



in this conversation, is one of the utmost importance in every point of view, and will probably cause another war, if it is to be carried into execution.

Goklah says most truly, that it is impossible to carry it into execution without the assistance of the British government, both in money and troops; and it stands to reason, that the British government must exercise its discretion regarding the propriety of attempting it. To attempt it, unless these chiefs should be guilty of some act of infidelity towards the Peshwah's government, would be a breach of an engagement I made to those chiefs in a letter which I wrote to them during the war. But I think that reasons exist for which it should be discountenanced entirely, and that the British government should not assist in it.

The family of Pursheram Bhow are the most ancient friends that the British government have in the Mahratta Empire. Pursheram Bhow had under his command a body of British troops during the former war against Tippoo. His sons and relations, the present chiefs of that family, served in the same army, and there gained a knowledge and respect for the valour and discipline of a British army, which was the first cause of their joining me in the campaign of 1800 against Dhoondiah Waugh. The friendship then established, and the friendly terms on which I was with those chiefs in the beginning of last year, enabled me to bring them forward to Poonah to re-establish the Peshwah on his musnud, although, with or without reason, these chiefs did not wish well to his Highness's cause. This service ought never to be forgotten by the Peshwah, and probably never will be forgotten by the British government, as it is a well known fact, that if the chiefs of the Putwurdun family had done so little in the cause of his Highness, or rather had done so much against that cause at that moment, as others now enjoying his Highness's favour, the success of the march to Poonah would have been a matter of doubt, and if they had opposed the advance, it must have been relinquished under the orders of his Excellency the Governor-General. Afterwards, they did not come forward in support of the cause of the allies in the war. But when I consider the circumstances under which that war was commenced, the nature of the Mahratta character, the fact, that for a Mahratta to suppose the allies would be successful, was to relinquish every idea of national pride, and to lose the recollection of their former triumphs, I am not astonished that these chiefs should have kept



also. But some of the Mahrattas cordially supported the cause of the allies in the war. That cause was supported by two Mahratta chiefs of inferior rank and interest. The troops of both were paid by the British government during the war; and that of the Peshwah did not give the assistance even of the grain and cattle which it might have supplied. Neither of them was considered by the Peshwah as his servant when I marched to Poonah; neither was ordered by the Peshwah to accompany me, and both came because they had known me before, and saw a prospect of advantage.

The chiefs of the Putwurdun family were, at least, neutral in the contest; which neutrality, however, was a most important object for the Company's possessions. I cannot say this for some of the persons now in favour at the Peshwah's durbār. Under the engagement that I have made, that they shall not be attacked so long as they are the faithful servants of the Peshwah, it will certainly be necessary that the Peshwah should produce some proof of their want of fidelity to his government, before he can receive the assistance of the British government in the execution of this plan of destruction. It is probable, in the present state of the Mahratta empire, that either the refusal of these chiefs to resign their lands, or to come to Poonah without the guarantee of the British government for their personal safety, will be deemed acts of infidelity. But admitting them to be so, and that the British government is at liberty, consistently with an adherence to good faith, to act against these chiefs, I still doubt the expediency of giving British assistance to work their destruction. The Putwurdun family, connected, as I have above mentioned, as they are with the British government, are certainly the most respectable of all the Peshwah's subjects properly so called. They are the support of the system of order which exists on the Company's frontier, and on the frontiers of Mysore; and they are a check to the nest of freebooters kept by the Rajah of Kolapoor, and to the numerous polygars who inhabit the countries watered by the Kistna, Malpoorba, and Gutpurba.

If the Peshwah had the power, or had manifested an inclination to establish his government on a respectable footing, or on any footing, I should doubt the propriety of allowing him to root out this family of friends to the British government from their important position, in respect to the frontiers of Mysore and the Company's territories. But when I see that the Peshwah does nothing to settle his government; that the only system of govern-



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ment is that of a robber, I cannot think it expedient to allow this family to be destroyed. In a discussion upon this subject, the motive for their destruction may be considered. It is revenge for the acts of Pursheram Bhow, during the political disputes at Poonah. If it was because these chiefs did not support the cause of the allies in the war, why are not others punished as well as the chiefs of the Putwurdun family? Why do some escape who have actually been opposed to the British troops, and others who did not assist in restoring the Peshwah to his government?

In respect to the plan itself, it will be one of great unpopularity, and of some difficulty in the execution. It is well known throughout the Mahratta Empire, that those chiefs are the ancient friends of the British government, and that they are detested by the Peshwah, for former acts which have nothing to do with the politics of the present day. The other chiefs of the Empire will, I fear, have but little reliance upon the friendship of the British government, to protect them against the effects of the known feeling in the Peshwah's character, if we should be the instruments of his revenge in this instance; and each will expect, in his turn, to become the victim of the same passion. This feeling may operate to induce them to make the defence of the possessions of the Putwurdun family a common cause; and, in that case, the attack of those possessions becomes a military operation of some magnitude and extent.

At all events, whether all the chiefs do or do not make the defence of those possessions a common cause, it is my opinion that it would not be prudent to send any part of the subsidiary force at present to the southern countries to attack them. The attack, therefore, must be made by troops brought from the frontiers of Mysore and the ceded countries: and here arises a new question of expense; another affecting the safety of the frontiers of Mysore, and the Company's territories, while these troops are to be employed in this manner; and a third, regarding the preference of this operation to others in the Company's territories, on parts of which it is absolutely necessary to take some effectual measures to establish the authority of government. Upon the whole, I think I may conclude that the Governor-General will not attend to the Peshwah's wishes upon this subject, and I have to request that, if his Highness should propose this plan to your consideration, you will not encourage it till you have taken the orders of his Excellency.



217. To Major Shawe.

*Difficulties with the Peshwah in arranging the terms of peace.
His consent must be bought.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 7th March, 1804.

Take my word for it, that the Peshwah will come into no arrangement for the partition of the conquered countries; and that he will commence his intrigues immediately with Scindiah's durbar, respecting Jansi, Calpee, &c., which the Governor-General may have taken for the convenience of our frontier. He will grant sunnuds for them to Scindiah or Ambajee Inglia, or he will intrigue in any other manner to distress the British government.

In order to bring the proposed partition treaty and the cession of Jansi and Calpee to a favourable conclusion, there is but one remedy, and that is to bribe the Peshwah with money; to supply him with small sums occasionally, till he shall finally have come into all the Governor-General's views, for the final settlement of the peace, and for the frontier of Bengal.

Nothing but this will answer. The Peshwah is callous to every thing but money and revenge. He will call upon the British government to gratify the latter passion; but he will make no sacrifices unless to procure money. I must see Col. Close before I give my opinion about his sincerity. I think it will be difficult to account for his having the Frenchmen concealed in Poonah for a month, and having never communicated one word to the British Resident respecting their arrival.

218. To the Governor-General.

The Peshwah's complaints of the neglect of his interests at the peace. His vindictiveness, and shuffling apology for inaction. General Wellesley's answer and advice. General remarks on his character, views, and conduct. The settlement of the South Mahratta country, a burning question. Alternatives open to us.

(Extracts.)

Camp at Chowke, 7th March, 1804.

Shortly after my arrival at Poonah, the Peshwah's minister, Suddasheo Munkaiseer, appointed a day to meet and converse with me on the Peshwah's affairs, previous to a meeting for the



same purpose which, he said, his Highness was desirous of having with me.

There were present at the meeting, which took place on the 1st March, Suddasheo Munkaiseer, Anund Rao, and Byajee Naig. Suddasheo Munkaiseer first alluded to the fact, that peace had been made with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; and he said, that his Highness the Peshwah had not been consulted on the terms of the peace, and that his orders had not been taken on many points in which his interest was concerned.

In answer, I told Suddasheo Munkaiseer, that the fact of the vakeels of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar being in my camp, and treating for peace, was notorious; and that as his Highness the Peshwah had troops and a vakeel there on his part, he must have been apprised of it at a very early period after their arrival: that Scindiah's vakeels were there nearly two months, and the Rajah of Berar's nearly one month, before their negotiations were concluded by treaties of peace; and that there certainly had been many opportunities for his Highness to intimate to me his wishes regarding his objects with those Chiefs respectively. He had omitted, however, to attend to his interest upon this occasion, and the treaties of peace had been concluded. But I observed, that though they had been thus concluded, and I had not had the benefit of being made acquainted with his Highness's wishes, I hoped, when your Excellency should give orders that the treaties might be communicated to his Highness, that his Highness would find that his interests had not been neglected by me. Suddasheo Munkaiseer then adverted to the conclusion of the foreign war; but said there still remained the punishment of rebels. I begged him to name them; and he said, 'Amrut Rao and the freebooters who had been plundering on the frontiers,' and who had lately been defeated and dispersed by the British troops. He went much at large into the subject of the Peshwah's complaints against Amrut Rao; and declared that even his name was so odious to his Highness, that if it were only mentioned in his presence, it would be necessary for his Highness to perform his ablutions.

In answer to this speech, I related the progress of the British government and their armies, from the date of the signature of the treaty of Bassein, to the moment of the breaking out of the war with the confederated Mahratta chiefs. I pointed out to Munkaiseer, that the Peshwah had derived all the benefit of his



treaty with the Company, and that he had been restored to the exercise of the powers of his government; but that when he was called upon to perform his part of the treaty, and to produce his army, his treasure to pay his troops, his provisions and equipments in the common cause in which the allies were subsequently engaged, he was deficient in every respect. I said that I did not mean to inquire into the causes of that deficiency. It existed at the moment of difficulty, and for what cause the inquiry was not then material; but that as I was charged with the defence of his Highness's territories and person, it was necessary that I should take every step to preclude the possibility that his Highness should suffer from this deficiency.

On this ground, as soon as the war broke out, it had appeared important to me to secure, by a treaty of peace, one great branch of the confederated chiefs, and I had made a treaty with Amrut Rao, of which I, and of course his Highness, had received all the advantage during the war; and I further observed that his Highness had been distinctly apprised that this measure would be adopted if he should omit to furnish his *quota* of troops, &c., for the war.

In respect to the freebooters upon the frontier, I observed, that I had beaten and dispersed them. It was true that I had not seized their persons; but I informed Suddasheo Munkaiseer that the principal of all those persons, Sirjee Rao Ghautky, had resided at the Peshwah's durbar, where he had received marks of his Highness's favour; that I had reason to believe that his brother, Viswaz Rao Ghautky, had fled to Wahy, after his action with me on the 5th Feb., and that he had been received into his Highness's presence; and that certainly I thought if one freebooter deserved punishment, it was he who had been the principal, but who had received marks of his Highness's favour.

In answer, Byajee Naig denied that Sirjee Rao Ghautky had received the marks of his Highness's favour which I supposed he had. He said that Sirjee Rao had been allowed to depart, because it was not the custom of the durbar to seize the persons of those who had been allowed, or who had been encouraged, to come to Poonah to pay their respects to the Peshwah.

Munkaiseer observed, that the reason for which the Peshwah had omitted to perform his treaty was, that the Putwurdun and other principal jaghiredars of the Empire had refused to serve, and had disobeyed his Highness's orders. He said that Goklah



and Appah Dessaye had served ; and it was his Highness's wish to reward them with the lands held by the chiefs of the family of Pursheram Bhow, by Prittee Niddee, and by Rastia ; and he asked whether the principle of rewarding those who did serve, and of punishing those who did not, was not fair ?

I told Munkaiseer, that it was not possible for me to give any answer to a question asked in such a manner. I said that I considered the plan which he had then proposed to my consideration, viz. to destroy all the great families of the state, as one of the greatest importance, and likely to be attended with much difficulty in the execution, in the present state of the Mahratta Empire. I observed to Munkaiseer, that the Peshwah had not even settled the country about Poonah ; and that after having come out of a foreign war of great extent, he was about to commence a domestic one.

I then asked Munkaiseer what resources of money and troops his Highness had to carry on this war, and in what manner he proposed to proceed ? In answer, he gave me to understand, that his Highness expected the assistance of the British government ; and he gave me the choice of two plans, either to begin with the family of Pursheram Bhow, or with Rastia and Prittee Niddee ; and to deceive, in the mean time, that party whose destruction might be delayed.

I told Munkaiseer that his plan was impracticable : that those chiefs were not to be deceived by the Peshwah ; that the whole would join for their common defence ; that, in that case, the operations against them would become of importance ; that they could not, at all events, be undertaken without your Excellency's orders ; and that while they were carrying on, the foreign enemy might come in again, and his Highness and his territories would be involved in fresh difficulties and troubles.

I observed to Munkaiseer that, in my opinion, it would be much better for his Highness, after 7 years of difficulty and civil wars, in the course of which, nearly every man in the Empire had at some time or other been opposed to his government and armies, to endeavour, by pardon and conciliation, to settle his government and country, than to enter on any system of revenge so extensive as that proposed, and so dangerous and so imprudent.

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Although I believe that your Excellency will have had before you an account of the conference I had with the Peshwah's min-



isters on the 1st inst., I have been particular in relating it to you, as it alludes to points of great importance, and lays open, in a great degree, the views of the Peshwah's durbar. The principal object there is to procure money, not for the service of the state, nor even to gain the power of inflicting punishment on the objects of the Peshwah's hatred, but to bear the expense of the pleasures of the Court. To incur expense, or to adopt any solid mode of settling the country, is entirely out of the question. To incur expense for troops is equally out of the thoughts of the Peshwah and his ministers; and although to gratify his revenge is a great object of his government, and he really believes his personal honour involved in it, he leaves that to the British government and to the exertion of the British troops.

The question with Amrut Rao is completely settled; and Amrut Rao has proposed to go and reside at Benares, as soon as the next rains shall be over. But it is strange, that notwithstanding the Peshwah was professing such an invincible aversion to Amrut Rao, one so forcibly described by Munkaiseer, his Highness had opened a negotiation with him since my arrival at Poonah. Amrut Rao's vakeel has attributed this negotiation to the desire of the Peshwah to make for himself better terms than he supposed I should propose to him, and to keep in confinement some of Amrut Rao's servants. My opinion is, that it has been entered into in order to avoid the necessity of attending, on any subject, to the advice of an officer employed by the British government. I encouraged this negotiation as much as possible; for nothing can settle so long as the Peshwah and his brother are at variance.

Your Excellency will have observed the commencement of Munkaiseer's discourse respecting the Peshwah's wishes in the peace. In the course of the conversations which I had with his Highness and his ministers, all expressed his Highness's hopes that he should rise, and his state increase in proportion with that of the Company, accompanied by strong expressions of confidence in your Excellency's justice.

It is also my duty to inform your Excellency, that while I was at Poonah, I received intelligence from more than one quarter, that the Peshwah had determined to ask me, whether you did not propose to give up to him all the territory which his servant Scindiah had ceded by the late treaty of peace. I mention these circumstances only because they tend to elucidate the foreign policy of this Prince. In respect to his domestic policy, his chief



object is to destroy all the great families in what can be called his Empire ; and he proposes to use his alliance with the British government in effecting this object.

Besides this, his Highness encourages the Rajah of Kolapoor, a foreign prince, to invade and destroy his own territories, in the possession of the family of Pursheram Bhow. The Peshwah's ministers scarcely deny this fact, and the chiefs of Pursheram Bhow's family allege it as the reason for not serving when called for.

There is no doubt whatever that the Peshwah's government cannot exist on its present footing. Unless the British government interfere in some manner respecting the southern jaghire-dars, there will be a contest in the southern part of the Empire, which will, in its consequences, affect Mysore and the Company's territories. They will be obliged to interfere in the end, probably with less effect than they can at present, and in the mean time all the benefit of the services of the southern chiefs and their troops is entirely lost.

In my opinion, the first step to be taken is to give a check to the Rajah of Kolapoor. His country is the resort of all the freebooters driven from other places, and he is ready to place himself at the head of every disturbance. He has received into his territories the freebooters lately opposed to me on the Nizam's frontiers ; on which subject I propose to write to him, and it will remain with your Excellency to determine what shall be done with him hereafter.

In respect to the southern jaghiredars, the following lines of conduct may be pursued :

To concur with the Peshwah in destroying them ; to leave them and the Peshwah to their fate ; and to allow both parties to settle their disputes in the best manner they can, without interfering at all. To interfere in a certain degree to ascertain the extent of the service to which the Peshwah is entitled from the southern jaghiredars ; to oblige them to afford it ; and, on the other hand, to protect them from the oppression of the Peshwah's government ; and to guarantee to them their possessions as long as they shall continue to serve the Peshwah with fidelity. To make them at once independent states, under the protection, arbitration, and guarantee of the British government.



219. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.

Precariousness of the peace with Scindiah. Its permanence probably dependent on a liberal interpretation of the 9th Article of the Treaty. Summum jus he will hold to be summa injuria. Difficulties and danger which would attend the renewal of warfare, and its bad effect at home. We ought to make every sacrifice for peace compatible with honour and safety. Though I was ill informed on Gohud, our argument seems technically good, that Scindiah ought not to have it. But should we risk peace for it, or for Gwalior? Is not a compromise feasible? I do not fear war, and its success might be personally gratifying to me; but, on public grounds, I strongly prefer peace.

Bombay, 15th March, 1804.

I send you some very interesting despatches just received from Malcolm; among others, one containing the copy of the Treaty of Defensive Alliance agreed to by Scindiah. This completes everything you wished for in this part of India.

It is proper, however, that I should inform you that my opinion is that the duration of the peace with Scindiah depends upon the arrangements consequent to the 9th Article. We must not depend at all upon the annihilation of his army and resources, or too much upon the influence we have established in his durbar. In respect to his army, the men and horses remain; and the extreme distress to which the men are reduced renders it more necessary to employ them in hostility against the Company's government.

It may appear extraordinary, but it is certainly true, that an army in the state in which Scindiah's army is described to be by Malcolm is more dangerous in the present state of the Company's power than one well paid, and in a better state of discipline, and under better command. In fact, the existence of the individuals, and of their horses (their only property), depends upon their being led into some rich provinces; and they will join any chief who will profess an intention to lead them to plunder. I have many proofs that pay is not an object to Mahratta horsemen compared with plunder; and, notwithstanding the wretchedness of Scindiah's resources at present, I have no doubt but that if he were desirous to renew the war he would not want the means of carrying his wishes into execution.



The influence established in Scindiah's durbar gives us a better hold of him than the state of his army. But even this must not be too much depended upon. The peace must introduce new modes of acting and of thinking upon every subject. The view from it must be tranquillity, and the hope of personal or national aggrandizement must be laid aside. But much time must elapse before the minds of any description of men can be brought cordially to adopt such a change in their situation, and to relinquish all the prospects to which they have looked forward for years. We must not expect, therefore, that the chiefs of Scindiah's durbar will entirely discourage the proposition to renew hostilities with the Company; founded upon the notion, whether true or false, that Scindiah has not been treated with the generosity which he expected in the arrangements consequent to the 9th Article of the treaty of peace.

We must take care not to come to any conclusion respecting the sentiments of the chiefs of Scindiah's durbar from what we have seen of the sentiments of the persons composing the durbars of the Soubah of the Deccan and the Peshwah. In fact, there are no persons in the durbars of either of those princes who were ever of any consequence, or had any power previously to our connection with those durbars respectively (the Minister at Hyderabad, I believe, excepted); all the persons of the description of Gopal Bhow, and others who appear to be at the head of affairs in Scindiah's durbar, are either living in obscurity, or are intriguing to render themselves independent, or are gone over to the enemy.

I believe Scindiah to be disposed to preserve the peace with the Company, and to have a strong feeling of resentment against Holkar, and to know that he cannot support his power against that chief unless by the assistance of the Company's government. I believe him to have been much gratified by the manner in which the treaty of peace was negotiated; by which, after he had been humbled to the dust, his pride wounded, and his power destroyed, he was raised to a degree of power greater than that possessed by any other prince in India, notwithstanding the immense acquisitions which we have made; and the prospect of the generosity of the Company was afforded to him.

But if by the arrangements consequent to the 9th Article of the treaty he is to be deprived of a large portion of territory, which he imagined he should hold; if the arrangement is to be one consistent with justice, not generosity, and with good faith



as defined by the laws of civilized nations, and not as it is understood by these barbarians, these favourable feelings and dispositions of Scindiah's mind must be effaced by one which operates most strongly upon every native, viz. wounded pride, and the fear and shame of hearing and bearing the insults of his own followers for having sacrificed his power to the British government.

We must not depend on Scindiah's sense of his interests, although we may have found him and his ministers to know them well. None of the native princes are guided by a sense of their permanent interest, even as they understand it themselves, but in every instance by their passions, of which the strongest is pride.

Under these circumstances the arrangement under the 9th Article of the treaty of peace is a matter of great delicacy; and the peace of India in a great measure depends upon its being made in conformity with the negotiations for the treaty.

I have no fear whatever for the result of a recommencement of the war, although possibly we might not enjoy all the advantages in carrying it on which we had even in the last war. I feel confident that we must be successful upon every occasion in which we may employ the troops, and that the result of the war must be honourable to us. But we should have to encounter many difficulties, particularly in this quarter. The countries in which we should act, or through which we should have to pass, are entirely exhausted by having been the seat of the operations of the late war, and by having been plundered for years; and a scarcity of rain in the last season, combined with these causes, has produced a famine, of which the army must feel the consequences.

Supposing that we should penetrate to Hindostan, matters are there in a worse situation than they are in the Deccan, and we should experience greater difficulties.

I have frequently apprised you of circumstances respecting the Peshwah, which, if they do not prove insincerity, at least show how difficult it would be to bring his government through another war immediately; and in respect to the southern chiefs I have to observe that it is not possible to suppose but that they are aware of the Peshwah's designs against them, and that they would take the opportunity of the renewal of hostilities to force us to adopt their plans for their own independence.

We are mistaken if we suppose that the Soubah of the Deccan



will be satisfied with the portion of the conquests allotted to him, or that he will enter cordially into a new war, the cause of which will be the failure of an arrangement in which he will have no concern.

The Rajah of Berar will not remain at peace. He complains loudly of the conduct of the Soubah's servants in Berar, and he would renew hostilities if he should see a favourable opportunity.

Under these circumstances we should be obliged to make the most formidable arrangements both for offensive and defensive operations that have ever yet been made by the British government, far exceeding the scale of those made for the last war, because every point must be defended, and our operations must be most actively offensive.

In relation to the state of affairs at home, I consider the renewal of the war to be the greatest misfortune that could occur. In the eyes of those who are to judge of your conduct, it would efface the glory of the last war and of your whole administration. Believe me that neither the Court of Directors nor the King's Ministers are capable of taking an enlarged view of the present state of affairs in India. Everything has been so much altered within these last five years that I doubt very much whether there is any man in England who understands our present situation. I am certain Lord Castlereagh does not, and, as a proof of it, I enclose the copy of a letter which I have got from Mr. Duncan in confidence.

Since I have learned the real state of the case regarding the support that you are to expect in future from the Ministers, and particularly since I have perused the letter of which the enclosed is a copy, I have rejoiced at the peace as the most fortunate event that could have occurred, and equal at least to any that has occurred during your administration, both for the public interest and your reputation. But what a falling off will it be if the consequence of the peace should be a renewal of the war under circumstances of greater difficulty than have hitherto occurred! You possibly may not feel this part of the subject so strongly as I do; but I acknowledge that I cannot separate the notion of your great character with the public from the public interests in India.

If all this be true, I think there is no doubt but that any sacrifice ought to be made to preserve the peace, and that everything ought to be done to keep Scindiah's durbar in the temper in



which it was left when the peace was signed, which is not absolutely inconsistent with the public faith or the public safety.

In the negotiations of the treaty of peace I was certainly not sufficiently informed respecting the real state of Gohud. I understood that the Ranah of Gohud existed as a state in the same manner as the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor; and Scindiah's ministers encouraged that misunderstanding in order to deceive me. It appears that the Ranah of Gohud has not existed as a state for years; that the territory of Gohud has been in the possession of Scindiah; and that your object was to restore the state of the Jauts, not to preserve a state that existed already. I think there is no doubt but that the argument is on our side; and that, both from the breach of the treaty and the understanding of the persons who made it, Scindiah ought to have nothing to do with Gohud. But he thinks he ought; and his ministers have flattered him with the possession of this country and Gwalior, under the hope that I had been deceived, and that the words of the treaty would give him both; and in my opinion the whole question of the peace of India turns upon this point.

I am fully aware of the benefit to be derived from having forts, but I don't think that the possession of this or any other fort is worth the risk of the renewal of the war. Gwalior would be of use to us for offensive operations with Malwa, and perhaps it is absolutely necessary if we keep possession of Gohud. But it is of no use for general defensive purposes; and I know of no fort and no line of frontier excepting a navigable river that is of any use against the Mahratta armies for mere defensive purposes. But Gwalior may be of use to secure the navigation of the Jumna, an object which is of the utmost importance, although it is too distant, in my opinion, to affect that navigation in any great degree, unless it has a very large garrison.

An arrangement might be made with Scindiah which would secure the navigation of the Jumna, leaving in his hands the fort of Gwalior. Under the circumstance of his having agreed to the treaty of defensive alliance, this measure cannot be deemed a dangerous one.

I would recommend that Scindiah should be informed that under the treaty of peace he had forfeited all claim to the territory of Gohud and to the fort of Gwalior; that the object in wishing to retain those territories and the fort was to secure the navigation of the Jumna; but that provided he would come into arrangements with a view to that object, and would appoint a



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person to be killadar who should be agreeable to the British government, and in consideration of the intimate alliance lately established between the two states, the British government would restore to him Gwalior and the territory of Gohud, excepting those parts of it which would be necessary to form a sufficient state for the Ranah. If territory should not be wanted for this purpose, it would be better to give him back the whole.

It is scarcely necessary that I should make any excuse for giving you my opinion upon this subject; I should be unpardonable if I omitted it. It agrees with that of Malcolm, and I think it probable that you will adopt it when you will have before you the real state of the case. If you should not, I will enter upon the new state of things with all the zeal and ardour that is possible; and I have no doubt whatever of success. But however I may be pleased with the prospect of that success as far as I am concerned, I should prefer the continuance of peace for the public and for you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

220. To Major Malcolm.

Discussion of our right to retain Gwalior; and conclusion in the negative. To do so would also be inexpedient, as tending to impair our character for good faith, the ground of so much of our late success.

(Extract.)

Bombay, 17th March, 1804.

There is one part of the question into which I have not entered in that letter very fully, that is, our right to Gwalior. This stands upon two grounds: 1st, our right under the 9th article of the treaty of peace, a treaty having been made with the Ranah of Gohud; 2ndly, our right, under the same article, a treaty having been made with Ambajee Ingliia. I think your argument with Kavel Nyn is unanswerable, respecting the first ground. The treaty of peace mentions the Ranah of Gohud and his territory frequently; these are the Company's boundary, &c. &c.; and if they do not exist, one of the parties who made that treaty was guilty of a fraud, of which he has no right to the benefit. But, supposing that the Ranah of Gohud is to have territory, the question is, whether Gwalior is included in that territory? I have not got a translation of the treaty with that chief; but I am informed that it does not notice Gwalior. The Governor-



General claims that on the other ground, the treaty with Ambajee ; therefore the ground on which I, who made the treaty of peace, considered that we should get possession of the fort of Gwalior, entirely fails.

The fact is, that we now feel the consequences of my ignorance of the real state of affairs in Hindustan. Till I received the Governor-General's great dispatch regarding the peace, I thought that the state of the Ranah of Gohud existed ; but that dispatch for the first time informed me, that it was a state to be restored, and not one to be supported in independence, for which I was to provide. There was the error ; and the same error will be found in his own treaty.

In respect to the second ground of our claim to Gwalior, viz. the treaty with Ambajee, on which alone the Governor-General rests, it fails us in two instances : 1st, Ambajee held the fort as a servant of Scindiah. The fort was Scindiah's, and Ambajee his amildar. The clause in the 9th article of the treaty will therefore deprive us of it. 2ndly, Ambajee has broken his treaty, and we have determined that he shall not enjoy any of the advantages for which he had stipulated. The Governor-General will, I know, bring forward an ingenious argument, on which he will claim the fort ; but I am afraid that it will be too ingenious, and too much abstracted from all the circumstances of the case, to elicit the other parts of the proceeding.

The question, in my opinion, stands thus. Is it consistent with good faith to insist that the stipulations in our favour shall hold good, not against Ambajee, but against Scindiah, when the ground of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, that upon which we claim the independence of the Rajahs, was the necessity of preserving the Company's faith ? Where is the necessity of preserving the Company's faith with Ambajee, who has broken his treaty ?

I think it rather doubtful whether, in a case of this kind, we can adhere to one part of the treaty, and not to another, although I believe it is done in many instances. That is to say, the powerful party adopts the measures required by its own dignity, interest, and safety. This, I think, will be the Governor-General's theme. But at the expense of what other party are those measures adopted ? at the expense of that party who broke the treaty, but not at the expense of Scindiah, a power independent of both. The fair way of considering this question is, that a treaty broken is in the same state as one never made ; and, when that principle



is applied to this case, it will be found that Scindiah, to whom the possessions belonged before the treaty was made, and by whom they have not been ceded by the treaty of peace, or by any other instrument, ought to have them.

In respect to the policy of the question, it is fully canvassed in the enclosed letter. I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every frontier of India, ten times over, in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith, and the advantages and honour we gained by the late war and the peace; and we must not fritter them away in arguments, drawn from overstrained principles of the laws of nations, which are not understood in this country. What brought me through many difficulties in the war, and the negotiations for peace? The British good faith, and nothing else.

221. To the Governor-General.

British mediation essential for settling the South Mahratta country. Comparative recommendations of the alternatives previously¹ proposed for that purpose. The third course preferred.

(Extract.)

Bombay, 21st March, 1804.

The first point which it is desirable to obtain is, the Peshwah's formal consent that the British government should interfere between his Highness and the southern jaghiredars. If this should not be effected, the settlement will be imperfect; intrigues will be carried on by the Peshwah and his ministers, to derange the settlement made; and other sirdars of the Empire, possibly some who have rendered services, and to whom the British government may wish well, will be urged to excite disturbances in the countries allotted for the payment of the troops employed by the jaghiredars. By obtaining his Highness's consent to the arrangement, persons of that description, or others, possibly really in rebellion, and not employed by him, will be deprived of the use of his Highness's name, which is the common instrument used by every freebooter in the Empire, who takes up arms against his Highness's authority, or that of the persons acting under the authority of his government.

After that is done, the best mode of settling the questions between the Peshwah and the jaghiredars is that alluded to in the third instance, in my address to your Excellency of the 7th

¹ See p. 382, *ad fin.*—*Ed.*



inst., viz. 'to interfere in a certain degree; to ascertain the extent of the service to which the Peshwah is entitled from the southern jaghiredars; to oblige them to afford it, and, on the other hand, to protect them from the oppression of the Peshwah's government, and to guarantee to them their possessions, so long as they shall continue to serve the Peshwah with fidelity.'

The modes proposed in the first and second instances, in my address of the 7th inst., viz. 'to concur with the Peshwah in destroying the southern jaghiredars,' or 'to leave them and the Peshwah to their fate, and allow both parties to settle their disputes in the best manner they can, without interfering at all,' will infallibly occasion a contest, which will, in its consequences, affect the peace of the territories of the Hon. Company and of the Rajah of Mysore.

If the first mode be adopted, and the settlement of the country, after it shall have been taken from the jaghiredars, is to rest with the Peshwah's government, it will not be so advantageous to the British government as that which exists at present; and if the second mode be adopted, the contest will be long, the issue uncertain, the resources of the country will be destroyed, the communications between Mysore and the troops at Poonah interrupted, vast bodies of freebooters will be collected in the southern provinces of this empire, and the British government will at last be obliged to interfere, to provide for its own security and the peace of the territories of the Hon. Company, and of the Rajah of Mysore.

The mode proposed in the fourth instance, viz. 'to make the jaghiredars at once independent states, under the protection, arbitration, and guarantee of the British government,' is one which would possibly provide more effectually for the security of the Hon. Company, and their allies and dependents, than any other that could be devised. But it must be founded upon the fact, that the Peshwah has broken his treaty with the Hon. Company, in instances in which it was in his power to perform it; and upon a knowledge of the personal characters and dispositions, and military resources of all the southern jaghiredars, which I am afraid we do not entirely possess.

The mode in which I have recommended to settle this question arises out of the treaty of Bassein, and the present state of his Highness's government and power. The measure is pressed upon the British government by considerations relative to the safety and peace of the Company's territories, as well as the



advantage of the Peshwah, the increase of his power, and of the means of his government to assist the British government in any future war; and it will be a preparatory step to the independence of the jaghiredars under the Company's protection, if circumstances should ever render that event necessary or desirable. I have little doubt but that the southern jaghiredars, particularly the family of Pursheram Bhow, will readily come into this arrangement; and, in my opinion, if affairs should settle to the northward, the best period to complete it would be during the rainy season.

222. To Major Malcolm.

Further illustration of the injustice of sustaining the Treaties with the Rajah of Berar's feudatories; and danger of renewed war.

(Extract.)

Bombay, 30th March, 1804.

I have but faint hopes that I shall succeed in inducing the Governor-General to alter his intentions; as, by a letter which I received yesterday from Mr. Edmonstone, it appears that he insists upon the confirmation of all the treaties made with the feudatories of the Rajah of Berar; some of which were signed at Cuttack, not less than 10 days after the intelligence of the treaty of peace.

I have to observe also upon those treaties, that they have been negotiated and concluded, not with the real Rajahs or feudatories, but with their rannees or ministers. The real Rajahs are, and have always been, in confinement at Nagpoor. The Governor-General has, however, offered compensation to the Rajah of Berar for the loss he will sustain by the transfer of these Rajahs from his authority. But this will not satisfy him, as I know that his object was to establish his own authority in those countries.

My dear Malcolm, we shall have another war, and the worst of it will be, that all these questions will not bear inquiry. It is not even denied that the treaties were signed many days after the treaty of peace was known at Cuttack; but all that is nothing; the previous *verbiage* is thought sufficient to bind us, as if the signing of a treaty was not that which concluded and bound the parties; and as if, in the treaty of peace with Ragojee, we had not so far insisted upon this point as to continue our operations till he had ratified his treaty. I declare that I am



dispirited and disgusted with this transaction beyond measure; however, I can say no more on it. The orders are called final; but my public letters, written in February, show my opinion of it.

223. To Major Malcolm.

Dilemma as to giving up Asseerghur, resulting from the Gwalior question.

(Extract.)

Bombay, 18th April, 1804.

I have given the Governor-General my opinion, in very strong terms, upon the consequence which I apprehend from his pushing one of his favourite projects, and I have told him that he must expect a war with Scindiah. If this war occurs, it must be carried on with disadvantage, if we have not Asseerghur; and will not the Governor-General have some reason to complain of me, if, foreseeing that war, I should urge you to give up Asseerghur on an occasion in which you and Gen. Lake entertain doubts? In fact, to adopt this measure is tantamount to an anticipation of his final opinion on the subject of Gwalior.

I am aware that to retain Asseerghur is a breach of treaty, and that it is a measure which will much annoy Scindiah's government. But this is as much the affair of the Commander-in-Chief and yourself as it is mine; and where you doubt, I can have no confidence, and cannot venture to act.

These are my deliberate sentiments upon the subject. I see clearly that Asseerghur ought to be given up, but I cannot venture to give an opinion upon it.

Confound these red boxes and the gentlemen in Bengal! The delays they occasion will send us to the devil.

224. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

Imbecility, unpopularity, and unreasonable demands of the Peshwah. Will the Governor-General continue to support him?

(Extract.)

Bombay, 12th May, 1804.

It now appears that the Peshwah is not supported by a single Mahratta sirdar or horseman, that he does not enjoy any revenue, and that he has no means whatever of supporting his own authority. The records at Poonah will show that he lately applied to me to take measures to catch thieves who had taken refuge in the jungles; and it now appears that, in order to enable the Peshwah to carry on his government at all, the



country must be conquered again by the British troops. I do not mean to urge the difficulty of this operation, but I allude to these circumstances, in order to show the possibility that the Governor-General might determine to adopt a mode of settling the question with the jaghiredars which would not occasion a necessity of employing the British troops to the southward at the present crisis.

In respect to the list of talooks, of which the Peshwah requires that the British troops should put his amildars in possession, it contains the names of all the strong forts, excepting Darwar; and of districts belonging to every chief, particularly a large tract belonging to Madhoo Rao Rastia.

In respect to Goklah, he naturally refuses to give up the districts which are to support his troops, till other means of support shall have been assigned to him, upon which subject the Peshwah will not, or has not, satisfied him. At the same time, Goklah was the only chief on whom his Highness could rely, and his the only body of troops whose services he could command, either to support the ordinary operations of his government, to overawe the southern jaghiredars, or to perform his treaty with the Company. This sirdar, and these troops, have slipped through his hands. Goklah has crossed the Kistna, and is gone to the southward; and his Highness now calls upon the British government, not only to support him against his foreign enemies, and to guard his person, but to perform these services without the assistance which he is bound to afford, to support the ordinary operations of his government, to undertake an extensive service against certain of his subjects, whose allegiance, by common management, might have been secured, and, at last, to punish and destroy the chief who has served for years with the British troops, whose conduct has always been satisfactory, and whom I left at Poonah 2 months ago in a disposition to undertake any service for the Peshwah's government, provided he should be treated with common justice.

All these facts are so strong, they prove so much incapacity in the Peshwah's government, and point out so clearly the aversion to it of all the principal chiefs, and show the probable grounds of that aversion, that I think it much to be doubted whether his Excellency the Governor-General will choose to give his support to his Highness's authority.



225. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

Prospect of war with Holkar, which ought to be very short. Famine in the Deccan; its causes. Difference with the Governor-General on Gwalior and treaties with Berar tributaries. Danger of renewed war with the ex-Confederates. The Governor-General 'sincere in his notions,' but over ingenious, and lacks capable and independent advisers. Consensus of opinion against our right to retain Gwalior.

(Extract.)

Bombay, 13th May, 1804.

I have been detained here ever since I wrote to you by Houghton, by the want of the Governor-General's answers upon a variety of points which I had referred to him at different times, and by the chance which I saw that the result of General Lake's discussions with Holkar would be the necessity of attacking that chief. Accordingly I have within these few days received the Governor-General's order to attack the possessions of Holkar in the Deccan, while General Lake will attack him in Hindostan; and I propose to join the army which is now encamped between this place and Poonah in the course of very few days.

There is at present a famine in the Deccan, which, in my opinion, will destroy half of the inhabitants. It is occasioned in part by the operations of the Mahratta armies for the last ten years, particularly by those of Holkar in the year 1802; in part by the operations of the Mahratta armies in the war, and in part by the want of rain in the last season, and by the want of arrangement and energy in the government of the Peshwah. But whatever may be its cause, I fear that it will prevent me from commencing my operations till a late period in the rainy season, when I may expect that the new grass and new crops of grain will afford some forage. In the mean time it is my opinion that if General Lake attacks Holkar with vigour, and pursues him with activity and perseverance, and above all, if Scindiah should co-operate heartily in the war, it will not last a fortnight. Holkar's power is like that of the band of freebooters whom I destroyed in the month of February last: it cannot stand a defeat of his army; and the pursuit after the defeat will make it crumble away to nothing.

Scindiah's government, although it has concluded the defen-



sive alliance, is not satisfied with us; and the misfortune is that, between ourselves, I think we are in the wrong. The difference relates to the fort of Gwalior, which Scindiah thinks ought to belong to him, and the Governor-General will not give it up. I differ in opinion with the Governor-General both as to the right and policy of keeping this fort: I have delivered my opinion to him regarding the latter, but have said nothing upon the former, as the question turns upon a nice point of the law of nations, which the Governor-General has argued with his usual ingenuity; but I acknowledge I differ from him entirely.

I could not make you understand this subject without writing a volume, and you will probably see the papers upon it very shortly after you will receive this letter. All I can say is, that I am convinced, and so is Malcolm, that we should have renewed the war upon this point if the Governor-General had not determined to give Scindiah the whole of the Holkar possessions; and this concession will probably reconcile Scindiah's mind to the disappointment respecting Gwalior.

If Scindiah should not be satisfied, and should take advantage of the state of our affairs with Holkar to attack us again, the Rajah of Berar, who is equally dissatisfied, will likewise enter into the war. He also is not satisfied with the manner in which the treaty of peace has been carried into execution. The Nizam's government have pressed upon him most powerfully, and I think that the Governor-General has not treated him with liberality. I promised that the tenth article of the treaty of peace should not be applied in any instance in which it was not necessary for the preservation of the Company's faith; and I reported this promise to the Governor-General in the letter which accompanied the treaty, and in the minute of the conferences in the negotiation. The Rajah has been called upon to confirm, under the tenth article of the treaty of peace, verbal offers (I may call them) which were scarcely accepted, and on which treaties were not concluded till ten days after Colonel Harcourt had received from Calcutta the intelligence of the peace, and nearly twenty days after he had received private intelligence of it from me. After all, the treaties were not concluded with the real feudatories, who were in confinement at Nagpoor, but with their ministers in some instances, and their wives in others. The Governor-General makes an ingenious argument to show that a verbal agreement is equally binding



with a treaty, which verbal agreement, by the bye, was never made; but supposing it had been made, let it be recollected that after I had signed a treaty of peace with an authorized vakeel of the Rajah of Berar, I refused to stop the operations: on the contrary, I continued my march towards Nagpoor till the treaty was ratified by this very Rajah of Berar, who is now told that verbal agreements must be considered as binding upon the British government.

From all this statement you will observe that the system of moderation and conciliation by which, whether it be right or wrong, I made the treaties of peace, and which has been so highly approved and extolled, is now given up. Our enemies are much disgusted, and complain loudly of our conduct and want of faith; and in truth I consider the peace to be by no means secure.

However, the Governor-General is sincere in his notions upon these subjects. He considers his decisions to be strictly correct, and he has offered compensation to the Rajah of Berar, and, as I have above told you, has adopted measures which will possibly conciliate Scindiah. But still we are all shaking again: the public interests may again be exposed to the risk of a battle, which we might have avoided by a smaller portion of ingenuity.

In fact, my dear Henry, we want at Calcutta some person who will speak his mind to the Governor-General. Since you and Malcolm have left him, there is nobody about him with capacity to understand these subjects, who has nerves to discuss them with him, and to oppose his sentiments when he is wrong. There cannot be a stronger proof of this want than the fact that Malcolm and I, and General Lake, and Mercer, and Webbe, were of opinion that we had lost Gwalior with the treaty of peace.

I wish you to consider all that I have written to you upon this subject as entirely between ourselves. I mention it to you only that you may know the real state of the case if the war should be renewed: however, I now think it possible that it will not.



226. Translation of a Mahratta letter from Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, dated 9th Suffun, answering to the 20th May, 1804.

Advice to Scindiah on the Gohud and Gwalior question. First perform the Treaty; then remonstrate, in reliance on your close ally, the British Government.

(Extract.)

My language to your ministers upon this subject has been uniformly the same. I said, whenever they spoke to me, that the possession of Gohud and Gwalior must depend upon the treaties which had been made with Gen. Lake; and I think I have shown you in this letter, that the treaties which affect the possession of Gohud and Gwalior ought to be confirmed under the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

Under these circumstances, you cannot suppose that the Company can or will relinquish their just demand that you should confirm the treaties which affect Gohud and Gwalior, as well as the other treaties: you are bound to confirm them by the 9th article of the treaty of peace; and, without being guilty of a breach of faith towards the Ranah of Gohud, the Company cannot avoid insisting upon your performing your engagement. I most anxiously recommend you to perform it.

This transaction may be attended with greater loss to your government than you were aware of at the time you engaged to perform it; and it may have reduced your power to a degree much lower than I contemplated when I negotiated the peace, or than the Governor-General ever intended. If you should feel the pressure of your difficulties, state them to the Resident at your durbar, and he will report them to the Governor-General; and rely upon it that the British Government will not fail to adopt every measure, which is consistent with justice and propriety, to relieve the difficulties of a state with which its interest is so closely connected. But it is necessary, in the first instance, to perform the treaty of peace.



227. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

*Report of discussion with Scindiah's envoys on Gwalior, &c.
Paramount necessity of conciliating the natives, and consult-
ing their interests.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.

I have received a letter from Scindiah upon the subject of Gohud and Gwalior, to which I have written an answer, which I have given to Goorparah. I enclose the English draft and a copy of the answer. From what Goorparah said, I think that this letter will settle the question. In the argument yesterday, which followed the perusal of the letter, they gave up Gohud and Gwalior, and continued to dispute on the ground of other districts which Ambajee had ceded, and which we had made over to the Ranah. I told them that I could not go into details, as I had no information; that the decision upon every such district depended upon two points: 1st, was it to the southward of the territories of the Ranah; 2nd, had it been Scindiah's, or Serinjaumy? In summing up the result of the discussions I observed to them that they had given up Gohud and Gwalior, and directed their arguments entirely to the possession of other districts; to which they answered in the usual style, that they had done so because it was my pleasure. But the fact is, that they had nothing to answer.

I pressed them to discontinue their angry discussions, to advise Scindiah from me to bring this question to a close by confirming the treaties, and afterwards to enter into a confidential communication with you on the state of his affairs in general. The Governor-General may write what he pleases at Calcutta; we must conciliate the natives, or we shall not be able to do his business; and all his treaties, without conciliation and an endeavour to convince the Native powers that we have views besides our own interests, are so much waste paper.

228. To Colonel Close.

Hurry Pursheram seeks reconciliation with the Peshwah, through the influence of the British Government. Gen. Wellesley's advice to him, and to the Resident at Poonah, on the general question of the Southern Chiefs.

(Extracts.)

Camp at Meritch, 1st July, 1804.

I have the honour to inform you that Hurry Pursheram,



commonly called Baba Saheb Putwurdun, one of the family of Pursheram Bhow, paid me a visit yesterday, in my camp at Rajahpore, which I returned this morning on my road through Tasgaum. He took the opportunity of this visit to talk to me in private. He said that he was entirely at the mercy of the British government, and it must rest with them either to destroy him, or to allow him to retain his possessions. I desired him to explain himself; he then said he heard that the Peshwah was offended at his conduct, and that he was at the mercy of the British government. That all he was desirous of was to serve the Peshwah's government, as in former times; and that all he hoped for was the favour of his Highness and the British government, in proportion to his zeal and fidelity.

In answer, I told Baba Saheb that it was perfectly true that the Peshwah was offended with him, and that his Highness certainly had reason to complain of his conduct; however, it was possible that his Highness might be induced to forgive and forget what had passed; but that it must be in the confidence that he should have no cause to complain in future; and that that confidence must be founded on acts,—not professions of service. I therefore urged him earnestly, if he had any regard for his own honour and situation, to endeavour to reconcile himself to the Peshwah, and to serve him hereafter with zeal and fidelity. I pointed out to him the state of the Peshwah's government at the present moment; I observed that it was stronger in his Highness's own opinion, and in reality, than that of any Peshwah had ever been; and I hinted to him, that it was not to be supposed that the British government, which had done so much for the Peshwah, would cease its endeavours in his support, till his power and authority should be completely established and acknowledged in all parts of his territories. I observed that the Peshwah was not, in fact, so bent upon revenge as people supposed; that I had found him to be an indulgent master, when he had reason to believe that his servants were in earnest in their profession of repentance and future good conduct; and that he might depend upon it that there was nothing that the British government wished so much, as to see his Highness surrounded by his sirdars, and his government supported by its natural strength, and the chief men of the Empire in the enjoyment of their rights and possessions. In answer, Baba Saheb said that he wished and intended to serve the Peshwah according to ancient custom; and



I told him that I should consider what he had then said and so frequently repeated, as binding upon him in any future discussion which might take place upon this subject. I observed that I had no instructions to discuss the subject at this time, and did not know what the ancient custom was; but that it appeared that the intention expressed by Baba Saheb was fair, and would be satisfactory.

* * * * *

The circumstances that I have above detailed, which passed at the meeting with Baba Saheb, appear to hold out a favourable opportunity of settling the Peshwah's affairs with the Putwurdun family, and eventually with all the southern chiefs; and I proceed to give you my opinion regarding the mode in which that settlement ought to be effected. In respect to Baba Saheb, it is my opinion that, if he should open himself to you upon the subject, you ought to urge the durbar to accept his offers of service; and if he should require that the British government shall guarantee the security of his person while he shall be at Poonah on the service of the Peshwah, and his possessions while he shall serve his Highness with fidelity, it is entirely consistent with the instructions of his Excellency the Governor-General to give that guarantee. As the arrangement which there is a prospect of making with Baba Saheb will be made in concert and communication with the Peshwah, and as his Highness is well aware that the British government will not permit him to break engagements into which he may enter with his subjects or servants, through their mediation, it is probable that he will have no objection to this guarantee, and it is desirable that it should be given with his knowledge and consent. If the arrangement should be made with Baba Saheb, as I hope it will, it is probable that offers to the same purport will be made by the other southern chiefs; and I anxiously recommend that you should encourage them all, and urge the durbar to accept them; and that you should give the sirdars the Company's guarantee for the security of their persons and their possessions, on the ground of their faithful services to the Peshwah's state.

229. To E. Strachey, Esq.

The British Government to arbitrate the differences between the Peshwah and the Southern Chiefs. Nature of their relation



to the Peshwah. Appah Saheb to be first dealt with. Articles of agreement to be proposed to him.

(Extracts.)

Camp at Bindegherry, 8th July, 1804.

1. I enclose the copy of a dispatch which I have received from his Excellency the Governor-General, from which you will observe that it is his Excellency's desire that the British government should interpose its arbitration for the purpose of settling the differences between the Peshwah and the southern jaghiredars; and that I should appoint a person to conduct the inquiries and negotiation connected with the proposed settlement.

2. I have fixed upon you for the performance of this service, and I proceed to give you my instructions.

3. The persons who are the objects of the Governor-General's orders are not properly jaghiredars. They are the serinjaumy sirdars of the Poonah state; and it is peculiarly the case with serinjaumy lands, that the possession of them may be changed annually. The chiefs in question, however, have held their lands of this description for many years; and they have other possessions under the Poonah state, some in jaghire, others in enaum, and others held only as comavisdars or amildars of the government.

4. Serinjaumy lands are granted for the payment of troops employed in the service of the state, and it stands to reason that the condition of the tenure of serinjaumy lands is, that the holder should render service to the state; but the chiefs in question have long been in the habit of rendering no service to the Peshwah, under various pretences; the principal of which is, that the Rajah of Kolapoor has attacked them, and has plundered their possessions; and that their troops are employed in the defence of the territories from the revenues of which they are to be supported.

* * * * *

8. In my opinion, the best mode of arranging these affairs is, to commence settling with Appah Saheb, who is commonly supposed to be the head of the Putwurdun family. I have accordingly written to that chief, to inform him that I was desirous of communicating with him on business of importance, and had requested you to go to him; and I have desired him to write to you at Deogherry, on the Werdah, and to fix the time and place at which you will meet him.

9. I have the honour to enclose with this a letter of introduction for Appah Saheb.

* * * * *

13. If you should find that Appah Saheb is disposed to serve the Peshwah, you will lay open the following propositions, as the articles of an agreement for settling all differences between the Peshwah and his family, and for defining their respective claims and benefits hereafter.

i. There shall be a mutual oblivion and pardon of all injuries on both sides. The British government will guarantee the security of the persons of Appah Saheb, his brothers, relations, and adherents, so long as they shall serve the Peshwah with fidelity, and refrain from intriguing or holding any communication with his Highness's enemies.

ii. Appah Saheb, his brothers, relations, and adherents, shall hold the lands of which they have possession by virtue of sunnuds, or legal grants from the state, whether as serinjaumy, or enaum, or in jaghire; and the British government will guarantee to them the possession of all those lands as long as they shall serve the Peshwah zealously and faithfully, and shall hold no communication with his Highness's enemies. In order to ascertain the lands, the possession of which the British government are to guarantee to Appah Saheb, and his brothers, relations, &c., a list of them is to be given in by Appah Saheb, which list is to be referred to his Highness the Peshwah, who will make such objections as he may think proper to Appah Saheb's retaining any particular portion of those described in the list. Appah Saheb is to reply to the Peshwah's objections to his list: and the British government is to decide between the parties. In the mean time, till the decision shall be made, Appah Saheb is to remain in possession of the lands.

iii. The condition on which the Hon. Company will guarantee to Appah Saheb, &c., the possession of their lands is, that they shall serve the Peshwah zealously and faithfully. In consideration of the injuries which the country has received from long wars, and having been frequently plundered, and lately a famine, Appah Saheb, &c., shall not be required to produce, at any time, more than two-thirds of the forces; for the support of which they will retain the serinjaumy lands. But that reduced number must be produced whenever it may be called for, otherwise the guarantee in the 2nd article shall be null and void. Also one-third of the number of the forces Appah Saheb, &c., are bound to supply, are always to be at Poonah, under the command of one of the members of the Putwurdun family. The person who shall command this force shall be under the guarantee of the



Company, in respect to the security of his person. The number of troops which Appah Saheb will have to furnish, according to this arrangement, shall be ascertained and decided by the British government, in the same manner as the quantity of lands which Appah Saheb, &c., are to hold till the decision shall be made. Appah Saheb, &c., are to supply for the Peshwah's service that body of troops which they will allege they ought to furnish according to the present arrangement.

iv. Appah Saheb, &c., are to restore to the Peshwah's government all lands, &c., &c., which they may hold, for which they have no sunnuds. In this article are included all lands of which they may be the comavisdars or amildars, unless the possession of such lands should be material to their safety, or to enable them to collect the revenues of their serinjaumy, enaum, or jaghire lands: in which case, the British government will interest themselves with the Peshwah, that the comavisdars may be continued to the Putwurdun family, provided they give security that the Peshwah shall regularly receive the revenue.

230. To Major Shawe.

Strange circumstance of Scindiah's inclining to Holkar against us. He has broken the treaty of defensive alliance. But war with him would be most ill-timed. Proposed mode of dealing with him, and with Holkar.

(Extracts.)

Seringapatam, 14th Dec., 1804.

I think it almost certain, that the accounts of the victories of the British armies of the 13th and 17th Nov. will produce an alteration in the councils of Scindiah. He will not be so ready to join himself with Meer Khan, and neither will be bold enough to venture upon an attack upon the British possessions. The facts, however, stated in Mr. Jenkins's dispatch are curious, and well deserving the attention of every European politician who has any thing to say to India. Scindiah, whose enmity to Holkar was become proverbial; who allied himself with the Company for the express purpose of defending himself against, and eventually destroying, Holkar; who rejoiced when he found that the war was determined on and inevitable; who has suffered severely in its progress by Holkar's plunder of his town of Mundleysir, and by Meer Khan's plunder of Bhilsa; and who has every thing



to hope from its successful conclusion, which the smallest exertion on his part would ensure ; instead of making that exertion against his enemy, joins his enemy, for the purpose of destroying his friend and ally.

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There can be no doubt but that Scindiah has already broken the treaty of defensive alliance.

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In the case of a breach of treaty, it certainly rests with the British government to adopt that measure which will be most convenient for its own interests. It would be fully justified in having recourse to arms, at the same time that war is not the necessary consequence of every breach of treaty. The question, therefore, is simply one of convenience ; and upon this point I have no scruple in declaring, that the present is of all others the worst time to attempt the conquest of Malwa ; which must be the object of the war, and the only one which can bring it to a conclusion. We have neither troops, money, civil servants, magazines, nor any one object which would be necessary to carry this plan into execution. There are other reasons also for delaying to attempt it, referrible to the state of affairs in England. It will not be easy hereafter for Scindiah to get any European allies ; and his armies and resources will certainly not improve during the interval in which we may think proper to leave him to himself, and to the prosecution of his own plans against Holkar.

The plan which I should recommend to the Governor-General would be to call upon Scindiah now to take measures to seize Holkar ; if he should refuse, or omit to take any measures for that purpose, I would leave him to himself. I would form the armies in Bundelcund, and in the conquered provinces, according to the plan proposed in one of my memorandums ; and the subsidiary forces with the Soubah of the Deccan and the Peshwah on the Godavery, according to a plan proposed in one of my letters to you, and another to the Governor-General. I would then intimate to Kavel Nyn, or whoever may be the head of the English party at Scindiah's durbar, that the Governor-General had been prepared to advance money to Scindiah, and to assist him with troops in the true spirit of the defensive alliance, in order to enable him to settle a government in Malwa, but that Scindiah had broken it in all its essential articles, and that the British government would not revive it ; or would not act upon it



in any manner as long as Sirjee Rao Ghautky formed a part of the council, or remained in Scindiah's presence. At the same time, I would intimate an intention to perform every article of the treaty of peace.

This plan of conduct may revive the English party, and if it should, we may depend upon its permanence, and may act with it in the spirit of the defensive alliance; but if Ghautky should last, we may have peace with Scindiah for a time, and possibly, after the example which has been made of Holkar, for a very long time, but we cannot venture to act upon the defensive alliance.

It may be asked, what will be done with Holkar, who, I suppose, has escaped alive? I answer, he cannot now be formidable to the British government. Let him be followed, as I proposed in one of my memorandums to the Governor-General, with a reward for his apprehension. If we should take him, so much the better; if not, leave him to his contest with Scindiah, which will revive with double fury.

231. To Colonel Close.

Scindiah most blameable for not punishing those concerned in the attack on Mr. Jenkins. He is probably overawed by Ghautky. Neither probably desires war with the Company, or they would have acted sooner. Difficulty of interposing to save Mr. Jenkins, and yet avoid war. To write a letter, and advance a corps near to Scindiah's army,—the safest and most pacific plan. Alternative courses likely to be adopted by Scindiah. How far each is compatible with peace.

(Extract.)

Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

There can be no doubt but that the conduct of Scindiah throughout has been very improper; but not, in my opinion, in making an attack upon Bhopal or Saugur. There is no doubt but that he had a claim upon the Nabob of Bhopal, and it is more than probable that he had one upon Saugur, which, as you observe, holds but very slightly on the Peshwah; but his misbehaviour has been, in my opinion, principally towards Mr. Jenkins himself. The first attack upon Mr. Jenkins was a gross violation of the law of nations, on a point perfectly understood by the Mahrattas; and it was Scindiah's business to punish the



persons guilty of making that attack, and to take special care that it should not be repeated. The repetition of the attack adds to the enormity of the first offence, particularly as no measures have been taken to punish the persons guilty of it.

The Governor-General, in his dispatches, has decided that Scindiah shall be considered guilty of Ghautky's acts, if he retains Ghautky in his service, and does not restrain him; but the question upon this subject, is not whether Scindiah has the inclination, but whether he has the power, of restraining him.

I believe Scindiah to be very weak in intellect, although he has been known at times to assert his own power and dignity with a tolerably strong hand. But I am convinced that neither he nor his real ministers could ever have been concerned in the outrages to which I have referred. I am convinced also, that Scindiah knows that if he were to go to war with the British government, every respectable man in his state and army would leave him. It is my opinion, therefore, that he is overawed by Ghautky; that he feels the danger of endeavouring to arrest Ghautky's person, which can alone put a period to his practices; and he thinks that the measure would, in the event, leave him without resources and without army.

The result of this reasoning is, then, that we have reason to complain of Scindiah's government for acts committed by Ghautky, which, we have reason to suppose, are contrary to Scindiah's inclination, and that of his real ministers, and all his sirdars, but which he had not the power, or that he fears to punish.

It is my opinion that neither Scindiah nor Ghautky means to attack the Company. If they had intended it, they would not have lost the time before Saugur, during which Holkar and Meer Khan have been defeated; and it is to be hoped that the Rajah of Bhurtpoor will have been destroyed; but they would have dashed at once at Bundelcund and upon Benares, during the time that they knew that the Commander-in-Chief and our troops were engaged with Holkar and the Rajah of Bhurtpoor's forts. Scindiah's object is, I think, to get together a little money, and to be guided by events; and Ghautky appears to have no object at all, excepting to keep together an army of plunderers, which will give him the power over Scindiah. We must expect that the course of events will be favourable to us; and therefore it is unlucky that affairs have been brought to such a crisis,



and that it is absolutely necessary to interfere with a strong hand to save Mr. Jenkins and our honour, by which we shall again risk a war.

I do not see what plan we can adopt, in the execution of which Mr. Jenkins' life will not be in danger; and although it is an object of the first consequence to save his life, I declare that I am doubtful whether a strong measure or a moderate one is most likely to be successful. It is my opinion, that the Governor-General or you ought to write to Scindiah, to point out to him the enormity of the acts committed against Mr. Jenkins, who was residing with him in the quality of an ambassador; and who, therefore, by the laws of nations, as they are fully understood by the Mahrattas, was entitled to his protection; that the Governor-General was disposed to believe that these acts had been committed without Scindiah's knowledge, and against his consent; but they had passed without punishment or even notice, and it was therefore absolutely necessary to withdraw Mr. Jenkins from Scindiah's durbar, and to cease all communication with him, unless Scindiah should, immediately on the receipt of that letter, seize Sirjee Rao Ghautky, and punish him as his conduct had deserved.

But in case Scindiah should omit to punish Ghautky, and Mr. Jenkins should withdraw from his camp, Scindiah should be considered responsible for his security, till he should reach one of the posts occupied by the British army; and if, unfortunately, any accident should happen to Mr. Jenkins, Scindiah must expect the consequences of placing himself in the character of an enemy of the British government.

At the same time that this letter should be written, orders ought to be given to the Bundelcund corps, if it is supposed to be of sufficient strength, to approach towards Scindiah's position. If it should not be of sufficient strength, it ought to be strengthened, particularly in cavalry. Our troops in the Deccan cannot do anything in my opinion; excepting Wallace's corps, to seize Scindiah's possessions about Ahmednuggur, if the war should be determined upon; and Haliburton's to seize Burhampoor, and lay siege to Asseerghur.

These operations can be carried on, without impeding the arrangement detailed by me in my letters, of which I sent you copies. The only thing to take care of, is to make Wallace's corps approach Haliburton, as soon as he shall have placed the collector in possession of the countries about Ahmednuggur; in



order that he may cover Haliburton's operations, and prevent Scindiah from impeding the operations against Asseerghur, supposing that he should fly before the Bundelcund corps, and move in that direction.

When Scindiah shall have received the letter, which I have above proposed should be written to him, he will either seize Ghautky, or he will allow Mr. Jenkins to go away, with protection or without it; or he will not seize Ghautky, and will retain Mr. Jenkins. In the first case our triumph will be complete, but I fear that cannot be expected. In the second case, and the third, we shall remain at peace with Scindiah, provided Mr. Jenkins arrives in safety at one of our posts; if he should not do so, the war, in my opinion, is inevitable; and it is not impossible but that the Governor-General will go to war, at all events, for what has passed, unless Ghautky should be seized and punished: the only reason for which he may possibly not insist upon Ghautky's punishment is, that the proofs against him are not strong. In the fourth case, we must equally go to war, for we cannot submit to have our ambassador ill treated by a parcel of barbarians, without noticing the insult in the most serious manner.

There is a line of conduct which Scindiah may adopt, which may also leave peace as a possible event; it is to retain Mr. Jenkins, and to allow Ghautky to escape. When he does escape, he will be followed by all his plunderers, and will join Holkar; but this is a point of immaterial consequence, and would be the event most to be wished, next to that of his being blown from a gun. In this view of the case, the only chance of immediate war with Scindiah appears to rest on danger to Mr. Jenkins's person, or on Scindiah's retaining him in camp, contrary to the Governor-General's desire, while Ghautky shall still remain in power.

To ill-treat an ambassador is so violent a measure, one so repugnant to the feelings, even of the Mahrattas, that I acknowledge I do not imagine that Scindiah will venture upon it, although Ghautky would. The measure then to be adopted appears to be, to place a force in such a situation, when we shall communicate with Scindiah upon this subject, as shall convince him that we have the power of protecting him against Ghautky, supposing that he is inclined to be freed from his tyranny; and, at the same time, shall show Ghautky himself, that he cannot commit any act of violence against Mr. Jenkins's person with impunity.



The Bundelcund corps can easily be placed in such a position, and if the result of the measures to be adopted should be, that Scindiah should allow Mr. Jenkins to go away, he will be able to reach that corps with facility. It is my opinion, then, that the approach of a British corps will induce all Scindiah's real ministers, and the old adherents of his family, to declare themselves against the violent measures of Ghautky.

Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion, that to write a letter, such as I have proposed, and to place our Bundelcund corps rather nearer to Scindiah's army, afford the best prospect of maintaining the peace with Scindiah; which, if we can do with honour, I consider to be an object of the first importance.

232. To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick.

Choute a regular branch of revenue, and a vested interest. Its varied and intricate arrangement in the Nizam's territories. Owned by him and his allies;—rarely by the Peshwah.

(Extract.)

Fort St. George, 5th March, 1805.

I conclude that Appah Dessaye's claim to the choute of Aurungabad is quite clear; and that this question is not one referrible to the arbitration of the British government. Indeed, I have reason to believe it is so, and, therefore, that Appah Dessaye ought to be paid. The fact of the matter regarding this choute is, that although originally a denomination of a portion of revenue, established by the Mahratta exactions, and in many instances a grievance upon the people, from the mode in which it is collected, it could not be entirely abolished, without making a very serious and dangerous attack upon property.

In some instances that I know of, the Nizam and his Mussulmann sirdars have the choute of Mahratta districts, which, of course, was originally exacted by the head of the Mahratta government; and, by subsequent arrangements, has been ceded to the Nizam, and granted by him to his servants. In many instances the choute is arranged by the grant of a few villages in a district in lieu of it; in others, the quarter of the district is in the possession of a choutear, in lieu of his claim to a quarter of the actual revenue realized from the whole district; and in others, by a more complicated arrangement, the choutear has a certain number of villages, and the sircar besides pays him the



in which the rent of these villages is deficient, to make up the quarter of the revenue of the district.

In almost every instance that I have seen, the right of the choute exists in some individual who resides in the country, and who is but little more attached to the government of the Peshwah than he is to that of the Nizam, if at all attached to the former; and in but very few instances does it belong to the Peshwah's government. This very claim of Appah Dessaye's is one attached to his office of sirlushkur, and every person holding the office before him has enjoyed it. It is my opinion, therefore, generally, that the question for arbitration by the British government is, whether the Soubah shall pay to the Peshwah the choute of Beeder, which is a question depending upon treaties, and not whether his territories shall be exempt from the payment of that portion of revenue called choute, which has always been paid by them. This choute, to which I have referred, is entirely distinct from that general kind of indiscriminate plunder, to which the Mahrattas lay claim all over India. This is a right of the sword, which, of course, ceases when the sword is no longer in their hand; and the Soubah has a right to be exempt from it, excepting in instances in which he has bound himself by acknowledged treaties to pay it.

233. To Major Shawe.

War with Scindiah to be carefully avoided now. We are in no condition for it.

Fort St. George, 6th March, 1805.

I sent you yesterday the copy of a letter which I had written to Col. Close, on the subject of the late events in Scindiah's camp, the greatest part of which was written before I had received your letter of the 18th Feb. I hope to God we shall be able to avoid a war with Scindiah. Take my word for it, we are not now in a state to attempt the conquest of Malwa; an operation which, under other circumstances, would be a mere joke. The army to whose share it would naturally fall is now drawn to the Jumna, by the Commander-in-Chief; there is not a sepoy at Bombay, and very few sepoys and not 200 Europeans in Guzerat. The Peshwah's subsidiary force is not yet efficient; and if it were, neither that corps nor the Soubah's subsidiary force could be moved from the Deccan with safety.



You see the time and lives that have been spent in the attempts to subdue the Rajah of Bhurtpoor; and you will see that the army of Bengal will not be clear of that country before the season comes round, in which it will be necessary for them to go into cantonments. I therefore most anxiously hope that all that can be done with honour, will be done to preserve peace with Scindiah as long as possible.

234. To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.

*Sentiments on the final arrangements with Scindiah and Holkar.
Strong feeling in England in favour of peace, at any price.*

Hastings, 31st July, 1806.

I have received your letters up to the 14th Jan., for which I return you many thanks. The subjects to which they relate are too large to be discussed in a letter which must go to the post this afternoon, in order to be despatched by the ships which will sail in a few days. I shall therefore satisfy myself by telling you that I consider that you have acted a part entirely consistent with your own character, and in strict conformity with my sentiments, in everything that you have done. The arrangement with Scindiah is precisely that which you and I recommended long before, and which I urged, and, I believe, was ordered when I was in Bengal in 1804. I thought also at that time, and so did you, that the Rajpoots ought to have been subjugated to the control of Scindiah's government, as the only mode of re-establishing it; the state in which it must exist, if it is to exist at all. This object might with care and justice have been effected at that time, if the state of Scindiah's government had permitted it; and I am not sufficiently acquainted with all that has passed between the Rajpoots and our government since the period of Monson's defeat, to be able to decide that we ought not to deliver them over to Scindiah, notwithstanding the favourable change which has taken place in the state and dispositions of his councils.

I regret that it has been necessary to allow Holkar to exist, and to be at large. I should be induced to suspect that he will never allow us to be at peace; and without peace we cannot reduce the debt, which must be the great object at present. However, if it was necessary to allow him to exist, I see but one



amendment which could have been made to the treaty with him ; that is, to have kept permanently Umber and Chandore in the Deccan, and some place of similar consequence in Hindustan, either in our own hands or those of our allies, as a perpetual memorial to the whole world that we had defeated him. The powers of India will not now believe that our moderation alone has occasioned the treaty which has been concluded ; and I shall not be surprised if it give ground for a belief, the most erroneous, that Holkar's power and his mode of warfare had been more destructive to us than the resources and the efficiency and discipline of the armies of the other Mahrattas.

In respect to the necessity of peace with Holkar, no man can be a judge of it who has not been in this country, who has not sat in the House of Commons, and had means of ascertaining the public opinion at its fountain head. I really believe, that in the opinion of the majority of people in this country, it would have been better to cede the whole of Oude to Holkar than to continue the war with him.

As for myself, I am here in the command of a few troops stationed in this part of the coast, the old landing place of William the Conqueror. You will have seen that I am in Parliament, and a most difficult and unpleasant game I have had to play in the present extraordinary state of parties. I have desired Sydenham to send you a copy of a speech which I made upon the budget.

I have seen your brothers, Pulteney and Charles, both well. The former is in the *Donegal*, off Brest ; the other unemployed in London. But Sir Thomas, whom I saw likewise, expects to be able to get a ship for Charles soon. God bless you, my dear Malcolm ; don't stay too long in India.

P.S. Pray remember me most kindly to Wilks and all friends in Seringapatam.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



5. WAR WITH HOLKAR.

235. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

The object of the campaign is to bring Holkar to a general action, as soon as possible. This he will avoid as long as he can. His advantages over us in this respect. We cannot choose the seat of war; he can. Thus we must keep up our communications with our own country, to ensure supplies. Hence we should obtain the alliance and co-operation of the Mahratta chiefs on this side of India. Answer to political objections against such alliances. Military advantages of the connexion.

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 27th Nov., 1802.

It is impossible to give a decided opinion upon the particular operations before the decided object of the Governor-General is known; but whatever may be that object, as the means of attaining it must be the defeat of the formidable body of troops collected by Holkar, time is not thrown away in considering certain subjects connected with the operations against that chieftain.

It is obvious that the intentions of the British government regarding the affairs of the Mahratta empire cannot be carried into execution unless Holkar's army is either defeated or dissipated. The object of the campaign must therefore be to bring him to a general action at as early a period as possible. This object, I have to observe, is not one of which, like the siege of Seringapatam, or the operations of a former war against Tippoo, the time it will take to attain it can be calculated. If it be our interest to bring Holkar to a general action, it is his to avoid it; and it may be depended upon that he will avoid it as long as he can.

His army is light, and chiefly composed of cavalry. The whole composition of our armies is heavy; even our cavalry, from the nature of their constitution and their equipments, and owing to the food eaten by the horses, are not able to march with greater celerity for any length of time than our infantry. His troops and his horses subsist on the grain the produce of the country. Our troops come from countries the general produce of which is rice; they, and even their followers, must have a certain quantity of that grain; and the horses of the cavalry must likewise have a grain not the general produce of the Mahratta territory, which, in addition to the inconvenience of the necessity of boiling it, must be brought from a distance.



Holkar, therefore, will have not only the inclination but the means of avoiding the result which, I take it for granted, can alone bring the war to a conclusion; and it is obvious that no man possesses a datum on which he can calculate the length of time which will elapse before he can bring the contest to that state.

Putting the European troops out of the question, the mode of equipping our Native armies, the food which they and their followers and horses are in the habit of using, will render it necessary that a large stock of provisions should be carried for their consumption. But however large that stock may be, no man can pretend to say that it will last till the general action will take place, which will alone bring the contest to a conclusion, because I have already shown that the enemy will be inclined, and will have the means of avoiding it. Therefore I conclude that, after a certain period for which our stock of provisions will have been provided, we shall be obliged to return to our own country for a fresh supply.

There are but two modes of carrying on this war by which we may avoid this disagreeable result: one is to place the seat of it in a country so near our own resources as that we shall be able with ease to command our supplies, or in one which is capable of affording us the supplies we require; the other is to keep up our communication with our own country, whatever may be the distance from it of the seat of the war. In regard to the first, viz. to command the seat of the war, I have to observe that we shall no more be able to do that than we shall to command its operations. The result is to be a general action with the enemy, and I have already shown that we must fight that action where he pleases, and therefore we cannot fix upon the seat of the war.

The second mode then is that alone by which we can succeed. By this mode we shall always supply ourselves; the enemy may protract his defeat, but sooner or later it must happen. The question is, in what manner is this desirable object to be attained?

The long operations of conquering and establishing ourselves in the countries on this side of the Kistna I put out of the question, as suitable neither to the state of our force at the present moment nor to our finances. Besides, it is probable that before we should have brought matters to that state that we should be able to commence the operations against the enemy which are to bring the war to a conclusion, other revolutions would happen in India which would entirely alter the situation of affairs.



The manner then by which I would propose to keep up the communication with our rear would be to take into our alliance and call for the co-operation of all the Mahratta chiefs on this side of India.

Upon this subject I observe that my opinion is different from yours, and I am aware that the question is political, upon which I am not called to give an opinion at all; but it is so intimately connected with the military operations that it is not possible to consider the one without considering the other.

In all cases of war, particularly with such a nation as the Mahrattas, there can be no doubt but that generally it is desirable that a part of them should be on our side; and I proceed to consider whether there is any reason which ought to induce us to reject the alliance of those Mahrattas whose services I believe we can now command. The great objection to our adopting it is the engagements by which we or the Peshwah may be fettered hereafter. I do not think it probable that we shall be under the necessity of entering into such engagements; but even if we should, the object of the contest is not territory for ourselves, but the defeat of a power from which we or our ally apprehend danger; and the question regarding the engagements must be decided by that of the value or the necessity of the assistance of those with whom they are to be entered into.

The Mahratta territory is divided among jaghiredars, all of whom have troops in the service of the state, or it belongs to Polygars, who pay a peshcush, or it is managed by the aumildars of the Sircar. But the peshcush of these Polygars, and everything collected by the aumildars, is applied to the payment of the Peshwah's troops, whose chiefs have tuncaws upon the revenues, or in payment of the debts of the state, also upon tuncaws. The Mahratta government was formerly as regularly organised as any in India, and these jaghiredars completely under the control of the Peshwah as head of the empire; but during the late troubles they have become in some degree independent of his authority, and they look to other sources besides his favour for their security. There is no doubt, however, but that all that they could claim from us in return for their assistance would be protection in the enjoyment of their jaghires, which, in case of our interference in the affairs of the empire hereafter, it is more than probable that we should afford them at all events. The promise of this protection would not prevent us from availing ourselves of any advantages to be derived here-



after from any subsidiary engagements which might be entered into with the Peshwah. The countries which it is probable we should wish to have under such an arrangement are Savanore and Darwar, on which there are no jaghires. Their revenues are applied in part to the payment of Goklah's army, being the army of the state, and in part of a debt due by the state to the family of Pursheram Bhow; and all that would be necessary would be to urge the Peshwah to make some other arrangement for the payment of this debt. Upon the whole, therefore, considering the nature of the tenures of the chiefs who command the troops in this part of the Mahratta territory, and their probable objects and ours, I cannot conceive that we can be fettered hereafter by any engagements we may enter into with them.

I now come to consider what assistance they can give us.

In the first place, the government of the countries through which the British army must pass to fight this battle is in their hands. By having them in our camps the inhabitants of these countries will be friendly to us; we shall enjoy the supplies which they can afford, and our own supplies will pass through them with comparatively small escorts. In short, we shall enjoy advantages nearly as extensive as we should supposing that the countries were in our own hands, without spending time, money, and lives to conquer them.

In the second place, we shall have the assistance of a body of cavalry amounting to not less than 20,000 men. I don't mean to hint that we shall require this assistance in the day of battle, but we shall to escort our supplies, to guard our baggage and provisions on our marches, to keep our camps quiet, to cover our forage, and save our own cavalry.

In the third place, we shall have the advantage of the best intelligence, particularly of any designs upon our rear. With such a body of cavalry in your camp, the enemy would not dare to detach small parties to your rear to distress your communications; and if he did, those parties would not remain there, as you would have the earliest intelligence of their movements, and might detach superior bodies immediately; and the fear of weakening himself too much in front of such a body of cavalry as you would have would equally prevent him from detaching a large body.

There is no doubt but that the advantages to be derived from this body of men are very great, and probably will more than



counterbalance the perils to be expected from an alliance with them; and when it is recollected that by their assistance a prospect is afforded of keeping open our rear, and thus of bringing the contest to the only possible conclusion, I think that the necessity of encouraging them is obvious.

I have previously stated that these troops belong to the Mah-ratta state, for whose subsistence payment is already provided by the arrangements of that government; therefore the employment of them will occasion no expense. They likewise and their horses, like all other Mahrattas, live upon jowarry, the grain of the country, and their consumption will not fall upon our supplies.

I have, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

236. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

*Expediency of direct—inexpediency of indirect—communications
with Holkar.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 22nd June, 1803.

I am of opinion that one great fault of which we have been guilty in the negotiations to prevent the confederacy, has been that we have omitted to keep up a communication and intercourse with Holkar, whom I consider as the most formidable of the three supposed confederates. I endeavoured to remedy this fault as soon as I arrived at Poonah, and proposed to Holkar to send him a gentleman; but he was at that time on his plundering plan in the Nizam's territories, and in his answer he pretended not to understand the meaning of my proposition. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the sooner we remedy this fault the better; and I should not object much to any channel by which we might obtain so desirable an object. But I don't like the communications through third persons: they never lead to any thing but inaction on our part, and give room for every kind of intrigues. If Fukker u Deen has any proposition to make of a mode by which the peace between Holkar and the Honourable Company can be preserved, he is an old servant of the Company's, and in constant communication with you, and he ought to come forward and make it, and to state his authority and his reasons for believing that the mode which he proposes will have the desired effect. On the ground of such a



communication some steps can be taken, the business can be put in some kind of shape, we can see what prospect there is of getting it forward, and its future progress; but these second and third hand communications are always intrigues, and lead to disasters.

237. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

General Wellesley writes to Holkar, with a copy of the Treaty.

Camp, 16th July, 1803.

Although the Governor-General mentioned in one of his despatches that the treaty of Bassein ought to be communicated to Holkar, no orders have been sent stating by whom; and I have not observed in any of the correspondence that it has been communicated to that chief. I have long thought that it would be very desirable to open a communication with Holkar, and particularly to make known to him the treaty of Bassein. I have therefore taken the opportunity of the departure from this camp of a vakeel from Amrut Rao to show Holkar the treaty; and I have written him a letter¹, of which I enclose a translation, which I send to him by a Native officer.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

238. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.

A contest with Holkar not to be precipitated.

(Extract.)

Camp, 31st Jan., 1804.

It is difficult to say what line Holkar will take, or what ought to be done with him. He is evidently only a freebooter, and to crush him cannot be called a war in the present state of the Company's power; but whatever may be done hereafter, I think it will be advisable not to touch him, unless he should attack the Company or their allies, till the alliance with Scindiah will be concluded. If Scindiah sees us attack Holkar, he will most probably not enter into the defensive alliance; he will attack Holkar at the same time, in order to get what he can.

¹ See No. 147, p. 262.—*Ed.*



239. To Colonel Montresor.

War with Holkar probably avoidable : if not, he ought to be promptly suppressed.

(Extract.)

Bombay, 26th March, 1804.

The subsidiary alliance offered to Scindiah, in the 5th article of the treaty of peace, has been concluded. The knowledge of this event will, I think, prevent the supposed contest with Holkar, which after all, in the present state of the Company's power, could not have been considered more than a Polygar war. But to say the truth, I have always considered Holkar's power to depend upon his avoiding a contest with any of the British armies, and I believe that he has been of the same opinion : there are, therefore, good grounds for thinking that we shall now have unqualified peace. Supposing that we should not, there are four or five armies ready to move upon him, and we should make a capital finishing of a Mahratta confederacy by destroying the chief who they say planned it, but who cautiously avoided activity in the execution of his own plans after the two other members had been destroyed.

240. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

General Lake ought to dash at Holkar at once ; or postpone hostilities until he is strong enough to do so.

Bombay, 20th April, 1804.

Malcolm's letter of the 14th is certainly very important ; but I by no means think the question of peace or war decided. It will depend upon Holkar's conduct when he will find that General Lake has moved. The General's intention not to quit Hindustan, and not to follow Holkar, will be fatal. He ought to leave a corps in Hindustan for its security, and move with a light body in pursuit of Holkar, whose force will fritter away daily, whether he retreats after fighting or without fighting. If he should not pursue Holkar, the war will immediately become defensive on our part in the most important quarter, and by such operations we must lose.

Colonel Murray's offensive operations must be feeble in comparison with those of the Commander-in-Chief ; indeed, I don't think that he can venture far from the Myhie. No progress, then, will be made in the war till I can reach the countries north



of Ougein; and supposing it to be safe for me to quit the Deccan with any formidable corps of troops, I am almost certain that I shall not have it in my power to collect a sufficient quantity of provisions to subsist the troops till they would arrive in communication with the stores of Guzerat. At all events, months must elapse before I could reach those countries; and I really think that if General Lake should push Holkar vigorously, the war ought not to last a fortnight.

If General Lake should not be sufficiently strong to carry on the war in this manner, he ought to delay its commencement till he can be reinforced, or till Scindiah's subsidiary force can be arranged. I return all your letters.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

241. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

Why the English Government ought not to support Cashee Rao Holkar.

(Extract.)

Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

I have always held the same opinion about Cashee Rao Holkar. He is an infamous blackguard, despised by everybody, full of prejudices, hatred, and revenge, and without one adherent or even a follower. By adopting his cause we shall burthen ourselves with the defence and support of another weak and helpless power, we shall disgust Scindiah's government, and we shall not give satisfaction to the followers and adherents of the Holkar family. The act will be abstractedly generous; but considering that Cashee Rao was concerned in the murder of his brother, it will be to support usurpation founded on murder, and, for the reasons I have above mentioned, highly impolitic.

The question ought to be decided at the same time that the Governor-General decides that he will go into the war, and I must, of course, write to him about it; but you ought to write likewise.

242. To Colonel Murray.

Murray to march quickly into Malwa, when the war with Holkar begins.

(Extract.)

Bombay, 30th April, 1804.

At whatever period hostilities may commence with Holkar, it will be necessary that your corps should move into Malwa. You



will observe, therefore, the necessity of keeping it prepared, at least till the exact state of affairs in Hindustan shall be known; and when you break it up for the rains, you will take care to occupy such positions as will be most useful to enable you to advance with celerity into Malwa, as will at the same time cover Guzerat from invasion, and as will enable you to collect in strength whenever that may be necessary.

243. To Colonel Murray.

Instructions for the conduct of the war with Holkar.

(Extracts.)

Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

I have the honour to inform you that I have received intimation from his Excellency the Governor-General, that he has given directions to the Commander-in-Chief to attack Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and his Excellency has ordered me to make arrangements to co-operate with, and support the operations of, the Commander-in-Chief.

It is impossible for me to say what the operations of the Commander-in-Chief will be, but Holkar's power appears to consist principally in a considerable army in the field; and I imagine that his Excellency's operations will, in the first instance, be directed to defeat that army; or, if Holkar should avoid an action by flying, to press upon him so closely as to oblige his troops to disperse. This operation can be aided very materially from Guzerat, and I proceed to point out to you in what manner.

* * * * *

If the operations of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief should be directed to the defeat and dispersion of Holkar's army according to the mode which I have supposed at the commencement of this letter, your object will be to post yourself in such a manner as to stop Holkar, and embarrass and impede his flight as much as possible, and if you can, to engage him.

If the Commander-in-Chief should commence his operations in a short time, it does not appear to me to be probable that Holkar, who is now, I believe, about Ajmeer, will retire to the south-westward, or towards Guzerat; but he will, probably, move towards Ougein. I have no ground, however, for this conjecture, excepting the knowledge that the rains will commence in June, and the probability that Holkar will be disinclined to trust himself in a country in that season of the year, in which his operations would



be confined by the course of the rivers, the nature of the country, &c. If he should move towards Ougein, it will be your business to join Scindiah's army at the earliest practicable period; and at all events, to move with celerity upon Holkar, and attack him whenever you shall have an opportunity. You will take with you as large a body of the Guickwar cavalry as can be furnished to you.

* * * * *

I understand that he has some strongholds in Malwa, particularly at Rampoorra, or Brampoora, to which he has lately sent his infantry and guns; but it will not be difficult to obtain possession of them, and to make a final conquest and settlement of his country, as soon as his army shall have been beaten and dispersed; and to employ our troops in sieges till this object shall have been effected will only give Holkar leisure for his predatory operations, will enable him to distress the troops by operating on their communications during such sieges, and will delay his final defeat.

244., To General Lake.

Rapid and continuous pursuit, with corps capable of sustaining an action, the best mode of dispersing such an army as Holkar's.

27th May, 1804.

*****¹ The account you give of the state of Holkar's army is very satisfactory. I have served a good deal in this part of India against this description of freebooter; and I think that the best mode of operating, is to press him with one or two corps capable of moving with tolerable celerity, and of such strength as to render the result of an action by no means doubtful, if he should venture to risk one. There is but little hope, it is true, that he will risk an action, or that any one of these corps will come up with him. The effect to be produced by this mode of operation is to oblige him to move constantly and with great celerity. When reduced to this necessity, he cannot venture to stop to plunder the country, and he does comparatively but little mischief: at all events the subsistence of his army becomes difficult and precarious, the horsemen become dissatisfied, they perceive that their situation is hopeless, and they desert in numbers daily; the freebooter ends by having with him only a

¹ *Sic* in Col. Gurwood's Edition.—*Ed.*



few adherents ; and he is reduced to such a state as to be liable to be taken by any small body of country horse, which are the fittest troops to be then employed against him.

In proportion as the body of our troops, to be employed against a freebooter of this description, have the power of moving with celerity, will such freebooter be distressed. Whenever the largest and most formidable bodies of them are hard pressed by our troops, the village people attack them upon their rear and flanks, cut off stragglers, and will not allow a man to enter their villages ; because their villages being in some degree fortified, they know well that the freebooters dare not wait the time which would be necessary to reduce them. When this is the case, all their means of subsistence vanish, no resource remains excepting to separate ; and even this resource is attended by risk, as the village people cut them off on their way to their homes.

You will have been informed by Mr. Webbe that Col. Murray has moved before this time.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have great hopes that I shall be able to move, and to make the siege of Chandore in the course of the month of June. Every thing is ready. The troops have been clothed and equipped, and I wait only for a fall of rain to insure water.

245. To Colonel Murray.

Murray's force adequate to its requirements. Mischief of innuendos that it is not.

(Extract.)

Camp at Niggeree, 28th June, 1804.

You have a larger body of European soldiers than the Commander-in-Chief, or than I have ever had ; and Col. Monson has driven Holkar before him out of the territories of the Rajah of Jeypoor, of Bhoondy, and of Kota, without a single European soldier or horseman, excepting the irregular horse of the country. You will be joined by a large body of Scindiah's cavalry.

From your frequent allusions to this subject, I should be induced to believe that you do not deem your force sufficient to perform the service on which you are employed, if I was not aware of the circumstances to which I have above referred ; and it is, therefore, necessary, that I should request you to explain yourself fully to Mr. Duncan upon it. Your explanation of your sentiments ought to be full ; as, by allusions to your weakness, and



expressing your hopes that you will be reinforced, you expose the government to the severe responsibility of omitting to reinforce you on the one hand, if it should be necessary; or of reinforcing you, on the other, if it should not.

246. To Major Malcolm.

Peril involved in the prolongation of the war. Murray and Monson both afraid of Holkar; and each justifies his retreat by that of the other.

(Extract.)

Barrackpoor, 24th Aug., 1804.

You may depend upon it that the Commander-in-Chief will not allow me to undertake the settlement of affairs in Malwa; indeed it would be improper to propose such an arrangement to him, and unreasonable to expect that he would propose it himself.

It is now reported that Holkar is crossing the Chumbul; and if that report be well founded, the Commander-in-Chief will have a favourable opportunity of attacking him, and of bringing the war to a conclusion. If it is not soon brought to a conclusion, either in this manner or some other, it will be the most serious affair in which the British government have ever been engaged, and one which will require the exertions of all of us. In such a case, I have no objection to go back to the Deccan: but otherwise I am very desirous to avoid the journey. I shall speak to the Governor-General respecting the arrangements you propose for Close.

I have read over with the greatest attention all Monson's letters, and all the information which has arrived here respecting the late misfortunes; and I am decidedly of opinion that Monson advanced without reason, and retreated in the same manner; and that he had no intelligence of what was passing 5 miles from his camp.

It is a curious circumstance that Monson and the Commander-in-Chief should attribute their misfortunes to Murray's retreat, and that Murray should attribute his retreat to a movement of the same kind made by Monson. At all events both parties appear to have been afraid of Holkar, and both to have fled from him in different directions.

I do not think that the Commander-in-Chief and I have carried on the war so well by our deputies as we did ourselves. There is no news. The countries to the northward are in great alarm;



but it is to be hoped that the Governor-General's luck will not leave him in this crisis: and that all will be settled before the late misfortunes can have any serious effect. Would to God that I had come round here in March, and Holkar would now have been in the tomb of all the Capulets!

247. To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace.

*Narrative of Monson's retreat. Rationale of his disasters.
Lessons from his campaign.*

Fort William, 12th Sept., 1804.

¹You will have heard reports of poor Monson's reverses, but as I am on the spot, you will be glad to hear the truth from me; and as they give some important military lessons to us all, I do not regard the trouble of writing them to you. When it became necessary to attack Holkar, Monson was detached from the grand army with 3 battalions and their guns, and a body of cavalry, under Lieut. Lucan. Holkar, who was then near Ajmeer, with an army composed only of horse (and as Gen. Lake was at no great distance from Monson), retreated towards Malwa.

After quitting the river Jumna, and passing through the flat countries depending on Agra, the first country going to the southward is a mountainous tract called Jeypoor, governed by the Rajah of that name, who had been tributary to Scindiah and Holkar previous to the late war, and who had been relieved from his tribute by the operation of the treaty of peace. Joining to the territories of Jeypoor is that of the Rajah of Boondy, of the same description; and joining to Boondy is the territory of the Rajah of Kota. These last two Rajahs had been, and are still, tributary to Scindiah; and Holkar has claims upon them which they hoped to get rid of by the British assistance, in consequence of their conduct in the war; at all events, they were desirous to obtain for a time the British protection against the demands of Holkar.

Between Boondy and Jeypoor is a small territory and fort called Rampoor, which, at the commencement of the war, belonged to Holkar. This territory had formerly been part of the Jeypoor territory, and had been seized by the Holkar family in some of their former contests with the Rajah of Jeypoor. The

¹ This letter is given entire, except three opening paragraphs, on personal matters.—*Ed.*



whole of this country between Agra and the province of Malwa, which joins to the Kota territory, and which is entered through a pass called the Muckundra ghaut, is intersected by rivers and nullahs, which are either full throughout the western rains, or are filled at times by those rains, and become impassable for troops. Of these, the principal is the river Chumbul, which runs between Kota and Boondy, and the river Banas, which runs between Rampoorra and Agra.

When Holkar fled in front of the army of the Commander-in-Chief, Col. Monson followed him successively to Boondy and Kota, the Rajahs of which countries were very desirous to have the protection of the British troops against his exactions, and promised supplies and every thing which Col. Monson could want. At the same time that Col. Monson advanced, a detachment under Col. Don, consisting of 2 battalions, was sent to take Rampoorra, of which place it got possession by storm; and this detachment afterwards joined and reinforced Monson's corps, which then consisted of 5 battalions.

In the month of June, the Commander-in-Chief withdrew his army into cantonments, leaving Monson's corps in the Kota country. Monson, towards the end of that month, passed through the Muckundra ghaut into Malwa, accompanied by the troops of the Rajah of Kota, and some of Scindiah's, under Bappojee Scindiah, and attacked, and took by storm, the hill fort of Hinglisghur; and after this operation, he took up a position in Malwa, recommended to him by the Rajah of Kota, at some distance from the Muckundra ghaut, in which the Rajah told him he was likely to get supplies, and from which Monson expected to be able to communicate with Col. Murray, at that time on his march from Guzerat towards Ougein.

After his retreat in front of the Commander-in-Chief, Holkar had first threatened Ougein, and afterwards had gone to Mundissoor, a town belonging to Scindiah, situated to the north-west of Ougein, and on the left of the Chumbul. Between the middle and latter end of June, he took and plundered this town; and at that time the river Chumbul was between him and Col. Monson, who was encamped about 5 coss from the river, on the right bank.

Towards the beginning of July, Holkar passed the Chumbul with his army. Col. Monson learnt that he was doing so, and intended to attack him. He moved towards the place at which he heard Holkar was, and found that the whole army had



crossed the river; nearly about the same time, he understood that Col. Murray, who had made 2 marches towards Ougein from Guzerat, had recrossed the Myhie; and upon the whole, Monson, having only 2 days' provisions, thought it best to retreat. Accordingly, he sent off his baggage early on the following morning, the 8th July, I believe, towards the Muckundra ghaut; and he followed with the infantry at about 9 in the morning, meaning to reach Muckundra that night, the distance about 17 miles. He left Lucan, with his irregular horse and Bappojee Scindiah's horse, to cover his rear, and to follow as his rear guard. After Monson had marched a few miles, he heard that Holkar had attacked, with his cavalry, his rear guard of irregular horse; and shortly afterwards, he received intelligence that the rear guard was destroyed, and Lucan taken prisoner. He arrived at Muckundra unmolested, and took up a position that covered the ghaut; but which, like all others that I have seen, had many passages practicable for cavalry.

On the next day, or the next but one, Monson was attacked by the whole of Holkar's cavalry, in 3 separate bodies, who, however, could make no impression upon him; and they were beat off. Towards evening he heard that the infantry was arrived at a camp within 2 or 3 coss of the Muckundra ghaut, with their guns, 175 in number; and he determined to retreat again. He accordingly marched to Kota, the Rajah of which place urged him to stay there, but could not supply him with provisions; and then Monson marched on the following day, and crossed the Chumbul in boats, provided by the Rajah, which he sunk after he had crossed.

The rain began about the 10th July, and became incessant, and rendered Monson's marches much more difficult than they would otherwise have been; particularly in that country, which is a black cotton ground. At last, after he had crossed the Chumbul, he was obliged to spike his guns and leave them behind, and he continued his march, getting but little provision on the road until he reached Rampoor. He was followed, but not much harassed, by a body of Holkar's horse, which overtook him at a nullah, which being full, stopped him. He twice beat up the camp of this body of horse, and then I believe they quitted him. On his arrival at Rampoor, Monson was joined by 2 battalions with their guns, and a body of Hindustany horse, under Major Frith, which had been sent from Agra to reinforce him, and he immediately began to collect provisions at Rampoor.



The rains, which had been so distressing to Monson, likewise impeded Hólkar, some of whose guns remained to the southward of the Muckundra ghaut. His progress to the northward was likewise impeded by Monson having destroyed the Rajah of Kota's boats on the Chumbul. However, at last he advanced, and towards the 20th Aug. again approached Monson at Rampoora.

By this time, Monson had collected only about 12 days' provisions, and the Commander-in-Chief, foreseeing the difficulty in which he might again be involved, desired him on the 20th Aug. to retire towards Jeypoor, if he should think it probable that he might be distressed for provisions.

Monson, however, remained till Holkar approached him within 6 coss with his whole army, and on the 21st Aug., in the evening, commenced his retreat towards Agra, by Kooshalghur, leaving Jeypoor on his left hand. He left 15 companies as a garrison in Rampoora. He arrived at Banas river on the 23rd, and found that it was full: on the 24th, in the morning, it fell, and became fordable, and he passed over his baggage and a battalion; and between 12 and 3 o'clock, he passed over three more battalions, leaving the piquets and one battalion to support them on the southern bank.

Holkar's troops had appeared in the morning, and were seen crossing at different fords on the right and left flank; and towards evening, Holkar's infantry and guns appeared in front. They attacked the piquets, but were repulsed; and the piquets and battalion took 8 guns; but afterwards our troops were overpowered by superior numbers, and were obliged to retreat across the river to the main body, in which operation they lost many men, being attacked on their rear, and also by the horse, who had crossed the river and moved up its bed.

Monson retreated from Banas river on the night of the 24th, leaving his baggage, and arrived at Kooshalghur, about 40 miles distant, on the night of the 25th. He was followed throughout the march by Holkar's horse, who, however, were not able to make any impression upon him. He halted on the night of the 25th and the 26th at Kooshalghur, and on the 26th at night marched towards Agra. Something happened on the 27th, of which I have not received an account; but on the 30th, Monson and his detachment arrived at Agra.

The Commander-in-Chief has taken the field, and it is to be hoped that he will have an early opportunity of wiping away the disgrace which we have suffered.



It is worth while to review these transactions, in order that we may see to what these misfortunes ought to be attributed, that in future, if possible, they may be avoided.

In the 1st place, it appears that Col. Monson's corps was never so strong as to be able to engage Holkar's army, if that Chief should collect it; at least the Colonel was of that opinion. 2ndly: It appears that it had not any stock of provisions. 3rdly: That it depended for provisions upon certain Rajahs, who urged its advance. 4thly: That no measures whatever were taken by British officers to collect provisions either at Boondy or Kota, or even at Rampoor, a fort belonging to us, in which we had a British garrison. 5thly: That the detachment was advanced to such a distance, over so many almost impassable rivers and nullahs, without any boats collected, or posts upon those rivers; and in fact, that the detachment owes its safety to the Rajah of Kota, who supplied them with his boats.

The result of these facts is an opinion, in my mind, that the detachment must have been lost, even if Holkar had not attacked them with his infantry and artillery.

In respect to the conduct of the operations, it is my opinion that Monson ought to have attacked Holkar in the first instance. If he chose to retire, he ought to have supported the rear guard with his infantry, and to have sent the irregular horse away with the baggage.

When he began to retreat, he ought not to have stopped longer than a night at Muckundra; because he must have been certain that the same circumstances which obliged him to retire to Muckundra, would also oblige him to quit that position. The difference between a good and a bad military position is nothing when the troops are starving.

The same reasoning holds good respecting Monson's halt at Rampoor, unless he intended to fight. As he had been reinforced, he ought to have fallen back till he was certain of his supplies; and having waited till Holkar approached him, and particularly as Holkar's army was not then in great strength in infantry and guns, he ought to have vigorously attacked him before he retired. When his piquets were attacked on the Banas, he ought to have supported them with his whole corps, leaving one battalion on the northern bank to take care of his baggage; and if he had done so, he probably would have gained a victory, would have saved his baggage, and regained his honour.



We have some important lessons from this campaign. 1st: We should never employ a corps on a service for which it is not fully equal. 2ndly: Against the Mahrattas in particular, but against all enemies, we should take care to be sure of plenty of provisions. 3rdly: Experience has shown us, that British troops can never depend upon Rajahs, or any allies, for their supplies. Our own officers must purchase them; and if we should employ a Native in such an important service, we ought to see the supplies before we venture to expose our troops in the situation in which they may want them. 4thly: When we have a fort which can support our operations, such as Rampoorah to the northward, or Ahmednuggur, or Chandore, in your quarter, we should immediately adopt effectual measures to fill it with provisions and stores, in case of need. 5thly: When we cross a river likely to be full in the rains, we ought to have a post and boats upon it; as I have upon all the rivers south of Poonah, and as you have, I hope, upon the Beemah and the Godavery.

In respect to the operations of a corps in the situation of Monson's, they must be decided and quick; and in all retreats, it must be recollected that they are safe and easy, in proportion to the number of attacks made by the retreating corps. But attention to the foregoing observations will, I hope, prevent a British corps from retreating.

These misfortunes in Hindustan will, I fear, take me back to the Deccan. Indeed, I shall leave this immediately, and orders have been already given that cavalry may be prepared to reinforce the troops with you.

P.S. Of course I mean this letter¹ only for your own perusal, and that of your particular friends.

¹ The compiler takes the liberty to add, as notes, to this and the following letter, an opinion and an illustration of them.

Sir Robert Peel, in speaking of the Duke of Wellington, said that he considered him the most powerful writer in the English language, and that the letter upon Col. Monson's retreat was the best military letter he had ever read, and quoted the line from Horace:

'Scribendi recte, sapere est et principium et fons.'

De Arte Poetica, l. 309.

Extract from a letter from Major-Gen. Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B., after the battle of Meeanee, dated Hyderabad, 20th Feb., 1843.

¹ The Duke's letter on the retreat of Col. Monson decided me never



248. To Colonel Murray.

Advice on the conduct of the war with Holkar.

(Extract.)

Fort William, 14th Sept., 1804.

There are two modes in which the Mahrattas carry on their operations. They operate upon supplies by means of their cavalry; and after they have created a distress in the enemy's camp, which obliges the army to commence a retreat, they press upon it with all their infantry and their powerful artillery. Their opponent, being pressed for provisions, is obliged to hurry his march, and they have no fear of being attacked. They follow him with their cavalry in his marches, and surround and attack him with their infantry and cannon when he halts, and he can scarcely escape from them.

That, therefore, which I consider absolutely necessary in an operation against a Mahratta power (indeed in any military operation in India) is such a quantity of provisions in your camp as will enable you to command your own movements, and to be independent of your magazines, at least for that length of time which may be necessary to fulfil the object for which you may be employed.

The next object to be considered is, the strength of your corps. Experience has shown us that the Mahratta cavalry are not very formidable when opposed to our infantry; that of Holkar, in particular, made no impression upon Monson's detachment in its long retreat. All the impression was produced by the infantry and cannon, the weather, and want of provisions. The infantry is the strength of Holkar's, as it is of every other army, and to that I conceive your corps to be fully equal.

It is probable that the Commander-in-Chief will not be at Kota till towards the end of October, and supposing that Holkar should adopt the plan of operations which I have detailed in the commencement of this letter, he will be near you about the beginning or middle of that month. You ought therefore to have

to retire before an Indian army. If I have done wrong abstractedly (for success, like charity, covers sins), the Great Master led me into it; but my own conviction is that I have done right; and that my admiration of him, and study of his words and deeds, as the great rules of war, have caused this victory.'—Col. Gurwood's note.



Cast a month's provision in your camp. If he should bring his infantry and cannon near you, you ought to throw your baggage into any fortified village, or throw up a few redoubts to cover it, in any place in which there may be water, where you will leave a guard to take care of it, and march to attack his infantry. If you should beat that, the cavalry will not hold together.

You must by all means avoid allowing him to attack you with his infantry. There is no position in which you could maintain your camp against such powerful artillery as all the Mahrattas have. If you should not hear of their approach until they are close to you and coming to attack you, it would be better to secure your baggage in any manner, and move out to attack them. Do not allow them to attack you in your camp, on any account.

Holkar may, however, possibly keep his infantry out of your way, surround you with his cavalry, and entirely cut off your communication. You have then only to beat up his cavalry camps as frequently as you may hear of their situation. Do not allow the enemy to lie near you with impunity, and you will soon clear the communication. Send constant accounts towards Kota of your situation; and if you should hear of the infantry camp, move upon it with celerity and attack it. In this consideration of the subject, I have supposed that you will have no cavalry. If you should have any, you will, of course, use it in attacks upon the enemy as often as may be practicable; and if you should support those attacks by your infantry and your cannon, you may be certain that they will be successful.

If your provisions should fail you, and you should hear that Holkar's infantry is near you, you ought to attack them before you think of any thing else. If you should be obliged to draw off towards your magazines, make your regular marches at the regular hours; beat up the cavalry corps as frequently as you can; if the infantry, or any part of them, should approach you, attack them with vigour. Even if you should lose a day or two by it in the time of your arrival at your magazines, you will probably gain time in the period of your relief from your distresses, as the cavalry will cease to hang upon your flank when the infantry are beaten. Burn all the baggage which you cannot carry on. But if you should have provisions in your camp in sufficient quantities to enable you to fulfil the objects for which your corps is employed, there is nothing which can oblige you to retreat.

I do not know what orders you may have received from the Commander-in-Chief. His intention is, I believe, that you should



act as I proposed in my letter of the 7th May. At all events, whatever his intention may be, you must have a store of provisions in your camp, or you will not be in safety, much less be of any use to his operations.

249. To Colonel Agnew.

*Dangerous impression produced on the native mind by
Monson's retreat.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 13th Jan., 1805.

After Colonel Monson's defeat I acknowledge that I considered the peace with the Mahrattas very precarious; and indeed if the success of Holkar had continued, I consider that we should have had to fight over again not only our battles with the Mahrattas, but those with all the other powers of India, whether considered as our dependants or our allies. I also believe that the Rajah of Berar in particular, and very possibly Scindiah, considered the advantages gained by Holkar to have been much greater than they really were; that they anticipated farther successes, and the former prepared to take advantage of them.

250. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

*Navigable rivers the only natural barrier against Mahrattas.
Alliances with petty Rajahs unprofitable.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 14th Jan., 1805.

I have always been of opinion that this warfare with Holkar has shown that there is no such thing in India as a frontier, properly so called, particularly against the Mahrattas. In fact, with their horse they can penetrate anywhere, excepting across a navigable river; and when once they have penetrated with their horse, they have no difficulty in making roads for their guns. I have marched with a British army through one of these impracticable countries at the rate of from sixteen to twenty miles a day.

So far for the natural frontier; but Captain Burr says that the Bheels will defend this frontier, and that by a system of connexion with Oudepoor and different other petty Rajahs, we shall have the service of all these people. This is another error which this warfare with Holkar has exposed. The British government can form no connexion with petty powers of this description in India, excepting that of subjection on their part and



government on ours. Indeed, I doubt whether that connexion can be formed; and if I were to choose whether I would connect the Company with them or leave them with the Mahrattas, I would adopt the latter. Of this I am very sure, that I should be much more certain of their assistance in the day of need by this system than by taking them under the Company.

The conduct of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, on the frontier of the Jumna, is a strong proof of the conduct of these people. This Rajah was made independent, had additions made to his territories, and the whole guaranteed to him in the war with Scindiah, in which he served with the Commander-in-Chief's army. Notwithstanding this, *he* called in Holkar; *he* supported him upon the Jumna; *he* is the cause of the invasion of the Dooab, and of the prolongation of the contest at this moment by the support which he gives to Holkar's defeated troops by his forts on our frontier.

The Rajah of Jyenagur is another instance. His country was considered as one of the bulwarks of Bengal, yet Holkar galloped through it with his cavalry, marched his infantry through it, has communicated ever since with Malwa through it; and the Rajah, although rendered independent by the treaty of peace and called an ally of the Company, has not only never given any assistance, but is strongly suspected of having aided to distress Colonel Monson on his retreat. There are many other instances of the same kind on the frontier of Cuttack. So much for alliances with petty Rajahs.

251. To Colonel Malcolm.

Assaults on Bhurtpoor mismanaged, and of dangerous consequence.

(Extract.)

St. Helena, 3rd July, 1805.

The 4th and 5th failures before Bhurtpoor are disastrous events, of which I apprehend the worst consequences. They must have blundered that siege terribly, for it is certain that, with adequate means, every place can be taken; and ——— having been so long before the place, adequate means must have been provided, or in his power. The fault lies therefore in the misapplication of them, or, most probably, in the omission to employ all those which were necessary to accomplish the object in view, either through the ignorance of the engineers, or the impetuosity of ———'s temper, which could not brook the necessary delay.



VI. DEFENCE OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

I. ANGLO-INDIAN ARMY.

252. To Lord Clive.

Alteration of the military system in the Company's territories desirable. There must be an active field force; and as few garrisons as possible.

(Extract.)

Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800.

I have received the honour of your Lordship's letter of the 14th inst., in which you desire to have my opinion regarding the extent of the military force which will be necessary for the new territory which your Lordship informs me will be assigned by the Nizam to the exclusive management of the Company for Mysore, Malabar, Canara, and Goa. It is difficult to give an opinion regarding the new territory, of which I have but little knowledge; but as your Lordship has desired it, I shall proceed to state what has occurred to me upon the subject.

The question which your Lordship has put to me involves considerations affecting the whole of our military system in this country. When the country proposed to be ceded to the Company is likewise to be defended, its inhabitants to be kept in tranquillity, and its revenue to be realised by means of the troops, it is impossible to expect to be able to effect these objects on the system of weak and dispersed garrisons, on which we have been acting hitherto. This must be changed: neither the new territory, nor the old, can be kept in awe by troops dispersed in forts, which they cannot quit with safety; and, therefore, the system which I should recommend would be to garrison those posts only which are absolutely necessary to us, and to



have at all times in the field, and in motion, 2 or 3 regiments of Europeans, all the cavalry, and as large a body of Native infantry as can be got together. This will be a real security, not only to the new territory and to Mysore, but to the Carnatic, Malabar, and Canara, and nothing else ever will. It will appear more clearly that this system is necessary in the new territory, when the nature of its inhabitants, and the governments to which they have been accustomed, are considered.

The whole of the country to be ceded by the Nizam is inhabited by petty rajahs and polygars, who have never been entirely subdued, and have never submitted to the species of government which must be exercised by the Company's servants. They have been accustomed either to the rapacity and corruption of Tippoo's government, or to the weakness of the Nizam's; but they are entirely unacquainted with the restraint of a regular authority, constructed upon the principles adopted by the Company's government. This they will resist; and they must be kept in awe, particularly at first, by a large and an active force. For this purpose troops in garrison will never answer.

253. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

Peace in Europe no good ground for reduction of the army in India. How it may best be reduced.

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 22nd March, 1802.

I am very glad to find that the King's ministers are likely again to take the power over this country into their own hands, and make use of the control which they have over the gentry in Leadenhall-street. I do not know exactly the points upon which Lord Wellesley is at issue with them, but I judge from Malcolm's account of the letters which he has received from England, that whatever they may be, he will be supported by the Board of Control, particularly as he appears disposed to make every reduction in the military expenses which is at all practicable.

I agree with you entirely about the peace. It establishes the French power over Europe, and when we shall have disarmed we shall have no security excepting in our own abject-



ARMY REDUCTION AS AFFECTED BY THE PEACE.

CSL

ness. There is a report that the finances were in a very embarrassed state, which I am afraid is true, as there could have been no other inducement to make such a peace.

I look upon the question of reduction in this country to stand upon grounds entirely independent of peace or war in Europe. We have carried on no offensive operations in this quarter, and we have long ceased to fear an attack from the French. The size of our army is to be attributed to the demands for its services existing in India, and is by no means occasioned by the war in Europe. The question is, whether those demands are likely to be lessened or to cease upon the conclusion of the peace. I rather believe that as that event will be accompanied by the return of the French and Dutch to their settlements in India, it might be concluded with more truth that the army ought to be increased rather than diminished.

The people of England, however, will not willingly hear of the existence of our large military establishments in India in time of profound peace in Europe. They will not easily believe that there is a necessity for them in India in the most peaceable times, and some reduction is therefore absolutely necessary. On this ground only does the peace influence the question of reduction. But it is very clear that the army ought to be reduced as little as possible, particularly that its effective strength ought to be kept entire.

If there is to be any reduction of numbers below what they will be after the supernumeraries are struck off, I think the best mode will undoubtedly be to decrease the number of men in each battalion, rather than to disband any of the regiments. By this mode it will be more easy at all times to increase the army to its present numbers; and as by either mode the officers must still be in the service, on the establishment, and in the receipt of their pay and batta, it will be equally economical for the present. Hereafter, however, when the number of officers will have decreased, to disband some of the regiments will be the more economical mode; but it will be attended with the disadvantage of great difficulty in increasing the numbers of the army again.



254. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

Distribution of the military establishment required for the pacification and defence of the Madras Presidency. The conquest of foreign enemies does not alone enable us to reduce our armies. The increasing influence of the civil government may do so; and make a field force less necessary than I once thought it.

(Extract.)

3rd July, 1804.

In respect to the general question of a military establishment, it has always appeared to me that government has made an erroneous calculation of the value of their conquests, as if they were to tend to the decrease of the military establishments and their expense. They have adverted only to the fact that, by the success of their arms, they have diminished the number of their external enemies; and they have imagined that, in proportion as they have become secure abroad, they ought to have the means of reducing their armies at home. This appears to be particularly the error of the Court of Directors.

They have not adverted to the fact that all government in India, excepting perhaps that in Bengal, is held by the sword; that, in order to carry on their foreign wars, they have been obliged to weaken the means of their internal government, that is to say, the power of the sword in their own provinces, by which, till this last war, they have invariably suffered; and that the conclusion of the most successful foreign war in India, that by which the most formidable enemy may have been subdued, if it gives an accession of territory, must, bring with the territory a necessity to increase the army; because the government must be established in the new territory, and supported, as well as in the old, by the power of the sword. The want of knowledge, or rather of recollection, of these facts, is the cause of all the complaints of high military establishments and expenses, and of all the difficulties in which you must have found yourself, from the want of troops.

This want, however, it is to be hoped, will not hereafter be so severely felt. For the last 5 or 6 years, great exertions have been made, and the Company's power has been vastly extended, without any very great increase of their military resources. What has been done has been by great military activity and



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exertion ; for I believe it will be found, upon an examination of the Company's military establishments, that, excepting in cavalry, they are but little larger than they were in Lord Cornwallis's time, and not so strong in European troops. Accordingly, every thing has been on the stretch, and every nerve has been exerted, to support the authority of government in its extended provinces, as well as to provide the means of making foreign conquests. But now I believe that we can conquer no more, at least on the establishment of Fort St. George ; and the troops and military resources of this presidency will be applicable to the defence of the Peninsula against a foreign European enemy, and to provide for the peace of the country.

I have never had much apprehension of the attack of an European enemy in India, and least of all in this war ; because the enemy appear to have turned their resources to that kind of naval equipment which, it must be obvious, they could not use in an attack on this country.

In respect to the internal peace, I have great hopes of it, from the operation of the systems of government adopted in the latter end of Lord Clive's time. All arguments founded on theory are in their favour ; and we have also in their favour the practical example of a long course of peace and increasing prosperity in the provinces under Fort William, administered by the same system ; and that of the peace and tranquillity of the provinces under the government of Fort St. George (excepting always Malabar) in the late war, being the only foreign war in which the Company have ever been engaged, during which the people in all their provinces in the Peninsula from which their troops were withdrawn were not in rebellion. It is true that the circumstances and events of the war were favourable to internal peace, and all ought not to be attributed to the system of civil government lately established. But, on the other hand, a Mahratta war is one during which, above all others, the country is likely to be disturbed, as the Mahrattas have their agents and intrigue every where ; and therefore I think it but fair to attribute the general tranquillity, excepting always in Malabar, throughout the late war, to something more than chance, or than to the circumstances and events of the war itself. Still, however, the sword is the main support of the government ; and it is necessary now to provide a military establishment adequate to defend the Peninsula against a foreign European enemy, and to preserve the internal tranquillity : and I have adverted particularly to the



state of the civil government, as in my opinion that must influence in a great degree, not only the amount of the force in each of the military divisions, but the mode in which that force ought to be disposed.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to point out that place on the great extent of coast, for the defence of which you have to provide, on which it is most probable that the French would make an attack. After providing for the defence of Goa on the western coast, and Masulipatam and Fort St. George on the eastern, that distribution of the army which would best provide for the support of the internal government, and would preserve tranquillity, would probably answer best to defend the Peninsula against the attack of an European enemy. I shall proceed, therefore, to state my opinion upon this part of the subject.

In the countries in which the new systems of government have been introduced, there can be little occasion (or at least it is probable that in a short time there will be little occasion) for the constant interference of the military in the support of the civil government and of the police. In those districts it will be possible to collect the troops allotted to the division in one or two great stations. This arrangement will be advantageous to discipline; it will be attended by the advantage of giving you the ability to move the troops, at once, to any point on the coast which may be threatened or attacked; you will always have a force ready to move to suppress insurrection or rebellion; and supposing that it should be necessary to keep troops in these districts, at all times, for the support of the civil government, those which you might withdraw from a great station, in which some troops would be left, would not be missed, as they have been heretofore, when the troops, being scattered in numerous small posts, have been withdrawn from the whole, and all have been left unoccupied in time of war, when to hold them would appear most important. But although I thus recommend the assembly of the troops in each division where the new systems of government have been established, generally in one large station, I am by no means an advocate for the destruction of the forts. You have my opinion already upon that subject; and I shall only mention here that the forts in these countries ought either to be made over to the civil government, or held by small detachments made from one corps at the principal station.

In the countries in which the new system of civil government



has not been introduced, I fear that the old mode of distributing the troops must still continue. But even in these, I should recommend, as a general principle, to draw the corps together as much as possible, and to make detachments only in case of very evident necessity. If this principle can be carried into effect in every division of the army, and I conceive that it might in some degree, it will give you in each division a small disposable force. This may not be equal to all the demands which may arise, but it will give you some strength everywhere; and considering the great extent of coast you have to defend, and of the Company's territories under the government of Fort St. George, I should prefer that to the concentration of your force in one position.

In the present state of the army equipments, I conceive that, for the purposes of defence against an European enemy, or even of preserving internal tranquillity, and suppressing insurrection and rebellion, there is but little occasion to have the troops constantly in the field. Both Native and European troops have their camp equipage always in readiness; and I can speak with certainty of Seringapatam, and I should think it probable, of other principal stations of the army, that the time which would be required to bring in the cattle belonging to the ordnance, and for the carriage of the camp equipage of corps, would be sufficient to procure the bullocks which might be necessary to carry any stores that might be wanted, and the provisions for the European troops. The cattle for the carriage of the gram for the horses of the cavalry can always be procured as soon as the gram.

Even if you were to form a field force, it is probable that you would not give it a gram department; and, therefore, when it would move, it would depend upon its bazaars and the country for its supplies, as must the troops when they move suddenly from these great stations. The only advantage in point of equipment that the field force would have would be carriage for the sick; but even some of that is always to be procured: and it is to be supposed that the troops moving suddenly, for which event the field force would be provided, would leave their sick behind them in their station. The objections to the central field force are, that with the expense of an army in the field, they become, in a short time, not much better than troops in a cantonment. The field force at Hyderabad, and those at Cawnpore and Futyghur in Bengal, are examples of the truth of this



observation. Those troops are in barracks, and the officers in bungalows; and it is as difficult to move them, as it is to move a similar number from a garrison, and a proportion of them must be left to take care of the cantonment.

But in respect to an invasion by the French, I should suppose that your mode of defence would be to collect, as speedily as possible, a body of troops in the neighbourhood of the spot on which the French might land, with directions to watch and circumscribe their movements as much as possible, to cut off their communications with the country, and to prevent them from receiving supplies of cattle, provisions, &c. Supposing the landing to be made in the Carnatic, and the number of men the French should land to be as large as any they have been able to bring out to India, I should imagine the disposable troops in the eastern division of the Carnatic, collected, I would suppose, at Wallajahbad, to be fully equal to the service proposed for them. It is probable that the central field force, unless reinforced by the disposable troops in the other divisions, would not be equal to more; and the troops at Wallajahbad would have the advantage over them, that the enemy would feel them at an earlier period than they would the field force.

On the other hand, supposing the enemy to land on the western coast, the measures to be pursued would be the same. The troops would collect in Malabar in their neighbourhood; they would be joined by those from Seringapatam; and they would certainly be felt before the field force could approach.

When preparations are to be made for a great foreign war, such as the late war with the Mahrattas, the mere readiness of the troops is nothing, in comparison with the preparations required for the departments of the service. You could march the troops from the most distant garrisons before these would be ready, and therefore here again the field force would be of no use. I acknowledge that I have altered my opinion upon this subject; but the state of the country has altered much since I formed it; the equipments of the army have been much improved; I have gained more experience and knowledge of the real benefits of these field forces; and I acknowledge that I am sanguine in my expectations, that the improvements of the civil government have established tranquillity in the districts in which they have been made, upon a basis more firm than has hitherto existed.



255. To Lord W. Bentinck.

Necessity of adding five regiments to the Madras army. Their pay has already been provided.

Fort William, 29th Aug., 1804.

The Governor-General has desired me to inform your Lordship that it is his intention to send orders to Fort St. George, as soon as they can be prepared, to authorise you to add 5 regiments to that establishment. His Excellency, however, is desirous that no measures should be taken in consequence of this intimation of his intention till you shall hear further from him.

He intends that the troops of the government of Fort St. George should occupy the territories and posts as detailed in his notes of instructions dated the 25th May, excepting Goa, which place he intends to occupy by Bombay troops. According to this arrangement, Scindiah's subsidiary force will be permanently formed of Bengal troops.

This addition to the establishment of Fort St. George will probably appear large; but it is not so large within 4 battalions as that required by Gen. Stuart; and the establishment will not be larger than that which existed in the end of the year 1802.

After a full review of the military establishments since the year 1796, when they were first formed upon the model on which the army stands at the present moment, it appears clearly that all the additions which have been made to the armies of Fort St. George and Bombay, including this addition of 5 regiments, have been paid for by subsidies, or by revenues granted for the express purpose of supporting troops. I enclose a copy of a memorandum which I have given to the Governor-General upon this subject, which will explain fully my sentiments upon it.

It is difficult to say upon what principle the establishment of 1796 was formed. However, it was certainly not sufficient for any purpose, even in the limited state of our territories under Fort St. George at that time; as, besides the regular regiments, there were 4 extra battalions, which have since been formed into the 12th and 13th regts., and there was a Madras battalion and several corps of sebundies in the northern Circars.

Even thus increased, it was certainly not an establishment adequate to give protection against a foreign enemy, and to



maintain internal tranquillity at the same time; as in the first place, it is a well known fact that it was with the utmost difficulty that an army was assembled in 1798 and 1799 that could go to Seringapatam; and in the second place, when that army was drawn together and marched into Mysore, a rebellion broke out in the provinces south of the Coleroon, and another in those north of the Kistna.

The reduction of our great Native enemy, therefore, which was the result of that war, could not be urged as a reason for the diminution of the military establishments to be stationed in the old territories, when it appeared that the moment the troops marched out of those territories, the inhabitants were in rebellion. I therefore conclude that the establishment of 1796 was adequate only to the preservation of internal tranquillity in the Carnatic; and that when additions of territory were made, additional troops were required. But supposing the establishment of 1796 to have been an adequate peace establishment, which circumstances have proved it was not, I think the facts stated in the enclosed memorandum show that all the corps raised since (including the 5 new regiments) have been paid for by the means provided.

If the new levies had not been made, the Company's old territories would have been lost, or the Company must have failed to perform their part of the treaties, by which they have gained such large subsidies.

256. Memorandum submitted to the Governor-General by Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the Military establishments of India.

Arbitrary and inadequate provision of the Court of Directors for the military requirements of Madras and Bombay. Rapid and large expansion of those requirements since; coincidently with, and in consequence of, the acquisition of territorial and pecuniary resources for the support of the additional troops.

Fort William, Nov., 1804.

1. On the 11th Feb. 1801, the Court of Directors wrote orders that the military establishment of Fort St. George should consist of 7 regiments of European infantry and 14 regiments of Native infantry, including 3 regiments for the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.



2. They ordered at the same time 3 European regiments and 8 regiments of Native infantry for the establishment of Bombay, under the notion that all above 4 of the latter would be paid for by the subsidies from the Rajah of Travancore, and the Nabob of Surat.

3. I shall advert hereafter to the European establishment for those governments. It does not appear that the Court of Directors have had before them any detailed statements of the want of troops when they gave these orders; but they have given them in an arbitrary manner, without considering at all the circumstances of the country to which they were intended to be applied.

4. In respect to the establishment of Fort St. George, it was not increased by these orders beyond that ordered in the year 1796, excepting to supply the subsidiary force for the Nizam. The establishment ordered in 1796 was 11 regiments, and one for the Nizam, if he should require one; that of 1801 was 11 regiments, and 3 for the Nizam. Yet in 1799 an addition was made to the Company's territories of Coimbatore, of the districts bordering on the eastern ghauts (besides Canara and Soonda, for which provision was supposed to be made from the Bombay establishment); and the Company engaged, in consequence of a subsidy of 7 lacs of star pagodas from the Rajah of Mysore, to defend his territories and support his government.

5. As the Court of Directors have not condescended to particulars, it is impossible to say whether they adverted to the necessity of defending Mysore or not; but whether they did or not, 3 regiments were certainly necessary for the purposes of Mysore and Coimbatore, in addition to the old establishment necessary for the Carnatic and the Nizam's subsidiary force.

6. After the letter of Feb. 1801, was written, the treaty of 1800 was concluded with the Soubah of the Deccan, by which a large territory was ceded, in perpetuity, in commutation of subsidy. The principle on which this territory was ceded, was that the Company should receive nearly double the amount of the sum paid as subsidy, in order to defray the expense of defending and governing the territory ceded: it cannot be denied that this territory would require troops.

7. Subsequently to the dispatch of this letter from the Court of Directors, the civil government of the Carnatic was transferred to the Company. The Nabob's troops were discharged, and the duty which they had performed devolved upon those



of the Company. This was a fresh demand for the services of troops, for which the advantages gained provided the means of payment.

8. These last two demands may be fairly stated to have occasioned a necessity for 2 regiments; and in this manner has the establishment of Fort St. George amounted to 19 regiments.

9. In respect to the establishment of Bombay, the Court of Directors have decided that 2 battalions in Malabar, and 2 battalions in Canara, are fully sufficient. That establishment has certainly never been sufficient, as the Court might see by referring to their records. But the Court have admitted of 8 regiments on the Bombay establishment, and fortunately it has been possible to post a large portion of the force in Malabar.

10. Since these orders have been written, the following additional demands have been made upon the establishment of Bombay: viz. 2 battalions for Goa; 4 battalions, if they should be of their present strength of 700 men, and if 1000 men, 3 battalions for the Guickwar state. Only one regiment has been raised to make up this deficiency, so that there remain 3 battalions to be provided for.

11. Besides this deficiency, the subsidiary force at Poonah is paid for, and to be supplied either by the government of Fort St. George or Bombay; and the territories ceded by the Guickwar, the Peshwah, and Scindiah in Guzerat, which altogether are of the value of 50 lacs of rupees, would appear to deserve some troops to take care of them.

12. Reckoning that these territories require only one battalion, the total deficiency of Native infantry, for the payment of which provision is made (excepting for the 2 battalions at Goa, and one in the territories in Guzerat, for which 12 lacs at Baroach may be considered a fair equivalent), will amount to 10 battalions.

13. I shall now consider the subject in reference to the detailed wants of each establishment, the only mode in which a question of this kind can be fairly considered.

14. The Guickwar subsidiary force must be 3000 men, or 3 battalions of Bombay troops; there must be 2 battalions of Bombay troops at Surat; and one battalion of Bombay troops at Baroach; 6 battalions of Bombay troops at Poonah; 4 at Bombay; and 2 at Goa; making the total of Bombay troops 18 battalions, or 9 regiments.

15. The battalions of Bombay infantry ought to be 1000



men in time of war at all events. Hereafter I shall give a memorandum regarding the mode of arranging the Guickwar subsidiary force.

16. Gen. Stuart's distribution of the army at Fort St. George will require 54 battalions, from which, if 2 battalions to be posted at Goa, and to be found, according to this plan, by Bombay, are subtracted, there will remain 52 battalions. He has now 38 battalions, and if he should be authorised to raise 5 more regiments to make up for his deficiencies of Bombay troops, the deficiency in his distribution will be 4 battalions. These may be extra battalions until the orders of the Court of Directors shall have been received.

17. It is desirable that the orders for completing these 5 regiments should be given as soon as possible, as in their present state the extra battalions are useless; and in the season of operations Gen. Stuart will be deficient—in fact, all the Bombay troops which will have been relieved; and the 5 Madras battalions, still remaining at Poonah, whose return cannot be expected till the end of the year: making a total deficiency of 15 battalions in an army of 48 battalions, or nearly one third.

18. In respect to Europeans, the difference between the Court of Directors and Gen. Stuart is not very great. They have given 20 battalions, and therefore we cannot tell on what they have founded their calculation. But since they have made it, one regiment has been given to the Nizam, for which he makes provision, and the Ceded districts certainly require one, and may be fairly estimated as supplying the means of paying one. Gen. Stuart's estimate is 11 regiments, including Goa. If Goa is to be supplied by Bombay, the number demanded by Gen. Stuart is reduced to 10 regiments, which is only one regiment more than is allowed by the Court of Directors, adding one for the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and one for the Ceded districts, both of which are paid for.

19. The Court of Directors have fixed 3 regiments of Europeans as the establishment for Bombay, including one for Goa. There ought to be 4, of which number 2 ought to be at Bombay, one at Goa, and one to the northward.

20. In respect to cavalry at Fort St. George, the original establishment in 1796 was 4 regiments; since that time the Nizam has paid for 2 regiments, and the Peshwah for one regiment. There are now 8 regiments, so that the increase of the establish-



nient is one regiment since the year 1796. Of all the increases of establishments which have been made, and which are now necessary, this is the only one which appears to me not to have been paid for by subsidies from the Native powers, and this may be fairly counted as provided for by the revenues of Coimbatore, &c.

21. It may be urged against this statement, if no increase has been made to the army, not provided for, how came the military expenses of Fort St. George to be still such a burthen on the finances? I answer, because Fort St. George has now the burthen of defending Malabar, which Bombay formerly had.

In case this Memorandum should be approved of, it would be desirable to acquaint Mr. Duncan of the alteration of the arrangement respecting Scindiah's subsidiary force and Goa; and to adopt Gen. Stuart's distribution for the territories of Fort St. George, and to order the increase of the establishment.

257. Memorandum on the plan proposed of an interchange of Native troops of India and the Negro Corps of the West Indies. 1805¹.

The plan involves replacing English soldiers in India by negroes. The high qualities of the former are unique, and the foundation of our power in India. Negroes will possess no such peculiar combination of remarkable qualities; and will be a source of weakness and danger. They might with

¹ This memorandum was written at sea on the voyage from St. Helena to England, in consequence of the observations contained in the following letters from Lord Castlereagh to Marquess Wellesley.—Note by His Grace, the present Duke of Wellington.

My dear Lord,

East Sheen, 21st Aug., 1804.

The extreme difficulty of raising men at home for general service has induced His Majesty's Ministers to turn their attention to foreign troops of every description. A considerable number of Europeans has already been procured, and an extensive augmentation of the black corps in the West Indies has been ordered, but still the establishment of the army will remain very far short of what the various and pressing exigencies of our situation require.

Amongst other expedients for augmenting the public force, the possibility of raising sepoy regiments for service extra India has suggested itself for consideration; but as considerable doubts are entertained here of the policy of such a measure as bearing upon the habits and feelings of our Native subjects in that part of the globe, there is a reluctance in