



prey to their fanatical foes, to perish in the passes exposed to the full rigour of an Afghan winter.

The concluding remarks by Broadfoot on that part of Lieut. Eyre's narrative, from the outbreak to November 23, 1841, are as follows :

Lieut. Eyre's narrative here closes, the rest not having been sent in. It shows that to our own mismanagement, in Afghanistan and in India, we chiefly owe our misfortunes. There is in the narrative a tone of bitterness towards individuals which would render its accuracy suspicious but for the fact of its having been compiled under the correction of so many survivors, active agents in the events, and fellow-prisoners of Lieut. Eyre.

As to the cowardice of H.M.'s 44th Regt. and other portions of the troops, it is only what will always result from feebleness and incapacity in the leaders, in situations so false, in a military point of view, as was that of the Cabool force. The 44th were of the same class of men as other British soldiers, and only gave way somewhat sooner from being in a bad state of discipline originally. The native troops, like other troops, gave way sooner or later as they had good or indifferent officers.

The military errors are plain and numerous ; but it was the fault of the Government that our armies were so circumstanced that incapacity should lead to annihilation. As to Gen. Elphinstone, he had many disadvantages to contend with, and he was utterly broken by sickness in mind and body ; in fact, he had actually sent in his resignation on these grounds.

After November 23 our troops cannot be said to have fought ; the enemy insulted and harassed them with impunity, except from occasional efforts of individuals, especially Capt. Colin Mackenzie with a handful of Juzailchees and Sappers. The military authorities called on the Envoy to capitulate. The Shah early in December openly declared himself the chief Ghazee, and conferred honours on the champions of the faith. Negotiations were opened with Mahomed Akbar Khan, interrupted by this chief murdering the Envoy, and were resumed at the instance of the military leaders against the advice of the subordinate political officers (Major Pottinger, Capt. Mackenzie, &c.), and finally, on January 6, 1842, the force marched. The same feebleness and incapacity of the leaders, and misconduct of the troops, marked the march, and its disastrous end is known.

I had 300 Sappers there, very fine troops, which had been sent back from Tezin. They were ordered to bridge the watercourses near the cantonment for the passage of our camels, *and not allowed*



to take their arms. These were left under a guard in the cantonment. The men were kept at the bridges till night, when the enemy rushed into the cantonment, and seized their arms. Thus, by gross mismanagement, were these men delivered up helpless to slaughter. Some have made their way through all: most of them perished in the passes. They were, according to the custom there, transferred from one strange officer to another, but clung together to the last; and no small number reached Jugduluk, to perish in the last fatal march from that place. I give this to show the extent mismanagement had reached.

At Jugduluk the unfortunate remnant took up a position in a small table-land, at one corner of which rises a conical hill. This table-land was occupied by a piquet of Sir R. Sale's force on its march down, and I had to secure them, as we also were surrounded. The conical hill so completely commands the ground that I found it necessary to construct a small work by digging out the peak, where I put a party of our best men. It is a dangerous post to hold, inasmuch as it can only be entered or quitted under fire of many hills around, but safe [when] once entered. This post Gen. Elphinstone neglected, and the enemy seized it, making a terrible slaughter of our men from it. Major Thain proposed to the remnant of the 44th to storm it, and a number consented; but they had to volunteer for *officers!* and were led by Lieut. Macartney, S.S.F.,<sup>5</sup> Capt. Mathews commanding the Sappers S.S.F., and Capt. Hay, also of S.S.F. Two of these officers were wounded, but the hill was taken. The troops, however, could not be kept in it, and the enemy again seized it. In hopes of stopping this slaughter, Gen. Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, and Capt. Johnson were induced to visit Mahomed Akbar to negotiate. They found themselves prisoners, and the poor General vainly demanded to be sent back to perish with his men. He was already wounded. He contrived to send the troops information of the treachery, and they marched; but an abattis across the road caused irretrievable confusion. Had they been in hand they might still have forced the pass, not a very difficult one; but the above incidents will have shown disorganisation could go little farther. Brigadier Anquetil's death completed it, and the force then utterly perished under the knives of the neighbouring peasantry, for the Cabool troops had gone back.

We long had no accounts of these matters but from Lady Sale's letters, which, naturally, carried too great weight here. She, seeing the pursuit by the enemy's cavalry in the Cabool actions,

<sup>5</sup> S.S.F. : Shah Shuja's force.



and the way our troops, horse and foot, shrank from meeting them, formed an extraordinary opinion of them, and communicated it to the authorities here, where it did us much harm. An injurious timidity was shown that gave extraordinary confidence to the enemy, and tended to produce despondency among ourselves. Their cavalry is, like their infantry, composed of men severally brave, collectively worthless. The men are ill mounted, and, above all, without mutual confidence, which discipline and regular organisation alone can give. It was not till *repeated* examples, chiefly with our horse in foraging parties, and the sappers<sup>6</sup> in working parties, had shown that the merest handful of disciplined troops moderately supported could act in the face of any number of them, and defeat great odds, that their true value began to be felt.

But this spread farther, and the Afghan cavalry and infantry were, most erroneously, believed to be an enemy more formidable than any we had hitherto met. Nothing could be more unfounded. I have seen nothing like military skill among their leaders but once, [viz.] in a chief in the Jugduluk pass, who was killed at the time, and his efforts failed. Their troops are mere peasantry as far as the infantry soldiers are concerned; the cavalry soldiers are an ill-mounted mob, not to be compared to the Mahrattas, and still less to the troops of Hyder Ali and Tippoo. As to coping with disciplined troops, European or native, it is absurd, unless in cases of mismanagement so gross that it matters not who the enemy are. All we want are efficient leaders, and above all an efficient commissariat, and system of equipment adapted to the country. Would to Heaven, Gen. Cullen were here as Commissary-General with unlimited power from the Government, and all would go well. We have failed from ignorance, want of forethought, and the gross neglect of every rule of war and policy, in our governors and commanders. The difficulties of the force under Gen. Elphinstone, either with a view to suppressing the rebellion, or retiring to India, or rather the difficulty of invading and subduing the country through the Punjab, which is open to us, is not equal to that of the enterprise accomplished by the Duke of Wellington, when he marched from Mysore to destroy the Maharatta confederacy. He, also, had a long line of operation, poor and difficult countries to traverse, rapid rivers to cross, and mountains not merely to pass, but, as at Gawilgurh, to carry his siege train across. But see his foresight, timely preparation, and profound knowledge, and then see the results in his uninterrupted and then unparalleled march from victory to victory. Yet he had, besides natural obstacles, to con-

<sup>6</sup> They used to have no covering parties. Half worked, and were protected by the rest.



tend with armies that could fight a battle like Assaye, which the Afghans could no more do than the American Indians.

Set the Duke down at Ferozpoore with *carte blanche*; both contempt of the enemy and timidity would disappear, and Afghanistan would soon be our own to keep or abandon.

I know not what is to be the future policy; but this I know, that however great (and it is enormous) is the evil of a poor dependency, or expensive war pressing on our finances, scanty at the best, it is but an inconvenience that time and prudence may remedy, compared with the evil of our superiority in arms being doubted in India; above all, if those before whom we are constrained to go back, are an Asiatic and Indian nation like the Afghans. Shake the belief in our invincibility, in our immeasurable military superiority rendering opposition hopeless, and you shake the foundation of our power.

Whilst Pollock's army was being got ready to advance towards Kabul, Broadfoot was sent out with a small force, on July 25, towards Fatehabad and Gandamak. He considered that his detachment was too weak to withstand an attack from the Afghans; and therefore he at once assumed the offensive. By making sudden and rapid marches he defeated his foes in detail with such effect as to cause the submission of all in the neighbourhood. These movements, though undoubtedly the wisest under the circumstances, alarmed Pollock, a cautious rather than a dashing commander. Broadfoot was forbidden to act on the offensive, which the General considered to be dangerous for so small a force far from support: at the same time reinforcements were promised. Of Broadfoot's doings, Capt. Henry Lawrence in a letter to Mr. George Clerk, dated August 7, 1842, wrote thus:

Broadfoot is out here, doing good service in collecting grain and frightening the scoundrels. He went up the valley towards Kajar four days ago, where the inhabitants were all in revolt; but to-day the Malliks of the whole country round for ten miles have come in. He took his Sappers and 200 irregular horse, and has, I think, done great good; but he has got a damper from the General.

In the same letter reference is made to the destruction of Fatehabad by Broadfoot, as a grateful sight and a most just punishment. Two days later Lawrence contrasted Broadfoot's energy in command of a small detachment, with Sale's inactivity at the head of a large brigade.



## CHAPTER VI.

1842.

Advance on Kabul—Mámú Khel despatches—Broadfoot's report—Col. Taylor's letter—Extract from the 'Englishman'—Broadfoot's reply to Col. Taylor—Sappers ordered to Mamu Khel—Instructions from Gen. Pollock—Description of the ground—Broadfoot attacked and carried the village—Pursued the enemy to Kúdí Khel—Partially cleared the hills beyond—Advance arrested by the arrival of a senior officer—Unfortunate result—Troops retired to Mamu Khel—Afghans skilful in mountain war—Letter to Mr. Loch—Gen. Elphinstone—Letter to Mrs. Bayley—Post of honour given to Broadfoot's Sappers—Affair at Jagdalak—Action at Tezin—Arrival at Kabul—Recovery of the prisoners—Gen. Nott—Capture of Istálif: Broadfoot wounded—Return of the army to Firozpur—Letters to Mrs. Bayley and Mr. Loch, and from Lord Ellenborough—Broadfoot gazetted brevet-major and C.B.

By the strenuous exertions of all concerned, from the Governor-General downwards, supplies and carriage were so far provided that a forward movement on the part of Pollock's army became possible. Baggage was reduced, the sick were left behind, and Broadfoot volunteered to take his Sappers without tents at all.

Pollock marched from Jalalabad on August 20, and arrived at Gandamak on the 23rd, where he intended to halt to collect further supplies and to await news from Gen. Nott. Gandamak was within the region in which disaster, destruction, and plunder had proved to the satisfaction of the Afghan his superiority to British troops. Consequently small detached bodies did not fear to approach Pollock's army, and endeavour by insult and provocation to bring on a fight.

Seeing that there was hard work to be done, and the importance of having it well done, Pollock sent that night for Broadfoot and his Sappers, and a squadron of H.M.'s 3rd Dragoons who were behind with Sale at Nimla. So promptly did they respond that they were with the General before sunrise. With Pollock, as with Sale on former occasions, there was no danger of Broadfoot and his men being forgotten in

the hour of peril, however faulty the Generals' memories might be when that was over and when the time came for mentioning their services in despatches. Gen. Pollock's despatch of August 25, 1842, is a remarkable instance of this. It records how, as above mentioned, Broadfoot was sent for in the night, and arrived before daylight; how at 4 A.M. he with his corps joined the right column, which he for a time commanded; how he cleared the hills of the enemy in one place, and in another captured their camp equipage, with its carriage cattle. And yet in the next paragraph, where the officers who specially distinguished themselves are thanked, Broadfoot's name is looked for in vain. Gen. Pollock published Broadfoot's report, and in the mention made in the body of the despatch of his services there is nothing to indicate an unworthy motive, or a wish to conceal their value. The omission of his name among the officers 'mentioned in the despatch' must therefore be put down to an oversight; but it is one deserving of severe censure. If there were any reasons why Broadfoot's name should not have been mentioned as one to whom the General was specially indebted on that occasion, they should, considering the tenor of the rest of the despatch, have been explained.

Broadfoot's report, or rather a review of the events of 1842 in Afghanistan by the 'Delhi Gazette,' based on that report, the accuracy of which was questioned by Col. Taylor of the 9th Foot, led to a correspondence which elicited from Broadfoot an account of the events of the day so complete and so accurate, that Col. Taylor was desired by high military authority to make no reply.

The report is as follows :

*From Capt. G. Broadfoot, Sappers and Miners, commanding Right Column, to Capt. G. Ponsonby, Assist. Adjt.-General.*

Camp, Mamoo Khel : August 25, 1842.

Sir,—Agreeably to orders, I have the honour to report the proceedings of the column entrusted to me by the Major-General commanding in the action yesterday.

I moved, as directed, with the Sappers (about 220 men) and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry (250) across the ravine on the right of the force. We found the enemy strongly posted in an orchard with some inclosures, and the usual fieldworks of loose stones in their front



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were also occupied. This position flanked the approach of the main body.

Having formed an attacking party in front, I sent the rest of the Sappers in column, under Lieut. Orr, to turn the enemy's left flank, and Capt. Tait's horse still more to the right and in advance, to cut off their retreat. While we waited in this order the advance of the force, the enemy reinforced the orchard and moved out to attack us. I was therefore obliged to advance before the force arrived. The enemy's positions were quickly carried in succession. One party was driven towards the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, who pursued, and the remainder fled to the village of Mamoo Khel, into which the main body of the enemy were at this moment driven by the fire of our artillery. They opened a fire on us, ill directed, but so heavy that we were obliged to attack the village; they fled when we reached it, and the Sappers pursued to the fort, but were so exhausted by the march from Futehabad and the previous operations that the enemy was able to enter and barricade the gate; their fire was kept down by one party of Sappers, while the rest climbed on each other's shoulders over a half-repaired bastion about eight feet high and covered with thorns; the enemy fled over the walls on the other side, leaving the rear gate barricaded. This, and descending from the walls, lost so much time, that pursuit was nearly hopeless as far as our now exhausted men were concerned. We pressed on with the least fatigued, however, and keeping up to the hills forced the enemy into level ground; our cavalry was approaching, and we had the satisfaction of seeing the cavalry overtake and attack them.

Parties were now directed to destroy the forts abandoned on the cavalry approaching, while with a few men I pushed on to the last village near the hills, where we surprised the enemy, whose headquarters were there, driving them out of the village and adjoining camp, and obtaining their tents, cattle, and ammunition, and a good quantity of provisions. The enemy (who were evidently the Juzailchees from Cabool) fled to the hills, the fire from which swept the village.

I was now directed to take a party of H.M.'s 9th Foot, the Sappers being now worn out, except about six men, and attack the hills; the first and second heights were carried at the point of the bayonet, and flanking parties having turned the shoulders of the high range, we were advancing up it when the main force arrived, and our farther progress was stayed. My separate command now ceased, and I was soon after ordered with the Sappers to headquarters.

The conduct of the troops, officers and men, European and native, was admirable, and it is due to the 26th N.I. to mention that in storming the second height with a party of H.M.'s 9th Foot,



a party of the former corps joined us, and behaved with the same spirit as the rest. I have &c.

G. BROADFOOT, *Captain,*  
*Commanding Right Column.*

From this report the 'Delhi Gazette' compiled the following sentence, which formed part of their review of the events of 1842 :

The Sappers being completely knocked up except about six men, Capt. Broadfoot took a party of H.M.'s 9th Foot, carried some of the hills at the point of the bayonet, and would have driven off all the enemy, had not Gen. Pollock thought it prudent to recall all the detached parties, some of whom had gone more than two miles in advance of Mamoo Khel.

With reference to this, Col. Taylor addressed the editor of the 'Delhi Gazette' as follows :

Camp, Mobarakpore : February 20, 1843.

Sir,—Observing in your 'Gazette' of the 15th inst., in 'continuation of a review of the past year,' a narrative of the affair at Mamoo Khel between the troops of Major-Gen. Pollock and the Afghans on August 24 last, in which you state that Capt. (now Major) Broadfoot 'took a party of the 9th Foot, carried some hills at the point of the bayonet,' &c. ; in correction I have to observe that on that day no party of the 9th Foot was placed under Capt. Broadfoot's command either by me or Gen. M'Caskill, nor did any soldiers of that corps act under his orders to my knowledge. In justice to two gallant officers, I have further to add that on the occasion alluded to by you, I ordered Major Huish, 26th N.I., and Capt. Ogle, H.M.'s 9th Foot (both senior to Capt. Broadfoot), to take two companies from each of those regiments, and dislodge the enemy from the heights over Kookey Kail, which they effectually did in a few minutes, and to those officers is due the credit of that gallant action. Capt. Broadfoot, I understood, accompanied them with three or four of his Sappers, but he could have no command of a superior officer, Major Huish.

I have the honour &c.

A. B. TAYLOR,  
*Lieut.-Col. 9th Foot.*

This called forth from Broadfoot a letter which appeared in the 'Englishman and Military Chronicle' of March 23, 1843, on which that newspaper remarked :



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We have much pleasure in giving publicity to the following communication from Major Broadfoot, concerning the carrying of certain hills at Mamoo Khel, in which the gallant Major incontestably proves that the whole work was done by himself, prior to his supersession by Lieut-Col. Huish; and that Col. Taylor's version of the affair does not invalidate his (Major Broadfoot's) claim to the chief credit due for the conspicuous part he bore in the transaction. The communication is written in the frank, manly, soldierlike tone, we should have expected from one of the most distinguished officers engaged in that memorable campaign, and as a mere personal narrative of a very gallant, brilliant action, we are quite sure will be perused with much interest by all our military readers. We have neither time nor space at the present moment to comment more fully upon the subject.

*To the Editor of the 'Englishman and Military Chronicle.'*

Sir,—With reference to Lieut.-Col. Taylor's letter and my own, in your paper of the 12th and 13th instant, you will oblige me by giving a place to the following:

About the middle of August last, Major-Gen. Pollock advanced from Jellalabad to Gundumuk, Sir Robert Sale being left at Futteh-abad. A small Afghan force had come from Cabool to garrison Tatang, a fort of Mahomed Akbar near Gundumuk, but it was destroyed before their arrival by a detachment of Sir R. Sale's troops. The intended garrison, being joined by some neighbouring chiefs, took post at Mamoo Khel, about two miles from Gen. Pollock's camp at Gundumuk: they attacked his piquets, followed back small parties sent to look at them, and not being chastised, increased in numbers hourly. At length Gen. Pollock resolved to attack them and capture Mamoo Khel, the seat of one of the great officers of Shah Shooja's Court, and a leader in the movements against the English.

On August 23, Sir R. Sale was directed to send a squadron of H.M.'s 3rd Dragoons, and Broadfoot's Sapper corps, on to Gundumuk; the latter were at the moment some miles from camp bringing in supplies, but by evening they had returned, and after dark marched with the Dragoons under Major Bond, leaving stores and baggage with the usual guards (besides about a company in garrison at a fort a few miles off) to follow next day. They were thus only about 300 strong.

The march was only fifteen miles, but included an ascent of about 2,000 feet, and a descent of perhaps 500.

Major Bond arrived before dawn on the 24th, and found Gen. Pollock's force under arms to move on Mamoo Khel. The Sappers were ordered to join. They had now been four-and-twenty hours at



work or under arms with no food save dry pulse, eaten as they marched; and when at daylight a few minutes' halt was made, they sat down and nearly all slept from weariness. On Capt. (now Major) Havelock, however, summoning them to the front of the column, they received him with loud cheers. Gen. Pollock now told me to furnish such skirmishing parties as would be demanded by officers whom he named; I think (but am not certain) they were Brigadier Tulloch and Lieut.-Col. Taylor. The force moved on, but no skirmishers were asked for. Gen. Pollock after a time came up again, and with many kind expressions informed me he wished the men to share in a fight they had come so far for, and he desired me to mention any separate service for them my knowledge

\* I had been under Sir Robert Sale against the place the year before.

of the ground<sup>a</sup> might suggest; finally he sanctioned another column on the right to secure our flank and complete our success by getting on the enemy's best line of retreat; that, namely, towards Koodee Khel, an opening in the mountains two miles beyond and to our right of Mamoo Khel.

The country south of Gundumuk rises rapidly but uniformly for four or five miles to the foot of the first range of the steep and pine-covered hills of the Soofed Koh. The hill streams flow to the Soorkhab river in deep channels which divide this tract into *strips* of irregular form stretching obliquely up to the hills. On one of these stands Mamoo Khel, an open village of flat-roofed houses of mud and stone, overlooking the stream on our right as we came from Gundumuk; about three-quarters of a mile beyond it, and towards the stream on our left, was the fort, a weak place, without a ditch, and surrounded with broken ground laid out in gardens and vineyards. The rest of the ground was cultivated in terraces for corn, and it narrowed towards Koodee Khel. Beyond the stream on our right was a tract of similar form, but stony and barren, save near the stream, where there were orchards. Across this stream I was directed to take the Sappers and Tait's horse as a subsidiary column of attack.

We moved rapidly to our new place, and found the enemy in some force on that side, and posted in the orchards; while on Gen. Pollock's side of the stream a considerable body was displayed in line before the village of Mamoo Khel, which, as well as the ground beyond, was occupied by numbers greater than expected. Their plan appeared to be to draw on our force against the men before the village, who would give way and leave our troops under the fire of the village in their front, and of the orchards across the stream on their flank.



Lieut. Cunningham carried information of their numbers and position to the General, and brought back his sanction to our attacking the orchards when he should attack in front. Dispositions were made accordingly, but delays in the main body brought us on the enemy single-handed. On halting we were attacked, while reinforcements from the village prepared to join our immediate opponents, and some of the people in front of Gen. Pollock threatened our flank; we were too few for defence on such ground, and retreat would have brought the enemy victorious on the flank of our main force; so the orchards were carried at once. While this passed, Gen. Pollock's artillery opened, and the advanced body of the enemy ran back into the village, from which a fire was opened on us, then in the orchards and adjoining works which were open to the village. Our main body was not visible, and we were again obliged to attack; the stream was recrossed, and the village carried. We were now directly in front of Gen. Pollock's right, and consequently the subsidiary column of attack had become a main one. This was unavoidable, but unfortunate from our feeble numbers, as well as from its leaving no infantry in a position to cut the enemy's line of retreat from the fort.

Musketry was now heard in rear on our left as if our troops were advancing, and Lieut. Mayne, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General to Major-Gen. McCaskill, joined us; he informed me that our main force was coming up, though slowly: so, begging his aid with the cavalry, I moved towards the fort, which fell into our hands as mentioned in the despatches.

The enemy was now scattered in flight, with our cavalry pursuing. Gen. Pollock's objects were gained with little loss; and here the action of Mamoo Khel, properly speaking, ended; the rest was pursuit or incidents arising from it.

I directed the Sappers to be collected and to rest at Mamoo Khel, not meaning to go farther; but seeing some of the 5th Cavalry follow the enemy among forts, I took out some of the least

<sup>b</sup> The officers and several sergeants came, perhaps forty men of all ranks.

exhausted men to support them,<sup>b</sup> and went towards the hills to intercept fugitives. Lieut. Mayne now joined the cavalry; the pursuit began afresh and went far, leading us on in support: the forts were abandoned as the cavalry approached, and I put a few sappers in each to secure what grain &c. there was.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>c</sup> These forts were strewed with clothes, hooks, music &c. belonging to the destroyed Cabool force and garrison of Gundumuk.

This took time, and after it I found resistance was over in the open country, though there was a little firing along the hills by fugitives who



<sup>a</sup> One party rallied and returned to the plain, but was vigorously attacked and driven back by a native officer, Soobadar Aslam Khan, and some sappers. Several small parties of sappers, after a little rest at Mamoo Khel, went out skirmishing about the hill.

staff, also moving towards the hills.

Koodee Khel is an open <sup>e</sup> village of stone houses with flat roofs,

<sup>\*</sup> It has the low thin wall round it, called Gao-bundee by Afghans, intended to keep the cattle from straying at night; but the gates were gone, and the wall ruined towards the hill, which, as well as the intermediate slope, commanded the place.

the small hills are united by which is a small rocky protuberance which may be considered an

<sup>†</sup> All these really form but one hill, or rather the end of one long hill or ridge. I shall, however, for clearness call them the *small*, the *intermediate*, and the *large* hills.

from Cabool was in the village and on the slope adjoining the little hill, tents being stretched across many courtyards: the Afghans, in the belief they cherished of our fearing to approach high hills, were quietly resting after their labours. The sapper ran at them with

<sup>‡</sup> Neither man happened to have his musket loaded.

large force was on them, snatched up their turbans and arms, and fled over walls and housetops; the alarm spread, and the camp was abandoned.

The men at the village followed the enemy with their fire to the top of the little hill, from which it was returned in a way that made it clear the village was untenable without taking the hill, and that, being too weak to attempt this, we must go away soon, if we wished our withdrawal to seem voluntary.

Two or three men were posted to fire occasionally, and the rest

<sup>§</sup> All the enemy's horses were seized by camp followers or soldiers. Their ammunition I would not

had reached them.<sup>d</sup> I heard, also, that a few of our cavalry had been briskly fired on at Koodee Khel, and obliged to withdraw. I went in that direction, having with me eight or ten men; on the way I fell in with Major-Gen. McCaskill and his

having on three sides gardens and vineyards, and on the fourth a narrow strip of bare stony ground, sloping up to the right into a small but steep and rugged hill, the termination of the high pine-covered range which forms one side of the Koodee Khel valley. The large and

a steep ridge, at the lower end of which is a small rocky protuberance which may be considered an intermediate hill.<sup>f</sup>

The village seemed empty; but when halfway through it, a sapper entering a courtyard found it occupied by some of the enemy. The camp, in short, of the Juzailchees

his bayonet, followed by myself and the only other man at the spot.<sup>g</sup>

The Afghans, doubtless supposing a

large force was on them, snatched up their turbans and arms, and fled over walls and housetops; the alarm spread, and the camp was

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it clear the village was untenable without taking the hill, and that,

being too weak to attempt this, we must go away soon, if we wished

our withdrawal to seem voluntary.

Two or three men were posted to fire occasionally, and the rest

made to carry off or destroy all they

could; a work camp followers and

stragglers soon came to help them in.<sup>h</sup>



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then allow the people to meddle with for fear of accident; later in the day the enemy recaptured it, but in the confusion blew it, and some of themselves, up.

we could manage it. He said, 'Why don't you take it, then?' I told him I had no men. He was told they were in Mamoo

<sup>1</sup> The objection was the time it would have taken; too long to remain inactive under fire. I may here remark that remaining at all with so few men may seem imprudent, for I did not then know more infantry were coming up; but it was intended to be but for a very short time, during which we had only the enemy's fire to sustain. Had he come down and into contact with us, the fire from the hill would have ceased, our cavalry, who were masters of the plain, could have approached, and our retreat been secured.

I said, 'Nothing better; how many?' He answered, 'A company,' or 'About a company,' and asked if it was enough. I said it was, but we must have support. He said, 'Oh, there's lots of support; the General's up, the 9th and 26th are close here, and in fact the whole force is coming up; you'll have plenty of support.' I begged him to see them spread to the right and left, which he promised to do.

<sup>\*</sup> The exhaustion from exertion in that country is inconceivable till felt. In the morning my horse knocked up beyond persuasion of spur, or even sword point, just as we were attacking the orchard. I had to abandon him, the syce being killed. The subsequent operations were all on strong ground, and at a rapid pace, and the heat too was intense. I was obliged to cast away successively belts, scabbard, and all clothes not indispensable. At Koodee Khel, just before Lieut. Mayne joined me, having no scabbard, I gave my sword to a sepoy to hold, but the plunder of the camp had made him a truant. To the credit of our people, these things were all brought back to me that day, though scattered over miles.

At this time Lieut. Mayne came up and asked how we were getting on. I gave my view of our position, adding that the hill was the thing if Khel and all the forts and country between. He asked if they could not be brought up. I said, 'No,' and if they could they are too much done up for hills to-day.' After a little more conversation as to our position, he said, 'If I can get you other men, will you undertake to take the hill?' I said, 'Yes, get me any other men, and I go at the hill.' He said, 'Very good, I'll see what I can do,' and rode off.

He returned shortly and said, 'Here you are. I have got you some men of the 9th; they'll do, I suppose?'

He then obtained me a sword<sup>k</sup> from one of his mounted orderlies, and we moved on, I again requesting him to look to our support. I had been sitting at a gap in the village wall, next the enemy. At the corner of the village we met the men of the 9th Foot coming up to the hill. Lieut. Mayne said, 'These are the men.' 'Very well,' I replied, 'up we go,' and the ascent immediately commenced, for we were under a fire which increased when the enemy saw our object. Capt. Havelock was there, but I am not sure whether he came with the 9th men or joined Lieut. Mayne and myself just be-



fore ; I think the latter. At any rate, I spoke to him and asked his aid in keeping our men from firing and in getting a rapid advance with the bayonet. I believe also that I bespoke his aid in getting support and sending men round the flanks of the hill. He and Lieut. Mayne accompanied me, cheering on the men and preventing firing. There were several officers of the 9th present, not one of whom I knew, and I only remember speaking to one of them who during the ascent made a remark on something unconnected with the duty. All of them joined in making the men advance without halting to fire or load. Before we reached the summit the enemy ran to the intermediate height and ridge beyond. Capt. Havelock and Lieut. Mayne came as far as their horses could come,

<sup>1</sup> A little knoll of rocks in the centre of the summit.

and went down on seeing us up. When I reached the highest point<sup>1</sup> there were with me only two or three

men of the 9th, and as many Sappers.

After taking breath and giving time for more men to come up, we moved to the intermediate height, which the enemy abandoned. We were accompanied by a few men of the 26th N.I., who had come up while we were waiting ; the first I saw of that regiment.

Beyond the intermediate hill rose the large hill ; the enemy were now in full retreat up the connecting ridge, but as some had

<sup>m</sup> The military reader will see that so small a party was left in order to have few men under the enemy's closest fire ; they sufficed to keep the enemy from creeping down the rocks to short musket range of the little hill, which was all we wanted for the present. A small number also could alone find cover. Some of the sepoys of the 26th who first came up remained there, and two or three of the 9th afterwards joined them : a thing to be encouraged as long as safe. I placed the Sappers there because they were used to close quarters with the Afghans, and not likely to think they were abandoned when we went back.

already gained the top, and the ascent was long and steep, I thought it prudent to wait till the subsidiary arrangements were made below. Leaving, therefore, the few Sappers<sup>m</sup> (about six) at the intermediate hill, I returned to the small hill, and saw the space below full of our troops, horse and foot, of whom considerable parties were stretching out to the right and left along the flanks of the large hill : more infantry, both European and Native, were also ascending the little hill ; in short, all was going as one could wish.

In due time the left flank of the hill was enveloped by troops, chiefly of the 26th Regiment ; the right flank was not so well

<sup>n</sup> I knew this officer would cooperate with vigour and judgment when he saw the assault begin. I knew also he would easily get troops from officers near, and if there were none the men would follow him.

manned, but troops were going that way, among whom I perceived Lieut. Orr<sup>n</sup> of the Sappers, and the position of the men on the left flank was completely under the enemy's fire ;



They seldom fail, be they black or white.

hill,<sup>o</sup> and when near it made a sign to the party there to advance, and passed the word for the ascent of the large hill, moving on myself.

<sup>o</sup> This was from ten to twenty minutes after reaching the summit of the small hill; it seemed the latter or even more, but I had not a watch, and to a man waiting the time seems long.

‘Sir! sir! there is an order to who gave the order?’ A very

<sup>p</sup> The Major’s courtesy may not seem great, but I cannot be certain that my own manner was very bland.

there, and informed him that I had been sent up with orders to take the hill: he said he also had been sent up with orders to occupy the hill we were on, but not to go higher. I said my orders were from the General, received through Lieut. Mayne. He said his orders also were from the General.

<sup>q</sup> I, of course, asked Major Huish if he had any occasion for my services or those of my men, and was told he had not.

to headquarters and make my report.<sup>q</sup>

Seeing the little hill crowded with our men, however, I again went to Major Huish and said there was certainly some mistake in these contradictory orders, and urged him to complete the capture of the hill, pointing out its necessity. He objected its being too steep to ascend, its being out of shot, and not worth taking, and that its capture would cost many men. The enemy’s bullets showed its nearness while we conversed: on other points, I mentioned the enemy’s flight up it just before, and assured him stopping short would cost more men than taking it, as the enemy would ascribe it to fear, and not only fire on him then, but rally generally, and pursue him when he left. He seemed incredulous as to the rallying and pursuit, urging besides that if we did go up we must come back, and were just as likely to be pursued then as now. He said also the enemy would go to other heights, which we must take, and then others in endless succession. I pointed out the form of the whole hill, that once on the top, we had the Afghans comparatively on

so I resolved to attack at once. I went towards the intermediate hill, and when near it made a sign to the party there to advance, and passed the word for the ascent of the large hill, moving on myself. Before many paces, some one called out, ‘Halt! halt!’ I called out, ‘No! no! No halt! Move on!’ and went forward more rapidly; but again the cry of ‘Halt!’ was raised, and a man of the 9th called out, ‘Halt.’ I asked, ‘Who said so? And who gave the order?’ A very young-looking officer standing under a rock called out in answer to the last question,<sup>p</sup> ‘I, Major Huish, give it, if you choose to obey it.’ I explained to the Major my ignorance of any officer senior to myself being

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level ground, where indiscipline and inferior arms put their standing against us out of the question, and they could not go to the other hills without descending first, no easy matter when pursued by us from above. I assured him Afghans never fought hopeless battles, and that when they saw no ground could stop us, they would disperse, and the terror of such a blow at the opening of the campaign would prevent all serious opposition in the passes.

He did not feel justified in making the attempt, and I then pressed him to withdraw at once from the hill; his orders preventing

\* The Pushtoo name of the rough field works of loose stones used by the Afghans. They are quickly made and useful.

this, I advised his keeping very few men, a mere guard, upon it, and putting them into a 'sungur,'<sup>r</sup> having the rest in reserve below; and, above all, I urged him to with-

draw the men below on the left flank of the large hill, who, besides being now not wanted there, were in a false position.

After some discussion he agreed to diminish the number on the summit, and proceeded to do so, while I went down the hill. The enemy had, on the Sappers being brought back from their advance, crowded to the crest of the upper hill. Their fire too had since been getting steadier. I had not gone fifty yards down before Major Huish called me back, and, with some excitement, said, 'Capt. Broadfoot, this is all your doing, and I shall hold you responsible. I shall make it known to Gen. Pollock.' He then pointed out the enemy, who had come a little way down the hill, and planted a flag. He added, 'I sent down the men entirely by your advice, and trusting to your greater experience of hill warfare, and it has brought down the enemy upon us. I shall recall my men, and make known to Gen. Pollock this was your doing.'

I said this was just what I had been telling him, the Afghans thought us frightened, that flag would rally them over all the country round, and the longer he stayed the worse it would be; that of course he must use his own judgment; but I repeated my advice to take the hill or get out of its reach; or if he must stay where he was, to have a few men above and his reserves below, and well posted to cover his retreat. But I again suggested the removal of the men on the left below (his own men the 26th chiefly, if not altogether), or they would get into

\* The hope was expressed, I imagine, to get the General informed there were doubts as to the goodness of the position.

trouble. As to Gen. Pollock, I promised to tell him all about it myself; he said he hoped<sup>s</sup> I would; and for the rest, Col. Taylor was

at the foot of the hill; and so with mutual good wishes we parted.

I shall not enter into details of the subsequent events.



CSL

At the foot of the hill I mentioned briefly to Lieut.-Col. Taylor my being prevented by the arrival of Major Huish from taking the high hill, of which I advocated the necessity and feasibility; adding that in twenty minutes from Major Huish stopping me the whole would have been accomplished. Col. Taylor disagreed with me, his reasons being similar to those of Major Huish, but the discussion was short. The Colonel did not seem to think I knew much about the matter; so I went away to Gen. McCaskill at the village.

Midway I met Capt. Havelock, who may perhaps recollect my complaining of the contradictory <sup>t</sup> orders, which sent me up to be

<sup>t</sup> My impression at the time was that the contradiction arose, as in other cases there, from different general officers exercising command at one time, and orders coming through all sorts of channels, and I may have mentioned this to Capt. Havelock.

superseded just as we were completing the victory of the day, by a lesson to the enemy as desirable as the reverse we were now certain of, would be dangerous, with our comparatively inexperienced troops at the opening of a campaign. I recounted what had passed between

Major Huish, Lieut.-Col. Taylor, and myself, and urged the necessity of yet getting the hill captured, or reverses would follow. I had the gratification to find he agreed in the necessity of taking the hills completely, and I believe he tried in vain to get it done.

To Gen. McCaskill I reported my supersession by Major Huish having prevented the complete occupation of the hill. I believe I

<sup>u</sup> The truth, I believe, is, the General was ordered to hold the position that I was calling untenable.

mentioned my interview with Lieut.-Col. Taylor, and I certainly stated my opinion of our position, but no reply<sup>u</sup> was given.

Capt. (now Major) Macgregor was at the village on the part of Gen. Pollock, and I think I mentioned the matter to him. I certainly did to Lieut. Mayne, in very plain terms, who said he could not help it, but would now get the orders as to myself from Gen. Pollock, who was at Mamoo Khel. Meanwhile the officers and sergeants of Sappers were ordered to collect all men in that quarter for fear of any sudden change in affairs.

Orders came for me to join the Sappers at Mamoo Khel; but, in the interim, our troops under Lieut.-Col. Taylor had been driven with loss from some of their positions, and reinforcements sent for. When those arrived I took leave of Gen. McCaskill and repaired to Mamoo Khel.

In reply to Gen. Pollock's interrogations, I mentioned what I had seen, and stated plainly and fully all the opinions above given; and on his demanding my opinion as to the best course in present cir-



cumstances, I still advised the capture of the hill, but by a larger force than Gen. McCaskill had, as it was no longer held by a beaten fragment of the enemy, outnumbered and pursued, but by a fast increasing body flushed with success. This not being agreed to, I

\* Gen. McCaskill was very ill, but came out for the action and pushed on, as has been seen. The heat and fatigue so reduced his strength, that I left Koodee Khel not without apprehension regarding him.

advised the immediate withdrawal of our troops from Koodee Khel, more troops, especially cavalry, being sent to secure their retreat.

I also mentioned the state of Gen. McCaskill's health.\*

Captain Macgregor, however, seemed to think Koodee Khel tenable without the whole hill, and nothing was decided then, save that Gen. McCaskill was to remain.

† There were many conversations before and after the retreat of our troops. I took part in some, but counsels changed, and I forget whether it was decided to attack the hill in the morning or not. I think it was, for I remember discussing the plan of attack with Capt. Havelock, who was present at some of those conversations; and I think it was a view to this decision that enabled me to meet Capt. Macgregor's arguments, viz. 'political reasons,' and 'moral effect' on the people and chiefs, of retreat. The former were not detailed. For the latter I suggested victory, but thought our chances of it were not improved by letting the Afghans belabour two of our best regiments all night in a bad post. No troops, however, were warned for the attack, and it may not have been determined on.

I believe<sup>y</sup> it was finally settled that, the day being now advanced, Gen. McCaskill should retire, and the enemy be attacked next morning. Cavalry was sent out, and the troops at Koodee Khel fell back in good order to Mamoo Khel; pursued, however, to that place by the enemy, who fired for a time and then drew off.

Next morning the enemy took post at Hissaruk, some miles west from Mamoo Khel, a good position for impeding our commissariat operations, as well as for guarding both roads to Cabool. We, however, let him alone; but we met him again the following month at Jugduluk, and then with a different fortune as to hills.

Such are my recollections of the affair at Mamoo Khel, giving in great detail all that bears on my relations with Col. Taylor, and merely indicating the other and more important events.

Battles are notoriously the subjects on which the memories of those engaged, most widely vary, even to contradiction; and I have no hope of escaping the common fate. Some will remember what I have forgotten, and forget what I remember. Others would see what I did not, or see the same things in a different light, while much that I have seen will be unknown to them; and one man

\* Add to the list all the officers of the Sappers, who saw more or less of what went on, viz. Lieut.

may be flurried where another is not; but I have named, as far as I remember, those who were present.‡



Orr, Lieut. Cunningham, and Dr. Forsyth. Messrs. Kelly and Bruen, now adjutants of police corps, were conspicuously employed in the main action. The latter also joined Col. Taylor's party, and was severely wounded on his repulse; he was sent to bring back straggling sappers, but seeing our comrades of Col. Taylor's force hard pressed, joined them.

<sup>a</sup> With that of 'Delhi Gazette,' or any similar one, I shall not meddle, either in the way of contradiction or confirmation. Materials for any account of the operations in Northern Afghanistan approaching to correctness are not before the public.

<sup>b</sup> Taken from the 'Delhi Gazette,' which I have seen since my former letter. My original report was verbal, merely stating that the delay of the main force brought the enemy on us, and forced us to engage singly, that we beat them, but at the close of the pursuit Major Huish came up and superseded me. I mentioned also getting some men of the 9th at the end of the pursuit, and their good behaviour; but all about Major Huish I *detailed* at that officer's request. Sir Richmond Shakespear (I think) was sent to me afterwards at the Sappers' bivouac for a written report, as they could not get on with a despatch for want of it. Dr. Forsyth will remember its being written in all haste and weariness; still, recollections were fresh, and it cannot be far wrong.

They were placed under my command by Lieut. Mayne, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General of the Infantry Division, to

<sup>c</sup> Orders under fire were oftener brought, at least when I was employed, by Capt. Havelock, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieut. Mayne, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, than by any other staff officers, and no man ever did or could question the authority of either.

perhaps given the order through Lieut. Mayne, for such things happened up there. But I felt quite sure of Gen. McCaskill, and could

A copy of this number of the 'Englishman' sent to each will be the first communication on the subject from me. I have, as far as I remember, kept back nothing, softened nothing, and, I hope, aggravated nothing. Let the gentlemen named say whether and how far the general tenor of their recollections varies from mine. Now for Lieut.-Col. Taylor's contradiction of my statement.<sup>a</sup> Here it is, being the end of my report<sup>b</sup> to Gen. Pollock. 'I was now directed to take a party of H.M.'s 9th Foot, the Sappers being now worn out, except about six men, and attack the hills. The first and second heights were carried at the point of the bayonet; and flanking parties having turned the shoulders of the high range, we were advancing up it, when the main force arrived, and our farther progress was stayed. My separate command now ceased, and I was soon after ordered with Sappers to headquarters.'

First, 'I was directed to take men of the 9th, and attack the hills.' Lieut.-Col. Taylor denies this. He says, 'No party of the 9th Foot was placed under Capt. Broadfoot's command either by me or by Gen. McCaskill.'

They were placed under my command by Lieut. Mayne, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General of the Infantry Division, to which Lieut.-Col. Taylor and I both belonged, and his orders, I presume, were, in such circumstances, to be taken as those of the general officer on whose staff he was,<sup>c</sup> and that was Gen. McCaskill. I did not know but what Gen. Pollock was up and had sanctioned the measure,

scarcely do otherwise. After consulting as to an enterprise which one of his principal staff officers wishes me to conduct, the former goes off 'to see what he can do.' He comes back saying he has got me men, and aids in the arrangements. What could I sup-

<sup>d</sup> Lieut. Mayne may remember, when I first asked for a sword he did not hear; and my saying (I fear with a little irritation), 'If I am to lead these men, you must get me a sword.'

pose<sup>a</sup> but that he had suggested to his superior the capture of the hill and my leading the assaulting party, and that both had been approved: more especially when in assuring me of support he mentioned the General

as being up, and the whole force as coming on? Nay, more; had I thought I commanded the whole, or that I did more than lead the party that was to crown the hill, I should have been sorry to undertake the duty. Powerful support was required, involving bodies of troops my rank precluded me from commanding: I took it for granted, and till I learn the contrary from a good source I shall continue to believe, that the extensive movements against the hill were at least sanctioned by the General. And in this belief it was, I asked his staff officers, one of whom (Capt. Havelock) was my senior, to see the necessary steps taken for our support. They were taken, and with a skill and readiness strongly indicative of experience and zeal like theirs.

But Lieut.-Col. Taylor says Gen. McCaskill placed no men of the 9th under my orders. Being near the General, I conclude he has asked him the question, and that the General did not give the order or does not remember it. I have served under Gen. McCaskill on other occasions, actively enough, and in all kinds of work, but I never received an order from *himself* yet that I can remember; nor is such the practice of armies; yet the General, I dare say, will not disavow my doings. Save in rare cases of emergency, requiring me to use my own judgment, my orders were from his staff, his Adjutant-General, his Quartermaster-General, his aide-de-camp, or, in sapper's work, his engineer; and so it was on the present occasion. I received the order from his Quartermaster-General, his authorised instrument, disobedience to orders conveyed through whom is a military crime. Lieut. Mayne knows best where he got the men, but he went for men and brought them for me to take up the hill; and he assuredly did not tell me that though the attack was sanctioned, it was entrusted to other hands.

The Lieutenant-Colonel continues: 'Nor did any soldiers of that corps act under his orders, to my knowledge.' Who, then, led them, i.e. the party who first gained the little hill? The Lieutenant-Colonel tells us: 'In justice,' says he, 'to two gallant officers, I have further to add that, on the occasion alluded to by you, I ordered



Major Huish, of the 26th N.I., and Capt. Ogle, H.M.'s 9th Foot (both senior to Capt. Broadfoot), to take two companies from each of those regiments and dislodge the enemy from the heights over *Kookey Kail*' (a misprint, I suppose, for *Koodee Khel*).

Major Huish, then, commanded; but first, it appears I have been transferring to others some of the Lieutenant-Colonel's own laurels. My orders being through Lieut. Mayne, I considered them as Gen. McCaskill's; but knowing the Lieutenant served all masters, I was not sure whether Gen. Pollock might not be the author, and merely reported, 'I was directed,' &c.

This, however, excluded Lieut.-Col. Taylor, under whose orders I was not. Now that officer, I make no doubt, gave the orders he says, whether in consequence of an application from Lieut. Mayne or not is immaterial; they were orders any man coming there with sufficient troops was likely to give, and on such occasions the same orders are often given by various leaders; but I beg to remind the reader that what I wanted was *the whole hill*, or none of it; less, I thought an error.

Having told us he had ordered Major Huish and Capt. Ogle to 'dislodge the enemy from the heights over *Koodee Khel*,' Lieut.-Col. Taylor continues, 'which they effectually did in a few minutes, and to those officers is due the credit of that gallant action.'

Most undoubtedly it is due to them if they did clear those heights effectually.\* They were not cleared by me farther than is

\* The heights of *Koodee Khel* are a long narrow hill with steep sides, lying between the narrow valley of *Koodee Khel* on one side, and the village of the same name on the margin of the open country on the other. This hill, or these heights, were the scene of the contest between us and the Afghans; they on the upper part, we on the lower.

mentioned above. Did Major Huish go farther, after I left, than I had been? Were the heights cleared at all? Did the enemy's fire cease for a moment? Was he ever off the crest of the hill till he came down to pursue us from the base? Would to God the credit of 'effectual clearing' on that occasion had been ours

to dispute about! To secure that, I would gladly resign my claim to share in it.

The Lieutenant-Colonel proceeds: 'Capt. Broadfoot, I understand, accompanied them with three or four of his Sappers; but he could have no command of a superior officer, Major Huish.' As to my commanding 'a superior officer, Major Huish,' I never imagined I had done so, for I do not think he was present. He showed every proper readiness to assume the command when he did come up, but that was after the ascent of the little hill. He may, however, have been with the assaulting party, but he did not then make himself known to me, nor did he lead it, and will not, I think, say he did.



CSL

Neither do I think he will court the honour of commanding an assault *a tergo*. If he does, I am satisfied to have 'accompanied' it at the other end.

Capt. (now Major) Ogle was present, as I learn from an officer here who was in the affair:<sup>f</sup> the

<sup>f</sup> I have also an impression, but an uncertain one, that Lieut. Mayne recently informed me, Major Ogle had been there, and spoke of my having commanded a senior. I know Capt. Havelock informed me of a similar occurrence in another action.

<sup>g</sup> I do not think Lieut. Mayne mentioned his name, but am not sure, for hearing it would have told me nothing, as I knew few or no officers of the force that relieved Jellalabad. I made my first acquaintance with Lieut.-Col. Taylor and Lieut.-Col. Huish that day. I was in another brigade, and had been very constantly detached from headquarters during Gen. Pollock's stay at Jellalabad. I had, indeed, dined once at the mess of the 9th Regiment with Gen. Pollock, who lived there; but I knew not the names of the officers I then conversed with. Lieut. Mayne may have mentioned Capt. Ogle's name, but did not certainly say he was in command, or my senior, and it could hardly occur to me under the circumstances.

claim for him is not of command, but of having been second under Lieut.-Col. Huish instead of me. If that would have pleased him better, I regret it was not so; and, in every case, I deeply regret not having known at the time that he was there; or rather, that he was my senior.<sup>g</sup> Lieut. Mayne could not have known his presence either, or else thought me the senior; perhaps did not advert to our relative standing at all: from whatever cause it arose that I led where I ought to have followed, I regret it for the sake of an officer so generally allowed as Major Ogle to be one of our best. Had I even known it before giving in my report, that document should have terminated with the occupation of the village and the enemy's camp. Luckily Major Ogle has not lost much; the affair was a trifling one as far as we

carried it, though I wish it had ended as well as it was beginning.

This whole affair is evidently one of misconception, arising from causes frequent enough in such cases. Lieut.-Col. Taylor probably saw that at least a portion of the hill must be held, if only to divert fire from the village, and ordered four companies under Major Huish to seize the part I have called the little hill; but arrangements he knew not of were previously made for the total dispersion of the enemy by their pursuit to the summit if they went there, and

<sup>h</sup> Major Huish is gone or going home, but an officer, I think, of his own regiment, whose name I do not know, was with him when he first addressed me; if he sees this he will remember (if he was present at any of our subsequent conversation) my informing Major Huish of the Afghans running up the ridge he thought impracticable, and of

before Major Huish arrived the little hill was taken<sup>h</sup> by men procured by Lieut. Mayne for the greater scheme; but these men seem also to have been warned for the little plan, and to have been taken away for the other without Lieut.-Col. Taylor's knowledge; all likely things



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<sup>f</sup> I have also an impression, but an uncertain one, that Lieut. Mayne recently informed me, Major Ogle had been there, and spoke of my having commanded a senior. I know Capt. Havelock informed me of a similar occurrence in another action.

<sup>g</sup> I do not think Lieut. Mayne mentioned his name, but am not sure, for hearing it would have told me nothing, as I knew few or no officers of the force that relieved Jellalabad. I made my first acquaintance with Lieut.-Col. Taylor and Lieut.-Col. Huish that day. I was in another brigade, and had been very constantly detached from headquarters during Gen. Pollock's stay at Jellalabad. I had, indeed, dined once at the mess of the 9th Regiment with Gen. Pollock, who lived there; but I knew not the names of the officers I then conversed with. Lieut. Mayne may have mentioned Capt. Ogle's name, but did not certainly say he was in command, or my senior, and it could hardly occur to me under the circumstances.

here who was in the affair: <sup>f</sup> the claim for him is not of command, but of having been second under Lieut.-Col. Huish instead of me. If that would have pleased him better, I regret it was not so; and, in every case, I deeply regret not having known at the time that he was there; or rather, that he was my senior. <sup>g</sup> Lieut. Mayne could not have known his presence either, or else thought me the senior; perhaps did not advert to our relative standing at all: from whatever cause it arose that I led where I ought to have followed, I regret it for the sake of an officer so generally allowed as Major Ogle to be one of our best. Had I even known it before giving in my report, that document should have terminated with the occupation of the village and the enemy's camp. Luckily Major Ogle has not lost much; the affair was a trifling one as far as we carried it, though I wish it had ended as well as it was beginning.

This whole affair is evidently one of misconception, arising from causes frequent enough in such cases. Lieut.-Col. Taylor probably saw that at least a portion of the hill must be held, if only to divert fire from the village, and ordered four companies under Major Huish to seize the part I have called the little hill; but arrangements he knew not of were previously made for the total dispersion of the enemy by their pursuit to the summit if they went there, and

before Major Huish arrived the little hill was taken <sup>h</sup> by men procured by Lieut. Mayne for the greater scheme; but these men seem also to have been warned for the little plan, and to have been taken away for the other without Lieut.-Col. Taylor's knowledge; all likely things

<sup>h</sup> Major Huish is gone or going home, but an officer, I think, of his own regiment, whose name I do not know, was with him when he first addressed me; if he sees this he will remember (if he was present at any of our subsequent conversation) my informing Major Huish of the Afghans running up the ridge he thought impracticable, and of



the slight loss (one man killed) in taking the little hill, when he objected to attacking the summit. Our whole conversations were, on his part, in the style of one who had *not* come up at first, and therefore I doubt his presence in the attack; but I may be wrong. I saw only a few of the very foremost men; people do not look back on those occasions.

were all together for nearly five months after that, but not a hint escaped the Lieutenant-Colonel on the subject. He and I served together, and became acquaintances, but he never mentioned the matter,

<sup>1</sup> It was usual there to praise catalogues of officers. I was in the early part of the action dissatisfied with certain parties, but the arrangement for a separate column was suddenly made and imperfectly understood. Above all, inexperience mainly caused what I disliked; it was the first action for a good many. I would not praise, nor would I pointedly except. All the rest had done well. I said so, and named no one; but the officers with me will see I was not ungrateful to them.

<sup>\*</sup> I do not, however, say that by lapse of time Lieut.-Col. Taylor forfeits his right to claim what he considers due to his officers, his men, or himself, when it has been otherwise given in despatches, or passed over in silence. Far from it. Some day I may perhaps follow his example; but I complain of his having without personal inquiry for so long a period, and without reference even by letter for explanation, written as he did to a public paper.

fellow-soldiers. Let them read this detail, and apply to it, as far as their judgment allows, the corrections or contradictions it may call forth. Then let them read my report to Gen. Pollock, and say if there be a trace of desire to overstate the services of my own corps or myself, or to shine at others' cost. I am conscious of having throughout the war in Afghanistan gone to the opposite extreme, of having scarcely done justice to the men and officers who served under my orders (at least as to affairs where I was myself present), in suffering without remonstrance their services to be slightly

enough to happen on service of that kind, and probably all explicable (mistakes as to seniority and all) by five minutes' conversation among the parties concerned. Now this Lieut.-Col. Taylor might have had: Generals Pollock and McCaskill, Lieut.-Colonels Taylor and Huish, Majors Havelock and Ogle, Lieut. Mayne and myself

nor did anyone else; yet my report was read at the Adjutant-General's Office, by various parties, before it was sent away, and even gave cause of complaint to myself by some who thought I underrated their services.<sup>1</sup> The events of the action were much discussed, my share of it and my opinions especially; and in due time my report appeared in print; but it was never noticed till now,<sup>k</sup> and then not by letter, but in a way that compels me not only to prove I had reason for what I said on the controverted points, but to set myself right with my professional friends, who otherwise could not but think so great a departure from courteous usage on the part of an officer of Lieut.-Col. Taylor's rank and reputation impossible, save to a man notoriously capable of arrogating to himself the honour due to his



<sup>1</sup> From first to last they slipped strangely out of mind when despatches were writing: not at other times; indeed, as far as kind words and employment went, they seemed favourites.

I must here acknowledge, however, first, that Sir R. Sale having by accident discovered in Jellalabad some curious things of this kind, made the amende by referring generally to past services in the next laudatory order, which has not of course been published; and secondly, that in Gen. Pollock's Tezeen despatch he mentions me with some dragoons instead of Capt. Tritton, whom I only *accompanied* (not in Col. Taylor's sense) *en amateur* and as a guide; he commanded his men, not I; and right good work he made of it. I spoke not to the men except to pass Capt. Tritton's orders, unless that on first reaching the enemy I warned those near me to be cautious, that these fugitives were *ugly customers*, and got off their horses to fight, not escape. I mentioned this mistake in the proper quarter when I found it out, and would have done so officially, but that the account refutes itself. Sappers could not keep up with dragoons in a gallop of several miles, which the *first* business was, and then had I meddled with that despatch at all, I must have noticed other matters.

<sup>m</sup> One opinion I am not certain he knew at the moment, but he probably heard of it, as it was publicly given. I was present when Lieut.-Col. Taylor reported the success of the enemy, first to Gen. McCaskill at Khodee Khel, and afterwards to Gen. Pollock at Mamoo Khel. It was done publicly; Gen. Pollock was in a crowd under trees in the garden at Mamoo Khel. The Lieutenant-Colonel ascribed his misfortune to want of due firmness on the part of a portion of his troops. The Major-General spoke to me of it shortly afterwards, and I told him I thought there was no reason to distrust the troops for this check, that no troops whatever could have stood their ground in such a position. Those on the left at Koo-dee Khel had a steep and rocky hill in front occupied by the enemy, while their flank was in the air (to speak technically), and beyond it lay a rocky ravine amidst broken and commanding ground, the ravine leading down from the enemy's position to the country on the left and rear: the enemy from above, and from the continuation of the hills on the left, had only to occupy this, and, themselves secure, envelop this body of men in fire; and if troops so posted be assailed, the moment must come when a vigorous charge will rout them, be they who they may. That moment Afghans are quick to discern and resolute to use.

They are masters in mountain war; individually brave, yet cautious, and watchful; skilful in [choosing] ground, and of a coolness never to be disconcerted; swift to advance, timely in retreat, and expert in both; their masses were seldom shown, hardly ever uncovered to our fire, yet never far away when a blow could be struck. This will apply to all Afghans, but pre-eminently to the eastern Ghilzies and Eusofzies. Better arms, orga-

noticed, or kept altogether out of sight,<sup>1</sup> or in letting others reap where they had sown. I may suffer this, but I will not also be openly treated, and by a man of some mark, as guilty of the opposite baseness.

I owe an apology to the officers, whose names are mentioned. I deeply regret that they and I should be dragged into controversy, a thing which, I fear, seldom raises our profession in the public estimation; but when attacked, one must defend.

I regret, too, that some things mentioned may not be agreeable to all. I differed from Lieut.-Col. Taylor at Koo-dee Khel, and did my best to get other plans adopted, as I thought this could only end in evil; but this was a public matter, publicly conducted. I gave my opinions freely to the General, the Lieutenant-Colonel knew them at the time,<sup>m</sup> and the military reader can judge whether, hold-



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nisation, and leaders would make them troops of the highest order: the want of all three rendered their largest assemblages unworthy of the name of armies, and they knew this. I have seen in the field nearly all the chiefs who fought against us in Northern Afghanistan, but I only remember two who showed anything like military talent, and they were of very subordinate rank. One, a brother (or cousin) of the petty Ghilzie Khan of Saroobe,<sup>1</sup> showed some skill and much courage against Sir R. Sale's rear guard in the Jugduluk pass in 1841; he fell in that fight. The other, Haji Ali, the commandant of a corps of Juzailchees in Mahomed Akbar's service, was at Mamoo Khel, but did not command, for several Barukzye and other Afghan chiefs of high rank were present. He was a Tajik of Cabool, formerly a shoemaker there, and of diminutive stature, all circumstances lowering his influence: religious zealotry and great valour scarcely saved him from the open ridicule of the lower Afghans and the good-humoured contempt of the Khans. He was in the village of Mamoo Khel in the morning, and as we crossed the stream to assail it, the usual taunts and reproaches between our Afghan sappers and their opponents turned from our side on the Haji's stature and former occupation. The advantage he took of the delay of the main force, to assail our right column, was judicious and prompt; the means employed, too, might have succeeded had time been given. At Koodee Khel he commanded on the heights, but the repulse of our troops from the ground they were on would have been effected as quickly by any Afghan peasantry. The prompt resumption after his success of a post on the line of operation was, however, due to him. His influence rose for the time, but Jugdulluk destroyed it. The greater Afghan chiefs were, as soldiers, one and all below mediocrity.

These evils, however, must not be overrated. Gen. Pollock's victory was still complete as to its primary object of expulsion of the enemy from Mamoo Khel, where he could not be tolerated by an army preparing at Gundumuk to enter the passes. Had the hill been taken, the enemy's rout would have been total, and we masters of all east of the passes; as it was, he was able with recovered courage to take up the next injurious position of Hissaruk. In itself, the mishap was but very partially absolute reverse; only in the first repulse from the untenable ground: our troops rallied when clear of that, and occupied gardens &c., keeping the enemy at bay, and they finally retired in good order; but it was unfortunate from pursuing to be put on the defensive, and finally to be pursued; with old troops it would have mattered nothing but the lives lost; with troops only once (I believe) in action before, it risked loss of confidence; but so excellent were those corps, that it did little or no harm, or if any the Jugduluk fight set all right. This check caused, however, nearly all the loss sustained in the 9th and 26th that day, a loss not great, but to be regretted as useless.

<sup>o</sup> Towards Hissaruk was the line of retreat of an army from Cabool, beaten at Mamoo Khel by one from Jellalabad; but no Afghan army could retire before regular troops across an open country; they therefore retreated on Koodee Khel, off the Cabool road, out of the line of operations altogether, and, of course, leaving it undefended; but they found shelter in Koodee Khel valley, which was too narrow to be safely entered without first seizing the hill between it and the village. Had we taken that, the valley also was ours with much of the grain of the neighbouring country there stored, and the enemy had no further refuge,

<sup>1</sup> Sarubi, a fort sixteen miles from Tezin.



no choice but destruction or utter dispersion. Hence my anxiety for the hill to be carried. The enemy, however, knew his true point, and, finding us checked, went to Hissaruk. The country in that direction is not so open as farther east, and was irrigated; but there was nothing to stop an army.

and he never, I believe, found me reluctant. In fact, when I have been under him, it was in most cases voluntary. When the Sappers were distributed in detachments I might have ridden in dignity with a nominal headquarters, but I went where I could be most useful, though as a subordinate, and always put myself under such an officer as Lieut.-Col. Taylor with pleasure; yet I was in a position without impropriety to do as I did in recommending the completion of the work.

After all, the difference between us is one of opinion; and if he has made a mistake, all soldiers do

<sup>p</sup> This was, however, so distant as to be almost a separate range, just within cannon shot of the lower heights. At Koodee Khel the village was within long musket range of the top of the upper hill. Had the little hill been in the same line, the fire directed at it would have made the village a very uncomfortable post.

<sup>q</sup> My artillery comrades of Afghanistan know how highly I valued them and their arm; and at Koodee Khel I longed for Major Backhouse and his mountain train; but we used sometimes to forget that, save in breaching and other exceptional cases, it is a *co-operating*, not a *main* arm, still less to be used singly. Indeed, we were too apt to make one arm attempt the work of all, or to use them successively instead of together.

<sup>r</sup> On Gen. Pollock telling me his resolution to attack, and ordering me to join it, I expressed my happiness thereat; when he mentioned its being opposed by the officers of rank he had consulted.

If anything now written gives pain to Lieut.-Col. Huish, I shall regret it; he is not the assailant, but he is the assailant's battle horse, and the one cannot well be repelled without the other. If our acquaintance at Koodee Khel began a little roughly, it soon became friendly. In our conversations, he may remember I sought neither command nor credit for myself, but urged *him* to take *his*

it remembered, though junior (and no two soldiers can be equal) to Lieut.-Col. Taylor, I was not under him. He commanded a regiment, and so did I; when we were on the same duty, I, of course, obeyed;

the same; the best alone learn by them. The general voice, however, was with him at the time. Beyond the Sappers and some of the Staff, who had served in the previous campaign, I know not if any officer at Mamoo Khel sided with me then. Even at Jugduluk the attack of the upper range<sup>p</sup> was only ordered after much delay and a vain<sup>q</sup> cannonade, and then Gen. Pollock<sup>r</sup> went against eminent advice. It settled the hill question, and Lieut.-Col. Taylor, soon after, at Tezeen, the day before the action with Mahomed Akbar, showed, in a brilliant hill affair of his own, that the lesson had not been lost.



men on to finish the work ;<sup>a</sup> and if I presumed to remonstrate or advise, he will not perhaps forget that I excused and illustrated

<sup>a</sup> Major Havelock will bear witness that in our many conversations at this time, I urged only the performance of the service by the officers and the troops nearest the place, not my being employed or the Sappers. Once only I volunteered the latter for the main attack on the following day, on hearing some talk of 'a mere sacrifice of men.' Throughout the war I was much employed in separate commands, but I never asked for them.

what I said by reference to our own errors, and their punishment in Gen. Sale's force the year before: though differing in opinion, we parted as friends. Later in the day I heard with sorrow of his wound; and rejoiced when we met again as comrades in Kohistan, where, and in the passes coming back from Cabool, I ever found him the active and gallant commander of a brave and willing corps.

To Lieut. Mayne I offer no apology for using his name. He will see it is unavoidable. I have little doubt of his remembering the main facts, but I am going across the sea, and reference would cause much loss of time; our conversations are given, therefore, in considerable detail, lest any link in the chain of circumstances

<sup>b</sup> This is also the reason of my giving so many other details.

should have escaped his memory, which these may recall.<sup>c</sup> He will, I doubt not, tell Lieut.-Col. Taylor where he got the men, as well as whether or not he led me to understand I was to lead them; and I feel perfectly sure it will turn out that he obtained the men in a proper way, and never exceeded the limits of his duty, whether he acted by direct orders from his superior, or by using the discretion left in such circumstances to all staff officers, and especially to one in whom all above him justly placed so much reliance as they did in him.

I cannot ask editors of other papers to insert all this, but I trust those who copied Lieut.-Col. Taylor's letter will inform their readers that something has been said on the other part, and tell them where to find it.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

G. BROADFOOT, *Major,*  
*A.D.C. to the Governor-General,*  
*late commanding Sappers and Miners.*

Spence's Hotel: March 18, 1843.

This letter, besides being useful as a complete account of the operations at Mamu Khel, shows the high soldierly spirit which animated Broadfoot on all occasions.



After this affair, Mamu Khel was occupied for a few days, and the troops returned to Gandamak on August 30.

Broadfoot wrote many letters during the halt at Gandamak, of which two, addressed to Mr. Loch and Mrs. Bayley, are here reproduced.

Camp near Gundumuk : September 5, 1842.

My dear Sir,—I have, as you know, usually addressed a few lines each month to the mother of my poor friend, Capt. Mackenzie; and I purposed doing so this month, but I can only give news of him so disheartening, that I think it best to put you in possession of all we as yet know, with a view to your making Mr. Butterworth Bayley acquainted with it, and he, I doubt not, will communicate to Mrs. Mackenzie so much of it as may be desirable.

Mahomed Acbar has removed the prisoners towards Bameean, except two, Captains Troup and Bygrave, whom he retains near himself; and two ladies, Mrs. Eyre and Mrs. Anderson, too ill to be removed. With them he has left Dr. Campbell. Whether their husbands are also left, is not, I believe, known.

Poor Mackenzie last month had a very severe illness; from which, however, he has since recovered. When the captivity of these unfortunates will end, it is now impossible to say.

It was my intention to have written you at some length before now, but I have been prevented; first, by being sent out in this direction six weeks back, with a detachment so small as to be somewhat unsafe. It could not, however, be reinforced at the time; and I was consequently obliged to break up the confederacy of the surrounding clans by rapid and unexpected movements against them severally, while they believed we were on the defensive. In this way we managed to bring the whole country round us into submission; but the fatigue to men and officers was excessive, and is now telling on us in great sickness.

I was next detached to a place, Tatang (not that of our maps), abreast of this (about five miles south), to destroy a strong fort, belonging to Mahomed Acbar.

On Gen. Sale coming out to Futehabad, I joined him; but being now known to all the people for many miles round, I had to act a good deal as interpreter, &c. Nearly a fortnight back Gen. Pollock came out here and sent back to Futehabad for the Sappers, who arrived just in time to take part in an affair with the enemy on the 24th ultimo.

For the last few days I have been unwell from fatigue and exposure, which, with very constant work in my commissariat capacity



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(for I feed my own people and cattle), has prevented me from writing any private letters.

Our force is now concentrated here. The troops are abundantly numerous, and of a quality equal to meet any enemy; but an inefficient commissariat cripples us. There is no excuse for it. Had Gen. Cullen been here, difficulties would scarcely have been heard of.

We march, if possible, to-morrow. Two days ago, I strongly urged the formation of a depôt here, and I hope it will be done. The officers most about the General to whom I spoke, agreed; but the General himself was naturally anxious to carry as many troops as possible to Cabool. But I shall be apprehensive as to our communications if this end of the passes be left unguarded.

I also urged the General to abandon all tents, and put the native troops on half rations, which are ample for mere subsistence. He had before reduced the tentage one half, and has now yielded as far as three-quarter rations. The tents will never be pitched in the passes; and at Cabool there is nothing to prevent our occupying the inhabitants' dwellings as in Europe. The carriage of the tents would convey more sick and wounded than we can now accommodate, and warm clothing for the cold weather now at hand; two points of first-rate importance. The General would do this, but that he is perhaps a little too sensitive to the murmurings, which are only heard from those who are undeserving of notice or consideration.

There is no difficulty before us that a moderate share of foresight and good management cannot overcome; and I am, therefore, in hopes, notwithstanding our deficiency in carriage, that all will go well. We ought to be getting over what have much injured us heretofore, a foolish contempt of the enemy, causing rashness, and then a miserable timidity, almost panic, on finding this rashness produce its inevitable effects.

You are perhaps aware that Lord Ellenborough has paid me the very flattering compliment of placing me on his personal staff. In fact he has in every way shown me the most distinguished kindness. I suspect that in this I am indebted not a little to Lord Elphinstone's kindness, which has been very great indeed, and unremitting. I shall probably never again meet him, but I must ever feel grateful to him.

Gen. Nott is now well on his way; but any combination at such a distance, and with a communication so completely closed, is out of the question. Each force ought to be strong enough to do the work singly; and then the want of perfect concert is harm-



less. We are strong in all but heavy artillery, engineers' tools, and gunpowder.

The enemy, however, is fortunately not a formidable one. Still, I should have liked greater preparation for every event, and, above all, a better supply of carriage; in one word, an efficient commissariat. However, my next will, I trust, be from Cabool, and announce ample success.

The Governor-General has provided for young Cunningham (a son of Allan the poet), one of my officers, who, on the close of hostilities, goes into the Mysore Commission. I am now anxious to see something done for Orr and for our surgeon, Dr. Forsyth, regarding whom I ventured to write to you; and these will doubtless also be provided for, seeing that Lord Ellenborough seems resolved to pick out for promotion those he considers working men.

I was very sorry lately to hear your health had been affected in the early part of summer. I trust it is now re-established, and that Miss Loch and the *middy* are also well. Give them both my very best wishes, and believe me &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

You will, of course, hear from other channels of Futeh Jung, the son of Shah Shoojah, and lately nominal king at Cabool, having escaped to this camp.

Gen. Nott is said to have defeated the enemy at Mookoor, about five marches south of Ghuznee.

I was pained to see that poor Gen. Elphinstone was accused at home even of personal cowardice. No one could less deserve so base an imputation. As a high-spirited, honourable man, his family need not blush for him. Than his military measures, nothing could be more feeble and ill judged, but, as he himself said to me, before the rebellion broke out in Cabool, he was gone in body and mind; and had it been otherwise, incapacity as a commander—errors, that is, in judgment—is scarcely a fit subject of vituperation.

The following may be added as additional testimony in favour of the unfortunate General.

Eldred Pottinger, in a letter to Col. Buller Elphinstone, announcing Gen. Elphinstone's death, and forwarding a memorandum found among his effects, remarked that the opinions of the unprejudiced in the army coincided with those expressed in the General's memorandum. Further, he continued, that he and his companions in misfortune were at a loss which more to admire, the noble fortitude with which the General bore his



great reverse of fortune and excessive bodily pain, or the constant self-denial he showed during his prolonged illness in regard to the wants and cares of others in preference to his own.

Next day Broadfoot wrote to Mrs. Bayley :

Camp near Gundumuk : September 6, 1842.

My dear Mrs. Bayley,—We were to have marched this morning, and however much I regret on other accounts our delay till tomorrow, I rejoice that it gives me an opportunity of thanking you, before we move into the passes, for two letters which nothing but an unseasonable attack of illness, conjoined with the bustle of preparation for the journey, has prevented me from duly answering. Not that I have been very unwell, but from having been for the last six weeks detached, we had fallen into arrears of pay, and these accounts, with all preparations crowded into a few days, made a very little illness indispose me more than a much severer attack at other times.

I began this letter in the morning, and have continued almost word by word amidst incessant interruptions, till it is now dawn hour, and I must close.

The day's delay has caused an entire change in the order of advance, and has thrown apparently all into Gen. Sale's hands, which has not raised the hopes of the poor Company's men, of fame at least in despatches. However, time will show. The poor old General (Sale, I mean) has, I fear, prejudiced advisers around him, a thing very mischievous at all times, and especially now. But you must really pardon me for all this camp gossip, with which, to say the truth, I am so stunned, that it runs from my ears to my pen, almost without my knowledge. In fact, you cannot imagine what barbarians we are in camp, positively all men *à une idée*, or monsters *à mille idées*; and I do seriously apprehend that I shall never again be able to comport myself decently in civilised society. You must at any rate take me in hand for a time; tame the bear, in fact, for such you will doubtless style me.

Again interrupted, but now by a man three days from Cabool, who says our poor prisoners and the royal families were carried off by night; that the force sent to succour Ghuznee had returned; that Mahomed Akbar was in vain trying to assemble a force to meet us in the passes, but that the troops we beat the other day, with Ghilzye reinforcements, were awaiting us on this side of Jugdulluk. I apprehend no opposition we shall not easily overcome; for Gen. Pollock, if not a Napoleon, is superior to any general



officer I have yet chanced to meet in these regions. But I am falling back to the *one idea*, so I must, with promises of future amendment, beg you to offer my kindest regards to all your circle, and to believe me ever, my dear Mrs. Bayley, most truly yours,

G. BROADFOOT.

P.S. I used to write to Colin's mother about him, but could not last month or this; the news was too cheerless. He is, I believe, safe, and will eventually be restored, but when is uncertain.

The day after this letter was written, Pollock's force marched for Kabul.

Again, as before with Sale's brigade, the posts of honour were assigned to Broadfoot's Sappers; they led the advance and were the last in the rear guard.

The first half of Broadfoot's Sappers were immediately followed by the 5th company of the Bengal Sappers and Miners, Backhouse's mountain train, nine companies of a Native Infantry regiment, four guns of Abbott's battery, and three companies of a European regiment. It is believed that this order was followed in the advance guard throughout the march to Kabul; except when the disposition had to be varied for purposes of attack.

The march to Surkhab, nine miles, took over five hours, though the troops were unmolested by the enemy. Traces of the unfortunate Kabul army were everywhere to be seen, but most frequent near the conical hill close to Gandamak, where the last stand was made. Snow had fallen after the Kabul army was destroyed, and the severe frost, together with the snow, had in instances preserved the bodies, so that recognition was possible. These silent yet eloquent witnesses to the value of a convention with Afghans, appealed to their comrades for retribution. Some of the troops had already sworn, at the request of the wives of the destroyed men, to avenge their husbands.

Next day, September 8, the force marched for Jagdalak. Defective intelligence resulted in Pollock finding the enemy in considerable strength where he was ignorant of their existence. Broadfoot evidently considered the fighting in the passes on this occasion so very slight in comparison with what he had seen when Sale's brigade fought its way through, that he left little on record concerning these marches. It is sufficient to say that on this day there was fighting, and where that was



thickest there were to be found Broadfoot and his men. Briefly, when Pollock saw that the enemy, mostly on this occasion Ghilzis, could not be dislodged by artillery from their positions on the hills which commanded the road, he resolved on attacking them by infantry.

For this purpose Capt. Broadfoot was detached to the extreme left of the enemy's position, and his Sappers commenced ascending a steep hill on the top of which the enemy were entrenched in a 'sungah.'<sup>2</sup> . . . Capt. Broadfoot had completely succeeded in the attack he made, and the enemy were dispersed in every direction, a large body of them retiring to the summit of a high mountain. On this apparently inaccessible height they planted their standards and showed every demonstration of maintaining it. As the achievements of the day would have been incomplete were they suffered to remain, I decided upon dislodging them. The following troops advanced under cover of Capt. Abbott's guns and those of Capt. Backhouse's mountain train: H.M.'s 13th L.I., one company 26th N.I., one company 35th L.I., 5th company Bengal Sappers and Broadfoot's Sappers. Seldom have soldiers had a more arduous task to perform, and never was an undertaking of the kind surpassed in execution: these lofty heights were assaulted in two columns led by Captains Wilkinson and Broadfoot.<sup>3</sup>

The discomfited Ghilzis fled, carried off their standards, and their position was occupied by the assailants.

Another event of the day deserves to be recorded. Backhouse has stated that the enemy having opened rather a warm fire on the left flank, Sale ordered him to draw up his battery on that flank, not to fire, but to use them 'as a parapet or traverse to intercept the enemy's fire.'

It is probable that the mountain train was unnecessarily exposed by Sale's order, and its commander was with reason indignant. The Afghans had used our dead soldiers as a protecting rampart, but it is by no means to be accepted that an English officer deliberately put a living corps to a similar use.

<sup>2</sup> 'Sungah,' *sungur*, properly *sangar*: a breastwork usually made of stones, or stones and the trunks and branches of trees, behind which the defenders can fire on assailants with comparative immunity. In the passes

on this occasion, the bodies of our destroyed army formed no inconsiderable part of the works. See marginal note, page 141.

<sup>3</sup> 'Pollock's despatch.'



The next marches, to Kata Sang on September 9, and to Seh Baba on the 10th, were made without fighting.

On the 11th, Pollock marched to Tezin; a few parties of the enemy posted on the heights were dislodged by the fire of the artillery of the advance guard.

Here he was joined by the 2nd division of his army under Gen. McCaskill, and the combined force halted to give the carriage animals much needed rest. The immediate effect of this halt was that Muhammad Akbar and the Afghans, attributing it to indecision, determined on a final struggle. He sent the majority of the prisoners towards the Hindu Kush and Turkistan, collected his forces, and marched to Tezin.

On the 12th, towards evening, the outposts were assaulted by the Afghans with great courage. Backhouse has related that a piquet of Broadfoot's Sappers was very vigorously attacked, and its defenders were getting the worst of it, at a stone's-throw distance from our main body, though on a very high steep hill, when a company of their old comrades, the 13th L.I., came to their assistance, and the Afghans were dispersed.

Col. Taylor of the 9th, to whom reference has already been made, was sent out to drive back another party of the enemy; he had about 250 men of his regiment, and was joined by Major Huish and a small party of the 26th N.I.; with this little force he attacked and drove them before him up the hills. When the Afghans arrived at the top, they established themselves there and kept up a heavy fire; but Col. Taylor, with skill and gallantry, brought up unperceived a small part of his little force, and then suddenly attacked the Afghans in flank, who, surprised, fled incontinently down the steep hill, and during their flight suffered severely. Lieut. Elmhirst of the 9th distinguished himself greatly on this occasion.

Next day, September 13, the force marched to Khurd Kabul, through the Tezin pass. A party was detached to turn the hills far to the right of the advancing army.

On the advance guard arriving about the middle of the pass, and turning a projecting rock, the enemy were discovered quite close in front, swarming on the hills right and left of the pass, and brisk