



CSL

A.D. 1857.]

## INDIAN MUTINY.

[RELATIVE POSITIONS.]

Arthur Wellesley. The British nation must, if necessary, be prepared to tell the Duke of Cambridge and Lord Canning, in the most unequivocal terms, that Sir Colin is to be allowed in all respects to conduct the war in his own way."

The month of December, 1857, had commenced amidst much cause for anxiety and for vigorous effort on the part of the English commander. The convoy of Lucknow fugitives was still necessarily detained under the protection of the troops at Cawnpore, whose operations were shackled by the presence of the helpless and useless multitude. The Gwalior mutineers still held possession of the town and the greatest part of the suburbs, from whence their artillery kept up an incessant cannonade upon the intrenchment and the southern cantonments, in which the convoy and the Lucknow force were encamped; but until the women and children, with the wounded people, could be safely dispatched on their route to Allahabad, the hands of Sir Colin Campbell were tied. He daily saw his officers and men fall around him, without being able prudently to act against the enemy. The loss of officers alone, in the week from the 26th of November to the 2nd of December, amounted to ten killed, thirty-two wounded, and two missing.

Before entering upon details connected with the movements of the opposing forces on the 6th of December, it should be observed, for the purpose of illustrating those movements, that the town of Cawnpore lies on the right or west bank of the Ganges, about 130 miles north-west of Allahabad. The town does not extend quite down to the river; and in order to reach the latter, a sandy plain, of about two miles in breadth, must be traversed. This space, covered with officers' bungalows and their compounds, is called the cantonments, and it stretches several miles along the water-side. In this plain of the cantonments, there were, as already stated, the intrenchments, and the fort for the protection of the bridge of boats, which afforded the only means for crossing the river and communicating with the Lucknow-road. It was for the purpose of occupying these defences, and of protecting the bridge, and thereby preserving the communication with Sir Colin Campbell, that General Windham was entrusted with the command at Cawnpore. Through the cantonments there is a road, which, at a few miles' distance, south-

east of Cawnpore, joins the Grand Trunk-road, which unites Delhi, Cawnpore, Allahabad, and Calcutta. A considerable distance northward of this junction, but before reaching the city, were the ruins of the intrenchment in which the late Sir Hugh Wheeler was besieged by Nana Sahib and his rebel force. This road through the cantonments, and the Grand Trunk-road, it should be observed, was the line of retreat to be taken by the rescued garrison of Lucknow, on the route to Allahabad; and its preservation was therefore of vital importance.

When, on the evening of the 30th of November, the whole of the convoy and troops had crossed from Oude, the position of the entire British camp was in the form of a half-circle, stretching from some old dragoon lines lying near the Ganges, and the fort, south-westward across the Grand Trunk-road, and round the position occupied by Sir Hugh Wheeler. In short, its right rested on the river, while its centre and left covered the Grand Trunk-road.

It should further be observed, that the city of Cawnpore lay in front of the British camp, separated by a canal running east and west, the larger portion of the city being on its northern side. On the evening that Sir Colin arrived from Lucknow, the mutineers were driven from that part of the city which lay nearest the British intrenchments; and Brigadier Greathed, about the same time, occupied the General-gunge—an old bazaar of very considerable extent, which lay along the canal in front of the line occupied by the British camp. Thus, it will be seen, that the enemy were on the north side of the canal, and the British on the south side, having one advanced post (the General-gunge) on the canal itself. The rebels' right, facing the British left, stretched out beyond the angle formed by the Grand Trunk-road and the canal; and before closing with it, the British force would therefore be obliged to cross the canal by the only two bridges that formed the communication. The centre of the enemy was in the town of Cawnpore, where he occupied the houses and bazaars which overhung the canal. The city, in this part, was full of narrow lanes, the houses in which were loopholed, and the principal streets were carefully barricaded. This division of the enemy's force was exactly opposite to the British advanced post named the General-gunge, held by Bri-



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gadier Greathed; but this position of the enemy, strong as it appeared to be, in reality proved his weakness; for, between his centre and his right, there was the wall of the city, which separated one portion of his force from the other so completely, that, in case of emergency, he had no means of transferring troops from one flank to the other. The left division of the rebel force occupied the old cantonment—namely, that portion of the ground which lies between the city and the Ganges. In the rear of this position, and about a mile and a-half distant, in a direct line from the British intrenchments, was the Subahdar's Tank, and in front of this was the Baptist chapel. Thus the entire line of the rebel force extended from the Ganges through the city of Cawnpore, and along the canal westward of the city wall, which was parallel to the canal. The camp of the enemy was pitched two miles in rear of his right division, and covered the Calpee-road, which afterwards formed his line of retreat. This disposition of the enemy's force did not escape the notice of the commander-in-chief, who saw, in a moment, the disadvantage to which it would be exposed, if the attack was directed from a particular point; and upon that point, therefore, he determined to base his operations.

On the night of the 5th of December, the force of the enemy at Cawnpore consisted of about 25,000 men, with at least forty pieces of artillery; while the facilities afforded by his position for the uninterrupted junction of other mutinous regiments by the Calpee-road, rendered the actual strength and resources of the rebel army—which already outnumbered, by more than two-thirds, the aggregate strength of the British troops opposed to it—a point on which no certain calculation could be based. The comprehensive genius of the commander-in-chief, was, however, equal to the emergency forced upon him by the adverse circumstances that had thrown a cloud over the proceedings of the few previous days; and, as usual, he grasped the difficulties of his position with a determination to overcome them. The force under his command on the 5th of December, amounted to about 8,000 men of all arms, of which, in round numbers, not more than 7,500 were available for service in the field.

Early in the morning of the 6th, Sir Colin Campbell assigned to his several corps and officers their respective stations and

duties, and the moment for action at length arrived; the baggage, &c., of the army having first been taken down to the river-side for precaution. At nine o'clock on the morning of the 6th of December, a heavy bombardment was opened from the intrenchment to the east of Cawnpore, for the purpose of inducing the enemy to believe he would be attacked from that quarter. Brigadier Greathed's three regiments, at the General-gunge bazaar were then reinforced by the 64th, the rest of the force being drawn up in contiguous columns in the plain of the cantonments, and effectually masked from the observation of the enemy. By eleven o'clock all was ready, and the infantry deployed in parallel lines fronting the canal—Brigadier Hope being in advance in one line, and Brigadier Inglis, of Lucknow, leading the second. The cavalry and horse artillery were then directed to cross the canal by a bridge a mile and a-half to the westward, and from thence threaten the enemy's rear. Immediately to the left of Brigadier Greathed, was another bridge over the canal, which was crossed by Brigadier Walpole, under cover of the guns. Keeping along the city wall, that officer drove the enemy from the shelter of some brick-kilns, and the whole line advanced—Captain Peel, with the heavy guns of his naval brigade, leading the way over the bridge, accompanied by a private of the 53rd regiment named Hannaford; and, in a short time, the whole of the British force was on the Cawnpore side of the canal, and the enemy's centre and right were driven back at all points. By one o'clock in the afternoon, his camp was reached, and taken possession of after a short struggle; and the rout of the rebel army became complete along the Calpee-road, for fourteen miles of which he was hotly pursued by cavalry and artillery; and so perfect was the abandonment of the enemy, that not a single gun or ammunition carriage on the right of his position escaped the grasp of the victors. But the triumph was yet incomplete: the left wing of the enemy still remained untouched; and, consequently, as the commander-in-chief passed through the unoccupied camp of the rebels, he dispatched General Mansfield, with a detachment, to secure the latter, and to take the position of the Subahdar's Tank, which stood in rear of the enemy's left. By skill and valour this task was admirably accomplished; and having occupied the camp, and



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[THE ACTION.]

taken measures for maintaining a good post on the Calpee-road, General Mansfield advanced towards the tank, struggling over broken ground and through enclosures, and driving parties of the enemy before him. After a good deal of manœuvring, in ground highly favourable to the rebels, the general at length succeeded in obtaining the position assigned to him, and soon after had the satisfaction to see large bodies of the enemy's infantry and cavalry rapidly moving off, in full retreat, to the westward. As it was not practicable to communicate with Sir Colin after sunset, the position being almost isolated, and considerable numbers of the enemy being still in portions of the town and the old cantonment, the general strengthened the pickets round his position, and bivouacked for the night without molestation. The rebel centre finding itself without support, its camp lost, and its wings destroyed, broke up during the night, and fled from the town in every possible direction; and before Sir Colin Campbell returned to the British camp at the close of that well-fought day, the enemy had been driven completely from Cawnpore. The following are the despatches of the commander-in-chief, in reference to the battle of the 6th of December:—

*"The Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-general.*

*"Head-quarters, Camp, Cawnpore, Dec. 10th.*

*"My Lord,—I have the honour to report to your lordship, that late on the night of the 3rd instant, the convoy, which had given me so much anxiety, including the families and half the wounded, was finally dispatched; and on the 4th and 5th the last arrangements were made for consigning the remainder of the wounded in places of safety, while a portion of the troops were withdrawn from the intrenchments to join the camp. On the afternoon of the 5th, about 3 P.M., the enemy attacked our left pickets with artillery, and showed infantry round our left flank. A desultory fire was also begun on our pickets in the Generalgunge, which is an old bazaar of very considerable extent along the canal, in front of the line occupied by the camp. These advanced positions had been held, since our arrival, by Brigadier Greathed's brigade with great firmness, the brigadier having displayed his usual judgment in their arrangement and support. On two or three occasions he had been supported by Captain Peel's heavy guns and Captain Bouchier's field battery, when the artillery of the enemy had*

annoyed him and the general front of the camp. After two hours of cannonading, the enemy retired on the afternoon in question. Arrangements were then made for a general attack on him the next day.

"His left occupied the old cantonment, from which General Windham's post had been principally assailed. His centre was in the city of Cawnpore, and lined the houses and bazaars overhanging the canal, which separated it from Brigadier Greathed's position, the principal streets having been afterwards discovered to be barricaded. His right stretched some way beyond the angle formed by the Grand Trunk-road and the canal, two miles in rear of which the camp of the Gwalior contingent was pitched, and so covered the Calpee-road. This was the line of retreat of that body. In short, the canal, along which were placed his centre and right, was the main feature of his position, and could only be passed in the latter direction by two bridges. It appeared to me, if his right was vigorously attacked, that it would be driven from its position without assistance coming from other parts of his line; the wall of the town, which gave cover to our attacking columns on our right, being an effective obstacle to the movement of any portion of his troops from his left to right. Thus the possibility became apparent of attacking his division in detail.

"From intelligence received before and after the action, there seems to be little doubt that, in consequence of the arrival of four regiments from Oude, and the gathering of various mutinous corps which had suffered in previous actions, as well as the assemblage of all the Nana's followers, the strength of the enemy now amounted to about 25,000 men, with all the guns belonging to the contingent, some thirty-six in number, together with a few guns belonging to the Nana.

"Orders were given to General Windham, on the morning of the 6th, to open a heavy bombardment at 9 A.M. from the intrenchment in the old cantonments, and so induce the belief in the enemy that the attack was coming from the general's position. The camp was struck early, and all the baggage driven to the river-side under a guard, to avoid the slightest risk of accident. Brigadier Greathed, reinforced by the 64th regiment, was desired to hold the same ground opposite the centre of the enemy, which he had been occupying for some days past, as above mentioned, and at 11 A.M., the rest of the force, as per margin,\* was drawn up in contiguous columns in rear of some old cavalry lines, and effectually masked from the observation of the enemy. The cannonade from the intrenchment having become slack at this time, the moment had arrived for the attack to commence.

"The cavalry and horse artillery, having been sent to make a detour on the left and across the canal, by a bridge a mile and a-half further up, and threaten the enemy's rear, the infantry deployed in parallel lines fronting the canal. Brigadier Hope's brigade was in advance in one line, Brigadier Inglis's brigade being in rear of Brigadier

\* *Artillery Brigade*—Two troops of horse artillery; three light field batteries; guns of the naval brigade; heavy field battery royal artillery. *Cavalry Brigade*—Her majesty's 9th lancers; detachments of 1st, 2nd, and 5th Punjab cavalry, and Hodson's horse. *4th Infantry Brigade*—Her majesty's 53rd regiment; her majesty's 42nd and 93rd highlanders; 4th Punjab rifles. *5th Infantry Brigade*—Her

majesty's 23rd fusiliers; her majesty's 32nd regiment; her majesty's 82nd regiment. *6th Infantry Brigade*—2nd and 3rd battalion rifle brigade; detachment of her majesty's 39th foot. *Engineer Brigade*—Royal engineers, and detachments of Bengal and Punjab; sappers and miners attached to the various brigades of infantry. (The whole of the force enumerated did not exceed 7,500 men.)

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Hope. At the same time Brigadier Walpole, assisted by Captain Smith's field battery, royal artillery, was directed to pass the bridge immediately to the left of Brigadier Greathed's position, and to drive the enemy from the brick-kilns, keeping the wall of the city for his guide. The whole attack then proceeded, the enemy quickly responding, from his proper right, to the fire of our heavy and field artillery.

"Good use was made of these guns by Captain Peel, C.B., R.N., and the artillery officers under Major-general Dupuis, C.B., R.A., Brigadier Crawford, R.A., and Major Turner, B.A. The Sikhs of the 4th Punjab infantry, thrown into skirmishing order, supported by her majesty's 53rd foot, attacked the enemy in some old mounds and brick-kilns to our left, with great vigour.

"The advance then continued with rapidity along the whole line, and I had the satisfaction of observing, in the distance, that Brigadier Walpole was making equal progress on the right. The canal bridge was quickly passed, Captain Peel leading over it with a heavy gun, accompanied by a soldier of her majesty's 53rd, named Hannaford. The troops which had gathered together, resuming their line of formation with great rapidity on either side as soon as it was crossed, and continuing to drive the enemy at all points, his camp was reached and taken at 1 P.M., and his rout was complete along the Calpee-road.

"I must here draw attention to the manner in which the heavy 24-pounder guns were impelled and managed by Captain Peel and his gallant sailors. Through the extraordinary energy and good-will with which the latter had worked, their guns have been constantly in advance throughout our late operations, from the relief of Lucknow, till now, as if they were light field-pieces, and the service rendered by them in clearing our front has been invaluable. On this occasion there was the sight beheld of 24-pounder guns advancing with the first line of skirmishers.

"Without losing any time, the pursuit with cavalry, infantry, and light artillery was pressed with the greatest eagerness to the fourteenth milestone on the Calpee-road, and I have reason to believe that every gun and cart of ammunition which had been in that part of the enemy's position, which had been attacked, now fell into our possession. I had the satisfaction of accompanying the troops engaged in the pursuit, and of being able to bear witness to their strenuous endeavours to make the most of the success which had been achieved. When I passed the camp and went forward on the Calpee-road, Major-general Mansfield was desired by me to make arrangements for the attack of the position called the Subahdar's Tank, which extended round the left rear of the enemy's position in the old cantonments. As this operation was a separate one, I beg to enclose for your lordship's consideration the major-general's own narrative.

"The troops having returned from the pursuit at midnight on the 6th, and their baggage having reached them on the afternoon of the next day, Brigadier-general Grant was detached in pursuit on the 8th, with the cavalry, some light artillery, and a brigade of infantry, with orders to destroy public buildings belonging to the Nana Sahib at Bithoor, and to press on to Serai-Ghat, twenty-five miles from hence, if he had good tidings of the retreating enemy. This duty was admirably performed by the

brigadier-general, and he caught the enemy when he was about to cross the river with his remaining guns. The brigadier-general attacked him with great vigour; and by the excellent disposition he made of his force, succeeded in taking every gun the enemy possessed, without losing a single man. I have the pleasure to enclose the brigadier-general's report for your lordship's perusal.

"It now remains for me to bring to your lordship's notice the officers who have distinguished themselves during the series of operations which have occurred under my own eyes, since this field force left the neighbourhood of Lucknow. I have a particular pleasure in again bringing to your lordship's notice the zeal and great ability with which Major-general W. R. Mansfield, chief of the staff, has conducted the very important duties of his high position, and of my obligations to him for the most valuable assistance he has afforded me during the whole of the recent operations. I desire also to call your lordship's attention to the able and distinguished manner in which he conducted the troops placed under his orders, after the enemy's centre had been divided, to the attack of their strong position at the Subahdar's Tank, and to recommend to your lordship's favourable consideration the names of the officers who assisted him.

"I have to thank Brigadier-general Hope Grant, C.B., very particularly for the admirable manner in which he has conducted the duties of the force, and more particularly for his exertions on the 6th of December, and the capital operations he performed on the 8th and 9th. The brigadier-general speaks in the highest terms of his divisional and personal staff.

"I have the greatest satisfaction in bringing to your lordship's notice, Brigadiers Greathed, the Hon. A. Hope, Walpole, and Inglis. These officers have all exerted themselves to the utmost, and have fully justified my expectations. They desire to record their obligations to the officers commanding corps in their respective brigades, and to their brigade staff.

"Owing to his knowledge of the ground, I requested Major-general Windham to remain in command of the intrenchment, the fire of which was a very important feature in the operations of the 6th of December, although I felt and explained to General Windham that it was a command hardly worthy of an officer of his rank. He gave me every satisfaction, and I have to thank him accordingly.

"I must particularly notice the exertions of Captain H. W. Norman, assistant-adjutant-general of the army; of Captain Herbert Bruce, deputy-quarter-master-general; and of Captain J. H. Smyth, Bengal artillery, the latter of whom had been requested by me to take command of the artillery in the intrenchment, as a special duty. Captain Smyth has rendered other great and valuable services since he left Calcutta, of which I have not had an opportunity before of recording my approval. I desire also to bring to your lordship's favourable notice, the officers on the general staff, or belonging to the personal staff of myself or Major-general Mansfield.

"To the crew of her majesty's ship *Shannon*, and to the royal and Bengal artillery, my thanks are alike due; but more particularly to Captain Peel, C.B., royal navy; to Brigadier Crawford, royal artillery; and to Major Turner, Bengal horse artillery. I cannot refrain from again drawing your lordship's most marked attention to the very distin-



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[DISPATCHES CONTINUED.]

guished merits of the last-named (Major Turner.) As is always the case in the three services, the batteries and troops were manœuvred with remarkable dexterity.

"Captain Peel has brought to my favourable notice Lieutenant Vaughan, royal navy, and I should much wish that this recommendation may be known to the admiralty; and Brigadier Crawford has expressed his obligations to his brigade-major, Captain H. L. G. Bruce, Bengal artillery, and has mentioned with marked distinction all the officers holding commands. Major-general Dupuis, C.B., royal artillery, commanded the artillery during the action, in consequence of his accidental presence in camp; and I beg to thank him for his exertions, as well as those of his staff. Colonel Harness, royal engineers, was also present in the same manner, and accompanied me throughout the action. General Grant has also brought to my notice the distinguished conduct of Brigadier Little, commanding the cavalry, as also of officers commanding corps in that brigade, and its staff officers.

"During the pursuit of the 6th, and the operation of the 9th, the cavalry maintained that high character for dash and perseverance which has distinguished them since they took the field in the numerous engagements of their long campaign. I desire also to mention Major Payne, of the 53rd regiment, whom I saw performing very valuable service during the first advance on the 6th instant. I must not allow this opportunity to pass without bearing my testimony to the unwearied zeal and assiduity of the superintending surgeon, Dr. J. C. Brown, Bengal artillery, which have never flagged for an instant, and have been of the greatest use to the force in the field from the time the troops first moved before going to Delhi. I beg to recommend him most particularly to your lordship's favourable consideration.—I have, &c.,

"C. CAMPBELL, General, Commanding-in-Chief."

The report of General Mansfield to the commander-in-chief was as follows:—

"Head-quarters, Camp, Cawnpore, Dec. 10th.

"Sir,—In obedience to your excellency's instructions, when I left your side after the capture of the enemy's camp, on the afternoon of the 6th December, I proceeded to make the arrangements for taking the position called the Subahdar's Tank, in rear of the enemy's left, and about a mile and a-half in a direct line from the intrenchments through the old cantonment.

"Before advancing, measures were taken for the safe guard of the captured camp, Colonel Kelly, with a wing of the 38th foot, being placed in position for that purpose, in addition to the 23rd regiment, which had already been left there by your excellency. These two regiments repelled an attack in the course of the afternoon, and took two guns from the enemy. The 93rd highlanders, who had been placed on the Grand Trunk-road, beyond the camp to the left, at the time that your excellency gave the orders for pressing the pursuit of the enemy along the Calpee-road, were now, at 2 P.M., beginning to suffer from the enemy's guns, which were in position about one thousand yards in their front, in the enclosures between them and the tank. They were advanced a short distance with Captain Middleton's field battery, R.A., which answered the enemy's guns, until the rifle brigade under Brigadier Walpole,

and the heavy field battery under Captain Longden, R.A., could be brought up. In the course of half-an-hour this had taken place, and the heavy field battery pushed along the road intersecting the Grand Trunk-road, about a mile to the left of the enemy's camp, and leading directly to the old cantonment. The rifles were extended in skirmishing order some 300 yards on each side of the road, slightly in advance of the heavy guns, the highlanders being kept in reserve.

"These arrangements having been made, the advance took place, and the enemy began to give way immediately, successive positions being taken up, and a rapid fire maintained, by Captain Longden and Captain Middleton, of the royal artillery, the rifles passing through the enclosures to the right, and the broken ground to the left of the road, with much spirit, under the able directions of Brigadier Walpole.

"On the entrance of the village being reached, which may be distinguished as the soldiers' burial-ground, although the enclosures were still held to a certain degree by the enemy, it appeared to me expedient to push the field battery through the village at a gallop, and take position in the plain, with the tank on the right, the infantry being desired to press forward as fast as they could. This was done very well by Captain Middleton, R.A., and he had the satisfaction of firing at the enemy's guns as they disappeared along the Bithoor-road, whilst the rifles were still running up to his support. The position was then fairly occupied, Brigadier Hope coming up with the reserve of highlanders, and taking charge of the pickets which were thrown out on the line of the enemy's retreat. About 4 P.M. the position which had been taken was attacked by artillery, brought by the enemy from the old cantonment. These guns might have been taken; but I refrained from giving the necessary order, being aware that it was contrary to your excellency's wish to involve the troops among the enclosures and houses of the old cantonment; and that, if the slightest advance had been made in that quarter, it would have been necessary, at whatever loss, to make no stop till the intrenchment should have been reached. When Captain Longden's and Captain Middleton's batteries had almost succeeded in silencing the enemy's fire, the position was attacked by some guns of the enemy from the broken ground of the plain on exactly the opposite side. They could not be seen, except by their smoke. They were, however, answered quickly, and all the men and field hospital, &c., having been put under tolerable cover, no harm was suffered by the troops in consequence of this attack. At dusk I had the satisfaction of seeing large bodies of the enemy's infantry and cavalry move round to the west of the position about a mile distant, in full retreat.

"It not being possible to communicate with your excellency after sunset, the position taken up being almost isolated, and, as reported to me, there being considerable numbers of the enemy still in occupation of the town and old cantonment, the pickets all round the position were slightly strengthened, and the troops bivouacked by their arms. Everything having been quiet during the night, the highlanders were withdrawn the next morning, and replaced by the 38th foot under your excellency's orders.

"My thanks are eminently due to Brigadier Walpole, who commanded the advance, and Brigadier Hope, commanding the reserve; to Captains



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gurb, became fearfully excited; and the anxiety of the inhabitants was not lessened by intelligence of an attempt, on the part of the prisoners at the gaol, to force the gates and commence the pillage of the town. The design was, however, rendered abortive by the decisive conduct of the guard at the gaol, who killed six and wounded eleven of the prisoners, and thereby deterred their companions from joining in the effort to escape. Beyond the first act of insubordination, the men of the 17th regiment did not commit themselves; and after some five or six days of intense anxiety, the inhabitants were relieved from any apprehension of a military revolt. The sepoys allowed the collector to open the cash chest, and remove sufficient for current expenses, but refused to surrender charge of the whole until relieved from their responsibility by military authority. These men continued faithful until after their removal from the station.

Whatever may have been the characteristics of English rule in India previous to the outbreak of this general revolt, it is quite clear that no measures of undue severity were adopted until all prudent endeavours to restore order by conciliatory means had proved unavailing. The dissuasive appeals and lenient proclamations of Mr. Colvin, the lieutenant-governor of the North-West Provinces, have already been noticed\* as ineffectual for the accomplishment of the humane objects contemplated by their author; but even yet, after fire and sword had ravaged the plains and desolated many of the cities of Hindostan, efforts were still made, as well by the government itself as by its commissioners, to recall the Bengal army to a proper sense of its duty, and to keep open the doors of reconciliation and forgiveness to all who might be disposed to seek it. Among other proofs of the existence of this feeling, we may instance the following address of the chief commissioner of the Punjab, promulgated among the Hindostani soldiers of the Bengal army in the early days of June:—

"Sepoys!—You will have heard that many sepoys and sowars of the Bengal army have proved faithless to their salt at Meerut, at Delhi, and at Ferozepore. Many at the latter place have been already punished. An army has been assembled, and is now close to Delhi, prepared to punish the mu-

tineers and insurgents who have collected there. Sepoys! I warn and advise you to prove faithful to your salt—faithful to the government who has given your forefathers and you service for the last hundred years—faithful to that government who, both in cantonments and in the field, has been careful for your welfare and interests; and who, in your old age, has given you the means of living comfortably in your homes. Those who have studied history know well, that no army has ever been more kindly treated than that of India. Those regiments which now remain faithful, will receive the rewards due to their constancy. Those who fall away now will lose their service for ever. It will be too late to lament hereafter, when the time has passed by; now is the opportunity of proving your loyalty and good faith. The British government will never want for native soldiers. In a month it might raise 50,000 in the Punjab alone. If the 'Poorbeah' sepoy neglect the present day, it will never return. There is ample force in the Punjab to crush all mutineers. The chiefs and the people are loyal and obedient, and the latter only long to take your place in the army: all will unite to crush them. Moreover, the sepoy can have no conception of the power of England. Already, from every quarter, English soldiers are pouring into India. You know well enough that the British government have never interfered with your religion. Those who tell you the contrary, say it for their own base purposes. The Hindoo temple and the Mohammedan mosque have both been respected by the English government. It was but the other day that the Jumma mosque of Lahore, which had cost lacs of rupees, and which the Sikhs had converted into a magazine, was restored to the Mohammedans. Sepoys! my advice is, that you obey your officers; seize all those among yourselves who endeavour to mislead you. Let not a few bad men be the cause of your disgrace. If you have the will you can easily do this, and government will consider it as a test of your fidelity. Prove by your conduct that the loyalty of the sepoy of Hindostan has not degenerated from that of his ancestors. JOHN LAWRENCE."

Following out the principle on which the above address was based, Sir John Lawrence, in the subjoined telegraphic communication to the governor-general, recommends the discharge of such men of the regular native infantry as might desire it.

\* See ante, pp. 129—137.



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[PANIC AT NEEMUCH.]

and after noting that the state of Peshawur was rather critical at that moment, he proceeds thus:—

"I suggest, that such men of the regular native infantry who desire it, may be paid up and discharged. We shall get rid of the bad, and the good will remain. At present the former are a source of danger. We are crippled in order to guard against them: should they break out, the irregular Hindostani cavalry will not act against them. When disbanded, they can do no harm, and we can hold the country securely without them—certainly more securely without them. This proposal not to include mutineers. Punjabee troops behaving famously."

Vain was the attempt to pour oil upon the troubled waters of Hindoo disaffection; futile the effort to hold forth the olive-branch of peace to the excitable and impulsive races, whom it was desired to conciliate rather than to crush. The fires of rebellion were now smouldering, or bursting forth in every direction, and the eye vainly sought repose from the lurid glare of its wide-spread conflagration. While the pen yet traced the bloodstained record of the mutinies at Hansi—at Seetapore—at Azimgurh—crimes of equal enormity, in other directions, were surging up on the memory, and crowding the already overcharged tablets on which they were too vividly inscribed.

At Neemuch—a cantonment 155 miles north-west of Mhow, and situated between Malwa and Newar, on the frontier of Rajpootana—the hydra of revolt raised one of its fearful heads also on the 3rd of June, under circumstances of extraordinary interest. The station had been for some time denuded of its proper garrison of Bombay troops, whose place had been supplied by the 72nd Bengal native infantry, the 4th troop 1st battalion horse artillery from Agra, and a wing of the Bengal light cavalry from Mhow. The elements of mischief were therefore concentrated in dangerous abundance; and the effect of the arrangement may be traced in the following details.

The massacres at Meerut and at Delhi were known at Neemuch very soon after their occurrence; and with the natural reliance upon the resources and energies of the government, the inhabitants of that place were looking anxiously for the news that should announce the restoration of the Monghol capital to its British rulers. Day

by day, the excitement produced by unsatisfied expectation and feverish anxiety grew more oppressive; yet the desired intelligence came not. During the feast of the Eed, the Mussulmans congregated in formidable numbers, and the whole week passed in disquietude, the people of the bazaars leaving the town in shoals, and every species of carriage being engaged in conveying the timid inhabitants to the shelter of the adjoining villages, for safety from some anticipated but yet undefined danger. All sorts of reports were in circulation; and the panic was complete, notwithstanding the efforts of Brigadier Abbott and Captain Lloyd, in command of the troops, to restore confidence. An unusual and offensive demeanour by the sepoys, whose manners had suddenly changed from a respect bordering upon servility, to that of bold, saucy indifference, too plainly showed that the cords of discipline had become relaxed, and that the influence of the officers over their men had been dangerously shaken. Thus matters had continued for some days, when at length the expected crisis was precipitated by some mischievous fellows declaring aloud in the bazaar, that the *Ghoré log*—i.e., European soldiers—were coming to attack them. The report occasioned a rush of people into the cantonments; and the sepoys, in wild excitement, tore open the bells of arms, and took possession of their weapons and ammunition. Colonel Abbott repaired as quickly as possible to the lines of the 72nd (his own regiment), hoping by his presence, and the influence he then possessed over his men, to avert the impending catastrophe. Fortunately he reached the lines before a shot had been fired, and for the moment succeeded in calming the excitement of the troops. At this moment, some sepoys of the 7th regiment of the Gwalior contingent, then stationed in the fort, manned the ramparts, and the sowars of the light cavalry prepared to mount at the command of a leader they had themselves chosen. The terror of the natives in the bazaar had now become excessive; and a report that a mutinous outbreak would occur at midnight, did not serve to allay it. On the night of the 30th of May, it was arranged by Colonel Abbott, that the officers of each corps should occupy tents in their respective lines among the men, himself saying to the 72nd—"You are so foolish and childlike in believing every absurd report, that I must treat you as my



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manded the whole of the artillery, rendered the greatest service, both in the action and in the moving of the guns; Lieutenant Millman, who commanded the battery; Captain Remington, who worked his guns admirably, and who was most zealous in giving every assistance to Captain Middleton; Brigadier A. Little, to whom I was much indebted for his cavalry support to the guns, and for the way in which he brought his force to the front on the advance of the enemy; Major Ouvry, commanding the 9th lancers, a most active and zealous officer; Lieutenant Young-husband, commanding 5th Punjab cavalry; and Lieutenant Gough, commanding Hodson's horse: to all of whom my thanks are due for the very able way in which they commanded their regiments. Lieutenant Malcolm, commanding the royal engineers, and Lieutenant Forbes, commanding the Bengal engineers, who, with their men, executed the work entrusted to them with great ability and zeal; Brigadier the Hon. A. Hope, commanding the infantry brigade, was of the greatest possible assistance, and behaved with his usual well-known gallantry; Lieutenant-colonel Thorold, commanding 42nd high-

landers; Colonel Faber, commanding 53rd regiment; Lieutenant-colonel Leith Hay, commanding 93rd highlanders; and Captain Ryves, commanding 4th Punjab infantry.

"My thanks are also due to the officers engaged for the able manner in which they commanded their regiments. Captain Bruce, head of the intelligence department, rendered me very great assistance in procuring information regarding the movements of the enemy.—I have, &c.,

"HOPE GRANT, Brigadier-general,  
commanding Force."

The result of these successful movements by Sir Colin Campbell and his brigadiers, was to clear the road around Cawnpore for a considerable distance, while it left the commander-in-chief at liberty to mature his plan of future operations, and also to strengthen his force preparatory to a final advance upon Lucknow.

## CHAPTER VIII.

PREPARATIONS FOR A CAMPAIGN IN OUDE; ATTACK UPON A REBEL FORCE AT JEERUM; NEEMUCH IN DANGER; INSUBORDINATION OF ODEYPOR CONTINGENT; THE FORT AT NEEMUCH; APPROACH OF REBEL FORCE; THE SIEGE; ASSAULT AND REPULSE; RETREAT OF REBEL TROOPS; CAPTURE OF A MOSLEM STANDARD; DETAILS OF THE SIEGE; MEHIDPORE; DEFECTION OF MALWA CONTINGENT; SLAUGHTER OF EUROPEAN OFFICERS; REBELS DEFEATED AT RAWUL; MUNDASORE EVACUATED BY THE REBEL TROOPS; THE NAWAB OF RUMEEA; OUTBREAKS AT CHITTAGONG AND DACCA; REBEL FORCE AT JELFIGOREE; AN EXECUTION; UNSUCCESSFUL PURSUIT OF THE ENEMY; JUNG BAHADOOR OF NEPAUL; THE GHOORKAS; GOVERNMENT NOTIFICATION; RECEPTION OF THE NEPAUL FORCE BY THE AUTHORITIES ON THE FRONTIER; ADVANCE TOWARDS GORUCKPORE; DEFEAT OF THE REBEL TROOPS; RECAPTURE OF GORUCKPORE; BATTLE OF SOHUNPORE; THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF EN ROUTE TO FUTTEGHUR; AFFAIR AT KALEE NUDDEE; FURRUCKABAD OCCUPIED; CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS FOR OUDE; STATE OF ROHILCUND; THE PUNJAB, MALWA, AND CENTRAL INDIA; HEROIC DEFENCE OF THE TREASURY AT TULLOWAN.

WHILE the operations detailed in the preceding chapter had been progressing at Cawnpore and the adjacent districts of the Upper Provinces, the revolutionary influences that raged over Hindostan were actively mischievous in other directions also; and, on every side, "war, and rumours of war," terrified and distressed society. The attention of the commander-in-chief was, at this period, principally confined to securing the advantages already obtained by his troops, and in maturing preparations for a campaign that should enable him to wrest Lucknow from the hands of its rebel masters, and restore the kingdom of Oude to the undisturbed domination of the British government. It was therefore not surprising, while thus occupied, that in distant quarters the fires of rebellion should

burst forth, and burn with undiminished fury, fed as they were by the brands of religious fanaticism and national hatred.

Turning from the Doab, now for a time cleared of the rebel forces, we trace the lurid flame in a south-west direction, to the border of Rajpootana, where it had spread its devastating influences over a wide extent of country. For many months, Neemuch had been one of the centres of disaffection in this province; and about the middle of October, the mutinous sepoys and their vagrant followers began to gather around it from the surrounding districts; a body of them, from Mundasore, concentrating at Jeerum (a walled town, about ten miles distant), with an intention to attack the garrison at Neemuch. The latter, however, took the initiative in the matter;

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# INDIAN MUTINY.

[AFFAIR AT JEERUM.

and on the 24th of the month, marched out to try their strength. The rebels to be attacked had arrived from Mundesore, and were about a hundred strong. Two advanced parties of the 2nd cavalry, under Captain Tucker and Lieutenant Blair respectively, were sent on the previous night by different roads, the main column following at half-past 5 A.M. The party under Captain Tucker fell in with the rebels near Jeerum at daylight; and leaving a reserve, under Lieutenant Le Geyt, in a concealed situation, he advanced with a few men towards the enemy, and charged right through them, paying with his life for the daring act. In the *mêlée*, Captain Lawrie, of the 21st native infantry, who had volunteered to accompany the party, and had vainly endeavoured to dissuade Tucker from rashly charging with his half-dozen men into so large a force, finding remonstrance useless, bravely resolved to share the danger of his companion, and was wounded severely in the breast with a lance, besides being much cut about by the swords of the enemy. His horse was shot under him; and one trooper, with Captain Tucker, was killed in the charge. The enemy was, however, sufficiently alarmed by this unexpected encounter, to induce them to retire to a position out of the reach of cavalry, before Lieutenant Le Geyt, who had but a handful of men in reserve, could come up with them. The body of Captain Tucker was carried off by the rebels, but afterwards recovered by the men of his own troop, severed from the head, which had been retained by his murderers.

While this affair was in progress, the main body from Neemuch, under Captain Simpson, arrived before the walls of Jeerum, and found the enemy assembled on the brow of a hill, about 200 yards in front of the town, where they remained until the 9-pounder guns of the column got into position, and sent a few rounds of grape amongst their ranks, when they slowly retired to take up a stronger position, behind the shelter of some huts. Captain Bannister was then dispatched with a squadron to the other side of the town, to cut off any stragglers, and the action proceeded, and raged for some time with unusual obstinacy on the part of the enemy. The infantry in vain attempted to dislodge the latter from their position; and in their advance for that purpose, Captain Reade, commanding a detachment of the 83rd

regiment, was killed, and Captain Sopitt, of the 12th native infantry, dangerously wounded. Both infantry detachments seeing their commanders fall, made a retrograde movement; and the enemy, emboldened by it, rushed impetuously upon them, and captured one mortar, and had nearly obtained the guns, when Captain Simpson, with Lieutenants Blair and Le Geyt, with Riding-master Steers, charged with a squadron upon the enemy, recaptured the mortar, and dispersed the rebels, who fled to the fort. In this charge, Captain Simpson was severely wounded in the head, and his two lieutenants were also disabled. The day now approached its close; and a report reached Captain Bannister, who succeeded Captain Simpson in command of the column, that a large force of the enemy was advancing on Neemuch from another direction. For this reason, as well as on account of the great natural strength of the place, which rendered it impregnable without the aid of breaching guns, Captain Bannister determined upon returning to protect Neemuch, which he reached with the remains of his column the same night, taking with him the body of Captain Reade, which had been gallantly recovered, in the face of a heavy fire from the walls, by a Belooch of the 12th native infantry, named Mulam Khan.

The reported advance upon Neemuch was from Mundesore, about twenty-eight miles distant; and the rebel force collected for the purpose, was understood to consist of some 600 Affghans, or Belatees, 4,000 Meewatties, and 350 horsemen of various races, with seven guns: thus the threatened danger was obviously of a serious character. For several days, no perceptible movement on the part of the rebels appeared to substantiate the rumour; but at length, on Sunday, the 8th of the month, a spy arrived at the British camp about 3 P.M., and announced that the enemy, who had been for a day or two encamped at Mullhayar (an intermediate town, about twelve miles from Neemuch), were advancing in great force, the advanced guard of cavalry being already within three miles of the town. As no time was to be lost in an effort to check their approach, a detachment of the 2nd light cavalry, consisting of a hundred men under Captain Bannister, moved out, and proceeded along the Mundesore-road. By the time they had marched about two miles, the van of the enemy

"On the morning of the 2nd instant, Colonel Abbott informed me, in his own regimental lines, that from the occurrences of the previous night, and from information he had received, he was of opinion that the outbreak could not be delayed more than a few hours. I left him to secure a few of my most valuable records, and endeavour to ensure a line of retreat for fugitives by the Odeypoor-road, by means of a detachment of police sowars. Meanwhile, Colonel Abbott undertook to assemble all the native officers of the force, and endeavour to bring them to a sense of their duty, and to remove the distrust in each other which, there was reason to believe, was one cause of the prevailing excitement. After some discussion, all took oaths on the Koran and Ganges water, that they now trusted each other, and would remain true to their salt. The commanding officer was requested to swear to his confidence in their faithful intentions, and did so, when the meeting broke up, all apparently being satisfied and loyally inclined. All continued quiet up to the evening of the 3rd, when some excitement was again apparently arising, as it was said, from a rumour of the approach of troops to the station. It is necessary to mention here, that for many preceding days the utmost panic had prevailed in the Suddur Bazaar, and great numbers of persons had removed with their property. The wildest reports were constantly set afloat by designing persons to increase the distrust, and the commonest occurrences were distorted into phantoms of evil intended against the troops. The move of the Kotah force under Major Burton, for the protection of Jawud, had been determined upon in consultation with Colonel Abbott, commanding the station. The troops of Neemuch had been told of the intended move some days before, and assured that no part of the force was intended to approach Neemuch. Kotah troops were ordered to Jawud, in view to preserving the peace in the district, and protecting the town from marauders. I believe there is no reason whatever to suppose that this movement precipitated the crisis, while subsequent events have proved it to have been a most fortunate and happy one for the interests of government.

"On the night of the 3rd, symptoms of violence were shown by the artillery, and Lieutenant Walker could only restrain them for about two hours, when some of them rushed to the guns, and, loading them, fired

two off, evidently as a preconcerted signal. Upon this the cavalry rushed to join them, and, shortly afterwards, the 72nd broke from their lines also. The wing of the 7th regiment, Gwalior contingent, encamped outside the fort, had been marched inside by Captain Macdonald on the report of the signal-guns, and every preparation for defence made. To provide for this emergency, I had furnished Captain Macdonald with a written promise, on the part of government, of rewards to the following amount in case of a successful defence of the fort and treasury, but to be used only in case of an outbreak:—To each sepoy, 100 rupees; to each naik, 300; to each havildar, 500. Native commissioned officers to be rewarded in proportion, at the discretion of government; and a special reward of 5,000 rupees to be given to the senior native officer, or to the one who most distinguished himself in the defence and preserving the loyalty of the regiment. The promise was duly promulgated on the outbreak occurring; but, after holding firm for some time, the gates were ordered, by a subahdar named Heera Sing, to be opened, and the officers were told to save themselves, and eventually escorted to a place of comparative safety. Captain Macdonald and his officers remained in the fort to the very last, and only left it on the gates being forcibly opened, and their lives in the greatest danger, with no hope of being of the least use.

"I was roused on the report of the two signal-guns, and was quickly on horseback. I proceeded to rouse my assistant, Lieutenant Ritchie, and Assistant-surgeon Cotes, who resided in the next bungalow. While there, Lieutenant Barnes, artillery, galloped up, begging us to aid in bringing away Mrs. Walker and child, whose carriage had been fired at four or five times by mounted troopers. We immediately hastened to assist, and succeeded in getting out of the station upon the Odeypoor-road, and by this time fires were appearing in all directions. Having seen the party safe to the village of Daroo, Lieutenant Ritchie and I returned towards cantonments, in the hope of assisting fugitives. We met the officers of the 1st cavalry, but no others, and, after hovering about the burning station till daylight, we set out for Daroo."

A note from Moorun, a small town about eighteen miles east of Neemuch, dated the 6th of June, stated, that "all the officers of the 72nd, with their wives and children,



are safe and well; likewise Dr. and Mrs. Hookin, Captain and Mrs. Laurie, and Lieutenant Williams, of the 21st regiment. Captain Lloyd and Lieutenant Rithie have also escaped. We hear that all the officers of the 7th regiment (Gwalior contingent) have also escaped; but the fate of the four officers of the 1st Bengal cavalry, and two officers of the Bengal artillery, is too melancholy to think of. We have two sergeants with us, Taylor and Horne. We are *en route* to Neemuch, with some Kotah troops under the command of Major Barton, and expect to be at Neemuch on the 8th. We hear that there is only one bungalow standing at Neemuch."

The subjoined narrative of Ensign Davenport, belonging to the 12th regiment of Bombay native infantry, who happened to be at Neemuch at this juncture, thus describes the circumstances attending the commencement of the outbreak, in a letter from Odeypoor:—

"About a week before the mutiny I volunteered to do duty with the Gwalior contingent (7th infantry.) I was ordered to take up my quarters in the fort, where Macdonald and I remained day and night with the right wing (three companies.) The left wing (five companies) was quartered in a vacant hospital, some quarter of a mile distant from the fort. On the night of the 3rd, Macdonald and I lay down in our clothes, but not to sleep, as we had reason to suspect that all was not right. At half-past 11 p.m., we were aroused by the report of a gun, which in a few minutes was followed by another. This was the signal for the row to commence; and many moments had not passed when we saw our houses blazing all round. Lieutenant Gurdon, who was at the hospital with the left wing, under the command of Lieutenant Rose, also at the hospital, was aroused by a subahdar telling him that guns had been fired, and the disturbance commenced. Lieutenant Rose and he got the men out of the hospital, and marched them to join us in the fort. A shot was fired on the way to the fort (it was said by a sepoy) at Lieutenant Rose. When they had joined us, we placed the men along the ramparts, served out ammunition to them, and ordered them to load. They obeyed all our orders with apparent cheerfulness; and one and all swore to defend the place with their lives. I was placed to defend

the gate, with a subahdar of nearly fifty years' service, two European sergeants, and twenty picked men. We remained in the most anxious state of suspense for nearly four hours, during which time we saw cavalry men riding about and thrusting lighted torches, placed at the end of long poles, into the thatch of the bungalows, when we heard the 72nd Bengal native infantry, the Bengal cavalry, and artillery approaching. Just as they passed the political agent's house, about 200 or 300 yards from the fort, two more guns were fired. This was the signal for the Gwalior men to be up and doing. Immediately on these guns being fired, my old hero of fifty years' standing ordered his picked and brave men to lower the gate, which I did my best to prevent; and for my pains received a gentle intimation, that if I did not hold my tongue and be quiet, I should be treated to a little cold steel in the shape of a dozen or so of bayonets. I then asked them to let me go and report progress to the major: this they granted. I made my report; after which Macdonald, Rose, Gurdon, and myself went among the men, who were assembled in the courtyard fixing bayonets. Macdonald addressed the men to no purpose. We then tried to take away the colours, but this they would not permit. They then took us outside the gate and told us to go; and on our hesitating, said if the Bengal infantry, cavalry, and artillery saw us we should be murdered, and that they could not, and would not, try to save us. We then went away. Macdonald and myself, having lost our horses, had to walk to Baree beyond Duno, about thirteen miles from Neemuch, where we met several others in the same plight as ourselves. We had not been there long before the villagers in affright—it having been reported that the cavalry was after us—told us to take ourselves elsewhere. We started from Baree about 1 p.m. on June 4th, and after three hours' march under a broiling sun, reached Chota Sadree. Here we got a little to eat and drink, and were joined by a large number of women and children. After about two hours' stay at this place we were sent away, our party now consisting of about fifteen men, six women, and ten children. We travelled all night, getting to Burra Sadree at 6 a.m. of the 5th of June. We got nothing to eat till two o'clock; and after partaking of some kind of stew, got on our legs again, the villagers having

reported that an attack had certainly been intended, but that during the night, an express had arrived from the Shahzadah at Mundesore, ordering all the faithful to repair to that place forthwith, and assist in repelling the attack made upon it by the Mhow column.

On examining the position held by the rebels after their departure, the bank of the intrenchment was found scooped out in numerous places, to allow of men being well covered while firing upon the fort, the general appearance being that of a rabbit-warren.

The following memoranda of the siege of Neemuch may not be uninteresting:—

"November 8th.—About 5 P.M. the enemy appeared before the fort: a *reconnaissance* was made by the 2nd Bombay cavalry, under Captain Bannister, in which Lieutenant Stapleton's (1st Bengal light cavalry) charger was mortally wounded by a round shot from the enemy. The enemy were seen to be in force, with several guns, their number supposed to amount to about 4,000. Our cavalry returned about sunset.

"It having been determined that, with our small force of only about 400 effective fighting-men, we could not meet the enemy in the field, the cavalry, with some baggage, marched out into the neighbouring country in the early morning. About 8 A.M. the enemy came into the station, burning the houses that the mutineers of the 3rd of June had spared. The enemy had fired a few shots from a large gun placed near the village of Nixongunge; but our shells from the 8-inch mortars interfered with their shooting a good deal. Their sharpshooters took possession of some outhouses and the intrenchment, and kept up a heavy fire. Lieutenant Williams, 21st grenadier Bombay native infantry, was struck by one of them to-day, the bullet going through his hat and tearing his forehead above the left eye—rather a narrow escape. A Banda man of the 2nd cavalry was also grazed on the jaw by a bullet, either on the 9th or 10th. The fire of the enemy from their guns was very slack from the 9th to the 10th; on some days, a few round shot being fired against the fort, and on others none at all. On the 11th, Lieutenant Barnes, Bengal horse artillery, was struck by a bullet while looking over a parapet early in the morning; the ball entered above the nipple of the right breast, and was cut out of the armpit. This day the cavalry made a diver-

sion, coming into Nixongunge, and cutting up some dozen or so of the enemy there, and drawing the enemy out of the intrenchments, under the fire of our 24-pounder, which let into them with round shot. The cavalry was the 6th troop, under Lieutenant Farquharson, with Lieutenant Stevenson (2nd Bombay Europeans), and Lieutenant Stapleton (1st Bengal light cavalry), as subalterns: the enemy came out in great force, and attempted to surround it with their cavalry. Some of the Odeypore troops, who accompanied our cavalry, had several of their number destroyed by the enemy. The loss of our cavalry was two men, and one or two slightly wounded. The plan of the enemy was to keep up a pretty smart matchlock fire in the early morning and in the evening; at mid-day they did not fire much—perhaps they were eating their dinners and sleeping. This fire was kept up from outhouses near the fortified square, and from the lines of circumvallation thrown up round the fort.

"Nov. 19th.—An attempt was made to batter one of the curtains. Some of the shots hit the curtain, some went over the fort altogether, and some fell inside; one of the last went into that partition of the fort in which the post-office was kept, and broke the table of Lieutenant Rose (25th Bombay native infantry), the postmaster, who, luckily, was not sitting at it. Their attempt at breaching having failed, the enemy seem to have determined to try to take the place by escalade: accordingly, on the 21st, between 4 and 5 A.M., they made the attempt in the dark; but the garrison were not to be caught napping, and beat them off, they leaving four ladders and a standard on the ground; the standard, a holy green Mussulman affair, was brought in by Teeka Sing and Mulam Khan, both of the 12th Bombay native infantry; the former was a havildar, and is to be promoted to a jemadarship; the latter is promoted from private to havildar.

"On the 22nd (early morning), it was found that the enemy had left the place en route for Mundesore: it has since been learnt that they met the Mhow column and lost their guns; and that numbers of them were slain. Lieutenant Brett, 2nd Bombay cavalry, and two of her majesty's 83rd, died of sickness during the siege. On the 22nd (evening) the cavalry returned to camp. There seems to be some confusion in the papers as to what defences the garrison of Neemuch were surrounded by during the



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INDIAN MUTINY.

[REPULSE AT MEHIDPORE.]

siege; to dispel which I give you the following explanation:—The fort of Neemuch is a common fortified square, about as large as a big serai. Outside this, and surrounding it, except on one side where a stream runs, at a distance of about 300 yards or so, on an average from the centre of the fort, run a succession of salient and re-entering angles of the parapet and *bouquette*, with a ditch on the outside. Of course, so vast a length of lines could only be kept by thousands, and were useless—worse than useless—to the small garrison of Neemuch, but very useful to the enemy, who occupied them on the first day, and kept on firing from them every day that they remained in Neemuch. It is said that these lines were made at the suggestion, or requisition, or order, and some say at the expense, of one of General Lawrence's assistant politicals, who is officiating political agent, Mewar; and they were commonly called after him, 'Showers' ditch.' They are now being levelled, and may be considered as of the past."

The departure of the rebel force from Neemuch had not been commanded before it was wanted; although the accession of its numbers was unavailing in the contest before it. On the morning of the 8th of November, the Malwa contingent, under Major Timins and Lieutenant Mills, was attacked at Mehidpore by the Vellaitces, Rohillas, and Mokranees, aided by the budmashes of the city. The insurgents were led by the amildar (or native police officer of Mehidpore), and numbered between 4,000 and 5,000 men, armed with matchlocks, swords, and spears. The force opposed to this host consisted of 250 men of the contingent, with the two officers named; and after maintaining a gallant but unequal fight, from seven in the morning until three in the afternoon, the loyal troops were compelled to retire from the scene of contest with the loss of their guns. The Mussulmans of the contingent refused to obey their officers, and joined the enemy, who forthwith gratified their revenge by murdering several of the Europeans, among whom were Lieutenant Mills, Dr. Carey, and two sergeant-majors. They then plundered and set fire to the station. Major Timins escaped in the direction in which the Malwa field force, under Brigadier Stuart, was supposed to be advancing; but the fate of his lady and other Europeans at the station, remained for some time unknown. At length, on the

13th of the month, Mrs. Timins reached the English camp at Jehampore in safety, having been compelled to disguise herself in male attire, to escape the pursuit of the rebels. The following telegram, from Captain Mayne to the governor-general, announced the intelligence of the affair at Mehidpore:—

"Camp, Jehampore, Nov. 13th, 1857.

"Mehidpore was attacked by the rebel force from Bunnuggur at 8 A.M. on the 8th instant, they having first fired the station. The infantry and artillery of the contingent assembled near the artillery lines, and the guns opened on the rebels, who were under cover of the bungalows and their enclosures. The Mehidpore contingent infantry mostly behaved shamefully, refusing to attack when led on by their officers. The subahdar-major opened his jacket as the rebels approached, took out a green flag, and hoisted it. Only a portion of the artillery stood to their guns, and, at noon, the rebels advanced and took them. The contingent troops then fled, and their officers were forced to escape, escorted by a faithful band of the 2nd Gwalior cavalry. Lieutenant Mills is killed, and Dr. Carey reported to be so. Major Timins left his wife in the city of Mehidpore, and fled towards Oojein with Lieutenant Dysart, joining our camp at Bunnuggur on the 10th instant. That night, the Hyderabad contingent force, under the command of Major Orr, started for Mehidpore, parties of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th cavalry, going in advance; but on reaching that station, they found it evacuated, the rebels having taken with them two 12-pounders, four 9-pounders, and sixty cart-loads of ammunition and plunder."

On the morning of the 11th, the advanced body of cavalry, led by Captain Abbot, of the 1st regiment, reached Mehidpore, which they occupied without resistance, the rebels having evacuated it the previous day. On the 12th, he marched out with 337 of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Hyderabad cavalry, and overtook the insurgents, to the number of about 500, with two guns, at Rawul, where they had resolved to make a stand. They were immediately attacked and dispersed, leaving a hundred dead upon the field, with two 9-pounder guns, and a large quantity of ordnance stores. In the pursuit that followed, the enemy abandoned three guns, which they had taken from Mehidpore, with two others of larger calibre, seized by them at Bunnuggur. Upon this occasion

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the casualties were inconsiderable—one officer only being seriously wounded. Of the enemy, seventy-six prisoners were taken, who were tried by drum-head court-martial at Mehidpore, and shot for being in rebellion against the government. On the 12th, part of the force crossed the Chumbul, and encamped on the other side, two marches from Mundesore, near which some 8,000 rebels were reported to have taken up a position. The troops continued inactive until the 21st of the month, when the enemy, under Heera Sing, attacked the left front, but were driven back into Mundesore with heavy loss. The cavalry pursued the rebel commander and his escort into a fortified village about ten miles from Mundesore, on the Neemuch-road, where the main body of the rebel force appeared in strength, and displayed its standards. On the 23rd, Brigadier Stuart's main column came up, and marched in quest of the mutineers, with whom it at length met, drawn up in a strong position, having the village of Goorareea in their centre, and considerably outflanking, by their numbers and arrangement, the British force, whose artillery speedily silenced a battery of five guns, afterwards captured by a party of the 14th light dragoons. The enemy were then driven from their position with heavy loss; but a body of them took shelter in the village, and continued to hold it with great determination. While thus engaged in front, the garrison of Mundesore sallied out, and attacked the rear of the force, but were repulsed with loss by the rear-guard, which had been timely strengthened in anticipation of the attack. On the 25th, the rebels, dispirited by successive defeats, evacuated Mundesore during the night, and retired on Nagurh, in the direction of Rampoorah. By this movement, Neemuch was effectually relieved from any danger on the Mundesore side. Shortly after this fact was ascertained, the Malwa field force returned to Mhow, where Major-general Rose was appointed to the command, *vice* Brigadier Stuart.

The subjoined account of some of the movements of the force is interesting:—

'Mhow, December 25th, 1857.

"The Malwa field force having returned hither, I purpose giving you a brief account of our journey from the time we left Mundesore. On the morning of the 2nd inst. we left that place, and arrived at Mehid-

pore about 8 A.M. on the 9th, where we found that the work of devastation had been carried to a fearful extent. Not a vestige of anything European was to be seen, except the smoke-blackened, ruined walls of those bungalows in which but recently our countrymen and their families happily dwelt. There were fearful traces of the recent battle fought between Orr's column and the Mehidpore mutineers, as well as the victory gained over the latter. Rambling amidst the ruins, I strayed into a mango-tope only a few paces from the main road, and there I counted fifty human skeletons; and a short distance from the residency, down a little valley, eighteen more. It was, I think, obvious to all of us, that, at the time we entered the place, a great number of rebels were still sheltered there; for on our approach, the native artillery lines were set fire to, as if to acquaint us with their presence and their unsated vengeance. It is quite clear the fire could not have arisen from spontaneous combustion; and had the inhabitants of Mehidpore—who now professed to be staunch friends to the government—desired to prove their loyalty, they could easily have apprehended the scoundrels who dared thus to mock British authority, especially as the rebels were declared to have fled some days previous to our arrival. On the following morning we marched *en route* to Oojein, and from thence to Indore, where we arrived on the morning of the 15th, all expecting to be called upon to demand from the native inhabitants a "settlement of accounts," in atonement for the blood of not our countrymen, but our helpless countrywomen and children, who were brutally murdered by those accursed Indoreans, who are now, according to the statement of Colonel Durand, "satisfactorily" settled with, and are fondly petted by those to whom we have all along been looking up, with patience and anxious glances, for the word to march, and inflict upon such miscreants the punishment they so richly deserve."

At this time, the natural excitement of the European troops against the native inhabitants of the towns that had revolted, still prevailed in an intense degree; and every instance of leniency shown to the latter, whether merited by exceptional circumstances, or not, was imperfectly understood, and became a source of disappointment and dissatisfaction to those who con-

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# INDIAN MUTINY.

[THE NAWAB OF RUNEEA.]

sidered British soldiers in India only properly employed when carrying out measures of vengeance and retaliation.

Proceeding northward, we find treachery and rebellion trampled down by the iron heel of the authority that had been insulted in that direction; and the vigour and decision of Mr. Montgomery, judicial commissioner for the Punjab, as described in the following letter addressed officially to the commissioner of Sirsa, was considered as entitling the former gentleman to high and merited encomium, for the example he had afforded to others invested with similar powers.

"Lahore, November 7th, 1857.

"Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 3rd, submitting the vernacular proceedings of the case of Noor Sunnund Khan, nawab of Runeea; and, in reply, to communicate the following remarks:—I gather from the proceedings, that on danger threatening the district of Sirsa in May last, the superintendent, Captain Robertson, summoned the nawab of Runeea (the prisoner in this case, and who with his family receive a pension from government of 5,760 rupees per annum), and directed him to raise a small force, horse and foot, for the protection of Sirsa; which he did, and a sum of money was advanced to meet the cost of maintaining them. The nawab was present in Sirsa, with his men, when the outbreak took place. There is evidence to show that the nawab and his men, instead of protecting the town, joined the plunderers, and that a portion of the plunder was sent to his house in carts; also, that he was proclaimed ruler of the country; and that, as such, he wrote a letter deprecating the conduct of certain parties who had made an inroad into his territory. Gohur Ali Khan, the uncle of the prisoner, was with him at the time, and has since been apprehended and hanged.

"The commission finds the prisoner, Nawab Noor Sunnund Khan, guilty of treason against the state, by having caused the king of Delhi to be proclaimed as king, and himself as ruler of the country, and passed sentence of death on him; but inasmuch as he does not seem to have been guilty of murder, and considering an example no longer necessary, the case is referred for my final orders. Of the nawab's guilt there can be no doubt. He, as also his ancestors, long enjoyed pensions, favour, and consideration from the British government. In-

stead, therefore, of aiding the local authorities, who reposed confidence in him, and whom he professed to serve, he joined the rebels with his adherents, and caused himself to be proclaimed ruler. Although murder is not actually proved to have been committed by himself, yet the city of Sirsa was entirely plundered and destroyed, as were also the government offices; treasure and property belonging to government carried off, and the prisoners released from gaol. A number of lives are known to have been sacrificed, of which there is no record. I consider it, therefore, imperative to make examples of such men as the nawab. The leaders must feel that vengeance will assuredly overtake them. Mercy, in this instance, would be weakness, and would encourage others to rebel hereafter. I, therefore, with the concurrence of the chief commissioner, sentence him, Noor Sunnund Khan, nawab of Runeea, to be hanged.

"The sentence is to be carried out without delay.—I have, &c.,

"R. MONTGOMERY, Judicial Commissioner."

Crossing from the north-west to almost the south-eastern extremity of Bengal, we find the town and district of Chittagong, which was ceded to the British in 1760, subjected, in November, to the usual consequences of a mutinous outbreak. On the night of the 18th of the month, some companies of the 34th regiment of native infantry rose upon their officers, whom, however, they did not harm. First plundering the treasury of about three lacs of rupees, they liberated the prisoners in the gaol, killing a burkandaze who resisted them; and then, having fired their cantonments, they blew up the magazine and left the town, taking with them three government elephants to carry their booty. Avoiding the main road to Tipperah, through fear of being intercepted at a ferry on the route, the mutineers hurried on the way towards Sylhet, where they halted for a short time to deliberate on their further proceedings; and being there reinforced by the accession of a number of armed vagabonds from the adjacent villages, they subsequently took the route to Mongapore, through the jungle, in order to avoid the chance of being intercepted.

The report of Captain Dewool, commanding the 34th regiment of native infantry at Chittagong, affords the following detail of this affair, which fortunately involved no loss of European life.

"Chittagong, November 24th, 1857.

"I have the honour to report, for the information of Major-general Sir J. Hearsey, K.C.B., commanding the presidency division, that, on the evening of Wednesday, the 18th instant, about nine o'clock, the detachment of the 34th regiment of native infantry mutinied, and instantly occupied the magazine with a strong body of men. Immediately upon hearing the noise from my house, which is quite close to the lines, I went to the parade in company with Lieutenant Hunter; but upon approaching the scene of disturbance, hearing the men very violent and loading their muskets, I directed that officer to retire, and went forward to the mutineers alone. I found a very strong guard in front of the magazine, who challenged me, and shouted out in a most violent tone, 'Don't care for him! Go away! you have no business here!' I advanced up to it, and did my best, with every argument I could use, to persuade the men to their duty; but a Mohammedan, who was in a native dress, and not in uniform like the rest, standing out in front, called out in a loud voice, 'The whole detachment is in a state of mutiny, and we have all determined to die if it is necessary. Go away!' This he said shaking his hand in my face, and using the most violent gestures. A shout was then raised, 'Shoot him! shoot him!' but a number of voices replied, 'No! no! don't hurt the captain.' Taking encouragement from this, and thinking I might have some men who would stand by me, I again endeavoured, by every persuasion, to bring the men to a sense of their duty, and appealed to several sepoys by name, who had previously borne a good character, to think what they were about, and to remain faithful to their salt; but they all replied that they had joined the mutineers, and that it was not their intention to withdraw. A shout was again raised, 'Shoot him! shoot him!' which was again negatived; and at the same moment two or three sepoys, with their muskets at the charge, came at me. Not liking this demonstration, I stepped back a few paces, and got out of the crowd, which was gradually getting round me; a Sikh of No. 4 company then came up, and giving me a rough push, said, 'Go away from this (*Hum suh lag bigger gya*).' Not a single native commissioned or non-commissioned officer, or Sikh, remained by me; and seeing nothing could be done, I went to the quarters of Lieutenant Hunter,

close by, and found that officer with Lieutenant Thomson, walking in the verandah; I told them hastily what had occurred, upon which they armed themselves and immediately went away. I then went to every house in the cantonment, to give warning to the residents, but most of them had already taken alarm and fled. Ultimately joining the civil surgeon's family, who live at the extreme end of the cantonment, in their company I sought to make my own escape; but by this time the parade and all the road around were covered with mutineers, so that we were only able to reach the next house, where we were detained for about two hours; we afterwards disguised ourselves as natives, and, under the guidance of the collector's bearers, proceeded by a jungle path to the banks of the river, when with difficulty we got a boat, and dropped down to the Kortabera lighthouse, from whence we returned yesterday.

"I have to state that the mutineers plundered the treasury most completely, and in doing so killed a burkundaze. They also broke open the gaol, and forced the prisoners to go with them to carry the treasure; and afterwards returned to the cantonments, and blew up the magazine and burned down the lines. I am happy to say that none of the European residents have been personally injured, and that, with the exception of a horse or two which were taken away to carry their baggage, the mutineers have left all private property untouched.

"I have been informed by a native named Thakoor Bux, formerly a jemadar of the Chittagong provincial battalion, whom the mutineers forced to go some distance with them, that the pay-havildar of No. 4 company, named Rujub Ali Khan, has assumed command of the detachment, which, we hear, has crossed the Fenny river, and entered the territories of the rajah of Tipperah.

"I took the opportunity while at Kootahdeen, to write to the commissioner of Arracan, reporting the mutiny, and requesting him to send a copy of my letter for the information of the general commanding, which I hope has been done.—I have, &c.,

"P.H.K. DEWOOL, Captain, commanding  
34th Regiment Native Infantry.

"P.S.—Lieutenants Hunter and Thomson are in safety."

Intelligence of the outbreak at Chittagong reached Dacca, a military station of secondary importance, but the capital of a



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## INDIAN MUTINY.

[CONFLICT AT DACCA.]

district of Bengal, situated on a branch of the Brahmaputra, called the Booree Gunga, or Old Ganges, at a few miles distant from the scene of disorder. Upon the arrival of the messenger from Chittagong, at 10 P.M., the authorities assembled, and resolved, by way of prevention, to disarm the sepoys of the 11th native infantry, in garrison there, amounting to about 260 men. To effect this, they had no other military force than a small corps of volunteers, which had been for some weeks in training for active service, and a few sailors collected under the command of Lieutenant Lewis; the whole amounting together to about ninety Europeans. The volunteers were ordered to march at once to the collectorate, to watch the guard there, while the process of disarming it was carried out. A little before 5 A.M., the sailors, with two mountain howitzers, under the command of Lieutenant Lewis, proceeded to the collectorate, and disarmed the guard there, without meeting with any attempt at resistance. The executive officers' guard was soon after marched in without arms by Lieutenant Rhynd, and the whole were placed in charge of the volunteers. Soon after some very heavy firing was heard in the direction of the Lall Bagh, a fortified barrack; and an alarm was given that the men stationed there were escaping from it by windows in the rear. The sailors were immediately marched off for the Lall Bagh, situated a mile and a-half to the westward of the treasury, detaching on their way a party to disarm the commissariat guard. On approaching the Lall Bagh, Lieutenant M'Mullin, with two sailors, went forward to communicate with the officers in charge; but they were fired upon, and compelled to retire to the main body, which deployed into line, and advanced. Immediately on this movement being observed, a severe fire of grape was opened upon them, in front and flank, from the barracks, which, having lattice-work verandahs, afforded shelter to those who fired, as loopholes would have done. Lieutenant Lewis, upon this, left his howitzers, and with two or three gentlemen, who acted as riflemen, wheeled his men right-shoulders-forward, and gave the order to charge up the face of a mound, in front of the building on which some of the mutineers had posted themselves. This assault was made in gallant style, but not without the loss of several brave men. The mutineers then fled into the barracks, and were driven from

building to building, along the whole length of the enclosure; and in the course of the struggle, a gallant charge was made upon the guns, which were taken; and the sepoys then fled by every possible outlet from the place. During the conflict, Dr. Green, the military surgeon, was shot through the leg, and seriously injured, while attending the wounded at the hospital. The Rev. Mr. Winchester, a resident, distinguished himself in the midst of the fire, by assisting to carry the wounded from the field to the hospital. The people of the town behaved remarkably well, and, with cheers, assisted to drag the captured guns and tumbrils to the collectorate, and seemed to look on with admiration when the sailors, having made a prize of the drum and fife belonging to the sepoys, marched back to their barracks, playing the "British Grenadiers." In this short but spirited affair, there were engaged about ninety Europeans against 260 native soldiers, having among them twenty-six golundauzes; the whole of the mutineers being fully prepared for the struggle whenever it might happen—the pouches of many of them being found to contain sixty rounds of ball cartridge, besides a number of the latter concealed in their beds and other places. Of the Europeans, one was killed, and eighteen wounded—three mortally.

The subjoined report from Lieutenant Dowell, R.A., commanding at Dacca, furnishes the official account of the occurrence at that place.

"Dacca, November 22nd, 1857.

"Sir,—I have the honour to inform you that, in consequence of intelligence received by express at 5 P.M. last evening, from Mr. Metcalfe, judge of Tipperah, that the three companies of the 34th native infantry stationed at Chittagong, had mutinied, plundered the treasury, let loose the prisoners, and were supposed to be making towards this station, a meeting, composed of C. T. Davidson, Esq., commissioner of the district; C. F. Carnac, Esq., magistrate; Lieutenant Lewis, Indian navy, commanding detachment of European seamen, and myself, was immediately convened; at which it was unanimously agreed that the detachments 2nd company 9th battalion artillery, and 73rd regiment of native infantry (strength as per margin\*), should be disarmed at day-

\* Artillery—1 havildar, 3 naiks, 22 privates. Detachment 73rd regiment native infantry—1 subadar, 2 jemadars, 12 havildars, 8 naiks, 4 drummers, 201 sepoys.



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unfordable, and the order was given to retire. Upon the retreat becoming known to the rebels, their courage and spirits became extravagantly exuberant; they fired volley after volley, laughed, danced, and booed the retiring force, until the men were half mad with rage and vexation. They, however, obeyed orders, and again reached the long grass, having sustained no other casualty than four rank and file wounded by spent shot. The troops returned to Jelpigoree the same night, quite knocked-up with their fruitless march of eighty miles in twenty-three hours.

A letter from Soodharam, in East Bengal, of the 7th of December, referred to a party of the Chittagong rebels in the following terms:—"Certain intelligence has at last reached this, that the Chittagong mutineers have passed Cornillah and Angertollah, and may by this time have gone beyond Sylhet. They have been precipitate in their flight, and have committed but little damage on their way. It appears that the fellows spent very freely the money they carried away from the collectorate of Chittagong; and several of them who carried the treasure contrived to separate themselves from their companions on the way, and went off with bags of the stolen money. The fact became known in consequence of the police apprehending all stragglers; and money, to the amount of five or six thousand rupees, was thus recovered and accounted for. The inhabitants of Cornillah were seized with panic, which lasted several days; during which, the wealthy classes removed with their families to more secure localities. The magistrate, collector, and judge, were the only persons among us who did not show any signs of fear, and continued to hold their courts as usual with a few amlahs."—At Tirhoot,

about the same date, some apprehension was entertained of danger from Jelpigoree; but as the division of the 73rd regiment there had a large proportion of the hill tribes in its ranks, and had hitherto acted loyally, the alarm subsided before any serious inconvenience resulted from it. The districts of Chittagong and Dacca were shortly afterwards well supplied with troops for their protection, and confidence was restored among all classes of the inhabitants, who, for a time, were left in the enjoyment of tranquillity.

The arrival of Jung Bahadoor, prime minister and commander-in-chief of Nepal,\* with a large force of Ghoorkas, intended to co-operate with the British troops in the restoration of order, was announced in the *Calcutta Gazette* of the 19th of December, in the following terms:—"General Order of the Bengal Government.

"The maharajah, Jung Bahadoor, prime minister and commander-in-chief of Nepal, will shortly enter the plains of Hindostan, at the head of a large force destined to co-operate with the British troops in the restoration of order in the British provinces.

"The right honourable the governor-general in council directs, that the civil and military authorities of the principal stations through which his excellency may pass, shall unite in paying to his excellency the honour and attention which are due to his exalted station.

"At every principal military station, post, and camp, a salute of seventeen guns will be fired in honour of the maharajah, Jung Bahadoor; a salute of thirteen guns in honour of the maharajah's second in command, General Runodeep Sing; and salutes of eleven guns each in honour of Generals Bukht Jung and Khurg Baha-

\* This individual, who has long attained an historical celebrity in this country as the "Nepalese Ambassador," of jewelled memory, was a nephew of a former prime minister of Nepal, whose death paved the way for the exaltation of his young relative; the latter, under his uncle's successor, becoming commander-in-chief of the army, and, in due time, possessing himself of almost sovereign authority. His visit to, and reception in, this country, greatly strengthened his position in his own; and shortly after his return home, he caused a marriage to be concluded between his daughter, then six years old, and the heir-apparent to the Nepalese throne, then in his ninth year. When the revolt broke out in British India, Jung Bahadoor exercised paramount authority in Nepal, and took every opportunity to evince his friendly disposition towards the English,

by acts of kindness and protection towards such of them as were compelled to seek shelter within his territory, of which the following instance (among others) may be cited in proof:—About the middle of June, 1857, fifteen Europeans, (seven gentlemen, three ladies, and five children) escaped from the Oude mutineers into the jungle region of Nepal, and sought refuge in a post station, or serai, about ten days' journey from Goruckpore, and eighteen from Khatmandoo. The officer at the latter place reported the occurrence, and asked for instructions, when he speedily received the following reply:—"Treat them with every kindness; give them elephants, &c., and escort them safely to Goruckpore." The place indicated was at the time in the possession of the English, and was also the nearest dak station to the Nepalese territory.



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## INDIAN MUTINY.

[OFFERS FROM NEPAUL.]

door, commanding divisions in the Nepalese force.

"The maharajah, Jung Bahadoor, will be accompanied by Brigadier-general Macgregor, C.B., in the capacities of military commissioner and governor-general's agent; and all civil authorities in the districts through which the Nepalese camp may pass, are hereby required to give immediate attention to all requisitions which may be addressed to them by that officer."

The rumour of proffered assistance from Nepaul,\* was at first received with some degree of incredulity, inasmuch as it had become known, that an offer of troops, which had been made by Jung Bahadoor at an early period of the rebellion, had been somewhat curtly declined. In that instance, the proposition from Nepaul was to place three bodies, of 1,000 men each, at the service of the Anglo-Indian government—one party to act in Oude, and the other two in the Lower Provinces; but as such disposition of the force would have had the effect of isolating them upon their respective fields of action, and a very natural suspicion existed as to the fealty of any native sovereign whatever, it was deemed prudent to decline the offer. At a later period, Jung Bahadoor renewed his friendly proposition—this time extending the number of troops to 10,000 for service in Oude; and his offer was accepted. The fact had no sooner become known through the official announcement above quoted, than curiosity was actively employed in efforts to discover the price at which the extraordinary aid would be furnished. Various surmises were broached upon the subject; and, among others, the restoration to Nepaul of the Oude Terai—a district on its southern frontier, consisting of a strip of

swampy forest-land, thirty miles broad, lying between the plains and the hills, which had formerly been ceded to the British government—was suggested; the value of the equivalent being somewhat awkwardly depreciated by the *Calcutta* press, which described the territory as of no earthly use to the English, and therefore as very proper to be ceded in return for valuable assistance in a time of need!

By another authority (probably self-constituted), it was announced that Jung Bahadoor had applied to the government for the grant of a tract of land in the northern part of the Oude district, with the right and title of prince, "protected" by the British government. His highness, it was said, was well aware that his present exalted position, won as it had been by sheer energy and indomitable strength of character, was, at best, a precarious one, especially in a court like that of Khatmandoo—famous for intrigues of unusual cunning and hardihood; and he felt, that were he the ruler, recognised as an ally by the British government, of ever so small a principality, even though it was but a strip of *terai*, trans-Gogra, it would give him such status and position among his unscrupulous adversaries round the throne of Nepaul, as would render him safe from their machinations, and permanently secure to him the influence he had already acquired in the government of that country.

However the question of remuneration for service in the field might be disposed of, it is certain that the stout hearts and sharp kookrees of Jung Bahadoor's Ghoorkas very soon found opportunity to prove their mettle upon the enemy of their friend and ally. Upon emerging from the mountain passes that form the southern boundary of Nepaul, the maharajah, Jung Bahadoor,

\* Nepaul is about equal in extent to England, and is one of the few remaining independent states of Northern India; comprising the southern slopes of the Himalaya mountain chain, which forms its northern boundary; having on the west and south sides the British territories of Behar and Oude, and, on the east, Kumaon. The region is distinguished by its giant mountains, which separate it from Thibet; by the dense forest jungle of the Terai, on the Oude frontier; and by a beautiful valley, in which the capital, Khatmandoo, is situated, and which is covered with flourishing towns and villages, luxuriant fields and picturesque streams. The climate of Nepaul is temperate and healthy. The inhabitants, about two millions in number, comprise Ghoorkas, Newars, Bhotias, Dhanwars, and Manjees; but the Ghoorkas are the dominant race. The Newars are the

aborigines of Nepaul, and are the artisans of the kingdom; while the Ghoorkas are hardy soldiers: the other three tribes are chiefly cultivators of the soil. In the latter half of the last century, Nepaul was for a short time a dependency of the Chinese empire; but a treaty of commerce with the Anglo-Indian government, in 1782, enabled it to throw off Chinese supremacy, and establish its own independence. In 1812, the East India Company made war upon Nepaul, and narrowly escaped ignominious defeat. A peace ensued, which lasted until 1816, when another rupture occurred. After a short but severe struggle, in which the soldierlike qualities of the Ghoorkas were established, a treaty of amity succeeded, which had not since been violated. A great portion of the transit trade between Cashmere and the Chinese empire, passes through Nepaul.



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with his 10,000 Ghoorkas, composed of fourteen regiments of infantry, and four batteries of artillery of six guns each, reached Segowlie—a frontier town in the British dominions—on the morning of the 21st of December; and the chief was there received by the authorities assembled for the purpose, with great demonstrations of respect. The same day the troops were reviewed; and, on the following morning, a brigade marched for Bettiah, and another for Govindgunge. On the 23rd, the maharajah and the British officers in his suite, followed the troops to Bettiah, where they halted while carriages were collected for their further progress.

On the 30th of the month, the baggage of the Ghoorka force having all been conveyed across the Gundah, the army marched from the right bank of that river to Bimnowlee factory on the following day. On the 1st of January, 1858, the force reached Gobernath; and, on the 2nd, arrived at Parowno—a town of some importance in the Bengal presidency; where a lithographed proclamation of Mahomed Hossein's was found attached to the Tehseeldaree, which notified to the world at large, that his Nuseeh had risen higher than the stars, and called upon all men to assist him in the extermination of the Feringhees. Four burkandazes were tried at this place for having taken service under Mahomed Hossein, and three of them atoned for their crime by death. On the 3rd, the force marched to Ramkotah, the zemindar of which had been acting under the orders of Mahomed; and had his house burned down as a mark of disapproval of his conduct. His personal safety had been secured by a timely flight. Continuing their route, the Ghoorka force moved on towards Preetpaitch, on the road to Goruckpore—the capital of a district in the presidency of Bengal, adjoining the Nepaulese dominions, and about 150 miles N.W.N. of Patna. The town, which is situated on the Raptee, had been for some time in the hands of a rebel force from Fyzabad; and, from its position in reference to the stations at

Azimgurh, Jounpore, and other important places, its early recovery from the insurgents was desirable.

It should be observed, that previous to the advance of the Ghoorka force, Jung Bahadoor had stipulated, that a European officer should be attached to each of his regiments; and, accordingly, a number of officers of all arms, with General Macgregor at their head, were ordered from Calcutta to join the Nepaulese troops. A description of the chief and his army was given in a letter from one of these officers, in the following terms:—

"Yesterday, we went to see the maharajah in full durbar. He is a very fine fellow, and made a most favourable impression on us all. He was magnificently dressed; but, at the same time, in the very best taste.\* He is accompanied by two of his brothers; one of them second in command, and the other without any specific appointment. The army, which consists of about 11,000 men, is formed into divisions, commanded by the Jung's half-brothers. Indeed, half the durbar was composed of his blood relations. After the durbar, which did not last half-an-hour, we went out to look at the troops. They were drawn up in lines of regiments one behind the other, the best, of course, in front; but we were very agreeably surprised, both as to their state of discipline, *physique*, and equipment. They marched as steadily as any troops I ever saw. The double march was singularly steady; and they formed column, square, and deployed, and passed in review in a most soldierlike and steady manner. Far from realising our preconceived notions of Ghoorka diminutiveness, they, at any rate in the crack corps, were giants; and even those in the non-selected regiments were very much larger than in our Ghoorka battalions. I inquired about their composition; and General Rumheer Sing, the second in command, informed me that, with the exception of seventeen, they were all pure Ghoorkas.† The Jung is most anxious to get at the enemy."

At length, on the morning of the 6th of

\* Another correspondent with the army afterwards writes upon this subject as follows:—"Jung Bahadoor's dress was most magnificent. The first day he wore the skin of a wild animal for a coat, richly trimmed with head-bands of pure gold; his girdle was of the same, studded with precious stones; his trowsers of fine cloth of gold. As for his turban, it was really magnificent; first there was a row of rubies all round it, then emeralds; and a broad plate of pure

large diamonds in front, with a large waving plume. Fancy, his entire dress was worth upwards of six lacs of rupees (£60,000.) His two younger brothers were with him, of course dressed as superbly, befitting their high rank in Nepal."

† These hardy soldiers are of Monghol origin, but smaller and darker than the real Chinese. They first became familiar to the British by their resolute soldierly qualities during our wars with Nepal; and



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## INDIAN MUTINY.

[THE FIRST FIGHT.]

January, the maharajah, with his troops, set out from Preepraitch, about ten miles from Goruckpore, for the purpose of attacking the rebels at that place: the road was heavy and bad, running through thick jungle almost the entire way, and intersected by three nullahs. The force marched at 7 A.M., and, after proceeding about two miles, came upon the jungle, where it separated, one brigade taking ground to the right, and another to the left, for the purpose of turning the enemy's position near a broken bridge over a nullah in the centre of the wood. The movement had scarcely been completed before the centre column of the Ghoorkas came suddenly upon the rebel force strongly posted in the jungle. The Ghoorka guns at once opened fire, and for a time were vigorously replied to both by guns and musketry; but the conflict did not last; for, on the advance of the Ghoorka infantry, the rebels turned and fled, leaving behind them an iron gun, with limber and bullocks attached. From this moment, for about four miles through the jungle, it became a race for life between the enemy and their pursuers; but the former, spurred on by terror of the Ghoorkas, flew with extraordinary speed, strewing the road with their shoes, which they cast away to expedite their flight. On arriving at the bridge, which the rebels had only partially broken, a few sappers were brought to the front; and it was quickly rendered passable for the troops, who, shortly after crossing, came upon a body of rebel sowars, whom a few rounds sufficed to disperse. In this advance, the rapid and effective manner in which the guns were handled by the Ghoorkas, elicited the surprise and admiration of the European officers attached to the force; they having no limbers, were drawn by hand, the trail being supported on the shoulders of other men. After dispersing this body of cavalry the whole force reunited and advanced. Upon reaching the crest of a small eminence in front of Goruckpore, the enemy opened fire from a clump of trees, in direct line with the advancing column; but the Ghoorkas, having brought up their guns to the front, drove the enemy from his position, and then

although Hindoos by religion, they have little in common with Hindoos, as regards caste prejudices and exclusiveness; nor do they sympathise materially with the inhabitants of the plains of Hindostan. Being natives of a country of but limited wealth, they have, within the last few years, evinced a readiness to enter the military service of the Company as auxiliary troops; and, as such, have been incorporated

charged *en masse*. From this point it was a race into the station, the Ghoorkas cutting up the stragglers on the road with their kookrees. The intrenched position of the rebels had been abandoned by all but about a dozen men, who were instantly cut down; and the chase was continued through the town to the bank of the river, when a frightful slaughter commenced. A number of the rebels had succeeded in crossing by a ferry; and had they lined the opposite bank of the river, and kept up a fire upon the Ghoorkas, many, if not most of their party might have escaped with life; but *saute qui peut* was the order of the day with them, and they all fled in confusion; the consequence was, that, without order or combination, they became a mob, and were struck down in great numbers, boat-loads of them being shot, drowned, or cut to pieces, until the river was actually red with their blood.

"So continuous," says an eye-witness, "was the fire-firing for upwards of an hour, that the maharajah thought the sepoys were making a stand: he became desperate with excitement; and those who were near him must have thought we were fighting another Inkermann. Altogether, though no passage of arms, it was a very respectable 'scrimmage'; we took six guns, and two things which we have called '*rumbouruks*,' for want of a better name, mounted on carriages; and two not mounted, besides a little 1-pounder brought in by the villagers."

The result of this action was the entire clearance of the Goruckpore district. The rebel leader, Mahomed Hossein, fled to Tanda, a town on the road to Fyzabad, in the vicinity of which he again collected his scattered forces. The Ghoorkas, for a few days, remained upon the field of their triumph while waiting for carriage.

A letter from Goruckpore, of the 12th of January, gave the following account of the state of affairs at that place:—"This town has now been almost a week in our possession, and matters are rapidly returning to their former state. New thanadars and tehseeldars are appointed; several of those who held post under the Nizam (as Mahomed Hossein is called by the natives) are

into a force called the Simoor and Kumaon Battalions, which upon several occasions in the early stages of the revolt, found opportunity to exhibit their earnestness in the cause of their European employers. The troops of which we are now treating, form a distinct body, employed on a special service, and commanded by its own chief, the Jung Bahadoor, who was assisted on the occasion by a staff of British officers.



being brought in for trial, and execution quickly follows. Already we see convicts clearing up the station, and no doubt the gaol will soon be again as well tenanted as it was in August last. No regard is shown to a man's former rank: all alike are made to do sweepers' work, so far as clearing up and removing rubbish goes. The church, which had been completely dismantled by the rebels (who had taken away or destroyed everything removable, and smashed the windows), has been cleansed, and the writing effaced from the walls; the civil offices are crowded with candidates for situations; and British authority, I am happy to learn, is being rapidly re-established over the district.

"We expect hourly the arrival, at Goruckpore, of that consummate villain Mushurruf Khan,\* who was apprehended a few days since by the rance of Bustie, but was taken from her by a powerful zemindar of the same district, who is anxious to curry favour with the British government, now that it is again unmistakably in the ascendant. Ten men were hung the day after we arrived, and six on the following day; how many more since it is not easy to say, as the gallows was removed from the conspicuous spot it occupied in consequence of an intimation from the Nepaulese chief, that it was displeasing to him to see bodies hanging. Bustie, where the force will next move to, is about forty miles from this, and half-way to Fyzabad."

On the 22nd of January, the advanced brigade of Jung Bahadoor's force had reached Belwa Bagur on the Gogra, opposite to Fyzabad; and, with the brigades of General Franks and Colonel Rowcroft, formed a complete chain on the south and east of Oude, from Fyzabad to within twenty miles of Allahabad.

It should be observed, that early in December, the brigade under Colonel Rowcroft had moved up the country, in the direction

\* This individual had formerly been sentenced to imprisonment for "budmashee," by Mr. Bird, the joint magistrate of Goruckpore. When the station was abandoned by the British, Mr. Bird alone remained at his post; but his efforts to maintain order were fruitless; the gaol was thrown open, and the prisoners liberated; and the first visitor Mr. Bird was honoured with from that undesirable locality, was Mushurruf Khan, who coolly walked into his house, and, sitting down upon a sofa, informed the magistrate that he had come to settle the little account they had between them. Mushurruf Khan was armed, and accompanied by a number of his gaol companions. Mr. Bird was alone, all police,

of Goruckpore, where, ultimately, he established communications with Jung Bahadoor, who sent him a reinforcement of 500 men; and with these, the marines, and naval brigade, the colonel considered it safe to advance against a body of the enemy encamped at Sohunpore, on the Little Gundah. With the accession mentioned, Colonel Rowcroft's whole strength only amounted to 1,100 men, of whom but 160 were Europeans; the enemy, on the other hand, mustered over 5,000 men, with a large train of artillery. Leaving his camp between Myrwa and Mujhowlee, in the Sarun district, the colonel, on the 26th of December, moved forward to attack the position held by the rebels, and, after a sharp encounter, succeeded in dislodging them, and driving them across the river. In the accomplishment of this result, the British commander was necessitated to change his front several times, to prevent the enemy from overlapping his flanks, and so gradually forcing him to retire without a chance of engaging under an accidental advantage of ground which he had secured. In the course of the war, there was scarcely another instance of an enemy so numerically superior, being forced to retreat before a force so weak, and with such small loss to the attacking party—Colonel Rowcroft having but four men wounded. By his masterly operations at Sohunpore, he forced the rebels out of the district of Sarun, crossed the Little Gundah, and effectually assisted the ulterior movements of the Ghoorka force. The following is the despatch of Colonel Rowcroft, to the secretary of government, in reference to this spirited affair:—

"Camp, Mujhowlee, on the river Chota Gundah,

"25 miles west of Sewan, 28th Dec., 1857.

"I have the honour to report, for the information of the right honourable the governor-general, that the field force under my command received a reinforcement of the Gorucknath regiment of Ghoorkas (500 strong) on the morning of the 25th of Decem-

gaol-guard, and rajah followers having deserted him. After a tolerably long stay, the worthy Naib Nazim left the house, with a promise that he would repeat his visit before long; in the interim, however, Mr. Bird escaped from the place on an elephant, and got safely through the jungle to Chuprah. Upon the advance of Jung Bahadoor's force, he accompanied it as joint magistrate of the district; and upon the subsequent recapture of Mushurruf Khan, he had the satisfaction of hanging his uninvited visitor, whom he first had paraded in a cart through the streets of Goruckpore, where, during the five preceding months, he had been accustomed to ride about with a species of regal pomp.



A.D. 1857.]

## INDIAN MUTINY.

[BATTLE OF SOHUNPORE.]

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ber, sent on to join me by forced marches from Segowlie, by his excellency Maharajah Jung Bahadur, and Mr. Samuels, the commissioner. It was represented to me strongly that they were too fatigued, foot-sore, and hungry, to march again that day, and that they had been without sleep for two nights. I therefore postponed for the day, though reluctantly, my arrangements to move and attack the rebels at Sohunpore, seven miles distant, and about midway between my intrenched camp at Myrwa and Muihowlee. About half-past seven on the morning of the 26th of December, I marched from camp with the force,\* leaving two companies (a hundred men) of Ghoorkas, and fifty matchlockmen of the Hutwara rajah's, for the protection of the camp; and of these, half a company and twenty matchlockmen to watch and secure the narrow causeway bridge over the river Jurhaee, less than half a mile in front of my camp. It was reported to me that the rebels were posted in the village of Sohunpore, and in two or three large topes (woods) close to it, on either side of the Muihowlee-road, with a tank with high banks close in front of the village on the north, in which most of the sepoys, and three of their four guns, were posted. On arriving within little more than half a mile of the position of the rebels, I formed line, and took ground to the right, to turn their left flank, and act more easily on the tank. During this movement, the enemy pushed forward numerous skirmishers into the topes and cultivation, and opened fire of guns and musketry on our line. Our skirmishers, consisting of the marines, part of the naval brigade, and Sikhs, soon returned their fire, doing much execution among the enemy, especially the marines, with the Minié rifle. We also opened fire with our guns; and a few shells well thrown in two or three directions, checked the rebels for a time. I advanced the line a short distance, when the main body of the enemy rapidly moved to their right, to join a force previously in position—I strongly suspect, on our left; their aim apparently being to surround us with their numbers. I changed our front immediately to our left. During this time, a village on our left was steadily and gallantly held by Lieutenant Burlton (40th regiment native infantry), with the fifty Sikhs, and I sent two companies of the Ramdull regiment of Ghoorkas, to reinforce him in holding that post, and, if possible, to capture a gun firing on our left. Lieutenant Burlton reports that Subahdar Himkumal Bushnia (9th company Ramdull Ghoorkas) behaved very gallantly, constantly encouraging his men, and, in riding at one of the rebels who was attacking Lieutenant Burlton, inflicting, fortunately, only a cut through his turban and helmet, the subahdar was severely wounded by a tulwar-cut round the left hip, a Sikh then rushing up, cutting down, and killing the rebel. After changing ground to the left, I advanced the line towards the enemy, now and then allowing our guns to throw a shell or two. The enemy made a show of advancing a short distance, with about fifty sowars in their front. After advancing the line a short distance, two or three shells were beautifully pitched into the midst of this large body of foot and horsemen, at 900 or 1,000 yards distance, scattering

\* Royal marines, 30; naval brigade, 130; Ramdull Ghoorka regiment, 500; Gorucknath ditto, 350 (one company of this regiment being at Sewan, and two in camp); four guns (12-pounder howitzers), two being mountain-train; Captain Ratray's Sikhs, 50.

them in all directions. I am sorry there was no opportunity to allow of the Ghoorkas joining in a charge. The main body then moved rapidly to their left, as if to gain their old position in the topes and village. Our line was changed to the right. During the former advance and this movement, the rebel skirmishers were firing from heavy cover on us from our right and right rear. I ordered the marines to skirmish and cover our right, and two companies of the Gorucknath regiment, who were placed in reserve to cover our right rear. The line and skirmishers advanced, firing a few rounds from our guns into the topes, and in the direction of the tank. The rebels seem to have had only a rear-guard at this time left at Sohunpore. The skirmishers rapidly advanced into the topes, which we found quite clear of the enemy. Three tents of Baboo Koer Sing's nephew, Hurkishen Sing, were here found all pitched, and a quantity of grain, &c. I ordered the tents to be burned at once. We then moved to the right, to get on the Muihowlee-road, and continued our advance without delay to Muihowlee, some six miles distant. Within about two miles of Muihowlee, we saw the rear of the rebels entering the place; and on nearing it, I ordered the marines, and part of the naval brigade, and four companies of the Gorucknath regiment, to push on rapidly after the Sikhs composing the advance guard, in the hope of capturing their guns, crossing the deep ford of the Gundah. I am happy to say one large iron 6-pounder gun, and limber complete, full of ammunition, was taken near the river. The Sikhs, and some men of the Gorucknath regiment, with Captain Koolpurshad Sing Bushnia, were among the first down at the river in capturing the gun. The cultivation was so heavy, and we advanced on so quickly, it was difficult to ascertain the number of the rebels killed. Two other tumbrils—one full of ammunition, the other of powder—and some carts, were also taken. The rebels, by all reports and appearances, were 1,100 or 1,200 sepoys, and between 4,000 and 5,000 other armed men. The Naib Nazim, Mushurraf Khan, was present in the action with his force, and also Ali Kureem, Moulvie of Patna, who was first reported to have been killed in the action, but now said to have got away the evening before. The governor-general will be pleased to learn, that this one day's work has completely cleared the district of this horde of marauding rebels, relieving the many villages of their plundering and oppression. The rajah of Muihowlee and the people gladly welcomed us, as did other people on the road. The rajah states that the rebels made sure of surrounding and destroying us, as we were so few, and of being able to get into Chuprah, and to plunder the district. The rajah also states that, with the sepoys, matchlockmen, sword and spearmen, the rebels were more than 6,000 or 7,000 strong. I do not think the rebels had heard of the arrival of the second Ghoorka regiment on the 25th of December. I learn from the Muihowlee rajah, and other reports, that there must have been some 120 of the rebels killed, by the number of bodies since seen in their positions in the field. Besides many wounded, a few rebels were killed at the ford, and six in one boat. I am happy to say we have had few casualties. The gun and basket-firing of the rebels was too high, their round shot and matchlock bullets mostly passing over our heads, one round shot killing a dhooly bearer and a villager in our rear. A Ghoorka private of the Gorucknath regiment was wounded by a musket-ball, and also



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one of the magistrate's sowars. It is a marvel none in the line were hit, for numbers of the round shot, &c., passed over or by us, tearing up the ground, and ricocheting, but without hitting any one. The action commenced about 10 A.M.; and by half-past 1 P.M. we had dispersed the rebels, and driven them through the ropes and village of Sohnpore, and had followed them up and driven them out of Mujhowlee, and over the river Gundah by 4 P.M. The troops had a hard day's work, and went through their fatigue most cheerfully. I was myself in the saddle for ten hours, or would have written to you earlier; but I wrote and reported our advance and successful attack, and complete operation, to Brigadier-general Macgregor, with Maharajah Jung Bahadoor, the same evening, express to Bettiah. We bivouacked for the night near the river, having marched without tents or baggage, except two or three tents for the men of the naval brigade, and a few hackeries for the ammunition, and to carry the Ghoorkas and Sikhs in case of accidents during the action.

"I marched again yesterday morning (27th December) with a detachment of the naval brigade, two guns, eight companies of Ghoorkas (400 men), and the Sikhs—crossed the river, and moved through Selimpore, and about two miles beyond, to the house of one Narain Dial Conengoe, formerly an assistant collector, who had been forward in marauding and giving aid to the rebels. His house was blown up, burnt, and destroyed. We also moved to another village, to the house of one Sungram Lall, the nephew and toomandar of the above, and destroyed his house; but neither of the villages was injured. We returned to camp at half-past 4 P.M.

"I need hardly say that the troops behaved, as British marines and seamen ever do, most excellently and gallantly: Captain Sotheby was ever ready and present with the guns, and to afford me every assistance in the field. Captain Sotheby has paid great attention to the drill and training of the naval brigade for land service, and in quickly training the horses and ponies for the guns—horses for the large 12-pounder guns, and ponies for the three others, and the seamen to ride and act as gunners; and, under Lieutenant Turner, R.N., in charge of the artillery, they have had constant drill and training, and are now ready and steady for field service, and were in the action of the 26th December.

"Major Captain Sree Bhuggut Khanks, commanding Ramdull regiment; Captain Deredass Opu-diah, Ramdull regiment; Captain Koolpurshad Sing Bushnial, commanding Gorucknath regiment, and all the officers of the two Ghoorka regiments, were anxious and ready to render good service; and the men of both regiments were steady and willing in the field, and kept well to the front with the European force.

"I respectfully beg to recommend Captain Sotheby, R.N., of her majesty's steam-frigate *Pearl*, and all the civil, military, and naval officers, to the favourable notice of the right honourable the governor-general.

"I have reports that the rebels left their gun which played on our left behind them, in some well or jungle at Sohnpore, and also the two guns they are said to have crossed over the river, somewhere hidden beyond Selimpore. The rebels will feel the want of their guns and ordnance stores at Goruckpore, as they are said to be in want of ammunition.

"On the evening of the 26th, I dispatched a messenger to Myrwa to move on the camp and baggage,

which was carefully brought on to this place at 4 P.M. yesterday, under Lieutenant Hamilton, 8th regiment native infantry, doing duty with the naval brigade.

"I have ordered a bridge of boats to be got ready to cross the river to-morrow, to facilitate the movement over of the numerous hackeries, the only carriage we have; to be ready to move and act according to reports brought in, and probable orders from Brigadier-general Macgregor, and to co-operate with the maharajah's Nepaulese army.

"A few sepoys and rebels were brought in prisoners during yesterday. They will be duly and speedily disposed of. Proclamations have been sent out to the villagers to capture all rebels, and offering rewards:—I have, &c.—H. ROWCROFT, Colonel, Commanding Sarun Field Force."

Having at length put Cawnpore into an efficient state of defence, and restored discipline in the camp there, after the irregularities that followed the disastrous occurrences of the later days of November, the commander-in-chief appointed Brigadier Inglis (of Lucknow) to the command, *vice* General Windham, removed to Umballah; and on the 24th of December, Sir Colin Campbell, with a force of about 8,000 men, commenced his march towards Futteghur (the British cantonment of Furruckabad), proceeding by the Great Trunk-road. On the 28th of the month, his force reached Meerun-ki-Serai, where he opened communications with Colonel Seaton at Mynpoorie, through Lieutenant Hodson, of the irregular horse which bears his name; who, with a hundred of his men, made a rapid dash over ninety miles of country overrun with rebels; and having received the chief's orders for the advance of Colonel Seaton to Furruckabad, he galloped back to Mynpoorie, having narrowly escaped being crossed in his ride by the retreating troops and guns of the rajah of Etawah, who had been driven from that town by Seaton's column during his absence. In the meantime Sir Colin Campbell continued his advance along the Great Trunk-road, and, on the 29th, reached Jellalabad, a small village two marches from Futteghur, where a large body of matchlockmen, with several guns, appeared to dispute his further progress. Without a moment's delay the rebel force was saluted with a discharge of grape and round shot; and without an effort to maintain their position, the insurgents dispersed, leaving behind them eighteen pieces of cannon, besides a quantity of small arms which they threw away in their flight. On the 1st of the month of January, the head-quarters of the British force were



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## INDIAN MUTINY.

[ADVANCE ON FUTTEGHUR.

at the village of Goorsuhagunje, six miles beyond which the road crosses the Kalee Nuddee by a suspension-bridge, which the enemy had broken down, and had also taken the precaution to remove or destroy all the boats in the vicinity. A brigade was at once sent forward with the sappers to restore this means of communication, and by the morning of the 2nd, the bridge was nearly completed, when the repairing party was fired upon from a village on the opposite side of the river. Had the enemy ventured upon this interruption some two or three hours earlier, they might, from the nature of the ground on the other side of the stream, have caused very serious annoyance; but they fortunately delayed until the bridge was nearly completed. A heavy cannonade was instantly opened upon the village by the guns of the naval brigade, while the whole force was brought up; and the bridge being now finished, the men advanced across it, and deployed in front of the village. The rebels scarcely had time to look upon the British troops before they were swept from the position they had taken, and driven up the road towards Futteghur, for several miles, by the cavalry and horse artillery, losing six guns and a quantity of ammunition in their hasty flight. Encamping for the night at the twelfth milestone from Futteghur, Sir Colin marched upon that cantonment early on the morning of the 4th, and hopes ran high that before the close of that day many a treacherous murder would be avenged upon the very spot on which it had been perpetrated; but they were not realised. At three o'clock p.m., the advanced column reached the station, but no semblance of human existence was there to meet it—no sound was heard save the echoes of the footfall of the impatient band that thirsted for retribution. During the preceding night the rebel camp had broken up, and its recreant occupiers had fled from the station; two heavy guns stood ready shotted on the parade-ground; the intrenched camp was left all standing, filled with the furniture, carriages, and other property of the fugitive English residents, afterwards murdered on their passage down the Ganges by order of Nana Sahib.\* All the enemy's guns, except two, which he had carried off, and a large quantity of stores and ammunition, fell into the hands of the disappointed soldiers upon this occasion. On the 5th, the

city of Furruckabad, three miles distant, was also taken possession of by Sir Colin Campbell, and, to the intense dissatisfaction of the troops under his command, without the slightest attempt at opposition, the whole of the rebel force having abandoned the place.

Fortunately, their retreat had been so precipitate, that they had not time to destroy the government property within the town; and thus Sir Colin found a large quantity of stores of the most valuable description, belonging to the gun and clothing departments, available for his immediate use. Having secured these important items of military property, the commander-in-chief sent a large stock of grain to Cawnpore, to assist the commissariat in supplying the troops of Sir James Outram at the Alumbagh. The nawab of Furruckabad had long been notorious as one of the most ferocious leaders of the insurgents, and the time had now arrived when punishment could no longer be evaded. In a telegram from the commander-in-chief at this time, it is stated—“The destruction of the nawab's palace is in progress. I think it right that not a stone should be left unturned in all the residences of the guilty chiefs. They are far more culpable than their misguided followers.”

A letter from an officer attached to the force with Sir Colin Campbell, has the following details of the action of the 2nd of January, at the Kalee Nuddee, and of the advance to Futteghur on the following day. After describing the movements of the commander-in-chief on his way from Cawnpore, the writer says—“His course lay from Meerun-ki-Serai to Goorsuhagunje, where head-quarters were established on the 1st of January. A brigade was sent on to repair the suspension-bridge, fourteen miles from that place. They commenced work on the 1st, and, by the morning of the 2nd, had finished it all but one or two planks, which they were laying down when Sir Colin saw the villagers come out of the village opposite. He desired some one to go and tell them not to be afraid, as they would not be hurt, when all of a sudden off came a round shot from amongst them, which killed four men of the 53rd. The enemy were then discovered to be in force: the naval brigade opened on the village for about two hours, the enemy returning the fire with an 18-pounder and 9-pounder. The bridge was soon finished,

\* See vol. i., p. 349.



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and then Sir Colin with his force crossed, turned the enemy out of the village, and pursued them with cavalry and artillery for about eight miles. The naval rockets blew up a magazine of theirs very prettily, and knocked over a 9-pounder; this and another gun they left in the village. The cavalry captured four more—one an 18-pounder, and plenty of ammunition; in all, six guns that day. Our loss was Younghusband, of the Sikhs, shot through the lungs; and Maxwell, of the artillery, shot through the thigh. General Grant was slightly touched, and a spent ball hit Sir Colin on the stomach, but did not injure him; four men of the 53rd were killed, and six or seven of the 8th were also knocked over by a shell; no others wounded. They encamped at the twelfth milestone from here, and started again on the 3rd at 11 A.M. The cavalry, the night before, came upon a body of the rebels in the open, and cut them up in grand style. Fifty bodies were counted in a few fields—all sepoys. The force came near Futteghur about 3 P.M.; and, to their disgust, found the enemy had decamped during the night. They had an 18 and 24-pounder ready loaded, and were intrenched on the grand parade; also an intrenched camp outside the fort. They left all their guns but two, and ammunition, and merely made off with all the treasure, and two guns to protect it."

A letter from Futteghur, dated January 5th, stated, that, on the previous day, Nadir Khan, one of the individuals concerned in executing the orders of Nana Sahib for the murder of the European women at Cawnpore, was hanged in the midst of a great number of the native inhabitants, and that he died "calling upon the people of India to draw their swords and assert their independence, by the extermination of the English."

Another correspondent, at the camp of the commander-in-chief, says—"We arrived at Futteghur about 5 P.M. on the 3rd instant. We had a brush with the rebels on the way, and gave them a sound thrashing, killing about 200, and capturing seven guns—one of them a 32-pounder. The rebels bolted from Futteghur, leaving ten guns, a good deal of ammunition, and a vast quantity of miscellaneous plunder. They have gone across the Ganges into Oude, and, fools like, the panic-stricken wretches could not muster up courage enough to wait and blow up the bridge of boats, which, if they had

done, would have delayed us for a week at least, instead of leaving us, as now, at liberty to cross over at any moment we choose. The chief's force suffered much during the advance on Futteghur. The 'old man' was determined to push on, and all in camp were eager to carry out his ideas. Forced marches, and sometimes nothing for breakfast and dinner, were accordingly the order of the day. Add to this, lots of hard work, and bivouacking on the open plain, and you will be able to form something like an accurate idea of the march from Cawnpore. The rebels' camp at Futteghur was a curious sight. It had evidently been abandoned in haste, and in hot haste too. It was full of articles plundered from Europeans. For instance, ladies' boots and shoes, with portions of dress, and many articles of personal requirement among females and children, were strewn about all over the camp. The Pandies must have been in a great fright, which we shall, doubtless, increase before long. We care not how soon."

Previous to the flight of the rebels from Furruckabad, the nawab had fired a portion of the town, and allowed his retainers to plunder it. At one time he had evidently contemplated resistance, as heavy guns were mounted on the walls of his fort, and at other points which might have been troublesome to the advancing troops; but the rapid and complete discomfiture of his advanced post at the village near the Kalee Nuddee, assured him that his only chance of safety consisted in flight; and he fled accordingly, seeking an asylum in Oude, the precise quarter in which the commander-in-chief desired hereafter to meet with him.

Almost at the same time these events were in progress, Colonel Walpole, who had been dispatched from Cawnpore to clear Etawah with his column, encountered and defeated the enemy at a place called Akbarpore, where he captured a number of guns, and arrested twenty persons of Nana Sahib's immediate retinue, whom he tried for their complicity in that chief's atrocities, and immediately hung. From thence, marching by Mynpoorie, and clearing the country as he advanced, he at length joined the commander-in-chief at Futteghur.

On the 1st of February, Sir Colin Campbell broke up his camp at Futteghur, and commenced his return march to Cawnpore. Himself, with General Mansfield, and the officers of his staff, pushed on in advance of the army, escorted by the 9th lancers and



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## INDIAN MUTINY.

[GENERAL OPERATIONS.]

a troop of Bengal horse artillery, and, proceeding at the rate of twenty-five miles a-day, he arrived at Cawnpore on the 4th of the month. When at Soorajpore, their last halting-place before reaching the city, the commander-in-chief was informed that the arch-rebel and murderer, Nana Sahib, was on the opposite side of the river in Oude, with a small guard of Mahratta irregular infantry: there was, however, no means by which he could be reached; although, but for the intervention of the river, the traitor, and his handful of adherents, might have been surrounded, and their capture, living or dead, effected by the chief's escort.

The main body of troops at Futteghur followed the commander-in-chief with all speed; the 82nd regiment, with some Sikh cavalry and infantry, only remaining to protect the station. Walpole's brigade was withdrawn across the Ganges, from the right bank of the Ramgunge, on the farther side of which he had been watching a large but inactive body of Rohileund rebels, and arrived at Cawnpore on the 10th and 11th. Hope's brigade, which, on the 26th of January, overthrew, with loss, a body of Mussulman fanatics at Shumsabad Mhow (twenty-five miles from Futteghur), reached Cawnpore on the 7th; and on the following day, the commander-in-chief departed by rail for Allahabad, at which city the governor-general had already arrived, for the purpose of consultation with him. The interview was important in its results, as unity of purpose was thereby secured between the two chief authorities in India; and, on the 12th, Sir Colin rejoined the army at Cawnpore.

Meanwhile, Jung Bahadoor, with his Ghoorkas, remained inactive before Fyzabad in eastern Oude, being unable to take the place for want of ammunition. Supplies were consequently ordered for him from Benares; and, pending their arrival at his camp, the march of Brigadier Franks, on the road from Jounpore by Sultanpore to Lucknow, was halted at Budlapore. Such were the respective positions, on the 7th of February, of the two auxiliary forces destined to aid the commander-in-chief in the reconquest of Oude.

Turning to the north-west of that territory, the great province of Rohileund still continued a wide field of disorder and outrage, although, by the beginning of February, no less than five Sikh regiments of foot, with cavalry and guns, had moved down the roads

from Lahore, and were already within the boundary of the province. Before their arrival, however, a severe blow had been inflicted upon the rebels of Bareilly. Of these depredators, three large bodies were stationed at the following points, between Bareilly and the hills:—One party, under Fuze Huk, held the road to Peeleebheel, at a point fourteen miles from the bottom of the Nynce Tal hill; a second was at Rudapore, further to the west; and a third was in the centre, on the main Bareilly-road, twenty-four miles from the Nynce Tal hill, or rather from the camp at the foot of the hill, occupied by Colonel M'Causland, with the 66th Ghoorkas, some 500 Nepalese and hill-men, with irregular horse, and four light guns; in all, about 1,200 men. With this little force, on the 10th of February, the colonel attacked the rebels on the Bareilly-road (commanded by Kalee Khan, who had advanced within thirteen miles of his camp), and utterly routed them, capturing three guns, and killing and wounding upwards of 500 of the rebel troops. His own loss, in killed and wounded, was thirty-five, including among the latter two officers of the 66th regiment. The action over, Colonel M'Causland prudently marched back to his camp, which was exposed to attack by the two other forces of the enemy, having, within twenty-four hours, traversed nearly thirty miles, and fought a pitched battle.

At this period all was quiet in the Punjab, from whence Sikh regiments moved down into Hindostan; while European ones came from Kurrachee to take their places. On the 4th of the month, Sir John Lawrence arrived at Loodiana with the 17th Punjab infantry, on his way to Delhi and Agra—the districts recently handed over to his superintendence; and from Mooltan the 7th fusiliers had arrived at Lahore, relieving the 81st regiment, which was thus free to reinforce the scanty garrison at Peshawur.

At the same time, a small Bombay force left Hyderabad, in Scinde, for Rajpootana, and arrived at Jeysulmeer, from which point it might be conveniently directed upon Joudpore, if necessary. The Rajpootanee force, under General Roberts, had also commenced its march from Nusseerabad to Kotah. In Malwa, the energies of the rebels appeared to be crushed; and the execution of the rajah of Amjhara, at Indore, had stricken a wholesome terror among the disaffected. The delinquent was

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one of the first among the native chiefs to commence disturbance in his district; but was spared by Sir Robert Hamilton, the political commissioner, when his ministers were executed, upon the ground of imbecility—a plea that no longer availed him.

Further to the eastward, in Central India, Sir Hugh Rose and General Whitlock were pressing on, helping to reduce into an ever-narrowing circle, the yet smouldering fires of rebellion and anarchy. The first-named commander, after having relieved Saugor from the presence of the enemy, moved eastward against a strongly situated fort, called Guratoka, about twenty-five miles from that place, supposed to be occupied by the remains of the mutinous 52nd Bengal native infantry. He proceeded to invest the fort, which, however, from its extent and situation, his force would have been perfectly inadequate to accomplish, when the occupants, seized with a panic, fled from the place. A party of cavalry and horse artillery, sent in pursuit, cut up nearly a hundred of the fugitives; and then, having demolished the defences of the fort, Sir Hugh moved with his brigade towards Jhansie, on which point his other column, with Captain Orr's force of the Hyderabad contingent, had already marched.

During these operations of Sir Hugh Rose, and pending the arrival at Jubbulpore of General Whitlock's force, a small Madras column, sent out from that station on the Great Deccan-road to the Ganges, had not been idle. Several rebel villages were destroyed; and an attack of the rebels in force upon the village of Sleemanabad, was gallantly repulsed by detachments of the 28th and 33rd Madras native infantry. Communications were also opened with Captain Osborne and the rajah of Rewah, by whom the fort of Bijrajooghur had been taken. The rajah of the place contrived to escape; but the *killadar* (commandant of the fort) and ninety-four other prisoners were taken. These men Captain Osborne hesitated to execute, doubting the temper of the Rewah men; and he accordingly sent the prisoners down the road to the Madrasees, by whom they were readily shot. General Whitlock's force was to leave Jubbulpore about the 15th of the month, and advance in two divisions—one along the great road to the Ganges, the other to Saugor by way of Dumoh.

The Calpee rebels, thus pressed upon in

the rear, had been twice compelled to measure swords with the British troops—once near Etawah, where 125 of them were destroyed in a walled enclosure, by a force under Mr. Hume, a collector; and the second time towards Cawapore, where a detachment of the 88th regiment attacked a party of them which had crossed the Jumna, and utterly routed them, leaving eighty of their number lifeless on the field.

In the presidency of Bombay, since the occupation of Shorapore and the capture of its chief at Hyderabad, the Southern Mahratta country had remained tranquil; but, in the Sawnut Warree district, a state prisoner (one of the insurgents of 1844) having escaped from gaol, collected about 200 followers, and attacked a small treasury station of the government, at a place called Tullowan, defended only by a *havidar* and ten sepoy of the ghaut police. The little garrison, on being summoned to surrender the post, manfully refused to do so, and sustained and repulsed a series of attacks from the armed budmashes; which continued during four hours, and in which several daring efforts were made to fire the place over their heads. Failing in open assault, the rebels demanded a parley, through an influential man of the neighbouring village, and, during the conference, attempted a surprise, but were again foiled. At length they appeared to remember that the wives and children of the soldiers were in the village; these they immediately seized, and placing them in front of the position held by the loyal treasury guard, threatened indescribable atrocities if the place and treasure were not instantly surrendered to them. To their threats, and to the shrieks of the terrified captives, the brave men were alike deaf; and at length the assailants withdrew, taking with them the unfortunate women and children. Such were among the cruel incidents of the terrible war that still desolated homes, and destroyed families, throughout the wide and bloodstained provinces of Hindostan at the close of the first year of its duration.

Of the prospect of its speedy termination, expectations were various and sanguine, in the early part of the year 1858, even among those who, by position and circumstances, were naturally deemed well informed upon the subject. Of the confidence with which the entire and speedy suppression of the revolt was then asserted, the following passages, in a letter received by Lord



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## INDIAN MUTINY.

[LUCKNOW.]

Elphinstone, the lieutenant-governor of Bombay, from an officer of distinction in the camp of the commander-in-chief, dated at Meerun-ki-Serai, on the 28th of December, may be instanced as one proof of the mistaken views entertained upon the subject, even by persons actually upon the scene of operations. The writer, referring to the revolt generally, says, "The neck of the business, all over the country, is broken;" and the whole tone of intelligence forwarded to Europe by the Indian mails of January, might be understood as expressed by those few but positive words. But it proceeded yet further to reassure and inspirit all who were interested in the pacification of the country, and the personal safety of its European residents. "Now," said the letter, "that the overwhelming superiority of the British forces to those of the mutineers has been established by the series of brilliant exploits, that ended with the rout of the numerous, and well-appointed, and half-victorious Gwalior contingent, a desultory and comparatively feeble opposition is all that is likely to be encountered in our progress towards the

complete pacification of the country. The Doab, which for so many months was abandoned to rebel chiefs and lawless soldiery, has been swept clear of the enemy; Bithoor, Etawah, Mynpoorie, Futteghur, Furruckabad—all in our hands. Their petty rulers and landholders, if still at large, are at least fugitives in Rohilcund or Oude, and their lands have passed from them for ever. The mutineers under Bahadur Khan, at Bareilly, have next to be attacked; and here some resistance may be met with; but neither from them, nor from the hordes whom Sir James Outram is holding in check at the Alumbagh, and whose destruction will be the latest event of the insurrection, do we look to receive anything more than a momentary obstruction to the re-establishment of the benign and just rule of England."

Unfortunately for the accuracy of this prediction, Oude had yet to be conquered; and rivers of blood were yet to flow, before the blessings of peace could be again realised by the native populations of the greater portion of the Anglo-Indian empire, or safety be insured to its European residents.

## CHAPTER IX.

BRITISH FORCE AT THE ALUMBAGH; THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND SIR JAMES OUTRAM; ADVICE AND CAUTION; THE STAFF AT FAULT; THE REBEL TROOPS IN LUCKNOW; BATTLE OF GULEE; OFFICIAL DETAILS; ACTIONS OF THE 12TH AND 16TH OF JANUARY; REPULSE ON THE 21ST OF FEBRUARY; QUARREL BETWEEN THE DELHI AND OUDE SEPOYS IN THE CITY; ADVANCE OF THE REBEL FORCE ON THE 25TH OF FEBRUARY; THE BEGUM AND COURT IN THE FIELD; DEFEAT OF THE REBELS; STATE OF LUCKNOW; ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH FORCE UNDER THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; THE ASSAULT; DEFEAT AND DISPERSION OF THE REBELS; FINAL OCCUPATION OF THE CITY.

It will be remembered, that when Sir Colin Campbell retired from Lucknow, in November, 1857, with the relieved garrison of the presidency, and the women and children whom he had rescued from destruction, he left Sir James Outram, with a strong division of British troops, to hold possession of Alumbagh, and form a nucleus for future operations in Oude.\* The force selected by the commander-in-chief for this important service, consisted of two brigades of infantry, composed of the 5th, 75th, 78th, 84th, and 90th regiments of the British line, the 1st

Madras European regiment, the Ferozepore regiment of Sikhs, the 12th irregular horse, a body of volunteer cavalry, and a formidable detail of artillery, engineers, sappers, &c., &c.; the whole amounting to about 3,500 men, partly stationed at the Alumbagh, and partly in an intrenched camp between that post and the city.

In consequence of the successful result of the action at Cawnpore on the 6th of December, it appeared of importance to the commander-in-chief, that the road between that place and Sir James Outram's post in Oude, should be thenceforth kept free from

\* See ante, p. 98.



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interruption by scattered parties of the enemy, and the communication between himself and the force at the Alumbagh rendered less precarious. In order to effect this desirable object, the following memorandum was forwarded to the major-general by the chief of the staff at Cawnpore:—

“Head-quarters, Cawnpore, Dec. 8th.

“The commander-in-chief is of opinion, that you should take immediate steps in pursuance of the advantages gained the day before yesterday at Cawnpore, to put your communications with this place in a thoroughly effective condition. You will, therefore, on the receipt of this memorandum, detach to the rear 400 European soldiers, 200 Madras infantry, Captain Olphert's light field battery, and half your cavalry, with all your camels.

“This force, which should be placed under your best officer, must clear the vicinity of the road from Alumbagh to Cawnpore, of all refractory characters, including Munsik Ali, who disturbs the neighbourhood of Onoa. This force will collect, as it marches, as much carriage as possible, bringing it to the north bank of the Ganges, to be laden with gram and supplies for your field force. The difficulties of procuring carriage at Cawnpore are very great, but every effort is being made in your behalf.”

The instructions thus conveyed appear to have been met with strong objection by Sir James Outram, who considered that the weakening of his force to so great an extent, while in the immediate proximity of an enemy nearly ten times his numerical strength, would be to risk the safety of the position entrusted to him, and, in all probability, might lead to its loss. On the 11th of the month, therefore, he submitted his view of the inexpediency of the measure enjoined upon him, in the following letter to the chief of the staff, for the information of the commander-in-chief:—

“Camp, Alumbagh, Dec. 11th, 1857.

“Sir,—I am directed by Major-general Sir James Outram to acknowledge the receipt of the message dispatched by you, by cossid, on the 8th instant, with the account of the commander-in-chief's victory over the Gwalior force, which arrived yesterday. He did not, however, bring the ‘memorandum’ by the chief of the staff, for the guidance of Sir J. Outram, G.C.B. Sir James only received the copy of that this morning. He is desirous of being informed if the memo-

randum was sent by the cossid, that he may deal with him according to his deserts, if he has been playing false. He has been examined, and will remain a prisoner until information is received from you.

“Sir J. Outram is much concerned to find, by that ‘memorandum,’ that the commander-in-chief expects him to detach so large a force to the rear as 400 Europeans and 200 Madras infantry, as well as half the cavalry, and Captain Olphert's light field battery.

“In his letter to the governor-general in council of the 9th instant, which was forwarded, under a flying seal, for the commander-in-chief's information, he states—‘We have barely carriage for a weak brigade; which, however, could not be detached with prudence, to a distance involving an absence of more than a day, without exposing the camp to considerable risk, menaced as it is by many thousands of the enemy, supported by several guns posted in the gardens and enclosures on this side of the canal, on our front and flanks, which daily send round shot into our advanced posts, though from so great a distance as to do no injury.’

“The enemy are now busily employed in erecting a battery on our left flank, which very likely is intended for defensive purposes, but, at the same time, might become offensive at any moment: they are also daily strengthened by the fugitives of the army defeated by the commander-in-chief.

“They have lately brought out two horse artillery guns. These guns could do much harm by moving on our flanks, if we had no guns of a similar description to oppose to them; and it must be recollected that they have a strong reserve of guns in the city, which might, at any time, be brought out against this camp or the Alumbagh. We are also entirely without gram, and we shall be obliged to make more distant expeditions in search of it; and these parties must, of course, be increased in strength in proportion.

“The cavalry force is most inefficient: the horses of the volunteer cavalry, and the irregulars, who have all been in the presidency, are so reduced in condition, that they can render little or no service; and our present want of gram, and the cold at night, prevent their regaining it. The military train can only mount 140 men; their saddle-trees being so bad, that no amount of stuffing suffices to prevent sore



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## INDIAN MUTINY.

[DIFFERENCE OF OPINION.]

backs; and these, therefore, comprise the only efficient cavalry we have.

"Detaching 200 Madras infantry from Bunnee, would weaken Colonel Fisher too much, as strong parties of the enemy, accompanied by guns, have been reported as moving along the old road to our rear, and in the direction of that post; and Sir James thought it expedient, on Colonel Fisher's application, to reinforce him with 50 Europeans; they will, however, accompany the convoy, and remain at Bunnee on their return.

"The major-general also writes to point out the extensive nature of his position, the right of which is Jellalabad, and the left resting on a village to the left of the main road—a front, altogether, of nearly four miles. This extent is rendered necessary by being obliged to occupy Jellalabad, in which direction all the grazing and forage for the cattle is obtained; and the villages on the left front and flank have to be occupied, in order to prevent the enemy commanding the main road and our flank with their guns, from a very strong defensive position. Sir J. Outram trusts that the commander-in-chief will view these points in the same light that he does, and agree with him in the inexpediency, under these circumstances, of detaching the force proposed to the rear.

"To-night, the convoy, consisting of 350 camels, will leave this camp, escorted by 150 European infantry, fifty Sikhs, and twenty-five cavalry, and be joined at Bunnee by fifty of the 90th regiment, now stationed there. This is the utmost of the force Sir James feels himself justified in sending. He retains 150 camels, for the purpose of bringing in gram, which, from information received, he hopes to lay his hands on. Your letter only specifies camels; and Sir James has not sent any carts, as it delays the march of the convoy, and involves a larger escort accompanying it.—I have, &c.,

"F. BERKELEY, Colonel,  
"Chief of the Staff."

The remonstrance thus submitted by Sir James Outram, through the chief of his staff, was by no means satisfactory to Sir Colin Campbell, by whose orders the following memorandum was immediately transmitted to the Alumbagh, for the guidance of the major-general:—

"Head-quarters, Cawnpore, Dec. 12th.

"The commander-in-chief has had under his consideration, a letter addressed to the

chief of the staff by Colonel Berkeley, deputy-adjutant-general, by order of Major-general Sir James Outram, G.C.B., in which the reasons of the latter are alleged for not giving execution to his excellency's orders, conveyed in the memorandum by Major-general Mansfield, chief of the staff, on the 7th of December.

"It is a subject of the deepest regret to his excellency that he cannot coincide in the reasoning of Sir James Outram, the order above alluded to having been considered with the greatest care before it was given, with reference to the country in which Sir James Outram's camp is pitched, and the knowledge of what it is in the power of the enemy to attempt.

"His excellency entreats Sir James Outram to believe that he is fully alive to the circumstances of his position, and he does not think it possible for him to be threatened by real danger.

"Including the posts of Alumbagh and Bunnee, Sir James Outram has at his disposal 4,400 fighting-men, of which the bulk is composed of European infantry, besides a very powerful artillery. The effect of the late successes on the right bank of the Ganges, cannot but be felt throughout the province of Oude as elsewhere.

"If the left be threatened by a battery, his excellency would suggest the advisability of attacking and destroying it before it can become a cause of annoyance. If, on the occasion of a detachment going out, Sir James has fears for his position, his excellency would further venture to suggest that the front of the camp should be contracted, or that it should be converted into a bivouac, in case of really imminent danger.

"The strength of detachments is always calculated by the commander-in-chief with the greatest care, with reference to general circumstances, with which it is hardly possible that any one but his excellency should be acquainted.

"In conclusion, his excellency observes, that nothing advanced in this memorandum is said by way of reproach, but merely of advice and friendly caution."

The "advice" and "caution" thus furnished, might naturally, from its tone, seem to require the paragraph that closed the memorandum, which was calculated to operate as a salve to the wound that document might tacitly inflict upon the feelings of an officer of the rank and merit of Sir

James Outram, who, as a disciplinarian himself, could do no other than bow in silence to the reproof thus administered to him by his superior in rank and responsibility. Further correspondence on the subject was therefore avoided; but the irritable feeling on either side had scarcely time to calm down, before some "routine" blunders in the quartermaster-general's department at the Alumbagh, brought down the following communication from the chief of the staff, "for the guidance of Sir James Outram," and his officers in charge of departments:—

"Head-quarters, Cawnpore, Dec. 15th.

"Two hundred gun-bullocks have been dispatched to Sir J. Outram, yoked to carts. He will have the goodness to apply them to the guns. A fortnight's provisions for all Sir James Outram's force, including Bunnee, together with what stores of clothing, tentage, and boots, it is in the power of Brigadier Inglis, commanding at Cawnpore, to give.

"Sir James Outram will arrange in future, by order of his excellency, to send a sufficient escort, with carriage, once a fortnight, to take out what supplies he may want from Cawnpore to his camp. This escort must never consist of less than 350 European infantry, 150 native infantry, seventy cavalry soldiers, together with two field guns. Colonel Fisher, commanding at Bunnee, being under the command of Sir James Outram, will be supplied by the commissariat of the major-general's division, and not from that of Cawnpore, which belongs to another.

"It will be easy for Captain Maclean and Captain Christopher so to arrange together, under the orders of the deputy-commissary-general, that the supplies meant for Bunnee, shall not travel onwards to Alumbagh.

"Sir J. Outram is informed that, owing to the neglect of his deputy-assistant-quartermaster-general, or other staff officer, a quantity of flannel shirts and serge jackets, besides other articles, which had been provided by the commander-in-chief for the use of his division, were positively allowed to return to Cawnpore, instead of being made use of as intended.

"The chief of the staff is aware that an order was issued, on the occasion of the commander-in-chief quitting Alumbagh, that the quilts, &c., brought for Sir James Outram's division, should be taken charge

of at once. It appears never to have occurred to his staff officer to have examined the other bales besides those containing quilts, although it was perfectly well known to every one in the force, that what stores were in Alumbagh, had been brought solely for the use of the Lucknow garrison under Sir James Outram.

"Sir James Outram is requested to inform the officers subordinate to Colonel Berkeley, now on the staff of his division, of the commander-in-chief's marked displeasure on this account, and to enforce their personal attention and superintendence of every duty committed to their charge. Any staff officer failing in this respect in future, will be immediately deprived of his appointment, according to a general order lately published on the subject."

It may be presumed, that the warning thus given had its intended effect, as no record appears to be extant of any continued displeasure of the commander-in-chief with the staff at the Alumbagh; nor did another instance occur during its occupation by Sir James Outram, of objections to the declared arrangements of Sir Colin Campbell.

We may now resume our detail of active operations in connection with the important position held by the force under Major-general Sir James Outram, and the final reoccupation of the capital of Oude.

From the time of the departure of the commander-in-chief, on the night of the 22nd of November, no serious aggression on the part of the rebels was attempted until the 22nd of the following month, when General Outram received information that the enemy were preparing to cut off his communication with Cawnpore, and to form a chain of outposts between the camp and Bunnee, about fourteen miles on the Cawnpore-road, where he intended to place guns in position; and to effect this purpose, 5,000 men, with four guns, were collected at a village called Guilee, about three miles from the camp, in the direction of Dillkoosha, and at a short distance from the city. The troops at the Alumbagh were already becoming tired of the inactivity enforced by their position; and Sir James Outram, feeling that the occasion warranted immediate action, determined upon taking the enemy by surprise, and thus frustrating their project. Accordingly, the necessary force for an attack was detailed



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## INDIAN MUTINY.

[BATTLE AT GULEE.]

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off; and at 4 o'clock A.M. on the 22nd of December, the troops—consisting of 1,100 infantry, and 150 cavalry, with six guns—marched from the station, and arrived near the advanced picket of the enemy by daybreak. The force quietly approached, under cover of a ruined village, until within a hundred yards of the rebels, when they halted; and scouts were sent out to discover their position. These were absent but a few minutes, when they returned and reported to the general. Sir James Outram at once advanced alone a short distance, to satisfy himself of their accuracy, and then silently beckoned to the troops to advance. As they emerged into the open plain in rear of the village, the cavalry videttes of the enemy were seen directly in front of them; but so completely surprised were the latter, that for some moments they stood gazing upon the advancing column as if incredulous of sight. They at length challenged; but without loitering for a reply, the astonished troopers discharged their carbines at random, and galloped off to their main body. As soon as the English troops were fairly in the open ground, but before they could deploy into line, the enemy, who were favourably posted in a thick tope, fired upon them with musketry and round shot. Sir James Outram at once gave the order to form line and advance; and without giving the rebels time to fire a second volley, the troops rushed forward with a hearty cheer, and drove everything before their bayonets. Their first trophy was the gun belonging to the enemy, which was taken with the loss of only one man killed and one wounded. The troops continued to advance, skirmishing through a jungle on the right of the enemy's position; and having driven them out of the latter, reformed line, and advanced across a wide plain in pursuit. The ground being favourable for cavalry at this place, the volunteer corps made a brilliant charge, and drove the enemy in confusion towards the town, leaving three guns to their pursuers. As the object of the general was simply to drive them from the position they had taken, and capture such guns as they might have brought with them, without hazarding a general engagement, the troops were now halted, and shortly after returned to the camp, which they reached about 11 A.M., to breakfast. The loss of the enemy in this morning encounter, was estimated at 150 killed, and four guns. On the side of the

British, the killed and wounded amounted to three only.

The following despatch of Major-general Outram to the deputy-adjutant-general of the army, gives the official details of the battle of Guilee:—

"Camp before Lucknow, Dec. 23rd, 1857.

"Sir,—I have the honour to report, for the information of his excellency the commander-in-chief, that I had yesterday an affair with the enemy at a village called Guilee, three miles from hence, situated a little to the right of the road to Dilkoosha.

"I had been informed two days previously, by my spies, that the enemy contemplated surrounding my position, in order to cut off supplies, stop all foraging expeditions, and to intercept my communication with Bunnee. With this object, they dispatched a force to Guilee, which took up a position between that village and Budroop, which places are about a mile distant from each other.

"On the evening of the 21st instant, I learnt that the rebels had been reinforced, and that their strength amounted to about 4,000 infantry, 400 cavalry, and eight field guns.\*

"Having ascertained that a space of about half a mile intervened between their position and the gardens skirting the canal and the Dilkoosha, I moved out at 5 A.M., in the hope of surprising them at daybreak and intercept their retreat to the city, with a force detailed in the accompanying divisional order, which I have this day issued, and to which I beg to refer his excellency for all details, and for the terms in which I express my appreciation of the conduct of the troops on the occasion.

"The main body of the enemy being on the march considerably in advance, retreated to the city by a detour to the left, out of our reach, and concealed by intervening topes of trees, on hearing the attack on their rear; but the loss of four horse artillery guns, much ammunition, besides elephants and baggage, and some fifty or sixty men slain, will, I think, deter the enemy from again venturing beyond their defensive works, or at any rate, from attempting, for some time to come, to carry out their plan for surrounding this camp within a too limited circumference; and I have great hopes that the success of this expedition will be productive of good effect

\* Since ascertained to be only four, all of which were captured.



in restoring confidence to the neighbouring inhabitants."

*Divisional Orders issued by Major-general Outram, G.C.B.*

"Camp, Alumbagh, Dec. 23rd, 1857.

"Major-general Sir James Outram has much pleasure in recording, in divisional orders, his satisfaction with the conduct of the officers and men\* under the command of Brigadier Stisted, engaged yesterday in the skirmish at Guilee, in which four guns and twelve waggons, filled with ammunition, were captured. The right column, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Purnell, her majesty's 90th regiment, consisting of detachments of the 78th and 90th regiments, and of the Ferozepore regiment of Sikhs, excited his admiration, by the gallant way in which, with a cheer, they dashed at a strong position held by the enemy, and from which they were met by a heavy fire; regardless of the overwhelming numbers, and six guns reported to be posted there. The suddenness of the attack, and the spirited way in which it was executed, resulted in the immediate flight of the enemy, with hardly a casualty on our side.

"Colonel Guy, in command of the left column, consisting of her majesty's 5th fusiliers, under the guidance of Lieutenant Moorsom, deputy-assistant-quartermaster-general, was equally successful in his simultaneous attack on the adjacent village of Guilee; in which, and the adjoining tope, two guns were captured. The enemy were now rapidly followed up across the plain by the volunteer cavalry, under Captain Barrow, until they found refuge in a village, from which they opened a fire of ~~grape and musketry~~. They were, however, speedily dislodged, by the assistance of two of Captain Olphert's guns, under the command of Lieutenant Smithett; and, changing their line of retreat, they endeavoured to reach the city by the way of the Dilkoosha.

"The military train, under Major Robertson, having been, however, dispatched to make a flank movement, followed them up so closely, that they dispersed their cavalry,

and drove their guns into a ravine, where they were captured, the leading horses, of which the traces were cut, only escaping. The major-general was particularly pleased with the very cool and soldierlike behaviour of the military train. Far ahead of the infantry, and unable to remove the guns which were captured, they were menaced in their front by a large body of fresh troops from the city, and attacked, on their right flank, by the main body of the enemy, consisting of about 2,000 infantry, who had commenced their march previous to our attack; and who, on hearing their rear assailed, also changed their route to one in the direction of the city; and seeing their guns in possession of so small a force as that under Major Robertson, made demonstrations of an attempt to regain them; but by the bold front shown by the military train, and the gallant advance of their skirmishers, were held at bay until the arrival of a party of the 5th fusiliers, and two 9-pounder guns, under Captain Olphert, who completely secured their capture, and enabled a working party of Madras sappers, under the command of Lieutenant Ogilvie, to extricate them from the ravine into which they had been driven. Captain Hutchinson, chief engineer, on this, as on several other occasions during the day, afforded much valuable assistance.

"The major-general has to thank Lieutenant-colonel H. Hamilton, commanding the reserve, for the good position taken up by him; which, with the fire of the two guns under Lieutenant Simpson, which were most judiciously posted, were of great assistance in checking the advance of the enemy, during the protracted operations of removing the captured guns.

"Sir James Outram has also to express his acknowledgments to Brigadiers Hamilton and Eyre, who were left in charge of the camp, and who, with the small force at their disposal, checked the dispositions for an attack, which the enemy was commencing with their skirmishers on the left flank, until the return of the force to camp caused them to abandon their intentions.

\* Two 9-pounder guns, royal artillery, Captain Maude; four ditto, 2nd company 3rd battalion Bengal artillery, Captain Olphert; 112 of the military train, Major Robertson; 30 of volunteer cavalry, Lieutenant Hay and Lieutenant Graham; 550 of H.M.'s 5th fusiliers, Colonel Guy; 103 of H.M.'s 75th regiment, Captain Brookes; 156 of H.M.'s 78th highlanders, Captain Lockhart; 108 of H.M.'s 84th regiment, Captain O'Brien; 270 of H.M.'s 90th light infantry,

Captain Guise; 150 of the regiment of Ferozepore, Captain Brasyer; 40 Madras sappers, Lieutenant Ogilvie; total, six 9-pounder guns, under Captain Olphert; 190 cavalry under Major Robertson; 1,227 infantry, under Brigadier Stisted; right column, under Lieutenant-colonel Purnell, H.M.'s 90th light infantry; left column, under Colonel Guy, 5th fusiliers; reserve, under Lieutenant-colonel Hamilton, H.M.'s 78th highlanders.



"It will be the pleasing duty of the major-general to make his excellency the commander-in-chief acquainted with the successful result of yesterday's operations, and his approbation of the conduct of all those concerned in them."

A letter from the Alumbagh, written a few days after this spirited affair, says—"On the 22nd of December, the enemy made a clever attempt to obtain possession of the road to Cawnpore. They posted 1,200 men inside a jungle, with a sandy plain in front, and the road close at hand. Sir James Outram understood the plan; and at night, two regiments were silently put in motion. The soft sand deadened all sound, and dawn found them within the enemy's pickets. A rattling volley, a cheer, and the enemy, pouring in one discharge, fled, leaving their guns (four) and about a hundred men dead on the field. Since that day nothing has been seen of the foe, who are believed to be quarrelling fiercely among themselves, instigated by some one whom the spies and our officers call the queen-mother. They are said to be losing heart; and some of the chiefs have sent silver fish (the symbol of nobility) to the general, as a token of surrender. Maun Sing and Bal Kishan (the finance minister) are reported as amongst those who are anxious to treat; and as several European captives are in their hands, if the rebels are sincere in their advances, it is hoped that their overtures may not be altogether rejected. All information, however, as to their intentions, is at present doubtful; for, in contradiction to the rumours of their inclination to succumb, it is said that 27,000 men are at work repairing the intrenchments vacated by us in November, and that they intend to hold them to the last man. However true this may be of the sepoys, it is certain that the peasantry are turning round, which is not a good omen for them. For a fortnight after the retreat from Lucknow, not a grain of wheat or a wisp of hay could be procured from them, even by force: but the victory of the 6th of this month, by Sir Colin Campbell, suddenly changed the tone of popular feeling. It was then discovered that 'the English raj was really *not* over;' and the 'Sahib loge' speedily became much honoured by these servile people. Grain, forage, milk, bread, and vegetables poured into the camp with unprecedented abundance, and no difficulty was made in furnishing such supplies as the country

round afforded. The country is still swarming with armed vagabonds hastening to Lucknow, to meet their common doom, and die in the last grand struggle with the Feringhee. The more the better. It is the dispersion, not the strength of the enemy, that we dread."

From this time until near the middle of January, the enemy continued to receive almost daily an accession to their numbers, until the force within and around the city, amounted to near 87,000 men: they did not, however, make any demonstration against the camp at the Alumbagh, beyond keeping in activity a vigilant system of *espionage*; by means of which the measures of the commandant of that garrison were made familiar to them, even before any attempt was made to carry them into effect: they also laboured hard at restoring the fortifications of the various important positions of the city, and in providing stores of ammunition, &c., in order to be fully prepared for the attack they anticipated from the force led by the commander-in-chief, and which they were aware would not be long delayed. This lull in their offensive operations did not arise from any indifference on their part to the important position held, as it were, at their very gates by Sir James Outram; and it was deemed necessary that, previous to the arrival of any large British force before Lucknow, the garrison at Alumbagh should be annihilated. For this purpose an opportunity seemed to present itself by the absence of a considerable number of the British troops, who had been dispatched to convoy a supply of provisions from Cawnpore; and accordingly a large force was detailed to attack the garrison in its weakened state: but Sir James Outram had intelligence of the intended attack, and was prepared to meet it. At sunrise on the morning of the 12th of January, the rebels were seen advancing from the city in a stream of columns, amounting, in round numbers, to 30,000 men, forming a wide semicircle in front and flank of the Alumbagh and camp. General Outram, who had no idea of being confined to the walls of his citadel, at once massed his force of little more than 3,000 effective men into two brigades, and sent them out to confront the enemy. A fierce and sanguinary contest ensued; for, while the main body of the enemy attacked the two English brigades, a second division proceeded to assault the fort of Jellalabad, which formed



the right extremity of the British position; while a third, by a detour, reached the Alumbagh, defended only by a very small portion of the garrison, and endeavoured to intercept and cut off General Outram's communication with it. The struggle continued between the mere handful of men under the British general, and the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, from sunrise until four o'clock in the afternoon, every gun being incessantly employed in repelling the advance of dense masses of the enemy. Foiled at every point by the indomitable bravery of the troops opposed to them, the enemy at length withdrew to their positions in the city, and the gardens and villages surrounding it, leaving on the field upwards of 400 killed. To pursue the retiring force with such disparity of numbers was not considered prudent, after the arduous exertions made by the men during fourteen hours of incessant fighting, and Sir James Outram remained content with holding possession of the field, and securing his position at the Alumbagh. The whole of the casualties on the English side in this affair, amounted to six wounded.

On the 16th of the month, the enemy appeared again in the field before Alumbagh. The force upon this occasion was led by a Hindoo fanatic, supposed to be a fakir of the Monkey Temple in Awadh, disguised to represent the Monkey god Humayun. This enthusiast marched at the head of the insurgents, and incited them, by his cries and gestures, to rush upon and exterminate the little band, which they might have been sufficient to crush by mere force of numbers. Fortunately all the fanaticism in the world will not stop bullets; and the noisy and nimble-footed rebels had a far greater relish for keeping at a safe distance from English bayonets, than for grappling with them at close quarters. They therefore could only screw their courage up, on this occasion, to a tiresome and desultory conflict, which lasted from ten in the morning until nine at night, when they hastily retreated, leaving their leader, the representative of the Monkey god, a prisoner in the hands of the English troops, and a large number of killed and wounded upon the ground. The loss of the British was again but trifling—a circumstance partly attributable to the general's appreciation of the value of European life, and partly to the withering power of the Enfield rifle; for even numbers are of little value against an enemy who can fire

half-a-dozen rounds before the old musket can be brought within range; and thus it is that the disproportion of forces, and of casualties on either side, were satisfactorily accounted for.

The result of the attack on the 16th of January, was notified to the governor-general and the commander-in-chief, by the following telegram from Major-general Sir J. Outram:—

"Alumbagh, January 17th, 1858.

"The enemy attacked my position yesterday, the 16th, in force, led on by a Hindoo fanatic, Bidube Dass Hunnooman, who was severely wounded and taken prisoner. The attacks from various quarters lasted, with slight intermission, from 10 A.M. till 9 P.M. —Loss on our side trifling: that of the enemy severe. This is the second attack within the last three days."

At this period, the force of the enemy in and around Lucknow was daily increasing. Hour by hour they received accessions of troops from Goruckpore, from Rohilcund, and even from Central India. The leaders, driven from Etawah, Allygurh, Fateghur, Goruckpore, and Banda, were also swarming to Lucknow with their bands of desperadoes, and had there concentrated, it was supposed, upwards of 100,000 fighting-men, with from eighty to 100 guns, and abundance of ammunition. The fortifications of the city had been carefully restored, the streets intrenched, and most of the houses loopholed for musketry; in short, everything appeared to indicate that the rebels, driven to bay, intended to die fighting, or to drive the Europeans from Oude, believing they could now hold Lucknow as once they had held Bhurtpore. From the report of the spies sent among them at this time, it appeared to be the general belief that the present struggle between the sepoys and the British would terminate in the destruction of both parties. Thus an officer who was engaged in executing a party of the rebel prisoners, asked each before he died, why he had fought, and what was the proposed object of the war? and each gave, in effect, the same answer—"The slaughter of the English was required by our religion; the end will be, the destruction of all the English and all the sepoys; and then—God knows."

Meanwhile an important contest of opinion was silently operating in the official world, at the seat of government, and at the camp as well as at the court. One party, led by the government in Calcutta, was anxious



that Lucknow should be attacked at once, and disposed of. "There," said they, "is the true seat of the rebellion; and that once secured, the bands scattered over the country would lose hope, and the rebellion would die out: but until that central point of union is destroyed, every day's delay adds to its strength and *prestige*; while the victories of the British troops only add to the number and the desperation of its defenders." It was contended, that while Lucknow continued in the hands of the rebels, the revolt had still a centre and a flag, around which the discontented from every quarter might and would rally.

The other party, headed by the commander-in-chief, were represented as holding it essential to clear Rohileund first. They felt that the large bands of mutineers and insurgents still roaming over that province might intercept communications, and produce serious embarrassment; while the concentration of rebel troops at Lucknow would eventually be advantageous as bringing the difficulty to one point, instead of having it distributed all over the country. Another reason for delay also had some influence in this quarter: the Sikh levies, depended upon for the augmentation of Sir Colin's army, were slow in coming forward; and without them, the whole numerical strength of his command was inconsiderable. It was urged, that although some 13,000 men (the whole number that the persistent energy of the commander-in-chief was yet able to collect) might be sufficient, with its native auxiliaries and the Ghoorkas from Nepaul, to recapture Lucknow, yet it would not suffice to take that place by street-fighting against 100,000 men—to leave a strong garrison there, and then, with the remainder of the little force, to effect the clearance of Rohilcund, with the hot season immediately before them. The commander-in-chief, therefore, was content to "bide his time."

From the 16th of January to the end of the second week in February, the rebels at Lucknow did not venture upon any renewed demonstration of their designs on Alumbagh; but hoping, probably, by another attack, to disarrange some part of the measures they justly calculated might be contemplated for their discomfiture, and being aware that the bulk of the English forces in India, under Sir Colin Campbell, were actually in motion towards the frontier of their country, they ventured upon repeated struggles with the troops at the

Alumbagh, and, as usual, met with signal defeat. The circumstances attending the most important of these affairs were as follow.

Exasperated by the continued loss to which the rebel force in and around Lucknow had been subjected by troops notoriously inferior to them in numerical strength, some adherents of the principal adviser of the queen (Mummoo Khan), issued a proclamation, in which it was declared that there were only 200 Europeans at Alumbagh, and yet that no one dared to attack them except Mummoo Khan. The vain-glorious boast gave great umbrage to the sepoys and their officers, who forthwith held a council of war, at which it was decided that two-and-a-half months' pay should be given to the troops engaged in a proposed assault, and certain distinctions were to be conferred upon them in case of success. The sepoys, who had more stomach for rewards than for the fight that was to win them, did not evince any considerable ardour in competing for the questionable prize, until at length one of the mutineer native officers of rank undertook to annihilate the entire English force at the Alumbagh within ten days, upon condition that he was appointed to the chief command for the occasion. His proposal was accepted; but half the stipulated period had already elapsed without any approach to the promised extermination, when it was discovered that Sunday, the 21st of February, would be a favourable day for the enterprise. A feud had for some weeks existed between the begum (acting as regent for her son) and a moulvie, who possessed great influence over the troops; but, in the hope of the prospective triumph, they were reconciled; and the Hindoos swore on the Ganges—the Mohammedans on the Koran—that they would destroy the British troops at the Alumbagh, or perish in the attempt. The plan of operations was to surround the force by making a wide detour to the rear, and, when the circle was completed, to close in, making desperate assaults at five or six different points at the same time; mass after mass being poured upon the Feringhees, until not one should be left alive to carry tidings of the defeat to the English commander-in-chief. The scheme was cleverly designed; and had its execution been equal to the spirit that conceived it, the result might have been serious: fortunately, it was not so.

Late in the evening previous to the



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meditated attack, Major-general Outram was duly informed of the proposed operations of the rebels, and adopted instant measures to counteract them.

Just before daybreak on the morning of the 21st of February, a body of the rebel army, amounting to 20,000 men, with a large train of artillery, silently emerged from their shelter in the city and adjacent villages, and moved towards the British position. The major-general had already dispatched some cavalry and guns from the Alumbagh, to meet the right and left wings of the enemy, cautiously permitting them to proceed with their intended circle until it amounted to a horse-shoe. Unaware of the measures taken to arrest their progress, and supposing everything to be favourable to their project, the enemy commenced to fire from their front and both flanks at the same moment. They were at first replied to languidly, with the hope of drawing them on; but before they could find heart to advance, the British cavalry and guns were at work on both extremities of their line, and a general rout ensued. They were hotly chased by the cavalry and horse artillery; and their aggregate loss in the affair amounted to upwards of 500 men. The casualties on the side of the British amounted to six wounded only.

An officer in the force sent out to attack the rebel troops, describes the affair as follows:—"Early on the morning of the 21st of February, a body of the rebel troops, amounting to 20,000 men, emerged from the city and some adjacent villages, for the purpose of taking Alumbagh by assault. Their first operations having filled all the trenches with as many men as they could hold, and placed large masses of infantry in the topos as a support, a simultaneous movement was commenced round both flanks of General Outram's position, threatening, at the same time, the whole length of his front, the north-east corner of the Alumbagh, and the picket and fort at Jellalabad. Outram perceiving, at a glance, the nature and object of the attack, lost no time in strengthening the several endangered posts. At the Alumbagh and Jellalabad posts the enemy met a severe check, owing to their having ventured within range of the grapeshot which the British poured out upon them. The major-general then detached 250 cavalry and two field-pieces, in charge of Captain Barrow, to the rear of Jellalabad. Upon the arrival of the

detachment at this point, it came in front of a body of 2,000 of the enemy's cavalry and 5,000 infantry, which were advancing towards the garrison; but were so effectually kept at bay by the two field-pieces, that their intended scheme of attack was frustrated; and they halted, apparently undecided whether to fall upon and overwhelm the handful of men opposed to them, or to retire to another and less dangerous position. The enemy's attack on Major-general Outram's left flank, was made by no less than 5,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry; to oppose which formidable number, he sent only four field guns and 120 men of the military train, under Major Robertson; and this mere handful of brave men, with their four guns, actually succeeded in driving back the armed masses before them. A large convoy from Cawnpore was known to be on its march at this time, and the necessary escort had taken away the greater part of our cavalry—a fact of which the enemy was aware; and yet, with a disproportion of numbers so great in their favour, and with all the advantages of choosing their plan of attack, and for the accession of reinforcements equal to, or even exceeding, their number in the field, this large army suffered itself to be ignominiously beaten by a few hundred men. The truth is, that our men now so heartily despise these miserable rebels, that a picket, or sometimes a dozen of men, will suffer themselves to be surrounded, without thinking of falling back on the main body, and then knock the enemy over with the Enfield rifle, man after man, as they come within reach. The assailants never dream of making a rush over the quarter of a mile at which the weapon is fatal, knowing that any that might escape would immediately fall into our hands; no party, however small, being left unwatched."

Cooled down by this repulse, the prudence of the enemy for a time restrained their courage; and during the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, everything remained quiet on their part: but on the night of the 24th, a quarrel that had for some time existed between the Delhi and Oude sepoys, broke out into a fierce encounter, and there was much firing between the belligerent parties in the city. This, however, was but the prelude to another attempt upon the English position. About 9 A.M. of the 25th, information was sent in by the pickets, that the enemy, in large masses, were



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[CAMP CORRESPONDENCE.]

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endeavouring to creep round by the left, and get into the rear of the garrison. The pickets were instantly strengthened, especially on the flanks, and the troops were ordered to stand on the alert, but to make no movement until the enemy was close at hand. Upon this occasion, the queen, with her son and the officers and members of her court, came out of the city on state elephants, to encourage the assailants, and to be eyewitnesses of the anticipated victory. Stimulated by the presence of the begum, a strong body of the rebels advanced into a grove of trees near Jellalabad, when the order to charge was given, and, in less than five minutes, the leading column of the enemy was cut off from both its flanks. Two guns were captured in this charge, and two more immediately followed. The rebels were panic-stricken. The rout became general, and so precipitate, that the cavalry were seen riding over their own infantry in the way back to the city. Unfortunately for the pursuers, the ground was extremely broken and irregular, which interfered materially with the punishment the fugitives would otherwise have received; but the horse artillery, as usual, committed great havoc. From this time to the first week in March, the enemy remained quiet in their stronghold, which, with the exception of the residency compound, had been wholly in their hands since the early part of July in the preceding year.

The subjoined extracts of letters from the Alumbagh, during the period occupied by the occurrences referred to, are interesting, as furnishing personal views of the state of affairs in Oude at the time, and of camp life at the Alumbagh. The first is dated February the 17th; and reads thus:—"In the midst of my work yesterday, and whilst it was blowing a tremendous dust-storm, the rebels attempted to attack us, and turned out pretty strong on our left. Smithett was first sent off with a couple of guns, and Timbrell followed with four others. Captain Olpherts accompanied the party; and Robertson, with the military train, formed the cavalry escort to the guns. On seeing the rebel infantry, Olpherts, with the guns, galloped up to within 200 yards, and pitched in grape. The enemy fired once, knocked over one havildar driver, and then cut! Olpherts then gave them round and shrapnel, and retired, having spoilt a few of them. For some reason the cavalry did not charge; had they done so, they

might have cut up a lot. These rebels are getting more impertinent every day; and whilst I am writing, they are peppering away at a great pace. On the 15th, the guns, with Major Robertson, who commanded the cavalry, went out at a good trot for four or five miles, and then suddenly came down upon a party of the enemy's infantry hovering along the Bithoor-road, escorting someone in a dhooly. This we have since learnt was the moulvie of Lucknow. The guns were galloped smartly to the front—came about in splendid style at about 150 yards' distance, and then gave them grape. It was a splendid sight. The moulvie was wounded in the shoulder, and eight fellows were killed, and many wounded. If we had had a few more cavalry we might have cut up every one of them, and taken the moulvie prisoner; but Robertson did not like to leave the guns, as the enemy's cavalry were beginning to come out. We then came back, and not before it was time; for the rebels had put their whole army in motion, and were advancing upon us. On the 16th, the rebels attacked our position again, but, after a sharp contest for several hours, they were driven off. These fellows give us no peace by day or night, and our guns are now kept harnessed, in momentary expectation of being required. However, we are all jolly, and have no sickness in camp."

Another extract is from a letter dated "Alumbagh, February 20th." The writer states—"The engineers' park here is assuming most magnificent proportions—gabions in thousands, fascines in tens of thousands, and sand-bags by cart-loads, have already arrived from Cawnpore, or been made on the spot; boats, ladders, &c., are in proportion, and the sapper corps numbers nearly a thousand men. The enemy have shown their teeth frequently of late; but they have never succeeded in gaining anything beyond a loss, nor will they. They were to have attacked us in force yesterday, and once or twice we were on the alert, under the idea that they were coming on; but nothing occurred out of the usual practice of loud drumming and long-range practice; nor do I suppose that the attack threatened for to-morrow will be more to the purpose; for though they talk of bringing 'scaling-ladders' up to the Alumbagh enclosure, they are likely to sit down and calculate the cost before they venture to cross the intermediate 'open.' Their esca-



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lade will be like their artillery attacks *à la distance*. The cause of their present activity is, that five days ago, a subahdar of the 65th regiment undertook to destroy the English in ten days, if he were made commander-in-chief for that time. He has now only half his time to do it in, poor fellow. The moulvie was wounded the other day in the arm by grape. His life will be saved, but his arm will be useless for the remainder of his days—no very protracted period, I fancy, if he falls into our hands. The begum, they say, is in a dreadful state of mind at the turn affairs have taken. The Delhi troops compelled her to release the moulvie, who, having set up a throne of his own in rivalry to that of her son (the present 'boy-king'), had been secured and thrown into prison; and as the moulvie declares that everything has gone wrong during his confinement (whereas, had he been at large, he would long since have exterminated us), the Delhi gentlemen are decidedly disrespectful to her majesty the queen-mother. The local troops, by whom her son was placed on the throne, though very respectful, are unequivocally disobedient. They profess their readiness to fight *on being paid*—a condition with which their royal mistress cannot comply; and they are not the men to be coaxed into perilous activity by the promises of the lady, although she has increased their pay to twelve rupees per mensem—that of the recusant Delhi-ites remaining at nine rupees. To add to the poor woman's discomfort, Maun Sing has broken away from the rebels, and entered into an alliance with Macgregor. Maun's example has been followed by other sirdars; and a very general feeling of distrust seems to prevail in the rebel ranks. So uncomfortable is the position of the poor begum, that even her favourite, Mummoo Khan—the darogah of the ex-king's seraglio, and well known to be the father of the present boy-king; though, of course, the latter is, in theory, the son of Wajid Ali—has latterly presumed to be insolent towards her, and has, in consequence, been more than once reprimanded for it in darbar. The begum holds daily *levées*, and addresses the officers of state, civil and military, with much energy from behind a purdah. Poor thing! she talks of poisoning herself and her son also, so soon as the Kaiserbagh is stormed; and it is the very best thing she can do. It will save herself and Sir Colin

Campbell a world of trouble; for if taken, it is impossible she can be let off; and I am sure Sir Colin would much rather not have the hanging of her—he hates that sort of thing."

As the time approached when Lucknow was again destined to revert to the possession of the English authorities—a fact to be realised only through torrents of blood and days of frightful carnage—it may be *apropos* here to observe, that during the interval between November and March, the defences of the city had been greatly strengthened and augmented. Although not surrounded by a fortified wall, as Delhi had been, its many miles of area, full of narrow streets and lofty houses, and occupied by an enormous military force, in addition to the ordinary population, constituted it a formidable stronghold. The city, it will be remembered, lies on the right bank of the river Goomtee, which there runs nearly from north-west to south-east; all the buildings on the opposite or left bank of the river being nearly suburban. After winding round the buildings called the Martinière and the Dilkoocha, the river changes its course towards the south. The south-eastern extremity of the city is bounded by a canal, which enters the Goomtee near the Martinière; but there is no defined boundary on the south-west, west, or north-west. Between the crowded or commercial part of the city, and the river, there extended, previous to the revolt, a long range of palaces and gardens, occupying, collectively, an immense area, and known by the several names of the Secunderbagh, the Shah Nujeeb, Shah Munzil, the Motee Mahal, the Kaiserbagh (or Palace of the King), the Chuttur Munzil, Fhurreed Buksh, the Residency enclosure, Muchee Bowun, the great Emaumbarra, and the Moosabagh; these various palaces and stately buildings occupying an almost continuous line of five miles along the right bank of the river, and forming a belt between it and the poorer and more dense portion of the city. To cross the river, there were at this time three bridges—namely, one of stone, near the great Emaumbarra; an iron suspension bridge, near the residency; and a bridge of boats, near the Motee Mahal.

In preparing for the struggle which they were well aware was before them, the rebels did not neglect the various precautions of defensive warfare; and rightly judging that the English commander would avoid a hand-



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[THE OUDE LEADERS.]

to-hand contest in the streets, and would direct his attack towards the south-eastern suburb, they exerted themselves in strengthening that side of the city. In their plan of fortification they prudently treated the buildings and courts of the Kaiserbagh as a citadel, and interposed between it and the expected besiegers a series of formidable works. The exterior of these was a line of defence extending from the river to a building known as "Banks' House;" of this line the canal formed the wet ditch, and behind it was a rampart or embankment with guns. The second defence consisted of an earthwork beginning at the river-side, near the Motee Mahal: and the third, or interior defence, was formed by the principal rampart of the Kaiserbagh itself. All these lines consisted of well-constructed earthen parapets, or ridges fronted by wide and deep ditches, and strengthened at intervals by bastions. But not alone on these formidable works did the enemy rely; for, with prudent foresight, they had loopholed and fortified almost every house and enclosure, constructed strong counter-guards in front of the gateways, and placed isolated bastions, stockades, and traverses across each of the principal streets. The three lines of defence all abutted at one extremity on the river Goomtee; and, at the other, on the great street or road called the Huzrut-gunge, which was one of the chief avenues, and was loopholed and bastioned. Nearly one hundred guns and mortars were placed in position upon the various works; and the number of troops collected for the defence of the place, was computed as ranging between ninety and one hundred thousand. Whatever the exact number of troops might then have been, it was certain that, at the beginning of March, the city contained above 60,000 revolted sepoys; and at least 50,000 irregular volunteers, and armed retainers of insurgent chiefs; besides the ordinary city population of some 300,000 persons; and upon this immense host of living beings, congregated and massed within the boundaries of Lucknow, the storm of war was about to burst with pitiless but just severity. The insurgent chiefs of Oude, with their followers, animated by a desire to avenge the wrong inflicted upon their native sovereign by the prostration of his throne, and the degradation of his kingdom to the level of a mere English province, were there assembled to make a last effort for native independence. The mutinous and revolted sepoys of the

Anglo-Indian government, whose lives scarcely depended upon the alternative afforded by victory or defeat, were there also in their desperation; and the position of the mere resident population was necessarily compromised by their presence. This, however, was a result which the stern necessities of the war rendered unavoidable under any circumstances.

Of the leaders and chief personages who exercised influence over this vast multitude at the time, the first and prime mover of the insurrectionary movement was the begum, Huzrut Mehal, first wife of the king of Oude, then a prisoner at Fort William, Calcutta. This personage is represented to be a woman of much energy of character; who, since the departure of her husband, had assumed the regency of the kingdom, acting in the name of, and during the minority of her son, a boy of eight years old, whom she now desired to be looked upon as the successor of his father upon the musnud. A favourite counsellor of the begum, named Mummoo Khan, raised by her to the office of chief judge, and one Shirreff-u-Dowlah, the chief minister, were her principal advisers; the commander-in-chief, Hissamut-u-Dowlah, also exercised great influence in the councils of the regent; as did also a mouvie, or Mussulman fanatic, who, though professing allegiance to the infant prince, laid under strong suspicion of aiming at the throne for his own purposes—a surmise that created much personal ill-feeling at times between the begum and himself. Most of the chief officers of the existing Oudian government, had purchased their places by large gifts to the begum or her favourites, and were consequently deeply interested in the success of her cause in the approaching struggle. The powerful military commands under Shirreff-u-Dowlah, were held by eunuchs of the royal palace.

One serious obstacle to success in this war—which, as regards the Oudians exclusively, might be regarded as a war of independence—was the simple fact, that the court of Lucknow was a vast mass of intrigue, in which the various members of the royal family only sought how they might obtain power and wealth at the expense of each other, and of the bulk of the people; while the ministers and officers were only subservient to their purposes, so far as might conduce to their own personal interests. The begum and the mouvie

leader, although moved by different considerations, were in fact the chief levers by which popular resistance to British rule was moved, and by them every measure was resorted to that would incite the fanaticism of the native population against the English, who were studiously represented as murdering all that fell into their hands; and resistance to the death was inculcated as the only means by which a chance of deliverance could be preserved to the people of Oude.

After the reduction and reoccupation of Futteghur and Furruckabad, it will be remembered, the commander-in-chief continued for some days encamped in the neighbourhood of the former place, busily occupied in collecting his resources for the final advance into Oude. While thus stationed, his excellency dispatched to the governor-general the following account of the operations of the various forces under his command:—

"Head-quarters, Fort Futteghur, Jan. 5th, 1858.

"My Lord,—I have already had the honour to inform your lordship by telegraph, of the various arrangements which have been made for the march of the force, under my immediate command, up the Doab. Having been obliged to part with much of my carriage to meet the wants of Major-general Sir J. Outram, G.C.B., in Oude, considerable delay was unavoidable at Cawnpore after the action of the 6th. The time, however, was not lost. A brigade under Brigadier the Hon. Adrian Hope was detached to Bithoor, where every vestige of the Nana Sahib's property was swept away; and, after very considerable exertion, much treasure recovered from the wells belonging to his former palace. The troops had worked hard at this duty; and it was not completed when it became necessary for Brigadier Hope to close on me, subsequent to my march. The 88th foot was accordingly ordered out from Cawnpore, under Colonel Maxwell, C.B., to prosecute the researches which had already been attended by much success. An order has been given to transfer the treasure so found to Mr. Sherer, civil magistrate of Cawnpore.

"Another brigade had been detached under Brigadier Walpole, to make a detour by Akbarpore, through Etawah to Mynpoorie, with orders to rejoin me on the Grand Trunk-road. The effect of this movement has been excellent; and Captain Bradford, the officer whom I selected to act as a special commissioner to accompany Brigadier Walpole's force, has been enabled to shape out the police arrangements. He has punished some notorious malefactors and disaffected districts, as shown by the various reports which have been forwarded to the secretary of government. In consequence of the march of this column, it would appear that there has been a complete sweep of rebels and bad characters from the southern part of the Doab. Brigadier Walpole joined me yesterday at Futteghur, and has received my entire approval for the able and judicious manner in which he has carried out the duty entrusted to

him. I am informed, by the civil authorities, that my protracted stay at Cawnpore was of much benefit; and I am convinced that, apart from any immediate military object, it is necessary for the re-establishment of authority, that the march of the troops should be deliberate. Time is thus afforded to the magistrates and special commissioners to visit rebellious towns and villages, and again display to the people, in an unmistakable manner, the resolution of your lordship's government to visit punishment on all those who have, during the last few months, set aside their allegiance. Our movements have accordingly been regulated on this principle with reference to the day on which Brigadier Walpole was ordered to be at Mynpoorie, and the date of the probable arrival of Colonel Seaton's column from Delhi, at the same place. Having completed my means of movement with the carts which had returned from Allahabad on the 23rd December, after conveying the wounded to that station, I marched to Chowpore on the 24th.

"On the 28th, while the head-quarters and one brigade were advanced to Meerunka Serai, Major-general Windham, C.B., was detached with his remaining brigade to Futtiyah, the rajah of which place had abandoned his fort the night of the advance from Cawnpore. The fort was destroyed by the engineers, and several rebels belonging to the villages in the neighbourhood were disposed of by the magistrate. Mr. Power accompanied this brigade, and was enabled to make a good circuit round the country. Measures were taken, from our several halting-places, to destroy the country boats on the Ganges, in order to prevent interruption of the Doab, from the Oude side of the river, when the troops should have moved on. A considerable number were burnt, but it is probable that many may have escaped notice.

"On the 31st of December the leading brigades arrived at Goorsalgunge, Brigadier Greathed and Major-general Windham closing up, the one from the river in the evening, and the other from Futtiyah the next day. Early in the forenoon of the 1st of January, Brigadier Hope was sent forward with two regiments to the Kalee Nuddee, to prevent the further destruction of the iron suspension-bridge by the rebels. They disappeared on his approach, and the corps of royal engineers and Bengal sappers, with a party of sailors, under Major Nicholson (royal engineers), set to work with great vigour, and worked day and night for the repair of the bridge, which had been very much injured. I consider that Major Nicholson, and the officers and men under his command, deserve great credit for the unflagging industry and real skill displayed on this occasion. The sailors were specially useful to Major Nicholson, in the management of the ropes which replaced the broken part of the iron-work of the suspension-bridge.

"On the morning of the 2nd of January, I rode out, accompanied by the chief of the staff, to see if the bridge was ready for the advance of the column. Shortly after my arrival, while I was inspecting the work, which was nearly complete, I observed an unusual movement amongst the villagers in a village about half a mile to the right front of the bridge. It soon became evident that an attack was about to be made on the working parties. The picket, which had been placed on the enemy's side of the river, to cover the working party, was quickly reinforced. The pickets there, consisting of a wing of the 53rd