CHAPTER X.

SIR HUGH ROSE'S CAMPAIGN IN CENTRAL INDIA—LAST DAYS OF THE MUTINY.

Sir H. Rose—March on Saugor—Capture of the fort of Gurakota—Passage of the defile of Madanpore—Siege of Jansi—Arrival and defeat of Tantia Topee—Assault of Jansi—Departure from Jansi—Capture of Kounch—Excellent behaviour of the Gwalior Contingent—March on Calpi—Battle of Golowli—Capture of Calpi—Defeat of Maharajah Scindiah at Bahadourpore by Tantia Topee—Death of the Ranee of Jansi—Capture of Gwalior—Summary of Sir H. Rose's campaign—The situation in June 1858—End of the Honourable East India Company—The last campaign in Oude—Tantia Topee and his allies—Sir C. Campbell—Approximate loss of the natives.

WHILE Sir Colin Campbell was pursuing the work of conquest in the kingdom of Oude, and the English army was forcibly penetrating, for the third time in six months, to the heart of the capital, the columns we left at Mhow, on their return from a successful expedition in the district of Malwa, did not remain idle, and their deeds were not inferior, either in danger or fatigue, to those of their comrades who were combating on the left bank of the Ganges. The object was to push back the revolted sepoys, and the bands holding Central India, upon that great river, so as to get them between two fires. The country, bristling with forts, destitute of roads, intersected by rivers and torrents, offered almost insurmountable difficulties to military operations, especially when directed against an enemy with whom the entire population was in league. In this part of India, the war was not merely a mutiny but a national up-rising. Though thegreat princes, the Nizam of Hyderabad, Scindiah at Gwalior, and Holkar at Indore, had remained faithful to the English, the latter had irreconcilable enemies in the dispossessed rulers and the warlike population. The

Indian, it has been said, rarely thinks of the past or of the future, and the lessons of experience are no more unanswerable arguments to him than they are to the European. The fall of Delhi, and the success of the English at Lucknow, had not even yet demonstrated to the chiefs and people the superiority of regular armies, however weak numerically, over undisciplined hordes. Sustained by religious and military enthusiasm, to the very last the whole population clung to the national cause with a fervour productive of many heroic acts of devotion. We must also add that Tantia Topi, the principal adviser of the Nana and of the Ranee of Jansi, who were the chief leaders of resistance, showed an energy and military talent such as were not possessed by the veteran officers of the Bengal army, to whom the King of Delhi entrusted the command of his troops.

As has already been said, a general recently arrived in India had received the direction of the military movements intended to complete the work of pacification, and to drive back to the Ganges the armed bands and the revolted regiments of Central India. During the foregoing events, the names which appear in the first ranks of the armies and councils of England were those of soldiers of fortune, or statesmen who had reached the summit of the hierarchy only after a prolonged struggle. Outram, the two Lawrences, Nicholson, Sir C. Campbell himself were the authors of their own success, and owed nothing to the advantages of family. Fortune, however, reserved a glorious share in the great Indian drama for a member of the English aristocracy. The record of the birth of the general who brought to a successful issue one of the most brilliant campaigns of the war, is to be found in the peerage, and, what is more, he had never been mixed up in any way with Indian affairs.

Sir Hugh Rose, a son of a former ambassador of England to Berlin, entered the army in 1820, and rose step by step to the rank of major, without having seen any military service except in the repression of some disturbances in Ireland. Towards 1837, Major Rose, becoming weary of a garrison life, had himself placed on the unattached list, and family

influences procured for him the position of Consul-General at Beyrout. The events of 1840 brought the new agent into prominence, and from Syria he passed as first secretary to Constantinople, where he was acting representative of England when the difficulties broke out which soon after resulted in the Crimean War. Major Rose, now a colonel by seniority, took an active part in the campaign, without giving up his diplomatic career, and as commissioner represented English interests at the French head-quarters before Sebastopol. His services had just been rewarded by promotion and the cross of K.C. of the Bath when the mutiny broke out. At his own request Major-General Sir Hugh Rose, to give him his new title, was sent to Bombay to assume the command of the army, intended for the reduction of Central India. This choice naturally excited much sharp criticism in the Anglo-Indian public, and the claims of a 'Griffin' to a command of such importance were freely discussed. The soldier-diplomatist was, however, a born general, and was to justify the trust reposed in him by the home authorities by unparalleled energy and first-class military talents.

Towards the middle of December, a high dignitary belonging to the Anglo-Indian Government arrived at Mhow simultaneously with Sir H. Rose. Sir Robert Hamilton had been, for many years, the agent of the Governor-General in Central India, where he had acquired great influence over the native princes. He was intimately acquainted with the people and customs of the country, and by his advice the first measures of the authorities were skilfully directed towards restoring all their former prestige to the native rulers. Well-timed severity secured Holkar's power against the defection of his soldiers and subjects, and when the expedition set out on its task of reconquest, it left behind a firm and grateful ally. The little force which, under the pompous name of the Army of Central India, started, early in January 1858, to relieve the Europeans shut up in the fortress of Saugor, met at first with no obstacles.

It advanced through the dominions of the Begum of Bhopal, one of those superior women who appear from time

to time like a star in the sombre annals of India. She, as well as her royal brothers of Indore and Gwalior, fully gauged the all-powerful resources of European civilisation, and during the mutiny she remained scrupulously faithful to the treaty which bound her to her powerful neighbours. The well-cultivated fields of the tiny kingdom breathed an air of universal wealth and comfort. The capital, Bhopal, possessed straight, clean streets, well lighted at night, with a steamer on a small lake close by. To complete this likeness to Europe, the Princess Royal was married to an English officer, Victoria and Albert fashion, as the dark-skinned dowager pointed out triumphantly. On leaving Bhopal, military operations began by an attack on Rhatgarh, a native fortress, perched on a rock, like an eagle's eyrie. The defence was not a vigorous one, and after a few days' siege, the garrison evacuated the place under cover of darkness. As soon as day broke, the English cavalry pursued the fugitives, whose rear-guard they cut to pieces. Amongst the spoil were found lances surmounted by painted wooden heads, stained with blood, made to represent Europeans, both men and women, in features and complexion. We must not omit a horrible detail: long tresses of hair, the fineness and colour of which showed that it must have belonged to some of the poor victims slain at the outset of the mutiny, were discovered fastened on the lances. The capture of Rhatgarh opened the road to Saugor, without endangering the communications with Indore. On February 3, the deliverers appeared before the fortress where so many English families had found shelter in the day of trial. Amongst the defenders of the place was the 31st B.A., the only native regiment which had remained faithful to the laws of military honour, or, as the Indian expression puts it, to their salt, without being obliged to do so by the fear of punishment.

The primary object of the campaign was now reached, and there only remained to exact vengeance for the massacre at Jansi, on the spot itself where it had taken place, which had plunged so many English families into mourning. Before marching forwards it was, however, necessary, in order to

secure communication with Bombay, to reduce the fortress of Gurakota, 25 miles to the east of Saugor, and then held by the 51st and 52nd, B.A. It was situated on a high promontory between two rivers, and was so well guarded by nature that, in 1818, after a siege of three weeks, an Anglo-Indian force of 11,000 men only succeeded in penetrating within the walls, by granting an honourable capitulation to the defenders. The expedition, under the personal command of Sir Hugh Rose, arrived at Gurakota on February 11, and though the day was far advanced, proceeded at once to drive the sepoys and their allies from their positions in front of the fort. Twice the rebels bravely charged the batteries which were mowing down their ranks, but on being repulsed with loss, they retired to the fortress or dispersed in the neighbourhood. Next day a breaching battery opened fire, and did such execution that the sepoys abandoned all idea of resistance. The fort was evacuated in the night, and on the following morning it was occupied without resistance by the 3rd European Fusiliers, B.A. The cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent was sent in pursuit of the retreating enemy, whose rear-guard they overtook, bringing back a great many prisoners and some booty. Sir H. Rose's victory was incomplete, but the position of the fortress was so well chosen, that it would have required a much more considerable force than he could dispose of to invest the place entirely, and prevent the garrison from escaping into the dense jungles covering the hills on the south. The object of the expedition was, however, obtained, for the enemy had lost a fortress formidable from its natural defences, and abundantly supplied with ammunition and provisions, where the rebels on their return from their forays would have found a secure refuge.

The English troops re-entered Saugor on February 17. Their two months' campaigning had taught them what difficulties and privations would be entailed by any further advance into the interior. The districts between Saugor and Cawnpore having been for ten months in a state of complete anarchy, offered no means of providing provisions

for the army. Even at the time of the return from Gurakota miserable natives, driven to it by hunger, had been seen picking up the remains of the corn left by the horses and beasts of burden. Sir Hugh Rose attended with the greatest care to the organisation of the expeditionary force. The sick and wounded were left in the hospital of Saugor. All supplies necessary for the siege-train were renewed, and a few pieces of artillery added. The troops exchanged their usual uniform for one more adapted to the climate, the heavy baggage was stored in magazines in the fortress of Saugor, and finally, the provisioning of the active portion of the army was provided for by establishing a line of military trains in communication with Bombay. Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of the Presidency, was not less careful for the comfort of the men than the general himself, and attended to the sending of the convoys with an unflagging zeal, which greatly contributed towards the success of the campaign.

The English forces recommenced operations on February 27, and the very first night of their march plainly showed the feelings of the population. Their movements were signalled to the enemy by fires on every hill. The native troops occupied the defile of Malthoun, forty miles north of Saugor, in the heart of the Vindhyas chain, the natural difficulties of which had been skilfully augmented. But, on this occasion again, the leaders, exclusively preoccupied as they were with the defence of a single point, scarcely fortified the neighbouring pass of Madanpore, which offered an approach to Jansi, through the territories of the Rajah of Schahgarh, who had joined the insurrection some time before. Having captured the small fort of Barodia, situated between the two passes, Sir Hugh Rose undertook to force that of Madanpore. A feigned attack on the pass of Malthoun called off the attention of the allied chieftains, whilst the principal body of the English army marched on the defile of Madanpore. At daybreak, the 3rd European Fusiliers B.A. and the infantry of the Hyderabad contingent advanced to dislodge the enemy's outposts from the wooded heights which

they occupied, whilst the main body, preceded by artillery, appeared at the same instant at the entrance of the pass. The skirmishers, concealed in the jungle, and a battery placed at the other end of the defile, showered such a storm of bullets on the English, that the artillerymen had to shelter themselves behind their guns. Sir H. Rose had his horse wounded under him, and the forward movement was arrested. The check was but a momentary one. Some cannon belonging to the Hyderabad contingent shelled the defenders of the pass, and the English troops made a charge with decisive effect. The natives dispersed, and the pass of Madanpore was carried by assault. The victory was completed by the dragoons of the Royal Army and the cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, who galloped through the defile, and pursued the enemy for a distance of several miles.

The natives, in their discouragement, successively abandoned the fortresses of Seraï, Marowa, Tel Bihat, and that of Banpore, the residence of the Rajah of the same name. The possession of these strongholds secured the re-establishment of English authority in the district, and Sir H. Rose resumed his forward march. On March 17, the English troops effected the passage of the Betwa without firing a shot. That same day, the 2nd Brigade, which had been detached from the main body for some time, achieved an important success by capturing the formidable fortress of Chanderi, situated on the left bank of the Betwa. The defenders of the place showed great resolution and skill. A mine, which was fired just as the column was to begin the assault, made great havoc in the ranks of the 86th R.A. The news of the capture of Chanderi was received by Sir H. Rose the day after the passage of the Betwa. Feeling certain from this that his forces would soon be at their full complement, he continued his advance on Jansi.

The Indian Government attached the greatest importance to the speedy reduction of this town, rightly considering it the stronghold of the insurrection in Central India. Minute care had been taken with the defence of the place : the trees round the town were cut down, the walls and houses, so

placed as to be of any advantage to the attacking forces, were levelled with the ground. The old citadel, which commanded the town, was completely armed and repaired, and the flag of the Ranee was displayed on one of the towers. The town, in a circuit of four miles, was defended by a loop-holed wall 25 feet high and flanked at intervals by bastions provided with heavy guns. The final preparations for the defence were being made when the English arrived, and native workmen were still seen putting the last touches to a battery on the wall. All these posts were held by a garrison of 11,000 men, composed of rebel sepoys or warlike tribes, and inspired by the presence of the Ranee of Jansi, a courageous and bloodthirsty woman, one of the principal authors of the massacre in the month of June, and who, as such, could hope for no mercy.

There were other dangers to be apprehended besides those from the town itself. It was vaguely known that Tantia Topee, one of the most formidable and clever leaders of the rebels, had left Jansi some time before to go in quest of assistance. His errand acquired great importance from the presence of the Gwalior contingent at Calpi, where it had come to recruit after its defeat at Cawnpore early in December by Sir C. Campbell. The conflict was beginning under terrible difficulties, but Sir H. Rose was not a man to flinch. He had instinctively divined the secret of victory in Asiatic warfare, and his first proceedings showed a master-mind.

It was soon recognised that before attempting to make a breach in the outer wall of the fortress, which was defended by three lines of solid masonry, it was necessary to capture the town, and Jansi was accordingly invested on March 22. The next day four breaching batteries on the right, which had been finished on the evening of the 24th, opened fire. Steward's brigade, which had just taken the fort of Chanderi, reached head-quarters that same day. This reinforcement was all the more important that a company of Sappers R.A. and a considerable amount of artillery were attached to it. With their help Sir Hugh Rose was able to complete the

attack on the left. On March 26 two supplementary batteries, placed on heights commanding some of the works of the fortress, gave a fresh impulse to the attack. Although the town and its fortifications were exposed till the end of the month to a terrible fire, the resistance offered by the besiegers never slackened. The example of the Ranee sustained the courage of her subjects; the women and children showed themselves on the ramparts in the midst of the soldiers, to whom they brought food and drink. The English had been obliged to employ most of their artillery in silencing the fire from the town, and the breaching battery, consisting only of two guns, had little effect on a wall of remarkable solidity.

The sufferings of the besiegers had almost reached the limit of human endurance. Since the passage of the Betwa, sixteen days before, the troops had scarcely been able to snatch a few hours' rest; the horses were always saddled and bridled at the picquets. Besides this, the terrible summer season had set in; the men, from morn till night, were exposed to the fiery rays of the sun, and that among granite rocks, which refracted the heat like so many furnaces. When in action, officers and soldiers only escaped apoplexy by causing the Chistis (water-carriers) to pour the contents of their masacks (skins) on their heads. Terrible though the position of the besiegers was, it was about to become still more so. On March 31 the semaphores placed on the heights round the camp gave warning of the approach of numerous armed bodies. On being carefully examined, they turned out to be a force of 20,000 men. The Gwalior contingent, calling itself the army of the Peischwah, and reinforced by hordes of fanatics, under Tantia Topee, was advancing by forced marches to the relief of Jansi.

In presence of this great danger, the English general never faltered. A worthy successor of Clive, Wellesley, and all the illustrious soldiers whose courage and skill gave India to England, Sir H. Rose put a bold face on the matter, and fortune rewarded him by success. If the operations of the siege were once interrupted, the besieged

would regain courage and would prolong their resistance. Sir H. Rose decided not to withdraw a single man from his lines of attack, and to march against Tantia Topee with two incomplete brigades, amounting to about 2,000 men, of whom not even the half were Europeans. On learning towards nightfall that a strong column of the Peischwah's army was advancing on the north front of Jansi, he modified his original plan, and sent the first brigade to bar their passage. This movement, thanks to the darkness and to the nature of the ground, passed unperceived by the enemy. Encouraged by the small numbers of the English forces, which his vanguard had easily ascertained from the heights occupied by it early in the day, Tantia Topee had passed the Betwa, and pitched his camp a short distance from the English tents. During the night the sentinels could plainly hear the challenges and insults hurled against them by their adversaries. The besieged followed with deep interest the different incidents of the day from the top of the towers and walls. As the evening drew on their hopes of speedy deliverance showed themselves by bonfires, discharges of musketry and artillery, cries of joy, and beatings of drums and tamtams.

At daybreak the English outposts fell back on the main body before the Peischwah's army, which advanced in one long line, with such extended wings as to threaten to outflank Sir H. Rose's feeble brigade. The English infantry received orders to lie down, and the horse artillery, opening a well-directed fire, carried death and confusion into the enemy's ranks. The decisive moment had arrived. Sir H. Rose, followed by a squadron of dragoons, and Captain Prettyjohn, at the head of some light cavalry belonging to the Hyderabad contingent, rushed headlong, one on to the right wing, the other on to the left of their adversaries. Their example was immediately followed by the infantry, who made a charge with the bayonet. This heroic conduct decided the fortunes of the day. When the smoke round the guns lifted, a handful of English dragoons were seen in the midst of an affrighted multitude, flying in hot haste towards the

second Indian line, commanded by Tantia Topee. The latter body was provided with formidable artillery, and had taken up its position about two miles from the scene of the first combat, on rising ground surrounded by jungle. The operations of the second English brigade had been equally successful.

While Sir H. Rose and his dragoons were laying about them like ancient paladins in the very thick of the Peischwah's hordes, the first brigade had routed the native column which the evening before had directed its march to the north front of Jansi, and was about to bear down upon the reserve of the English army. The fiat of the God of battles had gone forth. The first line of the native forces had given way; their right wing was turned; the troops that had not been engaged were thrown into confusion by thousands of fugitives, who hampered their movements. Tantia Topee wisely resolved on retiring, covered by his artillery. The nature of the ground, cut up by ditches and strewn with blocks of granite, and the overpowering heat of the day, protected the natives in their retreat, and they were able to recross the Betwa, leaving, however, seventeen guns and 1,000 dead behind them. The English forces, and especially the cavalry, had suffered severely. No prisoners had been made on either side. Meanwhile the defenders of the town had not remained idle: constant discharges from the ramparts in the early part of the day had seemed to announce a sortie on a great scale; but the result of the battle, which was being fought before their eyes, and the phases of which they were able to follow, filled all hearts with despair. The growing discouragement could be perceived by the slackening of the fire from the place, and when the English troops re-entered the camp, the silence of the night was only broken by the reports from the breaching battery, which still continued its work of destruction.

Profiting by this state of feeling, Sir H. Rose, with happy decision, made use of the favourable opportunity to strike a decisive blow. The siege batteries had continued

their fire uninterruptedly, and on the evening of April 2 the breach was pronounced practicable. The assault was fixed for the following day. At three in the morning the 86th R.A. and the 28th B.A. stormed the breach with no great loss. The troops told off to assist the storming column, the 3rd European Bombay Fusiliers and two companies of native sappers, met with more difficulties in the attempt to escalade the walls. One of the detachments, while advancing over open ground by the light of the moon, was decimated by the fire of the besieged before reaching the foot of the ramparts. Once there, the ladders were found to be too short, others were not strong enough, and broke. The undertaking seemed desperate, when some officers of the Engineers, hoisted up by their men, reached the top of the wall, where they were soon followed by their soldiers. The struggle was one of the fiercest, and was still uncertain, when the shouts of victory raised by the storming column were heard in the distance, and the besieged, giving way, fled in all directions. The two corps effected their junction, and marched towards the palace by way of the main street. Before they could get there the artillery of the citadel where the Ranee had taken refuge opened fire on the heart of the town, causing a conflagration of the buildings near the palace, and it was through flames and projectiles that the besiegers arrived at the royal abode.

The entry was vigorously defended. An explosion of powder, which occurred when the English were debouching through the great gate, caused many deaths in their ranks. The sepoys were driven from room to room, and the magnificent palace, one of the glories of Indian architecture, soon offered a terrible scene of murder and pillage. Towards the middle of the day the English troops, who had been fighting since dawn, took a short rest. To this halt succeeded a bloody combat. About fifty body-guards of the Ranee had taken refuge in the stables, where they were all slain to a man. Meanwhile, fighting was still going on in the streets and houses. Like the Rajpoots of olden times, the inhabitants threw their wives, their children, their

treasures, into the wells, into which they leapt themselves after burning their last cartridge. Outside the town there occurred several terrible episodes. Some hundreds of fugitives who had escaped over the outer wall were surrounded on rising ground by a body of cavalry, and were all mowed down by discharges of grape-shot from a native battery B.A., notwithstanding their entreaties and heart-rending cries.

Fighting, which ceased at night-fall, was resumed the following day. One after the other, the cannon foundry and the elephant park of the Ranee fell into the hands of the English. The Princess, with 500 adherents, had taken refuge in the citadel the day before. At one time it was thought that, in order to escape from her enemies, she had ascended a funeral pile and perished in the flames, like the Indian widows of yore. The Ranee, however, did not wish to succumb unrevenged by a useless suicide, and when all hope of resistance was lost, she evacuated the fortress. An officer who, on the morning of April 6, ventured in the neighbourhood of the citadel, found the gates wide open and the garrison gone. The English cavalry sent in pursuit of the Ranee only succeeded in cutting to pieces a few badly mounted horsemen of the escort.

Next day an assembly of armed men and sepoys entrenched in the houses of Lane Bagh, in the centre of the town, resisted for several hours the troops sent to dislodge them, and the losses on both sides were considerable. This was the last fighting of the siege, and from this moment the smoking ruins of Jansi were no longer defended. In this six days' battle the English lost 300 killed and wounded, about 15 per cent. of the troops engaged. Among the dead was Colonel Turnbull, who was mortally wounded in the attack on the palace. He was a distinguished officer, and had shown great skill in directing the artillery in the battle of April 1. Of the eight officers of Engineers attached to the expedition, only two escaped safe and sound. The losses of the besieged were much greater: inside the walls, more than a thousand bodies were burnt or buried. Large

stores of food and ammunition fell into the hands of the conquerors; the citadel alone contained more than fifty guns of various calibres. The search made immediately after the victory for the remains of the unfortunate victims of June 1 proved successful. The bodies had been thrown pell-mell into a ditch outside the town, close to the spot where the work of murder had been done.

Since his departure from Mhow, fortune had constantly smiled on Sir H. Rose's undertakings. He had advanced on the very heart of Central India without a check, and had wrested their most formidable strongholds from the allied natives by main force. Always and everywhere he had disconcerted his adversaries by the rapidity of his movements and the vigour of his blows. The capture of Jansi, though it placed almost the last refuge of the insurgents in his hands, did not complete the work of repression. A halt was, however, absolutely necessary. Losses in battle, combined with fatigue and privations, had reduced immensely the brigades designated by the pompous title of Army of Central India. Sir Hugh Rose granted a well-deserved rest to his troops, and spent the greater part of April in preparing for ulterior operations.

The allies, on their side, were not idle. Though worsted in a hundred encounters and deprived of their fortresses, chiefs and soldiers alike, with the heroic determination we have been called upon to admire nearly at every page of these sketches, were still resolved to try the fortunes of war. The valiant Ranee, Tantia Topee, Rao Sahib, the Nana's brother, had united their forces, and the army of the Peischwah was rapidly reconstituted under the walls of Calpi where, for ten months, the flag of the mutiny had floated. The fortress of Calpi, situated on the right bank of the Jumna, which, as before said, commands the road from Jansi to Cawnpore, was the last stronghold of the insurgents. Its fall would at once re-establish direct and easy communication between Sir C. Campbell's army and the troops in Central India.

Before resuming active operations, Sir H. Rose was

obliged to diminish still further his small force by leaving a sufficient garrison at Jansi, and on April 26 he reappeared in the field. Since the middle of the month, small flying columns had been scouring the country and taking possession of the tiny forts scattered over it, in order to clear the road between Jansi and Calpi. The season and the nature of the soil were most unfavourable to the movements of the troops. The ground, cut up in all directions by deep ravines and calcined by the summer sun, bore no trace of vegetation. At the bivouacs, the wretched oxen and horses were lucky if they received meagre rations of branches and dry leaves; the wells were almost dry, and what little water they yielded was bad. The heat of the day had become so frightful that, as far as possible, the soldiers were not exposed to the rays of the sun, and all marching was done at night. The sufferings of Sir H. Rose's soldiers were not less than those their brothers in arms were enduring at the same time in Rohilkund under Sir C. Campbell. A few hours of unrefreshing doze (sound sleep was impossible, from howling dogs, jackals, and beasts of burden chewing their cud and jingling bells with every move of the head), and then another march and a battle. We marched most of the night; and how long the hours seem in night marches! The infantry were fatigued before they started, but they began to try hard to bear up against it. In the first halt they sit down and are soon asleep, then they awake, nod off again, and awake again several times. The bugle sounds, and they are up and off again; but before a second halt is sounded, they begin to fall out, and must be carried in 'dhoolies.' An occasional joke passes off among the older campaigners, and the hopes of meeting the foe keep up their flagging spirits.

The sun rises, and then the heat and clouds of white dust well-nigh overpower them, and the men begin to cry out, almost hysterically, for water. Water! but the bag is empty; and they look round imploringly and keep on a little longer. By-and-bye, a village and a large tope of trees is seen, and then the 'bheesties rush off for water, and

the men expect a halt.' Long-continued excitement like this soon begins to tell upon the best of them; a shadowing of delirium begins to show itself; there is a nervous restlessness and a wild glare from the dry red eye, and awful vengeance is vowed against the foe! Men begin to talk of home, and cool shady places and brooks, as the hot air begins to blow over them, parching up every drop of moisture in the body; and dogs rush past with great raw wounds in their backs, like sabre cuts, caused by the sun, howling for water and shade; the patient camel cries and grunts, and the intelligent elephant tries to rut the raw soles of his feet, and big tears trickle from his eyes as the advance continues; at length the head of the column has halted; there is a village, and the men are blessed with ample shade and water for a time!

In the midst of these trials the English forces were steadily advancing on Calpi, but the difficulty of procuring water in sufficient quantity prevented Sir H. Rose from concentrating his forces on one point, and giving to his movements their usual rapidity. The allies, by taking up a position under the guns of the fortress of Kounch, forty miles south-west of the fort of Calpi, shortened by one-half the march of their adversaries. Conspicuous among the native cavalry was the Ranee at the head of a body of Amazons. On learning their approach, Sir H. Rose assembled his two brigades on May 5, ten miles from the fort. The day before, the 93rd Highlanders had joined head-quarters. Though their effective force was very small, yet it almost filled up the gap made by the garrison left at Jansi. On May 6, the day being already far advanced, Sir H. Rose attacked the front of the enemy's positions at the head of the first brigade and of the Hyderabad contingent, whilst the second brigade executed a flank movement on the left. The allies did not wait for the result of this double manœuvre, and fearing that their communications with Calpi would be cut off, they beat in retreat after a short artillery engagement. The town and fortress of Kounch offered no resistance. The only serious fighting occurred when the English troops

pursued and attacked the rear-guard. The Gwalior contingent, who had been ordered to protect the retreat, extorted praises from the victors by their firm attitude, and kept up the high reputation they had acquired during the campaign.

Their infantry, drawn up in a line of skirmishers two miles long, connected by groups of from thirty to forty men, saved the Peischwah's army from an immense disaster. These fine soldiers retreated for several hours in good order, keeping up a steady fire, and only hastening their steps when the English cavalry and artillery appeared on their flanks. The victors lost few men in the engagement by the enemy's fire, but suffered greatly from fatigue. They had begun to march at midnight, and the pursuit did not cease till nine the next evening. The thermometer stood at 120° in the shade, and the sun made many victims in the ranks. Three times the General-in-Chief came very near having a sun-stroke. Stopping at the foot of a tree, he was obliged to have buckets of water thrown on his head in order to prevent congestion of the brain. The allies left about 600 dead and nine guns on the battle-field.

Even after this trying day, Sir H. Rose gave his troops only a few hours' rest, and next day at dawn they started for Calpi. On leaving Kounch, the English force deviated from the straight line of march, Sir H. Rose having been informed that the allies had raised many obstacles on the road from Jansi to Calpi. This change had the advantage of placing the expedition in communication with a detachment sent by Sir C. Campbell to operate on the left bank of the Jumna. The latter body was composed of several companies of Sikhs, of the 88th R.A., and of the Camel Corps—that is to say, infantry mounted on dromedaries—under Colonel Maxwell.

Before any successful operation could be effected, the Peischwah's army, like a phœnix, rose from its ashes. The citadel of Calpi, with its well-stocked arsenal, was held by a garrison composed of the Gwalior contingent, the remains of the Bengal regiments, and bands of Rohillas, the whole

recently reinforced by the cavalry of the Rajah of Bandah, and, according to an official document, amounting to 20,000 men in all. The Ranee of Jansi and Tantia Topee had sworn to defend to the death this last stronghold of the mutiny, and to win heaven by destroying the infidels.

The citadel of Calpi, situated on the right bank of the Jumna, stands on a rock outside the town, from which it is separated by a line of precipices. On the town-walls, numerous temples surrounded by ditches played the part of detached forts. The outer line of entrenchments was formed by fortifications, armed with heavy guns, beyond which extended fields intersected by deep ravines. Ground of this nature not only opposed great difficulties to any offensive operation, but also facilitated sorties on the part of the besieged by furnishing them with all kinds of covered ways. Tantia Topee skilfully turned the natural advantages of the soil to the utmost account, and being fully aware that the sun was his best ally, never began his attacks until the middle of the day, when the heat was at its fiercest.

Sir H. Rose concentrated his two brigades at Golowli, to the south-west of Calpi, on May 19, and was joined on the following day by a rather strong force from Colonel Maxwell's detachment, some companies of Sikhs, and of the 88th R.A., and the whole Camel Corps. Colonel Maxwell, with the rest of his forces, was to second the attack by bombarding the fortress from the left bank of the Jumna, where he was stationed. The arrival of this reinforcement enabled the operations of the siege to be commenced at once. Sir Hugh's left rested on the road from Bandah to Calpi, and his right reached the ravines in the immediate neighbourhood of the Jumna. On May 22, towards ten in the morning, strong hostile columns debouching by the road to Bandah attacked the English left, and the contest became a severe one. Whether, owing to a secret information or to a fortunate inspiration at the last moment, Sir H. Rose considered this engagement as a mere feint, and altered nothing in his previous arrangements, refusing to withdraw a single man

from the forces composing his right wing. This determination decided the fate of the day.

Suddenly, as by magic, the long line of ravines on the right of the English appeared bristling with guns, which showered grape and balls, while sepoys, emerging as it were from the bowels of the earth, covered the English battalions with a storm of bullets. The sharpness of the attack, the great number of the assailants, and the heat of the sun then straight overhead, overpowered Sir H. Rose's most energetic men. The ranks wavered, and the enemy, encouraged by the sight, advanced with demoniacal yells. One moment's hesitation and the battle was lost. But Sir H. Rose had already provided for the danger, and the Camel Corps, setting off at full galop, arrived on the scene of action just as the English artillery was about to fall into the hands of the victorious allies. The soldiers dismounted, and led by General Stuart, sword in hand, fell on the sepoys. The effect of this charge was decisive; it checked the natives in their triumphant advance, and caused them to fly ignominiously after a short resistance. The cavalry, by taking part in the fight at the right moment, captured a great many guns and a considerable amount of baggage, in spite of the difficulties of the ground. The Ranee, who was looking on at the head of her Amazons, lost her tents, and was obliged to spend the night in the open air at the foot of a tree. During the struggle Colonel Maxwell poured a continuous artillery fire into the town and citadel from his position on the left bank of the Jumna.

Discouraged by the events of the day, their ranks decimated by the English fire, the allies evacuated the place in the night, and the following day it was occupied by the English without resistance. All that was found there showed that a prolonged resistance had been contemplated. There were buildings and tents sufficient to house a great number of troops; there were smithies and cannon foundries in full activity. The arsenal was overflowing with stores of all sorts—such as saltpetre, sulphur, coal, cartridges for muskets and cannon, surgical instruments and medicines pillaged from

the magazines at Cawnpore and Agra. Finally, an immense quantity of official documents was discovered, among others, one proclaiming Nana Sahib the sovereign of all the land south of the Jumna. On May 24, the troops celebrated the Queen's birthday in the midst of the trophies of the previous day's victory. Never had a more precious gift been offered to a beloved sovereign by devoted and brave soldiers. How much suffering, however, clouded this day of rejoicing! Sir H. Rose's two brigades were almost in a state of dissolution. The staff existed merely in name, its head was lying delirious on a sick bed; Sir H. Rose's constitution was being slowly undermined by fever, after having been severely tried by three sunstrokes; the chaplain had gone mad. The officers, all of whom were wounded or completely worn out, stood in the utmost need of seeking strength and health in the salubrious climate of Europe.

After so much fatigue and so many hardships, it might have been supposed that the task of the little army of Central India was at length accomplished. A flying column, under Colonel Robertson, composed of troops of all arms, had been sent in pursuit of the natives. The reports of the spies gave rise to the belief that Tantia Topee and his companions were moving towards the Ganges, and that after crossing it, they would take refuge in Oude, where there could be no thought of following them. Deceived by this reassuring intelligence, Sir H. Rose was preparing to leave the army, after conveying by an order of the day his thanks to his faithful companions in danger and fatigue for their devotedness and good discipline, when an event which occurred a few days previously threatened to wrest from the English all the fruits of the campaign.

On leaving Calpi, Tantia Topee and the Ranee had advanced on Gwalior by forced marches, instead of flying to the jungles of Oude from the relentless vengeance of their enemies. In order to bar their passage, Maharajah Scindiah marched out at the head of his troops, on May 30, as far as Bahadourpore, some nine miles from Gwalior. He was deserted by the bulk of his troops, who passed over to the

enemy, and taking to flight with his body-guard, he crossed the Chambal and arrived safe and sound at Agra. By a bold stroke, the men, who only a few days earlier were despairing fugitives, their last battle fought and lost, had become masters of Scindiah's treasures, of the wealth of his adherents and of a well-stocked arsenal.

Tantia Topee at once proclaimed his master, Nana Sahib, Scindiah's successor, and rewarded the treachery of the Gwalior troops by considerable gifts of money. In a short time this Indian Mithridates, by an unexpected turn of fortune, saw himself at the head of an army of 20,000 men, and in a position to withstand the efforts of adversaries exhausted by innumerable hardships.

The column sent from Calpi in pursuit of the fugitives soon perceived that they were marching on Gwalior instead of retreating to the Ganges, and, in order to avert serious danger in that direction, Sir H. Rose despatched some of his forces under Brigadier Stuart to the help of the Maharajah. The reinforcement did not arrive in time, and the disaster which befell Scindiah at Bahadourpore was soon known at Calpi. Tantia Topee's success gave every reason to anticipate grave complications. Holkar's contingent, carried away by this example, might turn against their leader, and take possession of Indore in the name of the mutineers. Where were the forces strong enough to prevent the Mahratta population of the Deccan and of Hyderabad from joining the standard of the heir of the Peischwah? Once again the English supremacy in India was seriously threatened.

The military authorities of Northern India, on learning Scindiah's defeat, hastened to despatch help to the scene of danger. The 3rd European Bengal Fusiliers were at once sent from Agra to the Chambal, and a column employed in Bandelkhund, under Brigadier Smith, received orders to march northwards. Brigadier Robert Napier hastily left head-quarters at Cawnpore with reinforcements, and took the road to Gwalior by way of Calpi. On June 6, Sir H. Rose, calling on his men for a last effort, quitted the banks of the Jumna to rejoin his advanced guard.

During these last marches the English troops experienced the worst sufferings of a summer campaign in India. 'As we passed along, we saw several camels, bullocks and tatoos, which had fallen dead from the heat, but there was no decomposition going on—they seemed to be drying up like mummies in this intensely powerful sun. Scores of poor sepoys, who could go no further, had taken off their belts and horrible red cloth coats, and lay down gasping in any morsel of shade; others, jaded and worked up to intense nervous irritability, were dragging themselves along—limping onwards with drooping heads, or staggering with a gait like an idiot, a paralytic, or a drunkard.'

On June 16, the two brigades effected their junction at Indorki, on the banks of the Sinde, and, in the evening, Brigadier Napier, with his corps, joined head-quarters. This officer-general, who had taken a glorious share in both the sieges of Lucknow, and who was to distinguish himself still more in the Abyssinian war, assumed the command of the second brigade, vacant by the placing of Brigadier Stuart on the sick list. Brigadier Smith and the column sent from Agra advanced on their side to invest the place on the north and south.

There had been no time to repair the ruined fortifications of the citadel of Gwalior, which owed to its position the name of the Gibraltar of India, and the allies had confined themselves to fortifying the heights round the town. The Ranee of Jansi personally superintended the works of defence, and fought to the end with heroic courage. As to Tantia Topee and his colleagues, according to their usual tactics they took to flight on the approach of danger.

Three miles to the east of the fortress and the citadel were the cantonments of Morar, where Scindiah's contingent with the European officers commanding it had been formerly stationed. On the morning of June 17 Sir H. Rose perceived that Morar was occupied by a considerable portion of the native army; an engagement immediately followed, which proved a mere artillery duel, till one of the English brigades, turning the right flank of the natives, the latter

beat in retreat through the camp, hard pressed by their adversaries. The retreat became a total rout on the arrival of Sir H. Rose's other brigade, which very opportunely appeared at the further end of the cantonments; but the artillery and cavalry, owing to the nature of the ground, were unable to complete the victory by pursuing the enemy. The day was marked by one of those terrible episodes so common in Indian warfare. Fifty sepoys, who stood at bay in a ravine, defended themselves to the last against the Highlanders by whom they were surrounded. Not a man issued alive from this modern Thermopylæ.

The result of the encounter seemed to presage a speedy and decisive victory; the entry of the troops into Gwalior was imminent, and a wise policy seemed to demand the giving some guarantee that the object of the expedition was merely the restoration of a faithful ally to his throne. It was necessary that Scindiah should make his appearance among the English on their entry into Gwalior, in order to reassure the population against any fear of annexation. The Maharajah had already been some days with the column sent from Agra to assist in the reduction of the place, and was at once summoned to head-quarters. Brigadier Smith's column, which was advancing from the south, arrived on the evening of the affair at Morar at Kota Ki Seraï, on the little river Omrar, seven miles from Gwalior. Beyond the village the road winds between hills, until it issues into the plain, in the midst of which Gwalior is situated. An encounter between advanced posts had taken place that morning. The enemy's vedettes having been seen on the other side of the stream, two squadrons of the 8th Hussars R.A. and a small body of infantry were ordered to make a reconnaissance. They were soon met by the fire of a masked battery, which the Hussars carried by a dashing charge, only retiring after spiking the guns and on the approach of very superior forces. Some native cavalry, on advancing to attack the Hussars, were overthrown, and perished almost to a man, trodden down under the horses' feet. On this occasion, according to a report, the Ranee of Jansi, who dis-

appears henceforth from the scene, was among the dead. Let us accept popular rumour, without too minute investigation, and assume that the valiant Ranee met with her death on the heights of Gwalior, whether by ball, shell, or sabre cut. It seems only appropriate that the modern Semiramis should be slain fighting at the head of her Amazons in a cavalry engagement.

In the affair of the 17th it had been made pretty clear that Brigadier Smith was in presence of the bulk of the allied forces, and Sir H. Rose, deviating from his line of operations, joined his lieutenant. On the morning of the 18th the native leaders entered into action with an impetuosity which was of short duration. The 86th R.A. deployed on the right in lines of skirmishers, the 71st R.A. in the same order, followed by the main body, composed of the 95th R.A. and the 10th and 25th B.A., dislodged the allies from their positions on the heights, and drove them as far as the last ridge overlooking the plain of Gwalior. Considerable forces of horse and foot were seen to issue from the town, and to form in confusion in the neighbouring fields. Notwithstanding the exhausted condition of his troops, and the lateness of the hour, Sir H. Rose determined to strike a decisive blow. His cavalry continuing to advance, descended into the plain, and the allied troops fled at their approach, without attempting the slightest resistance. In the evening the victors occupied the town and the palace. The next day Scindiah re-entered his capital in triumph at the very time a detachment of the 25th Native Regiment B.A. was completing the victory by the capture of the fortress of Gwalior. Some fifty sepoys and armed natives had taken refuge in the ruins, and, with the dogged heroism characteristic of the Indian race, resisted to the last.

On June 29 Sir H. Rose placed the command of the army in the hands of Brigadier Napier, and set out for Bombay, after successfully conducting one of the most brilliant campaigns that any general can boast of. At the head of two small brigades he had traversed Central India from the banks of the Sipri to those of the Jumna, meeting at

every step with an enemy ten times superior in number, with citadels which were at least formidable from their natural defences, and with populous towns animated by the most hostile sentiments. Besides all this, the climate from the very beginning had thrown almost insurmountable obstacles in his way. Everywhere, and always, victory had been on his side; everywhere and always he had changed defeat of the enemy into a complete rout by the rapidity and the determination of his movements. After five months of daily fighting, the English flag at last floated on the walls of Calpi, and the object of the campaign seemed attained, when the revolt of Scindiah's troops compromised the results of so much labour and hardship. Sir H. Rose's military talents, ever fertile in resources, did not fail him in this emergency, and by immediately taking the field, with exhausted and badly-equipped troops, he prevented Gwalior from becoming a second Delhi, and receiving into its walls all the malcontents of India. By his capacity for enduring fatigue, by his presence in the very thick of the battle, by his care for his soldiers, he succeeded in winning from them the most boundless devotion, and his name deserves a foremost place among those of Anglo-Indian captains. Once again fortunate England—and here we may be allowed a feeling of envy—had put the right man in the right place by entrusting to a military diplomatist the command of the adventurous expedition sent against Central India.

In June 1858 a year had scarcely elapsed since the outbreak of the mutiny, and though the smouldering embers still emitted flames, no serious conflagration was to be feared. In Bengal, in Central India, and in the North-West Provinces, the sepoys no longer existed as an organised army; they had disappeared without a single military genius of any sort having appeared in their ranks, and without showing any conspicuous bravery on the battle-field, with the exception of some few picked regiments. The principal leaders who still resisted, Tantia Topee, Beni Madho, Prince Firoz-Shah, and the Begum of Oude, now only thought of saving their heads from the vengeance of the conquerors.

Thousands of bewildered fugitives were scattered over the country, attacking small forts, and disappearing on the approach of the first horseman sent in pursuit. After the capture of Calpi and Gwalior, deep discouragement fell upon the rebels, who saw themselves threatened on all sides. A new enemy now appeared: the vanquished carried about with them in their belts and turbans the rich spoils of Jansi, Calpi, and Gwalior, and the rapacious inhabitants attacked these richly laden vagabonds who neither dared to fight, to halt, nor to disperse.

In all the vast extent of India, the kingdom of Oude alone had not yet acknowledged European supremacy. The capital, it is true, was in the hands of the English. Communications were secured by a chain of military posts, and before the rains had made the country impracticable even to the natives, the English columns scoured it in every direction. But a deep feeling of hostility existed among the inhabitants, whose proud and warlike character and sincere attachment to their feudal institutions predisposed them to try the chances of a guerilla warfare. It was necessary, in order to secure a lasting peace, not only to conquer the country, but also to occupy it militarily, diminish the power of the great chieftains, and disarm the population. The task reserved for the English army was more wearisome than dangerous. Nothing was to be feared from the enemy in the open field. The only checks to be apprehended in the multifarious operations which would necessarily follow, even when carried on in the heart of unexplored districts, would be checks due to imprudence or want of skill, as in the expeditions of Rhadamoa and Indgespore.

The lessons of experience clearly pointed out the way to avoid danger in the future, and to prevent the respite afforded by the rainy season from being used to recruit and organise the rebel forces. It was of the highest importance to let it be known by all, chiefs and soldiers, that the war was no longer one of dispossession and extermination, and that all means of safety were not denied to them. The English authorities were fully alive to the exigencies of the

moment. We have already had occasion to notice the revulsion of feeling that had taken place in England on the question of India. The secret instructions of the Court of Directors, couched in a spirit of moderation, if not of clemency, fully in harmony with the kindly dispositions of Lord Canning, provoked no serious opposition among high Indian functionaries. Even in the army itself there was no longer any very fervent wish to prolong a contest where no mercy was shown to the conquered and no glory redounded to the conquerors. With the exception of a few fanatics, all the authorities, civil and military, began faintly to grasp the immense distance which separates assassins from rebellious but honourably-minded men, and ignorant soldiers from rebellious leaders. Political good sense was making itself heard, and people began to feel that though in the eyes of Asiatics clemency borders closely on weakness, there are yet certain thorny situations in which to pursue a war of extermination to the bitter end and to exasperate one's adversaries by merciless punishments, is both a mistake and a crime.

This conciliatory policy found an able interpreter in the new Commissioner-General of the kingdom, a man admirably fitted to carry it out. Skilled in the management of the natives, Sir R. Montgomery took advantage of the respite furnished by the rainy season to soothe and propitiate them. Some landowners, important from their birth and their wealth, came to make their peace at Lucknow; others, in their secret correspondence, made it clear that they were only held back from imitating their example by the fear of violence from their neighbours. Dissensions broke out among the mutineers, and one of their most formidable leaders fell in an insignificant quarrel. The Moulvie was shot in an encounter with the partisans of the Rajah of Powayne. The victor is said to have cut off his enemy's head, and sent it to the nearest English commissioner with a request for the promised reward. By a curious piece of trickery the price of blood was withheld,

because the Rajah was already dead before the head was cut off.

In the midst of all these negotiations, and whilst small expeditions, which were generally successful, were going on, the rainy season came to a close, and the moment for resuming active operations arrived. Before Sir C. Campbell reappeared at the head of his troops an important event had been chronicled by contemporary history. We allude to the substitution of the Queen's Government for that of the East India Company. We shall be able more fully to appreciate this change by studying the reforms, not very considerable, however, introduced into Anglo-Indian institutions by the vote of Parliament. For the moment, we shall confine ourselves to saying a few words regarding the effect produced on the native population by the nominal change of rulers.

The proclamation in which Queen Victoria announced to her new subjects that she was about to assume the sceptre of India heretofore wielded by the Honourable Company was worthy of the sovereign of the great nation, which as yet, alas, is the only one in Europe capable of reconciling respect for the past with liberal institutions. Certain parts of the preamble to the new charter of India were calculated to please and conciliate the natives. All thought of future aggrandisement was formally disavowed. All treaties and engagements, all the rights of the native princes, were to be scrupulously respected. A Government which was swayed by feelings of pure Christianity could not but have broad notions of religious toleration, and extend an impartial protection to all sects. Her Majesty's representatives bound themselves to respect the rights of the natives, especially that of property, so dear to a people like the Indians, who think so much of living and dying on the paternal acres. Liberal conditions of pardon, more liberal than those mentioned in Lord Canning's proclamation, were offered to all who would lay down their arms before the end of the year. 'May the Almighty God grant to us and to our representatives the strength to carry out the

wishes which we make from the bottom of our heart for the well-being and prosperity of our Indian people.' So said, with touching modesty, the pacific conqueror to whom her faithful Parliament had just offered 150 millions of new subjects.

On November 1, 1858, a memorable date in modern annals, Queen Victoria's proclamation, translated into twenty languages, promulgated simultaneously in the great centres and in the remotest stations of the vast empire, announced that the Bill of the Parliament had come into force. Universal rejoicings took place on that day from Cape Comorin to the heights of the Himalaya; prayers were offered alike in churches, temples, mosques and pagodas; salvoes of artillery were fired; the military bands played their most joyous airs, and military displays were general. In the port of Bombay, on the Indus, the Ganges, the Irrawaddy, hundreds of ships were gaily decked with flags. In the evening, the accession of Queen Victoria to the throne of the Great Mogul, and the last day of the Honourable East India Company's rule, were celebrated by banquets, followed by many toasts and copious libations, by brilliant illuminations, and by fireworks. These proofs of loyalty, given by the European community to a beloved sovereign, were also an expression of triumph after a struggle for life and death which had lasted more than a year.

The native population made fewer demonstrations, and only the enlightened spirits among them understood the real meaning of the great political change they were witnessing. Having been accustomed to the rule of invisible masters secluded in the depths of the harem, the Indians had never comprehended the mechanism of the foreign Power whose yoke they bore. We think we are justified in stating that the defunct Company, whose magnificent funerals had just taken place, had always been thought of by the great majority of its subjects as an antiquated Begum, living in grand style beyond the seas. The Begum had paid her debt to nature; there was no reason for rejoicing or for

wonder. But change and novelties are as attractive to the Indian as to the European. The actual sovereign engaged in the most solemn terms to respect the rights and religion of her new subjects, she offered a full pardon to the rebels who had not yet laid down their arms. Her reign opened directly after a terrible struggle, in which European authority had asserted itself on a hundred battle-fields; the native press, the public orators, and addresses covered with thousands of signatures welcomed simultaneously the august heiress of the East India Company.

After being present at the ceremony of November 1, by the side of the Governor-General, Sir C. Campbell lost no time in resuming the offensive, and left the same evening to take the chief command of the several expeditions intended to re-establish definitively European supremacy in Oude. The main body left Beylah on November 8. It was provided with considerable supplies for siege operations, with a view of shedding as little English blood as possible in the reduction of the petty forts that were to be met with at every step. Other columns, under Brigadiers Troup, Walpole, and Hope Grant, were to act in concert with Sir Colin, and combine their movements so as to enclose the insurgents in a circle of iron.

The great war was over; and a detailed account of the marches and counter-marches of the troops in pursuit of an invisible enemy would offer little interest. The most renowned strongholds fell in a few hours under the fire of Sir Colin's guns, but an impenetrable jungle was within easy reach of the ramparts, and the darkness of night favoured the retreat of the garrisons. In the morning, the only trophies remaining to the English were battered buildings, a few unserviceable pieces of artillery, and some provisions. The leaders would often at the last moment betake themselves by one gate to the English camp, in the hope of saving their life and treasures, whilst, by the opposite one, the entire garrison would hurry to join the standard of the nearest chief. The natives, who were masters in the art of deceit, sought to gain time by feigning to negotiate. The son of Beni Madho,

one of the most determined opponents of English rule, wrote to head-quarters, disavowing his father's conduct, and claiming the latter's confiscated lands for himself. The population was evidently in heart on the side of its hereditary masters. On the approach of the foreign columns, the villagers fled from their houses; the most vague, the most contradictory information was supplied to the staff. How strange was the attachment of these poor creatures to rulers who had never known any law but that of their own passions and interests!

All material advantages were on the side of the English. Their absolute supremacy was enforced in the neighbouring villages by detachments of police and troops; little by little order was re-established; the taxes began to be collected; the most prominent leaders, such as the Rajah of Anrethie, Man Singh, and his brother, Rutber Singh, made their submission. All armed bands had retired from the districts on the left bank of the Ganges. Towards the end of November Beni Madho and his many thousand partisans were driven by main force from the fortress of Dondla Khera, a highly venerated sanctuary on the banks of the sacred river, which he had sworn to defend to the death; but the wily fugitive left no trace of his flight. The reports of the spies affirmed that he had been seen at the same day and at the same hour in four different places. The first object of the expedition was now accomplished, and Sir Colin Campbell marched on Lucknow. Though the losses inflicted by the enemy were light, yet the endurance of the soldiers had been severely tried; for several days in succession they had to march twenty-four miles at a stretch.

In the beginning of December, more reliable and circumstantial information was forthcoming. It was ascertained that Beni Madho had taken refuge in the district of Bareitch, on the confines of Nepaul, and that the Begum of Oude and the infamous Nana Sahib were in his camp, sharing his good and evil fortunes. The hope of at length seizing the author of the Cawnpore massacre revived the general courage, and the pursuit was undertaken with immense ardour, but the

most secretly planned expeditions, the boldest enterprises resulted in failures. A rear-guard in full retreat, which soon disappeared in the direction of the unhealthy territory of Nepaul, was just caught sight of and nothing more. The difficulties of the ground and the complicity of the peasants placed insurmountable obstacles in the way. The limits of the known world seemed to have been reached. Maps and guides were both wanting; two or three English officers, formerly in the service of the King of Oude, had a few years previously ridden through the scarcely inhabited country, but they knew absolutely nothing of its topography. It was necessary to make one's way through swamps and torrents, over precipices and through primæval forests, where traces of wild beasts were to be met with at every step.

On December 25, the English forces celebrated their Christmas in sight of the glaciers of the Himalaya; the Dhawalaghiry, and Mount Everest, the highest peak in the world, were visible on the horizon, some leagues off, while the enemy, who refused either to fight or to submit, was making for the neutral territory of Nepaul. A romantic episode ended this romantic campaign. On the last day of the year, certain information was received that Beni Madho and his allies were encamped a short distance from the Rapti, a river separating Oude from Nepaul; and Sir C. Campbell could not refrain from attempting a surprise. That evening, the entire camp was set in motion; 150 elephants, intended to carry five foot soldiers each, were standing ready to start; a battery of horse artillery and the entire force of cavalry completed the expedition. A lantern borne by the elephant at the head of the column was to direct the march in the midst of darkness. Sir C. Campbell, who had been seriously hurt a few days previously by a fall from his horse, insisted nevertheless on taking the command himself. All these efforts proved fruitless: the wily chieftain escaped once more from his adversaries. Next morning, the Hussars alone succeeded in overtaking the last of the enemy's cavalry, as they were crossing the Rapti, and in exchanging sabre cuts and pistol shots in single combats with the Begum of Oude's

sowars. The rebels managed to reach the territory of Nepaul, and once there, they could afford to rest in relative security till the native government should grant permission to pursue them.

Sir Jang Bahadour was not chivalrous enough to take in hand the cause even of his own race, when it was hopeless, and on hearing of the treasures the chiefs carried with them on their wanderings, he soon sent his troops in pursuit. In the early part of February an English brigade, after following the fugitives without intermission through the wildest parts of Nepaul, took from them their last guns, fifteen in number. Beni Madho was soon afterwards killed in an encounter with the Nepaulese forces. By the mouth of April the armed bands were entirely destroyed. Those among them who refused to lay down their arms, perished by fever or by hunger. The Nana and his brother succeeded in eluding the vengeance of the English, but they are both supposed to have been carried off by illness in 1859.[1] The English

[1] At the time of going to press, the last news from Calcutta announces that the prisoner taken at Gwalior, whose capture excited such interest and curiosity both in India and in Europe, is not the real Nana Sahib. The fate of the arch-murderer is still enveloped in mystery, as is shown by the following letter :—

'Sir—In your paper of Monday, the 16th, you have quoted from the *Delhi Gazette* a statement made by one Sheodul Singh, who died a year ago, at his native village in the Azimgurh district, that Nana Dhundut Punh died of Serai fever in the Nepaul jungles, and that he (Sheodul) was one of the number who took part in the performance of the funeral obsequies. Sheodul Singh may very possibly have done this, for the personal obsequies were duly performed with all the usual ceremonies ; but, nevertheless, Nana did not die—his funeral obsequies were a feint. In the autumn of 1859, Nana was encamped with his brother Bala Bao and Debi Bux Singh, the ex-Rajah of Gonda, and with a considerable army under his command, at the foot of the Nepaul mountains, near the entrance of a pass. There they remained for some time, but at length the movement of the British troops in search of them rendering their position dangerous, they broke up their camp, and, entering the pass, retreated entirely through Nepaul, until they arrived within the confines of Chinese territory. They then fixed their quarters, after crossing a large river, at a village or town named Tharwaria, close upon the frontier. Before they left the plains, however, the three chiefs had their funeral rites performed, lest, as they gave out, they should never return to the Holy Ground of Hindustan. This gave rise to the report which prevailed very universally at that time, but which was not believed by the inhabitants of our own provinces, who were in the habit of passing to and from Nepaul, and with whom I came in frequent contact, that Nana was dead. My informant was a man who was taken prisoner

had the good sense to cease the pursuit of a mother who had but defended the legitimate or fictitious rights of her son, and the Begum of Oude was allowed to live at Khatmandou, the capital of Oude, without being further disturbed.

The remainder of the insurgents on the right bank of the Ganges were as hardly treated by fortune as those on the left bank. After his defeat at Gwalior, Tantia Topee escaped for a long time from the numerous columns sent in pursuit of him, and even the defection of the Rajah of Bandah and of other powerful chieftains, who had hitherto adhered to the cause of the mutineers, did not shake his courage; and for many months, in company with his lieutenant Man Singh, of Gwalior, he pursued his vagrant course in the most widely separated districts of Central India, from Gujerat to Jeypore, from Jeypore to the neighbourhood of Agra. Treachery finally triumphed over his inexhaustible resources. Man Singh made his submission in April 1859 to Major Meade, and, in order to save his head, betrayed the secret of his leader's hiding-place. After a few days' confinement, Tantia Topee was brought before a court-martial, and executed on April 15, 1859, at Sipri. The calmness of the Indian chief did not fail, either during the trial or at the moment of death, and he died with heroic courage. Though we quite admit that, with the certain proofs of his complicity in the massacre of Cawnpore before them, the authorities could not do otherwise than to condemn him to death, we must none the less pay a tribute of admiration to

by a party of the Nana's scouts in November 1859, and carried off to the camp, where he was kept in irons. Being of a good caste, he was employed in menial offices about the person of the chiefs, and accompanied them in their march through the mountains. In June 1860, aided by some of the natives in the country, he made his escape, and returned to his own house, a few miles on the British side of the Nepaul frontier, leaving Nana Sahib safe within the Chinese territory and in perfect health. The description given by the man of the nature of the Chinese boundary, and of the dress and appearance of the inhabitants, was, I was informed by good authority, quite correct. A curious part of the man's statement, and one that may be of importance in the inquiry now going forward, was that the chiefs at the time of performing the funeral rite each cut off a finger, and that these little members were burned and the funeral obsequies solemnly performed over them as representatives of their whole bodies.—B.——, Calcutta, November 19, 1874. To the Editor of the *Englishman*.'

this truly remarkable character. At Cawnpore, on the Betwa, at Kounch, Calpi, and Gwalior, Tantia Topee gave indications of a political genius, full of audacity and fertile in expedients. If he can be reproached with holding aloof from the battle-field, his courage at the last showed that death possessed no terrors for him.

By January 1859 the work of repression was completely finished, and in the whole extent of India there was no enemy capable of exciting the alarm of the European authorities. The Anglo-Indian empire had, we must acknowledge, proved both its strength and its resources; Delhi had fallen, Havelock and Outram had relieved the garrison of Lucknow, before a single soldier or officer sent from England had disembarked on Indian soil. Sir Colin Campbell, however, played a glorious part in the events which followed, and fully deserved the elevation to the peerage, with the title of Lord Clyde, with which a grateful Government rewarded his services. When he arrived at Calcutta, in September 1857, final success entirely depended on the military talents of the new Commander-in-Chief; a single false step, or even a partial success, might once again compromise the fate of India. No fault, no imprudence was committed by Sir C. Campbell, and if he can be reproached with slowness at the outset, we must take into consideration the difficulty of acting with precision under the circumstances. The climate, the immense distances, and the fact that he was a free agent neither as regarded time nor the scene of operation, were all against him. The Lucknow Residency had to be relieved at any price. A delay, even of a few days, might have occasioned a second Cawnpore massacre. Sir C. Campbell's first efforts were crowned by victory, the trophies being the women and children whom he rescued from the ruins of the Residency, and whose fate Europe was watching with the most painful anxiety. The occupation of the Doab, the second expedition against Lucknow, the taking of Bareilly and the last campaign in Oude, commanded by the General-in-Chief in person, were accomplished without a single serious check. Though neither at Lucknow nor at

Bareilly were the effective forces of the insurrection destroyed at a single stroke, the blows dealt were none the less mortal. In the multifarious operations he was obliged to carry out, Sir C. Campbell did not perhaps always estimate his own strength and the weakness of his adversaries at their true value. But before criticising the methodical prudence which characterised all his proceedings, we must remember that he was not sent to India to play the part of a guerilla leader, who is always expected to risk his life and his cause. His position was a higher one. As General-in-Chief, he had to direct the movements of a great regular army, and his first duty was, above all, to place nothing at the mercy of chance. What mattered the greater or less duration of the conflict, if success was eventually to follow! The prudence which marked all Sir C. Campbell's plans was as conspicuous in the open field as in the sieges of towns and in the heat of battle. Full of the most paternal solicitude for his men, he invariably spared his battalions by a judicious use of his artillery. His second expedition against Lucknow (March 1858), in which, by the employment of heavy guns, he reduced a town of more than half a million souls in eight days with inconsiderable loss to himself, a town defended by every resource which despair could suggest to the enemy, may be considered a model of street-fighting. If one is to judge of the merits of a leader by the severity of blows he dealt to his adversaries, Sir C. Campbell would rank among the most illustrious captains of history. Never were any enemy, any mercenaries guilty of violating the code of military honour, punished more unsparingly than were the sepoys of the Bengal Army.

By January 1859, the cadres of this once powerful organisation only contained a small number of disarmed regiments, closely watched by powerful European garrisons. The remainder had disappeared in the storm, leaving no living traces, but a few hundred native soldiers, who had been transported to the Andaman Islands, two or three thousand prisoners in the gaols of India, and five or six thousand sepoys who, by good luck, by chance, or by unusual

clemency on the part of the victors, had succeeded in reaching their homes or losing themselves in the mass of the native population. The number of native soldiers and officers belonging to the Bengal Army or to the various contingents, who in little less than a year fell on the battlefield, were executed, or perished by wounds, privations, or illness, can be computed at more than 120,000. It is impossible to give any approximate idea of the losses sustained by the native population which took part in the struggle, and it would be below the truth to estimate these losses at the same figure as those of the sepoys. More than 200,000 natives forfeited their lives in consequence of the risings at Mirut and at Delhi. Yet even confronted by this vast loss of lives, and these streams of human blood, impartial history must still recognise that India did not pay too dearly for the triumph of the foreign rulers, who alone could give her order, peace, and progress.

CHAPTER XI.

CAUSES OF THE MUTINY—END OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY—THE NEW CHARTER OF INDIA.

Attitude of the Anglo-Indian population during the crisis—The native population and the Mutiny—Causes of the Mutiny—Retrospective glance on the East India Company—Unpopularity of the Company in England—The new Bill relative to India before Parliament—Religious ferment in England—Reforms in the military institutions of India—The Staff Corps—The India Council—The Legislative Council—The High Courts—Rewards granted to native princes—The finances of India—The problem of castes.

BEFORE summing up the causes which produced the Mutiny, and the changes in the government which followed, we must pay a just tribute to the noble conduct of the European population during this memorable crisis. The history of India in 1857 offers a strange and terrible phenomenon. In a single day the work of a hundred years was overturned by the revolutionary storm. A formidable army, in which not only crime but indiscipline was unknown, abjured in a few hours the laws of military honour, stained its weapons with the blood of its officers, their wives and children, and turned the undisputed masters of yesterday into the proscribed of to-day. European families who had retired to rest at night under the care of obsequious servants, found themselves, on awaking, surrounded by ferocious enemies. Roads and by-ways, on which a woman or a young girl had hitherto been able to travel in all security, became infested with rapacious and blood-thirsty marauders. Without previous warning, without preparation, a few handfuls of English, lost in the heart of India, far from all help, were exposed for months to mortal dangers. Everywhere the storm was valiantly withstood; and here we do not allude to the Cannings, the

Lawrences, the Outrams, the Nicholsons, the statesmen or the soldiers who won for themselves undying glory, but to the English *bourgeoisie*, if we may use this term, whom necessity had scattered over India in the public service or in undertakings of a private nature, to the almost defenceless communities, who for many weary, heart-breaking days were surrounded on all sides by thousands of sepoys, aided by the scum of the great towns and the riffraff of the prisons, to the modest officers, planters, railway engineers, whose courage and presence of mind often averted an impending outbreak. At Cawnpore, at Saugor, at Lucknow, men, women, and children braved all the horrors of a long siege and a pitiless warfare with the most heroic energy. Facts like these, which were of daily occurrence, speak eloquently in praise of that branch of the Anglo-Saxon race inhabiting India. In this terrible juncture, civil and military authorities, officers, soldiers, planters, merchants, women and children, all did their duty, and deserved well of their country. Never before had the superiority of the white man over the black, of the Caucasian over the Asiatic race, asserted itself so triumphantly.

To what degree did the native population take part in the struggle, to which side their hopes and wishes incline? Difficult though the problem be, we shall attempt to solve it, at least approximately. If it is difficult to form a correct idea of public opinion among the compact and enlightened nations of Europe in moments of great political excitement, it is far more so in India, where the population is an aggregation, not a fusion of races. Religious affinities, which alone unite the inhabitants of the vast Indian continent, scarcely soften down the characteristic differences between them. The Moslem of Oude is quite as distinct from the Moslem of Bengal as the Turk is from the Greek, and the Hindoo of Amritsur from his co-religionist of Benares, as the Frenchman from the German. Without passing the bounds of probabilities, we may safely assert that the Hindoos felt towards their foreign rulers those feelings of jealousy, if not of hatred, which always exist between the weak and the

strong, the conquered and the conqueror. Further than this we will not go.

In fact, in this strange land patriotism does not exist; the feeling of nationality, of independence finds no echo in the population. The political notions of the Indian, which conceive nothing higher than mere despotism, are the same from the sovereign to the humblest subject. Whether from apathy or resignation, each man is satisfied with his lot, and, desirous of no change, obeys the master whom Providence has set over him, whatever be his creed or the colour of his skin. The fanaticism and bloodthirstiness of which the adepts of the Koran gave so many proofs during the struggle can easily be explained. Before the conquest of India, the sons of the Prophet had never submitted to Christian rule, and for the first time they had to bend their necks to the yoke in a land where everything reminded them of the recent and now vanished glory of their race. Is it to be wondered at that they could not forget their degradation, and should have attempted one last effort to rid themselves of masters separated from them by every distinguishing characteristic: religion, custom, and colour?

English supremacy in India is maintained under circumstances almost unknown in history. The nineteenth century alone has seen sixty or eighty thousand foreigners impose their laws on two hundred millions of subjects, with whom they have no social connection, and whom they govern merely by the superiority of civilisation over barbarism. It was far otherwise in the days of the Mogul conquerors, whose inheritance has been seized by the English. The victorious Moslems accepted up to a certain point the customs and laws of the vanquished Hindoos. India became their second country, in which they made their home. Marriages between the various royal families united different creeds on the throne. Hindoo ministers became the depositaries of the power of the Moslem princes, and *vice versâ*. The outburst of religious passions and persecutions, it is true, often gave expression to the antagonism of races, but a calm soon followed the storm, and peace was speedily restored at

least on the surface. The magnificent ruins, which still attest the grandeur of the Mogul Empire, reveal the love of the conquerors for their adopted country.

English rule follows a diametrically opposite policy. The European master carefully preserves his nationality in all its exclusiveness, has no points of contact with his subjects, and is separated by an impassable barrier from the natives he has despoiled. He knows nothing of the interior life of his very servants—their hut is a sacred spot, whose threshold none dare cross. In the large towns, the native banker, if he is wealthy, possesses, it is true, a fine house adorned with every European luxury—pianos, bronzes, and pictures—where, from time to time, he offers to the European community nautch-dances or banquets, of which he never partakes. Nevertheless, he himself dwells in a hut, sleeps on a pallet-bed, and eats with his fingers, as did his forefathers. The gulf is still more perceptible in the country, where the great landowners and the foreign authorities only meet on rare occasions at hunting-parties. In this way, England loses a most important element of governmental strength.

Formerly, the Mohammedan dynasties rewarded those who deserved well of the Empire by gifts of fiefs and lands, and common interests bound the great territorial nobles to the Court of Delhi. Now, humiliated when not crushed by the levelling character of English rule, the native aristocracy has no motives, either of gratitude or of self-interest, for supporting the Government. Outside public or private business, both in the great centres and in the provinces, the white population only mixes with the higher native classes at nautch-shows, at sports, or at evening promenades. As to the lower strata of society—the masses—they know nothing of their rulers, and scarcely differ in any way from their primitive ancestors. As we have often said, the beliefs and customs of Europe have not penetrated into the native community, and modern civilisation has passed over the soil of India without making any impression on it, as the sun's rays pass over the earth.

Even taking into consideration the many divergencies between the English and the natives, the Mutiny of 1857 cannot be called a national movement in the full sense of the word. The semi-independent states of Central India, the North-West Provinces and the Kingdom of Oude, from which chiefly the Bengal Army was recruited, alone took an active share in the insurrection. The population of Bengal, of Madras, and of Bombay remained neutral, almost indifferent, and only bandits and thieves joined the rebels. The inhabitants of the Punjab rose as one man to fight for England; the veteran Sikh regiments, strengthened by fresh levies, covered themselves with glory at the siege of Delhi. Lastly, though the observance of treaties is not a distinguishing feature of the Indian race, the native princes, who still possessed considerable political power, adhered almost all with remarkable steadfastness to the English cause. Under the influence of his minister, Salar Jung, the Nizam maintained order in his dominions, and preserved the Presidency of Madras from the spread of disaffection. Holkar and Scindiah steadfastly resisted the threats of their own soldiers, who had raised the standard of revolt. The Rajah of Pattyalah, and the other chieftains of the confederate Sikh States, made common cause from the outset with the Anglo-Indian authorities, and placed troops and treasure at their disposal. Nepaul took an active, if not decisive, part in the third expedition against Lucknow. Facts of this kind prove that the events of 1857 had nothing of the character of a patriotic movement, and that the Mutiny had no claim to be considered a war of independence. Had it been otherwise, had India's two hundred million inhabitants risen in one and the same spirit of revolt against their invaders, the European population would have perished down to the last child in less than a month, overwhelmed by the multitude of their assailants.

Are we to connect the Mutiny with the religious prejudices of the sepoys, and admit that, alarmed at the progress of Christianity, they took up arms to defend their faith, which they believed to be seriously threatened? If the fear

of an enforced and speedy conversion had really been the reason which roused the soldiers of the Bengal Army, the Mutiny would have soon spread to the army of Bombay, and especially to that of Madras. The Presidency of Madras is the one in which the Christian propagandism is most successful, and where the greatest number of converts are made. The strength of religious passions is such amongst Indians that the movement would have assumed a national character, which it never did. It is quite as fallacious to ascribe the crisis to the intrigues of the native princes. The thousand inquiries, instituted after the English victory, brought to light neither documents nor correspondence to justify the belief in dark plots between the native courts and the rebellious regiments. It results from all this that the latent state of indiscipline of the Bengal Army, and a mad panic produced by the spirit of caste, are the only assignable causes of the outbreak of the Mutiny in the first instance.

Formerly, caste was the basis of Indian law and religion; now caste has become all-powerful, and absorbs both law and religion. Nothing can be well imagined more subversive of discipline than the influence of the Brahmins, as it made itself felt for many years in the ranks of the Bengal Army. We may well be surprised that any military institutions should have resisted this radical source of weakness for the space of a century. In the eyes of his comrades in the regiment, a Brahmin is not only a man of illustrious blood, whom a caprice of fate has placed in the ranks, but a superior being whose favour they court and whose anger they dread. The relations between a native officer and a high caste soldier are still more difficult. How dare the former give orders to or inflict punishment on this living incarnation of Brahma, at whose feet he prostrates himself, and who, by a word, may condemn him to everlasting torments? As to the European officer, Brahminical doctrines assign him a social rank far inferior to that of the most degraded Indian, lower even than the street-sweeper or the corpse-bearer: his breath, his very shadow pollutes the men over whom he exercises paramount authority! If we remember that this sacred order has

wielded supreme authority in India for two thousand years, in spite of revolutions and dynastic changes; that its members are united among themselves by the indissoluble bonds of hierarchical order, and by the fraternity of the clan, it is not difficult to perceive that a horrible explosion would one day necessarily result from the many inflammable materials existing in the ranks of the Bengal sepoys. The introduction of greased cartridges into the army was the spark which fired this formidable mine. The annals of India are not the only ones which record unlikely events, currents of error and madness which, at certain fatal periods, overwhelm our poor humanity! Does not European history relate that, out of a reformist banquet of small *bourgeois*, there arose a movement which, in 1848, swallowed up one respected throne, and threatened others at Berlin and Vienna?

The terrors of the spirit of caste are the only adequate explanation of the mixture of passion and weakness which characterised the Mutiny. Instantaneous outbreaks occasionally take place in bodies which have long been ready for the infection of poison. In others, on the contrary, its action becomes apparent but slowly, and slight external circumstances suffice to arrest its progress. The Bombay and Madras armies, where military discipline triumphed over the spirit of caste, escaped the contagion. On the other hand, some regiments which had remained faithful under trying circumstances suddenly gave way to temptation, as if under the influence of a sort of malaria, mutinying at the very time when success was impossible, and when revolt could only lead to dishonour and death. A panic is a disease which spreads of itself, and against which there is no remedy but uprightness and firmness of character. Lord Canning and his skilful coadjutors had the merit of discerning the real state of things: they perceived that India, as a whole, was not imbued with the spirit of disaffection, and that, without laying themselves open to the accusation of folly or credulity, trust might be placed in certain portions of the population. In the Punjab, Sir John Lawrence, who was intimately acquainted with the national character, did

not give his Sikh regiments time to be corrupted by idleness, but kept them in the path of duty by the energy and opportuneness of his measures. He sent off his Punjab auxiliaries to Delhi, whether veteran soldiers or new levies, with as much apparent security as if they had been English troops. His confidence was amply justified, and during the whole siege the Sikhs showed the firmest zeal and loyalty. There can be no doubt that without the assistance of these valiant allies the European forces, tried as they were by the murderous climate, could not have succeeded in their task. If, instead of obeying this inspiration of genius, the impulse of fear and anger had been allowed to triumph, the struggle would speedily have become a war of races, and an impassable gulf, which neither bloodshed nor multitudes of victims could have bridged over, would have separated for ever the English from their subjects. The statesmen who understood the real nature of the Mutiny, and saw clearly that the question was not one of national independence nor of religion, but exclusively one of caste, earned thereby imperishable rights to the gratitude of England. In order to clear up all doubts on the subject, we shall here give a summary of the declaration made before a Parliamentary Commission by one of the most prominent actors in the insurrection.

'The Mutiny,' says Sir J. Lawrence, 'was the explosion of fanatical passions in a demoralised army, and at once attracted to itself all the impure discontented elements of the country. Nowhere was it a war of religion or of race. It is noticeable that the native troops took part in all the operations which followed the outbreak at Mirut. Another native element was substituted for the insurgent regiments, and the names of the new levies showed the extent and the resources of the Anglo-Indian Government—Theend's Horse, Moultanee Horse, Punjab Guides, &c., &c. And we may venture to say that England's power over the races of India received a new and brilliant confirmation by the events of 1857. As to the King of Delhi, whatever part he took in subsequent proceedings, nothing shows that he had entered into a serious conspiracy, intended to cause the revolt of the

Bengal Army. The Mutiny is the work of the army, and it cannot be attributed to anterior and external intrigues, though ambitious and discontented persons made use of it for their own purposes. The deciding cause of the Mutiny was the introduction of greased cartridges; the examination of several hundred letters written by or to sepoys leaves no doubt on this point.'

Whatever was the nature and the cause of the Mutiny of 1857, the East India Company was not destined to survive it. Up to that time the concerns of India had never excited much interest in England. The loquacious traveller, newly disembarked from a Peninsular and Oriental steamer, amply satisfied the curiosity of his audience in a single afternoon by the recital of some bits of family news, the description of a tiger hunt, or by the communication of a few culinary recipes. To this apathy succeeded, almost without transition, the most feverish, the most devouring anxiety. England, maddened by the terrible occurrences in India, gave way to incoherent transports of rage and despair, and the whole burden of this anger fell, in the last instance, on the ancient corporation which, in name at least, was responsible for recent events. The public voice unanimously demanded that the Government of India should be withdrawn from such unskilful and feeble hands, and we have seen that the reign of Queen Victoria was inaugurated in India on November 1, 1858. Whilst considering the dethronement of the East India Company, the impartial observer cannot but remember the glorious part it has played in modern history, and it will not be out of place to examine a little the accusations which caused its fall.

The obvious fact which appears in every page of these sketches is surely this: that English rule in India can only be maintained by the help of a force at once imposing and devoted, differing from the native population in customs, language, and belief, and occupying all the strategic positions of the country. Now, we must remember that the year before the Mutiny, the Home Government, hard pressed by the needs of the Crimean war, had reduced the effective

forces of the Royal Army in India lower than they had been in the early part of the century, and this in spite of the immense increase of annexed territory, and against the energetic protests of the Court of Directors. Just before the outbreak there were scarcely 3,000 European soldiers to be found in the North-West Provinces, Oude and Bengal taken together. Hence the necessary counterpoise to the sepoys and the indigenous population was wanting, and a few days were sufficient to sweep away the last vestige of British power. In the Punjab, on the contrary, after a short struggle, victory remained with the representatives of the Company. The spirit of disaffection among the sepoys was not less rife at Lahore than at Delhi, but in Ranjit Singh's former kingdom more than 10,000 European soldiers were quartered in the neighbouring stations of Peshawur, Lahore, Sialkote, and these imposing forces were equal to the task of repressing the revolt.

At the same time that we do full justice to the skill and the indefatigable energy with which Sir John Lawrence and his staff carried out the work of repression in the Punjab, it is impossible not to ascribe the greater part of their success to the number of soldiers at their disposal. This indisputable fact warrants our saying that if the authorities of Oude and of the North-West Provinces had had at their command a certain number of English regiments, the spirit of disaffection would have remained latent among the native forces stationed at Delhi and Lucknow, and that, if any outbreak had occurred, the sepoys' triumph would have been of short duration.

Is it not equally unjust to throw the exclusive blame of the immense expansion given to the Anglo-Indian territory during the last twenty years on the rapacity and ambition of the Company?

It is a difficult matter to believe that all the statesmen who contributed to the formation of the Indian Empire obeyed the same impulse and followed identically the same system with the same success. Yet history proves that all their labours have had the same result. Clive, Warren

Hastings, Wellesley, Bentinck, Dalhousie, all added a certain number of provinces to the original possessions of the Company. The identity of the results reveals a deep-seated permanent cause stronger than the will of statesmen, which has constrained them to alter their individual opinions, and has furnished unexpected, and often little desired, solutions to the problems they were called upon to solve. In the interest of truth, and at the risk of wounding prejudices popular even in England, we here intend to take a retrospective glance at the conditions under which less than ten years before the annexation of the Punjab, England's firmest ally in the crisis of 1857, had taken place.

The kingdom founded by Ranjit Singh on the right bank of the Sutlej, far from exciting the jealousy of its European neighbours, was the object, on their part, of a sympathy which is easy to explain. Under the impression that the most formidable dangers which might at any moment threaten the empire would come from the north and from the vigorous Mohammedan races on the other side of the Indus, the English statesmen had seen with marked favour the rise of a Hindoo power, forming a natural barrier against the invasions of the mountaineers of the Indian Caucasus and the tribes of Central Asia. The kingdom of Ranjit Singh was the work of one man. After his death, the only vestige of his power was an army left without a hand to rule or a head to guide it; and, against their wish, the English were obliged to treat the heirs of the Lion of the Punjab as they had done the lieutenants of Aureng Zeb's successors. Their goodwill towards the kingdom of Lahore was so real that, when the victory of Sobraon (1846) placed the Punjab at their mercy, the Governor-General preserved by treaty the native government.

The Crown had passed to a child, and the attempts to govern in his name led in 1849 to another dangerous war. Twice had the Sikh power exposed the European masters of India to perils as great as the possible invasions of the Afghans or the Persians, against whom it had been expected to act as a barrier. Here was an additional proof of the

short-sightedness of human previsions; the difficulty could only now be solved by cutting the Gordian knot with the sword, and incorporating the Punjab into the Anglo-Indian territory.

This example is a demonstration of the obstacles which constantly hindered the success of the most carefully concerted and thoughtfully considered plans of Anglo-Indian statesmen, and, to a certain degree, exonerates the Company from the accusation of a capricious policy and insatiable ambition. Again, it is quite unfair to reproach the Bengal Government with having caused the mutiny of its native troops by inopportune measures. The introduction of greased cartridges, which proved the final and decisive cause of the outbreak, was rather a fiction cleverly made use of by the disaffected than a reality. Were not these cartridges found in the pouches thrown away by the sepoys on the battle-fields? Only one error, but that a tremendous one, was committed by the Company. Its highest representatives placed too great confidence in an army of mercenaries who, it is true, had been faithful for a century, and its officers failed to discern the spirit of mutiny and rebellion which was smouldering in the ranks. The European conquerors forgot the lessons taught by Oriental history, which at every page exhibits revolted armies overturning powerful empires. The infatuation of civil and military authorities led to one of the greatest catastrophes ever experienced by England, and to the disappearance of the East India Company, even to its name.

The causes of the Mutiny, and the errors for which the Company was justly blamed, had little influence on the hostile sentiments felt towards the latter in England. By a strange effect of the power of words, the scapegoat demanded by public opinion scarcely existed in point of fact. For many years, the share taken by the Company in the government of India had been reduced to the smallest proportions. The modifications made in the original charter during the debates presided over by Pitt had, since 1784, placed all the real management of affairs in the hands of the counsellors of the Crown. The name of the Company was merely retained in the administration of India, in order to

deprive the ministers of the means of influence and bribery which they might have found in the patronage of special, civil, and military services. From this time, the paramount authority of the sovereign in the domain of politics was legally established, and the members of the Court of Directors, the highest expression of the Company's power, became mere advisers of the minister, known as the President of the Board of Control. Such unimportant personages were they in reality, that their wishes could easily be overruled by sending secret instructions from the Crown to its agent, the Governor-General.

The political revolution was accomplished, and in all the revisions of the Indian Charter that followed, the changes made were exclusively in the commercial rights still retained by the Company. In 1813, it lost the monopoly of the India trade; in 1833, that of the China trade. At the last renewal of the Charter in 1853, the commercial question was finally settled, and the Bill of the Parliament encroached upon the last privileges of the Company by taking from the Directors the disposal of Civil Service appointments, which henceforth could only be obtained by passing an examination.

The Mutiny cut the thread which, for seventy years, had held the sword of Damocles suspended over the head of this venerable corporation. A blind and insatiable desire for revenge was added to the popular jealousy and instinctive ill-will to which it had been exposed at every important period of its existence. Public opinion, under the influence of a sort of mirage, caused the weight of its anger to fall on the dual government which presided, at least nominally, over the affairs of India. In reality, there only existed the two governments which must always co-exist—the Government of India and the Government of England. The East India Company, as a political power, had collapsed more than fifty years before. No formal recognition of this fact, it is true, had taken place. The acts of the Anglo-Indian authorities were still in its name, and its seal was still affixed to the instructions and orders sent by the President of the Board of Control to his agents beyond sea.

This was enough to cause, though not to justify, the public indignation against the whole system, and to determine the fate of the victim. How was the culprit to be discovered, when responsibility was shared by two bodies? Fictions such as these, anomalies unworthy of a century of progress and order, ought to be abolished. Whigs and Tories, disciples of Exeter Hall and free-thinkers united for once in loudly demanding the dissolution of the Company, and this universal cry of 'Delenda est Carthago' showed that its days were numbered.

In December 1857, a communication from Lord Palmerston, always eager to pander to popular passions, at that time Premier, informed the Court of Directors that a Bill was to be introduced into Parliament with the object of investing the Crown with the immediate government of India. This warning, which indicated their speedy ruin, caused the Court of Directors to abandon the attitude of passive dignity which they had assumed in face of the outbursts of public opinion, and to reply somewhat as follows, in a letter dated December 31.

The Directors expressed their surprise that the Ministry should have taken the initiative of so sweeping a measure, without previously inquiring into the causes of the Mutiny and the errors of the Government. The destruction of a great institution, which had rendered good service in the terrible crisis just passed, had been determined on even before the revolt had been completely suppressed. In spite of the appeals of a rebellious soldiery, the chiefs of the native states had remained loyal, and the mass of the population neutral, if nothing more. Could a more striking testimony have been given to the solidity of, and the benefits conferred by the original institutions? At the opening of Parliament, in February, the first protest was followed by a petition in which all the reasons in favour of the Company were exposed with unexampled clearness.[1]

[1] The petitioners demanded, in the first instance, that an inquiry should be instituted as to their past conduct, the causes of the Mutiny, and the measures taken for its suppression. The most complete harmony had existed between

The document had not long to wait for an answer, and towards the middle of February, Lord Palmerston submitted to Parliament the new Bill for the better government of the representative of the Crown and the Company. To pretend that a minister could govern more successfully without the help of the Court of Directors was to assert the strange theory that experienced, honest, and responsible advisers hinder the action of authority. It was not less absurd to repair the mistakes of the past, by suppressing the inferior branch which by the very fact of its subordination was the least responsible for official errors. The directors did not wish to decline their share of responsibility in the acts of a well-intentioned government, whose conduct deserved praise, and could fearlessly abide the verdict of history. But it was useless to shut one's eyes to facts, and the threats hurled at the Company were calculated to produce a very bad effect on the native population. The changes proclaimed necessary and opportune by the Ministry would lead to the belief that a radical alteration was contemplated in the existing political system. The people of India might well fear that the new government, ceasing to hold the balance fairly between the various races and religions, might abandon the wise traditions of impartiality and respect for prejudices and habits from which its predecessor had never departed. If this were to happen, a general rebellion would break out. Owing to the reputation for toleration enjoyed by the Company's representatives, this had not been the case, even when soldiers, maddened by religious passions, had risen in open mutiny. There were further dangers to be apprehended. The English were inflamed by feelings of ardent and still unquenched hatred against the natives. The new theory was that India should be governed with a view to the greater benefit of European interests. Her former masters had never made any difference between their subjects, and their fall foreshadowed the triumph of an opposite system. All these considerations pointed to deferring the decision of the questions under discussion till the public feeling should calm down under the influence of time, and then changes in the government could no longer be ascribed to the sad events which had recently occurred. Any amelioration, any reform made even at their own expense, in the interest of the public, would be welcomed with pleasure by the petitioners. They were ready to lay down their power without a murmur when convinced of the possibility of providing India with a better government than its actual one. But how was it possible to do this?

No minister of the Crown could assume the direction of Indian affairs without being assisted by experienced advisers capable not only of furnishing him with information on special matters, but of exercising in addition a sort of moral control, and acting as a counterpoise to the pressure of exclusively English interests. If the Council did not serve this purpose, it became a mere sham! What Council would possess the influence of the historic Court of Directors? Councillors appointed by the Crown offered no guarantee of an independent spirit. Subject to the influence of Parliament and of party feeling, they would be unable to preserve that happy independence which allowed the Court of Directors to reward ability and eminent services in India by advancement. A good system of government for the latter country must necessarily unite three requisites: a council independent of the minister's will, the control by that council, apart from the ministers, over the officers and despatches of

India. The first clauses decreed the transfer of the political powers, the rights and the possessions of the Honourable East India Company to the Queen's Government. As the recognised sovereign of India, Her Majesty delegated her authority to a president and a council of eight members. The president was to enjoy the same privileges and powers as the other Secretaries of State, and on almost all questions his veto was to be absolute. The members of the Council were to be chosen from English subjects who had served the Crown or the Company, or who had resided fifteen years in British India. The Council was invested with the powers formerly divided between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors, and its members could only be dismissed by a royal decree consequent on a vote of Parliament. No modification was made in the services or the patronage of India.

the Home Department, and finally a council in which all the special branches of Indian administration were represented, and which, therefore, could not have fewer than eighteen members, like the Court of Directors. If the latter were found to possess all these conditions of efficiency, they prayed Parliament not to abridge the duration of their power.

As to the reproach so often made against the Anglo-Indian authorities of dual government and want of real responsibility, was it in any degree founded? Did the Court of Directors possess executive power? It could safely be said that no branch of the Home Department possessed such, in the usual meaning of the word. The executive power resided, and rightly so, in India. As matters were constituted, the Court of Directors filled the functions performed by Parliament in the constitutional scheme. To examine and revise past acts, to lay down principles, and send out general instructions, to give or refuse their sanction to the important measures submitted to their approbation, such were in short the rights and duties common to both sections of the central government. Work of this description was beyond the strength of one man—would it then increase the vigour of the Government to simplify it by destroying its most potent spring of action? The unenlightened public considered the responsibility of the Government of India was less than that of the ministerial departments, because of the co-existence of the Court of Directors and the Board of Control. The merest explanation would dissipate this popular error. The central administration of India was doubly responsible by the Minister and the Court of Directors, but, as in all departments of the State, the representative of the Crown took the initiative in or sanctioned all the acts of his coadjutors. The petitioners wound up by praying Parliament to spare in any case the civil and military officers who had contributed so much to their success, and demanded not to appear before their judges until preliminary inquiries had been made.

In this new shape, said the partisans of the Ministry, the old tree was relieved of its parasitical branches, and for the future the Home Government would be exclusively responsible. The logic of events demanded this reform. The Queen's Army being now called to take a larger share in the defence of India, it was but just that the powers of her Government should be increased in direct proportion to the development of her military forces. The accession of a new ruler could not fail to calm the ill-will and opposition existing both in England and India against the former Government. The adherents of the Court of Directors, on the contrary, pointed out the imprudence of selecting the actual troublous times for effecting a radical change in the Anglo-Indian institutions. The proposed reforms invested a single member of the Cabinet with a dangerous and almost unbalanced power; from every point of view, a dual government was preferable to the despotism of one man. Would not the irresistible pressure of public opinion lead the Minister of the Crown to enforce measures more conformable to European than to native wishes? Finally, how could the Indian Mohammedans accept a sovereign who bore amongst other glorious titles that of Defender of the Faith?

Lord Palmerston's Bill was not destined to pass. Though voted after a three nights' debate on February 18, it shared the fate of the Ministry, who went out in the following sitting on a question of home policy, caused by Orsini's attempt on the life of Napoleon III. The mere thought of the slightest concession to a foreign prince roused all the latent fire of British pride, and the Whig Cabinet was succeeded by a Tory one. Lord Ellenborough took the place of Mr. Vernon Smith at the Board of Control, and the second reading of the India Bill was fixed for April 22. During this interval the new Ministry drew up an India Bill on a more liberal basis, in which the number of the members of the Council was fixed at eighteen. Nine of these, representing the multifarious branches of the Anglo-Indian service, were to be elected by all who had resided or served in India for the space of ten years; five other members were to be

elected by the five great centres of English commerce and industry, and four by the holders of 1,000*l.* India Stock or 2,000*l.* of shares in Indian railways.

This liberal but complicated Bill, by attempting to conciliate all opinions, pleased none, and the Ministry were warned in time to modify their work. Lord Ellenborough was not to be the author of Anglo-Indian reforms; in consequence of unreasonable disputes with the Governor-General, he handed over the presidency of the Board of Control to Lord Stanley. A recent voyage to India had enabled the new Secretary of State to study on the spot the intricacies of Indian administration. Possessing a practical turn of mind, he set to work earnestly, and brought out in July a Bill, both just and well considered, which conciliated with rare ability former rights and future interests, and of which we shall reproduce here the most salient features.

A Secretary of State and a Council of fifteen members were to compose the Supreme Government of India. Eight of the fifteen must have served or resided fifteen years in India. The Council, in the first instance, was to be appointed jointly by the Crown and the Court of Directors, and afterwards, alternatively by the Crown and the Council itself. The members who were named during good behaviour were to receive a salary of 1,200*l.*, and none but the President could be a member of Parliament. The Secretary of State assigned to each councillor a special department, but all official documents had to receive his signature. He or his representative had a double vote on every question, but within certain limits, his opinion was sufficient in most discussions to counterbalance that of the majority. As the successor of the former secret committee, the minister retained the privilege of sending and receiving despatches, which were not communicated to the Council. The local authorities had still the patronage in civil and military matters, but that originally belonging to the Court of Directors was divided between the Crown and the Council; commissions in the Artillery and the Engineers had now to be obtained by competition. Other clauses determined the

transfer to the Crown of the fleet, army, possessions, claims and debts of the Company, with the exception of India Stock; handed over to the Secretary of State the control of Indian receipts and expenditure, and decreed the non-liability of the Indian budget for the expenses of wars undertaken for other than Indian interests.

Lord Stanley's Bill, which was drawn up in a real spirit of conciliation and progress, could not but please all parties, and in spite of opposition from Lord Palmerston, who asked that the number of councillors should be reduced to twelve, and their appointment vested exclusively in the Crown, it surmounted victoriously the perils of a third reading in the Lower House on July 8. A few days later, the Bill was discussed in the House of Lords, where Lord Ellenborough attempted, but in vain, to substitute his own Bill for that of Lord Stanley. Unfortunately, the Lords Spiritual were unable to refrain from taking a part in the debate. One of the Archbishops gave vent to the imprudent wish that the contemplated reforms might bring about the speedy conversion of the population of India, and called upon the Government to tolerate no longer the system of caste. Such a challenge from such a quarter might, if reproduced by the native press, have produced a terrible effect in India. Lord Stanley instantly met the danger by asserting once more that the policy of the Anglo-Indian Government was one of toleration. 'England's vital interests, the very existence of her power in India, demands that her representatives should abstain from all religious intervention, and grant impartial protection to all sects and all creeds. The Government could do no more fatal nor inconsistent act than lend its aid openly and actively towards converting the natives from their belief, however false and superstitious it might be.'

This wise declaration was all the more needed that religious passions, which are always powerful in England, were then at their height. The fanaticism of the Exeter Hall party, over-excited by recent victories, gave vent to the wildest declamations. The time had come to display the banner of the Cross and throw open the towns, the bazaars,

the country districts to missionary effort. The Bible was henceforward to be the text-book in native schools. No further favour, no toleration of idolators and pagans! total withdrawal of subsidies and support from native priests and temples, the suppression of the system of caste, of the Indian laws and holy days. India was to be delivered over to Christianity bound hand and foot. The display of energy, and a firm action on the part of the Government, would cause the docile Indian to submit to give up a proscribed faith, and to accept the doctrines of the Gospel instead of those of the Koran and the Vedas. Fortunately for England, her statesmen were not blinded by religious mania, and Lord Stanley's words were a pledge that the new Government would not be less tolerant than its predecessor.

On August 2 the India Bill received the Queen's sanction, and the ancient and glorious corporation disappeared from the scene of politics. On September 1, the dispossessed Directors held a last meeting, in which they won great applause by the dignity with which they accepted their fate. They still watched with fatherly care over the interests of their agents, and one of their last acts was to grant a considerable pension to Sir John Lawrence in recognition of his eminent services.

The reform inaugurated by Lord Palmerston possessed the great advantage of freeing the Government of India from obsolete forms, devoid of all significance, and the Delusion which associated all previous success with the Company's rule was quite as pernicious as the one which attributed to it every past reverse. The fiction of the Company did more harm in England than in India, as it weakened the Government, caused little interest to be felt in the affairs of India, and led both Crown and Parliament to overlook their own responsibility, and throw on their coadjutors the blame due in the first instance to themselves. It was time to put an end to a two-headed organisation, which prevented anything like real responsibility. But the reform touched none of the essential elements of a good government. It was of little moment whether the members

of the India Council were selected by the holders of India Stock or otherwise; whether their acts were sealed or not with the arms of the Company. Yet such were the principal alterations made by the new Bill.

The essential machinery of the system remained much as it had been left after the great debates of the past century. The new India Committee was invested with all the power of the Court of Directors. The number of councillors was slightly modified, but the weight of the Council depended less on this than on the reputation and attainments of its members. The first appointments were very satisfactory, and were made from among the former servants of the Company, whose past offered a guarantee for their future services. Almost at the head of the list were the names of Sir John Lawrence, the successful dictator of the Punjab, and of his skilful coadjutor, Sir Henry Montgomery. The former members of the Court of Directors were also widely represented in the new council.

The reform to which Lord Stanley gave his name has already victoriously withstood the test of time, and the last fifteen years have amply proved its prudent character and the necessity which existed for it. Influenced by the spirit which ought to preside over all innovations among a great nation, it spared all well-tried institutions or recognised services, and merely suppressed a name—though a great one.

The modest Company of Merchants, which, by the enterprising spirit and the political and military genius of its agents, created an empire of two hundred million subjects beyond sea in the centre of Asia, has acquired eternal right to England's and even to India's gratitude. Its haughty but just and civilising rule kept peace for more than fifty years between a creed of exclusiveness and one of extermination, induced hereditary sects of priests, soldiers, thieves, and assassins to live together in harmony, and conferred the most entire liberty of worship on a country which had hitherto been a prey to religious wars and persecutions. As a last favour, fate had allowed the ancient corporation

to continue in power long enough to carry out the work of repression victoriously, if not radically, almost without help from Europe. For all these reasons, the merchant company, whose magnificent inheritance H.M. Queen Victoria acquired in 1858, deserves a high place in modern history. The work of the great politicians and illustrious soldiers who built up the glory and fortune of 'Old John Company,' to give it its familiar nickname, is no ways inferior to that of the Cæsars, the Charlemagnes, the Napoleons. The rare good fortune which favoured the founders of English greatness in India had extended to their successors. Time, which has not spared the labours of great conquerors, seems inclined to leave the Anglo-Indian Empire undisturbed, and, hitherto at least, there is no reason to believe that, in the hands of the powerful Queen of Great Britain, it is exposed to any danger.

Local institutions did not pass through the great crisis of 1857 as easily as the supreme government. In the first place, out of the immense Bengal Army only eleven regiments remained, which, owing to special circumstances, to feelings of loyalty or to fear, had remained faithful to their colours. The contingents of the native princes had all disappeared in the storm, except that of the Nizam of Hyderabad. It was necessary to reorganise the whole of the military forces of India. Experience had shown the full extent of the error committed by the Company in basing its power on a body of mercenaries; but at the same time it had once more exhibited the important part necessarily played by native soldiers in military operations. Superior as a fighting animal, according to the picturesque expression of Sultan Hyder Ali, irresistible on the battle-field, the European finds it hard to support the fatigue of marching and the trying climate. Ignorant of the many languages of Asia, he is not able to perform the ordinary services of camp life; and a native force is the indispensable complement of an European one If the budget of India could suffice to maintain an army of a hundred thousand English soldiers, numerous native forces would still have to be employed. On the other hand, recent events proved that the population was a stranger to the

feelings of nationality and independence, and therefore did not suffer from the pressure of the conquerors. The masses in India easily resigned themselves to a foreign rule which respected their religious prejudices, and secured order and peace to the land. In short, the matter for consideration was not how to hold down two hundred millions of recalcitrant subjects at the point of the bayonet, but how to maintain order in an immense territory, guaranteed by the weakness of its neighbours from all external danger, and inhabited by docile races long accustomed to obey. The only solution to the problem of military reorganisation was the augmentation of the European and the reduction of the native forces.

Circumstances had taken the initiative of these reforms. In order to meet the exigencies of the war, considerable reinforcements had been sent from England, and for some time the effective force of the Royal troops in India amounted to more than 110,000 men. Reductions were made later on in the number of European troops serving in India, which finally have been fixed at fifty-two infantry and eleven cavalry regiments, besides considerable artillery. The nine Fusilier regiments in the pay of the Company, with the artillery belonging to the latter, were incorporated into the Royal Army.[1] The troops actually serving in India are only 17,000 men more than in 1857. The counsels of experience were equally considered in the reorganisation of the native armies. The Bengal Army has been reconstituted on a small scale with the loyal regiments and new levies, while important reductions have been made in those of Bombay and Madras. The total number of native forces now amounts to 137 infantry and forty cavalry regiments, besides a few troops stationed in Central Asia.[2] The effective force of a

[1] See Documents, No. XV.

[2]

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Bengal	49	19
Madras	40	4
Bombay	30	7
Punjab	12	6
Contingent of Hyderabad	6	4
Total	137	40

All the artillery, except a few Sikh batteries, is now commanded by Europeans.

cavalry regiment is fixed at 500 sabres, that of an infantry regiment at 700 bayonets. The native army, which does not muster 120,000 men, is inferior nowadays to what it was at the beginning of the century, and is not even half as strong as in 1857. It can safely be affirmed that in no country are the military forces so disproportionate to the population as in India. In reality, the native army, which is reduced to its lowest figure, is a mere skeleton, and the ranks would have to be increased in order to carry out the most insignificant expedition; such an increase is, however, a very easy matter. The irregular system has preponderated in the work of reorganisation. The regimental staff for cavalry and infantry regiments is uniformly composed of seven officers, viz., a commander, a sub-commander, wing officer, a second wing officer, an adjutant, a quartermaster, two lieutenants, intrusted with the general service, and wing subalterns.[1] The rules of promotion by seniority, for native soldiers alone, have been abolished, and the new system gives the commander summary power to reward or punish.

We still have to consider the most important reform which was ever made in Anglo-Indian military institutions. We have often had occasion to point out the attraction felt by officers in the Company's service for civil and military functions other than regimental, and among the original causes of the Mutiny can be cited the spirit of discontent and apathy existing in the regimental staffs. To remedy this state of things, Anglo-Indian officers have been formed in each Presidency into a body, incorrectly enough known as the 'Staff Corps,' whose members must choose, on entering the service, between a purely civil or a purely military career.[2]

[1] The Anglo-Indian regiments are divided into two wings or battalions.

[2] Independently of the Civil Service, properly so called, India offers to the English people a magnificent field of military, political, and administrative appointments, where a well-educated man can, if not make his fortune, at least obtain considerable emoluments. Thus on July 1, 1874, the Staff Corps of the three Presidencies was composed as follows: 219 general officers, of whom 22 were on the active list; 184 officers on the staff or in purely military posts; 1,027 in native regiments; 397 filling civil or political functions; 133

Another important innovation makes promotion in the Staff Corps to depend on a fixed term of service, and not on seniority alone, as was formerly the case. Four years' service in one of the Staff Corps gives the rank of captain; twenty years, twenty-six years, thirty-one years, those of major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel. After thirty-eight years' service, a colonel may retire on full pay to England, where, by right of seniority, he may reach, if his life is prolonged, the highest military dignities. For the rank and file, promotion proceeds on entirely different principles, and is conferred at will by the Commander-in-Chief, independently of rank. There is nothing to prevent the most eccentric regimental arrangements, such as giving the command of a corps to a captain, and thus placing lieutenant-colonels and majors under his orders. The pecuniary position of regimental officers has been considerably ameliorated, and their pay is quite on a par with that of their equals in rank employed in civil functions, or on the staff proper. An ensign or a cornet of the Royal Army (from whence all the Indian Staff Corps are supplied) receives on joining the native regiment the rank of lieutenant and a supplementary pay of 100*l.* The pay of a lieutenant-colonel commanding a regiment is as much as 1,750*l.*

The establishment of the Staff Corps, which was principally intended for the improvement of the regimental staffs, can only be considered an experiment, and fifteen years' experience has shown its many drawbacks. The reformers, who rightly desired to respect the former organisation, and all vested rights, and who were, moreover, influenced by the brilliant results of a mixed administration in the Punjab, forgot that the work of force is finished in India, and that there is no longer a foot of territory to be gained by arms. Under present circumstances, the mission of the soldier-statesman, equally fitted to lead an army or to complete the work of conquest, who played so prominent a part in Indian

in the police; 61 in public works; 232 in departments of the posts and the studs; 161 on sick leave; 90 superior officers, doing general duties; 66 retired lieut.-colonels living in England with a pay of 1*l.* a day.

history, has come to an end. To the rule of the sword must succeed an administration more in harmony with the wants of the country. Nevertheless, the number of military men who receive civil appointments tends to increase more and more, and will, doubtless, in a few years amount to half that of the effective of Anglo-Indian officers. Yet the young man who, on being admitted into diplomacy, or into the administration, bids an eternal farewell to the noble profession of arms, will none the less pass through all ranks, till, if life be given him, he returns to end his days in England, with the rank of a general officer. Grades won by the pen, far from the battle-field, cannot fail to weaken the prestige which till now has surrounded the higher grades of the English Army.

From a purely military point of view the reforms have not produced entirely satisfactory results. The system of promotion at will, exclusively for regimental grades, if we may still use the expression, has never been adopted in any regular army. Even allowing that the Commander-in-Chief resists all private influence, and promotes the most deserving with a view to the interest of the service alone, yet one of the principal causes of weakness in the old Bengal Army is not thereby obviated, viz., the absence of intercourse between the European officer and the native soldier. Promotion in the corps itself can only be the exception in cadres of seven officers, and the latter must consider their regiments as mere stations which they will have to leave at a moment's notice. Moreover, unfilled vacancies, which was pointed out in 1857 as one of the immediate causes of the Mutiny, have reappeared in the regimental staffs. From one cause or another, from illness, from absence on leave, or from occupying posts on the military staff, the seven European officers are very rarely present at the same time with their regiments. Lastly, the peace enjoyed by India for the last fifteen years, and the system of grades acquired by a stated period of service, have destroyed the proper proportion between the superior and inferior grades. For thirty regiments of regular cavalry, the Anglo-Indian Army numbers eighty superior officers, and

for 115 infantry regiments, 407. These weak points of the new organisation are not irremediable; the definitive separation of the civil and military services, and fixed qualifications for promotion in the army, would doubtless prove sufficient to complete the military reforms brought about by the terrible events of 1857.

We have still to consider the changes among high Anglo-Indian officials, which almost immediately followed the transfer of the Company's possessions to the Crown. The title of Governor-General was replaced by that of Viceroy. The Viceroy, members of the Indian Council who are not selected from the Indian Service, and the Governors of the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, are appointed by the Queen. Members of the Indian Council belonging to the Indian Services and the Commanders-in-Chief hold their functions from the Secretary of State for India. The Viceroy appoints, with the Queen's authorisation, the deputy-governors. Up to 1859, all the decisions of the Indian Council were taken collectively, but at that time Lord Canning, overwhelmed with business, assigned to each member, in the interest of the public good, the direction of the department with which he was best acquainted. Only measures of great importance were reserved for the examination of the Governor-General and his Council. This division of labour received legal sanction by an Act of Parliament in 1861. At the head of the Government of India in our day is a Cabinet, the prime minister of which is superior to his colleagues in authority and social rank, and who exercises absolute control over their actions.

At the time of the Mutiny, the Indian Council was composed of two members drawn from the Indian Civil Service, of one member belonging to the native army, and of a fourth, chosen from the cleverest barristers in London, whose office was to give a legal form to the acts of the Council. But as money matters occupied the first place amongst the difficulties of the crisis, the post of legal member which had become vacant was conferred on a distinguished financier, Mr. T. Wilson. Since then, the need of legal

knowledge having been felt, a new member has been added to the Council. Each of the councillors receives a magnificent salary of 8,000*l.* Under the Company's rule, in case of the absence or death of the Governor-General, the senior member of the Council became his temporary successor. At present the viceroyalty is exercised *ad interim* by the Governor of Madras or the Governor of Bombay, according to seniority.

The Indian Legislative Council, which completes the constitutional machinery of the empire, has also undergone certain modifications, and is composed of twelve members, of whom at least six are chosen, not from either the civil or the military services, but from the principal merchants and planters, or from high-class natives. Similar councils exist at Madras and Bombay. Finally, the supreme courts of the three presidencies, which till the Mutiny had exercised their authority independently of the Company, have been amalgamated with the native supreme courts (saddar uddanlat), and now bear the name of high courts. They are composed of judges, taken from the Indian Civil Service and the English bar, before whom English and native barristers plead. To give an idea of the magnificent prizes offered to followers of the law, it will be sufficient to say that judges of the High Courts receive from 5,000*l.* to 6,000*l.*, and that famous barristers at Bombay and Calcutta make from 8,000*l.* to 12,000*l.* per annum.

Administrative and military reforms were not the only pressing exigencies of the moment. Events had amply justified the policy of conquest and annexation which was followed during the last twenty years of the Company's rule; for if the sepoys had found a Tippoo Sahib, or a Ranjit Singh in British India, the struggle would have assumed proportions too vast even for England's strength. The native princes who held their thrones under her protectorate remained loyal, for they had measured the chances of the revolt with great political judgment, and had been able to estimate England's resources and the weakness of her adversaries at their real value. With a few exceptions,

they felt that the triumph of the sepoys would be full of danger for their own authority, and that if the English were defeated, their thrones would soon give way beneath the blows of a lawless soldiery. It was both just and politic to take into account intelligent loyalty such as this, and to give marked proofs of confidence to the friends in adversity. The means of reward was ready at hand.

We have already mentioned the confiscations disguised under the name of *post-mortem* annexations, which became part of the Company's system after Lord Dalhousie assumed the management of affairs. It was determined to put a stop to all such proceedings, by granting to the native princes the right of adoption in the fullest meaning of the word. In default of direct descendants, every native prince above the rank of 'jaghirdar' was allowed to perpetuate his power by adoption according to Hindoo customs if he was a Hindoo, or, in other cases, according to the laws of his race, as long as the real or fictitious representative of the family remained faithful to the treaties and engagements which bind him to the English Government. This restoration of the ancient common law of India facilitated relations between the suzerain and her vassals, by completely reassuring the native princes as to the transmission of their hereditary rights. The measure was equally well received by the native population, which had been irritated by seeing the European conquerors tread under foot the religious custom of adoption. The Nizam of Hyderabad, the Rajah of Pattyalah, the Maharajah of Nepaul, and the confederate Sikh chieftains were rewarded for their services by an increase of territory, which in most cases was a mere restitution. Finally, the alliance between the two parties was cemented by the institution of an order of chivalry, the Star of India.[1]

On November 1, 1861, in a solemn assembly at Allahabad, where European luxury vied with Oriental pomp,

[1] The Star of India is divided into three classes:—

1st. The Knights Grand Commanders, G.C.S.I., twenty-five in number, of whom fifteen are natives and ten Europeans.

2nd. The Knights Commanders, K.C.S.I., fifty in number.

3rd. Companions, C.S.I., to the number of a hundred.

Lord Canning, acting as Grand Master of the Star of India, invested with the insignia of the Order the Maharajahs of Gwalior and Pattyalah, the Ranee of Bhopal, and the Rajah of Rampore, all of whom by their loyalty had deserved well of England. On the same day was held high festival at the old castle of Windsor. The august lady who, thanks to the admirable system of the balance of power, bears a sceptre worthy of Charlemagne in her feeble hands, without sinking under it, conferred the Grand Cross of the Star of India on the veteran Sir C. Campbell, now raised to the peerage as Lord Clyde, on Sir John Lawrence, and on Lord Harris, Governor of Madras during the Mutiny. Besides this, later on, and by degrees, all the civil and military officers who distinguished themselves in 1857 became Companions of the same order.

The financial history of the Company offers the picture of a daily struggle between receipts and expenditure, and only by incessant efforts could the local revenues be made to suffice for the maintenance of the civil and military services which were necessary to preserve and develope its dominions beyond seas. These budget difficulties are easily explained. On one side, a civil and judicial administration, Staff Corps and troops, sent from a distance at great expense, and bringing along with them the habits and wants of another hemisphere; on the other, a primitive system of taxation, borrowed from the traditions of the great Moguls. In a word, the expenditure of a European Government had to be defrayed by the budget of an Asiatic one. The state of affairs grew worse after the Mutiny. The military budget, from eleven and a half millions sterling in 1856–57, increased to twenty millions in 1857–58. The European forces were raised to 112,000 men, and the native forces, including the Bombay and Madras Armies, the new levies and the Sikh regiments exceeded 300,000 men. Two years had elapsed, and there seemed no reason for anticipating any reduction in the amount of military expenses. Europeans continued to arrive in great numbers, and the local government was at the end of its resources.

Under these circumstances, the Legislative Council, faithful to old-fashioned economical ideas, enormously increased the import duties, and established taxes on the exportation of the principal articles. Fortunately, the deficit in Indian finances had attracted the notice of the Home Government, and the latter, desirous of securing for the Calcutta authorities the advice of an experienced financier, appointed, as we have already said, Mr. James Wilson to the vacant post in the Indian Council.

Up to 1859, the revenue of India had remained fixed within stereotyped forms, and was drawn almost exclusively from three sources: the land-tax, the salt-tax, and the opium monopoly. The land-tax forms the real basis of the Indian budget, and its proceeds yield more than both the other branches of the revenue together. It is intimately connected with the fundamental principles of the administration, and any alteration in this principal source of the wealth of the State would assume the character of a political question. It has already been stated that, though more moderate under the Company's rule than under that of the great Moguls, the land-tax weighed very heavily on the rural population. The English officers who found a refuge in the huts of the natives during the Mutiny, and were in a position to judge the life of the ryot, almost all agreed as to his extreme misery. Similar considerations of humanity forbade any great increase in the salt-tax, which is specially burdensome to the lower classes. The produce of the opium monopoly entirely depends on the demands of China, and the Government cannot possibly exercise any influence over it.

When Mr. Wilson, whose short and brilliant career we intend briefly to relate, arrived in India, the temporary triumph of obsolete doctrines had already borne fruit. Trade and commercial transactions were paralysed, the public revenue scarcely yielded a slight surplus; far from being averted, the crisis daily became more threatening. The new arbiter of Indian finance perceived the urgent necessity of creating fresh sources of revenue, and of intro-

ducing the system of direct taxation. In February 1860, Mr. Wilson laid before the Council a series of financial reforms, the salient features of which can be summed up as follows:—A reduction to 10 per cent. *ad valorem* of the import duties on all merchandise except tobacco, wines, beer, and spirits, which continued to be taxed very heavily; the complete removal of all export duties on the products of the country, except saltpetre, which was a monopoly, and the increased value of which exclusively fell on the consumer; a tax of 2 per cent. on incomes between 20*l.* to 50*l.*, and of 4 per cent. on all above this amount. The stamp duty, which had hitherto been obligatory only in legal proceedings, was now made equally so for every species of documents, receipts, bills of exchange, bills of lading, powers of attorney, &c.

Mr. Wilson was not able to complete his task; worn out by overwork and the climate, he died at the end of 1860. His successor, Mr. Laing, a well-known economist, only entered upon the scene in 1862, when by a decided return to the former state of things, he brought back the duties on piece-goods and yarns, so opposed to the manufacturing interests of Great Britain, to the old tariff of 5 and 3½ per cent. The duty on tobacco, which for ordinary qualities was actually 100 per cent., and therefore almost put a stop to trade, was reduced to 20 per cent. The same reduction was made on the tariff of wines, beer, and spirits, which had hitherto been taxed at 50 per cent. *ad valorem*. As to the tax of 2 per cent. on incomes below 50*l.*, the expenses for perception of which exceeded 30 per cent., it was definitively abolished. Mr. Laing's successors followed the fiscal system he inaugurated, and little by little all traces of the recent innovations disappeared from Indian finances. The tax on incomes above 50*l.* produced but 8,000,000*l.* in five years, and was not renewed at the expiration of its legal term in 1865. In 1867, it was replaced by a licence-tax, varying from a minimum of eight shillings to a maximum of 20*l.*, from which incomes under 50*l.* were exempt. This latter imitation of European taxation has been effaced from the Indian budget since April 1, 1873.

This rapid summary of the financial history of India

during the last fifteen years sufficiently indicates the secret resistance of all kinds which has nullified all endeavours to improve the machinery of taxation. We may suppose, however, that the refractoriness shown by India towards improved methods of political economy must not be exclusively attributed to her inability to support fresh burdens. The causes of this failure are of another kind, and far more complicated. How is it possible to apply fresh taxation to a country as vast as Europe, with a population of nearly two hundred million souls, without meeting, at least in some provinces, with insurmountable obstacles? Let the attempt be made to apply the budget of France to Russia, and the problem will prove no less arduous and complicated than that of forcing a uniform system of taxation on the inhabitants of Oude, the Punjab, or those of the great commercial cities of the Indian Ocean. Latent and natural difficulties such as these explain the failure of fiscal innovations, in spite of a steady increase in the public revenue, which it still remains for us to consider.

During the last thirty years, the receipts have increased by a million sterling yearly, notwithstanding constant wars and the unfinished state of the roads of the country.[1]

Annexation of territory must undoubtedly be taken into account in this increase of revenue, which is, however, principally due to the indisputable development of public wealth. On the other hand, figures like the above-mentioned are reassuring as to the future, though State expenditure

[1]

Years.	Revenues.	Years.	Revenues.
1840	£20,124,038	1864	£44,613,032
1845	23,666,246	1865	45,652,897
1850	27,522,344	1866	48,935,220
1855	29,133,050	1867	42,122,433*
1857	31,691,015	1868	48,534,412
1859	36,060,788	1869	49,262,691
1860	39,705,822	1870	50,901,081
1861	42,903,234	1871	51,413,686†
1862	43,829,472	1872	50,110,215
1863	45,143,752	—	—

* In consequence of a change in the official year, the accounts were only made up for eleven months.

† See Documents No. XVI.

has followed an upward progression which is fully justified by the extension given to public works, such as roads, irrigation, and railways. Moreover, we must remember that certain articles in the budget of receipts have not attained their presumable expansion, whilst corresponding ones in that of the expenditure will ultimately be diminished, if not altogether suppressed. In the first place, the State has for ten years paid large subsidies to the various railways, the amount of which cannot possibly remain the same when the network of railways is finished in the whole extent of the empire. The actual returns of the Customs, 2,500,000*l.*, are quite out of proportion with the population of India, which numbers more than 150,000,000 inhabitants. There is reason to believe that owing to the greater facility of communication, the products of Europe will, within a calculable period, come into more common use among the natives, and that the Customs of the empire will emerge from the stagnation in which they have remained for years. But without going beyond the bounds of actual facts, it can be prophesied that in another twenty years the revenue of India will be quite equal to that of Great Britain, and will amount to 70,000,000*l.*

As to the debt of India, it was in 1857 some 59,500,000*l.*, and in 1861, 107,500,000*l.*, that is to say, in less than five years it was increased by 48,000,000*l.* Yet if the enormous expenses entailed by modern warfare be taken into consideration, this sum is not an exorbitant one. If the colonial government had been acquainted with modern financial methods in 1857, it is probable that by negotiating a loan to cover the expenses of the war, its financial reputation would have come out of the crisis intact. Their measures were not equal to the occasion. The expenses of the war were charged on the ordinary budget, and an open loan, at a fixed interest, the success of which remained uncertain, was resorted to. This uncertainty, and the deficit[1] which marked

[1] Deficit . .

1857–58	£7,864,322
1858–59	13,393,137
1859–60	9,290,129
1860–61	4,026,225
Total .	£34,573,713

the year of the Mutiny and the following one, cast serious discredit for some time on the solvency of India. The equilibrium of the budget was soon re-established, and the debt was even reduced in 1867 to 98,500,000*l.* Since then, the development given to public works has weighed heavily on the resources of the country. The debt, however, has only increased in extremely small proportions. Thus, the interests paid by Government, which were 5,732,757*l.* in 1867–68, amounted merely to 5,966,299*l.* in 1871–72.

The receipts of 1871–72, according to official documents, amounted to 51,413,686*l.*, and show an increase of 512,605*l.* on those of the preceding year. The expenditure, on the contrary, amounted to 49,930,696*l.*, showing a diminution of 611,870*l.* The excess of receipts over expenditure amounted to 1,483,990*l.* As we have already stated, the Viceroy had announced that the income-tax would not be renewed on the expiration of its legal term, March 31, 1873. Indian finances emerged triumphant from the disasters of 1857, and, if the specialists to whom the home authorities added to the Indian Council did not succeed in creating new sources of revenue, their special knowledge at least exercised a beneficial influence over India. London financiers bore in mind that though accurate book-keeping is not enough to ensure that the finances will be in a flourishing state, yet the prosperity of the latter is not compatible with ill-kept accounts. This branch of Indian administration, which was reorganised and improved by Mr. Wilson and his successors, leaves little to be desired, and its results rarely differ from the estimates. The budget of India is in a state of perfect equilibrium, and stands fourth on the list among those of the great nations of the world; before long it will have outstripped that of Russia. We may therefore wind up by asserting that the condition of public finance in the Asiatic dominions of Queen Victoria is eminently satisfactory for the present, and gives good promise for the future. This state of things cannot fail to attract the attention of bankers and persons in search of safe investments, and the day will surely

come in which Indian Stocks will be in high favour on the markets of Europe.[1]

After fifteen years' trial, it can safely be asserted that the crisis of 1857 left the English stronger than it found them, and that the result has justified the transfer of the Company's dominions to the Crown. Yet the great Indian problems remain still to be solved. The system of castes, considered superficially, seems to touch but remotely on great political questions, and, *à priori*, it is allowable to ask what would be the advantage to England if all her subjects were miraculously to be united by a feeling of fraternity, and became free to sit at the same table, to intermarry, and to have full liberty to choose their own profession. Fraternity! though the word still adorns the smoking ruins of the finest monuments of one of the most beautiful cities in Europe, it will always be without meaning for the vast majority of men. The frugal races of Asia take their meals in the family circle, and the names of host and guest are unknown to them. How could such determined water-drinkers, such obstinate rice-eaters, such rejectors of the use of the fork as they are, find any pleasure in sharing the banquets of modern civilisation, in which the richest plate, the most delicate dishes, and the most exquisite wines gratify alike the palate and the eye? The prohibition of marriage between the different castes is

[1] The financial results of the last few years bear out these favourable prognostics, in spite of the burdens which the Bengal famine laid on the Government. The year 1872–73 surpassed all former ones in financial prosperity. Thus the revenue, estimated at £48,286,000, reached £49,476,000, while the expenditure, calculated at £48,066,000, was diminished to £47,657,300. The surplus, which in the budget estimates was valued at £210,000, actually reached £1,818,700.

The current year 1873–74 gives the following figures:—Receipts, £48,984,000; ordinary expenditure, £47,720,000; that is to say, a surplus of £1,264,000. But the estimated expenditure for the famine amounted to £6,500,000, of which £3,920,000 had already been spent and carried to account, thus converting the expected surplus into a deficit of £2 101,300. The balance of the expenses of the famine, £2,580,000, placed to the debt of 1874–75, converted the surplus for this period, estimated at £1,192,000, into a deficit of £1,138,000. The expenditure caused by the famine may be said to have been more than half covered by the surplus of the receipts over the expenditures of the budgets of 1872–73 and 1873–74.

little felt in a country where social relations do not exist, and where the precocity of the race causes unions to be contracted in very early youth. Moreover, there never has been, and there never will be, a social condition in which distinctions of birth, of education, and of fortune have no value, and where marriage between noble and plebeian, between the rich and the poor, even if not forbidden by law, will be encouraged by public opinion. In countries where public education is widely extended, an adult may naturally choose his profession, but in India, where the father is the best and almost the only teacher of his son, the hereditary nature of professions is almost an indispensable necessity.

The three fundamental laws of the native community, when expressed in these simple terms, would scarcely seem to deserve the attention of statesmen. Unfortunately, these details of private life, of domestic etiquette, under their inoffensive exterior, go to form the intricate meshes of the vast and heavy net under which Brahminical influence still holds down modern India. How could a civilised government pass over the strange tyranny, and the extraordinary crimes which naturally flow from the system of castes? Ought Pariahs to be forced to wear a bell round their necks, according to the prescriptions of the laws of Manou? Shall the Brahmin who strikes down a Nazyadi by an arrow, or a shot from a gun at the distance of seventy-four paces, in order to avoid pollution from the shadow of the unclean being—shall he, in accordance with the laws of Manou, escape the vengeance of the law?

The lessons of the Mutiny, which have but too fully shown the danger of concessions to the prejudices of the sepoys, forbid the continuance of the same perilous system. The native soldiers must not only fight but eat together, perform every kind of military duty, and accept the order to march to any destination without a murmur. Neither in the public administrations must the spirit of caste, so opposed to the good of the service, be considered. Caste must also disappear from railway stations, hospitals, and prisons, where it is impossible to separate, according to their orthodoxy, the

different castes whom the chances of travel, of illness, or of crime may bring together.

These reforms, which have been carried out with steady perseverance, have not as yet met with any insurmountable obstacles, for if the Brahmins still persist in asserting the infallibility and immutability of the laws of Manou, the decrease of their influence is daily proved by a thousand different facts. In the various branches of the public service men of the highest castes recognise as their superiors men belonging to the most degraded. Brahmins themselves trade in spirituous liquors and butchers' meat, and wear sandals of cowhide. The intercourse between Europeans and natives in large towns is incessantly wearing away the system of caste. The time seems to have arrived for the downfall of the political and religious institutions which have been India's weakness and misfortune for thousands of years. The equality of castes before the law, which is no violation of the solemn engagement entered into by the English Government to respect scrupulously the religions of its Asiatic subjects, is the real and desirable solution of the problem, the object which all Indian statesmen ought to keep in view. But no intervention ought to go further, and any interference with the intimate details of native life and hierarchy would be as useless as dangerous.

Catholic and evangelical missions are not obliged to act in the same spirit. The relations between the missionaries and the natives are of a strictly private character, and in the school or the church it would neither be politic nor liberal to force men of high birth to associate with the lower classes of the population. The native who embraces Christianity is, by the very fact of his conversion, cut off for ever from his relations and friends without thereby acquiring a position in English society, and the life of isolation to which neophytes are condemned, is one of the greatest hindrances to the success of proselytism. Such is not the case with Hindoo converts to Islamism, who are at once received as brothers by their new co-religionists. Therefore, it is but just to leave the advantages of his birth to the high-class convert in

compensation for his sacrifices. We cannot conclude these sketches without pointing out once more that the English Government must take no share whatever in the work of Christian missions, and that any attempt at, or suspicion of, official propagandism would suffice to let loose on India a more terrible storm than that of 1857, which would assuredly shipwreck the fortunes of England.

CHAPTER XII.

PUBLIC WORKS, EXPORTATIONS, AND IMPORTATIONS—THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ—RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA AND INDIAN RAILWAYS.

Reforms in the legislation on landed property—The Anglo-Indian telegraph system—Postal reforms—New military works—Canals—Roads—Railways—Basis of the contracts with the railway companies—Government supervision—The great Anglo-Indian companies—Exportations and importations—Shipping—Rice—Jute—Tea—Coffee—Cotton—Progress of local manufactures—Importations, merchandise, and precious metals—Trade by land—The Suez Canal and the Eastern question—Anglo-Indian policy considered as such—The Duke of Edinburgh's excursion in India.

INDIA has never been and never will be a colony of England in the strict sense of the word; the Anglo-Saxon race will never be able to people the deltas of the Ganges and of the Indus. Nature, with her own powerful hands, has placed impassable obstacles in the way of such an occupation. If grown men lose their strength in the deleterious climate of India, its action is still more pernicious to children and adults. Every well-to-do family of the European community sends its children home at three or four years of age at the latest. The statistics of mortality among the children of common soldiers, the only offshoots of the Caucasian race who are brought up in India, explain more than sufficiently these early but necessary separations. The Asiatic dependency of Great Britain will never be aught for its masters but a conquered territory, where they can only maintain their power by preserving their physical and moral superiority over the indigenous population. It is no less indispensable for England to develop the immense resources of her empire, and we cannot conclude without saying a few words of the progress made in India during the last fifteen years.

It is only recently that the Government of India has shown any concern for material interests. From the beginning of the century to the annexation of the Punjab (1849), the representatives of the Company, either from necessity or from ambition, gave themselves up entirely to questions of external policy, and did little for the development of the riches of the country. The energetic and enlightened administration of Lord Dalhousie inaugurated the era of great public works. The Great Trunk road, which connects Calcutta with Delhi, was opened to the public in 1851. In 1854, India was endowed with a complete network of electric telegraphs, and nearly at the same time a thorough and much needed reform in postal matters was carried out. A system of railways, connecting the centres of commerce and production in the three Presidencies, was projected, and before Lord Dalhousie's departure (1856), important sections of the lines were ready for traffic in Bengal and Bombay. The Mutiny attracted attention to India, led to the reform of the whole administrative machinery, and did more in a few months for the material development of the country than would have been done by fifty years of monotonous and peaceful prosperity. The terrible storm cleared the atmosphere, and paved the way for the peaceful victories which, to be thoroughly successful, only require the assistance of European capital and energy, and the protection of an honest and enlightened government.

A radical reform was to precede all others. In its suspicious dread of foreign interference, the Company had never allowed even Englishmen to possess or acquire land in its dominions. This state of things naturally called forth protests on all sides, and under the pressure of public opinion, the new authorities from the outset boldly attacked the fundamental principles of Anglo-Indian legislation. For many years now the enterprising European, of whatever nationality, has the right to become a landed proprietor in India on the same conditions as the natives themselves. Waste land, or land recently brought into cultivation, may be bought of the Government in fee simple; as for land on

the regular rent roll, a legal artifice baffles the strictness of the fundamental law, which recognises the Government as the sole legitimate owner of the soil. By depositing in the hands of the district collector a capital in Government bonds yielding interest equal to the assessment, the buyer frees himself for ever from the land-tax, and his position is exactly what it would be if he had sold his Indian stock to invest it in real estate. This desirable change in Indian legislation was preceded by the establishment of a telegraphic system and the reform of the post, both which ameliorations belong to Lord Dalhousie's administration (1849-56). We shall now briefly consider them.

The first works on the line from Calcutta to Agra were begun in November, 1853, and finished in five months. On March 24, 1854, the two great centres were connected by telegraph. On February 15 following, the wires were extended to Madras *viâ* Bombay, and on the north to Attock, on the Indus. In 1855, the system was completed by the lines of Rangoon on the east, and Peshawur on the north, and gave a magnificent total of four thousand miles of telegraphic wires. The learned Sir W. O'Shaughnessy, to whom is due this fine monument of modern science and civilisation, had to contend against all the obstacles which nature can oppose to the efforts of men: pestiferous jungles, which for months together exhaled pestilential fevers, and were moreover inhabited by wild beasts,[1] moun-

[1] The following lines give some idea of the difficulties and dangers which beset the pioneers of science and progress in India :—

'One extraordinary feature of Indian life is the number of human beings destroyed by wild beasts. Rewards are offered by the Government for the killing of these animals; but in some districts the loss of life is very great, and in others, where it is less excessive, the reason given is that the goats are very abundant, and that wolves prefer kids when they can get them. Deaths from snake bites are very frequent, no fewer than 14,529 persons having lost their lives in that way in 1869, while in 1871 the total deaths caused by dangerous animals of all classes amounted to 18,078. Dr. Fayrer is of opinion that if systematic returns were kept, the annual number of deaths from snake-bites would be found to exceed 20,000. The inhabitants of the border-lands between jungle and cultivation are killed and eaten by tigers in such numbers as to require the immediate and serious attention of Government both in India and England. The following are a few out of many instances. A single

tains, rocks, precipices, impenetrable forests, swamps, and rivers. The cable which carries the electric wire through the river Soane is fifteen thousand eight hundred and forty feet long. The expense of laying down the original four thousand miles of wires amounted to twenty-one lacs of rupees, or about five hundred rupees a mile. The system has since been increased by new local lines, with a special view to opening telegraphic communications with Europe. There is now, and marvellous indeed is the fact, no European, living in the remotest parts of the empire of Tamerlane and Aureng-Zeb who is not able to communicate in a few days, nay, in a few hours, with the mother-country. It is useless to dwell on the political advantages which England derives from telegraphic communication with India. We have already pointed out the important part played by the wires in the beginning of the Mutiny before they were destroyed. The enormous extent of India forbids any comparison with a European state,[1] and one must turn to the United States in order to find points of comparison in the tariff used. The latter are very advantageous to the Anglo-Indian public, who, whatever the distance, merely pay a rupee for a telegram of six words, address free.

At the present moment India is connected with Europe by three separate telegraphic lines. The first passes by Constantinople, Mossoul, Bagdad, and Fao, on the Persian Gulf, from whence starts the submarine cable connecting the

tigress caused the destruction of thirteen villages, and 256 square miles of country were thrown out of cultivation. In January 1868 a panther broke into the town of Chicacole and wounded four persons, and one died. It appears that there are difficulties in the way of killing down these tigers. First, the superstition of the natives, who regard the "man-eating" tiger as a kind of incarnate and spiteful divinity, whom it is dangerous to offend; secondly, the failure of Government rewards; thirdly, the desire of a few in India actually to preserve tigers as game, to be shot with the rifle as a matter of sport.'—*Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India*, 1871–72.

[1] From Calcutta to Peshawur . . . . . 1,550 miles
„ „ Bombay . . . . . 1,548 „
„ „ Palamcottah . . . . . 1,665 „

The distance from Peshawur on the extreme north-west frontier to Palamcottah to the far south of the Madras Presidency is 2,631 miles. The line from Peshawur to Moulmein, British Burmah, comprises 2,863 miles of wire.

latter town with Kurrachee; the second (the Indo-European Telegraphic Company) passes through Berlin, Warsaw, Kertch, Tiflis, Tabriz, Teheran, Bushire, Cape Yask and Gwadur; the third, inaugurated in 1870, connects Suez with Bombay by submarine cable. Another line, opened in 1871, completes communication between Europe and the far East, *viâ* Madras, Penang, Singapore, and Hong Kong. In spite of the advantages they offer, the Indian telegraphs are far from giving satisfactory financial results. The net profits of the Suez Company, with a capital of 1,200,000*l.*, amount to 8 per cent., which just about pays the annual wear and tear of the cable. The Indo-European Telegraphic Company, with a capital of 450,000*l.*, is unable to meet its working expenses after paying the charges made by the different Governments whose wires it uses. The revisions of the tariff have not proved an efficacious remedy. Telegrams of twenty words, which originally cost 5*l.*, and subsequently 2*l.* 18*s.*, were raised again to 4*l.*, without producing any considerable effect on the receipts.

As soon as Lord Dalhousie arrived in India he was struck by the insufficiency of the postal administration, and in 1850 he named a commission to report upon the necessary reforms to be made. The labours of this commission brought about the following changes for the better: The post became a special administration, with a director-general under the control of the Supreme Government; a uniform rate of one anna (1½*d.*) for letters weighing half-an-ounce, and of half an anna for papers and printed matter, whatever the distance; the system of stamps was also introduced. These innovations were completed by the fixed rate of sixpence on letters to Europe weighing half-an-ounce. India, it may be said, is the country where the public profits by postal arrangements at the least cost to themselves. For the modest sum of less than three half-pence a letter may be sent from Cape Comorin to Peshawur, a distance of three thousand miles; under the former system, the rate, though very moderate when the distance is taken into account, would have amounted to one shilling. This great reform, be it

added, is not burdensome. According to the budget of 1870-71, the receipts were 805,235*l.*, and the expenditure 613,041*l.*, showing a surplus of 192,194*l.*[1]

Thirty years ago, public works in India were limited to keeping up military and civil buildings, such as barracks, arsenals, hospitals, public banks, and prisons. Besides this, the action of the Government only extended to works of irrigation. A committee, composed of the principal functionaries belonging to the civil departments of the army, was amply sufficient for the modest requirements of a *statu quo* policy, which, if not hostile, was utterly indifferent to the development of the wealth of the country. Lord Dalhousie, on taking office, broke with these traditions of the past, and separating public works from the army, made the former branch of the service a separate department of the Supreme Government. The new department soon enlarged its sphere of activity. The budget of public works, which in 1852-53 amounted to 600,000*l.*, a fifth of which was set apart for the maintenance and construction of roads, exceeded seven millions in 1867-68, viz:—

	£
Military works (new barracks, &c.)	2,856,000
Civil buildings	1,144,240
Public Works—Roads	1,358,640
Irrigation	1,136,280
Various works	218,640
Grants to railways	502,500
Total	7,116,300

These figures show that by an odd freak of fortune the new administration was called upon to reconstruct the military buildings of the Company. The Mutiny led to a great increase in the number of European troops in India. Barracks were wanting in which to lodge the new-comers,

[1] The number of letters which passed through the Indian Post Office in 1873 amounted to 83,127,098, showing an increase of nearly three millions over the preceding year, 80,636,643. Papers, reviews, &c., were 7,928,090 and 6,840,130. The Anglo-Indian Press comprises 255 papers printed in Indian dialects, 67 half in English, half in native languages, 156 in English alone, total, 478; 48 new papers appeared in 1873.—*The Englishman*, February 13, 1874.

and the old ones, built in the time of the Company, were sadly notorious for their unhealthiness. Moreover, the English, in their blind infatuation, had been satisfied to keep up in a sort of fashion the fortifications raised by the native princes, without constructing any additional works of defence. This state of things attracted at the very beginning the attention of the new authorities, and a credit of eleven millions, charged on the budgets of several years, was assigned to the construction of new military buildings, the improvement of those already existing, and the erection of works required to ensure the defence of the great centres and principal ports. At this moment most Indian barracks possess the conditions of space and ventilation necessary for the health of Europeans in that deleterious climate, and if epidemics still sweep off whole regiments, the fault can no longer be attributed to the negligence or parsimony of the Government. Moreover, Allahabad, Lucknow, and Delhi are now surrounded by formidable fortifications, which would enable even weak garrisons to defy the utmost efforts of the native population for a considerable period. The plans for the defence of the great seaports have been pushed forward with less activity, and are still buried in the portfolios of the commissions of inquiry.

The other portion of the former budgets of public works in India has not been treated less liberally, and we willingly acknowledge that since the transfer of the Company's possessions to the Crown, the European authorities have endeavoured, with an ardour which does them credit, to make their mission a providential one. The plague of famine, which civilisation has almost banished from modern Europe, still exists in India, and in years of drought whole populations succumb to the attacks of the fell enemy and its accompanying diseases.

Great calamities of this description paralyse commerce and trade, and make themselves felt by formidable deficits in the public revenue. For their own interests, no less than from a humanitarian point of view, one of the first duties of an Indian administration is to combat these disastrous

eventualities by extending the means of artificial irrigation. The creation of such works in the North-West Provinces is due to the Mogul Emperors; Firoz Shah had the first canal dug in the plains, in order to water a favourite hunting-ground of his. The reign of Shah Yekan was marked by the opening of the Delhi Canal, executed under the direction and on the plans of the eminent architect Ali Murdan Khan, which for the space of a century fertilised the districts in the neighbourhood of the capital. Other canals, which it would be too long to enumerate, testified to the far-seeing philanthropy of Akbar's successors; but in the midst of the disorders which preceded and followed the fall of the Mogul Empire, the land became covered with ruins, and the great arteries ceased to provide it with their fertilising streams.

On becoming the heirs of the great Moguls, the English, who studiously followed the tradition of their predecessors, lost no time in repairing the canals damaged by time. Between 1803 and 1822, the Eastern Jumna Canal, which is one hundred and fifty miles long, and waters a hundred and fifty thousand acres, and the Western Jumna Canal, which has a length of four hundred and forty-five miles, were opened. These restorations were the mere prelude of the greatest and most useful work which honoured the long reign of the East India Company. The great canal of the Ganges is eight hundred and ninety-eight miles long, irrigates one million four hundred and seventy-one thousand five hundred acres, and protects a population of six million persons from the horrors of famine. The principal branch, opened on April 8, 1854, which is prolonged for a distance of one hundred and twenty-five miles, and is ten feet at its greatest depth, and one hundred and seventy at its greatest width, is almost unequalled in the world, and is larger by a third than the largest navigable canals in the United States. The efforts made in the Company's time to create new irrigation works never extended beyond the North-West Provinces. In Bengal nothing more was done than to keep up the dykes and embankments which defend the coast from

inundations, and to cut several navigable canals in the neighbourhood of Calcutta. The configuration of the ground in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies generally allows of irrigation by means of reservoirs formed by banking up the waters of the valleys. These reservoirs were almost all established before the European conquest, and did not involve the Government in very considerable works, as they entailed little expense to keep in repair. The occurrence of the Mutiny called away for some time attention from the question of irrigation, but this vital matter was again brought into prominence by the famine which, in 1861, prevailed in a large portion of the North-West Provinces, and in 1866 in the provinces of Orissa and Lower Bengal.[1]

[1] A few words will suffice to give the reader some idea of the horrors of a famine in India. We borrow the terrible details from the declarations made by Mr. Justice Wauchope and the Rev. A. Miller, before the court of inquiry on the famine in Bengal and the province of Orissa in 1866.

Mr. Wauchope's deposition before the Committee at Cuttack, on January 12, 1867, is as follows:—'I went to Midnapore from Hooghly on March 26, 1866, and noticed that there were many starved and emaciated people about the station, picking up berries and living on what they could get. This was the state of things immediately on my arrival, and people said that they had never seen such a thing before. I was only at the station three weeks, and knew little of what was going on there. I had before me at that time a number of dacoity cases in which the crime had been evidently committed by starving people. That was also the opinion of the Commissioner. Many of the prisoners admitted the robbery, pleading want of food. The persons tried principally belonged to the jungle tribes. On April 17 I went back to Hooghly. 'I did not there notice any particular appearance of famine. I left Hooghly again for Balasore on May 19, and went back to Balasore, arriving on May 22. There was nothing, so far as I recollect, that particularly attracted my attention between Calcutta and Midnapore, and at Midnapore I was only a few hours in the house. On the road from Midnapore to Balasore, from about twenty miles out of Midnapore, I saw real signs of famine. The villages seemed to be nearly deserted, the men, women, and children seen on the road were literal skeletons, and wherever I stopped I was surrounded by hundreds of the skeleton beggars. This increased in intensity from beyond Dantoon all the way to Balasore. I never had seen such scenes in my life. I cannot say where I first saw dead bodies. At Balasore there were several thousand starving people, and they were fed daily at the "dhurmsala." But the state of things about Balasore was literally horrible. Every road and every part of Balasore was covered with living skeletons, picking up bits of sticks to cook the rice given to them; hundreds of them were lying on every side of the road; they seemed as if black parchment were stretched over bones. As time passed, starving people kept pouring in from the interior, nearly all skeletons, and things got worse; deaths became numerous. On July 2, I left Balasore and returned to Calcutta.

Another famine laid waste Bengal in 1874, but the generous and vigorous efforts of the Government succeeded in averting the evil, which, anyhow, was greatly exaggerated by articles in the English papers.

From 1860 the Home Government gave *carte blanche* to the Indian authorities to undertake irrigation works on a hitherto unprecedented scale. A first credit of a million sterling, assigned for this purpose in 1867, could not be employed on account of the insufficiency of the preliminary calculations. Since then these works have been pushed on with steady activity, and it may be hoped that India in twenty-five years will be provided with a complete system of irrigation. By indefatigably promoting this great undertaking, England shows herself truly worthy of the civilising mission which Providence has entrusted to her. The duty of European rulers towards their Asiatic subjects does not merely consist in giving them order and peace, but in protecting them, as much as lies in the power of modern art and science, from the terrible eventuality, the very name of which causes the bravest to grow pale—against famine. India must not only be benefited by irrigation in places where it is profitable, but wherever it is possible, and when this

The roads were almost impassable from the rains, and horrible as were the scenes I had seen on my previous journey, they were ten times more horrible on my return.'

The Rev. A. Miller says :—'Towards the end of May, people were dying very rapidly about the station, and I think that June, July, and August were the worst months. Hundreds died in fields and out-of-the-way places, where no one saw them. If one chanced to cross the country, one saw the bodies lying about and the jackals eating them. I should say, to be within bounds, that about one-fourth of the population of Orissa has died. In this neighbourhood, I think the mortality has been one-third; but I believe that in other parts of the province it has not been so severe. As to the number of deaths in a certain day, I have seen some exaggeration in the papers; it was said that 1,000 had died in one day in the streets of Balasore—that was an exaggeration. I think the worst day we ever had about 290 or 300 were carted off dead from the station, and thrown into the river. But, as respects the general misery and suffering, I do not think that it has ever been fully described; it would have been almost impossible to exaggerate it. I heard a well-authenticated instance in which a mother and son were found eating a dead child.'—*Report of the Commissioners appointed to Inquire into the Famine in Bengal and Orissa in* 1866, vol. i. Nos. 73 and 86.

immense task is accomplished, England will have acquired imperishable claims to India's gratitude.

Twenty-five years ago India was without roads, and the traveller could only depend on his own legs, a palanquin, the backs of native bearers, a donkey, a horse, a dromedary, or an elephant; but means of communication are not as indispensable in Asia as in Europe; nature sometimes greatly favours, sometimes completely arrests all transit. The dryness, which lasts nine months in the year, makes every path practicable both to those on foot and those on horseback, and facilitates, moreover, the crossing of rivers and torrents. In the rainy season all locomotion is suspended, and the most perfect road ever made will never allow, otherwise than exceptionally, the passage of goods or travellers under the deluges which inundate the country between June and September. The old servants of the Company, who were generally opposed to progress of any kind, whether material or not, easily accustomed themselves to the expenses and length of the journey, which for them were the only drawbacks of this state of things, and were even heard to praise its advantages. Thus, stress was laid on the fact that the want of roads necessitated holding in readiness on every point stores of provisions and means of transport for the troops, which, with very slight preparation, could pass from a peace to a war footing. Hence the extraordinary promptness with which Anglo-Indian armies took the field in certain wars; hence, also, the skill and marvellous resources of the commissariat, which was always kept in activity; and thus to the troops who, in their changes of garrison, experienced for months together real camp life, a military school of the most useful character was afforded. Experience has, however, shown the fallacy of these paradoxes, and the construction of roads is at present one of the questions which most preoccupies the Queen's representatives in India.

The first roads were made in the North-West Provinces, where the configuration of the country was favourable to the works, and where, moreover, the necessary materials

abounded. Towards 1851 the road from Calcutta to Delhi was opened for traffic. The impulse had been given, and was especially followed in the Punjab, then recently annexed, whose progress Lord Dalhousie was following with paternal care as Governor-General. The movement, however, only reached its full development when a parliamentary vote transferred the sceptre of India to the Crown. The progress made under the new rule is sufficiently shown by the following figures. In 1851–52, the credit granted for the construction and maintenance of roads in the three Presidencies amounted to 120,000*l.* Fifteen years later, the same credit was ten times as high, and in 1867–68 it reached the sum of 1,358,640*l.*, viz., 531,840*l.* assigned to the maintenance of roads already existing, and 826,800*l.* for the extension of the system. A good macadamised road averages about 1,000*l.* a mile in India. The cost, it is true, varies very greatly in different localities, and is much higher in Lower Bengal, where materials are totally wanting, and where stones have to be brought at a great expense from a distance, or else broken bricks have to be used, which makes the keeping up of the roads a costly matter.

A characteristic feature of Indian roads is their incompleteness; bridges over rivers are invariably wanting. In reality, the latter, which are very expensive constructions, are of little use. In summer, the rivers can be easily forded or crossed in boats, whilst only the strongest structures could resist the violence of the currents in winter, and would in any case be very little used. The actual budget would enable about eight hundred miles of roads to be opened yearly, at the average cost of 1,000*l.* per mile; but the maintenance of new thoroughfares is incumbent on the State, and in India there are no public revenues, subsidies, forced labour, or local taxes which can be assigned to this object, as in Europe. Turnpikes were established at first, but the proceeds scarcely covered the expenses of collecting the tolls; they were destroyed in the Mutiny, and have not been set up again. The problem of the main-

tenance of roads still remains to be solved, and is one of great importance; for if we estimate the average cost at 75*l.* per mile, and the annual construction at eight hundred miles, we see that the budget of public works is yearly charged with an increase of 60,000*l.*, owing to new and indispensable expenses of maintenance. At this moment the length of the macadamised roads in India is ten thousand miles; and though this shows great and remarkable progress as compared with twenty years ago, the work of opening up the empire has, we may say, scarcely begun. The laying down of railways makes it still the more indispensable to speedily finish the work of road making. Many stations are hundreds of miles away from any road fit for vehicles, and the railways will not produce their full results until a system of improved roads enables the produce of the districts they traverse to reach the trucks without exorbitant cost of carriage.

Lord Dalhousie, to whom belongs the honour of having conceived and inaugurated the great work of Indian railways, felt that the Government's aim ought not merely to be the protection of the military and political interests of the conquest. Above all, he intended that a network of railways should serve to develop the wealth and the resources of the country, by connecting the centres of production with the large seaports. The eminent statesman felt, moreover, that to carry out the undertaking successfully, it was necessary to combine the action of both private and public enterprise, and that European capitalists, from whom alone assistance could be expected, would not venture on a task full of unknown difficulties, if left solely dependent on their own resources. The fundamental basis of the contracts made with the various companies was generally as follows:—The Government engaged to provide gratis the ground necessary for the lines, and to guarantee a minimum interest of 5 per cent. on the capital invested since the beginning of the work. As reimbursement for these advances, it was agreed that the net profits of the works should be paid into the public treasury. As long as the amount of these payments did not exceed

5 per cent. of the capital expended, the whole sum was kept by the State; above 5 per cent. the surplus was divided into equal portions, one for the shareholders, the other for the treasury. The sums thus received by the latter were to be applied to liquidate the interest previously paid to the shareholders, and when the total reimbursement thus effected should balance the total of the advances made by the State, at simple interest of 5 per cent., the profits should belong definitively and entirely to the shareholders.

Another important question still remained to be solved. As all the capital had to come from England, it was indispensable to guard against the fluctuations of the exchange, and it was determined that the latter should be fixed at 1*s.* 10*d.*, a rate less by 9 per cent. than the legal value of the rupee. The Government, in short, sold its bills at a fixed rate, but much lower than the market price. The wisdom of this proceeding has been clearly shown since 1869, and in the last budget, 1872–73, the profits accruing to the public treasury amounted to 2,800,000*l.*

On December 30, 1871, the advances made by the State as guarantees to the various companies reached the sum of 20,000,000*l.* Though these figures are very high, it can be safely asserted that the Indian budget has never been charged with a more honourable and more useful debt.[1]

In return for the help given to the various companies, the Government reserved to itself the right of interference in their proceedings; its sanction was necessary for all expenses of laying down lines or working them. The general accounts are revised by its comptrollers, and the various companies have absolute power only over their own clerks, whom they can appoint or dismiss at will, but whose salaries and functions are determined by the Government.

The various companies are represented in England by administrative councils, subject to the control of a Government director, who sits on all the committees, and has a right of veto on their decisions. In India, an agent delegated by each company presides over the staff of clerks, and the

[1] See Documents No. XVII.

carrying out of the works under the supervision of a consulting engineer, an official who acts as intermediary between the companies and the State. In theory, the Government exercises an absolute authority over Indian railways, but in practice this control is non-existent. In England, a single agent would not suffice for the business of eight great companies; in India, the consulting engineer only attends to the works of the line entrusted to him, and to this his powers are limited. Hence it has happened that the costs of certain companies have much exceeded the estimates, and that in others the work has been carried out with lamentable parsimony. Moreover, the stimulus which in general calls forth the energetic supervision of the directors of companies and their agents, the desire to establish an excess of receipts over expenditure, which may allow the payment of a dividend to the shareholders, is not to be found among the officials of the Anglo-Indian lines. As they have no anxiety on this score, whatever be the result of the working, they show neither zeal nor economy in their management of affairs. Government intervention has also encountered serious difficulties in the management of the railways whenever the interests of the public, which it represents, are in direct opposition to those of the companies. The latter try to combine a maximum of profit with a minimum of traffic, whilst the public, on the contrary, wish to obtain the same result by means of the lowest possible tariffs. At this point Government action stops, and it can neither force the companies to reduce their fares to the minimum, nor to multiply the number of trains. So that railway freight is exorbitant and almost prohibitive for certain articles—coal, for instance.

The original system of Indian railways[1] comprises nine principal lines, worked by as many companies, with a guarantee of interest. The first, the 'East Indian,' connects Calcutta with the Punjab, passing through the large towns of Bengal and the North-West Provinces. The second, the 'Great Indian Peninsular,' connects Bombay with Calcutta by

[1] See Documents No. XVIII.

its junction with the 'East Indian' at Allahabad and Bombay, with Madras, by its junction with the Madras line at Koulburga. The third is the 'Madras Railway,' whose various branch lines connect the Arabian Gulf with that of Bengal, Madras with the fine plateau of the Neilgherries and with the 'Great Indian Peninsular.' The fourth, the 'Scinde, Punjab, and Delhi,' offers a substitute for the difficult navigation of the Lower Indus. Besides these, there are the 'Bombay, Baroda, and Central India,' the 'Great Southern of India,' the 'Eastern Bengal,' the 'Oude and Rohilkund,' and lastly, the 'Carnatic,' which is intended to supply the wants of Madras and Pondicherry. Experience has since then revealed new wants, but any supplementary lines which have been grafted on to the original system are now constructed by the State, and are entirely under its control. Such, for instance, are the 'Calcutta and South-Eastern,' the 'Northern Punjab,' and the 'Rajpootana.' In the official year 1871–72 (April 1 to March 31) 408 miles of railway were opened for traffic, and there are now in full activity 5,204 miles, of which 5,136 belong to companies, and 68 to the State. The completion of the projected lines will necessitate laying down another 2,440 miles, of which 940 by the companies and 1,500 by the State.

The expenses of the various companies, from the first works (1849) to March 31, 1872, amount to 90,623,793*l.*, that is to say: Sums expended in India for materials and labour, 53,688,044*l.*; cost of material, freight, insurance in England, 36,935,549*l.*[1] The cost of construction and materials may be computed approximately thus: Bridges, 28,000,000*l.*; permanent ways and stations, 27,000,000*l.*; rolling stock and engines, 13,000,000*l.* The supplement of 90 millions having defrayed various expenses—such as the salary of the officials, freight, and insurance, electric telegraphs,[2] according to the specification, the land was given gratis by the Government to the companies.

The receipts of Anglo-Indian railways during the year 1871–72 amounted to 6,146,130*l.*, and the expenditure to

[1] See Documents No. XIX.

[2] See Documents No. XX.

3,302,050*l.*; that is to say, the net profit was 2,844,080*l.*, with a proportion of 54 per cent. between receipts and expenditure. These figures differed little from those of the preceding year, but it must not be forgotten that 408 fresh miles of permanent way were opened for traffic in 1871–72, and by this very fact the original cost of the construction was increased by 2,300,000*l.* The diminution of receipts fell exclusively on the 'East Indian' and the 'Scinde, Punjab, and Delhi.' The other lines have fared better; thus the 'Great Indian Peninsular' showed an increase of 200,000*l.* The receipts for 1871–72 may be divided as follows: 18,940,585 passengers gave 1,940,549*l.*, and 3,289,561 tons of merchandise, 4,025,309*l.*, the remainder being supplied from various sources, such as telegraphs and transports. The total of train miles run reached 14,080,064, 4,789,184 of which was by passenger train, 4,921,434 by luggage trains, and 4,309,446 by mixed or exclusively mineral trains.

Train mileage receipts and expenses vary considerably. On the 'Bombay, Baroda, and Central India' the receipts are 12·46, on the 'Carnatic' 2·52. The expenditure amounted to 7·43 on the former, 1·64 on the 'Carnatic,' and 4·03 on the 'East Indian.' The average for the whole system is 8·74 and 4·50. In England, the same year, the average was 5·13 and 2·54. The great diversity of expenses on the various Indian lines is due to the different sorts of fuel in use. Some of them bring their fuel at great expense from England, while others use only wood. The 'East Indian' passes through the fine coal districts of Lower Bengal, and gets its fuel at a lower price than the most favoured European lines. Recent investigations have revealed the presence of coal in large quantities in certain parts of Central India, and these mines will shortly supply the 'Great Indian Peninsular.' The geological researches made during these last years in the Presidency of Madras have proved fruitless, and no beds of coal have been discovered.

On September 30, 1871, 68,517 officials were employed

by the Anglo-Indian railways, of whom 4,852 were European. The latter figures give an idea of the magnificent opening which the working of railways in India offers to the English middle and lower classes. We will conclude these dry details by stating that passengers on the more important Indian lines travel with far greater security than is the case, unfortunately, anywhere in Europe. Only one accident of any consequence, in which eight passengers were hurt, occurred in 1871-72. Less serious accidents, to the number of 548, may be classed thus: 76 from fire, 70 from trains getting off their proper lines, 35 from collisions, 53 from various causes, and 314 from cattle straying on the line. Let it be noted here that under the name of cattle, hyenas, deer, buffaloes, tigers, and other dispossessed inhabitants of the jungle are included. Death has none the less stricken down its victims among the crowd of passengers: 110 natives, with but two or three exceptions, died in railway carriages from fever, dysentery, or cholera.

A few pages back we showed that the net profits of Anglo-Indian railways in the year 1871–72 rose to 2,844,000*l.*, or about $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the capital invested by the companies (85,000,000*l.* approximately). In order to fulfil its engagements towards the shareholders and to make up the interest of 5 per cent. promised, the Indian Government was obliged to supply a sum of about 1,200,000*l.* This, it must be confessed, was a heavy burden for the colonial budget, and hitherto the extensive works undertaken for the public good have not justified the hopes indulged in at the first. Exceptional circumstances were at fault in 1871-72 in diminishing traffic on the 'East Indian,' which is the most active and extensive line in India. Moreover, on these recently constructed lines passenger and merchandise traffic is far from having reached the development it is capable of. On the lines first opened the average of receipts increases considerably every five years.[1] These statistics give grounds for anticipating a better future for Indian railways.

As to the system of companies guaranteed by the State,

[1] See Documents No. XXI.

the results have been such as to furnish its adversaries with powerful arguments. On several lines the cost of construction has largely exceeded the estimates. The officials, who are not interested in procuring a dividend, show neither economy nor activity in their management, without which no great enterprises can be profitable. Finally, the interests of the public are constantly sacrificed to those of the companies, without the Government having the power to take vigorous action in the cause of justice. These unquestionable facts have long made the system unpopular, and as early as 1862 Lord Elgin, the Governor-General, objected to applying it to the new lines which have since been exclusively made and worked by the State. Many people have even been found favourable to the idea of ousting the companies for the advantage of the Government, and they take their stand on a clause in the contract by which the latter reserved to itself the right of buying up the lines at the end of twenty-five years. There would be little difficulty in doing this, and the Indian Government would find it all the more easy to negotiate a loan of two milliards, that after all it would only be a question of a simple conversion.[1]

Without prejudging the future of Indian railways, we

[1] The rate of interest paid to the companies is actually 1 per cent. higher than if the Government borrowed directly. Moreover, while the State only detains half of the profits above 5 per cent., it is responsible not only for the guaranteed interest, but also for all the working expenses beyond those that are covered by the receipts. Finally, any company when in great straits may call upon the State to take its place and to repay its capital and its debts. These considerations militate undeniably in favour of buying up all railways without distinction, whether remunerative or not. With regard to the time at which this purchase should be made, Mr. Hector Malot, the Director of the Bank of Bengal, in a recent pamphlet, gives in favour of immediate action figures which seem decisive. In 1868, the 100*l.* shares of the good Indian companies varied from 103⅜ to 107⅝, whilst in 1873 they were quoted at from 113 to 120. The rise in 1869 giving a premium of 10 per cent. to the shares, the expenses of the budget in 1878 would have only been 56,000*l.*; and ten years later, in 1888, the State would benefit to the extent of 1,500,000*l.* Buying up of the lines at this present moment would not cost the budget much more than what its actual engagements oblige it to pay, whilst the uniformity of the lines, reductions in the number of officials both at home and in India, would result in immediate and considerable economy in the working.

will confine ourselves to impartially examining the great work initiated by Lord Dalhousie. Questions of finance, of systems of construction and working disappear before considerations of a far higher order. By giving to the India of the Brahmins a complete system of railways in less than twenty years, England has finally taken root in this land, where change is unknown. The lines of rail which are now laid down on the banks of the Ganges and the Indus will certainly bring in their train the seeds of moral and material progress and of true civilisation, as they have done everywhere else. The conquerors, who have gifted their subjects with 5,000 miles of permanent way, have successfully achieved a task without precedent in history, and we must acknowledge that the English in the last twenty years have shown themselves worthy of the favours which fortune has showered on them for a century in Asia.

The statistics of the Anglo-Indian empire for 1871–72 place the exports from the great seaports of Kurrachee, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Moulmein, and Rangoon at the high figure of 64,661,940*l.* Imports, too, for the same places during the same time amounted to 42,657,560*l.* The returns of the previous nine years show clear proof of the extent to which external politics are felt in commercial transactions in India. During the American civil war, which gave an enormous impulse to cotton growing, the exports reached the maximum. The European wars of 1866 and 1870 disturbed all the markets of the world; when peace returned trade revived, and the statistics of maritime trade in 1871–72 differ very slightly from those of the period of the American crisis.

The port of Calcutta stands at the head of Indian mercantile traffic, and in 1871–72 the imports amounted to 19,741,420*l.*, the exports to 27,849,329*l.* Trade on the banks of the Hooghly follows a progressive course, and the year 1872 showed over the first of the last decennial period an increase of 5,497,954*l.* in the imports and of 12,458,606*l.* in the exports. It was not so with Bombay, where the exports rose to almost a milliard during the cotton fever (1864–65),

to fall in the last return lower than in 1863. The statistics for the ten years previous to 1872 places imports to Bombay at 10,432,058*l.* and exports at 25,899,239*l.* These figures are much the same as in 1863—viz., imports 9,905,637*l.*, exports 25,849,848*l.*

Indian maritime trade in 1872 was represented by 45,885 ships of 8,333,638 tons, comprising inward and outward entries.[1] If these figures be compared with those of the first budget of the decennial period—41,501 ships of 5,612,205 tons—it is clear that the number of ships has remained nearly stationary, while the tonnage is nearly double. During the last few years a twofold change has taken place in English merchant shipping. Vessels of small tonnage have given way to large clippers, and since the opening of the isthmus of Suez steamers have competed with sailing vessels for freight in the Indian Seas. Though modern discoveries have not yet solved the question of superiority between the two great Indian metropoli, they have nevertheless developed fresh sources of wealth in and around them. If, since the opening of the Suez Canal, Bombay is ten days nearer Europe than Calcutta, the latter has much the advantage in point of railway communication. There are but 560 miles between Calcutta and Allahabad, which latter place is the point of junction of the 'East Indian Railway,' running through the North-West Provinces and the Punjab and the 'Indian Peninsular,' whilst the distance from Bombay to Allahabad is some 850 miles. The Calcutta line is supplied with fuel from the mines of Raniganje at a much lower rate than that paid by the Peninsular Company, which draws all its fuel from Europe. The influence of the Suez Canal is felt at Bombay by the increase in steam navigation, which in 1872 numbered 88 inward and 90 outward-bound steamers, as against 75 and 76 in the previous year. The completion of M. de Lesseps' work also induced the ports of Genoa, Trieste, Constantinople, and Odessa to enter into direct communication with India. The efforts of the Trieste ship-owners were crowned with

[1] See Documents No. XXII.

success, and in 1872 the exports from Bombay to the Adriatic rose to 500,000*l*. Attempts made with the same object by the Russian Government proved less successful: the line of steamers under its protection lasted but a short time, with most unsatisfactory results.

Were we to examine item by item the commercial statistics of India, we should outstep the limits of these sketches. We shall therefore confine ourselves to the mention of the new products which, while already of considerable importance, have not yet reached the full development which the future holds in reserve for them. Foremost on the bill come rice from British Burmah, jute, coffee, tea, and cotton.

Rice is the great article of export of India, if not in value, at least in quantity. Its total yearly amount is about 16,990,890 cwt. In 1871–72, more than half this amount was furnished by British Burmah, a territory annexed to the Anglo-Indian possessions after the second Burmese war twenty years ago. Rice from Rangoon and Moulmein not only competes with that from Saigon and Bangkok in the European market, but also in those of China, the Mauritius, and the Island of Bourbon. English speculation has neglected nothing in order to give the Burmese rice trade the fullest development it is capable of, and at the present moment there are sixteen recently built rice mills, provided with all the latest improvements in working order, in the neighbourhood of the two European centres of that country.

Jute, the hemp of Bengal, which grows wild in the delta of Eastern Bengal, between the Ganges and the Brahmapootra, only began to play its present important part in the Calcutta trade about the time of the War of Secession. Jute is brought by the native cultivators to the markets of Seraoganje, Naraganje, and Dacca, from whence it is forwarded to Calcutta, and eventually to Europe. Dundee, in the United Kingdom, is the centre of the manufacture of articles in jute, such as ropes and cordage, cloths, and coarse carpets. The factories of Messrs. Cox Brothers, who employ 3,000 horse-power and more than 2,000 workmen, and transport the jute on their

own steamers, are fully equal in importance to the gigantic cotton spinning establishments of Manchester. Jute is also used in India to make gunny bags for packing rice, and is sent in enormous quantities to Burmah, China, and America (5,112,421 sacks). The following table shows, without need of commentary, the progress made in the culture of jute during the last thirty years, and the importance which this article, unknown fifty years ago, has already acquired in European trade :—

Exportation of Jute.

	£		£
1842 . . .	24,941	1862 . . .	537,610
1852 . . .	180,976	1872 . . .	4,299,767

Like everything in India, tea has a legend of its own. An Indian devotee, called Durmah, who lived some five hundred years before the Christian era, touched by the religious ignorance of the Chinese, undertook to make known the divine revelation to them. Indifferent to comfort, the holy man started on his journey without provisions. One day, worn out by hunger and fatigue, he lay down and fell asleep. On awaking, Durmah, ashamed of having given way for a moment to the wants of nature, tore out his eyebrows by way of self-chastisement, and threw them away. They were immediately changed into graceful leafy shrubs; the astonished traveller plucked and tasted the leaves, and perceived that they restored vigour both to his body and to his mind. The renown of Durmah's sanctity soon spread; he advised his numerous followers to make use of the new plant, and soon the taste for the beverage, which cheers without inebriating, became universal in China.

The culture of the tea-plant, with a view to trade, is of recent origin in India, and goes back only fifty years. The first Burmese war made the English masters of the Assam territory in 1816, and soon after tea-plants were discovered in the conquered territory. Were these shrubs indigenous, or did they date from an epoch of former civilisation whose undeniable traces are visible in the Brahmapootra valley?

Whatever their origin, their discovery did not pass unnoticed, and a mission sent by the Governor-General, Lord Bentinck, in 1834, reported that the tea-plant was indigenous in Upper Assam, and its leaves available for purposes of trade. The Government at once brought labourers and seed from China, and in 1839, eight chests of Assam tea were sold in the London market. This first success attracted the attention of speculators; a company was formed under the auspices of the Babou Dwarkanaught Tagore, whose name is honourably connected with all progress in commerce and agriculture made in India during the first half of the century, and bought up all the Government tea plantations. The beginnings of the Assam Tea Company were not successful, but a change of administration re-established order and economy in its affairs, and its property caused a regular tea mania, both in the markets of London and Calcutta. Demands for grants of land increased, and companies sprang into existence on all sides. Unsafe or dishonest speculations led to catastrophes, and to a temporary check to production, until badly managed undertakings collapsed and gave way to companies worthier of the confidence of the shareholders. Assam is not the only part of India fit for tea-planting, and the shrub is found wild in the neighbouring province of Cachar, as well as in the lower slopes of the Himalaya, in the North-West Provinces, and in the Punjab. Lord Dalhousie's government, wishing to extend tea-planting in the north as well as in the west, organised plantations at Kumaon, and at Dehra Doun, and sixteen years ago we visited these interesting gardens, then in their first novelty. In 1864, they were sold to companies, and, if properly managed, they ought one day to rival those of Assam and Cachar. The following figures give a correct notion of the progress made by tea planting:—

Exports of Tea.

	£		£
1842 . . .	17,244	1862 . . .	192,242
1852 . . .	59,220	1872 . . .	1,482,186

The latter figures representing 17,460,138 pounds of tea,

and the whole amount being far from conveying a true idea of the total production of India. The tea from the Himalaya districts finds an advantageous market on the spot, in Thibet and Afghanistan, and is not included in the total of the exports by sea. Assam tea is largely consumed in India, and is furnished in great quantities to the European army. We shall not go further into the matter, as what we have said shows clearly enough the important place which tea will certainly occupy in the commerce between India and England.

Coffee-planting, which is peculiar to the Madras Presidency, has long been carried on there; and local tradition asserts that the shrub was introduced into the table-land of Mysore by a pilgrim, who brought back seven grains of coffee from Mecca. But it has only become of importance as an article of exportation within the last twenty years, in consequence of the abolition of a heavy duty which formerly hampered the trade. Coffee plantations exist only in Mysore, the Neilgherries, and in the Courg and Wyniad districts on slopes 3,000 or 4,000 feet above the level of the sea. This agricultural industry, which is pursued in a climate favourable to European constitutions, where, during the south-west monsoon, a planter may oversee his labourers during the entire day without fear of sunstroke, was the very thing for retired officers, who were desirous of occupying their leisure time. There are numbers of veterans formerly in the Company's service to be found among the planters. The progress and the importance of coffee-planting are shown by the following table:—

	£		£
1842 . . .	74,957	1862 . . .	462,380
1852 . . .	84,306	1872 . . .	1,380,410

The figures of 1872 represent a weight of 56,889,888 pounds.

The use of cotton in India, where the sun, the climate, and labour are exceptionally favourable to it, goes back to the earliest ages. It was, however, only under the influence of an external and unforeseen event, the American War of Secession, that cotton-planting made a great stride. It is

noticeable that the East India Company, though generally not inclined to favour material progress, yet took great interest in the question of cotton from the outset. Already in the last century official efforts were made to improve the indigenous plant. In 1829, for the first time, seeds of upland Georgia, Sea Island, Demerara, were imported by the Royal Agricultural Society, and the Government of India granted the sums necessary for the expenses of the first trial. The climate of the country round Calcutta, where the first attempts were made, was both too hot and too damp, and the result was a total failure. Ten years later, an agent sent out by the Court of Directors brought back from America ten experienced planters, and many kinds of seeds, and the experiment was resumed on a vast scale in the three Presidencies. In Bengal, the American seeds did not succeed even in the soil most adapted to the indigenous species. In the Madras Presidency, on the contrary, the official report stated that they gave a superior yield both as to quantity and quality. In that of Bombay, where cotton-planting is most widely diffused, the results varied greatly, and were not equally favourable; in the Dharwar they were negative, in Guzerati they were everything that could be desired. It was even observed that in certain seasons, when the native plant perished from cold or heat, American cotton resisted vigorously these deleterious influences. These differences must be ascribed, as was recognised afterwards, to the unfortunate choice of locality and the exclusive employment of the American system of planting. In so vast a country as India, experience and time alone can determine the soil and the climate specially favourable to certain products. As to the method of cultivation, in the very places where the American system had failed, the foreign seeds yielded later on an abundant crop, when managed according to the old Indian tradition—as, for example, in the districts of Khandeish and Dharwar, in Central India, and in the Presidency of Bombay.[1]

The question of introducing American seeds into Indian

[1] See Documents No. XXIII.

agriculture was now settled, but there were other elements to be taken into account with regard to the greater development of production. Up to the moment when the American War threatened the great European manufactures for spinning and weaving cotton with an immediate stoppage—with a famine, according to the forcible expression of the day—the market for the Indian article was always uncertain, and the price so low as scarcely to be remunerative. The demand for China, one of the two great cotton markets for India, never goes beyond certain limits. That for England, on the contrary, varies according to the crop in the United States. If the crop is a poor one beyond the Atlantic, Indian cotton is much sought after, and bought up immediately; but the following year, a good crop at New Orleans is enough to throw back Indian cotton into a state of stagnation, to the great loss of the planters, who had increased their production in the hope that their cottons will always be in demand for the English market. We may add that the bad condition of the Indian cotton, which is damp, and full of dry leaves and sand, fully explains this variation in the export to Europe. The Asiatic article is accepted there as a last resource when the finer products of the Southern States of America are not to be had. Owing to the many hands through which the cotton has to pass, and to the insufficiency of means of transport, it only reaches the port of shipment after long delays, burdened with the costs of numerous commissions and heavy expenses of transport, and often after having been repeatedly adulterated.

This state of things has been much improved by the completion of the Indian railway system, which enables European merchants to deal directly by means of agents with the native producer, to the immense gain of the latter. The planter had hitherto been a prey to the village usurer, and however diligent his labour or abundant his crop, it was a matter of difficulty for him to pay the rent of his land and advances, the interest on which was generally 36 per cent. As he now comes into contact with the representatives of the Bombay and Calcutta merchants, he sells his cotton

for ready money only, and at a remunerative price, so that in certain districts, after the sale of the crop, there are not jewellers enough to be found to convert into ornaments the gold and silver which abound. Railways have done quite as much towards improving the quality of the produce. Formerly the bales were exposed to all the changes of the weather in long journeys, which kept them weeks on the road; now they reach the port of shipment in fewer days than it would have taken months to convey them to their destination some years ago, and at a far lower cost of transport. In 1867, there were 8,000,000 acres of land given up to cotton planting, of which 552,520 were in the Central Provinces, and 1,254,552 in Berar. In 1871–72, in the Bombay Presidency alone, the number rose to almost three millions. The total value of cotton exports reached 21,272,430*l.*, with a gross weight of 809,246,087 lbs. The port of Bombay stands at the head of the list, and contributes to the above total 540,404,613 lbs., worth 14,820,637*l.* For the port of Calcutta the figures were only 164,476,962 lbs., worth 4,036,956*l.* A proof that the development of the cotton culture has not attained its full extent is that the exports of 1871–72 were almost twice what they were in the first year of the preceding decennial period, and surpassed the maximum reached in the height of the American crisis. But if one wants to get a thorough notion of the progress made in this branch of Indian agriculture, one must go back still further; in 1852–53 the exports amounted to 217,433,911 lbs., and have thus increased nearly fourfold in twenty years.[1]

The Universal Exhibitions in London and Paris, and more recently in Vienna, have made known to the public the variety and number of Indian fabrics. The shawls, the many woollen stuffs, the carpets from the Punjab, the

[1] *Exportation of Cotton.*

	£		£
1863 . . .	473,678,421	1868 . . .	614,056,149
1864 . . .	550,126,402	1869 . . .	697,630,796
1865 . . .	525,052,876	1870 . . .	554,834,522
1866 . . .	803,150,124	1871 . . .	577,600,764
1867 . . .	427,563,892	1872 . . .	809,246,087

embroidered silks from Delhi, the cottons from Nagpore, the specimens of cabinet work from Bombay, the fine muslins of Dacca, occupied a high place even among the marvellous products of European industry. Native trade, far from being ruined by English imports, fully holds its superiority for articles of high quality, such as woollen or cotton tissues, hand-embroidery, &c. This persistent existence of local industry shows clearly enough that the raw products are consumed in the country; so that statistics of the commercial relations between province and province would form an interesting chapter in the economical history of India. Unfortunately, these are yet in their infancy, and exist only in exceptional cases. For instance, it is well known that in the Punjab the value of imports and exports is almost equal: 2,350,000*l.*, as against 2,780,000*l.* The trade on the Indus is registered at Sakkar in Scinde, and shows a value of 105,000*l.* going up, and 630,000*l.* going down. Approximate calculations estimate the foreign trade of the Central Provinces at 14,003,917*l.* Native production has been considerably increased of late years by the establishment of factories on a vast scale, provided with the latest improvements of modern industry. There are nineteen such for spinning and weaving cotton in the Bombay Presidency, of which Bombay itself contains eleven. They employ 404,000 spindles, 4,294 looms, and nineteen steam-engines. Among other great establishments of Anglo-Indian industry, the Elgin Cotton-Spinning and Weaving Company at Cawnpore, and the Goosey Cotton Mills Company, in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, must be mentioned. Let us also note in the same Presidency, 153 licensed steam presses and 287 hand presses for pressing bales of cotton. We have already mentioned the mills for cleaning rice, established some years ago at Calcutta and in the two ports of British Burmah, Moulmein and Rangoon.

The value of the imports to the great Indian seaports in 1871–72 amounted, without including precious metals, to 31,084,347*l.*, that is to say, to an increase of nearly 10,000,000*l.* over the year 1862–63. The great economical

changes which have occurred in India have left their mark on the returns of the last ten years. The progress of local industry, and the consequences of the completion of the railway system, are visible in the increase in the importation of machinery, worked iron, and iron in bars. A considerable augmentation in the quantity of wines corresponds to the increase of the European army and of the white population. The growing expansion of imports in woven and spun cottons deserves notice; in the last budget they rose to 17,484,837*l.*, or almost twice the value of the same articles imported in the first year of the decennial period, 9,630,530*l.* Considerable as is the amount of the imports from home taken by India, its full importance can only be understood if we go back some sixty years, to the first importation of English cotton. The same articles which in the last returns are quoted at 16,000,000*l.*, in 1814 only amounted to a single lac of rupees, 10,000*l.*

Of all the articles of consumption furnished by Europe to India, the precious metals most deserve to attract the attention of economists and financiers. From time immemorial India has drawn immense sums from Europe, which are there converted into personal ornaments. Before the Mutiny the annual average consumption was estimated at 3,000,000*l.* Public works and the cotton crisis caused precious metals, and amongst them, gold for the first time, to abound in the Indian market. In the ten years between 1862-63 and 1871-72, India drew from Europe in round numbers 103,000,000*l.* in silver and 59,000,000*l.* in gold.[1] The exports rose to 13,000,000*l.* in silver and 2,500,000*l.* in gold, that is to say, to an absorption of 146,500,000*l.*, or an annual average of 14,500,000*l.* It is true that the period which we have just considered offers certain special circumstances which can never recur: the great work of the Anglo-Indian railways now finished and the American War created an exceptional demand for the precious metals. It is none the less certain that if, by a special decree of Providence, the era of wars and revolutions were to end in Europe, Australia and

[1] See Documents No. XXIV.

California would still for many years find a sure and vast market for their gold and silver in England's Asiatic dependency.

Let us conclude by giving the figures of the general trade of India in 1871–72, including precious metals. It reached two milliards and a half of francs, a total which needs no commentary to give a true idea of the important part played by the three Presidencies in the commercial transactions of the world.[1]

Besides her maritime commerce India possesses a trade by land through the passes of the Himalaya leading to Afghanistan, Turkestan, and Thibet. The nomadic tribes by whom it is carried on start on their journey about the month of October, and move towards the Punjab, from whence their merchandise reaches the great markets of India, Amritsur, Benares, Calcutta, &c. These importations comprise wool for Cashmere shawls of inferior quality, which are manufactured in the Punjab, raw silks, ingots of gold and silver, borax and fruit both fresh and dry. On their return the caravans take back cotton and woollen stuffs, embroidered Delhi scarves, indigo, and Benares brocades. This traffic has existed from time immemorial, in spite of the high duties and the vexations it is subjected to by the petty rulers of the Indian Caucasus and their agents. In the last few years the English Government has attempted on several occasions to diminish the difficulties of the road, and to open up new routes for traffic on the land frontiers of its dominions. In 1867 the initiative of the political agent at Ladakh developed commercial relations through the passes of the Himalaya between India and Eastern Turkestan. Three years later, in 1870, the Maharajah of Cashmere, under pressure from the English agent, granted, on condition of reciprocity, a free transit through his possessions to the expedition sent to Central Asia. These new routes cannot fail to attract the attention of the Manchester and Bradford manufacturers, for they open up the markets of Central Asia, where their cotton goods can be sent at less

[1] See Documents No. XXV.

cost than similar articles from Moscow.[1] On the other hand, the articles brought back by the returning caravans, such as raw silks and precious metals, are eminently fitted by their small volume for transport over difficult roads. Those which lead from India to the table-lands of Thibet do not exclusively pass through the Northern Himalaya; there are others which lead through the passes of the eastern chain by way of Nepaul and Assam. In the latter province we must take note of the fair at Sudya, to which the neighbouring tribes bring skins and indiarubber, and which is destined to be one day the great point of junction of trade between India and Eastern China.

The fairs which are held after a pilgrimage to some holy place play a most important part in the internal trade of India. Among these solemnities, which partake at once of a commercial and religious character, we must note the fair which is held every year in the beginning of April at Hardwar,[2] at the mouth of the Ganges, in the plains where,

[1] The cost of transport from England to Kashgar, one of the principal markets of Eastern Turkestan, amount to 3*l.* 17*s.* 10*d.* on every 100 lbs. of manufactured cotton. The same amount of goods sent from Moscow would cost 4*l.* 7*s.* 8*d.*

[2] Though more than a week had yet to elapse before the great day, the Twelfth of April, the roads from Mirut to Hardwar, for ninety miles round, were literally covered with people. There was a continuous stream of foot passengers, of camels, of ox-carts—a regular immigration, so to speak. Looking from my palanquin, I might have thought myself in the midst of an entire nation on its travels, more numerous than the Jews when they left Egypt for the promised land. There the resemblance ends, for no Pharaoh was in pursuit of this multitude. Nothing could give a truer notion of the enormous population of India, and of the influence still exercised in spite of a century of foreign and Christian rule, by the prejudices of an imbecile religion, than the aspect of this throng crowding on one long road. Every race of India was represented in the medley: here a valiant Rajpoot with a herculean frame, there a timid Bengalee, here Punjabis, there Arabs from Scinde. The customs of all these pilgrims were of the strangest! Some had come from the most distant part of the Madras Presidency, with a stick and a copper pot as their only baggage. In that ox-cart, packed closer together than herrings in a barrel, were some twenty individuals—men, women, and children—who had travelled in this fashion for months. Here a long file of camels carried pilgrims from the deserts of Upper India. There a troop of women of doubtful character, dressed in sombre colours, marched along the road, uttering wild cries, whose discordant sounds rose above the roll of the drum, with which travellers seek to relieve the tedium of a halt. Finally, in yonder gilt

according to tradition, Vishnu took his celebrated stride to Ceylon.

More than fifteen years ago our good star led us to this

palanquin there must surely be some rich Baboa, who has abandoned the care of temporal concerns to give himself up to spiritual matters and do homage to the god Ganges.

Strange scenes, strongly coloured by local peculiarities, announced the approach to the camp. On the sides of the road hideous beggars complacently displayed to the eyes of the passers-by repulsive leprosies, shocking sores, marvellously contorted limbs! Naked devotees, with filthy matted hair, were seen loudly demanding charity; phenomenal sacred bulls, covered with trappings adorned with shells, and with a fifth leg attached to the shoulder or the rump; which deception, though of the grossest kind, was yet accepted without a doubt by the credulous spectators. The greatest amount of alms was collected on the carpet of a 'Sannyassi,' who had hit upon the curious plan of lying down in the middle of the road with several inches of dust on his face and chest—a pneumatic exhibition which had ruined the business of a poor sacred bull a few steps off, who vainly strove to attract the faithful by the sight of an extra leg artistically attached to its neck!

As far as one could see, in the plain and on the precipitous sides of the mountain, the pilgrims had pitched their temporary abodes, the result being the most varied assemblage of every species of shelter which man's industry or ingenuity can devise against the elements. Elegant and strangely-coloured tents, huts made of branches, a rug or a few rags hung on bamboos, often merely the forepart of a cart served to shelter some twenty people. The English authorities, with their usual prudence, had taken care to trace out the plan of the camp beforehand. The different streets intersecting it radiated from the centre, where the tents of the sepoy regiment entrusted with the maintenance of order were pitched. Night and day every available space was thronged with a crowd denser than the throng which flocks to see fireworks on the Place de la Concorde. The strange power of primitive superstition had brought together more than a million of people on this plain, which yesterday was an absolute desert. So serried were the ranks of the multitude that only on the back of an elephant could a visit to the camp be made without running the risk of suffocation. There was really something marvellous in the sagacity with which these noble beasts picked their way through the human sea around them, and the natives have such trust in their sagacity and kindly disposition, that when comfortably resting on the ground they did not disturb themselves, but let the enormous creatures walk over them without stirring.

The camp of the Baigaris, situated close to the canal, offered several characteristic episodes illustrative of their senseless customs. There they were like so many dozens of hideous animals. I crave pardon of you, sagacious elephant; of you, O dog, the friend of man; of you, O horse, the companion of his pleasures and labours, for being obliged by the poverty of language to apply to this species of the human race the generic name under which you are generally known. In the animal kingdom I see but quadrumans, and even amongst them only monkeys, which bite their tails, fit to be compared to these repulsive and idiotic mammifers. There they were, I repeat, squatting by dozens on the

wonderful festival, and we witnessed strangely picturesque scenes which we can never forget, in the midst of a million

sides of the road at the doors of the huts, in every sort of fantastic and ridiculous posture, all as little clothed as Adam before the fall; their bodies plastered with ashes or painted with all the colours of the rainbow. One individual, in sign of homage to the Deity, had for years held his right arm pointing to the sky, so that the poor decrepit, dried-up limb had become rigid and motionless. This other one had held his two hands closed for so long, that the nails had grown through the flesh in the midst of nauseous suppuration. That holy man, or more correctly, that hoary goose, had from his youth remained standing on one leg at the same spot, his chest supported by a sort of see-saw. The head-quarters of these fanatics was worthy of their private habits; a sort of altar on which were some copper-plates covered by rice and flowers, rose in the shade of a *Zeus indica*. Four fakirs in a state of nature, more hideous far than the most hideous Chinese figures, crouched at the four corners: a choir of the faithful were praising the Deity by howlings, drummings, and the clang of brass instruments. At night, this truly diabolical scene, which the wildest efforts of an artist could not reproduce, was lit up by torches of resin.

On April 12, at six in the morning, the Baigaris were to leave the head-quarters of the sect for the sacred ghaut. The camp, which, as I have said, was pitched on the embankment along the Ganges, was guarded by a company of Goorkhas. The martial bearing of these men, who were all mountaineers and well proportioned, notwithstanding their low stature, reminded me of that of our Basque Voltigeurs. They wore the dark green uniform of the Rifle Brigade, and by way of a sabre, a cutlass, which, in their hands, proved, I was told, a very formidable weapon. The authorities and their guests, all of them on elephants, took their places close to the soldiers in a vast open space, which the procession had to cross. An immense multitude was assembled on this point, and the green-turbaned irregulars could only keep out the throng from the space reserved for the Baigaris by the most energetic efforts. Exactly at six o'clock, tumultuous shouts were heard in the direction of the latter's encampment. The Goorkhas abandoned the position across the quay, which they had hitherto occupied; the procession had just started! At its head came twelve elephants richly caparisoned, carrying fakirs almost devoid of clothing, who bore gigantic standards with hamps more than twenty feet high, and silk flags of the most glaring colours as large as the sails of a ship. Twenty yards in advance marched a splendid elephant, bearing on its back in a silver basket one of the heads of the sect—a middle-aged man of austere countenance—wrapped in the folds of a magnificent crimson Cashmere shawl. Immediately behind this dignitary came several led horses with rich trappings, destined as presents for the Brahmins, who guarded the sacred spot. A band of musicians, armed with monstrous trumpets, frightful tam-tams, and discordant cymbals, advanced proudly at the head of the mass of Baigaris, who formed a battalion of more than 3,000 men, while shouts formed a fit accompaniment to this infernal symphony.

As soon as the march-past was over, our object was to reach the sacred ghaut at the same time as the procession, and we turned the heads of our intelligent beasts in that direction.

of human beings, whom half a dozen European magistrates and half a sepoy battalion sufficed to keep in absolute order. The India of former days, with its princes, its rajahs, its Brahmins, fakirs and sorcerers, its luxury and its misery, its ardent faith, its peaceful manners, its elementary or refined industry, was there as a whole, an unchanged and grandiose picture forgotten in the gallery of time! Nowadays, pilgrims and merchants reach the foot of the Himalaya, and almost the very place of purification, in a fourth-class

The aspect of the place had really something wild and grand about it. A countless multitude covered the surface of the waters, the roofs of the houses and temples. Everywhere, as far as the eye could reach, there was no clear space but the holy staircase, which was guarded by a triple line of sentinels. From the middle of the stream rich natives and European visitors on elephants looked down upon the vast panorama, where the diligent observer might catch sight here and there of some scenes full of national characteristics. A fat Brahmin, with a double chin and protruding abdomen, a regular Triton except for the shell, was playing about in the water, shouting for joy like a child. A more graceful sight was the meeting of two young girls, the only pretty creatures I saw among this assembled million, who kissed one another tenderly, and offered each other reciprocally the sacred liquid. Children led their blind and feeble parents into the purifying bath. Here a pious Æneas on the most herculean scale carried astride on his hip a little old woman who could not be less than a hundred years old, judging by her decrepit, shaking body, her red eyes, and the cracked voice with which she joined in the acclamation of the populace. On a sort of platform, almost on a level with the river, stood children dressed in scarlet with a gilt paper helmet, adorned with peacock feathers, who received considerable alms. Finally, sentinels in red uniforms, their loins girt with a cloth, kept the crowd away from dangerous places in the river, and strange to say, did not compel obedience by means of the cudgel they carried, but by threatening to throw water in the face of adventurous bathers—a threat before which the latter quailed with the utmost terror.

I was looking on with great curiosity at these scenes, typical of another age, when the first part of the procession of the Baigaris appeared on the summit of the ghaut. In a second, the human flood covered every step of the sacred staircase. It was a human anthill, an avalanche of black heads and brown bodies, in the midst of which the scarlet uniform of the sepoys stood out prominently. Now at last the latter used their sticks, which they brandished right and left. The elephants of the procession entered the river by a bye-path, and the fakirs threw themselves off their backs into the water with the wildest fervour. An immense saturnalia, with a million actors in it, was before me, the minute reproduction of which could only be attempted by the brush of Decamps. In conclusion, let me point out the inoffensive, good-natured behaviour of the crowd; the European traveller could freely circulate in its midst without once hearing a rude remark or meeting with looks of hatred and anger.

waggon or in a sleeping car; but the increased rapidity and facility of communication can only increase the commercial transactions which follow on the fair of Hardwar. The Delhi fair also brings together vast multitudes every year. In the Punjab alone a hundred and twenty-seven fairs take place annually. In Scinde and in the Bombay Presidency the number is no less considerable, but in the former pilgrimages have only for objects the places venerated by Mohammedans.

The Suez Canal and Indian railways have introduced into the great questions which may one day convulse the world new factors which still require consideration. We have already stated that the work done by M. de Lesseps must exercise paramount influence on events occurring in the Indian seas, but its action begins in the Mediterranean. It would be unjust, however, to attribute the change in the principal stations of the Peninsular and Oriental Company to the opening of the isthmus. It was evident that as soon as the system of Italian railroads was finished, the English steamers, in order to accelerate communications, would abandon Marseilles, and transfer their head-quarters to the port of the peninsula nearest to Egypt. The choice of Brindisi as the Company's principal station has not only seriously compromised the prosperity of Marseilles, but has also brought about constant relations between England and Italy, which will have a great influence on European politics. The fate of the Indian mail, and of the passengers who travel by it, is intimately connected with the tranquillity and unity of Italy. In default of a public or private treaty, a common interest insures to the latter the protection of England and the British fleet; even a Gladstone Ministry would certainly oppose any attempt to interfere with the results of the fatal day of Sedan, from whatever quarter it might come. The reader must be good enough to excuse this digression. We will now return to the Suez Canal, and to the important part it will be called upon to fill when the Eastern question, now dormant but not settled, is again brought forward.

The Crimean war proved clearly that had it not been for

the French alliance, England, left to herself, could not have prevented Russia from entering Constantinople. To-day the situation has completely changed, and one wonders rightly enough that Lord Palmerston should have thrown obstacle upon obstacle in the way of an undertaking the accomplishment of which would open the gates of Europe to an Anglo-Indian force. To-day, and as long as the British fleet retains its superiority in the Mediterranean, whatever question arises—whether Eastern, Italian, or Spanish—England can always throw the weight of her Indian army into the balance. Her army is no longer limited, as at the siege of Sebastopol, to seek for recruits to its ranks from the population of the United Kingdom alone. Her two hundred millions of Asiatic subjects furnish an inexhaustible supply of auxiliaries whom it is easy to despatch to the theatre of war. From Bombay sepoy regiments can be conveyed by steam, and landed on any given point of Syria or European Turkey in a period of time only a few hours longer than would be required by an expedition despatched from Plymouth. At the call of the Viceroy, we repeat, these warlike races, these low caste natives who have shown their courage and loyalty on every Indian battlefield, would hasten to join the royal standard, and regiments would appear as by magic as long as they were certain of a regular pay. The credit of England is sufficiently good to bear the strain of an armament on the vastest scale, so that without giving the reins to the imagination, we may well look forward to a time when the Anglo-Indian forces could muster round Constantinople in sufficient numbers to withstand the Russians.

Here we have a new and important element in England's means of military action which we must needs point out; and perhaps of all the astonishing surprises which the future reserves for coming generations, the strangest may be the intervention of a Sikh army sent into Europe under the flag of Great Britain for the defence of the Prophet's legitimate successor. Let us hasten to add, thanks be to Providence, the Eastern question seems at rest for many

years. The eminent statesman who directs affairs in Russia appears satisfied with having, at little cost to his country, regained supremacy in the Black Sea, and only leaves his retirement to take part in the politics of the far East, and to turn the active forces of Russia towards Central Asia and the river Amoor. However distant the first appearance of the Anglo-Indian forces on the shores of the Mediterranean may be, the possibility of such a fact is worthy of attracting the attention of statesmen and thinkers.

It is now time to return to exclusively Indian questions, and examine the difficulties and dangers which may arise on the frontiers of the empire. The first glance falls on the defiles of the Himalaya and the table-lands of Central Asia, where even people of common sense persist in seeing the two-headed eagle ready to swoop down upon the valleys of the Indus and the Ganges. The results of an untimely interference, the recollection of the terrible Cabul disaster, have borne fruit; and though the phantom of Russian invasion still alarms public opinion in England, it has no longer any weight with the men who rule India. Anglo-Indian policy wisely rejects all thought of territorial aggrandisement, or even of intervention in the internal affairs of the countries north of Peshawur. It has been finally acknowledged that the advance of a Russian army on India threatens above all the independence of Afghanistan, and that at its first approach the native chieftains, who are devotedly attached to their mountains, would at once ask assistance from their European neighbours and place the principal strategic points of the country, such as Guznee, Quettah, Candahar, in their hands. Why compromise this position by useless diplomatic manœuvres, and not rather wait for the day when the British flag may appear beyond the Khyber Pass as the herald not of enemies but of allies and liberators! But after the results of the Crimean war and the disasters of the Russian columns in their marches between Moscow and Odessa, how can the invasion of India from the north, through mountainous regions inhabited by the most intractable races of the globe, be admitted as a

serious eventuality? To procure food the invaders must subdue the wandering, marauding tribes who are to be found everywhere between the Russian frontiers and the Indus, and, if successful, they would still encounter fevers and epidemics resulting from hardships, privation, and climate. Even allowing for one moment that all these difficulties were overcome by the admirable military qualities of the Russian soldier, the invasion, on debouching into the plains, would find, thanks to the completion of the Indian railway system, 40,000 at least of excellent European troops, besides innumerable native soldiers drawn up to bar its passage, provided with arms and artillery of the most improved description.

Anglo-Indian diplomacy has so entirely disposed of Russophobia that when civil war broke out in 1862 in Afghanistan on the death of Dost Mohammed, the then Viceroy, Sir Henry Lawrence, refused to interfere in favour of either pretender to the throne. He remained four years an impartial and impassible spectator, without compromising the neutrality of his government by the slightest demonstration. He only emerged from his apparent indifference to lend his moral influence and a few subsidies to the new government, the day after Shere Ali, unaided, reconquered the capital and the throne of his ancestors (1868), when not even the most determined opponent of the new state of things could pretend to attribute the victory to help sent from beyond the Indus. Afghanistan, according to the answer of one of its chieftains, only produces men and rocks, and is not likely to arouse the cupidity of any conqueror. A wise policy, like that inaugurated by the eminent dictator of the Punjab, during his viceroyalty, and since followed by his successors—a wise policy, we repeat—ought to limit itself to favouring the establishment in the Indian Caucasus of a strong military power capable of holding in check its barbarous subjects, and of efficaciously protecting the passage of caravans, whilst leaving to the future the care of solving the mystery of Russian designs in that part of Asia. A few years were sufficient to prove the wisdom of non-intervention.

At the very time of our writing these lines the last news from India points to fresh and bloody quarrels in Afghanistan, even before nature has opened the succession of Shere Ali. This prince, influenced by intrigues of the harem, or by some motive of the kind, in choosing his second son, Abdallah Jan, as his successor, to the detriment of his elder son, Yakoub Khan, has made a formidable enemy, and has fanned into a blaze, doubtless for many years, the still smouldering embers of civil war.[1]

On all the other frontiers are the dominions of princes who in the most critical days of the mutiny gave undeniable proofs of loyalty to England, and on whom she may apparently rely: such as the Maharajah of Nepaul, the King of Cashmere, the Rajah of Khelat, and the petty chiefs of Beloochistan. A most serious danger arising from

[1] The contest which placed Dost Mohammed on the throne was scarcely over when serious dissensions broke out in the family of the new Emir. Yakoub Khan, the Dost's eldest son, who had proved his father's ablest and most active general, was excluded from the succession, and his younger brother Abdallah Jan declared heir presumptive. Whatever were Dost Mohammed's motives for this determination, he could not but know that Yakoub Khan would be a dangerous enemy for his successor. So that in an interview which took place at Amballah (1869), between the Governor-General and the Emir, the latter attempted to have the rights of his favourite son to the throne openly recognised; but Lord Mayo refused to bind himself by any promises. The Dost's fears were soon justified, and since his disgrace, Yakoub Khan has lived in a state of intermittent revolt. One of the many reconciliations between father and son was of so solemn a nature that it might have been expected to last. Yakoub Khan was made Governor of Candahar and Herat, which two provinces are so distant from the centre of the empire, that it was hoped the prince would no longer be able to carry on the court intrigues of which he was the soul. Placed as he was on the frontier of Persia, he made a point of following a policy diametrically opposed to that of his father, towards the Russians, English, Persians, and the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara. Any exile, any discontented person from Cabul, was sure to find shelter and protection at Herat. The last news (August 1874) announces that Yakoub Khan has at last thrown off the mask, and is marching at the head of considerable forces into the districts of the interior. On his side, the Emir of Cabul seems determined to push matters to extremity. Yakoub Khan's spies have been executed at Cabul, and it is well known that the name of spy, a most elastic one in Asia, includes all the partisans of a political adversary. In short, the two parties are about to come to an open quarrel, and unless one of those sudden reconciliations, so characteristic of political conflicts in Afghanistan, takes place, the country will soon be a prey to a fresh civil war.

external causes might, however, lead to a catastrophe as sudden as terrible, in which the very foundations of British power in India would be shaken. If one day the influence of Exeter Hall prevails in Parliament and the Viceroy, together with the President of the Board of Control, become the blind instruments of Protestant propaganda, railways, telegraphs, administration, police, European army, all the active forces of the conquest will disappear before the violent or passive resistance of the two hundred million subjects. The sound doctrines of toleration which are in force in England will never allow of official intervention in the religious concerns of India, and the safety of the country must be left to Him who makes and unmakes empires.

We have reached the limits of these sketches, and shall not even attempt to sum up the principal events which marked the administration of Lord Canning's successors, Lord Elgin, Sir H. Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook. There is, however, one episode of the years just passed which we intend bringing under the reader's notice. On December 26, 1869, the Duke of Edinburgh, then a captain in the Navy, landed at Calcutta. For the first time a prince of the House of Hanover set foot on the soil of India. The reception was worthy of the visitor, and the young sailor found the most illustrious feudatories of his august mother assembled on the banks of the Hooghly to do him honour. There were the Maharajah of Jeypore, Scindiah, the princes of Bartpore, of Kapoortala, and the Ranee of Bhopal, all of them illustrious by their wealth and the antiquity of their race. Never was a more striking testimony to the power and equity of the Europe of the nineteenth century.[1] In presence of this illustrious assemblage, the mind involuntarily travels back through the cycle of past ages; and the incomprehensible decrees which determine the fate of empires, appear to it in all their marvellous incon-

[1] Here is a curious detail of these festivities. At one of the banquets offered to his guests by the Viceroy, a small elephant made its appearance, the offspring of the favourite elephant of the Ranee of Bhopal during the latter's journey. The huge four-legged baby walked round the table, and was rewarded for its gambols by gifts of fruits and sweetmeats.

sistency. In the far-off centuries, when kingdoms which had already reached the height of civilisation and prosperity were flourishing on the banks of the Ganges and the Jumna, what was a small island in the North Sea, apparently so little favoured by nature, but now the undisputed mistress of the whole country between Cape Comorin and the Himalaya? Scarcely a hundred years ago, a few insignificant clerks, exclusively concerned in commercial matters, represented the vanguard of the conquerors on the scene of their future victories! Force of arms, diplomacy, and even duplicity have raised the fabric of English rule in India.

The sceptre of the Great Mogul has passed into the hands of Queen Victoria; but statesmen formed in the school of modern liberty have completed the work of force and chance. The inviolability of property and person, universal equality before the law, and absolute religious toleration exists to-day in India as in England, and this it is which pre-eminently distinguishes the present state of things from the past, the rule of Queen Victoria from that of the Mogul conquerors. So that the successors of the great vassals of Timour and Aureng-Zeb, who, in their distrust of their suzerains, would rather have taken up arms than ventured within the walls of Delhi, hastened to the capital of modern India at the first summons, in order to do homage to their sovereign's son. They were well aware that, even in the midst of European bayonets, they were under the protection of the law, and that neither a jewel of their crowns nor a hair of their heads would be touched. This is, indeed, a great and noble homage paid by these Oriental potentates to the spirit of justice of their European masters. This is indeed an unanswerable argument against those partisans of brute force who assert the impotence and the sterility of free government. Despotism cannot alone boast of great military prowesses which have altered the face of the world. The names of the two Lawrences, of Outram, of Nicholson, the glorious deeds of the armies of Delhi and Lucknow, one hundred and sixty millions of pounds spent in less than

twenty years on works of every kind—roads, railways, canals, telegraphs—are sufficient proof that great men and great actions are not wanting among the favoured nations who have found a safe anchorage in hereditary and constitutional monarchy.

H. L.

MIMWOOD, HERTS: *October* 1, 1881.

APPENDIX.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

Provinces	Square miles	Population	Value
			£
Bengal	245,000	38,500,000	3,838,000
North-West	83,000	30,000,000	3,994,000
Madras	124,000	26,500,000	4,376,000
	Sq. miles		
Bombay	63,000		
Scinde	15,000	117,000	12,500,000	2,944,000
Desert	39,000		
Punjab	95,000	15,000,000	1,877,000
Oude	23,000	8,000,000	1,033,000
Central Provinces	84,000	6,500,000	571,000
Burmah	90,000	2,300,000	283,000
Berar	17,000	1,000,000	493,000
Courg	2,000	100,000	21,000
Total	880,000	140,900,000	19,452,000
Native States under the protection of England:—			
	Sq. miles		
Mysore	31,000		3,500,000	—
Hyderabad	95,000	326,000	10,500,000	—
Rajpootana	123,000		8,500,000	—
Central India	77,000		7,900,000	—
Native States under the protection of the Government of—			
	Sq. miles		
Madras	21,000		1,750,000	—
Bombay	60,000		4,500,000	—
Bengal	46,000	271,000	1,500,000	—
North-West Provinces	6,000		400,000	—
Punjab	103,000		3,000,000	—
Central Provinces	35,000		300,000	—
Total	597,000	45,400,000	—
General Total	1,477,600	186,300,000	—

II.

Caste and Race in the Sepoy Army.

Extracts from the official return showing the number, caste, and country of the native officers and soldiers of each regiment, regular and irregular, of each Presidency, confined to regiments borne on the returns of each Army respectively; so far as can be stated from the record in this House.—East India House, September 1858.

Bengal.

Native Infantry, 7 *Regiments—viz.*, 21*st*, 31*st*, 47*th*, 65*th*, 66*th*, 70*th*, 73*rd*:—

Native Officers. Caste.	
Mohammedans	25
Brahmins	52
Rajpoots	39
Hindoos of inferior description	23
	139

Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. Caste.	
Mohammedans	1,170
Brahmins	1,878
Rajpoots	2,637
Hindoos of inferior description	2,057
Sikhs and Punjabees	54
	7,796

Irregular and Local Infantry, 12 *Regiments—viz.*, *Regiment of Khelat-i-Ghilzi*, *Regiment of Ferozepore*, *Regiment of Loodianah*, *Timour Battalion*, *Kumaon Battalion*, *Nusseree Battalion*, *Hill Rangers*, *Assam Light Infantry Battalion*, *Mhairwarrah Battalion*, *Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion*, *Arracan Battalion*, *and Shekhawattee Battalion*:—

Native Officers Caste.	
Mohammedans	38
Brahmins	23
Rajpoots	59
Hindoos of inferior description	43
Sikhs	17
Hill men	16
Mughs	6
Burmese	1
Munniporees	1
	204

Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. Caste.	
Mohammedans	1,185
Brahmins	849
Rajpoots	2,711
Hindoos of inferior description	2,247
Sikhs	1,309
Hill men	1,112
Mughs	705
Burmese	6
Munniporees	167
Thats	48
	10,339

MADRAS.

Native Cavalry, 7 *Regiments* :—

Native Officers. Caste.	
Mohammedans	68
Mahrattas	6
Rajpoots	3
	77

Country.	
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	64
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	7
Mysore	3
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	1
Ceded districts	2
	77

Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. Caste.	
Christians	32
Mohammedans	1,956
Rajpoots	90
Mahrattas	300
Other castes	2
Indo-Britons	159
	2,539

Country.	
Hindustan	22
Northern Circars	67
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	1,841
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	205
Baramahal	48
Ceded districts	54
Mysore	212
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	90
	2,539

Native Infantry, 52 *Regiments* :—

Native Officers. Caste.	
Christians	4
Mohammedans	584
Brahmins and Rajpoots	83
Mahrattas	12
Telingas (Gentoo)	242
Tamil	97
Other castes	8
Indo-Britons	0
	1,030

Country.	
Hindustan	51
Northern Circars	317
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	239
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	177
Baramahal	29
Ceded districts	32
Carried forward	845

Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. Caste.	
Christians	1,853
Mohammedans	15,272
Brahmins and Rajpoots	1,922
Mahrattas	385
Telingas (Gentoo)	15,371
Tamil	4,275
Other castes	1,616
Indo-Britons	1,011
	41,705

Country.	
Hindustan	1,938
Northern Circars	16,938
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	8,841
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	4,760
Baramahal	1,022
Ceded districts	1,705
Carried forward	35,204

Country.	
Brought forward . .	845
Mysore	59
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	119
Deccan and Mahratta . . .	7
	1,030

Country.	
Brought forward . .	35,204
Mysore	2,698
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	3,617
Canara, Moulmein, Taullah, and Belgaum . . .	28
Deccan and Mahratta . .	99
Portugal	1
Other parts	58
	41,705

BOMBAY.

Native Cavalry, 3 *Regiments* :—

Native Officers. Caste.	
Christians	1
Mohammedans	12
Brahmins and Rajpoots . .	9
Mahrattas	1
Telingas (Gentoo) . . .	0
Tamil	0
Other castes	12
Indo-Britons	1
	36

Country.	
Hindustan	29
Northern Circars . . .	1
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore	2
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0
Deccan	2
Concan	1
Mysore	0
Tanjore, Madras, and Tinnevelly	0
Bombay	1
	36

Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. Caste.	
Christians	66
Mohammedans . . .	459
Brahmins and Rajpoots . .	282
Mahrattas	118
Telingas	0
Tamil	5
Other castes	508
Indo-Britons . . .	22
	1,425

Country.	
Hindustan	1,073
Northern Circars . . .	21
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore	30
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0
Deccan	125
Concan	114
Mysore	0
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0
Guzerat	14
Persia	1
Lisbon	4
Africa	2
Bombay	4
Punjab and Scinde . . .	21
Cabul and Afghanistan . .	15
Europe	1
	1,425

Native Infantry, 29 *Regiments* :—

Native Officers. Caste.	
Christians	5
Mohammedans	111
Brahmins and Rajpoots	188
Mahrattas	116
Telingas	6
Tamil	1
Jews	3
Other castes	130
Purwarrees	3
	563

Country.	
Hindustan	268
Northern Circars	7
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore	37
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	13
Deccan	57
Concan	173
Mysore	4
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0
Guzerat	4
	563

Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. Caste.	
Christians	270
Mohammedans	2,048
Brahmins and Rajpoots	6,421
Mahrattas	7,980
Telingas	107
Tamil	55
Jews	12
Other castes	7,728
Indo-Britons	22
Purwarrees	170
Mochees	29
Sikhs	28
	24,870

Country.	
Hindustan	11,089
Northern Circars	135
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	412
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	203
Deccan	1,820
Concan	10,878
Mysore	36
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	33
Mysore and Punjab	28
Guzerat	80
Scinde, Punjab, and Rajpootana	155
Europe	1
	24,870

MINISTRY OF CULTURE · GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

III.

COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

Return showing the Number of Troops, Regular and Irregular, which were serving in the three Presidencies immediately before the Mutiny.

	Royal Troops		East India Company's Troops.												
				Artillery			Native Cavalry		Infantry						
	Cavalry, 4 Regiments	Infantry, 22 Regiments	Engineers and Sappers	Horse, 5 Brigades	European Foot, 12 Battalions	Native Foot, 6 Battalions	Regular, 21 Regiments	Irregular, 33 Regiments	European, 9 Regiments	Native Regular, 155 Regiments	Native Irregular, 45 Regiments	Veterans	Medical Establishment	Warrant Officers	Total
Officers	115	693	251	119	231	138	284	106	335	2,769	152	163	814	—	6,170
European non-commissioned officers, rank and file	2,571	20,884	110	2,029	4,390	37	60	—	8,103	259	59	—	—	—	38,502
European veterans	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	465	—	—	465
Native commissioned, non-commissioned, rank and file	—	—	3,043	659	—	3,517	9,532	20,941	—	149,832	35,215	3,613	—	—	226,352
Gun lascars	—	—	—	449	1,658	343	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,450
Ordnance drivers	—	—	—	—	1,489	848	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,337
Apothecaries and stewards	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	434	—	434
Native doctors	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	651	—	651
Warrant officers (ordnance)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	385	385
	2,686	21,577	3,404	3,256	7,768	4,883	9,876	21,047	8,438	152,860	35,426	4,241	1,899	385	277,746
	24,263		3,404	15,907			30,923		196,724			4,241	1,899	385	277,746

Indian Army Commission—Total Europeans.—Officers, 6,170
Men, 38,967
Natives, 232,609
277,746

R. B. WOOD, Colonel and Secretary.

IV.

The Chuppaties.

In the course of the trial of the King of Delhi great pains were taken to extract from the witnesses, both European and native, some explanation of the 'Chuppati mystery,' but nothing satisfactory was elicited. The following opinions, however, were recorded :—

From the Evidence of Tat Mall, News-writer to the Lieutenant-Governor.

Q. Did you ever hear of the circulation of chuppaties about the country some months before the outbreak; and if so, what was supposed to be the meaning of this?

A. Yes, I did hear of the circumstance. Some people said that it was a propitiatory observance to avert some impending calamity; others, that they were circulated by the Government to signify that the population throughout the country would be compelled to use the same food as the Christians, and thus be deprived of their religion; while others, again, said that the chuppaties were circulated to make it known that Government was determined to force Christianity on the country by interfering with their food, and intimation of it was thus given that they might be prepared to resist the attempt.

Q. Is sending such articles about the country a custom among the Hindoos or Mussulmans; and would the meaning be at once understood without any accompanying explanation?

A. No, it is not by any means a custom; I am fifty years old, and never heard of such a thing before.

Q. Did you ever hear that any message was sent with the chuppaties?

A. No; I never heard of any.

Q. Were these chuppaties chiefly circulated by Mohammedans or Hindoos?

A. They were circulated indiscriminately, without reference to either religion, among the peasantry of the country.

From the Evidence of Sir Theophilus Metcalfe.

Q. Can you give the Court any information about the chuppaties which were circulated from village to village some months before the outbreak; and has it been ascertained how they originated, or what was the purport of their being circulated?

A. There is nothing but conjecture regarding them, but the first suggestion made by the natives in reference to them was, that they

were thus sent about in connection with some sickness that prevailed; but this was clearly an error, as I took the trouble of ascertaining that the chuppaties were never sent into any native states, but were confined always to Government villages; they were spread through only five villages of the Delhi territory, when they were immediately stopped by authority, and they never proceeded far up-country. I sent for the men who had brought them from the district of Bolundshuhr, and their apology for circulating them was that they believed it to be done by order of the English Government, that they had received them elsewhere, and had but forwarded them on. I believe that the meaning of the chuppaties was not understood in the Delhi district; but originally they were to be taken to all those who partook of one kind of food, connecting a body of men together in contradistinction to those who lived differently and had different customs. I think these chuppaties originated at Lucknow, and were, no doubt, meant to sound a note of alarm and preparation, giving warning to the people to stand by one another on any danger menacing them.

From the Evidence of Captain Martineau.

Q. Had you any conversation with these men—*i.e.* with the men assembled at Umballa for musketry instruction—relative to some chuppaties that were circulated to different villages in these districts before the outbreak?

A. Yes, I had frequent conversations with various sepoys on the subject. I asked them what they understood in reference to them, and by whom they supposed that they were circulated; they described them to me as being in size and shape like ship biscuits, and believed them to have been distributed by order of Government through the medium of their servants for the purpose of intimating to the people of Hindustan that they should all be compelled to eat the same food, and that was considered as a token that they should likewise be compelled to embrace one faith, or, as they termed it, 'one food and one faith.'

Q. As far as you could understand, was this idea generally prevalent among all the sepoys of the various detachments at the depôt?

A. It was prevalent, as far as I could judge, among all the sepoys of every regiment that furnished a detachment to the depôt at Umballa.

Q. Was there any report of the Government having mixed ground bones with flour for the purpose of having it distributed to the sepoys, and so destroying their caste?

A. Yes, I heard of this in the month of March. It was told me

that all the flour retailed from the Government depôts for the supply of troops on the march was so adulterated.

Q. Do you think the sepoys generally firmly believed this?

A. I have seen correspondence from various men, which the sepoys of the depôt voluntarily placed in my hands, the writers of which, themselves sepoys, evidently believed that such was the case.

Q. Did the sepoys ever speak to you about any other cause of complaint, or points on which they sought information?

A. Their complaint, or rather fear, was this: they apprehended that Government was going forcibly to deprive them of their caste.

Q. Did any of them ever speak about Government interference regarding the re-marriage of Hindoo widows?

A. Yes, they alluded to that as an invasion of their social rights.

[The following translation from a native letter shows how general was the belief among the sepoys in all parts of the country that the Government had mixed ground bones with the flour, and purposed to compel or to delude them to eat it.]

Translation of an anonymous Petition sent, in March 1857, *to Major Matthews, commanding the* 43*rd Regiment at Barrackpore.*

The representation of the whole station is this, that we will not give up our religion. We serve for honour and religion; if we lose our religion, the Hindoo and Mohammedan religions will be destroyed. If we live, what shall we do? You are the masters of the country. The Lord Sahib has given orders which he has received from the Company to all commanding officers to destroy the religion of the country. We know this, as all things are being brought up by Government. The officers in the salt department mix up bones with the salt. The officer in charge of the ghee mixes up fat with it; this is well known. These are two matters. The third is this: that the Sahib in charge of the sugar burns up bones, and mixes them in the syrup the sugar is made of; this is well known: all know it. The fourth is this: that in the country the Burra Sahibs have ordered the Rajahs, Thakurs, Zemindars, Mahajans, and Ryots all to eat together, and English bread has been sent to them; this is well known. And this is another affair, that throughout the country the wives of respectable men, in fact, all classes of Hindoos, on becoming widows, are to be married again; this is known. Therefore we consider ourselves as killed. You all obey the orders of the Company, which we all know. But a king, or any other one who acts unjustly, does not remain.

With reference to the sepoys, they are your servants, but, to destroy their caste, a council assembled and decided to give them

muskets and cartridges made up with greased paper to bite; this is also evident. We wish to represent this to the General, that we do not approve of the new musket and cartridge; the sepoys cannot use them. You are the masters of the country; if you will give us all our discharge we will go away. The native officers, subahdars, jemadars, are all good in the whole brigade, except two, whose faces are like pigs: the subhadar major of the 70th Regiment, who is a Christian, and Thakur Misser, jemadar of the 43rd Regiment Light Infantry.

Whoever gets this letter must read it to the major as it is written. If he is a Hindoo and does not, his crime will be equal to the slaughter of a lac of cows; and if a Mussulman, as though he had eaten pig; and if an European, must read it to the native officers, and if he does not, his going to church will be of no use, and be a crime. Thakur Misser has lost his religion. Kchratrizas are not to respect him. Brahmins are not to salute or bless him. If they do, their crime will be equal to the slaughter of a lac of cows. He is the son of a Chumar. The Brahmin who hears this is not to feed him; if he does his crime will be equal to the murdering of a lac of Brahmins or cows.

May this letter be given to Major Matthews. Anyone who gets it is to give it; if he does not, and is a Hindoo, his crime will be as the slaughter of a lac of cows; and if a Mussulman, as if he had eaten pig; and if he is an officer, he must give it.

V.

Mutiny at Barrackpore.

About the middle of the year 1824, the 47th Bengal Native Infantry had been marched to Barrackpore, from which, at a later period of the year, they were to proceed to share in the operations of the Burmese war. To European readers it will be unnecessary to explain that no military force can move in India without a large number of bullocks and other beasts of burden, which are requisite not only for carrying provisions and stores, but also for transporting a considerable portion of the personal baggage of the men, such as their knapsacks, cooking utensils, &c.: the expense of these animals and their drivers so far as employed for the use of the sepoys, being defrayed by the sepoys themselves. Unfortunately, on the present occasion, no bullocks could be provided for hire, and they could only be purchased at an extravagant price; and when application was made for assist-

ance from the Commissariat, the men were curtly told that they must provide the required accommodation for themselves.

The great inconvenience and hardship occasioned by this circumstance on the march rankled in the minds of the men, and made them brood so bitterly upon other real or supposed grievances, that by the time they arrived at Barrackpore they were, unfortunately, too well prepared for the unhappy scenes that occurred soon after their arrival. On October 30, at a heavy marching order parade, the greater part appeared without their knapsacks, and the cause of the neglect being demanded, they replied that their knapsacks were unfit to produce. They were informed that the new ones were on their way, and that till their arrival they must use the old ones. They refused, however, to produce them; and part of the regiment, moreover, declared that they would not proceed to Rangoon or elsewhere by sea, as it involved the forfeiture of caste. After some vain attempts to subdue the prevailing discontent by reasoning, Colonel Cartwright, the commanding officer, being unable, from the number of the mutineers, to take any more vigorous measures, dismissed the regiment, and sought the advice of General Dalzell. The latter officer proceeded to Calcutta to consult the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Edward Paget, and on his return ordered a parade to take place at daybreak on the morning of November 1.

At this parade all semblance of duty was cast aside, and the regiment, with the exception of the officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, burst into acts of open violence. During the night the mutineers had slept on their arms, maintaining regular guards and pickets, and a strong chain of sentries and patrols. In this state of affairs, Sir Edward Paget arrived. Two native regiments, beside the 47th, were stationed at Barrackpore, preparatory to their proceeding on service; but both of them were infected in some degree with the mutinous spirit which had taken entire possession of the regiment last mentioned. It was necessary, therefore, to seek the means of overawing the mutineers elsewhere; and His Majesty's Royals and 47th Regiments, with a battery of light artillery, and the Governor-General's body-guard, promptly arrived from Calcutta. The force intended to act against the mutineers having taken position, the Commander-in-Chief deputed the Quartermaster-General and the Adjutant-General, accompanied by Captain Macan, of the 16th Lancers, as interpreter, and by the commanding officer of the regiment in rebellion, to give, on his part, an answer to a paper which had been forwarded by the malcontents, as well as to explain to them their situation, and the consequences that must result from their adhering to the course which they had adopted. Their fate, they were informed,

would depend on their obedience to the command which they were about to receive from the Adjutant-General.

The word to order arms being given, was instantly obeyed. The next order was to ground arms; with this only one man complied, while the silence which had hitherto been maintained was now broken by loud and continued murmurings. These were silenced by a few discharges of grapeshot from a battery in their rear, when the rebel troops speedily broke and fled in every direction, throwing away their arms and accoutrements, and, wherever practicable, divesting themselves of the military dress altogether.

A few of the mutineers were killed by this painfully necessary proceeding; and the fugitives being hotly pursued, many were taken prisoners. These were forthwith brought to trial before a court-martial. A considerable number were found guilty and sentenced to death, but a few only of the more active were executed. The regiment was disbanded, and its number most properly erased from the list of the Army, the European officers being transferred to another raised in its place.

'Our Indian Army,' by Captain Rafter.

VI.

Final Orders to the Musketry Schools.

The Adjutant-General of the Army to Major-General Hearsey.

Sir,—Referring to the telegraph message from this office dated the 23rd ultimo (and your acknowledgments of the 25th idem), communicating the Commander-in-Chief's orders to postpone the target practice of the native soldiers at the rifle depôt at Dum-Dum pending further instructions from this department, I am now desired to request you will be good enough to inform the officer commanding at Dum-Dum, and through him the depôt authorities concerned, that the course of instruction is to be completed by the native details, and that their target practice is to be commenced as soon as practicable after the Government general order disbanding the 19th Regiment of Native Infantry has been read to the troops at the station, including the detachments of native regiments at the depôt.

2. The grease for the cartridge is to be any unobjectionable mixture which may be suited for the purpose, to be provided by selected parties comprising all castes concerned, and is to be applied by the men themselves.

3. The paper of which the cartridges are constructed having been

proved by chemical test, or otherwise, to be perfectly free from grease, and in all respects unobjectionable; and all possible grounds for objection in regard to the biting of the cartridge and the nature of the grease to be used having been removed, it is not anticipated that the men will hesitate to perform the target practice; but in the event of such unexpected result the Commander-in-Chief desires that their officers may be instructed to reason calmly with them, pointing out the utter groundlessness for any objection to the use of the cartridges now that biting the end has been dispensed with, and the provision and application of the necessary greasing material has been left to themselves; and, further, to assure them that anyone who shall molest or taunt them on return to their corps shall be visited with severe punishment.

4. The officer commanding the depôt will be held responsible that the above directions respecting the greasing mixture and those recently issued in regard to the new mode of loading are strictly observed.

5. If, notwithstanding all these precautions and considerate measures, any disinclination to use the cartridges shall be manifested, the parties demurring are to be warned calmly and patiently, but firmly, that a persistence in such unjustifiable conduct will be viewed as disobedience of orders and insubordination, and treated accordingly, and in the event of any individuals after such warning obstinately refusing to fire, the officer commanding at Dum-Dum will at once place such parties in arrest or confinement, according to the rank of the offenders, and cause them to be tried by court-martial.

6. If, however, the entire depôt shall combinedly refuse to fire, which is very improbable, the Commander-in-Chief, under such circumstances, empowers you to place all the native officers in arrest pending his Excellency's further orders, which you will immediately apply for; to deprive the non-commissioned officers and sepoys of their arms and accoutrements, and to pay them up and summarily discharge them on the spot, excepting, of course, any ringleaders in these latter grades or parties whose refusal may be accompanied by insolence or insubordination, who are to be placed under arrest or confinement, in view of their being arraigned before a district or general court-martial, as the case may require.

7. This communication is to be considered purely confidential, and his Excellency relies implicitly on your carrying out the instructions it contains with the utmost caution and discretion.

I am, &c.,

C. CHESTER, Colonel,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

VII.

Danger of the Position of the English at Delhi.

It does not appear that Lord Dalhousie laid any stress upon the fact that no European troops were posted in Delhi, nor, indeed, did Sir Charles Napier, who at this time was Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in India. He saw clearly that the military situation was a false one, and he wrote much about the defence of the city, but without drawing any distinction between European and native troops. In both cases the anticipated danger was from a rising of the people, not of the soldiery. With respect to the situation of the magazine, Sir Charles Napier wrote to the Governor-General (Lahore, December 15, 1849), saying :—'As regards the magazine, the objections to it are as follows : 1st. It is placed in a very populous part of the city, and its explosion would be very horrible in its effects as regards the destruction of life. 2nd. It would destroy the magnificent palace of Delhi. 3rd. The loss of Government property would also be very great, especially if my views of the importance of Delhi, given in my report, be acted upon—namely, that it and Dinapore should be two great magazines for the Bengal Presidency. 4th. It is without defence beyond what the guard of fifty men offer, and its gates are so weak that a mob could push them in.'

At the same time the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, wrote to the Board of Directors :—

'Here we have a strong fortress in the heart of one of the principal cities of our empire, and in entire command of the chief magazine of the Upper Provinces, which lies so exposed both to assault and to the dangers arising from the carelessness of the people dwelling around it, that it is a matter of surprise that no accident has yet occurred to it. Its dangerous position has been frequently remarked upon, and many schemes have been prepared for its improvement and defence ; but the only eligible one is the transfer of the stores into the palace, which would then be kept by us as a British post, capable of maintaining itself against any hostile manœuvre, instead of being, as it now is, the source of positive danger, and perhaps not unfrequently the focus of intrigues against our power.'

VIII.

Letters of General Anson and Sir John Lawrence.

General Anson to Sir J. Lawrence.

Umballah, May 17, 1857.

It becomes now a matter for your consideration whether it would be prudent to risk the small European force we have here in an enterprise on Delhi. I think not. It is wholly, in my opinion, insufficient for the purpose. The walls could, of course, be battered down with heavy guns. The entrance might be opened and little resistance offered, but so few men in a great city, with such narrow streets, and an immense armed population, who know every turn and corner of them, would, it appears to me, be in a very dangerous position, and, if six or seven hundred were disabled, what would remain? Could we hold it with the whole country around against us? Could we either stay in or out of it? My own view of the state of things now is that by carefully collecting our resources, having got rid of the bad material which we cannot trust, and having supplied their places with others of a better sort, it would not be very long before we could proceed without a chance of failure in whatever direction we might please. Your telegraphic message informing me of the measures which you have taken to raise fresh troops confirms me in this opinion. I must add also that this is now the opinion of all here whom I have consulted upon it—the major-general and brigadier, the adjutant-general, quartermaster-general, and commissary-general. The latter has, however, offered a positive impediment to it in the impossibility of providing what would be necessary for such an advance under from sixteen to twenty days. I thought it could have been done in less, but that was before I had seen Colonel Thompson. Indeed, it is very little more than forty-eight hours since I came here, and every turn produces something which may alter a previous opinion.

Anson.

Sir John Lawrence to General Anson.

Rawal Pindee, May 17.

I do not myself think that the country anywhere is against us, certainly not from here to within a few miles of Delhi. I served for nearly thirteen years in Delhi and know the people well. My belief is, that with good management on the part of the civil officers it would open its gates on the approach of our troops. It seems in-

credible to conceive that the mutineers can hold and defend it. Still, I admit that on military principles, in the present state of affairs, it may not be expedient to advance on Delhi; certainly not until the Meerut force is prepared to act, which it can only be when set free. Once relieve Meerut and give confidence to the country, no difficulty regarding carriage can occur. By good arrangements the owners will come forward, but in any case it can be collected. From Meerut you will be able to form a sound judgment on the course to be followed. If the country lower down be disturbed and the sepoys have mutinied, I conceive it would be a paramount duty to march that way, relieve each place, and disarm or destroy the mutineers. If, on the other hand, all were safe, it would be a question whether you should consolidate your resources there or march on Delhi. I think it must be allowed that our European troops are not placed at this or that station simply to hold it, but to be ready to move wherever they may be required. Salubrious and centrical points for their location were selected; but so long as we maintain our prestige and keep the country quiet, it cannot signify how many cantonments we abandon. But this we cannot do if we allow two or three native corps to checkmate large bodies of Europeans. It will then be a mere question of time, by slow degrees; but of a certainty, the native troops must destroy us. We are doing all we can to strengthen ourselves and to reinforce you, either by direct or indirect means. But can your Excellency suppose for one moment that the irregular troops will remain staunch if they see our European soldiers cooped up in their cantonments tamely awaiting the progress of events. Your Excellency remarks that we must carefully collect our resources; but what are these resources but our European soldiers, our guns, and our material: these are all ready at hand, and only require to be handled wisely and vigorously to produce great results. We have money also, and the control of the country. But if disaffection spread, insurrection will follow, and we shall then neither be able to collect the revenues nor procure supplies. Pray only reflect on the whole history of India. Where have we failed when we acted vigorously? Where have we succeeded when guided by timid counsels? Clive, with 1,200, fought at Plassey in opposition to the advice of his leading officers, beat 40,000 men, and conquered Bengal; Monson retreated from the Chambal, and before he gained Agra his army was disorganised and partially annihilated. Look at the Cabul catastrophe. It might have been averted by resolute and bold action. The irregulars of the army, the Kazilbashis—in short, our friends, of whom we had many, only left us when they found we were not true to ourselves.

How can it be supposed that strangers and mercenaries will sacrifice everything for us? There is a point up to which they will stand by us, for they know that we have always been eventually successful, and that we are good masters; but go beyond this point, and every man will look to his immediate benefit, his present safety. The irregulars of the Punjab are marching down in the highest spirits, proud to be trusted, and eager to show their superiority over the regular troops—ready to fight, shoulder to shoulder, with the Europeans. But if, on their arrival, they find the Europeans behind breastworks, they will begin to think that the game is up. Recollect that all this time, while we are halting, the emissaries of the mutineers are writing to and visiting every cantonment. . . . I cannot comprehend what the Commissariat can mean by requiring from sixteen to twenty days to procure provisions. I am persuaded that all you can require to take with you must be procurable in two or three. We have had an extraordinarily good harvest, and supplies must be abundant between Amballah and Meerut. The greater portion of the country is well cultivated. We are sending our troops in every direction without difficulty, through tracts which are comparatively desert. Our true policy is to trust the Maharajah of Puttyalah and the Rajah of Jheend and the country generally, for they have shown evidence of being on our side, but utterly to distrust the regular sepoys. I would spare no expenses to carry every European soldier—at any rate, to carry every other one. By alternately marching and riding, their strength and spirits will be maintained. We are pushing on the Guides, the 4th Sikhs, the 1st and 4th Punjab Regiments of infantry, from different parts of the Punjab, in this way. If there is any officer in the Punjab whom your Excellency would wish to have at your side, pray do not hesitate to apply for him.

LAWRENCE.

(Sir John Kaye's 'History of the Sepoy War.')

IX.

THE FIRST SIKH WAR (1844–1845.)

Like the news of Napoleon's movements received at Brussels, the intelligence of the passage of the Sutlej by the Sikhs arrived at Amballah on the day (December 11) on which a great ball was to be given by the Commander-in-Chief, and he moved the next day at the head of all the available troops. In six days the force marched 150 miles, getting little food and less rest, and on December 28, after a

long march of twenty-one miles, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the cavalry of Lall Singh's division of the Sikh army attacked the leading divisions of the British forces at Moodkee. On the confirmation of Major Broadfoot's news, the Governor-General had published a manifesto by which, in consideration of an unprovoked attack of a friendly Power, all the Sikh possessions east of the Sutlej were declared forfeit. He then threw 5,000 men from Loodianah into Busseau, where Major Broadfoot had collected provisions and stores. Meanwhile, Lall Singh, passing Sir John Littler, had pushed on to Feroze-Shuhr, where he formed a vast entrenched camp; and hearing that the British force advancing was a slight one, had moved on the 18th with 20,000 men and twenty-two guns to oppose it.

While it lasted, the battle of Moodkee was sharp and bloody; and at first, sepoys and even English soldiers, exhausted as they were, reeled under the excellent fire and energetic attack of the Sikh infantry; but before night finally closed seventeen guns had been taken and the Sikh army retreated with heavy losses; that on the side of the British—872 (215 killed and 657 wounded)—included Sir Robert Sale and General MacCaskill, both deeply regretted. On the 19th and 20th the army halted, and two European and two native regiments joined the Commander-in-Chief.

It was now determined to assault the great Sikh entrenchments at Feroze-Shuhr on the 21st, and Sir John Littler was directed to join on that day with as many troops as he could spare from Ferozepore. He therefore marched with 5,000 infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and twenty-one guns, and took up his place in the general disposition of the troops about noon. Had the army—17,000 strong, with sixty-nine guns—advanced at once, much precious time would have been saved, the action would have been more decisive, and the loss and confusion of the night averted; but the Commander-in-Chief had formed no definite plan beyond, as were his only tactics, storming batteries and carrying them by the bayonet; and in moving troops from place to place, and making such hasty and imperfect arrangements as ensued, four precious hours were wasted. At about four in the afternoon of the shortest day in the year, when but little daylight remained, the British forces were led, in three divisions—the right by Sir Hugh Gough, the left by Sir John Littler, and the centre by the Governor-General—to the attack of a strong entrenchment, a mile and a half long by half a mile wide, defended by 35,000 of the flower of the Sikh army, with 100 guns. There were weak points in the Sikh works which might have been discovered by previous reconnaissance, but they were overlooked or neglected, and the very strongest positions assaulted. Her Majesty's 50th Regiment,

directed by Captain Pringle O'Hanlon, of the Staff, was the first to gain a footing in the Sikh camp, and the combat everywhere became general; but the enemy was as resolute in defence as the British troops were persevering in assault. Regiment after regiment of Sir John Littler's division staggered under the tremendous fire of grape and musketry by which they were met. Her Majesty's 62nd Regiment was much shattered, and at nightfall this division was obliged to retire. Sir Harry Smith, whose brigade had carried and occupied the village of Feroze-Shuhr, was unable to hold it during the night, and also drew off; but General Gilbert's division held what it had won. During the hottest part of this furious combat the 3rd Dragoons rode through the Sikh camp from end to end, with a desperate valour only equalled by the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava.

Before the camp was carried darkness fell upon the scene, and the night that ensued was truly designated as the 'night of horrors.' Portions of the camp were held by the English troops, others by the still unconquered Sikhs. A hard frost set in: the English forces had had neither food nor water for many hours, and the intense cold aggravated their sufferings. Men of different regiments, European and natives, separated in the darkness and confusion, huddled together; and the noble 'Husseinee Pultun,' the 16th Bengal Native Infantry, under Colonel Hall, victorious and unbroken, was a rallying point for many a weary soldier during the night. By the bright starlight the Sikh artillery from time to time fired upon the exhausted troops, and one large gun in particular did so much execution, that about two in the morning Sir Henry Hardinge, calling upon Her Majesty's 80th and the 1st European Regiment, among whom he was lying, led them to attack and spike it, driving away the Sikh infantry by whom it was guarded. When daylight broke order was restored; the various regiments on the field took up their positions in line with alacrity, and leading their respective divisions Sir Hugh Gough and the Governor-General advanced steadily, swept through the camp with cheers, and changing front to the centre, completed the victory.

But at this juncture, Tej Singh brought up from the Sutlej a fresh force of 20,000 regular and irregular infantry, 5,000 superb cavalry, and seventy guns, and the action was partially renewed. It was at this crisis that the greatest peril existed; for the ammunition of all arms was nearly expended; the formation of regiments was by no means complete, and the troops were thoroughly exhausted alike by fatigue, thirst, and want of food. The advance of the Sikh cavalry, accompanied by horse artillery, is described as the most

splendid sight of the campain. Their horses caracolling and bounding, and the bright sunlight flashing from steel armour, sabres, and spears, they came on at a rapid pace to within 400 yards of the British line, which, availing itself of such cover as could be found, awaited the charge with little hope of repelling it. Suddenly, however, after firing a few shots from their guns, the whole, as if stricken by a sudden panic, upon a movement of English cavalry on their flank, wheeled about and retired as they had come. It was rumoured that Tej Sing had been bribed by English gold, but this has never been substantiated, and his retreat is accounted for by the fact that what he had come to save was already lost, and subordinate as he was to Lall Singh, who had fled to the Sutlej, he was bound to follow his commander. What he did was, as he said, to save his honour as a soldier.

The British losses had been very severe, 694 killed and 1,721 wounded, with a large proportion—103—of officers, among whom were many very distinguished men; Broadfoot, who had won a high reputation in Afghanistan, and who had proved invaluable as a political officer; Somerset d'Arcy Todd, of Herat fame, and many others. On the part of the Sikhs, the loss was estimated at 8,000 men, and seventy-three noble guns and many standards remained in the hands of the victors.

In the Sikh camp during the night dissensions had run high, and the military chest of Lall Singh, who had fled at an early period, was plundered by an exasperated soldiery. Under a better and braver leader the result might indeed have been very different, for never before had so hardly contested a battle been fought in India, nor, with eventual victory, had ever such great peril of defeat been encountered.

The British forces could not immediately follow up the success they had achieved; heavy guns, stores, and ammunition were all wanting, and till their arrival from Delhi no forward movement could be made. The Sikhs, attributing this delay to fear, took heart, and towards the middle of January, Sirdar Ranjoor Singh recrossed the Sutlej and threatened the station of Loodianah, then weakly garrisoned. Sir Harry Smith was therefore despatched with four regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, and eighteen guns to relieve it. He had been cautioned against approaching the fort of Buddewal, which lay on his route; but nevertheless, moving under its walls, suffered sharply from its fire and from the splendid artillery of Ranjoor Singh, lost some of his baggage, and was only saved from further disaster by the dashing charges of the cavalry under Colonel Cureton. Being reinforced, however, by his junction with the

Loodianah troops and Brigadier Wheeler's brigade, Sir Harry Smith now advanced in turn to attack the enemy, who had taken up an entrenched position at Aliwal, and had been reinforced by 4,000 men of the best disciplined Sikh infantry. Their army amounted by estimate to 15,000 men, with seventy-six guns; that of the British was about 10,000 men, with thirty-two guns. On January 28, the Sikhs had advanced from their entrenched camp to meet Sir Harry Smith, and a brilliant action ensued. The Sikh squares were penetrated and overthrown by charges of cavalry, in which Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, under Colonel Cureton, in particular, were nobly distinguished. Position after position, battery after battery, were stormed, sixty-seven guns were taken, and the enemy, driven to the bridge of boats they had constructed, fled precipitately across the Sutlej, many of them perishing in the stream, and under the fire of the artillery, which played with great effect upon the boats.

Although the Sikh army had suffered three notable defeats, they still continued to retain their mischievous and turbulent predominance in the State. Golab Singh, who had undertaken the office of minister, from which Lall Singh had been deposed, although he entered into negotiations with the Governor-General, who demanded the dismissal of the Sikh army, declared that he was helpless to effect it. No act of submission or peaceful overtures from the army having been offered, hostilities were resumed on the arrival of the siege-train from Delhi, which reached camp on February 8. For some weeks, the Sikhs, under the direction of a Spanish officer, named Huerba, had been employed in constructing a remarkably powerful *tête de pont*, at the village of Sobraon, to cover a bridge of boats which they had thrown across the river Sutlej, below the ford of Hurrekee, and it was now completed in a series of half-moon bastions, connected by curtains, and covered by a ditch in front, both flanks resting on the river. This great work, two-and-a-half miles in length, was protected by batteries on the right bank of the river, so as to command the passage, and manned by 35,000 of the best of the Sikh troops, with sixty-seven heavy guns. It had been difficult to restrain the British army during its inaction in the presence of the daily progress of this entrenchment; but one day only intervened between the arrival of the heavy guns, stores, and ammunition, and the assault. The British army consisted of 15,000 men, of whom 5,000 were Europeans; and under the cover of a fog, on the morning of February 10, all the dispositions for attack were made without being noticed by the enemy.

When they were complete, about seven in the morning, the fog suddenly rolled away, displaying the British forces in order of battle;

and the heavy guns opened on the Sikhs; but they made no impression on the earthworks; the enemy's fire was not checked, and the only resource that remained was a general assault, which was forthwith carried out amidst the thunder of 120 pieces of artillery on both sides. About nine o'clock the whole of the infantry divisions advanced. Of Sir Robert Dick's division on the left, the horse artillery, under Colonel Lane, galloped up to within 300 yards of the Sikh batteries, and delivered their fire, while the brigade under Colonel Storey, Her Majesty's 10th and 53rd Regiments, with the 43rd and 59th Native Infantry, advancing in line with the regularity of a parade movement, were the first to reach the entrenchments; and the Sikhs gathered to defend it, which they did by a withering fire that checked the leading troops, but did not repulse them. The divisions of Sir Harry Smith on the right, and General Gilbert in the centre, were led on in turn, and after a severe carnage, the entrenchment was won. The Sikh troops, fighting desperately to the last, retired to the bridge, where their retreat became a flight; and the British horse artillery coming up at a gallop, poured grape and shrapnel on the flying masses, till the stream, now barely fordable, was choked with corpses, and the water dyed with blood. Nearly 10,000 Sikhs perished in two hours, and the whole of their guns, sixty-seven in number, with standards, and immense military stores, remained as trophies to the victors. The battle had begun in earnest at nine o'clock, and by eleven there was not a single Sikh soldier, except the dead and wounded, on the left bank of the river. The British loss was also severe, amounting to 2,383 in killed and wounded, and General Sir Robert Dick, who fell in the assault.

No time was lost in throwing the British army across the river by a bridge of boats, which was constructed by Major Abbott, with the boats that Lord Ellenborough had procured from Scinde; they crossed on the night of the action, and on the 11th envoys arrived from Lahore, followed by Rajah Golab Singh on the 15th, and the boy, Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, on the 17th. On the 20th, having advanced by easy marches, the army encamped on the plain of Meean Meer, without Lahore, and the citadel was partly occupied by British troops. Sir Henry Hardinge, on February 22, issued a public notification, reviewing the events that had occurred, and dwelling with a proud satisfaction on the fact, that in sixty days he had defeated the flower of the Khulsa army, in four general actions, and taken from them 220 pieces of artillery; that only 14,000 of the great army remained, and that he was now dictating a treaty, the conditions of which will tend to secure the British provinces from the repetition of a similar outrage. On the 23rd, at a public durbar,

the treaty itself was executed. All the Sikh territories on the left bank of the Sutlej, with the Jullundur Doab, a fertile tract lying between the Sutlej and the Beyas, were to become British; 1,500,000*l.* to be provided, partly by cash, and partly by the sale of the mountain territory, which includes Cashmere; all the mutinous troops to be disbanded, and the army for the future to consist of twenty-five battalions of 800 each, or 20,000 men with 12,000 cavalry. Golab Singh became the purchaser of Cashmere for a million sterling, and a separate treaty was made with him on March 16, at Umritsur, which secured to him and his heirs the sovereignty of the districts he had purchased. The sale of Cashmere was sharply criticised at the time; but its inaccessible character, and the still uncertain relations with the Punjab, are conclusive reasons as to the reason of their abandoning it.

('Manual of Indian History,' by Meadows Taylor.)

X.

The Second Sikh War and Annexation of the Punjab, 1848–1849.

'Unwarned by precedent, uninfluenced by example, the Sikh nation has called for war; and, on my word, Sir, they shall have it with vengeance.' Such was Lord Dalhousie's memorable expression at a farewell banquet before he left Calcutta, on October 10, 1848, on his way to the upper provinces. Although the whole of the Punjab was seething with disaffection, Chutter Singh was the only chieftain to begin war openly in the field. He applied for aid to Dost Mohammed, agreed to deliver Peshawur to him if he would join the Sikhs against the English; and this strange compact between people who hated each other mortally was actually made. Major, afterwards Sir George, Lawrence, was then in charge of Peshawur, with 8,000 Sikh troops, whose fidelity was in the last degree questionable; but he contrived to keep them to their duty, until Sultan Mohammed, the brother of Dost Mohammed, a person to whom he had shown the utmost kindness, treacherously seduced them, and, on October 24, led them to attack him in the Residency. Major Lawrence and his companions were conducted to Kohat, but afterwards delivered or sold to Chutter Singh, who confined them at Peshawur. Meanwhile, Shere Singh, who had marched from Mooltan, had joined his father, and round their standards collected most of the old soldiers of the Sikh army.

The forces assembled at Ferozepore for operations in the Punjab,

were completed in equipment during October 1848, and under the personal command of Lord Gough crossed the Ravee (Beyas) on November 16. They consisted of fifteen regiments of infantry—four European and eleven native, three regiments of English and ten of native regular and irregular cavalry, with sixty field guns and eighteen heavy guns, the latter now, for the first time, drawn by elephants instead of bullocks. On November 22, Lord Gough found Shere Singh encamped at Ramnuggur, on the right bank of the Chenab, with 15,000 men, and a powerful artillery, with an advanced force on the left bank covered by his batteries. It was too strong a position to assail in front; but the advanced Sikh force was attacked and driven back without material result, and in a charge of the British cavalry to clear the left bank of the river, it was rendered helpless in the sands, and suffered heavily from the Sikh guns on the right bank. In this desultory and ineffective skirmish, Colonel Cureton of the Lancers, who commanded the cavalry division, and Colonel William Havelock, the 'el chico bianco' of many a Peninsular fight, lost their lives, to the universal regret of the army. A flank movement, which might have been made at first, was now arranged, and on December 2, Sir Joseph Thackwell, with 8,000 men, crossed the river at Vizarabad, twenty-four miles above Ramnuggur. It was proposed that he should advance upon Shere Singh's camp from the right flank, while the main army crossed the river in front. Shere Singh, however, did not await this issue. Abandoning his entrenchments, he marched to attack General Thackwell, whom, with a diminished force, he met at Sadoollapore, but did not close with him, and after sustaining a heavy, but ill-directed cannonade, which lasted till evening, General Thackwell discovered during the night that the Sikhs, now 30,000 strong, with forty guns, had retired towards the Jhelum. Lord Gough, in his despatch, claimed the movement as a victory over the Sikh army, and even asserted its dispersion; but the fact was soon evident that Shere Singh had only retired to a better position, and had carried with him all his guns and equipment unmolested.

The position chosen by Shere Singh was one of singular strength, and its selection displayed his skill as a general in no mean degree. To have followed him up, and forced him to fight at a disadvantage, would probably have been effected by Lord Gough after the affair at Ramnuggur, but he was restrained by the Governor-General for upwards of three weeks, and unable to interfere with Shere Singh, who was thus able to carry out his plans leisurely, and without interruption. On January 11, however, Lord Gough reviewed his troops, and on the 12th they advanced twelve miles to Drujee, and on the

13th were near the Sikh entrenchments at Chillianwallah, which were held by them with 30,000 men and sixty guns. Of this place no reconnaissance had been made, nor were the enemy's dispositions understood, as they were covered by a thick jungle; and Lord Gough was about to encamp for the night, when the Sikhs fired upon him from some advanced guns, and he rashly gave orders for an immediate action. The whole of the Sikh guns now opened fire, after enduring which for upwards of an hour, the British troops advanced on the position. The first regiment which reached the Sikh batteries was Her Majesty's 24th, which was overwhelmed by a fearful fire of grape and musketry; 459 men, with twenty-three officers, were at once killed or wounded. General Colin Campbell, afterwards Lord Clyde, had carried the position before him, spiking the guns; and other divisions, under Sir Walter Gilbert, with brigades under Penny, Mountain, and others, though suffering heavily, finally conquered, and the Sikhs retired into the forest behind them. The cavalry had been less successful. Charged by a comparatively small body of Sikh horse, the 14th Dragoons, under a false order, uttered it was supposed by some coward in its ranks, went about, and galloped to the rear, pursued by the Sikhs; and the misadventure was only redeemed by a desperate charge made by Captain Unett. It was found impossible to hold the field during the night, now closing in, and Lord Gough unwillingly withdrew the army to Chillianwallah for water and rest. During the night the Sikh troops returned, carried off all the captured guns except twelve, and barbarously murdered all the wounded who could not be recovered before the close of the action. The loss in this consequent battle, which had nearly been a disastrous defeat, was 2,357 men and eighty-nine officers in killed and wounded; three regiments had lost their colours, and four horse-artillery guns had been taken.

After the conclusion of the siege of Mooltan, General Whish moved up to reinforce the Commander-in-Chief. Shere Singh, perceiving this movement, and probably desiring to destroy General Whish's force before it could cover Lahore or form a junction with the main army, left his camp at Russool on February 6, and marched in the direction of Lahore; but if the conception had been that of a clever tactician, its execution was extremely indifferent. He allowed British detachments to occupy the fords of the Chenab, and, thus foiled, took up a position at Goojerat. He had been joined by his father, Chutter Singh, and a considerable force, and by Akram Khan, a son of Dost Mohammed, with a division of Afghans; and the whole Sikh army, now collected in one place, amounted to upwards of 50,000 men, with sixty guns. On the other hand, Lord Gough,

reinforced by General Whish on February 20, had under him 20,000 men and 100 guns. It will have been remarked in all Lord Gough's battles that artillery had been an arm of only very secondary consideration; and its disuse was even freely commented upon by the Sikh generals to Major George Lawrence, and so became the subject of open conversation. Lord Gough was urged by all the best officers of the army, and even by the Governor-General, to employ it in the next engagement, and he happily consented to do so, though, it was said, against conviction.

On February 27, 1849, the British army advanced in line in parade order upon the Sikh position at Goojerat. The centre was composed of eighty-four guns, many of heavy calibre, drawn by elephants, and when within easy range of the Sikh batteries the whole opened fire, forming a magnificent spectacle. The effect was just what had been anticipated. The Sikh fire in two hours and a half was nearly silenced, and the British infantry, advancing from both flanks, carried the entrenched villages one by one, and drove out the Sikh infantry, without a check. One brilliant charge was made by the Sikh and Afghan horse, but it was gallantly met and defeated by the 9th Lancers and the famous Scinde horse, under Captain Malcolm, and hurled back. Finally, the British cavalry charged the now broken Sikh infantry, and pursued it for fifteen miles beyond the field of battle, doing immense execution. The whole of the British loss in this brilliant and scientifically fought battle was only ninety-two killed and 682 wounded, and fifty-three guns were taken, with many standards. It was impossible to estimate fully the loss of the Sikhs, but it amounted to several thousands, and the whole army had become totally broken and disorganised.

The pursuit of Shere Singh was taken up by General Gilbert with 12,000 men and forty guns; but the Sikh general was in no condition to renew the struggle. Having been joined by Major George Lawrence, who had been allowed absence to Lahore on parole, and whose good faith in returning was welcomed with enthusiastic shouts by the Sikh soldiers, negotiations were entered into with General Gilbert, who consented to receive the submission of the Sikhs if they laid down their arms unconditionally. On March 12, at the great Buddhist monument of Mamkyalah, Shere Singh and the wreck of his army, about 8,000 men, met General Gilbert, and Shere Singh set the example by delivering up his sword. Then followed an astonishing and affecting spectacle. Chief after chief laid his sword at the general's feet, and after them the brave Sikh soldiers, one by one, passed by, casting their arms, sometimes in silent grief and tears, sometimes with passionate exclamations, upon the heaps which received them. Forty-one more

guns were surrendered, the last of the parks of the whole army, which had been buried 'till they should be needed.' This finished, General Gilbert, with the cavalry, hunted the Afghans back to the passes, into which they fled ignominiously, and, as the Sikhs said, 'like dogs.' The Sikhs had submitted honestly and without shame to a Power which they now respected, and to which, since then, they have been admirably faithful in many trying scenes.

During the progress of the war the British civil officers, with a wonderful skill and perseverance, held their posts; and many brilliant affairs, into which it is impossible to enter, occurred in different localities. Of these the most remarkable was the retention of the Jullundur Doab, the province lately ceded by Mr., the present Lord Lawrence, who, without regular troops, and with a few hastily collected levies of Sikhs and hill-men, routed the rebels, and overawed all attempts of local disaffection. Major Herbert, too, had defended the fort of Attock against many attacks, and received the emphatic thanks of the Governor-General.

The fate of the Punjab was not long in suspense; and by a proclamation of March 29, 1849, the Governor-General, reviewing past events and the fact of the Lahore territories having been already once spared after a treacherous attack upon its allies, coupled with the uncertainty which would remain in future, boldly annexed the whole territory—a measure which no one then ventured to impugn, or which has since been questioned. On the young Maharajah Dhuleep Singh a pension of five lacs of rupees (50,000*l.*) a year was conferred. He is now a Christian and an English country gentleman, owning large estates in Suffolk, one of the best shots in England, and respected by all who know him. The chiefs were settled in their hereditary villages on pensions according to their rank, and the whole of the population submitted with extraordinary unanimity to the new rulers. Lord Dalhousie was created a marquis, Lord Gough a baron, and the honours of the Bath were conferred upon several of the most distinguished officers; but there were some, nevertheless, who, deserving as much or more than others, were unaccountably passed over. Thus ended the second and final Sikh war. With it the conquest of India, within its natural boundaries, the Indus, the Himalayas, and the ocean—more universal and more complete than any by which it had been preceded—had, after many vicissitudes, been effected in less than a hundred years by the English nation.

('A Student's Manual of the History of India,' by Meadows Taylor.)

XI.

Letter of Sir John Lawrence relating to the Executions at Peshawur.

In respect of the mutineers of the 55th, they were taken fighting against us, and so far deserve little mercy. But on full reflection, I would not put them all to death. I do not think that we should be justified in the eyes of the Almighty in doing so. A hundred and twenty men are a large number to put to death. Our object is to make an example to terrify others. I think this object would be effectually gained by destroying from a quarter to a third of them. I would select all those against whom anything bad can be shown—such as general bad character, turbulence, prominence in disaffection or in the fight, disrespectful demeanour to their officers during the few days before the 26th, and the like. If these did not make up the required number, I would then add to them the oldest soldiers. All these should be shot or blown away from guns, as may be most expedient. The rest I would divide into batches; some to be imprisoned ten years, some seven, some five, some three. I think that a sufficient example will then be made, and that these distinctions will do good, and not harm. The sepoys will see that we punish to deter, and not for vengeance. Public sympathy will not be on the side of the sufferers. Otherwise, they will fight desperately to the last, as feeling certain that they must die.

Lawrence.

(Sir John Kaye's 'History of the Sepoy War.')

XII.

Correspondence relating to the Abandonment of Peshawur.

Sir John Lawrence to Colonel Herbert Edwardes.

Rawal Pindee, June 21.

Here we are, with three European regiments, a large artillery, and some of our best native troops locked up across the Indus—troops who, if at Delhi, would decide the contest in a week. What have we got for all the rest of the Punjab? We have barely two thousand Europeans. I doubt if we have so many holding the port of Philour, Govindourgh, Ferozepore, Lahore, and Mooltan. We have not a man more with a white face whom we can spare. We cannot concentrate more than we have now done, except by giving up Rawal

Pindee and eventually Peshawur. Should the Sikhs rise, our condition on this side of the Indus will be well-nigh desperate. With the Peshawur force on this side we should be irresistibly strong. There was no one thing which tended so much to the ruin of Napoleon in 1814 as the tenacity with which, after the disasters at Leipsig, he clung to the line of the Elbe, instead of falling back at once to that of the Rhine. He thus compromised all his garrisons beyond the Elbe, and when he was beaten in the field, these gradually had to surrender. But these troops would have given him the victory had they been at his side at Bautzen, and the other conflicts which followed Leipsig.

Sir John Lawrence to Colonel Herbert Edwardes.

Rawal Pindee, June 25.

A severe action at Delhi apparently with little results; on the 25th Bareilly mutineers *en route* to Delhi. Gwalior contingent have mutinied. Agent has left. If matters get worse, it is my decided opinion that the Peshawur arrangements should take effect. Our troops before Delhi must be reinforced, and that largely—they must hold their ground.

General Sidney Cotton to Sir John Lawrence.

Peshawur, June 25.

We have pushed our conquests up to the very mouth of the Afghanistan passes, and at this very moment, by God's blessing, our strongest position in India is at the mouth of the Khyber. By our good rule, we have engaged the affections (I may say) to a considerable extent of the border tribes, and in the hour of need they (who, not many years since, were our most bitter enemies), relying on our great name and power, have come forward to help us against the disaffection of the very troops with whom we have conquered the Sikhs, Punjabis, and others. A retrograde movement from Peshawur, believe me, would turn all these parties, now our friends, against us. The Punjab irregular force, Pathans, Sikhs, Punjabis, and such like, no longer respecting our power, will, in all likelihood, turn against us, and their most valuable services be lost to us for ever. My dear Sir John, our removal from Peshawur cannot fail to be disastrous, and cannot be effected without immediate confusion throughout the whole of this part of this country, and throughout the length and breadth of British India. Hence the measure will seriously injure the interests of our forces in all quarters, whilst the additional strength to be gained would be small, and, indeed, we could afford no timely

aid. In handing over the Peshawur district to the Dost (a measure which we may pretend to be a mere matter of expediency, and not of necessity), the Afghans will at once see our weakness, and will duly profit by the same against the common enemy. To this frontier, and to the present strength of our position on it, as well as to Calcutta at the opposite end of our territory, we must look for the recovery of our power throughout the intermediate kingdoms of the Bengal Presidency. Our great name is upheld on our frontiers, whilst Calcutta and this seaboard, in the plenitude of power, with European reinforcements continually arriving, will afford eventually and more surely the necessary succour. At this very moment six or eight regiments of Europeans must be between Calcutta and Delhi, *en route* to the seat of war, and triple that amount will be eventually thrown in from home and elsewhere, and by such means must our supremacy be recovered. When could our troops reach the seat of war, and in what numbers and conditions? These questions must be duly considered, and by them the loss and gain of our removal from hence be balanced and determined on. I earnestly implore of you, my dear Sir John, to hold to our position on this frontier. The required succour must indeed be thrown in from Calcutta, not from this. When the reinforcements from above and below, at present in progress towards Delhi, have reached their destination, I feel confident that that city will again fall into our hands, and I am very much mistaken if disaffection does not then cease in all quarters, and, our power being thus established, mutiny will gradually disappear throughout the land.

Colonel H. Edwardes, Commissioner at Peshawur, to Sir John Lawrence.

Peshawur, June 26, 1857.

General Cotton, James, and myself are all of opinion that you should not go on throwing away your means in detail, by meeting General Reid's demands for reinforcements. Delhi is not India, and if General Reid cannot take it with 8,000 men, he will not take it with 9,000 or 10,000. However important a point, it is only a point, and enough has been done for it. You will serve the empire better by holding the Punjab, than by sacrificing the Punjab and recovering Delhi. You will sacrifice the Punjab, if you either withdraw General Collins's force from Peshawur, or fritter away Nicholson's moveable column, already too weak. 'Make a stand! anchor, Hardy, anchor!' Tell General Reid he can have no more men from here, and must either get into Delhi with the men he has, or get reinforcements from below, or abandon the siege and fall back on the

Sutlej, leaving Delhi and its dependencies to be reorganised in the cold weather. There are two policies open to you—to treat the Punjab as secondary to the North-West Provinces, and go on giving and giving troops to General Reid till you break down in the Punjab, or to maintain the Punjab as your first duty, and the most important point of the two, and to refuse to give General Reid any more troops than you can spare. We are decidedly and distinctly of the latter opinion. . . . We consider that if you leave the Peshawur frontier, we shall not hold together for a month, but be demoralised and despised, and reduced to the condition of a flock of sheep. . . . If you hold the Punjab, you will facilitate the reconquest of India from the seaboard. We have only got to hold on three months. Do not try too much. We are outnumbered. Stick to what you can do. Let us hold the Punjab, *coûte que coûte*, and not give up one European necessary to that duty. Whatever takes place in Central India, we shall stand on a firm and honourable attitude if we maintain the capitals on the sea and the frontiers here. Between the two it is all a family quarrel—an insurrection in our own house. If we let foreigners in from the frontier, the Empire is invaded. We may pretend to make friendly presents of provinces, but we cannot disguise that we have lost them by weakness. India has not yet recovered from our expulsion from Afghanistan. The world ignores our voluntary cession of it after Pollock's expedition, and knows well that we could not hold it. Do not repeat the policy and give up the trans-Indus. No words of mine can express my sense of the disgrace and ruin that it will bring upon us. It is abandoning the cause of England in the East. Don't yield an inch of frontier; gather up your resources and restrict yourself to the defence of the Punjab. It is a practicable and a definite policy, and we will support you to the last. If General Reid, with all the men you have sent him, cannot get into Delhi, let Delhi go. Decide on it at once. . . . Don't let yourself be sucked to death as General Reid is doing. He has his difficulties, and we have ours. You have made vast efforts for him, and no one can blame you for now securing your own promise. . . . . The Empire's reconquest hangs on the Punjab.

Sir John Lawrence to Lord Canning.

July 24, 1857.

All these reinforcements ought to enable our army to maintain itself in its present condition and allow the mutineers to expend their power against our entrenchments. But should further aid be required from this quarter, our only resource would be to abandon Peshawur and Kohat, and to send the troops thus relieved to Delhi.

It seems to me vain to attempt to hold Lahore, and insanity to try to retain Peshawur, &c., if we are driven from Delhi. The Punjab will prove short work to the mutineers, when the Delhi army is destroyed. . . . My policy would then be to bring the troops from across the Indus and send them to Delhi; in the meantime to send all our women and children down the river to Kurrachee, and then, accumulating every fighting man we have, to join the army before Delhi, or hold Lahore, as might appear expedient. Colonel Edwardes, Generals Cotton and Nicholson, are for maintaining our hold on Peshawur to the last. They argue that we could not retire in safety, and that the instant we attempt to make a retrograde movement all would be up against us. This I do not believe; but granting that insurrection would immediately ensue, I maintain that the force at Peshawur would make good its retreat. It contains more soldiers, more guns, more power than that with which Pollock recovered Cabul after forcing the passage of the Khyber. Between Peshawur and the Indus are no defiles, but an open country; the only difficulty is the passage of the Indus, which, with Attock in our hands, ought not to be a work of danger. It is for your lordship to decide what course we are to pursue. In the event of misfortune at Delhi, are we to leave that army to its fate and endeavour to hold its own, or shall we, by timely retirement from beyond the Indus, consolidate our resources in the Punjab, and maintain the struggle under the walls of Delhi? I pray that your lordship will decide one way or the other. If we are left to decide the matter ourselves, time will be lost in vain discussions, and by the time we decide on the proper course to follow, it will prove too late to act effectually.

The question of the abandonment of Peshawur was decided by the following despatch of Lord Canning:—

Calcutta, July 15, 1857.

The outbreak at Indore on the 1st will no doubt have interrupted the dâk as well as the telegraph to Bombay. I therefore send a steamer to Madras with this letter and the despatches which accompany it; and I shall request Lord Harris to telegraph to Lord Elphinstone my answer to your question regarding Peshawur. It will be, 'Hold on Peshawur to the last.' I should look with great alarm to the effect in Southern India of an abandonment of Peshawur at the present time, or at any time until our condition becomes more desperate or more secure.

(Sir John Kaye's 'History of the Sepoy War.')

XIII.

Difficulties of the English Agents for the Communications between the Punjab and Calcutta during the Mutiny.

In consequence of the disturbed state of the country great difficulty was experienced in securing the safe transit of the mails; indeed it was often impossible, though the accidents and delays which occurred in this department of the public service were much fewer than might have been expected. By degrees, however, one road after another became stopped. The road between Calcutta and the Punjab was interrupted by the state of the districts about Mirzapore, Mynpooree, Meerut, and Delhi. The mail road between the Punjab and Bombay ran through Agra, Indore, and Mhow; this, too, after a time became unsafe, in consequence of the bands of rebels hovering about the country between Mhow and Agra. Another line of road from Ajmere and Nusseerabad to Bombay took the direction of Pallee, Erinpoora and Deesar; from thence a branch led up to Mount Abou. Communication was kept up between Ajmere and Agra pretty regularly, as the road lay through the States of independent chiefs in alliance with the British Government; and as this was the most direct and the nearest route by which communication could be kept up with Kurrachee—a place that was daily growing in importance, in consequence of its being a harbour and a landing place for European troops, and the seat of government of the North-West Provinces—Mr. Frere, the Commissioner of Scinde, conceived the idea of establishing a post line across the desert between Hyderabad in Scinde and Jodhpore, from whence communication was easily extended to Ajmere and so on to Agra. Mr. Frere's views and instructions were ably carried out by an officer named Lieutenant Tyrwhitt, who held the office of Deputy-Collector of Meerpore. This appointment placed him in charge of the whole desert between Hyderabad and the frontier of Marwar, though Meerpore, where his head-quarters were, was only about two or three marches from Hyderabad. During the summer months the heat in the desert is such as to render travelling not only inconvenient but dangerous, but Lieutenant Tyrwhitt was not to be daunted, and he set out in the burning month of May and rode up, attended by a few followers, all the way to Jodhpore. Resting at certain distances and calling around him the chiefs of the surrounding tribes, he struck a bargain with them, by which they engaged themselves to keep three camels at each station, about ten miles apart, for the conveyance of the

mails. A considerable expense was incurred by this means, but Mr. Frere was one of those men who do not shrink from responsibility, and who recognise the importance of individual energy and the necessity of departing from the routine of established regulation in times of great emergency. Sir John Lawrence was another, and it was to men of their stamp that, we may say, humanly speaking, we owe the retention of our Indian Empire. Captain Mason, the political agent at Jodhpore, eagerly co-operated with Mr. Frere and his active subordinate Lieutenant Tyrwhitt, and the plan was extended beyond the limit originally designed by a line of camel dâks, as they are called, being established between Jodhpore and Bhawulpore on the Sutlej, by which means communication was easily kept up with the Punjab, and a line of road open that was not likely to be affected by the movements of the rebels, who would hardly penetrate so far into the desert. Another mounted post was established between Jodhpore and Ajmere. The former place thus suddenly became the centre of communication between some of the most important parts of our Eastern Empire. A deputy-superintendent of the line, Mr. C. Hewitt, who is now dead, took up his residence near the Agency, and made it his head-quarters, from whence he set out on a periodical inspection of the line, and was ready to go to any point where the presence of a supervising officer was requisite. These lines were begun in the latter end of May, but the several branches were not completed till the end of June or beginning of July, and it was some little time before the various streams of communication, so often thwarted in their progress, began to find out there was an open channel for them, and turned their course accordingly. Now, however, the influx of work upon the poor little post-office established at Jodhpore, presided over by a native writer on a salary of seventy-five rupees a month, was so great as utterly to bewilder the methodical old gentleman, who had never before had anything more to do than start off a bag of letters once or twice a day by the regular runners, and receive and distribute a few English Letters to the Political Agent, his family, and the few European residents attached to the Agency and the Maharajah's court, and a small quantity of native correspondence in the city. The Jodhpore lines, as they may be called, as they all centred there, were enormously expensive. Three camels were maintained at each post, two for work, and one spare in case of accident and for expresses, and for each the sum paid by contract was sixteen rupees per mensem; but the money was usefully spent. It was of the last importance to keep up communication, and whatever roads throughout North and Central India were stopped, the Jodhpore lines were always open

and in working order. But supervision was required, and as there was no immediate prospect of the unattached Bengal officers going to Agra, and I was therefore unemployed in any capacity, Captain Monck Mason easily procured the sanction of the Governor-General's agent to my being placed in charge of the Jodhpore post-office. I gladly accepted the task, and was soon deep in the postal department's rules and regulations. At times, as many as eight mails arrived during the day, not small letter-bags, such as are usually seen on the backs of runners in India, but regular camel-loads; and often as many as two camels were required at once to bring on the bags, or rather sacks of letters. The packets were deposited in a part of the verandah of the Agency that was enclosed to serve for a post-office, distributed and started off again on their route, either to Scinde across the desert, or to Ajmere, Nusseerabad and Agra, or to Bhawulpore and the Punjab, or to Bombay *viâ* Pallu and Erinpoora.

At one time letters and despatches from Calcutta to Meerut had to be sent across the country to Bombay, thence to Jodhpore, thence to Lahore *viâ* Bhawulpore, and from Lahore down to Meerut, and for a very long time the only communication with the army before Delhi was by this roundabout route.

('The Mutinies in Rajpootana,' by T. T. Prichard.)

XIV.

The last Nazzar given to the King of Delhi by English Officers.

As soon as the camp arrived at Delhi, the Government records were produced, in order that reference should be made to the etiquette followed as regarded the Emperor on those previous rare occasions in which Governor-Generals had visited the Imperial city. It was found that although the relative position of the Governor-General and the Emperor did not admit of their exchanging visits, yet that a deputation had been sent on the part of the Governor-General to ask after the health of his Majesty, and tender him a 'nazzar' of a certain amount of gold mohurs, which in reality amounted to an expression of submission and fealty on the part of the British Government to the Great Mogul, and an acknowledgment of holding our Indian possessions as his feudatory. As, however, this had been the usual practice, no question was raised as to its propriety; and, therefore, without any previous intimation to the Governor-General of what was about to be done, Mr. Thomason and

myself, accompanied by Colonel Broadfoot, proceeded to the palace on elephants, each being provided with a silk bag full of gold mohurs for presentation to the King. We were required to proceed without any shoes into the immediate presence—such having been in all ages in India the usual mark of respect on the part of an inferior on approaching a superior. On this occasion, we compromised the matter by putting short worsted Cashmere socks over our boots, and thus entered the hall of audience. On a curtain being drawn aside, we saw the old King, then apparently a very feeble old man, about seventy years of age, seated on his throne, which was elevated so as to have the royal person, as he sat cross-legged, on a level with our faces. We made a low obeisance to the Emperor, and on approaching the throne, each in succession presented his bag of gold mohurs, and inquired after his Majesty's health and prosperity. I confess to a feeling of awe and solemnity passing over me as I stepped up and addressed this representative of a long line of kings and of a once powerful empire, and presented my 'nazzar' for his Majesty's acceptance, which was remarkable as being the last that was ever offered on the part of a British subject to the Imperial house of Timour. The King simply accepted it, and ordered us to be robed in dresses of honour, and to have turbans bound round our heads. This was done in due form; we made our obeisance to the King, and departed. We remounted our elephants, and were paraded through the chief streets of Delhi as 'those whom the King delighted to honour.' The ridiculous transformation we had all three undergone, clad in these robes of tinsel tissue, drove all feelings of solemnity and respect out of my mind. I contrived to get ahead of my party, and stripping off my own finery, as I sat on the howdah, made my way to the Governor-General's tent to beg his lordship to come and see the Chief Secretary and Colonel Broadfoot as they arrived in camp and before dismounting from their elephants, as these two estimable gentlemen looked as if they had gone suddenly mad, and decked themselves out in a manner worthy of 'Madge Wildfire.' The Governor-General (Lord Ellenborough) begged me to explain what we had been doing, and on my informing him his lordship's indignation and surprise was extreme; and then, for the first time, I myself became alive to the impropriety of an act which, in reality, made Queen Victoria, in Eastern estimation at least, hold her Indian possessions as a mere feudatory and vassal of the Imperial house of Delhi.

(Edwardes' 'Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian.')

XV.

Sir Henry Barnard's last Letter to the Governor-General.

The following letter was written to Lord Canning by Sir Henry Barnard three days before his death. It gives a correct idea of the difficulties of the position before Delhi:—

Camp above Delhi, July 2, 1857.

My dear Lord Canning,—Ere this reaches you, the business here will have been settled; if successfully, well; if a failure, I shall like to leave behind me a brief record of the service of the little force.

The work of reduction or re-occupation of Delhi was evidently greatly under-estimated. Delhi, when once its gates were shut, and its immense arsenal and magazines in the hands of insurgent troops, became a formidable operation to reduce. When, added to this, the passions of the people were roused, and the cry raised of a new 'Mogul dynasty,' it became as important as formidable.

With means totally inadequate, this force was sent against it, reinforced by detachments from Meerut, who were to have provided sappers, gunners, and field implements; when all had formed a junction the force barely arrived at 3,800. Meerut sent no gunners and only a small number of sappers, and these unprovided. On June 8 we started from Alipore, met the enemy at Budlie-ka-Seraï, and from thence drove them from the height above Delhi. Here the commanding artilleryman and chief engineer proposed to commence the attack; batteries were planned and erected, but the distance was too great. After eight days, I found the side of the town, which must be silenced before we got approaches, quite as alive as ever. The artilleryman admitted the distance too great, and the engineer his inability to make batteries, having positively not a single sandbag. I was promised reinforcements, and for their arrival I determined to wait. They have arrived, and now comes the decisive moment, and I confess to you I never was so puzzled. The force I have amounts to about 5,000, and comprises almost all the Europeans in the upper provinces; quite enough, if free, to re-establish the country, but quite insufficient to storm Delhi, guard the camp, and keep open my communications with the rear for supplies. If I succeed in the gambler's throw, well and good, but if I fail, the game is up, and all I can expect to be able to do would be to effect an honourable retreat, carrying off sick, wounded, and guns. To add to my distress, dissatisfaction is proved to exist in the native

troops just arrived, and some have been detected in trying to tamper with the men of Coke's corps. These fellows are to be hanged to-night, but the 9th Irregular Cavalry and some of the Sikh corps are known to be tainted, and would like an opportunity of doing us any mischief they could. Thus it is, with enemies without, traitors within, and a task before me I cannot in reason feel my force competent to undertake, I am called upon to decide. Much is said about the native character and aptitude at turning tail, but where the treasure is I fear the heart will be found also; for all these miscreants are laden with plunder they will not abandon, and they know full well that every man's hand is against them. They dare not fly.

My men are very tired; we have had since the action of Budlie-ka-Seraï no less than ten affairs, seven of which employed my whole force, cavalry and infantry; in each we experienced heavy losses, but inflicted greater. The traitors are, or rather were, tired; they openly said it was no use fighting, and that unless assisted they would fly in four days. Yesterday brought them the Bareilly people, so we shall have our eleventh to-morrow. After that, I think the game is over. The Gwaliors are not coming on, and we shall have defeated them all in turn. But to be useful, I must enter the city, and this will, I am fearful, be a sanguinary affair, for it is clear the sepoy knows well how to fight behind stone walls.

I hope to hear of the head of the European columns coming up from Calcutta, and then matters will begin to look up again.

Pray excuse this scrawl: it is written in a gale of wind. The rain has fallen for two days, but it is fine again.

Very truly yours,

H. BARNARD.

(Sir J. Kaye's 'History of the Sepoy War.')

XVI.

VISIT OF NANA SAHIB TO LUCKNOW.

I must here mention a visit which was made to Lucknow in April by the Nana of Bithoor, whose subsequent treachery and atrocities have given him a pre-eminence in infamy. He came over on pretence of seeing the sights at Lucknow, accompanied by his young brother and a numerous retinue, bringing letters of introduction from a former judge of Cawnpore to Captain Hayes and to myself. He visited me, and his manner was arrogant and presuming. To make a show of dignity and importance he brought six or seven followers with him into the room, for whom chairs were demanded. One of these men was his notorious agent Azimoola.

His younger brother was more pleasing in appearance and demeanour. The Nana was introduced by me to Sir Henry Lawrence, who received him kindly, and ordered the authorities of the city to show him every attention. I subsequently met him parading through Lucknow with a retinue more than usually large. He had promised before leaving Lucknow to make his final call on the Wednesday. On the Monday we received a message from him that urgent business required his attendance at Cawnpore, and he left Lucknow accordingly. At the time his conduct attracted little attention, but it was otherwise when affairs had assumed the aspect which they did at Cawnpore by May 20. His demeanour at Lucknow and sudden departure to Cawnpore appeared exceedingly suspicious, and I brought it to the notice of Sir Henry Lawrence. The Chief Commissioner concurred in my suspicions, and by his authority I addressed Sir Hugh Wheeler, cautioning him against the Nana, and stating Sir Henry's belief that he was not to be depended on. The warning was unhappily disregarded, and on May 22 a message was received stating that 'two guns and three hundred men, cavalry and infantry, furnished by the Maharajah of Bithoor, came in this morning.'

(Gubbins, 'The Mutinies in Oude.')

XVII.

Letter from Sir Henry Lawrence to Lord Canning, on account of the state of mind in the Native Troops.

May 9, 1857.

I had a conversation with a jemadar of the Oude Artillery for more than an hour, and was startled by the dogged persistence of the man—a Brahmin of about forty years of age, of excellent character—in the belief that for ten years past Government has been engaged in measures for the forcible, or rather fraudulent, conversion of all the natives. His argument was, that as such was the case, and that as we made our way through India, won Bhurtpore, Lahore, &c., by fraud, so might it be possible that we mixed bone-dust with the grain sold to the Hindoos. When I told him of our power in Europe, how the Russian war had quadrupled our army in a year, and in another it could, if necessary, have been interminably increased, and that in the same way, in six months, any required number of Europeans could be brought to India, and that therefore we are not at the mercy of the sepoys, he replied that he knew that we had plenty of men and money, but that Europeans are expensive, and that therefore we wished to take Hindoos to sea to conquer the world for

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113. On my remarking that the sepoy, though a good soldier on shore, is a bad one at sea, by reason of his poor food, 'That is just it,' was the rejoinder, 'You want us all to eat what you like, that we may be stronger and go everywhere.' He often repeated, 'I tell you what everybody says.' But when I replied, 'Fools and traitors may say so, but honest and sensible men cannot think so,' he would not say that he himself did or did not believe, but said, 'I tell you they are like sheep; the leading one tumbles down, and all the rest rolls over him.' Such a man is very dangerous; he has his full faculties, is a Brahmin, has served us twenty years, knows our strength and our weakness, and hates us thoroughly. It may be that he is only more honest than his neighbours, but he is not the less dangerous. On one only point did he give us credit. I told him that in the year 1846, I had rescued 150 native children, left by our army in Cabul, and that instead of making them Christians, I had restored them to their relations and friends. 'Yes,' he replied, 'I remember well. I was at Lahore.' On the other hand, he told me of our making Christians of children purchased during famines. I have spoken to many others, of all ranks, during the last fortnight: most give us credit for good intentions; but here is a soldier of our own, selected for promotion over the heads of others, holding opinions that must make him at heart a traitor.

Lord Canning to Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay.

Calcutta, May 8, 1857.

The mutinous spirit is not quelled here, and I feel no confidence of being able to eradicate it very speedily, although the outbreak may be repressed easily. The spirit of disaffection, or rather of mistrust, for it is more that, has spread further than I thought six weeks ago, but widely rather than deeply, and it requires very wary walking. A hasty measure of retribution, betraying animosity, or an unjust act of severity, would confirm, instead of allaying the temper which is abroad. It is not possible to say with confidence what the causes are, but with the common herd there is a sincere fear for their caste, and a conviction that this has been in danger from the cartridges and other causes. This feeling is played upon by others from outside, and to some extent with political objects. But upon the whole, political animosity does not go for much in the present movement, and certainly does not actuate the sepoys in the mass.

('MS. Correspondence.')

XVIII.

The May Proclamation.

Fort William, Home Department, May 16, 1857.

Proclamation.

The Governor-General of India in Council has warned the army of Bengal that the tales by which the men of certain regiments have been led to suspect that offence to their religion or injury to their caste is meditated by the Government of India are malicious falsehoods.

The Governor-General in Council has learned that this suspicion continues to be propagated by designing and evil-minded men, not only in the army, but amongst other classes of the people.

He knows that endeavours are made to persuade Hindoos and Mussulmans, soldiers and civil subjects, that their religion is threatened secretly, as well as openly, by the acts of the Government, and that the Government is seeking in various ways to entrap them into a loss of caste for purposes of its own.

Some have been deceived and led astray by these tales.

Once more, then, the Governor-General in Council warns all classes against the deceptions that are practised on them.

The Government of India has invariably treated the religious feelings of all its subjects with careful respect. The Governor-General in Council has declared that it will never cease to do so. He now repeats that declaration, and he emphatically proclaims that the Government of India entertains no design to interfere with their religion or caste, and that nothing has been, or will be, done by the Government to affect the free exercise of the observances of religion or caste by every class of the people.

The Government of India has never deceived its subjects, therefore the Governor-General in Council now calls upon them to refuse their belief to seditious lies.

This notice is addressed to those who hitherto, by habitual loyalty and orderly conduct, have shown their attachment to the Government, and a well-founded faith in its protection and justice.

The Governor-General in Council enjoins all such persons to pause before they listen to false guides and traitors, who would lead them into danger and disgrace.

By order of the Governor-General of India in Council,

Cecil Beadon,
Secretary to the Government of India.

XIX.

Private Letter from Lord Canning to Lord Elgin.

Calcutta, May 19, 1857.

My dear Elgin,—I wish I could give you a more cheerful and acceptable greeting than you will find in the letter by which this is accompanied. As it is, you will not bless me for it, but the case which I have before me here is clear and strong. Our hold of Bengal and the upper provinces depends upon the turn of a word—a look. An indiscreet act or irritating phrase from a foolish commanding officer at the head of a mutinous or disaffected company may, whilst the present condition of things at Delhi lasts, lead to a general rising of the native troops in the lower provinces, where we have no European strength, and where an army in rebellion would have everything its own way for weeks and months to come. We have seen within the last few days what that way would be. I cannot shut my eyes to the danger, or to the urgent necessity under which I lie, to collect every European that can carry arms and aid to the Government of India in the event of such a crisis. I do not want aid to put down the Meerut and Delhi rebels; that will be done easily, as soon as the European troops can converge upon Delhi, but not sooner. Meanwhile, every hour of delay—unavoidable delay—is an encouragement to the disaffected troops in other parts; and if any one of the unwatched regiments on this side of Agra should take heart and give the word, there is not a fort, or cantonment, or station in the plains of the Ganges that would not be in their hands in a fortnight. It would be exactly the same in Oude. No help that you could give me would make us safe against this, because it cannot arrive in time. The critical moments are now and for the next ten or twelve days to come. If we pass through them without a spread of the outbreak, I believe all will go well. If we do not, the consequences will be so frightful, that any neglect to obtain any possible accession of strength whereby to shorten the duration of the reign of terror which will ensue, would be a crime. If you send me troops they shall not be kept one hour longer than is absolutely needed. If you come with them yourself, you shall be most heartily welcome.

XX.

Proclamation of the Nana Sahib, dated July 6.

'A traveller just arrived at Cawnpore from Calcutta had heard that previous to the distribution of the cartridges, a council had been held for the purpose of depriving the Hindustanis of their faith and religion. The members of the council came to the decision, since it was a matter affecting religion, it would be right to have seven or eight thousand European soldiers that fifty thousand Hindustanis might be destroyed, and all (the rest) become Christians. This resolution was sent to Queen Victoria and received her approval. Again, another council was held, at which the English merchants assisted. It was here determined that the European force should be made equal to the Hindustani army (in numbers), so that when the contest took place, there should be no fear of failure. When this representation (from the council) was read in England, 35,000 soldiers were embarked in all haste and despatched to India, and the news of their departure has reached Calcutta. The sahib of Calcutta ordered the distribution of the cartridges with the especial object of making Christians of the native army, so that when the army became Christians, there would be no delay in making Christians of the ryots. These cartridges were rubbed over with the fat of pigs and cows. This fact has been asserted by Bengalese who were employed in the manufacture of the cartridges, and of those who related this, one has been executed, and all the rest put into confinement. They (the sahibs) made their arrangements here. This is the news from thence (Europe). The Turkish ambassador wrote from London to the Sultan to inform him that 35,000 men have been despatched to Hindustan for the purpose of making Christians of the Hindustanis. The Sultan of Room (may God perpetuate His sovereignty!) despatched a firman to the Pasha of Egypt to this effect:—"You are an ally of Queen Victoria. But this is not the season for amity, inasmuch as my ambassador writes that 35,000 soldiers have been despatched to Hindustan for the purpose of making Christians of the native ryots and troops. Therefore, in this case, whilst a remedy is in my power, if I should be negligent, how shall I show my face to God? And this day (*i.e.* conjuncture) may some time or other be my own (meaning this may some day be his own case), since, if the English make the Hindustanis Christians, they will make an attempt on my dominions."'

When the Pasha of Egypt received this firman, he, previous to

the arrival of the (English) force, assembled and organised his troops at Alexandria, which is on the road to Hindustan. The moment the soldiers (English) appeared, the Pasha's troops opened an artillery fire upon them from all sides, and destroyed and sank their ships, so that not a single soldier escaped.

When the English at Calcutta had issued their order for the distribution of the cartridges, and the disturbances had arisen, they anxiously looked out for the troops from London to aid them. But the Almighty, in His perfect omnipotence, had already disposed of these. When the news of the slaughter of the army from London came known, the Governor-General was greatly affected and distressed and THUMPED HIS HEAD!

Persian Quatrain.

In the beginning of the night, he possessed the power over life and property. In the morning his body was without a head, and his head without a crown. In one revolution of the cærulean sphere, neither Nadir (Shah) remained nor any sign of him.

Issued from Painted Garden of the Peischwah.

('Parliamentary Documents.')

XXI.

Sir J. Outram to the Governor-General.

Dinapore, August 19, 1857.

I purpose taking on two guns of the battery here (leaving the mountain train for service in Behar if necessary hereafter, for which I intended it), and also Major Eyre's battery to Benares, where I propose, if practicable, to organise a column to advance to Lucknow through Jaunpore, between the Sye and Goomti rivers, the only course now left by which we can hope to relieve our garrison in Lucknow; General Havelock having again retired from the attempt, and recrossed the Ganges at Cawnpore, being unable, I suppose, to cross the Sye in face of the enemy, the Bunnee bridge having been destroyed. In addition to the artillery above mentioned, I can only have the 5th Fusiliers and 90th Regiment, so weakened by detachments as to amount together to less than 1,000 men, some of the Goorkhas perhaps, and the Madras regiment now on its way up the river. But I hope to arrange with General Havelock—after effecting a junction with such troops as he can forward from Cawnpore—to cross the Ganges about Futtehpore, and pass the Sye near Roy Bareilly. I would there prepare rafts (on inflated skins) by which

these reinforcements would cross the Sye. We should then be in sufficient strength, I trust, to force our way to Lucknow.

All my arrangements here will be completed by to-morrow, and no time shall be lost in pushing up to Benares, whence I hope to send back most of the steamers and flats now here and above. Aware as I am how urgently these vessels are required at Calcutta, I am very much vexed that such great and unnecessary delays should have interposed, by detentions here, at Dinapore, and other places; and your lordship may rely on my preventing any further delay that can possibly be avoided.

(Sir James Outram's 'Campaigns in India, 1857–1858.')

The Commander-in-Chief to Sir J. Outram.

Calcutta, August 24, 1857.

I have been favoured by the Governor-General with a perusal of yours to his lordship of the 19th instant, in which you propose to collect a force of about 1,000 infantry and eight guns at Benares, with a view to march to the relief of our garrison in Lucknow, by the most direct route from thence, and that the force under General Havelock at Cawnpore should co-operate with you in this movement, by crossing the Ganges at Futtehpore, and the Sye subsequently (with your assistance) at Roy Bareilly, and forming a junction with you beyond that place.

General Havelock states, in his telegraph of the 20th instant, that his force is reduced to 700 men in the field, exclusive of the detachments required to guard his entrenchments, and keep open his communication with Allahabad, and so inadequate does he consider his force to be for the defence of his post, that he states in his telegraph dated August 21, 12.30 P.M., that, if not assured of reinforcements by return of telegraph, he will retire to Allahabad. Hope of co-operation from General Havelock (by a force equal to accomplish the movement you propose, by crossing the Ganges at Futtehpore) is not to be entertained. The march from Benares, by the most direct route, to Lucknow is a long one—some 150 miles—and the population through which you would have to pass hostile. Its great recommendation, I presume to be, that you (by that route) turn, or rather, come in rear of, the many nullahs which, I am told, interpose between Cawnpore and Lucknow, and this would be an important advantage. But if the force you propose to collect at Benares were to be moved by the river to Cawnpore, and united with Havelock's reduced numbers, do you think it would be equal to force its way over the numerous nullahs, necessarily full of water at this

season, which are to be found on the road from the latter place to Lucknow? By this route all incumbrances, such as sick, &c., would be left at the different stations, or pass along the road, and the troops, being conveyed by steam, would suffer less than if obliged to march, and Havelock's anxiety about his post would be removed.

In offering these remarks or suggestions to you, who are acquainted with the country people and difficulties attending the movements you propose, it is not with any view to fetter your judgment and perfect freedom of mind, but I mention these as they occur to me in writing to you, and I think I may venture to say that the measures you may deem most advisable to pursue will receive the approval of the Governor-General. I hope to have the pleasure of hearing from you.

(Idem.)

The Governor-General of India to Sir J. Outram.

Telegraphic. August 25, 1857.

Upon well considering the plan proposed in your letter of the 19th, it seems open to these objections:—

The road to Lucknow by Jaunpore is bad: it lies through a country in insurrection; there would be great difficulty in keeping communications open in your rear; there would be no safe places at which to leave the sick and wounded; supplies must be uncertain; the march will be 150 miles, and will not be eased or expedited by carriage or water conveyance.

The road by Allahabad and Cawnpore is much longer, but none of these objections apply to it. It will bring you into junction with General Havelock's force, which, considering the small strength of each force, seems very necessary; and if the Gwalior regiments advance, you will have them in front. But the road by Jaunpore may have advantages of which I am not aware, and I am confident that your deliberate judgment will decide for the best.

It is not probable that the relief of the Lucknow garrison will be facilitated by the abandonment of Cawnpore; but if this should be the case, do not hesitate to abandon it. The political importance of it, and the cost of recovering it, are not to be weighed against the relief of Lucknow.

Accounts from Lucknow to the 16th were received last night. There are 350 Europeans and 300 natives, but they have 120 sick and 4 per cent. women and children, and no carriage; they cannot, therefore, cut their way out. They are hard pressed, but a reduction to half rations will enable them to hold out till the 10th of next month.

Endeavour to communicate with Colonel Inglis, and tell him

that he is not to care for the treasure, if it should be an incumbrance, but that he may use it in any way for the release of the garrison.

(Idem.)

Sir J. Outram to Mr. Mangles, Chairman of the Court of Directors.

Allahabad, September 3, 1857.

I arrived here on the evening of the 1st instant, and had hoped to be overtaken yesterday by the troops which were to follow in two hours after I sailed from Benares on the morning of the 3rd, but they have not yet (8 A.M.) made their appearance. I hope they will arrive in the course of the day, and in the meantime everything is prepared for their onward march. I trust I shall join Havelock at Cawnpore by the 10th or 11th, and that then no time will be lost in forcing our way to Lucknow and relieving the garrison, as I confidently rely on doing.

We have no direct accounts thence, but I am pretty sure that they are not in such stress as represented—even to the length, it is said, of negotiating for terms!—reports set about by the rebels no doubt. Indeed, an officer likely to be well informed writes from Cawnpore on the 31st ultimo: 'Lucknow is all right and in good spirits.' The amount of reinforcements I am taking on to General Havelock, and his confidence that they will suffice, you will gather from the enclosed copies of telegraphic messages which have lately passed between us. In coming up the river, I have made every disposition the means at my command permitted for the security of the principal stations bordering thereon, and I trust they will suffice so far; but of course I could not provide military means for ridding the districts of the gaol birds and budmashes let loose on the country by the blundering of the authorities at Dinapore. I, however, suggested to the civil authorities to augment their police, and to impress on the zemindars, &c., that they would be held responsible for keeping the peace within their own limits. By such means Behar and Tirhoot ought to be kept tolerably quiet, until troops can be released from their more pressing duties in advance. The abandonment of Goruckpore by the Goorkhas was a sad mistake, and has encouraged an invasion in that quarter from Oude, which would never otherwise have been attempted. I trust, however, that the evil will not spread further in that direction, and that the Goorkhas may yet be induced to resume their position at Goruckpore for the present, in addition to Azimghur and Jaunpore, which they are now holding with great advantage, securing those districts from incursions from Oude. I trust my next will be from Lucknow; and my

object in writing this hasty note, which I am told will be in time for the mail, is to relieve you from the anxiety which the critical position of those at Lucknow must naturally inspire. I rely on their holding out till we can advance, and in that case that we shall succeed. (Idem.)

XXII.

Order of the Day of Sir J. Outram and Brigadier Havelock.

Cawnpore, September 15, 1857.

The important duty of relieving the garrison of Lucknow had been first entrusted to Brigdadier-General Havelock, C.B., and Major-General Outram feels that it is due to that distinguished officer and to the strenuous and noble exertions he had already made to effect that object, that to him should accrue the honours of the achievement.

Major-General Outram is confident that this great end, for which Brigadier-General Havelock and his brave troops have so long and so gloriously fought, will now, under the blessing of Providence, be accomplished.

The Major-General, therefore, in gratitude for and admiration of the brilliant deeds of arms achieved by Brigadier-General Havelock and his gallant troops, will cheerfully waive his rank in favour of that officer on this occasion, and will accompany the force to Lucknow in his civil capacity, as Chief Commissioner of Oude, tendering his military services to Brigadier-General Havelock as a volunteer.

On the relief of Lucknow, the Major-General will resume his position at the head of the forces.

Cawnpore, September 16, 1857.

Brigadier-General Havelock, in making known to the column the kind and generous determination of Major-General Sir J. Outram, G.C.B., to leave to him the task of relieving Lucknow, and rescuing its gallant and enduring garrison, has only to express his hope that the troops will strive, by their exemplary and gallant conduct in the field, to justify the confidence thus reposed in them.

(Sir J. Outram, 'Campaigns in India, 1857–58.')

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