



CSL-AS-54 (R)  
AS003267

954.083 MAL-H



CSL



HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY.



FOR CONSULTATION ONLY

CSL

HISTORY



OF THE

INDIAN MUTINY,  
1857-1858.

COMMENCING FROM THE CLOSE OF THE  
SECOND VOLUME OF  
SIR JOHN KAYE'S HISTORY OF THE SEPOY WAR.

BY

COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.

AUTHOR OF "HISTORY OF THE FRENCH IN INDIA,"  
"HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE NATIVE STATES OF INDIA," ETC., ETC.

VOLUME II.

SECOND EDITION

72500-2A

LONDON:  
W. H. ALLEN AND CO.  
13 WATERLOO PLACE, S.W.  
1879.

All rights reserved.





CSL

954.053  
MAL M79H

R.2  
LONDON

PRINTED BY W. H. ALLEN AND CO.

C

54  
954.083

Mal 478H

~~AS-003267~~

AS-003267





CSL

IN THE HOPE THAT THIS BOOK MAY LIVE,

I DEDICATE IT

TO THE MEMORY OF MY BROTHER-IN-LAW,

*Quintin Batty,*

OF THE CORPS OF GUIDES,

ONE OF THE FIRST OF THE MANY GALLANT MEN WHO GAVE THEIR  
LIVES FOR THEIR COUNTRY ON THE RIDGE BEFORE DEHLI.

THE WORDS WHICH HE UTTERED,  
WHEN, ON THE 9TH JUNE, 1857, HE RECEIVED THE WOUND WHICH  
HE KNEW TO BE MORTAL,

*DULCE ET DECORUM EST PRO PATRIA MORI,*

WERE CHERISHED

AS A MOST PRECIOUS INHERITANCE BY HIS BROTHER,

*Aligram Batty,*

WHO, ENTERING THE SERVICE AFTER HIS DEATH,  
WAS APPOINTED TO THE SAME REGIMENT, THE CORPS OF GUIDES,  
AND BY UNFLINCHING GALLANTRY AND DEVOTION

WON FROM THE STERN FRONTIER MEN WHO COMPOSED IT THE  
ESTEEM AND AFFECTION

WHICH THEY HAD BORNE TO QUINTIN.

FOLLOWING THROUGHOUT HIS NOBLE LIFE

IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF HIS BROTHER,

HE EMULATED HIM IN THE MANNER OF HIS DEATH,  
FOR HE TOO DIED LEADING THE GUIDES IN A GALLANT CHARGE

AGAINST THE ENEMIES OF ENGLAND,  
AT FATHABAD, NEAR JALLALABAD, THE 2ND APRIL, 1879.

SIMILAR AS WAS THEIR LIFE,

SIMILAR AS WAS THEIR DEATH,

I WOULD NOT SEPARATE IN THIS DEDICATION

THE TWO GALLANT BROTHERS.

*PAR NOBILE FRATRUM.*



CSL

## LIST OF PLANS.

|  |                  |
|--|------------------|
| Plan to illustrate the Operations of the British Army before Dehli<br>in the year 1857 . . . . . | to face page 68  |
| Sketch of Operations for relief and withdrawal of Lakhnao<br>garrison . . . . .                  | to face page 224 |
| Sketch of the City of Kánhpúr . . . . .  | to face page 276 |
| Plan to illustrate the Operations of the British Army before<br>Lakhnao in March 1858 . . . . .  | to face page 400 |





CSL

## PREFACE

### TO THE SECOND EDITION.

---

FIVE weeks after the appearance of this volume I am called upon to prepare a second edition.

It has been a matter of no small gratification to me that the critics have almost universally recognised the earnest desire by which I have been influenced to search out the truth and to record it alike without favour and without fear.

The only serious adverse criticism which has been directed against the book is that which refers to my estimate of the character of Hodson. It is, I am sure, unnecessary for me to state that I had no personal feeling against that daring soldier. On the contrary, when I knew him at Subáthú in 1846, a year after he had entered the service, he impressed me as a man born to command. I had then for him but one feeling, that of admiration. I never met him afterwards.

But, when a man undertakes to write history, he must, if he be honest, suppress his private feelings



CSL

vid

## PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

towards individuals. He must deal with them as they proved themselves to be. I have endeavoured to act in this manner with respect to Hodson; and if my remarks upon him are severe, they are, I maintain with regret, justified by his action.

The critics who have taken up this question adversely to my view have especially blamed me for imputing a love of blood-shedding to Hodson. I shall now endeavour to prove that they were wrong and that I was right.

Leaving out of consideration, for the moment, the case of the three princes, I take that of the king. That the King of Dehli was not actively implicated in the atrocities committed in the palace, that, a feeble old man, he was merely a passive instrument, not possessing the power to resist, in the hands of others, was shown conclusively at his trial. It was known before his trial. It was believed even whilst the siege was progressing. On this point we have the evidence of Hodson himself. Before the capture of Dehli he wrote: "He" (the king) "is old and well nigh impotent, and is only used as an authority for all the acts of rebellion and barbarity committed by his sons." Would it have been possible for Hodson to record with greater clearness his opinion that the king was helpless and irresponsible—merely a lay figure?

Yet what were the feelings of Hodson regarding this helpless old man? On the 30th August he wrote: "If I get into the palace the House of Taimúr





will not be worth five minutes' purchase, I ween." It may be said by his apologists that this remark applied not to the king individually, but to other members of his family. But what of the following, written four days after the capture of the king: "I would much rather have brought him into Dehli dead than living"? If this is not an expression of regret that the orders he had received alone prevented him from shedding the blood of the helpless, unarmed, king—of the man "old and well nigh impotent"—the man who, not initiating slaughter, was "only used as an authority" for the acts of others,—if it is not this, then language has no meaning. Hodson had recorded his acquittal of the king of active participation in the revolt; he knew that he was old, helpless, feeble in mind as well as in body; and yet he regretted that he had not been allowed to shed his blood!

This was no evanescent feeling. It was not a mere expression escaping a man before it had been well considered. It was a deliberate opinion. It can be discerned in many of Hodson's letters. More than four months afterwards (12th February 1858) he records his indignation that it should be supposed that he, of his own free action, had spared the king: "I see that many people suppose that I had promised the old king his life *after* he was caught. Pray contradict this."

It will thus be observed that not in the excitement of capture, not when there was before his





eyes the prospect of the danger which might be caused by the escape of the king, but after the king had been captured, when he had ceased to be dangerous or even formidable, Hodson regretted that his hand had not slain the deposed monarch.

I think I have written enough to justify the opinion I have recorded of Hodson, and which remains unaltered in this edition. I may add that this opinion is shared not only by some of the most prominent of the men who fought before Dehli and in other parts of India in 1857-58, but by men who have occupied very high positions in India, who were cognizant of all the facts of the case, who knew Hodson intimately, and whose names carry weight with them on all matters connected with our Eastern empire.

I have made but few important changes in this volume. At page 35 I have rendered justice to Captain Baynes, 8th Foot, whose name was omitted, owing to a careless misapprehension, in the first edition: at page 128 I have rectified a mistake which had crept in regarding the junction of the *Pearl* brigade with that of the *Shannon*—a junction which never took place: at page 183 I have added five words (“no other officer accompanied them”) which will leave no doubt as to the validity of the claim I have there preferred in behalf of Lieutenant Colonel Ewart and of Lieutenant Cooper; at page 420 I have supplied an omission regarding the gallantry displayed by Mr. Mayo, I.N.; at





page 440 I have given in somewhat greater detail the account of the operations in the Sambalpūr district ; and at page 498 I have placed more prominently on record the fact that the undertaking of the Rohilkhand campaign in the hot-weather months of 1858 was due entirely to the wise insistence of Lord Canning.

One word more. Objection has been taken to the statement made in the first volume, page 168, attributing to the late Sir James Outram a large credit for the plan actually followed in the relief of Lakhnao. It has even been asserted that the plan carried out by Sir Colin Campbell differed, in all respects save one, from that proposed by Outram. I do not think it can be denied, however, that the plan forwarded to Sir Colin by Outram by the hands of Mr. Kavanagh—a plan based on the very accurate map of Lakhnao drawn by Captain Moorsom—formed the basis on which Sir Colin acted. Sir Colin himself professed to have deviated from that plan in one particular only—the particular stated at page 168 of this edition. The question, then, resolves itself into this. Outram, anxious to assist Sir Colin, sent him most valuable information at the imminent risk of a brave man's life, and Sir Colin, exercising his discretion as to the extent to which he should avail himself of it, used it largely though not blindly: that is, he did not rigidly adhere to every one of its details. Outram's plan will be found in Appendix (D). I



have ascertained that it was designed by himself alone.

At page 364 I have indicated in somewhat greater detail than in the first edition, the influence exercised by Lord Napier of Magdála—then Brigadier Napier and Chief Engineer—in the preparation of the plan of the siege of Lakhnao. Not only was Brigadier Napier, as stated in the text, the guest of Sir Colin Campbell at Kánhpúr, there constantly consulted by him, but he accompanied Sir Colin from that place to Lakhnao. It was Brigadier Napier who recommended that the attack should take place on the east side of the city, a recommendation which was adopted. On this point I beg to refer the reader to the Chief Engineer's report, dated 31st March 1858, republished in Volume X. of *Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers*.

G. B. M.

27, West Cromwell Road,  
1st October 1879.

---





## PREFACE.

---

IN the preface to my last volume I expressed my intention of publishing the volume which should conclude the history of the Indian Mutiny in the early part of the current year.

But after writing the six hundred pages which form the volume I now offer to the public, I found that the stirring events in the Western Presidency, including a review of the administration of Lord Elphinstone; the occurrences in southern and central India, and in Bandalkhand, including the campaigns of Sir Hugh Rose, of Sir Robert Napier, and of Whitlock; and the campaign which terminated in the pacification of Oudh, had still to be recorded. I had, too, to write a review of the policy inaugurated by Lord Canning in the later phases of the revolt.

Compelled, as I have been, to confine to the smallest space the notice of events not germane to the main threads of the story, and conscious



that even with the greatest possible compression the history of the mutiny up to the point it has reached in the present volume had occupied nearly six hundred pages, I felt that were I to condense in the same volume the occurrences still remaining to be told, either I should be forced to write them on a scale much smaller than that which their intrinsic importance demanded; or, the volume would attain an exceptional bulk, extremely inconvenient to the reader.

Under these circumstances I could not hesitate. I decided to publish the second volume at once.

The division which by these means is produced seems in other respects to be convenient. Whilst the present volume deals with the storming of Dehlí; with Sir Colin Campbell's campaigns of 1857 in Oudh, and of 1858 up to the end of May of that year in Oudh and Rohilkhand; with the movements of the several columns and detachments in north-western India, in the Ázamgarh district, in Bihar, in eastern Bengal, and on the south-western frontier; whilst, in fact, it deals generally with the Bengal Presidency and Rajpútáná, the volume which is to follow, and which I hope to offer to the public in the first month of the coming year, will narrate the occurrences in the sister presidencies, in Haidarábád, and in central India. I propose, too, to devote one chapter of that volume to a comprehensive review of Lord Canning's later policy; and another to a





consideration of the action of the civil officers in many of the districts which came, more or less, under the influence of the great wave of the revolt.

In the present volume I have endeavoured to render justice not less to the generals entrusted with the suppression of the mutiny than to those officers of less exalted rank whose splendid exertions enabled the generals to conquer. In the instances in which the conduct of a general has seemed to me to be open to criticism I have endeavoured to state the case with fairness and impartiality. There is not a published official document, there is not a document, relating to the events I have recorded, to which it was possible for me to have access, which I have not carefully read and noted.

Whilst expressing my acknowledgments to those who have, in this way, rendered me invaluable aid; to others who have placed at my disposal journals and letters written at the time, it is fit that I should admit the special obligation under which I lie to the writer of an article on Lord Clyde's Indian Campaign which appeared in *Blackwood's Magazine* for October 1858. If the author of that article, who, I understand, is Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, C.B., had continued his story in the same graphic and nervous style, and with the same attention to correct detail which characterises the article to which I





## PREFACE.

CSL

refer, this history would never have been written. Having traversed the same ground in Blue-books and private documents, I have shown my opinion of that writer's historical power and impartiality by the copious extracts I have made from his article, and I am desirous to place here upon record my admiration of its vigour, its truth, and its vivid reality.

I am anxious, before I conclude, to acknowledge the generous reception which the first volume of this work has met with in this country, in the colonies, and in America. It was not possible, writing of events, many actors in which survive, and to some of whom a record of their performances cannot be palatable, that I should absolutely escape hostile criticism. But the bulk of opinion in England, in Australia, and in America has been sufficiently out-spoken to encourage me to believe that with the course of time the history I have written of the occurrences of a very memorable period will meet with universal acceptance.

G. B. MALLESON.

27, West Cromwell Road,

9th August 1879.

---





CSL

## GLOSSARY OF PROPER NAMES.

The mode of spelling now adopted.

The old mode of spelling

|                           |               |
|---------------------------|---------------|
| Agra . . . . .            | Agra.         |
| Ajmir . . . . .           | Ajmir.        |
| Alambágh . . . . .        | Alumbagh.     |
| Aligarh . . . . .         | Aligurh.      |
| Allahábád . . . . .       | Allahabad.    |
| Arah . . . . .            | Arrah.        |
| Azamgarh . . . . .        | Azingurh.     |
| Baksar . . . . .          | Buxar.        |
| Balamgarh . . . . .       | Ballumgurh.   |
| Balandshahr . . . . .     | Bolundshuhr.  |
| Banáras . . . . .         | Benares.      |
| Bandalkhand . . . . .     | Bundelkhund.  |
| Banni . . . . .           | Bunnee.       |
| Barhampúr . . . . .       | Berhampore.   |
| Bhágalpúr . . . . .       | Bhagulpore.   |
| Bhútán . . . . .          | Bhootan.      |
| Bihár . . . . .           | Behar.        |
| Bilúchi . . . . .         | Beloochee.    |
| Chaibása . . . . .        | Cheybassa.    |
| Chátgáon . . . . .        | Chittagong.   |
| Chattra . . . . .         | Chuttra.      |
| Chutiá Nágpúr . . . . .   | Chota Nagpore |
| Dákhá . . . . .           | Dacca.        |
| Dánápúr . . . . .         | Dinapore.     |
| Dárjiling . . . . .       | Darjeeling.   |
| Dehlí, or Diblí . . . . . | Delhi.        |
| Dilkúsha . . . . .        | Dilkoosha.    |
| Faizábád . . . . .        | Fyzabad.      |
| Farrakhábád . . . . .     | Furruckabad.  |
| Fathgarh . . . . .        | Futtehgurh.   |
| Fathpúr . . . . .         | Futtehpore.   |
| Firozpúr . . . . .        | Ferozpore.    |
| Gandak . . . . .          | Gunduck.      |
| Gháhrah . . . . .         | Gogra.        |



The mode of spelling now adopted.

The old mode of spelling.

|                      |              |
|----------------------|--------------|
| Gházípur . . . . .   | Ghazipore.   |
| Gorákhpur . . . . .  | Gorrukhpore. |
| Gúmti . . . . .      | Goomtie.     |
| Gwáliár . . . . .    | Gwalior.     |
| Imámbará . . . . .   | Emambarah.   |
| Itáwa . . . . .      | Etawah.      |
| Jagdispúr . . . . .  | Jugdispore.  |
| Jaipúr . . . . .     | Jeypore.     |
| Jajhar . . . . .     | Jujjhur.     |
| Jalpáigori . . . . . | Julpigori.   |
| Jamná . . . . .      | Jumna.       |
| Jánpúr . . . . .     | Jaunpore.    |
| Jodhpúr . . . . .    | Jodhpore.    |
| Kálpi . . . . .      | Calpee.      |
| Kánhpúr . . . . .    | Cawnpore.    |
| Kánúj . . . . .      | Canouj.      |
| Katak . . . . .      | Cuttack.     |
| Kúsi . . . . .       | Koosi.       |
| Lakhnao . . . . .    | Lucknow.     |
| Mainpúri . . . . .   | Mynporie.    |
| Manghir . . . . .    | Monghyr.     |
| Mathurá . . . . .    | Muttra.      |
| Múltán . . . . .     | Mooltan.     |
| Naddi . . . . .      | Nuddee.      |
| Nasrábád . . . . .   | Nusseerabad. |
| Nímach . . . . .     | Neemuch.     |
| Nipál . . . . .      | Nepaul.      |
| Orisá . . . . .      | Orissa.      |
| Panjáb . . . . .     | Punjaub.     |
| Patná . . . . .      | Patna.       |
| Púrná . . . . .      | Purnea.      |
| Rajpútáná . . . . .  | Rajpootana.  |
| Rohilkhand . . . . . | Rohilkhund.  |
| Rúrki . . . . .      | Roorkee.     |
| Silhat . . . . .     | Sylhet.      |
| Són . . . . .        | Soane.       |
| Tirhút . . . . .     | Tirhoot.     |
| Tísta . . . . .      | Teesta.      |





CONTENTS  
OF  
THE SECOND VOLUME.

---

|                    | Page |
|--------------------|------|
| PREFACE . . . . .  | vii  |
| GLOSSARY . . . . . | xi   |

---

BOOK X.

---

CHAPTER I.

|   |    |
|---|----|
| The siege of Dehli . . . . .                              | 1  |
| General Wilson doubts the success of an assault . . . . . | 2  |
| The Chief Engineer, Major Baird Smith . . . . .           | 3  |
| Baird Smith's arguments in favour of an assault . . . . . | 4  |
| General Wilson yields to those arguments . . . . .        | 6  |
| Description of the fortifications of Dehli . . . . .      | 7  |
| Plan of the attack . . . . .                              | 9  |
| Effective strength of the besiegers . . . . .             | 10 |
| General Wilson's order to his army . . . . .              | 11 |
| The tracing of the batteries begins on the 7th . . . . .  | 12 |
| Brind's battery (No. 1) opens fire . . . . .              | 14 |
| And renders the Mori harmless . . . . .                   | 15 |
| Gallantry of Lieutenant Lockhart . . . . .                | 16 |
| No. 2 battery is traced and opens fire . . . . .          | 18 |



## CONTENTS.

|  | Page |
|--|------|
| edley traces No. 3 battery . . . . .                                       | 19   |
| ne enemy are alive to the opportunities they had neglected . . . . .       | 21   |
| The great artillery duel . . . . .   | 22   |
| Splendid conduct of the Bengal Artillery . . . . .                         | 23   |
| The engineers are sent to examine the breaches . . . . .                   | 24   |
| They report them practicable . . . . .                                     | 26   |
| The columns of assault detailed . . . . .                                  | 27   |
| The commanders of the columns of assault . . . . .                         | 30   |
| The order of assault . . . . .   | 32   |
| Nicholson orders the advance . . . . .                                     | 33   |
| Storm of the first column . . . . .  | 34   |
| Storm of the second column . . . . .                                       | 35   |
| The explosion party at the Káshmir gate . . . . .                          | 36   |
| Gallant advance of the third column . . . . .                              | 38   |
| The storm of the fourth column . . . . .                                   | 40   |
| Reid is struck down . . . . .  | 41   |
| And the attack is repulsed . . . . .                                       | 43   |
| Disastrous effect of this repulse . . . . .                                | 44   |
| Nicholson determines to press on . . . . .                                 | 45   |
| After losing many officers, he leads the way, and is struck down . . . . . | 47   |
| The cavalry during the storm . . . . .                                     | 49   |
| The third column falls back on the church . . . . .                        | 52   |
| The results of the day's work . . . . .                                    | 53   |
| The losses of the day . . . . .  | 54   |
| The success does not correspond to the General's hopes . . . . .           | 55   |
| Neville Chamberlain urges him to persevere . . . . .                       | 55   |
| Baird Smith is not less peremptory . . . . .                               | 57   |
| On the 15th preparations are made to push on . . . . .                     | 58   |
| Progress made on the 16th . . . . .  | 59   |
| And on the 17th . . . . .  | 61   |
| The attack on the Láhor gate on the 18th fails . . . . .                   | 62   |
| Despondency of General Wilson . . . . .                                    | 63   |
| Great progress made on the 19th . . . . .                                  | 64   |





## CONTENTS.

XV

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| The Jamma Masjid and Palace occupied on the 20th          | 66   |
| Lieutenant Aikman captures the Sélingarh                  | 67   |
| Dehli after the capture                                   | 69   |
| The King of Dehli, and the influences about him           | 70   |
| He takes refuge in the tomb of Humayún                    | 73   |
| Whilst the rebel army evacuates the city                  | 74   |
| Hodson of Hodson's Horse                                  | 75   |
| Hodson induces the king to surrender                      | 77   |
| Hodson induces the princes to surrender                   | 79   |
| And murders them  | 80   |
| Comments on the deed                                      | 80   |
| The gates of the city are secured                         | 81   |
| Major Brind clears the city of the scum of the population | 82   |
| Death and character of Nicholson                          | 83   |
| Remarks on the siege                                      | 84   |

## CHAPTER II.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| A column is despatched south-eastwards under Greathed           | 87  |
| Greathed moves on Balandshahr                                   | 89  |
| Attacks and defeats the rebels at that place                    | 91  |
| Death of Lieutenant Home  | 92  |
| Greathed receives letters from Agra imploring aid               | 93  |
| The condition of Agra subsequent to the 9th September           | 94  |
| Difficulties of its position increased by the storming of Dehli | 96  |
| Greathed reaches Agra on the 10th October                       | 98  |
| Encamps on the parade ground                                    | 100 |
| His camp is suddenly attacked by the rebels                     | 101 |
| Battle of Agra and defeat of the enemy                          | 101 |
| The "surprise" greater to the rebels than to the British        | 104 |
| Greathed is superseded by Hope Grant                            | 105 |



|  | Page |
|--|------|
| Who takes the column to Kánhpúr, and thence to the Banni bridge . . . . .                                  | 106  |
| Van Cortlandt re-establishes order north of Dehlí . . . . .  | 107  |
| Showers is sent with a column to the districts west and south-west of Dehlí . . . . .                      | 108  |
| On his return another column, under Gerrard, is sent in the same direction . . . . .                       | 109  |
| Combat of Narnál . . . . .   | 110  |
| Splendid feat of Colin Cookworthy . . . . .  | 116  |
| Gerrard beats the rebels, and, while pursuing, is killed . . . . .   | 117  |
| Seaton succeeds Gerrard, and returns to Dehlí, preparatory to escorting a convoy towards Kánhpúr . . . . . | 118  |

---

## BOOK XI.

---

### CHAPTER I.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| State of affairs in India on the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell . . . . .   | 119 |
| The enormous difficulties by which he is beset . . . . .   | 120 |
| His manner of "organising victory" . . . . .   | 122 |
| The China troops begin to arrive . . . . .   | 125 |
| Captain William Peel and the Naval Brigade . . . . .   | 126 |
| Character of William Peel . . . . .  | 127 |
| Troops begin to arrive from England . . . . .  | 128 |
| Sketch of the districts intervening between Sir Colin Campbell's base of operations at Allahábád, and Calcutta . . . . . | 129 |
| Mr. George Yule and eastern Bihár . . . . .  | 129 |
| Captain Dalton and Chutiá Nágpúr . . . . .   | 134 |





## CONTENTS.

xvii

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| The Madras army . . . . .                         | 137  |
| How that army lent its aid to Bengal . . . .      | 138  |
| Major English defeats the rebels at Chattra . . . | 141  |

## CHAPTER II.

|   |            |
|---|------------|
| Sir Colin Campbell starts for the seat of war . . .   | 142        |
| Colonel Powell and William Peel march towards Kánhpúr . . . . .   | 143        |
| Powell hears of the enemy at Kajwá . . . . .  | 144        |
| Battle of Kajwá, and death of Powell . . . . .  | 145        |
| William Peel, succeeding to the command, completes the victory . . . . .  | 146        |
| How the fall of Dehli drove the Gwáliár contingent into the field against the British . . . . .   | 147        |
| Consideration of Sir Colin's position at Kánhpúr, and of the reasons which prompted him to relieve Lakhnao before crushing the Gwáliár troops . . | 148        |
| He leaves a force at Kánhpúr under Windham . . .  | 149        |
| And joins Hope Grant in the plain beyond Banni . .  | 150        |
| Outram and Havelock at the Residency . . . . .  | 151        |
| How Outram provided fresh quarters for his troops . .   | 152        |
| The sorties at Lakhnao . . . . .  | 154 to 156 |
| Outram fails to open out the Kánhpúr road . . . .   | 157        |
| The mining and countermining . . . . .  | 158        |
| Altered tactics of the rebels . . . . .   | 160        |
| Some casualties of the siege . . . . .  | 161        |
| Outram improvises telegraphic communication with the Alambágh . . . . .   | 162        |
| Thomas Henry Kavanagh . . . . .   | 163        |
| Kavanagh penetrates in disguise the enemy's lines and reaches Sir Colin Campbell . . . . .  | 164        |
| Composition of Sir Colin's relieving force . . . .  | 165        |
| Sir Colin inspects his troops,—the effect . . . .   | 166        |



|  | Page       |
|--|------------|
| His plan of operations . . . . .   | 168        |
| He moves on, and encamps near the Alambágh . . . .   | 169        |
| Adrian Hope carries the fort of Jallálábád . . . .   | 170        |
| The several brigades of the relieving force . . . .  | 171        |
| The force carries the Dilkúsha and the Martinière . .  | 173        |
| Sir Colin holds his position that afternoon and the night,<br>repulsing several attacks . . . . .                        | 174 to 177 |
| The rear-guard under Ewart, 93rd, reaches camp . .   | 177        |
| The 15th, and preparations for the 16th . . . . .  | 178        |
| The advance on the 16th . . . . .  | 179        |
| On the Sikandar Bágh . . . . .   | 180        |
| Splendid gallantry of Blunt, Bengal Artillery . . .  | 181        |
| The storming of the Sikandar Bágh . . . . .  | 182        |
| Richard Cooper, Ewart, and a few followers leap<br>through the breach . . . . .  | 183        |
| The daring gallantry of those officers and their fol-<br>lowing . . . . .  | 184        |
| Their gallantry gives time to their comrades to force<br>the gate and window . . . . .                                   | 185        |
| The Sikandar Bágh is gained . . . . .  | 187        |
| The "Barracks" are captured . . . . .  | 188        |
| The Shah Najíf . . . . .   | 188        |
| The attack on the Shah Najíf . . . . .   | 189        |
| Its obstinate resistance . . . . .   | 190        |
| Infantry, artillery, and naval brigade are baffled . .   | 192        |
| Till Sergeant Paton, 93rd, indicates a way of which<br>Adrian Hope takes advantage, and the place is<br>gained . . . . . | 194        |
| The troops then bivouac for the night . . . . .  | 195        |
| How the merits of officers cannot be discovered from<br>the mention of a few in the despatches . . . .                   | 196        |
| Some of the deserving stormers . . . . .   | 197        |
| The action of the rebels during the 16th . . . .   | 199        |
| Sir Colin's plans for the 17th . . . . .   | 199        |
| He sends Brigadier Russell to secure his left flank .  | 200        |





## CONTENTS.

xix

|   | Page       |
|---|------------|
| William Peel cannonades the Mess House . . . . .  | 201        |
| And Garnet Wolseley storms it and the Moti Mahal . . . . .  | 202        |
| The meeting of Outram and Havelock with Sir Colin . . . . .   | 204        |
| The proceedings of Outram and Havelock to open out<br>a communication with Sir Colin . . . . .                                    | 205 to 208 |
| The difficulties which still remained after the commu-<br>nications had been opened under Russell and<br>Hale . . . . .           | 209        |
| The operations on the left rear . . . . .   | 209 to 215 |
| Withdrawal of the women and children . . . . .  | 215        |
| And of the force . . . . .  | 216        |
| The cavalry during the siege . . . . .  | 217        |
| Death of Havelock . . . . .   | 218        |
| His character and career . . . . .  | 218 to 220 |
| Sir Colin reaches the Alambágh and reorganises his<br>force . . . . .   | 217        |
| Leaves Outram with four thousand men at the Alam-<br>bágh, and moves towards Kánhpúr . . . . .                                    | 222        |
| Hears on the road alarming rumours, and receives more<br>alarming letters, regarding the state of affairs<br>at Kánhpúr . . . . . | 223        |
| Leaving his infantry to follow, he gallops to the front<br>with his staff and artillery . . . . .                                 | 224        |
| And discovers the disaster by which Windham was<br>threatened . . . . .   | 225        |

## CHAPTER III.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Explicit instructions sent to Windham at Kánhpúr . . . . .                                    | 226 |
| Description of the ground between Kálpi and Kánhpúr . . . . .                                 | 228 |
| Tántia Topi crosses the Jamná at Kálpi, and occupies<br>that ground . . . . .                 | 229 |
| Windham asks for and obtains permission to detain the<br>troops arriving at Kánhpúr . . . . . | 230 |





|  | Page |
|--|------|
| He marches beyond the town and displays his force . . . . .  | 231  |
| Increasing difficulties of his position . . . . .  | 232  |
| Solicits Sir Colin's sanction to a plan of offensive defence . . . . .   | 233  |
| Communication with Lakhnao having ceased, he takes up a position on the Kálpi road covered by the canal . . . . .          | 234  |
| The rebels approaching him, he resolves to attack them . . . . .   | 235  |
| In the battle Carthew and Kelly capture three guns . . . . .   | 236  |
| Windham falls back on the brick-kilns, threatened by the enemy's cavalry . . . . .   | 237  |
| Windham learns that Sir Colin is marching on Kánhpúr . . . . .   | 237  |
| On the 27th he prepares to stand on the defensive, when he is attacked . . . . .   | 238  |
| Carthew, on the right, repulses the enemy . . . . .  | 239  |
| Windham is not so fortunate on the left, but is forced by the superior artillery power of the enemy to fall back . . . . . | 240  |
| He hopes to make a stand at the brick-kilns . . . . .  | 241  |
| His injudicious order, repeated, to Carthew to fall back exposes his right . . . . .                                       | 242  |
| Carthew, nevertheless, returning, stems the advancing tide . . . . .   | 243  |
| And gallantly repulses for the night the attack on the right . . . . .   | 244  |
| Remarks on the manœuvres of the day . . . . .  | 245  |
| Windham makes his dispositions for the 27th . . . . .  | 246  |
| Does not give sufficient strength to the decisive point . . . . .  | 247  |
| Carthew gallantly and successfully defends the right . . . . .   | 248  |
| The attack on the left, not being the decisive attack, is easily repulsed . . . . .  | 249  |
| Windham orders Carthew and Wilson to advance . . . . .   | 250  |
| Wilson's repulse exposes Carthew's right . . . . .   | 251  |
| Windham has no supports on the decisive point . . . . .  | 252  |





## CONTENTS.

xxi

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| Splendid tenacity of Carthew and the 34th . . . . .                 | 253  |
| Carthew is forced to fall back on the intrenchment . . . . .        | 253  |
| Carthew and Windham . . . . .                                       | 254  |
| Reinforcements are sent to Carthew, too few, and too late . . . . . | 255  |
| The aggressive action of Windham justified in principle . . . . .   | 256  |
| Sir Colin Campbell arrives on the scene . . . . .                   | 257  |

## CHAPTER IV.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Sir Colin has an interview with Windham . . . . .                             | 258 |
| The rebels plan the destruction of the bridge . . . . .                       | 259 |
| Sir Colin baffles them and crosses his army . . . . .                         | 260 |
| The position occupied by the enemy . . . . .                                  | 261 |
| They attempt to harass the British . . . . .                                  | 262 |
| Sir Colin despatches the ladies and children to Allah-ábád . . . . .          | 264 |
| He detects the one weak point in the enemy's position . . . . .               | 265 |
| The strength of the hostile armies . . . . .                                  | 266 |
| Sir Colin's plan of battle . . . . .  | 268 |
| Battle of Kánhpúr. Greathed threatens the centre . . . . .                    | 269 |
| Walpole employs the right, whilst Adrian Hope turns the right flank . . . . . | 270 |
| Desperate struggle on the canal is decided by William Peel's dash . . . . .   | 271 |
| The enemy are completely beaten . . . . .                                     | 272 |
| Mansfield is sent to cut them off at the Subadár's tank . . . . .             | 273 |
| Character of General Mansfield . . . . .                                      | 274 |
| He allows the enemy to escape . . . . .                                       | 275 |
| Hope Grant is then sent to pursue them . . . . .                              | 276 |
| He attacks and destroys them near Sheorájpur . . . . .                        | 278 |



|   | Page |
|---|------|
| Comments on Sir Colin Campbell's tactics . . . . .              | 279  |
| The part of the programme remaining to be carried out . . . . . | 281  |

---

## CHAPTER V.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Sir Colin's further movements are hampered by want of carriage . . . . . | 283 |
| He detaches Walpole to Mainpúrí . . . . .                                | 284 |
| A few fanatics bar his way at Itáwa . . . . .                            | 285 |
| Bourchier clears them out, and Walpole reaches Mainpúrí . . . . .        | 286 |
| Seaton starts from Dehlí with his convoy for Mainpúrí . . . . .          | 287 |
| Suddenly hears that the rebels are marching against him . . . . .        | 288 |
| He attacks and completely defeats them . . . . .                         | 289 |
| Finds the rebels at Pattiáli . . . . .                                   | 290 |
| Where he again beats them . . . . .                                      | 291 |
| And to a great extent pacifies the country . . . . .                     | 292 |
| Again he defeats the rebels near Mainpúrí . . . . .                      | 294 |
| Daring exploit of Hodson and McDowell . . . . .                          | 295 |
| Seaton unites with Walpole . . . . .                                     | 298 |

---

## CHAPTER VI.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Sir Colin marches from Kánhpúr towards Fathgarh . . . . .                                   | 299 |
| The rebels lose their opportunity of breaking down the bridge over the Káli Naddi . . . . . | 300 |
| Vaughan's skilful gun practice . . . . .  | 302 |
| Gallant dash of the 53rd . . . . .  | 303 |
| The enemy are completely beaten . . . . .   | 304 |
| The soldiers give an ovation to Sir Colin . . . . .   | 304 |
| Gallant conduct of Lieutenant Roberts . . . . .   | 305 |





## CONTENTS.

xxiii

|  | Page |
|--|------|
| Reasons why the Commander-in-Chief advocated the reduction of Rohilkhand prior to an attack on Lakhnao . . . . . | 306  |
| Reasons which actuated Lord Canning in deciding to attack Lakhnao in the first instance . . . . .                | 307  |
| Lord Canning's action justified . . . . .  | 308  |
| The military position occupied by Sir Colin considered . . . . .   | 309  |
| He leaves Seaton to command at Fathgarh . . . . .  | 310  |
| Deceives the Rohilkhand rebels . . . . .   | 311  |
| Adrian Hope attacks and defeats them at Sítia . . . . .  | 312  |
| The final preparations for an attack on Lakhnao . . . . .  | 313  |
| The British army is at last in the plains between Kánhpúr and Lakhnao. Its composition . . . . .                 | 314  |

## CHAPTER VII.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Jang Bahádur of Nipál offers his aid to Lord Canning . . . . .  | 315 |
| The offer, after some delay, is accepted . . . . .  | 316 |
| The Nipál troops are sent to Azamgarh and Jánpúr . . . . .  | 317 |
| They surprise and defeat the rebels at Mandori . . . . .  | 318 |
| And pacify the district . . . . .   | 319 |
| Lieutenant-Colonel Longden is sent with a detachment to co-operate with the Nipál troops . . . . .                            | 319 |
| Combat at Chánda . . . . .  | 320 |
| Longden drives the rebels from Atráolia . . . . .   | 320 |
| The Governor-General concludes an arrangement with Jang Bahádur for a further supply of Nipál troops led by himself . . . . . | 321 |
| Rowcroft defeats the rebels at Sobanpúr . . . . .   | 322 |
| Jang Bahádur occupies Gorákhpúr . . . . .   | 323 |
| He defeats the rebels at Phúlpúr and enters Oudh . . . . .  | 324 |
| Description of General Franks's column . . . . .  | 325 |
| Instructions given to Franks by Lord Canning . . . . .  | 325 |



|  | Page |
|--|------|
| And by Mr. J. P. Grant . . . . .   | 326  |
| The rebel army opposed to Franks and its positions . . . . .   | 326  |
| Nature of the endeavours made to supply his want of<br>cavalry . . . . .                               | 327  |
| Franks attacks and beats the rebels at Nasratpúr . . . . .   | 328  |
| He returns to Badlapúr and enters Oudh . . . . .   | 329  |
| He attacks and defeats Banda Húsén at Chánda . . . . .   | 330  |
| And Mehndi Húsén at Hamírpúr . . . . .   | 331  |
| Manœuvres between Franks and Mehndi Húsén to<br>gain Budhayan . . . . .                                | 331  |
| Franks out-manœuvres his rival, whereupon the latter<br>takes up a position beyond Súltánpúr . . . . . | 332  |
| Strength and weakness of the position . . . . .  | 333  |
| Battle of Súltánpúr . . . . .  | 334  |
| Gallantry of Macleod Innes . . . . .   | 334  |
| Total defeat of the enemy . . . . .  | 335  |
| Franks is joined by the Jalandhar Cavalry under Aik-<br>man . . . . .                                  | 335  |
| Aikman's splendid daring . . . . .   | 336  |
| Franks is repulsed at Dhaorára . . . . .   | 337  |
| Summary of the results of his campaign . . . . .   | 338  |
| Henry Havelock, Patrick Carnegy, and Venables . . . . .  | 339  |
| Franks joins Sir Colin Campbell . . . . .  | 341  |

---

## CHAPTER VIII.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Description of the Alambágh . . . . .   | 343 |
| Position taken up there by Outram . . . . .                                     | 343 |
| The rebels in Lakhnao recover confidence and resolve<br>to attack him . . . . . | 344 |
| The attack on the 22nd December . . . . .                                       | 345 |
| Outram drives them back on the Dilkúsha . . . . .                               | 346 |
| They make another attack on the 12th January . . . . .                          | 347 |
| Olpherts foils them on the right, Down on the centre . . . . .                  | 348 |





## CONTENTS.

xxv

|   | Page       |
|---|------------|
| And Outram on the left . . . . .  | 349        |
| Religious influences affecting the natives . . . . .                                      | 349        |
| The Moulvi swears an oath . . . . .   | 350        |
| Olpherts forces him to break it . . . . .   | 351        |
| An attack on the 16th January is repulsed . . . . .                                       | 352        |
| Discord in the rebel camp . . . . .   | 353        |
| The Moulvi attacks on 15th February, and is repulsed . . . . .                            | 353        |
| The rebels resolve to make a grand assault on Sunday,<br>21st February . . . . .          | 354        |
| The assault of Sunday, 21st February, is repulsed . . . . .                               | 355        |
| They make another and final attack on the 25th . . . . .                                  | 356        |
| Battle of the 25th, and repulse of the rebels . . . . .                                   | 356 to 359 |
| Service rendered to England by Outram's four months'<br>defence of the Alambágh . . . . . | 359 to 361 |
| The men who aided Outram . . . . .  | 361        |
| Sir Colin Campbell reaches the Alambágh . . . . .   | 363        |

## CHAPTER IX.

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| Force at the disposal of Sir Colin Campbell . . . . .  | 364        |
| Defences of Lakhnao . . . . .  | 364 to 367 |
| The weak point of the defence—detected by Sir Colin . . . . .  | 367        |
| Sir Colin's plan of attack . . . . .   | 367        |
| He advances on the Dilkúsha, captures it, and esta-<br>blishes batteries there and at the Muhammad<br>Bágh . . . . .       | 369        |
| He orders bridges to be thrown across the Gúmí . . . . .   | 370        |
| And directs Outram to cross with a <i>corps d'armée</i> . . . . .  | 371        |
| Outram establishes himself on the left bank . . . . .  | 372        |
| The programme assigned to him . . . . .  | 372        |
| Outram pushes forward to the Faizábád road on the<br>8th, establishes himself there, and constructs<br>batteries . . . . . | 373        |
| He storms the Chakar Kothí, and occupies the Bádsháh<br>Bágh on the 9th . . . . .  | 374        |



|  | Page     |
|--|----------|
| Notifies his success to Sir Colin by the hoisting of a flag . . . . .  | 375      |
| Major Nicholson, R.E., establishes a battery enfilading the enemy's works . . . . .  | 375      |
| He observes that the enemy's lines seem abandoned . . . . .  | 375      |
| Lieutenant Thomas Butler swims the Gúmti to ascertain the fact, and occupies the lines until relieved by the Highlanders . . . . . | 376      |
| Sir Colin carries the Martinière . . . . .   | 377      |
| The line from the Gúmti to the vicinity of Banks's house is occupied . . . . .   | 378      |
| The British position on the evening of the 10th : . . . .  | 379      |
| Outram feels his way to the iron and stone bridges . . . . .   | 380, 381 |
| He occupies the positions then taken up the four days following the 11th . . . . .   | 382      |
| The Sikandar Bágh is occupied without opposition . . . . .   | 382      |
| By the happy audacity of three engineer officers the Kaddam Rasúl and Shah Najíf are gained . . . . .                              | 383      |
| Lugard effects a breach in the Bégam Kothí . . . . .   | 384      |
| Adrian Hope's brigade is ordered to storm it . . . . .   | 385      |
| Description of the Bégam Kothí . . . . .   | 385      |
| The Bégam Kothí is stormed . . . . .   | 386      |
| Death of Hodson . . . . .  | 387      |
| Position of the assailants on the evening of the 11th . . . . .  | 388      |
| The 12th and 13th are given to the engineers . . . . .   | 389      |
| On the 14th Franks storms the Imámbará . . . . .   | 390      |
| The troops, excited by their victory, push on . . . . .  | 391      |
| They turn the enemy's third line of works . . . . .  | 392      |
| Splendid behaviour of the Sikhs, 10th, 90th, of Have-lock, of Brayer . . . . .   | 392-3    |
| The supports come up . . . . .   | 393      |
| Franks and Napier resolve that the advantage shall be pursued, and the Kaisar Bágh is carried . . . . .                            | 394      |
| The scene of plunder . . . . .   | 394-5    |
| Result of the day's work on the right bank . . . . .   | 395      |





## CONTENTS.

xxvii

|  | Page       |
|--|------------|
| Outram proposes to cross by the iron bridge and intercept the rebels in their flight . . . . .       | 395        |
| Sir Colin informs him that he may cross provided in doing so he does not lose a single man . . . . . | 396        |
| Reflections on the reply . . . . .   | 397-8      |
| Useless pursuit of the rebels on the 15th . . . . .  | 399        |
| Outram crosses near the Sikandar Bāgh and pushes on to the Residency . . . . .                       | 399        |
| Contrast between the defence of the Residency by Europeans and by natives . . . . .                  | 400        |
| Outram captures the Residency, the Great Imámbará, and the Machhi Báwan . . . . .                    | 401        |
| The retreating rebels attack Walpole and are repulsed . . . . .                                      | 401        |
| An attack made on the Alambāgh is repulsed . . . . .   | 402        |
| Jang Bahádur advances, covering Sir Colin's left . . . . .   | 403        |
| Rescue of Miss Jackson and Mrs. Orr . . . . .  | 403        |
| Outram occupies Sharfu-dáola's house . . . . .   | 404        |
| Lamentable accident by an explosion . . . . .  | 404        |
| Outram carries the Músá Bāgh . . . . .   | 406        |
| William Campbell allows the rebels to escape . . . . .   | 406        |
| Gallantry of Colonel Hagart . . . . .  | 407        |
| Reflections on Brigadier Campbell's conduct . . . . .  | 408        |
| Lord Canning's proclamation . . . . .  | 409        |
| The city is cleared of the rebels . . . . .  | 410        |
| Hope Grant beats them at Kúrsi . . . . .   | 411        |
| Remarks on the campaign . . . . .  | 412 to 415 |

---

BOOK XII.

---

## CHAPTER I.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| The narrative returns to Bengal . . . . .  | 416 |
| Why the interest of the history is now almost entirely with Sir Colin Campbell . . . . . | 417 |



|  | Page |
|--|------|
| Lord Canning proceeds to Allahábád . . . . .   | 417  |
| Panic in Calcutta on the 3rd March . . . . .   | 418  |
| The 34th at Chátgáon mutiny . . . . .  | 419  |
| The attempt to disarm the 73rd at Dákhá results in a<br>conflict and the flight of the troops . . . . .  | 420  |
| Loyalty of the Rájá of Tiparah . . . . .   | 421  |
| Prompt action of the Government with respect to Chát-<br>gáon and Dákhá . . . . .  | 421  |
| The Chátgáon mutineers enter Tiparah . . . . .   | 422  |
| They are pursued and beaten, after a forced march, by<br>the Silhat Light Infantry . . . . .   | 423  |
| Splendid conduct of the Silhat sepoys . . . . .  | 423  |
| Death of Byng . . . . .  | 424  |
| Ultimate fate of the Chátgáon mutineers . . . . .  | 425  |
| The difficulties in eastern Bihár are aggravated by the<br>events in Dákhá and Chátgáon . . . . .  | 426  |
| Mr. George Yule, perceiving this, marches on Párniá . . . . .  | 426  |
| He arrives just in time, for the 11th Irregulars promptly<br>mutiny . . . . .  | 426  |
| Gallant conduct of Mr. Francis Anstruther Elphinstone-<br>Dalrymple, C.S. . . . .  | 427  |
| The prompt and daring action of Yule saves Párniá . . . . .  | 429  |
| The Dákhá rebels menace Jalpáigori . . . . .   | 430  |
| Yule marches against them . . . . .  | 431  |
| His foresight and activity do not prevent them from<br>escaping . . . . .  | 432  |
| Yule pursues and drives the rebels into Nipál . . . . .  | 433  |
| Major J. F. Richardson . . . . .   | 433  |
| Jang Bahádur orders his lieutenant to co-operate with<br>Yule . . . . .  | 434  |
| The Nipál commander, by his unwillingness to divide<br>his forces, spoils the plans of Yule and Richard-<br>son, and the rebels escape . . . . . | 435  |
| State of Chútia Nágpúr in November 1857 . . . . .  | 436  |
| Action of Lieutenant Graham in Palámao . . . . .   | 437  |





CONTENTS.

xxix

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| Action of Captain Leigh in Sambalpúr . . . . .                    | 438  |
| Splendid conduct of Mr. Cockburn, Commissioner of Katak . . . . . | 439  |
| He pours troops into Sambalpúr . . . . .                          | 439  |
| The rebels are defeated in Singhbhúm and Sambalpúr . . . . .      | 440  |
| Dangerous position of Mr. Lushington and his companions . . . . . | 440  |
| Tranquillity is gradually restored in Chútia Nágpúr . . . . .     | 441  |

CHAPTER II.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Retrospect of affairs in western Bihár . . . . .   | 442 |
| That province under Mr. Tayler's successor . . . . .   | 443 |
| Kúnwar Singh returns to it . . . . .   | 444 |
| The situation is aggravated by various risings . . . . .   | 444 |
| The military movement of Rattray and Alonzo Money . . . . .  | 444 |
| They are out-manceuvred by the rebels, and Gayá is saved by the gallantry of Skipwith Tayler . . . . .     | 445 |
| Mutiny of two companies of the 32nd Native Infantry . . . . .  | 445 |
| Rattray avenges his disaster of the 8th September, and fights an indecisive combat with the 32nd . . . . . | 445 |
| The narrative proceeds to the line of communication between Allahábád and Lakhnao . . . . .                | 446 |
| Carthew at Fatehpúr . . . . .  | 447 |
| He clears the country on the left bank of the Jamná . . . . .  | 448 |
| Campbell clears the country near Allahábád . . . . .   | 449 |
| Moveable columns are sent to keep open the line . . . . .  | 449 |
| The effect being to secure Sir Colin's operations against Lakhnao . . . . .                                | 450 |
| Sotheby defeats the rebels at Chandipúr . . . . .  | 451 |
| Roweroff defeats the rebels at Amórha and establishes himself there . . . . .                              | 452 |
| Kúnwar Singh makes a diversion in eastern Oudh . . . . .   | 453 |
| Milman attacks and drives back his troops near Atráolia . . . . .  | 455 |



|  | Page       |
|--|------------|
| The opportunity of cutting off Milman from his base<br>is seized by Kúnwar Singh . . . . .                                     | 456        |
| He forces back Milman on Azamgarh . . . . .  | 457        |
| Lord Canning, hearing of Milman's disaster, sends<br>Lord Mark Kerr to relieve him . . . . .                                   | 458        |
| Lord Mark sets out with four hundred and forty-four<br>men . . . . .   | 459        |
| He encounters the enemy, four thousand strong, near<br>Azamgarh . . . . .  | 460        |
| Desperate contest, and the resolute persistence of Lord<br>Mark Kerr, who beats the rebels, and relieves<br>Azamgarh . . . . . | 460 to 463 |
| Great credit due on every ground to Lord Mark Kerr .   | 464        |
| His victory probably saved Banáras from the clutches<br>of Kúnwar Singh . . . . .  | 465        |
| Fatal error in Kúnwar Singh's tactics . . . . .  | 466        |

## CHAPTER III.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Objects still remaining to Sir Colin to accomplish .  | 467 |
| He orders a brigade under Lugard to Azamgarh .  | 468 |
| Lugard defeats some rebels near Tigra . . . . .   | 469 |
| State of the Azamgarh garrison . . . . .  | 470 |
| Wily tactics of Kúnwar Singh . . . . .  | 470 |
| Lugard forces the passage of the Tons . . . . .   | 471 |
| Death of Venables . . . . .   | 471 |
| The rebels fall back, unbeaten, and baffled their pur-<br>suers . . . . .   | 471 |
| Douglas is sent to pursue Kúnwar Singh . . . . .  | 472 |
| Kúnwar Singh baffles him at Naghai, by retreating .   | 473 |
| He continues to evade a decisive action . . . . .   | 474 |
| But is caught and beaten at Manjhar . . . . .   | 475 |
| Notwithstanding this, outwitting Cumberlege and<br>baffling Douglas, he crosses the Ganges into<br>Shahábád, and reoccupies Jagdispúr . . . . . | 476 |





## CONTENTS.

xxx

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| Le Grand attacks him there and is totally defeated . . . . .  | 477  |
| Death of Kúnwar Singh, and succession of his brother<br>Ammar Singh . . . . .   | 478  |
| Lugard crosses into Shahábád . . . . .  | 479  |
| He repeatedly beats and disperses the rebels, but they<br>always reunite . . . . .  | 480  |
| The rebels harry the district and defy pursuit . . . . .  | 481  |
| Lugard cuts roads across the jungles, and succeeds in<br>driving the rebels to a considerable distance,<br>when he is forced to resign his command from<br>ill-health . . . . . | 482  |
| His successor, Douglas, has not even taken up the com-<br>mand, when the rebels return and renew their<br>depredations . . . . .  | 483  |
| Douglas determines to converge seven columns on a<br>belt into which he proposes to drive the rebels . . . . .  | 484  |
| Reasons why he deferred the execution of the plan till<br>the conclusion of the rainy season . . . . .  | 485  |
| The plan fails in consequence of the delay of one of the<br>column commanders . . . . .   | 486  |
| Sir Henry Havelock's plan of mounted infantry is sanc-<br>tioned . . . . .  | 487  |
| Great success attends the plan at the outset . . . . .  | 488  |
| On a second occasion Havelock drives the rebels into a<br>position from which they escape only in conse-<br>quence of the mistake of the infantry . . . . .                     | 490  |
| He again pursues them, and drives them into the<br>Kaimúr hills . . . . .   | 491  |
| Where they are finally destroyed on the 24th November . . . . .   | 492  |

## CHAPTER IV.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Hope Grant is ordered from Lakhnáo to the districts<br>watered by the Ghaghra . . . . . | 493 |
|---|-----|



|   | Page |
|---|------|
| The rebels make a daring reconnoitring expedition into his camp . . . . .   | 494  |
| The Moulvi devises a skilful plan to surprise Hope Grant . . . . .  | 495  |
| The plan fails owing to the inability of the leaders of his cavalry to withstand temptation . . . . .                           | 496  |
| Hope Grant joins Jang Bahádur's camp . . . . .  | 497  |
| Satiated condition in which he found the Gúrkahs . . . . .  | 497  |
| Sir Colin Campbell's plans for the reconquest of Rohilkhand . . . . .   | 498  |
| Seaton's position at Fathgarh . . . . .   | 499  |
| He attacks, and, beating, foils the plans of, the rebels, at Kankar . . . . .   | 500  |
| General Penny marches towards Rohilkhand . . . . .  | 501  |
| The enemy attempt a surprise, and Penny is killed . . . . .   | 501  |
| The column, commanded by Colonel Jones, joins the Commander-in-Chief . . . . .  | 502  |
| Nature of the task entrusted to Walpole . . . . .   | 502  |
| Character of Walpole as a general . . . . .   | 503  |
| Walpole learns that the fort of Rúiya is occupied by a rebel chief . . . . .  | 504  |
| Though informed by a trooper that the rebel chief intends to evacuate the place, Walpole determines to attack it . . . . .      | 505  |
| He sends his infantry in skirmishing order against the walls . . . . .  | 506  |
| The infantry suffer great loss, and Walpole orders a retreat, which is the signal for the display of marked gallantry . . . . . | 507  |
| Adrian Hope is about to ride up to Walpole, when he is shot dead . . . . .  | 508  |
| It was believed in camp that he was about to deprive Walpole of the command . . . . .   | 508  |
| The rebels evacuate the fort . . . . .  | 508  |
| Loud and deep invectives in the camp against Walpole . . . . .  | 509  |





|  | Page        |
|--|-------------|
| Tributes to Adrian Hope . . . . .  | 504 and 509 |
| Walpole drives the rebels from Sirsa, and joins the<br>Commander-in-Chief . . . . .  | 510         |
| A brigade assembles at Búrki under the command of<br>Colonel John Coke . . . . .   | 511         |
| Previous service and character of Colonel Coke . . . . .   | 512         |
| Coke is able, by his practical knowledge of the natives<br>and their customs, to supply his force with car-<br>riage, otherwise not procurable . . . . . | 513         |
| Coke is superseded by Brigadier-General John Jones;<br>the change, however, not affecting the working<br>of the force . . . . .                          | 514         |
| Coke crosses the Ganges and completely defeats the<br>rebels at Bhogniwálá . . . . .   | 515         |
| Cool and resolute feat of arms accomplished by the<br>native officer Jamadár Imám Bakhsh Khán . . . . .  | 516         |
| The rebels are again defeated at Naghína . . . . .   | 517         |
| Cureton, after greatly contributing to the first defeat,<br>administers a second the same day . . . . .  | 518         |
| The deed of Cureton still the talk of the Indian army . . . . .  | 519         |
| Gallantry and reward of Hanna . . . . .  | 519         |
| The people of Morádábád greatly discontented with<br>native rule . . . . .   | 520         |
| Coke, splendidly aided by Angelo and others, seizes<br>several rebel chiefs in Morádábád . . . . .   | 521         |
| The Commander-in-Chief, advancing on Shajahánpúr,<br>is baffled by the evasion of the Moulvi and his<br>following . . . . .                              | 522         |
| He leaves a garrison there under Hale, and marches on<br>Baréí . . . . .   | 522         |
| Khán Bahádur Khán and Baréí . . . . .  | 523         |
| Sir Colin advances on Baréí and pushes back the rebels<br>across the Nattia Naddi . . . . .  | 525         |
| The Gházis make a tremendous onslaught on the High-<br>land brigade . . . . .  | 526         |



|   | Page |
|---|------|
| After maltreating Cameron and Walpole, they are slain where they fought . . . . .                                   | 527  |
| On account of the suffering of the troops from heat, and for other reasons, Sir Colin halts for the day . . . . .   | 528  |
| The Gházis attack a company of the 93rd, commanded by Richard Cooper . . . . .                                      | 528  |
| The halt ordered by Sir Colin enables Khán Bahádúr Khán to withdraw . . . . .                                       | 529  |
| The Búrki column advances from Morádábád and effects a junction with Sir Colin . . . . .                            | 529  |
| The Moulvi designs a raid on Shahjahánpúr . . . . .   | 531  |
| A halt of two hours made on the road enables a spy to convey intelligence of his approach to Colonel Hale . . . . . | 532  |
| Hale baffles the Moulvi, who occupies, and levies contributions from, the town . . . . .                            | 533  |
| Sir Colin sends General Jones to relieve Shahjahánpúr . . . . .   | 534  |
| Jones penetrates to the position occupied by Hale . . . . .   | 535  |
| Then, finding himself not strong enough, applies for assistance . . . . .   | 536  |
| The Moulvi, on his side, receives reinforcements from all parts . . . . .   | 536  |
| On the 15th he attacks Jones and is repulsed . . . . .  | 537  |
| Sir Colin was on the point of distributing his forces when he receives Jones's appeal . . . . .                     | 537  |
| He at once sets out for Shahjahánpúr . . . . .  | 538  |
| He skirmishes with the rebels, but owing to his weakness in cavalry, is unable to obtain decisive success . . . . . | 539  |
| Sir Colin sends for Coke's brigade . . . . .  | 540  |
| The rebels fall back into Oudh . . . . .  | 540  |
| Conclusion of the Rohilkhand campaign . . . . .   | 540  |
| Character and previous career of the Moulvi . . . . .   | 541  |
| His influence in causing the mutiny . . . . .   | 542  |





## CONTENTS.

XXXV

|  | Page |
|--|------|
| The Moulvi attempts to obtain assistance from the Rájá of Powán . . . . .          | 543  |
| He is shot dead by the Rájá's brother . . . . .                                    | 544  |
| The claim of the Moulvi to the character of a patriot established . . . . .        | 544  |
| William Peel gradually recovers from his wound . . . . .                           | 545  |
| Cordial reception prepared for him and for the Naval Brigade in Calcutta . . . . . | 545  |
| Honours conferred upon him . . . . .   | 545  |
| He dies of small-pox. Universal appreciation of his noble character . . . . .      | 546  |
| Venables, "the brave, self-denying English gentleman" . . . . .                    | 547  |

## CHAPTER V.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Rajpútáná from July 1857 . . . . .  | 550 |
| Effect on the Rajpúts of the suzerainty of the British as administered by General George Lawrence . . . . .   | 551 |
| The disaffected few—the criminal class and the soldiery . . . . .   | 552 |
| An outbreak in the Ajmír jail is suppressed . . . . .   | 553 |
| A slight military disturbance at Nasirábád is quelled . . . . .   | 553 |
| And another at Nímach . . . . .   | 554 |
| Mount Abú, and its inhabitants . . . . .  | 555 |
| Some mutineers of the Jodhpúr legion scale Mount Abú and fire on the English soldiers as they sleep . . . . . | 556 |
| The mutineers are completely baffled and driven away . . . . .  | 557 |
| The Jodhpúr legion revolts at Irinpúrah . . . . .   | 558 |
| Conolly shows a daring persistence in endeavouring to recall them to their duty . . . . .                     | 559 |
| At last a few men rally round him . . . . .   | 560 |
| The strange inconsistency of these loyal few . . . . .  | 560 |



|   | Page |
|---|------|
| The Anádra mutineers arrive . . . . .   | 561  |
| After great vicissitudes Conolly is allowed to go . . . .   | 562  |
| The case of Abbás Ali and Monck-Mason . . . . .   | 562  |
| The Rájá of Jodhpúr sends an army against the<br>rebels . . . . .   | 562  |
| The Thákur of A'wah rebels against his liege lord . . .   | 563  |
| He offers to submit on certain terms, which Monck-<br>Mason is unable to accept . . . . .                 | 564  |
| The rebels defeat the Jodhpúr troops at Palí . . . .  | 565  |
| General Lawrence marches against A'wah . . . . .  | 566  |
| But is compelled to fall back on A'jmír . . . . .   | 567  |
| Death of Monck-Mason . . . . .  | 567  |
| The affairs of Kotá . . . . .   | 568  |
| Major Burton denounces certain men to the Maháráo,<br>who repeats his language to the men denounced . . . | 569  |
| The Kotá troops rise and murder Burton and his sons .   | 569  |
| Excuses of the Maháráo . . . . .  | 570  |
| The British are repulsed in an attack on Jíran . . . .  | 571  |
| Lawrence again attacks and captures A'wah . . . . .   | 572  |
| General Roberts arrives, and marching on Kotá, com-<br>pletely defeats the rebels . . . . .               | 574  |
| Pacification of Rajpútáná . . . . .   | 576  |
| Reasons why Rajpútáná so easily weathered the storm<br>of the mutiny . . . . .                            | 576  |
| George St. Patrick Lawrence . . . . .   | 577  |

---





CSL

# HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY OF 1857.

## BOOK X.

### CHAPTER I.

I TAKE up the history of the siege of Dehli from the 1st September. Nicholson's great victory at Najafgarh, gained the 25th August, had not only forced the enemy within their defences, but had ensured the safety of the siege-train then in progress from Firozpur. From that moment, then, preparations were set on foot for carrying out active operations for the capture of the place.

It was not, indeed, without much misgiving that the commander of the besieging army, Major-General Archdale Wilson, had given his consent to the carrying out of a measure the success of which, he considered, would depend on accident.\* In an elaborate letter, addressed on the 20th of

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.  
The siege of  
Dehli.

\* His own words were: "It is evident to me that the results of the proposed operations will be thrown on the hazard of a die."



Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.

Sept. 1.

Doubts and  
fears of Ge-  
neral Wilson.

August to the chief engineer, Major Baird Smith, General Wilson, dwelling with considerable emphasis on the difficulties that had attended the progress of the siege—on the fact that he and his army had in reality occupied the position of a besieged force—had announced his intention of commencing offensive operations against the city on the arrival of the siege-train from Firozpur, though with no “hope of being able to take the place until supported by the force from below.” He concluded his letter—the contents of which he intended to send to the Governor-General as a justification of his conduct—with a request that Major Baird Smith would favour him with such remarks and emendations as his experience as Chief Engineer might suggest.\*

\* The entire letter, a perusal of which will make clear the position before Dehli at the date on which it was written (20th August 1857), runs as follows: “A letter has been received from the Governor-General urging our immediately taking Dehli, and he seems angry that it was not done long ago. I wish to explain to him the true state of affairs: that Dehli is seven miles in circumference, filled with an immense fanatical Músalmán population, garrisoned by full 40,000 soldiers armed and disciplined by ourselves, with 114 pieces of heavy artillery mounted on the walls, with the largest magazine of shot, shell, and

ammunition in the Upper Provinces at their disposal, besides some sixty pieces of field artillery, all of our own manufacture, and manned by artillerymen drilled and taught by ourselves; that the Fort itself has been made so strong by perfect flanking defences erected by our own engineers, and a glacis which prevents our guns breaking the walls lower than eight feet from the top, without the labour of a regular siege and sap—for which the force and artillery sent against it has been quite inadequate; that an attempt to blow in the gates and escalate the walls was twice contemplated, but that it was considered,





Who and what sort of a man was he to whom the commander of the besieging army, at this

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

from the state of preparation against such attack on the part of the rebels, such an attempt would inevitably have failed, and have caused the most irreparable disaster to our cause; and that, even if we had succeeded in forcing our way into the place, the small force disposable for the attack would have been most certainly lost in the numerous streets of so large a city, and have been cut to pieces. It was, therefore, considered advisable to confine our efforts to holding the position we now occupy, which is naturally strong, and has been daily rendered more so by our engineers, until the force coming up from below could join to co-operate in the attack. That since the command of the force has devolved on me I have considered it imperatively necessary to adopt the same plan as the only chance of safety to the Empire, and that I strongly urge upon his Lordship the necessity of his ordering General Havelock's or some other force marching upon Dehli as soon as possible. The force under my command is, and has been since the day we took our position, actually besieged by the mutineers, who, from the immense extent of suburbs and gardens extending nearly

to the walls of the town, have such cover for their attacks that it has been very difficult to repel them, and at the same time to inflict such a loss as would deter a repetition of them. They have frequently been driven back with loss, but they immediately take refuge under the grape fire of their heavy guns on the city walls, and, on our retirement, reoccupied their former positions; every such attack upon them has entailed a heavy loss upon our troops, which we can ill spare, and has done us little good. I shall be reinforced by a siege-train from Ferozpur by the end of this or the beginning of next month, when I intend to commence more offensive operations against the city; but I cannot hold out any hope of being able to take the place until supported by the force from below. As an artillery officer, I have no hesitation in giving my opinion that the attack on Dehli, garrisoned and armed as it now is, is as arduous an undertaking as was the attack on Bharatpur in 1825-26, for which 25,000 troops and 100 pieces of artillery were not considered too large a force. I enclose a return of the original force which was sent down to capture this strong place, and also a return of the





Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

Baird Smith.

important conjuncture, made this earnest appeal? Major Baird Smith was an honour even to the Corps of Engineers. To a knowledge founded on extensive reading, to a mind which had thought out the several problems pertaining to Indian administration, he added a power of prompt and decisive action rarely bestowed except upon the senior wranglers of the University of Nature. He had travelled much, had mastered the several methods in which, in the countries of continental Europe, science, and especially the engineering science, had been laid under contribution to develop the latent forces of nature; and in India, had, as the administrative agent to whom was entrusted the completion of the Ganges Canal, applied the experience thus acquired to the perfection of that great work. The genius which could grasp great schemes of administrative reform, was equally at home in the performance of those duties with which the military side of his profession brought him into contact. Chief Engineer of the army before Dehli, he had brought to the performance of his

present effective force, including sick and wounded, from which his Lordship will see how desperate would have been any attempt to take the city by assault, more especially as the mutineers keep a large portion of their force encamped outside the city walls, who, on our assaulting the city, could easily attack and capture our camp, with

all our hospitals, stores, and ammunition, unless a strong provision was made against it. Something of this sort I intend forwarding to the Governor-General, and shall be glad if you will return this with such remarks and emendations as your experience as Chief Engineer suggests."





duties the large mind, the profound knowledge, the prompt decision which had characterised him in his civil work. Neither the shock and pain caused by a wound, nor the weakness and emaciation produced by a severe attack of camp scurvy, aggravated by diarrhoea, depressed his spirit or lessened his energies. Refusing to be placed on the sick list, though assured that mortification would be the consequence of a continued use of his wounded leg, Baird Smith clung to the last to the performance of his duty. The advice which he gave to General Wilson proved that never was his courage higher, never were the tone and temper of his mind more healthy, than when, bowed down by two diseases and suffering acutely from his wound, he seemed a livid wreck of the man he once had been.

It was to such a man that Wilson appealed. The answer was clear, emphatic, decisive. Baird Smith was for action, for prompt and immediate action. True it is, he reasoned, the besieged are more numerous than the besiegers; true it is their resources are greater, their position is formidable, their defences are strong. But in war something must be risked. In his opinion the risk of a repulse in a well-contrived and well-organised assault was infinitely less than the risk which would attend the waiting during a long and uncertain period for reinforcements from below. The waiting for reinforcements involved inaction—an inaction which might last for weeks. Such inaction, at a time when the Panjáb, denuded of its last troops, was quivering in the balance, in-

Book X.  
Chapter 1.  
1857.  
Sept. 1.

The reasons which influenced Baird Smith to advise immediate action.





BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

volved a risk greater even than the risk of a repulse before the walls of the city. Nor was this last danger so great, in Baird Smith's estimation, as the General seemed to consider. He believed that it would be possible by skilfully preparing and effectively delivering an assault, to reduce it to a small proportion. He gave the fullest expression, in his reply, to these convictions, and concluded by urging the General to prepare for and to deliver that assault without delay—before the enemy should have time to strengthen his position within and without the beleaguered city.

These arguments, forcible, clear, based on logic and reason, had their natural effect on General Wilson. Though he did not share to the full Baird Smith's opinions as to the probable result of an assault, he was brought to regard the risk which would thus be encountered as considerably less than the risk which would be involved by inaction. He yielded \* then, and directed the Chief Engineer to prepare a plan of attack.

Wilson yields,  
though without  
being  
convinced.

The reluctant assent of General Wilson threw upon the shoulders of his Chief Engineer the responsibility for the assault. Far from shrinking from the burden, Baird Smith eagerly seized it.

\* General Wilson wrote thus on Baird Smith's memorandum: "It is evident to me that the results of the proposed operations will be thrown on the hazard of a die; but under the circumstances in which I am placed, I am willing to try this hazard—the more so as I

cannot suggest any other plan to meet our difficulties. I cannot, however, help being of opinion that the chances of success under such a heavy fire as the working parties will be exposed to, are anything but favourable. I yield, however, to the judgment of the Chief Engineer."





In conjunction with his second in command, Captain Alexander Taylor, a most able and indefatigable member of the same corps, one of those men who, once tried in difficult circumstances, are found to be indispensable, he submitted a plan—previously prepared, but subject to alteration resulting from daily-gained experience—simple, bold, and effective—easily workable, on the sole condition of hearty and zealous co-operation and obedience on the part of his subordinates. The result showed how well placed was the confidence bestowed by the Chief Engineer in the officers serving under his orders.

Before adverting to that plan, I propose to lay before the reader a short description of the defences of, and the approaches to, Dehlí.

The characteristic features of the place were, at the time, thus officially described by Baird Smith: "The eastern face rests on the Jamná, and during the season of the year when our operations were carried on the stream may be described as washing the base of the walls. All access to a besieger on the river front is therefore impracticable. The defences here consist of an irregular wall, with occasional bastions and towers, and about one half of the length of the river face is occupied by the palace of the King of Dehlí, and its out-work, the old Mogol fort of Sélingarh. The river may be described as the chord of a rough arc formed by the remaining defences at the place. These consist of a succession of bastioned fronts, the connection being very long, and the out-works limited to one

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

Baird Smith  
and Taylor  
prepare a  
plan of  
assault.

The fortifications  
of  
Dehlí.





BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

crown-work at the Ajmír gate, and martello towers mounting a single gun at such points as require additional flanking fire to that given by the bastions themselves. The bastions are small, generally mounting three guns in each face, two in each flank, and one in the embrasure at the salient. They are provided with masonry parapets about twelve feet in thickness, and have a relief of about sixteen feet above the plane of site. The curtain consists of a simple masonry wall or rampart sixteen feet in height, eleven feet thick at top, and fourteen or fifteen at bottom. This main wall carries a parapet loop-holed for musketry, eight feet in height and eight feet in thickness. The whole of the land front is covered by a berm of variable width, ranging from sixteen to thirty feet, and having a scarp wall eight feet high. Exterior to this is a dry ditch, of about twenty-five feet in width, and from sixteen to twenty feet in depth. The counterscarp is simply an earthen slope easy to descend. The glacis is a very short one, extending only fifty or sixty yards from the counterscarp. Using general terms, it covers from the besiegers' view from half to one third of the height of the walls of the place. The defences, in a word, are 'modernised' forms of ancient works that existed when the city fell before Lord Lake's army in 1803. They extend about seven miles in circumference, and include an area of about three square miles. On the western side of Dehli there appear the last out-lying spurs of the Aravelli mountains, and represented here by a low ridge, which dis-





appears at its intersection with the Jamná, about two miles above the place. The drainage from the eastern slope of the ridge finds its way to the river along the northern and the north-western faces of the city, and has formed there a succession of parallel or connected ravines of considerable depth. By taking advantage of these hollow ways admirable cover was constantly obtained for the troops, and the labour of the siege was materially reduced. The whole of the exterior of the place presents an extraordinary mass of old buildings of all kinds, of thick brushwood, and occasional clumps of forest trees, giving great facilities for cover, which, during the siege operations at least, proved to be on the whole more favourable to us than to the enemy."

Such being the place, the plan for assaulting it traced by Baird Smith and Taylor may thus be described.

It was inevitable that the attack should be made on the northern face of the fortress—the face represented by the Morí, Káshmir, and Water bastions, and the curtain walls connecting them. These connecting curtains were merely parapets, wide enough only for musketry fire. It had been in the power of the enemy greatly to strengthen these defences by pulling down the adjacent buildings, and on their ruins erecting a rampart, from which a continued fire of heavy guns should be concentrated on an attacking force. In neglecting, as a rule, to use the advantage thus open to them the rebel leaders added another example to many preceding it, of the absence from their

Book X.  
Chapter I.  
1857.  
Sept. 1.

Plan of the  
attack.





Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 1.

councils of a really capable commander. The neglect was likely to be fatal to the defence, for it enabled the besiegers to concentrate on the curtains a fire sufficient to crush the defenders' fire and to effect breaches through which the infantry could be launched against the town.

The plan of the Chief Engineer, then, was to crush the fire of the Morí bastion at the north-west corner of the city. That fire silenced, the advance on the extreme left, which was covered by the river, would be secure, and there the assault would be delivered.

Its simplicity  
and wisdom.

The simple wisdom of this plan will be at once recognised. In the first place the advance was effectually covered by the river on one flank, and partially so by trees and brushwood in front. The assault delivered, our men would not be at once involved in narrow streets, but there would be a space comparatively open in which to act.

Effective  
number of  
the besieging  
force.

Sept. 6.

On the 6th September all the reinforcements which could be expected, together with the siege-train, had arrived in camp. The effective rank and file, of all arms, amounted to eight thousand seven hundred and forty-eight men, of whom three thousand three hundred and seventeen were Europeans. In line with, and acting with them, were two thousand two hundred native levies from Káshmir, and some hundreds from Jhínd.

Sept. 7.

The evening of the 7th was fixed upon for the commencement of the tracing of the batteries which were to assail the northern face of the city. On that day General Wilson issued to





the troops an order, in which he announced to them that the time was drawing near when he trusted their labours would be over, and they would be rewarded for all their past exertions, and for the fatigue still before them, by the capture of the city. Much, he reminded the infantry, still remained to be accomplished. They had to aid and assist the engineers alike in the erection of the batteries and in acting as covering parties; and when the way should be smoothed for them by the scientific branches of the service, they would have to dare death in the breach. When it should come to that point it would be necessary for them to keep well together, to push on in compact and unbroken masses.

As for the artillery, their work, General Wilson warned them, would be harder than any they had till then encountered. He expressed, at the same time, his confidence that the members of that branch of the service would bring to the performance of that harder work the same cheerfulness and the same pluck which had characterised their labours up to that time.

Reminding the troops of the cruel murders committed on their officers and their comrades, as well as on their wives and children, General Wilson declared that whilst the troops should spare the women and children who might fall in their way, they should give no quarter to the mutineers.

Upon the regimental officers was impressed the necessity of keeping their men together, of preventing plunder, of carrying out the directions of

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 7.

General  
Wilson an-  
nounces to  
the troops his  
intention to  
assault.

His appeal to  
the infantry,

to the artil-  
lery,

regarding  
quarter to  
the foe,

to the regi-  
mental offi-  
cers.





CSL

12

NO. 1 BATTERY TRACED.

Book X.  
Chapter I.1857.  
Sept. 7.Reid's  
battery.

the engineers. The Major-General concluded by asserting his confidence that a brilliant termination of their labours would follow a zealous enforcement of his directions.

Before detailing the work which, on the evening of the 7th, followed the issue of this order, it is necessary to inform the reader that at the suggestion of Major Charles Reid,\* who commanded on the ridge, a light battery had been erected on the night of the 6th upon the plateau of the ridge close to the Sammy house. The object of this battery, known as Reid's battery, was to keep the ground clear and to protect the contemplated new heavy battery, No. 1, during its construction. Reid's battery contained eight light pieces, six 9-pounders, and two 24-pound howitzers, and was commanded by Captain Remmington.

Taylor and  
Medley trace  
No. 1 battery.

To return.—On the evening of the day on which General Wilson's order was issued the engineers commenced their work. In pursuance of the resolve to trace out a battery, the fire from which should crush the Morí bastion, Captain Alexander Taylor, assisted by Captain Medley, proceeded at sunset, accompanied by half-a-dozen sappers, to Hindú Ráo's house. A site had previously been selected to the left of the Sammy House, below the ridge on the open plain, and within seven hundred yards of the Morí bastion. Sand-bags had been taken down on the night of the 6th and covered over with grass and brushwood. These were found untouched by the enemy. The two engi-

\* Now General Sir Charles Reid, K.C.B.





neers at once set to work to trace a battery on this spot. The battery, styled No. 1 battery, was divided into two sections. The right section, commanded by Major Brind,\* intended to receive five 18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer, was to silence the Morí bastion, and to prevent it from interfering with the real attack on the left; the left section, and armed with four 24-pounders, under the command of Major Kaye, was designed to keep down the fire from the Káshmir bastion until the order to assault it should be given. These two sections were to be connected by a trench which, carried on beyond the left section, would communicate with the deep nullah close to the rear, and form a sort of first parallel, giving good cover to the guard of the trenches.

Book X.  
Chapter I.  
—  
1857.  
Sept. 7.

Its right  
section.

Its left  
section.

The tracing of this battery had but just been completed when a strong covering party of Reid's Gúrkahs arrived. Camels with fascines and gabions followed, and the work progressed rapidly during the night. The working parties were but little disturbed by the enemy, three well-directed showers of grape from the Morí alone reaching them.

The tracing  
completed.

In order to draw off the enemy's attention as much as possible, Major Reid, who was with

\* Now General Sir James Brind, K.C.B. General Wilson's orders in writing, and verbally given by the Assistant Adjutant-General of Artillery, Edwin Johnson, were to the effect that Major Brind, commanding the Foot Artillery of the Delhi Field Force, was to command the Key, or

No. 1 battery; Majors Frank Turner and Edward Kaye being attached for the subordinate command of the right and left wings. Major Turner being struck down by serious illness, the left wing was placed under charge of Major Kaye, supervised throughout by Major Brind.



BOOK X.  
Chapter I.1857.  
Sept. 7.Reid diverts  
the fire from  
the Morí  
bastion.

Sept. 8.

At dawn of  
day the  
enemy dis-  
cover the new  
batteries.Brind's  
splendid  
exertions.The enemy's  
attempt to  
carry the

Taylor and Medley, sent directions to Captain Remington to keep up a constant fire on the Morí bastion. This had the desired effect, for the Morí at once opened on Reid's battery and the Sammy House, and did not again molest the working parties. Indeed the enemy did not discover till the day dawned this fresh work upon which the besiegers had been engaged. Much to their dismay they beheld Brind's battery all but completed. Though great efforts had been made, however, all was not ready in it, and but one gun was in position as the morning of the 8th dawned. The rebels on the Morí bastion were not slow to notice the results of the work of that long night. Instantaneously they took measures to demolish it. With the daylight there poured on the barely armed battery showers of grape and round shot. So terrible and so incessant was the fire, that almost every man who ventured from the protection of the battery was knocked over. To this storm the defenders of the battery had but one gun to reply. Major James Brind, one of the heroes of this long siege, who, as already stated, commanded the entire No. 1 battery, noting this, dragged, by great exertion, a howitzer to the rear, and fired over the parapet at the Morí. The fire of the enemy still poured in, however, fierce, incessant, relentless. Emboldened by the weakness of the British reply, they even thought it might be possible to carry by assault the newly made battery. With this object they despatched a body of cavalry and infantry from the Láhor gate. This little





force, emerging from the gate with resolution, took at once the direction of the battery. But they had not gone far when they encountered a hot fire from the 18-pounder and howitzer in the right section of No. 1 battery, from the guns on the ridge, and the light guns on the plateau. This threw them into confusion—a confusion changed into a rout by the opportune discharge of a volley of grape from Brind's battery. The volley sent them back faster than they had come. All this time the men in this battery had been working hard, and though pelted incessantly from the Morí bastion, they soon succeeded in finishing a second platform, then a third, soon after a fourth and a fifth. On the completion of each platform the gun placed on it opened at once on the enemy. The effect of the fire, thus gradually increasing, was soon felt on the Morí. In Major Brind the officers and men possessed a commander of great perseverance, rare energy, a strong will, and a thorough knowledge of his profession. Under his skilful direction the shot from the battery told with tremendous and unceasing effect on the masonry bastion. Gradually the fire from it diminished; by the afternoon it ceased altogether. The bastion was then a heap of ruins, and although the enemy, displaying rare courage, managed to replace the heavy guns in succession to those knocked over, and to discharge them at the battery, the want of cover made it deadly work, and their fire soon languished. One part of the Engineer's plan had thus been carried out. The Morí bastion had been made harmless.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 8.

battery is  
baffled.

The right  
section is  
armed.

Major Brind  
renders the  
Morí harm-  
less.





CSL

Book X.  
Chapter I.1857.  
Sept. 8.The left  
sectionis destroyed  
by fire on the  
10th.Gallantry  
of Lieutenant  
Lockhart.

Heavy fire was, however, continued upon it from the right section and from the ridge until the night before the assault was delivered.

Whilst the right section of the battery had thus been blazing away at the Morí, the 24-pounders in the left section under Major Kaye had been doing their work well, their fire directed on the Káshmir bastion. This fire was continued day and night until noon on the 10th, when the battery caught fire from the constant discharge of our own guns. The sand-bags first caught the flame, then the fascines, made of dry brushwood, and at length the whole battery was in a blaze, which it was feared might extend to the right section and expense magazine.

Lieutenant Lockhart, now Colonel Lockhart, commanding 107th Foot, who was attached to Reid's Gúrkahs, was at the time on duty with two companies of the regiment in the connecting trench between the two sections. The necessity to extinguish the fire was so apparent to him, that he at once suggested to Major Kaye whether it might not be possible to save the battery by working from the outside and top of the parapet. Kaye replied that he thought something might be done if a party were to take sand-bags to the top, cut them, and smother the fire with the sand. Lockhart instantly jumped on to the parapet, followed by six or seven Gúrkahs, and began the work in the manner suggested. The enemy were not slow to discover what had happened, and, determined that the flames should not be extinguished, they at once brought every gun to bear on the blazing





battery and poured in a deadly fire of grape and musketry. Two of the Gúrkahs fell dead, and Lockhart rolled over the parapet with a shot through his jaw. The shot penetrating through the right cheek, passed under his tongue, and went out through the left cheek, smashing the right jaw to pieces.\* The fire was eventually extinguished by means of the sand from the sand-bags, but the section was destroyed.

\* The noble example set by Lockhart was witnessed by Major Reid, and mentioned as a case worthy, he considered, of the Victoria Cross. Unfortunately Reid's pencil reports, like many more despatches of his written daily from the ridge in pencil and under fire, were destroyed by General Wilson, as, being written in pencil and not in the regulated form, they were not considered "official." It thus happened that when General Wilson penned his final despatch, he had none of Reid's pencil notes and reports to refer to. Reid subsequently represented that his recommendations had not been attended to; that he had again and again brought to notice the gallant conduct of officers of the 60th Rifles and others who had served under him; and at length he himself sent in a supplementary despatch, through Colonel Norman, then Acting Adjutant-General. The reply he received was that in Lord Clyde's opinion "the time

had altogether passed for publishing any further despatches relative to services of officers at Delhi, which, however meritorious, are now of old date." This was in February 1859. Prior to this Reid had been urging General Wilson to take notice of his recommendations. But it was in vain. Neither his pencil notes written under fire, nor his reports after the siege, were ever properly attended to, and many deserving officers were consequently left unrewarded. Among these was Captain John Fisher, second in command of the Sirmúr Battalion, who was on the ridge with the regiment throughout the siege, who commanded it during the assault, and who was the only officer out of nine who escaped being wounded. This officer did not even receive a brevet. For the same reason Major Reid's appreciatory mention of the services of the Engineer and Artillery officers, expressed in the strongest language, remained unpublished.

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 10.





Book X.  
Chapter I.  
1857.  
Sept. 7.

Tracing of  
battery No. 2.  
Sept. 8.

To return to the 7th. At the same time that the batteries just referred to were traced on the right, preliminary arrangements for the real attack had been made on the left. On the evening of the 7th, Kúdsia Bágh and Ludlow Castle were occupied by strong pickets. No opposition was offered to this occupation, the mutineers being impressed with the idea that the real attack would be made on the Morí. With these two posts strongly occupied as supports, the engineers were able, on the evening of the 8th, to trace out battery No. 2. This trace was made in front of Ludlow Castle, and five hundred yards from the Káshmir gate. Like battery No. 1—called, after the commandant, Brind's battery—it was divided into two portions, the right-half being intended for seven heavy howitzers and two 18-pounders; the left, about two hundred yards distant, for nine 24-pounders. The fire from these two portions was intended to silence the fire from the Káshmir bastion, to knock away the parapet right and left that gave cover to the defenders, and to open the main breach by which the place was to be stormed.\*

Warned by the experience of Brind's battery,

\* These and the other details describing the plans of the engineers have been taken chiefly from a work entitled *A Year's Campaigning in India*. This book—written by Captain, now Lieutenant-Colonel, Julius George Medley, R.E., himself a distinguished actor in

the scenes he describes—gives an account of the proceedings at this memorable epoch of the siege, which may be almost styled authoritative, confirmed as it has been by the testimony of distinguished officers who took part in the preliminaries to the assault,





no attempt was made to complete battery No. 2 in one night. On the 8th the tracing alone was completed. The wisdom of this cautious mode of proceeding was made clear the following day, when a sharp fire of shot, of shell, and of musketry was opened from the Káshmir and Water bastions and the Sélingarh, on the positions newly occupied. Little damage, however, was effected, and the work was pushed forward during the nights of the 9th and 10th. Before dawn of the 11th the battery had been completed and armed, and it was then unmasked. Major Campbell commanded the left section of it, and Major Kaye—transferred from the ignited left section of Battery No. 1—the right, but the former officer having been wounded on the evening of the 11th, Captain Edwin Johnson,\* Assistant Adjutant-General of Artillery, then serving in the battery, succeeded to the command, and held it to the moment of assault, when he resumed his place on General Wilson's staff.

The third battery was not completed before that night. This battery was traced by Captain Medley the evening of the 9th. With a boldness which was not rare, but the display of which, in this instance, testified to remarkable negligence on the part of the enemy, the engineers traced this battery within one hundred and sixty yards of the Water bastion. Seeking for a fit site for the battery, the director of the attack, Captain Medley, discovered a small ruined building, an

BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 8.

The enemy  
open fire  
upon it.

Sept. 9-11.

Battery No. 3.

\* Now Lieutenant-General Sir Edwin Johnson, K.C.B.





BOOK X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 9-11.

out-office of the Custom House—a large edifice within one hundred and sixty yards of the Water bastion, and totally unoccupied by the enemy. Captain Medley took possession of the Custom House, and determined to trace the battery inside the small ruined building referred to, the outer wall of which would conceal the work and give cover to the workmen. This daring measure completely succeeded. Though the enemy, suspecting something though not the actual truth, peppered our workmen incessantly, these never flinched. When one man fell another would take his place.\* Working in this way the battery was finished and armed by the night of the 11th.

Battery No. 4.

Another battery, No. 4, for four heavy mortars, commanded by Major Tombs, was traced and armed on the night of the 10th, in a safe spot in the Kúdsiabágh itself, ready to open fire when required.

The enemy detect the point from which the attack is to be made,

The mutineers had by this time become alive to the fact that it was not from the right but from the left that the real attack was to issue. With an alacrity worthy of the highest praise, they at once decided upon measures which, if

\* "Pandy did not know what we were at, but at any rate he knew the people were working in that direction, and he served out such a liberal supply of musketry and shell that night that the working party lost thirty-nine men killed and wounded. It was wonderful indeed to see with what courage the men worked.

"They were merely the unarmed Pioneers I have described above, and not meant to be fighting men. With the passive courage so common to natives, as man after man was knocked over, they would stop a moment, weep a little over their fallen friend, pop his body in a row along with the rest, and then work on as before."—*Medley.*





commenced but forty-eight hours earlier, would have effectually baffled the attack. Seeing the effect which the fire from the still masked batteries must produce, they set to work to mount heavy guns along the long curtain. In other convenient nooks, out of reach of the fire of the attack, they mounted light guns. Taking advantage, too, of the broken ground before them, they made in one night an advanced trench parallel to the left attack, and three hundred and fifty yards from it, covering the whole of their front. This trench they lined with infantry.

The heavy guns could not be mounted behind the long curtain in time to anticipate the attack; but at daybreak, on the morning of the 11th, the light guns above alluded to opened an enfilading attack from the right, whilst the muskets from the infantry in the new trench began a hot and unceasing fire. For a time there was no answer. But at 8 o'clock the two sections of No. 2 battery, unmasked, replied. They began with a salvo from the nine 24-pounders—a salvo greeted by cheers from the men in the battery. The effect was marked and decisive. As the site of the breach was struck, huge fragments of stone fell, and the curtain wall disappeared in the ditch. The defenders on the Káshmir bastion attempted to reply, but in ten minutes their fire was silenced. For the rest of the day the guns of No. 2 battery continued to pound away at the walls. It was an exhilarating sight to watch the stone-work crumbling under the storm of shot and shell, the breach getting larger and larger, and the 8-inch

Book X.  
Chapter I.

1857.  
Sept. 10-11.

and take  
measures to  
repel it.

They open  
fire on the  
new batteries.

Effective  
reply from  
No. 2 battery.





Book X.  
Chapter I.  
—  
1857.  
Sept. 11.

The enemy's  
fire works  
destruction in  
No. 1 and 2  
batteries.

shells, made to burst just as they touched the parapet, bringing down whole yards of it at a time.\*

During the night the mortars from No. 3 battery kept the enemy on the alert with incessant fire. But the rebels were by no means idle. The light guns already alluded to, reinforced by a heavy one, playing from martello towers and from holes in curtain walls, maintained a constant and most effective front and enfilading fire on Nos. 1 and 2 batteries. The batteries were constantly raked from end to end. So terrible and so effective was this fire, that, at last, one of the guns of No. 1 battery was withdrawn from playing on the breach and placed in the epaulment to keep down, if possible, the enfilading fire. But even this did not prove very effectual. At one time General Wilson was inclined to make a rush at these guns from the right† and spike or capture them. But their position, within grape-shot of the curtain wall, rendered an attack on them difficult, and certain to be attended with loss. On the other hand, No. 3 battery would be completed on the morrow, and it was hoped that the effect of the full power of the artillery would be decisive.

Sept. 12.

At 11 o'clock on the morning of the 12th,

\* Medley.

† In fact, Major Reid actually was instructed to make a night attack on the position, and four companies of Guides and Gúrkahs were told off supplied with spikes for the purpose. At the same time

the battery near the Sammy House received orders from Major Reid to cover the attack and draw off the enemy's fire. Just then orders arrived from General Wilson countermanding the attack.





Greathed, of the Engineers, aided by some native sappers, unmasked the embrasures. The battery was commanded by Major Scott, with the gallant Fagan as his second in command. In another minute the six guns of the battery opened fire. The effect was tremendous. The enemy's guns were dismounted or smashed; the Water bastion was beaten into a shapeless mass, and in a few hours the breach seemed almost practicable. But the rebels showed no faint heart. Though their guns were silenced, they continued to pour in so heavy and continuous a musketry fire that the air seemed alive with bullets. The loss of life was consequently severe. Fagan, who, in his over-anxiety to see the effect of the first salvo, had raised his head above the parapet, was shot dead. Still further to embarrass the attack, the enemy opened from the other side of the river an enfilading fire, which, though not so effective or so destructive as that carried on from martello towers, was still sufficiently annoying. But our gallant artillerymen never flinched. Throughout the day all the batteries poured in a fire from fifty guns and mortars on the devoted city. The heat was intense, the labour was severe, the danger was enormous. But during the long hours of the day, and of the night which slowly followed, those unflinching officers and men, sustained by the conviction that to their unflagging energies was entrusted a task necessary for the triumph of the British cause, stood firmly to their guns, resisting every weakness of the flesh, their hearts joined in one firm resolve, re-

Book X.  
Chapter 1.

1857.  
Sept. 12.

No. 3 battery  
opens fire,

with tremen-  
dous effect.

Splendid  
exertions of  
the Bengal  
Artillery.