During this period a vast amount of useful work had been carried out. Upwards of a hundred thousand square miles had been surveyed and mapped, in addition to the surveys directly connected with this delimitation, and two hundred and ninety miles of frontier had been determined and marked by pillars. Besides this, much valuable information, topographical, political, scientific, ethnical and military had been collected, and, as the Foreign Department remarked with pride, "the Commission had lived and travelled in the wildest parts of Central Asia gaining the goodwill of the inhabitants and without a single complaint being brought against anyone of its members, officers or men, by the officials or people of the country."[1]

[1] Properly speaking, a special official volume or series of volumes, descriptive of this remarkable episode in Lord Dufferin's Viceroyalty ought to have been forthcoming. In a separate work, "Memoir on the Indian Surveys, 1875-1890 (Stanford) 1891," I endeavoured to give a brief summary of the labours of the officers who were attached to the Afghan Boundary Commission, but no facilities of research were given to me (although the work was official) and the summary referred to was necessarily brief. At that time I was serving in the India Office and having ascertained that the Government of India were really desirous of a worthy record being prepared of the doings of the Mission, and had written home to that effect, I tried to convince the authorities at home of the desirability of doing something to give effect to the wishes of the Indian Government, but in this I was unsuccessful. And yet other missions of less importance, like Sir F. Goldsmid's Mission to Eastern Persia, and Sir Douglas Forsyth's to Eastern Turkistan, had formed the subject of most interesting Reports compiled by order of Government. Had it not been for this, as it seems to me, unfortunate decision, the literature of Central Asia would have been conspicuously enriched in regard to an obscure region of considerable historical and political importance, where the struggle for the future mastery of Asia will in all probability be decided.

CHAPTER XI

THE INDIAN VICEROYALTY (*continued*)

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER AND AFGHAN POLICY—DEFENCE OF INDIA—FRONTIER TRIBES

THE possibility of war with Russia had to a great degree simplified the policy of the Government of India towards Afghanistan. Briefly, this policy consisted in making common cause with the Amir, in getting him to agree to follow our advice, and in supplying him with the means of repelling invasion from the north. But when Russia's aggressiveness began to cool down, the situation as a whole had to be reconsidered on rather broader lines. The Viceroy accordingly called the attention of the Secretary of State to the questions of the future relations of India with Afghanistan, and a long correspondence of high importance ensued. A great deal, indeed the major part thereof, is of a confidential character and unsuitable for publication, but it affords a very striking example of the thoroughness with which Lord Dufferin mastered the whole field of an exceedingly complex subject. Having myself devoted many years of my India Office service

(1869–1892) to studying Afghan geography, ethnology, history, and politics, I must confess my surprise at finding how many points of obscure but weighty import he ferreted out and is careful to lay stress on. On the whole he appears to have formed moderate and statesmanlike views, views which deserve the attentive study of those who have been too much inclined to range all varying shades of Indian policy under the misnomers of the backward or forward school.

In considering the situation, a start was made from the datum line of the Ripon Agreement of July 20th, 1880, under which the British Government pledged itself to maintain the integrity of the Amir's dominions. Lord Dufferin showed very clearly how one-sided a compact this was, when Abdur Rahman bore himself in no friendly guise towards Colonel Ridgeway, and also steadfastly discountenanced the idea of locating two or three British officers on the frontier, for the settlement of all border disputes with his Russian neighbours. However, after very careful consideration of the latter step, Lord Dufferin arrived at the conclusion that it was inexpedient, and that it was preferable to station an officer on the Persian border at Meshed to closely watch events and advise the Amir's officials.[1] This was duly done, General

[1] I remember making a similar suggestion to the Government in 1880, soon after I was appointed a Private Secretary to the Secretary of State at the Home Office. The particular strategic point of observation I recommended was Sarakhs and, had Lord Granville approved of the idea, the officer who would probably have been appointed was Colonel

Maclean being the first officer appointed. As to the general notion of making Afghanistan a "Buffer State," Lord Dufferin confessed that, personally, he never felt very cordially inclined thereto, mainly in consequence of the difficulty of sending troops to protect the distant frontier which England had undertaken to defend, and also because of the disorganised condition of the country. It was a "conglomeration of insubordinate tribes, governed by lieutenants, incompetent, disobedient, corrupt or disloyal, and sometimes all these things at once." Speaking of Herat in a subsequent letter he draws this interesting comparison :

> Herat is in some respects to Afghanistan what Khartoum is to Egypt. It is an alien possession, where all the advantages are on the side of the attack and all the disadvantages on that of the defence. It is true I was always in favour even of Egypt holding Khartoum as long as she could do so with any prospect of success—a condition which existed until poor Hicks was driven into making his unfortunate expedition into Kordofan—and of course I am still more anxious that Afghanistan should maintain its hold upon Herat.

The revolt of the Ghilzais, in the Autumn of

(afterwards Sir) Oliver St. John. This was some years before M. Lessar's roving propensities led him to explore the territory of Badghis, north and east of the Hari Rud River. At that time the country was absolutely unexplored and unknown, but it was destined to soon form a very critical field of international discussion, and eventually the boundary line was pushed far down to the south, mainly in consequence of M. Lessar's arguments, and his superior local knowledge. Things would have turned out far better for us, if that accomplished surveyor and observer, St. John, in 1880 had been the first explorer of the region instead of Lessar in 1883.

1886, brought the Afghan question to the front again. These powerful tribesmen inhabit the country between Cabul and Candahar, and the attitude that the British Government should adopt towards them called for anxious consideration, especially as the insurgent leaders had appealed to the Indian authorities for help. Lord Dufferin, however, pointed out in writing home that the Amir was our creature, that our friendly relations with him had become a matter of history, and that it would be impossible for us to assist the tribes, unless the Amir showed himself false to us. On the other hand it was undesirable for various reasons for any bad feeling to exist between the Ghilzais and the British. Regarding the former the Viceroy observed :

> From all accounts they are very well disposed towards us. They have begun to understand the danger of having Russia for a neighbour . . . and that their best chance of protection and fair treatment is from us. They are not wilder or fiercer or more bloodthirsty than were formerly the tribes of the Lebanon,[1] and I do not see why we should not be able to establish such relations as have subsisted for so many years past between the Druses and the Turkish Government.

This suggestion, however, was mainly put forward because Abdur Rahman had not, up to that point, established his rule very firmly. In the ensuing years he did much to fortify and consolidate his power, and with the assistance of Sir Salter Pyne

[1] See Syrian chapter, p. 58.

and a few other Englishmen inaugurated an era of industrial development, which revolutionised Cabul, and to some extent conduced to the strength and prosperity of the country.

The upshot of the correspondence between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State was a resolve to pursue a course of masterly inactivity in the quarrel between the Amir and his subjects, but to continue to fortify the British frontier, with the view of making it inexpugnable. This coincided with the advice of Sir Frederick Roberts and General Chesney, who had returned from a tour of inspection along the North-West Frontier. The Ghilzai revolt was eventually repressed, but the effect had been to encourage disaffection in Herat and Afghan Turkistan, and Ayub Khan, who had been for some time living in Teheran, considered that the time had come for striking a blow for the throne of Afghanistan. Accompanied by a group of adherents, he quitted Teheran and succeeded in reaching the Afghan frontier, but there his advance was stopped by the combined action of Persian and Afghan soldiery, and for a time he was reduced to the condition of a political fugitive, till he appealed to General Maclean at Meshed. Their negotiations resulted in an arrangement which provided for the following :— Ayub Khan and his principal followers should take up their abode in India and receive allowances according to their rank, the total sum amounting to about four lakhs of rupees. This arrangement

was sanctioned by the Secretary of State, and the whole party with their attendants, comprising more than a thousand persons, were transferred to the Punjab and placed under the supervision of a political officer especially appointed for the purpose.

In Afghan Turkistan, the province which Lord Dufferin always considered was more liable to detachment from the Amir's cause, a more serious movement took place. The Governor of this province was Ishak Khan, the Amir's cousin, and grandson of Dost Mahomed. He was strongly suspected of being in close alliance with the Russian officials across the border: in fact, Josef Popofski, the well-known writer on Central Asia, openly calls him "a hireling of Russia." He and Abdullah Jan, the Governor of the extreme north-eastern and mountainous province of Badakshan, were summoned to Cabul to confer with the Amir, and Ishak Khan at first feigned compliance, but later on threw off the mask and proclaimed himself Amir. His success against Abdullah Jan was, however, scanty and short-lived, and he fled to his Russian friends across the border. One important result, however, was that on the news of Abdullah Jan's defeat reaching the Amir, the latter at once sent off a messenger to Peshawar, begging the Government of India to occupy and hold for him some important strategical points in his territory. The tide of battle soon turned, however, and Abdur Rahman despatched a second messenger

to stop his original message. It was too late, though, the first missive having already reached its destination; and the incident shed a very significant light on the policy which the Amir would probably adopt in the event of any serious difficulty.

Another consequence arising out of the revolt was the postponement of a mission which the Viceroy had contemplated sending to Cabul. He had proposed a meeting with a view to the exchange of ideas, and in reply the Amir had suggested that two British officers of high position, such as members of council, should be deputed to the capital, to be present at a conference, in which any measures which the Viceroy might propose would be discussed with representatives of the nation. The Amir conceived an original idea that Mr. Gladstone, who was then out of office, would make a capital member of the mission. Finally the Viceroy nominated his Foreign Secretary, Mr. H. M. Durand,[1] and his Private Secretary, Sir Donald M. Wallace, but, owing to Ishak Khan's revolt and the events ensuing thereupon, the whole project fell through.

The relations between England and Afghanistan and the frontier tribes left untouched, however, the question of strategic defence, which, after all, constituted India's chief bulwark, whenever the struggle came. The Viceroy pointed out to his colleagues and to the Secretary of State, that the

[1] Now H.B.M.'s Ambassador at Madrid.

fact of India having become practically contiguous with a great military power of the European type, necessitated a radical modification of our previous scheme of defence. Long before arriving in India Lord Dufferin had formed the conclusion in his own mind that a first-class fort, supplemented by subsidiary forts on properly chosen sites, was one of the necessities of the future. In this the Secretary of State concurred, and the whole question was entrusted to a Committee of specialists, whose report was only sanctioned on October 15th, 1885. On the details of the project of defence it would be undesirable to dwell in a work intended for publication. Moreover, in general terms, it has been most clearly and concisely described by Lord Roberts in his "Forty-one Years in India," vol. ii., p. 402.

Since Lord Dufferin's time, there has been an immense development of activity on the North-West Frontier, so that what was begun in 1885 represents but a small part of the present scheme of frontier defence. There has been, too, an extraordinary accretion of territory, so that in the north, Hunza-Nagar, Chitral, and the intervening ground up to the neighbourhood of Peshawar, has fallen to Great Britain. Southward of the Safed Koh (the southern watershed of the Cabul river) the cast of the net of destiny has brought within the scarlet frontier line a gigantic area of country up to the Persian border and

the Arabian Sea.[1] Our political responsibilities have been thus enormously enlarged. But the strategic conditions, which are primarily dependent on the great geographical features, have not as yet been materially modified. The practicable routes leading from Russian territory to the Indian frontier are still divisible into three groups, viz.—(1) The mountain paths leading from Wakhan and Badakshan across the Hindu Kush to Kashmir, Gilgit, and Chitral; (2) the passes converging on Cabul, and the valley of the Cabul River; and (3) the routes leading to Candahar and eastward to the passes through the Sulimans which debouch into the valley of the Indus. In all these regions there has been a systematised scheme of surveys, which have been incorporated in a series of trans-frontier maps, so that the physical features, the practical routes and the resources of, and supplies procurable on each line of advance have been minutely recorded. Defensive works, railways, roads, and bridges, have been built, and in the interior protective measures have been taken for the care of the arsenals and large railway bridges. Steps have also been taken for protecting, by means of heavy guns, gunboats, torpedo boats and other appliances the harbours of Karachi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Rangoon.

In order to complete the scheme of defence, in 1885 it was necessary to increase the number of British and Native troops in India. This meant

[1] See page 244, *infra*.

a permanent increase of the military budget and additional taxation, but Lord Dufferin showed clearly that the necessity had to be boldly faced; and the recommendations were sanctioned and have since been gradually carried out.

The Native Princes came forward at the time of the Russian menace with offers of men and money. This loyal attitude on their part was very gratifying, but the subject and the whole question were too wide and important to be settled offhand. It was decided to make an experiment of modest dimensions in the Punjab Native States, for extension to other States if found feasible. Eventually a force called the Imperial Service troops was created, by the contribution from each Native State of a small military force commanded by State officers, but drilled, disciplined, and armed under the supervision of British officers and on British lines, our Government finding the necessary supervising officer, arms, and organisation. The offer was universally accepted. The number of Imperial Service troops now amounts to about eighteen thousand, or sixteen per cent. of the total number of Indian troops. These have done admirable service in Gilgit, Chitral, and minor wars on the North-West Frontier, and undoubtedly form a valuable accession to the military strength of India.

As is well known, between Afghanistan (using the term in its political sense to denote the dominions

directly responsible to the Amir's rule) and the old British frontier at the foot of the Sulimans there is a long strip of mountainous territory stretching from the Hindu Kush to the Bolan Pass, inhabited by warlike tribes, mostly Pathans or Afghans, whose quarrels with, and occasional chastisements by the British authorities are matters of notorious history. In fact, the Northern part is called Yaghistan or Rebel Land by the timid Kashmiris. On the merits of what has been called the "Punjab system," Lord Dufferin wrote as follows to the Secretary of State in his letter of August 18th, 1887:

Hitherto it had been the practice of the Punjab Government, who were principally concerned in this part of the question, to discourage all intercourse between our own subjects and the various communities living beyond the border. Their system was to punish the tribes promptly and efficiently if they committed any outrage upon our territory, but in all other respects to leave them severely alone. This procedure had many advantages so long as Russia remained in the far distance. It avoided complications, trivial causes of dispute, and the friction between individuals, which results from all human intercourse; but on the other hand, it left us in ignorance of the geographical features of the country immediately on our front, and our wild neighbours in equal ignorance of our own desirable qualities. Now, however, that circumstances may render this intervening tract the theatre of conflict between Russia and ourselves, it is desirable that at least we should acquaint ourselves with the lie of the land, and if possible, establish a friendly familiarity with its inhabitants.

There was one conspicuous exception to the

record of dubious success on the Punjab frontier, and that was the late Sir Robert Warburton's administration of affairs in the Khyber, from 1879 to 1898. He employed the Afridi *maliks* to keep the pass open, and earned Lord Dufferin's warm praise. Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, too, speaks of Warburton's work in 1886, as "a remarkable example of the possibility of controlling and disciplining the Pathan tribes of the border." Wallace adds that the road through the Khyber in independent Afridi territory was, in consequence, at least as safe as the neighbouring roads in British territory around Peshawar. Sir Robert Warburton in his own work ("Eighteen Years in the Khyber": *Murray*)[1] gives clear and detailed instances how successful were his methods. It is a powerful condemnation of the Punjab system of aloofness from the frontier tribes, and a proof that the successful policy of Sir Robert Sandeman in Baluchistan might have been applied with similar results along the northern borders, had energetic and sympathetic agents been forthcoming. It is true that Warburton had Afghan blood in his veins, his father having married a noble lady of that race, a niece of Dost Mahomed, but any one can see from his book that his methods were English. He trusted the tribes, was constantly associating with them, and they implicitly repaid his confidence. Sir Donald Wallace points out,

[1] Written at the suggestion of King Edward VII., when Prince of Wales.

Photo by] [*Bourne & Shepherd.*

CARAVAN IN KHYBER PASS.

[*To face p.* 242.

however, that the system involved pay to tribal levies, and would have been too costly if applied along the whole length of the border.

Lord Dufferin's administration was not marked by any striking or immediate change in the important and much contested question of the Indian frontier policy. There was, indeed, an expedition in 1888, against those notorious marauders the Hassanzais of the Black Mountain, who were pacified for a time, and satisfactory relations were opened up with the important little mountain state of Chitral, below the crest of the great Hindu Kush range. It forms a watch-tower of considerable value, commanding as it does a well-known line of advance from the upper Oxus basin, where the Russians have a strong permanent fort, down the Kunar valley to Peshawar. Sir William Lockhart, afterwards Commander-in-Chief in India, visited Chitral in 1885, and persuaded the Mehtar and his sons that their best course was to cultivate a firm friendship with the British Raj. Some ten years later Chitral was permanently annexed and occupied by a military force, after a memorable siege. On the extreme north the secluded and difficult valley of Hunza-Nagar, an integral part of the Indus basin, be it remembered, was conquered in 1891, after a very brilliant series of assaults, and that region too has been brought under the Britannic ægis. Mr. E. F. Knight's graphic account of this little war ("Where Three Empires meet": *Longmans & Co.*) is a well-

known and deservedly popular book. Both Chitral and Hunza-Nagar had attracted the polite curiosity of two Russian explorers, Yanoff and Grombchevsky.

It was not till November 12th, 1893, that Sir Mortimer Durand concluded an agreement with the Amir providing for the demarcation of the long frontier between the two Powers from Wakhan to Persia. From a political point of view this settled the question of jurisdiction once for all, and since then, of course, Great Britain has been responsible for the good government of the country east and south of that long line, and the Amir for all west and north of it. The last important event in reference to the Indian frontier has been the creation by Lord Curzon of a new province called the North-West Frontier Province under the direct control of the Governor-General in Council, for the better ordering of frontier matters.

These administrative changes will doubtless bring about in time the tranquillisation, good government, and prosperity of the border districts, as well as provide for the defence of India against invasion from the north-west. It has taken two decades to organise matters on a satisfactory basis, but the credit of initiating a new *régime* may be justly ascribed to Lord Dufferin. Before his time the old policy, so ignominiously stigmatised by some as that of "slaughter and scuttle," was in favour; Lord Dufferin's sagacity perceived the

weakness of this line of action, and the menaces of Russia culminating in the Penjdeh fracas—though they caused great anxiety and much, in a sense, unproductive expenditure—led, nevertheless, to a more thorough study of the defence of our Indian north-western frontier, and to a scheme of measures which have made it practically impregnable.

CHAPTER XII

THE INDIAN VICEROYALTY (*continued*)

TROUBLES WITH BURMA—FRANCE'S AND CHINA'S ATTITUDES—CONQUEST OF UPPER BURMA—HOSTILITIES WITH TIBET OVER SIKKIM—PERSIA AND THE SOMALI COAST

WHILE the political sky was so troublous and overcast in the north-west, there were unfortunately other complications arising in the east. Upper or Native Burma was ruled by King Thebaw, who had succeeded an intelligent and prudent prince, Mindoon Min, in 1878. One of the first acts of the new monarch, a weak youth under the influence of an ignorant and unprincipled wife, was to massacre all the male members of the royal family accessible, so as to remove any possible pretenders to the throne. Such an outrage could not be countenanced by us, and the British Resident was accordingly withdrawn. Commercial relations between the two countries continued, however, to subsist, and the Chief Commissioner kept up his communications with the authorities in Mandalay. The carrying trade up the main stream of communication was in the hands of the Irrawaddy

Flotilla Company, lucrative teak forests were leased to the Bombay Burma Trading Company, and the import and export trade was largely in the hands of Rangoon merchants. Towards the end of 1884 the town of Bhamo was captured by a band of marauding mountaineers, and this produced wide-spread trouble and excitement. On January 12th, 1885, the Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State :

I am beginning to be very anxious about the condition of Burma. The Chinese irruptions, though probably it may turn out to be nothing but "dacoity" on a large scale, is evidently disorganising the kingdom. The Shans are beginning to move in the east, and brigandage is appearing in the south. I should not be surprised if a revolution were to ensue. We have just received a letter from Bernard, our Chief Commissioner, an abstract of which I enclose, which speaks for itself. Hitherto Bernard has been strongly opposed to interference, and has invariably snubbed the British colony at Rangoon, who were, of course, screaming for an immediate march on Mandalay. Now, however, he seems to have entirely changed his opinion, and as I am told he is an able and trustworthy man, we cannot afford to overlook his representations. For this reason I telegraphed to you to-day the gist of his proposals, without, however, myself passing an opinion on them or asking you for instructions. In a little while we may see clearer into the matter. The idea of a military adventure up the Irrawaddy is extremely distasteful to me. I should feel like a man riding at a very big fence with only one foot in the stirrup. On the other hand it is clear that if a step in that direction is admitted to be within the scope of our policy, the present would be an opportune moment to take it. . . .

If we decided upon acting at all, it would become a question whether this plan, or complete annexation, would be preferable. France is undoubtedly working very actively against us, both in Siam and further to the north amongst the Eastern Shans, and will probably in the end become as troublesome along that frontier as the Russians in the north-west. Our precautions should therefore be taken in time, and everything done to strengthen Siam and our trade relations with her. But all this means money, taxation, and a thousand unpleasant contingencies.

Eventually Bhamo was retaken by the Burmese troops. But unfortunately French influence at the capital, Mandalay, became more active. A rumour reached the Viceroy that a Franco-Burmese treaty had been concluded, according to which the famous Ruby mines had been leased to a French Company and other concessions in the Shan States had been made to Frenchmen. Lord Dufferin immediately made up his mind that if French movements should eventuate in any serious attempt to forestall us in Upper Burma, he would not hesitate to annex the country, believing that this course would be preferable to setting up a doubtful Prince on the throne. Shortly afterwards certain Burmese documents reached the Chief Commissioner at Rangoon, showing that the king's ministers were carrying on negotiations which would enable French agents to monopolise the whole trade and the chief resources of the country. Among the papers was a letter from a high personage in Paris to the Burmese Minister for Foreign Affairs, containing the following passage :—" With regard to the passage

through the province of Tonquin to Burma, of arms of various kinds, ammunition, and military stores generally, amicable arrangements will be made with the Burmese Government for the passage of the same when peace and order prevail in Tonquin, and when the officers stationed there are satisfied that it is proper and that there is no danger."

It was difficult to say whether this letter was authentic or not, but clear evidence was subsequently furnished to Lord Dufferin that the French Government intended to establish large French commercial interests at Mandalay, and to secure their political ascendancy in the upper valley of the Irrawaddy, with the view of acquiring a position which would enable them to put pressure upon England, and thus obtain advantages when required.

The Viceroy considered the matter in Council, and a vigorous telegram was sent to the Secretary of State, saying that in the opinion of the Government of India immediate action should be taken. A confidential hint was given to the French Ambassador in London, but this produced no effect for the time, and French activity at Mandalay continued unabated. A decisive move was soon made by the Burmese. Towards the close of August a false charge of secretly removing timber was brought against the Bombay Burma Trading Corporation, and on this pretext an enormous fine of twenty-three lakhs of rupees was levied by

decree on the unfortunate Company, with the intimation that, in default of payment, the leases would be cancelled. This was more than our Government could stand, as Thebaw was politely informed, but with a view to amicable settlement arbitration was suggested. The Burmese Government, however, stoutly adhered to their own view of the case, and declined to suspend their action. There was good reason to believe that the reply had been dictated or inspired by the French Consul, for it was precisely about this time that the prospectus for the French Bank at Mandalay was circulated in Paris.

Under these circumstances the Government of India, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determined to send an ultimatum to King Thebaw. The main requirements were :

That an Envoy from the Viceroy should be suitably received at Mandalay, and the present dispute settled in communication with him ; that all action against the Bombay Burma Trading Corporation should be suspended until the Envoy arrived, and that a diplomatic agent, provided with proper securities for his safety, should reside permanently at Mandalay, and receive becoming treatment from the Burmese Government. At the same time his Majesty was informed that for the future he would be expected to regulate his foreign relations in accordance with the advice of the Government of India, and to afford reasonable facilities for opening up British trade with China. In order to make it quite clear that the Government was in earnest, a warning was given that any reply short of an immediate, unconditional acceptance of the first three demands, and a general

acquiescence in the two last would be treated as a refusal. Simultaneously with the despatch of the letter containing these terms, a force of nearly ten thousand men was assembled in Rangoon under the command of General Prendergast.

The reply of King Thebaw was an evasive and silly endeavour to gain time, so as to try and secure foreign intervention on his behalf. At the same time he issued a warlike proclamation to his own people, telling them that the English intended to destroy the religion, violate the customs, and lower the honour of the Burmese, but that he himself would march out in person with his army to exterminate the enemy and take their country, and that beatific rest would be the portion of those who fell in the struggle.

This, of course, was tantamount to a refusal, and the Secretary of State ordered an immediate advance on Mandalay. General Prendergast acted with praiseworthy despatch. He crossed the frontier on November 15th, and on the 26th King Thebaw's envoys came and prayed for an armistice. The answer was that the advance could not be stayed, but that if the King submitted unconditionally he would be spared and properly treated. Thebaw fell in with the inevitable, and on the 28th the Royal Palace was occupied, and its late master, with his Queen and some ladies of the Court, were conveyed to Madras. The entire campaign had cost the lives of less than twenty officers and men.

The question which had now to be faced was the future government of Upper Burma. Lord Dufferin favoured annexation pure and simple. As he pointedly put it, "It is quite enough to be worried by a buffer policy in the west without re-duplicating it in the east." Moreover, elasticity and a certain power of intermediate resistance are (he added) the essential qualities of a "buffer" which, in a limited sense, do exist in Afghanistan, but not in Burma, which Lord Dufferin picturesquely describes as a "soft, pulpy and molluscous" entity. In writing to the Secretary of State he admitted that Upper Burma, if well governed and developed, might eventually prove a rich appanage of the British Crown, but that it would take years before both ends could be made to meet.

A rather puzzling point, however, was the suzerainty, jurisdiction, or position of China. On November 5th the Chinese Minister made anxious inquiries as to the objects of the Burma Expedition. He stated that Commissioners had been despatched from Yunnan to Mandalay, advising the king to rescind the decree against the company, but it was then too late. The Secretary of State, however, suggested to Lord Dufferin that it would be well for the Government of India to send a special Envoy to Peking. This suggestion was cordially concurred in and his Excellency selected Sir Lepel Griffin for the mission. In consequence, however, of Chinese opposition the proposal fell through, and subsequent negotiations were carried on through

the usual channels. Lord Salisbury assured Marquis Tseng that the Government would examine in the most friendly manner, with the desire to take them into account, any rights of China which could be sustained by records or custom. In the meantime, however, it was necessary to define the international status of Burma, and on January 1st, 1886, the annexation of the territories previously governed by King Thebaw was formally promulgated. It was explained by the British Chargé d'Affaires at Peking to the Tsungli-Yamen, that this made no difference in our relations with China in regard to Burma, and that the arrangement regarding the position of China equally held good. The interchange of missions and presents between Upper Burma and China, in accordance with the Burmo-Chinese Treaty of 1769, would still continue, and arrangements would be made for the delimitation of the frontier.

Any one familiar with the vague notions subsisting in China over "tribute" will readily understand that it was rather difficult to ascertain what were the real relations between the Courts of Ava and Peking. A mission was said to be despatched regularly every ten years with presents from Mandalay, and another mission with less valuable presents from Peking, but the Burmese Ministers declared this was nothing but an exchange of courtesies and implied no tribute. The probability is that this view was correct, as we find a similar exchange of compliments has long existed and used to exist

up to a recent date, between Nepal and China. Lord Dufferin's suggested expedient was to empower the Emperor of China, as the head of the Buddhist faith, to appoint the chief ecclesiastic or hierarch of Mandalay, but this was opposed by some of the India Office authorities and also by some of the leading Burmans. An unexpected opportunity, however, arose of squaring the Chinese in another way—*i.e.*, over the commercial mission to Lhassa, which they themselves had sanctioned, but which, in spite of Imperial orders for its reception, the Tibetans were preparing to resist by force. This was a very awkward position for China, and when it was hinted that if they would abstain from opposing us in Burma we might refrain from insisting on the fulfilment of their engagement in the Tibetan mission, the Tsungli-Yamen jumped at the chance.

On July 24th, 1886, a Convention was signed, providing that England should have a free hand in Burma, that the highest authority in the province should continue to send the customary decennial missions to Peking, that the frontier should be demarcated by a Commission, and that China should protect and encourage trade between her south-western provinces and the valley of the Irrawaddy. The permanent incorporation of the Kingdom of Ava with the British Empire was announced in the Queen's Speech on the opening of Parliament in February 1886.[1]

[1] Mr. Gladstone's fourth Ministry succeeded that of Lord Salisbury on February 6th.

Recognising that a visit to Burma would enable him to settle several of the pending questions there, Lord Dufferin left Calcutta for Rangoon on February 3rd, and thence proceeded to Mandalay. Here he instituted careful inquiry and after anxious consultation with the officials on the spot, wired to the Secretary of State his matured views. He gave in his voice for annexation pure and simple, one of his most convincing arguments being that he considered the rapid overthrow and obliteration of a perverse ruler in the neighbourhood of the British dominions would not have an unsatisfactory effect upon the minds of the Indian Princes, whom Lord Ripon in particular was afraid of alarming.

The greatest difficulty that the Viceroy had to confront was the dacoity. Some people in England were inclined to regard these depredators as peasants carrying on partisan warfare against the British, but this was not at all the case. The dacoits never attacked our troops, but preyed upon the natives, and were raiding right and left, before ever the English appeared on the scene. Gang robberies appeared to have been the rule for a long time in Native Burma, and to have been encouraged through King Thebaw's eccentric methods of administration. Rapid progress was, however, being made, and the mere presence of English officers was having a tranquillising effect. By way of comparison, Lord Dufferin in his letter to the Secretary of State, could not resist the

temptation of pointing out that thirty years previously, and even at a later period, the neighbourhood of Calcutta and Poona had been a good deal more unsafe than the country round Mandalay was then (1886). A notorious dacoit had for three or four years in Central India baffled all the attempts of the Government to catch him, and dacoity, Lord Dufferin slyly added, was a thing not altogether unknown in the streets of London. At the same time it was quite clear that dacoity was a form of crime that somehow was very congenial to the more restless and disreputable Burmese, and in spite of constant and energetic measures to suppress it, it took some years before it was finally got under. The province had an area larger than that of France, and the Burmese being singularly ill-qualified for police work, a large body of military police had to be recruited from Northern India, and shipped in batches to Rangoon.

In England a rather gloomy view of the situation was taken, mainly, as it would appear, owing to the telegrams and letters of the *Times* correspondent, who was apparently on not very friendly terms with the chief officials in Burma. In a letter dated September 20th, to the Secretary of State, Lord Dufferin endeavoured to refute some of the main points of criticism, which, by-the-bye, were not at all unlike some of the allegations brought, with probably more justice, against the Government in 1889—1902 over the South African war. It was said that the Indian authorities had

miscalculated the difficulties of the task, but Lord Dufferin was able to point out that the original force conquered the country with practically no loss at all, and that up to the time of his own visit to Mandalay the dacoit gang leaders and pretenders were quiescent. Both the civic and military authorities said that they had plenty of men at their disposal. Lord Dufferin was, however, not quite satisfied. An illustration of this, which he gave me one day in conversation with him at Clandeboye, was very interesting. He had put the question to the late Sir Charles Bernard as to whether the military force, with which we hoped to hold and pacify the country, was really adequate. Bernard, after consulting Sir Frederick Roberts, was of opinion that it was, but Lord Dufferin said he would not decide immediately, but would think over it. In the afternoon the Viceroy, in company with a field officer, took a walk and ascended to the top of a commanding hill, from whence the surrounding country could be seen. He asked his companion how far British jurisdiction extended, and a line on the near horizon was pointed out to him marking the watershed. "But" added the officer, Colonel White, afterwards the heroic defender of Ladysmith, "I think we should have considerable difficulty in holding even that at a pinch." Again Lord Dufferin said nothing, but the same evening he had telegraphed to India on his own responsibility for ten thousand more men. As he put it in his letter to Lord

Cross, the Secretary of State: "I steadily continued the process until our force amounted to something like thirty-thousand men."

Soon after the beginning of the cold weather the number of troops had been augmented to some thirty-two thousand, and the military police to eight thousand, and on December 28th, his Excellency was able to write home to the Secretary of State:

> On the whole I am in hopes that matters in Burma are improving. The unfortunate people who oppose us are always forced to give way with loss, while on our side we scarcely receive a scratch, and the way in which we are surrounding the disturbed districts, and are turning up when least expected, has not only disheartened our opponents, but has at last put some spirit into the general population, and we now hear on all sides of the villagers not only resisting the attacks made upon them, but of their sallying forth and capturing the disturbers of the public peace.

Further additions were, however, made to the police force, which was increased to a total of about twenty-seven thousand Indian and native men, with a sort of depot for recruits of some four thousand more, undergoing training in India. These numbers were, of course, disproportionately and abnormally large, considering the population, but they really fulfilled to a great extent the purposes of an army of occupation, and gave opportunity for the continual reduction of the Burma garrison proper. Endeavour was also made to disarm the people by a proclamation calling

for a surrender of all fire-arms, but this was not very successful. An important means of communication was made by the extension of the Toungoo Railway to Mandalay immediately after the annexation. This is the grand arterial or trunk line of Burma, and has conduced powerfully to the development of the whole province.

It is not necessary to trace bit by bit the administrative enlargement of Upper Burma. The formation of a civil corps, and of a revenue system, and the provision of jails, court-houses, and municipal institutions as well as of a village system of organisation have proved eminently successful, and at the present day Burma, Upper and Lower, is a model of a flourishing province, owing its prosperity largely to the incorporation and amalgamation of the two halves in Lord Dufferin's time.

The Shan States were another region brought under British rule contemporaneously with Upper Burma. The Shans occupy an elevated plateau stretching eastward of Mandalay, in the direction of the Mekong River, between Yunnan and Siam, and intersected by numerous ranges of hills. The inhabitants are of different origin and language from the Burmese, and live under the patriarchal rule of hereditary chiefs,[1] who had been long tributary, to the Alompra dynasty of Ava. The

[1] There is an interesting and exhaustive account of the country of the Shans by the late Colonel R. G. Woodthorpe, C.B., in the *Geographical Journal* for June, 1896. The Shan chiefs were by general consent the most picturesquely attired of all the native princes at the Delhi Durbar of 1903.

Government of India thus became suzerain to those chiefs, and the policy was followed of maintaining the chiefs in their respective positions, on the condition that they kept their people from raiding, abstained from fighting among themselves and from entering into relation with any foreign power, and that they should gradually approximate to our standard of civil discipline. These objects have been gradually attained without military operations, by the appointment of a political agent called the Superintendent of the Shan States, whose jurisdiction thus extends eastward to the watershed of the Mekong and Salwin Rivers.

In the north the wild and mountainous nature of the country and the uncivilised character of the Kakhyen tribes precluded much progress. Comparing, however, the pacification of the country with that achieved in the case of Pegu, which, though far smaller than Upper Burma, took eight years, from 1853-1861, to reduce to order, the progress made in the three years, 1886-89, in the latter province was undeniably satisfactory.

Another memorable event of Lord Dufferin's Viceroyalty was the war with Tibet over Sikkim. This originated in the desire of the Bengal Government to open up commercial relations with the great and mysterious land of the Lamas, a project which engaged the attention of Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General of India, in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The history of the mission to Tibet of Mr. Bogle, Hastings's envoy,

has been admirably told by Sir Clements Markham, in his volume published by Trübner and Co. (1876). It is needless to retrace the ground here, but having been associated with Sir Clements in the collection and utilisation of the material for that work, I cannot help saying that I firmly believe that there is a large and important trade to be done between India and Tibet, were communications freely thrown open between the two countries. The subject of Tibet seems to have cropped up in consequence of the interest aroused by the secret visits of the Bengali pundit, Sarat Chandra Das, to the Tibetan capital of Lhassa in 1879 and 1881. Mr. Colman Macaulay of the Bengal Civil Service was much struck with the chances that these visits seemed to offer to re-establish friendly intercourse between India and her northern neighbour, and made an official proposal for the despatch of an Indian mission to the land of the Lamas. Lord Dufferin was at first indisposed to entertain the suggestion, but Lord Randolph Churchill, who was then Secretary of State for India, was of a different opinion, and the Bengal Government being very keen in the matter, the Secretary of State despatched Mr. Macaulay to Peking, and with the assistance of the Chinese Minister in London the necessary passports were soon procured. It soon transpired, however, that the objection of the Tibetan ecclesiastics, who, notwithstanding their nominal allegiance to China, are remarkably independent,

was very determined. Passports or no passports, the Lamas had no intention of admitting the British mission, and preparations were made, with Chinese connivance, as it would appear, for stopping it at the frontier. As mentioned above, China was, fortunately for her, extricated from this dilemma by concessions in regard to Burma in return for England abandoning the Tibetan Mission.[1]

This, however, did not close the incident. In order to reach the lofty plateau of Tibet from the plains of India, travellers usually follow a circuitous road through the native State of Sikkim, which lies wedged in between Nepal and Bhutan. In their eagerness to oppose the proposed Mission, the Tibetans had descended into Sikkim territory and erected and garrisoned a fort at Lingtu, some distance beyond their own frontier. As the Sikkim Government was bound by their treaty with us of 1861 not to allow foreign troops into their territory, the Rajah was required by us to insist on the Tibetan garrison at Lingtu clearing out; but his Highness's sympathy was all with the Tibetans, of whom he was much more afraid than he was of the Calcutta authorities. Representations were made to the frontier officials and to the

[1] A clear and trustworthy account of the Tibeto-Sikkim imbroglio and of Sarat Chandra Das's sojourn and labours in Peking will be found in the late Mr. Alex. Michie's interesting work "The Englishman in China" (*Blackwood and Sons*), vol. ii., pp. 305-312, and in Mr. Rockhill's introduction to Sarat Chandra Das's "Journey to Lhassa and Central Tibet," published by Murray, under the auspices of the Royal Geographical Society.

Chinese Government, but in vain, and the Bengal Government began to press for stronger measures.

The Rajah had taken to residing all the year round at Chumbi, which lies in the tongue of Tibetan territory, jutting down between Sikkim and Bhutan, and, as already mentioned, his predilections were with the Tibetans. The Lepchas, or National party, who had practically carried on the Government during his absence, were really pro-British, but the impression was gaining ground that no help was forthcoming from India, and there was then a real danger that the whole Sikkim population might decide to throw in their lot with the Tibetans. It was for this reason that the difficulty could not be settled through diplomatic representations at Peking, for the enormous distance between Lhassa and the Chinese capital made speedy arrangements an impossibility.

In these circumstances diplomatic pressure at Peking had to be supplemented by action on the spot, and a letter was sent to the officer in command of the Lingtu garrison, telling him that unless he evacuated the fort by March 15th he would be expelled by force. This letter was returned unopened, with a verbal message that the Tibetan Government did not permit their servants to receive communications from foreigners! The letter was then forwarded to the Tibetan frontier officers, but was not answered. In February 1888, another appeal was made, this time to the Dalai Lama, disclaiming all aggressive or territorial

designs on the part of the British Government, but this also remained unanswered.

The Chinese Tsungli Yamen in Peking, in the meantime, were getting very uneasy, as March 15th was approaching, and through their new envoy in Szechuen, the province adjoining Tibet on the east, were pressing for still further delay as proof of friendly intentions. This, however, was out of the question, for, as our Minister at Peking put it, if two years' forbearance were not proof of goodwill, nothing would be. As a warning, one hundred and fifty pioneers were sent on ahead to repair the bridge at Rhenok, between our position and Lingtu, but this hint had no effect. Beyond, a stockade had been erected to bar the road, and on March 20th General Graham's column stormed this obstacle without any serious casualties on our side, and with the loss of fifty Tibetans. This defeat disheartened the enemy, and Lingtu was abandoned and the pass crossed. In the Chumbi valley some three thousand Tibetan troops assembled, and made a sudden attack on Gnatong, a post fortified by the British troops a little in advance of Lingtu. After three hours' fighting the Tibetans were driven back with the loss of about one hundred killed and as many wounded. In spite of these two reverses the militant hierarchy at Lhassa, who were practically the dominant power, would not give in, and by the middle of September a fresh force of about eleven thousand was collected, and entrenched near Gnatong. They were easily

routed by General Graham on September 24th, about four hundred of them being killed, a proportionate number wounded, and over one hundred taken prisoners. This decided the campaign, and the Tibetans offered no further molestation.

Since then endeavours have been made to place the trade between India and Tibet on a recognised and practicable footing, and after long and tedious negotiations, a treaty "port" was opened at Yatung on the frontier. It has not, however, been attended with great success, the Lhassa Lamas having always viewed the innovation with ill-disguised hostility. Tibet being shut off in every direction by such stupendous mountains, physical difficulties, and wild, bleak, and sterile regions, there appears to be but little prospect of better relations being soon established between its people and ours. One can only hope that the slowly expanding commercial traffic, and our own studious abstention from encroachments and annexation, may in time diminish suspicions, and engender better feelings towards us, and thus lead to the free exchange of commodities for which there is such ample opportunity.

Turning our gaze to the western confines of India we must remember how important a part is played by Persia in the shaping of the foreign policy of India. The country adjoins both Afghanistan and Baluchistan, and it may be almost assumed that Russia will never contemplate a real invasion of India till she has annexed the northern half, at least, of the Shah's dominions. Were

England determined to support the integrity of Persia, or at least of its southern provinces, the Shah might be assured of her guarantee against the perpetual fear of Russian aggression in the north. But our attitude towards Persia has ever been one of the weakest points in our Asiatic policy, and the consequence is that, while Russia is daily strengthening her position on the Khorassan frontier and the Caspian, our representative, as Sir Donald Wallace truly remarks, seems condemned to play a losing game.

As is well known, the British Minister at Teheran is under the Foreign Office, although the Indian Viceroy is furnished with copies of all important papers and information. When Lord Randolph Churchill was Secretary of State in 1886, he suggested that the direction of diplomatic relations with Persia as well as with Siam and China should be transferred to India, and the Viceroy replied that the proposal seemed a good one; but for some reason or other it fell through and nothing more was heard of it. Probably the Foreign Office in Downing Street was averse to the change.[1]

Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Chargé d'Affaires at Teheran displayed considerable energy in the

[1] At the risk of being considered egotistical, perhaps I may be forgiven for mentioning that I wrote several letters to the *Observer* some years ago advocating that the conduct of all our Asiatic business should be vested in one department, a suggestion which was practically not very different from the idea mentioned in the text above. I thought that a "Secretary of State for Asia" might lead towards more unity and strength of purpose in our Oriental policy. I was not, however, aware that the matter had been so recently officially mooted, although of

endeavour to effect better administration and improved communications in the south of Persia. But he encountered obstacles. He was confidentially told that the Russian Minister was talking vaguely about compensation in the north for any concession vouchsafed to England. This indeed might have been surmounted, for there is nothing that disconcerts your Russian statesman more than a firm front. But a more formidable difficulty arose in the refusal of the Treasury to incur any financial responsibility in respect of guaranteeing a British-built railway in Persia,[1] and the project had to be abandoned.

course I knew that some distinguished Anglo-Indians like Sir Henry Rawlinson had been in favour of it. Sir Charles Dilke, *inter alios*, was opposed to my suggestion, mainly, I think, on the ground that the greater part of Asia does not belong to us. But, if it comes to that, there is an Asiatic Department of the Russian Government (though it deals with only a fraction of the aggregate population of that vast continent), and a very useful and powerful Department it is.

[1] Curiously enough a year or two later I was led to examine and eventually read a paper before the Society of Arts on the possibility of constructing a railway from Port Said to Karachi, by way of Northern Arabia, Southern Persia, and Baluchistan, and the question of a British guarantee cropped up. Lord Currie, who was then the Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, and perhaps smarting under the recollection of the Treasury snub just referred to, was very emphatic as to the futility of expecting encouragement from that Department, although I explained that a yearly allowance for the conveyance of the mails was all that was needed in the way of Imperial subsidy.

No one else to my knowledge has ever gone into the matter of the construction of a trans-Arabian line, although from the researches I made I am certain it is feasible, and, while the Bagdad Railway is to the fore, most important. As to the Persian section of a railway to India, Lord Curzon's Quetta to Nushki line seems to presage the probable route. Opposition and outcry from Russia are to be expected, as a matter of course, but these may be discounted,

As to the future of Persia Lord Dufferin showed how unstatesmanlike, illiberal and weak Eastern potentates were by nature and upbringing. But he also laid his finger on the essential blot and canker of our Persian policy towards the Shah.

He asks our Minister for some definite assurance of support if in obedience to our recommendations he refuses some concession to Russia, and all he gets in reply is a few friendly expressions from which any promises of material assistance are carefully excluded.

At the same time, the Viceroy fully approved of the plan of extending British commerce in the South of Persia by means of railways. He did not, however, think it fair for India to give money by way of subsidising Persia. The line of developing trade in the south was energetically followed up by Sir H. Drummond Wolff and eventually met with success in the throwing open of the Karun to commerce.

In the Persian Gulf no radical change in the situation took place, so far as England's attitude was concerned. The independent *status quo* of the islands therein was maintained in spite of Russo-Persian intrigues, and the extension of Turkish Sovereignty over Koweit and the riparian tracts to the south was firmly discouraged.

With regard to the Somali Coast, which has of late figured prominently in our extra European politics, matters were in embryo at the beginning of Lord Dufferin's reign. The Egyptian Government had

determined to relinquish their tenure of the Somali Coast, and the Secretary of State for India, considering the importance of Berbera and Zeila as markets and ports of supply to Aden, suggested the deputation of a political officer to facilitate the Egyptian evacuation, and to conclude protectorate arrangements with the local Sheikhs. Lord Ripon's Government, though sensible of the importance of these two ports to Aden, had been very reluctant to become financially responsible for places more within the home than the Indian sphere of influence.

Soon after Lord Dufferin's arrival in India he wrote to the Secretary of State (on December 30th, 1884) saying he had studied the papers and was inclined to think, as far as the Indian Exchequer was concerned, that the best plan would be to place Aden and all its dependencies, including the island of of Perim, at the mouth of the Red Sea, under the Colonial Office. Failing that he would consent to India undertaking the management of Berbera and Zeila provided she were indemnified for all expense incurred. This was eventually agreed to, but as the revenues of those states soon exceeded the expenditure no indemnification became necessary.

CHAPTER XIII

THE INDIAN VICEROYALTY (*continued*)

MILITARY REFORMS—PUNJAB FRONTIER FORCE—PRESIDENTIAL COMMANDS—MILITARY STRENGTH OF INDIA—LORD ROBERTS' ACTIVITY AND REFORMS

THE military aspect of the Indian Viceroyalty has been admirably described by Major-General Sir. E. Collen, G.C.I.E., in a special memorandum which he, when serving as Secretary to Government, wrote at Lord Dufferin's request. It was a most interesting paper explaining as it did, at the outset, the peculiar features of military administration in India. The Military Department of the Supreme Government is concerned more especially with the financial control, organisation and general policy, and the Commissariat, Ordnance, and other spending branches are placed under it. On the other hand, the discipline, efficiency, equipment, training, education, and mobilisation, and what may be termed executive and the technical parts of the business, are in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief.

During the four years 1884–1888, changes were made in the administration and better organisation of the army, in raising its strength and in formu-

lating a plan for mobilisation, in reorganising certain army departments and developing the defences of the Empire.

One of the first questions that cropped up, was the transfer of the Punjab Frontier Force from the control of the Punjab Government to that of the Commander-in-Chief. This proposal had not been accepted by the Secretary of State in 1883, but in 1885, when the reorganisation of the army was taken in hand, the change became necessary. The occupation of Baluchistan had converted part of the old Punjab frontier into an internal instead of an external frontier, and it was embarrassing that the regular army in Baluchistan should be under different jurisdiction from that in the Punjab. The transfer was duly sanctioned by the Home authorities, and Lord Dufferin took the opportunity to express the high sense entertained by the Queen-Empress of the loyal and brilliant services which the Punjab Frontier Force had rendered to the State. The change was carried out in July, 1886, and has been attended with marked success.

The staff and commands of the army were also reorganised, this change having been necessitated by the extension of the railway system, and the occupation of Baluchistan and annexation of Burma. Instead of three classes of higher commands, it was decided to have only two (Divisional and Brigadier-General), while the staff of the Adjutant-General and Quarter-Master-General's Departments were

amalgamated, this being a plan which not only worked efficiently and economically, but had been partially adopted in England, and more completely in all the great continental armies. Certain new appointments were also provided for the staff and commands in Burma, the whole scheme being carried out at a less cost than under the existing system.

Another great question was the suggested abolition of the Presidential army system, a subject which had been considered by the Army Organisation Commission of 1879. It had been negatived by the Secretary of State in 1881, but four years later Lord Dufferin was so convinced of its necessity, that he determined to press it very strongly upon the Home authorities, and did so in a despatch dated August 14th, 1885. The Secretary of State and his India Office advisers were, however, not convinced, and Lord Dufferin had again to urge the matter on the attention of the Home Government. In a Minute of October 15th, 1888, he pointed out that the leading principle of the proposals was decentralisation in less important military business, the supreme financial and administrative power remaining in the hands of the Governor-General in Council. The Commander-in-Chief in India should, he submitted, be placed in command of the whole army, instead of his powers being confined chiefly to the control of the Bengal Army, and he would thus be given a direct incentive in carrying out economies. The four armies (Bengal, Punjab, Madras, and Bombay)

should each be commanded by a Lieutenant-General, aided by a strong military and departmental staff, while the Commander-in-Chief would be drawn into closer financial relations with the Government, and would become commander in reality, as well as in name, of the whole of the military forces in India, being freed from the detailed and executive business of the Bengal Army.

The Viceroy also set forth, at some length, his views on the military administration of India. He recalled the fact that many years before, it had been proposed to substitute a Minister of War for the Commander-in-Chief, while the Army Commission of 1879, though they did not favour that notion, recommended that the Commander-in-Chief should not have a seat in the Governor-General's Council. This proposal was passed over by the Government of India, and wisely in Lord Dufferin's opinion. He was, however, entirely opposed to the suggestion in Lord Lytton's Minute of May 16th, 1880, that there should be no Military Member of Council save the Commander-in-Chief, and that the whole business of military administration and government should be concentrated in the hands of the latter, assisted by the Chief of the Staff and a Financial Secretary. Such an arrangement, he contended, appeared to rest on a misapprehension of the true principles of military administration, for by it the executive command of the army, the financial control, and the functions of the administration, would be absolutely confused.

The result would be to burden the staff with duties of overlooking departments, from which a vast deal of the expenditure of the army proceeds —duties for which they were untrained and unaccustomed—and to lead them to neglect their real and practical work of preparing the troops in all respects to take the field. Such a *bouleversement* of duties would be impracticable to begin with, and most inexpedient in vesting undue power in the hands of the representative of the army, who would be more specially interested in pressing proposals involving expenditure than in exercising rigid and systematic economy. On the existing state of things, Lord Dufferin delivered himself in the Minute as follows:

> The present form of Military Administration in India, where every Military Department is worked by professional soldiers, has been tried during a century in every conceivable kind of campaign and expedition, and it has not been found wanting. It appears to me that when a force has to be launched on active service, very large powers are possessed by the Military Chiefs, and that the intervention of the Government of India is no more than absolutely required. . . . It will be seen, therefore, that I hold the strongest opinion that the form of the Supreme Military Administration in India should not be changed, but that opportunity should be taken to introduce improvements, whenever this can be done without impairing the constitutional structure.

The Viceroy then went on to mention the exceptional military operations which had had to be undertaken during his tenure of office—viz., the

Suakin Expedition, the war preparations of 1885, the campaign in Burma, and the expeditions to Sikkim and Hazara, adding that "though there are defects which may be remedied, the Indian Army and its military administration will bear comparison with any other army in the world."

The above Minute seems to me a close and masterly document, indicating the thoroughness with which the subject of this memoir assimilated topics which are often regarded as too technical and professional for the civilian to pronounce a very confident opinion upon.

With regard to the increase of the military strength of India, carried out in Lord Dufferin's time, it is necessary to bear in mind that in 1882 Lord Ripon had reduced the number of regiments in the Native Army, and a certain number of batteries of artillery, while increasing the strength of the remainder. This step had been taken for financial reasons, but it reduced some corps of good fighting qualities. The two great points upon which Lord Dufferin insisted were, firstly, the necessity for an increase to the strength of the British Army, and secondly, that the fighting element of the armies of India should be developed. He felt that new conditions had arisen, which rendered it necessary to place the military force of the country on such a footing as would enable a large force of British and Native troops to be put into the field against any aggressive movements of Russia, while at the same time providing for the internal security of the

country. In March, 1885, the Viceroy therefore recommended to her Majesty's Government that an increase should be made to the native cavalry and infantry of four thousand five hundred, and seventeen thousand five hundred men respectively.

The British troops at this time were dangerously low in point of numbers. The large strength to which they had been raised during the Mutiny had been reduced to a normal establishment of sixty thousand, but in 1884-5 this total had sunk considerably below this figure. Great discussion ensued between the Government and the Commander-in-Chief, on the subject of the proposed increase to the British Army. The latter was in favour of a large augmentation, but eventually it was decided that an addition of eleven thousand would suffice, raising the strength of the army to seventy thousand men.

Out of the foregoing arose the question whether the British Army in India was organised in the most economical and efficient way. In a Minute of December 8th, 1888, Lord Dufferin wrote:

> In Continental armies, the strength of battalions in a war establishment varies from seven hundred to about one thousand, the highest being that of the Russian Infantry, and we ought to be certain that the battalions of British infantry, and regiments of British cavalry in this country, are of sufficient strength to provide for all contingencies, and to admit of the considerable deductions which have to be made when regiments take the field. The establishments of regiments in India have varied from time to time, and both cavalry and infantry regiments have stood at a higher strength than at present. It is obvious

that while maintaining the army at the present strength, the most economical arrangement is to have large regiments of cavalry and battalions of infantry. There are, I am aware, some disadvantages in this arrangement, especially with regard to the reduction in the number of British officers in India, it will probably be desirable to wait until we see what result is obtained from the endeavour to form a reserve of officers from various sources, which would be required in time of war. The question should, in my opinion, be thoroughly discussed. It is imperative to seek relief to the finances in every possible way, and if my military advisers consider the plan feasible, there should be neither difficulty nor danger in carrying it out.

But there is another very important question connected with the British Army in India, viz. :—whether the present system of short service is adapted to an army in India. I believe that the Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that longer service is necessary for soldiers in this country. This is a problem which is surrounded by difficulties, and much can be said on both sides of the question. The system of short service enables England to have a large reserve, and at one time it was contended that the possession of this reserve was a great strength to India. Under certain circumstances this would be the case, but, on the other hand, we have lately had evidence, in our discussion of the mobilisation scheme with the Home authorities, that there is great doubt whether England, in the event of a considerable war, would be able to spare a portion of the reserve for Indian service. . . . According to calculations made, India has the services of the British soldier, on an average, for a period of less than five and a half years, and the expenditure in England, and in the conveyance of these men to and from India, is very considerable.

All these matters, Lord Dufferin contended, were deserving of careful consideration, so that the

portion of the British Army in India should be organised on the most economical principle.

In the same Minute he dwelt on various debatable points touching on the native forces. The inclusion of unwarlike races or tribes among them had led to the elimination of some of these from the Bengal Army, and Lord Dufferin more than hinted at further steps in the same direction, or utilisation of the men in military police work in Burma and other operations, so that the combatant spirit might not deteriorate. Another very notable step was the establishment of reserves of the Native Army. It had long been regarded as a blot that no plan existed by which, when war occurred, regiments and battalions proceeding on active service could be brought up to sufficient strength to take the field. Large numbers of native soldiers annually went back to civil life, and the army was practically one of short service, there being a considerable aggregate of young men scattered over the country who had voluntarily taken their discharge. It was decided, therefore, with the approval of the Secretary of State, to form an active reserve for the infantry, and a second or garrison reserve to consist of soldiers pensioned after twenty-one years' service, or who had passed their time with the colours and the active reserve. The linking of battalions for facilitating transfer from one to the other, and the formation of regimental centres or head quarters for the groups of two or more battalions, were also sanctioned.

Passing by the events in Burma, and the grand Durbar at Rawal Pindi, which from a military point of view necessitate but scanty reference here, we come to the important topic of mobilisation. This subject had been on the *tapis* for many years, but many distinguished officers had argued that the circumstances of India rendered it impossible for a system to be devised whereby a large force could be promptly put into the field. These comfortable but at the same time irritating views were, however, not generally accepted, and in 1886, the Military Department, with Lord Dufferin's thorough concurrence, formulated practical proposals. A strong Committee was formed with the Commander-in-Chief as President, to work out the details of a scheme. In most continental armies the changes among garrisons from which the units are drawn, are comparatively few, so that mobilisation is a more simple matter than it is in India, where the circumstances of country, occupation, and climate, prevent a rigid and permanent garrison system. All the regulations necessary for the equipment of certain army corps, the collection of transport and the provision of ammunition, ordnance stores and commissariat supplies were drawn up. In the branch of transport alone, the details had to be worked out minutely, not only for the regimental equipment of the army, but for the trains which would be necessary for the food and supplies of all kinds.

Lord Dufferin took the greatest personal interest

in the mobilisation scheme, and in his Despatch to the Secretary of State, enclosed a Minute expressing his warm admiration of the manner in which the Committee had conducted its arduous labours. To the Commander-in-Chief and his staff, to General Chesney, to Colonel Collen,[1] who had long made this subject his special study, and to Major Elles R.A., the able Secretary, amongst others, special thanks were awarded. The result of the Committee's labours was pronounced to be "a magnificent monument of industry and professional ability."

To the important discussion on the general strategical situation of Russia in Central Asia, and the measures necessary in the event of war, reference has already been made; it is noteworthy that Lord Dufferin, with characteristic insight, had commended various crucial points in the general question to the special consideration of the Committee, and that the upshot was a very complete scheme of preparation and action for such an eventuality.

A great deal was also done during the Viceroyalty for the moral improvement and social lot of the soldier. Lord Roberts in his book says that, though the G.C.I.E. awarded to him in the Jubilee *Gazette* was most gratifying, what he valued still more was the acceptance by the Government of his strong recommendation for the establishment of a Club or Institute in every British regiment

[1] Lord Roberts described the Colonel as "a particularly helpful member of the Committee."

and battery in India. The Commander-in-Chief's special object was to abolish that "relic of barbarism," the canteen, and to supersede it by an Institute in which the soldier could have under the same roof a reading room, recreation room, and a decently-managed refreshment room. Lord Dufferin cordially welcomed the proposal, and Lord Cross in the same enlightened spirit, gave his sanction, so that the Regimental Institute became a recognised establishment.

Funds having been granted, a scheme was drawn up for the erection of buildings, and for the management of the Institutes. Canteens were reduced in size, and such attractions as musical instruments were removed to the recreation rooms; the name "liquor-bar" was substituted for that of canteen, and that there should be no excuse for frequenting the liquor bar, at the instance of the Commander-in-Chief a moderate and limited amount of beer was served, if required, with the men's suppers in the refreshment room. The arrangement has been followed by the happiest results. Financially, as well as morally, these reforms have proved a striking success.

Various ameliorations were also made in the position of the native soldier by a revision of the good conduct pay rules, as well as those affecting pension, and by improving the lines or hut barracks in which they lived. Medals, too, for meritorious service and good conduct, together with annuities and gratuities, were granted on a system similar

to that obtaining in the British Army. This was done in commemoration of the Jubilee.

Amid a variety of minor changes and reforms the strengthening of the defences of India from attack by sea and land, ranks as one of the most important military events of the Viceroyalty. To the latter reference has already been made (p. 238), but in addition some of the principal ports received much needed attention. Something had been done at Aden, but very little had been effected at other places, the proposals of the Defence Committee having been put aside by Lord Ripon and Sir Evelyn Baring on account of the expense involved. Early in 1885 revised proposals for the defence of the harbours were placed before Lord Dufferin, and eventually sanctioned. The permanent defences of Bombay consisted of six principal batteries, suitably armed, on the mainland and islands, and two turret-ships. Less extensive but, nevertheless, adequate provision was made at Karachi, Calcutta (where, the Hooghly being very difficult to navigate, the need for batteries is not so urgent), Rangoon, and Madras.

Regarding the East India Squadron, a subject which comes within the scope of the Military Department, it is gratifying to note that, on the representation of the Government of India in 1887, the annual subsidy of £70,000 to the Admiralty was reduced to £38,500. Instead of six ships of war, four were allotted for service in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, under the more direct control



Photo by] [*Bourne & Shepherd.*

MADRAS.

[*To face p.* 282.

of the Government of India. At the present day, of course, the Persian Gulf is a very critical focus of international politics, and it would be very greatly to our interest to have a stronger naval force *en evidence* there. But at that time, the southward pressure of Russia, Germany, and France in those regions, had not materialised, and there is reason enough to be thankful for what was done in the way of defence within the confines of India proper. Sir Edwin Collen sums up the situation by saying that "it is doubtful whether there has ever been a period of such active movement in campaigns and expeditions, in which so much has been done to raise the strength and condition of the Army, to render India safe by sea and land, and to effect valuable reforms in every branch of the service, as that closed with the departure of Lord Dufferin from India."

CHAPTER XIV

THE ECONOMIC SIDE OF THE INDIAN VICEROYALTY

FINANCES OF INDIA—RAILWAYS—IRRIGATION

THE financial features of Lord Dufferin's Indian administration are not so easy to follow and appreciate, unless one steadfastly bears in mind the radical difference between the "beneficent despotism" of India, and the robust enterprise of England's institutions. The duty of initiation and responsibility for the same lies directly at the door of the Central and Local Governments in India, so that any violent disturbing influences are liable to cripple administration very severely. Occasional famines, fluctuations in the price of opium and in the rate of exchange with the Home country, are among the best known of these influences. In these and in other respects the four years of the Viceroyalty were extraordinarily unlucky, and it is no small credit to Lord Dufferin and his advisers that these cumulative disasters were so successfully overcome.

A persistent fall in the exchange produced an aggregate loss for the four years of close on ninety millions of rupees, as compared with the last year

of Lord Ripon's administration (1884–85). This in itself was bad enough, but in addition came the Russo-Afghan imbroglio, involving considerable military preparations costing some Rx. 3,000,000. This, too, was only part of the expenditure, for Russia's proximity to the Indian frontier necessitated special defences, involving an average annual expenditure (including frontier roads) of about Rx. 900,000 for several years, and a considerable and permanent increase of the army in addition.

A third abnormal cause of expense was the annexation of Native or Upper Burma, the military and civil expenses entailed by the pacification of the country and its transformation into a province of British India being very great.

To meet all this increased expenditure it was clearly necessary to enlarge the revenue, and this was done chiefly as follows:

	Rx.
Imposition of Income tax . . .	900,000
Absorption of Famine Insurance grant	1,450,000
Revision of Provincial contracts . .	550,000
Increase of Salt duties . . .	1,725,000
Petroleum tax	65,000
Assessed taxes and Excise in Burma .	100,000
	Rx. 4,790,000

But even these important items did not balance the account, and the consequence was, that three of Lord Dufferin's four years closed with a deficit, the aggregate being about fifty millions of rupees.

There was also during Lord Dufferin's administration a considerable increase of the capital account for which the Home Government was mainly responsible, for they borrowed twenty-two and a half million sterling, while the Government of India borrowed only ninety million seven hundred thousand rupees. All this, however, it must be borne in mind, is not an addition to the Public Debt in the sense in which it is understood in England, for it is more in the nature of a mortgage. If the value of all the Indian public works, including railway and irrigation undertakings were estimated, the total value would probably be found equal to the liabilities. Whether this be strictly so or not, the borrowed money referred to above was very profitably invested. The sterling loans included some millions for the purchase of the Oudh and Rohilkhund Railway, six millions for redeeming the annuities of the Sind-Punjab and East Indian Railways, and minor securities. It also included a loan of Rx. 1,200,000 for the construction of the Bombay and Calcutta Docks, an instance of far-sighted enterprise which might well serve as an example to the mother country, which has been content to let the docks of her chief port and metropolis languish for centuries, without stretching out a helping hand to advise or even bring them up-to-date.

Turning our attention to the public works, which help to develop the country, and ward off famine, and which in India it devolves on the

Government to provide, it is noteworthy that 2,896 miles of railway were added to the open lines, while 2,861 miles were left under construction at the time of Lord Dufferin's departure. In the early days of railway enterprise, the work of construction, though under the direct control of the Government, was somewhat haphazard and unsystematic. But in 1880, the Famine Commission strongly recommended the institution of "Famine Protection" lines, a scheme which was worked up into a general railway construction programme under Lord Ripon, and duly sanctioned by the Home authorities. On Lord Dufferin's arrival in India he found that the scheme required over hauling, particularly in regard to frontier defence, which (as already mentioned) necessitated the addition of a system of military railways. One of the most important of these was the Sind-Pishin and Bolan line of connection between the Indus Valley and the frontier at Candahar. Between Sibi, which marks the descent to the plains of the Indus, and Bostan, which is within fifty miles of the Afghan frontier, there were run alternative lines, one through the Bolan Pass and the other through the Hurnai Valley. The difficulties of construction encountered in both cases were very great, but were triumphantly overcome by the engineers. Beyond Bostan, where the two railway routes re-unite, a single line runs through a tunnel (completed since Lord Dufferin's time) to Chaman, our frontier post. This line may be said in a measure to balance

on the south, the Kushkh railway of the Russians in the north, the objective point of which is of course Herat. Between these two lines, which project towards the ancient highway passing through Candahar, lies the mass of the dominions of the Amir, where no railways are permissible. How long these adjuncts to civilisation will be excluded from Afghanistan it is impossible at present to predict, but it may safely be said that until Great Britain has virtual control of her protectorate there, railway lines in Afghanistan might easily prove an occasion of anxiety rather than a blessing.

There was steady progress made with irrigation works at an aunual expenditure of about Rx. 1,000,000, during the four years of the Viceroyalty. The work consisted mainly in prosecuting undertakings already commenced, and the Swat River, Betwa and Gokak Canals and part of the Chenab Canal were opened. The Periyar project was also set on foot, this being an attempt to intercept and divert the waters on the western side of the Ghauts, where the rainfall is copious and secure (about one hundred and twenty inches per annum), to the drier regions of the east, where it is scanty and uncertain. A masonry dam 155 feet high, and 1,300 feet in length was to impound a large lake on the west, from which the water would be drawn off by a tunnel one and a quarter miles in length, into the basin of the Vaigai River on the eastern side. The area to be irrigated was estimated at one hundred

and forty thousand acres, and the total cost of the project at fifty-four and a half lakhs of rupees.[1]

On the whole Indian irrigation works give a fair return for the capital invested at the present day, while indirectly, of course, they bring additional revenue to the Government, and confer enormous benefit on the population.

The chief ports of the country also received much attention from Government. The policy has been to constitute Port Trusts, and these on the whole, have worked well. It is interesting, however, while the problem of the Port of London is occupying so much attention, to take note of Indian experience which proves that the Port Trusts have one grave defect: they are unable to raise capital on their own guarantee at a moderate rate of interest. Consequently, the Indian Government deemed it to be their interest to come to the rescue and give financial assistance to the Port Trusts of Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi, and Rangoon. In England the Government has not yet been educated up to this enlightened attitude.

Since the assumption of the Government of

[1] The Periyar project was eventually opened by Lord Wenlock on October 10th, 1895. As for the financial results of this great engineering enterprise it is too early even yet (1903) to speak definitely and precisely. But from Mr. A. T. Mackenzie's exhaustive work ("History of the Periyar project": Madras, 1899), we learn that there is no doubt whatever as to its great utility to the country. Madura had suffered long from drought and scarcity and many attendant evils, and the mere fact of pouring such vast stores of water down the bed of the Vaigai and through the distribution canals, has proved of incalculable benefit to the wells, the cattle, the crops, the pasture, and the fish, to say nothing of rendering a considerable population secure from want.

India by the Crown, there has been a marked spread of English education and sentiment among the natives of India. Sir Donald Wallace truly remarks that a great problem of the future is to prevent this class becoming a danger to our rule, and to convert it into an instrument for strengthening rather than weakening the Government. Coming, as he did, immediately after Lord Ripon, Lord Dufferin had a delicate function to fulfil. Soon after his arrival in India, he made the following remarks in a reply to the Corporation of Calcutta :

In alluding to the subject of local self-government, and to the exceptional impulse it has received under the benign auspices of Lord Ripon, you have touched upon a matter which has already attracted my attention. If there is one principle more inherent than another in the system of our Indian administration, it is that of continuity. Nothing has struck me more than the loyal and persistent manner in which successive Viceroys, no matter what part they may have played in the strife of party politics at home, have used their utmost endeavours to bring to a successful issue whatever projects their predecessors may have conceived for the benefit of the people. It is by adherence to this principle that we have built up in this country the majestic fabric of our Government, and it is needless for me to assure you that I shall not fail to follow a line of conduct consecrated by the example of Cornwallis, Bentinck, Canning, Mayo, and those who followed them. The Marquis of Ripon and his predecessors have prepared the soil, delved and planted. It will be my more humble duty to watch, water, prune and train, but it may not be out of place for me to remind you that the further development of the principle of Local Self-Government rests very much in your own hands. It is by an intelligent

discharge of your duties, by a conscientious care of the public purse by purity of administration, by the vigorous and economical promotion of whatsoever operations come within your sphere, that you will vindicate your title to enjoy the privileges conferred upon you.

This was the principle unswervingly borne in mind by Lord Dufferin. He also strongly commended the cause of sanitation to the local authorities, and to further this a Resolution of the Government of India of July 29th, 1888, was issued. The main effect of this was to assist local sanitary agencies by appointing in each Province a Sanitary Board acting in concert with the Chief Sanitary Commissioner.

The question of increasing the native element in the civil administration both Imperial and Provincial received very careful consideration. The so-called Statutory Civil Service initiated in Lord Lytton's time had not answered very well, the system of nomination being regarded somewhat in the light of favouritism, and Lord Dufferin arrived at the conclusion that a thorough and public investigation of the whole question of native grievances with regard to the constitution of the Civil Service, was necessary. This was sanctioned by the Secretary of State, and on October 4th, 1886, a commission of fifteen members under the presidency of Sir Charles Aitchison, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, was appointed. It included five covenanted civilians, six native