



five guns, threatened to attack him. But it was little more than a demonstration, and Sir Colin, passing the ground on which he had previously encamped, made a partial circuit of the city to the bridge of boats. Crossing this, unopposed, he traversed the city, and effected a junction with Brigadier General Jones.

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Chapter IV.

1858.
May 18.

But even then the British force was too weak in cavalry to encounter the enemy with any hope of a decisive result—a result, that is to say, fraught not only with defeat but with an annihilating pursuit. The truth of this presumption was fully shown that very day. Sir Colin had no intention whatever to engage the enemy. It happened, however, that a reconnoitring party of horse was fired on by the enemy from four guns posted in a fortified village called Panhat; the sound of the guns brought out the masses of the enemy's cavalry; and these again attracted to the field the Commander-in-Chief and his whole force. The battle then partially engaged. The 82nd, pushed forward, occupied the village of Panhat, on the right front. They were followed by the horse artillery, and a field battery, and part of the 9th Lancers and the Irregulars. The 79th then took possession of a grove of trees in the centre of the position, near a small rising ground, on which were posted a couple of heavy guns; whilst a heavy field battery, supported by a wing of the Rifles, with parties of the Carabineers and Bilúchis, covered the left flank. It was a strong defensive position, on which the enemy could make no impression. In the artillery and cavalry

His cavalry
skirmish
with the
rebels, —

which brings
on an action.

which, for
want of
cavalry, is
indecisive.



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Chapter IV.

1858.
May 18-24.

Sir Colin
sends for
Coke's
brigade.

He then
marches to
attack the
rebels,

who fall back
into Oudh.

Close of the
summer cam-
paign.

skirmish which followed, the rebels displayed more than ordinary skill and courage, and although in the end they gave ground, no attempt was made to pursue them.

Sir Colin, in fact, was quite satisfied with the repulse of the enemy. He preferred to defer a decisive battle till he should have more troops, especially more cavalry. He sent off, then, a despatch to Brigadier Coke, directing him to bring down his brigade with all possible speed.

Coke at once turned back, and joined the Commander-in-Chief on the 22nd. On the 24th the whole force marched to attack the enemy. But again the Moulvi baffled him. Whilst his light cavalry did their utmost to hinder the British advance on Mohamdi, retiring the moment the pursuers halted to discharge their guns, the Moulvi and his allies evacuated that place, after destroying the defences. They had similarly treated Katchiáni, the mud fort which had previously given shelter to European fugitives. The expulsion of the rebels from Rohilkhand was the one result of the campaign.

How they were followed up and hunted down in Oudh I shall tell in another chapter. The occurrences in Rajpútáná, long neglected, demand immediate attention. It will suffice here to state that on the expulsion of the Moulvi from Rohilkhand, the Rohilkhand and Rúrki field forces were broken up, the regiments of which they were composed being detailed for other duties. The Commander-in-Chief himself, and the headquarter staff, resumed his journey to Fathgarh; Brigadier



Seaton, relieved by Colonel M'Causland in his command at that place, was appointed to Shahjahánpúr, having under him the 60th Rifles, the 82nd, the 22nd Panjáb Infantry, the Múltáni Horse, two squadrons of the Carabineers, and some artillery. Coke turned with his force to Moradábád, to act as Brigadier commanding the district; the 64th went to Miráth; the 9th Lancers to Ambála; the 79th to Fathgarh. The army was broken up. In south-eastern India, Oudh alone remained to be thoroughly subjugated.

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Chapter IV.

1858.
May.

But I cannot leave the scene of so many combats without recording events which, either from their historical interest, or from the deep personal sympathy they excited, demand special notice. The first of these, not in date, not in importance, not in the sympathy it excited, but in the connection which it bears to the contents of this chapter, is the death of the Moulvi of Faizábád. The Moulvi was a very remarkable man. Sir Thomas Seaton, who had many opportunities for arriving at a just opinion, has described him as "a man of great abilities, of undaunted courage, of stern determination, and by far the best soldier among the rebels." It has been surmised, and with great reason, that before the mutiny occurred the Moulvi was travelling through India on a roving commission, to excite the minds of his compatriots to the step then contemplated by the master-spirits of the plot. This at least is known: that such a commission was undertaken; that the Moulvi travelled to the parts of India which subsequently proved most susceptible to

The Moulvi

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Chapter IV1858.
May.

the revolt; that he was the confidential friend and adviser of a very prominent member of the deposed royal family of Lakhnao. If, as I believe, the mutiny was really caused not less by the annexation of Oudh than by the sudden and treacherous manner in which that annexation was carried into effect—that the greased cartridges were simply a means used by the higher conspirators to force to revolt men who could be moved only by violence to their faith—the story of the action of the Moulvi only seems natural. Certain it is that in April 1857 he circulated seditious papers throughout Oudh; that the police did not arrest him; and that to obtain that end armed force was required. He was then tried and condemned to death. But before the sentence could be executed, Oudh broke into revolt, and, like many a political criminal in Europe, he stepped at once from the floor of a dungeon to the footsteps of a throne. He became the confidential friend and adviser of the Bégam of Lakhnao, the trusted leader of the rebels.

His appearance and ability as a leader.

In person the Moulvi was tall, lean, and muscular, with large deep-set eyes, beetle brows, a high aquiline nose, and lantern jaws. Of his capacity as a military leader many proofs were given during the revolt, but none more decisive than those recorded in this chapter. No other man could boast that he had twice foiled Sir Colin Campbell in the field!

His death follows immediately the close of the summer campaign.

His death he owed, strange to say, not to his enemies, but to his *quondam* allies. After his retreat from Mohamdi, determined to use every

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Chapter IV.1858.
June.

means in his power to hinder the complete success of the British, the Moulvi started off, armed with the authority and money of the Bégam, for Powáin, a town on the frontiers of Oudh and Rohilkhand, thirteen miles north-east of Shahjáhpúr. The Rájá of this place was supposed to possess a certain amount of influence, and it was the Moulvi's object to induce him and others to join in a new league against the British.

The Moulvi started for Powáin, with a small following, on the 5th June, having previously sent forward a messenger to make known his wishes to the Rájá. The Rájá, Jaggarnáth Singh by name, was a fat unwieldy man, not given to martial feats, desirous to sit at home at ease, and particularly anxious to avoid giving offence to the British in the hour of their triumph. He, however, consented to grant the Moulvi a conference. Upon this the Moulvi pushed on to Powáin.

The manner
of it.

On reaching that place he found, to his surprise, that the gates were closed, the walls manned, and the Rájá, his brother, and his armed retainers, were lining the ramparts which overlooked the gateway. Amid these unpromising appearances the conference began. But the Moulvi soon satisfied himself that unless he could overawe the Rájá his eloquence would be wasted. To overawe him, then, he made the driver of the elephant upon which he was mounted urge the animal forward to burst open the gate. The elephant advanced, and applied his head with such force to the barrier, that in a second or two it must inevitably have yielded. In this crisis the Rájá's brother, inspired

The Moulvi
attempts to
force an
entrance
into Powáin,



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June.

and is shot
dead.

His head is
exposed.

Tribute due
to the Moulvi.

by the urgency of the occasion, seized a gun and shot the Moulvi dead. His followers at once turned and fled. The Rájá and his brother then and there cut off the Moulvi's head, and, wrapping it in a cloth, drove to Shahjahánpúr, thirteen miles distant. Arrived at the magistrate's house, they entered, and found that official and his friends at dinner. They immediately produced the bundle, and rolled the bloody head at the feet of the Englishmen. The day following it was exposed to view in a conspicuous part of the town, "for the information and encouragement of all concerned."*

Thus died the Moulvi Ahmad Úlla of Faizábád. If a patriot is a man who plots and fights for the independence, wrongfully destroyed, of his native country, then most certainly the Moulvi was a true patriot. He had not stained his sword by assassination, he had connived at no murders: he had fought manfully, honourably, and stubbornly in the field against the strangers who had seized his country, and his memory is entitled to the respect of the brave and the true-hearted of all nations.

Naturally enough, the British Government rejoiced to be rid of a formidable enemy. But another death, occurring a few weeks earlier, caused an outburst of the deepest sorrow in the heart of every Englishman serving in India—throughout the homes and the hearths of England. The reader who has accompanied me so far will

* The Government paid thousand pounds for killing the Rájá a reward of five the Moulvi.



have marked with pride and pleasure the record of the splendid achievements of the Naval Brigade under its gallant and accomplished leader, William Peel; they will remember that on the 9th March, when seeking a suitable place for the posting of some guns to breach the outer wall of the Martinière, William Peel was shot in the thigh by a musket-ball. The ball, however, was extracted, and the progress to convalescence after the extraction, if slow, was solid and hopeful.

With the capture of Lakhnau the work of the Naval Brigade was regarded as completed. On the 1st April, then, the sailors struck their tents, and started for Kánhpúr on their way to Calcutta. Great preparations were made to receive them in that city. The Government had decided to notify their sense of their splendid services by giving them a public reception, and the Calcutta people, for once in accord with the Government, were resolved that the reception should yield, in heartiness, in sincerity, and in splendour, to none by which a body of public men had ever been greeted in their palatial city. No one foresaw that the daring leader, for whom the greatest ovation was reserved, would be called to his last home too soon to witness the admiration of his non-combatant countrymen.

One gratification, indeed, had been reserved for William Peel. On the 2nd March he had received the mark of the approval of his Gracious Sovereign, intimated by his nomination to be an Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, and by the bestowal of the Knight Commandership of the Bath. They

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April.

William Peel

Reception
designed for
him and his
brigade in
Calcutta.

Honours
awarded to
William Peel
by the Crown



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1858.
April.

He is attacked
by small-pox,
and dies.

Universal
grief at his
death.

General order
issued on the
occasion by
Lord Canning.

were fit honours for his noble service, rewards of the nature he would prize the most, as constituting spontaneous testimony from his Sovereign of the efforts he had made to suppress the rebellion, the possible mischief of which, if unchecked, no one had recognised more clearly than had the First Lady in the Realm.*

William Peel reached Kánbpúr in safety. Though still weak, he was still slowly gaining strength, when, on the 20th April, he was attacked by confluent small-pox. His frame had been too much weakened to bear the shock. On the 27th he succumbed to the disease.

In him England lost one of the worthiest, of the noblest of her sons. How thoroughly he had impressed his spirit on the men whom he led may be gathered from the journal of one of them. "I cannot say," wrote Lieutenant Verney, on the 30th April, "what a sad loss we all feel this to be, and how deeply his death is felt and regretted by every officer and man; the mainspring that worked the machinery is gone. We never felt ourselves to be the *Shannon's* Naval Brigade, or even the *Admiralty* Naval Brigade, but always *Peel's* Naval Brigade." But the grief was not confined to the gallant men who had followed him. It was overpowering; it was universal; it was realised that England had lost a king of men.

The Government were not slow in giving expression to the universal feeling. On the 30th April Lord Canning issued a general order, in

* Life of the Prince Consort, vol. iv. chapter 78.



which, after notifying the sad fact and recapitulating his services, he thus eloquently recorded his sense of the extent of the catastrophe, of the greatness of the man:—"The loss of his daring but thoughtful courage, joined with eminent abilities, is a heavy one to this country; but it is not more to be deplored than the loss of that influence which his earnest character, admirable temper, and gentle kindly bearing exercised on all within his reach—an influence which was exerted unceasingly for the public good, and of which the Governor-General believes it may with truth be said, that there is not a man of any rank or profession who, having been associated with Sir William Peel in these times of anxiety and danger, has not felt and acknowledged it."

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April.

The memory of his great name and his great deeds still survives. In the Eden Gardens of Calcutta a statue in white marble recalls to the citizens, by whom those gardens are nightly thronged, the form and fashion of him who was indeed the noblest volunteer of this or any age, who was successful because he was really great, and who, dying early, left a reputation without spot, the best inheritance he could bequeath to his countrymen.*

Marble
statue of him
in Calcutta.

I have already recorded the death of Venables. This gentleman, an indigo-planter, had, by his un-

Venables.

* The death of William Peel was a double misfortune to the officers of the *Shannon* brigade. He had been very sparing of praise in his despatches. It had been his intention personally to press the claims of the officers whom he knew to be deserving. His premature death frustrated this idea.



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April.

flinching daring, saved the district of Āzamgarh in June 1857, when its natural guardians had withdrawn from it. Subsequently he had struggled bravely against the invaders from Oudh, and had ridden with Franks, as a volunteer, in his glorious march from the eastern frontier of Oudh to Lakhnao. Withdrawing thence to Allahābād, "broken in health and spirits, anxious for rest, looking forward eagerly to his return to England,"* he was

* Letter from Lord Canning to the Committee of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce, assembled in June 1858, to devise a fitting monument to Mr. Venables. The letter ran thus:—"It will be a satisfaction to me to join in this good work, not only on account of the admiration which I feel for the high qualities which Mr. Venables devoted to the public service, his intrepidity in the field, his energy and calm temper in upholding the civil authority, and his thoroughly just appreciation of the people and circumstances with which he had to deal, but also, and especially, on account of circumstances attending the last service which Mr. Venables rendered to his country. After the capture of Lucknow, where he was attached to Brigadier-General Franks's column, Mr. Venables came to Allahabad. He was broken in health and spirits, anxious for rest, and looking forward

eagerly to his return to England, for which his preparations were made. At that time the appearance of affairs near Azimghar was threatening; and I asked Mr. Venables to forego his departure from India, and return to that district, with which he was intimately acquainted, there to assist in preserving order until danger should have passed away. He at once consented cheerfully; and that consent cost him his life. I am certain that the Court of Directors, who are fully informed of all particulars of Mr. Venables' great services and untimely death, will be eager to mark, in such manner as shall seem best to them, their appreciation of the character of this brave, self-denying English gentleman; and I am truly glad to have an opportunity of joining with his fellow-countrymen in India in testifying the sincere respect which I feel for his memory."



THE 'BRAVE, SELF-DENYING ENGLISH GENTLEMAN.' 549

persuaded by the Governor-General to return to Azamgarh, once again seriously threatened. The reader will recollect how useful were the services he then rendered to the gallant Lord Mark Kerr. Nor were those subsequently given to Sir E. Lugard less remarkable. It was in the performance of "these great services," inspired by the highest sense of duty, that, on the 15th April, he was struck down. The wound was mortal. "A few days afterwards," wrote in eloquent language some years ago an able and conscientious historian,* "death, resulting from the wound, cut short the sufferings and belied the hopes of this 'brave, self-denying English gentleman,' one among many such who in those days of sharp trial proved their right to be held in equal honour with the best rewarded officers of the East India Company and the Crown."

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1858.

April.

The noble
service he
rendered to
his country.

* Trotter's *History of the British Empire in India*.



BOOK XII.

CHAPTER V.

Rajpútáná.

I HAVE brought the history of events in Rajpútáná up to the end of June 1857, and have shown how the foresight and energy of General G. St. P. Lawrence, had till then baffled all the efforts of the mutinous soldiers who had been sent to support British authority in that extensive country.

Continues
tranquil.

The tranquillity restored in June continued throughout July. General Lawrence maintained his headquarters at Ájmir, but he moved thence occasionally, as his military and political duties required, to Biáór and Nasirábád. To show his confidence in the Mairs, he would have no other guard but a native officer's party of the Mair-wará battalion, and it is only fair to those loyal men to add that the events which followed, many of them peculiarly trying, fully justified that confidence.



It was a considerable evidence of the satisfaction felt by the princes and people of Rajpútáná with the mild but effective suzerainty of the British that they showed no sympathy with the revolted sepoys. The exactions of Amír Khán and the grinding tyranny of the Maráthás were not so remote ~~but~~ that the recollection of them could be entirely forgotten. The forty succeeding years of peace and prosperity, of protection against outer enemies, had been a proof of the advantage of the British connection too practical to allow the existence of a wish that the connection should be severed. They felt keenly, that whatever might be the result of such severance, even were it to be effected, it would not be to their advantage; and they knew from the experience of the past that complete success in the field of military hordes was the certain prelude to unbridled license, to a condition of rule without law.

These sentiments of the people were fully displayed on more than one occasion during the months that followed the outbreaks at Nimach and Nasírábád. The air was infected with panic; the movement of a corporal's guard was magnified into a great military demonstration: rumours, slight in their origin, were multiplied by every mouth that repeated them, until the resemblance to the original disappeared altogether. In this state of affairs the merchants, the bankers, the trading community in the great centres of Rajpútáná, terrified by the reports, would send away their families for security, and then come to "their father," the Governor-General's agent, for

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1857.
July.

Effect on the
princes and
people of the
mild sway of
the British.

The confi-
dence
bestowed by
them in
General
Lawrence.



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1857.

July-August.

General
Lawrence's
demeanour.

advice and protection. In every instance General Lawrence succeeded in calming their fears, and in inducing them to recall their families. His own example tended not a little to inspire them with confidence. When at Ajmir he never once allowed the routine of civil duties to be interrupted, but held open court, almost daily visiting the city, where, in spite of the fierce and sullen looks of the disaffected, he was always regarded with respect. Treating the people with a generous confidence, General Lawrence was nevertheless stern, even severe towards all wrongdoers, and never once relaxed the reins of strict and efficient discipline.

The dis-
affected few.

I have spoken of "the fierce and sullen looks of the disaffected." In all great cities, in all large countries, there must be some who hate restriction. The criminal class, the men who having nothing would live by other means than by labour, answer to this description. But above all, in the circumstances of 1857, were the soldiery. Throughout this period there was, there could not help being, a considerable amount of sympathy between the native soldiers of the Company and the native soldiers of the indigenous princes. They were of the same caste and the same class; they often came from the same recruiting-ground. The causes which impelled the British sepoys to mutiny could not fail to influence greatly their comrades in other services. These were the men whose looks were fierce and sullen, these the classes from whom danger was to be apprehended.

An émeute in
the Ajmir

From these classes the danger came. On the



9th August an outbreak took place in the Ajmir jail, and fifty prisoners escaped—an outbreak of the criminal class. But General Lawrence was prompt. He sent out a detachment of the mounted police, previously warned by him to be in readiness, to pursue them, and rode after them himself. The fugitives were cut up or captured. It was a sign of the good feeling of the respectable classes, that when he set out on this pursuit, many leading Mahomedans of the city volunteered to accompany him.

On the day following, one of the other classes referred to—the military class—showed its teeth. One of the regiments accompanying the force for which Lawrence had made a requisition on Disá, and which had reached Nasirábád on the 12th June, was the 12th Bombay Native Infantry. A trooper of the 1st Bombay Lancers, suddenly mounting his charger, had galloped in front of the lines of his regiment, endeavouring by cries and threats to induce his comrades to mutiny. The Bombay Lancers, however, were staunch, and some of them mounted their horses to pursue the rebel, whereupon, discharging his carbine at one of them, a native officer, he fled to the lines of the 12th, where he was received and sheltered. Meanwhile the Brigadier, Henry Macan, had come on to the parade ground. He at once ordered the men of the 12th to turn out. Only forty obeyed. Upon this the Brigadier called out the guns, and bringing up a company of the 83rd, proceeded to the lines of the 12th. The original mutineer, the trooper of the 1st Cavalry, fired at him but missed.

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1857.

Aug. 9-10.

jail is suppressed.

Slight outbreak at Nasirábád

is easily suppressed by Brigadier Macan.



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1857.
Aug. 10-12.

The rebel himself was then shot by an artillery officer. The men of the 12th were paraded, and all who had disobeyed the order to turn out were disarmed. Their muskets were found loaded. The ringleaders were then tried by court-martial, five were hanged and three sentenced to imprisonment for life. Twenty-five had previously deserted. To the remainder their arms, on their expression of contrition, were restored, and they behaved well in the field ever afterwards.

A similar
occurrence at
Nimach

A similar feeling displayed itself about the same time at another station. I have already stated* that after the revolt of the native troops at Ní-mach, General Lawrence, having no other soldiers at his disposal, had caused that place to be occupied by detachments from Méwa, Kotá, and Búndí. Subsequently, placing little trust in these men, he had ordered up a force composed of one squadron of the 2nd Bombay Light Cavalry, one hundred men of the 83rd, and two hundred of the 12th Bombay Native Infantry to relieve them. But some of the relievers were as bad as the relieved. About the 12th August some disaffected men of the 2nd Light Cavalry and the 12th Native Infantry endeavoured to promote a disturbance. But Colonel Jackson, the commanding officer, acted with great promptitude. Before the mutiny had actually declared itself, he brought up the 83rd, and seized the ringleaders. Some of these were arrested, eight escaped, one man of the 83rd was killed, an officer and two men were wounded, but the mutiny was nipped in the bud.

is success-
fully met by
Colonel
Jackson.

* Vol. i. page 256.



But the mutinous feeling had been too widely spread over the province to be checked by one or two failures, nor had the officers at the out-stations at hand the same means of repression as those possessed by the commandants at Nímach and Nasirábád.

The station of Mount Ábú, in the native state of Sirohí, was the summer residence of the Governor-General's agent, and generally of the wives and families of the officers serving under him. There, at this time, were congregated the wife and two daughters of General Lawrence, and the wives and families of many officers serving in the field. In the European barracks were likewise thirty convalescent soldiers of the 83rd. To protect the station was a detachment of sixty to seventy men of the Jodhpúr legion—whose headquarters were at Íripúrah—under the command of Captain Hall.

The Jodhpúr legion consisted of artillery, cavalry, and infantry. The artillery—two 9-pounders—was drawn by camels and manned from the infantry. The cavalry consisted of three troops, each having two native officers, eight non-commissioned officers, seventy-two troopers, and a trumpeter. The infantry was formed of eight companies of Hindústánis, each having two native officers, twelve non-commissioned officers, and eighty privates; and three companies of Bhíls, each counting seventy men besides native officers. The legion, especially the cavalry portion of it, had a good reputation for efficiency.

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Chapter V.

1857.
August.

Mount A'bú,
the summer
residence in
Rajpútáná.

Composition
of the Jodh-
púr legion.

On the 19th August a company of the infantry

A company
and a troop

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1857.

Aug. 19-21.
of the legion
meet at
Anádra.Captain Hall
inspects
them and
finds them
cheery.The men at
Anádra
mutiny,
climb the hill,
and fire into
the barracks.

portion of the legion, which had been sent with the view of holding in check a rebel chief in the neighbourhood, arrived at a place called Anádra, two miles from the foot of the mountain pass leading to Ábú. A troop of cavalry of the same legion had arrived there a few days previously, and had been distributed in small parties in the different villages to protect the road from Díśá to Ábú.

The following afternoon Captain Hall arrived at Anádra to give orders for the occupation by the detachment of certain villages. The sepoys and their baggage had been soaked by heavy rain, but the men seemed cheery and well-disposed. Having given the necessary orders, he returned to Ábú. But on his way he met a havildár belonging to the detachment at that place, who, in reply to his question, said that he was going to see his newly arrived friends. This was true so far as it went: but the havildár deemed it unnecessary to add—what nevertheless was proved from subsequent inquiry to be the fact—that “he had been deputed to manage the attack which was to come off the following morning.”*

The morning of the 21st was thick and hazy, and the people residing at Ábú, under the influence of murky atmosphere, kept their beds late. Not so the men of the Jodhpúr legion at Anádra. They rose very early, climbed the hill, and, under the cover of the dense fog, crept unseen to the door of the barracks, in which lay,

* Prichard's *Mutinies in Rajpútáná*.



buried in sleep, the thirty sick and invalid British soldiers. The native assassins then peeped through the window and saw their intended victims sleeping. Then raising their muskets, they poked the muzzles through the windows—and fired.

They aimed too high! The British soldiers starting from sleep at that sound, unwonted at Ábú, divine the cause, seize their muskets, and begin to load. But then another volley is poured in, harmless as its predecessor. By this time their muskets are loaded, they rush out, they reply. The result is “singular but satisfactory; one mutineer fell—the rest ran away.”*

While the main body were thus engaged at the barracks, another party of mutineers had crept round to Captain Hall’s house, to dispose, if possible, of a man whom they knew to be capable and resolute, and whose influence they dreaded. Arrived in front of the house, they became aware that Captain Hall was asleep. They at once extended in line in front of it, and by word of command fired a volley within. Again was the result futile. Hall, awakened by the noise, managed to escape by a back door with his family into the schoolhouse, which had been fortified as a place of refuge. Leaving his family there, he took with him a small guard of four men of the 83rd, and, charging the assailants, drove them off. He was speedily joined by the remaining men of the 83rd, and the mutineers were driven from the hill. The state of the weather rendered pursuit impossible.

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Chapter V.

1857.
Aug. 21.

Complete
failure of the
mutineers.

They fail also
to kill Cap-
tain Hall,

* Prichard.



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1857.

Aug. 21-22.

but wound
Mr. Lawrence.

The muti-
neers set out
for Irin-
púrah.

The Jodhpúr
legion muti-
nies at that
place.

Trying
position of
Lieutenant
Conolly.

He appeals to
the Bhíls,

Only one European was wounded, and that was Mr. Alexander Lawrence, son of the General. Hearing the firing, he had started for Captain Hall's house, when the sepoys noted and shot him—in the thigh. The wound was severe, but he recovered.

The mutineers, baffled first by their own clumsiness, and secondly by the spirit of the men they had tried to murder, made at once for the headquarters of the regiment—the station of Írinpúrah. The only Europeans at this station at the time were the adjutant, Lieutenant Conolly, two sergeants and their families. Early on the morning of the 22nd, a letter from one of the baffled mutineers was brought to Conolly by his orderly, Makdún Bakhsh by name. This letter, addressed to the men at headquarters, called upon them to revolt and join their comrades “who had been to Ábú, fought with the Europeans, and taken all precautions.” Conolly immediately mounted his horse and rode down to the parade ground. A glance showed him that the spirit of mutiny had infected the troops. The gunners were running to their guns, shouting to Conolly, as they ran, to keep off. Conolly then determined to appeal to the Bhíls, who had no sympathies of caste, of kindred, or even of a common origin, with the men of the other branches of the legion. But to reach the Bhíls he was forced to pass the lines of the cavalry. These, too, he saw were mutinying, and though he stopped to order them to turn out under arms, but not to stir from their lines, his orders were not attended to. At last he reached



the Bhils. He found them loyal and ready to obey him, except so far as to march against the loaded guns and muskets of their more numerous comrades. As a last resource, Conolly rode back to make an appeal to the infantry. He found them mad with excitement, and refusing to hear a word. He then tried the gunners. But, as he neared the guns, the men shouted to him to keep off; as he persisted in advancing, they wheeled their guns round, and pointed the muzzles at him, holding the portfires ready. Conolly then turned his horse's head, and changing his direction, rode again at the guns, taking them in flank. Upon this several troopers rode at him, between him and the guns, and pointing their carbines at him, exclaimed, "Go back, or we will fire." Conolly then called out with a loud voice that those on his side should join him. A few troopers rode over.

Meanwhile the sepoys had begun the work of plunder. The two English sergeants with their wives and families, two men, two women, and five children, unable to stem the tide, had abandoned their houses, and were seeking refuge in vain flight. Conolly sent for them to join him in the cavalry lines. They came. "Here, then," writes the chronicler of the story of the mutinies in Rajpútáná,* "the little band of English men and

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Chapter V.

1857.
Aug. 22.

then to the
infantry,

then to the
gunners,

and fails with
all.

The small
English
colony is in
great straits ;

* Lieutenant Iludus Thomas Prichard, of the 15th Regiment Native Infantry, a soldier and a scholar of no mean capacity. The mutiny of his regiment disgusted Mr. Prichard with military service. He left the army

after 1858, and devoted himself to literature, in which he played, in India, a conspicuous and honourable part. His work on the mutiny is styled *The Mutinies in Rajpútáná: a Personal Narrative.*



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Chapter V.

1857.
Aug. 22.

soon to
become still
greater,

when a slight
reaction
occurs.

The "loyal"
rebels are
willing to
spare Conolly
and the
children,

but not the
sergeants and
their wives.

women were collected, utterly helpless, surrounded by blood-thirsty villains, every instant plunging deeper and deeper into their career of crime, from which there was no drawing back, and becoming more and more intoxicated with the unbridled indulgence of their passion for plunder, lust, and rapine."

It was indeed a terrible and a trying position. It was soon to become worse. Gradually the men who had responded to Conolly's call began to show a disposition to desert him. There were a few noble and loyal spirits, however, who in this dark hour dared to show that they preferred honour to life. A *rasaldár*,* Ábbás Áli by name, came forward, and taking off his turban in a solemn manner before the more infuriated of the rebels, declared to them that before they should offer violence to the English, they would have to pass over his body. His example was followed by another native officer, Ábdúl Áli. The orderly, too, Makdún Bakhsh, exerted himself to save his officer. Ultimately forty-five troopers swore to stand by Conolly or to die in his defence.

With a strange inconsistency, however, they would not ride off with Conolly and the sergeants and sergeants' families: they would not allow them to depart alone. They offered to allow Conolly to ride away, and to take charge of the children—but as for the parents, it was impossible, they said, to save them. With a spirit becoming a British officer, Conolly under those circumstances

* A native cavalry officer—a squadron commander.



declined to leave. He resolved to save his comrades with himself, or to share their fate.

Meanwhile the rebels had brought their guns to bear upon the cavalry lines. To prevent the escape of the Europeans and the loyal troopers, they then insisted that all the cavalry horses should be picketed close to the guns, and that the Europeans, now their captives, should be sent to occupy a small tent on the parade ground, carefully guarded.

So that long night passed. The next morning the Anádra mutineers, fresh from their baffled attempt on Ábú, marched into the station with a swagger scarcely consistent with their actual performances. However much minded they may have been to avenge their defeat on the prisoners, they were unable to do so without a fight with their own brethren. For the faithful "forty-five" still kept jealous guard. They contented themselves, then, with an outpouring of abuse.

The ways of the mutineers throughout the mutiny were inscrutable. They were so specially on this occasion. We have seen that on the day of the revolt of Írinpúrah, the revolted were willing to allow Conolly to go, but not the sergeants and their wives. On the evening of the second day they came to a resolution to permit the two sergeants, their wives and children, to depart, but to retain Conolly. In consequence of this resolve, the sergeants and their families were sent away. The mutineers then marched from the station in the direction of Ájmír, taking

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Chapter V.

1857.
Aug. 22.

The crisis
continues.

The Anádra
mutineers
arrive.

Aug. 23.

The rebels
dismiss the
sergeants and
their families,
and carry
away Conolly.

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Chapter V.

1857.

Aug. 23-24.

The rebels
allow Conolly
to depart.

Conolly with them, a prisoner, mounted but carefully guarded.

Conolly had given up all hope of life. But never was he in outward appearance more cheery. He has left in a letter to a friend a vivid account of the occurrences of that and the following day. On the third day he was allowed to depart, and he rode into Írinpúrah, followed by three faithful troopers.* The rasaldár who had first proved his loyalty, then wrote to Captain Monck-Mason, the political agent at Jodhpúr, offering to desert with a large body of the cavalry, and the guns, provided he and his comrades should be pardoned and reinstated in the service of the Government.

The "loyal"
rebels offer
to submit on
promise of
a pardon,

It may be convenient to state here that Monck-Mason was anxious to accept the offer, but his hands were tied by the order of Government, which prohibited all officers from making terms with rebels while they had arms in their hands. Monck-Mason therefore replied that though he was precluded by recent orders from accepting the terms offered, yet that if Ábbás Áli would act as a faithful soldier and servant of the British Government, and weaken the cause of the rebels by deserting in the manner he proposed, there was no doubt but that his case would be leniently dealt with by the Government, and he would probably receive an unconditional pardon and a suitable reward. Ábbás Áli, regarding this reply as a refusal, became an active leader of the rebel force. The results were serious to the British

which the
political
agent has no
power to
grant.

* Vide Appendix C.



cause, and especially serious to Captain Monck-Mason himself.

The rebels, after dismissing Conolly, pushed on towards Ajmir with the intention of taking it. Their line of march lay through the Jodhpúr country. To stop them, and, if possible, to annihilate them, the Rájá, acting in conformity with the advice of Monck-Mason, despatched his own army, commanded by his favourite officer, a very daring and a very gallant man, who had given several instances of his courage—Anár Singh—to Páli, a place on the high road to his capital. To aid Anár Singh with his counsels, a British officer, Lieutenant Heathcote, was, by order of General Lawrence, despatched from the Rájputáná field force, of which he was Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General. The Jodhpúr troops intrenched themselves at Páli.

Meanwhile the rebels, advancing towards that place, had arrived at Áwah. The Thákur or baron of this stronghold was in rebellion against his liege lord, the Rájá of Jodhpúr. The Thákur, a man of a long and proud lineage, of great repute throughout the country, was unwilling to enter into any bond of alliance with men whom he regarded as the revolted hirelings of the European. But revenge is sweet. And he, probably the second man in importance in Márwár, believed that his wrongs cried out for vengeance. A rebel against his Rájá, he was likewise to that extent a rebel against the British suzerain of that Rájá. Before, however, he would consent to the terms which the rebel sepoys, in their anxiety to gain

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1857.
August.

The Rájá of
Jodhpúr
sends an
army against
the rebels.

The Thákur
of Áwah



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Chapter V.

1857.

Aug.-Sept.
makes offers
of submission
to Monck-
Mason,

him, pressed upon him with urgency, he despatched a messenger to the British agent, Monck-Mason, to tell him that if the British Government would accord him certain conditions, which he named, he would return to his allegiance, would keep the gates of his fort closed against the mutineers, and, if co-operated with either by a British force or by the troops of the Rájá, would open fire upon their camp, which was within gunshot of his walls.

which that
officer has no
power to
accept.

Again was Monck-Mason tempted. Sound policy would have induced him to accept the Thákur's offer. The conditions named were of no great practical importance, relating as they did more to sentimental than to real grievances. But his hands were tied. He had no authority to treat with rebels still in arms. He had no authority at all to treat with this Thákur, whose first complaint lay against the Rájá. He was obliged to send a reply to this effect by the messenger; to inform him in addition that the Thákur's quarrel was with his own Rájá, and that the Rájá had frequently expressed his determination to hold no communication with him unless he should confess his error, throw himself upon his mercy, and pay up his arrears of revenue. The result of this reply was that the Thákur and the rebel sepoys came to terms, and together marched towards Páli.

He therefore
coalesces
with the
rebels.

The rebels
march on
Páli.

They marched towards Páli; but when they saw the intrenched position of the Jodhpúr troops, they did not care to attack it. The delay which ensued, trying as it was to men situated as were



the Jodhpúr troops, might have been endured but for the evil effect it was sure to produce on the native courts and the native troops of Rajpútáná. These could not understand the utility of a Torres Vedras. Royal troops who would not advance were half beaten. The moment was especially full of anxiety for the officer responsible for the security of this important part of India, and General Lawrence was justified in the desire he expressed to the Rájá that some more active measures should be taken by his troops than those involved "in dancing attendance on the rebels, like orderlies."

But before General Lawrence's letter reached Jodhpúr, the commander of the royal troops, Anár Singh, had left his strong position and encamped in close proximity to the rebels. Here, on the early morning of September 8th, his camp was surprised by the enemy, his men gave way, and though he, with a few, a very few, kindred spirits, fought bravely to the last, giving their lives for their Rájá, he could not redeem the day. His camp, his guns, his military stores, fell into the hands of the rebels. Heathcote, after using every effort to induce the men to stand, had mounted his horse and galloped from the field.

General Lawrence was at Ájmir when the events I have recorded occurred. From the 21st to the 26th August he received no intelligence from Ábú, but on the 22nd a letter had reached him from Conolly at Írinpúrah, telling him of the anticipations he entertained of an outbreak at that

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1857.

September.

Consider-
which moved
the Jodhpúr
troops not to
remain quiet.

The rebels
attack and
defeat the
Jodhpúr
troops.

General
Lawrence



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Chapter V.

1857.
September.

assembles a
small force to
coerce the
rebels.

station. Five days later he received the bare outline of the mutinies at both stations.

We have seen that the European forces at the disposal of Lawrence were all required for the maintenance of order at the great military centres in Rajpútáná, and that few, if any, could really be spared for service in the field. No one can wonder, then, at the anxiety expressed by the Governor-General's agent for the prompt and energetic action on the part of the Jodhpúr troops. But, after the defeat of those troops at Páli, Lawrence considering, and rightly considering, that the effect on the country would be very injurious if the course of the rebels were not promptly checked, assembled as soon as possible a small force at Bíáor for the purpose of co-operating with the Jodhpúr troops. This force was composed of one hundred and fifty men of the 83rd, a portion of the Mairwára battalion, the 1st Bombay Lancers, two 12-pounders, three 6-pounders, and two mortars.

The rebels
fall back on
A'wah.

The rebels, after their victory over the Rájá's troops, had fallen back on Áwah, the fortifications of which they proceeded to strengthen. Áwah is surrounded by a high wall, and is only approachable through a dense jungle. Being well supplied with guns, it could claim to be defensible against the small force which Lawrence was marching against it.

General
Lawrence
arrives before
A'wah.

He arrived before it on the 18th, and proceeded at once to make a reconnaissance in force. This had the effect of causing the enemy to bring a strong fire to bear upon his men from every



gun on their walls. It was seen that the place was strong and could scarcely be carried by an assault. Lawrence, then, hoping that the enemy would come out and attack him, fell back on the village of Chulawáss, about three and a half miles distant. Here he was to have been joined by Monck-Mason, but that officer, on arriving within three hundred yards of the place where the General was standing, was decoyed by the enemy's bugle-sound—similar to those of the British—and was shot dead. His death was a loss to the State, for he was a man of many and varied accomplishments, with a noble heart and a lofty mind—one of the old school of soldier-politicians who constituted one of the glories of the Company's rule.

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Chapter V.

1857.
September.

Monck-
Mason is
killed.

Lawrence remained three days at Áwah. The rebels left him in peace, busily occupied in strengthening their position. Unable with his actual force to take the place, and having to a certain extent impressed the people of the country through which he marched, Lawrence then fell back leisurely on Ájmir and Nasirábád. Áwah bade him defiance, but with the exception of Kótá, the remainder of Rájpútáná remained for the three months that followed loyal and submissive. It may be convenient to add a word here regarding the proceedings at Áwah. Not many days elapsed before the proud Thákur and his rebel allies quarrelled. Instead of coming to blows, however, they sensibly agreed to separate. The Thákur remained at Áwah; the sepoys took their way towards Dehlí. They were en-

Lawrence
falls back on
Ájmir.

Ultimate fate
of the Jodh-
púr legion.



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Chapter V.

1857.
October.

Kotá.

countered, completely defeated, and many of them cut up by a British force under Gerrard at Nár-núl on the 16th October following.*

Kotá, an offshoot from the more ancient principality of Búndí, is a native State bordering on the south-west frontier of Sindia's dominions, having an area of five thousand square miles, and a population of four hundred and thirty-three thousand souls. In 1857 the ruling chief was Maháráo Rám Singh. An auxiliary force of the three arms, commanded by European officers, had been maintained in the State since 1838. The entire cost of this force was maintained by the Maháráo. The political agent, representing the British Government, was Major Burton.

Troops from
Kotá tempo-
rarily occupy
Nímach.

The reader is aware that, when the troops of the regular army revolted at Nímach, Lawrence had caused that station to be reoccupied by detachments from the contingents of Mewár, Kotí, and Búndí, until such time as the Europeans he had sent for from Dísá should arrive.† Major Burton had accompanied the Kotá troops on that expedition. He did not, however, return with them, General Lawrence having requested him to remain at Nímach for some three weeks, as "in those unsettled times he could not have confidence in his troops."

Major Burton
and his sons
return to
Kotá.

Major Burton, consequently, remained at Nímach. But, after the occurrences at A'wah to which I have adverted, deeming his presence at

* Page 112. I may add that the rasaldár, Abbás Ali, was ultimately pardoned by Lord Canning.

† Vol. i: page 256.



the capital of the State to which he was accredited necessary for the assurance of the policy of the Mahārāo, he set out to return to Kotā, accompanied by two of his sons, the one aged twenty-one, the other sixteen, but leaving behind him, under the safeguard of the British troops at Nímach, his wife and four remaining children. He reached Kotā on the 12th October, was visited by the Mahārāo in state the following morning, and returned the visit on the 14th. The Mahārāo subsequently stated that at the return visit Burton gave him the names of some of his officers whom he knew to be disaffected, and impressed upon him the advisability of punishing or at least dismissing them. Whether Burton gave this advice can never be certainly known; but this is certain, that that same day the Mahārāo caused the officers and men of the contingent to be informed that he had given it!

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—
1857.
October.

The Mahārāo betrays Burton to the men whom he had denounced,

Officers and men were, in very truth, alike disaffected, and, being so, the communication made to them by order of the Mahārāo determined them to take the law into their own hands. Accordingly they assembled the following morning, and killing Mr. Salder, the Residency surgeon, and Mr. Saviell, the doctor of the dispensary in the city, who resided in houses in the Residency grounds, attacked the Residency itself. The guards and servants fled from the premises and hid themselves in the ravines close by. Major Burton and his two sons, left with a single servant, a camel-driver, took refuge in a room on the roof of the house. The revolters then

who attack the Residency,



BOOK XII.
Chapter V.

1857.
October.

and murder
Burton, his
sons, and
other Euro-
peans.

The Maharáo
excuses him-
self.

fired round shot into the Residency. "For four hours," writes General Lawrence in his graphic account of the mournful transaction,* "these four brave men defended themselves, till at length the Residency was set on fire, and Major Burton, feeling the case desperate, proposed to surrender on condition of the mob sparing his son's lives. The young men at once rejected the offer, saying they would all die together. They knelt down and prayed for the last time, and then calmly and heroically met their fate. The mob had by this time procured scaling-ladders, and thus gaining the roof, rushed in and despatched their victims, the servant alone escaping. Major Burton's head was cut off and paraded through the town, and then fired from a gun, but the three bodies were by the Maharájá's order interred that evening."

The Maharáo at once communicated the occurrence to General Lawrence, accompanying the communication with the expression of his regret and with the excuse that the troops had taken the law into their own hands and that he was powerless. He may have been powerless, but he had, perhaps unwittingly, set the troops on. The Government of India subsequently signified their opinion, that though innocent of fore-knowledge, the Maharáo had not wholly performed his duty, by reducing his salute from seventeen to thirteen guns.

* *Reminiscences of Forty*. by Lieut.-General Sir George
three Years' Service in India, Lawrence, K.C.S.I., C.B.



The tragedy at Kotá was not the only outrage which disturbed the peace of the country during the month of October. About the same time that Burton was being besieged in the Residency of the former place, a party of rebels from Mandisúr, led by a chief who pretended relationship to the royal house of Dehlí, marched on and seized Jíran, a fortified town with a very strong defence, within ten miles of the cantonment of Nímach. It was impossible to allow such an outrage to pass unnoticed. On the 23rd October there was sent from Nímach to attack them a force of four hundred men, with two guns and a mortar. The men were chiefly Bombay native troops, cavalry and infantry, but they were headed by fifty men of the 83rd, the whole commanded by Captain Tucker. They found the enemy still at Jíran. Tucker at once opened fire with his guns, and when they had played some time upon the defences, he sent his infantry to attack the town. The rebels then sallied out in overwhelming numbers, drove back the infantry, and, pushing on, captured the mortar. Upon this the cavalry charged, recovered the mortar, compelled the enemy to re-enter the town, and silenced their fire. But the place itself was too strong for the efforts of a force so small and so lightly provided; the loss already incurred had been heavy, two officers, Tucker and Read, having been killed, and three wounded; a retreat was therefore ordered. Strange to say, the enemy evacuated Jíran that night.

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Chapter V.

1857.
October.

Disturbances
near Nímach.

The repulse
at Jíran.

Their retreat, however, was only the prelude

The rebels
advance



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Chapter V.

1857.

November.

again in
greater
numbers
and attack
Nímach.

to an advance in larger numbers. On the 8th November a body of them, numbering four thousand, advanced on Nímach, occupied the station, and forced the European and native troops to take refuge within the fortified square. This they attempted, but vainly, to escalate; then, after a siege of fifteen days' duration, hearing that reinforcements were advancing to the aid of the British, they fell back.

Lawrence
applies for
reinforce-
ments.

1858.

January.

On receiving intelligence of the murder of Captain Burton and his sons, General Lawrence had made an urgent requisition to Bombay for troops. The first and smaller detachments of these began to arrive in Rajpútáná in January 1858, but it was not until March that the reinforcements assumed a sufficient strength to justify decisive action on a large scale.

On the
arrival of
some of them
he besieges,

The detachments which arrived in January, however, enabled General Lawrence to throw off the quiescent attitude which he had till then deemed it politic to assume. In January he was able to detach a force of eleven hundred men, with a due proportion of guns, under Colonel Holmes, 12th Bombay Native Infantry, against A'wah. Holmes invested the place on the 19th, and the same day his guns opened fire. At the end of five days a practicable breach had been made, and the assault was ordered for the following morning. The garrison, perfectly cognisant of all that was going on in the British camp, resolved not to wait. Fortunately for them there raged that night a storm so fearful, and there ruled a darkness so intense, that sentries only a

and captures
A'wah.



few paces apart could neither see nor hear each other. Under cover of these portents they evacuated the place in the night.

The strength of the fortifications of A'wah, when it was occupied next morning by the British troops, were such as to justify to the full General Lawrence's determination regarding it in the previous September. It had a double line of defences, the inner of strong masonry, the outer of earthwork, both being loop-holed. Thirteen guns, three tons of powder, and three thousand rounds of small arms ammunition were found in the place. The keep, the bastions, and all the masonry works were blown up and destroyed, so as effectually to prevent the stronghold becoming a nucleus of rebellion for the future.*

This act of vigour had a very salutary effect. Order was maintained in the country; and in March, when the reinforcements from Bombay poured in, the difficulty of the task for which troops had been required in the previous November had in no way increased.

The reinforcements numbered five thousand five hundred men of all arms. They were composed of the 92nd, 83rd, and 95th Regiments, the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, the 8th Hussars, the 1st Bombay Lancers, the Sind Horse, Brown's battery of artillery, eighteen field-pieces, of which ten were 8-inch mortars and howitzers, and a corps of sappers and miners. They were commanded by Major-General H. G. Roberts of the Bombay army.

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Chapter V.

1858.

Jan.-March

The fortifications of
A'wah

justify
Lawrence's
previous
retirement.

The main
reinforce-
ments arrive

* *Forty-three Years in India*, Sir G. Lawrence.



Book XII.
Chapter V.

1858.
March.

under
General
Roberts.

The state of
Kotá after
the murder of
Burton.

On the arrival of General Roberts in March, General Lawrence resigned the military command into his hands, and reverted to his civil and political functions as agent to the Governor-General. In this capacity he accompanied the force.

The first operation to be attempted was the recovery of Kotá. Ever since the murder of Captain Burton disorder had prevailed in that State. The sepoy, having tasted the pleasure of revolt, drained the cup to the very dregs. They imprisoned the Maháráo in his palace. They then forced him to sign a paper consisting of nine articles, one of which was to the effect that he had ordered the murder of Major Burton. The Maháráo endeavoured by compliance to keep the rebels in good humour, but meanwhile he despatched secretly messengers to the Rájá of Karáolí, begging him to send troops to his aid. The Rájá complied, and his troops, faithful to their liege lord, drove the rebels from the part of the town of Kotá in which the palace was situated, and released the Maháráo. They were still occupying it, for the defence of that prince, when Roberts arrived in Rajpútáná. The rebels, however, occupied the other part of the town, reduced already by pillage and other excesses to extreme misery.

The road
between
Nasirábád
and Kotá.

A military march from Nasirábád, the headquarters of Roberts's force, to Kotá, was not one which a general could regard as being necessarily a pleasure trip. Not only did the town of Kotá occupy a formidable position, covered by the river Chambal on one side and by a large and deep lake



on the other, but the approach to it offered many positions capable of easy defence by a small force against one much larger. Chief amongst these was the Mokandára pass—a long and narrow valley between two ranges of hills.

But once more the want of true military instinct was manifested. None of the difficult positions were defended. Roberts, marching from Nasirábád on the 10th, encamped on the north bank of the Chambal, opposite Kotá, on the 22nd March. He found the rebels in complete possession of the south bank, on which they had planted their guns, many in number, and some of them large in calibre. Roberts ascertained at the same time that the fort, the palace, half the city, and the ferry over the river, were held by the Maháráo with the Karáli troops.

Early on the morning of the 25th, information reached him that the rebels were making an assault on the palace with a view to seize the ferry. Roberts instantly sent across three hundred men of the 83rd, under Major Heath, to aid the Maháráo. The attack was repulsed. On the 27th he crossed over himself with six hundred of the 95th, and two 9-pounders, and having placed the heavy guns in the fort in position to bear on the enemy's camp, he opened upon it on the 29th a heavy fire of shot and shell. On the 30th, whilst the remainder of the force cannonaded the rebels' position from the north bank, he, marching from the fort in three columns, moved on it on the south bank, and gained it with very small loss. By this brilliant manœuvre he not only

BOOK XII.
Chapter V.

1858.
March.

Roberts
penetrates
to Kotá.

He attacks
and com-
pletely
defeats the
rebels.



BOOK XII.
Chapter V.

1858.

March-April.

The authority
of the Mahá-
ráo is re-
stored.

completely defeated the enemy but captured fifty guns! The cavalry, however, failed to intercept the rebels, and they almost all escaped.

The British troops occupied Kotá for three weeks. At the end of that time, the authority of the Maháráo having been completely re-established, General Roberts evacuated it and returned to Nasirábád, despatching a portion of his force to garrison Nímach. With the fall of Kotá peace and order had been completely restored throughout Rájputáná, and although, two months later, both were broken by Tántia Topi, the action of this famous leader was strictly an invasion. Tántia induced neither prince nor peasant to join his standard.

The reason
why Rájpu-
táná was, by
comparison,
little affected
by the
mutiny.

Of all the large tracts of territory inhabited mainly by a people boasting a common origin, not one passed through the trying period of 1857-58 with smaller injury to itself, with less infliction of suffering and bloodshed, than the territory of Rájputáná. Parcelled out into eighteen sovereign States, each ruled by its own independent chief, the circumstance may seem surprising. But the causes of it are not far to seek. I attribute the result mainly to the fact that no people in India had suffered so much or so recently as the Rájputs from the lawlessness which characterised the sway immediately preceding the suzerainty of the British—the sway of the Maráthás. When the policy of Marquess Wellesley towards the Rájput States was reversed in 1805 by Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow, a system of oppression and misrule was inaugurated, under which the buffalo



was to the man who held the bludgeon, and the fair daughters of the land were to the strong arm of the marauder. For twelve years the sufferings of Rájputáná cried to heaven for redress. That redress came only when, in 1817, the Marquis of Hastings reverted to the policy of his great predecessor. Under that policy the princes of Rájputáná have been secured against invaders from outside and against each other. Once more has every man been able to lie down in his own mango-grove and to eat of his own date-tree. Security has prevailed throughout the land. The honour of every man and of every woman has been secured. It was the sense of this security, enjoyed under British suzerainty, that ensured the loyalty of the great bulk of the Rájputés during the troublous times of the mutiny.

It is proper to add that this recollection of past and present benefits was stimulated and enforced by the choice made by the Government of India of the agents to carry out their policy. Foremost among these was George St. Patrick Lawrence. His tact, his energy, his fearlessness, his readiness of resource, when he had not a single European soldier at his disposal, stamp him as a man eminently fitted to rule in troublous times. The display of these qualities begat confidence in the minds of the native princes, fear and dismay among the adventurers who welcomed turmoil. His presence, thus, proved itself to be worth an army. But for his promptitude, Ájmir would have fallen, and with Ájmir occupied by two or three regiments of British sepoy, British authority

George
St. Patrick
Lawrence.



Book XII.
Chapter V.

1858.

The story
reverts to
Bombay.

would have disappeared. The preservation of Rájputáná, then, will ever be connected with the name of this gallant and distinguished officer.

The inroad of Tántia Topi into Rájputáná, and the campaign in pursuit of that famous leader, will be treated of in its proper place in the next volume. Before dealing with him it will be my pleasing duty to record the statesmanlike measures by which Lord Elphinstone caused Bombay to become a strong wall of support to the threatened edifice of British rule in India, and to narrate how Sir Hugh Rose illustrated the highest genius of the inspired warrior by his daring and successful campaign in Central India.



APPENDIX A.

1.—(Page 39 of text.)

MAJOR REID's plan of attack on the strong position of Kishanganj has never been published. I therefore give it verbatim. On the 2nd February, 1858, after he had in a measure recovered from his wound, he wrote as follows:

“With regard to Kishanganj I can only say that were I ordered to attack the place to-morrow, supposing the enemy's heavy guns to be in the same position they were in on the 14th September last, my plan of attack would be just what it was then.

“You have seen the position, and know the localities and great strength of the place, and will therefore understand me when I say the hugging the garden wall on the left of the road before you come to the canal bridge, and then the loop-holed serai wall, as also the garden wall which runs parallel to it, places one, comparatively speaking, out of harm's way. The heavy guns in the two batteries could not be brought to bear, nor could the loop-holes be made use of for musketry, so long, mind you, as the column *hugged* the



walls above alluded to 'four deep,' as I had my troops on the 14th September.

"I was just about to carry out this plan and make a feint in front of the heavy batteries whilst I made a *real* attack in rear of the serai,* when I was knocked over, but my intentions were to have attacked the strong works at the end of the road—their second line of defence—and had this been successful, I should have entered the serai through the breach which was made by my order in rear of the heavy batteries, as also through the gate, which I could have blown in, and through which I entered when I took the place on the 17th June.

"My object in detaching four hundred infantry, two hundred cavalry, and four guns of the Jammoo contingent to the Eedgar was to make a diversion and place Trevelyan-ganj between a cross fire, as also to watch the enemy and prevent my right flank being turned; and I had a still further object in view, namely, to make the enemy believe that our real attack was to be on the right! That they were deceived by this movement there can be but little doubt, otherwise they would not have reinforced Kishanganj in the way they did, for at the time I felt the enemy mustered at least fifteen thousand strong.

"After getting possession of Kishanganj I should have turned the four captured heavy guns, as also the two 8-inch mortars, on Trevelyan-ganj. Their fire, coupled with that of the four guns of the Jummoo contingent, would have made it too hot for them, and I calculated on their retreating into the city. Had they done so, I should have left half the reserve in the serai, and proceeded with my column along the dry bed of the canal up to the Kábul gate, which Nicholson would have opened for me after he had reached that point with his column inside the city walls.



"A good deal would have depended on circumstances, but certain it is I should not have attempted to enter the city so long as the enemy were in force on my right.

"My desire was to attack Kishanganj before daybreak, but I was over-ruled by the General, and it was decided that I should wait for the explosion—the blowing in of the Cashmere gate. But after all, I could not wait, as the detached party of the Jummoo contingent became engaged with the enemy. Had my orders been obeyed they would have got into the Eedgar without firing a shot long before daybreak, but the party was late in starting from the camp, and before getting half way to their destination the day had dawned, and the enemy were on the alert and at once attacked them, eventually driving them back and capturing their four guns."

2.—(Pages 42 and 43 of text.)

A great difference of opinion having been expressed at the time regarding the action of the fourth column after the fall of Major Reid, the matter was referred by Captain Lawrence, with the approval, I understand, of Major, now Lieutenant-General, Sir Henry Norman, to the late Colonel Sir Herbert Edwardes, K.C.B., for investigation. Sir Herbert Edwardes, after examining many witnesses who were present on the occasion, and giving to the subject the most patient attention, recorded his opinion in the manner stated below. It will be observed that, for reasons which seem to me sufficient, I have not adhered implicitly to Sir Herbert's conclusions, but I consider it only fair to General Richard Lawrence that they should be placed on record in this volume.



MEMO.: on a correspondence connected with the operations of the fourth column of attack on Delhi, on the 14th September, 1857, referred to me for arbitration by Majors Norman and Lawrence.

1. Major Lawrence complains of three passages in a *Narrative of the Siege of Delhi*, published by Major Norman. The passages are as follows:

"No. 4 column, under Major Reid, advanced from the Subzee Mundi towards Kissengunge, the *Cashmere contingent* co-operating on its right. *The latter, however, was so sharply attacked by the insurgents, who were in great force, that, after losing a great number of men and four guns, they were completely defeated, and fell back to camp.*"

"Major Reid's column met with the most strenuous opposition, *greatly increased, doubtless, by the failure of the Cashmere contingent.*

"Captain Muter, 60th Rifles, *the next senior officer* (a) judiciously *withdrew the troops to their former posts* (b) at Hindoo Raos and in the Subzee Mundi."

2. The sentences in italics contain the statements objected to; and I proceed to express the opinions I have formed on the documentary evidence placed before me by Majors Lawrence and Norman, aided by conversation on the matter with Brigadier-General Chamberlain *previous* to my perusal of the papers; and a fuller personal inquiry made by me now from Captain Boisragon (who was in the action) *after* perusing the documents, for the sake of clearing up doubtful points.

3. The first passage is certainly very inaccurate, inasmuch as it conveys the impression that either the whole, or at all events the main body, of the Cashmere contingent was co-operating on the right of No. 4 column, and lost four guns; whereas the contingent on that occasion acted in two bodies. First, the main one (eight hundred strong, under Major R.



Lawrence) as reserve to No. 4 column in its attack on Kissengunge, which shared in the failure of that column, and lost no guns; and secondly, a detachment of four hundred, under Captain Dwyer, which acted separately against the Edgah at a distance of three-fourths of a mile on the right of No. 4 column, which *was* completely defeated, and *did* lose four guns. This inaccuracy is fully admitted by Major Norman in his reference to me, and it is unnecessary to discuss it farther than to mention that it arose apparently from the official report of Major Muter.

4. The second passage would similarly be admitted by Major Norman to be so far inaccurate as he spoke of the "Cashmere contingent" instead of a *detachment* of the Cashmere contingent; but with that exception he is still inclined to think that the passage is correct, that Captain Dwyer's detachment attacked the enemy at the Edgah before Colonel Reid attacked at Kissengunge, and that its defeat was sufficiently early to bring down a greater pressure on Colonel Reid's column, and so to contribute to its repulse. The evidence on these points is not always positive, and is very conflicting. Lieutenant Evans, who was in the Crow's Nest battery, evidently saw Captain Dwyer's detachment engaged with the enemy at the Edgah while No. 4 column was forming up; and I consider his testimony decisive upon that point. His evidence is not precise about the time of the retirement of Captain Dwyer's detachment, though it leans apparently to its having occurred previous even to Colonel Reid's assault. This cannot be the case, as Colonel Reid precisely states that some time after he had been wounded, and was making over the command to Major Lawrence, one hundred yards in rear of the canal, he told Major Lawrence "to support the four hundred Jummoo troops on the right, who were *becoming hotly engaged with the enemy.*" This establishes that the two engagements were going on simultaneously at Kissengunge and Edgah, and the inquiry



is thus narrowed to which of the two repulses occurred first. Major Muter says that No. 4 column attacked thus twice, and failed in being able to get up another attack, the loss was so heavy, the confusion so great, and the men so disheartened. This all occurred within a quarter of an hour of the fall of Major Reid, who was one of the first hit; in that quarter of an hour we lost two hundred men out of the seven hundred and fifty. Here it is precisely stated that No. 4 column had been finally repulsed a quarter of an hour after Colonel Reid was wounded; Colonel Reid describes himself as having been "for some time" insensible on the ground after being hit, and when he became conscious he was carried to the rear, where he met Major Lawrence. It would seem, then, that the second attack must have been about failing, if it had not failed, when Colonel Reid asked Major Lawrence to send aid to Captain Dwyer's detachment, which was then "becoming hotly engaged with the enemy"; but Colonel Reid goes on to say that "up to this time the troops were well in hand, and were as steady as possible, and I made sure of success," which would be irreconcilable with Major Muter's account, if we did not remember that Major Muter was in front engaged in the action, and therefore cognizant of the facts, while Colonel Reid was in the rear after having been some time insensible. Again, Captain Shebbeare is clear that one reason for the *retirement* of No. 4 column was the running in of Captain Dwyer's men upon the right flank of No. 4 column, which allowed the enemy to work round to the rear; on the other hand, Lieutenant Manderson, who was with Captain Dwyer's party, is equally clear that as he was returning he met two Cashmere guns coming back from No. 4 column, and the native officer in command related how No. 4 had been repulsed. The opinion I form upon these statements (which are perhaps not more conflicting than those of officers engaged in different parts of a field usually are) is that the two engagements



at Edgah and Kissengunge were raging simultaneously, and that the repulse of neither was long enough before the other to have any effect on the result, considering that they were nearly a mile apart. The loss of more than one-fourth of No. 4 column, as described by Major Muter, sufficiently accounts for its repulse. It was obviously too weak for the operation, and I should say this alone was the cause of its failure.

5. The third passage contains two statements which Major Lawrence objects to.

1st. That Major Muter was "the next senior officer" after Colonel Reid's withdrawal.

2nd. That Major Muter "withdrew the troops to their former posts."

It is now acknowledged by all that the next senior officer in the field on the occasion was Major R. Lawrence, who was commanding the main body of the Cashmere contingent, which formed Colonel Reid's "reserve"; and Colonel Reid states that, on recovering his senses after his wound, he called out for Major Lawrence, and meeting him one hundred yards over the bridge, gave over the command to him: therefore, by military usage, Major Muter could not be described as "the next senior officer," though in point of fact he was the senior officer of all those who were in front with the troops which formed the column of attack, and, that being the case, in an affair wherein minutes were hours, while two desperate attacks had crowded themselves into one quarter of an hour, been overwhelmingly repulsed, and followed by hopeless confusion, Major Muter might fitly have retired with the attacking column, at all events as far as the reserve, and there have left the real senior officer to resume the attack or not. But I do not consider that he could fitly have withdrawn from the field the column which he knew was not under his command. But it does not appear in these documents that Major Muter ever assumed



the command of the troops in front, or organised the retirement. Captain Shebbeare describes "all the officers in front as agreeing among themselves, in the absence of a commander, to retire, as the attack was a failure, and as having reported what they had done to Major Lawrence, when they found him after recrossing the canal, knowing him to be the next in command to Colonel Reid, on which 'he,' i.e. Major Lawrence, confirmed the order, but shortly after ordered an advance, which he again countermanded almost immediately. When he reached the serai in the Subzee Mundi, he, at my suggestion, ordered me to occupy the Crow's Nest and the line reaching right up to the battery. These are distinct acts of command amounting to this, that the final relinquishment of the attack, and the retirement of the majority of the troops in No. 4 column 'to their former posts,' were really carried out under the orders of Major R. Lawrence, who was also the proper person to issue them. Captain Wriford states that on Colonel Reid being wounded he considered Major Lawrence in command, but getting no orders from either him or Major Muter, he thought both were *hors de combat*, and withdrew his men, on his own judgment, to Subzee Mundi, where he found that Major Muter was present, and resigned the command to him as senior officer, *and some little time after this* Major Lawrence came into the Subzee Mundi picquet, when he of course became senior." This tallies with Captain Mocatta's account that he was sent by Major Lawrence to the posts in rear to bring up the European troops again, who had clearly been withdrawn without his authority, and, as he seems at first to have judged, without necessity (though in that matter I cannot agree with him). Major Muter himself puts the above testimonies beyond doubt, for in reply to a question whether during the day he received any orders, directly or indirectly, from Major Lawrence, he says he has "some recollection of a requisition for European sol-



diers *long after* the men had been reposted in our old position"; therefore Major Lawrence must have kept the field "long after" Major Muter, and he must have had troops with him. He could not have been alone. This is, in other words, what Captain Boisragon stated, that "the native portion of the column, Ghoorkas, Guides, and Sikhs, were in the field as long as I was present, hotly engaged with the enemy," and he explained that he was in the field for upwards of an hour after Major Reid was wounded. Farther, Doctor Corbyn, in a letter to Major Lawrence, testifies that he "went into the Subzee Mundi serai, where Parker and myself were of great assistance to the wounded Europeans. Here I found Captain Muter, Wriford also I think, and a number of Europeans. You did not retire with the Oashmeres, I know, for nearly an hour afterwards." And this brings me to the difficulty which I judge from the papers, more than anything else, prevented Major Norman from modifying the passages in his narrative; I mean the difficulty of understanding how the Europeans, Ghoorkas, and Sikhs of distinguished regiments, who were in the column of attack, could be repulsed, and retreat to their former posts, while the Jummoo reserve, consisting of troops of inferior discipline and armament, still kept the field. It seemed to Major Norman to involve an incredible reproach to the column of attack. But having very carefully analysed these papers, and corrected my notions of the localities by a published plan of the "City and Cantonments of Delhi," and by interrogating Captain Boisragon, who was in the action, it seems to me quite clear that the two statements are perfectly reconcilable with the honour of both corps. As I understand it, Colonel Reid disposed the Jummoo reserve on his right rear. The attack failed from being totally inadequate, Colonel Reid fell and was removed. The confusion in the column of attack, in consequence of the repulse, and of the enemy following hotly up, was very



great. The next senior officer being in the rear with the reserve, could not possibly give any timely orders, or know that Colonel Reid had been wounded. No orders were consequently issued for retiring in good order, and the officers at the head of the column agreed together to withdraw, and did so to the best of their ability. Major Muter and Captain Wriford reached Subzee Mundi with the majority of their men without even meeting Major Lawrence, and Captains Shebbeare and Boisragon, commanding the Guides and Ghoorikas, both fell in with Major Lawrence, and placed themselves under his orders. A new advance was thought possible but abandoned, and Captain Shebbeare's party was ordered to occupy certain posts. But Major Lawrence remained out with the Jummoo reserve and Captain Boisragon's men, and (as Captain Boisragon informs me) fragments of almost every detachment, European or native, that had made up No. 4 column, for the following up of the enemy after the repulse of the column was very hot, and it became indispensable to check them; and this was effectually done by our broken parties and the reserve lining the banks of the canal and occupying the jungle on the right of the road, while Lieutenant Evan's guns continued to fire over their heads, and completed the check of the enemy. Things seem to have remained in this position for a couple of hours at least, till the firing ceased and both sides withdrew. Thus the Jummoo reserve never renewed the attack on Kisingunge after the repulse of No. 4 column, and, as I understand, does not pretend to have ever advanced to the point between the first and second breastworks, where the column had been repulsed, and in no way puts itself in invidious comparison with any of the other troops, but did remain in the field with numbers of native and some European soldiers of No. 4 column, exchanging a hot fire with the enemy, and losing of its own number forty-three killed and wounded.



While, therefore, it shared in the general failure of the column of which it was the reserve, I cannot see that it in any way contributed to that failure; and, on the contrary, it took its full share in covering the retreat. Some opinions are offered in the correspondence that it was useless to keep the troops out a moment longer than could be helped after the main object of the column had failed; but in this I cannot concur, for every rebel sepoy held engaged at Kissengunge was a loss to the garrison in the city. The siege of Delhi has been often compared with the siege of Sebastopol, and I should think that No. 4 column was to the other three columns at Delhi much what the English at the "Redan" were to the French at the "Malakoff."

6. The whole of the present misunderstanding has arisen, as it seems to me, from Major Muter taking the irregular course (as he admits to Major Lawrence) of reporting direct to General Wilson instead of through Major Lawrence. Had he pursued the regular military course, his due share of credit as the senior remaining officer of the attacking column would have accrued to him; Major Lawrence would have appeared as having done the best with a command to which he succeeded when the day was lost; Major Muter's mistake as to the two divisions of the Cashmere contingent (of which he seems to have only now become aware) would have been corrected in time; and no blame would have been attached to that contingent for sharing in the general failure of the fourth column which the disparity of numbers and artillery rendered perfectly inevitable.

(Signed) HERBERT B. EDWARDES,

Commissioner and Superintendent.

July 1st, 1879.



APPENDIX B.

(Page 197 of text.)

SINCE I wrote the remarks in the text, a case of neglect, as remarkable as that of Cooper of the 93rd, has been brought to my notice. It is very curious that the neglect in this case should apply to an officer also of the name of Cooper—a near relative, I am informed, of Richard Cooper of the 93rd. I extract the case from Colonel Pack's Memoirs, published in 1878.

“As dawn approached, it became known that the guns were not to open, and that instead of our waiting for the signal to attack after two hours' bombardment, we were to look for it shortly after the French assault on the Malakoff. The Brigadier (Yea) came across from the Quarries and took post at the extremity of the Boyaus, that he might there watch for the commencement of the action. . . .

“Whilst watching the Malakoff, probably a few minutes, the Rifles, stationed close to the Quarries as a covering party, having evidently mistaken one of the French rockets for the British signal, commenced firing from their hiding-places, when round shot dropping about from the Redan proved our red jackets were observed. The error of the coverers was great, and considerably annoyed the Brigadier,



who, pointing to a flagstaff near the 8-gun battery, said, 'A flag will be hoisted there when Lord Raglan stands.' He added, 'That fire,' (alluding to the covering party of the Rifles) 'must be stopped. Somebody must go across the open: it is no use attempting to get through the trenches.'

"Moments like these try the mettle of men and prove of what they are made. No mere bravado answers; for that always fails when actual and perilous deeds of cool and deliberate courage have to be performed. Whoever volunteered to fulfil the Brigadier's mission knew he must go as it were with his life in his hand. Not only every step, but every inch of the distance between the trenches and the covering party was strewn with peril, and carrying the message and escaping with his life was not for an instant to be looked for.

"A momentary silence ensued. The fire from all arms was pounding away in every direction, and the service was very perilous. To cross the open and reach the Quarries we saw and knew exposure to the fire from the Malakoff was certain, and the able marksmen and the guns of the Redan were also to be encountered. The duty was seen to be so momentous that all hesitated to undertake it, not from fear, but from the feeling of all but certain failure. Brigadier Yea then repeated his desire, saying, 'Who will go?' Then there was another pause, when every soldier who heard his leader's request felt his heart beat with intense rapidity, and every mental energy of his mind awakened. For a few moments there was intense silence amongst us, and then quickly and nervously Captain Cooper, one of his aides-de-camp, answered, 'I will, Sir!' And out this gallant officer went.

"Springing over the trench, commencing with a quick walk, he increased his pace gradually till he ran. His eyes were fixed upon the Rifles, all eyes were upon him. All expected to see him fall; but Providence guarded him. He



reached the Quarries, and stopped the fire, his life most probably preserved by this courageous act of gallantry, for the crowd and confusion at the opening of the miserably small trench whence the stormers issued were so great, he never could have rejoined his lamented chief had he gone by the way of the trenches.

“Yet, though many an officer and many a man have received the Victoria Cross for the common act of humanity—aiding or assisting to bring in a wounded officer or comrade under circumstances of danger—acts which most of us at the time they happened thought little about, and certainly never regarded them as deserving the designation of ‘distinguished,’ *for the above gallant act, setting an example of the highest devotion to the service of his Queen and country in the face of hundreds, this officer received no reward.*”^{*} The officer in question was Captain Joshua Cooper, 7th Fusiliers.—*Sebastopol Trenches, and Five Months in Them*, by Colonel Reynell Pack, C.B., 7th Fusiliers.

^{*} The italics are Colonel Pack's.



APPENDIX C.

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LIEUTENANT CONOLLY thus wrote to Captain Black, regarding his escape: "Such a scene of confusion I never saw; some sepoy firing at Bhils, they shot seven poor wretches on the parade-ground, who, I declare, were only looking at the novel scene. During the day we halted. The first day we marched to —, and a greater rabble never crossed country than our once smart legion; not a sepoy hardly saluted me. I was taken to Abbas Ali's tent at —, and the infantry were a little behind, when a tremendous row commenced. Some Minas made a rush at the carts; the infantry thought it was an attack; away went the cavalry to see to matters, cut up a few Bhils, and, seeing no one else, pulled up to look about them. Another row, and rush towards where I was standing near my saddled horse. I can't say I was desperately alarmed, for all hope of life I had cast aside some hours before, when we marched. The rush towards me was caused by some amiable sepoy taking the opportunity to make a run at me. Abbas Ali and his men saw it, and were soon between us; but I cannot enter into details of self;



once again they attempted to get at me at Doola. What made them so mad was, that my strenuous attempts to seduce the cavalry had been made known to Mihrwan Sing, and he swore I should die. At Doola they had three or four rows—councils they called them—about me. At last, Mihrwan Sing and the other beauties, seeing Abbas Ali would not give me up, said I might go solus. Next morning, they sent again to say, no, I should not go. However, Abbas Ali and his men surrounded my charpoy all night; we none of us slept, and on the morning of the 27th, when the force was ready, the guns were loaded, the infantry shouldered arms, and I was brought up. I was told to ride to the front; poor Dokul Sing, the havildar-major, and some others, ran out blubbering; Abbas Ali and Abdul Ali, rode up on each side, made me low salaams, and told me to ride for it; that not a sowar should be allowed to interfere with my retreat. My three sowars, who, I have forgotten to say, had stuck to me as if I had been their brother since the very beginning, by a preconcerted plan, were ordered to see me off a little way. I could not help giving a farewell wave of the hand to the infantry in irony; they shouted and laughed, the band struck up, and that is the last I saw of the legion. I rode right in to Erinpoora with three sowars; I came straight here, and the people seemed ready to eat me with joy. The names of the three sowars are, Nusseeroodeen, second troop; Elahu Bux, third troop (the man who used to ride my grey); and Momin Khan, first troop. They left everything behind, and, I must say, are three as fine fellows as I wish to see. By-the-by, the cavalry said if I would agree to turn Mussulman, to a man they would follow me. Very kind of them. They offered me money when I was coming away, and also on the march. I took twenty rupees from Abbas Ali; now I wish I had taken my pay; they twice offered it. Now is our time, the legion is divided. Jawan Sing, golundaz, and his party, about seven other golundaz (gunners), will play the



infantry a trick if they can. I have told Jawan Sing I will myself give him five hundred rupees if he breaks with the infantry. Abbas Ali, the havildar-major, and Abdul Ali, are in danger on my account, and they are kept with their men under the guns night and day. I feel most glad to think I did them as much harm as I could. Makdun Bux had a musket put to his breast for letting me ride with my sword on. I was a bone of contention. I have this morning sent a sharp kossid to Abbas Ali, telling him, for his own sake, to try and communicate with Mason, who, I believe, is at Pali, and to whom I have written to try and communicate with Abbas Ali."



APPENDIX D.

(Page 168 of text.)

From Sir James Outram to the Officer commanding the
Relieving Force.

[Along with the following important and deeply interesting letter, Sir James Outram forwarded a plan of the ground intervening between the Alum Bāgh and the Residency, together with minute descriptions of every position and building capable of being held by the enemy. The plan was based on the surveys made by the late Captain Morrison prior to the outbreak, the only surveys that had been made of Lucknow. The copy of this plan, which will be found at the end of the volume, should be consulted in the perusal of the following letter. It is Plan No. I.]

My communication of the 14th instant informed you I consider your first operation should be the occupation of the "Dilkhusha" house and park, by a direct movement to that place from the Alumbāgh. The Fort of Jellalabad, which is situated a mile or a mile and a half to the right of that route, is said to be occupied by the enemy, with two guns; but it is too distant to interrupt that line of communication, and it is not likely to be maintained after the Dilkhusha, in addition to Alumbāgh, has been occupied in



its rear. I think it hardly worth while, therefore, to waste time against that place, which at the commencement of the outbreak was little capable of defence, and is not likely since to have been repaired or stored sufficiently to admit of its retention. The guns now there appear to have been sent merely to interrupt the forage parties from Alumbágh. (A description of Jellalabad, as it was just before the outbreak, is appended.) Yet it will be prudent, in afterwards communicating with Alumbágh, to afford strong escort until it is known whether or not Jellalabad is evacuated.

The direct advance from Alumbágh *viâ* Char Bágh, and the main street marked (1) (1) (1) on the plan, should *not* be attempted, very formidable opposition being prepared on the other side of the Char Bágh bridge, the bridge itself being destroyed, and the passage strongly fortified; besides which there are two miles of street to pass through, in which every means of obstruction has been prepared, the houses loopholed, and guns in position at various points, with ditches, mines, and other obstacles. For the same reason I would deprecate any attempt to force the street which runs from the junction of the Dilkhusa and Martinière roads to the Kaiser Bágh, marked (2) (2) (2).

At Dilkhusa, it is stated, there are at present only some Rajwarra matchlockmen, with cavalry at Beebeepore village perhaps, and at the Martinière; but these are almost certain to decamp when you approach, and may perhaps suffer considerably ere they get across the canal, if followed up sharply by cavalry and horse artillery. Two guns were said to be at Dilkhusa some days ago, probably those now at Jellalabad. If still there, they would have to be abandoned ere they could be crossed over the canal, if followed up.

It is possible that some of the so-called Regular Infantry may be sent over to the Dilkhusa when they hear of your approach. If so, they will but add to their own confusion and panic flight when you attack, for never by any chance do



they stand in the open. Two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, sent out to oppose Major Barston's convoy, fled at his approach without firing a shot; and on every occasion where whole hosts of them were opposed to ourselves it was just the same. The Dilkhusa palace cannot be maintained under fire of our artillery, having large windows on every side. If any force of the enemy is assembled there, they must suffer awfully from your guns in escaping across the canal. Or should they fly to the Martinière, they will be in a similar predicament when you follow them up.

On seeing the Dilkhusa occupied by your troops, the enemy would most probably evacuate the Martinière. After lodging your baggage in the garden to the rear of, and commanded by, the Dilkhusa house (and surrounded by walls without houses, something like Alumbagh, and easily defensible), you would proceed against the Martinière through the road marked (3) (3) (3). But it would be well, ere getting within musket-range of the building, to throw a few shells and round shot into it, in case it should be occupied by the enemy, whose fire from the terraced roof might cause much loss ere you get near enough to rush up and blow open doors for entry. It would be well for you to have some one with you well acquainted with the Martinière building. And it may be a matter for your consideration whether it would not be better, if the place appears strongly fortified, to mask it by encamping your troops between the road (3) (3) and the canal, contenting yourself by bombarding the Martinière during the day and night, which will almost ensure its evacuation before morning. The mound marked (4)* would be a favourable site for a 24-pounder battery, which would command the opposite bank of the canal, where you purpose

* Sir J. Outram afterwards availed himself of this mound to plant a 24-pounder battery of the Shannon Brigade, which effectually kept down the enemy's fire opened on the rear division under his command, when he finally retired to the Alumbagh.



effecting your passage to protect the sappers in making a road for your guns.

It is possible the bridge leading to the Martinière may not be destroyed, and that you may prefer advancing over it. But, on reconnoitring, you will, I believe, find places where the canal may be crossed without much difficulty farther down, towards (6), which would enable you to turn any defensive works the enemy may prepare on the main road (2) (2) (2). If you cross the bridge, therefore, I would recommend your turning to the right after passing it, and making your way through the mud huts (indicated by the brown colour on the plan) until you get into the road running from (6) to (W) (W) (W)—W denotes some deserted and destroyed infantry lines,—leaving the houses, marked D D D, on your left, and thus making your way into the road (7) (7), which passes the open front of the enclosure in which the barracks are situated. Should the barrack buildings be occupied (they were precipitately abandoned when we advanced from the same quarter), it may be prudent to throw a few shot and shell ere the infantry advances to the attack. Having large doors, open on both sides, as is customary in European barracks in India, I anticipate little difficulty in your effecting an entry. Staircases lead to the terrace roof from the interior of the centre room. The terrace is considerably raised above, and therefore commands, the houses of the Huzrutgunj, and a few rifles placed there could keep down any musketry fire from thence (Huzrutgunj), which alone could disturb the party left in occupation of the barracks when you advance farther. But it would be necessary to throw up a parapet of sand-bags, or screens of shutters, to protect the riflemen on the roof, as it has no parapet. The south wall of the enclosure is, however, sufficiently high to afford some protection against direct fire.

Should you cross by the bridge, your whole force would, I presume, come that way. And your next operation, after



leaving an adequate guard for the barracks (say 300 or 400 infantry, some cavalry, and a couple of guns; or, probably, you might secure a gun, or two guns, which the enemy are said to have there), would be to proceed by the road (7) (7) to the Sikundra Bāgh (G), which, if held, could easily be breached by 24- or 18-pounders—the wall being only about $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet thick—*vide* enclosed description.* It is said to be occupied by Maun Sing, with some 200 or 300 Rajwarras and two guns; the former are pretty sure to bolt when your guns open upon the place, and two or three shells are thrown into it.

If you cross the canal at (6), the main body of your force should proceed by the road from (6) to (W). A regiment and portion of artillery might, perhaps, make their way by the road which leads direct to the Secundra Bāgh (8) (8); but as it is not well defined, it may be more prudent to keep all together till you occupy the barracks.†

Should you have met with opposition, or been delayed much in crossing the canal, the day will be pretty far advanced ere you have occupied the barracks and Sikundra Bāgh. These might be the limit of your operation that day—encamping your force between, and a little in advance of, those two points, with its right rear on Sikundra Bāgh, and

* The Commander-in-Chief's force met with serious opposition at the Sikundra Bāgh, owing to their having approached it by a cross-road from the rear, whence their breaching guns could not be brought up until the troops had been exposed for some time to a heavy fire. Had they come by the broad pukka road leading from the barracks, as suggested, their heavy guns could have opened upon the place while the infantry remained out of musketry fire. A practicable breach would then have been made, or the shelling would have driven the enemy out. As it was, however, the occupants, greatly more numerous than reported, had no means of egress, and were destroyed to a man; but our own troops also suffered severely in taking the place.

† Neither the roads (7) (7) or (8) (8) were followed by Sir Colin Campbell's force, which was taken by a more circuitous and intricate road than either, and suffered greatly before its guns could be brought to the front.



the barracks on its left rear—thus obtaining a tolerably open plain to encamp on, with almost clear space in front, from which your guns would play upon the buildings which still intervene between your camp and our position, namely, the Shah Nujjif (H), Moti Mahal (K), Mess-house (M), and Tara Kothi (N), which, if held, might be bombarded from both our positions prior to commencing combined operations next morning. You would then decide on the garrisons to occupy the barracks and Sikundra Bâgh, to maintain communication with Dilkrusha, where your baggage would, I trust, be secure in the garden, protected by 200 men occupying the house, and a couple of guns. About the same strength (with convalescents) would suffice for Alumbâgh, aided by the enemy's guns we have there. And, perhaps, two of our own guns, supported by 100 riflemen, would hold the Martinière, with a small body of cavalry to command the plain down to the canal. A strong picquet also should be placed in the nearest huts to the road by which you cross the canal. You would, perhaps, occupy the houses D-D also, as further security for your communications.* Another point to which you should turn your attention while delayed in breaching the Sikundra Bâgh is the destruction of the bridge of boats some few hundred yards thence.† If a troop of horse artillery and cavalry are sent off rapidly to any point commanding the boats, many men would be destroyed with the boats that would be sunk by your guns; and the destruction of the boats will prevent the enemy's force on the other side of the Gúmti coming over to molest you at night.

The signal that you are crossing the canal will be my notice to spring certain mines, and storm the posts now held by the

* All this was carried out, with the exception that the barracks and the houses D D were refused in the *advance* to the Sikundra Bâgh, and had, therefore, to be taken afterwards, and (it is believed) at a greater loss than had they been assailed in the first instance.

† The enemy's leaders themselves caused the bridge to be broken up to prevent the flight of their followers.

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enemy in my immediate front (9) (9) ; and once in possession of these, I shall open my guns on the buildings above mentioned, and endeavour, also, to silence the fire of the Kaiser Bâgh, which commands the open space between us, to favour our junction next morning* when our united batteries could be turned upon the Kaiser Bâgh. And they would, I hope, in a day or two, effect its capture, which is necessary to ensure the entire submission of the city.

* This was done. Sir James Outram's troops stormed and took the buildings (9) (9) on the day Sir Colin took the Sikundra Bâgh. Sir James then opened his batteries on the Mess-house, Kaiser Bâgh, &c., exactly as here proposed, until the junction was effected; and the Kaiser Bâgh could have soon after been taken, had it had not been determined to withdraw our forces for a time.—(*See the Despatches of General Havelock, Brigadier Eyre, Colonel Napier, &c., in reference to these operations.*)

NOTE BY THE AUTHOR.—*This extract has been taken from Sir James Outram's General Orders, Despatches, and Correspondence, published in 1860 (Smith, Elder, & Co.). All the notes attached to it were made by the editor of that volume.—*
G. B. M.

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