte; the French are now become the common enemy of both states. That perfidious people, disregarding all the obligations of friendship and the stipulations of treaty have sent forth their armies to invade the peaceful provinces of Egypt, the acknowledged territory of the Ottoman Porte; without urging the slightest pretext to justify this outrage, but on the contrary



professing sentiments of perfect friendship and regard, these disturbers of the peace of nations have carried war and desolation into the most fruitful provinces of the empire, the venerated sanctuary of the Mahomedan faith; they have attempted to establish their authority upon the ruins of your religion; they have now unequivocally declared their resolution to maintain by force what they have acquired by the violation of every principle of public faith, and of every maxim of civil and religious obligation.

I entertain too high an opinion of your attachment to the interests and independence of the parent state, and of your zeal for the support of the religion which you revere, to believe that you can have witnessed without indignation and alarm, this unexampled instance of the inordinate ambition and perfidious conduct of the French nation.

I am persuaded you cannot view with unconcern the ambitious and encroaching spirit of the French nation which, unresisted, must inevitably complete the downfall of the Mahomedan authority, not only in Egypt, but in all the neighbouring territories, and must establish the supremacy of the French power in the most sacred seats of the Mahomedan religion.

It has been the uniform policy of the French to endeavour to disarm the resentment of the people, whose country they have invaded, by professing the most amicable intentions, and by pretending that the sole motive of their actions is to mitigate the tyranny of oppressive governments, to establish the independence of oppressed nations, and to secure to mankind the full enjoyment of civil and religious rights. By these insidious arts, the French have succeeded in reducing to their absolute power many of the states of Europe, which they have invaded and ravaged, without the slightest pretext or provocation.

They have employed the same means to reconcile the inhabitants of Egypt to their unprovoked violence and unjust usurpation, and they will endeavour to practice the same perfidious policy for the purpose of subjugating the remaining dependencies of the Ottoman empire in Arabia.

They will labour to impress you with a belief of their amicable disposition, and of their regard for the sanctity of your religion; under the pretence of establishing your independence, they will endeavour to subvert your government, and to erect their tyrannous misrule upon its ruins.

With the most friendly solicitude, I warn you to take example from the unhappy fate of other states, and to beware of yielding to the insidious professions of a nation, which has forfeited all pretensions to credit by a systematic contempt of the obligations of public faith, and of the established law of nations, especially by their unprovoked and unjustifiable invasion of Egypt.

You have no other security for the preservation of your independence, and for the maintenance of your rights, than a determination to resist the force, and to frustrate the frauds of the French nation.

You are called upon, therefore, by every motive of interest and of self-preservation, by every principle of national honour and religious attachment, to unite your efforts with the combined exertions of the British power, and of the Ottoman state, for the expulsion of the French from





Egypt. A formidable army of Turkish troops is already acting with vigour, for the purpose of dispossessing the French of their usurped authority in Egypt, and a numerous body of British troops now co-operates in Egypt with the army of the porte, in effecting the expulsion of the French from Egypt.

With a view to second the operations of this combined army, I have detached a considerable force of European and native troops from India, to unite in a joint effort for the expulsion of the common enemy. This measure while it favours the success of the operations to be carried on from the side of Syria, and the Mediterranean is calculated to provide for the security of the Mahomedan possessions, on the Arabian side of the Red Sea.

As the existence of the Mahomedan dominion in Arabia, and the interests of the Mahomedan religion are obviously concerned in the expulsion of the French, I cannot doubt that you will employ all the resources of your country, and the influence of your authority in promoting the success of the projected enterprize; I am the more induced to rely upon your exertions by the report which has been made to me by Captain Wilson, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, (who were deputed under my orders to the Red Sea,) of the friendly disposition which you entertain towards the British nation.

I trust you will employ every effort to procure and to facilitate the despatch of provisions, and of stores to the troops employed in the Red Sea, that you will furnish a reinforcement of the troops of your country to act with the British army, and that you will encourage the several chiefs and states in Arabia, and in Egypt, to make common cause against the common enemy of your nation, and of the British power.

Major-General Baird the commander-in-chief of the Indian forces, or a proper person deputed by him, will have the honour to deliver to you this letter, and will present to you a few articles, the produce of Europe, and of this country, as a token of my friendship and regard.

I request your favourable attention to the suggestions and applications which may be made on my part for your assistance in promoting the object of the expedition.

For the rest, believe me anxious for accounts of your welfare, &c.

WELLESLEY.

(A true Copy.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,  
Secretary to the Government.



CSL  
April,

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, TO

No. CXXIV.

*The Governor-General to the Vizier of Oude.*

5th April, 1801.

I have had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter.\* The general spirit and tenour of this communication

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\* *From the Vizier.*

Received 14th March, 1801.

I had the honour to receive your Lordship's friendly letter through Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, on the 2nd of Showaul (or 22nd Jan. 1801\*), and I have fully understood the whole of its contents.

Your Lordship writes, that "your Lordship had learned with great alarm and concern, from my letters to Colonel Scott, the probability of a failure in providing for the charges of the increased force, which had been furnished the preceding year for the protection of my country.

With a view, therefore, to remove your Lordship's concern on that head, I beg leave to state as follows:

The occasion of my writing to that effect in my communications with Colonel Scott was this:

Your Lordship formerly wrote to me, desiring that I would communicate whatever was upon my mind to Colonel Scott; freely and without reserve, as any concealment and reserve in communicating my sentiments to Colonel Scott, who was the medium of intercourse between the two States, would be productive of embarrassment and impediment in our mutual concerns.

Therefore, whereas in your Lordship's former letter it was written, that "by means of this reform I should obtain funds for the discharge of the whole of the expences of the Company's additional troops;" and whereas in your Lordship's second letter it was written that, "for the purpose of providing for the additional expences which were now become indispensably necessary for the defence of my country, without adding to my incumbrances, it would be sufficient to disband the mutinous battalions in my service;" and whereas in the letter from his Excellency Sir Alured Clarke it was written that, "economy would not be the least of the advantages resulting to me from a reform in my military establishment;" and whereas at the close of the statement of the additional force which Colonel Scott delivered to me by your Lordship's orders, it was written that, "the charges of the additional troops were to be provided for by the disbanding of my own."

Therefore, since the resources provided by disbanding my troops were inadequate to supply the expences of the Company's (additional) forces

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\* See page 429.



from your Excellency have excited my serious concern. Your Excellency's conduct on this important occasion has been as unexpected, as it has been evidently incompatible with your approved character of wisdom, prudence, and attachment to the Company. The magnitude of the questions discussed in my last address to your Excellency; the alarming facts submitted to your observation, and the necessary conclusions deduced from those facts, and from your own reiterated declarations, might have been expected to have engaged your Excellency's deliberate and sincere attention, and to have induced you to enter into the subject of my propositions with a spirit of candour and justice. With what sentiments then must my mind be afflicted, when I perceive that your Excellency has met my anxious endeavour to avert the evils now menacing your dominions, not by an open and distinct consideration of the alternative proposed to you, but by a

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(in conformity to your Lordship's desire that I would unreservedly communicate my sentiments to Colonel Scott upon all subjects), it became necessary for me to state those circumstances to Colonel Scott; that is, to desire that in conformity to the several writings (above quoted) he would provide the necessary resources.

In the course of these conferences and communications, however, no impediment of affairs occurred, and no failure or deficiency whatever was experienced in the discharge of the expences of the new troops, and in the payment of the Kists of the fixed subsidy. On the contrary, those expenses and Kists were punctually paid; accordingly the Kist of the fixed subsidy, and the charges of the additional troops, have been completely paid to the end of January 1801, and Colonel Scott has expressed his acknowledgments on the occasion.

As my consent to the first proposition is altogether impracticable (accordingly I have already written an ample reply to that proposition,) and as it is impossible for me, with my own hands, to exclude myself from my patrimonial dominion, (for what advantage should I derive from so doing?) this therefore is a measure which I will never adopt.

With respect to what your Lordship writes about providing a territorial resource for the payment of the British troops, since I have not in any way delayed or neglected to discharge the Kists for the expenses of the troops, but have paid them with punctuality, where is the occasion for requiring any territorial resource? I expect to derive the most substantial profits from bringing into a flourishing condition this country, which has so long been in a state of waste and ruin; by a separation of territory my hopes of these substantial profits would be entirely cut off and a great loss would accrue. How then can I consent to any territorial cession?



CSL

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, TO

April,

studious suppression of the most material facts of the case, by an erroneous representation of the only argument which you have noticed, and by an evident design to evade the irresistible inference resulting from your Excellency's former communications both with Colonel Scott, and with me. Deeply lamenting the temper, and disposition of mind, in which your Excellency appears to have entered into this most arduous discussion, most painful regret has been occasioned by the conclusion of your Excellency's letter, in which you have peremptorily rejected, without qualification, both the propositions which I had submitted to your choice, for the preservation of the combined interests of the Company, and of your Excellency, in the province of Oude.

The unhappy counsels which have induced your Excellency to adopt this precipitate and inconsiderate measure leave me no alternative, but that of becoming an inactive spectator of the ruin of your Excellency's, and of the Honourable Com-

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Colonel Scott has also verbally communicated to me the demand for the expenses incurred by the Company at the period of Zemaun Shah's approach. I am ready to discharge the expenses which were fairly and actually incurred by the Company upon that occasion. I will reimburse those expenses from whatever resources and in whatever mode it may be practicable.

It is equally a subject of astonishment and concern to me, that whereas under the former government the payment of the Kists, though so much smaller in amount than the present, was constantly kept in arrear during three or four months, the Jumma of the country was diminishing yearly, and yet no such propositions were brought forward, they should be agitated under the government of a friend who hopes for every thing from your Lordship's kindness; who is anxious to obey you, and to manifest the steadiness of his attachment; who punctually pays the full amount of the Kists, notwithstanding their increased amount, and who has conformed to your Lordship. At all events, upon your Lordship I rest my hopes of prosperity.

This is substantially my reply to your Lordship's letter, which, with a view to remove your Lordship's concern, I have hastily committed to paper, and now transmit to your Lordship. I am about to draw up a particular answer to every article (of your Lordship's letter). If your Lordship be desirous of a detailed reply be pleased to intimate the same, and I will in a very short space of time transmit such a reply to your Lordship.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,  
Secretary to the Government.





pany's interests in the province of Oude, or of resorting to the most decisive steps for the purpose of averting those evils, which must inevitably flow from your Excellency's adherence to your apparent determination of rejecting both the propositions which I have submitted to your consideration.

In my last letter to your Excellency, I reviewed the embarrassed situation of your affairs, and the distressed condition of your country; and expressed my unalterable conviction, that no effectual security against the ruin of the general interests of the province of Oude would be provided, otherwise than by the adoption of the first plan proposed for your Excellency's consideration.

I further informed your Excellency, that if you should unfortunately be persuaded to reject that salutary and advantageous proposal, the funds for the payment of the subsidy, must be placed without a moment of delay beyond the hazard of failure, and I concluded by declaring to your Excellency my determination to adhere with firmness to the tenor of that letter, as containing principles from which the British Government could never depart.

I lament that the facts and conclusions detailed in that letter should not have convinced your Excellency that my determination was the result of the most mature reflection, arising from a deliberate and dispassionate conviction of an insuperable necessity, and confirmed by your Excellency's own representations, and by the progressive experience of every hour; and consequently that a decision formed with such deliberation, founded on such principles, and directed to such objects, would not be relinquished with levity, or precipitation.

Your Excellency has not controverted one of the facts or principles upon which that determination was founded. Recent events have enforced the spirit of both; and have manifested, that the issue of these propositions must ultimately involve the fate of your fertile but decaying dominions, the security of the Company's provinces, and the happiness of a numerous and industrious, but suffering people; entrusted with the charge of such extensive interests, I am resolved never to recede from any measure, evidently demanded by the exigency of my arduous duty.

I, therefore, now declare to your Excellency in the most



explicit terms, that I consider it to be my positive duty to resort to any extremity, rather than to suffer the further progress of that ruin, to which the interests of your Excellency, and the Honourable Company are exposed, by the continued operation of the evils and abuses actually existing in the civil and military administration of the province of Oude.

With this view, I have repeated my former instructions to Lieut.-Colonel Scott; and I have directed him again to offer the two propositions contained in my last letter to your Excellency's most serious consideration.

I trust that your Excellency in your answer to this letter, will signify your acquiescence in one or other of the propositions submitted to you; and I entertain a confident hope of having the satisfaction to learn by your next despatch, that the necessary arrangements have actually been commenced, if not concluded, for carrying into effect that proposition which may be most acceptable to you. I have judged it expedient to introduce these general observations at the commencement of this letter, for the purpose of impressing your Excellency with a solemn conviction of the importance of the occasion, and with a just sense of my fixed and unalterable resolution to apply an effectual remedy without delay, to the existing abuses in the province of Oude.

I now proceed to reply more particularly to the statements contained in your Excellency's letter of the  
The manner in which you have been pleased to quote from my correspondence, and from the letters of Sir Alured Clarke, and of Lieut.-Colonel Scott, together with the inference which you draw from those papers, would warrant an apprehension, that the substance and spirit of all your Excellency's late communications to Lieut.-Colonel Scott, relative to the failure of your resources, had entirely escaped your memory. Your Excellency has hitherto described your embarrassments to have arisen, not merely from the charge of that part of your Excellency's troops which you have thought fit to continue in your service, but principally from the defective state of the collections, and from the ruinous condition of the country. Independently of your Excellency's repeated acknowledgement of the decline of your resources and revenues, and of evils and abuses which pervade every branch of the administration, your Excellency in your letter to Lieut.-Colonel Scott of the





29th Jemaudy Oosany adverting to the means of providing funds for the payment of the subsidiary force, has distinctly stated that your apprehension of the failure of the necessary funds arose not from the continued charge of your own useless and dangerous troops (the immediate reduction of which was obstructed solely by your Excellency's intervention), but from the precarious state of the collections. I here transcribe your Excellency's expressions from that letter: "The state of the collections of the country is not unknown to you, you know with what difficulties and exertions they are realized, and hence I frequently feel a great degree of solicitude and apprehension, knowing that occasions of exigency often suddenly present themselves, lest, if I should fail at a season of exigency in making the necessary provision, my responsibility should be impeached. I therefore wrote to you, that until I was secure of resources to answer the demands, I could not become responsible. Accordingly Jye Sook Roy has been directed to prepare a statement of the condition of the country, with respect to its resources. You shall be informed when it is ready, and you can then come and inspect it, and in concert, devise resources for the additional demands according to the actual assets." Again in the same letter, your Excellency states, "I am constantly in fear and apprehension lest, on account of the want of resources to supply all these heavy expences, any delay should occur in the liquidation of the Kists, and my good faith be consequently impeached." By this just and candid declaration, your Excellency has directly admitted the notorious and undeniable fact, that the apprehended failure of your resources is to be ascribed to the precarious realization of your revenues, and to the declining assets of the country. This declaration on the part of your Excellency, is a clear admission that the security of the united interests of your Excellency, and the Honourable Company in providing for the defence of your Excellency's territories, is exposed to imminent hazard.

Your Excellency however, in the letter to which I now reply, appears to have lost sight of the facts thus explicitly avowed, and, entirely admitting all reference to the declining state of the collections, and to the abusive administration of the Government of Oude, you now seem disposed to rest your complaint solely on the charges of that remaining portion of your troops, whose dismissal from your service, has been





delayed exclusively by your own unfortunate and erroneous policy, in direct opposition to my advice.

I admit, with real concern, that your Excellency's embarrassments are greatly aggravated, by your determination to retain in your service, a considerable proportion of those licentious and disorderly troops, whose disaffection has been proved in every hour of trial, and whose turbulent spirit has repeatedly violated the peace of the country, and endangered your authority and your life.

It is, however, a source of great satisfaction to me, to reflect that the removal of this cause of embarrassment is within your Excellency's own power; and I have directed the resident to take the most effectual means of affording you immediate relief in this respect, by accelerating the dismissal of the remainder of your Excellency's troops; I have no doubt, that whatever accidental counteraction, or difficulty, may have occurred to prevent the resident's success in completing the proposed reduction of your Excellency's troops, will now be altogether removed; and that your Excellency will henceforth unite cordially and zealously with Lieut.-Colonel Scott in the final and complete accomplishment of a measure, the delay of which your Excellency now declares to be the principal, if not the sole cause of your embarrassments. It is indeed evident, that the resources expected from the reduction of your troops cannot prove effectual, while your Excellency shall continue to delay the dismissal of so large and expensive a part of your military establishments. But I must recall to your Excellency's recollection the fact, which you have so emphatically acknowledged on former occasions, that the principal source of all your difficulties, is to be found in the state of the country.

I have repeatedly represented to your Excellency the effects of the ruinous expedient of anticipating the collections. The destructive practice of realizing them by force of arms, the annual diminution of the Jumma\* of the country, the precarious tenure by which the aumils and farmers hold their possessions; the misery of the lower classes of the people, absolutely excluded from the protection of the government, and the utter insecurity of life and property throughout the province of Oude.

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\* Revenue.





Your Excellency has not only admitted the existence of these inveterate evils, but has solicited the aid and interference of the British Government, as the only mode of remedy.

The transactions of every day in your Excellency's dominions furnish additional proof, that these evils augment to such an alarming degree, as must speedily impair the resources of the State, and must frustrate all your Excellency's efforts to fulfil your engagements with the British Government.

Your Excellency has recently seen within a few miles of your capital, an aumil employing the military force under his command to seize a number of Zemindars, who, with their families and their inhabitants, have deserted the villages which the aumil proposed to destroy by fire.

If such violent measures of extorting the revenues are employed under the walls of your Excellency's palace, what must be the condition of your remote subjects? From such a system the general desolation of the country must rapidly ensue; and while the revenue and population of the districts are failing in every direction, on what foundation rests the security for the payment of the subsidy to the Company?

An immediate alteration in the system of management, affords the only hope of providing either for the security of the Company's military funds, or for any other interest involved in the fate of Oude.\*

\* The Governor-General's views were supported by the following letter from Lieut.-Colonel Scott, the Resident at Lucknow:—

MY LORD,

Fully sensible that the information which I have been able to convey to your Lordship respecting the disposition, the views, and the administration, of the Nawaub Vizier has been very circumscribed and imperfect, I feel an earnest desire to supply the defects by such occasional communications as arise from observation and reflection.

After attentively studying the character of his Excellency, and acquainting myself as far as circumstances will allow, with the general tenor of his proceedings, I am led to conclude, that whilst he is determined to fulfil, with minute regularity, the peculiar engagements with the Company, his views are directed to the enjoyment of a full authority over his household affairs, hereditary dominions, and subjects, according to the most strict interpretation of the clause of the 17th article of the treaty executed at Lucknow.

I have no conception that he aspires either now or in prospect to political independence; what he aims at is the independent management of the





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The necessity of such a change your Excellency has repeatedly admitted, and you have accompanied that admission by an acknowledgement of your utter inability to carry into effect this indispensable reform. If any other proof were required of your Excellency's inability to introduce such an effectual reform, that proof is to be found in the progressive and hourly aggravation of all the inveterate evils and abuses of the former government, notwithstanding the solicitude which your Excellency has upon all occasions professed, for the attainment of an improved system of administration.

Under these circumstances, to introduce a wise and lenient system of administration, to diffuse happiness and prosperity

interior concerns of his dominions, to the exclusion of all interference and inspection on the part of the English Government, and to the gradual diminution of its influence over the internal administration of his country.

In furtherance of this design, according to my judgment, is the suppression of the functions of the ministers who were the channels of communications to the Resident, and through whom he maintained, if not an efficient controul, at least an useful interposition in the details of Government, which it is not very easy, if possible, to exercise, when every arrangement is concluded under the eye of the Vizier, and discussed only amongst his private agents and confidential advisers.

If I discovered any attempts or disposition to introduce a system of order, justice, and energy in the state; if I saw the Nabob Vizier's exertions directed to the prosperity of his dominions, and to the happiness of his subjects, I should feel no uneasiness at the decline of the Resident's interference in the ordinary internal transactions of government, since the exercise of it does not seem to have been intended by the late treaty, and is unequivocally disavowed by several declarations to his predecessor, and since an effectual controul over the dominions and the political concerns of the Sovereign is formally established by our military force, and will become more vigilant and extensive in proportion as that force shall be augmented and diffused.

But when I see a perseverance in the same abuse and mismanagement in the revenue collections which prevailed under the former government, with the only difference, that the fruits of them go into the private treasury of the Sovereign, and are carefully hoarded by him; when I hear of the same oppressions and extortions, and observe the same imbecility in respect to impunity of crimes, I cannot but feel that the uncontrolled authority is not exercised to the purposes expected; and that the ruin of the country, commenced in a reign of profusion and indolence, will progressively proceed in a reign of parsimony and diligence.

Lucknow,

I have the honour, &c.

Sept. 20th, 1799.

W. SCOTT.

The Right Honourable Earl of Mornington, K.P.





among your subjects, to restore the vigour of your resources, and to provide for the internal and external security and tranquillity of the country, what means remain, but the substitution of the Company's management, in place of abuses, which your Excellency's hands cannot control ?

It would be vain and fruitless to attempt this arduous task by partial interference, or by imperfect modifications of a system, of which every principle is founded in error and impolicy, and every instrument tainted with injustice and corruption.

After long and mature consideration, I offer to your Excellency a renewal of my former declaration, "that the province of Oude, cannot otherwise be preserved than by the gradual and regular operation of a system of administration, founded on principles of substantial justice, and of comprehensive policy, and enforced by all the power and energy of the British Government."

The complete introduction of the British authority and management in the civil, as well as military, administration of the province of Oude, would evidently combine more advantages to every party interested in the prosperity of that country, than could be attained by any other arrangement. By the stipulations which form a part of the first of the two propositions offered to your Excellency's acceptance, your Excellency would be relieved from the cares and hazards of a situation to which you have declared yourself to be unequal.

Effectual provision would be made for your comfort, affluence, and dignity, and for the situation of your family. The sons of your deceased father, the widow of your late brother, and his reputed children, would be maintained from the resources of the State; the existing pensions and jagheers would be continued to the persons now entitled to those provisions. Your Excellency would be exonerated from a heavy but just burthen, the debts of your predecessor; the happiness of your subjects, and the prosperity of your country would be established on a durable basis; the hazard of failure in the resources of the country, and the danger of internal commotion, and of external attack would no longer excite alarm.

But whatever may be your Excellency's sentiments with





respect to the first proposition, the right of the Company to demand a cession of territory, adequate to the security of the funds necessary for defraying the expence of our defensive engagements with your Excellency, is indisputable.

For the purpose of affording to your Excellency a more distinct view of the Company's right to demand a cession of territory, I shall here state some of the leading principles on which that right is founded. The evils and abuses of the existing system of administration have gradually impaired the resources of the State, and these causes of decay in the revenue of the country, must continue to operate with increased effect, and ultimately must disable your Excellency from fulfilling your pecuniary engagements with the Company.

This argument is sufficiently proved by the actual state of the country and government.

In your last letter, your Excellency has indeed omitted your accustomed complaints of the state of the country and government; but your Excellency's repeated declarations to Lieut.-Colonel Scott, and to me, respecting the confused condition of your affairs, and the distress and decline of the country, added to the notoriety of the fact, justify a serious apprehension of the approaching failure of those resources, on which the security for the payment of the subsidy must depend.

The punctuality of your Excellency's present payments neither diminishes this apprehension, nor in any degree affects the right of the Company to a satisfactory security against the operation of evils, of which the existence is evident, and the effect certain. To refrain from demanding adequate security until the resources of the country shall actually have failed, would be to defeat all expectation of attaining the security to which the Company is entitled.

The resources which had been found inadequate to the regular payment of subsidy, must prove still more insufficient to support the additional burthen of a heavy arrear.

Your Excellency indeed, has pledged your private resources in addition to the resources of the state for the payment of the arrears of subsidy; but the extent of your private resources is uncertain, and while that species of security, from its nature, must be fluctuating and precarious, it must also depend on the resources of the country, and consequently





must be affected by the same causes which produce a failure in the payment of the subsidy. Neither the letter nor the spirit of the existing treaty could justify the British Government in delaying the demand of satisfactory security to a period of time, when such a demand must prove altogether nugatory. The intention of the contracting parties, could not have been to pledge their faith to an impracticable and fruitless stipulation. At the time when the treaty was concluded, your Excellency considered yourself to be bound to secure the Company against the evil effects of a failure in the payment of the subsidy. Your Excellency's accession to the Musnud afforded a strong hope, that your prudence and exertions would improve the resources of the country to a degree amply sufficient to secure the payment of the subsidy against any hazard of failure.

The disappointment of those hopes, cannot exonerate your Excellency from a responsibility which the altered state of circumstances has rendered more urgent. The intention of the British Government could not have been to confine its claim of security to a period of time, when the resources of the country should be inadequate to the payment of the subsidy, and to relinquish that claim, when the approaching failure of the public resources should hazard the irretrievable loss of that important branch of the Company's revenue. This right of demanding satisfactory security, is not confined to the extent of the established sum of 76 lacs of rupees. It is equally applicable to the funds necessary for defraying the expences of the additional force. The necessity of stationing the additional force, has been proved already, and the consequent rights of the Company under the existing treaty, arise from that necessity. Entertaining these sentiments, and having satisfied my judgment of the justice and necessity of the measures founded upon them, I was deeply concerned to read the unqualified and peremptory expressions by which your Excellency has signified your absolute rejection of both my propositions, and especially of the first. Your Excellency will be pleased to recollect, that this proposition is founded upon your own deliberate and formal declaration, that you were utterly unable to administer the affairs of your government, that "your mind was utterly withdrawn from the government of a people, who were neither pleased with you, nor you with them; and with whose





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evil dispositions, enmity, disobedience, and negligence, you were completely disgusted." The first proposition might seem to be acceptable to a prince, who had declared his determined resolution to abandon the cares and hazards of public life; to descend from the Musnud; and to return to a private station.

Your Excellency must expect me to express some degree of surprize, that, under a manifest and encreasing aggravation of all these circumstances of vexation and difficulty; of embarrassed resources; of internal discord; of popular discontent and disaffection, your Excellency should now decline to enter into any discussion of your former resolution; and, although you originally solicited my attention to your desire of resigning the exercise of the government at a moment when your abdication was entirely unexpected by me, that you should now reject every possible modification of your own suggestion, declaring that your consent to the first proposition "is altogether impracticable." I have already adverted to the inference, which your Excellency has drawn from the punctuality of your payments, "*that the necessity of territorial security is wholly precluded.*" Your Excellency must have observed that my solicitude is directed to future events, and to the necessary and inevitable consequences of the distressed condition of the country, and of the increasing defalcation of the public resources. That your Excellency will continue to discharge with punctuality the current kists of the subsidy, as long as you can derive funds for the payment of them from the resources of your country, I am fully convinced; but under the ruinous system of the existing administration; under the operation of the evils, abuses, and oppressions which prevail throughout your country, on what security does your Excellency rely for the permanence of those resources, from which alone your Excellency is now enabled to fulfil your pecuniary engagements with the Company. Your Excellency has virtually destroyed the force of any argument founded on the punctuality of your past payments, by admitting the ruinous state of the country; by acknowledging your apprehension of an impending failure of your resources; and by declaring your own incompetency to remove the causes of these evils.

Your Excellency in your last letter is pleased to state,





that you "expect to derive ample profits from bringing into a flourishing condition this country, which has so long been in a state of waste and ruin."

From an early period after your Excellency's accession to the Musnud down to this day, your Excellency has never ceased to complain of the disorders and confusion existing in your dominions. Hitherto no effort has been made on your part to improve the system of your civil administration, or to avert the evils and dangers of which you have expressed your apprehension, and of which you have repeatedly experienced the effects. It has always been evident to me, that those mischiefs were insurmountable by any exertion of your Excellency's power. Under a similar impression your Excellency has deliberately avowed your despair of introducing any effectual reform into the system of your administration; but now, under the pressure of accumulated embarrassments, without any increase of power; without any additional means of acting; without any change of principle or practice; your Excellency suddenly announces, "an expectation of ample profits, by bringing the country into a flourishing condition." Can your Excellency then reasonably hope to induce me, by this unsupported assertion, to rest the interests of the Company in the province of Oude, on a foundation so precarious and insecure as the expectation of an improvement, obstructed by the whole system of your government, and by every relative circumstance in the state of your affairs? Your Excellency asserts, that "your expectation of ample profits from the country will be entirely cut off, and that a heavy loss will accrue" to your Excellency from what you have termed "a separation of your territory." Would it then be a "*separation of your territory*," to place a portion of your dominions in the hands of those, with whose interests your own are indissolubly united? whose justice placed you on the Musnud; and whose power now supports you in that exalted station? Would it be a separation of territory, and a heavy loss of profit to your Excellency to consent to an arrangement, under which the wise and benevolent administration of the Honourable Company would call forth all the resources of the ceded country, and would apply them to the defence of your remaining dominions, while the happiness and prosperity of the people would be effectually secured?





A territorial cession would meet your Excellency's explicit desire, contained in the following extract from your Excellency's letter to Colonel Scott, of the 29th of Jemaudy Oossany.

"Let assets be pointed out and fixed once for all, for the realization of what it is intended to demand, so that henceforth all cause of anxiety upon that head may be removed for ever, and no question of increase, nor any altercation ever after arise; for these repeated altercations are productive of anxiety and vexation."

Your Excellency has anticipated in these words a powerful argument in favour of a territorial grant. By this measure the assets for the realization of what it is intended to demand, will undoubtedly be fixed once for all. Thenceforward all cause of anxiety upon that head will be effectually removed, and no question, nor any altercation can arise.

The tract of territory proposed to be ceded from the circumstances of its situation will form a barrier, against the attempts of any external enemies to disturb the tranquillity of your Excellency's remaining possessions, while the improved and flourishing state of the country, under the British administration, will relieve your Excellency from all apprehension of the turbulence and disaffection of the Zemindars in that quarter.

As the districts to be ceded, will be taken at the amount of their actual Jumma, your Excellency's finances, so far from suffering by the proposed commutation, would benefit in proportion to the amount by which the actual collections from those districts are inferior to their present jumma. With regard to the expectation which your Excellency may entertain of encreasing the produce of those districts, your Excellency is aware that the Jumma of a considerable portion of them is already fixed at as high a rate as can be expected, and that the collections have been secured solely by the ability and exertions of Almass Ali Khaun. The infirmities of old age and sickness, have induced him to become desirous of relinquishing that charge, and, whenever your Excellency shall commit those districts to other aumils, you must expect a diminution in the amount of the collections. With regard to the Jumma of the remaining districts, no hope can be reasonably entertained that it can ever be raised to the





standard which it originally bore, when those districts passed into the possession of your Excellency's family, unless the introduction of the wise and equitable administration of the British Government, should afford such a prospect.

In addition to these arguments it may be observed, that the honour and dignity of your Excellency's government will not in any degree be compromised by this arrangement, as the territory proposed to be ceded, was added to the possessions of your Excellency by the aid of the British arms, and was not the original possession of your Excellency's ancestors.

Your Excellency has lately beheld in the conduct of his Highness, the Soubadar of the Deccan, an example of the beneficial commutation of pecuniary payments of subsidy for a territorial cession; although the hazard of failure in his Highness' territorial resources, bore no proportion to the dangers which menace the most alarming defalcation in those of your Excellency's country, yet his Highness wisely considered, that by securing the funds for the payment of the subsidiary force beyond the hazard of failure, he provided the most effectual security for the protection and prosperity of his dominions. Under circumstances of infinitely greater urgency, and of more confirmed necessity, I trust that your Excellency will not neglect to profit by this salutary example.

I have thus stated to your Excellency the benefits and objects of each of the two propositions submitted to you. I have endeavoured to demonstrate to your Excellency the superior security and advantage offered by the first proposition to your Excellency, to your family, and to your people; I have explained the right of the Honourable Company to require effectual and satisfactory security for the payment of subsidy against all future hazard of failure; and I have proved that no other security can be effectual or satisfactory, than an absolute and perpetual assignment of territory; and therefore that if your Excellency should unfortunately persist in declining the first proposition, the second will become unavoidable. I now repeat my anxious hope that your Excellency will not refuse the benefits offered to your acceptance by the advantageous and honourable provisions of the first proposition; at the same time it is my duty again to declare





to your Excellency that if you should unhappily be induced to persist in your rejection of that salutary arrangement, it is my unalterable resolution never to recede from the just and indispensable demand of territorial security. I shall accordingly wait with the utmost anxiety to hear from Lieutenant Colonel Scott that your Excellency has accepted one or other of the propositions.

I am much gratified to be informed by your Excellency that you are prepared to discharge the large arrears due on account of the additional troops serving in the Province of Oude. Lieutenant-Colonel Scott has received my directions to present the account to your Excellency, and as the charges therein stated have been actually incurred for a considerable period of time in the necessary defence of your Excellency's dominions, I trust that your Excellency will defray the amount without delay. It is necessary on this occasion to communicate to your Excellency my decided opinion that a proportion of the expenses attending the embassy of Captain Malcolm and of Mehdi Ali Khaun into Persia is justly chargeable to your Excellency's account. The primary object of both these embassies was the security of your Excellency's dominions by averting the long threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah: Mehdi Ali Khaun was actually successful in exciting the Government of Persia to aid Mahmood Shah in the recovery of his possessions; and Zemaun Shah has, in consequence, been diverted from carrying into effect those designs against your Excellency's possessions which have recently been disclosed by the papers found in the palace of the late Tippoo Sultaun. Captain Malcolm has been employed in negotiating an arrangement at the Court of Persia, calculated to prevent any return of the same danger to your Excellency's dominions. The amount of these charges shall be hereafter stated to your Excellency. Your Excellency will admit the obligation upon you to discharge a proportion of the expenses incurred for the express purpose of averting from your Excellency's territories the dangers of a formidable invasion. But in the event of Your Excellency's acceptance of the first proposition, I shall be ready to take into consideration an equitable modification of the just demands of the Company upon you, as well as on account of the arrears of subsidy for the additional





force serving in Oude, as on account of the charges of both embassies to Persia. These demands, in the case supposed, may admit of considerable abatement.

Your Excellency signifies that, "it is equally a subject of astonishment and concern to you, that, whereas under the former government the payment of the kists, though so much smaller in amount than the present, was kept constantly in arrear during three or four months, and the jumma of the country was diminishing yearly, and yet no such propositions (meaning the territorial cession) were brought forward, they should be agitated under your Excellency's government, notwithstanding the punctuality of your payments." But the long delay which has occurred in making this requisition, for territorial security, is an evident proof that the British Government was not disposed to make it until it became indispensably necessary. It has never been denied that the same evils, now the subject of complaint, have existed for a long course of years in the province of Oude. In proportion to the extent and continuance of the operation of such causes of ruin, their effect is the more to be apprehended; and the necessity of a remedy is become more urgent and indispensable. Your Excellency's peculiar friendship and attachment to the Company, might be expected to render you peculiarly interested in facilitating the success of the necessary arrangement. These considerations have contributed to confirm my determination to effectuate the completion of the affairs of Oude, while your Excellency is seated on the Musnud; for while I am convinced that these salutary measures may derive great advantage from your Excellency's co-operation, I am equally satisfied, that they will tend to secure your own happiness and the prosperity of the country. I am sincerely anxious for the attainment of both objects; but the prosperity of the people of Oude, must be the invariable object of your Excellency's solicitude and of the Company's care.

With regard to your Excellency's proposal of transmitting a detailed reply to my former letter, I beg leave to inform your Excellency, that any detailed reply, either to that letter or to this, appears to me to be unnecessary, confidently expecting that your Excellency will afford the most acceptable and indisputable testimony, which you can furnish of your real attachment to the Company, as well as of your wisdom and prudence and of





THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, TO

April, **CSL**

your regard for the interests of your family, and of your people, by despatching in reply to this friendly remonstrance, a letter containing your Excellency's unequivocal acceptance of one or other of the propositions which have been offered to you. At all events Lieut.-Colonel Scott has received full powers to act in any exigency without further reference to me, I rely, however, on your Excellency to unite cordially with Colonel Scott, in a final and satisfactory adjustment of all difficulties, according to the tenor of one or other of the propositions submitted to your consideration.

WELLESLEY.

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No. CXXV.

*The Earl of Elgin to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Constantinople, January 16th, 1801.

[Received 23rd April, 1801.]

MY LORD,

I have the satisfaction of informing your Lordship that, on the 30th of December Lord Keith anchored off Marmorice on the coast of Caramania, with one division of the armament against Egypt. The second division reached that destination on the 1st of January. Your Lordship will rejoice to find, by the enclosed copies of Lord Keith's and Sir Ralph Abercromby's letters to me, that the whole expedition is in the highest health and spirits. These papers contain the latest intelligence I have received on the intentions of the commanders.

I subjoin accurate lists of the ships and of the land forces. I find that, in addition to the 16,000 men as stated in the military return, there are 1,000 infantry, and 1,000 dismounted cavalry, on their way to join Sir Ralph Abercromby. Sir John B. Warren is arrived at Gibraltar, to remain on that station during Lord Keith's absence.

I have received no very recent accounts from General Koehler. Colonel Murray, who went to the Grand Vizier, by order from Sir Ralph Abercromby, had been repeatedly in conference with his Highness, and it was on his communications, combined with other informations, that Sir Ralph has





decided upon attacking on the Damietta branch of the Nile rather than by beginning by Alexandria. General Moore was to sail from Marmorice on the 4th of January, in order to combine the whole operation with the Grand Vizier.

I need not add how anxiously the expedition, that is to proceed up the Red Sea, must now be expected.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Excellency's most obedient, humble servant,

ELGIN.

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No. CXXVI.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Resident at Lucknow.*

SIR,

Fort William, April 28th, 1801.

I have received your several letters noted in the margin,\* and the Persian translator has laid before me a translation of the letter from his Excellency the Vizier in reply to mine to his Excellency of the 22nd of January.

The temper and disposition of mind in which his Excellency appears to have entered into the discussion of the important subjects of my letter to his Excellency of the 22nd of January, and the general spirit and tenor of his reply to that letter have excited my serious concern. His Excellency's conduct, on this occasion, has been as unexpected as it has been evidently incompatible with the dignity of his station, with the interests of his government and people, and with the gratitude due from him to the Company.

The magnitude of the questions discussed in my letter to his Excellency, the alarming facts submitted to his observation, and the necessary conclusions deduced from those facts, as well as from his Excellency's reiterated declarations, might have been expected to engage his Excellency's deliberate and sincere attention, and to have induced him to enter into the subject of my propositions with a spirit of candour and justice.

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\* 18th February; 6th, 7th, and 16th of March.





THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, TO

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But his Excellency has met my anxious endeavours to avert the evils now menacing his dominions, not by an open and distinct consideration of the alternative proposed to him, but by a studious suppression of the most material facts of the case, by an erroneous representation of the only argument which he has noticed, and by an evident design to evade the irresistible inference resulting from all the former communications which have passed with his Excellency since the commencement of my administration.

The artful and uncandid manner in which his Excellency has combined the several extracts which he has quoted from my correspondence, and from your letters, and those of Sir Alured Clarke, together with the inference which his Excellency attempts to draw from those papers manifest a design on the part of his Excellency to evade the substance and spirit of all his communications to you relative to the failure of his resources.

His Excellency has totally suppressed all reference to the acknowledgment which he has repeatedly and explicitly made, particularly in his letter to you of the 29th of Jemaudy Oossauuny 1215 of the defective state of the collections, of the ruinous condition of the country, and of the evils and abuses which pervade every branch of the administration of Oude. His Excellency now confines his complaint solely to the pressure of the charges arising from the continuance of that remaining portion of his own troops whose dismissal from his service has been delayed exclusively by his own unfortunate and erroneous policy in direct opposition to my advice, and to your assiduous representations.

His Excellency's embarrassments must certainly be aggravated in a high degree by his determination to retain in his service so considerable a proportion of those licentious and disorderly troops whose disaffection has been proved in every hour of trial, and whose turbulent spirit has repeatedly violated the peace of his country, defied his authority, and endangered his life.

It is, however, a source of satisfaction to me to reflect that the removal of this cause of embarrassment is within his Excellency's own power. His Excellency's assertion that his embarrassments have arisen from the charges of that part of his own troops which he has continued in his service, will



enable you to renew, with peculiar advantage, your recommendation to his Excellency to dismiss those troops without further delay, and I accordingly direct you to urge his Excellency with the utmost earnestness, assiduity, and perseverance, to carry into immediate effect, this important and indispensable measure.

You will, however, be careful to avoid any argument or any proceeding which might induce his Excellency to construe your earnestness upon this point, into an admission of the truth of his Excellency's assertion respecting the sole cause of his embarrassments, nor will you encourage any expectation in his Excellency's mind that my public duty can permit me to rest satisfied with his Excellency's adoption of my advice in the single instance of disbanding the remainder of his disorderly troops, while all the complicated evils resulting from the vicious system of the civil administration of his government shall continue in full operation.

The facts and conclusions detailed in my last letter to his Excellency ought to have convinced him that my determination as expressed in that letter was the result of the most mature reflection, arising from a deliberate and dispassionate conviction of the existence of an insuperable necessity, and confirmed by his Excellency's representations, and by the progressive experience of every hour. A decision formed with such deliberation, founded on such principles, and directed to such objects, cannot be relinquished with levity or precipitation.

His Excellency has not controverted one of the facts or principles on which that determination was founded. Recent events have enforced the spirit of both, and have manifested that the issue of all the propositions which I submitted to his Excellency's acceptance in my letter of 22d January must ultimately involve the fate of his Excellency's fertile but declining dominions, the security of the Company's contiguous provinces, and the happiness of a numerous and industrious but suffering people.

Entrusted with the charge of such extensive interests, I am resolved never to recede from any measure evidently demanded by the exigency of my arduous duty: and I consider it to be my positive duty to resort to any extremity rather than to suffer the further progress of that ruin to which the





THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, TO

CSL  
April

interests of his Excellency and of the Honourable Company are exposed, by the abuses actually existing in the civil and military administration of the Province of Oude.

His Excellency has not only admitted the existence of these evils and abuses, but has solicited the direct aid and interference of the British Government as the only mode of effectual remedy.

The transactions of every day within his Excellency's dominions furnish additional proof that these evils augment to such an alarming degree, as must speedily impair the resources of the state, and must frustrate all his Excellency's efforts to fulfil his engagements with the British Government. The violent measures recently adopted by one of his Excellency's Aumils in the neighbourhood of Lucknow, for the purpose of extorting the revenue, exhibits a forcible example of the oppressions which pervade his Excellency's dominions, and which are probably aggravated in proportion to the distance from the seat of Government.

An immediate alteration in the system of management affords the only hope of providing either for the security of the Company's military funds, or for any other interest implicated in the destiny of Oude.

The necessity of such a change his Excellency has repeatedly admitted. He has accompanied that admission by an acknowledgement of his own utter inability to carry into effect this indispensable reform.

Under these circumstances, to introduce a wise and lenient system of administration, to diffuse happiness and prosperity among the inhabitants of his Excellency's dominions, to restore the vigour of the public resources, and to provide for the internal and external security and tranquillity of the country, no course now remains but the direct substitution of the Company's management in place of abuses, which no exertion of his Excellency's power can enable him to controul.

It would be vain and fruitless to attempt this arduous task by partial interference, or by imperfect modifications of a system, of which every principle is founded in error and impolicy, and every instrument tainted with injustice and corruption.

The experience of every hour has served to confirm the





truth of my former declaration, " that the Province of Oude cannot otherwise be preserved than by the gradual and regular operation of a system of administration, founded on principles of substantial justice and of comprehensive policy, and enforced by all the power and energy of the British Government."

The complete introduction of the British authority and management, in the civil as well as the military administration, of the whole Province of Oude would evidently combine more advantages to every party interested in the prosperity of that country than could be attained by any other arrangement.

By the stipulations which form a part of the first of the two propositions offered to his Excellency's acceptance, his Excellency would be relieved from the cares and hazards of a situation to which he has declared himself unequal. Effectual provision would be made for his Excellency's comfort, affluence and dignity, and for the situation of his family.

The stipends of the families of Shujah Doulah and Asof oo Doulah, and the existing pensions and jaggeers of persons now entitled to those provisions would be continued and secured, and his Excellency would be relieved from the heavy but just burthen of the debts of his predecessor.

The happiness of his subjects, and the prosperity of the country, would be established on a desirable basis; the hazard of a failure in the resources of the country, and the danger of internal commotion and of external attack, would be effectually precluded.

Under the second Proposition, although his Excellency would be effectually secured against the attempts of any external enemies to disturb the tranquillity of his possessions, he would still be exposed to all the hazards of internal discord, and of popular disaffection; and although the dangers which now menace a failure in the payment of the subsidy, would be effectually precluded, the evils, abuses, and oppressions of the civil administration, would continue to operate with considerable violence in the territory remaining in his Excellency's hands.

The foregoing considerations have determined me to make another effort to obtain his Excellency's consent to the terms of the first proposition.





If his Excellency should persist in his rejection of that salutary arrangement, the same considerations must confirm my resolution to adhere to the just and indispensable demand of territorial security.

I accordingly direct you to avail yourself of the earliest opportunity to renew the negotiation entrusted to your charge by my instructions of the 22d January.\* The foregoing observations will suggest the requisite arguments for the support of the first proposition in preference to the second. You will therefore press this important point upon his Excellency with the utmost degree of earnestness; and you will endeavour to obtain his Excellency's consent to enter into a negotiation for the conclusion of a treaty upon the basis of that which you have already proposed to him, or with such modifications as you have been authorized to make, or as circumstances may appear to you to render advisable, without departing from the general tenor and spirit of my instructions upon that head. In discussing this subject it will be proper to remind his Excellency that the first proposition is founded on his own deliberate and formal declaration; that he was utterly unable to administer the affairs of his Government; that "his mind was utterly withdrawn from the government of a people who were neither pleased with him, nor he with them; and with whose evil dispositions, enmity, disobedience and negligence, he was completely disgusted."

You will further express to his Excellency my surprise, that under a manifest and increasing aggravation of all those circumstances of vexation and difficulty, of embarrassed resources, of internal discord, and of popular discontent and disaffection which originally induced him to make a formal avowal of his own incapacity and disqualification, his Excellency should now decline to enter into any discussion of his former resolution; and although he originally solicited my attention to his desire of resigning the exercise of the government at a moment when his abdication was entirely unexpected by me, that he should now reject every possible modification of his own suggestion, peremptorily declaring that

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\* See p. 422.





his consent to the first proposition is altogether impracticable,

Should his Excellency, however, persist in his absolute rejection of that proposition, it will then become your duty to impress upon his Excellency's mind the unavoidable necessity of his assent<sup>and</sup> to the second proposition, as founded upon the most indisputable principles of right and justice.

With the view to assist your judgment in stating to his Excellency the right of the Company to demand territorial security for the payment of the subsidy, I shall here advert to some of the leading principles on which that right is founded.

The evils and abuses of the existing system of administration in Oude have gradually impaired the resources of the state; and these causes of decay in the revenue of the country must continue to operate with increased and accelerated effect, and ultimately must disable his Excellency from fulfilling his pecuniary engagements with the Company.

This argument is sufficiently proved by the actual state of the country and government. His Excellency has indeed, in his last letter, omitted his accustomed complaints of the state of the country and government, but his repeated declarations to you and to me respecting the confused condition of his affairs, and the distress and decline of the country, added to my positive knowledge and to the public notoriety of the fact, justify a serious apprehension of the approaching failure of those resources on which the security for the payment of the subsidy must depend.

The punctuality of his Excellency's present payments, on which his Excellency founds a conclusion that the necessity of a territorial cession is altogether precluded, neither diminishes the apprehension of his speedy failure, nor in any degree affects the right of the Company to a satisfactory security against the operation of evils of which the existence is evident, and the effect certain. It is evident that to refrain from demanding adequate security until the resources of the country shall actually have failed, would be to defeat all expectation of attaining the security to which the Company is entitled. The resources which had been found inadequate to the regular payment of the subsidy must prove still more



insufficient to support the additional burthen of a heavy arrear.

His Excellency has, indeed, pledged his private resources in addition to the resources of the state for the payment of the arrears of subsidy; but the extent of his Excellency's private resources is uncertain, and while that species of security from its nature must be fluctuating and precarious, it must also depend on the resources of the country, and consequently must be affected by the same causes which produce a failure in the payment of the subsidy.

Neither the letter nor the spirit of the existing treaty could justify the British Government in delaying the demand of satisfactory security to a period of time when such a demand must prove altogether nugatory. The intention of the contracting parties could not have been to pledge their faith to an impracticable and fruitless stipulation. At the time when the treaty was concluded, his Excellency considered himself to be bound to secure the Company against the evil effects of any possible failure in the payment of the subsidy.

On his Excellency's accession to the Musnud a hope was entertained that his Excellency would improve the resources of the country to a degree amply sufficient to secure the payment of the subsidy against any hazard of failure.

The disappointment of that hope cannot exonerate his Excellency from a responsibility which the altered state of circumstances has rendered more urgent.

The intention of the British Government could not have been to confine its claim of security to a period of time when the resources of the country should be adequate to the payment of the subsidy, and to relinquish that claim when the approaching failure of the public resources should hazard the irretrievable loss of that important branch of the Company's revenue.

This right of demanding security is not confined to the extent of seventy-six lacs, the amount of the former subsidy. It is equally applicable to the funds necessary for defraying the expences of the additional force. The necessity of stationing the additional force in Oude is indisputable, and the consequent rights of the Company, under the existing treaty arise from that necessity.





Whatever may be my confidence that his Excellency will continue to discharge, with punctuality, the current kists of subsidy while he can derive funds for the payment of them from the resources of his country, I cannot forget, that the ruinous system of the existing administration, and the destructive operation of the evils, abuses, and oppressions which prevail throughout his country, deprive his Excellency of all permanent security for the stability of those resources, from which alone he now derives the means of fulfilling his pecuniary engagements with the Company.

His Excellency has virtually destroyed the force of any argument founded on the punctuality of his past payments by admitting the ruinous state of the country, by acknowledging his apprehension of an impending failure of his resources, and by declaring his own incompetency to remove the causes of those evils.

With a view to evade a compliance with the proposition for a territorial security, his Excellency has announced in his letter to me, an expectation of deriving ample profits from bringing the country into a flourishing condition. From an early period after his Excellency's accession to the Musnud down to this day, his Excellency has never ceased to complain of the disorders and confusion existing in his dominions, but hitherto no effort has been made on his Excellency's part to improve the system of his civil administration, or to avert the evils and dangers of which he has expressed his apprehension, and of which he has repeatedly experienced the effects. It has always been evident to me, that those mischiefs were insurmountable by any exertion of his Excellency's power. Under a similiar impression, his Excellency has deliberately avowed his despair of introducing any effectual reform into the system of his administration; after such a course of experience, and after such plain and repeated confessions; under the pressure of accumulated embarrassments; without any encrease of power; without any additional means of action; without any change of principle or practice; his Excellency at this moment suddenly announces an expectation of ample profits, by bringing the country into a flourishing condition. His Excellency cannot reasonably hope to induce me by this unsupported assertion, to rest the interests of the Company in the province of Oude, on a foundation so precarious and



insecure as the expectation of an improvement, obstructed by the whole system of his government, and by every relative circumstance in the state of his affairs.

His Excellency has further stated, that his expectation of ample profits from the country would be entirely cut off, and that a heavy loss would accrue to him from what he has termed, a separation of his territory.

His Excellency cannot justly apply this phrase to an arrangement which would place a portion of his territory in the hands of those with whose interests his own are indissolubly united, whose justice placed him on the Musnud, and whose power now supports him in that exalted station. He cannot reasonably consider it as a separation of territory, and a heavy loss to him to consent to an arrangement, under which the wise and benevolent administration of the Honourable Company would call forth all the resources of the ceded country, and would apply them to the defence of his remaining dominions, while the happiness and prosperity of the people subject to the Company's Government would be effectually secured.

As the districts to be ceded will be taken at the amount of their actual Jumma, his Excellency's finances would be improved in proportion to the amount by which the actual collections from those districts are inferior to their present Jumma.

You have demonstrated to his Excellency in your memorial of the 16th of March, the advantages which his Excellency would derive with respect to the defence and security of his dominions from the local position of the districts proposed to be ceded, and you have proved the fallacy of the illusory expectation, professed to be entertained by his Excellency, of increasing the produce of those districts under his own management.

In discussing this subject with his Excellency you will not fail to place the same arguments in the strongest point of view.

In your discussions with his Excellency, you will advert to the example of his Highness the Nizam, on a similar though less urgent occasion, and you will state to his Excellency, that although the hazard of failure in the Nizam's territorial resources bore no proportion to the dangers which menace the most alarming defalcation in the revenues of Oude, yet the





Nizam wisely considered, that by securing the funds for the payment of the subsidiary force beyond the hazard of failure, under a territorial grant, his Highness provided the most effectual security for the protection and prosperity of his dominions in the Deccan.

You will convey to the Nawaub Vizier my confident expectation that under circumstances of infinitely greater urgency, and of more confirmed necessity, his Excellency will not neglect to profit by this salutary example. In my reply to his Excellency's last letter, which has already been transmitted to you by the Persian translator,\* I have entered into a detailed discussion of the preceding topics, and I have declared to his Excellency my unalterable resolution never to recede from the demand of territorial security, if he should still persist in rejecting the terms of the first proposition.

Under this decided determination, any further reference to me from Oude is unnecessary; I therefore empower you to act under the instructions contained in this letter without waiting for additional orders.

If, therefore, his Excellency should persist in rejecting both propositions, you will inform him that any further remonstrances to me upon this subject will be unavailing, that you are directed to insist upon the immediate cession of the territory, proposed to be transferred to the Company, and that in the event of his Excellency's refusal to issue the necessary orders for that purpose, you are authorized to direct the British troops to march for the purpose of establishing the authority of the British Government within those districts.

I trust, however, that the arguments which I have addressed to his Excellency, and which you will personally enforce according to the tenor of this despatch, will induce his Excellency to conform to one of the two propositions submitted to his consideration, and that no necessity will occur of resorting to extremities for the security of the Company's rights, and for the preservation of the combined interests of the two states in the province of Oude.

I was much gratified to be informed by his Excellency's last letter that he is prepared to discharge the arrears due

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\* N. B. Edmonstone, Esq.





THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, TO

CSL  
MAY

on account of the additional troops serving in the province of Oude. You have already been furnished with the documents necessary to enable you to prepare a statement of those arrears, and you have received the communication of my orders, to require his Excellency's immediate discharge of the amount.

It is my decided opinion, that a proportion of the expenses attending the embassy of Captain Malcolm, and of Mehdi Ali Khan into Persia, is justly chargeable to his Excellency's account. The primary object of both those embassies, was the security of his Excellency's dominions, by averting the long threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah.

Mehdi Ali Khan was despatched to Persia for that purpose, by the Government of Bombay, in 1798, and was actually successful in exciting the Government of Persia, to aid the Prince Mahmood Shah in the recovery of his possessions, and Zemaun Shah was in consequence diverted from carrying into effect those designs against his Excellency's possessions in Oude, which have recently been disclosed by the papers found in the palace of the late Tippoo Sultaun.

Captain Malcolm has been employed in negotiating an arrangement at the Court of Persia, calculated to prevent any return of the same danger to his Excellency's dominions. His Excellency cannot justly dispute the obligation to discharge a proportion of the expenses incurred for the express purpose of averting from his territories the dangers of a formidable invasion.

You will hereafter be furnished with a statement of those charges; in the meantime I desire that you will communicate to his Excellency my intention of making this demand.

You will, however, inform his Excellency, that in the event of his acceptance of the first proposition, I shall be ready to take into consideration an equitable modification of the just demand of the Company upon him, as well on account of the arrears of subsidy for the additional force serving in Oude, as on account of the charges of both embassies to Persia, and that these demands (in the case supposed) may admit of considerable abatement.

I am, &c.

WELLESLEY.





## No. CXXVII.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Earl of Elgin.*

MY LORD,

Fort William, May 6th, 1801.

I have had the honour to receive your Excellency's several despatches noted in the margin.\*

My acknowledgements are due to your Excellency for the many interesting and important documents, which you have done me the honour to transmit.

The accounts which those despatches have conveyed of the safe arrival of Sir Ralph Abercromby, and of the troops under his command, in the vicinity of Egypt, are in the highest degree satisfactory.

The superiority of the British troops, added to the zeal and ardour for the success of the general cause, which now appears to animate the Turkish army, promise a happy issue to the important enterprise in which they are engaged.

The importance of compelling the French to evacuate Egypt, is greatly increased by the late disastrous events on the Continent of Europe, and by the probability of a war between England and Russia.

Your Excellency will have been apprized by my last despatch, dated the 7th of March, of the measures adopted by the British Government in India, for carrying into effect his Majesty's commands, to co-operate with the force under Sir Ralph Abercromby, by a powerful division of British troops from India, on the side of the Red Sea.

The two battalions of native infantry amounting to 1,600 men, ordered to be holden in readiness for embarkation at Bombay, sailed from that place on the 4th and 12th of March, and will probably have reached Mocha before the close of that month. The progress of that division of the troops

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\* Four private letters dated 16th December, 1800, received 10th March, 1801; two ditto, 17th December, 1800, received 10th March, 1801; Nos. 1, 2, and 3, 16th January, 1801, No. 4, 19th January, 1801, No. 5, 26th January, 1801, received 23rd April; private—dated 20th February, received 7th May, 1801.





MR. WICKHAM, TO

CSL  
May

appointed for the expedition, which was assembled at Ceylon, has been retarded by causes which could not be foreseen.

The Honourable Colonel Wellesley commanding the troops assembled at that place, having been furnished by the government of Fort St. George, with copies of the Right Hon. Henry Dundas's despatches of the 6th and 10th of October, 1800, anticipated my determination to conform to the requisition contained in those despatches, and was induced by various considerations connected with the speedy and effectual execution of that design, to proceed with the troops under his command to Bombay, and there to await my instructions for the conduct of the expedition.

Colonel Wellesley accordingly sailed with the whole of the troops, excepting one regiment of Europeans, which was left at Ceylon for want of tonnage, and arrived at Bombay with the greater part of the troops on the 21st of March.

In the meantime Major-General Baird sailed for Ceylon, for the purpose of taking the command of the troops, according to the arrangement communicated to your Lordship in my last despatch.

Major-General Baird on his arrival at Ceylon, finding that the troops had embarked for Bombay, followed them immediately, and arrived on the 31st of March at that Presidency. On the 6th ultimo, all the troops from Ceylon had arrived at Bombay, and had reembarked for Mocha, excepting a small proportion which had been compelled to touch at Goa, whence they were ordered to proceed directly to Mocha. Measures have been taken to supply the place of the regiment left at Ceylon.

It is probable that the troops which sailed from Bombay in the beginning of March, will have proceeded up the Red Sea from Mocha without waiting for the remainder of the armament, and it may be expected that the whole will be in a situation to combine their operations by the end of this month.

I am, however, of opinion that the success or the failure of the expedition under Sir Ralph Abercromby, will have been decided before the arrival of the armament at the head of the Red Sea.

The unavoidably late arrival in India of his Majesty's orders





for employing a body of troops from this quarter, to co-operate in the expulsion of the French from Egypt, would probably under any circumstances, have prevented the arrival of the force destined for that service at the scene of its operations, in time to co-operate with the army under Sir Ralph Abercromby.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WELLESLEY.

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No. CXXVIII.

*Mr. Wickham to the Marquess Wellesley.*

Vienna, 29th January, 1801.

[Received 9th May, 1801.]

MY LORD,

By a messenger who is going with despatches to your Lordship, I forward an extract of one of mine to Lord Grenville,\* containing the only information, I have received on the subject of the intended expedition to the Isles of France, and Bourbon, since my letter of the 13th of November, from Cremsmunster.† I have, however, lost several letters since the Austrian retreat, and have reason to believe, that some communications upon that subject have miscarried.

We are here in hourly expectation of seeing a separate peace concluded by Austria. The Archduke Charles joined

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\* *Extract of a Despatch from Mr. Wickham to the Right Honourable Lord Grenville, dated Vienna, 25th January, 1801.*

As to the intended expedition to the Isles of France and Bourbon, of which I spoke in my despatch of last November, No. 132. I am still positively assured, that it is as much as ever in contemplation though great pains are taken to conceal its real destination, and that the vessels of which it is composed appear to make a part of the St. Domingo squadron, of the destination of which I also spoke in my despatch No. 157.

It is suggested that the Red Sea may make a part of the object of the expedition, but that its first destination is the Isle of France, the dependence of which it is necessary first to secure.

† See p. 417





THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, TO

CSL  
May

the army, after it had sustained several successive defeats, and was absolutely incapable of any exertion whatever. An armistice, concluded on the 26th ultimo, when the army was on the banks of the Erlau, about six posts from here saved the capital and probably the empire.

The Archduke Charles has been made Field-Marshal, and President of the Council of War, and is now entirely at the head of affairs. Baron Thugut retires, after some faint attempts to act in concert with his Royal Highness.

It is a question whether we shall go to war with the Northern Powers or no. Appearances seem at this moment to be in favour of peace, as Sweden and Denmark have shown some symptoms of returning intellect in consequence of which the Emperor of Russia has sent away both their ministers from Petersburg.

I shall remain with the army, whose head-quarters are at S'beit (a short league from hence) until the peace, and possibly at Vienna some months longer, and shall not fail to forward to your Lordship any thing of consequence that I may receive from France, in any way relating to the British settlements in the East.

In the meantime I have the honour to remain, with very high and sincere respect and regard,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and  
faithful humble servant,

W. WICKHAM.

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No. CXXIX.

*Mr. Wickham to the Marquess Wellesley.*

MY LORD,

Vienna, 1st February, 1801.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that a squadron of seven sail of the line dropped down from Brest harbour, into Berthaume Roads, in the evening of the 8th ultimo, and sailed from thence at five in the afternoon, of the 9th. Its destination is unknown, but as it is conjectured that it may





be intended either for the Red Sea, or the Mediterranean, I lose no time in informing your Lordship of the event. It appears that the whole was out of sight of land on the morning of the 10th and it was believed at Brest, that the squadron had escaped the observation of the British fleet.

I have the honour to be,  
with sincere respect and regard, my Lord,  
Your Lordship's most faithful and  
obedient servant,

W. WICKHAM.

P.S. Supposed force of the squadron that sailed from Brest of the 8th, and 9th ultimo, commanded by Admiral Gantheaume; *L'Indivisible*, *Le Formidable*, *L'Indomptable*, of eighty guns; *La Constitution*, *Le Desaix*, *Le dix Août*, *Le Jean Bart*, of seventy-four each. The *Bravoure* and *Créole* frigates, carrying eighteen pounders, and two luggers. It is not known whether they have troops on board or no.

W. W.

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No. CXXX.

*The Marquess Wellesley to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.*

MY DEAR SIR,

Barrackpore, May 10th, 1801.

1. The object of this despatch is to intimate to you, my sentiments on the plans which you appear to have in contemplation relative to the permanent government of the Island of Ceylon, if that possession should remain in our hands after the peace.

2. The present civil establishment of Ceylon is certainly a heavy burthen on the finances of the Company in India, and as far as relates to them, it would be a relief to throw the burthen of the civil Government of Ceylon on the Crown. With respect to the European force to be maintained for the defence of that island, I think it might be provided without any addition to the number of 18,000 effective infantry, which I proposed in my letter of the 13th July, 1800, for the whole





THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY, TO

CSL  
May

of our present Indian Empire, continental, as well as insular, including Ceylon, the Moluccas, Malacca, and Goa, as a British possession.

3. The revenue of Ceylon is not adequate to the payment of the necessary establishments under a separate royal government; nor can I think, that the revenue of that Island will be found answerable to its necessary expenditure under a separate government, if ever, for many years to come. The deficiency must, therefore, be provided from home, if Ceylon be entirely separated from the general Government of India. To meet this charge at home, the cargoes of cinnamon, and the investment of Ceylon, might possibly be taken by the Crown; still however, an advance must annually be made by Parliament for the expenses of Ceylon, to be balanced by the sale of its investment, as the charges of our colonies in the West Indies may be balanced by the duties levied on the produce of those colonies. But I rather suppose that the Crown would take no direct concern in the commercial investment, but would leave that trade, either to the East India Company, or to private traders under certain regulations, and that the Crown would levy duties on the trade, as a more natural and proper mode of drawing a resource from the possession of Ceylon.

4. The transfer of the civil and military expense of Ceylon to the Crown, would render that part of our Indian Empire a charge on the public of the United Kingdom, and would be substantially the same measure which you so earnestly deprecate. For the direct operation of such an arrangement necessarily must be to render that part of our Indian Empire a burthen upon the mother country, and to have recourse to the public finances at home, for the payment of that branch of our Indian establishments.

5. In this view of the subject, therefore, the account between the British Islands and India, would stand, precisely the same as if aid were to be granted by Parliament, to a similar extent, in the shape of direct assistance to the finances of the East India Company, holding Ceylon as a territorial possession, and defraying the general charges of that possession, together with those of the continental empire of India.

6. In this case, as in the separate case of Ceylon, if annexed to the Crown, the public would be remunerated by the duties