



this treasure; the course followed by the Government of India with respect to it has been alleged as one of the causes of the outbreak of war.

With the correspondence here referred to, was a despatch reporting the arrangement whereby 'the services of Major Broadfoot, C.B., have been substituted in the Agency of the North-West Frontier for those of Lieut.-Col. Richmond, whose state of health obliged him to apply for leave of absence on sick certificate to proceed to sea.'

Another matter, not in itself very important, must be explained, as briefly as possible, because the action and orders of the Government of India regarding it have been set forth as Sikh grievances against the British.

This was whether the Raja of Nabha was justified in resuming his part of the village of Mowran, which had been granted through Ranjit Singh of Lahore to one Dhanna Singh, a subject of the Nabha State.

It appeared that the Raja of Nabha had given his part of the village to Maharaja Ranjit Singh; but the gift was invalid, because the Raja, a protected chief, did not inform the British Government, nor obtain their consent. The Raja became displeased with either Dhanna Singh or his son Hukm Singh, who was in the Sikh service, and desired to resume the gift. Mr. Clerk recognised his right to his own half of the village, but feared he might, in resuming his own, seize the other half, which belonged to Patiala. The Raja asked the Agent if he might resume the gift, and the latter replied, as he seems to have considered, evasively, to the effect that Mowran appeared to belong to Nabha, and that if the Raja pleased he could take it back. The Raja did not consider this at all an evasive answer, and acted accordingly. He collected troops, took the village by force with some loss of life, and seized such property as belonged to Hukm Singh, who had succeeded his father.

The Lahore Darbar remonstrated; the Government of India upheld the right of the Raja of Nabha to resume his village, but desired that he should compensate Hukm Singh for the loss of personal property, unless it should appear that force was not used till peaceful means to resume the village had failed.



CHAPTER X.

1844.

Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough—Frontier arrangements—Letters congratulating Broadfoot on his appointment—His first interview with the Lahore Vakil—Diplomatic fencing—The frontier—Suchet Singh's treasure—Village of Mowran—Letter to Lord Ellenborough—Lahore news—Raja Hira Singh's policy—Rani Jindān—Mangla, the slave girl—Flight and destruction of Hira Singh—Anarchy at Lahore—Broadfoot's orders to his Assistants—Instructions from the Governor-General—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab affairs—Broadfoot's reports—Letters from Sir H. Gough and Sir Charles Napier.

BEFORE proceeding with the private and other correspondence during Major Broadfoot's tenure of office as Governor-General's Agent, a few extracts from a letter written by Sir Henry Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough will be made; they are interesting as showing the matters which at the time chiefly occupied the attention of the Governor-General.

Sir Henry wrote very fully and with great regularity, considering the stirring events of the time, to Lord Ellenborough about the more important matters, civil and military, with which the Government of India was concerned. The letters are now of great value and interest, as events are described with greater freedom than is compatible with official reserve.

Calcutta: September 17, 1844.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—We¹ are expecting our English mail every hour; and before we are in the hurry of despatching our answers, I may as well give you the outline of what has passed since you left us.

I have appointed Col. Richmond to Lucknow, Broadfoot to the North-West Frontier, and Durand to the Tenasserim. The latter I sent off by steamer, and I expect Broadfoot every day.

On the North-West Frontier I am in correspondence with Gough²

¹ 'We' may mean the Governor-General and his Staff, or the Governor-General and his Council.

² Sir Hugh Gough, Commander-in-Chief in India.



to get all our troops of horse artillery and batteries in complete order; and we propose to send four companies of Europeans, picked men, to fill up vacancies, and weed the old and infirm. The same weeding must take place in the infantry, where we have, on an average of a thousand men, two hundred unfit for active duty. . . .

We are in the greatest want of infantry barracks on that frontier; we can only concentrate five and a half battalions, including Meerut, which is eight days, forced marches, from the frontier.

We must have barracks for another wing at Loodhiana, and an entire battalion either at Ferozpoore or near Sirhind. The first is somewhat too forward, and I have written to Gough to say I am determined not to build at Ferozpoore, *at the present moment*, on account of the alarm which it would create, and that I am anxious to treat the Lahore Government with all the friendly consideration which good faith and a desire for peace can require. Agra and Cawnpore can only hold a regiment each, making seven and a half infantry regiments of Europeans. In the event of military operations, two of these would have to march long distances from Cawnpore and Agra to the Sutlej, and the remainder could not be brought up till the season for military operations was nearly over.

Unless you had built the barracks at Kussowlie,³ Subathu, and Umballa, any concentration of a European force would have been impracticable. Another battalion and a half are absolutely necessary to insure a vigorous use of the force at the disposal of the Government; and in this, as in other cases, I cannot, if I were so disposed, but assent to the accuracy of your military judgment.

There are appearances of dissensions, likely to lead to blows, between the Heera Singh party and the hill tribes under Goolab Singh. But Richmond gives us nothing but the reports from the newswriters in the Durbar, and we shall have no very open demonstration until the dussehra.⁴ . . .

September 21. . . . I expect Broadfoot every day. . . . Sir George Pollock arrived yesterday, and was sworn in.⁵

I will keep this open for the last hour. Sir G. Pollock is very decidedly of opinion that Ferozpoore is the true point for a barrack for a thousand men; the foundations are already laid. A wing at

³ Kasauli as now officially spelt.

⁴ *Dasahrá*, the ten days' festival at the beginning of October, after which the Sikhs usually set out on their

yearly expedition. See also Yule's *Glossary*, p. 256.

⁵ As military member of the Governor-General's Council.



Loodhiana is absolutely necessary ; there is great inconvenience in having a Queen's regiment with one wing on the Sutlege and the other at Meerut, nine days' march asunder.

As may be supposed, Broadfoot received many letters of congratulation on being appointed Agent.⁶ The office was at the time one of the most important in India after that of the Governor-General.

Major Lawrence, afterwards so well known as Sir Henry Lawrence, wrote as follows :

Nepal : October 24, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot,—I have more than once thought of writing to you at Maulmain, but now that you are again a *Bengalee*, I must give you a line to congratulate you, which I do heartily, on the honourable post you have obtained ; it is one that if offered to me I should have been proud to accept ; as it *has not*, I am very glad you have got it, as I am sure you will do it full justice, and a noble field it is for an energetic man.

I hope your health is good ; give me a line and tell me about yourself. This is a delightful place as far as climate, *idleness*, salary &c. goes ; indeed, if I could be content to do nothing, it would be preferable to anything in India ; it came very opportunely to me, for my health was such that I must have gone home ; I am now much better.

Yours &c.

H. M. LAWRENCE.

The next is a fragment from Lieut. Orr, who had been, it will be recollected, adjutant of Broadfoot's Sappers. It commences thus in the middle of a sentence :

. . . on being in the finest appointment in all India. I look upon your situation, in regard to importance and responsibility, as being the next only to the Governor-General of India, and I was not a little proud and gratified to see my former leader appointed to it. I hope your health keeps better than it used to do, and that I shall see you some day Governor of the Punjab.

From Mr. Cameron to Major Broadfoot.

Calcutta : November 2, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot, . . . The Governor-General said the other day that he had at first supposed you to be rather too prone to war ; but that his intercourse with you had convinced him that he was

⁶ Governor-General's Agent on the North-Western Frontier, is the complete title.



mistaken, and that he had now full confidence in your discretion (or words to that effect); he said this at the council table in a manner that led me to suppose it was meant for me to hear and perhaps to repeat.

From Vincent Eyre to Major Broadfoot.

Gwalior: November 7, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot,—Welcome to Bengal again! May your shadow increase!

You have made a giant's stride from south-east to north-west. I wonder whither in the world your next stride will take you. I wish our friend Colin Mackenzie were employed in the same Agency.

The writer proceeded to bring to notice the services of Husain Khan, who is mentioned in Lieut. Eyre's 'Journal of Imprisonment in Afghanistan' as having displayed devoted heroism when Colin Mackenzie was besieged in the Kila i-Nishan Khan at the breaking out of the insurrection, and who had not been adequately rewarded.

The ceremonial visit of the Sikh chiefs and other local celebrities to Major Broadfoot is said by Mr. Cust, who as an Assistant to the Agent was present, to have been a very striking and picturesque scene.

At any time a crowd of Punjabis is a much brighter sight than an ordinary crowd of Hindustanis; for, apart from their superiority in physique, the colours which they affect, especially in their turbans, contrast most favourably with the prevailing dirty white, with which is mingled occasionally the equally dirty but more sacred shade of terra cotta worn by certain priests, which is characteristic of an ordinary crowd south of the Punjab.

On an occasion of this kind the contrast is even greater. The chiefs were semi-independent, and had retainers of their own, some resplendent in armour; whilst elephants, camels, and horses, with highly ornamented howdahs and saddles, all added to the general effect.

Broadfoot's knowledge of the languages of India was unusually exact, though of course not equally so in each language or dialect. Thus in what is called Urdu and in Persian he was proficient. He could speak and understand both, even to the

niceties of the languages, and could read an ordinarily written petition, or a letter from the Lahore Darbar, couched in the flowery language of the East, without the assistance of a munshi. He was thus enabled to dispense with the presence of an interpreter, and to receive natives alone and listen to their information, which was more readily and freely given in the absence of inconvenient witnesses.

He considered his knowledge of Punjabi deficient, which cannot be thought remarkable by anyone conversant with that dialect, when the short time during which he had an opportunity of learning it is taken into account. There are indications in his correspondence that his familiarity with it was rapidly increasing.

One of the earliest reports he made to the Government of India, was of his first business interview with the Lahore Vakil or agent, Rai Kishen Chand.

It would have been a curious sight to see the wily Oriental, guarded as he believed on all points, gauging the character and abilities of the new Agent with whom he would have to deal; watching carefully for the smallest sign of weakness, whether in want of knowledge of the language and its delicate capacity for conveying more to the mind than what reached the ear; or in want of ability, skill in argument, or courage resting on the complete assurance of support from his Government. The Vakil also no doubt reckoned on comparative ignorance of Lahore affairs on the part of the new Agent; he himself having for many years held his present post.

The interview is fully described in a letter dated November 11, 1844, the substance of which will now be given.

The Vakil commenced business by mentioning some matters of routine of small importance, which, he said, he concluded were known to the Agent, as he had mentioned them to one of the Assistants. This of itself was a rather ingenious and wholly native mode of ascertaining the relations which existed between the Agent and his Assistants, and the amount of power and influence the latter were likely to enjoy.

The Agent replied, that the matters referred to had not been mentioned to him; that he was very busy and had little time to listen to current rumours even from his Assistants. The Vakil then said, that he presumed he need not speak to anyone but the Agent



himself. The latter answered that he was at liberty to speak to everyone he pleased ; but that no value was attached to anything save what was communicated in the proper way from the Lahore Darbar to the Governor-General's Agent. ' In that case,' said the Vakil, ' I can speak freely and mention everything, a course which the Darbar will approve, when it is directly to yourself.' This preliminary over, the Vakil mentioned that the announcement of Major Broadfoot's appointment had been received in Lahore, and that a letter would come soon on the subject. He intimated that even the appearance of quarrel between Raja Hira Singh and his uncle Raja Gulab Singh had vanished ; whereupon the Agent congratulated the Vakil on the prospect thus opened of firm rule in the State, at which the Governor-General, as a well-wisher, would be pleased.

The Vakil next mentioned his own long connection with the Government of India as the agent of the Lahore State, which had extended over a period of thirty-five years. He further referred to Broadfoot's knowledge of the Punjab, of its chiefs, and especially of its army, and to the march of the convoy of Shah Shuja's wives ; but said that, though his confidence in us was as great as Ranjit Singh's, still the Agent would not be surprised to learn that he (the Vakil) got angry demands for explanation regarding our military preparations. ' But,' he said, looking earnestly and anxiously at Broadfoot, ' I replied, that from my long knowledge of the English, I was prepared to say they would not attack an old ally,' especially under present circumstances.

The Agent replied that he knew the circumstances, and was aware of the Vakil's appreciation of the British ; that in the latter Ranjit Singh was pre-eminent, and see how he rose from a simple Sardar to be Maharaja of Lahore ; whilst, on the other hand, observe Holkar, who would not rely on us. Where was he now ? and what had not Ranjit Singh risen to ? and how steadfast had been our friendship ! The Governor-General was anxious it should so continue.

The Vakil then assured the Agent that order had been introduced into the State, and that Raja Hira Singh greatly esteemed the Governor-General, and had a great regard for his Agent : to which the latter replied, that when governments are friendly, their servants must be friends ; that the Governor-General had the sincerest friendship for the Maharaja, and that the Agent recollected with pleasure his acquaintance with Raja Hira Singh. The Vakil then mentioned his official intercourse with Mr. Clerk, whom he could trust, and who always spoke without the intervention of anyone, as they were now doing, and who assured him of the sincerity

of our good wishes. 'You,' he said, 'were intimate at that time with Mr. Clerk, and no doubt felt the same, and can give similar assurances.' I told him I could; Mr. Clerk's and my feelings were friendly, both from inclination and duty; but we were only servants: what was more to the purpose, I could assure him of the Governor-General's earnest wish that friendship might continue. I told him that he might, on my word, seal a declaration to that effect.

He expressed great joy and said: 'But you better than any man know our army, can remember events, and have exercised forbearance.' I said, 'I perfectly know and remember, and so do you and we; but all men know, and must in no circumstances forget, that our bank of the Sutlej is sacred. Those whom we are bound to protect we will protect. I did exercise forbearance, but there was a line beyond which it could not go, and never has gone; and that was the sacredness of the frontier. Ranjit Singh never forgot this, and no one must hope to neglect what so old a friend kept so scrupulously in mind.'

He said this was all just, and that all earnestly desired to respect the frontier, and no doubt it would never be violated. I told him that its violation was a thing not to be spoken of: it was too absurd to be contemplated. He said it was, and the matter dropped.

The Vakil next brought forward the cases regarding Suchet Singh's treasure, and the resumption of Mowran; he stated that the Lahore Government was dissatisfied with the decisions at which our Government had arrived in both cases; that with regard to the treasure, Col. Richmond was a wise man, and had advised his own Government well, and the Darbar greatly regretted that we had not followed his advice.

'I answered that the Colonel's ill health and speedy departure had prevented me from becoming acquainted with much of his opinions; but in the present case this mattered little, as I had the orders of Government, which I was not only bound but glad to obey, for I considered them wise and just; that it was the very knowledge of our uprightness which had induced Suchet Singh to put his money in British territory, instead of in his own forts; that British territory was, in this way and for this reason, the asylum of those oppressed, or who felt distrust; that Suchet Singh was not the only one who had thought justice inviolable in British territory, and I asked him to say where in the Punjab and the protected Sikh states not only suspicion, but utter dismay, would cease, if for the first time property was given up by the British to any but those believed to be the rightful owners. I



asked him if the very demanders of the money would not feel this, if gratified; for they knew fortune was inconstant, and if the British territory gave no refuge, where were those engaged in the struggles of life to look?

'The Vakil looked as if he agreed, and said nothing; but he could not conceal his satisfaction, as he has much of his own property, as nearly every man of eminence in the Punjab has, invested⁷ as a resource in case of need.

'In such a case, I told him, Ranjit Singh would have made no such demand, but would have assisted the heirs to get the property and bring it to Lahore, when he would have taken his measures. He laughed, and said that it was true.'

The Vakil, after a fruitless attempt to get Broadfoot to assist in making a new reference to Government on the subject of the treasure, tried whether he could more successfully work the Mowran grievance. Again he proceeded to quote opinions alleged to have been those held by Col. Richmond.

'I stopped him by saying when once a matter went to Government, subordinates' opinions were of no consequence; that in the matter of lapses on this side of the Sutlej, the Government of India was supreme.'

He complained that compensation had not been paid, and asked the Agent to read all the records connected with the case, and see if he did not then conclude that the Governor-General had arrived at a wrong decision.

The Agent assured him that compensation would be paid, and that he would carefully study the case; but that the Governor-General did not decide till after full and deliberate inquiry, and therefore the Vakil must hold out no hope to his court of a reversal of the decision.

The Vakil said that Suchet Singh's treasure was a trifle, but that the question about Mowran was a serious affair.

To this the Agent replied, that whatever concerned the happiness of subjects, or the intercourse of governments, was serious, and was always seriously considered by our Government.

It may be imagined that after this fencing the Oriental diplomatist retired somewhat impressed with the skill of his opponent.

The following letter to Lord Ellenborough contains an outline of Punjab news at the time. The last paragraph being partly destroyed, restorations are shown in brackets.

⁷ In British territory.

Amballa : November 18, 1844.

My Lord,—I have foolishly delayed writing in order to write at length on some matters, until I have now scarcely time to write at all.

Having an impression that objection had been taken in some quarters to my appointment to the Tenasserim coast, or at any rate to its results, known only through the local press, which was in the hands of corrupt public servants, I was desirous of stating those results to your Lordship; but they are now recorded before the Board of Revenue, the Sudder Adawlut,⁸ and the Government of Bengal. What existed before may be seen in the proceedings of the trials of Messrs. X and Z, and of the various inquiries at Tavoy.

I have never been able yet to thank your Lordship for the Archduke's work which Capt. Smith brought me down. I feel deeply the kindness which caused you to send it, and do not the less value that mark of it because it has been so speedily followed by another of a different kind. I thank you also for the flattering letter which accompanied the work, though I fear even were I able to command armies as they ought to be commanded, the hope is not to be cherished; the course of the service places sufficiently high rank at too great a distance.

My appointment to this situation I cannot but consider as being as much due to your Lordship as if directly made by you; for to Sir Henry Hardinge I was, of course, unknown, save through your Lordship. My only anxiety is, that I may be able to do justice to the nomination. I took charge on the 1st inst. Col. Richmond, much broken in health, left on the 3rd. Heera Singh and Goolab Singh have become in appearance reconciled; the latter having submitted and sent his son as a hostage to Lahore; but his previous intrigues were probably never discontinued, at any rate they have produced a serious revolt in Moozuffurabad and the other hill states bordering on Cashmeer. It has taken the form of a religious war, and the insurgent peasantry have overpowered several Sikh garrisons. In the mean time the Lahore rulers had begun vigorously to confiscate the jageers⁹ of the greater chiefs, who are all therefore malcontent; and the restoration of discipline in the army had also been attempted; the regular troops about the capital are therefore discontented. It will require no ordinary ability, means, and fortune for the present rulers to escape dangers so various and

⁸ *Sadr adalat*, till 1862, in Calcutta and in the N.W.P. the chief court of appeal from the district courts. Yule's

Glossary, p. 653.

⁹ *Jagir*, a grant or assignment of land and its revenue as annuity.

great. They show, however, much promptitude and energy, and these do much. The whole Mahomedan population of the West is excited, and little is wanting to make revolt beyond the Jhelum general, which would at once bring in the Afghans. The death, also, of Dewan Sawun Mull, the able ruler of Mooltan, removes another guarantee of stability, so that the danger to the Sikh empire was probably never so great as at this moment.

Still I think we shall, perhaps, be able to preserve peace for the present. All rational men in the Punjab fear a quarrel with us, and will seek to avoid offence; and on our side, though there is in general a desire for war, yet the considerations I find in one of your Lordship's letters to my predecessor are weighty indeed; for war here should be no half measure; that would but prolong and double every evil. We must go to the top of the Himalayas, or stop in a false position; but once across the Punjab we enter on that great mass of unmixed Mahomedanism which extends from the Indus to the Mediterranean. To this we undoubtedly must sooner or later come; but whenever we do, we cannot stop, and going on in such countries is only just less ruinous than stopping.

[Cap]tain Durand I was delighted to [find] my successor in Tenasserim; the fittest man in India for [the situa]tion, able, and benevolent. The [provinces] will, in a few years, [pay their] expenses, [and] eventually add to the general wealth and strength; and this is undoubtedly your Lordship's work. [I h]ave written this whils[t] the [camp is setting] out for Loodeeana, where at present [I remain]. I address this to the House of [Lords, where it will be] sure to find your Lordship. [I] shall continue to write occasionally. If your Lordship will, however briefly, [reply and say] you have not forgotten me, for whom you have done so much, you will gratify [me] in the highest degree. From Sir Henry Hardinge I have received the greatest and most marked kindness. It is to you I owe it, and I felt on that account the more pleasure in it; being more generally than any else but Durand known as an *Ellenborough man*.

Instead of sending mere translations of the newswriters' letters, which were of little value without confirmation, Broadfoot forwarded to the Government of India a careful summary of the information he collected, both from newswriters and from other sources.

In November and during the first half of December 1844, he reported that Raja Hira Singh and Pandit Jalla were following a bold course, which if successful would tend to-

wards stability; but it was at first encompassed by many and serious dangers.

The Raja and his adviser were trying to destroy the power and influence of the chiefs, and to restore discipline in the army. They had partial success. The Raja managed the army, and is said to have brought it more under control than it had been since the reign of Maharaja Kharrak Singh.

The civil administration of the State was managed by the Pandit, who, finding that expenditure exceeded income, declared that they must balance. By compulsory offerings, and by means of fines, he replenished the treasury for the moment. But to preserve financial equilibrium either increased taxation of the people, or a reduction of the cost of the army, was necessary. In the former case there was the danger of rebellion; and in the latter the probability was that the army would overthrow any government which did not meet its demands.

Raja Hira Singh's policy failed at last, partly from uncontrollable circumstances, and partly because success had made its authors underrate their remaining antagonists.

The Sikh chiefs, seeing their destruction imminent, were strongly opposed to the Raja's measures. They found a powerful ally in 'the Maharaja's mother, Jind Kavar, commonly called Rani Jindán, erroneously pronounced Chandán by many of our Hindustanis.' She was very beautiful, and then quite young; she had been married, it was said, about 1835 to the sword and arrow of Ranjit Singh. She was very fond of Raja Suchet Singh, and never forgave Hira Singh for his death, and that of the brave Rai Kesri Singh. Raja Hira Singh seems not to have sufficiently appreciated her power and her talent. She was permitted to intrigue at her pleasure, and to rail unchecked at the ministry.

A revolt in Kashmir was suppressed with a rapidity and vigour which would have done credit to any government.

The Raja, seeing the financial crisis at hand, sent for the officers of the army, and, in Darbar, explained to them the state of the case. He either convinced them of the necessity for retrenchment, or intimidated them to the extent required for the admission of such necessity.

But the Rani, with, in this instance, a clearer perception of where the power lay, went to the men. Her brothers, and the

slave girl Mangla, visited the troops openly and gained them, so that little hope remained for the ministry.

The Raja and Pandit 'had made enemies, dangerous and silent, who knew their counsels and precipitated the crisis. The secretariat of that Government is composed of men despised by the ignorant Surdars, but influential, and able with the cunning of a depressed class. At the head of them is Dewan Dinanath,' who, offended by Pandit Jalla's retrenchment, secretly joined the other faction.

The crisis was not long delayed. On November 17 and 18, 1844, Raja Hira Singh reviewed some of the troops and ordered the issue of pay; but he discharged on the spot above 500 men, and confiscated their pay. The boldness of this measure, and its contrast with his former prudence, inspired a suspicion that he meditated flight.

During November 19 and 20, negotiations between the Raja and the officers were in progress; they were delayed, it was thought, in the hope of the arrival from Jammu of hill troops, with whose aid Hira Singh might emerge triumphant from his difficulties.

But the Rani again appealed to the men; she sent her brother and Mangla to the camps to say that her life was in danger; 'and finding the troops still waver, she took the bold step of ordering out her tents in the night in order to join the army. The troops at once declared themselves her protectors,' and some men were sent into the fort of Lahore.

It was arranged that Raja Hira Singh and Pandit Jalla were to be attacked in their houses on the afternoon of November 21. On that morning Miyan Jawahir Singh, son of Raja Dhyan Singh, at the head of 7,000 men, set out from Jammu for Lahore. But that same morning the Rani with the young Maharaja, attended by her brother Jawahir Singh, Sham Singh of Atári, and other chiefs, formally appealed to the troops, and asked whether Duleep Singh or Raja Hira Singh was to be their king. The troops, with loud shouts and with bands playing, declared for Duleep Singh.

The noise revealed to Hira Singh and Jalla that they had no time to lose; they announced their intention of joining the Maharaja and his mother, but in fact mounted their elephants, crossed the river Ravi to Shahdera, and, joined by a



small body of their adherents previously sent across, retreated at once on the road to Jammu.

As soon as this was known, salutes were fired, the Rani was congratulated, and Sardar Sham Singh of Atari with about 6,000 men started in pursuit of the fugitives. Some of Raja Hira Singh's followers deserted him and joined in the pursuit. The Khalsa troops soon came up with the Raja's small body of hill men, attacked them, and put them to flight. Miyan Lábh Singh, to give Hira Singh and Jalla more chance of escape, dismounted and fell fighting, after having killed five or six of the pursuers. The flight was continued for about fourteen miles from Lahore, when, finding their horses exhausted, Hira Singh, Jalla, and some others, dismounted and entered a village. When Sham Singh came up he set it on fire; on which the pursued 'came out and, after a desperate resistance of about an hour, were overpowered and slain. Their heads were carried into Lahore and exhibited hung in chains.'

Then all parties gave themselves up to rejoicing; the prisons were thrown open; fines were remitted; increased taxes were reduced; and for two whole days the Rani reigned supreme.

Again the scene changed; debauchery and licence were followed by anarchy. The Rani repeated her experiment of a personal visit and appeal to the troops, but with diminished effect. They told her that Duleep Singh might reign, provided he paid them as regularly as Hira Singh had done; whilst they significantly reminded her that Peshora Singh had prior claims to the throne, and recommended her to send for Sardar Lahna Singh, Majithia, to be wazir, a man, as they said, who dared not lift his eyes in their presence.

The Sardars all this time had to stand with joined hands as suppliants before the troops, and finally, with the terrified Rani, returned to Lahore amidst the laughter and hooting of the drunken crowd.

By the latest accounts the disorder of the troops was little abated: they had even plundered a young woman of condition, about to burn as a suttee, and already at the pile; tearing the rings with violence from her nose and ears. She was burnt praying for the ruin of the Sikhs, who stood by laughing. She was the widow of Heera Singh's dewan, who perished with him.



About this time a messenger, bearing news for one of the Agent's Assistants, was seized by the Lahore Government, and his despatches taken from him. The impossibility of convincing the Darbar that the man was a private servant, and not an emissary of the Government of India, and the inconvenience likely to result therefrom, rendered it necessary for Broadfoot to issue an order to his Assistants forbidding them, without express sanction, to employ any agents whatever in the Punjab, and to recall every agent they might have there at the time. They were likewise desired not to correspond with parties in the Punjab or Afghanistan without sanction; and if they received letters from chiefs, or other persons of these countries, they were desired, save in case of emergency, to refer the writers to the Agent.

In another case it was reported at the Lahore Court that one of the Assistants had expressed to the Lahore Vakil attached to his office, sorrow for the fate of Raja Hira Singh, indignation with Jalla, and other sentiments. The Agent, in asking what foundation there might be for the report, repeated his instructions that the Vakils with the Assistants were there purely for local purposes; that if they spoke on any other matters they were to be referred to him, and Assistants were to abstain carefully from all expression of opinion on political subjects. The serious evils which might result were pointed out. An unguarded expression of opinion was never considered as private, but rather to be that of the Agent; and when, as must often happen, the language of the Governor-General at some future time was found to be very different, a suspicion of insincerity or bad faith arose, as difficult to dispel as it was mischievous in its effects. These orders caused some dissatisfaction in the case of one or two of the Assistants, and it is not to be greatly wondered at; for when, for any reason, discipline has been relaxed, and the reins of power and influence have dropped into subordinate hands, reform and rectification cannot be carried out without readjustment, which entails a loss of influence among subordinates, certain to be keenly felt if not resented.

The instructions were, however, approved by the Government of India, and received the special commendation of the English Government.



The Agent further reported that the Sikh soldiers had extorted from the Darbar pay at the rate of 14 rs. a month, which was twice as much as the Company's sepoy received. The probable evil effects of this contrast were predicted, as was also the impending collapse of the Sikh Government.

Major Broadfoot was informed that this part of his despatch had received special attention, and it was observed that the state of affairs reported might lead to serious complication with the Lahore Government.

He was reminded that the instructions as to the line of policy to be followed were explicit; and it was intimated that he was expected to prove by his conduct that it was the desire of the Government of India to evince the strictest good faith with the Lahore Government, and that our recognition of the Maharaja was no empty form, but a measure by which we were prepared to abide.

It was further remarked that the Agent's proceedings were in perfect accordance with these principles.

He was informed of the regret with which the news of the recent revolution had been received; but it was pointed out that our position towards the nominal government of Duleep Singh was not thereby changed, and that our course must be plain and decisive. As long as the Maharaja retained his position, we must continue to act towards him with friendship and good faith, and abstain from interference with the internal affairs of his state.

The frontier must, however, be maintained inviolate, and the measures taken by the Agent for its protection, and his correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief on the subject, were considered to be expedient, and such as to deserve entire approval.

The following letter from the private secretary of the Governor-General to Major Broadfoot corroborates unofficially the statement that his reports and measures were approved.

Calcutta : December 7, 1844.

My dear Major,—As I believe Wood has answered the letter you wrote to him a short time ago, I will not take up your time except to let you know, by Sir Henry's desire, that he finds your reports on the state of affairs in the Punjab &c. most satisfactory, and quite refreshing after those of Col. Richmond.



From the last accounts affairs seem to be still unsettled there, although the period when any outbreak might have been expected has now passed.

We are all going on as usual here. Mayne is married this afternoon.

Yours &c.

C. S. HARDINGE.

When the news of the revolution at Lahore, and of Raja Hira Singh's death, was received in England, the condition of the Punjab had attracted the attention of the Government, as the most important matter connected with India at that time. During the years 1842, 1843, and 1844, the Kabul disasters, and the victories of the armies under Generals Pollock and Nott, Sir Charles Napier's victories, and the annexation of Sind; the short Gwalior campaign, and Lord Ellenborough's recall; had occupied the somewhat limited attention devoted in England to Indian matters.

Early in 1845, when the reports by the Agent, and the orders on them, of which a brief summary has been given, were received in England, the principles laid down, the language used, and the course pursued by the Government of India, were entirely approved. Gratification was expressed at noticing 'how thoroughly Major Broadfoot enters into the spirit of your instructions, and how judiciously he conducts himself in a crisis of much delicacy. This has been in no manner more strongly or properly evinced than in the observations made, and the instructions given, in his circular letter of December 18, 1844, and in the letter which he addressed to . . . his Assistant at Ferozpoore on the 28th of the same month.'

The following letters from Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough are interesting. Part of the first letter is omitted, as in it events already described are recapitulated or predicted.

Calcutta: December 23, 1844.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—I received your letter of October 30 in the bustle of making up our despatches for England.

First, as regards yourself. I do not despair of seeing you in the Cabinet with Peel and the Duke, notwithstanding the failure of the first overture. It is not only in his department that a statesman has the power of useful distinction, but in the general affairs of the



Empire which are discussed and decided upon in Cabinet. Rely upon it, you are made for public life, and will not be happy in a private station. At this distance between us it is useless to discuss matters of this description.

You will be glad to hear that Durand succeeds admirably, as well as Broadfoot did; whilst Broadfoot is in his element on the frontier.

Calcutta: January 8, 1845. 6 A.M.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,—The affairs of the Punjab are more unsettled than ever. Heera Singh and Pundit Julla have lost their lives and about 1,000 of their followers in the struggle.

The army sold Heera for 300,000*l.* and a rise in their pay to 14 rs. a month, being exactly the double of the B.¹ sepoy's pay. This contrast, and the example of a large army in a successful state of mutiny, is the greatest danger we have to apprehend; but I anticipate no immediate necessity for interference. We have 20,000 men pretty well up for defensive objects, and 36,000 for offensive operations. I have sent Sir J. Littler to Ferozpoor. Broadfoot does admirably on the Sutlege.

Forbearance will be pushed to the utmost limits justified by safety. The steamer has announced an earlier hour of starting, and I must close this hasty note or lose the opportunity.

Ever &c.

H. HARDINGE.

It was part of Broadfoot's duty to keep the Commander-in-Chief and the principal military officers in his neighbourhood acquainted with events on the north side of the Sutlej which might lead to a violation of the frontier, and consequent collision with our forces. He accordingly addressed Sir Hugh Gough, who was then in camp at Ambála on a tour of inspection, on December 24,² and reported the recent disturbances at Lahore. He said that for the moment the Rani and her brothers were the ostensible and active heads of the administration; but, though important events might arise from this change of government, yet it did not necessarily affect our relations with Lahore, and that he did not think there was more cause for anxiety now about the frontier than there had been for the past year. He further informed Sir Hugh that Capt. Nicolson had been desired to carry on his work at

¹ B.: common abbreviation for British; here it may stand for that or for Bengal.

² This and the next letter have been deciphered with difficulty from a nearly illegible rough draft.



Firozpur as usual, giving the customary shelter to refugees, but disarming them if they came in large bodies; and that Gen. Gilbert had been asked to assist him should the necessity arise.

To Gen. Gilbert he wrote as follows:

Loodeeana : December 24, 1844.

My dear General,—I know that with you I am writing more for form's sake than from necessity, in order to say that the *coup d'état* which has taken place over the water is, as concerns us, a mere change of ministry effected after the usual Asiatic method.

There is no need for the present of more precaution on this frontier than is necessary at all times with such neighbours. That suffices to make surprise always impossible, and I know, from our former conversation, that you agree with me in thinking that with your force, supported as it is, nothing more is wanted; and, indeed, I must repeat the expression of my gratification that we do agree on this point, for really the occasional fits of excitement or irritation provoked by any stir at Lahore produce effects anything but desirable on either side of the Sutlej.

We can be perfectly vigilant without either showing or feeling fear; and, if I may take the liberty of saying so, I rejoice at your being on this frontier, as it is a security for this sort of vigilance.

Capt. Nicolson has been directed to permit fugitives to cross as usual to our side; and should any large bodies of men come and refuse to disarm he may need your aid, which will, I know, be effectual; but though its being called for is possible, it is unlikely.

Believe me &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

This is Sir H. Gough's reply to the letter addressed to him.

Headquarters Camp, Umballa : December 26, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot,—I had last night the pleasure of receiving your private letter and note of the 24th, and this morning your official letter announcing the official communication to you of the recent massacres near Lahore. It was just what might have been expected, when an attempt was made to restrain an unruly soldiery.

I entirely concur in your opinion with regard to any open demonstration of military preparation, and consider such demonstration, at the present moment, would be very prejudicial to the formation of a government in the Punjab. On the contrary, I have not made, nor do I intend to make, the slightest movement indicative of distrust on our part. The only change I shall make is that of retain-



ing the 31st here until the actual arrival of its relieving regiment (the 62nd).

I have again pressed on the Governor-General the expediency of placing a European regiment permanently at Ferozpoor. These frequent outbreaks may lead to a state of things requiring our interference, and the more European troops we have on the frontier the better shall we be prepared to act, especially at so detached a position as Ferozpoor, where there is no possibility of immediate support.

I shall remain for some days here longer than I contemplated, to watch events, and shall be happy to hear from you as frequently as you conveniently can write; and I shall feel obliged for, and anxious to know, your opinions on passing events at a crisis of such importance to our future relations with the Punjab. . . .

Believe me &c.

H. GOUGH.

Sir Charles Napier, Governor of Sind, who at this time was about to attack the Bugtis to punish certain acts for which they were responsible, wished to obtain permission to march through part of the Multan territory, or to secure its closure against the Bugtis as well as against his troops. He accordingly addressed Major Broadfoot, and as the letter is a characteristic one it is here reproduced.


(Confidential.)

Sukkur: December 28, 1844.

Sir,—Will you allow me first to explain in a few words the outline of what I am about? The tribes in the Boogty hills, including the space between *Poolagee* and *Deyrah*, have committed atrocities upon our frontier all the past year. These men I am trying to punish. My plan (it is yet crude, as certain circumstances may change my projects) is to enter these hills in two divisions, one from *Poolagee*, the other from the most northern point of our frontier (marked *Bara* on Walker's map), while by an alliance with the Murrees, who have a blood feud with the Boogties, I shall bring them down on the Boogties from the north, or rather I am more likely only to shut the Murree hills against the Boogties, for there is no confidence to be placed in these barbarians, though they are good fellows in their way. Thus you have my outline [see next page].

Well, so far is simple; but there is a difficulty. The *Ameer's* territory runs up to *Omercote* on the Indus, as marked in Walker's map. But the late chief of Mooltan took from the Ameers this ground down as far as *Kusmore*. Now, I fear that the road to *Deyrah* from *Kusmore* runs through this bit of *Mooltan territory*. Of this

I am not sure. If I can avoid touching on the Governor of Mooltan's territory, I will ; indeed I must, unless he gives me permission ; but I wish you to gain this permission for me if possible ; we shall injure nothing, pay for everything. If the Governor will allow us, ask him to send some one to meet us and attend us through his territory, and I should be glad that you would do this as soon as possible.



I have been led to form this scheme only a few days ago, but I ought to have written sooner. However, it is time enough yet if you will be quick. I think I have a right to demand that if Mooltan refuses me leave to march through his territory, he should also refuse Beja Khan and the Boogties, who would fly from me in that direction. If one side is refused entrance, so should the other. This is according to the law of all nations. If he acts honestly and equally to us both, he will do me all the good in the world, for he would put Simpson's column at my disposal !

The only reason why I put ' confidential ' at the top of this letter is, that it is as well to speak of these things as little as we can. I was obliged to enter into the outline to enable you to understand why I make this request and to interest you in my movements. By this if any difficulties arise you may be able to help me, and if any complaints are made you will easily answer them. Excuse this long story, and believe me to be &c.

C. J. NAPIER, *Major-General,*
Governor.

CHAPTER XI.

1845.

Decline of the Sikh Government—Letter from Sir C. Napier—Insubordination of the Sikh army—Courage of Rani Jindan—Effect on our sepoys of successful mutiny of Sikh soldiers—Governor-General's memorandum—Scare caused in Lahore by the issue of certain orders by the Commander-in-Chief—Movement of Sikh troops towards the Sutlej—Interview between the Agent and the Wakil—Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India—Letter to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Relations between a Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in India—Sir H. Gough's letter about the orders he had given—Letter from Mr. Currie: the political situation—Inquiry regarding disaffection among the sepoys—Overtures to the Agent from Gulab Singh—Letter from Sir C. Napier: Bugtis defeated—Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough: Punjab news—Instructions to the Agent—Letter from Gen. Ventura.

THE year 1845 is memorable as being the last of real Sikh independence. Towards its close the Sikhs invaded British territory, war was declared, and two battles were fought, the latter of which was the most desperate struggle in which our troops have ever been engaged in India. The correspondence which will be quoted or condensed will show the continued anxiety of the Governor-General to preserve relations of friendship with the Lahore State, and the steps taken in consequence; it will also show how the Darbar, with the instinct of self-preservation, and in order to be relieved from the intolerable pressure of the insubordinate army, encouraged the troops to attack the British.

As a letter from Sir Charles Napier closed the correspondence of last year, so that of 1845 may be commenced by another from the same pen.

An officer serving in Sind had addressed one of Broadfoot's native agents in a somewhat peremptory manner, desiring him to act in a matter affecting the traffic on the Sutlej in a way neither expedient nor in conformity with usage.

Broadfoot, on being referred to by the native, gave him



suitable instructions, and then asked Sir C. Napier, who was Governor of Sindh, whether his subordinate's action was approved by him, pointing out the objections. The matter is altogether too trivial to deserve any notice, but it serves to introduce a characteristic letter.

(Private.)

Sukkur : January 2, 1845.

Dear Sir,—I cannot lose a moment in replying privately to your official of the 20th ultimo. I have only had time to get the Persian letter of Capt. — translated, and I really have seldom read a more impertinent production. I know nothing of it, or what it means. It was unauthorised by, and unknown to, me. It is moreover perfectly out of rule, contrary to all the principles upon which I am acting, and to existing treaties, and also most offensive in its style. I beg of you to feel assured that such a letter never issued from my pen.

You must, till you receive this, think me a strange being. I have demanded an official explanation of his apparently unwarrantable conduct from Capt. —, and it shall be forwarded to you when received. In the mean time allow me to thank you for the good nature and self-command which made you write to me with so much politeness; when the letter of Capt. — warranted your sending it on to the Governor-General without further ceremony, as a *sample of the Sindh correspondence*.

May I request of you to assure the native agent that I never knew of the letter, and that I beg of him not to consider me capable of writing, unprovoked, in such a style to any gentleman whether native or European, or to any man, be his rank what it may, in style so unbecoming and so injurious to the service?

Believe me &c.

C. J. NAPIER, *Major-General*.

Since I wrote to you about asking Mooltan for the leave to traverse a portion of his territory, I have heard of the new disturbance and confusion in the Seikh Government. I have, therefore, thought it *unsafe* (even *with* the Governor of Mooltan's permission) to risk any collision with his disorderly gang. I have therefore broken up the camp at Subzulcote, and ordered the Bundelcund Legion to continue its march to Sukkur, and I propose to enter the Boogtie hills at the [pass]¹ near Poolajee. These movements will begin in about a fortnight, I think; but as yet I have no exact knowledge of where Beja Khan is.

¹ The name is illegible in the original.



If any complaints reach you I beg you will reply distinctly that my movements are purely those of reprisal on the Boogties, the Doomkies, and Jackrannies ; which tribes have, during the whole of the hot weather, and without provocation, entered our territory, and murdered numbers of our people, plundering and devastating in all directions.

C. N.

The policy of distrust and unfriendliness towards the British inaugurated by Raja Hira Singh, and the gross insubordination of the army of the Khalsa, made the violation of the frontier a not improbable contingency. It was not expected that the Sikh army would cross, but it was thought possible that detached bodies of men might cross, either for the purpose of plundering, or by degrees and so as to evade notice, of assembling a considerable body of Sikh troops on the British side of the river. The Agent therefore addressed Major-Gen. Gilbert as follows :

Should you hear of bodies of troops crossing the Sutlej, I request you will, if military prudence allows, take the following measures :

If they have not my permission, they cannot be looked on as the troops of an *allied state* ; they can only be regarded as robbers or refugees.

In either case, if they attempt to cross into the British territory . . . they should be disarmed if refugees ; and if not refugees, forbidden to cross, and if necessary repulsed by force.

If they cross into the protected territory, it will be better merely to watch their movements until you hear from me, except in the following case. If you think the crossing of the river by such a body compromises the safety of either of the frontier forces, and that you can by attacking such armed body save your own force, then you are justified in attacking them without waiting to communicate with me. If the Government such men profess to serve is friendly, they must be rebels ; and if not, they are enemies ; and in either case their destruction is a duty to ourselves and no disservice to any friend.

The Adjutant-General pointed out to Gen. Gilbert that under less urgent circumstances than those indicated by the Agent, the Commander-in-Chief desired that no offensive operations should be attempted unless success were perfectly certain. If threatened he should remain on the defensive till



reinforced, and in a position to act with vigour, and to insure victory.²

The troops at Lahore showed their insubordination in a variety of ways. Sardar Attar Singh, of Kala, had succeeded Raja Hira Singh in charge of the army. His family were, before they became Sikh, by caste barbers. When the men of Ventura's regiments brought the usual reports, they told him that the administration of justice by barbers was a novelty, and they recommended as a preliminary to hearing the reports, that he should send for razors and scissors for the beards of the Musalman. This was followed by such demonstrations of compelling the Sardar to resume the trade, that he mounted his horse and fled.

They also completely controlled the Darbar, and are said, early in January, to have proclaimed Peshora Singh as Maharaja ; but, on promise of a small increase of pay or a present, they recommended him to retire for a time.

The Rani had more spirit than most of the chiefs ; she declared she meant to govern like Begam Samru ; and on one occasion, when the Darbar was terrified by a crowd of drunken and disorderly soldiers, she came out from behind her curtain, threw aside her veil, and addressed the people. The men were delighted, for she was young and handsome. But the effect was merely temporary.

The Agent reported that the army used the Rani and Peshora Singh as two pumps of the treasury, the one in use, the other in reserve.

The Rani, with the advice of some of the principal chiefs, made overtures to the British, through the Agent, for the restoration of order by our intervention.

Broadfoot, in sending such papers for the orders of the Government of India, was very careful to insure complete secrecy ; so that those concerned or those who gave him information should not on that account suffer. In a letter to Mr. Currie, then Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, he said : ' You may perhaps observe that in most things you have my own handwriting or Cust's. It is to this, and to my reading every paper except routine myself, and in cases of

² This letter was signed by Major the Army ; now Field-Marshal Sir P. P. Grant, Deputy Adjutant-General of Grant, G.C.B. &c.



news putting them into the fire when read,' that he attributed the freedom with which natives supplied him with information, or consulted him about delicate difficulties.

He mentioned that he wished to write about distrust among the chiefs caused, first, by unrecorded negotiations in Mr. Clerk's time or previously, with the object of making them tributary; second, by the very contrary course taken lately, of treating them as unfortunate sovereigns about to be plundered by a greedy Company; third, by reopening cases once settled; and fourth, by the publicity of the most secret documents.

On receipt of the despatches, containing all this news, the Governor-General desired the Agent to inform the Darbar that in the event of the young Maharaja being deposed, he (the Agent) could in no way recognise a new chief of the State until he had received instructions from the Government of India. The Commander-in-Chief was instructed to take certain steps towards rendering the force on the frontier more efficient; and the usual commendation of the measures taken by the Agent, with an expression of complete confidence in his discretion, was repeated.

It will be recollected that Broadfoot had brought to the notice of the Government of India the dangerous example to our sepoys of the Sikh soldiers, who had successfully extorted a rate of pay nearly double what was paid by us; and that he was informed that the subject was occupying the serious attention of the Governor-General.

The following memorandum on the subject was addressed to the Agent:

(Confidential.)

Memorandum.

January 12, 1845.

The Governor-General wishes Major Broadfoot to make the most accurate inquiries on the following subject:

What was the influence on the minds of our sepoys in January 1844, by the example of the Sikh army successfully extorting high rates of pay and controlling the Government it professed to serve?

The Governor-General's attention has been drawn to this subject on account of the impression which the mutinies in the vicinity of Ferozpoore made on Lord Ellenborough's mind at the time; and although much of the discontent which was then manifested may be attributed to the dislike of the troops to proceed to Scinde, still a



variety of circumstances appear to justify the apprehension that the example of the power exercised by a large Sikh army had to a certain extent disturbed the minds of our men and predisposed them to hope for the same licence by the same means.

The recent revolution brought about by the Sikh army, and its present unmanageable state, render it expedient to omit no means of ascertaining the truth as regards the *past*, and by the most vigilant scrutiny for the *future* to be at all times well informed as to the temper and disposition of the sepoys on the frontier.

Major Broadfoot's knowledge of the sepoy, combined with his means of using political resources, render him the person best qualified to be charged with this important inquiry. He will, of course, impart to Sir John Littler his sentiments as to the degree of caution to be used in such an inquiry. The very suspicion of such a supposed apprehension would in its effects be most mischievous. It ought not to transpire, and this communication ought to be considered strictly confidential.

In the Governor-General's opinion the mutinies of last January proceeded more from the panic of marching to Scinde, and the refusal of the former extra allowances in that country, than from any seduction effected by Sikh emissaries or Sikh example. On the other hand, in conversation a few days ago with Gen. Ventura, that officer stated as of his own knowledge that the British sepoys were then in such a disaffected state that they had made proposals to cross over to the right bank of the Sutlege, and that he, the General, had given an intimation to this effect to Gen. Vincent, then commanding at Ferozpoore. At the present moment the Governor-General is aware that there are personal considerations now pending which may incline Gen. Ventura to exalt the importance of his own conduct and services on that occasion.

Capt. Nicolson some months ago wrote to Mr. Edwards proposing to obtain a letter, said to be in existence in the Lahore offices, showing the interference, if not the actual approval, of the Lahore Government in the allurements then held out to our sepoys. The existence of any such letter is very improbable; but Col. Birch, the Judge Advocate-General, who was at Ferozpoore for some days during the period in question, states that he was informed the Sikh emissaries, on pretence of bringing letters to the Vakil, with the knowledge of the latter had meetings with delegates from our sepoy regiments at night, and that it was not deemed prudent to institute any proceedings, the mutinies for³ disobedience then occupying more prominently the attention of the Government.

³ *Sic* in original. The mutinous refusal of some native regiments to go to Sind is referred to.



The disbandment of the 34th N.I. took place about the same period. The men went in considerable numbers to the right bank of the Sutlege, and were not enlisted into the Sikh army. This discouragement may have had its effect on our sepoys, and probably the preponderating cause in provoking those mutinies was the Scinde panic and refusal of pay already adverted to.

Be this as it may, it is expedient to adopt the means of accurate information as to any attempts which may be made by Sikh emissaries, and the effects supposed to be produced on the temper and feelings of the British sepoys.

The Governor-General also desires to be informed of the probable number of Hindostanee troops in the Sikh army, also of men trained in our army who have risen to rank in the Sikh army. He also wishes to have in detail as much information as can be collected of the comparative pay, allowances, pensions, clothing &c. of the two armies.

It would also be desirable to have information as to the system under which it would appear that delegates of Sikh soldiers attend the decisions of the Durbar on matters connected with the pay of the soldiers, what prospect any government has of controlling these pretorian bands, bearing in mind that one of the consequences of the Sikh example of extorting higher pay has recently been successfully imitated by the hill troops under Jowahir Singh; their pay, according to Major Broadfoot's report, having been nearly doubled to secure their allegiance to Golab Singh.

These events in a large Eastern army undoubtedly are calculated to destroy the preconceived notions of the superiority of the pay of the British sepoy. The longer this state of things lasts, the more regularly the Sikhs are paid, the greater their licence and their impunity, so much the more vigilant must the British Government be in watching, and if necessary in counteracting, the contagion of such a state of things, infinitely more inconvenient than a well-organised army of equal strength, ready to risk a struggle with the paramount power in the East.

The Governor-General therefore requests that Major Broadfoot will turn his attention to this subject, and address his answers direct to the Governor-General.

HENRY HARDINGE.

Mr. W. Edwards, then Under Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, wrote to Broadfoot on January 15 to complain of irregularity in the receipt of his despatches, and to say that some of them arrived open, and therefore a suspicion existed that they might have been



tampered with on the road. After intimating Sir Henry Hardinge's orders with a view to prevent this, Mr. Edwards wrote :

All that you have done hitherto has elicited not merely approbation, but admiration. I venture to send you a little extract from a note from Thomason . . . which shows his opinions. I beg your attention to the first few lines, as completely bearing out, though unintentionally, what I asserted to you in my last letter—the falseness of our position here. If it be useless to speculate down here, much more is it useless to attempt to issue orders.

The extract from Mr. Thomason's letter is as follows :

Camp near Suharunpoor : January 6, 1845.

My dear Edwards,—Thank you for your letter just received. You forget that we are a little nearer the North-West Frontier, and that the events of one month in that unhappy country wipe out the events of the preceding month most completely. I could not help feeling amused at your speculations on things at Lahore. I am very glad that Broadfoot is appreciated. I hear from him constantly privately, as well as receive copies of his public despatches. The latter seem to me most able. I have seen little of his work in my department yet, for he has been too busy with more important events ; but from what he lets drop in his private letters, I have no doubt he will do great good, if he has time and opportunity. I am just now afraid that I may not see him at Khythul, which I expect to reach at the end of this week ; for the far more important events passing across the Sutlej will most probably keep him on the frontier. I shall probably make a run over to Umballah if he can meet me there.

The Lahore Darbar had newswriters in most of the principal stations in British India, in order that they might be informed of what took place there. One of these, either stationed at Ambala or attached to the Commander-in-Chief's camp, wrote that Sir Hugh Gough had issued orders for the troops to be ready for immediate service, and that consequent preparations were being made. This report caused extreme excitement, and the Agent, anticipating a demand for explanation, wrote to Sir Hugh to ask whether anything of the kind described had happened, or whether it was not mere idle rumour. He further informed his Excellency that, in consequence of the appearance of preparation, 'our position with



respect to the Darbar is materially and unfavourably changed,' and that the risk of collision was increased.

In spite of this the Agent did not think that the rupture would then occur, and considered that the usual vigilance on the frontier would suffice.⁴ On January 16 he reported to the Government of India, that the troops in the provinces of Kashmir, Peshawar, Muzafarabad, Hazara, the Derajat, and Kot Kangra, had mutinied, expelled their officers, and committed great excesses. The rejected officers were received back after making due submission to the men.

In the hills, it was stated that Raja Gulab Singh continued to make public profession of abject submission to the Darbar, of being broken-hearted on account of the violent deaths of his brother and nephew, and of desiring nothing more than to be allowed to die in peace; but at the same time his preparation for war was continued with unwearied energy.

The Rani had seemed disposed to trust the English; but her confidence was shaken by the presence of the Commander-in-Chief on the frontier, and was lost when the rumour, alluded to above, reached Lahore.

In spite of the remonstrance of her more cautious advisers, she laid the report before the Darbar. The greatest excitement prevailed; the matter was referred to the panchayats, and with every expression of reproach, insult, and defiance which occurred to a drunken soldiery, it was decided to move troops towards the Sutlej forthwith, and to desire the Vakil to call on the Agent for an explanation.

He accordingly waited on Broadfoot, and said that he had three messages from the Darbar to deliver.

First. That, owing to the scarcity of forage near Lahore, a few troops had been sent towards the Sutlej.

Second. That he was desired to express the warm concurrence of the Darbar with respect to a message which the Agent had sent.

Third. That he was directed to ask for explanation why his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief had issued orders for the troops to be held ready for immediate active service.

⁴ The Political Agent to the Commander-in-Chief, January 15, 1845.

See *Papers &c.* printed February 26, 1846, p. 16.



To the first I answered that it could only be cavalry that could require forage. The Vakeel looked confused, but readily enough asked if I had not observed that he had added 'fuel' to the forage; he had not done so, but I told him I had not heard it, and asked what troops were going to move. He said he did not know. I said I hoped no evil advisers had recommended the movement of any to the Sutlej.

To the second I merely expressed satisfaction.

The third was the subject of a long conversation; for the Darbar had a very minute account, whether accurate or not, of the military proceedings [at headquarters].

Having heard the whole story, and been warned that my answer was for the Darbar, I said that I knew nothing at all about the matter, that the Commander-in-Chief was the head of the army, and that it was his business to inspect and exercise the troops in every way, and that it was possible that he might have looked into their readiness for movement at Amballa, seeing that to be so ready was part of their duty; but whether he did or not, I knew not, and was not likely to know or concern myself, for, though I was very far below his Excellency in rank, I was for the present serving exclusively under the Governor-General, with whom alone, and with the Government, I had anything to do; and I added that the Darbar also had only to do with the same authorities.

The Vakil admitted the truth of this, but said, as the Commander-in-Chief was a 'Lord,'⁵ the Sikhs could not help anxiety as to his doings.

I told him to undeceive the Darbar; that they should no more concern themselves about the Commander-in-Chief than about the Lord Bishop; who, also, had recently been here; or the lord judges of Calcutta. That each had his own sphere of duty, and could in no way interfere with the Punjab without the sanction of Government.

The Agent further pointed out the inconsistency of the assurances of confidence in the sincerity of the Governor-General, which they continued to express, and the action of despatching troops towards the Sutlej, which indicated suspicion; and in this way endeavoured to allay the excitement which the newswriter's report had caused.

⁵ In India the Governor-General is called the Mulki Lāt, the lord of the country; the Commander-in-Chief, the

Jangī Lāt, or lord of war; and the subordinate governors or lieutenant-governors are called Lāt Sāhib.



On the subject of the correspondence with Sir Charles Napier about permission to march some of his troops through Multan territory, Mr. Currie, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, addressed a letter to the Agent, dated January 13, 1845, from which we give the following extracts :

Although the aid desired by Sir C. Napier is in reality merely the neutrality of the Dewan of Mooltan in an intended attempt by the Scinde Government to chastise the Booghtie tribe of Beloochees, who have committed many acts of atrocity upon the inhabitants of our villages in the neighbourhood of Shikarpore, still the measure involves the application for the free passage of a British force through the Sikh territory, and such a proceeding at this time might have a very mischievous effect, and might result in circumstances very embarrassing to the British Government.

The Governor-General in Council therefore entirely approves of the course so judiciously taken by you, as described in these papers.

The Governor-General in Council desires that you do not proceed one step beyond what you have already done, which his Excellency observes will answer substantially all Sir C. Napier's objects. According to Sir C. Napier's letter, the passage by Gen. Simpson's detachment through the Mooltan territory is not required, in the event of Dewan Moolraj Mull⁶ acting as the interests of his own possessions will dictate, and as the desire which he is known to profess to propitiate the British Government, will doubtless induce him. You should consequently rather recede than advance in the matter, and, treating the whole affair as one of the utmost indifference to us, you should give the Dewan to understand that the communication which you have already made has been merely in the spirit of friendship, and out of regard to the relations which exist between us and his Government.

You are acting entirely in accordance with the spirit of your instructions, and with the wishes of the Governor-General in Council, in avoiding any step by which the Lahore Government, or the Sikh army, which is perhaps truly the Government, may take alarm. British interference in the internal affairs of the Punjab must not only be strictly abstained from, but every act on our part that could be laid hold of by the Durbar, or by any faction in the Lahore territory, as a plea for expecting British aid, must be studiously avoided.

⁶ The name is so spelt in the copy of the letter : Diwan Mulraj, son of

Diwan Sáwan Mall, was Governor of Multan.



Came to Broadfoot Jan 13, 1845

To require the co-operation of the Governor of Mooltan in a military movement of the British army of Scinde, might justly be assumed as giving the Lahore Government a right to expect the reciprocity of British co-operation on some future occasion; any such expectation the Governor-General in Council has desired may be entirely discouraged.

Military aid in the settlement of the affairs of the Punjab is withheld, not from the existence of feelings inimical to the Maharaja or the Sikh Government, but upon principles of justice and policy. If the Governor-General in Council could by advice or the manifestation of any act of friendship assist the Lahore Government in its difficulties, he would gladly do so; but he can on no account sanction any measure which may give to the Lahore Government the appearance of a claim to our active interference in Punjab affairs by the aid of a military force.

A copy of this letter will be sent to Sir C. Napier for his information. His Excellency was doubtless in ignorance of late events which have occurred in the Punjab when he addressed you on the subject of his expedition.

At the risk of incurring a charge of unnecessary repetition, the following letter from Major Broadfoot to Lord Ellenborough is inserted: there is much in it which deserves careful consideration.

Camp near Loodeeana: January 17, 1845.

My Lord,—Accept my hearty congratulations on the honours which have attended your return to England. I rejoice at them on public and private grounds. None were ever better earned, and I hope to see them still increased. Your Lordship will have heard of the revolution at Lahore on the 21st ultimo. Pundit Julla and Heera Singh ended their government and lives fighting desperately.

They had shown remarkable ability and courage, but the difficulties were insuperable. The great Surdars on the one hand, and the disciplined army, or rather the *drilled* army, on the other, suffice severally to swallow up the revenue. Both together devour the country. Pundit Julla tried by rigorous economy and punctual pay to keep the Government going, while he reduced both these formidable bodies, using the one against the other; but he left out of his calculations the mother of the nominal sovereign, and she was suffered in contempt to intrigue against him; or rather the task undertaken was impossible, and both Surdars and army, suddenly uniting, overthrew the Pundit and the Raja, and revived anarchy.

This still continues. The civil officers of the Government are



embezzling all they can, the soldiers are in a state of mutiny, and are pillaging everywhere. The Surdars are helpless amidst the confusion they have raised; and Rajah Goolab Singh is professing submission and daily offering terms, but really preparing to the utmost for war. Feeble hostilities are going on in the hills at Jusrota, and the Government is emptying the treasury to keep the troops quiet.

Peshora Singh, a son of Runjeet Singh, was lately here as a fugitive; he has gone back, and after one unsuccessful attempt to gain the government is preparing another.

The Government is a caricature; they have formed a council: the leaders of the mutinous troops, and a few of the old servants of the government there, debate every question with the Ranee, a young and handsome woman, behind a curtain, whence she scolds them heartily. Her brother, Surdar Jowahir Singh, was nominated Regent; but the Ranee acts for herself, and is now nearly at open issue with her brother. She has lovers and slave girls, who, of course, bear their part; so also do the common soldiers who attend the Durbar, and whom on one occasion the Ranee had to come from behind the curtain and address.

They have sent for Lena Singh, Majeetea, but the Ranee has heard he is a coward, and spoken of him with open contempt. She seems to consider courage the highest quality; and assuredly without it a man had better not try public life in the Punjab at present.

There has been a disturbance at Cabool, and names of noted men are given as slain; but though this is believed at Lahore, I do not think the details are yet to be trusted. This has, however, prevented insurrection at Peshawur.

Before next month we shall probably have a change of government. The troops will, perhaps, set up Peshora Singh as sovereign or minister, and something decisive as to Goolab Singh will be known.

As concerns us, all was confidence in us till a few days ago, when some reported arrangements of the Commander-in-Chief threw the Lahore Government into a panic, and they called on the army to support them. I regret this; they will give us somewhat more insecurity, but will scarcely attack us; and unfortunately the movements of his Excellency do not tally altogether with what I had said, and gave them occasion to demand explanations. I had previously taken the liberty of giving my opinion to his Excellency; and the Governor-General, I am delighted to say, approved of it. My opinion was that we ought to show no sign of alarm by extra preparation, seeing that, thanks to your Lordship, we have a force equipped in the Sirhind Division for service at an hour's notice.



His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has, however, made some requisitions of a small but alarming kind, such as not only detaining her Majesty's 31st Foot, which was useful and unnoticed, but sending for their recruits from Cawnpore, and causing baggage to be weighed.⁷ (This latter I do not, however, know from his Excellency, and it may not be quite correct.)

The Sikhs have, in consequence, ordered troops to the Sutlege, which will produce insecurity and tampering with our native troops, if it is not put a stop to. Now, in my view, if this division of 16,000 British troops needed reinforcements, it would be by divisions and brigades, not by a few hundred recruits. The former ought not to be done except with intention of war, and by the Governor-General; the latter, I think, had better have been let alone. It indicates and excites alarm, and in both ways is objectionable.

I mention this as the event of the moment, though a small one; but it touches a very delicate part of the Indian Government, as your Lordship must know—I mean the relations between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief *before war breaks out*.

The Commander-in-Chief is above everyone but the Governor-General; yet he is neither the author nor the instrument of the policy of the Government with foreign states in time of peace, and when away from Council can know nothing of its details; but his measures may embarrass this policy unless regulated so as to accord with it; and I do therefore think he ought never, when a separate officer, to be absent from the Governor-General, who alone can even advise him without something of presumption. Certainly I think he ought not to be on a frontier without the Governor-General, unless indeed the whole affairs of it are put into his hands; for on frontiers, especially near a revolution, reports are innumerable; and are not always listened to with the apathy one acquires after hearing many of them.

Sir Henry Hardinge has throughout treated me with a kindness and confidence which make it very pleasant to serve under him; they would make me vain did I not know I owe them, as well as that I am here, to your Lordship; as it is, they only make me grateful for your great kindness.

Poor Sir John McCaskill has had a paralytic stroke at Amballa, but is better. Of your other friends you doubtless hear directly from themselves, and at any rate I am here out of the world.

Believe me &c.

G. BROADFOOT.

⁷ See Sir Hugh Gough's letter, next page.



The remarks about the relations between the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General, and the possible embarrassment caused by the presence of the former on the frontier, are worthy of attention.

Sir Hugh Gough's reply to the Agent regarding the rumours which had been reported in Darbar, is as follows :

January 18, 1845.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th inst. mentioning the extraordinary excitement which prevailed at Lahore in consequence of reports from the news-writer at Umballa respecting orders which it is said I had issued to the troops there, to hold themselves in readiness to march at four hours' notice ; and you request that I will say 'whether there has been anything of the kind described as having occurred.'

Your knowledge of our military system must have pointed out to you at once the absurdity of such reports : a British force, being always ready to move at an hour's notice, would not require such orders ; but as you request a definite reply, I will give it. Such reports are totally without foundation. No orders were ever given to the troops, nor intended to be given. On the contrary, having received distinct instructions from the Governor-General in Council as to the wishes of the Government to abstain from all interference in the affairs of the Punjab, and to preserve a line of conduct exhibiting the wish as well as the determination on the part of the Government to preserve the most perfect good faith towards our ally, I have scrupulously avoided the slightest overt⁸ act towards any manifestation of interference, and discouraged it in others.

The only circumstance that could have given rise or the most distant countenance to such reports is, that whilst at Umballa, wishing to curtail as much as possible the kits of the army in India, and to establish a uniformity of system as to the quantum of necessaries a European or a native soldier should carry, both in light and in heavy marching order, I had (as an experiment previous to my issuing any G.O.⁹ on the subject) ordered the kits, as also the bedding of a European and a sepoy, to be weighed ; I need hardly add this measure had as much reference to the troops now in Calcutta as it had to those at Umballa ; and so little idea had I of any such movement of troops for any aggressive or even defensive purpose, that I left Umballa on the 14th, according to my previous arrangements, to visit Kythul and Kurnaul, at neither of which places is there any body of troops.

⁸ This word is somewhat illegible in the original.

⁹ General order.